,,analysis ,,of ,,the ,,phenomena ,,of ,,the ,,human ,,mind ,,by ,,james ,,mill ,,with ,,notes ,,illustrative ,,and ,,critical ,,by ,,alexander ,,bain ,,andrew ,,findlater ,,and ,,george ,,grote ,,edited ,,with ,,additional ,,notes ,,by ,,john ,,stuart ,,mill ,,in ,,two ,,volumes ,,vol4 ,i4 ,,second ,,edition ,,london ,,longmans1 ,,green1 ,,reader1 ,,and ,,dyer4 #ahgh ,in order to prepare the way for a just and comprehensive system of ,logic1 a previous survey of our nature1 considered as a great whole1 is an indispensable requisite4--,philosophical ,essays 7,prelim4 ,dissert47 p4 lxvii4 by ,dugald ,stewart1 ,esq4 ,would not ,education be necessarily rendered more systematical and enlightened1 if the powers and faculties on which it operates were more scientifically examined1 and better understood8 ,ibid4 p4 xlviii4 ,right of ,translation reserved4 ,,preface ,,to ,,the ,,present ,,edition4 ,,in the study of ,nature1 either mental or physical1 the aim of the scientific enquirer is to diminish as much as possible the catalogue of ultimate truths4 ,when1 without doing violence to facts1 he is able to bring one phenomenon within the laws of another2 when he can shew that a fact or agency1 which seemed to be original and distinct1 could have been produced by other known facts and agencies1 acting according to their own laws2 the enquirer who has arrived at this result1 considers himself to have made an important advance in the knowledge of nature1 and to have brought science1 in that department1 a step nearer to perfection4 ,other accessions to science1 however important practically1 are1 in a scientific point of view1 mere additions to the materials3 this is something done towards perfecting the structure itself4 ,the manner in which this scientific improvement takes place is by the resolution of phenomena which vi are special and complex into others more general and simple4 ,two cases of this sort may be roughly distinguished1 though the distinction between them will not be found on accurate examination to be fundamental4 ,in one case it is the order of the phenomena that is analysed and simplified2 in the other it is the phenomena themselves4 ,when the observed facts relating to the weight of terrestrial objects1 and those relating to the motion of the heavenly bodies1 were found to conform to one and the same law1 that of the gravitation of every particle of matter to every other particle with a force varying as the inverse square of the distance1 this was an example of the first kind4 ,the order of the phenomena was resolved into a more general law4 ,a great number of the successions which take place in the material world were shewn to be particular cases of a law of causation pervading all ,nature4 ,the other class of investigations are those which deal1 not with the successions of phenomena1 but with the complex phenomena themselves1 and disclose to us that the very fact which we are studying is made up of simpler facts3 as when the substance ,water was found to be an actual compound of two other bodies1 hydrogen and oxygen2 substances very unlike itself1 but both actually present in every one of its particles4 ,by processes like those employed in this case1 all the variety of substances which meet our senses and compose the planet on which we live1 have been shewn to be vii constituted by the intimate union1 in a certain number of fixed proportions1 of some two or more of sixty or seventy bodies1 called ,elements or ,simple ,substances1 by which is only meant that they have not hitherto been found capable of further decomposition4 ,this last process is known by the name of chemical analysis3 but the first mentioned1 of which the ,newtonian generalization is the most perfect type1 is no less analytical4 ,the difference is1 that the one analyses substances into simpler substances2 the other1 laws into simpler laws4 ,the one is partly a physical operation2 the other is wholly intellectual4 ,both these processes are as largely applicable1 and as much required1 in the investigation of mental phenomena as of material4 ,and in the one case as in the other1 the advance of scientific knowledge may be measured by the progress made in resolving complex facts into simpler ones4 ,the phenomena of the ,mind include multitudes of facts1 of an extraordinary degree of complexity4 ,by observing them one at a time with sufficient care1 it is possible in the mental1 as it is in the material world1 to obtain empirical generalizations of limited compass1 but of great value for practice4 ,when1 however1 we find it possible to connect many of these detached generalizations together1 by discovering the more general laws of which they are cases1 and to the operation of which in some particular sets of viii circumstances they are due1 we gain not only a scientific1 but a practical advantage2 for we then first learn how far we can rely on the more limited generalizations2 within what conditions their truth is confined2 by what changes of circumstances they would be defeated or modified4 ,not only is the order in which the more complex mental phenomena follow or accompany one another1 reducible1 by an analysis similar in kind to the ,newtonian1 to a comparatively small number of laws of succession among simpler facts1 connected as cause and effect2 but the phenomena themselves can mostly be shewn1 by an analysis resembling those of chemistry1 to be made up of simpler phenomena4 ,in the mind of man1 says ,dr4 ,thomas ,brown1 in one of his ,introductory ,lectures1 all is in a state of constant and ever-varying complexity1 and a single sentiment may be the slow result of innumerable feelings4 ,there is not a single pleasure1 or pain1 or thought1 or emotion1 that may not1 by the influence of that associating principle which is afterwards to come under our consideration1 be so connected with other pleasures1 or pains1 or thoughts1 or emotions1 as to form with them1 for ever after1 an union the most intimate4 ,the complex1 or seemingly complex1 phenomena of thought1 which result from the constant operation of this principle of the mind1 it is the labour of the intellectual inquirer to analyse1 as ix it is the labour of the chemist to reduce the compound bodies on which he operates1 however close and intimate their combination may be1 to their constituent elements4444 ,from the very instant of its first existence1 the mind is constantly exhibiting phenomena more and more complex3 sensations1 thoughts1 emotions1 all mingling together1 and almost every feeling modifying1 in some greater or less degree1 the feelings that succeed it2 and as1 in chemistry1 it often happens that the qualities of the separate ingredients of a compound body are not recognizable by us in the apparently different qualities of the compound itself1--so in this spontaneous chemistry of the mind1 the compound sentiment that results from the association of former feelings has1 in many cases1 on first consideration1 so little resemblance to these constituents of it1 as formerly existing in their elementary state1 that it requires the most attentive reflection to separate1 and evolve distinctly to others1 the assemblages which even a few years may have produced4 ,it is1 therefore1 scarcely possible to advance even a single step1 in intellectual physics1 without the necessity of performing some sort of analysis1 by which we reduce to simpler elements some complex feeling that seems to us virtually to involve them4 ,these explanations define and characterize the task which was proposed to himself by the author of the x present treatise1 and which he concisely expressed by naming his work an ,analysis of the ,phenomena of the ,human ,mind4 ,it is an attempt to reach the simplest elements which by their combination generate the manifold complexity of our mental states1 and to assign the laws of those elements1 and the elementary laws of their combination1 from which laws1 the subordinate ones which govern the compound states are consequences and corollaries4 ,the conception of the problem did not1 of course1 originate with the author2 he merely applied to mental science the idea of scientific inquiry which had been matured by the successful pursuit1 for many generations1 of the knowledge of external nature4 ,even in the particular path by which he endeavoured to reach the end1 he had eminent precursors4 ,the analytic study of the facts of the human mind began with ,aristotle2 it was first carried to a considerable height by ,hobbes and ,locke1 who are the real founders of that view of the ,mind which regards the greater part of its intellectual structure as having been built up by ,experience4 ,these three philosophers have all left their names identified with the great fundamental law of ,association of ,ideas2 yet none of them saw far enough to perceive that it is through this law that ,experience operates in moulding our thoughts and forming our thinking powers4 ,dr4 ,hartley was the man of genius who first clearly xi discerned that this is the key to the explanation of the more complex mental phenomena1 though he1 too1 was indebted for the original conjecture to another wise forgotten thinker1 ,mr4 ,gay4 ,dr4 ,hartley's treatise 7,observations on ,man7 goes over the whole field of the mental phenomena1 both intellectual and emotional1 and points out the way in which1 as he thinks1 sensations1 ideas of sensation1 and association1 generate and account for the principal complications of our mental nature4 ,if this doctrine is destined to be accepted as1 in the main1 the true theory of the ,mind1 to ,hartley will always belong the glory of having originated it4 ,but his book made scarcely any impression upon the thought of his age4 ,he incumbered his theory of ,association with a premature hypothesis respecting the physical mechanism of sensation and thought2 and even had he not done so1 his mode of exposition was little calculated to make any converts but such as were capable of working out the system for themselves from a few hints4 ,his book is made up of hints rather than of proofs4 ,it is like the production of a thinker who has carried his doctrines so long in his mind without communicating them1 that he has become accustomed to leap over many of the intermediate links necessary for enabling other persons to reach his conclusions1 and who1 when at last he sits down to write1 is unable to recover them4 ,it was another great disadvantage to ,hartley's theory1 that its xii publication so nearly coincided with the commencement of the reaction against the ,experience psychology1 provoked by the hardy scepticism of ,hume4 ,from these various causes1 though the philosophy of ,hartley never died out1 having been kept alive by ,priestley1 the elder ,darwin1 and their pupils1 it was generally neglected1 until at length the author of the present work gave it an importance that it can never again lose4 ,one distinguished thinker1 ,dr4 ,thomas ,brown1 regarded some of the mental phenomena from a point of view similar to ,hartley's1 and all that he did for psychology was in this direction2 but he had read ,hartley's work either very superficially1 or not at all3 he seems to have derived nothing from it1 and though he made some successful analyses of mental phenomena by means of the laws of association1 he rejected1 or ignored1 the more searching applications of those laws2 resting content1 when he arrived at the more difficult problems1 with mere verbal generalizations1 such as his futile explanations by what he termed relative suggestion4 ,brown's psychology was no outcome of ,hartley's2 it must be classed as an original but feebler effort in a somewhat similar direction4 ,it is to the author of the present volumes that the honour belongs of being the reviver and second founder of the ,association psychology4 ,great as is this merit1 it was but one among many services which he rendered to his generation and to mankind4 ,when xiii the literary and philosophical history of this century comes to be written as it deserves to be1 very few are the names figuring in it to whom as high a place will be awarded as to ,james ,mill4 ,in the vigour and penetration of his intellect he has had few superiors in the history of thought3 in the wide compass of the human interests which he cared for and served1 he was almost equally remarkable3 and the energy and determination of his character1 giving effect to as single-minded an ardour for the improvement of mankind and of human life as ,i believe has ever existed1 make his life a memorable example4 ,all his work as a thinker was devoted to the service of mankind1 either by the direct improvement of their beliefs and sentiments1 or by warring against the various influences which he regarded as obstacles to their progress3 and while he put as much conscientious thought and labour into everything he did1 as if he had never done anything else1 the subjects on which he wrote took as wide a range as if he had written without any labour at all4 ,that the same man should have been the author of the ,history of ,india and of the present treatise1 is of itself sufficiently significant4 ,the former of those works1 which by most men would have been thought a sufficient achievement for a whole literary life1 may be said without exaggeration to have been the commencement of rational thinking on the subject of ,india3 and by that1 and his subsequent xiv labours as an administrator of ,indian interests under the ,east ,india ,company1 he effected a great amount of good1 and laid the foundation of much more1 to the many millions of ,asiatics for whose bad or good government his country is responsible4 ,the same great work is full of far-reaching ideas on the practical interests of the world2 and while forming an important chapter in the history and philosophy of civilization 7a subject which had not then been so scientifically studied as it has been since7 it is one of the most valuable contributions yet made even to the ,english history of the period it embraces4 ,if1 in addition to the ,history and to the present treatise1 all the author's minor writings were collected2 the outline treatises on nearly all the great branches of moral and political science which he drew up for the ,supplement to the ,encyclopdia ,britannica1 and his countless contributions to many periodical works2 although advanced thinkers have outgrown some of his opinions1 and include1 on many subjects1 in their speculations1 a wider range of considerations than his1 every one would be astonished at the variety of his topics1 and the abundance of the knowledge he exhibited respecting them all4 ,one of his minor services was1 that he was the first to put together in a compact and systematic form1 and in a manner1 adapted to learners1 the principles of ,political ,economy as renovated by the genius of ,ricardo3 whose great xv work1 it may be mentioned by the way1 would probably never have seen the light1 if his intimate and attached friend ,mr4 ,mill had not encouraged and urged him1 first to commit to paper his profound thoughts1 and afterwards to send them forth to the world4 ,many other cases might be mentioned in which ,mr4 ,mill's private and personal influence was a means of doing good1 hardly inferior to his public exertions4 ,though1 like all who value their time for higher purposes1 he went little into what is called society1 he helped1 encouraged1 and not seldom prompted1 many of the men who were most useful in their generation3 from his obscure privacy he was during many years of his life the soul of what is now called the advanced ,liberal party2 and such was the effect of his conversation1 and of the tone of his character1 on those who were within reach of its influence1 that many1 then young1 who have since made themselves honoured in the world by a valuable career1 look back to their intercourse with him as having had a considerable share in deciding their course through life4 ,the most distinguished of them all1 ,mr4 ,grote1 has put on record1 in a recent publication1 his sense of these obligations1 in terms equally honourable to both4 ,as a converser1 ,mr4 ,mill has had few equals2 as an argumentative converser1 in modern tunes probably none4 ,all his mental resources seemed to be at his command at any moment1 and were then freely xvi employed in removing difficulties which in his writings for the public he often did not think it worth while to notice4 ,to a logical acumen which has always been acknowledged1 he united a clear appreciation of the practical side of things1 for which he did not always receive credit from those who had no personal knowledge of him1 but which made a deep impression on those who were acquainted with the official correspondence of the ,east ,india ,company conducted by him4 ,the moral qualities which shone in his conversation were1 if possible1 more valuable to those who had the privilege of sharing it1 than even the intellectual4 ,they were precisely such as young men of cultivated intellect1 with good aspirations but a character not yet thoroughly formed1 are likely to derive most benefit from4 ,a deeply rooted trust in the general progress of the human race1 joined with a good sense which made him never build unreasonable or exaggerated hopes on any one event or contingency2 an habitual estimate of men according to their real worth as sources of good to their fellow-creatures1 and an unaffected contempt for the weaknesses or temptations that divert them from that object1 making those with whom he conversed feel how painful it would be to them to be counted by him among such backsliders2 a sustained earnestness1 in which neither vanity nor personal ambition had any part1 and which spread from him by a sympathetic contagion to those xvii who had sufficient moral preparation to value and seek the opportunity2 this was the mixture of qualities which made his conversation almost unrivalled in its salutary moral effect4 ,he has been accused of asperity1 and there was asperity in some few of his writings2 but no party spirit1 personal rivalry1 or wounded amour-propre ever stirred it up4 ,even when he had received direct personal offence1 he was the most placable of men4 ,the bitterest and ablest attack ever publicly made on him was that which was the immediate cause of the introduction of ,mr4 ,macaulay into public life4 ,he felt it keenly at the time1 but with a quite impersonal feeling1 as he would have felt any thing that he thought unjustly said against any opinion or cause which was dear to him2 and within a very few years afterwards he was on terms of personal friendship with its author1 as ,lord ,macaulay himself1 in a very creditable passage of the preface to his collected ,essays1 has1 in feeling terms1 commemorated4 ,at an early period of ,mr4 ,mill's philosophical life1 ,hartley's work had taken a strong hold of his mind2 and in the maturity of his powers he formed and executed the purpose of following up ,hartley's leading thought1 and completing what that thinker had begun4 ,the result was the present work1 which is not only an immense advance on ,hartley's in the qualities which facilitate the access of recondite xviii thoughts to minds to which they are new1 but attains an elevation far beyond ,hartley's in the thoughts themselves4 ,compared with it1 ,hartley's is little more than a sketch1 though an eminently suggestive one3 often rather showing where to seek for the explanation of the more complex mental phenomena1 than actually explaining them4 ,the present treatise makes clear1 much that ,hartley left obscure3 it possesses the great secret for clearness1 though a secret commonly neglected--it bestows an extra amount of explanation and exemplification on the most elementary parts4 ,it analyses many important mental phenomena which ,hartley passed over1 and analyses more completely and satisfactorily most of those of which he commenced the analysis4 ,in particular1 the author was the first who fully understood and expounded 7though the germs of this as of all the rest of the theory are in ,hartley7 the remarkable case of ,inseparable ,association3 and inasmuch as many of the more difficult analyses of the mental phenomena can only be performed by the aid of that doctrine1 much had been left for him to analyse4 ,i am far from thinking that the more recondite specimens of analysis in this work are always successful1 or that the author has not left something to be corrected as well as much to be completed by his successors4 ,the completion has been especially the work of two distinguished thinkers in the present xix generation1 ,professor ,bain and ,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer2 in the writings of both of whom1 the ,association ,psychology has reached a still higher development4 ,the former of these has favoured me with his invaluable collaboration in annotating the present work4 ,in the annotations it has been our object not only to illustrate and enforce1 but to criticise1 where criticism seemed called for4 ,what there is in the work that seems to need correction1 arises chiefly from two causes4 ,first1 the imperfection of physiological science at the time at which it was written1 and the much greater knowledge since acquired of the functions of our nervous organism and their relations with the mental operations4 ,secondly1 an opening was made for some mistakes1 and occasional insufficiency of analysis1 by a mental quality which the author exhibits not unfrequently in his speculations1 though as a practical thinker both on public and on private matters it was quite otherwise2 a certain impatience of detail4 ,the bent of his mind was towards that1 in which also his greatest strength lay2 in seizing the larger features of a subject--the commanding laws which govern and connect many phenomena4 ,having reached these1 he sometimes gives himself up to the current of thoughts which those comprehensive laws suggest1 not stopping to guard himself carefully in the minuti of their application1 nor devoting much of his thoughts to anticipating all the objections that xx could be made1 though the necessity of replying to some of them might have led him to detect imperfections in his analyses4 ,from this cause 7as it appears to me71 he has occasionally gone further in the pursuit of simplification1 and in the reduction of the more recondite mental phenomena to the more elementary1 than ,i am able to follow him2 and has left some of his opinions open to objections1 which he has not afforded the means of answering4 ,when this appeared to ,mr4 ,bain or myself to be the case1 we have made such attempts as we were able to place the matter in a clearer light2 and one or other1 or both1 have supplied what our own investigations or those of others have provided1 towards correcting any shortcomings in the theory4 ,mr4 ,findlater1 of ,edinburgh1 ,editor of ,chambers' ,cyclopdia1 has kindly communicated1 from the rich stores of his philological knowledge1 the corrections required by the somewhat obsolete philology which the author had borrowed from ,horne ,tooke4 ,for the rectification of an erroneous statement respecting the relation of the ,aristotelian doctrine of ,general ,ideas to the ,platonic1 and for some other contributions in which historical is combined with philosophical interest1 ,i am indebted to the illustrious historian of ,greece and of the ,greek philosophy4 ,mr4 ,grote's1 ,mr4 ,bain's and ,mr4 ,findlater's notes are distinguished by their initials2 my own1 as those of the ,editor4 xxi ,the question presented itself1 whether the annotations would be most useful1 collected at the end of the work1 or appended to the chapters or passages to which they more particularly relate4 ,either plan has its recommendations1 but those of the course which ,i have adopted seemed to me on the whole to preponderate4 ,the reader can1 if he thinks fit1 7and1 if he is a real student1 ,i venture to recommend that he should do so7 combine the advantages of both modes1 by giving a first careful reading to the book itself1 or at all events to every successive chapter of the book1 without paying any attention to the annotations4 ,no other mode of proceeding will give perfectly fair play to the author1 whose thoughts will in this manner have as full an opportunity of impressing themselves on the mind1 without having their consecutiveness broken in upon by any other person's thoughts1 as they would have had if simply republished without comment4 ,when the student has done all he can with the author's own exposition--has possessed himself of the ideas1 and felt1 perhaps1 some of the difficulties1 he will be in a better position for profiting by any aid that the notes may afford1 and will be in less danger of accepting1 without due examination1 the opinion of the last comer as the best4 ,,contents ,,of ,,the ,,first ,,volume4 99 99 99 99 99 ,,page ,,introduction #a ,,chapter ,i4 ,sensation #b ,,section #a4 ,smell #g #b4 ,hearing #af #c4 ,sight #ba #d4 ,taste #be #e4 ,touch #bh #f4 ,sensations of ,disorganization1 or of the ,approach to ,disorganization1 in any part of the ,body #cg #g4 ,muscular ,sensations1 or those ,feelings which accompany the ,action of the ,muscles #dj #h4 ,sensations in the ,alimentary ,canal #de ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,ideas #ea ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,the ,association of ,ideas #gj ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,naming #abg ,,section #a4 ,nouns ,substantive #acd #b4 ,nouns ,adjective #add #c4 ,verbs #aea #d4 ,predication #aei xxiv ,,section #e4 ,pronouns #aid #f4 ,adverbs #aii #g4 ,prepositions #bja #h4 ,conjunctions #bab ,,chapter ,v4 ,consciousness #bbc ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,conception #bcc ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,imagination #bch ,,chapter ,,viii4 ,classification #bdg ,,chapter ,,ix4 ,abstraction #bid ,,chapter ,x4 ,memory #cah ,,chapter ,,xi4 ,belief #cda ,,chapter ,,xii4 ,ratiocination #dbd ,,chapter ,,xiii4 ,evidence #dbh 99 99 99 99 99 ,,appendix #ddj ,,contents ,,of ,,the ,,second ,,volume4 99 99 99 99 99 ,,chapter ,,xiv4 ,,page ,some ,names which require a particular ,explanation #a ,,section #a4 ,names of ,names #c #b4 ,relative ,terms #f ,abstract ,relative ,terms #gb #c4 ,numbers #hi #d4 ,privative ,terms #ii #e4 ,time #aaf #f4 ,motion #adb #g4 ,identity #afd ,,chapter ,,xv4 ,reflection #agf ,,chapter ,,xvi4 ,the ,distinction between the ,intellectual and ,active ,powers of the ,human ,mind #aha ,,chapter ,,xvii4 ,pleasurable and ,painful ,sensations #ahd ,,chapter ,,xviii4 ,causes of the ,pleasurable and ,painful ,sensations #ahg ,,chapter ,,xix4 ,ideas of the ,pleasurable and ,painful ,sensations1 and of the ,causes of them #ahi ,,chapter ,,xx4 ,the ,pleasurable and ,painful ,sensations1 contemplated as passed1 or future #aif vi ,,chapter ,,xxi4 ,the ,causes of ,pleasurable and ,painful ,sensations1 contemplated as passed1 or future #bja ,,section #a4 ,the immediate ,causes of ,pleasurable and ,painful ,sensations1 contemplated as passed1 or as future #bja #b4 ,the ,remote ,causes of ,pleasurable and ,painful ,sensations contemplated as passed1 or future #bjf ,,sub-,,sect4 #a4 ,wealth1 ,power1 and ,dignity1 and their ,contraries1 contemplated as ,causes of our ,pleasures and ,pains #bjg #b4 ,our ,fellow-,creatures contemplated as ,causes of our ,pleasures and ,pains #bad #a4--;,friendship #baf #b4--,kindness #baf #c4--;,family #bah #d4--;,country #bbf #e4--,party2 ,class #bbg #f4--,mankind #bbi #c4 ,the ,objects called ,sublime and ,beautiful1 and their ,contraries1 contemplated as ,causes of our ,pleasures and ,pains #bcj ,,chapter ,,xxii4 ,motives #bef ,,section #a4 ,pleasurable or ,painful ,states1 contemplated as the ,consequents of our own ,acts #bef #b4 ,causes of our ,pleasurable and ,painful ,states1 contemplated as the ,consequents of our own ,acts #bfe ,,chapter ,,xxiii4 ,the ,acts of our ,fellow-creatures1 which are ,causes of our ,pains and ,pleasures1 contemplated as ,consequents of our own ,acts #bhj ,,chapter ,,xxiv4 ,the ,will #cbg ,,chapter ,,xxv4 ,intention 99#cif ,,analysis ,,etc4 99 99 99 99 99 ,,introduction ,i shall inquire into the original of those ideas1 notions1 or whatever else you please to call them1 which a man observes and is conscious to himself he has in his mind2 and the ways whereby the understanding comes to be furnished with them4 ,locke1 i4 #a1 #c4 ,,philosophical inquiries into the human mind have for their main1 and ultimate object1 the exposition of its more complex phenomena4 ,it is necessary1 however1 that the simple should be premised2 because they are the elements of which the complex are formed2 and because a distinct knowledge of the elements is indispensable to an accurate conception of that which is compounded of them4 ,the feelings which we have through the external senses are the most simple1 at least the most familiar1 of the mental phenomena4 ,hence the propriety of commencing with this class of our feelings4 #b ,,chapter ,i4 ,,sensation4 ,i shall not at present meddle with the physical consideration of the mind1 or trouble myself to examine wherein its essence consists2 or by what motions of our spirits1 or alterations of our bodies1 we come to have any ,sensation by our organs1 or any ,ideas in our understandings2 and whether those ideas do in their formation1 any or all of them1 depend on matter or no4 ,these are speculations which1 however curious and entertaining1 ,i shall decline1 as lying out of my way in the design ,i am now upon4--,locke1 i4 #a1 #b4 ,,my object1 in what ,i shall say respecting the phenomena classed under the head of ,,sensation1 is1 to lead such of my readers as are new to this species of inquiry to conceive the feelings distinctly4 ,all men are familiar with them2 but this very familiarity1 as the mind runs easily from one well known object to another1 is a reason why the boundary between them and other feelings is not always observed4 ,it is necessary1 therefore1 that the learner should by practice acquire the habit of reflecting upon his ,sensations1 as a distinct class of feelings2 and should be hence prepared to mark well the distinction between them and other states of mind1 when he #c advances to the analysis of the more mysterious phenomena4 ,what we commonly mean1 when we use the terms ,sensation or phenomena of ,sensation1 are the feelings which we have by the five senses1--,,smell1 ,,taste1 ,,hearing1 ,,touch1 and ,,sight4 ,these are the feelings from which we derive our notions of what we denominate the external world2--the things by which we are surrounded3 that is1 the antecedents of the most interesting consequents1 in the whole series of feelings1 which constitute our mental train1 or existence4 ,the feelings1 however1 which belong to the five external ,senses are not a full enumeration of the feelings which it seems proper to rank under the head of ,sensations1 and which must be considered as bearing an important part in those complicated phenomena1 which it is our principal business1 in this inquiry1 to separate into their principal elements1 and explain4 ,of these unnamed1 and generally unregarded1 ,sensations1 two principal classes may be distinguished3--first1 ,those which accompany the action of the several muscles of the body2 and1 secondly1 ,those which have their place in the ,alimentary ,canal4#a ,bain's footnote #a3 ,important points of ,psychology are raised in classifying the senses1 and in assigning the order of their exposition4 ,the author justly animadverts on the insufficiency of the common enumeration of the ,five ,senses1 and indicates two grand omissions--the ,muscular ,sensibilities1 and the feelings associated with ,digestion4 ,with regard to the first omission--the ,muscular ,feelings1--a further advance has been found requisite4 ,instead of adding these to the list1 as a sixth sense1 they are made a genus apart #d and put in contrast to the ,sensations as commonly understood4 ,they are the feelings of our ,,activity1 of the ,active side of our nature1 and are in relation to the ,motor or ,outcarrying nerves of the body4 ,the ,sensations proper1 such as ,smell and ,hearing1 are the feelings of our ,,receptivity1 or ,passivity1 and arise in connection with the ,sentient1 or ,incarrying nerves4 ,in the exercise of the senses1 however1 a muscular element is almost always combined4 ,this is conspicuous in ,touch1 which is most frequently accompanied with movements of the hand1 or other parts touched2 it is also the case with ,sight1 there being six muscles constantly engaged in moving the eye-ball4 ,there is least muscularity in ,hearing and ,smell1 but in neither is it wholly absent4 ,thus in ,hearing1 there are certain small muscles for adjusting the tightness of the membrane of the tympanum2 apart from which1 there are movements of the head in conjunction with hearing4 ,so in ,smell2 the sniffing action with the breath is muscular4 ,nevertheless1 it is easy to separate1 in all the senses1 the passive and proper sensibility of the sense1 7called by ,hamilton the idiopathic sensibility7 from the active accompaniment4 ,we can make experiments upon passive touch1 or pure contact2 we can isolate in our consciousness the optical sensibility of the eye2 we can eliminate activity from the ear2 and we can attend to the sensations of smell in their pure passivity4 ,the best course of proceeding is to deal with ,muscularity apart1 in the first instance1 and to give it the priority in the order of exposition4 ,chronologically it is an earlier fact of our being2 we move before we feel2 there is an inborn energy of action in the animal system1 which goes out1 as it were1 and meets the objects of sensation4 ,this is one reason of priority4 ,another is the fact just stated that movement accompanies all the senses1 or is a common factor in sensation4 ,to discuss its peculiar sensibility is thus a preparation for treating of the senses4 ,the importance of drawing a broad line between the active and the passive branches of our primary sensibilities is seen in various applications1 but most especially in the problem of #e ,external ,perception4 ,the great distinction that this problem requires us to draw between the external and the internal sides of our being 7so described by an imperfect metaphor7 has its deepest foundation in the distinction between the sense of expended muscular energy and the feelings that are neither energy in themselves1 nor vary definitely according to our energies4 ,the qualities of things admitted on all hands to be qualities of the external 7or object7 world--called the ,primary ,qualities1 ,resistance and ,extension1--are modes of our muscular energies2 the qualities that do not of themselves suggest externality1 or objectivity1--the secondary qualities1 as ,heat1 ,colour1 c4--are our passive sensibilities1 and do not contain muscular energy4 ,when these secondary qualities enter into definite connections with our movements1 they are then referred to the external1 or object world4 ,light and colour1 when varying definitely with our various movements1 as postures and actions1 are from that circumstance referred to the external1 or non-ego2 without such connections they would be called internal or subjective states4 ,the contrasted terms ',object' and ',subject' are the least exceptionable for expressing the fundamental antithesis of consciousness and of existence4 ,matter and ,mind1 ,external and ,internal1 are the popular synonyms1 but are less free from misleading suggestions4 ,extension is the ,object fact by pre-eminence2 ,pleasure and ,pain are the most marked phases of pure ,subjectivity4 ,between the consciousness of extension and the consciousness of a pleasure there is the broadest line that can be drawn within the human experience2 the broadest distinction in the whole universe of being4 ,these then are the ,object and ,subject extremes2 and1 in the final analysis1 the object extreme appears to be grounded on the feeling of expended muscular energy4 ,the second omission alluded to is the ,digestive ,sensibility1 which ought undoubtedly to be included among sensations1 having all the constituents of a sense2 an object--the food2 a sensitive organ--the stomach2 and a characteristic form of sensibility or feeling4 ,the author farther takes notice of #f ',sensations of ,disorganization1 or of the approach to ,disorganization1 in any part of the body1' which too deserve to be reckoned among mental facts4 ,he might farther have adverted to the acute and depressing feelings of the ,lungs1 in case of partial suffocation1 with the exhilaration attending the relief from such a state1 and the change from a close to a fresh atmosphere4 ,moreover1 there are states of purely physical comfort1 associated with a vigorous circulation1 with healthy innervation1 with the proper action of the skin2 and feelings of discomfort and depression from the opposite states4 ,a slight allusion to these various feelings occurs in chapter second towards the close4 ,these various modes of sensibility seem to be fitly grouped together under the common head of ,sensations of ,organic ,life3 their detail being arranged according to the several organs--viz4--the ,alimentary ,canal1 ,lungs1 ,circulation1 ,nervous ,system1 c4 ,these would make a sixth ,sense properly so called1 or a department of passive sensibility4--,b4 #g ,,section ,i4 ,,smell4 ,it is not material to the present purpose in what order we survey the subdivisions of this elementary class of the mental phenomena4 ,it will be convenient to take those first1 which can be most easily thought of by themselves2 that is1 of which a conception1 free from the mixture of any extraneous ingredient1 can be most certainly formed4 ,for this reason we begin with ,,smell4#b ,bain's footnote #b3 ,the order of exposition of the senses is not a matter of indifference4 ,the author1 like ,condillac1 selected ,smell to begin with1 as being a remarkably simple and characteristic feeling2 he has found another expository advantage in it1 by disturbing our routine mode of regarding the intellect as principally made up of sensations of sight4 ,it has a startling effect on the reader1 to suggest a mental life consisting wholly of smells and ideas of smell4 ,there are two principles of arrangement of the senses1 each good for its own purpose2 it being understood that the active or muscular sensibility is taken apart from1 and prior to1 sensation proper4 ,the first is to take them in the order of ,intellectual development4 ,some of the senses are evidently intellectual in a high degree1 as ,sight and ,hearing1 others are intellectual in a much smaller degree1 as ,smell and ,taste4 ,the organic sensations are still less connected with the operations of the intellect4 ,many of the least intellectual sensations are remarkably intense1 as pleasure and pain2 perhaps more so than the intellectually higher class4 ,the organic pains are more unendurable than the worst pains of hearing or of sight1 unless these are assimilated to the other class1 by injury of the organs4 ,the intellectual superiority of the higher senses shows itself in two ways1 the one strictly in the domain of ,intellect1 the other in the domain of ,feeling4 ,as regards ,intellect1 it is shown in the predominance of the ideas of the higher senses4 ,our intellectual or ideal trains1 the materials of thought and knowledge1 are made up most of all of ideas of sight1 next of ideas of hearing1 to a less degree of ideas of touch or skin contact1 and1 least of all1 of ideas of stomach and lung sensations or other organic states4 ,the trains of the scientific man1 of the man of business1 and even of the handicraft worker1 are almost entirely made up of ideas of sight and of hearing 7with active or muscular ideas74 ,our understanding of the order of nature1 our very notion of the material universe1 is a vast and complex scheme of ideas of sight4 ,the intellectual superiority of the higher senses in the domain of ,feeling is connected with the remembrance or ideal persistence of pleasures and pains4 ,the pleasures of ,digestion are weakly and ineffectively remembered1 in the absence of the actuality4 ,the pleasures of ,smell are remembered better4 ,the pleasures and pains of ,hearing and ,sight are remembered best of any4 ,this gives them a higher value in life2 the addition made to the actual1 by the ideal1 is1 in their case1 the greatest of all4 ,they are said1 for this among other reasons1 to be more refined4 ,the arrangement dictated by the gradation of intellectuality would be as follows3--#a4 ,sensations of ,organic ,life4 #b4 ,taste4 #c4 ,smell4 #d4 ,touch4 #e4 ,hearing4 #f4 ,sight4 ,the second principle of arrangement starts with ,touch1 as the most simple in its mode of action1 and the most diffused in its operation4 ,touch consists in mere mechanical pressure on a sensitive surface2 this is the most simple and elementary of all stimuli4 ,the other senses are regarded as specialised modifications of ,touch4 ,in ,hearing1 the mode of action is touch or mechanical contact4 ,in the remaining senses1 the contact is accompanied with other forces4 ,taste and ,smell involve chemical change1 as well as contact4 ,the action of ,light on the eye is probably some species of molecular disturbance involving chemical action4 ,this mode of viewing the order and dependence of the senses belongs more especially to the theory of the development of the organic system1 which is made prominent in the ,psychology of ,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer4 ,the arrangement might be variously expressed3--it might be ,touch1 ,hearing1 ,sight1 ,taste1 ,smell1 ,organic ,sensibility2 or ,touch1 ,hearing1 ,taste1 ,smell1 ,organic ,sensibility1 ,sight4--,b4 #h ,in the ,smell three things are commonly distinguished4 ,there is the ,,organ1 there is the ,,sensation1 and there is the antecedent of the ,sensation1 the #i external ,,object1 as it is commonly denominated1#a99 to which the ,sensation is referred as an effect to its cause4 ,mill's footnote #a3 ,it is necessary here to observe1 that ,i use1 throughout this ,inquiry1 the language most commonly in use4 ,this is attended with its disadvantages2 for on the subject of mind the ordinary language almost always involves more or less of theory1 which may or may not appear to me to correspond with the true exposition of the phenomena4 ,the advantages1 however1 of not departing from familiar terms still appeared to me to preponderate2 and ,i am willing to hope1 that such erroneous suggestions1 as are sometimes inseparable from the language ,i have thought it best upon the whole to employ1 will be corrected1 without any particular notice1 by the analysis which ,i shall present4--7,author's ,note47 ,these three distinguishable particulars are common to all the five ,senses4 ,with regard to the ,,organ1 which is a physical rather than a mental subject of inquiry1 ,i shall have occasion to say little more than is required to make my reader distinguish1 with sufficient accuracy1 the part of his body to which the #aj separate feelings of his five ,senses belong4 ,and with regard to the antecedent of the ,sensation1 or ,,object of the ,senses1 the proper place for explaining what is capable of being known of it is at a subsequent part of this inquiry4 ,my desire at present is1 to fix the attention of the reader upon the ,,sensation2 that he may mark it as a mental state of a particular kind1 distinct from every other feeling of his nature4 ,the ,,organ of ,smell1 as every body knows1 is situated in the mouth and nostrils1 or in the nerves1 appropriated to smelling1 which are found in the passage between the mouth and nostrils1 and in the vicinity of that passage4 ,though it appears to be ascertained that the nerves are necessary to sensation1 it is by no means ascertained in what way they become necessary4 ,it is a mystery how the nerves1 similar in all parts of the body1 afford us1 in one place1 the sensation of sound2 in another1 the sensations of light and colours2 in another1 those of odours1 in another those of flavours1 and tastes1 and so on4 ,with respect to the external ,,object1 as it is usually denominated1 of this particular sense2 in other words1 the antecedent1 of which the ,sensation ,smell is the consequent2 it is1 in vulgar apprehension1 the visible1 tangible object1 from which the odour proceeds4 ,thus1 we are said to smell a rose1 when we have the sensation derived from the odour of the rose4 ,it is more correct language1 however1 to say1 that we smell the odorous particles which proceed from the visible1 tangible object1 than that we smell the object itself2 for1 if any thing prevents the odorous particles1 which the body emits1 from reaching the organ of smell1 the #aa sensation is not obtained4 ,the object of the sense of smelling then are odorous particles1 which only operate1 or produce the sensation1 when they reach the organ of smell4 ,but what is meant by odorous particles we are still in ignorance4 ,something1 neither visible nor tangible1 is conveyed1 through the air1 to the olfactory nerves2 but of this something we know no more than that it is the antecedent of that nervous change1 or variety of consciousness1 which we denote by the word smell4 ,still farther1 ,when we say that the odorous particles1 of which we are thus ignorant1 reach the nerves which constitute the organ of smell1 we attach hardly any meaning to the word reach4 ,we know not whether the particles in question produce their effect1 by contact1 or without contact4 ,as the nerves in every part of the body are covered1 we know not how any external particles can reach them4 ,we know not whether such particles operate upon the nerves1 by their own1 or by any other influence2 the galvanic1 for example1 or electrical1 influence4 ,these observations1 with regard to the organ of smell1 and the object of smell1 are of importance1 chiefly as they show us how imperfect our knowledge still is of all that is merely corporeal in sensation1 and enable us to fix our attention more exclusively upon that which alone is material to our subsequent inquiries--that point of consciousness which we 99denominate the sensation of smell1 the mere feeling1 detached from every thing else4 ,when we smell a rose1 there is a particular feeling1 a particular consciousness1 distinct from all others1 which we mean to denote1 when we call it the smell #ab of the rose4 ,in like manner we speak of the smell of hay1 the smell of turpentine1 and the smell of a fox4 ,we also speak of good smells1 and bad smells2 meaning by the one1 those which are agreeable to us2 by the other1 those which are offensive4 ,in all these cases what we speak of is a point of consciousness1 a thing which we can describe no otherwise than by calling it a feeling2 a part of that series1 that succession1 that flow of something1 on account of which we call ourselves living or sensitive creatures4 ,we can distinguish this feeling1 this consciousness1 the sensation of smell1 from every other sensation4 ,smell and ,sound are two very different things2 so are smell and sight4 ,the smell of a rose is different from the colour of the rose2 it is also different from the smoothness of the rose1 or the sensation we have by touching the rose4 ,we not only distinguish the sensations of smell from those of the other senses1 but we distinguish the sensations of smell from one another4 ,the smell of a rose is one sensation2 the smell of a violet is another4 ,the difference we find between one smell and another is in some cases very great2 between the smell of a rose1 for example1 and that of carrion or assafoetida4 ,the number of distinguishable smells is very great4 ,almost every object in nature has a peculiar smell2 every animal1 every plant1 and almost every mineral4 ,not only have the different classes of objects different smells1 but probably different individuals in the same class4 ,the different smells of different individuals are perceptible1 to a certain extent1 even by the human organs1 and to a much greater extent by those of the #ac dog1 and other animals1 whose sense of smelling is more acute4 ,we can conceive ourselves1 as endowed with smelling1 and not enjoying any other faculty4 ,in that case1 we should have no idea of objects as seeable1 as hearable1 as touchable1 or tasteable4 ,we should have a train of smells2 the smell at one time of the rose1 at another of the violet1 at another of carrion1 and so on4 ,the successive points of consciousness1 composing our sentient being1 would be mere smells4 ,our life would be a train of smells1 and nothing more4 ,smell1 and ,life1 would be two names for the same thing4 ,the terms which our language supplies1 for speaking of this sense1 are exceedingly imperfect4 ,it would obviously be desirable to have1 at any rate1 distinct names for the ,,organ1 for the ,,object1 and for the ,,sensation2 and that these names should never be confounded4 ,it happens1 unfortunately1 that the word ,,smell is applicable to all the three4 ,that the word smell expresses1 both the quality1 as we vulgarly say1 of the object smelt2 and also the feeling of him by whom it is smelt1 every one is aware4 ,if you ask whether the smell1 when ,i hold a violet to my nostrils1 is in me or in the violet1 it would be perfectly proper to say1 in both4 ,the same thing1 however1 is not in both1 though the two things have the same name4 ,what is in me is the sensation1 the feeling1 the point of consciousness2 and that can be in nothing but a sentient being4 ,what is in the rose1 is what ,i call a quality of the rose2 in fact1 the antecedent of my sensation2 of which1 beside its being the antecedent of my sensation1 ,i know nothing4 ,if ,i were speaking of a place in which my senses had been #ad variously affected1 and should say1 that1 along with other pleasures1 ,i had enjoyed a succession of the most delightful smells1 ,i should be understood to speak of my sensations4 ,if ,i were speaking of a number of unknown objects1 and should say of one1 that it had a smell like that of honey2 of another1 that it had a smell like that of garlick2 ,i should be understood as speaking of the object of each sensation1 a quality of the thing smelt4 ,the word smell1 beside denoting the sensation and the object1 denotes also the organ1 in such phrases as the following2 ,sight and ,hearing are two of the inlets of my knowledge1 and ,smell is a third2 ,the faculty by which ,i become sensible of odour is my ,smell4#c ,editor's footnote #c3 ,it may be questioned whether1 in the phrases here cited1 the word ,smell stands for the olfactory organ4 ,it would perhaps be most correct to say1 that in these cases it denotes the abstract capacity of smelling1 rather than the concrete physical instrument4 ,even when smell is said to be one of the five senses1 it may fairly be doubted whether a part of the meaning intended is1 that it is one of the five organs of sensation4 ,nothing more seems to be meant1 than that it is one of five distinguishable modes of having sensations1 whatever the intrinsic difference between those modes may be4 ,in the author's footnote he recognises that the abstract power of smelling enters into this particular application of the word ,smell2 and refers to a subsequent part of the treatise for the meaning of ,power4 ,but he thinks that along with the power1 or as part of the conception of ,power1 the material organ is also signified4 ,it seems to me that the organ does not enter in either of these modes1 into the signification of the word4 ,we can imagine ourselves ignorant that we possess physical organs2 or aware that we possess them1 but not aware that our sensations of smell are connected with them4 ,yet on either of these suppositions the power of smelling would be perfectly intelligible1 and would have the same meaning to us which it has now4--,ed4 #ae ,in the phrases in which smell is called a ,,sense1 as when we say1 that smell is one of the five senses1 there is considerable complexity4 ,the term here imports the organ1 it imports the sensation1 and1 in a certain way1 it imports also the object4 ,it imports the organ as existing continuously1 the sensation as existing only under a certain condition1 and that condition the presence of the object4#b99 ,mill's footnote #b3 ,it will naturally occur to some of my readers1 that1 in the term sense of smelling1 the idea of power is also included4 ,they will say1 that when we speak of the sense of smelling1 we mean not only the organ1 but the function of the organ1 or its power of producing a certain effect4 ,this is undoubtedly true2 but when the real meaning of the language is evolved1 it only amounts to that which is delivered in the text4 ,for what does any person mean when he says that1 in the sense of smelling1 he has the power of smelling8 ,only this1 that he has an organ1 and that when the object of that organ is presented to it1 sensation is the consequence4 ,in all this1 there is nothing but the organ1 the object1 and the sensation1 conceived in a certain order4 ,this will more fully appear when the meaning of the relative terms1 cause and effect1 has been explained4--7,author's ,note47 #af ,,section ,,ii4 ,,hearing4 ,in ,hearing1 the same three particulars1 the ,,organ1 the ,,object1 and the ,,feeling1 require to be distinguished4 ,the name of the organ is the ,ear2 and its nice and complicated structure has been described with minuteness and admiration by anatomists and physiologists4 ,in vulgar discourse1 the object of our ,sense of ,hearing is a sounding body4 ,we say that we hear the bell1 the trumpet1 the cannon4 ,this language1 however1 is not correct4 ,that which precedes the feeling received through the ear1 is the approach of vibrating air to the ear4 ,certain bodies1 made to vibrate in a certain way1 communicate vibrations to the air1 and the vibrating air1 admitted into the ear1 is followed by the sensation of hearing4 ,if the air which the body makes to vibrate does not enter the ear1 however the body itself may vibrate1 sensation does not follow2 hearing does not take place4 ,there is1 in fact1 no sound4 ,of the circumstances in which sound is generated1 part only were present4 ,there was the organ1 and there was the object1 but not that juxta-position which is needed to make the antecedent of the sensation complete4 ,air vibrating in juxta-position to the organ1 is the object of ,hearing4 ,how air in vibration should produce the #ag remarkable effect1 called hearing1 in the nerves of the ear1 and no effect in those of the eye1 in those of smelling1 or those of taste1 our knowledge does not enable us to tell4 ,it is not very difficult to think of the sensation of hearing1 apart from the organ1 and from the object1 as well as from every other feeling4 ,i hear the hum of bees4 ,the feeling to which ,i give this name is a point of my own consciousness2 it is an elementary part of my sensitive being2 of that thread of consciousness1 drawn out in succession1 which ,i call myself4 ,i have the hearing2 it is a sensation of my own2 it is my feeling1 and no other man's feeling2 it is a very different feeling from taste1 and a very different feeling from smell1 and from all my other feelings4 ,i hear the song of birds1 ,i hear the lowing of oxen1 ,i hear the sighing of the wind1 ,i hear the roaring of the sea4 ,i have a feeling1 in each of these cases2 a consciousness1 which ,i can distinguish not only from the feelings of my other senses1 but from the other feelings of the same sense4 ,if ,i am asked1 what takes place in me1 when a trumpet is unexpectedly sounded in the next room1 ,i answer1 a sensation1 a particular feeling4 ,i become conscious in a particular way4 ,the number of those feelings which we are able to distinguish is very great4 ,in this respect1 the organ of hearing in man1 is much more perfect than the organ of smell4 ,the organ of hearing can distinguish1 not only the voices of different classes1 but of different individuals in the same class4 ,there never1 probably1 #ah was a man whose voice was not distinguishable from that of every other man1 by those who were familiarly acquainted with it4 ,the most simple case of sound is that perhaps of a single note on a musical instrument4 ,this note may be sounded on an endless number of instruments1 and by an endless number of human voices1 from no two of which will the same sound exactly be returned4 ,we can think of ourselves as having the feelings of this class1 and having no other4 ,in that case1 our whole being would be a series of ,hearings4 ,it would be one sensation of hearing1 another sensation of hearing1 and nothing more4 ,our thread of consciousness would be the sensation1 which we denominate sound4 ,life and sound would be two names for the same thing4 ,the language by which we speak of the sense of hearing1 is also imperfect4 ,we have1 indeed1 the term ,ear1 to express the ,,organ1 but we have no appropriate name for the ,,sensation1 nor for the ,,object4 ,the term sound is a name both of the sensation and the object4 ,if ,i were asked1 when the bell rings1 whether the sound is in me1 or in the bell1 ,i might answer1 in both2 not that the same thing is in both2 the things are different2 having the same name4 ,the sensation called a sound is in me1 the vibration called a sound is in the bell4 ,hearing is equally ambiguous2 a name both of the organ and the feeling4 ,if asked1 by which of my organs ,i have the knowledge of sound1 ,i should answer1 my hearing4 ,and if asked what feeling it is ,i have by the ear1 ,i still should say1 hearing4 ,hearing is rarely made use of to denote #ai the object of hearing1 and hardly at all except by figure4 ,noise is a name which denotes the object1 in certain cases4 ,there is a certain class of sounds1 to which we give the name noise4 ,in those cases1 however1 noise is also the name of the sensation4 ,in fact1 it is the name of the sensation first1 and only by transference that of the object4 ,in the phrase1 sense of hearing1 the word has the same complexity of meaning1 which we found in the word smelling1 in the corresponding application of that term4 ,when ,i say that ,i have the sense of hearing1 ,i mean to say1 that ,i have an organ1 which organ has an appropriate object2 and that when the organ and the object are in the appropriate position1 the sensation of hearing is the consequent4 ,in the term1 sense of hearing1 then1 is included1 the organ1 the object1 and the sensation1 with the idea of a synchronous order of the two first1 and a successive order of the third4 ,sense of hearing is thus seen to be the name of a very complex idea1 including five distinguishable ingredients1 the idea of the organ of hearing1 the idea of the sensation1 the idea of the object of hearing1 the idea of a synchronous order1 and the idea of a successive order4#d ,editor's footnote #d3 ,in the case of hearing1 as of smell1 one of the ambiguities brought to notice by the author is of questionable reality4 ,it is doubtful if hearing is ever used as a name of the organ4 ,to the question supposed in the text1 by which of my organs do ,i have the knowledge of sound the correct answer would surely be1 not my hearing--an expression which1 so #bj applied1 could only be accepted as elliptical1--but my organ of hearing1 or 7still better7 my ear4 ,again1 the phrase ,i have the sense of hearing signifies that ,i have a capacity of hearing1 and that this capacity is classed as one of sense1 or in other words1 that the feelings to which it has reference belong to the class ,sensations3 but the organ1 though a necessary condition of my having the sensations1 does not seem to be implied in the name4--,ed4 #ba ,,section ,,iii4 ,,sight4 ,in ,,sight1 the organ is very conspicuous1 and has an appropriate name1 the ,eye4 ,in ordinary language1 the object of sight is the body which is said to be seen4 ,this is a similar error to those which we have detected in the vulgar language relating to the senses of smell and hearing4 ,it is ,light alone which enters the eye2 and ,light1 with its numerous modifications1 is the sole object on sight4 ,how the particles of light affect the nerves of the eye1 in the peculiar manner in which they are affected in sight1 without affecting the other nerves of the body1 in any similar manner1 we can render no account4 ,that the feeling we have in sight1 is very different from the feeling we have in hearing1 in smelling1 in tasting1 or touching1 every man knows4 ,it is difficult1 however1 to detach the feeling we have in sight from every other feeling2 because there are other feelings which we are constantly in the habit of connecting with it2 and the passage in the mind from the one to the other is so rapid1 that they run together1 and can not easily be distinguished4 ,the different modifications of light we call colour4 ,but we cannot think of the sensation of colour1 without at the same time #bb thinking of something coloured1 of surface or extension1 a notion derived from another sense4 ,that the feelings of sight which we are capable of distinguishing from one another1 are exceedingly numerous1 is obvious from this1 that it is by them we distinguish the infinite variety of visible objects4 ,we have the sensation2 the sensation suggests the object2 and it is only by the difference of sensation1 that the difference of object can be indicated4 ,some of the things suggested by the sensations of sight1 as extension and figure1 are suggested so instantaneously1 that they appear to be objects of sight1 things actually seen4 ,but this important law of our nature1 by which so many things appear to be seen1 which are only suggested by the feelings of sight1 it requires the knowledge of other elements of the mental phenomena to explain4 ,the imperfections of the language1 by which we have to speak of the phenomena of sight1 deserve the greatest attention4 ,we have an appropriate name for the organ2 it is the ,eye4 ,and we have an appropriate name for the ,object2 it is light4 ,but we have no appropriate name for the ,sensation4 ,from confusion of names1 proceeds confusion of ideas4 ,and from misnaming1 on this one point1 not a little unprofitable discourse on the subject of the human mind has been derived4 ,the word sight1 in certain phrases1 denotes the sensation4 ,if ,i am asked1 what is the feeling which ,i have by the eye8 ,i answer1 sight4 ,but sight is also a name of the object4 ,the light of day is said to be a beautiful sight4 ,and sight is sometimes employed as a name of the organ4 ,an old man informs us1 #bc that his sight is failing1 meaning that his eyes are failing4#e ,editor's footnote #e3 ,the example given does not seem to me to prove that sight is ever employed as a name of the organ4 ,when an old man says that his sight is failing1 he means only that he is less capable of seeing4 ,his eyes might be failing in some other respect1 when he would not say that his sight was failing4 ,the term sense of sight1 like sense of hearing or of smell1 stands1 as it seems to me1 for the capability1 without reference to the organ4--,ed4 ,colour is a name1 as well of the object1 as of the sensation4 ,it is most commonly a name of the object4 ,colour is1 properly speaking1 a modification of light1 though it is never conceived but as something spread over a surface2 it is1 therefore1 not the name of light simply1 but the name of three things united1 light1 surface1 and a certain position of the two4 ,in many cases1 however1 we have no other name for the sensation4 ,if ,i am asked1 what feeling ,i have when a red light is presented to my eyes1 ,i can only say1 the colour of red2 and so of other visual feelings1 the colour of green1 the colour of white1 and so on4 ,in the term sense of sight1 the same complexity of meaning is involved which we have observed in the terms sense of smell1 and sense of hearing4 ,when ,i speak of my sense of sight1 as when ,i speak of the attraction of the load-stone1 ,i mean to denote an antecedent1 and a consequent2 the organ with its object in appropriate position1 the antecedent2 the sensation1 the consequent4 ,this is merely the philosophical statement of the fact1 that1 when light is received into the eye1 the sensation of sight is the consequence4 ,vision1 a word expressive of the phenomena of #bd sight1 is ambiguous in the same manner4 ,it is sometimes used to denote the sense of seeing2 that is1 the antecedent and consequent1 as explained in the preceding paragraph4 ,thus we say1 the phenomena of vision1 with the same propriety as we say the phenomena of sight4 ,it is sometimes employed to denote the sensation4 ,if we ask what feeling a blind man is deprived of1 it would be perfectly proper to say1 vision is the feeling of which he is deprived4 ,it is1 also1 employed to denote the object4 ,what vision was that8 would be a very intelligible question1 on the sudden appearance and disappearance of something which attracted the eye4#f ,editor's footnote #f3 ,vision1 ,i believe1 is used to denote the object of sight1 only when it is supposed that this object is something unreal1 i4e41 that it has not any extended and resisting substance behind it3 or rhetorically1 to signify that the object looks more like a phantom than a reality2 as when ,burke calls ,marie ,antoinette1 as once seen by him1 a delightful vision4--,ed4 #be ,,section ,,iv4 ,,taste4 ,the ,,organ of ,,taste is in the mouth and fauces4 ,in ordinary language1 the ,,object of taste is any thing1 which1 taken into the mouth1 and tasted1 as it is called1 produces the peculiar ,,sensation of this sense4 ,nor has philosophy as yet enabled us to state the object of taste more correctly4 ,there are experiments which show1 that galvanism is concerned in the phenomena1 but not in what way4 ,the ,,sensation1 in this case1 is distinguished by every body4 ,the taste of sugar1 the taste of an apple1 are words which immediately recall the ideas of distinct feelings4 ,it is to be observed1 however1 that the feelings of this sense are very often united with those of the sense of smell2 the two organs being often affected by the same thing1 at the same time4 ,in that case1 though we have two sensations1 they are so intimately blended as to seem but one2 and the flavour of the apple1 the flavour of the wine1 appears to be a simple sensation1 though compounded of taste and smell4#g ,editor's footnote #g3 ,some physiologists have been of opinion that a large proportion of what are classed as tastes1 including all flavours1 as distinguished from the generic tastes of sweet1 sour1 bitter1 c41 are really affections of the nerves of smell1 and are mistaken for tastes only because they are experienced along with tastes1 as a consequence of taking food into the mouth4--,ed4 #bf ,it is not so easy1 in the case of this1 as of some of the other senses1 to conceive ourselves as having this class of feelings and no other4 ,antecedent to the sensation of taste1 there is generally some motion of the mouth1 by which the object and the organ are brought into the proper position and state4 ,the sensation can hardly be thought of without thinking of this motion1 that is1 of other feelings4 ,besides1 the organ of taste is also the organ of another sense4 ,the organ of taste has the sense of touch1 and most objects of taste are objects of touch4 ,sensations of touch1 therefore1 are intimately blended with those of taste4 ,by a little pains1 however1 any one may conceive the sensations of tasting1 while he conceives his other organs to remain in a perfectly inactive state1 and himself as nothing but a passive recipient of one taste after another4 ,if he conceives a mere train of those sensations1 perfectly unmixed with any other feeling1 he will have the conception of a being made up of tastes2 a thread of consciousness1 which maybe called mere taste2 a life which is merely taste4 ,the language employed about this sense is not less faulty1 than that employed about the other senses1 which we have already surveyed4 ,there is no proper name for the organ4 ,the word ,mouth1 which we are often obliged to employ for that purpose1 is the name of this organ and a great deal more4 ,there is no proper name for the object4 ,we are obliged to call it1 that which has taste4 ,the word flavour is used to denote that quality1 which is more peculiarly the object of taste1 in certain articles of food2 and sometimes we borrow the word sapidity1 #bg from the ,latin1 to answer the same purpose more extensively4 ,the word taste is a name for the sensation4 ,we generally call the feeling1 which is the point of consciousness in this case1 by the name taste4 ,thus we say one taste is pleasant1 another unpleasant2 and nothing is pleasant or unpleasant but a feeling4 ,the word taste is also a name for the object1 as when we say1 that any thing has taste4 ,it is further employed as a name of the organ4 ,as we are said to perceive qualities by the eye1 the ear1 and the touch2 so we are said to perceive them by the taste4 ,in the phrase1 sense of taste1 there is the same complexity of meaning as we have observed in the corresponding phrase in the case of the other senses4 ,in this phrase1 taste expresses all the leading particulars2 the organ1 the object1 and the sensation1 together with the order of position in the two first1 and the order of constant sequence in the last4#h ,editor's footnote #h3 ,the statement that taste is sometimes employed as a name of the organ1 seems to me1 like the similar statements respecting the names of our other senses1 disputable4--,ed4 #bh ,,section ,v4 ,,touch4 ,in discoursing about the ,,organ1 the ,,sensations1 and the ,,objects1 of touch1 more vagueness has been admitted1 than in the case of any of the other senses4 ,in fact1 every sensation which could not properly be assigned to any other of the senses1 has been allotted to the touch4 ,the sensations classed1 or rather jumbled together1 under this head1 form a kind of miscellany1 wherein are included feelings totally unlike4 ,the ,,organ of ,,touch is diffused over the whole surface of the body1 and reaches a certain way into the alimentary canal4 ,of food1 as merely tangible1 there is seldom a distinct sensation in the stomach1 or any lower part of the channel1 except towards the extremity4 ,the stomach1 however1 is sensible to heat1 and so is the whole of the alimentary canal1 as far at least as any experiment is capable of being made4 ,it may1 indeed1 be inferred1 that we are insensible to the feelings of touch1 throughout the intestinal canal1 only from the habit of not attending to them4#i ,bain's footnote #i3 ,the surface of the sense of ,touch properly so called is the skin1 or common integument of the body1 the interior of the mouth and the tongue1 and the interior of the nose4 ,there are common anatomical peculiarities in these organs2 which distinguish them from the alimentary canal and all the other interior surfaces of the body4 ,moreover1 although1 in the alimentary canal1 there is solid or liquid contact with a sensitive surface1 the mode of exciting the sensitive nerves1 and the resulting sensibility1 are peculiar and distinct4 ,the mode of action in touch is mechanical contact or pressure1 mainly of solid and resisting bodies2 in digestion1 the nerves are affected through chemical and other processes--solution1 absorption1 assimilation1 c4 ,in touch1 there is the peculiar feeling known as hard contact1 together with the varying discrimination of plurality of points4 ,in digestion1 when healthy1 the feeling of contact is entirely absent4--,b4 #bi ,we have next to consider the ,,object of ,,touch4 ,whatever yields resistance1 and whatever is extended1 figured1 hot1 or cold1 we set down1 in ordinary language1 as objects of touch4 ,i shall show1 when the necessary explanations have been afforded1 that the idea of resistance1 the idea of extension1 and the idea of figure1 include more than can be referred to the touch1 as the ideas of visible figure and magnitude include more than can be referred to the eye4 ,it has been long known1 that many of the things1 which the feeling by the eye seems to include1 it only suggests4 ,it is not less important to know1 that the same is the case with the tactual feeling2 that this also suggests various particulars which it has been supposed to comprehend4 ,in the present stage of our investigation1 it is not expedient to push very far the inquiry1 what it is1 or is not1 proper1 to class as sensations of touch1 because that can be settled with much greater advantage hereafter4 ,the sensations of heat and cold offer this advantage1--that being often felt without the accompaniment of #cj any thing visible or extended1 which can be called an object1 they can be more distinctly conceived as simple feelings1 than most of our other sensations4#aj ,they are feelings very different from the ordinary sensations of touch2 and possibly the only reason for classing them with those sensations was1 that the organ of them1 like that of touch1 is diffused over the whole body4 ,we know not that the nerves appropriated to the sensations of heat and cold are the same with those which have the sensation of touch4 ,if they be the same1 they must at any rate be affected in a very different manner4 ,bain's footnote #aj3 ,the sensations of heat and cold are1 of all sensations1 the most subjective4 ,the reason is that they are least connected with definite muscular energies4 ,the rise and fall of the temperature of the surrounding air may induce sensations wholly independent of our own movements2 and to whatever extent such independence exists1 there is a corresponding absence of objectivity4 ,this independence1 however1 is still only partial1 even in the case of heat and cold2 in a great number1 perhaps a majority1 of instances1 they depend upon our movements2 as in changing our position with reference to a fire1 in our clothing1 and so on4 ,it is the possibility of conceiving them in the pure subject character1 and apart from object relations1 that constitutes them simple feelings1 in the acceptation of the text4 ,although not in an equal degree1 the same is true of sensations of hearing1 on which the author made a similar remark4--,b4 ,to whatever class we may refer the sensations of heat and cold1 in their moderate degrees1 it seems that good reasons may be given for not ranking them with the sensations of touch1 when they rise to the degree of pain4 ,all those acute feelings which attend the disorganization1 or tendency toward disorganization1 #ca of the several parts of our frame1 seem entirely distinct from the feelings of touch4 ,even in the case of cutting1 or laceration1 the mere touch of the knife or other instrument is one feeling1 the pain of the cut1 or laceration1 another feeling1 as much as1 in the mouth1 the touch of the sugar is one feeling1 the sweetness of it another4 ,as we shall offer reasons hereafter to show1 that the feelings of resistance1 extension1 and figure1 are not feelings of touch1 we should endeavour to conceive what feeling it is which remains when those feelings are taken away4 ,when we detach the feeling of resistance1 we1 of course1 detach those of hardness and softness1 roughness and smoothness1 which are but different modifications of resistance4 ,and when these1 and the feelings of extension and figure1 are detached1 a very simple sensation seems to remain1 the feeling which we have when something1 without being seen1 comes gently in contact with our skin1 in such a way1 that we cannot say whether it is hard or soft1 rough or smooth1 of what figure it is1 or of what size4 ,a sense of something present on the skin1 and perhaps also on the interior parts of the body1 taken purely by itself1 seems alone the feeling of touch4 ,the feelings of this sense are mostly moderate1 partaking very little of either pain or pleasure4 ,this is the reason why the stronger feelings1 which are connected with them1 those of resistance1 and extension1 predominate in the groupe1 and prevent attention to the sensations of touch4 ,the sensations of touch operate as signs to introduce the ideas of resistance and extension1 and are no more regarded4 #cb ,the imperfection of the language which we employ1 in speaking of this sense1 deserves not less of our regard1 than that of the language we employ1 in speaking of our other senses4 ,we need distinct and appropriate names1 for the organ1 for the object1 and for the sensation4 ,we have no such name for any of them4 ,the word touch is made to stand for all the three4 ,i speak of my touch1 when ,i mean to denote my organ of touch4 ,i speak also of my touch1 when ,i mean to denote my sensation4 ,and in some cases1 speaking of the object1 ,i call it touch4 ,if ,i were to call a piece of fine and brilliant velvet a fine sight1 another person might say1 it is a fine touch as well as fine sight4#aa ,editor's footnote #aa3 ,it is more true of the word touch1 than of the names of our other senses1 that it is occasionally employed to denote the organ of touch2 because that organ1 being the whole surface of the body1 has not1 like the organs of the special senses1 a compact distinctive name4 ,but it may be doubted if the word touch ever stands for the object of touch4 ,if a person made use of the phrase in the text1 it is a fine touch as well as a fine sight1 he would probably be regarded as purchasing an epigrammatic turn of expression at the expense of some violence to language4--,ed4 ,in ordinary language1 the word feeling is appropriated to this sense2 though it has been found convenient1 in philosophical discourse1 to make the term generical1 so as to include every modification of consciousness4#c99 ,mill's footnote #c3 ,the word feeling1 though in many cases we use it as synonymous to touching1 has1 however1 a much more extensive signification1 and is frequently employed to denote our internal1 as well as our external1 affections4 ,we feel hunger and thirst1 we feel joy and sorrow1 we feel love and hatred4--,ad4 ,smith1 on the ,external ,senses4--7,author's ,note47 ,when ,i say that ,i feel the table1 there is a considerable complexity of meaning4 ,dr4 ,reid1 and his followers1 maintain1 that ,i have not one point of #cc consciousness only1 but two2 that ,i feel the sensation1 and that ,i feel the table2 that the sensation is one thing1 the feeling of the table another4 ,expositions which will be given hereafter are necessary to the complete elucidation of what takes place4 ,but the explanations which have been already afforded will enable us to state the facts with considerable clearness4 ,in what is called feeling the table1 my organ of touch1 and an object of touch1 in the appropriate position1 are the antecedent2 of this antecedent1 sensation is the consequent4 ,the expression1 ,i feel the table1 includes both the antecedent and the consequent4 ,it does not mark the sensation alone2 it marks the sensation1 and1 along with the sensation1 its antecedent1 namely1 the organ1 and its object in conjunction4 ,the phrase1 sense of touch1 or the word feeling1 often synonymous1 has the same complexity of meaning1 which we have observed in the phrases1 sense of hearing1 sense of sight1 and the rest of the senses4 ,when ,i say that ,i touch1 or have the sense of touch1 ,i mean to say1 that ,i have a certain feeling1 consequent upon a certain antecedent4 ,the phrase1 therefore1 notes the sensation1 and at the same time connotes#d99 the following things3 #ast1 the organ2 #b;dly1 #cd the object of the organ2 #c;dly1 the synchronous order of the organ and object2 #dthly1 the successive order of the sensation2 the synchronous order being1 as usual1 the antecedent of the successive order4#e99 #ab ,mill's footnote #d3 ,the use1 which ,i shall make1 of the term connotation1 needs to be explained4 ,there is a large class of words1 which denote two things1 both together2 but the one perfectly distinguishable from the other4 ,of these two things1 also1 it is observable1 that such words express the one1 primarily1 as it were2 the other1 in a way which may be called secondary4 ,thus1 white1 in the phrase white horse1 denotes two things1 the colour1 and the horse2 but it denotes the colour primarily1 the horse secondarily4 ,we shall find it very convenient1 to say1 therefore1 that it notes the primary1 connotes the secondary1 signification4--7,author's ,note47 ,reasons will be assigned further on1 why the words to connote and connotation had better be employed1 not as here indicated1 but in a different and more special sense4--,,ed4 ,mill's footnote #e3 ,the terms synchronous order1 and successive order1 will be fully explained hereafter1 when any obscurity which may now seem to rest upon them will be removed2 it may be useful at present to say1 that1 by synchronous order1 is meant order in space1 by successive order1 order in time2 the first1 or order in space1 being nothing but the placing or position of the objects at any given time2 the second1 or order in time1 being nothing but the antecedence of the one1 and the consequence of the other4--7,author's ,note47 ,bain's footnote #ab3 ,additional ,observations on the ,sense of ,touch4--,the author is right in drawing a distinction between ,touch proper and the sensibility to ,heat and ,cold1 which1 though principally found in the skin1 extends beyond the seat of tactile sensibility1 as1 for example1 to the alimentary canal1 and to the lungs4 ,it is a debated point1 whether the nerves of ,touch are also the nerves of ,heat and ,cold2 some persons contending for special nerves of ,temperature4 ,such special nerves1 however1 have not been proved to exist4 ,the remark is also correct1 that the feelings of temperature can be more easily attended to1 as simple feelings1 than the #ce feelings of touch proper4 ,the reason is not precisely stated4 ,it is that radiant heat may affect the surface of the body without occasioning resistance or movement1 and is thus a purely passive sensibility2 a subject-state without an object-accompaniment4 ,when the degree of the sensation varies definitely with definite movements1 it is treated as an object sensibility1 or as pointing to the object world4 ,thus when we grow warmer as we move in one direction1 and colder as we move in another1 we no longer think of the feeling as a purely subject fact1 but as having an object1 or external embodiment4 ,it is also justly remarked in the text1 that the severe sensations of heat1 and cold1 as well as those from laceration of the skin1 may be properly classed with feelings of disorganization generally4 ,at the same time1 these painful feelings have a character varying with the organ affected2 the fact of injury of tissue may be the same1 but the feeling will not be the same1 in the skin1 the nostrils1 the ear1 the eye1 the alimentary canal4 ,the description above given of the feeling that remains1 when the different modifications of resistance are deducted1 is scarcely adequate to represent the reality4 ,frequently it is true of them1 that they 'are mostly moderate1 partaking very little of either pain or pleasure1' but there are occasions when they rise into prominence and power4 ,we may refer to the contact of the bedclothes at night1 when the body is relieved from the tight and deadening embrace of the ordinary clothing4 ,the case of greatest moment1 however1 is the contact of one human being or animal with another2 such contact being the physical element in the tender as well as in the sexual affections4 ,there is a combination of tactile sensibility and warmth in this instance1 each counting for a part of the pleasure4 ,the influence is well enough known as experienced among human beings2 but the sphere of its operation in animals has been but imperfectly explored4 ,if we observe carefully the first movements of a new-born animal1 a mammal for example1 we find that the guiding and #cf controlling sensation of its first moments1 is the contact with the mother4 ,in that contact1 it finds satisfaction and repose2 in separation1 it is in discomfort and disquiet4 ,its earliest volitions are to retain and to recover the soft warm touch of the maternal body4 ,when it commences sucking1 and has the sensation of nourishment1 a new interest springs up1 perhaps still more powerful in its attractions1 and able to supersede the first1 or at least to put it into a second place2 yet1 during the whole period of maternal dependence1 the feeling of touch is a source of powerful sensibility both to the mother and to the offspring4 ,among animals born in litter1 as pigs1 kittens1 c41 the embrace is equally acceptable between the fellow-progeny themselves4 ,the sensual pleasure of this contact is the essence1 the fact1 of animal affection1 parental and fraternal2 and it is the germ1 or foundation1 and concomitant of tender affection in human beings4 ,it is the experience of this agreeable contact that prepares the way for a still closer conjunction after the animal reaches puberty4 ,independent of1 and antecedent to1 that still more acute sensibility1 there is a pleasure in the warm embrace of two animals1 and they are ready to enter upon it1 at all times when the other interests1 as nourishment1 exercise and repose1 are not engrossing4 ,the play of animals with one another clearly involves the pleasure of the embrace1 even without sexuality2 and it leads to the sexual encounter at the ripe moment4--,b4 #cg ,,section ,,vi4 ,,sensations ,,of ,,disorganization1 ,,or ,,of ,,the ,,approach ,,to ,,disorganization1 ,,in ,,any ,,part ,,of ,,the ,,body4 ,that we have sensations in parts of the body suffering1 or approaching to1 disorganization1 does not require illustration4 ,the disorganizations of which we speak proceed sometimes from external1 sometimes from internal1 causes4 ,lacerations1 cuts1 bruises1 burnings1 poisonings1 are of the former kind2 inflammation1 and other diseases in the parts1 are the latter4 ,these sensations are specifically different from those classed under the several heads of sense4 ,the feelings themselves1 if attended to1 are evidence of this4 ,in the next place1 they have neither organ1 nor object1 in the sense in which those latter feelings have them4 ,we do not talk of an organ of burning2 an organ of pain2 nor do we talk of an object of any of them2 we do not say the object of a cut1 the object of an ache1 the object of a sore4 ,most of those sensations are of the painful kind2 though some are otherwise4 ,some slight1 or locally minute inflammations1 produce a sensation called itching1 which is far from disagreeable1 as appears from the desire to scratch1 which excites it4#ac ,editor's footnote #ac3 ,the author1 in this passage1 uses the word itching out of its ordinary sense2 making it denote the pleasant sensation accompanying the relief by scratching1 instead of the slightly painful1 and sometimes highly irritating1 sensation which the scratching relieves4--,ed4 #ch ,the scratching1 which excites the pleasure of itching1 is a species of friction1 and friction1 in most parts of the body1 excites a sensation very different from the mere sense of touching or the simple feeling of the object4 ,the tickling of the feather in the nose1 for example1 is very different from the mere feeling of the feather in touch4 ,in some parts of the body the most intense sensations are produced by friction4 ,there is difficulty in classing those sensations4 ,they are not the same with those of any of the five senses3 and they are not the same with those which rise from any tendency to disorganization in the parts of the body to which they are referred4 ,great accuracy1 however1 in the classification of the sensations1 is not essential to that acquaintance with them1 which is requisite for the subsequent parts of this inquiry4 ,it will suffice for our purpose1 if the reader so far attend to them1 as to be secure from the danger of overlooking or mistaking them1 where a distinct consideration of them is necessary for developing any of the complicated phenomena in which they are concerned4#ad ,bain's footnote #ad3 ,organic ,sensibilities4--,the author did well to signalize these sensibilities1 so powerful in their influence on human life4 ,they are not confined to the side of pain4 ,the same organs whose disorganization is connected with pain1 are1 in their healthy and vigorous working1 more or less connected with pleasure4 ,this is true not merely of the digestive functions1 but of the respiration1 the circulation1 and others4 ,nor is it difficult in their case to make up the full analogy #ci of a sense1 as having an ,object1 an ,organ1 and a characteristic ,sensation4 ,in digestion1 the object is the food1 the organ is the alimentary canal2 in respiration1 the object is the air1 and the organ the lungs4 ,if it be said that the air is an impalpable agent and not discovered to the mind by its mode of operating1 so is heat1 the object of an admitted sense4 ,the accurate classification of these feelings may not have much speculative interest1 in ,psychology1 but it has a great practical interest in the diagnosis of disease4 ,for want of subjective knowledge on the part of the patient1 and of a well understood nomenclature of subjective symptoms1 the discrimination of disease by the feelings is usually very rough4 ,the best mode of arranging these sensibilities seems to be to connect them with their organs1 or seats--,muscular ,tissue1 ,bones and ,ligaments1 ,nerves1 ,heart and ,circulation1 ,lungs1 ,alimentary ,canal4 ,the sensations of itching and tickling are modes of skin sensibility4 ,tickling is an effect not well understood1 although some interesting observations have been made upon it4--,b4 #dj ,,section ,,vii4 ,,muscular ,,sensations1 ,,or ,,those ,,feelings ,,which ,,accompany ,,the ,,action ,,of ,,the ,,muscles4 ,there is no part of our ,consciousness1 which deserves greater attention than this2 though1 till lately1 it has been miserably overlooked4 ,hartley1 ,darwin1 and ,brown1 are the only philosophical inquirers into ,mind1 at least in our own country1 who seem to have been aware that it fell within the province of their speculations4 ,the muscles are bundles of fibres1 which1 by their contraction and relaxation1 produce all the motions of the body4 ,the nerves1 with which they are supplied1 seem to be the immediate instruments of the muscular action4 ,that these muscles have the power of acute sensation1 we know1 by what happens1 when they are diseased1 when they suffer any external injury1 or even when1 the integuments being removed1 they can be touched1 though ever so gently4 ,it has been said1#f99 that if we had but one sensation1 #da and that uninterrupted1 it would be as if we had no sensation at all2 and1 to the justice of this observation1 some very striking facts appear to bear evidence4 ,we know that the air is continually pressing upon our bodies4 ,but1 the sensation being continual1 without any call to attend to it1 we lose1 from habit1 the power of doing so4 ,the sensation is as if it did not exist4 ,we feel the air when it is in motion1 or when it is hotter or colder1 to a certain degree1 than our bodies2 but it is because we have the habit of attending to it in those states4 ,as the muscles are always in contact with the same things1 the sensations of the muscles must be almost constantly the same4 ,this is one reason why they are very little attended to1 and1 amid the crowd of other feelings1 are1 in general1 wholly forgotten4 ,they are of that class of feelings which occur as antecedents to other more interesting feelings4 ,to these the attention is immediately called off1 and those which preceded and introduced them are forgotten4 ,in such cases the thought of the less interesting sensations is merged in that of the more interesting4 ,mill's footnote #f3 ,itaque et sensioni adhret1 proprie dict1 ut ei aliqua insita sit perpetuo phantasmatum varietas1 ita ut aliud ab alio discerni posset4 ,si supponeremus1 enim1 esse hominem1 oculis quidem claris cterisque videndi organis recte se habentibus compositum1 nullo autem alio sensu prditum1 eumque ad eandem rem eodem semper colore et specie sine ulla vel minima varietate apparentem obversum esse1 mihi certe1 quicquid dicant alii1 non magis videre videretur1 quam ego videor mihi per tacts organa sentire lacertorum meorum ossa4 ,ea tamen perpetuo et undequaque sensibilissima membrana continguntur4--,adeo sentire semper idem1 et non sentire1 ad idem recidunt4 ,hobbes1 ,elem4 ,philos4 ,pars ,,iv4 c4 xxv4 #e4--7;,author's ,note47 ,if we had not direct proof1 analogy would lead us to conclude1 that no change could take place1 in parts of so much sensibility as the muscles1 without a change of feeling2 in particular1 that a #db distinguishable feeling must attend every contraction1 and relaxation4 ,we have proof that there is such a feeling1 because intimation is conveyed to the mind that the relaxation or contraction is made4 ,i will1 to move my arm2 and though ,i observe the motion by none of my senses1 ,i know that the motion is made4 ,the feeling that attends the motion has existed4 ,yet so complete is my habit of attending only to the motion1 and not to the feeling1 that no attention can make me distinctly sensible that ,i have it4 ,nay1 there are some muscles of the body in constant and vehement action1 as the heart1 of the feelings attendant upon the action of which we seem to have no cognisance at all4 ,that this is no argument against the existence of those feelings1 will be made apparent1 by the subsequent explanation of other phenomena1 in which the existence of certain feelings1 and an acquired incapacity of attending to them1 are out of dispute4#ae ,editor's footnote #ae3 ,the paradox1 of feelings which we have no cognisance of--feelings which are not felt--will be discussed at large in a future note4--,ed4 ,in most cases of the muscular feelings1 there is not only that obscurity1 of which we have immediately spoken1 but great complexity2 as several muscles almost always act together2 in many of the common actions of the body1 a great number4 ,the result of these complex feelings is often sufficiently perceptible1 though the feelings1 separately1 can hardly be made objects of attention4 ,the unpleasant feeling of fatigue1 in part at least a muscular feeling1 is one of those results4 ,the pleasure which almost all the more perfect animals1 especially the #dc young1 appear to feel1 in even violent exercise1 may be regarded as another4 ,the restlessness of a healthy child2 the uneasiness in confinement1 the delight in the activity of freedom1 which so strongly distinguish the vigorous schoolboy2 seem to indicate1 both a painful state of the muscular system in rest1 and a pleasurable state of it in action4 ,who has not remarked the playful activity of the kitten and the puppy8 ,the delight of the dog1 on being permitted to take exercise with his master1 extends through the greater part of his life4 ,one of the cases in which the feeling of muscular action seems the most capable of being attended to1 is the pleasure accompanying the act of stretching1 which most animals perform in drowsiness1 or after sleep4 ,a very slight degree of reflection is sufficient to evince1 that we could not have had the idea of resistance1 which forms so great a part of what we call our idea of matter1 without the feelings which attend muscular action4 ,resistance means a force opposed to a force2 the force of the object1 opposed to the force which we apply to it4 ,the force which we apply is the action of our muscles1 which is only known to us by the feelings which accompany it4 ,our idea of resistance1 then1 is the idea of our own feelings in applying muscular force4 ,it is true1 that the mere feeling of the muscles in action is not the only feeling concerned in the case4 ,the muscles move in consequence of the ,will2 and what the ,will is1 we are not as yet prepared to explain4 ,what is necessary at present is1 not to shew all the simple feelings which enter into the feeling of resistance2 but to shew #dd that the simple feeling of muscular action is one of them4 ,the feeling of resistance admits of great varieties4 ,the feeling of a plate of iron is one thing1 the feeling of a blown bladder is another1 the feeling of quicksilver is a third1 the feeling of water a fourth1 and so on4 ,the feeling of weight1 or attraction1 is also a feeling of resistance4 #de ,,section ,,viii4 ,,sensations ,,in ,,the ,,alimentary ,,canal4 ,when the sensations in the alimentary canal become acutely painful1 they are precise objects of attention to every body4 ,there is reason to believe that a perpetual train of sensations is going on in every part of it4 ,the food stimulates the stomach4 ,it undergoes important changes1 and1 mixed with some very stimulating ingredients1 passes into the lower intestines2 in every part of which it is still farther changed4 ,the degree1 and even the nature1 of some of the changes1 are different1 according as the passage through the canal is slower1 or quicker2 they are different1 according to the state of the organs1 and according to the nature of the food4 ,of the multitude of sensations1 which must attend this process1 very few become objects of attention2 and1 in time1 an incapacity is generated1 of making them objects of attention4 ,they are not1 however1 as we shall afterwards perceive1 feeble agents1 or insignificant elements1 in the trains of thought4 ,they are of that class of feelings1 to which we have already been under the necessity of alluding2 a class1 which serve as antecedents1 to feelings more interesting than themselves2 and from which the attention is so instantaneously drawn1 to the more interesting feelings by which they are succeeded1 that we are as little sensible of their existence1 as we often are of the #df sound of the clock1 which may strike in the room beside us1 and of course affect our ear in the usual manner1 and yet leave no trace of the sensations behind4 ,the complicated sensations in the intestinal canal1 like those in the muscles1 though obscure1 and even unknown1 as individual sensations1 often constitute a general state of feeling1 which is sometimes exhilarating1 and sometimes depressing4 ,the effects of opium1 and of inebriating liquors1 in producing exhilaration1 are well known2 and though much of the pleasure in these states is owing to association1 as we shall afterwards explain1 yet the agreeable feelings in the stomach1 are the origin and cause of the joyous associations4#af ,the state of feeling in the stomach in seasickness1 or under the operation of an emetic1 is1 on the contrary1 one of the most distressing within our experience2 though we can neither call it a pain1 nor have any more distinct conception of it1 than as a state of general uneasiness4 ,bain's footnote #af3 ,the exact mode of operation of opium and alcohol is still unknown2 but the part affected is probably the nervous substance and not the stomach4 ,it can hardly be said with propriety that any part of the pleasure of these stimulants is due to association4 ,no doubt the exhilarated tone of the mind is favourable to the flow of joyful ideas1 which serve to heighten the pleasure2 but that pleasure could not be arrested or subdued through the absence of any supposable associations4--,b4 ,the general effects of indigestion are well known4 ,when the organs of digestion become disordered1 and indigestion becomes habitual1 a sense of wretchedness is the consequence2 a general state of feeling composed of a multitude of minor feelings1 none of #dg which individually can be made an object of attention4 ,in the sense of wretchedness1 which accompanies indigestion1 and which sometimes proceeds to the dreadful state of melancholy madness1 it is difficult to say1 how much is sensation1 and how much association4 ,one thing is certain2 that sensations which are the origin of so much misery are of high importance to us2 whether they1 or the associations they introduce1 are the principal ingredient in the afflicting state which they contribute to create4 ,the effects of indigestion in producing painful associations1 is strikingly exemplified by the horrible dreams which it produces in sleep2 not only in those whose organs are diseased2 but in the most healthy state of the stomach1 when it has received what1 in ordinary language1 is said1 whether from quantity or quality1 to have disagreed with it4 ,the general states of feeling composed of the multitude of obscure and unnoticed feelings in the alimentary canal1 though most apt to be noticed when they are of the painful kind1 are not less frequently of the pleasurable kind4 ,that particular sorts of foods1 as well as liquors1 have an exhilarating effect1 needs hardly to be stated4 ,and it is only necessary to revive the recollection of the feeling of general comfort1 the elasticity1 as it seems1 of the whole frame1 the feeling of strength1 the disposition to activity and enjoyment1 which every man must have experienced1 when his digestion was vigorous and sound4#ag ,bain's footnote #ag3 ,these effects pass beyond the influence of mere digestion4 ,all the viscera contribute to the condition of high general #dh vigour and comfort here supposed4 ,if one were to venture upon a scale of relative importance of the different organs1 one would place the nervous centres first1 and the digestion second4 ,the present section is open to several remarks4 ,some qualification must be given to the author's surmise 'that a perpetual train of sensations is going on in every part of the alimentary canal4' ,it is hardly correct to say that there are perpetual sensations in any part of it3 during a great part of our time we are in a state of indifference as to stomachic changes2 and not merely because we are not disposed to attend to them1 but because they scarcely exist4 ,the sensibility of the organ is shown1 on anatomical grounds1 to be mainly in the stomach1 and in the rectum2 these parts are supplied by the nervus vagus2 and very few nerves1 besides those of the sympathetic system1 are found in the smaller1 or in the larger intestine1 so that the sensitiveness of those parts is manifested only in case of violent disorganization1 as cramp1 stoppage1 or inflammation4 ,hence the feelings are principally attendant on the changes in the stomach1 as when food has just been taken1 and after long privation1 when the state called hunger shows itself4 ,it is not correct to class the sensations of the alimentary canal1 as a whole1 with those that lose their hold of the attention1 that become unheeded in themselves1 and are valued only as the antecedents of other more pleasurable feelings4 ,the remark is inapplicable to the sensations mainly characterized as pleasure or pain2 nothing can be more interesting than a pleasure1 except a still greater pleasure4 ,it applies only to those slight irritations that are in themselves nothing1 but may be the symptoms or precursors of ill health1 or of returning good health4 ,the author's doctrine as to our acquiring artificially the habit of not attending to alimentary states1 demands a fuller explanation4 ,the usual cause of inattention to impressions is unbroken continuance2 in accordance with the universal law #di of ,relativity or ,change1 we are usually insensible to the contact of our clothing with the skin1 except at the moments when we put on or take off any part of it4 ,in walking1 and in standing1 for a length of time1 we are insensible to the body's weight2 on rising from the recumbent position we are rendered in some degree conscious of it4 ,now as the alimentary sensations--,hunger and ,repletion--are intermitted and alternated with other states1 they fulfil the chief condition of wakeful consciousness4 ,the example of the striking of the clock1 adduced in the text1 brings into operation a different power of the mind1 which may go far to counteract the influence of change4 ,under a very engrossing sensation1 or occupation1 we become insensible to the stimulation of the senses by other agents4 ,the strain of the mind in some one direction causes a sort of incapacity for going out in any other direction while the strain lasts4 ,this is the explanation of the indifference to the striking of the clock4 ,by the farther influence of habit1 inattention to a certain class of impressions may become habitual2 as in the power of carrying on mental work in the midst of distracting noises4 ,the same effect may arise in connection with the alimentary feelings4 ,a person very much engrossed with a subject is unconscious of hunger1 and does not feel the pleasures of eating4 ,should any one be absorbed habitually with some occupation or pursuit1 such an one may contract a settled indifference to the recurring phases of alimentary sensation2 but this is an extreme and unusual case4 ,any ordinary degree of interest in the avocations and pursuits of business is compatible with full attention to the feelings of hunger1 and of repletion1 as well as to the occasional pains and discomforts of indigestion4 ,we do not often choose to contract an indifference to pleasures1 and we seldom succeed in acquiring an indifference to pains1 although we may have moments of such indifference1 under some special engrossment of mind by other things4 ,it is over-rating the influence of association to make it a #ej chief element in the pleasure of intoxicating stimulants1 or in the wretched feelings of diseased digestion4 ,these states are direct results of physical agency1 and are the same throughout all stages of life1 with many or with few opportunities of being associated with other feelings4 ,they are not the cases favourable for illustrating the power of association1 in the important department of the feelings4--,b4 #ea ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,,ideas4 ,hc in genere sors esse solet humana1 ut quid in quovis genere recte aut cogitari aut effici possit sentiant prius quam perspiciant4 ,laborem autem haud ita levem illum veriti1 qui in eo impendendus erat ut1 ideas operatione analytica penitus evolventes1 quid tandem velint1 aut qunam res agatur1 sibi ipsis rationem sufficientem reddant1 confusis1 aut saltem haud satia explicatis rationibus1 ratiocinia1 et scientiarum adeo systemata superstruere solent communiter1 eoque confidentius1 quo ejus quam tractant scienti fundamentum solidum magis ignorant4--,schmidt-,phiseldek1 ,philos4 ,critic ,expositio ,systematica1 t4 i4 p4 #efa4 ,pour systematiser une science1 c'est--dire1 pour ramener une suite de phnomnes leur principe1 un phnomne lmentaire qui engendre successivement tous les autres1 il faut saisir leurs rapports1 le rapport de gnration qui les lie2 et pour cela1 il est clair qu'il faut commencer par examiner ces diffrens phnomnes sparment4--,cousin1 ,fragm4 ,philos41 p4 #h4 ,,the sensations which we have through the medium of the senses exist only by the presence of the object1 and cease upon its absence2 nothing being here meant by the presence of the object1 but that position of it with respect to the organ1 which is the antecedent of the sensation2 or by its absence1 but any other position4 ,it is a known part of our constitution1 that when our sensations cease1 by the absence of their objects1 something remains4 ,after ,i have seen the sun1 and #eb by shutting my eyes see him no longer1 ,i can still think of him4 ,i have still a feeling1 the consequence of the sensation1 which1 though ,i can distinguish it from the sensation1 and treat it as not the sensation1 but something different from the sensation1 is yet more like the sensation1 than anything else can be2 so like1 that ,i call it a copy1 an image1 of the sensation2 sometimes1 a representation1 or trace1 of the sensation4 ,another name1 by which we denote this trace1 this copy1 of the sensation1 which remains after the sensation ceases1 is ,,idea4 ,this is a very convenient name1 and it is that by which the copies of the sensation thus described will be commonly denominated in the present work4 ,the word ,,idea1 in this sense1 will express no theory whatsoever2 nothing but the bare fact1 which is indisputable4 ,we have two classes of feelings2 one1 that which exists when the object of sense is present2 another1 that which exists after the object of sense has ceased to be present4 ,the one class of feelings ,i call ,,sensations2 the other class of feelings ,i call ,,ideas4 ,it is an inconvenience1 that the word ,,idea is used with great latitude of meaning1 both in ordinary1 and in philosophical discourse2 and it will not be always expedient that ,i should avoid using it in senses different from that which ,i have now assigned4 ,i trust1 however1 ,i shall in no case leave it doubtful1 in what sense it is to be understood4 ,the term ,sensation has a double meaning4 ,it signifies not only an individual sensation2 as when ,i say1 ,i smell this rose1 or ,i look at my hand3 but it also signifies the general faculty of sensation2 that is1 #ec the complex notion of all the phenomena together1 as a part of our nature4 ,the word ,idea has only the meaning which corresponds to the first of those significations2 it denotes an individual idea2 and we have not a name for that complex notion which embraces1 as one whole1 all the different phenomena to which the term ,idea relates4 ,as we say ,sensation1 we might say also1 ,ideation2 it would be a very useful word2 and there is no objection to it1 except the pedantic habit of decrying a new term4 ,sensation would in that case be the general name for one part of our constitution1 ,ideation for another4 ,it is of great importance1 before the learner proceeds any farther1 that he should not only have an accurate conception of this part of his constitution2 but should acquire1 by repetition1 by complete familiarity1 a ready habit of marking those immediate copies of his sensations1 and of distinguishing them from every other phenomenon of his mind4 ,it has been represented1 that the sensations of sight and hearing leave the most vivid traces2 in other words1 that the ideas corresponding to those sensations1 are clearer than others4 ,but what is meant by clearer and more vivid in this case1 is not very apparent4 ,if ,i have a very clear idea of the colour of the trumpet which ,i have seen1 and a very clear idea of its sound which ,i have heard1 ,i have no less clear ideas of its shape1 and of its size2 ideas of the sensations1 neither of the eye1 nor of the ear4 ,it is not easy1 in a subject like this1 to determine what degree of illustration is needful4 ,to those who are in the habit of distinguishing their mental #ed phenomena1 the subject will appear too simple to require illustration4 ,to those who are new to this important operation1 a greater number of illustrations would be useful1 than ,i shall deem it advisable to present4 ,it is necessary to take notice1 that1 as each of our senses has its separate class of sensations1 so each has its separate class of ideas4 ,we have ideas of ,sight1 ideas of ,touch1 ideas of ,hearing1 ideas of ,taste1 and ideas of ,smell4 #a4 ,by ,sight1 as we have sensations of red1 yellow1 blue1 c41 and of the innumerable modifications of them1 so have we ideas of those colours4 ,we can think of those colours in the dark2 that is1 we have a feeling or consciousness1 which is not the same with the sensation1 but which we contemplate as a copy of the sensation1 an image of it2 something more like it1 than any thing else can be2 something which remains with us1 after the sensation is gone1 and which1 in the train of thought1 we can use as its representative4 #b4 ,the sensations of ,touch1 according to the limitation under which they should be understood1 are not greatly varied4 ,the gentle feeling1 which we derive from the mere contact of an object1 when we consider it apart from the feeling of resistance1 and apart from the sensation of heat or cold1 is not very different1 as derived from different objects4 ,the idea of this tactual feeling1 therefore1 is not vivid1 nor susceptible of many modifications4 ,on the other hand1 our ideas of heat and cold1 the feelings which we call the thought of them1 existing when the sensations no longer exist1 are among the most distinct of the feelings which we distinguish by the name of ideas4 #ee #c4 ,i hear the ,sound of thunder2 and ,i can think of it after it is gone4 ,this feeling1 the representative of the mere sound1 this thinking1 or having the thought of the sound1 this state of consciousness1 is the idea4 ,the hearing of the sound is the primary state of consciousness2 the idea of the sound is the secondary state of consciousness2 which exists only when the first has previously existed4 ,the number of sounds1 of which we can have distinct ideas1 as well as distinct sensations1 is immense4 ,we can distinguish all animals by their voices4 ,when ,i hear the horse neigh1 ,i know it is not the voice of the ox4 ,why8 ,because ,i have the idea of the voice of the ox1 so distinct1 that ,i know the sensation ,i have1 is different from the sensation of which that is the copy or representative4 ,we can distinguish the sounds of a great number of different musical instruments1 by the same process4 ,the men1 women1 and children1 of our intimate acquaintance1 we can distinguish1 and name1 by their voices2 that is1 we have an idea of the past sensation1 which enables us to declare1 that the present is the voice of the same person4 #d4 ,that the sensations of ,taste recur in thought1 when the sensation no longer exists1 is a point of every man's experience4 ,this recurring1 in thought1 of the feeling which we have by the sense1 when the feeling by the sense is gone1 is the idea of that feeling1 the secondary state of consciousness1 as we named it above4#ah ,that we can distinguish a very #ef great number of tastes1 and distinguish them accurately1 is proof that we have a vast number of distinct ideas of taste2 because1 for the purpose of making such distinction1 we have just seen that there must be a sensation and an idea2 the sensation of the present object1 and the idea of the sensation of each of the other objects from which we distinguish it4 ,you have tasted port wine1 and you have tasted claret2 when you taste claret again1 you can distinguish it from port wine2 that is1 you have the idea of the taste of port wine1 in conjunction with the sensation of claret4 ,you call it bad claret4 ,why8 ,because1 along with the present taste1 you have the idea of another1 which1 when it was sensation1 was more agreeable than the present sensation4 ,bain's footnote #ah3 ,discrimination and ,retentiveness 7the having of ,ideas as the produce of ,sensations7 are different functions1 although mutually involved1 and1 in all likelihood1 developed in proportionate degrees in the same organ4 ,we begin by discriminating changes of impression2 this process is necessary in order to our having even a sensation2 the more delicate the discriminating power1 the greater the number of our primary sensations4 ,he that can discriminate twenty shades of yellow has twenty sensations of yellow2 the two statements express the same fact4 ,these various sensations being often repeated1 acquire at last an ideal persistence2 they can be maintained as ideas1 without the originals4 ,the function or power of the ,intellect whereby they are thus rendered self-subsisting as ideas1 is not the same function as discrimination2 we call it ,memory1 ,retentiveness1 ,adhesiveness1 ,association1 and so on4 ,what may be affirmed about it1 on the evidence of induction1 is1 that where discrimination is good1 memory or retentiveness is also good4 ,the discriminative eye for colour is accompanied with a good memory for colour2 the musical ear is both discriminative and retentive4--,b4 #e4 ,since we distinguish smells1 as well as tastes1 #eg we have the same proof of the number and distinctness of the ideas of this class of sensations4 ,there is none of the numerous smells to which we have been accustomed1 which we do not immediately recognise4 ,but for that recognition the idea of the past sensation must be conjoined with the present sensation4 #f4 ,of that class of sensations1 which ,i have called sensations of disorganization1 we have also ideas4 ,we are capable of having the thought of them when the sensation is gone2 and that thought is the idea4 ,a spark from the candle flew upon my hand3 ,i had the sensation of burning4 ,i at this moment think of that sensation2 that is1 ,i have the idea of that sensation2 and ,i can think of it1 as different from ten thousand other painful sensations3 that is1 ,i have ideas of as many other sensations of this class4 #g4 ,the ideas of the sensations which attend the action of the muscles are among the most important of the elements which constitute our being4 ,from these we have the ideas of resistance1 of compressibility1 of hardness1 of softness1 of roughness1 of smoothness1 of solidity1 of liquidity1 of weight1 of levity1 of extension1 of figure1 of magnitude1 of whole and of parts1 of motion1 of rest4 ,it is1 indeed1 to be observed1 that these are all complex ideas1 and that other feelings than the mere muscular feeling are concerned in their composition4 ,in almost all the ideas referrible to the muscular feelings1 of sufficient importance to have names1 the ,will is included4 ,the muscular action is the consequent1 the ,will the antecedent2 and the name of the idea1 includes both4 ,thus the idea of resistance is the thought1 or idea1 of #eh the feelings we have1 when we will to contract certain muscles1 and feel the contraction impeded4#ai #bj ,editor's footnote #ai3 ,rather1 when we will to contract certain muscles1 and the contraction takes place1 but is not followed by the accustomed movement of the limb2 what follows1 instead1 being a sensation of pressure1 proportioned to the degree of the contraction4 ,it is not the muscular contraction itself which is impeded by the resisting object3 that contraction takes place3 but the outward effect which it was the tendency1 and perhaps the purpose1 of the muscular contraction to produce1 fails to be produced4--,ed4 ,bain's footnote #bj3 ,it is unnecessary to advert to the operation of the ,will1 7in the first instance at least17 in considering the feelings of muscular action4 ,the will is the principal1 but not the only1 source of our activity4 ,the mere spontaneous vigour of the system may put the muscles in motion4 ,likewise the muscular pleasure itself operates1 by the fundamental law of the will1 for its own continuance2 a process not commonly called voluntary4 ,in these circumstances1 it seems advisable to consider and describe the consciousness of muscular exertion by itself1 and without reference to the will4--,b4 ,there is no feeling of our nature of more importance to us1 than that of resistance4 ,of all our sensations1 it is the most unintermitted2 for1 whether we sit1 or lie1 or stand1 or walk1 still the feeling of resistance is present to us4 ,every thing we touch1 at the same time resists2 and every thing we hear1 see1 taste1 or smell1 suggests the idea of something that resists4 ,it is through the medium of resistance1 that every act by which we subject to our use the objects and laws of nature1 is performed4 ,and1 of the complex states of consciousness1 which the philosophy of mind is called upon to explain1 there is hardly one1 in which the feeling or idea of resistance is not included4 ,it is partly owing to this combination of something #ei else with the muscular feeling1 in all the states of consciousness to which we have given names1 that it is so difficult to think of the mere muscular feeling by itself2 that our notion of the muscular sensations is so indistinct and obscure2 and that we can rather be said to have ideas of certain general states of muscular feeling1 as of fatigue1 or activity1 composed of a great number of individual feelings1 than of the individual feelings themselves4 #h4 ,as the feelings1 or sensations which we have in the intestinal canal1 are almost always mixed up indistinctly with other feelings1 and1 except in the cases of acute pain1 are seldom taken notice of but as constituting general states1 we hardly have the power of thinking of those sensations one by one2 and1 in consequence1 can hardly be said to have ideas of them4 ,they are important1 as forming component parts of many complex ideas1 which have great influence on our happiness4 ,but to unfold the mystery of complex ideas1 other parts of our mental process have yet to be explained4 ,there is a certain distressful feeling1 called the feeling of bad health1 which is considerably different in different cases1 but in which sensations of the intestinal canal are almost always a material part4 ,indigestion is the name of an idea1 in which the feelings of the intestinal canal are mainly concerned4 ,hunger1 and thirst1 are also names of ideas1 which chiefly refer to sensations in the same part of our system4#ba #bb ,bain's footnote #ba3 ,thirst is a sensation of the fauces and of the stomach2 it is also a feeling of the body generally1 due to a deficiency of water in the blood4 ,it is also caused by an excess of saline ingredients in the system4 ,in like manner1 a distinction is to be drawn between ,inanition1 from deficiency of nutritive material in the body1 and ,hunger1 or the state of the stomach preparatory to the act of eating4 ,the two states must in a great measure concur3 yet they may be distinct4 ,the account of the organic states given in this chapter would have come in appropriately under ,sensation--,b4 ,editor's footnote #bb3 ,i venture to think that it is not a philosophically correct mode of expression1 to speak of indigestion1 or of hunger and thirst1 as names of ideas4 ,hunger and thirst are names of definite sensations2 and indigestion is a name of a large group of sensations1 held together by very complicated laws of causation4 ,if it be objected1 that the word indigestion1 and even the words hunger and thirst1 comprehend in their meaning other elements than the immediate sensations2 that the meaning1 for instance1 of hunger1 includes a deficiency of food1 the meaning of indigestion a derangement of the functions of the digestive organs2 it still remains true that these additional portions of meaning are physical phenomena1 and are not our thoughts or ideas of physical phenomena2 and must1 therefore1 in the general partition of human consciousness between sensations and ideas1 take their place with the former1 and not with the latter4--,ed4 #fj ,it is proper to remark1 that1 beside the internal feelings to which ,i have hitherto directed the reader's attention1 there are others1 which might be classed1 and considered apart4 ,the blood-vessels1 for example1 and motion of the blood1 constitute an important part of our ,system1 not without feelings of its own2 feelings sometimes amounting to states which seriously command our attention4 ,of the feelings which accompany fever1 a portion may reasonably be assigned to the change of action in the blood-vessels4 ,there are states of feeling1 very distinguishable1 #fa accompanying diseased states of the heart1 and of the nervous and arterial systems4 ,beside the blood and its vessels1 the glandular system is an important part of the active organs of the body2 not without sensibility1 and of course1 not without habitual sensations4 ,the same may be said of the system of the absorbents1 of the lymphatics1 and of the vascular system in general4 ,the state of the nerves and brain1 the most wonderful part of our system1 is susceptible of changes1 and these changes are accompanied with known changes of feeling4 ,there is a class of diseases which go by the name of nervous diseases3 and though they are not a very definite class2 though it is not even very well ascertained how far any morbid state of the nerves has to do with them2 it is not doubtful that in some of those diseases there are peculiar feelings1 which ought to be referred to the nerves4 ,the nerves and brain may thus be1 not only the organs of sensations1 derived from other senses1 but organs of sensations1 derived from themselves4 ,on this subject we cannot speak otherwise than obscurely1 because we have not distinct names for the things which are to be expressed4 ,it is not1 however1 necessary1 in tracing the simple feelings which enter into the more complex states of consciousness1 to dwell upon the obscurer classes of our inward sensations2 because it is only in a very general way that we can make use of them1 in expounding the more mysterious phenomena4 ,having never acquired the habit of attending to them1 and having1 by the habit of inattention1 lost the power of remarking them1 except in their general results1 we #fb can do little more than satisfy ourselves of the cases in which they enter for more or less of the effect4 ,we have now considered what it is to have sensations1 in the simple1 uncompounded cases2 and what it is to have the secondary feelings1 which are the consequences of those sensations1 and which we consider as their copies1 images1 or representatives4 ,if the illustrations ,i have employed have enabled my reader to familiarize himself with this part of his constitution1 he has made great progress towards the solution of all that appears intricate in the phenomena of the human mind4 ,he has acquainted himself with the two primary states of consciousness2 the varieties of which are very numerous2 and the possible combinations of which are capable of composing a train of states of consciousness1 the diversities of which transcend the limits of computation4#bc #bd ,bain's footnote #bc3 ,the ,sensation and the ,idea compared4--,great importance1 in every way1 attaches to the points of agreement and of difference of the ,sensation and of the ,idea4 ,by the ,sensation1 we mean the whole state of consciousness1 under an actual or present impression of sense1 as in looking at the moon1 in listening to music1 in tasting wine4 ,by the ,idea is meant the state of mind that remains after the sensible agent is withdrawn1 or that may be afterwards recovered by the force of recollection4 #a4 ,for many purposes the sensation and the idea are identical4 ,they are compared to original and copy1 which1 although not in all respects of equal value1 can often answer the same ends4 ,a perfect recollection of a process that we wish to repeat1 is as good as actually seeing it4 ,for all purposes of knowledge1 and of practical guidance1 a faithful remembrance is equal to the real presence4 ,so1 as regards the emotional ideas1 or the recollection of states of pleasure and of pain1 which #fc prompt our voluntary actions1 in pursuit and in avoidance1 the memory operates in the same way as the original fact1 allowance being made for difference of degree4 ,a pleasing melody induces us to listen to it1 and to crave for its repetition2 the after recollection of it1 also moves us to hear it again4 ,if we find ourselves in the midst of distracting noises1 we are impelled to escape2 the mere remembrance1 at an after time1 has the same influence on the will4 #b4 ,it is highly probable1 if not certain1 that the same nervous tracks of the brain are actuated during the sensation1 and during the idea1 with difference of degree corresponding to the difference of vivacity or intensity of the actual and remembered states4 ,of the points wherein the ,sensation and the ,idea are found to differ1 the most obvious is their degree of intensity4 ,we are able to maintain in idea1 the state of mind corresponding to the sight of the sun1 the sound of a bell1 or the smell of a rose1 but we are conscious of a great inferiority in the degree or vividness of the state4 ,the bright luminosity of the original sun turns into a feeble effect1 without dazzle or excitement4 ,the thrill of a fine musical air cannot be sustained by the mere memory of it1 even in the freshness of the immediately succeeding moment4 ,a certain pleasing remembrance attaches to a good dinner1 but how far below the original6 ,moreover1 in a complicated object of sense1 a great many of the parts and lineaments drop entirely out of view4 ,memory is unequal to retaining1 without long familiarity and practice1 the exact picture of a landscape1 a building1 or an interior4 ,the difference in the fulness of the idea1 as compared with the sensation1 is no less remarkable than the difference of vivacity or intensity4 ,this inferiority in the idea as compared with the actuality is of very various amount2 being in some cases very great1 and in others very slight4 ,the difference is in proportion to the mind's power of retentiveness1 a power varying according to several circumstances or conditions1 which have to be distinctly enunciated by the ,psychologist4 ,for example1 it is well known1 that frequency of repetition enables the idea to #fd grow in vivacity and in fulness1 and to approximate in those respects to the original4 ,it is also known1 that some minds are by nature retentive1 and1 by a small number of repetitions1 gain the point that others reach only by a greater number4 ,now1 that the vivacity and fulness of a remembered idea should constitute the exact measure of the mind's retentiveness in that particular instance1 is a thing of course4 ,there is no other measure of retentiveness but the power of reproducing in idea1 what has been before us1 in actuality1 or as sensation2 and the greater the approach of the idea to the original sensation1 the better is the retaining faculty4 ,there is an apparent exception to this general principle4 ,the memory of the same idea1 or the same feeling1 in the same person1 may be at one time full and vivid1 and at another time meagre and faint4 ,in particular moments1 we may recall former experiences with especial force1 as if there were something that co-operated with the proper force of retentiveness4 ,what1 then1 are these additional or concurring forces8 ,hume recognises the influence of disease in giving preternatural intensity to ideas4 ,the answer is that some other recollection concurs with1 and adds its quota to the support of1 the one in question4 ,when1 in the view of one natural prospect1 we recall another with great fulness1 the present sensation supplies or fills in the parts of the remembered scene2 which scene1 therefore1 does not exist in the mind by memory alone1 but as a compound of memory and actuality4 ,so while listening with pleasure to a band of music1 we remember strongly the pleasure of some previous musical performance2 yet1 the vivid consciousness of the past is not dependent upon the memory of the past1 but upon the stimulus of the present2 we are more properly under sensation1 than under idea4 ,in all mental resuscitation1 there is a degree of vividness and of fulness1 due to the proper retentiveness of the mind for each particular thing1 according to natural power1 repetition1 c4 ,whatever is beyond this1 must be ascribed to the accidental concurrence of other stimulants1 either of present sensation1 or of remembered impressions4 #fe ,in recollection1 there is an influence designated by the term excitement1 which means that portions of the brain are in a state of exalted activity4 ,any ideas embodied in the parts so excited1 if in operation at all1 are more than ordinarily vivid4 ,thus in fever1 faded memories brighten up into vivacity and clearness4 ,to this case the same remark applies2 the result is partly memory1 or the proper retentiveness of the system1 and partly an excitation of the brain1 through present influences4 ,the proper power of memory is a constant quantity1 varying only with repetition1 and the strict conditions of memory2 the intensity or fulness of a resuscitated idea is a complex result of memory proper and present stimulants1 or sensations4 ,difference of vividness was the only distinction adverted to by ,hume in his ,psychology1 which resolved all our intellectual elements into ,impressions and ,ideas4 ,his opening words are3--,all the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds1 which ,i shall call impressions and ideas4 ,the difference between these consists in the degrees of force and liveliness1 with which they strike upon the mind1 and make their way into our thought or consciousness4 ,he afterwards allows that in particular circumstances1 as in sleep1 in fever1 or in madness1 our ideas may approach in vividness to our sensations4 ,another distinction between the ,sensation and the ,idea1 is of the most vital importance4 ,to the ,sensation belongs ,objective ,reality2 the ,idea is purely ,subjective4 ,this distinction lies at the root of the question of an ,external ,world2 but on every view of that question1 objectivity is connected with the ,sensation2 in contrast to which the ,idea is an element exclusively mental or subjective4 ,meanings of ,sensation4--,the word ,sensation has several meanings1 not always clearly distinguished1 and causing serious embroilments in philosophical controversy4 #a4 ,there being1 in ,sensation1 the concurrence of a series of physical or physiological facts with a mental fact1 the name may be inadvertently employed to express the physical1 as well #ff as the mental element1 or at all events to include the physical part as well as the mental4 ,the change made on the retina by light1 and the nervous influences traversing the brain1 may very readily be considered as entering into the phenomenon of sensation4 ,this1 however1 is an impropriety4 ,the proper use of ,sensation is to signify the mental fact1 to the exclusion of all the physical processes essential to its production4 #b4 ,in ordinary ,sensation1 as in looking round a room1 there is a double consciousness1--objective and subjective4 ,in the objective consciousness1 we are affected with the qualities named magnitude1 distance1 form1 colour1 c42 these are called object properties1 properties of the external and extended universe4 ,in the subject consciousness1 we are alive to states of pleasure or of pain1 which may go along with the other4 ,we do not usually exist in both modes at one instant2 we pass out of one into the other4 ,now the word ,sensation covers both1 although1 to the object consciousness1 ,perception is more strictly applicable2 and in contrast to ,perception1 ,sensation would mean the subjective consciousness1 the moments when we relapse from the object attitude and become subjective or self-conscious1 or alive to pleasure and pain4 ,when the mind is in the object phase1 it is neutral or indifferent as respects enjoyment4 #c4 ,in ,sensation1 a distinction may be drawn between the present effect upon the mind1 or the impression that would arise if the outward agent had operated for the first time1 and the total of the past impressions of the same agent1 which by its repetition are recalled to fuse with the present effect4 ,the present view of the moon reinstates the sum total of the previous views held by memory1 and is not what we should experience if we saw the moon for the first time4 ,now1 if the recall of the previous impressions1 or of the joint and iterated idea1 be considered an addition made by the ,intellect1 being dependent on the retentive power of the mind1 ,sensation1 as opposed to ,intellect1 would mean the force of the present impression and nothing more2 or the difference between the #fg vividness of reality1 and the inferior vividness of recollection4 ,what we can retain when we shut our eyes would represent the force of our intelligence2 the additional intensity when we resume our gaze1 would represent the power of sensation or the actual experience4 ,this distinction suggests an important remark as to the whole nature of ,sensation1 namely1 that there can hardly be such a thing as pure ,sensation1 meaning ,sensation without any admixture of the ,intellect4 ,we may attribute this purity to the earliest impressions made upon the mind1 but not to anything known in the experience of the adult4 ,this mixture of ,intellect with ,sense is not confined to ,retentiveness2 the other intellectual functions1 ,discrimination and perception of ,agreement1 are inseparable from the exercise of the senses4 ,we cannot have a sensation without a feeling of difference2 warmth is a transition from cold1 and a conscious discrimination of the two facts4 ,so1 whenever we repeat a sensation1 we have the consciousness of the repetition1 or agreement4 ,were not these modes of consciousness present1 we should have no sensation1 indeed no consciousness4 ,there is thus no hard line between sense and intellect4 ,the question as to the origin of our ,ideas in ,sense is not a real question1 until we explain what we mean by ,sense1 and make allowance for this unavoidable participation of ,intellect in sensation4 #d4 ,sensation is commonly used to employ the whole of our primary feelings and susceptibilities1 as opposed to the ,emotions which are secondary or derived4 ,it thus confounds together two different sides of our susceptibility1 the active and the passive2 the feelings arising in connection with our exertion of inward force or energy1 and those arising under impressions from external things4 ,both are primary states of consciousness2 they are alike dependent on modifications of our sensitive tissues4 ,but1 between the two1 there is a contrast1 wide1 deep1 and fundamental1 completely missed by the older ,psychologists1 to the detriment of their handling of such vital questions as the origin of knowledge1 and the perception of a material world4 ,the name ,sensation1 pointing immediately to #fh the operation of the five senses1 gave the slip to the feelings of energy1 or brought them in partially and inadequately4 ,yet it is the only name we have for the primary susceptibilities of the organism including both movement and passive sensibility4--,b4 ,editor's footnote #bd3 ,a question which1 as far as ,i know1 has been passed over by psychologists1 but which ought not to be left unanswered1 is this3 ,can we have ideas of ideas8 ,we have sensations1 and we have copies of these sensations1 called ideas of them3 can we also have copies of these copies1 constituting a second order of ideas1 two removes instead of one from sensation8 ,every one will admit that we can think of a thought4 ,we remember ourselves remembering1 or imagine ourselves remembering1 an object or an event1 just as we remember or imagine ourselves seeing one4 ,but in the case of a simple idea of sensation1 i4e4 the idea or remembrance of a single undivided sensation1 there seems nothing to distinguish the idea of the idea1 from the idea of the sensation itself4 ,when ,i imagine myself thinking of the colour of snow1 ,i am not aware of any difference1 even in degree of intensity1 between the image then present to my mind of the white colour1 and the image present when ,i imagine myself to be seeing the colour4 ,the case1 however1 is somewhat different with those combinations of simple ideas which have never been presented to my mind otherwise than as ideas4 ,i have an idea of ,pericles2 but it is derived only from the testimony of history3 the real ,pericles never was present to my senses4 ,i have an idea of ,hamlet1 and of ,falstaff2 combinations which1 though made up of ideas of sensation1 never existed at all in the world of sense2 they never were anything more than ideas in any mind4 ,yet1 having had these combinations of ideas presented to me through the words of ,shakespeare1 ,i have formed what is properly an idea not of an outward object1 but of an idea in ,shakespeare's mind2 and ,i may communicate my idea to others1 whose idea will then be an idea of an idea in my mind4 ,my idea of ,pericles1 or my idea of any person now alive whom ,i have never seen1 differs from these in the circumstance that ,i #fi am persuaded that a real object corresponding to the idea does now1 or did once1 exist in the world of sensation3 but as ,i did not derive my idea from the object1 but from some other person's words1 my idea is not a copy of the original1 but a copy 7more or less imperfect7 of some other person's copy3 it is an idea of an idea4 ,although1 however1 the complex idea ,i have of an object which never was presented to my senses1 is rightly described as an idea of an idea2 my remembrance of a complex idea which ,i have had before1 does not seem to me to differ from the remembered idea as an idea differs from a sensation4 ,there is a distinction between my visual idea of ,mont ,blanc and the actual sight of the mountain1 which ,i do not find between my remembrance of ,falstaff and the original impression from which it was derived4 ,my present thought of ,falstaff seems to me not a copy but a repetition of the original idea2 a repetition which may be dimmed by distance1 or which may1 on the contrary1 be heightened by intermediate processes of thought2 may have lost some of its features by lapse of time1 and may have acquired others by reference to the original sources2 but which resembles the first impression not as the thought of an object resembles the sight of it1 but as a second or third sight of an object resembles the first4 ,this question will meet us again in the psychological examination of ,memory1 the theory of which is in no small degree dependent upon it4--,ed4 #gj ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,,the ,,association ,,of ,,ideas4 ,to have a clear view of the phenomena of the mind1 as mere affections or states of it1 existing successively1 and in a certain series1 which we are able1 therefore1 to predict1 in consequence of our knowledge of the past1 is1 ,i conceive1 to have made the most important acquisition which the intellectual inquirer can make4 ,brown1 ,lectures1 i4 #edd4 ,,thought succeeds thought2 idea follows idea1 incessantly4 ,if our senses are awake1 we are continually receiving sensations1 of the eye1 the ear1 the touch1 and so forth2 but not sensations alone4 ,after sensations1 ideas are perpetually excited of sensations formerly received2 after those ideas1 other ideas3 and during the whole of our lives1 a series of those two states of consciousness1 called sensations1 and ideas1 is constantly going on4 ,i see a horse3 that is a sensation4 ,immediately ,i think of his master3 that is an idea4 ,the idea of his master makes me think of his office2 he is a minister of state3 that is another idea4 ,the idea of a minister of state makes me think of public affairs2 and ,i am led into a train of political ideas2 when ,i am summoned to dinner4 ,this is a new sensation1 followed by the idea of dinner1 and of the company with whom ,i am to partake it4 ,the sight of the company and of the food are other #ga sensations2 these suggest ideas without end2 other sensations perpetually intervene1 suggesting other ideas3 and so the process goes on4 ,in contemplating this train of feelings1 of which our lives consist1 it first of all strikes the contemplator1 as of importance to ascertain1 whether they occur casually and irregularly1 or according to a certain order4 ,with respect to the ,,sensations1 it is obvious enough that they occur1 according to the order established among what we call the objects of nature1 whatever those objects are2 to ascertain more and more of which order is the business of physical philosophy in all its branches4 ,of the order established among the objects of nature1 by which we mean the objects of our senses1 two remarkable cases are all which here we are called upon to notice2 the ,,synchronous ,,order1 and the ,,successive ,,order4 ,the synchronous order1 or order of simultaneous existence1 is the order in space2 the successive order1 or order of antecedent and consequent existence1 is the order in time4 ,thus the various objects in my room1 the chairs1 the tables1 the books1 have the synchronous order1 or order in space4 ,the falling of the spark1 and the explosion of the gunpowder1 have the successive order1 or order in time4 ,according to this order1 in the objects of sense1 there is a synchronous1 and a successive1 order of our sensations4 ,i have ,,synchronically1 or at the same instant1 the sight of a great variety of objects2 touch of all the objects with which my body is in contact2 hearing of all the sounds which are reaching my ears2 smelling of all the smells which are reaching my #gb nostrils2 taste of the apple which ,i am eating2 the sensation of resistance both from the apple which is in my mouth1 and the ground on which ,i stand2 with the sensation of motion from the act of walking4 ,i have ,,successively the sight of the flash from the mortar fired at a distance1 the hearing of the report1 the sight of the bomb1 and of its motion in the air1 the sight of its fall1 the sight and hearing of its explosion1 and lastly1 the sight of all the effects of that explosion4#be ,bain's footnote #be3 ,there is here raised the interesting and important question1 how far are we able to entertain synchronous sensations2 in other words1 whether or not we can be cognisant of a plurality of sensations at the same instant of time4 ,there are various circumstances tending to obscure this point2 the chief being the extreme rapidity of our mental transitions4 ,it is requisite to view the question from two sides1 the side of sensation and the side of action4 ,on the first1 the appearances are more in favour of plurality2 on the second1 more in favour of unity4 ,as regards ,sensation1 we are incessantly solicited by a variety of agencies1 outward and inward4 ,we may be roused into consciousness1 through the eye1 through the ear1 through the touch1 through the taste1 through the smell1 through the organic sensibilities2 and all this at the same time with the rise of emotions or ideas through purely mental causes4 ,nay more2 even under a single sense1 we may have a plurality of distinguishable impressions4 ,sight is the greatest example4 ,hearing is little inferior2 witness the complexity of a band of music1 and the tumult of a stormy sea4 ,in ,touch1 likewise1 we may have a plurality of distinguishable feelings of contact over the body4 ,the point to be considered1 then1 is1 how many of these multitudinous effects1 strictly synchronous in their occurrence1 are capable of operating synchronously1 either in directing the thoughts1 or in impressing the memory4 ,how many of them are able to work the smallest assignable change upon the consciousness8 ,to all appearance1 more than one at a time4 ,consider first the two senses most concerned in developing 7out of muscular feeling as the basis7 the notion of ,space or ,extension2 that is1 ,touch and ,sight4 ,it will be enough to comment upon ,sight4 ,the eye1 as is known1 takes in a wide prospect2 the retinas of the two eyes combined can embrace a large fraction of the surrounding visible sphere4 ,now1 the attention at any one moment is confined to a limited portion3 the precise limits are not here considered2 there being a complication of action with sensation proper1 which will be adverted to afterwards4 ,but1 notwithstanding this confinement of the attention1 there is a consciousness of the whole visible expanse2 as is proved in the case of any sudden change at any part2 the attention is then instantly diverted to that part4 ,we might say that there is1 at every moment1 a ramified area of sensibility1 at its maximum in the centre--the line of direction of the eyes1 and decreasing to the extremity or circumference of the visible expanse4 ,to one gazing at the heavens1 the flash of a meteor would be felt throughout the whole area of visibility2 while it would be more certain in its effect1 the nearer it was to the line of perfect vision1 which is the place of special attention4 ,a faint corruscation arising near the circumference might pass unheeded4 ,next as to the sense of ,hearing4 ,peculiar difficulties attend the explanation of this sense4 ,there is only one main line of access to the inner ear1 where the nerves are distributed1 namely1 the solid chain of bones of the middle ear2 and that line can hardly be supposed capable of conveying at the same instant a plurality of different series of vibrations4 ,yet we fancy that we hear a concurring plurality of sounds4 ,of what avail would be a band of a hundred performers if there were no power of taking in simultaneous pulses of sound8 ,there is1 however1 an absence of accurate investigation of this point2 no one has endeavoured to ascertain how much of the complex effect is due to the rapid transitions of the ear from one sound to another1 how much to the concurrence of several series of pulses in one augmented series1 and how much to the composition of successive effects in the ear into a synchronous whole in the emotional wave1 or general excitement of the brain4 ,it will be found1 by any careful observer1 that in listening to a band1 we are really occupied with very few of the sounds at the same instant of time2 we perform a number of rapid movements of the attention from one to another2 while1 at each moment1 we are under an influence remaining from the recently occurring beats1 to which we are not now giving our full attention4 ,touch is exactly parallel to ,sight1 and need not be dwelt upon4 ,in ,smell1 and in ,taste1 we may have a plurality of distinguishable effects at one moment3 we often experience complex odours and tastes4 ,the above remarks will apply to these4 ,the undoubted tendency of the mind is to single out1 for attention1 the separate constituents by turns1 and to pass with rapidity from one to another2 while it is also true that the individual effects that are for the moment seemingly neglected1 still exercise an influence on the consciousness2 which would be decisively shown 7as in the case of sight7 on any occasion of their suddenly increasing in force1 or suddenly vanishing4 ,also1 in their state of having fallen out of attention1 they still leave an influence to modify the present sensation1 the effect of their being attended to in the previous instant4 ,until we can measure the rapidity of those transitions of the attention1 we are not in a position to affirm absolutely the power of double1 triple1 or multiple attention1 although to all practical intents such a power is possessed4 ,it is certain that the mind is every moment actuated and determined by a plurality of influences1 impressions1 considerations1 thoughts4 ,almost every act of the will is a resultant of many motives4 ,our thoughts seldom spring up at the instance of a simple link of association2 although it may happen that some one link is sufficing and overpowering1 and therefore governs the recall2 yet there are almost always others aiding or checking the particular resuscitation4 ,nevertheless1 such complication of antecedents is not inconsistent with the theory of very rapid transitions of attention1 there being a certain persisting influence from each separate act4 ,there would1 however1 be a greater theoretical simplicity1 as well as a less appearance of straining a point1 if we could suppose that the several conspiring agencies unite in a strictly synchronous whole4 ,let us next view the question from the side of ,activity4 ,here the circumstance that would most decisively limit the power of attention1 and impose an absolute unity 7qualified by rapidity of transition7 is the singleness of the muscular executive4 ,no one organ can perform two movements at the same instant4 ,plurality can arise only by the separate organs performing separate actions4 ,in such a case as playing on the pianoforte1 there is a very complicated series of muscular exertions4 ,the eyes are occupied with the printed music2 both hands are exerted1 and every finger performs a separate note2 the foot also may be brought into action4 ,at the same time1 the ear has to be on the alert4 ,the plurality is here very great2 yet it seems much greater than it is4 ,for1 at the stage when such a performance is possible1 there is a great amount of acquirement2 many synchronous groupings have been made by long repetition1 so as to dispense with attending to the several acts in separation4 ,the real attention is concentrated on one1 or on a very few acts2 so few that it is not impossible for them to be commanded by the mere rapidity of transition from one to another4 ,the performer need not attend to the notes of the music1 and to the action of the fingers at the same absolute instant of time4 ,it is in the case of commencing some act entirely new to us1 that the limitation of the muscular executive is most apparent4 ,in learning the first elements of any accomplishment by imitating a master1 the whole attention is concentrated on single movements2 at one instant on the master1 and the next instant on the act of imitating2 the only synchronous addition to this last being the remaining trace of the impression of the model4 ,if the act is complicated1 and requires concurring movements of different organs1 the attention1 at the outset1 must be given to one at a time2 the conjunction of independent movements is not a primitive1 but an acquired power4 ,previous to acquired groupings1 the restriction of the attention to one movement is the rule4 ,let us now consider the senses as compounded of passive sensation and movement4 ,the eye1 for example1 is a moving organ under the command of the will2 both eyes being moved in one indivisible volition4 ,visual attention consists sometimes in moving the eyes to and fro1 at other times1 in fixing them in one immoveable attitude4 ,we have seen that so far as the optical sensibility is concerned1 there is at each instant an effective impression of a wide area1 although of very unequal distinctness4 ,the impressions derived from the movements of the eye are much more limited4 ,at the same absolute instant of time1 we can scan only a very small portion2 say the outline of some isolated form1 or the trace of an isolated movement4 ,we can run rapidly round the circumference of a round body1 or along the edge of a cubical block4 ,in looking at a tree1 we perform a series of muscular sweeps1 scarcely including1 at one time1 more than a single outline course4 ,no doubt our optical sensibility is receiving1 in a faint way1 a complicated superficies2 yet the ocular sweep1 on which we depend for our ideas of form1 can hardly be supposed to take more than one line at the same instant4 ,the rapidity of transition is very great2 but there is a conscious transition when we wish to combine the impression of a circle inscribed in a square4--,b4 #gc ,among the objects which ,i have thus observed synchronically1 or successively2 that is1 from which ,i #gd have had synchronical or successive sensations2 there are some which ,i have so observed frequently2 others #ge which ,i have so observed not frequently3 in other words1 of my sensations some have been frequently #gf synchronical1 others not frequently2 some frequently successive1 others not frequently4 ,thus1 my sight of #gg roast beef1 and my taste of roast beef1 have been frequently ,,synchronical2 my smell of a rose1 and my sight and touch of a rose1 have been frequently synchronical2 my sight of a stone1 and my sensations of its hardness1 and weight1 have been frequently synchronical4 ,others of my sensations have not been frequently synchronical3 my sight of a lion1 and the hearing of his roar2 my sight of a knife1 and its stabbing a man4 ,my sight of the flash of lightning1 and my hearing of the thunder1 have been often ,,successive2 the pain of cold1 and the pleasure of heat1 have been often successive2 the sight of a trumpet1 and the sound of a trumpet1 have been often successive4 ,on the other hand1 my sight of hemlock1 and my taste of hemlock1 have not been often successive3 and so on4 ,it so happens1 that1 of the objects from which we derive the greatest part of our sensations1 most of those which are observed synchronically1 are frequently observed synchronically2 most of those which are observed successively1 are frequently observed successively4 ,in other words1 most of our synchronical sensations1 have been frequently synchronical2 most of our successive sensations1 have been frequently successive4 ,thus1 most of our synchronical sensations are derived from the objects around us1 the objects which we have the most frequent occasion to hear and see2 the members of our family2 the furniture of our houses2 our food2 the instruments of #gh our occupations or amusements4 ,in like manner1 of those sensations which we have had in succession1 we have had the greatest number repeatedly in succession2 the sight of fire1 and its warmth2 the touch of snow1 and its cold2 the sight of food1 and its taste4 ,thus much with regard to the order of ,,sensations2 next with regard to the order of ,,ideas4 ,as ideas are not derived from objects1 we should not expect their order to be derived from the order of objects2 but as they are derived from sensations1 we might by analogy expect1 that they would derive their order from that of the sensations2 and this to a great extent is the case4 ,our ideas spring up1 or exist1 in the order in which the sensations existed1 of which they are the copies4 ,this is the general law of the ,association of ,ideas2 by which term1 let it be remembered1 nothing is here meant to be expressed1 but the order of occurrence4 ,in this law1 the following things are to be carefully observed4 #a4 ,of those sensations which occurred synchronically1 the ideas also spring up synchronically4 ,i have seen a violin1 and heard the tones of the violin1 synchronically4 ,if ,i think of the tones of the violin1 the visible appearance of the violin at the same time occurs to me4 ,i have seen the sun1 and the sky in which it is placed1 synchronically4 ,if ,i think of the one1 ,i think of the other at the same time4 ,one of the cases of synchronical sensation1 which deserves the most particular attention1 is1 that of the several sensations derived from one and the same #gi object2 a stone1 for example1 a flower1 a table1 a chair1 a horse1 a man4 ,from a stone ,i have had1 synchronically1 the sensation of colour1 the sensation of hardness1 the sensations of shape1 and size1 the sensation of weight4 ,when the idea of one of these sensations occurs1 the ideas of all of them occur4#bf ,they exist in my mind synchronically2 and their synchronical existence is called the idea of the stone2 which1 it is thus plain1 is not a single idea1 but a number of ideas in a particular state of combination4 ,bain's footnote #bf3 ,this must be qualified by the fact that the same individual sensation may be found in many groupings1 and therefore may not bring up any one aggregate or concrete object in particular4 ,the colour1 white1 is seen in conjunction with many different shapes1 magnitudes1 and weight2 consequently it does not suggest a specific shape or magnitude4 ,in such a case1 the recall may be very various according to circumstances2 some individual may have a greater prominence than the rest1 and be singled out on that ground2 two or three may be brought to view2 or a still greater number may be revived4 ,this is an important limitation of the working of the associating principle4 ,an individual thing is not restored1 as a matter of course1 unless the link of connexion points to it alone2 as is often effected by a plurality of bonds4 ,thus a musical air is not suggested until as many notes are heard as to distinguish it from every other known air4--,b4 ,thus1 again1 ,i have smelt a rose1 and looked at1 and handled a rose1 synchronically2 accordingly the name rose suggests to me all those ideas synchronically2 and this combination of those simple ideas is called my idea of the rose4 ,my idea of an animal is still more complex4 ,the #hj word thrush1 for example1 not only suggests an idea of a particular colour and shape1 and size1 but of song1 and flight1 and nestling1 and eggs1 and callow young1 and others4 ,my idea of a man is the most complex of all2 including not only colour1 and shape1 and voice1 but the whole class of events in which ,i have observed him either the agent or the patient4 #b4 ,as the ideas of the sensations which occurred synchronically1 rise synchronically1 so the ideas of the sensations which occurred successively1 rise successively4 ,of this important case of association1 or of the successive order of our ideas1 many remarkable instances might be adduced4 ,of these none seems better adapted to the learner than the repetition of any passage1 or words2 the ,lord's ,prayer1 for example1 committed to memory4 ,in learning the passage1 we repeat it2 that is1 we pronounce the words1 in successive order1 from the beginning to the end4 ,the order of the sensations is successive4 ,when we proceed to repeat the passage1 the ideas of the words also rise in succession1 the preceding always suggesting the succeeding1 and no other4 ,our suggests ,father1 ,father suggests which1 which suggests art2 and so on1 to the end4 ,how remarkably this is the case1 any one may convince himself1 by trying to repeat backwards1 even a passage with which he is as familiar as the ,lord's ,prayer4 ,the case is the same with numbers4 ,a man can go on with the numbers in the progressive order1 one1 two1 three1 c4 scarcely thinking of his act2 and though it is possible for him to repeat them backward1 because he is accustomed #ha to subtraction of numbers1 he cannot do so without an effort4 ,of witnesses in courts of justice it has been remarked1 that eye-witnesses1 and ear-witnesses1 always tell their story in the chronological order2 in other words1 the ideas occur to them in the order in which the sensations occurred2 on the other hand1 that witnesses1 who are inventing1 rarely adhere to the chronological order4 #c4 ,a far greater number of our sensations are received in the successive1 than in the synchronical order4 ,of our ideas1 also1 the number is infinitely greater that rise in the successive than the synchronical order4 #d4 ,in the successive order of ideas1 that which precedes1 is sometimes called the suggesting1 that which succeeds1 the suggested idea2 not that any power is supposed to reside in the antecedent over the consequent2 suggesting1 and suggested1 mean only antecedent and consequent1 with the additional idea1 that such order is not casual1 but1 to a certain degree1 permanent4 #e4 ,of the antecedent and consequent feelings1 or the suggesting1 and suggested2 the antecedent may be either sensations or ideas2 the consequent are always ideas4 ,an idea may be excited either by a sensation or an idea4 ,the sight of the dog of my friend is a sensation1 and it excites the idea of my friend4 ,the idea of ,professor ,dugald ,stewart delivering a lecture1 recals the idea of the delight with which ,i heard him2 that1 the idea of the studies in which it engaged me2 that1 the trains of thought which succeeded2 and each epoch of my mental history1 the succeeding one1 till the present moment2 in which ,i am endeavouring to present to others what appears to me valuable among #hb the innumerable ideas of which this lengthened train has been composed4 #f4 ,as there are degrees in sensation1 and degrees in ideas2 for one sensation is more vivid than another sensation1 one idea more vivid than another idea2 so there are degrees in association4 ,one association1 we say1 is stronger than another3 ,first1 when it is more permanent than another3 ,secondly1 when it is performed with more certainty3 ,thirdly1 when it is performed with more facility4 ,it is well known1 that some associations are very transient1 others very permanent4 ,the case which we formerly mentioned1 that of repeating words committed to memory1 affords an apt illustration4 ,in some cases1 we can perform the repetition1 when a few hours1 or a few days have elapsed2 but not after a longer period4 ,in others1 we can perform it after the lapse of many years4 ,there are few children in whose minds some association has not been formed between darkness and ghosts4 ,in some this association is soon dissolved2 in some it continues for life4#bg ,bain's footnote #bg3 ,the difference between transient and permanent recollections turns entirely upon the strength of the association4 ,there is not one specific mode of association suited to temporary recollection and another to permanent2 the permanent contains the temporary1 as the greater does the less4 ,the reason why a feebler association will suffice for temporary purposes1 is that a recent impression still retains something of the hold of a present reality4 ,the chords struck during the actual presence have not ceased to vibrate4 ,it is difficult to estimate with precision the influence of recency2 we know it to be very considerable4 ,a thing distinctly remembered for a few hours will be forgotten1 or else held as a mere fragment1 at the end of a month2 while anything that persists for two or three months may be considered as independent of the power of recency1 and may last for years4--,b4 ,in some cases the association takes place with less1 in some with greater certainty4 ,thus1 in repeating words1 ,i am not sure that ,i shall not commit mistakes1 if they are imperfectly got2 and ,i may at one #hc trial repeat them right1 at another wrong3 ,i am sure of always repeating those correctly1 which ,i have got perfectly4 ,thus1 in my native language1 the association between the name and the thing is certain2 in a language with which ,i am imperfectly acquainted1 not certain4 ,in expressing myself in my own language1 the idea of the thing suggests the idea of the name with certainty4 ,in speaking a language with which ,i am imperfectly acquainted1 the idea of the thing does not with certainty suggest the idea of the name2 at one time it may1 at another not4 ,that ideas are associated in some cases with more1 in some with less facility1 is strikingly illustrated by the same instance1 of a language with which we are well1 and a language with which we are imperfectly1 acquainted4 ,in speaking our own language1 we are not conscious of any effort2 the associations between the words and the ideas appear spontaneous4 ,in endeavouring to speak a language with which we are imperfectly acquainted1 we are sensible of a painful effort3 the associations between the words and ideas being not ready1 or immediate4 #g4 ,the causes of strength in association seem all to be resolvable into two2 the vividness of the associated feelings2 and the frequency of the association4 ,in general1 we convey not a very precise meaning1 #hd when we speak of the vividness of sensations and ideas4 ,we may be understood when we say that1 generally speaking1 the sensation is more vivid than the idea2 or the primary1 than the secondary feeling2 though in dreams1 and in delirium1 ideas are mistaken for sensations4 ,but when we say that one sensation is more vivid than another1 there is much more uncertainty4 ,we can distinguish those sensations which are pleasurable1 and those which are painful1 from such as are not so2 and when we call the pleasurable and painful more vivid1 than those which are not so1 we speak intelligibly4 ,we can also distinguish degrees of pleasure1 and of pain2 and when we call the sensation of the higher degree more vivid than the sensation of the lower degree1 we may again be considered as expressing a meaning tolerably precise4 ,in calling one ,,idea more vivid than another1 if we confine the appellation to the ideas of such ,,sensations as may with precision be called more or less vivid2 the sensations of pleasure and pain1 in their various degrees1 compared with sensations which we do not call either pleasurable or painful2 our language will still have a certain degree of precision4 ,but what is the meaning which ,i annex to my words1 when ,i say1 that my idea of the taste of the pine-apple which ,i tasted yesterday is vivid2 my idea of the taste of the foreign fruit which ,i never tasted but once in early life1 is not vivid8 ,if ,i mean that ,i can more certainly distinguish the more recent1 than the more distant sensation1 there is still some precision in my language2 because it seems true of all my senses1 that if ,i compare a distant sensation with a present1 ,i am less sure of its being or not being a repetition of the same1 than #he if ,i compare a recent sensation with a present one4 ,thus1 if ,i yesterday had a smell of a very peculiar kind1 and compare it with a present smell1 ,i can judge more accurately of the agreement or disagreement of the two sensations1 than if ,i compared the present with one much more remote4 ,the same is the case with colours1 with sounds1 with feelings of touch1 and of resistance4 ,it is therefore sufficiently certain1 that the idea of the more recent sensation affords the means of a more accurate comparison1 generally1 than the idea of the more remote sensation4 ,and thus we have three cases of vividness1 of which we can speak with some precision3 the case of sensations1 as compared with ideas2 the case of pleasurable and painful sensations1 and their ideas1 as compared with those which are not pleasurable or painful2 and the case of the more recent1 compared with the more remote4#bh ,editor's footnote #bh3 ,if it be admitted that in the three cases here specified the word vividness1 as applied to our impressions1 has a definite meaning1 it seems to follow that this meaning may be extended in the way of analogy1 to other cases than these4 ,there are1 for example1 sensations which differ from some other sensations like fainter feelings of the same kind1 in much the same manner as the idea of a sensation differs from the sensation itself3 and we may1 by extension1 call these sensations less vivid4 ,again1 one idea may differ from another idea in the same sort of way in which the idea of a sensation had long ago differs from that of a similar sensation received recently3 that is1 it is a more faded copy--its colours and its outlines are more effaced3 this idea may fairly be said to be less vivid than the other4 ,the author himself1 a few pages farther on1 speaks of some complex ideas as being more obscure than others1 merely on account of their greater complexity4 ,obscurity1 indeed1 in this case1 means a different quality from the absence of vividness1 but a quality fully as indefinite4 ,mr4 ,bain1 whose view of the subject will be found further on1 draws a fundamental distinction 7already indicated in a former note7 between the attributes which belong to a sensation regarded in an intellectual point of view1 as a portion of our knowledge1 and those which belong to the element of ,feeling contained in it2 ,feeling being here taken in the narrower acceptation of the word1 that in which ,feeling is opposed to ,intellect or ,thought4 ,to sensations in their intellectual aspect ,mr4 ,bain considers the term vividness to be inapplicable3 they can only be distinct or indistinct4 ,he reserves the word vividness to express the degree of intensity of the sensation1 considered in what may be called its emotional aspect1 whether of pleasure1 of pain1 or of mere excitement4 ,whether we accept this restriction or not1 it is in any case certain1 that the property of producing a strong and durable association without the aid of repetition1 belongs principally to our pleasures and pains4 ,the more intense the pain or pleasure1 the more promptly and powerfully does it associate itself with its accompanying circumstances1 even with those which are only accidentally present4 ,in the cases mentioned in the text1 a single occurrence of the painful sensation is sufficient to produce an association1 which neither time can wear out nor counter-associations dissolve1 between the idea of the pain and the ideas of the sensations which casually accompanied it in that one instance1 however intrinsically indifferent these may be4--,ed4 #hf ,that the association of two ideas1 but for once1 does1 in some cases1 give them a very strong connection1 is within the sphere of every man's experience4 ,the most remarkable cases are probably those of pain and pleasure4 ,some persons who have experienced a very painful surgical operation1 can never afterwards bear the sight of the operator1 however strong the #hg gratitude which they may actually feel towards him4 ,the meaning is1 that the sight of the operator1 by a strong association1 calls up so vividly the idea of the pain of the operation1 that it is itself a pain4 ,the spot on which a tender maiden parted with her lover1 when he embarked on the voyage from which he never returned1 cannot afterwards be seen by her without an agony of grief4 ,these cases1 also1 furnish an apt illustration of the superiority which the sensation possesses over the idea1 as an associating cause4 ,though the sight of the surgeon1 the sight of the place1 would awaken the ideas which we have described1 the mere thought of them might be attended with no peculiar effect4 ,those persons who have the association of frightful objects with darkness1 and who are transported with terrors when placed in the dark1 can still think of darkness without any emotion4 ,the same cases furnish an illustration of the effect of recency on the strength of association4 ,the sight1 of the affecting spot by the maiden1 of the surgeon by the patient1 would certainly produce a more intense emotion1 after a short1 than after a long interval4 ,with most persons1 time would weaken1 and at last dissolve1 the association4 ,so much with regard to vividness1 as a cause of strong associations4 ,next1 we have to consider frequency or repetition2 which is the most remarkable and important cause of the strength of our associations4 ,of any two sensations1 frequently perceived together1 the ideas are associated4 ,thus1 at least1 in the minds of ,englishmen1 the idea of a soldier1 and the idea of a red coat are associated2 the idea of a #hh clergyman1 and the idea of a black coat2 the idea of a quaker1 and of a broad-brimmed hat2 the idea of a woman and the idea of petticoats4 ,a peculiar taste suggests the idea of an apple2 a peculiar smell the idea of a rose4 ,if ,i have heard a particular air frequently sung by a particular person1 the hearing of the air suggests the idea of the person4 ,the most remarkable exemplification of the effect of degrees of frequency1 in producing degrees of strength in the associations1 is to be found in the cases in which the association is purposely and studiously contracted2 the cases in which we learn something2 the use of words1 for example4 ,every child learns the language which is spoken by those around him4 ,he also learns it by degrees4 ,he learns first the names of the most familiar objects2 and among familiar objects1 the names of those which he most frequently has occasion to name2 himself1 his nurse1 his food1 his playthings4 ,a sound heard once in conjunction with another sensation2 the word mamma1 for example1 with the sight of a woman1 would produce no greater effect on the child1 than the conjunction of any other sensation1 which once exists and is gone for ever4 ,but if the word mamma is frequently pronounced1 in conjunction with the sight of a particular woman1 the sound will by degrees become associated with the sight2 and as the pronouncing of the name will call up the idea of the woman1 so the sight of the woman will call up the idea of the name4 ,the process becomes very perceptible to us1 when1 at years of reflection1 we proceed to learn a dead or foreign language4 ,at the first lesson1 we are told1 or #hi we see in the dictionary1 the meaning of perhaps twenty words4 ,but it is not joining the word and its meaning once1 that will make the word suggest its meaning to us another time4 ,we repeat the two in conjunction1 till we think the meaning so well associated with the word1 that whenever the word occurs to us1 the meaning will occur along with it4 ,we are often deceived in this anticipation2 and finding that the meaning is not suggested by the word1 we have to renew the process of repetition1 and this1 perhaps1 again1 and again4 ,by force of repetition the meaning is associated1 at last1 with every word of the language1 and so perfectly1 that the one never occurs to us without the other4 ,learning to play on a musical instrument is another remarkable illustration of the effect of repetition in strengthening associations1 in rendering those sequences1 which1 at first1 are slow1 and difficult1 afterwards1 rapid1 and easy4 ,at first1 the learner1 after thinking of each successive note1 as it stands in his book1 has each time to look out with care for the key or the string which he is to touch1 and the finger he is to touch it with1 and is every moment committing mistakes4 ,repetition is well known to be the only means of overcoming these difficulties4 ,as the repetition goes on1 the sight of the note1 or even the idea of the note1 becomes associated with the place of the key or the string2 and that of the key or the string with the proper finger4 ,the association for a time is imperfect1 but at last becomes so strong1 that it is performed with the greatest rapidity1 without an effort1 and almost without consciousness4 ,in few cases is the strength of association1 derived #ij from repetition1 more worthy of attention1 than in performing arithmetic4 ,all men1 whose practice is not great1 find the addition of a long column of numbers1 tedious1 and the accuracy of the operation1 by no means certain4 ,till a man has had considerable practice1 there are few acts of the mind more toilsome4 ,the reason is1 that the names of the numbers1 which correspond to the different steps1 do not readily occur2 that is1 are not strongly associated with the names which precede them4 ,thus1 #g added to #e1 make #ab2 but the antecedent1 #g added to #e1 is not strongly associated with the consequent #ab1 in the mind of the learner1 and he has to wait and search till the name occurs4 ,thus1 again1 #ab and #g make #ai2 #ai and #h make #bg1 and so on to any amount2 but if the practice of the performer has been small1 the association in each instance is imperfect1 and the process irksome and slow4 ,practice1 however2 that is1 frequency of repetition2 makes the association between each of these antecedents and its proper consequent so perfect1 that no sooner is the one conceived than the other is conceived1 and an expert arithmetician can tell the amount of a long column of figures1 with a rapidity1 which seems almost miraculous to the man whose faculty of numeration is of the ordinary standard4 #h4 ,where two or more ideas have been often repeated together1 and the association has become very strong1 they sometimes spring up in such close combination as not to be distinguishable4 ,some cases of sensation are analogous4 ,for example2 when a wheel1 on the seven parts of which the seven prismatic colours are respectively painted1 is made to revolve rapidly1 it appears not of seven colours1 but of one #ia uniform colour1 white4 ,by the rapidity of the succession1 the several sensations cease to be distinguishable2 they run1 as it were1 together1 and a new sensation1 compounded of all the seven1 but apparently a simple one1 is the result4 ,ideas1 also1 which have been so often conjoined1 that whenever one exists in the mind1 the others immediately exist along with it1 seem to run into one another1 to coalesce1 as it were1 and out of many to form one idea2 which idea1 however in reality complex1 appears to be no less simple1 than any one of those of which it is compounded4 ,the word gold1 for example1 or the word iron1 appears to express as simple an idea1 as the word colour1 or the word sound4 ,yet it is immediately seen1 that the idea of each of those metals is made up of the separate ideas of several sensations2 colour1 hardness1 extension1 weight4 ,those ideas1 however1 present themselves in such intimate union1 that they are constantly spoken of as one1 not many4 ,we say1 our idea of iron1 our idea of gold2 and it is only with an effort that reflecting men perform the decomposition4 ,the idea expressed by the term weight1 appears so perfectly simple1 that he is a good metaphysician1 who can trace its composition4 ,yet it involves1 of course1 the idea of resistance1 which we have shewn above to be compounded1 and to involve the feeling attendant upon the contraction of muscles2 and the feeling or feelings1 denominated ,will2 it involves the idea1 not of resistance simply1 but of resistance in a particular direction2 the idea of direction1 therefore1 is included in it1 and in that are involved the ideas of extension1 and of place and motion1 some of the most complicated phenomena of the human mind4 #ib ,the ideas of hardness and extension have been so uniformly regarded as simple1 that the greatest metaphysicians have set them down as the copies of simple sensations of touch4 ,hartley and ,darwin1 were1 ,i believe1 the first who thought of assigning to them a different origin4 ,we call a thing hard1 because it resists compression1 or separation of parts2 that is1 because to compress it1 or separate it into parts1 what we call muscular force is required4 ,the idea1 then1 of muscular action1 and of all the feelings which go to it1 are involved in the idea of hardness4 ,the idea of extension is derived from the muscular feelings in what we call the motion of parts of our own bodies2 as for example1 the hands4 ,i move my hand along a line2 ,i have certain sensations2 on account of these sensations1 ,i call the line long1 or extended4 ,the idea of lines in the direction of length1 breadth1 and thickness1 constitutes the general idea of extension4 ,in the idea of extension1 there are included three of the most complex of our ideas2 motion2 time1 which is included in motion2 and space1 which is included in direction4 ,we are not yet prepared to explain the simple ideas which compose the very complex ideas1 of motion1 space1 and time2 it is enough at present to have shewn1 that in the idea of extension1 which appears so very simple1 a great number of ideas are nevertheless included2 and that this is a case of that combination of ideas in the higher degrees of association1 in which the simple ideas are so intimately blended1 as to have the appearance1 not of a complex1 but of a simple idea4 ,it is to this great law of association1 that we trace #ic the formation of our ideas of what we call external objects2 that is1 the ideas of a certain number of sensations1 received together so frequently that they coalesce as it were1 and are spoken of under the idea of unity4 ,hence1 what we call the idea of a tree1 the idea of a stone1 the idea of a horse1 the idea of a man4 ,in using the names1 tree1 horse1 man1 the names of what ,i call objects1 ,i am referring1 and can be referring1 only to my own sensations2 in fact1 therefore1 only naming a certain number of sensations1 regarded as in a particular state of combination2 that is1 concomitance4 ,particular sensations of sight1 of touch1 of the muscles1 are the sensations1 to the ideas of which1 colour1 extension1 roughness1 hardness1 smoothness1 taste1 smell1 so coalescing as to appear one idea1 ,i give the name1 idea of a tree4 ,to this case of high association1 this blending together of many ideas1 in so close a combination that they appear not many ideas1 but one idea1 we owe1 as ,i shall afterwards more fully explain1 the power of classification1 and all the advantages of language4 ,it is obviously1 therefore1 of the greatest moment1 that this important phenomenon should be well understood4 #i4 ,some ideas are by frequency and strength of association so closely combined1 that they cannot be separated4 ,if one exists1 the other exists along with it1 in spite of whatever effort we make to disjoin them4 ,for example2 it is not in our power to think of colour1 without thinking of extension2 or of solidity1 without figure4 ,we have seen colour constantly in combination with extension1 spread1 as it were1 upon a #id surface4 ,we have never seen it except in this connection4 ,colour and extension have been invariably conjoined4 ,the idea of colour1 therefore1 uniformly comes into the mind1 bringing that of extension along with it2 and so close is the association1 that it is not in our power to dissolve it4 ,we cannot1 if we will1 think of colour1 but in combination with extension4 ,the one idea calls up the other1 and retains it1 so long as the other is retained4 ,this great law of our nature is illustrated in a manner equally striking1 by the connection between the ideas of solidity and figure4 ,we never have the sensations from which the idea of solidity is derived1 but in conjunction with the sensations whence the idea of figure is derived4 ,if we handle any thing solid1 it is always either round1 square1 or of some other form4 ,the ideas correspond with the sensations4 ,if the idea of solidity rises1 that of figure rises along with it4 ,the idea of figure which rises1 is1 of course1 more obscure than that of extension2 because1 figures being innumerable1 the general idea is exceedingly complex1 and hence1 of necessity1 obscure4 ,but1 such as it is1 the idea of figure is always present when that of solidity is present2 nor can we1 by any effort1 think of the one without thinking of the other at the same time4 ,of all the cases of this important law of association1 there is none more extraordinary than what some philosophers have called1 the acquired perceptions of sight4 ,when ,i lift my eyes from the paper on which ,i am writing1 ,i see the chairs1 and tables1 and walls of my room1 each of its proper shape1 and at its proper #ie distance4 ,i see1 from my window1 trees1 and meadows1 and horses1 and oxen1 and distant hills4 ,i see each of its proper size1 of its proper form1 and at its proper distance2 and these particulars appear as immediate informations of the eye1 as the colours which ,i see by means of it4 ,yet1 philosophy has ascertained1 that we derive nothing from the eye whatever1 but sensations of colour2 that the idea of extension1 in which size1 and form1 and distance are included1 is derived from sensations1 not in the eye1 but in the muscular part of our frame4 ,how1 then1 is it1 that we receive accurate information1 by the eye1 of size1 and shape1 and distance8 ,by association merely4#bi ,bain's footnote #bi3 ,we derive through the eye 7#a7 sensations of light in its various degrees1 and of colours and their shades2 7#b7 visible form and visible magnitude1 together with their changes2 and also visible movements4 ,the second group of feelings depends on the movements of the eyes2 and they are feelings of activity1 or of muscular expenditure4 ,we have1 besides1 a certain internal muscular sensibility to the alterations of the eye ball in adjusting for distance--,b4 ,the colours upon a body are different1 according to its figure1 its distance1 and its size4 ,but the sensations of colour1 and what we may here1 for brevity1 call the sensations 99of extension1 of figure1 of distance1 have been so often united1 felt in conjunction1 that the sensation of the colour is never experienced without raising the ideas of the extension1 the figure1 the distance1 in such intimate union with it1 that they not only cannot be separated1 but are actually supposed to be seen4 ,the sight1 as it is called1 of figure1 or #if distance1 appearing1 as it does1 a simple sensation1 is in reality a complex state of consciousness2 a sequence1 in which the antecedent1 a sensation of colour1 and the consequent1 a number of ideas1 are so closely combined by association1 that they appear not one idea1 but one sensation4 ,some persons1 by the folly of those about them1 in early life1 have formed associations between the sound of thunder1 and danger to their lives4 ,they are accordingly in a state of agitation during a thunder storm4 ,the sound of the thunder calls up the idea of danger1 and no effort they can make1 no reasoning they can use with themselves1 to show how small the chance that they will be harmed1 empowers them to dissolve the spell1 to break the association1 and deliver themselves from the tormenting idea1 while the sensation or the expectation of it remains4 ,another very familiar illustration may be adduced4 ,some persons have what is called an antipathy to a spider1 a toad1 or a rat4 ,these feelings generally originate in some early fright4 ,the idea of danger has been on some occasion so intensely excited along with the touch or sight of the animal1 and hence the association so strongly formed1 that it cannot be dissolved4 ,the sensation1 in spite of them1 excites the idea1 and produces the uneasiness which the idea imports4 ,the following of one idea after another idea1 or after a sensation1 so certainly that we cannot prevent the combination1 nor avoid having the consequent feeling as often as we have the antecedent1 is a law of association1 the operation of which we shall afterwards find to be extensive1 and bearing a principal part in #ig some of the most important phenomena of the human mind4 ,as there are some ideas so intimately blended by association1 that it is not in our power to separate them2 there seem to be others1 which it is not in our power to combine4 ,dr4 ,brown1 in exposing some errors of his predecessors1 with respect to the acquired perceptions of sight1 observes3 ,i cannot blend my notions of the two surfaces1 a plane1 and a convex1 as one surface1 both plane and convex1 more than ,i can think of a whole which is less than a fraction of itself1 or a square of which the sides are not equal4 ,the case1 here1 appears to be1 that a strong association excludes whatever is opposite to it4 ,i cannot associate the two ideas of assafoetida1 and the taste of sugar4 ,why8 ,because the idea of assafoetida is so strongly associated with the idea of another taste1 that the idea of that other taste rises in combination with the idea of assafoetida1 and of course the idea of sugar does not rise4 ,i have one idea associated with the word pain4 ,why can ,i not associate pleasure with the word pain8 ,because another indissoluble association springs up1 and excludes it4 ,this is1 therefore1 only a case of indissoluble association2 but one of much importance1 as we shall find when we come to the exposition of some of the more complicated of our mental phenomena4#cj ,editor's footnote #cj3 ,some further elucidation seems needful of what is here said1 in so summary a manner1 respecting ideas which it is not in our power to combine3 an inability which it is essential to the analysis of some of the more complex phenomena of mind that we should understand the meaning of4 ,the explanation is indicated1 but hardly more than indicated1 in the text4 ,it seems to follow from the universal law of association1 that any idea could be associated with any other idea1 if the corresponding sensations1 or even the ideas themselves1 were presented in juxtaposition with sufficient frequency4 ,if1 therefore1 there are ideas which cannot be associated with each other1 it must be because there is something that prevents this juxtaposition4 ,two conditions hence appear to be required1 to render ideas incapable of combination4 ,first1 the sensations must be incapable of being had together4 ,if we cannot associate the taste of assafoetida with the taste of sugar1 it is implied1 that we cannot have the taste of assafoetida along with the taste of sugar4 ,if we could1 a sufficient experience would enable us to associate the ideas4 ,here1 therefore1 is one necessary condition of the impossibility of associating certain ideas with one another4 ,but this condition1 though necessary1 is not sufficient4 ,we are but too capable of associating ideas together though the corresponding external facts are really incompatible4 ,in the case of many errors1 prejudices1 and superstitions1 two ideas are so closely and obstinately associated1 that the man cannot1 at least for the time1 help believing that the association represents a real coexistence or sequence between outward facts1 though such coexistence or sequence may contradict a positive law of the physical world4 ,there is therefore a further condition required to render two ideas unassociable1 and this is1 that one of them shall be already associated with some idea which excludes the other4 ,thus far the analysis is carried in the author's text4 ,but the question remains1 what ideas exclude one another8 ,on careful consideration ,i can only find one case of such exclusion3 when one of the ideas either contains1 or raises up by association1 the idea of the absence of the other4 ,i am aware of no case of absolute incompatibility of thought or of imagination1 except between the presence of something and its absence2 between an affirmative and the corresponding negative4 ,if an idea irresistibly raises up the idea of the absence of a certain sensation1 it cannot become associated with the idea of that sensation2 for it is impossible to combine together in the same mental representation1 the presence of a sensation and its absence4 ,we are not yet1 however1 at the end of the difficulty2 for it may be objected1 that the idea of the absence of anything is the idea of a negation1 of a nullity2 and the idea of nothing must itself be nothing--no idea at all4 ,this