,,the ,,philosophy ,,of ,,fine ,,art ,,by ,g4 ,w4 ,f4 ,,hegel ,,translated1 ,,with ,,notes1 ,,by ,f4 ,p4 ,b4 ,,osmaston1 ,b4,a4 ,,author ,,of ,,the ,,art ,,and ,,genius ,,of ,,tintoret1 ,,an ,,essay ,,on ,,the ,,future ,,of ,,poetry1 ,,and ,,other ,,works ,,vol4 ,i ,,london ,g4 ,,bell ,,and ,,sons1 ,,ltd4 #aibj ,,translator',s ,,preface ,the translation of ,hegel's ,aesthetik or ,philosophy of ,fine ,art1 which is contained in the four volumes of the present work1 is the first complete translation in ,english of the three volumes devoted to this subject in the collected edition 7,berlin1 #ahce74 ,i know of four partial translations in ,english of this work and one in ,french4 ,these are ,mr4 ,w4 ,m4 ,bryant's translation of ,part ,,ii#a1 ,mr4 ,kedney's short analysis of the entire work#b1 ,mr4 ,hastie's translation of ,michelet's short ,philosophy of ,art#c1 prefaced by ,hegel's ,introduction1 partly translated and partly summarized and lastly ,professor ,b4 ,bosanquet's complete translation of ,hegel's first ,introduction with notes#d4 ,the ,french translation of ,m4 ,bnard purports to be more or less a reproduction of the entire work and runs into two large-sized volumes4 ,it also is1 however1 so far as ,hegel's ,introduction and the first two ,parts are concerned1 merely a compressed summary1 and only in particular passages is the translation anything but a very free rendering of the original1 though there is a far closer approach to this in ,part ,,iii4 ,i have not seen ,mr4 ,bryant's translation4 ,as any approach to an adequate reproduction of ,hegel's writing ,mr4 ,hastie's translation of ,michelet's work and ,mr4 ,kedney's analysis are of very little value#e4 ,professor ,bosanquet's translation is admirable within the limits imposed4 ,to that extent ,i have merely followed1 as ,i was able1 in my friend's footsteps2 but this advance covers little more than one sixteenth part of the entire work of #a1fjj pages4 ,with regard to all such analyses ,i entirely concur with ,professor ,bosanquet's view stated in his preface1 that such merely mislead if regarded as in any way a reflex of either ,hegel himself or the ,german text4 ,it is true that this work is--as are in their degree other volumes of the collected edition1 the ,outlines of the ,philosophy of ,right for example--a heterogeneous product1 in our own instance not merely lacking the final revision of the author1 but rather put together as such a connected treatise by the editor responsible 7i7 from several autograph ,,mss4 of ,hegel#f1 some of which were little more than fragmentary notes for lectures1 7ii7 supplemented further from notes#g taken by pupils who attended such lectures1 the entire conglomerate being 7iii7 finally dovetailed together with connecting links by the editorial hand much as1 to cite his own illustration1 a careful picture restorer might do in order to secure the impression of a unified work1 the unity aimed at by himself being rather that of a connected literary treatise than a series of lectures4 ,it is obvious that a product of this nature will vary considerably throughout in the degree that the personality and unique flavour of ,hegel himself1 whether viewed as writer or thinker1 asserts itself4 ,the introductions#h have been1 it would appear1 taken almost exclusively from ,hegel's own ,,mss42 but even these remained unrevised for the press1 owing to the premature and sudden death of their author4 ,of the greater portion of the work we can merely form our judgment of the nature of its authenticity from the content itself4 ,on the whole ,i should myself say that the result was more favourable than might under such conditions have been expected4 ,the editor assures us expressly that so far as all illustrations and the substantive content of the work is concerned no attempt has been made whatever to supplement the same4 ,hegel is throughout here entirely responsible4 ,i think1 further1 that the endeavour claimed by the editor to preserve the general character and tone 7,kolorit7 of ,hegel's own diction has attained a degree of success that could only have been within the reach of devoted pupils and friends of the man himself1 who for many years both attended his lectures and studied his published works4 ,whatever opinion1 however1 we may arrive at on this head there can hardly be two opinions as to the sources in which the main interest consists for a modern reader4 ,first1 ,i should lay particular stress on the forceful and characteristic manner in which the fundamental philosophical conceptions which underlie the entire fabric are worked into and elaborated explicitly1 throughout its detail4 ,the very nature of this unwearied and insistent interfusion 7,durchdringung7 of positive fact1 whether historical1 scientific1 or aesthetic1 with the dialectic movement of the ,idea is here as essentially the method of ,hegel as it is elsewhere4 ,and this is so despite the fact that it is here presented for the most part in a form less repellent to the ordinary reader and less provocative of hostile criticism4 ,translators therefore1 who1 following the example of the ,french translator#i1 deliberately seek to lighten the burden of their cargo by throwing overboard what they choose to call the injurious dialectic1 or the dark labyrinth of this aspect of our work may reproduce much that is of instruction or interest1 but most certainly do not reproduce either the main strength of ,hegel as a thinker1 or the most characteristic impression--to say nothing of the repetitions--of such style or absence of literary style that he possessed4 ,secondly1 if there is one feature more striking than any other in this work1 which is bound at least to surprise anyone who still harbours the obsolete notion that this philosopher moved in an exclusively abstract region of idea remote from the concrete experience of life and scientific or artistic knowledge1 it is the wealth and extraordinary range of the illustrations in these volumes no less than the vigour and freshness of their application4 ,in this respect two translations which merely amount to a summary of theoretical content simply omit the vital or at least the most attractive heart of the interest4 ,as to the present claim of this laborious work to recognition and study1 its historical significance is1 ,i think1 admitted by the most acknowledged authorities on the subject4 ,as ,schasler has called it1 it is the first complete system of a philosophy of ,art4 ,the nature of its importance to our own most able and learned historian of the ,philosophy of ,fine ,art may not only be deduced from his own summary of its contents and significance in his invaluable historical survey#aj1 but is further illustrated by the fact that he has reproduced the concluding portion of ,hegel's ,introduction in extenso in an ,appendix to this work4 ,other writers have been less judicious both as hostile critics and in the degree of their praise or enthusiasm4 ,one ,german authority has called it ,hegel's masterpiece4 ,such a title is1 apart from any other ground1 sufficiently excluded by its history alone4 ,whether ,hegel might have made it his masterpiece had he lived is of course another question4 ,other admirers1 such as the late ,professor ,caird#aa1 have more legitimately accepted such a distinction for the ,phenomenologie des ,geistes4 ,mr4 ,hastie will even have it that throughout ,all is clear1 radiant1 harmonious and dim with the things that are a joy for ever4 ,such an effusive display of abstract ,vorstellung reminds one little of either the dour temper of the ,swabian philosopher1 or the concrete intelligence which most distinguishes him from his rivals now and in his lifetime4 ,i can promise no such garden of ,hesperides1 or even ,platonic banquet1 to any of my readers4 ,it is true that we have here1 the work being primarily built upon lectures intended to instruct the ordinary student1 no such parade of the dialectic method in its formal structure such as constitutes the root of offence in some other works of ,hegel4 ,but if we approach it with the belief that all is therefore the plain sailing we meet with in the world of journalistic art criticism and the commonsense conceptions of everyday life1 or with the assurance that the work is1 or can be1 intelligible without some real attempt to grapple with the fundamental ideas of ,hegelian metaphysic1 we may find our disappointment very considerable4 ,as a humble translator ,i am bound to say that in a very large number of passages ,i have by no means discovered immediacy of intelligibility or radiance to be a conspicuous feature of the original4 ,radiance is indeed1 ,i should say1 not an attribute emphatically characteristic of any kind of ,teutonic literature1 and least of all of its scientific and philosophical literature4 ,the present work is certainly no exception4 ,with its untiring1 not to say remorseless1 effort to press home in repeated expression1 often but slightly varied1 the same fundamental points1 its dogged and endless persistence in the careful explication through rational definition of every kind of positive material that presents itself from the nature of the divine in man1 or the soul of living beast to the accurate determination in the terms of expressed thought of a musical sound or an epigram or simile1 with its well-nigh total disregard of the beauty of literary style1 and its by no means unfrequent disregard of all principle of proportion in the co-ordination of its varied subject-matter--whatever else such a product may be it is most assuredly not1 at least to ,english apprehension1 reminiscent of the radiance either of ,homer or ,apollo4 ,but though even sincere admiration may smile over such a description1 it does unquestionably reflect to a remarkable extent the thoroughness1 tenacity of purpose1 the absence of superficial rhetoric1 the wide range1 the extraordinary combination of constructive idea and detailed knowledge and research we rightly associate with the most valued works of ,german science and philosophy4 ,it has never been more needful than at this time of day to draw attention to such qualities1 when the national bias is to ignore or belittle their presence4 ,it is1 moreover1 not without passages which attain to a very real elevation of eloquence1 eloquence marked by the profoundest earnestness and entirely free from the least flavour of bombast or sentimentalism4 ,to the right kind of reader it can hardly fail to convey a certain fascination which is not merely due to the presence of a powerful and original intellect1 but is equally inseparable from the product of a human soul intent upon getting at the heart of its subject1 and keeping its vision throughout fixed on that4 ,nor is the mere breadth of the canvas and the depth of its content its only attraction4 ,the work is indeed full of digressions of exceptional interest to the general reader1 and as such bears the indelible stamp of ,hegel's manner as a lecturer1 which his editor maintains stood out in such marked contrast to his more concise style as an author1 drawing as he did when lecturing so largely on his encyclopaedic stores of knowledge4 ,to treat all the text as we now have it with the same respect may very possibly betoken to some an excess of zeal on the part of the translator2 but after all the most important thing for an ,english reader is to know what the volumes actually contain4 ,in dealing with ,hegel the outlined sketch1 whether secured through a process of distillation or adulteration1 is by no means any compensation for the loss of the complete picture4 ,if we are impatient over many aspects of this philosopher's particularity1 we had much better dispense with him altogether4 ,sympathetically studied it is hardly too much to say that this monumental work is an education in itself4 ,it is at any rate one which cannot fail to enlarge our conceptions of the significance and dignity of human art4 ,nor is this by any means impossible1 even though we are unable to concur in1 or indeed remain insufficiently qualified to express a judgment upon all or even a few of the most important of its conclusions4 ,but it is perhaps not wholly unnecessary to observe that before venturing upon a verdict in our wisdom we must1 as ,robert ,browning submitted in reference to the criticism passed upon his poetry1 have awakened both our senses and intelligence that they may the better judge4 ,it is the modest aim of the present translation to make that preparatory process more easy for the ,english reader1 to assist that intelligent assimilation of the truth as it appears to a great and world-famous thinker1 which is the necessary condition of any criticism meriting respectful attention at all4 ,such assimilation is perhaps impossible in the case of ,hegel without effort1 and indeed something of sympathy with his general outlook and temper1 making as he does little or no appeal whatever to the lover of literature as such1 who had consequently far better leave him austerely alone to the consideration of others who are more attracted4 ,i do not propose in these prefatory remarks to enlarge further on the actual content of the work1 or on the nature of the criticism which has been directed either to fundamental positions or matters of detail4 ,some of these ,i have referred to in my notes on the text where they are most obviously pertinent4 ,the general reader will find a very useful introduction to some of the more primary difficulties in the study of ,hegel in ,professor ,bosanquet's prefatory essay to his translation4 ,the more serious student can hardly dispense with the perusal of a considerable portion of the same writer's history of ,aesthetik1 at least that portion which directly deals with the writings of ,kant1 ,schiller1 ,goethe1 ,schelling1 and ,hegel himself on the subject#ab4 ,i hold my translation to be as literal as is possible consistently with an endeavour to render or interpret ,german philosophical language in the language or idiom of really expressive and intelligible ,english4 ,it is now generally admitted that all translation is in the nature of an interpretation4 ,however much ,i may have fallen short of my aim1 that aim has been throughout to express the actual ideal content of the ,german1 not merely with all the force and directness ,i could muster1 but with as near an approach to the formal structure of the ,german text as was consistent with the like condition of really readable ,english4 ,above all ,i have striven to avoid the lassitude of mere paraphrase1 that vague generalization of content which conceives itself to possess the right to eliminate from the text pretty much what it pleases4 ,the ,index attached to the final volume is limited in its reference to proper names1 and pre-eminently to illustrations in the text of works either of general literature1 or other products of art1 which ,i considered of use or interest to the general reader4 ,in the table of contents to the several volumes ,i have notified with brackets my own contributions to the ,german original4 ,in all other respects ,i have retained the divisions of subject-matter as ,i found them recorded by ,hegel or his editor4 ,f4 ,p4 ,o4 ,footnote #a3 ,new ,york1 ,appleton and ,co4 ,footnote #b3 ,chicago1 ,griggs and ,co41 #ahhe4 ,footnote #c3 ,edinburgh1 ,oliver and ,boyd1 #ahhf4 ,the translation is literal and of good quality for a little over thirty pages4 ,after that it is a mere summary4 ,footnote #d3 ,kegan ,paul1 ,trench and ,co41 #ahhf4 ,footnote #e3 ,mr4 ,kedney's volume only amounts to about three hundred small-sized pages altogether4 ,footnote #f3 ,the most important source were ,,mss4 for lectures given in #ahbj4 ,this formed the basis of further lectures in #ahbc1 #ahbf1 and #ahbi4 ,footnote #g3 ,the notes to which our editor had access referred to the lectures given in #ahbc and #ahbf1 with others of those in #ahbf and #ahbi4 ,footnote #h3 ,the first ,introduction is obviously taken from ,hegel's ,,ms41 the editor not even venturing in this case to obliterate its form as an address in the lecture room4 ,it represents perhaps the nearest approach we possess to the revised ,,ms4 ,footnote #i3 ,an almost inevitable defect of such a translation is that criticism may be offered without supplying the material necessary for any satisfactory verdict upon its sufficiency4 ,thus ,m4 ,bnard cites with approval an adverse criticism passed upon what is called ,hegel's inadequate treatment of the ,idea of ,beauty as a partial manifestation of the absolute ,idea1 but barely includes any of the passages which refer to this in his translation 7note1 p4 #cf74 ,such can lead to no conclusion whatever1 though it obviously may entirely mislead his readers4 ,footnote #aj3 ,history of ,aesthetik1 by ,bernard ,bosanquet 7,sonnenschein1 #ahib74 ,see in particular pp4 #ccc-cfb4 ,with regard to the comparative value of the work of ,schelling and ,hegel on this subject the author says 7p4 #ccd73 ,it may be said that while we prefer ,hegel to ,schelling this is partly because ,schelling is best represented in ,hegel4 ,i can claim but a very limited firsthand knowledge of modern ,german works on ,aesthetik4 ,but ,i may observe that the section of ,ltze's history of ,german works on the subject devoted to ,hegel's ,philosophy of ,fine ,art appears to me by no means equal in ability to other portions of the work4 ,the aim of the author appears rather that of proving that his own researches occupy a ground wholly unoccupied by ,hegel than of defining with any completeness the ground actually appropriated by ,hegel4 ,footnote #aa3 ,life of ,hegel1 p4 #aaj4 ,footnote #ab3 ,the most authoritative introduction to the study of the ,hegelian standpoint for ,english readers is1 of course1 the late ,professor ,wallace's ,prolegomena to his translation of the lesser ,logic1 and the introduction to his translation of the ,philosophy of ,mind4 ,,contents ,,of ,,vol4 ,i ,,translator',s ,,preface ,,introduction ,i4 ,the ,limits of ,aesthetic defined1 and certain ,objections against the ,philosophy of ,art refuted 7a7 ,aesthetic confined to ,beauty of ,art 7b7 ,is ,art unworthy of scientific consideration8 7c7 ,or at least is it incapable of truly philosophical exposition8 ,negative answer to both these questions ,,ii4 ,scientific ,methods which apply to the ,beautiful and ,art #a4 ,the ,empirical ,method #b4 ,abstract ,reflection #c4 ,the ,philosophical ,idea of artistic ,beauty1 that is1 the notional concept thereof1 provisionally defined ,,iii4 ,the ,notion of the ,beauty of ,art ,observations upon the ordinary ideas about ,art #a4 ,the art-work is a creation of human activity 7a7 ,theory of imitation of ,art by rule 7b7 ,art as direct inspiration 7c7 ,the rank of ,art relatively to ,nature 7d7 ,the nature of the human ,art-impulse #b4 ,the art-work is addressed to human sense 7a7 ,theory that its object is to excite feeling 7b7 ,the nature of artistic taste 7c7 ,the nature of art-scholarship as contrasted with artistic taste 7d7 ,the more philosophical consequences of the fact that ,art appeals to sense and requires a sensuous medium for its expression #c4 ,the ,end or ,interest of ,art 7a7 ,is it imitation of ,nature8 7b7 ,is the end or content identical with the dictum1 ,humani nihil a me alienum1 etc4 7c7 ,how far it is a mitigation or purification of the passions 7d7 ,the higher object of ,art which consists in its revelation of truth in itself ,,iv4 ,historical ,deduction of the true ,notion of ,art #a4 ,the philosophy of ,kant 7a7 ,feeling of aesthetic satisfaction not appetitive 7b7 ,beauty an object of universal satisfaction 7c7 ,teleological aspect of the ,beautiful 7d7 ,pleasure in the ,beautiful necessary1 though felt #b4 ,schiller1 ,winckelmann1 and ,schelling #c4 ,irony ,v4 ,division of the ,subject #a4 ,inquiry as to the mode under which the divisions of the subject arise from the notional concept of ,beauty #b4 ,part ,i4 ,the ,ideal #c4 ,part ,,ii4 ,the particular general types of ,beauty 7a7 ,the ,symbolic type of ,art 7b7 ,the ,classical type of ,art 7c7 ,the ,romantic type of ,art #d4 ,part ,,iii4 ,the specific arts 7a7 ,architecture 7b7 ,sculpture 7c7 ,romantic art1 which includes 77 ,painting 77 ,music 77 ,poetry #e4 ,conclusion ,,first ,,part ,,the ,,idea ,,of ,,the ,,beauty ,,of ,,art ,,or ,,the ,,ideal ,the ,position of ,art relatively to finite ,reality1 ,religion1 and ,philosophy 7a7 ,theory that the ,beautiful is no intelligible object of thought 7b7 ,the relation of the human reason to ,nature both empirically and speculatively 7c7 ,the realm of ,fine ,art that of the ,absolute ,spirit 7d7 ,how far ,art responds to a genuine spiritual want in man 7e7 ,the truth which forms the content of art1 religion1 and philosophy differs only in the modes under which it is presented ,,chapter ,i ,,the ,,notion ,,of ,,the ,,beautiful ,,in ,,general #a4 ,the ,idea 7a7 ,the ,idea is concrete1 not abstract 7b7 ,objectivity is the real existence of the notion1 and the means whereby it is actualized 7c7 ,the ,idea is the harmonized totality of the two aspects #b4 ,the ,determinate ,existence of the ,idea #c4 ,the ,idea of the ,beautiful 7a7 ,not apprehended alone by the faculty of the understanding1 or the finite categories 7b7 ,the nature of finite or abstract apprehension and practical volition considered 7c7 ,the object of beauty resolves and the one-sidedness of both standpoints in a free and infinite totality ,,chapter ,,ii ,,the ,,beauty ,,of ,,nature ,a4 ,the ,beauty of ,nature as such #a4 ,the ,idea as ,life 7a7 ,the first mode under which the notion is in ,nature asserted as objectivity is that of physical matter1 the ideal unity whereof is not found as ideality 7b7 ,a further step is the integration of natural objects under a unified system1 as the solar system 7c7 ,the third mode is that of organic ,life4 ,this alone is a determinate existence of the ,idea #b4 ,the animated life of ,nature as ,beauty 7a7 ,the motion of life considered in relation to the conception of beauty 7b7 ,the nature of organic unity1 and the degree it contributes to the beauty of an object 7c7 ,the inward unity of soul-life and the degree it contributes to the correlation of parts of an organism1 or is asserted in external form to our senses rather than our reflection #c4 ,modes under which the beauty of ,nature is investigated 7a7 ,where the form is immediately in the materia as its essence or conformative energy1 as in crystals1 or more concretely as the informing soul through the living organism 7b7 ,mobility in animals as a test of their apparent beauty 7c7 ,self-conscious life the culminating mode ,b4 ,the external ,beauty of abstract ,form viewed as ,uniformity1 ,symmetry1 ,conformity to ,rule1 and ,harmony4 ,also ,beauty regarded generally as abstract unity of the ,sensuous ,material ,c4 ,the ,defective ,aspects of the ,beauty of ,nature #a4 ,the ,inward principle in its immediacy as merely such inwardness 7a7 ,immediate singularity as conserved in the purely animal organism 7b7 ,of the nature of the contrast between the above and the human body 7c7 ,social organizations viewed in such particularized immediacy1 and the defects they betray as such external totalities #b4 ,the ,dependence of particular existence as viewed in its immediate singularity 7a7 ,the dependence of animal life upon its natural environment 7b7 ,the nature of a similar dependence in the case of the human organism 7c7 ,the dependence of human souls1 or spiritual interests1 on the prose-life of ordinary existence #c4 ,the limitations implied by such conditions 7a7 ,the restriction of species in the animal world1 and of the social condition as it affects human individuality 7b7 ,the limitation of racial division1 or of particular families1 or particular professions1 and the effect of such upon the aspect of beauty 7c7 ,it is the very defects of this finite plane of reality1 which stimulates man to recover the vision of his freedom in ,art ,,chapter ,,iii ,,the ,,beauty ,,of ,,art ,,or ,,the ,,ideal ,a4 ,the ,ideal as such #a4 ,individuality which partakes of ,beauty4 7a7 ,the nature of the conditions under which ,art can express a profound and infinite spiritual content 7b7 ,what ,art rejects from natural embodiment in order to effect this revelation1 which is also a purification 7c7 ,this referring back of external form to spirituality1 or inwardness1 issuing in harmonious individuality1 is the very nature of the ,ideal 77 ,the blythe serenity of antique art 77 ,the treatment of emotion by romantic art 77 ,irony #b4 ,the ,ideal relatively to ,nature 7a7 ,the formal ideality of a work of art1 i4e41 the element of poetry therein 7b7 ,the creative faculty contrasted with ,nature in its power to grasp ideal significance1 with illustrations of this power 7c7 ,the nature of this spiritual recreation of natural fact by ,art originating in the energy of mind4 ,illustration with the example of ,dutch art in its genre painting1 also with that of portraiture and classical art ,b4 ,the ,determinate ,character of the ,ideal ,i4 ,ideal determinacy as such #a4 ,thought apart from the plastic material can only comprehend the ,divine in its universality and unity4 ,mohammedan and ,hebrew art #b4 ,the polytheistic aspect of ,hellenic art considered1 as also ,christian art #c4 ,the relation of the arts of painting and sculpture to the latter4 ,the transition from the principle of spiritual repose to that of development and conflict ,,ii4 ,the ,action #a4 ,the universal ,world-condition 7a7 77 ,the self-subsistency of such a condition as a necessary prius of the embodiment of the ,ideal 77 ,the nature of the reality adapted to artistic treatment as contrasted with what is not so adapted4 ,the fixed order of the ,state as contrasted with conditions most favourable to free individuality 77 ,further examination of contrast in relation to judicial functions and the ideas of punishment or revenge as we find it in the heroic age4 ,the reappearance of an analogous condition in the ,middle ,ages 7b7 ,modern prosaic life the condition most favourable to the private or personal life as an object of interest 7c7 ,resistance by individual poets to this process of social change4 ,the permanent demand for the heroic #b4 ,the ,situation 7a7 ,the situation that is devoid of situation 7b7 ,the situation as defined in its harmlessness or absence of further conflict 77 ,the movement from pure tranquillity to movement or expression4 ,illustrations from classical art 77 ,movement as related to externality4 ,the initial stage of action4 ,greek sculpture 77 ,situation in movement presented as an opportunity to further expression4 ,illustrations from poetry 7c7 ,the ,collision 77 ,collisions which arise from wholly material conditions4 ,only of artistic interest as a consequence of natural misfortune4 ,illustrations 77 ,spiritual collisions dependent on natural conditions4 ,classified and illustrated4 77 ,the above only form the starting-point of the collision of the essential forces of spiritual life4 ,the third and most important type is the collision caused by the disruption of ,spirit alone4 ,illustrations #c4 ,the ,action 7a7 ,the universal forces operative in the action4 77 ,these forces are the eternally paramount religious and ethical modes of relationship1 such as family1 fatherland1 church1 friendship1 status1 honour1 and love4 ,they are children of the one absolute ,idea4 ,illustration of their contention 77 ,they must not act in discord with the main action4 ,the position of evil powers as confronting them1 and its treatment by classic and modern poetry 77 ,such forces must appear in ,art as embodied in particular personalities4 ,contrast between ancient and modern art in this respect 7b7 ,the individuals concerned in the action 77 ,the relations between gods and men in classical art1 and that between the ,divine and the human in ,christian art ,pathos considered in its relation to various modes of art 7c7 ,character 77 ,viewed as co-extensive or self-coherent individuality1 relatively1 that is1 to the intrinsic wealth it connotes4 ,illustrations 77 ,viewed relatively to the particular form under which it is bound to appear 77 ,viewed as a concrete unity coalescing wholly with its determinate form and as assured character4 ,illustrations classified in their stability and lack of such ,,iii4 ,the ,external ,determination of the ,ideal4 #a4 ,the abstract ,externality as such4 7a7 ,spatiality1 ,uniformity1 ,figure1 ,time1 and ,colour4 77 ,how far such contribute to artistic production 77 ,the necessity of clear articulation of form and tone considered #b4 ,the ,coalescence of the concrete ,ideal with its external ,reality 77 ,the bond of unity regarded as no positive reality1 but as a mysterious or secret connection4 ,the relation of external ,nature to the work of art4 ,the ,homeric poems contrasted with the ,niebelungenlied in this respect 7b7 ,where the unity is expressly due to human activity and human adaptation of means to ends 77 ,the use made by man of ornament or of anything used for mere show1 e4g41 precious metals for statuary 77 ,the question how far objects used for practical purposes are suited for art4 ,the idyllic1 civilized and heroic condition compared in the degree they are thus adapted 77 ,the spiritual environment itself in social institutions1 etc41 regarded in its relation to ideal character #c4 ,the ,externality of a work of ,art in relation to a ,public 7a7 ,what is implied in the assertion by the artist of the particular culture of his own times8 7b7 ,what may be regarded as truth when the reference is to a ,past1 either in an exclusive or objective sense8 7c7 ,what may still be regarded as valid in truth though the matter be appropriated from a time and nationality foreign to the artist8 ,all three questions discussed and illustrated ,c4 ,the ,artist #a4 ,imagination1 ,genius1 and ,inspiration #b4 ,the objective character of the artistic presentation #c4 ,manner1 ,style1 and ,originality4 ,,the ,,philosophy ,,of ,,fine ,,art ,,introduction ,i ,the present inquiry#a has for its subject-matter ,aesthetic4 ,it is a subject co-extensive with the entire realm of the beautiful2 more specifically described1 its province is that of ,art1 or rather1 we should say1 of ,fine ,art4 ,for a subject-matter such as this the term ,aesthetic is no doubt not entirely appropriate1 for ,aesthetic denotes more accurately the science of the senses or emotion4 ,it came by its origins as a science1 or rather as something that to start with purported to be a branch of philosophy1 during the period of the school of ,wolff1 in other words when works of art were generally regarded in ,germany with reference to the feelings they were calculated to evoke1 as1 for example1 the feelings of pleasure1 admiration1 fear1 pity1 and so forth4 ,it is owing to the unsuitability or1 more strictly speaking1 the superficiality of this term that the attempt has been made by some to apply the name ,callistic to this science4 ,yet this also is clearly insufficient inasmuch as the science here referred to does not investigate beauty in its general signification1 but the beauty of art pure and simple4 ,for this reason we shall accommodate ourselves to the term ,aesthetic1 all the more so as the mere question of nomenclature is for ourselves a matter of indifference4 ,it has as such been provisionally accepted in ordinary speech1 and we cannot do better than retain it4 ,the term1 however1 which fully expresses our science is ,philosophy of ,art1 and1 with still more precision1 ,philosophy of ,fine ,art4 7a7 ,in virtue of this expression we at once exclude the beauty of ,nature from the scientific exposition of ,fine ,art4 ,such a limitation of our subject may very well appear from a certain point of view as an arbitrary boundary line1 similar to that which every science is entitled to fix in the demarcation of its subject-matter4 ,we must not1 however1 understand the limitation of ,aesthetic to the beauty of art in this sense4 ,we are accustomed1 no doubt1 in ordinary life to speak of a beautiful colour1 a beautiful heaven1 a beautiful stream1 to say nothing of beautiful flowers1 animals1 and1 above all1 of beautiful human beings4 ,without entering now into the disputed question how far the quality of beauty can justly be predicated of such objects1 and consequently the beauty of ,nature comes generally into competition with that of art1 we are justified in maintaining categorically that the beauty of art stands higher than ,nature4 ,for the beauty of art is a beauty begotten1 a new birth of mind#b2 and to the extent that ,spirit and its creations stand higher than ,nature and its phenomena1 to that extent the beauty of art is more exalted than the beauty of ,nature4 ,indeed1 if we regard the matter in its formal aspect1 that is to say1 according to the way it is there1 any chance fancy that passes through any one's head#c1 is of higher rank than any product of ,nature4 ,for in every case intellectual conception and freedom are inseparable from such a conceit4 ,in respect to content the sun appears to us an absolutely necessary constituent of actual fact1 while the perverse fancy passes away as something accidental and evanescent4 ,none the less in its own independent being a natural existence such as the sun possesses no power of self-differentiation2 it is neither essentially free nor self-aware2 and1 if we regard it in its necessary cohesion with other things1 we do not regard it independently for its own sake1 and consequently not as beautiful4 ,merely to maintain1 in a general way1 that mind and the beauty of art which originates therefrom stand higher than the beauty of ,nature is no doubt to establish next to nothing4 ,the expression higher is obviously entirely indefinite2 it still indicates the beauty of ,nature and art as standing juxtaposed in the field of conception1 and emphasizes the difference as a quantitative and accordingly external difference4 ,but in predicating of mind and its artistic beauty a higher place in contrast to ,nature1 we do not denote a distinction which is merely relative4 ,mind1 and mind alone1 is pervious to truth1 comprehending all in itself1 so that all which is beautiful can only be veritably beautiful as partaking in this higher sphere and as begotten of the same4 ,regarded under this point of view it is only a reflection of the beauty appertinent to mind1 that is1 we have it under an imperfect and incomplete mode1 and one whose substantive being is already contained in the mind itself4 ,and apart from this we shall find the restriction to the beauty of art only natural1 for in so far as the beauties of ,nature may have come under discussion--a rarer occurrence among ancient writers than among ourselves--yet at least it has occurred to no one to insist emphatically on the beauty of natural objects to the extent of proposing a science1 or systematic exposition of such beauties4 ,it is true that the point of view of utility has been selected for such exclusive treatment4 ,we have1 for example1 the conception of a science of natural objects in so far as they are useful in the conflict with diseases1 in other words a description of minerals1 chemical products1 plants1 animals1 which subserve the art of healing4 ,we do not find any analogous exploitation and consideration of the realm of ,nature in its aspect of beauty4 ,in the case of natural beauty we are too keenly conscious that we are dealing with an indefinite subject-matter destitute of any real criterion4 ,it is for this reason that such an effort of comparison would carry with it too little interest to justify the attempt4 ,these preliminary observations over beauty in ,nature and art1 over the relation of both1 and the exclusion of the first-mentioned from the province of our real subject-matter are intended to disabuse us of the notion that the limitation of our science is simply a question of capricious selection4 ,we have1 however1 not reached the point where a demonstration of this fact is feasible for the reason that such an investigation falls within the limits of our science itself1 and it is therefore only at a later stage that we can either discuss or prove the same4 ,assuming1 however1 that we have1 by way of prelude1 limited our inquiry to the beauty of art1 we are merely by this first step involved in fresh difficulties4 7b7 ,what must first of all occur to us is the question whether ,fine ,art in itself is truly susceptible to a scientific treatment4 ,it is a simple fact that beauty and art pervade all the affairs of life like some friendly genius1 and embellish with their cheer all our surroundings1 mental no less than material4 ,they alleviate the strenuousness of such relations1 the varied changes of actual life2 they banish the tedium of our existence with their entertainment2 and where nothing really worth having is actually achieved1 it is at least an advantage that they occupy the place of actual vice4 ,yet while art prevails on all sides with its pleasing shapes1 from the crude decorations of savage tribes up to the splendours of the sacred shrine adorned with every conceivable beauty of design1 none the less such shapes themselves appear to fall outside the real purposes of life1 and even where the imaginative work of art is not impervious to such serious objects1 nay1 rather at times even appear to assist them1 to the extent at least of removing what is evil to a distance1 yet for all that art essentially belongs to the relaxation and recreation of spiritual life1 whereas its substantive interests rather make a call upon its strained energy4 ,on such grounds an attempt to treat that which on its own account is not of a serious character with all the gravity of scientific exposition may very possibly appear to be unsuitable and pedantic4 ,in any case from such a point of view art appears a superfluity if contrasted with the essential needs and interests of life1 even assuming that the softening of the soul which a preoccupation with the beauty of objects is capable of producing1 does not actually prove injurious in its effeminate influence upon the serious quality of those practical interests4 ,owing to this fundamental assumption that they are a luxury it has often appeared necessary to undertake the defence of the fine arts relatively to the necessities of practical life1 and in particular relatively to morality and piety2 and inasmuch as this harmlessness is incapable of demonstration1 the idea has been at least to make it appear credible1 that this luxury of human experience contributes a larger proportion of advantages than disadvantages4 ,in this respect serious aims have been attributed to art1 and in many quarters it has been commended as a mediator between reason and sensuous associations1 between private inclinations and duty1 personified in short as a reconciler of these forces in the strenuous conflict and opposition which this antagonism generates4 ,but it is just conceivable#d that1 even assuming the presence of such aims with all their indubitably greater seriousness1 neither reason nor duty come by much profit from such mediation1 for the simple reason that they are incapable by their very nature of any such interfusion or compromise1 demanding throughout the same purity which they intrinsically possess4 ,and we might add that art does not become in any respect more worthy thereby of scientific discussion1 inasmuch as it remains still on two sides a menial1 that is1 subservient to idleness and frivolity1 if also to objects of more elevated character4 ,in such service1 moreover1 it can at most merely appear as a means instead of being an object for its own sake4 ,and1 in conclusion1 assuming that art is a means1 it still invariably labours under the formal defect1 that so far as it in fact is subservient to more serious objects1 and produces results of like nature1 the means which actually brings this about is deception4 ,for beauty is made vital in the appearance#e4 ,now it can hardly be denied that aims which are true and serious ought not to be achieved by deception2 and though such an effect is here and there secured by this means1 such ought only to be the case in a restricted degree2 and even in the exceptional case we are not justified in regarding deception as the right means4 ,for the means ought to correspond with the dignity of the aim4 ,neither semblance nor deception1 but only what is itself real and true1 possesses a title to create what is real and true4 ,just in the same way science has to investigate the true interests of the mind in accordance with the actual process of the real world and the manner of conceiving it as we actually find it4 ,we may possibly conclude from the above grounds that the art of beauty is unworthy of philosophical examination4 ,it is after all1 it may be said1 only a pleasant pastime1 and1 though we may admit more serious aims are also in its purview1 nevertheless it is essentially opposed to such aims in their seriousness4 ,it is at the most merely the servant of specific amusements no less than the exceptional serious objects1 and for the medium of its existence as also for the means of its operations can merely avail itself of deception and show4 ,but yet further in the second place1 it is a still more plausible contention that even supposing fine art to be compatible generally with philosophical disquisition1 none the less it would form no really adequate subject-matter for scientific enquiry in the strict sense4 ,for the beauty of art is presented to sense1 feeling1 perception1 and imagination3 its field is not that of thought1 and the comprehension of its activity and its creations demands another faculty than that of the scientific intelligence4 ,furthermore1 what we enjoy in artistic beauty is just the freedom of its creative and plastic activity4 ,in the production and contemplation of these we appear to escape the principle of rule and system4 ,in the creations of art we seek for an atmosphere of repose and animation as some counterpoise to the austerity of the realm of law and the sombre self-concentration of thought2 we seek for blithe and powerful reality in exchange for the shadow-world of the ,idea4 ,and1 last of all1 the free activity of the imagination is the source of the fair works of art1 which in this world of the mind are even more free than ,nature is herself4 ,not only has art at its service the entire wealth of natural form in all their superabundant variety1 but the creative imagination is able inexhaustibly to extend the realm of form by its own productions and modifications4 ,in the presence of such an immeasurable depth of inspired creation and its free products1 it may not unreasonably be supposed that thought will lose the courage to apprehend such in their apparent range1 to pronounce its verdict thereon1 and to appropriate such beneath its universal formulae4 ,science1 on the other hand1 everyone must admit1 is formally bound to occupy itself with thinking which abstracts from the mass of particulars3 and for this very reason1 from one point of view1 the imagination and its contingency and caprice1 in other words the organ of artistic activity and enjoyment1 is excluded from it4 ,on the other hand1 when art gives joyous animation to just this gloomy and arid dryness of the notion1 bringing its abstractions and divisions into reconciliation with concrete fact1 supplementing with its detail what is wanting to the notion in this respect1 even in that case a purely contemplative reflection simply removes once more all that has been added1 does away with it1 conducting the notion once again to that simplicity denuded of positive reality which belongs to it and its shadowland of abstraction4 ,it is also a possible contention that science in respect to content is concerned with what is essentially necessary4 ,if our science of ,aesthetic places on one side natural beauty1 not merely have we apparently made no advance1 but rather separated ourselves yet further from what is necessary4 ,the expression ,nature implies from the first the ideas of necessity and uniformity1 that is to say a constitution which gives every expectation of its proximity and adaptability to scientific inquiry4 ,in mental operations generally1 and most of all in the imagination1 if contrasted in this respect with ,nature1 caprice and superiority to every kind of formal restriction1 caprice1 it is here assumed1 is uniquely in its right place1 and these at once put out of court the basis of a scientific inquiry4 ,from each and all these points of view consequently1 in its origin1 that is to say1 in its effect and in its range1 fine art1 so far from proving itself fitted for scientific effort1 rather appears fundamentally to resist the regulative principle of thought1 and to be ill-adapted for exact scientific discussion4 ,difficulties of this kind1 and others like them1 which have been raised in respect to a thoroughly scientific treatment of fine art have been borrowed from current ideas1 points of view1 and reflection1 the more systematic expansion of which we may read ad nauseam in previous literature1 in particular ,french literature1 upon the subject of beauty and the fine arts4 ,such contain to some extent facts which have their justification2 in fact1 elaborate arguments#f are deduced therefrom1 which also are not without their tincture of apparent plausibility4 ,in this way1 for instance1 there is the fact that the configuration of beauty is as multifold as the phenomenon of beauty is of universal extension2 from which we may conclude1 if we care to do so1 that a universal impulse towards beauty is enclosed in our common nature1 and may yet further conceivably infer1 that because the conceptions of beauty are so countless in their variety and withal are obviously something particular1 it is impossible to secure laws of universal validity either relatively to beauty or our taste for it4 ,before turning away from such theories to the subject1 as we ourselves conceive it1 it will be a necessary and preliminary task to discuss the questions and objections raised above4 ,first1 as to the worthiness of art to form the object of scientific inquiry1 it is no doubt the case that art can be utilized as a mere pastime in the service of pleasure and entertainment1 either in the embellishment of our surroundings1 the imprinting of a delight-giving surface to the external conditions of life1 or the emphasis placed by decoration on other objects4 ,in these respects it is unquestionably no independent or free art1 but an art subservient to certain objects4 ,the kind of art1 however1 which we ourselves propose to examine is one which is free in its aim and its means4 ,that art in general can serve other objects1 and even be merely a pastime1 is a relation which it possesses in common with thought itself4 ,from one point of view thought likewise1 as science subservient to other ends1 can be used in just the same way for finite purposes and means as they chance to crop up1 and as such serviceable faculty of science is not self-determined1 but determined by something alien to it4 ,but1 further1 as distinct from such subservience to particular objects1 science is raised of its own essential resources in free independence to truth1 and exclusively united with its own aims in discovering the true fulfillment in that truth4 ,fine art is not art in the true sense of the term until it is also thus free1 and its highest function is only then satisfied when it has established itself in a sphere which it shares with religion1 and philosophy1 becoming thereby merely one mode and form through which the ,divine1 the profoundest interests of mankind1 and spiritual truths of widest range1 art brought home to consciousness and expressed4 ,it is in works of art that nations have deposited the richest intuitions and ideas they possess2 and not infrequently fine art supplies a key of interpretation to the wisdom and religion of peoples2 in the case of many it is the only one4 ,this is an attribute which art shares in common with religion and philosophy1 the peculiar distinction in the case of art being that its presentation of the most exalted subject-matter is in sensuous form1 thereby bringing them nearer to ,nature and her mode of envisagement1 that is closer to our sensitive and emotional life4 ,the world1 into the profundity of which thought penetrates1 is a supersensuous one1 a world which to start with is posited as a ,beyond in contrast to the immediacy of ordinary conscious life and present sensation4 ,it is the freedom of reflecting consciousness which disengages itself from this immersion in the this side1 or immediacy1 in other words sensuous reality and finitude4 ,but the mind is able1 too1 to heal the fracture which is thus created in its progression4 ,from the wealth of its own resources it brings into being the works of fine art as the primary bond of mediation between that which is exclusively external1 sensuous and transitory1 and the medium of pure thought1 between ,nature and its finite reality1 and the infinite freedom of a reason which comprehends4 ,now it was objected that the element#g of art was1 if we view it as a whole1 of an unworthy character1 inasmuch as it consisted of appearance and deceptions inseparable from such4 ,such a contention would of course be justifiable1 if we were entitled to assume that appearance had no locus standi#h at all4 ,an appearance or show is1 however1 essential to actuality4 ,there could be no such thing as truth if it did not appear1 or1 rather1 let itself appear#i1 were it not further true for some one thing or person1 for itself as also for spirit4 ,consequently it cannot be appearance in general against which such an objection can be raised1 but the particular mode of its manifestation under which art makes actual what is essentially real and true4 ,if1 then1 the appearance1 in the medium of which art gives determinate existence to its creations1 be defined as deception1 such an objection is in the first instance intelligible if we compare it with the external world of a phenomena1 and its immediate relation to ourselves as material substance1 or view it relatively to our own world of emotions1 that is our inward sensuous life4 ,both these are worlds to which in our everyday life1 the life1 that is1 of visible experience1 we are accustomed to attach the worth and name of reality1 actuality and truth as contrasted with that of art1 which fails to possess such reality as we suppose4 ,now it is just this entire sphere of the empirical world1 whether on its personal side or its objective side1 which we ought rather to call in a stricter sense than when we apply the term to the world of art1 merely a show or appearance1 and an even more unyielding form of deception4 ,it is only beyond the immediacy of emotional life and that world of external objects that we shall discover reality in any true sense of the term4 ,nothing is actually real but that which is actual in its own independent right and substance#aj1 that which is at once of the substance of ,nature and of mind1 which1 while it is actually here in present and determinate existence1 yet retains under such limitation an essential and self-concentred being1 and only in virtue of such is truly real4 ,the predominance of these universal powers is precisely that which art accentuates and manifests4 ,in the external and soul-world of ordinary experience we have also no doubt this essence of actuality1 but in the chaotic congeries of particular detail1 encumbered by the immediacy of sensuous envisagement1 and every kind of caprice of condition1 event1 character1 and so forth4 ,now it is just the show and deception of this false and evanescent world which art disengages from the veritable significance of phenomena to which we have referred1 implanting in the same a reality of more exalted rank born of mind4 ,the phenomena of art therefore are not merely not appearance and nothing more2 we are justified in ascribing to them1 as contrasted with the realities of our ordinary life1 an actually higher reality and more veritable existence4 ,to as little extent are the representations of art a deceptive appearance as compared with the assumed truer delineations of historical writing4 ,for immediate existence also does not belong to historical writing4 ,it only possesses the intellectual appearance of the same as the medium of its delineations1 and its content remains charged with the entire contingent materia of ordinary reality and its events1 developments and personalities1 whereas the work of art brings us face to face with the eternal powers paramount in history with this incidental association of the immediate sensuous present and its unstable appearance expunged4 ,if1 however1 it is in contrast with philosophic thought and religious and ethical principles1 that the mode of appearance of the shapes of art1 is described as a deception1 there is certainly this in support of the view that the mode of revelation attained by a content in the realm of thought is the truest reality4 ,in comparison1 nevertheless1 with the appearance of immediate sensuous existence and that of historical narration1 the show of art possesses the advantage that1 in its own virtue1 it points beyond itself1 directing us to a somewhat spiritual1 which it seeks to envisage to the conceptive mind4 ,immediate appearance1 on the contrary1 does not give itself out to be thus illusive1 but rather to be the true and real1 though as a matter of fact such truth is contaminated and obstructed by the immediately sensuous medium4 ,the hard rind of ,nature and the everyday world offer more difficulty to the mind in breaking through to the ,idea than do the products of art4 ,but if from this particular point of view we place art thus highly1 we must not1 on the other hand1 fail to remember that neither in respect to content or form is art either the highest or most absolute mode of bringing the true interests of our spiritual life to consciousness4 ,the very form of art itself is sufficient to limit it to a definite content4 ,it is only a particular sphere and grade of truth which is capable of being reproduced in the form of a work of art4 ,such truth must have the power in its own determinate character to go out freely into sensuous shape and remain adequate to itself therein1 if it is to be the genuine content of art1 as is the case1 for example1 with the gods of ,greece4 ,on the other hand there is a profounder grasp of truth1 in which the form is no longer on such easy and friendly terms with the sensuous material as to be adequately accepted and expressed by that medium4 ,of such a type is the ,christian conception of truth2 and above all it is the prevailing spirit of our modern world1 or1 more strictly1 of our religion and our intellectual culture1 which have passed beyond the point at which art is the highest mode under which the absolute is brought home to human consciousness4 ,the type peculiar to art-production and its products fails any longer to satisfy man's highest need4 ,we are beyond the stage of reverence for works of art as divine and objects deserving our worship4 ,the impression they produce is one of a more reflective#aa kind1 and the emotions which they arouse require a higher test and a further verification4 ,thought and reflection have taken their flight above fine art4 ,to those who are fond of complaint and grumbling such a condition of things may be held as a form of decadence2 it may be ascribed to the obsession of passion and selfish interests1 which scare away the seriousness of art no less than its blithesomeness4 ,or we may find the fault to lie in the exigencies of the present day1 the complex conditions of social and political life1 which prevent the soul1 entangled as it is in microscopic interests1 from securing its freedom in the nobler objects of art1 a condition1 too1 in which the intelligence itself becomes a menial to such trifling wants and the interests they excite in sciences1 which subserve objects of a like nature1 and are seduced into the voluntary exile of such a wilderness4 ,but however we may explain the fact it certainly is the case that ,art is no longer able to discover that satisfaction of spiritual wants1 which previous epochs and nations have sought for in it and exclusively found in it1 a satisfaction which1 at least on the religious side1 was associated with art in the most intimate way4 ,the fair days of ,greek art1 as also the golden time of the later middle ages1 are over4 ,the reflective culture of our life of to-day makes it inevitable1 both relatively to our volitional power and our judgment1 that we adhere strictly to general points of view1 and regulate particular matters in consonance with them1 so that universal forms1 laws1 duties1 rights1 and maxims hold valid as the determining basis of our life and the force within of main importance4 ,what is demanded for artistic interest as also for artistic creation is1 speaking in general terms1 a vital energy1 in which the universal is not present as law and maxim1 but is operative in union with the soul and emotions1 just as also1 in the imagination1 what is universal and rational is enclosed only as brought into unity with a concrete sensuous phenomenon4 ,for this reason the present time is not1 if we review its conditions in their widest range1 favourable to art4 ,and with regard to the executive artist himself it is not merely that reflection on every side1 which will insist on utterance1 owing to the universal habit of critical opinion and judgment1 leads him astray from his art and infects his mind with a like desire to accumulate abstract thought in his creations2 rather the entire spiritual culture of the times is of such a nature that he himself stands within a world thus disposed to reflection and the conditions it presupposes1 and1 do what he may1 he cannot release himself either by his wish or his power of decision from their influence1 neither can he by means of exceptional education1 or a removal from the ordinary conditions of life1 conjure up for himself and secure a solitude capable of replacing all that is lost4 ,in all these respects art is and remains for us1 on the side1 of its highest possibilities1 a thing of the past4 ,herein it has further lost its genuine truth and life1 and is rather transported to our world of ideas than is able to maintain its former necessity and its superior place in reality4 ,what is now stimulated in us by works of art is1 in addition to the fact of immediate enjoyment1 our judgment4 ,in other words we subject the content1 and the means of presentation of the work of art1 and the suitability and unsuitability of both1 to the contemplation of our thought4 ,a science of art is therefore a far more urgent necessity in our own days than in times in which art as art sufficed by itself alone to give complete satisfaction4 ,we are invited by art to contemplate it reflectively1 not1 that is to say1 with the object of recreating such art#ab1 but in order to ascertain scientifically its nature4 ,in doing our best to accept such an invitation we are confronted with the objection already adverted to1 that even assuming that art is a subject adapted for philosophical investigation in a general way1 yet it unquestionably is not so adapted to the systematic procedure of science4 ,such an objection1 however1 implies to start with the false notion that we can have a philosophical inquiry which is at the same time unscientific4 ,in reply to such a point ,i can only here state summarily my opinion1 that whatever ideas other people may have of philosophy and philosophizing1 ,i myself conceive philosophical inquiry of any sort or kind to be inseparable from the methods of science4 ,the function of philosophy is to examine subject-matter in the light of the principle of necessity1 not1 it is true1 merely in accordance with its subjective#ac necessity or external co-ordination1 classification1 and so forth2 it has rather to unfold and demonstrate the object under review out of the necessity of its own intimate nature4 ,until this essential process is made explicit the scientific quality of such an inquiry is absent4 ,in so far1 however1 as the objective necessity of an object subsists essentially in its logical and metaphysical nature the isolated examination of art may in such a case1 at any rate1 or rather inevitably1 must be carried forward with a certain relaxation of scientific stringency4 ,for art is based upon many assumptions1 part of which relate to its content1 part to its material or conceptive#ad medium1 in virtue of which art is never far from the borders of contingency and caprice4 ,consequently it is only relatively to the essential and ideal progression of its content and its means of expression that we are able to recall with advantage the formative principle of its necessity#ae4 ,the objection that works of fine art defy the examination of scientific thought1 because they originate in the unregulated world of imagination and temperament1 and assert their effect exclusively on the emotions and the fancy with a complexity and variety which defies exact analysis1 raises a difficulty which still carries genuine weight behind it#af4 ,as a matter of fact the beauty of art does appear in a form which is expressly to be contrasted with abstract thought1 a form which it is compelled to disturb in order to exercise its own activity in its own way4 ,such a result is simply a corollary of the thesis that reality anywhere and everywhere1 whether the life of ,nature or mind1 is defaced and slain by its comprehension2 that so far from being brought more close to us by the comprehension of thinking1 it is only by this means that it is in the complete sense removed apart from us1 so that in his attempt to grasp through thought as a means the nature of life1 man rather renders nugatory this very aim4 ,an exhaustive discussion of the subject is here impossible2 we propose merely to indicate the point of view from which the removal of this difficulty or impossibility and incompatibility might be effected4 ,it will at least be readily admitted that mind is capable of self-contemplation1 and of possessing a consciousness1 and indeed one that implies a power of thought co-extensive with itself and everything which originates from itself4 ,it is1 in fact1 precisely thought1 the process of thinking1 which constitutes the most intimate and essential nature of mind4 ,it is in this thinking-consciousness over itself and its products1 despite all the freedom and caprice such may otherwise and indeed must invariably possess--assuming only mind or spirit to be veritably pregnant therein--that mind exhibits the activity congenial to its essential nature4 ,art and the creations of art1 being works which originate in and are begotten of the spirit1 are themselves stamped with the hall-mark of spirit1 even though the mode of its presentation accept for its own the phenomenal guise of sensuous reality1 permeating as it does the sensuous substance with intelligence4 ,viewed in this light art is placed from the first nearer to spirit and its thought than the purely external and unintelligent ,nature4 ,in the products of art mind is exclusively dealing with that which is its own4 ,and although works of art are not thought and notion simply as such1 but an evolution of the notion out of itself1 an alienation of the same in the direction of sensuous being1 yet for all that the might of the thinking spirit is discovered not merely in its ability to grasp itself in its most native form as pure thinking1 but also1 and as completely1 to recognize itself in its self-divestment in the medium of emotion and the sensuous1 to retain the grasp of itself in that other which it transforms but is not1 transmuting the alien factor into thought-expression1 and by so doing recovering it to itself4 ,and moreover in this active and frequent relation to that other than itself the reflective mind is not in any way untrue to itself4 ,we have here no oblivion or surrender of itself2 neither is it so impotent as to be unable to comprehend what is differentiated from that other#ag2 what it actually does is to grasp in the notion both itself and its opposite4 ,for the notion is the universal1 which maintains itself in its particularizations1 which covers in its grasp both itself and its other1 and consequently contains the power and energy to cancel the very alienation into which it passes4 ,for this reason the work of art1 in which thought divests itself of itself#ah1 belongs to the realm of comprehending thought2 and mind1 by subjecting it#ai to scientific contemplation1 thereby simply satisfies its most essential nature4 ,for inasmuch as thought is its essence and notion1 it can only ultimately find such a satisfaction after passing all the products of its activity through the alembic of rational thought1 and in this way making them for the first time in very truth part of its own substance4 ,but though art1 as we shall eventually see with yet more distinctness1 is far indeed from being the highest form of mind1 it is only in the philosophy of art that it comes into all that it may justly claim4 ,in the same way art is not debarred from a philosophical inquiry by reason of its unregulated caprice4 ,as already intimated1 it is its true function to bring to consciousness the highest interests of mind4 ,an immediate consequence of this is that1 so far as the content of fine art is concerned1 it cannot range about in all the wildness of an unbridled fancy2 these interests of spirit posit categorically for the content that embodies them definite points of attachment#bj1 however multifold and inexhaustible may be the forms and shapes they assume4 ,the same may be said of the forms themselves4 ,they too do not remain unaffected by constraining principles4 ,it is not every chance form which is capable of expressing and presenting these interests1 capable of assimilating them and reproducing them4 ,it is only through one determinate content that the form adequate to its embodiment is defined4 ,it is upon grounds such as these that we are also able to discover a track adapted to critical reflection through the apparently endless vistas of artistic creations and shapes4 ,we have now1 ,i trust1 by way of prelude1 succeeded in restricting the content of our science on the lines of definition proposed4 ,we have made it clear that neither is fine art unworthy of philosophical study1 nor is such a philosophical study incapable of accepting as an object of its cognition the essence of fine art4 ,,ii ,if we now investigate the required mode of such scientific investigation1 we are here again face to face with two contradictory modes of handling the subject1 each of which appears to exclude the other and to permit us to arrive at no satisfactory result4 ,on the one hand we observe the science of art1 merely so to speak1 from an external point of view busying itself with actual works of art1 cataloguing them in a history of art1 drawing up a sort of commentary upon extant works1 or propounding theories which are intended to supply the general points of view for artistic criticism no less than artistic production4 ,on the other hand we find science wholly giving itself up in its independence and self-assured to the contemplation of the beautiful1 offering generalizations which do not concern the specific characteristics of a work of art1 producing in short an abstract philosophy of the beautiful4 #a4 ,with regard to the first mentioned method of study1 the starting-point of which is the empirical study of definite facts1 such is the path everyone must tread who means to study art at all4 ,and just as everyone nowadays1 even though he does not actually concern himself with physical science1 yet deems it indispensable to his intellectual equipment to have some kind of knowledge of the principles of that science#ba1 so too it is generally considered more or less essential to any man of real cultivation1 that he should possess some general knowledge of art2 and indeed the pretension to be ranked as dilletante1 or even as genuine connoisseur1 meets with comparatively few exceptions4 7a7 ,if however knowledge of this kind is really to claim the rank of connoisseurship of the first class it must be both varied in its character and of the widest range4 ,it is an indispensable condition to such that it should possess an accurate knowledge of the well-nigh limitless field of particular works of art both of ancient and modern times1 some of which have already disappeared1 while others are only to be found in distant countries or portions of the globe1 and which it is the misfortune of our situation to be unable to inspect4 ,add to this that every work of art belongs to one age1 one nationality1 and depends upon particular historical or other ends and ideas4 ,on account of this it is indispensable that the finest type of art-scholarship should have at its command not merely historical knowledge of a wide range1 but knowledge that is highly specialized4 ,in other words1 a work of art is associated with particular#bb detail in a peculiar sense1 and a specific treatment1 is imperative to the comprehension and interpretation of it4 ,and in conclusion this connoisseurship of the finest class does not merely imply like every other a retentive memory1 but also a keen imaginative sense1 in order to hold clearly before the mind the images of such artistic representations in all their characteristic lines1 and above all1 to have them ready for comparison with other works of art4 7b7 ,within the limits of such a method of study which is primarily historical#bc1 distinct points of view will soon assert themselves which in the contemplation of such works we are not suffered to lose sight of1 inasmuch as they are indispensable to a critical verdict4 ,such points of view1 as is the case with other sciences the commencement of which is empirical1 are summarized1 after their due collection as separate units and comparison1 in general criteria and propositions1 emerging in a yet further stage of formal generalization in ,theories of the arts4 ,this is not the place to dwell at length upon literature of this kind2 we will merely recall a few specimens of such work in the most general way4 ,there is1 for instance1 the ,poetics of ,aristotle1 which contains a theory of tragedy still of real interest4 ,with still more pertinency among the ancients the ,ars ,poetica of ,horace and the ,essay on the ,sublime by ,longinus will exemplify generally the manner in which this type of theorizing is carried out4 ,the general theses which are therein formulated are intended to stand as premises and rules1 in accordance with which works of art ought to be produced1 their necessity being above all insisted on in times of the decadence of poetry and art4 ,they are1 in short1 prescriptions to the practitioner4 ,the prescriptions1 however1 of these physicians of art were even less successful in their curative effect on art than are the ordinary ones in the restoration of bodily health4 ,as to such theories ,i will merely remark that although in their detail they contain much that is instructive1 yet what they have to say is based on a very limited range of artistic production1 which passed no doubt for the superlatively beautiful ones1 but for all that occupied but a very restricted portion of the entire field of survey4 ,from a further point of view such generalizations are in part very trivial reflections1 which in their generality led up to no secure grasp of actual detail1 though that is above all the matter of most importance4 ,the epistle of ,horace already cited is full of such general theses1 and consequently a book for everyone1 but one which for this very reason contains much of no importance at all4 ,take the lines3 ,omne tulit punctum qui miscuit utile dulci ,lectorum delectando pariterque monendo-- ,he carries all votes who has interfused the useful and the pleasant1 by at the same time charming and instructing his reader4 ,this is no better than copybook headings such as ,stay where you are and earn an honest sixpence--which are good enough as generalization1 but are defective in the concrete determinacy upon which action depends4 ,an interest of another kind deducible from this type of artistic study does not so much consist in the expressed object to promote the production of genuine works of art3 the intention appears to be rather that of influencing the judgment of others upon artistic works by such theories1 creating1 in short1 a standard of taste4 ,it is for an object of this kind that ,horne's ,elements of ,criticism1 the writings of ,batteux1 and ,ramler's ,introduction to the ,fine ,arts have found many readers in their day4 ,taste1 in this sense1 has to do with co-ordination and artistic treatment1 the thing in its right place1 and all that concerns the finish of that which belongs to the external embodiment of a work of art4 ,add to this that to the principles of such a taste views were attached which belonged to the psychology in fashion at the time1 views which had been discovered by empirical observations of capacities and activities of the soul1 or of passions and their potential aggrandizement1 succession1 and so forth4 ,it is1 however1 an invariable fact that every one forms his opinion of works of art1 or characters1 actions and events according to the measure of his insight and his perceptive temperament2 and inasmuch as the formation of taste to which we have referred merely touched what was external and therefore jejune1 and apart from this deduced its prescriptions entirely from a limited circle of artistic works and an intellectual culture and emotional discipline equally restricted1 its sphere of influence was ineffective1 and it had neither the power to comprehend the profounder significance#bd and the true1 nor to make the vision more keen for their apprehension4 ,such theories proceed through generalization as do the rest of the non-philosophic sciences4 ,the content which they submit to examination is accepted from ordinary ideas as something final and received as such4 ,questions are then asked about the constitution of such a concept1 the need for more distinct specification making itself apparent1 and this too is borrowed from current ideas1 and forthwith finally established from it in definitions4 ,but in such a procedure we at once find ourselves on an insecure basis exposed to controversy4 ,it might in the first instance no doubt appear that the beautiful was quite a simple idea4 ,but we soon discover it combines several aspects2 one writer will emphasize one of these1 another some other one2 or1 even assuming the same points of view are considered1 the question for dispute still remains which aspect is to be regarded as essential4 ,with regard to such questions it is generally reckoned as inseparable from scientific completeness1 that the various definitions of the beautiful should be enumerated and criticized4 ,for ourselves we do not propose to attempt this with such historical exhaustiveness as would unfold all the many refinements of such essays at definition1 nor indeed on account of their historical interest4 ,we simply1 by way of illustration1 shall offer a few specimens of the more recent and more interesting ways of regarding the matter which do in fact hit off pretty nearly what is actually implied in the idea of the beautiful4 ,with this in view it is of first importance to recall ,goethe's definition of the beautiful1 which ,meyer has incorporated in his ,history of the ,creative ,arts in ,greece1 in which work he also brings forward the views of ,hirt1 though he does not actually mention his name4 ,hirt1 one of the greatest among connoisseurs of the first class in our time1 in his ,essay upon ,fine ,art 7,horen1 #agig1 seventh number71 after considering the beautiful in the several arts1 summarizes his conclusions in the statement that the basis of a just criticism of fine art and cultivation of taste is the idea of the ,characteristic4 ,in other words he defines the beautiful ultimately as the ,consummate#be which is or can be an object of eye1 ear1 or imagination4 ,he then proceeds to define this consummate as that which is adequate to its aim1 which nature or art aimed at producing in the constitution of the object--after its generic kind and specific type4 ,for which reason it is necessary that1 in order to instruct our critical sense of beauty1 we should direct our attention1 so far as possible1 to the specific indications of the object's essential constitution4 ,it is1 in fact1 these insignia of individuality which are its characteristic4 ,consequently under the term character as a principle of art he understands that definite individual characterization#bf1 whereby forms1 movement and gesture1 mien and expression1 local colouring1 light and shadow1 chiaroscuro and pose are severally distinguished in due relation of course to the requirements of the object previously selected4 ,this formula is more significant in its actual terms than other definitions in vogue4 ,if we proceed to ask what the characteristic is we find that it implies1 first1 a content1 as1 for instance1 a definite emotion1 situation1 event1 action1 individual person or thing2 secondly1 the specific manner in accordance with which such a content is represented4 ,it is to this mode or manner of presentation that the artistic principle of the characteristic is related4 ,it requires that every aspect of detail in the mode of expression shall subserve the clearer definition of that expression's content1 and become a vital member of such expression4 ,the abstract determination of the characteristic emphasizes therefore the pertinency with which particular detail ought to bring into prominence the content which it is intended to reproduce4 ,attempting an elucidation of this conception apart from technical phrase we may state the limitation implied in it as follows3 ,in the drama1 for instance1 it is an action which constitutes the content4 ,that is to say1 the drama has to represent how this or that action takes place4 ,now men do all kinds of different things4 ,they speak to each other1 take their meals1 sleep1 put on their clothes1 say this and that1 and all the rest of it4 ,but in all this business of life what does not lie in immediate relation with the particular action selected as the real dramatic content1 must be excluded in order that relatively to it everything shall be significant4 ,in the same way in a picture which only includes one moment of that action1 and it is possible to accumulate--such are the countless vistas into which the objective world draws us--a mass of circumstances1 persons1 situations or other occurrences1 which stand in no relation to the specific action as it actually occurs1 nor subserve in any way the clearer characterization of the same4 ,but according to the definition given of the characteristic only that ought to enter into a work of art1 which is appertinent to the manifestation and essential expression of precisely this one content and no other4 ,nothing must declare itself as idle or superfluous4 ,this definition is no doubt of real importance1 and from a certain point of view admits of justification4 ,meyer1 however1 in the work cited1 is of opinion that the view propounded has vanished1 every vestige of it1 and in his opinion only to the advantage of art4 ,such a conception he thinks would in all probability lead to caricature4 ,this judgment is based on the previous idea that an attempt of this kind to define the beautiful once and for all is associated with the notion of prescription4 ,the philosophy of art has absolutely nothing to do with precepts for artists4 ,the object is to unfold the essential nature of the beautiful1 and--apart from any intention to propound rules for the executant--how it is illustrated in actual work1 that is works of art4 ,to such a criticism we may observe that the definition of ,hirt no doubt includes what is capable of being caricature1 for caricature may also be characteristic4 ,the obvious point to make1 however1 against it is this1 that in caricature character in its definition is emphasized to the point of exaggeration and is1 if we may say so1 a superfluity of the characteristic4 ,but a surfeit of this kind is no longer appropriate to the characteristic1 but a burdensome reiteration whereby the characteristic may itself be ousted from what it ought to be4 ,moreover1 what is of the nature of caricature is displayed as the characteristic presentment of what is ugly1 which is of course a mode of distortion4 ,ugliness is in its own right in this way more closely related to the content#bg1 so that it may be actually asserted that the principle of the characteristic includes also ugliness and the presentment of the same as a part of its essential determination4 ,the definition of ,hirt1 of course1 gives us no further account of the content of the beautiful4 ,it merely supplies us in this respect with a purely formal statement1 which1 however1 contains real truth in it although formulated in abstract terms4 ,there is1 however1 the further question--what ,meyer would substitute for the artistic principle of ,hirt1 what he proposes himself8 ,he deals in the first instance exclusively with the principle as we have it in ancient works of art1 which1 however1 must contain in the widest connotation of the term the essential determinant#bh of beauty#bi4 ,in doing so he finds occasion to refer to ,mengs and to ,winckelmann's definition of the ,ideal1 and expresses himself to the effect that he does not wish either to reject or wholly to accept this principle of beauty1 but on the other hand that he feels no hesitation in subscribing to the opinion of an enlightened judge of art 7that is ,goethe71 inasmuch as its meaning is distinct and it appears to solve the problem with more accuracy4 ,now what ,goethe says is this3 ,the highest principle of the ancients was the significant2 the highest result of successful artistic handling is the beautiful4 ,if we look more closely at what this dictum implies we have again once more two aspects1 that is to say a content or subject matter1 and the mode of its presentation4 ,in our consideration of a work of art we begin with that which is directly presented to us1 and after seeing it we proceed to inquire what its significance or content is4 ,that external husk possesses no value to us simply as such4 ,we assume that there is an inward1 an ideality or a significance behind it1 in virtue of which the external appearance is made alive with mind or spirit4 ,it is to this1 its soul1 that the external appearance points and attests4 ,for an appearance which is significant of something does not present itself to us1 and merely that which it is qu externality1 but something other than this2 as also does the symbol for example and with yet more clarity the fable1 the significance of which is simply the moral and teaching of the same4 ,in fact there is no word which does not point to a meaning1 possessing no value by itself4 ,in the same way the human eye1 the face1 flesh1 skin1 the entire presence are a revelation of spirit1 intelligence and soul2 and in such a case the significance is without exception something beyond that which is offered in the bare appearance4 ,in this way too the work of art must possess significance2 it must not appear to have told its tale simply in the fact of particular lines1 curves1 surfaces1 indentations1 reliefs of stone-work1 in particular colours1 tones1 sounds of words1 whatever medium in fact art may employ4 ,its function is to unveil an inward or ideal vitality1 emotion1 soul1 a content and mind1 which is precisely what we mean by the significance of a work of art4 ,this demand1 therefore1 for significance in a work of art is to all intents1 and in its embrace much the same thing as ,hirt's principle of the characteristic4 ,according to this conception we find as characteristic constituents of the beautiful an inward somewhat1 a content1 and an external rind which possesses that content as its significance4 ,the inner or ideal constituent appears in the external and thus enables itself to be recognized1 that which is external pointing away from itself to the inward4 ,we cannot1 however1 pursue the matter here into further detail4 7c7 ,but the earlier fashion of this theory-spinning1 no less than the laying down of rules for the executant already adverted to1 has already been thrust on one side despotically in ,germany--mainly owing to the appearance of genuine living poetry--and the right of genius1 its work and effects1 have had their full independence insisted upon as against the pretensions of such rules of thumb and the broad water-ducts of theory4 ,from this foundation of an art which is itself of truly spiritual rank1 as also of a sympathy and absorption of the same1 have arisen the receptivity and freedom which make it possible for us to enjoy and appreciate great works of art which have long since been within our reach1 whether it be those of the modern world1 of the ,middle ,ages1 or of wholly foreign peoples of the ,past1 the works of ,india for example2 works1 which1 in virtue of their antiquity or the remoteness of their nationality1 possess unquestionably for ourselves a side alien to ourselves2 but which1 if we consider the way in which their content passes over and beyond such national limits1 and the matter in it of common appeal to all mankind1 can only be hallmarked by the prejudice of theory among the products of a barbarous or corrupt taste4 ,this recognition of works of art anywhere and everywhere1 works which depart from the specific circle and forms of those upon which in the main the abstractions of theory were based1 has1 as a primary consequence1 led to the recognition of a peculiar type of art---the romantic art4 ,it became necessary to apprehend the notion and the nature of the beautiful in a profounder way than these theories attempted4 ,with this fact another1 too1 cooperated1 viz41 that the notions in its form of apperception1 the mind as pure thought on its part reached in philosophy a point of profounder self-cognition1 and was thereby compelled forthwith to grasp the essence of art too on profounder lines4 ,in this way1 even in virtue of the point in the process reached of this general evolution of human thought1 the type of theorizing upon art we have described1 both relatively to its principles no less than their elaboration1 has become obsolete4 ,it is only the scholarship of the history of art which retains an abiding value1 and must continue to retain it in proportion as the boundaries of its survey have enlarged in every direction by means of the advance made in man's powers of receptivity already noticed4 ,its business and function consists in the aesthetic appreciation of particular works of art and the knowledge of the historical1 in other words the external conditions from which the work of art originates4 ,it is an attitude of the mind1 which1 if assisted with sound sense and critical insight1 supported too with historical knowledge1 is an indispensable condition to the complete penetration into the individuality of a given work of art4 ,the many writings of ,goethe upon art and works of art are an excellent illustration4 ,theorizing1 in the specific sense noticed1 is not the aim of this type of examination1 although no doubt it not unfrequently also busies itself with abstract principles and categories1 and may drop into such a style unconsciously4 ,if1 however1 without letting such deviations on our route detain us1 we keep before our vision those concrete illustrations of artistic works1 such at least1 whatever else they may do1 supply a philosophy of art with the visible warrant and confirmation of actual work1 into the historical detail of which1 in each particular case1 philosophy is not permitted to enter4 ,this then may be accepted as the first method of art study4 ,it starts from the particular work which we have before us4 #b4 ,the method or point of view to be contrasted with this1 in other words an entirely theoretical reflection1 which is concerned to cognize the beautiful as such from its own intrinsic wealth1 and to penetrate to the idea of it1 is essentially distinct from the first method4 ,as is well known1 ,plato was the first to demand of philosophical inquiry in a profounder sense1 that objects should not be cognized in their particularity1 but in their universality1 in their generic type1 their essential being and its explicit manifestation4 ,he maintained that this true essence#cj did not consist in particular actions which were good1 in particular true opinions1 handsome men or beautiful works of art1 but in goodness1 beauty1 and truth in their universality4 ,now if in fact the beautiful ought to be cognized according to its essence and notion1 this can only be effected by means of the thinking notion#ca1 by means of which the logical and metaphysical nature of the ,idea as such1 as also of that of the particular ,idea of the beautiful enters into the thinking consciousness4 ,but the consideration of the beautiful in its self-independence and its idea may readily once more become an abstract metaphysic2 and even though ,plato is accepted as founder and pioneer1 the ,platonic abstraction no longer supplies all we require1 not even for the logical ,idea of the beautiful4 ,we are bound to grasp this idea more profoundly and more in the concrete4 ,the emptiness of content which clings to the ,platonic ,idea1 no longer satisfies the richer philosophical requirements of the mind to-day4 ,it is no doubt the case that we also in the philosophy of art must make the ,idea of the beautiful our starting point2 but it is by no means inevitable that we should adhere to the ,platonic ideas in their abstraction1 ideas from which the philosophy of the beautiful merely dates its origins4 #c4 ,the philosophical idea of the beautiful to indicate at any rate its true nature provisionally1 must contain both extremes which we have described mediated in itself4 ,it must combine1 that is to say1 metaphysical universality with the determinate content of real particularity4 ,it is only by this means that it is grasped in its essential no less than explicit truth4 ,for on the one hand it is then1 as contrasted with the sterility of one-sided reflection1 fruit-bearing out of its own wealth4 ,it is its function1 in consonance with its own notion1 to develop into a totality of definite qualities1 and this essential conception itself1 no less than its detailed explication1 comprises the necessary coherence of its particular features as also of the progress and transition of one phase thereof into another4 ,on the other hand1 these particulars into which the passage is made essentially carry the universality and essentiality of the fundamental notion1 as the particulars of which they appear4 ,the modes of inquiry hitherto discussed lack both these aspects1 and for this reason it is only the notion1 as above formulated1 in its completeness1 which conducts us to definitive principles which are substantive1 necessary1 and self-contained in their completeness4 ,,iii ,after these preliminaries we come to closer quarters with our actual subject-matter1 namely1 the philosophy of ,fine ,art#cb2 and for the reason that we are undertaking to treat it scientifically1 our commencement must be with the notional concept of the same4 ,it is only after we have definitely ascertained this that we can map out the division of its parts1 and with it the plan of the science as a whole4 ,a division of this kind1 if it is not to be1 as is the case with non-philosophical inquiry1 undertaken in a purely external way1 must discover its principle in the notion of the subject treated itself4 ,face to face with such a demand we are at once met by the question3 ,whence do we arrive at such a conception8 ,if we begin with the notional concept of ,fine ,art itself the same at once becomes a pre-supposition and mere assumption4 ,mere assumptions1 however1 are excluded from the philosophical method2 whatever here is allowed as valid must have its truth demonstrated1 in other words must be established in its necessity4 ,we will endeavour to arrive at an understanding in a few words in the presence of this difficulty which invariably recurs in the introduction to every course of philosophical study if treated independently4 ,the subject-matter of every science presents in the first instance two aspects for consideration3 first1 the fact that a given object is2 secondly1 the question what it is4 ,upon the question of fact in ordinary scientific inquiry little difficulty is experienced4 ,indeed it might on a cursory view even appear ridiculous if the demand were made that we had to prove in geometry1 for instance1 that there were such objects as space1 and geometrical figures1 or in astronomy and physics that there was a sun1 stars1 and magnetic phenomena4 ,in these sciences1 which are concerned with what is actually presented to sense perception1 objects are accepted from objective experience1 and so far from it being regarded necessary to demonstrate 7beweisen7 them1 it is deemed sufficient to point to 7weisen7 the bare facts4 ,yet even within the limits of non-philosophical instruction doubts may arise as to the existence of certain objects4 ,in psychology1 for example1 the science of mind1 the doubt is possible whether there is a soul1 an intelligence1 i4e41 something distinct from material conditions1 something immaterial#cc1 independent and self-substantive1 or in the theology whether a ,god actually exists4 ,moreover1 assuming the objects of the science to be thus immaterial1 in other words1 merely present in the mind1 and not a part of the objective world we perceive1 we have to face the possible conviction that there is nothing in the mind1 but that which it has evoked in virtue of its own activity4 ,this brings up incidentally the question whether men have produced this idea or intuition which is inward to their minds or not1 and even if we do actually accept the first alternative1 whether they have not made such an idea once more to vanish1 or depreciated1 the same at any rate to an idea of wholly subjective validity1 whose content possesses no independent or self-contained existence#cd4 ,in this way1 for example1 the beautiful has been frequently regarded as possessing no necessarily essential and independent stability in the world of our ideas2 rather it is accepted as a pleasure purely personal to ourselves1 due to the caprice of our senses#ce4 ,even our external intuitions1 observations and perceptions frequently deceive and lead us astray2 but still more is this the case with those ideas that do not arise from sense-perception1 even though they possess in themselves the greatest vitality1 and are able to transport us into passion1 we are powerless to resist4 ,this doubt1 then1 whether an object of the inward world of our ideas and intuitions actually exists as an independent fact or not1 as also that further incidental problem1 whether the particular consciousness in question has produced it in itself1 and whether the particular mode or process1 in which it objectified it to itself1 is also adequate to the object thus envisaged in its essential and independent nature--these are precisely the kind of questions which have awakened in men the higher demand of philosophy1 which is that1 even if there is every appearance that an object is1 or that we have before us such an object1 yet none the less that object must be expounded or demonstrated on the basis of its necessity4 ,a demonstration of this kind1 if developed on truly philosophical lines1 ought at the same time to supply a sufficient answer to the question3 ,what a given object is4 ,to work this out fully would1 however1 carry us further than is now possible4 ,we propose to limit ourselves to the following general remarks4 ,if we are to propound the necessity of our subject-matter1 in other words the beauty of art1 we are bound to prove that art1 or the beautiful1 is a result of antecedents such as1 when regarded relatively to their true notional concept1 conduct us with scientific necessity to the similar notion of fine art itself4 ,inasmuch as1 however1 we propose to make art the point of departure1 and its idea and the objective presence of the same1 and do not propose to deal with the antecedent conditions which are essential to the necessary exposition of its notional concept1 for this reason art1 in our treatment of it as a particular object of scientific inquiry1 involves a pre-assumption1 which lies outside the boundary of our investigation2 which1 implying as it does a different content1 belongs1 as scientifically treated1 to another course of philosophical inquiry4 ,we have therefore now no other alternative than frankly to accept the notional idea of art1 so to speak1 provisionally#cf1 which is inevitable with every one of the particular philosophical sciences1 if regarded in their abstract isolation4 ,for it is the entire body of philosophy1 and that alone1 which either is or can be the comprehension of the universe as one essentially single organic totality2 and which1 as such a totality1 self-evolved from its own notional ,idea1 and returning into itself so as to form a whole in virtue of the necessary principle in which it is placed relatively to itself1 encloses itself1 and all that is itself1 into one single world of truth4 ,in the coronal of this scientific necessity is every particular member thereof a self-complete circle which returns into itself1 while1 at the same time1 and as imperatively1 it possesses a necessary bond of connection with other parts4 ,this bond of coherence is a backward from which it is self-derived1 no less than a forward to which it is self-impelled onward1 in so far as it fruitfully begets fresh material from its own resources1 and renders the same open and pervious to scientific cognition4 ,it is not therefore our purpose to demonstrate the ,idea of the beautiful1 which is our point of departure1 or1 in other words1 to deduce it in all its necessity from the assumptions which are its antecedents in philosophy1 and from the womb of which it is born4 ,this is the object appropriate to an encyclopaedic development of philosophy as a whole and in its specific branches4 ,for ourselves the notional concept of the beautiful and art is a pre-supposition supplied us by the system of philosophy4 ,inasmuch1 however1 as we are not prepared to discuss this system1 and the association of art with it in the present context#cg1 we have not as yet the idea of the beautiful before us in a scientific form3 what we have and are able to deal with are simply the phases and aspects of the same as we find them in the various conceptions of beauty and art of our everyday conscious life1 or as they have been conceived by previous writers4 ,having made our start at this point we shall then at a later stage pass on to the more fundamental investigation of those views1 in order thereby to secure the advantage of1 in the first instance1 working out a general idea of our subject-matter no less than obtaining a provisional acquaintance1 as a result of our necessarily brief criticism1 with its higher principles1 which will occupy our thoughts in the inquiry which follows#ch4 ,by this means our final introduction#ci will supply a sort of overture to the exposition of the subject itself1 and will aim at being a general concatenation and direction of our reflection on the real subject-matter before us4 ,what in the first instance is known to us under current conceptions of a work of art may be subsumed under the three following determinations3 7#a7 ,a work of art is no product of ,nature4 ,it is brought into being through the agency of man4 7#b7 ,it is created essentially for man2 and1 what1 is more1 it is to a greater-or less degree delivered from a sensuous medium1 and addressed to his senses#dj4 7#c7 ,it contains an end bound up with it4 #a4 ,with regard to the first point1 that a work of art is a product of human activity1 an inference has been drawn from this 7a7 that such an activity1 being the conscious production of an external object can also be known and divulged1 and learned and reproduced by others4 ,for that which one is able to effect1 another--such is the notion--is able to effect or to imitate#da1 when he has once simply mastered the way of doing it4 ,in short we have merely to assume an acquaintance with the rules of art-production universally shared1 and anybody may then1 if he cares to do so1 give effect to executive ability of the same type1 and produce works of art4 ,it is out of reasoning of this kind that the above-mentioned theories1 with their provision of rules1 and their prescriptions formulated for practical acceptance1 have arisen4 ,unfortunately that which is capable of being brought into effect in accordance with suggestions of this description can only be something formally regular and mechanical4 ,for only that which is mechanical is of so exterior a type that only an entirely empty effort of will and dexterity is required to accept it among our working conceptions1 and forthwith to carry it out2 an effort1 in fact1 which is not under the necessity to contribute out of its own resources anything concrete such as is quite outside the prescriptive power of such general rules4 ,this is apparent with most vividness when precepts of this kind are not limited to what is purely external and mechanical1 but extend their pretensions to the activity of the artist in the sense that implies wealth of significance and intelligence4 ,in this field our rules pass off to purely indefinite generalities1 such as the theme ought to be interesting1 and each individual person must speak as is appropriate to his status1 age1 sex and situation4 ,but if rules are really to suffice for such a purpose their directions ought to be formulated with such directness of detail that1 without any further co-operation of mind1 they could be executed precisely in the manner they are prescribed4 ,such rules being1 in respect to this content1 abstract1 clearly and entirely fall short of their pretension of being able to complete#db the artistic consciousness4 ,artistic production is not a formal activity in accordance with a series of definitions2 it is1 as an activity of soul1 constrained to work out of its own wealth1 and to bring before the mind's eye a wholly other and far richer content1 and a more embracing and unique#dc creation than ever can be thus prescribed4 ,in particular cases such rules may prove1 of assistance1 in so far1 that is1 as they contain something really definite and consequently useful for practice4 ,but even here their guidance will only apply to conditions wholly external4 7b7 ,this above indicated tendency has consequently been wholly given up2 but writers in doing so have only fallen as unreservedly into the opposite extreme4 ,a work of art came to be looked upon1 and so far rightly1 as no longer the product of an activity shared by all men1 but rather as a creation of a mind gifted in an extraordinary degree4 ,a mind of this type has in this view merely to give free vent to its peculiar endowment1 regarded as a specific natural power4 ,it has to free itself absolutely from a pursuit of rules of universal application1 as also from any admixture of conscious reflection with its creative and1 as thus viewed1 wholly instinctive powers1 or rather it should be on its guard therefrom1 the assumption being that such an exercise of conscious thought can only act on its creations as an infection and a taint4 ,agreeably to such a view the work of art has been heralded as the product of talent and genius2 and it is mainly the aspect of natural gift inseparable from the ordinary conception of talent and genius1 which has been emphasized4 ,there is to some extent real truth in this4 ,talent is specific1 genius universal capacity4 ,with neither#dd of these can a man endow himself simply by the exercise of his self-conscious activity4 ,we shall consider this at greater length in a subsequent chapter#de4 ,in the present context we would merely draw attention to the false assumption in this view that in artistic production every kind of self-reflection upon the artist's own activity was regarded as not merely superfluous1 but actually injurious4 ,in such a view the process of creation by talent or genius simply is taken to be a general state2 or we may define it more precisely as a condition of inspiration4 ,to such a condition1 it is said1 genius is in some measure exalted by the subject-matter itself2 it is also to some extent voluntarily able to place itself under such a condition1 a process of self-inhibition in which the genial service of the champagne bottle is not forgotten#df4 ,an idea of this kind was in vogue during the so-called ,epoch of ,genius1 which originated with the early poetical work of ,goethe1 receiving subsequent illustration in those of ,schiller4 ,these poets by their rejection of all rules hitherto fabricated made as it were an entirely new start2 with deliberate intention they ran counter to such rules1 and while doing so distanced all competitors by many lengths4 ,i do not1 however1 propose to discuss with more detail the confusions which have prevailed over the conception of inspiration and genius1 and the notion1 which even at the present day finds advocates1 that inspiration simply by itself can effect anything and everything4 ,the real and indeed sole point to maintain as essential is the thesis that although artistic talent and genius essentially implies an element of natural power1 yet it is equally indispensable that it should be thoughtfully cultivated1 that reflection should be brought to bear on the particular way it is exercised1 and that it should be also kept alive with use and practice in actual work4 ,the fact is that an important aspect of the creating process is merely facility in the use of a medium#dg2 that is to say1 a work of art possesses a purely technical side1 which extends to the borders of mere handicraft4 ,this is most obviously the case in architecture and sculpture1 less so in painting and music1 least of all in poetry4 ,a facility here is not assisted at all by inspiration2 what solely indispensable is reflection1 industry1 and practice4 ,such technical skill an artist simply must possess in order that he may be master over the external material1 and not be thwarted by its obstinacy4 ,add to this that the more exalted the rank of an artist the more profoundly ought he to portray depths of soul and mind2 and these are not to be known by flashlight1 but are exclusively to be sounded1 if at all1 by the direction of the man's own intelligence on the world of souls and the objective world4 ,in this respect1 therefore1 once more study is the means whereby the artist brings to consciousness such a content1 and appropriates the material and structure of his conceptions4 ,at the same time no doubt one art will require such a conscious reception and cognitive mastery of the content in question more than another4 ,music1 for example1 which has exclusively to deal with the entirely undefined motion of the soul within1 with the musical tones of that which is1 relatively1 feeling denuded of positive thought1 has little or no need to bring home to consciousness the substance of intellectual conception#dh4 ,for this very reason musical talent declares itself as a rule in very early youth1 when the head is still empty and the emotions have barely had a flutter2 it has1 in fact1 attained real distinction at a time in the artist's life when both intelligence and life are practically without experience4 ,and for the matter of that we often enough see very great accomplishment in musical composition and execution hung together with considerable indigence of mind and character4 ,it is quite another matter in the case of poetry4 ,what is of main importance here is a presentation of our humanity rich in subject-matter and reflective power1 of its profounder interests1 and of the forces which move it4 ,here at least mind and heart must themselves be richly and profoundly disciplined by life1 experience1 and thought before genius itself can bring into being the fruit that is ripe1 the content that has substance1 and is essentially consummate4 ,the early productions of ,goethe and ,schiller are characterized by an immaturity1 we may even call it a rawness and barbarity1 which really are appalling4 ,this phenomenon1 that in the majority of those experiments we find a preponderating mass of features which are absolutely prosaic1 or at least uninspired and commonplace1 is a main objection to the ordinary notion that inspiration is inseparable from youth and its sirocco season4 ,these two men of genius were the first beyond question to give our nation true works of poetry1 are1 in fact1 our national poets2 but for all that it was only their mature manhood1 which made it a present of creations profound1 sterling of their kind1 creations of genuine inspiration1 and no less technically complete in their artistic form#di4 ,we naturally recall the case of the veteran ,homer1 who only composed and uttered his immortal songs in his old age4 7c7 ,a third view1 held relatively to the idea of a work of art as a product of human activity1 concerns the position of such towards the phenomena of ,nature4 ,the natural tendency of ordinary thinking in this respect is to assume that the product of human art is of subordinate rank to the works of ,nature4 ,the work of art possesses no feeling of its own2 it is not through and through a living thing1 but1 regarded as an external object1 is a dead thing4 ,it is usual to regard that which is alive of higher worth than what is dead4 ,we may admit1 of course1 that the work of art is not in itself capable of movement and alive4 ,the living1 natural thing is1 whether looked at within or without1 an organization with the life-purpose of such worked out into the minutest detail4 ,the work of art merely attains to the show of animation on its surface4 ,below this it is ordinary stone1 wood1 or canvas#ej1 or in the case of poetry idea1 the medium of such being speech and letters4 ,but this element of external existence is not that which makes a work a creation of fine art4 ,a work of art is only truly such in so far as originating in the human spirit1 it continues to belong to the soil from which it sprang1 has received1 in short1 the baptism of the mind and soul of man1 and only presents that which is fashioned in consonance with such a sacrament4 ,an interest vital to man1 the spiritual values which the single event1 one individual character1 one action possesses in its devolution and final issue1 is seized in the work of art and emphasized with greater purity#ea and clarity than is possible on the ground of ordinary reality where human art is not4 ,and for this reason the work of art is of higher rank than any product of ,nature whatever1 which has not submitted to this passage through the mind4 ,in virtue of the emotion and insight1 for example1 in the atmosphere of which a landscape is portrayed by the art of painting1 this creation of the human spirit assumes a higher rank than the purely natural landscape4 ,everything which partakes of spirit is better than anything begotten of mere ,nature4 ,however this may be1 the fact remains that no purely natural existence is able1 as art is1 to represent divine ideals4 ,and further1 all that the mind borrows from its own ideal content it is able1 even in the direction of external existence1 to endow with permanence4 ,the individual living thing on the contrary is transitory2 it vanishes and is unstable in its external aspect4 ,the work of art persists4 ,at the same time it is not mere continuation1 but rather the form and pressure thereon of the mintage of soul-life which constitutes its true pre-eminence as contrasted with ,nature's reality4 ,but this higher position we have thus assigned to the work of art is yet further contested by another prevalent conception of ordinary ideas4 ,it is contended that ,nature and all that proceeds from her are a work of ,god1 created by ,his goodness and wisdom4 ,the work of art is on the contrary merely a human product fashioned by human hands according to human design4 ,the fallacy implied in this contrast between the products of ,nature viewed as a divine creation and human activity as of wholly finite energy consists in the apparent assumption that ,god is not operative in and through man1 but limits the sphere of ,his activity to ,nature alone4 ,we must place this false conception entirely on one side if we are desirous of penetrating to the true idea of art2 or rather1 as opposed to such a conception we ought to accept the extreme opposite thereto1 namely1 that ,god is more honoured by that which mind makes and creates than by everything brought into being and fashioned in the natural process4 ,for not only is there a divinity in man1 but it is actually effective in him in a form which is adequate to the essential nature of ,god in a far higher degree than in the work of ,nature4 ,god is a ,spirit1 and it is only in man that the medium1 through which the ,divine passes1 possesses the form of spirit fully conscious of the activity in which it manifests its ideal presence4 ,in ,nature the medium correspondent to this is the unconscious sensuous#eb and external materia1 which is by many degrees inferior to consciousness in its worth4 ,in the products of art ,god works precisely as ,he works through the phenomena of ,nature4 ,the divine substance1 however1 as it is asserted in the work of art has secured1 being begotten of spirit life itself1 a highway commensurable to its existence2 determinate existence in the unconscious sensuousness of ,nature is not a mode of appearance adequate to the ,divine ,being4 7d7 ,assuming1 then1 that the work of art is a creation of man in the sense that it is the offspring of mind or spirit we have still a further question in conclusion1 which will help us to draw a more profound inference still from our previous discussion4 ,that question is1 ,what is the human need which stimulates art-production8 ,on the one hand the artistic activity may be regarded as the mere play of accident1 or human conceits1 which might just as well be left alone as attempted4 ,for1 it may be urged1 there are other and better means for carrying into effect the aims of art1 and man bears within himself higher and more weighty interests1 than art is capable of satisfying4 ,in contrast to such a view art appears to originate in a higher impulse1 and to satisfy more elevated needs1 nay1 at certain times the highest and most absolute of all1 being1 as it has been1 united to the most embracing views of entire epochs and nations upon the constitution of the world and the nature of their religion4 ,this inquiry1 however1 concerning a necessity for art which shall not be merely contingent1 but absolute1 we are not as yet able to answer with completeness2 it demands1 in fact1 a concreter mode of exposition than is compatible with the form of this introduction4 ,we must accordingly deem it sufficient for the present merely to establish the following points4 ,the universal and absolute want from which art on its side of essential form#ec arises originates in the fact that man is a thinking consciousness1 in other words that he renders explicit to himself and from his own substance#ed1 what he is and all in fact that exists4 ,the objects of ,nature exist exclusively in immediacy and once for all4#ee ,man1 on the contrary1 as mind reduplicates himself4 ,he is1 to start with1 an object of ,nature as other objects2 but in addition to this1 and no less truly1 he exists for himself2 he observes himself1 makes himself present to his imagination and thought1 and only in virtue of this active power of self-realization is he actually mind or spirit4 ,this consciousness of himself man acquires in a twofold way2 in the first instance theoretically4 ,this is so in so far as he is under a constraint to bring himself in his own inner life to consciousness--all which moves in the human heart1 all that surges up and strives therein--and generally1 so far as he is impelled to make himself an object of perception and conception1 to fix for himself definitively that which thought discovers as essential being1 and in all that he summons out of himself1 no less than in that which is received from without1 to recognize only himself4 ,and secondly1 this realization is effected through a practical activity4 ,in other words man possesses an impulse to assert himself in that which is presented him in immediacy1 in that which is at hand as an external something to himself1 and by doing so at the same time once more to recognize himself therein4 ,this purpose he achieved by the alteration he effects in such external objects1 upon which he imprints the seal of his inner life1 rediscovering in them thereby the features of his own determinate nature4 ,and man does all this1 in order that he may as a free agent divest the external world of its stubborn alienation from himself--and in order that he may enjoy in the configuration of objective fact an external reality simply of himself4 ,the very first impulse of the child implies in essentials this practical process of deliberate change in external fact4 ,a boy throws stones into the stream1 and then looks with wonder at the circles which follow in the water1 regarding them as a result in which he sees something of his own doing4 ,this human need runs through the most varied phenomena up to that particular form of self-reproduction in the external fact which is presented us in human art4 ,and it is not merely in relation to external objects that man acts thus4 ,he treats himself1 that is1 his natural form1 in a similar manner3 he will not permit it to remain as he finds it2 he alters it deliberately4 ,this is the rational ground of all ornament and decoration1 though it may be as barbarous1 tasteless1 entirely disfiguring1 nay1 as injurious as the crushing of the feet of ,chinese ladies1 or the slitting of ears and lips4 ,for it is among the really cultured alone that a change of figure1 behaviour1 and every mode and manner of self-expression will issue in harmony with the dictates of mental elevation#ef4 ,this universal demand for artistic expression#eg is based on the rational impulse in man's nature to exalt both the world of his soul experience and that of ,nature for himself into the conscious embrace of mind as an object in which he rediscovers himself4 ,he satisfies the demand of this spiritual freedom by making explicit to1 his inner life all that exists1 no less than from the further point of view giving a realized external embodiment to the self made thus explicit4 ,and by this reduplication of what is his own he places before the vision and within the cognition of himself and others what is within him4 ,this is the free rationality of man1 in which art as also all action and knowledge originates4 ,we shall investigate at a later stage the specific need for art as compared with that for other political and ethical action1 or that for religious ideas and scientific knowledge4 #b4 ,we have hitherto considered the work of art under the aspect that it is fashioned by man2 we will now pass over to the second part of our definition1 that it is produced for his sense-apprehension1 and consequently is to a more or less degree under obligations to a sensuous medium4 7a7 ,this reflection has been responsible for the inference that the function of fine art is to arouse feeling1 more precisely the feeling which suits us--that is1 pleasant feeling4 ,from such a point of view writers have converted the investigation of fine art into a treatise on the emotions and asked what kind of feelings art ought to excite--take fear1 for example1 and compassion--with the further question how such can be regarded as pleasant1 how1 in short1 the contemplation of a misfortune can bring satisfaction4 ,this tendency of reflection dates for the most part from the times of ,moses ,mendelssohn1 and many such trains of reasoning may be found in his writings4 ,a discussion of this kind1 however1 did not carry the problem far4 ,feeling is the undefined obscure region of spiritual life4 ,what is felt1 remains cloaked in the form of the separate personal experience under its most abstract persistence#eh2 and for this reason the distinctions of feeling are wholly abstract2 they are not distinctions which apply to the subject-matter itself4 ,to take examples--fear1 anxiety1 care1 dread1 are of course one type of emotion under various modifications2 but in part they are purely quantitative degrees of intensity1 and in part forms which reflect no light1 on their content itself1 but are indifferent to it4 ,in the case of fear1 for instance1 an existence is assumed1 for which the individual in question possesses an interest1 but sees at the same time the negative approach which threatens to destroy this existence1 and thereupon discovers in immediate fusion within himself the above interest and the approach of that negative as a contradictory affection of his personal life4 ,a fear of this sort1 however1 does not on its own account condition any particular content2 it may associate with itself subject-matter of the most opposed and varied character4 ,the feeling merely as such is in short a wholly empty form of a subjective state4 ,such a form may no doubt in certain cases itself be essentially complex1 as we find it is with hope1 pain1 joy1 and pleasure2 it may also in this very complexity appropriate various modes of content1 as1 for example1 we have a feeling of justice1 an ethical feeling1 a sublime religious feeling1 and so forth2 but despite the fact that a content of this kind is present in different modes of feeling1 no light whatever is thereby thrown on such content which will disclose its essential and definite character4 ,the feeling throughout remains a purely subjective state which belongs to me1 one in which the concrete fact vanishes1 as though contracted to a vanishing point in the most abstract of all spheres#ei4 ,for this reason an inquiry over the nature of the emotions which art ought or ought not to arouse1 comes simply to a standstill in the undefined2 it is an investigation which deliberately abstracts from genuine content and its concrete substance and notion4 ,reflection upon feeling is satisfied with the observation of the personal emotional state and its singularity1 instead of penetrating and sounding the matter for study1 in other words the work of art1 and in doing so bidding good-bye to the wholly subjective state and its conditions4 ,in feeling1 however1 it is just this subjective state void of content which is not merely accepted1 but becomes the main thing2 and that is precisely why people are so proud of having emotions4 ,and for no other reason that is why such an investigation is tedious owing to its indefinite nature and emptiness1 and even repellent in its attention to trivial personal idiosyncrasies4 7b7 ,inasmuch1 however1 as the work of art is not merely concerned with exciting some kind of emotion or other--for this is an object it would share without any valid distinction with eloquence1 historical composition1 religious edification and much else--but is only a work of art in so far as it is beautiful1 it occurred to reflective minds to discover a specific feeling for beauty1 and a distinct sense faculty correspondent with it4 ,in such an inquiry it soon became clear that a sense of this kind was no definite and mere#fj instinct rigidly fixed by ,nature1 which was able by itself and independently to distinguish the beautiful4 ,as a consequence the demand was made for culture as a condition precedent to such a sense1 and the sense of beauty as thus cultivated was called taste1 which1 albeit an instructed apprehension and discovery of the beautiful1 was none the less assumed to persist in the character of immediate feeling4 ,we have already discussed the way in which abstract theory attempted to form such a sense of taste1 and how external and one-sided that sense remained4 ,while the critical sense generally of the time when such ideas were in currency was lacking in the universality of its principles1 as a specific critique of particular works of art it was less concerned to substantiate a judgment more decisive than hitherto--indeed the material to effectuate this was not as yet forthcoming--than to promote in a general way the cultivation of such a taste#fa4 ,consequently this educative process also came to a halt in the region of the more indefinite1 and merely busied itself by its reflections in the fitting out of feeling as a sense of beauty in such a way that beauty could immediately be discovered whenever and wherever it might chance to appear4 ,the real depth of the subject-matter remained notwithstanding a closed book to such a taste4 ,profundity of this kind demands not merely sensitive reception and abstract thought1 but the reason in its concrete grasp and the most sterling qualities of soul-life4 ,taste on the contrary is merely directed to the outside surfaces1 which are the playground of the feelings1 and upon which one-sided principles may very well pass1 as currency4 ,but for this very reason our so-called good taste is scared by every kind of profounder artistic effect1 and is dumb where the ideal significance#fb is in question1 and all mere externalities and accessories vanish4 ,for when great passions and the movements of a profound soul assert themselves1 we do not bother ourselves any more with the finer distinctions of taste and its retail traffic in trifles4 ,it is#fc conscious that genius leaves such ground far behind it in its stride2 and shrinking before that power feels on its part far from comfortable1 not knowing very well which way to turn4 7c7 ,thus it is the further change has come about that critics of art-production no longer have an eye simply to the education of taste1 or are intent upon the illustration of such a sense4 ,the connoisseur1 or art-scholar1 has taken the place of the man1 or judge of artistic taste4 ,the positive side of art-scholarship1 in so far as it implies a sound and exhaustive acquaintance with the entire embrace of what is distinctive and peculiar in a given work of art1 we have already maintained to be a necessary condition of artistic research4 ,a work of art1 owing to its nature1 which1 if it is material from one point of view1 is also related to a particular person1 originates from specific conditions of the most varied kind1 among which as exceptionally important we may mention the date and place of its origins1 the characteristic personality of the artist1 and1 above all1 the degree of executive accomplishment secured by the art4 ,all these points of view have to be taken into consideration if we wish to obtain a view and knowledge of such a work which is clear in its outlines1 and founded on a true basis1 nay1 even wish to enjoy it rightly4 ,it is with these that our art-scholarship is mainly occupied2 and all that it can do for us in this way should be gratefully accepted4 ,though it is quite true such art-scholarship must be reckoned as of essential importance1 it ought not to be regarded as the sole1 or indeed the highest1 constituent in the relation of the contemplative spirit to a work of art and art generally4 ,such art-scholarship 7this is the defective tendency7 may restrict itself wholly to a knowledge of purely external characteristics1 either on the side of technique or historical condition1 or in other directions2 it may continue to possess the barest inkling of the true nature of a given work1 or simply no knowledge at all4 ,it may even form a depreciatory verdict on the value of profounder inquiries as compared with purely matter of fact1 technical1 and historical knowledge4 ,yet even so an art-scholarship1 assuming it to be really genuine and thorough1 at least proceeds upon grounds and knowledge which are definite1 and an intelligent judgment2 and it is association with such that our more accurate review of the distinct1 if also to some extent exterior1 aspects of a work of art1 and our estimate of their relative significance1 is secured4 7d7 ,following the above observations upon the modes of inquiry which were suggested by that aspect of a work of art in which1 as itself an object with a material medium1 it possessed an essential relation to man as himself receptive through sense1 we will now examine this point of view in its more essential connection with art itself4 ,we propose to do this partly 77 in respect to the art-product viewed as an object1 partly 77 as regards the personal characteristics of the artist1 his genius1 talent1 and so forth4 ,we do not1 however1 propose to enter into matter which can in this connection exclusively proceed from the knowledge of art according to its universal concept#fd4 ,the truth is we are not as yet in the full sense on scientific ground2 we have merely reached the province of external reflection4 77 ,there is no question1 then1 that a work of art is presented to sensuous apprehension4 ,it is submitted to the emotional sense1 whether outer or inner1 to sensuous perception and the imaged sense1 precisely as the objective world is so presented around us1 or as is our own inward sensitive nature4 ,even a speech1 for example1 may be addressed to the sensuous imagination and feeling4 ,notwithstanding this fact1 however1 the work of art is not exclusively directed to the sensuous apprehension1 viewed1 that is1 as an object materially conditioned4 ,its position is of the nature1 that along with its sensuous presentation it is fundamentally addressed to the mind4 ,the mind is intended to be affected by it and to receive some kind of satisfaction in it4 ,this function of the work of art at once makes it clear how it is that it is in no way intended to be a natural product or1 on the side where it impinges on ,nature1 to possess the living principle of ,nature4 ,this1 at least1 is a fact whether the natural product is ranked lower or higher than a mere work of art1 as people are accustomed to express themselves in the tone of depreciation4 ,in other words the sensuous aspect of a work of art has a right to determinate existence only in so far as it exists for the human mind1 not1 however1 in so far as itself1 as a material object1 exists for itself independently4 ,if we examine more closely in what way the sensuous materia is presented to man we find that what is so can be placed under various relations to the mind4 77 ,the lowest in grade and that least compatible with relation to intelligence is purely sensuous sensation4 ,it consists primarily in mere looking1 listening1 just as in times of mental overstrain it may often be a relaxation to go about without thought1 and merely listen and have a look round4 ,the mind1 however1 does not rest in the mere apprehension of external objects through sight and hearing2 it makes them objective to its own inward nature1 which thereupon1 is impelled itself to give effect to itself in these things as a further step under a sensuous mode1 in other words1 it relates itself to them as desire4 ,in this appetitive relation to the external world man1 as a sensuous#fe particular thing1 stands in a relation of opposition1 to things in general as in the same way particulars4 ,he does not address himself to them with open mind and the universal ideas of thought2 he retains an isolated position1 with its personal impulses and interests1 relatively to objects as fixed in their obduracy as himself1 and makes himself at home in them by using them1 or eating them up altogether1 and1 in short1 gives effect to his self-satisfaction by the sacrifice he makes of them4 ,in this negative relation desire requires for itself not merely the superficial show of external objects1 but the actual things themselves in their material concrete existence4 ,mere pictures of the wood1 which it seeks to make use of1 or of the animals1 which it hopes to eat up1 would be of no service to desire4 ,just as little is it possible for desire to suffer the object to remain in its freedom2 its craving is just this to force it to annihilate this self-subsistency and freedom of external facts1 and to demonstrate that these things are only there to be destroyed and devoured4 ,but at the same time the particular person is neither himself free1 begirt as he is by the particular limited and transitory interests of his desires1 for his definite acts do not proceed from the essential universality and rationality of his will1 neither is he free relatively to the external world1 for desire#ff remains essentially determined by things and related to them4 ,this relation1 then1 of desire is not that in which man is related to the work of art4 ,he suffers it to exist in its free independence as an object2 he associates himself with it without any craving of this kind1 rather as with an object reflective of himself#fg1 which exists solely for the contemplative faculty of mind4 ,for this reason1 as we have said1 the work of art1 although it possesses sensuous existence1 does not require sensuous concrete existence1 nor yet the animated life of such objects4 ,or1 rather1 we should add1 it ought not to remain on such a level1 in so far as its true function is exclusively to satisfy spiritual interests1 and to shut the door on all approach to mere desire4 ,hence we can understand how it is that practical desire rates the particular works of ,nature in the organic or inorganic world1 which are at its service1 more highly than works of art1 which are obviously useless in this sense1 and only contribute enjoyment to other capacities of man's spirit4 77 ,a second mode under which the externally present comes before the conscious subject is1 as contrasted with the single sensuous perception and active desire1 the purely theoretical relation to the intelligence4 ,the theoretic contemplation of objects has no interest in consuming the same in their particularity and satisfying or maintaining itself through the sense by their means2 its object is to attain a knowledge of them in their universality1 to seek out their ideal nature and principle1 to comprehend them according to their notional idea4 ,consequently this contemplative interest is content to leave the particular things as they are1 and stands aloof from them in their objective singularity1 which is not the object of such a faculty's investigation4 ,for the rational intelligence is not a property of the particular person in the sense that desire is so2 it appertains to his singularity as being itself likewise essentially universal4 ,so long as it persists in this relation of universality to the objects in question1 it is his reason in its universal potency which is attempting to discover itself in ,nature1 and thereby the inward or essential being of the natural objects1 which his sensuous existence does not present under its mode of immediacy1 although such existence is founded therein4 ,this interest of contemplation1 the satisfaction of which is the task of science1 is1 however1 shared in this scientific form just as little by art as it shared in the common table of those impulses of the purely practical desire4 ,science can1 it is true1 take as its point of departure the sensuous thing in its singularity1 and possess itself of some conception1 how this individual thing is present in its specific colour or form4 ,but for all that this isolated thing of sense as such possesses no further relation to mind1 inasmuch as the interest of intelligence makes for the universal1 the law1 the thought and notion of the object1 and consequently not only does it forsake it in its immediate singularity1 but it actually transforms it within the region of idea#fh1 converting a concrete object of sense into an abstract subject-matter of thought1 that is converting it into something other than the same object of its sensuous perception actually was4 ,the artistic interest does not follow such a process1 and is distinct from that of science for this reason4 ,the contemplation of art restricts its interest simply in the way in which the work of art1 as external object1 in the directness of its definition1 and in the singularity wherein it appears to sense1 is manifested in all its features of colour1 form1 and sound1 or as a single isolated vision of the whole2 it does not go so far beyond the immediately received objective character as to propose1 as is the case with science1 the ideal or conceptive thinking of this particular objectivity under the terms of the rational and universal notion which underlies it4 ,the interest of art1 therefore1 is distinguishable from the practical interest of desire in virtue of the fact that it suffers its object to remain in its free independence1 whereas desire applies it1 even to the point of destruction1 to its own uses4 ,the contemplation of art1 on the other hand1 differs from that of a scientific intelligence in an analogous way#fi in virtue of the fact that it cherishes an interest for the object in its isolated existence1 and is not concerned to transform the same into terms of universal thought and notion4 77 ,it follows1 then1 that1 though the sensuous materia is unquestionably present in a work of art1 it is only as surface or show of the sensuous that it is under any necessity to appear4 ,in the sensuous appearance of the work of art it is neither the concrete material stuff1 the empirically perceived completeness and extension of the internal organism which is the object of desire1 nor is it the universal thought of pure ideality1 which in either case the mind seeks for4 ,its aim is the sensuous presence1 which1 albeit suffered to persist in its sensuousness1 is equally entitled to be delivered from the framework of its purely material substance4 ,consequently1 as compared with the immediately envisaged and incorporated object of ,nature1 the sensuous presence in the work of art is transmuted to mere semblance or show1 and the work of art occupies a midway ground1 with the directly perceived objective world on one side and the ideality of pure thought on the other4 ,it is not as yet pure thought1 but1 despite the element of sensuousness which adheres to it1 it is no longer purely material existence1 in the sense at least that stones1 plants1 and organic life are such4 ,the sensuous element in a work of art is rather itself somewhat of ideal intension#gj1 which1 however1 as not being actually the ideal medium of thought1 is still externally presented at the same time as an object4 ,this semblance of the sensuous presents itself to the mind externally as the form1 visible appearance1 and harmonious vibration of things4 ,this is always assuming that it suffers the objects to remain in their freedom as objective facts1 and does not seek to penetrate into their inward essence by abstract thought1 for by doing so they would 7as above explained7 entirely cease to exist for it in their external singularity4 ,for this reason the sensuous aspect of art is only related to the two theoretical#ga senses of sight and hearing2 smell1 on the other hand1 taste1 and the feeling of touch are excluded from the springs of art's enjoyment4 ,smell1 taste1 and touch come into contact with matter simply as such#gb1 and with the immediate sensuous qualities of the same2 smell with the material volatization through the air2 taste with the material dissolution of substance1 and touch or mere bodily feeling with qualities such as heat1 coldness1 smoothness1 and so forth4 ,on this account these senses cannot have to do with the objects of art1 which ought to subsist in their actual and very independence1 admitting of no purely sensuous or rather physical relation4 ,the pleasant for such senses is not the beauty of art4 ,thus art on its sensuous side brings before us deliberately merely a shadow-world of shapes1 tones1 and imaged conceptions#gc1 and it is quite beside the point to maintain that it is simply a proof of the impotence and limitations of man that he can only present us with the surface of the physical world1 mere schemata1 when he calls into being his creative works4 ,in art these sensuous shapes and tones are not offered as exclusively for themselves and their form to our direct vision4 ,they are presented with the intent to secure in such shape satisfaction for higher and more spiritual interests1 inasmuch as they are mighty to summon an echo and response in the human spirit evoked from all depths of its conscious life4 ,in this way the sensuous is spiritualized in art1 or1 in other words1 the life of spirit comes to dwell in it under sensuous guise4 77 ,for this reason1 however1 a product of art is only possible in so far as it has received its passage through the mind1 and has originated from the productive activity of mind4 ,this brings us to another question we have to answer1 and it is this3 ,how is the sensuous or material aspect1 which is imperative as a condition of art1 operative in the artist as conjoined to his personal productive activity#gd8 ,now this mode or manner of artistic production contains1 as an activity personal to the artist1 in essentials just the same determinants which we found posited in the work of art4 ,it must be a spiritual activity1 which1 however1 at the same time possesses in itself the element of sensuousness and immediacy4 ,it is neither1 on the one hand1 purely mechanical work1 such as is purely unconscious facility in sleight of hand upon physical objects1 or a stereotyped activity according to teachable rule of thumb2 nor1 on the other hand1 is it a productive process of science1 which tends to pass from sensuous things to abstract ideas and thoughts1 or is active exclusively in the medium of pure thought4 ,in contrast to these the two aspects of mental idea and sensuous material must in the artistic product be united4 ,for example1 it would be possible in the case of poetical compositions to attempt to embody what was the subject-matter in the form of prosaic thought in the first instance1 and only after doing so to attach to the same imaginative ideas rhymes and so on1 so that as a net result such imagery would be appendent to the abstract reflections as so much ornament and decoration4 ,an attempt of this kind1 however1 could only lead us to a poor sort of poetry1 for in it we should have operative a twofold kind of activity in its separation1 which in the activity of genuine artistic work only holds good in inseparable unity4 ,it is this true kind of creative activity which forms what is generally described as the artistic imagination4 ,it is the rational element1 which in its import as spirit only exists1 in so far as it actively forces its way into the presence of consciousness1 yet likewise1 and only subject to this condition1 displays all its content to itself under a sensuous form4 ,this activity possesses therefore a spiritual content1 but it clothes the same in sensuous image1 and for this reason that it is only able to come to a knowledge of the same under this sensuous garb4 ,we may compare such a process with that of a man of experience in life1 a man1 shall we add1 of real geniality and wit1 who--while at the same time being fully conscious in what the main importance of life consists1 what are the things which essentially bind men together1 what moves them and is the mainspring of their lives--nevertheless has neither brought home this content in universal maxims1 nor indeed is able to unfold it to others in the generalities of the reflective process1 but makes these mature results of his intelligence without exception clear to himself and others in particular cases1 whether real or invented1 or by examples and such like which hit the mark4 ,for in the ideas of such a man everything shapes itself into the concrete image determinate in its time and place1 to which therefore the addition of names and any other detail of external condition causes no difficulty4 ,yet such a kind of imagination rather rests on the recollection of conditions1 he has lived through1 actual experience1 than it is a creative power of itself4 ,memory preserves and renews the particularity and external fashion of such previous events with all their more distinct circumstances1 but on the other hand does not suffer the universal to appear independently4 ,the creative imagination of an artist is the imagination of a great mind and a big heart2 it is the grasp and excogitation of ideas and shapes1 and1 in fact1 nothing less than this grasp of the profoundest and most embracing human interests in the wholly definite presentation of imagery borrowed from objective experience4 ,a consequence of this is1 that imagination of this type#ge is based in a certain sense on a natural gift1 a general talent for it1 as we say1 because its creative power essentially implies an aspect of sense presentation4 ,it is no doubt not unusual to speak in the same way of scientific talent4 ,the sciences1 however1 merely presuppose the general capacity for thought1 which does not possess1 as imagination does1 together with its intellectual activity1 a reference to the concrete testimony of ,nature1 but rather precisely abstracts from the activity that form in which we find it in ,nature4 ,it would be1 therefore1 truer to the mark if we said there is no specific scientific talent in the sense of a purely natural endowment4 ,imagination#gf1 on the other hand1 combines within it a mode of instinct-like creativeness4 ,in other words the essential plasticity and material element in a work of art is subjectively present in the artist as part of his native disposition and impulse#gg1 and as his unconscious activity belongs in part to that which man receives straight from ,nature4 ,no doubt the entire talent and genius of an individual is not wholly exhausted by that we describe as natural capability4 ,the creation of art is quite as much a spiritual and self-cognized process2 but for all that we affirm that its spirituality contains an element of plastic or configurative facility which ,nature#gh confers on it4 ,for this reason1 though almost anybody can reach a certain point in art1 yet1 in order to pass beyond this--and it is here that the art in question really begins--a talent for art which is inborn and of a higher order altogether is indispensable4 ,considered simply as a natural basis a talent of this kind asserts itself for the most part in early youth1 and is manifested in the restless persistency1 ever intent with vivacity and alertness1 to create artistic shapes in some particular sensuous medium1 and to make this mode of expression and utterance the unique one or the one of main importance and most suitable4 ,and thus also a virtuosity up to a certain point in the technique of art which is arrived at with ease is a sign of inborn talent4 ,a sculptor finds everything convertible into plastic shape1 and from early days takes to modelling clay2 and so on generally whatever men of such innate powers have in their minds1 whatever excites and moves their souls1 becomes forthwith a plastic figure1 a drawing1 a melody1 or a poem4 77 ,thirdly1 and in conclusion3 the content of art is also in some respects borrowed from the objective world perceived in sense1 that is ,nature2 or1 in any case1 if the content is also of a spiritual character1 it can only be grasped in such a way1 that the spiritual element therein1 as human relations1 for example1 are displayed in the form of phenomena which possess objective reality4 #c4 ,there is yet another question to solve1 namely1 what the interest or the ,end is1 which man proposes to himself in the creation of the content embodied by a work of art4 ,this was1 in fact1 the third point of view1 which we propounded relatively to the art-product4 ,its more detailed discussion will finally introduce us to the true notional concept of art itself4 ,if we take a glance at our ordinary ideas on this subject1 one of the most prevalent is obviously 7a7 ,the principle of the imitation of ,nature4 ,according to this view the essential aim or object of art consists in imitation1 by which is understood a facility in copying natural forms as present to us in a manner which shall most fully correspond to such facts4 ,the success of such an exact representation of ,nature is assumed to afford us complete satisfaction4 77 ,now in this definition there is to start with absolutely nothing but the formal aim to bring about the bare repetition a second time by man1 so far as his means will permit of this1 of all that was already in the external world1 precisely too in the way it is there4 ,a repetition of this sort may at once be set down as 77 ,a superfluous task for the reason that everything which pictures1 theatrical performances represent by way of imitation--animals1 natural scenery1 incidents of human life--we have already elsewhere before us in our gardens or at home1 or in other examples of the more restricted or extended reaches of our personal acquaintance4 ,looked at1 moreover1 more closely1 such a superfluity of energy can hardly appear otherwise than a presumptuous trifling2 it is so because 77 ,it lags so far behind ,nature4 ,in other words art is limited in its means of representation4 ,it can only produce one-sided illusions1 a semblance1 to take one example1 of real fact addressed exclusively to one sense4 ,and1 moreover1 if it does wholly rely on the bare aim of mere imitation1 instead of ,nature's life all it gives us ever is the mere pretence of its substance4 ,for some such reason the ,turks1 who are ,mohammedans1 will not put up with any pictures or copies of men and other objects4 ,when ,james ,bruce1 in his travels through ,abyssinia1 showed a painted fish to a ,turk1 that worthy was at first astonished2 but1 quickly recovering himself1 he made answer as follows3 ,if this fish shall rise up against you at the last day1 and say1 ',you have certainly given me a body1 but no living soul1' how are you going to justify yourself against such a complaint8 ,the prophet himself1 moreover1 if we may believe the ,sunna1 said to the two women ,ommi ,hubiba and ,ommi ,selma1 who told him of certain pictures in the ,aethiopian churches3 ,these pictures will rise up in judgment against their creators on the ,last ,day4 ,there are1 no doubt1 no less examples of completely deceptive imitation4 ,the painted grapes of ,zeuxis1 have been accepted from antiquity and long after as an instance of art's triumph1 and also of that of the principle of imitation1 because1 we are told1 actual doves pecked at them4 ,we might add to this ancient example that more modern one of ,bltner's monkey1 which bit to pieces a painted cockchafer in ,rsel's ,diversions of ,insects1 and was consequently forgiven by his master1 although he destroyed by this means a fine copy of the precious work1 because he proved thus the excellence of its illustrations4 ,but if we will only reflect a moment on such and other instances we can only come to the conclusion that instead of praising works of art1 because they have deceived even doves and monkeys1 the foolish people ought to be condemned who imagine that the quality of a work of art is enhanced if they are able to proclaim an effect of the same so miserable as the supreme and last word they can say for it4 ,in short1 to sum up1 we may state emphatically that in the mere business of imitation art cannot maintain its rivalry with ,nature1 and if it makes the attempt it must look like a worm which undertakes to crawl after an elephant4 77 ,having regard1 then1 to this invariable failure1 that is1 relative failure of human imitation as contrasted with the natural prototype1 we have no end left us but the pleasure offered by sleight of hand in its effort to produce something which resembles ,nature4 ,and it is unquestionably a fact that mankind are able to derive enjoyment from the attempt to reproduce with their individual labour1 skill1 and industry what they find around them4 ,but a delight and admiration of this kind also becomes1 if taken alone#gi1 indeed just in proportion as the copy follows slavishly the thing copied1 so much the more icily null and cold1 or brings its reaction of surfeit and repugnance4 ,there are portraits which1 as has been drily remarked1 are positively shameless in their likeness#hj2 and ,kant brings forward a further example of this pleasure in imitation pure and simple to the effect that we are very soon tired of a man--and there really are such--who is able to imitate the nightingale's song quite perfectly2 for we no sooner find that it is a man who is producing the strain than we have had enough of it4 ,we then take it to be nothing but a clever trick1 neither the free outpouring of ,nature1 nor yet a work of art4 ,we expect1 in short1 from the free creative power of men something quite other than a music of this kind1 which only retains our interest when1 as in the case of the nightingale's note1 it breaks forth in unpremeditated fashion1 resembling in this respect the rhythmic flood of human feeling1 from the native springs of its life4 ,and as a general rule this delight we experience in the skill of imitation can only be of a restricted character2 it becomes a man better to derive enjoyment from that which he brings to birth from himself4 ,in this respect the invention of every insignificant technical product is of higher rank2 and mankind may feel more proud at having invented the hammer1 nail1 and so forth1 than in making themselves adepts as imitators4 ,for this abstract zest in the pursuit of imitation is on the same lines as the feat of the man who had taught himself to throw lentils through a small aperture without missing4 ,he made an exhibition of this feat to ,alexander1 and ,alexander merely made him a present as a reward for this art1 empty and useless as it was1 of a bushel of lentils4 77 ,inasmuch as1 moreover1 the principle of imitation is purely formal1 objective beauty itself disappears1 if that principle is accepted as the end4 ,for the question is then no longer what is the constitution of that which is to be imitated1 but simply whether the copy is correct or no4 ,the object and the content of the beautiful comes to be regarded as a matter of indifference4 ,when1 in other words1 putting the principle of mere imitation on one side1 we speak1 in connection with animals1 human beings1 places1 actions1 and characters1 of a distinction between beauty and ugliness1 it remains none the less the fact that relatively to such a principle we are referring to a distinction which does not properly belong to an art for which we have appropriated this principle of imitation to the exclusion of all others4 ,in such a case1 therefore1 whenever we select objects and attempt to distinguish between their beauty and ugliness1 owing to this absence of a standard we can apply to the infinite forms of ,nature1 we have in the final resort only left us the personal taste1 which is fixed by no rule1 and admits of no discussion4 ,and1 in truth1 if we start1 in the selection of objects for representation1 from that which mankind generally discover as beautiful and ugly1 and accept accordingly for artistic imitation1 in other words1 form their particular taste1 there is no province in the domain of the objective world which is not open to us1 and which is hardly likely to fail to secure its admirer4 ,at any rate1 among men we may assume1 that1 though the case of every husband and his wife may be disputed1 yet at least every bridegroom regards his bride as beautiful1 very possibly being the only person who does so2 and that an individual taste for a beauty of this kind admits of no fixed rules at all may be regarded as a bit of luck for both parties4 ,if1 moreover1 we cast a glance wholly beyond mere individuals and their accidental taste to that of nations1 this again is full of diversity and opposition4 ,how often we hear it repeated that a ,european beauty would not please a ,chinaman1 or even a ,hottentot--a ,chinaman having a totally distinct notion of beauty from that of a black man1 and the black man in his turn from that of a ,european4 ,indeed1 if we consider the works of art of those extra-,european peoples1 their images of gods1 for instance1 which have been imaginatively conceived as worthy of veneration and sublime1 they can only appear to us as frightful idols2 their music will merely ring in our ears as an abominable noise1 while1 from the opposite point of view1 such aliens will regard our sculptures1 paintings1 and musical compositions as having no meaning or actually ugly4 77 ,but even assuming that we abstract from an objective principle of art1 and retain the beautiful as established on the subjective and individual taste1 we shall soon discover1 from the point of view of art itself1 that the imitation of natural objects1 which appeared to be a universal principle1 and indeed one secured by important authorities1 is not to be relied upon1 at least under this general and wholly abstract conception of it4 ,if we look at the particular arts we cannot fail to observe that1 albeit painting and sculpture portray objects which resemble those of ,nature1 or the type of which is essentially borrowed from ,nature1 the works of architecture on the contrary--and this1 too1 is one of the fine arts--quite as little as the compositions of poetry1 to the extent at least that these latter are not restricted to mere description1 cannot justly be described as imitations of ,nature4 ,at any rate1 if we are desirous of maintaining such a thesis with respect to the arts thus excluded1 we should find ourselves forced to make important deviations from the track1 in order to condition our proposition in various ways1 and level down our so-called truth at least to the plane of probability4 ,but once accept probability1 and we should again be confronted with a great difficulty in determining precisely what is and what is not probable2 and in the end no one could really think of or succeed1 even if he did so1 in excluding from poetry all compositions of an entirely capricious and completely imaginative#ha character4 ,the end or object of art must therefore consist in something other than the purely formal#hb imitation of what is given to objective sense1 which invariably can merely call into being technical legerdemain and not works of art#hc4 ,it is no doubt an essential constituent of a work of art that it should have natural forms as a foundation1 because the mode of its representation is in external form1 and thereby along with it in that of natural phenomena4 ,in painting it is obviously an important study to learn to copy with accuracy colours in their mutual relations1 such as light effects and reflections1 and so forth1 and1 with no less accuracy1 the forms and shapes of objects carried into their most subtle gradations of line4 ,it is in this respect that in modern times more particularly the principle of the imitation of ,nature and naturalism generally has come into vogue4 ,the object has been to recall an art1 which has deteriorated into weakness and nebulosity1 to the strength and determinate outlines of ,nature1 or1 in yet another direction1 as against the purely arbitrary caprice and convention of a studio1 which is in truth as remote from ,nature as it is from art1 and merely indicates the path of art's declension1 to assert the claim of the legitimate1 direct1 and independent1 no less than coherent stability of natural fact4 ,but while admitting that from a certain point of view such an effort is reasonable enough1 yet for all that the naturalism which it demands1 taken by itself1 is neither the substantive thing1 not yet of primary importance1 in the true basis of art2 and although the external fact in its natural appearance constitutes an element of essential value1 yet the objective fact alone does not supply the standard of rightness1 nor is the mere imitation of external phenomena1 in their external shape that is1 the end of art4 7b7 ,and as a consequence of this we have the further question--,what is the true content of art1 and with what aim is that content brought before us8 ,on this head we are confronted by the common opinion that it is the task and object of art to bring before our sense1 feeling1 and power of emulation#hd every thing that the spirit of man can perceive or conceive4 ,art has in short to realize for us the well-known saying1 ,nihil humani a me alienum puto4 ,its object is therefore declared to be that of arousing and giving life to slumbering emotions1 inclinations1 passions of every description1 of filling the heart up to the brim2 of compelling mankind1 whether cultured or the reverse1 to pass through all that the human soul carries in its most intimate and mysterious chambers1 all that it is able to experience and reproduce1 all that the heart is able to stir and evoke in its depths and its countlessly manifold possibilities2 and yet further to deliver to the domain of feeling and the delight of our vision all that the mind may possess of essential and exalted being in its thought and the ,idea--that majestic hierarchy of the noble1 eternal1 and true2 and no less to interpret for us misfortune and misery1 wickedness and crime2 to make the hearts of men realize through and through#he all that is atrocious and dreadful1 no less than every kind of pleasure and blessedness2 and last of all to start the imagination like a rover among the day-dream playing-fields of the fancy1 there to revel in the seductive mirage of visions and emotions which captivate the senses4 ,all this infinitely manifold content--so it is held--it is the function of art to explore1 in order that by this means the experience of our external life may be repaired of its deficiencies1 and yet from a further point of view that the passions we share with all men#hf may be excited1 not merely that the experiences of life may not have us unmoved1 but that we ourselves may thereafter long to make ourselves open channels of a universal experience4 ,such a stimulus is not presented on the plane of actual experience itself#hg1 but can only come through the semblance of it1 that is to say through the illusions which art1 in its creations1 substitutes for the actual world4 ,and the possibility of such a deception1 by means of the semblances of art1 depends on the fact that all reality must for man pass through the medium of the vision and imaginative idea2 and it is only after such a passage that it penetrates the emotional life and the will4 ,in such a process it is of no consequence whether it is immediate external reality which claims his attention1 or whether the result is effected by some other way1 in other words by means of images1 symbols1 and ideas1 which contain and display the content of such actuality4 ,men are able to imagine things1 which do not actually exist1 as if they did exist4 ,consequently it is precisely the same thing for our emotional life1 whether it is the objective world or merely the show of the same1 in virtue of which a situation1 a relation1 or any content of life1 in short1 is brought home to us4 ,either mode is equally able to stir in us an echo to the essential secret which it carries1 whether it be in grief or joy1 in agitation or convulsion1 and can cause to flow through us the feelings and passions of anger1 hate1 pity1 anxiety1 fear1 love1 reverence and admiration1 honour and fame4 ,the awakening of every kind of emotion in us1 the drawing our soul through every content of life1 the realization of all these movements of soul-life by means of a presence which is only external as an illusion--this it is which1 in the opinion described1 is pre-eminently regarded as the peculiar and transcendent power of artistic creation4 ,we must not1 however1 overlook the fact that in this view of art as a means to imprint on the soul and the mind what is good and evil alike1 to make man more strong in the pursuit of what is noblest1 no less than enervate his definite course#hh1 by transporting his emotional life through the most sensuous and selfish desires1 the task as yet proposed to art remains throughout of an entirely formal character2 without possessing independently an assured aim all that art can offer is the empty form for every possible kind of ideal and formative content4 7c7 ,as a matter of fact art does not possess this formal side1 namely1 that it is able to bring before our senses and feeling and artistically adorn every possible kind of material1 precisely as the thoughts of ordinary reflection#hi elaborate every possible subject-matter and modes of action1 supplying the same with its equipment of reasons and vindications4 ,in the presence1 however1 of such a variety of content we cannot fail to observe that these diversified emotions and ideas1 which it is assumed art has to stimulate or enforce1 intersect each other1 contradict and mutually cancel each other4 ,indeed1 under this aspect1 the more art inspires men to emotions thus opposed1 to that extent precisely it merely enlarges the cleavage in their feelings and passions1 and sets them staggering about in ,bacchantic riot1 or passes over into sophistry and scepticism precisely as your ordinary free thinkers do4 ,this variety of the material of art itself compels us1 therefore1 not to remain satisfied with so formal a determination4 ,our rational nature forces its way into this motley array of discord1 and demands to see the resurrection of a higher and more universal purpose from these elements despite their opposition1 and to be conscious of its attainment4 ,just in a similar manner the social life of mankind and the ,state are no doubt credited with the aim that in them all human capacities and all individual potencies should meet with expansion and expression in all their features and tendencies4 ,but in opposition to so formal a view there very quickly crops up the question in what unity these manifold manifestations are to be concentrated1 and what single end they must have for their fundamental concept and ultimate end4 ,just as in the case of the notional concept of the human ,state so too there arises in that of human art the need1 as to a part thereof1 for an end common to the particular aspects1 no less than in part for one which is more exalted and substantive in its character#ij4 ,as such a substantive end the conclusion of reflection is readily brought home to us that art possesses at once the power and function to mitigate the savagery of mere desires4 77 ,with regard to this first conception we have merely to ascertain what characteristic peculiar to art implies this possibility of eliminating this rawness of desire1 and of fettering and instructing the impulses and passions4 ,coarseness in general has its ground-root in an unmitigated self-seeking of sensuous impulses1 which take their plunge off and are exclusively intent on the satisfaction of their concupiscence4 ,sensual desire is1 however1 all the more brutal and domineering1 in proportion as1 in its isolation and confinement1 it appropriates the entire man1 so that he does not retain the power to separate himself in his universal capacity from this determinacy and to maintain the conscious presence of such universality#ia4 ,even if the man in such a case exclaims1 the passion is mightier than myself1 though it is true no doubt that for that man's mind the abstract ego is separate from the particular passion1 yet it is purely so in a formal way4 ,all that such a separation amounts to is that as against the force of the passion the ego1 in its universal form or competency1 is of no account at all4 ,the savageness of passion consists therefore in the fusion#ib of the ego as such a universal with the confined content of its desire1 so that a man no longer possesses volitional power outside this single passion4 ,such savageness and untamed force of the possibilities of passion art mitigates in the first instance to the extent that it brings home to the mind and imagination of man what he does actually feel and carry into effect in such a condition4 ,and even if art restricts itself to this that it places before the vision of the mind pictures of passion1 nay1 even assuming such to be flattering pictures1 yet for all that a power of amelioration is contained therein4 ,at least we may say1 that by this means is brought before a man's intelligence what apart from such presentment he merely is4 ,the man in this way contemplates his impulses and inclinations2 and whereas apart from this they whirl him away without giving him time to reflect1 he now sees them outside himself and already1 for the reason that they come before him rather as objects than a part of himself1 he begins to be free from them as aliens4 ,for this reason it may often happen that an artist1 under the weight of grief1 mitigates and weakens the intensity of his own emotions in their effect upon him by the artistic representation of them4 ,comfort1 too1 is to be found even in tears4 ,the man who to start with is wholly given up to and concentrated in sorrow1 is able thus1 at any rate1 to express that which is merely felt within in a direct way4 ,yet more alleviating is the utterance of such inner life in words1 images1 musical sound1 and shapes4 ,it was therefore a good old custom in the case of funerals and layings-out to appoint wailing women1 in order to give audible expression to grief1 or generally to create an external sympathy4 ,for manifestations of sympathy bring the content of human sorrow to the sufferer in an objective form2 he is by their repetition driven to reflect upon it1 and the burden is thereby made lighter4 ,and so it has from of old been considered that to weep or to speak oneself out are equally means whereby freedom is secured from the oppressing burden1 or at least the heart is appreciably lifted4 ,consequently the mitigation of the violence of passions admits of this general explanation that man is released from his unmediated confinement#ic in an emotion1 becomes aware of it as a thing external to himself1 to which he is consequently obliged to place himself in an ideal relation4 ,art1 while still remaining within the sphere of the senses1 faces man from the might of his sensitive experience by means of its representations4 ,no doubt we frequently hear that pet phrase of many that it is man's duty to remain in immediate union with ,nature4 ,such union is in its unmediated purity nothing more or less than savagery and wildness2 and art1 precisely in the way that it dissolves this unity for human beings1 lifts them with gentle hands over this inclosure in ,nature4 ,the way men are occupied with the objects of art's creation remains throughout of a contemplative#id character2 and albeit in the first instance it educates merely an attention to the actual facts portrayed1 yet over and beyond this1 and with a power no less decisive1 it draws man's attention to their significance1 it forces him to compare their content with that of others1 and to receive without reserve the general conclusions of such a survey and all the ramifications#ie such imply4 77 ,to the characteristic above discussed adheres in natural sequence the second which has been predicated of art as its essential aim1 namely1 the purification of the passions1 an instruction1 that is1 and a building to moral completeness4 ,for the defining role that art has to bridle savage nature and educate the passions remained one wholly formal and general1 so that the further question must arise as to a specific kind and an essential and culminating point of such an educative process4 77 ,the doctrine of the purification of the passions shares in the defect previously noted as adhering to the mitigation of desires4 ,it does1 however1 emphasize more closely the fact that the representations of art needed a standard1 by means of which it would be possible to estimate their comparative worth and unworth4 ,this standard is just their effectiveness to separate what is pure from that which is the reverse in the passions4 ,art1 therefore1 requires a content which is capable of expressing this purifying power1 and in so far as the power to assert such effectiveness is assumed to constitute the substantive end of art1 the purifying content will consist in asserting that effective power before consciousness in its universality and essentiality4#if 77 ,it is a deduction from the point of view just described that it is the end of art to instruct4 ,thus1 on the one hand1 the peculiar character of art consists in the movement of the emotions and in the satisfaction which is found in this movement1 even in fear1 compassion1 in painful agitation and shock--that is to say1 in the satisfying concern of the feelings and passions1 and to that extent in a complacent1 delighted1 or enthusiastic attitude to the objects of art and their presentation and effect3 while1 on the other hand1 this artistic object is held to discover its higher standard exclusively in its power to instruct1 in the fabula docet1 and thereby in the usefulness1 which the work of art is able to exercise on the recipient4 ,in this respect the ,horatian adage ,et prodesse volunt et delectare poetae#ig contains1 concentrated into a few words1 all that in after times has been drawn out as a doctrine of art through every conceivable grade of dilution to the last extreme of insipidity4 ,in respect1 then1 to such instruction we have to ask whether the idea is that the same ought to be direct or indirect in the work of art1 explicit or implicit4 ,now if the question at issue is one of general importance to art about a universal rather than contingent purpose1 such an ultimate end1 on account of the essential spirituality of art1 can only be itself of spiritual import2 in other words1 so far from being of accidental importance it must be true in virtue of its own nature and on its own account4 ,an end of this kind can only apply to instruction in so far as a genuine and essentially explicit content is brought before the mind by means of the work of art4 ,from such a point of view we are entitled to affirm that it is the function of art to accept so much the more of a content of this nature within its compass in proportion to the nobility of its rank1 and that only in the verity of such a content will it discover the standard according to which the pertinency of or the reverse of what is expressed is adjudged4 ,art is in truth the primary#ih instructress of peoples4 ,but1 on the other hand1 if the object of instruction is so entirely treated as an end that the universal nature of the content presented cannot fail to be asserted and rendered-bluntly and on its own account explicit as abstract thesis1 prosaic reflection or general maxim1 rather than merely in an indirect way contained by implication in the concrete embodiment of art1 then and in that case1 by means of such a separation1 the sensuous1 plastic configuration1 which is precisely that which makes the artistic product a work of art1 is merely an otiose accessory1 a husk1 a semblance1 which are expressly posited as nothing more than shell and semblance4 ,thereby the very nature of a work of art is abused4 ,for the work of art ought not to bring before the imaginative vision a content in its universality as such1 but rather this universality under the mode of individual concreteness and distinctive sensuous particularity4 ,if the work in question does not conform to such a principle1 but rather sets before us the generalization of its content with the express object of instruction pure and simple1 then the imaginative no less than the material aspect of it are merely an external and superfluous ornament1 and the work of art is itself a shattered thing within that ornament#ii1 a ruin wherein form and content no longer appear as a mutually adherent growth4 ,for1 in the case supposed1 the particular object of the senses and the ideal content apprehended by the mind#ajj have become external to one another4 ,furthermore1 if the object of art is assumed to consist in utilitarian instruction of this kind1 that other aspect of delight1 entertainment1 and diversion is simply abandoned on its own account as unessential2 it has now to look for its substance to the utility of the matter of instruction1 to which it is simply an accompaniment4 ,but this amounts to saying1 that art does not carry its vocation and purpose in itself1 but that its fundamental conception is in something else1 to which it subserves as a means4 ,art becomes1 in short1 merely one of the many means1 which are either of use1 or may be employed to secure1 the aim of instruction4 ,this brings us to the boundary line where art can only cease to be an end on its own independent account2 it is deliberately deposed either to the mere plaything of entertainment1 or a mere means of instruction4 77 ,the line of this limit is most emphasized when the question is raised as to the end or object of highest rank for the sake of which the passions have to be purified or men have to be instructed4 ,this goal has frequently in modern times been identified with moral improvement1 and the end of art is assumed to consist in this that its function is to prepare our inclinations and impulses1 and generally to conduct us to the supreme goal of moral perfection4 ,in this view we find instruction and purification combined4 ,the notion is that art by the insight it gives us of genuine moral goodness1 in other words1 through its instruction1 at the same time summons us to the process of purification1 and in this way alone can and ought to bring about the improvement of mankind as the right use they can make of it and its supreme object4 ,with reference to the relation in which art stands to the end of improvement1 we may practically say the same thing as we did about the didactic end4 ,it may readily be admitted that art as its principle ought not to make the immoral and its advance its end4 ,but it is one thing deliberately to make immorality the aim of its presentation and another not expressly to do so in the case of morality4 ,it is possible to deduce an excellent moral from any work of art whatever2 but such depends1 of course1 on a particular interpretation and consequently on the individual who draws the moral4 ,the defence is made of the most immoral representations on the ground that people ought to become acquainted with evil and sin in order to act morally4 ,conversely1 it has been maintained that the portrayal of ,mary ,magdalene1 the fair sinner1 who afterwards repented1 has seduced many into sin1 because art makes repentance look so beautiful1 and you must first sin before you can repent4 ,the doctrine of moral improvement1 however logically carried out1 is not merely satisfied that a moral should be conceivably deducible from a work of art through interpretation2 on the contrary1 it would have the moral instruction clearly made to emerge as the substantive aim of the work#aja2 nay1 further1 it would deliberately exclude from art's products all subjects1 characters1 actions1 and events which fail to be moral in its own sense4 ,for art1 in distinction from history and the sciences1 which have their subject-matter determined for them1 has a choice in the selection of its subjects4 ,in order that we may be in a position to estimate this view of the moral end of art on the basis of principle1 we ought above all to raise the question as to the precise standpoint of the morality which is recommended for our reception by this view4 ,if we examine more closely the standpoint of morality such1 as is submitted us to-day under an enlightened interpretation#ajb1 we soon discover that its conception does not immediately coincide with that which we describe in a general way as virtue1 respectability#ajc1 uprightness1 and so forth4 ,to be a respectable honest man is not sufficient to make a man moral in the sense under discussion1 for morality in this sense implies reflection and the definite consciousness of what is consonant with duty1 and the acts which issue from such a consciousness4 ,now duty is itself the law of the will1 which man1 however1 freely establishes out of himself1 and thereon is taken to determine himself to this duty for duty's sake and its fulfilment's sake2 in other words he only does good as acting under the conviction already secured that it is the good4 ,this law--the duty which is selected and carried into effect for duty's sake to be the rule of conduct out of free conviction and the inner conscience--is1 on its own account1 the abstract universal of the will1 which is the absolute antithesis to ,nature1 the impulses of sense1 selfish interests1 the passions and all that is commonly described collectively as emotional life and heart4 ,in this opposition the one side is regarded as negating the other2 and for the reason that both are present in the individual in their opposition1 he is compelled1 as determining himself from his own identity1 to adopt the choice of one to the rejection of the other4 ,such a decision and the act carried out in accordance with it merely become moral from the standpoint now considered on the one hand in virtue of the free conviction of duty1 and on the other by reason of the victory secured not only over the particular will1 the natural motives1 inclinations1 passions and so on1 but also in virtue of the noble feelings and higher impulses4 ,for the modern ethic starts from the fixed opposition