objection has imposed upon more than one metaphysician2 but the solution of the paradox is very simple4 ,the idea of the presence of a sensation is the idea of the sensation itself along with certain accompanying circumstances3 the idea of the absence of the sensation is the idea of the same accompanying circumstances without the sensation4 ,for example3 my idea of a body is the idea of a feeling of resistance1 accompanying a certain muscular action of my own1 say of my hand2 my idea of no body1 in other words1 of empty space1 is the idea of the same or a similar muscular action of my own1 not attended by any feeling of resistance4 ,neither of these is an idea of a mere negation2 both are positive mental representations3 but inasmuch as one of them includes the negation of something positive which is an actual part of the other1 they are mutually incompatible3 and any idea which is so associated with one of them as to recall it instantly and irresistibly1 is incapable of being associated with the other4 ,the instance cited by the author from ,dr4 ,brown1 is a good illustration of the law4 ,we can associate the ideas of a plane and of a convex surface as two surfaces side by side2 but we cannot fuse the two mental images into one1 and represent to ourselves the very same series of points giving us the sensations we receive from a plane surface and those we receive from a convex surface both at once4 ,that this cannot but be so1 is a corollary from the elementary law of association4 ,not only has no instance ever occurred in our experience of a surface which gave us at the same moment both these sets of sensations2 but whenever in our experience a surface originally plane1 came to give us the sensations we receive from a convex surface 7as for instance when we bend a flat sheet of paper71 it1 at the very same moment1 ceased to be1 or to appear1 a plane4 ,the commencement of the one set of sensations has always been simultaneous with the cessation of the other set1 and this experience1 not being affected by any change of circumstances1 has the constancy and invariability of a law of nature4 ,it forms a correspondingly strong association2 and we become unable to have an idea of either set of sensations1 those of planeness or those of convexity1 without having the idea of the disappearance of the other set1 if they existed previously4 ,i believe it will be found that all the mental incompatibilities1 the impossibilities of thought1 of which so much is made by a certain class of metaphysicians1 can be accounted for in a similar manner4--,ed4 #ih #aj4 ,it not unfrequently happens in our associated feelings1 that the antecedent is of no importance #ii farther than as it introduces the consequent4 ,in these cases1 the consequent absorbs all the attention1 #ajj and the antecedent is instantly forgotten4 ,of this a very intelligible illustration is afforded by what happens in ordinary discourse4 ,a friend arrives from a distant country1 and brings me the first intelligence of the last illness1 the last words1 the last acts1 and death of my son4 ,the sound of the voice1 the articulation of every word1 makes its sensation in my ear2 but it is to the ideas that my attention flies4 ,it is my son that is before me1 suffering1 acting1 speaking1 dying4 ,the words which have introduced the ideas1 and kindled the affections1 have been as little heeded1 as the respiration which has been accelerated1 while the ideas were received4 ,it is important in respect to this case of association #aja to remark1 that there are large classes of our sensations1 such as many of those in the alimentary duct1 and many in the nervous and vascular systems1 which serve1 as antecedents1 to introduce ideas1 as consequents2 but as the consequents are far more interesting than themselves1 and immediately absorb the attention1 the antecedents are habitually overlooked2 and though they exercise1 by the trains which they introduce1 a great influence on our happiness or misery1 they themselves are generally wholly unknown4 ,that there are connections between our ideas and certain states of the internal organs1 is proved by many familiar instances4 ,thus1 anxiety1 in most people1 disorders the digestion4 ,it is no wonder1 then1 that the internal feelings which accompany indigestion1 should excite the ideas which prevail in a state of anxiety4 ,fear1 in most people1 accelerates1 in a remarkable manner1 the vermicular motion of the intestines4 ,there is an association1 therefore1 between certain states of the intestines1 and terrible ideas2 and this is sufficiently confirmed by the horrible dreams to which men are subject from indigestion2 and the hypochondria1 more or less afflicting1 which almost always accompanies certain morbid states of the digestive organs4 ,the grateful food which excites pleasurable sensations in the mouth1 continues them in the stomach2 and1 as pleasures excite ideas of their causes1 and these of similar causes1 and causes excite ideas of their effects1 and so on1 trains of pleasurable ideas take their origin from pleasurable sensations in the stomach4 ,uneasy sensations in the stomach1 produce analogous effects4 ,disagreeable sensations are #ajb associated with disagreeable circumstances3 a train is introduced1 in which1 one painful idea following another1 combinations1 to the last degree afflictive1 are sometimes introduced1 and the sufferer is altogether overwhelmed by dismal associations4#ca #cb ,bain's footnote #ca3 ,there is more than association in the case here supposed4 ,fear1 anxiety1 and painful emotions generally1 cause disorder in the digestive and other vital functions1 as a part of their nature4 ,every mental state can be proved to have its counterpart physical state2 joy1 sorrow1 fear1 are each embodied in a distinct group of physical effects in the nervous system1 the muscular movements1 and the organic processes4 ,the physical side of agreeable emotions1 as a rule1 is a heightened tone of the purely animal functions4 ,the physical side of fear is a complicated series of effects1 one of them being the depression of the organic processes1 digestion among the rest4 ,in this respect1 however1 it more or less resembles severe pain1 sorrow1 shame1 remorse1 and other states1 characterised by the general phrase depressing passions2 the depression being both mental and physical4 ,the reciprocal agency described in the text1 whereby the painful sensations of indigestion induce fear1 is not dependent on the association of ideas1 but on the deep connections of the emotional states with one another1 through their physical accompaniments4 ,a painful feeling of indigestion has much in common with states of depression due to mental causes1 as1 for example1 the shock of a misfortune1 fear1 sorrow1 and the like4 ,from this alliance it favours the ideas of depressing states4 ,it does more2 it directly reduces that vigorous tone of the system1 which is the support of the courageous and sanguine disposition2 and hence1 surrenders the mind an easy prey to any chance incentive of alarm or anxiety4--,b4 ,editor's footnote #cb3 ,the law of association laid down in this section ranks among the principal of what may be termed the laws of ,obliviscence4 ,it is one of the widest in its action1 and most important in its consequences of all the laws of the mind2 and the merit of the author1 in the large use he makes of it is very great1 as1 though it is the key that unlocks many of the more mysterious phenomena of the mind1 it is among the least familiar of the mental laws1 and is not only overlooked by the great majority of psychologists1 but some1 otherwise of merit1 seem unable to see and understand the law after any quantity of explanation4 ,the first1 however1 of the examples by which the author illustrates this law1 is not marked by his usual felicity4 ,its shortcomings are pointed out by ,mr4 ,bain in the preceding note4 ,the internal feelings 7says the author7 which accompany indigestion1 introduce trains of ideas 7as in the case of horrible dreams1 and of hypochondria7 which are acutely painful1 and may embitter the whole existence1 while the sensations themselves1 being comparatively of little interest1 are unheeded and forgotten4 ,it is true that the sensations in the alimentary canal1 directly produced by indigestion1 though 7as every one knows7 in some cases intense1 are in others so slight as not to fix the attention1 and yet may be followed by melancholy trains of thought1 the connection of which with the state of the digestion may be entirely unobserved3 but by far the most probable supposition appears to be1 that these painful trains are not excited by the sensations1 but that they and the sensations are joint or successive effects of a common organic cause4 ,it is difficult to comprehend how these obscure sensations can excite the distressing trains of ideas by the laws of association2 for what opportunity have these sensations usually had of becoming associated1 either synchronously or successively1 with those ideas8 ,the explanation1 in the text1 of this difficulty1 seems surprisingly insufficient4 ,anxiety1 in most people1 disorders the digestion2 and consequently1 according to the author1 the sensations of indigestion excite the ideas which prevail in a state of anxiety4 ,if that were the true explanation1 the only persons with whom indigestion would depress the spirits1 would be those who had suffered previous depression of spirits1 sufficient in duration and intensity to disorder the digestion1 and to keep it disordered long enough to effect a close and inseparable cohesion between even very slight sensations of indigestion and painful ideas excited by other causes4 ,surely this is not the fact4 ,the theory has a true application in the case of the confirmed hypochondriac4 ,when the sensations have been repeatedly experienced along with the melancholy trains of thought1 a direct association is likely to grow up between the two2 and when this has been effected1 the first touch of the sensations may bring back in full measure the miserable mental state which had coexisted with them1 thus increasing not only the frequency of its recurrence1 but1 by the conjunction of two exciting causes1 the intensity of the misery4 ,but the origin of the state must be looked for elsewhere1 and is probably to be sought in physiology4 ,the other example in the text seems still less relevant4 ,fear tends to accelerate the peristaltic motion1 therefore there is a connection between certain states of the intestines and terrible ideas4 ,to make this available for the author's purpose1 the consequence of the connection ought to be1 that acceleration of the peristaltic motion excites ideas of terror4 ,but does it8 ,the state of indigestion characteristic of hypochondria is not looseness of the bowels1 but is commonly attended with the exact opposite4 ,the author's usual acuteness of discernment seems to have been1 in these cases1 blunted by an unwillingness to admit the possibility that ideas as well as sensations may be directly affected by material conditions4 ,but if1 as he admits1 ideas have a direct action on our bodily organs1 a prima facie case is made out for the localization of our ideas1 equally with our sensations1 in some part of our bodily system2 and there is at least no antecedent presumption against the supposition that the action may be reciprocal--that as ideas sometimes derange the organic functions1 so derangements of organic functions may sometimes modify the trains of our ideas by their own physical action on the brain and nerves1 and not through the associations connected with the sensations they excite4--,ed4 #ajc ,in illustration of the fact1 that sensations and ideas1 which are essential to some of the most important #ajd operations of our minds1 serve only as antecedents to more important consequents1 and are themselves so #aje habitually overlooked1 that their existence is unknown1 we may recur to the remarkable case which we have just explained1 of the ideas introduced by the sensations of sight4 ,the minute gradations of colour1 which accompany varieties of extension1 figure1 and distance1 are insignificant4 ,the figure1 the size1 the distance1 themselves1 on the other hand1 are matters of the greatest importance4 ,the first having introduced the last1 their work is done4 ,the consequents remain the sole objects of attention1 the antecedents are forgotten2 in the present instance1 not completely2 in other instances1 so completely1 that they cannot be recognised4#cc #cd ,bain's footnote #cc3 ,perhaps the most remarkable case of sensations overlooked on their own account1 and considered only as a means of suggesting something else1 is the visual1 or retinal1 magnitude of objects seen by the eye4 ,this is probably the most delicate sensibility within the compass of the mind2 and yet we habitually disregard it for all things near us1 and use it solely for perceiving real magnitude as estimated by our locomotive and other members4 ,the visual magnitude of a table1 or other article in a room1 is never thought of for itself2 although incessantly fluctuating we never think of the fluctuations2 we pass from these to the one constant perception1 named the true or real magnitude4 ,it is only for remote objects1 as the sun and moon1 the clouds1 the distant hills1 that the retinal magnitude abides with us in its own proper character4 ,in looking down a vista1 we may also be aroused to the feeling of retinal magnitude4 ,for perspective drawing1 it is necessary that we should arrest the strong tendency to pass from the visible1 to the real1 forms and dimensions of things4--,b4 ,editor's footnote #cd3 ,the reader1 it may be hoped1 is now familiar with the important psychological fact1 so powerfully grasped and so discerningly employed by ,hartley and the author of the ,analysis1--that when1 through the frequent repetition of a series of sensations1 the corresponding train of ideas rushes through the mind with extreme rapidity1 some of the links are apt to disappear from consciousness as completely as if they had never formed part of the series4 ,it has been a subject of dispute among philosophers which of three things takes place in this case4 ,do the lost ideas pass through the mind without consciousness8 ,do they pass consciously through the mind and are they then instantly forgotten8 ,or do they never come into the mind at all1 being1 as it were1 overleaped and pressed out by the rush of the subsequent ideas8 ,it would seem1 at first sight1 that the first and third suppositions involve impossibilities1 and that the second1 therefore1 is the only one which we are at liberty to adopt4 ,as regards the first1 it may be said--,how can we have a feeling without feeling it1 in other words1 without being conscious of it8 ,with regard to the third1 how1 it may be asked1 can any link of the chain have been altogether absent1 through the pressure of the subsequent links8 ,the subsequent ideas are only there because called up by it1 and would not have arisen at all unless it had arisen first1 however short a time it may have lasted4 ,these arguments seem strong1 but are not so strong as they seem4 ,in favour of the first supposition1 that feelings may be unconsciously present1 various facts and arguments are adduced by ,sir ,william ,hamilton in his ,lectures2 but ,i think ,i have shewn in another work1 that the arguments are inconclusive1 and the facts equally reconcilable with the second of the three hypotheses4 ,that a feeling should not be felt appears to me a contradiction both in words and in nature4 ,but1 though a feeling cannot exist without being felt1 the organic state which is the antecedent of it may exist1 and the feeling itself not follow4 ,this happens1 either if the organic state is not of sufficient duration1 or if an organic state stronger than itself1 and conflicting with it1 is affecting us at the same moment4 ,i hope to be excused for quoting what ,i have said elsewhere on this subject 7,examination of ,sir ,william ,hamilton's ,philosophy1 ch4 #ae74 ,in the case1 for instance1 of a soldier who receives a wound in battle1 but in the excitement of the moment is not aware of the fact1 it is difficult not to believe that if the wound had been accompanied by the usual sensation1 so vivid a feeling would have forced itself to be attended to and remembered4 ,the supposition which seems most probable is1 that the nerves of the particular part were affected as they would have been by the same cause in any other circumstances1 but that1 the nervous centres being intensely occupied with other impressions1 the affection of the local nerves did not reach them1 and no sensation was excited4 ,in like manner1 if we admit 7what physiology is rendering more and more probable7 that our mental feelings1 as well as our sensations1 have for their physical antecedents particular states of the nerves2 it may well be believed that the apparently suppressed links in a chain of association1 those which ,sir ,william ,hamilton considers as latent1 really are so2 that they are not1 even momentarily1 felt2 the chain of causation being continued only physically1 by one organic state of the nerves succeeding another so rapidly that the state of mental consciousness appropriate to each is not produced4 ,we have only to suppose1 either that a nervous modification of too short duration does not produce any sensation or mental feeling at all1 or that the rapid succession of different nervous modifications makes the feelings produced by them interfere with each other1 and become confounded in one mass4 ,the former of these suppositions is extremely probable1 while of the truth of the latter we have positive proof4 ,an example of it is the experiment which ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton quoted from ,mr4 ,mill1 and which had been noticed before either of them by ,hartley4 ,it is known that the seven prismatic colours1 combined in certain proportions1 produce the white light of the solar ray4 ,now1 if the seven colours are painted on spaces bearing the same proportion to one another as in the solar spectrum1 and the coloured surface so produced is passed rapidly before the eyes1 as by the turning of a wheel1 the whole is seen as white4 ,the physiological explanation of this phenomenon may be deduced from another common experiment4 ,if a lighted torch1 or a bar heated to luminousness1 is waved rapidly before the eye1 the appearance produced is that of a ribbon of light2 which is universally understood to prove that the visual sensation persists for a certain short time after its cause has ceased4 ,now1 if this happens with a single colour1 it will happen with a series of colours3 and if the wheel on which the prismatic colours have been painted1 is turned with the same rapidity with which the torch was waved1 each of the seven sensations of colour will last long enough to be contemporaneous with all the others1 and they will naturally produce by their combination the same colour as if they had1 from the beginning1 been excited simultaneously4 ,if anything similar to this obtains in our consciousness generally 7and that it obtains in many cases of consciousness there can be no doubt7 it will follow that whenever the organic modifications of our nervous fibres succeed one another at an interval shorter than the duration of the sensations or other feelings corresponding to them1 those sensations or feelings will1 so to speak1 overlap one another1 and becoming simultaneous instead of successive1 will blend into a state of feeling1 probably as unlike the elements out of which it is engendered1 as the colour white is unlike the prismatic colours4 ,and this may be the source of many of those states of internal or mental feeling which we cannot distinctly refer to a prototype in experience1 our experience only supplying the elements from which1 by this kind of mental chemistry1 they are composed4 ,the elementary feelings may then be said to be latently present1 or to be present but not in consciousness4 ,the truth1 however1 is that the feelings themselves are not present1 consciously or latently1 but that the nervous modifications which are their usual antecedents have been present1 while the consequents have been frustrated1 and another consequent has been produced instead4 ,in this modified form1 therefore1 the first of the three hypotheses may possibly be true4 ,let us now consider the third1 that of the entire elision of some of the ideas which form the associated train4 ,this supposition seemed to be inadmissible1 because the loss of any link would1 it was supposed1 cause the chain itself to break off at that point4 ,to make the hypothesis possible1 it is only1 however1 necessary to suppose1 that1 while the association is acquiring the promptitude and rapidity which it ultimately attains1 each of the successive ideas abides for a brief interval in our consciousness after it has already called up the idea which is to succeed it4 ,each idea in the series1 though introduced1 not by synchronous1 but by successive association1 is thus1 during a part of its continuance1 synchronous with the idea which introduced it3 and as the rapidity of the suggestions increases by still further repetition1 an idea may become synchronous with another which was originally not even contiguous to it1 but separated from it by an intervening link2 or may come into immediate instead of mediate sequence with such an idea4 ,when either of these states of things has continued for some time1 a direct association of the synchronous or of the successive kind will be generated between two ideas which are not proximate links in the chain2 ,a will acquire a direct power of exciting ,c1 independently of the intervening idea ,b4 ,if1 then1 ,b is much less interesting than ,c1 and especially if ,b is of no importance at all in itself1 but only by exciting ,c1 and has therefore nothing to make the mind dwell on it after ,c has been reached1 the association of ,a with ,c is likely to become stronger than that of ,a with ,b3 ,c will be habitually excited directly by ,a2 as the mind runs off to the further ideas suggested by ,c1 ,b will cease to be excited at all2 and the train of association1 like a stream which breaking though its bank cuts off a bend in its course1 will thenceforth flow in the direct line ,,ac1 omitting ,b4 ,this supposition accounts more plausibly than either of the others for the truly wonderful rapidity of thought1 since it does not make so large a demand as the other theories on our ability to believe that a prodigious number of different ideas can successively rush through the mind in an instant too short for measurement4 ,the result is1 that all the three theories of this mental process seem to be quite possible2 and it is not unlikely that each of them may be the real process in some cases1 either in different persons1 or in the same persons under different circumstances4 ,i can only remit the question to future psychologists1 who may be able to contrive crucial experiments for deciding among these various possibilities4--,ed4 #ajf #aa4 ,mr4 ,hume1 and after him other philosophers1 have said that our ideas are associated according to #ajg three principles2 ,contiguity in time and place1 ,causation1 and ,resemblance4 ,the ,contiguity in time and #ajh place1 must mean1 that of the sensations2 and so far it is affirmed1 that the order of the ideas follows that #aji of the sensations4 ,contiguity of two sensations in time1 means the successive order4 ,contiguity of two #aaj sensations in place1 means the synchronous order4 ,we have explained the mode in which ideas are associated1 in the synchronous1 as well as the successive order1 and have traced the principle of contiguity to its proper source4 ,causation1 the second of ,mr4 ,hume's principles1 is the same with contiguity in time1 or the order of succession4 ,causation is only a name for the order established between an antecedent and a consequent2 that is1 the established or constant antecedence of the one1 #aaa and consequence of the other4 ,resemblance only remains1 as an alleged principle of association1 and it is necessary to inquire whether it is included in the laws which have been above expounded4 ,i believe it will be found that we are accustomed to see like things together4 ,when we see a tree1 we generally see more trees than one2 when we see an ox1 we generally see more oxen than one2 a sheep1 more sheep than one2 a man1 more men than one4 ,from this observation1 ,i think1 we may refer resemblance to the law of frequency1 of which it seems to form only a particular case4#ce ,editor's footnote #ce3 ,the reason assigned by the author for considering association by resemblance as a case of association by contiguity1 is perhaps the least successful attempt at a generalisation and simplification of the laws of mental phenomena1 to be found in the work4 ,it ought to be remembered that the author1 as the text shows1 attached little importance to it4 ,and perhaps1 not thinking it important1 he passed it over with a less amount of patient thought than he usually bestowed on his analyses4 ,objects1 he thinks1 remind us of other objects resembling them1 because we are accustomed to see like things together4 ,but we are also accustomed to see like things separate4 ,when two combinations incompatible with one another are both realised in familiar experience1 it requires a very great preponderance of experience on one side to determine the association specially to either4 ,we are also much accustomed to see unlike things together2 ,i do not mean things contrasted1 but simply unlike4 ,unlikeness1 therefore1 not amounting to contrast1 ought to be as much a cause of association as likeness4 ,besides1 the fact that when we see 7for instance7 a sheep1 we usually see more sheep than one1 may cause us1 when we think of a sheep1 to think of an entire flock2 but it does not explain why1 when we see a sheep with a black mark on its forehead1 we are reminded of a sheep with a similar mark1 formerly seen1 though we never saw two such sheep together4 ,it does not explain why a portrait makes us think of the original1 or why a stranger whom we see for the first time reminds us of a person of similar appearance whom we saw many years ago4 ,the law by which an object reminds us of similar objects which we have been used to see along with it1 must be a different law from that by which it reminds us of similar objects which we have not been used to see along with it4 ,but it is the same law by which it reminds us of dissimilar objects which we have been used to see along with it4 ,the sight of a sheep1 if it reminds us of a flock of sheep1 probably by the same law of contiguity1 reminds us of a meadow2 but it must be by some other law that it reminds us of a single sheep previously seen1 and of the occasion on which we saw that single sheep4 ,the attempt to resolve association by resemblance into association by contiguity must perforce be unsuccessful1 inasmuch as there never could have been association by contiguity without a previous association by resemblance4 ,why does a sensation received this instant remind me of sensations which ,i formerly had 7as we commonly say71 along with it8 ,i never had them along with this very sensation4 ,i never had this sensation until now1 and can never have it again4 ,i had the former sensations in conjunction not with it1 but with a sensation exactly like it4 ,and my present sensation could not remind me of those former sensations unlike itself1 unless by first reminding me of the sensation like itself1 which really did coexist with them4 ,there is thus a law of association anterior to1 and presupposed by1 the law of contiguity3 namely1 that a sensation tends to recall what is called the idea of itself1 that is1 the remembrance of a sensation like itself1 if such has previously been experienced4 ,this is implied in what we call recognising a sensation1 as one which has been felt before2 more correctly1 as undistinguishably resembling one which has been felt before4 ,the law in question was scientifically enunciated1 and included1 ,i believe for the first time1 in the list of ,laws of ,association1 by ,sir ,william ,hamilton1 in one of the ,dissertations appended to his edition of ,reid3 but the fact itself is recognised by the author of the ,analysis1 in various passages of his work2 more especially in the second section of the fourteenth chapter4 ,there is1 therefore1 a suggestion by resemblance--a calling up of the idea of a past sensation by a present sensation like it--which not only does not depend on association by contiguity1 but is itself the foundation which association by contiguity requires for its support4 ,when it is admitted that simple sensations remind us of one another by direct resemblance1 many of the complex cases of suggestion by resemblance may be analysed into this elementary case of association by resemblance1 combined with an association by contiguity4 ,a flower1 for instance1 may remind us of a former flower resembling it1 because the present flower exhibits to us certain qualities1 that is1 excites in us certain sensations1 resembling and recalling to our remembrance those we had from the former flower1 and these recall the entire image of the flower by the law of association by contiguity4 ,but this explanation1 though it serves for many cases of complex phenomena suggesting one another by resemblance1 does not suffice for all4 ,for1 the resemblance of complex facts often consists1 not solely1 or principally1 in likeness between the simple sensations1 but far more in likeness of the manner of their combination1 and it is often by this1 rather than by the single features1 that they recall one another4 ,after we had seen1 and well observed1 a single triangle1 when we afterwards saw a second there can be little doubt that it would at once remind us of the first by mere resemblance4 ,but the suggestion would not depend on the sides or on the angles1 any or all of them2 for we might have seen such sides and such angles uncombined1 or combined into some other figure4 ,the resemblance by which one triangle recalls the idea of another is not resemblance in the parts1 but principally and emphatically in the manner in which the parts are put together4 ,i am unable to see any mode in which this case of suggestion can be accounted for by contiguity2 any mode1 at least1 which would fit all cases of the kind4--,ed4 #aab ,mr4 ,hume makes contrast a principle of association1 but not a separate one1 as he thinks it is compounded #aac of ,resemblance and ,causation4 ,it is not necessary for us to show that this is an unsatisfactory account #aad of contrast4 ,it is only necessary to observe1 that1 as a case of association1 it is not distinct from those which we have above explained4 ,a dwarf suggests the idea of a giant4 ,how8 ,we call a dwarf a dwarf1 because he departs from a certain standard4 ,we call a giant a giant1 because he departs from the same standard4 ,this is a case1 therefore1 of resemblance1 that is1 of frequency4 ,pain is said to make us think of pleasure2 and this is considered a case of association by contrast4 ,there is no doubt that pain makes us think of relief from it2 because they have been conjoined1 and the great vividness of the sensations makes the association strong4 ,relief from pain is a species of pleasure2 and one pleasure leads to think of another1 from the resemblance4 ,this is a compound case1 therefore1 of vividness and frequency4 ,all other cases of contrast1 ,i believe1 may be expounded in a similar manner4 ,i have not thought it necessary to be tedious in expounding the observations which ,i have thus stated2 for whether the reader supposes that resemblance is1 or is not1 an original principle of association1 will not affect our future investigations4 #ab4 ,not only do simple ideas1 by strong association1 run together1 and form complex ideas3 but a #aae complex idea1 when the simple ideas which compose it have become so consolidated that it always appears as one1 is capable of entering into combinations with other ideas1 both simple and complex4 ,thus two complex ideas may be united together1 by a strong association1 and coalesce into one1 in the same manner as two or more simple ideas coalesce into one4 ,this union of two complex ideas into one1 ,dr4 ,hartley has called a duplex idea4#cg ,two also of these duplex1 or doubly compounded ideas1 may unite into one2 and these again into other compounds1 without end4 ,it is hardly necessary to mention1 that as two complex ideas unite to form a duplex one1 not only two1 but more than two may so unite2 and what he calls a duplex idea may be compounded of two1 three1 four1 or any number of complex ideas4 ,editor's footnote #cg3 ,i have been unable to trace in ,hartley the expression here ascribed to him4 ,in every passage that ,i can discover1 the name he gives to a combination of two or more complex ideas is that of a decomplex idea4--,ed4 ,some of the most familiar objects with which we are acquainted furnish instances of these unions of complex and duplex ideas4 ,brick is one complex idea1 mortar is another complex idea2 these ideas1 with ideas of position and quantity1 compose my idea of a wall4 ,my idea of a plank is a complex idea1 my idea of a rafter is a complex idea1 my idea of a nail is a complex idea4 ,these1 united with the same ideas of position and quantity1 compose my duplex idea of a floor4 ,in the same manner my complex idea of glass1 and wood1 and others1 compose my duplex idea of a window2 and #aaf these duplex ideas1 united together1 compose my idea of a house1 which is made up of various duplex ideas4 ,how many complex1 or duplex ideas1 are all united in the idea of furniture8 ,how many more in the idea of merchandize8 ,how many more in the idea called ,every ,thing8#ch #ci ,bain's footnote #ch3 ,this chapter raises questions of the most fundamental kind relating to our intellectual constitution4 ,the ,association of ,ideas1 comprehensively viewed1 involves everything connected with the mental persistence and reproduction of ideas2 being offered as adequate to explain the operations named ,memory1 ,reason1 and ,imagination4 ,conditions of the ,growth of ,association1 or of the ,retentiveness of the ,mind4--,a practical1 as well as a theoretical1 interest attaches to the precise statement of the conditions or circumstances that regulate the growth of our associations1 in other words our mental culture generally4 ,all agree in the efficacy of the two conditions mentioned in the text2 the vividness of the feelings associated1 and the frequency of the association1 that is repetition or practice4 ,it is well remarked1 however1 that the phrase vividness of the sensations or ideas does not convey a very precise meaning4 ,the proper attribute of a sensation1 or an idea1 considered as an intellectual element1 is greater or less distinctness2 when an object seen or remembered is seen or remembered distinctly and fully1 and without any unusual labour or effort1 there is nothing more to be desired1 so far as concerns our intelligence4 ,if1 however1 the object is accompanied with feeling--with pleasure or pain--a new element is introduced1 to which other epithets are applicable4 ,a feeling is more or less strong or intense2 and the addition of an intense feeling to an intellectual conception is a sum1 combining both sets of attributes--distinctness and adequacy in the conception1 and intensity in the feeling4 ,an object whose perception or conception is thus accompanied with the animation of strong feeling1 is called lively1 or vivid2 #aag in the absence of feeling1 these epithets are unsuitable4 ,hence1 the associating stimulus expressed by vividness is better expressed by the strength of the feelings4 ,any strong feeling impresses on the mind whatever is the object of it1 or is in any way mixed up with it4 ,we remember by preference the things that have given us either pleasure or pain2 and the effect may be produced by mere excitement although neither pleasurable nor painful2 the influence of a surprise being a case in point4 ,our interest in a thing is but another name for the pleasure that it gives us2 and to inspire interest is to aid the memory4 ,hamilton's ,law of ,preference refers to this source2 and appears to exclude1 or not to recognise1 the efficacy of feelings not pleasurable1 namely1 such as are either painful or neutral4 ,the comprehensive law should include all the feelings1 although there are specific characters attaching to the influence of each of the three modes4 ,pleasure is the most effectual in stamping the memory1 as it is the most powerful in detaining the attention and the thoughts4 ,pain has a conflicting operation2 as affecting the will1 it repels the object2 but as mere excitement it retains it2 we cannot forget what is disagreeable1 merely because we wish to forget it4 ,the stimulant of pain1 as applied in education1 is an indirect pleasure4 ,it is not intended to make the subject of the lesson disagreeable1 but to render painful all diversions from that towards other subjects2 so that comparatively the most pleasing course to a pupil may be to abide by the task prescribed4 ,the influence of the ,feelings upon ,retentiveness is not throughout in proportion to their degree1 whether they are pleasurable1 painful1 or neutral4 ,we have to introduce a modifying circumstance into the case1 namely1 that great strength of feeling absorbs the forces of the system1 and diminishes the power available for cementing an intellectual association4 ,a strong feeling once aroused1 while inflaming the attention upon whatever is bound up with it1 necessarily engages us with itself4 ,the plastic process of fixing a train or aggregate of ideas has but a share of the energies awakened under feeling4 ,it is possible also to stimulate attention1 and thereby to #aah quicken memory1 without the excitement of the feelings1 as in pure voluntary attention4 ,for although the will1 in the last resort1 is stimulated by an end 7which must involve the feelings71 yet we may be strongly moved without being under the excitement of the feelings that enter into the final end4 ,our volitions may be energetic1 without the presence of strong emotions1 notwithstanding that1 apart from our possessing such emotions1 we should not be strongly moved to action4 ,thus1 a difference is made between the influence of the feelings and the influence of the will2 both being powers to impress the memory4 ,the two considerations now advanced1 namely1 the want of strict concomitance between strength of feeling and the stimulus to memory1 and the operation of the will in the abeyance of present feeling1 make it desirable to find some other mode of stating the element or condition that qualifies the influence of ,frequency or ,repetition1 in the growth of memory and association4 ,perhaps the best mode of singling out the operative circumstance is to describe it as ,concentration of ,mind2 the devotion of the mental forces to the thing to be done or remembered--the withdrawal of power from other exercises1 to expend it on the exercise in hand4 ,every circumstance that at once rouses the mental and nervous energies1 and keeps them fixed upon any subject of study or the practice of any art1 is a circumstance in aid of acquisition4 ,no fact more comprehensive1 more exactly in point1 can be assigned than the one now stated4 ,what remains is to apply it in the detail1 or to point out the occasions and conditions that favour1 and those that obstruct1 the concentration of the mental energy4 ,it is under this view that we can best appreciate the efficacy of pleasure 7interest in the subject71 of pain1 of mere excitement1 and of voluntary attention4 ,we can also see1 as an obvious corollary1 the advantage of having the mind unoccupied1 or disengaged for the work1 and the disadvantage of being diverted1 or distracted by other objects4 ,fear1 care1 anxiety1 are hostile to culture by lowering the tone or energy of the mind2 while what power is left concentrates itself upon the subject matter of the anxious feeling4 ,on the other hand1 general vigour of the #aai system1 good health1 easy circumstances1 are all in favour of mental improvement1 provided the force thus made available can be reserved and devoted to that end4 ,thus the two leading conditions of the plastic process are ,frequency of ,repetition1 and ,mental ,concentration4 ,for practical purposes1 these are all that we need to consider1 at least as regards the same individual4 ,we have no art or device for training either body or mind but what is comprised under one or other of these heads4 ,there are methods of superseding the labour of new acquirement1 by adapting existing acquirements to new cases2 but no means can be assigned for the original construction of adhesive links1 apart from these two circumstances4 ,still1 in a large and exhaustive view of the ,retentive power of the mind1 we should not omit to allow for the differences between one mind and another in respect of ,natural ,aptitude for acquiring4 ,when two persons engaged in the same lesson1 for equal periods of time1 and with about equal concentration of mind1 make very unequal progress1 we must admit a difference in natural or constitutional plasticity on that particular subject4 ,sometimes we find extraordinary progress made in acquisition generally2 the same person excelling in languages1 in sciences1 in practical arts1 and in fine arts4 ,more commonly1 however1 we find an aptitude for some subject in particular1 combined with deficiency in other things4 ,one person has great mechanical acquirements1 another lingual1 and so on4 ,the first case is sufficiently common to justify the assumption of degrees of acquisitive or plastic aptitude on the whole1 or a variety in the cerebral endowment corresponding to the adhesion of trains of actions and ideas that have been more or less frequently brought together4 ,if the differences among human beings are not so broad as to make this apparent1 we may refer to the differences between the lower animals and man4 ,the animals have the power of acquiring1 but so limited is that power in comparison with human beings1 that people have often doubted its existence4 #abj ,the second case1 the inequality of the same person's progress in different subjects1 may be looked at in another way4 ,we may view it as incident to the better or worse quality1 for all purposes1 of the special organs concerned4 ,thus to take musical acquisition4 ,this is commonly attributed to a good ear1 meaning a delicate sense of musical notes1 as shown in their nice discrimination4 ,discriminating is a different function from remembering2 yet1 we can only doubt that the fact of being able to discriminate acutely is accompanied by the power of remembering or retaining the impressions of the sense4 ,the superiority of endowment that shows itself in the one function1 embraces also the other4 ,hence we are entitled to say that the special retentiveness for any one subject1 or department of training1 varies with the local endowment involved3 which is not to maintain an identical proposition1 for the local endowment may be held as tested by delicacy of discrimination1 a distinct fact from memory4 ,thus1 a delicate sense of shades of colour would entail a good visual memory for spectacle2 a delicate ear for articulation would indicate a memory for shades and varieties of pronunciation1 thereby counting as a part of the verbal memory4 ,so1 delicate discrimination in the tactile muscles would be followed by rapid acquirements in manipulative or manual art4 ,the ,ultimate ,analysis of the ,laws of ,association4--,it is easy to reduce all the laws ever assigned1 as governing the reproduction of our ideas1 to three1 ,contiguity1 ,similarity1 and ,contrast4 ,it is open to question whether these can be resolved any farther4 ,the author has endeavoured to reduce ,similarity to ,contiguity1 but his reasons show that he had not deeply considered the workings of similarity4 ,hamilton's criticisms on the attempt 7,reid1 p4 #iad7 are just and irrefragable4 ,by far the most important examples of the working of similarity are such as1 by their very nature1 preclude a former contiguity3 as1 for example1 ,franklin's identification of ,electricity and lightning4 ,there is1 nevertheless1 a considerable degree of subtlety in the relationship of the two principles4 ,there may be good reasons #aba for treating them as distinct1 but in their working they are inextricably combined4 ,there can be no contiguity without similarity1 and no similarity without contiguity4 ,when1 looking at a river1 we pronounce its name1 we are properly said to exemplify contiguity2 the river and the name by frequent association are so united that each recalls the other4 ,but mark the steps of the recall4 ,what is strictly present to our view is the impression made by the river while we gaze on it4 ,it is necessary that this impression should1 by virtue of similarity or identity1 re-instate the previous impression of the river1 to which the previous impression of the name was contiguous4 ,if one could suppose failure in the re-instatement of the former idea of the river1 under the new presentation1 there would be no opportunity given to the contiguous bond to come into operation4 ,in that accumulation of the impressions of contiguous ideas1 ending at last in a firm association1 there must be a process of similarity to the extent of reviving the sum of the past at the instance of the present4 ,this is a case of similarity that we give little heed to1 because it is sure and unfailing2 we concern ourselves more with what is liable to uncertainty1 the acquired strength of the contiguous adhesion4 ,yet it strictly comes under the case of reproduction through similarity4 ,consider again1 what may be called a case of ,similarity proper1 as when a portrait recalls the original4 ,the sensuous effects possessed in common by the portrait and by its subject bring about a restoration of the idea of the subject1 in spite of certain differences or discrepancies4 ,the interest of this case is owing to the fact that a partial likeness1 a likeness in unlikeness1 will often reproduce a past idea2 thus enabling us to assemble in the mind a number of things differing in some respects because they agree in other respects4 ,this is not identifying a thing with itself1 viewed at a former time1 but assimilating one thing with other things placed far asunder in nature1 and having many features of difference4 ,let us try and express the consecutive steps of this case of reproduction4 ,the thing now present to the mind has certain #abb peculiarities in common with one or more things formerly present2 as when1 in a portrait1 the outline and colouring resembles a subject original4 ,these sensible effects make alive the previous recurrence of them1 or put us in the cerebral and mental attitude formerly experienced by the corresponding effects of the resembling object4 ,we are aware1 by the liveliness of our impression1 that we have gone in upon an old track2 we have the peculiar consciousness called the consciousness of ,identity or ,agreement4 ,this is one step1 but not the whole4 ,in order that the complete restoration may be effected1 the features of community must be in such firm contiguous alliance with the features of difference--the special part of the previous subject that the one shall reinstate the idea of the other4 ,the points common to a present portrait and a past original must be so strongly coherent with the remaining features of the original1 that the one cannot be awakened without the other following4 ,here1 then1 in the very heart of ,similarity1 is an indispensable bond of ,contiguity2 showing that it is not possible for either process to be accomplished in separation from the other4 ,the mutual coherence of parts1 now described as essential to reproduction1 may be too weak for the purpose1 and the recovering stroke of similarity will in that case fail4 ,it might1 therefore1 be supposed that ,similarity is1 after all1 but a mode of ,contiguity1 namely1 the contiguity or association of the different features or parts of a complex whole4 ,the inference is too hasty4 ,because contiguity is a part of the fact of the restoration of similars1 it is not the entire fact4 ,there is a distinct and characteristic step preceding the play of this mutual coherence of the parts of the thing to be recovered4 ,the striking into the former track of the agreeing part of the new and the old1 is a mental movement by itself1 which the other follows1 but does not do away with4 ,the effect above described1 as the consciousness of agreement or identity1 the flash of a felt similarity1 is real and distinct4 ,we are conscious of it by itself2 there are occasions when we have it without the other1 that is to say1 without the full re-instatement of the former #abc object in its entireness4 ,we often aware of an identity without being able to say what is the thing identified2 as when a portrait gives us the impression that we have seen the original1 without enabling us to say who the original is4 ,we have been affected by the stroke of identity or similarity2 but the restoration fails from the feebleness of the contiguous adherence of the parts of the object identified4 ,there is thus a genuine effect of the nature of pure similarity1 or resemblance1 and a mode of consciousness accompanying that effect2 but there is not the full energy of reproduction without a concurring bond of pure contiguity4 ,a portrait may fail to give us the consciousness of having ever seen the original4 ,on the supposition that we have seen the original1 this would be a failure of pure similarity4 ,thus in every act of reproducing a past mental experience1 there is a complication1 involving both contiguity proper and similarity proper4 ,when the similarity amounts to identity1 as when a new impression of a thing puts us in the track of the old impressions of the same thing1 the effect is so sure1 so obvious1 so easily arrived at1 that we do not need to think of it1 to make a question of it4 ,it does not prevent us from regarding the operation of recalling a name when we see the thing1 or recalling a thing when we hear the name1 as pure contiguity4 ,the strength of the coherence may be deficient1 and the restoration may fail on this account2 it can never fail on account of insufficient similarity4 ,no inconvenience will arise from speaking of this case as if it were ,contiguity and nothing else4 ,the situation of ,similarity in ,diversity is quite distinct4 ,the diversity obstructs the operation of similarity2 we cannot be sure that the new shall put us on the track of the old4 ,it is always a question whether such similarities shall be felt at all2 whether we shall experience the flash1 the peculiar consciousness1 of agreement in difference4 ,it is a farther question1 whether the internal coherence of the thing identified is enough to restore it in completeness4 ,this last step may be allowed to be a case of proper contiguity2 while the flash of identity struck between a present and a past1 never coupled in the #abd mind before1 is an effect sui generis1 and not resolvable into any mode or incident of contiguity4 ,the circumstances of this identifying stroke are so numerous and far-reaching as to demand a special exemplification4 ,some of the broadest distinctions of intellectual character can be grounded on the distinctive aptitudes of the mind for ,contiguity and for ,similarity4 ,learning1 ,acquisition1 ,memory1 ,habit1 all designate the plastic adherence of contiguous impressions4 ,the processes of ,classification1 ,reasoning1 ,imagination1 and the ,inventive faculty generally1 depend upon the identifying stroke of likeness in unlikeness4 ,some forms of intellectual strength1 as a whole1 are best represented by a highly energetic ,adhesiveness2 distinction as a learner1 a follower of routine1 turns upon this power4 ,other1 and higher1 forms of intelligence depend upon far-reaching strokes of similarity2 the identification of likeness shrouded in diversity1 expresses much of the genius of the poet1 the philosopher1 the man of practice4 ,there remains the consideration of ,contrast1 as a link of association4 ,it is easy to show that both ,contiguity and ,similarity may enter into the association of contrasts4 ,all contrasts that we are interested in are habitually coupled in language1 as light and dark1 heat and cold1 up and down1 life and death4 ,again contrasts suppose a common genus1 that is a generic similarity2 at least until we ascend to the highest contrast of all1 the subject mind1 and the object or extended world4 ,cold and ,hot are grades of the common attribute called ,temperature4 ,as these links of contiguity and similarity are present1 and of considerable strength1 they practically lead to the mutual suggestion of contrasting things4 ,still1 we cannot overlook the deeper circumstance that in contrast there is relation1 and therefore mutual implication1 so that the two members must always be virtually present1 although they are not equally attended to4 ,heat has no meaning1 no existence1 but as a change from cold2 the north implicates the south4 ,we have two modes of regarding these relationships1 which are distinguished by language1 as if we #abe could abstract the one side from the other2 that is1 we think of heat apart from cold1 and of the north apart from the south4 ,but if one side is present1 both must be present1 and nothing is wanted but a motive1 to make us reverse the conception1 and bring into prominence the side that was in abeyance1 cold instead of heat1 south instead of north4 ,this view of ,contrast is variously expressed by ,hamilton4 7,reid1 ,note ,d 99 99 9974 ,contrast1 therefore1 as an associating link1 would draw from three sources1 ,relativity1 ,contiguity1 and ,similarity4 ,it would also be heightened1 in many instances1 by the presence of strong feelings or emotions1 as in the contemplation of startling changes1 and the vicissitudes of things4 ,being one of the effects habitually introduced in ,art and in ,oratory1 we are more than ordinarily impressed by the things so made use of--infancy beside old age1 squalor following on splendour1 abasement succeeding to elevation4 ,the associating principle of ,contrast cannot be put forward as a basis of distinction in intellectual character4 ,there is no such a thing as a special aptitude for ,contrasts4 ,there may be1 in certain minds given to emotion1 a fondness for the impressive or emotional contrasts2 but there is no intellectual gift1 subsisting apart from other powers and rising and falling independently1 for the mutual recall of contrasting qualities4 ,whenever we feel a difference we make a contrast2 the two differing things1 are contrasting things1 and are both known in one indivisible act of thought4 ,to be unable to bring up the contrast of a subject present to the view1 is not to know the subject2 we cannot possess intelligently the conception of up1 and be oblivious to1 or incapable of remembering1 down4 ,forgetfulness in this department is not the snapping of a link1 as in ,contiguity1 or the dulness that cannot reach a similitude2 it is the entire blank of conception or knowledge4 ,the north pole of a magnet cannot be in the view1 and the south pole in oblivion4--,b4 ,editor's footnote #ci3 ,the author and ,mr4 ,bain agree in rejecting ,contrast as an independent principle of association4 ,i think they might #abf have gone further1 and denied it even as a derivative one4 ,all the cases considered as examples of it seem to me to depend on something else4 ,i greatly doubt if the sight or thought of a dwarf has intrinsically any tendency to recall the idea of a giant4 ,things certainly do remind us of their own absence1 because 7as pointed out by ,mr4 ,bain7 we are only conscious of their presence by comparison with their absence2 and for a further reason1 arising out of the former1 viz4 that1 in our practical judgments1 we are led to think of the case of their presence and the case of their absence by one and the same act of thought1 having commonly to choose between the two4 ,but it does not seem to me that things have any special tendency to remind us of their positive opposites4 ,black does not remind us of white more than of red or green4 ,if light reminds us of darkness1 it is because darkness is the mere negation1 or absence1 of light4 ,the case of heat and cold is more complex4 ,the sensation of heat recalls to us the absence of that sensation3 if the sensation amounts to pain1 it calls up the idea of relief from it2 that is1 of its absence1 associated by contiguity with the pleasant feeling which accompanies the change4 ,but cold is not the mere absence of heat2 it is itself a positive sensation4 ,if heat suggests to us the idea of the sensation of cold1 it is not because of the contrast1 but because the close connection which exists between the outward conditions of both1 and the consequent identity of the means we employ for regulating them1 cause the thought of cold and that of heat to be frequently presented to us in contiguity4--,ed4 #abg ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,,naming4 ,i endeavour1 as much as ,i can1 to deliver myself from those fallacies which we are apt to put upon ourselves1 by taking words for things4 ,it helps not our ignorance to feign a knowledge where we have none1 by making a noise with sounds without clear and distinct significations4 ,names made at pleasure1 neither alter the nature of things1 nor make us understand them1 but as they are signs of1 and stand for1 determined ideas4--,locke1 ,hum4 ,und4 b4 ii4 ch4 #ac1 #ah4 ,,we have now surveyed the more simple and obvious phenomena of the human mind4 ,we have seen1 first1 that we have ,,sensations2 secondly1 that we have ,,ideas1 the copies of those sensations2 thirdly1 that those ideas are sometimes ,,simple1 the copies of one sensation2 sometimes ,,complex1 the copies of several sensations so combined as to appear not several ideas1 but one idea2 and1 fourthly1 that we have ,,trains of those ideas1 or one succeeding another without end4 ,these are simple facts of our nature1 attested by experience2 and my chief object in fixing upon them the attention of the reader has been1 to convey to him that accurate and steady conception of them1 which is requisite for the successful prosecution of the subsequent inquiries4 #abh ,after delineating the simple and elementary states of consciousness1 it follows1 in order1 that we should endeavour to show what is contained in those that are complex4 ,but in all the more complicated cases of human consciousness something of the process of ,naming is involved4 ,these cases1 of course1 cannot be unfolded1 till the artifice of ,naming is made known4 ,this1 therefore1 is necessarily an intermediate inquiry2 and one to which it is necessary that we should devote a particular degree of attention4 ,there are two purposes1 both of great importance1 for which marks of our ideas1 and sensations2 or signs by which they may be denoted2 are necessary4 ,one of these purposes is1 ,that we maybe able to make known to others what passes within us4 ,the other is1 ,that we may secure to ourselves the knowledge of what at any preceding time has passed in our minds4 ,the sensations and ideas of one man are hidden from all other men2 unless they have recourse to some expedient for disclosing them4 ,we cannot convey to another man our sensations and ideas directly4 ,our means of intercourse with other men are through their senses exclusively4 ,we must therefore choose some ,,sensible ,,objects1 as ,,signs of our inward feelings4 ,if two men agree1 that each shall use a certain sensible sign1 when one of them means to make known to the other that he has a certain sensation1 or idea1 they1 in this1 and in no other way1 can communicate a knowledge of those feelings to one another4 ,almost all the advantages1 which man possesses above the inferior animals1 arise from his power of acting in combination with his fellows2 and of accomplishing1 by the united efforts of numbers1 what could #abi not be accomplished by the detached efforts of individuals4 ,without the power of communicating to one another their sensations and ideas1 this co-operation would be impossible4 ,the importance1 therefore1 of the invention of signs1 or marks1 by which alone that communication can be effected1 is obvious4 ,among sensible objects1 those alone which are addressed to the senses of seeing and hearing have sufficient precision and variety to be adapted to this end4 ,the language of ,action1 as it has been called1 that is1 certain gesticulations and motions1 has very generally1 especially among rude people1 whose spoken language is scanty1 been found in use to indicate certain states1 generally complicated states1 of mind4 ,but1 for precision1 variety1 and rapidity1 the flexibility of the voice presented such obvious advantages1 not to mention that visible signs must be altogether useless in the dark1 that sounds1 among all the varieties of our species1 have been assumed as the principal medium by which their sensations and ideas were made known to one another4 ,there can be little doubt that1 of the two uses of marks1 ,communicating our thoughts1 and ,recording them1 the advantage of the first would be the earliest felt2 and that signs for ,communicating would be long invented1 before any person would see the advantage of ,recording his thoughts4 ,after the use of signs for ,communication had become familiar1 it would not fail1 in time1 to appear that signs might be employed for ,recordation also2 and that1 from this use of them1 the highest advantages might be derived4 ,in respect to those advantages1 the following particulars are to be observed4 #acj #a4 ,we cannot recall any idea1 or train of ideas1 at will4 ,thoughts come into the mind unbidden4 ,if they did not come unbidden1 they must have been in the mind before they came into it2 which is a contradiction4 ,you cannot bid a thought come into the mind1 without knowing that which you bid2 but to know a thought is to have the thought3 the knowledge of the thought1 and the thought's being in the mind1 are not two things but one and the same thing1 under different names4 ,if we cannot recall at pleasure a single idea1 we are not less unable to recall a train4 ,every person knows how evanescent his thoughts are1 and how impossible it is for him to begin at the beginning of a past train1 if it is not a train of the individual objects familiar to his senses1 and go on to the end1 neither leaving out any of the items which composed it1 nor allowing any which did not belong to it1 to enter in4 #b4 ,it is most obvious that1 by ideas alone1 the events which are passed1 are to us any thing4 ,if the objects which we have seen1 heard1 smelt1 tasted1 and touched1 left no traces of themselves2 if the immediate sensation were every thing1 and a blank ensued when the sensation ended1 the past would be to us as if it had never been4 ,yesterday would be as unknown as the months we passed in the womb1 or the myriads of years before we were born4 #c4 ,it is only by our ideas of the past1 that we have any power of anticipating the future4 ,and if we had no power of anticipating the future1 we should have no principle of action1 but the physical impulses1 which we have in common with the brutes4 ,this great law of our nature1 the anticipation of the future from the #aca past1 will be fully illustrated in a subsequent part of this inquiry3 at present1 all that is required is1 the admission1 which will probably not be refused1 of this general truth3 ,that the order1 in which events have been observed to take place1 is the order in which they are expected to take place2 that the order in which they have taken place is testified to us only by our ideas2 and that upon the correctness1 with which they are so testified1 depends the faculty we possess of converting the powers of nature into the instruments of our will2 and of bringing to pass the events which we desire4 #d4 ,but all this power depends upon the order of our ideas4 ,the importance1 therefore1 is unspeakable1 of being able to insure the order of our ideas2 to make1 in other words1 the order of a train of ideas correspond unerringly with a train of past sensations4 ,we have not1 however1 a direct command over the train of our ideas4 ,a train of ideas may have passed in our minds corresponding to events of great importance2 but that train will not pass again1 unvaried1 except in very simple cases1 without the use of expedients4 #e4 ,the difference between the occasions of our ,,ideas1 and the occasions of our ,,sensations1 affords a resource for this purpose4 ,over the occasions of our sensations2 we have an extensive power4 ,we can command the smell of a rose1 the hearing of a bell1 the sight of a tree1 the sensation of heat or of cold1 and so on4 ,over the occasions of our ideas we have little or no direct power4 ,our ideas come and go4 ,there is a perpetual train of them1 one succeeding another2 but we cannot will any link in that chain of ideas2 each link is determined by the foregoing2 and every man knows1 how impossible #acb it is1 by mere willing1 to make such a train as he desires4 ,thoughts obtrude themselves without his bidding2 and thoughts which he is in quest of will not arise4 ,by the power1 however1 which we have over the occasions of our sensations1 we can make sure of having a train of sensations exactly the same as we have had before4 ,this affords us the means of having a train of ideas exactly the same as we have had before4 ,if we choose a number of sensible objects1 and make use of them as marks of our ideas1 we can ensure any succession which we please of the sensible objects2 and1 by the association between them and the ideas1 a corresponding succession of the ideas4 #f4 ,to one of the two sets of occasions1 upon which ,signs are thus useful1 evanescent ,signs are the best adapted2 permanent signs are absolutely necessary for the other4 ,for the purposes of speech1 or immediate communication1 sounds are the most convenient marks4 ,sounds1 however1 perish in the making4 ,but for the purpose of retracing a train of ideas1 which we have formerly had1 it is necessary we should have marks which do not perish4 ,marks1 addressed to the sight1 or the touch1 have the requisite permanence2 and1 of the two1 those addressed to the eye have the advantage4 ,of marks addressed to the eye1 two kinds have been adopted2 either marks immediately of the ideas intended to be recalled2 such as the picture-writing1 or hieroglyphics1 of some nations3 or1 visible marks1 by letters1 of the audible marks employed in oral communication4 ,this latter kind has been found the most convenient1 and in use among the largest1 and most intelligent portion of our species4 #acc ,according to this scheme1 spoken language is the use of immediate marks of the ideas2 written language1 is the use of secondary marks of the ideas4 ,the written marks are only signs of the audible marks2 the audible marks1 are signs of the ideas4#dj ,editor's footnote #dj3 ,this exposition of ,naming in its most general aspect1 needs neither explanation nor comment4 ,it is one of those specimens of clear and vigorous statement1 going straight to the heart of the matter1 and dwelling on it just long enough and no longer than necessary1 in which the ,analysis abounds4--,ed4 #acd ,,section ,i4 ,,nouns ,,substantive4 ,the power of ,language essentially consists1 in two things2 first1 in our having marks of our ,,sensations1 and ,,ideas3 and1 secondly1 in so arranging them1 that they may correctly denote a ,,train of those mental states or feelings4 ,it is evident1 that if we convey to others the ideas which pass in our own minds1 and also convey them in the order in which they pass1 the business of ,,communication is completed4 ,and1 if we establish the means of reviving the ideas which we have formerly had1 and also of reviving them in the order in which we formerly had them1 the business of ,,recordation is completed4 ,we now proceed to show1 by what contrivances1 the expedient of ,marking is rendered efficient to those several ends4 ,the primary importance to men1 of being able to make known to one another their ,,sensations1 made them in all probability begin with inventing marks for that purpose2 in other words1 making ,names for their ,,sensations4 ,two modes presented themselves4 ,one was to give a name to each single sensation4 ,another was to bestow a name on a cluster of sensations1 whenever they were such as occur in a cluster4 ,of this latter class1 are all names of what are called ,external ,objects2 rose1 water1 stone1 and so on4 ,each of these names is the mark of as many sensations 7sight1 touch1 smell1 taste1 sound7 as we are said to derive from those objects4 ,the name rose1 is the #ace mark of a sensation of colour1 a sensation of shape1 a sensation of touch1 a sensation of smell1 all in conjunction4 ,the name water1 is the mark of a sensation of colour1 a sensation of touch1 a sensation of taste1 and other sensations1 regarded not separately1 but as a compound4#da ,findlater's footnote #da3 ,it is not intended to be understood that all this complex meaning entered into the names as originally given4 ,the process of naming seems to have been this3 ,each object was designated by a term expressive of some one prominent quality1 and of that only4 ,thus rose is referred with every probability to the same root as the adjective red 7compare ,greek ,greek3 r7o_/don1 a rose1 ,greek3 e7ruthros red1 ,german roth1 ,latin rutilus71 and thus meant the ruddy 7flower74 ,other objects would doubtless also be called ruddy1 and would dispute the epithet with the rose2 but by a process of natural selection1 each would settle down in possession of the term found best suited to distinguish it2 which would thus cease to be an attributive1 and become a name substantive with a complex connotation derived from association4 ,all names of objects whose origin can be traced are found to be thus simple in their primary signification4 ,the stars 7,sans4 staras7 were so called because they were strewers 7of light74--,f4 ,there is a convenience in giving a single mark to any number of sensations1 which we thus have in clusters2 because there is hence a great saving of marks4 ,the sensations of sight1 of touch1 of smell1 and so on1 derived from a rose1 might have received marks1 and have been enumerated1 one by one2 but the term rose1 performs all this much more expeditiously1 and also more certainly4 ,the occasions1 however1 are perpetual1 on which we need marks for sensations1 not in clusters1 but taken separately4 ,and language is supplied with #acf names of this description4 ,we have the terms1 red1 green1 hot1 cold1 sweet1 bitter1 hard1 soft1 noise1 stench1 composing in the whole a numerous class4 ,for many sensations1 however1 we have not names in one word2 but make a name out of two or more words3 thus1 for the sensation of hearing1 derived from a trumpet1 we have only the name1 sound of a trumpet2 in the same manner1 we have smell of a rose1 taste of an apple1 sight of a tree1 feeling of velvet4 ,of those names which denote clusters of sensations1 it is obvious 7but still very necessary7 to remark1 that some include a greater1 some a lesser number of sensations4 ,thus1 stone includes only sensations of touch1 and sight4 ,apple1 beside sensations of touch and sight1 includes sensations of smell and taste4 ,we not only give names to clusters of sensations1 but to clusters of clusters2 that is1 to a number of minor clusters1 united into a greater cluster4 ,thus we give the name wood to a particular cluster of sensations1 the name canvas to another1 the name rope to another4 ,to these clusters1 and many others1 joined together in one great cluster1 we give the name ship4 ,to a number of these great clusters united into one1 we give the name fleet1 and so on4 ,how great a number of clusters are united in the term ,house8 ,and how many more in the term ,city8 ,sensations being infinitely numerous1 all cannot receive marks or signs4 ,a selection must be made4 ,only those which are the most important are named4 ,names1 to be useful1 cannot exceed a certain number4 ,they could not otherwise be remembered4 ,it is1 therefore1 of the greatest importance that each name should accomplish as much as possible4 ,to this end1 #acg the greater number of names stand1 not for individuals only1 but classes4 ,thus the terms red1 sweet1 hot1 loud1 are names1 not of one sensation only1 but of classes of sensations2 that is1 every sensation of a particular kind4 ,thus also the term1 rose1 is not the name of one single cluster1 but of every cluster coming under a certain description4 ,as rose denotes one class1 stone denotes another1 iron another1 ox another1 and so on4#db ,editor's footnote #db3 ,economy in the use of names is a very small part of the motive leading to the creation of names of classes4 ,if we had a name for every individual object which exists in the universe1 and could remember all those names1 we should still require names for what those objects or some of them have in common2 in other words1 we should require classification1 and class names4 ,this will be obvious if it is considered that had we no names but names of individuals1 we should not have the means of making any affirmation respecting any object2 we could not predicate of it any qualities4 ,but of this more largely in a future note4--,ed4 ,as we need marks for ,,sensations1 we need marks also for ,,ideas4 ,the ,ideas which we have occasion to name1 are first1 ,simple ,ideas1 the copies of simple sensations2 secondly1 ,complex ,ideas1 the copies of several sensations1 combined4 ,of those complex ideas1 also1 there is one species1 those copied directly from sensations1 in the formation of which the mind has exercised but little control2 as the ideas of rose1 horse1 stone1 and of what are called the objects of sense in general4 ,there is another species of complex ideas which1 though derived also from the senses1 are put together in a great degree at our discretion1 as the ideas of a #ach centaur1 a mountain of gold1 of comfort1 of meanness2 all that class of ideas in short which ,mr4 ,locke has called mixed modes4 ,we may thus distinguish three classes of ideas1 which we have occasion to name3 #a1 simple ideas1 the copies of single sensations3 #b1 complex ideas1 copied directly from sensations3 #c1 complex ideas1 derived indeed from the senses1 but put together in arbitrary combinations4 ,the two former classes may be called ,sensible1 the last ,mental ,ideas4 ,with respect to ideas1 of the first two classes1 those which are the direct copies of our sensations1 either singly1 or in groups2 it is of great importance to observe1 and also to remember1 that1 for the most part1 the words1 which are employed as marks of the ,sensations1 are made to serve the further purpose of being marks also of the ,ideas4 ,the same word is at once the name of the sensations1 and the ideas4 ,if any person were asked1 whether the word ,,being is the name of a ,sensation1 or of an ,idea2 he would immediately reply1 that it is the name of an ,idea4 ,in like manner1 if he were asked1 whether the word ,,animal is the mark of a cluster of ,sensations1 or of a cluster of ,ideas2 he would with equal readiness say1 of a cluster of ,ideas4 ,but if we were to ask1 whether the name ,sheep is the name of a cluster of ,sensations1 or of a cluster of ,ideas2 he would probably say1 that ,sheep is the name of ,sensations2 in the same manner as rose1 or apple4 ,yet1 what is the difference8 ,only this1 that ,,animal is the more general name1 and includes sheep along with other species2 and that ,,being is still more general1 and includes animal along with vegetable1 mineral1 and other #aci genera4 ,if sheep1 therefore1 or stone1 be a name of sensations1 so is animal or being2 and if animal1 or being1 be a name of ideas1 so is sheep or stone a name of ideas4 ,the fact is1 they are all names of both4 ,they are names of the ,sensations1 primarily2 but are afterwards employed as names also of the ,ideas or copies of those sensations4 ,it thus appears1 that the names generally of what are called the objects of sense are equivocal2 and whereas it would have been a security against confusion to have been provided with appropriate names1 one1 in each instance1 for the ,sensation1 and one for the ,idea1 the same name has been made to serve as the mark for both4 ,the term horse is not only made to stand for the sensations of sight1 of hearing1 of touch1 and even of smell1 which give me occasion for the use of the term horse2 but it stands also for the ideas of those sensations1 as often as ,i have occasion to speak of that cluster of ideas which compose my notion of a horse4 ,the term tree denotes undoubtedly the ,idea in my mind1 when ,i mean to convey the idea tree into the mind of another man2 but it also stands for the sensations whence ,i have derived my idea of a tree4 ,thus1 too1 if ,i mean to name my simple ideas2 those1 for example1 of sight2 ,i have no other names than red1 blue1 violet1 c42 but all these are names of the sensations4 ,when forced to distinguish them1 ,i must use the awkward expressions1 my sensation of red1 my idea of red4 ,again2 sound of a trumpet1 is the name1 as well of the sensation1 as the idea2 flight of a bird1 the name1 as well of the sensation1 as the idea2 light the name as well of the sensation as the idea2 pain #adj the name as well of the sensation as the idea2 heat the name as well of the sensation as the idea4#dc ,editor's footnote #dc3 ,in strict propriety of language all these are names only of sensations1 or clusters of sensations2 not of ideas4 ,a person studious of precision would not1 ,i think1 say heat1 meaning the idea of heat1 or a tree1 when he meant the idea of a tree4 ,he would use heat as the name only of the sensation of heat1 and tree as the name of the outward object1 or cluster of sensations2 and if he had occasion to speak of the idea1 he would say1 my idea 7or the idea7 of heat2 my idea 7or the idea7 of a tree4--,ed4 ,as we have remarked1 in regard to ,,sensations1 singly1 or in clusters1 that they are too numerous to receive names but in classes1 that is names common to every individual of a class1 the same is obviously true of the ,,ideas4 ,the greater number of names of ,sensible ,ideas are names of classes3 man is the name of a class2 lion1 horse1 eagle1 serpent1 and so on1 are names of classes4 ,ideas1 of the third class1 those which the mind forms arbitrarily1 are innumerable2 because the combinations capable of being formed of the numerous elements which compose them1 exceed computation4 ,all these combinations cannot receive names4 ,the memory can manage but a moderate number4 ,of possible combinations1 therefore1 a small proportion must be selected for naming4 ,these1 of course1 are the combinations which are suggested by the occasions of life1 and conduce to the ends which we pursue4 ,we arrange those ideas1 also1 in classes2 to the end that every name may serve the purpose of marking1 as extensively as possible4 ,thus the term fear is #ada applicable to a state of mind1 of which the instances form a class4 ,in like manner1 courage is the name of a class2 temperance1 ignorance1 piety1 and so on1 names of classes4 ,republic1 aristocracy1 monarchy1 are names1 each of them1 not of an individual government1 a government at one time and place1 but of a class1 a sort of government1 at any time and place4 ,the names of the ideas which are thus mentally clustered1 are exempt from that ambiguity which we saw belonged to the names of both classes of sensible ideas4 ,the names of sensible ideas generally stand for the sensations as well as the ideas4 ,the names of the mental ideas are not transferable to sensations4 ,but they are subject to another uncertainty1 still more fertile in confusion1 and embarrassment4 ,as the combinations are formed arbitrarily1 or in other words1 as the ideas of which they are composed1 are more or less numerous1 according to pleasure1 and each man of necessity forms his own combination1 it very often happens1 that one man includes something more or something less than another man in the combination to which they both give the same name4 ,using the same words1 they have not exactly the same ideas4 ,in the term piety1 for example1 a good catholic includes many things which are not included in it by a good protestant4 ,in the term good manners1 an ,englishman of the present day does not include the same ideas which were included in it by an ,englishman two centuries ago2 still less those which are included in it by foreigners of habits and usages dissimilar to our own4 ,prudence1 in the mind of a man of rank and fortune1 has a very different meaning from what it bears in the minds of the #adb frugal and industrious poor4 ,under this uncertainty in language1 it not only happens that men are often using the same expressions when they have different ideas2 but different1 when they have the same ideas4#dd ,editor's footnote #dd3 ,there is some need for additional elucidation of the class of complex ideas distinguished 7under the name of ,mixed ,modes7 by ,locke1 and recognised by the author of the ,analysis1 as put together in a great degree at our discretion2 as those which the mind forms arbitrarily1 so that the ideas of which they are composed are more or less numerous according to pleasure1 and each man of necessity forms his own combination4 ,from these and similar phrases1 interpreted literally1 it might be supposed that in the instances given1 a centaur1 a mountain of gold1 comfort1 meanness1 fear1 courage1 temperance1 ignorance1 republic1 aristocracy1 monarchy1 piety1 good manners1 prudence--the elements which constitute these several complex ideas are put together premeditatedly1 by an act of will1 which each individual performs for himself1 and of which he is conscious4 ,this1 however1 happens only in cases of invention1 or of what is called creative imagination4 ,a centaur and a mountain of gold are inventions3 combinations intentionally made1 at least on the part of the first inventor2 and are not copies or likenesses of any combination of impressions received by the senses1 nor are supposed to have any such outward phenomena corresponding to them4 ,but the other ideas mentioned in the text1 those of courage1 temperance1 aristocracy1 monarchy1 c41 are supposed to have real originals outside our thoughts4 ,these ideas1 just as much as those of a horse and a tree1 are products of generalization and abstraction3 they are believed to be ideas of certain points or features in which a number of the clusters of sensations which we call real objects agree3 and instead of being formed by intentionally putting together simple ideas1 they are formed by stripping off1 or rather1 by not attending to1 such of the simple sensations or ideas entering into the #adc clusters as are peculiar to any of them1 and establishing an extremely close association among those which are common to them all4 ,these complex ideas1 therefore1 are not1 in reality1 like the creations of mere imagination1 put together at discretion1 any more than the complex ideas1 compounded of the obvious sensible qualities of objects1 which we call our ideas of the objects4 ,they are formed in the same manner as these1 only not so rapidly or so easily1 since the particulars of which they are composed do not obtrude themselves upon the senses1 but suppose a perception of qualities and sequences not immediately obvious4 ,from this circumstance results the consequence noticed by the author1 that this class of complex ideas are often of different composition in different persons4 ,for1 in the first place1 different persons abstract their ideas of this sort from different individual instances2 and secondly1 some persons abstract much better than others2 that is1 take more accurate notice of the obscurer features of instances1 and discern more correctly what are those in which all the instances agree4 ,this important subject will be more fully entered into when we reach that part of the present work which treats of the ideas connected with ,general ,terms4--,ed4 #add ,,section ,,ii4 ,,nouns ,,adjective4 ,as the purpose of language is to denote sensations and ideas2 to mark them for our own use1 or to give indication of them to our fellow men2 it is obvious that the names of sensations and ideas are the fundamental parts of language4 ,but as ideas are very numerous1 and the limits of the human memory admit the use of only a limited number of marks or names1 various contrivances are employed to make one name serve as many purposes as possible4 ,of the contrivances for making the use of each word as extensive as possible1 we have already adverted to one of great importance2 that of arranging ideas in classes1 and making one name stand for each individual of the class4 ,when the classes are large1 one word or mark serves to name or indicate many individuals4 ,but when1 for the sake of economizing names1 those classes have been made as large as possible1 we often find occasion for breaking them down into smaller parcels1 or sub-classes1 and speaking of these sub-classes by themselves4 ,an example will render what is here expressed sufficiently plain4 ,the term sound1 is the name of a large class of ideas or sensations2 for it is equally the name of both2 the sound of thunder1 the sound of a cannon1 the whistling of the wind1 the voice of a man1 the howling of a dog1 and so on4 #ade ,among these sounds ,i perceive differences2 some affect me in one way1 and ,i wish to mark them as doing so2 some affect me in another way1 and ,i wish to mark them as affecting me in that particular way4 ,it is obvious that names might be invented for these subordinate classes1 to mark such of them as we have occasion to mark2 and the cases are numerous1 in which this is the expedient adopted4 ,thus the term animal is the name of a large class4 ,but we have occasion to speak apart of various portions of this class1 to all the more important of which portions1 we have given particular names4 ,horse is the name of one portion1 man of another1 sheep of another1 and so of the rest4 ,there is1 however1 another mode of naming subordinate classes2 a mode by which the use of names is greatly economized1 and of which the utility is therefore conspicuous4 ,the subordinate class is distinguished from they rest of the greater class by some peculiarity1 something in which the individuals of it agree with one another1 and do not agree with the rest4 ,thus to recur to the example of sound4 ,one set of sounds affect me in a certain way1 a way peculiar to that set4 ,wishing to distinguish these sounds from others by a mark1 ,i call them loud4 ,another set of sounds affect me in another way1 and ,i call them low2 a third set in another way1 and ,i call them harsh2 a fourth in another way1 and ,i call them sweet4 ,by means of those adjectives applied as marks upon the mark of the great class1 ,i have the names of four species1 or sub-classes2 #a1 loud sounds2 #b1 low sounds2 #c1 harsh sounds2 #d1 #adf sweet sounds2 and the number might be greatly enlarged4 ,it thus appears that1 as nouns substantive are marks of ideas1 or sensations1 nouns adjective are marks put upon nouns substantive1 or marks upon marks2 in order to limit the signification of the noun substantive2 and instead of its marking a large class1 to make it mark a subdivision of that class4 ,thus the word1 rose1 is the mark of a large class3 apply to it the adjective yellow1 that is1 put the mark yellow upon the mark rose1 and you have the name1 yellow rose1 which is a sub-division1 or species1 of the class ,rose4 ,this peculiarity of naming1 this putting of marks upon marks1 in order to modify the meaning of a certain mark1 is a contrivance which deserves the greatest attention4 ,it is one of the principal expedients for the great purpose of economizing names1 and performing the business of marking with the smallest number of marks2 but1 like the rest of the contrivances for this purpose1 it contributes to obscure the simple process of naming2 and when not distinctly known and attended to1 operates as a source of confusion and error4 ,the use of adjectives1 in economizing names1 is most conspicuous1 in the case of those subdivisions which apply to the greatest number of classes4 ,there is one distinction which applies to most classes2 the distinction between what pleases1 and what does not please us1 no matter on what account4 ,the first we call good1 the second evil4 ,these two terms serve to mark a very great number of subordinate classes1 and1 of course1 save1 to a great extent1 the multiplication of names4 #adg ,thus1 in the case of the senses1 we have the word taste1 the mark of one great class of sensations4 ,tastes we divide into sub-classes by the words good and evil2 good tastes being one class1 bad tastes another4 ,if we had invented separate marks for each of these two classes1 we should have had three names1 to mark the class taste with these its two primary subdivisions2 and we should have had occasion for the same number of names in the case of each of the five senses2 or1 fifteen different names4 ,but the adjectives1 good1 and evil1 they being applicable to all the senses1 save us the invention of names for the sub-classes of the other four senses2 as we say good smells1 bad smells1 in the same manner as good tastes1 and bad tastes4 ,they save1 therefore1 eight names out of fifteen1 or more than one-half4 ,the economizing power of adjectives is still more remarkable1 when we depart from simple sensations and ideas1 and apply them as marks upon the names of the complex1 which are far more numerous4 ,thus1 the term horse is the mark of a complex idea1 and the name of a class of objects4 ,we say good horse and bad horse1 good dog and bad dog1 good house and bad house1 and so in cases without number2 in each of which1 the repetition of the two adjectives1 good1 and bad1 saves us the use and embarrassment of separate names4 ,it deserves to be remarked1 that the terms good and evil apply much more generally to that class of complex ideas1 in the formation of which the mind has but little control2 namely1 those of external objects2 than they do to the other class of complex ideas which the mind makes up in an arbitrary #adh manner to suit its own convenience4 ,ideas of the latter description are very often made up according to the distinction of good and evil4 ,thus1 the idea glory1 is composed of ingredients all of which belong to the classes1 good2 and the idea good1 is multifariously included in the name4 ,after the same manner1 the idea of evil is multifariously included in the complex idea disgrace4 ,good is implied in the term virtue1 evil in the term vice2 good is implied in the term wealth1 evil in the term poverty2 good is implied in the term power1 evil in the term weakness4 ,in some cases1 the ideas of this class are so general1 that good and evil are both included2 and1 in such cases1 adjectives are necessary to mark the subdivisions or species4 ,thus1 we say good manners1 bad manners2 good sense1 bad sense2 good conduct1 bad conduct2 and so on4 ,next to the adjectives which form the numerous sub-classes of good and evil1 those which mark degrees are of the most extensive application1 and in the operation of sub-marking save the greatest number of names4 ,thus the terms1 great1 and little1 are applicable to a great proportion of the marks of complex ideas of both formations4 ,we say a great tree1 a little tree2 a great man1 a little man2 a great crime1 a small crime2 great blame1 little blame2 great honour1 little honour2 great value1 little value2 great weight1 little weight2 great strength1 little strength1 and so on4 ,different adjectives differ in the number of classes to the subdivision of which they are subservient4 ,thus hot and cold are only applicable where diversities of temperature are included2 round1 square1 and #adi so on1 where figure is included2 white or black1 where colour2 and so on4 ,beside the use of adjectives1 in dividing great classes into smaller ones1 without multiplication of names2 they sometimes answer another purpose4 ,it often happens that1 in the cluster of sensations or ideas which have one name2 we have occasion to call attention particularly to some one ingredient of the cluster4 ,adjectives render this service1 as well as that of marking a class4 ,this rose1 ,i say1 is red2 that rose is yellow3 this stone is hot1 that stone is cold4 ,the term1 red rose1 or yellow rose1 is the name of a class4 ,but when ,i say1 this rose is red1 where an individual is named1 ,i mark emphatically the specific difference2 namely1 red1 or yellow2 which constitutes that subdivision of the genus rose1 to which the individual belongs4#de ,editor's footnote #de3 ,in the concluding paragraph we find the first recognition by the author that class names serve any purpose1 or are introduced for any reason1 except to save multiplication of names4 ,adjectives1 it is here said1 answer also the purpose of calling attention to some one ingredient of the cluster of sensations combined under one name4 ,that is to say1 they enable us to affirm that the cluster contains that ingredient3 for they do not merely call attention to the ingredient1 or remind the hearer of it3 the hearer1 very often1 did not know that the cluster contained the ingredient1 until he was apprised by the proposition4 ,but surely it is not only adjectives which fulfil either office1 whether of giving information of an ingredient1 or merely fixing the attention upon it4 ,all general names do so1 when used as predicates4 ,when ,i say that a distant object which ,i am pointing at is a tree1 or a building1 ,i just as much call attention to certain ingredients in the cluster of sensations constituting the object1 as ,i do when ,i say1 ,this rose is red4 ,so #aej far is it from being true that adjectives are distinguished from substantives by having this function in addition to that of economizing names1 that it is1 on the contrary1 much more nearly true of adjectives than of the class-names which are nouns substantive1 that the economizing of names is the principal motive for their institution4 ,for though general names of some sort are indispensable to predication1 adjectives are not4 ,as is well shewn in the text1 the peculiarity1 which really distinguishes adjectives from other general names1 is that they mark cross divisions4 ,all nature having first been marked out into classes by means of nouns substantive1 we might go on by the same means subdividing each class4 ,we might call the large individuals of a class by one noun substantive and the small ones by another1 and these substantives would serve all purposes of predication2 but to do this we should need just twice as many additional nouns substantive as there are classes of objects4 ,since1 however1 the distinction of large and small applies to all classes alike1 one pair of names will suffice to designate it4 ,instead therefore of dividing every class into sub-classes1 each with its own name1 we draw a line across all the classes1 dividing all nature into large things and small1 and by using these two words as adjectives1 that is1 by adding one or other of them as the occasion requires to every noun substantive which is the name of a class1 we are able to mark universally the distinction of large and small by two names only1 instead of many millions4--,ed4 #aea ,,section ,,iii4 ,,verbs4 #a4 ,there is one class of complex ideas1 of so particular a nature1 and of which we have so frequent occasion to speak1 that the means of sub-dividing them require additional contrivances4 ,marks put upon marks are still the instrument4 ,but the instrument1 to render it more effectual to this particular purpose1 is fashioned in a particular way4 ,i allude to the class of words denominated ,verbs3 which are1 in their essence1 adjectives1 and applied as marks upon marks2 but receive a particular form1 in order to render them1 at the same time1 subservient to other purposes4 ,the mode of their marking1 and the peculiarity of their marking power may easily1 ,i hope1 be thus conceived4 ,a billiard-ball affects my senses1 in a particular manner4 ,on account of this1 ,i call it round2 and the term round is ever after a mark to me of a portion of the sensations which ,i derive from it4 ,it affects me in another manner4 ,i call it on that account white1 and the term white is to me a mark of this other mode in which it affects me3 and in the same manner as ,i call it white1 round1 on account of such and such sensations1 ,i call it ,moving1 on account of certain other sensations1 of which the term ,moving is to me a perpetual mark4 #aeb ,the manner of affecting me on account of which ,i call it moving1 ,i learn from experience to be peculiarly entitled to my regard4 ,i find that it is a mode of affecting me1 which belongs to almost all bodies2 and ,i find that upon this attribute of theirs the greatest part of my interesting sensations depend4 ,i am therefore deeply concerned in the knowledge of motions2 and have the strongest inducement to divide them into such classes as may in the highest degree facilitate that knowledge4 ,motions are divided in a great variety of ways for a variety of purposes4 ,sometimes we divide them according to their subjects4 ,thus1 the motion of a bird is one class of motions2 the motion of a horse another2 so the motion of a serpent1 the motion of an arrow1 the motion of a wheel4 ,at other times we form classes of motions according to the manner4 ,thus we have running1 flying1 rolling1 leaping1 staggering1 throwing1 striking1 and so on4 ,of all the classifications of motions1 however1 that which deserves the greatest attention is the distinction of them into the motions which originate within the moving body1 and those which originate without it4 ,of the motions which originate within the moving body1 the principal are the living motions of animals4 ,we find1 also1 that of all the motions of animals1 those of men are the most important to men4 ,the motions of men are divided into a great number of classes4 ,on account of one set of motions we call a man walking2 on account of another sort we call him running2 another1 writing2 another1 dancing2 another1 fencing2 another1 boxing2 another1 building2 and so on4 ,we have also frequent occasion for a name which shall #aec embrace all these motions of men4 ,for this purpose the word ,acting is employed3 and the term ,action denotes any of the motions1 which originate within a man as the moving body4 ,it is no objection to this account of the use of the word action1 that it is sometimes employed in cases in which the motion is not the principal object of attention2 as in the act of singing1 or that of speaking4 ,here1 though it is not the motion1 but the effect of the motion1 which is the object of attention to the hearer1 the act of the singer or speaker is not the less truly a motion4 ,the word action1 when thus invented1 and used1 is afterwards applied metaphorically to motions which do not originate in the moving body1 as when we say the action of a sword2 and also to certain processes of the mind1 which1 as they are accompanied with the feeling we call effort1 resembling that which accompanies the voluntary motions1 are sometimes classed along with them1 and1 by an extension of the meaning of the word1 receive the name of actions4 ,in this manner1 remembering1 computing1 comparing1 even hearing1 and seeing1 are denominated actions4 #b4 ,in applying the term ,acting1 or the terms expressive of the several kinds of acting1 the ,time the action is a material circumstance4 ,the grand divisions of time are the ,past1 the ,present1 and the ,future4 ,there is great utility in a short method of marking these divisions of time in conjunction with the mark of the action4 ,this is effected by the ,tenses of ,verbs4 #c4 ,when the name of an act is applied to an agent the agent is either the person speaking1 the person spoken to1 or some other person4 ,the word denoting #aed the action is1 by what are called the ,persons of the verb1 made to connote these diversities4 ,thus amo notes the act1 and connotes the person speaking as the actor2 amas notes the act1 and connotes the person spoken to1 as the actor2 amat notes the act1 and connotes some person1 as the actor1 who is neither the person speaking1 nor the person spoken to4#df ,editor's footnote #df3 ,there is here a fresh instance of the oversight already pointed out1 that of not including in the function for which general names are required1 their employment in ,predication4 ,amo1 amas1 and amamus1 cannot1 ,i conceive1 with any propriety be called names of actions1 or names at all4 ,they are entire predications4 ,it is one of the properties of the kind of general names called verbs1 that they cannot be used except in a ,proposition or ,predication1 and indeed only as the predicate of it3 7for the infinitive is not a verb1 but the abstract of a verb74 ,what else there is to distinguish verbs from other general names will be more particularly considered further on4--,ed4 #d4 ,when the names of actions are applied to agents1 they are applied to one or a greater number4 ,a short method of connoting this grand distinction of numbers is effected by the marks of the ,singular and ,plural number4 ,thus amo notes the act1 and connotes one actor2 amamus notes the act1 and connotes more than one actor4 #e4 ,in applying the names of actions to the proper subjects of them1 there are three ,modes of the action1 one or other of which is always implied4 ,the first is1 when the action has no reference to any thing previously spoken of4 ,the second is1 when it has a reference to something previously spoken of4 ,the third is1 when it has a reference to some state of the will of #aee the speaker or person spoken of4 ,these diversities of mode are connoted by the ,moods of the verb4 ,the ,indicative is used when no reference is made to any thing which precedes3 the ,subjunctive1 when a reference is made to something which precedes3 and the ,optative1 and ,imperative1 when the reference is to the state of the will of the speaker or the person spoken of4 ,such are the contrivances to make the marks or names of action1 by their connotative powers1 a more and more effectual instrument of notation4 ,accurately speaking1 they are adjectives1 so fashioned as to connote1 a threefold distinction of agents1 with a twofold distinction of their number1 a threefold distinction of the manner of the action1 and a threefold distinction of its time2 and1 along with all this another important particular1 about to be explained1 namely1 the ,,copula in ,,predication4#dg ,editor's footnote #dg3 ,the imperfection of this theory of ,verbs is sufficiently apparent4 ,they are1 says the author1 a particular kind of ,adjectives4 ,adjectives1 according to the preceding ,section1 are words employed to enable us1 without inconvenient multiplication of names1 to subdivide great classes into smaller ones4 ,can it be said1 or would it have been said by the author1 that the only1 or the principal reason for having ,verbs1 is to enable us to subdivide classes of objects with the greatest economy of names8 ,neither is it strictly accurate to say that ,verbs are always marks of motion1 or of action1 even including1 as the author does1 by an extension of the meaning of those terms1 every process which is attended with a feeling of effort4 ,many verbs1 of the kind which grammarians call neuter or intransitive verbs1 express rest1 or inaction3 as sit1 lie1 and in some cases1 stand4 ,it is true however that the verbs first invented1 as far as we know anything of them1 expressed forms of motion1 and the principal function of verbs still is to affirm or deny action4 ,or1 to speak yet more generally1 it is by means of verbs that we predicate events4 ,events1 or changes1 are the most important facts1 to us1 in the surrounding world4 ,verbs are the resource which language affords for predicating events4 ,they are not the names of events2 all names of events are substantives1 as sunrise1 disaster1 or 99infinitives1 as to rise1 and infinitives are logically substantives4 ,but it is by means of verbs that we assert1 or give information of1 events2 as1 ,the sun rises1 or1 ,disaster has occurred4 ,there is1 however1 a class of neuter verbs already referred to1 which do not predicate events1 but states of an unchanging object1 as lie1 sit1 remain1 exist4 ,it would be incorrect1 therefore1 to give a definition of ,verbs which should limit them to the expression of events4 ,i am inclined to think that the distinction between nouns and verbs is not logical1 but merely grammatical1 and that every word1 whatever be its meaning1 must be reputed a verb1 which is so constructed grammatically that it can only be used as the predicate of a proposition4 ,any meaning whatever is1 in strictness1 capable of being thrown into this form3 but it is only certain meanings1 chiefly actions or events1 which there is1 in general1 any motive for putting into this particular shape4--,ed4 #aef #f4 ,we have1 last of all1 under this head1 to consider the marking power of a very peculiar1 and most comprehensive word1 the ,,substantive ,,verb1 as it has been called by grammarians1 or the word expressive of ,,being4 ,the steps1 which we have already traced1 in the process of naming1 will aid us in obtaining a true conception of this1 which is one of the most important steps1 in that process4 ,we have seen that1 beside the names of particular species of motions1 as walking1 running1 flying1 there was occasion for a general name which might include #aeg the whole of those motions4 ,for this purpose1 the names ,action and ,acting were employed4 ,it is now to be remembered1 that those sensations which we mark by the names of action1 as walking1 running1 c41 are but part of the sensations which we derive from objects2 that we have other sensations1 and clusters of sensations1 from them1 on account of which we apply to them other names2 as when we call a man tall1 on account of certain sensations2 dark1 on account of certain other sensations1 and so on4 ,now1 as we had occasion for a name to include the separate clusters1 called walking1 running1 flying1 rolling1 falling1 and so on1 and for that purpose adopted the name ,acting2 so1 having from objects other sensations than those marked by the word acting1 we have occasion for a name which shall include both those sensations1 and those comprehended in the word acting along with them3 in short1 a word that shall embrace all sensations1 of whatever kind1 which any object is capable of exciting in us4 ,this purpose is effected by the word affirmative of ,existence4 ,when we affirm of any thing that it ,,exists1 that it ,,is3 what we mean1 is1 that we may have sensations from it2 nothing1 without ourselves1 being known to us1 or capable of being known1 but through the medium of our senses4 ,there is the same occasion for making the ,substantive ,verb connote the three distinctions of ,,time ,,past1 ,,time ,,present1 and ,,time ,,future1 as in the case of other verbs2 also to connote the distinctions of ,,persons and ,,numbers2 and1 lastly1 to connote the ,,three ,,modes1 that in which there is no reference to any thing preceding1 that in which there is a reference to something preceding1 and that in which reference #aeh is made to the will of one of the ,,persons4 ,accordingly the ,substantive ,verb has ,,tenses1 ,,moods1 ,,numbers1 and ,,persons1 like any other verb4 ,such is the nature and object of the ,substantive ,verb4 ,it is the most ,,generical of all the words1 which we have characterized1 as marks upon marks4 ,these are the words usually called ,,attributives4 ,according to the view which we have given of them1 they may be more appropriately denominated1 ,,secondary ,,marks4 ,the names of the larger classes1 as tree1 horse1 strength1 we may call ,,primary ,,marks4 ,the subsidiary names by which smaller classes are marked out of the larger2 as when we say1 tall tree1 great strength1 running horse1 walking man2 that is1 all attributives1 or marks applied upon marks2 we may call ,,secondary ,,marks4 #aei ,,section ,,iv4 ,,predication4 ,the purposes of language are two4 ,we have occasion to mark sensations or ideas singly2 and we have occasion to mark them in trains2 in other words1 we have need of contrivances to mark not only sensations and ideas2 but also the order of them4 ,the contrivances which are necessary to mark this order are the main cause of the complexity of language4 ,if all names were names of one sort1 there would be no difficulty in marking a train of the feelings which they serve to denote4 ,thus1 if all names were names of individuals1 as ,john1 ,james1 ,peter1 we should have no difficulty in marking a train of the ideas of these individuals2 all that would be necessary would be to set down the marks1 one after another1 in the same order in which1 one after another1 the ideas occurred4 ,if all names were names of ,species1 as man1 horse1 eagle1 the facility of marking the order of the ideas which they represent would be the same4 ,if the idea man occurred first1 the idea horse second1 the idea eagle third2 all that would be necessary would be to put down the name or mark man the first1 the name or mark horse the second1 and the order of marks would represent the order of ideas4 ,but we have already seen1 that the facility of communication requires names of different degrees of #afj comprehensiveness2 names of individuals1 names of classes1 and names both of the larger and the smaller classes4 ,for the younger and less instructed part of my readers1 it may be necessary to mention1 that the names of the smaller classes1 are called names of ,species1 or specific names2 the names of the larger classes1 names of ,genera1 or generic names4 ,thus1 the term animal1 denotes a large class2 a class which contains the smaller classes1 man1 horse1 dog1 c4 ,the name animal1 therefore1 is called a ,genus1 or a generic name2 the name man1 a ,species1 or a specific name4 ,in using names of these different kinds2 names of individuals when the idea is restricted to one individual2 and1 for brevity1 the names of classes2 the names of the less when necessary1 of the large when practicable2 there is perpetual need of the substitution of one name for another4 ,when ,i have used the names1 ,james and ,john1 ,thomas and ,william1 and many more1 having to speak of such peculiarities of each1 as distinguish him from every other1 ,i may proceed to speak of them in general1 as included in a class4 ,when this happens1 ,i have occasion for the name of the class1 and to substitute the name of the class1 for the names of the individuals4 ,by what contrivance is this performed8 ,i have the name of the individual1 ,john2 and the name of the class man2 and ,i can set down my two names2 ,john1 man2 in juxta-position4 ,but this is not sufficient to effect the communication ,i desire2 namely1 that the word man is a mark of the same idea of which ,john is a mark1 and a mark of other ideas along with it1 those to wit1 of which ,james1 ,thomas1 c4 are marks4 ,to complete my contrivance1 ,i invent a mark1 which1 placed between my marks1 #afa ,john and man1 fixes the idea ,i mean to convey1 that man1 is another mark to that idea of which ,john is a mark1 while it is a mark of the other ideas1 of which ,james1 ,thomas1 c41 are marks4 ,for this purpose1 we use in ,english1 the mark is4 ,by help of this1 my object is immediately attained4 ,i say1 ,john is a man4 ,i1 then1 use the word man1 instead of the word ,john1 with many advantages2 because every thing which ,i can affirm of the word man1 is true not only of ,john1 but of ,james1 and ,peter1 and every other individual of the class4 ,the joining of two names by this peculiar mark is the act which has been denominated1 ,,predication2 and it is the grand contrivance by which the marks of sensations and ideas are so ordered in discourse1 as to mark the order of the trains1 which it is our purpose to communicate1 or to record4 ,the form of expression1 ,john is a man1 is called a ,proposition4 ,it consists of three marks4 ,of these1 ,john1 is denominated the ,,subject2 man1 the ,,predicate2 and is1 the ,,copula4 ,to speak generally1 and in the language of the grammarians1 the nominative of the verb is the subject of the proposition2 the substantive1 or adjective1 which agrees with the nominative1 is the predicate1 and the verb is the copula4 ,by a few simple examples1 the reader may render familiar to himself the use of ,,predication1 as the grand expedient1 by which language is enabled to mark not only sensations and ideas1 but also the order of them4#dh ,editor's footnote #dh3 ,the theory of ,predication here set forth1 stands in need of further elucidation1 and perhaps of some correction and addition4 ,the account which the author gives of a ,predication1 or ,proposition1 is1 first1 that it is a mode of so putting together the marks of sensations and ideas1 as to mark the order of them4 ,secondly1 that it consists in substituting one name for another1 so as to signify that a certain name 7called the predicate71 is a mark of the same idea which another name 7called the subject7 is a mark of4 ,it must be allowed that a predication1 or proposition1 is intended to mark some portion of the order either of our sensations or of our ideas1 i4e41 some part of the coexistences or sequences which take place either in our minds1 or in what we term the external world4 ,but what sort of order is it that a predication marks8 ,an order supposed to be believed in4 ,when ,john1 or man1 are said to be marks of an individual object1 all there is in the matter is that these words1 being associated with the idea of the object1 are intended to raise that idea in the mind of the person who hears or reads them4 ,but when we say1 ,john is a man1 or1 ,john is an old man1 we intend to do more than call up in the hearer's mind the images of ,john1 of a man1 and of an old man4 ,we intend to do more than inform him that we have thought of1 or even seen1 ,john and a man1 or ,john and an old man1 together4 ,we inform him of a fact respecting ,john1 namely1 that he is an old man1 or at all events1 of our belief that this is a fact4 ,the characteristic difference between a predication and any other form of speech1 is1 that it does not merely bring to mind a certain object 7which is the only function of a mark1 merely as such72 it asserts something respecting it4 ,now it may be true1 and ,i think it is true1 that every assertion1 every object of ,belief1--everything that can be true or false--that can be an object of assent or dissent--is some order of sensations or of ideas3 some coexistence or succession of sensations or ideas actually experienced1 or supposed capable of being experienced4 ,and thus it may appear in the end that in expressing a belief1 we are after all only declaring the order of a group or series of sensations or ideas4 ,but the order which we declare is not an imaginary order2 it is an order believed to be real4 ,whatever view we adopt of the psychological nature of ,belief1 it is necessary to distinguish between the mere suggestion1 to the mind of a certain order among sensations or ideas such as takes place when we think of the alphabet1 or the numeration table and the indication that this order is an actual fact1 which is occurring1 or which has occurred once or oftener1 or which1 in certain definite circumstances1 always occurs2 which are the things indicated as true by an affirmative predication1 and as false by a negative one4 ,that a predication differs from a name in doing more than merely calling up an idea1 is admitted in what ,i have noted as the second half of the author's theory of ,predication4 ,that second half points out that every predication is a communication1 intended to act1 not on the mere ideas of the listener1 but on his persuasion or belief3 and what he is intended to believe1 according to the author1 is1 that of the two names which are conjoined in the predication1 one is a mark of the same idea 7or let me add1 of the same sensation or cluster of sensations7 of which the other is a mark4 ,this is a doctrine of ,hobbes1 the one which caused him to be termed by ,leibnitz1 in words which have been often quoted1 plus quam nominalis4 ,it is quite true that when we predicate ,b of ,a--when we assert of ,a that it is a ,b--,b must1 if the assertion is true1 be a name of ,a1 i4e41 a name applicable to ,a2 one of the innumerable names which1 in virtue of their signification1 can be used as descriptive of ,a3 but is this the information which we want to convey to the hearer8 ,it is so when we are speaking only of names and their meaning1 as when we enunciate a definition4 ,in every other case1 what we want to convey is a matter of fact1 of which this relation between the names is but an incidental consequence4 ,when we say1 ,john walked out this morning1 it is not a correct expression of the communication we desire to make1 that having walked out this morning or a person who has walked out this morning are two of the innumerable names of ,john4 ,they are only accidentally and momentarily names of ,john by reason of a certain event1 and the information we mean to give is1 that this event has happened4 ,the event is not resolvable into an identity of meaning between names1 but into an actual series of sensations that occurred to ,john1 and a belief that any one who had been present and using his eyes would have had another series of sensations1 which we call seeing ,john in the act of walking out4 ,again1 when we say1 ,negroes are woolly-haired1 we mean to make known to the hearer1 not that woolly-haired is a name of every negro1 but that wherever the cluster of sensations signified by the word negro1 are experienced1 the sensations signified by the word woolly-haired will be found either among them or conjoined with them4 ,this is an order of sensations3 and it is only in consequence of it that the name woolly-haired comes to be applicable to every individual of whom the term negro is a name4 ,there is nothing positively opposed to all this in the author's text3 indeed he must be considered to have meant this1 when he said1 that by means of substituting one name for another1 a predication marks the order of our sensations and ideas4 ,the omission consists in not remarking that what is distinctively signified by a predication1 as such1 is ,belief in a certain order of sensations or ideas4 ,and when this has been said1 the ,hobbian addition1 that it does so by declaring the predicate to be a name of everything of which the subject is a name1 may be omitted as surplusage1 and as diverting the mind from the essential features of the case4 ,predication may thus be defined1 a form of speech which expresses a belief that a certain coexistence or sequence of sensations or ideas1 did1 does1 or1 under certain conditions1 would take place3 and the reverse of this when the predication is negative4--,ed4 #afb ,for the more complete elucidation of this important part of the business of ,naming1 it is necessary to #afc remark1 that ,logicians have classed ,predications1 under five heads2 #ast1 when the ,genus is predicated1 #afd of any subject2 #b;dly1 when the ,species is predicated2 #c;dly1 when the ,specific ,difference is predicated2 #dthly1 #afe when a ,property is predicated2 #ethly1 when an ,accident is predicated4 ,these five classes of names1 the things capable of being predicated1 are named ,,predicables4 ,the five ,predicables1 in ,latin1 the language in which they are commonly expressed1 are named ,genus1 ,species1 ,differentia1 ,proprium1 ,accidens4 ,we have already seen1 perhaps at sufficient length1 the manner in which1 and the end for which1 the ,genus1 and the ,species are predicated of any subject4 ,it is1 that the more comprehensive name1 may be substituted for the less comprehensive2 so that each of our marks may answer the purpose of marking1 to as great an extent as possible4 ,in this manner we substitute the word man1 for example1 for the word ,thomas1 when we predicate the ,species of the individual1 in the proposition1 ,thomas is a man2 the word animal1 for the word man1 when we predicate the ,genus of the ,species1 in the proposition1 man1 is an animal4#di ,editor's footnote #di3 ,if what has been said in the preceding note is correct1 it is a very inadequate view of the purpose for which a generic or specific name is predicated of any subject1 to say that it is in order that the more comprehensive name may be substituted for the less comprehensive1 so that each of our marks may answer the purpose of marking to as great an extent as possible4 ,the more comprehensive and the less comprehensive name have each their uses1 and the function of each not only could not be discharged with equal convenience by the other1 but could not be discharged by it at all4 ,the purpose1 in predicating of anything the name of a class to which it belongs1 is not to obtain a better or more commodious name for it1 but to make known the fact of its possessing the attributes which constitute the class1 and which are therefore signified by the class-name4 ,it is evident that the name of one class cannot possibly perform this office vicariously for the name of another4--,ed4 #aff ,we have already1 also1 taken notice of the artifice1 by which smaller classes are formed out of larger1 by the help of secondary marks4 ,of these secondary marks1 the principal classes are designated by the terms ,differentia1 ,proprium1 ,accidens4 ,no very distinct boundaries1 are1 indeed1 marked by these terms2 nor do they effect a scientific division2 but1 for the present purpose1 the elucidation of the end to which ,predication is subservient1 they are sufficient4 ,differentia is always an ,attributive1 applicable to a ,genus1 and which1 when combined with it1 marks out a ,species2 as the word rational1 which is applicable to the ,genus animal1 and when applied to it1 in the phrase rational animal1 marks out a ,species1 and is synonymous with the word man4 ,in a similar manner the word sensitive is applicable to body1 and marks out the subordinate ,genus1 animal4 ,proprium is also an ,attributive1 and the ,attributives classed under this title differ from those classed under the title differentia1 chiefly in this2 ,that those classed under differentia1 are regarded as more expressly involved in the definition of the ,species which they seem to cut out from the ,genus4 ,thus1 both rational1 and risible1 when applied to animal1 cut out of it the class ,man2 but rational is called ,,differentia1 risible ,,proprium1 because rational1 is strictly involved in the definition of man2 risible is not4 ,some ,attributives are classed under the title proprium1 which1 when applied to the genus1 do not constitute the same ,species1 constituted by the differentia1 but a different ,species2 as bipes1 two-footed animal1 is the name of a class including at least the two classes of men1 and birds2 hot-blooded animal1 is the name of a class so #afg large as to include man1 horse1 lion1 dog1 and the greater part of the more perfectly organized ,species4 ,there are some ,attributives1 classed under the title proprium1 which cut out of the ,genus a class even less than that which is cut by the differentia2 as1 for example1 the word grammatical4 ,this word grammatical1 applied to the word animal1 in the term grammatical animal1 separates a class so small1 as to include only part of the ,species man1 those who are called ,grammarians4 ,such ,attributives1 for an obvious reason1 are applicable1 as well to the name of the ,species1 as to that of the ,genus4 ,thus1 we say1 a grammatical man1 as well as a grammatical animal1 and that with greater propriety1 as cutting out the sub-species from the ,species more immediately4 ,the ,attributives1 classed under the title accidens1 are regarded1 like those classed under differentia1 and proprium1 as applicable to the class cut out by the differentia1 but applicable to it rather fortuitously than by any fixed connection4 ,the term lame is an example of such ,attributives4 ,the term lame1 however1 applied to the name of the ,species1 does not the less take out of it a sub-species1 as lame man1 lame horse4 ,with respect to these classes of ,attributives 7,differentia1 ,proprium1 ,accidens7 this is necessary to be observed1 and remembered2 that they differ from one another only by the accident of their application4 ,thus1 when rational1 applied to the ,genus animal1 constitutes the ,species man1 all other ,attributives applied to that ,species are either accidens1 or proprium2 but these ,attributives themselves may be the differentia in the case of other classes4 ,thus1 warm-blooded1 applied to man1 stands under the class proprium2 but #afh when applied to the animals which stand distinguished from the cold-blooded1 as constituting a class1 it becomes the differentia1 and rational1 with respect to this comprehensive class1 is only an accidens4#ej ,editor's footnote #ej3 ,the author says1 that no very distinct boundaries are marked by the three terms1 ,differentia1 ,proprium1 and ,accidens1 nor do they effect a scientific division4 ,as used1 however1 by the more accurate of the school logicians1 they do mark out distinct boundaries1 and do effect a scientific division4 ,of the attributes common to a class1 some have been taken into consideration in forming the class1 and are included in the signification of its name4 ,such1 in the case of man1 are rationality1 and the outward form which we call the human4 ,these attributes are its ,differenti2 the fundamental differences which distinguish that class from the others most nearly allied to it4 ,the school logicians were contented with one ,differentia1 whenever one was sufficient completely to circumscribe the class4 ,but this was an error1 because one attribute may be sufficient for distinction1 and yet may not exhaust the signification of the class-name4 ,all attributes1 then1 which are part of that signification1 are set apart as ,differenti4 ,other attributes1 though not included among those which constitute the class1 and which are directly signified by its name1 are consequences of some of those which constitute the class1 and always found along with them4 ,these attributes of the class are its ,propria4 ,thus1 to be bounded by three straight lines is the ,differentia of a triangle3 to have the sum of its three angles equal to two right angles1 being a consequence of its ,differentia1 is a ,proprium of it4 ,rationality is a ,differentia of the class ,man3 to be able to build cities is a ,proprium1 being a consequence of rationality1 but not1 as that is1 included in the meaning of the word ,man4 ,all other attributes of the class1 which are neither included in the meaning of the name1 nor are consequences of any which are included1 are ,accidents1 however universally and constantly they may be true of the class2 as blackness1 of crows4 ,the author's remark1 that these three classes of ,attributives differ from one another only in the accident of their application1 is most just4 ,there are not some attributes which are always ,differenti1 and others which are always ,propria1 or always ,accidents4 ,the same attribute which is a ,differentia of one genus or species1 may be1 and often is1 a ,proprium or an ,accidens of others1 and so on4--,ed4 #afi ,we now arrive at a very important conclusion2 for it thus appears1 that all ,predication1 is ,predication of ,genus or ,species1 since the ,attributives classed under the titles of ,differentia1 ,proprium1 ,accidens1 cannot be used but as part of the name of a ,species4 ,but we have seen1 above1 that ,predication by ,genus and ,species is merely the substitution of one name for another1 the more general for the less general2 the fact of the substitution being marked by the ,copula4 ,it follows1 if all ,predication is by ,genus and ,species1 that all ,predication is the substitution of one name for another1 the more for the less general4 ,it will be easy for the learner to make this material fact familiar to himself1 by attending to a few instances4 ,thus1 when it is said that man is rational1 the term rational is evidently elliptical1 and the word animal is understood4 ,the word rational1 according to grammatical language1 is an adjective1 and is significant only in conjunction with a substantive4 ,according to logical language1 it is a connotative term1 and is without a meaning when disjoined from the object1 the property or properties of which it connotes4#ea ,editor's footnote #ea3 ,i am unable to feel the force of this remark4 ,every predication ascribes an attribute to a subject4 ,differentiae1 ,propria1 and ,accidents1 agree with generic and specific names in expressing attributes1 and the attributes they express are the whole of their meaning4 ,i therefore cannot see why there should not be ,predication of any of these1 as well as of ,genus and ,species4 ,these three ,predicables1 the author says1 cannot be used but as part of the name of a genus or species3 they are adjectives1 and cannot be employed without a substantive understood4 ,allowing this to be logically1 as it is grammatically1 true1 still the comprehensive and almost insignificant substantive1 thing or being1 fully answers the purpose2 and the entire meaning of the predication is contained in the adjective4 ,these adjectives1 as the author remarks1 are connotative terms2 but so1 on his own shewing elsewhere1 are all concrete substantives1 except proper names4 ,why1 when it is said that man is rational1 must the word animal be understood8 ,nothing is understood but that the being1 ,man1 has the attribute of reason4 ,if we say1 ,god is rational1 is animal understood8 ,it was only the ,greeks who classed their gods as ,greek3 za a7tha_/nata4 ,the exclusion of the three latter ,predicables from predication probably recommended itself to the author as a support to his doctrine that all ,predication is the substitution of one name for another1 which he considered himself to have already demonstrated so far as regards ,genus and ,species4 ,but proofs have just been given that in the predication of ,genus and ,species no more than in that of ,differentia1 ,proprium1 or ,accidens1 is anything which turns upon names the main consideration4 ,except in the case of definitions1 and other merely verbal propositions1 every proposition is intended to communicate a matter of fact3 ,this subject has that attribute--,this cluster of sensations is always accompanied by that sensation4 ,let me remark by the way1 that the word connote is here used by the author in what ,i consider its legitimate sense--that in which a name is said to connote a property or properties belonging to the object it is predicated of4 ,he afterwards casts off this use of the term1 and introduces one the exact reverse3 but of this hereafter4--,ed4 #agj ,with respect1 however1 to such examples as this last1 namely1 all those in which the predicate consists #aga of the genus and differentia1 the proposition is a mere definition2 and the predicate1 and the subject1 are precisely equivalent4 ,thus1 rational animal is precisely the same class as man2 and they are only two names for the same thing2 the one a simple1 or single-worded name2 the other a complex1 or double-worded1 name4 ,such propositions therefore are1 properly speaking1 not ,predications at all4 ,when they are used for any other purpose than to make known1 or to fix1 the meaning of a term1 they are useless1 and are denominated identical propositions4#eb ,editor's footnote #eb3 ,in this passage the author virtually gives up the part of his theory of ,predication which is borrowed from ,hobbes4 ,according to his doctrine in this place1 whenever the predicate and the subject are exactly equivalent1 and are only two names for the same thing1 the predication serves only to make known1 or to fix1 the meaning of a term1 and such propositions are1 properly speaking1 not ,predications at all4--,ed4 ,the preceding expositions have shown the peculiar use of the ,copula4 ,the ,predication consists1 essentially1 of two marks1 whereof the first is called the ,subject1 the latter the ,predicate2 the ,predicate being set down as a name to be used for every thing of which the ,subject is a name2 and the ,copula is merely a mark necessary to shew that the ,predicate is to be taken and used as a substitute for the ,subject4 ,there is a great convenience in giving to the ,copula the same powers of connotation1 in respect of ,time1 #agb ,manner1 ,person1 and ,number1 as we have seen to be usefully annexed to the ,verb4 ,it is necessary to explain a little this convenience2 and the explanation will have another advantage1 that it will still farther illustrate the manner in which ,predication serves the great purpose of marking the ,order of ideas in a ,train4 ,if the sensations or ideas in a train were to be marked as merely so many independent items1 the mode of marking the order of them would be simple2 the order of the marks itself might suffice4 ,if this1 for example1 were the train2 smell of a rose1 sight of a rat1 sound of a trumpet1 touch of velvet1 prick of a pin1 these names placed in order might denote the order of the sensations4 ,in the greater number of instances1 however1 it is necessary to mark the train as the train of somebody2 and for this purpose additional machinery is required4 ,suppose that the train ,i have to mark is the train of ,john1 a train of the sensations of ,john2 what are the marks for which ,i shall have occasion8 ,it is first of all evident that ,i must have a mark for ,john1 and a mark for each of the sensations4 ,suppose it is my purpose to represent ,john as having a sensation by each of his senses1 sight1 smell1 c41 how must ,i proceed8 ,i have first the word ,john1 for the mark of the person2 and ,i have the word seeing1 for the mark of the sensation4 ,but beside the marks1 ,john1 seeing1 ,i have occasion for a mark to show that ,i mean the mark seeing to be applied to the mark ,john1 and not to any other4 ,for that purpose ,i use the word is4 ,i say ,john is seeing1 and the first sensation of ,john's train is now sufficiently #agc denoted4 ,in the same manner ,i proceed with the rest2 ,john is smelling1 ,john is tasting1 ,john is hearing1 ,john is touching4 ,but ,i have often occasion to speak not only of ,john's present sensations1 but of his past or his future sensations2 not of ,john as merely now seeing1 hearing1 c41 but as having been1 or as going to be1 the subject of these sensations4 ,the ,copula may be so contrived as most commodiously to connote the main distinctions of ,time3 not merely to mark the connection between the two marks which form the subject and the predicate of the proposition1 but to mark1 along with this1 either past1 or present1 or future1 ,time4 ,thus1 if ,i say ,john is seeing1 the copula marks present time along with the peculiar connection between the predicate and the subject2 if ,i say ,john was seeing1 it connotes past time2 if ,i say ,john will be seeing1 it connotes future time4 ,as1 in explaining the functions of verbs1 there appeared a convenience in the contrivance by which they were made to connote three ,manners2 first1 when no reference is made to any thing which is previously spoken of2 secondly1 when a reference is made to something which is previously spoken of2 thirdly1 when a reference is made to the will of one of the ,,persons2 it will now be seen that there is the same convenience in making the ,copula connote these references by a similar contrivance4 ,thus1 when we speak of a man having sensations1 we may speak of him as having them or as not having them1 in consequence of something previously spoken of2 or we may speak of him as having them in consequence of our will4 ,it is1 therefore1 useful1 that the ,copula should #agd have moods as well as tenses4 ,the same thing may be said of persons and numbers2 of which no illustration seems to be required4 ,we come next to an observation respecting the ,copula1 to which the greatest attention is due4 ,in all ,languages1 the ,verb which denotes ,,existence has been employed to answer the additional purpose of the ,copula in ,predication4 ,the consequences of this have been most lamentable4 ,there is thus a double meaning in the ,copula1 which has produced a most unfortunate mixture and confusion of ideas4 ,it has involved in mystery the whole business of ,predication2 the grand contrivance by which language is rendered competent to its end4 ,by darkening ,predication1 it has spread such a veil over the phenomena of mind1 as concealed them from ordinary eyes1 and allowed them to be but imperfectly seen by those which were the most discerning4 ,in our own language1 the verb1 ,,to ,,be1 is the important word which is employed to connote1 along with its ,subject1 whatever it be1 the grand idea of ,,existence4 ,thus1 if ,i use the first person singular of its indicative mood1 and say1 ,i am1 ,i affirm ,,existence of myself4 ,i am1 is the equivalent of ,i am ,,existing4 ,in the first of these expressions1 ,i am1 the mark am involves in it the force of two marks2 it involves the meaning of the word existing1 and the marking power or meaning of the ,copula4 ,in the second expression ,i am existing1 the word am ought to serve the purpose of the ,copula only4 ,but in reality its connotation of ,,existence still adheres to it2 and whereas the expression ought to consist of the three established parts of a ,predication2 #a1 the subject #age ,i2 #b1 the predicate ,,existing2 and #c1 the copula2 it in reality consists of1 #a1 the subject ,i2 #b1 the predicate ,,existing2 #c1 the ,copula2 which signifies1 #d1 ,,existing1 over again4 ,let us take1 as another case1 that in which the subject and predicate of my intended proposition are1 the word ,i and reading4 ,i want for the purpose of predication only a ,copula to signify nakedly that the mark reading is applied to the mark ,i2 but instead of this ,i am obliged to use a word which connotes ,,existence1 along with the force of the ,copula2 and when ,i say ,i am reading1 not only reading is predicated of me1 but ,,existing also4 ,suppose1 again1 my subject is ,john1 my predicate dead1 ,i am obliged to use for my ,copula the word is1 which connotes ,,existence1 and ,i thus predicate of ,john both existence and death4 ,it may be easily collected1 from this one example1 what heterogeneous and inconsistent ideas may be forced into connection by the use of the ,substantive ,verb as the ,copula in ,predication2 and what confusion in the mental processes it tends to produce4 ,it is in the case1 however1 of the higher abstractions1 and the various combinations of ideas which the mind1 in the processes of enquiring and marking1 forms for its own convenience1 to obtain a greater command over its stores and greater facility in communicating them1 that the use of the verb which conjoins the ,predication of ,,existence with every other ,predication1 has produced the wildest confusion1 and been the most deeply injurious4 ,is it any wonder1 for example1 that ,chance1 and ,fate1 and ,nature1 have been personified1 and have had an ,,existence ascribed #agf to them1 as objects1 when we have no means of predicating anything whatsoever of them1 without predicating such ,,existence at the same time4 ,if we say that chance is nothing2 we predicate of it1 by the word is1 both existence and nothingness4 ,when this is the case1 it is by no means to be wondered at1 that philosophers should so long have inquired what those ,,existences are which abstract terms were employed to express2 and should have lost themselves in fruitless speculations about the nature of entity1 and quiddity1 substance1 and quality1 space1 time1 necessity1 eternity1 and so on4 ,it is necessary here to take notice of a part of the marking power of ,verbs1 which could not be explained till the nature of the copula was understood4 ,every ,verb involves in it the force of the copula4 ,it combines the marking powers of an adjective1 and of the copula2 and all ,verbs may be resolved into those elements4 ,thus1 ,john walks1 is the same with ,john is walking4 ,verbs1 therefore1 are attributives1 of the same nature as adjectives1 only with additional connotative powers2 and they cut smaller classes out of larger1 in the manner of adjectives4 ,thus ,john walks1 is an expression1 the same in import as the ,predication ,john is a walking man2 and1 walking men1 standing men1 running men1 lying men1 are all sub-species of the ,species ,man4 ,the same unhappy duplicity of meaning1 which is incurred by using the ,substantive ,verb as the copula in ,predication1 is inflicted on other ,verbs1 in that part of their marking power by which they exhibit the connection between the two terms of a ,predication4 ,the copula1 included in ,verbs1 is not the ,,pure copula1 #agg but the ,,actual copula2 the copula familiar and in constant use2 namely1 the ,substantive ,verb4 ,from this it results1 that whatever the peculiar attribute1 which is predicated by means of any verb1 ,,existence is always predicated along with it4 ,thus1 when ,i say ,john walks1 which is equivalent to ,john is walking1 ,i predicate both existence1 and walking1 of ,john4 ,when ,i say1 ,caliban existed not1 which is the same as ,caliban was not existing1 ,i predicate both existence1 and non-existence1 of the imaginary being ,caliban4 ,by the two first words of the ,predication1 ,caliban was1 existence is predicated of him2 by the addition of the compound term not existing1 the opposite is predicated of him4 ,the instances1 in which the more complicated formations of the mind are the subjects of this double ,predication1 are those which1 from the importance of their consequences1 deserve the greatest degree of attention4 ,thus1 when we say virtue exalts1 both existing1 and exalting1 are predicated of virtue4 ,when we say that passion impels1 both existence1 and impulsion1 are predicated of passion4 ,when we say that ,time generates1 and ,space contains all things1 we affirm existence of space and time1 by the same expression by which we affirm of the one1 that it generates2 of the other1 that it contains4 ,this constancy of ,predication1 forcing the same constancy in the junction of the ideas1 furnishes a remarkable instance of that important case of association1 of which we took notice above1 where1 by frequency of association1 two ideas become so joined1 that the one constantly rises1 and cannot be prevented from rising1 in combination with the other4 ,thus it is1 #agh that ,time forces itself upon us as an object4 ,so it is with ,space4 ,we cannot think of ,space1 we cannot think of ,time1 without thinking of them as existent4 ,with the ideas of space and time1 the idea of ,,existence1 as it is predicated of objects1 is so associated1 by the use of the ,substantive ,verb as the copula in predication1 that we cannot disjoin them4 ,the same would have been the case with ,chance1 and ,fate1 and ,nature2 if our religious education did not counteract the association4 ,it was precisely the same1 among the ,greeks and ,romans1 whose religious education had not that effect4#ec #ed ,findlater's footnote #ec3 ,the account of predication above given is in conformity with the phenomena of the family of languages known as the ,indo-,european4 ,logicians1 in fact1 in treating of this subject have had almost exclusive regard to ,greek and ,latin and the literary languages of modern ,europe1 which are all of one type4 ,it might therefore be presumed that the theory thus formed would be found not to fit in all its parts when applied to languages of an altogether different structure4 ,the mental process must doubtless be the same in all2 but the words that express the several parts may be used in new and unprecedented ways4 ,were naturalists to construct a scheme of the animal organism without ever having seen any other animals than those of the vertebrate type1 the theory would certainly fail in generality2 certain organs or functions would be set down as essential to animal existence which acquaintance with other classes of creatures shows can be quite well dispensed with4 ,similarly1 the current theory of predication1 when viewed in the light of a wider and deeper knowledge of the organism of speech1 seems to attach an exaggerated importance to the peculiar predicative power presumed to be inherent in verbs1 and especially in the verb of existence4 ,it is now a well known fact that in the monosyllabic class of languages1 in which a third part of the human race express their thoughts1 there is no distinction among the parts of speech4 ,in ,chinese1 for example1 the word ta expresses indifferently great1 greatness1 to be great1 to make great or magnify1 greatly4 ,it is only position that determines in each case how the word is to be understood2 thus traditional convention assigns to ta fu the meaning of a great man1 and to fu ta that of the man is great4 ,being habituated to the constant use of the verb is in such a case as the latter1 we are apt to suppose that the expression derives its predicative force from its suggesting the verb of existence1 which the mind instinctively and necessarily supplies for itself4 ,how little ground there is for this presumed necessity1 has been conclusively shown by the late ,mr4 ,garnett1 in his profound and exhaustive essay on the ,nature and ,analysis of the ,verb4 ,speaking of the theory that makes the essential difference between the verb and other parts of speech to reside in the verb substantive1 which is to be supplied by the mind in all cases where the functions of the verb proper are to be called into requisition1 he observes3 ,this theory presupposes the existence of a verb substantive in the languages in question1 and consciousness of that existence and of the force and capabilities of the element in those who speak them4 ,unfortunately the ,spanish grammarians1 to whom we are indebted for what knowledge we possess of the ,philippine dialects1 unanimously concur in stating that there is no verb substantive either in ,tagal1 ,pampanga1 or ,bisaya1 nor any means of supplying the place of one1 except the employment of pronouns and particles4 ,mariner makes a similar remark respecting the ,tonga language2 and we may venture to affirm that there is not such a thing as a true verb substantive in any one member of the great ,polynesian family4 ,it is true that the ,malayan1 ,javanese and ,malagassy grammarians talk of words signifying to be2 but an attentive comparison of the elements which they profess to give as such1 shows clearly that they are no verbs at all1 but simply pronouns or indeclinable particles1 commonly indicating the time1 place or manner of the specified action or relation4 ,it is not therefore easy to conceive how the mind of a ,philippine islander1 or of any other person1 can supply a word totally unknown to it1 and which there is not a particle of evidence to show that it ever thought of4 ,of the substitutes put in place of the substantive verb1 by far the most common are pronouns1 and particles indicating position4 ,thus in ,coptic1 the descendant of the ancient ,egyptian1 the demonstrative pe1 this1 after a noun singular masculine1 or te when the noun is feminine1 is equivalent to is2 and ne1 these1 after a plural1 to are4 ,in the ancient hieroglyphic monuments the function of the substantive verb is performed by the same means4 ,even in the ,semitic languages1 which have substantive verbs1 pronouns are habitually used instead of them2 so that ,i ,i1 or ,i he1 stands for ,i am1 and we we or we they1 for we are4 ,thou art my ,king 7,ps4 #dd1 #e7 is in the ,hebrew ,thou he my ,king2 ,we are the servants of the ,god of heaven 7,ezra #e1 #aa7 is in ,chaldee ,we they servants of the ,god of heaven2 ,i am the light of the world1 is in ,arabic ,i he the light of the world4 ,although such modes of expression are foreign to the ,indo-,european languages1 even they furnish abundant evidence of the predicative power of pronouns and particles4 ,if any word required to have inherent in it the peculiar affirmative power attributed to verbs1 it is the word yes4 ,accordingly ,tooke derives it from the ,french imperative a-yez3 forgetting1 or not knowing1 that the ,anglo-,saxon gese or yea 7cognate with the ,sanscrit pronoun ya7 was in existence long before the ,french ayez4 ,the fact is that ,eng4 yes1 ,ger4 ja1 and the corresponding words in the other ,european languages are oblique cases of demonstrative pronouns1 and mean simply in this 7manner71 or thus4 ,the ,italian si 7yes7 is from ,lat4 sic1 7thus72 the ,provenal oc is from ,lat4 hoc2 and the modern ,fr4 oui was originally a combination of hoc illo1 and passed through the stages of ocil and oil into its present form4 ,the consideration of these and a multitude of similar phenomena suggests1 that the ,sanscrit as-mi1 ,gr4 ei-mi1 ,lat4 s-um 7for es-um71 ,eng4 a-m1 may have had for its root the demonstrative pronoun sa1 and meant primarily that 7or there7 as to me4 ,be that as it may1 all philologists are agreed that the verbs now used to express being in the abstract1 expressed originally something physical and palpable4 ,thus ,ital4 stato1 ,fr4 t1 been1 are from the ,lat4 statum1 the participle of sto1 to stand2 and exist itself meant to stand out or be prominent4 ,eng4 be1 ,lat4 fu- is identical with ,gr4 phy- to grow2 and1 according to ,max ,mller1 as the root of as-mi meant breath or breathing4 ,it may then be safely affirmed that no word had for its primary function to express mere existence2 it seems enough for the purpose of predication that existence be implied4 ,with regard to ordinary verbs1 the analytic processes of comparative grammar show no traces of a substantive verb entering into their structure4 ,it is now an accepted doctrine of philology that1 as a rule1 the root of a verb is of the nature of an abstract noun2 and that it became a verb simply by the addition of a pronominal affix--as in the ,greek ,greek3 di_/-d-mi1 di_/-d-s1 di_/-d-si1 in which the terminations were originally ,greek3 -mi1 -si1 -ti4 ,the habits of thought arising out of the present analytic state of the ,indo-,european languages naturally lead us to conceive these pronominal affixes as nominatives4 ,but gift ,i does not seem a very natural way of getting at the meaning ,i give2 and therefore ,mr4 ,garnett maintains that the affixes were originally in an oblique case--the genitive or the instrumental--so that the literal meaning was gift of me1 or giving by me4 ,that this is the nature of the verb in the agglutinate languages--by far the most numerous class--it seems hardly possible to dispute2 for in these the affixes remain rigidly distinct and little disguised4 ,thus1 according to ,garnett1 the ,wotiak1 in order to express my son1 thy son1 c41 joins oblique cases of the personal pronouns to the noun pi in the following way3-- pi-7i 4444 son of me pi-ed 4 4 4 son of thee pi-ez 4 4 4 son of him pi-mi 4 4 4 son of us pi-dy 4 4 4 son of you pi-zy 4 4 4 son of them ,in an exactly similar way the preterite of the verb to speak stands thus-- bera-i 4 4 4 speech of me ,i spoke bera-d 4 4 4 speech of thee bera-z 4 4 4 speech of him bera-my 4 4 speech of us bera-dy 4 4 speech of you bera-zy 4 4 speech of them ,in the ,fiji language loma means heart or will2 and loma-qu 7heart of me7 may1 according to the connection1 signify either my heart or will1 or ,i will4 ,in the inflected languages the affixes are so amalgamated with the root and otherwise obliterated that there is no such direct evidence of their nature2 but a great many facts tend to show that the structure of the verb was originally the same as in the agglutinate family4 ,if this analysis of the verb is correct1 the affirmation of existence found no expression in the early stages of language2 the real copula connecting the subject with the predicate was the proposition contained in the oblique case of the pronominal affix4--,f4 ,editor's footnote #ed3 ,the interesting and important philological facts adduced by ,mr4 ,findlater1 confirm and illustrate in a very striking manner the doctrine in the text1 of the radical distinction between the functions of the copula in predication1 and those of the substantive verb2 by shewing that many languages have no substantive verb1 no verb expressive of mere 99existence1 and yet signify their predications by other means2 and that probably all languages began without a substantive verb1 though they must always have had predications4 ,the confusion between these two different functions in the ,european languages1 and the ambiguity of the verb ,to ,be1 which fulfils them both1 are among the most important of the minor philosophical truths to which attention has been called by the author of the ,analysis4 ,as in the case of many other luminous thoughts1 an approach is found to have been made to it by previous thinkers4 ,hobbes1 though he did not reach it1 came very close to it1 and it was still more distinctly anticipated by ,laromiguire1 though without any sufficient perception of its value4 ,it occurs in a criticism on a passage of ,pascal1 and in the following words4 ,quand on dit1 l'tre est1 etc4 le mot est1 ou le verbe1 n'exprime pas la mme chose que le mot tre1 sujet de la dfinition4 ,si j'nonce la proposition suivante3 ,dieu est existant1 je ne voudrais pas dire assurment1 ,dieu existe existant3 cela ne ferait pas un sens2 de mme1 si je dis que ,virgile est pote1 je ne veux pas donner entendre que ,virgile existe4 ,le verbe est1 dans la proposition1 n'exprime donc pas l'existence relle2 il n'exprime qu'un rapport spcial entre le sujet et l'attribut1 le rapport du contenant au contenu1 c4 7,leons de ,philosophie1 #gme ed4 vol4 i4 p4 #cjg47 ,having thus hit upon an unobvious truth in the course of an argument directed to another purpose1 he passes on and takes no further notice of it4 ,it may seem strange that the verb which signifies existence should have been employed in so many different languages as the sign of predication1 if there is no real connection between the two meanings4 ,but languages have been built up by the extension of an originally small number of words1 with or without alterations of form1 to express new meanings1 the choice of the word being often determined by very distant analogies4 ,in the present case1 the analogy is not distant4 ,all our predications are intended to declare the manner in which something affects1 or would affect1 ourselves or others4 ,our idea of existence is simply the idea of something which affects or would affect us somehow1 without distinction of mode4 ,everything1 therefore1 which we can have occasion to assert of an existing thing1 may be looked upon as a particular mode of its existence4 ,since snow is white1 and since snow exists1 it may be said to exist white2 and if a sign was wanted by which to predicate white of snow1 the word exists would be very likely to present itself4 ,but most of our predications do relate to existing things3 and this being so1 it is in the ordinary course of the human mind that the same sign should be adhered to when we are predicating something of a merely imaginary thing 7an abstraction1 for instance7 and that1 being so used1 it should create an association between the abstraction and the notion of real existence4--,ed4 #agi ,we have now observed1 wherein ,predication consists1 and the instruments by which it is performed4 #ahj ,we have also1 in part1 contemplated the ,end which it is destined to fulfil2 that is1 to mark the order in which sensations and ideas follow one another in a #aha train4 ,on this last part of the subject1 however1 the following observations are still required4 ,the trains1 the order of which we have occasion to #ahb mark1 may for the elucidation of the present subject1 be divided into two classes4 ,we have occasion to #ahc mark1 either1 first1 ,the series of the objects we have seen1 heard1 or otherwise perceived by our senses2 or1 #ahd secondly1 ,a train of thoughts which may have passed in our minds4 #a4 ,when we come to record a train of the objects we have perceived1 that is1 a train of sensations1 the sensations have become ideas2 for the objects are not now acting on our senses1 and the sensations are at an end4 ,the order of the objects of our senses1 is either the order of time1 or the order of place4 ,the first is the order of ,,succession2 when one object comes first1 another next1 and so on4 ,the second is the order of ,,position2 when the objects are considered as simultaneous1 but different in distance and direction from a particular point4 ,let us observe in what manner the artifice of #ahe ,predication is adapted to the marking of a train in either of those orders3 and first1 with respect to a train in the order of ,time4 ,of this the following may be taken as a simple example4 ,the sun rises2 clouds form2 clouds cover the sky2 lightning flashes2 thunder roars4 ,it is easy in these expressions to observe1 what were the sensations1 and in what order they succeeded one another4 ,it is also observable1 that the order is denoted by so many ,predications2 and that ,predication is our only expedient for denoting their order4 ,first sensation1 sight of the sun2 second sensation1 rising of the sun2 these two denoted shortly and in their order by the ,predication1 the sun rises4 ,third sensation1 sight of clouds2 fourth sensation1 forming of clouds2 these two again shortly denoted in their order by the ,predication1 clouds form4 ,the next1 clouds cover the sky1 needs no further explanation2 but there is a peculiar artifice of language in the two following ,predications2 lightning flashes1 thunder roars1 which deserves to be well understood4 ,lightning flashes2 here there is but one sensation1 the sensation of sight1 which we call a flash4 ,but there are various kinds of flashes2 this is a peculiar one1 and ,i want to mark peculiarly what it is4 ,it is not a flash on the earth1 but a flash in the sky2 it will not1 however1 sufficiently distinguish the flash in question1 to say1 the sky flashes1 because other flashes come from the sky4 ,what then is my contrivance8 ,i form the fancy of a cause of this particular flash1 though ,i know nothing concerning it1 and for this unknown cause ,i invent a name1 and call it lightning4 ,i have then an expression which always accurately #ahf marks the sensation ,i mean to denote3 ,i say1 the lightning flashes1 a flash of lightning1 and so on4 ,thunder roars1 is another case of the same artifice4 ,the noise here is the only sensation2 but in order to distinguish it from all other noises1 ,i invent a name for its unknown cause1 and by its means can mark the sensation with perfect precision4 ,the ,fictions1 after this manner resorted to1 for the purpose of marking2 though important among the artifices of naming2 have contributed largely to the misdirection of thought4 ,by the unfortunate ambiguity of the ,copula1 ,,existence is affirmed of them in every ,predication into which they enter4 ,the idea of ,,existence becomes1 by this means1 inseparable from them2 and their true nature1 as ,creatures of the mind1 and nothing more1 is rarely1 and not without difficulty1 perceived4 ,the mode in which a train1 in the order of place1 is marked by the artifice of ,predication1 may be thus exemplified3 ,the house is on a hill2 a lawn is in front2 a stable is on the left hand2 a garden is on the right2 a wood is behind4 ,it is not necessary1 after the exposition of the preceding example1 to exhibit the detail of the marking performed by these ,predications4 ,the reader can trace the sensations1 the order of them1 and the mode of the marking1 according to the specimen which has just been exhibited4 #b4 ,the trains of thought which pass in our minds1 are sequences1 the items of which are connected in three principal ways3 #ast1 as cause and effect2 #b;dly1 as resembling2 #c;dly1 as included under the same name4 ,a short illustration of each of these cases will #ahg complete the account of predication1 as a contrivance for marking the order of ideas4 ,to illustrate a sequence1 connected as ,cause and ,effect1 let me suppose that ,i have a flint and steel in my hand1 which ,i am about to strike1 one against the other1 but at that instant perceive a barrel of gunpowder open1 close before me4 ,i withhold the stroke in consequence of the train of thought which suggests to me the ultimate effect4 ,if ,i have occasion to mark the train1 ,i can only do it by a series of ,predications1 each of which marks a sequence in the train of causes and effects4 ,i strike the flint on the steel1 first sequence4 ,the stroke produces a spark1 second sequence4 ,the spark falls on gunpowder1 third sequence4 ,the spark ignites the gunpowder1 fourth sequence4 ,the gunpowder ignited makes an explosion1 fifth sequence4 ,the ideas contained in these propositions must all have passed through my mind1 and this is the only mode in which language enables me to mark them in their order4#ee ,editor's footnote #ee3 ,it is necessary again to notice the consistent omission1 throughout the author's theory of ,predication1 of the element ,belief4 ,in the case supposed1 the ideas contained in all the propositions might have passed through the mind1 without our being led to assert the propositions4 ,i might have thought of every step in the series of phenomena mentioned1 might have pictured all of them in my imagination1 and have come to the conclusion that they would not happen4 ,i therefore should not have made1 either in words or in thought1 the predication1 ,this gunpowder will explode if ,i strike the flint against the steel4 ,yet the same ideas would have passed through my mind in the same order1 in which they stand in the text4 ,the only deficient link would have been the final one1 the ,belief4--,ed4 #ahh ,the sequences of which the items are connected by ,resemblance will not require much illustration4 ,i see ,a1 who suggests ,b to me by his stature4 ,b suggests ,c by the length of his nose4 ,c suggests ,d by the similarity of their profession1 and so on4 ,the series of my thoughts is sufficiently obvious4 ,how do ,i proceed when ,i have occasion to mark it8 ,i use a series of predications4 ,i see ,a2 this predication marks the first item1 my sight of ,a4 ,a is tall1 the second4 ,a man of like tallness is ,b1 the third2 and so on4 ,the mode in which thoughts are united in a ,syllogism1 is the leading example of the third case4 ,let us consider the following very familiar instance4 ,every tree is a vegetable3 every oak is a tree3 therefore1 every oak is a vegetable4 ,this is evidently a process of naming4 ,the primary idea is that of the object called an oak2 from the name oak1 ,i proceed to the name tree1 finding that the name oak1 is included in the name tree2 and from the name tree1 ,i proceed to the name vegetable1 finding that the name tree is included in the name vegetable1 and by consequence the name oak4 ,this is the series of thoughts1 which is marked in order1 by the three propositions or predications of the syllogism4#ef ,editor's footnote #ef3 ,for the present ,i shall only remark on this theory of the syllogism1 that it must stand or fall with the theory of ,predication of which it is the sequel4 ,if1 as ,i have maintained1 the propositions which are the premises of the syllogism are not correctly described as mere processes of naming1 neither is the formula by which a third proposition is elicited from these two a process of mere naming4 ,what it is1 will be considered hereafter4--,ed4 #ahi ,the ,predications of ,arithmetic are another instance of the same thing4 ,one and one are two4 ,this again is a mere process of naming4 ,what ,i call one and one1 in numbering things1 are objects1 sensations1 or clusters of sensations2 suppose1 the striking of the clock4 ,the same sounds which ,i call one and one1 ,i call also two2 ,i have for these sensations1 therefore1 two names which are exactly equivalent3 so when ,i say1 one and one and one are three3 or when ,i say1 two and two are four3 ten and ten are twenty3 and the same when ,i put together any two numbers whatsoever4 ,the series of thoughts in these instances is merely a series of names applicable to the same thing1 and meaning the same thing4 ,beside the two purposes of language1 of which ,i took notice at the beginning of this inquiry2 the recording of a man's thoughts for his own use1 and the communication of them to others2 there is a use1 to which language is subservient1 of which some account is yet to be given4 ,there are complex sensations1 and complex ideas1 made up of so many items1 that one is not distinguishable from another4 ,thus1 a figure of one hundred sides1 is not distinguishable from one of ninety-nine sides4 ,a thousand men in a crowd are not distinguishable from nine hundred and ninety-nine4 ,but in all cases1 in which the complexity of the idea arises from the repetition of the same idea1 names can be invented upon a plan1 which shall render them distinct1 up to the very highest degree of complication4 ,numbers are a set of names contrived upon this plan1 and for this very purpose4 ,ten and the numbers below ten1 are the repetition of so many ones3 twenty1 thirty1 forty1 c41 up to a hundred1 are #aij the repetition of so many tens3 two hundred1 three hundred1 c41 the repetition of so many hundreds2 and so on4 ,these are names1 which afford an immediate reference to the ones or units1 of which they are composed2 and the highest numbers are as easily distinguished by the difference of a unit as the lowest4 ,all the processes of ,arithmetic are only so many contrivances to substitute a distinct name for an indistinct one4 ,what1 for example1 is the purpose of addition8 ,suppose ,i have six numbers1 of which ,i desire to take the sum1 #ah1 #ad1 #i1 #be1 #ai1 #ae2 these names1 eighteen1 and fourteen1 and nine1 c41 form a compound name2 but a name which is not distinct4 ,by summing them up1 ,i get another name1 exactly equivalent1 one hundred1 which is in the highest degree distinct1 and gives me an immediate reference to the units or items of which it is composed2 and this is of the highest utility4 ,that the ,predications of ,geometry are of the same nature with those of ,arithmetic1 is a truth of the greatest importance1 and capable of being established by very obvious reasoning4 ,it is well known1 that all reasoning about quantity can be expressed in the form of algebraic equations4 ,but the two sides of an algebraic equation are of necessity two marks or two names for the same thing2 of which the one on the right-hand side is more distinct1 at least to the present purpose of the inquirer1 than the one on the left-hand side2 and the whole purpose of an algebraic investigation1 which is a mere series of changes of names1 is to obtain1 at last1 a distinct name1 a name the marking power of which is perfectly known to us1 on the right-hand side of the equation4 ,the language of geometry #aia itself1 in the more simple cases1 makes manifest the same observation4 ,the amount of the three angles of a triangle1 is twice a right angle4 ,i arrive at this conclusion1 as it is called1 by a process of reasoning3 that is to say1 ,i find out a name twice a right angle1 which much more distinctly points out to me a certain quantity1 than my first name1 amount of the three angles of a triangle2 and the process by which ,i arrive at this name is a successive change of names1 and nothing more2 as any one may prove to himself by merely observing the steps of the demonstration4#eg ,editor's footnote #eg3 ,i cannot see any propriety in the expression that when we infer the sum of the three angles of a triangle to be twice a right angle1 the operation consists in finding a second name which more distinctly points out the quantity than the first name4 ,when we assent to the proof of this theorem1 we do much more than obtain a new and more expressive name for a known fact2 we learn a fact previously unknown4 ,it is true that one result of our knowledge of this theorem is to give us a name for the sum of the three angles1 the marking power of which is perfectly known to us3 but it was not for want of knowing the marking power of the phrase sum of the three angles of a triangle that we did not know what that sum amounted to4 ,we knew perfectly what the expression sum of the three angles was appointed to mark4 ,what we have obtained1 that we did not previously possess1 is not a better mark for the same thing1 but an additional fact to mark the fact which is marked by predicating of that sum1 the phrase twice a right angle4--,ed4 ,there is one important class of words1 the ,,names of ,,names2 of which we shall have occasion to take account more particularly hereafter1 and of which it is necessary here to speak only as they form a variety of ,predication4 ,a few examples will make the case #aib intelligible4 ,,word is a generical name for all ,names4 ,it is not the name of a ,thing1 as chair is the name of a thing1 or watch1 or picture4 ,but word is a name for these several names2 chair is a word1 watch is a word1 picture is a word1 and so of all other names4 ,thus grammatical and logical terms are names of names4 ,the word noun1 is the name of one class of words1 verb of another1 preposition of another1 and so on4 ,the word sentence1 is the name of a series of words put together for a certain purpose2 the word paragraph the same2 and so oration1 discourse1 essay1 treatise1 c4 ,the words genus and species1 are not names of things1 but of names4 ,genus is not the name of any thing called animal or any thing called body2 it is a name of the names animal1 body1 and so on2 the name animal is a genus1 the name body is a genus2 and in like manner is the name man a species1 the name horse1 the name crow1 and so on4 ,the name proposition1 the name syllogism1 are names of a series of words put together for a particular purpose2 and so is the term definition2 and the term argument4 ,it will be easily seen that these words enter into ,predication precisely on the same principles as other words4 ,either the more distinct is predicated of the less distinct1 its equivalent2 or the more comprehensive of the less comprehensive4 ,thus we say1 that nouns and verbs are declinables2 preposition and adverb indeclinables2 where the more comprehensive terms are predicated of the less4 ,thus we say1 that adjectives and verbs are attributes2 where the more distinct is predicated of the less4#eh ,editor's footnote #eh3 ,this exposition of the class of words which are properly names of names1 belongs originally to ,hobbes1 and is highly #aic important4 ,they are a kind of names1 the signification of which is very often misunderstood1 and has given occasion to much hazy speculation4 ,it should however be remarked that the words genus and species are not solely names of names2 they are ambiguous4 ,a genus never indeed means 7as many of the schoolmen supposed7 an abstract entity1 distinct from all the individuals composing the class2 but it often means the sum of those individuals taken collectively2 the class as a whole1 distinguished on the one hand from the single objects comprising it1 and on the other hand from the class name4--,ed4 #aid ,,section ,v4 ,,pronouns4 ,the principal part of the artifice of ,naming is now explained4 ,we have considered the nature of the more necessary marks1 and the manner in which they are combined so as to represent the order of a train4 ,beside those marks1 which are the fundamental part of language1 there are several classes of auxiliary words or marks1 the use of which is1 to abbreviate expression1 and to render it1 what is of great importance1 a more rapid vehicle of thought4 ,these are usually comprehended under the titles of pronoun1 adverb1 preposition1 and conjunction2 a classification which1 for our present purpose1 has the best recommendation1 that of being familiarly known4 ,it is to be distinctly understood1 that in the account which is here to be given of the subsidiary parts of speech1 it is but one part of the explanation of them which will be attempted4 ,the ideas1 which many of them stand for1 are of the most complicated kind1 and have not yet been expounded4 ,we are1 therefore1 not yet prepared to point out the items which they mark4 ,our present business is only to indicate the mode in which they are used in ,predication1 as part of the great contrivance for marking the order of a train of ideas1 and for economizing the number of words4 ,it is also necessary to observe1 that ,i have limited myself1 in this part1 to brief indications1 without #aie going into minute development1 the length of which1 it appeared to me1 would not be compensated by the advantage4 ,in all speech 99there is a speaker2 there is some person spoken to2 and there is some person or thing spoken of4 ,these objects constitute three ,classes1 marks of which are perpetually required4 ,any artifice1 therefore1 to abridge the use of marks1 of such frequent recurrence1 was highly to be desired4 ,one expedient offered itself obviously1 as likely to prove of the highest utility4 ,speakers constituted one class1 with numerous names2 persons spoken to1 a second class2 persons and things spoken of1 a third4 ,a generical name might be invented for each class2 a name1 which would include all of a class1 and which singly might be used as the substitute of many4 ,for this end were the ,personal ,pronouns invented and such is their character and office4 ,i1 is the generical mark which includes all marks of the class1 speakers4 ,thou1 is a generical mark1 which includes all marks of the class1 persons spoken to4 ,he1 she1 it1 are marks1 which include all marks of the class1 persons or things spoken of4 ,by forming ,adjectives from certain kinds of ,nouns we obtain a useful class of specific names4 ,from wool we make woollen2 and woollen1 attached to various generic names1 furnishes us with specific names2 thus we say woollen cloth1 which is a species of cloth2 woollen yarn1 which is a species of yarn2 woollen garment1 which is a species of garment4 ,so1 from the word gold we make golden1 which furnishes us with a greater number of specific names2 from wood wooden1 which furnishes us with a still greater number4 ,adjectives are #aif formed in like manner from the personal pronouns3 from ,i1 my or mine2 from ,thou1 thy or thine2 from ,he1 ,she1 ,it1 his1 hers1 its2 also from the plurals of them1 ours1 yours1 theirs4 ,these adjectives answer a purpose of very frequent recurrence2 that of singling out1 from any class of objects1 a sub-class1 or an individual1 bearing a peculiar relation1 to the person speaking1 the person spoken to1 or the person or thing spoken of4 ,thus1 when ,i say1 my sheep or my oxen1 ,i denote a sub-class of those animals1 those which stand in the relation of property to the speaker2 when ,i say thy sheep or oxen1 ,i denote a sub-class in the same relation to the person spoken to2 and when ,i say his sheep or oxen1 a sub-class1 standing in that relation to the person spoken of4 ,when ,i say my son1 thy wife1 his father1 ,i single out individuals having that relation4 ,the ,demonstrative ,pronouns1 ,this and ,that1 are of great utility4 ,they serve to individualize any thing in a class4 ,one of these marks put upon a specific mark1 makes it an individual mark4 ,thus1 the mark man1 is the name of a class3 put upon it the mark this1 or that2 this man1 and that man1 are marks1 signs1 or names1 of individuals4 ,in this manner innumerable individual names can be made1 without adding a single word to the cumbrous materials of language4 ,the nature of the ,relative ,pronoun is not difficult to understand4 ,it supplies the place of a personal pronoun and a conjunction1 in connecting a ,predication with the subject1 or predicate of another proposition4 ,thus1 ,john received a wound1 which occasioned his death1 is of the same import as ,john received a wound1 and it occasioned his death4 ,this #aig is a case in which the ,relative connects a subsequent predication with the predicate of an antecedent predication4 ,the following are cases in which it connects a subordinate predication with the subject of the principal one3 ,erasmus1 who was a lover of truth1 but of a timid character1 hesitated between the new and the old religion4 ,erasmus1 and he was a lover of truth1 c4 ,the man who spoke to you is my father4 ,the man spoke to you1 and he is my father4#ei ,findlater's footnote #ei3 ,there is really no well marked distinction between relative pronouns and demonstrative pronouns1 either in their origin or in their use4 ,of the demonstrative roots ka1 sa1 ta1 ja1 derivatives from the 99guttural ka prevail as relatives in ,latin and its modern descendants 7,lat4 qui1 ,it4 che1 ,fr4 qui71 and in the ,teutonic languages 7,goth4 hva1 ,eng4 who1 ,ger4 wer1 welch71 but by no means exclusively4 ,in ,greek the relative differs little from the article1 which is also used as a demonstrative and a personal pronoun4 ,modern ,italian uses as a demonstrative a compound of the ,latin qui with iste and illa--questo1 quella4 ,in ,german the relative proper1 viz4 welch1 is comparatively little used1 its place being supplied by the article der1 which is merely an unemphatic demonstrative2 and in ,english that is perhaps as often used as who or which4 ,the relative serves for two purposes1 which it is useful to distinguish4 7#a7 ,it may add on either a clause containing an independent proposition1 as in the example in the text1 ,john received a wound1 which occasioned his death2 or a clause dependent in some way upon the preceding--e4g4 assigning the reason of it1 as1 ,it was unjust to punish the servant1 who only did what he was ordered4 7#b7 ,the clause introduced by the relative may serve simply to limit or define a noun1 in the way that an adjective or another noun in apposition does1 as ,the man who spoke to you is my father4 ,it is in this latter use of the relative1 and in no other1 that it is permissible in ,english to use that2 to substitute that for which in the first of the other two sentences1 or for who in the second1 would give a different meaning4 ,now it is only in the cases in which that could not be substituted for who or which that the relative involves the force of a conjunction2 and it is not always and that is the conjunction involved4 ,the conjunction has no verbal expression1 and never had2 it is only suggested1 and the mind supplies that which best suits the logical connection4 ,when the predication of the relative clause is co-ordinate with the preceding1 as in the first example1 and is the proper conjunction to supply4 ,in the sentence about the punishment of the servant1 who is equivalent to for he2 and in that about ,erasmus1 in the text1 to inasmuch as he4 ,when the relative clause merely defines1 no conjunction of any kind is even implied4 ,in such a sentence as ,he rewarded the man that rescued him1 the relative clause is the answer to a question naturally suggested by ,he rewarded the man--what man8 ,the or that 7man7 rescued him2 which is equivalent to1 his rescuer4 ,to resolve it into ,and that man rescued him1 gives quite a different meaning2 namely1 that he rewarded some man 7otherwise known to the hearers7 for something 7likewise known to them71 and that this man now rescued him4--,f4 #aih ,the ,interrogative is easily explained4 ,it is merely the ,relative1 in a very elliptical form of expression4 ,the interrogative sentence1 ,who gave you that book8 when the subaudition is supplied1 is thus expressed3 ,the person gave you the book1 and him ,i will you to name to me4 ,what is the hour of the day8 is an elliptical form of1--,it is an hour of the day1 and it ,i will you to tell me4 #aii ,,section ,,vi4 ,,adverbs4 ,the power of this class of words1 in the great business of marking1 and the extent of the service rendered by them1 will be so easily seen1 that a few words will suffice to explain them4 ,adverbs may be reduced under five heads2 #a1 ,adverbs of ,time2 #b1 ,adverbs of ,place2 #c1 ,adverbs of ,quantity2 #d1 ,adverbs of ,quality2 #e1 ,adverbs of ,relation4 ,they are mostly abridgments1 capable of being substituted for longer marks4 ,and they are always employed for the purpose of putting a modification upon the ,subject1 or the ,predicate1 of a ,proposition4 ,a few examples will suffice for the further elucidation of this subject4 ,anciently1 is an adverb of time4 ,it is of the same import as the expression1 ,in distant past time4 ,it is applied to modify the subject1 or predicate1 of a proposition1 as in the following example3 ,a number of men anciently in ,england had wives in common4 ,had wives in common1 is the predicate of the above proposition1 and it is modified1 or limited1 in respect to time1 by the word anciently4 ,adverbs of place it is easy to exemplify in the same manner4 ,under adverbs of quantity all those which mark degrees may be included2 as greatly1 minutely3 ,thus1 ,he enlarged greatly upon patriotism3 ,greatly here means in many words2 and it modifies the predicate1 enlarged1 c4 ,adverbs of #bjj quality and relation are exceedingly numerous1 because they are easily made from the words which connote the quality or relation3 thus1 from hard1 hardly2 from loud1 loudly2 from sweet1 sweetly2 from warm1 warmly3 again1 from father1 paternally2 from son1 filially2 from magistrate1 magisterially2 from high1 highly2 from expensive1 expensively2 and so on4 ,in all this no difficulty is presented which requires removing4#fj ,editor's footnote #fj3 ,in many cases1 and even in some of the examples given1 the adverb does not modify either the subject or the predicate1 but the application of the one to the other4 ,anciently1 in the proposition cited1 is intended to limit and qualify not men1 nor community of wives1 but the practice by men of community of wives3 it is a circumstance affecting not the subject or the predicate1 but the predication4 ,the qualification of past and distant time attaches to the fact asserted1 and to the copula1 which is the mark of assertion4 ,the reason of its seeming to attach to the predicate is because1 as the author remarked in a previous section1 the predicate1 when a verb1 includes the copula4--,ed4 #bja ,,section ,,vii4 ,,prepositions4 ,it is easy to see in what manner ,prepositions are employed to abridge the process of discourse4 ,they render us the same service which1 we have seen1 is rendered by adjectives1 in affording the means of naming minor classes1 taken out of larger1 with a great economy of names4 ,thus1 when we say1 a man with a black skin1 this compound name1 a man with a black skin2 is the name of a sub-class1 taken out of the class man2 and when we say1 a black man with a flat nose and woolly hair2 this still more compound name is the name of a minor class1 taken out of the sub-class1 men with a black skin4 ,prepositions always stand before some word of the class called by grammarians nouns substantive4 ,and these nouns substantive they connect with other nouns substantive1 with adjectives1 or with verbs4 ,we shall consider the use of them1 in each of those cases4 #a4 ,substantives are united to ,substantives by prepositions1 on purpose to mark something added1 something taken away1 something possessed or owned4 ,thus1 a man with a dog1 a horse without a saddle1 a man of wealth1 a man of pleasure1 and so on4 ,it was first shewn by ,mr4 ,horne ,tooke1 that prepositions1 in their origin1 are verbs1 or nouns4 ,thus the prepositions in ,english1 which note the modifications effected by adding to1 or taking from1 were #bjb originally concrete words1 which1 beside something connoted by them1 marked particularly junction1 or disjunction4 ,in the use of them as prepositions1 that part of their signification1 which we have called the connotation1 has been dropped2 and the notation alone remains4 ,prepositions1 therefore1 are a sort of abstract terms1 to answer a particular purpose4 ,to express my idea of a man with a dog 7a very complex idea1 consisting of two clusters2 one1 that which is marked by the term man2 the other1 that which is marked by the term dog72 it is not enough that ,i set down the term ,man1 and the term ,dog2 it is necessary1 besides1 that ,i have a mark for that particular junction of them1 which my mind is making4 ,for that mark ,i use the preposition with4 ,without denotes disjunction in a similar manner1 and requires no further explanation4 ,the preposition of1 by which possession or ownership is denoted1 7formerly1 as remarked by ,mr4 ,gilchrist1 written og1 oc1 ac1 c471 is eke1 or add4 ,if we suppose that our verb have is of the same origin1 of is merely the verb1 which signifies possessing2 and the learner may thus conceive the nature of its different applications4#g99 ,a man of wealth1 a man hav7ing7 wealth2 a field of ten acres1 a field hav7ing7 ten acres2 so1 a house of splendour2 a woman of gallantry2 in all of which cases1 beside the two clusters of ideas1 marked by the two names which the preposition connects1 there is an idea of possession coming between4 99,mill's footnote #g3 ,see note at p4 #bji4 ,here1 however1 a peculiarity is to be noted4 ,when there is a possessor1 there is something possessed4 #bjc ,the preposition1 therefore1 which marks the relation between the possessor and the possessed1 stands ambiguously between the active and the passive power4 ,it1 therefore1 partakes more of the active or the passive signification1 according to the position of the words which it is employed to connect4 ,in the instances previously given1 we have seen that it had clearly an active signification4 ,in the following it has clearly a passive4 ,the book of ,john2 the book of1 hav7ed7 ,john4 ,the ,creator of the world2 ,creator hav7ed74 ,the wealth of ,croesus2 wealth hav7ed74 ,of is employed in a partitive sense1 when one of the words denotes a part of the other2 as half of the army2 many of the people2 much of the loss4 ,in this case the idea of possession is sufficiently obvious to support the analogy4 ,the parts are possessed1 had1 by the whole4 ,part of the debt1 part hav7ed7 the debt4 ,it is easy to see how the preposition with a substantive1 serves the purpose of a new adjective4 ,thus1 in the expression1 a man with one eye1 the words1 with one eye1 might have been supplied by an adjective1 having the same meaning or marking power2 and the ,french language actually has such an adjective1 in the mark borgne4 ,we say1 a man with red hair1 and we have the adjective1 red-haired2 a man of wealth1 and we have the adjective1 wealthy2 a man of strength1 and we have the adjective1 strong2 cases which distinctly exemplify our observation4 #b4 ,we come now to shew in what manner1 and with what advantage1 prepositions are employed to connect ,substantives with ,adjectives4 ,the following #bjd classes of adjectives will furnish sufficient illustration of this part of the subject3 #a1 ,adjectives of place or position2 99#b1 ,adjectives of time or succession2 #c1 ,adjectives signifying profit or disprofit2 #d1 ,adjectives of plenty or want2 #e1 ,adjectives signifying an affection or state of the mind4 ,adjectives of position1 such as near1 distant1 high1 low1 have the ordinary power of adjectives1 as marks upon marks2 and an additional power1 which will best be explained by examples4 ,when we say a distant house1 a neighbouring town2 the words distant1 and neighbouring1 are not only marks upon house1 and town1 but refer to something else3 a distant house1 is a house distant from something2 a neighbouring town1 is a town neighbouring something3 it may mean a house distant from my house1 a town neighbouring my house3 in these cases1 we should say that the adjective has both a notation1 and a connotation4 ,the adjective distant1 for example1 notes house1 and connotes my house2 neighbouring1 notes town1 connotes my house4 ,it is next1 however1 to be observed1 that the connotation1 in such cases1 would be vague without a mark to determine it4 ,the expression would be very imperfect1 if1 after the word high1 we were merely to put the word hill2 and say1 the house is high the hill2 or1 the house is distant the post-town4 ,prepositions supply this defect4 ,we say1 the house is high on the hill2 the house is distant from the post-town4 ,in the case of some adjectives1 their juxta-position makes the reference sufficiently precise2 and in that case1 the preposition may be dispensed with2 as1 near the town1 near the road1 c4 #bje ,it is observable1 that the adjectives of position are not numerous4 ,some very general ones are used2 and the sub-species are formed out of them by the aid of prepositions4 ,thus we have the word placed1 which includes all positions2 and this1 joined with a substantive and a preposition1 marks positions of all kinds3 thus we can say1 placed on the right hand1 placed on the left hand1 placed behind the house1 placed before the house1 placed above it1 placed below it1 placed in it1 and so on4 ,it is not my intention to inquire into the precise meaning of each of the prepositions4 ,it is sufficient to have given a sample of the inquiry1 as in the case of the prepositions which connect substantives with substantives2 and to have shewn the mode of their signification1 as a kind of abstract terms1 either active or passive4 ,the varieties of time or succession are not many1 and the words to denote them1 proportionally few4 ,previous1 simultaneous1 posterior1 are the principal adjectives2 and the terms to which these words of reference point1 are marked by prepositions3 thus we say1 previous to1 simultaneous to1 and also with2 with1 as we have seen1 denoting junction1 sameness of time4 ,adjectives of profit or disprofit1 need prepositions to mark their connexion with the things benefited or hurt2 as1 hurtful to the crop2 good for the health4 ,these adjectives afford a good example of the manner in which generical adjectives are divided into numerous sub-species1 without the inconvenience of new names1 by the aid of the prepositions3 thus1 hurtful1 which notes all kinds of hurtfulness1 is made to note #bjf its various species1 in the following manner3 hurtful to the health1 hurtful to the eyes1 hurtful to the stomach1 hurtful to the crops1 hurtful to the reputation3 all different species of hurtfulness1 which might be noted by adjectives severally appropriated to them4 ,there is nothing particular to be remarked of the manner in which adjectives of plenty1 or want1 or those signifying an affection of the mind1 are connected with the objects they connote1 by prepositions2 we shall1 therefore1 proceed to shew the manner in which verbs are connected with substantives1 by their means4 #c4 ,all verbs are adjectives1 either active or passive1 put into a particular form1 for the sake of a particular connotation4 ,all actions1 saving those which begin and end in the actor1 have a reference to a patient1 or something acted on2 and the being acted on2 the passion as it is called2 has a reference to the actor4 ,action1 therefore1 and passion1 are relative terms1 standing in the order of cause and effect2 agent and patient1 are the names of the subjects of the action and the passion1 the cause and the effect4 ,most actions are motions1 or named by analogy to motions4 ,in applying terms denoting motion1 there is particular occasion for marking the two points of termination2 the point at which it began1 and the point at which it ended4 ,this is effected by the name of the two places1 and a preposition4 ,the contrivance will be sufficiently illustrated by an obvious example3 ,john travelled from ,london to ,dover3 ,travelled1 the name of the motion2 ,london1 the point of commencement2 ,dover1 the point of termination3 from1 a word denoting commencement1 #bjg connecting ,london with travelled2 to1 a word signifying completion1 connecting the word ,dover1 with the word travelled4 ,some verbs1 which imply motion1 have their main1 or only reference1 to the point of its termination4 ,thus1 he stopped at ,dover3 he struck him on the head3 he stabbed him in the side4 ,these prepositions1 whatever their precise import1 which we shall not now stop to inquire1 mark1 when thus applied to the name of the place at which the respective motions terminated1 the connexion of the two names1 that of the motion1 and that of its point of termination4 ,with respect to motions1 we have occasion to mark1 not only the points of their commencement and termination1 but also their direction4 ,the direction of a motion1 