between the will in its spiritual universality and its sensuous natural particularity2 it does not consist in the perfected mediation of these opposed aspects1 but in their mutual conflict as opposed to one another1 which carries with it the demand1 that the impulses in their antagonism to duty ought to yield to it4 ,an opposition of this nature is not merely present to mind in the restricted confines of moral action2 it asserts itself as a fundamental severation and antithesis between that which is actual essentially1 and on its own account1 and that which is external reality and existence#ajd4 ,apprehended in entirely formal terms it is the contrast exposed by the universal1 in so far as it is fixed in its substantive independence over against the particular1 as the latter is also on its part rigidly exterior to it4 ,in more concrete form it appears in ,nature as the opposition of the abstract law to the wealth of particular phenomena1 each of which possesses its specific characteristics4 ,it appears in mind as that between the sensuous and spiritual in man1 as the conflict of spirit with the flesh2 it is that of duty for duty's sake2 of the cold imperative with particular impulses1 the warm heart1 the sensuous inclinations and impulses1 in a word with man simply as individual4 ,or it appears as the harsh antagonism between the inward freedom and the external necessity of natural condition1 and1 lastly1 as the contradiction of the dead1 essentially emptied1 concept1 when confronted with the fulness of concrete life1 in other words1 of theory and subjective thought as contrasted with objective existence and experience4 ,such are antithetical points of view1 the discovery of which is not to be ascribed either to the ingenuity of reflective minds1 or the pedantry of a philosophical cult4 ,they have in all ages1 if in manifold guise1 occupied and disquieted the human consciousness1 although it is our more modern culture which has emphasized their opposition most deliberately1 and forced it in each case to the keenest edge of contradiction4 ,intellectual culture1 or rather the rapier edge of the modern understanding1 creates in man this contrast1 which converts him into some amphibious animal4 ,he is compelled to live in two worlds mutually contradictory2 and in this divided house consciousness1 too1 wanders aimlessly2 tossed over from one side to the other it is unable to discover permanent satisfaction#aje for itself in either one side or the other4 ,for1 on the one hand1 we see mankind confined within common reality and earthly temporal condition1 oppressed by necessity and want1 in ,nature's toils1 entangled in matter1 in sensuous aims and their enjoyment1 dominated and whirled away by impulse and passion4 ,on the other hand he lifts himself up to eternal idea's1 to a realm of thought and freedom4 ,as ,will he legislates for himself universal laws and destinations#ajf1 he disrobes the world of the life and blossom of its reality2 he dissolves it in abstractions1 that the mind may vindicate its right and intrinsic worth by this very dissolution of ,nature's rights and such maltreatment1 a process in which he brings home to her again the necessity and violence he has experienced at her hands4 ,such a cleavage of life and mind is1 however1 accompanied for modern culture with the demand that a contradiction so deep-seated should be dissolved4 ,the mere understanding of abstract reflection is unable to disengage itself from the obstinacy of such contradictions4 ,the solution consequently remains here for consciousness a mere ought1 and the present and reality is merely moved within the continuous unrest of a to and fro1 which seeks for that reconciliation it is unable to find4 ,the problem therefore arises whether such a many-sided and fundamental antagonism1 which is unable to pass beyond the mere ought and postulate of its solution1 can be the essential and wholly expressed truth1 and#ajg1 indeed1 the final and supreme consummation4 ,if the culture of the civilized world has fallen into such a contradiction it becomes the task of philosophy to dissolve the same1 in other words to demonstrate that neither the one side or the other1 in its one sided abstractness1 should be held to possess truth1 but that they contain within themselves the principle of their dissolution4 ,the truth only then comes before us in the reconciliation and mediation of both2 and this mediation is no mere postulate1 but is1 in its essential nature1 and in its actual presence the at the same time accomplished and self-accomplishing4 ,and1 in fact1 this view agrees directly with unwitting#ajh faith and will1 which always has before its conscious life this contradiction in its resolution1 and in action accepts it as its aim and carries it into effect4 ,all that philosophy achieves is to contribute the insight of thought into the essence of such cleavage4 ,it demonstrates1 or seeks to demonstrate1 how that which truth really is is simply the resolution of the fracture1 and1 be it added1 not in the sense that this antagonism and its alternative aspects in any way are not1 but in the sense that they are there#aji in reconciliation4 7d7 ,when discussing moral improvement as the ultimate end accepted for art it was found that its principle pointed to a higher standpoint4 ,it will be necessary also to vindicate this standpoint for art4 ,thereby the false position to which we have already directed attention vanishes1 namely1 that art has to serve as a means for moral ends and the moral end of the world generally by means of its didactive and ameliorating influence1 and by doing so has its essential aim not in itself1 but in something else4 ,if we therefore continue still to speak of an end or goal of art1 we must at once remove the perverse idea1 which in the question1 ,what is the end8 will still make it include the supplemental query1 ,what is the use8 ,the perverseness consists in this that the work of art would then have to be regarded as related to something else1 which is presented us as what is essential and ought to be4 ,a work of art would in that case be merely a useful instrument in the realization of an end which possessed real and independent importance outside the realm of art4 ,as opposed to this we must maintain that it is art's function to reveal truth under the mode of art's sensuous or material configuration1 to display the reconciled antithesis previously described1 and by this means to prove that it possesses its final aim in itself1 in this representation in short and self-revelation4 ,for other ends such as instruction1 purification1 improvement1 procuring of wealth1 struggle after fame and honour have nothing whatever to do with this work of art as such1 still less do they determine the fundamental idea#aaj of it4 ,it is then from this point of view1 into which the reflective consideration of our subject-matter finally issues1 that we have to grasp the fundamental idea of art in terms of its ideal or inward necessity1 as it is also from this point of view that historically regarded the true appreciation and acquaintance with art took its origin4 ,for that antithesis1 to which we have drawn attention1 did not merely assert its presence within the general thought of educated men1 but equally in philosophy as such4 ,it was only after philosophy was in a position to overcome this opposition absolutely that it grasped the fundamental notion of its own content1 and1 to the extent it did so1 the idea of ,nature and of art4 ,for this reason1 as this point of view implies the reawakening of philosophy in the widest connotation of the term1 so also it is the re-awakening of the science of art4 ,we may go further and affirm that aesthetic as a science is in a real sense primarily indebted to this re-awakening for its true origination1 and art for its higher estimation4 ,,iv ,from this point of transition1 ,i will briefly summarize the historical subject-matter that ,i have in my mind's eye1 partly on account of the historical importance itself1 and in part because thereby the points of view are more clearly indicated to which importance is attached1 and upon the basis of which we propose to continue the superstructure4 ,in its most general definition that basis consists in this1 that the beauty of art has become recognized as one of the means which resolve and bring back to unity that antithesis and contradiction between the mind and ,nature as they repose in abstract alienation from each other in themselves1 whether this latter is regarded as external phenomena or the inward world of individual feeling and emotion#aaa4 #a4 ,it was the philosophy of ,kant which1 in the first instance1 not merely experienced the want of such a point of union1 but secured definite knowledge of it and brought it clearly before the mind4 ,speaking generally1 ,kant accepted as his basis for intelligence no less than for the will the rationality which relates itself to itself or freedom1 the self-consciousness that discovers and knows itself essentially as infinite4 ,this knowledge of the absoluteness of reason in its essential substance1 which has proved in more modern times the turning-point of philosophy1 this absolute point of departure deserves recognition1 and does not admit of refutation1 even though in other respects the ,kantian philosophy is inadequate4 ,but at the same time it was ,kant who through falling back upon the fixed opposition between subjective thought and objective things1 between abstract universality and the sensuous individuality of the will1 in a pre-eminent degree strained to the extremest limit the very antithesis of morality we have previously adverted to1 inasmuch as over and above this he emphasized the practical operation of mind to the disadvantage of the contemplative4 ,in virtue of this fixity of the antithesis as cognized by the faculty of the understanding he had no other alternative than to express the unity exclusively in the form of subjective ideas for which no adequate reality could be demonstrated as correspondent2 or1 on its practical side1 as postulates1 which it was no doubt possible to deduce from the practical reason1 but whose essential being was not within the cognition of thought1 and the practical fulfilment of which remained throughout a mere ought deferred to infinity4 ,and for this reason1 though ,kant did actually bring the reconciled opposition within the compass of intelligible ideas1 he was neither able to develop its essential truth scientifically1 nor to assert the same as actual and exclusive reality4 ,unquestionably ,kant did press beyond this point1 in the sense1 that is to say1 that he discovered the unity demanded in what he called the intuitive understanding2 but in this respect too he is held up by the opposition of subjectivity and objectivity1 so that1 while he no doubt offers us a resolution in an abstract sense of the antithesis between conception and reality1 universality and particularity1 understanding and sense-perception1 and suggests the ,idea1 yet he once more conceives this resolution and reconciliation itself in a wholly subjective sense1 not as being true and real both essentially and on its own independent account4 ,in this respect the ,critique of the power of the judgment1 in which he investigates the aesthetic and teleological power of the judgment is both instructive and remarkable4 ,the beautiful objects of ,nature and art1 the products of ,nature with their adaptations to ends1 by means of which he approaches more closely the notion of the organic and the living1 he considers wholly from the point of view of the reflection which judges them subjectively4 ,and indeed ,kant himself generally defines the power of judgment as the capacity to think the particular as comprised under the universal1 and calls the power of judgment reflective when it has only the particular submitted to it1 and has to discover the universal under which it is subsumed4 ,to this end it requires a law1 a principle1 which it has to contribute to itself2 and ,kant affirms teleology to be this law4 ,with regard to the conception of freedom which belongs to the practical reason the achievement of end or purpose gets no further than a mere ought2 and in the teleological judgment1 however1 relatively to the living thing1 ,kant does manage to regard the living organism in such a way that the notional concept1 the universal1 succeeds in also including the particular1 and as end does not determine the particular and external1 the structure of the members from outside1 but as an inward principle1 and under the mode1 that the particular conforms to the end spontaneously4 ,yet with such a judgment once more it is assumed that the objective nature of the thing is not known1 but that it is only a mode of subjective reflection which is thereby expressed4 ,in a similar way ,kant so conceives the aesthetic judgment that it neither proceeds from the understanding1 as such1 in other words as the faculty of ideas1 nor yet from the sensuous perception as such1 and its varied manifold1 but from the free play of the understanding and the imagination4 ,in this common agreement of the faculties of knowledge the object finds its relation to the individual consciousness1 and its feeling of pleasure and contentment4 7a7 ,now this general feeling of contentment is1 in the first place1 without any interest1 that is to say1 it is devoid of relation to our appetitive faculty4 ,if we have an interest of curiosity1 shall we say1 or a sensuous interest excited for a physical want1 a desire for possession and use1 then the objects are not important for their own sake1 but in virtue of our need of them4 ,in a case such as this what exists merely possesses a value in relation to such a need1 and the relation is of the kind1 that the object is on the one side and on the other is an attribute distinct from the object to which we relate it none the less4 ,as an illustration if ,i consume the object in order to nourish myself therewith1 this interest rests exclusively in me1 and remains alien to the object4 ,now1 in ,kant's view1 our position relatively to the beautiful is not of this description4 ,the aesthetic judgment suffers that which is externally presented to subsist in free independence1 proceeding as it does from the desire to permit the object to persist on its own account and to retain its end unimpaired within itself4 ,this is1 as we have already observed1 an important observation4 7b7 ,in the second place1 ,kant maintains that the beautiful is definable as that which without a conception1 i4e41 without a category of the understanding1 is placed before us as the object of a universal satisfaction4 ,to estimate the beautiful an educated mind is indispensable4 ,the man in the street#aab has no judgment about the beautiful2 this judgment1 in fact1 claims universal validity4 ,the universal is no doubt in the first instance simply1 as such1 an abstraction1 one which1 however1 is in its essential and on its independent account1 true2 and consequently carries essentially the property and demand to pass also as universally valid4 ,in this sense1 too1 the beautiful ought to be universally recognized1 although the mere concepts of the understanding are compatible with no judgment thereupon4 ,the good--the right which enters into particular actions1 for example--is subsumed under universal concepts1 and the action is accepted as good1 if it is conformable to such concepts4 ,the beautiful1 on the contrary1 ought1 according to this view1 to arouse a universal satisfaction without any such mediation of concept4 ,this simply means that in the contemplation of the beautiful we are not conscious of the notional concept or any subsumption under it1 and do not permit the independent passage of the separation between the particular object and the universal concept1 which is present in all other cases of the judgment4 7c7 ,thirdly1 in this view of ,kant1 the beautiful ought to have the teleological form to the extent that the teleological relation is apprehended in the object without the idea of an end4 ,this is substantially a mere repetition of the view just discussed4 ,any natural product--take1 for instance1 a plant or an animal--is organized as adapted to an end1 and is so immediately to us in this its teleological purpose1 that we have no conception of the end on its own account as separate and distinct from the actual presence of the object4 ,it is in this way that the beautiful also is presented us teleologically4 ,in finite teleology end and means remain external to each other2 the end stands in no essential inner relation to the material means of its execution#aac4 ,in this case the idea of the end as recognized in apartness#aad is distinguishable from the object in which the end appears as realized4 ,the beautiful1 on the contrary1 exists as teleological in the essential sense1 without means and end appearing as disparate in aspects distinct from each other4 ,for example1 the purpose of the members of the organism is the principle of life which exists in the members as actual therein4 ,in their separation#aae the parts cease to be members of a whole4 ,for in the living thing the end and material medium of the end are so immediately united1 that the existing being only exists in so far as the end remains indwelling4 ,the beautiful1 as thus regarded and in ,kant's view1 does not carry its teleological purpose as an external form attached to it3 but the teleological correspondence of the inner and outer is to be regarded as the immanent nature of the beautiful object4 7d7 ,fourthly and finally the view of ,kant posits the beautiful under the mode that it is recognized without a universal concept as object of a necessary feeling of satisfaction4 ,necessity is an abstract category1 and indicates an ideal and essential relation between two aspects or sides3 if the one is1 and because the one is1 then1 and for that reason1 the other is also4 ,the one likewise includes the other within its determinate nature4 ,cause is meaningless without effect4 ,the pleasure which we obtain from beauty is necessary in this sense1 and it is so wholly without a relation to conceptions1 that is to say the categories of the understanding4 ,thus1 no doubt1 we derive pleasure from what is symmetrical1 for this is constructed in accord with an idea of the understanding4 ,kant1 however1 demands more as a definition of delight in art than the unity and uniformity of such an idea as this4 ,now what we find in all these theses of ,kant is the non-severation of that which otherwise is assumed to be distinct in consciousness4 ,in the beautiful this separation is found to be abolished4 ,the universal and particular1 purpose and means1 idea and object completely interpenetrate each other4 ,thus1 too1 ,kant sees the beauty of art as a concurrence1 in which the particular itself is conformable to the conception4 ,particulars1 taken alone1 are primarily1 both as against each other and the universal1 of a contingent nature2 and this very contingent element1 whether we find it in sense1 feeling1 susceptibility1 or impulse1 is now in the beauty of art not merely subsumed under the categories of the understanding1 and dominated by the notion of freedom in its abstract universality1 but united to the universal in such a way that it appears inwardly and on its own merits as realized fact adequate thereto4 ,by this means thought is incorporated in fine art1 and the material is not externally defined by such thought1 but continues to exist in its own freedom4 ,in other words1 what is natural--the senses1 emotional temperament1 and so forth--possess in themselves measure1 end1 and agreement4 ,perception and feeling1 too1 in the same way are raised to a power of spiritual universality2 and thought no less not merely renounces its hostility to ,nature1 but is made blithe therein4 ,feeling1 pleasure1 and enjoyment are thereby justified and sanctified1 and thus it is that ,nature and freedom1 sense and idea in one presence discover their just place and their satisfaction4 ,yet even this apparently complete reconciliation is ultimately still assumed to be#aaf merely subjective in respect to our judgment no less than our productive activity1 and not to be essentially and on its own account either the true or real4 ,these may1 ,i think1 be taken to be the main results of the ,critique of ,kant so far as they affect our present inquiry4 ,it constitutes the starting-point for the true conception of the beauty of art4 ,such a conception could1 however1 only make itself effective as the higher comprehension of the true union of necessity and freedom1 particular and universal1 sensuous and rational1 by its overcoming the defects still latent in the previous standpoint4 ,it must in fact be admitted that the artistic sense of a profound and1 at the same time1 philosophical spirit anticipated philosophy in the stricter sense by its demand for and expression of the principle of totality and reconciliation in its opposition to that abstract finiteness of thought1 that duty for duty's sake1 that understanding faculty devoid of any substantive content1 which one and all apprehend nature and reality1 sense and feeling1 merely as a limits something downright alien or hostile4 ,it is ,schiller who must be credited with the important service of having broken through the ,kantian subjectivity and abstractness of thought1 and of having ventured the attempt to pass beyond the same by comprehending in thought the principles of unity and reconciliation as the truth1 and giving artistic realization to that truth4 ,for ,schiller1 in his aesthetic investigations1 did not merely adhere to art and its interest unaffected by their relation to philosophy proper1 but he compared his own interest in the beauty of art in their due relation to philosophical principles2 and it is only from the starting-point of these latter and by their aid that he penetrated the profounder nature and notional concept of ,beauty4 ,thus we are conscious that it was a feature of a certain period of his productive activity that he was actively engaged with reflective thought1 more perhaps than was wholly favourable to the simple and direct beauty of his work as an art product4 ,the deliberate character of abstract reflections1 and even the interest of the philosophical notion1 arrest the attention in several of his poems4 ,he has1 in fact1 been made the subject of stricture on this account2 and especially his work has been blamed and depreciated in its contrast with the equable serenity and straightforward simplicity of ,goethe's ideas and more objective naturalism4 ,but in this respect ,schiller as poet did but pay the debt of his century4 ,a real ideal evolution#aag was responsible1 the recognition of which only redounds to the honour of this sublime soul and profound genius1 as it has been no less of signal profit to science and knowledge4 ,this stimulating movement of science during the same epoch also diverted ,goethe from the sphere1 most distinctively his own1 as poet4 ,but just as ,schiller was absorbed in the study of the ideal depths of the mind1 so the characteristic predilection of ,goethe inclined to the physical aspect of art1 to external nature1 such as animal and vegetable organization1 crystals1 cloud-formation and colours4 ,to such scientific inquiry ,goethe applied his extraordinary powers of intuition1 which in these provinces have driven off the field the theories of the mere understanding and their errors1 just as ,schiller1 on the other side1 succeeded in demonstrating the ,idea of the free totality of ,beauty as against the theory of the analytical understanding relative to volition and thinking4 ,an entire series of ,schiller's productions is devoted to this insight into the nature of art4 ,above all in importance come the ,letters upon aesthetic education4 ,in these letters the main point of departure is that every individual man contains within himself the natural capacity of an ideal humanity4 ,this genuine human being is represented by the ,state1 which1 in his view1 is the objective1 universal1 and1 in short1 normal form1 in which the separate individuals or subjects of such human consciousness aim at making all coalesce and concentrate in unity4 ,there were then1 in his view1 two imaginable ways in which man in the temporal process could thus coalesce with the human being in the notional ,idea#aah4 ,on the one hand this could be effected in the suppression of individuality by the ,state under its generic idea of morality1 law1 and intelligence#aai3 while1 on the other1 a similar result could be effected by the individual himself raising himself to the level of such a generic conception1 in other words1 by the man of the particular temporal condition ennobling himself to the level of the essential man of the ,idea4 ,now1 in this view1 reason demands unity as such1 the generic attribution2 ,nature1 however1 asks for variety and individuality1 and both these legislatures make a simultaneous claim upon man4 ,confronted with the conflict of these antagonistic rivals1 aesthetic education simply consists in giving actual effect to the demand for their mediation and reconcilement4 ,the aim of such an education is1 according to ,schiller1 to give vital form to inclination1 the senses1 impulse and emotional life in such a way that they become essentially permeated with mind2 and1 from the reverse point of view1 that reason1 freedom1 and spirituality come forth from the grave-clothes of their abstractedness1 are mated in union with the natural element thus essentially rationalized1 and thus receive the substance of flesh and blood4 ,beauty is therefore affirmed to be the conformative unification#abj of the rational and the sensuous1 and this union is pronounced the truly real4 ,this view of ,schiller will in its general terms be all the more readily recognized in ,anmuth und ,wrde#aba1 as also in his poems for the reason that the praise of women is in such works more particularly the theme4 ,it was pre-eminently in their character that he recognized and emphasized the spontaneously present conjunction of the spiritual and natural4 ,this unity of the universal and particular1 of freedom and necessity1 of spirituality and the natural element1 which ,schiller conceived with scientific thoroughness as the principle and essence of art1 and endeavoured indefatigably to call into actual life by means of art and aesthetic education1 has received yet further recognition in the ,idea itself1 cognized as the supreme principle of knowledge and of existence1 the ,idea in this sense being apprehended as sole truth and reality4 ,by means of this acknowledgment science1 in the philosophy of ,schelling1 attained its absolute standpoint2 and although art had already begun to assert its peculiar rights and dignity in their relation to the highest interests of man1 it was only now that the notion itself and the scientific position of art were discovered4 ,it was then that art was--even if1 from a certain point of view1 with a measure of perversity1 which this is not the proper place to discuss--accepted with due reference to its exalted and true vocation4 ,even before this time and independently ,winckelmann had been inspired by his observation of the ideals of the ancients in a way which prompted the creation of a new sense of artistic contemplation1 the disengagement of it from the association of vulgar aims and mere imitation of ,nature1 and exercised a mighty influence in the discovery of the idea of art in works of art and in its history4 ,winckelmann ought1 in fact1 to be regarded as belonging to the type of men who have been able in the field of art to supply the mind with a new organ and wholly new methods of observation ,his views have1 however1 exercised less influence on the theory and the scientific knowledge of art4 ,to summarize these historical antecedents further yet more briefly1 in association with the renaissance of our modern philosophy1 ,a4 ,w4 and ,friedrich von ,schlegel1 impelled by their zest for novelty and all that was either distinctive or arresting1 assimilated just so much of the philosophical ideas as was compatible with minds essentially critical1 though by no means really philosophical in any strict sense of the term4 ,neither of these writers in fact can claim the reputation of being speculative thinkers4 ,they did1 however1 in virtue of their critical sagacity1 at least approach the standpoint of the ,idea2 and with the aid of remarkable boldness of speech and audacity of innovation--to which1 however1 but very few ingredients of genuine philosophy contributed--directed a brilliant polemic against views hitherto received1 and by this means unquestionably introduced a novel standard of criticism and new ways of looking at things which were of superior value to those they attacked4 ,for the reason1 however1 that their criticism was not accompanied with a knowledge of the nature of such a standard based on philosophical principles1 a lack of definition and continuity was inseparable from this standard2 and they at one time attempted too much and again at another too little4 ,despite1 therefore1 of the fact that it may be reckoned to their credit that they have once more drawn attention to and emphasized with genuine enthusiasm much hitherto regarded as obsolete and too little appreciated by their times1 the works of the older ,italian masters1 for example1 and certain ,flemish paintings1 as also the ,niebelungen ,lied among other things2 despite the fact that they even endeavoured with zeal to acquire knowledge of matter barely known at all1 such as the poetry and mythology of ,india1 nevertheless they not only attached too high an importance to the works of such a period1 but also themselves committed the mistake of admiring works of very average merit1 such as the comedies of ,holberg1 or of attaching an absolute value to what possessed a purely relative worth1 or even of boldly proving themselves the enthusiasts of a perverse tendency and a subordinate standpoint as though one of first-rate importance4 ,from this tendency1 and particularly from the opinions#abb and doctrines of ,friedrich von ,schlegel1 issued in all its manifold forms the so-called ,irony4 ,the idea had its profounder root1 as to one of its aspects1 in the philosophy of ,fichte1 in so far as the principles of that philosophy were applied to art4 ,friedrich von ,schlegel1 as also ,schelling1 made the standpoint of ,fichte their point of departure4 ,schelling passed wholly beyond it2 ,fried1 von ,schlegel elaborated it in his own peculiar fashion1 and then flung himself free of it4 ,with reference to the more intimate connection of the doctrines of ,fichte with one tendency of this irony1 it is only necessary to emphasize the following point in our present context1 namely this1 that ,fichte posits the ,ego as the absolute principle of all knowledge1 reason1 and cognition1 and in fact posits it as the ,ego which persists throughout in its abstraction of pure form4 ,for this reason this ,ego is1 in the second place1 wholly and essentially simple1 and1 on the one hand1 it is the negation of every particularity1 attribute--in short1 every content--for every positive subject-matter#abc is overwhelmed in this abstract freedom and unity4 ,on the other hand1 every content1 which is to pass muster for the ,ego1 is posited and recognized as exclusively so in virtue of the activity of the ,ego4 ,whatever is1 is only in virtue of the ,ego2 whatever is through me 7that is1 my ,ego7 ,i am in turn able to annihilate4 ,now if we abide in these entirely vacant forms1 which originate in the absoluteness of the abstract ,ego1 nothing can then be regarded as of value in itself1 that is1 essentially and on its own account#abd4 ,it is exclusively produced by the subjectivity of the ,ego4 ,but this being so1 it follows that the ,ego remains lord and master over everything4 ,in no sphere of morals or law1 of all that is human or divine1 profane or sacred1 is there anything at all which would not in the first instance have to be posited by the ,ego1 and which consequently could not equally be nullified by the same agency4 ,this is nothing less than making all that exists on its own actual and independent warranty a mere semblance1 not true and a part of reality on account of itself and by its own instrumentality1 but a mere show in virtue of the ,ego1 within whose power and caprice it remains at the free disposition of such4 ,to suffer its presence and to destroy it stands purely in the favour of the ,ego1 which has attained the absolute standpoint as essentially the ,ego1 that and nothing more than that4 ,thirdly1 the ,ego is a living1 active individual1 and its life consists in bringing home its individuality to itself no less than to others1 in giving expression to itself and revealing itself among phenomena#abe4 ,for every man during his life endeavours to realize himself and does realize himself4 ,in relation to the beautiful and art this means that he lives the life of an artist1 and shapes his life artistically4 ,but1 according to the principle now discussed1 ,i live as artist when all my action and expression whatever1 in so far as it has to do with a content1 is for myself on the plane of mere semblance1 and assumes a formal content which is wholly at my disposal4 ,so ,i am not truly serious either about this content or1 speaking generally1 about its expression and realization4 ,genuine seriousness only issues from a substantive interest1 a subject-matter which itself possesses a rich content1 such as truth1 morality1 and so on--in other words1 from a content which as it stands ,i regard as essential1 so that ,i only become essential on my own account1 in so far as ,i have absorbed myself in such a content1 and have come to conform myself to it in the entire range of my thought and action4 ,at the standpoint at which the artist is the ,ego1 which both posits and resolves everything through its own essential fiat#abf1 for which no content of consciousness appears as absolute and essentially independent1 but only as itself a semblance created and destroyable1 such seriousness can find no place1 nothing here receiving a right to be save the formalism of the ,ego4 ,no doubt for others my self-revealment1 in which ,i appear to them1 may be taken seriously1 inasmuch as they interpret me as though in reality ,i was in earnest about the business2 but therein they are deluded1 poor1 born creatures1 without the faculty or the power to comprehend and attain to the height of my argument4 ,and by this it is brought home to me that everyone is not so free 7e4g41 that is formally free7 as to see in all which is usually of value1 dignity and sanctity to mankind1 merely a product of each man's own possibilities of inclination1 which is operative in permitting him to determine and make rich the course of his life1 or the reverse4 ,it is thus that this virtuosity of your ironical artist's life comes to be credited as some god-like geniality1 for which every conceivable thing is a purely spectral creature1 to which the free creator1 knowing himself to be absolutely unattached1 does not yoke himself1 for he can ever annihilate the same no less than create it4 ,whoever has reached such a standpoint of god-like geniality consequently looks down in his superior fashion on all other mortals4 ,they are ruled out as narrow and dull1 in so far1 that is1 as law1 morals1 and the rest retain for them a validity that is assured1 obligatory1 and essential4 ,and the individual who thus lives this artist life1 which he does no doubt associate with others1 whether friends or mistresses or ,i know not what1 yet as man of genius sets no real stock on such relations as they stand to his individual personality and particular actions4 ,all these are as nothing in their contrast to the universal which is his in its own and independent warranty1 namely that genius which faces all such with irony4 ,this is the universal import of the genial god-like irony as this concentration of the ,ego in itself1 for which all bands are broken1 and which can only live in the bliss of self-enjoyment4 ,this irony was the discovery of ,herr ,fried1 von ,schlegel1 and many have chattered about it after him1 or it may be are giving us a fresh sample of such chatter4 ,the proximate form of this negativity which has been called irony is1 then1 on the one hand1 the illusory nature#abg of all that is matter of fact1 or moral1 or of substantive content1 the nothingness of all that is objective and of essential and independent worth4 ,so long as the ,ego adheres to such1 a standpoint as this1 everything appears to be null and void1 the personal subjectivity alone excepted1 which thereby becomes hollow and empty1 and nothing but conceit itself4 ,conversely1 however1 from the opposite point of view1 the ,ego may also fail to find satisfaction in this self-delight2 it may prove an insufficient supply to its craving1 so that it now feels a thirst for what is secure and substantive1 definite and essential interests4 ,from a situation such as this there arises unhappiness and the contradiction1 that whereas1 on the one hand1 the individual seeks to penetrate into truth and longs after objectivity1 yet on the other he is unable to divest himself of this isolation and self-seclusion1 is unable to overcome this unsatisfied and abstract soul-inwardness1 and consequently is seized with a fit of sentimental yearning1 which we have also marked as one of the emanations of the philosophy of ,fichte4 ,the discontent of this quiescence and impotence1 which is unable either to act or set its hands to anything1 lest it have to surrender the harmony within1 and which remains unreal and empty1 even though it may be essentially unflecked1 despite all its craving for reality and the absolute--is the source of morbid saintliness#abh and yearning4 ,a soul that is fair or saintly in a true sense acts and is a reality4 ,but all that yearning and heart burning is merely the feeling of the nothingness of the empty and vain personage1 who has it1 and yet has not the power to cast himself adrift of this empty void1 and fill himself with that which is solid and substantive4 ,in so far1 however1 as the irony is made an art type it did not restrict itself in giving artistic shape to the life and particular individuality of the man who appropriated the irony4 ,over and beyond the artistic content of his own actions1 etc41 the artist had also to produce objective works of art as the creations of his imagination4 ,the principle of such productions1 which mainly are confined to the domain of poetry1 is once more the display of the god-like as ,irony4 ,the ironical here1 however1 as genial individuality1 consists in the self-annihilation of what is noble1 great1 and excellent4 ,consequently the independent figures of art will also have to illustrate the principle of absolute subjectivity1 and to do so by exhibiting all that is of human worth and dignity as a mere naught in this process of self-annihilation4 ,this implies not merely that we are not to take seriously justice1 morality and truth1 but that there is really nothing in what is highest and best4 ,in short it amounts to this1 that irony contradicts and annihilates itself as manifested in individuals1 characters and actions1 and consequently is an irony which overreaches itself#abi4 ,this mode or art-type1 abstractly considered1 approaches closely to the principle of comedy4 ,at the same time we ought fundamentally to distinguish the comic from the ironical as thus associated4 ,for the comic must be limited to the making null what is essentially itself of no worth1 that is to say1 a false and contradictory appearance1 a whim1 for instance1 a piece of egotism1 a particular caprice1 as set over against a mighty passion2 or even some principle1 assumed to be efficacious1 or rigid maxims may be thus exposed in their nullity4 ,but it is wholly a different matter1 when what is in fact moral and true1 generally something with really substantive core1 is asserted in an individual and through the same as essentially of no account4 ,such an individual is then nugatory and despicable in his character1 and the weakness and absence of character are thus introduced into the representation4 ,in this distinction1 therefore1 between the ironical and the comic the point of real importance is what is the nature of the content which is destroyed4 ,they are in the case of irony evil1 good for nothing subjects1 persons unable to hold staunchly to their fixed and important purposes1 only too ready to give it up and to permit its destruction within them4 ,your ,irony loves this irony of the characterless4 ,for true character implies on the one hand an essential substance in its purpose1 and on the other adherence to such a purpose1 so that individuality would be rifled of its veritable existence1 if it was compelled to let it drop and give it up4 ,this doggedness and stability constitutes the keynote of character4 ,cato can only live as ,roman and republican4 ,now if irony is made the keynote of the representation1 we have the extreme antithesis to art accepted as the true principle of the work of art4 ,for what we have here is in part insipid figures1 in part figures that have neither content nor defined position#acj4 ,seeing that what is of substance in them is proved to be an illusion4 ,and1 last of all1 we have into the bargain those yearning floods and unresolved contradictions of the soul4 ,compositions of this kind are not likely to arouse real interest4 ,and for this very reason it is precisely from the advocates of this ,irony that we have the continuous round of lament over the public's want of critical sense1 artistic insight and genius1 which of course cannot appreciate the lofty ways of such an ,irony2 in other words what the public does not like is this very mediocrity1 which is the half of it mere trifling#aca1 and the other half without distinctive character4 ,and it is right that these spectre-like1 moon-shine gazing natures are no favourites2 it is a comfort to think that this insincerity and hypocrisy is not in fashion1 and that what men1 on the contrary1 demand imperatively are full and veritable interests1 and no less so characters which remain true to the weighty substance at their core4 ,we may add as a matter of historical interest that it was ,solger and ,ludwig ,tieck who above all accepted irony as the highest principle of art4 ,this is not the place to speak of ,solger at the length he really merits2 and ,i must content myself with a few general remarks4 ,solger was not1 as the others were1 satisfied with a superficial philosophical culture4 ,a truly speculative impulse of his innermost nature made him probe the very depths of the philosophical idea4 ,and in doing so he came upon the dialectical phase of the ,idea1 that transition point which ,i call the infinite absolute negativity1 the activity of the idea in its negation of itself as infinite and universal1 in order to pass into finiteness and particularity1 and with no less truth once more in order to annul this negation1 and in so doing to establish again the universal and infinite within the finite and particular4 ,solger did not get beyond this negativity2 and unquestionably it is a phase#acb in the speculative idea2 but nevertheless1 as exclusively conceived in this dialectic unrest and dissolution of the infinite no less than the finite1 it is only such a phase contributory1 and not1 as ,solger imagined1 the ,entire ,idea4 ,unfortunately ,solger's life was too early broken off to permit him to grasp the concrete evolvement of the philosophical ,idea in all it implies4 ,and so he never got beyond this aspect of negativity1 which possesses an affinity with the dissolution by irony of all that is determinate no less than essentially substantive1 a negative movement which he identified with the principle of artistic activity4 ,yet in the actual conditions of his life1 and with due reference to the stability1 seriousness1 and sterling qualities of his character1 he was neither himself an ironic artist in the sense we have previously described1 nor was his really profound instinct for true works of art1 a sense which a long course of study of art had developed greatly1 either of such an ironical character4 ,so much we will venture in the vindication of ,solger1 whose life1 philosophy1 and actual contributions to art merit being wholly kept separate from the apostles of irony previously named4 ,with regard to ,ludwig ,tieck1 his culture1 too1 dates from that period in which ,jena was the literary centre4 ,tieck and others who belonged to these superior people are on excellent terms with such modes of expression1 without being able to tell us much what they mean4 ,thus ,tieck always insists on the importance of ,irony4 ,but when it comes to delivering judgment on great works of art1 though his recognition and description of their greatness is no doubt beyond reproach1 yet if one imagines that in any particular example--let us say ,romeo and ,juliet--we have the opportunity put for an explanation of that in which here the irony consists1 we are wide of the mark4 ,we hear nothing more whatever about ,irony4 ,v#acc #a4 ,after the above introductory observations we may now pass on to the consideration of our subject itself4 ,we are1 however1 still within the introduction2 and being so ,i do not propose to attempt anything more than indicate by way of sketch the main outlines of the general course of the scientific inquiry which is to follow it4 ,inasmuch1 however1 as we have referred to art as issuing from the absolute ,idea itself1 and1 indeed1 have assigned as its end the sensuous presentation of the ,absolute itself1 it will be incumbent on us to conduct this survey of the entire field in such a way1 as at least to disclose generally1 how the particular parts originate in the notional concept of the beauty of art4 ,we must therefore attempt to awaken some idea of this notion in its broadest significance4 ,it has already been stated that the content of art is the ,idea1 and the form of its display the configuration of the sensuous or plastic image4 ,it is further the function of art to mediate these two aspects under the reconciled mode of free totality4 ,the first determinant implied by this is the demand that the content1 which has to secure artistic representation1 shall disclose an essential capacity for such display4 ,if this is not so all that we possess is a defective combination4 ,a content that1 independently1 is ill adapted to plastic form and external presentment is compelled to accept this form1 or a matter that is of itself prosaic in its character is driven to make the best it can of a mode of presentation which is antagonistic to its nature4 ,the second requirement1 which is deducible from the first1 is the demand that the content of art should be nothing essentially abstracts ,this does not mean1 however1 that it should be merely concrete in the sense that the sensuous object is such in its contrast to all that is spiritual and the content of thought1 regarding these as the essentially simple and abstract4 ,everything that possesses truth for ,spirit2 no less than1 as part of ,nature1 is essentially concrete1 and1 despite its universality1 possesses both ideality#acd and particularity essentially within it4 ,when we state1 for example1 of ,god that he is simple ,one1 the ,supreme ,being as such1 we have thereby merely given utterance to a lifeless abstraction of the irrational understanding4 ,such a ,god1 as ,he is thus not conceived in ,his concrete truth1 can supply no content for art1 least of all plastic art4 ,consequently neither the ,jews nor the ,turks have been able to represent their ,god1 who is not even an abstraction of the understanding in the above sense1 under the positive mode in which ,christians have represented ,him4 ,for in ,christianity ,god is conceived in ,his ,truth1 and as such essentially concrete1 as personality#ace1 as the subjective focus of conscious life1 or1 more accurately defined1 as ,spirit4 ,and what ,he is as ,spirit is made explicit to the religious apprehension as a trinity of persons1 which at the same time are1 in their independence1 regarded as ,one4 ,here is essentiality1 universality1 and particularity1 no less than their reconciled unity1 and it is only a unity such as this which gives us the concrete4 ,and inasmuch as a content1 in order to unveil truth at all1 must be of this concrete character1 art makes the demand for a like concreteness1 and1 for this reason1 that a purely abstract universal does not in itself possess the property to proceed to particularity and external manifestation1 and to unity with itself therein4 ,if1 then1 a sensuous form and configuration is to be correspondent with a true and therefore concrete content1 such must in the third place likewise be as clearly individual1 entirely concrete and a self-enclosed unity4 ,this character of concreteness1 predicable of both aspects of art1 the content no less than the representation1 is just the point in which both coalesce and fall in with one another4 ,the natural form of the human body is1 for example1 such a sensuous concrete capable of displaying ,spirit in its essential concreteness and of adapting itself wholly to such a presentment4 ,for which reason we must quit ourselves of the idea that it is a matter of mere accident that an actual phenomenon of the objective world is accepted as the mode in which to embody such a form coalescent with truth4 ,art does not lay hold of this form either because it is simply there or because there is no other4 ,the concrete content itself implies the presence of external and actual1 we may even add the sensuous appearance4 ,but to make this possible this sensuous concrete1 which is essentially impressed with a content that is open to mind1 is also essentially addressed to the inward conscious life1 and the external mode of its configuration1 whereby it is visible to perception and the world of idea1 has for its aim the being there exclusively for the soul and mind of man4 ,this is the sole reason that content and artistic conformation are dovetailed one into the other4 ,the purely sensuous concrete1 that is external ,nature as such1 does not exclusively originate in such an end4 ,the variously coloured plumage of birds is resplendent unseen2 the notes of this song are unheard4 ,the ,cereus#acf1 which only blossoms for a night1 withers away without any admiration from another in the wilderness of the southern forests2 and these forests1 receptacles themselves of the most beautiful and luxuriant vegetation1 with the richest and most aromatic perfumes1 perish and collapse in like manner unenjoyed4 ,the work of art has no such nave and independent being4 ,it is essentially a question1 an address to the responding soul of man1 an appeal to affections and intelligence4 ,although the endowment by art of sensuous shape is not in this respect accidental1 yet on the other hand it is not the highest mode of grasping the spiritually concrete4 ,thought is a higher mode of presentment than that of the sensuous concrete4 ,though abstract in a relative sense2 yet it must not be one-sided1 but concrete thinking1 in order to be true and rational4 ,the extent to which a definite content possesses for its appropriate form sensuous artistic representation1 or essentially requires1 in virtue of its nature1 a higher and more spiritual embodiment is a question of difference exemplified at once if we compare the ,greek gods with ,god as conceived under ,christian ideas4 ,the ,greek god is not abstract1 but individual1 and is in close association with the natural human form4 ,the ,christian ,god is also1 no doubt1 a concrete personality1 but under the mode of pure spiritual actuality1 who is cognized as ,spirit and in ,spirit#acg4 ,his medium of determinate existence is therefore essentially knowledge of the mind and not external natural shape1 by means of which ,his representation can only be imperfect1 and not in the entire depths of ,his idea or notional concept4 ,inasmuch1 however1 as it is the function of art to represent the ,idea to immediate vision in sensuous shape and not in the form of thought and pure spirituality in the strict sense1 and inasmuch as the value and intrinsic worth of this presentment consists in the correspondence and unity of the two aspects1 that is the ,idea and its sensuous shape1 the supreme level and excellence of art and the reality1 which is truly consonant with its notion1 will depend upon the degree of intimacy and union with which idea and configuration appear together in elaborated fusion4 ,the higher truth consequently is spiritual content which has received the shape adequate to the conception of its essence2 and this it is which supplies the principle of division for the philosophy of art4 ,for before the mind can attain to the true notion of its absolute essence1 it is constrained to traverse a series of stages rooted in this very notional concept2 and to this course of stages which it unfolds to itself1 corresponds a coalescent series1 immediately related therewith1 of the plastic types of art1 under the configuration whereof mind as art-spirit presents to itself the consciousness of itself#ach4 ,this evolution within the art-spirit has further itself two sides in virtue of its intrinsic nature4 ,first1 that is to say1 the development is itself a spiritual and universal one2 in other words there are the definite and comprehensive views of the world#aci in their series of gradations which give artistic embodiment to the specific but widely embracing consciousness of ,nature1 man1 and ,god4 ,secondly1 this ideal or universal art-development has to provide for itself immediate existence and sensuous configuration1 and the definite modes of this art-actualization in the sensuous medium are themselves a totality of necessary distinctions in the realm of art--that is to say1 they are the particular types of art4 ,no doubt the types of artistic configuration on the one hand are1 in respect to their spirituality1 of a general character1 and not restricted to any one material1 and the sensuous existence is similarly itself of varied multiplicity of medium4 ,inasmuch1 however1 as this material potentially possesses1 precisely as the mind or spirit does1 the ,idea for its inward soul or significance1 it follows that a definite sensuous involves with itself a closer relation and secret bond of association with the spiritual-distinctions and specific types of artistic embodiment#adj4 ,relatively to these points of view our philosophy will divided into three fundamental parts4 ,first1 we have a general part4 ,it has for its content object the universal ,idea of fine art1 conceived here as the ,ideal1 together with the more elaborated relation under which it is placed respectively to ,nature and human artistic production4 ,secondly1 we have evolved from the notional concept of the beauty of art a particular part1 in so far as the essential distinctions1 which this idea contains in itself1 are unfolded in a graduated series of particular modes of configuration#ada4 ,thirdly1 there results a final part which has to consider the particularized content of fine art itself4 ,it consists in the advance of art to the sensuous realization of its shapes and its consummation in a system of the several arts and their genera and species4 #b4 ,in respect to the first and second of these divisions it is important to recollect1 in order to make all that follows intelligible1 that the ,idea1 viewed as the beautiful in art1 is not the ,idea in the strict sense1 that is as a metaphysical ,logic apprehends it as the ,absolute4 ,it is rather the ,idea as carried into concrete form in the direction of express realization1 and as having entered into immediate and adequate unity with such reality4 ,for the ,idea as such1 although it is both potentially and explicitly true1 is only truth in its universality and not as yet presented in objective embodiment4 ,the ,idea as fine art1 however1 is the ,idea with the more specific property of being essentially individual reality1 in other words1 an individual configuration of reality whose express function it is to make manifest the ,idea--in its appearance4 ,this amounts to the demand that the ,idea and its formative configuration as concrete realization must be brought together under a mode of complete adequacy4 ,the ,idea as so conceived1 a reality1 that is to-say1 moulded in conformity with the notional concept of the ,idea1 is the ,ideal4 ,the problem of such consonancy might1 in the first instance1 be understood in the wholly formal sense that the ,idea might be any idea so long as the actual shape1 it matters not what the shape might be1 represented this particular ,idea and no other4 ,in that case1 however1 the required truth of the ,ideal is a fact simply interchangeable with mere correctness1 a correctness which consists in the expression of any significance in a manner adapted to it1 provided that its meaning is thereby directly discoverable in the form4 ,the ,ideal1 however1 is not to be thus understood4 ,according to the standard or test of its own nature any content whatever can receive adequate presentation1 but it does not necessarily thereby possess a claim to be the fine art of the ,ideal4 ,nay1 more1 in comparison with ideal beauty the presentation will even appear defective4 ,and in this connection we may once for all observe--though actual proof is reserved to a later stage--that the defects of a work of art are not invariably to be attributed to defects of executive skill4 ,defectiveness of form arises also from defectiveness of content4 ,the ,chinese1 ,hindoos1 and ,egyptians1 for example1 in their artistic images1 sculptured deities and idols1 never passed beyond a formless condition1 or a definition of shape that was vicious and false1 and were unable to master true beauty4 ,and this was so for the reason that their mythological conceptions1 the content and thought of their works of art1 were still essentially indeterminate1 or only determinate in a false sense1 did not1 in fact1 attain to a content which was absolute in itself4 ,viewed in this sense the excellence of works of art is so much the greater in the degree that their content and thought is ideal and profound4 ,and in affirming this we have not merely in our mind the degree of executive mastery displayed in the grasp and imitation of natural form as we find it in the objective world4 ,for in certain stages of the artistic consciousness and its reproductive effects the desertion and distortion of the conformations of ,nature is not so much due to unintentional technical inexperience or lack of ability1 as it is to deliberate alteration1 which originates in the mental content itself1 and is demanded by the same4 ,from this point of view there is therefore imperfect art1 which1 both in technical and other respects1 may be quite consummate in its own specific sphere1 yet if tested with the true notion of art and the ,ideal can only appear as defective4 ,only in the highest art are the ,idea and the artistic presentation truly consonant with one another in the sense that the objective embodiment of the ,idea is in itself essentially and as realized the true configuration1 because the content of the ,idea thus expressed is itself in truth the genuine content4 ,it is appertinent to this1 as already noted1 that the ,idea must be defined in and through itself as concrete totality1 thereby essentially possessing in itself the principle and standard of its particularization and definition as thus manifested objectively4 ,for example1 the ,christian imagination will only be able to represent ,god in human form and with man's means of spiritual expression1 because it is herein that ,god ,himself is fully known in ,himself as mind or ,spirit4 ,determinacy is1 as it were1 the bridge to phenomenal presence4 ,where this determinacy is not totality derived from the ,idea itself1 where the ,idea is not conceived as that which is self-definitive and self-differentiating1 it remains abstract and possesses its definition1 and with it the principle for the particular mode of embodiment adapted to itself not within itself but as something outside it4 ,and owing to this the ,idea is also still abstract and the configuration it assumes is not as yet posited by itself4 ,the ,idea1 however1 which is essentially concrete1 carries the principle of its manifestation in itself1 and is thereby the means of its own free manifestation4 ,thus it is only the truly concrete ,idea that is able to evoke the true embodiment1 and this appropriate coalescence of both is the ,ideal4 #c4 ,but inasmuch as in this way the ,idea is concrete unity1 this unity can only enter the artistic consciousness by the expansion and further mediation of the particular aspects of the ,idea2 and it is through this evolution that the beauty of art receives a totality of particular stages and forms4 ,therefore1 after we have considered fine art in its essence and on its own account1 we must see how the beautiful in its entirety breaks up into its particular determinations4 ,this gives1 as our second part1 the doctrine of the types of art4 ,the origin of these types is to be found in the varied ways under which the ,idea is conceived as the content of art2 it is by this means that a distinction in the mode of form under which it manifests itself is conditioned4 ,these types are therefore simply the different modes of relation which obtain between the ,idea and its configuration1 relations which emanate from the ,idea itself1 and thereby present us with the general basis of division for this sphere4 ,for the principle of division must always be found in the notional concept1 the particularization and division of which it is4 ,we have here to consider three relations of the ,idea to its external process of configuration4 7a7 ,first1 the origin of artistic creation proceeds from the ,idea when1 being itself still involved in defective definition and obscurity1 or in vicious and untrue determinacy1 it becomes embodied in the shapes of art4 ,as indeterminate it does not as yet possess in itself that individuality which the ,ideal demands4 ,its abstract character and one-sidedness leaves its objective presentment still defective and contingent4 ,consequently this first type of art is rather a mere search after plastic configuration than a power of genuine representation4 ,the ,idea has not as yet found the formative principle within itself1 and therefore still continues to be the mere effort and strain to find it4 ,we may in general terms describe this form as the symbolic type of art4 ,the abstract ,idea possesses in it its external shape outside itself in the purely material substance of ,nature1 from which the shaping process proceeds1 and to which in its expression it is entirely yoked4 ,natural objects are thus in the first instance left just as they are1 while1 at the same time the substantive ,idea is imposed upon them as their significance1 so that their function is henceforth to express the same1 and they claim to be interpreted1 as though the ,idea itself was present in them4 ,a rationale of this is to be found in the fact that the external objects of reality do essentially possess an aspect in which they are qualified to express a universal import4 ,but as a completely adequate coalescence is not yet possible1 all that can be the outcome of such a relation is an abstract attribute1 as when a lion is understood to symbolize strength4 ,on the other hand this abstractness of the relation makes present to consciousness no less markedly how the ,idea stands relatively to natural phenomena as an alien2 and albeit it expatiates in all these shapes1 having no other means of expression among all that is real1 and seeks after itself in their unrest and defects of genuine proportion1 yet for all that it finds them inadequate to meet its needs4 ,it consequently exaggerates natural shapes and the phenomena of ,nature in every degree of indefinite and limitless extension2 it flounders about in them like a drunkard1 and seethes and ferments1 doing violence to their truth with the distorted growth of unnatural shapes1 and strives vainly by the contrast1 hugeness1 and splendour of the forms accepted to exalt the phenomena to the plane of the ,idea4 ,for the ,idea is here still more or less indeterminate1 and unadaptable1 while the objects of ,nature are wholly definite in their shape4 ,hence1 on account of the incompatibility of the two sides of ideality and objective form to one another1 the relation of the ,idea to the other becomes a negative one4 ,the former1 being in its nature ideal1 is unsatisfied with such an embodiment1 and posits itself as its inward or ideally universal substance under a relation of sublimity over and above all this inadequate superfluity of natural form4 ,in virtue of this sublimity the natural phenomena1 of course1 and the human form and event are accepted and left simply as they are1 but at the same time1 recognized as unequal to their significance1 which is exalted far above all earthly content4 ,these features constitute in general terms the character of the primitive artistic pantheism of the ,east1 which1 on the one hand1 charges the meanest objects with the significance of the absolute ,idea1 or1 on the other1 compels natural form1 by doing violence to its structure1 to express its world-ideas4 ,and1 in consequence1 it becomes bizarre1 grotesque1 and deficient in taste1 or turns the infinite but abstract freedom of the substantive ,idea contemptuously against all phenomenal existence as alike nugatory and evanescent4 ,by such means the significance cannot be completely presented in the expression1 and despite all straining and endeavour the final inadequacy of plastic configuration to ,idea remains insuperable4 ,such may be accepted as the first type of art--symbolic art with its yearning1 its fermentation1 its mystery1 and sublimity4 7b7 ,in the second type of art1 which we propose to call ,classical1 the twofold defect of symbolic art is annulled4 ,now the symbolic configuration is imperfect1 because1 first1 the ,idea here only enters into consciousness in abstract determinacy or indeterminateness3 and1 secondly1 by reason of the fact that the coalescence of import with embodiment can only throughout remain defective1 and in its turn also wholly abstract4 ,the classical art-type solves both these difficulties4 ,it is1 in fact1 the free and adequate embodiment of the ,idea in the shape which1 according to its notional concept1 is uniquely appropriate to the ,idea itself4 ,the ,idea is consequently able to unite in free and completely assonant concord with it4 ,for this reason the classical type of art is the first to present us with the creation and vision of the complete ,ideal1 and to establish the same as realized fact4 ,the conformability1 however1 of notion and reality in the classical type ought not to be taken in the purely formal sense of the coalescence of a content with its external form1 any more than this was possible in the case of the ,ideal4 ,otherwise every copy from ,nature1 and every kind of portrait1 every landscape1 flower1 scene1 and so forth1 which form the aim of the presentment1 would at once become classical in virtue of the fact of the agreement it offers between such content and form4 ,in classical art1 on the contrary1 the characteristic feature of the content consists in this1 that it is itself concrete ,idea1 and as such the concrete spiritual2 for it is only that which pertains to ,spirit which is veritable ideality#adb4 ,to secure such a content we must find out that in ,nature which on its own account is that which is essentially and explicitly appropriate to the spiritual4 ,it must be the original notion itself#adc1 which has invented the form for concrete spirituality1 and now the subjective notion--in the present case the spirit of art--has merely discovered it1 and made it1 as an existence possessed of natural shape1 concordant with free and individual spirituality4 ,such a configuration1 which the ,idea essentially possesses as spiritual1 and indeed as individually determinate spirituality1 when it must perforce appear as a temporal phenomenon1 is the human form4 ,personification and anthropomorphism have frequently been abused as a degradation of the spiritual4 ,but art1 in so far as its function is to bring to vision the spiritual in sensuous guise1 must advance to such anthropomorphism1 inasmuch as ,spirit is only adequately presented to perception in its bodily presence4 ,the transmigration of souls in this respect an abstract conception#add1 and physiology ought to make it one of its fundamental principles1 that life has necessarily1 in the course of its evolution1 to proceed to the human form1 for the reason that it is alone the visible phenomenon adequate to the expression of intelligence4 ,the human bodily form1 then1 is employed in the classical type of art not as purely sensuous existence1 but exclusively as the existence and natural shape appropriate to mind4 ,it has therefore to be relieved of all the defective excrescences which adhere to it in its purely physical aspect1 and from the contingent finiteness of its phenomenal appearance4 ,the external shape must in this way be purified in order to express in itself the content adequate for such a purpose2 and1 furthermore1 along with this1 that the coalescence of import and embodiment may be complete1 the spirituality which constitutes the content must be of such a character that it is completely able to express itself in the natural form of man1 without projecting beyond the limits of such expression within the sensuous and purely physical sphere of existence4 ,under such a condition ,spirit is at the same time defined as particular1 the spirit or mind of man1 not as simply absolute and eternal4 ,in this latter case it is only capable of asserting and expressing itself as intellectual being#ade4 ,out of this latter distinction arises1 in its turn1 the defect which brings about the dissolution of the classical type of art1 and makes the demand for a third and higher form1 namely the romantic type4 7c7 ,the romantic type of art annuls the completed union of the ,idea and its reality1 and occurs1 if on a higher plane1 to the difference and opposition of both sides1 which remained unovercome in symbolic art4 ,the classical type of art no doubt attained the highest excellence of which the sensuous embodiment of art is capable4 ,the defect1 such as it is1 is due to the defect which obtains in art itself throughout1 the limitations of its entire province1 that is to say4 ,the limitation consists in this1 that art in general and1 agreeably to its fundamental idea1 accepts for its object ,spirit1 the notion of which is infinite concrete universality1 under the guise of sensuously concrete form4 ,in the classical type it sets up the perfected coalescence of spiritual and sensuous existence as adequate conformation of both4 ,as a matter of fact1 however1 in this fusion mind itself is not represented agreeably to its true notional concept4 ,mind is the infinite subjectivity of the ,idea1 which as absolute inwardness#adf1 is not capable of freely expanding in its entire independence1 so long as it remains within the mould of the bodily shape1 fused therein as in the existence wholly congenial to it4 ,to escape from such a condition the romantic type of art once more cancels that inseparable unity of the classical type1 by securing a content which passes beyond the classical stage and its mode of expression4 ,this content1 if we may recall familiar ideas--is coincident with what ,christianity affirms to be true of ,god as ,spirit1 in contrast to the ,greek faith in gods which forms the essential and most fitting content of classical art4 ,in ,greek art the concrete ideal substance is potentially1 but not as fully realized1 the unity of the human and divine nature2 a unity which for the very reason that it is purely immediate and not wholly explicit1 is manifested without defect under an immediate and sensuous mode4 ,the ,greek god is the object of nave intuition and sensuous imagination4 ,his shape is therefore the bodily form of man4 ,the sphere of his power and his being is individual and individually limited2 and in his opposition to the individual person#adg is an essence and a power with whom the inward life of soul#adh is merely potentially in unity1 but does not itself possess this unity as inward subjective knowledge4 ,the higher stage is the knowledge of this implied unity1 which in its latency the classical art-type receives as its content and is able to perfectly represent in bodily shape4 ,this elevation of mere potentiality into self-conscious knowledge constitutes an enormous difference4 ,it is nothing less than the infinite difference which1 for example1 separates man generally from the animal creation4 ,man is animal2 but even in his animal functions he is not restricted within the potential sphere as the animal is1 but becomes conscious of them1 learns to understand them1 and raises them--as1 for instance1 the process of digestion--into self-conscious science4 ,by this means man dissolves the boundaries of his merely potential immediacy2 in virtue of the very fact that he knows himself to be animal he ceases to be merely animal1 and as mind is endowed with self-knowledge4 ,if1 then1 in this way the unity of the human and divine nature1 which in the previous stage was potential1 is raised out of this immediate into a self-conscious unity1 it follows that the genuine medium for the reality of this content is no longer the sensuous and immediate existence of what is spiritual1 that is1 the physical body of man1 but the self-aware inner life of soul itself4 ,now it is ,christianity--for the reason that it presents to mind ,god as ,spirit1 and not as the particular individual spirit1 but as absolute in spirit and in truth--which steps back from the sensuousness of imagination into the inward life of reason1 and makes this rather than bodily form the medium and determinate existence of its content4 ,so also1 the unity of the human and divine nature is a conscious unity exclusively capable of realization by means of spiritual knowledge1 and in ,spirit4 ,the new content secured thereby is consequently not indefeasibly bound up with the sensuous presentation1 as the mode completely adequate1 but is rather delivered from this immediate existence1 which has to be hypostatized as a negative factor1 overcome and reflected back into the spiritual unity4 ,in this way romantic art must be regarded as art transcending itself1 albeit within the boundary of its own province1 and in the form of art itself4 ,we may therefore briefly summarize our conclusion that in this third stage the object of art consists in the free and concrete presence of spiritual activity#adi1 whose vocation it is to appear as such a presence or activity for the inner world of conscious intelligence4 ,in consonance with such an object art cannot merely work for sensuous perception4 ,it must deliver itself to the inward life1 which coalesces with its object simply as though this were none other than itself#aej1 in other words1 to the intimacy of soul1 to the heart1 the emotional life1 which as the medium of ,spirit itself essentially strives after freedom1 and seeks and possesses its reconciliation only in the inner chamber of spirit4 ,it is this inward or ideal world which constitutes the content of the romantic sphere3 it will therefore necessarily discover its representation as such inner idea or feeling1 and in the show or appearance of the same4 ,the world of the soul and intelligence celebrates its triumph over the external world1 and1 actually in the medium of that outer world1 makes that victory to appear1 by reason of which the sensuous appearance sinks into worthlessness4 ,on the other hand1 this type of art1 like every other1 needs an external vehicle of expression4 ,as already stated1 the spiritual content has here withdrawn from the external world and its immediate unity into its own world4 ,the sensuous externality of form is consequently accepted and represented1 as in the symbolic type1 as unessential and transient2 furthermore the subjective finite spirit and volition is treated in a similar way2 a treatment which even includes the idiosyncrasies or caprice of individuals1 character1 action1 or the particular features of incident and plot4 ,the aspect of external existence is committed to contingency and handed over to the adventurous action of imagination1 whose caprice is just as able to reflect the facts given as they are#aea1 as it can change the shapes of the external world into a medley of its own invention and distort them to mere caricature4 ,for this external element has no longer its notion and significance in its own essential province1 as in classical art4 ,it is now discovered in the emotional realm1 and this is manifested in the medium of that realm itself rather than in the external and its form of reality1 and is able to secure or to recover again the condition of reconciliation with itself in every accident1 in all the chance circumstance that falls into independent shape1 in all misfortune and sorrow1 nay1 in crime itself4 ,hence it comes about that the characteristics of symbolic art1 its indifference1 incompatibility and severance of ,idea from configurative expression1 are here reproduced once more1 if with essential difference4 ,and this difference consists in the fact that in romantic art the ,idea1 whose defectiveness1 in the case of the symbol1 brought with it the defect of external form1 has to display itself as ,spirit and in the medium of soul-life as essentially self-complete4 ,and it is to complete fundamentally this higher perfection that it withdraws itself from the external element1 ,it can1 in short1 seek and consummate its true reality and manifestation nowhere but in its own domain4 ,this we may take to be in general terms the character of the symbolic1 classical1 and romantic types of art1 which in fact constitute the three relations of the ,idea to its embodiment in the realm of human art4 ,they consist in the aspiration after1 the attainment and transcendency of the ,ideal1 viewed as the true concrete notion of beauty4 #d4 ,in contrast to these two previous divisions of our subject the third part presupposes the notional concept of the ,ideal1 and the universal art-types4 ,it in other words consists in their realization through specific sensuous media4 ,we have consequently no longer to deal with the inner or ideal evolution of the beauty of art in conformity with its widest and most fundamental determinations4 ,what we have now before us to consider is how these ideal determinants pass into actual existence1 how they are distinguishable in their external aspect1 and how they give an independent and a realized shape to every element implied in the evolution of this ,idea of beauty as a work of art1 and not merely as a universal type4 ,now it is the peculiar differences immanent in the ,idea of beauty which are carried over by it into external existence4 ,for this reason in this third fundamental division these general art-types must themselves supply the basic principle for the articulation and definition of the particular arts4 ,or1 to put the same thing another way1 the several species of art possess in themselves the same essential differences1 which we have already become acquainted with as the universal art-types4 ,external objectivity1 however1 to which these types are subjected in a sensuous and consequently specific material1 necessitates the differentiation of these types into diverse and independent modes of realization1 in other words1 those of particular arts4 ,each general type discovers its determinate character in one determinate external material or medium1 in which its adequate presentation is secured under the manner it prescribes4 ,but1 from another point of view1 these types of art1 inasmuch as their definition is none the less consistent with the fact of the universality of their typical import1 break through the boundaries of their specific realization in some definite art-species1 and achieve an existence in other arts no less1 although their position in such is of subordinate importance4 ,for this reason1 albeit the particular arts belong specifically to one of these general art-types respectively1 the adequate external embodiment whereof they severally constitute1 yet this does not prevent them1 each after its own mode of external configuration1 from representing the totality of these art-types#aeb4 ,to summarize1 then1 in this third principal division we are dealing with the beauty of art1 as it unveils itself in a world of realized beauty by means of the arts and their creations4 ,the content of this world is the beautiful1 and the true beautiful1 as we have seen1 is spiritual being in concrete form1 the ,ideal2 or apprehended with still more intimacy it is the absolute mind and truth itself4 ,this region of divine truth artistically presented to sensuous vision and emotion forms the centre of the entire world of art4 ,it is the independent1 free and divine ,image#aec1 which has completely appropriated the externality of form and medium1 and now wears them simply as the means of its self-manifestation4 ,inasmuch1 however1 as the beautiful is unfolded here as objective reality1 and in this process is differentiated into particular aspects and phases1 this centre posits its extremes1 as realized in their peculiar actuality1 in antithetical relation to itself4 ,thus one of these extremes consists of an objectivity as yet devoid of mind1 which we may call the natural environment of ,god4 ,here the external element1 when it receives form1 remains as it was1 and does not possess its spiritual aim and content in itself1 but in another#aed4 ,the other extreme is the divine as inward1 something known1 as the manifold particularized subjective existence of ,deity4 ,it is the truth as operative and vital in sense1 soul1 and intelligence of particular persons1 which does not persist as poured forth into its mould of external shape1 but returns into the inward life of individuals4 ,the ,divine is under such a mode at once distinguishable from its pure manifestation as ,godhead1 and passes itself thereby into the variety of particularization which belongs to every kind of particular subjective knowledge1 feeling1 perception1 and emotion4 ,in the analogous province of religion with which art1 at its highest elevation1 is immediately connected1 we conceive the same distinction as follows4 ,first1 we imagine the natural life on ,earth in its finitude as standing on one side2 but then1 secondly1 the human consciousness accepts ,god for its object1 in which the distinction between objectivity and subjectivity falls away2 then1 finally1 we advance from ,god as such to the devotion of the community1 that is to ,god as ,he is alive and present in the subjective consciousness4 ,these three fundamental modifications present themselves in the world of art in independent evolution4 7a7 ,the first of the particular arts with which1 according to their fundamental principle1 we have to start is architecture considered as a fine art4 ,its function consists in so elaborating the external material of inorganic ,nature that the same becomes intimately connected with ,spirit as an artistic and external environment4 ,its medium is matter itself as an external object1 a heavy mass that is subject to mechanical laws2 and its forms persist as the forms of inorganic ,nature co-ordinated with the relations of the abstract understanding such as symmetry and so forth4 ,in this material and in these forms the ,ideal is incapable of realization as concrete spirituality1 and the reality thus presented remains confronting the ,idea as an external fabric with which it enters into no fusion1 or has only entered so far as to establish an abstract relation4 ,and it is in consequence of this that the fundamental type of the art of building is that of symbolism4 ,architecture is in fact the first pioneer on the highway toward the adequate realization of ,godhead4 ,in this service it is put to severe labour with objective nature1 that it may disengage it by its effort from the confused growth of finitude and the distortions of contingency4 ,by this means it levels a space for the ,god1 informs ,his external environment1 and builds ,him ,his temple1 as a fit place for the concentration of ,spirit1 and its direction to the absolute objects of intelligent life4 ,it raises an enclosure for the congregation of those assembled1 as a defence against the threatening of the tempest1 against rain1 the hurricane1 and savage animals4 ,it in short reveals the will thus to assemble1 and although under an external relation1 yet in agreement with the principles of art4 ,a significance such as this it can to a greater or less extent import into its material and its forms1 in proportion as the determinate content of its fabric1 which is the object of its operations and effort1 is more or less significant1 is more concrete or more abstract1 more profound in penetrating its own essential depth1 or more obscure and superficial4 ,indeed architecture may in this respect proceed so far in the execution of such a purpose as to create an adequate artistic existence for such an ideal content in its very forms and material4 ,in doing so1 however1 it has already passed beyond its peculiar province and is diverted into the stage immediately above it of sculpture4 ,for the boundary of sculpture lies precisely1 in this that it retains the spiritual as an inward being which persists in direct contrast to the external embodiment of architecture4 ,it can consequently merely point to that which is absorbed in soul-life as to something external to itself4 7b7 ,nevertheless1 as above explained1 the external and inorganic world is purified by architecture1 it is co-ordinated under symmetrical laws1 and made cognate with mind1 and as a result the temple of ,god1 the house of his community1 stands before us4 ,into this temple1 in the second place1 the ,god himself enters in the lightning-flash of individuality which smites its way into the inert mass1 permeating the same with its presence4 ,in other words the infinite#aee and no longer purely symmetrical form belonging to intelligence brings as it were to a focus and informs the shape in which it is most at home4 ,this is the task of sculpture4 ,in so far as in it the inward life of ,spirit1 to which the art of architecture can merely point away to1 makes its dwelling within the sensuous shape and its external material1 and to the extent that these two sides come into plastic communion with one another in such a manner that neither is predominant1 sculpture receives as its fundamental type the classical art-form4 ,for this reason the sensuous element on its own account admits of no expression here which is not affected by spiritual affinities#aef1 just as1 conversely1 sculpture can reproduce with completeness no spiritual content1 which does not maintain throughout adequate presentation to perception in bodily form4 ,what sculpture1 in short1 has to do is to make the presence of ,spirit stand before us in its bodily shape and in immediate union therewith at rest and in blessedness2 and this form has to be made vital by means of the content of spiritual individuality4 ,the external sensuous material is consequently no longer elaborated either in conformity with its mechanical quality alone1 as a mass of weight1 nor in shapes of the inorganic world simply1 nor in entire indifference to colour1 etc4 ,it is carried into the ideal forms of the human figure1 and1 we may add1 in the completeness of all three spatial dimensions4 ,in other words and relatively to such a process we must maintain for sculpture that in it the inward or ideal content of ,spirit are first revealed in their eternal repose and essential self-stability4 ,to such repose and unity with itself there can only correspond that external shape which itself persists in such unity and repose4 ,and this condition is satisfied by configuration viewed in its abstract spatiality4#aeg ,the spirit which sculpture represents is that which is essentially sound1 not broken up in the play of chance conceits and passions2 and for this reason its external form also is not dissolved in the manifold variety of appearance1 but exhibits itself under this one presentment only as the abstraction of space in the totality of its dimensions4 ,assuming1 then1 that the art of architecture has executed its temple1 and the hand of sculpture has placed therein the image of the god1 we have in the third place to assume the community of the faithful as confronting the god thus presented to vision in the wide chambers of his dwelling-place4 ,now this community is the spiritual reflection into its own world of that sensuous presence1 the subjective and inward animating life of soul1 in its union with which1 both for the artistic content and the external material which manifests it1 the determining principle may be identified with particularization in varied shapes and qualities1 individualization and the life of soul#aeh which they imply4 ,the downright and solid fact of unity the god possesses in sculpture breaks up into the multiplicity of a world of particular souls#aei1 whose union is no longer sensuous but wholly ideal4 ,here for the first time ,god ,himself is revealed as veritably ,spirit--viz41 the ,spirit revealed in ,his community4 ,here at last ,he is seen apprehended as this moving to-and-fro1 as this alternation between ,his own essential unity and ,his realization in the knowledge of individual persons and that separation which it involves1 as also in the universal spiritual1 being#afj and union of the many4 ,in such a community ,god is disengaged from the abstraction of ,his unfolded self-seclusion and self-identity1 no less than from the immediate absorption in bodily shape1 in which ,he is presented by sculpture4 ,he is1 in a word1 lifted into the actual sphere of spiritual existence and knowledge1 into the reflected appearance1 whose manifestation is essentially inward and the life of heart and soul4 ,thereby the higher content is now the nature of ,spirit1 and that in its ultimate or absolute shape4 ,but at the same time the separation to which we have alluded displays this as particular spiritual being1 a specific emotional life4 ,moreover1 for the reason that the main thing here is not the untroubled repose of the ,god in