by which we mean the position of the moving body1 at the several points of its course1 can only be marked by a reference to other bodies1 whose position is known4 ,thus1 ,he walked through the field4 ,the direction of the walk1 or the position of the walking man1 at the several moments of it1 is marked by a reference to the field whose position is known to me1 and a word which means from side to side4 ,the expression1 ,it flew in a straight line1 is less full and particular in its marking1 but clear and distinct1 as far as it goes1 by reference to a modification of position2 namely1 a line1 with which ,i am perfectly familiar4 ,in using verbs of action and passion1 that is1 words which mark a certain cluster of ideas1 we have occasion to modify such clusters1 by adding to1 or taking from them1 not only ideas of ,position1 as above1 but various other ideas2 of which the idea of #bjh the ,cause1 or ,end1 of the action1 the idea of the ,instrument with which it was performed1 and the idea of the ,manner of the performance1 are among the principal4 ,john worked2 to this1 a mark of a certain cluster of ideas1 ,i want to make an addition1 that of the ,cause or ,end of his working4 ,that ,end is1 ,bread4 ,to mark this as the cause of his working1 it is not enough to set down the name bread2 ,i need a mark to fix its connexion with the working1 and the kind of its connexion4 ,i say1 ,john worked for 7cause7 bread4 ,john was robbed for 7cause of the robbery7 his money4 ,the ideas of manner and instrument are commonly annexed by one preposition2 ,john worked with 7joining7 diligence1 the manner2 ,john worked with a spade1 the same idea1 as ,john with 7joined7 a spade worked2 spade1 the instrument4 ,john worked by the job1 worked by the day2 manner3 ,john worked by machinery1 the instrument4 ,he was killed with barbarity1 with a cudgel4 ,we say1 done with hurry1 or in a hurry1 done in haste4 ,in1 which seems to mark a modification of position1 is here applied to that which does not admit of position4 ,hurry and haste seem in such expressions to be personified2 to be things which surround an action1 and in the midst of which it is done4 ,we have compound names for many actions4 ,thus we may say1 he hurt ,john1 or he did hurt to ,john1 he gave a lecture to ,john1 or1 he lectured ,john4 ,the reason why a preposition is required before the patient1 in the case of the compound name of the action1 and not of the single name1 is1 that the word which stands with respect to the verb in the #bji immediate relation of the recipient or patient of the action1 is not the man1 but the thing done4 ,thus1 in the phrase1 he did hurt to ,john1 it is not ,john which is done1 but hurt3 in the phrase1 he gave a lecture to ,john1 it is not ,john who is given1 but a lecture4 ,there are here as it were1 two patients1 lecture1 the primary1 ,john1 the secondary2 juxta-position marks the connexion of the primary2 but a preposition is necessary1 to mark that of the secondary4 ,the following phrases seem to admit of a similar explanation4 ,he reminded him of his promise2 he accused him of perjury2 he deprived him of his wife3 the secondary patients being promise1 perjury1 wife4 ,he reminded him of his promise 7hav7ed7 his promise72 the promise being the thing had or conceived in the reminding3 accused him of perjury2 perjury being the thing had in the accusation1 the matter of the accusation3 deprived him of his wife2 his wife being the matter of the deprivation2 the thing hav7ed7 in it4#fa ,findlater's footnote #fa3 ,the ingenious speculations of ,mr4 ,tooke did great service to the cause of philology in ,england1 by awakening a very general interest in the subject4 ,but his knowledge of the cognate languages was far too circumscribed to warrant his sweeping inductions4 ,in his day1 in fact1 the accesses had not yet been opened up to this new mine1 nor the right veins struck that have since yielded such rich results4 ,accordingly nearly all ,tooke's derivations are now discredited1 and among others his account of prepositions4 ,one or two ,english prepositions1 of comparatively recent formation1 seem to be formed from nouns2 as among ,ang4 ,sax4 gemang or ongemang1 gemang meaning mixture2 and against1 ,ang4 ,sax4 on-gegen in which gegen1 from its use in cognate dialects1 appears to be #baj a noun1 though its primary meaning is not very clear4 ,these however still involve a preposition which has to be accounted for4 ,between1 again1 is by twain1 near two2 and except1 save1 during were originally participles in the case absolute2 except this was originally this excepted1 ,lat4 hoc excepto4 ,but the simple prepositions in1 of1 by belong to the radical elements of language1 and are more independent of nouns and verbs than nouns and verbs are of them4 ,comparative philology1 which did not exist in ,tooke's days1 has shewn1 that1 besides predicative roots1 as they are called--that is syllables expressive of some action or property1 such as to go1 to eat1 to be bright1 to speak1 c41 which form the bases of nouns1 adjectives1 and verbs--there was a class of roots denoting simply relations in space1 that is1 place or direction 7here or this1 there or that1 up1 down1 away1 c474 ,it is easy to see how the audible marks of such notions1 at first1 doubtless1 vague enough1 would be rendered precise and intelligible by gesticulations2 or perhaps the gesticulations were the original signs1 and the words mere involuntary exclamations accompanying them1 and in time taking their place4 ,these syllables have been called local1 demonstrative1 or pronominal roots1 and play a most important part in language4 ,they are joined to other roots to form derivatives of various kinds2 and it is of them that the inflexional endings of nouns and verbs are built up4 ,singly or in combination1 they constitute the pronouns1 personal as well as demonstrative4 ,abstract as are now the meanings of ,i1 he1 they were once patent to the senses2 ma was an emphatic here1 calling attention to the speaker2 sa or ta1 there1 that1 something different from both speaker and hearer4 ,most of the prepositions originated in roots of this class4 ,the roots of some of them1 at least1 are identical with those of pronouns2 others express direction1 and thus imply motion4 ,thus up means1 7motion7 from below to above2 in the root ,,fr 7as in for1 from71 which is represented in ,sans4 ,gr4 and ,lat4 by ,,pr 7pro71 the ground idea is1 motion or removal from the speaker1 in the front direction4 ,of is the ,gothic af1 ,old ,ger4 aba or apa1 ,sans4 apa1 ,gr4 ,greek3 a7po #baa ,lat4 a or ab4 ,it is not easy to determine the precise physical relation primarily expressed by this particle2 probably proceeding from1 or descending or depending from4 ,if there is any connection between of and have1 it is more likely that have is derived from of than the reverse4 ,that not a few verbs have this kind of origin1 is now recognised2 the ,english utter from out is a signal example4 ,the primary relations expressed by prepositions were always physical or sensible2 but the transition to the abstruse mental relations which they now serve to mark 7cause instrumentality1 superiority1 c47 is1 as a rule1 sufficiently obvious4 ,for example1 issuing or proceeding from passes insensibly into being part of1 belonging to1 in the possession of4--,f4 #bab ,,section ,,viii4 ,,conjunctions4 ,the ,conjunctions are distinguished from the ,prepositions1 by connecting ,predications2 while the ,prepositions connect only ,words4 ,there are seeming exceptions1 however1 to this description1 the nature of which ought to be understood4 ,they are all of one kind2 they all belong to those cases of ,predication1 in which either the subject or the predicate consists of enumerated particulars2 and in which the ,conjunction is employed to mark the enumeration4 ,thus we say1 ,four1 and four1 and two1 are ten4 ,here the subject of the predication consists of three enumerated particulars1 and the conjunction seems to connect words1 and not predications4 ,in like manner1 we say1 ,his bag was full of hares1 and pheasants1 and partridges4 ,in this last case1 the predicate is composed of enumerated particulars4 ,in these instances1 the words called conjunctions1 appear to perform the business of prepositions1 in joining words3 and in fact1 they may be supplied by prepositions4 ,thus1 instead of four1 and four1 and two1 are ten1 we may say four1 with four1 with two1 are ten3 and1 in the same way1 ,his bag was full of hares1 and pheasants1 and partridges1 may be put full of hares1 with pheasants1 with partridges4 ,and nothing can be more simple than such a variety in the use of such words4 #bac ,with means join2 and means add4#fb ,these are words of the same kind1 and the same import2 and nothing but use has appropriated the one to the joining of words rather than predications1 the other to the joining of predications rather than words4 ,findlater's footnote #fb3 ,this is according to ,tooke's etymology1 who traces and to an ,ang4 ,sax4 verb anan1 to add4 ,unfortunately1 ,anglo-,saxon scholars deny that there is such a verb4 ,the nearest to it is unnan1 which means1 however1 merely to wish well to1 to favour4 ,no satisfactory account has been given of and1 but the analogy of other conjunctions would connect it with a demonstrative root4 ,j4 ,grimm is inclined to consider it as a nasalised form of the ,lat4 et2 which in its turn may be an inversion of ,greek ,greek3 ti1 just as ac1 is of ,greek3 kai4 ,all conjunctions are essentially adverbs1 and derive their connective power from their adverbial meaning4 ,this is well seen in also1 the radical meaning of which is all 7quite7 in that 7the same7 way4 ,most of the adverbs used as conjunctions are obviously oblique cases of pronouns2 so1 as1 than1 when1 where1 tum1 ubi1 quam1 quum4 ,in ,gothic1 jah1 7,old ,ger4 ja1 ,finnish ja2 of the same origin as ,eng4 yes7 takes the place of and1 and means in that or the same 7manner74 ,the ,gr4 ,greek3 kai and the ,lat4 que1 and1 are similarly oblique cases from the root ka1 and equivalent to in which or that 7manner74 ,the identity of manner or circumstance constitutes the mental bond4 ,it is easy to see how a preposition used adverbially and expressing proximity1 distance1 or other relative position1 would connect predications or ideas2 e4g4 ,after he had rested a little1 he began again4--,f4 ,our object1 however1 on the present occasion1 is distinct1 both from that of the grammarian1 and that of the etymologist4 ,we have shewn1 that a set of marks are exceedingly useful to connect single words1 and by what contrivances this end is accomplished2 it remains for us to shew1 what use there is of marks #bad to connect ,predications2 and by what contrivances that object is attained4 ,the occasions for the use of marks to connect ,predications1 seem to be of two kinds4 ,first1 ,when two ,predications are to be marked1 as following one another4 ,secondly1 ,when they are to be marked1 as modified1 the one by the other4 #a4 ,those of the first kind need but few words for their explanation4 ,i may say1 ,newton was a mathematician1 ,locke was a metaphysician1 ,milton was a poet4 ,so stated1 these ,predications do not mark any particular order in my thoughts4 ,i desire1 however1 to show1 that the ideas thereby expressed1 were proximate parts of the train in my mind4 ,the word and1 which means add1 placed between every pair1 affords the requisite indication4 ,like and1 the conjunction nor marks predications in sequence4 ,it differs from and only in uniting negative predications4 ,the act is not honourable1 nor is the man honest4 ,in this case1 it is obvious that nor1 whatever its origin1 has the meaning of and not4 ,the predications then are two negative predications1 the sequence of which1 is marked by the word and4 ,but1 though it has been otherwise classed1 and called adversative1 is of the same kind1 and simply marks the sequence4 ,thus we say1 ,catiline was a brave man1 but ,catiline was a wicked man4 ,the meaning of but is scarcely different from that of and1 addition being the fundamental idea signified by both of them4 ,the opposition between the two predications is signified by the predications themselves1 not by the #bae connective4#fc ,in fact1 the sense would not be changed1 if we substituted and for but4 ,it is only because1 in use1 but has been commonly confined to the sequence of two opposing predications1 that the word but is no sooner expressed1 than an opposing predication is anticipated4 ,this is a simple case of association4 ,findlater's footnote #fc3 ,this is not strictly correct4 ,but is compounded of the two prepositions or local particles by and out 7,ang4 ,sax4 bi utan72 and the force of it1 in the example given in the text1 may be thus paraphrased3 ,catiline was a brave man2 but 7by1 near or beside that fact1 put another fact1 which is out1 away1 or different from it1 namely7 ,catiline was a wicked man4 ,this is something more than a simple case of association2 the opposition is expressed as well as the addition4--,f4 #b4 ,it is not necessary for us to do more than exemplify the principal cases in which one ,predication is modified by another4 ,the space is triangular1 if it is bounded by three straight lines4 ,the space is triangular1 because it is bounded by three straight lines4 ,the space is bounded by three straight lines1 therefore it is triangular4 ,in each of these three propositions1 there are two predications2 the one of which is dependent on the other4 ,the dependence is that of necessary consequence4 ,the triangularity is the consequence of being bounded by three straight lines4 ,in order to have names for two ,predications thus related1 we may call the one the conditioning1 the other the conditioned4 ,in the above instances1 ,the space is bounded by three straight lines1 is the conditioning #baf predication2 ,the space is triangular1 is the conditioned4 ,there are two states of the conditioning predication2 one1 in which it is contingent2 another1 in which it is positive4 ,observe1 now1 the simple contrivance for marking the dependence of the conditioned upon the conditioning predication1 in all the above cases4 ,in the first of the examples1 ,the space is triangular1 if it is bounded by three straight lines1 the conditioning predication is contingent4 ,the word if1 which is equivalent to give1#fd prefixed to the conditioning predication1 marks it both as the conditioning predication1 and as contingent4 ,findlater's footnote #fd3 ,that if has no connection with give1 is manifest from the cognate forms2 ,goth4 jabai1 ,frisic jef1 ,ang4 ,sax4 gif1 ,old ,ger4 ibu1 ,lettish ja1 all meaning primarily in which or in that case1 or supposition4 ,jabai--from which the other ,germanic forms are descended--appears to have originally been a dative or instrumental case of ja1 analogous to tubya ,latin tibi3 compare ibi1 ubi1 ,gr4 ,greek3 bi_/phi1 ,slavonic tebje tibi4--,garnett4--,f4 ,in the second of the examples1 ,the space is triangular1 because it is bounded by three straight lines1 the conditioning predication is positive2 the word because 7having the meaning of1 cause be1 or cause is7#fe prefixed to it1 marks it as at once the conditioning predication1 and also positive4 ,if for had been the #bag mark instead of because1 the artifice would have been still the same1 as for has the meaning of cause4 ,findlater's footnote #fe3 ,the syllable be1 in because1 before1 c41 is the simple preposition by1 ,sans4 abhi1 ,gr4 ,greek3 epi1 near1 close to4 ,therefore is for that2 in which for is a preposition1 meaning primarily position in front1 and thence1 by metaphor1 the relation of motive or cause4--,f4 ,in the third of the examples1 ,the space is bounded by three straight lines1 therefore it is triangular2 the order of the predications is inverted1 the conditioning being put first4 ,in this case1 therefore1 we need a mark to show that the last predication is conditioned1 and conditioned by the preceding4 ,this is done by prefixing to it the compound word1 therefore1 of which the first part there is equivalent to that1 and fore or for means cause4 ,the expression in its elementary form being1 ,the space is bounded by three straight lines2 for that1 or cause that1 the space is triangular4 ,in these cases we have examples of what are called1 the ,suppositive1 the ,causal1 and the ,illative conjunctions4 ,the following are examples of what are called the ,disjunctive4 ,the ship was well manned2 else it would have been lost4 ,unless the ship had been well manned1 it would have been lost4 ,in these two examples1 the conditioning 99predications are1 ,the ship was well manned2 ,the ship had been well manned3 the conditioned is1 it would have been lost1 in both instances4 ,the dependence here1 between the conditioning and conditioned1 is that of physical consequence4 ,the ship's not being lost1 was the consequence of its being well manned4 ,the contrivance for marking this dependence is akin to that which we have traced in the former instance4 ,in the first of the two examples1 the conditioning #bah predication stands first4 ,how do ,i mark that the next is conditioned1 and conditioned as a physical consequent8 ,i interpose the word else4 ,this is part of an obsolete verb1 signifying1 to dismiss1 to turn out1 to take away4#ff ,and the sentence is thus resolved3 ,the ship was well manned1 take away that 7take away the cause1 the effect is taken away also7 she would have been lost4 ,findlater's footnote #ff3 ,else is the genitive of an obsolete adjective1 in ,gothic alis1 corresponding to ,lat4 alius2 and is analogous with ,lat4 alias4--,f4 ,other conjunctions of the disjunctive kind1 as they are called1 would here have answered the same purpose with else4 ,the ship was well manned1 otherwise1 she would have been lost4 ,otherwise here is precisely of the same import as else4 ,the ship was well manned2 that being dismissed1 that being other than it was2 it would have been lost4 ,the ship was well manned1 or it would have been lost4 ,or1 in ,german oder1 is other4 ,the resolution of this sentence1 therefore1 is the same as the former4 ,in the second of the two examples1 ,unless the ship had been well manned1 it would have been lost1 the contrivance is the same1 with a mere change of position4 ,unless1 is a word of the same import1 rather the same word1 as else4 ,unless is ,,prefixed to the conditioning predication1 whereas else is ,,suffixed2 and that is the difference4#fg ,the word except1 which signifies take #bai away1 may be substituted for unless4 ,a peculiar application of if 7give7 may here also be exemplified4 ,if with the negative1 7if not17 has a similar signification with unless1 except2 ,if the ship had not been well manned1 c4 ,findlater's footnote #fg3 ,unless is simply on less1 corresponding to ,fr4 moins1 and is equivalent to if not4--,f4 ,let us now pass to another case4 ,although the ship was well manned1 it was lost4 ,the two predications may change places1 without change of meaning4 ,the ship was lost1 although it was well manned4 ,what 7as above7 was to be marked by else1 unless1 if not1 except1 and so on1 was the connexion between a cause and its usual effect2 that is1 the manning of a ship1 and the safety of the ship4 ,what is to be marked in this case is the want of connexion between a cause and its usual effect4 ,it is done by similar means4 ,although is part of an obsolete verb1 to allow1 to grant4#fh ,the two predications are3 ,the ship was well manned1 ,the ship was lost4 ,i want to mark between my two predications not only a connexion1 that of the antecedence and consequence of the predicated events1 but the existence of a consequent differing from that by which the antecedent is usually followed4 ,although1 prefixed to the predication of the antecedent event1 gives notice of another predication1 that of the consequent1 and of a consequent differing from that by which the antecedent might have been #bbj followed3 ,grant such an antecedent1 such and not such was the consequent4 ,findlater's footnote #fh3 ,although is a compound pronominal adverb resembling ,lat4 tamen1 and means 7the case being7 quite thus 7yet74--,f4 ,the same connection is marked by other conjunctions4 ,the ship was well manned1 nevertheless it was lost4 ,nevertheless1 means not less for that4#fi ,notwithstanding the ship was well manned1 it was lost4 ,notwithstanding1 is1 not being able to prevent1 maugre1 in spite of4 ,the resolution of the above sentences is obvious4 ,the ship was well manned1 yet it was lost4 ,yet is the verb get1 and has here the force of although1 grant4 ,the ship was well manned1 yet 7or got1 that being got1 had1 granted7 it was lost4#gj ,the ship was well manned1 still1 it was lost4 ,still is part of an obsolete verb1 to put1 to fix1 to establish4 ,the ship was well manned1 still 7that put1 that supposed7 it was lost4#ga ,findlater's footnote #fi3 ,nevertheless means literally1 not less by 7or for7 that4 ,in this compound the is not the article1 but an adverb1 in ,ang4 ,sax4 thy1 by that much1 and corresponds to ,lat4 eo in the expression eo minus4--,f4 ,findlater's footnote #gj3 ,yet is of pronominal origin like ,gr4 ,greek3 i7_/ti1 ,ger4 jetzt1 and has no connection with the verb get4--,f4 ,findlater's footnote #ga3 ,still seems to be the adjective still1 quiet1 used adverbially1 and having the force of undisturbed1 uninterrupted by that4--,f4 ,a few more cases will exemplify all that is material in the marking power of the conjunctions4 ,we study1 that1 we may be learned4 ,the connexion here1 again1 is that of cause and effect4 ,we study3 ,we may be learned1 are the two predications1 between which the connexion in question is to #bba be marked4 ,the demonstrative pronoun performs the service4 ,we may be learned1 that we study3 we study2 what8 to be learned4 ,john is more learned than ,james is eloquent4 ,the conjunction here is a relative term1 and consists of the two words1 more than4 ,the two predications are1 ,john is learned1 ,james is eloquent4 ,the connexion between them is1 that they are the two parts of a comparison turning upon the point of greatness in degree4 ,the two words more than1 suffice to mark that connexion4 ,than is but a mode of spelling and pronouncing that1 which use has appropriated to this particular case4 ,john is learned1 more that 7that being the more1 the other of course is the less71 ,james is eloquent4#gb ,findlater's footnote #gb3 ,than is only another form of then1 and marks that the one comes after the other1 and is therefore inferior4--,f4 ,as1 obsolete as a pronoun1 only exists as a conjunction4 ,it is a word of the same import with that4 ,the following will suffice in exemplification of the marking property which it retains4 ,virgil was as great a poet as ,cicero an orator4 ,the two predications are1 ,virgil was a great poet1 ,cicero was a great orator4 ,they also are connected as the two parts of a comparison1 turning upon the point of equality in degree4 ,as1 or that1 suffices to mark that connexion4 ,virgil was a great poet1 that 7namely great7 ,cicero was an orator4 ,we shall see afterwards1 in the composition of ,,relative ,,terms1 that every such term consists of two words1 or the same word taken twice4 ,the conjunction here is a relative term1 and consists #bbb of two words1 namely1 as1 or that1 taken twice4 ,virgil was a poet great1 that that1 an orator was ,cicero2 the first that marking great as poet2 the second that1 marking great as orator4#gc ,findlater's footnote #gc3 ,as is an oblique case of the demonstrative root sa1 and is equivalent to in this 7degree72 and the nature of the connection is this3 ,virgil was a poet great in this degree2 ,cicero was an orator great in this degree2 that is1 the degree of greatness was the same in both4--,f4 #bbc ,,chapter ,v4 ,,consciousness4 ,it is not easy for the mind to put off those confused notions and prejudices it has imbibed from custom1 inadvertency1 and common conversation4 ,it requires pains and assiduity to examine its ideas1 till it resolves them into those clear and distinct simple ones out of which they are compounded2 and to see which1 amongst its simple ones1 have or have not a necessary connexion and dependence one upon another4 ,till a man doth this in the primary and original notions of things1 he builds upon floating and uncertain principles1 and will often find himself at a loss4--,locke1 ,hum4 ,und4 b4 ii4 c4 #ac4 s4 #bh4 ,,it will now be instructive to retrace our steps1 to look back upon the space we have passed1 and contemplate the progress we have made toward our journey's end4 ,we have become acquainted with the elementary feelings of our nature2 first1 those derived immediately from our bodies1 whether by impressions made on the surface of them1 or unseen causes operating on them within2 secondly1 the feelings which1 after the above mentioned feelings have ceased1 are capable of existing as copies or representatives of them4 ,we have also observed the manner in which those secondary ,feelings1 to which we have given the name of ,,ideas1 flow1 either into groups1 or into trains4 ,and #bbd we have explored the system of contrivances1 to which mankind have had recourse1 for ,,marking those feelings1 and the trains of them2 so as either to fix the knowledge of them for one's own use1 or to make communication of them to others4 ,in what has been thus already presented1 it will be seen that several expositions of considerable importance are included4 ,sensations1 and ,ideas1 are both feelings4 ,when we have a sensation we feel1 or have a feeling2 when we have an idea we feel1 or have a feeling4 ,having a ,,sensation1 and having a feeling1 are not two things4 ,the thing is one1 the names only are two4 ,i am pricked by a pin4 ,the sensation is one2 but ,i may call it sensation1 or a feeling1 or a pain1 as ,i please4 ,now1 when1 having the sensation1 ,i say ,i feel the sensation1 ,i only use a tautological expression3 the sensation is not one thing1 the feeling another2 the sensation is the feeling4 ,when1 instead of the word feeling1 ,i use the word conscious1 ,i do exactly the same thing1 ,i merely use a tautological expression4 ,to say ,i feel a sensation1 is merely to say ,i feel a feeling2 which is an impropriety of speech4 ,and to say ,i am conscious of a feeling1 is merely to say that ,i feel it4 ,to have a feeling is to be conscious2 and to be conscious is to have a feeling4 ,to be conscious of the prick of the pin1 is merely to have the sensation4 ,and though ,i have these various modes of naming my sensation1 by saying1 ,i feel the prick of a pin1 ,i feel the pain of a prick1 ,i have the sensation of a prick1 ,i have the feeling of a prick1 ,i am conscious of the feeling2 the thing named in all these various ways is one and the same4 #bbe ,the same explanation will easily be seen to apply to ,,ideas4 ,though1 at present1 ,i have not the sensation1 called the prick of a pin1 ,i have a distinct idea of it4 ,the having an idea1 and the not having it1 are distinguished by the existence or non-existence of a certain feeling4 ,to have an idea1 and the feeling of that idea1 are not two things2 they are one and the same thing4 ,to feel an idea1 and to be conscious of that feeling1 are not two things2 the feeling and the consciousness are but two names for the same thing4 ,in the very word feeling all that is implied in the word ,consciousness is involved4 ,those philosophers1 therefore1 who have spoken of ,consciousness as a feeling1 distinct from all other feelings1 committed a mistake1 and one1 the evil consequences of which have been most important2 for1 by combining a chimerical ingredient with the elements of thought1 they involved their inquiries in confusion and mystery1 from the very commencement4 ,it is easy to see what is the nature of the terms ,,conscious1 and ,,consciousness1 and what is the marking function which they are destined to perform4 ,it was of great importance1 for the purpose of naming1 that we should not only have names to distinguish the different classes of our feelings1 but also a name applicable equally to all those classes4 ,this purpose is answered by the concrete term ,conscious2 and the abstract of it1 ,consciousness4 ,thus1 if we are in any way sentient2 that is1 have any of the feelings whatsoever of a living creature2 the word ,conscious is applicable to the feeler1 and ,consciousness to the feeling3 that is to say1 the words are ,,generical marks1 under which all the names of the subordinate classes #bbf of the feelings of a sentient creature are included4 ,when ,i smell a rose1 ,i am conscious2 when ,i have the idea of a fire1 ,i am conscious2 when ,i remember1 ,i am conscious2 when ,i reason1 and when ,i believe1 ,i am conscious2 but believing1 and being conscious of belief1 are not two things1 they are the same thing2 though this same thing ,i can name1 at one time without the aid of the generical mark1 while at another time it suits me to employ the generical mark4#gd #ge ,bain's footnote #gd3 ,the mistake of ,reid in raising ,consciousness to a separate faculty has been commented on by ,brown1 ,hamilton1 and others4 ,it must be allowed that to feel and to be conscious are not two things but the same thing3 that is to say1 the use of the term consciousness1 whether in common life or in philosophical discussion1 does not point to knowing1 and exclude feeling4 ,consciousness is the widest word in our vocabulary4 ,by common consent it embraces everything that mind embraces2 while one mode of extricating the great problem of ,perception from self-contradictions1 makes it mean more than mind strictly means4 ,we speak of the object-consciousness as our attitude in being cognisant of the extended universe2 while our attitude under feeling1 and thought1 we call subject-consciousness1 or mind4 ,the object-consciousness follows one set of laws1 the laws of matter and space1 as propounded in ,mathematics1 ,natural ,philosophy1 and so on4 ,the subject-consciousness follows a different set of laws1 such as the laws of pleasure and pain1 and the association of ideas1 treated of in ,psychology4 ,we are conscious objectively1 in counting the stars1 we are conscious subjectively1 in feeling oppressed by their number4 ,the subject-consciousness comprises all our feelings and thoughts2 it enters into volition2 and it makes a part of sensation1 in which both attitudes are conjoined4 ,this #bbg consciousness may be faint and limited1 or it may be intense and variegated4 ,we may be in a state of pleasure with little or nothing of thought accompanying2 we are still properly said to be conscious or under consciousness4 ,but we may add to the mere fact of pleasure1 the cognition of the state1 as a state of pleasure1 and as a state belonging to us at the time4 ,this is not the same thing as before3 it is something new superposed upon the previous consciousness4 ,when we take note of the fact that we are pleased1 we proceed beyond the bare experience of the present pleasure1 to an intellectual act of comparison1 assimilation1 or classification with past pleasures2 we probably introduce the machinery of language to express ourselves as pleased2 all this is so much extra consciousness4 ,these knowing operations are not involved in mere feeling2 we may feel without them4 ,indeed1 if the cognitive powers are brought into very active exercise upon our feelings1 as in the self-dissection of the ,psychologist1 the feelings themselves are apt to subside4 ,it is thus correct to draw a line between feeling1 and knowing that we feel2 although there is great delicacy in the operation4 ,it may be said1 in one sense1 that we cannot feel without knowing that we feel1 but the assertion is verging on error2 for feeling may be accompanied with a minimum of cognitive energy1 or as good as none at all2 or it may be accompanied with an express application of our knowing powers1 which is purely optional on our part1 and even hostile to the full development of the feeling as feeling1 as pleasure or pain4 ,reid wanted a name to express the act of scrutinizing or examining the mind1 and to correspond with such names as ,perception1 ,observation1 for the study of the extended or object universe4 ,he used ,consciousness for this purpose2 a word that had been probably more applied to our cognitive energies than to our experience of mere feeling in its simplest manifestation4 ,it is not often that consciousness is employed as the popular designation of states of feeling as such1 states of marked enjoyment or suffering4 ,on the other hand1 the word is frequently made use of to designate the act of cognizing or #bbh thinking of our states of feeling2 for which1 however1 self-consciousness is undoubtedly the more proper appellative4 ,hamilton terms consciousness a condition of our feelings and mental operations2 more correctly it is the operations themselves2 the consciousness is not the condition of the feeling1 but the feeling itself4 ,more material is the opinion1 held by ,hamilton in common with most of the ,german philosophers1 that the foundation of all consciousness is knowing2 that we feel1 only as we know that we feel4 ,he says1 ,it is evident that every mental phenomenon is either an act of knowledge1 or only possible through an act of knowledge3 for consciousness is a knowledge--a phenomenon of cognition4 7,metaphysics1 ,lect xi47 ,now although we may not be able to rebut this singular assertion by pointing to a state of feeling such as to entirely exclude knowledge1 we may ask1 do the two properties1 said to be thus implicated1 rise and fall in steady concomitance2 the more the knowledge1 the greater the feeling8 ,the answer must be negative4 ,a favourite doctrine of ,hamilton1 containing a certain amount of truth1 affirms an inverse ratio between knowing and feeling2 which it is difficult to reconcile with the present doctrine4 ,a new distinction must be laid down between the kind of knowing that constitutes feeling1 and the kind of knowing that constitutes knowing in the strict sense of knowledge4 ,we may concede to ,hamilton that feeling must always be within reach of a cognitive exertion1 but it cannot be conceded that an actual cognitive exertion is essential to the manifestation of the feeling4 ,such exertion unless kept within narrow limits of intensity cools down instead of promoting the emotional state4 ,the facts of the case appear to be best represented1 by allowing the state of ,feeling to stand on its own independent foundation as a mode of the subject-consciousness1 or of mind4 ,there may1 and almost always does1 go along with it a certain degree of cognitive effort4 ,we can scarcely be under feeling1 without performing some function of an intellectual kind2 the divisions of the mental energies do not imply that they can exist in absolute separation4 ,the act of discriminating the #bbi degree of feeling1--of pronouncing a pleasure to be greater than1 or equal to1 some other pleasure1--is properly an intellectual1 or cognitive exercise2 but this discrimination does not make the feeling4 ,so a feeling cannot exist without impressing the memory in some degree1 which is an intellectual function2 one may truly affirm that we do not feel unless1 immediately afterwards1 we remember that we felt4 ,it is an incident or concomitant of feeling to leave an impression behind1 but this does not characterize or define the state of feeling4 ,being an accompaniment or concomitant of an emotional excitement1 we may point to memory as a proof of its existence and a criterion of its degree1 but we should confuse all the boundaries of mental phenomena1 if we treated memory or retentiveness otherwise than as an intellectual property1 a property whose sphere is intellect and not feeling4--,b4 ,editor's footnote #ge3 ,those psychologists who think that being conscious of a feeling is something different from merely having the feeling1 generally give the name ,consciousness to the mental act by which we refer the feeling to ourself2 or1 in other words1 regard it in its relation to the series of many feelings1 which constitutes our sentient life4 ,many philosophers have thought that this reference is necessarily involved in the fact of sensation3 we cannot1 they think1 have a feeling1 without having the knowledge awakened in us at the same moment1 of a ,self who feels it4 ,but of this as a primordial fact of our nature1 it is impossible to have direct evidence2 and a supposition may be made which renders its truth at least questionable4 ,suppose a being1 gifted with sensation but devoid of memory2 whose sensations follow one after another1 but leave no trace of their existence when they cease4 ,could this being have any knowledge or notion of a ,self8 ,would he ever say to himself1 ,i feel2 this sensation is mine8 ,i think not4 ,the notion of a ,self is1 ,i apprehend1 a consequence of ,memory4 ,there is no meaning in the word ,ego or ,i1 unless the ,i of to-day is also the ,i of yesterday2 a permanent element which abides through a succession of feelings1 and connects the feeling of each moment with the remembrance of previous feelings4 ,we have1 no #bcj doubt1 a considerable difficulty in believing that a sentient being can exist without the consciousness of ,itself4 ,but this difficulty arises from the irresistible association which we1 who possess ,memory1 form in our early infancy between every one of our feelings and our remembrance of the entire series of feelings of which it forms a part1 and consequently between every one of our feelings and our ,self4 ,a slight correction1 therefore1 seems requisite to the doctrine of the author laid down in the present chapter4 ,there is a mental process1 over and above the mere having a feeling1 to which the word ,consciousness is sometimes1 and it can hardly be said improperly1 applied1 viz4 the reference of the feeling to our ,self4 ,but this process1 though separable in thought from the actual feeling1 and in all probability not accompanying it in the beginning1 is1 from a very early period of our existence1 inseparably attendant on it1 though1 like many other mental processes1 it often takes place too rapidly to be remembered at the next instant4 ,other thinkers1 or perhaps the same thinkers on other occasions1 employ the word ,consciousness as almost a synonyme of ,attention4 ,we all know that we have a power1 partly voluntary1 though often acting independently of our will1 of attending 7as it is called7 to a particular sensation or thought4 ,the essence of ,attention is that the sensation or thought is1 as it were1 magnified1 or strengthened3 it becomes more intense as a whole1 and at the same time more distinct and definite in its various parts1 like a visible object when a stronger light is thrown upon it3 while all other sensations or thoughts which do or which might present themselves at the same moment are blunted and dimmed1 or altogether excluded4 ,this heightening of the feeling we may call1 if we please1 heightening the consciousness of the feeling2 and it may be said that we are made more conscious of the feeling than we were before3 but the expression is scarcely correct1 for we are not more conscious of the feeling1 but are conscious of more feeling4 ,in some cases we are even said to be1 by an act of attention1 made conscious of a feeling of which we should otherwise have #bca been unconscious3 and there is much difference of opinion as to what it is which really occurs in this case4 ,the point has received some consideration in a former ,note1 but there may be advantage in again recalling it to remembrance4 ,it frequently happens 7examples of it are abundant in the ,analysis7 that certain of our sensations1 or certain parts of the series of our thoughts1 not being sufficiently pleasurable or painful to compel attention1 and there being no motive for attending to them voluntarily1 pass off without having been attended to2 and1 not having received that artificial intensification1 they are too slight and too fugitive to be remembered4 ,we often have evidence that these sensations or ideas have been in the mind2 because1 during their short passage1 they have called up other ideas by association4 ,a good example is the case of reading from a book1 when we must have perceived and recognized the visible letters and syllables1 yet we retain a remembrance only of the sense which they conveyed4 ,in such cases many psychologists think that the impressions have passed through the mind without our being conscious of them4 ,but to have feelings unconsciously1 to have had them without being aware1 is something like a contradiction4 ,all we really know is that we do not remember having had them2 whence we reasonably conclude that if we had them1 we did not attend to them2 and this inattention to our feelings is what seems to be here meant by being unconscious of them4 ,either we had the sensations or other feelings without attending to them1 and therefore immediately forgot them1 or we never1 in reality1 had them4 ,this last has been the opinion of some of the profoundest psychologists4 ,even in cases in which it is certain that we once had these feelings1 and had them with a lively consciousness 7as of the letters and syllables when we were only learning to read7 yet when through numberless repetitions the process has become so rapid that we no longer remember having those visual sensations1 these philosophers think that they are elided1--that we cease to have them at all4 ,the usual impressions are made on our organs by the written characters1 and are transmitted to the brain1 but these organic states1 #bcb they think1 pass away without having had time to excite the sensations corresponding to them1 the chain of association being kept up by the organic states without need of the sensations4 ,this was apparently the opinion of ,hartley2 and is distinctly that of ,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer4 ,the conflicting suppositions are both consistent with the known facts of our mental nature4 ,which of them is the true1 our present knowledge does not1 ,i think1 enable us to decide4 ,the author of the ,analysis often insists on the important doctrine that we have many feelings1 both of the physical and of the mental class1 which1 either because they are permanent and unchangeable1 or for the contrary reason1 that they are extremely fugitive and evanescent1 and are at the same time uninteresting to us except for the mental processes they originate1 we form the habit of not attending to2 and this habit1 after a time1 grows into an incapacity2 we become unable to attend to them1 even if we wish4 ,in such cases we are usually not aware that we have had the feelings2 yet the author seems to be of opinion that we really have them4 ,he says1 for example1 in the section on ,muscular ,sensations 7ch4 i4 sect4 vii47 ,we know that the air is continually pressing upon our bodies4 ,but the sensation being continual1 without any call to attend to it1 we lose from habit1 the power of doing so4 ,the sensation is as if it did not exist4 ,is it not the most reasonable supposition that the sensation does not exist2 that the necessary condition of sensation is change2 that an unchanging sensation1 instead of becoming latent1 dwindles in intensity1 until it dies away1 and ceases to be a sensation8 ,mr4 ,bain expresses this mental law by saying1 that a necessary condition of ,consciousness is change2 that we are conscious only of changes of state4 ,i apprehend that change is necessary to consciousness of feeling1 only because it is necessary to feeling3 when there is no change1 there is1 not a permanent feeling of which we are unconscious1 but no feeling at all4 ,in the concluding chapter of ,mr4 ,bain's great work1 there is an enumeration of the various senses in which the word ,consciousness is used4 ,he finds them no fewer than thirteen4--,ed4 #bcc ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,,conception4 ,the generalizations of language are already made for us1 before we have ourselves begun to generalize2 and our mind receives the abstract phrases without any definite analysis1 almost as readily as it receives and adopts the simple names of persons and things4 ,the separate co-existing phenomena1 and the separate sequences of a long succession of words1 which it has been found convenient to comprehend in a single word1 are hence1 from the constant use of that single word1 regarded by the mind almost in the same manner1 as if they were only one phenomenon1 or one event4--,inquiry into the ,relation of ,cause and ,effect4 ,by ,thomas ,brown1 ,m4,d4 ,note ,m1 p4 #efg4 ,,the philosophers1 who erected ,,consciousness into what they called a ,power of the mind1 have bestowed the same rank upon ,,conception4 ,when we have a ,sensation1 we are not said1 in the ordinary use of the word1 to ,conceive4 ,if burned with the candle1 ,i do not say1 ,i conceive the pain2 ,i do not say1 if ,i smelt putrescence1 that ,i conceive the stench4 ,it even seems to be not without a sort of impropriety1 if the term is ever applied to mark a simple ,idea4 ,we should not1 in ordinary language1 say1 ,i conceive red1 ,i conceive green4 ,we say1 however1 ,i conceive a horse1 ,i conceive a tree12 ,i conceive a ship2 we say also1 ,i conceive an #bcd argument1 ,i conceive a plan4 ,in these examples1 which may be taken as a sufficient specimen of the manner in which the term ,conception is used1 we see that it is applied exclusively to cases of the secondary feelings2 to the ,idea1 not the ,sensation2 and to the case of compound1 not of single ideas4 ,with this use1 the etymology of the word very accurately corresponds3 ,i conceive1 that is1 ,i take together1 a horse2 that is1 the several ideas1 combined under the name horse1 and constituting a compound idea4 ,the term conception1 we have seen1 applies not only to those combinations of ideas1 which we call the ideas of external objects1 but to those combinations which the mind makes for its own purposes4 ,it thus appears1 that the word ,,conception is a generical name1 like ,,consciousness2 but less comprehensive4 ,we call ourselves conscious1 when we have any sensation1 or any idea4 ,we say that we conceive1 only when we have some complex idea4 ,it remains to be inquired1 whether by saying we conceive1 or have a conception1 we mean any thing whatsoever beside having an idea4 ,if ,i say1 ,i have the idea of a horse1 ,i can explain distinctly what ,i mean4 ,i have the ideas of the sensations of sight1 of touch1 of hearing1 of smelling1 with which the body and actions of a horse have impressed me2 these ideas1 all combined1 and so closely1 that their existence appears simultaneous1 and one4 ,this is my ,,idea of a horse4 ,if ,i say1 ,i have a ,,conception of a horse1 and am asked to explain what ,i mean1 ,i give the same account exactly1 and ,i can give no other4 ,my ,,conception of the horse1 is merely my taking together1 in one1 the simple ideas of the #bce sensations which constitute my knowledge of the horse2 and my ,,idea of the horse is the same thing4 ,we may notice here1 however1 one of those curious illusions1 which the intimate associations of ideas with words1 so often1 and sometimes so inconveniently1 occasion4 ,the term ,i conceive1 has the form of an active verb2 and with the form of an active verb ,,the ,,idea ,,of ,,action is so frequently conjoined1 that we are rarely able to separate them4 ,by this means1 the idea of activeness is often mixed up with other ideas1 when it is wholly misplaced and illusive4 ,i use the same form of expression when ,i say1 ,i dream2 as when ,i say1 ,i study1 ,i argue1 ,i imagine4 ,in these cases the idea of what ,i call activity is properly included3 in the expression ,i dream1 it is not properly included2 though the active form of the verb so invariably calls up a certain idea of activity1 and so strongly tends to mix it with the other ideas1 that in using the term1 ,i dream1 we seem to consider ourselves as1 somehow1 agents4 ,even in using the term1 ,i die1 we cannot escape the illusion2 though the ideas are so highly incongruous4 ,it would be obviously absurd to affirm that we are less active when we say we have an idea1 than when we say we have a conception1 yet there is constantly a feeling1 when we use the phrase ,i conceive1 as if we were in some manner active2 and no such feeling1 when we use the phrase ,i have an idea4 ,the terms1 therefore1 the concrete conceive1 and its abstract conception1 are somewhat inconvenient1 and misguiding1 as they infuse into the complex ideas to which they are applied1 an ingredient which does not belong to them4 ,the relation which the words1 ,,consciousness1 and #bcf ,,conception1 bear to one another1 is now1 therefore1 apparent4 ,consciousness is the more generical of the two names4 ,conception is the name of a class included under the name ,consciousness4 ,consciousness applies to sensations1 and to ideas1 whether simple or complex2 to all the feelings1 whatsoever they may be1 of our sentient nature4 ,conception applies only to ideas2 and to ideas1 only in a state of combination4 ,it is a generical name including the several classes of complex ideas4#gf ,editor's footnote #gf3 ,the doctrine of this chapter is as just as it is admirably stated4 ,a conception is nothing whatever but a complex idea1 and to conceive is to have a complex idea4 ,but as there must always have been some cause why a second name is used when there is already a first1 there is generally some difference in the occasions of their employment3 and a recognition of this difference is necessary to the completeness of the exposition4 ,it seems to me that conception and to conceive are phrases appropriated to the case in which the thing conceived is supposed to be something external to my own mind4 ,i am not said to conceive my own thoughts2 unless it be in the ease of an invention1 or mental creation2 and even then1 to conceive it1 means to imagine it realized1 so that it may be presented to myself or others as an external object4 ,to conceive something is to understand what it is2 to adapt my complex idea to something presented to me objectively4 ,i am asked to conceive an iceberg3 it is not enough that ,i form to myself some complex idea2 it must be a complex idea which shall really resemble an iceberg1 i4e41 what is called an iceberg by other people4 ,my complex idea must be made up of the elements in my mind which correspond to the elements making up the idea of an iceberg in theirs4 ,this is connected with one of the most powerful and misleading of the illusions of general language4 ,the purposes of general names would not be answered1 unless the complex idea #bcg connected with a general name in one person's mind were composed of essentially the same elements as the idea connected with it in the mind of another4 ,there hence arises a natural illusion1 making us feel as if1 instead of ideas as numerous as minds1 and merely resembling one another1 there were one idea1 independent of individual minds1 and to which it is the business of each to learn to make his private idea correspond4 ,this is the ,platonic doctrine of ,ideas in all its purity3 and as half the speculative world are ,platonists without knowing it1 hence it also is that in the writings of so many psychologists we read of the conception or the concept of so and so2 as if there was a concept of a thing or of a class of things1 other than the ideas in individual minds--a concept belonging to everybody1 the common inheritance of the human race1 but independent of any of the particular minds which conceive it4 ,in reality1 however1 this common concept is but the sum of the elements which it is requisite for the purposes of discourse that people should agree with one another in including in the complex idea which they associate with a class name4 ,as we shall presently see1 these are only a part1 and often but a small part1 of each person's complex idea1 but they are the part which it is necessary should be the same in all4--,ed4 #bch ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,,imagination4 ,,the ,,imagination is another term1 the explanation of which will be found to be included in the expositions which have previously been given4 ,the phenomena classed under this title are explained1 by modern ,philosophers1 on the principles of ,association4 ,their accounts of the mental process1 to which the name ,imagination is applied1 include their explanation of the laws of ,association1 or the manner in which ideas succeed one another in a train1 with little else1 except remarks on the causes to which diversity in the several kinds of ,imagination may be traced4 ,it is not to be overlooked that the term ,,imagination is here used in the sense which is given to it by philosophers when they rank it as a particular power of the mind2 for it is no doubt true1 that it is often used1 in vulgar speech1 as synonymous with ,conception1 and with ,supposition1 and with ,conjecture2 as the verb1 to imagine1 is1 with the verbs1 to discover1 to suppose1 conjecture1 believe1 and perhaps others4 ,we have seen that ,consciousness1 and ,conception1 are names of feelings1 taken one by one3 ,consciousness #bci of any of our feelings so taken2 ,conception of a particular class of them1 namely1 complex ideas4 ,,imagination is not a name of any one idea4 ,i am not said to imagine1 unless ,i combine ideas successively in a less or greater number4 ,an imagination1 therefore1 is the name of a train4 ,i am said to have an imagination when ,i have a train of ideas2 and when ,i am said to imagine1 ,i have the same thing2 nor is there any train of ideas1 to which the term imagination may not be applied4 ,in this comprehensive meaning of the word ,imagination1 there is no man who has not ,imagination1 and no man who has it not in an equal degree with any other4 ,every man imagines1 nay1 is constantly1 and unavoidably1 imagining4 ,he cannot help imagining4 ,he can no more stop the current of his ideas1 than he can stop the current of his blood4 ,in the phrase we have just employed1 there is no man who has not imagination1 it is meant1 that there is no man who now has not1 who has not always had1 and who will not always have a train of ideas4 ,imagination1 therefore1 is a word connoting indefinite time2 it is1 to use the language of the ,greek grammarians1 aoristical4 ,when it connotes1 which by the strain of the passage it may be made to do1 a particular time1 it marks a particular train4 ,when it connotes time indefinitely1 it marks trains indefinitely1 any train at any time4 ,the having or doing a thing at any time1 means the potentiality of having or doing it4 ,imagination1 then1 has two meanings4 ,it means either some one train1 or the potentiality of a train4 ,these are two meanings which it is very necessary not to confound4 #bdj ,there is great diversity of trains4 ,not only has the same individual an endless variety of trains2 but a different character belongs to the whole series of trains which pass through the minds of different individuals or classes of individuals4 ,the different pursuits in which the several classes of men are engaged1 render particular trains of ideas more common to them than other trains4 ,one man is a merchant2 and trains respecting the goods in which he deals1 the markets in which he buys1 and those in which he sells1 are habitual in his mind4 ,another man is a lawyer1 and ideas of clients1 and fees1 and judges1 and witnesses1 and legal instruments1 and points of contestation1 and the practice of his court1 are habitually passing in his mind4 ,ideas of another kind occupy the mind of the physician2 of another kind still1 the mind of the warrior4 ,the statesman is occupied with a train different from that of any of the classes that have been mentioned2 and one statesman with a very different train from another1 according as his mind is running upon expedients which may serve the purpose of the day1 or arrangements which may secure the happiness of the population from generation to generation4 ,a peculiar character belongs to the train which habitually occupies the mind of the mathematician4 ,the mind of the metaphysician is also occupied by a train distinguished from that of other classes4 ,and there is one man1 yet to be mentioned1 the poet1 the peculiarity of whose trains has been a subject of particular observation4 ,to such a degree1 indeed1 have the trains of the poet been singled out for distinction1 that the word ,imagination1 in a more restricted sense1 is appropriated to them4 ,we do not #bda call the trains of the lawyer1 or the trains of the merchant1 imagination4 ,we do not speak of them as imagining1 when they are revolving1 each1 the ideas which belong to his peculiar occupation2 it is only to the poet1 that the epithet of imagining is applied4 ,his trains1 or trains analogous to his1 are those which receive the name of ,imagination4 ,it is then a question1 to which we should find an answer1 whether1 in that by which the trains of the poet differ from the trains of other men1 there be any thing which1 being wholly absent from that by which the trains of other classes are distinguished1 lays a foundation for this peculiarity of naming4 ,the trains of one class differ from those of another1 the trains of the merchant1 for example1 from those of the lawyer1 not in this1 that the ideas follow one an other by any other law1 in the mind of the one1 and the mind of the other2 they follow by the same laws exactly2 and are equally composed of ideas1 mixed indeed with sensations1 in the minds of both4 ,the difference consists in this1 that the ideas which flow in their minds1 and compose their trains1 are ideas of different things4 ,the ideas of the lawyer are ideas of the legal provisions1 forms1 and distinctions1 and of the actions1 bodily1 and mental1 about which he is conversant4 ,the ideas of the merchant are equally ideas of the objects and operations1 about which he is concerned1 and the ends toward which his actions are directed2 but the objects and operations themselves1 are remarkably different4 ,the trains of poets1 also1 do not differ from the trains of other men1 but perfectly agree with them1 in this1 that they are composed of ideas1 and that those ideas succeed one another1 #bdb according to the same laws1 in their1 and in other minds4 ,they are ideas1 however1 of very different things4 ,the ideas of the poet are ideas of all that is most lovely and striking in the visible appearances of nature1 and of all that is most interesting in the actions and affections of human beings4 ,it thus1 however1 appears most manifestly1 that the trains of poets differ from those of other men in no other way1 than those of other men differ from one another2 that they differ from them by this only1 that the ideas of which they are composed1 are ideas of different things4 ,there is also nothing surprising in this1 that1 being trains of pleasurable ideas1 they should have attracted a peculiar degree of attention2 and in an early age1 when poetry was the only literature1 should have been thought worthy of a more particular naming1 than the trains of any other class4 ,these reasons seem to account for a sort of appropriation of the name ,imagination1 to the trains of the poet4 ,an additional reason may be seen in another circumstance1 which also affords an interesting illustration of a law of association already propounded2 namely1 the obscuration of the antecedent part of a train1 which leads to a subsequent1 more interesting than itself4 ,in the case of the lawyer1 the train leads to a decision favourable to the side which he advocates4 ,the train has nothing pleasurable in itself4 ,the pleasure is all derived from the end4 ,the same is the case with the merchant4 ,his trains are directed to a particular end4 ,and it is the end alone1 which gives a value to the train4 ,the end of the metaphysical1 and the end of the mathematical inquirer1 is the discovery of truth3 #bdc their trains are directed to that object2 and are1 or are not1 a source of pleasure1 as that end is or is not attained4 ,but the case is perfectly different with the poet4 ,his train is its own end4 ,it is all delightful1 or the purpose is frustrate4 ,from the established laws of association1 this consequence unavoidably followed2 that1 in the case of the trains of those other classes1 the interest of which was concentrated in the end1 attention was withdrawn from the train by being fixed upon the end2 that in the case of the poet1 on the other hand1 the train itself being the only object1 and that pleasurable1 the attention was wholly fixed upon the train2 that hence the train of the poet was provided with a name2 that in the cases of the trains of other men1 where the end only was interesting1 it was thought enough that the end itself should be named1 the train was neglected4 ,in conformity with this observation1 we find1 that wherever there is a train which leads to nothing beyond itself1 and has any pretension to the character of pleasurable 7the various kinds of reverie1 for example71 it is allowed the name of ,imagination4 ,thus we say that ,rousseau indulged his imagination1 when1 as he himself describes it1 lying on his back1 in his boat1 on the little lake of ,bienne1 he delivered himself up for hours to trains1 of which1 he says1 the pleasure surpassed every other enjoyment4 ,professor ,dugald ,stewart has given to the word ,imagination1 a technical meaning2 without1 as it appears to me1 any corresponding advantage4 ,he confines it to the cases in which the mind forms new combinations2 or1 as he calls them1 creations2 that is1 #bdd to cases in which the ideas which compose the train do not come together in the same combinations in which sensations had ever been received4 ,but this is no specific difference4 ,this happens1 in every train of any considerable length1 whether directed to any end1 or not so directed4 ,it is implied in every wish of the child to fly1 or to jump over the house2 in a large proportion of all his playful expressions1 as puss in boots1 a hog in armour1 a monkey preaching1 and so on4 ,it is manifested in perfection in every dream4 ,it is well known that1 for the discovery of truths in philosophy1 there is a demand for new trains of thought1 multitudes of which pass in review before the mind1 are contemplated1 and rejected1 before the happy combination is attained1 in which the discovery is involved4 ,if imagination consists in bringing trains before the mind involving a number of new combinations1 imagination is probably more the occupation of the philosopher than of the poet4 ,mr4 ,stewart appears not to have understood the real distinction between the use of the words ,conception1 and ,imagination2 that the one is the name of a single idea1 the other that of a train4 ,he also involves1 without seeming to be wholly aware of it1 the idea of a train destined to a particular end in the meaning which he bestows on the word ,imagination4 ,imagination is with him1 not the name of a train having merely new combinations1 but of a train having new combinations1 and those destined to some end4 ,but this is not more the character of the trains which belong to the painter and the poet1 as his language appears to imply1 than it is of the lawyer1 or the metaphysician2 or1 indeed1 the professors of many #bde of the vulgar arts2 the tailor1 for example1 and the mantua-maker4#gg ,bain's footnote #gg3 ,the foregoing analysis of the ,imagination brings to view some of the important points of distinction between it and the other faculties2 for example1 the circumstance that the trains and constructions of the ,imagination are their own ends1 and not a means to farther ends1 as in the constructions of science and of the industrial arts4 ,all creative originality is not imagination2 the steam-engine was not a product of this faculty4 ,the main features that distinguish the ,imagination seem to be these three3-- #a4 ,it is a faculty of the ,,concrete1 like ,perception and ,memory1 and not of the ,abstract1 as the scientific faculties4 ,when we imagine a thing1 we picture it to the mind1 as far as we are able1 in its full concrete reality4 ,our imagination of a scene in the tropics is of the character of an actual perception2 it embraces1 or should embrace1 whatever would strike the view of any one surveying the reality4 #b4 ,imagination rises above ,perception and ,memory1 in being a ,,constructive faculty4 ,it alters1 re-arranges1 puts together the materials of perception and memory to satisfy certain demands of the mind4 ,in this respect1 it is more than ,conception1 which as viewed by the author1 is also a faculty of the concrete1 but introduces no novelty of combination4 ,conception may involve a great constructive effort1 as when we try to picture to ourselves a poet's creation by the help of his language2 nevertheless1 the term imagination loses its characteristic force1 and leaves an important meaning without a name1 if applied to this conceiving or realizing effort4 ,the imaginative stretch belongs to the poet or artist2 the power of conceiving is what the reader of a poem brings into exercise4 #c4 ,imagination is swayed by some ,,present ,,emotion4 ,this is another way of expressing the author's view that it is an end in itself4 ,if we were to use the general word feeling1 we should encounter the difficulty of separating imagination #bdf from common industry1 which is all intended to gain pleasures or ward off pains4 ,the brief designation present emotion approximates to1 but does not fully bring out1 the precise operation of the feelings in the constructions of ,imagination4 ,when1 actuated by the love of the marvellous1 any one invents a fabulous story1 or highly exaggerates a real occurrence1 the process is a typical instance of the imaginative workings4 ,the ,fine ,arts are the domain of ,imagination2 the one goes far to specify the other4 ,if the coincidence were exact1 ,imagination would be defined by a definition of the sthetic emotions4 ,now1 although any original construction1 selected and put together to gratify an sthetic emotion1 is a work of ,imagination1 yet imagination is not exhausted by fine art4 ,the picture that an angry man draws of his enemy would be called an effort of imagination1 but not a work of fine art4 ,all our emotions1--,wonder1 ,fear1 ,love1 ,anger1 ,vanity--determine the constructions of the intellect1 when called into active exercise2 and for these constructions we have no other name but imagination1 whether they may1 or may not give pleasure as works of art4 ,perhaps this exceptional region may be marked out by a statement of the perverting influence1 or bias1 of the feelings in matters of truth and falsehood1 or in works of utility4 ,when the true and the useful1 instead of being determined by their own ends1 or their proper criteria1 are swayed by extraneous emotions--giving birth to mythical or fictitious creations--we have the corrupting substitution of ,imagination for ,reason in men's judgments and opinions4 ,thus1 ,fear is a potent spur to ,imagination2 its creations may not be sthetically agreeable1 and therefore may not come under the definition of ,fine ,art2 yet they are fairly to be described as perverting the judgment of true and false4--,b4 #bdg ,,chapter ,,viii4 ,,classification4 ,dans l'ordre historique1 la philosophie transcendante a devanc la philosophie lmentaire4 ,il ne faut point s'en tonner2 les grands problmes de la mtaphysique et de la morale se prsentent l'homme1 dans l'enfance mme de son intelligence1 avec une grandeur et une obscurit qui le sduisent et qui l'attirent4 ,l'homme1 qui se sent fait pour connotre1 court d'abord la vrit avec plus d'ardeur que de sagesse2 il cherche deviner ce qu'il ne peut comprendre1 et se perd dans des conjectures absurdes ou tmraires4 ,les thogonies et les cosmogonies sont antrieures la saine physique1 et l'esprit humain a pass travers toutes les agitations et les dlires de la mtaphysique transcendante avant d'arriver la psychologie4--,cousin1 ,frag4 ,philos4 p4 #ge4 ,,the process by which we connect what we call the objects of our senses1 and also our ideas1 into certain aggregates called classes1 is of too much importance not to have attracted the attention of those who have engaged in the study of mind4 ,yet it is doubtful1 whether metaphysicians have regarded ,,classification as an original power of the mind1 or have allowed that what is included under that name might be resolved into simpler elements4 ,the term ,abstraction1 ,i think1 they have generally taken as the name of a distinct1 and original1 power1 not susceptible of further analysis4 ,but1 in doing so1 it seems 7for the language of writers #bdh is too loose on this subject1 to allow us the use of more affirmative terms71 they have restricted the name to the power of forming such ideas as are represented by the terms1 hardness1 softness1 length1 breadth1 space1 and so on4 ,and this operation they rather consider as subservient to classification1 than as that operation itself4 ,the process1 however1 of grouping individuals into classes1 has been regarded as sufficiently mysterious4 ,the nature of it has been the object of deep curiosity2 and the erroneous opinions which were entertained of it bewildered1 for many ages1 the most eminent philosophers2 and enfeebled the human mind4 ,what 7it was inquired7 is that which is really done by the mind1 when it forms individuals into classes2 separates such and such things from others1 and regards them1 under a certain idea of unity1 as some thing by themselves8 ,why is the segregation thought of8 ,and for what end is it made8 ,these questions all received answers2 but it was many ages before they received an answer approaching the truth2 and it is only necessary to read with care the writings of ,plato and of ,aristotle1 and of all philosophers1 with very few exceptions1 from theirs to the present time1 to see1 that a misunderstanding of the nature of ,general ,terms is that which chiefly perplexed them in their inquiries1 and involved them in a confusion1 which was inextricable1 so long as those terms were unexplained4 ,the process in forming those classes was said to be this4 ,the ,mind leaves out of its view this1 and that1 and the other thing1 in which individuals differ from one another2 and retaining only those in which they all agree1 it forms them into a class4 ,but what is #bdi this forming of a class8 ,what does it mean8 ,when ,i form a material aggregate2 when ,i collect a library2 when ,i build a house2 when ,i even raise a heap of stones2 ,i move the things1 whatever they may be1 and place them1 either regularly or irregularly1 in a mass together4 ,but when ,i form a class1 ,i perform no operation of this sort4 ,i touch not1 nor do ,i in any way whatsoever act upon the individuals which ,i class4 ,the proceeding is all mental4 ,forming a class of individuals1 is a mode of regarding them4 ,but what is meant by a mode of regarding things8 ,this is mysterious2 and is as mysteriously explained1 when it is said to be the taking into view the particulars in which individuals agree4 ,for what is there1 which it is possible for the mind to take into view1 in that in which individuals agree8 ,every colour is an individual colour1 every size is an individual size1 every shape is an individual shape4 ,but things have no individual colour in common1 no individual shape in common1 no individual size in common2 that is to say1 they have neither shape1 colour1 nor size in common4 ,what1 then1 is it which they have in common1 which the mind can take into view8 ,those who affirmed that it was something1 could by no means tell4 ,they substituted words for things2 using vague and mystical phrases1 which1 when examined1 meant nothing4 ,plato called it ,greek3 i7de_/a1 ,aristotle1 ,greek3 ei7dos1 both1 words taken from the verb to see2 intimating1 something as it were seen1 or viewed1 as we call it4 ,at bottom1 ,aristotle's ,greek3 ei7dos1 is the same with ,plato's ,greek3 i7de_/a1 though ,aristotle makes a great affair of some very trifling differences1 which he creates and sets up between them4 ,the ,latins1 translated both ,greek3 i7de_/a1 and #bej ,greek3 ei7dos1 by the same words1 and were very much at a loss for one to answer the purpose2 they used species1 derived in like manner from a verb to see1 but which1 having other meanings1 was ill adapted for a scientific word2 they brought1 therefore1 another word in aid1 forma1 the same with ,greek3 o7_/rama1 derived equally from a verb signifying to see1 which suited the purpose just as imperfectly as species2 and as writers used both terms1 according as the one or the other appeared best to correspond with their meaning1 they thickened by this means the confusion4 ,after a time1 unfortunately a long time1 it began to be perceived1 that what was thus represented as the object of the mind in the formation of classes1 was chimerical and absurd2 when a set of inquirers appeared1 who denied the existence of all such objects1 affirmed that ideas were all individual1 and that nothing was general but names4 ,the question rose to the dignity of a controversy2 and to the hateful violence of a religious controversy4 ,they who affirmed the existence of general ideas were called ,realists1 they who denied their existence ,nominalists4 ,there can be no doubt1 that of the two the ,nominalists approached1 by far1 the nearest to the truth2 and their speculations tended strongly to remove from mental science the confusion in which the total misapprehension of abstract terms had involved it4 ,but the clergy brought religion into the quarrel1 and as usual on the wrong side4 ,realism was preached as the doctrine which alone was consistent with orthodoxy2 the ,nominalists were hunted down2 and persecution1 well knowing her object1 clung to the books as well as the men2 so that the books of the ,nominalists1 #bea though the art of printing tended strongly to preserve them1 were suppressed and destroyed1 to such a degree1 that it is now exceedingly difficult to collect them2 and not easy to obtain copies even of the most remarkable4 ,the opinion1 that the particulars in which the individuals of a class agree were distinct ,objects of the ,mind1 soon made them distinct ,,existences2 they were the ,essence of things2 the ,eternal ,exemplars1 according to which individual things were made2 they were called ,,universals1 and regarded as alone the ,objects of the ,intellect4 ,they were invariable1 always the same2 individuals1 not the objects of intellect but only the low objects of sense1 were in perpetual flux1 and never1 for any considerable period1 the same4 ,universals alone have ,unity2 they alone were the subject of science2 ,individuals were innumerable1 every one different from another2 and cognoscible only by the lower1 the sensitive part of our nature4 ,endless were the subtleties into which ingenious men were misled1 in the contemplation of those ,fictions2 and wonderful were the attributes which they bestowed upon them4 ,it is1 then1 on these permanent ,phantasms1 says ,mr4 ,harris1 copying the ancient ,philosophers1 that the human mind first works1 and by an energy as spontaneous and familiar to its nature1 as the seeing of colour is familiar to the eye1 it discerns at once what in ,,many is ,,one2 what in things ,,dissimilar and ,,different is ,,similar and the ,,same4 ,by this it comes to behold a kind of superior ,objects2 a new ,race of ,perceptions1 more comprehensive than those of sense2 a ,race of ,perceptions1 each one of which1 may be found entire and whole in the separate #beb individuals of an infinite and fleeting multitude1 without departing from the unity and permanence of its own nature4#h99 ,here we have something sufficiently mystical2 a thing which is1 at once1 ,,one1 and ,,many2 which is ,,one1 it seems1 by its very nature1 and yet may exist1 entire and whole1 in the separate individuals of an infinite ,,multitude4 ,this is a specimen of their ,doctrine2 a specimen of what they call ,,the ,,sublime in ,intellection4 ,mill's footnote #h3 ,hermes1 b4 iii4 ch4 #d4 ,but this is not all4 ,for as1 when we form a minor class1 as man1 there is a certain ,,one1 the object of intellect1 complete in every individual2 ,,many1 therefore1 and at the same time1 ,,one2 so when we form a larger class1 animal1 there is a certain ,,one1 the object of intellect1 complete in every one of those individuals4 ,and when we go still higher1 as to the grand class1 ,,body1 there is always a ,,one1 the object of intellect1 complete in every one of those more numerous individuals4 ,when we mount up to the very summit1 and embrace all things in one class1 ,,being1 there is in like manner a ,,one1 the object of intellect1 complete in every individual that exists4 ,this is the grand ,,one2 the ,,one pre-eminently4 ,this is the ,,one2 ,greek3 to_/ e7_/n2 ,,oneness2 ,,one in the abstract4 ,this was a conception deemed truly ,,sublime4 ,the loftiest epithets were bestowed upon ,greek3 to_/ e7_/n1 the ,,one4 ,it was ,,divine2 it was more than that2 for being not concrete1 but abstract1 it was ,,divinity4 ,all things were contained in the ,,one2 and the ,,one was in all things4 ,the ,,one was the source and principle of ,being4 ,it was immutable1 eternal4 #bec ,these ,,ones they also called by the names of ,internal ,forms1 and ,intelligible ,forms4 ,thus ,harris3 ,let us suppose any man to look for the first time upon some ,work of ,art2 as1 for example1 upon a ,clock2 and1 having sufficiently viewed it1 at length to depart4 ,would he not retain1 when absent1 an ,idea of what he had seen8 ,and what is it1 to retain such ,idea8 ,it is to have ,a ,,form ,,internal correspondent to ,,the ,,external2 only with this difference1 that the ,internal ,form is devoid of the ,matter2 the ,external is united with it1 being seen in the metal1 the wood1 and the like4 ,now1 if we suppose this ,spectator to view many such ,machines1 and not simply to view1 but to consider every part of them1 so as to comprehend how those parts all operate to one ,end1 he might be then said to possess a kind of ,,intelligible ,,form1 by which he would not only understand and know the clocks1 which he had seen already1 but every ,work1 also1 of like ,sort1 which he might see hereafter4 ,we might here remark upon the mystical jargon1 which is thus employed to obscure the simple fact1 that after a man has seen an individual of a particular kind he has the idea of that individual2 and after he has seen various individuals of the same kind1 he has ideas of the various individuals1 and has them combined by association4 ,but we must hear ,mr4 ,harris a little further4 ,after telling us that there are two orders of these immutable ,,intelligible ,,forms2 one belonging to the ,contemplator of objects1 and subsequent to their existence2 another belonging to the ,maker of them1 being the archetype1 according to which they were formed2 he thus proceeds3 ,the ,,whole ,,visible #bed ,,world1 exhibits nothing more than so many passing pictures of these ,,immutable ,,archetypes4 ,nay1 through these it attains even a ,semblance of ,immortality1 and continues throughout ages to be ,,specifically ,,one1 amid those infinite particular changes1 that befall it every moment4 ,may we be allowed then to credit those speculative men1 who tell us1 it is in these permanent and comprehensive ,,forms that the ,,deity views at once1 without looking abroad1 all possible productions both present1 past1 and future2 that this great and stupendous view is but a view of himself1 where all things lie enveloped in their ,principles and ,exemplars1 as being essential to the fulness of this universal ,intellection8 ,i shall exhibit but one other specimen of the mode of speculating about these imaginary ,beings1 from another great master of the ancient philosophy1 ,cudworth4 ,both ,aristotle and ,plato1 he says1 acknowledged two sorts of ,entities1 the one mutable1 or subject to flux and motion1 such as are especially individual corporeal things2 the other immutable1 that always rest or stand still1 which are the proper objects of certain1 constant1 and immutable knowledge1 that therefore cannot be mere nothings1 non-entities4 ,which latter kind of being1 that is1 the immutable essence1 as a distinct thing from individual sensibles1 ,aristotle plainly asserts against ,heraclitus1 and those other flowing philosophers in these words3 ',we would have these philosophers to know1 that besides sensible things that are always mutable1 there is another kind of being or entity of such things as are neither subject to motion1 corruption1 nor generation4' ,and elsewhere he tells us1 that this immovable essence #bee is the object of theoretical knowledge1 of the first philosophy1 and of the pure mathematics4 ,now these immutable entities are the universal rationes1 or intelligible natures and essences of all things1 which some compare to unities1 but ,aristotle to numbers2 which formally considered1 are indivisible3 saith he1 ',the essences of things are like to numbers2' because if but the least thing be added to any number1 or subtracted from it1 the number is destroyed4 ,and these are the objects of all certain knowledge4 ,as for example1 the objects of geometry are not any individual material triangles1 squares1 circles1 pyramids1 cubes1 spheres1 and the like2 which because they are always mutable1 nothing can be immutably affirmed of them2 but they are those indivisible and unchangeable rationes of a triangle1 square1 circle2 which are ever the same to all geometricians1 in all ages and places1 of which such immutable theorems as these are demonstrated1 as that a triangle has necessarily three angles equal to two right angles4 ,but if any one demand here1 where this ,greek3 a7ki_/ntos ou7si_/a1 these immutable entities do exist8 ,i answer1 first1 that as they are considered formally1 they do not properly exist in the individuals without us1 as if they were from them imprinted upon the understanding1 which some have taken to be ,aristotle's opinion2 because no individual material thing is either universal or immutable4 ,and if these things were only lodged in the individual sensibles1 then they would be unavoidably obnoxious to the fluctuating waves of the same reciprocating ,euripus1 in which all individual material things are perpetually whirled4 ,but because #bef they perish not together with them1 it is a certain argument that they exist independently upon them4 ,neither in the next place1 do they exist somewhere else apart from the individual sensibles1 and without the mind1 which is that opinion that ,aristotle justly condemns1 but either unjustly or unskilfully attributes to ,plato4 ,for if the mind looked abroad for its objects wholly without itself1 then all its knowledge would be nothing but sense and passion4 ,for to know a thing is nothing else but to comprehend it by some inward ideas that are domestic to the mind1 and actively exerted from it4 ,wherefore these intelligible ideas or essences of things1 those forms by which we understand all things1 exist no where but in the mind itself2 for it was very well determined long ago by ,socrates1 in ,plato's ,parmenides1 that these things are nothing but nomata3 these species or ideas are all of them nothing but nomata1 or notions that exist no where but in the soul itself4' ,wherefore1 to say that there are immutable natures and essences1 and 99rationes of things1 distinct from the individuals that exist without us1 is all one as if one should say1 that there is in the universe above the orb of matter and body1 another superior orb of intellectual being1 that comprehends its own immediate objects1 that is1 the immutable rationes and ideas of things within itself1 by which it understands and knows all things without itself4 ,and yet notwithstanding though these things exist only in the mind1 they are not therefore mere figments of the understanding3 for if the subjects of all scientifical theorems were nothing but figments1 then all truth and knowledge that is built upon them would #beg be a mere fictitious thing2 and if truth itself1 and the intellectual nature be fictitious things1 then what can be real or solid in the world8 ,but it is evident1 that though the mind thinks of these things at pleasure1 yet they are not arbitrarily framed by the mind1 but have certain1 determinate1 and immutable natures of their own1 which are independent upon the mind1 and which are not blown away into nothing at the pleasure of the same being that arbitrarily made them4 ,but we all naturally conceive that those things have not only an eternal1 but also a necessary existence1 so that they could not ever but be1 such and so many as they are1 and can never possibly perish or cease to be1 but are absolutely undestroyable4 ,which is a thing frequently acknowledged in the writings of both those famous philosophers1 ,plato and ,aristotle4 ,the former of them calling those things1 'things that were never made1 but always are1' and 'things that were never made1 nor can be destroyed4' ',things ingenerable and unperishable2' ,qu ,plato negat gigni sed semper esse 7as ,tully expresseth it7 et ratione et intelligentia contineri4 ,and ,philo the ,platonical ,jew1 calls the ,greek3 ta ,nota1 which are the same things we speak of1 ,greek3 a7nagkaio_/tatai ou7si_/ai1 the most necessary essences1 that is1 such things as could not but be1 and cannot possibly not be4 ,and ,aristotle himself calls the rationes of things in his metaphysics1 not only ,greek3 christa and ,greek3 a7ki_/nta1 things separate from matter and immutable1 but also ,greek3 a7_/dia1 or eternal2 and in his ethics likewise1 he calls geometrical truths ,greek3 a7_/dia1 eternal things1 #a4 #c1 c4 #e2 'where he makes the geometrical truth concerning the incommensurability betwixt the #beh diameter and the side of a square1 to be an eternal thing4' ,elsewhere he tells us1 that ',science1 properly so called1 is not of things corruptible and contingent1' but of things necessary1 incorruptible and eternal4 ,which immutable and eternal objects of science1 in the place before quoted1 he described thus3 ',such a kind of entity of things has neither motion nor generation1 nor corruption1' that is1 such things as were never made1 and can never be destroyed4 ,to which1 he saith1 the mind is necessarily determined4 ,for science or knowledge has nothing either of fiction or of arbitrariness in it1 but is 'the comprehension of that which immutably is4' ,moreover1 these things have a constant being1 when our particular created minds do not actually think of them1 and therefore they are immutable in another sense likewise1 not only because they are indivisibly the same when we think of them1 but also because they have a constant and never-failing entity2 and always are1 whether our particular minds think of them or not4 ,for the intelligible natures and essences of a triangle1 square1 circle1 pyramid1 cube1 sphere1 c41 and all the necessary geometrical verities belonging to these several figures1 were not the creatures of ,archimedes1 ,euclid1 or ,pythagoras1 or any other inventors of ,geometry2 nor did then first begin to be2 but all these rationes and verities had a real and actual entity before1 and would continue still1 though all the geometricians in the world were quite extinct1 and no man knew them or thought of them4 ,nay1 though all the material world were quite swept away1 and also all particular created minds annihilated together with it2 yet there is no doubt but the #bei intelligible natures or essences of all geometrical figures1 and the necessary verities belonging to them1 would notwithstanding remain safe and sound4 ,wherefore these things had a being also before the material world and all particular intellects were created4 ,for it is not at all conceivable1 that ever there was a time when there was no intelligible nature of a triangle1 nor any such thing cogitable at all1 and when it was not yet actually true that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles1 but that these things were afterward arbitrarily made and brought into being out of an antecedent nothing or non-entity2 so that the being of them bore some certain date1 and had a youngness in them1 and so by the same reason might wax old1 and decay again2 which notion he often harps upon1 when he speaks of the ,greek3 ,ei7_/d1 or forms of things1 as when he says1 'there is no generation of the essence of a sphere1' that is1 it is a thing that is not made2 but always is3 and elsewhere he pronounces universally of the ,greek3 ,ei7_/d1 ',the forms of material things are without generation and corruption1' and 'that none makes the form of any thing1 for it is never generated4' ,divers have censured ,aristotle in some of such passages too much to confound physics and metaphysics together2 for indeed these things are not true in a physical1 but only in a metaphysical sense4 ,that is1 the immediate objects of intellection and science1 are eternal1 necessarily existent1 and incorruptible4#i99 ,mill's footnote #i3 ,a ,treatise concerning ,eternal and ,immutable ,morality4 ,by ,ralph ,cudworth1 ,d4,d4--pp4 #bda--bej4 ,under the influence of such notions as these1 men #bfj were led away from the real object of ,classification2 which remained1 till a late period in metaphysical inquiry1 not at all understood4 ,yet the truth appears by no means difficult to find1 if we only observe the steps1 by which the mind acquires its knowledge1 and the exigencies which give occasion to the contrivances to which it resorts4 ,man first becomes acquainted with individuals4 ,he first names individuals4 ,but individuals are innumerable1 and he cannot have innumerable names4 ,he must make one name serve for many individuals4 ,it is thus obvious1 and certain1 that men were led to class solely for the purpose of economizing in the use of names4 ,could the processes of naming and discourse have been as conveniently managed by a name for every individual1 the names of classes1 and the idea of classification1 would never have existed4 ,but as the limits of the human memory did not enable men to retain beyond a very limited number of names2 and even if it had1 as it would have required a most inconvenient portion of time1 to run over in discourse1 as many names of individuals1 and of individual qualities1 as there is occasion to refer to in discourse1 it was necessary to have contrivances of abridgment2 that is1 to employ names which marked equally a number of individuals1 with all their separate properties2 and enabled us to speak of multitudes at once4#gh ,editor's footnote #gh3 ,the doctrine that men were led to class solely for the purpose of economizing in the use of names1 is here reasserted in the most unqualified terms4 ,the author plainly says that if our memory had been sufficiently vast to contain a name for every individual1 the names of classes and the idea of classification would never have existed4 ,yet how 7,i am obliged to ask7 could we have done without them8 ,we could not have dispensed with names to mark the points in which different individuals resemble one another3 and these are class-names4 ,the fact that we require names for the purpose of making affirmations--of predicating qualities--is in some measure recognised by the author1 when he says it would have required a most inconvenient portion of time to run over in discourse as many names of individuals and of individual qualities as there is occasion to refer to in discourse4 ,but what is meant by an individual quality8 ,it is not individual qualities that we ever have occasion to predicate4 ,it is true that the qualities of an object are only the various ways in which we or other minds are affected by it1 and these affections are not the same in different objects1 except in the sense in which the word same stands for exact similarity4 ,but we never have occasion to predicate of an object the individual and instantaneous impressions which it produces in us4 ,the only meaning of predicating a quality at all1 is to affirm a resemblance4 ,when we ascribe a quality to an object1 we intend to assert that the object affects us in a manner similar to that in which we are affected by a known class of objects4 ,a quality1 indeed1 in the custom of language1 does not admit of individuality3 it is supposed to be one thing common to many2 which1 being explained1 means that it is the name of a resemblance among our sensations1 and not a name of the individual sensations which resemble4 ,qualities1 therefore1 cannot be predicated without general names2 nor1 consequently1 without classification4 ,wherever there is a general name there is a class3 classification1 and general names1 are things exactly coextensive4 ,it thus appears that1 without classification1 language would not fulfil its most important function4 ,had we no names but those of individuals1 the names might serve as marks to bring those individuals to mind1 but would not enable us to make a single assertion respecting them1 except that one individual is not another4 ,not a particle of the knowledge we have of them could be expressed in words4--,ed4 #bfa ,it was impossible that this process should not be involved in obscurity1 and liable to great #bfb misapprehension1 so long as the manner1 in which words become significant1 was unexplained4 ,after this knowledge was imparted1 and pretty generally diffused1 the value of it seemed for a long time to be little understood4 ,words become significant purely by association4 ,a word is pronounced in conjunction with an idea2 it is pronounced again and again2 and1 by degrees1 the idea and the word become so associated1 that the one can never occur without the other4 ,to take first the example of an individual object4 ,the word1 ,st4 ,paul's1 has been so often named in conjunction with the idea of a particular building1 that the word1 ,st4 ,paul's1 never occurs without calling up the idea of the building1 nor the idea of the building without calling up the name1 ,st4 ,paul's4 ,the effect of association is similarly exemplified in connecting the visible mark with the audible4 ,children learn first to speak4 ,they learn next to read4 ,in learning to speak1 they associate the audible mark with their sensations and ideas2 the sound tree is associated with the sight of the tree1 or the idea of the tree4 ,in learning to read1 a new association has to be formed4 ,the written word is a visible sign of the audible sign4 ,what reading accomplishes1 by degrees1 is1 to associate the visible sign so closely with the audible1 that at the same instant with the sight of the word the sound of it1 and with the sound of it the sense1 occurs4 ,after the explanations which have been already #bfc given1 no difficulty can remain about the manner in which names come to signify the individuals of which they are appointed to be the marks4 ,let us now1 proceeding to the simplest cases first1 and by them expounding such as are more complicated1 suppose that our name of one individual is applied to another individual4 ,let us suppose that the word1 foot1 has been first associated in the mind of the child with one foot only2 it will in that case call up the idea of that one1 and not of the other4 ,here is one name1 and one thing named4 ,suppose next1 that the same name1 foot1 begins to be applied to the child's other foot4 ,the sound is now associated not constantly with one thing1 but sometimes with one thing1 and sometimes with another4 ,the consequence is1 that it calls up sometimes the one1 and sometimes the other4 ,here two things1 the two feet1 are both of them associated with one thing1 the name4 ,the one thing1 the name1 has the power of calling up both1 and in rapid succession4 ,the word foot suggests the idea of one of the feet2 this foot with its name1 is a complex idea2 and this complex idea suggests its like1 the other foot with its name4 ,this is a peculiar and a highly important case of association2 but not the less simple and indisputable4 ,we have already sufficiently exemplified the two grand cases of the formation of complex ideas by association2--that in which the ideas of synchronous sensations are so concreted by constant conjunction as to appear1 though numerous1 only one2 of which the ideas of sensible objects1 a rose1 a plough1 a house1 a ship1 are examples2--and that in which the ideas of successive sensations are so concreted2 of which1 the idea of a #bfd tune in music1 the idea of the revolution of a wheel1 of a walk1 a hunt1 a horse-race1 are instances4 ,it is easy to see wherein the present case agrees with1 and wherein it differs from1 those familiar cases4 ,the word1 man1 we shall say1 is first applied to an individual2 it is first associated with the idea of that individual1 and acquires the power of calling up the idea of him2 it is next applied to another individual1 and acquires the power of calling up the idea of him2 so of another1 and another1 till it has become associated with an indefinite number1 and has acquired the power of calling up an indefinite number of those ideas indifferently4 ,what happens8 ,it does call up an indefinite number of the ideas of individuals1 as often as it occurs2 and calling them up in close connexion1 it forms them into a species of complex idea4 ,there can be no difficulty in admitting that association does form the ideas of an indefinite number of individuals into one complex idea2 because it is an acknowledged fact4 ,have we not the idea of an army8 ,and is not that precisely the ideas of an indefinite number of men formed into one idea8 ,have we not the idea of a wood1 or a forest2 and is not that the idea of an indefinite number of trees formed into one idea8 ,these are instances of the concretion of synchronous ideas4 ,of the concretion of successive ideas indefinite in number1 the idea of a concert is one instance1 the idea of a discourse is another1 the idea of the life of a man is another1 the idea of a year1 or of a century1 is another1 and so on4 ,the idea1 which is marked by the term race of man1 is complex in both ways1 for it is not only the idea of the present generation1 but of all successive generations4 #bfe ,it is also a fact1 that when an idea becomes to a certain degree complex1 from the multiplicity of the ideas it comprehends1 it is of necessity indistinct4 ,thus the idea of a figure of one thousand sides is incurably indistinct2 the idea of an army is also indistinct2 the idea of a forest1 or the idea of a mob4 ,and one of the uses of language1 is1 to enable us1 by distinct marks1 to speak with distinctness of those combinations of ideas1 which1 in themselves1 are too numerous for distinctness4 ,thus1 by our marks of numbers1 we can speak1 with the most perfect precision1 of a figure not only of a thousand1 but of ten thousand sides1 and deduce its peculiar properties2 though it is as impossible1 by the idea1 as by the sensations1 to distinguish one of a thousand1 from one of a thousand and one1 sides4 ,thus1 when the word man calls up the ideas of an indefinite number of individuals1 not only of all those to whom ,i have individually given the name1 but of all those to whom ,i have in imagination given it or imagine it will ever be given1 and forms all those ideas into one1--it is evidently a very complex idea1 and1 therefore1 indistinct2 and this indistinctness has1 doubtless1 been the main cause of the mystery1 which has appeared to belong to it4 ,that this1 however1 is the process1 is an inevitable result of the laws of association4 ,it thus appears1 that the word1 man1 is not a word having a very simple idea1 as was the opinion of the ,realists2 nor a word having no idea at all1 as was that of the ,nominalists2 but a word calling up an indefinite number of ideas1 by the irresistible laws of association1 and forming them into one very #bff complex1 and indistinct1 but not therefore unintelligible1 idea4 ,it is thus to be seen1 that appellatives1 or general names1 are significant1 in two modes4 ,we have frequently had occasion to recur to the mode in which the simple ideas of sensation are associated or concreted1 so as to form what we call the complex ideas of objects4 ,thus1 ,i have the complex ideas of this pen1 this desk1 this room1 this man1 this handwriting4 ,the simple ideas1 so concreted into a complex idea in the case of each individual1 are one thing signified by each appellative2 and this complex idea of the individual1 concreted with another1 and another of the same kind1 and so on without end1 is the other of the things which are signified by it4 ,thus1 the word rose1 signifies1 first of all1 a certain odour1 a certain colour1 a certain shape1 a certain consistence1 so associated as to form one idea1 that of the individual2 next1 it signifies this individual associated with another1 and another1 and another1 and so on2 in other words1 it signifies the class4 ,the complexity of the idea1 in the latter of the two cases1 is distinguished by a peculiarity from that of the former4 ,in applying the name to the odour1 and colour1 and so on1 of the rose1 concreted into one idea1 the name is not the name of each of the sensations taken singly1 only of all taken together4 ,in applying the name to rose1 and rose1 and rose1 without end1 the name is at once a name of each of the individuals1 and also the name of the complex association which is formed of them4 ,this too1 is itself a peculiar association4 ,it is not the association of a name with a number of particulars clustered together #bfg as one2 but the association of a name with each of an indefinite number of particulars1 and all those particulars associated back again with the name4 ,this peculiarity may require a little further explanation4 ,it is well known1 that between an idea1 and the name which stands for it1 there is a double association4 ,the name calls up the idea in close association1 and the idea calls up the name in equally close association2 and this they have a tendency to do in a series of repetitions2 the name bringing up the idea1 the idea the name1 and then the name the idea again1 and so on1 for any number of times4 ,this is1 in great part1 the way in which language is learned1 as we observe by the repetitions to which children are prone4 ,and this1 indeed1 is what1 in many cases1 we mean when we speak of dwelling upon an idea4 ,it is a familiar observation1 that no idea dwells in the mind1 or can2 for it has innumerable associations1 and whatever association occurs1 of course1 displaces that by which it is introduced4 ,but if the idea which thus displaces it1 again calls it up1 and these two go on calling up one another1 that which is the more interesting of the two appears to be that which alone is occupying the attention4 ,this alternation is frequent between the name and the idea4 ,now1 then1 let the word1 man1 be supposed1 first of all1 the name of an individual2 it becomes associated with the idea of the individual1 and acquires the power of calling up that idea4 ,let us next suppose it applied to one other individual1 and no more3 it becomes associated with this other idea2 and it now has the power of calling up either4 ,the following is1 then1 a very natural train3-- #a1 ,the name occurs2 #b1 the name #bfh suggests the idea of one of the individuals2 #c1 that idea suggests the name back again2 #d1 the name suggests the idea of the second individual4 ,all this may pass1 and1 after sufficient repetition1 does pass1 with the rapidity of lightning4 ,suppose1 now1 that the name is associated1 with the ideas not of two individuals1 but of many2 the same train may go on2 the name exciting the idea of one individual1 that idea the name1 the name another individual1 and so on1 to an indefinite extent2 all in that small portion of time of which the mind takes no account4 ,the combination thus formed stands in need of a name4 ,and the name1 man1 while it is the name of every individual included in the process1 is also the name of the whole combination2 that is1 of a very complex idea4 ,one other question1 respecting classification1 may still seem to require solution2 namely1 what it is by which we are determined in placing such and such things together in a class in preference to others2 what1 in other words1 is the principle of ,classification8 ,i answer1 that1 as it is for the purpose of naming1 of naming with greater facility1 that we form classes at all2 so it is in furtherance of that same facility that such and such things only are included in one class1 such and such in another4 ,experience teaches what sort of grouping answers the purposes of naming best2 under the suggestions of that experience1 the application of a general word is tacitly and without much of reflection regulated2 and by this process1 and no other1 it is1 that ,classification is performed4 ,it is the aggregation of an indefinite number of individuals1 by their association with a particular name4 ,it may seem that this answer is still very general #bfi and that to make the explanation sufficient1 the suggestions by which experience recommends this or that classification should be particularized4 ,for the purpose of the present chapter1 however1 namely1 to shew that the business of ,classification is merely a process of naming1 and is all resolvable into association1 the observation1 though general1 is full and satisfactory4 ,the detail of the purposes to be answered by general terms belongs more properly to the next head of ,discourse1 and as far as the development of the mental phenomena seems to require it1 will there be presented4 ,it may still be useful to advert to the three principal cases into which ,classification may be resolved2 #a1 that of objects considered as synchronical2 #b1 that of objects considered as successive2 #c1 that of feelings4 ,the first is exemplified in the common classes of sensible objects1 as men1 horses1 trees1 and so on2 and requires no further explanation4 ,the second is exemplified in the classes of events1 denoted by such words1 as ,birth1 ,death1 ,snowing1 ,thundering1 ,freezing1 ,flying1 ,creeping4 ,by these words there is always denoted one antecedent and one consequent1 generally more1 sometimes a long train of them4 ,and it is obvious that each of them is1 at once1 the name of each instance individually1 and of all taken generally together4 ,thus1 ,freezing1 is not the name of an individual instance of freezing only1 but of that and of all other instances of ,freezing4 ,the same is the case with other words of a still more general1 and thence more obscure signification1 as ,gravitation1 ,attraction1 ,motion1 ,force1 c42 which words have this additional source of confusion1 that they are #bgj ambiguous1 being both abstract and concrete4 ,when we say that there is a third case of classification1 relating to ,feelings1 it does not mean that the two former do not relate to feelings3 for when we say1 that we classify objects1 as men1 horses1 c42--or events1 as the sequences named births1 deaths1 and so on2--it is obvious that our operation is about our own feelings1 and nothing else2 as the objects1 and their successions1 are1 to us1 the feelings merely which we thus designate4 ,but as there are feelings which we do thus designate2 and feelings which we do not2 it is convenient1 for the purpose of teaching1 to treat of them apart4 ,the ,feelings1 of this latter kind1 which we classify1 are either single feelings1 or trains4 ,thus1 ,pain is the name of a single feeling1 and the name both of an individual instance1 and of indefinite instances1 forming a most extensive class4 ,memory is the name not of a single feeling or idea1 but of a train2 and it is the name not only of a single instance1 but of all instances of such a train1 that is1 of a class4 ,the same is the case with ,belief4 ,it is the name of a train consisting of a certain number of links2 and it is the name not only of an individual instance of such trains1 but of all instances1 forming an extensive class4 ,imagination is another instance of the same sort of classification4 ,so also is ,judgment1 and ,reasoning1 and ,doubting1 and we might name many more4 ,it is easy to see1 among the principles of ,association1 what particular principle it is1 which is mainly concerned in ,classification1 and by which we are rendered capable of that mighty operation2 on which1 as its basis1 the whole of our intellectual structure is reared4 ,that principle is ,resemblance4 ,it seems to #bga be similarity or resemblance which1 when we have applied a name to one individual1 leads us to apply it to another1 and another1 till the whole forms an aggregate1 connected together by the common relation of every part of the aggregate to one and the same name4 ,similarity1 or ,resemblance1 we must regard as an ,idea familiar and sufficiently understood for the illustration at present required4 ,it will itself be strictly analysed1 at a subsequent part of this ,inquiry4 ,so deeply was the sagacious mind of ,plato1 far more philosophical than that of any who succeeded him1 during many ages1 struck with the importance of ,classification1 that he seems to have regarded it as the sum of all philosophy2 which he described1 as being the faculty of seeing the ,,one in the ,,many1 and the ,,many in the ,,one2 a phrase which1 when stripped from the subtleties of the sophists whom he exposed1 and from the mystical visions of his successors1 of which he never dreamed1 is really a striking expression of what in classification is the matter of fact4 ,his error lay1 in misconceiving the ,,one2 which he took1 not for the aggregate1 but something pervading the aggregate4#gi #hj ,grote's footnote #gi3 ,the two chapters 7,,vii4 and ,,viii47 of ,mr4 ,james ,mill's ,analysis are highly instructive1 and exhibit all his customary force and perspicuity4 ,but in respect to ,classification and ,abstraction1 ,i think that the ancient philosophers of the ,sokratic school generally1 are entitled to more credit than he allows them2 and moreover that in respect to the difference of opinion between ,plato and ,aristotle1 he has assigned an undue superiority to the former at the expense of the latter4 ,the reader would take very inadequate measure of these #bgb ancient philosophers1 if he judged them from the two citations out of ,harris and ,cudworth1 produced by ,mr4 ,james ,mill as setting forth the most successful speculations of the ancient world4 ,both these passages are brought to illustrate the mystical jargon 7p4 #bec7 with which the ancients are said to have obscured a clear and simple subject4 ,the mysticism in both citations is to a certain extent real2 but it depends also in part on the use of a terminology now obsolete1 rather than on confusion of ideas4 ,in regard to the citation from ,harris1 it is a passage in which that author passes into theology1 and includes ,god and ,immortality3 topics upon which mystical language can seldom be avoided3 moreover1 if we compare the remarks on ,harris 7p4 #bea7 with p4 #bga1 we shall find ,mr4 ,james ,mill ridiculing as mystical1 when used by ,harris1 the same language 7about the ,one in the ,many7 which1 when employed by ,plato1 he eulogises as follows--a phrase which1 when stripped from the subtleties of the sophists whom he 7,plato7 exposed1 and from the mystical visions of his successors1 of which he never dreamed1 is really a striking expression of what in classification is the matter of fact4 ,i wish ,i could concur with ,mr4 ,james ,mill in exonerating ,plato from these mystical visions1 and imputing them exclusively to his successors4 ,but ,i find them too manifestly proclaimed in the ,timus1 ,phdon1 ,phdrus1 ,symposion1 ,republic1 and other dialogues1 to admit of such an acquittal3 ,i also find subtleties quite as perplexing as those of any sophist whom he exposed4 ,along with these elements1 the dialogues undoubtedly present others entirely disparate1 much sounder and nobler4 ,i have in another work endeavoured to render a faithful account of the multifarious ,platonic aggregate1 stamped in all its parts1--whether of negative dialectic1 poetical fancy1 or ethical dogmatism1--with the unrivalled genius of expression belonging to the author4 ,the misfortune is that his ,neo-,platonic successors selected by preference his dreams and visions for their amplifying comment and eulogy1 leaving comparatively unnoticed the instructive lessons of philosophy #bgc accompanying them4 ,to this extent the ,neo-,platonists fully deserve the criticism here bestowed on them4 ,the long passage1 extracted in the ,analysis from ,cudworth1 contains two grave mis-statements1 respecting both ,plato and ,aristotle2 which deserve the more attention because they seem to have misled ,mr4 ,james ,mill himself4 ,respecting ,universals1 ,cudworth1 after saying that they do not exist in the individual sensibles1 proceeds as follows 7p4 #bee-bef7-- #a4 ,neither1 in the next place1 do they exist somewhere else apart from the individual sensibles1 and without the mind3 which is that opinion that ,aristotle justly condemns1 but either unjustly or unskilfully attributes to ,plato4 #b4 ,wherefore these intelligible ideas or essences of things1 those forms by which we understand all things1 exist nowhere but in the mind itself3 for it was very well determined long ago by ,socrates1 in ,plato's ,parmenides1 that these things are nothing but nomata3 these species or ideas are all of them nothing but nomata1 or notions that exist nowhere but in the soul itself4 ,now1 neither of these assertions of ,cudworth will be found accurate3 neither the determination which he ascribes to the ,platonic ,sokrates--nor the censure of unjust or unskilful which he attaches to ,aristotle4 ,it is indeed true that the opinion here mentioned is enunciated by ,sokrates in ,plato's ,parmenides4 ,but far from being given as a determination1 it is enunciated only to be refuted and dropt4a ,in that dialogue1 ,sokrates is introduced as a youthful and ardent aspirant in philosophy1 maintaining the genuine ,platonic theory of self-existent and separate ,ideas4 ,he finds himself unable to repel several acute objections tendered against the theory by the veteran ,parmenides3 he is driven from position to position3 and one among them1 not more tenable than the rest1 is the suggestion cited by ,cudworth4 ,yet ,parmenides1 though his objections remain unanswered and though he alludes to others #bgd not specified1--concludes by declaringb that nevertheless the ,platonic theory of ,ideas cannot be abandoned3 it must be upheld as a postulate essential to the possibility of general reasoning and philosophy4 ,footnote a3 ,plato ,parmenid4 p4 #acb1 ,c1 ,d4 ,footnote b3 ,plato ,parmenid4 p4 #ace1 ,b1 ,c4 ,i have given an account of this acute but perplexing dialogue1 in the twenty-fifth chapter of my work on ,plato and the other ,companions of ,sokrates4 ,even in the ,parmenides itself1 therefore1 where ,plato accumulates objections against the theory of separate and self-existent ,ideas1 we still find him reiterating his adherence to it4 ,and when we turn to his other dialogues1 ,phdrus1 ,phdon1 ,symposion1 ,republic1 ,kratylus1 c41 we see that theory so emphatically proclaimed and so largely illustrated1 that ,i wonder how ,cudworth can blame ,aristotle for imputing it to him4 ,it is by ,cudworth1 probably1 that ,mr4 ,james ,mill has been misled1 when he says--p4 #bdi--;,at bottom1 ,aristotle's ,greek3 ei7dos is the same as with ,plato's ,greek3 i7de_/a1 though ,aristotle makes a great affair of some very trifling differences1 which he creates and sets up between them4--,i have pointed out ,cudworth's mistake1 and ,i maintain that the difference between ,plato and ,aristotle on this subject was grave and material4 ,the latter denied1 what the former affirmed1 self-existence and substantiality of the ,universal ,ideas1 apart from and independent of particulars4 ,having cited with some comments the extracts from ,cudworth and ,harris1 ,mr4 ,james ,mill observes1 ,under the influence of such notions as these1 men were led away from the real object of ,classification1 which remained1 till a late period of metaphysical enquiry1 not at all understood4 ,yet the truth appears by no means difficult to find1 if we only observe the steps by which the mind acquires its knowledge1 and the exigencies which give occasion to the contrivances to which it resorts 7p4 #bei74--;,he then proceeds1 clearly and forcibly1 to announce his own theory of classification1 intended to dispel the mystery with which others have surrounded #bge it 7p4 #bfd74 ,the word man is first applied to an individual3 it is first associated with the idea of that individual1 and acquires the power of calling up the idea of him3 it is next applied to another individual1 and acquires the power of calling up the idea of him3 so of another and another1 till it has acquired the power of calling up an indefinite number of those ideas indifferently4 ,what happens8 ,it does call up an indefinite number of the ideas of individuals1 as often as it occurs3 and calling them up in close combination1 it forms them into a species of complex idea4 ,it thus appears that the word man is not a word having a very simple idea1 as was the opinion of the ,realists3 nor a word having no idea at all1 as was that of the ,nominalists3 but a word calling up an indefinite number of ideas1 by the irresistible laws of association1 and forming them into one very complex and indistinct1 but not therefore unintelligible1 idea 7p4 #bfe74--;,as it is for the purpose of naming1 and of naming with greater facility1 that we form classes at all2 so it is in furtherance of that same facility that such and such things only are included in one class1 such and such things in another4 ,experience teaches us what sort of grouping answers this purpose best3 under the suggestions of that experience1 the application of a general word is tacitly and without much of reflection regulated3 and by this process and no other1 it is1 that ,classification is performed4 ,it is the aggregation of an indefinite number of individuals1 by their association with a particular name 7p4 #bfh74--;,it is ,similarity or ,resemblance1 which1 when we have applied a name to one individual1 leads us to apply it to another and another till the whole forms an aggregate1 connected together by the common relation of the aggregate to one and the same name 7p4 #bga74 ,such is the theory of ,mr4 ,james ,mill4 ,its great peculiarity is that it neither includes nor alludes to ,abstraction4 ,it admits in ,classification nothing more than the one common name associated with an aggregate indefinite and indistinct1 of similar concrete individuals4 ,i shall now consider the manner #bgf in which the ,greek philosophers of the fourth century ,b4,c4 dealt with the same subject1 and how far they merit the censure of having imported unnecessary mystery into it4 ,it is impossible to understand ,plato unless we take our departure from his master ,sokrates4 ,now it is precisely in regard to ,classification1 and the meaning and comprehension of general terms1 that the originality and dialectical acuteness of ,sokrates were most conspicuously manifested4 ,he was the first philosopher 7as ,aristotlec tells us7 who set before himself the ,universal as an express object of investigation1--and who applied himself to find out and test the definition of universal terms4 ,he wrote nothing2 but he passed most part of his long life in public1 and in talking indiscriminately with every one4 ,oral colloquy1 and cross-examining interrogation1 were carried by him to a pitch of excellence never equalled4 ,not only did he disclaim all power of teaching1 but he explicitly avowed his own ignorance2 professing to be a mere seeker of truth from others who knew better1 and to be anxious only for answers such as would stand an accurate scrutiny4 ,to this peculiar scheme--the topics on which he talked were adapted3 for he avoided all recondite themes1 and discussed only matters relating to man and society3 such as ,what is the ,holy8 ,what is the ,unholy8 ,what are the ,beautiful and the ,mean the ,just and ,unjust8 ,temperance8 ,madness8 ,courage8 ,cowardice8 ,a ,city8 ,a man fit for citizenship8 ,command of ,men8 ,a man fit for commanding men8 ,such is the specimen-list given by ,xenophond of the themes chosen by ,sokrates4 ,we see that they are all general1 and embodied in universal terms4 ,but the terms as well as the themes were familiar to all3 every man believed himself thoroughly to understand the meaning of the former--every one had convictions ready-made and decided on the latter4 ,when ,sokrates first opened the colloquy1 respondents were surprised to be questioned about such subjects1 upon which they presumed #bgg that every one must know as well as themselves4 ,but this confidence speedily vanished when they came to be tested by inductivee interrogatories3 citation of appropriate particulars1 included or not included in the generalities which they laid down4 ,the result proved that they could not answer the questions without speedily contradicting themselves3 that they did not understand the comprehension of their own universal terms3 and that upon all these matters1 on which they talked so confidently1 they had never applied themselves deliberately to learn1 nor could they say how their judgments had been acquired or certified4f ,footnote c3 ,aristot4 ,metaphys4 ,a4 p4 #ihg1 b4 #a1 ,m4 p4 #ajgh1 b4 #cj4 ,footnote d3 ,xenophon1 ,memorab4 ,i41 #a--af4 ,footnote e3 ,so ,aristotle calls them--,greek3 lo_/gous e7paktikou_/s4--,metaph4 ,m4 p4 #ajgh1 b4 #bh4 ,footnote f3 ,xenophon1 ,memorab4 ,,iv4 #b--ac--cj--cf4 ,the conviction formed in the mind of ,sokrates1 after long persistence in such colloquial cross-examination1 is consigned in his defence before the ,athenian judicature1 pronounced a month before his death4 ,he declared that what he found every where was real ignorance1 combined with false persuasion of knowledge3 that this was the chronic malady of the human mind1 which it had been his mission to expose3 that no man was willing to learn1 because no man believed that he stood in need of learning3 that1 accordingly1 the first step indispensable to all effective teaching1 was to make the pupil a willing learner1 by disabusing his mind of the false persuasion of knowledge1 and by imparting to him the stimulus arising from a painful consciousness of ignorance4 ,such was the remarkable psychological scrutiny instituted by ,sokrates on his countrymen1 and the verdict which it suggested to him4 ,i have already observed that his great intellectual bent was to ascertain the definition of general terms1 and to follow these out to a comprehensive and consistent classification4g ,it must be added that no man was ever less inclined to mysticism than ,sokrates3 and that he was thus #bgh exempt from those misleading influences which 7according to ,mr4 ,james ,mill1 p4 #bfj7 have led men away from the real object of ,classification1 and prevented them from understanding it till a late period in metaphysical enquiry4 ,sokrates did not come before his countrymen with classifications of his own1 originated or improved--nor did he teach them how the process ought to be conducted4 ,his purpose was1 to test and appreciate that ,classification which he found ready-made and current among them4 ,he pronounced it to be worthless and illusory4 ,footnote g3 ,xenophon4 ,memor4 ,,iv4 #e1 #ab2 ,,iv4 99#f4 #a--g--aj--ae4 ,greek3 7n e7_/neka skopn sun tois sunousin1 ti_/ e7_/kaston ei7_/ tn o7_/ntn1 ou7de_/pote e7_/lge4 ,now ,i wish to point out that what ,sokrates thus depreciated1 is exactly that which this ,chapter of the ,analysis lays before us as ,classification generally4 ,i agree with the ,analysis that ,classification1 up to a certain point1 grows out of the principle of ,association and the exigencies of the human mind1 by steps instructively set forth in that work4 ,but such natural growth reaches no higher standard than that which ,sokrates tested and found so lamentably deficient1 even among a public of unusual intelligence4 ,it does not deserve the name of a mighty operation 7bestowed upon it by ,mr4 ,james ,mill1 p4 #bgj74 ,it is a rudimentary procedure1 indispensable as a basis on which to build1 and sufficing in the main for social communication1 when no science or reasoned truth is required3 but failing altogether to realise what has been understood by philosophers1 from ,sokrates downward1 as the true and full purpose of ,classification4 ,so long as the ,class is conceived to be only what the ,analysis describes1 an indistinct aggregate of resembling individuals denoted by the same name1 without clearly understanding wherein the resemblance consists1 or what facts and attributes are connoted by the nameh 7,i use the word connote1 #bgi not in the sense of the ,analysis1 but in the sense of ,mr4 ,john ,stuart ,mill7--so long will ,classification continue to be1 as ,sokrates entitled it1 a large persuasion of knowledge with little reality to sustain it4 ,footnote h3 ,the necessity of determining the connotation of the ,class-term is distinctly put forward by ,sokrates--,xenophon1 ,memorab4 ,,iii4 #ad1 #b4 ,greek3 lo_/g o7_/ntos peri o7noma_/tn1 iph' oi7 e7_/rg e7_/kaston ei7_/--,e7_/choimen a7n 7e7ph7 ei7pein1 e7pi poi pote e7_/rg a7_/nthrpos o7pso_/phagos kaleitai8 c41 also the remarkable passage ,,iv41 #f4 #ac--ae1 ,plato1 ,sophistes1 p4 #bah ,b4 ,greek3 tou7_/noma mo_/non e7_/chomen koin to de e7_/rgon1 e7ph' 7 kaloumen1 c4 ,i pass now from ,sokrates to ,plato4 ,it is true1 as we read in the ,analysis1 7p4 #bga7 that ,plato was so deeply struck with the importance of ,classification1 that he seems to have regarded it as the sum of all philosophy4 ,but what ,plato thus admired was not the ,classification that he found prevalent around him1 such as this chapter of the ,analysis depicts4 ,here ,plato perfectly agreed with ,sokrates4 ,among his immortal dialogues1 several of the very best are devoted to the illustration of the ,sokratic point of view3 to the cross-examination and exposure of the minds around him1 instructed as well as vulgar1 in respect to the general terms familiarly used in speech4 ,the ,platonic questions and answers are framed to shew how little the respondents understand beneath those current generalities on which every one talks with confidence and fluency--and how little they can avoid contradiction or inconsistency1 when their class-terms are confronted with particulars4 ,in fact1 ,plato goes so far as to intimate that these uncertified classifications1-- generated in each man's mind by merely learning the application of words1 and imbibed unconsciously1 without special teaching1 through the contagion of ordinary society--are rather worse than ignorance3 inasmuch as they are accompanied by a false persuasion of knowledge4 ,it would be 7in the opinion of ,plato7 a comparative improvement1 if this state of mental confusion1 creating a false persuasion of knowledge1 were broken up2 and if there were substituted in place thereof positive ignorance1 together with the naked and painful consciousness of being really ignorant4 ,only in this way could the mind of the learner be stimulated to active effort in the acquisition of genuine knowledge4i ,footnote i3 ,plato1 ,sophistes1 p4 #bcj--bca4 ,symposion1 p4 #bjd ,a1 ,menon p4 #hd1 ,a4 ,d4 ,accordingly1 when it is said that ,plato was deeply struck #bhj with the importance of ,classification1 we must understand the phrase as applying to ,classification1 not as he found it prevalent1 but as he idealized it4 ,and the scheme that he imagined was not merely different from that which he found1 but in direct repugnance to it4 ,he denounced altogether the aggregate of individuals2 he declared the class-constituent to reside in a reality apart from them1 separate and self-existent--the ,idea or ,form4 ,he enjoined the student of philosophy to fix his contemplation on these ,class-,ideas1 the real ,realities1 in their own luminous region3 and for that purpose1 to turn his back upon the phenomenal particulars1 which were mere transitory1 shadowy1 incoherent projections of these ,ideasj--and from the study of which no true knowledge could be obtained4 ,of the two statements in the ,analysis--7p4 #bga7 that ,plato never dreamed of the mystical visions of his successors1 and that his error 7respecting ,classification7 lay in misconceiving the ,one2 which he took1 not for the aggregate1 but something pervading the aggregate--neither one nor the other appears to me accurate4 ,in regard to the second of the two1 indeed1 you may find various passages of ,plato which1 if construed separately1 would countenance it3 for ,plato does not always talk ,realism--nor always consistently with himself4 ,but still his capital and peculiar theory was1 ,realism4 ,the ,platonic ,one was not something pervading the aggregate of particulars1 but an independent and immutable reality1 apart from the aggregate3 and ,plato1 when he thus conceived #bha the ,one1 illustrating it by the vast hypotheses embodied in the ,republic1 ,phdon1 ,phdrus1 ,symposion1 ,menon1 c41 is the true originator of those mystical visions against which the ,analysis justly protests4 ,such visions were doubtless suggested to ,plato by his deep sense of the importance of ,classification3 but they are his own1 though continued and amplified1 without his decorative genius1 by ,neo-,platonic successors4 ,his theory of classification was the first ever propounded2 and that theory was ,realism4 ,the doctrine here ascribed to him by ,mr4 ,james ,mill is much more ,aristotelian than ,platonic4 ,the main issue raised by ,aristotle against ,plato was1 upon the essential separation1 and separate objective existence1 of the ,abstract and ,universal3 ,plato affirmed it1 ,aristotle denied it4k ,aristotle recognised no reality apart from the ,particular1 to which the ,universal was attached as a predicate1 either essential or accidental to its subject4 ,the ,aristotelian ,universal may thus be called1 in relation to a body of similar particulars1 not the aggregate but something pervading the aggregate4 ,but this is not ,plato's view3 it is the negation of the ,platonic ,realism4 ,footnote j3 ,this is what we read in the memorable simile of the ,cave1 in ,plato1 ,republic1 ,,vii41 p4 #ead--eai4 ,the language used throughout this simile is ,greek3 peria_/gein1 periakti_/on1 periagg_/1 c4 ,he supposes that the natural state of man is to have his face and vision towards the particular phenomena1 and his back towards the universal realities3 the great problem is1 how to make the man face about1 turn his back towards phenomena1 and his eyes towards ,universals--,greek3 ta o7_/nta--ta nota_/4 ,nothing can be learnt from observation however 99acute1 of the phenomena4 ,the same point is enforced with all the charm of ,platonic expression in ,republ4 ,v4 #dgh1 #dgi1 ,,vi41 #dic1 #did4 ,symposion1 p4 #baj--baa1 ,phdon1 p4 #gd--ge4 ,footnote k3 ,according to ,plato1 it is ,greek3 to e7n para ta polla_/4 ,according to ,aristotle1 it is ,greek3 e7n kata polln--e7n kai to au7to e7pi pleio_/nn m o7m_/numon e7n e7pi polln4 ,analyt4 ,poster4 ,i4 #aa1 p4 #gg1 a4 #f4 ,metaphys4 ,i4 #i1 p4 #iij1 b4 #g--ac4 ,whoever reads the portions of ,plato's dialogues indicated in my last preceding foot note1 will see how material this difference is between the two philosophers4 ,in the remarkable passage of the ,analyt4 ,post4 ,i4 #bd1 p4 #he1 a4 #cj1 b4 #bj1 ,aristotle notices the ,platonic hypothesis that the ,universal has real objective1 separate1 existence apart from its particulars 7,greek3 to katho_/lou e7pi ti para ta kath' e7_/kasta7 as an illusion1 mischievous and misleading--frequent1 but not unavoidable4 ,see the antithesis between ,plato and ,aristotle1 on the subject of ,universals1 more copiously explained in the recent work of ,professor ,bain1 ,mental and ,moral ,science1 ,appendix1 pp4 #f--bj4 ,when we read in the ,analysis 7p4 #bfe7 that the word man is not a word having a very simple idea1 as was the opinion of the ,realists2 nor a word having no idea at all1 as was that of the ,nominalists this language seems to me not well-chosen4 #bhb ,as to the ,realists--the ,platonic ,ideas are conceived as eternal1 immutable1 grand1 dignified1 c41 but ,aristotlel contends that they cannot all be simple3 for the ,idea of ,man 7e4g47 can hardly be simple1 when there exists distinct ,ideas of ,animal and of ,biped4 ,as to the ,nominalists--we cannot surely say that they conceived the universal term as having no idea at all4 ,a doctrine something like this is ascribed 7on no certain testimony7 to ,stilpon1 in the generation succeeding ,aristotle3 the word ,man 7,stilpon is said to have affirmedm7 did not mean ,john more than ,william or ,thomas or ,richard1 c41 therefore it did not mean either one of them3 therefore it had no meaning at all4 ,so also ,william of ,ockham is said to have declared that ,universal ,terms were mere flatus vocis3 but this 7as ,prantl has shewnn7 was a phrase fastened upon him by his opponents1 not employed by himself4 ,still less can it be admitted that ,hobbes and ,berkeley conceived the ,universal ,term as having no idea at all4 ,they denied indeed ,universal ,ideas in the ,realistic sense3 they also denied what ,berkeley calls determinate abstract ,ideas3 but both of them explained 7,berkeley especially7 that the ,universal term meant1 any particular idea1 considered as representing or standing for all other particular ideas of the same sort4o ,whether this be the best and most complete explanation or not1 it can hardly have been present to ,mr4 ,james ,mill's mind1 when he said that the ,universal term had no idea at all in the opinion of the ,nominalists4 ,footnote l3 ,aristot4 ,metaphys4 ,z4 #ajci1 a4 #bg1 #ajdj1 a4 #bc4 ,footnote m3 ,see ,grote1 ,plato and the other ,companions of ,sokrates1 ,vol4 ,,iii41 ch4 #ch1 p4 #ebc4 ,footnote n3 ,prantl1 ,geschichte der ,logik1 ,vol4 ,,iii41 ,sect4 #ai1 p4 #cbg4 ,footnote o3 ,berkeley1 ,principles of ,human ,knowledge1 ,introduction1 ,sect4 #ab1 #ae1 #af4 ,there is one other remark to be made1 respecting the view of ,classification presented in the eighth ,chapter of the ,analysis4 ,we read in the beginning of that ,chapter--p4 #bdi--;,forming a class of things is a mode of regarding them4 ,but what is meant by a mode of regarding things8 ,this is mysterious3 #bhc and is as mysteriously explained1 when it is said to be the taking into view the particulars in which individuals agree4 ,for what is there which it is possible for the mind to take into view1 in that in which individuals agree8 ,every colour is an individual colour1 every size is an individual size1 every shape is an individual shape4 ,but things have no individual colour in common1 no individual shape in common1 no individual size in common3 that is to say1 they have neither shape1 colour1 nor size in common4 ,what then is it which they have in common which the mind can take into view8 ,those who affirmed that it was something1 could by no means tell4 ,they substituted words for things3 using vague and mystical phrases1 which when examined meant nothing4 ,here we find certain phrases1 often used both in common speech and in philosophy1 condemned us mystical and obscure4 ,in the next or ninth ,chapter 7on ,abstraction1 p4 #bie seq471 we shall see the language substituted for them1 and the theory by which the mystery is supposed to be removed4 ,i cannot but think that the theory of ,mr4 ,james ,mill himself is open to quite as many objections as that which he impugns4 ,he finds fault with those who affirm that the word cube or sphere is applied to a great many different objects by reason of the shape which they have in common2 and that they may be regarded so far forth as cube or sphere4 ,but surely this would not have been considered as either incorrect or mysterious by any philosopher1 from ,aristotle downward4 ,when ,i am told that it is incorrect1 because the shape of each object is an individual shape1 ,i dissent from the reason given4 ,in my judgment1 the term individual is a term applicable1 properly and specially1 to a concrete object--to that which ,aristotle would have called a ,hoc ,aliquid4 ,the term is not applicable to a quality or attribute4 ,the same quality that belongs to one object1 may also belong to an indefinite number of others4 ,it is this common quality that is connoted 7in the sense of that word employed by ,mr4 ,john ,stuart ,mill7 by the class-term3 and if there were no common quality1 the class-term would have no connotation4 ,in other words1 there would be no class3 nor #bhd would it be correct to apply to any two objects the same concrete appellative name4 ,but when we come to the following ,chapter of the ,analysis 7ch4 ix4 on ,abstraction1 p4 #bif71 we read as follows--,let us suppose that we apply the adjective black first to the word ,man4 ,we say 'black man4' ,but we speedily see that for the same reason for which we say black man1 we may say black horse1 black cow1 black coat1 and so on4 ,the word black is thus associated with innumerable modifications of the sensation black4 ,by frequent repetition1 and the gradual strengthening of the association1 these modifications are at last called up in such rapid succession that they appear commingled1 and no longer many ideas1 but one4 ,black is therefore no longer an individual1 but a general name4 ,it marks not the particular black of a particular individual1 but the black of every individual and of all individuals4 ,to say that we apply the word black to the horse for the same reason as we applied it to the man1 is surely equivalent to saying that the colour of the horse is the same as that of the man3 that blackness is the colour which they have in common4 ,it is quite true that we begin by applying the name to one individual object1 then apply it to another1 and another1 c42 but always for the same reason--to designate 7or connote1 in the phraseology of ,mr4 ,john ,stuart ,mill7 the same colour in them all1 and to denote the objects considered under one and the same point of view4 ,it may be that in fact there are differences in shade of colour3 but the class-name leaves these out of sight4 ,when we desire to call attention to them1 we employ other words in addition to it4 ,every attribute is considered and named as ,one1 which is or may be common to many individual objects3 the objects only are individual4 ,it is to be regretted1 ,i think1 that ,mr4 ,james ,mill disconnected ,classification so pointedly from ,abstraction1 and insisted on explaining the former without taking account of the latter4 ,such disconnection is a novelty1 as he himself states 7p4 #bid73 previous expositors thought that abstraction was included in classification--and1 in my judgment1 they were #bhe right in thinking so1 if 7with ,mr4 ,james ,mill7 we are to consider ,classification as a great operation4 ,an aggregate of concretes is not sufficient to constitute a ,class1 in any scientific sense1 or as available in the march of reasoned truth4 ,you must have1 besides1 the peculiar mode of regarding the aggregate3 7a phrase which ,mr4 ,james ,mill deprecates as mysterious1 but which it is difficult to exchange for any other words more intelligible7 you must have that separating one or more of the ingredients of a complex idea from the rest1 which has received the name of ,abstraction--to repeat the very just explanation given by him1 p4 #bie--though that too1 if we look at p4 #bdi1 he seems to consider as tainted with mystery4 ,we proceed afterwards to some clear and good additional remarks--p4 #bih4 ,a class-term1 as black1 is associated with two distinguishable things1 but with the one much more than with the other3 the clusters1 with which it is associated1 are variable3 the peculiar sensation with which it is associated1 is invariable4 ,it is constantly1 and therefore much more strongly1 associated with the sensation1 than with any of the clusters4 ,it is at once a name of the clusters and a name of the sensation3 but it is more peculiarly a name of the sensation4 ,again shortly afterwards1 the abstract term is justly described as marking exclusively one part 7of the cluster71 upon which such and such effects depend1 no alteration being supposed in any other part of it4p ,footnote p3 ,the abstract term is coined for the express purpose of marking one part of a cluster simultaneously present to the mind1 and fixing attention upon it without the other parts--but the concrete term is often made to serve the same purpose1 by means of the adverb quatenus1 ,greek3 ka_/thoson1 7 c4 ,these phrases are frequent both in ,plato and ,aristotle3 the stock of abstract terms was in their day comparatively small4 ,it is needless to multiply illustrations of that which pervades the compositions of both3 a very good one appears in ,plato1 ,republ4 ,i41 p4 #cdj ,d1 #cda ,c1 #cdb4 ,this process of marking exclusively1 and attending to1 one constant portion of a complex state of consciousness1 amidst a #bhf great variety of variable adjuncts--is doubtless one fundamental characteristic in ,abstraction and ,classification4 ,a mystery was spread around it by ,plato--first through his ascribing to the ,constant a separate self-existence1 apart from the ,variables--still more by his hyperbolical predicates respecting these self-existent transcendental ,entia4 ,platoq however in other passages gives many just opinions1 respecting ,classification1 which are no way founded on ,realism1 and are equally admissible by ,nominalists3 and portions of ,aristotle may be indicated1 which describe the process of abstraction as clearly as any thing in ,hobbes or ,berkeley4r ,footnote q3 ,the two ,platonic dialogues1 ,sophistes and ,politikus1 7in which processes of ,classification are worked out17 give precepts1 for correct and pertinent classification1 not necessarily involving the theory of ,realism1 but rather putting it out of sight2 though in one special part of the ,sophistes1 the debate is made to turn upon it4 ,the main purpose of ,plato is to fix upon some fact or phenomenon1 clear and appropriate1 as the groundwork for distinguishing each class or sub-class--and to define thereby each class-term 7i4e41 to determine its connotation1 in the sense of ,mr4 ,john ,stuart ,mill74 ,plato deprecates the mere following out of resemblances as a most slippery proceeding 7,greek3 o7listhro_/taton ge_/nos--,sophist4 #bca ,a74 ,the commonly received classes carry with them in his opinion1 no real knowledge1 but only the false persuasion of knowledge3 he wants to break them up and remodel them4 ,footnote r3 ,see especially ,aristot4 ,de ,memori et ,reminiscenti1 c4 #a1 p4 #ddi1 b4 #ac4 ,de ,sensu et ,sensili1 c4 #f1 p4 #dde1 b4 #ag4 ,de ,anim ,,iii4 #h1 p4 #dcb1 a4 #i4 ,one farther remark may be made upon these two ,chapters of the ,analysis4 ,mr4 ,james ,mill seems to take little or no thought of ,classification and ,abstraction1 except as performed by ,adjectives4 ,but the adjective presupposes a substantive1 which is alike an appellative2 and which has already performed its duty in the way of abstracting and classifying4 ,this fact seems to be overlooked in the language of some sentences in the present ,chapter3 for example--,some successions are found to depend upon the clusters called objects1 all taken together4 ,thus a tree1 a man1 a stone1 are the #bhg antecedents of certain consequents1 as such3 and not on account of any particular part of the cluster4 ,other consequents depend not upon the whole cluster1 but upon some particular part3 thus a tall tree produces certain effects which a tree not tall cannot produce1 c4 ,i think that the phraseology of this passage is not quite clear4 ,the whole cluster all taken together is not a tree as such--a man as such--a stone as such--but this particular man1 tree1 or stone1 as it stands3 ,john1 ,thomas1 ,caius or ,titius1 clothed with all his predicates1 acting or suffering in some given manner4 ,when we speak of a man as such or quatenus man--we do not include the whole cluster1 but only those attributes connoted 7in ,mr4 ,john ,stuart ,mill's sense of the word7 by the name man3 we speak of him as a member of the class ,man4 ,what ,i wish to point out is--,that ,man is a class-term1 just as much as tall or short3 only it is the name of a larger class1 while tall man is a smaller class under it4 ,the school-logicians did not consider substantives as connotative1 but only adjectives3 ,mr4 ,james ,mill has followed them as to this extent of the word1 though he has inverted their meaning of it 7see p4 #bii74 ,mr4 ,john ,stuart ,mill1 while declining to adopt the same inversion1 has enlarged the meaning of the word connotative1 so as to include appellative substantives as well as adjectives4--,g4 ,editor's footnote #hj3 ,rejecting the notion that classes and classification would not have existed but for the necessity of economizing names1 we may say that objects are formed into classes on account of their resemblance4 ,it is natural to think of like objects together2 which is1 indeed1 one of the two fundamental laws of association4 ,but the resembling objects which are spontaneously thought of together1 are those which resemble each other obviously1 in their superficial aspect4 ,these are the only classes which we should form unpremeditatedly1 and without the use of expedients4 ,but there are other resemblances which are not superficially obvious2 and many are not brought to light except by long experience1 or observation carefully directed to the purpose2 being mostly resemblances in the #bhh manner in which the objects act on1 or are acted on by1 other things4 ,these more recondite resemblances are often those which are of greatest importance to our interests4 ,it is important to us that we should think of those things together1 which agree in any particular that materially concerns us4 ,for this purpose1 besides the classes which form themselves in our minds spontaneously by the general law of association1 we form other classes artificially1 that is1 we take pains to associate mentally together things which we wish to think of together1 but which are not sufficiently associated by the spontaneous action of association by resemblance4 ,the grand instrument we employ in forming these artificial associations1 is general names4 ,we give a common name to all the objects1 we associate each of the objects with the name1 and by their common association with the name they are knit together in close association with one another4 ,but in what manner does the name effect this purpose1 of uniting into one complex class-idea all the objects which agree with one another in certain definite particulars8 ,we effect this by associating the name in a peculiarly strong and close manner with those particulars4 ,it is1 of course1 associated with the objects also2 and the name seldom or never calls up the ideas of the class-characteristics unaccompanied by any other qualities of the objects4 ,all our ideas are of individuals1 or of numbers of individuals1 and are clothed with more or fewer of the attributes which are peculiar to the individuals thought of4 ,still1 a class-name stands in a very different relation to the definite resemblances which it is intended to mark1 from that in which it stands to the various accessory circumstances which may form part of the image it calls up4 ,there are certain attributes common to the entire class1 which the class-name was either deliberately selected as a mark of1 or1 at all events1 which guide us in the application of it4 ,these attributes are the real meaning of the class-name--are what we intend to ascribe to an object when we call it by that name4 ,with these the association of the name is close and strong3 and the employment of the same name by different #bhi persons1 provided they employ it with a precise adherence to the meaning1 ensures that they shall all include these attributes in the complex idea which they associate with the name4 ,this is not the case with any of the other qualities of the individual objects1 even if they happen to be common to all the objects1 still less if they belong only to some of them4 ,the class-name calls up1 in every mind that hears or uses it1 the idea of one or more individual objects1 clothed more or less copiously with other qualities than those marked by the name2 but these other qualities may1 consistently with the purposes for which the class is formed and the name given1 be different with different persons1 and with the same person at different times4 ,what images of individual horses the word horse shall call up1 depends on such accidents as the person's taste in horses1 the particular horses he may happen to possess1 the descriptions he last read1 or the casual peculiarities of the horses he recently saw4 ,in general1 therefore1 no very strong or permanent association1 and especially no association common to all who use the language1 will be formed between the word horse and any of the qualities of horses but those expressly or tacitly recognised as the foundations of the class4 ,the complex ideas thus formed consisting of an inner nucleus of definite elements always the same1 imbedded in a generally much greater number of elements indefinitely variable1 are our ideas of classes2 the ideas connected with general names2 what are called ,general ,notions3 which are neither real objective entities1 as the ,realists held1 nor mere names1 as supposed to be maintained by the ,nominalists1 nor abstract ideas excluding all properties not common to the class1 such as ,locke's famous ,idea of a triangle that is neither equilateral nor isosceles nor scalene4 ,we cannot represent to ourselves a triangle with no properties but those common to all triangles3 but we may represent it to ourselves sometimes in one of those three forms1 sometimes in another1 being aware all the while that all of them are equally consistent with its being a triangle4 ,one important consequence of these considerations is1 that #bij the meaning of a class-name is not the same thing with the complex idea associated with it4 ,the complex idea associated with the name man1 includes1 in the mind of every one1 innumerable simple ideas besides those which the name is intended to mark1 and in the absence of which it would not be predicated4 ,but this multitude of simple ideas which help to swell the complex idea are infinitely variable1 and never exactly the same in any two persons1 depending in each upon the amount of his knowledge1 and the nature1 variety1 and recent date of his experience4 ,they are therefore no part of the meaning of the name4 ,they are not the association common to all1 which it was intended to form1 and which enables the name to be used by all in the same manner1 to be understood in a common sense by all1 and to serve1 therefore1 as a vehicle for the communication1 between one and another1 of the same thoughts4 ,what does this1 is the nucleus of more closely associated ideas1 which is the constant element in the complex idea of the class1 both in the same mind at different times1 and in different minds4 ,it is proper to add1 that the class-name is not solely a mark of the distinguishing class-attributes1 it is a mark also of the objects4 ,the name man does not merely signify the qualities of animal life1 rationality1 and the human form1 it signifies all individual men4 ,it even signifies these in a more direct way than it signifies the attributes1 for it is predicated of the men1 but not predicated of the attributes2 just as the proper name of an individual man is predicated of him4 ,we say1 ,this is a man1 just as we say1 ,this is ,john ,thompson3 and if ,john ,thompson is the name of one man1 ,man is1 in the same manner1 a name of all men4 ,a class name1 being thus a name of the various objects composing the class1 signifies two distinct things1 in two different modes of signification4 ,it signifies the individual objects which are the class1 and it signifies the common attributes which constitute the class4 ,it is predicated only of the objects2 but when predicated1 it conveys the information that these objects possess those attributes4 ,every concrete class-name is thus a connotative name4 ,it marks #bia both the objects and their common attributes1 or rather1 that portion of their common attributes in virtue of which they have been made into a class4 ,it denotes the objects1 and1 in a mode of speech lately revived from the old logicians1 it connotes the attributes4 ,the author of the ,analysis employs the word connote in a different manner2 we shall presently examine which of the two is best4 ,we are now ready to consider whether the author's account of the ideas connected with ,general ,names is a true and sufficient one4 ,it is best expressed in his own words4 ,the word ,man1 we shall say1 is first applied to an individual2 it is first associated with the idea of that individual1 and acquires the power of calling up the idea of him2 it is next applied to another individual1 and acquires the power of calling up the idea of him2 so of another1 and another1 till it has become associated with an indefinite number1 and has acquired the power of calling up an indefinite number of those ideas indifferently4 ,what happens8 ,it does call up an indefinite number of the ideas of individuals1 as often as it occurs1 and calling them up in close connexion1 it forms them into a species of complex idea4 4 4 4 ,when the word man calls up the ideas of an indefinite number of individuals1 not only of all those to whom ,i have individually given the name1 but of all those to whom ,i have in imagination given it1 or imagine it will ever be given1 and forms all those ideas into one1--it is evidently a very complex idea1 and therefore indistinct2 and this indistinctness has doubtless been the main cause of the mystery which has appeared to belong to it4 ,that this however is the process1 is an inevitable result of the laws of association4 ,in brief1 my idea of a ,man is a complex idea compounded of the ideas of all the men ,i have ever known and of all those ,i have ever imagined1 knit together into a kind of unit by a close association4 ,the author's description of the manner in which the class-association begins to be formed1 is true and instructive2 but does any one's idea of a man actually include all that the author #bib finds in it8 ,by an inevitable result of the laws of association1 it is impossible to form an idea of a man in the abstract2 the class-attributes are always represented in the mind as part of an image of an individual1 either remembered or imagined2 this individual may vary from time to time1 and several images of individuals may present themselves either alternatively or in succession3 but is it necessary that the name should recal images of all the men ,i ever knew or imagined1 or even all of whom ,i retain a remembrance8 ,in no person who has seen or known many men1 can this be the case4 ,apart from the ideas of the common attributes1 the other ideas whether of attributes or of individual men1 which enter into the complex idea1 are indefinitely variable not only in kind but in quantity4 ,some people's complex idea of the class is extremely meagre1 that of others very ample4 ,sometimes we know a class only from its definition1 i4e4 from an enumeration of its class-attributes1 as in the case of an object which we have only read of in scientific books3 in such a case the idea raised by the class-name will not be limited to the class-attributes1 for we are unable to conceive any object otherwise than clothed with miscellaneous attributes3 but these1 not being derived from experience of the objects1 may be such as the objects never had1 nor could have2 while nevertheless the class1 and the class-name1 answer their proper purpose2 they cause us to group together all the things possessing the class-attributes1 and they inform us that we may expect those attributes in anything of which that name is predicated4 ,the defect1 as it seems to me1 of the view taken of ,general ,names in the text1 is that it ignores this distinction between the meaning of a general name1 and the remainder of the idea which the general name calls up4 ,that remainder is uncertain1 variable1 scanty in some cases1 copious in others1 and connected with the name by a very slight tie of association1 continually overcome by counter-associations4 ,the only part of the complex idea that is permanent in the same mind1 or common to several minds1 consists of the distinctive attributes marked by the class-name4 ,nothing else is universally present1 though #bic something else is always present3 but whatever else be present1 it is through these only that the class-name does its work1 and effects the end of its existence4 ,we need not therefore be surprised that these attributes1 being all that is of importance in the complex idea1 should for a long time have been supposed to be all that is contained in it4 ,the truest doctrine which can be laid down on the subject seems to be this--that the idea corresponding to a class-name is the idea of a certain constant combination of class attributes1 accompanied by a miscellaneous and indefinitely variable collection of ideas of individual objects belonging to the class4--,ed4 #bid ,,chapter ,,ix4 ,,abstraction4 ,i think1 too1 that he 7,mr4 ,locke7 would have seen the advantage of 'thoroughly weighing1' not only 7as he says7 'the imperfections of ,language2' but its perfections also3 ,for the perfections of ,language1 not properly understood1 have been one of the chief causes of the imperfections of our knowledge4--,diversions of ,purley1 by ,john ,horne ,tooke1 ,a4,m41 i4 #cg4 ,,the two cases of ,consciousness1 ,,classification1 and ,,abstraction1 have not1 generally1 been well distinguished4 ,according to the common accounts of ,classification1 ,,abstraction was included in it4 ,when it is said1 that1 in order to classify1 we leave out of view all the circumstances in which individuals differ1 and retain only those in which they agree2 this separating one portion of what is contained in a complex idea1 and making it an object of consideration by itself1 is the process which is named ,abstraction1 at least a main part of that process4 ,it is necessary now to inquire what are the purposes to which this separating of the parts of a complex idea1 and considering and naming the separated parts by themselves1 is subservient4 #bie ,we have already observed the following remarkable things in the process of naming3 #a1 ,assigning names of those clusters of ideas called objects2 as man1 fish2 #b1 ,generalizing those names1 so as to make them represent a class2 #c1 ,framing adjectives by which minor classes are cut out of larger4 ,those adjectives are all names1 of some separate portion of a cluster1 and are1 therefore1 all instruments of abstraction1 or of that separating one or more of the ingredients of a complex idea from the rest1 which has received the name of ,abstraction4 ,one purpose of ,abstraction1 therefore1 is the formation of those sub-species1 the formation of which is required for certain purposes of speech4 ,these observations will be rendered familiar by examples4 ,we say1 tall man1 red flower1 race horse4 ,in my complex idea of a man1 or the cluster of ideas of sense to which ,i affix that mark1 are included1 certain ideas of colour1 of figure1 size1 and so on4 ,by the word tall1 ,i single out a portion of those ideas1 namely1 the part relating to size1 or rather size in one direction1 and mark the separation by the sign or name4 ,in my complex idea of a flower1 colour is always one of the ingredients4 ,by applying the adjective red1 ,i single out this one from the rest1 and point it out for peculiar consideration4 ,the explanation is obvious1 and need not be pursued in a greater number of instances4 ,words of this description all denote differences2 either such as mark out species from genera1 or such as mark out individuals from species4 ,of this latter sort the number is very small2 of which the reason is obvious2 individual differences are too numerous to #bif receive names1 and are marked by contrivances of abridgment which will be spoken of hereafter4 ,to explain this notation of differences2 the same examples will suffice4 ,in the phrase tall man1 the adjective tall marks the difference between such a man1 and short man1 or middle-sized man4 ,of the genus man1 tall men are one species2 and the difference between them and the rest of the genus is marked by the word tall4 ,of the genus flower1 red flowers form a species1 and the difference between them and the rest of the genus is marked by the adjective red4 ,of the genus horse1 race horse forms a species1 and the difference between this species and the rest of the genus is marked by the word race4 ,it is of importance further to observe1 that adjectives singling out ideas which are not differences1 that is1 ideas common to the whole class1 are useless3 as1 tangible wood2 coloured man2 sentient animal4 ,such epithets express no more than what is expressed by the name without them4 ,another thing requiring the attention of the student is the mode in which these differential adjectives are generalized4 ,as the word man1 applied first to one individual1 then to another1 becomes associated with every individual1 and every variety of the species1 and calls them all up in one very complex idea2 so are these adjectives applied to one class after another1 and by that means at last call up a very complicated idea4 ,let us take the word black for an example2 and let us suppose that we apply this adjective first to the word man4 ,we say black man4 ,but we speedily see that for the same reason for which we say black man we may say black horse1 black cow1 #big black coat1 and so on4 ,the word black is thus associated with innumerable modifications of the sensation black4 ,by frequent repetition1 and the gradual strengthening of the association1 these modifications are at last called up in such rapid succession that they appear commingled1 and no longer many ideas1 but one4 ,black is therefore no longer an individual but a general name4 ,it marks not the particular black of a particular individual2 but the black of every individual1 and of all individuals4#ha ,the same is the case #bih with all other words of the same class4 ,thus ,i apply the word sweet1 first to the lump of sugar in my mouth1 next to honey1 next to grapes1 and so on4 ,it thus becomes associated with numerous modifications of the sensation sweet2 and when the association is sufficiently strengthened by repetition1 calls them up in such close succession1 that they are converted into one complex idea4 ,we are also to remember1 that the idea and the name have a mutual power over one another4 ,as the word black calls up the complex idea1 so every modification of black calls up the name2 and in this1 as in other cases1 the name actually forms a part of the complex idea4 ,editor's footnote #ha3 ,the example which the author has here selected of a general name1 sets in a strong light the imperfection of the theory of general names1 laid down by him in the preceding chapter4 ,a name like black1 which marks a simple sensation1 is an extreme case of the inapplicability of the theory4 ,can it be maintained that the idea called up in our minds by the word black1 is an idea compounded of ideas of black men1 black horses1 black cows1 black coats1 and the like8 ,if ,i can trust my own consciousness1 the word need not1 and generally does not1 call up any idea but that of a single black surface4 ,it is still not an abstract idea1 but the idea of an individual object4 ,it is not a mere idea of colour2 it is that1 combined with ideas of extension and figure1 always present but extremely vague1 because varying1 even from one moment to the next4 ,these vague ideas of an uncertain extension and figure1 combined with the perfectly definite idea of a single sensation of colour1 are1 to my consciousness1 the sole components of the complex idea associated with the word black4 ,i am unable to find in that complex idea the ideas of black men1 horses1 or other definite things1 though such ideas may of course be recalled by it4 ,in such a case as this1 the idea of a black colour fills by itself the place of the inner nucleus of ideas knit together by a closer association1 which ,i have described as forming the permanent part of our ideas of classes of objects1 and the meaning of the class-names4--,ed4 ,the next thing1 which ,i shall observe1 deserves in a high degree1 the attention of the learner4 ,in the various applications of that species of marks which we are now considering1 they are associated with two distinguishable things2 but with the one much more than the other4 ,thus1 when we say black man1 black horse1 black coat1 and so of all other black things1 the word black is associated with the cluster1 man1 as often as black man is the expression2 with the cluster horse1 as often as black horse is the expression1 and so on with infinite variety3 but at the same time that it is associated with each of those various clusters1 it is also associated with the peculiar sensation of colour which it is intended to mark4 ,the ,,clusters1 therefore1 with which it is associated1 are variable2 the ,,peculiar ,,sensation with which it is associated is invariable4 ,it is much more constantly1 and therefore much more strongly associated with the ,,sensation than with any of the ,,clusters4 ,it is at once a name of the clusters1 and a name of the #bii sensation2 but it is more peculiarly a name of the ,,sensation4 ,we have1 in a preceding note1 observed1 that such words have been called connotative2 and ,i shall find much convenience in using the term ,,notation to point out the sensation or sensations which are peculiarly marked by such words1 the term ,,connotation to point out the clusters which they mark along with this their principal meaning4 ,thus the word1 black1 ,,notes that of which black is more peculiarly the name1 a particular colour2 it ,,connotes the clusters with the names of which it is joined3 in the expression1 black man1 it connotes man2 black horse1 it connotes horse2 and so of all other cases4 ,the ancient ,logicians used these terms1 in the inverse order2 very absurdly1 in my opinion4#hb ,editor's footnote #hb3 ,the word ,connote1 with its substantive ,connotation1 was used by the old logicians in two senses2 a wider1 and a narrower sense4 ,the wider is that in which1 up to this place1 the author of the ,analysis has almost invariably used it2 and is the sense in which he defined it1 in a note to section 99#e of his first chapter4 ,there is a large class of words which denote two things both together2 but the one perfectly distinguishable from the other4 ,of these two things1 also1 it is observable1 that such words express the one primarily as it were2 the other in a way which may be called secondary4 ,thus white1 in the phrase white horse1 denotes two things1 the colour and the horse2 but it denotes the colour primarily1 the horse secondarily4 ,we shall find it very convenient to say1 therefore1 that it notes the primary1 connotes the secondary signification4 ,this use of terms is attended with the difficulty1 that it may often be disputed which of the significations is primary and which secondary4 ,in the example given1 most people would agree with the author that the colour is the primary signification2 the word being associated with the objects1 only through its previous association with the colour4 ,but take the other of the two words1 horse4 ,that too is connotative1 and in the same manner4 ,it signifies any and every individual horse1 and it also signifies those attributes common to horses1 which led to their being classed together and receiving that common name4 ,which1 in this case1 is the primary1 and which the secondary signification8 ,the author would probably say1 that in this case1 unlike the other1 horse is the primary signification1 the attributes the secondary4 ,yet in this equally with the former case1 the attributes are the foundation of the meaning3 a thing is called a horse to express its resemblance to other horses2 and the resemblance consists of the common attributes4 ,the question might be discussed1 pro and con1 by many arguments1 without any conclusive result4 ,the difference between primary and secondary acceptations is too uncertain1 and at best too superficial1 to be adopted as the logical foundation of the distinction between the two modes of signification4 ,the author1 however1 has1 throughout the preceding chapters1 regarded words as connoting any number of things which though included in their signification1 are not1 in his judgment1 what they primarily signify4 ,he said1 for example1 that a verb notes an action1 and connotes the agent 7as either me1 thee1 or some third person71 the number of agents 7as one or more71 the time 7as past1 present1 or future71 and three modes1 that in which there is no reference to anything preceding1 that in which there is a reference to something preceding1 and that in which reference is made to the will of one of the ,persons4 ,i cite this complicated case1 to shew by a striking example the great latitude with which the author uses the word ,connote4 ,but in the present chapter he follows the example of some of the old logicians in adopting a second and more restricted meaning1 expressive of the peculiar connotation which belongs to all concrete general names2 viz4 that twofold manner of signification1 by which every name of a class signifies1 on the one hand1 all and each of the individual things composing the class1 and on the other hand the common attributes1 in consideration of which the class is formed and the name given1 and which we intend to affirm of every object to which we apply the name4 ,it is difficult to overrate the importance of keeping in view this distinction1 or the danger of overlooking it when not made prominent by an appropriate phrase4 ,the word ,connote1 which had been employed for this purpose1 had fallen into disuse4 ,but1 though agreeing with the old logicians in using the word ,connote to express this distinction1 the author exactly reverses their employment of it4 ,in their phraseology1 the class-name connotes the attributes3 in his1 it notes the attributes1 and connotes the objects4 ,and he declares that in his opinion1 their mode of employing the term is very absurd4 ,we have now to consider which of these two modes of employing it is really the most appropriate4 ,a concrete general name may be correctly said to be a mark1 in a certain way1 both for the objects and for their common attributes4 ,but which of the two is it conformable to usage to say that it is the name of8 ,assuredly1 the objects4 ,it is they that are called by the name4 ,i am asked1 what is this object called8 and ,i answer1 a horse4 ,i should not make this answer if ,i were asked what are these attributes called4 ,again1 ,i am asked1 what is it that is called a horse8 and ,i answer1 the object which you see2 not the qualities which you see4 ,let us now suppose that ,i am asked1 what is it that is called black2 ,i answer1 all things that have this particular colour4 ,black is a name of all black things4 ,the name of the colour is not black1 but blackness4 ,the name of a thing must be the name which is predicated of the thing1 as a proper name is predicated of the person or place it belongs to4 ,it is scarcely possible to speak with precision1 and adhere consistently to the same mode of speech1 if we call a word the name of any thing but that which it is predicated of4 ,accordingly the old logicians1 who had not yet departed widely from the custom of common speech1 considered all concrete names as the names of objects1 and called nothing the name of an attribute but abstract names4 ,now there is considerable incongruity in saying that a word connotes1 that is1 signifies secondarily1 the very thing which it is a name of4 ,to connote1 is to mark something along with1 or in addition to1 something else4 ,a name can hardly be said to mark the thing which it is a name of in addition to some other thing4 ,if it marks any other thing it marks it in addition to the thing of which it is itself the name4 ,in the present case1 what is marked in addition1 is that which is the cause of giving the name2 the attributes1 the possession of which by a thing entitles it to that name4 ,it therefore seems more conformable to the original acceptation of the word ,connote1 that we should say of names like man or black that they connote humanity or blackness1 and denote1 or are names of1 men and black objects2 rather than1 with the author of the ,analysis1 that they note the attributes1 and connote the things which possess the attributes4 ,if this mode of using the terms is more consonant to propriety of language1 so also is it more scientifically convenient4 ,it is of extreme importance to have a technical expression exclusively consecrated to signify the peculiar mode in which the name of a class marks the attributes in virtue of which it is a class1 and is called by the name4 ,the verb to note1 employed by the author of the ,analysis as the correlative of to connote1 is far too general to be confined to so specific a use1 nor does the author intend so to confine it4 ,to connote1 on the contrary1 is a phrase which has been handed down to us in this restricted acceptation1 and is perfectly fitted to be used as a technical term4 ,there is no more important use of a term than that of fixing attention upon something which is in danger of not being sufficiently taken notice of4 ,this is emphatically the case with the attribute-signification of the names of objects4 ,that signification has not been seen clearly1 and what has been seen of it confusedly has bewildered or misled some of the most distinguished philosophers4 ,from ,hobbes to ,hamilton1 those who have attempted to penetrate the secret of the higher logical operations of the intellect have continually missed the mark for want of the light which a clear conception of the connotation of general names spreads over the subject4 ,there is no fact in psychology which more requires a technical name2 and it seems eminently desirable that the words ,connote and ,connotative should be exclusively employed for this purpose2 and it is for this purpose that ,i have myself invariably employed them4 ,in studying the ,analysis1 it is of course necessary to bear in mind that the author does not use the words in this sense1 but sometimes in a sense much more vague and indefinite1 and1 when definite1 in a sense the reverse of this4 ,it may seem an almost desperate undertaking1 in the case of an unfamiliar term1 to attempt to rectify the usage introduced by the actual reviver of the word3 and nothing could have induced me to attempt it1 but a deliberate conviction that such a technical expression is indispensable to philosophy1 and that the author's mode of employing these words unfits them for the purpose for which they are needed1 and for which they are well adapted4 ,i fear1 however1 that ,i have rarely succeeded in associating the words with their precise meaning1 anywhere but in my own writings4 ,the word ,connote1 not unfrequently meets us of late in philosophical speculations1 but almost always in a sense more lax than the laxest in which it is employed in the ,analysis1 meaning no more than to imply4 ,to such an extent is this the case1 that able thinkers and writers do not always even confine the expression to names1 but actually speak of ,things as connoting whatever1 in their opinion1 the existence of the ,things implies or presupposes4--,ed4 #cjj ,in using these connotative names1 it is often highly convenient to drop the connotation2 that is1 to leave out the connoted cluster4 #cja ,a mark is needed1 to show when it is meant that the connotation is dropped4 ,a slight mark put upon the connotative term answers the purpose2 and shews #cjb when it is not meant that anything should be connoted4 ,in regard to the word black1 for example1 we merely annex to it the syllable ness2 and it is immediately #cjc indicated that all connotation is dropped3 so1 in sweetness2 hardness2 dryness2 lightness4 ,the new words1 so formed1 are the words which have been denominated #cjd ,,abstract2 as the connotative terms from which they are formed have been denominated ,,concrete2 and1 as these terms are in frequent use1 it is necessary that the meaning of them should be well remembered4 ,it is now also manifest what is the real nature of ,,abstract terms2 a subject which has in general presented such an appearance of mystery4 ,they are simply the ,,concrete terms1 with the connotation dropped4 ,and this has in it1 surely1 no mystery at all4#hc ,editor's footnote #hc3 ,after having said that a concrete general name notes an attribute1 that this1 one of the sensations in a cluster1 and connotes the objects which have the attribute1 i4e4 the clusters of which that sensation forms a part2 the author proceeds to say that an abstract name is the concrete name with the connotation dropped4 ,this seems a very indirect and circuitous mode of making us understand what an abstract name signifies4 ,instead of aiming directly at the mark1 it goes round it4 ,it tells us that one name signifies a part of what another name signifies1 leaving us to infer what part4 ,a connotative name with the connotation dropped1 is a phrase requiring to be completed by specifying what is the portion of signification left4 ,the concrete name with its connotation signifies an attribute1 and also the objects which have the attribute4 ,we are now instructed to drop the latter half of the signification1 the objects4 ,what then remains8 ,the attribute4 ,why not then say at once that the abstract name is the name of the attribute8 ,why tell us that x is a plus b with b dropped1 when it was as easy to tell us that x is a8 ,the noticeable thing however is that if a stands merely for the sensation1 x really is a little more than a3 the connotation 7in the author's sense of the term7 of the concrete name is not wholly dropped in the abstract name4 ,the term blackness1 and every other abstract term1 includes in its signification the existence of a black object1 though without declaring what it is4 ,that is indeed the distinction between the name of an attribute1 and the name of a kind or type of sensation4 ,names of sensations by themselves are not abstract but concrete names4 ,they mark the type of the sensation1 but they do not mark it as emanating from any object4 ,the sensation of black is a concrete name1 which expresses the sensation apart from all reference to an object4 ,blackness expresses the same sensation with reference to an object1 by which the sensation is supposed to be excited4 ,abstract names thus still retain a limited amount of connotation in both the author's senses of the term--the vaguer and the more specific sense4 ,it is only in the sense to which ,i am anxious to restrict the term1 that any abstract name is without connotation4 ,an abstract name1 then1 may be defined as the name of an attribute2 and1 in the ultimate analysis1 as the name of one or more of the sensations of a cluster2 not by themselves1 but considered as part of any or all of the various clusters1 into which that type of sensations enters as a component part4--,ed4 #cje ,it hence1 also1 appears that there can be no ,,abstract term without an implied ,,concrete1 though cases are not wanting1 in which there is much occasion for the ,,abstract term but not much for the ,,concrete2 in which1 therefore1 the concrete is not in use1 or is supplied by another form of expression4 #cjf ,in regular and capricious languages1 as our own1 the dropping of the connotation of the concrete terms is not marked in a uniform manner2 and this requires some illustration4 ,thus1 heavy is a concrete term1 and we shew the dropping of the connotation1 by the same mark as in the instances above1 saying heaviness2 but we have another term which is exactly the equivalent of heaviness1 and frequently used as the abstract of heavy2 that is1 weight4 ,friend is a concrete1 connotative term1 in the substantive form4 ,its connotation is dropped by another mark1 the syllable ship2 thus1 friendship2 in like manner1 generalship2 brothership2 cousinship4 ,the syllable age is another of the marks we use for the same purpose2 pilotage1 parsonage1 stowage4 ,among concrete connotative words1 we have already had full opportunity of observing that verbs constitute a principal class4 ,those words all ,,note some motion or action and ,,connote an actor4 ,there is the same frequency of occasion to leave out the connotation in the case of this class of connotative words1 as in other classes4 ,accordingly ,,abstract terms are formed from them1 as from the connotative adjectives and substantives4 ,the infinitive mood is such an abstract term2 with this peculiarity1 that1 though it leaves out the connotation of the actor1 it retains the connotation of time4#hd #cjg ,it is convenient1 however1 to have abstract terms from the verbs1 which leave out also the connotation of time2 such are the substantive amor from amo1 timor from timeo1 and so on4 ,editor's footnote #hd3 ,the infinitive mood does not always express time4 ,at least1 it often expresses it aoristically1 without distinction of tense4 ,to love is as abstract a name as love1 to fear1 as fear3 they are applied equally to past1 present1 and future4 ,the infinitives of the past and future1 as amavisse1 amaturus esse1 do1 however1 include in their signification a particular time4--,ed4 ,verbs have not only an active but a passive form4 ,in the passive form1 it is not the action1 but the bearing of the action1 which is ,,noted2 and not the actor1 but the bearer of the action1 that is ,,connoted4 ,in this case1 also1 there is not less frequent occasion to drop the connotation4 ,by the simple contrivance of a slight alteration in the connotative term1 the important circumstance of dropping the connotation is marked4 ,in the case of the passive as the active form of verbs1 the infinitive mood drops the connotation of the person1 but retains that of the time4 ,other abstract terms1 formed from the passive voice1 leave out the connotation both of person and time4 ,thus from legor1 there is lectio2 from optor1 optatio2 from dicor1 dictio2 and so on4 ,it is to be remarked that the ,latin mode of forming abstract terms from verbs1 by the termination tio1 has been adopted to a great extent in ,english4 ,a large proportion of our abstract terms are thus distinguished2 as action1 association1 imagination1 navigation1 mensuration1 friction1 motion1 station1 faction1 legislation1 corruption1 and many others4 ,it is also of extreme importance to mark a great defect and imperfection1 in this respect1 of the ,latin language4 ,such words as lectio1 dictio1 actio1 are derived with equal readiness either from the supine1 lectum1 dictum1 actum2 or from the participle1 lectus1 dictus1 actus4 ,the supine is active1 the participle1 passive4 ,from this circumstance probably it is1 that #cjh these abstract terms in the ,latin language possess both the active and passive signification2 and by this most unfortunate ambiguity have proved a fertile source of obscurity and confusion4 ,this defect of the ,latin language is the more to be lamented by us1 that it has infected our own language2 for as we have borrowed from the ,latin language a great proportion of our abstract terms1 we have transplanted the mischievous equivocation along with them4 ,this ambiguity the ,greek language happily avoided3 thus it had ,greek3 praxis and ,greek3 pragma the first for the active signification of actio1 the latter the passive4#he ,editor's footnote #he3 ,i apprehend that ,greek3 pragma is not an abstract but a concrete term1 and does not express the attribute of being done1 but the thing done--the effect which results from the completed action4--,ed4 ,of the abstract terms1 of genuine ,english growth1 derived from the concrete names of action1 or verbs1 the participle of the past tense supplied a great number1 merely dropping the adjective1 and assuming the substantive form4 ,thus1 weight1 a word which we had occasion to notice before1 is the participle weighed1 with the connotation dropped3 stroke is merely struck2 the thing struck1 the connotation1 being left out3 thought is the past participle passive of the verb to think1 and differs from the participle in nothing1 but that the participle1 the adjective1 has the connotation2 the abstract1 the substantive1 has it not4 ,whether the concrete1 or the abstract1 is the term employed1 is in such cases always indicated by the context2 and1 therefore1 no particular mark to distinguish them is required4 #cji ,in our non-inflected language1 a facility is afforded in forming a non-connotative from the connotative1 in the active voice of verbs2 because the connotative word is always distinguished by the presence of the persons of the verb1 or that of some part of the auxiliary verb4 ,the same word1 therefore1 answers for the abstract1 as for the concrete2 it being of course the abstract1 when none of the marks of the concrete are present4 ,thus the word love1 is both the verb or the connotative1 and the substantive or the non-connotative2 thus also fear1 walk1 ride1 stand1 fight1 smell1 taste1 sleep1 dream1 drink1 work1 breath1 and many others4 ,we have in ,english1 formed from verbs1 a great many abstracts or non-connotatives1 which terminate in th1 as truth1 health1 dearth1 stealth1 death1 strength4 ,it may be disputed whether these words are derived from one part of the verb or another2 but1 in all other respects1 the nature of them is not doubtful4 ,the third person singular of the present1 indicative active1 ends in th2 and1 therefore1 they may be said to be that part of the verb with the connotation dropped4 ,the termination1 however1 of the past participle is d1 and we know that th and d1 are the same letter under a slight difference of articulation2 and1 therefore1 they may just as well be derived from the past participle1 and as often at least as they have a passive signification1 no doubt are4 ,thus the verb trow1 to think1 has either troweth1 or trowed2 from one of which1 but more likely from the last1 we have truth3 the verb to heal1 has either healeth1 or healed2 from one of which1 but more likely the last1 we have health3 the verb to string has stringeth1 or stringed2 #caj from one of which we have strength2 thus from dieth1 or died1 death2 from stealeth1 or stealed1 stealth2 mirth in the same manner1 from a verb now out of use2 so heighth1 length1 breadth4#hf ,findlater's footnote #hf3 ,the abstracts in -th belong to a very early stage of the language4 ,we cannot now form words like health1 truth1 as we can abstracts in -ness4 ,as in the case of adjectives in -en 7wooden71 and of preterites and participles like fell1 fallen1 that particular part of the vital energy of the language that produced them1 is dead--ossified1 as it were2 and we cannot exemplify their formation by any process now going on4 ,to account for many of them1 we must suppose them formed from roots different from any now existing as separate words--roots from which the corresponding verbs and adjectives that we are acquainted with have been themselves derived by augmentation or other change4 ,this being the case1 it is impossible to say with certainty whether the immediate root of any particular abstract in -th was a verb1 a noun1 or an adjective2 and1 indeed1 the question need hardly be raised1 since a primitive root was of the nature of all three4 ,the structure of these derivatives is better seen in some of the other ,teutonic dialects than in the ,english or the ,anglo-,saxon1 in which the affix is reduced to a mere consonant4 ,thus1 for ,eng4 depth the ,gothic has diupi-tha2 for heigh-th1 hauhi-tha4 ,in ,old ,high ,german the affix -tha becomes -da1 and we have heili-da corresponding to ,eng4 heal-th2 strenki-da1 to streng-th2 besides a great number of analogous forms1 such as evi-da1 eternity 7from the same root as ever2 compare ,lat4 aetas for aevitas74 ,in modern ,german comparatively few of these derivatives survive2 and in those that do2 the -da of the ,old ,german has passed into -de1 as in ge-baer-de1 the way of 'bearing' oneself1 behaviour2 equivalent to ,latin habi-tus4 ,the modern ,german equivalents of bread-th1 leng-th1 are breit-e1 lng-e2 but in some of the popular dialects the older forms breite de1 lng-de are still retained2 and in ,dutch warm-te corresponds to warm-th1 and grt-te is great-ness4 ,when we recollect that th or d in the ,germanic languages represents in such cases the t of the ,greek and ,latin 7compare ,gr4 ,greek3 me_/lit 7os71 honey with ,goth4 milith2 ,lat4 alter with ,eng4 other71 we cannot help seeing how analogous is the formation of the class of words we are now considering to that of ,latin past participles 7ama-tus1 dic-tus1 audi-tus74 ,in the case of those abstracts that seem to come more naturally from an adjective root than from a verb1 we can conceive the adjective formed on the analogy of the past participle2 just as there are in ,english adjectives having no possible verbal root1 yet simulating past participles2 as able-bodi-ed1 three-corner-ed4 ,the abstract noun would appear to have been originally distinguished from the participle1 or participial adjective1 by some additional affix1 as in lec-t-io4 ,in ,greek and ,latin this additional affix very often consisted in a reduplication of the formative element t1 as if for the purpose of denoting multitude1 generality2 as in ,greek 7,greek3 neo_/-tt-os71 ,latin juven-tut-is1 sani-tat-is4 ,it is not impossible that ,goth4 diupi-tha1 ,o4,h4,g4 heili-da are abbreviations of diupi-tha-th1 heili-da-d1 just as ,lat4 sani-tat has dwindled down in modern ,ital4 to sani-t4 ,in a great many words essentially belonging to the same class both in meaning and in mode of formation1 the -th has1 for the sake of euphony or from other causes1 given place to t or d4 ,thus mood corresponds to ,goth4 mo-th1 and means a motion 7,lat4 motus7 or affection 7of the mind72 blood1 to ,goth4 blo-th2 theft1 is in ,ang4 ,sax4 theof-th4 ,mur-ther1 from a root akin to ,lat4 mori2 burthen1 from the root of to bear1 are of similar formation1 with additional affixes4 ,all these considerations would seem to put ,horne ,tooke's proposed derivation of these abstracts from the third person singular of the present indicative of the verb1 completely out of court4 ,the famous case of truth from troweth is especially absurd4 ,for one thing the ,ang4 ,sax4 verb treowan does not mean to think1 but to trust1 rely on1 believe4 ,this implies a ground for the trust1 and that ground lies in the quality expressed by the adjective1 true4 ,truth has the same relation1 logically and etymologically1 to true1 that dearth has to dear1 health to hale4 ,remarking on the identity in form between the ,ang4 ,sax4 treow1 trust1 a treaty1 and treow1 a tree1 ,jacob ,grimm suggests that they are radically related1 and that the idea common to tree and true is firmness1 fixedness4 ,thus the true would be the firm the fixed--what may be relied on4 ,this view is supported by the analogy of the ,lat4 robur1 which means both an oak and strength4--,f4 #caa ,it would be interesting to give a systematic account of the non-connotatives1 derived from ,english #cab verbs2 and this ought to be done2 but for the present inquiry it would be an operation misplaced4 ,the nature of the words1 and the mode of their signification1 is all which here is necessary to be understood4 ,one grand class of connotative terms is composed of such words as the following3 walking1 running1 flying1 reading1 striking2 and we have seen that1 for a very obvious utility1 a generical name was invented1 the word ,,acting1 which includes the whole of these specific names2 and to which the non-connotative1 or abstract term ,,action corresponds4 ,there was equal occasion for a generical name to include all the specific names belonging to the other class of connotative terms2 such as coloured1 sapid1 hard1 soft1 hot1 cold1 and so on4 ,but language has by no means been so happy in a general name for this1 as for the other class4 ,the word ,,such1 is a connotative term1 which includes them all1 and indeed the other class along with them2 for when we apply the word ,,such to any thing1 we comprehend under it all the ideas of which the cluster #cac is composed4 ,but this is not all which is included under the word such4 ,it is a relative term1 and always connotes so much of the meaning of some other term4 ,when we call a thing such1 it is always understood that it is such as some other thing4 ,thus we say1 ,john is such as ,james4 ,corresponding with our such as1 the ,latins had talis qualis4 ,if we could suppose qualis to have been used without any connotation of talis1 qualis would have been such a word as the occasion which we are now considering would have required4 ,the ,latins did not use qualis1 in this sense1 as a general concrete1 including all the other names of the properties of objects other than actions4 ,but they made from it1 as if used in that very sense1 a non-connotative or abstract term1 the word ,,quality1 which answers the same purpose with regard to both classes1 as action does to one of them4 ,that is to say2 it is a very general non-connotative term1 including under it the non-connotatives or abstracts of hot1 cold1 hard1 soft1 long1 short2 and not only of all other words of that description1 but of acting1 and its subordinates also4 ,quantus1 is another concrete which has a double connotation like qualis4 ,it connotes not only the substantive with which it agrees1 but also1 being a relative1 the term tantus1 which is its correlate4 ,by dropping both connotations1 the abstract ,,quantity is made2 a general term1 including under it the abstracts of all the names by which the modifications of greater and less are denominated2 as large1 small1 a mile long1 an inch thick1 a handful1 a ton1 and so on4 ,much remains1 beside what is here stated1 of the full explanation of the mode in which talis qualis1 #cad tantus quantus1 are made conducive to the great purposes of marking4 ,but this must be reserved till we come to treat of ,,relative ,,terms1 in general4 ,we have previously observed1 that one of the purposes for which we abstract1 or sunder the parts of a complex idea1 marked by a general name1 is1 to form those adjectives1 or connotative terms1 which1 denoting differences1 enable us to form1 and to name1 subordinate classes4 ,we now come to the next of the great purposes to which abstraction is subservient1 and it is one to which the whole of our attention is due4 ,of all the things in which we are interested1 that is1 on which our happiness and misery depend1 meaning here by things1 both objects and events1 the most important by far are the successions of objects2 in other words1 the effects which they produce4 ,in reality1 objects are interesting to us1 solely on account of the effects which they produce1 either on ourselves1 or on other objects4 ,but an observation of the greatest importance readily occurs2 that of any cluster1 composing our idea of an object1 the effects or consequents depend1 in general1 more upon one part of it than another4 ,if a stone is hot1 it has certain effects or consequences2 if heavy1 it has others1 and so on4 ,it is of great importance to us1 in respect to those successions1 to be able to mark discriminately the real antecedent2 not the antecedent combined with a number of things with which the consequent has nothing to do4 ,i observe1 that other objects1 as iron1 lead1 gold1 produce similar effects with stone2 as often as the name hot can1 in like manner1 be predicated of them4 ,in the several clusters therefore1 hot stone1 hot iron1 hot gold1 #cae hot lead1 there is a portion1 the same in all1 with which1 and not with the rest1 the effects which ,i am contemplating are connected4 ,this part is marked by the word hot2 which word1 however1 in the case of each cluster1 connotes also the other parts of the cluster4 ,it appears at once1 how much convenience there must be in dropping the connotation1 and obtaining a word which1 in each of those cases1 shall mark exclusively that part of the cluster on which the effect depends4 ,this is accomplished by the abstract or non-connotative terms1 heat1 and weight4 ,certain alterations1 also1 are observed in those parts of clusters on which such and such effects depend2 which alterations make corresponding alterations in the effects1 though no other alteration is observable1 in the cluster1 to which such parts belong4 ,thus1 if a stone is more or less hot1 the effects or successions are not the same2 so of iron1 so of lead2 but the same alteration in the same part of each of those clusters1 is followed by the same effects4 ,it is true1 that we know nothing of the alteration in the cause1 but by the alteration in the effects2 for we only say that a stone is hotter1 because it produces such other effects1 either in our sensations immediately1 or in the sensations we receive from other objects4 ,it is1 however1 obvious that we have urgent use for the means of marking1 not only the alterations in the effects1 but the alterations in the antecedents4 ,this we do1 by supposing the alterations to be those of increase and diminution1 and marking them by the distinction of lower and higher degrees4 ,but1 for this purpose1 it is obvious that we must have a term which is not connotative2 because we suppose no alteration in any #caf part of the cluster but that which is not connoted2 thus we can say1 with sufficient precision1 that a greater or less degree of heat produces such and such effects2 but we cannot say1 that a greater or less degree of hot stone1 of hot iron1 of hot any thing else1 produces these effects4 ,this then1 is another use1 and evidently a most important use1 of abstract1 non-connotative terms4 ,they enable us to mark1 with more precision1 those successions1 in which our good and evil is wholly contained4 ,this also enables us to understand1 what it is which recommends such and such aggregates1 and not others1 for classification4 ,those successions of objects1 in which we are interested1 determine the classifications which we form of them4 ,some successions are found to depend upon the clusters1 called objects1 all taken together4 ,thus a tree1 a man1 a stone1 are the antecedents of certain consequents1 as such2 and not on account of any particular part of the cluster4 ,other consequents depend not upon the whole of the cluster1 but upon some particular part3 thus a tall tree1 produces certain effects1 which a tree not tall1 cannot produce2 a strong man1 produces certain effects1 which a man not strong cannot produce4 ,when these consequents are so important1 as to deserve particular attention1 they and their antecedents must be marked4 ,for this purpose1 are employed the connotative terms marking differences4 ,these terms enable us to group the clusters containing those antecedents into a sub-class2 and ,,non-,,connotative or ,,abstract terms1 derived from them1 enable #cag us to speak separately of that part of the cluster which we have to mark as the precise antecedent of the consequent which is engaging our attention4 ,it is presumed1 that these illustrations will suffice1 to enable the reader to discern the real marking power of abstract terms1 and also to perceive the mode of their formation4 #cah ,,chapter ,x4 ,,memory4 ,the science of metaphysics1 as it regards the mind1 is1 in its most important respects1 a science of analysis2 and we carry on our analysis1 only when we suspect that what is regarded by others as an ultimate principle1 admits of still finer evolution into principles still more elementary4--,inquiry into the ,relation of ,cause and ,effect1 by ,thomas ,brown1 ,m4,d4 ,p4 iv4 s4 i4 p4 #cca4 ,,it has been already observed that if we had no other state of consciousness than sensation1 we never could have any knowledge1 excepting that of the present instant4 ,the moment each of our sensations ceased1 it would be gone1 for ever2 and we should be as if we had never been4 ,the same would be the case if we had only ideas in addition to sensations4 ,the sensation would be one state of consciousness1 the idea another state of consciousness4 ,but if they were perfectly insulated2 the one having no connexion with the other2 the idea1 after the sensation1 would give me no more information1 than one sensation after another4 ,we should still have the consciousness of the present instant1 and nothing more4 ,we should be wholly incapable of acquiring experience1 and accommodating our actions #cai to the laws of nature4 ,of course we could not continue to exist4 ,even if our ideas were associated in trains1 but only as they are in ,imagination1 we should still be without the capacity of acquiring knowledge4 ,one idea1 upon this supposition1 would follow another4 ,but that would be all4 ,each of our successive states of consciousness1 the moment it ceased1 would be gone for ever4 ,each of those momentary states would be our whole being4 ,such1 however1 is not the nature of man4 ,we have states of consciousness1 which are connected with past states4 ,i hear a musical air2 ,i recognise it as the air which was sung to me in my infancy4 ,i have an idea of a ghost2 ,i recognise the terror with which1 when ,i was alone in the dark1 that idea1 in my childish years1 was accompanied4 ,uniting in this manner the present with the past1 and not otherwise1 ,i am susceptible of knowledge2 ,i am capable of ascertaining the qualities of things2 that is1 their power of affecting me2 and of knowing in what circumstances what other circumstances will take place4 ,suppose that my present state of consciousness is the idea of putting my finger in the flame of the candle4 ,i recognise the act as a former act2#hg and this recognition is followed #cbj by another1 namely1 that of the pain which ,i felt immediately after4 ,this part of my constitution1 which is of so much importance to me1 ,i find it useful to name4 ,and the name ,i give to it is ,,memory4 ,when the memory of the past is transferred into an anticipation of the future1 by a process which will be explained hereafter1 it gets the name of experience2 and all our power of avoiding evil1 and obtaining good1 is derived from it4 ,unless ,i remembered that my finger had been in the flame of the candle2 and unless ,i anticipated a similar consequent1 from a similar antecedent1 ,i should touch the flame of the candle1 after being burned by it a hundred times1 just as ,i should have done1 if neither burning nor any of its causes had ever formed part of my consciousness4 ,bain's footnote #hg3 ,the recognition of an act as a former act1 or of a present sensation as having formerly occurred1 is a 99phase of the intellectual power named consciousness of ,agreement1 or ,similarity1 which is both an essential of our ,knowledge1 and a means of mental ,reproduction4 ,the defectiveness of the author's view of this function of the intellect has been elsewhere commented on4--,b4 ,our inquiry is1 what this part of our constitution1 so highly important to us1 is composed of4 ,all inquirers are agreed1 that it is complex2 but what the elements are into which it may be resolved1 has not been very successfully made out4 ,it is proper to begin with the elements which are universally acknowledged4 ,among them1 it is certain1 that ,,ideas are the fundamental part4 ,nothing is remembered but through its ,,idea4 ,the memory1 however1 of a thing1 and the idea of it1 are not the same4 ,the idea may be without the memory2 but the memory cannot be without the idea4 ,the idea of an elephant may occur to me1 without the thought of its having been an object of my senses4 ,but ,i cannot have the thought of its having been an object of my senses1 without having the idea of the animal at the #cba same time4 ,the consciousness1 therefore1 which ,i call memory1 is an idea1 but not an idea alone2 it is an idea and something more4 ,so far is our inquiry narrowed4 ,what is that which1 combined with an idea1 constitutes memory8 ,that memory may be1 the idea must be4 ,in what manner is the idea produced8 ,we have already seen in what manner an idea is called into existence by association4 ,it is easy to prove that the idea which forms part of memory is called up in the same way1 and no other4 ,if ,i think of any case of memory1 ,i shall always find that the idea1 or the sensation which preceded the memory1 was one of those which are calculated1 according to the laws of association1 to call up the idea involved in that case of memory2 and that it was by the preceding idea1 or sensation1 that the idea of memory was in reality brought into the mind4 ,i have not seen a person with whom ,i was formerly intimate for a number of years2 nor have ,i1 during all that interval1 had occasion to think of him4 ,some object which had been frequently presented to my senses along with him1 or the idea of something with which ,i have strongly associated the idea of him1 occurs to me2 instantly the memory of him exists4 ,the friend with whom ,i had often seen him in company1 accidentally meets me2 a letter of his which had been long unobserved1 falls under my eye2 or an observation which he was fond of producing1 is repeated in my hearing2 these are circumstances all associated with the idea of the individual in question2 the idea of him is excited by them1 and with the mere idea of the #cbb man1 all the other circumstances which constitute memory4 ,the necessary dependence of memory upon association1 may be proved still more rigidly in this way4 ,it has been already observed1 that we cannot call up any idea by willing it4 ,when we are said to will1 there must be in the mind1 the idea of what is willed4 ,will1 without an idea1 are incongruous terms2 as if one should say1 ,i can will1 and will nothing4 ,but if the idea of the thing willed1 must be in the mind1 as a condition of willing1 to will to have an idea in the mind1 is to will to have that in it1 which1 by the supposition1 is in it already4 ,there is a state of mind familiar to all men1 in which we are said to try to remember4 ,in this state1 it is certain that we have not in the mind the idea which we are trying to have in it4 ,how then is it1 that we proceed in the course of our endeavour to procure its introduction into the mind8 ,if we have not the idea itself1 we have certain ideas connected with it4 ,we run over those ideas1 one after another1 in hopes that some one of them will suggest the idea we are in quest of2 and if any of them does1 it is always one so connected with it1 as to call it up in the way of association4 ,i meet an old acquaintance1 whose name ,i do not remember1 and wish to recollect4 ,i run over a number of names1 in hopes that some of them may be associated with the idea of the individual4 ,i think of all the circumstances in which ,i have seen him engaged2 the time when ,i knew him1 the place in which ,i knew him1 the persons along with whom ,i knew him1 the things he did1 or the things he suffered2 and1 if ,i chance upon any idea with which the name is #cbc associated1 then immediately ,i have the recollection2 if not1 my pursuit of it is in vain4#hh ,bain's footnote #hh3 ,this process seems best expressed by laying down a law of ,compound or ,composite ,association2 under which a plurality of feeble links of connexion may be a substitute for one powerful and self-sufficing link4--,b4 ,the laws of compound association are the subject of one of the most original and profound chapters of ,mr4 ,bain's treatise 7,the ,senses and the ,intellect4 ,part ii4 ,chap4 #c474--;,ed4 ,there is another set of cases1 very familiar1 but affording very important evidence on the subject4 ,it frequently happens1 that there are matters which we desire not to forget4 ,what is the contrivance to which we have recourse for preserving the memory2 that is1 for making sure that it will be called into existence1 when it is our wish that it should4 ,all men1 invariably employ the same expedient4 ,they endeavour to form an association between the idea of the thing to be remembered1 and some sensation1 or some idea1 which they know beforehand will occur at or near the time when they wish the remembrance to be in their minds4 ,if this association is formed1 and the sensation or the idea1 with which it has been formed1 occurs2 the sensation1 or idea1 calls up the remembrance2 and the object of him who formed the association is attained4 ,to use a vulgar instance2 a man receives a commission from his friend1 and1 that he may not forget it1 ties a knot on his handkerchief4 ,how is this fact to be explained8 ,first of all1 the idea of the commission is associated with the making of the knot4 ,next1 the handkerchief is a thing which it is known beforehand will be frequently seen1 and of #cbd course at no great distance of time from the occasion on which the memory is desired4 ,the handkerchief being seen1 the knot is seen1 and this sensation recalls the idea of the commission1 between which and itself1 the association had been purposely formed4 ,what is thus effected through association with a sensation1 may be effected through association with an idea4 ,if there is any idea1 which ,i know will occur to me at a particular time1 ,i may render myself as sure of recalling any thing which ,i wish to remember at that time1 by associating it with this idea1 as if ,i associated it with a sensation4 ,suppose ,i know that the idea of ,socrates will be present to my mind at twelve o'clock this day week3 if ,i wish to remember at that time something which ,i have to do1 my purpose will be gained1 if ,i establish between the idea of ,socrates1 and the circumstance which ,i wish to remember1 such an association that the one will call up the other4 ,a very remarkable application of this principle offers itself to our contemplation1 in the artificial memory which was invented by the ancient orators and rhetoricians4 ,the orator made choice of a set of objects1 sufficient in number to answer his purpose4 ,the ideas of those objects he taught himself1 by frequent repetition1 to pass through his mind in one constant order4 ,the objects which he chose were commonly such as aided him in fixing them according to a certain order in his memory2 the parts1 for example1 of some public building1 or other remarkable assemblage4 ,having so prepared himself1 the mode in which he made use of his machinery was as follows4 ,the topics or sentiments of his speech were #cbe to follow in a certain order4 ,the parts of the building he had chosen as his instrument had previously been taught to follow by association1 in a certain order4 ,with the first of these1 then1 he associated the first topic of his discourse2 with the second1 the second1 and so on4 ,the first part of the building suggested the first topic2 the second1 the second2 and each another1 to the end of his discourse4#hi ,bain's footnote #hi3 ,the conditions of the success of this expedient are interesting to study as illustrations of the working of association4 ,the supposition is that the parts of the building are perfectly coherent in the mind1 that they can recall each other easily and rapidly4 ,the advantage gained will depend entirely upon the superior facility of attaching a head of discourse to the visible appearance of a room1 as compared with the facility of attaching it to a previous head4 ,if we can form an enduring bond between a topic and the picture of an interior1 by a smaller mental effort than is necessary to conjoin two successive topics1 there is a gain by the employment of the device2 the difference of the two efforts is the measure of the gain4 ,probably the result would depend upon the relative force of the pictorial and the verbal memory in the individual mind4 ,in minds where the pictorial element prevails1 there might be a positive advantage2 in cases where the pictorial power is feeble and the verbal power strong1 there would almost certainly be a dead loss4--,b4 ,we not only have ideas of memory1 individually taken2 that is1 separately1 each by itself2 as in the instances which we have just been considering3 we have also trains of such ideas4 ,all narratives of events which ourselves have witnessed are composed of such trains4 ,the ideas forming those trains do not follow one another in a fortuitous manner4 ,each succeeding idea is called up by the one which #cbf precedes it2 and every one of these successions takes place according to a law of association4 ,after a lapse of many years1 ,i see the house in which my father died4 ,instantly a long train of the circumstances connected with him rise in my mind3 the sight of him on his death-bed2 his pale and emaciated countenance2 the calm contentment with which he looked forward to his end2 his strong solicitude1 terminating only with life1 for the happiness of his son2 my own sympathetic emotions when ,i saw him expire2 the mode and guiding principles of his life2 the thread of his history2 and so on4 ,in this succession of ideas1 each of which is an idea of memory1 there is not a single link which is not formed by association2 not an idea which is not brought into existence by that which precedes it4 ,whensoever there is a desire to fix any train in the memory1 all men have recourse to one and the same expedient4 ,they practise what is calculated to create a strong association4 ,the grand cause of strong associations is repetition4 ,this1 accordingly1 is the common resource4 ,if any man1 for example1 wishes to remember a passage of a book1 he repeats it a sufficient number of times4 ,to the man practised in applying the principle of association to the phenomena in which it is concerned1 the explication of this process presents itself immediately4 ,the repetition of one word after another1 and of one idea after another1 gives the antecedent the power of calling up the consequent from the beginning to the end of that portion of discourse1 which it is the purpose of the learner to remember4 ,that the remembrance is produced in no other way1 #cbg is proved by a decisive experiment4 ,for1 after a passage has been committed to memory in the most perfect manner1 if the learner attempts to repeat it in any other order than that1 according to which the association was formed1 he will fail4 ,a man who has been accustomed to repeat the ,lord's ,prayer1 for example1 from his infancy1 will1 if he has never tried it1 find the impossibility of repeating it backwards1 small as the number is of the words of which it consists4 ,that words alone1 without ideas1 suggest one another in a train1 is proved by our power of repeating a number of words of an unknown language4#ij ,and1 it is worth observing1 that the power of arithmetical computation is dependent upon the same process4 ,thus1 for example1 when a child learns the multiplication table1 and says1 #aa times #aa is #aba1 or #ab times #ab is #add1 he annexes no ideas to those words2 but1 by force of repetition1 the expression #ab times #ab instantly calls up the expression #add1 or #aa times #aa the expression #aba1 and so upwards from twice #b1 with which he begins4 ,in illustrating the mode in which repetition makes association more and more easy1 ,i used the process of arithmetical addition as a striking example4 ,persons little accustomed to the process perform it with great difficulty2 persons #cbh much accustomed to it1 with astonishing facility4 ,in men of the first class1 the association is imperfectly formed1 and the several antecedent expressions slowly suggest the proper consequent ones2 in those of the latter class the association is very perfectly formed1 and the expressions suggest one another with the greatest expedition and ease4 ,editor's footnote #ij3 ,there is here a lapse1 of mere expression4 ,the meaning is not that words suggest one another without ideas2 words do not suggest words1 but the ideas of words4 ,the author intended to say that words1 or the ideas of them1 often suggest the ideas of other words 7forming a series7 without suggesting along with them any ideas of the things which those words signify4--,ed4 ,thus far we have proceeded with facility4 ,in ,memory there are ideas1 and those ideas both rise up singly1 and are connected in trains by association4 ,the same occurs in ,imagination4 ,imagination consists of ideas1 both suggested singly1 and connected in trains1 by association4 ,this is the whole account of ,imagination4 ,but ,memory is not the same with ,imagination4 ,we all know1 when we say1 we imagine a thing1 that we have not the same meaning1 as when we say1 we remember it4 ,memory1 therefore1 has in it all that ,imagination has2 but it must also have something more4 ,we are now1 then1 to inquire what that additional something is4 ,there are two cases of ,memory4 ,one is1 when we remember sensations4 ,the other is1 when we remember ideas4 ,the first is1 when we remember what we have seen1 felt1 heard1 tasted1 or smelt4 ,the second is1 when we remember what we have thought1 without the intervention of the senses4 ,i remember to have seen and heard ,george ,,iii1 when making a speech at the opening of his ,parliament4 ,this is a case of sensation4 ,i remember my conceptions of the ,emperor ,napoleon and his audience1 when ,i read the account of his first address to the ,french ,chambers4 ,this is a case of ideas4 #cbi ,we shall consider the case of sensations first4 ,what is it to remember any thing ,i have seen8 ,first1 there is the idea of it2 and that idea brought into existence by association4 ,but1 in ,memory1 there is not only the idea of the thing remembered2 there is also the idea of my having seen it4 ,now these two1 #a1 the idea of the thing1 #b1 the idea of my having seen it1 combined1 make up1 it will not be doubted1 the whole of that state of consciousness which we call memory4#ia ,editor's footnote #ia3 ,the doctrine which the author thinks will not be doubted is more than doubted by most people1 and in my judgment rightly4 ,to complete the memory of seeing the thing1 ,i must have not only the idea of the thing1 and the idea of my having seen it1 but the belief of my having seen it2 and even this is not always enough2 for ,i may believe on the authority of others that ,i have seen a thing which ,i have no remembrance of seeing4--,ed4 ,but what is it we are to understand by what ,i have called the idea of my having seen the object8 ,this is a very complex idea2 and1 in expounding1 clearly1 to the comprehension of persons1 not familiar with these solutions1 the import and force of a very complex idea1 lies all the difficulty of the case4 ,it will be necessary for such persons to call to mind the illustrations they have already contemplated of the remarkable case of association1 in which a long train of ideas is called up so rapidly as to appear but one idea2 and also the other remarkable case1 in which one idea is so strongly associated with another1 that it is out of our power to separate them4 ,thus1 when we use the word battle1 the mind runs over the #ccj train of countless acts1 from the beginning of that operation to the end2 and it does this so rapidly1 that the ideas are all clustered into one1 which it calls a battle4 ,in like manner1 it clusters a series of battles1 and all the intermediate operations1 into one idea1 and calls it a campaign2 also several campaigns into one idea1 and calls it a war4 ,of the same nature is the compound idea1 which we denote by the word year2 and the still more compound idea1 which we denote by the word century4 ,the mind runs over a long train of ideas1 and combines them so closely together1 that they assume the appearance of a single idea2 to which1 in the one case1 we assign the name year1 in the other1 the name century4 ,in my remembrance of ,george ,,iii41 addressing the two ,houses of ,parliament1 there is1 first of all1 the mere idea1 or simple apprehension2 the conception as it is sometimes called1 of the objects4 ,there is combined with this1 to make it memory1 my idea of my having seen and heard those objects4 ,and this combination is so close1 that it is not in my power to separate them4 ,i cannot have the idea of ,george ,,iii42 his person and attitude1 the paper he held in his hand1 the sound of his voice while reading from it1 the throne1 the apartment1 the audience2 without having the other idea along with it1 that of my having been a witness of the scene4 ,now1 in this last-mentioned part of the compound1 it is easy to perceive two important elements2 the idea of my present self1 the remembering self2 and the idea of my past self1 the remembered or witnessing self4 ,these two ideas stand at the two ends of a portion of my being2 that is1 of a series of my states #cca of consciousness4 ,that series consists of the successive states of my consciousness1 intervening between the moment of perception1 or the past moment1 and the moment of memory1 or the present moment4 ,what happens at the moment of memory8 ,the mind runs back from that moment to the moment of perception4 ,that is to say1 it runs over the intervening states of consciousness1 called up by association4 ,but to run over a number of states of consciousness1 called up by association1 is but another mode of saying1 that we associate them2 and in this case we associate them so rapidly and closely1 that they run1 as it were1 into a single point of consciousness1 to which the name ,,memory is assigned4 ,if this explanation of the case in which we remember sensations is understood1 the explanation of the case in which we remember ideas cannot occasion much of difficulty4 ,i have a lively recollection of ,polyphemus's cave1 and the actions of ,ulysses and the ,cyclops1 as described by ,homer4 ,in this recollection there is1 first of all1 the ideas1 or simple conceptions of the objects and acts2 and along with these ideas1 and so closely combined as not to be separable1 the idea of my having formerly had those same ideas4 ,and this idea of my having formerly had those ideas1 is a very complicated idea2 including the idea of myself of the present moment remembering1 and that of myself of the past moment conceiving2 and the whole series of the states of consciousness1 which intervened between myself remembering1 and myself conceiving4 ,if we contemplate forgetfulness1 not memory1 we shall see how completely the account of it confirms the account we have just rendered of memory4 ,every #ccb case of forgetfulness1 is a case of weakened1 or extinct1 association4 ,some years ago1 ,i could repeat a certain discourse with accuracy and ease1 from beginning to end2 attempting it1 the other day1 ,i was unable to repeat more than a few sentences4 ,the reason is obvious4 ,the last of the words and ideas which occurred to me failed to suggest the following2 that is to say1 the association which formerly existed between them was dissolved4 ,a remarkable piece of natural scenery1 composed of mountains1 woods1 rivers1 lakes1 ocean1 flocks1 herds1 cultivated fields1 gay cottages1 and splendid palaces1 of which ,i had a lively recollection many years ago1 presents itself to me now very much faded3 in other words1 a great variety of the circumstances1 which make up the detail and minute features of the scene1 were formerly remembered by me1 but are now forgotten4 ,and how forgotten8 ,the manner is obvious4 ,the greater features1 which ,i still remember1 had formerly the power of calling up the smaller along with them1 and the whole scene was revived2 the association gradually declining1 the great objects have no longer the power to excite the idea of the small2 and they are therefore gone from me for ever4 ,there are things of which ,i have so entirely lost the recollection1 that it never can be revived4 ,the meaning is1 that the associations which were formed between the ideas of them1 and other ideas1 are so completely dissolved1 that none of my present ideas has the power of exciting them4 ,it is observable1 that sensations have a stronger power to excite recollections than is possessed by #ccc ideas4#ib ,a man1 after an absence of many years1 revisits the scenes of his infancy3 a variety of circumstances crowd into his memory1 which1 but for the scene before him1 would never have been remembered again4 ,these are the circumstances between which1 and the perception of the pristine objects1 the association is not yet dissolved4 ,there are other circumstances1 without number1 which 7the association being completely dissolved7 not even that perception can revive1 and which never can be remembered more4 ,bain's footnote #ib3 ,this is for no other reason than the superior intensity or impressiveness of the actual as compared with the ideal4 ,although as a rule1 the sensation has a greater hold of the mind1 than the corresponding idea1 there are exceptions4 ,an idea may sometimes be accompanied with an intensity of mental occupation and excitement1 surpassing the reality3 what we have looked at with indifference when it occurred1 may take on an extraordinary importance in the retrospect2 in which case its power of resuscitating collateral circumstances will be far greater than the power of the original sensation4--,b4 ,we have seen that there are two cases of memory2 that in which sensations are remembered1 and that in which ideas4 ,it is said1 that there are men1 who1 by often telling a mendacious story as true1 come at last to believe it to be true4 ,when this happens1 the fact is1 that a case of the memory of ideas1 comes to be mistaken for a case of the memory of sensations4 ,how did the man know at first that it was a fictitious story2 and how did he afterwards lose that knowledge8 ,he knew1 at first1 by certain associations2 he lost his knowledge1 by losing those associations1 and #ccd acquiring others in their stead4 ,when he first told the story1 the circumstances related called up to turn the idea of himself fabricating the story4 ,this was the memory of the fabrication4 ,in repeating the story as real1 the idea of himself fabricating the story is hurried over rapidly2 the idea of himself as actor in the story is dwelt upon with great emphasis4 ,in continued repetitions1 the first circumstance being attended to as little as possible1 the association of it grows weaker and weaker2 the other circumstance engrossing the attention1 the association of it grows stronger and stronger2 till the weaker is at last wholly overpowered by the stronger1 and ceases to have any effect4 ,in delirium1 madness1 and dreams1 men believe that what they only imagine1 they hear1 see1 and do4 ,this so far agrees with the case of forgetfulness1 just explained1 that1 in both1 there is a mistake of ideas for sensations2 but1 in the case of memory1 it is a mistake of past ideas for past sensations2 in delirium1 madness1 and dreaming1 it is a mistake of present ideas for present sensations4 ,how men in sound memory distinguish the ideas remembered1 from sensations remembered1 and know that the one is not the other1 seems to be accounted for by the difference of the things themselves4 ,a sensation is different from an idea1 only because it is felt to be different2 and being felt to be different1 and known to be different1 are not two things1 but one and the same thing4 ,i have a sensation2 ,i have an idea3 if these two are distinguishable in the having1 it is likely that the copy of the sensation should be distinguishable from the revival of the idea1 when they are both brought up by association2 just as when ,i #cce have two distinguishable sensations1 one1 for example1 of red1 and another of black1 the copies of them1 when brought up by association1 are distinguishable4 ,besides1 the accompaniments of a sensation are always generically different from those of an idea2 of course1 the associations are generically different4 ,the accompaniments of a sensation1 are all the simultaneous objects of sensation1 together with all those which1 to a certain extent1 both preceded and followed it4 ,the accompaniments of an idea are not the simultaneous objects of sensation1 but other ideas2 namely1 the neighbouring parts1 antecedent and consequent1 of the mental train4 ,a sensation1 therefore1 called up by association1 and an idea called up by association1 are distinguished both by the difference of the two feelings1 and the difference of the associated circumstances4 ,it is observable1 that the idea of a sensation called up by association1 and recognised as the idea of a sensation1 is of course a remembrance4 ,the recognition consists in that highly complex idea1 consisting of three principal ingredients3 #a1 the point of consciousness called the remembering self2 #b1 the point of consciousness called the percipient self2 #c1 the successive states of consciousness which filled up the interval1 between these two points4 ,an idea called up by association is not necessarily a remembrance2 it is only a remembrance when recognised as having been an idea before4 ,and it is recognised as having been an idea before1 by the association of that idea1 which connects the self of the present moment with the self of the past moment1 the remembering self with the conceiving self3 in other #ccf words1 the complex idea is made up of those two selfs and the intermediate states of consciousness4 ,another distinction is here suggested between the memory of a sensation and the memory of an idea4 ,the complex idea1 which needs to be associated with a mere simple idea1 to make it memory1 is not the same in the two cases4 ,there is a specific difference4 ,the self which is at the antecedent end of the associated train1 7in the case of sensation17 is the sentient self2 that is1 seeing or hearing2 the self at the antecedent end of the associated train1 7in the case of ideas17 is not the sentient self1 but the conceptive self1 self having an idea4 ,but myself percipient1 and my self imagining or conceiving1 are two very different states of consciousness3 of course the ideas of these states of consciousness1 or these states revived by association1 are very different ideas4 ,the simplest of all cases of memory is that of a sensation immediately past4 ,i have one sensation1 and another sensation2 call them ,a and ,b2 and ,i recognise them as successive4 ,every man has experience of the fact1 and is familiar with it4 ,but not every man can tell what it involves4 ,when a sensation ceases1 it is as completely gone1 as if it had never existed4#ic ,it is1 in a certain sense1 #ccg revived again in its idea4 ,but that idea must be called into existence by something with which it is associated4 ,in my two sensations1 supposed above1 the one antecedent1 the other consequent1 how do ,i recognise the succession2 if the first is gone1 before the coming of the second8 ,it is evident that it must be by memory4 ,and how by memory8 ,the preceding developments seem to make the process clear4 ,the consciousness of the present moment calls up the idea of the consciousness of the preceding moment4 ,the consciousness of the present moment is not absolutely simple2 for1 whether ,i have a sensation or idea1 the idea of what ,i call ,myself is always inseparably combined with it4 ,the consciousness1 then1 of the second of the two moments in the case supposed1 is the sensation combined with the idea of ,myself1 which compound ,i call ,myself ,sentient4 ,this ,self ,sentient1 in other words sensation ,b1 combined with the idea of self1 calls up the idea of sensation ,a combined with the idea of self4 ,this we call ,,memory2 and1 there being no intermediate link1 immediate ,,memory4 ,suppose that1 instead of two sensations1 there had been three1 ,a1 ,b1 ,c4 ,in order #cch to remember ,a1 it is necessary to step over ,b4 ,the consciousness of the third moment1 namely1 sensation ,c1 united with the idea of self1 calls up the idea of sensation ,a1 united with the idea of self1 and along with this the intermediate state of consciousness1 ,b1 with the constant concomitant self4 ,if the intermediate state1 ,b1 were not included1 the sensation ,a would appear to have immediately preceded sensation ,c1 and the memory would be inaccurate4 ,bain's footnote #ic3 ,this is a statement that should be qualified4 ,looking to the change of outward situation1 we may say that the difference between the present reality1 and the idea of it when past1 is total and vast3 the wide prospect before the eyes at one moment is gone1 annihilated1 non-existent4 ,but looking at the mental process1 we must use more moderate language4 ,the mind does not adapt itself to the new situation with the same rapidity4 ,if one is very much impressed with a picture1 one maintains the rapt attitude for a little time1 after the picture is withdrawn1 and only by degrees loses the hold in favour of the next thing presented to the view4 ,it is possible for us to resist the solicitation of the actual scene1 and to be absorbed to the full measure of actuality by something no longer actual4 ,the immediate past may still divide the empire with the present4 ,the psychological transition follows a different law from the objective transition3 a circumstance in no small degree involved in the subtle question of our mental continuity or personal identity4--,b4 ,we have thus carried the analysis of ,memory to a certain point4 ,we have found the association to consist of three parts2 the remembering self2 the remembered self2 and the train which intervened4 ,of these three parts1 the last has been fully expounded4 ,the recalling of the successive states of consciousness1 which composed the intervening train1 is an ordinary case of association4 ,the other parts1 the two selfs1 at the two extremities of this train1 require further consideration4 ,the self1 at the first end1 is the remembered self2 the self which had a sensation1 or an idea4 ,the idea of this self1 therefore1 consists of two parts3 of self1 and a sensation1 or an idea4 ,the last-mentioned part of this combination1 the sensation or idea1 needs no explanation2 the first1 that which is called self1 does4 ,the self at the other extremity of the chain of consciousness1 is the remembering self4 ,remembering is associating4 ,the idea of this self1 then1 is the combination of self with the idea of associating4 ,and here1 too1 associating needs no explanation2 it is the other part of the combination that does4 ,the analysis1 then1 of ,,self1 or the account of what is included in that state of consciousness commonly #cci called the idea of personal identity1 is still wanting to the complete developement of ,memory4 ,philosophers tell us also1 that the idea of ,time is included in every act of ,,memory2 and again1 that it is from ,,memory we obtain our idea of ,time3 thus asserting that the idea of ,time must precede ,,memory1 and that ,,memory must precede the idea of ,time4 ,these contradicting propositions imply that the idea of ,time in the minds of those who make them1 is a very confused idea4 ,nevertheless1 as there can be no memory without the idea called ,time1 the exposition of that idea1 likewise1 is necessary to the full understanding of ,memory4 ,the idea of personal ,,identity1 and the idea of ,,time1 two very remarkable states of consciousness1 will be very carefully examined hereafter4 ,but for the more ready understanding of what is necessary to be adduced in expounding those complicated cases of association1 some other phenomena of the mind will first be explained4 ,what is to be understood by that ,,belief which is said to accompany ,,memory1 will be seen in the next chapter1 where all the different cases of belief will be resolved into their elements4#id ,editor's footnote #id3 ,the only difficulty about ,memory1 when once the laws of ,association are understood1 is the difference between it and ,imagination2 but this is a difference which will probably long continue to perplex philosophers4 ,the author finds in ,memory1 besides the idea of the fact remembered1 two other ideas3 the idea of my present self1 the remembering self1 and the idea of my past self1 the remembered or witnessing self3 and a supposed rapid repetition in thought1 of the whole of the impressions which ,i received between the time remembered and the #cdj time of remembering4 ,but 7apart from the question whether we really do repeat in thought1 however summarily1 all this series7 explaining memory by ,self seems very like explaining a thing by the thing4 ,for what notion of ,self can we have1 apart from ,memory8 ,the fact of remembering1 i4e4 of having an idea combined with the belief that the corresponding sensation was actually felt by me1 seems to be the very elementary fact of ,self1 the origin and foundation of the idea2 presupposed in our having the very complex notion of a ,self1 which is here introduced to explain it4 ,as1 however1 the author admits that the phenomenon of ,belief1 and the notions of ,time and of ,personal ,identity1 must be taken into account in order to give a complete explanation of ,memory1 any further remarks had better be deferred until these subjects have been regularly brought under our consideration4--,ed4 #cda ,,chapter ,,xi4 ,,belief4 ,cette recherche peut infiniment contribuer aux progrs de l'art de raisonner2 elle le peut seule dvelopper jusques dans ses premiers principes4 ,en effet1 nous ne dcouvrirons pas une manire sre de conduire constamment nos penses2 si nous ne savons pas comment elles se sont formes4--,condillac1 ,trait des ,sensations1 p4 #dfj4 ,,it is not easy to treat of ,,memory1 ,,belief1 and ,,judgment1 separately4 ,for1 in the rude and unskilful manner in which naming has been performed1 the states of consciousness1 marked by those terms1 are not separate and distinct4 ,part of that which is named by ,,memory is included under the term ,,belief2 and part of that which is named by ,,judgment1 is also included under the name ,,belief4 ,,belief1 therefore1 instead of having a distinct province to itself1 encroaches on the provinces both of ,,memory1 and ,,judgment2 from which great confusion has arisen4 ,i take ,,memory first1 and ,,judgment last1 from no other principle of arrangement1 than facility of #cdb exposition2 and ,i have in this way found it convenient to treat of ,,judgment as a case of ,,belief4#ie ,editor's footnote #ie3 ,how is it possible to treat of ,belief without including in it ,memory and ,judgment8 ,memory is a case of belief4 ,in what does ,memory differ from ,imagination1 except in the belief that what it represents did really take place8 ,judgment1 in its popular acceptation1 is ,belief resulting from deliberate examination1 in other words1 ,belief grounded on evidence3 while in its philosophical sense it is coextensive1 if not synonymous1 with ,belief itself4 ,i do not know how it is possible to distinguish a judgment from any other process of the mind1 except by its being an act of belief4--,ed4 ,we begin as usual with the simplest cases4 ,these are1 the case of a simple sensation1 and the case of a simple idea4 ,when we have a sensation1 we ,,believe that we have it2 when we have an idea1 we ,,believe that we have it4 ,but1 to have a sensation1 and to believe that we have it1 are not distinguishable things4 ,when ,i say ,i have a sensation1 and say1 ,i believe that ,i have it1 ,i do not express two states of consciousness1 but one and the same state4 ,a sensation is a feeling2 but a feeling1 and the belief of it are the same thing4 ,the observation applies equally to ideas4 ,when ,i say ,i have the idea of the sun1 ,i express the same thing exactly1 as when ,i say1 that ,i believe ,i have it4 ,the feeling is one1 the names1 only1 are two4#if #ig ,bain's footnote #if3 ,in the case of a present reality1 belief has no place2 it can be introduced only by a fiction or a figure4 ,the believing state comes into operation when something thought of is still remote1 and attainable by an intermediate exertion4 ,the fact ,i see the sun is full fruition3 the fact that ,i can see the sun by going out of doors affords scope for belief or disbelief4--,b4 ,editor's footnote #ig3 ,the difference between ,mr4 ,bain and the author is but in language and classification4 ,it is necessary for the reader of the ,analysis to remember1 that the author uses the word ,belief as the most general term for every species of conviction or assurance2 the assurance of what is before our eyes1 as well as of that which we only remember or expect2 of what we know by direct perception1 as well as of what we accept on the evidence of testimony or of reasoning3 all this we are convinced or persuaded of2 all this1 in the author's language1 we believe4 ,mr4 ,bain1 on the other hand1 like ,sir ,william ,hamilton and many others1 restricts the term to those cases of conviction which are short of direct intuition4--,ed4 #cdc ,it may be alleged that1 when ,i say ,i have a sensation1 ,i express the simple feeling1 as derived from the outward sense2 but that when ,i say ,i believe ,i have a sensation1 ,i express two things1 the simple sensation1 and the association with it1 of that remarkable idea1 the idea of myself4 ,the association1 however1 is the same in both cases4 ,as ,i never have the sensation of an object1 the sight1 for example1 of a rose1 without associating with it1 the idea of position1 and also that of unity2 nor the idea of such an object1 without the same association2 so ,i never have a sensation1 nor the idea of that sensation1 without associating with it1 the idea of myself4 ,and in both cases1 the associations are of that remarkable class1 which we have denominated inseparable4 ,it is not in our power to prevent them4 ,whensoever the perception of the object exists1 the idea of its position is sure to exist along with it2 whensoever one of my sensations exists1 the idea of myself exists along with #cdd it2 whensoever one of my ideas exists1 the idea of myself is sure to exist along with it4 ,in the case1 then1 of a present sensation1 and that of a present idea2 the sensation1 and the belief of the sensation2 the idea1 and the belief of the idea1 are not two things2 they are1 in each case1 one and the same thing2 a single thing1 with a double name4 ,the several cases of ,belief may be considered under three heads3 ,i41 ,belief in events1 real existences2 ,,ii41 ,belief in testimony2 and ,,iii41 ,belief in the truth of propositions4 ,we shall consider them in their order2 and first1 ,belief in events1 real existences4 ,i4 ,this is subdivided into three distinct cases3 #a1 ,belief in present events2 #b1 ,belief in past events2 #c1 ,belief in future events4 #a4 ,belief in present events1 again1 is divided into two cases3 #a1 ,belief in immediate existences present to my senses2 #b1 ,belief in immediate existences not present to my senses4 ,belief in existences present to my senses1 includes1 for one element1 belief in my sensations2 and belief in my sensations1 as we have just observed1 is only another name for having the sensations4 ,but belief in the external objects1 is not simply belief in my present sensations2 it is this1 and something more4 ,the something more1 is now the object of our inquiry4 ,i see1 for example1 a rose3 my sensation is a sensation of sight3 that of a certain modification of light2 but my belief of the rose is not this2 it is this1 and much more4 ,besides the sensation of colour1 ,i have1 for one thing1 the belief of a certain distance1 at which ,i see #cde the rose2 and that of a certain figure1 consisting of leaves disposed in a certain form4 ,i believe that ,i see this distance and form2 in other words1 perceive it by the eye1 as immediately as ,i perceive the colour4 ,now this last part of the process has been explained by various philosophers4 ,there is no dispute1 or uncertainty1 about the matter4 ,all men admit1 that this1 one of the most remarkable of all cases of belief1 is wholly resolvable into association4#ih ,it is acknowledged1 that1 by the sense of sight1 we receive no sensation but that of a certain modification of light4 ,it is equally proved1 that the sensations from which our ideas of distance and figure are derived1 are sensations of the muscular actions and touch4 ,how1 then1 is the ,belief generated1 that we see extension and figure1 as well as colour8 ,after the experience the learner has now had in tracing the rapid combinations of the mind1 this presents but little difficulty4 ,he knows1 that when we are receiving through the muscles and the touch1 the sensations which yield us the idea of extension and figure1 we are receiving the sensations of sight at the same time1 from the same objects4 ,the sensations of sight1 therefore1 are #cdf associated with the ideas of these tactile and muscular sensations2 and associated in the most perfect possible manner2 because the conjunction is almost invariable1 and of incessant occurrence1 during the whole period of life4 ,we are perpetually feeling1 and seeing1 the same objects1 at the same time2 so much so1 that our lives may be said to consist of those sensations in union2 to consist1 at least to a far greater degree1 of this1 than of any one other state of consciousness4 ,editor's footnote #ih3 ,all men admit4 ,certainly not all men2 though1 at the time when the author wrote1 it might be said1 with some plausibility1 all psychologists4 ,unfortunately this can no longer be said3 ,mr4 ,samuel ,bailey has demanded a rehearing of the question1 and has pronounced a strong and reasoned opinion on the contrary side2 and his example has been followed by several other writers3 but without1 in my opinion1 at all weakening the position which since the publication of ,berkeley's ,essay on ,vision1 had been almost unanimously maintained by philosophers4--,ed4 ,this intensity of association1 we know1 produces two effects4 ,one1 is to blend the associated feelings so intimately together1 that they no longer appear many1 but one feeling4 ,the other is1 to render the combination inseparable2 so that if one of the feelings exist1 the others necessarily exist along with it4 ,the case of association which we are now considering1 brings to view another circumstance1 of some importance in tracing the effects of this great law of our nature4 ,it is this3 that in any associated cluster1 the idea of sight is almost always the prevalent part4 ,the visible idea is that which takes the lead1 as it were2 and serves as the suggesting principle to the rest4 ,so it happens in the combination of the sensations of colour1 with those of extension and figure3 the visible idea stands foremost2 and calls up the rest4 ,it calls them up also with such intensity1 that both the remarkable cases of association are exemplified4 ,whenever we have the sensation of colour1 we cannot avoid having the ideas of distance1 of extension1 and figure1 along with it2 nor can we avoid having them in such intimate union with the ocular sensation1 that they appear to be that sensation itself4 #cdg ,this is the whole of what is ever supposed to be in the case4 ,of no phenomenon of the human mind is the developement more complete or more important4 ,our belief that we see the shape1 and size1 and distance of the object we look at1 is as perfect as belief in any instance can be4 ,but this belief is nothing more than a case of very close association4 ,the case of belief by association1 any one may illustrate further1 for himself1 by recollecting some of the commonest cases of optical deception4 ,if we look at a landscape with the naked eye1 we believe the several objects before us1 the men1 the animals1 the trees1 the houses1 the hills1 to be at certain distances4 ,if we next look at them through a telescope1 they seem as if they were brought near2 we have the distinct belief of their proximity1 and though a belief immediately corrected by accompanying reflection1 it is not only belief1 but a belief that we can by no means shake off4 ,we can1 after this1 invert the telescope1 and then we cannot help believing1 that the nearest objects are removed to a distance4 ,now what is it that the telescope performs in these two instances8 ,it modifies in a certain manner the rays of light to the eye4 ,the rays1 proceeding from the objects1 are so distributed on the eye1 as they would be if the distance of the objects was less1 or greater4 ,instantly we have the belief that it is less or greater2 because1 the sensation of the eye1 by means of the glass1 is made to resemble that which it receives1 when objects are seen at a smaller or greater distance2 and each of the sensations calls up that idea of distance which is habitually associated with it4 ,we have thus far proceeded1 with some certainty1 #cdh in detecting the component parts of that which we call our belief in the existence of external objects4 ,we have taken account of the sensation from which is derived the visible idea1 of the sensations from which are derived the ideas of position1 extension1 and figure2 and we have explained the intimate combination of those two sets of ideas by association4 ,but these1 though the leading sensations and ideas1 are not the only ones4 ,there are1 besides1 the sensations from which we derive the idea of resistance1 in all its modifications1 from that of air1 to that of adamant4 ,there are also sensations which are not common to all objects1 but peculiar to some2 as smell1 peculiar to odorous bodies2 taste1 to sapid2 and sound1 to sonorous ones4 ,now1 though the most remarkable case of the associations among those feelings1 is that between colour1 and extension and figure1 they are all blended by association into one idea2 which1 though in reality a cluster of ideas1 affects us in the same manner as if it were a single idea2 an idea1 the parts of which we detect by an analysis1 which it requires some training to be able to make4 ,with the colour of the rose1 the size and figure of the rose1--which are the predominant ideas1--,i associate the idea of that modification of hardness and softness1 which belongs to the rose2 its degree of resistance1 in short2 also its smell1 and its taste4 ,these associations have been formed1 as other associations are1 by repetition4 ,i have had so uniformly the sight1 along with the handling1 these1 along with the smell1 and the taste--of the rose1 that they are always called up together1 and in the closest combination4 #cdi ,now then let us ask1 what we mean1 when we affirm1 that the rose exists4 ,in this meaning are undoubtedly included the above sensations1 in a certain order4 ,i see the rose on the garden wall1 and ,i affirm that it exists3 that is1 along with my present sensation1 the sight of the rose1 ,i have the ideas of a certain order of other sensations4 ,these are1 first1 the idea of distance1 that is1 the idea of the feelings involved in the act of going to the rose3 after this1 the idea of the feelings in handling it2 then in smelling1 then in tasting it2 all springing up by association with the sight of the rose4 ,it is said1 we believe we should have these sensations4 ,that is1 we have the idea of these sensations inseparably united one with the other1 and inseparably united with the idea of ourselves as having them4 ,that this alone constitutes belief1 in the remarkable case of the association of extension and figure with the sensations of sight1 has already been seen2 that this alone constitutes it1 in many other remarkable cases1 will be seen as we proceed2 and in no case can it be shewn1 that any thing more is included in it4 ,in my belief1 then1 of the existence of an object1 there is included the belief1 that1 in such and such circumstances1 ,i should have such and such sensations4 ,is there any thing more8 ,it will be answered immediately1 yes3 for that1 along with belief in my sensations as the effect1 there is belief of something as the cause2 and that to the cause1 not to the effect1 the name object is appropriated4 ,this is a case of ,belief1 which deserves the greatest possible attention4 ,it is acknowledged1 on all hands1 that we know nothing of objects2 but the sensations #cej we have from them4 ,there is a cause1 however1 of those sensations1 and to that we give the name object3 or1 rather1 there is a cluster of causes1 corresponding with the cluster of sensations4 ,thus1 when ,i see1 and handle1 and smell1 and taste the rose1 there is a cause of the sensation red1 a cause of the sensation soft1 a cause of the sensation round1 a cause of the smell1 and a cause of the taste2 and all these causes are united in the rose4 ,but what is the rose1 beside the colour1 the form1 and so on8 ,not knowing what it is1 but supposing it to be something1 we invent a name to stand for it4 ,we call it a substratum4 ,this substratum1 when closely examined1 is not distinguishable from ,cause4 ,it is the cause of the qualities2 that is1 the cause of the causes of our sensations4 ,the association1 then1 is this4 ,to each of the sensations we have from a particular object1 we annex in our imagination1 a cause2 and to these several causes we annex a cause1 common to all1 and mark it with the name substratum4 ,this curious case of association we now proceed to develop4 ,the word cause1 means the antecedent of a consequent1 where the connection is constant4 ,this has been established on such perfect evidence1 that it is a received principle of philosophy4 ,more of the evidence of this important principle will appear as we go on4 ,here we shall take the proposition for granted4 ,not only are we1 during the whole period of our lives1 witnesses of an incessant train of events2 that is1 of antecedents and consequents1 between which1 for the greater part1 the order is constant2 but these constant conjunctions are1 of all things in the world1 what we are #cea the most deeply interested in observing2 for1 on the knowledge of them1 all our power of obtaining good and avoiding evil depends4 ,from this1 it necessarily follows1 that between none of our ideas is the association more intimate and intense1 than between antecedent and consequent1 in the order of events4 ,whenever we perceive an event1 the mind instantly flies to its antecedent4 ,i hear words in the street2 event3 some one1 of course1 is making them2 antecedent4 ,my house is broken1 and my goods are gone2 event3 a thief has taken them2 antecedent4 ,this is that remarkable case of association1 in which the combination is inseparable2 a case of so much importance in explaining some of the more mysterious phenomena of thought4 ,other instances of this remarkable phenomenon1 to which we have already had occasion to advert1 are1 the sight of an object1 and the ideas of its distance1 its extension1 and figure2 the idea of colour1 and the idea of extension2 the idea of an object1 and the idea of position and unity2 the idea of one of my sensations1 and the idea of myself4 ,in no instance is this inseparable association more perfect1 or its consequences more important1 than in that between an event1 and its antecedent4 ,we cannot think of the one without thinking of the other4 ,the two ideas are forced upon us at the same time2 and by no effort of ours can they be disjoined4 ,so necessarily1 from the first moment of experience1 are we employed in observing the constant conjunctions of events2 and so deeply are we interested1 in looking out for1 and knowing the constant antecedent of every event1 that the association becomes part of our being4 ,the perception1 or the idea1 of an event1 instantly brings up #ceb the idea of its constant antecedent2 definite and clear1 if the antecedent is known2 and indefinite and obscure1 if it is unknown4 ,still1 the idea of an event1 of a change1 without the idea of its cause1 is impossible4 ,that a cause means1 and can mean nothing to the human mind1 but constant antecedent1 is no longer a point in dispute4#ii ,editor's footnote #ii3 ,here again the author takes too sanguine a view of the amount of agreement hitherto attained among metaphysical philosophers4 ,that a cause means1 and can mean1 nothing to the human mind but constant antecedent is so far from being no longer a point in dispute that it is denied with vehemence by a large numerical majority of philosophers2 and its denial is perhaps the principal badge of one of the two schools which at this1 as at most other times1 bisect the philosophical world--the intuitional school and the experiential--,ed4 ,of this remarkable case of association1 that which we call ,our ,belief in ,external ,objects is one of the most remarkable instances4 ,of the sensations1 of sight1 of handling1 of smell1 of taste1 which ,i have from a rose1 each is an event2 with each of those events1 ,i associate the idea of a constant antecedent1 a cause2 that cause unknown1 but furnished with a name1 by which it may be spoken of1 namely1 quality2 the quality of red1 the cause of the sensation red2 the qualities of consistence1 extension and figure1 the causes of the sensations of handling2 the qualities of smell and taste1 the causes of the sensations of smell and taste4 ,such is one part of the process of association in this case4 ,another is that by which the ideas of those sensations are so intimately united1 as to appear not several ideas1 but one idea1 the idea of a rose4 ,we have now two steps of association2 that #cec of the several sensations into one idea2 that of the several sensations each with a separate cause4 ,but we do not stop here2 for1 as in a train of events1 consisting of several links1 ,a1 ,b1 ,c1 ,d1 and so on1 though ,c is the antecedent or cause of ,d1 it is itself the consequent or effect of ,b2 and in all cases1 when we have found the cause of any particular event1 we have still to find out what was the cause of that cause4 ,in this manner1 when our habit of association has carried us from our sensations to the causes of them1 the same habit carries us still farther4 ,as each of our sensations must have a cause1 to which1 as unknown1 we give the name quality2 so each of those qualities must have a cause4 ,and as the ideas of a number of sensations1 concomitant in a certain way1 are combined into a single idea2 as that of rose1 that of apple2 the unity1 which is thus given to the effects1 is of course transferred to the supposed causes1 called qualities3 they are referred to a common cause4 ,to this supposed cause of supposed causes1 we give a name2 and that name is the word ,substratum4 ,it is obvious1 that there is no reason for stopping at this ,substratum2 for1 as the sensation suggested the quality1 the quality the substratum1 the substratum as properly leads to another antecedent1 another substratum1 and so on1 from substratum to substratum1 without end4 ,these inseparable associations1 however1 rarely go beyond a single step1 hardly ever beyond two4 ,the ,barbarian1 in accounting for the support of the earth1 placed it on the back of a great elephant1 and the great elephant on the back of a great tortoise2 but neither himself1 nor those whom he #ced instructed1 were carried by their habits of association any farther4#ajj ,editor's footnote #ajj3 ,it is a question worth considering1 why that demand for a cause of everything1 which has led to the invention of so many fabulous or fictitious causes1 so generally stops short at the first step1 without going on to imagine a cause of the cause4 ,but this is quite in the ordinary course of human proceedings4 ,it is no more than we should expect1 that these frivolous speculations should be subject to the same limitations as reasonable ones4 ,even in the region of positive facts in the explaining of phenomena by real1 not imaginary1 causes--the first semblance of an explanation generally suffices to satisfy the curiosity which prompts the inquiry4 ,the things men first care to inquire about are those which meet their senses1 and among which they live2 of these they feel curious as to the origin1 and look out for a cause1 even if it be but an abstraction4 ,but the cause once found1 or imagined1 and the familiar fact no longer perplexing them with the feeling of an unsolved enigma1 they do not1 unless unusually possessed by the speculative spirit1 occupy their minds with the unfamiliar antecedent sufficiently to be troubled respecting it with any of the corresponding perplexity4--,ed4 ,such appear to be the elements included in our belief of the existence of objects acting on our senses4 ,we have next to unfold the case of belief in the present existence of objects not acting on our senses4 ,of this ,belief1 there are two cases3 #a1 ,belief in the existence of objects1 which we have not perceived2 #b1 ,belief in the existence of objects1 which we have perceived4 ,the first of these1 is a case of the ,belief in testimony2 which is to be explained hereafter4 ,what we are to examine at the present moment1 then1 is1 our ,belief in the existence of objects1 which1 though not #cee now present to our senses1 have been so at a previous time4 ,thus1 ,i believe in the present existence of ,st4 ,paul's1 which ,i saw this morning4 ,in tracing the elements of this ,belief1 it is obvious in the first place1 that in so far as it is founded on my past sensations1 memory is concerned in it4 ,but ,memory relates to past events1 ,belief in which1 is to be considered under a following head4 ,this part of the development1 therefore1 we postpone4 ,but1 beside ,memory1 what other element is concerned in it8 ,there is evidently an anticipation of the future4 ,in believing that ,st4 ,paul's exists1 ,i believe1 that whenever ,i am in the same situation1 in which ,i had perception of it before1 ,i shall have perception of it again4 ,but this ,belief in future events1 is also a case1 which remains to be considered under a subsequent head4 ,this1 therefore1 is another part of the development1 which must be postponed4 ,i not only believe1 that ,i shall see ,st4 ,paul's1 when ,i am again in ,st4 ,paul's ,churchyard2 but ,i believe1 ,i should see it if ,i were in ,st4 ,paul's ,churchyard this instant4 ,this1 too1 is also a case1 of the anticipation of the future from the past1 and will come to be considered under the subsequent head already referred to4 ,besides these cases1 the only one which remains to be considered1 is1 my ,belief that1 if any creature whose senses are analogous to my own1 is now in ,st4 ,paul's ,churchyard1 it has the present sensation of that edifice4 ,my belief in the sensations of other creatures1 is wholly derived from my experience of my own sensations4 ,the question is1 ,how it is derived4 ,that #cef it is an inference from similitude1 will not be denied4 ,but what is an inference from similitude8 ,i have no direct knowledge of any feelings but my own4 ,how is it1 then1 that ,i proceed8 ,there are certain things which ,i consider as marks or signs of sensations in other creatures4 ,the ,belief follows the signs1 and with a force1 not exceeded in my other instance4 ,but the interpretation of signs is wholly a case of association1 as the extraordinary phenomena of language abundantly testify4#aja ,and whenever the association1 between the sign and the #ceg thing signified1 is sufficiently strong to become inseparable1 it is belief4 ,thus1 rude and ignorant people1 to whom the existence of but one language is known1 believe the name by which they have always called an object to belong to it naturally1 as much as its shape1 its colour1 or its smell4#aj99 ,thus the perceptions of sight1 mere signs of distance1 magnitude1 and figure1 are followed by belief of the sight of them4 ,and it is remarked1 with philosophical accuracy1 by ,condillac1 that if our constitution had been such1 as to give us1 instead of a different modification of sight1 a different modification of smell1 with each variety of distance1 extension1 and figure1 we should have smelt distance1 extension and figure1 in the same manner as1 by the actual conformation of our organs1 we see them4 ,nor can we doubt the truth of the ingenious observation of ,diderot1 that if we had seen1 and heard1 and tasted1 and smelt1 at the ends of our fingers1 in the same manner as we feel1 we should have believed our mind to be in the fingers1 as we now believe it to be in the head4 ,bain's footnote #aja3 ,this is true in by far the greater number of instances4 ,nevertheless1 there are some of the signs of feeling that have an intrinsic efficacy1 on very manifest grounds4 ,while the meanings of the smile and the frown could have been reversed1 if the association had been the other way1 there is an obvious suitability in the harsh stunning tones of the voice to signify anger and to inspire dread1 and a like suitability in the gentle tones to convey affection and kindly feeling4 ,we might have contracted the opposing associations1 had the facts been so arranged1 just as in times of peace1 we associate joy with deafening salvos of artillery2 and as loud1 sharp-pealing laughter serves in the expression of agreeable feeling4 ,but there is a gain of effect when the signs employed are such as to chime in1 by intrinsic efficacy1 with the associated meanings4 ,on this coincidence depend the refinements of elocution1 oratory1 and stage display4--,b4 ,the fact here brought to notice by ,mr4 ,bain is1 that certain of the natural expressions of emotion have a kind of analogy to the emotions they express1 which makes an opening for an instinctive interpretation of them1 independently of experience4 ,but if this be so 7and there can be little doubt that it is so7 the suggestion takes place by resemblance1 and therefore still by association4--,ed4 ,mill's footnote #aj3 ,it has been very justly remarked1 that if all men had uniformly spoken the same language1 in every part of the world1 it would be difficult for us not to think believe that there is a natural connexion of our ideas1 and the words which we use to denote them4--,brown1 ,lectures1 ii4 p4 #hj4 #b;d ed4 ,the process of our ,belief in this case1 then1 is evidently1 as follows4 ,our sensations are inseparably associated with the idea of our bodies4 ,a man cannot think of his body without thinking of it as sensitive4 ,as he cannot think of his own body without thinking of it as sensitive1 so he cannot think of another man's #ceh body1 which is like it1 without thinking of it as sensitive4 ,it is evident that the association of sensitiveness is more close with certain parts of the complex idea1 our bodies1 than with other parts2 because the association equally follows the idea of horse1 of dog1 of fowl1 and even of fish1 and insect3 and it will be found1 ,i think1 that there is nothing with which it is so peculiarly united as the idea of spontaneous motion4 ,what is the reason we do not believe there is any sensation in the most curiously-organized vegetable2 while we uniformly believe there is in the polypus1 and the microscopic insect8 ,nothing whatsoever can be discovered1 but a strong association which exists in the one case1 and is wanting in the other4 ,and this is one of the most decisive of all experiments to prove the real nature of ,belief4 ,as1 then1 our belief in the sensations of other creatures is derived wholly from the inseparable association between our own sensations and the idea of our own bodies1 it is apparent that the case in which ,i believe other creatures to be immediately percipient of objects1 of which ,i believe that ,i myself should be percipient if ,i were so situated as they are1 resolves itself ultimately into this particular case of my belief in certain conditional sensations of my own4 ,this1 again1 as we have seen above1 resolves itself into that other important law of ,belief1 which we are shortly to consider1 the anticipation of the future from the past4 #b4 ,it comes next in order1 that we notice our ,belief in past existences2 that is1 our present belief1 that something had a present existence at a previous time4 ,much of the development of this case is included in the expositions already afforded4 ,our present #cei belief1 means1 for one thing1 a present idea2 our present belief of an existence1 the idea of something existing4 ,of what associations the idea of something existing consists1 we have just ascertained4 ,our present belief of a past existence1 then1 consists of our present idea of something existing1 and the assignment of it to a previous time4 ,there are two cases of this assignment2 one1 in which the thing in question had been the object of our senses2 another1 in which it had not been the object of our senses4 ,when the thing1 the existence of which we assign to a previous time1 had been the object of our senses1 and when the time to which we assign it is the time when it had so been the object of our senses1 the whole is ,memory4 ,in this case1 ,memory1 and ,belief1 are but two names for the same thing4 ,memory is1 in fact1 a case of ,belief4 ,belief is a general word4 ,memory is one of the species included under it4 ,memory is the belief of a past existence1 as ,sensation is the belief of a present existence4 ,when ,i say1 that ,i remember the burning of ,drury-,lane ,theatre2 the remembering the event1 and believing the event1 are not distinguishable feelings1 they are one and the same feeling1 which we have two ways of naming4 ,the associations included in ,memory we have already endeavoured to trace4 ,it is a case of that indissoluble connexion of ideas which we have found in the preceding article to constitute belief in present existences4 ,when ,i remember the burning of ,drury-,lane ,theatre1 what happens8 ,we can mark the following parts of the process4 ,first1 the idea of that event is called up by association2 in other words1 the copies of the #cfj sensations ,i then had1 closely combined by association4 ,next1 the idea of the sensations calls up the idea of myself as sentient2 and that1 so instantly and forcibly1 that it is altogether out of my power to separate them4 ,but when the idea of a sensation forces upon me1 whether ,i will or no1 the idea of myself as that of which it was the sensation1 ,i remember the sensation4 ,it is in this process that memory consists2 and the memory is the ,belief4 ,no obscurity rests on any part of this process1 except the idea of self1 which is reserved for future analysis4 ,the fact1 in the mean time1 is indisputable2 that1 when the idea of a sensation1 which ,i have formerly had1 is revived in me by association1 if it calls up in close association the idea of myself1 there is memory2 if it does not call up that idea1 there is not memory2 if it calls up the idea of myself1 it calls up the idea of that train of states of consciousness which constitutes the thread of my existence2 if it does not call up the idea of myself1 it does not call up the idea of that train1 but some other idea4 ,a sensation remembered1 then1 is a sensation placed1 by association1 as the consequent of one feeling and the antecedent of another1 in that train of feelings which constitute the existence of a conscious being4 ,all this will be more evident1 when what is included in the notion of ,personal ,identity is fully evolved4 ,the case of ,belief in past existences which have not been the object of our senses1 resolves itself into the belief1 either of testimony1 or of the uniformity of the laws of nature2 both of which will1 after a few intervening expositions1 be fully explained4 #c4 ,the process which we denote by the words1 #cfa ,belief in future events1 deserves1 on account of its importance1 to be very carefully considered4 ,that it is a complex process1 will very speedily appear4 ,our endeavour shall be to resolve it into its elements2 in doing which1 we shall see whether it consists wholly of the elements with which we have now become familiar1 or whether it is necessary to admit the existence of something else4 ,i believe that1 to-morrow1 the light of day will be spread over ,england2 that the tide will ebb and flow at ,london-bridge2 that men1 and houses1 and waggons1 and carriages1 will be seen in the streets of this metropolis2 that ships will sail1 and coaches arrive2 that shops will be opened for their customers1 manufactories for their workmen1 and that the ,exchange will1 at a certain hour1 be crowded with merchants4 ,now1 in all this1 what is involved8 ,first of all1 in the ,belief of any future event1 there is1 of course1 involved the idea of the event4 ,it will be immediately understood1 from what has been already adduced1 that there can be no ,belief in any existence1 without an idea of that existence4 ,if ,i believe in the light of day to-morrow1 ,i must have an idea of it2 if ,i believe in the flux and reflux of the water at ,london-bridge1 ,i must have ideas of those several objects2 and so of all other things4 ,in the next place2 as it has already been shewn1 that we cannot call up any idea by willing it2 and that none of our ideas comes into existence but by association2 the idea which forms the fundamental part of ,belief is produced by association4 ,ideas and association1 then1 are necessary parts of belief4 #cfb ,but there can be no idea of the future2 because1 strictly speaking1 the future is a nonentity4 ,of nothing there can be no idea4 ,it is true we can have an idea of that which never existed1 and which we do not suppose ever will exist1 as of a centaur2 but this is a composition of the ideas of things which have existed4 ,we can conceive a sea of milk1 because we have seen a sea1 and milk2 a mountain of gold1 because we have seen a mountain1 and gold4 ,in the same manner we proceed with what we call the future4 ,the ideas which ,i have recently enumerated as parts of my belief of to-morrow2 the light of day1 the throng in the streets1 the motion of the tide at ,london-bridge1 are all ideas of the past4 ,the general fact1 indeed1 is not a matter of dispute4 ,our idea of the future1 and our idea of the past1 is the same2 with this difference1 that it is accompanied with retrospection in the one case1 anticipation in the other4 ,what retrospection is1 we have already examined4 ,it is ,memory4 ,what ,anticipation is1 we are now to inquire2 and to that end it is necessary to recall1 distinctly1 some important facts which we have already established4 ,the fundamental law of association is1 that when two things have been frequently found together1 we never perceive or think of the one without thinking of the other4 ,if the visible idea of a rose occurs to me1 the idea of its smell occurs along with it2 if the idea of the sound of a drum occurs to me1 the visible idea of that instrument occurs along with it4 ,of these habitual conjunctions1 there is none with which we are more incessantly occupied1 from the #cfc first moment of our existence to the last1 and in which we are more deeply interested1 than that of antecedent and consequent4 ,of course there is none between the ideas of which the association is more intimate and intense4 ,in fact1 our whole lives are but a series of changes2 that is1 of antecedents and consequents4 ,the conjunction1 therefore1 is incessant2 and1 of course1 the union of the ideas perfectly inseparable4 ,we can no more have the idea of an event without having the ideas of its antecedent and 99its consequents1 than we can have the idea and not have it at the same time4 ,it is utterly impossible for me to have the visible idea of a rose1 without the idea of its having grown from the ground1 which is its antecedent2 it is utterly impossible for me to have the idea of it without the ideas of its consistence1 its smell1 its gravity1 and so on1 which are its consequents4 ,of the numerous antecedents and consequents1 forming the matter of our experience1 some are constant1 some are not4 ,of course the strength of the association follows the frequency4 ,the crow is seen flying as frequently from east to west1 as from west to east2 from north to south1 as from south to north2 there is1 therefore1 no association between the flight of the crow and any particular direction4 ,not so with the motion of a stone let go in the air3 that takes one direction constantly4 ,the order of antecedent and consequent is here invariable4 ,the association of the ideas1 therefore1 is fixed and inseparable4 ,i can no more have the idea of a stone let go in the air1 and not have the idea of its dropping to the #cfd ground1 than ,i can have the idea of the stone1 and not have it1 at the same time4#ajb ,editor's footnote #ajb3 ,the theory maintained so powerfully and with such high intellectual resources by the author1 that ,belief is but an inseparable association1 will be examined at length in a note at the end of the chapter4 ,meanwhile let it be remarked1 that the case of supposed inseparable association given in this passage1 requires to be qualified in the statement4 ,we cannot1 indeed1 think of a stone let go in the air1 without having the idea of its falling2 but this association is not so strictly inseparable as to disable us from having the contrary idea4 ,there are analogies in our experience which enable us without difficulty to form the imagination of a stone suspended in the air4 ,the case appears to be one in which we can conceive both opposites1 falling and not falling2 the incompatible images not1 of course1 combining1 but alternating in the mind4 ,which of the two carries belief with it1 depends on what is termed ,evidence4--,ed4 ,where the sequence of two events is merely casual1 it passes speedily away from the mind2 because it is not associated with the idea of any thing in which we are interested4 ,the things in which we are interested1 are the immediate antecedents of our pleasures and pains1 and the ideas of them are all inseparably associated with constant conjunctions4 ,the association of the ideas of a constant antecedent and consequent1 therefore1 has both causes of strength1 the interesting nature of the ideas1 and the frequency of conjunction1 both at their greatest height4 ,it follows1 that it should be the most potent and inseparable of all the combinations in the mind of man4 ,as we are thus incessantly1 and thus intensely1 occupied with cases of constant conjunction1 while cases of casual conjunction pass slightly over the mind1 and #cfe quickly vanish from our consciousness1 every event calls up the idea of a constant antecedent4 ,the association is so strong1 that the combination is necessary and irresistible4 ,it often enough1 indeed1 happens1 that we do not know the constant antecedent of an event4 ,but never does it fail to call up the idea of such an antecedent2 and so inseparably1 that we can as little have and not have the idea of an event1 as we can have the idea of it1 and not have the idea of an inseparable antecedent along with it4--,ignorant1 sometimes1 of the constant antecedents of such and such events1 we find them out by subsequent inquiry4 ,those cases of successful investigation still further strengthen the association4 ,all that we call good1 and all that we call evil1 depend so entirely upon those constant conjunctions1 that we are necessarily under the strongest stimulus to find them out1 and to trace them with greater and greater accuracy4 ,thus we very often find a constancy of sequence1 in which we acquiesce for a while2 but after a time discover1 that though constant1 indeed1 it is not immediate2 for1 that between the event and supposed antecedent1 several antecedents intervene4 ,at first we regard the ignition of the gunpowder1 as the immediate antecedent of the motion of the ball4 ,better instructed1 we find that a curious process intervenes4 ,the constancy of the sequence is always more certain1 the more nearly immediate the antecedent is4 ,and so frequent is our detection of antecedents1 more immediate than those which we have just observed1 that an association is formed between the idea of every antecedent1 and that of another antecedent1 as yet unknown1 intermediate between it and the consequent which we #cff know4 ,in no sequence do we ever feel satisfied that we have discovered all4 ,we see a spark ignite the gunpowder1 we see one billiard-ball impel another4 ,though we consider these as constant antecedents and consequents1 the idea of something intermediate is irresistibly conjoined4 ,to this1 though wholly unknown1 we annex a name1 that we may be able to speak of it4 ,the name we have invented for this purpose is ,,power4 ,thus1 we conceive that it is not the spark which ignites the gunpowder1 but the power of the spark2 it is not one billiard-ball that moves the other1 but the power of the ball4 ,the ,power1 in this case1 is a supposed consequent of the moving ball1 and antecedent of the moved2 and so in all other cases4 ,but the idea of an event does not call up the idea of its constant antecedent in closer and more intense association1 than it calls up that of its consequent or consequents4 ,i cannot have the idea of water1 without the idea of its mobility1 its weight1 and other obvious properties4 ,i cannot have the idea of rhubarb1 without the idea of its nauseous taste1 and other familiar properties4 ,i cannot have the idea of the stroke of a sword upon the head of a man1 without the idea of a wound inflicted on his head4 ,i cannot have the idea of my falling from a ship into the middle of the sea1 without the idea of my being drowned4 ,i cannot have the idea of my falling from the top of a high tower1 without having the idea of my being killed by the fall4 ,if ,i have the first idea1 the second forces itself upon me4 ,the union has in it all that ,i mark by the word necessity2 a sequence1 constant1 immediate1 and inevitable4 ,this great law of our nature shews to us #cfg immediately in what manner our idea of the future is generated4 ,night has regularly been followed by morning4 ,the idea of night is followed by that of morning2 the idea of morning is followed by that of the events of the morning1 the gradual increase of light1 the occupations of men1 the movements of animals and objects1 and all their several successions from morning till night4 ,this is the idea of to-morrow2 to this succeeds another to-morrow2 and an indefinite number of these to-morrows makes up the complex idea of futurity4 ,but ,i am told1 that we have not only the idea of to-morrow1 but the belief of to-morrow2 and ,i am asked what that belief is4 ,i answer1 that you have not only the idea of to-morrow1 but have it inseparably4 ,it will also appear1 that wherever the name belief is applied1 there is a case of the indissoluble association of ideas4 ,it will further appear1 that1 in instances without number1 the name belief is applied to a mere case of indissoluble association2 and no instance can be adduced in which any thing besides an indissoluble association can be shewn in belief4#ajc ,it would seem #cfh to follow from this1 with abundant evidence1 that the whole of my notion of to-morrow1 belief included1 is nothing but a case of the inevitable sequence of ideas4 ,bain's footnote #ajc3 ,the case that is most thoroughly opposed to the theory of indissoluble association is our belief in the ,uniformity of ,nature4 ,our overweening tendency to anticipate the future from the past is shown prior to all association2 the first effect of experience is to abridge and modify a strong primitive urgency4 ,there is1 no doubt1 a certain stage when association co-operates to justify the believing state4 ,after our headlong instinct has1 by a series of reverses1 been humbled and toned down1 and after we have discovered that the uniformity1 at first imposed by the mind upon everything1 applies to some things and not to others1 we are confirmed by our experience in the cases where the uniformity prevails2 and the intellectual growth of association counts for a small part of the believing impetus4 ,still1 the efficacy of experience is perhaps negative rather than positive2 it saves1 in certain cases1 the primitive force of anticipation from the attacks made upon it in the other cases where it is contradicted by the facts4 ,it does not make belief1 it conserves a pre-existing belief4 7,see ,note at the end of the chapter47--,b4 ,this1 however1 is a part of our constitution1 of so much importance1 that it must be scrutinized with more than ordinary minuteness4 ,our first assertion was1 that in every instance of belief1 there is indissoluble association of the ideas4 ,we shall confine our examples1 for the present1 to that case of belief which is more immediately under our examination2 belief in the future4 ,i believe1 that if ,i put my finger in the flame of the candle1 ,i shall feel the pain of burning4 ,i believe1 that if a stone is dropped in the air1 it will fall to the ground4 ,it is evident that in these cases1 the belief consists in uniting two events1 the antecedent1 and the consequent4 ,there are in it1 therefore1 two ideas1 that of the antecedent1 and that of the consequent1 and the union of those ideas4 ,the previous illustrations have abundantly shewn us1 in what manner the two ideas are united by association1 and indissolubly united4 ,these ingredients in the belief are all indisputable4 ,that there is any other cannot be shewn4 #cfi ,our second assertion was1 that cases of indissoluble association1 admitted by all men to be this1 and nothing more1 are acknowledged as ,belief4 ,the facts 7which any one may call to recollection71 in proof of this assertion1 deserve the greatest attention2 they shew the mode of investigating some of the most latent combinations of the human mind4 ,no fact is more instructive1 in this respect1 than one1 which more than once we have had occasion to make use of2 the association of the ideas of distance1 extension1 and figure1 with the sensations of sight4 ,i open my eyes2 ,i see the tables1 and chairs1 the floor1 the door1 the walls of my room1 and the books ranged upon the walls2 some of these things at one distance1 some at another2 some of one shape and size1 some of another4 ,my belief is1 that ,i see all those particulars4 ,yet the fact is1 that ,i see nothing but certain modifications of light2#ajd and that all my belief of seeing the distance1 the size1 and figure of those several objects1 is nothing but the close and inseparable association of the ideas of other senses4 ,there is no room for even a surmise that there is any thing in this case but the immediate blending of the ideas of one sense with the sensations of another1 derived from the constant concomitance of the sensations themselves4 ,bain's footnote #ajd3 ,more guardedly--',i am affected by certain modifications of light4' ,the word 'see' carries with it too much meaning for the case put4 ,there is also the omission1 previously remarked on1 to take into account the mental elements due to the movements of the eye--visible forms1 magnitudes1 and movements4--,b4 ,the case of hearing is perfectly analogous1 though #cgj not so exact4 ,i am in the dark2 ,i hear the voice of one man1 and say he is behind me2 of another1 and say he is before me2 of another1 he is on my right hand2 another1 on my left4 ,i hear the sound of a carriage1 and say1 it is at one distance2 the sound of a trumpet1 and say1 it is at another4 ,in these cases ,i believe1 not only that ,i hear a sound1 but the sound of a man's voice1 the sound of a carriage1 the sound of a trumpet4 ,yet no one imagines that my belief is any thing1 in these cases1 but the close association of the sounds with the ideas of the objects4 ,i believe1 not only that ,i hear the sound of a man's voice1 but that ,i hear it behind me1 or before me2 on my right hand1 or on my left2 at this distance1 or at that4 ,the indisputable fact1 in the mean time1 is1 that ,i hear only a modification of sound1 and that the position and distance1 which ,i believe ,i hear1 are nothing but ideas of other senses1 closely associated with those modifications of sound4 ,that this state of consciousness1 the result of an immediate irresistible association1 is identical with the state which we name belief1 is proved by a very remarkable experiment1 the deception produced by ventriloquism4 ,a man acquires the art of forming that peculiar modification of sound1 which would come from this or that position1 different from the position he is in2 in other words1 the sound which is associated1 not with the idea of the position he is in1 but that of another position4 ,the sound is heard2 the association takes place2 we cannot help believing that the sound proceeds from a certain place1 though we know1 that is1 immediately recognize1 that it proceeds from another4 ,we must not be afraid of tediousness1 while we #cga adduce instances in superabundance1 to prove that in dissoluble association 7in one remarkable class of its cases1 which1 on account of their vast importance1 it is found expedient to distinguish by a particular name7 is that state of consciousness1 to which we have given the name of ,,belief4 ,we are all of us familiar with that particular feeling1 which is produced1 when we have turned ourselves round with velocity several times4 ,we ,,believe that the world is turning round4 ,the sound of bells1 opposed by the wind1 appears to be farther off4 ,a person speaking through a trumpet appears to be nearer4 ,our experience is1 that sounds decrease by distance4 ,a sound is decreased by opposition of the wind2 the idea of distance is associated2 and the association being inseparable1 it is belief4 ,a sound is increased by issuing from a trumpet1 the idea of proximity is associated1 and the association being indissoluble1 it is belief4 ,in passing1 on board of ship1 another ship at sea1 we believe that she has all the motion1 we none3 though we may be sailing rapidly before the wind1 she making hardly any progress against it4 ,when we have been making a journey in a stage coach1 or a voyage in a ship1 we believe1 for some time after leaving the vehicle1 that still we are feeling its motion2 more especially just as we are falling asleep4 ,nobody doubts1 that these1 and similar cases of belief1 which are very numerous1 are all to be resolved into pure association4 ,what the associations are1 we leave to be traced by the learner2 so many repetitions of the same process1 though a useful exercise to him1 would be very tedious here4 #cgb ,the ,belief which takes place in ,dreaming merits great attention in this part of our inquiry4 ,no belief is stronger than that which we experience in dreaming4 ,our belief of some of the frightful objects1 which occur to us1 is such1 as to extort from us loud cries2 and to throw us into such tremors and bodily agitations1 as the greatest real dangers would fail in producing4 ,not less intense is our belief in the pleasurable objects which occur to us in dreams2 nor are the agitations which they produce in our bodies much less surprising4 ,yet there is hardly any difference of opinion about the real nature of the phenomena which occur in dreaming4 ,that our dreams are mere currents of ideas1 following one another by association2 not controlled1 as in our waking hours1 by sensations and will2 is the substance of every theory of dreaming4 ,the belief1 therefore1 which occurs in dreaming1 is merely a case of association2 and hence it follows that nothing more is necessary to account for ,belief4 ,there is not a more decisive instance of the identity of ,belief and ,association1 than the dread of ghosts1 felt in the dark1 by persons who possess1 in its greatest strength1 the habitual disbelief of their existence4 ,that dread implies belief1 and an uncontrollable belief1 we need not stay to prove4 ,when the persons of whom we speak feel the dread of ghosts in the dark1 the meaning is1 that the idea of ghost is irresistibly called up by the sensation of darkness4 ,there is here1 indisputably1 a case of indissoluble association2 nor can it be shewn that there is anything else4 ,in the dark1 when this strong association is produced1 there #cgc is the belief2 not in the dark1 when the association is not produced1 there is no belief4#aje ,bain's footnote #aje3 ,the efficacy of association is not correctly explained in this instance4 ,the influence of ,terror on belief is unquestionably great2 but the operation is more complicated than the description given of it in the text4 ,terror1 in the first place1 is a depressing passion1 and as such impairs the tone of mind suited to the anticipation of coming good1 or in the obverse1 increases the tendency to anticipate coming evil4 ,in the next place1 it is the state most liable to a morbid fixed idea of evil1 calamity1 or danger4 ,thirdly1 we have learned in the course of our lives to expect numerous possible calamities2 and are maintained in serenity only by seeing clearly a good way before us1 so as to be sure that none of these possible evils are approaching4 ,darkness extinguishes for the time our assuring fore-sight1 and thus1 by removing a counteractive1 leaves us a prey to all the demons of mischief4 ,fourthly1 the emotion of ,terror has its corresponding imaginations1 into which are taken up with avidity all the suggestions of danger that have ever been made to us1 including ghosts1 hobgoblins1 and other agents of calamity1 when we have not natural vigour or express training to set them at nought4 ,the mere fact communicated to us1 on a few occasions1 that ghosts appear in the dark1 and sometimes perform dreadful deeds1 would not by force of association alone produce all that un-nerving effect which children and weak or superstitious persons are liable to when1 at night1 exposed in a lonely place1 or passing a churchyard4--,b4 ,few men1 except those who are accustomed to it1 could walk on the ridge of a high house without falling down4 ,yet the same men could walk with perfect security1 on similar footing1 placed on the ground4 ,what is the interpretation of this contrariety8 ,fear1 we are told1 is that which makes the #cgd inexperienced person fall4 ,but fear implies belief4 ,there is nothing1 however1 in the case1 but the intense association of the idea of his falling1 with his sight of the position in which he is placed4 ,in some persons this idea is so easily excited1 that they cannot look down from even a very moderate height1 without feeling giddy1 as they call it2 that is1 without having the apprehension2 in other words1 the belief1 of falling4#aa99 ,mill's footnote #aa3 ,the same account1 in substance1 of some of the last of these phenomena1 is given by ,dr4 ,brown2 and it may aid the conceptions of the learner1 to observe the different modes of exposition used by two different writers4 ,there can be no question1 that he who travels in the same carriage1 with the same external appearances of every kind by which a robber could be tempted or terrified1 will be in equal danger of attack1 whether he carry with him little of which he can be plundered1 or such a booty as would impoverish him if it were lost4 ,but there can be no question also1 that though the probabilities of danger be the same1 the fear of attack would1 in these two cases1 be very different2 that1 in the one case1 he would laugh at the ridiculous terror of any one who journeyed with him1 and expressed much alarm at the approach of evening2 and that1 in the other case1 his own eye would watch suspiciously every horseman who approached1 and would feel a sort of relief when he observed him pass carelessly and quietly along at a considerable distance behind4 ,that the fear1 as a mere emotion1 should be more intense1 according to the greatness of the object1 might indeed be expected2 and if this were all1 there would be nothing wonderful in the state of mind which ,i have now described4 ,but there is not merely a greater intensity of fear1 there is1 in spite of reflection1 a greater belief of probability of attack4 ,there is fear1 in short1 and fear to which we readily yield1 when otherwise all fear would have seemed absurd4 ,the reason of this it will perhaps not be difficult for you to discover1 if you remember the explanations formerly given by me1 of some analogous phenomena4 ,the loss of what is valuable in itself1 is of course a great affliction4 ,the slightest possibility of such an evil makes the evil itself occur to us1 as an object of conception1 though not at first1 perhaps1 as an object of what can be termed fear4 ,its very greatness1 however1 makes it1 when thus conceived1 dwell longer in the mind2 and it cannot dwell long1 even as a mere conception1 without exciting1 by the common influence of suggestion1 the different states of mind1 associated with the conception of any great evil2 of which associate or resulting states1 in such circumstances1 fear is one of the most constant and prominent4 ,the fear is thus readily excited as an associate feeling2 and when the fear has once been excited1 as a mere associate feeling1 it continues to be still more readily suggested again1 at every moment1 by the objects that suggested it1 and with the perception or conception of which it has recently co-existed4 ,there is a remarkable analogy to this process1 in the phenomena of giddiness1 to which ,i have before more than once alluded4 ,whether the height on which we stand1 be elevated only a few feet1 or have beneath it a precipitous abyss of a thousand fathoms1 our footing1 if all other circumstances be the same1 is in itself equally sure4 ,yet though we look down1 without any fear1 on the gentle slope1 in the one case1 we shrink back in the other case with painful dismay4 ,the lively conception of the evil which we should suffer in a fall down the dreadful descent1 which is very naturally suggested by the mere sight of the precipice1 suggests and keeps before us the images of horror in such a fall1 and thus indirectly the emotions of fear1 that are the natural accompaniments of such images1 and that but for those images never would have arisen4 ,we know well1 on reflection1 that it is a footing of the firmest rock1 perhaps1 on which we stand1 but in spite of reflection1 we feel1 at least1 at every other moment1 as if this very rock itself were crumbling or sinking beneath us4 ,in this case1 as in the case of the traveller1 the liveliness of the mere conception of evil that may be suffered1 gives a sort of temporary probability to that which would seem to have little likelihood in itself1 and which derives thus from mere imagination all the terror that is falsely embodied by the mind in things that exist around4 ,it is not1 then1 any simple ratio of probabilities which regulates the rise of our hopes and fears1 but of these combined with the magnitude or insignificance of the objects4--,lectures on the ,philosophy of the ,human ,mind4 ,lecture ,,lxv41 vol4 iii41 p4 #cde--cdg4 #b;d ed4 ,notwithstanding this1 the ideas of ,dr4 ,brown were so far from being clear and settled on the subject1 that in the same work1 ,lecture ,,vi41 v4 i41 p4 #aae1 he seems to affirm1 that belief cannot be accounted for by association1 but must be referred to instinct2 though it is necessary to use the word seems1 for it is not absolutely certain that he does not by instinct mean association4--7,author's ,note47 #cge ,from these illustrations1 then1 it does not appear that the anticipation of the future from the past1 contains in it any thing peculiar4 ,so far from standing by itself1 a phenomenon sui generis it is included in one of the most general of the laws of the human mind4 ,when ,professor ,stewart1 therefore1 and other writers1 erect it into an object of wonder1 a prodigy1 a thing falling within no general rule2 and tell us they can refer it to nothing but instinct2 which is as much #cgf as to say1 to nothing at all2 the term instinct1 in all cases1 being a name for nothing but our own ignorance2 they only confess their failure in tracing the phenomena of the mind to the grand comprehensive law of association2 to the admission of which1 in its full extent1 they seem to have had a most unaccountable1 and a most unphilosophical aversion2--as if that simplicity1 according to which one law is found #cgg included in a higher1 and that in a yet higher1 till we arrive at a few which seem to include the whole1 were not as much to be expected in the world of mind1 as in the world of matter4#ab99 ,mill's footnote #ab3 ,locke1 at a period subsequent to the publication of his ,essay1 seems to have become more sensible of the importance of association4 ,these are his words3--,i think ,i shall make some other additions to be put into your ,latin translation1 and particularly concerning the connexion of ideas1 which has not1 that ,i know1 been hitherto considered1 and has1 ,i guess1 a greater influence upon our minds1 than is usually taken notice of4--,locke1 ,lett4 to ,molineux1 ,april #bfth1 #afie4--7;,author's ,note47 ,when ,locke wrote the letter here quoted1 he had not yet written the chapter of his ,essay which treats of the ,association of ,ideas4 ,that chapter did not appear in the original edition1 but was first inserted in the fourth1 published in #afij4 ,the intention1 therefore1 which he expressed to ,molineux1 has received its fulfilment2 and the passage quoted further on in the text1 is part of the addition which he contemplated4--,ed4 ,we have now then explored those states of ,consciousness which we call ,belief in existences2--,belief in present existences2 ,belief in past existences2 and ,belief in future existences4 ,we have seen that1 in the most simple cases1 ,belief consists in sensation alone1 or ideas alone2 in the more complicated cases1 in sensation1 ideas1 and association1 combined2 and in no case of belief has any other ingredient been found4 ,in accounting for belief in present objects not acting on the senses1--it appeared1 that a certain anticipation of the future entered1 for so much1 into this compound phenomenon2 the explanation of which part we were obliged to leave1 till the #cgh anticipation of the future had undergone investigation4 ,we have now seen that this part1 as well as the rest1 consists of association4 ,the whole1 therefore1 of this case of belief1 is now resolved into association4 ,mr4 ,locke1 whose expositions of any of our mental phenomena are almost always instructive1 even when they stop short of being complete1 has given the above account of belief precisely1 in one remarkable and very extensive class of cases2 those in which the belief is unfounded2 which he denominates prejudices4 ,there is1 he says1#ac99 scarce any one that does not observe something that seems odd to him1 and is in itself really extravagant in the opinions1 reasonings1 and actions1 of other men4 ,mill's footnote #ac3 ,essay on the ,human ,understanding1 ,b4 ,,ii41 ,ch4 #cc4 ,this sort of unreasonableness is usually imputed to education and prejudice2 and for the most part truly enough2 though that reaches not the bottom of the disease1 nor shews distinctly enough whence it rises1 or wherein it lies4 ,education is often rightly assigned for the cause2 and prejudice is a good general name for the thing itself2 but yet1 ,i think1 he ought to look a little farther1 who would trace this sort of madness to the root it springs from1 and so explain it1 as to shew whence this flaw has its original in very sober and rational minds1 and wherein it consists4 ,mr4 ,locke affords the explanation1 which he thought necessary to be given1 and proceeds as follows4 ,some of our ideas have a natural correspondence and connexion one with another4 ,it is the office1 and #cgi excellence1 of our reason1 to trace these2 and hold them together in that union and correspondence1 which is founded in their peculiar beings4 ,besides this1 there is another connexion of ideas1 wholly owing to chance or custom4 ,ideas1 that in themselves are not at all of kin1 come to be so united in some men's minds1 that it is very hard to separate them4 ,they always keep in company2 and the one no sooner at any time comes into the understanding1 but its associate appears with it4 ,and if they are more than two which are thus united1 the whole gang1 always inseparable1 shew themselves together4 ,this wrong connexion1 in our minds1 of ideas in themselves loose and independent of one another1 has such an influence1 and is of so great force1 to set us awry in our actions1 as well moral as natural1 passions1 reasonings1 and notions themselves2 that perhaps there is not any one thing that deserves more to be looked after4 ,the ideas of goblins and sprights have really no more to do with darkness than light4 ,yet let but a foolish maid inculcate these often in the mind of a child1 and raise them there together1 possibly he shall never be able to separate them again so long as he lives2 but darkness shall ever afterwards bring with it those frightful ideas1 and they shall be so joined1 that he can no more bear the one than the other4 ,a man receives a sensible injury from another2 thinks on the man and that action over and over2 and by ruminating on them strongly1 or much in his mind1 so cements those two ideas together1 that he makes them almost one4 ,when this combination is settled1 and while it #chj lasts1 it is not in the power of reason to help us and relieve us from the effects of it4 ,ideas in our minds1 when they are there1 will operate according to their nature and circumstances4 ,and1 here1 we see the cause why ,time cures certain affections1 which reason1 though in the right1 has not power over1 nor is able1 against them1 to prevail with those who are apt to hearken to it in other cases4 ,after adducing various examples1 to illustrate the effect of these associations1 in producing both vicious affections1 and absurd opinions1 he thus concludes3 ,that which thus captivates our reasons1 and leads men blindfold from common sense1 will1 when examined1 be found to be what we are speaking of4 ,some independent ideas of no alliance to one another1 are1 by education1 custom1 and the constant din of their party1 so coupled in their minds1 that they always appear there together2 and they can no more separate them in their thoughts1 than if there were but one idea2 and they operate as if they were so4 ,this gives sense to jargon1 demonstration to absurdity1 and consistency to nonsense2 and is the foundation of the greatest1 ,i had almost said1 of all1 the errors in the world4 ,such is ,mr4 ,locke's account of wrong belief1 or error4 ,but wrong belief is belief1 no less than right belief4 ,wrong belief1 according to ,locke1 arises from a bad association of ideas4 ,right belief1 then1 arises from a right association of ideas2 and this also was evidently ,locke's opinion4 ,it is1 thus1 association1 in both cases2 only1 in the case of wrong belief1 the association is between ideas which ought not to #cha be associated2 in the case of right belief1 it is between ideas which ought to be associated4 ,in the case of right belief1 the association is between ideas which1 in the language of ,locke1 have a natural correspondence and connexion one with another3 in the case of wrong belief1 it is between ideas1 which in themselves are not at all of kin1 and are joined only by chance or custom4 ,the ideas of the colour1 shape1 and smell of the rose2 the ideas of the spark falling on the gunpowder1 and the explosion1--are the sorts of ideas which are understood1 by ,mr4 ,locke1 as having a natural correspondence and connexion4 ,ideas1 such as those of darkness1 with those of ghosts2 of the miseries suffered at school1 with the reading of books1--are the kind which he describes as not of kin1 and united in the mind only by chance or custom4 ,this1 put into accurate language1 means1 that when the ideas are connected in conformity with the connexions of things1 the belief is right belief2 when the ideas are connected not in conformity with the connexions of things1 the belief is wrong belief4 ,the ideas1 however1 which are connected in conformity with the connexions among things1 are connected by custom1 as much as those which are connected not in conformity with those connexions4 ,and the custom which unites them in conformity1 is by far the most common of the two4 ,it is1 in fact1 the regular1 the ordinary1 the standard custom1 the other only constitutes the exceptions4 ,,ii4 ,we have divided ,belief into1 #a1 ,belief in events1 real existences2 #b1 ,belief in testimony2 #c1 ,belief in the truth of propositions4 ,though this division1 suggested by the ordinary #chb forms of language1 appeared to me didactically convenient1 it is not logically correct4 ,the expression1 ,belief in testimony1 is elliptical4 ,when completed1 it becomes ,belief in events upon the evidence of testimony4 ,there are then1 in reality1 only two kinds of ,belief2 #a4 ,belief in events or real existences2 and #b4 ,belief in the truth of ,propositions4 ,but ,belief in events or real existences has two foundations2 #a4 our own experience2 #b4 the testimony of others4 ,the first of these we have examined1 the consideration of the second remains4 ,when we begin1 however1 to look at the second of these foundations more closely1 it soon appears1 that it is not in reality distinct from the first4 ,for what is testimony8 ,it is itself an event4 ,when we believe any thing1 therefore1 in consequence of testimony1 we only believe one event in consequence of another4 ,but this is the general account of our belief in events4 ,it is the union of the ideas1 of an antecedent1 and a consequent1 by a strong association4 ,i believe it is one o'clock4 ,why8 ,i have just heard the clock strike4 ,striking of the clock1 antecedent2 one o'clock1 consequent2 the second closely associated with the first4 ,the striking of the clock is in fact a species of testimony4 ,what does it testify8 ,not one event1 but an infinite number of events1 of which the term one o'clock is the name4 ,at every instant in the course of the day1 a number of events are taking place1 some known to us1 some unknown4 ,the term one o'clock1 is the name of those which take place at a particular point of the diurnal revolution4 ,i believe in them all upon the testimony of the clock4 ,why8 ,from experience2--every one would directly and #chc truly reply4 ,i have found the events constantly1 or at least very regularly1 conjoined4 ,from junction of the events1 junction of the ideas2 in other words1 belief4 ,if proof1 only1 were wanted1 this would suffice4 ,for the purpose1 however1 of instruction1 tuition1 training1 a more minute developement of this important case of belief seems too useful to be dispensed with1 notwithstanding the tediousness which so many repetitions of the same process are too likely to produce4 ,the watchman calling the hour1 is a case of human testimony4 ,that the account of our belief1 in this case1 is precisely the same as that in the case of the striking of the clock1 it is wholly unnecessary to prove4 ,but if our reliance on testimony in one case is pure experience1 it may reasonably be inferred that it is so in all4 ,the forms of expression1 which we apply to this case of belief1 are very misleading4 ,we say1 we believe a man1 or1 we believe his testimony4 ,we attach belief to the man1 or1 to his testimony4 ,in these expressions1 the name belief is applied to the wrong event2 to the antecedent1 instead of the consequent4 ,what we mean to say is1 that we believe the consequent1 the thing testified1 not the antecedent1 the speaking of the words4 ,the words the man uses1 are1 to us1 sensations3 belief that he uses the words1 is not what is meant by belief in his testimony4 ,the same form of expression is perfectly absurd1 when applied to other cases4 ,we never say that we believe the flame of the candle1 or we attach belief to the flame of the candle1 when we mean to state the belief1 that a finger will be burnt if it is put into the flame2 #chd we never say we believe the spark1 when we mean to express our belief of an explosion when the spark falls upon the gunpowder4 ,the only question1 then1 is1 in what manner the words of the testifier1 the antecedent1 come to be so united with the idea of the thing testified1 as to constitute belief4 ,and surely there is no difficulty here1 either in conceiving1 or admitting the process4 ,words call up ideas by association1 solely4 ,there is no natural connexion between them4 ,the manner in which words are applied to events1 ,i know most intimately by my own experience4 ,i am constantly1 and1 from the first moment ,i could use them1 have constantly been1 employing words in exact conformity with events4 ,cases occur in which ,i do not1 but they are few in comparison with those in which ,i do4 ,it has been justly remarked1 that the greatest of liars speak truth a thousand times for once that they utter falsehood4 ,the connexion between the use of words1 and the idea of conformable existence1 is1 of course1 established into one of the strongest associations of the human mind4 ,in other words1 belief1 in consequence of testimony1 is1 strictly1 a case of association4 ,that we interpret other men's actions by our own1 no one doubts2 and that we do so entirely by association has already been proved4 ,in accounting for belief in past existences where it is not memory1 we have found that it is resolvable into belief in testimony1 and in the uniformity of the laws of nature2 and the explanation of this we postponed till the cases of belief in testimony1 and in the uniformity of the laws of nature1 should be expounded4 ,a few words will now suffice to connect the #che explanations formerly given with those which have now been presented4 ,the two cases1 as we have seen1 resolve themselves into one2 as belief in testimony is but a case of the anticipation of the future from the past2 and belief in the uniformity of the laws of nature is but another name for the same thing4 ,i believe the event called the fire of ,london1 upon testimony4 ,i believe that the stranger who now passes before my window1 had a father and mother1 was once an infant1 then a boy1 next a youth1 then a man1 and that he has been nourished by food from his birth2 all this1 from my belief in the uniformity of the laws of nature4 ,after the preceding developments1 it is surely unnecessary to be minute in the analysis of these instances4 ,i have had experience1 of a constant series of antecedents and consequents1 in the life of man2 generation1 birth1 childhood1 and so on2 as ,i have had of pain from putting my finger in the flame4 ,a corresponding association is formed4 ,if the sight of a stranger calls up the idea of his origin and progress to manhood1 the ordinary train of antecedents and consequents is called up2 nor is it possible for me to prevent it4 ,the association is indissoluble1 and is one of the cases classed under the name of ,belief4 ,the explanation is still more simple of my belief in the fire of ,london4 ,the testimony in this case is of that sort which ,i have always experienced to be conformable to the event4 ,between such testimony1 and the idea of the event testified1 ,i have1 therefore1 an indissoluble association4 ,the testimony uniformly calls up the idea of the reality of the event1 so closely1 #chf that ,i cannot disjoin them4 ,but the idea1 irresistibly forced upon me1 of a real event1 is ,belief4#ajf ,bain's footnote #ajf3 ,the belief in ,testimony is derived from the primary credulity of the mind1 in certain instances left intact under the wear and tear of adverse experience4 ,hardly any fact of the human mind is better attested than the primitive disposition to receive all testimony with unflinching credence4 ,it never occurs to the child to question any statement made to it1 until some positive force on the side of scepticism has been developed4 ,gradually we find that certain testimonies are inconsistent with fact2 we have1 therefore1 to go through a long education in discriminating the good testimonies from the bad4 ,to the one class1 we adhere with the primitive force of conviction that in the other class has been shaken and worn away by the shocks of repeated contradictions4--,b4 ,it is in this way that belief in ,history is to be explained4 ,it is because ,i cannot resist the evidence2 in other words1 because the testimony calls up irresistibly the idea1 that ,i believe in the battle of ,marathon1 in the existence of the ,thirty ,tyrants of ,athens1 in that of ,socrates1 ,plato1 and so on4 ,,iii4 ,we come now to what we set out with stating as the third case of ,belief2 but which1 as there are in reality but two kinds of belief1 is1 strictly speaking1 the second1--,i mean ,belief in the ,truth of ,propositions2 in other words1 verbal truths4 ,the process by which this ,belief is generated1 or rather the combination wherein it consists1 has1 by the writers on ,logic1 at least those in the ,latin and modern languages1 been called ,,judgment4 ,this1 however1 is a restricted sense4 ,in general1 the word ,judgment is used with more latitude4 ,sometimes it is nearly co-extensive with ,belief1 excluding hardly #chg any but the sudden and momentary cases4 ,we should hardly say1 ,a man judges there are ghosts1 who is afraid of them in the dark1 but firmly believes his fear is unfounded2 or judges the surgeon to be noxious1 whom he shudders at the sight of1 from recollection of the terrible operation which he underwent at his hands4 ,in all cases1 however1 either of deliberate or well-founded belief1 we seem to apply the word judgment without impropriety4 ,i judge that ,i see the light1 that ,i hear the drum1 that my friend speaks the truth1 that water is flowing in the ,ganges4 ,all ,belief of events1 except that of our present sensations1 and ideas1 consists1 as we have seen1 in the combination of the ideas of an antecedent and a consequent4 ,the antecedent is sometimes simple1 sometimes compound1 being not one event1 but various events taken together4 ,these varieties in the antecedent constitute two distinguishable cases of belief4 ,the last of them1 that in which the antecedent is complex1 is that in which the term judgment is most commonly applied4 ,again1 there are two cases of complex antecedent1 one1 in which all the events are concordant2 another1 in which they are not all concordant4 ,it is to this last case that the term judgment is most peculiarly applied4 ,thus1 it is not usual to say1 that we judge we shall feel pain if we put a finger in the flame of the candle4 ,but if we saw two armies ready to engage1 one of which had considerable superiority1 both in numbers and discipline1 we should say we judge that it would gain the victory4 ,this case1 however1 of belief1 where the antecedent is complex1 will receive additional illustration farther on4 #chh ,we have now to consider the case of ,belief in the truth of propositions4 ,,proposition is a name for that form of words which makes a predication4 ,what ,predication is1 of what parts it consists1 what end it serves1 and into how many kinds it is divided1 we have already explained4 ,it remains to inquire what is meant by the ,,truth of a ,predication1 and what state of consciousness it is which is called the recognition or ,,belief of that truth4 ,predication consists essentially in the application of two marks to the same thing4 ,of this there are two remarkable cases2 one1 ,that in which two names of equal extent are applied to the same thing2 another1 ,that in which two names1 one of less1 another of greater extent1 are applied to the same thing4 ,the questions we have to resolve are1 ,what is meant by truth in these cases2 and1 ,what is the process1 or complex state of consciousness1 which is called assent to the proposition1 or belief of it4 ,and1 first1 as to the case of two names of equal extent1 as when we say1 ,man is a rational animal2 here the two names are1 ,man1 and ,rational animal1 exactly equivalent2 so that man is the name of whatever rational animal is the name of2 and rational animal is the name of whatever man is the name of4 ,this coincidence of the names is all that is meant by the truth of the proposition2 and my recognition of that coincidence is another name for my belief in its truth4 ,now1 how is it that ,i recognise two names as equivalent8 ,about this1 there will not be any dispute4 ,i recognise the meaning of names solely by #chi association4 ,i recognise that such a name is of such a meaning1 by association4 ,i recognise that another name is of the same signification1 by the same means4 ,that ,i recognise the meaning of the last1 whatever it is1 by association1 cannot be doubted1 because it is by this that the meaning of every word is established4 ,there is1 however1 another fact2 that ,i recognise the meaning in the second case1 as the same with the meaning in the first case4 ,what is the process of this recognition8 ,the word ,man is the mark or name of a certain cluster of ideas4 ,a certain cluster of ideas ,i know to be what it is1 by having it4 ,having it1 and knowing it1 are two names for the same thing4 ,having it1 and having it again1 is knowing it1 and knowing it again2 and that is the recognition of its sameness4 ,it is a single name for the two states of consciousness4 ,this1 then1 is all that is meant by our belief in the truth of a proposition1 the terms of which are convertible1 or of equal extent4 ,when of two names1 applied to the same thing1 one is of less1 another of greater extent1 the association is more complex2 but in that is all the difference4 ,thus1 when ,i believe the truth of the proposition1 ,man is an animal1 the meaning of the name man is called up by association1 and the meaning of the name animal is called up by association4 ,thus far is certain4 ,but there is something further4 ,i recognise1 that animal is a name of whatever man is a name of1 and also of more4 ,in having the meaning of the name man called up by association1 that is1 in having the ideas1 ,i recognise that man is a name of ,james1 and ,john1 and ,homer1 and ,socrates1 and all the individuals of the class4 #cij ,this is pure association4 ,in having the meaning of the name animal called up by association1 ,i recognise that it is a name of ,james1 and ,john1 and all the individuals of the same class1 as well as of all the individuals of other classes2 and this is all that is meant by my ,belief in the truth of the proposition4 ,man is the name of one cluster of ideas2 animal is the name of a cluster1 including both this and other clusters4 ,the latter cluster is partly the same with1 and partly different from1 the former4 ,but having two clusters1 and knowing them to be two1 is not two things1 but one and the same thing2 knowing them in the case in which ,i call them same1 and knowing them in the case in which ,i call them different1 is still having them1 having them such as they are1 and nothing besides4 ,in this second case also1 of the belief of a proposition1 there is1 therefore1 nothing but ideas1 and association4 ,we have already shewn1 under the head ,,naming1 when explaining the purpose to which ,predication is subservient1 that all ,predication may be strictly considered as of one kind1 the application to the same thing of another name of greater extent2 in other words1 that ,predication by what ,logicians call the ,difference1 ,property1 or ,accident of a thing1 may be reduced to ,predication by the ,genus or ,species2 but as there is a seeming difference in these latter cases1 a short illustration of them will probably be useful4 ,thus1 suppose ,i say1 ,man is rational1 and that ,i choose to expound it1 without the aid of the word animal1 understood2 what is there in the case8 ,the word man1 marks a certain cluster of ideas4 ,rational marks a portion of that cluster4 ,in the #cia cluster marked man1 the cluster marked rational is included4 ,to recognise this1 is also called believing the proposition4 ,but to have one cluster of ideas1 and know what it is2 then another1 and know what it is1 is merely to have the two clusters4 ,to have a second cluster1 part of a first1 and to know that it is a part of the first1 is the same thing4 ,the peculiar property of that class of words to which ,rational belongs1 must here be recollected4 ,they are the connotative class4 ,beside marking some thing peculiarly1 they mark something else in conjunction2 and this last1 they are said to connote4 ,thus the word rational1 beside the part of the cluster1 man1 which it peculiarly marks1 connotes1 or marks in conjunction with it1 the part included under the word animal ,it will be easy to apply the same explanation to all other cases4 ,i say1 the rose is red4 ,red is a connotative term1 distinctively marking the idea of red4 ,the idea of red is part of the cluster ,i mark by the word rose4 ,take a more obscure expression2 ,fire burns4 ,it is very obvious1 that in the cluster of ideas ,i mark by the word fire1 the idea of burning is included4 ,to have the idea1 fire1 therefore1 and the idea burning1 called up by the names standing in predication1 is to believe the proposition4 ,the ,predications1 ,virtue is lovely1 ,vice is hateful1 and the like1 all admit of a similar exposition4 ,in the cluster virtue1 the idea of loveliness is included2 in the cluster vice1 that of hatefulness is included4 ,such propositions1 therefore1 merely say1 that what is a part of a thing1 is a part of it4 ,the #cib two words call up the two ideas2 and to have two ideas1 one a part of another1 and know that one is part of another1 is not two things1 but one and the same thing4 ,to have the idea of rose1 and the idea of red1 and to know that red makes part of rose1 is not two things1 but one and the same thing4 ,little more is necessary to explain this case of ,belief in the truth of ,propositions4 ,propositions are formed1 either of general names1 or particular names1 that is1 names of individuals4 ,propositions consisting of general names are by far the most numerous class1 and by far the most important4 ,the preceding exposition embraces them all4 ,they are all merely verbal2 and the ,belief is nothing more than recognition of the coincidence1 entire or partial1 of two general names4 ,the case of ,propositions formed of particular names1 is different1 and yet remains to be explained4 ,mr4 ,brougham made a speech in the ,house of ,commons on such a day4 ,the ,predicate1 making a speech in the ,house of ,commons1 is neither general1 so as to include the subject1 ,mr4 ,brougham1 as in a species2 nor is the cluster of ideas1 marked by the predicate1 included in the cluster marked by the subject1 as a part in its whole4 ,the proposition marks a case either of experience1 or of testimony4 ,if ,i heard the speech1 the proposition is an expression of the ,memory of an event2 ,mr4 ,brougham1 antecedent1 and making a speech1 consequent2 and the ,belief of the ,proposition1 is another name for the ,memory of the ,event4 ,if ,i did not hear it1 ,belief of the proposition1 is belief in the testimony of those who say they heard it4 #cic ,as all propositions relating to individual objects are1 after this manner1 marks either of other men's testimony1 or of our own experience1 what belief1 in these cases1 is1 has already been explained4 ,propositions relating to individuals may be expressions either of past1 or of future events4 ,belief in past events1 upon our own experience1 is memory2 upon other men's experience1 is ,belief in testimony2 both of them resolved into association4 ,belief in future events1 is the inseparable association of like consequents with like antecedents4 ,it is not deemed necessary to unfold these associations4 ,it has been already done4 ,it seems enough1 if they are indicated here4#ajg #ajh ,bain's footnote #ajg3 ,the author has treated in different places several questions intimately allied4 ,these are3-- #a4 ,the essential nature of the state of mind called ,belief1 the mental region whence it springs1 or the phenomena that it is to be classed with--whether ,intellect1 ,feeling1 or ,will4 #b4 ,the belief in the ,past1 and the belief in the ,future2 in what respect they differ from belief in the present4 ,inseparably implicated with this1 if not prior to it and preparatory to it1 is the difference between ideas of ,memory and ideas of ,imagination4 #c4 ,the nature of our continuous ,mental ,life1 or ,identity2 or what is meant by the ,permanent ,existence of ,mind4 ,the chapters on ,memory1 and on ,belief1 and the section on ,identity 7,chap4 ,,xiv471 all treat of these questions1 and contain profound original views on them all4 ,as regards the nature of ,belief1 he errs 7in common with philosophers generally7 in calling it a purely intellectual state4 ,the consequence is to mar the explanations of the other points4 ,he displays a remarkably just and penetrating insight into the differences between ,memory and ,imagination1 and between #cid our own self or ,personality1 and the personality of others2 whereby he fully accounts for what is involved in ,personal ,identity4 ,to resolve the difficult phenomenon of ,belief in ,memory1 of which the belief in the ,permanent ,existence of ,mind is merely another expression1 we must clear up the foundations of the state of ,belief in general4 ,the prevailing error on this subject consists in regarding ,belief as mainly a fact of the ,intellect1 with a certain participation of the feelings4 ,the usual assumption is1 that if a thing is conceived in a sufficiently vivid manner1 or if two things are strongly associated in the mind1 the state of belief is thereby induced4 ,a better clue to the real character of belief is found in the connexion between faith and works4 ,the practical test applied to a man's belief in a certain matter1 is his acting upon it4 ,a capitalist's trust in the soundness of a project1 is shown by his investing his money4 ,in its essential character1 ,belief is a phase of our active nature1--otherwise called the ,will4 ,our tendency to action1 under special circumstances1 assumes the aspect called belief2 as in other circumstances1 it takes the form of ,desire1 and in a third situation1 appears as ,intention2 none of all which are essential to voluntary action in its typical form4 ,the state of belief or of disbelief is manifested when we are pursuing an ,intermediate ,end4 ,in masticating something sweet1 the fruition of the sweetness sustains the energy of the will2 there is no case for the believing function properly so called1 any more than there is for ,desire1 ,deliberation1 or ,resolution4 ,in going to a shop to purchase sweets1 there is wanting this immediate support of the voluntary energies2 the support grows out of an ideal state1 the anticipation of the pleasure of sweetness2 this state is called ,belief4 ,we are said to believe that what we are going to purchase will impart an agreeable sensation4 ,the state is one of degree2 we may have a strong belief or a weak belief2 the strength having no other measure than the energy of pursuit inspired by it4 ,if we #cie follow the intermediate end with all the avidity shown when we are realizing the full actuality1 we have the perfect belief that what we aim at will bring the actuality4 ,if1 as often happens1 we are less strongly moved than this1 our belief is said to be so much weaker4 ,or1 the comparison may be expressed in a different form4 ,if two things are connected together as means and end2 and1 if on attaining the means1 we feel as much elated 7the end being something good7 as if we had attained the end1 then our belief is at the maximum2 if less so1 our belief is less4 ,the promise made to us by one man gives all the satisfaction of the performance2 the promise of another man gives a very inferior satisfaction2 the comparison measures our comparative trust in the two men4 ,so far the matter seems plain4 ,the real difficulty lies in assigning the mental origin or seat of the believing attitude4 ,the view to be maintained in this note is1 that the state of belief is identical with the activity or active disposition of the system1 at the moment1 and with reference to the thing believed4 ,now as there are various sources of activity1 so there are various sources of belief4 ,these are3--,first1 ,spontaneous ,activity1 or the mere overflow of energy growing out of the nourishment of the system4 ,secondly1 ,voluntary ,action1 in the strictest signification1 or the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain1 under the stimulus of one or other of those states4 ,thirdly1 the tendency of an ,idea to become an ,actuality1 the degree of which tendency accords with the mental excitement attending the idea4 ,fourthly1 the addition of ,habit to all the others4 ,under every one of these four influences1 we are prompted to act1 and in the same degree disposed to believe4 ,not one of the tendencies is any guarantee for the truth of the thing believed2 which is a somewhat grave consequence of the theory contended for4 ,it will now be asked1 in what acceptation1 or under what circumstances1 does mere activity1 no matter how arising1 constitute1 or amount to1 the state of belief4 ,there are certain situations where the two states are on the surface the same2 the fact of going along a certain road implicates the belief that #cif a certain destination will be reached4 ,nay1 farther1 a great amount of natural energy would sustain a vigorous pace1 irrespective of the certainty of the goal2 while physical feebleness would make one languid1 however strong the evidence of the distant good4 ,all this shows that the mental state called believing is of little use without the active power1 and that the active power readily simulates the believing state1 and makes it seem greater or less than it really is4 ,let us now look at the question in another light4 ,having a natural fund of activity1 with or without the addition of proper volitional impulses1 we commence moving in a certain direction1 no matter what4 ,we are not necessarily urged to move by any prospect of what we are to find4 ,we act somehow1 because action comes upon us2 and we take the consequences4 ,suppose1 however1 that we encounter a check1 in the form of obstruction or pain3 this stops our activity in that direction1 but does not prevent it from taking another direction4 ,now1 not only does the actual pain arrest our steps1 but also the memory of it 7if the circumstances are such as to give it a certain degree of strength7 is deterring4 ,we avoid that track in the future4 ,with reference to it there is generated a voluntary activity and determination1 containing the whole essence of belief2 namely1 the avoidance of a certain course1 before the point of actual pain4 ,this is1 to all intents1 belief on the side of prospective harm4 ,equally important is it to remark1 that wherever we have not experienced any positive harm1 check1 or obstruction1 we go on as readily and as energetically as ever4 ,our natural state of mind1 our primitive start is tantamount to full confidence or belief2 which is broken in upon1 only after hostile experiences2 by these1 the original condition of implicit confidence is impaired2 and in certain directions1 a positive anticipation or determining volition and belief of evil is substituted4 ,an animal born on a summer morning1 and able to move about from the first1 would not anticipate darkness2 it would behave exactly as if light were never intermitted4 ,a few days experience makes an #cig in-road on this primitive confidence1 and modifies it to suit the facts4 ,let us add another circumstance to the foregoing example4 ,instead of the individual moving blindly on1 by mere exuberance or spontaneity1 let the movement be favoured by bringing pleasure at every step4 ,in this situation1 the whole force of the spontaneity at the time1 and the whole force of the will 7proportioned to the stimulating pleasure71 sustain the movements at a more energetic pace2 and there is nothing to counter-work them4 ,the mental disposition is now equivalent to the highest confidence2 there is no hesitation1 no distrust1 nothing but exuberant unrestrained activity4 ,neither scepticism as to the unknown future1 nor a demand for assurance that the present condition is to last1 is entertained by the mind4 ,the individual does not inquire whether a precipice1 or the lair of a devouring beast be on the track4 ,the ignorance is at once bliss and belief4 ,here1 then1 we may discern the original tendency of the mind as regards belief4 ,to have gone a certain way with safety and with fruition1 is an ample inducement to continue in that particular path4 ,the situation contains all that is meant by full and unbounded confidence that the future and the distant will be exactly what the present is4 ,the primary impulse of every creature is at the farthest remove from a procedure according to ,logic4 ,in the beginning1 confidence is at its maximum2 the course of education is towards abating1 and narrowing it1 so as to adapt it to the fact of things4 ,every check is a lesson1 destroying to a certain extent the over-vaulting assurance of the natural mind1 and planting a belief in evil1 at points where originally flourished only the illimitable belief in good4 ,there is thus wrapped up1 in the active impulses of our nature1 a power of credulity leading us habitually to overstep the experience of the present4 ,we believe in the uniformity of nature with a vengeance4 ,we have to be schooled by adverse encounters1 before we are brought within the limits of the real uniformity4 ,our natural credulity is equally excessive #cih on the side of evil and on the side of good2 where we have once suffered we expect always to suffer4 ,in short1 whereas to the logician1 there is a great gulf between the present and future1 the known and the unknown1 to the natural man there is not even a break4 ,the early mind laughs the logician's gulf to scorn4 ,all that science or logic has been able to do is to show that at certain points the assumed uniformity is broken in upon2 tractable and docile minds learn to respect these exceptions2 but wherever an outlet exists1 with no barrier1 or express prohibition1 not only is that outlet followed1 it is followed with all the pristine impetuosity of our active nature4 ,the ordinary logician1 over-awed by this force of determination1 seldom asserts the principle that the present can by no logical implication contain the future1 that a present reality holds in itself no warrant for the unknown past1 the distant or the future4 ,the barrier that this principle would interpose to our inferences has been carried by assault2 the gordian knot is always cut with the sword4 ,from the point of view of the logician1 a serious difficulty attaches to our belief in the ,memory of the ,past2 the psychologist can refer it to the incontinence of the mind1 in moving freely away from the present in any direction1 in accounting the step next to be entered upon in the absence of impediment1 as secure as the one actually taken4 ,let us consider the process first by reverting to the anticipation of the ,future4 ,that a state of things now begun will continue indefinitely is what the mind not only assumes but proceeds upon with a vehemence proportioned to its active endowments and dispositions1 until admonished to the contrary by the experience of being checked4 ,all instruction1 or corroborating information1 is dispensed with at the outset3 the burden is always laid upon the denier4 ,of this tendency of the mind the examples are innumerable1 and need only to be indicated4 ,in the default of evidence1 on one side1 and against what ought to be considered evidence on the other side1 we believe that1 as we feel now1 so we shall feel always4 ,and our belief is not simply giving the benefit of any doubt there may #cii be to the opinion we incline to2 it is a powerful impulse1 counteracted only by a severe and protracted discipline4 ,also1 we believe that our own feelings exactly measure and correspond to the feelings of every one else4 ,very few are ever brought within the limits of the actual truth on this point2 the primitive tendency is not met by a sufficient force of the requisite education4 ,it is the belief in the future that offers the simplest and clearest example of the mind's tendency to overleap the actual1 to see no hard line between the present and the remote4 ,the belief in nature's continuance and uniformity has always been in excess4 ,from the very same tendency springs whatever belief we have of our own continued existence and identity4 ,we make light of the difference between the conceived future and the real present4 ,much more subtlety attends the ,belief in ,memory3 the meaning of which is1 that1 whereas certain ideas recalled by memory are1 de facto1 ideas1 or mental elements of a kind that imagination might furnish1 they yet carry with them the belief that they represent what was once actuality1 like any sensation of the present moment4 ,let us first apply to the case the overweening instinct now fully set forth4 ,to the logician1 the past1 however recent1 is divided by a deep gulf from the present3 the idea and the actuality can never be interchanged4 ,it is not so with the mind following its native disposition4 ,i have a present sensation of thirst2 in that present consciousness1 ,i have the highest attainable assurance2 my action upon it is unhesitating and complete4 ,let that sensation1 however1 pass away for one minute1 and there remains only the idea which1 as a mere idea1 by virtue of its recency1 may be at its maximum strength4 ,the point now to be explained is1 why ,i believe not merely that ,i have the idea1 which as a fact of present consciousness ,i am entitled to believe to the utmost1 but that the idea was lately a full actuality as much as is my present state of satisfied sensation4 ,the explanation seems to be1 that we really make no radical difference between a present and a proximate past2 #djj the march of the mind is to and fro1 into the past and the future1 with the same tendency to act out both1 as to act out the present1 assuming always the absence of a positive check or break4 ,such is the inveterate persistence of the natural activity1 that the belief in the thirst when present 7shown by action in accordance therewith7 has a continuing efficacy second only to the belief in a still present state4 ,at the moment of actual thirst1 ,i1 in the absence of corrective influences1 7and to some degree in spite of these71 would be disposed to believe that ,i always was1 and always would be thirsty4 ,the satisfaction that has followed reduces that belief to a fraction of its former state2 and my utmost licence of assumption would be1 7in the absence of contradictory beliefs7 that all my past has been one thirst4 ,the fact is1 that1 in these moments1 when ,i give full licence to the sway of the idea1 by voluntarily remitting attention to my new experience1 that idea may swell out into a pitch of mental occupation hardly distinguishable from the real presence2 in which case1 my past self and my present self are1 as it were1 one and indivisible2 they are freely interchanged2 the actual consciousness compounds and contains them both4 ,going another step backward1 let us consider the state prior to the thirst2 say a consciousness of heat and muscular fatigue4 ,what proof have ,i that these penultimate states were present in continuity of time and in immediate precedence to the thirst1 and are not vagaries of imagination1 nor drawn from a remote past1 accidentally revived8 ,there seems no other evidence than that already given regarding the proximate state4 ,in surrendering our mind to the idea still remaining1 and so imparting a momentary quasi-reality to the state1 we have an experience possessing the characteristic features of present reality4 ,another consideration has to be mentioned4 ,the state of transition from reality to reality is a distinct and unmistakeable experience4 ,the transition from a present sensation of thirst to a present sensation of satisfied thirst is a march of its own kind--unique and explicit4 ,there are in it attendant #dja circumstances1 not to be confounded with the transition from a present to a past across a break4 ,the recent and proximate state of thirst has a mode of continuity1 a setting in contact with the present1 such as did not belong to the thirst of yesterday1 and still less belongs to the idea of the narrated thirst of another person4 ,no sensation ever comes to us alone1 or without a group of collaterals2 and the collaterals of the formerly actual1 and of the ideal never an actual1 are wholly different4 7,this point has been well illustrated in the text1 ,chap4 ,x4 on ,memory74 ,the peculiar link whereby a present actual passes out of actuality into proximate actuality1 when it is barely deprived of existence in the real1 is a fact that remains and attaches to everything that has been actual2 and the unbroken sequence of these is our past life of actuality1 clearly marked out from every aggregate of ideas indiscriminately culled and united in a whole of imagination4 ,this last process has its own distinctive collaterals2 it is accompanied by numerous shocks of agreement in difference1 under the law of similarity2 but we do not confound these or other accompaniments with the gliding movement of the mind over the chronological past4 ,thus to take the extreme instance4 ,we can assume another person's mental state 7to a certain degree72 and yet we do not fuse that with our own identity4 ,there is a broad line of demarcation between each one's experience that they term their actual1 and the assumption of a second person's experience1 say of thirst1 of fear1 of curiosity4 ,our own past has continuity and fusion1 in itself1 and a peculiar set of circumstantial surroundings2 in general1 too1 it is easy to remember4 ,the other person's experience is received through a machinery of objective signs1 laboriously interpreted1 and not realized with the collaterals of an experience of our own2 it is shorn of all the beams of our own personality1 whether in the present or in the recollected past4 ,the distinction now drawn1 7substantially what is exemplified at length in the chapter referred to17 is confirmed by what happens on occasions when memory and imagination are confounded4 ,when a fact is long past1 and all but forgotten1 #djb the oblivion overtakes the evidentiary collaterals1 the marks of continuity that link together what has been one actual state to what has been another actual state4 ,i remember having had the idea or purpose to say or to do something on a certain occasion2 but ,i do not remember whether ,i actually did or said the thing4 ,the memory of the occasion is incomplete2 the links are snapped that connect that idea with my remembered acting at the time referred to2 it is not in its place in that authenticated series2 and it is not associated with the collateral circumstances that always attend an actual transaction4 ,on the other hand1 as is well remarked in the chapter quoted1 imagination may simulate remembered reality1 when there is wanting the real memory that would people the occasion with authentic circumstances1 and when the imagination has been excited and exercised so as to include in its compass the collaterals that go with an experience in the actual4--,b4 ,editor's footnote #ajh3 ,the analysis of ,belief presented in this chapter1 brings out the conclusion that all cases of ,belief are simply cases of indissoluble association3 that there is no generic distinction1 but only a difference in the strength of the association1 between a case of belief and a case of mere imagination3 that to believe a succession or coexistence between two facts is only to have the ideas of the two facts so strongly and closely associated1 that we cannot help having the one idea when we have the other4 ,if this can be proved1 it is the greatest of all the triumphs of the ,association ,psychology4 ,to first appearance1 no two things can be more distinct than thinking of two things together1 and believing that they are joined together in the outward world4 ,nevertheless1 that the latter state of mind is only an extreme case of the former1 is1 as we see1 the deliberate doctrine of the author of the ,analysis2 and it has also in its favour the high psychological authority of ,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer4 ,mr4 ,bain1 in the preceding note1 as well as in his systematic work1 looks at the phenomenon from another side1 and pronounces that what constitutes ,belief is the power which an #djc idea has obtained over the ,will4 ,it is well known and understood that a mere idea may take such possession of the mind as to exercise an irresistible control over the active faculties1 even independently of ,volition1 and sometimes in opposition to it4 ,this1 which ,mr4 ,bain calls the power of a ,fixed ,idea1 is exemplified in the cases of what is called fascination3 the impulse which a person looking from a precipice sometimes feels to throw himself down it2 and the cases of crimes said to have been committed by persons who abhor them1 because that very horror has filled their minds with an intense and irrepressible idea of the act4 ,since an idea is sometimes able to overpower volition1 it is no wonder that an idea should determine volition2 as it does whenever we1 under the influence of the idea of a pleasure or of a pain1 will that which obtains for us the pleasure or averts the pain4 ,in this voluntary action1 our conduct is grounded upon a relation between means and an end2 7that is1 upon a constant conjunction of facts in the way of causation1 ultimately resolvable into a case of resemblance and contiguity73 in common and unanalytical language1 upon certain laws of nature on which we rely4 ,our reliance is the consequence of an association formed in our minds between the supposed cause and its effect1 resulting either from personal experience of their conjunction1 from the teachings of other people1 or from accidental appearances4 ,now1 according to ,mr4 ,bain1 when this association between the means and the end1 the end calling up the idea of the means1 arrives at the point of giving to the idea thus called up a command over the ,will1 it constitutes ,belief4 ,we believe a thing1 when we are ready to act on the faith of it2 to face the practical consequences of taking it for granted3 and therein lies the distinction between believing two facts to be conjoined1 and merely thinking of them together4 ,thus far ,mr4 ,bain3 and with this ,i fully agree4 ,but something is still wanting to the completeness of the analysis4 ,the theory as stated1 distinguishes two antecedents1 by a difference not between themselves1 but between their consequents4 ,but when the consequents differ1 the antecedents cannot be the same4 ,an association #djd of ideas is or is not a ,belief1 according as it has or has not the power of leading us to voluntary action3 this is undeniable3 but when there is a difference in the effects there must be a difference in the cause3 the association which leads to action must be1 in some respect or other1 different from that which stops at thought4 ,the question1 therefore1 raised1 and1 as they think1 resolved1 by the author of the ,analysis and by ,mr4 ,spencer1 still demands an answer4 ,does the difference between the two cases consist in this1 that in the one case the association is dissoluble1 in the other it is so much more closely riveted1 by repetition1 or by the intensity of the associated feelings1 as to be no longer dissoluble8 ,this is the question we are compelled to face4 ,i4 ,in the first place1 then1 it may be said--,if ,belief consisted in an indissoluble association1 ,belief itself would be indissoluble4 ,an opinion once formed could never afterwards be destroyed or changed4 ,this objection is good against the word indissoluble4 ,but those who maintain the theory do not mean by an indissoluble association1 one which nothing that can be conceived to happen could possibly dissolve4 ,all our associations of ideas would probably be dissoluble1 if experience presented to us the associated facts separate from one another4 ,if we have any associations which are1 in practice1 indissoluble1 it can only be because the conditions of our existence deny to us the experiences which would be capable of dissolving them4 ,what the author of the ,analysis means by indissoluble associations1 are those which we cannot1 by any mental effort1 at present overcome4 ,if two ideas are1 at the present time1 so closely associated in our minds1 that neither any effort of our own1 nor anything else which can happen1 can enable us now to have the one without its instantly raising up the other1 the association is1 in the author's sense of the term1 indissoluble4 ,there would be less risk of misunderstanding if we were to discard the word indissoluble1 and confine ourselves to the expression which the author employs as its equivalent1 inseparable4 ,this ,i will henceforth do1 and #dje we will now enquire whether ,belief is nothing but an inseparable association4 ,in favour of this supposition there is the striking fact1 that an inseparable association very often suffices to command belief4 ,there are innumerable cases of ,belief for which no cause can be assigned1 except that something has created so strong an association between two ideas that the person cannot separate them in thought4 ,the author has given a large assortment of such cases1 and has made them tell with great force in support of his theory4 ,locke1 as the author mentions1 had already seen1 that this is one of the commonest and most fertile sources of erroneous thought2 deserving to be placed high in any enumeration of ,fallacies4 ,when two things have long been habitually thought of together1 and never apart1 until the association between the ideas has become so strong that we have great difficulty1 or cannot succeed at all1 in separating them1 there is a strong tendency to believe that the facts are conjoined in reality2 and when the association is closer still1 that their conjunction is what is called ,necessary4 ,most of the schools of philosophy1 both past and present1 are so much under the influence of this tendency1 as not only to justify it in principle1 but to elect it into a ,law of ,things4 ,the majority of metaphysicians have maintained1 and even now maintain1 that there are things which1 by the laws of intelligence1 cannot be separated in thought1 and that these things are not only always united in fact1 but united by necessity3 and1 again1 other things1 which cannot be united in thought--which cannot be thought of together1 and that these not only never do1 but it is impossible they ever should1 coexist in fact4 ,these supposed necessities are the very foundation of the ,transcendental schools of metaphysics1 of the ,common ,sense school1 and many others which have not received distinctive names4 ,these are facts in human nature and human history very favourable to the supposition that ,belief is but an inseparable association1 or at all events that an inseparable association suffices to create ,belief4 ,on the contrary side of the question it may be urged1 that #djf the inseparable associations which are so often found to generate ,beliefs1 do not generate them in everybody4 ,analytical and philosophical minds often escape from them1 and resist the tendency to believe in an objective conjunction between facts merely because they are unable to separate the ideas4 ,the author's typical example of an inseparable association1 7and there can be none more suited to the purpose17 is the association between sensations of colour and the tangible magnitudes1 figures1 and distances1 of which they are signs1 and which are so completely merged with them into one single impression1 that we believe we see distance1 extension1 and figure1 though all we really see is the optical effects which accompany them1 all the rest being a rapid interpretation of natural signs4 ,the generality of mankind1 no doubt1 and all men before they have studied the subject1 believe what the author says they do2 but a great majority of those who have studied the subject believe otherwise3 they believe that a large portion of the facts which we seem to see1 we do not really see1 but instantaneously infer4 ,yet the association remains inseparable in these scientific thinkers as in others3 the retinal picture suggests to them the real magnitude1 in the same irresistible manner as it does to other people4 ,to take another of the author's examples3 when we look at a distant terrestrial object through a telescope1 it appears nearer2 if we reverse the telescope it appears further off4 ,the signs by which we judge of distance from us1 here mislead1 because those signs are found in conjunction with real distances widely different from those with which they coexist in our ordinary experience4 ,the association1 however1 persists1 and is irresistible1 in one person as much as in another2 for every one recognises that the object1 thus looked at1 seems nearer1 or farther off1 than we know it to be4 ,but does this ever make any of us1 except perhaps an inexperienced child1 believe that the object is at the distance at which we seem to see it8 ,the inseparable association1 though so persistent and powerful as to create in everybody an optical illusion1 creates no delusion1 but leaves our belief as conformable to the realities of fact as if no such illusive appearance had presented #djg itself4 ,cases similar to this are so frequent1 that cautious and thoughtful minds1 enlightened by experience on the misleading character of inseparable associations1 learn to distrust them1 and do not1 even by a first impulse1 believe a connexion in fact because there is one in thought1 but wait for evidence4 ,following up the same objection1 it may be said that if belief is only an inseparable association1 belief is a matter of habit and accident1 and not of reason4 ,assuredly an association1 however close1 between two ideas1 is not a sufficient ground of belief2 is not evidence that the corresponding facts are united in external nature4 ,the theory seems to annihilate all distinction between the belief of the wise1 which is regulated by evidence1 and conforms to the real successions and coexistences of the facts of the universe1 and the belief of fools1 which is mechanically produced by any accidental association that suggests the idea of a succession or coexistence to the mind3 a belief aptly characterized by the popular expression1 believing a thing because they have taken it into their heads4 ,indeed1 the author of the ,analysis is compelled by his theory to affirm that we actually believe in accordance with the misleading associations which generate what are commonly called illusions of sense4 ,he not only says that we believe we see figure and distance--which the great majority of psychologists since ,berkeley do not believe2 but he says1 that in the case of ventriloquy we cannot help believing that the sound proceeds from the place1 of which the ventriloquist imitates the effect2 that the sound of bells opposed by the wind1 not only appears farther off1 but is believed to come from farther off1 although we may know the exact distance from which it comes2 that in passing on board ship1 another ship at sea1 we believe that she has all the motion1 we none3 nay even1 that when we have turned ourselves round with velocity several times1 we believe that the world is turning round4 ,surely it is more true to say1 as people generally do say1 the world seems to us to turn round4 ,to me these cases appear so many experimental proofs1 that the tendency of an inseparable association to generate belief1 even when that #djh tendency is fully effectual in creating the irresistible appearance of a state of things that does not really exist1 may yet be impotent against reason1 that is1 against preponderant evidence4 ,in defence of these paradoxes1 let us now consider what the author of the ,analysis might say4 ,one thing he would certainly say3 that the belief he affirms to exist in these cases of illusion1 is but a momentary one2 with which the belief entertained at all other times may be at variance4 ,in the case1 for instance1 of those who1 from an early association formed between darkness and ghosts1 feel terror in the dark though they have a confirmed disbelief in ghosts1 the author's opinion is that there is a temporary belief1 at the moment when the terror is felt4 ,this was also the opinion of ,dugald ,stewart3 and the agreement 7by no means a solitary one7 between two thinkers of such opposite tendencies1 reminds one of the saying ,quand un ,franais et un ,anglais sont d'accord1 il faut bien qu'ils aient raison4 ,yet the author seems to adopt this notion not from observation of the case1 but from an antecedent opinion that dread implies belief1 and an uncontrollable belief1 which1 he says1 we need not stay to prove4 ,it is to be wished1 in this case1 that he had stayed to prove it3 for it is harder to prove than he thought4 ,the emotion of fear1 the physical effect on the nervous system known by that name1 may be excited1 and ,i believe often is excited1 simply by terrific imaginations4 ,that these imaginations are1 even for a moment1 mistaken for menacing realities1 may be true1 but ought not to be assumed without proof4 ,the circumstance most in its favour 7one not forgotten by the author7 is that in dreams1 to which may be added hallucinations1 frightful ideas are really mistaken for terrible facts4 ,but dreams are states in which all other sensible ideas are mistaken for outward facts4 ,yet sensations and ideas are intrinsically different1 and it is not the normal state of the human mind to confound the one with the other4 ,besides1 this supposition of a momentary belief in ghosts breaking in upon and interrupting an habitual and permanent belief that there are no ghosts1 jars considerably with the #dji doctrine it is brought to support1 that belief is an inseparable association4 ,according to that doctrine1 here are two inseparable associations1 which yet are so far from exclusively possessing the mind1 that they alternate with one another1 each ,inseparable implying the separation of the other ,inseparable4 ,the association of darkness with the absence of ghosts must be anything but inseparable1 if there only needs the presence of darkness to revive the contrary association4 ,yet an association so very much short of inseparable1 is accompanied1 at least in the absence of darkness1 by a full belief4 ,darkness is in this case associated with two incompatible ideas1 the idea of ghosts and that of their absence1 but with neither of them inseparably1 and in consequence the two associations alternately prevail1 as the surrounding circumstances favour the one or the other2 agreeably to the laws of ,compound ,association laid down with great perspicuity and reach of thought by ,mr4 ,bain in his systematic treatise4 ,to the argument1 that the inseparable associations which create optical and other illusions1 do not1 when opposed by reason1 generate the false belief1 the author's answer would probably be some such as the following4 ,when the rational thinker succeeds in resisting the belief1 he does so by more or less completely overcoming the inseparableness of the association4 ,associations may be conquered by the formation of counter-associations4 ,mankind had formerly an inseparable association between sunset and the motion of the sun1 and this in separable association compelled them to believe that in the phenomenon of sunset the sun moves and the earth is at rest4 ,but ,copernicus1 ,galileo1 and after them1 all astronomers1 found evidence1 that the earth moves and the sun is at rest3 in other words1 certain experiences1 and certain reasonings from those experiences1 took place in their minds1 the tendency of which was to associate sunset with the ideas of the earth in motion and the sun at rest4 ,this was a counter-association1 which could not coexist1 at least at the same instant1 with the previous association connecting sunset with the sun in motion and the earth at rest4 ,but for a long time the new #daj associating influences could not be powerful enough to get the better of the old association1 and change the belief which it implied4 ,a belief which has become habitual1 is seldom overcome but by a slow process4 ,however1 the experiences and mental processes that tended to form the new association still went on2 there was a conflict between the old association and the causes which tended to produce a new one2 until1 by the long continuance and frequent repetition of those causes1 the old association1 gradually undermined1 ceased to be inseparable1 and it became possible to associate the idea of sunset with that of the earth moving and the sun at rest2 whereby the previous idea of the sun moving and the earth at rest was excluded for the time1 and as the new association grew in strength1 was at last thrown out altogether4 ,the argument should go on to say that after a still further prolongation of the new experiences and reasonings1 the old association became impossible and the new one inseparable2 for1 until it became inseparable1 there could1 according to the theory1 be no belief4 ,and this1 in truth1 does sometimes happen4 ,there are instances in the history of science1 even down to the present day1 in which something which was once believed to be impossible1 and its opposite to be necessary1 was first seen to be possible1 next to be true1 and finally came to be considered as necessarily true1 and its opposite 7once deemed necessary7 as impossible1 and even inconceivable2 insomuch that it is thought by some that what was reputed an impossibility1 might have been known to be a necessity4 ,in such cases1 the quality of inseparableness has passed1 in those minds at least1 from the old association to the new one4 ,but in much the greatest number of cases the change does not proceed so far1 and both associations remain equally possible4 ,the case which furnished our last instance is an example4 ,astronomers1 and all educated persons1 now associate sunset with motion confined to the earth1 and firmly believe this to be what really takes place2 but they have not formed this association with such exclusiveness and intensity as to have become unable to associate sunset with motion of the sun4 ,on the contrary1 the visible appearance still suggests #daa motion of the sun1 and many people1 though aware of the truth1 find that they cannot by any effort make themselves see sunset any otherwise than as the sinking of the sun below the earth4 ,my own experience is different3 ,i find that ,i can represent the phenomenon to myself in either light2 ,i can1 according to the manner in which ,i direct my thoughts1 see sunset either as the earth tilting above the sun1 or as the sun dipping below the earth3 in the same manner as when a railway train in motion passes another at rest1 we are able1 if we prevent our eyes from resting on any third object1 to imagine the motion as being either in the one train or in the other4 ,how1 then1 can it be said that there is an inseparable association of sunset with the one mode of representation1 and a consequent inability to associate it with the other8 ,it is associated with both1 and the one of the two associations which is nearest to being inseparable is that which belief does not accompany4 ,the difference between different people in the ability to represent to themselves the phenomenon under either aspect1 depends rather on the degree of exercise which they have given to their imagination in trying to frame mental pictures conformable to the two hypotheses1 than upon those considerations of reason and evidence which yet may determine their belief4 ,the question still remains1 what is there which exists in the hypothesis believed1 and does not exist in the hypothesis rejected1 when we have associations which enable our imagination to represent the facts agreeably to either hypothesis8 ,in other words1 what is ,belief8 ,i think it must be admitted1 that when we can represent to ourselves in imagination either of two conflicting suppositions1 one of which we believe1 and disbelieve the other1 neither of the associations can be inseparable2 and there must therefore be in the fact of ,belief1 which exists in only one of the two cases1 something for which inseparable association does not account4 ,we seem to have again come up1 on a different side1 to the difficulty which we felt in the discussion of ,memory1 in accounting for the distinction between a fact remembered1 and the same fact imagined4 ,there is a close parallelism between #dab the two problems4 ,in both1 we have the difference between a fact and a representation in imagination2 between a sensation1 or combination of sensations1 and an idea1 or combination of ideas4 ,this difference we all accept as an ultimate fact4 ,but the difficulty is this4 ,let me first state it as it presents itself in the case of ,memory4 ,having in our mind a certain combination of ideas1 in a group or a train1 accompanying or succeeding one another2 what is it which1 in one case1 makes us recognize this group or train as representing a group or train of the corresponding sensations1 remembered as having been actually felt by us1 while in another case we are aware that the sensations have never occurred to us in a group or train corresponding to that in which we are now having the ideas8 ,this is the problem of ,memory4 ,let me now state the problem of ,belief1 when the belief is not a case of memory4 ,here also we have ideas connected in a certain order in our own mind1 which makes us think of a corresponding order among the sensations1 and we believe that this similar combination of the sensations is a real fact3 i4e41 whether we ever felt it or not1 we confidently expect that we should feel it under certain given conditions4 ,in ,memory1 we believe that the realities in ,nature1 the sensations and combinations of sensations presented to us from without1 have occurred to us in an order which agrees with that in which we are representing them to ourselves in thought3 in those cases of ,belief which are not cases of ,memory1 we believe1 not that they have occurred1 but that they would have occurred1 or would occur1 in that order4 ,what is it that takes place in us1 when we recognize that there is this agreement between the order of our ideas and the order in which we either had or might have had the sensations which correspond to them--that the order of the ideas represents a similar order either in our actual sensations1 or in those which1 under some given circumstances1 we should have reason to expect8 ,what1 in short1 is the difference to our minds between thinking of a reality1 and representing to ourselves an imaginary picture8 ,i confess that ,i can perceive no escape from the opinion that the distinction is ultimate and primordial4 #dac ,there is no more difficulty in holding it to be so1 than in holding the difference between a sensation and an idea to be primordial4 ,it seems almost another aspect of the same difference4 ,the author himself says1 in the chapter on ,memory1 that1 a sensation and an idea being different1 it is to be expected that the remembrance of having had a sensation should be different from the remembrance of having had an idea1 and that this is a sufficient explanation of our distinguishing them4 ,if this1 then1 is an original distinction1 why should not the distinction be original between the remembrance of having had a sensation1 and the actually having an idea 7which is the difference between ,memory and ,imagination72 and between the expectation of having a sensation1 and the actually having an idea 7which is the difference between ,belief and ,imagination78 ,grant these differences1 and there is nothing further to explain in the phenomenon of ,belief4 ,for every belief is either the memory of having had a sensation 7or other feeling71 or the expectation that we should have the sensation or feeling in some given state of circumstances1 if that state of circumstances could come to be realized4 ,,ii4 ,that all belief is either ,memory or ,expectation1 will be clearly seen if we run over all the different objects of ,belief4 ,the author has already done so1 in order to establish his theory2 and it is now necessary that we should do the same4 ,the objects of ,belief are enumerated by the author in the following terms3--#a4 ,events1 real existences4 #b4 ,testimony4 #c4 ,the truth of propositions4 ,he intended this merely as a rough grouping1 sufficient for the purpose if it includes everything3 for it is evident that the divisions overlap one another1 and it will be seen presently that the last two are but cases of the first4 ,belief in events he further divides into belief in present events1 in past events1 and in future events4 ,belief in present events he subdivides into belief in immediate existences present to my senses1 and belief in immediate existences not present #dad to my senses4 ,we see by this that he recognises no difference1 in a metaphysical sense1 between existences and events1 because he regards1 with reason1 objects as merely the supposed antecedents of events4 ,the distinction1 however1 requires to be kept up1 being no other than the fundamental difference between simultaneousness1 and succession or change4 ,belief in immediate existences present to my senses1 is either belief in my sensations1 or belief in external objects4 ,believing that ,i feel what ,i am at this moment feeling1 is1 as the author says1 only another name for having the feeling2 with the idea1 however1 of ,myself1 associated with it2 of which hereafter4 ,the author goes on to analyse ,belief in external objects present to our senses2 and he resolves it into a present sensation1 united by an irresistible association with the numerous other sensations which we are accustomed to receive in conjunction with it4 ,the ,object is thus to be understood as a complex idea1 compounded of the ideas of various sensations which we have1 and of a far greater number of sensations which we should expect to have if certain contingencies were realized4 ,in other words1 our idea of an object is an idea of a group of possibilities of sensation1 some of which we believe we can realize at pleasure1 while the remainder would be realized if certain conditions took place1 on which1 by the laws of nature1 they are dependent4 ,as thus explained1 belief in the existence of a physical object1 is belief in the occurrence of certain sensations1 contingently on certain previous conditions4 ,this is a state of mind closely allied to ,expectation of sensations4 ,for--though we use the name ,expectation only with reference to the future1 and even to the probable future--our state of mind in respect to what may be future1 and even to what might have been future1 is of the same general nature1 and depends on the same principles1 as ,expectation4 ,i believe that a certain event will positively happen1 because the known conditions which always accompany it in experience have already taken place4 ,i believe that another event will certainly happen if the known conditions which always accompany it take place1 and those conditions ,i can produce when ,i please4 ,i believe #dae that a third event will happen if its conditions take place1 but ,i must wait for those conditions2 ,i cannot realize them at pleasure1 and may never realize them at all4 ,the first of these three cases is positive expectation1 the other two are conditional expectation4 ,a fourth case is my belief that the event would have happened at any former time if the conditions had taken place at that time4 ,it is not consonant to usage to call this ,expectation1 but1 considered as a case of belief1 there is no essential difference between it and the third case4 ,my belief that ,i should have heard ,cicero had ,i been present in the ,forum1 and my belief that ,i shall hear ,mr4 ,gladstone if ,i am present in the ,house of ,commons1 can nowise be regarded as essentially different phenomena4 ,the one we call ,expectation1 the other not1 but the mental principle operative in both these cases of belief is the same4 ,the author goes on to say1 that the belief that we should have the sensations if certain conditions were realized1 that is1 if we had certain other sensations1 is merely an inseparable association of the two sets of sensations with one another1 and their inseparable union with the idea of ourselves as having them4 ,but ,i confess it seems to me that all this may exist in a case of simple imagination4 ,the author would himself admit that the complex idea of the object1 in all its fulness1 may be in the mind without belief4 ,what remains is its association with the idea of ourselves as percipients4 ,but this also1 ,i cannot but think1 we may have in the case of an imaginary scene1 when we by no means believe that any corresponding reality exists4 ,does the idea of our own personality never enter into the pictures in our imagination8 ,are we not ourselves present in the scenes which we conjure up in our minds8 ,i apprehend we are as constantly present in them1 and as conscious of our presence1 as we are in contemplating a real prospect4 ,in either case the vivacity of the other impressions eclipses1 for the most part1 the thought of ourselves as spectators1 but not more so in the imaginary1 than in the real1 spectacle4 ,it appears to me1 then1 that to account for belief in external #daf objects1 we must postulate ,expectation2 and since all our expectations1 whether positive or contingent1 are a consequence of our ,memory of the past 7as distinguished from a representation in fancy71 we must also postulate ,memory4 ,the distinction between a mere combination of ideas in thought1 and one which recals to us a combination of sensations as actually experienced1 always returns on our hands as an ultimate postulate4 ,the author proceeds to shew how this idea of a mere group of sensations1 actual or contingent1 becomes knit up with an idea of a permanent ,something1 lying1 as it were1 under these sensations1 and causing them2 this further enlargement of the complex idea taking place through the intimate1 or1 as he calls it1 inseparable association1 generated by experience1 which makes us unable to imagine any phenomenon as beginning to exist without something anterior to it which causes it4 ,this explanation1 seems to me quite correct as far as it goes2 but1 while it accounts for the difficulty we have in not ascribing our sensations to some cause or other1 it does not explain why we accept1 as in fact we do1 the group itself as the cause4 ,i have endeavoured to clear up this difficulty elsewhere 7,examination of ,sir ,william ,hamilton's ,philosophy71 and in preference to going over the ground a second time1 ,i subjoin1 at the end of the volume1 the chapter containing the explanation4 ,that chapter supplies all that appears to me to be further necessary on the subject of belief in outward objects2 which is thus shewn to be a case of ,conditional ,expectation4 ,it is unnecessary to follow the author into the minute consideration of ,belief in the existence of objects not present since the explanation already given equally applies to them4 ,my belief in the present existence of ,st4 ,paul's is correctly set forth by the author as consisting of the following elements3 ,i believe that ,i have seen ,st4 ,paul's3 ,i believe that ,i shall see ,st4 ,paul's1 when ,i am again in ,st4 ,paul's ,churchyard3 ,i believe that ,i should see ,st4 ,paul's1 if ,i were in ,st4 ,paul's ,churchyard at this instant4 ,all this1 as he justly remarks1 is ,memory or ,expectation4 ,and this1 or some part of this1 is #dag the whole of what is in any case meant by belief in the real existence of an external object4 ,the author adds1 ,i also believe that if any creature whose senses are analogous to my own1 is now in ,st4 ,paul's ,churchyard1 it has the present sensation of that edifice4 ,but this belief is not necessary to my belief in the continued existence of ,st4 ,paul's4 ,for that1 it suffices that ,i believe ,i should myself see it4 ,my belief that other creatures would do so1 is part of my belief in the real existence of other creatures like myself2 which is no more mysterious1 than our belief in the real existence of any other objects some of whose properties rest not on direct sensation1 but on inference4 ,belief in past existences1 when those existences have been perceived by ourselves1 is ,memory4 ,when the past existences are inferred from evidence1 the belief of them is not ,memory1 but a fact of the same nature as ,expectation2 being a belief that we should have had the sensations if we had been cotemporary with the objects1 and had been in the local position necessary for receiving sensible impressions from them4 ,we now come to the case of ,belief in testimony4 ,but testimony is not itself an object of belief4 ,the object of belief is what the testimony asserts4 ,and so in the last of the author's three cases1 that of assent to a proposition4 ,the object of belief1 in both these cases1 is an assertion4 ,but an assertion is something asserted1 and what is asserted must be a fact1 similar to some of those of which we have already treated4 ,according to the author1 belief in an assertion is belief that two names are both of them names of the same thing3 but this we have felt ourselves obliged to discard1 as an inadequate explanation of the import of any assertions1 except those which are classed as merely verbal4 ,every assertion concerning ,things1 whether in concrete or in abstract language1 is an assertion that some fact1 or group of facts1 has been1 is1 or may be expected to be1 found1 wherever a certain other fact1 or group of facts1 is found4 ,belief in this1 is therefore either remembrance that we did have1 or expectation that we shall have1 or a belief of the same nature with expectation that in #dah some given circumstances we should have1 or should have had1 direct perception of a particular fact4 ,belief1 therefore1 is always a case either of ,memory or of ,expectation2 including under the latter name conditional as well as positive expectation1 and the state of mind similar to expectation which affects us in regard to what would have been a subject of expectation1 if the conditions of its realization had still been possible4 ,it may be objected1 that we may believe in the real existence of things which are not objects of sense at all4 ,we may4 ,but we cannot believe in the real existence of anything which we do not conceive as capable of acting in some way upon our own or some other being's consciousness2 though the state of consciousness it produces may not be called a sensation4 ,the existence of a thing means1 to us1 merely its capacity of producing an impression of some sort upon some mind1 that is1 of producing some state of consciousness4 ,the belief1 therefore1 in its existence1 is still a conditional expectation of something which we should1 under some supposed circumstances1 be capable of feeling4 ,to resume3 ,belief1 as ,i conceive1 is more than an inseparable association1 for inseparable associations do not always generate belief1 nor does belief always require1 as one of its conditions1 an inseparable association3 we can believe that to be true which we are capable of conceiving or representing to ourselves as false1 and false what we are capable of representing to ourselves as true4 ,the difference between belief and mere imagination1 is the difference between recognising something as a reality in nature1 and regarding it as a mere thought of our own4 ,this is the difference which presents itself when ,memory has to be distinguished from ,imagination2 and again when ,expectation1 whether positive or contingent 7i4e4 whether it be expectation that we shall1 or only persuasion that in certain definable circumstances we should1 have a certain experience7 has to be distinguished from the mere mental conception of that experience4 ,,iii4 ,let us examine1 once more1 whether the speculations in the text afford us any means of further analysing this difference4 #dai ,the difference presents itself in its most elementary form in the distinction between a sensation and an idea4 ,the author admits this distinction to be ultimate and primordial4 ,a sensation is different from an idea1 only because it is felt to be different4 ,but1 after having admitted that these two states or consciousness are distinguishable from each other in and by themselves1 he adds1 that they are also distinguishable by their accompaniments4 ,the accompaniments of a sensation are always generically different from those of an idea4 4 4 4 4 ,the accompaniments of a sensation1 are all the simultaneous objects of sensation1 together with all those which1 to a certain extent1 both preceded and followed it4 ,the accompaniments of an idea are not the simultaneous objects of sensation1 but other ideas2 namely1 the neighbouring facts1 antecedent and consequent1 of the mental train4 ,there can be no doubt that in those individual cases in which ideas and sensations might be confounded1 namely1 when an idea reaches or approaches the vivacity of a sensation1 the indication here pointed out helps to assure us that what we are conscious of is1 nevertheless1 only an idea4 ,when1 for instance1 we awake from a dream1 and open our eyes to the outward world1 what makes us so promptly recognise that this and not the other is the real world1 is that we find its phenomena connected in the accustomed order of our objects of sensation4 ,but though this circumstance enables us1 in particular instances1 to refer our impression more instantaneously to one or the other class1 it cannot be by this that we distinguish ideas at first from sensations2 for the criterion supposes the distinction to be already made4 ,if we judge a sensation to be a sensation because its accompaniments are other sensations1 and an idea to be an idea because its accompaniments are other ideas1 we must already be able to distinguish those other sensations from those other ideas4 ,a