himself#afa1 but his manifestation simply1 the ,being which is for another1 self-revealment in fact1 it follows that1 on the plane we have now reached1 all the varied content of human subjectivity in its vital movement and activity1 whether viewed as passion1 action1 or event1 or more generally the wide realm of human feeling1 volition and its discontinuance1 become one and all for their own sake objects of artistic representation4 ,agreeably with such a content the sensuous element of art has likewise to show itself potentially adapted to such particularization and the display of such an inward content of heart and mind4 ,media of this description are supplied by colour1 musical tones1 and finally in sound as mere sign for ideal perceptions and conceptions2 and we further obtain the means of realizing with the use of such media a content of this kind in the arts of painting1 music1 and poetry4 ,throughout this sphere the sensuous medium is found to be essentially disparate in itself and throughout posited#afb as ideal4 ,in this way it responds in the highest degree to the fundamentally spiritual content of art1 and the coalescence of spiritual significance and sensuous material attains a more intimate union than was possible either in architecture or sculpture4 ,at the same time such a union is necessarily more near to soul-life1 leaning exclusively to the subjective side of human experience2 one which1 in so far as form and content are thus constrained to particularization and to posit their result as ideal1 can only be actually effected at the expense of the objective universality of the content as also of the fusion with the immediately sensuous medium#afc4 ,the arts1 then1 which are lifted into a higher strain of ideality1 abandoning as they do the symbolism of architecture and the classical ,ideal of sculpture1 accept their predominant type from the romantic art-form2 and these are the arts most fitted to express its mode of configuration4 ,they are1 however1 a totality of arts1 because the romantic type is itself essentially the most concrete4 7c7 ,the articulation of this third sphere of the particular arts may be fixed as follows3 77 ,the first art which comes next to sculpture is that of painting4 ,it avails itself for a medium of its content and the plastic configuration of the same of visibility as such1 to the extent that it is differentiated in its own nature1 in other words is defined in the continuity of colour4 ,no doubt the material of architecture and sculpture is likewise both visible and coloured4 ,it is1 however1 not1 as in painting1 visibility in its pure nature1 not the essentially simple light1 which by its differentiating of itself in its opposition to darkness1 and in association with that darkness gives rise to colour#afd4 ,this quality of visibility made essentially ideal#afe and treated as such no longer either requires1 as in architecture1 the abstractly mechanical qualities of mass as appropriate to materials of weight1 nor1 as is the case with sculpture1 the complete dimensuration of spatial condition1 even when concentrated into organic forms4 ,the visibility and the making apparent1 which belong to painting1 possess differences of quality under a more ideal mode--that is1 in the specific varieties of colour--which liberates art from the objective totality of spatial condition1 by being limited to a plane surface4 ,on the other hand the content also attains the widest compass of particularity4 ,whatever can find a place in the human heart1 as emotion1 idea1 and purpose1 whatever it is capable of actually shaping--all such diversity may form part of the varied presentations of painting4 ,the entire world of particular existence1 from the most exalted embodiment of mind to the most insignificant natural fact1 finds a place here4 ,for it is possible even for finite ,nature1 in its particular scenes and phenomena1 to form part of such artistic display1 provided only that we have some reference to conscious life which makes it akin to human thought and emotion#aff4 77 ,the second art which continues the further realization of the romantic type and forms a distinct contrast to painting is that of music4 ,its medium1 albeit still sensuous1 yet proceeds into still profounder subjectivity and particularization4 ,we have here1 too1 the deliberate treatment of the sensuous medium as ideal1 and it consists in the negation and idealization into the isolated unity of a single point#afg1 the indifferent external collocation of space#afh1 whose complete appearance is retained by painting and deliberately feigned in its completeness4 ,this isolated point1 viewed as this process of negation1 is an essentially concrete and active process of cancellation within the determinate substance of the material medium1 viewed1 that is1 as motion and vibration of the material object within itself and in its relation to itself4 ,such an inchoate ideality of matter1 which no longer appears under the form of space1 but as temporal ideality#afi1 is sound or tone4 ,we have here the sensuous set down as negated1 and its abstract visibility converted into audibility4 ,in other words sound liberates the ideal content from its fetters in the material substance4 ,this earliest#agj secured inwardness of matter and impregnation of it with soul-life supplies the medium for the intimacy and soul of ,spirit--itself as yet indefinite--permitting1 as it does1 the echo and reverberation of man's emotional world through its entire range of feelings and passions4 ,in this way music forms the centre of the romantic arts1 just as sculpture represents the midway point of arrest between architecture and the arts of the romantic subjectivity4 ,thus1 too1 it forms the point of transition between the abstract1 spatial sensuousness of painting and the abstract spirituality of poetry4 ,music carries within itself1 like architecture1 and in contrast to the emotional world simply and its inward self-seclusion1 a relation of quantity conformable to the principles of the understanding and their modes of co-ordinated configuration#aga4 77 ,we must look for our third and most spiritual type of artistic presentation among the romantic arts in that of poetry4 ,the supreme characteristic of poetry consists in the power with which it brings into vassalage of the mind and its conceptions the sensuous element from which music and painting began to liberate art4 ,for sound1 the only remaining external material retained by poetry1 is in it no longer the feeling of the sonorous itself1 but is a mere sign without independent significance4 ,and it is1 moreover1 a sign of idea which has become essentially concrete1 and not merely#agb of indefinite feeling and its subtle modes and gradations4 ,and this is how sound develops into the ,word1 as essentially articulate voice1 whose intention it is to indicate ideas and thoughts4 ,the purely negative moment to which music advanced now asserts itself as the wholly concrete point1 the point which is mind itself1 the self-conscious individual1 which produces from itself the infinite expansion of its ideas and unites the same with the temporal condition of sound4 ,yet this sensuous element1 which was still in music immediately united to emotion1 is in poetry separated from the content of consciousness4 ,mind1 in short1 here determines this content for its own sake and apart from all else into the content of idea2 to express such idea it no doubt avails itself of sound1 but employs it merely as a sign without independent worth or substance4 ,thus viewed1 the sound here may be just as well reproduced by the mere letter1 for the audible1 like the visible1 is here reduced to a mere indication of mind#agc4 ,for this reason1 the true medium of poetical representation is the poetical imagination and the intellectual presentation itself2 and inasmuch as this element is common to all types of art it follows that poetry is a common thread through them all1 and is developed independently in each4 ,poetry is1 in short1 the universal art of the mind1 which has become essentially free1 and which is not fettered in its realization to an externally sensuous material1 but which is creatively active in the space1 and time belonging to the inner world of ideas and emotion4 ,yet it is precisely in this its highest phase1 that art terminates1 by transcending itself2 it is just here that it deserts the medium of a harmonious presentation of mind in sensuous shape and passes from the poetry of imaginative idea into the prose of thought4 ,such we may accept as the articulate totality of the particular arts2 they are the external art of architecture1 the objective art of sculpture and the subjective arts of painting1 music1 and poetry4 ,many other classifications than these have been attempted1 for a work of art presents such a wealth of aspects1 that it is quite possible1 as has frequently been the case1 to make first one and then another the basis of division4 ,for instance1 you may take the sensuous medium simply4 ,architecture may then be viewed as a kind of crystallization2 sculpture1 as the organic configuration of material in its sensuous and spatial totality2 painting as the coloured surface and line1 while in music1 space1 as such1 passes over into the point or moment of time replete with content in itself1 until we come finally to poetry1 where the external medium is wholly suppressed into insignificance4 ,or1 again1 these differences have been viewed with reference to their purely abstract conditions of space and time4 ,such abstract divisions of works of art may1 as their medium also may be consequentially traced in their characteristic features4 ,they cannot1 however1 be worked out as the final and fundamental principle1 because such aspects themselves derive their origins from a higher principle1 and must therefore fall into subordination thereto4 ,this higher principle we have discovered in the types of art--symbolic1 classical1 and romantic--which are the universal stages or phases of the ,idea of beauty itself4 ,their relation to the individual arts in their concrete manifestation as embodiment is of a kind that these arts constitute the real and positive existence of these general art-types4 ,for symbolic art attains its most adequate realization and most pertinent application in architecture1 in which it expatiates in the full import of its notion1 and is not as yet depreciated1 as it were1 into the merely inorganic nature dealt with by some other art4 ,the classical type of art finds its unfettered realization1 on the other hand1 in sculpture1 treating architecture merely as the enclosure which surrounds it1 and being unable to elaborate painting and music into the wholly adequate#agd forms of its content4 ,finally1 the romantic art-type is supreme in the products of painting and music1 and likewise in poetical composition1 as their preeminent and unconditionally adequate modes of expression4 ,poetry is1 however1 conformable to all types of the beautiful1 and its embrace reaches them all for the reason that the poetic imagination is its own proper medium1 and imagination is essential to every creation of beauty1 whatever its type may be4 ,to sum up1 then1 what the particular arts realize in particular works of art1 are according to their fundamental conception1 simply the universal types which constitute the self-unfolding ,idea of beauty4 ,it is as the external realization of this ,idea that the wide ,pantheon of art is being raised2 and the architect and builder thereof is the spirit of beauty as it gradually comes to self-cognition1 and to complete which the history of the world will require its evolution of centuries4 ,footnote #a3 ,the introduction begins as an introduction of lectures4 ,but as the work is merely based to a large extent on notes for lectures1 or on a manuscript which did not preserve the lectures as they were delivered1 it will be found most convenient to ignore this fact1 and in references to regard it simply as a written treatise4 ,footnote #b3 ,hegel1 alluding no doubt to the words of the ,gospel1 puts it born and born again from mind 7spirit74 ,footnote #c3 ,it is assumed that such a fancy is seized and defined as such in separation from other experience4 ,footnote #d3 ,the sentence is slightly ironical4 ,footnote #e3 ,dem ,scheine4 ,footnote #f3 ,raisonnements3 a disparaging expression4 ,footnote #g3 ,hegel here means the formal character1 not the material on which it is imposed in the several arts4 ,footnote #h3 ,hegel says1 as that which has no right to be1 das ,nichtseyn sollende4 ,footnote #i3 ,erscheine as contrasted with scheine4 ,footnote #aj3 ,das ,an-und-,frsichseyende4 ,that which is explicitly to itself self-determinate being1 no less than essentially such in its substantive right4 ,footnote #aa3 ,besonnener ,art4 ,possibly ,hegel means one more compatible with common sense4 ,footnote #ab3 ,i think by the words kunst wieder hervorzurufen ,hegel rather means to call up art as it was previously cultivated than merely to stimulate art production4 ,the latter is1 however1 ,professor ,bosanquet's translation4 ,footnote #ac3 ,subjective apparently in the sense of being wholly personal to the writer or philosopher in so far as the form of his treatise deals in classification and arrangement peculiar to himself and so external1 if not entirely arbitrary4 ,footnote #ad3 ,i agree with the note of ,professor ,bosanquet 7,trans41 p4 #ba7 that the word element refers here to the mental constituents of art1 as contrasted with the sensuous medium4 ,footnote #ae3 ,that is to say1 the essential formative process involved in its necessity4 ,footnote #af3 ,there must be a misprint or oversight in ,professor ,bosanquet's rendering of this passage 7p4 #ba74 ,as the sentence now stands it does not appear to me to make sense4 ,footnote #ag3 ,von ihm4 ,the pronoun1 ,i take it1 must refer here to das ,andere rather than the subject of the verb4 ,footnote #ah3 ,makes itself an alien to itself perhaps expresses the ,german better4 ,footnote #ai3 ,that is1 the work of art4 ,footnote #bj3 ,haltpunkte4 ,points of arrest in essential ideas necessary which restrain this tendency to purely arbitrary caprice4 ,footnote #ba3 ,i do not think the first part of this sentence ironical4 ,hegel admits that a general knowledge is a legitimate feature of modern culture4 ,but he points out that people are only too ready to confuse such a general knowledge with real art scholarship4 ,to bring out this ,i have translated rather freely4 ,footnote #bb3 ,detail of historical fact and artistic observation4 ,footnote #bc3 ,it is historical1 first1 regarded as a survey of historical condition1 and1 secondly1 because facts are collected whether in relation to ancient or modern art as a historian collects his facts4 ,footnote #bd3 ,lit41 the inmost or most ideal 7meaning74 ,footnote #be3 ,vollkommen4 ,complete or rather completely articulate and rounded in itself4 ,it is not easy to select the ,english word that exactly corresponds4 ,footnote #bf3 ,bestimmte ,individualitt4 ,the definition may1 as ,hegel says1 be more significant1 but it is for all that not very clearly expressed4 ,professor ,bosanquet translates the words determinate individual modification4 ,footnote #bg3 ,my view is that what ,hegel means to say is that in caricature ugliness is emphasized and made more 7nher7 a part of the content than belongs to the true nature of the characteristic of which it is 7in ,hegel's opinion7 no essential determinant or property4 ,the view stated in the sentence is therefore a kind of reductio ad absurdum4 ,professor ,bosanquet's translation appears to me to leave it doubtful whether the view stated is a just one or not4 ,he translates nher by closely1 not the comparative4 ,in my view ,hegel agrees that caricature may be characteristic1 but he does not agree that it is a genuine property of the characteristic where it is pressed to the excess of ugliness4 ,footnote #bh3 ,bestimmung4 ,footnote #bi3 ,that is1 in ,hegel's view4 ,footnote #cj3 ,das ,wahre4 ,footnote #ca3 ,den denkenden ,begriff4 ,it is possible that the notion of thought would express ,hegel's meaning1 as it would be a less strange expression4 ,but ,i have retained the more literal translation as the reference may be to the self-evolution of ,thought in its own dialectical process1 thought or the ,idea thinking out itself in the ,hegelian sense4 ,professor ,bosanquet seems to assume this1 as he translates the thinking ,idea4 ,footnote #cb3 ,kunstschnen4 ,i have translated this by the expression fine art because ,hegel in the opening of the introduction makes the expression interchangeable with schne kunst4 ,at the same time it must be recollected that the emphasis here is even more on beauty than the fact that it is the beauty of human art4 ,and it is for this reason1 ,i presume1 that ,professor ,bosanquet translates it here artistic beauty4 ,the only objection ,i have to make to this1 apart from ,hegel's words ,i have referred to1 is that the expression artistic beauty is sometimes used to signify beauty that is capable of being expressed by art4 ,of course that is excluded from ,hegel's use of the term2 he means the beauty of artistic work4 ,footnote #cc3 ,subjektiven4 ,footnote #cd3 ,independent1 that is1 of the consciousness of any particular individual4 ,hegel does not necessarily mean independent of consciousness altogether4 ,he has1 no doubt1 generally in his mind the kind of scepticism which received its most logical exposition in ,hume4 ,footnote #ce3 ,this appears to me the meaning of zuflliger ,sinn4 ,professor ,bosanquet translates it accidental sense4 ,by that ,i presume he understands the meaning to be a sense of beauty that is entirely personal to the recipient1 it may be possessed by one man1 but not by another4 ,hegel's illustration hardly supports this1 so it seems to me4 ,footnote #cf3 ,i do not know the exact translation of lemmatisch1 and by a curious slip the sentence is omitted from ,professor ,bosanquet's translation4 ,the general sense is plain enough4 ,every particular science accepts its subject-matter as a datum4 ,it starts from the empirical fact4 ,whether it admits the assumption or not1 it does assume such facts4 ,it is obvious that ,hegel's adoption of this standpoint is only relatively true4 ,footnote #cg3 ,hegel means1 ,i presume1 mainly in the introduction4 ,after that he does in a qualified degree discuss the profounder import of the ,idea of ,fine ,art4 ,his statements are not perhaps wholly free from inconsistency1 because he has previously said that apart from an encyclopaedic consideration of all the sciences1 it was not possible to do so1 and also some of ,his statements seem to imply that he does not intend to do so4 ,footnote #ch3 ,that is1 in the first ,part of the entire treatise4 ,footnote #ci3 ,what ,hegel means by the die letzte einleitende ,betrachtung ,i am not quite sure4 ,i presume he means the introduction to the first ,part4 ,the whole of this paragraph is not very clear4 ,footnote #dj3 ,by man's sensitive life in its widest sense is1 ,i think1 intended4 ,footnote #da3 ,the ,german words are machen and nachmachen4 ,we have no exact equivalents4 ,footnote #db3 ,lit41 to fill out 7ausfllen7 in complete equipment4 ,footnote #dc3 ,individuelle4 ,footnote #dd3 ,the ,german will admit of the interpretation that the reference is merely to genius1 but ,i think ,hegel clearly means that neither one nor the other can be thus conjured up4 ,footnote #de3 ,at the end of the first main division of the work4 ,footnote #df3 ,one of ,meredith's correspondents has put the question with all gravity whether he considered inspiration could be assisted by wine drinking4 ,with equal gravity our humourist replied that though wine might be something of a restorative after mental effort it was not his experience that it contributed to first-rate artistic work4 ,he actually mentions the case of ,schiller4 ,though ,i have read somewhere that this poet used to be inspired by the smell of rotten apples ,i do not recollect reading that he favoured the champagne bottle4 ,meredith also mentions the case of ,hoffmann1 and adds that the type of his work does not increase our respect for the precedent4 ,footnote #dg3 ,eine usserliche ,arbeit4 ,a craftsmanship which has to deal with the outside surface4 ,we may translate external craftsmanship2 but the translation in the text gives the meaning best1 ,i think4 ,footnote #dh3 ,keinen geistigen ,stoff4 ,professor ,bosanquet translates spiritual content4 ,i imagine the emphasis to be mainly on the absence of positive ideas available to knowledge4 ,in any case ,hegel appears to press his point of contrast too far4 ,men of genius such as ,mozart 7who was probably in his mind7 and ,schubert may bear him out4 ,but on the other hand we have a ,keats1 ,shelley1 and ,raphael4 ,genius matures rapidly1 but the greatest works of musical art no less than any other imply a real maturity of mind at least1 and more than is here assumed of1 ,i should say1 a rich experience4 ,mozart1 of course1 upsets any theory1 and it is questionable even whether ,mozart is really an exception4 ,it depends on the point of view from which we are estimating the intelligible content of music as an expression of soul-life4 ,footnote #di3 ,the ,iphigenie was completed in ,goethe's thirty-eighth year1 fourteen years later than ,gtz4 ,the bulk of his more important works are of the same date or later4 ,schiller's ,wallenstein was completed after his thirty-fifth year4 ,footnote #ej3 ,this is surely not quite accurate4 ,the medium of painting in the sense that speech or writing is the medium of poetry is not canvas or panel but oil or other colour4 ,canvas would correspond with the blank pages of a book4 ,footnote #ea3 ,free1 that is1 from accidental and irrelevant matter4 ,footnote #eb3 ,professor ,bosanquet translates sinnliche here as sensitive4 ,i am inclined to think that ,hegel here rather leaves out of sight the fact that in the process of ,nature we have sensitive organic life no less than unconscious inorganic4 ,his contrast is rather between the conscious life of man and unconscious nature1 the conscious life that is not self-conscious being for the object of the contrast treated as equivalent to unconscious4 ,he would also apparently ignore the fact that man himself and the higher beauty which attaches to him is also from ope point of view a part of the natural process4 ,footnote #ec3 ,that is1 apart from purely personal ends in its pursuit1 which are accidental to its essential notion4 ,footnote #ed3 ,that is1 in the medium of conscious life4 ,footnote #ee3 ,einmal4 ,they are there1 but they do not know they are there4 ,footnote #ef3 ,aus geistiger ,bildung1 i4e41 a high level of mental culture is necessary before the advent of civilized manners and customs in which spiritual life is reflected with real refinement and directness4 ,footnote #eg3 ,bedrfniss zur ,kunst4 ,footnote #eh3 ,lit41 ,in the form of the most abstract single subjectivity4 ,that is to say1 that the main fact about it is that it is felt2 but1 except in respect to intensity1 it cannot be described as an object of thought with defining attributes1 ,it is abstract individual sensation4 ,footnote #ei3 ,by the expression ,kreis ,hegel would mean rather an indefinite sphere than a definite circle4 ,the simile is perhaps not very apt4 ,the idea1 apparently1 is of a sphere of feeling1 that is1 such as being self-complete1 but is so abstract or indefinable that the introduction into it of positive ideas such as justice1 etc41 are the mere entrance of spectral forms which vanish in such an indefinable medium1 without disclosing their nature4 ,they are felt but not cognized for what they really are4 ,footnote #fj3 ,blinder1 blind in the sense that it is not guided by deliberate and self-conscious reason1 i4e41 mere animal instinct4 ,footnote #fa3 ,a difficult sentence to translate4 ,i have followed ,professor ,bosanquet in assuming that the substantive with which mangelhaft agrees must be borrowed from the following sentence1 though it seems also to be carried on in a loose kind of way from the previous sentence 7,gesckmacksinn47 ,the entire sentence is built1 as we have it1 on the further confusion that there are two parallels which before the sentence ends are regarded as one6 ,that is to say1 the general critical sense is contrasted with the critique of particular works of art and further the defect of that general sense in its neglect of universal principles is further contrasted with the way the specific critique deals with particular works4 ,i hardly think1 however1 that my admirable predecessor is justified in ignoring the comparative degree of bestimmteres1 or in his translation of ,zeug as power4 ,i take it to mean the material of actual works of art4 ,the sentence is a good example of1 some of the difficulties of ,hegel translation4 ,footnote #fb3 ,die ,sache4 ,the subject-matter in its most real sense as content4 ,footnote #fc3 ,that is1 the so-called good taste4 ,footnote #fd3 ,begriff4 ,concrete notional ,idea4 ,footnote #fe3 ,that is1 in his physical form4 ,footnote #ff3 ,hegel is here considering desire abstractedly1 that is1 on its own account 7als solche47 ,it may of course in its turn subserve a rational purpose1 such as the preservation of health or life4 ,but the contrast here is between the relation of appetite1 and that of the theoretic faculty to objects4 ,footnote #fg3 ,sein ,objekt4 ,the object in which he finds himself2 rather this1 ,i think1 than that which he has created4 ,footnote #fh3 ,innerlich1 i4e41 in the world of mind as contrasted with that of the sensuous vorhandene4 ,footnote #fi3 ,hegel or his editors have in a converse way4 ,this is obviously a mistake4 ,in both examples the point is that the object is preserved as against desire with its destruction1 and the contemplative intelligence with its ideal transformation4 ,footnote #gj3 ,ein ideelles4 ,the meaning is1 ,i think1 that the materia is stamped with the hall-mark of deliberate artistic purpose4 ,the ideality1 though relatively jejune on such a work as the pyramids1 in the higher reaches of art such as poetry and music affects of course the medium itself1 the musical chord being pure ideality4 ,professor ,bosanquet's translation omits this and the previous sentence1 probably by an oversight4 ,but it is also possible that this thinker conceived the statement as here expressed to be misleading1 or at least open to misconception4 ,in architecture and even painting it is obvious1 from a certain point of view1 the sensuous materia1 if directed to an artistic end1 remains none the less the material borrowed from natural fact though the fact as natural may be modified in its form4 ,painting may represent the semblance1 but it employs a medium simply sensuous4 ,hegel has mainly before his attention here obviously the arts of painting1 poetry1 and music4 ,footnote #ga3 ,they are theoretical because as applied to a work of art they imply the presence of the contemplative faculty4 ,in a later section of the work ,hegel makes a more complete analysis of what is implied in the sense of hearing as applied to musical composition and in the colour sense4 ,in both cases it is obvious the mind contributes to the facts cognized4 ,hearing is1 however1 from ,hegel's point of view the most ideal of the two1 and he conceives the position of the ears itself points to this distinction4 ,footnote #gb3 ,it may at least be questioned whether the ground given here of this distinction1 or part of it1 is strictly accurate4 ,it may be said that our sense of sight and hearing are both in contact with the waves of the medium1 the vibration of which produces the impression we call sound or light4 ,the most obvious distinction then appears to be that the natural object is left as it is by hearing and sight4 ,this at least holds good as against taste4 ,but at least it may be questioned1 ,i think1 whether the sense of touch may not be the source of artistic enjoyment1 certainly in the case of the blind4 ,and the sense of smell at least leaves objects as they are1 and some may contend that it is a source of enjoyment of the beauty of ,nature4 ,hegel would reply1 of course1 that no works of human art are enjoyed by such means4 ,the main ground is1 however1 that sight and hearing are the senses closest to intelligence4 ,footnote #gc3 ,by ,anschauungen ,hegel apparently has in mind all the ideas of poetry4 ,we should certainly rather have expected the word ,vorstellungen1 the word used being rather visible perceptions4 ,but the three words here seem generally to denote the subject-matter of painting1 music1 and poetry4 ,footnote #gd3 ,lit41 ,operative in the artist viewed 7i4e41 the artist7 as the personal energy 7,subjektivitt7 which creates4 ,professor ,bosanquet's translation as a productive state of the person would appear to make the sensuous side a subjective state of the artist4 ,but apart from construction1 can we speak of this as a state8 ,it is modified by his energy--but it can hardly be regarded as a part of it4 ,footnote #ge3 ,i find it impossible to fix any one ,english equivalent to ,hegel's use of the words ,einbildungskraft1 ,phantasie1 or ,vorstellung1 in the sense at least that fancy1 imagination1 or phantasy have been used and defined by famous ,english writers4 ,generally speaking1 ,i should say that ,phantasie1 or as it is called sometimes artistic or creative ,phantasie1 stands for the most intellectual faculty1 though ,vorstellung is also used in much the same sense4 ,but it is impossible to arrive at any clear distinction such as was originally made so profoundly by ,ruskin between fancy1 the instrument of poetical talent1 the surface gift1 and imagination or1 as he called it1 penetrative imagination1 which summarizes all the powers of a genius and personality and enters into the heart of the subject-matter by an illuminating flash which reveals reality rather than illustrates by means of image4 ,the present passage appears to me even more unsatisfactory than the more carefully digested analysis at the end of ,part ,i1 when ,hegel discusses the artist4 ,it not merely ignores the indispensable presence of imagination in the pioneers of science1 but appears to myself to confuse talent as the natural gift of a man with the mode in which it is exercised in presenting ideas in sensuous imagery1 or at least makes the former depend on the latter4 ,professor ,bosanquet translates ,phantasie here by fancy4 ,but fancy is1 in our way of looking at it1 precisely not the faculty which distinctively belongs to the great mind and the big heart or soul1 though other parts of the description are more applicable4 ,and in short1 as ,i say1 to fix definite ,english equivalents to ,hegel's phraseology appears to me impossible4 ,footnote #gf3 ,die ,phantasie4 ,footnote #gg3 ,this is1 ,i presume1 ,hegel's way of putting the simple fact1 that much of the process of artistic production is unconscious4 ,one man instinctively draws1 or picks up his notes on the piano1 another cannot4 ,i think ,hegel rather refers to this original talent than the much more important one in which genius1 right into maturity1 rides over difficulties without knowing how it does so4 ,such happy or even miraculous effects--such as artists sometimes playfully call them--are obviously in part1 if only in part1 the result of profound artistic experience4 ,he is dealing almost exclusively with the natural bias1 which makes one man naturally an artist1 whether creative or executant1 and is absent from another4 ,he hardly approaches the question what constitutes the artist of genius as contrasted with the man of natural talent4 ,footnote #gh3 ,this confirms the conclusion above4 ,footnote #gi3 ,fr sich4 ,if merely admired as imitation and nothing more4 ,footnote #hj3 ,zur ,ekelhaftigkeit4 ,sickeningly like is ,professor ,bosanquet's closer translation4 ,the expression damnably like is not unknown4 ,footnote #ha3 ,i think with ,professor ,bosanquet that phantastischen is here not fantastic but strictly derived from ,phantasie in its sense of imagination4 ,completely1 of course1 as involving no direct imitation of ,nature4 ,footnote #hb3 ,formal1 i4e41 implying no creative supplement from the artist1 purely mechanical4 ,footnote #hc3 ,it would be both instructive and interesting to discuss if1 and how far1 and by virtue of what1 that distinct type of modern art known as still life1 such as a few objects of the library1 or even a shell or two and so on up to more important organic life was excluded from this condemnation4 ,it is quite clear that ,ruskin would have a good deal to say that would imply important qualification4 ,footnote #hd3 ,begeisterung4 ,i think this must be the meaning4 ,inspiration hardly makes sense4 ,it is art that is inspired1 not those who attend the celebration4 ,footnote #he3 ,im ,innersten is ,i think here obviously to be taken with the verb1 not with the substantives4 ,footnote #hf3 ,ueberhaupt4 ,footnote #hg3 ,the meaning of in diesem ,gebiete is1 ,i presume1 the actual world4 ,but if so it is simply otiose1 and ,i have left it out4 ,footnote #hh3 ,bestimmung4 ,the translation given appears to be the sense1 though we should rather say weaken a man from the pursuit of a definite course4 ,professor ,bosanquet1 who translates the word aim a little lower down1 evades the word here4 ,footnote #hi3 ,raisonnirende here and raissonnement below have a depreciatory sense--and signify ordinary reasoning in the first instance and the methods of the popular secularist in the second4 ,footnote #ij3 ,a sentence omitted by ,professor ,bosanquet1 and it seems to amount to little more than a more generalized statement of what has gone before4 ,the end of art both directly and indirectly concerns its subject-matter1 or rather1 as ,hegel puts it1 the need of the notion or ,idea of it carries us to a further end beyond the end shared in common by its particular content4 ,footnote #ia3 ,i follow ,professor ,bosanquet in his translation of the words als ,allgemeines fr sich zu zuerden2 but ,i am not sure that the more literal translation is not simply as the words stand1 the sense being not to be self-conscious of himself 7fr sich7 as the universal principle1 to be aware of this property1 but rather as universal principle to become for himself1 i4e4 independent of desire4 ,footnote #ib3 ,einheit--unity to the point of fusion1 identity4 ,footnote #ic3 ,unmittelbaren ,befangenheit4 ,sunkenness is ,professor ,bosanquet's translation4 ,footnote #id3 ,theoretic as a direct transcript of 1 4 ,footnote #ie3 ,gesichtspunkte4 ,the various points of view necessary to arrive at such a general conclusion4 ,footnote #if3 ,though not entirely confident ,i am right in accepting the words zu bringen as a repetition of the hervorzubringen just before1 the alternative of ,professor ,bosanquet which takes the words wird zu bringen seyn as equivalent to gebracht seyn sollte certainly appears to me no direct translation4 ,footnote #ig3 ,poets aim at utility and entertainment alike4 ,footnote #ih3 ,i think that ,hegel in his use of erste here rather refers to the fact of past history than a fact in the individual history of nations4 ,art is1 in the early days of history1 the instructress of nations1 gives1 ,i think1 his meaning4 ,it is the first instructress in the history of nations4 ,footnote #ii3 ,i venture to think if ,professor ,bosanquet's translation were the right one the ,german would be ein in sich selbst gebrochenes4 ,i do not think in ihm selbst can be a ,german rendering of in itself4 ,but ,i admit the translation is tempting whether ,hegel had in his mind the house divided against itself or not4 ,footnote #ajj3 ,lit41 the spiritual universal1 i4e41 the universal substance of its ideal content4 ,footnote #aja3 ,precisely as ,ruskin1 for example1 in his ,modern ,painters condemns both ,titian and ,tintoret1 not because they painted the ,paradise or the ,assunta1 to produce fine paintings1 or even because they did not or did themselves believe in the truth of their subject-matter1 but because they did not paint in order to make converts1 an extraordinary lapse of judgment4 ,footnote #ajb3 ,im besten ,sinne des ,wortes4 ,footnote #ajc3 ,professor ,bosanquet points out in a note on this passage 7p4 #aja7 that ,sittlichkeit here1 which he translates1 as ,i have done1 respectability1 is the habit of virtue1 without the reflective aspiration after goodness as an ideal4 ,of course there is no depreciation in the use of the term4 ,it is simply the morality of ordinary people1 who do generally what their neighbours think the right thing4 ,the word moralitt and moralisch1 which ,i have only been able to translate by a paraphrase1 is the morality of the standpoint discussed1 which is very much that of ,kant or ,duty for duty's sake in ,bradley's ,ethical ,studies4 ,footnote #ajd3 ,that is the contingency of the world of ,nature as contrasted with the essential stability of mind or spirit4 ,footnote #aje3 ,lit41 ,to satisfy itself in its real or independent self 7fr sich74 ,it cannot identify itself with either side as its wholly real self made therein explicit4 ,it is neither fish nor fowl4 ,footnote #ajf3 ,bestimmngen may here be a reference to man's broadest spiritual characterizations as one of the human family1 the race1 the nation1 and so forth1 or1 as ,i think1 a reference to his vocation1 future destiny1 general welfare4 ,footnote #ajg3 ,an und fr sich ,wahre4 ,footnote #ajh3 ,unbefangenen1 i4e41 the nave outlook of ordinary life4 ,footnote #aji3 ,professor ,bosanquet merely translates are not and are in italic as in the text1 which of course1 except that he adds a comma after are1 is a literal translation4 ,but the sense1 as ,i understand it1 is that the writer says it is not in the sense that these two contradictories do not exist at all 7i4e41 as relative reality71 but rather in the sense that in philosophical thought which grasps their essence they are not only present but present as reconciled factors of one truth4 ,professor ,bosanquet's translation appears to me to amount to this3 that all ,hegel maintains is that the sense he means is not that such contradictory elements are not reconciled1 but in the sense that they are reconciled4 ,perhaps this is his view4 ,but if so1 ,i fail to see the importance of the antithesis1 which appears to me between gar nicht sind and in ,vershnung sind4 ,hegel before had expressly said that such contradictory sides were reconciled in philosophy1 so ,i do not see why he should so emphatically repeat himself4 ,the comma1 of course1 may be a misprint4 ,footnote #aaj3 ,begriff4 ,notion1 or concrete ,idea of it4 ,footnote #aaa3 ,of that world in its opposition to reason4 ,footnote #aab3 ,der ,mensch als er geht und steht4 ,the man in ordinary conditions---the average man1 however1 rather than the natural man1 which carries slightly different associations4 ,footnote #aac3 ,the difference between a material instrument1 which is a mere means to an end conceived by the craftsman1 such as a plough for ploughing1 a rake for raking1 and a purpose inseparable from the organic whole as a mouth for eating1 for without life the organism collapses4 ,footnote #aad3 ,fr sich4 ,footnote #aae3 ,in his history of ,aesthetic in ,germany ,ltze disputes this4 ,it seems to some extent a question of definition4 ,in ,hegel's view a dead body is not a human body in the full sense1 but the corpse of a man4 ,a hand separated from the body1 whether we call it a hand or not1 is no longer1 whatever it may be1 a living member1 its essential significance as a hand has disappeared4 ,it was only a hand in its coherence as part of a larger whole4 ,it may still for a time preserve the semblance of its life1 but it is cut off as the withered leaf4 ,these are facts at least that are undeniable1 and the objection appears to me based on a misunderstanding4 ,a hand is only an und fr sich human when it is part of a living man4 ,what is the organic reality in the complete sense is the man as a whole4 ,the hand is merely the extremity of one of his arms4 ,you may call a dead hand a hand if you like4 ,the point is what was implied in the fact that you called it a hand at all whether alive or dead4 ,footnote #aaf3 ,that is1 by ,kant1 of course4 ,footnote #aag3 ,by ,verwicklung ,i understand the general evolution of ideal philosophy which the defects of the ,kantian ,critique stimulated4 ,professor ,bosanquet apparently limits it to a perplexity personal to ,schiller4 ,i doubt whether the word will bear this4 ,footnote #aah3 ,that is1 the concrete idea of humanity as a collective aggregate4 ,footnote #aai3 ,that is1 intelligence as asserted by a society of human beings as public opinion1 etc4 ,footnote #abj3 ,die ,ineinsbildung4 ,footnote #aba3 ,grace and ,dignity4 ,footnote #abb3 ,gesinnungen4 ,sentimental views is probably what is implied4 ,footnote #abc3 ,alle ,sache4 ,footnote #abd3 ,professor ,bosanquet is clearly right in his view that the order of the words here should be reversed4 ,the words an und fr sich are obviously the wider explication of in sick selbst1 the auxiliary1 as not unfrequently in ,hegel1 being almost equivalent to nmlich4 ,whether a misprint or an oversight ,i have translated subject to this correction4 ,footnote #abe3 ,i presume the revelation is not merely that of visible shape or even mainly4 ,footnote #abf3 ,das alles aus sich setzende und auflsende ,ich4 ,the three points emphasized by ,hegel in ,fichte's ,philosophy are3 7a7 ,the ,ego is abstract2 7b7 ,everything is a show for it2 7c7 ,its own acts are a semblance4 ,footnote #abg3 ,hegel uses the word ,eitelkeit and eitle in their double sense of empty-nothingness--futility and vain or conceited4 ,this cannot be readily reproduced in ,english4 ,footnote #abh3 ,schnseligkeit4 ,borrowed no doubt from ,goethe's notion of a fair soul4 ,footnote #abi3 ,like the vaulting ambition of ,shakespeare which falls on the other side1 is ber sich selbst4 ,footnote #acj3 ,haltung4 ,professor ,bosanquet translates this conduct4 ,i rather think it refers to bearing1 demeanour4 ,they are1 as we say1 featureless1 flaccid figures4 ,footnote #aca3 ,lppische4 ,i am not quite sure what is exactly meant4 ,professor ,bosanquet translates it grotesque4 ,but the word is a provincial form of ,schlaff apparently--loose1 flaccid and so childish1 trifling4 ,footnote #acb3 ,moment4 ,a phase in an evolutionary1 or1 as it is here1 a dialectical process4 ,a momentary feature of it4 ,footnote #acc3 ,this final section is called the ,division of the ,subject4 ,footnote #acd3 ,subjektivitt4 ,that is1 the ideality of consciousness1 or thought4 ,footnote #ace3 ,professor ,bosanquet1 in his note on this passage1 expresses the opinion that ,hegel when he writes thus is referring ,to the self-consciousness of individual human beings as constituting1 and reflecting on1 an ideal unity between them4 ,this no doubt1 as he suggests1 does put a somewhat unnatural meaning on the word person or subjekt4 ,no doubt there is a sense in which we can ascribe personality to a state1 or nation1 in the concrete unity of its life4 ,but while admitting that unity such as this1 which is not sensuous but ideal1 can be effective and actual1 ,i find it difficult to conclude that ,hegel did himself hold that the unity of the ,divine ,being was merely identical with the unity or totality of concrete human life as reflected upon by single individuals4 ,how far is human life as a whole on this ,earth a unity or totality at all8 ,that question has been discussed by ,professor ,bradley and others with very different conclusions4 ,nay1 how far does human existence itself exhaust the actually present realization or self-realization of self-conscious ,spirit or ,intelligence8 ,whatever maybe the wisest answer to such and other questions ,i can hardly think that ,hegel would have accepted ,professor ,bosanquet's interpretation as completely adequate4 ,footnote #acf3 ,fackeldistel4 ,torch thistle1 a plant of the genus ,cereus4 ,footnote #acg3 ,or1 as mind and in mind4 ,footnote #ach3 ,that is to say1 presents to itself to conscious grasp of itself as such ,art-spirit 7als knstlerischer47 ,footnote #aci3 ,the two evolutions here alluded to are 7i7 that of a particular way of regarding ,nature1 man1 and ,god in a particular age and nation such as the ,egyptian1 ,greek1 and ,christian viewed in express relation to art2 7ii7 ,the several arts--sculpture1 music1 poetry1 etc41 each on their own foundation and viewed relatively to the former evolution4 ,footnote #adj3 ,the point1 of course1 is that the different media of the several arts are inherently1 and in virtue of the fact that we have not here mere matter as opposed to that which is intellectual rather than sensuous1 but matter in which the notional concept is already essentially present or pregnant 7sound is1 for instance1 more ideal than the spatial matter of architecture71 adapted to the particular arts in which they serve as the medium of expression4 ,footnote #ada3 ,professor ,bosanquet explains these plastic forms 7,gestaltungs formen7 as the various modifications of the subject-matter of art 7,trans41 p4 #adj note74 ,i am not quite sure of the meaning here intended4 ,it would apparently identify the term with the ,gebilde referred to in the third division4 ,i should myself rather incline to think that ,hegel had mainly in his mind the specific general types1 that is1 the three relations of the ,idea itself to its external configuration1 viewed as a historical evolution1 which ,hegel calls symbolic1 classical1 and romantic4 ,perhaps this is what ,professor ,bosanquet means4 ,but in that case it does not appear to me so much the subject-matter as the generic forms in the shaping of that matter4 ,footnote #adb3 ,das wahrhaft ,innere4 ,that is1 the inward of the truth of conscious life4 ,footnote #adc3 ,means apparently the notion in its absolute sense4 ,footnote #add3 ,because it represents spirit as independent of an appropriate bodily form4 ,footnote #ade3 ,what appears to be denoted by ,geistigkeit is the generic term of intelligence--that activity of conscious life which does not necessarily make us think of a single individual--the common nature of all spirit4 ,footnote #adf3 ,by ,innerlichkeit1 which might also be rendered as pure ideality1 what is signified is that in a mental state there are no parts outside of each other4 ,footnote #adg3 ,subjekt1 i4e41 the individual ,ego of self-consciousness4 ,footnote #adh3 ,das subjective ,innere1 lit41 the subjective inner state4 ,footnote #adi3 ,geistigkeit4 ,professor ,bosanquet translates it here intellectual being4 ,footnote #aej3 ,the distinction between a percipient and an external object falls away4 ,the content displayed is part of the soul-life itself4 ,footnote #aea3 ,professor ,bosanquet apparently assumes a negative has slipped out4 ,but the text probably is correct in the rather awkward form in which it stands4 ,footnote #aeb3 ,thus poetry is primarily a romantic art1 but in the ,epic it is affiliated with the objective character of classical art1 or we may say that there is a romantic and classical type of architecture1 though the art is primarily symbolic4 ,footnote #aec3 ,gestalt4 ,plastic power is perhaps a better translation4 ,footnote #aed3 ,he means that in architecture the building is merely a shrine or environment of the image of the god4 ,footnote #aee3 ,infinite1 of course1 in the concrete sense of rounded in itself1 as the circle1 or1 still more1 the living organism4 ,footnote #aef3 ,lit41 which is not also that of the spiritual sphere4 ,footnote #aeg3 ,that is1 an object limited only in space4 ,footnote #aeh3 ,subjektivitt4 ,the particularization in romantic art implies the presence of an ideal element imported by the soul of the artist1 which appeals directly to the soul in its emotional life4 ,compare a picture by an ,italian master with a ,greek statue4 ,footnote #aei3 ,lit41 ,a multiplicity of isolated examples of inwardness4 ,footnote #afj3 ,that is1 in the life shared by all as one community actuated by a common purpose4 ,footnote #afa3 ,as in sculpture4 ,footnote #afb3 ,professor ,bosanquet's note is here 7,trans41 p4 #aff7 ,posited or laid down to be ideal4 ,this almost is equal to made to be in the sense of not being4 ,in other words musical sound is ideal as existing1 qu work of art1 in memory only1 the moment in which it is actually heard being fugitive4 ,a picture is equally so in respect of the third dimension1 which has to be read into it4 ,poetry is almost wholly ideal1 uses hardly any sensuous element1 and appeals almost wholly to what exists in the mind4 ,footnote #afc3 ,by particularization is meant the variety in the material of colours1 musical tones1 and ideas1 which latter are really quite as much the medium of poetry as written language4 ,the sensuous medium is here an abstract sign and1 as ,hegel would contend1 nothing more than this4 ,footnote #afd3 ,reference1 of course1 to ,hegel's unfortunate acceptance of ,goethe's theory of colour4 ,footnote #afe3 ,the colour of art is not merely ideal as applied to only two dimensions of space1 but also is subjective in the artistic treatment of it under a definite scheme4 ,it is not clear whether ,hegel alludes also to this2 apparently not1 though it is the most important feature4 ,in fact1 even assuming his theory of light to be correct1 it is difficult entirely to follow his distinction between the appearance of colour on a flat or a round surface4 ,as natural colour the one would be as ideal as the other4 ,only regarded as a composition would painting present distinction4 ,footnote #aff3 ,it is obvious that the reference here is mainly to an intentional appeal to the human soul through the content of the composition4 ,but the appeal may also be made through the technique and artistic treatment of the medium itself4 ,footnote #afg3 ,the parts of a chord are not in space1 but are ideally cognized4 ,hegel describes this by saying that music idealizes space and concentrates it to a point4 ,it would perhaps be more intelligible to say that it transmutes the positive effects of a material substance in motion into the positive and more ideal condition of time4 ,the point which is continually negated is at least qu music the point1 or rather1 moment1 of a temporal process4 ,footnote #afh3 ,by the indifferent externality of space is signified the fact that the parts of space1 though external to each other1 are not qualitatively distinguishable4 ,footnote #afi3 ,succession in time is more ideal than coexistence in space because it exists only as continuity in a conscious subject4 ,footnote #agj3 ,painting no doubt introduces ideal elements into the artistic composition of colour1 but the colour still remains the appearance of a material thing or superficies4 ,footnote #aga3 ,that is to say1 music or harmony is based on a solid conformity to law on the part of its tones in their conjunction and succession1 their structure and resolution4 ,footnote #agb3 ,as in painting4 ,footnote #agc3 ,the views here propounded suggest considerable criticism4 ,it appears to me that the stress here laid upon the intelligible content of poetry as contrasted with the sensuous qualities of its form as modulated speech is certainly untenable4 ,what we call the music of verse may unquestionably be most intimately associated with the ideal content expressed2 but apart from the artistic collocation of language as sound no less than symbol we certainly do not get the art of poetry4 ,even where ,hegel deals directly with rhythm and rhyme in the body of the treatise ,i think it is clear he underrates all that is implied in the difference between the musical expression of poetry as contrasted even with the sonorous language of mere prose4 ,a further question upon which more doubt is permissible is how far the actual script in written or printed letters is not entitled to be regarded as at least in part the sensuous medium4 ,no doubt the poem is not dependent upon it as a painting is upon colour1 or the canvas which supports it1 for it may be recited4 ,but at least it is practically dependent upon it for its preservation4 ,the point may very possibly appear1 however1 as nugatory or entirely unimportant1 beside the question whether the medium of the art is not really imaginative idea rather than articulate speech4 ,footnote #agd3 ,absolute ,formen4 ,adequate in the sense of being unconditionally so4 ,,first ,,part ,,the ,,idea ,,of ,,fine ,,art1 ,,or ,,the ,,ideal ,,the ,,position ,,of ,,art ,,relatively ,,to ,,finite ,,reality1 ,,religion1 ,,and ,,philosophy ,the conclusion of the introduction brings within sight the more methodical exposition of our subject4 ,it will in the first place be useful as a point of departure for a true philosophy of the beautiful to sum up shortly the position of ,fine ,art in its general relation to the ,real1 no less than to emphasize the salient features which distinguish the philosophy of ,fine ,art from other philosophical inquiries4 7a7 ,with this object in view we will first enumerate the diverse attempts which have been made to apprehend the beautiful in thought1 placing each in the order which will best assist a critical verdict4 ,we have already contributed something to this in our introduction4 ,and1 moreover1 we may add that the mere inquiry what others have contributed either rightly or wrongly to our subject1 at least with the hope of ascertaining something really instructive to an exposition which claims to be wholly scientific1 will not assist us much4 ,so far from this being so we must preface our remarks with the admission that1 in the opinion of many1 the beautiful1 for the very reason that it is the beautiful1 does not admit of such intellectual apprehension1 is1 in short1 no object intelligible to human thought4 ,to such a thesis we must for the present--in our response to those who at this time of day contend that all ,truth is ultimately incomprehensible1 and only the finiteness of the phenomenal and the contingent matters of temporal existence is within our mental grasp--reply that it is precisely ,truth1 and ,truth alone1 which is to be thus comprehended1 and for this reason that it possesses the absolute notion1 or1 more succinctly1 the ,idea for its basic support4 ,now beauty is no other than a particular determination under which the ,true is expressed and revealed to us2 and it lies open to the fullest comprehension of thought in so far as such can equip it with the armoury of the concrete notion4 ,it is quite true that no idea has suffered more severely in our own time from misconceptions than this which we call the notion in its fullest explication4 ,one is only too often misunderstood to mean a determination which is abstract and one sided1 or at least a conception of the analytical understanding4 ,as thus understood neither the totality of ,truth nor the idea of beauty as a concrete whole can be brought home to a thinking consciousness4 ,but the idea of beauty1 as we have already observed1 and shall seek to make more intelligible as we proceed1 is no such abstraction of the mind3 rather it may be defined as the absolute notion in its self-evolved concreteness1 or still more specifically defined1 the absolute ,idea4 7b7 ,and1 further1 we cannot more succinctly define the absolute ,idea1 in the above use of the expression1 than by saying it is mind 7,spirit73 and we may add that the mind thus referred to is not mind regarded as finite1 that is1 subject to the conditions and limitations of sense-perception1 but the universal and absolute ,intelligence#age1 which1 out of its own free activity1 determines ,truth in the profoundest signification of the term4 ,to the ordinary consciousness of everyday life the object of perception1 no doubt1 breaks away from mind1 as though our thought stood in opposition to ,nature1 which receives from us a validity equal at least to the consciousness which perceives it4 ,but in this way of looking at ,nature and the conscious subject as two neighbours set over against one another in territories equally self-subsistent it is only the finite and limited mind1 not that which it is as an infinite substance and in its notional truth1 which is apprehended4 ,nature is not thus to be set over against absolute ,mind1 either as conjoint with a sphere of the ,real of equal worth1 or as an independent boundary thereto4 ,rather the aspect which ,nature appears to hold in this respect is that which mind or spirit itself sets up1 and of which it becomes the product as a ,nature in which limit and boundary are themselves determining constituents4 ,in fact1 ,mind in its absolute or infinite substance can only be apprehended as this free activity1 which is manifested in self-development through differentiation4 ,this object1 this other1 through which such differentiation proceeds1 is regarded in such opposition as ,nature1 but as the object of intelligence it is quite as much indebted to ,mind for the free gift and fulness of its own essential substance4 ,we must therefore conceive ,nature as herself containing in potency the absolute ,idea4 ,she is that ,idea in apparent shape1 which mind1 in its synthetic power1 posits as the object opposed to itself4 ,she is so far a product1 a creation4 ,the truth of ,nature therefore is simply the determination by mind of its own substance1 its ideality and power of determination1 through a process which no doubt begins with a separation of itself into two factors which apparently negate each other1 but which1 by the very activity of such negation and separation1 passes beyond the contradiction it implies to a unity which heals the fracture4 ,instead of finding our-elves opposed to a limit and a barrier we have a totality in which the parts which opposed each other are fused together by the free universality of mind4 ,this ideality1 in other words this infinite power of determination#agf1 is that which constitutes the profound notion of ,mind's subjectivity4 ,as subjectivity mind is1 in the first instance1 merely ,nature1 ,mind1 or ,spirit that is not explicitly unfolded1 mind which has not arrived at the grasp of its true notion4 ,nature is here set up in opposition to ,mind1 not as an object which itself has created1 but as one whose limits it fails to overcome1 an object1 moreover1 which1 as assumed to be already subsisting in independence1 ,mind remains alongside of in the internal seclusion of knowledge and volition1 and is only able to constitute the other side of ,nature4 ,the finiteness of scientific theory1 no less than that of practical life1 is to be1 found in this limited mode of consciousness1 where intelligence is restricted to the use of finite categories and the formal ought in the realization of ethical perfection#agg4 ,we find here1 as we have pointed out was the case with ,nature1 that the phenomenal is not adequate to the essential truth of that which appears2 what we receive is still the confusing medley of abilities1 passions1 intentions1 opinions1 and talents1 which no sooner make themselves felt than they are displaced1 working at cross purposes as often against as on the side of each other1 in a strife between volition1 opinion1 and reflection1 which brings to the surface every phase of fortuitous experience in all its confusing variety4 ,it is the standpoint of the entirely finite1 temporal1 contradictory1 and for that reason transitory1 unsatisfied1 and unreconciled spirit4 ,for the satisfactions which obtain in such a consciousness1 through the finiteness which inseparably clings to its entire outlook1 itself so limited and confused1 are of a purely relative and isolated validity4 ,it is inevitable that consciousness1 volition1 and thought should make an effort to rise above this condition and seek for the universality1 unity1 and satisfaction which it eventually finds in the infinite substance of ,spirit and its ,truth4 ,this unity and satisfaction1 to which mind is carried forward by the impulse of its own ideal activity1 transmuting the raw material of its finite conditions1 constitutes the first revelation of that which the world of appearances is under a more notional grasp of it4 ,mind grasps its finiteness as the negation of its own essential substance1 and is aware of its infinity4 ,and this essential truth of the finite mind is the absolute ,mind or ,spirit4 ,in this form of self-consciousness mind is merely actualized as absolute negativity4 ,the element of finitude which it confronts is apprehended as such and annulled4 ,in this1 the highest sphere of its activity1 mind becomes the object of volition4 ,the ,absolute itself becomes the object of mind4 ,spirit1 as self-consciousness1 differentiates itself as the knowing subject from the absolute ,spirit as the object of knowledge4 ,mind in this latter sense1 in contradistinction from mind which has not overcome the conditions of finite perception1 may therefore be defined as a finite mind in possession of the principle of differentiation from its true object4 ,in the higher and more speculative consideration of truth1 however1 it is the absolute mind itself1 which1 in order to unfold explicitly the knowledge of itself1 essentially becomes a principle of differentiation to itself1 and thereby posits the finitude of mind1 within which it becomes for itself absolute object of the knowledge of itself4 ,it is now absolute mind within the ideal community#agh which belongs to it1 the actual ,absolute of itself in the form of ,mind and knowledge#agi4 ,this is1 in fact1 the starting-point of the ,philosophy of ,fine ,art4 ,for the idea of ,fine ,art is neither the logical ,idea1 absolute ,thought1 that is1 which develops itself in the medium of its freest activity1 nor is it the ,idea of ,nature apprehended under more finite categories4 ,its province is rather that of ,mind untrammelled by either the judgments or the actions of the finite spirit4 7c7 ,the realm of ,fine ,art is the realm of absolute ,spirit4 ,we can but briefly indicate the reason why this is so4 ,a fully philosophical proof belongs rather to treatises which immediately deal with those questions of philosophy we have noticed already1 by which we mean those which treat of ,logic1 whose content1 as above explained1 is that of the absolute ,idea1 or the philosophy of ,nature1 or lastly1 the philosophy of ,mind in its determinate spheres of finitude4 ,for in these sciences the object is to show not merely how the logical ,idea presupposes the objective particularity of ,nature as a vehicle to its determinate existence1 but also how it is capable of passing from such externality to mind1 and1 finally1 of freeing itself from all the finitude that clings to it and of attaining to ,spirit in its eternal concreteness and truth4 ,from such a point of view1 which is also applicable to art when regarded in all the fulness of worth it in truth implies1 we are justified in associating it with the self-same province which belongs to religion and speculative philosophy4 ,in every direction in which ,mind or ,spirit becomes identical with the absolute ,mind it frees itself from the restricting limits of its positive existence1 and1 while liberating itself from the contingent relations1 which pertain to it in its temporal existence1 and the finite content of its objects and interests1 is made aware of and discloses the entire wealth of reality it contains4 ,it may be of service here to expand more completely the position which ,art thus occupies in its relation respectively to the life of ,nature and ,spirit4 ,a survey of the entire field of human existence presents to the ordinary consciousness of mankind the widest variety of interests and means of satisfaction4 ,there is1 in the first instance1 the complex system of purely physical necessities1 to the satisfaction of which the whole economy of industrial enterprise1 through all its complicated tissue of commerce1 merchandize1 and technical crafts1 is actively pursued4 ,if we raise the level of our review to a more spiritual range1 we are confronted with the world where rights are established and enforced1 the world of legislative enactment1 family life1 division of social classes1 in a word1 the concrete living organism of the ,state4 ,and more than this1 there is the religious want1 which asserts itself in the hearts of particular men and women1 and finds its satisfaction in the life of a church4 ,finally1 there is the many-sided and intricately specialized activity of scientific research1 the organized effort to integrate all knowledge1 and the comprehension which that knowledge implies1 in one all-embracing system4 ,within this latter are comprised the activities of the fine arts1 the interest1 that is to say1 in beauty1 and which derives its spiritual nutriment in the realization of that beauty in plastic shapes4 7d7 ,the question becomes inevitable how far a spiritual want of this kind is bound up as a necessary element in the life of man and his world-history4 ,in the first instance these two spheres#ahj appear simply as immediate factors of our entire survey4 ,it is1 however1 the requirement of philosophy to probe more deeply into that which binds them as essential and necessarily interacting constituents of one organic whole4 ,for on closer inspection it will be found that they do not stand in relation to one another on the mere basis of utility2 rather we shall discover that only through the one we shall fully comprehend the other4 ,in other words1 the one circle overlaps the other1 in the sense that the higher forms of its activity are found to be a part of the other2 and that which is of less value in its own province is lifted into a finer atmosphere2 and what had failed to free itself from its original bounds is now enlarged to liberty through the profounder satisfaction it receives in the widening of the range of its interests#aha4 ,and it is this which makes clear the necessity of the ideal bond4 ,we will recall now for a moment the analysis we established of the notion of the beautiful and that of art generally4 ,two opposed aspects come under notice4 ,in the first place we have a content1 an end1 a significance2 and in addition to that we get the artistic expression of the same1 the appearance and realization of such content2 and1 thirdly1 these two aspects of the artistic product so pass into each other that the rationality or particularity is nothing short of the expression of the artistic purpose1 nothing more or less is given us than the essential expression of the entire content4 ,what we designate as content1 significance1 is just this simplicity of idea1 the work of art resolved into its simplest yet most comprehensive determinants1 as it exists for mind in contrast with the actual work executed4 ,as an example we may summarize the content of a book from a few words or sentences the book contains1 and nothing may be necessary to expound the content of that book sufficiently in its general import4 ,this simple idea1 the thesis or main problem of our book1 which forms the fundamental basis on which the entire structure is built1 is the abstract significance4 ,it is only the detailed exposition which gives us the concrete totality4 ,both sides1 however1 of this opposition do not stand in an indifferent or purely external relation one to the other1 as1 for instance1 is the case when we contrast with it the particular content of an abstract mathematical figure1 such as a triangle or an ellipse1 to which the external particularity of its size or figure is related without affecting its significance4 ,rather in the former case we shall find that the content of its form1 taken in abstraction in itself1 possesses a determinate impulse in the direction of realization and thereby concreteness4 ,there is in it essentially the should of purpose4 ,however strongly form is here posited in independence1 we are unable to rest satisfied with such abstraction1 and ask for something more4 ,this is at first apprehended merely as an unsatisfied want1 a desire in the conscious subject1 which strives to annul itself and secure satisfaction4 ,from such a standpoint all we can say is that the content is purely self-contained1 or subjective1 over against which the objective other-than-itself is placed in opposition in such a way as to emphasize the desire to make the subjective content objective4 ,such a conflict between the subjective content and the objective1 reality which confronts it1 no less than the mere impulse to transcend the opposition1 is a universal characteristic of the determination of all self-conscious life#ahb4 ,even that aspect of human life which we call physical1 and still more that world of man's spiritual aims and interests depends on this necessity to carry forward that which is at first purely subjective and ideal into the objective world1 that a fuller satisfaction in its essential substance may be realized4 ,but so long as the content of aims and interests is merely and at first apprehended in the one-sided form of subjective consciousness1 and that one-sidedness is apprehended as a mere limit1 this loss makes itself simply felt as unrest or pain4 ,it is a negative something which is bound to resolve itself as such negativity1 and1 in order to remove the sense of defect1 exerts an impulse to transcend the barrier itself1 already an object of consciousness and thought4 ,and1 moreover1 this transcendency does not merely amount to this1 that the objective other ceases to be an opposed factor to the general subjective consciousness3 rather in the more determinate connection1 this defect of subjective thought is itself and within itself a defect and negation which involves an impulse to negate and pass beyond4 ,in other words the conscious subject is implicitly and according to its essential notion the complete whole#ahc1 that is1 not merely what is inward1 but the realization no less of that which is inward or ideal in and through what is without4 ,if we assume that it exists only abstractly in one form we have to face the contradiction that whereas it is1 according to its concrete notion the whole1 yet according to its mode of existence it remains merely one side of that totality4 ,it is only through the entire resolution of such a contradiction that life becomes affirmative4 ,to pass through each phase of this opposition1 contradiction and its final abrogation is the higher and legitimate demand of conscious life4 ,that which remains always affirmative1 is1 and remains1 without life4 ,life is built upon negation and pain4 ,it is only by crushing out such contradictions in the crucible of fuller life and knowledge that it remains in its affirmative substance4 ,if it anchor wholly on contradiction without such a possibility of resolution it must be infallibly wrecked thereon4 ,such1 then1 is the nature of these determinations of thought regarded in their abstraction to which it was necessary to draw attention at the present stage4 ,the most exalted content which lies within the grasp of self-conscious life may be concisely called freedom4 ,freedom is the highest determination of ,spirit4 ,in its formal aspect freedom1 in its first instance1 consists in this1 that the subject thereof ceases to find a limit or barrier in the material which is set over against it2 this is no longer an element foreign to it1 but one in which it finds itself again4 ,even under this formal definition of it all necessity and misfortune disappears2 the individual consciousness is reconciled with the world1 finds satisfaction in such reconciliation1 and all opposition and contradiction is thereby dissolved4 ,but over and above this1 on closer inspection1 we find that it is universally the rational--that is to say ethical relations in practical life1 truth in thought--which constitutes the content of freedom4 ,but1 furthermore1 inasmuch as freedom itself is in the first instance only subjective1 not wholly carried into effect1 there must remain for the individual an element of unfreedom1 a somewhat purely objective opposed to it as a necessity of ,nature2 and it is accompanied likewise with the demand to secure a reconciliation of this opposition4 ,from the reverse point of view a similar contradiction is apparent in the internal domain of the subjective consciousness itself4 ,we have1 on the one hand1 that which is universal and self-subsistent in its own right1 in other words the universal dictates or principles of justice1 goodness1 and truth4 ,on the other there are the various impulses of mankind1 all the emotions1 preferences1 and passions which exercise their power over the heart of each man and woman individually4 ,this opposition no less than the other excites conflict and contradiction1 and in this strife man becomes subject to every conceivable longing1 the profoundest grief1 and1 in a word1 to every kind of worry and discontent4 ,it is the prerogative of the spiritual life of mankind to be a veil severed and broken asunder1 tossed as it must be on the waves of contradiction4 ,the animal creation lives at peace with itself and its environment4 ,man is unable to find a complete refuge in that which is exclusively inward1 the soul as such1 pure thought1 in the world of legal obligation and its universality4 ,he is dependent also upon his sensuous existence1 his emotions1 and all that appeals to his heart and soul4 ,it is the part of philosophy to give expression to this contradiction in thought1 as it extends throughout its all-embracing compass1 and to overcome the same with a reconciliation equally comprehensive4 ,in the immediacy of everyday life1 however1 man seeks to secure an immediate satisfaction4 ,perhaps the most obvious example of such a resolution is to be found in the domain of animal wants and their satisfaction4 ,the states of hunger1 thirst1 fatigue on the one hand1 and feeding1 drinking1 sleep on the other1 with all such similar states1 illustrate the contradictions and resolutions to which we here refer4 ,in this sphere of human existence1 which is fundamentally the same as purely animal life1 the content of such satisfaction is1 however1 of a finite and limited range4 ,such satiety carries with it no permanence1 but moves forward without rest to a renewed sense of want4 ,men eat1 drink1 and sleep1 and on the morrow are as hungry and weary as before4 ,man is compelled1 therefore1 to strive for a freedom more lasting in that element of the spiritual life which he appropriates in knowledge and volition1 the sciences and his social activities4 ,the ignorant man is unfree because he faces a world which is foreign to himself1 a world which tosses hither and thither aimlessly1 to which he is joined as an appendage1 unable to unite that foreign world to itself1 and to feel itself at home there as in its own demesne4 ,the merest impulse of curiosity1 the awakening of the love of knowledge1 the lowest phase of animate unrest1 and the highest grasp of philosophical insight are ultimately derived from the same source1 namely1 the desire to overcome every condition that is unfavourable to freedom1 and to bring the world of everyday life1 and that of the subject which reflects upon it1 into one harmonious unity4 ,if we consider the world of action the result is the same2 freedom in human action is the attempt to make positive or real the reason of the ,will4 ,reason is realized by voluntary action through the life of the ,state4 ,in a ,state that is differentiated through itself on any rational principle1 all the laws and social institutions which belong to it are simply a realization of freedom according to their own essential determinants4 ,this being so1 the reason that belongs to any citizen discovers in such institutions its own essential life3 and1 so long as such is not in revolt from those laws1 proceeds with them as with its own kith and kin rather than a foreign adversary4 ,we not infrequently find licence identified with freedom4 ,but the freedom of licence is irrational2 it depends upon a choice and self-determination which has nothing to do with a rational will1 but is rather the product of accidental impulses and their dependence on the world of sense and physical ,nature4 ,we may conclude1 then1 that the physical needs of man1 no less than his knowledge and power of volition1 receive in fact1 each in its own sphere1 a satisfaction in the world1 and deliberately break up the contradiction between the subjective and objective1 that is to say1 between the freedom of consciousness and the external necessity of things with which it is confronted4 ,the content1 however1 of such a freedom and the satisfaction which is therein experienced is still subject to limitations1 and for this reason both still retain an element of finitude4 ,and wherever we find such an element supervening it is inevitable that the original contradiction should again reassert itself1 and the self-satisfaction only maintain a relative significance4 ,for example1 in the sphere of jurisprudence and its realization in the ,state it is true enough that the rationality of each citizen1 his will and his freedom are recognized2 he is a person and as such is respected2 he is the owner of property1 and if that property is in danger the courts of law reassert his rights in their integrity4 ,this recognition1 however1 and the freedom it establishes are confined to single relations and isolated objects1 such as a particular house1 a sum of money1 some particular right or law1 in fine some particular transaction in the practical world4 ,what the consciousness has at any one time before it are particular things1 which no doubt are related to one another1 and in fact form a nucleus of such relations2 but1 on the other hand1 they are appropriate to categories of purely relative validity1 are subject to various conditions of tenure1 which make the satisfaction only immediately experienced when their predominance is reasserted1 or at any rate fail to establish any degree of permanence4 ,and further than this the life of the ,state in its organic entirety1 as a related whole of monarch1 government1 courts of justice1 military control1 and general grouping of all the various societies which compose it1 no less than the obligations and duties which such arrangements presuppose1 the aims and satisfaction to which they are directed1 the entire scope of its civic and commercial activities already referred to1 in one word the complete organism of a nation's life1 is indeed in a genuine ,state complete in itself1 and in a sense rounded off as a real totality4 ,at the same time we must observe that the fundamental principle1 for the realization of which the ,state exists1 and wherein the individual man finds his satisfaction as a citizen1 is1 despite all the variety of that life1 all the manifold differentiation of class within itself and as related to the world without1 still a whole that is one-sided and in a real sense abstract4 ,it is only the rational freedom of the will made explicit in a particular totality4 ,it is1 in short1 only the national life1 and further the life of a particular nation2 a life1 moreover1 in which freedom is realized in a particular sphere of existence as individualized reality4 ,and on this account it is that we are necessarily conscious1 that rights and obligations in the mere bounds of civic existence1 on the plane1 that is to say1 of merely this world's or temporal existence1 do not discover the absolute satisfaction we are seeking4 ,we require as rational beings a higher realization of their objective truth as private individuals1 a fuller sanction of their imperative validity than they themselves1 in such a sphere1 can offer us4 ,what mankind1 pressed on all sides by the boundaries of his purely terrestrial life1 in fact requires is that region of more essential reality1 in which every opposition and contradiction is overcome1 and freedom can finally claim to be wholly at peace with itself4 ,and this is1 of course1 nothing other than absolute ,truth itself1 no merely relative truth4 ,in the ,truth1 according to its highest notion1 all must be brought home to one unity4 ,in it there can be no more opposition between freedom and necessity1 ,spirit and ,nature1 knowledge and the object of knowledge1 law and impulse1 between whatever form1 in fact1 the opposition of these contradictory phenomena of human experience may assume4 ,it is in virtue of such truth that proof is possible that neither a freedom which is essentially subjective and disparate from every element of necessity is true in the absolute sense2 nor1 on the other hand1 is it admissible to predicate truth of a necessity conceived in absolute isolation from consciousness4 ,our ordinary conscious life fails to overcome this contradiction1 and either plunges desperately into the same1 or thrusts it on one side and makes its escape from it in some other way4 ,philosophy will1 however1 so address itself to the two determinating factors of the contradiction as to show that they are apprehended as isolate from each other in abstraction1 not according to their concrete notion2 and by the grasp of this latter it will demonstrate the one-sidedness in its relative character1 placing these opposing aspects in the fuller union and harmony which is truth4 ,it is the function of philosophy to grasp and formulate this notion of truth4 ,unquestionably philosophy recognizes the concrete notion throughout2 and it is in virtue of this that it is ,thought with full grasp of truth4 ,but what we call the notion is something other than this1 truth1 that is1 in its essential verity together with the existence which is either adequate to it or is not so4 ,in all finite reality the determinations1 which are essential to ideal truth1 appear separable from each other1 dividing the veil of that which in its absolute ,truth is a complete totality4 ,take the case of a living being4 ,under such finite categories we are forced to regard it as a subject in opposition to the inorganic ,nature which environs it4 ,both the points of view are no doubt present in the notion1 but they are there reconciled4 ,finite existence1 however1 thrusts them apart4 ,it is1 in short1 an existence or reality which is unequal to the unity of the notion4 ,we may therefore say that the notion is valid in every sphere of actuality4 ,at the same time the main point to be determined is whether the notion in its ideal concreteness is actually completed in the particular unity presented1 wherein the two aspects posited in opposition persist in no ultimate self-subsistence and coherence over against each other1 but are rather ideal phases which tend to pass into a higher unity which cancels such opposition4 ,and the reality of this highest mode of union is only reached when we enter the sphere of truth1 freedom1 and the satisfaction which they create4 ,the higher life which belongs to this sphere1 this supreme enjoyment of truth1 which as feeling is called blessedness1 and as conscious thought contemplation1 we may describe generically as the life known to religion4 ,for religion is just this universal domain#ahd1 in virtue of which the one concrete totality of the ,world comes to each man in union with himself1 as his essential substance1 while it remains no less for consciousness the essential truth of ,nature4 ,and it is this profounder truth of the ,real which alone proves itself invincible over all that is merely particular and finite1 being as it is the one absolute harmony wherein all that is otherwise discordant and opposed is finally resolved4 ,now it is through its direct concern in the true1 regarded as the absolute object of consciousness1 that ,art belongs to the supreme sphere of ,spirit1 and it is to be placed1 in respect to its content1 if in a more specific sense1 on the same basis as religion and philosophy4 ,i connect these two last for the reason that philosophy has no other object than ,god4 ,in its substance it is in fact rational theology1 and in its service of the truth a continual service of ,god4 7e7 ,accepting1 then1 this fundamental similarity of content these three spheres of absolute ,spirit only differ in the forms under which they present their object1 that is1 the ,absolute1 to human consciousness4 ,the differences which are perceptible in these modes of presentment are due to the notion of the absolute ,spirit 7,mind7 itself4 ,spirit1 in its truth1 is essential substance brought home to itself4 ,it is1 therefore1 no essence which lies outside and in abstract relation to objectivity1 but rather is1 within the compass of that objectivity1 the re-collected presence#ahe of the substance of all objects within finite spirit4 ,it is the finite which grasps its own essential universality1 and1 in doing so1 grasps essential ,being in the absolute sense4 ,the first mode of this comprehension is an immediate one1 that is to say1 it is a sensuous cognition1 a cognition in the form and semblance of the object of sense-perception1 in which the ,absolute is presented directly to the understanding#ahf and feeling4 ,the second form is that of the conceptive or imaginative consciousness4 ,last of all1 we have the free thought of absolute ,spirit4 ,the form of sensuous perception is appropriate to art in the sense that it is art which presents truth to consciousness in its sensuous semblance2 but it is a semblance which1 under the mode of its appearance1 possesses a higher and profounder meaning and significance1 although it is not its function to render the universality of the notion wholly intelligible through the medium of sense4 ,it is indeed rather the unity to which art attains with that of the particular appearance which constitutes the essence of the beautiful1 the essence of the artistic product4 ,this union is perfected in art not entirely through sensuous objectification1 but also through the medium of imaginative conception4 ,this is exceptionally so in the art of poetry4 ,at the same time1 even in this1 the most intellectual or ideal art1 the union between significance and the individual mode of its presentation is present with the same1 although it is displayed to the imaginative consciousness1 and every part of its content is conceived in its immediacy and visualized for the imagination#ahg4 ,and generally we must accept the fact that art1 possessing as it does truth or ,spirit for its object1 is unable to reproduce the same by merely copying particular objects of ,nature1 such as the sun1 moon1 earth1 and stars4 ,such are1 no doubt1 objects of sensuous perception2 but1 simply as such1 they are isolated and can offer no reflection of what is spiritual4 ,in thus attributing to art this absolute significance as a manifestation of ,spirit we have expressly set on one side the conception of art which finds its content of too various a nature1 or too much occupied with interests foreign to it1 to merit such a view4 ,and at the other extreme religion1 no doubt1 frequently summons art to her service1 in order to bring the truths of religion more near to the emotion1 or to clothe the same in imaginative form4 ,in both cases unquestionably art is rendering a service to a province not1 in strictness1 its own4 ,at the same time where art is found in most exalted perfection1 in that case no doubt it unfolds in plastic guise the mode of exposition most adequate and essentially necessary to the content of the truth accepted4 ,among the ,greeks1 for example1 ,art was the highest medium under which the community conceived its gods1 and became conscious of truth4 ,for this reason we may justly say that the poets and artists of ,greece created the gods of their people4 ,in other words1 they defined for the imagination of their people the active life and energy of the ,divine ,presence1 giving ,them the definite content of a religion4 ,and this statement must not merely be taken to imply that all ,greek artists did was to clothe in imagery or embellish with the beauty of poesy vague conceptions and hearsays which1 as general religious maxims or isolated determinations of conscious life1 were already present before the era of such poetic creations4 ,the truth of this artistic production is rather to be found in this1 that art and poetry were the exclusive forms in which these creative artists could bring to life and expression the ideas which fermented in themselves4 ,in other phases of that consciousness1 where we find the content less completely represented by the plastic imagery of art1 the scope of ,art as the handmaid of religion is of less importance4 ,we have thus indicated what was1 at any rate1 once the true position of ,art in its relation to the highest interests of man's spiritual life4 ,but inasmuch as art is preceded in ,nature and the finite processes of life by a kind of antenatal history1 so too there is a history that follows its culmination1 which in other terms passes over and beyond its purely conceptive or plastic grasp of the ,infinite4 ,for art carries in the notion that gives it life a limit2 and it is from this boundary that the human consciousness passes beyond into forms more adequate to its spiritual import4 ,it is this inherent shortness of the mark that fixes the subordinate position we are only too ready to assign to art in our daily life nowadays4 ,for us ,european art is no longer the highest means in which the actuality of truth is possessed4 ,speaking generally1 thought has long ago pronounced a verdict upon art when it defined it as the portrayal of the ,divine by concepts which appeal to sense-perception4 ,this was the judgment passed on it by the ,jews and the followers of ,mohammed4 ,nay1 we find it present among the ,greeks themselves1 as the strong opposition of ,plato and ,homer and ,hesiod to the popular conception of the gods proves clearly4 ,there is a period in the education of every civilized nation1 when art becomes a sign-post1 as it were1 to that which stands beyond her border4 ,the evolution of ,christendom is itself an illustration4 ,the historical features of that religion1 the resurrection of ,christ1 ,his life and death1 have doubtless offered to the art of painting a mighty field on which to exercise its imaginative bounty2 and the ,church has either surrounded such art with its magnificent protection1 or suffered it simply to work on unheeded4 ,but as the love of knowledge and scientific research1 and yet more the felt want of a more intimate and personal spirituality necessitated the ,reformation1 the religious imagination was called away from the sensuous medium which enwrapped it1 and centred once for all upon the inward spirituality of emotional life and conscious thought4 ,in this way there grew up1 so to speak1 that posterior twilight of ,art's history ,i referred to1 where the want has found a dwelling in