similar remark is applicable to a criterion between sensations and ideas1 incidentally laid down by ,mr4 ,bain in the ,first ,part of his systematic treatise4 ,a mere picture or idea remains the same whatever be our bodily position or #dbj bodily exertions2 the sensation that we call the actual is entirely at the mercy of our movements1 shifting in every possible way according to the varieties of action that we go through4 7,the ,senses and the ,intellect1 #bnd ed4 p4 #cha47 ,this test1 like the author's1 may serve in cases of momentary doubt2 but sensations in general must have been already distinguished from ideas1 before we could have hit upon this criterion between them4 ,if we had not already known the difference between a sensation and an idea1 we never could have discovered that one of them is at the mercy of our movements1 and that the other is not4 ,it being granted that a sensation and an idea are ipso facto distinguishable1 the author thinks it no more than natural that the copy of the sensation should be distinguishable from the revival of the idea1 when they are both brought up by association4 ,but he adds1 that there is another distinction between the memory of a sensation1 and the memory of an idea1 and it is this4 ,in all ,memory the idea of self forms part of the complex idea2 but in the memory of sensation1 the self which enters into the remembrance is the sentient self1 that is1 seeing and hearing3 in the memory of an idea1 it is not the sentient self1 but the conceptive self1 self having an idea4 ,but 7he adds7 myself percipient1 and myself imagining1 or conceiving1 are two very different states of consciousness3 of course the ideas of these states of consciousness1 or these states revived by association1 are very different ideas4 ,concerning the fact there is no dispute4 ,myself percipient1 and myself imagining or conceiving1 are different states1 because perceiving is a different thing from imagining2 and being different states1 the remembrance of them is1 as might be expected1 different4 ,but the question is1 in what does the difference between the remembrances consist8 ,the author calls one of them the idea of myself perceiving1 and the other the idea of myself imagining1 and thinks there is no other difference4 ,but how do the idea of myself having a sensation1 and the idea of myself having an idea of that sensation1 differ from one another8 since in either case an idea of the sensation is all #dba that ,i am having now4 ,the thought of myself perceiving a thing at a former time1 and the thought of myself imagining the thing at that former time1 are both at the present moment facts of imagination--are now merely ideas4 ,in each case ,i have an ideal representation of myself1 as conscious in a manner very similar in the two cases2 though not exactly the same1 since in the one case ,i remember to have been conscious of a sensation1 in the other1 to have been conscious only of an idea of that sensation3 but1 in either case1 that past consciousness enters only as an idea1 into the consciousness ,i now have by recollection4 ,in what1 then1 as far as mere ideas are concerned1 do my present mental representations of the two cases differ8 ,will it be said1 that the idea of the sensation is one thing1 the idea of the idea of the sensation another thing8 ,or are they both the same idea1 namely1 the idea of the sensation2 and is the element that is present in the one case1 but absent in the other1 not an idea but something else8 ,a difference there is admitted to be between the remembrance of having had a sensation1 and the remembrance of having merely thought of the sensation1 i4e4 had the idea of it3 is this difference a difference in the ideas ,i have in the two cases1 or is the idea the same1 but accompanied in the one case by something not an idea1 which does not exist in the other8 for if so1 this something is a ,belief4 ,i have touched upon this question in a former note1 and expressed my inability to recognise1 in the idea of an idea1 anything but the idea itself2 in the thought of a thought1 anything but a repetition of the thought4 ,my thought of ,falstaff1 as far as ,i can perceive1 is not a copy but a repetition of the thought ,i had of him when ,i first read ,shakespeare3 not indeed an exact repetition1 because all complex ideas undergo modification by time1 some elements fading away1 and new ones being added by reverting to the original sources or by subsequent associations2 but my first mental image of ,falstaff1 and my present one1 do not differ as the thought of a rose differs from the sight of one2 as an idea of sensation differs from the sensation4 ,on this point the author was perhaps of #dbb the same opinion1 since we find him contrasting the copy of the sensation with the revival of the idea1 as if the latter was a case of simple repetition1 the former not4 ,it would have been well if he had made this point a subject of express discussion2 for if his opinion upon it was what1 from this passage1 we may suppose it to have been1 it involves a serious difficulty4 ,if 7he says7 a sensation and an idea are distinguishable in the having1 it is likely that the copy of the sensation should be distinguishable from the revival of the idea4 ,but the copy of the sensation is the idea2 so that1 on this shewing1 the idea is distinguishable from its own revival1 that is1 from the same idea when it occurs again4 ,the author's theory would thus require him to maintain that an idea revived is a specifically different idea1 and not the same idea repeated3 since otherwise the two states of mind1 so far as regards the ideas contained in them1 are undistinguishable1 and it is necessary to admit the presence in ,memory of some other element4 ,let us put another case4 ,instead of ,falstaff1 suppose a real person whom ,i have seen3 for example ,general ,lafayette4 ,my idea of ,lafayette is almost wholly1 what my idea of ,falstaff is entirely1 a creation of thought3 only a very small portion of it is derived from my brief experience of seeing and conversing with him4 ,but ,i have a remembrance of having seen ,lafayette1 and no remembrance of having seen ,falstaff1 but only of having thought of him4 ,is it a sufficient explanation of this difference to say1 that ,i have an idea of myself seeing and hearing ,lafayette1 and only an idea of myself thinking of ,falstaff8 ,but ,i can form a vivid idea of myself seeing and hearing ,falstaff4 ,i can without difficulty imagine myself in the field of ,shrewsbury1 listening to his characteristic soliloquy over the body of ,hotspur2 or in the tavern in the midst of his associates1 hearing his story of his encounter with the men in buckram4 ,when ,i recal the scene1 ,i can as little detach it from the idea of myself as present1 as ,i can in the case of most things of which ,i was really an eye-witness4 ,the spontaneous presence of the idea of ,myself in the #dbc conception1 is always that of myself as percipient4 ,the idea of myself as in a state of mere imagination1 only substitutes itself for the other when something reminds me that the scene is merely imaginary4 ,i cannot help thinking1 therefore1 that there is in the remembrance of a real fact1 as distinguished from that of a thought1 an element which does not consist1 as the author supposes1 in a difference between the mere ideas which are present to the mind in the two cases4 ,this element1 howsoever we define it1 constitutes ,belief1 and is the difference between ,memory and ,imagination4 ,from whatever direction we approach1 this difference seems to close our path4 ,when we arrive at it1 we seem to have reached1 as it were1 the central point of our intellectual nature1 presupposed and built upon in every attempt we make to explain the more recondite phenomena of our mental being4--,ed4 #dbd ,,chapter ,,xii4 ,,ratiocination4 ,it would afford great light and clearness to the art of ,logic1 to determine the precise nature and composition of the ideas affixed to those words which have complex ideas2 i4e41 which excite any combinations of simple ideas1 united intimately by association4--,hartley4 ,prop4 #ab1 ,corol4 #c4 ,,ratiocination is one of the most complicated of all the mental phenomena4 ,and it is worthy of notice1 that more was accomplished towards the analysis of it1 at an early period in the history of intellectual improvement1 than of any other of the complex cases of human consciousness4 ,it was fully explained by ,aristotle1 that the simplest case of ,ratiocination consists of three propositions1 which he called a syllogism4 ,a piece of ratiocination may consist of one1 or more syllogisms1 to any extent2 but every single step is a syllogism4 ,a ratiocination1 then1 or syllogism1 is first resolved into three propositions4 ,the following may be taken as one of the simplest of all examples4 ,all men are animals3 kings are men3 therefore kings are animals4 ,next1 the ,proposition is resolved into its proximate elements4 ,these are three2 two ,terms1 one called the ,subject1 the other the ,predicate1 and the ,copula4 #dbe ,what is the particular nature of each of these elements we have already seen1 and here1 therefore1 need not stay to inquire4 ,the ancient writers on ,logic proceeded in their analysis1 no farther than ,terms4 ,after this1 they only endeavoured to enumerate and classify terms2 to enumerate and classify propositions2 to enumerate and classify syllogisms2 and to give the rules for making correct syllogisms1 and detecting incorrect ones4 ,and this1 as taught by them1 constituted the whole science and art of ,logic4 ,what1 under this head1 we propose to explain1 is--the process of association involved in the syllogism1 and in the belief which is part of it4 ,that part of the process which is involved in the two antecedent propositions1 called the premises1 has been already explained4 ,it is only1 therefore1 the third proposition1 called the conclusion1 which further requires exposition4 ,we have seen1 that in the proposition1 ,all men are animals1 ,belief is merely the recognition that the meaning of the term1 all men1 is included in that of the term animals1 and that the recognition is a case of association4 ,in the proposition also1 kings are men1 the belief is merely the recognition1 that the individuals named kings1 are part of the many1 of whom men1 is the common name4 ,this has already been more than once explained4 ,and now1 therefore1 remains only to be shewn what further is involved in the third proposition1 or conclusion1 kings are animals4 ,in each of the two preceding propositions1 two terms or names are compared4 ,in the last #dbf proposition1 a third name is compared with both the other two2 immediately with the one1 and1 through that1 with the other2 the whole1 obviously1 a complicated case of association4 ,in the first proposition1 all men are animals1 the term1 all men1 is compared with the term animals2 in other words1 a certain association1 already expounded1 takes place4 ,in the second proposition1 kings are men1 the term kings1 is compared with the term all men2 comparison here1 again1 being only a name for a particular case of association4 ,in the third proposition1 kings are animals1 the name kings1 is compared with the name animals1 but mediately through the name1 all men4 ,thus1 kings1 is associated with all men1 all men1 with animals2 kings1 therefore1 with animals1 by a complicated1 and1 at the same time1 a rapid1 and almost imperceptible process4 ,it would be easy to mark the steps of the association4 ,but this would be tedious1 and after so much practice1 the reader will be at no loss to set them down for himself4#aji ,editor's footnote #aji3 ,this chapter1 which is of a very summary character1 is a prolongation of the portion of the chapter on ,belief1 which examines the case of belief in the truth of a proposition2 and must stand or fall with it4 ,the question considered is1 how1 from belief in the truth of the two premises of a syllogism1 we pass into belief in the conclusion4 ,the exposition proceeds on the untenable theory of the import of propositions1 on which ,i have so often had occasion to comment4 ,that theory1 however1 was not necessary to the author for shewing how two ideas may become inseparably associated through the inseparable association of each of them with a third idea3 and inasmuch as an inseparable association between the subject and #dbg predicate1 in the author's opinion1 constitutes belief1 an explanation of ratiocination conformable to that given of belief follows as a matter of course4 ,although ,i am unable to admit that there is nothing in belief but an inseparable association1 and although ,i maintain that there may be belief without an inseparable association1 ,i can still accept this explanation of the formation of an association between the subject and predicate of the conclusion1 which1 when close and intense1 has1 as we have seen1 a strong tendency to generate belief4 ,but to shew what it is that gives the belief its validity1 we must fall back on logical laws1 the laws of evidence4 ,and independently of the question of validity1 we shall find in the reliance on those laws1 so far as they are understood1 the source and origin of all beliefs1 whether well or ill-founded1 which are not the almost mechanical or automatic products of a strong association--of the lively suggestion of an idea4 ,we may therefore pass at once to the nature of ,evidence1 which is the subject of the next chapter4 ,i venture to refer1 in passing1 to those chapters in my ,system of ,logic1 in which ,i have maintained1 contrary to what is laid down in this chapter1 that ,ratiocination does not consist of ,syllogisms2 that the ,syllogism is not the analysis of what the mind does in reasoning1 but merely a useful formula into which it can translate its reasonings1 gaining thereby a great increase in the security for their correctness4--,ed4 #dbh ,,chapter ,,xiii4 ,,evidence4 ,in consequence of some very wonderful laws1 which regulate the successions of our mental phenomena1 the science of mind is1 in all its most important respects1 a science of analysis4 ,brown's ,lect41 i41 #ajh4 ,,before leaving the subject of ,belief1 it will be proper to shew1 in a few words1 what is included1 under the name ,evidence4 ,evidence1 is either the same thing with ,belief1 or it is the antecedent1 of which ,belief is the consequent4 ,belief we have seen to be of two sorts3 ,belief of events2 ,belief of propositions4 ,of events1 believed on our own experience1 the evidence of the present is sense2 of the past1 memory2 and in these cases1 the evidence and the belief are not two things1 but one and the same thing4 ,the lamp1 which at this moment lights me1 ,i say that ,i see burning1 and that ,i believe it burning4 ,these are two names of one and the same state of consciousness4--,i remember it was burning at the same hour last night1 and ,i believe it was burning at the same hour last night1 are also two expressions for the same thing4--,in the simple anticipation of the future1 from the past1 also1 the evidence1 and the belief1 are #dbi not two things1 but one and the same thing4 ,there is a close and inseparable association of the idea of a like antecedent1 with the idea of a like consequent4 ,this has not a single name1 like memory2 but1 like memory1 it is both evidence and belief4 ,the case of testimony is different4 ,the ,testimony is one thing1 the ,belief is another4 ,the name ,evidence is given to the testimony4 ,the association of the testimony1 with the event testified1 is the belief4 ,beside the belief of events which are the immediate objects of sense1 of memory1 and of anticipation 7the consequence of sense and memory71 and of those which are the immediate objects of testimony2 there is a belief of events which are not the immediate objects of any of those operations4 ,the sailor1 who is shipwrecked on an unknown coast1 sees the prints of a man's foot on the sand4 ,the print of the foot is here called the evidence2 the association of the print1 as consequent1 with a man1 as antecedent1 is called the belief4 ,in this case1 the sensation of one event1 the print of a foot on the sand1 induces the belief of another event1 the existence of a man4 ,the sailor who has seen the mark1 reports it to his companions who have not quitted the wreck4 ,instantly they have the same belief2 but it is a remove farther off1 and there is an additional link of evidence4 ,the first event to them1 is the affirmation of their companion2 the second1 the existence of the print2 the third1 that of the man4 ,there is here evidence of evidence2 the testimony1 evidence of the print2 the print1 evidence of the man4 ,the companions of the sailor1 having themselves gone on shore1 perceive1 indeed1 no man1 but see a #dcj large monkey1 which leaves prints on the sand very much resembling those which had first been perceived by their companion4 ,what is now the state of their minds8 ,doubt4 ,but doubt is a name2 what do we call by that name8 ,a phenomenon of some complexity1 but of which the elements are not very difficult to trace4 ,there is1 here1 a double association with the print of the foot4 ,there is the association of a man1 and there is the association of a monkey4 ,first1 the print raises the idea of a man1 but the instant it does so1 it raises also the idea of a monkey4 ,the idea of the monkey1 displacing that of the man1 hinders the first association from the fixity which makes it belief2 and the idea of man1 displacing that of monkey1 hinders the second association from that fixity which constitutes belief4 ,when evidence is complex2 that is1 consists of more than one event2 the events may be all on the same side1 or not all on the same side2 that is1 they may all tend to prove the same event2 or some of them may tend to prove it1 some may have an opposite tendency4 ,thus1 if after discovering the print on the sand1 the sailors had seen near it a stick1 which had any appearance of having been fashioned into a club1 or a spear1 this would have been another event1 tending1 as well as the print on the sand1 to the belief of the presence of men4 ,the evidence would have been complex1 but all on one side4 ,the process is easy to trace4 ,there is now a double association with the existence of men4 ,the print of the foot excites that idea1 the existence of the club excites that idea4 ,this double excitement gives greater permanence to the #dca idea4 ,by repetition1 the two exciting causes coalesce1 and1 by their united strength1 call up the associated idea with greater force4 ,in the case of the appearance of the monkey1 in which one of the events tended to one belief1 the other to another1 we have just seen that the effect is precisely contrary2 to lessen the strength of the association with the existence of a man1 and to hinder its becoming belief4 ,these expositions may be applied with ease to the other cases of complex evidence1 which can only consist of a greater or less number of events1 either all tending to the belief of the same event1 or some tending that way1 some another2 but all operating in the manner which has just been pointed out4 ,thus we may complicate the present case still further1 by the supposition of additional events4 ,after the appearance of the monkey1 the sailors may discover1 in the neighbourhood1 the vestiges of a recent fire1 and of the victuals which had been cooked by it4 ,the association of human beings with these appearances is so strong1 that1 combined with the association between the print and the same idea1 it quite obscures the association between the print and the monkey2 and the belief that the place has inhabitants becomes complete4 ,but suppose1 further2 that after a little observation1 they discover an ,english knife1 and fork1 and a piece of ,english earthenware near the same place4 ,the idea of an ,english ship having touched at the place1 is immediately excited1 and all the evidence of local inhabitants1 derived from the marks of fire and cookery1 is immediately destroyed4 ,in other words1 a new association1 that with an ,english ship1 #dcb is created1 which completely supersedes the idea1 formerly associated1 that of inhabitants existing on the spot4 ,the whole of the events1 which go in this manner to form a case of belief1 or of doubt1 or of disbelief1 are called ,evidence4 ,and the association1 which binds them together into a sort of whole1 as antecedent1 and connects with them the event to which they apply as consequent1 and which constitutes the belief1 doubt1 or disbelief1 very often goes by the names of judgment1 judging of the evidence1 weighing the evidence1 and so on4 ,in these cases of the belief of ,events upon complicated evidence1 there is an antecedent and a consequent2 the antecedent consisting of all the events which are called evidence1 the consequent of the event1 or events evidenced2 and lastly1 there is that close association of the antecedent and the consequent1 which we have seen already1 in so many instances1 constitutes belief4 ,we have now to consider1 what we call evidence in the case of the ,belief of ,propositions4 ,there are two cases of the ,belief of propositions4 ,there is belief in the case of the single proposition2 and there is belief of the conclusion of a syllogism1 which is the result of a combination of ,propositions4 ,we have seen what the process of belief in ,propositions is4 ,the subject and predicate1 two names for the same thing1 of which the predicate is either of the same extent with the subject1 or of a greater extent1 suggests1 each of them1 its meaning2 that is1 call up1 by association1 each of them1 its peculiar cluster of ideas4 ,two clusters of ideas are called up in #dcc connexion1 and that a peculiar connexion1 marked by the copula4 ,to have two clusters of ideas1 to know that they are two1 and to believe that they are two1 this is nothing more than three expressions for the same thing4 ,to know that two clusters are two clusters1 and to know that they are either the same1 or different1 is the same with having them4 ,in this case1 then1 as in that of the belief of events1 in sense and memory1 the belief and the evidence are the same thing4 ,belief of the conclusion of a syllogism1 is preceded by two other beliefs4 ,there is belief of the major proposition2 belief of the minor proposition2 by the process immediately above explained1 in which the evidence and the belief are the same thing4 ,these are the antecedent4 ,there is1 thirdly1 belief of the conclusion1 this is the consequent4 ,the process of this belief has been so recently explained1 that ,i do not think we need to repeat it4 ,in this case1 it is sometimes said1 that the two premises are the evidence2 sometimes it is said1 that the ratiocination is the evidence2 in the former of these applications of the word evidence1 the belief of the concluding proposition of the syllogism is not included2 in the last1 it is4 ,the ratiocination is the belief of all the three propositions2 and1 in this acceptation of the word1 the evidence and the belief are not considered as two things1 but one and the same thing4 ,this1 however1 is only a difference of naming4 ,about the particulars named1 there is no room for dispute4#aaj ,editor's footnote #aaj3 ,this chapter on ,evidence is supplementary to the chapter on ,belief1 and is intended to analyse the process of weighing and balancing opposing grounds for believing4 #dcd ,evidence is either of individual facts 7not actually perceived by oneself71 or of general truths4 ,the former is the only case to which much attention is paid in the present chapter2 which very happily illustrates it1 by the case of navigators having to decide on the existence or non-existence of inhabitants in a newly discovered island4 ,the process of balancing the evidence for and against1 is depicted in a very lively manner4 ,let us see whether the mental facts set down in the exposition1 are precisely those which take place4 ,when the sailors have seen prints of a foot1 resembling those of a man1 the idea is raised of a man making the print4 ,when they afterwards see a monkey1 whose feet leave traces almost similar1 the idea is also raised of a monkey making the print1 and the state of their minds1 the author says1 is doubt4 ,of this state he gives the following analysis3 ,there is here a double association with the print of the foot4 ,there is the association of a man1 and there is the association of a monkey4 ,first1 the print raises the idea of a man1 but the instant it does so1 it raises also the idea of a monkey4 ,the idea of the monkey1 displacing that of the man1 hinders the first association from the fixity which makes it belief2 and the idea of man1 displacing that of monkey1 hinders the second association from that fixity which constitutes belief4 ,this passage deserves to be studied2 for without having carefully weighed it1 we cannot be certain that we are in complete possession of the author's theory of ,belief4 ,there are two conflicting associations with the print of the foot4 ,the picture of a man making it1 cannot co-exist with that of a monkey making it4 ,but the two may alternate with one another4 ,had the association with a man been the only association1 it would1 or might 7for on this point the author is not explicit7 have amounted to belief4 ,but the idea of the monkey and that of the man alternately displacing one another1 hinder either association from having the fixity which would make it belief4 ,this alternation1 however1 between the two ideas1 of a monkey making the footprint and of a man making it1 may #dce very well take place without hindering one of the two from being accompanied by belief4 ,suppose the sailors to obtain conclusive evidence1 testimonial or circumstantial1 that the prints were made by a monkey4 ,it may happen1 nevertheless1 that the remarkable resemblance of the foot prints to those of a man1 does not cease to force itself upon their notice3 in other words1 they continue to associate the idea of a man with the footsteps2 they are reminded of a man1 and of a man making the footsteps1 every time they see or think of them4 ,the double association1 therefore1 may subsist1 and the one which does not correspond with the fact may even be the most obtrusive of the two1 while yet the other conception may be the one with which the men believe the real facts to have corresponded4 ,all the rest of the exposition is open to the same criticism4 ,the author accounts very accurately for the presence of all the ideas which the successive appearance of the various articles of evidence arouses in the mind4 ,but he does not shew that the belief1 which is ultimately arrived at1 is constituted by the expulsion from the mind of one set of these ideas1 and the exclusive possession of it by the other set4 ,it is quite possible that neither of the associations may acquire the fixity which1 according to the apparent meaning of the author1 would defeat the other association altogether1 and drive away the conception which it suggests2 and yet1 one of the suppositions may be believed and the other disbelieved1 according to the balance of evidence1 as estimated by the investigator4 ,belief1 then1 which has been already shewn not to require an inseparable association1 appears not to require even fixity--such fixity as to exclude the idea of the conflicting supposition1 as it does exclude the belief4 ,the problem of ,evidence divides itself into two distinguishable enquiries3 what effect evidence ought to produce1 and what determines the effect that it does produce3 how our belief ought to be regulated1 and how1 in point of fact1 it is regulated4 ,the first enquiry--that into the nature and probative force of evidence3 the discussion of what proves what1 and #dcf of the precautions needed in admitting one thing as proof of another--are the province of ,logic1 understood in its widest sense3 and for its treatment we must refer to treatises on ,logic1 either inductive or ratiocinative4 ,all that would be in place here1 reduces itself to a single principle3 ,in all cases1 except the case of what we are directly conscious of 7in which case1 as the author justly observes1 the evidence and the belief are one and the same thing7--in all cases1 therefore1 in which belief is really grounded on evidence1 it is grounded1 in the ultimate result1 on the constancy of the course of nature4 ,whether the belief be of facts or of laws1 and whether of past facts or of those which are present or future1 this is the basis on which it rests4 ,whatever it is that we believe1 the justification of the belief must be1 that unless it were true1 the uniformity of the course of nature would not be maintained4 ,a cause would have occurred1 not followed by its invariable effect2 an effect would have occurred1 not preceded by any of its invariable causes2 witnesses would have lied1 who have always been known to speak the truth2 signs would have proved deceptive1 which in human experience have always given true indication4 ,this is obvious1 whatever case of belief on evidence we examine4 ,belief in testimony is grounded on previous experience that testimony is usually conformable to fact3 testimony in general 7for even this may with truth be affirmed72 or the testimony of the particular witness1 or the testimony of persons similar to him4 ,belief that the sun will rise and set to-morrow1 or that a stone thrown up into the air will fall back1 rests on experience that this has been invariably the case1 and reliance that what has hitherto occurred will continue to occur hereafter4 ,belief in a fact vouched for by circumstantial evidence1 rests on experience that such circumstances as are ascertained to exist in the case1 never exist unaccompanied by the given fact4 ,what we call evidence1 whether complete or incomplete1 always consists of facts or events tending to convince us that some ascertained general truths or laws of nature must have proved false1 if the conclusion which the evidence points to is not true4 #dcg ,belief on evidence is therefore always a case of the generalizing process2 of the assumption that what we have not directly experienced resembles1 or will resemble1 our experience4 ,and1 properly understood1 this assumption is true2 for the whole course of nature consists of a concurrence of causes1 producing their effects in a uniform manner2 but the uniformity which exists is often not that which our first impressions lead us to expect4 ,mr4 ,bain has well pointed out1 that the generalizing propensity1 in a mind not disciplined by thought1 nor as yet warned by its own failures1 far outruns the evidence1 or rather1 precedes any conscious consideration of evidence2 and that what the consideration of evidence has to do when it comes1 is not so much to make us generalize1 as to limit our spontaneous impulse of generalization1 and restrain within just bounds our readiness to believe that the unknown will resemble the known4 ,when ,mr4 ,bain occasionally speaks of this propensity as if it were instinctive1 ,i understand him to mean1 that by an original law of our nature1 the mere suggestion of an idea1 so long as the idea keeps possession of the mind1 suffices to give it a command over our active energies4 ,it is to this primitive mental state that the author's theory of ,belief most nearly applies4 ,in a mind which is as yet untutored1 either by the teachings of others or by its own mistakes1 an idea so strongly excited as for the time to keep out all ideas by which it would itself be excluded1 possesses that power over the voluntary activities which is ,mr4 ,bain's criterion of ,belief2 and any association that compels the person to have the idea of a certain consequence as following his act1 generates1 or becomes1 a real expectation of that consequence4 ,but these expectations often turning out to have been ill grounded1 the unduly prompt suggestion comes to be associated1 by repetition1 with the shock of disappointed expectation2 and the idea of the desired consequent is now raised together with the idea not of its realization1 but of its frustration3 thus neutralizing the effect of the first association on the belief and on the active impulses4 ,it is in this stage that the mind learns the habit of looking out for1 and weighing1 evidence4 ,it presently discovers #dch that the expectations which are least often disappointed are those which correspond to the greatest and most varied amount of antecedent experience4 ,it gradually comes to associate the feeling of disappointed expectation with all those promptings to expect1 which1 being the result of accidental associations1 have no1 or but little1 previous experience conformable to them3 and by degrees the expectation only arises when memory represents a considerable amount of such previous experience2 and is strong in proportion to the quantity of the experience4 ,at a still later period1 as disappointment nevertheless not unfrequently happens notwithstanding a considerable amount of past experience on the side of the expectation1 the mind is put upon making distinctions in the kind of past experiences1 and finding out what qualities1 besides mere frequency1 experience must have1 in order not to be followed by disappointment4 ,in other words1 it considers the conditions of right inference from experience2 and by degrees arrives at principles or rules1 more or less accurate1 for inductive reasoning4 ,this is substantially the doctrine of the author of the ,analysis4 ,it must be conceded to him1 that an association1 sufficiently strong to exclude all ideas that would exclude itself1 produces a kind of mechanical belief2 and that the processes by which this belief is corrected1 or reduced to rational bounds1 all consist in the growth of a counter-association1 tending to raise the idea of a disappointment of the first expectation3 and as the one or the other prevails in the particular case1 the belief1 or expectation1 exists or does not exist1 exactly as if the belief were the same thing with the association4 ,it must also be admitted that the process by which the belief is overcome1 takes effect by weakening the association2 which can only be effected by raising up another association that conflicts with it4 ,there are two ways in which this counter-association may be generated4 ,one is1 by counter-evidence2 by contrary experience in the specific case1 which1 by associating the circumstances of the case with a contrary belief1 destroys their association with the original belief4 ,but there is also another mode of weakening1 or altogether #dci destroying1 the belief1 without adducing contrary experience3 namely1 by merely recognising the insufficiency of the existing experience2 by reflecting on other instances in which the same amount and kind of experience have existed1 but were not followed by the expected result4 ,in the one mode as in the other1 the process of dissolving a belief is identical with that of dissolving an association2 and to this extent--and it is a very large extent--the author's theory of ,belief must be received as true4 ,i cannot1 however1 go beyond this1 and maintain with the author that ,belief is identical with a strong association2 on account of the reason already stated1 viz4 that in many cases--indeed in almost all cases in which the evidence has been such as required to be investigated and weighed--a final belief is arrived at without any such clinging together of ideas as the author supposes to constitute it2 and we remain able to represent to ourselves in imagination1 often with perfect facility1 both the conflicting suppositions1 of which we nevertheless believe one and reject the other4--,ed4 #ddj ,,appendix4 7,from ,an ,examination of ,sir ,william ,hamilton's ,philosophy47 ,,the ,,psychological ,,theory ,,of ,,the ,,belief ,,in ,,an ,,external ,,world4 ,,we have seen ,sir4 ,w4 ,hamilton at work on the question of the reality of ,matter1 by the introspective method1 and1 as it seems1 with little result4 ,let us now approach the same subject by the psychological4 ,i proceed1 therefore1 to state the case of those who hold that the belief in an external world is not intuitive1 but an acquired product4 ,this theory postulates the following psychological truths1 all of which are proved by experience1 and are not contested1 though their force is seldom adequately felt1 by ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton and the other thinkers of the introspective school4 ,it postulates1 first1 that the human mind is capable of ,expectation4 ,in other words1 that after having had actual sensations1 we are capable of forming the conception of ,possible sensations2 sensations which we are not feeling at the present moment1 but which we might feel1 and should feel if certain conditions were present1 the nature of which conditions we have1 in many cases1 learnt by experience4 ,it postulates1 secondly1 the laws of the ,association of ,ideas4 ,so far as we are here concerned1 these laws are the following3 #ast4 ,similar phnomena tend to be thought of together4 #bnd4 ,phnomena which have either been experienced or conceived #dda in close contiguity to one another1 tend to be thought of together4 ,the contiguity is of two kinds2 simultaneity1 and immediate succession4 ,facts which have been experienced or thought of simultaneously1 recall the thought of one another4 ,of facts which have been experienced or thought of in immediate succession1 the antecedent1 or the thought of it1 recalls the thought of the consequent1 but not conversely4 #crd4 ,associations produced by contiguity become more certain and rapid by repetition4 ,when two phnomena have been very often experienced in conjunction1 and have not1 in any single instance1 occurred separately either in experience or in thought1 there is produced between them what has been called ,inseparable1 or less correctly1 ,indissoluble ,association3 by which is not meant that the association must inevitably last to the end of life--that no subsequent experience or process of thought can possibly avail to dissolve it2 but only that as long as no such experience or process of thought has taken place1 the association is irresistible2 it is impossible for us to think the one thing disjoined from the other4 #dth4 ,when an association has acquired this character of inseparability--when the bond between the two ideas has been thus firmly riveted1 not only does the idea called up by association become1 in our consciousness1 inseparable from the idea which suggested it1 but the facts or phnomena answering to those ideas come at last to seem inseparable in existence3 things which we are unable to conceive apart1 appear incapable of existing apart2 and the belief we have in their coexistence1 though really a product of experience1 seems intuitive4 ,innumerable examples might be given of this law4 ,one of the most familiar1 as well as the most striking1 is that of our acquired perceptions of sight4 ,even those who1 with ,mr4 ,bailey1 consider the perception of distance by the eye as not acquired1 but intuitive1 admit that there are many perceptions of sight which1 though instantaneous and unhesitating1 are not intuitive4 ,what we see is a very minute fragment of what we think we see4 ,we see artificially that one thing is hard1 another soft4 ,we see artificially that one thing is hot1 another cold4 ,we see artificially that #ddb what we see is a book1 or a stone1 each of these being not merely an inference1 but a heap of inferences1 from the signs which we see1 to things not visible4 ,we see1 and cannot help seeing1 what we have learnt to infer1 even when we know that the inference is erroneous1 and that the apparent perception is deceptive4 ,we cannot help seeing the moon larger when near the horizon1 though we know that she is of precisely her usual size4 ,we cannot help seeing a mountain as nearer to us and of less height1 when we see it through a more than ordinarily transparent atmosphere4 ,setting out from these premises1 the ,psychological ,theory maintains1 that there are associations naturally and even necessarily generated by the order of our sensations and of our reminiscences of sensation1 which1 supposing no intuition of an external world to have existed in consciousness1 would inevitably generate the belief1 and would cause it to be regarded as an intuition4 ,what is it we mean1 or what is it which leads us to say1 that the objects we perceive are external to us1 and not a part of our own thoughts8 ,we mean1 that there is concerned in our perceptions something which exists when we are not thinking of it2 which existed before we had ever thought of it1 and would exist if we were annihilated2 and further1 that there exist things which we never saw1 touched1 or otherwise perceived1 and things which never have been perceived by man4 ,this idea of something which is distinguished from our fleeting impressions by what1 in ,kantian language1 is called ,perdurability2 something which is fixed and the same1 while our impressions vary2 something which exists whether we are aware of it or not1 and which is always square 7or of some other given figure7 whether it appears to us square or round--constitutes altogether our idea of external substance4 ,whoever can assign an origin to this complex conception1 has accounted for what we mean by the belief in matter4 ,now all this1 according to the ,psychological ,theory1 is but the form impressed by the known laws of association1 upon the conception or notion1 obtained by experience1 of ,contingent ,sensations2 #ddc by which are meant1 sensations that are not in our present consciousness1 and individually never were in our consciousness at all1 but which in virtue of the laws to which we have learnt by experience that our sensations are subject1 we know that we should have felt under given supposable circumstances1 and under these same circumstances1 might still feel4 ,i see a piece of white paper on a table4 ,i go into another room4 ,if the phnomenon always followed me1 or if1 when it did not follow me1 ,i believed it to disappear rerum natur1 ,i should not believe it to be an external object4 ,i should consider it as a phantom--a mere affection of my senses3 ,i should not believe that there had been any ,body there4 ,but1 though ,i have ceased to see it1 ,i am persuaded that the paper is still there4 ,i no longer have the sensations which it gave me2 but ,i believe that when ,i again place myself in the circumstances in which ,i had those sensations1 that is1 when ,i go again into the room1 ,i shall again have them2 and further1 that there has been no intervening moment at which this would not have been the case4 ,owing to this property of my mind1 my conception of the world at any given instant consists1 in only a small proportion1 of present sensations4 ,of these ,i may at the time have none at all1 and they are in any case a most insignificant portion of the whole which ,i apprehend4 ,the conception ,i form of the world existing at any moment1 comprises1 along with the sensations ,i am feeling1 a countless variety of possibilities of sensation3 namely1 the whole of those which past observation tells me that ,i could1 under any supposable circumstances1 experience at this moment1 together with an indefinite and illimitable multitude of others which though ,i do not know that ,i could1 yet it is possible that ,i might1 experience in circumstances not known to me4 ,these various possibilities are the important thing to me in the world4 ,my present sensations are generally of little importance1 and are moreover fugitive3 the possibilities1 on the contrary1 are permanent1 which is the character that mainly distinguishes our idea of ,substance or ,matter from our notion of sensation4 ,these possibilities1 which are conditional #ddd certainties1 need a special name to distinguish them from mere vague possibilities1 which experience gives no warrant for reckoning upon4 ,now1 as soon as a distinguishing name is given1 though it be only to the same thing regarded in a different aspect1 one of the most familiar experiences of our mental nature teaches us1 that the different name comes to be considered as the name of a different thing4 ,there is another important peculiarity of these certified or guaranteed possibilities of sensation2 namely1 that they have reference1 not to single sensations1 but to sensations joined together in groups4 ,when we think of anything as a material substance1 or body1 we either have had1 or we think that on some given supposition we should have1 not some one sensation1 but a great and even an indefinite number and variety of sensations1 generally belonging to different senses1 but so linked together1 that the presence of one announces the possible presence at the very same instant of any or all of the rest4 ,in our mind1 therefore1 not only is this particular ,possibility of sensation invested with the quality of permanence when we are not actually feeling any of the sensations at all2 but when we are feeling some of them1 the remaining sensations of the group are conceived by us in the form of ,present ,possibilities1 which might be realized at the very moment4 ,and as this happens in turn to all of them1 the group as a whole presents itself to the mind as permanent1 in contrast not solely with the temporariness of my bodily presence1 but also with the temporary character of each of the sensations composing the group2 in other words1 as a kind of permanent substratum1 under a set of passing experiences or manifestations3 which is another leading character of our idea of substance or matter1 as distinguished from sensation4 ,let us now take into consideration another of the general characters of our experience1 namely1 that in addition to fixed groups1 we also recognise a fixed ,order in our sensations2 an ,order of succession1 which1 when ascertained by observation1 gives rise to the ideas of ,cause and ,effect1 according to what ,i hold to be the true theory of that relation1 and is on any #dde theory the source of all our knowledge what causes produce what effects4 ,now1 of what nature is this fixed order among our sensations8 ,it is a constancy of antecedence and sequence4 ,but the constant antecedence and sequence do not generally exist between one actual sensation and another4 ,very few such sequences are presented to us by experience4 ,in almost all the constant sequences which occur in ,nature1 the antecedence and consequence do not obtain between sensations1 but between the groups we have been speaking about1 of which a very small portion is actual sensation1 the greater part being permanent possibilities of sensation1 evidenced to us by a small and variable number of sensations actually present4 ,hence1 our ideas of causation1 power1 activity1 do not become connected in thought with our sensations as actual at all1 save in the few physiological cases where these figure by themselves as the antecedents in some uniform sequence4 ,those ideas become connected1 not with sensations1 but with groups of possibilities of sensation4 ,the sensations conceived do not1 to our habitual thoughts1 present themselves as sensations actually experienced1 inasmuch as not only any one or any number of them may be supposed absent1 but none of them need be present4 ,we find that the modifications which are taking place more or less regularly in our possibilities of sensation1 are mostly quite independent of our consciousness1 and of our presence or absence4 ,whether we are asleep or awake the fire goes out1 and puts an end to one particular possibility of warmth and light4 ,whether we are present or absent the corn ripens1 and brings a new possibility of food4 ,hence we speedily learn to think of ,nature as made up solely of these groups of possibilities1 and the active force in ,nature as manifested in the modification of some of these by others4 ,the sensations1 though the original foundation of the whole1 come to be looked upon as a sort of accident depending on us1 and the possibilities as much more real than the actual sensations1 nay1 as the very realities of which these are only the representations1 appearances1 or effects4 ,when this state of mind has been arrived at1 then1 and from that time forward1 we are never #ddf conscious of a present sensation without instantaneously referring it to some one of the groups of possibilities into which a sensation of that particular description enters2 and if we do not yet know to what group to refer it1 we at least feel an irresistible conviction that it must belong to some group or other2 i4e4 that its presence proves the existence1 here and now1 of a great number and variety of possibilities of sensation1 without which it would not have been4 ,the whole set of sensations as possible1 form a permanent background to any one or more of them that are1 at a given moment1 actual2 and the possibilities are conceived as standing to the actual sensations in the relation of a cause to its effects1 or of canvas to the figures painted on it1 or of a root to the trunk1 leaves1 and flowers1 or of a substratum to that which is spread over it1 or1 in transcendental language1 of ,matter to ,form4 ,when this point has been reached1 the ,permanent ,possibilities in question have assumed such unlikeness of aspect1 and such difference of apparent relation to us1 from any sensations1 that it would be contrary to all we know of the constitution of human nature that they should not be conceived as1 and believed to be1 at least as different from sensations as sensations are from one another4 ,their groundwork in sensation is forgotten1 and they are supposed to be something intrinsically distinct from it4 ,we can withdraw ourselves from any of our 7external7 sensations1 or we can be withdrawn from them by some other agency4 ,but though the sensations cease1 the possibilities remain in existence2 they are independent of our will1 our presence1 and everything which belongs to us4 ,we find1 too1 that they belong as much to other human or sentient beings as to ourselves4 ,we find other people grounding their expectations and conduct upon the same permanent possibilities on which we ground ours4 ,but we do not find them experiencing the same actual sensations4 ,other people do not have our sensations exactly when and as we have them3 but they have our possibilities of sensation2 whatever indicates a present possibility of sensations to ourselves1 indicates a present possibility of similar sensations to them1 except so far as #ddg their organs of sensation may vary from the type of ours4 ,this puts the final seal to our conception of the groups of possibilities as the fundamental reality in ,nature4 ,the permanent possibilities are common to us and to our fellow-creatures2 the actual sensations are not4 ,that which other people become aware of when1 and on the same grounds1 as ,i do1 seems more real to me than that which they do not know of unless ,i tell them4 ,the world of ,possible ,sensations succeeding one another according to laws1 is as much in other beings as it is in me2 it has therefore an existence outside me2 it is an ,external ,world4 ,if this explanation of the origin and growth of the idea of ,matter1 or ,external ,nature1 contains nothing at variance with natural laws1 it is at least an admissible supposition1 that the element of ,non-ego which ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton regards as an original datum of consciousness1 and which we certainly do find in our present consciousness1 may not be one of its primitive elements--may not have existed at all in its first manifestations4 ,but if this supposition be admissible1 it ought1 on ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton's principles1 to be received as true4 ,the first of the laws laid down by him for the interpretation of ,consciousness1 the law 7as he terms it7 of ,parcimony1 forbids to suppose an original principle of our nature in order to account for phnomena which admit of possible explanation from known causes4 ,if the supposed ingredient of consciousness be one which might grow up 7though we cannot prove that it did grow up7 through later experience2 and if1 when it had so grown up1 it would1 by known laws of our nature1 appear as completely intuitive as our sensations themselves2 we are bound1 according to ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton's and all sound philosophy1 to assign to it that origin4 ,where there is a known cause adequate to account for a phnomenon1 there is no justification for ascribing it to an unknown one4 ,and what evidence does ,consciousness furnish of the intuitiveness of an impression1 except instantaneousness1 apparent simplicity1 and 99unconsciousness on our part of how the impression came into our minds8 ,these features can only prove the impression to be #ddh intuitive1 on the hypothesis that there are no means of accounting for them otherwise4 ,if they not only might1 but naturally would1 exist1 even on the supposition that it is not intuitive1 we must accept the conclusion to which we are led by the ,psychological ,method1 and which the ,introspective ,method furnishes absolutely nothing to contradict4 ,matter1 then1 may be defined1 a ,permanent ,possibility of ,sensation4 ,if ,i am asked1 whether ,i believe in matter1 ,i ask whether the questioner accepts this definition of it4 ,if he does1 ,i believe in matter3 and so do all ,berkeleians4 ,in any other sense than this1 ,i do not4 ,but ,i affirm with confidence1 that this conception of ,matter includes the whole meaning attached to it by the common world1 apart from philosophical1 and sometimes from theological1 theories4 ,the reliance of mankind on the real existence of visible and tangible objects1 means reliance on the reality and permanence of ,possibilities of visual and tactual sensations1 when no such sensations are actually experienced4 ,we are warranted in believing that this is the meaning of ,matter in the minds of many of its most esteemed metaphysical champions1 though they themselves would not admit as much3 for example1 of ,reid1 ,stewart1 and ,brown4 ,for these three philosophers alleged that all mankind1 including ,berkeley and ,hume1 really believed in ,matter1 inasmuch as unless they did1 they would not have turned aside to save themselves from running against a post4 ,now all which this manoeuvre really proved is1 that they believed in ,permanent ,possibilities of ,sensation4 ,we have therefore the unintentional sanction of these three eminent defenders of the existence of matter1 for affirming1 that to believe in ,permanent ,possibilities of ,sensation is believing in ,matter4 ,it is hardly necessary1 after such authorities1 to mention ,dr4 ,johnson1 or any one else who resorts to the argumentum baculinum of knocking a stick against the ground4 ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton1 a far subtler thinker than any of these1 never reasons in this manner4 ,he never supposes that a disbeliever in what he means by ,matter1 ought in consistency to act in any different mode from those who believe in it4 ,he knew #ddi that the belief on which all the practical consequences depend1 is the belief in ,permanent ,possibilities of ,sensation1 and that if nobody believed in a material universe in any other sense1 life would go on exactly as it now does4 ,he1 however1 did believe in more than this1 but1 ,i think1 only because it had never occurred to him that mere ,possibilities of ,sensation could1 to our artificialized consciousness1 present the character of objectivity which1 as we have now shown1 they not only can1 but unless the known laws of the human mind were suspended1 must necessarily1 present4 ,perhaps it may be objected1 that the very possibility of framing such a notion of ,matter as ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton's--the capacity in the human mind of imagining an external world which is anything more than what the ,psychological ,theory makes it--amounts to a disproof of the theory4 ,if 7it may be said7 we had no revelation in consciousness1 of a world which is not in some way or other identified with sensation1 we should be unable to have the notion of such a world4 ,if the only ideas we had of external objects were ideas of our sensations1 supplemented by an acquired notion of permanent possibilities of sensation1 we must 7it is thought7 be incapable of conceiving1 and therefore still more incapable of fancying that we perceive1 things which are not sensations at all4 ,it being evident however that some philosophers believe this1 and it being maintainable that the mass of mankind do so1 the existence of a perdurable basis of sensations1 distinct from sensations themselves1 is proved1 it might be said1 by the possibility of believing it4 ,let me first restate what ,i apprehend the belief to be4 ,we believe that we perceive a something closely related to all our sensations1 but different from those which we are feeling at any particular minute2 and distinguished from sensations altogether1 by being permanent and always the same1 while these are fugitive1 variable1 and alternately displace one another4 ,but these attributes of the object of perception are properties belonging to all the possibilities of sensation which experience guarantees4 ,the belief in such permanent possibilities seems #dej to me to include all that is essential or characteristic in the belief in substance4 ,i believe that ,calcutta exists1 though ,i do not perceive it1 and that it would still exist if every percipient inhabitant were suddenly to leave the place1 or be struck dead4 ,but when ,i analyse the belief1 all ,i find in it is1 that were these events to take place1 the ,permanent ,possibility of ,sensation which ,i call ,calcutta would still remain2 that if ,i were suddenly transported to the banks of the ,hoogly1 ,i should still have the sensations which1 if now present1 would lead me to affirm that ,calcutta exists here and now4 ,we may infer1 therefore1 that both philosophers and the world at large1 when they think of matter1 conceive it really as a ,permanent ,possibility of ,sensation4 ,but the majority of philosophers fancy that it is something more2 and the world at large1 though they have really1 as ,i conceive1 nothing in their minds but a ,permanent ,possibility of ,sensation1 would1 if asked the question1 undoubtedly agree with the philosophers3 and though this is sufficiently explained by the tendency of the human mind to infer difference of things from difference of names1 ,i acknowledge the obligation of showing how it can be possible to believe in an existence transcending all possibilities of sensation1 unless on the hypothesis that such an existence actually is1 and that we actually perceive it4 ,the explanation1 however1 is not difficult4 ,it is an admitted fact1 that we are capable of all conceptions which can be formed by generalizing from the observed laws of our sensations4 ,whatever relation we find to exist between any one of our sensations and something different from it1 that same relation we have no difficulty in conceiving to exist between the sum of all our sensations and something different from them4 ,the differences which our consciousness recognises between one sensation and another1 give us the general notion of difference1 and inseparably associate with every sensation we have1 the feeling of its being different from other things3 and when once this association has been formed1 we can no longer conceive anything1 without being able1 and even being compelled1 to form also the conception of something different from it4 #dea ,this familiarity with the idea of something different from each thing we know1 makes it natural and easy to form the notion of something different from all things that we know1 collectively as well as individually4 ,it is true we can form no conception of what such a thing can be2 our notion of it is merely negative2 but the idea of a substance1 apart from its relation to the impressions which we conceive it as making on our senses1 is a merely negative one4 ,there is thus no psychological obstacle to our forming the notion of a something which is neither a sensation nor a possibility of sensation1 even if our consciousness does not testify to it2 and nothing is more likely than that the ,permanent ,possibilities of sensation1 to which our consciousness does testify1 should be confounded in our minds with this imaginary conception4 ,all experience attests the strength of the tendency to mistake mental abstractions1 even negative ones1 for substantive realities2 and the ,permanent ,possibilities of sensation which experience guarantees1 are so extremely unlike in many of their properties to actual sensations1 that since we are capable of imagining something which transcends sensations1 there is a great natural probability that we should suppose these to be it4 ,but this natural probability is converted into certainty1 when we take into consideration that universal law of our experience which is termed the law of ,causation1 and which makes us mentally connect with the beginning of everything1 some antecedent condition1 or ,cause4 ,the case of ,causation is one of the most marked of all the cases in which we extend to the sum total of our consciousness1 a notion derived from its parts4 ,it is a striking example of our power to conceive1 and our tendency to believe1 that a relation which subsists between every individual item of our experience and some other item1 subsists also between our experience as a whole1 and something not within the sphere of experience4 ,by this extension to the sum of all our experiences1 of the internal relations obtaining between its several parts1 we are led to consider sensation itself the aggregate whole of our sensations as deriving its origin from antecedent existences #deb transcending sensation4 ,that we should do this1 is a consequence of the particular character of the uniform sequences1 which experience discloses to us among our sensations4 ,as already remarked1 the constant antecedent of a sensation is seldom another sensation1 or set of sensations1 actually felt4 ,it is much oftener the existence of a group of possibilities1 not necessarily including any actual sensations1 except such as are required to show that the possibilities are really present4 ,nor are actual sensations indispensable even for this purpose2 for the presence of the object 7which is nothing more than the immediate presence of the possibilities7 may be made known to us by the very sensation which we refer to as its effect4 ,thus1 the real antecedent of an effect--the only antecedent which1 being invariable and unconditional1 we consider to be the cause--may be1 not any sensation really felt1 but solely the presence1 at that or the immediately preceding moment1 of a group of possibilities of sensation4 ,hence it is not with sensations as actually experienced1 but with their ,permanent ,possibilities1 that the idea of ,cause comes to be identified3 and we1 by one and the same process1 acquire the habit of regarding ,sensation in general1 like all our individual sensations1 as an ,effect1 and also that of conceiving as the causes of most of our individual sensations1 not other sensations1 but general possibilities of sensation4 ,if all these considerations put together do not completely explain and account for our conceiving these ,possibilities as a class of independent and substantive entities1 ,i know not what psychological analysis can be conclusive4 ,it may perhaps be said1 that the preceding theory gives1 indeed1 some account of the idea of ,permanent ,existence which forms part of our conception of matter1 but gives no explanation of our believing these permanent objects to be external1 or out of ourselves4 ,i apprehend1 on the contrary1 that the very idea of anything out of ourselves is derived solely from the knowledge experience gives us of the ,permanent ,possibilities4 ,our sensations we carry with us wherever we go1 and they never exist where we are not2 but when we change #dec our place we do not carry away with us the ,permanent ,possibilities of ,sensation3 they remain until we return1 or arise and cease under conditions with which our presence has in general nothing to do4 ,and more than all--they are1 and will be after we have ceased to feel1 ,permanent ,possibilities of sensation to other beings than ourselves4 ,thus our actual sensations1 and the ,permanent ,possibilities of sensation1 stand out in obtrusive contrast to one another3 and when the idea of ,cause has been acquired1 and extended by generalization from the parts of our experience to its aggregate whole1 nothing can be more natural than that the ,permanent ,possibilities should be classed by us as existences generically distinct from our sensations1 but of which our sensations are the effect4 ,the same theory which accounts for our ascribing to an aggregate of possibilities of sensation1 a permanent existence which our sensations themselves do not possess1 and consequently a greater reality than belongs to our sensations1 also explains our attributing greater objectivity to the ,primary ,qualities of bodies than to the ,secondary4 ,for the sensations which correspond to what are called the ,primary ,qualities 7as soon at least as we come to apprehend them by two senses1 the eye as well as the touch7 are always present when any part of the group is so4 ,but colours1 tastes1 smells1 and the like1 being1 in comparison1 fugacious1 are not1 in the same degree1 conceived as being always there1 even when nobody is present to perceive them4 ,the sensations answering to the ,secondary ,qualities are only occasional1 those to the ,primary1 constant4 ,the ,secondary1 moreover1 vary with different persons1 and with the temporary sensibility of our organs2 the ,primary1 when perceived at all1 are1 as far as we know1 the same to all persons and at all times4 ,,end ,,of ,,vol4 ,i4 ,,london3 ,,savill1 ,,edwards ,,and ,,co41 ,,printers1 ,,chandos ,,street1 ,,covent ,,garden4 ,,analysis ,,of ,,the ,,phenomena ,,of ,,the ,,human ,,mind4 ,,analysis ,,of ,,the ,,phenomena ,,of ,,the ,,human ,,mind ,,by ,,james ,,mill ,,with ,,notes ,,illustrative ,,and ,,critical ,,by ,,alexander ,,bain ,,andrew ,,findlater ,,and ,,george ,,grote ,,edited ,,with ,,additional ,,notes ,,by ,,john ,,stuart ,,mill ,,in ,,two ,,volumes ,,vol4 ,,ii4 ,,second ,,edition ,,london ,,longmans1 ,,green1 ,,reader1 ,,and ,,dyer4 #ahgh ,,contents ,,of ,,the ,,second ,,volume4 99 99 99 99 99 ,,chapter ,,xiv4 ,,page ,some ,names which require a particular ,explanation #a ,,section #a4 ,names of ,names #c #b4 ,relative ,terms #f ,abstract ,relative ,terms #gb #c4 ,numbers #hi #d4 ,privative ,terms #ii #e4 ,time #aaf #f4 ,motion #adb #g4 ,identity #afd ,,chapter ,,xv4 ,reflection #agf ,,chapter ,,xvi4 ,the ,distinction between the ,intellectual and ,active ,powers of the ,human ,mind #aha ,,chapter ,,xvii4 ,pleasurable and ,painful ,sensations #ahd ,,chapter ,,xviii4 ,causes of the ,pleasurable and ,painful ,sensations #ahg ,,chapter ,,xix4 ,ideas of the ,pleasurable and ,painful ,sensations1 and of the ,causes of them #ahi ,,chapter ,,xx4 ,the ,pleasurable and ,painful ,sensations1 contemplated as passed1 or future #aif vi ,,chapter ,,xxi4 ,the ,causes of ,pleasurable and ,painful ,sensations1 contemplated as passed1 or future #bja ,,section #a4 ,the immediate ,causes of ,pleasurable and ,painful ,sensations1 contemplated as passed1 or as future #bja #b4 ,the ,remote ,causes of ,pleasurable and ,painful ,sensations contemplated as passed1 or future #bjf ,,sub-,,sect4 #a4 ,wealth1 ,power1 and ,dignity1 and their ,contraries1 contemplated as ,causes of our ,pleasures and ,pains #bjg #b4 ,our ,fellow-,creatures contemplated as ,causes of our ,pleasures and ,pains #bad #a4--;,friendship #baf #b4--,kindness #baf #c4--;,family #bah #d4--;,country #bbf #e4--,party2 ,class #bbg #f4--,mankind #bbi #c4 ,the ,objects called ,sublime and ,beautiful1 and their ,contraries1 contemplated as ,causes of our ,pleasures and ,pains #bcj ,,chapter ,,xxii4 ,motives #bef ,,section #a4 ,pleasurable or ,painful ,states1 contemplated as the ,consequents of our own ,acts #bef #b4 ,causes of our ,pleasurable and ,painful ,states1 contemplated as the ,consequents of our own ,acts #bfe ,,chapter ,,xxiii4 ,the ,acts of our ,fellow-creatures1 which are ,causes of our ,pains and ,pleasures1 contemplated as ,consequents of our own ,acts #bhj ,,chapter ,,xxiv4 ,the ,will #cbg ,,chapter ,,xxv4 ,intention 99#cif ,,analysis1 ,,etc4 99 99 99 99 99 ,,chapter ,,xiv4 ,,some ,,names ,,which ,,require ,a ,,particular ,,explanation4 ,quam difficile sit inveteratas1 eloquentissimorumque scriptorum authoritate confirmatas1 opiniones1 mentibus hominum excutere1 non ignoro4 ,prsertim cum philosophia vera 7id est accurata7 orationis non modo fucum1 sed etiam omnia fere ornamenta ex professo rejiciat3 cumque scienti omnis fundamenta prima non modo speciosa non sint1 sed etiam humilia1 arida1 et pene deformia videantur4--,hobbes ,comput4 sive ,logica1 cap4 i4 s4 ,i4 ,,we have now seen that1 in what we call the mental world1 ,consciousness1 there are three grand classes of phenomena1 the most familiar of all the facts with which we are acquainted1--,,sensations1 ,,ideas1 and the ,,train ,,of ,,ideas4 ,we have examined a number of the more complicated cases of ,consciousness2 and have found that they all resolve themselves into the three simple elements1 thus enumerated4 ,we also found it necessary to shew1 for what ends1 and in what manner1 marks were contrived of sensations and ideas1 and by what combinations they were made to represent1 #b expeditiously1 trains of those states of consciousness4 ,some marks or names1 however1 could not be explained1 till some of the more complicated states of consciousness were unfolded2 these also are names so important1 and so peculiar in their mode of signification1 that a very complete understanding of them is required4 ,it is to the consideration of these remarkable cases of ,naming that we now proceed4#a ,editor's footnote #a3 ,under the modest title of an explanation of the meaning of several names1 this chapter presents us with a series of discussions of some of the deepest and most intricate questions in all metaphysics4 ,like ,plato1 the author introduces his analysis of the most obscure among the complex general conceptions of the human mind1 in the form of an enquiry into the meaning of their names4 ,the title of the chapter gives a very inadequate notion of the difficulty and importance of the speculations contained in it1 and which make it1 perhaps1 the profoundest chapter of the book4 ,it is almost as if a treatise on chemistry were described as an explanation of the names air1 water1 potass1 sulphuric acid1 c4--,ed4 ,,section ,i4 ,,names ,,of ,,names4 ,it is of great importance to distinguish this class of terms2 to understand well the function which they perform1 and to mark the subdivisions into which they are formed4 ,there is not1 however1 such difficulty in the subject as to require great minuteness in the exposition4 ,as we have occasion to speak of things2 animals1 vegetables1 minerals2 so we have occasion to speak of the marks1 which we are under the necessity of using1 in order to record or to communicate our thoughts respecting them4 ,we cannot record or communicate our thoughts respecting names1 as man1 tree1 horse1 to walk1 to fly1 to eat1 to converse1 without marks for them4 ,we proceed in the case of names1 as we do in other cases4 ,we form them into classes1 some more1 some less1 comprehensive1 and give a name to each4 ,we have one name1 so general as to include them all2 ,word4 ,that is not a name of any thing4 ,it is a name of the marks which we employ for discourse2 and a name of them all4 ,john is a word1 mountain is a word1 to run is a word1 above is a word1 and so on4 ,they are divided into classes1 differently for different purposes4 ,the grammarian1 who regards chiefly the concatenation of words in sentences1 divides them into noun1 adjective1 pronoun1 verb1 adverb1 preposition1 #d conjunction2 these words are none of them names of things4 ,noun is not a name of a thing2 it is a name of a class of words1 as ,john1 ,james1 man1 ox1 tree1 water1 love1 hatred2 the same is the case with adjective1 verb1 and so of the rest4 ,the philosopher makes another division of them1 adapted to his purposes1 which has a more particular reference to their mode of signification4 ,thus1 he divides them into universal1 and particular2 concrete1 and abstract2 positive1 and negative2 equivocal1 and univocal2 relative1 and absolute2 and so on4 ,it is very easy to see that the word universal1 for example1 is not a name of a thing4 ,things are all individual1 not general4 ,the name1 man1 is a universal1 because it applies to every individual of a class2 for the same reason the name ox1 the name horse1 the name dog1 and so on1 are universals4 ,the words1 genus and species are synonymous with universal2 of course they also are names of names4 ,such is the word number4 ,one1 two1 one hundred1 one thousand1 are numbers2 in other words1 number is a general name for each and all of those other names4 ,beside our names for names singly1 we have occasion to name combinations of names4 ,thus we have the name predication4 ,this is a name for the combination of three words1 subject1 predicate1 and copula4 ,we have the name sentence1 which never can be less1 implicitly or explicitly1 than a predication1 but is often more4 ,the same is the account of the word definition4 ,we have the names speech1 oration1 sermon1 conversation1 all of them names for a series of sentences4 ,we have #e also names of written discourse1 such as a volume1 a book1 a chapter1 a section1 a paragraph4#b ,editor's footnote #b3 ,a right understanding of the words which are names of names1 is of great importance in philosophy4 ,the tendency was always strong to believe that whatever receives a name must be an entity or being1 having an independent existence of its own2 and if no real entity answering to the name could be found1 men did not for that reason suppose that none existed1 but imagined that it was something peculiarly abstruse and mysterious1 too high to be an object of sense4 ,the meaning of all general1 and especially of all abstract terms1 became in this way enveloped in a mystical haze2 and none of these have been more generally misunderstood1 or have been a more copious source of futile and bewildering speculation1 than some of the words which are names of names4 ,genus1 ,species1 ,universal1 were long supposed to be designations of sublime hyperphysical realities2 number1 instead of a general name of all numerals1 was supposed to be the name1 if not of a concrete thing1 at least of a single property or attribute4 ,this class of names was well understood and correctly characterized by ,hobbes1 of whose philosophy the distinction between names of names and of things was a cardinal point4--,ed4 #f ,,section ,,ii4 ,,relative ,,terms4 ,the explanation of ,relative ,terms will run to a considerable length4 ,the mode in which they are employed as marks is peculiar2 and has suggested the belief of something very mysterious in that which is marked by them4 ,it is therefore necessary to be minute in exhibiting the combinations of ideas of which they are the names4 ,one peculiarity of ,relative ,terms1 which it is necessary for us to begin with noticing1 is1 that they always exist in pairs4 ,there is no relative without its correlate1 either actual or implied4 ,thus1 we have ,father and ,son2 ,husband and ,wife2 ,master and ,servant2 ,subject and ,king2 also ,high and ,low2 ,right and ,left2 ,antecedent and ,consequent4 ,in these cases of relative pairs1 the two names are two different words2 in other cases1 one word serves for both names4 ,of this sort are the words ,brother1 ,sister1 ,cousin1 ,friend1 ,like1 ,equal1 and so on4 ,when we say that ,john is brother1 we always mean of some one else1 as ,james1 whom we also call brother4 ,we call ,jane the sister of ,ann1 as we call ,ann the sister of ,jane4 ,when we say that ,a is equal to ,b1 we signify1 by the same expression1 that ,b is equal to ,a2 and so on4 ,it is always to be remembered1 that1 in speaking1 we are only indicating our own trains2 and that of #g course every word in a mark of some part of a train4 ,the parts of our trains to which we give relative names1 are either simple1 or complex4 ,the simple1 are either the simple sensations1 or the ideas of those sensations4 ,the complex1 are either those clusters of simple ideas which we call the ideas of objects1 because they correspond with clustered sensations2 or they are the clusters which the mind puts together arbitrarily for its own purposes4 ,if it is asked1 why we give names in pairs8 ,the general answer immediately suggests itself2 it is because the things named present themselves in pairs2 that is1 are joined by association4 ,but as many things are joined in pairs by association1 which do not receive relative names1 the cause may still be inquired of the classification4 ,what is the reason that some pairs do1 while many more do not1 receive relative names8 ,the cause is the same by which we are guided in imposing other names4 ,as the various combinations of ideas are far too numerous for naming1 and we are obliged to make a selection1 we name those which we find it of most importance to have named1 omitting the rest4 ,it is a question of convenience1 solved by experience4 ,it will be seen more distinctly hereafter that relative names are one of the contrivances for epitomising2 and that they enable us to express ourselves with fewer words than we should be able to do without them4#c ,editor's footnote #c3 ,no part of the ,analysis is more valuable than the simple explanation here given of a subject which has seemed so mysterious to some of the most enlightened and penetrating philosophers1 down even to the present time4 ,the only difference between relative names and any others consist in their being given in pairs2 and the reason of their being given in pairs is not the existence between two things1 of a mystical bond called a ,relation1 and supposed to have a kind of shadowy and abstract reality1 but a very simple peculiarity in the concrete fact which the two names are intended to mark4 ,in order to make quite clear the nature of this peculiarity1 it will be desirable to advert once more to the double mode of signification of concrete general names1 viz4 that while they denote 7or are names of7 objects1 they connote some fact relating to those objects4 ,the fact connoted by any name1 relative or not1 is always of the same nature2 it is some bodily or mental feeling1 or some set of bodily or mental feelings1 accompanying or produced by the object4 ,but in the case of the ordinary names of objects1 this fact concerns one object only1 or rather only that one object and the sentient mind4 ,the peculiarity in the case of relative names is1 that the fact connoted concerns two objects1 and cannot be understood without thinking of them both4 ,it is a phenomenon in which two objects play a part4 ,there is no greater mystery in a phenomenon which concerns two objects1 than in a phenomenon which concerns only one4 ,for example2 the fact connoted by the word cause1 is a fact in which the thing which is the cause1 is implicated along with another thing which is the effect4 ,the facts connoted by the word parent1 and also by the word son or daughter1 are a long series of phenomena of which both the parent and the child are parts2 and the series of phenomena would not be that which the name parent expresses1 unless the child formed a part of it1 nor would it be that which the name son or daughter expresses1 unless the parent formed a part of it4 ,now1 when in a series of phenomena of any interest to us two objects are implicated1 we naturally give names expressive of it to both the objects1 and these are relative names4 ,the two correlative names denote two different objects1 the cause and the effect1 or the parent and son2 but though what they denote is different1 what they connote is in a certain sense the same3 both names connote the same set of facts1 considered as giving one name to the one object1 another name to the other4 ,this set of facts1 which is connoted by both the correlative names1 was called by the old logicians the ground of the relation1 fundamentum relationis4 ,the fundamentum of any relation is the facts1 fully set out1 which are the reason of giving to two objects two correlative names4 ,in some cases both objects seem to receive the same name2 in the relation of likeness1 both objects are said to be like2 in the relation of equality1 both are said to be equal4 ,but even here the duality holds1 on a stricter examination3 for the first object 7,a7 is not said to be like1 absolutely1 but to be like the second object 7,b72 the second is not said to be like absolutely1 but to be like the first4 ,now though like is only one name1 like ,a is not the same name as like ,b1 so that there is really1 in this case also1 a pair of names4 ,from these considerations we see that objects are said to be related1 when there is any fact1 simple or complex1 either apprehended by the senses or otherwise1 in which they both figure4 ,any objects1 whether physical or mental1 are related1 or are in a relation1 to one another1 in virtue of any complex state of consciousness into which they both enter2 even if it be a no more complex state of consciousness than that of merely thinking of them together4 ,and they are related to each other in as many different ways1 or in other words1 they stand in as many distinct relations to one another1 as there are specifically distinct states of consciousness of which they both form parts4 ,as these may be innumerable1 the possible relations not only of any one thing with others1 but of any one thing with the same other1 are infinitely numerous and various4 ,but they may all be reduced to a certain number of general heads of classification1 constituting the different kinds of ,relation3 each of which requires examination apart1 to ascertain what1 in each case1 the state of consciousness1 the cluster or train of sensations or thoughts1 really is1 in which the two objects figure1 and which is connoted by the correlative names4 ,this examination the author accordingly undertakes3 and thus1 under the guise of explaining names1 he analyses all the principal cases which the world and the human mind present1 of what are called ,relations between things4--,ed4 #h ,i4 ,the only1 or at least the principal1 occasions1 for naming simple sensations1 or simple ideas1 in pairs1 seem to be these3 #a ,when we take them into simultaneous view1 as such and such2 #b4 ,when we take them into simultaneous view1 as antecedent and consequent4 ,,ii4 ,the principal occasions on which we name the complex ideas1 called objects1 in pairs1 are these four3 #i #a4 ,when we speak of them as having an order in space2 #b4 ,when we speak of them as having an order in time2 #c4 ,when we speak of them as agreeing or disagreeing in quantity2 #d4 ,as agreeing or disagreeing in quality4 ,,iii4 ,the occasions on which we name the complex ideas of our own formation in pairs1 are1 #aj #a4 ,when we speak of them as composed of the same or different simple ideas2 #b4 ,when we speak of them as antecedent and consequent4 ,whatever it may be necessary to remark1 respecting relative terms1 will occur in the consideration of these several cases4 ,i4 #a4 ,we speak of two sensations1 as ,same or ,different1 ,like or ,unlike4 ,these words are ,relatives of the double signification2 each individual of the pair has the same name4 ,when we say that sensation ,a is the same with #aa sensation ,b1 we mean that ,b also is the same with ,a2 different1 like1 and unlike1 have the same double application4 ,another ambiguity needs to be noted in the word same4 ,when there are two things1 they are not the same thing2 for same1 in the strict sense of the word1 means one thing1 and that only4 ,here it means a great degree of likeness1 a sense in which1 with respect to sensations and ideas1 it is very frequently used4 ,of two sensations1 or two ideas1 we1 in truth1 can only say1 that they are like or unlike2 or1 that the one comes first1 the other after it4 ,it is now necessary to attend very carefully to what happens1 when we say that two sensations are like1 or that they are unlike4 ,first of all1 we have the two sensations4 ,but what is it to have two sensations8 ,it is merely to be conscious of a change4 ,but to be conscious of a change in sensation1 is sensation4 ,it is an essential part of the process4 ,without it we should not be sentient beings4 ,to have sensation1 and not to be conscious of any change1 is to have but one sensation continued4 ,we have already seen that this is a state which seems incapable of being distinguished from that of having no sensation4 ,at any rate1 what we mean by a sentient being1 is not a being with one unvaried sensation1 but a being with sensations continually varied2 the varying being a necessary part of the having more sensations than one2 and the varying1 and the being conscious of the variation1 being not two things1 but one and the same thing4 ,having two sensations1 therefore1 is not only having sensation1 but the only #ab thing which can1 in strictness1 be called having sensation2 and the having two1 and knowing they are two1 which are not two things1 but one and the same thing1 is not only sensation1 and nothing else than sensation1 but the only thing which can1 in strictness1 be called sensation4 ,the having a new sensation1 and knowing that it is new1 are not two things1 but one and the same thing4#d ,bain's footnote #d3 ,the author is here endeavouring to express the most fundamental fact of the consciousness--the necessity of change1 or transition from one state to another in order to our being conscious4 ,he approaches very near to1 without exactly touching1 the inference that all consciousness1 all sensation1 all knowledge must be of doubles2 the state passed from and the state passed to1 are equally recognised by us4 ,opening the eyes to the light1 for the first time1 we know a contrast1--a present light1 a past privation--but for the one we should not have known the other4 ,any single thing is unknowable by us2 its relative opposite is a part of its very existence4 ,in a former page it is stated that relative names are one of the conveniences of epitomising4 ,this is a narrow view to take of them4 ,they are an essential part of language2 they are demanded by the intrinsic relativity of all nameable things4 ,if we have a thing called light1 we have also another thing but for which light could not be known by us1 dark4 ,it is expedient to have names for both elements of the mutually dependent couple4 ,and so everywhere4 ,language would be insufficient for its purposes if it did not provide the means of expressing the correlative 7called also the negative7 of every thing named4--,b4 ,the case between sensation and sensation1 resembles that between sensation and idea4 ,how do ,i know that an idea is not a sensation8 ,who ever thought of asking the question8 ,is not the having an idea1 #ac and the knowing it as an idea1 the same thing8 ,the having without the knowing is repugnant4 ,the misfortune is1 that the word1 know1 has associations linked with it1 which have nothing to do with this case1 but which intrude themselves along with the word1 and make a complexity1 where otherwise there would be none4 ,this is a matter which deserves the greatest attention4 ,one of the most unfortunate cases of the illusions1 which the close association of ideas with words has produced1 is created by ideas clinging to words when they ought to be disjoined from them1 and mixing themselves by that means with the ideas under consideration1 when they ought to be considered wholly distinct from them4 ,nothing was of more importance1 than that the phenomenon1 to which we are just now directing our attention1 the very first ingredient in the great mental composition1 should be accurately understood1 and nothing mixed up with it which did not truly belong to it4 ,there is no doubt that in one of its senses1 knowledge is synonymous with sensation4 ,if ,i am asked what is my knowledge of pain8 ,i answer1 the feeling of it1 the having it4 ,the blind man has not the knowledge of colours2 the meaning is1 he has not the sensations3 if deaf also1 he is without the knowledge1 that is1 the sensations1 of sounds3 suppose him void of all other sensations1 you suppose him void of knowledge4 ,in many cases1 however1 we arrive at knowledge1 by certain steps2 by something of a process4 ,the word1 know1 is most frequently applied to those cases4 ,when we know1 by mere sensation1 we say we see1 we hear1 and so on2 when we know by mere ideas1 #ad or rather ideation1 if we could use such a word1 we say we conceive1 we think4 ,the word know1 therefore1 being almost constantly joined with the idea of a process1 it is exceedingly difficult1 when we apply it to sensation1 not to have the idea of a process at the same time2 and thus exceedingly difficult to conceive that sensation1 and knowing1 in this case1 are purely synonymous4 ,as the knowing ,i have an idea1 is merely having the idea2 as the having a sensation1 and knowing ,i have a sensation2 the knowing1 for example1 that ,i have the pain of the toothache1 and the having that pain2 are not two things1 but one and the same thing2 so the having a change of sensation1 and knowing ,i have it1 are not two things but one and the same thing4 ,having a change1 ,i have occasion to mark that change4 ,the change has taken place in a train of feelings4 ,i call the first part by one name1 the last by another1 and the marking of the change is effected4 ,suppose that1 without any organ of sense but the eye1 my first sensation is red1 my next green4 ,the whole process is sensation4 ,yet the green is not the red4 ,what we call making the distinction1 therefore1 has taken place1 and it is involved in the sensation4 ,my names1 green1 and red1 thus applied1 are absolute names4 ,the one has no reference to the other4 ,suppose that after green1 ,i have the sensations1 blue1 yellow1 violet1 white1 black2 and that ,i mark them respectively by these names4 ,these are still absolute names4 ,each marks a particular sensation1 and does nothing more4 ,but1 now1 suppose that1 after my sensations red1 green1 blue1 c41 ,i have the sensation #ae red again2 that ,i recognise it as like the sensation ,i had first1 and that ,i have a desire to mark that recognition2 it remains to explain what are the steps of this process4 ,having the sensation a second time needs no explanation2 it is the same thing as having it the first4 ,but what happens in recognising that it is similar to a former sensation8 ,beside the ,sensation1 in this case1 there is an ,idea4 ,the idea of the former sensation is called up by1 that is1 associated with1 the new sensation4 ,as having a sensation1 and a sensation1 and knowing them1 that is1 distinguishing them1 are the same thing2 and having an idea1 and an idea1 is knowing them2 so1 having an idea and a sensation1 and distinguishing the one from the other1 are the same thing4 ,but1 to know that ,i have the idea and the sensation1 in this case1 is not all2 ,i observe1 that the sensation is like the idea4 ,what is this observation of likeness8 ,is it any thing but that distinguishing of one feeling from another1 which we have recognised to be the same thing as having two feelings8 ,as change of sensation is sensation2 as change1 from a sensation to an idea1 differs from change to a sensation1 in nothing but this1 that the second feeling in the latter change is an idea1 not a sensation2 and as the passing from one feeling to another is distinguishing2 the whole difficulty seems to be resolved2 for undoubtedly the distinguishing differences and similarities1 is the same thing2 a similarity being nothing but a slight difference4#e ,as #af change from red to green1 and knowing the change1 or from a sensation of sight1 to one of any other of the senses1 the most different1 is all sensation2 so change from one shade of red to another1 is assuredly sensation4 ,its being a different shade consists in my feeling of it1 that is1 in my sensation4 ,bain's footnote #e3 ,more properly ,similarity is agreement in difference4 ,difference or discrimination is one thing1 one element of knowledge or cognition2 ,similarity or agreement in difference is another thing1 the second or completing element of knowledge4 ,the two work together in closest intimacy1 but they should neither be looked upon as the same fact1 nor as merely a various shading of the same fact4 ,without difference there would be no similarity2 but similarity is difference and something more4 ,at their roots or first origins1 the two processes lie in almost undistinguishable closeness2 but in their developments they run wide apart4 ,no fact or attribute is known1 or mentally possessed1 without the union of many shocks of difference with many shocks of identity1 or agreement in difference4--,b4 ,passing from red to red1 red1 red1 through a succession of distinguishable shades1 is one train of pure sensation3 passing from red to green1 blue1 tasting1 smelling1 hearing1 touching1 is another train of pure sensation2 that these are not the same trains1 but different trains1 consists in their being felt to be so2 they would not be different1 but for the feeling3 and that a feeling is different1 and known to be so1 are not two things1 but one and the same thing4 ,having two such trains1 ,i want marks to distinguish them4 ,for this purpose1 ,i invent the words same1 similar1 and their contraries2 by means of which1 my object is attained4 ,i call the parts of a train1 such as the first1 same1 or similar2 those of a train like the last1 different1 dissimilar4 ,by these relative terms1 we name the sensations in pairs4 ,when we say1 same1 we mean that sensations #ag ,a1 and ,b1 are the same2 different1 that ,a1 and ,b1 are different2 like and unlike1 the same4 ,by these words we have four pairs of relative terms4 ,a4 ,b4 same same different different like like unlike unlike4 ,the feeling is perfectly analogous in the case of the ideas of those sensations2 and the naming is the same4 ,thus the idea of red1 green1 and so on1 and the ideas of the different shades of red are distinguished from one another by the ideas themselves4 ,to have ideas different and ideas distinguished1 are synonymous expressions2 different and distinguished1 meaning exactly the same thing4 ,the sensations above mentioned1 and their ideas1 have the same absolute names3 thus1 red is at once the name of the sensation1 and the name of the idea2 green1 at once the name of the sensation and the idea2 sweet1 at once the name of the sensation and the idea4 ,the relative terms1 it is obvious1 have the same extent of application4 ,same1 different1 like1 and unlike1 are names of pairs of ideas1 as well as pairs of sensations4 ,it seems1 therefore1 to be made clear1 that1 in applying to the simple sensations and ideas their absolute names1 which are names of classes1 as red1 green1 sweet1 bitter2 and also applying to them names which denote them in pairs1 as such and such2 there is nothing whatsoever but having the sensations1 having the ideas1 and making marks for them4#f ,editor's footnote #f3 ,the author commences his survey of ,relations with the most universal of them all4 ,likeness and ,unlikeness2 and he examines these as subsisting between simple sensations or ideas2 for whatever be the true theory of likeness or unlikeness as between the simple elements1 the same1 in essentials1 will serve for the likenesses or unlikenesses of the wholes compounded of them4 ,examining1 then1 what constitutes likeness between two sensations 7meaning two exactly similar sensations experienced at different times72 he says1 that to feel the two sensations to be alike1 is one and the same thing with having the two sensations4 ,their being alike is nothing but their being felt to be alike2 their being unlike is nothing but their being felt to be unlike4 ,the feeling of unlikeness is merely that feeling of change1 in passing from the one to the other1 which makes them two1 and without which we should not be conscious of them at all4 ,the feeling of likeness1 is the being reminded of the former sensation by the present1 that is1 having the idea of the former sensation called up by the present1 and distinguishing them as sensation and idea4 ,it does not seem to me that this mode of describing the matter explains anything1 or leaves the likenesses and unlikenesses of our simple feelings less an ultimate fact than they were before4 ,all it amounts to is1 that likeness and unlikeness are themselves only a matter of feeling3 and that when we have two feelings1 the feeling of their likeness or unlikeness is inextricably interwoven with the fact of having the feelings4 ,one of the conditions1 under which we have feelings1 is that they are like and unlike3 and in the case of simple feelings1 we cannot separate the likeness or unlikeness from the feelings themselves4 ,it is by no means certain1 however1 that when we have two feelings in immediate succession1 the feeling of their likeness is not a third feeling which follows instead of being involved in the two4 ,this question is expressly left open by ,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer1 in his ,principles of ,psychology2 and ,i am not aware that any philosopher has conclusively resolved it4 ,we do not get rid of any difficulty by calling the feeling of likeness the same thing with the two feelings that are alike3 we have equally to postulate likeness and unlikeness as primitive facts--as an inherent distinction among our sensations2 and whichever form of phraseology we employ makes no difference in the ulterior developments of psychology4 ,it is of no practical consequence whether we say that a phenomenon is resolved into sensations and ideas1 or into sensations1 ideas1 and their resemblances1 since under the one expression as under the other the resemblance must be recognised as an indispensable element in the compound4 ,when we pass from resemblance between simple sensations and ideas1 to resemblance between complex wholes1 the process1 though not essentially different1 is more complicated1 for it involves a comparison of part with part1 element with element1 and therefore a previous discrimination of the elements4 ,when we judge that an external object1 compounded of a number of attributes1 is like another external object2 since they are not1 usually1 alike in all their attributes1 we have to take the two objects into simultaneous consideration in respect to each of their various attributes one after another3 their colour1 to observe whether that is similar2 their size1 whether that is similar2 their figure1 their weight1 and so on4 ,it comes at last to a perception of likeness or unlikeness between simple sensations3 but we reduce it to this by attending separately to one of the simple sensations forming the one cluster1 and to one of those forming the other cluster1 and if possible adjusting our organs of sense so as to have these two sensations in immediate juxtaposition3 as when we put two objects1 of which we wish to compare the colour1 side by side1 so that our sense of sight may pass directly from one of the two sensations of colour to the other4 ,this act of attention directed successively to single attributes1 blunts our feeling of the other attributes of the objects1 and enables us to feel the likeness of the single sensations almost as vividly as if we had nothing but these in our mind4 ,having felt this likeness1 we say that the sensations are like1 and that the two objects are like in respect of those sensations3 and continuing the process we pronounce them to be either like or unlike in each of the other sensations which we receive from them4--,ed4 #ah #b4 ,the only other relative terms applicable to simple sensations and ideas1 are those which denote them as ,antecedent and ,consequent4 #ai ,i have sensation red1 sensation green4 ,why ,i mark them red1 and green1 or as different1 has already been seen4 ,what happens in marking them #bj as antecedent and consequent comes next to be considered4 ,a sensation1 the moment it ceases1 is gone for ever4 ,when ,i have two sensations1 therefore1 ,a1 and ,b1 one first1 the other following1 sensation ,a is gone1 before sensation ,b exists4 ,but though sensation ,a is gone1 its idea is not gone4 ,its idea1 called up by association1 exists along with sensation ,b1 or the idea of sensation ,b4 ,my knowing that the idea of sensation ,a is the idea of sensation ,a1 is my having the idea4 ,having it1 and knowing it1 are not two things1 but one and the same thing4 ,having the idea of sensation ,a1 that is1 having the idea of the immediate antecedent of sensation ,b1 seems1 also1 to be the same thing with knowing it as the idea of that antecedent4 ,having sensation ,a1 and after it sensation ,b1 is mere sensation2 and having the idea of sensation ,a1 the immediate antecedent1 called up by sensation ,b1 the immediate consequent1 is knowing it for that antecedent4 ,the links of the train are three2 #a1 sensation ,a2 #b1 sensation ,b2 #c1 the idea of sensation ,a1 in a certain order with ,b1 called up by sensation ,b2 and after this1 ,,naming4 ,the case appears mysterious1 solely1 from the want of words to express it clearly2 and our confirmed habit of inattention to the process4 ,suppose1 that #ba instead of two sensations1 ,a and ,b1 we have three1 ,a1 ,b1 and ,c1 in immediate succession4 ,i recognise ,a1 as the antecedent of ,b2 ,b1 as the antecedent of ,c4 ,what is the process8 ,the idea of sensation ,a1 is associated with sensation ,b2 and the idea of sensation ,b1 is associated with sensation ,c4 ,but sensation ,c1 is not associated with the idea of sensation ,b solely1 it is associated also with the idea of sensation ,a4 ,it is associated1 however1 differently with the one and the other4 ,it is associated with ,b immediately2 it is associated with ,a1 only through the medium of ,b2 it calls up the idea of ,b1 by its own associating power1 and the idea of ,b1 calls up the idea of ,a4 ,this second state of consciousness is different from the first4 ,the first is that in consequence of which ,b receives the name ,antecedent1 and ,c the name ,consequent4 ,when two sensations in a train are such1 that1 if one exists1 it has the idea of the other along with it1 by its immediate exciting power1 and not through any intermediate idea2 the sensation1 the idea of which is thus excited1 is called the antecedent1 the sensation which thus excites that idea1 is called the consequent4 ,it is evident that the terms1 antecedent1 and consequent1 are not applied in consequence of sensation merely1 but in consequence of sensation joined with ideas4 ,the antecedent sensation1 which is past1 must be revived by the consequent sensation1 which is present4 ,it is the peculiarity of this revival which procures it the name4 ,if revived by any other sensation1 it would not have that name4 ,the ,clock strikes three4 ,my feelings are1 three sensations of hearing1 in succession4 ,how do ,i know #bb them to be three successive sensations8 ,the process in this instance does not seem to be very difficult to trace4 ,the clock strikes one2 this is pure sensation4 ,it strikes two2 this is a sensation1 joined with the idea of the preceding sensation1 and the idea of the feeling 7also sensation71 called change of sensation1 or passage from one sensation to another4 ,after two1 the clock strikes three2 there is1 here1 sensation1 and a double association2 the third stroke is sensation2 that is associated immediately with the idea of the second1 and through the idea of the second1 with the idea of the first4 ,it is observable1 that these successive associations soon cease to afford distinct ideas2 they hardly do so beyond the second stage4 ,when the clock strikes1 we may have distinct ideas of the strokes1 as far as three1 hardly farther2 we must then have recourse to ,,naming1 and call the strokes1 four1 five1 six1 and so on3 otherwise we should be wholly unable to tell how often the clock had struck4 ,in the preceding pairs of relative terms1 we have found only one name for each pair4 ,thus1 when we say of ,a and ,b1 that ,a is similar to ,b1 we say also1 that ,b is similar to ,a4 ,we have now an instance of a pair of relative terms1 consisting not of the same1 but of different names4 ,if we call ,a antecedent1 we call ,b consequent4 ,the first class were called by the ancient logicians1 synonymous1 the second heteronymous2 we may call them more intelligibly1 single-worded1 and double-worded1 relatives4#g ,editor's footnote #g3 ,the next relation which the author examines is that of succession1 or ,antecedent and ,consequent4 ,and here again we have one of the universal conditions to which all our feelings or states of consciousness are subject4 ,whenever we have more feelings than one1 we must have them either simultaneously or in succession2 and when we are conscious of having them in succession1 we cannot in any way separate or isolate the succession from the feelings themselves4 ,the author attempts to carry the analysis somewhat farther4 ,he says that when we have two sensations in the order of antecedent and consequent1 the consequent calls up the idea of the antecedent2 and that this fact1 that a sensation calls up the idea of another sensation directly1 and not through an intermediate idea1 constitutes that other sensation the antecedent of the sensation which reminds us of it--is not a consequence of the one sensation's having preceded the other1 but is literally all we mean by the one sensation's having preceded the other4 ,there seem to be grave objections to this doctrine4 ,in the first place1 there is no law of association by which a consequent calls up the idea of its antecedent4 ,the law of successive association is that the antecedent calls up the idea of the consequent1 but not conversely2 as is seen in the difficulty of repeating backwards even a form of words with which we are very familiar4 ,we get round from the consequent to the antecedent by an indirect process1 through the medium of other ideas2 or by going back1 at each step1 to the beginning of the train1 and repeating it downwards until we reach that particular link4 ,when a consequent directly recalls its antecedent1 it is by synchronous association1 when the antecedent happens to have been so prolonged as to coexist with1 instead of merely preceding1 the consequent4 ,the next difficulty is1 that although the direct recalling of the idea of a past sensation by a present1 without any intermediate link1 does not take place from consequent to antecedent1 it does take place from like to like3 a sensation recalls the idea of a past sensation resembling itself1 without the intervention of any other idea4 ,the author1 however1 says1 that when two sensations in a train are such that if one exists1 it has the idea of the other along with it by its immediate exciting power1 and not through any intermediate idea2 the sensation1 the idea of which is thus excited1 is called the antecedent1 the sensation which thus excites that idea is called the consequent4 ,if this therefore were correct1 we should give the names of antecedent and consequent not to the sensations which really are so1 but to those which recall one another by resemblance4 ,thirdly and lastly1 to explain antecedence1 i4e4 the succession between two feelings1 by saying that one of the two calls up the idea of the other1 that is to say1 is followed by it1 is to explain succession by succession1 and antecedence by antecedence4 ,every explanation of anything by states of our consciousness1 includes as part of the explanation a succession between those states2 and it is useless attempting to analyse that which comes out as an element in every analysis we are able to make4 ,antecedence and consequence1 as well as likeness and unlikeness1 must be postulated as universal conditions of ,nature1 inherent in all our feelings whether of external or of internal consciousness4--,ed4 #bc ,,ii4 ,having shewn what takes place in naming simple ,,sensations1 and simple ,,ideas1 in pairs1 both as #bd such and such1 and as antecedent and consequent1 we come to the second case of relative terms1 that of naming the clusters1 called ,,external ,,objects1 in pairs4 ,the principal occasions of doing so we have said are four4 #a4 ,when we speak of them1 as they exist in the synchronous order1 that is1 the order in space1 we use such relative terms as the following3 high1 low2 east1 west2 right1 left2 hind1 fore2 and so on4 ,it is necessary to carry along with us a correct idea of what is meant by synchronous order1 that is1 the order of simultaneous1 in contradistinction to that of successive1 existence4 ,the synchronous order is much more complex than the successive4 ,the successive #be order is all1 as it were1 in one direction4 ,the synchronous is in every possible direction4 ,the following seems to be the best mode of conceiving it4 ,take a single particle of matter as a centre4 ,other particles may be aggregated to it1 in the line of every possible radius2 and as the radii diverge1 and other lines1 tending to the centre1 may be continually interposed1 to any number1 particles may be aggregated in those numberless directions4 ,they may also be aggregated in those directions to a less or a greater extent4 ,and they may be aggregated to an equal extent in every direction2 or to a greater extent in some of the directions1 a less extent in others4 ,in the first case of aggregation they compose a globe2 in the last1 any other shape4 ,every one of the particles in this aggregate1 has a certain order2 first with respect to the centre particle2 next with respect to every other particle4 ,this order is also called1 the ,position of the particle4 ,in such an aggregate1 therefore1 the positions are innumerable4 ,it is thence observable1 that position is an exceedingly complex idea2 for the position of each of those particles is its order with respect to every one of the other innumerable particles2 it includes1 therefore1 innumerable ingredients4 ,hence it is not wonderful that1 while viewed in the lump1 it should seem obscure and mysterious4 ,of positions1 thus numberless1 it is a small portion1 only that have names4 ,bulk is a name for an aggregate of particles1 greater1 or less4 ,figure is only a modification1 or case1 of bulk2 it is more or fewer particles in such and such directions4 ,these things being explained1 it now remains to #bf shew1 of what copies of sensations1 peculiarly combined1 the complex ideas in question are composed4 ,the simplest case of position1 or synchronous order1 is that of two or more particles in one direction4 ,let us take the particle1 conceived as the centre particle1 in a preceding supposition1 and let us aggregate to it a number of particles1 all in the direction of a single radius1 one by one4 ,we have first the centre particle1 and one other1 in juxta-position4 ,this is the simplest case of synchronous order1 and this is the simplest of all positions4 ,let us next aggregate a second particle2 we have now the centre particle1 and two more4 ,the position of the first of the aggregated particles with respect to the centre particle is contact1 or juxta-position2 that of the second is not juxta-position1 but position at the distance of a particle2 the next which is aggregated1 is at the distance of two2 the next of three particles1 and so on1 to any extent4 ,particles thus aggregated1 all in the direction of a single radius from the first1 constitute a line of less or greater length1 according to the number of aggregated particles4 ,line is a word of great importance2 because it is by that1 chiefly1 we express ourselves concerning synchronous order2 or frame names for positions4 ,now it happens1 that ,line has a duplicity of meaning1 most unfortunate1 because it has confounded two meanings1 which it is of the highest importance to preserve distinct4 ,we have already remarked the distinction between concrete1 and abstract1 terms2 and explained wherein the difference of their signification consists4 ,we have #bg also observed1 that though in very many cases1 the concrete term1 and the abstract term1 are different words1 as good and goodness1 true and truth1 there are many others in which the concrete and abstract terms are the same2 and this is the case1 unhappily1 with the word ,truth itself1 which is used in the concrete sense1 as well as the abstract4 ,thus we call a proposition1 a ,truth2 in which phrase1 the word ,truth1 means ,true ,proposition2 and in this sense we talk of eternal truths1 meaning1 ,propositions1 always true4 ,property1 is another word1 which is sometimes concrete1 sometimes abstract4 ,thus1 a man calls his horse1 his field1 his house1 his property4 ,in such phrases the word is concrete4 ,he also says1 he has a property in such and such things4 ,in these phrases1 it is abstract4 ,of this ambiguity1 the word ,line is an instance4 ,it is applied as well to what we call a physical line1 as to what we call a mathematical line4 ,in the first case1 it is a concrete1 or connotative term2 in the second case1 it is an abstract or non-connotative term4 ,let us then conceive clearly the two meanings4 ,the purest idea of a physical line1 is that which we have already formed2 the aggregate of particle after particle1 in the direction of a radius4 ,when this aggregate of particles in this order is called a line1 the word1 line1 is connotative2 it marks or notes the direction1 but it also marks or connotes the particles2 it means the particles and the direction both2 it is1 in short1 the concrete term4 ,when it is used as the abstract term1 the connotation is left out4 ,it marks the direction without marking the particles4 ,it is here necessary to call to mind1 that abstract #bh terms derive their meaning wholly from their concretes2 and that by themselves they have absolutely no meaning at all4 ,i know a green tree1 a sweet apple1 a hard stone1 but greenness without something green1 hardness without something hard1 are just nothing at all4 ,the same1 in its abstract sense1 is the case with line1 though we have not words by which we can convey the conception with equal clearness4 ,if we had an abstract term1 separate from the concrete1 the troublesome association in question would have been less indissoluble1 and less deceptive4 ,if we had such a word as ,lineness1 or ,linth1 for example1 we should have much more easily seen1 that our idea is the idea of the physical line2 and that linth without a line1 as breadth without something broad1 length without something long1 are just nothing at all4#h ,editor's footnote #h3 ,this conception of a geometrical line1 as the abstract1 of which a physical line is the corresponding concrete1 is scarcely satisfactory4 ,an abstract name is the name of an attribute1 or property1 of the things of which the concrete name is predicated4 ,it is1 no doubt1 the name of some part1 some one or more1 of the sensations composing the concrete group1 but not of those sensations simply and in themselves2 it is the name of those sensations regarded as belonging to some group4 ,whiteness1 the abstract name1 is the name of the colour white1 considered as the colour of some physical object4 ,now ,i do not see that a geometrical line is conceived as an attribute of a physical object4 ,the attribute of objects which comes nearest to the signification of a geometrical line1 is their length3 but length does not need any name but its own2 and the author does not seem to mean that a geometrical line is the same thing as length4 ,he seems to have fallen into the mistake of confounding an abstract with an ideal4 ,the line which is meant in all the theorems of geometry ,i take to be as truly concrete as a physical line2 it denotes an object1 but one purely imaginary2 a supposititious object1 agreeing in all else with a physical line1 but differing from it in having no breadth4 ,the properties of this imaginary line of course agree with those of a physical line1 except so far as these depend on1 or are affected by1 breadth4 ,the lines1 surfaces1 and figures contemplated by geometry are abstract1 only in the improper sense of the term1 in which it is applied to whatever results from the mental process called ,abstraction4 ,they ought to be called ideal4 ,they are physical lines1 surfaces1 and figures1 idealized1 that is1 supposed hypothetically to be perfectly what they are only imperfectly1 and not to be at all what they are in a very slight1 and for most purposes wholly unimportant1 degree4--,ed4 #bi ,what are1 then1 the sensations1 the ideas of which1 in close association1 we mark by the word line8 ,though it appears to all men that they see position1 length1 breadth1 distance1 figure2 it is nevertheless true1 that what appear1 in this manner1 to be sensations of the eye1 are ,ideas1 called up by association4 ,this is an important phenomenon1 which throws much light upon the darker involutions of human thought4 ,the sensations1 whence are generated our ideas of synchronous order1 are from two sources2 they are partly the sensations of touch1 and partly those of which we have spoken under the name of muscular sensations1 the feelings involved in muscular action4#i ,bain's footnote #i3 ,in attaining the ideas of synchronous order1 which is another name for ,space1 or the ,extended ,world1 sight is a leading instrumentality4 ,it is by sight more than by any other sense that we get somewhat beyond the strict limits of the law of the successiveness of all our perceptions4 ,although we can distinctly see only a limited spot at one instant1 we can couple with this a vague perception of an adjoining superficies4 ,this is an important sign of co-existence1 as contrasted with succession1 and enters with various other signs into the very complex notion of the author's synchronous order1 otherwise called the ,simultaneous or ,co-existing in ,space4--,b4 #cj ,a line1 we have said1 is an order of particles1 contiguous one to another1 in the direction of a radius from one particle4 ,let us begin from this one particle1 and trace our sensations4 ,one particle may be an object of touch2 it may be felt1 as we call it1 and nothing more2 it may1 at the same time1 give the sensation of resistance1 which we have already described as a feeling seated in the muscles1 just as sound is a feeling in the ear4 ,resistance1 is force applied to force4 ,what we feel1 is the act of the muscle4 ,without that1 no resistance4 ,this state of consciousness is1 in reality1 what we mark by the name4 ,it is1 at the same time1 a state of consciousness not a little obscure2 because we habitually overlook many of the sensations of which it is composed2 because it is1 in itself1 very complex2 and because it is entangled with a number of extraneous associations4 ,we have already remarked the habit we acquire of not attending to the sensations which are seated in the muscles1 of attending only to the occasions of them1 and the effects of them2 that is1 their antecedents1 and consequents2 overlooking the intermediate sensations4 ,in marking1 therefore1 or assigning our names1 it seems to be rather the occasions and effects1 the antecedents and consequents1 than the sensations themselves1 which are named4 ,the word resistance is thus the name of a very complex #ca idea4#aj ,it is the name2 first1 of the feelings which we have when we say we feel resistance2 secondly1 of the occasions1 or antecedents1 of those feelings2 and1 thirdly1 of their consequents4 ,the feelings intermediate between the antecedents and consequents1 are themselves complex4 ,there are two kinds of sensations included in them2 the sensation of touch1 and the muscular sensations2 and there is something more4 ,when we move a muscle1 we ,will to move it4 ,this state of consciousness1 the ,will to move it1 is part of the feeling of the motion4 ,what that state of consciousness1 called the ,will1 is1 we have not yet explained4 ,at present we speak of it merely as an element in the compound4 ,of what elements it is itself compounded we shall see hereafter4 ,in the idea of resistance1 then1 there is the will to move the muscles1 the sensations in the muscles1 the occasion or antecedent of those feelings1 and the effects or consequents of them4 ,and there is the common complexity attending all generical terms1 that of their including all possible varieties4 ,bain's footnote #aj3 ,still1 when we apply an analysis to the complex facts indicated by the name1 we come to a simple as well as ultimate experience1 which is correctly signified by the name ,resistance4 ,the feeling of muscular energy expended is in all likelihood an absolutely elementary feeling of the mind2 and the form of this feeling that is least complicated or mixed up with other sensibilities is what the word ,resistance most usually expresses1 namely1 the dead strain1 that is energy without leading to movement1 or causing movement in such a slight degree as not to depart from the essential peculiarity of expended force4--,b4 ,these things being explained1 the learner will now be able to trace1 without error1 the formation of one of the most important of all our ideas1 that of #cb resistance1 or pressure4 ,we touch one thing1 butter1 for instance2 it yields to the finger1 after a slight pressure2 that is1 a certain feeling of ours4 ,the will to move the muscles1 and the sensations in the muscles1 are both included in that feeling2 but1 for shortness1 we shall speak of them1 through the present exposition1 under one name1 as the feelings or sensations in the muscles4 ,as we call the butter yellow1 on account of a feeling of sight2 odorous1 on account of a feeling of smell2 sapid1 on account of a feeling of taste2 so we call it soft1 on account of a feeling in our muscles4 ,we touch a stone1 as we touched the butter1 and it yields not1 after the strongest pressure we can apply4 ,as we called the butter soft1 on account of one muscular feeling1 we call the stone hard1 on account of another4 ,the varieties of these feelings are innumerable4 ,only a small portion of them have received names4 ,the feeling upon pressure of butter1 is one thing2 of honey1 another2 of water1 another2 of air1 another2 of flesh1 one thing2 of bone1 another4 ,we mark them as we can1 by the terms soft1 more soft1 less soft2 hard1 more hard1 less hard1 and so on4 ,we have great occasion1 however1 for a word which shall include all these different words4 ,as we have coloured to include all the names of sensations of sight2 touch all the names of sensations of touch1 and so on2 we invent the word resisting1 which includes all the words1 soft1 hard1 and so on1 by which any of the sensations of pressure are denoted4 ,such1 then1 are the feelings which we are capable of receiving from the particle with which we may suppose a line of particles to commence4 ,these feelings1 in passing along the line1 we should receive in #cc succession from each1 if the tactual sense were sufficiently fine to distinguish particles in contact from one another4 ,it has not1 however1 this perfection4 ,even sight cannot distinguish minute intervals4 ,if a red-hot coal is whirled rapidly round1 though the coal is present at only one part of the circle at each instant1 the whole is one continuous red4 ,if the seven prismatic colours are made to pass rapidly in order before the eye1 they appear not distinct colours1 but one uniform white4 ,in like manner1 in passing from one to another1 in a line of particles1 there is no feeling of interval2 there is the feeling we call continuity2 that is1 absence of interval4 ,the sensations1 then1 the ideas of which combined compose the idea which we mark by the word line1 may thus be traced4 ,the tactual feeling1 and the feeling of resistance1 derivable from every particle1 attend the finger in every part of its progress along the line4 ,what is there besides8 ,to produce the progress of the finger1 there is muscular action2 that is to say1 there are the feelings combined in muscular action4 ,that we may exclude extraneous ideas as much as possible1 let us suppose1 that1 when a person first makes himself acquainted with a line1 he has the sense of touch1 and the muscular sensations1 without any other sense4 ,he has one state of feeling1 when the finger1 which touches the line1 is still2 another1 when it moves4 ,he has also one state of feeling from one degree of motion1 another from another4 ,if he has one state of feeling from the finger carried along1 as far as it can extend1 he has another feeling when it is only carried half as far1 and so on4 ,it is extremely difficult to speak of these feelings #cd precisely1 or to draw by language those who are not accustomed to the minute analysis of their thoughts1 to conceive them distinctly2 because they are among the feelings1 as we have before remarked1 which we have acquired the habit of not attending to1 or rather1 have lost the power of attending to4 ,it is certain1 however1 that by sensation alone we become acquainted with lines2 that in every different contraction of the muscles there is a difference of sensation2 and that of the tactual feeling1 and the feelings of the contracted muscles1 all the feelings which constitute our knowledge of a line are composed4 ,as1 after certain repetitions of a particular sensation of sight1 a particular sensation of smell1 a particular sensation of sight1 and so on1 received in a certain order1 ,i give to the combined ideas of them1 the name rose1 the name apple1 the name fire1 and the like2 in the same manner1 after certain repetitions of particular tactual sensations1 and particular muscular sensations1 received in a certain order1 ,i give to the combined ideas of them1 the name ,line4 ,but when ,i have got my idea of a line1 ,i have also got my idea of extension4 ,for what is extension1 but lines in every direction8 physical lines1 if real1 tactual extension2 mathematical lines1 if mathematical1 that is1 abstract1 extension4 ,it would be tedious to pursue the analysis of extension farther4 ,and ,i trust it is not necessary2 because the application of the same method to the remaining cases1 appears completely obvious4 ,take plane surface for example4 ,it is composed of all the lines which can be drawn in a particular plane2 the idea of it1 therefore1 is derived from the tactual feeling1 and the feeling of resistance1 combined with the #ce muscular feelings involved in the motion of the finger in every direction which it can receive on a plane4 ,let us now take some of the words which1 along with the synchronous order1 connote objects in pairs4 ,the names of this sort are not very numerous4 ,high1 and low1 right1 and left1 hind1 and fore1 are examples4 ,these1 it is obvious1 are names of the principal directions from the human body as a centre4 ,the order of objects1 the most frequently interesting to human beings1 is1 of course1 their order with respect to their own bodies4 ,what is over the head1 gets the name of high2 what is below the feet1 gets the name of low2 and so on4 ,of the pairs which are connoted by those words1 the human body is always one4 ,the words1 right1 left1 hind1 fore1 when they denote the object so called1 always connote the body in respect to which they are right1 left1 hind1 fore4 ,we have already noticed the cases in which the objects1 thus named in pairs1 have each a separate name1 as father1 son2 also those in which both have the same name1 as sister1 brother4 ,we have here another case1 which deserves also to be particularly marked1 that in which only one of them has a name4 ,the human body1 which is always one of the objects named1 when we call things right1 left1 hind1 fore1 and so on1 has no corresponding relative name4 ,the reason is sufficiently obvious2 this1 being always one of the pair1 cannot1 the other being named1 be misunderstood4 ,for the complete understanding of these words1 it does not appear that any thing remains to be explained4 ,if one line1 proceeding from a central particle1 be understood1 every line1 which can proceed from it1 is also understood4 ,if that central point be a part #cf of the human body1 it is plain that as the hand1 passing along a line in a certain direction from that centre1 has certain muscular actions1 passing along in another direction1 it has muscular actions somewhat different4 ,when we say muscular actions somewhat different1 we say muscular feelings somewhat different4 ,difference of feeling1 when important1 needs difference of naming4 ,a particular case of association is here to be remarked2 and it is one which it is important for the learner to fix steadfastly in his memory4 ,we never perceive1 what we call an object1 except in the synchronous order4 ,whatever other sensations we receive1 the sensations of the synchronous order1 are always received along with them4 ,when we perceive a chair1 a tree1 a man1 a house1 they are always situated so and so1 with respect to other objects4 ,as the sensations of positions are thus always received with the other sensations of an object1 the idea of ,position is so closely associated with the idea of the object1 that it is wholly impossible for us to have the one idea without the other4 ,it is one of the most remarkable cases of indissoluble association2 and is that feeling which men describe1 when they say that the idea of space forces itself upon their understandings1 and is necessary4#aa ,editor's footnote #aa3 ,under the head1 as before1 of ,relative ,terms1 we find here an analysis of the important and intricate complex ideas of ,extension and ,position4 ,it will be convenient to defer any remarks on this analysis1 until it can be considered in conjunction with the author's exposition of the closely allied subjects of ,motion and ,space4--,ed4 #cg #b4 ,we come now to the case of naming ,,objects in pairs1 on account of the ,successive ,order4 ,we have had occasion to observe that there is nothing in which human beings are so deeply interested1 as the ,successive ,order of objects4 ,it is the successive order upon which all their happiness and misery depends2 and the synchronous order is interesting to them1 chiefly on account of its connection with the successive4 ,when we speak of objects1 it is necessary to remember1 that it is sensations1 not ideas1 to which we are then directing our attention4 ,all our sensations1 we say1 are derived from objects2 in other words1 object is the name we give to the antecedents of our sensations4 ,and1 reciprocally1 all our knowledge of objects is the sensations themselves4 ,we have the sensations1 and that is all4 ,a knowledge1 therefore1 of the successive order of objects1 is a knowledge of the successive order of our sensations2 of all the pleasures1 and all the pains1 and all the feelings intermediate between pleasure and pain1 of which the body is susceptible4 ,of successions1 that is1 the order of objects as antecedent and consequent1 some are constant1 some not constant4 ,thus1 a stone dropped in the air always falls to the ground4 ,this is a case of constancy of sequence4 ,heavy clouds drop rain1 but not always4 ,this is a case of casual sequence4#ab ,human life is #ch deeply interested in ascertaining the constant sequences of all the objects from which human sensations are derived4 ,the great business of philosophy is to find them out2 and to record them1 in the form most convenient for acquiring the knowledge of them1 and for applying it4 ,editor's footnote #ab3 ,this is surely an improper use of the word ,casual4 ,sequences cannot be exhaustively divided into invariable and casual1 or 7as by the author a few pages further on7 into constant and fortuitous4 ,heavy clouds1 though they do not always drop rain1 are not connected with it by mere accident1 as the passing of a waggon might be4 ,they are connected with it through causation3 they are one of the conditions on which1 when united1 rain is invariably consequent1 though it is not invariably consequent on that single condition4 ,this distinction is essential to any system of ,inductive ,logic1 in which it recurs at every step4--,ed4 ,in the successions of objects1 it very often happens1 that what appear to us to be the immediate antecedent and consequent1 are not immediately successive1 but are separated by several intermediate successions4 ,thus1 the falling of a spark on gunpowder1 and the explosion of the gunpowder1 appear antecedent and consequent2 but several successions in reality intervene2 various decompositions1 and compositions1 in which1 indeed1 all the sequences cannot as yet be traced4 ,most of the successions1 which we are called upon to notice and to name1 are in the same situation4 ,we fix upon two conspicuous points in a chain of successions1 and the intermediate ones are either overlooked1 or unknown4 ,thus1 we name ,doctor and ,patient1 the two extremities of a pretty long succession of objects4 ,the ,doctor is not the immediate antecedent of any change in the patient4 ,he is the immediate antecedent of a certain conception1 of which the consequent is1 writing a prescription2 the consequent of this1 is the sending #ci it to the apothecary2 the consequent of that1 is the apothecary's reading it1 and so on2 the whole composing a multitudinous train4 ,doctor and ,patient1 therefore1 are not only two paired names of two paired objects1 but names of all the successions between the one and the other4 ,doctor and ,patient1 therefore1 properly speaking1 are to be considered one name1 though made up of two parts4 ,taken together1 they are the name of the complex idea of a considerable train of sequences1 of which a particular man is one extremity1 a particular man another2 just as navigation is the single-worded name of the complex idea of a very long train1 of which the extremities are not particularly marked4 ,if you say1 navigation from the ,thames to the ,ganges1 you have a many-worded name1 by which the extremities of this long train are particularly marked4 ,the relative terms1 ,father and ,son1 are obviously included in this explanation4 ,they are the two extremities of a train of great length and intricacy1 very imperfectly understood4 ,they also1 both together1 compose1 as may easily be seen1 but one name4 ,father is a word which connotes ,son1 and whether ,son is expressed or not1 the meaning of it is implied4 ,in like manner ,son connotes ,father2 and1 stripped of that connotation1 is without a meaning4 ,taken together1 therefore1 they are one name1 the name of the complex idea of that train of which father is the one extremity1 son the other4#ac ,editor's footnote #ac3 ,it seems hardly a proper expression to say that ,physician and ,patient1 or that ,father and ,son1 are one name made up of two parts4 ,when one of the parts is a name of one person and the other part is the name of another1 it is difficult to see how the two together can be but one name4 ,father and ,son are two names1 denoting different persons3 but what the author had it in his mind to say1 was that they connote the same series of facts1 which series1 as the two persons are both indispensable parts of it1 gives names to them both1 and is made the foundation or fundamentum of an attribute ascribed to each4 ,with the exception of this questionable use of language1 which the author had recourse to because he had not left himself the precise word ,connote1 to express what there is of real identity in the signification of the two names2 the analysis which follows of the various complicated cases of relation seems philosophically unexceptionable4 ,the complexity of a relation consists in the complex composition of the series of facts or phenomena which the names connote1 and which is the fundamentum relationis4 ,the names signify that the person or thing1 of which they are predicated1 forms part of a group or succession of phenomena along with the other person or thing which is its correlate3 and the special nature of that group or series1 which may be of extreme complexity1 constitutes the speciality of the relation predicated4--,ed4 #dj ,brother and ,brother are a pair of relative terms marking a still more complex idea4 ,two brothers are two sons of the same ,father2 taken together1 they are1 therefore1 marks of all that ,son1 taken twice1 is capable of marking4 ,son1 as we have just seen1 always implies ,father2 and1 taken together1 they are the name of a train4 ,the relatives1 therefore1 brother and brother1 are the compound name2 two brothers1 are the name of the train marked by the term1 ,father and ,son1 taken twice1 the prior extremity of the train being the same in both cases1 the latter different4 ,the above terms4 ,father and ,son1 ,brother and #da ,brother1 are imposed on account of sequences which are passed4 ,i do not at this moment recollect any relative terms imposed on account of sequences purely future4 ,the terms1 ,buyer and ,seller1 are sometimes1 indeed1 used in a sense wholly future2 when they mean persons having something to buy and something to sell3 but they are also used in a sense wholly passed1 when they signify persons who have effected purchase and sale4 ,we have1 however1 many relative terms on account of trains which are partly passed and partly future4 ,thus1 ,lender and ,borrower1 are imposed partly on account of the passed train included in the contract of lending and borrowing2 partly on account of the future train implied in the repayment of the money4 ,the words ,debtor and ,creditor are names of the same train1 partly passed and partly future4 ,the relative terms1 ,husband and ,wife1 are of the same class2 the name of a train partly passed1 to wit1 that implied in entering into the nuptial contract2 and partly future1 to wit1 all the events expected to flow out of that contract4 ,master and ,servant are imposed1 on account of a train partly passed and partly future2 the train of entering into the compact of master and servant1 and the train of acts which flow out of it4 ,king and ,subject are the name of a train similarly divided2 first1 the train which led to the will of obeying on the part of the people1 the will of commanding on the part of the king2 secondly1 the trains which grow out of these wills4 ,owner and ,property are relative terms1 or terms which connote one another4 ,they also are imposed on account of a train partly passed and partly future4 ,the part which is passed is the train implied in the #db circumstances of the acquisition1 whether inheritance1 gift1 labour1 or purchase4 ,the part which is future is the train implied in the use which the owner may make of the property4 ,of the terms which denote objects in successive pairs1 several are very general4 ,thus we have antecedent and consequent1 which are applicable to any parts of any train4 ,prior and ,posterior1 are nearly of the same import4 ,first and ,last1 are applicable to the two extremities of any train4 ,second1 third1 fourth1 and so on1 are applicable to the contiguous parts of any train4 ,we have remarked1 above1 that successions of objects are to be distinguished into two remarkable kinds2 that of the successions which are fortuitous1 and that of the successions which are constant4 ,names to mark the antecedent and consequent in all constant successions1 which are things of such importance to us1 were found of course indispensable4 ,cause and ,effect1 are the names we employ4 ,in all constant successions4 ,cause is the name of the antecedent4 ,effect the name of the consequent4 ,and1 beside this1 it has been proved by philosophers1#a99 that these names denote absolutely nothing4 ,mill's footnote #a3 ,chiefly by ,dr4 ,brown1 of ,edinburgh1 in a work entitled ,inquiry into the ,relation of ,cause and ,effect2 one of the most valuable contributions to science for which we are indebted to the last generation4--7,author's ,note47 ,it is highly necessary to be apprized1 that each of the two names4 ,cause and ,effect1 has a double meaning4 ,they are used1 sometimes in the concrete sense1 sometimes in the abstract4 ,by this ambiguity1 #dc ideas are confounded1 which it is of the greatest importance to preserve distinct4 ,when we say1 the sun is the ,cause of light1 cause is concrete2 the meaning is1 that the sun always causes light4 ,when we say that ice is the ,effect of cold air1 effect is concrete2 the meaning is1 that ice is effected by cold air4 ,cause1 in these cases1 is merely a short name for causing object1 ,effect1 a short name for caused object4 ,in abstract discourse1 on the other hand1 ,cause and ,effect are often used in the abstract sense1 in which cases ,cause means the same thing as would be meant by causingness2 ,effect1 the same as would be meant by causedness4 ,they are merely the connotative or concrete terms1 with the connotation dropped4 ,as the abstract terms have no meaning1 except as they refer to the concrete1 it is in the concrete sense ,i shall always use the words ,cause and ,effect1 unless when ,i give notice to the contrary4 ,other terms1 pairing the parts of a train1 take parts more or less distant2 first and last1 take the most distant2 father and son1 take parts at a considerable distance2 cause and effect1 on the other hand1 mean always the proximate parts4 ,it does not1 indeed1 happen1 that we always apply them to the proximate parts2 because the intermediate sequences are often unknown1 at other times overlooked4 ,they are always1 however1 applied to the parts regarded as proximate4 ,for we do not1 strictly speaking1 say1 that any thing is the cause of a thing1 when it is only the cause of another thing1 which is the cause of that thing2 still less1 when there is a series of causes and effects1 before you arrive at that which you have marked as the effect1 because the ultimate one4 ,in #dd all the inquiries of philosophers into causes1 it is the antecedent and consequent1 really proximate1 which is the object of their pursuit4 ,we have observed1 in the case of the relative terms1 applied to objects as successive1 that the words1 properly speaking1 form but one name1--that of the complex idea of a train of less or greater length3 thus1 ,doctor and ,patient is a name2 ,father and ,son is a name2 each denoting a train of which two individuals are the principal parts4 ,in like manner1 the relative terms ,cause and ,effect1 taken together1 are but one name1 the name of a short train1 that of one antecedent and one consequent1 regarded as proximate1 and constant4 #c4 ,we have now shewn1 in what manner the principal ,relative ,terms are applied1 when we have to speak of objects as having order in ,space1 and when we have to speak of them as having order in ,time4 ,we proceed to shew in what manner they are applied1 when we have to speak of objects as differing in ,quantity1 or differing in ,quality2 and first1 as differing in ,quantity4 ,we apply the word ,quantity1 in a very general manner2 to things1 which have the greatest diversity4 ,thus1 we use the word quantity1 when we speak of extension2 we use the word quantity1 when we speak of weight2 we use it1 when we speak of motion2 we use it1 when we speak of heat2 we use it1 in short1 on almost every occasion1 on which we can use the word degree4 ,of course1 it represents not one idea1 but many ideas1 some of which have the greatest diversity4 ,the relative terms1 which we co-apply with #de quantity1 are equal1 unequal1 or some particular case included under these more general terms2 as1 more heavy1 less heavy992 more strong1 less strong2 whole1 part2 and so on4 ,when quantity is applied to extent1 it may be extent either in one1 or more1 or every direction2 it may mean either quantity in line1 quantity in surface1 or quantity in bulk4 ,accordingly1 we can say1 equal1 or unequal1 lines2 equal1 or unequal1 surfaces2 equal1 or unequal1 bulks4 ,line is the simplest case2 the explanation of it will1 therefore1 facilitate the rest4 ,we have already traced the sensations1 which constitute our knowledge of a line4 ,we have seen that they are certain sensations of touch1 combined with the muscular sensations involved in extending the arm4 ,as the sensations1 involved in extending the arm so far1 are not the same with those which are involved in extending it farther2 and as the having different sensations1 and distinguishing them1 are not two things1 but one and the same thing2--as often as ,i have those two cases of sensation1 ,i distinguish them from one another2 and1 distinguishing them from one another1 ,i require names to mark them4 ,the first ,i mark1 by the word1 short2 the other1 by the word1 long4 ,as ,i call a line long1 from extending my arm so far2 that is1 from the sensations involved in extending it2 ,i call it longer from extending it farther4 ,after experience of a number of lines1 there are some which ,i call long1 long1 long1 one after another1 to any amount2 others which ,i call longer1 longer1 longer2 others which ,i call short1 short1 short2 and so on4 ,when we have perceived the sensations1 on account #df of which we call lines long1 longer1 short1 shorter1 we can be at no loss for the knowledge of those1 on account of which we call them equal1 and unequal4 ,it is to be observed1 that in applying the words long1 longer1 short1 shorter1 minute differences are not named4 ,they cannot be named4 ,the names would be too numerous4 ,a general mark1 however1 may be invented1 to shew when there is even a minute difference1 and when there is not4 ,when there is not1 we call the two lines equal2 when there is1 we call them unequal4 ,we shall presently see1 when we come to trace the ideas1 which the class of words1 called numbers1 are employed to mark1 what distinction of sensation it is which is marked by the words1 one1 and two4 ,in the mean time1 it is easy to see1 that the case of sensation1 when we trace one line1 with the hand1 and then another1 is different from the case of sensation when we trace one line only1 or even the same line twice2 and this diversity needs marks to distinguish it4 ,it is true1 that in tracing one line1 and then another1 and marking the distinction1 there is something more than sensation1 there is also memory4 ,but to this ingredient in the compound1 after the explanation which has already been given of memory1 it is not1 at present1 necessary particularly to advert4 ,when it is seen1 what are the sensations which are marked by the terms longer and shorter1 applied to a line1 it will not be difficult to see what are the sensations1 which are marked by the terms1 part1 and whole4 ,the terms1 a part1 and whole1 imply division4 ,of course1 the thing precedes the name4 ,men divided1 before they named the act1 or the consequences of the #dg act4 ,in the act of division1 or in the results of it1 no mystery has ever been understood to reside4 ,it is of importance to remark1 that the word division1 in its ordinary acceptation1 includes1 and thence confounds1 things which very much need to be distinguished4 ,it includes the will1 which is the antecedent of the act2 the act itself2 and the results of the act4 ,at present we may leave the will aside2 it will be explained hereafter2 and1 as it is not the act1 but the antecedent of the act1 the consideration of it is not required1 for the present purpose4 ,the act of dividing1 like all the other acts of our body1 consists in the contraction and relaxation of certain muscles4 ,these are known to us1 like every thing else1 by the feelings4 ,the act1 as act1 is the feelings2 and only when confounded with its results1 is it conceived to be any thing else4 ,if it be said1 that the contraction of the muscles of my arm1 is something more in me than feelings1 because ,i see the motion of my arm2 it is to be observed1 that this seeing1 this sensation of sight1 is not the act1 but one of its results2 the feelings of the act are the antecedent2 this sensation of sight one of the consequents4 ,in the act of dividing a line1 as in the act1 already analysed1 of tracing a line1 there is a feeling of touch1 and there is also a muscular feeling4 ,there may be more or less of cohesion in the parts of the line2 and thence1 more or less of what we call muscular force1 required to disunite them4 ,of course1 what we call more or less of force1 are only names for different states of feeling4 ,the states of feeling which we mark by the term1 force1 being antecedent1 all the rest #dh are consequents of this antecedent4 ,the disunion of the parts of one line is attended with a certain muscular feeling2 ,i call the feeling a small force4 ,that of another line is attended with a muscular feeling somewhat different2 ,i call it a greater force2 and so on4 ,this muscular feeling1 however1 has various accompaniments2 which are closely associated with the idea of the act1 and with its name4 ,thus there is the sight of the line1 there is the sight of the hands in the act of disruption1 and there is the sight of the line after it is divided4 ,the term division1 as we have mentioned before1 includes all2 the muscular feeling1 the sight of the line before division1 and the sight of it after4 ,i need a pair of names for the line before division1 and the line after4 ,i call the one whole1 the other parts4 ,like other relative terms1 the one of these connotes the other2 whole has no meaning1 but when associated with parts2 parts have no meaning1 but when associated with whole4 ,taken together2 that is1 whole and parts1 used as one name2 they mark a complex idea1 consisting of three principal parts2 an undivided line1 the act of division1 and the consequent of that antecedent1 the line after division4 ,in the preceding exposition1 it is actual division1 the actual making of parts1 which has been spoken of4 ,it is observable1 however1 that the same language1 by which we name actual division1 and actual parts1 is applied to conceived division1 and conceived parts4 ,thus we talk of the parts of a line1 when it is not divided1 nor meant to be divided4 ,the exposition of this1 however1 is easy2 and there is obscurity only when the double use of the terms confounds the two #di cases1 the division which is actual1 with that which is conceived4 ,the division of the line may consist of one act1 or of more acts than one4 ,by the first act1 it is divided into two parts2 by the second into three2 by the third into four1 and so on4 ,the parts of a line are so many lines4 ,these may be equal1 or unequal4 ,but the sensations1 on account of which we denominate lines equal1 or unequal1 have been already shewn2 the equality1 and inequality1 therefore1 of the parts of a line1 need no further explanation4 ,when the learner conceives distinctly the sensations on account of which we apply the terms whole and parts to a line1 he will not find it difficult to understand1 on what account we apply them to all the modifications of extension2 seeing that all these modifications are lines combined4 ,thus1 a plane surface is a number of straight lines1 in contact1 in the direction called a plane4 ,it is of greater or less extent1 according as these lines are longer or shorter from a central point2 it is of one shape or another shape1 according as the lines are of the same length1 or of different lengths4 ,when they are all of one length1 the surface is called a circle4 ,as they may be of different lengths in endless variety1 the surface may have an endless variety of shapes1 of which only a few have received names4 ,the square is one of these names1 the triangle another1 the parallelogram another1 and so on4 ,bulk1 which is the other great modification of extension1 is lines from a central point in every direction4 ,this bulk is greater or less1 according as these lines are longer or shorter4 ,the figure or shape of this #ej bulk is different1 according as the lines are of the same or different lengths4 ,if they are of the same length1 the bulk is called round1 or1 in one word1 a sphere2 sphere meaning exactly round bulk4 ,as the lines1 when they differ in length1 may differ in endless ways2 figures1 or the shapes of bulk1 are also endless1 as our senses abundantly testify4 ,of these but a small number have received names4 ,in this number are the cube1 the cylinder1 the cone4 ,we name some shapes by referring to known objects2 thus we speak of the shape of an egg1 the shape of a pear1 and so on4 ,it seems that nothing1 therefore1 is now wanting1 to shew in what manner the relative terms1 expressive of ,quantity1 are applied to all the modifications of extension4 ,after what has been said1 it will not be difficult to ascertain the sensations on account of which we apply the same relative terms to cases of ,weight4 ,weight is the name of a particular species of pressure2 pressure towards the centre of the earth4 ,pressure1 as we have already fully seen1 is the name we apply1 when we have certain sensations in the muscles1 just as green is the name we apply when we have a certain sensation in the eye4 ,as green is the name of the sensation in the eye1 pressure is the name of the sensation in the muscles4 ,pressure upwards1 is one thing2 pressure downwards1 is another2 pressure of a body1 when that body is urged by another body1 is one thing2 pressure of a body1 when it is not urged by another body1 is a different thing3 pressure of a body in altering the position of its parts is one thing2 pressure1 when there is no alteration of the position of its parts1 is another thing4 ,of this last sort is weight1 #ea the pressure downwards1 or towards the centre of the earth1 of a body not urged by another body1 and not altering the position of its parts4 ,in supporting in my hand a stone1 ,i resist a certain pressure2 in other words1 have certain muscular feelings1 on account of which ,i call the stone heavy4 ,i support other stones1 and in doing so have muscular feelings1 in one case similar1 in another dissimilar4 ,in the case of similarity1 ,i call two stones equal1 meaning in weight2 in the case of dissimilarity1 unequal2 and so ,i apply all the other relative terms by which quantity is expressed4 ,it seems unnecessary to carry this analysis into further detail4 ,the words equal1 unequal3 greater1 less2 applied to ,motion1 to ,heat1 and other modifications of sensation1 have a meaning1 which in following the course so fully exemplified it cannot be difficult to ascertain4 ,it seems still necessary that ,i should say something of the word ,quantus1 from which the word ,quantity is derived4 ,quantus is the correlate of ,tantus4 ,tantus1 ,quantus1 are relative terms1 applicable to all the objects to which we apply the terms1 ,great1 or ,little2 they are applicable1 therefore1 to all the modifications of extension1 of weight1 of heat2 in short1 to all modifications which we can mark as degrees4 ,of two lines1 we call the one tantus1 the other quantus4 ,the occasions on which we do so are1 when the one is as long as the other4 ,tantus1 and ,quantus1 then1 in this case1 mean the same thing as equal1 equal4 ,they will be found to have the same import as equal1 equal1 when applied also to surface1 and bulk2 and so in all other compatible cases4 #eb ,what then1 it may be asked1 is the use of them8 ,if it should appear that they were of no use1 it would not be very surprising2 considering by whom languages have been made2 and that redundancy is frequent in them as well as defect4 ,in the present case1 however1 a use is not wanting4 ,it is necessary to observe the artifice1 to which we are obliged to have recourse1 to name1 and even to distinguish1 the different modifications1 not of kind but of degree1 included under the word quantity4 ,we are obliged to take some one object1 with which we are familiar1 and to distinguish other objects1 as differing or agreeing with that object4 ,thus1 we take some well-known line1 the length of the foot1 or the length of the arm1 and distinguish and name all other lengths by that length2 which can be divided or multiplied so as to correspond with them4 ,in like manner1 we take some well-known object as a standard weight1 which we call1 for example1 a pound1 and distinguish and name all other weights1 as parts or multiples of that known weight4 ,now it will be recognised1 that1 in applying the relative terms equal1 equal1 or in calling two objects equal1 no one of them is marked as the standard4 ,both are taken on the same footing4 ,the one is equal to the other2 and the other is equal to that4 ,but when we say that one thing is tantus1 quantus another2 or one so great1 as the other is great2 the first is referred to the last1 the tantus to the quantus2 the first is distinguished and named by the last4 ,the quantus is the standard4 ,it is this which gives its peculiar meaning to the word ,quantity1 and has recommended it for that very #ec comprehensive and generical acceptation1 in which it is now received4 ,our word ,quantity1 is the ,latin word ,quantitas2 and ,quantitas is the abstract of the concrete ,quantus4 ,we have no ,english words1 corresponding to ,tantus1 ,quantus4 ,we form an equivalent1 by aid of the relative conjunctions2 we say1 ,so ,great1 ,as ,great4 ,but these concrete terms do not furnish abstracts2 we do not say1 ,as-greatness2 in the first place1 because it is an awkward expression2 and in the next place1 because the relative1 as1 is not steady in its application1 since we use as great not for quantus only1 but frequently also for tantus4 ,as greatness1 therefore1 does not readily suggest the idea of the abstract of ,quantus4 ,on what account1 then1 is it we give to any thing the name ,quantus8 ,as a standard by which to name another thing ,tantus4 ,the thing called ,quantus1 is the previously known thing1 the ascertained amount1 by which we can mark and define the other amount4 ,leaving out the connotation of ,quantus1 which is some one individual body1 ,quantitas merely denotes such and such an amount of body4 ,quantitas1 if it was kept to its original meaning1 would still connote ,tantitas2 just as paternity connotes filiality4 ,but in the case of ,quantity1 even this connotation is dropped2 it is used not as a relative abstract term1 but an absolute abstract term2 and is employed as a generical name for any portion of extension1 any portion of weight1 of heat1 or any thing else1 which can be measured by a part of itself4#ad ,editor's footnote #ad3 ,after analysing ,position and ,extension under the head of ,relative ,terms1 the author now1 under the same head1 gives the analysis of ,quantity and ,quality4 ,to what he says on the subject of ,quantity it does not appear necessary to add anything4 ,he seems to have correctly analysed the phenomenon down to a primitive element1 beyond which we have no power to investigate4 ,as ,likeness and ,unlikeness appeared to be properties of our simple feelings1 which must be postulated as ultimate1 and which are inseparable from the feelings themselves1 so may this also be said of ,more and ,less4 ,as some of our feelings are like1 some unlike1 so there is a mode of likeness or unlikeness which we call ,degree3 some feelings otherwise like are unlike in degree1 that is one is unlike another in intensity1 or one is unlike another in duration2 in either case one is distinguished as more1 or greater1 the other as less4 ,and the fact of being more or less only means that we feel them as more or less4 ,the author says in this case1 as he had said in the other elementary cases of relation1 that the more and the less being different sensations1 to trace them and to distinguish their difference are not two things but one and the same thing4 ,it matters not1 since there the difference still is1 unsusceptible of further analysis4 ,the author's apparent simplification amounts only to this1 that differences of quantity1 like all other differences of which we take cognizance1 are differences merely in our feelings2 they exist only as they are felt4 ,but 7as we have already said of resemblance1 and of antecedence and consequence7 they must be postulated as elements4 ,the distinction of more and less is one of the ultimate conditions under which we have all our states of consciousness4--,ed4 #ed #d4 ,after tracing the sensations and ideas1 which are marked when we apply relative terms to objects1 as agreeing or disagreeing in quantity2 we have now to trace the sensations and ideas1 which are marked1 when we apply relative terms to objects1 on account of their agreeing or disagreeing in quality4 ,first of all1 the learner must take note of what he #ee means by ,quality4 ,we ascribe qualities to an object on account of our sensations4 ,we call an object green1 on account of the sensation green2 hard1 on account of the sensation hard2 sounding1 on account of the sensation sounding4 ,the names of all qualities of objects1 then1 are names of sensations4 ,are they any thing else8 ,yes2 they are the names of our sensations1 with connotation of a supposed unknown cause of those sensations4 ,as far1 however1 as our knowledge goes1 they are names of sensations1 and nothing else4 ,the supposed cause is never known2 the effects alone are known to us4 ,we ascribe qualities to objects1 in two cases1 which require to be distinguished3 on account of the sensations which we have from them primarily2 on account of those which we have from them secondarily4 ,the first we call their sensible qualities2 as green1 hot1 hard1 sweet1 scented1 and so on3 the second we more frequently call their powers2 as the power of the loadstone to draw iron1 the power of water to melt sugar4 ,in this latter case1 the sensations marked are not those which are derived from the loadstone1 or from water2 but those which are derived from the changes in the iron1 and the sugar2 of which changes1 we call the loadstone1 and the water1 the cause4 ,in the latter case1 the train of antecedents and consequents is longer than it is in the former4 ,when ,i see an object green2 there is the object1 the antecedent2 and myself sentient of green1 the consequent4 ,when ,i see a loadstone draw iron1 there is the following train2 the loadstone1 antecedent2 iron drawn1 first consequent2 myself seeing it drawn1 second consequent4 ,when ,i see water melt sugar1 there is the #ef antecedent water2 sugar melting1 first consequent2 myself seeing it1 second consequent4 ,what ,i call the powers of an object1 then1 are its order in respect to certain of my sensations1 the order of antecedence1 not proximate1 but more or less remote4 ,when ,i say that grass is green1 ,i trace my sensation green1 no farther than to the grass4 ,when ,i say1 the sugar is melting1 ,i trace my sensations 7for they are several7 called sugar melting1 first to the sugar1 and then to the water4 ,my word green1 therefore1 is the notation of a sensation1 and connotation of an unknown cause2 my name melting1 is the notation of a compound of sensations1 and connotation of two causes1 an antecedent and a consequent3 the first1 an unknown cause in the sugar2 the second1 the cause of that unknown cause1 namely1 the water4 ,in speaking of the qualities of an object1 it is necessary to take notice of an inaccuracy of language2 which1 not only1 as ,dr4 ,brown has well observed1 lies at the bottom of many philosophical errors1 but induces men to mistake the very business of the philosopher4 ,the term1 quality or qualities of an object1 seems to imply1 that the qualities are one thing1 the object another4 ,and this1 in some indistinct way1 is1 no doubt1 the opinion of the great majority of mankind4 ,yet1 the absurdity of it strikes the understanding1 the moment it is mentioned4 ,the qualities of an object are the whole of the object4 ,what is there beside the qualities8 ,in fact1 they are convertible terms3 the qualities are the object2 and the object is the qualities4 ,but1 then1 what are the qualities8 ,why1 sensations1 with the association of #eg the object as the cause4 ,and what is the association of the object as the cause8 ,why1 the association of other sensations as antecedent4 ,what1 for example1 are the smell1 and colour1 and other qualities of the rose8 ,is not each of the names of these qualities1 that of the smell1 for example1 a connotative name1 not only noting the sensation1 of which it is properly the name1 but connoting all the sensations of colour1 of consistence1 of figure1 of position2 to which1 all combined by association1 so as to form one complex idea1 we give the specific name1 rose1 the more general name1 vegetable1 and the still more general name1 object8 ,when the smell of a rose is perceived by me1 or the idea suggested to me1 immediately all the other ideas included under the term rose1 are suggested along with it1 and their indissoluble union presupposed4 ,but this belief of the previous indissoluble union of each of those sensations with all the other sensations1 is all which ,i really mean when ,i refer each sensation to the rose as its cause4 ,if the learner has fully apprehended the ideas here premised1 it will be easy for him to trace to the bottom the relative terms1 which we apply to objects on account of their agreeing or disagreeing in ,quality4 ,we say1 that objects agree or disagree1 on account of one quality1 or more than one quality1 that is1 on account of single sensations1 or combined sensations4 ,let us first observe the case of one quality4 ,we say1 that a blade of grass is like the leaf of an oak1 meaning1 that in the quality of colour both are green2 we say that the leaf of the rose tree1 is unlike the petal of the flower1 meaning in colour4 ,by these #eh words1 we name the objects in pairs2 first1 the pair of leaves1 to each of which1 we give the name1 like2 secondly1 the leaf and the petal1 to each of which1 we give the name1 unlike4 ,we name the first two objects1 like1 on account of the two sensations1 green1 and green1 one of each object2 we name the next two objects unlike1 on account of the two sensations1 green of the one1 red of the other4 ,what is done1 or rather what is felt1 when we give the same1 or a different name1 to each of two sensations1 has been already so fully explained1 that a bare suggestion of what has been premised1 is here all that will be required4 ,we have two sensations4 ,a1 ,b4 ,having two sensations1 and knowing them to be two sensations1 that is1 not one sensation1 is having the sensations1 and nothing more4 ,why do ,i call one sequence of sensations1 green1 green2 another sequence1 green1 red8 ,clearly on account of the sensations4 ,no other explanation can be given of it1 nor can be required4 ,for the same reason for which ,i called the sensations of the first sequence individually1 green1 green1 ,i call them both1 like2 and for the same reason for which ,i called those of the second sequence1 not green1 green1 but green1 red1 ,i call them1 unlike4 ,let us next put the case of several sensations4 ,we say1 that one rose is like another4 ,we have only to take the sensations combined under the name rose1 one by one1 to see that this1 and the former1 case1 are in reality the same4 ,the two roses are like in colour1 like in smell1 like in consistence1 like in form1 like in position4 ,the likeness of the two roses1 is a likeness #ei not in one sensation1 but in several4 ,but the likeness of two sensations of smell1 is of the same nature as the likeness of the two sensations of sight4 ,when ,i call the smell1 therefore1 of the two roses like1 it is for the same reason as ,i call the colour of them like1 that is1 the sensations4 ,when ,i call the shape and consistence1 and position1 like1 it is for the same reason still2 the tactual and muscular sensations1 whence the ideas are derived to which these names are annexed4 ,in this case1 however1 the reason is by no means so clearly seen1 first1 because the sensations are complex1 and secondly1 because they are of that class of sensations which we habitually overlook4 ,the ,latin words1 ,talis1 ,qualis1 are applied to objects in the same way1 on one account1 as ,tantus1 ,quantus1 on another2 and the explanation we gave of ,tantus1 ,quantus1 may be applied mutatis mutandis1 to the pair of relatives we have now named4 ,tantus1 ,quantus1 are names applied to objects on account of dimension4 ,talis1 ,qualis1 are names applied to objects on account of all other sensations4 ,we apply ,tantus1 ,quantus1 to a pair of objects when they are equal2 we apply ,talis1 ,qualis1 to a pair of objects1 when they are like4 ,talis1 ,qualis1 however1 express the likeness of two objects in a manner somewhat different from the other pair of nearly equivalent relatives1 ,like1 and ,like4 ,when we call two objects ,like1 the one is placed on the same footing as the other4 ,no one of them is taken as the standard4 ,when we apply1 ,talis1 ,qualis1 the case is different4 ,one of the objects is then the standard4 ,the object ,qualis1 is that to which the reference is made4 #fj ,this being understood1 the extensive meaning which came to be given to the word ,quality1 may be easily explained4 ,quality is the ,latin ,qualitas1 and ,qualitas is the abstract of ,qualis4 ,the meaning of the abstract is the same with that of the concrete1 the connotation being dropped4 ,when the word ,qualis1 is applied to an object1 it notes something about it in particular1 but connotes the whole object4 ,the ,qualitas of that object1 is the something noted in particular1 the connotation being dropped4 ,as ,qualis is applied to objects1 sometimes on account of one thing belonging to them1 sometimes on account of another1 ,qualitas comes in turn to be applied to every thing in them1 requiring at any time a separate notation4 ,qualitas1 when first formed from ,qualis1 has the force of a relative1 and connotes the abstract of ,talis2 but in its frequent use1 in marking every thing in objects1 which requires separate notation1 this connotation1 also1 comes to be dropped2 and ,quality is finally used as an absolute term1 the generical name of every thing in objects1 for which a separate notation is required4#ae ,editor's footnote #ae3 ,as in the case of ,quantity1 so in that of ,quality1 it is needless to add anything to the author's very sufficient elucidation4 ,i merely make the usual reserves with respect to the use of the word ,connotation4 ,the concrete names which predicate qualities 7for of abstract relative names the author is not yet speaking7 are said by him to be the names of our sensations2 green1 for instance1 and red4 ,but it is the abstract names alone which are this3 the names greenness1 and redness4 ,and even the abstract names signify something more than only the sensations3 they are names of the sensations considered as derived from an object which produces them4 ,the concrete name is a name not of the sensation1 but of the object1 of which alone it is predicable3 we talk of green objects1 but not of green sensations4 ,it however connotes the quality greenness1 that is1 it connotes that particular sensation as produced by1 or proceeding from1 the object2 as forming one of the group of sensations which constitutes the object4 ,this1 however1 is but a difference1 though a very important one1 in terminology4 ,it is strictly true1 that the real meaning of the word is the sensations2 as1 in all cases1 the meaning of a connotative word resides in the connotation 7the attributes signified by it71 though it is the name of1 or is predicable of1 only the objects which it denotes4--,ed4 #fa ,,iii4 ,it was remarked at the beginning of this investigation of relative terms or names applied in pairs1 that we name in pairs-- #a1 single sensations or ideas2 #b1 the clusters we call objects2 #c1 the complex ideas we form arbitrarily for our own purposes4 ,having finished the consideration of the two former cases1 we shall not find occasion to speak much at length upon the last4 ,the clusters1 formed by arbitrary association1 receive names in pairs1 on two occasions2 either1 #a4 ,when they consist of the same or different simple ideas2 or1 #b4 ,when they succeed one another in a train4 #a4 ,the ideas which we put together arbitrarily are sometimes less1 sometimes more1 complex1 for the most part1 they are exceedingly complex4 ,of the less complicated kinds1 are such ideas as that of the unicorn1 which is a horse with one straight horn growing from the middle of its forehead2 the ,cyclops1 a gigantic man1 with a single eye in the middle of his forehead2 a mermaid1 of which the upper part is a woman1 the lower a fish2 the ,brobdignagian #fb and ,lilliputian of ,swift1 which are men of greatly reduced1 or greatly enlarged dimensions4 ,of the more complicated kinds1 are such ideas as those which are marked by the word ,science1 by the word ,trade1 by the word ,law1 by the word ,religion1 by the word ,faith1 by the words ,god and ,devil1 by the word ,value1 by the words ,virtue1 ,honour1 ,vice1 ,beauty1 ,deformity1 ,space1 ,time1 and so on4 ,language has not many relative terms1 applicable to ideas of this class4 ,we speak of pairs of them as like or unlike1 same or different1 greater or less2 and except when their order in time is to be noted1 we hardly apply to them any other marks in pairs4 ,we say the ,cyclops in ,homer1 and the ,brobdignagian of ,swift1 are unlike4 ,we do so precisely in the same way1 as we say1 the rose and the lily are unlike2 and the explanation which we have given of that which is distinctively marked by those terms1 when applied to objects1 is precisely applicable here4 ,in the case of objects1 that which is named1 is1 clusters of ideas2#af in the present case1 that which is named1 is clusters of ideas4 ,that one cluster has been formed in one way1 another in another1 makes no difference in annexing marks to the clusters when they are formed4 ,editor's footnote #af3 ,say rather1 in the case of objects1 what is named is clusters of sensations1 supplemented by possibilities of sensation4 ,if an object is but a cluster of ideas1 what is there to distinguish it from a mere thought8--,ed4 ,there is as little difficulty in tracing what is marked by the relatives1 different1 and same1 when applied to ideas of this class4 ,we say1 the unicorn is different #fc from the horse2 because1 to the idea of the horse it adds that of a horn growing in the middle of the forehead4 ,in the case of very complex ideas1 it is much more difficult to say1 with precision1 what are the added and subtracted ideas1 on account of which1 we apply the term1 different2 as when we say1 the courage of ,ajax was different from that of ,achilles2 but it is not the less certain1 that it is wholly on account of ideas added and subtracted1 that we so denominate the courage of the two men4 ,rather more explanation is needed1 to shew what is peculiarly marked by the relatives equal1 unequal1 greater1 less1 when applied to the class of arbitrarily formed complex ideas4 ,we have already seen1 that those terms are primarily applied to what we call objects1 on account of their extension2 objects are equal or unequal1 greater or less1 in extension4 ,we have also seen1 that in marking the extension of different objects1 we are under the necessity of taking some known object as a standard1 and by that object naming others4 ,thus1 we take the foot1 and say that other objects are two feet1 three feet1 or the half or quarter of a foot1 and so on4 ,having become familiar with what we call degrees of extension1 we are led to employ the same mode of notation1 when we come to mark analogous differences in other cases of sensation4 ,thus1 when we perceive the weight of different heavy bodies2 as the terms equal1 unequal1 greater1 less1 are applied with convenience to certain cases of extension1 it appears they may be applied with equal convenience1 and even precision1 to cases of weight4 ,all other sensations1 #fd having distinguishable differences1 may be marked in the same way3 thus sounds are more or less loud1 and we speak of equal1 or unequal1 less or greater loudness of sound2 less or greater sweetness in objects of the palate2 less or greater resistance2 less or greater pain2 less or greater pleasure4 ,when the terms equal1 unequal1 less1 greater1 had been applied to simple sensations of the pleasurable kind1 and their ideas2 the transference of them to complex ideas1 of the pleasurable or painful kind1 was easy4 ,if the less or greater sweetness of the rose and the woodbine1 was a convenient notation1 so was the less or greater beauty of those two flowers1 the less or greater beauty of two women1 the less or greater wisdom or folly1 vice or virtue1 of two men4 ,it thus appears1 that1 as we apply the term unlike to our complex ideas1 on account of the addition and subtraction of ideas of different kinds1 so we apply to them the term unequal1 on account of the addition and subtraction of ideas of the same kind4 ,like and equal we apply1 when we neither add1 nor subtract4#ag ,editor's footnote #ag3 ,in this passage the author has got as near as it is perhaps possible to get1 to an analysis of the ideas of ,more and ,less4 ,we say there is more of something1 when1 to what there already was1 there has been superadded other matter of the same kind4 ,and when there is no actual superadding1 but merely two independent masses of the same substance1 we call that one the greater which produces the same impression on our senses which the other would produce if an addition were made to it4 ,so with differences of intensity4 ,one sweet taste is called sweeter than another because it resembles the taste which would be produced by adding more sugar3 and so forth4 ,in all these cases there is presupposed an original difference in the sensations produced in us by the greater mass and by the smaller3 but according to the explanation now offered1 the idea which guides the application of the terms is that of physical juxtaposition4--,ed4 #fe #b4 ,we apply the same relative terms to successive ideas of this class1 which we apply to simple ideas1 or the clusters called objects1 when successive4 ,we call them antecedent and consequent1 or names equivalent2 as prior1 posterior2 first1 second2 or even successive1 which is a name including both antecedent and consequent4 ,in speaking of the relative terms applied to objects as successive1 we had occasion to explain the two important terms1 ,cause and ,effect4 ,we found that ,cause and ,effect1 were only other names for antecedent and consequent1 in a certain set of cases4 ,we do not use the terms1 ,cause and ,effect1 as synonymous with antecedent and consequent1 in those cases in which1 though the objects may be antecedent and consequent to our perception1 we know not whether they are parts of the same series1 or parts of two different series4 ,within the sphere of our observation1 innumerable series of events are going on2 and we are observing1 first a part of one series1 and then a part of another1 continually4 ,it is thus constantly happening1 that those things1 which are immediately antecedent and consequent to our observation1 are not parts of the same series1 but parts of different series2 and1 of course1 in those antecedents and consequents1 there is no constancy2 they are accidental1 as the course of each man's attention4 ,this may be illustrated by many familiar instances4 ,there may be #ff immediately before me1 a man playing on the violin1 one series2 another man filing a saw1 a second series4 ,my attention may pass immediately from the sight of the man playing on the violin1 to the sound produced by the filing of the saw4 ,playing on the violin1 and the disagreeable sound of the file on the saw1 are thus antecedent and consequent to my attention4 ,but1 as we recognise such antecedents and consequents1 as parts of different series of events1 we do not call them cause and effect4 ,there are two cases of antecedents and consequents1 even when they are parts of the same series4 ,they may be proximate2 or they may be remote2 that is1 parts of the series1 more or fewer1 may come between them4 ,it is only to the case of the proximate parts of the same series1 that the relatives1 cause and effect1 are properly and strictly applied4 ,when the series1 however1 is the same1 the intermediate links between any two remote parts are constant4 ,suppose a series1 ,a1 ,b1 ,c1 ,d2 as ,b is the immediate consequent of ,a1 ,c the immediate consequent of ,b1 and ,d the immediate consequent of ,c2 when ,i know ,a and ,d as antecedent and consequent1 without knowing the intermediate parts ,b1 and ,c1 there is little inaccuracy in naming ,a and ,d cause and effect2 because ,b and ,c are surely intermediate1 and the succession of ,a and ,d1 though not immediate1 is constant4 ,we accordingly do name cause and effect parts of a series thus removed from one another1 in all those cases in which the intermediate parts are either unknown to us1 or habitually overlooked4 ,the terms ,cause and ,effect1 thus applied to ,objects as antecedent and consequent1 are applied also to #fg ,thoughts as antecedent and consequent4 ,thus we say1 that ,evidence is the cause of ,belief2 ,villany is the cause of ,indignation1 and so on4 ,of objects1 antecedent and consequent1 we have observed1 that innumerable series are existing at the same time2 a separate series1 of vegetation1 for example1 in every plant1 of animalization in every animal1 of composition and decomposition in objects without number4 ,in the mind1 however1 there is but one train1 not various trains at the same time2 and therefore1 according to the sense above applied to the terms ,cause and ,effect1 each thought in a train is the cause of that which follows it1 and each succeeding thought is the effect of that which precedes it4 ,but if thoughts are reciprocally ,cause and ,effect2 that is to say1 if1 in trains of thought1 the same antecedent is regularly followed by the same consequent1 how happens it that all trains of thought are not the same8 ,for if the ideas ,a1 ,b1 ,c1 ,d1 c41 constantly follow one another1 every mind into which ,a may enter1 goes on with ,b1 ,c1 ,d1 c41 and hence all such minds should consist of the same trains1 that is1 should be the same4 ,supposing the succession of two thoughts to have that constancy to which we apply the terms cause and effect1 trains would still have that variety which we experience4 ,our trains consist of two distinguishable ingredients2 sensations and ideas4 ,sensations depend upon the innumerable series of objects4 ,they are1 therefore1 liable to all that variety which attends the perception of those objects4 ,a perpetual variety in sensations produces a perpetual variety in the thoughts which are consequent upon them4 ,the #fh variety of sensation1 is even much greater than is commonly supposed4 ,the most active of all our sensations is the sight4 ,but in most objects of sight there are numerous parts4 ,some of these are more seen1 some are less seen2 some not seen at all4 ,of these1 the parts that are more seen by one man1 are less seen by another2 whence it is probable1 that from an object of any complexity no two men ever receive precisely the same sensations4 ,there is a striking exemplification of this1 in the fact1 so constantly observed1 of the different manner in which different men are affected by the comparison of two countenances4 ,to one man there appears a strong likeness1 where another man cannot discover any4 ,of the minute particulars1 on which the likeness depends1 none1 or an insufficient number1 is embraced by the vision of the one1 while the contrary is the case with that of the other4 ,the variety in the sensations1 which mix in the trains of men1 is one grand cause of the variety in the ideas1 which make up or complete those trains4 ,the variety in the order of those sensations is another cause4 ,we have seen that ideas follow one another1 in the order in which the sensations have followed4 ,thus1 a man may be a kind father to his child4 ,the sight of him to the child is habitually accompanied with agreeable sensations4 ,the same man may be a severe master to his slaves4 ,the sight of him to the slaves is habitually accompanied with painful sensations4 ,a corresponding difference exists in the case of the ideas4 ,when his image presents itself to the mind of the child1 it is followed by a train of pleasurable ideas1 corresponding to the #fi pleasurable sensations which the child has habitually enjoyed in his presence4 ,when his image rises to the mind of the slave1 it is followed1 from the contrary cause1 by ideas of the contrary description4#ah ,editor's footnote #ah3 ,the author may seem to be anticipating a difficulty which few will feel1 when he asks how it happens that all trains of thought are not the same4 ,but what he is enquiring into is not why this happens1 but how its happening is consistent with the doctrine he has just laid down4 ,he is guarding against a possible objection to his proposition1 that the succession of two thoughts has that constancy to which we apply the terms ,cause and ,effect4 ,if 7he says7 it is by direct causation that an idea raises up another idea with which it is associated2 and if it be the nature and the very meaning of a cause1 to be invariably followed by its effect2 how is it1 he asks1 that any two minds1 which have once had the same idea1 do not coincide in their whole subsequent history8 ,and how is it that the same mind1 when it gets back to an idea it has had before1 does not go on revolving in an eternal round8 ,of this difficulty he gives a solution1 good as far as it goes--that it is because the train of ideas is interrupted by sensations1 which are not the same in different minds1 nor in the same mind at every repetition1 and which even when they are the same1 are connected in different minds with different associations4 ,this is true1 but is not the whole truth1 and a still more complete explanation of the difficulty might have been given4 ,the author has overlooked a part of the laws of association1 of which he was perfectly aware1 but to which he does not seem to have been always sufficiently alive4 ,the first point overlooked is1 that one idea seldom1 perhaps never1 entirely fills and engrosses the mind4 ,we have almost always a considerable number of ideas in the mind at once2 and it must be a very rare occurrence for any two persons1 or for the same person twice over1 to have exactly the same collection of ideas present1 each in the same relative intensity4 ,for this reason1 were there no other1 the ideas which the mental state excites by association are almost always more or less different4 ,a second point overlooked is1 that every sensation or idea is far from recalling1 whenever it occurs1 all the ideas with which it is associated4 ,it never recalls more than a portion of them1 and a portion different at different times4 ,the author has not1 in any part of the ,analysis1 laid down any law that determines which among the many ideas associated with an idea or sensation1 shall be actually called up by it in a given case4 ,the selection which it makes among them depends on the truth already stated1 that we seldom or never have only one idea at a time4 ,when we have several together1 they all exercise their suggesting power1 and each of them aids1 impedes1 or modifies the suggesting power of the others4 ,this important case of ,association has been treated in a masterly manner by ,mr4 ,bain1 both in his larger treatise and in his ,compendium1 under the name of ,compound ,association1 and he lays down the following as its most general law4 ,past actions1 sensations1 thoughts1 or emotions1 are recalled more easily when associated either through contiguity or similarity1 with more than one present object or impression4 7,compendium of ,psychology and ,ethics1 p4 #aea47 ,it follows that when we have several ideas in our mind1 none of which is able to call up all the ideas associated with it1 those ideas will usually have the preference which are associated with more than one of the ideas already present4 ,an idea ,a1 coexisting in the mind with an idea ,b1 will not select the same idea from among those associated with it1 that it would it it occurred alone or with a different accompaniment4 ,if there be any one of the ideas associated with ,a which is also associated with ,b1 this will probably be one of those called up by their joint action4 ,if there be any idea associated with ,a which not only is not associated with ,b1 but whose negation is associated with ,b1 this idea will probably be prevented from arising4 ,if there are any sensations which have usually been presented in conjunction1 not with ,a alone or with ,b alone1 but with the combination ,a ,b1 still more likely is it that the ideas of these will be recalled when ,a and ,b are thought of together1 even though ,a or ,b by themselves might in preference have recalled some other4 ,these considerations will be found of primary importance in explaining and accounting for the course of human thought4 ,they enable us1 for example1 to understand what it is that keeps a train of thought coherent1 i4e4 that maintains it of a given quality1 or directs it to a given purpose4 ,the ideas which succeed one another in the mind of a person who is writing a treatise on some subject1 or striving to persuade or conciliate a tribunal or a deliberative assembly1 are suggested one by another according to the general laws of association4 ,yet the ideas recalled are not those which would be called up on any common occasion by the same antecedents1 but are those only which connect themselves in the writer's or speaker's mind with the end which he is aiming at4 ,the reason is1 that the various ideas of the train are not solitary in his mind1 but there coexists with all of them 7in a greater or less degree of constancy according to the quality of the mind7 the highly interesting idea of the end in view3 and the presence of this idea causes each of the ideas which pass through his mind while so engaged1 to suggest such of the ideas associated with them as are also associated with the idea of the end1 and not to suggest those which have no association with it4 ,the ideas all follow one another in an associated train1 each calling up by association the one which immediately follows it2 but the perpetual presence or continual recurrence of the idea of the end1 determines1 within certain limits1 which of the ideas associated with each link of the chain shall be aroused and form the next link4 ,when we come to the author's analysis of the power of the ,will over our ideas1 we shall find him taking exactly this view of it4 ,concerning the simultaneous existence of many ideas in the mind1 and the manner in which they modify each other's exercise of the suggesting power1 there is an able and instructive passage in ,cardaillac's ,etudes ,elmentaires de ,philosophie1 which has been translated and quoted by ,sir ,william ,hamilton in his ,lectures1 and which1 being highly illustrative of the preceding remarks1 ,i think it useful to subjoin4 ,among psychologists1 those who have written on ,memory and ,reproduction with the greatest detail and precision1 have still failed in giving more than a meagre outline of these operations4 ,they have taken account only of the notions which suggest each other with a distinct and palpable notoriety4 ,they have viewed the associations only in the order in which language is competent to express them2 and as language1 which renders them still more palpable and distinct1 can only express them in a consecutive order1 can only express them one after another1 they have been led to suppose that thoughts only awaken in succession4 ,thus1 a series of ideas mutually associated1 resembles1 on the doctrine of philosophers1 a chain in which every link draws up that which follows2 and it is by means of these links that intelligence labours through1 in the act of reminiscence1 to the end which it proposes to attain4 ,there are some1 indeed1 among them1 who are ready to acknowledge1 that every actual circumstance is associated to several fundamental notions1 and consequently to several chains1 between which the mind may choose2 they admit even that every link is attached to several others1 so that the whole forms a kind of trellis1--a kind of network1 which the mind may traverse in every direction1 but still always in a single direction at once1--always in a succession similar to that of speech4 ,this manner of explaining reminiscence is founded solely on this1--that1 content to have observed all that is distinctly manifest in the phenomenon1 they have paid no attention to the under-play of the latescent activities1--paid no attention to all that custom conceals1 and conceals the more effectually in proportion as it is more completely blended with the natural agencies of mind4 ,thus their theory1 true in itself1 and setting out from a well-established principle1 the ,association of ,ideas1 explains in a satisfactory manner a portion of the phenomena of ,reminiscence2 but it is incomplete1 for it is unable to account for the prompt1 easy1 and varied operations of this faculty1 or for all the marvels it performs4 ,on the doctrine of the philosophers1 we can explain how a scholar repeats1 without hesitation1 a lesson he has learned1 for all the words are associated in his mind according to the order in which he has studied them2 how he demonstrates a geometrical theorem1 the parts of which are connected together in the same manner3 these and similar reminiscences of simple successions present no difficulties which the common doctrine cannot resolve4 ,but it is impossible1 on this doctrine1 to explain the rapid and certain movement of thought1 which1 with a marvellous facility1 passes from one order of subjects to another1 only to return again to the first2 which advances1 retrogrades1 deviates1 and reverts1 sometimes marking all the points on its route1 again clearing1 as if in play1 immense intervals2 which runs over1 now in a manifest order1 now in a seeming irregularity1 all the notions relative to an object1 often relative to several1 between which no connection could be suspected2 and this without hesitation1 without uncertainty1 without error1 as the hand of a skilful musician expatiates over the keys of the most complex organ4 ,all this is inexplicable on the meagre and contracted theory on which the phenomena of reproduction have been thought explained4 4 4 4 4 4 4 ,to form a correct notion of the phenomena of ,reminiscence1 it is requisite that we consider under what conditions it is determined to exertion4 ,in the first place it is to be noted that1 at every crisis of our existence1 momentary circumstances are the causes which awaken our activity1 and set our recollection at work to supply the necessaries of thought4 ,in the second place1 it is as constituting a want1 7and by want ,i mean the result either of an act of desire or of volition7 that the determining circumstance tends principally to awaken the thoughts with which it is associated4 ,this being the case1 we should expect1 that each circumstance which constitutes a want1 should suggest1 likewise1 the notion of the object1 or objects1 proper to satisfy it2 and this is what actually happens4 ,it is1 however1 further to be observed1 that it is not enough that the want suggests the idea of the object2 for if that idea were alone1 it would remain without effect1 since it could not guide me in the procedure ,i should follow4 ,it is necessary1 at the same time1 that to the idea of this object there should be associated the notion of the relation of this object to the want1 of the place where ,i may find it1 of the means by which ,i may procure it1 and turn it to account1 c4 ,for instance1 ,i wish to make a quotation3--,this want awakens in me the idea of the author in whom the passage is to be found which ,i am desirous of citing2 but this idea would be fruitless1 unless there were conjoined1 at the same time1 the representation of the volume1 of the place where ,i may obtain it1 of the means ,i must employ1 c4 ,hence ,i infer1 in the first place1 that a want does not awaken an idea of its object alone1 but that it awakens it accompanied with a number1 more or less considerable1 of accessory notions1 which form1 as it were1 its train or attendance4 ,this train may vary according to the nature of the want which suggests the notion of an object2 but the train can never fall wholly off1 and it becomes more indissolubly attached to the object1 in proportion as it has been more frequently called up in attendance4 ,i infer1 in the second place1 that this accompaniment of accessory notions1 simultaneously suggested with the principal idea1 is far from being as vividly and distinctly represented in consciousness as that idea itself2 and when these accessories have once been completely blended with the habits of the mind1 and its reproductive agency1 they at length finally disappear1 becoming fused1 as it were1 in the consciousness of the idea to which they are attached4 ,experience proves this double effect of the habits of reminiscence4 ,if we observe our operations relative to the gratification of a want1 we shall perceive that we are far from having a clear consciousness of the accessory notions2 the consciousness of them is1 as it were1 obscured1 and yet we cannot doubt that they are present to the mind1 for it is they that direct our procedure in all its details4 ,we must1 therefore1 ,i think1 admit that the thought of an object immediately suggested by a desire1 is always accompanied by an escort more or less numerous of accessory thoughts1 equally present to the mind1 though1 in general1 unknown in themselves to consciousness2 that these accessories are not without their influence in guiding the operations elicited by the principal notion2 and it may even be added that they are so much the more calculated to exert an effect in the conduct of our procedure1 in proportion as1 having become more part and parcel of our habits of reproduction1 the influences they exert are further withdrawn1 in ordinary1 from the ken of consciousness4 4 4 4 ,the same thing may be illustrated by what happens to us in the case of reading4 ,originally each word1 each letter1 was a separate object of consciousness4 ,at length1 the knowledge of letters and words and lines being1 as it were1 fused into our habits1 we no longer have any distinct consciousness of them1 as severally concurring to the result1 of which alone we are conscious4 ,but that each word and letter has its effect1--an effect which can at any moment become an object of consciousness1--is shewn by the following experiment4 ,if we look over a book for the occurrence of a particular name or word1 we glance our eye over a page from top to bottom1 and ascertain1 almost in a moment1 that it is or is not to be found therein4 ,here the mind is hardly conscious of a single word1 but that of which it is in quest2 but yet it is evident1 that each other word and letter must have produced an obscure effect1 which effect the mind was ready to discriminate and strengthen1 so as to call it into clear consciousness1 whenever the effect was found to be that which the letters of the word sought for could determine4 ,but if the mind be not unaffected by the multitude of letters and words which it surveys1 if it be able to ascertain whether the combination of letters constituting the word it seeks1 be or be not actually among them1 and all this without any distinct consciousness of all it tries and finds defective2 why may we not suppose1--why are we not bound to suppose1 that the mind may1 in like manner1 overlook its book of memory1 and search among its magazines of latescent cognitions for the notions of which it is in want1 awakening these into consciousness1 and allowing the others to remain in their obscurity8 ,a more attentive consideration of the subject will show1 that we have not yet divined the faculty of ,reminiscence in its whole extent4 ,let us make a single reflection4 ,continually struck by relations of every kind1 continually assailed by a crowd of perceptions and sensations of every variety1 and1 at the same time1 occupied by a complement of thoughts2 we experience at once1 and we are more or less distinctly conscious of1 a considerable number of wants1--wants1 sometimes real1 sometimes factitious or imaginary1--phenomena1 however1 all stamped with the same characters1 and all stimulating us to act with more or less energy4 ,and as we choose among the different wants which we would satisfy1 as well as among the different means of satisfying that want which we determine to prefer2 and as the motives of this preference are taken either from among the principal ideas relative to each of these several wants1 or from among the accessory ideas which habit has established into their necessary escorts2--in all these cases it is requisite1 that all the circumstances should at once1 and from the moment they have taken the character of wants1 produce an effect1 correspondent to that which1 we have seen1 is caused by each in particular4 ,hence we are compelled to conclude1 that the complement of the circumstances by which we are thus affected1 has the effect of rendering always present to us1 and consequently of placing at our disposal1 an immense number of thoughts2 some of which certainly are distinctly recognised1 being accompanied by a vivid consciousness1 but the greater number of which1 although remaining latent1 are not the less effective in continually exercising their peculiar influence on our modes of judging and acting4 ,we might say1 that each of these momentary circumstances is a kind of electric shock which is communicated to a certain portion1 to a certain limited sphere1 of intelligence2 and the sum of all these circumstances is equal to so many shocks which1 given at once at so many different points1 produce a general agitation4 ,we may form some rude conception of this phenomenon by an analogy4 ,we may compare it1 in the former case1 to those concentric circles which are presented to our observation on a smooth sheet of water1 when its surface is agitated by throwing in a pebble2 and1 in the latter case1 to the same surface when agitated by a number of pebbles thrown simultaneously at different points4 ,to obtain a clearer notion of this phenomenon1 ,i may add some observations on the relation of our thoughts among themselves1 and with the determining circumstances of the moment4 #a4 ,among the thoughts1 notions1 or ideas which belong to the different groups attached to the principal representations simultaneously awakened1 there are some reciprocally connected by relations proper to themselves2 so that1 in this whole complement of coexistent activities1 these tend to excite each other to higher vigour1 and consequently to obtain for themselves a kind of pre-eminence in the group or particular circle of activity to which they belong4 #b4 ,there are thoughts associated1 whether as principals or accessories1 to a greater number of determining circumstances1 or to circumstances which recur more frequently4 ,hence they present themselves oftener than the others1 they enter more completely into our habits1 and take1 in a more absolute manner1 the character of customary or habitual notions4 ,it hence results1 that they are less obtrusive1 though more energetic1 in their influence1 enacting1 as they do1 a principal part in almost all our deliberations2 and exercising a stronger influence on our determinations4 #c4 ,among this great crowd of thoughts1 simultaneously excited1 those which are connected with circumstances which more vividly affect us1 assume not only the ascendant over others of the same description with themselves1 but likewise predominate over all those which are dependent on circumstances of a feebler determining influence4 ,from these three considerations we ought1 therefore1 to infer1 that the thoughts connected with circumstances on which our attention is more specially concentrated1 are those which prevail over the others2 for the effect of attention is to render dominant and exclusive the object on which it is directed1 and during the moment of attention it is the circumstance to which we attend that necessarily obtains the ascendant4 ,thus1 if we appreciate correctly the phenomena of ,reproduction or ,reminiscence1 we shall recognise1 as an incontestable fact1 that our thoughts suggest each other not one by one successively1 as the order to which language is astricted might lead us to infer2 but that the complement of circumstances under which we at every moment exist1 awakens simultaneously a great number of thoughts2 these it calls into the presence of the mind1 either to place them at our disposal1 if we find it requisite to employ them1 or to make them co-operate in our deliberations by giving them1 according to their nature and our habits1 an influence1 more or less active1 on our judgments and consequent acts4 ,it is also to be observed1 that in this great crowd of thoughts always present to the mind1 there is only a small number of which we are distinctly conscious3 and that in this small number we ought to distinguish those which1 being clothed in language1 oral or mental1 become the objects of a more fixed attention2 those which hold a closer relation to circumstances more impressive than others2 or which receive a predominant character by the more vigorous attention we bestow on them4 ,as to the others1 although not the objects of clear consciousness1 they are nevertheless present to the mind1 there to perform a very important part as motive principles of determination2 and the influence which they exert in this capacity is even the more powerful in proportion as it is less apparent1 being more disguised by habit4 7,sir ,william ,hamilton's ,lectures on ,metaphysics1 vol4 ii4 ,lecture xxxii47--,ed4 #gj ,this1 then1 is all which seems necessary to be said respecting the occasions on which we apply ,relative #ga ,terms1 and to show what it is which they distinctively mark1 in the trains of our sensations and ideas4 #gb ,,abstract ,,relative ,,terms4 ,from the ,concrete relative terms1 ,abstract terms are formed1 in the same manner as ,abstract terms are #gc 99formed from other ,concrete terms4 ,thus from equal1 we have equally2 from unequal1 unequally2 from #gd like1 likeness2 from unlike1 unlikeness2 from friend1 friendship2 and so on4 #ge ,after what has been said about abstract terms in general1 it will not be very difficult to mark what is #gf peculiar in the nature of this species of them4 ,we have seen that concrete1 are connotative1 terms2 and #gg that their corresponding abstracts have the same meaning with the concretes1 that which is connoted #gh being left out4 ,white1 for example1 has a notation1 and a connotation4 ,it notes a quality1 and it connotes #gi something else1 that which is white4 ,the abstract whiteness marks what is noted by the concrete1 but not what is connoted4 ,we are now to see1 in what manner this applies to relative terms4 ,i call two things like3 two sensations1 for example2 let us say1 sensations of red4 ,i call sensation ,a1 like sensation ,b2 and1 of course1 sensation ,b1 like sensation ,a4 ,it is here more easy to observe distinctly what is connoted1 than what is noted4 ,what is connoted are the two sensations4 ,they are clear and simple4 ,what is noted is what we call their likeness4 ,what is that8 ,we have remarked1 that1 in having two sensations1 the distinguishing them one #hj from another is included2 it is part of the compound process3 ,and that in having two sensations--red1 red1 and two sensations red1 green1 the distinguishing the succession red1 red1 from the succession red1 green1 is included2 it being part of the process1 which1 though in this case compound1 and on that account obscure1 is not the less wholly sensation4 ,in the process of sensation1 then1 that part which consists in distinguishing one as one1 another as another1 and in distinguishing one succession from another2 red1 red1 for example1 from red1 green1--is the part which is noted by the words like and unlike4 ,the thing noted is not a distinct sensation1 it is part of a process of sensation1 and a part which1 being never experienced separate by itself1 it is very difficult to make a distinct subject of attention4 ,even that part of the process which consists in distinguishing1 is to be distinguished into two parts4 ,there is that part which consists in distinguishing the sensations from one another1 as one1 and one2 and there is that part which consists in distinguishing the two1 red1 and red1 from the two1 red1 and green4 ,it is this latter part which is noted by the terms like and unlike4 ,what is connoted is all the rest of the process4 ,when1 therefore1 we make abstracts1 from the terms like and unlike2 that is1 cut off the connotative part of their meaning1 retaining the notative only2 it is the part of the process which consists in distinguishing1 not one and one1 but two and two1 which the terms distinctively mark4 ,we have also seen1 and remarked1 that having two sensations1 one after another1 and knowing them to be first one and then another1 is a process of sensation and association4 ,the pair of relatives1 prior and #ha posterior1 or antecedent and consequent1 taken together1 names the whole of the process2 each pair is in reality a compound name of a complex idea1 that of a certain process1 the process of having two ideas in succession1 in which process the being sensible of the successiveness is part4 ,by all concrete relatives1 something is noted1 something connoted4 ,in the process which is marked by the relatives prior and posterior1 part is noted1 part connoted2 and the part which is noted1 is the part which it is difficult to make a separate object of attention1--the part which consists in being sensible of the successiveness1 for which we have not a name4 ,by its notation and connotation1 taken together1 each of the terms1 prior1 and posterior1 is a name of something1 and that something is very distinct2 prior is a name of the first sensation and something else2 posterior is a name of the second sensation1 and something else4 ,it is by connotation1 however1 that each is the name of its respective sensation4 ,their notative power relates to the something else1 and not to the whole of that2 because prior and posterior1 beside connoting1 each its own sensation1 connote one another4 ,the notation and connotation1 therefore1 are divided between them1 in a manner which renders it difficult to shew what belongs to each4 ,we have not names adapted to the purpose4 ,the word prior notes something1 and connotes something4 ,when we make from it the abstract term priority2 what was connoted by the concrete1 prior1 is dropped2 what was noted by it is retained4 ,in the succession of ideas ,a1 and ,b1 priority is not the name of ,a1 it is the name of that part of the compound process1 which consists in knowing ,a1 as the #hb first of the two2 posteriority is not the name of ,b1 but of that part of the compound process1 which consists in knowing ,b1 as the last of the two4 ,there is a peculiarity1 however1 in the abstract terms formed from the relative concrete terms4 ,these abstract terms are not1 as whiteness1 hardness1 wholly void of connotation4 ,they have a connotation of their own4 ,the abstract of one relative of a pair1 always connotes the abstract of the other2 thus1 priority always connotes posteriority1 and posteriority priority4 ,this constitutes a distinction1 worth observing1 between the force of the abstracts formed from the pairs of relatives which consist of different names1 as prior1 posterior2 cause1 effect2 father1 son2 husband1 wife2--and those which consist of the same name1 as equal1 equal2 like1 like2 brother1 brother2 friend1 friend2 and so on4 ,priority and ,posteriority make together a compound name of something1 of which1 taken separately1 each is not a name2 ,causingness and ,causedness1 the abstracts of cause and effect1 make up between them the name of something1 of which each by itself is not a name1 and so of the rest4 ,the case is different with such abstracts as likeness1 equality1 friendship1 formed from pairs which consist of the same name4 ,when we call ,a like1 and ,b like2 the abstract1 likeness1 formed from the one1 connotes merely the abstract1 likeness1 formed from the other4 ,thus1 as priority and posteriority make a compound name1 so1 likeness and likeness1 make a compound name4 ,but as likeness and likeness are merely a reduplication of the same word1 likeness taken once very often signifies the same as likeness taken twice4 ,priority never signifies as much as priority and #hc posteriority taken together2 but likeness taken alone very often signifies as much as likeness1 likeness1 taken both together4 ,likeness has thus a sort of a double meaning4 ,sometimes it signifies only what is marked by the abstract of one of the pair1 like1 like2 sometimes it signifies what is marked by the abstracts of both taken together4 ,the same observation applies to the abstracts equality1 inequality2 sameness1 difference2 brotherhood1 sisterhood2 friendship1 hostility2 and so on4#ai ,editor's footnote #ai3 ,the exposition here given of the meaning of abstract relative names is in substance unexceptionable2 but in language it remains open to the criticism ,i have1 several times1 made4 ,instead of saying1 with the author1 that the abstract name drops the connotation of the corresponding concrete1 it would1 in the language ,i prefer1 be said to drop the denotation1 and to be a name directly denoting what the concrete name connotes1 namely1 the common property or properties that it predicates3 the likeness1 the unlikeness1 the fact of preceding1 the fact of following1 c4 ,when the author says that abstract relative names differ from other abstract names in not being wholly void of connotation1 inasmuch as they connote their correlatives1 priority connoting posteriority1 and posteriority priority1 he deserts the specific meaning which he has sought to attach to the word connote1 and falls back upon the loose and general sense in which everything implied by a term is said to be connoted by it4 ,but in this large sense of the word 7as ,i have more than once remarked7 it is not true that non-relative abstract names have no connotation4 ,every abstract name--every name of the character which is given by the terminations ness1 tion1 and the like--carries with it a uniform implication that what it is predicated of is an attribute of something else2 not a sensation or a thought in and by itself1 but a sensation or thought regarded as one of1 or as accompanying or following1 some permanent cluster of sensations or thoughts4--,ed4 #hd ,among the abstract terms corresponding to relative concretes1 those corresponding to cause and effect1 are the only ones which1 on account of their importance1 require to be somewhat more particularly expounded4 ,cause and ,effect have not abstract terms formed immediately from themselves4 ,one of the grand causes of their obscurity is1 that they are not constant in their meaning1 but are sometimes used as concretes1 sometimes as their own abstracts4 ,cause means something causing2 effect1 something caused4 ,causingness1 therefore1 is the proper abstract of cause2 and causedness1 the proper abstract of effect4 ,of two objects1 ,a1 and ,b1 we call the one causing1 the other caused1 when they are not only prior and posterior1 but parts of the same series2 and1 if we speak strictly1 proximate parts4 ,of proximate parts of the same series1 we call the antecedent1 causing2 the consequent1 caused4 ,causingness1 and causedness1 therefore1 mean antecedence and consequence1 and something more4 ,the ideas are more complex4 ,causingness and causedness1 mean1 not only antecedence and consequence1 but also sameness of series1 and proximity of parts4 ,as we have seen1 that priority and posteriority1 taken together1 form a compound name of a certain complex idea1 so causingness and causedness1 taken together1 form the compound name of a still more complex idea4 ,having frequent occasion to express that idea1 a separate name for it was found necessary4 ,accordingly1 we have the term ,power1 which means precisely what is meant by causingness and causedness taken together4 ,causation has the same #he meaning with ,power1 except that it connotes present time2 ,power connotes indefinite time4#bj ,editor's footnote #bj3 ,the term ,causation1 as the author observes1 signifies causingness and causedness taken together1 but ,i do not see on what ground he asserts that it connotes present time4 ,to my thinking1 it is as completely aoristic as ,power4 ,power1 again1 seems to me to express1 not causingness and causedness taken together1 but causingness only4 ,some of the older philosophers certainly talked of passive power1 but neither in the precise language of modern philosophy nor in common speech is an effect said to have the power of being produced1 but only the capacity or capability4 ,the power is always conceived as belonging to the cause only4 ,when any co-operating power is supposed to reside in the thing said to be acted upon1 it is because some active property in that thing is counted as a con-cause--as a part of the total cause4--,ed4 ,the connotation of ,time1 by abstract terms1 is a circumstance almost always overlooked1 but of which the observation is of the utmost importance to accuracy of thought4 ,when we have invented a number of marks to be taken in pairs1 as like1 like2 equal1 equal2 antecedent1 consequent2 master1 servant2 husband1 wife2 father1 son2 owner1 property2 author1 book2 cause1 effect2 and so on2 we have occasion for a name by which to speak of that class of names4 ,we have invented such a name4 ,we call those terms ,relative ,terms4 ,the word ,relative1 thus belongs to that class of names1 which have been called ,names of ,names4 ,as man1 tree1 stone1 are names of things1 of those clusters which we call objects2 as red1 green1 hard1 soft1 are names of sensations2 as courage1 wisdom1 #hf anger1 love1 are names of complex ideas arbitrarily composed2 so adjective is the name of one class of names1 verb the name of another class of names2 syllable1 is the name of one part of a word1 letter of another2 and so1 also1 relative is the name of the class of words which have this peculiarity1 that they are taken in pairs4 ,thus1 father and son1 are relative terms2 prior and posterior1 are relative terms2 like and like1 are relative terms2 so equal1 equal2 unequal1 unequal2 brother1 brother2 friend1 friend2 and so on4 ,relative itself corresponds with the names which it marks1 in its being one of a pair2 of that species of pairs1 which are formed by a double use of the same word1 as like1 like4 ,when we say of father and son1 that they are relative terms1 we mean that father is relative to son1 and son relative to father4 ,as relative is the name of all concrete names1 taken in pairs1 such as like1 like2 friend1 friend2 causing1 caused2 so the abstract relation1 formed from relative1 is the name given to all the abstract terms formed from the concrete relatives3 thus1 equality1 inequality1 friendship1 power1 are abstract terms1 which we call by a general name1 relation4 ,as ,noun is the name of a certain class of words1 so ,relation1 is the name of a certain class of words4 ,it is not1 however1 meant to be affirmed1 that relative and relation1 are not names which are also applied to things4 ,in a certain vague1 and indistinct way1 they are very frequently so applied4 ,this1 however1 is strictly speaking1 an abuse of the terms1 and an abuse which has been a great cause of confusion of ideas4 ,in this way1 it is said1 of two brothers1 that #hg they are relative2 of father and son1 that they are relative2 of two objects1 that they are relative in position1 relative in time2 we speak of the relation between two men1 when they are father and son1 master and servant2 between two objects1 when they are greater1 less1 like1 unlike1 near1 distant1 and so on4 ,what1 however1 we really mean1 when we call two objects relative 7and that is a thing which it is of great importance to mark7 is1 that these objects have1 or may have1 relative names4 ,on what accounts we give them relative names1 has just been explained1 and the explanation need not be repeated4 ,when we say that ,socrates and the ,emperor ,napoleon are unlike1 the men are1 each1 a man1 distinct1 separate1 absolute4 ,we only give them a pair of related names1 for the convenience of discourse4 ,in like manner1 ,charles ,i4 and ,george ,,iv4 are separate1 distinct1 absolute individuals4 ,we only give them the relative names ,predecessor1 ,successor1 for the convenience of discourse1 to mark the place which they occupied in a certain series of events4 ,from this appears also what is meant1 when we say of two objects1 that they have a relation to one another4 ,the meaning is1 that the objects may have relative names1 and that these names may have abstracts which we call relation4 ,thus we say that two brothers have a relation to one another4 ,that relation is brotherhood4 ,but brotherhood is merely the abstract of the relative names4 ,we say that father and son have a relation4 ,that relation is fathership and sonship4 ,these are merely the abstracts of the two relative names4 ,we say of two events1 a stab with a sword1 and death of the person stabbed1 that they have a relation to one another4 ,that relation is #hh causingness and causedness1 the abstract of cause and effect1 or1 in one word1 power4#ba ,editor's footnote #ba3 ,the application of the word ,relative to ,things is not only an offence against philosophy1 but against propriety of language4 ,the correct designation for ,things which are called by relative names1 is not ,relative1 but ,related4 ,a ,thing may1 with perfect propriety both of thought and of language1 be said to be related to another thing1 or to have a relation with it--indeed to be related to all things1 and to have a prodigious variety of relations with all2 because every fact that takes place1 either in nature or in human thought1 which includes or involves a plurality of ,things1 is the fundamentum of a special relation of those ,things with one another3 not to mention the relations of likeness or unlikeness1 of priority or posteriority1 which exist between each ,thing and all other ,things whatever4 ,it is in this sense that it is said1 with truth1 that ,relations exhaust all phenomena1 and that all we know1 or can know1 of anything1 is some of its relations to other things or to us4--,ed4 #hi ,,section ,,iii4 ,,numbers4 ,we have already observed1 that objects exist1 with respect to us1 in two orders2 in the synchronous order1 and the successive order2 and that we have great occasion for marks to represent them to us as they exist in both orders4 ,we have also to observe1 that the synchronous order1 the order in which things exist together2 that is1 as we otherwise name it1 the order of position1 or the order in place2 is interesting to us chiefly on account of the successive order4 ,the order in which objects 99succeed one another1 that is1 the order of the changes which take place1 the order of events1 depends almost entirely upon the synchronous order4 ,in other words1 the synchronous order is part of every successive order2 it is the antecedent of every consequent2 or as we otherwise express it1 the cause of every effect4 ,thus the synchronous order1 or the order in place1 of the spark and the gunpowder1 is the antecedent of the explosion2 the synchronous order of my finger and the candle1 is the antecedent or the cause of the pain which ,i feel4 ,in regard to the explosion1 also1 it is less or greater1 according as the quantity of the gunpowder is less or greater4 ,of the synchronous order1 therefore1 one part which ,i am particularly interested in knowing correctly is1 the amount of the things4 ,a certain amount of gunpowder produces one set of effects1 another #ij another3 a certain amount of men produce one set of effects1 another another2 and so of all other things4 ,it is of the last importance to me not only to be able to ascertain1 and know1 these amounts1 with accuracy1 but to be able to mark them4 ,for ascertaining and knowing amounts1 some contrivance is requisite4 ,it is necessary to conceive some small amount1 by the addition or subtraction of which1 another becomes larger or smaller4 ,this forms the instrument of ascertainment4 ,where one thing1 taken separately1 is of sufficient importance to form this instrument1 it is taken4 ,thus1 for ascertaining and knowing different amounts of men1 one individual is of sufficient importance4 ,amounts of men are considered as increased or diminished by the addition or subtraction of individuals4 ,a grain of gunpowder might also be taken2 but it is not of sufficient importance2 the quantity1 taken as the instrument of measurement1 must have an ascertainable influence upon the effect1 for the sake of which1 the ascertaining of the amount is of importance4 ,in their simple state1 men use principally the hand for their elementary ascertainments4 ,a pinch1 or as much as could be held between the finger and the thumb1 was a small amount distinctly conceived1 and formed the principle of measurement where small additions were important2 a handful was not less distinctively conceived1 and was the instrument1 where only larger additions were of importance4 ,when one addition was made1 or needed to be made1 after another1 and another after that1 and so on1 the next point of importance was to conceive exactly how often the addition was made4 ,a few #ia additions are distinct to sense4 ,place one billiard-ball by another1 the sight of the two is distinct4 ,place three or four1 it is still distinct4 ,soon1 however1 it ceases to be so4 ,place a dozen1 and you will not probably be able to distinguish them from eleven4 ,you must count them1 or divide them4 ,if you divide them by the eye1 into two parcels1 you may see that one is six and another six2 but to benefit by this1 you must know the art of putting six and six together4 ,the next step1 therefore1 necessary in the process of ascertaining amounts1 was1 to mark these additions1 one after another1 in such a manner1 as to make known to what extent they had gone4 ,when men were familiar with the operation of assigning names as marks of their ideas1 the course which would suggest itself to them is obvious2 they would employ a name as the mark of each addition4 ,they would say1 one1 for the first1 two1 for the second1 three1 for the third1 and so on4 ,these marks it was very useful to make connotative1 that the other important ingredient of the process1 the thing added1 might be made known at the same time4 ,thus we say1 one man1 two men2 one horse1 two horses2 and so of all other things1 the enumeration of which we are performing4 ,numbers1 therefore1 are not names of objects4 ,they are names of a certain process2 the process of addition2 of putting one billiard-ball to another2 not more mysterious than any other process1 as walking1 writing1 reading1 to which names are assigned4 ,one1 is the name of this once performed1 or of the aggregation begun2 two1 the name of it once more performed2 three1 of it once more performed2 and so on4 ,the words1 however1 in these concrete forms1 beside #ib their power in noting this process1 connote something else1 namely1 the things1 whatever they are1 the enumeration of which is required4 ,in the case of these connotative1 as of other connotative marks1 it was of great use to have the means of dropping the connotation2 and in this case1 it would have been conducive to clearness of ideas1 if the non-connotative terms had received a mark to distinguish them from the connotative4 ,this advantage1 however1 the framers of numbers were not sufficiently philosophical to provide4 ,the same names are used both as connotative1 and non-connotative2 that is1 both as abstract1 and concrete2 and it is far from being obvious1 on all occasions1 in which of the two senses they are used4 ,they are used in the connotative sense1 when joined as adjectives with a substantive2 as when we say two men1 three women2 but it is not so obvious that they are used in the abstract sense1 when we say three and two make five2 or when we say fifty is a great number1 five is a small number4 ,yet it must1 upon consideration1 appear1 that in these cases they are abstract terms merely2 in place of which1 the words oneness1 twoness1 threeness1 might be substituted4 ,thus we might say1 twoness and threeness are fiveness4#bb #bc ,editor's footnote #bb3 ,the vague manner in which the author uses the phrase to be a name of 7a vagueness common to almost all thinkers who have not precise terms expressing the two modes of signification which ,i call denotation and connotation1 and employed for nothing else7 has led him1 in the present case1 into a serious misuse of terms4 ,numbers are1 in the strictest propriety1 names of objects4 ,two is surely a name of the things which are two1 the two balls1 the two fingers1 c4 ,the process of adding one to one which forms two is connoted1 not denoted1 by the name two4 ,numerals1 in short1 are concrete1 not abstract names3 they denote the actual collections of things1 and connote the mental process of counting them4 ,it is not twoness and threeness that are fiveness3 the twoness of my two hands and the threeness of the feet of the table cannot be added together to form another abstraction4 ,it is two balls added to three balls that make1 in the concrete1 five balls4 ,numerals are a class of concrete general names predicable of all things whatever1 but connoting1 in each case1 the quantitative relation of the thing to some fixed standard1 as previously explained by the author4--,ed4 ,grote's footnote #bc3 ,here the process of numeration generally1 together with the function of numbers carrying their separate names1 are clearly set forth2 after which we find the remark1 that no distinction is made in the name of the number1 when used as an abstract and when used as a concrete4 ,mr4 ,james ,mill thinks that it would have been conducive to clearness if such distinction had been marked by an inflexion of the name4 ,the names of numbers are used in the connotative 7concrete7 sense1 when joined as adjectives with a substantive1 as when we say1 two men1 three men3 but it is not so obvious that they are used in the abstract sense1 when we say three and two make five3 or when we say fifty is a great number1 five is a small number4 ,yet it must upon consideration appear1 that in these cases they are abstract terms merely3 in place of which1 the words oneness1 twoness1 threeness1 might be substituted4 ,thus we might say1 twoness and threeness are fiveness4 ,the last part of what is here affirmed cannot1 in my judgment1 be sustained4 ,connecting itself with one among the many arguments between ,aristotle and ,plato1 it lays down a position from which both of them would have dissented4 ,in the last book but one 7,book ,m7 of ,aristotle's ,metaphysica1 this argument will be found set forth at length2 though with much obscurity1 which is cleared up by the lucid commentary of ,bonitz4 ,plato distinguished two classes of numbers--the mathematical1 and the ideal4 ,the first class were the ,quanta of equal and homogeneous units 7,one1 ,two1 ,three1 c471 any or all of which might be added so as to coalesce into one total sum4 ,the second class were1 the ideal or abstract numbers1 ,two quatenus ,two1 c41 represented by ,dyad1 ,triad1 ,tetrad1 ,pentad1 ,dekad1 c41 the characteristic property of which was1 that they could not be added together nor coalesce into one sum4 ,these were uncombinable numbers1 ,greek a7rithmoi a7su_/mbltoi--numeri inconsociabiles4-- ,see ,aristot4 ,metaph4 ,m4 #f4 #ajhj4 b4 #ab4 ,bonitz ,comment4 p4 #edj1 #eda1 seq4 ,plato regarded these uncombinable numbers as the highest representative specimens or coryphi of the ,platonic ,ideas4 ,in this character ,aristotle reasoned against them1 contending that they did nothing to remove the many objections against ,plato's ideal theory4 ,with the question thus opened1 ,i have no present concern3 all that ,i wish to point out is the view which ,plato originated and upon which ,aristotle reasoned1 viz43 ,that these ideal or abstract numbers could not be added together1 or fused into one sum total4 ,the abstract term ,twoness means ,two so far forth as two3 so also ,threeness and ,fiveness4 ,you cannot truly predicate anything of ,twoness which would be inconsistent with this fundamental characteristic3 you cannot add it to ,threeness so as to make ,fiveness1 nor can you subdivide ,fiveness into ,twoness and ,threeness1 without suppressing the fundamental characteristic of each4 ,neither of them admit of increase or diminution4 ,in like manner1 a ,triangle1 or every particular ,triangle1 may have one of its sides taken away1 or two more sides added to it3 on each of which suppositions it ceases to be a triangle4 ,but if we speak of a ,triangle so far forth as ,triangle1 neither of these suppositions is admissible4 ,we may say that its three angles are equal to two right angles1 but we cannot subtract from it one of its sides1 nor add to it one or two other sides4 ,the subject of predication is so limited and specialised1 that no predicate can be allowed which would efface its characteristic feature--,triangularity4 ,bonitz remarks truly that the class of numbers set forth by ,plato--the ideal or uncombinable numbers which could not be either added or subtracted--were divested of all the useful aptitudes and functions of numbers1 and passed out of the category of ,quantity into that of ,quality4 ,the ,triad was one quality2 the ,pentad was another3 there was no common measure into which both could be resolved 7,bonitz1 ,comment4 p4 #edj--eec74 ,two1 three1 five1 are quantifying names1 designating each so many numerable units3 and the units counted in each list may be added to1 or subtracted from1 the units counted in the others4 ,but when we say1 ,twoness or the ,dyad--,threeness or the ,triad--,fiveness or the ,pentad--we then recognise a peculiar quality1 founded upon each separate variety of aggregation or quantification3 so that these separate varieties are no longer resolvable into any common measure of constituent units4 ,each quality stands apart from the others1 and has its own predicates4 ,in the view of ,plato and the ,pythagoreans1 the ,dekad especially was invested with magnificent predicates4 ,i cannot therefore agree with ,mr4 ,james ,mill in his opinion that1 when we say three and two make five1 we use these numbers in the abstract sense4 ,we clearly do not mean that three1 so far forth as three1 and two1 so far forth as two1 make five4 ,but this would be what we should mean1 if we used these names of numbers in the abstract sense4 ,what we do mean is1 that the units constituting three may be added to those constituting two1 so as to make five3 and that this is equally true1 whether the units are men1 horses1 stones1 or any other objects4 ,two1 three1 five1 c41 are general or universal terms1 capable of being joined with units of indefinite variety3 but they do not become abstract terms1 until we limit them by qutenus1 ,greek3 katho_/son1 71 so far forth as1 c41 or by a suffix such as ness4 ,such abstracts would have been of little use as to the ordinary functions of numbers2 and accordingly they have never got footing in familiar speech1 though they are occasionally employed in metaphysical discussions4--,g4 #ic ,it is necessary to observe1 that the process1 marked by the names called numbers1 though used for the #id purpose of ascertaining synchronous order1 is in the mind successive2 one addition follows another4 #ie ,numbers1 therefore1 in reality1 name successions2 and are easily applied to mark certain particulars of the #if successive order1 when the marking of those particulars is of importance4 ,it is of importance1 when successions take place all of one kind2 and when consequences of importance depend upon the less or greater length of the train4 ,it is then of importance1 to mark the degrees of that length1 which is correctly done by the enumeration of the links4 ,to take a simple and familiar instance1 that of the human steps4 ,they are successions all of one kind4 ,consequences of importance may1 and often do result from a knowledge of the length of any particular series of steps4 ,the ascertainment of an aggregate1 in this order1 is made in the same way1 as that which we have traced in the synchronous order4 ,an element of aggregation is taken2 by its successive aggregations1 the amount of the aggregate is correctly conceived2 and1 by a proper mark for each successive aggregation1 it is also correctly denoted4 ,the continued successions of day and night are all of one kind2 and it is of the greatest importance for us to know accurately the length of a series of those successions2 of the series between such and such events2 between the sowing of the seed in the ground1 for example1 and the maturity of the crop4 ,this is done1 accurately1 by putting a several mark upon each #ig several succession1 one for the first1 two for the one after that1 three for the one after that1 and so on4 ,if there be no mystery in one sensation after another1 or one idea after another2 and1 if having them in that order and associating the idea of the antecedent with the sensation of the consequent be to know that they are in that order2 then there is no mystery in ,numbers1 for they are only marks to shew that one is after another4 ,that there is no mystery in the ideas of priority and posteriority1 which are relative terms1 has been shewn under the preceding head of discourse4 ,the word ,number itself1 which is only a name of the names1 one1 two1 c41 nothing being a number but some one of those names1 has also been explained1 when the class of words which are distinguished as ,names of ,names was under consideration4 ,in using the terms1 one1 two1 three1 four1 and so on1 the object is to ascertain with precision1 the amount of the aggregate in question4 ,in some cases1 however1 it is of importance to ascertain the order of aggregation1 as well as the amount2 and that1 whether a synchronous1 or a successive1 aggregate be the object in view4 ,this purpose is answered by a set of names1 called the ordinal numbers1 which1 applied to the units of aggregation in the order in which they are taken1 mark precisely the order of each4 ,thus1 when we say1 first1 second1 third1 fourth1 and so on2 each of these concrete1 or connotative names1 notes a certain position1 if in the synchronous order2 a certain link1 if #ih in the successive2 and connotes the precise object which holds that position1 or forms that link4 ,as there is no difficulty whatsoever in tracing the ideas1 which1 on each occasion1 receive those marks1 there is no need of multiplying words in their illustration4 #ii ,,section ,,iv4 ,,privative ,,terms4 ,privative terms are distinguished from other terms1 by this2 that other terms are marks for objects1 as present or existent2 privative terms are marks for objects1 as not present or not existent4#bd ,editor's footnote #bd3 ,the author gives the name of ,privative terms to all those which are more commonly known by the designation of ,negative2 to all which signify non-existence or absence4 ,it is usual to reserve the term ,privative for names which signify not simple absence1 but the absence of something usually present1 or of which the presence might have been expected4 ,thus blind is classed as a privative term1 when applied to human beings4 ,when applied to stocks and stones1 which are not expected to see1 it is an admitted metaphor4 ,this1 however1 being understood1 there is no difficulty in following the author's exposition by means of his own language4--,ed4 ,thus the word ,light1 is the mark of a certain well-known object1 as existent or present4 ,the word ,darkness1 on the contrary1 is the mark of the same object1 as not existent or not present4 ,ask any man1 what he means by darkness2 he says the absence of light4 ,but the absence of light1 is only another name for light absent2 and light absent1 is only another name for light not present4 ,darkness1 therefore1 is another name for light not present4 ,it thus appears1 that the idea called up by the #ajj word light1 is that of a certain object associated with its presence2 the idea called up by the word darkness1 is that of the same object associated with its absence4 ,after the explanations which have been so often given1 what ,i mean1 when ,i speak of the idea of an object1 as one thing2 the idea of its presence1 as another thing2 ought not to be obscure4 ,its presence1 is its existence2 its absence1 is its non-existence2 at least1 at a particular time and place4 ,what ideas and sensations ,i mark by the word existent1 has already been explained4 ,the word non-existent is the mere negation of the same sensations and ideas4 ,we have repeatedly seen1 that what we call existence1 is an inference from our sensations4 ,we have clusters of sensations2 these call up the ideas of antecedents1 which we call qualities2 these the idea of an antecedent common to all the qualities1 which we call ,substratum2 and the ,substratum1 with its qualities1 we call the ,object4 ,when we speak1 then1 of this ,substratum and its qualities1 as present1 at a particular time and place3 which is what we mean by its existence2 what we affirm is this2 that if there be sentient organs at such a time and place1 there will be such and such sensations4 ,when we speak of it as absent1 we affirm1 that though there be sentient organs at such a time and place1 there will not be those sensations4 ,these ideas1 then1 forming in combination a very complex idea1 are what1 in the respective cases1 we call the presence1 and the absence of an object4 ,any further analysis would be superfluous in this place4 #aja ,a law of some importance1 which has been already explained1 is1 that in complex ideas there is very often some one part1 so prominent1 as to throw the rest into the shade1 and confine the attention almost wholly to itself4 ,there is a curious exemplification of this law1 in the pair of cases before us4 ,thus1 in the complex idea of the object and its presence1 marked by the word ,light1 the object is the prominent part1 and the presence is so habitually neglected1 that it is with some trouble it is recognised4 ,the case is reversed in the complex idea of the object and its absence1 marked by the word ,darkness4 ,in this1 the absence is the prominent part1 and it so completely engrosses the attention1 that it requires reflection1 to discover1 that the idea of the object is necessarily combined4 ,there is something more in these two cases1 which it is of great importance to remember4 ,we have two sets of indissoluble associations1 both exceedingly numerous1 the one with the idea of the object as present1 the other with the idea of it as absent2 that is1 the one set with light1 the other set with darkness4 ,whenever we have the perception of light1 we habitually have1 along with it1 the perception of objects2 that is1 of all sorts of colours1 all sorts of shapes1 all sorts of magnitudes1 all sorts of distances1 and so on4 ,with the idea of light1 then1 are indissolubly associated the ideas of all sorts of objects2 of extension in all its modifications1 colour in all its modifications1 motion in all its modifications2 the word light1 therefore1 serves as a name1 not merely of the fluid which acts upon the eye1 but of that along with its innumerable associations4 ,such are the perceptions and #ajb ideas1 which1 when we have the perception of light1 we have along with it4 ,what are the perceptions and ideas1 which1 when we have not the perception of light1 we have along with that state of privation8 ,there is1 first1 the want of all the perceptions1 which we have along with that of light4 ,there is1 next1 the disagreeable sensations we experience from not knowing what objects are approaching us1 either by our motions1 or by theirs2 hence the idea of dangerous objects approaching2 hence1 also1 the inability to perform many of the acts which are conducive either to our being1 or well-being4 ,with the idea of darkness1 then1 are indissolubly associated a multitude of ideas1 of pain1 of privation1 of weakness2 all disagreeable2 with little or no mixture of any of an opposite kind4 ,and the word darkness1 therefore1 stands as a name not merely of light absent1 but of that along with all the accompanying sensations and ideas4 ,the reader will observe1 and it is necessary he should well observe1 that all terms might have corresponding privative terms4 ,we have already stated1 that the ordinary names of objects are names both of the object1 and of its presence or existence1 combined in one complex idea4 ,thus1 rose1 horse1 are names of the objects as present or existent4 ,we might have had names of them as absent or not existent4 ,it is only1 however1 in a few cases1 that the absence of an object is a matter of first-rate importance4 ,it is only in those cases that it has been found requisite to have for it a particular name4 ,the absence of light is obviously a case of the greatest importance4 ,consequences of the very first order1 and infinite in number1 #ajc depend upon it4 ,an appropriate name1 therefore1 was of the highest utility4 ,this explanation will enable us to see1 without a minute analysis1 the composition of the clusters marked by other ,privative ,terms4 ,let us take ,silence1 as the next example4 ,silence is the absence of sound1 either all sound1 which is sometimes its meaning2 or of some particular sound1 which at other times is its meaning4 ,sound is the name of a well-known something1 as present4 ,silence is the name of the same well-known something1 as absent4 ,the first word1 is the name of the thing1 and its presence4 ,the second1 is the name of the thing1 and its absence4 ,in the case of the combination marked by the first1 namely1 the thing and its presence1 the thing is the prominent part1 and the presence generally escapes attention4 ,in the case of the second1 the thing and its absence1 the absence is the important part1 and the thing is feebly1 if at all1 attended to4 ,ignorance is easily explained1 in the same manner4 ,knowledge is the name of a certain well-known something1 as present or existent4 ,ignorance is the name of the same well-known something1 as absent or nonexistent4 ,having a sensation1 or an idea1 is one state of consciousness2 not having it is another state of consciousness4#b99 ,the state of consciousness called not having #ajd it is no doubt very various2 for it is any sensation or idea different from the one in question4 ,the ,having one sensation and another sensation1 or one idea and another idea2 and the ,knowing that the one is not the other2 we have often observed to be the same thing4 ,the great majority of names are invented1 to mark sensations and ideas as had2 there are1 however1 cases1 in which it is necessary to mark them as not had4 ,in what manner1 in the more remarkable cases1 this marking is performed by privative names1 has now been shewn4 ,but1 beside the marks for particular cases1 it was necessary to have a comprehensive or general mark2 which should include all cases1 as well those provided with particular names1 as those not so provided4 ,absent was such a word4 ,absent1 standing by itself1 and unrestricted by connection with any other word1 is a name of any thing1 joined with the idea of its not being then and there4 ,what is included in that ,idea has already been shewn in explaining ,belief in ,existence4 ,the mark ,absent1 joined with any particular name1 becomes a particular ,privative ,term4 ,we have observed1 that the word rose1 is a mark not merely of the thing1 but the thing with the idea of its presence2 we have also observed1 that such ,presence-affirming ,terms1 except #aje in remarkable cases1 have not corresponding ,privative1 or ,absence-affirming ,terms4 ,but if we say absent rose1 we have a ,privative ,term1 double worded1 indeed1 instead of single worded1 exactly corresponding to the ,presence-affirming ,term1 rose4 ,and1 by the use of the same word1 we can form ,privative ,terms of this description1 in all cases in which they can be wanted2 thus we can say1 absent man1 absent horse1 absence of food1 c4 ,mill's footnote #b3 ,mr4 ,locke recognised the fact1 but gave an erroneous account of it3 ,i should offer this as a reason why a privative cause might produce a positive idea2 viz41 that1 all sensation being produced in us1 only by different degrees and modes of motion in our animal spirits1 variously agitated by external objects1 the abatement of any former motion1 must as necessarily produce a new sensation1 for abatement of any former motion1 read1 ceasing of a particular sensation2 and for new sensation1 read1 new feeling1 or1 new state of consciousness1 as the variation or increase of it3 and so introduce a new idea4 ,b4 ,,ii4 ch4 viii4 s4 #d4--7;,author's ,note47 ,the word ,nothing1 ,nihil1 is another generical ,privative ,term4 ,that this word has a very important marking power1 every man is sensible in the use which he makes of it4 ,but if it marks1 it names2 that is1 names something4 ,yet it seems to remove every thing2 that is1 not to leave anything to be named4 ,the preceding explanations1 however1 have already cleared up this mystery4 ,the word ,nothing is the ,privative ,term which corresponds to ,every ,thing4 ,every ,thing is a name of all possible objects1 including their existence4 ,nothing is a name of all possible objects1 including their non-existence4#be ,editor's footnote #be3 ,the analysis of the facts1 in all these cases1 is admirable1 but ,i still demur to the language4 ,i object to saying1 for instance1 that silence is the name of sound and its absence4 ,it is not the name of sound1 since we cannot say ,sound is silence4 ,it is the name of our state of sensation when there is no sound4 ,the author is quite right in saying that this state of sensation recalls the idea of sound2 to be conscious of silence as silence1 implies that we are thinking of sound1 and have the idea of it without the belief in its presence4 ,in another of its uses1 ,silence is the abstract of ,silent2 which is a name of all things that make no sound1 and of everything so long as it makes no sound2 and which connotes the attribute of not sounding4 ,so of all the other terms mentioned4 ,nothing is not a name of all possible objects1 including their non-existence4 ,if ,nothing were a name of objects1 we should be able to predicate of those objects that they are ,nothing4 ,nothing is a name of the state of our consciousness when we are not aware of any object1 or of any sensation4--,ed4 #ajf ,absent1 in its unrestricted sense1 above explained1 comes near to this marking power of the word ,nothing1 but differs from it in one respect4 ,absent is the ,privative name of all possible objects1 taken one by one4 ,nothing is the privative name of them1 taken altogether4 ,this distinction1 ,i presume1 is sufficiently obvious1 and intelligible1 thus expressed2 and stands in no need of a more wordy explanation4#c99 ,mill's footnote #c3 ,the account of ,privative ,terms which is given by ,locke1 is the same with that which is presented in the text4 ,the difference is1 that ,locke1 who has stated the case correctly1 has not attempted its analysis4 ,he says 7,b4 ,,ii4 ch4 viii471 ,we have negative names1 such as insipid1 silence1 nihil1 c41 which words denote positive ideas2 v4g41 taste1 sound1 being2 with a signification of their absence4--7,author's ,note47 ,we shall now take notice of the ,privative ,term ,,empty1 which is a word of great importance4 ,empty is a name applicable to all the things to which the name1 full1 is applicable2 in other words1 to all the things which are calculated to contain other things in position1 or in the synchronous order1 that is1 in the order of particle adjoining particle4 ,it is necessary to mark this limitation of the word contain2 because1 in another sense1 a complex idea is said to contain the simple ideas of which it consists2 and a chemical compound is said to contain the simple #ajg substances into which it can be decomposed4 ,empty1 and ,full1 are names of those things only which contain1 or are adapted to contain1 things in position1 or in the order of particle adjoining particle4 ,things adapted to contain other things in position1 are1 themselves1 a peculiar combination of positions1 to which we must very attentively advert4 ,to understand this combination1 it will be necessary to remember exactly the analysis of position2 of lines1 surfaces1 and bulks2 as it has been already given in our explanation of ,relative ,terms4 ,the word containing1 applied to anything1 as when we speak of a box containing books1 a cask containing liquor1 a room containing furniture1 generally includes the idea of limitation4 ,that which contains1 has certain boundaries within which the things contained are placed1 or have their position4 ,this idea of things having their position within another thing1 is a very complex idea1 the composition of which we must be at some pains to understand4 ,it consists1 first1 of the thing containing2 secondly1 of the things contained4 ,the thing containing1 again1 consists of two parts2 first1 its boundaries2 and1 secondly1 its containing capacity within its boundaries4 ,its boundaries are surfaces4 ,how we become acquainted with surfaces2 in other words1 what are the sensations1 the copies of which form our complex idea of surface1 has been already explained4 ,they are certain sensations of touch1 and certain sensations of muscular action4 ,this complex idea is easily distinguished into two parts2 first1 a certain idea of resistance2 secondly1 the idea of extension4 ,the sides #ajh of a box ,i call resisting1 and ,i call them extended2 and ,i call them by both names on account of certain sensations4 ,let us conceive the box without a lid2 each of the sides is extended and resisting4 ,what is the top without a lid8 ,extended1 and non-resisting4 ,the idea of the top is that of extension without resistance2 extension1 in a particular direction1 that of a plane surface4 ,what is the idea of the inside of the box without its contents8 ,that of extension in all directions without resistance4 ,this is emptiness4 ,so far is plain1 and not doubtful4 ,there are still1 however1 some things which require explanation4 ,what are we distinctly to understand by extension without resistance8 ,whenever we use the concrete extended1 we mean something extended2 and by that something we always mean something that resists4 ,what do we mean when we use the abstract extension8 ,it will be easily recollected that all this is a case of association1 which has been already fully explained4 ,concrete ,terms are ,connotative ,terms2 ,abstract ,terms are ,non-connotative ,terms4 ,concrete terms1 along with a certain quality or qualities1 which is their principal meaning1 or notation1 connote the object to which the quality belongs4 ,thus the concrete red1 always means1 that is1 connotes1 something red1 as a rose4 ,we have already1 by sufficient examples1 seen1 that the ,abstract1 formed from the ,concrete1 notes precisely that which is noted by the ,concrete1 leaving out the connotation4 ,thus1 take away the connotation from red1 and you have redness2 from hot1 take away the connotation1 and you have heat4 #aji ,the very same is the distinction between the concrete extended1 and the abstract extension4 ,what extended is with its connotation1 extension is without that connotation4 ,we have then to explain1 wherein the connotation consists4 ,when we say extended1 meaning something extended1 we mean one or other of three things1 a line1 a surface1 or bulk4 ,we have already explained sufficiently in what manner we come by the ideas of line1 surface1 and bulk4 ,we have certain sensations of touch1 and of muscular action1 conjoined1 and the ideas of those sensations1 in conjunction1 form our ideas of line1 surface1 and bulk4 ,the sensation1 or sensations1 which we mark by the word resisting1 seem to be those alone which are connoted by the word extending2 for it is most important to observe1 that what we call extending in the parts of our own body1 by the operation of its own muscles1 is that which we call extended in all other things2 and thus the essential connotation of the concrete1 extended1 is1 resisting1 and nothing else4 ,in other concrete terms the connotation is greater4 ,thus red1 connotes a surface1 that is1 something extended2 and extended connotes resisting4 ,and thus red connotes both extended and resisting1 while extended connotes resisting alone4 ,it is true1 that persons enjoying the faculty of seeing cannot conceive any thing extended1 without conceiving it coloured2 because in them the idea of something extended includes1 by association1 the visual1 as well as the tactual1 and muscular1 ideas2 and the visual being accustomed to predominate1 the tactual1 and muscular1 are faintly observed4 ,this1 however1 cannot be the case in persons born blind1 #aaj who have the tactual1 and muscular1 feelings1 and not the visual at all4 ,now1 then1 we can easily understand what extension is in all its cases4 ,linear extension is the idea of a line1 the connotation dropped1 that is1 the idea of resisting1 dropped2 superficial extension is the idea of a surface1 the same connotation dropped2 and solid extension1 or bulk1 is merely the idea of bulk1 the connotation1 or resisting1 dropped4 ,but bulk1 the connotation 7i4e4 resistance7 dropped1 is what8 ,the place for bulk3 ,position4 ,but place is1 what8 ,a portion of ,,space2 or1 more correctly speaking4 ,,space itself1 with limitation4 ,we thus seem to have arrived1 without any difficulty1 at an exact knowledge of what is noted or marked by the word ,,space2 a phenomenon of the human mind hitherto regarded as singularly mysterious4 ,the difficulty which has been found in explaining the term1 even1 by those philosophers who have approached the nearest to its meaning1 seems to have arisen1 from their not perceiving the mode of signification of ,abstract ,terms2 and from the obscurity of that class of sensations1 a portion of which we employ the word extended to mark4 ,the word space is an abstract1 differing from its concrete1 like other abstracts1 by dropping the connotation4 ,much of the mystery1 in which the idea has seemed to be involved1 is owing to this single circumstance1 that the abstract term1 space1 has not had an appropriate concrete4 ,we have observed1 that1 in all cases1 abstract terms can be explained only through their concretes2 because they note or name a part of what the concrete names1 leaving out the rest4 ,if we were #aaa to make a concrete term1 corresponding to the abstract term space1 it must be a word equivalent to the terms infinitely extended4 ,from the ideas included under the name infinitely extended1 leave out resisting1 and you have all that is marked by the abstract ,space4#bf ,editor's footnote #bf3 ,there is great originality as well as perspicacity in the explanation here given of ,space1 as a privative term1 expressing when analysed1 the absence of the feeling of resistance in the circumstances in which resistance is frequently felt1 namely1 after the sensations of muscular action and motion4 ,the only part of the exposition to which ,i demur is the classing of ,space among abstract terms4 ,i have already objected to calling the word line1 when used in the geometrical sense1 an abstract term4 ,i hold it to be the concrete name of an ideal object possessing length but not breadth4 ,in like manner a ,space may be said to be the concrete name of an ideal object1 extended but not resisting4 ,the sensations connoted by this concrete name1 are those which accompany the motion of our limbs or of our body in all directions3 and along with these sensations is connoted the absence of certain others1 viz4 of the muscular sensations which accompany the arrest of that motion by a resisting substance4 ,this being the meaning of a ,space1 ,space in general must be a name equally concrete4 ,it denotes the aggregate of all ,space4--,ed4 ,in the idea of ,,space1 the idea of ,infinity is included4 ,what the idea of ,infinity is1 needs therefore to be explained4 ,when the word ,infinite is not used metaphorically1 as it is when we speak of the infinite perfections of ,god1 in which case it is not a name for ideas1 but for the want of them1 it is applied only to ,number1 ,extension1 and ,duration4 ,we increase numbers by adding one to one1 one to two1 and so on1 without limit1 giving a name to #aab each aggregate4 ,the association of ideas which constitutes the process has been already explained4 ,with each number1 one1 two1 three1 four1 as we go on1 the idea of one more is so strongly associated1 that we cannot help its existing in immediate conjunction4 ,however high1 therefore1 we go in numbering1 the idea of one more always forces itself upon us2 and hence we say that number is infinite4 ,that this1 literally1 is not true2 that1 indeed1 it is a verbal contradiction1 is obvious4 ,number1 is something numbered2 but if numbered1 limited2 that is1 not infinite4 ,number is the negation of infinite2 as black is the negation of white4 ,the name infinite1 in this case1 is1 in reality1 nothing but a mark for that state of consciousness1 in which the idea of one more is closely associated with every succeeding number4 ,and ,infinity1 the abstract term1 is the peculiar idea1 without the connotation4 ,when we apply infinite to extension1 we do so equally to all its three modifications1 to lines1 surfaces1 and bulk4 ,how we do so is obvious4 ,we know no infinite line1 but we know a longer1 and a longer4 ,a line is lengthened1 as number is increased1 by continual additions2 a line of any length1 say of an inch1 is increased by the continual addition of other lengths1 say of an inch4 ,in the process1 then1 by which we conceive the increase of a line1 the idea of one portion more1 is continually associated with the preceding length2 and to what extent soever it is carried1 the association of one portion more1 is equally close and irresistible4 ,this is what we call the idea of infinite extension2 and what some people call the necessary idea2 which only means1 that the idea of a #aac portion more1 rises necessarily1 that is1 by indissoluble association1 so that we cannot help its rising4 ,infinite is the concrete term1 here connoting ,line2 drop the connotation1 you have ,infinity1 the abstract4 ,if such be the whole of what is involved in the idea of ,infinity1 in the case of a line2 call it necessary idea1 if you will2 the idea of it1 in the case of surface1 and of bulk1 is also explained2 for surface1 and bulk1 are only lines1 in such and such1 or in all directions4 ,the idea of a portion more1 adhering1 by indissoluble association1 to the idea of every increase1 in any or in all directions1 is the idea of infinitely extended1 and the idea of infinitely extended1 the connotation dropped1 is the idea of ,infinite ,space4 ,it has been called a simple idea 7so little has the real nature of it been understood72 while it is thus distinctly seen1 to be one of the most complex ideas1 which the whole train of our conscious being presents4 ,extreme complexity1 with great closeness of association1 has this effect--that every particular part in the composition is overpowered by the multitude of all the other parts1 and no one in particular stands marked from the rest2 but all1 together1 assume the appearance of ,,one4 ,something perfectly analogous occurs1 even in sensation4 ,if two or three ingredients are mixed1 as wine and honey1 we can distinguish the taste of each1 and say it is compound4 ,but if a great many are mixed1 we can distinguish no one in particular1 and the taste of the whole appears a simple peculiar taste4#bg ,editor's footnote #bg3 ,this explanation of the feeling of ,infinity which attaches itself to ,space1 is one of the most important thoughts in the whole treatise2 and1 obvious as its truth is to a mind prepared by the previous exposition1 it has great difficulty in finding entrance into other minds4 ,every object is associated with some position3 not always with the same position1 but we have never perceived any object1 and therefore never think of one1 but in some position or other1 relative to some other objects4 ,as1 from every position4 ,space extends in every direction 7i4e4 the unimpeded arm or body can move in any direction71 and since we never were in any place which did not admit of motion in every direction from it1 when such motion was not arrested by a resistance2 every idea of position is irresistibly associated with extension1 beyond the position3 and we can conceive no end to extension1 because the place which we try to conceive as its end1 raises irresistibly the idea of other places beyond it4 ,this is one of the many so-called ,necessities of ,thought which are necessities only in consequence of the inseparableness of an association3 but which1 from unwillingness to admit this explanation1 men mistake for original laws of the human mind1 and even regard them as the effect and proof of a corresponding necessary connexion between facts existing in ,nature4--,ed4 #aad ,this1 indeed1 is one great cause of the mistakes1 which have been committed1 in the examination of abstract ideas4 ,we have shewn that they are all complex1 and in the highest degree4 ,yet the greater number of them have always been treated as simple4 ,mr4 ,locke shewed that some of them1 which he calls mixed modes1 were undoubtedly compounded1 as obligation1 crime1 c4 ,but they are no otherwise complex1 than as power1 quality1 chance1 fate1 position1 and space1 are complex4 ,it is truly remarkable1 how many of the cases of indissoluble association are all united in the idea of ,,space4 ,first of all1 with the idea of every object1 the idea of position or place1 is indissolubly united4 #aae ,secondly1 with the idea of position or place1 the idea of extension is indissolubly united4 ,thirdly1 with the idea of extension the idea of infinity is indissolubly united4 ,fourthly1 by the unfortunate ambiguity of the ,copula1 the idea of existence is indissolubly united with ,,space1 as with other abstract terms4 ,what these several ingredients1 the ideas of ,position1 ,extension1 ,infinity1 ,existence1 are composed of1 we have already seen4 ,all these1 forced into combination1 by irresistible association1 constitute the idea of ,,space4 #aaf ,,section ,v4 ,,time4 ,as ,,space is a comprehensive word1 including all ,positions1 or the whole of synchronous order2 so ,,time is a comprehensive word1 including all ,successions1 or the whole of successive order4 ,the difficulty of the exposition1 in this case1 consists not in the ideas2 for they are clear and certain enough2 but in finding expressions which will have even a chance of conveying to readers1 who are not familiar with the analysis of mental phenomena1 the ideas which it is my object to impart4 ,as all objects1 considered as existing together1 are said to exist in ,,space1 so all objects considered as existing one after another1 are said to exist in ,,time4 ,objects1 however1 are said to exist in ,time1 in two distinguishable cases2 either when they are in constant flow2 or1 when they have1 what we call1 stability or duration4 ,the constant passage of men1 horses1 vehicles1 c41 in a busy and crowded street1 is in ,time2 the permanence of ,st4 ,paul's1 in its well-known position1 is also in ,time4 ,if ,time mean the succession of the objects in the one case1 it must mean something else in the other4 ,it cannot mean the succession of ,st4 ,paul's4 ,but it may mean the idea of ,st4 ,paul's1 associated with the idea of other successions4 ,of ,,time itself we conceive1 that it is never still4 ,it is a perpetual flow of instants1 of which only one can ever be present4 ,the very idea of ,time1 therefore1 is #aag an idea of successions4 ,it consists of this1 and of nothing else4 ,but there are no real successions1 save successions of objects1 that is of feelings in our minds4#bh ,what1 then1 are the successions of ,,time1 which are the successions of nothing8 ,to those who have thoroughly familiarized themselves with the account which we have given of abstract terms1 and who can promptly and steadily conceive the mode of their signification1 we can render an answer1 which will be understood at once1 and will be felt to be complete and satisfactory4 ,editor's footnote #bh3 ,there is an unusual employment of language here1 which if attention is not formally drawn to it1 may embarrass the reader4 ,by objects are commonly meant1 those groups or clusters of sensations and possibilities of sensation1 that compose what we call the external world4 ,a single sensation1 even external1 and still less if internal1 is not called an object4 ,in a somewhat larger sense1 whatever we think of1 as distinguished from the thought itself and from ourselves as thinking it1 is called an object2 this is the common antithesis of ,object and ,subject4 ,but in this place1 the author designates as objects1 all things which have real existence1 as distinguished from the instants of mere ,time1 which1 as he is pointing out1 have not2 and a puzzling effect is produced by his applying the name ,object1 in even an especial manner1 to sensations3 to the tickings of a watch1 or the beatings of a patient's pulse4--,ed4 ,we have shewn1 how we form the abstracts1 redness1 from red2 sweetness1 from sweet2 hardness1 from hard2 by simply dropping the connotation of the concrete term4 ,thus red1 always means something red2 redness1 is the red without the something2 so of sweetness1 hardness1 and so forth4 ,when the ideas are more #aah complicated1 the case is still the same4 ,when we use the concrete1 living1 it always connotes something living2 a living man1 a living quadruped1 a living bird1 fish1 insect1 and so forth4 ,when we use the abstract1 life1 we convey all that we convey by the term living1 except the connotation4 ,we say that ,john is healthy1 ,james is healthy1 on account of circumstances the idea of which forms a very complex idea4 ,the concrete healthy always connotes an individual4 ,use the abstract1 health1 you have the idea without the connotation4 ,in applying this doctrine to the case of successions1 we are ill supplied with appropriate names2 and hence the difficulty of the case1 both to the teacher1 and the learner4 ,we have said that there are no real successions1 but successions of objects4 ,the tickings of my watch are successive sounds1 that is1 sensations4 ,the beatings which are felt by the physician1 in the artery of his patient1 are successive feelings or sensations of touch4 ,when the different particulars of a scene in which a man has been engaged1 of a battle1 for example1 in which he has commanded1 pass through his mind1 there is a succession of ideas4 ,in all these cases of the successions of sensations1 or ideas1 there is always one present1 others past1 and others to come1 that is1 future4 ,drop the connotation of something past1 something present1 something future4 ,you have pastness1 presentness1 and futureness4 ,but pastness1 presentness1 and futureness1 are ,,time4 ,,time can neither be shewn1 nor conceived1 to be any thing else4 ,it is a single-worded abstract1 involving the meaning #aai of these three several abstracts4 ,the true meaning of these abstracts is clearly made out from their concretes4 ,the precise idea1 therefore1 marked by the word ,,time2 if the meaning of these abstracts is sufficiently apprehended2 is at last apparent4 ,nor is there any mysteriousness in it whatsoever1 but that which has arisen from misapprehension of that grand department of ,naming1 which belongs to abstract terms2 and from inattention to that class of words1 which are invented to supply the place1 each of them singly1 of several other words4 ,to our conclusion1 that ,,time is the equivalent of ,pastness1 ,presentness1 and ,futureness1 combined1 it may be objected1 that the word ,time is applicable to all the three cases2 as we can say1 past time1 present time1 and future time1 all with equal propriety4 ,this1 however1 is so far from being any presumption against the conclusion1 that it is a clear confirmation of it2 since ,time1 standing by itself1 marks no particular case1 and1 in order to do so1 must have another mark applied to it to limit its signification4 ,it is only because ,time marks all the cases of pastness1 presentness1 and futureness1 that it needs the marks past1 present1 or future1 to confine its meaning2 present time being merely another name for presentness1 future time1 for futureness1 and past time1 for pastness4 ,the same thing is seen in the case of all other abstracts4 ,redness is the name of a certain colour1 in all its modifications1 and to whatever object belonging4 ,but by the addition of an appropriate mark1 we confine its meaning to any particular case2 as when we say1 the redness of a rose1 the redness of scarlet1 and so on4 #abj ,the accounts1 which have been rendered of ,time by different philosophers1 so far as they have in them any acknowledged accuracy1 are1 all of them1 parts1 and but parts1 of the analysis which we have thus been presenting4 ,dr4 ,reid says1 ,memory gives us the conception and belief of finite intervals of duration2 and these we enlarge by our mental processes to infinity4#d99 ,we have already seen what ,memory is4 ,it is not a faculty1 as ,dr4 ,reid supposes1 which gives any thing2 it is an idea1 formed by association of the particulars of a certain train2 a train of antecedents and consequents1 of which the present feeling is one extremity4 ,pastness is included under the term ,memory4 ,memory is the name of a certain whole1 and ,pastness is the name of a part of that whole4 ,memory is a connotative term2 what it notes1 is the antecedence and consequence of the several parts of that which forms the chain of the remembrance2 what it connotes1 are the feelings themselves1 the objects remembered4 ,when what it connotes is left out1 and what it notes is retained1 we have the idea which is expressed by pastness4 ,mill's footnote #d3 ,intellect4 ,powers4 ,essay ,,iii4 ch4 v4 p4 #ehc4 ,in the chain of memory1 consisting of antecedent1 antecedent1 antecedent1 traced back to any length from the present feeling1 we call that which immediately precedes the present1 the nearest2 the next1 we call more distant2 the next1 more distant still2 and that1 between which and the present feeling the greatest number of successions intervenes1 we call the most distant1 also the farthest back2 but the farthest back of a series of successions1 is the oldest1 that between #aba which and the present time the greatest length of time has intervened4 ,greatest length of time1 therefore1 in this case1 is only another name for greatest number of successions4 ,it has been already seen1 that there is nothing in which we are so deeply interested1 as an accurate knowledge of the antecedents and consequents1 in the midst of which we exist4 ,of the different innumerable trains of antecedents and consequents which it is important for us carefully to mark1 it is observed1 that some succeed more quickly1 some less4 ,while the long pendulum of an eight-day clock is performing one oscillation1 the short pendulum of a table-clock performs two or three4 ,what that is1 to which we give the name of quickness1 or slowness1 in those successions2 in other words1 what is the state of consciousness which we have thus occasion to mark2 has already been seen4 ,every succession1 observed by us1 is a case of sensation and memory2 sensation of the consequent1 memory of the antecedent4 ,if we have observed simultaneously the oscillations of the two pendulums1 mentioned above1 we remember two or three antecedent oscillations of the short pendulum1 before we get back to one of the long4 ,it is a mere case1 therefore1 of the greater or less number of antecedents in a chain of memory1 expounded in a preceding chapter4 ,in the knowledge1 so important to us1 of antecedents and consequents1 it is not enough that we know what antecedents are followed by what consequents2 much depends upon the quickness or slowness of the successions4 ,it is1 therefore1 of the highest importance that we should have the means of marking them4 #abb ,what we do is1 to take some well-known case of successions1 and to make that a standard1 by which to ascertain the rest4 ,we take1 for example1 the oscillations of a pendulum4 ,so many of these we call a minute4 ,so many minutes we call an hour4 ,these minutes and hours1 then1 are so many oscillations1 that is successions4 ,we call them measures of time4 ,but things are measurable only by parts of themselves2 extension by extension1 weight by weight1 and so on4 ,what is 99measured by succession1 therefore1 is itself nothing but succession4 ,having assumed a certain case of successions as a standard1 and marked it into quantities1 by distinctive names1 we mark or name all other successions1 by the names applied to the standard case4 ,thus1 that grand succession1 on which so much of what we are interested in depends1 a revolution of the earth upon its own axis1 we distinguish1 by the term1 twenty-four hours2 which we also call by the name1 day2 and afterwards make use of1 as a standard1 to mark still slower successions1 such as a revolution of the moon about the earth1 a revolution of the earth about the sun4 ,in all these measurements1 and expressions1 of time1 it is still seen1 that there is nothing in reality conceived but successions4 ,beside the standards1 more distinctly conceived and expressed1 there is always1 in these estimates of time1 a tacit reference to another standard1 which is regarded as the unit1 or minimum of time4 ,the case here is precisely analogous to that of the unit1 or minimum1 of extension1 which we have already observed4 ,our tactual1 and muscular1 senses are not sufficiently fine to discern objects of less than a certain magnitude4 #abc ,the least which they can discern is tacitly assumed as the unit of extension4 ,nor are any of our senses fine enough to discern successions which have more than a certain degree of rapidity4 ,thus1 if the seven primitive colours are made to pass with a certain velocity before the eye1 they do not appear separate1 but blended into one continuous white4 ,in like manner1 if sounds are made to succeed one another1 at first1 slowly1 afterwards1 with greater and greater rapidity1 they cannot1 at last1 be distinguished as different sounds1 but appear as one continuous sound4 ,in fact1 this is probably the account of all sounds1 which are merely effects of the vibrations in the air1 and therefore pulses2 but often so quick1 in succession1 that no interval is distinguishable1 and the perception is that of a continuous sound4 ,the close resemblance1 in this respect1 between sensations and ideas1 is remarkable4 ,when sensations are brought into close conjunction they become blended1 and appear1 not several1 but one4 ,we have seen1 in a most important case of association1 that when ideas are called up together in close conjunction1 they1 too1 cease to be distinguishable1 and1 being blended together1 assume1 even where there is the greatest complexity1 the appearance1 not of many ideas1 but of one4 ,of this we have very remarkable examples1 in the two cases of ,,space1 and ,,time4 ,there is a certain succession1 then1 of sensations and ideas1 in which the antecedent and consequent can be distinguished3 another1 in which the antecedent and consequent1 on account of quickness1 cannot be distinguished4 ,the quickest that can be distinguished1 is that to which1 as the unit or minimum1 a tacit #abd reference is made1 in our several estimates of time4 ,having thus shewn how far the account of ,,time1 presented by one of the most recent ,philosophers of high name1 goes in expounding the phenomenon1 and how far it leaves it unexpounded2 it will be instructive next to observe1 how far the genius of the ancient ,greek ,philosophers carried them1 in this important inquiry4 ,it is satisfactory1 that we can refer the unlearned reader to a very clear and accurate exposition of their doctrines1 in a well known work in our own language1 the ,hermes of ,mr4 ,harris2 from which1 for the sake of this convenience1 the present account of those ancient doctrines shall be drawn4 ,time and ,space1 says that author1#e99 have this in common1 that they are both of them by nature continuous4 ,but in this they differ1 that all the parts of ,space exist at once and together1 while those of ,time only exist in ,transition or ,succession4 ,this is only transcribing the common language4 ,what remained was1 to shew what are the real facts couched under this language4#f99 ,mill's footnote #e3 ,hermes1 ,b4 ,i4 ch4 vii4 ,mill's footnote #f3 ,the expression of ,ammonius1 here quoted by ,harris1 comes nearer the fact than his own--,greek3 o7 chro_/nos u7phi_/sta_/tai kata_/ mo_/non to ,,nun1 e7n ga_/r t gi_/nesthai kai_/ phthei_/resthai to_/ einai e7_/chei4 ,time subsists only in a single ,,now or ,,instant1 for it hath its being in beginning and ceasing to be4 ,in other words1 ,time never is2 all you can say of it is only this1 it has been1 or it is about to be4--7,author's ,note47 ,in every given time we may assume anywhere a ,now or ,instant1 and therefore1 in every given ,time1 there may be assumed infinite ,nows or ,instants4 #abe ,a ,,now or ,,instant is the ,bound of every finite ,time4 ,but although a ,bound1 it is not a ,part of ,time4 ,if this appear strange1 we may remember1 that if a ,now or ,instant were a ,part of ,time it being essential to the character of ,parts1 that they should measure the ,whole1 it would contain within itself infinite other nows2 and this1 it is evident1 would be absurd and impossible4 ,the same ,now or ,instant1 may be the end of one ,time1 and the ,beginning of another2 the first1 necessarily ,past ,time1 as being previous to the ,now or ,instant1 which both ,times include2 the other necessarily ,,future1 as being subsequent4 ,as1 therefore1 every ,,now or ,,instant always exists in ,time1 and without being ,time1 is ,time's ,bound2 the ,bound of ,completion to the ,past1 and the ,bound of ,commencement to the ,future3 from hence we may conceive its nature or end1 which is to be the ,medium of ,continuity between the ,past and the ,future1 so as to render ,time1 through all its parts1 one ,intire and ,perfect ,whole4 ,it must be obvious to every one1 who has correctly followed me through the preceding deductions1 that this mysterious language1 if applied to actual successions1 has a distinct meaning2 if not so applied1 it is jargon merely1 without one idea annexed4 ,this ,,now1 which is not ,time1 and1 not being ,time1 is of course nothing else2 this ,,nothing1 then1 which1 though nothing is the medium of continuity between ,somethings1 namely1 time past1 and time future1 seems to be only a mysterious name for that link which is supposed to be between every antecedent and its consequent2 which supposition of a link1 or medium of continuity1 we have already shewn to be a mere case #abf of association1 involving a prejudice2 the antecedent and consequent1 and nothing else1 being really included in a case of succession4 ,thus understood1 however1 it is a medium of continuity1 forming the ,bound of ,completion to the previous train of successions1 the ,bound of ,commencement to the following4 ,mr4 ,harris proceeds to shew some of the conclusions1 resulting from the account which he had thus rendered of ,time4 ,in the first place1 he says1 there cannot 7strictly speaking7 be any such thing as time present4 ,we will draw from this a conclusion1 which ,mr4 ,harris appears not to have seen1 or does not choose to acknowledge2 ,that1 if there be no such thing as ,time present1 neither can there be any such thing as ,time past4 ,for what is the past1 but that which has been present8 ,but if there be no such thing as time present1 or time past1 there can be no such thing as time future4 ,time1 therefore1 is an impossibility4 ,mr4 ,harris himself1 indeed1 goes a certain way toward this conclusion4 ,if no ,portion of time1 he says1 be the object of any ,sensation2 further1 if the ,present never exist2 if the past be no more2 if the ,future be not as yet2 and if these are all the parts1 out of which ,time is compounded3 how strange and shadowy a ,being do we find it8 ,how nearly approaching to a perfect non-entity8#g99 ,mill's footnote #g3 ,it is but justice to ,aristotle1 to say1 that he expressed the right conclusion much more distinctly than ,harris thought proper to do4 ,his mode of inferring1 as translated by ,harris1 is as follows3 ,that1 therefore1 ,time exists not at all1 or at least1 has but a faint and obscure existence1 one may suspect from hence4 ,a part of it has been1 and is no more2 a part of it is coming1 and is not as yet2 and out of these is made that ,time1 which is without end1 and ever to be assumed farther and farther4 ,now1 that which is made up of nothing but non-entities1 it should seem was incapable ever to participate of ,entity4--7,author's ,note47 #abg ,mr4 ,harris then says1 ,let us try1 however1 since the senses fail us1 if we have not faculties of higher power1 to seize this fleeting ,being4 ,what then is it he does in the search of those faculties of higher power8 ,it will be seen1 from the following quotation1 that he merely describes a few cases of actual succession2 and says1 that from them1 by the help of memory1 and imagination1 we come by the idea of ,time4 ,but the ,memory and ,imagination of successions present to us nothing but the successions themselves4 ,if then the ,memory and ,imagination of successions1 give us the idea of ,time1 the idea of ,time can only be some part or the whole of the idea of the successions4 ,the ,world has been likened to a variety of ,things1 but it appears to resemble no one more than some moving spectacle 7such as a procession or a triumph7 that abounds in every part with splendid objects1 some of which are still departing1 as fast as others make their appearance4 ,the ,senses look on1 while the sight passes1 perceiving as much as is immediately present1 which they report with tolerable accuracy to the ,soul's superior powers4 ,having done this1 they have done their duty1 being concerned with nothing1 save what is present and instantaneous4 ,but to the ,memory1 to the ,imagination1 and above all1 to #abh the ,intellect1 the several ,nows or ,instants1 are not lost1 as to the ,senses1 but are presented and made objects of steady comprehension1 however1 in their own nature1 they may be transitory and passing4 ,now it is from contemplating two or more of these ,instants under one view1 together with that ,interval of ,continuity1 which subsists between them1 that we acquire insensibly the ,idea of ,,time4 ,for example3 ,the ,sun rises3 this ,i remember3 it rises again3 this too1 ,i remember4 ,these ,events are not together2 there is an ,extension between them--not however of ,space1 for we may suppose the place of rising the same1 or at least1 to exhibit no sensible difference4 ,yet still we recognise some ,extension between them4 ,now what is this ,extension1 but a natural day8 ,and what is that1 but pure ,time8 ,it is after the same manner1 by recognising two new ,moons1 and the ,extension between these2 two several ,equinoxes1 and the extension between these2 that we gain ,ideas of other ,times1 such as ,months and ,years1 which are all so many ,intervals1 described as above2 that is to say1 passing ,intervals of ,continuity between two ,instants viewed together4 ,and thus it is ,,the ,,mind acquires the ,idea of ,,time4 ,but this ,time it must be remembered is ,,past ,,time ,,only1 which is always the first ,species1 that occurs to the human ,intellect4 ,how then do we acquire the ,idea of ,,time ,,future8 ,the answer is1 we acquire it by ,anticipation4 ,should it be demanded still further1 ,and what is ,anticipation8 ,we answer1 that1 in this case1 it is a kind of reasoning by analogy from similar to similar2 from successions of events1 that are past already1 to similar successions1 #abi that are presumed hereafter4 ,for example3 ,i observe1 as far back as my memory can carry me1 how every day has been succeeded by a night2 that night1 by another day2 that day1 by another night2 and so downwards in order to the ,day that is now4 ,hence1 then1 ,i anticipate a similar succession from the present ,day1 and thus gain the ,idea of days and nights in futurity4 ,after the same manner1 by attending to the periodical returns of ,new and ,full ,moons2 of ,springs1 ,summers1 ,autumns1 and ,winters1 all of which1 in ,time past1 ,i find never to have failed1 ,i anticipate a like orderly and diversified succession1 which makes ,months1 and ,seasons1 and ,years1 in ,time future4 ,it is to be observed1 that1 in the above passage1 ,harris1 beside ,memory and ,imagination1 introduces the name of ,intellect1 as concerned in generating the idea of ,time4 ,but it will be seen that he makes no use of it1 whatsoever1 in giving his explanation1 nor mentions any other operations than those of1 memory for the past1 and anticipation for the future4 ,indeed1 it appears from a passage of his work1 immediately following1 that when ,mr4 ,harris1 in this inquiry1 uses the word ,intellect1 he means nothing but ,anticipation and ,memory4 ,there is nothing1 he says1 appears so clearly an object of the ,,mind or ,,intellect only1 as the ,future does1 since we can find no place for its existence any where else4 ,not but the same1 if we consider1 is equally true of the ,past499#h99 ,here we see1 that #acj both the ,future1 and the ,past1 are said to be objects of the ,,intellect only4 ,but the future is the object of anticipation1 the past of memory2 and both memory1 and anticipation1 as we have seen1 are cases of association4 ,mill's footnote #h3 ,ibid4 ,he goes on to say1 that1 from this same doctrine1 that ,time exists only in the mind1 some philosophers inferred1 that if mind did not exist1 neither could ,time4 ,greek3 ,po_/teron de m ou7_/ss psuchs ei7_/ a7n o7 chro_/nos1 a7por_/seien a7_/n tis4 7,aristot4 ,nat4 ,auscult4 #a4 iv4 c4 #bj47 ,themistius1 who comments the above passage1 expresses himself more positively4 ,greek3 ,ei7 toi_/nun dichs le_/getai1 to_/ te a7rithmton1 kai to a7rithmou_/menon1 to men1 to a7rithmton dlad1 duna_/mei1 to de e7nergei_/a1 tauta de ou7k a7n u7postai_/1 m o7_/ntos tou a7rithm_/sontos1 m_/te duna_/mei m_/t' e7nergei_/a1--phaneron 7s ou7k a7n o7 chro_/nos ei7_/1 m ou7_/ss psuchs4 7,them4 p4 #dh4 ,edit4 ,aldi47--7,author's ,note47 ,in the cases of succession which he adduces1 as examples1 to shew1 in what manner we acquire1 he says1 insensibly1 the idea of time1 he tells us1 there is sensation of the consequent1 memory of the antecedent1 and beside these1 contemplation of two or more instants under one view1 together with that ,interval of continuity1 which subsists between them4 ,but the contemplation of two instants1 one prior1 another posterior1 in one view1 with the interval between them1 is a circumlocution for memory4 ,it denotes obscurely1 and imperfectly1 that union1 in one idea1 of all the parts of a train1 to which the name memory is affixed4 ,from this contemplation1 he says it is1 that we acquire the idea of ,time4 ,the real meaning is thus shewn to be1 that we acquire it from memory4 ,mr4 ,harris1 therefore1 at the bottom1 agrees with ,dr4 ,reid2 and the same observations by which we shewed #aca the imperfection of ,dr4 ,reid's account1 are equally applicable to that1 of ,mr4 ,harris4 ,the case1 in truth1 is1 that neither of them does any thing more than merely state the fact1 without an attempt to explain it4 ,that we cannot have the idea of time1 without the observation of successions2 and that memory is joined with sense in the observation of successions1--is the matter of fact4 ,what ,,time is1 distinct from the memory and the sensations1 they ought to have told us1 but have not4 ,they would not have found it difficult1 had they been familiar with the distinction 7of such infinite importance1 in all accurate inquiries into the human mind7 between the mode of signification of concrete words1 and the mode of signification of abstract ones2 the latter1 in its more complicated cases1 of not very easy comprehension4 ,unfortunately1 we have no concrete term1 corresponding with ,time4 ,hence a great part of the difficulty of conceiving distinctly the meaning of the abstract4 ,time1 also1 is not the abstract name of any one train1 but of all trains2 as redness is not the name of one red1 but of all reds4 ,and there is this further complication1 that the word time is never applied to any train1 in particular2 as time of a race1 time of a battle1 and so on2 without the predominating association of that particular train1 whatever it be1 minutes1 hours1 or days1 which we are accustomed to employ1 as the measure of other successions4 ,without much and accurate practice1 therefore1 in conceiving the meaning of abstract terms1 especially in the more complex and intricate cases2 it is extremely difficult steadily to contemplate either ,,time1 as the #acb abstract name of all successive1 or ,,space1 as the abstract name of all simultaneous order4#i99 ,mill's footnote #i3 ,multos autem in errorem ducit1 quod voces generales et abstractas in disserendo utiles esse videant1 nec tamen earum vim satis capiant4 ,partim vero consuetudine vulgari invent sunt ill ad sermonem abbreviandum1 partim philosophis ad docendum excogitat1 non quod ad naturas rerum accommodat sint1 qu quidem singulares et concret existunt1 sed quod idone ad tradendas disciplinas1 propterea quod faciant notiones1 vel saltem propositiones1 universales4--,berkeley de ,motu1 s4 #g4 ,no predecessor of ,berkeley was so fully aware1 as he was1 of the deceptions practised on the human mind by abstract terms4--7,author's ,note47 ,it will be instructive1 to recapitulate the indissoluble associations which are contained in the idea of ,time4 ,with every present event1 is indissolubly associated the idea of an antecedent2 with that antecedent1 the idea of another antecedent2 and so on without end4 ,these are the ideas of ,succession1 and of ,infinity2 forced upon us by indissoluble association4 ,the events of the present moment1 are innumerable4 ,with every one of these we associate the ideas of antecedents without end4 ,this is the ,past2 an ,infinity of simultaneous successions1 each having antecedents1 running back without end4 ,these are successions in the concrete2 successions of objects4 ,drop the connotation1 to form the abstract1 as is done in other cases2 you have then successions without the objects2 which is precisely the meaning of the word ,,time4 ,as with every present event1 and those infinite in number1 is indissolubly associated the idea of a series of antecedents1 without end1 which1 in the abstract1 is #acc ,,time ,,past1 so with every such event1 is indissolubly associated the idea of a consequent1 with that the idea of another consequent1 and so on1 without end2 which1 in the abstract1 is ,,time ,,future4 ,the synchronous ,line1 or ,line of ,extension1 and the successive ,line1 or ,line of ,time1 bear a pretty close analogy4 ,as1 in the ,line of ,extension1 we have the concrete line1 and the abstract line2 the concrete line being the positions with the objects2 the abstract or mathematical line1 the positions without the objects2 so1 in the line of ,time1 we have the concrete line1 and the abstract line2 the concrete line being the successions with the objects2 the abstract line1 the successions without the objects2 to which abstract line1 we give the name ,,time4 ,we have before remarked1 as an important case of indissoluble association1 that the idea of ,position1 that is1 of a modification of ,space1 is indissolubly associated with the idea of every sensible object4 ,it is now to be remarked1 as a not less important case1 that the idea of succession or of antecedent and consequent1 that is1 a modification of ,time1 is indissolubly associated with the idea of every object4 ,the idea of a modification of ,space1 and the idea of a modification of ,time1 form parts of our complex idea of every object4 ,it is no wonder that they appear to be necessary1 seeing that they force themselves upon us1 by irresistible association1 with the idea of every object4#bi #cj ,editor's footnote #bi3 ,as is shewn in the text4 ,time is a name for the aggregate of the successions of our feelings1 apart from the feelings themselves4 ,i object1 however1 in the case of time1 as ,i did in the #acd case of ,space1 to considering it as an abstract term4 ,time does not seem to me to be a name 7as the author says7 for the pastness1 the presentness1 and the futureness of our successive feelings4 ,it is rather1 ,i think1 a collective name for our feeling of their succession--for what the author called1 in a previous section1 the part of the process which consists in being sensible of their successiveness1 for which part1 he then said1 we have not a name4 ,this taking notice of the successiveness of our feelings1 whether we prefer to call it a part of the feelings themselves1 or another feeling superadded to them1 is yet something which1 in the entire mass of feeling which the successive impressions give us1 we are able to discriminate1 and to name apart from the rest4 ,a perception of succession between two feelings is a state of consciousness per se1 which though we cannot think of it separately from the feelings1 we can yet think of as a completed thing in itself1 and not as an attribute of either or both of the two feelings4 ,its name1 if it had one1 would be a concrete name4 ,but the entire series of these perceptions of succession has a name1 ,time2 which ,i therefore hold to be a concrete name4 ,however inextricably these feelings of succession are mixed up with the feelings perceived as successive1 we are so perfectly able to attend to them1 and make them a distinct object of thought1 that we can compare them with one another1 without comparing the successive feelings in any other respect4 ,we can judge two or more successions to be of equal1 or of unequal1 rapidity4 ,and if we find any series of feelings of which the successive links follow each other with uniform rapidity1 such as the tickings of a clock1 we can make this a standard of comparison for all other successions1 and measure them as equal to one1 two1 three1 or some other number of links of this series3 whereby the aggregate ,time is said to be divided into equal portions1 and every event is located in some one of those portions4 ,the succession of our sensations1 therefore1 however closely implicated with the sensations themselves1 may be abstracted from them in thought1 as completely #ace as any quality of a thing can be abstracted from the thing4 ,the apparent infinity of ,time the author1 very rightly1 explains in the same manner as that of ,space4--,ed4 ,grote's footnote #cj3 ,in this section ,mr4 ,james ,mill explains ,time4 ,he tells us that it is a comprehensive word including all successions1 or the whole of successive order 7p4 #aaf7--;a perpetual flow of instants1 of which only one can ever be present4 ,the very idea of ,time is an idea of successions4 ,it consists of this and of nothing else 7pp4 #aaf--aag7--;it is the single worded abstract1 involving the meaning of the three several abstracts1 pastness1 presentness1 futureness 7p4 #aah74 ,in the line of ,time1 we have the concrete line1 and the abstract line3 the concrete line being the successions with the objects3 the abstract line1 the successions without the objects3 to which abstract line1 we give the name ,time 7p4 #acc74 ,in p4 #abj he gives us in a few words ,dr4 ,reid's explanation of ,time3--and in pp4 #abd--acj he cites at greater length ,aristotle's explanation1 as reproduced by ,harris in the ,hermes4 ,both ,aristotle and ,reid include in their meaning of ,time1 not merely succession1 but duration or continuity4 ,mr4 ,james ,mill includes only succession--antecedents and consequents4 ,he thinks that continuity is nothing else than an illusion or prejudice1 arising from extreme rapidity of succession 7pp4 #abc--abe74 ,time and ,space 7says ,harris1 cited p4 #abd7 have this in common1 that they are both of them by nature continuous4 ,but in this they differ--that all the parts of space exist at once and together2 while those of ,time only exist in ,transition or ,succession4 ,mr4 ,james ,mill proceeds to say--,this is only transcribing the common language4 ,what remained was1 to show what are the real facts couched under this language4 ,undoubtedly these facts ought to be shewn1 and shewn fully4 ,but ,i cannot think that they are shewn fully in the #acf present ,chapter of the ,analysis4 ,on the contrary1 a most important part of the case is omitted--,duration or ,continuity--which ,aristotle has put in the front of his exposition1 and after him 99,reid as well as ,harris4 ,if it were true that the word ,time is the abstract1 having for its concrete succeeding objects and nothing more1 we should not need the term at all4 ,the abstract term ,succession already answers this purpose1 much more perspicuously and obviously4 ,but ,time includes something more than succession4 ,it comprehends not merely potentiality for succeeding objects or events1 but also potentiality for continuous motions or sensations3 it embraces duration as well as succession4 ,the exposition of ,aristotle is adapted to readers and debates so different from those of the present day1 that it often appears strange1 and even mystical1 when ever so well translated4 ,in the present case1 however1 we derive satisfaction from knowing1 that his doctrine is1 with a very small reserve1 adopted by ,hobbes1 the most anti-mystical of all philosophers4 7,hobbes' ,first ,grounds of ,philosophy--,part ,,ii41 ,sect4 #g4 #c74 ,aristotle has given a theory of ,time at great length1 perfectly clear as to its main features1 though in several of its details1 obscure and difficult to follow4 ,i will add that throughout nearly the whole exposition1 he keeps the abstract in close implication with the concrete3 the neglect of which precaution1 by many philosophers1 is so justly censured by the ,author of the ,analysis4 ,aristotle1 according to a practice frequent with him1 begins by enumerating various puzzles and difficulties which stand in the way of any theory 7,greek3 diaporsai ,physic4 ,,iv4 #aj4 p4 #bag4 #f4 #cj74 ,in doing this1 here as elsewhere1 he states the difficulties in a manner somewhat paradoxical4 ,the citation of page #abf1 7together with note1 page #abg17 are all taken from this preliminary excursion1 the beginning and end of which ,aristotle distinctly marks 7,physica ,,iv4 c4 #aj4 p4 #bag b4 #cj4 p4 #bah a4 #cj74 ,he then proceeds to exposition2 and after remarking that ,time is one and alike every where1 amidst the greatest #acg diversity of events succeeding each other--he says that it is not indeed identical with ,motion1 7as some theorists considered it71 but that it is nevertheless inseparable from ,motion being one of the aspects or appurtenances of ,motion4 ,magnitude or ,body moved--,motion--,time--all go together in ,aristotle's conception4 ,magnitude is continuous3 ,motion is continuous3 ,time is continuous 7,physica ,,iv4 #aa4 p4 #bai4 a4 #ab4 #bbc4 a4 #aj73 ,line is continuous4 ,on the other hand1 the ,point is separate and indivisible2 no two ,points have any common term3 a ,line is not made up of ,points1 but of smaller ,lines2 and every ,line has ,points for its bounds or limits4 ,what the ,point is to a ,line1 the ,now or ,instant is to ,time3 the ,instant is not a portion of ,time1 but the boundary of each portion1 and the conjoining boundary between ,time past and ,time future4 7,physica ,,iv4 #aa4 p4 #bbj4 a4 #e-be--,,vi4 #c4 #bcd4 a4 #a-bd74 ,aristotle defines ,time as the ,number of ,motion according to ,former and ,later3 i4e41 ,continuous ,motion1 considered as numerable and successive4 ,to take the words of ,harris1 from ,aristotle 7cited p4 #abh of the ,analysis7--,it is from contemplating two or more ,instants under one view1 together with that ,interval of ,continuity which subsists between them1 that we acquire insensibly the ,idea of ,time4--,months and ,years are all so many ,intervals described as above2 that is to say1 passing ,intervals of ,continuity between two ,instants viewed together4 ,mr4 ,james ,mill hardly does justice to this exposition1 when he observes 7p4 #aca7--,neither ,harris 99nor ,reid does anything more than merely state the fact1 without an attempt to explain it4 ,that we cannot have the idea of time1 without the observation of succession2 and that memory is joined with sense in the observation of successions1--is the matter of fact4 ,what ,time is1 distinct from the memory and the sensations1 they ought to have told us1 but have not4--,in this passage1 the word sensations is evidently used by ,mr4 ,james ,mill as equivalent to successions or successive #ach sensations3 and the observation appears to me not well founded4 ,i think that ,aristotle has told us1 and ,harris after him1 what ,time is1 distinct from the successive sensations4 ,it includes ,motion and the ,continuity of ,motion4 ,these are elements of which ,mr4 ,james ,mill takes no notice3 and they supply the deficiency of which he complains4 ,it is one of the many merits of ,mr4 ,james ,mill's ,analysis that he has paid more attention to movements and muscular sensibility1 as elements of our consciousness1 than philosophers had done before him4 ,but in this chapter unfortunately1 he has left them out1 and has confined himself to successions4 ,the explanation of ,time1 given in the main by ,aristotle1 is completed and elucidated by ,professor ,bain in his work on the ,senses and the ,intellect 7chapter on the ,muscular ,feelings1 sect4 #bj--bc1 pp4 #ie1 #if2 compare also p4 #ahc1 in ed4 #crd74 ,the feeling of continuance in our muscular exertions1 of longer or shorter duration in the sweep of our limbs1 is one of the primordial varieties of sensibility4 ,a longer expenditure of our energy affects the consciousness differently from a shorter4 ,in a full sweep of the arm1 we are conscious of the instant of commencement as antecedent1--the interval of continued effort1--and the instant of termination as following4 ,this is the clearest illustration of that which ,aristotle and ,harris describe as ,time3 two instants former and later1 with continuous interval between them4 ,motion is the most striking and obvious example of ,continuity1 and is therefore employed by ,aristotle as the basis for his exposition of ,time4 ,the eternal and uniform motions of the celestial bodies were to him the most impressive of all phenomena2 the great standard by which all other motions were to be measured4 ,hobbes also takes the ,line as the proper exponent of time4 ,but though motion affords the best and amplest illustrations of ,continuity1 it is not motion only that is felt as continuous4 ,the sense of continuance is felt in regard to other impressions also4 ,professor ,bain observes--,all impressions made on the mind1 whether those of muscular energy1 or those of the ordinary senses1 are felt differently according as they endure #aci for a longer or a shorter time4 ,this is true of the higher emotions also4 ,the continuance of a mental state must be discriminated by us from the very dawn of consciousness2 and hence our estimate of time is one of our earliest mental aptitudes4 ,it attaches to every feeling that we possess--7p4 #ic74 ,we thus perceive that the sense of continuance is just as much an original presentation to our consciousness1 as the sense of succession4 ,this is an important fact1 which has not been sufficiently adverted to in the exposition of complex ideas such as ,time and ,space4 ,the fundamentum of ,continual ,quantity is an immediate manifestation of our sensitive discriminations not less than that of ,discrete ,quantity4 ,the complex ,idea of ,time embodies both4a ,mr4 ,james ,mill insists everywhere1 with laudable emphasis1 upon the necessity of seeking the meaning of every abstract term in the concrete particulars out of which it grows4 ,but in explaining ,time1 he has not set before himself all the concrete particulars in their full variety and amplitude4 ,confining himself to ,succession1 and scarcely touching ,continuance1 he has not been led to follow out the facts of motion in all their diversified aspects1 nor the many abstractions and generalisations which #adj spring from comparison of motions with each other1 under some one of these aspects4 ,footnote a3 ,aristotle's definition of ,time was much discussed by his contemporaries and successors4 ,both his pupils1 ,theophrastus and ,eudemus1 accepted it3 but there were many objectors1 and the earliest of them notified to us is1 ,straton of ,lampsakus1 pupil and successor of ,theophrastus4 ,straton objected on the ground that the definition combined ,number and ,motion--,discrete ,quantity and ,continual ,quantity--which combination he held to be inadmissible4 ,but this seems no valid objection4 ,aristotle very properly recognises the two as distinct varieties of ,quanta--7see ,categor4 p4 #d1 b4 #bj73 but that is no reason why both of them may not be combined in the same complex idea--especially when we see that each of them has its distinct root in different original presentations of our discriminative consciousness4 ,see ,simplikius ad ,aristot4 ,physic4 ,,iv4 ,scholia1 p4 #cid1 b4 #bg--dg4 ,brandis4 ,in a note to this chapter of the ,analysis 7p4 #abi7 attention is called by ,mr4 ,james ,mill to another important doctrine cited by ,harris out of ,aristotle--to the relative nature of ,time4 ,can there be any time1 apart from the percipient mind8 asks ,aristotle--since time is the numerable element in motion1 and there can be no numeration without a rational mind to number4b ,he does not affirm positively1 but he speaks as conceiving number and the numbering mind to be ,relatum and ,correlatum1 so that the former cannot exist without the latter4c ,both ,alexander of ,aphrodisias and ,themistius thought so likewise after him3 though ,bothius and other commentators dissented from the opinion4d ,upon this general question of relativity1 ,aristotle is not always consistent with himself4 ,though he declares explicitly1 that ,relata reciprocate in predication1 and are implicated each with the other--and though he says that the ,soul is in a certain sense all things 7i4e4 is the implied correlate of all our beliefs and disbeliefs1 affirmations and negations7--yet in other places1 he limits this #ada universal principal by exceptions1 which some of his commentators deprecate as inadmissible4e--,g4 ,footnote b3 ,aristot4 ,physica4 ,,iv4 #ad1 p4 #bbc1 a4 #bf4 ,footnote c3 ,so also ,hobbes' ,first ,philosophy1 ,part ,,ii4 #g1 #c1 #e3--,seeing all men confess a year to be time1 and yet do not think a year to be the accident or affection of any body1 they must needs confess it to be1 not in the things without us1 but only in the thought of the mind4 7,here ,hobbes goes too far1 divesting time of all objective character2 instead of considering it as relative to the mind1 which implies a subjective and an objective aspect combined4 ,the next passage exhibits this47 ,time is the phantasm of before and after in motion3 which agrees with the definition of ,aristotle4 ,time is the number of motion according to former and latter--for that numbering is an act of the mind4 ,to divide ,space or ,time1 is nothing else but to consider one and another within the same--division is not made by the operation of the hands1 but of the mind4 ,footnote d3 ,themistius ad ,aristot4 ,physic4 ,,iv4 p4 #ccg1 in ,spengel's edition of ,themistius--partly extracted by ,brandis in ,scholia to ,aristotle1 p4 #cic1 b4 #bg4 ,footnote e3 ,aristot4 ,categor41 c4 #g1 p4 #f1 a4 #cg1 b4 #bh2 p4 #g1 b4 #bc4 ,scholia ad ,categor41 p4 #fe1 b4 #aj--bj4 ,brandis4 ,aristot4 de ,anim1 ,,iii41 #h1 #dca1 b4 #ba1 ,greek3 7 psuch ta o7_/nta p_/s e7sti pa_/nta2 7 gar ai7sthta ta o7_/nta 7 nota1 e7_/sti d' 7 e7pist_/m men ta e7pistta_/ ps1 7 d' ai7_/sthsis ta ai7sthta_/4 #adb ,,section ,,vi4 ,,motion4 ,it is necessary to take notice of this term1 because the idea which is named by it is apt to present the appearance of something mysterious1 though1 after the expositions with which we are now familiar1 the materials of which it is compounded1 will not be difficult to find4 ,the word ,motion1 is the abstract of ,moving4 ,what we have to investigate1 therefore1 are the sensations1 on account of which1 we call a body moving2 motion being merely moving1 the connotation dropped4 ,all motion is in a ,line1 either a straight line1 or some other line4 ,the idea of moving1 therefore1 contains1 for one ingredient1 the idea of a line4 ,a body moving1 is a body which is successively at every point of a line4 ,every point of a line1 as we have seen1 is a particular position4 ,a body moving1 therefore1 is a body first in one position1 then in another1 then in another1 through a certain series4 ,in the idea of a ,body moving1 then1 we can enumerate the following particulars3 the idea of a body1 the idea of a position1 the idea of a line1 the idea of succession4 ,these are all complex ideas2 some of them highly complex2 united into one idea1 motion1 they compose one of the most complex of all our #adc ideas4 ,the ingredients1 however1 being already explained1 there can be no great difficulty in understanding the compound4 ,it is commonly said1 that motion includes the idea both of ,space1 and of ,time4 ,as it includes the idea of ,succession1 it includes the idea of ,time1 successions in the abstract 7otherwise called instants71 without end1 receiving the name of ,time4 ,as it includes the idea of a ,line1 it includes the idea of extension in one direction4 ,as it includes the idea of ,position1 which is that of lines1 in every direction1 it includes the idea of extension in every direction2 but extension in every direction1 taken abstractly1 is ,space4 ,it is important to observe1 that1 though we receive1 and that the most frequently1 information of motions by the eye1 it is not from the sensations of sight1 that the idea of motion is derived4 ,it is by association of ideas alone1 that we fancy we see motion1 as it is thence we fancy that we see figure1 and distance4 ,the classes of sensations1 from which we derive the idea of motion1 and the idea of extension1 are the same2 they are the muscular and tactual sensations4 ,the man born blind1 is not without the idea of motion1 as he is without that of colour2 on the contrary1 he has the idea probably much more precise1 than we who have entangled it inextricably with the perceptions of sight4 ,to recur to the exposition which we have already given2 we may remember1 that the sensations 7taking the simplest case71 on account of which we apply the name ,line1 are partly sensations of ,touch1 partly sensations of ,muscular ,action4 ,if we touch a line at one point with any part of our bodies1 say the finger2 so long as the finger is still1 we have merely the #add sensations1 on account of which we call the line tangible4 ,as soon as we move the finger along the line1 we have the sensations and ideas1 on account of which we call it extended4 ,but these new feelings1 on account of which we call the line extended1 are also the feelings1 on account of which we call the finger moved4 ,the sensations1 therefore1 whence we derive our ideas of extension1 and of motion1 exist simultaneously4 ,we have a certain compound of feelings1 partly sensations1 and partly ideas2 for we have already seen1 that the perception of succession consists in a present sensation1 associated with the idea of a past one2 and we assign to this compound1 not one name1 as on other occasions1 but two names1 after a very peculiar and remarkable manner4 ,these two names are1 ,line ,extended1 ,finger ,moved4 ,the complication of the feelings here1 and of course the obscurity of them1 is very remarkable2 though the naming1 as in certain other cases of obscure ideas1 is very distinct4 ,we are never misled in the application of the terms1 ,line ,extended1 ,finger moved2 though we may be very much puzzled to shew1 of the compound of feelings which are thus named1 and which1 in the compound1 are easily1 and infallibly traced1 how much is included under the one term1 and how much under the other4 ,a certain portion of the sensations in the compound is peculiar to what is called the ,line1 another portion is peculiar to what is called the ,finger4 ,the rest is common to both4 ,the common part1 united to what is peculiar to line1 is called line extended2 the same common part1 united with what is peculiar to finger1 is called ,finger moved4 ,our ideas of extension and motion1 are1 no doubt1 #ade originally derived from the action of our own bodies4 ,i touch something1 and have the sensation of resistance4 ,the idea of resistance is the fundamental part in every combination to which ,i give the name of object4 ,in this case1 there is the object touched1 and there is the finger touching4 ,a certain action is given to my finger1 still touching the object4 ,that action involves certain feelings2 these ,i combine both with the object1 and with the finger1 and to these two combinations ,i give the two names1 ,object ,extended1 ,finger ,moved4 ,if any one shut his eyes1 excluding as much as possible1 the ideas of sight1 and conceiving1 without admixture1 the feelings in the finger and the arm1 while the finger passes along a line1 he will get some notion of the series of antecedents and consequents1 whence the idea of ,motion is derived4 ,they are feelings1 which language does not enable us to communicate by words2 but it does not seem very difficult for any man to raise the ideas of them in himself4 ,let any one suppose1 that the line commences opposite to the centre of his body4 ,he begins by touching it at that point with the finger of his right hand2 and in this there is one state of feeling4 ,he gives the finger the smallest perceptible motion towards the right3 this is another state of feeling4 ,he gives it a further motion1 the smallest perceptible1 in the same direction3 this is another state of feeling2 and so on1 as far as the arm can reach4 ,the antecedent states are in each instance united with the present by memory1 and by the amount of the states1 thus united1 the amount of the motion is computed4 ,conceiving the case of a man born blind1 the more #adf easily to exclude the illusions of association2 it is obvious1 that such a man can obtain the idea of another body in motion1 only by accompanying it with his hand2 or by associating the ideas1 on account of which he calls the hand1 moved1 with the body in question4 ,by frequent operations of the hand1 such as that described above1 he becomes familiar with the idea of the hand moved4 ,the ideas of the sensations1 on account of which1 he calls it moved1 are easily raised1 easily form themselves into combination1 and easily associate themselves with the object1 ,hand4 ,the idea of ,hand1 and the idea of ,hand moved1 having become very familiar1 it is an easy case of association to transfer the term moved to other things1 as the foot moved1 the body moved1 the stone moved4 ,when he has become familiar with the application of ,moved1 as a connotative term1 to various objects1 it is easy1 in this1 as in other cases1 to drop the connotation2 and then he has the abstract1 ,,motion4#ca #cb ,bain's footnote #ca3 ,the author correctly1 in my opinion1 refers to our muscular sensibility 7aided by ,touch71 the fundamental notions of ,resistance1 ,motion1 ,extension1 ,space4 ,he also remarks properly1 that the idea of motion and the idea of extension are the same2 they are merely different modes of viewing one experience4 ,in a mutually involved series of properties such as these1 the ,analysis may proceed in several different arrangements1 no one being apparently very decisive4 ,the following mode is suggested as on the whole1 the most consecutive4 ,the feeling of ,resistance expresses what is probably the most fundamental state of all1 the consciousness of muscular energy or expended force4 ,taking the case of a dead strain1 or a pressure without movement1 we have mere muscular energy and nothing else4 ,we have an indivisible1 unanalysable1 mode #adg of consciousness1 distinct from all modes of passive sensation1 and from all forms of emotion4 ,it is a kind of consciousness remarkably constant in its character2 it varies in degree1 but with this peculiarity that because a man is physically weaker than usual1 he does not on that account exaggerate or misrepresent the degree of his muscular expenditure2 the feeling of lifting two pounds is not made the same as the feeling of lifting four pounds1 although in some of the incidents of exertion1 as in the organic state of exhaustion1 the smaller expenditure in one state is held to be equal to the greater expenditure in another state4 ,the consciousness of putting forth power is the most uniform1 the least variable1 of all our sensibilities2 the same amount of actual force expended is estimated as nearly the same under all circumstances4 ,in being conscious of expended energy1 we discriminate its degrees1 within certain limits2 we know when we increase or diminish the amount2 and our sensibility is measured by the smallness of the difference that makes a change in our consciousness4 ,this discrimination is the basis of our estimate of the property termed ,force1 ,resistance1 ,momentum1 in moving bodies4 ,our idea of force is a muscular idea1 an idea of muscular force of a certain amount4 ,force may be viewed in other ways1 or from other aspects1 but its direct and simple estimate is muscular energy in the dead strain4 #b4 ,we are farther conscious of muscular energy as more or less enduring or continuing4 ,our consciousness varies according as a strain is protracted2 a weight supported half a minute gives a feeling different from a weight supported a quarter of a minute4 ,farther1 it is important to remark that increase of continuance is not confounded with increase of force in the same time4 ,mechanically speaking1 it is the same to us1 whether we support two pounds one minute1 or one pound two minutes2 the energy gone out of us1 the oxidation1 or consumption of material1 must be the same for both4 ,but the consciousness is not the same for both2 each has a character of its own1 and we recognise the distinction in clear consciousness4 ,if we #adh confounded all modes of expended energy that are dynamically equal1 we should be disqualified from attaining the ideas of motion and extension4 ,when energy is accompanied by movement1 there is a new and characteristic mode of consciousness1 of vital importance4 ,energy in the dead strain and energy with motion may be equal as regard expended force1 but they are not the same to our feelings4 ,continuance in the one is a different fact from continuance in the other4 ,the feeling of continuance in moving energy is the fact that we call motion2 and also the fundamental property1 the starting point1 with reference to ,extension2 although much more is wanted to complete that cognition4 ,mere dead strain would not amount to extension2 and the discriminating of dead strain from moving strain is thus of essential moment4 ,from the sense of this distinction1 and the estimate of degree of continuance in movement1 we begin at once the experience of motion and the ground-work of extension4 ,the consciousness of continuance whether of dead strain or of movement is also a consciousness of duration1 but not the only mode of becoming versed in this property4 ,all our mental states1--whether muscular feelings1 sensations1 emotions1 thoughts1 volitions1--are different as they are more or less continued1 and this consciousness of difference is a consciousness of ,duration or ,time4 ,hence the usual saying that ,time is a property common to the ,object and to the subject4 ,the object experiences of motion and extension are the most convenient modes of measuring time1 they are the most accurate and discriminative1 but they are not the only nor the chief concrete embodiments of it4 ,we often measure time by the duration and succession of our feelings and thoughts4 #c4 ,another mode of discrimination inhering in our muscular consciousness is the degree of movement1 as slow or quick4 ,we are differently affected according to the rapidity of our movements2 an accelerated pace in the arm1 or in the whole body1 sensibly alters our feelings4 ,farther1 we do not compound this alteration with its dynamical equivalents in the #adi other modes--with increase in the amount of the dead strain1 in the continuance of the dead strain1 or in the continuance of movement4 ,a characteristic mode of feeling attends this special form of augmenting or reducing our expenditure of force4 ,the consequence is1 a feeling of velocity or speed of movement4 ,but this feeling of speed is not all4 ,we gain another equivalent of degrees of extension2 more speed in the same time being equal to more time with the same speed4 ,it is proper to remark1 however1 that we are premature in speaking of extension1 or in regarding it as arrived at1 at once by our primary experiences of movement2 much has to be gone through before this is fully formed or developed4 ,motion is the fundamental fact1 but motion is a fact of succession1 and can do nothing to suggest a group of contemporaneous phenomena1 an outspread universe of the co-existing in time4 ,our primary sensibility is a mere thread of succession1 duration1 or continuance2 we have to acquire by a process of aggregation and association1 the highly artificial experience of things permanently situated in a relationship of co-existence in space or extension4 ,it is at this point that ,sensation comes to our aid4 ,passive sensation by itself is incompetent to give us the foundations of extension2 through it1 we have neither resistance nor movement1 nor any fact partaking in what is essential to the extended or object universe4 ,mere warmth1 odour1 relish1 touch1 sound1 colour1 contain no elements of extension4 ,the co-operation with moving energy is what introduces us to the object world4 ,how then does ,sensation aid muscularity in evolving ,extension8 ,in various ways1 but chiefly thus4 ,our movements are not performed in vacuo1 but in conjunction with sensation4 ,the movements of the hand and arm1 are usually conjoined with sensations of touch4 ,we draw the hand across a table2 there is an arm sensibility1 purely motor or energetic1 which is distinct from every mode of passive sensation4 ,there accompanies it1 however1 a series of tactile sensations1 making a united experience1 active and passive4 ,if this conjunction #aej were to happen but once1 nothing would be thought of it farther than as a mere experience of succession4 ,again1 in another situation the sweep of the movement ends in a contact or sensation of touch1 or begins in the loss of such a contact4 ,so far1 these are mere casual conjunctions1 unions of moving energy and passive sensibility4 ,but in the course of many trials1 there arise uniform conjunctions of movement with passive sensibility3 the same movement being associated with the same tactile series1 or with the same beginning or ending of tactile sensation4 ,take the case of the movement of the hand over the surface of our own body4 ,a certain definite start1 and definite amount of exertion brings with it a uniform tactile sensation1 as in drawing the hand over the face4 ,this uniformity generates an expectation that the same sensation will follow on the same definite energy4 ,many such conjunctions are formed in this manner4 ,there is an interesting variety of the experience of such concurrences2 namely1 when we reverse a movement1 and find a series of sensations identified as the same in an inverted order4 ,the hand passed along the side of a knife1 experiences movement coupled with sensations1 as often as the movement is made2 the inverted movement inverts the sensations4 ,the supposition1 hitherto1 has been confined to ,touch4 ,when we take in sight1 the scope for the operation is greatly enlarged4 ,almost all our movements are conjoined with optical changes--sensations of colour and of visible form in a certain sequence4 ,we speedily detect a number of uniform occurrences of movement and visible sensation4 ,the same movement gives the same series of appearances at all times2 and an inverted movement corresponds with an inverted order4 ,here too we attain to a number of uniformities of coincidence1 with the expectation of future occurrence4 ,a certain movement of the eyes is accompanied with an optical series1 as scanning the starry heavens2 as often as the movement is repeated from the same stand-point1 the optical series is repeated2 the inverted movement gives the inverted series4 ,we #aea contract an expectation1 that such a coincidence will occur in the future1 and this expectation is our idea of the starry space4 ,our idea of extended things is thus completed by sensation4 ,it is a series of conjunctions1 or associations1 of movements and sensations1 in a fixed order4 ,we do not in our idea of space1 command an entire view at one glance2 the successive perception of points or limited portions is what we begin with1 and is the character of the mind's working even after we are educated to the utmost4 ,the co-existing in space1 is the mind's potentiality of finding definite sensations by means of definite movements2 and it seems impossible to assign any other meaning or import to the phenomena4 ,the genesis of the idea of space determines our mode of settling the great question of the ,perception of a material world4--,b4 ,editor's footnote #cb3 ,it will be both useful and interesting to the inquiring reader1 if ,i add to the analysis of these very complex ideas by the author of the present treatise1 and to that by ,mr4 ,bain1 the analysis given of them by the other great living master of the ,association psychology1 ,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer4 ,the following passages are from his ,principles of ,psychology4 ,first1 of ,resistance3 ,on raising the arm to a horizontal position and keeping it so1 and still more on dealing similarly with the leg1 a sensation is felt1 which1 tolerably strong as it is at the outset1 presently becomes unbearable4 ,if the limb be uncovered1 and be not brought against anything1 this sensation is associated with no other1 either of touch or pressure4 ,this is the sensation of ,muscular ,tension4 ,allied to the sensation accompanying tension of the muscles1 is that accompanying the act of contracting them--the sensation of muscular motion4 4 4 4 ,while1 from the muscles of a limb at rest1 no sensation rises2 while1 from the muscles of a limb in a state of continuous strain1 there arises a continuous sensation which remains uniform for a considerable time2 from the muscle of a limb in motion1 there arises a sensation which is #aeb ever undergoing increase or decrease1 or change of composition4 ,when we express our immediate experiences of a body by saying that it is hard1 what are the experiences implied8 ,first1 a sensation of pressure1 of considerable intensity1 is implied2 and if1 as in most cases1 this sensation of pressure is given to a finger voluntarily thrust against the object1 then there is simultaneously felt a correspondingly strong sensation of muscular tension4 ,but this is not all3 for feelings of pressure and muscular tension may be given by bodies which we call soft1 provided the compressing finger follows the surface as fast as it gives way4 ,in what then consists the difference between the perceptions8 ,in this2 that whereas when a soft body is pressed with increasing force1 the synchronous sensations of increasing pressure and increasing muscular tension are accompanied by sensations of muscular movement2 when a hard body is pressed with increasing force these sensations of increasing pressure and tension are not accompanied by sensations of muscular movement4 ,considered by itself1 then1 the perception of softness may be defined as the establishment in consciousness of a relation of simultaneity between three series of sensations--a series of increasing sensations of pressure2 a series of increasing sensations of tension2 and a series of sensations of motion4 ,and the perception of hardness is the same1 with omission of the last series4 7pp4 #bab1 #bah47 ,of ,extension2 and first1 of ,form or ,figure3 ,it is an anciently established doctrine that ,form or ,figure1 which we may call the most complex mode of extension1 is resolvable into relative magnitude of parts4 ,an equilateral triangle is one of which the three sides are alike in magnitude4 ,an ellipse is a symmetrical closed curve1 of which the transverse and conjugate diameters are one greater than the other4 ,a cube is a solid1 having all its surfaces of the same magnitude1 and all its angles of the same magnitude4 ,a cone is a solid1 successive sections of which1 made at right angles to the axis1 are circles regularly decreasing in #aec magnitude as we progress from base to apex4 ,any object described as narrow is one whoso breadth is of small magnitude when compared with its length4 ,a symmetrical figure is a figure in which the homologous parts on opposite sides are equal in magnitude4 ,figures which we class as similar to each other1 are such that the relation of magnitude between any two parts of the one1 is equal to the relation of magnitude between the corresponding parts of the other4 ,add to which1 that an alteration in the form of anything1 is an alteration in the comparative sizes of some of its parts--a change in the relations of magnitude subsisting between them and the other parts1 and that by continuously altering the relative magnitudes of its parts1 any figure may be changed indefinitely4 ,hence1 figure being wholly resolvable into relations of magnitude we may go on to analyze that out of which these relations are formed--magnitude itself4 7pp4 #bbd1 #bbe47 ,next therefore1 of ,magnitude3 ,what is a magnitude1 considered analytically8 ,the reply is1 ,it consists of one or more relations of position4 ,when we conceive anything as having a certain bulk1 we conceive its opposite limiting surfaces as more or less removed from each other2 that is1 as related in position4 ,when we imagine a line of definite length1 we imagine its termini as occupying points in space having some positive distance from each other2 that is1 as related in position4 ,as a solid is decomposable into planes2 a plane into lines2 lines into points2 and as adjacent points can neither be known nor conceived as distinct from each other1 except as occupying different places in space--that is1 as occupying not the same position1 but relative positions--it follows that every cognition of magnitude1 is a cognition of one or more relations of position1 which are presented to consciousness as like or unlike one or more other relations of position4 7p4 #bbf47 ,and finally1 of ,position3 ,this analysis of itself brings us to the remaining space-attribute of body--,position4 ,like magnitude1 ,position cannot be known absolutely2 but can be known only relatively4 #aed ,the notion of position is1 in itself1 the notion of relative position4 ,the position of a thing is inconceivable1 save by thinking of that thing as at some distance from one or more other things4 ,the essential element of the idea will be best seen1 on observing under what conditions only1 it can come into existence4 ,imagine a solitary point ,a1 in infinite space2 and suppose it possible for that point to be known by a being having no locality1 what now can be predicated respecting its place8 ,absolutely nothing4 ,imagine another point ,b to be added4 ,what can now be predicated respecting the two8 ,still nothing4 ,the points having no attributes save position1 are not comparable in themselves2 and nothing can be said of their relative position1 from lack of anything with which to compare it4 ,the distance between them may be either infinite or infinitesimal1 according to the measure used2 and as1 by the hypothesis1 there exists no measure--as space contains nothing save these two points2 the distance between them is unthinkable4 ,but now imagine that a third point ,c is added4 ,immediately it becomes possible to frame a proposition respecting their positions4 ,the two distances1 ,a to ,b1 and ,a to ,c1 serve as measures to each other4 ,the space between ,a and ,b may be compared with the space between ,a and ,c2 and the relation of position in which ,a stands to ,b becomes thinkable1 as like or unlike the relation in which ,a stands to ,c4 ,thus1 then1 it is manifest that position is not an attribute of body in itself1 but only in its connection with the other contents of the universe4 ,it remains to add1 that relations of position are of two kinds3 those which subsist between subject and object2 and those which subsist between either different objects1 or different parts of the same object4 ,of these the last are resolvable into the first4 ,it needs but to remember1 on the one hand1 that in the dark a man can discover the relative positions of two objects only by touching first one and then the other1 and so inferring their relative positions from his own position towards each2 and on the other hand1 that by vision no knowledge of their relative positions can be #aee reached save through a perception of the distance of each from the eye2 to see that ultimately all relative positions may be decomposed into relative positions of subject and object4 ,these conclusions--that ,figure is resolvable into relative magnitudes2 that magnitude is resolvable into relative positions2 and that all relative positions may finally be reduced to positions of subject and object--will be fully confirmed on considering the process by which the space-attributes of body become known to a blind man4 ,he puts out his hand and touching something1 thereby becomes cognizant of its position with respect to himself4 ,he puts out his other hand1 and meeting no resistance above or on one side of the position already found1 gains some negative knowledge of the thing's magnitude--a knowledge which three or four touches on different sides of it serve to render positive4 ,and then1 by continuing to move his hands over its surface1 he acquires a notion of its figure4 ,what1 then1 are the elements out of which1 by synthesis1 his perceptions of magnitude and figure are framed8 ,he has received nothing but simultaneous and successive touches4 ,each touch established a relation of position between his centre of consciousness and the point touched4 ,and all he can know respecting magnitude and figure--that is1 respecting the relative position of these points to each other--is necessarily known through the relative positions in which they severally stand to himself4 ,our perceptions of all the space-attributes of body being thus decomposable into perceptions of position like that gained by a single act of touch2 we have next to inquire what is contained in a perception of this kind4 ,a little thought will make it clear that to perceive the position of anything touched1 is really to perceive the position of that part of the body in which the sensation of touch is located4 ,whence it follows that our knowledge of the positions of objects1 is built upon our knowledge of the positions of our members towards each other--knowledge both of their fixed relations1 and of those temporary relations they are placed in by every change of muscular adjustment4 ,that #aef this knowledge is gained by a mutual exploration of the parts--by a bringing of each in contact with the others--by a moving over each other in all possible ways2 and that the motions involved in these explorations1 are known by their reactions upon consciousness2 are propositions that scarcely need stating4 ,but it is manifestly impossible to carry the analysis further without analysing our perception of motion4 ,relative position and motion are two ideas of the same experience4 ,we can neither conceive motion without conceiving relative position1 nor discover relative position without motion4 ,in the present1 therefore1 we must be content with the conclusion that1 whether visual or tactual1 the perception of every statical attribute of body is resolvable into perceptions of relative position which are gained through motion4 7pp4 #bbf--bbi47 ,in further prosecution of the analysis3 ,how do we become cognizant of the relative positions of two points on the surface of the body8 ,such two points1 considered as coexistent1 involve the germinal idea of ,space4 ,such two points disclosed to consciousness by two successive tactual sensations proceeding from them1 involve the germinal idea of ,time4 ,and the series of muscular sensations by which1 when self-produced1 these two tactual sensations are separated1 involve the germinal idea of ,motion4 ,the questions to be considered then are--,in what order do these germinal ideas arise8 and--,how are they developed8 444 ,taking for our subject a newly-born infant1 let us call the two points on its body between which a relation is to be established1 ,a and ,z4 ,let us assume these points to be anywhere within reach of the hands--say upon the cheek4 ,by the hypothesis1 nothing is at present known of these points2 either as coexisting in ,space1 as giving successive sensations in ,time1 or as being brought into relation by ,motion4 ,if1 now1 the infant moves its arm in such a way as to touch nothing1 there is a certain vague reaction upon its consciousness--a sensation of muscular tension4 ,this #aeg sensation has the peculiarity of being indefinite in all its commencement2 indefinite in its termination2 and indefinite in all its intermediate changes4 ,its strength is proportionate to the degree of muscular contraction4 ,whence it follows that as the limb starts from a state of rest1 in which there is no contraction2 and as it can reach a position requiring extreme contraction only by passing through positions requiring intermediate degrees of contraction2 and as the degrees of contraction must therefore form a series ascending by infinitesimal increments from zero2 the sensations of tension must also form such a series4 ,and the like must be the case with all subsequent movements and their accompanying sensations2 seeing that1 be it at rest or in action1 a muscle cannot pass from any one state to any other without going through all the intermediate states4 ,thus1 then1 the infant1 on moving its arm backwards and forwards without touching anything1 is brought to what we may distinguish as a nascent consciousness--a consciousness not definitely divisible into states2 but a consciousness the variations of which pass insensibly into each other1 like undulations of greater or less magnitude4 ,and while the states of consciousness are thus incipient--thus indistinctly separated1 there can be no clear comparison of them2 no thought1 properly so called2 and consequently no ideas of ,motion1 ,time1 or ,space1 as we understand them4 ,suppose1 now1 that the hand touches something4 ,a sudden change in consciousness is produced--a change that is incisive in its commencement1 and1 when the hand is removed1 equally incisive in its termination4 ,in the midst of the continuous feeling of muscular tension1 vaguely rising and falling in intensity1 there all at once occurs a distinct feeling of another kind4 ,this feeling1 beginning and ending abruptly1 constitutes a definite state of consciousness2 becomes1 as it were1 a mark in consciousness4 ,by similar experiences other such marks are produced2 and in proportion as they are multiplied1 there arises a possibility of comparing them1 both in respect to their degrees and their relative positions2 while at the same #aeh time1 the feelings of muscular tension being1 as it were1 divided out into lengths by these superposed marks1 become similarly comparable2 and so there are acquired materials for a simple order of thought4 ,observe1 also1 that while these tactual sensations may1 when several things are touched in succession1 produce successive marks in consciousness1 separated by intervening muscular sensations1 they may also become continually coexistent with these muscular sensations2 as when the finger is drawn along a surface4 ,and observe further1 that when the surface over which the finger is drawn is not a foreign body1 but some part of the subject's body1 these muscular sensations1 and the continuous tactual sensation joined with them1 are accompanied by a series of tactual sensations proceeding from that part of the skin over which the finger is drawn4 ,thus1 then1 when the infant moves its finger along the surface of its body from ,a to ,z1 there are simultaneously impressed upon consciousness three sets of sensations--the varying series of sensations proceeding from the muscles in action2 the series of tactual sensations proceeding from the points of the skin successively touched between ,a and ,z2 and the continuous sensation of touch from the finger-end4444 ,as subsequent motions of the finger over the surface from ,a to ,z always result in the like simultaneous sets of sensations1 these1 in course of time1 become indissolubly associated4 ,though the series of tactual sensations1 ,a to ,z1 being producible by a foreign body moving over the same surface1 can be dissociated from the others2 and though1 if the cheek be withdrawn by a movement of the head1 the same motion of the hand1 with its accompanying muscular sensations1 may occur without any sensation of touch2 yet1 when these two series are linked by the tactual sensation proceeding from the finger-end1 they necessarily proceed together2 and become inseparably connected in thought4 ,whence it obviously results that the series of tactual sensations ,a to ,z1 and the series of muscular sensations which invariably accompanies it when self-produced1 serve as mutual equivalents2 and being #aei two sides of the same experience1 suggest each other in consciousness4 ,due attention having been paid to this fact1 let us go on to consider what must happen when something touches1 at the same moment1 the entire surface between ,a and ,z4 ,this surface is supplied by a series of independent nerve-fibres1 each of which at its peripheral termination becomes fused into1 or continuous with1 the surrounding tissue2 each of which is affected by impressions falling within a specific area of the skin2 and each of which produces a separate state of consciousness4 ,when the finger is drawn along this surface these nerve-fibres ,a1 ,b1 ,c1 ,d 4 4 4 ,z1 are excited in succession2 that is--produce successive states of consciousness4 ,and when something covers1 at the same moment1 the whole surface between ,a and ,z1 they are excited simultaneously2 and produce what tends to become a single state of consciousness4 ,already ,i have endeavoured to shew in a parallel case1 how1 when impressions first known as having sequent positions in consciousness are afterwards simultaneously presented to consciousness1 the sequent positions are transformed into coexistent positions1 which1 when consolidated by frequent presentations1 are used in thought as equivalent to the sequent positions4f 444 ,as the series of tactual #afj impressions ,a to ,z1 known as having sequent positions in consciousness1 are1 on the one hand1 found to be equivalent to the accompanying series of muscular impressions2 and on the other hand1 to the simultaneous tactual impressions ,a to ,z1 which1 as presented together1 are necessarily presented in coexistent positions2 it follows that these two last are found to be the equivalents of each other4 ,a series of muscular sensations becomes known as equivalent to a series of coexistent positions2 and being habitually joined with it1 becomes at last unthinkable without it4 ,thus1 the relation of coexistent positions between the points ,a and ,z 7and by implication all intermediate points7 is necessarily disclosed by a comparison of experiences3 the ideas of ,space1 ,time1 and ,motion1 are evolved together4 ,when the successive states of consciousness ,a to ,z1 are thought of as having relative positions1 the notion of ,time becomes nascent4 ,when these states of consciousness1 instead of occurring serially1 occur simultaneously1 their relative positions1 which were before sequent1 necessarily become coexistent2 and there arises a nascent consciousness of space4 ,and when these two relations of coexistent and sequent positions are both presented to consciousness along with a series of sensations of muscular tension1 a nascent idea of ,motion results4 ,footnote f3 ,objects laid upon the surface will come to be distinguished from each other by the relative lengths of the series they cover2 or1 when broad as well as long1 by the groups of series which they cover4 4 4 4 ,by habit these simultaneous excitations1 from being at first known indirectly by translation into the serial ones1 will come to be known directly1 and the serial ones will be forgotten3 just as in childhood the words of a new language1 at first understood by means of their equivalents in the mother tongue1 are presently understood by themselves2 and if used to the exclusion of the mother tongue1 lead to the ultimate loss of it4 ,we see that a set of nervous elements may be excited simultaneously as well as serially2 that so1 a quasi single state of consciousness becomes the equivalent of a series of states2 that a relation between what we call coexistent positions thus represents a relation of successive positions1 and that this symbolic relation being far briefer1 is habitually thought of in place of that it symbolizes2 and that1 by the continued use of such symbols1 and the union of them with more complex ones1 are generated our ideas of 4 4 4 extension--ideas which1 like those of the algebraist working out an equation1 are wholly unlike the ideas symbolized1 and which yet1 like his1 occupy the mind to the entire exclusion of the ideas symbolized4--7pp4 #bbb--bbd47 ,the development of these nascent ideas1 arising as it does from a still further accumulation and comparison of experiences1 will be readily understood4 ,what has been above described as taking place with respect to one relation of coexistent positions upon the surface of the skin--or rather1 one #afa linear series of such coexisting positions1 is1 during the same period1 taking place1 with respect to endless other such linear series1 in all directions over the body4 ,the like equivalence between a series of coexistent impressions of touch1 a series of successive impressions of touch1 and series of successive muscular impressions1 is being established between every pair of points that can readily be brought into relation by movement of the hands4 ,let us glance at the chief consequences that must ultimately arise from this organization of experiences4 ,not only must there gradually be established a connection in thought between each particular muscular series1 and the particular tactual series1 both successive and simultaneous1 with which it is associated2 and not only must there1 by implication1 arise a knowledge of the special muscular adjustments required to touch each special part1 but1 by the same experiences1 there must be established an indissoluble connection between muscular series in general and series of sequent and coexistent positions in general1 seeing that this connection is repeated in every one of the particular experiences4 ,and when we consider the infinite repetition of these experiences1 we shall have no difficulty in understanding how their components become so consolidated1 that even when the hand is moved through empty space1 it is impossible to become conscious of the muscular sensations1 without becoming conscious of the sequent and coexistent positions--the ,time and ,space1 in which it has moved4 ,observe again1 that as1 by this continuous exploration of the surface of the body1 each point is put in relation not only with points in some directions around it1 but with points in all directions--becomes1 as it were1 a centre from which radiate lines of points known first in their serial positions before consciousness1 and afterwards in their coexistent positions--it follows1 that when an object of some size1 as the hand1 is placed upon the skin1 the impressions from all parts of the area covered being simultaneously presented to consciousness1 are placed in coexistent positions before #afb consciousness3 whence results an idea of the superficial extension of that part of the body4 ,the idea of this extension is really nothing more than a simultaneous presentation of all the impressions proceeding from the various points it includes1 which have previously had their several relative positions measured by means of the series of impressions separating them4 ,any one who hesitates respecting this conclusion1 will1 ,i think1 adopt it1 on critically considering the perception he has when placing his open hand against his cheek--on observing that the perception is by no means single1 but is made up of many elements which he cannot think of altogether--on observing that there is always one particular part of the whole surface touched1 of which he is more distinctly conscious than of any other--and on observing that to become distinctly conscious of any other part1 he has to traverse in thought the intervening parts2 that is1 he has to think of the relative positions of these parts by vaguely recalling the series of states of consciousness which a motion over the skin from one to the other would involve4 7pp4 #beg--bfc74 ,these three different expositions of the origin of our ideas of ,motion and ,extension1 by three eminent thinkers1 agreeing in essentials1 and differing chiefly in the comparative degrees of development which they give to different portions of the detail1 will enable any competent reader of such a work as the present to fill up any gaps by his own thoughts4 ,many pages of additional commentary might easily be written2 but they would not add any important thought to those of which the reader is now in possession2 and belonging rather to the polemics of the subject than to its strictly scientific exposition1 they would jar somewhat with the purely expository character of the present treatise4 ,i will only further recommend to particular attention1 the opinion of ,mr4 ,spencer1 also adopted by ,mr4 ,bain1 that our ascribing simultaneous existence to things which excite successive sensations1 is greatly owing to our being able to vary or reverse the order of the succession4 ,when we pass our hands #afc over an object1 we can have the tactual and muscular sensations in many different orders1 and after having them in one order1 can have them in another exactly the reverse4 ,they do not1 therefore1 become associated with each other in a fixed order of succession1 but are called up in any order with such extreme rapidity1 that the impression they leave is that of simultaneousness1 and we therefore hold the parts of tangible objects to be simultaneous4--,ed4 #afd ,,section ,,vii4 ,,identity4 ,there is one other term1 which still requires explanation2 and that is1 ,,identity1 about which there would not have appeared any difficulty1 had it not been for ,personal ,identity2 which is1 indeed1 a complicated case1 and1 of course1 involves the obscurity which great complexity implies4 ,we have already seen1 on what account we use the marks1 same1 and different1 when we apply them to two simple sensations1 or when we apply them to two ideas1 simple1 or complex4 ,in these cases1 the terms are relative terms1 and name the objects in pairs4 ,there is another case1 that which now it is our business to explain1 in which the name is not applied to two objects1 but to the same object1 at two different times4 ,thus it is1 that ,i say1 ,the bridge at ,westminster1 by which ,i crossed the ,thames thirty years ago1 is the same by which ,i crossed it yesterday4 ,the crown which was placed on the head of ,george ,,iv4 at his coronation1 is the same by which the kings of ,england have been crowned for many centuries4 ,the words which we read in the ,gospel of ,matthew1 are the same which were written by that evangelist4 ,the words which we read in the poem called the neid are the same which were written by the poet ,virgil4 ,the church which is now at ,loretto1 is the same with that which belonged to the ,virgin ,mary at ,nazareth1 which in the month of ,may1 in the year #abia1 was #afe carried through the air by ,angels1 from ,galilee to ,tersato1 in ,dalmatia2 and again on the #ajth of ,december1 #abid1 about midnight1 by what conveyance is not known1 was set down in a wood in ,italy1 in the district of ,ricanati1 about a thousand paces from the sea4 ,it is evident1 from the contemplation of these instances1 which might be multiplied to any extent1 that the word ,,same1 in this mode of applying it1 is merely the name of a certain case of ,belief3 a belief which1 in some of the instances1 is1 memory2 in some1 is grounded upon testimony2 in some1 upon circumstantial evidence2 and1 in some1 upon both testimony and circumstances4 ,thus1 the case of belief respecting ,westminster-bridge1 which ,i mark by the word1 same1 is ,memory4 ,the cases of belief respecting the crown of ,england1 respecting the words of the gospel1 respecting the church of ,loretto1 marked respectively by the word same1 are founded on testimony1 joined with circumstances4 ,as we have already shewn wherein ,belief1 in all its cases1 consists1 we have implicitly afforded the exposition of ,identity4 ,from same1 the concrete1 comes1 in the usual way1 sameness1 the abstract1 dropping only the connotation of the concrete4 ,and ,identity and ,sameness are equivalent terms4 ,from the importance1 however1 which has been attached to these words1 it seems necessary to shew to the learner1 somewhat more particularly1 the mode of tracing the simple ideas composing the clusters which they are employed to mark4 ,the ,lily1 when it produces its brilliant flower in summer1 ,i call the same1 with the plant which began #aff to shew itself above the surface of the ground1 in spring1 from a bulb1 which ,i had planted in a particular spot of my garden4 ,i also called it the same1 from one day to another1 though changing every day in its size1 and other appearances1 from its germination to the present time4 ,for what reason have ,i done so8 ,on account of certain circumstances1 which every body can enumerate2 its rising from a certain root2 the uninterrupted continuity1 by means of the stalk1 between the root and the other parts of the plant2 its being always found in the same place1 that is1 in the same synchronous order with certain other things2 its corresponding with other plants1 the growth of which ,i have observed1 and so on4 ,if it had grown in a flower pot1 and been transferred from one to another1 the enumeration of the circumstances would have been different2 the evidence of its having grown from the same root would have been drawn from other circumstances4 ,when ,i say1 then1 that the ,lily ,i see1 with its flowers in ,july1 is the same with the ,lily just emerging from the ground in ,april1 ,i only express my belief of its having sprung from a certain root1 and of its having vegetated1 in connexion with that root1 in the way of the plants grouped in the class called ,lily4 ,i have a male ,calf1 of singular beauty1 produced from my cow4 ,i observe him from day to day4 ,from day to day ,i call him the ,same2 and ,i do so when he has grown a bull of the greatest size4 ,when ,i do so1 ,i merely express my belief in a certain train of antecedents and consequents1 with which experience has rendered me familiar4 ,there is a certain train of antecedents and consequents1 known to me by #afg observation1 which ,i call the birth1 growth1 maturity2 and1 in one word1 the ,life1 of the animal4 ,the birth1 growth1 and maturity of one animal1 is one series of successions2 the birth1 growth1 and maturity of another animal1 is another series of successions4 ,when ,i apply the name ,same1 then1 to any animal1 ,i merely express my belief1 that my present sight of the animal is part of a particular series1 of which that perception is the last link4 ,the case1 it will not be doubted1 is perfectly analogous1 when ,i transfer the term from one of the lower animals to one of my fellow men4 ,the birth1 infancy1 childhood1 youth1 manhood1 of a human being1 are names for different parts of a certain series of antecedents and consequents4 ,this series is known to me by experience2 that is1 by sensation1 by memory1 and other cases of association4 ,the life of one man is one series4 ,the life of another man is another series4 ,when ,i say1 then1 that a man is the same1 ,i merely express my belief in one of those series2 belief that the particular man1 of the present instant1 is the last link of such and such a chain1 and not of any other4 ,it is1 however1 to be observed1 that the chain1 thus believed1 and the evidence upon which it is believed1 are different things2 and that this evidence is different in different cases4 ,in the case of a person whom ,i have lived with from his birth1 and seen every day1 the evidence1 to a great degree1 is sense and memory4 ,sometimes the sameness of an individual is proved in a court of justice1 by evidence1 such as is applicable to any other matters of fact2 by written documents1 marks on the body1 articles of property found #afh with the child1 and the testimony of those whose knowledge has been uninterrupted from one time to another4 ,it is not to be doubted1 that when ,i transfer the word ,same1 from another man to myself1 all that ,i do is to express my belief in one of those series2 and the only difference in the case is1 that it is a series of which ,i have evidence of a very particular kind1 and of which many parts are known to me1 which can be known to nobody else4 ,as far as memory reaches1 the evidence1 in regard to myself1 is memory and sensation4 ,in the case of ,evidence by memory and sensation1 we have observed a peculiarity1 necessary to be remembered1 that the ,evidence1 and the ,belief1 are not different things1 but the same thing4 ,the memory which ,i have of my own existence1 that is1 the memory of a certain train of antecedents and consequents1 is the ,belief of them2 on account of which belief1 ,i apply to myself the term same1 in the same way as ,i apply it to any other of my fellow men4 ,but ,i apply the term same to myself beyond the point to which memory reaches2 as far back1 in short1 as to other men4 ,this is true3 ,i believe1 that a train of antecedents and consequents1 corresponding to that which forms the existence of other men1 has also formed my existence4 ,part of this train ,i believe1 by consciousness1 memory4 ,part1 namely1 that which precedes memory1 ,i believe on other evidence4 ,what that evidence is1 it is not difficult to see4 ,we have1 in the first place1 the evidence of testimony2 namely1 that of all the persons who knew us from our birth1 to the time to which memory extends4 ,we have next #afi the evidence of what happens in the existence of all other men2 or that case of association which unites inseparably the idea of like antecedents with like consequents4 ,it may be said1 however1 that my belief in the ,identity of other men1 is a very different thing from belief in my own ,identity2 and that the foregoing exposition does not sufficiently account for the difference which every one remarks between them4 ,the foregoing exposition1 when duly attended to1 will be found to account completely for the difference4 ,we have remarked1 that the evidence which ,i have for a great part of the series1 in the case of other men1 and of myself1 is remarkably different4 ,in the case of other men1 it consists of observation and memory2 in the case of myself1 it consists of consciousness and memory4 ,in these several and respective circumstances1 ,observation1 and ,consciousness1 the distinction wholly consists4 ,the memory of a chain of facts observed1 is the evidence in the one case4 ,the memory of a chain of states of ,consciousness1 is the evidence in the other4 ,i doubt not that this1 without further analysis1 will be seen by many of my readers to be a complete solution of the question4 ,it may1 however1 be still objected1 that we resolve observation itself into states of consciousness2 and1 if so1 that the memory of a chain of states of ,consciousness1 is the evidence in both cases4 ,this brings us to the very bottom of the matter4 ,every body recognises1 at once1 that the memory of a state of consciousness1 and the memory of something #agj observed1 are two distinct things2 that the memory1 for example1 of one of my own sensations1 and the memory of an outward fact1 as of the death of my father1 are specifically different3 or1 to take two cases still easier perhaps to distinguish2 no one will say1 that the memory of one's own pain is any thing like the same state of consciousness with the memory of seeing another man in pain4 ,in the one case1 the state of consciousness remembered is the pain itself2 in the other it is the sensations of sight or hearing1 which indicated to me the pain of the other man1 or called up the idea of his pain by association4 ,in the one case1 the memory is memory of my own sensations purely2 in the other case1 it is the memory of my sensations1 as the evidence only of outward things4 ,each of the terms1 therefore1 ,i1 ,thou1 ,he1 marks a particular chain of antecedents and consequents1 terminating with the ,i1 the ,thou1 the ,he1 of the present moment4 ,the ,i1 the ,thou1 the ,he1 of the present moment1 is marked1 by these terms1 primarily2 the preceding links are marked1 secondarily1 that is1 connoted4 ,when ,i say1 ,i1 ,thou1 or ,he1 did any thing1 it is the ,i1 the ,thou1 the ,he1 of the moment spoken of1 that is specially noted4 ,the rest of the chain is not particularly adverted to1 except when there is particular occasion for it4 ,since the ,i1 the ,thou1 the ,he1 stand for the names of three men1 and equally denote the antecedents and consequents1 forming what is familiarly called the thread of life1 of each of those individuals2 how does it happen1 that the idea1 which is called up by the term ,i1 appears to be so different1 from that which is #aga called up by the term ,thou1 or any term denoting the vital chain of any other man8 ,in what has been already stated1 is found the answer4 ,in that chain of antecedents and consequents which ,i mark by the term same man1 two species of things are included2 #a4 ,the antecedents and consequents which form the successive states of his body2 #b4 ,the successive states of his consciousness4 ,in knowing the antecedents and consequents1 which form the successive states of my own body and of that of another man1 the mode1 though in some respects different1 is1 in so many respects1 the same1 that it does not here require explanation4 ,but the mode of knowing the successive states of my own consciousness1 and of those of other men1 is totally different2 and in this consists the peculiarity which appears to belong to the idea which ,i annex to the term ,i1 or myself4 ,the knowledge of my own states of consciousness is consciousness itself1 for the present moment1 and memory of that consciousness for all the past4 ,of the states of consciousness of other men1 ,i have no direct knowledge4 ,i draw my belief of them only from signs4 ,these signs1 too1 are significant only by reference to my own states of consciousness4 ,certain things cognizable by my senses1 are accompanied in myself by certain states of consciousness1 single1 or in trains4 ,these objects of sense 7sights1 sounds1 c47 are closely associated with the ideas of those states of consciousness4 ,when presented to me1 therefore1 as objects of sense to other men1 they excite the ideas of those states of consciousness2 and hence what ,i call my knowledge and belief of the mental trains of other men4 ,it is not necessary to go further in the #agb analysis4 ,it is very obvious1 that two complex ideas must be different1 which are formed in these different ways2 nor is any thing more necessary to account for the difference between the idea annexed to the pronoun ,i1 and that annexed to the pronoun ,thou4#cc ,editor's footnote #cc3 ,the author has avoided an error in the mode and order of the enquiry1 which has greatly contributed to make the explanations given by psychologists of ,personal ,identity1 so eminently unsatisfactory as they are4 ,psychologists have almost always begun with the most intricate part of the question4 ,they have set out by enquiring1 what makes me the same person to myself8 when they should first have enquired what makes me the same person to other people8 or1 what makes another person the same person to me8 ,the author of the ,analysis has done this1 and he easily perceived1 that what makes me the same person to others1 is precisely what makes a house1 or a mountain1 the same house or mountain to them to-day which they saw yesterday4 ,it is the belief of an uninterrupted continuity in the series of sensations derivable from the house1 or mountain1 or man4 ,there is not this continuity in the actual sensations of a single observer3 he has not been watching the mountain unintermittedly since yesterday1 or from a still more distant time4 ,but he believes1 on such evidence as the case affords1 that if he had been watching1 he should have seen the mountain continuously and unchanged during the whole intervening time 7provided the other requisites of vision were present--light to see it by1 and no cloud or mist intervening73 and he further believes that any being1 with organs like his own1 who had looked in that direction at any moment of the interval during which he himself was not looking1 would have seen it in the same manner as he sees it4 ,all this applies equally to a human object4 ,i call the man ,i see to-day the same man whom ,i saw yesterday1 for the very reason which makes me call the house or the mountain the same1 viz41 my conviction that if my organs had been in the #agc same position towards him all the time as they are now1 and the other conditions necessary for seeing had been present1 my perception of the man would have continued all the time without interruption4 ,if we now change the point of view1 and ask1 what makes me always the same person to myself1 we introduce1 in addition to what there was in the other case1 the entire series of my own past states of consciousness4 ,as the author truly says1 the evidence on which ,i accept my own identity is that of memory4 ,but memory reaches only a certain way back1 and for all before that period1 as well as for all subsequent to it of which ,i have lost the remembrance1 the belief rests on other evidence4 ,as an example of the errors and difficulties in which psychologists have involved themselves by beginning with the more complex question without having considered the simpler one1 it is worth remembering that ,locke makes personal identity consist in ,consciousness1 which in this case means ,memory2 and has been justly criticised by later thinkers for this doctrine1 as leading to the corollary1 that whatever of my past actions ,i have forgotten1 ,i never performed--that my forgotten feelings were not my feelings1 but were 7it must therefore be supposed7 the feelings of somebody else4 ,locke1 however1 had seen one part of the true state of the case2 which is1 that to myself ,i am only1 properly speaking1 the same person1 in respect of those facts of my past life which ,i remember2 but that ,i nevertheless consider myself as having been1 at the times of which ,i retain no remembrance1 the same person ,i now am1 because ,i have satisfactory evidence that ,i was the same to other people2 that an uninterrupted continuity in the sensations of sight and touch caused or which could have been caused to other people1 existed between my present self and the infant who ,i am told ,i was1 and between my present self and the person who is proved to me to have done the acts ,i have myself forgotten4 ,these considerations remove the outer veil1 or husk1 as it were1 which wraps up the idea of the ,ego4 ,but after this is removed1 there remains an inner covering1 which1 as far as ,i can perceive1 is impenetrable4 ,my personal identity consists #agd in my being the same ,ego who did1 or who felt1 some specific fact recalled to me by memory4 ,so be it3 but what is ,memory8 ,it is not merely having the idea of that fact recalled3 that is but thought1 or conception1 or imagination4 ,it is1 having the idea recalled along with the ,belief that the fact which it is the idea of1 really happened1 and moreover happened to myself4 ,memory1 therefore1 by the very fact of its being different from ,imagination1 implies an ,ego who formerly experienced the facts remembered1 and who was the same ,ego then as now4 ,the phenomenon of ,self and that of ,memory are merely two sides of the same fact1 or two different modes of viewing the same fact ,we may1 as psychologists1 set out from either of them1 and refer the other to it4 ,we may1 in treating of ,memory1 say 7as the author says7 that it is the idea of a past sensation associated with the idea of myself as having it4 ,or we may say1 in treating of ,identity1 7as the author also says71 that the meaning of ,self is the memory of certain past sensations4 ,but it is hardly allowable to do both4 ,at least it must be said1 that by doing so we explain neither4 ,we only show that the two things are essentially the same2 that my memory of having ascended ,skiddaw on a given day1 and my consciousness of being the same person who ascended ,skiddaw on that day1 are two modes of stating the same fact3 a fact which psychology has as yet failed to resolve into anything more elementary4 ,in analysing the complex phenomena of consciousness1 we must come to something ultimate2 and we seem to have reached two elements which have a good prima facie claim to that title4 ,there is1 first1 the common element in all cases of ,belief1 namely1 the difference between a fact1 and the thought of that fact3 a distinction which we are able to cognize in the past1 and which then constitutes ,memory1 and in the future1 when it constitutes ,expectation2 but in neither case can we give any account of it except that it exists2 an inability which is admitted in the most elementary case of the distinction1 viz4 the difference between a present sensation and an idea4 ,secondly1 in addition to this1 and setting out from the belief #age in the reality of a past event1 or in other words1 the belief that the idea ,i now have was derived from a previous sensation1 or combination of sensations1 corresponding to it1 there is the further conviction that this sensation or combination of sensations was my own2 that it happened to myself4 ,in other words1 ,i am aware of a long and uninterrupted succession of past feelings going as far back as memory reaches1 and terminating with the sensations ,i have at the present moment1 all of which are connected by an inexplicable tie1 that distinguishes them not only from any succession or combination in mere thought1 but also from the parallel successions of feelings which ,i believe1 on satisfactory evidence1 to have happened to each of the other beings1 shaped like myself1 whom ,i perceive around me4 ,this succession of feelings1 which ,i call my memory of the past1 is that by which ,i distinguish my ,self4 ,myself is the person who had that series of feelings1 and ,i know nothing of myself1 by direct knowledge1 except that ,i had them4 ,but there is a bond of some sort among all the parts of the series1 which makes me say that they were feelings of a person who was the same person throughout1 and a different person from those who had any of the parallel successions of feelings2 and this bond1 to me1 constitutes my ,ego4 ,here1 ,i think1 the question must rest1 until some psychologist succeeds better than any one has yet done in shewing a mode in which the analysis can be carried further4--,ed4 #agf ,,chapter ,,xv4 ,,reflection4 ,,so much use has been made of the word ,,reflection1 and results of so much importance have been referred to it1 that it is necessary to shew what state of ,consciousness it denotes1 in all the possible acceptations of it4 ,mr4 ,locke defines it1 ,that notice which the mind takes of its own operations4 ,when we have a sensation1 we have already seen1 on various occasions1 that the having the state of consciousness1 and taking notice of it1 are not two things1 but one and the same thing4 ,when we say that one sensation is more attended to than another1 this1 as we shall see hereafter1 is really tantamount to saying1 that the one is more a sensation than the other4 ,in like manner1 when we have an idea2 the having the idea1 the being conscious of the idea1 knowing the idea1 observing the idea1 are only different names for the same thing4 ,they mean the being conscious in a particular way4 ,but the being conscious is to take notice of the consciousness4 ,to be conscious1 and not to take notice1 is the same thing as to be #agg conscious1 and not conscious4 ,the notice is the consciousness1 and the consciousness is the notice4 ,thus far1 therefore1 it appears1 with abundant evidence that ,reflection is nothing but ,consciousness2 and ,consciousness is the having the sensations and ideas4 ,but what will be objected is1 that we not only have ,ideas2 but we are capable of forming the idea of that particular state of mind which exists when we have an idea4 ,it requires a close examination1 to discover what is really meant by the language in which this objection is conveyed4 ,the thing1 however1 to which it imperfectly points1 can be made out2 though1 from the imperfection of the language which we must employ1 it is not easy to explain it1 with a certainty of being understood4 ,when it is said1 that we can not only have a particular idea1 but can form an idea of that state of mind1 generally1 which is called having an idea2 this can mean nothing but the distinction between the particular and the general idea4 ,it is affirmed1 that we can not only have this idea1 and that idea1 but we can have the general idea of all ideas4 ,this is true4 ,but we know1 by previous elucidations1 what all this means4 ,we can have the idea not only of this man1 or that man1 but we can have the idea of men in general4 ,that is to say1 we can group all individuals of a certain description into one class1 to which class we give a name1 equally applicable to every individual2 which name1 accordingly1 being associated equally with individuals indefinite in number1 calls up the ideas of individuals1 indefinite in number1 on every application of it4 ,this points out a double meaning of the word ,idea2 from which all the confusion of the language #agh about ,,reflection seems to have been derived4 ,the same word1 ,idea1 is both the particular1 and the general name4 ,it cannot be disputed1 that so far as regards individual ,ideas1 the having an idea1 and knowing it1 the being in the state of consciousness1 and knowing the state of consciousness1 are one and the same thing4 ,and1 if the being in a state of consciousness1 and knowing it1 does not express all that is meant by reflecting upon it 7where reflecting is not used in another sense1 as equivalent with remembering71 it will remain for those who believe there is anything more1 to shew what it is4 ,that the general is derived from the particular1 there will be no hesitation in allowing4 ,the fact1 therefore1 so imperfectly stated1 is1 that1 from individual states of consciousness1 we rise1 by generalization1 as in other cases1 to the general idea which embraces a class4 ,general ,ideas1 on account of their complexity1 are all apt to appear1 to persons little accustomed to examine them closely1 more or less mysterious4 ,but general ideas1 not of the steady objects of sense1 but the fleeting states of consciousness1 which we have so little under command1 and for the naming of which we are so ill provided with terms1 cannot fail to appear mysterious in a much greater degree4 ,what we are now1 therefore1 contemplating is a case of generalization1 which1 how certainly soever1 from the common laws of the human mind1 we know that it is made1 it is far from easy distinctly to conceive4 ,and those of my readers1 who have followed me easily in this deduction1 may be satisfied they have made no slight progress in metaphysical science4 #agi ,it is evident1 when all this is clearly understood1 that what has been mysteriously set forth1 under the name of an ,idea of ,,reflection1 is simply the generalization of particular states of consciousness2 which particular states of consciousness are our sensations and ideas4 ,there are various cases of this generalization1 some more1 some less1 extensive4 ,in the same manner as we generalize the having of a single idea2 and conceive1 not the having of this idea1 or that idea1 but the having of any idea1 and all ideas2 we also generalize the having two associated ideas1 and1 from particulars1 mount up to the general idea of the association1 or train1 of ideas4 ,it is needless to be particular in referring to the specific cases4 ,we have seen what combination of ideas constitutes the case of memory4 ,individual instances of memory are generalized2 these peculiar combinations are viewed as a class2 hence the general idea1 and general name of the class4 ,the explanation is obviously the same1 in other cases1 as ,judgment1 ,reasoning1 ,belief1 ,willing4 ,we know what is the particular case of association on which each of these names is bestowed4 ,we know what is the state of consciousness1 on each individual occasion of ,judging1 ,reasoning1 and so forth4 ,generalization is performed4 ,the particular instances are viewed as composing a class4 ,the ,idea of the class is the ,idea of ,reflection4#cd ,editor's footnote #cd3 ,to reflect on any of our feelings or mental acts is more properly identified with attending to the feeling1 than1 7as stated in the text7 with merely having it4 ,the author scarcely #ahj recognises this as a difference4 ,he sometimes indeed seems to consider attention as mental repetition2 but in his chapter on the ,will1 we shall find that he there identifies attending to a feeling with merely having the feeling4 ,i conceive1 on the contrary1 7with the great majority of psychologists7 that there is an important distinction between the two things2 the ignoring of which has led the author into errors4 ,what the distinction is1 ,i have endeavoured to shew in my note to the chapter on ,consciousness2 and the subject will return upon us hereafter4--,ed4 #aha ,,chapter ,,xvi4 ,,the ,,distinction ,,between ,,the ,,intellectual ,,and ,,active ,,powers ,,of ,,the ,,human ,,mind4 ,it is the greatest triumph of philosophy to refer many1 and seemingly very various1 phenomena1 to one1 or a very few1 simple principles3 and the more simple and evident such a principle is1 provided it be truly applicable to all the cases in question1 the greater is its value and scientific beauty4--,elements of ,logic1 by ,dr4 ,whately1 p4 #cb4 ,,the ,phenomena of ,thought have long appeared to be divisible into two great classes2 which were distinguished by the names1 the one of the ,intellectual1 the other of the ,active1 ,powers of the ,human ,mind4 ,in the phenomena which compose the first of those classes1 and which we have now pretty completely surveyed1 the sensations and ideas are considered merely as existing4 ,in the phenomena which compose the second of the two classes1 the sensations and ideas are to be considered as not merely existing1 but also as exciting to action4#ce ,bain's footnote #ce3 ,instead of ,the phenomena of ,thought1 substitute the phenomena of ,mind1 the ,subject1 or the ,subject ,consciousness4 ,the use of the word ,thought seems to justify an opinion held by ,hamilton and by the ,german philosophers1 that thought1 or the cognitive function is the basis of mind1 instead of being co-ordinate with the other leading functions 7,feeling and ,will47 ,there is no evidence elsewhere that the author shares this opinion4 ,the defectiveness of the two-fold classification of the mind1 which seems to have descended from ,aristotle1 and is only in the present generation supplanted by an explicitly worked-out triple division1 is especially apparent in the handling of all the succeeding chapters of the present work4 ,the ,will1 or the activity of the system1 is spoken of as set on indiscriminately by sensations and ideas2 which1 as will be seen1 is to mix together a number of entirely distinct processes4 ,there is no adequate separation of the emotional part of a ,sensation1 from its intellectual or knowledge-giving part4 ,the same confusion extends to the word idea1 which1 without premonition1 is employed for the memory of pleasures and pains1 and for the memory of sensations of the intellectual or knowledge-giving kind4 ,there is1 as might be expected1 an insufficient treatment of the special forms of ,emotion2 there being no basis laid for their exhaustive or natural classification4--,b4 #ahb ,with respect to the sensations and ideas which