man to rest satisfied alone with the pure medium of the soul as the ultimate form of truth4 ,in the earliest beginnings of art we shall find mystery still present1 a secret strain and longing which persists because ,art's imaginative powers are unable to envisage to sense the complete truth of its content4 ,when once1 however1 the mind of man has succeeded in endowing such content with perfect outward shape in art1 it is driven inevitably away from this objective realization to its own free spiritual activity as from something repellent to it4 ,a period such as this is our own4 ,we may1 indeed1 express the hope that art will rise to yet higher grades of technical perfection2 but in any case ,art in its specific form has ceased to meet the highest requirements of spiritual life4 ,we may still wonder at the unrivalled excellence of the statues of the gods of ,hellas1 and imagine that ,god the ,father1 ,christ1 and the ,virgin ,mary have received ideal representation at the hands of more recent painters4 ,but it is of no use4 ,our knees no longer bow to them4 ,the sphere of conscious life nearest to that of art is that of religion4 ,the form which belongs to the religious consciousness is that of the imaginative concept4 ,the ,absolute is here removed from the externality of artistic production1 and received in a more spiritual way by the imagination1 so that the heart and emotions1 the inner life of the individual that is to say1 become its vehicle4 ,this progress in spiritual insight from art to religion may be further defined by the statement that art is only one aspect of the religious consciousness4 ,in other words1 when a work of art objectifies the truth or mind for sense-perfection1 and apprehends this form of the ,absolute as the one appropriate to its vision1 religion blends with the same the devotional attitude that flows from the inner life confronted with the absolute reality as thus presented4 ,devotion is a type of emotional existence which is1 strictly speaking1 outside the province of art4 ,it originates in the fact that the individual suffers that object which art has rendered visible to sense to penetrate the arcana of his emotional life1 and so completely identifies himself with it that this inward presence1 which the imagination and the inherent might of feeling has rendered possible1 becomes an essential phase in the manifestation of absolute reality4 ,devotion is this cultus of the community in its purest1 most intimate1 and subjective form2 a culture1 in which the principle of objectivity is at the same time consumed and absorbed1 and the content thereof is transmuted without such objectivity into the possession of heart and soul4 ,the third and last form or phase in the evolution of absolute mind 7spirit7 is philosophy4 ,in the boundaries of the religious sphere1 where ,god is apprehended in the first instance perforce as an external object1 and men are taught that there is a ,god1 and how ,he has revealed ,himself and still is revealed to mankind1 the subjective consciousness is indeed made the vehicle of such knowledge1 and the religious sense imparted stirs and fills the heart of the community2 but the inwardness of devotion which is born of the emotions and the imagination is not the highest form of inwardness4 ,we are bound to recognize that the purest form of knowledge is conscious thought in its freest activity4 ,in this alone the content of knowledge is1 adequate to the demands of that which is consciously apprehended3 here alone we are in the presence of that most intelligent form of cultus1 which seeks wholly to appropriate to itself1 and to grasp in concrete thought what is otherwise only the evanescent content of feeling or the imagination4 ,in the purview of such a philosophy art and religion1 as two aspects of one truth1 become related under a unifying conception4 ,on the one hand1 though philosophy1 by its surrender of all sensuous externality1 has lost the objective presentation of art1 yet it has exchanged it for the highest form under which concrete reality is objectively apprehended and redeemed1 in other words1 that of speculative reason4 ,it has1 on the other1 lost the emotional subjectivity of the religious consciousness in the same pure medium4 ,for while human thought is the most inward and appropriate vehicle of subjective life1 such thought1 in its fullest grasp of truth1 the ,idea1 is actuality in the most objective and universal sense of the term1 and is only to be apprehended by pure thought in the medium native to itself4 ,with this adumbration of the difference between the spheres of art1 religion1 and philosophy we must on the present occasion rest content4 ,the sensuous mode of consciousness is that which first appears in the history of mankind4 ,the earliest stages of religion are for this reason indistinguishable from a religion of art and its sensuous manner of presentation4 ,in the religion of ,spirit for the first time is ,god as ,spirit cognized also on a higher plane1 and one more adequate to thought1 wherein it likewise follows as a corollary1 that the presentation of truth in sensuous shape is not truly adequate to ,spirit4 ,now that we know something of the position which art occupies in the field of spiritual activity1 and that which belongs to the philosophy of art among the several philosophical sciences1 we will proceed in this introductory portion of our work in the first place to investigate the general idea of the beauty of art4 ,,subdivision ,,of ,,subject ,,idea ,,of ,,the ,,beauty ,,of ,,art1 ,,otherwise1 ,,fine ,,art ,to arrive at the ,idea of ,fine ,art in all its concreteness it will be necessary for us to consider it under three phases4 #a4 ,the first is concerned with the notion of the beautiful generally4 #b4 ,the second is that of natural beauty1 the defects of which will demonstrate the necessity of the ,ideal as ,fine ,art4 #c4 ,in the third of these aspects the subject of our investigation will be the ,ideal in its positive realization1 in other words as the artistic display of this ,ideal in particular works of art4 ,footnote #age3 ,the ,german word here is ,geist4 ,i have translated it as best seems to suit the particular context in which the ,german word occurs4 ,footnote #agf3 ,unendliche ,negativitt4 ,footnote #agg3 ,this is the ,ought of practical feeling4 ,as such just as in the case of the analytical sciences1 what it lacks is objective determination 7see ,phil4 of ,mind1 trans4 of ,w4 ,wallace1 p4 #id74 ,footnote #agh3 ,in seiner ,gemeinde4 ,we should rather expect in seiner ,gebiete4 ,footnote #agi3 ,the reference here appears to be to the three attitudes of thought to the objective world which may be generally indicated as that of ordinary consciousness1 that of empiricism and that of speculative ,philosophy4 ,in the paragraph which follows1 however1 ,hegel mainly refers to the logical process of dialectic and the ,idea of ,nature 7die natrliche ,idee47 ,the latter may1 however1 refer to both the previous divisions1 i4e41 the commonsense point of view and the scientific4 ,footnote #ahj3 ,the spheres of art and social life are first perceived as merely independent circles of activity4 ,footnote #aha3 ,that is to say1 nations have not only found in ,art the best means of expressing their religious consciousness1 but1 even where religion has been raised to a higher power1 have found in it the most adequate form in which to express the ideality of their general spiritual life4 ,footnote #ahb3 ,welche sick durch alles hindurchzieht1 i4e41 which permeates all experience4 ,footnote #ahc3 ,in this metaphysical passage ,hegel appears to be contrasting his own philosophical standpoint1 absolute idealism1 with that of critical or empirical philosophy1 those at least who conceive reality either as a thing-in-itself1 or the materia supplied to sense-perception from a world outside the human consciousness4 ,the entire content of the ,real is1 on the contrary1 all included under the form of self-conscious thought4 ,footnote #ahd3 ,he means1 ,i think1 province of the universal1 rather than universal expansion of horizon4 ,footnote #ahe3 ,the words of ,hegel are innerhalb derselben im endlichen ,geiste die ,erinnerung des ,wesens aller ,dinge4 ,he no doubt has in his mind the derivation of the word ,erinnerung4 ,it is the inwardization or idealization of such substance4 ,footnote #ahf3 ,anschauung1 that is to say1 it is the object of man's receptive senses4 ,footnote #ahg3 ,the punctuation is clearly wrong4 ,it is also very possible that derselben is a misprint for dieselbe4 ,but in any case there should be comma rather than semicolon4 ,,chapter ,i ,,the ,,notion ,,of ,,the ,,beautiful ,,in ,,its ,,general ,,significance ,i ,we have defined beauty to be the ,idea of the beautiful4 ,by this definition is implied that we have to conceive the beautiful as ,idea1 and1 moreover1 as ,idea in a determinate shape1 as ,ideal4 ,idea1 as thus posited1 is just this1 the conceptive notion1 the realization of the same1 and the unity of both4 ,the notion1 as such1 is not yet the ,idea1 although the terms notion and idea are often loosely interchanged4 ,idea is the notion only as presented in1 and brought into coalescence with1 its objective reality4 ,this unity1 however1 is by no means to be regarded as the mere neutralization of notion and reality1 so that the individual character and quality of either is absorbed2 as1 for example1 where we find that in a chemical compound salt-potash and acid tend to neutralize each other in so far as they have weakened their opposition4 ,in this unity1 on the contrary1 the notion is retained as the commanding factor4 ,it is already implicitly1 in virtue of its own nature1 this very identity4 ,out of its own wealth it evolves the reality as part of itself1 by means of a process which1 being no other than that of development1 surrenders nothing of its own nature1 but brings into more concrete actuality the riches of the notion1 and for this reason continues in unity with itself and its objective realization4 ,such a unity of the notional concept and its realization is the ,idea defined in abstract terms4 ,the word idea is1 of course1 frequently used by authors of works dealing with the theory of art4 ,it must1 however1 be admitted that many connoisseurs of high standing are particularly severe upon its employment4 ,the latest and most interesting example of this polemical attitude is to be found in ,herr von ,rumohr's ,italian investigations4 ,this work is based on the practical interest that the arts excite1 and is wholly unconcerned with that which for brevity we may call the ,idea4 ,the truth is that this writer1 who appears to have no knowledge of the development of philosophy in modern times1 freely confuses the expression as above defined with the undetermined conceptions of the phantasy1 or the abstract and characterless ,ideal of well-known art theories or schools of art1 ideas which present a lean contrast to the clearly defined and richly caparisoned objects of ,nature in their truth1 and which this writer opposes to the idea and empty ,ideal1 which the artist himself evolves from his own consciousness4 ,we have1 of course1 no more right to suppose that creative work can be the result of such poverty1 than we can with justice assume that a thinker can think with conceptions wholly indeterminate1 and persist in his thought with a content destitute of all defined relation4 ,such an objection1 however1 does not apply in any respect to the ,idea in the sense we use the expression4 ,this ,idea is through and through concrete2 a whole which consists of relations and is simply beautiful from being in direct union with the objective form adequate to its expression4 ,herr von ,rumohr has placed on record in this very book 7,book ,i1 pp4 #ade-df7 the following assertion1 that beauty in the most comprehensive meaning of the term1 and as it is understood by intelligent people of our day1 includes every quality of an object1 which may either stir the sense of sight with satisfaction1 or through that sense attune the soul and delight the mind4 ,these qualities are then further subdivided into three classes as follows3 ,first1 there is all that is perceptible through the eye2 secondly1 that which is apprehended by means of the peculiar1 presumably innate sense of mankind for spatial relations2 and thirdly1 all that in the first instance works upon the understanding1 and only indirectly through cognition on the emotions4 ,this third and most important determination rests apparently on forms which quite independently of all pleasure to the sense and the beauty of extended shape arouse in us a specific delight which is ethical or spiritual in its quality1 which in part to all appearance proceeds from the enjoyment we derive from the images excited 7,i presume he means ethical or spiritual ones7#ahh1 and in part from the pleasure which the mere activity of an intelligent appreciation infallibly brings with it4 ,such are the principal factors according to which this undoubted connoisseur of art defines his subject relatively to the beautiful4 ,it may very possibly pass muster with a certain type of uncritical reader4 ,it is1 however1 very unsatisfactory regarded from the philosophical standpoint4 ,for what does it at bottom amount to but this1 namely1 that the sense of vision or spiritual sense1 we may add the understanding itself1 are moved pleasurably1 or excite a feeling which results in awakened pleasure4 ,the entire argument hinges on this one aspect of awakened gratification4 ,this reduction1 however1 of the activity of the beautiful to terms of feeling--that which pleases and charms us--has been disposed of once for all by ,kant4 ,his exposition has already left far behind the feeling for the beautiful4 ,we will direct our attention now from this polemical tractate to a further consideration of the ,idea its hostility has failed to weaken4 ,in this1 as already stated1 is comprehended the concrete unity of the notion and its objective realization4 7a7 ,now1 first1 we will observe1 in directing our attention more closely to the essential nature of the notion1 that it is no purely abstract unity opposed to the differences of phenomenal reality2 rather1 as the notion1 it is already the unity that integrates those relations1 and by doing so is concrete totality4 ,the abstract conceptions such as man1 the quality blueness1 and their like1 are not notions as such at all1 but rather should be called abstract general concepts1 which are only raised to the dignity of the notion1 when we have demonstrated that they contain opposing factors in unity1 and1 in such a way1 that this self-related nexus of unity constitutes their notional truth4 ,for instance1 the concept blueness as a colour receives such a notional value when it is grasped as the unity1 and1 indeed1 the specific unity of light and darkness#ahi4 ,in the same way the concept man contains within it the opposing factors of sense1 life1 and reason1 body and mind 7spirit72 but a particular man is not to be regarded as a whole consisting in some way of these two aspects of his personality placed in a relation of indifference side by side as constituents of the same4 ,rather1 in virtue of the notion1 such a whole contains these constituents in concrete and mediated#aij union4 ,add to this that the notion is so completely the absolute bond and unity of its differences1 that independently they cease to exist1 they are unable to assert the particularity1 in virtue of which they might escape from such a union4 ,for this reason the notion includes all its determining constituents in the form of its own ideal unity and universality1 which constitute its subjective character in contradistinction from the real as the object of sense-perception4 ,for example1 gold is1 as a particular object1 of specific weight1 definite colour1 and placed in a certain relation to specific acids4 ,such are varied characteristics of gold1 and yet are invariably found in a unified whole4 ,the smallest speck contains them all in inseparable union4 ,by analysis or abstraction we indeed separate them1 but in their notion they are inseparably one4 ,the inability of the differences1 which the notion in its truth essentially possesses1 to stand alone in their isolated self-identity is of a similar nature4 ,a still more apposite illustration is presented by the unique concept of the self-conscious ,ego in its universality4 ,for that which we call soul1 or more appositely the ,ego1 is the notion itself in its free existence4 ,the ,ego contains a congeries of most distinct concepts and thoughts in itself2 it is a world of ideas2 yet none the less this infinitely complex content1 in so far as it lies within the ,ego1 remains without a vestige of substantiality or materiality packed within this ideal unity1 as the pure and throughout fluid transparency of the ,ego itself reflected to itself4 ,and this is precisely the way in which the notion retains its varied determinations in ideal unity4 ,the determinants of the notion which are most cognate to the notion as such are the universal1 the particular1 and the single4 ,every one of these determinate qualities taken by itself is a mere abstraction4 ,as thus regarded1 however1 abstract1 that is to say1 from one another1 they are not present in the notion3 that is rather their ideal unity4 ,the notion is therefore the universal1 which1 on the one hand1 negates itself to a condition of relativity and particularization1 but1 on the other1 this riving asunder1 in so far as it is negation of the universal1 is itself again annulled4 ,for the universal as present in the particular1 which itself is only the particular aspects of the universal itself is present in no particular absolutely1 but rather in that very particular reaffirms once more its essential unity as universal4 ,in this return upon itself the notion is infinite negation2 negation1 ,i mean1 not as against another1 but self-determination1 in which alone it subsists in its positive and correlative unity4 ,in this way it is singularity in its truth2 it is the universal nexus which shuts itself up with itself in its particulars4 ,as the highest example of this property of the notion we would refer back to what we have already1 if in a summary way1 said about the essential activity of ,spirit4 ,through this infinite capacity of return upon itself the notion is already1 by virtue of its intrinsic wealth1 totality4 ,it finds the unity of itself in the being of another1 and for this reason possesses a free activity1 being1 however1 negation as self-determination1 not as the alien limitation of its own substance through something other than itself4 ,but regarded as such totality the notion is already in potential possession of all phenomenal reality1 and is that which mediates and restores the unity of the ,idea4 ,and whoever ventures to think that in the ,idea we have presented to us something totally different and apart from the notion1 has as little knowledge of the nature of the ,idea as he has of the notion4 ,at the same time there is1 no doubt1 a difference between the notion and the ,idea1 and it is this3 in the former the particularization is only an abstract particularization1 for this reason that in the notion the determinate relations are alone coherent in its transparent medium1 that is to say1 in its unity and ideal universality4 ,the notion1 therefore1 itself remains subject to the one-sidedness of its particular material1 and is hampered with the defect that although in its own nature it is a totality1 yet it is only in the aspect of it as unity and universality that it is entitled to free self-development4 ,but inasmuch as this defect in its completeness is foreign to its own essential form1 the process of its activity is to remove it4 ,it negates itself as this very ideal unity and universality and allows that which is enclosed in the barren chamber of ideal subjectivity to flow forth freely into real and substantive objectivity4 ,in other words1 the notion through its own activity posits itself as objective reality4 7b7 ,objectivity is therefore1 truly apprehended1 the real existence of the notion4 ,it is1 however1 the notion under the mode of self-substantive particularization and of a differentiation of all antithetical phases#aia of reality1 whose ideal unity the notion in its subjective capacity constituted4 ,but inasmuch as it is the notion1 and only the notion1 whose function it is to endow objectivity with its determinate existence and reality1 so too it is only through objectivity that the notion is unveiled in its actuality4 ,the notion is1 however1 the mediating and ideal unity of all its particular antitheses4 ,within its differentiated reality this ideal unity1 effective throughout particularity in modes adequate to the notion1 has to establish itself in them1 precisely in a way similar to that in which the realized particularity of their unity1 as thus mediated to the point of ideality1 has also to exist in them#aib4 ,this is the might of the notion1 which refuses to surrender or forfeit its universality among the disjecta membra of the objective world1 but rather reveals its essential unity through such reality and within it4 ,for it is nothing less than the very life of the notion to preserve its unity in the material which is offered it4 ,only by so doing is it real and veritable totality4 7c7 ,this totality is the ,idea4 ,the ,idea is not simply the ideal unity and subjectivity of the notion4 ,it is quite as much its true and objective reality2 it is1 however1 an objectivity which does not confront the notion as an opposing factor1 but is rather that in which the notion itself is self-determined4 ,in whichever aspect we contemplate the notion1 whether as subjective to our apprehension1 or as objectively real1 the ,idea it manifests is a totality4 ,but it is more than this4 ,it is the unity which for ever is mediating between and bringing into more perfected harmony the two totalities4 ,only as thus apprehended is the ,idea truth and indeed all truth4 #b4 ,all that exists1 then1 has only truth in so far as it is a definite existence of the ,idea4 ,for the ,idea is alone the truly real4 ,the truth of the phenomenal is not derived from the fact that its particular existence is of an inward or external character1 and as such is in a general sense reality2 it is so wholly in virtue of the fact that such reality is adequate to the notion4 ,then alone is determinate existence real and true4 ,and the truth1 to which we here refer1 is not a subjective interpretation of it1 namely1 that a particular existence is accordant with my own conception of it4 ,it is truth in the objective sense that the reality of the ,ego1 or of any external object1 action1 or circumstance actually contributes to the realization of the notion4 ,if this identity is not established the existence remains purely phenomenal4 ,instead of the objectification of the notion in its completeness what obtains is purely a detached aspect of it2 and with regard to this1 whatever self-subsistence it may appear to have in opposition to the unity and universality of the notion1 such can only work to its final confusion by setting it in hostility to the true notion itself4 ,our conclusion1 therefore1 is that only the reality which adequately expresses the notion is truly reality1 and the reason it is so is that therein the ,idea manifests itself as existence4 #c4 ,we have maintained that beauty is ,idea4 ,it follows that beauty and truth are1 in one aspect of them1 identical4 ,in other words1 beauty must itself in its intrinsic being be true4 ,a closer investigation will further show to us that truth must be distinguished from beauty4 ,the idea is true in the sense that it is so by virtue of its essential being and according to its fundamental principle#aic1 and as such truth it is thought#aid4 ,it is not its sensuous and external existence1 but the universal ,idea of thought as present in this4 ,at the same time the ,idea is driven to seek its realization in external and objectively determined existence1 both in the sphere of ,nature and that of ,mind4 ,the true1 in the absolute sense1 also exists4 ,and in so far as1 in this its external existence1 it is immediately apprehended by consciousness1 and the notion rests in immediate unity with its external appearance1 the ,idea is not only true1 but is also beautiful4 ,the beautiful may therefore be defined as the sensuous semblance#aie of the ,idea4 ,for the sensuous condition and the objective world generally maintain no real self-subsistence in beauty1 but have merely to surrender the immediacy of their being4 ,in beauty such are posited simply as the determinate existence and externality of the notion1 and as a form of reality1 which itself manifests the notion in unity with its external appearance in this its particular objective existence4 ,for this reason it can only pass as the semblance of the notion4 7a7 ,accordantly with this it is impossible for the understanding#aif alone to grasp the significance of beauty4 ,for inasmuch as objective reality is apprehended by this faculty as something at least quite other than ideality1 sensuous perception1 as something very different from the notion1 the external object as something that is anywhere rather than within world of the conscious self1 to that extent it cannot fail to emphasize the contradictions implied in such separation1 rather than penetrate to the ideal unity we have above described4 ,the understanding remains rooted in the finite1 the incomplete and untrue abstraction4 ,the beautiful is on the contrary itself essentially infinite and free4 ,for although the content of beauty is stamped with particularity and to that extent limited1 such content is essentially in its mode of environment a totality that is infinite#aig and a free existence2 and it is both for the reason that it is the notion1 which does not pass beyond this its objective semblance1 and so fall into finite and one sided abstraction with it1 but rather is immersed as a blossom with this its objectification and through the imminent unity and perfection of such inclusion is revealed as essentially infinite4 ,with equal truth we may affirm that the notion in sealing1 as it were1 with a soul the real existence1 in which it is part of the objective world1 is itself by itself freely manifest in that world4 ,for the notion will not suffer that external existence in the sphere of beauty to follow1 as it would otherwise1 the laws that therein are paramount3 rather it determines out of its own riches the articulation and form of its appearance therein2 and it is precisely this harmony of the notion with the mode of its external existence which constitutes the essential life of beauty4 ,and the bond which braces all together1 no less than the power behind it1 is self-conscious life1 unity1 soul1 and artistic personality4 7b7 ,we conclude1 then1 that if we consider beauty in its relation to conscious life1 on the subjective side that is1 it is neither to be adequately apprehended by an intelligence that persists in the unfree medium of purely finite existence1 nor is it the object of the finite ,will4 ,we will enlarge a little on both points4 ,as finite intelligence we are aware in feeling of the inner no less than the outer objects of consciousness2 we observe them1 perceive them to be true to our senses1 allow them to form part of the content of our perceptions1 concepts1 and finally1 no doubt1 to become the abstractions which our understanding presents to us1 reflecting on their appearance1 and endowing them with the abstract form of universality4 ,now the finiteness and absence of freedom inseparable from this mental attitude consists in the assumption that the things perceived are self-subsistent4 ,we direct our attention to these objects1 suffer them to impress us1 form our ideas of them1 possessed with the faith in their material existence as objects1 and convinced that all we have to do is to perceive them as they appear to our passive reception1 to preserve1 in short1 the formal side of our attention intact1 holding such unfettered by our fancies1 opinions1 and prejudices4 ,in thus accepting this one-sided freedom of objects we posit at the same time the want of freedom in their mental apprehension4 ,to such the content is one wholly given from outside2 and instead of a true self-determination through difference we have nothing but the reception and acceptance of what is presented as a part of the objective thing4 ,we would arrive at truth by the suppression of all that belongs to ourselves#aih4 ,a criticism of like nature1 though the defect is here just at the other extreme1 may be applied to the finite ,will4 ,in this theory interests1 objects1 intentions1 and conclusions are all relegated to the subject1 whose will it is to enforce them as against the existence and properties of the material thing4 ,this it can only do by the annihilation of the object itself1 or at least1 in so far as it can modify or change its form and energies1 by transmuting its qualities1 or permitting them to exercise such a change on each other1 as water may exercise on fire1 fire on iron1 iron on wood1 and so forth4 ,we now find that it is the particular things1 which the subject has enrolled in its service1 as things to be regarded and treated as useful1 which in their turn have been deprived of their self-subsistence4 ,in other words1 they have come to be regarded as objects1 whose notion and meaning is not their own1 but derived from the reflecting consciousness1 so that what is most essential to them is precisely this relation of service in which they stand to the subjective purpose1 that is1 our own intelligence4 ,the values of either side of the relation are thus completely reversed4 ,the objective thing has lost freedom and the conscious subject secured it4 ,as a matter of fact1 the freedom on both aspects of the relation is1 owing to the finitude and abstraction it implies under such a view1 a purely supposititious one4 ,in the sphere of theory here it is the assumed independence of the objective world which creates the finitude and bondage of the conscious ,ego4 ,in that of the practical world this dependence is due to its one-sidedness1 the conflict and contradiction of its aims within and the impulses and passions which press from without1 no less than to the unreconciled opposition of a world of objects4 ,for the separation and opposition of these two aspects of one whole1 that is1 objects and relating self-conscious life1 is presupposed in1 and indeed is an accurate definition of1 this point of view4 ,and1 similarly1 with reference to the lack of freedom in the object4 ,here1 too1 in the sphere of intelligible conception1 the independence of the object is assumed1 but the freedom assumed is only apparent4 ,for it is only posited as bare objectivity without securing the presence of its notion1 as the unity and universality of the conscious subject1 within such objectivity4 ,it still remains outside it4 ,every object thus placed external to the notion merely exists as particularity1 which comes back to us in external guise together with its manifold1 and is1 in all the unlimited scope of its relations1 through its contact with other objects1 subject to the conditions of its origin1 change1 opposing force and final overthrow4 ,in the practical world the dependence of the object is expressly1 in this view1 assumed1 and the opposition of the thing is posited in definite relation to volition without possessing in itself the power of ultimate self-subsistency permitted to the latter4 7c7 ,the apprehension of the object as beautiful unites these two abstract points of view4 ,it in fact annuls the one-sidedness of both whether relatively to the subject of consciousness or its object1 and by doing so cancels the finitude and lack of freedom which characterize them4 ,philosophically regarded#aii1 the reason is this1 that the object is not apprehended in its existence as an isolated thing whose notion as the object of human thought is removed from the objectivity which belongs to it as something outside it1 and which in its particular reality extends and is dissipated in every conceivable direction as a manifold content of intelligible relations4 ,an object which is beautiful suffers its own notion to appear as realized in its objective presence1 and reveals in that appearance the unity and life inseparable from the conscious subject4 ,for this reason the object may be conceived as sweeping back into the curve of its unity that impulse of continuous externality1 cancelling its dependence on other objects1 and transmuting to our vision its unfree finitude into free infinity4 ,furthermore1 the ,ego in its relation to the object of beauty ceases to be merely the abstract attention or sensuous perception1 and the floating away of such perceptions into equally abstract reflections4 ,rather1 it is itself concretely realized in this object1 being at once the unity and reality of its notional idea1 and uniting for itself in its rounded concreteness that which has hitherto remained1 as abstractly perceived1 apart in the ,ego of the subject of perception and the thing perceived4 ,coming now to the practical import of this relation as it applies to the object of beauty1 we have already drawn attention to the fact at some length1 that in the contemplation of it the element of sensuous passion drops away4 ,all personal impulse that the individual may feel toward the object is done away with through that very aesthetic contemplation1 which regards it as self-subsistent in itself1 in other words1 its own object4 ,for this reason1 the purely finite relation of the object also disappears1 the relation1 that is1 in which it subserved1 as a means for their realization1 aims which were foreign to it1 and towards the fulfilment of which it was either presented as unfree or was compelled to take up1 however strange1 into its own existence4 ,at the same time that relation of the ,ego in the practical world which we found to be unfree disappears1 inasmuch as it differentiates itself no longer in subjective motives and their means or material1 remaining fixed in the finite relation of the formal ought for the carrying out of its subjective ends in the object1 but is here confronted with the notion and its aim completely realized4 ,we may say1 then1 that the aesthetic contemplation of the beautiful is a liberal education1 a portrayal of the object in its free and infinite being1 with no detracting consideration of its use or employment for finite wants and purposes4 ,further1 the object as a thing of beauty is neither under force or compulsion at our hands1 nor is it in conflict with and overcome by other things outside it4 ,it is of the essence of beauty that the notion1 end and soul thereof1 no less than its existent form1 and variety generally1 manifest themselves out of their own intrinsic wealth rather than through the energy of something outside them4 ,the reason of this lies in the fact1 already insisted upon1 that their truth consists solely in the unity and harmony of their notion with their objective existence4 ,and inasmuch as the notion is itself concrete totality1 its objective reality also appears as a manifestation of the same1 homogeneous in all its parts1 which1 as thus imbedded in the notion1 appear to fall into such ideal unity and animation4 ,for this harmony of the notion and its envisagement is nothing less than perfected suffusion#bjj4 ,accordingly the exterior form and shape is manifested1 not as such by its separation from other material1 or as an impression mechanically related to aims which are foreign to it1 but as the form of reality wherein the notion accommodates itself out of its own stuff and substance4 ,finally1 however much the particular aspects1 parts or articulations of the beautiful object are presented in the ideal unity of the notion and its unified envisagement1 that harmony must be so rendered visible to sense1 that in relation to one another they preserve the semblance of self-subsistent freedom2 in other words they must not only possess the ideal unity of the notion as such1 but must reflect back the side of a reality which is substantially objective also4 ,both aspects1 in short1 must be present in beautiful objects2 for these are1 on the one hand1 the necessity posited through the notion and discovered in the harmonious conclusion of these particular aspects1 and on the other1 the envisagement of their freedom as essentially one with the whole1 and not merely that of the unity which exists between the parts4 ,necessity in its full definition means the just relation of the two aspects1 which coalesce so completely that to posit one is to posit the other4 ,such a necessity must unquestionably be present in beautiful objects4 ,it is not1 however1 under the mode of necessity that it appears2 rather it should conceal itself beneath the semblance of unintentional accident4 ,otherwise the particular parts of such a real presence lose the position they should occupy according to their own real existence1 and only appear in the service of their ideal unity1 to which they therefore remain in abstract subordination4 ,in virtue of the freedom and infinitude above analysed1 which is inherent in the notion of beauty1 whether we view it in its objective presence as a thing of beauty1 or under its aesthetic contemplation1 we disengage the province of the beautiful from the relations of finite condition1 to exalt it into that of the ,idea and its truth4 ,footnote #ahh3 ,this is1 of course1 a note of ,hegel himself4 ,footnote #ahi3 ,this1 of course1 has reference to ,hegel's unfortunate belief in ,goethe's theory of colour4 ,footnote #aij3 ,mediated 7vermittelt71 because the concrete is first apprehended through its differences1 and only after reflection do we arrive at the notional unity which transcends and unites them4 ,footnote #aia3 ,momente4 ,phases asserted and reconciled in the evolved notional unity1 organic or otherwise4 ,the notion is subjective because it is an ideal unity4 ,footnote #aib3 ,the text is clearly corrupt4 ,the full-stop after herzustellen should be a comma1 and auch would be preferably changed to als die4 ,footnote #aic3 ,as essentially reason4 ,footnote #aid3 ,not the substantive1 but past participle4 ,footnote #aie3 ,das sinnliche ,scheinen4 ,footnote #aif3 ,verstand in the technical sense of ,kant's philosophy2 that is1 the faculty of scientific observation or ordinary perception--analytical1 in contrast to reason 7,vernunft71 the synthetic faculty4 ,footnote #aig3 ,infinite1 that is to say1 as human freedom is infinite1 as mind is infinite1 an ideal totality1 a whole complete in itself1 not an endless progress1 which is a contradiction4 ,footnote #aih3 ,or1 as ,hegel says1 by suppressing the subjective principle altogether4 ,footnote #aii3 ,theoretischen here used in sense of true philosophical theory1 not one-sided views as above4 ,footnote #bjj3 ,vollendete ,durchdringung1 i4e41 a penetration through all parts4 ,,chapter ,,ii ,,the ,,beauty ,,of ,,nature ,beauty is the ,idea as the immediate unity of the notion and its objective reality1 yet is only the ,idea in so far as its unity is immediately present in shape apprehensible to the senses and as semblance of the real4 ,the most elementary form of existence1 which the ,idea take to itself is ,nature1 and the first form of beauty is that of ,nature4 ,a4 ,,the ,,beauty ,,of ,,nature ,,as ,,such #a4 ,in the world of ,nature we must distinguish between the modes according to which the notion becomes existent reality in order to be part of the ,idea4 7a7 ,in the first place the notion is absorbed so immediately in pure objectivity1 that1 in its character of subjective and ideal unity1 it wholly fails to assert itself1 and passes over instead as a thing without a soul into the raw materia presented to sense4 ,the purely mechanical or physical bodies in their isolated singularity are of this order4 ,a particular metal is1 for example1 essentially no doubt a manifold of mechanical and physical qualities2 every part of it1 however1 has such qualities equally in itself4 ,such a body not merely fails to possess any entire articulation of its parts in the sense that every one of its different parts receives for itself a particular material existence1 but even the negative ideal unity of such differentiation is absent1 which might assert itself as animating principle#bja4 ,the difference here is a purely abstract multiplicity1 and the unity posited the indifferent equilibrium of identical qualities4 ,this is the first mode of the existence of the notion4 ,the differences here receive no independent existence1 and the ideal unity is not found as ideality4 ,for this reason such isolated bodies are essentially defective and abstract existences4 7b7 ,natural objects of a higher order suffer the differences asserted by the notion to appear as free1 so that each one as external to another is itself independently existent4 ,here we have for the first time the true character of objectivity4 ,objectivity is just this independent assertion of the segregated differences determined by the notion4 ,on this plane of existence the notion asserts itself in such a way that it is at least a totality of its differences1 which is truly realized1 in so far as the particular bodies1 while they each severally possess independent existence for themselves1 are at the same time members of one inclusive system4 ,of such a character is the solar system4 ,in one aspect of them the sun1 comets1 moon1 and planets appear as independent heavenly bodies apart from one another2 in another1 however1 they derive their definite character from being parts of one system of such material bodies4 ,not only their specific modes of motion1 but also their physical qualities1 are only to be deduced from their relation to this system4 ,this nexus which binds them together constitutes that inward unity which relates these particular existences together in one whole4 ,but further than this1 in this conception of system the operation of the notion is not exhausted in the existent unity of independent bodies as essential parts of it4 ,for just as the differences are real the unity which relates them to the totality has to assert itself as real4 ,this unity1 in other words1 differentiates itself from the multifold particularity of those objective bodies of which it is the integrating principle4 ,and on this plane of existence it is differentiated therefore itself against such a particularity as real1 independent and objective existence4 ,in the solar system the sun exists over against all particularity related to that system1 as such a unity of the system4 ,such a material existence of the ideal unity of the notion is still very defective2 for whereas on the one hand we have this unity posited in its reality only as the relation or material connection between the severally independent bodies1 on the other we have it posited as a body which belongs to that system1 whose unity1 in opposition to its real differences1 it essentially represents4 ,the sun1 in short1 which we take to be#bjb the soul of the system1 has itself an independent entity apart from the members which form the explicit content of this soul4 ,it is itself only one particular mode or phase of the notion1 that1 namely1 of unity in its difference from the actual separation of the several parts1 a unity which remains outside itself1 and is consequently abstract4 ,for however much the sun by virtue of its physical quality is plainly a principle of unity1 the illuminating body as such1 this is after all merely an abstract identity4 ,for light is simple1 undifferentiated appearance and nothing more4 ,we find therefore in the solar system the unity of the notion indeed objective1 and the totality of its differences explicitly realized1 each body making visible one particular phase#bjc of the notion2 but here1 too1 it lies absorbed in its objective reality1 and it fails to assert itself in such material as is truly inherent and explicit ideality4 ,the form of its existence which here prevails remains the independent segregation of its particular phasal units#bjd4 ,it is1 however1 essential to the true existence of the notion1 that the differences of the objectively real1 the reality1 that is to say1 of the separate independent parts and the equally independent unity that is therein objectively realized1 should as such be together brought back into unity4 ,only thus such a totality of innate differences can make wholly explicit either the notion as the realized differentiation of its characteristics1 or at the same time release each particular that belongs to it from the element of isolated independence which it cancels by enabling the ideality1 in which these differences recover their subjective unity1 to assert itself fully as the universal principle of their animated being4 ,in that case they become no longer parts hanging loosely to one another by a bond that still leaves their particularity unaffected1 but genuine members of one body4 ,they no longer possess an existence in their isolated singularity1 but retain such truly in the ideal unity which binds them together4 ,only in such an organic articulation the ideal unity of the notion is present to the parts thus integrated4 ,it is at once their support and immanent soul2 here for the first time the notion is not overwhelmed in objective reality1 but passes over into actual existence as the inward identity and universality1 which it essentially is4 7c7 ,but this third mode of ,nature's manifestation is a determinate existence of the ,idea1 and the ,idea as thus manifested in ,nature is ,life4 ,dead or inorganic nature is not adequate to express the ,idea2 only the organic life of ,nature unfolds its reality4 ,for in life we shall find1 first1 that the objective reality of the notion as differentiated is presented as such reality2 secondly1 however1 that the negation of such differences is entirely one of distinction in that reality#bje1 the ideal subjectivity of the notion overcoming to itself this very reality2 thirdly1 the unifying principle of animation is now the positive appearance of the notion in the form of its bodily substance1 that is to say1 the form of infinity1 which is sufficiently powerful to assert itself thus formally in its content4 77 ,if we ask ordinary consciousness#bjf for a definition of ,life1 we have two determinations presented1 either the imaginative conception of it as bodily life1 or as soul-life4 ,in the same view we distinguish these two determinations with qualities peculiarly belonging to each4 ,this contrast we set up between soul and body is also of great importance in the more philosophical consideration of our subject4 ,and it is no less part of our inquiry to investigate it4 ,at the same time we would point out that the philosophical interest concentrates itself quite as much on the unity which exists between soul and body1 a part of this inquiry which a really adequate survey of the subject has at all times found beset with the greatest difficulties4 ,it is1 however1 precisely in virtue of this unity that ,life is the first genuine appearance of the ,idea in ,nature4 ,we must consequently apprehend the identity of soul and body as no fortuitous connection#bjg1 but a union of profounder significance4 ,in other words1 we must recognize the body and its members as the objective existence of the notion itself in systematic articulation1 which in the members of the living organism1 secures an objective existence for its determinate features1 analogously no doubt1 if on a higher plane1 to the facts presented by the solar system4 ,within this real existence the notion asserts itself in like manner as the ideal unity of all these determinate parts4 ,this ideal unity is the soul4 ,the soul is the substantive unity and interfused universality which is no less a simple relation of self-determining than it is ideal ,being-for-itself or self-coherent totality4 ,this is the higher view of the union between soul and body4 ,to put it in other words both are not merely distinct aspects set side by side2 they are one and the same totality of identical determinants4 ,just as the ,idea generally can only be grasped in its explicit reality as the notion evolving itself as such#bjh1 in which conception the differentiation and unity of both sides1 that is both the notion and its objective reality1 are inseparably present1 in the same way ,life must be conceived as the unity of both soul and body4 ,and further1 the subjective no less than substantive unity of soul within the body is presented us and exemplified in ,feeling4 ,the feeling of a living organism is1 that is to say1 not merely an independent product of a particular member1 but it is also this ideal and simple unity of the entire organism4 ,it is carried through every member of the body is felt throughout in more than a hundred places at once2 and indeed1 to put it shortly1 rather than saying there are many thousand sensitive points#bji in a single organism we should more justly say there is but one1 namely1 the subject of consciousness4 ,and inasmuch as the animating principle of organic ,nature includes in itself this distinction between the real existence of the organic members1 and the abstract or simple self-coherence within such parts1 which we call the growing soul1 mediating between them both by virtue of its inherent unity1 such a principle of ,life stands on a higher plane than that of inorganic ,nature4 ,only with ,life is the ,idea existent1 and only thus is the ,idea truth4 ,no doubt even in the organic world this truth can be extinguished4 ,we find the body unable to perfect its essential ideality and animating energy4 ,such is the case in disease4 ,here we find the notion deprived of its controlling sovereignty1 and other powers are potent with it4 ,such a life is1 however1 defective and crippled3 it merely continues1 because the inadequacy of reality to the notion has not reached the point of absolute contradiction2 it is still only relatively valid4 ,once assume that all harmony between the two sides is broken1 that all genuine articulation of the members of the body and their true identity has dropped away1 and life is dissolved in death4 ,the several members are now mere appendages to each other1 with no principle of ,life to hold them in unsevered unity4 77 ,we must add that when we stated the soul is the totality of the notion regarded as the subjective and ideal unity1 the body on the other hand1 as distinguished by its members1 is the same totality but rather in its material aspect as the juxtaposition and sensuous accretion of all the several parts1 affirming at the same time that both soul and body are posited as one in the living organism1 there is no doubt something contradictory in the statement4 ,for the ideal unity1 so far from being this material juxtaposition of parts1 in which each particularity possesses its independent consistency and exclusive character1 is rather in direct antithesis to such external reality4 ,that what is diametrically opposed should nevertheless be identical is obviously a contradiction in terms4 ,the man1 however1 who declares the non-existence of anything from the fact that it carries in our notion of it a contradiction which implies the identity of opposed antitheses1 simply excludes ,life itself from the idea of existence4 ,for the force of ,life and still more the power of ,spirit 7mind7 consists in this very movement1 namely1 to assert the law of contradiction inherent within them1 to bear the burden thereof and to overcome it4 ,this affirmation and resolution of the contradiction which obtains between the ideal unity and material juxtaposition of the members1 constitutes the appointed process of life itself4 ,and ,life is simply process4 ,and this process of life includes an activity which has two distinct functions4 ,on the one hand it has continually to affirm the material existence of the physical distinctions#baj among the members of the organism thus determined2 on the other1 just in proportion as such distinctions grow obdurate in their independent particularity1 and tend to remain fixed in absolute separation from each other1 it has to make good once more that universal ideality1 which is the principle of their life4 ,this is the idealism of ,life's process4 ,philosophy is not the only idealism2 far from it4 ,nature herself in her domain of actuality creates in the life-process just that which the philosophy of idealism completes in the world of contemplative thought4 ,only where we have these two aspects of one activity1 that is1 the constant realization of the corporeal definition of the organism no less than the synthetic affirmation of such material presentment in the ideal unity1 which it is as one with the notion#baa1 then and only then we have the completed process of ,life1 whose more primitive forms#bab1 however1 this is not the place to discuss4 ,through this unity of ,life's energy in both its branches all the members of the organism are up held in their integrity1 and continually flushed anew with the ideality of their life4 ,this ideality is furthermore declared by the organic parts in the fundamental law of their being1 that this unity of ,life is not so much an accidental quality as1 on the contrary1 the substance of it4 ,in this alone they are able to preserve their specific character4 ,this it is which precisely constitutes the difference between the part of a mere conglomerate and the member of an organism4 ,the particular parts of a house1 for example1 the stones1 windows1 and so forth1 remain just what they are1 whether they form part of the structure of a house1 or whether they do not4 ,their relationship to one another is quite indifferent1 and the conceptual notion remains in their case a purely external form1 which possesses no life in these parts raising them to the ideality of a subjective unity4 ,the members of an organism have1 it is true1 an external reality1 but for all that it is the notion of ,life which constitutes the inward1 nay1 the characteristic being of such reality1 a reality which is not expressed through one external form uniting them1 but in the ideal coherence of their parts in one living whole4 ,for this reason the limbs have no such reality as belongs to the stones of a building1 or the planets1 moon1 and comets in the solar system4 ,their reality is one wholly within the content of the organism1 and all appearance to the contrary is1 as such1 ideally imposed on them4 ,dissever the hand from the body and it loses its independent existence as a member of the organism which made it what it was4 ,its activity1 form1 and colour1 all that constitutes it1 is at once changed2 it enters the process of corruption1 and ultimately ceases to exist#bac4 ,consistent character it only possesses as a limb of organic life1 reality only in constant reunion with that ideal unity which sustains it4 ,and that is just the superior mode of reality which the living organism possesses in itself4 ,the real or positive is for ever being set up as both the negation of itself and withal the ideal resumption of itself1 such ideality constituting1 in fact1 both the maintenance and specific character of the mode under which each of the separate parts of the bodily presence are associated together4 77 ,the reality1 then1 which the ,idea wins for itself in the life of ,nature is reality as a phenomenal process4 ,such an appearance stated in its simplest terms is this1 that a reality exists1 but its potential being#bad is not immediately in its possession1 rather it is at the same time negatively affirmed#bae in the particular form that belongs to it4 ,the negation of the immediately external and particular members of a body is not only a negative relative relation as the activity of the inherent idealization#baf1 but is as such a positive realization#bag4 ,hitherto we have considered the particular objects of the real as positive in their self-exclusive particularity4 ,this independence1 however1 is negated in the living object1 and the ideal unity asserted within the bodily organism is alone found to assert over itself the full force of positive determination4 ,such a positive ideality in the principle of negation it asserts is the soul4 ,on the appearance of the soul in the body we have at once such an affirmative presence as the one indicated4 ,the soul not merely asserts itself as a power against the subdivision of the bodily members1 it is their plastic creator#bah1 which preserves as inward and ideal that which is externally minted in the shape of physical members4 ,and consequently it is this very positive and ideal inward#bai which appears in the outer structure2 in other words1 the external1 so far as it is a mere external1 is a mere abstraction1 a mere aspect that is untrue for the whole4 ,in organic life the external we are confronted with is an externality through which the inward is made visible4 ,the outward1 that is to say1 declares itself in its potential nature as that inward1 which is its notion4 ,further to this notion appertains the reality in which it as notion is made visible4 ,inasmuch1 however1 as in the objective world the notion1 strictly as such1 is the principle of subjective life and self-determined life becoming explicit in its own objective reality#bbj1 life exists only as a living thing1 an individual subject4 ,it is only with life thus concentrated to a point that we find this negating centrum of unity4 ,and it is negative in this sense that the ideal explicitly self-unified totality#bba can only now stand forth in its reality by virtue of this principle of ideality being asserted through the differentiation of its positive presence1 together with which the ideal unity of such totality is at the same time incorporated4 ,it is of the greatest importance to make clear this aspect of the principle of subjectivity4 ,it is only as the single living thing thus unified by such a principle that life is actually present4 ,if we inquire further in what manner the ,idea is manifested within the actual life of such living individuals our survey will be as follows3 first1 this principle of ,life will be realized as the totality of an organism possessing bodily shape2 secondly1 this physical shape is not presented as a rigid product#bbb1 but as a continous process of ideal generation1 in which a living soul asserts itself4 ,thirdly1 the changes and determinations through which this totality passes are not imposed externally to it1 but are changes of form which are evolved from its inherent nature1 imposed on itself and for itself1 in a process wherein it stands self-determined as the subjective unity no less than the ultimate end of its being4 ,this free self-subsistence of the subjective principle of life is especially exemplified in the spontaneous motion of a living organism4 ,the inanimate bodies of inorganic ,nature are fettered to the conditions of ,space1 which limits them to one place1 or they are only moved from it by external forces4 ,the motion1 in short1 does not originate in themselves2 and1 when it is visible upon them1 it appears as an energy which is foreign to them1 to remove which the only force they exert is that of reaction4 ,and if the motion of the planets with similar phenomena appear to be otherwise produced1 such are at least wholly fettered by natural laws and their abstract necessity4 ,the living animal1 on the contrary1 in its freedom of motion1 negatives this enforced limitation to one spot by virtue of its own activity4 ,it is through such self-determination the continuous liberation of itself from the material isolation4 ,and for the same reason it is in this freedom of motion1 if only in a subordinate degree1 the release of itself from the former abstractness referable to the particular modes of motion1 their direction and their speed4 ,under a yet closer view1 moreover1 the animal1 regarded by itself in its organism1 presents the same sensuous matter that is moved2 and here1 too1 life is as before a freedom of motion within this organic reality1 evidenced in the flow of blood and the movement of the limbs4 ,motion1 however1 is not the only expression of animated life4 ,the free tones of the voice of animals1 which are unknown in the inorganic world1 where bodies merely roar and clatter through the blow of objects external to them1 these already present to us the higher expression of animated subjectivity4 ,the most intimate and vital expression of such ideal activity is1 however1 brought before us when we find the living individual able to concentrate itself as individuality over against the objective world1 while at the same time it appropriates and transfigures that world for its own4 ,and this is accomplished in part through observation by means of vision1 and partly for practical purposes1 in so far as such an individual brings the outer world into subjection to himself1 utilizes the same1 assimilates it as a means of nourishment1 and in this manner continually reproduces his individuality in that objective alterum4 ,such a process1 of course1 as it ascends through stronger organisms1 assumes more and more emphatic degrees of unsatisfied desire1 assimilation1 satisfaction1 or satiety4 ,such1 then1 are the activities1 in which the notion of animated life makes itself apparent4 ,moreover1 the principle of ,ideality thus rendered visible is not merely the result of our reflection2 it is objectively real itself in the living subject1 whose existence consequently we may go so far as to call an objective idealism4 ,and it is the soul1 as before stated1 which1 as this ideal energy1 brings about its own manifestation#bbc1 always reducing the purely external reality of the body to an appearance1 and thereby affirming itself as objective totality in that very bodily shape4 #b4 ,now it is as the ,idea made objectively visible to the senses that the animated life of ,nature is beautiful2 in so far1 that is to say1 as the truth or the ,idea1 presented in the form of ,nature1 where under it first appears1 in other words life1 is immediately given in the particular shape of reality adequate to it4 ,owing1 however1 to its sensuous immediacy the living beauty of ,nature is neither beautiful for itself nor is the beauty strictly that which is the outcome of itself1 a product1 that is1 of its purely objective appearance4 ,the beauty of ,nature is only beautiful for another1 that is for us1 the consciousness that apprehends its beauty4 ,the question therefore arises in what way and by virtue of what characteristics the principle of life appears to us beautiful in its immediate existence4 7a7 ,if we look at the practical way in which a living object becomes visible and preserves itself1 the first thing which rivets our attention is spontaneous motion4 ,this motion1 regarded simply as motion1 is nothing more than the entirely abstract freedom of motion from place to place and from time to time1 which we find exemplified in the spontaneous1 but entirely haphazard movements of animal life4 ,in music and the dance we have1 it is true1 motion in its generic significance2 but here motion is not merely a matter of chance and impulse1 but it exhibits the laws which regulate it2 it is defined1 complete in itself and subject to measure2 and it is all this1 though we still abstract from it the significance whereof it is the beautiful expression4 ,if we again interpret the motion of animals as the realization of an aim originating within themselves1 this excited impulse is still entirely accidental1 an end of most restricted import4 ,if we further extend our survey and conceive such motion as the activity and working together of all parts of the animal organism towards a definite purpose1 we shall merely find that such a conception is rendered possible by our own effort of imagination#bbd4 ,the case is just the same if we reflect upon the way in which an animal gratifies its physical wants1 obtains nourishment through the organs which grasp it1 consume it1 digest it1 and generally is a subject of the process which preserves its life4 ,for in this case also we have either only before us single desires and their spontaneous and haphazard gratification1 in which the inward activity#bbe of the organism is not present at all1 or at least all these activities and their means of expression have become the subject of our imaginative reflection1 which is at pains to understand such a process by relating it to definite ends1 and to establish a harmony between aims assumed to belong to the animal itself and the organs which fulfill them4 ,we shall rather find that neither the sensuous perception of single haphazard appetites1 arbitrary movements and efforts towards self-satisfaction1 nor the fanciful consideration of the animal organism as one directed by purpose will present to us purely animal life as a part of the beauty of ,nature4 ,the beauty consists in the appearance of individual form1 both in repose and motion1 quite apart from the relation of its self-gratification to any purpose thus subserved1 as it is apart from the entirely isolated contingency of self-imposed movement#bbf4 ,such beauty is related to the form alone1 because it is only as such that it is the external appearance1 in which the objective idealism of the principle of life makes itself known to us as a thing perceived and contemplated upon through the senses4 ,thought apprehends this objective idealism in the medium of its notion1 appropriating the same in the element of universality which belongs to it1 albeit the contemplation of its beauty is inseparably bound with its phenomenal reality4 ,and this reality is the external form of the articulated organism1 which is1 in our view of it1 quite as much determinate particularity as it is a semblance1 namely1 that of the physical manifold of the separate members1 which can only form part of the concrete totality of the living form under the guise of phenomenal appearance4 7b7 ,from the explanation of the notion of life already given we may deduce more narrowly the form of this appearance as follows4 ,the form is one of spatial extension1 limitation1 and configuration1 distinguished through its various shape1 colour1 and motion1 being1 in fact1 a manifold of such distinctions4 ,if1 however1 the organism which manifests these differences is a living organism1 it will inevitably appear that the organism does not derive its true existence from such a manifold and its physical configurations4 ,this is brought about by the fact that the different parts1 which are apprehended by us through the senses1 are at the same time conjoined together in one totality2 they appear consequently as the members of one individual existence1 which is a unity of such differences1 and which not merely possesses them in their difference1 but as parts of one homogeneous whole4 77 ,in the first place1 however1 this unity will assert itself as the purposeless identity of such differences1 that is to say with no abstract relation to any causal end whatever4 ,the parts in such a case are not rendered visible to sense merely as a means to or in the service of some defined purpose1 nor are they able to fix the determinate relation of form and structure which they occupy one over against the other4 77 ,rather the contrary is the case1 for1 in the second place1 the bodily members have for our sense-perception the appearance of being quite accidental in their form2 in other words the determination of one appears to be quite indifferent to that of another4 ,in other words1 we can never conclude because one has a certain form another will have the same1 as would be the case if a material uniformity was clear between them4 ,where uniformity is the rule an abstract determination of some kind of form1 size1 or whatever it may be1 is the property of all parts4 ,the windows of a building1 for example1 are all of one size1 or at least are placed together in one row4 ,or we may illustrate the same similarity with the uniform worn by all soldiers belonging to one regiment4 ,we have various parts of such clothing differing in colour1 texture and the rest1 but their formal opposition is no matter of chance2 each has its causal connection with some other2 it is there because the other is there4 ,neither is there here any complete distinction of form1 nor any unique independence wholly asserted4 ,with the individual organism of life the case is entirely otherwise4 ,here every part is absolutely distinguished2 the nose from the forehead1 the mouth from the cheek1 the breast from the neck1 the arms from the legs1 and so on4 ,inasmuch as for our sense-perception every member possesses its unique form rather than one which belongs to another1 or one which is determined by that of another1 the members appear as self-subsistent parts1 and for this reason free and spontaneous#bbg4 ,for the material juxtaposition of the parts alone throws no light upon their particular form4 77 ,thirdly1 it is obvious there must be for our imaginative perception a more inward bond of connection present in the self-subsistence of the organism1 if the unity is not offered us in its rational1 spatial1 temporal1 or quantitative relations such as are presented in the examples of uniformity referred to1 which1 as we have seen1 the unique particularity of the parts can extinguish4 ,this identity is not sensuous and immediately present to perception in the way the distinction between the members is presented2 it is rather a secret and inward bond of necessity and harmonious relation between the members and their form4 ,if it were only inward1 quite out of reach of our vision1 such a necessary unity would be apprehended only in thought1 removed from our sense-perception altogether4 ,in such a case1 however1 it would fail to enter into the beautiful object of our vision1 and what we found as such in the living1 object would cease to be the ,idea in its own objective and phenomenal reality4 ,such a unity must consequently enter into what is externally perceived1 although it is1 as the ideal principle of life within it1 not entirely apparent to sense or confined in spatial dimensions4 ,it appears in fact in the individual totality as the universal ideality of its members1 constituting thus the fundamental basis which supports and holds them together1 the subject of the living subject4 ,and this subjective unity in organic life finds its first direct expression in feeling4 ,in the emotional life the ,soul finds its true expression as ,soul4 ,for soul the mere juxtaposition of limbs have no real truth1 and in the presence of its subjective ideality the purely spatial multiplicity of external configuration ceases to exist4 ,such a manifold1 with its unique differentiations1 its organic articulation of parts#bbh is no doubt presupposed2 but when and in so far as the soul expresses itself through such in feeling the more inward unity ever-present to life asserts itself equally as the dissolution of all absolute independence between the physical parts1 which reveal now not merely their materia1 but also that wave of animation which fuses all in their soul4 7c7 ,to start with1 however1 we must observe that the emotional expression of soul-life neither offers us the visual impression of any necessary inter-dependence between the separate members1 nor indeed the perception of an identity which is necessary between such physical articulation and the subjective unity conferred on it by simple feeling4 ,we will investigate this more narrowly4 77 ,if indeed the form and only the form renders in some way visible this inward harmony and its necessity1 it may be because we look upon this juxtaposition as the habitual relation of such members1 a connection which brings to our view some specific type and the oft-repeated formal exemplifications of such a type4 ,but the necessity of custom is after all only a subjective necessity4#bbi ,according to such a principle we may find certain animals ugly for no other reason than that we find in them an organism which differs from our ordinary experience1 or runs contrary to it4 ,for this reason we call the organisms of certain animals bizarre in so far as the way in which their organs are related together is foreign to what is more common to our experience or entirely contradicts it4 ,fishes whose bodies are in size out of all proportion to their length of tail1 or those in which we find eyes together on one side of the head only1 are an example4 ,in the world of plants we are already prepared to find many such strange departures from type1 although the cactus with its spines1 and the more rectilinear shaping of its angular junctures#bcj may still arouse our wonder4 ,the more a man is educated1 however1 in all branches of natural history1 the more able he will be to recognize in their truth the subordination of all parts of organic life1 and carry in the memory the greatest variety of types in their proper classification1 and the less anything he may observe will surprise him4 77 ,a profounder penetration into this correlation of the parts will1 however1 in the second place1 tend to give us that truer insight competent to determine from one of the parts the entire form to which it must belong4 ,cuvier is a famous example of such aptitude3 a man of science1 who by the examination of a single bone1 whether fossil or otherwise1 was able to specify at once by its characteristics the kind of animal to which it belonged4 ,an excellent illustration this of ex ungue leonem4 ,so from a claw or a thigh bone we may discover the conformation of the teeth1 or vice versa from the teeth that of the hip-bone1 or that of the vertebral column4 ,such a profound synthesis of the type and the knowledge it implies carries us1 however1 beyond habitual experience only4 ,we must assume1 to render it possible1 previous thought and the systematic arrangement of the isolated facts of science4 ,our example ,cuvier had no doubt secured from previous experience a determinate content and some specific quality which prevailed in each generic conception1 and asserted itself as a unity of principle in all particulars however distinct1 and so enabled him to recognize their affinity4 ,such a specific quality is that of flesh-eating1 which is then the determinating principle of the form of the other members of the organism to which it belongs4 ,a flesh-eating animal requires teeth and jaws of exceptional vigour2 when hunting it will require claws to seize its prey1 mere hoofs are insufficient4 ,here in short is a quality which necessarily determines for us the form and principle of affinity among all the organic members4 ,a conception of such a typical character is the ordinary one we form of the strength of an eagle or a lion4 ,we may no doubt find something both beautiful and instructive#bca in this way of regarding the animal world1 in so far as we derive from it some unified idea of its configuration1 which is not a mere repetition of that unity in all the parts1 but gives full value to the distinctions they possess4 ,for all that it must be remembered the dominant factor of this survey is not the perception of our senses1 but the generic thought of our minds with which it is made to conform4 ,reviewed in this light we ought not to say that we find the object as such beautiful1 but rather attribute that beauty to the reflection of our own minds upon it4 ,and if we examine these reflections more closely we shall find they are after all a deduction of our principle of unity from a limited aspect of the organic whole4 ,we concentrate our attention1 for example1 on the mode in which it is nourished1 i4e41 whether such an animal is carnivorous or herbivorous4 ,through such a limited determination we are still removed from a vision of the coalescent unity of the whole we identified with the notion1 the soul itself4 77 ,the truth is we can only1 in this sphere1 bring before our consciousness the entire unity of life by means of our thought and grasp of reason4 ,in the natural world the soul1 in its full activity1 is not found2 that is to say1 the subjective unity1 in its pure ideality1 does not exist there for a self-consciousness4 ,if1 however1 by means of thought1 we endeavour to grasp the nature of soul-life according to its essential notion we shall find two aspects under which we may regard it2 first1 as the form subject to such a principle of animation2 secondly1 as the notion of soul for thought in all that the conception implies4 ,such a complete grasp of its true nature is not possible in the sensuous perception of the objects of beauty4 ,such must neither pass before us as thought1 nor must we allow the interest of ,thought as such to form a barrier of difference or opposition between itself and the vision revealed to us4 ,we are left1 then1 with no alternative but to consider1 under this point of view1 the object as wholly presented to sense2 we must assume that in the sphere of ,nature a sensuous perception of the natural form is our genuine mode of contemplating the beautiful4 ,sense1 that is the master-key#bcb to the position2 a word which in itself is interpreted in two opposed senses4 ,in the first place we may indicate thereby the organs of immediate#bcc perception1 secondly1 by the sense of a thing we may refer to the significance1 or the element of thought and the universal within it4 ,in this way ,sense is related on one side to the immediate externality of existence1 and on the other to its inward or essential nature4 ,a sensuous perception of that existence in fact preserves both sides in unity1 or rather in one direction so presents the aspect that is opposed to it in the immediate sense vision as to include therein both the essence and notion of the object4 ,but for the reason that it combines these opposed determinations in unfractured unity1 the notion is not presented as such to consciousness1 but is rather to be dimly foreshadowed there#bcd4 ,we accept1 for example1 as a determinate fact the existence of three realms of ,nature1 which we define as that of the mineral world1 that of plants1 and finally that of animals2 we can conclude from this1 as already foreshadowed by its truth regarded as a process rising from plane to plane1 that there is an inward necessity inherent in the notional articulation of its divisions1 and do not confine ourselves only to the purely imaginative conception of it as a world conforming on its exterior side only to a final end4 ,in the same way when confronted with the variety of the external presentment in each of these realms1 the sense-perception surmises a controlling unity intelligible to mind1 a progress subject to laws of thought1 visible no less in the formation of mountain ranges than in the orderly succession of plant-life and of the animal races4 ,the same tendency is presupposed when1 after an examination of the form of any particular animal organism1 an insect's1 for example1 as subdivided into head1 body1 abdomen1 and extremities1 we conclude the correlation of such parts to be based on a rational principle1 and are confident that though1 at first blush1 it may appear quite accidental that we are in possession of five senses1 we shall discover a true bond of relation between that number and the notion therein asserted4 ,of just this type is ,goethe's method of observing and accounting for the innate reason of ,nature and her phenomena4 ,with an extraordinary intuitive sense he directed his attention directly to#bce the objects of experience1 entirely convinced of the ideal bond of unity which explained their interconnection4 ,history may be written with a like object4 ,the narration of facts and individual lives is given in such a way as indirectly to throw a light on the essential significance which such events or persons contributed to the period in which they are necessarily bound together in one organic whole4 #c4 ,consequently we may affirm that ,nature generally1 regarded as the sensuous manifestation of the concrete notion and the ,idea1 is to be considered an object of beauty in so far as by such a sensuous perception of natural forms some kind of foreshadowing of the notional unity consonant to them is surmised1 and we are able through the channels of sense to discover not merely their form1 but somewhat of the inner necessity which binds together all their parts4 ,further than this incomplete surmise of the notion the sensuous contemplation of ,nature as beautiful is not carried4 ,this way of comprehending things1 for which the separate parts1 despite their appearance of independent freedom among themselves1 nevertheless reveal to the sight the harmony that exists there either in the characteristics of their form1 or detached portions of it or their motion and so forth1 remains for all that indefinite and abstract4 ,the inward unity is not open to external sense1 nor can it appear in its ideal and concrete form to such perception#bcf1 whether imaginative or no2 such at most acquiesces generally in the universality of a law of connection inherent in every living thing4 7a7 ,it is1 then1 in the first instance only in this bond of union which reveals itself as a necessary adjunct of vitality from the objectivity of ,nature1 in so far as the same is presented in forms adequate to the notion1 that we have before us the beauty of ,nature4 ,with this coalescence the materia is wholly identical2 the form is immediately at home in the matter1 as its true essence and its conforming energy#bcg4 ,this description may in fact stand for us1 so far as beauty at this stage is concerned1 as a general definition of it4 ,we admire1 for example1 the natural form of a crystal on account of the law of uniformity it manifests1 a law which through no mere action of forces external to it1 but by virtue of its own specific definition and free activity1 free in all its aspects as itself an object1 is manifested there4 ,for although an activity external to it could as such equally be free1 yet in crystals the conformative activity is not extraneous to the object2 rather it is a form operative as belonging to the mineral's innate character4 ,we may define it as the free force of its substance1 which out of its own resources informs itself and is not merely passively receptive of its environment4 ,consequently we find here the constituent material in its realized form as a free and independent creation4 ,in still higher and more concrete mode the immanent form projects itself through the living organism and all its parts1 in the articulate form and1 above all1 in its motion and its vital expression as feeling4 ,for in this last case we have the inward vitality pregnant itself as living4 7b7 ,it is moreover through this indeterminacy of the beauty of ,nature1 originating in its inward principle of animation that 77 both in virtue of the conception of life and the intuition of its true notion no less than of the habitual types conformable to its adequate presentment1 we are able to distinguish between animals which are beautiful and those which are ugly4 ,animals incapable of vitality1 such as the sloth1 which creeps about with difficulty1 and whose entire mode of life is suggestive of incapacity for motion or activity1 offend our aesthetic sense for this very reason#bch4 ,activity and mobility are precisely the qualities which assert the higher ideality of life4 ,for the same reason we condemn forms of amphibious life1 certain species of fishes1 crocodiles1 toads1 and many kinds of insects2 an additional reason will influence our similar attitude to hybrid species1 where confusion of form marks the passage from one determinate type to another2 the ornithorhyncus is an example#bci1 an animal which with its mixture of bird and four-footed beast may indeed astonish us1 but at the same time is repulsive to our sense of beauty4 ,such feelings of repulsion can no doubt be traced entirely to our habitual prepossessions which have moulded for the imagination a fixed type of animal species consonant to experience4 ,but even so there is already actively present the intuitive surmise that the configuration of a bird1 for example1 is related in its parts by a necessary principle of unity1 and cannot as such graft upon itself forms which belong to other species without being thereby transformed into a hybrid variety4 ,such abnormal deviations from type appear to us both strange and contradictory4 ,neither the one sided narrowness of organization1 which is so defective and mean in its manifestation1 that it exercises no activity over the straitened conditions of its environment1 nor confusions and passages of type1 which1 albeit they are not so enclosed within themselves1 are unable to hold fast the distinctive features of their type1 belong strictly to the sphere of natural beauty4 77 ,there is another sense in which we attribute beauty to ,nature1 namely1 when we have the collective picture of a landscape before us rather than observe the living form of a simple object4 ,here we have no organic articulation of parts such as is derived from their notion and is presented to us as such ideal unity in spontaneous life4 ,we have instead a rich variety of objects both organic and inorganic1 which are united together on one or more planes of vision in their distinctive features1 contour of mountains1 winding outlines of rivers1 groups of trees1 huts1 dwellings1 palaces1 and cities of mankind1 ships1 roadways1 heaven and sea1 valley and rock-cleft4 ,we find1 in addition to this variety and proceeding therefrom1 a delightful or imposing harmony which appeals to our sense and interests us4 ,it is lastly a peculiar characteristic of the beauty of ,nature that it should excite or exercise a harmonious influence over our emotional life4 ,a mood of this kind is aroused by the stillness of moonlight1 the peace of a valley1 through which some brook or other meanders1 the sublimity of the immeasurable storm-tossed sea1 the tranquil depth of the star-strewn heavens4 ,but the significant factor in this case is not so much to be found in the objects as in the peculiar moods they arouse in our feelings and affections4 ,on analogous grounds we attribute beauty to animals1 when the expression of their life directly suggests human qualities1 such as courage1 strength1 cunning1 good nature1 and the rest4 ,such1 no doubt1 in one aspect of it1 truly expresses the nature of the animals themselves2 but there is also our own conception of its affinity to ourselves1 and the mood in which we receive it4 7c7 ,however much animal life1 as the culminating point of natural beauty1 unfolds its freest expression as a living principle1 it is comparatively narrow in its range and subject to very limited qualities4 ,the circle of such existence is a strait one2 and in this the predominant interests are those of the satisfaction of natural instincts such as hunger and sex-attraction4 ,soul-life1 regarded as the inward principle expressed through external figure1 is poor1 abstract1 and empty of content4 ,add to this the consideration that this inward is not manifested at all as inward4 ,the soul in its essential substance is not revealed by the life of ,nature2 it is1 in fact1 the determining characteristic of ,nature that its soul remains shut in itself1 does not1 in other words1 proclaim itself in its ideality4 ,as already pointed out1 the soul of an animal is not this ideal unity self-acknowledged4 ,if it were otherwise we should have the manifestation of such personality brought home to others4 ,only in the self-conscious ,ego do we find the ideal in its simplest terms1 which is itself an ideal medium to itself1 knows itself as this simple unity1 and thereby endows itself with a reality1 which is not limited to bodily and sensuous form1 but is itself of an ideal character4 ,here1 for the first time1 reality is in possession of a form adequate to the notion2 or rather the notion sets itself up as its own opposite1 makes itself objectively real and finds its own realization in that objectivity4 ,the animal life1 on the contrary1 is only potentially such a unity as that in which reality as bodily form is other than the ideal unity of soul4 ,in self-consciousness we have this unity realized1 whose opposing factors are constituent elements of one transparent ideality4 ,and it is as this concrete totality of self-consciousness that the ,ego is manifested to others4 ,the forms of animal life merely enable us through imaginative perception to divine the soul's existence4 ,such only possess the troubled semblance of a soul1 betrayed to us through the breath or exhalement which permeates the whole1 gives some unity to all the members1 and reveals in the entire instinctive life the first germs of an independent character4 ,herein lies the primary defect of the beauty of ,nature1 even when taken at its point of culminating form3 and it is precisely this defect which will introduce us to the necessity of the ,ideal as the beauty of art4 ,but before we consider at length the nature of this ,ideal1 there are two determinations involved as the most immediate result of this inherent defect in natural beauty1 which invite our attention4 ,we have stated that in the animal form the soul appears as the bond of connection within the organism and the unified point of animation only under a cloud#bdj and destitute of any fully realized content4 ,we only find there a quite indeterminate and restricted mode of soul-life4 ,we will now consider the abstract limitations of this mode more closely4 ,b4 ,,the ,,external ,,beauty ,,of ,,abstract ,,form ,,regarded ,,as ,,uniformity1 ,,symmetry1 ,,conformity ,,to ,,rule ,,and ,,harmony ,,and ,,reality ,,in ,,the ,,sense ,,of ,,abstract ,,unity ,,of ,,the ,,physical ,,material4 ,there is in ,nature an external reality which is1 of course1 visible and definitely objective1 but the inward unity of which1 instead of presenting itself in the concrete inwardness referable to the unity of soul-life1 only goes to the point of indeterminacy and abstraction4 ,in other words1 it stops short of the inwardness self-actualized in an ideal form and as the particular existence conformable to its ideal content4 ,its appearance is that of the defining principle on the face of external reality4 ,now the specific characteristics of inwardness in all its concreteness should be these4 ,first1 the principle of soul-life is asserted for itself no less than is potentially replete with content4 ,secondly1 external reality interpenetrates this ideal arcanum1 and by so doing fully reveals its true form as such external reality4 ,a concrete unity of this nature is not reached by mere natural beauty3 it lies beyond as the ,ideal4 ,on this plane of existence we cannot say that such a concrete unity enters into the manifestation of form4 ,we have to deduce it through analysis1 examining in their separation and singularity the distinguishing features which the unity supports4 ,the form that informs here and the sensuous external reality fall apart from one another2 or rather we have two distinct aspects which we are compelled to consider separately4 ,by virtue of this fact1 which we may either regard as a division of the material of sense or as a review of certain facts taken in abstraction1 the inward unity1 which is one aspect of the external reality1 itself falls outside it2 that is to say1 it is not itself asserted in that rational reality as the wholly immanent form of the entire notion which constitutes it1 but rather as an ,ideality and determinacy imposed externally4 ,such are the points of view thus presented us which we will now consider more closely4 ,first1 then1 we have to discuss #a4 ,,the ,,beauty ,,of ,,abstract ,,form ,the form of natural beauty in its abstraction is a form which is determinate and thus of limited range2 in a further aspect of it it is focussed in a unity of abstract relation to itself#bda4 ,on closer inspection we shall1 however1 find that the external manifold controls this form of abstract beauty by reason of its own determinacy and unity4 ,we must not1 however1 imply in these latter any immanent inwardness or form of vital ideality1 but regard them as purely material definitions and unity of the external medium4 ,forms of such a character are uniformity1 symmetry1 or conformity to rule1 and finally harmony4 7a7 ,uniformity ,uniformity is1 speaking generally1 equality in external presentment1 or1 more specifically1 the unbroken repetition of one and the same definite form1 supplied by the determining unity to the form of objects4 ,such a unity1 in virtue of its initial abstraction1 is at the furthest extreme removed from the rational totality of the concrete notion4 ,its beauty is therefore a beauty which is referable to the faculty of the analytical understanding4 ,the fundamental process of that faculty is to perceive objects in their abstraction1 not in their self-determined completeness and identity4 ,for example1 among all lines the straight line is that which is most uniform1 because it alone manifests one abstract and undeviating direction4 ,for the same reason the cube is a figure dominated by regularity of content4 ,all its sides are of the same size1 the same length of line and the same angles1 which1 on account of their being rectangular1 however much their size is changed1 manifest no change in the form of their angles as is the case with angles which are obtuse or acute4 ,with this characteristic of uniformity we must closely connect that of symmetry4 ,form is unable long to rest in that barest abstraction of its determination1 namely1 undifferentiated equality4 ,a diverse relation is sure to assert itself1 breaking into the empty form of identity4 ,in this way we obtain symmetry1 which consists in no mere identical repetition of one form1 but in a combination with some such form analogous to it1 identical1 that is to say1 in its self-determination1 and yet manifesting a distinct contrast with it4 ,through such a combination we obtain another kind of equality and unity1 whose determination is more extensive and more varied4 ,if1 for example1 on one side of a house we meet with three windows of the same size separated at equal intervals of distance1 then three or four more of loftier size than the first-mentioned standing at more extended or closer intervals in relation to them1 and again three more precisely similar in size and distance to our original ones1 we have then before us a symmetrical arrangement4 ,mere uniformity and repetition of the same distinctions will never produce this result4 ,we may find such distinguishing features in size1 position1 form1 colour1 tones1 and many others like them1 which1 however1 to produce symmetry must be harmoniously related to similar forms of construction4 ,when we find a combination which presents to us an arrangement of such distinguishing characteristics according to some clearly uniform principle that then is symmetry4 ,both these attributes1 uniformity and symmetry1 being the determinations of the form and unity of external appearance1 are mainly applicable to distinctions in size4 ,for it stands to reason that what is expressly posited as external rather than truly immanent determination is generally a quantitative#bdb determination1 whereas the qualitative fixes the inherent character of anything4 ,consequently that which is assumed only to affect the external appearance cannot be concerned with the changes which are found in the qualitative aspect4 ,size1 on the other hand1 and its alteration regarded merely as size1 is for the qualitative determination1 when it is unable to assert itself in terms of measure1 an indifferent determination4 ,that is to say1 measure is quantity1 precisely in so far as it can give to itself an aspect which qualifies it1 and thereby a qualitative determination is united to the purely quantitative one4 ,as thus explained#bdc uniformity and symmetry are merely restricted to the determinations of size and their uniform appearance or arrangement of differences in symmetrical order4 ,further inquiry will show us that this due co-ordination of size is as applicable to the forms of organic life as it is to those of inorganic ,nature4 ,the human organism is1 for example1 at least in a certain degree both uniform and symmetrical4 ,we have two eyes1 two arms1 two legs1 similar hip-joints1 shoulder-blades1 and so on4 ,of other portions of the body the reverse is the case4 ,we find no conspicuous uniformity in the heart1 lungs1 bowels1 or liver4 ,the question arises what precisely constitutes the difference here4 ,the side on which uniformity1 whether of size1 form1 or position mainly asserts itself1 is obviously the aspect of the organism viewed from the outside4 ,the uniform and symmetrical determination1 in complete conformity with what we should expect1 is most apparent where the fact as objectively determined is itself the external envisagement itself1 and carries with it the least impression of inherent life4 ,the reality1 which is most constant to this pure externality1 rests satisfied with the abstract unity congenial to it4 ,within the organism1 on the contrary1 where we find the heart of the life-process1 and still more openly in the medium of untrammelled reason uniformity gives way before the subjective unity of life4 ,nature is1 no doubt1 in its opposition to mind1 a determinate existence external and independent2 but even in her we find that uniformity only pre-eminently asserts itself where externality is the predominant principle4 77 ,reviewing1 then1 shortly the prominent classifications of natural objects1 we observe1 in the first place1 that minerals1 taking the crystal for an example1 as structures destitute of the principle of life1 are characterized in their fundamental form by uniformity and symmetry4 ,as already remarked1 their form1 it is true1 is one appropriate to themselves1 is not merely the determination of external forces4 ,through an unseen energy the form that makes them what they are as products of ,nature creates their configuration both within and without4 ,this activity1 however1 is not yet the completed energy of the concrete notion as an ideal principle1 which directs the independent consistency of the positive reality1 subsuming them under an ideal totality such as is present in animal life4 ,the unity and definition of their form persists in purely abstract one-sidedness1 and we have as the characteristics of a unity which is wholly on the outside the bare forms of uniformity and symmetry1 the determinating factor in each case being an abstraction4 77 ,plant life is1 of course1 many degrees above the order of crystals4 ,from the very commencement its evolution is marked by a harmonious articulation1 and consumes material in a constantly active process of self-nourishment4 ,but plant-life also is not yet really the living whole#bdd4 ,although organically divided into parts1 its activity is still one that consists wholly in assimilation#bde4 ,it is rooted in the earth with no independent power of motion from place to place2 its growth is continuous1 and such energy of assimilation and self-nourishment as it possesses is not the tranquil self-subsistence of a completely individualized organic existence1 but rather a continuous extension of its growth as an external object4 ,an animal grows just as a plant grows1 but at a determinate point that growth in its external size ceases1 and that which reproduces itself in self-subsistence is one and the same individual4 ,plant-life1 however1 enlarges without intermission1 and only its decease renders the further increase of its boughs and leaves impossible4 ,and1 moreover1 all that it separately produces in this process is for ever the repeated pattern of the same organism in its entirety4 ,for every bough is a new plant1 and not1 as in the case with the animal organism1 only an isolated member4 ,on account of this persistent enlargement of itself through all the separate plant formations whereof it consists plant-life is without the subjective animation peculiar to sensation and the ideal unity which belongs to it4 ,and1 generally speaking1 we may say that plant-life1 however much the digestive process is an inward one1 in which we find nourishment is assimilated and the organism determines the form which is impressed on its substance out of itself by virtue of the increasing freedom of the notional type working through that substance1 nevertheless substantially1 through the entire process of its life1 it remains rooted to externality without either a true independence or unity1 and such self-subsistence as it possesses is continuous without a break4 ,and it is on account of this characteristic of plant-growth1 namely1 that it is for ever asserted on the side of externality1 that we find uniformity and symmetry to be the fundamental unity of its self-expression as it is a predominant principle of its structure4 ,no doubt uniformity is not so regnant here as we observed it to be in the formation of minerals1 and it is not expressed in the same extreme degree through the abstract straight line and right angle3 but it prevails here notwithstanding4 ,the stem for the most part runs on a straight line2 the rings of plants of higher type form themselves in circles2 leaves closely approach the configuration of crystals2 and1 at least as the basis of their type1 we find that the blossoms themselves in the number of their leaves1 their position and form are determined with uniformity and symmetry4 77 ,finally1 in the living organism of animals a difference is asserted in the reduplicated structure of the members4 ,in the bodies of animals1 more particularly if we examine the higher species1 the organism is a more inward1 self-contained and self-determined totality2 like a sphere1 it returns1 so to speak1 on itself1 while still remaining an external organism4 ,it is an external process1 and yet1 as a process1 asserted against externality4 ,the more important organs are those within1 such as heart1 lungs1 and liver1 and in these the life is bound up4 ,such are not determined under the simple characteristics of uniformity4 ,in those members1 however1 even of the animal organism1 which are fixed in direct relation to the outside world1 symmetrical arrangement prevails4 ,among such must be reckoned the members and organs which assert the subjective principle externally no less than those which are the instruments of the active life4 ,the sense-organs1 such as sight and hearing1 belong to the former2 all that we see and hear is left as we found it4 ,the organs of smell and taste already mark the point of union with an activity exercised externally4 ,we only smell that which is already assimilated#bdf by the organ of sense1 and we only exercise our taste through an act of destruction4 ,we have1 it is true1 but one nose1 but it is subdivided into two sections1 each of which is uniform in structure4 ,the same description is applicable to the lips and teeth and other organs like them4 ,further than this the eyes and ears1 and the limbs employed in motion from place to place1 or for direct control over external objects1 in other words1 legs and arms1 are entirely uniform in position1 form1 and other qualities4 ,we find1 therefore1 that in the organic world no less than in the inorganic uniformity asserts a very real predominance1 qualified1 however1 by the fact that its presence is limited to those members which are the instruments of the organism in its direct relation to the external world4 ,on those through which the life-process returns on itself by virtue of its own subjective principle there is no such impression of uniformity4 ,such1 then1 are the leading characteristics of the forms of uniformity and symmetry1 and the manner in which they are asserted in the configuration of natural phenomena4 7b7 ,conformity to ,rule ,we now propose to distinguish the more generic conception of conformity to law#bdg1 so far as it appears on a higher plane of organic evolution than that already adverted to1 and marks the passage of the same to the freedom of natural no less than spiritual life1 from the more abstract forms discussed above4 ,taken by itself1 no doubt1 conformity to rule is not alone sufficient to give us the subjective unity and freedom of totality2 but we do find in the configuration to which it corresponds a totality of essentially distinguished characteristics1 such as do not merely emerge in difference and opposition1 but betray both unity and determinate connection in such totality4 ,a unity thus controlled1 albeit still only positively asserted in quantitative substance1 is no longer referable to essentially exterior distinctions of mere size numerically ascertainable1 but already introduces to our notice a qualitative relation of consistency between these contrasted determinations4 ,in other words we have here neither the abstract repetition of one and the same determinant#bdh1 nor a uniform interchange of similarity and dissimilarity#bdi1 but the contemporaneous association of aspects essentially distinct from one another4 ,we find1 in fact1 our sense of sight gratified by the association of these distinguishing features in their completeness4 ,and it is the principle of reason which affords us such satisfaction1 gratifying our sense only through the totality1 or rather through the very totality of differences the nature of the fact requires4 ,such a connection1 however1 still remains an unexplained nexus1 which sense-perception arrives at partly on account of its persistent repetition1 and in part through an intuition of deeper source4 ,a few examples will make clear the process of definition from uniformity to conformity with law4 ,parallel lines of equal length are abstractly uniform4 ,a further step is taken when we compare geometrical figures of the same form1 triangles1 for example1 but assume their size to be unequal4 ,here the angles subtended by the corners of each and the relation of line to line is the same1 but we find such similarity in different quanta4 ,take again the circle1 it does not possess the uniformity of the straight line1 but at the same time the determination of abstract equality strictly applies to it1 for all its radii are of equal length4 ,the circle is consequently still but a curved line that awakes no particular interest#bej4 ,on the other hand1 there is still less uniformity in the ellipse and the parabola1 and they are only understood through the law of their form4 ,in other words the radii vectores of the ellipse are both unequal and in conformity with rule1 and the same qualification applies to the greater and lesser axis of their lines of differentiation#bea2 moreover1 their foci are not central as is the case with the circle4 ,we find in these examples1 therefore1 a qualitative relation of difference assert itself in the law applicable to such lines and constructive of their interconnection4 ,if1 however1 we divide the ellipse by means of its greater and lesser axes we obtain four equal sections2 regarded as a whole1 therefore1 we still find the principle of uniformity paramount in this figure4 ,of a higher degree of freedom in its conformity to law is the oval4 ,we know there is such a law1 though mathematicians have been unable to express its formula4 ,this figure is not an ellipse1 but the higher curve differs from that below it4 ,still we find that even in this example of freer eccentricity in ,nature1 if we divide it through its greater axis1 we have still two equal halves4 ,the final expression of mere uniformity in conformity to law is shown in lines1 which1 as in the example of the oval1 when divided through the smaller#beb axis1 give us unequal sections1 neither section being a mere repetition of the other4 ,the so-called undulatory line is an example of this1 in the sense ,hogarth describes it as the line of beauty4 ,thus the inclination of the arms as they fall on either side of the human body is opposed4 ,here we have conformity to rule without uniformity pure and simple4 ,such a kind of conformity especially characterises with its variety the conformation of the nobler living organisms4 ,conformity to law is1 then1 an attribute of substantiality1 binding together both its differences and its unity2 but it remains still abstract on the side of its controlling form1 unable to supply individuality with the freedom of motion1 or rather by virtue of that form is entirely without the higher freedom of subjectivity1 and quite incapable of revealing the vitality and ideality proper to it4 7c7 ,harmony ,on a higher plane in the sphere of abstract beauty must be placed harmony4 ,in harmony we find qualitative distinctions are held together1 and further held together in a totality of differentiation1 such as is based on the essential nature of the fact itself4 ,this consistency of support is derived from conformity to law1 in so far as that form unfolds what is essentially uniformity1 and thereby passes beyond the mere characteristics of equality and repetition4 ,but in doing this the distinctions of quality assert themselves not only in their difference of opposition and contradiction1 but in aspects of a unity that rivets them together1 a unity in which all distinguishing features1 it is true1 are maintained in their proper place1 but still only as belonging to one single whole4 ,this unity of accordance is what constitutes harmony4 ,we may either regard it as a totality of aspects essentially distinct1 or as the resolution of the element of mere contradiction asserted by them1 revealing their more vital interconnection and ideal solidarity4 ,in this sense we refer to the harmony of form1 or colour1 or musical tone4 ,as an example1 we have blue1 yellow1 green1 and red as the fundamentally necessary differentiation of colour#bec4 ,in these irresolvable data of the spectrum we have not merely the inequality we found in symmetry1 but contradictory opposites1 such as yellow and blue1 their neutralization and withal concrete identity4 ,the beauty of their harmony is revealed in the avoidance of their crude opposition1 which is softened thereby in such a way as to put before us the concordance hidden beneath their difference4 ,they do1 in fact1 emanate from one source1 namely colour1 which is not an abstract conception#bed1 but an essential totality4 ,so far1 indeed1 can the compulsive force of such totality carry us1 that we can1 as ,goethe has pointed out1 when we have but one colour presented to us1 still subjectively recognize another at the same time4 ,in the same way the tonic1 mediant1 and dominant are essential distinctions among musical tones1 which the unity of harmony associates through their difference in one whole4 ,we may submit the harmony of form1 which is differentiated through the varied aspects of position1 repose1 and motion to a similar analysis4 ,if we suffer any one of the subordinate distinctions to assume an exclusive predominance the unity which relates them will be destroyed4 ,harmony1 however1 is not to be confused with free ideal subjectivity and soul-life4 ,in the latter the unity manifested is not merely an interconnection and concordance1 but a positive negation of difference1 which1 for the first time1 reveals their concrete and ideal unity4 ,a concrete unity such as this is not the result of harmony4 ,such concrete unity is1 for example1 that which we find in the actually melodious thing#bee1 which no doubt possesses harmony as its fundamental form1 but at the same time possesses the higher characteristic of free subjectivity1 and by means of song gives expression to that4 ,harmony alone has nothing to do with the appearance of subjective life1 as such1 nor of that of mind1 although it is the highest manifestation of abstract form1 and stands in close affinity to free subjectivity4 ,such1 then1 is our determination of abstract unity as we find it brought before us in the specific modes of abstract form4 #b4 ,,beauty ,,as ,,abstract ,,unity ,,of ,,the ,,material ,,medium ,the side of abstract unity which we have now to consider is not that directly related to form1 but to the sensuous material simply in which it is asserted4 ,the unity is manifested on this side as the entirely undifferentiated concordance of the particular sensuous material4 ,it is the one form of unity1 which the material of sense1 in its purely objective aspect1 is capable of receiving4 ,on this plane and under the above noted relation#bef the abstract purity of the materia in its form1 colour1 or tone constitutes what is most essential to it4 ,entirely straight drawn lines1 which run without a shadow of difference in their straightness or strength1 bare superficies and similar examples please us by virtue of their persistent regularity and their uniform homogeneousness4 ,the purity of the heavens1 the translucence of the atmosphere1 a mirror-like lake the smoothness of the ocean's face1 all give pleasure by virtue of this unity4 ,we find the same truth brought home to us by purity of tone4 ,the voice when purely produced1 though taken quite by itself1 possesses an attraction for us inexpressibly delightful2 vocal notes which are not thus pure on the contrary1 by permitting us to hear the organ of production along with them1 disturb or weaken the pure resonance and definition of their music4 ,in much the same way human speech possesses pure tones in its vowels1 a1 e1 i1 o1 u1 and its compound vowels1 ae1 1 and 4 ,popular dialects are particularly characterized by impurity of vocalization and mediate tones such as oa4 ,purity of tones consists further in this that the vowels are associated with consonants1 whose sound does not tend to blurr the sonority of the vowel tones1 as is too frequently the case with our northern languages1 when contrasted with the way in which their purity is preserved by the ,italian1 a characteristic which makes that language so adaptable to singing4 ,we experience an enjoyment of similar nature through the sight of colour in its simplest purity of tint1 an absolutely pure red or blue for example1 not by any means a common occurrence1 such pristine colours being often weakened through the addition to them of yellow or tints of each other#beg4 ,violet can no doubt appear to us as a pure colour1 but only in an external object1 not1 that is to say1 as a compounded colour#beh1 for it is not itself an elementary colour belonging to colour's essential differentiation4 ,it is these elementary or cardinal colours1 easily recognized by sense in their purity1 which1 on account of their crude opposition1 are most difficult to unite together in harmony4 ,colours1 on the contrary1 which are blurred in their transparency by many other tints1 although not so antagonistic to general harmony1 fail to give us such direct enjoyment from the very fact that the energy of opposition in them is weakened4 ,green1 for instance1 is a compound of blue and yellow1 but it is the neutralization of these cardinal colours1 and for that reason less attractive to us in its own purity than blue and yellow in their secure#bei opposition4 ,such are the points of most importance we have to remark upon in dealing with the abstract unity of form no less than the simplicity and purity of the sensuous material4 ,in whichever aspect we regard our subject-matter we have to review that which is by virtue of its abstract character destitute of life1 and a unity with no true actuality4 ,ideal subjectivity is inseparable from this1 and such is entirely absent from the beauty of ,nature even at the highest potency of its manifestation4 ,this essential defect points us imperatively forward to the ,ideal1 which ,nature is unable to reveal to us1 and in contrast with which the beauty of ,nature appears as a subordinate mode4 ,c4 ,,defective ,,aspects ,,of ,,the ,,beauty ,,of ,,nature ,the true object of our inquiry is the beauty of art viewed as the only reality adequate to the ,idea of beauty4 ,we have hitherto treated the beauty of ,nature as the first mode of the existence of the beautiful4 ,we have now to inquire more closely into that which distinguishes natural beauty from that of art4 ,as an abstract proposition we may affirm that the ,ideal is beauty in its rounded completeness4 ,nature1 on the contrary1 brings before us beauty in its incompleteness4 ,such abstract predicates do not1 however1 help us much1 for our real problem is rather to explain exactly what it is which makes the difference between the completeness of the one from the incompleteness of the other4 ,our inquiry therefore hinges on the question how it comes about that ,nature is necessarily incomplete as a mode of beauty and how this incompleteness is asserted4 ,when we have answered that we shall be in a better position to deduce both the necessity and essential significance of the ,ideal4 ,we have already in following the process of ,nature up to its culminating manifestation in animal life drawn attention to the modes of beauty revealed in that process4 ,it is now of the first importance that we fix our attention more definitely on the culminating phase of that evolution where we find subjectivity and individuality presented to us in the living organism4 ,we have already referred to the beautiful as the ,idea in a manner identical to that we employ when we speak of the good and true as the ,idea1 in the sense1 that is to say1 where we characterize the ,idea as the wholly substantial and universal1 the absolute substance--with no sensuous material therewith--of reality1 in short1 the consistency of the world4 ,determined more strictly1 however1 as already pointed out1 the ,idea is not merely substantiality and universality1 but the unity of the notion and its reality1 just that1 the notion revealed to us as notion in its coincident objectivity4 ,it was ,plato who1 as we have remarked in our introduction1 posited the ,idea as that which was alone true and universal1 and1 indeed1 as the one concrete ,universal4 ,the ,platonic ,idea is1 however1 not itself as yet the concrete real1 for apprehended under the notion and its universality it is already coincident with the real4 ,apprehended1 however1 only in its universality#bfj1 it is not realized1 realized1 that is to say1 as ,truth in its self-determinate realization4 ,it is still only the potency of such self-realization4 ,but just as the notion is not the notion of real existence without its full objectivity1 in the same way the ,idea without its realization in the objective world is not the ,idea in its ,truth as existent reality4 ,the ,idea must proceed to such realization1 which is only present itself for the first time in a really existent subjectivity adequate to the notion1 and its ideal unity and self-determination4 ,in the generic species we find its reality first manifested as free and concrete individuality4 ,life only exists as a living thing2 goodness is only realized in particular men2 and all truth is simply the consciousness of knowledge--,spirit which has come to its own vital inheritance4 ,only the concrete singularity is both true and really existent1 mere abstract universality and particularity is not so4 ,this self-subsistent actuality1 this subjectivity is the point on which everything turns1 and which we must fully grasp in its significance4 ,subjectivity may be defined as ideal determination by virtue of a principle of ideal unity which asserts itself through negation of the differences presented to it as consistent parts of one objective reality#bfa4 ,the unity of the ,idea and its realization is the negative unity of the ,idea as such and its reality2 it is at once and at the same time the subsumption and deposition in a unified content of the difference asserted on either side4 ,only in this active process is the unity of the ,idea affirmatively determined in its full activity1 a unity and subjectivity whose process of self-determination is infinite4 ,we have consequently to apprehend the ,idea of the beautiful in its realized mode of existence as essentially concrete subjectivity and1 moreover1 as individual substantiality1 by virtue of which it is the ,idea really existent1 possessing the form of its reality in concrete and individual singularity4 ,but here we must distinguish between two distinct modes of singularity or individuality1 namely1 that which is immediately presented us by ,nature and that which is predicated of mind 7spirit74 ,in both forms it is given determinate existence1 and consequently is in both substantive content1 the ,idea in short1 and in the particular sphere of our inquiry for both forms the ,idea as beauty4 ,viewed in this way we may affirm if we please that the beautiful of ,nature has a similar content with that of the ,ideal4 ,in contradistinction1 however1 to such a point of view we must not fail to observe that the difference of form1 in which the ,idea herein attains reality1 that is to say the difference between the individuality which prevails in the spheres of ,nature and ,spirit1 the difference asserted in its respective appearance1 this it is which constitutes an essential distinction4 ,as we shall see1 the real point of our inquiry is this1 namely1 which of these two forms is really the one most adequate to the ,idea1 for it is obvious that it is only in the entirely adequate form that the totality of the ,idea is in its full content explicitly realized4 ,this is the more immediate point we have now to examine in so far as the difference between natural beauty and the ,ideal falls into line with the formal differentiation of singularity4 ,immediate singularity is no doubt primarily found in the domain of ,spirit no less than in ,nature as such4 ,for1 in the first place1 ,spirit is possessed of an external existence in bodily form2 secondly1 even in spiritual relations1 ,spirit1 in the first instance1 only exists in its union with immediate reality4 ,subdividing our inquiry in conformity with such facts1 we will consider the nature of immediate singularity from three different points of view4 #a4 7a7 ,we have already seen that the animal organism preserves its determinate existence through a persistent evolutionary process of its own in opposition to an environing inorganic ,nature1 which it assimilates by means of consumption and digestion1 compelling thereby what is external to submit to that process1 and asserting its own independent existence by so doing4 ,we found at the same time that this living process is a system of activities1 which is realized in a system of organs1 whose functional action consists in those very activities4 ,the one and single aim of this homogeneous system is the self-preservation of the living totality thereof through such a process4 ,the animal life consists1 therefore1 in a life of sensuous impulses1 whose general course and satisfaction is realized in the above-mentioned organic system4 ,the living organism is for this reason articulated in its parts under a teleological principle1 and the principle or end subserved is self-preservation4 ,life is immanent in every member2 they are united to life1 and life is one with them4 ,and the net result of this animate process is that the animal is maintained as a thing conscious of itself as an individual subject of feeling1 life and the self-enjoyment its singularity procures for it4 ,we have only to compare animal life with plant life to see the difference implied in the absence of such a sense-consciousness4 ,the plant simply brings to the birth new specimens of its species1 without even being able to concentrate any single one on that point of negation1 which constitutes self-singularity4 ,we must1 however1 add that even in the animal organism and its life we never have actually before our eyes the true manifestation of this centre of unity1 but rather simply the manifold of its members4 ,life is still too deficient on the side of freedom and in opposition to the mere caprice of sense-life to manifest such a subjective individuality as is capable of breaking through the external envisagement of its organic parts4 ,the vital centre of such activities in the animal organism still remains veiled from vision1 and all that we see are the mere outlines of the figure1 and this for the most part concealed from our view by feathers1 scales1 hair1 fur1 or spines4 ,there can be no question that coverings of this nature1 though characteristic of the animal world1 are coverings which partake of the form of the vegetable world4 ,and it is precisely at this point that the beauty of animal life declares its essential insufficiency4 ,that which the organism makes most visible to us is not the soul-principle4 ,that which is directed outward and throughout appears is not the life within1 but rather formations accepted from a lower plane of existence than the essential embodiment of life4 ,the animal is only fully alive beneath that outer crust1 and consequently for this very reason that its inwardness#bfb is not wholly made real in a form adequate to reveal it1 we are unable to see the principle of ,life everywhere shine freely through it2 it remains only an inwardness1 and the shell is external only unpermeated by the vital principle4 7b7 ,the human body1 in virtue of its more exalted station1 presents us with a striking contrast4 ,in this we are everywhere reminded that man is in possession of a unity of feeling1 a soul4 ,the human skin is not covered over plant-like with an apparently lifeless sheath2 the pulsation of the blood is visible throughout the entire surface2 the beating heart of life is everywhere at the same time apparent2 and we have in this outward manifestation1 as it were1 the real fount ,of life made visible1 the turgor vitae as it streams from its centre4 ,in the same way the human skin1 sensitive throughout in its minutest parts1 reveals to us the morbidezza of its colouring1 those tints of flesh-colour and vein-colour which are the despair of an artist4 ,on the other hand1 however much the human body presents1 as the apparent mirror of ,life1 a contrast with that of animals1 it undoubtedly expresses also the natural process of self-preservation in the subdivision of the skin1 and the indentations1 wrinkles1 pores1 small hairs and veins which we find attach thereto4 ,in fact the skin itself1 though permitting the inner life to shine through it1 is none the less an external protection of that life1 a means obviously intended for such self-preservation4 ,the supreme significance1 however1 of the contrast here presented is traceable in this extraordinary sensitiveness of the human cuticle1 which1 although not absolutely the seat of feeling itself1 alone renders such feeling possible4 ,but at the same time even in this direction we are made conscious of the defect1 that this sensitiveness does not penetrate as a vital impulse of concentrated emphasis equally through all the members4 ,we find in the human body itself certain organs whose form is entirely appropriate to mere animal functions1 while others give a more adequate expression to the entire soul-life1 its feelings and passions4 ,regarded in this way it is obvious that even in the human body the inner life of soul has not found its complete reflection in all parts of its external realization4 7c7 ,the same defect is apparent on the higher plane of the spiritual world and its organizations1 if we consider such under the aspect of life as immediately presented4 ,the more extensive and the richer their configurations are1 the more we shall find that the fundamental object of the inner life of such totalities requires other means co-operative with such externality for its adequate expression4 ,such organizations no doubt appear in immediate reality as organic wholes in which definite purpose is realized1 and the realization of such purpose is manifested by the mediation of voluntary effort4 ,every centre of such a spiritual organism1 such as the ,state or the family1 that is to say each individual organic totality1 is in possession of a will capable of such exercise1 and appears in unity with the other members of the same organism2 but the one inner soul of this nexus1 the freedom and reason of the aim of all is not visible in external reality as such in the absolute freedom of its subjective and universal principle of life1 nor is it thus manifested in every part4 ,the same thing may be observed in particular actions and events1 where we find a similar organic totality present4 ,the inner motive from which they proceed is not wholly made visible upon the external surface of their actual presence4 ,what we do find is a total presentment of fact1 whose most fundamental ground of unity and vitality still remains hidden from sight4 ,finally1 when we consider from the same point of view any single individual we are confronted with the same truth4 ,every human person is a self-rounded totality1 held together by the central unity of life4 ,in the immediate envisagement of reality1 that is in his life1 action1 avoidance of action1 desires and impulses1 he only appears in a fragmentary way2 none the less it is only from a general survey of all his actions or sufferings that we are able to form an estimate of character4 ,the centre of unity which thus concentrates to a point the entire subject-matter of our extended survey is not as such either visible or directly apprehended4 #b4 ,the second point of importance to which we would draw attention is this4 ,with the immediate appearance of individuality the ,idea1 as we have already indicated1 receives determinate existence4 ,through this very immediacy however it becomes interwoven with the complexity of the external world1 is conditioned by the limitations of external circumstance and the relative character of means and ends which are found there1 in one word is carried into the finitude of external ,nature4 ,for though immediate singularity is in the first place a fully rounded off unity1 it is for the same reason only self-exclusive as a centre of negation opposed to others1 and is1 by virtue of its immediate singularity1 influenced by1 no less than related to1 a totality of real existence other than its own1 upon which it is dependent in a thousand different ways4 ,the ,idea1 in short1 is in this very immediacy realized in every direction as individual distinction4 ,it is consequently now merely a reflex of the inherent energy of the notion which binds all individual existence1 that of ,nature no less than mind in reciprocal correlation#bfc4 ,such a relation to the existences themselves is a purely external one1 and appears also to them as a single external necessity uniting each part of the manifold in one shifting complexus of interrelated reciprocity4 ,the immediacy of determinate existence is therefore1 as thus regarded1 a system of necessary relations between apparently self-subsistent individual things and forces1 in which each singular entity is committed as a means to the service of ends foreign to it1 or itself is compelled to utilize that which is external to itself as such a means4 ,and inasmuch as the ,idea is under this aspect wholly realized on the ground of externality1 there appears at the same time the unrestrained play of every caprice and accident1 no less than the uncontrolled discharge of the burden of indigence4 ,singularity as immediate appearance lives and moves in the realm of unfreedom4 7a7 ,the individual animal is1 for example1 fettered wholly within the bounds of its natural environment of air1 water and land4 ,its entire way of living1 the mode of its self-nourishment1 everything that concerns it1 is thereby determined4 ,it is this which differentiates with such variety the species of animal life4 ,we find1 moreover1 intermediate strains1 such as swimming birds and suckling animals1 which live in the water1 amphibious species and others which still further mediate between the more obviously generic4 ,these are1 however1 mere confusions of race1 and indicate no higher mediation of considerable range4 ,throughout we find the animal subject in its self-preservation to the absolute necessities of external nature1 cold1 drought1 or insufficient supply of the means of nourishment4 ,under this despotic dominion it is liable through the parsimony of circumstance to lose the fulness of external form1 the blossom of its beauty1 in short to become as it were the reflex of starving ,nature herself4 ,external conditions fix imperatively the measure of beauty it either preserves or forfeits4 7b7 ,the human organism1 in its particular bodily existence is subject1 if not in the same measure1 to external forces of ,nature1 and is compelled to face the same contingencies1 deficient livelihoods1 and every kind of harassing disease and misery4 7c7 ,if we carry investigation further to that still higher plane of immediate reality where spiritual interests are predominant we shall find this dependence on external condition for the first time emphasized in its full relativity4 ,here we are face to face with the prose of human existence in its entire length and breadth4 ,the contrast already noticed between ends subservient to purely physical wants1 and those profounder aims of spiritual life1 and the conflict which tends to inflict a loss on one side or the other1 already opens our view of it4 ,add to this every individual man1 in order to preserve himself as such1 is compelled to make himself in many ways subservient to others1 and the limited aims of others1 and on the other hand1 in order to satisfy his own narrow interests1 to accept the service of others as a mere means for their fulfilment4 ,the individual1 then1 as he appears in the prose-life of everyday existence1 is not therefore active out of his own particular totality1 nor is he intelligible so much in virtue of himself as in virtue of that which he is not#bfd4 ,for individual man stands in a relation of dependence to the influences1 laws1 organizations and other social relations of civic life which he finds already existing around him1 and to which he must submit whether he forfeit his own independent soul-life thereby or not4 ,and more than this1 each separate individual is not presented to others as such totality1 but is only reflected in whatever isolated interest they may happen at the time to possess in his actions1 desires1 and opinions4 ,and what interests mankind mainly is some relation to their own particular thoughts and aims4 ,even historically important actions and events1 with which the community is expressly associated1 appear in this field of relative appearances merely as a manifold of isolated efforts4 ,it is a varied collection to which each contributes as he may1 with aims by no means identical1 some of which meet with success while others miscarry1 and indeed1 be they ever so fortunate1 are significant in a very subordinate degree if we consider them as contributions to the wellbeing of all4 ,what the majority may carry through1 in contrast with the entire aggregate of events and the end applicable to all#bfe1 to which it furnishes its quota1 is after all a mere patch2 nay1 even men of eminent standing1 who feel and are fully conscious of the universal passage of events#bff1 as their own world1 are for all that clearly immeshed in the same net of particular circumstances1 conditions1 and a thousand other hindrances involved in their relative position4 ,on all these grounds it is plain that in this sphere of exterior life the individual world is unable to offer us the vision of that independent and complete freedom of the living principle1 such as is essential to the true notion of beauty4 ,it is1 of course1 true that the immediate appearance of human reality and its events and organizations is not without system1 and as such is a totality of activities2 but this whole is rather in its appearance a mere mass of isolated fragments4 ,moreover the practical concerns of such activities are divided and subdivided into countless parts1 and in such a way that each single part is in touch with the merest fraction of all2 and1 in short1 however much individuals may remain steadfast to their own purposes1 and only bring forth to the light that which their own interest has employed as a means1 the self-subsistence and freedom of their will remains more or less of a formal character1 determined by external circumstance or accident1 and constantly thwarted by natural causes#bfg4 ,this is the prose of the world1 as presented to our own consciousness no less than to that of others2 a world of finitude and change1 a world immeshed in relation and submerged beneath the pressure of necessity1 a world from which no individual can extricate himself4 ,the central paradox of life confronts every unit of the living whole4 ,on the one hand there is the impulse of individuality to perfect its isolated unity in self-exclusion2 on the other there is the necessary condition of dependence on others from which none may claim immunity4 ,however prolonged the struggle to overcome this contradiction may be the effort of that interminable battle only terminates with life itself4 #c4 ,thirdly1 the immediate singularity of the worlds of ,nature and ,mind is not merely conditioned by dependence on others1 but is deficient in any complete self-subsistency owing to its confined nature1 or with more accuracy1 because it is particularized in its own specific mode of manifestation4 7a7 ,we will explain our meaning further4 ,every single specimen of life in the animal world is from the first fettered by a definite1 that is to say1 a restricted and constant species1 beyond the limits of which it cannot pass4 ,there is in the spiritual world1 no doubt1 a general picture of life and its organization1 which floats vaguely before our vision2 but in the real world1 which is one with ,nature1 this universal organism breaks up into a multitude of particulars1 each of which possesses the determinate type of form and grade of cultivation in which it is related to a definite portion of the social organism4 ,in addition to this and within these insuperable limits1 we find the pressure of that element of contingency1 as regards general condition or external environment1 predominantly asserted both uniquely and in haphazard fashion throughout every one of those individual units4 ,such a state of things disturbs our vision of the self-subsistency and freedom1 which the idea of true beauty imperatively requires4 7b7 ,as already observed1 it is unquestionably true that ,spirit discovers in its own bodily organism the notion of life completely realized4 ,this is so much the case that1 in contrast with it1 the forms of the animal world appear not only as incomplete1 but in inferior species as even pitiable objects4 ,the human organism is also1 however1 broken up1 if to a less1 degree1 in racial subdivisions and the ascending grades of beauty which distinguish such races4 ,moreover1 in addition to this obviously very general line of demarcation1 we have presented to us all the accidental variety of qualities1 peculiar to distinct families and their interfusion with one another1 such as modes of life1 facial expression1 and general demeanour4 ,we must further associate with such characteristic traits1 which all of them emphasize a condition of essentially unfree particularity1 those peculiarities which are inseparable from activity employed in the endless round of commercial life or professional career2 qualities which find their ultimate expression in the specific habits or idiosyncracies of any exceptionally marked character or temperament1 or1 as the reverse side of the picture1 in the various confusions of arrested development4 ,poverty1 care1 anger1 coldness1 and indifference1 the rage of passion1 the obstinate retention of narrow purposes1 indications of change and division in the spiritual world1 entire dependence on that of ,nature--in one word all that is implied in the transitory condition of human life--leaves its indelible1 if quite incalculable1 expression on the varied surface of the faces of mankind4 ,who has not crossed weather-beaten types of such1 on which the storm of all the passions has imprinted its disturbing wave2 or others1 where the coldness and superficiality of the soul within is all the impression we receive2 or1 lastly1 as the final verdict of self-absorbed particularity#bfh1 cases in which the general type seems almost totally to have disappeared4 ,there is no end to the caprice of the human features4 ,speaking generally1 we would associate with this ground the fact that the beauty of children most arrests us4 ,in their faces we find all pronounced idiosyncracies slumber as it were beneath a quiet veil2 no dominating passion as yet ravages their soul2 not one of the thousand interests of the grown man has engraved for ever the expression of its necessity on these mobile features4 ,this envisaged innocence of the child1 however1 though we may discover in its flexible animation the possibility of ,life's completed fulness1 obviously fails to reveal those profounder indications of a spirit which has been carried forward to explore the range of its own recesses and to make its life one with rational purpose4 ,we may regard1 then1 immediate existence1 both in the purely physical and spiritual sense of the term1 as a finitude1 or more justly as a finitude which does not satisfy its notion and for this very reason declares its finitude4 ,for the notion1 and more concretely still1 the ,idea1 is essentially independent and free4 ,purely animal life1 although as ,life it is the ,idea1 is no manifestation of infinity as such or freedom4 ,this is alone possible under conditions1 where we find the notion penetrate so completely the reality which is adequate to it1 that it finds itself entirely at home therein1 with no extraneous matter1 to disturb its possession4 ,then alone do we find it a really free and concrete individuality4 ,the natural life1 on the contrary1 is unable to overcome the element of feeling to which it is attached1 and which renders it incapable of penetrating the entire reality which enrings it4 ,it finds itself1 moreover1 immediately conditioned in itself1 restricted in its range and dependent1 a result which is due to the fact that its freedom is not truly self-determinate1 but conditioned by the external3 object4 ,and the same thing is true of the immediate and finite reality of the spirit world in its knowledge1 volitional action1 and fateful history4 ,for although in this latter case we find centres of unity expressed which have a real significance1 neither these any more than the particularities they unite have truth as they stand by themselves2 but only that truth which1 in their reciprocal relation to each other1 they manifest as constituent parts of a whole4 ,and this whole1 albeit in a sense adequate to its notion1 does not correspond to it in such a way as to manifest itself in its full totality#bfi1 which consequently still remains aloof from such envisagement1 or rather1 is only apprehended in the ideal world of thought4 ,in other words1 the notion finds no fully adequate presentation in external reality1 such as is powerful enough to marshal homogeneously all the numberless fragments of particularity1 and to concentrate them into one expression and one single form4 7c7 ,this1 then1 is the fundamental reason which prevents ,spirit itself1 on the finite planes of determinate existence1 and under the restricting conditions of its externality and necessity1 from rediscovering the immediate vision and enjoyment of its freedom4 ,it is consequently driven by its absence to seek that vision in a higher sphere4 ,that sphere is art1 and its realization is the ,ideal4 ,we have thus seen that it is the defects of immediate reality which drive us forward inevitably to the idea of the beauty of art4 ,we are further under an obligation to prove that its fundamental object#bgj is to manifest here on this very plane of rational reality and in its freedom the envisagement of life1 and1 most important of all1 the life of ,spirit4 ,here1 then1 we have at last the external revealed to us in a form adequate to the notion4 ,here1 for the first time1 truth is lifted up from its environment of temporal conditions1 from its running to and fro among the whirl of finite particularity1 and attains repose2 nay1 more than this1 discovers an external form1 from which the hunger of ,nature and the prose of life no longer stare at us4 ,here at last we have a form worthy of substantial truth1 which is wholly self-contained and self-dependent1 determining with freedom its own content1 and not driven from such self-assertion by the weight of that of others4 ,footnote #bja3 ,als ,beseelung sich kund gbe4 ,the reference is to the second class which follows rather than truly animates life4 ,the sun is such an animating principle4 ,how far modern physics with its investigations of the laws of motion that obtain among the chemical atoms of any specific form of matter and its denial of all dead matter would have modified ,hegel's view is an interesting question4 ,footnote #bjb3 ,wir wollen betrachten4 ,hegel seems to be conscious himself that there is something fanciful in this interpretation of the significance of what is simply an arbitrary1 if systematic1 arrangement of bodies according to natural laws4 ,footnote #bjc3 ,ein besonderes ,moment4 ,see note #aia on p4 #aeb4 ,i think what ,hegel means here is that every body as a vehicle of light reflects the mode in which the identity of the notion as system in the different parts asserts itself4 ,footnote #bjd3 ,in other words what should be phasal elements 7,momente7 of a whole integrated within that unity remain independent units4 ,they are not ,momente in the full sense4 ,footnote #bje3 ,als bloss real unterschiedener4 ,the meaning is that the distinction is only in the totality1 not as in the former case in a body which though part of a system1 could be viewed as an independent body like the sun4 ,footnote #bjf3 ,gewhnliches ,bewustseyn1 i4e41 the ordinary view of understanding 7,verstand7 and sense-perception4 ,footnote #bjg3 ,blosser ,zusammenhang4 ,fortuitous is rather too strong4 ,he means a bond of union cemented by one principle without which either side fails to possess its specific character1 e4g41 the human body apart from the human soul its animate individuality1 ceases to be human4 ,footnote #bjh3 ,als ,begriff seyende ,begriff4 ,the reference ,i take to be to the logical or dialectical movement of the ,idea4 ,footnote #bji3 ,viele tausend empfindende1 or centres of feeling4 ,footnote #baj3 ,die realen ,unterschiede1 i4 e41 the distinctions of the body viewed as part of the physical process of ,nature4 ,footnote #baa3 ,zu ihrer subjektiven ,einheit1 that is to say1 their unity with the notion of ,life as objectively realized in ,nature1 subjective only in the sense that it is ideal1 not apprehended by sense-perception as such4 ,footnote #bab3 ,nhere4 ,i think ,hegel uses nhe in the idiomatic sense in which he uses it in the phrase 7p4 #aej7 when he speaks of ,nature as das nchst ,daseyn der ,idee1 i4e41 most elementary1 more near to it when the notion first presses out of abstraction into totality4 ,footnote #bac3 ,ltze apparently disputes this distinction1 but it appears to me very clear4 ,footnote #bad3 ,seyn4 ,the logical terms are here employed in their technical ,hegelian sense4 ,seyn is being as part of a process1 it is rather a tendency to become than a particular or determinate being 7daseyn47 ,footnote #bae3 ,das ,negiren1 the negation of them as entirely independent structures4 ,footnote #baf3 ,des ,idealisirens1 e4g41 the principle of ideality which is in one aspect of it negation4 ,footnote #bag3 ,affirmatives ,frsichseyn1 e4g41 the explicit ideal totality of ,life apart from the process4 ,footnote #bah3 ,bilderin4 ,footnote #bai3 ,das ,innere1 otherwise called subjective 7see note above7 and meaning what is not externally visible as materia1 though it may be visible indirectly as explained further on4 ,footnote #bbj3 ,the rather difficult ,german here is3 ,da nun aber in der ,objektivitt der ,begriff als ,begriff die sich auf sich beziehende in ihrer ,realitt fr sich seyende ,subjektivitt ist4 ,the comma after ,begriff is clearly a misprint4 ,footnote #bba3 ,the words here are das subjektive ,frsichseyn1 i4e41 the self-conclusion of an explicit whole in virtue of a principle of ideal unity 7i4e41 life7 asserted1 throughout4 ,footnote #bbb3 ,ein ,beharrendes1 one that persists in an inert form4 ,footnote #bbc3 ,hegel uses the word scheinen both for the ideal manifestation of the ,idea in the object and the appearance of material reality reduced by it to mere show 7herabgesetzt zum scheinen71 i4e41 deprived of its independent reality4 ,this introduces a slight confusion ,i have endeavoured to avoid by using different terms4 ,footnote #bbd3 ,unseres ,verstandes4 ,we supply the notion of intelligent purpose4 ,footnote #bbe3 ,that is1 the assumed subordination of all organs to one definite end4 ,footnote #bbf3 ,sichbewegens4 ,the emphasis is of course on the self4 ,but even then the statement is rather an excess4 ,for it seems difficult to attribute all the beauty visible in the spontaneous movements of so many living creatures1 notably that of birds1 to their purely formal character4 ,at least there is something given by such motion analogous to the impression we receive from music and the dance2 they are gesetzmssig in short4 ,footnote #bbg3 ,zufllig--capricious as opposed to a uniform principle4 ,there is1 however1 one apparent bond of external similarity1 between the majority of such members1 namely1 their covering of skin2 this not merely relates the cheek to the neck1 for example1 but to some extent destroys the distinction4 ,footnote #bbh3 ,physical parts1 that is to say4 ,footnote #bbi3 ,that is to say1 it is based on a purely limited experience which does not necessarily concern the true nature of the objects perceived4 ,footnote #bcj3 ,stangen4 ,the word may express the branches on which the flowers are carried or the stamens they carry at their apex4 ,footnote #bca3 ,geistreich1 intelligent1 i4e41 an ingenious way of regarding such facts4 ,footnote #bcb3 ,dies wunderbare ,wort4 ,footnote #bcc3 ,the use of the word ,sinn to which ,hegel here alludes is not quite identical with our word ,sense4 ,in the ,english use of the term there is more stress on the materia presented to sense-perception and perhaps less reference to intellect when the word is employed in such an expression as ,that man has sense4 ,however1 ,milton has ,what surmounts the reach of human sense1 and no doubt both are employed very similarly in many writers4 ,footnote #bcd3 ,bleibt bei der ,ahnung4 ,footnote #bce3 ,naiver ,weise1 a common epithet of ,hegel to denote freedom from all philosophical prepossessions1 a frank and simple attitude of reception4 ,footnote #bcf3 ,betrachtung appears to imply in its contrast with ,anschauung the presence of that intuitive sense or imaginative co-ordination above discussed4 ,footnote #bcg3 ,gestaltende ,macht1 i4e41 plastic force4 ,footnote #bch3 ,this account of the criterium to be adopted in determining beauty in the animal creation is open to some criticism4 ,mobility is no doubt one element of beauty1 but it is only one4 ,professor ,bosanquet points out in his criticism of the passage 7,hist1 of ,aesthetik1 p4 #cch7 that it amounts to the assertion that ugliness is purely relative4 ,the defect is not only due1 it seems to me1 to ,hegel's insufficient regard for ,nature as a modern painter would so regard it1 but it may be traced also to his manifest preference for motion in all the manifestations of ,nature4 ,footnote #bci3 ,schnabelthier1 otherwise called the duck-billed platyptis1 a mammal found in ,australia1 much the size of an otter1 with the horny beak of a duck and paws formed for swimming4 ,footnote #bdj3 ,getrbt1 we have the word trben above1 translated there troubled1 life merely seen through the thick veil of instinctive sense4 ,footnote #bda3 ,that is1 the unity manifested is as abstract from all concrete totality as the form itself4 ,footnote #bdb3 ,this shows clearly that symmetry is only in an analogous way applicable to musical tones4 ,footnote #bdc3 ,in other words1 uniformity is outside the purely qualitative relation1 whereas symmetry is not so4 ,footnote #bdd3 ,beseelte ,lebendigkeit1 lit41 the insouled life-principle4 ,footnote #bde3 ,lit41 ,is continually thrust out into the external4 ,its activity as life is directed outward4 ,footnote #bdf3 ,was schon im ,sichverzehren begriffen ist4 ,i think the distinction implied is that in smell we are in actual contact with a part of the object4 ,the same thing would1 however1 be true of sight according to former theory exploded by ,newton's hypothesis4 ,footnote #bdg3 ,gesetzmssigkeit4 ,i cannot think of an ,english word that quite reproduces it4 ,i am not sure that either conformity to rule or law singly quite expresses it4 ,it implies both4 ,footnote #bdh3 ,as in uniformity4 ,footnote #bdi3 ,as in symmetry4 ,footnote #bej3 ,that is to say1 apart from symbolical meaning1 it possesses no hidden law to be discovered in the relation of part to part4 ,footnote #bea3 ,the words are die grosse und kleine ,axe von wesentlichem ,unterschiede4 ,these refer primarily1 it appears1 to the axes of an ellipse1 but the expression may possibly include the axes of a parabola parallel to the sides of a cone4 ,however ,i admit frankly ,i find the words von wesentlichem ,unterschiede difficult to interpret closely4 ,footnote #beb3 ,in the text grossen1 obviously a misprint4 ,footnote #bec3 ,the incorrectness of this statement according to more recent analysis does not1 of course1 affect the argument4 ,footnote #bed3 ,nicht einseitig4 ,i think the meaning here is that colour is not an abstract idea for independent qualities1 but is the generic notion of a really existing totality4 ,footnote #bee3 ,alles melodische1 primarily1 organic1 of course4 ,footnote #bef3 ,namely1 that of abstract unity4 ,footnote #beg3 ,hegel expresses this rather differently by saying that they tend to pass over into pink 7rthliche7 or orange 7gelbliche7 and green4 ,i have put the same statement rather more directly4 ,footnote #beh3 ,i think this is the meaning of the words aber nur usserlich1 d4h41 nicht beschmtzt4 ,violet1 however1 is now regarded as a cardinal colour4 ,it may also be doubted whether the difficulty of harmonizing pure colour is as ,hegel states it4 ,footnote #bei3 ,this of course is a very questionable position from the point of view of aesthetic taste no less than the conformity of our sight to natural objects4 ,the obvious retort is1 it all depends what the nature of the green is4 ,why is there such a preponderance of green in ,nature as we find it8 ,footnote #bfj3 ,that is to say1 under the ,platonic view of universal4 ,footnote #bfa3 ,so ,i have interpreted the words1 ,die ,subjectivitt nun aber liegt in der ,negativen ,einheit als ,ideellsetzen der ,unterschiede und ihres realen ,bestehens4 ,footnote #bfb3 ,das ,insichseyn1 i4e41 the incipient singularity of a feeling subject4 ,footnote #bfc3 ,i have translated the words bleibt nur die innre ,macht merely a reflex of the inherent energy1 etc4 ,i do not pretend thereby to clear up all the difficulties of this paragraph4 ,i would rather remind the general reader that in this entire discussion of the principle of individuality and its modes of real existence we are face to face with one the fundamental difficulties of the ,hegelian philosophy1 the passage of the ,idea to ,nature4 ,readers who wish to see difficulties more fully developed on this aspect of ,hegel's thought should read ,professor ,seth's interesting and on the whole moderately worded criticism contained in his little book ,hegelianism and ,personality 7,blackwood and ,sons2 see particularly ,lecture ,,iv1 ,thought and ,reality74 ,footnote #bfd3 ,aus ,anderem1 e4g41 the not-self of experience4 ,footnote #bfe3 ,des totalen ,zwecks4 ,footnote #bff3 ,i think the expression das ,ganze der ,sache means this rather than the entire organic whole of living reality4 ,footnote #bfg3 ,it is well for the general reader to remember that we have here no full account of what constitutes the content of a free will4 ,the emphasis throughout is on human activity as exercised in a world conditioned in its external aspect by necessary laws of ,nature4 ,footnote #bfh3 ,the reference here must ,i think he mainly1 perhaps wholly1 to the distorted face of the criminal1 outcast1 or insane classes4 ,but it is just possible that a certain type of aggressive genius may also be denoted4 ,footnote #bfi3 ,the totality of the notion4 ,footnote #bgj3 ,beruf1 i4e41 that which it professes to do4 ,,chapter ,,iii ,,the ,,beauty ,,of ,,art1 ,,or ,,the ,,ideal ,in our consideration of the beauty of art we will confine our attention to three fundamental points of view3 ,first1 the ,ideal in its essential import4 ,secondly1 the determination of the ,ideal in a particular work of art4 ,thirdly1 the creative subjectivity of the artist4 ,a4 ,,the ,,ideal ,,simply1 ,,or ,,as ,,such #a4 ,the most general conclusion which may be gathered from the examination we have already made in a merely formal way of the ,ideal of art may be thus summarized4 ,truth1 in its unravelment as external reality1 is only fully in possession of a true and determinate existence1 however much it may combine and retain in embracing unity a manifold content1 in so far as every portion of the content thus unfolded permits this unity1 which may be called either the animating soul or the unified totality1 freely to appear4 ,to take the human form once more under review as the most direct illustration of this1 we have already remarked that it is a totality of organic members each of which is penetrated by the notion1 differentiated thus in every particular organ by some particular mode of activity and the specific motion congenial to it4 ,if we ask ourselves now in which particular organ the soul appears as such in its entirety we shall at once point to the eye4 ,for in the eye the soul concentrates itself2 it not merely uses the eye as its instrument1 but is itself therein manifest4 ,we have1 however1 already stated1 when referring to the external covering of the human body1 that in contrast with the bodies of animals1 the heart of life pulses through and throughout it4 ,and in much the same sense it can be asserted of art that it has to convert every point of the external appearance into the direct testimony of the human eye1 which is the source of soul-life1 and reveals ,spirit4 ,take the famous adjuration of ,plato to the stars in the lines3 ,when thou gazest forth at the stars1 my star1 ,would that ,i were the heavens and thence on thee ,could gaze forth out of a thousand eyes4 ,conversely we may exclaim that art gives to her forms the dilation of a thousand-eyed ,argus1 through which the inward life of ,spirit at every point breaks into view4 ,and not merely is it the bodily form1 the expression of countenance1 the attitude and demeanour which thus avails2 the same appearance is everywhere visible in actions and events1 speech and voice-modulation1 in short1 under every condition of life through which it passes1 and under which it is possible for soul to make itself recognized in its freedom and ideal infinity4 7a7 ,and1 in close connection with this inquiry into the interpenetration through all parts of the animating soul1 we may justly ask ourselves1 what precisely we understand under this conception of a soul which is throughout visible3 or to restrict attention to definite limits we may inquire what are the specific characteristics of the soul whereof art reveals to us the truest manifestation4 ,for in ordinary parlance one refers to the animating principle#bga peculiar to metals1 stones1 wild animals1 to say nothing of that belonging to every kind of human character and its expressions4 ,to natural objects1 however1 such as stones and plants1 the expression soul in the complete acceptation of the term above mentioned is not strictly applicable4 ,such soul as purely natural objects possess is entirely finite1 transitory1 and rather a specific nature than a soul4 ,the determinate individuality of such existences is consequently completely exposed in their finite existence2 and1 inasmuch as all that is present there is a positive limit of restriction1 such appearance as there may be of a further claim to independence and freedom is only an appearance2 ideal characteristics which may indeed be imported into them from without by means of art1 but are not in the nature of the objects by themselves4 ,in the same way the soul of sense-feeling1 through which ,nature manifests first the ,life-principle only betrays a subjective individuality1 which still remains shut within itself1 unable to assert its reality in the further sense of a return upon itself in a consciousness which shall attach to it the form of infinity4 ,its content is1 therefore1 of a restricted nature1 and its manifestation in part the unrest1 power of motion1 sexual impulse1 anxiety or fear of the dependent life2 and1 in part1 it is the mere expression of an inwardness capable of overcoming its finitude4 ,the animating life of ,spirit 7mind7 brings us first into contact with the free infinity capable within its own external and determinate existence of remaining constant to the inner principle of unity1 and1 in the act of expression1 still reflected back upon its ideal substance4 ,to ,spirit consequently is it alone permitted to impress the hall-mark of its infinity and free self-recurrence on its external expression1 even though by such expression it enters the realm of narrow boundaries4 ,at the same time we may observe that ,spirit1 too1 is only free and infinite in so far as it truly apprehends its universality1 and deliberately posits for itself and accepts those ends which are adequate to its own notion4 ,consequently1 in so far as it fails to grasp its own freedom it can only exist in a restricted content1 a character that is stunted1 a temperament at once crippled and superficial4 ,in combination with nullity of this kind the manifestation of ,spirit must perforce remain wholly formal4 ,we shall only find here the abstract crust of self-conscious ,spirit1 whereof the content contradicts the infinity of its freedom4 ,only by virtue of a genuine and essentially substantive content through which the restricted and mutable particularity derives its essential self-subsistency--so that definite structure and intrinsic worth1 determined limit and substantial content1 are realized in one totality--is such existence thereby able1 through the very mode of expression which confines it1 to proclaim itself also in its universal substance of self-contained soul-life4 ,it is1 in short1 the province of art to comprehend and enunciate determinate and rational existence in its truth1 that is to say1 in the form adequate to its substance1 the truly explicit content4 ,and1 consequently1 the truth of art cannot consist in a mere conformity such as that to which we restrict the so-called imitation of ,nature2 external form must express harmoniously an internal content which is in itself harmonious throughout1 and consequently can express itself as such4 7b7 ,art then1 by comparing what is otherwise stained and rent through the contingent elements of external existence with the harmony that is essential to its notional truth1 rejects that in the world of appearance which it is unable to combine in such a unity1 and for the first time through this purification reveals the ,ideal4 ,it is possible to regard such a result as the flattery of art1 as we sometimes hear it said1 for example1 that portrait-painters flatter4 ,but even the portrait-painter1 a type of art in which the ,ideal is less prominent than in many others1 should at least flatter in this sense1 that he is bound to treat with indifference all that is merely the external detail of form1 texture1 and colour1 the mere adjuncts1 that is to say1 of physical life such as hairs1 pores1 scars1 and other external accidents1 in his undivided effort both to apprehend and deliver the subject selected in its universal character and permanent spiritual individuality4 ,it is one thing to imitate a physiognomy in the general outlines of purely superficial repose apparent at any time2 it is quite another to detect and delineate the particular features which reveal the fundamental soul-life or character of the sitter4 ,as already remarked1 the ,ideal is only truly found when the external presentment is in itself a vehicle of the soul4 ,it is one of our latest fashions to attempt1 by means of those so-called living pictures1 an intentional and gratifying imitation of famous masterpieces4 ,in these we find a fair reproduction of general accessories1 such as grouping and draping2 but1 instead of the spiritual expression of the figures1 have only too often to put up with faces absolutely commonplace4 ,such a defect mars the entire reproduction4 ,the ,madonnas of ,raphael1 on the contrary1 in every detail of their countenance--whether it be cheeks1 eyes1 nose1 or mouth--exhibit with harmonious consistency one supreme type of sacred joy1 the pious1 modest love of a devoted mother4 ,we may affirm1 if we will1 that all women are capable of such emotion2 but1 at any rate1 not every formal shape of feminine countenance is capable of expressing the depth of the same so consummately4 7c7 ,this reference1 then1 of all points of external existence to their spiritual significance1 so that the external appearance unveils in adequate measure the spirit thereof1 is just what constitutes the nature of the ,ideal4 ,it is1 however1 a carrying back into inwardness1 in which we do not find the universal thus carried back to its extremest limit to the form of abstract thought1 that is to say1 but is rather suffered to rest halfway at the point in which we find the purely external and the purely inward meet together harmoniously4 ,the ,ideal is consequently the reality selected out of the mass of chance particulars1 in so far as the inner core in this external totality thus raised in opposition to universality is itself manifested as living individuality4#bgb ,for the individual subjectivity1 which not only carries in itself a substantive content1 but permits the same to appear in its own external appearance1 stands in this central position1 that in it all that is substantially the content is not suffered in its universal aspect to appear as an abstraction of itself1 but still remains enclosed within the sphere of individuality1 and consequently appears associated with a determinate existence1 which now for its part1 freed from mere finitude and transitory condition1 is gathered up in a free and harmonious expression of most intimate soul-life4 ,schiller1 in his poem ,the ,ideal and ,life1 contrasts the reality and its pains and struggles with the still shadowland of ,beauty4 ,such a land of shadow is the ,ideal4 ,the spirits which rise up here have lost in death immediate existence1 are released from the hunger of ,nature1 freed from the claims which fettered them in subjection to external forces and all the changes and confusions which are linked together with finite appearance4 ,but however much the ,ideal treads under foot the mere object of sense and natural form1 it draws at the same time the very wealth of it to itself1 for it is art that is able to assign the very limits to all that the external appearance required for its self-preservation within which the external thing may appear as the manifestation of spiritual freedom4 ,for this reason it is the ,ideal which alone among things envisaged to sense presents a free and self-contained content reposing on its own resources1 in complete sensuous enjoyment and satisfaction with itself4 ,the music of this rapture may be heard through every embodiment of the ,ideal4 ,however far the external form may be carried the soul of the ,ideal is never wholly absorbed in it4 ,and in truth such manifestation is only beautiful in so far as its beauty not merely permeates the whole1 but is a subjective unity1 by virtue of which the subject-matter of the ,ideal must appear emergent from all the fracture of its former individual parts and their respective ends and energies1 raised in the ,ideal itself to a higher totality and self-subsistence4 77 ,we may in this respect point to the blessed repose#bgc1 this self-contentment in its own self-secure consummation1 as the crown of the ,ideal4 ,the ideal form of art stands like some blissful god before us4 ,for the blessed gods are ultimately above and beyond the grim earnest of actual necessity1 anger1 and interest in finite existence and purely finite ends2 and this positive withdrawal involved in the negation of all isolated particularity give them the characteristics of cheerfulness and repose4 ,in this sense we may interpret that phrase of ,schiller3 ,life is earnest1 ,art is cheerful4 ,pedants1 no doubt1 have often enough cracked a joke over it1 inasmuch as poetry in general1 and ,schiller's in particular1 is a serious matter2 and in truth no ideal art is without such a quality2 but for all that in this very earnestness the essential character of cheerfulness#bgd remains4 ,this force of individuality1 this triumph of self-concentrated freedom1 is that which we recognize in an exceptional degree in ancient works of art and the blithesome repose of their figures4 ,and this is not merely the case when we face a satisfaction that involves no struggle1 but even in an example where the subject is rent by some breach in the entire content of its existence4 ,for when the heroes of tragedy are represented as subject to ,fate we find that the demeanour they present1 which may be summed up in the words1 ,it is so6 still remains a simple withdrawal into personality#bge4 ,the subject thus depicted remains throughout true to himself4 ,he surrenders that which is seized from him1 but the aims he pursued are not simply taken away2 he suffers them to lapse and consequently does not lose his initiative4 ,the man who is the bondman of ,destiny may lose his life1 but not his freedom4 ,this repose on the essential birthright of ,spirit is that which is able to preserve and reveal the blithe atmosphere of repose in grief itself4 77 ,in romantic art1 it is true1 the breach or dissonance of the subjective principle is carried further1 inasmuch as in it the exposed contradictions are emphasized and their division can be preserved4 ,thus1 to take an example1 we find the art of painting1 in its representation of the ,passion1 not unfrequently dallies round the expression of ribaldry visible in the hideous contortions and grimaces of tormenting common soldiers2 and1 in its attachment to such discordant emotions1 especially when depicting what is criminal1 shameless1 or evil1 permitting the glad serenity of the ,ideal to pass away4 ,even when such disruption loses its force1 we find frequently that ugliness1 or1 at least1 the absence of real beauty1 is set up in its place4 ,in another school of the earlier ,flemish art of painting the downright directness and truth of the representation1 no less than the inextinguishable confidence of the faith to which it testifies1 tend to assert1 in despite of itself1 a reconciliation in the feelings of all who behold it#bgf4 ,but such an unyielding result falls#bgg short of the entire cheerfulness and satisfaction appropriate to the ,ideal4 ,however1 it is possible also in romantic art1 albeit here the representation of suffering and grief penetrates the soul and its emotions more deeply than is the case with antique art1 that the delineation may reveal to us a spiritual intimacy1 a delight in resignation1 a blessedness in pain1 a rapture in sorrow1 nay1 even a voluptuous ecstasy in martyrdom#bgh4 ,not only in painting but in the profoundly religious music of ,italian composers1 we find this ecstasy and illumination of grief abundantly expressed4 ,we may1 as a summary definition in romantic art1 call it the smile through tears4 ,the tears have their origin in affliction1 the smile in blithesome serenity1 and consequently this smile through weeping indicates1 as it were1 the point of self-repose in the midst of pain and suffering4 ,it is hardly necessary to add that the smile indicated here is no mere sentimental emotion1 no mere vanity of the subject treated or dabbling with beauty#bgi over painful effects and insignificant traits of subjective feeling2 rather 7on its artistic side7 it must appear as the firm delineation and freedom of beauty in defiance of all pain1 in the spirit of what was said of ,ximenes in the romances of the ,cid1 how beautiful she was in tears4 ,in contrast to this emotional abandonment in men is either ugly and repellent1 or actually ridiculous4 ,children1 for example1 break into tears at the slightest provocation1 and we can only laugh at them4 ,the tears1 however1 in the eyes of a man of earnest and self-contained character1 under stress of deep feeling1 betray a very different type of emotion4 ,laughter and tears can1 however1 very readily fall apart as unrelated1 and are1 as such1 falsely utilized as a vehicle of art in such abstraction2 the laughter chorus in ,weber's ,freischtz may be cited as an example4 ,laughter1 after all1 is a kind of explosion1 which it is impossible to exercise without restraint and preserve the ,ideal4 ,another example of this laughter1 which is nothing but laughter1 occurs in a duet of ,weber's ,oberon1 throughout which we are in a continual state of anxiety for the prima donna's throat and lungs4 ,how very differently the inextinguishable laughter of the gods affects us in ,homer1 a sound which breaks from the blessed repose of divinity1 and rather expresses gladsome serenity than abstract and wanton abandonment4 ,just as little ought weeping1 devoid of all restraint1 to be introduced into the ideal work of art1 of such a kind as that we may hear in all its comfortlessness in another part of the ,freischtz4 ,and speaking generally1 in music singing must take to itself the kind of joy and rapture which we catch from the lark in the open sky4 ,shrieking1 whether of pain or delight1 is not music at all4 ,even in the expression of suffering the sweet tones of the plaint must penetrate and clarify the sorrows1 so that it continually may seem to us worth all the suffering to arrive at such sweetness of plaint in its expression4 ,and this is the sweetness of melody1 the singing of every kind of art4 77 ,regarded in a certain relation to this fundamental axiom of art we may find some justification for the principle of irony in its modern sense2 but it must not be overlooked that irony is frequently destitute of all real seriousness1 and is particularly prone to expatiate over bad subject-matter2 and1 in another aspect of it1 it is apt to run to seed in the mere yearning of emotion rather than actively participate in practical life1 as is proved by the case of ,novalis1 one of the finer temperaments who have made this point of view their own1 and for lack of definite interest1 or through shrinking from the real world1 are driven up and down1 and cajoled into this sort of spiritual consumption4 ,this is the kind of yearning which will not descend to mere practical business and production1 because it is afraid of soiling itself with the contact of finite things1 although it already secretly feels the defects of such exclusion4 ,no doubt we find in irony that absolute principle of negativity1 in which the subject of consciousness becomes self-centred through the annihilation of definite relations and particulars2 but in this case the act of annihilation of definite relations and particulars1 as we have already pointed out when discussing the principle1 is not1 as in comedy1 essentially in its right place1 simply exposing its own want of substance1 but is directed quite as often against everything else excellent in itself and of sterling worth4 ,whether we regard irony1 then1 as this art of universal destruction1 or as the yearning of which we have spoken in contrast with the true ,ideal1 it betrays a secret lack of proportion and restraint which is detrimental to the artist4 ,substantive form is what the ,ideal demands1 which1 owing to the fact that it is clothed in the form and figure of external things1 is unquestionably qualified by particularity no less than limitation2 but this limitation of its form is at the same time included in such a way that everything merely external in its appearance is annulled and abolished4 ,only through this negation of mere externality is the determinate form of the ,ideal a real exposition of the substantive content which belongs to it in a mode of appearance susceptible to sense-perception and the imagination4 #b4 ,the plastic presentment of form1 which is as much a constituent feature of the ,ideal as it is of the essentially homogeneous character of its content1 and the way these two aspects are fused together1 render necessary an inquiry into the relation obtaining between the ideal representation of art and ,nature4 ,for this external aspect and its embodiment is closely associated with that which we generally call ,nature4 ,in this connection we once more come upon that old and ever-renewed and still unsettled dispute1 whether the representation of art should follow the objects of ,nature as they appear strictly to sense1 or should rather ennoble and illumine them4 ,the right of ,nature1 the rule of beauty1 the ,ideal and the truth of ,nature--with indefinite conceptions such as these arguments for and against may be bandied about for ever4 ,a work of art1 we are told1 should unquestionably be natural1 but there is such a thing as a mean or ugly ,nature1 we must not of course imitate that2 on the other hand--and so our disputants wrangle on and never come to a satisfactory conclusion4 ,in recent times the opposition between the ,ideal and ,nature has once more been emphasized and received an exceptional significance through the writings of ,winckelmann4 ,winckelmann's enthusiasm1 as already pointed out#bhj1 was first awakened by his study of the antique and its ideal forms4 ,this insight into the peculiar excellence of classic art he thoroughly mastered and only ceased from his labours after making all that he had learned through his study of such masterpieces famous throughout ,europe4 ,from this recognition1 however1 originated a kind of craze for ideal representation1 which1 despite all its belief in the discovery of beauty1 was really a relapse into flatness1 absence of vitality1 and superficiality4 ,it is this kind of emptiness more particularly in the art of painting1 which ,herr von ,rumohr had before him in the polemical writings ,i have already noticed4 ,the theory of art has to solve this difficulty4 ,as for its interest1 on the practical side of art1 we shall do well to pass it wholly by4 ,we may formulate principles as we please for mediocrity and the talents that express it1 the result is always the same4 ,whether our theory is a distorted one or unexceptionable all we shall get is something commonplace or weak4 ,at the same time ,art and more particularly painting has unquestionably received a stimulus other than that we have deprecated from this very quest of so-called ,ideals2 and1 through the renewed interest thereby excited in old ,italian and ,german painters1 has at least made an effort to secure a profounder and more vital content in its work4 ,the world is quite as tired of hearing the praises of that equally exclusive ,ideal in the opposite camp1 namely1 that of undiluted realism in art4 ,theatregoers are1 to take an example close at hand1 heartily sick of the realistic type of domestic drama4 ,the old story over and over again--disputes between husband and wife1 sons and daughters1 the source of our income1 the inventory of our expenses1 the servility of ministers and the intrigues of their lackeys and secretaries1 down to the question of the last sixpence between the dame of the house and her kitchen-maid1 or up to the last gossip of the daughters over their touching love-affairs in the parlour--such tales of woe most of us will prefer to take where1 we may at least get them without adulteration--at home4 ,in this opposition between ,ideal and ,nature writers have been inclined to regard one type of art to the exclusion of others1 with an especial predilection1 however1 for painting1 whose subject-matter is the particularity of sense-perception4 ,we will test our problem by putting the question to start with wholly in general terms1 thus3 ,is art to be prose or poetry8 ,now what is truly poetical in art is just that which we have called the ,ideal4 ,if the question of difficulty in question is a mere matter of terminology we are quite prepared to call the ,ideal something else4 ,but1 however called1 the question remains what it is which constitutes poetry or prose in art4 ,and although the adherence to what is in itself poetical in the determination of it by certain crafts may lead those arts into confusion1 and1 indeed1 has already done so1 it is contended that in so far as any subject has an express affinity with poetry1 such has been also the subject of genuine pictorial treatment1 genuine for the simple reason that such a content is unquestionably of a true poetical nature4 ,well1 let us examine a concrete case4 ,the present exhibition of art 7#ahah7 contains several pictures1 all of which are of one school1 the so-called ,dsseldorf4 ,every one of these have borrowed subjects from poetry1 and indeed from the emotional side of poetry peculiarly adapted to pictorial representation4 ,the more often and carefully we examine these pictures1 the more complete will be our impression of their excessive sweetness and insipidity#bha4 ,in the foregoing contradiction there are present the following general characteristics#bhb3 7a7 ,first1 there is the formal ideality of the work of art1 that is to say1 the element of poetry in its general signification1 which is1 as the term implies1 something composed and brought together by man1 which he has taken into his imagination#bhc and then actively worked into the artistic composition4 77 ,the nature of the content of such a translation may however1 be a matter of indifference or1 apart from the artistic representation we thus obtain of common life1 may only interest us indirectly for the moment4 ,in this way the ,dutch school of painting1 for example1 has recreated1 as it were1 by means of human workmanship1 the evanescent everyday appearances of natural objects in countless new artistic effects4 ,velvet1 armour1 light1 horses1 work-folk1 old cronies1 peasants puffing their smoke from old pipe stumps1 the glitter of wine in transparent tumblers1 rustics in soiled jackets playing with cards as ancient--such and a hundred other subjects like them which trouble us little enough in everyday life1 for the best of reasons1 that although we too may have our game at cards1 our drink1 and our gossip we are really occupied with quite another class of interests--all this medley of objects is brought before us in their pictures4 ,now the claim of art in the representation of such things is precisely this external show1 or reappearance of them as a product of spiritual activity1 which has transmuted that which was purely external and sensuously material into a new medium supplied by mind4 ,for instead of wool or silk that are tangible1 instead of actual hair1 glasses1 flesh1 and metals1 all we see now is colour2 instead of the three dimensions which are essential to external ,nature1 we have only superficies2 and yet1 despite all our losses1 we have a representation identical with that of reality4 77 ,in opposition to the immediate and prosaic reality of objects1 then1 this show of things which is effected by the mind is the wonder of ideality1 a jest1 if anyone cares to put it so1 and an irony directed against purely external existence4 ,only contrast with it the preparations ,nature or man has to make in ordinary life1 the countless instruments of every kind they have to employ to effect the same result4 ,what opposition the material of such objects--take a metal for example--may offer to any active effect upon it4 ,the world of ideas1 on the contrary1 out of which art creates its products1 is a malleable and simple element1 which readily converts everything1 which either ,nature or man in his purely natural existence is forced to leave bluntly just as they are1 to the uses which are appropriate to it4 ,in the same way the objects of ordinary apprehension and man as we meet him in everyday life are of no incommensurable wealth1 but subject to limitations--precious stones1 plants1 animals1 etc41 by themselves are of a certain positive and particular character4 ,but man in his creative capacity is an entire world of content1 which he has filched from ,nature1 and piled together in the comprehensive treasure-house of his world of images1 and which he is now free to give forth again simply and without the restraint of external conditions and the detailed processes of actual phenomena4 ,in this idealization art stands midway between the purely objective and restricted existence and the entirely subjective world of idea4 ,it gives indeed objects1 but they are supplied from the life of mind2 it offers them for uses other than those which belong to them2 it concentrates their entire interest in the abstract form of the ideal show which it therewith manifests to aesthetic contemplation1 and to that alone4 77 ,art consequently1 through the ideality above explained1 exalts objects otherwise unimportant1 determining them1 despite their ordinary character1 in a fixed relation to her own medium and essential aim1 and by so doing secures from us a sympathy in subject-matter which otherwise would not have enlisted our serious attention4 ,we find the same transformation in the relation of art to ,time4 ,its position is here too frankly ideal4 ,that which in ,nature rapidly passes by in art is secured with permanence2 the flash of a smile1 the sudden curve of roguish merriment on the lips1 a glance1 a gleam of sunshine1 together with all those evanescent traits of human life1 events and accidents which come and are gone1 and are as quickly lost to memory4 ,there is nothing which she cannot wrest from momentary existence1 and in this respect even becomes the vanquisher of ,nature herself4 ,in this formal ideality of art1 however1 it is not the content itself which makes the pre-eminent claim upon us1 but the satisfaction we derive from the act of artistic reproduction4 ,the representation must certainly strike us as natural1 but it is not the reality of ,nature that we require2 it is rather that of the process of reproduction1 this very deposition1 in fact1 of material conditions which is the poetical and ideal element of the work in the formal sense above indicated#bhd4 ,we delight in a manifestation1 which appears to us a product of ,nature1 and which is nevertheless a product of mind without the means at ,nature's disposition4 ,the objects charm us not so much by virtue of their approach to ,nature1 but rather because the artist has been able to effect that approach4 7b7 ,a further and still profounder reason for our interest in artistic products consists in this1 that the content is not brought before us in those forms in which it is found in immediate existence1 but1 being itself minted by the mind1 is capable of considerable extension and modification within such forms4 ,all that exists in ,nature is particular1 and1 indeed1 limited in every direction by such particularity4 ,the creative faculty#bhe1 however1 contains an intrinsic determination of universal import4 ,and all that it produces possesses forthwith a character of universality distinct from the particularity of ,nature4 ,the creative faculty thereby secures this advantage2 that being of a wider range it is more qualified to grasp ideal significance1 and to insist on that explicitly in all that it shows us4 ,it is quite true that a work of art is not entirely the imaginative concept in its universal aspect1 but rather the determinate form of its envisagement4 ,it is for all that bound1 emanating as it does from the creative medium and operations of mind1 and despite the living resemblance to real things we may find upon it1 to permeate the whole with this universal quality4 ,and in this we have that higher ideality of the poetical product as contrasted with the purely formal ideality of the art of production4 ,from this point of view it is the task of a work of art to grasp the object in its universal relations1 and in the envisagement it presents to let fall everything which stands in a wholly external or indifferent relation to the content4 ,an artist for this reason will refuse to accept all forms and means of expression offered him by the external world1 on the mere ground that he finds them there4 ,his main effort will be1 if at least his aim be a real poetical creation1 to secure that which will appropriately work in with his own imaginative conception2 and1 if he looks to ,nature for assistance in supplying him with details1 or1 generally1 as material to translate into his work1 he will utilize such1 not because he finds them so in ,nature1 but because they fall in their right place as a part of his composition and are rightly made for him4 ,this right of the artist is a higher one than the mere right of immediate fact4 ,in his representation of the human form1 for instance1 an artist will not attempt such imitation as we find attempted by those restorers of ancient pictures1 who reproduce old cracks1 which through the swelling of either paint or varnish have involved all the older parts of the picture in a kind of arabesque1 even on the portions restored4 ,the portrait-painter will rather permit the tracery of the flesh1 and a fortiori such incidents as freckles1 pustules1 warts1 and so forth1 to disappear entirely4 ,in this respect the painter ,denner1 so famous for his close realization of ,nature1 is by no means an ideal master4 ,for the same reason indications of muscles and veins may be given1 but their distinction and relief should be far slighter than that we observe in ,nature4 ,in all such impressions little or nothing of spirit is manifested1 and the expression of spirit is what is essential in the human form#bhf4 ,i cannot think it therefore wholly a disadvantage that we moderns have less to do with the nude in sculpture than the ancients4 ,on the other hand the general style of our dress in comparison with the ideal drapery of classical times is less artistic and more commonplace4 ,the object in both cases is to cover the form4 ,the drapery1 however1 we find in the antique is1 taken by itself1 a more or less formal smooth surface only so far determinate in its adjustment to the frame by its attachment to the shoulder4 ,in other respects the garment remains entirely formal#bhg1 hanging down simply and freely by virtue of its own immanent weight1 or only determined through the position of the body and the pose and motion of the limbs4 ,in the determination thus implied we find the external shape entirely reflecting the mutable expression of the spirit which animates the body4 ,the particular form of the garment1 the folds of it1 the motion of it either up or down is clothed in the shape dictated direct from the inward impulse1 and as each may momentarily appear appropriate to the particular pose or movement--and it is this form of determination which constitutes the ideality of such drapery4 ,in the clothing we have adopted nowadays1 on the contrary1 the entire material is1 from the first1 cut out and worked up stiffly into the forms of particular limbs1 so that anything approaching spontaneity in its rise and fall is impossible4 ,even the character of the folds is determined by previous models1 and generally both cut and fall are worked out wholly by the technical rules and craftsmanship of the tailor4 ,it is true1 of course1 that the configuration of the limbs determines generally the form of such clothing2 but in this arrangement of the bodily form we merely have either a perverse imitation1 or an enveloping of human limbs according to the convention of fashion and the accidental taste of the times4 ,the cut of our cloth once made is irrevocably made1 and neither the position of the body nor the motion of the limbs can appreciably affect it4 ,we may move our arms and legs about as much as we please1 the sleeves of our jackets and our trousers remain unalterable4 ,folds or creases may perhaps appear in them1 but even then only on the lines of the original cutting out1 as we see them1 for example1 on the statue of ,scharnhorst4 ,our modern way of clothing is consequently1 as an external cover1 not sufficiently differentiated from the inner life to appear on its reverse side as the formal expression of that life2 instead of this we have a false imitation of the human form stereotyped in the preordained and unalterable cut of our tailor4 ,a criticism similar to that we have directed to the representation by art of the human form and its exterior clothing might be applied to a whole multitude of things which make up the external show of life1 or minister to its wants1 such as eating1 drinking1 and sleeping--things necessary enough in themselves and useful to all men1 which1 however much in their manifold variety1 as constituent features of the physical life of mankind1 they may blend with those activities more directly related to its spirit1 do not themselves form part of such activities1 or stand in essential relation either to their determinations or their interests1 and thereby contribute to what is the truly ideal or universal element in the content of human life4 ,physical aspects of life such as these may no doubt receive poetical treatment in art2 and it is generally admitted that the descriptions of a poet such as ,homer in this direction adhere very closely to ,nature4 ,yet we find that even ,homer1 despite all his 1 all the vividness of his presentment1 is forced to limit his descriptions to general observations2 no one expects to find in him an entirely accurate picture of the facts in all their detail as they actually would occur in life4 ,he may give us1 no doubt1 in his delineation of the bodily presence of ,achilles1 the lofty brow1 the prominent nose1 the long and stalwart legs1 but he is not likely to include in the picture every detail of the veritable existence of limbs point for point1 and the relation in which they stand to one another in colour1 size1 and so forth1 in other words to offer us ,nature's reality instead of an artist's portrait4 ,and the reason is obvious inasmuch as in the art of poetry the type of expression is always the universal concept of the imagination as distinguished from the bare particularity of ,nature4 ,instead of the fact the poet always gives us the denominant1 the word1 in which the particular thing is universalized2 for the word is a product of mental conception1 and as such already carries in itself the nature of a universal4 ,one is entitled to say1 of course1 that it is natural in the formation of concepts and speech to employ a nomenclature1 the word1 as such an infinite#bhh abridgment of the existence we find in ,nature2 but if we do so the ,nature to which we refer it would not merely be opposed to the natural existence with which we compare it1 but would be just that which cancels it4 ,we are therefore confronted with the question in what sense we use the word ,nature when we contrast it with the characteristic of poetry4 ,the mere undefined use of the word ,nature by itself tells us nothing at all4 ,what poetry should always give us is the energetic1 the essential1 the truly characteristic2 and this fundamental expressiveness is precisely the ,ideal and not the merely immediate1 to enumerate all the details of which in the narration of an event or the portrayal of a scene will render either of these simply dull1 spiritless1 tedious1 and intolerable4 ,in the manifestation of this universality1 however1 one type of art will reveal more clearly its ideal characteristics2 another will rather emphasize1 by a restricted use of material form1 the infinite detail of external reality4 ,sculpture1 for example1 is in its presentments more abstract than painting2 in poetry the epic type1 in its realization of the external appearance of life itself1 will not be so complete as a dramatic poem should be4 ,on the other hand it will surpass the latter in its portrayal of the fulness of its imaginative vision1 the epic poet being most indebted to concrete pictures his imagination borrows from past history4 ,in contrast with him the dramatist is mainly restricted to the motives of an action1 the attitude of the will to it1 the psychological problem in short4 7c7 ,it is1 then1 ,mind 7,spirit71 which gives external realization in a particular form to the inward world of content which is of essential interest to it2 and it is in close relation to this fact that we should consider the question1 what precise significance we are to infer from the opposition above discussed between the ,ideal and naturalness4 ,and first we must observe that from such a point of view the word natural is not employed in the most genuine signification of the term4 ,as a description of the external form imposed upon facts by mind it obviously is neither the immediate naturality we find in animal life1 nor that presented in ,nature's landscape4 ,rather its very form of determination1 in so far1 that is to say1 as we see the mind here giving to itself an embodiment1 will show us that it is an expression of mind1 an expression moreover suffused with ideality4 ,for this taking up into the mind1 this plastic recreation of form on the part of mind is nothing less than idealization4 ,it is sometimes remarked of the countenances of dead people that they take on themselves once more the lineaments of childhood4 ,the obdurate expression of passion1 custom and strife1 the characteristic seal of their life of strenuous action1 passes off1 and the indeterminacy of the features of a child's face reappears4 ,in life1 however1 all traits whatsoever1 the entire presentment in fact1 receive their characteristic expression from the world of soul2 and in much the same way the different races and classes of mankind reflect the distinguishing features of their spiritual tendencies and activities in their external manifestation4 ,in all such organizations that which is outward is visibly permeated with mind2 and1 by virtue of its energy1 already confronts mere ,nature as an idealized creation4 ,only a clear perception of this truth will enable us to sift this significant question of an opposition between ,nature and the ,ideal to the bottom4 ,if we do not possess this we shall find ourselves maintaining that the forms in which ,spirit is visualized as a part of ,nature have already lost in that real appearance1 which is independent of art's imitative action1 such an intrinsic completeness1 beauty1 and excellence1 that it is quite impossible that there can be another and more exalted type of beauty1 which presents itself as the ,ideal in contradistinction to this immediate reality1 and this all the more for the reason that art is unable entirely to attain even to that which is present in ,nature herself4 ,or1 if our thoughts lean to the opposite extreme1 we shall look to art to supply us independently1 in opposition to ,nature's reality1 with more ideal modes of representation4 ,the polemics of ,herr von ,rumohr1 which we have already criticized1 are well worthy of attention in this connection4 ,this writer1 at any rate1 whatever others may say who have the word ,ideal so frequently on their lips in depreciation of the vulgarity of ,nature1 refers to the ,idea and the ,ideal in phrases of respect and contempt with absolute impartiality4 ,the real truth of the matter is rather this4 ,there is in the spiritual world1 both outwardly and inwardly regarded1 a ,nature of vulgar type1 which testifies to its meanness outwardly for the simple reason that its inward content is mean1 that is to say1 when all that it can realize externally in its activities are the aims of envy1 jealousy1 and avarice in every detail of sensuous life4 ,such a poverty-stricken ,nature can no doubt form part of the subject-matter of art1 and has been treated as such4 ,when this is the case1 however1 as we have already explained1 it is not the subject-matter1 but wholly the artistic handling of it1 which creates an interest of any permanent character2 and the artist will look in vain for sympathy in his subject1 or rather the mere material of his subject from the true connoisseur4 ,a particularly pertinent illustration of this type of art is the so-called genre painting1 which has not shown itself above accepting subjects of this character1 the artistic treatment of which has been carried by the ,dutch school to the extreme limit of perfection4 ,it may1 however1 be as well to ask ourselves1 first1 what the precise contribution of the ,dutch has been to this genre-painting1 what1 in short1 is the nature of content their dainty pictures express1 pictures which at least have asserted an extraordinary power of attraction and obviously cannot be shelved right away beneath the common stigma of vulgarity4 ,we shall not improbably find1 on closer examination1 that the subject-matter of these pictures is not so contemptible as it is often taken to be#bhi4 ,the ,dutch have selected the subject-matter of their artistic production out of their own substance1 out of the actual presence of their daily life4 ,to have once for all realized that presence even in art is no matter of reproach to them4 ,to estimate the character of their artistic interest we must view them in close connection with the actual panorama of their own times4 ,this is a problem of history4 ,the ,dutchman has in great measure himself created the ground wherein he lives and finds a home1 and has been forced continuously to preserve and defend that home against the invasion of the sea4 ,the citizens of the towns no less than the rural population have together1 through courage1 endurance1 and bravery1 repulsed the power of ,spain in the hands of ,philip ,,ii1 son of ,charles ,v1 the sovereign of a world-wide empire1 and in fighting their battle for civic freedom1 they were fighting that of religious liberty4 ,this staunch sense of citizenship1 this passionate love of enterprise in the narrow limits of their fatherland1 no less than abroad on the high seas1 this careful and at the same time clean and dainty mode of life1 together with the geniality and invincible self-respect which distinguishes them1 all this is as much the fruit of their own actions as it is the general content of their artistic production4 ,such a content as this is no common material1 though obviously it is not of the kind we must suppose we can approach with the supercilious superiority of critics for whom the exalted taste of courts and fine society is everything4 ,from a sterling national self-consciousness of this sort ,rembrandt painted his famous ,night-,watch now in ,amsterdam1 ,van ,dyck so many of his portraits1 ,wouvermans so many of his battle-pieces2 nor should even those reflections of rustic drinking-bouts1 jovialities1 and other scenes of merriment be wholly excluded from the category4 ,and in illustration of its excellence we would point1 by way of contrast1 to a work in this year's exhibition1 which1 though not downright bad genre-painting1 is much inferior to the handling by old ,dutch masters of similar subject-matter1 coming nowhere near to their freedom and joy of life4 ,in this picture a housewife is seen entering an alehouse to give her husband a good scolding4 ,here we have just a scene of cantankerous and waspish human-kind and nothing more4 ,these ,dutchmen painted their folk very differently2 whether we find them among their cups1 at weddings or dances1 feasting or drinking1 nay1 even when the matter proceeds to ribaldry and blows1 liveliness and lustiness is the prevailing temper4 ,young maids and women laugh with the rest1 and a feeling of free and abandoned merriment carries all before it4 ,this intimate delight in all enjoyment justifiably human1 which will even absorb itself wholly in animal life and crop up at times as mere satiety and grossness2 this freshly awakened sense of freedom and life1 fully grasped and embodied in composition and colour1 is what constitutes the higher spiritual import#bij of these ,dutch pictures4 ,on much the same grounds the beggar boys of ,murillo1 in the central gallery of the ,munich collection1 are excellent4 ,superficially regarded1 the subject here1 too1 is of a vulgar character4 ,the mother is scolding one of the youngsters1 as he quickly munches a piece of bread2 two others hard by1 ragged and poor1 are eating melons and grapes#bia4 ,but in this very poverty of half-nakedness what gleams forth from the entire composition as the soul of that beggar life is its complete carelessness and spontaneity4 ,no dancing dervish himself could give it us more frankly in its impression of entire health and jubilant vitality4 ,this freedom from all external care1 this inward liberty reflecting itself in that which is visible1 is precisely that which the notion of the ,ideal demands4 ,there is in ,paris a certain portrait of a boy by ,raphael2 the head leans propped at leisure on one arm1 and gazes with such ecstasy of careless contentment into the open landscape that we are loth to turn away from a picture expressive of such health and exuberant animation4 ,we receive a delight of very much the same nature from these lads of ,murillo4 ,it is obvious enough that neither their objects nor their interests aim high1 but this is no result of stupidity2 there they chaffer on ,god's earth with1 we may almost say1 the bliss and contentment of the ,olympian gods themselves4 ,they1 too1 have their business2 but though we hear little about it they are a genuine sample of humanity1 neither morose nor discontented with their lot4 ,feeling this ground-root in them of all sterling performance we can readily imagine that in favourable conditions youth such as this might be capable of most things4 ,a composition of this kind is entirely on a different level from the one above mentioned of the scolding housewife1 or two others we might also contrast with it1 of a certain peasant mending his whip and a postillion sleeping on a straw pallet#bib4 ,such paintings of genre should unquestionably be of small size2 and1 indeed1 in their total impression on the sense1 they must be made to appear of comparative insignificance1 that we may not feel the character of their subject-matter and its presentment has received undue prominence4 ,it would be intolerable to have such subjects painted life size as though the fulness of the reality were sufficiently attractive to claim our attention4 ,such are the principles which should regulate our artistic treatment of and sympathy with that which it is usual to stigmatize as mean or vulgar in ordinary life4 ,there is1 no doubt1 plenty of material for art to appropriate of higher grade than the representation of animal spirits and downright citizenship in all their essentially insignificant detail4 ,man has clearly more serious interests and objects than these1 interests which have unfolded as his own spirit has widened and deepened1 and in harmony with which it is his truest interest to remain4 ,an art will take highest rank which sets before itself the task of giving adequate representation to this more vital1 or at least more profound1 content4 ,and here at once we are confronted with the old question1 what is the source which will supply us with the forms most fitting to such creations of mind4 ,on the one side theorists maintain the opinion that1 inasmuch as the artist creates these lofty ideas1 which he desires to clothe in artistic form1 he must1 also supply their artistic forms1 create1 for example1 from his imagination the ideal figures of ,greek gods1 ,christ1 his apostles1 saints1 and so on4 ,in strenuous opposition to this view ,herr von ,rumohr has entered the lists4 ,this writer is of opinion that art is on a false track in supposing that the artist discovers the forms of his production in himself rather than in ,nature1 and it is under this conviction that he has reviewed the masterpieces both of ,italian and ,dutch painters4 ,on this head he finds it a matter of censure 7,italian ,investigations1 i1 p4 #aje7 that the theory of art1 during the sixty years which have elapsed1 should be at the pains to prove that it is an object1 or rather the main object1 of art to improve upon creation as it is particularised1 and by doing so to substitute forms which have no particular relation to anything1 which would ape ,nature's creation by going several points beyond her1 and release mortal man from all responsibility for the fact that ,nature has not known how to make her appearance more beautiful4 ,and consistently with such a point of view he further advises the artist to have nothing to do with the gigantic task of attempting to ennoble or elucidate the natural form1 or attempt any such exalted function of the human ,spirit under what name soever it may be written down in works upon art 7ibid4 p4 #fc74 ,he is1 in short1 wholly convinced that1 however exalted and spiritual#bic the subject to be treated may be1 completely adequate forms are to be found in ,nature as immediately perceived1 and consequently maintains 7p4 #hc71 that the exposition of ,art1 even in the case of subject-matter as highly spiritual as it is possible to conceive1 is never indebted to a symbolism capriciously created by man#bid1 but depends wholly for its consistency upon what is presented as significant by ,nature in organic form4 ,no doubt in advancing this ,herr von ,rumohr has particularly under review the ideal types of antique art as they are expounded by ,winckelmann4 ,it is for all that the abiding service of ,winckelmann to have pointed out and set forth in harmonious relation these very types1 although he may doubtless have1 committed errors of judgment with regard to particular masterpieces while carrying through the same4 ,as a possible example of such an oversight ,herr von ,rumohr thinks he has made out 7p4 #aae7 that the increase of length in the lower half of the body1 which ,winckelmann has characterized as an ideal feature of the antique1 is really borrowed from ,roman statuary4 ,and naturally enough1 as an opponent of the ,ideal1 improves the occasion by insisting that the artist should unreservedly take ,nature into his confidence in the study of form4 ,here1 and here alone1 he will find the presence of true beauty4 ,to quote this writer once more it is affirmed 7p4 #add71 that the beauty of most importance depends on a symbolic of forms rooted in ,nature rather than human caprice1 a beauty through which these forms are nourished into their characteristic and symbolic relations1 in the vision of which we necessarily have brought back to our memory definite images and conceptions1 and are made more definitely conscious of previously dormant feeling4#bie ,i ,and so finally it appears that in this writer's view 7p4 #aje7 a mysterious trait of our spiritual life1 what many would perhaps call ,idea1 seems to bind together the artist and the appearances of ,nature1 in which latter he is constantly and continuously learning to recognize the true character of his own artistic purpose#bif1 and to find himself in a position through them to give expression to it4 ,there can be no question1 of course1 that ideal art has no business at all with a symbolism capriciously created2 and1 if it really is the case that these ideal types of the ancients have been composed only to reduce the veritable forms of ,nature to false and empty abstraction1 we may freely admit that ,herr von ,rumohr is justified in his most trenchant opposition4 ,for our own part we would emphasize the points of fundamental importance to be grasped in this antithesis between the ideal of art and ,nature as follows3 ,the forms which are borrowed from immediate ,nature to determine an ideal content must be assumed to be thus taken symbolically in the usual sense of the term1 namely1 that they are not thus immediately significant in themselves1 but only as the external embodiment of that which is inward and spiritual1 the content1 in fact1 they express4 ,it is only ,spirit1 even in the reality which they possess outside the limits of art1 which constitutes their ideality in its contrast with that they entirely owe to ,nature simply as such1 and which is unable to reveal to us what is essentially mind4 ,it is the object of art1 on its more noble plane1 to give external shape to the inward content of ,spirit4 ,this content we discover in the conscious life of men realized in the world4 ,as such it possesses--we include with it our conscious human experience generally--an external semblance directly presented in and through which it finds expression4 ,so much may readily be conceded4 ,at the same time from a philosophical point of view it is simply futile to inquire whether we ought to look to the direct facts of ,nature alone for objects and physiognomical traits of beauty and expression to serve as entirely adequate materials for art's representation1 shall we say1 of the majesty1 repose1 and power of a ,jupiter or of a ,juno1 ,venus1 ,peter1 ,christ1 ,madonna1 or any other divinity1 or saint4 ,arguments may be supported on either side1 and the question can only remain finally undecided1 being wholly empirical4 ,for the only sufficient way of deciding the matter would be to contrast what is borrowed with the realities it purports to represent1 and this1 in the assumed case of the ,greek gods1 might be matter of some difficulty2 and1 to take the present day1 one man will see traits of beauty in their perfection where another a thousand times more acute will see nothing4 ,but over and above such considerations we must observe that the mere beauty of form will never give us that we have named the ,ideal1 inasmuch as the individuality of the content is a constituent part of it1 and therein form is necessarily included4 ,a human face1 for example1 may be both regular and beautiful in its outlines and yet remain cold and devoid of all expression4 ,the ideal figures of the ,greek gods are1 on the contrary1 true individualizations2 the universality of their ideal conception does not exclude the characteristic determination which belongs to each of them4 ,and the vitality of the ,ideal consists just in this1 that this determinate and fundamental spiritual significance1 which it is the function of art to exhibit1 should wholly transfuse by appropriate artistic treatment all the particular aspects of the external embodiment1 such as composition1 pose1 motion1 physiognomy1 and configuration of limbs1 so that nothing empty or insignificant should be left1 but the entire work should reflect that ideal significance4 ,all that we have learned from ,greek sculpture in recent times of a quality which1 in fact1 emanates from the school of ,pheidias1 is characterized by nothing so much as this penetrative vitality4 ,the ,ideal is preserved in all its severity without any lapse in the direction of mere grace1 softness1 elegance1 and exuberance1 yet retains the form in close relation to the ideal significance which should be embodied throughout the whole4 ,this supreme vitality is the distinguishing mark of the great artist4 ,we may call a typical significance of this kind1 in contrast to the particularity of the external world1 essentially abstract4 ,this is pre-eminently the case in sculpture and painting1 arts which illuminate but a momentary state1 without proceeding to such a varied development of exposition as we find1 for example1 in that where ,homer is able to depict the character of ,achilles as mild and courteous no less than severe and terrible1 to say nothing of all his other characteristics4 ,no doubt it is possible to find such a significance expressed in purely immediate reality4 ,there are1 for instance1 few countenances which cannot reflect the moods of piety1 devotion1 and cheerfulness2 but such faces also express countless other moods which either are quite inappropriate to that ideal significance1 or are only indirectly related to it4 ,for this reason it is by virtue of its particular realization that a portrait acquaints us of the fact that it is a portrait4 ,in many old ,german and ,flemish pictures we find the patron of the picture included in the composition with his entire family of sons and daughters4 ,all are necessarily painted as though taken in an act of devotion1 and this spirit illuminates every countenance2 but at the same time we have quite as clearly set before us in the men stalwart warriors1 men of vigorous action1 disciplined on the strenuous field of life and commerce1 and in the women dames of an equally doughty life-experience4 ,if we compare with such faces--and we may restrict our comparison wholly to these very pictures1 which are famous for their close approach to ,nature in their delineation of physiognomy--those of the ,virgin ,mary1 and the saints and apostles who surround her1 we shall find in these latter one preponderating expression2 and all the physical lineaments1 whether we look at build of bone1 structure1 or muscle1 traits of that express motion or repose1 are concentrated upon this one artistic effect4 ,that which is felt to be appropriate to the one class and not to the other exactly differentiates the distinction between the genuine ,ideal and mere portraiture4 ,some may imagine it possible for the artist to compose the ideal content of genuine types by a process of sifting and selection from the facts of immediate ,nature1 or quite possibly from the various physiognomies and compositions which collections of engravings from the copper-plate or the wood may furnish4 ,but a process such as this of mere collection and sifting is not the end of the matter4 ,an artist must maintain the creative impulse alert throughout4 ,he must himself1 in the strength of his own imagination1 already impregnated with the knowledge of appropriate form and made vital with profound experience and emotion1 give such an embodiment to the significance1 which is the inspiring motive of the work1 as will make it appear throughout as metal cast at one time and is one state of fusion4 ,b4 ,,the ,,determinacy ,,of ,,the ,,ideal ,to comprehend the ,ideal in its intrinsic significance1 that is to say1 according to its fundamental notion1 was a comparatively easy task4 ,but the beauty of art1 in so far as it is the ,idea1 is not to be restricted to the purely universal standpoint of its notional concept2 even as so comprehended it must necessarily include within it determination and particularity1 and is compelled to take definite embodiment as external reality4 ,the question consequently arises in what way is the ,ideal able still to assert itself in this process of objectification in the medium of external things and their finitude1 and despite all that is antagonistic to ideality2 and as a corollary to this we have to inquire how finite and determinate existence is enabled to attach to itself the ideality of the beauty of all art4 ,we propose to regulate this inquiry with the following division of our subject matter4 ,first1 the determination of the ,ideal in its simplest terms4 ,secondly1 the determination of it1 in so far as it proceeds by virtue of its particularity to a condition of discordant parts within itself and to their resolution1 a condition we may generally1 define as action#big4 ,thirdly1 the determination of the ,ideal from the point of view of it as an external object4 ,i4 ,,the ,,ideal ,,definition ,,as ,,such #a4 ,we have already observed that it is the function of art to make the ,divine the focus or centre of its entire exposition4 ,it is1 however1 only possible for thought in its pure medium1 that is to say1 apart from all the sensuous material of the figurative imagination1 to comprehend the ,divine in its essential significance of unity and universality4 ,to attempt to do otherwise1 by imagining a picture of ,god more readily grasped by the perception of the senses1 is1 as we know1 forbidden both ,jews and ,mahommedans4 ,this cuts away the ground of the figurative arts1 which absolutely require form as their medium in all its concreteness of actual life2 and we have only lyrical poetry left us to celebrate in its exaltation the praise of ,his power and glory4 #b4 ,considered1 however1 from the reverse point of view1 we must equally assert that however much unity and universality are predicable of the ,divine1 ,he is in ,his essential substance determined1 and1 so far as ,he withdraws ,himself from the pure quality1 of such predicates in their abstraction1 is thereby an object for the figurative sense and external perception4 ,if the ,divine is consequently apprehended and figuratively embodied for us through the forms of the imagination1 we are at once confronted with a possible variety in such determination2 and it is at this point that the actual realm of ideal art finds its commencement4 ,for1 in the first place1 the one ,divine substance disunites and breaks itself up into a multiplicity of self-subsistent gods1 such as we find presented by the polytheistic system of ,grecian art2 and even in the religious consciousness of ,christianity ,god is1 in opposition to ,his purely spiritual unity1 immediately revealed on ,earth and in the world-process as man4 ,and1 secondly1 the ,divine1 regarded generally in its determinate appearance and reality1 is both present and realized in emotional feeling1 will1 and the education#bih of mankind4 ,for this reason and in this sphere men who are filled with the ,spirit of ,god1 saints1 martyrs1 and1 in short1 all who share in the religious life1 are equally the appropriate subject of ideal art4 ,with this principle of the individuality of the ,divine and its determinate existence realized necessarily in the world-process1 we are face to face with--and this is the third point to be considered--the particularity of human existence4 ,for the entire world of human emotion1 with all that stirs it most profoundly--and what a power is implied in that open sea of feeling and passion1 everything of deepest interest to the human heart--this entire content is nothing less than its exposition and expression4 ,if it is true1 then1 that the ,divine in its purest essence of reason is only the object of the thinking consciousness1 it is equally true that ,spirit1 which takes to itself an actively bodily presence1 so far1 that is to say1 and only so far as we find it reverberate in the heart of humanity1 all this lies within the sphere of art4 ,once admit this1 and we must admit the content of particular interests and actions1 specific characters1 and momentary situations1 in short1 the entire process of development in the external order2 and it becomes of first importance to indicate under a general principle in what the relation between the ,ideal and this positive determination consists4 #c4 ,in conformity with what we have already advanced it is clear that here1 too1 the ,ideal will be most purely manifested in the representation--whether it be of gods1 ,christ1 apostles1 saints1 or any other type of devout persons--which brings most clearly before us the qualities of beatified repose and satisfaction1 a peace undisturbed with that which is earthly1 and subject to the storms of life's manifolded complexities1 struggles1 and contradictions4 ,we are therefore not surprised to find that both the arts of sculpture and painting have been peculiarly fitted to incorporate under ideal form not merely the ancient gods1 but ,christ as saviour of the world1 and individual apostles and saints4 ,that which is the most essential truth in actual life is concentrated to a focus on itself in the determinate embodiment of art1 rather than continually forced from its serenity through dependence upon finite conditions4 ,this essential concentration is not destitute of particularity1 but the divergent separation1 which is a feature of the external and finite state1 is purified to one simple definition1 so that it appears as though all traces of external influence and the relation thus created were overcome4 ,this deedless and infinite self-repose1 this taking a rest1 as we find it1 for example1 in certain statues of ,hercules1 is just what constitutes the significance of the ,ideal4 ,if the gods are represented in contact with the process of ,nature1 they must still carry with them their immortal and unapproachable majesty4 ,jupiter1 ,juno1 ,apollo1 ,mars1 and their like are1 it is true1 definite personalities1 but they are at the same time unyielding potentates and powers1 which preserve within them their self-subsistent liberty1 even when they are actively related to the world4 ,and for this reason it is not merely that a specific particularity must characterize the determinacy of the ,ideal1 but spiritual freedom must be manifested thereby as totality1 and in this state of repose suggest the potency of unfettered freedom of action4 ,if we turn now from the gods to the less exalted plane of temporal existence and human life1 we shall find the ,ideal active in its representation of the substantial content of such humanity1 and its dominant repression of wholly subjective particularity4 ,by this we mean that all that is entirely isolate in feeling and action is wrested from the element of contingency1 and particularity is represented in its concreteness1 that is to say in its wider bond of relation with what most truly and intimately belongs to its life4 ,when1 for instance1 we speak of the nobility1 excellence1 or perfection in particular men1 we assert in so many words that the substantial core of what is spiritual1 ethical1 and divine has announced itself as prevailing in the individual1 and man has submerged his active life1 his volitions1 his interests1 and passions wholly in this substantive basis1 that he may thereby give full satisfaction to the most authentic necessities of his soul4 ,at the same time1 however much in the case of the ,ideal the determination of ,spirit and its external presence appears to be absorbed in the simple self-relation1 the principle of development is likewise directly associated with the particularity unfolded#bii in determinate existence1 and along with this in that relation to environment which necessitates both the opposition and conflict of clashing forces4 ,this fact necessitates a closer examination of the determination of the ,ideal regarded in this very aspect of differentiation and process1 an aspect which we may in a general way define as action4 ,,ii4 ,,the ,,action ,the gracious innocence of beatific enjoyment1 the inactive repose1 the majesty of power in self-reliant tranquillity1 as also the concentrated compactness generally of that which is most substantial in a given content--all these are essentially ideal modes of determination4 ,that which is inward1 however1 and spiritual is in an equal degree active movement and development4 ,one-sidedness and division are inseparable from development4 ,spirit that is wholly itself and a totality will1 expanding into all particularity1 step forth out of its repose1 in despite of all satisfaction therein1 and involve itself in the contradictions of the broken and confused medley of earthly existence1 and is by so doing unable in this divided world to withdraw itself from the ill-fortune and ill-health that clings to finite existence4 ,even the immortal gods of ,polytheism do not dwell in eternal peace1 but take sides in mighty conflicts wherein contending passions and interests are roused1 being subject themselves to ,destiny2 nay1 more1 even the ,god of ,christians is1 not delivered from a passage of humiliation endured through suffering and shame of death1 is not spared the bitterness of soul1 which perforce cried aloud3 ,my ,god1 my ,god1 why hast thou forsaken me4 ,and the mother of ,christ experienced an agony of the same poignant character1 and human life in every direction is a life of struggle1 battle1 and pain4 ,for greatness and force of character is evolved in the greatness and force of contending elements1 out of which ,spirit concentrates itself again and again upon its unity4 ,the intensity and depth of subjectivity is only the more emphasized1 the more unbroken and unexampled the resistance of circumstances to its unity grows1 and the more irreconcilable the contradictions appear under which it has to preserve its own self-centred equilibrium4 ,in this development and through this alone the might of the ,idea and the ,ideal is preserved1 for power consists precisely in this self-preservation through a process of self-negation4 ,inasmuch as it is the fact1 then1 that the particularity of the ,ideal passes into a relation with the external world through such development1 and by so doing is made partaker in a world1 which1 so far from manifesting the ideally free association of the notion and its external reality1 presents an existence which is just that which it ought not to be1 in apprehending the true nature of this relation we have to consider how far the determinations which affect the ,ideal either in themselves contain immediately the principle of ,ideality1 or are to a more or less degree susceptible of it4 ,in this connection we would direct attention to three fundamental points of view4 ,in the first place we have the actual condition of the world generally1 which is assumed as involved in individual action and its specific character4 ,secondly1 we have the particularity of condition1 the determination of which introduces difference and tension within the substantive unity1 which is the motive-spring of the action1 in other words the situation4 ,thirdly1 we have to consider the situation from the side of subjectivity1 and furthermore the reaction by virtue of which the conflict and resolution of the element of difference is expressly asserted1 in other words1 the action in its strict sense4 #a4 ,,the ,,general ,,world-,,condition ,the ideal subjectivity is as such essentially a personal relation1 a relation1 that is to say1 of self to every aspect of motion or activity1 in which the self has to assert or perfect its own substance4 ,and to effect this a world environment is necessary as the universal ground of its realization4 ,when in reference to this we speak of condition we understand by this the universally prevailing mode1 under which1 within the sphere of spiritual reality1 that which is the substantive and essentially coalescing fabric of the same is present4 ,in this sense we refer to a condition of education1 the sciences1 the religious sense1 or even of finance1 administration of justice1 family life1 and similar examples4 ,all these objects of reference are1 however1 merely aspects of one and the same spiritual content1 which is thus in and through them rendered explicit and real4 ,in further considering the general condition of the world as the universal mode of the reality of ,spirit it will be necessary to pursue our examination from the point of view of the ,will4 ,it is through the exercise of volition that ,spirit generally unites itself to-determinate existence2 and the substantial nexi which are immediately present in reality betray themselves in the specific modes in which the determinations of ,will1 ethical and legal conceptions1 and1 indeed1 all that belongs to that which we are accustomed1 in a general way1 to define as justice1 actively asserts itself4 ,the question consequently arises how such a universal condition must be characterized in order that it may appear adequate to the individuality of the ,ideal4 7a7 ,pursuant to the foregoing considerations we may1 to begin with1 emphasize the following points3 77 ,the ,ideal is essential unity2 not a purely formal and external unity1 but the immanent unity of the content in itself4 ,this substantive repose on its own resources we have already characterized as the self-sufficiency1 rest1 and beatitude of the ,ideal4 ,we will1 in direct relation to the plane of discussion we have now reached1 develop this characteristic of self-subsistency#cjj1 making it a primary demand of our argument that what we have termed the general condition of the world appear in such a self-subsistent form as will enable it to accept the embodiment of the ,ideal4 77 ,now self-subsistency is an equivocal expression to start with4 ,in ordinary parlance that which is essentially substantial is called simply self-subsistent by virtue of the element of causation being implied within this substantiality2 we are wont to use it in this sense when describing the intrinsically divine and absolute4 ,but as retained in this universality of substance merely as such it is not declared as itself subjective1 and consequently meets with its irresolvable contradiction in the particularity of concrete individuality4 ,in this bare antithesis all true self-subsistency disappears4 77 ,on the other hand1 it is not uncommon to find such subsistency ascribed to purely formal individuality1 consisting solely in its self-reliance upon the fixed determinacy of its subjective characteristics4 ,this subjectivity1 however1 in so far as the actual content of life drops away from it1 so that the forces and substances which lie without it acquire in themselves an independent stability1 and as such confront the subject and the inward life as a content wholly unrelated1 lapses through this1 too1 into unequivocable contradiction with the actual substantiality of determinate existence1 and forfeits all claim to self-subsistency and freedom of content4 ,true self-subsistence consists alone in the unity and interpenetration of both individuality and universality with each other4 ,the universal acquires through the individual a concrete existence2 the subjectivity of the particular thing discovers for the first time in the universal the unassailable basis and the most genuine form of its realized totality4 77 ,consequently in making this demand of the universal world-condition we must ask for a form of self-subsistency in the same sense1 namely1 that the substantially universal in such a condition must contain within itself as the vehicle of its self-subsistence the form of subjectivity4 ,the most obvious presentment of this identity is that of thought4 ,for if thought is1 in one aspect of it1 subjective1 in another it possesses universality as the product of its inherent activity1 and encloses both universality and subjectivity in unfettered unity4 ,the universal of thought is1 however1 not that of art1 whose object is the beautiful4 ,and1 indeed1 apart from this distinction1 particular individuality as confronted by thought in its natural envisagement1 or form1 no less than in its active effects and complete realization1 stands in no necessary correspondence with the universality of thought4 ,there is1 for example1 a clear distinction between the subject apprehended in its concrete content of the actual world and that which is simply the thinking subject1 or at least it is open to such a distinction4 ,the same kind of cleavage affects the form of the universal itself4 ,in other words the moment the universal begins to assert itself in distinction from its otherwise related reality by that act it has in objective existence separated itself from all the varied play of its phenomenal particularity1 and1 in opposition to the same1 has already established an independent position assured and powerful4 ,in the ,ideal1 however1 it is precisely the particular individuality which ought to persist in inseparable co-ordination with the substantive reality1 and to the full extent that freedom and the self-subsistency of the subjective principle may attach to the ,ideal the world-environment of conditions and relations should possess no essential objectivity independent of the individual in the subjective aspect above referred to or already presupposed4 ,for the ideal individual is a self-enclosed totality1 which already includes the objective principle1 and it must not be permitted to have independent motion and development apart from the individuality of the subject2 otherwise the subject falls back into a purely subordinate position in contrast to a world whose independence is already assured4 ,consequently the universal must indeed be actual in the individual as that which is in a unique sense its own1 but not so as the property of the individual1 as a thinker1 but as that of his character and temperament4 ,to put the same truth in another way1 what is required for this unity of the universal and individual in art as opposed to the mediation and differentiation of thought1 is the form of immediacy2 and the self-subsistency which we claim here is the form of immediate self-subsistency4 ,with that1 however1 the element of contingency is associated4 ,that is to say1 so long as the universal and effective#cja constituents of spiritual life1 such as the self-subsistency of individuals exhibits1 are only presented to us in the immediate guise of subjective feeling1 temperament1 and disposition of character1 and debarred any other category of existence1 such are thereby already given over to the contingency of volition and its realization4 ,all we have left us1 then1 is what is peculiar to each individual viewed as such and his sensuous experience4 ,such a possession of what is nothing more than personal idiosyncracy is unable to assert for itself any further potency or necessity2 it appears simply as inclusion of content1 fixed achievement and at the same time arbitrary commitment of the wholly self-dependent subject to the influence of feeling1 disposition1 energy1 general ability1 cunning1 and talents1 instead of carrying out its realization over and over again according to a principle of universal import and acknowledged stability4 ,this type of contingency1 then1 is the characteristic quality of the condition which we required for the ground upon which all the varied wealth of the ,ideal is to appear4 77 ,in order to make more clear the actual character of the reality which is most adapted to artistic treatment we will contrast it with that aspect of existence which is not so adapted4 77 ,we find this pre-eminently where the ethical notion1 that is1 justice and rational freedom1 have already won for themselves and maintain a fixed position in the social order regulated by law1 so that1 even in the external world1 it appears as a positive and necessary power1 which is quite independent of the individuality and subjectivity of specific temperament and characters4 ,this is the case in the life of the ,state1 where that life is manifested in a form adequate to the true notion of citizenship4 ,for obviously it is not every chance association of human beings1 any more than every patriarchal community1 that will fulfil the requisites of ,state-life4 ,in the true ,state laws1 customs1 and rights1 in so far as they constitute the determinations of freedom applicable to all1 are of paramount force even in this universal and abstract relation1 and are not conditioned in their applicability by the chance requirements of any individual's idiosyncracy4 ,as the consciousness of society has issued for itself commands and laws in a mode of statement of general application1 in the same way these are externally valid as such universal fiat1 which proceeds in the path of order thereby indicated1 armed with powers of restraint and compulsion against any individual who may attempt to assert his caprice in an injurious opposition to such regulations4 77 ,such a condition at once assumes a dividing line between the universal ordinances of the regulative understanding and the immediate life1 connoting by this latter term the unity in which all that is substantive and essential in morals and the conduct of justice only finds a form for its existence in the experience of individuals1 their ethical feeling and opinion1 that is to say1 and thereby alone is exercised4 ,in the civilized ,state right and justice1 even religion and science1 or1 at any rate1 provident interest in religious and scientific education1 are subject to public control1 which directs and co-ordinates the same4 77 ,the position1 then1 that isolated individuals occupy in the ,state is one which contracts them within a fixed and organized order1 and subordinates them thereto2 and they stand in this relation for the reason that the character and disposition of each is not the only embodiment of ethical forces2 but1 if the ,state to which they belong is a genuine example1 they are on the contrary compelled to regulate all the external detail of their actions1 opinions1 and feelings with a due regard to what is legally permissible1 and to bring the same into line with it4 ,this dependence upon the objective rationality of the ,state in its power of self-assertion above all subjective caprice may either be regarded as a mere subjection1 inasmuch as laws and institutions possess1 as the paramount power1 a constraining force1 or we may see in it merely the free recognition and acceptance of the reason that underlies such a necessity of fact1 an acknowledgment through which the individual finds himself again in that objective order4 ,but even in the latter case isolated individuals continue to remain as merely incidental facts1 and apart from the organic reality of the ,state possess no real substantiality in themselves4 ,for substantiality1 in the sense we here use the term1 is by no means only the particular property of this or that individual1 but a fully explicit reality#cjb1 minted1 as it were1 in all aspects of it1 and down to the merest detail in a mode universally applicable and necessary4 ,all that mere individuals can effect with volition and accomplishment even in actions right1 moral1 and legal in themselves in the interest of and attendant upon the progress of the whole1 remains and must always remain1 in contrast with that whole1 insignificant and a mere example4 ,their actions are always only an entirely partial realization of a single case2 and1 moreover1 the realization of the same has no universal significance in the sense that the particular example of it is thereby of objective validity as law1 or1 as such law1 makes its appearance4 ,and for the same reason1 to put the matter the other way1 it is wholly unimportant whether the validity of right and justice is acknowledged by private individuals judging as individuals4 ,the validity is a vital fact of ,state life which holds whether it be acknowledged or no4 ,no doubt it is a matter of interest to the general public that every one should fall in with the order established and desire it2 but the wishes of isolated individuals have no influence upon that interest in the sense that it is only by virtue of the assent of this or that person that right and a moral order is preserved4 ,such require no such isolated example of assent2 and a breach of either is followed by punishment4 ,the subordinate position of private persons in the civilized ,state is finally emphasized in the fact that1 whatever share any one may have in the general civic life1 it is of a definite and in every case restricted character4 ,in the real ,state work must have some relation to the general good#cjc1 just as the active enterprise of the bourgeoisie in the commercial business is subdivided in the most varied way1 so that the entire life of the ,state shall not appear as the concrete achievement of any single person1 or in general can be entrusted to the arbitrary wishes1 enterprise1 courage1 resources1 and discretion of such1 but on account of the fact that it comprises activities and trades of countless complexity1 and must be carried out by associations of business men at least as varied4 ,the punishment of a criminal is no longer an affair of personal heroism or the virtue of any one individual1 but is throughout the entire process1 in the investigation and discovery of the felonious act1 in the pronouncement of judicial sentence and its execution1 contributed to by different persons2 nay1 every important phase of such a process is in the same way subject to some kind of division of labour4 ,to see that the laws are properly administered1 then1 is not within the special province of any one man1 but results from an organized effort of great variety and the rules which direct it4 ,add to this every man who assists in such a process is bound to follow certain general principles which are laid down for his guidance1 and all that is carried out under their direction is further subject to the criticism and control of yet higher officials4 77 ,in all such civic relations1 then1 we find that in a truly regulated ,state the public authority is not impressed with the imprimatur of any single person1 but it is the general ,will which prevails here in its universality1 a condition under which the particular life of the individual has the appearance of vanishing or1 at least1 of becoming of a quite subsidiary importance4 ,in a condition of things such as this the self-subsistency we were seeking for is out of the question4 ,and for this reason we required for the free embodiment of individuality conditions which are precisely the reverse of this1 in which the validity of the ethical principle derives its support from individuals1 and only from individuals1 men who make for themselves a great place in the arena of life through the activity of exceptional volitional power and the inherent greatness and effectiveness of their character4 ,with such right is simply that which they choose to accept as such2 and if that which is essentially moral is compromised by their action1 there is no all-constraining public might which brings them to judgment and exacts punishment1 but only the right of that inner voice of necessity1 which accentuates itself as vital in particular character and through external circumstance and condition and only thus is actually existent4 ,this is what differentiates punishment from revenge4 ,the punishment exacted by law asserts the validity of the generally applicable and carefully defined right against the violation of that right1 and makes use of the public power according to a definite process as its instrument1 in other words1 it employs a tribunal and a judge1 an instrument to which personality is attached as something accidental4 ,even revenge may in a similar way find a justification2 but such as it has is based entirely on the subjective conscience of those who deal with the criminal act1 and1 in pursuance of their own private convictions1 avenge themselves on the unrighteous act and its perpetrator4 ,the revenge of ,orestes is1 for example1 justifiable2 but he exacted it under the direction of the law which his own virtue prescribed1 not as the execution of a judgment and a right4 ,in the condition1 then1 that we claim as the most suitable for artistic treatment1 that which is moral and just must be throughout personal1 in the sense that its source is exclusively in the individual life1 and it only is actual in such dependence4 ,moreover1 to proceed with our contrasted conditions1 in regulated ,states the external environment of man is made secure1 and properly is protected1 and he is only permitted to retain in absolute independence for himself his private views and opinions4 ,but in that condition where the essential features of a ,state are not found the protection of life and property depends on the isolated energy and courage of each individual by himself1 who is compelled to look after his own security and that of everything which belongs to him4 ,such a condition we are accustomed to identify with the heroic age4 ,it is not1 of course1 our province here either to discuss or decide which of these two contrasted conditions of life is the worthier2 suffice it to say that1 so far as the ,ideal of art is concerned1 it is imperatively necessary that this hard and fixed line between the universal as an independent existence and individuality should be removed1 however much this distinction may be necessary in other directions for the realization of human existence4 ,the reason of this is that ,art and its ,ideal is just that universal1 in so far as it may be presented to the perception of the senses1 and by such presentment is permitted to enter into the variety and living forms of the world of objects4 77 ,what we were looking for1 therefore1 is supplied us by the heroic age1 for it is here that virtue1 in the full sense of that ,greek word1 creates the root-basis of actions4 ,in this connection it would appear that we must distinguish between and virtus as understood by the ,roman themselves4 ,the ,romans had already their ,state1 ,fatherland1 and legal institutions1 and as contrasted with the ,state1 as the controlling object of all1 they had surrendered personality4 ,to be simply a citizen of ,rome1 to have one object for the imagination and for every other personal energy to centre itself upon1 namely1 the fatherland and its sovereign majesty1 therein lies the earnestness and grit of ,roman virtue4 ,heroes1 on the contrary1 are individuals who undertake and accomplish a complete enterprise in consistent reliance upon their personal resources and initiative1 and with whom it is consequently a purely arbitrary act of their own when they execute anything in accordance with the moral principle4 ,this immediate unity1 however1 of what we may call the substantive import and individuality of inclination1 impulse1 and will is the characteristic of ,greek virtue4 ,according to this view personality is a law to itself without any further subjection to a law1 judgment1 and tribunal of independent subsistence4 ,the ,greek heroes make their appearance in an epoch anterior to legal enactment1 or they are themselves the founders of ,states1 so that right and social order1 law and ethical custom1 emanate from them1 and persist as their own creation in an indefeasible relation to them4 ,in this way ,hercules was regarded so highly by the ancients themselves1 and represents an ,ideal of original and heroic virtue4 ,his free and self-reliant virtue1 with which he championed the right and battled against the monstrosities of men and ,nature is not a prevailing characteristic of the age1 but belongs to him as an exclusive and unique possession4 ,and we may add he was not strictly a moral hero1 as his reception of the fifty daughters of ,thespius in one night#cjd clearly shows us2 neither would it appear from the tale about the ,augaean stables is he pre-eminent for gentility4 ,he is rather the general type of self-reliant strength and resource in its championship of right and justice1 to exemplify which he elected summarily and from a free choice to undergo countless toils and labours4 ,it is true that some of his deeds were carried out at the instigation of ,eurystheus1 but this submission is1 after all1 rather a formal association than a real one1 no connection at least of legal validity or inevitable necessity through which the strength of his self-reliant personality was diverted from its independent course4 ,the ,homeric heroes are of a similar type4 ,no doubt they have their clan chieftain2 but the associating bond is no fixed relation already determined by law1 which enforces their submission2 of their own free will it is that they follow ,agamemnon1 who is no monarch in the modern sense of the term4 ,consequently every hero volunteers his own advice1 the enraged ,achilles acts independently for himself in his separation1 and1 speaking generally1 each and all come and go1 act1 or take their leisure as they please4 ,in much the same independent position1 that is to say1 united in no fixed organization1 to which they are as individuals entirely subordinate1 we find the heroes of ,arabian poetry portrayed1 and even the ,shah-,rameh of ,ferdusi furnishes us with similar examples4 ,in latter-day ,christendom the age of feudalism and knighthood supplies a fertile field for the free growth of heroic enterprise and the type of individuality which belongs to it4 ,of such are the heroes of the round table1 no less than the heroic circle of which ,charles the ,great is the focus4 ,charles is1 much like ,agamemnon1 surrounded with independent chieftains of heroic mould1 a union which as such is powerless#cje4 ,he is consequently always compelled to take counsel with them1 however much each of them may be influenced by private passions2 he may bluster like a very ,olympian ,jupiter1 and none the less find himself and his undertakings suddenly left in the lurch while his confederates are off on some adventures of their own4 ,the ,cid is perhaps the most complete example of the type4 ,he1 too1 is the ally of a confederacy1 the dependent of a king1 and is bound to render duty as vassal2 but in opposition to this obligation he is pre-eminently influenced by the principle of honour1 the purely personal consideration of his own glory1 nobility1 and reputation#cjf4 ,and so in this case also the king can only determine a fixed line of action and make war after consulting and obtaining the consent of his vassals4 ,if this is not given they do not fight1 and1 moreover1 a mere majority of votes is not sufficient to compel them4 ,every man is independent of his neighbour1 and exercises his will and steers his own course as such4 ,we find in the accounts given us of ,saracen heroes an equally brilliant picture of self-reliant and still more inflexible personality4 ,even the ,reinecke ,fuchs fable is a fresh example of this state of things4 ,here1 it is true1 the lion is master and king1 but the wolf and the bear sit in council4 ,even ,reinecke and the rest do just what they like2 and when there is a general outcry1 the sly fellow either gets out of the mess with his story-telling1 or manages to make some particular interest of king and queen work to his own advantage1 and in his own cunning way talks over his sovereign somehow4 77 ,moreover1 in much the same way that each individual example of this heroic type of personality persists in immediate unity with all that he may will1 act1 and accomplish1 a similar unity is further maintained in all the consequences which flow from such initiative4 ,when we ourselves1 on the contrary1 act or estimate a particular action1 we assume that only full responsibility can attach where the individual under consideration is in complete possession of the true nature of his action and its attendant circumstances4 ,if the content of those surrounding conditions is otherwise than that which is present to the agent's consciousness in such a case a man nowadays will not take upon himself the burden of all that is implied in his action4 ,he will thrust on one side that part of it which he would not have done had he known completely or not misconceived the circumstances1 and he only accepts that which was fully under his cognisance and carried out with deliberate intention in conformity thereto4 ,the heroic character makes no such distinction4 ,he adheres simply to all the consequences and makes good his personal responsibility for the whole4 dipus on his way to consult the oracle meets a certain man1 quarrels with him and strikes him4 ,in those days such an act was not a crime at all4 ,he only returned a blow after being vigorously attacked4 ,but the stranger was his father4 dipus further marries a royal lady4 ,his wife is his mother4 ,without knowing it he commits an act of shame4 ,on learning the truth he acknowledges such enormities to their full extent1 inflicts a punishment on himself as murderer of his father and a man of incest1 and this although he was entirely ignorant of the true nature of these acts1 or had any intention of doing them4 ,the self-reliant stubbornness and entirety of the heroic character refuses to parcel out responsibility and knows nothing of such distinctions as personal intention and the objective act and its consequences4 ,in the evolution and ramification of an action as we moderns regard it these opposed points of view constantly recur1 and guilt is thrown into the background as far as possible4 ,no doubt our view of the matter is more in accordance with ethical principle1 in so far as the condition of a personal knowledge of the particular circumstances1 or the consciousness of an object good in itself1 in short1 generally the intent of an act1 is what materially assists us in our judgment4 ,but in the heroic age1 where we find the individual essentially indivisible and the objective act proceeding from himself as entirely his own1 each person claims absolutely all that he may do1 and refuses to surrender one jot or tittle of responsibility therefor4 ,to an extent equally minute the heroic figure is separated from the ethical whole1 to which he belongs1 and his self-consciousness is bound up wholly in substantial unity with that whole4 ,according to the views in vogue now we draw a line of distinction as private individuals between objects which are wholly personal and those which affect the community4 ,the individual acts in all that he does from his own private personality as distinct from others1 and views even his actions rather as relative to this than as part of all that is farmed out by the organic whole to which he belongs4 ,we consequently make a distinction between individuals and their families4 ,such is unknown in the heroic age4 ,the guilt of ancestors adheres to their descendants1 and an entire family will suffer for the original defaulter4 ,men inherit the fatality of guilt and transgression4 ,a condemnation such as this appears to us unjust as an irrational subjection to a blind fate4 ,with us the achievements of ancestors reflect no more honour on children and descendants than the punishments and crimes of such contaminate those that follow after them1 and least of all is their private character thus affected2 nay1 modern opinion is already close to the view that the confiscation of family property is a punishment which violates the profounder conception of liberty4 ,but in the ancient and more plastic totality the individual is not so isolated1 but rather a member of his family and race4 ,for this reason the character1 action1 and fortunes of the family continue to be the private affair of each member of it2 and so far from denying the actions of his parents1 each man voluntarily accepts them as his own2 they live in him1 and he is just that which his fathers were1 suffered1 or transgressed4 ,this appears to us a hardship1 but that which we replace it with1 this standing alone on our own possessions#cjg1 and the more subjective self-stability thus acquired is also from another point of view only the abstract self-sufficiency of each4 ,the individuality of heroic times is none the less of a more ideal type1 because it does not declare itself as satisfied with the mere form of freedom and infinity1 but remains in unalterable and immediate unity with all that is most substantial in the relations of spirit which it of itself endows with living actuality4 ,in such an individuality the substantial is immediately individual1 and the individual thereby himself essentially substantive4 77 ,from considerations such as these we conclude that the ideal figures of art must be sought for in the age of mythos1 that is to say1 speaking generally1 in past times1 where we shall find the soil most congenial to their growth4 ,if such material is taken from the age we live in1 whose most native form1 as we actually find it1 is tightly shut off from the imagination1 it matters not how we regard it1 then the modifications which the poet can hardly avoid making in it will not readily escape the appearance of a purely artificial and intentional composition4 ,the ,past entirely belongs to memory1 and memory perfects the infolding veil of character1 events1 and actions in the vesture of universality1 through which the particular external or contingent detail is unable to penetrate4 ,many trifling circumstances and mediating conditions1 many varied and isolated phases of activity1 are inseparable from the actual existence of an action or a character3 in the mirror of memory all these insignificant details are obliterated4 ,in this liberation of his work from what is accidental in the external fact the artist has a freer hand for his artistic powers of composition1 when dealing with that which is individual and particular in it1 if the actions1 histories1 and characters are borrowed from ancient times4 ,he has1 it is true1 also historical memories1 out of which he must mould a content conformable to the universal2 but the picture of the ,past possesses1 as already observed1 an advantage1 taken simply as a picture of greater universality1 while the manifold texture of mediating condition and circumstance1 interwoven as it is in the entire framework of finite existence which surrounds it1 offers him material ample enough to prevent his hand obliterating the individuality1 which is essential to his work of art4 ,the more closely we consider it1 the clearer will be our conclusion that a heroic age has the advantage over later and more civilized times in that the isolated character and personality generally in such an age does not as yet find what is substantive either in the sphere of ethical custom1 or moral obligation opposed to itself in the necessary embodiment of legal institution1 and thereby presents immediately to the poet all that the form of the ,ideal requires4 ,shakespeare has1 for example1 selected much material for his tragedies from chronicles and earlier romances1 framed upon a condition of life which has not as yet received the impression of a fully articulated social order1 but in which the energy of individuals1 as emphasized in personal resolve and achievement1 is still the prevailing characteristic4 ,his genuine historical dramas have1 on the contrary1 a vein of historical substance running through them in the strictest sense1 and for this reason lean farther away from an ideal exposition1 although here1 too1 both circumstances and actions are made to fall in with1 or are removed to suit1 the unyielding self-sufficiency and wilfulness of particular characters4 ,no doubt this characteristic remains for the most part in their case a purely formal self-inclusion1 whereas if we contrast it with the self-subsistency of heroic characters we find that here the essential content of all such have proposed to accomplish is bound up therewith4 ,it is on account of this contrast that we should find a reason for repeating the general thesis in connection with the ,ideal1 to the effect that the ,idyllic is exceptionally adapted for its expression1 inasmuch as where that is presented the cleavage between what is determined by legal necessity and the living person is wholly absent4 ,to this we must reply that1 however simple and original idyllic situations may be1 however far removed they may be from the artificial prose-existence of society1 such simplicity1 if we consider the nature of its content1 has1 in fact1 too insignificant an interest to satisfy the most substantial and essential requirements of the ,ideal4 ,material of this sort fails entirely to include the most weighty motives of heroic character such as ,fatherland1 moral and family problems1 and their development2 it is a kind of treatment which is apt to select as the very core of its subject such a fact as the loss of a single sheep or the falling in love of a girl4 ,in this way the ,idyllic not unfrequently becomes merely the resource and recreation of our hearts1 to which poets such as ,gessner1 for example1 will add their dose of sickly sweetness and sentimentalism4 ,the idyllic aspect of the days we live in have1 further1 this defect1 that this navet1 this domesticated or rural atmosphere in the emotional aspect of love or the enjoyment of a good cup of coffee in the open and things of that sort are not likely to awake much interest1 when we find in them nothing but the country parson flavour--find them cut off1 that is to say1 from all wider relations with the outside world1 and not a trace of the profounder web of purposes with which that world is interwoven4 ,it is precisely here that we have reason to admire the genius of ,goethe1 when he concentrated his poetic talent on material of this kind in his poem of ,hermann and ,dorothea4 ,it is true that he selects from the life of the ,present a particular theme of very limited extension1 but at the same time he unfolds before us as the background and atmosphere of the picture in which his characters are portrayed the great interests of the revolution and his own native country1 and1 in short1 associates with a subject-matter necessarily narrow in its range facts of world-history of the widest and most potent significance4 ,generally speaking1 we shall find that the ills of life and its evil1 war1 battles1 and revenge1 are not excluded from the subject-matter of the ,ideal1 but are frequently the very source and substance of the heroic age and its myths1 whose form grows all the wilder and sterner in proportion to the remoteness of such a period from a fully developed society of law and moral order4 ,in the chivalrous adventures of knight-errantry we find the heroes of such tales themselves often enough sharing the savage and dissolute characteristics of the times1 and in much the same way the martyrdom of the heroes of the ,church presupposes a condition of ferocious cruelty around them4 ,at bottom1 however1 the ,christian ideal1 which is based on the depth and inwardness of man's spiritual nature1 stands in a relation of entire indifference to the external world4 ,we have demonstrated that the condition of particular centuries is more applicable to the ,ideal2 in the same way ,art selects pre-eminently a particular class of society for the form under which the ,ideal shall appear1 the order1 that is to say1 of princes4 ,and the selection is made not because art is necessarily aristocratic1 or has any predilection for gentility#cjh1 but simply on account of the perfection in which free will and its products may be exemplified imaginatively through the highly placed class4 ,we have in the chorus of ancient tragedy the characteristics and universal background of general maxims1 modes of imaginative thought1 and emotion1 before which the definite movements of the action proceed4 ,in contrast to this appear the more clearly defined individualities of the personages immediately concerned in the action1 men and women of authority1 and belonging for the most part to royal families4 ,on the other hand1 the main impression forced upon us1 when seeing representatives of a lower class carrying on pursuits which are of a narrower range1 is one of subjection2 and1 indeed1 in an artificial#cji state of society the freedom of action of such a class is fettered in every direction1 and is necessarily involved with all its passions and interests in all the medley and despotic forces of external circumstance4 ,it is1 in fact1 held closely behind the invincible power of the social order1 which it is unable to come out of1 and is an alien from the authority of the dominant order1 even when that is asserted in accordance with just principle4 ,in this limitation of outlook through the hard conditions of life all real independence is wrecked4 ,for this reason both the circumstances and characters which we find in such a sphere of life are more appropriate to the treatment of comedy1 everybody being permitted in comedy to rate themselves as they please1 and to lay claims to a self-sufficiency in all that they will and think1 which is none the less immediately negatived by the spiritual no less than the external dependence of their lives4 ,as a rule1 such a false and second-hand self-subsistency must inevitably fall to pieces when confronted with the actual conditions of life and the distorted view which is formed of them4 ,the force of circumstances is presented to the lower orders of society on a totally different level from that in which it acts upon rulers and princes4 ,in ,schiller's ,braut von ,messina ,don ,caesar is able to exclaim1 and justly3 there stands no higher judge than myself6 ,and when he has to be punished he must himself give judgment and execute it4 ,he is1 in fact1 subject to no external necessity of right and law1 and even when punishment is the question is wholly dependent on himself4 ,the characters in the ,shakespearean drama do not entirely belong to the princely order and only partially are taken from mythical sources1 but they are placed in the era of civil wars1 in which the ties of social order and legislative enactment are either weakened or shattered1 and they secure from such a condition the exceptional independence and self-sufficiency we are looking for4 7b7 ,if we transfer our attention now from the characteristic conditions of society we have hitherto mainly considered to the actual state of the world around us and its carefully articulated scheme of ethical1 judicial1 and political institutions1 we shall not fail to observe that the material we have here offered us for figures of truly ideal type is of a very restricted character4 ,the province here in which an entirely open field is presented for the display of independent purpose in its fullest individuality is limited both in its range and the measure of opportunity4 ,the qualities that make a man thorough in his relations to his own family and his business1 the ideals1 in short1 of honest citizens and excellent wives1 in so far as will and activity are concentrated on the field in which it is still possible for a man to exercise his free personality1 to carry out1 in short1 all that he has a mind to do1 this is the prevailing feature of our modern society4 ,such ideals inevitably lack the depth of a fuller content1 and the most significant feature of them is that of the attitude of the individual mind to their realization2 for we find here the content is already presented by existing social institutions1 and consequently the essential interest we take in it depends on the particular way in which that content is realized and appears in the personal life1 its moral and inward significance4 ,for this reason it is not possible1 as in the case of former times1 to create ideals from the positions of judgeship and kingship4 ,if a man carries out his judicial functions nowadays in accordance with duty and the requirements of his office1 he merely is acting within the bounds already marked out for him by legislative enactments in the social order as the sphere of his responsibilities4 ,all that may characterize his tenure of office beyond this1 as proceeding from personal qualities1 such as suavity of demeanour or acuteness of judgment1 is not the main point or the substantial content1 but rather an aspect of it which it is possible to dispense with as something accidental4 ,in the same way the monarchs of our own day are no longer1 as was the case with the heroes of mythical times1 in themselves the embodying and culminating unity of society itself1 but rather a more or less unsubstantial centrum around which all legal and social institutions1 however moulded in the course of time1 group themselves in independent relations4 ,all the most important functions of the executive have nowadays been separated from the royal prerogative4 ,kings do not lay down the law1 control finance2 the preservation of social order is not one of their most characteristic functions4 ,peace and war are determined through the particular circumstances of international politics1 which it is not within their power exclusively either to direct or control2 and1 if it happens that any important decision with regard to either depends in the last resort on their judgment1 such a decision is not generally so much in the nature of its substance the result of any personal preference1 as it is the formal seal of monarchical authority on what is already determined on public grounds1 the mere imposition of that which is strictly official rather than personal in its character4 ,in the same way1 a general