compose the phenomena of the first class1 we have observed1 that they are apt to be formed into clusters of more or less complexity2 and that they follow one another1 in trains1 according to certain laws4 ,the sensations and ideas1 which compose the phenomena of the second class1 are equally formed into clusters1 with those composing the phenomena of the former class2 and follow one another1 in trains1 according to the same laws4 ,so far1 the two classes of phenomena agree2 and so far1 the analysis1 which we have endeavoured to effect of the former class1 is to be taken as the analysis also of the latter4 ,our object1 now1 is1 to trace to their #ahc source the differences which constitute this a separate class2 to mark the subdivisions into which it can be most conveniently distributed2 and to demonstrate the simple laws1 into which the whole phenomena of human life1 so numerous1 and apparently so diversified1 may all be easily resolved4 #ahd ,,chapter ,,xvii4 ,,pleasurable ,,and ,,painful ,,sensations4 ,,there is a remarkable difference of sensations1 which has been mentioned before1 but which must now be more particularly attended to4 ,some sensations1 probably the greater number1 are what we call indifferent4 ,they are not considered as either painful1 or pleasurable4 ,there are sensations1 however1 and of frequent recurrence1 some of which are painful1 some pleasurable4 ,the difference is1 that which is felt4 ,a man knows it1 by feeling it2 and this is the whole account of the phenomenon4 ,i have one sensation1 and then another1 and then another4 ,the first is of such a kind1 that ,i care not whether it is long or short2 the second is of such a kind that ,i would put an end to it instantly if ,i could2 the third is of such a kind1 that ,i like it prolonged4 ,to distinguish those feelings1 ,i give them names4 ,i call the first ,indifferent2 the second1 ,painful2 the third4 ,pleasurable2 very often1 for shortness1 ,i call the second1 ,pain1 the third1 ,pleasure4 ,we formerly shewed1 that having a sensation and #ahe knowing it1 are not two things1 but one and the same thing2 that having two sensations and knowing them1 are not two things1 but one and the same thing4 ,it is obvious1 therefore1 that having three sensations1 an ,indifferent1 a ,pleasurable1 and a ,painful1 and knowing them for what they are1 are not different things1 but one and the same thing4 ,the pleasurable and painful sensations are common to all the senses4 ,we have pleasures and pains of the eye1 of the ear1 of the touch1 the taste1 the smell1 and also of many internal parts of the body1 for which1 though1 as we shall presently see1 they hold a great share in composing the springs of human action1 we have not names1 nor any means of accurate estimation4#cf ,editor's footnote #cf3 ,in the case of many pleasurable or painful sensations1 it is open to question whether the pleasure or pain1 especially the pleasure1 is not something added to the sensation1 and capable of being detached from it1 rather than merely a particular aspect or quality of the sensation4 ,it is often observable that a sensation is much less pleasurable at one time than at another1 though to our consciousness it appears exactly the same sensation in all except the pleasure4 ,this is emphatically the fact in cases of satiety1 or of loss of taste for a sensation by loss of novelty4 ,it is probable that in such cases the pleasure may depend on different nerves1 or on a different action of the same nerves1 from the remaining part of the sensation4 ,however this may be1 the pleasure or pain attending a sensation is 7like the feelings of ,likeness1 ,succession1 c47 capable of being mentally abstracted from the sensation1 or1 in other words1 capable of being attended to by itself4 ,and in any case ,mr4 ,bain's distinction holds good1 between the emotional part or property of a sensation 7in which he includes the #ahf pleasure or pain belonging to it7 and its intellectual or knowledge-giving part4 ,it must be remembered1 however1 that these are not exclusive of one another2 the knowledge-giving part is not necessarily emotional1 but the emotional part is and must be knowledge-giving4 ,the pleasure or pain of the feeling are subjects of intellectual apprehension2 they give the knowledge of themselves and of their varieties4--,ed4 #ahg ,,chapter ,,xviii4 ,,causes ,,of ,,the ,,pleasurable ,,and ,,painful ,,sensations4 ,,next in order to the ,pleasurable and ,painful ,sensations1 it is necessary to take notice of the causes of them4 ,we can generally trace them to certain constant antecedents2 and it is evidently of the greatest importance to us to be able to do so2 as it is by those means only1 we can lessen the number of the painful sensations1 increase the number of the pleasurable4 ,of the causes of our ,pleasurable and ,painful ,sensations1 it is necessary to distinguish two classes2 first1 the immediate causes2 secondly1 the remote causes2 a remote1 being not1 strictly speaking1 the cause of the sensation1 but the cause of that cause4 ,thus1 the lash of the executioner is the immediate cause of the pain of the criminal4 ,the sentence of the ,judge1 is the cause of that cause4 ,the sound of the violin is the immediate cause of the pleasure of my ear2 the performance of the musician1 the cause of that sound2 the money with which ,i have hired the musician1 the cause of that performance4 ,the money is1 in this case1 the cause of the cause of the cause of the sensation2 or the cause1 at two removes4 #ahh ,it is necessary to be remarked1 respecting the causes of our pleasurable and painful sensations1 that1 they are apt to become greater objects of concern to us1 to rank higher in importance1 than the sensations themselves4 ,it is a vulgar observation1 with respect to money1 for example1 that1 though useful only for obtaining pleasure1 or saving from pain1 it is often employed for neither purpose1 but hugged as a good in itself4 ,the importance attached to the cause of the sensation1 is a case of association easy to be traced4 ,the pleasurable and painful sensations themselves are1 specifically1 not numerous4 ,the causes of them1 on the other hand1 are exceedingly numerous1 and diversified4 ,again2 the mind is not much interested in attending to the sensation4 ,the sensation provides for itself4 ,the mind1 however1 is deeply interested in attending to the cause2 that we may prevent1 or remove it1 if the sensation is painful2 provide1 or detain it1 if the sensation is pleasurable4 ,this creates a habit of passing rapidly from the sensation1 to fix our attention upon its cause4 #ahi ,,chapter ,,xix4 ,,ideas ,,of ,,the ,,pleasurable ,,and ,,painful ,,sensations1 ,,and ,,of ,,the ,,causes ,,of ,,them4 ,,we have already seen1 that all sensations are capable of being revived1 without that action on the organs of sense which originally produced them2 and that1 when so revived1 we call them ideas or copies of the sensations4 ,the sensations which are pleasurable and painful1 are revived in the same manner as those which are indifferent2 but1 as the sensations which are pleasurable and painful form a class of sensations remarkably distinguished from sensations of the indifferent class1 the ideas of the pleasurable and painful sensations form a class of ideas1 no less remarkably distinguished from the ideas of the indifferent sensations4 ,it is necessary to endeavour by a particular effort to distinguish accurately from all other feelings that peculiar state of consciousness1 which we call the idea of a pleasurable or painful sensation2 in other words1 that sensation revived1 after the operation upon the senses has ceased4 ,this state of consciousness1 like other states1 is known only by having it4 ,what it is felt to be1 it is4 #aij ,we can afford1 therefore1 no aid to the reader in distinguishing it1 otherwise than by using such expressions as seem calculated to fix his attention upon it4 ,it is his own inward1 invisible state1 which only he can mark for himself4 ,the idea of a pain or pleasure1 is not a pain or pleasure4 ,we do not say that the idea of the hand scalded is a pain1 or the idea of a sweet smell is a pleasure4 ,but this is not very satisfactory language2 for it1 in reality1 means little more1 than that the idea of a pleasurable or painful sensation1 is not a sensation4 ,that there are some trains of ideas1 however1 which it is agreeable to have1 others which it is disagreeable1 is one among the most familiar facts of our nature4 ,there is1 therefore1 a distinction among ideas1 analogous to that of pleasurable and painful among sensations4 ,it is difficult to think of any one sensation by itself2 because each is so combined with others1 that the idea of one can never present itself1 but in company with more4 ,this is peculiarly the case with sensations of the pleasurable and painful kinds3 and hence the cause of the indistinctness1 which seems to accompany the idea of any of those sensations1 when we endeavour to take it apart1 and consider what it is in itself4 ,an idea is the revival of a former state of feeling4 ,the first thing which ,i have to consider is1 what is my precise state of consciousness1 when ,i receive a pleasurable or painful sensation4 ,when the sensation was present1 suppose a painful one1 it was a state of consciousness1 so interesting to me1 that it was important to find a mark for it4 ,i #aia called it ,pain4 ,it is a state of consciousness known to every man by his having had it1 and it can be known by no other means4 ,we call it by various names2 an odious state1 a disagreeable state1 and so on2 but these are only several modes of marking what is felt1 and tell to no man anything more than his feeling has told4 ,except for his own knowledge of his own feeling1 the words would be utterly without a meaning4 ,such is the state of consciousness under the sensation4 ,i revive the sensation4 ,my state of consciousness under the sensation ,i called a pain4 ,my state of consciousness under the idea of the pain1 ,i call1 not a pain1 but an aversion4 ,an aversion is the idea of a pain4 ,whatever is included under the term idea of pain1 is included precisely under the term aversion4 ,they are not two things1 but two names for the same thing4 ,the same explanation applies to the case of a pleasurable sensation4 ,the state of consciousness under the sensation1 that is1 the sensation itself1 differed from other sensations1 in that it was agreeable4 ,a name was wanted to denote this peculiarity2 to mark1 as a class1 the sensations which possess it4 ,the term1 ,pleasure1 was adopted4 ,i revive the sensation2 in other words1 have the idea2 and as ,i had occasion for a name to class the sensations1 ,i have occasion for a name to class the ideas4 ,my state of consciousness under the sensation1 ,i call a ,pleasure3 my state of consciousness under the idea1 that is1 the idea itself1 ,i call a ,desire4 ,the term ,idea of a pleasure1 expresses precisely the same thing as the term1 ,desire4 ,it does so by the very import of the words4 ,the #aib idea of a pleasure1 is the idea of something as good to have4 ,but what is a desire1 other than the idea of something as good to have2 good to have1 being really nothing but desirable to have8 ,the terms1 therefore1 idea of pleasure1 and desire1 are but two names2 the thing named1 the state of consciousness1 is one and the same4 ,there is an ambiguity1 however1 in the terms ,aversion1 and ,desire1 which contributes not a little to cast darkness upon this part of our inquiry4 ,they are applied to the ideas of the ,causes of our ,pleasurable and ,painful ,sensations1 as well as to the ideas of those ,sensations2 and1 of course1 in a different sense4 ,we say we have an aversion to certain kinds of food1 or certain drugs2 we have a desire for water to drink1 for fire to warm us1 and so on4 ,when we examine these phrases narrowly1 we find that it is not literally1 but by a sort of figure of speech1 that the terms ,aversion1 and ,desire1 are applied to the ,causes of ,pains and ,pleasures4 ,properly speaking1 it is not to the food1 or the drug1 that we have the aversion1 but to the disagreeable taste4 ,the food is a substance of a certain colour1 and consistence2 so is the drug4 ,there is nothing in these qualities which is offensive to us2 only the taste4 ,in like manner1 it is not the water we desire1 but the pleasure of drinking2 not the fire we desire1 but the pleasure of warmth4 ,the illusion is merely that of a very close association4 ,there is no case1 indeed1 of association1 in which the union is more intimate1 than that between the idea of a pungent sensation1 and its customary cause2 and hence1 there is no wonder that the name #aic which properly belongs to the one1 should be bestowed upon the other1 or rather1 that the name which belongs properly to one1 should be given to the two1 formed into a complex idea1 in conjunction4 ,there is another source of perplexity1 which arises from the connotative power of the terms ,desire1 and ,aversion4 ,they are ,nouns1 in the future tense2 that is1 they connote futurity2 just as ,verbs1 in the future tense1 connote futurity4 ,though the feeling1 called the idea of a pleasurable sensation1 is precisely the feeling called desirableness2 desirableness1 and the idea of something pleasurable1 being convertible terms1 the word ,desire1 whenever it is applied to a particular case1 carries with it a tacit reference to future time4 ,when the idea of a sensation is present1 the sensation itself is not present4 ,the sensation has been1 or is to be4 ,it is difficult1 therefore1 to have the idea of a pleasurable sensation1 without the association of the past1 or the future4 ,the idea of a pleasurable sensation with the association of the ,past1 is never called ,desire4 ,the word ,desire1 is commonly used to mark the idea of a pleasurable sensation1 when the ,future is associated with it4 ,the idea of a pleasurable sensation1 to come1 is what is commonly meant by ,desire4 ,we have1 however1 no other name to mark the idea1 when it is considered by itself1 and without reference to the past1 or the future4 ,in these cases1 ,desire1 and the idea of a pleasurable sensation2 ,aversion1 and the idea of a painful sensation1 are convertible terms4 ,from this exposition1 it follows1 that the number of our desires is the same with that of our pleasurable sensations2 the number of our aversions1 the same #aid with that of our painful sensations2 just as the number of our simple ideas of sight1 is the same with that of our sensations of sight2 the number of our simple ideas of sound1 taste1 or smell1 the same with that of our sensations of sound1 taste1 or smell4#cg ,editor's footnote #cg3 ,the principal doctrine of this chapter is1 that ,desire1 and ,aversion1 are nothing but the idea of a pleasurable sensation1 and the ,idea of a painful sensation3 which doctrine is then qualified by saying1 that a desire is the idea of a pleasure associated with the future1 an aversion the idea of a pain associated with the future4 ,but according to the whole spirit of the author's speculations1 and to his express affirmation in the beginning of the next chapter1 the idea of any sensation associated with the future1 constitutes the ,expectation of it3 and if so1 it rested with him to prove that the expectation of a pleasure1 or of a pain1 is the same thing with the desire1 or aversion4 ,this is certainly not conformable to common observation4 ,for1 on the one hand1 it is commonly understood that there may be desire or aversion without expectation2 and on the other1 expectation of a pleasure without any actual feeling of desire3 one may expect1 and even look forward with satisfaction to1 the pleasure of a meal1 although one is not1 but only expects to be1 hungry4 ,so perfectly is it assumed that expectation1 and desire or aversion1 are not necessarily combined1 that the case in which they are combined is signified by a special pair of names4 ,desire combined with expectation1 is called by the name of ,hope2 ,aversion combined with expectation1 is known by the name of ,fear4 ,i believe the fact to be that desire is not ,expectation1 but is more than the idea of the pleasure desired1 being1 in truth1 the initiatory stage of ,will4 ,in what we call ,desire there is1 ,i think1 always included a positive stimulation to action2 either to the definite course of action which would lead to our #aie obtaining the pleasure1 or to a general restlessness and vague seeking after it4 ,the stimulation may fall short of actually producing action3 even when it prompts to a definite act1 it may be repressed by a stronger motive1 or by knowledge that the pleasure is not within present reach1 nor can be brought nearer to us by any present action of our own4 ,still1 there is1 ,i think1 always1 the sense of a tendency to action1 in the direction of pursuit of the pleasure1 though the tendency may be overpowered by an external or an internal restraint4 ,so also1 in aversion1 there is always a tendency to action of the kind which repels or avoids the painful sensation4 ,but of these things more fully under the head of ,will4--,ed4 #aif ,,chapter ,,xx4 ,,the ,,pleasurable ,,and ,,painful ,,sensations1 ,,contemplated ,,as ,,passed ,,or ,,as ,,future4 ,,we have considered1 what the pleasurable and painful sensations are when present2 what the ideas of them1 considered as present1 are2 and what the ideas of their causes4 ,those sensations1 however1 together with their causes1 we may contemplate1 either as passed1 or as future3 and so contemplated1 they give rise to some of the most interesting states of the human mind4 ,to contemplate any feeling as ,passed1 is to remember it2 and the explanation of ,memory we need not repeat4 ,to contemplate any feeling as ,future1 is merely a case of that ,anticipation of the future from the passed1 of which1 also1 we have already given the explanation4 ,when my finger was in the flame of the candle and burned1 the painful sensation was present4 ,the state of consciousness1 however1 was complex1 and consisted of several ingredients2 the sight of the burning candle1 the sight of my finger1 the sense of a certain position or locality1 namely1 that of my #aig finger and the candle1 the painful sensation1 and the belief that it was my sensation2 in other words1 the association of that thread of consciousness in which1 to me1 my being consists1 with the present sensation4 ,the painful feeling was thus a feeling deeply imbedded among others4 ,when ,i remember this state of consciousness1 the idea of it1 which makes part of the memory1 is by no means a simple idea4 ,it is composed of the ideas of all the above-mentioned sensations1 together with that of the train of consciousness1 which ,i call myself4 ,this last is necessary to constitute it my idea4 ,this idea1 thus existing as my idea1 and my present idea1 is associated with that part of my train or thread of consciousness which has intervened1 between the present state and the remembered state2 and by this last association the idea becomes memory4 ,the anticipation of the ,future is the same series of association2 with this difference1 that1 in memory1 the association of the train of consciousness1 which converts the idea into memory1 is from consequent to antecedent1 that is1 backwards2 the association in the case of anticipation is from antecedent to consequent1 forwards4 ,in anticipation1 as in memory1 there is1 first1 the complex idea1 as above2 next1 the passage of the mind forwards from the present state of consciousness1 the antecedent1 to one consequent after another1 till it comes to the anticipated sensation4 ,suppose1 that1 as a punishment1 a man is condemned to put his finger after two days in the flame of a candle2 wherein consists his anticipation8 ,the complex idea1 as described above1 of the painful sensation1 with all its #aih concomitant sensations and ideas1 is the first part of the process4 ,the remainder is the association with this idea of the events1 one after another1 which are to fill up the intermediate time1 and terminate with his finger placed in the flame of the candle4 ,the whole of this association1 taken together1 comprises the idea of the pain as his pain1 after a train of antecedents4 ,the process of anticipation is so precisely the same1 when the sensation is of the pleasurable kind1 that ,i deem it unnecessary to repeat it4#ch ,editor's footnote #ch3 ,this is the first place in which the author gives his analysis of ,expectation2 and his theory of it is1 as all theories of it must be1 the exact counterpart of the same person's theory of ,memory4 ,he resolves it into the mere ,idea of the expected event1 accompanied by the idea of the events1 one after another1 which are to begin with the present moment1 and end with the expected event4 ,but in this case1 as in that of ,memory1 the objection recurs1 that all this may exist in the case of mere ,imagination4 ,a man may conceive himself being hanged1 or elevated to a throne1 and may construct in his mind a series of possible or conceivable events1 through which he can fancy each of these results to be brought about4 ,if he is a man of lively imagination1 this idea of the events which are to fill up the intermediate time may be at least as copious1 as the idea of the series of coming events for a year from the present time1 which according to the author's theory ,i have in my mind when ,i look forward to commencing a journey twelve months hence4 ,yet he neither expects to be hanged1 nor to be made a king1 still less both1 which1 to bear out the theory1 it would seem that he ought4 ,the difference between ,expectation and mere ,imagination1 as well as between ,memory and ,imagination1 consists in the presence or absence of ,belief2 and though this is no explanation of either phenomenon1 it brings us back to one and the same real problem1 which ,i have so often referred to1 and which neither the author nor any other thinker has yet solved--the difference between knowing something as a ,reality1 and as a mere ,thought2 a distinction similar and parallel to that between a ,sensation and an ,idea4--,ed4 #aii ,in contemplating a painful or pleasurable sensation as past1 that is1 remembering it1 the mind is in general tranquil4 ,the state is not1 perhaps1 a state of indifference2 but it is not so far removed from it1 as to call attention to itself1 or require a name to mark it4 ,the case is different1 when the sensation is contemplated as future1 or anticipated4 ,the state of consciousness is then far removed from a state of indifference4 ,it admits of two cases4 ,one is1 when the sensation is contemplated as certainly future2 the other is1 when it is contemplated as not certainly future4 ,when a pleasurable sensation is contemplated as future1 but not certainly1 the state of consciousness is called ,hope4 ,when a painful sensation is contemplated as future1 but not certainly1 the state of consciousness is called ,fear4#ci ,editor's footnote #ci3 ,the author's definitions of ,hope and ,fear differ from those offered in my note 7p4 #aid74 ,he considers these words to signify that the pleasure or the pain is contemplated as future1 but without certainty4 ,it must be admitted that the words are often applied to very faint degrees of anticipation1 far short of those which in popular language would be spoken of as ,expectation3 but ,i think the terms are not inconsistent with the fullest assurance4 ,a man is about to undergo a painful surgical operation4 ,he has no doubt whatever about the event2 he fully intends it2 there are no other means1 perhaps1 of saving his life4 ,yet the feeling with which he looks forward to it1 and with which he contemplates the preparations for it1 are such as would1 ,i think1 by the custom of language1 be designated as fear4 ,death1 again1 is the most certain of all future events1 yet we speak of the fear of death4 ,it is perhaps more doubtful whether the fully assured anticipation of a desired enjoyment would receive1 in ordinary parlance1 the name of ,hope2 yet some common phrases seem to imply that it would4 ,we read even on tombstones the sure hope of a joyful immortality4 ,a still more restricted application of the word ,fear1 also justified by usage1 is to the case in which the feeling amounts to a disturbing passion2 and to this meaning ,mr ,bain1 as will be seen in a future note1 thinks it desirable to confine it4--,ed4 #bjj ,again3 ,when a pleasurable sensation is anticipated with certainty1 we call the state of consciousness ,joy4 ,when a painful sensation is thus anticipated1 we call it ,sorrow4 ,neither of the two terms is good2 because not confined to this signification4 ,both are applied to name other things1 also1 which we shall presently have occasion to notice4 ,they are1 therefore1 a source of confusion4 #bja ,,chapter ,,xxi4 ,,the ,,causes ,,of ,,pleasurable ,,and ,,painful ,,sensations1 ,,contemplated ,,as ,,passed1 ,,or ,,as ,,future4 ,,section ,i4 ,,the ,,immediate ,,causes ,,of ,,pleasurable ,,and ,,painful ,,sensations1 ,,contemplated ,,as ,,passed1 ,,or ,,as ,,future4 ,,beside the ,sensations1 the ,causes of them are capable of being contemplated1 both as passed1 and as future4 ,it may be regarded as remarkable1 that though the idea or thought of a disagreeable sensation1 as passed1 is nearly indifferent1 the thought of the cause of a painful passed sensation is often a very interesting state of consciousness4 ,this state of consciousness we sometimes call ,antipathy1 sometimes ,hatred2 though hatred1 as we shall afterwards see1 is more frequently the name of the ,motive to which it gives birth4 ,we have1 however1 but one concrete term for both of these abstracts1 the verb to hate1 which1 of course1 performs its business ill4 ,from this1 however1 it no doubt comes1 that the word ,hatred is often used as synonymous with ,antipathy4 #bjb ,this is a case of association1 which deserves a little attention4 ,the idea of the cause of a painful sensation is so closely associated with that of the sensation1 that the one never exists without the other4 ,but this is not all4 ,the anticipation of the future from the passed1 is so strong an association1 that1 in interesting cases1 it is indissoluble4 ,the thought of the ,cause of a passed painful sensation1 is the idea of an antecedent and a consequent4 ,the idea of the passed antecedent and consequent is instantly followed by that of a future antecedent and consequent2 and thus the feeling partakes of the nature of the anticipation of a future painful sensation4 ,the association may be but momentary1 as it may instantly be checked by other associations4 ,but1 being momentary1 it existed1 and its existence is sufficient to account for the difference1 which is often observable1 between the state of consciousness when the sensation is remembered1 and the state of consciousness when the cause of the sensation is remembered4 ,when the sensation is remembered singly1 there is not that association of a passed antecedent and consequent1 which is instantly followed by that of a future antecedent and consequent of the same kind4 ,that association takes place in the case of the remembered cause2 and hence the difference1 with which every man is acquainted4#dj ,editor's footnote #dj3 ,the difference here brought to notice between the very slight emotion excited in most cases by the idea of a past pain1 and the strong feeling excited by the idea of the cause of a past pain1 will be confirmed by every one's experience2 and is rightly explained by the author1 as arising from the fact that what has caused a past pain has an interest affecting the future1 since it may cause future pains4 ,it is noticeable that the author nowhere explains why the thought of a pain as future is so much more painful1 than the thought of a past pain when detached from all apprehension for the future2 why the expectation of an evil is generally so much worse than the remembrance of one4 ,this fact might have made him doubt the sufficiency of his theory of ,memory and ,expectation2 since1 according to his analysis1 neither of them is anything but the idea of the pain itself1 associated in each case with a series of events which may be intrinsically indifferent2 and if there were no elements in the case but those which he has pointed out1 no sufficient reason is apparent why there should be any inequality of painfulness between the remembrance and the expectation4--,ed4 #bjc ,the thought of the cause of a passed agreeable sensation or sensations1 is also very often an interesting state of consciousness4 ,it is called by the names both of ,sympathy1 and ,love4 ,neither of the terms is confined to this signification2 they are both1 therefore1 bad names1 and a great cause of confusion of ideas2 as we shall see in other instances hereafter4 ,the pleasurable sensations not being so pungent as the painful1 it but rarely happens that the immediate cause of a single passed pleasurable sensation is an object of interest3 the cause of the cessation1 however1 of a painful sensation is so1 not unfrequently4 ,the traveller1 who was ready to perish with thirst in the desert1 can never afterwards think of the well which relieved him1 without emotion4 ,the states of consciousness which exist when we contemplate the causes of our painful and pleasurable sensations as ,future1 are easily analysed1 after what has been shewn4 ,it is a case of the anticipation of the future from the passed2 with this peculiarity1 that #bjd the final antecedent and consequent are interesting1 the one as a pleasurable or painful ,feeling1 the other as the cause of it4 ,if the anticipated sensation is painful1 and contemplated as certain1 the associated ideas of the cause and effect constitute a state of consciousness1 which we mark by various forms of expression1 but for which we have no appropriate name4 ,we call it ,hatred1 we call it ,aversion1 we call it ,horror4 ,we call the object hateful1 or disgusting1 or loathsome1 according to the nature of the anticipated sensation4 ,when the sensation is contemplated as not certainly future1 the state of mind is what we call ,dread1 in some one or other of its numerous modifications4 ,when the cause of a pleasure is contemplated as certainly future1 such object is associated with the feeling called ,joy2 when it is contemplated as not certainly future1 it is associated with the feeling called ,hope4 ,what the feelings1 ,joy1 and ,hope1 are1 we have so recently seen1 that it cannot be forgotten4 ,in the association of the cause of a pleasure with both1 the state of consciousness has no more appropriate name than that of ,love4 ,an object contemplated as a future cause of future pleasure1 is an object loved1 whether the anticipation is certain or uncertain4#da ,bain's footnote #da3 ,a distinction should be drawn between ,aversion and ,fear4 ,we may be very much averse to a thing1 and yet not fear it4 ,a courageous person is not necessarily wanting in aversions or dislikes1 or in labours for warding off what is disagreeable4 ,anything that gives us pain1 when approaching or imminent1 is viewed with aversion1 and stimulates efforts of counteraction1 or escape2 and yet it may not inspire the state properly named ,fear4 ,the distinguishing characteristic of fear is an unhinging #bje excitement1 a disturbance of the serenity and balance of the mind1 inducing exaggerated1 disproportioned or misplaced exertions4 ,one of the causes of fear is approaching evil1 but the effect does not always happen4 ,the evil may work its proper effect upon the will1 namely to prevent or evade it1 without any of the perturbing accessories called being terrified or afraid4--,b4 #bjf ,,section ,,ii4 ,,the ,,remote ,,causes ,,of ,,pleasurable ,,and ,,painful ,,sensations1 ,,contemplated ,,as ,,past1 ,,or ,,future4 ,before entering into the detail of this part of the subject1 one important observation is to be made2 that the remote causes of our ,pains and ,pleasures are apt to be objects1 far more deeply interesting1 than those which are immediate4 ,this at first sight appears paradoxical4 ,it is the necessary result1 however1 of the general ,law of our nature4 ,the immediate causes of our pleasurable and painful sensations have never any very extensive operation4 ,the idea of any one is rarely associated with more than a limited number of pains or pleasures4 ,food1 for example1 the cause of the pleasures of eating2 pleasures1 perhaps1 from the frequency with which they are repeated1 and the portion of life over which they are spread1 more valuable1 as a class1 than any other which we enjoy2 has never appeared an object of sufficient interest1 to make the affection with which it is regarded be thought worthy of a name4 ,the idea of ,food1 though associated with pleasures which constitute so important a class1 is associated with the pleasures but of one class3 some of the remote causes are associated with the pleasures of almost every class4 ,money1 for example1 instrumental in procuring the causes of almost all our pleasures1 and removing the #bjg causes of a large proportion of our pains1 is associated with the ideas of most of the pleasurable states of our nature4 ,the idea of an object associated with a hundred times as many pleasures as another1 is of course a hundred times more interesting4 99 99 99 99 99 ,,sub-,,section ,i4 ,wealth1 ,power1 and ,dignity1 and their ,contraries1 ,contemplated as ,causes of our ,pleasures and ,pains4 ,as among the remote causes of our pleasures and pains may be reckoned everything which in any way contributes to them1 it follows that the number of such causes is exceedingly great4 ,of course it is only the principal cases which have been attended to1 and classed under ,titles4 ,they are mostly comprehended under the following3--,wealth1 ,power1 ,dignity1 as regards the pleasurable sensations2--,poverty1 ,impotence1 ,contemptibility1 as regards the painful sensations4 ,what our states of consciousness are1 when we are said to contemplate these causes of pains and pleasures1 with reference to ourselves1 or as causes of our own pleasures and pains1 we now proceed to inquire4 ,one remarkable thing is first of all to be noticed3 the three1 above named1 grand causes of our pleasures agree in this1 that they all are the means of procuring for us the ,services of our fellow-creatures1 and themselves contribute to our pleasures in hardly any other way4 ,it is obvious from this remark1 that the grand #bjh cause of all our pleasures are the services of our fellow-creatures2 since ,wealth1 ,power1 and ,dignity1 which appear to most people to sum up the means of human happiness1 are nothing more than means of procuring those services4 ,this is a fact of the highest possible importance1 both in ,morals1 and in ,philosophy4 ,that ,wealth1 ,power1 and ,dignity do procure for us pleasurable sensations only by procuring for us the services of our fellow-creatures1 a short illustration will suffice to shew4 ,wealth enables us either to purchase directly the services of other men1 as of those whom we desire to have in attendance about us2 or to purchase commodities2 or1 it adds to our ,power and ,dignity4 ,as far as it purchases the services of others directly1 the truth of what we have advanced is obvious4 ,it is hardly less obvious1 that when we purchase commodities1 which are the fruit of other men's labour1 we1 in reality1 do nothing but purchase the services of those men1 who1 in fact1 were working for us1 when working at the goods which we ultimately consume4 ,in as far as ,wealth adds to ,power1 and ,dignity1 it is included under those several heads4 ,a man's ,power means the readiness of other men to obey him4 ,now one man obeys another1 from the prospect1 either of good if he obeys1 or of evil if he does not obey4 ,wealth is the great means of procuring obedience1 through the medium of good4 ,all hire of services1 is through that medium4 ,the power of inflicting evil1 in case of disobedience1 and of procuring services by fear1 is what in the more peculiar sense1 is meant by the term ,power4 ,it is to be #bji observed1 that the range of obedience1 obtained by fear1 is capable of much greater enlargement1 than that which is obtained by hope4 ,the means any man has of paying for the services of others1 extends at most to some thousands2 the means which some men have had of imposing their commands on other men1 through fear1 has extended to many millions4 ,dignity is a word of much more vague signification1 than ,wealth1 or ,power4 ,it is1 therefore1 much more difficult1 to describe clearly its mode of operation4 ,dignity1 is commonly said to be that which procures us the respect of other men4 ,but what is this respect8 ,it is not a mere barren feeling in the mind of another man1 regarded as wholly unconnected with his actions4 ,it is regarded as a sentiment in his breast1 from which actions favourable to us may proceed4 ,it derives its whole value to us from the actions which it is likely to produce4 ,for the present purpose1 therefore1 we consider the word ,dignity1 as expressing all that1 in1 and about1 a man1 which is calculated to procure him the services of others1 without the immediate application either of reward1 or of fear4 ,wealth1 and ,power1 are the grand constituents of ,dignity2 and procure a man services beyond the immediate sphere1 either of the good1 or the evil1 he can dispense4 ,this is a remarkable case of association2 and a source of very important consequences in human life4 ,our proneness to sympathize with the ,rich and ,great1 has often been taken notice of1 as a remarkable phenomenon in human nature4 ,this has been described #baj as a readiness to go along with them in their affections2 to desire the accomplishment of their ends2 and to lend ourselves for the attainment of them4 ,i believe it will be sufficient1 if ,i barely indicate the mode of analysing the complicated sentiment1 which is thus described4 ,with command over the means of all sorts of pleasures1 we associate strongly the idea of happiness2 the idea of happiness1 is an agreeable idea2 and the idea of whatever disturbs it1 painful4 ,the first idea is a desire2 the second1 an aversion4 ,beside this2 with the ,power of dispensing a great deal of good1 or evil1 we associate strongly the idea of the actual dispensation2 that is1 the idea of a great number of individuals benefited1 or hurt4 ,but no association of good or evil to individuals is so constant and inseparable with the causes of them1 as that of good or evil to ourselves4 ,this association takes place in the case which we are now considering4 ,it may have been but momentary4 ,it may have been instantly overpowered by other associations1 by association of the circumstances which exclude the ,belief4 ,still it had a momentary existence2 and1 in its consequences1 presents a remarkable instance of those two very important facts1 first pointed out distinctly to the attention of philosophers by ,professor ,stewart2 ,first1 that feelings1 so momentary as not to be recognised the moment after they have passed1 may not only have existed1 but have given its whole character to some important phenomenon of the human mind2 and1 ,secondly1 that there is no conception1 that is1 idea1 without the momentary belief of the existence #baa of its object4#db ,the momentary conception and belief of good and evil to ourselves1 in the association constituting the idea of a man of wealth and power1 has a great share in the character which that association bears4 ,editor's footnote #db3 ,this is the place where the author most clearly enunciates the doctrine which is the indispensable basis of his theory of ,belief1 viz4 that there is no idea without the momentary belief of the existence of its object4 ,this opinion1 as the author observes1 is maintained also by ,dugald ,stewart2 but ,i have never seen any positive evidence in its favour4 ,all which has been established is1 that the belief may have momentarily existed1 although immediately afterwards forgotten1 and replaced by disbelief4 ,but no proof of this momentary existence has been given1 except that it is supposed that what is not believed to be real cannot cause strong emotion 7terror1 for instance71 nor prompt to outward action4 ,yet nothing can be more certain than that a mere idea can exercise direct power over our nerves of motion1 and through them1 over the muscles2 as the author shows by examples further on4 ,it is true that1 as ,mr4 ,bain has pointed out1 this power of an idea over the active energies is the only germ of belief which exists originally1 and the foundation of the power of ,belief in after life2 but it is not the less true that the power of ,belief as it exists in after life1 stands broadly distinguished from the power of the ,fixed ,idea1 and that this last may operate not only without1 but in defiance of1 a positive ,belief4 ,that a contrary belief has momentarily intervened is a mere conjecture1 which can neither be refuted nor proved4--,ed4 ,the ,power of doing good or evil1 though the foundation of our idea of ,dignity1 is not the only ingredient in it2 the ,disposition to make use of it enters for a great share4 ,the disposition to make use of it only for evil1 if carried1 to a certain pitch1 would #bab sink the idea of dignity1 and leave dread and abhorrence in its place4 ,beside the disposition to make a good use of wealth and power1 which is virtue2 ,knowledge1 and ,wisdom enter as an important ingredient in ,dignity4 ,in the possessor of wealth and power1 they are necessary to give effect to his good disposition2 in all men they are an instrument of power2 and they are intimately associated1 in well-educated minds1 with the idea of the great benefits to mankind1 which have been1 and will be1 derived from them4 ,in such minds1 they1 therefore1 inspire a very lively sympathy4 ,i do not think it necessary to lengthen this exposition1 by offering any analysis of the corresponding causes of pain1--,poverty1 ,weakness1 and ,contemptibility4 ,the reader1 after what he has learned1 will1 without difficulty1 perform it for himself ,what we have now to consider1 is the affection or state of mind1 which is formed1 when we contemplate each of those causes1 first1 as the past cause of past sensations1 and secondly1 as the future cause of future sensations4 ,we are singularly ill-provided with names1 to mark those several states of our consciousness4 ,it is very obvious1 that we ought to have two names for each cause2 for example1 one1 to mark the state of mind1 when ,wealth is contemplated as the past cause1 of past sensations1 and one to mark the state of mind1 when it is contemplated as the future cause of future sensations4 ,we have but one name for both4 ,we call by the single name1 ,love of ,wealth1 both the pleasurable state when we associate with the idea of our past wealth the past pleasures we have derived from it1 and #bac when we anticipate the future1 and associate with the idea of future wealth1 the idea of the pleasures to be derived from it4 ,there is no wonder that the two states should be confounded2 and that the love of wealth should be a vague1 indefinite term4 ,the imperfection of our language is the same in regard to the two other causes of our pleasures4 ,the ,love of ,power1 and the ,love of ,dignity1 are names for both states of mind1 both the contemplation of the past1 and the contemplation of the future4 ,the indistinctness of our language here1 too1 prevents the distinctness of our ideas4 ,the word ,hatred1 renders the same service in regard to the causes of evil4 ,hatred of poverty1 is the name for both states of mind1 both that in which the future1 and that in which the past1 is the object of contemplation4 ,hatred of imbecility1 hatred of contemptibility1 are not common expressions1 but we have for the states in question no other names4 ,it is to be observed1 that ,wealth1 ,power1 and ,dignity1 derive a great portion of their efficacy1 from their comparative amount2 that is1 from their being possessed in greater quantity than most other people possess them4 ,in contemplating them with the satisfaction with which powerful causes of pleasure are contemplated1 we seldom fail to include the comparison4 ,and the state of consciousness1 formed by the contemplation and comparison taken together1 is called ,pride4 ,we are said to be proud of our ,wealth1 proud of our ,power1 proud of our ,dignity2 and also1 of any of the ingredients of which our powder or dignity is #bad composed2 of our knowledge1 of our eloquence1 of our family1 of our personal beauty4 ,of course the name has a very different meaning in each of these applications2 a difference1 however1 which in ordinary minds1 the use of the same term1 almost completely confounds4 ,it is obvious1 that1 in the contemplation of our own ,wealth1 ,power1 and ,dignity1 as greater1 we include the contemplation of another man's ,wealth1 ,power1 and ,dignity1 as less4 ,as the state of consciousness1 thus formed1 is called ,pride when the reference is to ourselves1 it is called ,contempt when the reference is to others4 ,when the case is reversed1 and a man contemplates his ,wealth1 ,power1 and ,dignity as less than those of other men1 the state of consciousness is called ,humility4 ,as towards the other member of the comparison1 the men who possess the greater amount of those advantages1 it has the name of ,respect1 or ,admiration4 99 99 99 99 99 ,,sub-,,section ,,ii4 ,our ,fellow-,creatures contemplated as ,causes of our ,pleasures and ,pains4 ,wealth1 ,power1 and ,dignity1 being the origin of such powerful affections as we find them to be1 though the causes of ,pleasure to us only by being the causes of the actions of our ,fellow-creatures2 it would be wonderful1 if our ,fellow-creatures themselves1 the #bae more immediate causes of those actions1 should not be the origin of affections4 ,this is not the case4 ,our ,fellow-creatures are the origin of affections of the greatest influence in human life2 to the examination of which it is now our business to proceed4 ,it is1 in the first place1 however1 to be observed1 that ,wealth1 ,power1 and ,dignity1 afford perhaps the most remarkable of all examples of that extraordinary case of association1 where the means to an end1 means valuable to us solely on account of their end1 not only engross more of our attention than the end itself1 but actually supplant it in our affections4 ,what the associating process is by which this effect is produced1 we need not stay to inquire4 ,that it is produced1 to a remarkable degree1 in the case of ,wealth1 ,power1 and ,dignity1 is familiar to every man's observation4 ,how few men seem to be at all concerned about their fellow-creatures6 ,how completely are the lives of most men absorbed1 in the pursuits of wealth1 and ambition6 ,with how many men does the love of ,family1 of ,friend1 of ,country1 of ,mankind1 appear completely impotent1 when opposed to their love of ,wealth1 or of ,power6 ,this is an effect of misguided association1 which requires the greatest attention in ,education1 and ,morals4 ,we contemplate our ,fellow-creatures as causes of our ,pleasures1 either ,individually1 or in ,groups4 ,we shall consider the several cases1 which have attracted sufficient attention to be distinguished by names3 #ast1 ,that of ,friendship2 #b;dly1 ,that of ,kindness2 #c;dly1 ,that of ,family2 #dthly1 ,that of ,country2 #ethly1 ,that of ,party2 and #fthly1 ,that of ,mankind4 #baf #a4--;,friendship4 ,in what manner the associations are formed constituting that feeling towards another man which we call friendship1 it seems not very difficult to trace4 ,the states of circumstances in which the ,feeling originates are very numerous4 ,but they are all1 without exception1 of one kind4 ,they are all states of circumstances1 in which a greater proportion than usual of our own pleasures1 come to be associated with the idea of the ,individual4 ,it often originates in companionship1 between men who for some time have indulged their ,tastes1 and prosecuted their pleasures in company4 ,it is perfectly obvious how the idea of such men will occur to one another1 not simply as the idea of a man1 but so enveloped by the trains of pleasurable ideas associated with the man1 that the idea of him is upon the whole a highly pleasurable idea4 ,when to this is added1 the expectation of future pleasures1 not merely the continuation of the companionship1 but services of importance2 when the wisdom of the man promises light and guidance from his counsels2 when his fidelity makes it safe to trust him2 when his benevolence towards us makes us count upon his services1 whenever they are required1 and his reputation and influence in the world are such as to give weight to his endeavours1 there is a sufficient accumulation of pleasurable ideas with that of the individual to account for the affection denominated ,friendship4 #b4--,kindness4 ,there is nothing which more instantly associates with itself the ideas of our own ,pleasures1 and ,pains1 #bag than the idea of the ,pleasures and ,pains of another of our ,fellow-creatures4 ,the expositions already afforded sufficiently indicate the source of this association1 which exerts a powerful and salutary influence in human life4 ,the idea of a man enjoying a train of pleasures1 or happiness1 is felt by every body to be a pleasurable idea4 ,the idea of a man under a train of sufferings or pains1 is equally felt to be a painful idea4 ,this can arise from nothing but the association of our own pleasures with the first idea1 and of our own pains with the second4 ,we never feel any pains and pleasures but our own4 ,the fact1 indeed1 is1 that our very idea of the pains or pleasures of another man is only the idea of our own pains1 or our own pleasures1 associated with the idea of another man4 ,this is one not of the least important1 and curious1 of all cases of association1 and instantly shews how powerfully associated trains of ideas of our pains and pleasures must be with a feeling so compounded4#dc ,editor's footnote #dc3 ,that the pleasures or pains of another person can only be pleasurable or painful to us through the association of our own pleasures or pains with them1 is true in one sense1 which is probably that intended by the author1 but not true in another1 against which he has not sufficiently guarded his mode of expression4 ,it is evident1 that the only pleasures or pains of which we have direct experience being those felt by ourselves1 it is from them that our very notions of pleasure and pain are derived4 ,it is also obvious that the pleasure or pain with which we contemplate the pleasure or pain felt by somebody else1 is itself a pleasure or pain of our own4 ,but if it be meant that in such cases the pleasure or pain is consciously referred to self1 ,i take this to be a mistake4 ,by the acts or other signs exhibited by another person1 the idea of a pleasure 7which is a pleasurable idea7 or the idea of a pain 7which is a painful idea7 are recalled1 sometimes with considerable intensity1 but in association with the other person as feeling them1 not with one's self as feeling them4 ,the idea of one's ,self is1 no doubt1 closely associated with all our experiences1 pleasurable1 painful1 or indifferent2 but this association does not necessarily act in all cases because it exists in all cases4 ,if the mind1 when pleasurably or painfully affected by the evidences of pleasure or pain in another person1 goes off on a different thread of association1 as for instance1 to the idea of the means of giving the pleasure or relieving the pain1 or even if it dismisses the subject and relapses into the ordinary course of its thoughts1 the association with its own self may be1 at the time1 defeated1 or reduced to something so evanescent that we cannot tell whether it was momentarily present or not4--,ed4 #bah ,the ,pleasurable association composed of the ideas of a man and his pleasures1 and the painful association composed of the ideas of a man and his pains1 are both ,affections1 which have so much of the same tendency that they are included under one name1 ,kindness2 though the latter affection has a name appropriate to itself1 ,compassion4 #c4--;,family4 ,the ,group1 which consists of a ,father1 ,mother1 and ,children1 is called a ,family4 ,the associations which each member of this group has of his pains and pleasures1 with the pains and pleasures of the other members1 constitute some of the most interesting states of human consciousness4 ,the affection of the husband and wife is1 in its origin1 that of two persons of different sex1 and need #bai not be further analysed4 ,to this source of pleasurable association is added1 when the union is happy1 all those other associations1 just enumerated1 which constitute the affection of ,friendship4 ,to this another addition is made by the union of interests2 or that necessity1 under which both are placed1 of receiving pain and pleasure from the same causes4 ,as1 in too many instances1 these pleasurable associations are extinguished1 by the generation of others of an opposite description2 in other cases1 they are carried to such a height1 as to afford an exemplification of that remarkable state of mind1 in which a greater value is set upon the means1 than upon the end4 ,persons have been found1 the one of whom could not endure to live without the other4 ,the ,parental affection requires to be somewhat more minutely analysed4 ,first of all1 there can be no doubt1 that all that power of exciting trains of ideas of our own pains and pleasures1 which belongs to the pains and pleasures of any of our fellow-creatures1 is possessed by the pains and pleasures of a man's child4 ,in the next place1 it is well known that the pains and pleasures of another person affect us2 that is1 associate with themselves the ideas of our own pains and pleasures1 with more or less intensity1 according to the attention which we bestow upon his pains or pleasures4 ,a parent is commonly either led or impelled to bestow an unusual degree of attention upon the pains and pleasures of his child2 and hence a habit is contracted of sympathizing with him1 as it is commonly1 and not insignificantly named2 in other words1 a facility of associating the ideas of #bbj his own pains and pleasures1 with those of the child4 ,again1 a man looks upon his child as a cause to him of future pains or pleasures1 much more certain1 than any other person4 ,the father regards the son somewhat in the light of another self1 a great proportion of the effects of whose acts1 whether good or evil1 will redound to himself4 ,an object regarded as a great future cause to us of future pains or pleasures1 we call an object of intense interest2 in other words1 a train of interesting ideas1 that is1 of ideas of pains or pleasures1 is associated with it4 ,the vivacity and simplicity of the expressions of the pains and pleasures of children1 in their looks1 and tones1 and attitudes1 as well as words1 give them a peculiar power of exciting sympathy1 that is1 of associating with them trains of the analogous feelings of ourselves4 ,the frequency with which a parent is called upon to attend to those expressions in his child1 gives him a habit of forming the associations to which they lead4 ,the perfect dependence of the child upon the parent is a source of deep interest4 ,the whole of its pleasures being the fruit of his acts1 he more easily associates with them the trains of his own pleasures1 than with those of any person not so connected with him4 ,his acts1 too1 being required to save it from the worst of pains1 and from destruction1 the idea of its pains1 arising from any relaxation of his care1 calls up1 in strong association1 both the analogous pains of himself1 and also the opposite pleasurable feelings arising from the continuance of the acts by which the pleasures of the child are produced4 ,and to all these #bba sources of association is added1 that which is always agreeable1 the train making up the idea of our own power2 no case of power being so perfect as that of the parent over his helpless offspring4 ,another important source of agreeable association is yet to be mentioned4 ,man becomes fond 7it is a matter of daily observation7 of that on which he has frequently conferred benefits4 ,this is a fact of considerable importance in human nature2 for1 under the little care which hitherto has been bestowed in generating1 by education1 the associations on which ,beneficence depends1 a considerable part of the beneficence existing in the world has been produced by this cause4 ,it is also a case of association1 which strongly illustrates the fact1 that pleasures1 produced by our own acts1 have a peculiar power in associating with them trains of the ideas of our own pleasures4 ,not only a ,fellow-creature1 but even one of the lower animals1 by having been the object of repeated acts of kindness1 becomes an object of affection4 ,trains of our own pleasures are so often united with the idea of such an object of our kindness1 that the idea of the object becomes at last an idea made up of the original idea of the individual and of trains of our own pleasures3 a compound idea1 made up1 in great part1 of pleasurable ideas2 that is1 an ,affection4 ,that the whole of the parental affection is derived from these and similar associations1 is proved by some decisive facts4 ,whenever it happens that a man is placed in circumstances which produce those associations1 he feels the parental affection1 without parentage4 ,facts of this description are so frequent1 and so notorious1 that #bbb it is hardly necessary to produce an instance of them4 ,how else does it happen1 that a man who does not suspect the infidelity of his wife1 rears as his own1 and without any difference of affection1 the offspring of the man who has injured him8 ,cases1 for the credit of our nature1 are not wanting1 and when education is better1 they will be less rare1 in which a family of orphans is taken under the protection of a man of virtue4 ,by acting towards them the part of a parent1 he never fails to acquire for them the affection of a parent4 ,there are equally notorious and decisive facts to prove1 that whenever the parent is placed in circumstances which either wholly1 or to a great degree1 prevent the formation of the associations with the child to which we ascribe the parental affection1 there is a corresponding want of the affection4 ,the case of illegitimate children is pregnant with evidence to this point4 ,in the great majority of cases of this description1 no affection exists4 ,the parent may feel the obligation of maintaining the child1 because public opinion1 or perhaps the law1 requires it3 but this is the extent of the bond4 ,the circumstances of ,families1 in the two opposite states1 of great poverty1 and great opulence1 are unfavourable to the formation of those associations of which the parental affection consists4 ,in cases of extreme poverty1 which alone are the cases here understood2 because1 in the more moderate cases of poverty1 the parental affection exists in considerable strength2 the circumstances which lead to the formation of agreeable associations with the child1 are either wanting1 or counteracted by circumstances #bbc of an opposite tendency4 ,the parent has little the means of bestowing pleasures on his child2 he has not the means of saving it from an almost constant series of pains4 ,the means which he employs in saving the child from pains1 are taken from the means of saving himself from pains4 ,constantly occupied in the labours which yield him a scanty means of subsistence1 he spends but little time in the company of his child1 and has therefore little opportunity of attending to the engaging expressions of its pains and pleasures4 ,it is needless to carry the enumeration of particulars farther4 ,the circumstances which tend to generate agreeable associations with the child are few4 ,the circumstances which tend to generate painful associations with it are many4 ,in ,families of great opulence1 the attention of the parent1 averted either by the calls of pleasure1 or the avocations which his position in society creates1 is but little bestowed upon his children4 ,where the pains and pleasures of others are not attended to1 no association with those pains and pleasures exists2 where there is not a habit of forming the associations1 the ,affection does not exist4 ,the mode in which the child of the man of opulence is maintained and educated1 proceeds so remotely from the acts of the parent1 that the agreeable associations1 which we have with our own acts of beneficence1 are1 in the case of such a parent1 very imperfectly formed4 ,the man of opulence naturally regards his children as part of his state2 as the inheritors of his fortune2 or as belonging to the same line of ancestors with himself2 and with both those constituents of his #bbd dignity he has many agreeable associations4 ,but these are an imperfect substitute for the habits of agreeable association which are generated in more favourable circumstances4 ,hitherto1 we have considered only the parental affection of the ,father4 ,the parental affection of the ,mother differs from that of the ,father in the associations which she forms with her child in her own peculiar situations of gestation and nursing4 ,that these are such as to create intense associations every one will admit4 ,every movement of the child during the period of gestation is to her a sensation4 ,every thought of it is connected with that flood of hopes and fears attached to the awful hour1 never absent from her thoughts1 which1 through a series of cruel pains1 will either stretch her a lifeless corpse1 or render her a rejoicing mother4 ,as a nurse1 the child is to her a source1 both of agreeable sensations1 and agreeable ideas4 ,on the sensations we need not dilate4 ,they are known only to those who have experienced them4 ,but it is not possible to conceive a case more calculated to associate strongly the ideas of our own pleasures1 with the ideas of the pleasures we bestow1 than that of the mother1 when she presses her infant to her bosom1 and communicates to him the means of life1 and the only pleasures he is capable of enjoying1 not only by her own acts1 but from her own substance2 and when she perceives how soon in the mind of the child1 the idea of herself is associated with the existence of all his pleasures1 and the removal of all his pains2 in other words1 how quickly she becomes not only the object of his affections1 but the one and only object4 #bbe ,having explained at so much length the grand case of the ,domestic ,affections1 we may pass over the rest with a very cursory notice4 ,even the ,filial affection has in it nothing peculiar4 ,in the child1 the idea of his parent1 as a being with power almost unlimited over him1 creates the associations which constitute reverence1 and respect2 and the perpetual use of that power on the part of the parent to give him pleasures1 or the command of pleasures1 to remove from him pains1 or give him the means of removing them1 naturally creates the associations which constitute affection4 ,the affection which exists among ,brothers and ,sisters1 has in it most of the ingredients which go to the formation of ,friendship4 ,there is first of all ,companionship2 the habit of enjoying pleasures1 in common1 and also of suffering pains3 hence a great readiness in sympathizing with one another2 that is1 in associating trains of their own pains and pleasures1 with the pains and pleasures of one another4 ,there is next1 when the ,education is good1 a constant reciprocation1 to the extent of their power1 of beneficent acts4 ,and lastly there is their common relation to the grand source of all their pleasures1 the ,parent4 ,when the affections of the domestic class exist in perfection 7in such a state of ,education and ,morals as ours this rarely can happen71 they afford so constant a succession of agreeable trains1 that they form1 perhaps1 the most valuable portion of human happiness4 ,acts of beneficence to larger masses of mankind1 afford still more interesting trains to those who perform them4 ,but they are the small number4 ,the happiness of the ,domestic affections is open to all4 #bbf #d4--;,country4 ,the word country is the name of an idea of great complexity4 ,in that idea are included all the multitudes of persons1 and all the multitudes of things1 and all the multitudes of positions1 in a certain portion of the ,globe of the ,earth4 ,nor are these present existences alone included in that idea3 the ,,history of the country is included1 that is1 the whole series of prior existences2 and not the ,,past ,,history only1 but the ,,future ,,history also1 or series of future existences1 as far as our power of anticipation reaches4 ,this is a remarkable example of the power of association1 to unite ideas without number in such closeness1 that their individuality is unperceived1 and the cluster1 however large1 resembles a single uncompounded idea4 ,this cluster is not wholly made up of indifferent ideas4 ,there is included in it the sources of all our pleasures1 and almost all the objects with which we have been accustomed to associate trains of agreeable ideas4 ,the plains1 the mountains1 the valleys1 the rivers1 with which we have formed agreeable associations1 are all there2 the individual objects with which we have formed similar associations1 the trees1 the houses2 the house1 for example1 in which we were born1 the tree under which we have sat to enjoy the affections of our parents1 or indulge our sympathies with other objects of our love1 the paths in which we have strayed1 the fields through which we have roamed1 the riches wherewith we have seen them periodically clothed1 the labours of those fields1 the labourers1 their manners1 appearance1 and character1 #bbg the flocks and herds1 the cities and towns1 with all their inhabitants1 and all their operations1 the wonderful proceedings of the manufacturers1 the arrival and departure of ships1 loaded with the precious commodities of the different regions of the ,earth4 ,to these sources of ,interest is to be added1 all that portion of our fellow-creatures with whom we have been accustomed to associate our ,pains and ,pleasures4 ,here are our ,parents1 our ,brothers and ,sisters1 our ,sons and ,daughters4 ,here are the men1 and here the women1 who have engaged our affections4 ,here are our ,benefactors1 here are our ,instructors1 here are the manners which alone from habit are agreeable to us4 ,and here are the ,institutions from which we have derived ,protection1 and to which1 in their usual state of imperfection1 we are apt to lend a reverence1 such is the strength of the association1 far beyond the measure of their worth4 ,sufficient sources have now been pointed out1 to shew whence it is that the ,idea of country1 as it involves a great number of agreeable associations1 becomes1 or more properly speaking is1 an ,affection1 #e4--,party2 ,class4 ,that which constitutes a ,party1 or class1 is always some community of ,interest3 in other words1 some thing or things1 to be obtained1 secured1 or augmented1 by the common endeavours of the class1 and operating as a cause of pleasure to all of them4 ,the ,people1 that is1 the ,mass of the community1 are sometimes called a class2 but that is only to distinguish them1 like the term ,lower ,orders1 from the #bbh ,aristocratical class4 ,in the proper meaning of the term class1 it is not applicable to the ,people4 ,no interest is in common to them1 which is not in common to the rest of the community4 ,there is nothing which can operate as a cause of benefit to them exclusively4 ,whatever operates as a cause of benefit to them in common1 operates equally as a cause of benefit to every part of the community1 saving and excepting those who are in possession of some mischievous power over a portion1 greater or less1 of the community4 ,it may no doubt very easily happen1 that what is a benefit to the rest of the community1 is an evil to the possessors of such power2 as what is an evil1 and the greatest of all ,evils1 to the ,community1 is a ,benefit to them4 ,there is no ,love of ,class1 therefore1 but in a ,privileged ,order4 ,the ,patricians1 in ancient ,rome1 were a ,class of this sort4 ,and in modern ,europe there are two such classes3 the ,nobility1 in each ,country3 and the ,incorporated ,clergy2 calling themselves the ,church1 in ,catholic countries1 the ,established ,church1 in ,non-catholic countries4 ,the associations which the members of a governing class have with one another1 individually1 as fathers1 sons1 companions1 friends1 are not here to be taken into account4 ,the associations connected with the privileges which constitute any body of men a class1 are alone concerned in forming the states of mind which we now are explaining4 ,such privileges consist of ,wealth1 ,power1 ,dignity1 one1 or all1 conferred by ,legislative act3 that is1 not the result of natural acquisition1 but of a sort of force1 or compulsion1 put upon other people4 #bbi ,we need not again enter into an explanation of the agreeable associations which every man has with his own ,wealth1 ,power1 and dignity1 and with the causes1 either of their existence1 or of their increase1 or of their security4 ,when these causes to one man1 are causes also to a circle of other men1 the whole ,body has both individually and collectively the associations with those causes1 which constitute ,affection4 #f4--,mankind4 ,the word ,mankind is the name of another of those remarkable associations1 by which countless ideas are so combined1 that their individuality is sunk1 and the aggregate is1 to appearance1 one idea4 ,the ,idea ,mankind1 like the ,idea ,country1 is not made up wholly of indifferent ideas4 ,it has in it all the trains of pleasurable ideas which we associate1 either with individuals1 or with subdivisions1 of the whole mass4 ,we have interesting associations with the idea of a man1 as a man4 ,the idea of his pains1 and his pleasures1 call up1 unavoidably1 trains of the ideas of our own pains and pleasures4 ,the ,idea of a man1 therefore1 naturally includes1 the love of his pleasures1 hatred of his pains4 ,from our earliest ,infancy1 we have had experience of nothing more constantly than this2 that a great proportion of our pleasures proceeded from a certain disposition towards us1 on the part of those of our fellow-creatures who were near us2 and a great proportion of our ,pains from a certain other disposition on their part4 ,those ,dispositions1 taken in the most #bcj general sense1 are ,kindness1 which we have already explained2 and its opposite1 ,unkindness4 ,we have1 therefore1 very intense associations of ,pleasure1 with the idea of the ,disposition towards us1 called ,kindness1 in other men2 and very intense associations of ,pain with that of the ,disposition in them called ,unkindness towards us4 ,in our ,idea of each individual man1 therefore1 is included not only the ,love of his ,pleasures and ,aversion to his ,pains2 but1 in addition to this1 the ,love of his ,disposition of ,kindness towards us1 and ,aversion to his ,disposition of ,unkindness towards us4 ,now1 as our complex ,idea of ,mankind1 is made up of the aggregate of the ideas of ,individuals1 including the interesting trains called ,love of their ,pleasures1 ,hatred of their ,pains2 ,love of their ,kindness1 ,aversion to their ,unkindness2 the generation of the affection1 called ,love of ,mankind1 is1 for our present purpose1 sufficiently shewn4#dd #de ,bain's footnote #dd3 ,as carrying out the principle of association1 in the domain of the ,feelings1 the foregoing chapters1 from ,,xix4 onwards1 are unexceptionable and cogent4 ,as furnishing the complete account of the ,benevolent and ,malevolent ,affections1 and of the ,sympathies or disinterested impulses1 they are defective4 ,indeed1 the whole subject of the ,emotions is placed by the author upon a too narrow basis4 ,any theory that looks solely to the circumstance of pleasure and pain1 7important as that is7 fails to grapple with all the facts4 ,for example1 there is no account rendered of the very familiar emotion of ,wonder4 ,that the ,emotions are all compounded of elements of ,sense 7in the widest comprehension1 that is1 with ,muscularity included7 may be maintained on good grounds4 ,nevertheless1 in order to a satisfactory analysis of even the commoner emotions1 such as ,tenderness1 there is wanted a more exhaustive detail of the pleasures and pains of sense than is furnished in the present work4 ,a few remarks on the generic example of the ,tender ,feeling1 on which the author has expended the greatest part of his illustration1 will show the method to be pursued4 ,it is a case where certain primary sensibilities1 correctly ranked under ,sensation1 together with the associating principle1 seem to account for the whole of the phenomenon4 ,in such a case as ,wonder1 the explanation involves an additional element4 ,the pleasures of ,tender ,feeling1 or ,love and the ,affections1 are no doubt1 as remarked in the text1 in a considerable part associations with other pleasures1 such as nourishment4 ,an animal and a child would contract a pleasurable association with the person that brings them their food1 or ministers to their bodily wants4 ,still1 there is something different from this in ,tenderness or ,love4 ,the fact essential to the state is the gratification from the acts of caressing1 fondling1 and embracing2 a pleasure that has its independent sources in the human and animal sensibilities1 and does not need the association with being fed and cared for1 although enhanced and stimulated by that association4 ,even apart from the powerful element of sexuality1 there is a great mass of pleasurable animal feeling awakened in the loving embrace of two individuals of the warm-blooded species4 ,we may instance1 among these1 the pleasures of ,touch in the soft warm contact2 the muscular pleasures co-operating2 the organic feelings connected with secretions stimulated in the act1 of which the lachrymal is the prominent but not the solitary case2 the peculiar sensibility of the pharynx1 which is probably the sign of a less acute but more extended influence in the alimentary canal generally2 to all which1 is to be added1 in women1 the genial secretion of the breasts1 going on incessantly1 although more profuse in nursing mothers4 ,the coalition of these tactile1 muscular1 and organic sensibilities1 is the pleasure of love by itself1 or as it might be felt between two living sentient creatures1 in no other way the givers or receivers of benefits4 ,nor does this exhaust the circle4 ,the eye1 and the ear1 and even the smell1 may be also included4 ,the visible aspects of living beings are often highly agreeable from the first1 and become so to a farther extent by association with the tactile and organic pleasures4 ,similarly1 the ear may be charmed with the sounds emitted by another human being or animal1 and may also form associations with the still more potent pleasures above named4 ,once more1 the odour of one animal may be intrinsically sweet to another animal2 while here too1 associations may be added4 ,the pleasure of ,tender feeling must therefore be pronounced to have an independent standing in the sentient framework1 although susceptible of being analysed into the primary pleasures of the senses1 together with the influence of association4 ,all the affections derive the chief part of their strength from this complex source4 ,for1 although the acts of fondling and caressing are not universally practised between every two persons that have a mutual affection1 or are so only in the very limited form of the shake of the hand1 yet there is an echo of these1 and a stimulus to the organic accompaniments1 in the sight of each other1 in the sounds of the voice1 and in the more intellectual forms of indicating attachment4 ,it can be proved that the two higher senses enter deeply into the tender emotion1 7as they do into the ,beautiful74 ,the well-known ,dr4 ,kitto1 who was stone-deaf1 in describing his experience1 states that1 as regarded his pleasures1 the loss that affected him most was his inability to hear the voices of his children4 ,it is evident that the same remark1 as to the mutilation of an organ of tender feeling1 is applicable to the blind4 ,the pathos of the lines in ,paradise ,lost contains this implication4--,b4 ,editor's footnote #de3 ,the two preceding subsections are almost perfect as expositions and exemplifications of the mode in which1 by the natural course of life1 we acquire attachments to persons1 things1 and positions1 which are the causes or habitual concomitants of pleasurable sensations to us1 or of relief from pains3 in other words1 those persons1 things1 and positions become in themselves pleasant to us by association2 and1 through the multitude and variety of the pleasurable ideas associated with them1 become pleasures of greater constancy and even intensity1 and altogether more valuable to us1 than any of the primitive pleasures of our constitution4 ,this portion of the laws of human nature is the more important to psychology1 as they show how it is possible that the moral sentiments1 the feelings of duty1 and of moral approbation and disapprobation1 may be no original elements of our nature1 and may yet be capable of being not only more intense and powerful than any of the elements out of which they may have been formed1 but may also1 in their maturity1 be perfectly disinterested3 nothing more being necessary for this1 than that the acquired pleasure and pain should have become as independent of the native elements from which they are formed1 as the love of wealth and of power not only often but generally become1 of the bodily pleasures1 and relief from bodily pains1 for the sake of which1 and of which alone1 power and wealth must have been originally valued4 ,no one thinks it necessary to suppose an original and inherent love of money or of power2 yet these are the objects of two of the strongest1 most general1 and most persistent passions of human nature2 passions which often have quite as little reference to pleasure or pain1 beyond the mere consciousness of possession1 and are in that sense of the word quite as disinterested1 as the moral feelings of the most virtuous human being4 ,the author1 then1 has furnished a most satisfactory and most valuable explanation of certain of the laws of our affections and passions1 and has traced the origin and generation of a great number of them4 ,but it must be remarked of the whole exposition1 that it accounts truly1 but only partially1 for this part of human nature4 ,it affords a sufficient theory of what we may call the mental1 or intellectual element of the feelings in question4 ,but it does not furnish1 nor does the author anywhere furnish1 any theory of what may be called the animal element in them4 ,yet this is no unimportant ingredient in the emotional and active part of human nature3 and it is one greatly demanding analysis4 ,let us take the case of any of the passions3 and as one of the simplest as well as one of the most powerful of them1 let us take the emotion of ,fear4 ,the author gives no account of ,fear but that it is the idea of a painful sensation1 associated with the idea of its being 7more or less uncertainly7 future4 ,undoubtedly these elements are present in it2 but do they account for the peculiar emotional character of the passion1 and for its physiological effect1 such as pallor1 trembling1 faltering of the voice1 coldness of the skin1 loss of control over the secretions1 and general depression of the vital powers8 ,the case would be simpler if these great disturbances of the animal functions by the expectation of a pain were the same in kind as the smaller modifications produced by the mere idea4 ,this1 however1 is by no means the case2 ,ideas do produce effects on the animal economy1 but not those particular effects4 ,the idea of a pain1 if it acts on the bodily functions at all1 has an action the same in kind 7though much less in degree7 as the pain itself would have4 ,but the passion of fear has a totally different action4 ,suppose the fear to be that of a flogging4 ,the flogging itself1 if it produced any physical demonstrations1 would produce cries1 shrinkings1 possibly muscular struggles1 and might by its remoter effects disturb the action of the brain or of the circulation2 and if the fear of a flogging produced these same effects1 in a mitigated degree1 the power of fear might be merely the power of the idea of the pain4 ,but none of these are at all like the characteristic symptoms of fear3 while those characteristic symptoms are much the same whatever be the particular pain apprehended1 and whether it be a bodily or a purely mental pain1 provided it be sufficiently intense and sufficiently proximate4 ,no one has ever accounted for this remarkable difference1 and the author of the ,analysis does not even mention it4 ,the explanation of it is one of those problems1 partly psychological and partly physiological1 which our knowledge of the laws of animal sensibility does not yet enable us to resolve4 ,in whatever manner the phenomena are produced1 they are a case of the quasi-chemistry of the nervous functions1 whereby the junction of certain elements generates a compound whose properties are very different from the sum of the properties of the elements themselves4 ,this is the point which the author's explanations of the emotional part of human nature do not reach1 and1 it may even be said1 do not attempt to reach4 ,until1 however1 it is reached1 there is no guarantee for the completeness of his analysis of even the mental element in the passions3 for when the effect exhibits so much which has not1 in the known properties of the assigned cause1 anything to account for it1 there is always room for a doubt whether some part of the cause has not been left out of the reckoning4 ,this doubt1 however1 does not seriously affect the most important of the author's analyses1 viz4 those which1 without resolving the emotions themselves into anything more elementary1 expound their transfer by association from their natural objects to others2 with the great increase of intensity and persistency which so often accompanies the transfer1 and which is in general quite sufficiently accounted for by the causes to which the author refers it4--,ed4 99 99 99 99 99 ,,sub-,,section ,,iii4 ,the ,objects called ,sublime and ,beautiful1 and their ,contraries1 contemplated as ,causes of our ,pleasures and ,pains4 ,these objects have received much of the attention of ,philosophers2 and great progress has been made in #bca analysing the associations which form the complicated feelings1 ranged under the name of ,emotions of the ,sublime and ,beautiful4 #bcb ,it does not belong to the present purpose to go into the details of this subject1 which1 for obvious reasons1 have been pursued to great length4 ,it is necessary1 #bcc however1 for that purpose1 to shew1 into what general laws the phenomena are capable of being resolved4 ,the feelings which are marked under the name of #bcd ,emotions of the ,sublime and ,beautiful1 are so much alike1 that the distinction of them into two species is somewhat arbitrary4 ,though the ,romans did apply #bce the word sublimis1 and its abstract1 sublimitas1 in a certain rhetorical way1 to objects of ,taste1 their word ,pulchrum1 properly denoted all that is expressed by #bcf our ,sublime and ,beautiful1 taken together4 ,the ,greek word1 ,greek3 kalo_/n1 also clearly included every thing which we rank under the name of ,sublime4 ,longinus1 indeed1 who lived at a very late and degenerate period of ,grecian literature1 wrote a treatise to which he gave the affected ,title1 ,greek3 ,pe_/ri ,u7psous1 or ,about ,height2 and as that has been a very popular treatise in modern times1 it is not improbable1 that the use of the word ,sublime1 which has become so prevalent in the discourse of the moderns1 derives its origin from no higher source4 ,mr4 ,alison1 who wrote a very pleasing1 and1 to a certain degree1 a ,philosophical ,book1 on the ,emotions of ,taste1 has shewn by an abundance of well-chosen illustrations1 that it is not the immediate sensations1 received by us from the objects of ,taste1 which constitute them a cause of our pleasures4 ,the immediate sensations are commonly indifferent1 or approaching the indifferent4 ,it is only when they introduce1 by association1 a train of pleasurable ideas1 that the feelings called the pleasures of ,taste1 are ever enjoyed4 ,i believe that ,i may assume this as an established #bcg fact in our nature2 and ,i shall only adduce as much of the evidence as may teach those of my readers1 to whom these inquiries may be new1 the mode in which the truth of the proposition becomes apparent4 ,i also think it useful to avail myself1 not only of the illustrations1 but as much as possible of the words1 of ,mr4 ,alison1 as exhibiting the clear conviction of the wonderful effects of association1 in one instance1 on the part of a writer1 who seems to have had no idea of its affording an equally satisfactory solution of the other complex phenomena of mind4 ,what are called the external objects of ,taste1 are mostly objects of ,hearing1 objects of ,sight1 or objects of that ,muscular ,sense1 from which we derive the idea of extension4 ,that the feelings we have by these senses are generically distinct from the emotions of ,sublimity and ,beauty1 might1 ,i imagine1 be trusted to an appeal to each man's consciousness4 ,there are innumerable cases1 however1 which may be regarded as decisive experiments upon the subject4 ,of the sounds which can be adduced as ,sublime or ,beautiful1 there is1 perhaps1 not one1 which is not often heard in circumstances1 wherein no tendency to ,emotion is felt4 ,the circumstances in which the ,emotion is felt1 and those in which it is not felt1 are those in which a train of pleasurable ideas is1 or is not1 introduced by association4 ,all sounds1 says ,mr4 ,alison1 are in general ,,sublime1 which are associated with ,ideas of great ,power or ,might3 the ,noise of a ,torrent1--the ,fall of a ,cataract1--the ,uproar of a ,tempest1--the ,explosion of ,gunpowder1--the ,dashing of the ,waves1 c4 #bch ,all sounds1 in the same manner1 are sublime1 which are associated with ,ideas of ,majesty1 or ,solemnity1 or deep ,melancholy1 or any other strong ,emotion3 the ,sound of the ,trumpet1 and all other warlike instruments1--the ,note of the ,organ1--the ,sound of the ,curfew1--the ,tolling of the ,passing bell1 c4 ,there is a great variety of sounds also1 that occur in the scenes of ,nature1 which are productive of the ,emotion of ,,beauty3 the ,sound of a ,waterfall1--the ,murmuring of a ,rivulet1--the ,whispering of the ,wind1--the ,sheepfold-bell1--the sound of the ,curfew1 c4 ,that the ,notes or ,cries of some ,animals1 are ,sublime1 every one knows3 the ,roar of the ,lion1 the ,growling of ,bears1 the ,howling of ,wolves1 the ,scream of the ,eagle1 c4 ,in all those cases1 those are the notes of animals remarkable for their strength1 and formidable for their ferocity4 ,it would seem very natural1 therefore1 that the sublimity of such sounds should arise from the qualities of which they are expressive4 ,the ,bleating of a ,lamb1 is beautiful in a fine day in spring3 the ,lowing of a ,cow at a distance1 amid the scenery of a pastoral landscape in summer4 ,the ,call of a ,goat among rocks is strikingly beautiful1 as expressing wildness and independence4 ,the ,hum of the ,beetle is beautiful in a fine summer evening1 as appearing to suit the stillness and repose of that pleasing season4 ,the ,twitter of the ,swallow is beautiful in the morning1 and seems to be expressive of the cheerfulness of that time4 ,this enumeration of cases1 which is only a selection from those of ,mr4 ,alison1 is far more than #bci sufficient for the purpose1 as indeed it is one defect of his book that his propositions are overlaid with evidence4 ,that these sounds1 as sensations1 do not constitute the pleasures enjoyed1 he demonstrates1 by shewing that on many occasions1 on which the sensations exist as perfectly as on any other occasion1 no pleasure is felt4 ,he also shews1 that when the pleasures are felt1 a train of pleasurable ideas is introduced by association4 ,the sound of ,thunder1 he says1 is perhaps of all others in ,nature1 the most ,sublime4 ,yet the rolling of stones from a cart1 produces a sound so exactly the same1 that it is often mistaken for thunder4 ,while the mistake lasts1 the feeling of sublimity lasts4 ,when the mistake is corrected1 it instantly vanishes2 that is1 the association is dissolved4 ,there is scarcely in nature1 says ,mr4 ,alison1 a more trifling sound than the buzz of ,flies2 yet1 ,i believe1 there is no man of common ,taste1 who1 in the deep silence of a summer's noon1 has not found something strikingly sublime1 in this inconsiderable sound4 ,the falling of a drop of water1 produces in general a very insignificant and unexpressive sound2 yet sometimes in ,vaults1 and in large ,cathedrals1 a single drop is heard to fall1 at distant intervals1 from the roof2 than which1 ,i know not if there is a single sound more strikingly sublime4 ,mr4 ,alison further remarks1 that to those who have no trains of pleasurable ideas associated with sounds1 or who consider them simply as sounds1 they have no beauty4 ,it is long before children shew any sensibility to the beauty of sounds4 ,to the greater #bdj number of the sounds which we denominate beautiful1 the common people1 in the same manner1 are altogether indifferent4 ,to the peasant1 the ,curfew is only the mark of the hour of the evening1--the ,sheep-bell1 the sign of the neighbourhood of the flock1--the sound of a ,cascade1 the sign of the falling of water1 c4 ,give him the associations which men of cultivated imagination have with such sounds1 and he will infallibly feel their beauty4 ,mr4 ,alison shews1 that when the notes or cries of animals are stripped of certain associations1 they are unproductive of ,emotions of sublimity or beauty4 ,there is not one of these sounds1 he says1 which may not be imitated in some manner or other2 and which1 while we are ignorant of the deception1 does not produce the same ,emotion with the real sound3 when we are undeceived1 however1 we are conscious of no other ,emotion1 but that1 perhaps1 of simple pain from its loudness4 ,the howl of the ,wolf is little distinguished from the howl of the ,dog1 either in its tone or in its strength1 but there is no comparison between their sublimity4 ,few1 if any1 of the sounds felt as sublime are so loud as the most common of all sounds1 the lowing of a ,cow2 yet this is the very reverse of sublimity4 ,imagine this sound1 on the contrary1 expressive of ,fierceness and ,strength1 and there can be no doubt1 that it would become sublime4 ,the scream of the ,eagle is simply disagreeable1 when the bird is either tamed or confined2 it is ,sublime1 only when it is heard amid ,rocks and ,deserts1 and when it is expressive to us1 of ,liberty and ,independence1 and savage ,majesty4 ,the noise of the ,rattlesnake 7that most dangerous animal of all his tribe7 #bda is very little different from the noise of a child's play-thing2 yet who will deny its sublimity8 ,the growl of the ,tiger1 resembles the purring of a ,cat2 the one is sublime1 the other insignificant4 ,mr4 ,alison1 with great propriety1 adds1 ,upon the principle of the absolute and independent ,sublimity or ,beauty of ,sounds1 it is very difficult to account for the different sounds which have been mentioned as productive of these ,emotions4 ,there is certainly no resemblance1 as sounds1 between the noise of ,thunder1 and the hissing of a ,serpent1--between the growling of a ,tiger1 and the explosion of ,gunpowder1--between the scream of an ,eagle1 and the shouting of a multitude2 yet all of these are sublime4 ,in the same manner1 there is as little resemblance1 between the tinkling of the ,sheepfold-bell1 and the murmuring of the ,breeze2 between the hum of the ,beetle and the song of the ,lark2 between the twitter of the ,swallow1 and the sound of the ,curfew2 yet all of these are beautiful4 ,upon the principle of association1 they are all perfectly accountable4 ,i shall not follow ,mr4 ,alison in his illustrations of the beauty and sublimity felt in the tones of the human voice1 or in the composition of sounds1 called ,music2 because ,i have no doubt but it will be allowed that they derive the whole of what is called their expression1--in other words1 their power of pleasing1--from the associations connected with them4#df ,i #bdb shall also produce a very few specimens of the illustrations which he adduces to show that what is called the ,beauty and ,sublimity of objects of sight1 is derived wholly from association4 ,editor's footnote #df3 ,what the author thinks himself dispensed from either proving or illustrating because he has no doubt that it will be allowed1 is1 on the contrary1 one of the most disputable parts of his theory4 ,that very much of the pleasure afforded by ,music is the effect of its expression1 i4e4 of the associations connected with sound1 most people will admit3 but it can scarcely be doubted that there is also an element of direct physical and sensual pleasure4 ,in the first place1 the quality of some single sounds is physically agreeable1 as that of others is disagreeable4 ,next1 the concord or harmony of pleasant sounds adds a further element of purely physical enjoyment4 ,and thirdly1 certain successions of sounds1 constituting melody or tune1 are delightful1 as it seems to me1 to the mere sense4 ,with these pleasures those of the associated ideas and feelings are intimately blended1 but may1 to a certain extent1 be discriminated by a critical ear4 ,it is possible to say1 of different composers1 that one 7as ,beethoven7 excels most in that part of the effect of music which depends on expression1 and another 7as ,mozart7 in the physical part4 ,that the full physical pleasure of tune is often not experienced at the first hearing1 is a consequence of the fact1 that the pleasure depends on succession1 and therefore on the coexistence of each note with the remembrance of a sufficient number of the previous notes to constitute melody3 a remembrance which1 of course1 is not possessed in perfection1 until after a number of repetitions proportioned to the complexity and to the unfamiliar character of the combination4--,ed4 ,the following observations are general1 and very instructive4 ,the greatest part of colours are connected with a kind of established ,imagery in our minds1 and are considered as expressive of many very pleasing and affecting ,qualities4 ,these ,associations may perhaps be included in the following ,enumeration3 #ast1 ,such as arise from #bdc the nature of the objects thus permanently coloured3 #bndly1 ,such as arise from some analogy between certain ,colours1 and certain ,dispositions of mind3 and1 #crdly1 ,such as arise from accidental connexions1 whether national or particular4 #a4 ,when we have been accustomed to see any object capable of exciting ,emotion1 distinguished by some fixed or permanent colour1 we are apt to extend to the ,colour the ,qualities of the object thus coloured1 and to feel from it1 when separated1 some degree of the same emotion which is properly excited by the object itself4 ,instances of this kind are within every person's observation4 ,white1 as it is the colour of ,day1 is expressive to us of the cheerfulness or gaiety which the return of day brings4 ,black1 as the colour of ,darkness1 is expressive of gloom and melancholy4 ,the colour of the heavens1 in serene weather1 is ,blue3 ,blue1 is therefore expressive to us of somewhat of the same pleasing and temperate character4 ,green1 is the colour of the ,earth1 in ,spring3 it is1 consequently1 expressive to us of some of those delightful ,images which we associate with that season4 ,the expressions of those colours1 which are the signs of particular passions in the ,human countenance1 and which1 from this connexion1 derive their effect1 every one is acquainted with4 #b4 ,there are many colours which derive expression from some analogy we discover between them and certain affections of the ,human ,mind4 ,soft or ,strong1 ,mild or ,bold1 ,gay or ,gloomy1 ,cheerful or ,solemn1 c41 are terms1 in all languages1 applied to colours2 terms obviously metaphorical1 and the use of which indicates their connexion with particular #bdd qualities of ,mind4 ,in the same manner1 different degrees or shades of the same colour have similar characters1 as ,strong1 or ,temperate1 or ,gentle1 c4 ,in consequence of this ,association1--which is1 in truth1 so strong1 that it is to be found in all mankind1--such colours derive a character from this resemblance1 and produce in our mind some faint degree of the same ,emotion1 which the qualities they express are fitted to produce4 #c4 ,many colours acquire character from accidental ,association4 ,purple1 for instance1 has acquired a character of ,dignity1 from its accidental connexion with the ,dress of ,kings4 ,the colours of ,ermine have a similar character1 from the same cause4 ,the colours1 in every country1 which distinguish the ,dress of ,magistrates1 c41 acquire dignity in the same manner4 ,every person will1 in the same manner1 probably1 recollect the particular colours which are pleasing to him1 from their having been worn by people whom he loved1 or from some other accidental association4 ,that it is not from the sensation1 but from those trains of associated ,ideas1 that the feeling of ,beauty in colours1 whenever we have it1 is derived1 he demonstrates1 by adducing some well-chosen instances to shew that the sensation may exist as well without the association as with it2 and that1 as often as it is unaccompanied with the association1 it is unaccompanied with any feeling of ,beauty4 ,when it has the association4 ,beauty is felt3 when it has not the association1 ,beauty is not felt4 ,the association1 therefore1 is the cause of the ,beauty4 #bde ,black1 says ,mr4 ,alison1 is to us an unpleasant colour1 because it is the colour appropriated to mourning4 ,in ,venice and ,spain1 it is agreeable1 because it is the colour which distinguishes the dress of the ,great4 ,white is beautiful to us1 in a supreme degree1 as emblematical both of ,innocence and ,cheerfulness4 ,in ,china1 on the other hand1 it is the colour appropriated to ,mourning1 and1 consequently1 very far from being generally beautiful4 ,the common colours of the indifferent things which surround us1--of the ,earth1 of ,stone1 of ,wood1 c41--have no kind of ,beauty4 ,the things themselves are so indifferent to us1 that they excite no kind of emotion2 and1 of consequence1 their colours produce no greater emotion as the signs of such qualities1 than the qualities themselves4 ,the colours1 in the same manner1 which distinguish the ordinary ,dress of the ,common ,people1 are never considered as beautiful4 ,it is the colours only of the ,dress of the ,great1 of the ,opulent1 or of ,distinguished ,professions1 which are ever considered in this light4 ,no new colour is ever beautiful1 until we have acquired some pleasing associations with it4 ,this is peculiarly observable in the article of ,dress2 and indeed it is the best instance of it1 because no other circumstance intervenes by which the experiment can be influenced4 ,every man must have observed1 that1 in the great variety of new colours1 which the caprice of ,fashion is perpetually introducing1 no new colour appears at first sight as beautiful4 ,a few weeks1 even a few days alter our opinion2 as soon as it is generally adopted by those who lead #bdf the public ,taste1 and has become in consequence the mark of ,rank and ,elegance1 it immediately becomes beautiful4 ,when the particular associations we have with such colours1 are destroyed1 their beauty is destroyed at the same time4 ,the different machines1 instruments1 c41 which minister to the convenience of ,life1 have1 in general1 from the materials of which they are composed1 or from the uses to which they are applied1 a fixed and determinate colour4 ,this colour becomes accordingly in some degree beautiful1 from its being the sign of such qualities2 change the accustomed colour of such objects1 and every man feels a kind of disappointment4 ,this is so strong1 that1 even if a colour more generally beautiful is substituted1 yet still our dissatisfaction is the same2 and the new colour1 instead of being beautiful1 becomes the reverse4 ,rose-colour1 for instance1 is a more beautiful colour than that of ,mahogany3 yet1 if any man were to paint his doors and windows with ,rose-colour1 he would certainly not add to their beauty4 ,the colour of a polished steel grate is agreeable1 but is not in itself very beautiful4 ,suppose it painted green1 or violet1 or crimson1 all of them colours much more beautiful1 and the beauty of it is altogether destroyed4 ,instances of this kind are innumerable4#dg ,editor's footnote #dg3 ,the elements contributed by association are certainly more predominant in the pleasure of colours than in that of musical sounds2 yet ,i am convinced that there is a direct element of physical pleasure in colours1 anterior to association4 ,my own memory recals to me the intense and mysterious delight which in early childhood ,i had in the colours of certain flowers2 a delight far exceeding any ,i am now capable of receiving from colour of any description1 with all its acquired associations4 ,and this was the case at far too early an age1 and with habits of observation far too little developed1 to make any of the subtler combinations of form and proportion a source of much pleasure to me4 ,this last pleasure was acquired very gradually1 and did not1 until after the commencement of manhood1 attain any considerable height4 ,the examples quoted from ,alison do not prove that there is no original beauty in colours1 but only that the feeling of it is capable1 as no one doubts that it is capable1 of being overpowered by extraneous associations4 ,whether there is any similar organic basis of the pleasure derived from form1 so far at least as this depends on proportion1 ,i would not undertake to decide4 ,the susceptibility to the physical pleasures produced by colours and musical sounds1 7and by forms if any part of the pleasure they afford is physical71 is probably extremely different in different organisations4 ,in natures in which any one of these susceptibilities is originally faint1 more will depend on association4 ,the extreme sensibility of this part of our constitution to small and unobvious influences1 makes it certain that the sources of the feelings of beauty and deformity must be1 to a material extent1 different in different individuals4--,ed4 #bdg ,mr4 ,alison produces a very long line of illustrations to show that the ,beauty of ,,forms is not the mere sensation of ,form1 but consists1 as in the case of sounds and colours1 in the train of pleasurable ideas associated with the sensation4 ,mr4 ,alison is less happy1 and more tedious1 in the illustration of this than the preceding parts of his subject4 ,we shall make little use of his proofs2 because we can arrive1 by a short process1 at a very satisfactory conclusion4 ,mr4 ,alison seems not to have been aware of the #bdh origin of our ideas of ,form2 and thence in expounding them has found many difficulties which do not in reality belong to the subject4 ,he supposes that ,form is altogether a sensation of sight4 ,in a former part of this ,inquiry1 we ascertained the sensations3 we saw that ,form1 in all its cases1 is merely a modification of extension2 that it is made known to us1 by those feelings1 which accompany the motion of certain of our members1 as that of a finger1 or a hand4 ,those feelings are in no danger of being confounded with the emotion of ,beauty4 ,they are feelings so completely indifferent1 that in most of the associations into which the ideas of them enter as essential ingredients they are overlooked1 and the very existence of them is commonly unknown4 ,if the sensation is no cause of the ,pleasure derived from ,forms1 it will not be questioned that association is the cause4 ,forms are either ,animate or ,inanimate4 ,the associations with the ,animate only differ from those with the ,inanimate1 in holding some additional ingredients4 ,some ,forms affect us1 by their magnitude1 naturally associated with the idea of ,power2 some1 by the uses to which they are applied1 as the more powerful instruments of war2 some1 by the extent of their duration1 with which we have obvious associations2 some1 by the splendour or magnificence1 with the ideas of which they are associated1--the ,throne1 the ,diadem1 the ,triumphal ,car4 ,the natural movements of the arm1 from its turning in its socket as round a centre1 are all waving2 circles1 or portions of circles1 running into one another4 ,all other movements are forced upon it1 #bdi and the effect of constraint4 ,hence the beauty of waving lines1 because associated with the agreeable ideas of ,ease1 and absence of ,restraint4 ,as nothing is more agreeable to us than to trace the operation of design1 of successful contrivance1 some ,forms affect us strongly by the idea of their ,fitness1 of their adaptation to an ,end4 ,others affect us not only by the idea of their adaptation to an end1 but by the value which we attach to the end4 ,in this case it is by their utility that they are said to please us4 ,we associate with the idea of certain states of the ,human ,body1 or at least of the ,bodies of ,animals in general1 certain inward ,dispositions2 with great strength we associate great ,wilfulness1 and little regard of others2 with frailness1 we associate ,delicacy1 the ideas of gentleness1 compliance1 and regard for others4 ,the forms of inanimate objects sometimes bear such an analogy to the ,delicate and ,frail in human ,forms1 that the ideas associated with the animate1 are called up by the inanimate1 and produce the emotion of ,beauty4 ,this emotion1 however1 is altogether prevented1 when the more potent idea of ,fitness intervenes4 ,any thing analogous to the slender form1 which is so exquisitely beautiful in the more elegant grasses1 would be a real deformity in the oak4 ,more than one of those sources of agreeable association are often united in the same subject1 and increase the emotion produced by it4 ,mr4 ,alison goes on to the exposition of the associations which constitute the ,beauty of ,motion1 and the ,beauty of the ,human ,form and ,countenance4 #bej ,but after what has been said1 these associations are not difficult to trace2 and ,i have already carried the illustration of this subject farther than ,i should have done1 if ,i had not regarded this case of ,association as affording most important aid toward the developement of all the more mysterious phenomena of the ,human ,mind4 ,we have here a class of ,pleasures2 the ,feeling of ,beauty1 the ,feeling of ,sublimity2 exercising a great influence over all cultivated minds4 ,these ,feelings1 when taken as objects of general contemplation1 appear perfectly simple4 ,to such a degree have they assumed the appearance of simple and original feelings of our nature1 even to ,philosophers of eminence1 that a particular sense has been supposed necessary to account for their existence4 ,yet all this apparent simplicity is only an exemplification of that association1 by which a multitude of ideas are so intimately1 and instantaneously blended together1 that they appear to be not many ideas1 but one idea4 ,of this highly important fact1 we have had occasion to take notice of various leading cases1 before4 ,in the present case1 however1 there is a peculiarity2 which it has in common with the various cases called ,affection1 which we have recently been engaged in considering4 ,in the cases which occurred for examination1 in the earlier part of this ,inquiry1 where we found long trains of ,ideas so blended together1 by association1 as to appear not many ideas1 but one2 that of ,motion1 that of ,space1 that of ,time1 that of ,personal ,identity2 the ideas associated were those of indifferent sensations4 ,the ideas1 on the other hand1 which are associated under the terms #bea ,beauty and ,sublimity1 are ideas of pleasurable sensations4 ,the difference is that which is testified by every man's consciousness4 ,that there should be a remarkable difference between a train composed of ideas of the indifferent class1 and a train composed of ideas of the pleasurable class1 can be easily supposed4 ,it is necessary further to observe1 that between two trains1 both of the pleasurable class1 there are such important differences1 as to have suggested the use of marking them by different names4 ,thus1 even in the class which we have been now considering1 one train is composed of pleasurable ideas1 of such a kind1 that we call it sublime2 another1 of pleasurable ideas of such a kind1 that we call it ,beautiful4 ,from the train of ideas associated with the form of the statue called the ,venus de ,medicis1 we call it beautiful4 ,we have a train of ideas1 also pleasurable1 associated with the bust of ,socrates4 ,but this is a train not reckoned to belong to the class either of the beautiful or the sublime2 it is a train including all the grand associations connected with the ideas of intellectual1 and moral1 worth4 ,a particular description of the sort of ideas which constitute each of the more remarkable cases of our pleasurable trains 7that they are of one kind in one train1 of another kind in another train1--of one kind1 for example1 in the trains called ,sublimity1 another in the trains called ,beauty1 another in the trains for which we have no better name than moral approbation1 no one can doubt7 would be highly necessary in a detailed account of ,human ,nature4 ,it is not necessary for the ,analysis which is the object of this #beb ,work2 and would engage us in too tedious an exposition4#dh ,editor's footnote #dh3 ,the objection commonly made to the psychological analyses which resolve ,beauty into association1 is that they confound the ,beautiful with the merely agreeable4 ,this objection is urged1 for example1 by ,coleridge1 in his ,biographia ,literaria4 ,he admits1 with every one else1 that things not in themselves agreeable1 are often made agreeable by association2 that is1 the pleasantness which belongs to the ideas with which they are associated1 adheres to themselves3 but this cannot1 it is asserted1 be the cause of their producing the particular emotion to which we attach the name of ,beauty2 because1 as no feeling of beauty belongs to the ideas that are supposed to generate the emotion1 no such feeling can be transferred from them to what they are associated with4 ,any one who has studied the ,analysis up to this point1 is aware of the inconclusiveness of this last argument4 ,that a complex feeling generated out of a number of single ones1 should be as unlike to any of those from which it is generated1 as the sensation of white is unlike the sensations of the seven prismatic colours1 is no unexampled or rare fact in our sensitive nature4 ,but it will also1 ,i think1 be found1 in the case of our feelings of ,beauty1 and still more1 of ,sublimity1 that the theory which refers their origin mainly to association1 is not only not contradictory to facts1 but is not even paradoxical4 ,for if our perceptions of beauty and sublimity are of a more imposing character than the feelings ordinarily excited in us by the contemplation of objects1 it will be found that the associations which form those impressions are themselves of a peculiarly imposing nature4 ,this is apparent even from ,alison2 and if the ,author of the ,analysis had written later1 he might have referred to a deeper thinker than ,alison1 and a more valuable because an unconscious witness to the truth of the ,association theory4 ,mr4 ,ruskin1 with profounder and more thoughtful views respecting the beauties both of ,nature and of ,art than any #bec psychologist ,i could name1 undertakes1 in the second volume of ,modern ,painters1 to investigate the conditions of ,beauty4 ,the result he brings out is1 that every thing which gives us the emotion of the ,beautiful1 is expressive and emblematic of one or other of certain lofty or lovely ideas1 which are1 in his apprehension1 embodied in the universe1 and correspond to the various perfections of its ,creator4 ,he holds these ideas to be1 ,infinity1 ,unity1 ,repose1 ,symmetry1 ,purity1 ,moderation1 and ,adaptation to ,ends4 ,and he is1 in my judgment1 to a very considerable degree successful in making out his case4 ,mr4 ,ruskin1 it is true1 never thinks of inferring that our feelings of ,beauty are the actual consequence of our having those elevating or cheering ideas recalled to us through manifold channels of association4 ,he deems the emotion to be arbitrarily attached to these ideas by a pre-established harmony4 ,but the evidence which he adduces goes far to prove the other point4 ,if he succeeds1 as ,i think he does1 in showing that the things which excite the emotions of beauty or sublimity are always things which have a natural association with certain highly impressive and affecting ideas 7whether the catalogue which he has made of those ideas is correct and complete or not71 we need no other mode of accounting for the peculiar character of the emotions1 than by the actual1 though vague and confused1 recal of the ideas4 ,it cannot be deemed surprising that a state of consciousness made up of reminiscences of such ideas as ,mr4 ,ruskin specifies1 and of the grand and interesting objects and thoughts connected with ideas like those1 must be of a more elevated character1 and must stir our nature to a greater depth1 than those associations of commonplace and every-day pleasures1 which often combine with them as parts of the mass of pleasurable feeling set up in us by the objects of ,nature and ,art4 ,in a windy country1 a screen of trees so placed as to be a barrier against the prevailing winds1 excites ideas of warmth1 comfort1 and shelter1 which belong to the agreeable1 as distinguished by ,coleridge from the ,beautiful2 and these enter largely into the pleasurable feeling with which we contemplate the trees1 without contributing to give #bed them the peculiar character distinctive of sthetic feelings4 ,but besides these there are other elements constituting the beauty1 properly speaking1 of the trees1 which appeal to other1 and what we are accustomed1 not without meaning1 to call higher1 parts of our nature2 which give a stronger stimulus and a deeper delight to the imagination1 because the ideas they call up are such as in themselves act on the imagination with greater force4 ,as is observed by the author of the ,analysis1 the exposition in detail of the associations which enter into our various feelings of the sublime and beautiful1 would require the examination of the subject on a scale not suited to the character nor proportioned to the dimensions of this ,treatise4 ,of all our feelings1 our acquired pleasures and pains1 especially our pleasures1 are the most complex2 resulting from the whole of our nature and of our past lives1 and involving1 consequently1 a greater multitude and variety of associations than almost any other phenomena of the mind4 ,and among our various pleasures1 the sthetic are without doubt the most complex4 ,it may also be remarked1 and is a considerable confirmation of the association theory1 that the feelings of beauty or sublimity with which different people are affected by the contemplation of the same object1 are evidently as different1 as the pleasurable associations of different persons with the same object are likely to be4 ,but there are some ingredients which are universally1 or almost universally1 present1 when the emotions have their characteristic peculiarity2 and to which they seem to be mainly indebted for the extraordinary power with which they act on the minds which have the greatest susceptibility to them4 ,these ingredients are probably more numerous and various than is commonly suspected2 but some of the most important and powerful of them are undoubtedly pointed to1 and illustrated with great force1 in the discussion which ,i have mentioned1 by ,mr4 ,ruskin2 to whose work ,i willingly refer the psychological student1 as a copious source of at least far-reaching suggestions1 and often of much more4 ,supposing that all ,beauty had been successfully analysed #bee into a lively suggestion of one or more of the ideas to which it is referred by ,mr4 ,ruskin1 the question would still remain for psychologists1 why the suggestion of those ideas is so impressive and so delightful4 ,but this question may1 in general1 be answered with little difficulty4 ,it is no mystery1 for example1 why anything which suggests vividly the idea of infinity1 that is1 of magnitude or power without limit1 acquires an otherwise strange impressiveness to the feelings and imagination4 ,the remaining ideas in ,mr4 ,ruskin's list 7at least if we except those which1 like ,moderation1 are chiefly ancillary to the others1 by excluding what would jar with their effect7 all represent to us some valuable or delightful attribute1 in a completeness and perfection of which our experience presents us with no example1 and which therefore stimulates the active power of the imagination to rise above known reality1 into a more attractive or a more majestic world4 ,this does not happen with what we call our lower pleasures4 ,to them there is a fixed limit at which they stop3 or if1 in any particular case1 they do acquire1 by association1 a power of stirring up ideas greater than themselves1 and stimulate the imagination to enlarge its conceptions to the dimensions of those ideas1 we then feel that the lower pleasure has1 exceptionally1 risen into the region of the sthetic1 and has superadded to itself an element of pleasure of a character and quality not belonging to its own nature4--,ed4 #bef ,,chapter ,,xxii4 ,,motives4 ,,section ,i4 ,,pleasurable ,,or ,,painful ,,states1 ,,contemplated ,,as ,,consequents ,,of ,,our ,,own ,,acts4 ,,in contemplating pains and pleasures as future2 in other words1 anticipating them1 or believing in their future existence2 we observe1 that1 in certain cases1 they are independent of our actions2 in other cases1 that they are consequent upon something which may be done1 or left undone by us4 ,thus1 in certain cases1 we foresee that a painful sensation or sensations will be given us1 but that something may be done by us which will prevent it3 ,again1 that a pleasurable sensation1 or sensations will be given us1 but not unless something be done by us1 of which the sensations are the consequence4 ,it is necessary that those two cases1 a pain to be prevented1 and a pleasure to be obtained1 by our own actions1 should be distinguished from one another2 but as they both rank under the title of a good1 and1 as it will shorten our phraseology to name them #beg together1 we shall speak of the removal of pain1 in the present section1 at least1 under the denominations of a pleasure4 ,we have seen what is the state of consciousness1 produced by the contemplation of a pleasurable sensation as future2 that it is called ,joy1 if the pleasure is contemplated as certainly future1 in other words1 believed2 that it is called ,hope1 if the sensation is contemplated as not certainly future1 that is1 if the anticipation does not amount to belief4 ,we have also seen what is our state of consciousness1 when we contemplate the cause of a future pleasure1 and the pleasure1 together4 ,it is a mixture of ,love1 and ,joy2 ,love as regards the cause2 ,joy as regards the sensation4 ,the association which constitutes those ,states of ,mind 7,,affections1 as they are commonly called7 it is hardly necessary to repeat4 ,the anticipation of a future sensation1 is merely the association1 the result of prior sensations1 of a certain number of antecedents and consequents4 ,i anticipate1 for example1 the pleasing sensation of light1 at a certain hour to-morrow morning4 ,the meaning is1 that with my sensations of the present moment1 are associated those of the next2 with those of the next those of the following2 and so on1 till sleep2 after sleep1 waking1 and then the anticipated sensation4 ,when the cause is contemplated along with the sensation1 the association which constitutes the process of anticipation is the same1 till we arrive at the link which immediately precedes the sensation4 ,thus1 if instead of the pleasurable sensation of light1 the pleasure of breakfast1 is my anticipation of to-morrow #beh morning2 in that case1 the idea of the pleasure of eating is associated with the idea of the food1 not as with an ordinary antecedent1 but that peculiar antecedent which is called a cause4 ,when the idea of the ,pleasure is associated with an action of our own as its cause2 that is1 contemplated as the consequent of a certain action of ours1 and incapable of otherwise existing2 or when the cause of a ,pleasure is contemplated as the consequent of an action of ours1 and not capable of otherwise existing2 a peculiar state of mind is generated which1 as it is a tendency to action1 is properly denominated ,,motive4 ,the word ,,motive is by no means steadily applied to its proper object4 ,the pleasure1 for example1 which is the consequent of the act1 is apt to be regarded as alone the impelling principle1 and properly entitled to the name of ,motive4 ,it is obvious1 however1 that the idea of the pleasure does not constitute the motive to action without the idea of the action as the cause2 that it is the association1 therefore1 to which alone the name belongs4 ,as every pleasure is worth having2 for otherwise it would not be a pleasure2 the idea of every pleasure associated with that of an action of ours as the cause1 is a motive2 that is1 leads to the action4 ,but every motive does not produce the action4 ,the reason is1 the existence of other motives which prevent it4 ,a man is tempted to commit adultery with the wife of his friend2 the composition of the motive obvious4 ,he does not obey the motive4 ,why8 ,he obeys other motives which are stronger4 ,though pleasures are associated with the immoral act1 pains are #bei associated with it also2 the pains of the injured husband2 the pains of the injured wife2 the moral indignation of mankind2 the future reproaches of his own mind4 ,some men obey the first1 rather than the second motive4 ,the reason is obvious4 ,in them1 the association of the act with the pleasure1 is1 from habit1 unduly strong2 the association of the act with the pains1 is1 from want of habit1 unduly weak4 ,this is a case of bad ,education2 and one highly unfortunate1 for the value of the pleasures in question is infinitely outweighed by the value of the pains4 ,the business of a good education is to make the associations and the values correspond4 ,in the preceding paragraph1 ,i have spoken of the abstaining from an act1 as an act4 ,though this language is not rigidly correct1 yet as it will lead to no confusion1 and will often permit the use of abridged expressions1 ,i shall not scruple1 as often as ,i find occasion1 to adopt it4 ,in the cases adduced above1 of one man who obeys the motive to commit a crime1 of another who obeys the motive to abstain from it1 we have an example of an important fact2 that1 among the different classes of motives1 there are men who are more easily and strongly operated upon by some1 others by others4 ,we have also seen1 that this is entirely owing to habits of association4 ,this facility of being acted upon1 by motives of a particular description1 is that which we call ,,disposition4 ,and it is necessary to take notice of the name and its meaning here2 because we shall find that many of the names of ,motives are names also of the corresponding ,dispositions2 and we should not1 therefore1 be able to exhibit distinctly the #bfj marking power of such names1 without an accurate conception of what it is which1 in this mode of using them1 they are employed to mark4 ,each of the senses affords sensations1 which1 associated with the act which is its proper antecedent1 may be considered as forming a class of motives4 ,in most of its cases1 this association1 taking place uniformly and habitually1 is1 like the motion of the eyelids1 unnoticed1 and not provided with a name4 ,two cases1 however2 one1 the pleasures of the palate2 the other1 those of sex2 act so important a part in human life1 that the motives they constitute by association with their antecedents1 have not been left without names2 though very defective ones have been applied to them4 ,thus1 for the motive of ,eating1 we have the name ,gluttony3 but gluttony is applied to it only when it is unduly strong4 ,in like manner1 we have the name ,lust for the motive of sex2 but that1 too1 only when the motive is unduly strong1 or in some other respect faulty4 ,we have here an instance of that confusion of names which was noticed above2 the same word employed as the mark of two different things2 first1 the ,motive2 secondly1 the readiness to be acted upon1 and strongly acted upon1 by it4 ,the name ,gluttony is not only the name of a certain ,motive2 it is also the name of the corresponding ,disposition2 a readiness to obey that motive4 ,the name ,lust is not only the name of the ,motive2 but also of the ,disposition1 or a readiness to obey the motive4 ,drunkenness is a name used in the same way exactly as the preceding two4 ,it is the name of a motive1 #bfa only in the case of excess4 ,and it is a name with a double meaning1 being applied both to the ,motive1 and the ,disposition4 ,for these several motives1 in the cases which are not considered as in excess1 we have none but circumlocutory names2 as1 love of eating2 love of drinking2 love of sex4 ,it is to be observed1 also1 that the circumlocutory names have the same double meaning1 as the preceding single name2 they are the names both of the ,motive1 and the ,disposition4 ,the motives1 arising from the pleasures of the palate1 and from the pleasures of sex1 are sometimes spoken of as two species of one genus4 ,to this the name ,sensuality is applied4 ,the fact1 however1 rather is1 that the cases of excess1 named ,gluttony1 ,drunkenness1 ,lust1 are considered as the species of a certain genus4 ,sensuality is rather a generical name of the cases of excess1 than of those of moderation4 ,sensuality has the same duplicity of meaning1 with all the other names1 just enumerated2 it is the name1 both of the ,motive and of the ,disposition4 ,temperance1 and ,intemperance1 are names of ,dispositions1 which have a reference to pleasures generally4 ,we have seen1 from a previous illustration1 that when the motive resulting from the association of a pleasure is not obeyed1 it is owing to the association of a pain4 ,when the association of the pain resulting from any act so balances that of the pleasure1 that when the value of the pain exceeds that of the pleasure1 the pleasure never prevails1--the #bfb ,disposition called ,temperance exists2 that is1 an equal facility of associating with any act both its pleasures and its pains4 ,when the association in the two cases is not in this manner equally balanced2 that is1 when the association of the pleasures is an overmatch for the pains1 the ,disposition called ,intemperance exists4#di ,editor's footnote #di3 ,a ,motive is that which influences the will2 and the ,will is a subject we have not yet arrived at the consideration of4 ,meanwhile1 it is here shewn that a motive to an act consists in the association of pleasure with the act2 that a motive to abstain from an act1 is the association of pain with it2 and we are prepared to admit the truth deduced therefrom1 that the one or the other motive will prevail1 according as the pleasurable or the painful association is the more powerful4 ,what makes the one or the other more powerful1 is 7conformably to the general laws of association7 partly the intensity of the pleasurable or painful ideas in themselves1 and partly the frequency of repetition of their past conjunction with the act1 either in experience or in thought4 ,in the latter of these two consists the efficacy of education in giving a good or a bad direction to the active powers4 ,in further elucidation of ,motives1 ,i cite the following passages from the ,first ,appendix to the author's ,fragment on ,mackintosh 7pp4 #chi1 #cij73-- ,a motive is something which moves--moves to what8 ,to action4 ,but all action1 as ,aristotle says1 7and all mankind agree with him7 is for an end4 ,actions are essentially means4 ,the question1 then1 is1 what is the end of action8 ,actions1 taken in detail1 have ends in detail4 ,but actions1 taken in classes1 have ends which may be taken in classes4 ,thus the ends of the actions which are subservient to the pleasures of sense1 are combined in a class1 to which1 in abstract1 we give the name sensuality4 ,the class of actions which tend to the #bfc increase of power1 have a class of ends to which we give the name ambition1 and so on4 ,when we put all these classes together1 and make a genus2 that is1 actions in general2 can we in like manner make a genus of the ends2 and name ends in general8 ,if we could find what the several classes of ends2 sensuality for example2 ambition2 avarice2 glory2 sociality1 c42 have in common1 we could4 ,now1 they have certainly this in common1 that they are all agreeable to the agents4 ,a man acts for the sake of something agreeable to him1 either proximately or remotely4 ,but agreeable to1 and pleasant to2 agreeableness1 and pleasantness1 are only different names for the same thing2 the pleasantness of a thing is the pleasure it gives4 ,so that pleasure1 in a general way1 or speaking generically2 that is1 in a way to include all the species of pleasures1 and also the abatement of pains2 is the end of action4 ,a motive is that which moves to action4 ,but that which moves to action is the end of the action1 that which is sought by it2 that for the sake of which it is performed4 ,now that1 generically speaking1 is the pleasure of the agent4 ,motive1 then1 taken generically is pleasure4 ,the pleasure may be in company or connection with things infinite in variety4 ,but these are the accessaries2 the essence1 is the pleasure4 ,thus1 in one case1 the pleasure may be connected with the form1 and other qualities of a particular woman2 in another1 with a certain arrangement of colours in a picture2 in another1 with the circumstances of some fellow-creature4 ,but in all these cases1 what is generical1 that is the essence1 is the pleasure1 or relief from pain4 ,a motive1 then1 is the idea of a pleasure2 a particular motive1 is the idea of a particular pleasure2 and these are infinite in variety4 ,another question is1 in what circumstances does the idea of a pleasure become a motive8 ,for it is evident1 that it does not so in all4 ,it is only necessary here to illustrate1 not to resolve the question4 ,first1 the pleasure must be #bfd regarded as attainable4 ,no man wills an act1 which he knows he cannot perform1 or which he knows cannot effect the end4 ,in the next place1 the idea of the particular pleasure must be more present to the mind1 than any other of equal potency4 ,that which makes the idea of one pleasure more potent than another2 or that which makes one idea more present to the mind than another1 is the proximate cause of the motive1 and a remote cause of the volition4 ,the cause of that superior potency1 or of that presence to the mind1 is a cause of the volition1 still more remote1 and so on4--,ed4 #bfe ,,section ,,ii4 ,,causes ,,of ,,our ,,pleasurable ,,and ,,painful ,,states1 ,,contemplated ,,as ,,the ,,consequents ,,of ,,our ,,own ,,acts4 ,the motives which are formed by the association of our actions1 not with our pleasures immediately1 but the causes of them1 are much more numerous than those which are formed by the association of them with the pleasures themselves2 and give birth to a much greater number of actions4 ,the cause of this we have already explained1 and need not explain it again4 ,the causes of our ,pleasures1 including as well the remote as the proximate1 are so numerous1 that it is necessary to speak of them in classes4 ,we have surveyed them under the following ,heads2 ,wealth1 ,power1 ,dignity1 our ,fellow-creatures1 the objects called ,sublime and ,beautiful2 and having fully explained the associations by which they become ,,affections1 we have now only to shew1 by what additament these ,affections are converted into ,,motives4 ,it is not difficult to trace the course of association4 ,the idea of the pleasure carries us to the idea of the cause2 the idea of that cause1 to the idea of its cause2 and so on till we arrive at that action of ours which is the commencing cause1 and gives birth to all the #bff rest4 ,this association forms a complex state of consciousness1 which receives the name of ,,motive4 ,it is also to be observed1 that when a grand cause of pleasures has been associated with a great many pleasures1 and a great many times1 the association acquires a peculiar character and strength4 ,the idea of the cause1 as cause1 is so lost among the innumerable ideas of the pleasures combined with it1 that it seems to become the idea of pleasure itself4 ,an instance commonly adduced to illustrate the important class of associations to which this belongs1 is that of ,money2 and a remarkable instance it is4 ,many are the instances in which the association of pleasures with money constitutes so vehement an affection that it is an overmatch for all others4 ,in those cases the association which constitutes the motive seems to consist of a single link4 ,the money is the passion2 the idea of the action which is to add to it1 or prevent its diminution1 associated with the passion1 constitutes the ,motive4 ,the ,motive which leads to the acquisition of wealth1 great as is the part which it plays in human life1 has no appropriate name4 ,avarice1 ,rapacity1 like the words ,gluttony1 and ,lust1 are only names for cases of excess4 ,it is observable1 however1 that they have the above-noticed duplicity of meaning2 that they are names both of the ,motive1 and of the ,disposition4 ,we have noticed three states of consciousness into which the idea of a cause of our pleasures enters as a main ingredient3 #a4 ,the mere contemplation of it as a cause1 past or future2 which is called the ,,affection3 #b4 ,the association of an act of ours1 as the #bfg cause of the cause2 which is called the ,,motive3 #c4 ,a readiness to obey this motive1 which is called the ,,disposition4 ,we have seen1 that in regard to ,wealth1 we had no other name for the first of those states of ,consciousness1 or the ,,affection1 than the term ,love of ,wealth4 ,it is here of importance to observe1 that for the ,motive also1 or the second of those states1 unless in its cases of excess1 we have no other name than the name of the affection4 ,we call the ,motive also1 love of wealth4 ,nor have we any other name for the ,disposition4 ,this1 therefore1 is a case of great confusion4 ,we have but one name for the ,affection1 for the ,motive1 and for the ,disposition4 ,they are states of consciousness1 therefore1 perpetually confounded4 ,power1 as a cause of pleasure1 is rather a less distinct and definite idea1 than ,wealth4 ,the associations formed with it partake of this indistinctness4 ,the ,motive which is formed by association of the idea of ,power1 with that of an act of ours1 which is to add to it1 is a more vague idea than that formed of the idea of ,wealth associated with the ideas of the acts which are to add to it4 ,our present purpose1 however1 does not require a minute analysis4 ,the acts by which1 in the different degrees in which it is possessed1 men are commonly enabled to add to their power1 are vulgarly known4 ,power1 like wealth1 becomes itself a sort of primary affection4 ,the association with it of acts of ours as causes of its increase1 constitutes the state of mind called the ,motive4 ,this ,motive receives the name of ,ambition2 and that name is so applied pretty generally2 though its #bfh original and more appropriate application seems to be1 to great acquisitions of power1 or additions made to great acquisitions4 ,the same duplicity of meaning1 which we have so often remarked1 meets us here4 ,in whatever sense ,ambition is the name of the ,motive1 it is also a name of the ,disposition4 ,the term ,love of ,power1 which we have found to be the name of the ,affection1 is also applied to the two other states of mind1 the ,motive1 and the ,disposition4 ,the three1 therefore1 ,affection1 ,motive1 ,disposition1 are commonly confounded4 ,dignity is a more vague term than even ,power2 including a still greater number of undefined particulars4 ,but to understand sufficiently the three states of mind which it contributes to form1 no further enumeration of those particulars is necessary4 ,the idea of ,dignity1 as cause1 associated with the idea of pleasures as effect1 constitutes the state of mind called ,affection4 ,the state of mind called affection associated with the idea of an act of ours as cause of the cause1 is the state of mind called the ,motive4 ,and a facility of being acted upon by the motive1 is the ,disposition4 ,we have only one name1 ,love of ,dignity1 for all the three4 ,we have seen that the value of ,wealth1 ,power1 and ,dignity1 is greatly enhanced1 by their comparative amount2 that is1 the degree in which they are possessed by us1 compared with the degree in which they are possessed by others4 ,we have seen in what manner this comparison generates certain affections1 which have received the #bfi names of ,pride1 on the one hand1 ,contempt1 on the other2 ,humility1 on the one hand1 ,respect1 ,admiration1 on the other4 ,we have now to shew in what manner this comparison generates both ,motives1 and ,dispositions4 ,as it is not only of value to me to have more ,wealth1 ,power1 and ,dignity2 but of additional value to have more than other men2 the surpassing of other men becomes1 thus1 a cause of ,pleasure2 and hence the idea of this surpassing1 associated with the ideas of my own acts1 as the cause1 becomes a ,motive4 ,we may endeavour to surpass other men1 by either of two ways2 by adding to our own ,wealth1 ,power1 ,dignity2 or1 by abstracting from theirs4 ,when only the acts which add to our advantages enter into the ,motive1 it is called ,emulation4 ,when those which abstract from the advantages of another enter into it1 it is called ,envy4 ,emulation is sometimes the name of the ,disposition1 as well as of the ,motive4 ,ambition1 however1 is very often used as the name of the ,disposition corresponding to the ,motive1 ,emulation4 ,envy1 is the name both of the ,disposition and the ,motive4 ,it has the appearance also of being the name of the corresponding ,affection2 or of the state of consciousness arising from the comparison of another man's greater1 with our own less advantages4 ,this1 however1 is only ,humility4 ,it is never ,envy1 but when the ,motive to reduce them is felt4 ,it may be a ,motive without effect1 being counteracted by other motives4 ,and it is this state in which it assumes the appearance of an ,affection4 ,in these instances1 the same end is attainable by #bgj two sets of means2 the one virtuous2 the other vicious4 ,the man who takes the virtuous course1 that is1 obeys the virtuous motive1 is the man who has formed the habit of associating his idea of the good to be derived from surpassing others1 with the acts which lead to the increase of his own advantages4 ,the man who takes the vicious course1 is the man who has formed the habit of associating with his idea of the benefit of surpassing others1 the acts1 by which their advantages are diminished4 ,this a case of the greatest importance1 in ,education1 and ,ethics4 ,we now come to the explanation of that important class of ,motives which arise from the contemplation of our ,,fellow-,,creatures1 as the cause of our ,pleasures1 and ,pains4 ,with respect to our ,fellow-creatures1 a distinction must be carefully observed4 ,they are sources to us of ,pleasure or ,pain1 in two ways2 either by their ,,states2 or1 by their ,actions4 ,their ,,actions give birth to a set of ,associations of the greatest importance1 which remain to be considered under a ,head by themselves4 ,what the ,affections are1 which are generated by the association of our pains and pleasures1 with the ,,states of our ,fellow-creatures1 taken individually1 or in groups1 we have recently examined4 ,we have now only to shew1 and for this a few words will suffice1 what are the ,motives1 generated by the association of acts of ours with those ,,states2 acts contemplated as causes of such alterations in the ,states as render them to a greater or less degree causes of our pleasures or pains4 #a4 ,what the state of my ,friend is1 as respects both #bga his outward circumstances and his inward disposition1 which renders him1 more or less1 a source1 to me1 of pleasure on the one hand1 or pain on the other1 it is not necessary1 after what has been said1 any further to illustrate4 ,when alterations can be effected in that state by my actions1 of a kind to render my ,friend more a cause of ,pleasure to me1 or less a cause of ,pain1 the association takes place of my pleasures as effect with such alterations as cause of those pleasures1 and with my own acts1 as cause of those alterations4 ,the ,,motive1 therefore1 exists4 ,and when a facility of forming this association1 in other words1 a readiness of obeying the ,,motive1 is contracted1 the ,disposition exists4 ,it is important to observe1 that the word1 ,friendship1 has all that equivocation1 or variety of meaning1 which we have detected in other words expressing our states of mind towards the causes of our pleasures or pains4 ,it is1 at once1 the name of the ,,affection1 the name of the ,,motive1 and the name of the ,,disposition4 #b4 ,we have seen what the ,state of any one of our fellow-creatures is1 which so associates with it the ideas of our own pains and pleasures1 as to make him an object of ,kindness4 ,it is easy to see in what manner the ideas of our own acts are so joined to those associations1 as to constitute ,motives4 ,when the idea of additions to the pleasures of a man1 calls up the idea of additions to our pleasures2 the idea of a diminution of his pains1 the idea of a diminution of our pains2 and when to this is added the idea of our own acts as cause of those additions and diminutions1 the association exists which we call ,,motive4 #bgb ,the motive1 which we are now considering1 though in most men1 owing to a bad education1 in which so important an association has been neglected1 it is too feeble1 not to give way to any of the stronger propensities of our nature1 is1 nevertheless1 from the constancy of its action1 a powerful agent in human life1 and the cause of no small portion of all the happiness which exists in the world4 ,a readiness to be acted upon by this ,,motive2 a main object of good ,education2 constitutes the ,,disposition4 ,the ,,affection1 the ,,motive1 the ,,disposition1 have all but one name4 ,each is denominated ,kindness4 ,when the more immediate effect is the removal of pain1 we use the term ,compassion2 which is1 in like manner1 a name of the affection1 the motive1 and the disposition4 #c4 ,the ,state of the group1 denominated a ,family1 is a copious source of pain1 or pleasure1 to the members of it4 ,we have explained1 above1 the associations which constitute the ,family ,affections4 ,the formation of the ,motives it is now easy to trace4 ,to take the principal case1 that of the ,parent2 ,the pleasurable associations which he has with the pleasures1 and removal of the pains1 of his child1 joined with the idea of his own acts1 as cause of those pleasures and removals1 constitute a ,,motive1 the importance of which we daily observe4 ,notwithstanding the defects of the parental associations1 under such a state of ,education and ,morals as ours1 no other source of generosity in ,human ,nature produces uniformly so large a portion of its proper effects4 ,it is not necessary to explain in what manner the affections1 either of the child towards the parent1 or of #bgc brothers and sisters towards each other1 become motives4 ,that such motives often exist1 and in great strength2 and that no small portion of human happiness is derived from them1 is matter of experience4 ,we have no appropriate name for either the ,,affection1 or the ,,motive1 or the ,,disposition1 in the case1 either of the parent toward the child1 or of the child toward the ,parent1 or of the children among themselves4 ,we are under the necessity of forming circumlocutory names1 by aid of the general term ,love4 ,we say the ,love of ,family2 the ,love of a ,parent toward his offspring2 the ,love to one another of brothers and sisters4 ,and these are names1 at once1 of the ,,affection1 the ,,motive1 and the ,,disposition4 ,so imperfectly have some of the most interesting and important of our states of consciousness been distinguished4 #d4 ,the idea of our ,country is associated1 as in some sort their cause1 with a great portion of all the pleasures which we enjoy4 ,and the difference of the states1 in which it may be placed1 makes a prodigious difference in the amount of pleasures1 which we derive from it4 ,when actions of ours1 therefore1 can influence the state of our country1 we associate the idea of those acts as causes1 with the pleasurable results as effects1 and hence the ,,motive exists4 ,to individuals of the great body of the people1 wholly in most countries deprived of power1 their country can seldom present itself in the light of a motive1 because with few acts of theirs as cause1 can they associate a benefit to their country as the ,effect4 ,their exertions in repelling from it the invasion of a destructive enemy1 or freeing it from the power of a #bgd mischievous government1 are the principal exceptions to this general rule4 ,the way in which the idea of ,country becomes a ,motive to a man whose actions are more widely operative1 may thus be conceived4 ,in the prosperity of his country1 is included a portion of his own prosperity1 and of that of all the individuals who are objects of his affection4 ,such actions of his1 therefore1 as are calculated to add to the prosperity of his country1 are associated with all the agreeable trains1 which additions to the prosperity of himself1 and of all those with whom he has any sympathies1 imply4 ,there are cases1 though rare1 in which this motive has existed in extraordinary force2 in which men have been found capable of sacrificing every thing for their country4 ,this happens most readily in times of great excitement2 that is1 when public opinion holds out a great reward2 and when the object rather is1 to ward off some great calamity1 than to obtain an accession of good4#ej ,editor's footnote #ej3 ,it is too limited a view of the effect of times of great excitement in intensifying the patriotic feelings1 to identify it with the influence of a more than usual reward held out by public opinion4 ,that fact often contributes its share1 but there are other causes fully as effectual4 ,in times of excitement1 the idea of ,country1 the ideas of all the interests involved in it1 and of the manner in which those interests will be affected by our action or by our forbearance to act1 exist in the mind in greater intensity1 and are recalled with far greater frequency1 than in ordinary times4 ,moreover1 the fact that a feeling is shared by all or many of those with whom we are in frequent intercourse1 strengthens1 by an obvious consequence1 all the associations1 both of resemblance and of contiguity1 which give that feeling its force4 ,this is the well-known influence of sympathy1 so strikingly evinced by the vehement feelings of a crowd4 ,to these might be added another influence1 belonging rather to physiology than to psychology4 ,when the nervous system has been highly strung up by the influence of any strong feeling1 it seems to become more acutely sensible to feeling of any sort1 those feelings excepted which jar with1 and are counteracted by1 the prevailing tone of the system4--,ed4 #bge ,it is important to observe1 that this motive tends different ways1 according to the different positions of the individual4 ,where the inhabitants of a country are divided into classes1 a ,ruling ,class1 and a ,subject ,class1 the members of the ,ruling ,class have hardly any sympathies1 except with one another2 in other words1 have agreeable associations with the pleasures1 and removal of the pains1 of hardly any persons1 but those who belong to the same class4 ,in this class are contained1 their ,parents1 their ,brothers and ,sisters1 their ,sons and ,daughters1 their ,companions1 whether ,male or ,female1 and their ,friends3 the manners of this class1 are to them the only agreeable manners2 the morals of this class the only virtue4 ,it hence appears1 that the principal part of the associations1 which make the idea of country an ,,affection1 are1 in their case1 connected exclusively with the good of their own class4 ,when their own acts1 as causes1 are associated with accessions to this good1 as effects1 the ,motive created is that of benefit to the class4 ,patriotism1 in their case1 means1 literally1 #ast1 ,affection for their own class2 #bndly1 ,the ,motive to benefit that class2 and #crdly1 ,a readiness to obey that ,motive4 ,it is to be observed1 that ,patriotism is the only #bgf name provided for all the three states of the agreeable trains connected with the idea of country1 the ,,affection1 the ,,motive1 and the ,,disposition1--and that it is commonly used in a laudatory sense2 to mark an unusual degree of the ,affection1 the ,motive1 or the ,disposition4 ,it follows1 from what has been said1 that there can be no real ,patriotism1 no pointing of the ,affection1 the ,motive1 and ,disposition1 steadily to the good of the whole1 without preference of any particular part2 except1 either in men of elevated minds and affections1 in whom the larger associations1 generated by a good ,education1 control the narrow associations1 growing out of a particular position2 or1 in men whose position is such as to give them pleasurable associations chiefly with individuals of the general mass1 whose good has this happy quality1 that it is always identified with that of the community at large4 #e4 ,the group1 called a ,party1 or ,class1 generates associations1 which have produced great1 we may say terrible1 effects1 in human life2 and which thence deserve a great degree of attention4 ,the associations1 of which the ,,affection consists1 and by which the interest of the class comes to be identified1 as it were1 with the interest of the individual1 have been already pointed out4 ,from this the generation of the ,,motive is easily traced4 ,when the interests of the class are contemplated as capable1 either of receiving increase1 or of being preserved from diminution1 by the acts of the class1 collectively1 or individually2 that is1 when the increase1 or the preservation from diminution1 is associated1 as #bgg effect1 with acts of the class1 collectively1 or individually1 as cause1 the ,,motive exists4 ,when a readiness to obey this ,,motive2 that is1 a facility of forming the associations which constitute the ,,motive exists1 the corresponding ,,disposition exists4 ,there are no appropriate names for these states of consciousness4 ,we make1 by the usual forced service of the word ,love1 a name for necessary occasions4 ,a nobleman says1 he has a ,love for his ,order2 and that term1 ,love of his ,order1 is the name for all the three states1 the ,,affection1 the ,,motive1 and the ,,disposition4 ,the ,clergy have invented a name for their own case4 ,it is ,love of the ,church4 ,this means1 the love of the interests of the class2 of the ,wealth1 ,power1 and ,dignity1 of the ,clergy4 ,the term ,love of the ,church has the usual variety of meaning4 ,it is the name not only of the ,,affection1 but also of the ,,motive1 and the ,,disposition4 ,it is moreover a name well contrived for the purposes of the class2 because it is calculated to keep the real character of the associations out of sight4 #f4 ,the aggregate1 included under the comprehensive term ,mankind1 is in so many ways associated with our pains and pleasures1 that the interest of each individual appears1 in some degree1 bound up in the interest of the race4 ,any act of ours1 then1 by which the interest of the race can be promoted1 is associated in our minds with our own interest2 and becomes a motive4 ,a readiness to act upon this ,,motive1 is the ,,disposition and the ,,affection1 the #bgh ,,motive1 and the ,,disposition1 have but one name1 ,love of ,mankind4 ,this motive operates feebly1 and is easily overruled by other motives1 in the great majority of men4 ,a very general idea1 such as that of ,mankind1 is an indistinct idea2 and no strong association is formed with it1 except by the means of ,education4 ,in the common run of men1 the narrow sympathies1 alone1 act with any considerable force4 ,such men can sympathize with this individual1 and the other individual1 with their own ,family1 or their own class4 ,but to sympathize with mankind at large1 or even with the body of the people in their own country1 exceeds the bounds of their contracted affections4 ,large ,classes1 which cannot be the object of our ,senses1 become steady subjects of contemplation1 only through the medium of ,general ,terms4 ,applied1 in comprehensive1 and important ,propositions1 ,general ,terms call forth associations of the most interesting nature2 and to men1 who are in the habit of so applying them1 become the source of an affection1 powerful enough to control every other propensity of their nature4 ,it is only by a ,philosophical ,education1 that men are early trained to the use of ,general ,terms1 and comprehensive ,propositions2 and have the means of forming those associations1 on which the most ennobling of all the states of ,human ,consciousness depends4#ea ,editor's footnote #ea3 ,this ,section is devoted to an exposition of the manner in which facts which are not pleasures or pains1 but causes of pleasures or of pains1 become so closely associated in thought #bgi with the pains and pleasures of which they are causes1 as not only to become themselves pleasurable or painful1 but to become also1 by their association with acts of our own by which they may be brought about1 motives of the greatest strength4 ,the value of a due understanding of this fact1 both for the purposes of psychological science and for those of practical education1 is evidently very great3 and the author1 to whose mind the bearings of speculative philosophy on the practical interests of the human race were ever present1 has not failed to make some ethical and political applications of the psychological truth which he has here so excellently illustrated4--,ed4 #bhj ,,chapter ,,xxiii4 ,,the ,,acts ,,of ,,our ,,fellow-,,creatures1 ,,which ,,are ,,causes ,,of ,,our ,,pains ,,and ,,pleasures1 ,,contemplated ,,as ,,consequents ,,of ,,our ,,own ,,acts4 ,,we are now in a condition to explain the ,phenomena1 which have been classed under the titles of ,moral ,sense1 ,moral ,faculty1 ,sense of ,right and ,wrong1 ,moral ,affection1 ,love of ,virtue1 and so on1 which are all names of similar import4 ,we have already remarked1 that1 of all the ,causes of our ,pleasures and ,pains1 none are to be compared in point of magnitude1 with the actions of ourselves1 and our ,fellow-creatures4 ,from this class of causes1 a far greater amount of ,pleasures and ,pains proceed1 than from all other causes taken together4 ,it follows1 that these causes are objects of intense affection to us2 either favourable1 if they are the cause of ,pleasure2 or unfavourable1 if they are the cause of ,pain4 ,the actions from which men derive advantage have all been classed under four ,titles2 ,prudence1 ,fortitude1 ,justice1 ,beneficence4 ,we apply the names ,prudent1 ,brave1 ,just1 #bha ,beneficent1 both to our own acts1 and to the acts of other men4 ,when those names are applied to our own acts1 the first two1 ,prudent and ,brave1 express acts which are useful to ourselves1 in the first instance2 the latter two1 ,just1 and ,beneficent1 express acts1 which are useful to others1 in the first instance4 ,when we apply the same names1 not to our own acts1 but to the acts of other men1 the first two1 ,prudent and ,brave1 express acts which are useful to them in the first instance2 the latter two1 ,just and ,beneficent1 express acts which are useful to others1 in the first instance4 ,it is further to be remarked1 that those acts of ours1 which are primarily useful to ourselves1 are secondarily useful to others2 and those which are primarily useful to others1 are secondarily useful to ourselves4 ,thus1 it is by our own ,prudence and ,fortitude1 that we are best enabled to do acts of ,justice and ,beneficence to others4 ,and it is by acts of ,justice and ,beneficence to others1 that we best dispose them to do similar acts to us4 ,again1 in the case of other men1 the acts which are primarily useful to themselves1 their ,prudence1 their ,fortitude1 are secondarily useful to others1 as by them they are the better enabled to be always just and beneficent2 and the acts by which they are primarily useful to others1 their ,justice1 their ,beneficence1 are secondarily useful to themselves1 as disposing others the more to be just and beneficent toward them4 ,we have two sets of associations1 therefore1 with the acts which are thus named2 one set of associations #bhb with them1 when they are considered as our own acts2 another set of associations with them1 when they are considered as the acts of other men4 #a4 ,when they are considered as our own acts2 in other words1 when we consider our own ,prudence1 ,bravery1 ,justice1 and ,beneficence1 we have associations with them of the following kind4 ,with our own acts of ,prudence and ,bravery1 we associate good to ourselves2 that is1 either ,pleasure1 or the cause of ,pleasure1 as the immediate consequent4 ,acts of ,,prudence1 for example1 are divided into two sorts2 the sort productive of good1 and the sort preventive of evil4 ,all acts which add to our ,wealth1 ,power1 and ,dignity1 or any one of them1 so far as they produce this effect without counterbalancing evil1 may be called acts of ,prudence4 ,thus1 incessant ,labour1 by all those to whom it is necessary for subsistence1 or for reputation1 is a course of ,prudence4 ,prudence1 however1 in its common acceptation1 is more employed to denote the acts by which we avoid evils1 than those by which we obtain good2 those by which we reject present pleasures when followed by pains which overbalance them1 and by which we endure present pains when they prevent the following of greater pains1 or secure the following of pleasures which overbalance them4 ,it thus appears1 that1 for the most perfect performance of acts of prudence1 the greatest measure of knowledge is required4 ,it is the choice made1 among all the innumerable acts within our power1 of those1 the consequences of which1 when the pleasurable and painful are balanced against one another1 constitute the greatest amount of good4 ,to this is requisite a #bhc knowledge of all the train of consequences1 which each act can produce2 that is1 a knowledge of the qualities of almost every thing1 animate and inanimate1 with which we are surrounded2 and a judgment1 constantly upon the alert1 to draw correct conclusions from what we know4 ,when we perform acts of ,,courage or ,,fortitude1 the chance of ,evil1 that is1 danger1 is incurred for the sake of a preponderant good4 ,if the good were not something more than a balance for the chance of ,evil1 the consequences of the act would not be a balance of good1 but of evil4 ,it would1 therefore1 be an immoral1 not a moral1 act2 and would have no title to the name of ,courage4#eb ,bain's footnote #eb3 ,the virtue of ,prudence might apparently have included ,courage or ,fortitude2 we cannot be said to be prudent1 if we are unable to face a certain amount of evil or danger1 for the sake of a greater good4 ,doubtless1 however1 the author felt that ,prudence does not suggest the full scope of so eminent a quality as ,courage4 ,the reasons of this are interesting to explore4 ,of various considerations that might be adduced1 by far the most pertinent is the following4 ,courage1 as a virtue esteemed and extolled in all ages1 involves a certain amount of self-sacrifice4 ,if it were limited to the control of the state of fear1 so as to enable one never to fail in the pursuit of one's own interest1 by giving way to unreasonable alarms1 it would be respected as a manifestation of strength1 but it would not receive the warm admiration that we usually bestow upon courageous men4 ,the nobility of courage is its devotedness4 ,the courageous soldier is not he that maintains a post of apparent danger unmoved1 knowing there is no real danger2 which would be the prudent man's courage4 ,something very different is exacted in return for the epithet a brave man4--,b4 ,knowledge is1 therefore1 as necessary to the exercise of this virtue as to that of ,prudence4 ,courage1 in fact1 is but a species of the acts of ,prudence3 a class selected for distinction by a particular name2 that class1 in which evils1 of great magnitude1 or rather of a particular description1 are to be hazarded1 for the sake of a preponderant good4 ,but how is the #bhd amount of the good1 or of the evil1 to be ascertained1 but by that power of tracing the consequences of acts1 for which the greatest knowledge1 and the most accurate judgment1 are required8 ,when1 with the ideas of our acts of ,prudence1 and acts of ,courage1 past1 and future1 have been associated1 sufficiently often1 the classes of benefits which are the consequences of them1 the ,ideas of those acts are no longer ,,simple ,,ideas1 ,,indifferent ,,ideas2 they are ,,pleasurable ,,ideas2 that is1 ,,affections4 ,the ,,motive1 in this case1 presents a peculiarity1 which requires attention4 ,in the case of the ,love of ,wealth1 ,power1 or ,dignity1 the ,love of ,individuals1 the ,love of ,family1 and all other causes of our ,pleasures1 we have uniformly found the ,affection to be one thing1 the ,motive another4 ,the ,affection consisted of the association of the idea of the object as ,cause1 with that of our ,pleasures as ,effect4 ,the ,motive consisted of the association of the idea of the object1 as cause1 with that of our pleasures1 as effect1 and the idea of an act of ours1 as cause of that cause4 ,when it is an act of our own1 however1 which is the cause of our ,pleasure1 there is no act of ours to be associated as cause of that cause4 ,the #bhe ideas of the act1 and its consequences1 are the ,motive4 ,the ,,motive1 therefore1 and the ,,affection1 are in this case the same4 ,the next two classes of acts are those to which the names1 ,justice1 and ,beneficence1 have been applied4 ,taken together1 they are the names of all those acts of a man1 by which he does good to others4 ,out of these1 the name ,justice selects a particular class1 and all the rest are ,beneficence4 ,men1 in society1 have found it essential1 for mutual benefit1 that the powers of ,individuals1 over the general causes of good1 should be fixed by certain rules2 that is1 ,laws4 ,acts done in conformity with those rules are called ,just ,acts2 and1 when duly considered1 they are seen to include the main portion of acts of beneficence in general2 of those acts of ours1 the immediate object of which is the good of others4 ,to the performance of a certain portion of the acts of ,justice1 our ,fellow-creatures compel us1 by annexing penalties to the non-performance of them4 ,a large portion1 however1 remain to be performed without compulsion4 ,our ,beneficent acts are either causes of pleasure to others immediately1 or causes of the causes of their pleasures4 ,the act of him who gives a cup of water to the thirsty traveller in the ,desert1 may be said to be cause of the pleasure of the ,traveller4 ,the act of him who instructs the ,traveller1 before he proceeds on his journey1 where in the ,desert water is to be found1 is the cause of the cause of his ,pleasure4 ,to speak generally1 all acts of ours1 by which increase is imparted to the ,wealth1 ,power1 and ,dignity of another person1 and to the favourable disposition of #bhf other persons towards him2 or by which diminution of those advantages is prevented1 are acts of ,beneficence towards him4 ,it is easy to trace in what manner the ideas of those acts become ,affections4 ,in the first place1 we have associations of pleasure with all the pleasurable feelings of a ,fellow-creature4 ,we have associations of pleasure1 therefore1 with those acts of ours which yield him pleasure4 ,in the second place1 those are the acts which procure to us one of the most highly valued of all the sources of our pleasures1 the favourable ,disposition of our ,fellow-men4 ,with our acts of ,justice and ,beneficence1 therefore1 we have associations of all the pleasures which the favourable disposition of other men towards us is calculated to produce4 ,by those associations1 the ,idea of our own beneficent acts is no longer an ,,indifferent ,,idea2 it becomes a ,,pleasurable ,,idea1 that is1 an ,,affection4#ec ,bain's footnote #ec3 ,the affirmations in this paragraph require to be tested in the detail1 in order to find out their limitations4 ,that we have associations of pleasure with all the pleasurable feelings of a ,fellow-creature is true in a great many instances4 ,by the law of association1 the signs of happiness tend to suggest the happy feelings themselves1 and even to induce these to some extent upon the beholder4 ,the sight of happy beings is a positive contribution to our own happiness2 the obverse fact being equally well marked4 ,we are delighted with the playful gambols of animals1 and of children1 and with the pleased expression of our fellow-creatures generally4 ,on this ground1 we have an interest in conferring happiness upon all our associates1 and upon every one whose signs of pleasure and of displeasure come under our notice4 ,hence1 in the absence of other motives1 we are disposed to be the authors of pleasure1 rather than of pain1 wherever we go4 ,our first impulse towards a stranger would always be1 from this consideration1 to confer some benefit or perform some agreeable act4 ,from this origin1 there flows a considerable fraction of the generosity and the courtesy of human beings4 ,but the tendency is thwarted1 and often extinguished1 by other powerful impulses of the mind4 ,there are two principal counteractives1--,rivalry in interests generally1 and the ,love of ,power4 ,if the expression of pleasure manifested by any sentient being1 is procured at our expense1 we fail to realise the happy feelings2 we are1 on the contrary1 pained and embittered by the display4 ,now this is a fact of very frequent occurrence in all conditions of human beings2 and1 to the extent of its occurrence1 it mars the strength and purity of the association4 ,the ,love of ,power works in the same direction4 ,it not only reconciles the mind to displays of pain1 but it may render these a delight and luxury4 ,being an emotion little checked in ordinary human beings1 it provides a considerable share of gratification1 through the infliction of pain4 ,this1 therefore1 is a second interference with the law that would connect the signs of happiness with a thrill of pleasure in the beholder4 ,one can easily suppose1 and one frequently finds1 the emotion of power in such a pitch of development as to make the pleasure of seeing happy beings the exception1 and not the rule4 ,so much for the first of the two motives in the text4 ,the second1--the procuring of reciprocal benefits by benefits conferred1--is everything that a motive can be4 ,we are all our lives engaged in working out good for ourselves1 and if1 by doing good to others1 we obtain a corresponding measure of our own advantage1 we employ that instrumentality4 ,but then the prospect must be clear2 the instrument must be a promising one4 ,now there are some situations wherein we have a reasonable security of a return4 ,when there is a legal guarantee1 as in bargains1 and in covenanted services1 we are 7as a rule7 ready to fulfil our own share4 ,also1 in very little things1 such as the courtesies of civilised society1 we contribute our part willingly2 we are nearly sure of a full return for the trifling nature of the service4 ,but there are multitudes of cases where 7as we suppose7 there would be no adequate return1 or no return at all2 all of which interfere with the growth of the association between benefits conferred and pleasure to ourselves4 ,it is not necessary1 in order to the pleasure of benevolence1 that the return should be either in kind1 or in flattery4 ,if we can only obtain love for our benefits1 we think them well bestowed4 ,a great many benefits are conferred with no other view2 and the appreciation of the extent of this motive is necessary to do justice to the author's theory of the derivation of ,benevolence from ,prudence4 ,it does not admit of question1 that if all the services that each person is disposed to bestow1 were fairly requited in kind1 in praise1 or in love1 the motive to seek the good of others would have an overpowering strength of association1 such as the author assigns to it4 ,the finishing stroke1 in all cases of strong and unremitted association1--the transfer to the means of the feeling originally due to the end1 and even the sinking of the end out of view1--would be a sure result of the operation4 ,but so partial1 as human beings are now constituted1 is the operation of the principle2 so seldom are people satisfied1 that they have the full equivalent of benefits imparted2--that1 unless in select instances1 there is as much of mistrust as of confidence and hope1 in the reciprocation of services of any great magnitude4 ,of course1 people will differ greatly in their estimate of this fact2 but on no reasonable and candid calculation1 is the association strong enough to account for the intensity and diffusion of disinterested impulses as actually found among mankind4--,b4 #bhg ,pleasurable ideas1 as effects1 associated with acts of our own as the cause1 constitute the ,,motive1 as well as the ,,affection4 ,the reason of this1 we have just stated1 and need not repeat4 ,we have now seen by what associations both ,,affection1 and ,,motive are created1 in the case of our own acts of ,prudence1 ,fortitude1 ,justice1 and ,beneficence4 ,the ,,disposition1 as in all other cases1 consists in a facility1 from habit1 of performing the associations2 in other words1 a readiness of obeying the ,motive4 ,in each of the cases1 the ,affection1 the ,motive1 and the ,disposition1 have the same name4 ,thus1 ,prudence is the name of the ,affection1 and ,motive1 and also of the ,disposition1 to acts of ,prudence2 so is ,fortitude1 ,justice1 and ,beneficence1 each in regard to its own class of acts4 ,beside the four specific names1 ,prudence1 ,fortitude1 #bhh ,justice1 and ,beneficence1 we have a ,generical ,name1 which includes them all4 ,,virtue is the name of ,prudence1 ,fortitude1 ,justice1 and ,beneficence1 all taken together4 ,it is also1 like the name of each of the species included under it1 at once the name of the ,affection1 the ,motive1 and the ,disposition4 ,the man who has the ,disposition toward all the four1 ,prudence1 ,fortitude1 ,justice1 ,beneficence1 in full strength2 that is1 who has acquired1 from habit1 the facility of #bhi associating with those acts the pleasures which result from them1 in other words1 a habit of obeying the motives1 is perfectly virtuous4 ,it requires the most perfect education to create those associations adequately1 in other words1 to give the motives such power within us1 that1 when counteracted by other motives1 they may always prevail4 ,under the present imperfect state of education1 it is rather by their constant action1 than their force1 that they produce the very considerable effects1 of which we see that they are the causes4 ,in few men1 are they a #bij match for any of the more potent motives2 and1 in most men1 they give way1 habitually1 whenever they are opposed by any other motive even of moderate strength4 ,there are so many occasions1 however1 in every part of our lives1 for acts of virtue1 when other motives do not intervene1 that we may still ascribe to the motives of virtue1 feeble as they generally are1 a large portion of the happiness which we observe in the world4 #b4 ,having considered the associations which each of us has with the ideas of his own acts of ,prudence1 ,fortitude1 ,justice1 and ,beneficence1 it remains that we consider the associations which each of us has with other men's acts of ,prudence1 ,fortitude1 ,justice1 and ,beneficence4 ,we have already observed1 that the ,prudence of other men is primarily useful to themselves1 secondarily useful to others4 ,a man who is to a certain degree imprudent1 deprives himself of the power of being useful either to himself or to others4 ,as we have agreeable associations with acts which produce pleasure to others1 so we have agreeable associations with the cause of such acts1 the power of producing them2 and1 of course1 disagreeable associations with the acts which deprive a man of the means of doing good to others1 and warding off evil from himself4 ,it is not necessary to enter into a more minute analysis to show in what manner our ,idea of another man's ,prudence becomes a ,pleasurable ,idea1 in other words1 an ,,affection4 ,we next proceed to the case of ,fortitude1 ,courage4 ,we have seen that ,fortitude is the name of that class of acts1 in which a good is aimed at by the risk of a #bia great evil4 ,there is a grand class of cases in which the good aimed at is not the peculiar good of the ,individual or ,individuals by whom the act1 or series of acts1 is performed1 but a good common to others1 to a whole ,people2 as1 for example1 when another hostile ,people is encountered and overcome4 ,of course1 in such a case1 we have a strong association of our own pleasures1 or exemption from pains1 with other men's courage1 whether we are sharing with them in the danger1 or exempted from it by their acts4 ,this association is such as to constitute1 and we know by experience does constitute1 a very strong ,,affection4 ,even when the good sought by the act of courage is only the good of the individual1 we have a sufficient association with it of pleasurable ideas to constitute it an ,,affection4 ,we have1 first of all1 an agreeable association with the balance of good which the act is calculated to produce to the actor4 ,and next we have a very powerful association of pleasure with the state of mind in which the ,idea of a great evil is controlled by the ,idea of a greater good4 ,when the motive exists to do us good in a man who has such a mind1 he will not be deterred by the prospect of an inadequate evil4 ,when we encounter danger in company with such a man1 we shall not be exposed to greater danger by his deserting us4 ,as other men's acts of ,justice and ,beneficence are directly beneficial to them who are the objects of them1 it is impossible that every man should not have pleasurable associations1 first with the acts of ,justice and ,beneficence of the men1 whose sphere of action extends to himself1 and then with the acts of ,justice and ,beneficence of all men4 ,and as the benefits which #bib spring from such actions are very great1 the ,,affection1 generated by association of the ,ideas of those ,benefits1 is proportionally strong4 ,of all the ,,motives1 competent to our nature1 those belonging to this class are by far the most important4 ,as there is nothing in which ,i am so deeply interested1 as that the acts of men1 which regard myself immediately1 should be acts of ,justice and ,beneficence1 and those which regard themselves immediately1 should be acts of ,prudence and ,fortitude1 it follows1 that ,i have an interest1 proportionally deep1 in all those acts of my own1 which operate as causes of those acts in other people4 ,of acts of other men1 which are useful to us1 a great number can be bought by wealth1 or commanded by power1 or elicited by dignity4 ,the mode of the operation of those causes has already been explained1 and the motives into the composition of which they enter1 form a different class4 ,the acts of beneficence1 of justice1 of fortitude1 and of prudence1 performed by other men in our behalf1 are1 to a vast extent1 such as can neither be bought1 nor commanded4 ,what means have we of increasing to the utmost1 the number of those acts2 diminishing to the utmost1 the number of those of an opposite tendency8 ,those means are of two sorts3 #ast1 ,similar actions on our part2 #b;dly1 ,the manifestation on our part1 of the disposition to perform similar actions4 #a4 ,it is interesting here to observe1 by what a potent call we are summoned to ,virtue4 ,of all that we enjoy1 more is derived from those acts of other men1 on which we bestow the name ,,virtue1 than from any other cause4 ,our own virtue is the principal #bic cause why other men reciprocate the acts of virtue towards us4 ,with the idea of our own acts of virtue1 there are naturally associated the ideas of all the immense advantages we derive from the virtuous acts of our ,fellow-creatures4 ,when this association is formed in due strength1 which it is the main business of a good education to effect1 the motive of virtue becomes paramount in the human breast4 #b4 ,we strongly act upon other men1 when we manifest on our parts1 a disposition to perform acts in their favour1 in consequence of the acts performed by them in favour of others4 ,this disposition we manifest1 when we praise those acts2 or1 as we otherwise phrase it1 when we declare our approbation1 or admiration1 of them4 ,it is to be observed1 that all our names for those acts2--,prudence1 ,fortitude1 ,justice1 ,beneficence1 ,virtue2 are names of ,praise4 ,they are names1 not merely of the acts1 but of the acts associated with the ideas of the benefits resulting from them2 and further associated with the idea of those acts of ours1 which are the causes of such acts2 acts of similar utility on our part to the ,authors of the acts which are useful to us4 ,praise1 also1 is extensive in its operation4 ,the acts of any individual can afford a retribution for the virtuous acts of a very small number of men4 ,his ,praise can extend to all men2 and its effects are most important4 ,not only does it indicate the affection of him who is the author of it1 toward him who is the object2 but it points out him who is the object of it1 to all other men1 as the proper object of a similar affection in them4 ,this indication has some tendency #bid to propagate the favourable affection or disposition towards the object of the applause2 but it has a much greater tendency to propagate the praise2 and when praise is sounded from many lips1 that is1 when a disposition is expressed by many persons favourable to the man who has been the author of the applauded acts1 a number of acts in his favour are the natural consequence4 ,that we have pleasurable associations of great potency1 with this manifestation of the favourable disposition of others towards us1 is matter of common and constant experience4 ,it is called1 in its more remarkable states1 the ,,love ,,of ,,fame1 and is known to operate as one of the most powerful motives in our nature4 ,one of its cases is a remarkable exemplification of that high degree of association1 which has been already explained1 and to which we have frequently had occasion to advert1 in explaining other phenomena2 the degree which constitutes belief1 and which gives to that belief1 even when momentary1 and instantly overruled by other associations1 a powerful effect on our actions4 ,not only that ,praise of us1 which is diffused in our lives1 and from which agreeable consequences may arise to us1 is delightful1 by the associated ideas of the pleasures resulting from it2 but that ,praise1 which we are never to hear1 which will be diffused only when we are dead1 and from which no actual effects can ever accrue to us1 is often an object of intense affection1 and acts as one of the most powerful motives in our nature4 ,the habit which we form1 in the case of immediate praise1 of associating the idea of the praise with the #bie idea of pleasurable consequences to ourselves1 is so strong1 that the idea of pleasurable consequences to ourselves becomes altogether inseparable from the idea of our ,praise4 ,it is one of those cases in which the one ,idea never can exist without the other4 ,the belief1 thus engendered1 is of course encountered immediately by other belief1 that we shall be incapable of profiting by any consequences1 which posthumous fame can produce3 as the fear1 that is1 the belief of ghosts1 in a man passing through a churchyard at midnight1 may be immediately encountered by his settled1 habitual belief that ghosts have no existence2 and yet his terror1 not only remains for a time1 but is constantly renewed1 as often as he is placed in circumstances with which he has been accustomed to associate the existence of ghosts4#ed ,editor's footnote #ed3 ,the case here put1 that of the desire of posthumous fame1 affords no real support to the author's doctrines1 that a high degree of association constitutes belief1 and that belief is always present when we are determined to action4 ,the case is merely one of many others1 in which something not originally pleasurable 7the praise and admiration of our fellow-creatures7 has become so closely associated with pleasure as to be at last pleasurable in itself4 ,when it has become a pleasure in itself1 it is desired for itself1 and not for its consequences2 and the most confirmed knowledge that it can produce no ulterior pleasurable consequences to ourselves will not interfere with the pleasure given by the mere consciousness of possessing it1 nor hinder that pleasure from becoming1 by its association with the acts which produce it1 a powerful motive4 ,it is a frequent mode of talking1 to speak of the desire of posthumous fame in a kind of pitying way1 as grounded on a delusion2 as a desire which implies a certain infirmity of the understanding4 ,those who thus speak must be prepared to apply the same disparaging phrases to the interest taken in the welfare of others after our own death2 for in that case also1 no beneficial consequences to ourselves personally can ever follow from the realization of the object of our desire4 ,but there is nothing at variance with reason in the associations which make us value for themselves1 things which we at first cared for only as means to other ends2 associations to which we are indebted for nearly the whole both of our virtues1 and of our enjoyments4 ,that he who acts with a view to posthumous fame has a belief1 however momentary1 that this fame will produce to him some extraneous good1 or that he shall be conscious of it after he is dead1 ,i shall not admit without better evidence than ,i have ever seen or heard of4--,ed4 #bif ,the operation of ,dispraise is similar1 to prevent the performance of acts contrary to ,justice1 ,beneficence1 ,fortitude1 and ,prudence4 ,dispraise is the manifestation of a ,disposition1 unfavourable to the object of it1 a disposition to abstain from acts useful to him1 not to abstain from acts hurtful to him4 ,it is not necessary to point out the associations formed in this case4 ,it is a matter of common and constant experience1 that we have associations of painful consequences1 with the idea of the unfavourable disposition of our fellow-creatures1 associations which constitute some of the most painful feelings of our nature4 ,this it is1 which is commonly expressed by the terms loss of reputation1 loss of character1 disgrace1 infamy4 ,in some instances1 the ,association rises to that remarkable case1 which we have had frequent occasions of observing2 when the means become a more important object than the end1 the cause1 than the effect4 ,it not unfrequently happens1 that the idea of the unfavourable sentiments of mankind1 becomes more intolerable than all the consequences which could result from #big them2 and men make their escape from life1 in order to escape from the tormenting idea of certain consequences1 which1 at most1 would only diminish the advantages of living4#ee ,nor is the ,idea of posthumous ,disgrace1 less operative than that of posthumous ,fame1 and from the same species of association4 ,in men1 in whom the associations which constitute the pain of disgrace are strong2 though not sufficiently strong to restrain them from deeds which incur the execration of mankind1 the thought of what they have done is agonizing4 ,along with it1 constantly rises up1 before them1 the idea of the condemnatory countenance1 the condemnatory sentiment1 the retributive acts1 of every human being the idea of whom is presented to them4 ,they are never at rest4 ,the ,idea of the horrid ,deed or ,deeds becomes associated with almost every point of their consciousness4 ,at every moment1 it rises up in their minds1 and along with it the #bih overwhelming train of ideas1 with which it is connected4 ,in its more awful cases1 this state of mind is called ,remorse2 and is generally regarded as the most perfect state of suffering to which a human ,being is exposed4 ,editor's footnote #ee3 ,they do not seek death to escape from the idea of any consequences of the unfavourable sentiments of mankind4 ,the mere fact of having incurred those unfavourable sentiments has become1 by the adhesive force of association1 so painful in itself1 that death is sometimes preferred to it4 ,there is often no thought of the consequences that may arise from the unfavourable sentiments2 and when consequences are thought of1 they are usually rather those which are mere demonstrations of feeling1 and owe their painfulness to the sentiment of which they are demonstrations1 than those which directly grate upon our senses or are injurious to our interests4 ,it is true that a vague conception of the many unpleasant consequences liable to arise from the evil opinion of others1 was the crude matter out of which the horror of the thing itself was primitively formed3 but1 once formed1 it loses its connexion with its original source4--,ed4 ,the same considerations account for that remarkable phenomenon of our nature1 eloquently described1 but not explained1 by ,adam ,smith1 that1 in minds happily trained1 the love of ,praiseworthiness1 the dread of ,blameworthiness1 is a stronger feeling1 than the love of actual ,praise1 the ,dread of actual ,blame4 ,it is one of those cases1 in which1 by the power of the association1 the secondary feeling becomes more powerful than the primary4 ,in all men1 the idea of praise1 as consequent1 is associated with the idea of certain acts of theirs1 as antecedent2 the idea of blame1 as consequent1 with the idea of certain acts of theirs1 as antecedent4 ,this association constitutes what we call the feeling1 or notion1 or sentiment1 or idea 7for it goes by all those names71 of ,praiseworthiness1 and ,blameworthiness4#ef ,the anticipation1 in the one case1 is delightful2 in the other painful4 ,the association #bii exists in different men1 in all possible degrees of strength4 ,in some men it exists in so great a degree of strength1 that not only1 the pleasure of immediate praise1 the pain of immediate blame1 but every other feeling of their nature1 is subdued by it4 ,editor's footnote #ef3 ,this paragraph1 unexplained1 might give the idea that the author regarded praiseworthiness and blameworthiness as having the meaning not of deserving praise or blame1 but merely of being likely to obtain it4 ,but what he meant is1 that the idea of deserving praise is but a more complex form of the association between our own or another person's acts or character1 and the idea of praise4 ,to deserve praise1 is1 in the great majority of the cases which occur in life1 the principal mode of obtaining it2 though the praise is seldom accurately proportioned to the desert4 ,and the same may be said of blame4 ,a powerful association is thus1 if circumstances are favourable1 generated between deserving praise and obtaining it2 and hence between deserving praise1 and all the pleasurable influences on our lives1 of other people's good opinion4 ,and this association may become sufficiently strong to overcome the direct motive of obtaining praise1 where it is to be obtained by other means than desert2 the rather1 as the desire of undeserved praise is greatly counteracted by the thought that people would not bestow the praise if they knew all4 ,that what has now been stated was really the author's meaning1 is proved by his going on to say1 that praiseworthiness and blameworthiness1 as motives to action1 have reference not to what is1 or to what shall be1 but to what ought to be1 the sentiments of mankind4--,ed4 ,the case is perfectly analogous to that of the love of posthumous praise1 the dread of posthumous blame1 and is a still more important principle of action1 as it has reference1 not to what is1 or to what shall be1 but to what ought to be1 the sentiments of mankind4 ,such1 then1 are the ,,affections which we bear toward the just1 the beneficent1 the courageous1 the prudent acts of other men1 and the contrary2 that is1 such are the associations we have with them of pleasurable or painful consequences4 ,such also are the ,,motives2 that is1 the feelings generated by the association of certain acts of ours1 as cause1 with the virtuous acts of other men1 as their effects4 ,of those ,,motives1 that which involves the acts of praising and blaming1 is in constant and strong #cjj operation4 ,it is from the great use made of those acts in the ,education of children1 and even in the rude management of them in the nursery1 that praise and blame acquire the influence in most cases1 the ascendancy in some1 which they are seen to exercise over us4 ,it is this sensibility to praise and blame1 in other words1 the associations we have with them1 which gives its effect to what is called ,,popular ,,opinion1 or the ,,popular ,,sanction1 and1 when the acts of ,justice1 ,beneficence1 ,fortitude1 and ,prudence of other men are the objects of it1 the ,,moral ,,sanction2 ,popular ,opinion1 being a phrase which expresses the ,praise or ,blame which the people bestow2 and the ,sanction being the good or evil consequences which men are accustomed to associate with that praise or blame4 ,in the present state of ,education1 the ,praise and ,blame of most men are very erroneously bestowed1 with great precipitation1 commonly in excess upon small occasions1 with little regard to its justice2 blame being very often inflicted where applause is due1 and applause lavished where blame ought to be bestowed4 ,when ,education is good1 no point of morality will be reckoned of more importance than the distribution of ,praise and ,blame2 no act will be considered more immoral than the misapplication of them4 ,they are the great instruments we possess for ensuring moral acts on the part of our ,fellow-creatures2 and when we squander away1 or prostitute those great causes of virtue1 and thereby deprive them of a great part of their useful tendency1 we do what in us lies to lessen the quantity of ,virtue1 and thence of ,felicity1 in the world4 ,the ,,motives1 which are generated by the #cja association of our own acts of ,justice and ,beneficence as cause with other men's acts of ,justice and ,beneficence as effects1 are subject1 unhappily1 to strong counteraction2 because it rarely happens that we can perform acts of ,justice and ,beneficence without more or less sacrifice to ourselves4 ,the association1 at the same time1 is strong1 in all men4 ,all men have the daily experience1 that their own acts of ,justice1 and ,beneficence1 dispose other men to be ,beneficent to them2 their own acts of injustice and malevolence1 dispose other men to bring evil 7which in this case they call punishment7 upon them2 and to abstain from doing them good4 ,this experience is of course followed by the usual association between cause and effect4 ,the man who does acts of ,justice and ,beneficence1 anticipates the favourable disposition of mankind1 as their natural effect2 and this association is his belief1 or conviction1 or sense 7he calls it by all those names71 of deserving the favourable sentiments of mankind4 ,the man1 on the other hand1 who performs acts which are unjust and hurtful to others1 anticipates the unfavourable and hostile sentiments of mankind1 as the natural consequents of his acts2 in other words1 has the belief1 or conviction1 or sense 7for the association in this case also has these various names71 of deserving1 not well1 but ill1 at the hands of other men4 ,there are no men1 however vicious1 in whom those associations do not produce constant and numerous effects4 ,when they have not been happily cultivated1 and when the counteracting associations1 of which we just now made mention1 have been allowed to acquire a mischievous strength2 acts in opposition to them #cjb are1 occasionally1 but1 even in the worst men1 no more than occasionally1 produced4 ,this anticipation of the hostile1 or benevolent sentiments of mankind1 as the natural effects of actions of a certain description on our part1 is the foundation of that remarkable association of which we had very recently occasion to make mention1 the association which ,dr4 ,smith has called the love of ,praiseworthiness1 and which is sometimes found to be much more powerful than the love of actual ,praise4 ,the ,,disposition which corresponds to those ,,motives1 or the facility of forming the associations which constitute them1 is the result of habit in this as in all other cases4 ,the ,,affection1 in this case1 has the name of ,moral approbation and ,disapprobation4 ,the same is the only name we have for the ,,motive4 ,it is also the only name we have for the ,,disposition4 ,the terms ,moral ,sense2 ,sense of ,right and ,wrong2 ,love of ,virtue1 and ,hatred of ,vice1 are sometimes used as synonymous terms2 but they are not equally appropriate4 ,virtue1 as we have seen1 is a name which is given to each of the three1 the ,affection1 the ,motive1 the ,disposition2 ,morality is a name which is applied with similar latitude4#eg #eh ,bain's footnote #eg3 ,the foregoing analysis of the ,moral ,sentiment proceeds upon a number of unquestionable psychological data4 ,that we have a strong personal interest in the virtues of ,prudence1 ,fortitude1 ,justice and ,beneficence1 in the manner stated1 is most certain2 and that this personal interest will incline us to practise those virtues ourselves1 and to encourage them in #cjc others1 is also certain4 ,the only doubt is1 as to whether the motives to rectitude of action are exhausted in this analysis4 ,the sufficiency of an analysis is less easily tested in mental phenomena1 than in physical phenomena4 ,the chief reason is that1 in the mind1 we cannot make exact numerical estimates2 and1 therefore1 cannot show1 by castings up a sum1 that the assigned constituents of a compound exactly amount to the total4 ,the several constituents put down may be actually present1 without our being sure whether they are the whole4 ,hence the ,deductive verification1 so valuable in physical science1 does not carry with it the same precision1 in mental science4 ,to evade this source of uncertainty we are thrown back upon the ,experimental ,canons1 or the ,four ,methods4 ,we know by these1 that if an analysis is good1 there must be present in each instance of the phenomenon the causes assigned1 one or more2 and should one exist in a low degree1 or be entirely wanting1 the others must have a compensating intensity4 ,if1 on the other hand1 the whole of the causes have not been assigned1 there will1 almost inevitably1 occur instances1 either without the causes stated1 or with these in an obviously insufficient amount4 ,the following facts and considerations render doubtful the completeness of the author's explanation of the ,moral ,sentiment4 ,the affirmation in the text is that not merely the self-regarding virtue--,prudence1 but also the two great social virtues--,justice and ,beneficence1 are developed from associations with our own personal interest4 ,in other words1 they grow up exactly by the same course as the virtue of ,prudence2 they are strong as that happens to be strong1 and weak as that happens to be weak2 the most prudent man being the most just and beneficent man4 ,this inference can be avoided only by drawing some distinction between the interested associations entering into prudence1 and the interested associations entering into justice and beneficence2 but no such distinction #cjd is drawn in the foregoing chapter1 at least in such a way as to meet the difficulty thus suggested4 ,now1 on an appeal to the facts1 we find that the virtue of prudence is not uniformly concomitant with the virtues of justice and beneficence2 that1 on the contrary1 except in the more highly cultivated moral natures1 they are frequently manifested in the inverse proportion4 ,a human being1 by cherishing interested associations1 does not as a matter of course attain to either justice or beneficence4 ,even the most far-sighted prudence1 as regards self1 would not develop the whole virtue of justice1 nor the whole virtue of beneficence4 ,on the other hand1 beneficence is often abundant and pronounced in cases where interested associations with self have been very slightly cultivated4 ,the illustration of this generic discrepancy1 between the author's theory and the more obvious facts1 might be extended4 ,there is1 however1 another mode of proceeding1 perhaps more decisive2 that is1 to show that the mind contains sources of the moral sentiment besides the associations with self-interest4 ,it does not appear easy1 at first sight1 to establish the existence of purely disinterested impulses in our mental constitution2 the admixture of self being so seldom unequivocally absent from human conduct4 ,still1 if these impulses do exist1 there will probably be found instances where they are manifested in convincing isolation4 ,perhaps the desired isolation is most readily afforded in some of the familiar forms of ,pity4 ,there are instances1 no doubt1 where pity may have a selfish motive1 as when we compassionate the sufferings of parents1 friends1 and benefactors4 ,but1 in other instances1 it arises not only without any selfish bearing1 but in opposition to powerful associations of interest4 ,the pity that we often extend to enemies and to criminals is a case in point4 ,even when the punishment of wrong-doers is bound up with our strongest interests1 the spectacle of their sufferings often moves us to remit the punishment necessary for our own protection4 ,now1 with beings made up of purely #cje interested considerations1 the argumentum ad misericordiam1 under those circumstances1 would be void of effect4 ,another example is furnished by those acts of lavish generosity and charity that perhaps ruin the giver1 and do harm to the recipient4 ,if one's moral education were exclusively conducted through the building up of associations with self1 by what class of associating links is this impulse generated8 ,it is no less difficult to account for the actions of men wholly devoted to philanthropy1 like ,howard4 ,so very small is the result to self from the labours and sacrifices of such men1 that we are unable to account for their motives without assuming an independent source of disinterested affections4 ,the difficulty is greatly increased in the case of minds little cultivated1 as in the heroic devotion of the common soldier4 ,observation of children reveals a specific power in the spectacle of misery or suffering to awaken pity and generous sympathies4 ,the effective impulse to sympathy has little to do with a prudential education1 or with the following out of self-interest in its associations with the welfare of others4 ,the patriotic orator never trusts wholly to interested motives2 he does not omit these2 but he expects much from the lively description of suffering and misery to people generally2 and if the picture comes home to the experience of his hearers1 they will be moved by it1 on account of each other1 as well as on account of their separate selves4 ,from such facts as these1 it is admissible to lay down1 as a general law1 that the sight of misery in others prompts us1 irrespective of our own interest1 to enter into1 and to relieve1 that misery4 ,this is the essential fact of ,sympathy4 ,the principle thus announced is not an ultimate law of the mind4 ,it may be brought under a still higher law1 of which some notice will be taken afterwards 7see note on the ,will1 chap4 ,,xxiv471 namely1 the tendency of every idea to act itself out1 to become an actuality1 not with a view to bring pleasure or to ward off pain--which is the proper description of the will--but from an independent prompting of the mind that often makes us throw away pleasure and embrace pain4 ,the full #cjf exposition of this principle would add greatly to the evidence for pure disinterested impulses1 by showing that the fact described operates in a much wider sphere than the moral sentiment4 ,on a survey of the different theories of the mental origin of ,benevolent impulses1 we may reduce them under the following heads4 #a4 ,they have been ascribed to direct and immediate self-interest1 either from the return of benefits in kind1 or from the pleasure of praise and flattery4 ,this is substantially the position of ,mandeville4 #b4 ,it is said we are so constituted that the sight of misery is a pain to us2 and that we work to rid ourselves of that pain1 as we should work to assuage thirst1 to banish toothache1 or to escape reproach4 ,this view was held by ,hobbes4 ,it is forcibly brought in in the following anecdote recorded of him by ,aubrey 7,lives ,,ii4 p4 #fbc74 ,one time1 ,i remember1 goeing in the ,strand1 a poor and infirme old man begged his almes2 he beholding him with eies of pitty and compassion1 putt his hand in his pocket1 and gave him #f;d42 ,sayd a divine ,dr4 ,jaspar ,mayne that stood by1 ',would you have done this1 if it had not been ,christ's ,command8' ',yea1' sayd he3 ',why8' quoth the other2 ',because1' sayd he1 ',i was in paine to consider the miserable condition of the old man2 and now my almes1 giving him some relief1 doth also ease me4' ,there is a certain amount of truth in this statement2 and taking the fact by itself1 we might find some difficulty in drawing the line between a volition moved by our own pain1 and the acting out of the idea of pain in favour of the sufferer4 ,the best reply1 perhaps1 is to compare the amount of pain incurred and of pleasure remitted or sacrificed by the sympathiser1 with the utmost value fairly ascribable to his own mental pain4 ,the pain of misery witnessed is frequent and habitual1 and although it has a certain depressing effect upon the mind1 yet we should generally bear it much more easily than the pains of self-sacrifice it often incites us to4 #cjg #c4 ,we may be endowed with a positive susceptibility to pleasure from acts of kindness to others2 so that in doing good1 we are still moved in exact proportion to our own gratification4 ,this expresses very nearly ,bentham's view of ,disinterestedness2 which1 however1 equally with the foregoing1 comes short of the facts4 ,supposing some such pleasure to exist1 no one could show that in degree it fully corresponds to the effects prompted by benevolent impulse4 #d4 ,habits of acting in favour of others may be formed to such an extent1 that our virtuous actions1 begun under our own pleasures and pains1 may at last cease to have any reference to those pleasures and pains4 ,here1 also1 the appeal is to an undeniable fact of our mental constitution4 ,actions that begin as proper voluntary actions--on the spur of pleasure and pain--often pass into a mechanical routine1 and are persisted in even when they thwart our pleasures4 ,any one placed for a number of years in a position of danger1 and habituated to troublesome precautions1 is almost sure to keep up the same routine1 after the occasion has ceased2 mothers are liable to this unreasonable continuance of solicitude about their children4 ,the application of the fact to moral education is of great moment4 ,if the young are initiated betimes into a regard to the feelings and interests of others1 they will grow up with a sort of mechanical unquestioning tendency towards the same line of conduct4 ,these are the four different modes of stating the origin of disinterested conduct1 apart from the assumption of a source of purely disinterested impulses in the constitution of the mind4 ,such a source has been indicated above1 in what may be called the power of the fixed idea1 having its seat in the region of the intellect1 and operating to thwart the proper voluntary impulses1 which are instigated by our pleasures and pains4--,b4 ,i4 ,editor's footnote #eh3 ,it had been pointed out1 in a preceding chapter1 that ,wealth1 ,power1 ,dignity1 and many other things which are not #cjh in their own nature pleasures1 but only causes of pleasures and of exemption from pains1 become so closely associated with the pleasures of which they are causes1 and their absence or loss becomes so closely associated with the pains to which it exposes us1 that the things become objects of love and desire1 and their absence an object of hatred and aversion1 for their own sake1 without reference to their consequences4 ,by virtue of the same law of association1 it is pointed out in the present chapter that human actions1 both our own and those of other people1 standing so high as they do among the causes both of pleasure and of pain to us 7sometimes by their direct operation1 and sometimes through the sentiments they give birth to in other persons towards ourselves7 tend naturally to become inclosed in a web of associated ideas of pleasures or of pains at a very early period of life1 in such sort that the ideas of acts beneficial to ourselves and to others become pleasurable in themselves1 and the ideas of acts hurtful to ourselves and to others become painful in themselves3 and both kinds of acts become objects of a feeling1 the former of love1 the latter of aversion1 which having1 in our minds1 become independent of any pleasures or pains actually expected to result to ourselves from the acts1 may be truly said to be disinterested4 ,it is no less obvious that acts which are not really beneficial1 or not really hurtful1 but which1 through some false opinion prevailing among mankind1 or some extraneous agency operating on their sentiments1 incur their praise or blame1 may and often do come to be objects of a quite similar disinterested love or hatred1 exactly as if they deserved it4 ,this disinterested love and hatred of actions1 generated by the association of praise or blame with them1 constitute1 in the author's opinion1 the feelings of moral approbation and disapprobation1 which the majority of psychologists have thought it necessary to refer to an original and ultimate principle of our nature4 ,mr4 ,bain1 in the preceding note1 makes in this theory a correction1 to which the author himself would probably not have objected1 namely1 that the mere idea of a pain or pleasure1 by whomsoever felt1 is intrinsically painful or pleasurable1 and when raised in #cji the mind with intensity is capable of becoming a stimulus to action1 independent1 not merely of expected consequences to ourselves1 but of any reference whatever to ,self2 so that care for others is1 in an admissible sense1 as much an ultimate fact of our nature1 as care for ourselves2 though one which greatly needs strengthening by the concurrent force of the manifold associations insisted on in the author's text4 ,though this of ,mr4 ,bain is rather an account of disinterested ,sympathy1 than of the moral feeling1 it is undoubtedly true that the foundation of the moral feeling is the adoption of the pleasures and pains of others as our own3 whether this takes place by the natural force of sympathy1 or by the association which has grown up in our mind between our own good or evil and theirs4 ,the moral feeling rests upon this identification of the feelings of others with our own1 but is not the same thing with it4 ,to constitute the moral feeling1 not only must the good of others have become in itself a pleasure to us1 and their suffering a pain1 but this pleasure or pain must be associated with our own acts as producing it1 and must in this manner have become a motive1 prompting us to the one sort of acts1 and restraining us from the other sort4 ,and this is1 in brief1 the author's theory of the ,moral ,sentiments4 ,the exhaustive treatment of this subject would require a length and abundance of discussion disproportioned to the compass and purposes of a treatise like the present1 which was intended to expound what the author believed to be the real mode of formation of our complex states of consciousness1 but not to say all that may and ought to be said in refutation of other views of the subject4 ,there are1 however1 some important parts of the author's own theory1 which are not stated in this work1 but in a subsequent one1 of a highly polemical character1 the ,fragment on ,mackintosh3 and it may be both instructive and interesting to the reader to find the statement here4 ,i therefore subjoin the passages containing it4 ,nature makes no classes4 ,nature makes individuals4 ,classes are made by men2 and rarely with such marks as determine certainly what is to be included in them4 #caj ,men make classifications1 as they do everything else1 for some end4 ,now1 for what end was it that men1 out of their innumerable acts1 selected a class1 to which they gave the name of moral1 and another class1 to which they gave the name of immoral8 ,what was the motive of this act8 ,what its final cause8 ,assuredly the answer to this question is the first step1 though ,sir ,james saw it not1 towards the solution of his two questions1 comprehending the whole of ethical science2 first1 what makes an act to be moral8 and secondly1 what are the sentiments with which we regard it8 ,we may also be assured1 that it was some very obvious interest which recommended this classification2 for it was performed1 in a certain rough way1 in the very rudest states of society4 ,farther1 we may easily see how1 even in very rude states1 men were led to it1 by little less than necessity4 ,every day of their lives they had experience of acts1 some of which were agreeable1 or the cause of what was agreeable1 to them2 others disagreeable1 or the cause of what was disagreeable to them1 in all possible degrees4 ,they had no stronger interest than to obtain the repetition of the one sort1 and to prevent the repetition of the other4 ,the acts in which they were thus interested were of two sorts2 first1 those to which the actor was led by a natural interest of his own2 secondly1 those to which the actor was not led by any interest of his own4 ,about the first sort there was not occasion for any particular concern4 ,they were pretty sure to take place1 without any stimulus from without4 ,the second sort1 on the contrary1 were not likely to take place1 unless an interest was artificially created1 sufficiently strong to induce the actor to perform them4 ,and here we clearly perceive the origin of that important case of classification 4 4 4 4 the classification of acts as moral and immoral4 ,the acts1 which it was important to other men that each individual should perform1 but in which the individual had not a sufficient interest to secure the #caa performance of them1 were constituted one class4 ,the acts1 which it was important to other men that each individual should abstain from1 but in regard to which he had not a personal interest sufficiently strong to secure his abstaining from them1 were constituted another class4 ,the first class were distinguished by the name moral acts2 the second by the name immoral4 ,the interest which men had in securing the performance of the one set of acts1 the non-performance of the other1 led them by a sort of necessity to think of the means4 ,they had to create an interest1 which the actor would not otherwise have1 in the performance of the one sort1 the non-performance of the other4 ,and in proceeding to this end1 they could not easily miss their way4 ,they had two powers applicable to the purpose4 ,they had a certain quantity of good at their disposal2 and they had a certain quantity of evil4 ,if they could apply the good in such a manner as to afford a motive both for the performance and non-performance which they desired1 or the evil1 in such a manner as to afford a motive against the performance and non-performance which they wished to prevent1 their end was attained4 ,and this is the scheme which they adopted2 and which1 in every situation1 they have invariably pursued4 ,the whole business of the moral sentiments1 moral approbation1 and disapprobation1 has this for its object1 the distribution of the good and evil we have at command1 for the production of acts of the useful sort1 the prevention of acts of the contrary sort4 ,can there be a nobler object8 ,but though men have been thus always right in their general aim1 their proceedings have been cruelly defective in the detail2 witness the consequence1--the paucity of good acts1 the frequency of bad acts1 which there is in the world4 ,a portion of acts having been thus classed into good and bad2 and the utility having been perceived of creating motives to incite to the one1 and restrain from the other1 a sub-classification was introduced4 ,one portion of these acts was such1 that the good and evil available for their production #cab and prevention1 could be applied by the community in its conjunct capacity4 ,another portion was such1 that the good and evil available could be applied only by individuals in their individual capacity4 ,the first portion was placed under the control of what is called law2 the other remained under the control of the moral sentiments2 that is1 the distribution of good and evil1 made by individuals in their individual capacity4 ,no sooner was the class made1 than the rule followed4 ,moral acts are to be performed2 immoral acts are to be abstained from4 ,beside this the general rule1 there was needed1 for more precise direction1 particular rules4 ,we must remember the fundamental condition1 that all rules of action must be preceded by a corresponding classification of actions4 ,all moral rules1 99comprehended in the great moral rule1 must relate to a class of actions comprehended within the grand class1 constituted and marked by the term moral4 ,this is the case with grand classes in general4 ,they are subdivided into minor classes1 each of the minor classes being a portion of the larger4 ,thus1 the grand class of acts called moral has been divided into certain convenient portions1 or sub-classes1 and marked by particular names4 ,just1 ,beneficent1 ,brave1 ,prudent1 ,temperate2 to each of which classes belongs its appropriate rule that men should be just1 that they should be beneficent1 and so on 4 4 4 4 4 ,in the performance of our duties two sets of cases may be distinguished4 ,there is one set in which a direct estimate of the good of the particular act is inevitable2 and the man acts immorally who acts without making it4 ,there are other cases in which it is not necessary4 ,the first are those1 which have in them so much of singularity1 as to prevent their coming within the limits of any established class4 ,in such cases a man has but one guide2 he must consider the consequences1 or act not as a moral1 or rational agent at all4 #cac ,the second are cases of such ordinary and frequent occurrence as to be distinguished into classes4 ,and everybody knows 4 4 4 that when a class of acts are performed regularly and frequently1 they are at last performed by habit2 in other words1 the idea of the act and the performance of it follow so easily and speedily that they seem to cohere1 and to be but one operation4 ,it is only necessary to recall some of the more familiar instances1 to see the mode of this formation4 ,in playing on a musical instrument1 every note1 at first1 is found by an effort4 ,afterwards1 the proper choice is made so rapidly as to appear as if made by a mechanical process in which the mind has no concern4 ,the same is the case with moral acts4 ,when they have been performed with frequency and uniformity1 for a sufficient length of time1 a habit is generated 4 4 4 4 4 ,when a man acts from habit1 he does not act without reflection4 ,he only acts with a very rapid reflection4 ,in no class of acts does a man begin to act by habit4 ,he begins without habit2 and acquires the habit by frequency of acting4 ,the consideration1 on which the act is founded1 and the act itself1 form a sequence4 ,and it is obvious from the familiar cases of music and of speaking1 that it is a sequence at first not very easily performed4 ,by every repetition1 however1 it becomes easier4 ,the consideration occurs with less effort2 the action follows with less effort2 they take place with greater and greater rapidity1 till they seem blended4 ,to say1 that this is acting without reflection1 is only ignorance1 for it is thus seen to be a case of acting by reflection so easily and rapidly1 that the reflection and the act cannot be distinguished from one another 4 4 4 4 4 4 ,since moral acts are not performed at first by habit1 but each upon the consideration which recommends it2 upon what considerations1 we may be asked1 do moral acts begin to be performed8 ,the question has two meanings1 and it is necessary to reply to both4 ,it may be asked1 upon what consideration the men of our own age and country1 for example1 at first #cad and before a habit is formed1 perform moral acts8 ,or1 it may be asked1 upon what consideration did men originally perform moral acts8 ,to the first of these questions every one can reply from his own memory and observation4 ,we perform moral acts at first1 from authority4 ,our parents tell us that we ought to do this1 ought not to do that4 ,they are anxious that we should obey their precepts4 ,they have two sets of influences1 with which to work upon us2 praise and blame2 reward and punishment4 ,all the acts which they say we ought to do1 are praised in the highest degree1 all those which they say we ought not to do1 are blamed in the highest degree4 ,in this manner1 the ideas of praise and blame become associated with certain classes of acts1 at a very early age1 so closely1 that they cannot easily be disjoined1 ,no sooner does the idea of the act occur than the idea of praise springs up along with it1 and clings to it4 ,and generally these associations exert a predominant influence during the whole of life4 ,our parents not only praise certain kinds of acts1 blame other kinds2 but they praise us when we perform those of the one sort1 blame us when we perform those of the other4 ,in this manner other associations are formed4 ,the idea of ourselves performing certain acts is associated with the idea of our being praised1 performing certain other acts with the idea of our being blamed1 so closely that the ideas become at last indissoluble4 ,in this association consist the very important complex ideas of praise-worthiness1 and blame-worthiness4 ,an act which is praiseworthy1 is an act with the idea of which the idea of praise is indissolubly joined2 an agent who is praiseworthy is an agent with the idea of whom the idea of praise is indissolubly joined4 ,and in the converse case1 that of blame-worthiness1 the formation of the idea is similar4 ,many powerful circumstances come in aid of these important associations1 at an early age4 ,we find1 that not only our parents act in this manner1 but all other parents4 #cae ,we find that grown people act in this manner1 not only towards children1 but towards one another4 ,the associations1 therefore1 are unbroken1 general1 and all-comprehending4 ,our parents administer not only praise and blame1 to induce us to perform acts of one sort1 abstain from acts of another sort1 but also rewards and punishments4 ,they do so directly2 and1 further1 they forward all our inclinations in the one case1 baulk them in the other4 ,so does everybody else4 ,we find our comforts excessively abridged by other people1 when we act in one way1 enlarged when we act in another way4 ,hence another most important class of associations2 that of an increase of well-being from the good will of our fellow-creatures1 if we perform acts of one sort1 of an increase of misery from their ill-will1 if we perform those of another sort4 ,in this manner it is that men1 born in the social state1 acquire the habits of moral acting1 and certain affections connected with it1 before they are capable of reflecting upon the grounds which recommend the acts either to praise or blame4 ,nearly at this point the greater part of them remain1 continuing to perform moral acts and to abstain from the contrary1 chiefly from the habits they have acquired1 and the authority upon which they originally acted2 though it is not possible that any man should come to the years and blessing of reason1 without perceiving1 at least in an indistinct and general way1 the advantage which mankind derive from their acting towards one another in one way1 rather than another4 ,we come now to the second question1 viz4 what are the considerations upon which men originally performed moral acts8 ,the answer to this question is substantially contained in the explanation already given of the classification of acts as moral and immoral4 ,when men began to mark the distinction between acts1 and were prompted to praise one class1 blame another1 they did so1 either because the one sort benefited1 the other hurt them2 or for some other reason4 ,if for the first reason1 the case is perfectly intelligible4 ,the men had a motive #caf which they understood1 and which was adequate to the end4 ,if it was not on account of utility that men classed some acts as moral1 others as immoral1 on what other account was it8 ,to this question1 an answer1 consisting of anything but words1 has never been returned4 ,it has been said1 that there is a beauty1 and a deformity1 in moral and immoral acts1 which recommended them to the distinctions they have met with4 ,it is obvious to reply to this hypothesis1 that the mind of a savage1 that is1 a mind in the state in which the minds of all men were1 when they began to classify their acts1 was not likely to be much affected by the ideal something called the beauty of acts4 ,to receive pain or pleasure from an act1 to obtain1 or be deprived of1 the means of enjoyment by an act2 to like the acts and the actors1 whence the good proceeded1 dislike those whence the evil proceeded2 all these were things which they understood4 ,but we must endeavour to get a little nearer to the bottom of this affair4 ,in truth1 the term beauty1 as applied to acts1 is just as unintelligible to the philosopher1 as to the savage4 ,is the beauty of an act one thing2 the morality of it another8 ,or are they two names for the same thing8 ,if they are two things1 what is the beauty1 distinct from the morality8 ,if they are the same thing1 what is the use of the name morality8 ,it only tends to confusion4 ,but this is not all4 ,the beautiful is that which excites in us the emotion of beauty1 a state of mind with which we are acquainted by experience4 ,this state of mind has been successfully analysed1 and shewn to consist of a train of pleasurable ideas1 awakened in us by the beautiful object4 ,but is it in this way only that we are concerned in moral acts8 ,do we value them for nothing1 but as we value a picture1 or a piece of music1 for the pleasure of looking at them1 or hearing them8 ,everybody knows the contrary4 ,acts are objects of importance to us1 on account of their #cag consequences1 and nothing else4 ,this constitutes a radical distinction between them and the things called beautiful4 ,acts are hurtful or beneficial1 moral or immoral1 virtuous or vicious4 ,but it is only an abuse of language1 to call them beautiful or ugly4 ,that it is jargon1 the slightest reflection is sufficient to evince2 for what is the beauty of an act1 detached from its consequences8 ,we shall be told1 perhaps1 that the beauty of an act was never supposed to be detached from its consequences4 ,the beauty consists in the consequences4 ,i am contented with the answer4 ,but observe to what it binds you4 ,the consequences of acts are the good or evil they do4 ,according to you1 therefore1 the beauty of acts is either the utility of them1 or it is nothing at all2--a beautiful ground on which to dispute with us1 that acts are classed as moral1 not on account of their utility1 but on account of their beauty4 ,it will be easily seen1 from what has been said1 that they who ascribe the classification of acts1 as moral1 and immoral1 to a certain taste1 an agreeable or disagreeable sentiment which they excite 7among whom are included the ,scottish professors ,hutcheson1 and ,brown1 and ,david ,hume himself1 though on his part with wonderful inconsistency7--hold the same theory with those who say1 that beauty is the source of the classification of moral acts4 ,things are classed as beautiful1 or deformed1 on account of a certain taste1 or inward sentiment4 ,if acts are classed in the same way1 on account of a certain taste or inward sentiment1 they deserve to be classed under the names beautiful1 and deformed2 otherwise not4 ,i hope it is not necessary for me to go minutely into the exposure of the other varieties of jargon1 by which it has been endeavoured to account for the classification of acts1 as moral and immoral4 ',fitness' is one of them4 ,acts are approved on account of their fitness4 ,when fitness is hunted down1 it is brought to bay exactly at the place where beauty was4 ,fitness is either the goodness of the consequences1 or it is nothing at all4 #cah ,the same is the case with ',right ,reason1' or ',moral ,reason4' ,an act according to moral reason1 is an act1 the consequences of which are good4 ,moral reason1 therefore1 is another name1 and not a bad name1 for the principle of utility4a ,editor's footnote a3 ,fragment on ,mackintosh1 pp4 #bdg--bfe4 ,the following passage from another part of the same work1 is also very much to the purpose4 ,the terms moral and immoral were applied by men1 primarily1 not to their own acts1 but the acts of other men4 ,those acts1 the effects of which they observed to be beneficial1 they desired should be performed4 ,to make them be performed1 they1 among other things they did1 affixed to them marks of their applause2 they called them1 good1 moral1 well-deserving2 and behaved accordingly4 ,such is the source of the moral approbation we bestow on the acts of other men4 ,the source of that which we bestow on our own is twofold4 ,first1 every man's beneficial acts1 like those of every other man1 form part of that system of beneficial acting1 in which he1 in common with all other men1 finds his account4 ,secondly1 he strongly associates with his own beneficial acts1 both that approbation of other men1 which is of so much importance to him1 and that approbation which he bestows on other men's beneficial acts4 ,it is also easy to shew what takes place in the mind of a man1 before he performs an act1 which he morally approves or condemns4 ,what is called the approbation of an act not yet performed1 is only the idea of future approbation3 and it is not excited by the act itself2 it is excited by the idea of the act4 ,the idea of approbation or disapprobation is excited by the idea of an act1 because the approbation would be excited by the act itself4 ,but what excites moral approbation or disapprobation of an act1 is neither the act itself1 nor the motive of the act2 but the consequences of the act1 good or evil1 and their being within the intention of the agent4 #cai ,let us put a case4 ,a man with a starving wife and family is detected wiring a hare on my premises4 ,what happens8 ,i call up the idea of sending him to prison4 ,i call up the ideas of the consequences of that act1 the misery of the helpless creatures whom his labour supported2 their agonizing feelings1 their corporal wants1 their hunger1 cold1 their destitution of hope1 their despair3 ,i call up the ideas of the man himself in jail1 the sinking of heart which attends incarceration2 the dreadful thought of his family deprived of his support2 his association with vicious characters2 the natural consequences1--his future profligacy1 the consequent profligacy of his ill-fated children1 and hence the permanent wretchedness and ruin of them all4 ,i next have the idea of my own intending all these consequences4 ,and only then am ,i in a condition to perform1 as ,sir ,james says1 the 'operation of conscience4' ,i perform it4 ,but in this case1 it is1 to use another of his expressions1 'defeated4' ,notwithstanding the moral disapprobation1 which the idea of such intended consequences excites in me1 ,i perform the act4 ,here1 at all events1 any one may see1 that conscience1 and the motive of the act1 are not the same1 but opposed to one another4 ,the motive of the act1 is the pleasure of having hares2 not in itself a thing anywise bad4 ,the only thing bad is the producing so much misery to others1 for securing that pleasure to myself4 ,the state of the case1 then1 is manifest4 ,the act of which ,i have the idea1 has two sets of consequences2 one set pleasurable1 another hurtful4 ,i feel an aversion to produce the hurtful consequences4 ,i feel a desire to produce the pleasurable4 ,the one prevails over the other4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 ,nothing in an act is voluntary but the consequences that are intended4 ,the idea of good consequences intended1 is the pleasurable feeling of moral approbation2 the idea of bad consequences intended is the painful feeling of moral disapprobation4 ,the very term voluntary1 therefore1 applied to an act which produces good or evil consequences1 #cbj expresses the antecedence of moral approbation or disapprobation4b ,editor's footnote b3 ,fragment on ,mackintosh1 pp4 #cge--cgh4 ,i will quote one short passage more1 in correction of the very vulgar error1 that to analyse our disinterested affections and resolve them into associations with the ideas of our own elementary pleasures and pains1 is to deny their reality4 ,sir ,james must mean1 if he means anything1 that to trace up the motive affections of human nature to pain and pleasure1 is to make personal advantage the only motive4 ,this is to affirm1 that he who analyses any of the complicated phenomena of human nature1 and points out the circumstances of their formation1 puts an end to them4 ,sir ,james was totally ignorant of this part of human nature4 ,gratitude remains gratitude1 resentment remains resentment1 generosity generosity in the mind of him who feels them1 after analysis1 the same as before4 ,the man who can trace them to their elements does not cease to feel them1 as much as the man who never thought about the matter4 ,and whatever effects they produce1 as motives1 in the mind of the man who never thought about the matter1 they produce equally1 in the minds of those who have analysed them the most minutely4 ,they are constituent parts of human nature4 ,how we are actuated1 when we feel them1 is matter of experience1 which every one knows within himself4 ,their action is what it is1 whether they are simple or compound4 ,does a complex motive cease to be a motive whenever it is discovered to be complex8 ,the analysis of the active principles leaves the nature of them untouched4 ,to be able to assert1 that a philosopher1 who finds some of the active principles of human nature to be compound and traces them to their origin1 does on that account exclude them from human nature1 and deny their efficiency as constituent parts of that nature1 discovers a total incapacity of thinking upon these subjects4 ,when ,newton discovered that a white ray of #cba light is not simple but compound1 did he for that reason exclude it from the denomination of light1 and deny that it produced its effects1 with respect to our perception1 as if it were of the same nature with the elementary rays of which it is composed8c ,editor's footnote c3 ,fragment on ,mackintosh1 pp4 #ea1 #eb4 ,,ii4 ,the reluctance of many persons to receive as correct this analysis of the sentiments of moral approbation and disapprobation1 though a reluctance founded more on feeling than on reasoning1 is accustomed to justify itself intellectually1 by alleging the total unlikeness of those states of mind to the elementary one1 from which1 according to the theory1 they are compounded4 ,but this is no more than what is observed in every similar case4 ,when a complex feeling is generated out of elements very numerous and various1 and in a corresponding degree indeterminate and vague1 but so blended together by a close association1 the effect of a long series of experiences1 as to have become inseparable1 the resulting feeling always seems not only very unlike any one of the elements composing it1 but very unlike the sum of those elements4 ,the pleasure of acquiring1 or of consciously possessing1 a sum of money 7supposed not to be desired for application to some specific purpose17 is a feeling1 to our consciousness1 very different from the pleasure of protection against hunger and cold1 the pleasure of ease and rest from labour1 the pleasure of receiving consideration from our fellow-creatures1 and the other miscellaneous pleasures1 the association with which is admitted to be the real and only source of the pleasure of possessing money4 ,in the case1 then1 of the moral sentiments1 we have1 on the one hand1 a vera causa or set of causes1 having a positive tendency to generate a sentiment1 of love for certain actions1 and of aversion for certain others2 and on the other hand1 those sentiments of love and aversion1 actually produced4 ,this coincidence between the sentiments and a #cbb power adequate to produce them1 goes far towards proving causation4 ,that the sentiments are not obviously like the causes1 is no reason for postulating the existence of another cause1 in the shape of an original principle of our nature4 ,in a case1 however1 of so great interest and importance1 a rigid adherence to the canons of inductive proof must be insisted on4 ,those who dispute the theory are entitled to demand that it shall conform strictly to the general law of cause and effect1 which is1 that the effect shall occur with the cause1 shall not occur without the cause1 and shall bear some proportion to the cause4 ,unless it can be shewn that when the effect is not produced1 the cause is either absent1 or counteracted by some more powerful agency2 and unless1 when there is any marked difference in the effect1 a difference can be shewn in the cause1 sufficient to account for it2 the theory must give way1 or at least1 cannot be considered as proved4 ,the principal case in which the effect is absent1 notwithstanding the apparent presence of the cause assigned for it1 is anticipated by the author1 and provided for after his manner1 in the first of the passages quoted from the ,fragment on ,mackintosh4 ,there are actions 7he observes7 as beneficial as any others1 which yet do not excite the moral sentiment of approbation2 but it is because the spontaneous motives to those beneficial acts are in general sufficient3 as to eat when we are hungry1 or to do a service for which we are to be amply paid4 ,there are1 again1 actions of a very hurtful character1 but such that the spontaneous motives for abstaining from them may be relied on1 without any artificial addition3 such1 in general1 are acts destructive of one's own life or property4 ,but even in these cases the hurtful acts may become objects of moral reprobation1 when1 in any particular case1 the natural deterrents prove insufficient for preventing them4 ,the author seems to think that the difference here pointed out1 is explained by the fact that the moral sentiment is in the one case needed1 in the other not needed1 for producing the useful or averting the hurtful act2 that1 in short1 we are #cbc made to have the feeling1 by a foresight that our having it will operate usefully on the conduct of our fellow-creatures4 ,i cannot accept this explanation4 ,it seems to me to explain everything about the usual feelings1 except the feelings themselves4 ,it explains praise and blame1 because these may be administered with the express design of influencing conduct4 ,it explains reward and punishment1 and every other distinction which we make in our behaviour between what we desire to encourage1 and what we are anxious to check4 ,but these things we might do from a deliberate policy1 without having any moral feeling in our minds at all4 ,when there is a moral feeling in our minds1 our praise or blame is usually the simple expression of that feeling1 rather than an instrument purposely employed for an end4 ,we may give expression to the feeling without really having it1 in the belief that our praise or blame will have a salutary effect2 but no anticipation of salutary effects from our feeling will ever avail to give us the feeling itself3 except indeed1 what may be said of every other mental feeling--that we may talk ourselves into it2 that the habitual use of the modes of speech that are associated with it1 has some tendency to call up the feeling in the speaker himself1 and a great tendency to engender it in other people4 ,i apprehend1 however1 that there is another1 and more adequate reason why the feeling of moral approbation is usually absent in the case of actions 7or forbearances7 for which there are sufficient motives without it4 ,these actions are done1 and are seen to be done1 by everybody alike4 ,the pleasant associations derived from their usefulness merge1 therefore1 in our feelings towards human life and towards our fellow-creatures generally1 and do not give rise to any special association of pleasure with given individuals4 ,but when we find that a certain person does beneficial acts which the general experience of life did not warrant us in counting upon--acts which would not have been done by everybody1 or even by most people1 in his place2 we associate the pleasure which the benefit gives us1 with the character and disposition of that individual1 and with the act1 conceived as proceeding #cbd from that specially beneficent disposition4 ,and obversely1 if a person acts in a manner from which we suffer1 but which is such as we should expect from most other people in a parallel case1 the associations which his acts create in our minds are associations with human life1 or with mankind in general2 but if the acts1 besides being of a hurtful kind1 betoken a disposition in the agent1 more hurtful than we are accustomed to look for in average men1 we associate the injury with that very man1 and with that very disposition1 and have the feeling of moral disapprobation and repugnance4 ,there is1 as already intimated1 another condition which those who hold the ,association theory of the moral sentiments are bound to fulfil4 ,the class of feelings called moral embraces several varieties1 materially different in their character4 ,wherever this difference manifests itself1 the theory must be required to shew that there is a corresponding difference in the antecedents4 ,if pleasurable or painful associations are the generating cause1 those associations must differ in some proportion to the difference which exists in what they generate4 ,the principal case in point is the case of what is called ,duty1 or ,obligation4 ,it will probably be admitted that beneficial acts1 when done because they are beneficial1 excite in us favourable sentiments towards the agent1 for which the utility or beneficial tendency of the actions is sufficient to account4 ,but it is only some1 not all1 of these beneficial acts1 that we regard as duties2 as acts which the agent1 or we ourselves if we are the persons concerned1 are bound to do4 ,this feeling of duty or obligation1 it is contended1 is a very different state of mind from mere liking for the action and good will to the agent4 ,the association theory may account for the two last1 but not for the former4 ,i have examined this question in the concluding chapter of a short treatise entitled ,utilitarianism4 ,the subject of the chapter is the connexion between ,justice and ,utility4 ,i have there endeavoured to shew what the association is1 which exists in the case of what we regard as a duty1 but does not #cbe exist in the case of what we merely regard as useful1 and which gives to the feeling in the former case the strength1 the gravity1 and pungency1 which in the other case it has not4 ,i believe that the element in the association1 which gives this distinguishing character to the feeling1 and which constitutes the difference of the antecedents in the two cases1 is the idea of ,punishment4 ,i mean the association with punishment1 not the expectation of it4 ,no case can be pointed out in which we consider anything as a duty1 and any act or omission as immoral or wrong1 without regarding the person who commits the wrong and violates the duty as a fit object of punishment4 ,we think that the general good requires that he should be punished1 if not by the law1 by the displeasure and ill offices of his fellow-creatures3 we at any rate feel indignant with him1 that is1 it would give us pleasure that he should suffer for his misconduct1 even if there are preponderant reasons of another kind against inflicting the suffering4 ,this feeling of indignation1 or resentment1 is1 ,i conceive1 a case of the animal impulse 7,i call it animal because it is common to us with the other animals7 to defend our own life or possessions1 or the persons whom we care for1 against actual or threatened attack4 ,all conduct which we class as wrong or criminal is1 or we suppose it to be1 an attack upon some vital interest of ourselves or of those we care for1 7a category which may include the public1 or the whole human race73 conduct which1 if allowed to be repeated1 would destroy or impair the security and comfort of our lives4 ,we are prompted to defend these paramount interests by repelling the attack1 and guarding against its renewal2 and our earliest experience gives us a feeling1 which acts with the rapidity of an instinct1 that the most direct and efficacious protection is retaliation4 ,we are therefore prompted to retaliate by inflicting pain on the person who has inflicted or tried to inflict it upon ourselves4 ,we endeavour1 as far as possible1 that our social institutions shall render us this service4 ,we are gratified when1 by that or other means1 the pain is inflicted1 and dissatisfied if from any cause it is not4 ,this #cbf strong association of the idea of punishment1 and the desire for its infliction1 with the idea of the act which has hurt us1 is not in itself a moral sentiment2 but it appears to me to be the element which is present when we have the feelings of obligation and of injury1 and which mainly distinguishes them from simple distaste or dislike for any thing in the conduct of another that is disagreeable to us2 that distinguishes1 for instance1 our feeling towards the person who steals our goods1 from our feeling towards him who offends our senses by smoking tobacco4 ,this impulse to self-defence by the retaliatory infliction of pain1 only becomes a moral sentiment1 when it is united with a conviction that the infliction of punishment in such a case is conformable to the general good1 and when the impulse is not allowed to carry us beyond the point at which that conviction ends4 ,for further illustration ,i must refer to the little ,treatise already mentioned4--,ed4 #cbg ,,chapter ,,xxiv4 ,,the ,,will4 ,,we have now considered the class of sensations1 called ,pleasurable1 and ,painful4 ,we have also considered the ,ideas of those sensations1 or that revival of them which is capable of taking place1 when the outward action upon the senses is removed4 ,the ,idea of the pleasurable sensation1 and the ,desire of it2 the ,idea of the painful sensation1 and the ,aversion to it2 are respectively names for one and the same state of consciousness4 ,we have also considered the ,ideas of the ,causes of our ,pleasurable and ,painful sensations4 ,we have found that those ,ideas are never ,ideas of the ,causes separately2 but ,ideas both of the causes and of their effects1 inseparably joined by association4 ,they are not1 therefore1 indifferent ,ideas2 they are always either pleasurable or painful2 being complex ,ideas1 to a great degree composed of the ,ideas of pleasurable and painful sensations4 ,as the simple ,idea of a pleasurable or painful sensation1 is a ,,desire or an ,,aversion2 so the complex ,idea1 composed of the ,ideas of a ,cause of pleasurable or painful sensations1 and its effects1 is called an #cbh ,,affection2 which receives different names1 according as it is modified by different circumstances2 of time1 for example1 past or future2 and if future1 certainly or uncertainly1 future4 ,we next observed1 that our own acts were very often the cause of the causes of our pleasures1 and of the prevention of our pains4 ,the ,idea of an action of our own1 as cause1 strongly associated with the ,idea of a pleasure as its effect1 we found to be a state of mind peculiarly important2 because it excites to action4 ,in what manner this state of mind gives birth to action1 is the question which we now have to resolve4 ,the object of the ,inquiry is1 to find out1 what that peculiar state of mind or consciousness is1 by which action is preceded4 ,from all men it receives the same name4 ,it is called the ,will1 by every body2 and by every body this ,will is understood to be a state of mind or consciousness2 but how formed1 or wherein consisting1 is variously and vehemently disputed4 ,much of the confusion of ,ideas which has darkened this controversy arose from the misconception1 so long universal1 respecting the ,idea of a ,cause4 ,the will was invariably1 and justly1 assumed as the cause of the action2 but unhappily there was always assumed as a part of the ,idea of this cause1 an item1 which is found to be altogether imaginary4 ,in the sequence of events called ,cause and ,effect1 men were not contented with the ,cause and the ,effect2 they imagined a third thing1 called ,force or ,power1 which was not the cause1 but something emanating from the cause1 and the true and immediate cause of the #cbi ,effect4 ,this illusion has been minutely examined1 as we have already remarked1 by a late ,philosopher2 by whom it has been proved1 beyond the reach of contradiction1 that the power of any cause is nothing different from the cause4 ,a cause1 and the power of a cause1 are not two things1 but two names for the same thing4 ,with the ,idea of ,cause is always united the ,idea of ,effect4 ,it is one of the cases of inseparable conjunction4 ,the ,idea of the ,cause as existing1 is irresistibly followed by the ,idea of the ,effect as existing4 ,not only does the one ,idea always follow the other2 but it is not in our power to prevent their following4 ,now the ,idea of any thing as existing1 when that idea forces itself upon us1 and cannot be resisted1 is that which we call ,belief4 ,in all this1 however1 there is nothing but the idea of an ,antecedent and a ,consequent1 and a fixed order of ,association4 ,our object1 therefore1 in this ,inquiry will be completely attained if we discover which is the real state of mind which immediately precedes an action4 ,the actions of a human being may be divided into two sorts3 ,i4 ,those which are called the actions of his ,body2 ,,ii4 ,those which are called the actions of his mind4 ,we shall endeavour to ascertain what are the antecedents of both1 and shall begin with the ,body4 ,i4 ,the actions of the ,body are all of one sort4 ,they consist essentially of that action of certain fibres1 which is called contraction4 ,the object of this part of our ,inquiry1 therefore1 is to ascertain what are the states of mind which immediately precede a fibrous contraction4 #ccj ,we can show that muscular or fibrous contractions follow1 #ast1 ,sensations2 #b;dly1 ,ideas3 and we can also shew1 that in a vast proportion of those cases1 the sequence is invariable2 in other words1 that the ,sensation1 or ,idea1 is the cause of the contraction4 #a4 ,it is no part of our present business to adduce what has been discovered by physiologists in tracing the physical antecedents of a contracting muscle4 ,the mental antecedent is the object of our inquiry2 and whether a physical link1 or more than one physical link1 intervenes between it and the contraction1 alters not the question as to the state of the mental cause2 nor the fact as to the ultimate effect4 ,facts are abundant1 to prove1 that the nerves are the immediate instrument of contraction2 and also that the effect produced by the mental state is first upon the nerves1 and only through the nerves upon the muscle4 ,a paralytic limb1 is a limb1 the movement of which is not consequent upon that mental state which is usually followed by such a movement4 ,but a paralytic limb is only a limb1 the nerves of which are deprived of their usual power by a disorder in that part of the brain in which they originate4 ,innumerable facts are capable of being adduced1 to prove that sensation is a cause of muscular action4 ,there is1 however1 little necessity to be tedious with the proof2 because there will be little difficulty in assenting to the proposition4 ,the distinction1 which we formerly drew1 between those sensations which we have by what is called the external senses1 in other words1 on the surface of our body1 and those 7numerous1 not individually only1 but also in their species or kinds71 which we have in #cca the internal parts of our bodies1 it is here peculiarly necessary to remember1 and strongly to remark4 ,the muscles themselves are internal parts of the body4 ,the feelings in the muscles are one species of those internal sensations4 ,and1 in general1 as it is easy to conceive1 the internal sensations are a leading cause of such actions as take place in the internal organs of the ,body4#ei ,editor's footnote #ei3 ,the actions which take place in the interior of the body are not always1 nor perhaps even generally1 produced by sensations4 ,a large portion of them are not preceded by any sensation of which we are aware1 and have been ascertained to depend on nerves not terminating in the brain1 which is the seat of sensation1 but stopping at the spinal cord4 ,these actions are inferred to be the results of a mere 99physical stimulus1 operating either upon the local nerves1 or upon the spinal ganglions with which those nerves communicate1 and not attended with any consciousness4 ,many of the instances which the author goes on to enumerate1 of muscular action excited by sensation1 are1 in all probability1 cases of this description4 ,the muscular action is directly excited by the physical irritation of the nerves1 and any sensation which accompanies it is not its cause1 but a simultaneous effect4--,ed4 ,some of the external cases are remarkably familiar and precise4 ,a pungent odour enters the nostrils2 first1 a certain sensation follows1 and immediately after1 the violent action of a great number of muscles1 called ,sneezing4 ,in drinking1 a drop of water sometimes enters the larynx2 it produces a certain sensation1 immediately followed by the action of certain muscles1 from which we have the very painful feeling of suffocation4 ,there is a very remarkable exemplification of the same law1 in the case of the sensation #ccb of light4 ,the ,pupil of the ,eye contracts or dilates1 according as a greater or less degree of light falls upon the retina4 ,the eyelids are in perpetual motion in consequence of sensations to which we do not attend4 ,the painful sensation pervading the body1 when we plunge into cold water1 produces so much action in the muscles1 that we sob and respire in a convulsive manner4 ,the lachrymal glands are moved to action1 by certain effluvia1 as those of onions1 by smoke1 and various gases1 and even by certain states of the air1 so as to shed tears abundantly4 ,the action of food is similar upon the salivary glands2 and of heat and cold upon the skin1 the one opening1 the other contracting its pores4 ,in respect to a great number of the contractions of muscles1 which take place in consequence of impressions on the surface of our bodies1 the evidence is not so precise2 because1 though contractions are originally performed by sensation1 they are afterwards and more habitually performed by ,ideas4 ,we shall be able1 therefore1 to speak of them more instructively1 when more familiar with the sequence consisting of ,ideas antecedent1 and the contraction of muscles consequent4 ,the action of the internal organs in consequence of internal sensations1 is proved by many familiar1 as well as by many interesting phenomena4 ,the action of coughing1 than which none more familiar1 is the highest evidence4 ,the sensation here1 is not one of those which are neglected and obscure4 ,a violent action of the muscles is its immediate consequence4 ,hiccup is also produced by a sensation in the stomach2 and affords evidence definite and decisive4 ,vomiting is another very instructive case4 ,we #ccc know that it is the ultimate effect of something which produces disagreeable sensations in the stomach4 ,the sensation1 indeed1 in this case1 is not so well distinguished from others1 nor so precisely known1 as in the case of coughing4 ,we know1 however1 its general character1 and we know well the violent contraction of muscles1 which is the consequence of it4 ,in connexion with this1 we may notice the peculiar sensations in the ,uterus1 which produce the muscular actions of ,parturition2 some of the most violent belonging to the human frame4 ,the sensations1 which are the cause of cramps1 are commonly obscure4 ,it is the ,effect which engages all our attention4 ,there is no doubt1 however1 that it is by an internal sensation1 that this very painful effect is produced4 ,a greater proportion of those painful muscular actions called spasms1 are the effect of sensations2 though ,ideas1 also1 appear to be concerned in the production of those which become frequent4 ,one very remarkable case1 which is named the ,locked ,jaw1 is often the result of a pain produced by an external wound4 ,not any of our bodily functions is more important than ,respiration4 ,it is a very extensive action of muscles habitually performed by sensation merely4 ,the sensations1 however1 escape our attention to such a degree1 that we lose the power of attending to them4 ,and it is only by the effort we are capable of to stop ,respiration1 when a painful sensation after a time renders the action of the muscles irresistible1 that we get a sort of conjectural knowledge of what the ordinary sensation is4 ,there are some most important cases of the action of our internal organs1 in consequence of sensation1 in #ccd which1 from the habitual neglect of that which never calls for our attention1 both cause and effect1 to our ordinary perception1 are alike unknown4 ,that the heart is a part of the body endowed with sensation1 is abundantly known1 as often as1 by a departure from its habitual state1 it becomes the seat of sensations other than the habitual sensations1 to which1 from habit of inattention to them1 we have lost the power of attending4 ,the blood cannot flow into the heart1 without a sensation of the heart4 ,the contraction of the heart is the consequence of that sensation2 thence the circulation of the blood2 thence respiration1 and all the trains1 both of sensations1 and of actions1 which constitute the general working of the human machine4 ,in truth1 the actions of the alimentary canal1 necessary to keep up the supply of the blood and the actions of the circulating system1 which impart their action to most of the assimilating and secreting organs of the human body1 all taking place in sensitive parts1 all1 of course1 attended by sensation1 and all produced by sensation1 constitute a system of internal sensations1 numerous beyond what it is easy to conceive1--some pleasurable1 some painful1--and of all possible modifications of pain and pleasure2 but to which1 singly1 the habit of inattention is so complete1 that it amounts to inability of attending to them4 ,when they are very extensively of a pleasurable1 or very extensively of a painful kind1 they produce a general state1 which often calls our attention2 but for which1 as it is a vague1 indeterminate feeling1 we have only vague1 indeterminate names3 we call it a #cce state of comfort or discomfort2 of cheerfulness1 or gloom2 high spirits1 or low spirits2 and so on4 ,the incessant motion of the blood1 in so many sensitive tubes1 in every part of the body1 constitutes a system of sensations pervading the whole frame2 as the contact of the air produces a system of sensations1 pervading every part of the surface of our bodies1 but to which our habit of inattention is so complete1 that we are equally incapable of attending to them as we are of attending to the sensations produced in our arteries and veins1 by the motion of the blood1 and in the secreting and absorbing vessels when excited to action4#aj99 ,mill's footnote #aj3 ,is there not reason to suspect1 that our unconsciousness1 in health1 of the ,impressions made on our organs by the fluids which they contain1 depends on our being accustomed to the sensations which they incessantly excite2 so that there remains but a confused perception which in time disappears4--,elements of ,physiology1 by ,a4 ,richerand1 translated by ,james ,copeland1 ,m4,d41 #dth ed41 p4 #ba4--7;,author's ,note47 ,we are rather more attentive1 perhaps1 to the general states produced by the extensive diffusion of pleasurable or painful sensations in the alimentary canal1 than in the channels of the blood1 and perhaps we sometimes confound them4 ,to some of the feelings in the upper part of the canal we attend sufficiently to distinguish them2 the feeling called nausea1 for example1 in its numerous modifications4 ,to those in the other parts1 unless they amount to acute pain1 we never attend1 till they are so extensively diffused1 as to constitute a state1 to which we assign the terms1 ,comfort1 ,discomfort1 or some other #ccf of the vague names1 by which a state made up of an indefinite number of painful or pleasurable sensations is usually denominated4 ,yet we know that actions of great importance are the result of those unnoticed sensations2 the secretion of the gastric juice2 the secretion of the bile2 the separation of the nutritive from the innutritive part of the food2 the operation of the lacteal and lymphatic vessels1 and that extraordinary motion called the peristaltic1 which aids in carrying on the contents of the bowels to the place of their discharge4 ,it is probable1 that the pleasurable states of the alimentary canal are commonly joined1 or synchronous1 with pleasurable states of the channels of the blood2 and the painful states1 the same4 ,that the healthy1 or unhealthy state of the one1 accompanies that of the other1 we know4 ,and that certain diseased states of the circulating system1 are accompanied with that general state of feeling1 called discomfort1 or wretchedness1 which implies the wide diffusion of painful sensations throughout the system1 is but too well known to all who have experienced any modification of the febrile state2 nor can it be doubted1 that the joyous state of perfect health1 in which we feel delight in our being1 and our whole frame seems to be a source of pleasure to us1 is in a great degree produced by the innumerable unnoticed and unnoticeable sensations1 produced by the motion and contact of the blood1 in every part of our frame4 ,we seem authorized1 therefore1 by the fullest ,evidence1 to assume that ,sensation1 is the mental cause1 whatever the physical links1 of a great proportion of the muscular contractions of our frame2 and that #ccg among those so produced are found some of the most constant1 the most remarkable1 and the most important1 of that grand class of corporeal phenomena4 #b4 ,to prove that ,ideas1 as well as ,sensations1 are the cause of muscular actions1 it is necessary to make choice of cases1 in which the ,idea is in no danger of being confounded with that state of mind called the ,will4 ,and hardly any case will answer this condition1 except some of those which are held to be involuntary1 for the ,idea itself never can be very clearly distinguished from the ,will4 ,the ,winking of the ,eyelids1 when a person moves his hand rapidly close to the eyes of another person1 is a familiar case of an action of the muscles1 which we cannot prevent4 ,the idea is that of pain1 from the contact of the hand with the eye4 ,a sudden sensation of pain in the eye makes the eyelid close4 ,this is the case1 already examined1 of contraction by sensation4 ,when this has been performed1 a number of times1 the idea of pain in the eye1 and the idea of the contraction of the muscles1 that is1 of the sensations contained in the contraction of the muscles1 become associated together1 so strongly1 that the one can never exist without the other4 ,the next step of the process is1 that the contraction follows upon the ,idea1 in the same manner as it followed upon the sensation4 ,this is not a matter of conjecture1 it is matter of fact4 ,it is an experienced event4 ,we do not undertake to say1 what physical links are between the ,idea and the contraction1 any more than between the sensation and the contraction4 ,the ,idea is the last part of the mental operation4 ,and as the ,idea and the sensation are feelings so nearly alike1 there is #cch no difficulty in believing that like effects proceed from like causes4#fj ,bain's footnote #fj3 ,the act of winking or wincing under the threat of a blow on the eyes is a good example of strong1 and even indissoluble association4 ,any one making the experiment with an infant will find that there is no original tendency to perform the act4 ,it is an association generated under the impressiveness of an acute pain1 mingled with terror2 a state of things under which an indelible mental connexion will be established in a very small number of repetitions4 ,as a dog that has once suffered from a burnt cinder will dread for ever any commotion or stirring of the fire1 so one smart in the eye will be associated with the cause in an indissoluble bond2 and the mere sight of anything in motion towards the face will induce the preventive volition4--,b4 ,the origin of the sensation1 and the origin of the ,idea seem to be different4 ,the sensation originates in the extremity of the nerves at some particular part of the body4 ,something1 we know not what1 happens at the extremity of those nerves2 something1 we know not what1 is conveyed along the nerves to the brain2 and then sensation exists4 ,from the brain1 in its state of sensation1 something1 we know not what1 is conveyed along the nerves to the contracting muscle1 and the contraction takes place4 ,also1 from the ,brain1 in its state of ,ideation1 if ,i may here1 for the sake of the analogy with sensation1 use a word of my own coining1 something is conveyed along the nerves to the contracting muscle1 and the contraction takes place4 ,the sensation does not originate in the ,brain2 the ,idea does4 ,but if the state of the ,brain when it has a sensation1 and when it has the idea of that sensation1 be1 as we may #cci naturally suppose1 very nearly the same2 and if the state of the ,brain is a necessary link in the chain of antecedents and consequents which terminates in the contracted muscle1 the effect is so far accounted for4 ,yawning is a familiar case of contraction1 produced by sensation4 ,we yawn without intending it2 we know that we yawn in consequence of an antecedent state of feeling1 of which1 from never attending to it particularly1 we have no distinct ,idea2 but which we recognise sufficiently as the antecedent of the act4 ,this act1 however1 we also know is frequently the effect of ,ideas4 ,if we see another person yawn1 it rarely happens that we do not yawn along with him4 ,the act of yawning is so strongly associated with the idea of the feelings which precede it1 that the sight of the act by another person calls up in us strongly the idea of the precedent feelings4 ,the ,idea exists1 and as the contraction was the effect of the sensation1 so is it also of the ,idea4 ,the same is the account to be rendered of the infectious power of convulsions4 ,in assemblies of men and women1 especially under such a state of excitement 7religious enthusiasm1 for instance7 as implies the strong association of certain trains of ,ideas1 if one person is attacked with convulsions1 it commonly happens that others are attacked1 and frequently great numbers4 ,that this is a case of ,ideas is certain2 because nothing is conveyed to the spectators from a person convulsed1 but the sight of the person2 and the sight can do nothing but excite associated ,ideas4 ,the associated ,ideas exist3 the convulsions follow4 ,laughter is a curious phenomenon of human nature4 ,the analysis of it is not here required4 ,it #cdj will be easily recognised as a remarkable instance of the production of muscular action by ,ideas4 ,we laugh1 either when certain ideas are suggested to us by others1 or when they proceed from our own associations4 ,in either case1 the ,ideas exist2 the ,laughter follows4 ,sobbing and weeping1 in grief1 afford a similar instance4 ,what we call grief1 is the existence of certain trains of ,ideas4 ,the ,ideas exist3 the weeping follows4 ,the swallowing of the saliva affords a good experiment4 ,if a friend assures you that you cannot refrain1 for the space of a minute1 from this act1 and you are tempted to try1 you are almost sure to fail4 ,by the attention fixed on the act1 the ideas of the feelings1 which precede the act1 are so strongly called up by association1 that the act follows of course4#fa ,bain's footnote #fa3 ,this is a pure example of the fixed idea1 or of the tendency to work out into full actuality whatever is strongly presented in idea4 ,the case also shows this power in conflict with the ,will2 we are supposed to be trying hard to prevent the act 7which is volition71 and yet there is1 in the intense possession of an idea1 a power greater than the will4 ,the fact of being strongly excited to avoid swallowing the saliva1 increases the force of the idea of swallowing it1 and makes that idea almost omnipotent to work itself out4 ,the same baffling of the will1 the making it recoil upon itself1 is shown in our attempt to forget or banish a painful idea4 ,the more intensely we will to forget the idea1 the more do we stamp it on the mind1 through the excitement engendered by the volition4--,b4 ,there are many acts of familiar occurrence to shew1 that those actions of our organs which are the most #cda habitually produced by sensations1 are capable of being strongly modified by ,ideas4 ,the effect of ,fear1 for example1 on the action of the heart1 is known to be very remarkable4 ,so it is on the action of the bowels1 of the kidneys1 and of the skin4 ,one of its effects is perspiration2 another1 paleness3 another1 cold4#aa99 ,mill's footnote #aa3 ,the operation of ,ideas on the internal parts of the body is so familiar1 that we meet everywhere with pleasant stories of it4 ,zachary ,gray1 in one of his notes on ,butler's ,hudibras1 alluding to the story of the countryman1 who1 receiving a prescription from the doctor1 and being told by him to take that1 swallowed the paper1 asks1 ,and why might not this operate upon a strong imagination1 as well as the ugly parson1 the very sight of whom in a morning 7,oldham's ,remains7 would work beyond ,jalap or ,rhubarb2 and a ,doctor prescribed him to one of his patients as a remedy against costiveness3 ,or what is mentioned by ,dr4 ,daniel ,turner 7,de ,morbis ,cutaneis71 that the bare imagination of a purging potion has wrought such an alteration in sundry persons1 as to bring on several stools like those they call physical2 and he mentions a young gentleman1 his patient1 who having occasion to take many vomits1 had such an antipathy to them1 that ever after he would vomit as strongly by the force of imagination1 by the bare sight of the emetic bolus1 as most could do by medicine4 ,the application of a clyster-pipe1 without the clyster1 has had the same effect upon others4--7,author's ,note47 ,the cases which we have just adduced1 of yawning1 and contagious convulsions1 may be regarded as belonging to an extensive class2 which obtains the general name of ,imitation4 ,there is more or less of a propensity to ,imitation in all men1 that is1 to perform the act which we see another man performing4 ,in most children the propensity is very strong2 and #cdb to it they owe much of the celerity with which they make certain acquirements2 to that of imitating sounds1 for example1 the celerity with which they learn to speak4 ,the propensity to imitate musical sounds so adheres to persons of a musical ear1 even in mature age1 that they can scarcely forbear humming every tune which they hear4 ,children learn to stutter and to squint1 from imitation of their companions4 ,we know how universally it happens that young persons acquire the manner and the air of those with whom they habitually live4 ,these are cases not only of action1 but of habits of action1 produced by the agency of ,ideas4 ,it requires only cases of strong association to produce analogous effects1 at all periods of life4 ,when we see a stroke1 says ,mr4 ,smith1 aimed and just ready to fall upon the leg or arm of another person1 we naturally shrink and draw back our own leg1 or our own arm4 ,the mob1 when they are gazing at a dancer on the slack rope1 naturally writhe and twist1 and balance their own bodies as they see him do4 ,persons of delicate fibres and a weak constitution of body1 complain1 that in looking on the sores and ulcers which are exposed by beggars in the streets1 they are apt to feel an itching or uneasy sensation in the correspondent part of their own bodies4 ,men of the most robust make1 observe1 that in looking upon sore eyes1 they often feel a very sensible soreness in their own4 ,there are few persons who do not put on a cheerful countenance1 upon the sight of the cheerful countenances of their friends2 still fewer whose countenance is not made sorrowful by sight of the sorrowful countenances of their friends4 ,it is well known1 that ,tears are contagious2 and upon #cdc this some well-known rules for the countenance both of the orator and the actor are prescribed4 ,it is not necessary further to accumulate instances of this description2 nor further to enter into the analysis of them1 than to remark1 that the action1 the idea of which is conveyed to us by what we thus hear or see1 calls up1 by association1 the idea of the feelings which precede the action4 ,the ,idea of the feelings exists1 and the action follows4 ,there is a case of the action of the muscles which requires particular attention2 that in which we learn to make use of them2 in which we acquire what we call command over them only by degrees4 ,there is more or less1 probably1 of this process in all the sorts of muscular action which are not performed originally by sensation2 and the process seems to be longer or shorter according as the number of muscles1 which must act together in order to the production of the effect1 is greater or less4 ,we know how slowly the child acquires the power of so balancing his body as to hold it erect4 ,to this ,effect the action of a great number of muscles is required4 ,yet1 before the age at which reflection begins1 the power is so completely acquired1 that the mental process escapes our attention4 ,to be erect1 seems the posture into which our body puts itself of its own accord4 ,there are circumstances1 however1 in which we become distinctly conscious of the powerful effort1 which is required for that purpose1 though1 from its being habitual1 we are in ordinary circumstances wholly insensible of it4 ,if we allow sleep to come upon us1 while we are in an erect posture1 so far1 that the ideas which maintain the muscular action begin to give way1 we have #cdd immediately the sensation of falling1 and a strong perception of the effort required to keep the body erect4 ,we observe how slowly the child learns to perform1 with the requisite precision1 the contractions on which the operation of walking depends4 ,and every man can remember the difficulty with which he has learned to perform any new combination of contractions4 ,whoever has learned to dance1 knows how imperfectly1 till after a multitude of repetitions1 he performed the simplest steps4 ,whoever has been drilled1 as they call it2 that is1 trained to perform with the firelock the acts required of the soldier1 knows with what difficulty1 each of them1 however simple1 was originally performed4 ,there is another very familiar instance1 that of learning to write4 ,most men can remember1 when they began this process1 how imperfectly the hand obeyed them2 and how awkwardly they made even the simple strokes4 ,every man can make the experiment with his left hand4 ,after the habit of performing with the right hand is completely attained1 he is almost unable to form a letter with the left4 ,the cases of this incapacity of the left hand to perform the acts which we perform habitually with the right are innumerable2 and afford decisive illustration of the great fact which is now the subject of our attention4 ,to perform the contractions of a number of muscles1 the contractions of all of which must be combined in the action1 the idea whereon each of the contractions depends must previously exist1 and in the requisite order4 ,that is to say1 a certain association of ,ideas must be performed4 ,but we know1 that no new #cde association of ,ideas is easily or steadily performed4 ,this is the effect of ,repetition4 ,as soon as the association of the ideas is completely established by repetition1 the process1 both bodily and mental1 goes on with ease2 and where the habit is great1 with so much ease1 as even to escape attention4 ,the process of learning to play on a musical instrument is slow and difficult4 ,by habit the associations become so close1 that an expert performer can execute the most difficult pieces1 and carry on another and even an intricate process of thought at the same time4 ,how slowly1 and with how much difficulty do children acquire command over the organs of speech8 ,and how totally without effort on our part in after life does the sound appear immediately to cling to the ,idea of the word8 ,yet1 in learning the new sounds of a foreign language we become abundantly sensible of the difficulty1 sometimes altogether insurmountable1 of performing the precise combination of contractions which a particular sound requires4 ,it seems to be established1 therefore1 by an ample induction1 that muscular actions follow ideas1 as invariable antecedent and consequent1 in other words1 as cause and effect2 that whenever we have obtained a command over the ideas1 we have also obtained a command over the motions2 and that we cannot perform associate contractions of several muscles1 till we have established by repetition1 the ready association of the ,ideas4 ,i believe that nothing more need be said for the establishing of these truths4 ,i shall adduce a few more instances1 chiefly with the view to familiarize my readers with the mode of applying to this #cdf interesting class of facts1 the principles with which they are now fully acquainted4 ,there is no part of the body with the use of which we are so perfectly familiar as the hand4 ,there are no actions1 of the sort at least to which we are attentive1 the repetition of which is so incessant4 ,of course1 the associations of the ideas corresponding to the associate contractions of the muscles which produce the various movements or actions of the hand1 are formed in the most perfect manner2 and we never have the ,ideas1 as antecedent1 without the movement as consequent4 ,this inseparable connexion between the ,ideas1 and the contractions1 which we call the ,power of the ,will1 is gradually formed4 ,at first the hand of the infant is moved by sensations4 ,if the inside of the hand is touched1 so at least as to make the sensation considerable1 the fingers bend2 and perform more or less of the act of grasping4 ,here is a train of events4 ,first1 the sensation of touch1 from the application of the external object2 next1 an influence from the seat of the sensation in the brain1 transmitted along the nerves of certain muscles2 then the contraction of the muscles1 with the various sensations which the action upon those organs1 and the action excited in them1 imply4 ,when the sensation has been often repeated1 in conjunction with its effect1 the ,idea of the sensation becomes familiar and distinct2 and capable of producing many of the effects which the sensation itself produces4 ,it is also closely associated with the idea of the motion1 and all its accompanying sensations as the effect2 and the chain of antecedents and consequents proceeds in uninterrupted order4 #cdg ,as similar instances of motions1 at first produced by sensations1 afterwards by ides1 we may adduce the remarkable cases of the sphincters of the bladder and anus4 ,at first1 children perform their evacuations1 as they sneeze and cough1 when the sensations excite them4 ,afterwards1 they learn1 but by slow degrees1 to bring them under the command of ideas4 ,there is no case1 however1 which affords more decisive evidence of the power of ideas over the actions of particular parts1 than those which are called ,amatory2 because the effects1 which are produced by the ,ideas1 cannot be produced by the will4 ,there is another set of cases1 which deserve attention2 those in which the ideas which are followed by the action of certain muscles1 acquire associations with other sensations or ,ideas which call them up1 and thence give action to the muscles1 upon very inconvenient occasions4 ,a woman who has accustomed herself to scream out1 upon every sudden idea of the slightest danger1 cannot abstain from screaming4 ,the awkward motions1 for which some1 even eminent1 men have been remarkable1 ,dr4 ,johnson1 for instance1 are completely explained by this principle4 ,the ideas1 whence the motions proceed1 have become associated1 in ways which can seldom be traced1 with sensations1 or ideas of frequent recurrence4 ,and hence are the motions frequently produced4 ,there are equally remarkable cases1 in which the associations1 necessary to produce the idea on which the muscular actions depend1 are prevented by other associations more powerful4 ,men admitted to the presence of a great personage have found themselves wholly unable to articulate a word4 ,the ,ideas of #cdh ,power and ,dignity1 with all their associates of terror and of hope1 were called up in such irresistible association by the presence of him who was clothed with them2 that the ideas necessary to the articulation of words were excluded1 and the power of speaking was lost4 ,we have now established1 by an ample ,induction1 that the action of muscles follows1 as an effect its cause2 first1 upon sensations2 secondly1 upon ,ideas4 ,the language which ,professor ,stewart has applied to a similar case1 is perfectly applicable here4 ,it may1 indeed1 be said1 that these observations only prove the possibility1 that our muscular contractions may be all performed by sensations and ,ideas4 ,but1 if this be admitted1 nothing more can well be required2 for1 surely1 if these phenomena are clearly explicable1 from the known and acknowledged laws of the human mind1 it would be unphilosophical to devise a new principle1 on purpose to account for them4#ab99 ,mill's footnote #ab3 ,elements of the ,philosophy of the ,human ,mind4 ,chap4 ii4 ,i believe1 indeed1 that this conclusion is not at variance with the common belief upon the subject4 ,it appears to me to be not inconsistent with the language of the advocates for what is called the ,freedom of the ,will1 to admit1 that the action of the muscle takes place in consequence of the ,idea2 and that our power of willing consists in the power of calling into existence the appropriate ,idea2 that the power of the will is not immediate over the muscle1 but over the ,idea4 ,the following observations of ,dr4 ,reid1 though not remarkable for their precision1 seem fully to justify this ,inference4 #cdi ,first1 every act of will must have an object4 ,he that wills1 must will something2 and that which he wills is called the object of his volition4 ,as a man cannot think without thinking of something1 nor remember without remembering something1 so neither can he will without willing something4 ,every act of will1 therefore1 must have an object2 and the person who wills must have some conception1 more or less distinct of what he wills4 ,a second observation is1 that the immediate object of will must be some action of our own4 ,there are two assertions here which demand our attention2 #a1 that what is willed is an action of our own2 #b1 that to such will a conception1 that is1 an ,idea1 more or less distinct1 of this action of ours1 is indispensable4 ,he adduces some particulars1 in illustration1 which impart something more of precision to his meaning4 ,a healthy child1 some hours after its birth1 feels the sensation of hunger1 and1 if applied to the breast1 sucks and swallows its food very perfectly4 ,we have no reason to think1 that before it ever sucked1 it has any conception of that complex operation1 or how it is performed4 ,it cannot1 therefore1 with propriety1 be said that it wills to suck4 ,it appears1 from this example1 that the muscular actions1 which are performed by ,sensation1 ,dr4 ,reid distinguishes from those1 which he calls voluntary2 that he denominates voluntary1 those only which are performed by ,ideas4 ,it also appears fully1 from the example1 that the ,idea of the action willed1 which he considers the foundation of volition1 must1 in all cases1 be subsequent to the performance of the act by ,sensation2 in other #cej words1 that the idea cannot exist but in consequence of the sensation4 ,what has yet been advanced1 however1 is not a full explanation of the subject4 ,for1 after it is admitted that the motion of the muscles is1 in all cases1 the immediate effect of the appropriate ,idea1 there is still one class which all men agree to call involuntary2 another which many contend are voluntary4 ,it now remains that we inquire wherein the difference consists4 ,there is one point which is established by the mere statement1 and which goes a certain way towards the solution of the question4 ,since the action of the muscles follows upon the existence of the ,idea1 whatever calls up the ,idea produces the action4 ,the ,question1 then1 may be resolved into these two3 ,in what manner is the ,idea called up in cases called involuntary8 ,in what manner is it called up in those called voluntary8 ,in the cases called not voluntary1 ,i doubt not1 it will be easily admitted1 that the ,idea is raised in the way of ordinary association1 by a preceding ,sensation1 or ,idea4 ,in the yawning which proceeds from the sight of another person yawning1 the idea is called up by a ,sensation4 ,in the laughter which is excited either by ideas suggested to us from without1 or ideas which spring up in our associated trains1 the idea which is proximate to the muscular action is1 of course1 called up by an ,idea4 ,there appears no circumstance by which the cases called voluntary are distinguished from the involuntary1 except that in the voluntary there exists a ,desire4 ,shedding tears at the hearing of a tragic story1 we do not desire to weep3 laughing at the recital #cea of a comic story1 we do not desire to laugh4#fb ,but when we elevate the arm to ward off a blow1 we desire to lift the arm2 when we turn the head to look at some attractive object1 we desire to move the head4 ,i believe that no case of voluntary action can be mentioned1 in which it would not be an appropriate expression1 to call the action desired4 ,bain's footnote #fb3 ,these are emotional and not volitional manifestations4 ,they are the natural signs1 expression1 or embodiment of a feeling1 as feeling1 and apart from the power to move the will1 which is a separate fact4--,b4 ,we have already examined the meaning of the word ,desire4 ,we have seen that it is applied to pleasurable sensations2 to exemption from painful sensations2 and to the causes of them4 ,we have also seen1 and to the present purpose this is a point of great importance1 that when the word desire is applied1 to the cause of a sensation1 or of an exemption from a sensation1 it is employed in a figurative1 or metaphorical1 not in a direct sense4 ,few of our actions can be called pleasurable sensations2 or exemption from painful2 in propriety of language perhaps none4 ,our actions are causes of those two classes of events2 and on that account are called1 but only in a metaphorical sense1 objects of desire4 ,in a voluntary action1 then1 we recognise two ,ideas2 first1 the idea of the sensation or exemption1 which two1 for shortness1 we shall call by one name1 ,pleasure2 secondly1 the idea of an action of our own as the cause of the pleasure4 ,it is also easy to see how the ,idea of a pleasure should excite the ,idea of the action which is the cause of it2 and how1 when the ,idea exists1 the action should follow4 #ceb ,we have seen1 that the idea of a pleasure1 as effect1 associated with the ,idea of an act of our own1 as its cause1 is one of the cases of motive4 ,in the preceding paragraph it seems also to be one of the cases of will4 ,it may then be asked1 if the will is1 or is not1 anything different from the motive8 ,the course pursued by the mind in devising and executing a train of means for the accomplishment of an end1 has been often described4 ,the ,end2 that is1 the advantage or pleasure desired2 is the first thing in the contemplation of the mind2 the step nearest to the end in the process of attainment1 is the second2 the step immediately preceding that is the third2 and so on1 to the step at which the process of execution must begin4 ,thus1 suppose the pleasure of living in a handsome house is the end2 the apartments1 and furniture1 and accommodations of such a mansion is the nearest step2 the one immediately preceding that is the building and furnishing it2 the one preceding that1 the employing an architect and upholsterer2 the one preceding that1 the finding the money4 ,such is the order in which the mind proceeds from the primary conception of the ,end through the requisite series of means4 ,the order of execution is directly the reverse4 ,it begins where the other ends1 and ends where the other begins4 ,if the person we have supposed proceeds to the execution of his plan1 his first step is1 to find the money1 his next to provide the architect1 and so on from step to step1 till he places himself in the pleasurable situation he originally contemplated4 ,there is this double operation in what we may call the formation and execution of motives4 ,the first association starts from the pleasure4 ,the idea of the #cec pleasure is associated with its immediate cause1 that cause with its cause1 and so on1 till it reaches that act of ours which is the opposite end of the train4 ,the process may stop here1 and in that case the motive does not excite to action4 ,if it excites to action1 the process is exactly reversed4 ,in the first process of association1 the pleasure was the first link in the chain1 the action the last2 in the second process1 the action is the first1 the pleasure the last4 ,when the first process only is performed1 the association is called ,,motive4 ,when the second is performed it is called ,,will4 ,a difficulty1 however1 presents itself4 ,the first process terminates in an ,idea of the action4 ,the second process commences with an idea of the action4 ,the ,idea of the action is thus excited twice4 ,but the first time it is not followed by the action2 the second time it is4 ,how is this to be reconciled with the supposed constancy of connexion between the muscular action and the ,idea which produces it8 ,the difficulty is solved by observing1 that the phrase1 ,idea of the action1 has two meanings4 ,there are two ,ideas1 very different from one another1 to both of which we give the name1 ,idea of the action4 ,of these ,ideas1 one is the outward appearance of the action1 and is always a very obvious ,idea4 ,the other is the copy of those internal sensations which originally called the muscles into action1 to which1 from habit of not attending to them1 we have lost the power of attending4 ,this last is by no means an obvious ,idea4 ,and the mind passes from it so quickly1 intent upon the action which is its result1 that it is almost always swallowed up in the mass of association4 ,it constitutes1 in fact1 one of the most remarkable #ced instances of that class of links in a chain1 which1 how important soever to the existence of the chain1 are passed over so rapidly1 that the existence of them is hardly ever recognised4 ,this last ,idea alone1 is that upon which the contraction of the muscle is consequent4 ,in the process of association which we call the motive1 as described above1 the first of the two above-mentioned ideas of the action1 that of its outward appearance1 is the idea excited4 ,if the association stops there1 the motive is inoperative2 if the association does not stop there1 but the idea of the outward appearance of the action1 calls up that other1 the idea of the internal feelings of the action1 the motive is then operative1 and we are said ,,to ,,will4 ,if we are asked1 how an ,idea1 as that of the outward appearance of an act1 should at one time excite an idea1 as that of the internal feelings of the act1 at another time not excite it1 we can only refer to the laws of association1 as far as they have been ascertained4 ,we know there are certain cases of association1 so strong1 that the one ,idea never exists without calling up the other4 ,we know there are other cases in which an ,idea sometimes does1 and sometimes does not1 call up such or such an ,idea4 ,sometimes it is easy to trace the cause of this variety2 sometimes difficult4#fc ,editor's footnote #fc3 ,this analysis of the power of the ,will over muscular action is substantially that of ,hartley1 though more clearly and forcibly stated1 and more amply illustrated4 ,in the field of mental philosophy this is the point at which ,hartley approached nearest to the most advanced thoughts of his successors1 and left least for them to do beyond the task of commentators and defenders4 ,the doctrine of ,hartley on the ,will may be summed up in the following propositions4 #a4 ,all our voluntary movements were originally automatic3 meaning by automatic1 involuntary1 and excited directly by sensations4 #b4 ,when a sensation has the power of exciting a given muscular action1 the idea of that sensation1 if sufficiently vivid1 will excite it likewise4 #c4 ,the idea of the sensation which excites an automatic action of the muscles1 persists during the action1 and becomes associated with it by contiguity1 in such a manner as to be itself1 in its turn1 excited by any vividly recalled idea of the muscular act4 #d4 ,the following is what takes place in voluntary motion4 ,the idea of the end we desire1 excites by association the idea of the muscular act which would procure it for us4 ,the idea of this muscular act excites1 by association1 the idea of the sensation which originally excited the same muscular action automatically4 ,and lastly1 the idea of this sensation excites the action1 as the sensation itself would have done4 #e4 ,these associations being formed gradually1 and progressively strengthened by repetition1 this gives us the explanation of the gradual and slow process whereby we gain what is called command of our muscles2 i4e4 the process by which the actions1 originally produced automatically by sensations1 come to be produced1 and at last1 to be easily and rapidly produced1 by the ideas of the different pleasurable ends to which those muscular actions are the means4 #f4 ,in this chain of association1 as is so often the case in chains of association1 the links which are no otherwise interesting to us than by introducing other links1 gradually drop out of consciousness1 being1 after many repetitions1 either forgotten as soon as felt1 or altogether thrown out2 the latter being the supposition which ,hartley apparently favours4 ,the link that consists in the idea of the internal sensations which excited the muscular action when it was still automatic1 being the least interesting part of the whole series1 is probably the first which we cease to be aware of4 ,when the succession of the ideas has become1 by frequent repetition1 extremely prompt1 rapid1 and certain1 another link tends to disappear1 namely1 the ideas of the muscular feelings that accompany the act4 ,a practised player1 for example1 on a keyed instrument1 becomes less and less conscious of the motions of his fingers1 until there at last remains nothing in his consciousness to shew that the muscular acts do not arise without any intermediate links1 from the purpose1 i4e4 the idea in his mind1 which made him begin playing4 ,at this stage the muscular motion1 which1 from automatic1 had become voluntary1 has become1 from voluntary1 what1 in ,hartley's phraseology1 is called secondarily automatic2 and it seems to be his opinion that the ideas which have disappeared from consciousness1 or at all events from memory1 have not been 7as maintained by ,stewart7 called up1 and immediately afterwards forgotten1 but have ceased to be called up2 being1 as it were1 leapt over by the rapidity with which the succeeding links rush into consciousness4 ,this theory1 as we have seen1 is adopted1 and more fully worked out1 by the author of the ,analysis4 ,he proves1 by many examples1 that sensations excite muscular actions2 that ideas excite muscular actions2 and that1 when a sensation has power to excite a particular muscular action1 the idea of the sensation tends to do the same4 ,it is true that many1 if not most1 of what he presents as instances of muscular action excited by sensations1 are cases in which both the sensation and the muscular action are probably joint effects of a physical cause1 a stimulus acting on the nerves4 ,this misapprehension by the author reaches its extreme point when he declares traumatic tetanus to be produced not by the wound but by the pain of the wound2 and cramps to be produced by sensations1 instead of merely producing them4 ,but the error is quite immaterial to the theory of the ,will2 the two suppositions being equivalent1 as a foundation for the power which the idea of the muscular sensation acquires over the muscular action4 ,whether the sensation is the cause of the automatic action1 or its effect1 or a joint effect of the cause which produces it--on all these hypotheses the sensation and the action are conjoined in such a manner1 as to form so close an association by contiguity that the idea of the sensation becomes capable of exciting the action4 ,this being conceded1 it follows1 by the ordinary laws of association1 that whatever recals the idea of the sensation1 tends1 through the idea1 to produce the action4 ,now1 there is nothing so closely associated with the idea of the muscular sensation1 as the idea of the muscular act itself1 such as it appears to outward observation4 ,whatever1 therefore1 calls up strongly the idea of the act1 is likely to call up the idea of the accompanying muscular sensation1 and so produce the act4 ,but the idea of the act is called up strongly by anything which makes us desire to perform it2 that is1 by an association between it as a means1 and any coveted pleasure as an end4 ,the act is thus produced by our desire of the end2 that is 7according to the author's theory of desire7 by our idea of the end1 when pleasurable2 which1 if an end1 it must be4 ,the pleasurable association may be carried over from the ultimate end to the idea of the muscular act1 through any number of intermediate links1 consisting of the successive operations1 probably in themselves indifferent1 by which the end has to be compassed2 but this transfer is strictly conformable to the laws of association4 ,when the pleasurable association has reached the muscular act itself1 and has caused it to be desired1 the series of effects terminates in the production of the act4 ,what has now been described is1 in the opinion of the author1 the whole of what takes place in any voluntary action of the muscles4 ,at the close of the chapter we shall consider whether there is any part of the facts1 for which this theory does not sufficiently account4--,ed4 #cee ,,ii4 ,but even when it is admitted that all muscular contraction is the effect of association1 in the way we have described1 there are other #cef phenomena to be accounted for4 ,we may still be reasonably called upon to explain the power which the mind appears to possess over its associations4 ,there is a #ceg distinction in the trains of the mind which is observed by every body4 ,some trains1 as those in dreams1 in delirium1 in frenzy1 are supposed to proceed according #ceh to the established laws of association without any direction from the mind4 ,other trains2 a piece of reasoning1 for example2 any process of thought1 directed to an end2 are considered as wholly under the guidance of the mind4 ,the guidance of the mind is but another name for the will4 ,and thus it is inferred that the will is not association1 but something which controuls association4 ,we now proceed to the solution of this difficulty4 ,it can be supposed that the will controuls association1 in only one of two ways2 either1 by calling up an ,idea1 independently of association2 or1 by making an ,idea call up1 not the ,idea which would follow it spontaneously1 but some other ,idea4 ,the first supposition1 that an ,idea can be called up by the will1 is relinquished by the common consent of philosophers4 ,we cannot will without willing something2 and in willing we must have an ,idea of the thing willed4 ,if we will an ,idea1 therefore1 we must have the ,idea4 ,the ,idea does not remain to be called up4 ,it is called up already4 ,to say that we will to have an ,idea1 when we already have it1 is a mere absurdity4#fd ,bain's footnote #fd3 ,what we have in mind when we will to remember anything1 is of course not the thing to be remembered1 but some collateral1 or something to determine our search for it4 ,we will to remember an opinion found in a certain book4 ,we have not in our mind the actual opinion sought2 what we have in mind is the book1 and portion of the book1 and the subject that the opinion refers to2 and we desiderate the filling up of the blank in our present ideas4 ,we will to remember the ,greek name of the god1 called by the ,romans1 ,bacchus4 ,we have in mind the name ,bacchus1 and the knowledge that the ,greeks had a different name for the god2 we have not in our mind that name2 and we put forth an effort of recollection to arrive at it4--,b4 #cei ,the second supposition is1 that will can prevent an ,idea from calling up one idea1 make it call up another2 prevent its calling up the ,idea which would have followed it spontaneously1 make it call up the ,idea which the mind is in quest of4 ,the first question is1 how the will1 or the mind willing1 can prevent an ,idea from calling up another4 ,we know that this is wholly impossible in all those cases in which the association is strong4 ,we cannot think of colour without thinking of extension2 we cannot think of the word bread without thinking of its meaning4 ,it can be supposed that we have such power in those cases only in which an ,idea has not an inseparable association with the idea in question1 but only such an association with it as it has with many others4 ,but how is it that we can hinder an idea which has those associations1 from calling up any of the ideas with which it is associated8 ,how can we foresee which of those ideas it will call up8 ,and1 if we do foresee that it will call up the idea which we desire to avoid1 it follows that the ,idea is already in our mind4 ,there seems1 therefore1 the same incongruity in the supposition that the will can directly prevent1 as that it can directly produce1 an idea4 ,if the mind1 then1 possesses any power over its trains1 it seems to be confined to its power of making #cfj an idea call up other ideas than those which it would spontaneously excite4 ,and if it possesses this power1 it possesses that also of excluding ideas which would otherwise exist2 since a new train of associations must take its origin from the state of consciousness thus produced4 ,it is1 therefore1 in this1 if in any thing1 that the power of willing consists4 ,we are1 however1 immediately encountered by the question4 ,if the mind cannot will an ,idea1 what power does it possess of introducing any idea into a train1 but such as comes of its own accord8 ,if it has the idea1 it is in the train already4 ,if it has it not1 what can it do in order to obtain it8 ,there is the existing train2 but how can that be made any thing but what it is2 or have any associations but those which are already established8 ,in cases where language is too imperfect to ensure the conveyance of definite ideas1 there is an advantage in particular instances4 ,there are two familiar processes1 which are commonly adduced as examples of the power which the mind exercises over its trains4 ,the one is1 the endeavour to recollect something we do not remember4 ,the other is1 the process of attention4 ,when anything is remembered1 the idea of the thing is always in the mind along with certain associations4 ,in recollection1 therefore1 the object is attained by the excitement of this idea4 ,sometimes the effort which we make is successful2 sometimes it is not4 ,we are said to will to recollect2 but this is obviously an improper expression4 ,to recollect is to call up an ,idea4 ,but this1 as we have seen already1 is not within the province of will4 ,when it is said #cfa that we will to recollect1 the meaning only is1 that we desire to recollect4 ,but it is also to be inquired1 what here is the meaning of the word ,desire4 ,we have seen that it is a term applied to ,pleasure1 or the ,cause of ,pleasure4 ,the idea1 in this instance1 which the mind is in quest of1 is desired4 ,but why desired8 ,as ,pleasure2 or the ,cause of ,pleasure8 ,as ,cause1 we may reply1 in all instances4 ,the idea is wanted for some purpose or end4 ,in that ,end the pleasure is involved4 ,the ,end is thus a pleasurable1 that is1 an interesting1 ,idea4 ,but it is in the character of interesting ideas1 to dwell in the mind4 ,the meaning is1 that they are easily called up by other ideas2 and1 thus1 that there is a perpetual recurrence of them4 ,a young man in love1 is said to be engrossed with the idea of his mistress4 ,no sooner has her idea suggested another idea1 that is1 given place to it1 than her idea is again suggested by another1 and so on1 continually4 ,the man1 who is to be executed to-morrow1 can think of nothing but the terrible event which is approaching4 ,it can be banished1 hardly for an instant4 ,every thing serves to recall it3 and along with it a rush of ideas of the most painful description4 ,there is no law of association more remarkable than that of the rapidity with which pleasurable and painful ideas call up trains of great complexity1 and the facility with which they themselves are excited by almost every idea which enters the mind4 ,when we endeavour1 therefore1 to recollect any thing1 the pleasurable idea1 the purpose or end1 predominates in the mind1 and gives birth to those #cfb associations1 which are called the effort of recollection4 ,the idea sought after1 is sought as a means to this end4 ,till that idea is recalled1 the ,idea of the end1 that is1 an unsatisfied desire1 exists1 and calls up one circumstance after another1 more or less connected with the ,idea which is sought after4 ,if these circumstances do not recall the idea2 the feeling of unsatisfied desire still continues4 ,the feeling of unsatisfied desire1 accompanying successive cases of association1 constitutes the feeling to which we give the name of effort of recollection4 ,and the ,idea of the ,end1 perpetually calling up the idea of the absence of what is wanted1 as the means to that end1 and hence calling up in close association every circumstance connected with that unknown something1 constitutes the feeling which we call casting about1 for the unknown ,idea4 ,i believe that this is a full1 though summary account of the mental process1 or succession of ideas1 which takes place when we endeavour to recall a forgotten idea4 ,the other process1 through which the mind is supposed to influence its trains1 is ,attention4 ,we seem to have the power of attending1 or not attending to any object2 by which is meant1 that we can ,will to attend to it1 or not to attend4 ,by attending to an object1 we give it the opportunity of exciting all the ideas with which it is associated4 ,by not attending to it we deprive it of more or less of that opportunity4 ,and if the will has this power over every idea in a train1 it has thence a power1 which may be called unlimited1 over the train4 ,what remains1 therefore1 to complete this inquiry1 is1 to point out the real process1 on which the name #cfc ,,attention is in this manner bestowed4 ,the exposition has been substantially given by preceding writers4 ,but it is desirable1 if it be in our power1 to set forth the several steps of the process a little more distinctly than has hitherto been done4 ,at first sight1 the objects of attention seem to be infinite4 ,when traced to their sources1 however1 it is found1 that they are of two species only4 ,we attend to ,sensations2 we attend to ,ideas2 and there is no other object of our attention4 ,for the present purpose1 it is peculiarly necessary to bear in mind the important distinction we have already noticed1 between the class of indifferent sensations1 and the class of pleasurable or painful1 which we may call1 by one name1 interesting1 sensations4 ,uninteresting sensations are never1 for their own sakes1 an object of attention4 ,if ever they become objects of attention1 it is when they are considered as causes1 or signs1 of interesting sensations4 ,a painful or a pleasurable sensation is a peculiar state of mind4 ,a man knows it1 only by having it2 and it is impossible that by words he can convey his feeling to others4 ,the effort1 however1 to convey the idea of it1 has given occasion to various forms of expression1 all of which are greatly imperfect4 ,the state of mind under a pleasurable or painful sensation is such1 that we say1 the sensation engrosses the mind2 but this really means no more than that it is a painful or pleasurable sensation2 and that such a sensation is a state of mind very different from an indifferent sensation4 ,the phrase1 engrossing the mind1 is sometimes exchanged for the word ,attention4 ,a pleasurable or painful sensation is said to fix the #cfd ,attention of the ,mind4 ,but if any man tries to satisfy himself what it is to have a painful sensation1 and what it is to attend to it1 he will find little means of distinguishing them4 ,having a pleasurable or painful sensation1 and attending to it1 seem not to be two things1 but one and the same thing4 ,the feeling a pain is attending to it2 and attending to it is feeling it4 ,the feeling is not one thing1 the attention another2 the feeling and the attention are the same thing4 ,an objector may appeal to certain cases1 in which one sensation of the pleasurable or painful kind seems to be swallowed up1 as it were1 by another4 ,thus1 in the agony of the gout1 or toothache1 the uneasiness of some local cutaneous inflammation is hardly perceived4 ,the case here is that of two uneasy sensations1 one slight2 the other intense4 ,according to the supposition1 that attention is but a name given to the having of an interesting sensation1 what ought to happen in this case is that precisely which does happen4 ,the stronger sensation is1 the stronger attention4 ,and that the feebler sensation merges itself in the stronger1 and is lost in it1 is matter of common and obvious experience4 ,thus we are every instant1 as long as we are awake1 shutting and opening our eyelids4 ,we are1 therefore1 alternately in light and darkness4 ,but as the light is the stronger sensation of the two1 we have the sensation of light without interruption4 ,thus1 too1 if a stick ignited at one end is rapidly turned round in a circle1 though it is obvious that the ignited object is at only one part of the circle at a time1 and all the other parts are in darkness1 the circle1 nevertheless1 assumes the #cfe appearance of being wholly ignited4 ,there is not a more striking exemplification of this law than what is exhibited by the comparison of our sleeping and waking thoughts4 ,in dreams1 when our trains are composed of ,ideas1 unmixed with sensations1 the ,ideas have so much vividness as to be taken for sensations4#fe ,in our waking trains1 sensations and ideas are mixed together2 but as each sensation introduces many ideas1 however numerous the sensations may be1 the ideas are many times more numerous4 ,yet such is the effect of the more vivid to obscure the less vivid feeling1 that our day does not appear a day of ideas1 but a day of sensations4 ,bain's footnote #fe3 ,the author makes frequent reference to dreams1 but it may be doubted whether he has seized the explanation of that obscure phenomenon4 ,it is an approximately correct statement of one circumstance of dreams1 that the ,ideas are unmixed with sensations2 in a sound slumber1 we are inaccessible to the sensations of the five senses4 ,we are not equally fortified against the organic sensations1 as those of digestion and other functions4 ,the sensations absent are a very important class1 as regards objective or outward reality2 and it is probably their absence1 as competitors on this ground1 that allows the ideas to swell out into an unnatural and illusory prominence1 as if they alone were the full reality4 ,this is a more probable account of the illusion1 than the circumstance given in the text1 the greater vividness of the monopolising ,ideas1 although that too is a fact1 and may tend in the same direction4--,b4 ,there are cases in which the effect which is thus produced by a stronger sensation with respect to a weaker1 or by sensations with respect to ideas1 is also produced by one idea with respect to another4 ,innumerable cases can be adduced to prove1 and1 #cff indeed1 it forms one of the great features of what we call the intellectual nature of man1 that ,ideas1 by their accumulation1 are capable of acquiring a power1 superior to that of sensations1 both as pleasure and as pain4 ,the pleasures of ,taste1 the pleasures of ,intellectual exertion1 the pleasures of ,virtue1 acquire when duly cultivated1 a power of controlling the solicitations of appetite1 and are esteemed a more valuable constituent of happiness than all that sense can immediately bestow4 ,on the power of ideas1 as the stronger feelings1 to swallow up sensations1 in the same manner as stronger sensations swallow up the weaker1 some decisive experiments have been made4 ,the wretches who1 nearly a century ago1 were made tools of in ,france1 under the title of convulsionnaires1 to carry on the purposes of ,fanaticism1 were so placed under the dominion of certain ideas1 being persons of weak intellects and strong imagination1 and operated upon by men skilled in the ways of perverting feeble understandings1 that the ideas became feelings far more potent than the sensations2 and when the bodies of the frenzied creatures were subjected to operations calculated to produce the most intense sufferings1 they denied that they felt any thing1 and by the whole of their demeanour confirmed1 as far as it could confirm1 the truth of their asseverations4 ,that men in the ardour of battle receive wounds of a serious nature1 without being aware of them1 till after a considerable lapse of time1 is testified upon unsuspicious evidence4 ,these instances1 therefore1 it is manifest1 form no objection to our conclusion1 that the attending to an #cfg interesting sensation1 and the having the sensation1 are but two names for the same thing4 ,we have now to consider1 what it is1 to attend to an indifferent sensation4 ,the force of the word indifferent implies1 that an indifferent sensation is not an object of attention on its own account4 ,if it were an object of attention on its own account1 it would not be indifferent4 ,if it is regarded1 however1 as the cause1 or the sign1 of an interesting sensation1 we are already acquainted with the process which takes place4 ,the idea of the interesting sensation is immediately associated with it2 the state of consciousness then is not an indifferent sensation merely2 it is a sensation and an idea1 in union4 ,the idea besides is an interesting idea1 that of a pain or pleasure4 ,the union of an interesting idea1 with an indifferent sensation1 makes a compound state of consciousness which1 as a whole1 is interesting4 ,as the having an interesting sensation1 and the attending to it1 are but two names for the same thing2 the having a sensation rendered interesting by association1 and the attending to it1 cannot be regarded as two different things4 ,in the first case1 attention is merely a sensation of a particular kind2 in the second1 it is merely an association of a particular kind4 ,we have now to shew what takes place1 when the attention1 to use the common language1 is not directed to ,sensations but ,ideas4 ,ideas are1 like sensations1 of two kinds4 ,they are either interesting1 or not interesting4 ,we need not repeat what has been so often said respecting the origin and composition of those two classes of ,ideas1 and the cause of their difference4 #cfh ,an indifferent idea1 like an indifferent sensation1 is1 in itself1 not an object of attention4 ,if it were an object of attention1 it would not be indifferent2 in other words1 it would be interesting4 ,in fact1 it is in the very import of the word attention1 that the object of it is interesting4 ,and if an object is interesting it must be so1 either in itself1 or by association4 ,as we found that the having an interesting sensation1 and the attending to that sensation1 were not two distinguishable states of consciousness1 but one and the same state of consciousness1 let us now observe1 as carefully as we can1 whether the having an interesting idea is a state of consciousness1 which can be distinguished from attending to it1 or whether they are not merely two names for the same thing4 ,when the young man1 in love1 has the idea of the woman1 who is the object of his affections1 is not attention merely another word for the peculiar nature of the ,idea8 ,in like manner in the mind of the man1 who is to be executed to-morrow1 the idea of the terrible event before him1 is an idea in the very essence of which attention is involved4 ,attention is but another name for the interesting character of the idea4 ,if there are any cases to which an objector's appeal can be made1 they will be found1 upon examination1 to resemble those which we considered in the case of sensation1 and which we found to be nothing more than instances of the prevalence of a stronger feeling over a weaker2 stronger1 either by its nature1 or the peculiar circumstances of the moment4 ,we shall not1 therefore1 stay to propound and explain them4 #cfi ,it only remains to expound the case in which an indifferent ,idea becomes interesting by association4 ,it cannot do so in any other way1 than those in which it appeared that an indifferent sensation becomes interesting4 ,it may be considered as the cause1 or the sign1 of some interesting state of consciousness4 ,when that which is interesting becomes associated with that which is uninteresting1 so as to form one compound state of consciousness1 the whole is interesting4 ,an idea1 in itself indifferent1 associated with interesting ideas1 becomes part of a new compound which1 as a whole1 is interesting3 and an interesting idea existing1 and an interesting idea attended to1 are only two names for the same thing4 ,in the case of ,ideas1 then1 as in the case of sensations1 attention to an interesting ,idea1 is merely having it2 attention to an indifferent idea1 is merely associating with it some idea that is interesting4 ,as far then1 as ,,attention gives us power over the trains of our ideas1 it is not ,will which gives it to us1 but the occurrence of interesting sensations1 or ideas4 ,there is not any of the phenomena1 which are usually appealed to as the great manifestations of the power of the mind over its trains1 which this mode of exposition does not satisfactorily account for4 ,we may take as a sufficient exemplification of them all1 the composition of a ,discourse upon any important topic4 ,the operation of the mind upon such an occasion seems to consist in a perpetual selection2 that is1 in the exercise of an uninterrupted power over #cgj the trains of association4 ,there is no doubt that it consists of that peculiar class of associations1 to which we give the names1 of selection1 and power4 ,in composing a ,discourse1 a man has some end in view4 ,it is for the attainment of this end1 that the ,discourse is undertaken4 ,if every thing in the discourse tends to the accomplishment of the end1 the ,discourse is said to be coherent1 appropriate1 consistent4 ,if there are many things in it which have no tendency1 or but little tendency1 to the accomplishment of the end1 the discourse is said to be rambling1 and incoherent4 ,this is a case1 the exposition of which corresponds very much with that which we have already explained2 the endeavour to recollect a forgotten ,idea4 ,in that case1 the existence of an interesting idea calls up a variety of circumstances1 that is1 a variety of ideas2 and it very often happens1 that the idea which is sought for1 is called up among them4 ,in this case1 what the seeker has occasion for1 is a single ,idea2 a single idea accomplishes the end he has in view4 ,in the case of the composer of a discourse a great many ideas are wanted4 ,his end cannot be attained by one or a few4 ,but his proceeding is precisely of the same kind in regard to his many ,ideas1 as that of the man who desires to recollect in regard to his single ,idea4 ,he knows there are a number of ideas1 connected with the end he has in view1 which he can employ for his purpose1 provided he can call them up4 ,how they are called up1 after the practice we have had in those solutions1 requires but little explanation4 ,the end in view is an interesting ,idea4 ,it is1 at the time1 the prevalent ,idea4 #cga ,it is that by which the man is stimulated to action4 ,this idea calls up by association many ideas and trains of ideas4 ,of these a large proportion pass1 and are not made use of4 ,others are detained and employed4 ,this detaining and employing is all that needs to be explained4 ,it is the same sort of result as the recognition of the forgotten ,idea1 in the case of recollection4 ,the forgotten ,idea is an ,idea associated1 as cause1 with the end to be obtained by it1 as its effect4 ,the same is the case with the ideas which the composer of a discourse selects out of the multitudes1 which the continual suggestions of the interesting ,idea by which he is actuated1 that of his end1 bring before him4 ,the greater number are not associated with the idea of his end as cause and effect4 ,some among them are4 ,these immediately suggest the use to be made of them2 and thence1 by the regular chains of association1 the operations take place4 ,it is from these explanations1 also1 easy to see what constitutes the difference between the man who composes a coherent1 and the man who composes a rambling discourse4 ,in the man who composes the coherent discourse1 the main ,idea1 that of the end in view1 predominates1 and controls the association1 in every part of the process4 ,it is not only the grand suggesting principle1 which sets trains of the ideas connected with itself in motion2 but it is the grand selecting principle4 ,as ideas rise in the train1 this interesting and predominating idea stands ready to be associated as effect with every idea in the train which can operate as cause2 it so associates itself with no other2 and therefore no wrong selection is made4 #cgb ,if1 however1 it does not thus predominate in the mind of the composer of the discourse1 as his exclusive end2 if it gives way at every turn to some other end2 as the idea of applause from some lively jest1 from some gaudy description1 from some florid thought1 the selection is made so far upon other principles1 and the object of the discourse is forgotten4#ff ,editor's footnote #ff3 ,the account here given of ,attention1 though full of instructive matter1 ,i cannot consider to be at all adequate4 ,when it is said that a sensation1 by reason of its highly pleasurable or painful character1 engrosses the mind1 more is meant than merely that it is a highly pleasurable or painful sensation4 ,the expression means1 first1 that when a sensation is highly pleasurable or painful1 it tends1 more or less strongly1 to exclude from consciousness all other sensations less pleasurable or painful than itself1 and to prevent the rising up of any ideas but those which itself recals by its associations4 ,this portion of the facts of the case is noticed by the author1 though not sufficiently prominent in his theory4 ,but there is another portion1 altogether untouched by him4 ,through this power which the sensation has1 of excluding other sensations and ideas1 it tends to prolong its own existence2 to make us continue conscious of it1 from the absence of other feelings which if they were present would either prevent us from feeling it1 or would make us feel it less intensely2 which is called diverting our attention from it4 ,this is what we mean when we say that a pleasurable or painful idea tends to fix the attention4 ,we mean1 that it is not easy to have1 simultaneously with it1 any other sensation or idea2 except the ideas called up by itself1 and which in turn recal it by association1 and so keep it present to the mind4 ,becoming thus a nearly exclusive object of consciousness1 it is both felt with greater intensity1 and acquires greater power of calling up1 by association1 other ideas4 ,there is an increase both in the multitude1 the intensity1 and the distinctness of the ideas it suggests2 as is always the case when the suggesting sensation or idea is increased in intensity4 ,in this manner a sensation which gets possession of our consciousness because it is already intense1 becomes1 by the fact of having taken possession1 still more intense1 and obtains still greater control over the subsequent train of our thoughts4 ,and these also are precisely the effects which take place when1 the sensation not being so pleasurable or painful as to produce them of itself1 or in other words to fix the attention1 we fix it voluntarily4 ,all this is as true of ,ideas as of ,sensations4 ,if a thought is highly painful1 or pleasurable1 it tends to exclude all thoughts which have no connexion with it1 and which if aroused would tend to expel it--to make us 7as we say7 forget the pain or the pleasure4 ,by thus obtaining exclusive possession of the mind1 the pleasurable or painful thought is made more intense1 more painful or pleasurable2 and1 as is the nature of pains and pleasures1 acquires1 in consequence1 a greater power of calling up whatever ideas are associated with it4 ,all this is expressed by saying that it fixes the attention4 ,and ideas which are not of themselves so painful or pleasurable as to fix the attention1 may have it fixed on them by a voluntary act4 ,in other words1 the will has power over the attention4 ,but how is this act of will excited1 and in what does it consist8 ,on this point the author's analysis is conclusive1 and admirable4 ,the act1 like other voluntary acts1 is excited by a motive2 by the desire of some end1 that is1 of something pleasurable2 7including in the word pleasurable1 as the author does1 exemption from pain74 ,what happens is1 that1 the idea on which we are said to fix our attention not being of itself sufficiently pleasurable to fix it spontaneously1 we form an association between it and another pleasurable idea1 and the result then is that the attention is fixed4 ,this is the true account of all that we do when we fix our attention voluntarily2 there is no other possible means of fixing it4 ,it thus appears1 that the fixing of attention by an act of will depends on the same law1 as the fixing it by the natural pleasantness or painfulness of the idea4 ,of itself the idea is not pleasant or painful1 or not sufficiently so to fix the attention2 but if it were considerably more pleasant or painful than it is1 it would do so4 ,it becomes considerably more pleasurable by being associated with the motive--that is1 by a fresh association of pleasure with it--and the attention is fixed4 ,this explanation seems complete4 ,it may be said1 however1 by an objector1 that this accounts only for the case in which the voluntary attention flows easy and unimpeded1 almost as if it were spontaneous2 when the mere perception that the idea is connected with our purpose--with the pleasurable end which suggested the train of thought1 at once and without difficulty produces that exclusive occupation of the mind with it1 which is called fixing the attention4 ,but it often happens that the mere perception of its connexion with our purpose is not sufficient3 the mind still wanders from the thought3 and there is then required a supplementary force of will1 in aid of association2 an effort1 which expends energy1 and is often both painful and exhausting4 ,let us examine1 then1 what takes place in this case4 ,the association of the thought with the pleasurable end in view1 is sufficient to influence the attention1 but not sufficient to command it4 ,the will1 therefore1 has to be called in1 to heighten the effect4 ,but in this case1 as in every case1 the will is called into action by a motive4 ,the motive1 like all other motives1 is a desire4 ,the desire must be either the same desire which was already felt1 but made more effectual than before1 or another desire superadded to the first4 ,the former case presupposes the latter3 for the desire which was not sufficient to fix the attention firmly on that which is the means to its fulfilment1 cannot be sufficient to call forth the voluntary effort necessary for fixing it3 some other desire must come to its assistance4 ,what1 then1 is this other desire8 ,the question is not difficult4 ,the present is one of the complex cases1 in which we desire a different state of our own desires4 ,by supposition1 we do not care enough for the immediate end1 that is the idea of it is not sufficiently pleasurable1 or the idea of its frustration sufficiently painful1 to exert the force of association required4 ,but we are dissatisfied with this infirmity of our desires3 we wish that we cared more for the end2 we think that it would be better for us if either this particular end1 or our ends generally1 had greater command over our thoughts and actions than they have4 ,there is thus called up1 by our sense of the insufficiency of our attention in the particular case1 the idea of another desirable end--greater vigour and certainty in our mental operations4 ,that idea superadds itself to the idea of the immediate end1 and this reinforcement of the associating power at last suffices to fix the attention4 ,or 7which is the same thing in effect7 the painful idea is called up1 of being unable to fix our attention1 and being in consequence thwarted generally in our designs2 and this pain operates1 in the same manner as a pleasure1 in fixing our attention upon the thought which1 if duly attended to1 will relieve us from the oppressive consciousness4 ,it will be asked1 whence come the sense of laborious effort1 and the subsequent feeling of fatigue1 which are experienced when the attention does not fix itself spontaneously1 but is fixed with more or less difficulty by a voluntary act8 ,i conceive them to be consequences of the prolongation of the state designated by the author1 in the text1 as a state of unsatisfied desire4 ,that state1 whatever view the psychologist takes of it1 is a condition of the brain and nerves1 having physiological consequences of great importance1 and drawing largely on that stock of what we call nervous energy1 any unusual expenditure or deficiency of which produces the feeling of exhaustion4 ,the waste of energy1 and the subsequent exhaustion1 are greatest when the desire seems continually on the point of obtaining its gratification1 but the gratification constantly eludes it4 ,and this is what actually happens in the case supposed4 ,the attention continually fastens on the idea which we desire to attend to1 but1 from the insufficient strength of the pleasurable or painful association1 again deserts it2 and the incessant alternation of hope and disappointment produces1 as in other cases1 the nervous disturbance which we call the sense of effort1 and which is physiologically followed by the sensations of nervous exhaustion4 ,it is probable that whatever is not muscular in the feeling which we call a sense of effort1 is the physical effect produced by a more than usual expenditure of nervous force3 which1 reduced to its elements1 means a more than usually rapid disintegration and waste of nervous substance4 ,let me here remark1 that the recognition1 by the author of the ,analysis1 of a peculiar state of consciousness called a state of unsatisfied desire1 conflicts with his doctrine that desire is nothing but the idea of the desired pleasure as future4 ,in what sense is it possible to speak of an unsatisfied idea8 ,if even we insert the omitted element of ,belief1 and resolve desire not into the mere idea1 but into the expectation of a pleasure2 though we might rationally speak of an unsatisfied expectation1 it would only mean an expectation not fulfilled1 in other words1 an expectation of pleasure not followed by the pleasure2 an expectation followed by a mere negation4 ,how a pleasant idea1 followed1 not by a pain1 but by nothing at all1 is converted into a pain1 the pain of unsatisfied desire1 remains to be explained3 and the author has not pointed out any associations which account for it4 ,if it be said that the expectation is perpetually renewed and perpetually disappointed1 this is true1 but does not account for more than a continual alternation between a pleasant idea and no idea at all4 ,that an element of pain should enter into unsatisfied desire1 is a fact not explained by the author's theory2 and it stands as evidence that there is in a desire something inherently distinct from either an idea or an expectation4--,ed4 #cgc ,i cannot deem it necessary1 after the training which we now have had1 to give these expositions in more #cgd minute detail4 ,but it seems to be proper to notice1 in a few words1 the explanation which they afford of #cge the phenomena which are usually named the power or want of power over the train of the ideas--in a still #cgf more important instance than the composition of a discourse1 that of the conduct of life4 ,some men are distinguished for a steady direction of their actions1 through the course of their lives1 to some general end1 or ends4 ,one man attaches himself to the cultivation of his mind2 another1 to the accumulation of wealth2 another1 to the acquisition of fame4 ,there are other men whose lives appear to be a perpetual fluctuation4 ,they either shift from one great end to another perpetually2 or1 in their trains1 the great ends appear to have no ascendancy over the little4 ,there are men who seem to have a different end of their actions1 every day they rise from their beds4 ,the men1 in whose minds the great purposes of life seem to have no greater ascendancy than the minor objects1 are called frivolous men4 ,it sometimes happens1 that a #cgg man who chooses a frivolous end is steady in the pursuit of it4 ,the common case1 however1 is that no one frivolous end acquires a steady ascendancy2 and the man is in a state of perpetual fluctuation4 ,the solution of these phenomena is obvious4 ,when the idea of any of the great purposes of life exists habitually in controlling strength1 it performs the same function in regard to the selection of actions1 which the ,idea of the end or purpose of the ,discourse performs in regard to ideas1 in the case of the man who is composing it4 ,out of the whole number of ideas1 which present themselves to him1 the idea of his ,end associates itself with those which can operate as causes of its attainment2 and this association is followed by all the other associations which produce the employment of the ,ideas4 ,in like manner1 when #cgh the great purposes of life are established into predominating ideas1 they associate themselves strongly with the ideas of those actions which contribute to their attainment2 and those associations are followed by all the other associations1 which produce their adoption4 ,the interpretation which belongs to the phrases1 when we hear of men who have1 and men who have not1 their ideas and actions under command1 is1 that the one set of men have certain leading ideas1 called purposes1 so established1 as to maintain a control over both their ,ideas and their actions2 the other set have not ideas so formed as to exercise this ascendancy4 ,that man may be justly said to have the greatest command over his ideas1 whose associations with the grand sources of felicity are the most numerous and strong4 ,when the grand sources of felicity are formed into the leading and governing ideas1 each in its due and relative strength4 ,education has then performed its most perfect work2 and thus the individual becomes1 to the greatest degree1 the source of utility to others1 and of happiness to himself4 ,in regard1 then1 to that state of mind which precedes action1 we seem to have ascertained the following indisputable facts3 ,that actions are1 in some instances1 preceded by mere sensations2 that1 in other instances1 they are preceded by ideas2 that1 in all cases in which the action is said to be ,willed1 it is desired1 as a means to an end2 or1 in more accurate language1 is associated1 as cause1 with pleasure as effect3 that the idea of the outward appearance of the action1 thus excited by association1 excites1 in the same way1 the idea of the internal feelings1 which are #cgi the immediate antecedent of the action1 and then the action takes place2 that whatever power we may possess over the actions of our muscles1 must be derived from our power over our associations2 and that this power over our associations1 when fully analysed1 means nothing more than the power of certain interesting ,ideas1 originating in interesting sensations1 and formed into strength by association4#fg #fh ,editor's footnote #fg3 ,the analysis contained in this chapter affords1 as it appears to me1 a sufficient theory of the manner in which all that we denominate voluntary1 whether it be a bodily action or a modification of our mental state1 comes to be produced by a motive1 i4e4 by the association of an idea of pleasure or of exemption from pain with the act or the mental modification4 ,but there is still an unexplained residuum which has not yet been brought to account4 ,there are some bodily movements the consequence of which is not pleasure1 but pain4 ,painful states of consciousness1 no less than pleasurable ones1 tend to form strong associations with their causes or concomitants4 ,the idea1 therefore1 of a pain1 will1 no less than that of a pleasure1 become associated with the muscular action that would produce it1 and with the muscular sensations that accompany the action2 and1 as a matter of fact1 we know that it does so4 ,why1 then1 is the result not merely different1 but contrary8 ,why is it that the muscular action excited by association with a pleasure1 is action towards the pleasure1 while that excited by association with a pain is away from the pain8 ,as far as depends on the law of association1 it might seem that the action1 in both cases1 would be towards the fact with which the action is associated4 ,there are some remarkable phenomena in which this really happens4 ,there are cases in which a vivid imagination of a painful fact1 seems really to produce the action which realizes the fact4 ,persons looking over a precipice are said to be sometimes seized with a strong impulse to throw #chj themselves down4 ,persons who have extreme horror of a crime1 if circumstances make the idea of committing it vividly present to their mind1 have been known1 from the mere intensity of their horror1 to commit the crime without any assignable motive2 and have been unable to give any account of why they committed it1 except that the thought struck them1 that the devil tempted them1 and the like4 ,this is the case of what is sometimes called a fixed idea2 which has a sort of fascinating influence1 and makes people seek what they fear or detest1 instead of shunning it4 ,why is not this extremely exceptional case the common one8 ,why does the association of pain with an act1 usually excite not to that act1 but to the acts which tend to prevent the realization of the dreaded evil8 ,it seems1 that as the author has had to admit as an ultimate fact1 the distinction between those of our sensations which we call pleasures and those which we call pains1 considered as states of our passive sensibility1 so also he would be compelled to admit1 as a fact unreached by his explanations1 a difference between the two in their relation to our active faculty2 an attraction in the one case1 and a repulsion in the other4 ,that is1 he must admit that the association of a pleasurable or painful idea 7at all events when accompanied by a feeling of expectation7 with a muscular act1 has a specific tendency to excite the act when the idea is that of a pleasure1 but1 when it is the idea of a pain1 has a specific tendency to prevent that act1 and to excite the acts that are associated with the negation of the pain4 ,this is precisely what we mean when we say that pleasure is desired1 that pain is an object of aversion1 and the absence of pain an object of desire4 ,these facts are of course admitted by the author3 and he admits them even as ultimate3 but1 with his characteristic dislike to multiply the number of ultimate facts1 he merges them in the admitted ultimate fact of the difference between pleasure and pain4 ,it is chiefly in cases of this sort--in leading him to identify two ultimate facts with one another1 that his love of simplification1 in itself a feeling highly worthy of a philosopher1 seems to #cha mislead him4 ,even if we consent to admit that the desire of a pleasure is one and the same thing with the idea of a pleasure1 and aversion to a pain is the same thing with the idea of a pain--it remains true that the difference which we passively feel1 between the consciousness of a pleasure2 and that of a pain1 is one fact1 and our being stirred to seek the one and avoid the other is another fact2 and it is just this second fact that distinguishes a mere idea of something as future1 from a desire or aversion4 ,it is this conscious or unconscious reference to action1 which distinguishes the desire of a pleasure from the idea of it4 ,desire1 in short1 is the initiatory stage of volition4 ,the author might indeed say1 that this seeking of the sensation is involved in the very fact of conceiving it as pleasant2 but this1 when looked into1 only means that the two things are inseparable2 not that they are1 or that they can ever be thought of1 as identical2 as one and the same thing4 ,it appears1 then1 that there is a law of voluntary action1 the most important one of all1 which the author's explanations do not attempt to reach4 ,yet there is no necessity for accepting that law as ultimate4 ,a theory resolving it into laws still more fundamental1 has been propounded by ,mr4 ,bain in his writings1 and a masterly statement of it will be found in the succeeding note4 ,if1 as ,i expect1 this theory makes good its footing1 ,mr4 ,bain will be the first psychologist who has succeeded in effecting a complete and correct analysis of the ,will4 ,in the same note will be found an analysis of the case of an ide fixe--the most striking case of which1 is that of a terrific idea1 exceptionally drawing the active power into the direction which leads towards the dreaded catastrophe1 instead of1 as usual1 into the opposite direction4 ,this peculiar case obliges us to acknowledge the coexistence of two different modes in which action may be excited4 ,there is the normal agency of the ideas of a pleasure and a pain1 the one determining an action towards the pleasure1 the other an action away from the pain2 and there is the general power of an extremely strong association of any kind1 to make the action follow the idea4 #chb ,the reason why the determination of action towards a pain by the idea of the pain is only exceptional1 is1 that in order to produce it1 the general power of a strong association to excite action towards the fact which it recals1 has to overcome the specific tendency of a painful association to repel action from that fact4 ,but the intensity of the painful idea may be so great1 and the association of the act with it so strong1 as to overpower this repulsive force by a greater attractive force3 and it is then that we find the painful idea operating on action in a mode contrary to the specific property which is characteristic of it1 and which it usually obeys4 ,it has been suggested1 that the intensity with which the mind sometimes fixes upon a frightful idea1 may operate by paralysing for the time being the usual voluntary efforts to avoid pain1 and so allowing the natural impulse to act on a predominant idea to come into play4--,ed4 ,bain's footnote #fh3 ,this chapter is a remarkably searching discussion of the ,will1 not as a metaphysical puzzle1 but as a leading function of the mind4 ,it is greatly superior to any previous handling of the subject4 ,of the facts brought forward in illustration of voluntary movement1 some are more properly referable to other parts of the mental system4 ,first4 ,such actions as sneezing1 coughing1 contraction of the pupil of the eye1 hiccup1 parturition1 lock-jaw1 respiration1 the movements of the heart1 the peristaltic movements of the intestines1--all which are stated to be movements prompted by sensation1--are nearly1 if not altogether1 involuntary4 ,they are more usually termed ,reflex ,actions4 ,in a certain number1 sensation is present1 but is not essential2 as in coughing1 sneezing1 parturition4 ,in others1 for example1 the movements of the heart and the intestines1 there is no sensation2 the assumption made in the text1 that the blood cannot flow into the heart without being accompanied with sensation1 is incorrect4 ,these actions are interesting to study in connexion with the will1 but rather in the way of contrast than of similarity4 #chc ,there is probably a deep community in the foundations of the two classes of movements2 but1 in their more obvious aspect1 and for all psychological purposes1 they are opposed4 ,it is common to apply to the ,reflex class the name involuntary4 ,secondly4 ,the movements in yawning1 laughter1 sobbing2 the altered action of the heart1 the bowels1 the kidneys1 the skin1 in ,fear1--are allied with sensations or feelings2 but they are not correctly classed with the ,will2 in fact1 some of them are performed through involuntary muscles4 ,a different view must be taken of these effects4 ,they are the inseparable physical accompaniments of feeling2 the physical side or counterpart of the mental fact2 in their absence the feeling itself would not exist4 ,fear would not be fear1 if the emotional state were not attended with a series of physical effects1 partly of movement1 partly of altered secretions4 ,these physical accompaniments supply the appearances known to all men as the expression of feeling2 which although to a great degree made up of movements1 is totally distinct from the voluntary promptings of the feelings4 ,the smile that accompanies a pleasure tasted is one thing3 the activity inspired to prolong the enjoyment is another thing4 ,the two kinds of movement are frequently mingled2 thus1 in acute pains1 the cries and contortions of feature are the embodiment of the feeling2 the gestures and movements of the body1 may be partly expression1 but are also attempts to obtain relief4 ,expression in its purity is well seen in a shock of surprise2 a state which being often entirely neutral as regards pleasure or pain1 has no voluntary prompting whatsoever4 ,every feeling has a certain definite physical embodiment with much or with little outward display2 this belongs to the feeling as such2 it is a phenomenon of feeling or emotion1 and not of volition4 ,thirdly4 ,the operation of ,ideas1 in such instances as involuntary imitation1 contagious convulsions1 the influence of the imagination1--is a genuine source of actions1 but is yet to be distinguished from the ,will4 ,when the idea of a certain medicine produces the very same effect as the medicine actually applied1 when a person yawning makes the beholder yawn1 #chd or when1 standing on the brink of a precipice1 one is tempted to jump down1--there is no intervention of the will properly so called2 on the contrary1 there may be a conflict between the influence of the idea and the true volitional promptings4 ,the characteristic feature of the voluntary activity is to follow pleasure and to retreat from pain2 some of the tendencies growing out of an idea are in the direction of pain4 ,this1 in many respects remarkable1 phenomenon is better assigned to the ,intellectual part of our nature1 although it has consequences on our actions4 ,when a sensation passes into an idea1 it still retains1 in a diminished form1 many of its characteristic properties4 ,the sensation of a savoury morsel in the mouth is accompanied with a gush of saliva2 the corresponding idea in any way aroused1 as when just commencing to eat1 induces the very same flow1 expressed by the phrase the mouth watering4 ,the mode of interpreting the phenomenon is the announcement of a pregnant law of the mind 7two-sided like the mind itself71 that the idea is embodied in the same tracks as the sensation1 although commonly in a weaker form4 ,there is a standing mental determination1 whereby all ideas tend to work themselves out into full actuality2 a power that the will and other influences are constantly employed in checking4 ,the sight of a person yawning gives the idea of the act2 and the idea1 unless counteracted1 brings forth the reality4 ,the sight of a precipice gives very forcibly the idea of something falling headlong down1 and that idea possesses the mind of the spectator so strongly that but for a restraining volition1 he would act it out in his own person4 ,by far the most interesting application of the law is to explain the workings of ,sympathy1 in the form of purely beneficent disinterested impulses4 ,allusion has already been made to the law1 in this peculiar aspect1 in a former note 7,chap4 ,,xxiii4 p4 #cjb74 ,these three great classes of phenomena being withdrawn from the region of the ,will1 the remaining facts mentioned in the text can be viewed in a clearer light4 #a4 ,it is justly stated that the ,will is an extensive and #che laborious acquisition1 pursued1 especially at the commencement1 in the midst of considerable difficulties4 #b4 ,in the mature will1 the immediate antecedent of a voluntary act is an idea of the thing to be done4 ,this is true1 but not the precise1 nor the whole truth4 #c4 ,the author's mode of viewing the influence of ,attention points to the really fundamental and typical fact of the ,will4 ,he says1 ,attention is merely another name for the engrossing effect of a pleasurable or a painful sensation4 ,having a pleasurable or painful sensation1 and attending to it1 seem not to be two things1 but one and the same thing4 ,that is to say1 there is a power in pleasure as such1 and in pain as such1 to stimulate action or movement with reference to the pleasure or the pain4 ,this is the nearest approach that is made in the text to a statement of the law of voluntary action4 ,the law has been differently expressed4 ,locke said1 the will moves to the greatest uneasiness1 which is no doubt the fact4 ,still1 by a wider induction1 we obtain a more comprehensive1 as well as more accurate1 generalization4 ,if we observe one of the most familiar instances of voluntary action--the process of eating1 for example1 we find that what happens is as follows3--,the contact of the food with the tongue and palate stimulates1 by an immediate impulse1 all the movements of mastication and swallowing 7in its first stage71 and the further movements for placing more food in the mouth4 ,we find that the intensity of the stimulation is in proportion to the degree of the pleasurable excitement1 being highest at the commencement1 and sinking gradually in the approach to satiety4 ,there is no fact that can be produced more exactly typifying the primary action of the will4 ,a tasted pleasure1 everywhere1 at all times1 from the beginning to the close of life1 is an immediate inducement to activity4 ,coming out of a chilling atmosphere into a place of genial warmth1 our energy is at once aroused to follow the cue4 ,the striking up of a band attracts and detains all listeners susceptible to the charm4 ,there is1 in such instances1 no intermediate process of reflection1 deliberation1 or resolution2 a #chf simple1 an indivisible1 link unites a burst of pleasure and a burst of activity following up the pleasure4 ,reverting to the first example1 the act of eating1 we may detect another phase of the voluntary sequences4 ,suppose a morsel1 admitted in good faith1 to disclose a very bad taste1 say the taste of soot2 what is the immediate1 unreflecting1 response8 ,the first effect is a collapse and suspension of all the masticating movements4 ,from the earliest infancy1 this consequence would be shown4 ,there commonly succeeds1 and often with great rapidity1 a second effect1 which we shall consider under another head--the energetic discharge of the morsel from the mouth2 but long before children are capable of the second act1 they fall into the first--the suspension of the activity at the time4 ,on extending our survey to the analogous cases1 we are enabled to announce this also1 as a typical situation of the ,will1 namely3--,that1 as pleasure furthers activity in its own direction1 pain arrests activity in its own direction4 ,turning a street corner1 we encounter suddenly a bitter wintry blast2 we feel at once an arrest upon our movements4 ,an ill odour1 a painful contact1 a grating noise1 a disagreeable spectacle1 have all the same immediate efficacy4 ,the proper1 the direct consequent of an incursion of pain1 is suspended activity4 ,not only is this second law conformable to observation1 it is the implication1 the obverse1 of the previous law connecting pleasure with increased activity4 ,the apparent exceptions to the second law need to be adverted to4 ,the most obvious is the exciting effect of a smarting sensation1 as the stroke of a whip4 ,a light1 smarting1 pungent1 stimulus1 amounting to pain1 quickens the general activity of the system for the time2 while a more severe blow operates according to the general principle1 and suspends activity4 ,to quicken an animal's pace1 the light smart is often the best application2 to arrest an access of action1 there must be greater severity4 ,the excitement of an acute smart is due not to the pain of it1 but to the mere shock imparted to the nerves2 if a similar intensity of nervous shock were also a #chg cause of pleasure1 the stimulating effect would be far greater1 and more prolonged2 for the element of pain1 in the case of the painful smart1 destroys the activity in the second stage1 when the nervous excitement has subsided4 ,any one walking at a certain pace1 and suddenly jolted1 is momentarily awakened to a higher pitch of nervous excitement2 but goes on1 after the shock1 at a slackened pace4 ,an acute smart has thus a twofold efficacy2 it is both a temporary stimulant of activity1 and a cause of reduced energy on the whole1 according to the second law of the ,will4 ,another apparent exception is the vehemence manifested in escaping from pain2 a mode of activity almost indistinguishably mixed up with the writhings and contortions of a creature under suffering1 in other words1 with the physical embodiments of the state of pain4 ,the sudden excitement just adverted to also enters into the complex effect2 being brought out at the first moment of the infliction1 and at every new twinge in fitful modes of suffering4 ,this energetic activity for escape is a distinct aspect of voluntary power4 ,it is ,locke's typical form of the ,will1 but is here regarded as secondary or circuitous1 and not as the primitive situation4 ,thirdly4 ,we must now then consider expressly the influence of pain in stimulating action for alleviation or escape1 as when we draw back from anything that pains or offends us4 ,to call the pain the direct stimulant in this situation1 would be to connect pain and pleasure equally with the exaltation of our energies2 which would be a contradiction1 or else would tend to show that there is no casual connexion between pleasure or pain and our active exertions4 ,the real motive force of pain1 however1 is not the state of suffering1 but the relief2 and relief from pain is another form of pleasure4 ,that pleasure stimulates1 that pain depresses1 that alleviation of pain stimulates1 are all one and the same phenomenon--statements of the same law4 ,there are two stages in the operation of pain4 ,the first is1 when under a present pain1 something happens to give us relief2 in which case1 we experience on the instant1 a burst of #chh physical elation1 exactly as from a sudden access of pleasure4 ,in exposure to a cold wind1 we have the depression accompanying a massive pain2 in coming gradually under shelter1 we feel buoyed and elated1 our movements are quickened1 and we follow the lead with growing energy4 ,every one has experienced the stimulus of success1 and the damping effect of failure2 although1 practically viewed1 the success should dispense with the newborn energy1 and the failure should bring about an increase of exertion4 ,it takes a mind of unusual strength1 to resist these natural tendencies4 ,in the second stage1 pain is found acting as a stimulant1 without present alleviation1 and therefore without the benefit of the law of pleasure4 ,how is this8 ,the answer is1 that the idea of the relief is the operative circumstance4 ,the pedestrian exposed to a freezing wind is urged to an accelerated pace1 by the secondary or derived impulse1 growing out of the idea or anticipation of relief through a certain amount of exertion4 ,that this idea is the real source of the new strength1 is attested by the known facts and circumstances of the situation4 ,a sufferer1 having no idea1 prospect1 or hope of alleviation1 flags and succumbs1 in accordance with the proper tendency of pain2 the stimulation of the active powers does not follow the degree of the misery1 but the openings of a better lot4 ,what was noted above as the strength of mind that induces a successful man to refrain from pushing on still farther1 and an unsuccessful man to struggle the more1 means the firm possession of an idea1 to oppose the power of the present1--under success1 an idea of moderation1 and1 under misery1 an idea of relief to supply the active spur that the situation restrains4 ,we call a man strong-minded1 if he resists the pressure of the actual in favour of an ideal4 ,this is the highest manifestation of energy of will4 ,it owes its merit1 and even its meaning1 to the fact that a present pleasure inflames and a present pain quenches the activities2 and that1 to counterwork these tendencies1 there must be a strong conception of ideal pain in the one case1 and of ideal pleasure in the other2 which is the same law of the mind in another form4 ,we #chi cannot remain quiescent under a vivid and growing pleasure1 unless by the prospect of pain in the distance2 nor do we rouse up under pain without some idea of relief1 that is1 pleasure in the distance4 ,no general law of the mind is more thoroughly confirmed by the experience of human actions than the principle now stated in its three several aspects4 ,there is1 as has been seen1 something to be accounted for1 in the lively stimulus under acute smarts2 there is1 also1 an obverse of this fact1 in certain forms of pleasure 7as gentle warmth7 which are lulling and soporific2 but these are the consequence of another law of the mind1 in some degree complicating the phenomena1 without disproving the main law of the ,will4 ,possibly1 this principle1 wide as it is1 may be subsumed under a still wider3--namely1 a principle connecting pleasure with nutrition1 or the supply of vital power and stimulus1 and1 by implication1 pain with the abatement or loss of vital energy2 from which the law of the will would be a consequence4 ,the attempt to resolve it so is highly interesting2 but1 in the psychological explanation of the will1 we may be satisfied1 for the present1 to start from the less imposing1 but well-grounded generality now given4 ,at the same time1 it will be found that1 having once caught a glimpse of the higher law1 we cannot avoid occasionally falling into the language suggested by it2 so suitable does it often appear to the expression of the facts4 ,with regard to one great aspect of voluntary action1--our being moved to pleasure and from pain1 the law is the full and precise summary4 ,the element of the will remaining unexplained1 is the selection of the proper movements in each case2 as when we start up and walk in the direction of a pleasing sound4 ,the rendering an account of this selective adaptation is the theory of the growth or development of the will4 ,in the delicate and difficult enquiry as to the manner of first attaining the voluntary command of the movements1 the law of the will1 just expounded1 must still be referred to4 ,but taken by itself1 that law does not explain the beginnings of the will4 ,it accounts for the keeping up of a movement #cij bringing pleasure1 and the dropping of a movement bringing pain1 but it does not account for the ability to single out1 and set a-going1 movements calculated to enhance pleasure and subdue pain1 actual or distant4 ,there is not1 within its compass1 any specifying or selective faculty4 ,the complete explanation of the ,will demands a reference to two other laws of the mind4 ,the first is the ,spontaneous beginning of ,movements2 the second1 the ,retentive or ,associative process constituting the basis of all our acquisitions4 ,by the ,spontaneity of ,movement is meant the tendency of human beings1 and of animals generally1 to begin acting without the express stimulus of sensation from without1 and by virtue of the fund of power residing in the active organs themselves4 ,by means of nourishment1 the animal is disposed to pass into movement1 from the mere abundance of the motor energy in the nerve centres and in the muscles4 ,a large proportion of the activity of the more active creatures1--as the human species 7especially the young71 quadrupeds1 birds1 fishes1 and insects1--is due to the presence of an active machinery provided with superabundance of motive power4 ,apart from the stimulus of sensation1 from the wants and the pleasures of the animal1 there is a necessity for the active organs to put forth their activity4 ,the energy is greatly heightened1--often doubled or tripled1 by the stimulation of the senses1 and1 after a certain education1 by the influence of ideas2 but it is far from remaining in abeyance till operated upon by stimulants from without or from within4 ,besides summing up a large amount of the activity familiar to us in the life of human beings1 and of animals1 this ,spontaneity has a special importance as a starting-point for the will4 ,we have seen that the difficulty unprovided for by the law of pleasure and pain1 is the singling out1 or commencing1 of the suitable movements4 ,the utmost that the law can ensure is to retain or continue them1 when once commenced4 ,now1 the tendency to spontaneous action applies to all the voluntary members--locomotive organs1 trunk1 head1 jaw1 #cia tongue1 mouth1 eyes1 voice1 c4 ,there is1 at the outset1 no rule or order for the spontaneous outburst1 except the physical condition of each organ1 including the nervous connexions4 ,the animal1 in its exuberant phase1 after nourishment and rest1 may become active at any point2 it may run1 gesticulate1 chew1 gaze1 cry out2 or having expended itself in any one direction1 it may fall into other regions of activity where the force is still abundant4 ,one or two instances must here suffice to indicate the process of attaining the selective faculty of the will1 through ,spontaneity1 joined with the law of pleasure and pain4 ,in the maturity of the will1 we have the power of following with the eyes a moving object1 partly by revolving the eye-balls1 and partly by turning the head4 ,an infant has no such power4 ,the manner of arriving at it is open to observation1 and is typical of the less obvious cases4 ,suppose the child to have its gaze fixed upon a light1 or some other appearance of a stimulating kind4 ,the physical effect of the stimulus1 always conjoined with the mental effect1 is an increase of energy 7by the primary law of the will71 which would manifest itself in quickening and retaining the child's gaze2 there is displayed a more energetic strain of the attention than had existed when the eyes found nothing to impart a special charm4 ,suppose next that the light is withdrawn1 by being moved to one side4 ,the loss of the stimulus instantly works as a depression2 the heightened strain of attention collapses4 ,still1 the child is not reduced to absolute quiescence2 it has an internal fund of energy1 independent of casual stimulations2 the flowing out of this energy consists in a series of movements for the most part at random4 ,it may happen1 that one of these chance movements is a rotation of the eyes1 or of the head1 in the exact direction of the pleasing object1 and therefore tending to recover the illumination4 ,instantly1 there is a burst of heightened energy1 according to the law of pleasure2 and the movement accidentally commenced is persistently stimulated so long as the pleasure of the spectacle grows or continues4 ,the concurrence is fortuitous2 the prolongation of it is not fortuitous1 #cib but follows the law of the will--the abiding by whatever movement is giving pleasure4 ,the completing step is due to the ,retentive or plastic power of the mind4 ,an association is begun between the optical effect of a light retreating from the full gaze to the right or to the left1 and the muscular movements that enable the eye to follow it4 ,after a certain number of similar chance coincidences1 this bond of association is rendered firm enough to ensure the movement at once when the sensation is present2 and one of the many thousand links constituting the mature will is thereby forged4 ,the very same course of proceeding is followed in a host of other instances4 ,the beginnings of ,imitation are also highly illustrative of the process4 ,there is no trace of imitative power during the first months of infancy4 ,the rise and progress of the power may be visibly discerned by any observer2 and perhaps the best example for the purpose is ,speech4 ,in the beginnings of this extensive acquirement1 the basis is most obviously the infant's spontaneous articulations2 these must be waited for by the instructor1 who can only foster and maintain them when they come4 ,the law of the will provides for the fostering part of the process4 ,the child is1 in all probability1 gratified by the sound of its voice1 when it gives forth any new sound1 and so is stimulated to keep up the vocal exertion4 ,next in efficacy is the catching up and repeating of the sound by others1 which is an addition to the pleasing stimulus4 ,under the two-fold agency1 there is opportunity for an association to grow up between the vocal impulse and the sensation of the sound heard2 which association is ultimately the medium of bringing on the articulation whenever it is desired4 ,the other cases of ,imitation describe the same routine4 ,the movements are initiated by random spontaneity2 and when they arise1 they are accompanied by a sensible impression on the eye1 or on the ear2 the concurrences1 being regular and uniform1 are at length contiguously associated2 the muscular exertion of lifting the hand is connected with the visible picture of a lifted hand4 ,at a certain stage1 the association #cic may be brought to operate in the inverted order1--the sensations first1 the movement next1--which is the whole fact of ,imitation4 ,a numerous class of voluntary links consists in obeying the word of command1 or in following verbal directions4 ,this1 as will be admitted1 can be nothing but association4 ,it is an association that would not be attainable without the spontaneous commencement4 ,a child1 or an animal1 must perform a certain action1 proprio motu1 in the first instance2 the name is then uttered in company with it2 this being done repeatedly1 a connexion is made whereby the word can induce or single out the movement4 ,in the training of animals1 a hastening process is resorted to1 which well exemplifies the difficulties in the early education of the will4 ,in breaking a horse1 the whip and the curb form the earliest instrumentality4 ,the animal must still commence moving of its own accord4 ,the business is to guide the spontaneity into definite channels1 in consistency with the law of the will1 and to connect all the various desired movements with language and signs1 by whose means they can always be brought into play4 ,when the colt under discipline is moving in the desired pace1 it is allowed to go on without molestation or hindrance2 when it deviates in any way1 it is made to feel the pain of the whip or other check2 this1 by the law of pain1 abates the existing movements2 and if the abatement is the thing sought1 the end is gained4 ,the application may1 however1 be such as to quicken the movements by the smarting stimulus2 an effect both exceptional and uncertain1 and of use as causing a diversion of pace1 out of which may come the movement desired4 ,the surest agency of control1 however1 in the early and crude stage of the will1 is the abatement of an excessive or a wrong movement by a decidedly painful check1 such as the operation of the curb1 which by pressing severely on a sensitive surface1 is a certain means of depression2 whereas1 the light1 irritating smart of the whip operates by a spasmodic uncertain stimulation4 ,it is by the tendency of pain to put an arrest upon the wrong movement4 #cid and of the relief from pain to indicate the right movement1 that the trainer secures the obedience of the animal2 he1 at the same time1 familiarizing its ear with the sounds that are to signify the various paces and movements4 ,the spontaneous commencement is essential under all circumstances2 according as this spontaneity is1 from the first1 ready1 vigorous1 and various1 is the facility in attaining and cementing the initial links of voluntary command4 ,it will now be apparent that the immediate antecedent of a voluntary act is not solely the idea of the action to be performed4 ,the successive upbuilding of the voluntary associations developes a series of phases1 under which the direct antecedent is transformed into various shapes4 ,the sensation of hunger may be the sole antecedent in prompting an animal to the search for food2 the painful sensation is coupled at a very early stage with the sight and the idea of food4 ,when a child first attains the power of lifting a sweet morsel to its mouth1 the antecedent of the voluntary act is the sight of the morsel coupled with the remembrance of the sweetness4 ,a farther advance takes place by associating the ultimate object with intermediate actions1 as when the child learns to entreat what it wants from other persons4 ,the stage that first brings in an idea of the moving members themselves is ,imitation2 in imitating by sight1 the antecedent is the view of the parts moved4 ,through this medium1 we pass to what is popularly considered the type of voluntary control1 the moving from a wish to move4 ,i will to raise the arm1 and the act follows2 the antecedent is the idea of the raised arm 7together with some feeling to be gratified by the act74 ,in the highest developments of voluntary acquisition1 there is another case1 also of frequent occurrence2 namely1 where the intellectual antecedent is the idea of the work to be done2 as1 for example1 in the act of washing the hands1 where we do not think of the movements to be gone through1 but of a certain appearance to be produced4 ,in ,chapter ,x41 on ,memory1 it is remarked3--',when we #cie are said to will1 there must be in the mind what is willed4' ,but the idea of what is immediately willed1 with reference to the same ultimate end1 may assume all the variations above described4 ,to gain a pleasure or free ourselves from a pain1 we may employ different instrumentalities2 and the explanation of the will should comprehend them all4--,b4 #cif ,,chapter ,,xxv4 ,,intention4 ,,the word intend1 the concrete1 seems to be employed on two occasions4 #a4 ,we are said to intend1 or not to intend1 certain actions of our own4 #b4 ,and we are said to intend1 or not to intend1 certain consequences of our own actions4 ,we have to examine what is the state of mind which the word designates on each of those occasions4 #a4 ,we are said to intend only a future action4 ,when the action is immediate1 we are not said to ,,intend1 but to ,,will it2 an action intended1 is an action of ours contemplated as future1 or certainly to be4 ,we have minutely analysed1 on a former occasion1 the state of mind which exists1 when events1 other than actions of our own1 are contemplated as future4 ,an association1 from prior habit1 exists1 between antecedent and consequent1 in a series of events2 an association1 such1 that we cannot think of one of the events as existing1 without thinking of the others as existing2 that is1 without anticipating their existence4 #cig ,that this process is involved in anticipating that peculiar event1 called an action of our own1 cannot be doubted4 ,the only question is1 what are the circumstances from which it derives its peculiar character4 ,something peculiar is imparted to it1 from the very circumstance of its being an action of our own4 ,in anticipating an action of our own1 we necessarily anticipate the mental processes1 which are its antecedents4 ,among these we necessarily anticipate what is called the act of willing4 ,in such anticipations1 the association is of that intimate character1 which constitutes belief4 ,in anticipating an action of our own1 therefore1 we contemplate the act as certainly future3 that is1 we believe that we shall will it4 ,but to look forward through a certain train of antecedents and consequents1 the concluding part of which is a certain act1 which we shall then will1 and then do1 is a process which apparently involves in it all that is meant by what1 in this class of cases1 we call ,intention4 ,it may still1 however1 be objected1 that the explanation thus presented1 recognises1 in the state of mind in question1 only the ideas involved in the process called willing1 with the idea of the action1 and the belief that the action will take place2 but that there seems to be something more than the present existence of ideas and belief1 in that state of mind which we call intending1 which seems to partake of the nature of willing at the moment of its existence4 ,there is something here of the customary illusions of language4 ,the word intend is an active verb4 ,and1 wherever we use an active verb1 we have #cih the association of activity and of willing1 involved in it4 ,that there can be nothing of willing in the case1 is abundantly certain2 since the will relates only to immediate acts4 ,it may1 however1 be objected1 that though there is nothing of willing in the case1 there is nevertheless a determination or purpose to will4 ,a man may say1 ,i not only believe that ,i shall act so and so1 but ,i am determined that ,i shall act so and so4 ,in this objection1 the words determine1 and determination1 are still but substitutes for intend1 and intention4 ,at most1 they only mark a degree of strength in the intention4 ,there is another expression1 however1 which deserves notice4 ,a man may not only resolve to do a thing1 but he may promise to do it4 ,and the promises of men form a very important class of their actions4 ,after all1 a ,promise is in its very essence merely the ,declaration of an ,intention4 ,if it be asserted that it is not only the declaration of an intention1 but the declaration that nothing shall occur to hinder that intention of its effect2 what is this but the declaration of another intention2 the intention not to frustrate an existing intention8 ,but this second intention is included in the first4 ,the very existence of an intention implies the absence of any counter intention4 ,why is it that a man intends8 ,for the same reason1 of course1 that he wills4 ,in willing1 a certain act is contemplated as a cause of pleasure2 an immediate act1 and an immediate pleasure4 ,in intending1 a certain future act is contemplated as cause of a future #cii pleasure4 ,the idea of the pleasure and its cause1 united by association1 constitute the motive4 ,in this act of anticipation1 the sequence1 consisting of motive as cause1 action as effect1 is indissoluble4 ,in our supposed state of intention1 the motive is presented to the mind as about to exist at the time in contemplation2 the idea of the act as existing irresistibly follows4 ,an act of our own anticipated by irresistible association1 when the motive is immediate1 is willed2 when the motive is future1 is intended4 ,intention is the strong anticipation of a future will4 ,but every thing which strengthens the motive1 that is1 associates the idea of the act with that of a greater amount of good arising from it1 increases the certainty of the act4 ,a promise to perform the act strengthens the motive2 in some cases exceedingly4 ,as it is of great consequence to men in general1 that promises should be performed1 they take care to reward the performing of promises1 to punish the non-performing of them1 with their favour in the one case1 their disfavour in the other4 ,when the favour and disfavour of mankind are general1 and strong1 to a certain degree1 they amount to the highest of all punishments1 and all rewards4 ,a promise1 then1 which is the declaration of an intention1 greatly strengthens the certainty of the act1 by greatly adding to the force of the motive4 #b4 ,the next case of the meaning of ,intention is of easy explanation4 ,when we will1 or when we intend1 an action1 we either foresee1 or do not foresee1 certain of its consequences4 ,in what associations the act of foreseeing or anticipating consists1 we need not again explain4 ,the question1 whether a man did #djj or did not foresee certain consequents of his acts1 is of great importance in certain cases of judicature1 because upon this circumstance depends the propriety of a less or greater degree of punishment1 perhaps the propriety or impropriety of punishing at all4 ,a person administers to another person a medicine4 ,it turns out to be poison4 ,the person whose act the administration was1 believing the drug to be salubrious1 not hurtful1 anticipated good consequences2 in other words1 intended the benefit of the patient2 intending1 and anticipating1 here1 being only two names for the same thing4 ,he did not foresee the evil consequences2 and this we commonly express by saying he did not intend them4 ,if the person who administered the drug1 instead of believing it to be a proper medicine1 and anticipating from it salutary effects1 knew it to be poison1 anticipating from it destructive effects1 he would be said to intend those effects4 ,it thus appears1 that when a man1 having certain consequences of an act in view1 proceeds to the performance of the act1 the having in view1 or anticipating1 receives1 in these circumstances1 the name of intention4 ,it is a case of anticipation1 anticipation in peculiar circumstances1 and is marked by a peculiar name4 ,the consequence of an act may be such1 that the person had no reason to anticipate them1 or could not possibly anticipate them2 or they may be such1 that1 though actually not foreseen1 they might1 with more or less of care1 have been foreseen4 ,these are questions respecting the nature of one solitary act4 #dja ,they are what in law are called questions of fact4 ,the exact determination of them is essential to the right decision of the judge in the particular case2 but any further consideration of them is not within the province of this inquiry4#fi ,editor's footnote #fi3 ,this chapter is devoted to clearing up the confusion and disentangling the ambiguity connected with the word ,intention4 ,and it fully attains the purpose1 save where the refusal to admit any difference between expectation and a strong association1 throws a certain haze over an operation into which they both enter4 ,intention1 when the word is used in reference to our future conduct1 is well characterized by the author as the strong anticipation of a future will4 ,it is an unfaltering present belief that we shall hereafter will a particular act1 or a particular course of action4 ,there may be1 over and above this belief1 an intention that nothing shall occur to hinder that intention of its effect2 the intention not to frustrate an existing intention4 ,the author thinks that this second intention is included in the first3 but it is not necessarily so4 ,it is the first intention1 fortified by some additional motive which creates a special desire that this particular desire and intention should continue4 ,it is another case of what the author never recognizes1 the desire of a desire4 ,intention1 when we are said to intend the consequences of our actions1 means the foresight1 or expectation of those consequences2 which is a totally different thing from desiring them4 ,the particular consequences in question1 though foreseen may be disagreeable to us3 the act may be done for the sake of other consequences4 ,intention1 and motive1 are two very different things4 ,but it is the intention1 that is1 the foresight of consequences1 which constitutes the moral rightness or wrongness of the act4 ,which among the many consequences of a crime1 are those1 foresight of which constitutes guilt1 and non-foresight entitles to acquittal1 depends on the particular nature of the case4 ,we may say generally1 that it is the hurtful consequences4 ,when the question arises judicially1 we must say it is the consequences which the law intended to prevent4 ,reverting to the author's illustration2 a person who gives a drug to a patient1 who dies in consequence1 is not guilty 7at least of intentional crime7 if he expected good consequences1 or no consequences at all1 from its administration4 ,he is guilty1 if he expected that the consequence would be death2 because that was the consequence which the legislator intended to prevent4 ,he is guilty1 even if he thought that the death of the patient would be a good to the world3 because1 though the law did not intend to prevent good to the world1 it did intend to prevent persons from killing one another4 ,judged by a moral instead of a legal standard1 the man may be innocent2 or guilty of a different offence1 that of not using his thinking faculty with sufficient calmness and impartiality1 to perceive that in such a case as that of taking life1 the general presumption of pernicious consequences ought to outweigh a particular person's opinion that preponderant good consequences would be produced in the particular instance4--,ed4 #djb ,thus1 then1 the ,exposition of the ,human ,mind1 as far as the imperfection of the execution may allow the accomplishment to be predicated of the attempt1 may be regarded as brought to its close4 ,the phenomena which characterize man as a thinking ,being1 have been brought forward1 have been carefully resolved into their component elements1 and traced to certain general and undisputed laws4 ,i should call this the ,,theory of the ,human ,mind1 if ,i could hope that the word would be understood in its original and literal meaning1 that is1 ,,viewing or ,,observing1 ,,and ,,correctly ,,recording ,,the ,,matters ,,observed4 ,this is the task1 the execution of which #djc has been endeavoured throughout the preceding pages4 ,but1 unhappily1 the word ,theory has been perverted to denote an operation very different from this1 an operation by which ,,viewing--,,observing--is superseded2 an operation which essentially consists in ,,supposing1 ,,and ,,setting ,,down ,,matters ,,supposed ,,as ,,matters ,,observed4 ,theory1 in fact1 has been confounded with ,hypothesis2 and it is probably vain to think of restoring it to its proper signification4 ,if1 however1 the ,theoretical1 or ,expository part of the ,doctrine of the ,human ,mind were perfected2 another great branch1 the ,practical 7which1 to be rationally founded1 must be founded on the ,theoretical7 would still remain4 ,this subject1 it appears1 might be conveniently treated in three ,books3 ,i4 ,the ,book of ,logic2 containing the ,practical ,rules for conducting the mind in its search after ,truth3 ,,ii4 ,the ,book of ,ethics2 or the ,book of ,rules for regulating the actions of human beings1 so as to deduce from them the greatest amount of good1 both to the actor himself1 and to his fellow-creatures at large3 ,,iii4 ,the ,book of ,education2 or the ,book of ,rules1 for training the ,individual to the greatest excellence of his nature2 that is1 to the highest possible state of efficiency 7ability and will included71 as cause of good to himself1 and to his species4 ,,the ,,end4 ,,london3 ,,savill1 ,,edwards ,,and ,,co41 ,,printers1 ,,chandos ,,street1 ,,covent ,,garden4 99 99 99 99 99 ,transcriber's ,note ,all editions of this text were published in two volumes4 ,this file has combined them4 ,the only consequential change to the original material is that the ,contents pages for ,volume #b are repeated immediately after the ,contents of ,volume #a4 ,footnotes ,james ,mill's text had a few footnotes1 indicated by single asterisks4 ,his later commentators' work was printed as footnotes1 numbered consecutively through each volume 7though there is no note #cf in volume #a71 and attributed by an initial 7or ,editor's note7 at the end4 ,in this text each note is attributed to its author 7,james ,mill being called ,mill2 ,john ,stuart ,mill1 ,editor74 ,john ,stuart ,mill made one note in ,james' style1 #g99 in volume #a 7where the attribution has been marked by an asterisk74 ,there are footnotes in ,grote's main footnote1 and in a couple of other footnotes1 marked as in the original4 ,all footnotes are now placed after the paragraph in which they occur4 ,corrections ,corrected text is indicated by a preceding 994 ,the following corrections have been made 7usually confirmed by reference to the earlier editions73 ,location ,original ,correction ,volume #a p4 #aa denonominate denominate p4 #ie and of footnote #dg infinities infinitives footnote #ed existtence existence p4 #aie their there footnote #ei gutteral guttural p4 #bjd blank #b p4 #bag predicacations predications p4 #bef rationes rationes footnote g b #f footnote j accute acute footnote #hb #f #e footnote #hg phrase phase p4 #cfc it its p4 #ddg unconciousness unconsciousness ,volume #b ,contents #cfi #cif p4 #de 3 2 p4 #gb former formed p4 #hi succeeds succeed p4 #abb measure measured p4 #abi end quote mark missing at footnote #h99 p4 #acf ,read ,reid footnote #cj not nor p4 #cab comprehend comprehended footnote #ei physicial physical ,two uncorrections might be noticed3 in volume #a1 pp4 #fa-fb the ,mills read ',brobdignagian1' following1 it seems1 an edition with that spelling instead of the usual ',brobdingnag'2 in volume #b1 page #chg 'casual' is given in both editions but 'causal' seems better sense4 ,other matters ,page numbers are preserved in-text within 4 ,italic or gesperrt text is enclosed by 4 ,greek text is transliterated thus3 breathings marked 7 for hard1 7 for soft1 accents _/ for acute1 for grave1 for circumflex1 all after their vowel2 iota subscript is marked 4 ,in footnote #ec of ,volume #a1 7i is used to stand for i with a breve above it1 in a rendering of ,wotiak4