or field-marshal of our times has unquestionably great authority2 objects and interests of profound importance are under his control and his circumspection2 his courage1 his determination1 and his intelligence are involved in the weightiest decisions2 nevertheless1 whatever may be definitely traced to the essentially personal characteristics of the man has little opportunity for display in such a result4 ,for1 in the first place1 the objects upon which his decisions turn are not of his own selection1 and arise out of circumstances which lie beyond the sphere of his influence rather than are spontaneously fixed by himself2 secondly1 the means adopted to carry out such objects are not the sole result of his initiative4 ,on the contrary1 they are supplied him from sources which are not immediately under his authority or personal influence1 but stand rather quite apart from the sphere of his individual powers as a general4 ,to sum up1 then1 though it is true that under the present condition of the civilized world a man may act independently for himself in many directions1 the fact remains that in whatever direction he may turn he is still only a member of a fixed order of society and appears as such limited in his range rather than the vital representative and individual embodiment of society itself4 ,he acts necessarily under such a condition of restriction1 and our interest in such a personality1 no less than in the content of his aims and activity1 is entirely devoid of completeness4 ,in the end we are invariably driven to concentrate our attention on the purely personal interest1 how far1 that is to say1 he attained success1 what was the nature of the obstacles and complications which1 in either1 through untoward chance or necessity1 confronted or distracted his progress4 ,and if it is1 moreover1 true that our modern personality is of infinite significance when we estimate the character thus manifested as a spiritual product1 in its actions1 sufferings1 moral opinions1 and conduct that is to say1 it is also true that the moral content which is realized in such an individual is of a restricted character1 rather than1 as is the case in the heroic times1 the realization of universal right1 custom1 and legality4 ,the individual is no longer the exclusive vehicle and actual embodiment of these powers as in the previous times4 7c7 ,our interest1 however1 in and need to have presented us such a completely realized individuality and living self-dependence will always persist1 however strongly we may recognize the worth and reasonable nature of the more developed condition of an organized and trained civic society4 ,it is this necessity which makes us regard with astonishment the youthful spirit of ,schiller and ,goethe when they sought to discover that lost self-sufficiency in the prevailing conditions of modern times4 ,how do we find in particular this attempt is made by ,schiller in his earliest works8 ,simply by a rebellion directed against the whole organic framework of civil society4 ,karl ,moor1 suffering injury from the existing order at the hands of those who abuse the power entrusted them1 has the courage to break the bonds which bind him to law and order altogether1 cuts himself adrift and creates for himself a heroic situation1 in which he appears as the champion of right1 and the self-constituted avenger of wrong1 injustice1 and oppression4 ,none the less1 how insignificant and isolated must a private revenge of this kind appear1 if we estimate it from the practical point of view1 according to the probability of its success2 and1 in fact1 in one aspect of it1 it already contains the germ of wrong which can only lead to the criminal act on which it will fall to pieces4 ,no doubt1 as personal to ,karl ,moor himself1 this is a misfortune1 a fatality1 however1 which1 despite the tragical element in it1 can only engraft on mere boys the blight of such a robber-ideal4 ,in much the same way the characters depicted in ,kabale und ,liebe suffer wrong under prevailing conditions of life1 absorbed in the trivial facts and passions wholly personal to themselves4 ,it is not until we come to the dramas of ,fiesco and ,don ,carlos that we find characters of nobler significance and more substantive content1 heroes1 for example1 resolved to liberate their country1 or assert the liberty of religious conviction4 ,with a nobility still more striking ,wallenstein places himself at the head of his army that the crisis in the political situation may come to a focus4 ,he is fully cognisant of the nature of the political forces upon which his only means of control1 his army1 is dependent2 consequently he hesitates for long whether to follow his private inclination or his duty4 ,he has barely arrived at a decision when he finds the instrument on which he most depended slip from his grasp2 his means of action is gone4 ,for that which in the last instance unites the leading officers and generals is no gratitude for anything that may be due to him on the ground of past services rendered2 his fame as a general has nothing to do with it1 but rather the duty they owe to the universally recognized seat of government1 the oath they have sworn to the head of the ,state1 the emperor of the ,austrian monarchy4 ,he finds himself consequently in the end isolated1 and is not so much fought with and overcome by an external foe as he is stripped of all means of executing his purpose4 ,he is deserted by his army and from that moment is a lost man4 ,the ,gtz#caj of ,goethe starts from a dramatic situation of an analogous though somewhat inverse type4 ,the times of ,gtz and ,franz von ,sickingen belong to the interesting epoch in which knight-errantry and the self-reliant individuality of the class of nobility is being superseded by the new creation of an external and legally constituted social order4 ,to have selected precisely this critical time where we find the heroic characteristics of the ,middle ,ages and the legalized fabric of modern society meet and collide for the subject of his first artistic production shows much penetration on the part of ,goethe4 ,for ,gtz and ,sickingen are still heroes in the genuine sense1 who are resolved to exercise their influence over circumstances1 whether immediately affecting them or of wider range1 out of the resources of their own personalities1 their courage1 and their private sense of right4 ,the new order of things involves ,gtz in acts of illegality and brings about the catastrophe of his life4 ,it is only in the ,middle ,ages that knight-errantry and the relations of feudalism will supply a field entirely open to this type of self-reliant manhood4 ,when we find1 moreover1 the legalized order co-ordinated more completely in its prosaic form1 the predominant authority in fact1 the adventurous self-dependence of knighthood is left outside it as an unrelated excrescence2 and if an attempt is made to assert it as though it were still a valid means of attacking wrong1 and assisting the oppressed1 it becomes simply an object of ridicule1 such as ,cervantes illustrates for us in his ,don ,quixote4 ,in this allusion to the opposition which exists between two differently constituted rgimes of society and the collision which results from action in defiance of their particular character we have already indicated what we have above defined generally as the closer determination and differentiation of the universal state of the world1 that is to say1 the situation as generally expressed4 #b4 ,,the ,,situation ,the ideal world-condition which it is the function of art to present in contrast to prosaic reality we may conclude from our previous discussion to be merely a general background of society of a specific kind2 it is merely the possible condition necessary for the particular presentation1 not the presentation itself4 ,what we have hitherto directed attention to is1 in fact1 the general background upon which the living figures of art may appear4 ,it is undoubtedly fructified with individuality and is supported by its self-subsistency2 but as a general condition it is not yet the active movement of particular individuals in the very form of life1 just as we may say that the temple which ,art erects is not as yet the representation of the personal godhead1 but only encloses the germ of the same4 ,for this reason we must in the first instance regard this world-condition as a kind of medium in repose1 a harmony1 so to speak1 of forces which are operative in it1 and to this extent it possesses a substantial consistency of uniform worth1 which1 however1 must not be accepted as identical with what has been called the age of innocence4 ,for it is a condition in the fulness and sovereignty of whose ethical atmosphere the terrors of division only are slumbering because1 in our contemplation of it1 we have before us1 for the first time1 the aspect of its substantial unity1 and consequently are only presented with individuality in its most universal terms1 a mode of viewing it which makes it fade away as though without definition or any essential disturbance of its unity1 instead of giving to it the full value of definite characteristics4 ,but such characterization is essential to individuality4 ,and if the ,ideal is to appear as definite form it is necessary for it to escape from such pure universality1 or in other words for it to give the universal a particular expression1 and by so doing impart to it both existence and appearance4 ,art consequently has in this connection not only to translate into its medium a universal world-condition1 but must proceed beyond this quite indefinite conception to the composition of pictures of definite character and action4 ,regarded from the aspect under which it affects individual character this general condition is the environment of circumstance which1 according to its specifically detached form1 tends to excite both collisions and development1 forcing thereby the individuals thus affected to express their nature and exhibit such expression in a definite form4 ,from the point of view of the world-condition this self-revelation of particular individuals appears as the passing of its universality into the distinct embodiments of living individuality1 an aggregate over which universal forces still assert the mastery4#caa ,for the eternal powers operative in the world-process constitute the substantive content of the ,ideal as specifically defined in what it essentially is4 ,the mode of existence1 however1 which is realized through the bare form of external condition is unworthy of this content4 ,for in the first place such a condition is associated with habit1 and the habitual is no adequate determination of those profounder interests which are active in self-conscious mind4 ,furthermore1 as we have observed1 it was the contingency and caprice of individuality1 by virtue of whose spontaneous activity these very interests are permitted to appear in life2 but this unessential contingency and caprice is again quite as little adequate to the substantive universality1 which constitutes the notion of essential actuality4 ,on these grounds respectively we are therefore compelled to seek an art-envisagement more worthy and better defined for the concrete content#cab of the ,ideal4 ,this new configuration the universal powers can only retain in its determinate existence in virtue of the fact that they are manifested in their essential modes of difference and movement1 or1 to put the matter more specifically1 through their assertion of the contradictions which they relatively unfold4 ,two aspects of the process of individualization into which the universal thus passes must be here emphasized4 ,in the first place1 there is the substance as an embracing sphere of universal forces through the differentiation indicated1 which is broken from its substantive unity into its component parts2 secondly1 there are the individuals1 which spring forth as the active completion of these forces and give to them a specific objectification4 ,now what we have characterized as the difference and opposition in which the world-condition1 hitherto harmonious with the individuals conditioned by it1 is involved1 if we consider it from the point of view of universal condition1 is the manifestation of the essential content which it carries in itself4 ,on the other hand we observe that the substantive universal in that condition is articulated through particular units in such a way that this very universal procures for itself determinate existence1 albeit it is thus immersed in the appearance of chance1 disunion1 and division1 an appearance1 which1 however1 is rendered nugatory by the fact that it is the universal which thus appears4 ,the separation of these forces and their objectification#cac in individuals can1 however1 further take place under definite conditions and circumstances1 under which and as a constituent aspect of which the entire objective appearance receives a determinate form1 or as the stimulative impulse of this very realization4 ,by themselves such circumstances are without interest#cad1 and it is only through their relation to mankind that they receive such a significance1 through whose self-consciousness the content of these spiritual forces is carried actively into objective appearance4 ,the external circumstances are consequently only to be regarded of significance in so far as they supply an essential relation to ,spirit1 in so far1 that is to say1 as they are comprehended by those individual units and afford them a stimulus to actualize their inward spiritual needs1 the aims1 ideas1 the determinate substance1 in short1 of all that requires an individual embodiment4 ,regarded as a stimulating influence of this kind particular circumstances and conditions create what we have called the situation1 which is specifically presupposed in the actual self-expansion and activity of all that still lies undeveloped in the universal world-condition2 it is for this reason we have considered the previous determination of the notion of the situation as necessary to any inquiry into the true constituents of action4 ,the situation expressed in general terms is in one aspect of it the circumstance particularized to the point of definite character1 and under this characterization it is1 to put it another way1 the stimulating impulse to a particular expression of content1 which it is the function of artistic presentation to transmute into a specific form of existence4 ,looked at from this latter point of view especially the situation offers a wide field for contemplation1 inasmuch as it has ever been one of the most essential objects of art to discover situations of real interest1 that is to say1 of such a kind as will present to us the profound and weighty interest1 the truest content of spiritual life4 ,the requirements of the several arts in this respect no doubt differ4 ,sculpture1 for example1 is pre-eminently limited in its reference to the inwardly detailed variety of situations4 ,painting and music are already operative in a freer and more comprehensive medium4 ,finally1 we are least able among them all to exhaust the possibilities of poetry in this respect4 ,since we have not yet arrived at that portion of our subject where we deal directly with the specific arts1 it will be sufficient here to draw attention to a few of the most general aspects of that inquiry1 which we may subdivide in the following manner4 ,first1 we would observe that the situation still retains the form of universality and thereby of indeterminacy1 so long as it is undeveloped and without definite characterization2 we have1 consequently1 at first present before us a situation which is without situation4 ,for the form of indeterminacy is itself only one form as opposed to its contradiction of determinacy1 and is shown to be1 by virtue of this very contrast1 a one-sided aspect which as such possesses a determinate relation4 ,secondly1 however1 the situation passes in separation away from this universality1 and becomes certainly determinate to that extent1 but at first with a determinacy which produces no destructive consequences1 that is to say1 it is one which offers no stimulus to active opposition and its necessary resolution4 ,thirdly1 we find the element of disunion in all its vigour creating by the definition of its opposed characteristics the essence of the situation1 which thereby is carried into a collision1 which again proceeds to reactions1 and1 as such1 forms the point of departure to the conception of artistic action properly so called4 ,we may1 in fact1 characterize the situation generally as the intermediate plane between the universal world-condition still in a state of equilibrium1 and the concrete action unfolded in all its tendency to movement and reaction1 a position which gives to it the characteristics of both extremes1 and enables us to pass over from the one to the other4 7a7 ,the ,absence of ,situation#cae ,we passed from the notion of the universal world-condition in presenting to ourselves the form of it as essentially individual self-subsistency4 ,self-subsistency1 however1 regarded simply in its essential form1 presents to us in the first instance merely the secure repose upon its own resources in its bare tranquillity4 ,the form as thus defined is carried into no relation with another1 but remains at one with itself in inclusion with its unity both1 within and without4 ,this presents us with the situation which is without situation1 an illustration of which we may take those ancient types of temple-building dating from the earliest days of art1 whose character of profound immutable seriousness1 of tranquil1 nay even of austere and grandiose1 dignity has been the object of imitation even in more recent times proceeding on lines of a similar type4 ,the ,egyptian and most ancient ,greek sculptures will further illustrate for us the same kind of indeterminate situation4 ,in the plastic art of ,christianity1 especially if we consider particular examples of early bust-sculpture1 we shall find both ,god the ,father and ,christ are presented in a similar spirit4 ,indeed1 such a mode of delineation is peculiarly adapted to present us with the secure substantiality of the ,divine1 whether such be apprehended as a definite and particular ,godhead1 or is grasped as essentially absolute personality2 and this is so in virtue of the very defect of such a representation1 that it gives us portraits of persons of middle-age which are without any trace of definite situations1 in which the character of the individual as such can reveal itself1 and only the attempt is made to express the entirety of determinate character in its quality of stability#caf4 7b7 ,the ,situation defined in its ,harmlessness#cag ,the second point to emphasize is1 inasmuch as the situation generally is reached in the definition of form1 the passage from this tranquillity and blessed repose1 or from the unbroken severity and force of self-consistency1 forms which subsist in unfeatured equilibrium1 that is to say1 immutable both within and without1 have to be set in motion and surrender their undressed simplicity4 ,this bare progression to a more specific manifestation in some particular mode of expression is what we may describe certainly as definite situation1 but a situation which has not yet asserted conflicting elements in itself1 and is fully ripe for collision4 ,this first step in the process of individualized expression is consequently of a kind that carries with it no further result2 it is set in no antagonistic opposition to something else1 in a relation which evokes both collision and reaction2 it is already in its character of unconstrainedness finished and complete in itself4 ,with such a type of situation we may associate those which are mainly to be regarded as a kind of play1 in so far as all that proceeds or is carried out in them indicates no real seriousness of purpose4 ,for all earnestness in any kind of activity is generally the result of oppositions and contradictions1 which drive on their way to the final removal or victory of one side or the other4 ,for this reason situations of this kind cannot themselves be identified with actions1 nor are they the stimulative impulse of actions2 they are indeed1 in a certain aspect1 of determinate character1 but they are either circumstances of the most trivial significance1 or a form of action which is without an essentially serious object1 which either is the result of conflicts1 or is able to carry the action yet further into conflicts4 77 ,the first thing to arrest us in this process is the passage generally from the repose of the unfeatured situation to a condition of emotion and expression3 this is asserted partly as purely mechanical motion1 in part also as the first impulse and satisfaction of any internal want4 ,the ,egyptians1 for example1 represented the gods in their sculpture with closely locked limbs4 ,the ,greeks1 on the contrary1 released both arms and legs1 and endowed the bodily form with all that is appropriate to the advance and general variety of movement4 ,permanent repose1 a seated attitude1 a tranquil gaze1 are all of them simple conditions under which the ,greeks apprehended their gods2 they are modes which unquestionably gave to the self-subsistent figure of ,godhead a certain characterization1 but one nevertheless which is not carried forward into other relations and oppositions1 but rather remains enclosed within itself1 and permanently significant as such4 ,situations of this simple kind attach in a particular way to sculpture1 and the ancients1 above all others1 were inexhaustible in discovering fit subjects for such a condition of unconstrained freedom4 ,in this respect they showed an extraordinary insight2 for it is precisely through contrast with the insignificance of the particular situation that the majesty and self-subsistency of the ideal types of the ,greek ,pantheon were made to appear so striking4 ,it was1 in fact1 through the harmlessness and insignificance of what appeared to be done or left undone that the blessed peaceful tranquillity and immutability of the immortal gods was brought most clearly to consciousness4 ,the situation merely indicates the particular character of either god or hero in quite a general way1 such as brings them into no relation with other gods1 or at least into no relation suggestive of hostility or division4 77 ,it is a further step in the direction of more defined situation1 when we find in such any particular purpose already represented in it1 an activity which stands in definite relation to something external1 and the self-subsistent figure itself expressed as within the sphere of such purpose or activity4 ,even objectification such as these1 however1 which have no real disturbing influence upon the tranquillity and cheerful blessedness of the figures represented1 are rather to be regarded as particular modes of presentation incidental to this very quality of cheerful contentment4 ,the invention of the ,greeks was here1 too1 exceptionally thoughtful and fruitful4 ,it is essential to the unconstrainedness of such situations that the activity here presented should merely indicate an action in its initial stage in such a way that no further developments or oppositions are likely to proceed from it1 but that all that appears necessary to complete it should be found enclosed in the action depicted4 ,as an illustration of this the situation of the ,belvedere ,apollo is seized at the moment when he moves forward in wrathful majesty after slaying the ,python with his arrow4 ,a situation of this kind has not the grandiose simplicity of the earlier ,greek sculpture1 which asserts for our intelligence the repose and open clarity of the gods by means of expressed actions of less significance4 ,take the case of ,aphrodite peacefully gazing at herself while emerging from her bath in full possession of her charms2 or of fauns and satyrs at play1 play that is wholly absorbed in itself2 or of that famous satyr who dandled the young ,bacchus in his arms1 while he looks down upon him with infinite tenderness and grace2 to say nothing of the endless variety of unconstrained activities in which ,eros is depicted4 ,such are a few examples of this type of situation4 ,if the action is of more concrete character we are confronted with a more involved situation1 which1 at least for the artistic presentment of the ,greek gods as self-substantive powers1 is less appropriate4 ,in a case of this kind the pure universality of the individual god is less able to transpierce the accumulated detail of the particular action which he expresses4 ,the ,mercury of ,pigalli1 which is a present of ,louis ,,xv to the exposition of statuary in ,sanssouci1 is fastening on his winged sandals4 ,this is a perfectly harmonious action4 ,the ,mercury of ,thorwaldsen1 on the contrary1 is depicted under a situation which is almost too complicated for sculpture4 ,he listens attentively to the flute of ,marsyas4 ,at the same time he is craftily spying him to see how he may slay him while his hand grasps maliciously for the dagger he has concealed4 ,in opposition to this1 if we may add one more illustration from a more modern work of art1 is that representation by ,rudolf ,schadow1 of a maiden binding her sandals in much the same simple manner as we find in the case of ,mercury4 ,in this example the navet of the situation does not contain the interest we experience when it is a god who exhibits such unconstrained action4 ,when it is only a maiden who fastens her sandals or spins1 there is little else to engage our attention but the simple action1 which is by itself of little significance or importance4 77 ,we shall find further1 if we follow up the above train of thought1 that the more closely defined situation can be treated more generally1 as merely a more or less definite stimulus presenting the opportunity for further development of expressed action of wider range related to the primary subject with varying degrees of affinity4 ,many lyrical poems have what we may call an occasional situation of this kind4 ,a particular mood or a certain atmosphere of emotion is a situation which can be arrested poetically for consciousness1 and1 furthermore1 in particular relation to external circumstances1 festivals1 or public victories1 is able to carry us forward to this or that artistic expression1 either of more comprehensive or restricted range1 and in every kind of embodiment of feeling and idea4 ,pindar's odes of victory are supreme examples of this type of occasional poetry4 ,goethe1 too1 has selected as the subject-matter of his muse many lyrical situations of a similar character2 and1 in fact1 if we look closely into the matter1 we shall hardly be wrong in calling his ,werther a poem of occasion4 ,it is through the medium of ,werther that ,goethe has elaborated the convulsions and anguish of his own heart1 incorporated1 in short1 the facts of his own experience in a work of art4 ,this1 after all1 is true of every lyrical poet2 he gives poetical expression to that which nearly affects him1 and thereby throws the windows of his heart open to the fresh air4 ,that which has hitherto been sealed up within is released in the external object1 from which our humanity has freed itself1 just as we are the lighter for the rain of tears1 in which the sorrow is wept away4 ,so ,goethe1 as in fact he has told us himself1 by his composition of ,werther1 liberated himself from the mastery and pressure of his heart troubles4 ,at the same time we must point out that this last-mentioned situation is not really appropriate to the type with which we are now dealing2 it obviously presents the profoundest contradiction in itself which calls for resolution4 ,no doubt in the kind of lyrical situation we have identified with the occasional we may have declared a circumstance objectively determined1 in other words1 an activity in close relation to the external world2 but1 on the other hand1 we find the poetic temperament equally able to withdraw itself within the atmosphere it creates wholly free from its external environment1 and to make that inward world which is the combined product of circumstance and emotion its true point of departure4 7c7 ,the ,collision ,all the situations to which we have hitherto directed attention are1 as already observed1 neither true actions in themselves nor indeed the stimulative source of such action4 ,their determination was to a greater or less degree the purely occasional circumstance or condition1 or an action in itself of no significance1 in which a substantive content was expressed in such a way that its specific character appeared as a mere harmless play1 in which nothing of a truly serious nature was implied4 ,the full seriousness and weighty import of a situation can only begin when we find in it the element of disruption1 where the determination itself exposes an essential aspect of difference1 and by its opposition to something else becomes the source of a collision4 ,the collision arises1 as we are now considering it1 in an act of violation1 which is unable to retain its character as such1 but is compelled to find a new principle of unity2 it is a change in the previously existent condition of harmony1 a change which is still in process4 ,the collision is1 however1 not an action1 and is to be taken simply as stimulus to action to all that characterizes the situation4 ,and this is true1 although the contradiction in which the collision is enclosed may be the result of previous action4 ,as an example of this we may cite the trilogies of the ancients1 which carry forward the main theme by presenting at the close of one drama the collision which forms the stimulative impulse of the next1 which1 in its return1 renders necessary the resolution which is carried out by the third4 ,and1 moreover1 for this very reason that the collision always requires some resolution attendant on this conflict of opposing elements1 the more a situation is full of it the more it is peculiarly adapted to the subject-matter of dramatic art1 it being the especial claim of that art to present beauty in its completest and profoundest development4 ,sculpture1 on the contrary1 is not wholly suited to give embodiment to any action1 through which the great spiritual forces are manifested either in their division or reconciliation1 and indeed the art of painting1 despite its more extended spatial significance1 is only able to objectify a single moment of action4 ,these situations of tragic significance introduce a peculiar difficulty in dealing with them which is inherent in their very conception4 ,for inasmuch as they obviously arise from violations of the world-condition they offer to our consideration circumstances which are unable to continue as they are1 which render necessary something of a remedial nature to reclothe them4 ,but the beauty of the ,ideal consists precisely in its undisturbed unity1 repose1 and consummation with itself4 ,the collision1 on the other hand1 disturbs this harmony of what is truly real and ethical1 and drives this unity of the ,ideal into discord and opposition4 ,through the representation of such disruption the ,ideal itself suffers violation4 ,the function of art will undoubtedly consist partly in preventing the entire destruction of free beauty in this difference1 and partly in only carrying this breach of unity and the conflict it occasions to a point in which harmony may again be recovered as the result of such a conflict and its resolution1 and in this way become manifest for the first time in its essential perfection4 ,it is1 however1 impossible to determine on a general principle the precise limit to which such discordance may be carried inasmuch as the several arts in this respect preserve their independent character4 ,the medium of the subjective idea can support a far intenser disruption than that of the plastic arts#cah4 ,in other words1 poetry is quite within its right when it breaks up the unity of the world of the imagination even to the point of the extremest form of desperation1 and in its delineation of external objects to that of absolute ugliness4 ,in the case of the plastic arts1 on the contrary1 in painting1 that is to say1 and even more so in sculpture1 the external form remains in unalterable fixity2 it can neither be removed nor lightly passed over in such a way that it again disappears4 ,under such conditions it would be a serious defect to represent once and for all an ugliness1 which could not possibly be transmuted4 ,consequently all that would be quite compatible in dramatic poetry1 which is able to represent a momentary appearance that again vanishes1 is not within the province of the plastic arts4 ,in discussing the more obvious types of collision we can only in this portion of our inquiry indicate the most general points of view4 ,we would particularly draw attention to three fundamental aspects under which they may be co-ordinated4 ,first1 there are those collisions which proceed from purely natural1 that is to say1 physical conditions1 in so far as these are characterized with qualities which are negative or evil and consequently discordant4 ,secondly1 we have collisions which are of a spiritual nature1 but which depend on natural conditions1 conditions which may in themselves have a positive#cai character yet for the spirit contain within themselves the seeds of difference and contradiction4 ,thirdly1 there are divisions which are caused entirely by disruption in the ,spirit alone2 to these alone we are justified in attaching the peculiar interest of contradiction which is bound up with genuine human activity4 77 ,now with reference to the first type of conflicting forces--for the reason that here it is only external ,nature1 through the maladies and other evils and infirmities which are incidental to her creating1 conditions which destroy the pre-existent harmony of life1 replacing such with a state of antagonism--such can at most merely serve as a stimulus for something outside them4 ,regarded wholly by themselves such collisions are of no interest2 they are the subject-matter of art simply for the sake of the disruption which may follow as a consequence of some natural misfortune4 ,the ,alcestis of ,euripides1 we may add1 too1 that of ,gluck1 the subject of whose opera is practically the same1 are examples of this2 in both the sickness of ,admetus is necessarily presupposed4 ,that sickness merely by itself could not fitly supply a subject for artistic treatment4 ,it only becomes1 even in the handling of ,euripides1 associated with it by virtue of the individual characters1 who1 on account of such misfortune1 are compelled to face a further collision4 ,it is the word of the oracle that ,admetus must die unless another will pass to the underworld for his sake4 ,alcestis1 out of love for her husband1 devotes herself to such a sacrifice1 resolves to die1 in order to restrain ,death from touching her beloved1 the father of her children1 the king4 ,in the ,philoctetes of ,sophocles a physical malady is also the cause of the collision4 ,here the ,greeks during their voyage to ,troy place the man who is suffering from a wounded foot1 caused by the serpent's bite in ,chrysas1 on the island of ,lemnos4 ,in this case1 too1 the physical mishap is merely the extreme meeting point and incentive of a further collision4 ,for1 according to the prophecy1 ,troy can only fall when the arrows of ,hercules are in the hands of the storming army4 ,philoctetes refuses to give them up because he has been compelled for nine years to suffer the martyrdom of his banishment4 ,this refusal1 no less than the fact of his unrighteous desertion from which it springs1 could have been followed by every variety of result other than that which took place2 the real interest accordingly does not centre in the malady and its physical necessity1 but in the opposition which arises from the refusal of ,philoctetes to surrender the arrows4 ,the case of the plague in the ,greek camp before ,troy is very similar2 although this is already represented entirely as the consequence of former transgression1 as a punishment1 in short1 a mode of statement more adapted to epic than dramatic poetry1 nevertheless it is closely associated with evils incidental to natural misfortune such as storm1 shipwreck1 and drought4 ,as a rule1 however1 art will not represent such mischance as mere accident1 but rather as an obstruction and misfortune whose necessity simply consists in assuming precisely this particular form rather than another4 77 ,but1 to turn now to our second type of the collision1 inasmuch as the external powers of ,nature are not that which is most essential to the interests and contradictions of human life1 in cases where they are found closely associated with such spiritual relations1 they will present themselves merely as the ground from which the collision breaks forth in its true character4 ,this is the point of view from which we must regard all situations1 where we trace the original source of conflict in the facts of natural birth4 ,we will shortly distinguish between three particular cases of this4 77 ,in the first place we have the right that is bound up with natural condition1 that which constitutes relationship and inheritance for example1 which for the very reason that it stands in close connection with ,nature carries with it a number of relations that are bound up with her1 and this though the right1 the fact is one and only one4 ,the most important example of this is the right of succession to the throne4 ,it is important to observe that this right must not as yet1 in relation to the collisions which spring from it1 be absolutely fixed by rule1 otherwise the resultant conflict will be of quite another character4 ,if1 that is to say1 the right of succession is not as yet entirely controlled by legislation and the social order which it implies1 no wrong will necessarily attach to any one of the alternatives1 namely1 whether it be an older or younger brother1 or any other relative of the royal household who obtains the sovereignty4 ,but inasmuch as sovereignty is a qualitative rather than a quantitative possession1 which cannot like gold and other material goods be divided up according to a just principle1 dispute and contention is inevitably the result of such a form of succession4 ,when dipus1 for example1 leaves the throne of ,thebes without a ruler1 he leaves his two sons confronting each other with a right and claim of equal strength4 ,the brothers arrange to occupy the throne alternately from year to year4 ,eteocles1 however1 breaks the compact and ,polynices brings an army against ,thebes to enforce his right4 ,the antagonism of brothers has always been in the history of art a fruitful source of collision2 it commences indeed with the story of ,cain who slew his brother ,abel4 ,in the tale of ,shah-,rameh1 the earliest example we have of a ,persian book of heroic legend1 it is a contention of throne succession which is the source of the most varied conflicts4 ,in this ,feridu divided the ,earth among his three brothers4 ,selm receives as his portion ,rum and ,chawer2 ,turan and ,osin are given to ,thur1 and ,fredysh becomes lord of the ,earth from ,iran4 ,all three1 however1 claim the land which belongs to his brothers1 and endless quarrels and wars are the result4 ,in the ,middle ,ages we find just the same countless examples of family and dynastic broils4 ,such dissensions1 however1 appear in themselves to be due to accidental circumstance4 ,it is not necessary that brothers should be at enmity2 particular circumstances and more important causes must be attached1 such as the in itself tragic birth of the sons of dipus1 or1 as we find in the ,bride of ,messina1 the author is at pains to shift the quarrel of the brothers on to still more fateful circumstances4 ,in ,shakespeare's ,macbeth a similar collision is the foundation of the tragic dnouement4 ,duncan is king and ,macbeth1 as his nearest and oldest relation1 is consequently heir to the throne with a right precedent even to ,duncan's sons4 ,the primary incentive of ,macbeth's crime is the wrong which the king has done him in naming his own son as heir to the throne4 ,this justification of ,macbeth1 which is supported by the chronicles of the time1 ,shakespeare has entirely passed over1 because1 it was solely his object to bring into startling relief the repulsive aspect of ,macbeth's ambitious passion1 in order thereby to make his work agreeable to ,king ,james1 who would be naturally interested in finding the crime of ,macbeth depicted without extenuating circumstances4 ,as a consequence we can find no sufficient reason why1 under ,shakespeare's handling of the subject1 ,macbeth fails to murder the sons of ,duncan no less than their father1 lets them escape in fact2 nor can we understand why they are wholly overlooked by the nobles4 ,however1 the entire collision upon which1 the drama of ,macbeth turns carries us beyond the particular type which we are now mainly considering4 77 ,in the second of our examples in the type of collision#cbj we are now discussing we find the reverse situation to that just discussed1 and it consists in this that difference of birth1 which carries within itself a wrongs is moreover1 through ethical custom or law1 held within the chains of an insuperable barrier1 so that it receives at the same time the appearance of an innate wrong1 and consequently is the cause of collisions4 ,slavery1 serfdom1 differences of caste1 the position of ,jews in many states and1 with certain qualifications1 even the contrast between an aristocratical and citizen class are all of them cases for consideration under this head4 ,the conflict here consists in this1 that on the one hand humanity has rights1 relations1 desires1 aims and requirements which belong to it essentially in virtue of its fundamental idea1 which nevertheless in each one of the above mentioned examples meet with dangerous restriction and obstruction owing to the compulsive necessity of natural birth4 ,on this type of collision we have the following remarks to offer4 ,the differences which obtain between classes1 such as the ruled and the rulers1 are1 no doubt1 essential to the notion of state-life1 and are founded on reason1 for they are caused by the inevitable articulation of the organic community1 and assert themselves as such through the specific forms of occupation1 disposition1 modes of life1 and general levels of education in all their branches4 ,it is another matter1 however1 when these differences as they affect individuals are determined absolutely by the accident of birth1 so that the individual man from the very start is not on account of any quality in himself1 but solely through the accident of ,nature1 irrevocably relegated to a particular class or caste4 ,in such a case it is obvious these differences appear as innate and are1 moreover1 though purely external1 girt with force in its highest and most aggressive mode4 ,we are not bound to ask ourselves how this fixity and compulsive restraint came originally into existence4 ,for the nation may originally have been united1 and the natural distinction between freeman and serf been only evolved at a later time1 or the difference between castes1 classes1 and privileged persons may have grown out of earlier distinctions of nations and races1 as many are inclined to think is the explanation of the caste distinctions of ,india4 ,all this is a matter of no moment to us here4 ,the main point simply consists in this1 that vital relations of this kind1 which regulate the entire course of human existence1 have their source in natural conditions4 ,on general principles1 no doubt1 distinctions of class can be justified1 but at the same time no individual should be wholly robbed of his right to determine as his choice may direct to which particular class he shall belong4 ,natural capacity1 talents1 adaptability1 and education are the only right means to direct the way and decide in this respect4 ,when1 however1 the right of choice is debarred from birth onwards and a man is made thereby dependent on ,nature and its contingency1 there is always the possibility of conflict within the sphere of this necessity between the states thus enforced on the individual by natural conditions and the measure of spiritual education which he may acquire and the higher demand which it may justly make4 ,this is a pathetic and unfortunate type of collision which has its source in an essential wrong which the freedom of art is quite unable to respect4 ,in the social condition of our own days distinctions of class1 with a few exceptions1 are not determined by birth4 ,the ruling dynasty and the peerage are the only exceptions1 and these depend on a higher conception of the ,state altogether4 ,for the rest1 the mere fact of birth creates no essential distinction that can ultimately determine the class to which a man may belong if he is otherwise competent to join it4 ,for this reason1 however1 we must condition the demand for entire liberty of choice with the requirement that in education1 knowledge1 ability1 and general tastes the individual is equal to the particular society with which he may desire to associate4 ,if1 on the contrary1 the fact of a man's birth presents an insuperable obstacle to such claims1 which he would otherwise be quite competent to satisfy by virtue of his own vigorous activity1 then such a situation must appear to us not merely a misfortune1 but essentially a wrong under which he is compelled to suffer injury4 ,he is thus separated by a purely natural partition wall which is essentially unjust1 that is to say1 one beyond which his talents1 sentiments1 and general education have already raised him1 from that which he was competent to reach1 and a purely natural condition whose legalized fixity has been determined wholly by caprice presumes to oppose insuperable barriers to the freedom rightly demanded by all spiritual life4 ,to examine more closely the nature of this type of collision we shall do well to look at it from three different points of view1 each of which are of essential importance4 ,in the first place1 it is necessary that the individual should1 in the strength of his own spiritual resources1 already really have passed beyond the natural barriers whose opposition is to give way before his aims and desires1 otherwise the demand is simply an act of folly4 ,if1 for example1 a domestic servant1 whose education and ability is merely that of a menial1 falls in love with a princess or a lady of high society1 or1 inversely1 either of these with him1 such a love affair is both absurd and devoid of all taste1 and this is so even if the artistic representation of this passion display all the depth and interest of which an ardent heart is capable4 ,in such a case it is not so much the difference of birth which creates the obstacle2 this is rather to be found in the entire content of interests1 education1 aims of life1 requirements1 and mode of sentiment which distinguish in status1 material resources1 and social qualifications a lady in high position from a domestic servant4 ,if love is1 as in the case assumed1 the one and only bond of a union1 and is associated with nothing else throughout the entire sphere of all that men and women have to live through in just accordance with that which a particular status requires from their intelligence and experience1 it must necessarily remain devoid of content and is simply a union of the senses4 ,love1 to be wholly complete1 is nothing less than a real harmony of the entire conscious life1 in which the full nobility of sentiment can be shared and appreciated4 ,the second case we wish to examine is that in which the dependence of birth surrounds an essentially free human life and the objects it may rightly set before itself with legalized fetters of obstruction4 ,this collision also presents an element unadapted for artistic treatment1 opposed1 that is to say1 to the notion of the ,ideal1 despite its love to make use of it and the facility with which it may attempt to do so4 ,if distinctions of birth through positive laws and the powers which support them create a persistent wrong1 as doubtless may be the case where a man is born an outcast or a ,jew1 he obviously1 from one point of view1 is entirely right in holding with all the strength of his inward life1 which rebels before such a barrier1 that the same is dissolvable1 that he1 in fact1 recognizes his individuality as apart from it4 ,to oppose such restraint appears to be wholly justifiable4 ,but in so far as it becomes impossible through the force of existing circumstances to overcome such a barrier1 which is consequently converted into an irrevocable necessity1 a situation of this kind can only be regarded as a misfortune which itself is not without an element of falsity4 ,for the rational man is inevitably forced1 in so far as he is unable to subjugate the opposing necessity1 to submit to the same3 it is not in reason to continue to fight against the inevitable1 but rather quietly to let it pass over him4 ,he must1 in fact1 abandon the sense of interest in and need of that which is1 by virtue of this barrier1 swept from his reach1 and suffer what he fails to overcome with the quiet courage of passive endurance4 ,where a struggle is of no avail it is the part of wisdom to be quit of it in order at the least to retire into the formal independence of personal liberty4 ,by doing so the forces of wrong have no longer power over him2 if1 on the contrary1 he battles against them he must necessarily experience his dependence in its fullest extent4 ,at the same time it remains unquestionable that neither this abstraction of formal independence any more than that content which can lead to no result are truly beautiful when artistically considered4 ,there is a third type of collision which1 while being immediately connected with that we have just considered1 is equally removed from the genuine ,ideal4 ,it is to be found affecting that class of persons who attempt to assert some privilege which the mere fact of birth concedes them and supports with the full weight of a religious title1 positive enactments1 and the prevailing conditions of society4 ,in such a case1 it is true1 we have an independent position in harmonious relation with what is externally realized in positive institutions1 but when considered as the mere consistency of that which is in itself unjust and irrational it is quite as much as in our former example a purely formal independence1 and the notion of the ,ideal disappears4 ,we may1 no doubt1 very possibly persuade ourselves that the ,ideal is retained because we have here an appearance as though the personal life is in full union with the universal and its legalized constitution1 remaining consistently in such unity2 but it will be observed that here the universal does not assert its dominating power in the particular person1 as we found the heroic ,ideal demanded1 but only in and through the public authority of positive laws and their administration2 moreover1 what the individual here asserts is assumed to be essentially wrong1 and he loses in consequence the substantive significance which we have seen to be also essential to the ,ideal4 ,an affair in which the ideal subject of art is concerned must itself be at bottom true and justifiable4 ,to this type belong the legalized lordship exercised over slaves or serfs1 the right to rob a foreigner of his liberty1 or to sacrifice the same to the gods4 ,no doubt it is quite possible that such a right may be sustained by individuals with unquestioning belief that they are justified in so doing1 as in ,india1 for example1 the higher castes make use of their privileges1 or as ,thoas ordered the sacrifice of ,orestes1 or in ,russia the lords are wont to flout their serfs4 ,in fact1 those who are in authority are very likely to execute such rights as legalized rights on account of the interest they may have in preserving them4 ,but in a case of this kind their right will be merely the unrighteous right of the barbarian1 and they must themselves appear to us in the category of barbarians1 at least1 who resolve to carry out and perfect what is essentially injustice4 ,the legalized form1 under which the individual shelters himself1 is1 for the time to which it belongs1 and its spirit and the educational standard adapted to it1 no doubt to be respected and justified4 ,but if we reflect upon it rationally and apart from that1 it is wholly positive#cba1 containing no intrinsic claims or authority4 ,moreover1 if the individual makes use of his privileges for purely personal objects1 under the mastery of particular passions and the aims of mere selfishness1 in addition to our barbarian we get a bad character to boot4 ,poets have frequently sought to arouse our pity1 and it may be our fear as well1 through the presentation of conflicts of this kind1 following the rule of ,aristotle1 who lays it down that fear and compassion are objects of tragedy4 ,strictly speaking we experience neither fear nor reverence when confronted with rights which only exist among barbarians and are the misfortune of uncivilized times4 ,any compassion which such situations are likely to arouse is almost immediately converted into a spirit of indignant hostility4 ,the only true artistic dnouement of such a conflict is one where we find such illegitimate rights are not carried into execution1 as1 for example1 neither ,iphigenia nor ,orestes are respectively sacrificed in ,aulis and ,tauris4 77 ,the third and last class of that type of collision which is based on purely natural condition is that which is duetto personal passion caused by natural peculiarities of temperament and character4 ,the jealousy of ,othello is a supreme example of this4 ,ambition1 avarice1 nay1 even love itself in certain aspects1 will furnish other illustrations4 ,collision of this kind is only properly referred to such passions in so far as individuals1 seized and dominated exclusively by the power of such emotions1 are thereby forced into antagonism with the truly ethical constitution and inherently justifiable course of human existence1 and consequently are plunged into a still more serious conflict4 ,this carries our inquiry into the consideration of that third subdivision of our original classification of general types of collision1 the type of which is based exclusively upon the conflict of spiritual forces1 in so far as such opposition is the result of human activity4 77 ,we have already observed when dealing with purely natural collisions that they only form the starting-point as it were for further states of contradiction4 ,and the same is more or less true of the second type of conflict already adverted to4 ,all these1 in artistic compositions of really profound significance1 are unable to remain in such forms of opposition as we have hitherto discussed4 ,such disturbances and conflicting elements merely substantiate the opportune moment1 out of which the true and essential forces of spiritual life will clash together in opposition and contend for the mastery4 ,that which is spiritual can only be set in activity by virtue of spirit4 ,consequently the oppositions of ,spirit can only win reality in actual human deed1 can only thus manifest themselves in their true character4 ,the position we have arrived at1 then1 is this4 ,we have on one hand a difficulty1 an obstacle1 a violation effected through something human life has carried out in action4 ,we have on the other a violation of interests and forces intrinsically just and right4 ,by treating these two forms of determination in close juxtaposition we1 for the first time1 are able to gauge the full depth of this last type of collision4 ,we may distinguish between the prominent examples which fall within the consideration of this class of cases as follows3 77 ,in passing from the sphere of that type of conflict which we have pointed out rests for its primary basis on what is entirely due to ,nature we observe that the first class of cases which confronts us on crossing the boundary to the consideration of a new type is closely related to that we have just left behind us4 ,if1 then1 human action is assumed to be responsible for the collision1 it will follow that what is carried out as natural through human action1 that is to say1 in so far as humanity is not entirely spiritual1 will consist in this that a particular action is performed unconsciously and without purpose1 which will be found afterwards to be a positive infraction of the forces of self-respecting and civilized society4 ,the consciousness which any man latterly acquires of the injurious nature of an action1 of which he was previously unaware1 will drive him who still accepts the responsibility of such an action into division and conflict4 ,the ground of such a conflict1 in fact1 consists in the opposition with which the mind is confronted between that which was actually before it when the action took place1 and the subsequent discovery of all that was really implied in the act itself4 ,the cases of dipus and ,ajax will at once suggest themselves as examples4 ,the action of dipus1 if viewed simply with reference to his will and knowledge1 amounted merely to the fact that he killed a perfect stranger in a quarrel4 ,the unconscious act was the reality in its full significance1 that is to say1 the murder of his own father4 ,ajax1 in a fit of frenzy1 slaughtered the cattle of the ,greeks believing them to be the ,greek chieftains4 ,on regaining his senses and discovering what he really did he is seized with a sense of shame which drives him into collision with himself4 ,we must1 however1 observe that what has been unconsciously violated by a man in the type of collision we are now examining ought to be something which he himself1 when fully in a position to judge1 would both honour and revere4 ,if such a reverential attitude has its roots merely in personal idiosyncrasy or superstition1 such a collision can arouse1 to say the least1 no really profound interest4 77 ,further1 inasmuch as in the cases we are now discussing the conflict arises from a spiritual violation of spiritual forces through human action1 the collision more generally appropriate to the type will consist in a violation which is perpetrated with full consciousness proceeding out of such and the intention it implies4 ,the point of departure here may centre again in passion1 violence1 folly1 and other similar qualities4 ,the ,trojan war1 for example1 originates in the rape of ,helen4 ,agamemnon afterwards sacrifices ,iphigenia1 and so violates the feelings of her mother1 slaying thus the darling of her womb4 ,clytemnestra1 in consequence1 murders her spouse4 ,orestes avenges the murder of his father and king by assassinating his mother4 ,in a similar way in ,hamlet the father is sent to his grave by a stratagem1 and the mother of ,hamlet insults the manes of the dead man by a precipitate marriage with his murderer4 ,in the case of these collisions as in those already considered1 the main point is this1 that humanity is engaged in a self-imposed conflict with what is intrinsically moral1 true1 and worthy of reverence4 ,if this is not so1 then1 for all who are really conscious of what is moral and right1 such a conflict can only appear without worth or material significance1 as is the case1 for example1 in the famous episode of the ,mah-,bhrata1 with reference to ,nalas and ,damayanti4 ,king ,nalas marries the princess ,damayanti1 who is allowed the privilege of making a free choice among her sisters4 ,all the other suitors are genii floating in the air2 ,nalas stands on the ,earth alone as a man1 and she has the good sense to select him4 ,the genii are consequently much enraged1 and watch for the moment when they may find ,king ,nalas tripping4 ,for many years they can bring to his charge no offence1 as he is capable of none4 ,at last1 however1 they obtain power over him1 for he commits a great crime2 the crime is this1 namely1 that after making water1 he treads with his foot upon the earth thus watered4 ,according to ,indian ideas this is a severe offence which cannot escape punishment4 ,from that moment the genii have him in their power2 one renders all his amatory desires abortive1 another excites his brother against him1 and finally poor ,nalas1 after forfeiting his throne and being reduced to beggary1 is driven forth a wanderer in wretchedness with ,damayanti4 ,at length he is even compelled to part with her1 until1 as the tale will have it1 after many adventures1 he is once more set on the throne of his original happiness4 ,the real conflict upon which for the ,indians of old days the whole of this story was supported was an essential desecration of a sacred thing3 according to our notions the tale is absurd from beginning to end4 77 ,thirdly1 it is not necessary that the disruption should be direct1 or1 in other words1 that the action taken solely by itself should be an act of collision2 the fact of collision may well appear out of relations and circumstances of opposition and antagonism which are forced upon the mind during the process of that action's execution4 ,juliet and ,romeo are in love with one another4 ,in the mere fact of their love there is nothing to suggest disunion4 ,but they are aware that their families are living in mutual hate and hostility1 that their parents will never consent to the marriage1 and they are carried into collision by virtue of this preassumed situation of antagonistic forces4 ,we must content ourselves here with these very general remarks upon the relation which the determinate situation occupies in its opposition to the universal world-condition4 ,were we to extend our inquiry into all the divergent aspects1 modifications1 and nuances of the subject1 attempting thereby to express an opinion upon every possible form of situation1 this chapter would alone present us with sufficient matter for discussions of endless prolixity and diffuseness4 ,the discovery of different situations implies a content of exhaustless possibilities2 and in every particular example the essential question involved is how such may be adapted to the treatment of any specific art1 in true subordination to the principles and character of such an art4 ,to the fairy story much is permitted which is forbidden to a more stringent mode of artistic representation4 ,and we may say that generally the discovery#cbb of the situation is a critical point in the process of art-production which often presents great difficulty to artists4 ,in our own days the difficulty of obtaining a suitable subject-matter as a source for the circumstances and situations which the artist requires is a common complaint4 ,at first sight it may appear to us more in keeping with our notion of poet if he borrow from his own resources1 and invent situations himself2 but such independence does little to increase his claims as a creative artist4 ,for the situation does not directly constitute the spirituality of his work nor indeed give us its true artistic form3 all that it does is to supply the external material in which as its appropriate medium a character or temperament is unfolded before us4 ,it is only after working into this external material in which actions and characters find their starting-point that the true genius of the artist is actively displayed4 ,the poet consequently has little or no claim to our thanks for merely having himself invented this least of all poetical aspects of his production4 ,he is1 in fact1 fully entitled to draw as much and as frequently as he pleases from anything that comes to his hand1 whether it be history1 saga1 mythos1 or chronicle1 nay1 even from material and situations which have already been artistically treated4 ,just as we find in the art of painting the external matter of the situation is borrowed from legends of saints1 and the process has been repeated on similar lines over and over again4 ,to discover the real artistic significance of such artistic work we must penetrate far beyond the mere invention of particular situations4 ,the same remarks will apply in full force to the entire wealth of the circumstances and developments artistically handled4 ,in reference to this it is frequently claimed as a virtue of modern art in contrast with that of the ancients that we find in it an infinitely more exuberant imagination4 ,as a matter of fact1 we do find in the artistic creations of the ,middle ,ages and our modern world the most extraordinary variety and interfusion of situations1 events1 and occurrences1 whether tragic or otherwise4 ,this fulness of detail1 however1 does not take us far4 ,in spite of it all we have very few dramas or epics of the first excellence4 ,for the main point is not the external course and interchange of a variety of events1 when we find such events and histories merely complete the entire content of our work of art2 rather it is the ethical and spiritual form which embodies them1 and the masterful movements of temperament and character which are exposed and unveiled during the entire process of this artistic embodiment4 ,glancing now at the main position we have arrived at1 and from which our inquiry will proceed1 we have found that circumstances1 conditions1 and relations1 whether determined with a reference to the external world or the subjective consciousness1 only create the situation by virtue of the temperament or passion which experiences them and derives its nutriment through them4 ,we have further seen that the situation breaks up this determinate form in opposition1 obstruction1 development1 and disruption1 so that the emotional life feels itself compelled by the force of the affecting circumstances to react with energy against this disturbing and restraining influence1 which stands in the way of its objects and passions4 ,it is here1 in truth1 that the action1 strictly speaking1 commences1 when1 that is to say1 the contradiction has fully asserted itself1 which was already implied in the fully defined situation4 ,inasmuch as1 however1 the action which is based on this collision disturbs the unity of that which is opposed to it1 it calls into being by its antagonism the opposing force of that which it confronts1 and consequently the action is immediately associated with the reaction4 ,with this analysis of the forces rendered necessary by dramatic action1 we have at length arrived at the notion of the ,ideal as a fully defined process4 ,for we are here presented with two distinct spheres of interest1 both of which have been rent1 as it were1 from the harmony they originally possessed1 and confront each other in conflict4 ,such1 by the contradiction which is involved in them1 make a resolution of the discord necessary4 ,this movement1 regarded as a homogeneous whole1 belongs no more to the province of the mere situation and its conflicts2 we are carried now into that portion of our inquiry to which we have already given the name of the genuine action4 #c4 ,,the ,,action ,in the development of the subject under consideration1 the action immediately follows after the universal world-condition and the particular situation4 ,in considering the action in its external relation to that portion of our inquiry we have just concluded it will be well to bear in mind the result we arrived at1 that it presupposes circumstances which necessitate collisions1 action1 and reaction4 ,it is impossible to determine at what point in the circumstances thus presupposed the action will begin4 ,for that which in one aspect will appear as commencement will very possibly present itself in another as the result of earlier developments1 and to that extent will postpone the real starting-point4 ,and in like manner this1 too1 we may regard as a fact resulting from former collisions4 ,to take an example2 in the house of ,agamemnon ,iphigenia in ,tauris expiates the guilt and misfortune of her family4 ,the commencement here of this deliverance on the part of ,iphigenia is the fact that ,diana carries her to ,tauris4 ,this circumstance is1 however1 merely the result of earlier stages of the story1 such as the sacrifice in ,aulis1 which is again conditioned by the injury done to ,menelaus in the rape of ,helen by ,paris1 and so on1 ever backward1 until we come to the famous egg of ,leda4 ,in the same way the events which are the subject-matter of the ,iphigenia in ,tauris presuppose the murder of ,agamemnon1 and all the crimes associated with the house of ,tantalus4 ,an analysis of much the same character might be applied to the ,theban circle of mythos4 ,if an action is to be represented with all the facts that condition it1 poetry is the only real art that can attempt this4 ,such a complete exposition of historical fact has already become1 as a certain proverb reminds us1 rather a wearisome business2 it is1 in fact1 more within the province of simple prose1 and1 in contrast with such completeness1 poetry will rather consider its true function to be that of taking its audience at once into the heart of the matter4 ,there is a further important reason why it should not be to the interest of art to make its commencement from that point where we find the action under consideration is in the first instance externally conditioned1 and it is this3 such a point of departure is1 after all1 only related to the process regarded as natural or historical fact#cbc4 ,the association of the action with this commencement merely concerns the empirical unity of its appearance2 it may1 however1 in itself be of no significance at all to the real content of the action4 ,this external unity of historical sequence remains just as it was1 however it may chance that one particular person is affected by the involved threads of a varying series of fact4 ,no doubt the entirety of the facts of life1 its actions and fatalities1 tends to make the individual what he is2 but for all that his true nature1 the real core of his thoughts and capacities1 is manifested in one great situation and action independently of them4 ,it is the progress of these which reveals to us really what a character is made of1 a character which previously to their occurrence had been known merely in a nominal way1 that is the name of one more fact among the external facts of experience4 ,we must therefore not look for the commencement of the action in that empirical source of it2 we must rather centre the attention upon those circumstances which have taken a hold upon the particular nature with which we are dealing1 and created or satisfied its needs2 we must1 in fact1 reveal the particular collision in whose conflict and resolution the action in question consists4 ,homer1 for example1 in the ,iliad1 makes a start at once with the particular fact on which his entire epic is founded1 that is to say1 with the wrath of ,achilles4 ,he tells us nothing of earlier history of the life of ,achilles1 but emphasizes at once the critical collision1 and1 moreover1 does it in a way which unfolds a background of the greatest interest to his picture4 ,the representation1 then1 of the action as a process complete in itself1 in which action1 reaction1 and resolution are constituent elements1 is1 above all1 the function of the poetic art2 all the other arts can at most only seize upon and secure in their presentation one moment of this process4 ,it is quite true that if we direct our attention to that aspect of the medium they employ which is richest1 they may appear to have an advantage over poetry2 in painting especially#cbd we find a control asserted not merely over the entire external form1 but also over the expression of external demeanour and the play of such relatively to other objects grouped around it4 ,such a means of expression1 however1 cannot compare as an interpreter of truth with human speech4 ,the action itself is the clearest means of unfolding to us individual character1 whether we view it relatively to the entire emotional life#cbe or the objects of mind4 ,all that a man is at the very root of his nature is first revealed to us through his acts2 and action1 for the reason that it is an expression of spirit1 finds its ultimate expression as such most clearly and concisely in speech alone4 ,when we speak in general terms of human action we are apt to figure to ourselves an incalculable variety of mode4 ,for ,art1 however1 the sphere of action suitable to artistic representation is1 generally speaking1 limited4 ,her province is wholly restricted to the type of action which is conformable to the necessary configuration of the ,idea4 ,there are three points of essential importance necessary to grasp in connection with such action as is capable of artistic representation1 and which we may emphasize as follows4 ,the situation and the resulting conflict is that which generally stimulates it2 the active movement1 however1 taken by itself1 the element of difference1 that is to say1 of the ,ideal in its activity1 is made apparent first by virtue of the reaction4 ,this movement may be resolved into the following component features3 ,first1 we have the universal#cbf forces1 which constitute the essential content and object1 for the sake of which the action takes place4 ,secondly1 we have the realization#cbg of these forces in the individuals who act4 ,thirdly1 the two aspects above mentioned have to unite themselves in that which1 in default of any better generic term1 we will here call character4 7a7 ,the ,universal ,forces of ,action 7a7 ,however much we have finally arrived in our consideration of the action at a point where the definition and differentiation of the ,ideal is of the first importance1 nevertheless the very notion of art renders it necessary that in the sphere of true beauty1 be the aspect of it whatsoever it may1 it must still have upon it the stamp of the ,ideal2 it cannot1 that is to say1 maintain itself without rationality and the justification it implies4 ,interests of an ideal character must inevitably be in conflict with another1 so that might is opposed to might4 ,these interests are1 in fact1 the eternal and universal forces of spiritual existence1 the essential cravings of the human heart1 the spontaneous and inevitable objects of human action1 justifiable and rational in virtue of their own character1 and consequently the very universal powers to which we have referred4 ,they are indeed not the absolute ,divine itself1 but rather the sons of the one absolute ,idea#cbh1 and consequently dominant and valid4 ,they are the children of the one universal truth1 albeit only determinate1 particular moments of the same4 ,through their very distinction1 it is true1 they can fall into contradiction or disunion1 yet despite all the element of difference contained1 they must possess the original essentiality within them in order to appear as the determinate ,ideal4 ,such are the supreme motive forces of art4 ,they are the eternal#cbi religious and ethical modes of relationship1 status1 personal character#ccj1 and in the world of romance1 before everything else1 honour and love4 ,in the particular grade of their significance these powers differ1 but all are essentially the product of reason4 ,at the same time it is these powers in the human heart and mind1 which man1 by virtue of his humanity1 is bound to recognize1 to give free play to1 and to actualize4 ,at the same time they ought not directly to appear as rights in positive legislation4 ,for1 to take one reason1 the form of positive legislation1 as we have seen1 is already in partial conflict with the notion and content of the ,ideal2 furthermore1 it is quite possible that the content of positive rights may contribute to that which is essentially unjust1 albeit entirely clothed in the attributes of law4 ,the relations we have above referred to1 however1 are not merely the supreme stable embodiment of the external world#cca1 but the essentially substantive powers1 which for the very reason that they contain in themselves the actual content of human existence1 continue to be the stimulating source of its activity1 and ultimately all that ever carried it forward to perfection4 ,of this kind are the interests and objects which contend against each other in the ,antigone of ,sophocles4 ,creon1 the king1 as ruler of the state1 by a decree couched in the severest terms1 forbade the right of burial to the son of dipus1 who had proved himself an enemy of his country by bringing an army against ,thebes4 ,this proclamation was so far justifiable that it expressed care for the weal of the entire city4 ,antigone1 however1 is animated by an ethical principle of equal authority1 in other words by her love for her brother1 whom she finds it impossible to leave unburied1 the prey of carrion birds4 ,to leave such a duty unfulfilled would be in direct opposition to the sacred instincts of her personal relationship4 ,she consequently violates the decree of ,creon4 77 ,collisions of the type with which we are now dealing may be introduced in every possible way2 the necessity of the reaction1 however1 must not be occasioned by means of anything out of place or at cross purposes#ccb with the main action1 but through that which is in itself reasonable and justifiable4 ,for example1 in the well-known ,german poem of ,hartmann von der ,aue1 ,the ,poor ,henry1 the collision is repulsive4 ,the hero in this poem is visited by a fatality1 that is to say1 an incurable disease4 ,he turns for assistance to the monks of ,salermo4 ,they state as the condition of his cure that a human being must willingly surrender his or her life1 on the ground that the necessary salve can alone be forthcoming from a human heart4 ,a poor maiden who is in love with the knight offers freely her own life and accompanies him into ,italy4 ,this is pure barbarism1 and the silent love and pathetic devotion of the maiden are unable1 consequently1 to produce their full effect4 ,it is true that we find the injustice of human sacrifice presented us by the ancients as the ground of the collision4 ,the famous example is that of the story of ,iphigenia1 who is first offered as such a sacrifice1 and afterwards is on the point of offering up her brother4 ,but1 in the first place1 it is to be observed that in these examples the conflict is in close connection with other relations which are in themselves justifiable2 secondly1 the artistic principle is really satisfied1 as we have already observed1 by the fact that both ,iphigenia and ,orestes are finally delivered1 and the power of a collision which is opposed to our notion of right is thus destroyed4 ,and1 indeed1 this is also the case in the above mentioned poem of ,hartmann1 in so far as we may acknowledge the dnouement offered us in which1 on ,henry refusing to accept the sacrifice1 ,god releases him from his malady1 and the maiden is rewarded for her true love#ccc4 ,in apparent association with the positive powers we have enumerated must be added others set over against them1 that is to say1 the forces of that which is negative and bad1 evil in short4 ,that which is purely negative1 however1 ought not to be taken in the ideal representation of an action as the essential ground-motive for the necessary reaction4 ,the reality of the purely negative case1 it is true1 corresponds to the negative and its appropriate character1 but1 if the implied#ccd notion and object is already in itself rendered nugatory1 it is even less possible that the ugliness which is exposed in the inward life should manifest any genuine beauty upon its external reality4 ,the sophistry of passion can1 indeed1 by means of the capacity1 strength1 and energy of a character1 make the attempt to graft positive characteristics upon the negative1 but we only obtain thereby the vision of a whitewashed grave4 ,for that which is purely negative is generally flat and stale and leaves us consequently either void or drives us back1 whether it be used as the motive force of an action or merely as a means to promote a reaction in another4 ,the horrible1 unfortunate1 the harshness of dominion1 and the obduracy of superior power may form part of the content and burden of the imagination when such characteristics are exalted and carried by the abundant greatness of a particular character or object4 ,evil1 however1 taken simply for what it is1 envy1 cowardice1 and meanness1 is merely repulsive4 ,the devil1 if we take him for what he really ought to be1 is consequently a bad subject1 or rather a figure for which ,art has no uses at all4 ,he is just a falsehood and nothing more1 and consequently an extremely prosaic personality4 ,in the same way it is perfectly true that the ,furies of hate and many other allegorical figures of later times are potencies of a kind1 but they are without affirmative subsistency and holdfastness#cce1 unfavourable to ideal representation1 although in this respect a wide margin of difference is permissible in the several arts respectively1 and in the particular mode in which they may immediately visualize such objects4 ,evil is1 to express it in most general terms1 essentially cold and devoid of content1 because as such it is merely the source of negation1 discord1 and misfortune4 ,all art1 however1 which is true to its essential notion1 should reflect on us the vision of a harmony4 ,meanness1 above all1 is despicable1 for it is a quality which arises from the envy and hatred of all that is noble1 and does not shrink from distorting even a power that is essentially based upon the good into a means conformable to its own perverse and shameless passion4 ,the great poets and artists of the classical world have in consequence never presented us with the vision of absolute evil and depravity4 ,shakespeare1 on the contrary1 in his tragedy of ,king ,lear1 unfolds before us the spectacle of wickedness in all its horrors4 ,the old ,lear divides his kingdom among his daughters1 and1 while doing so1 is foolish enough to believe in their false and flattering speeches1 and to misinterpret the silent and faithful ,cordelia4 ,there is already folly and madness in this1 and it is followed by the most outrageous ingratitude and worthlessness of the elder daughters and their husbands to the point of absolute craze4 ,as an antithesis of this the heroes of the ,french school of tragedy are stretched and puffed out with every sort of grandiose and sublime motive1 and make a great parade of their honour and nobility1 and yet despite of it all destroy the very meaning of such motives by the mere fact of what they really are and accomplish4 ,but it is in modern times more especially that we find this unstable dissolution of everything spiritual#ccf1 which forces its way through every dissonance1 however repulsive1 become quite la mode2 moreover1 it has even given us what we may describe as the humour of the abominable thing1 a kind of burlesque simulation of irony1 an atmosphere in which a ,theodor ,hoffmann1 for example1 has found himself so much at home4 77 ,we may conclude1 then1 that it is the essentially positive and substantive powers in the spiritual world which supply the real content of the ideal action4 ,these sources of energy1 however1 in their artistic embodiment1 must not appear in their inherent universality1 albeit within the reality of the action they are essential phases of the ,idea4 ,rather they must receive the form of independent individuals4 ,if this were not so they would remain as merely the universals of thought or abstract conceptions which do not properly fall within the province of art4 ,though in their origin they should be held as intact as it is possible to hold them from mere caprices of the fancy1 it is equally necessary that in their development they should acquire determinacy no less than self-consistency#ccg1 and in this way appear as essentially particularized4 ,such definition as they possess ought not to be carried to the point of the particularity of external objects1 nor should their concentration be carried to that of the subjective self-consciousness#cch4 ,otherwise the individuality of those universal powers is necessarily involved in all the developments of finite existence4 ,in this respect we may say1 then1 that the determinacy of their individuality is not to be taken too seriously4 ,the gods of the ,greek ,pantheon are the most conspicuous example of this manifestation and sway of the universal forces we have just discussed in their self-subsistent form4 ,however they may be brought before us1 their blessedness and cheerfulness remains unaffected4 ,regarded separately as particular gods no doubt they engage in conflict1 but in all their battles we shall ultimately find they are not really serious in the sense that they concentrate themselves on any definite object with the entire consequential energy of their character and passion1 fully prepared to stake their existence upon the result4 ,they engage in this affair or that wherever it may take place1 identify particular interests in concrete examples with their own2 they are1 however1 equally ready to leave the matter at any point and wing their way back happily to ,olympus4 ,such is the view we get of the gods when they engage in warfare on the pages of ,homer4 ,the determinacy of their characterization is capable of conflict1 but they remain for all that the purely universal determinations which at bottom they are4 ,a battle begins to rage2 heroes advance singly one against another2 then we lose sight of individuals altogether in the universal storm and crush2 it is no longer the specific qualities of individuals which are now set in relief against each other--it is the universal rush of the fight1 the daemon of war loosed and roaring1 and now it is that the universal powers1 the gods themselves1 step forth on the scene of battle4 ,from such a temporary display of the contrasts of their characterization they ever withdraw themselves into the solitude of their self-subsistency and repose4 ,for though the individuality of their form carries them perforce into the region of time and contingency1 nevertheless inasmuch as the universal they claim as gods is that which ultimately must prevail1 the individual characteristic shrinks away into the determination of external form only2 they are unable in their personality to penetrate the true arcana of conscious spirit#cci4 ,their physical definition is1 in fact1 either more or less only the accommodating form of their divinity4 ,but this self-subsistency and careless repose is precisely that which gives to them their plastic individuality1 and relieves them of any anxiety and constraint#cdj in relation to earthly objects and events#cda4 ,for this reason we find in the gods of ,homer no final result when actively occupied with the concrete facts of human life1 although such activity is displayed for us in many and diverse directions4 ,the material and interest of human events which happen in time is that which gives them something to do and nothing more4 ,and in like manner we may remark other peculiar characteristics attached to the ,greek gods1 which we can only regard as essentially unrelated to the general notion of divinity which each god respectively connotes4 ,mercury is1 for example1 the slayer of ,argus2 ,apollo that of the hydra2 of the love affairs of ,zeus we have countless tales1 and1 among other things1 he hangs his wife on an anvil4 ,these and many other stories like them are merely supplementary additions1 which attach to the gods in their aspect of natural forces by virtue of symbol and allegory1 the origin of which we propose to discuss more fully later on4 ,in modern art we shall1 it is true1 find certain indications which point to a conception of definite and at the same time universal powers4 ,these are1 however1 for the most part simply cold and frost-like allegories of hate1 envy1 hope1 love1 faithfulness1 that is to say1 generally of virtues and vices in the actual truth of which we can retain no belief4 ,for with us moderns it is the concrete subjectivity alone1 for which we1 in the representations of art1 feel that profounder interest1 wherein abstractions such as these do not appear in their isolation1 but are made to appear merely as phases or aspects of human character1 whether we regard it in its particularity or as a concrete whole4 ,in much the same way the angels possess no essential universality and self-subsistency such as characterize ,mars1 ,venus1 and ,apollo1 or even ,oceanus and ,helios4 ,they are1 it is true1 objects of imaginative conception1 but their specific character is that of vassals of the one ,divine and essential substance1 which is not in this case broken up into self-subsistent individualities1 as we find it in the ,greek ,pantheon4 ,for this reason we have here no imaginative vision of many objective powers dwelling in a state of tranquillity1 which may be represented as essentially ,divine personalities4 ,we find1 on the contrary1 the essential content of such either as subsisting in the ,godhead1 or realized in a mode which is both particular and subjective in wholly human characters and actions4 ,nevertheless it was precisely in the conception#cdb of self-subsistency and individualization that the ideal representation of the gods originated4 7b7 ,the ,individuals in the ,action ,in the cases we have just discussed of the ideal gods it is not a difficult matter for art to secure the ideality she requires4 ,but in approaching the concrete action1 ideal representation is confronted with a real difficulty4 ,for though it is here that the gods and1 in general terms1 the universal powers may be identified with a principle which stimulates and compels activity1 we are not therefore on the plane of reality entitled to find in them the source of genuine individual action4 ,action is rather essentially the manifestation of human life4 ,consequently there are in this connection two distinct aspects of the problem to be considered4 ,on the one hand we have these universal forces in their self-subsistent repose and for that reason more abstract substantiality2 on the other there is the individuality of men1 in which we must seek the final spring and determinating impulse to action no less than its actual accomplishment4 ,it is1 of course1 only the simple truth that these eternally dominant powers are immanent in the identical nature of mankind1 constituting1 in fact1 the substantive core of its character2 but in so far as they are comprehended in their ,divine nature themselves as individuals#cdc1 and thereby in an exclusive way1 their relation to the subject of human consciousness must remain an external one4 ,and this fact enables us to see the essential difficulty we noticed above4 ,there is1 in truth1 a contradiction immediately involved in this relation between the gods and men4 ,it is quite true that the content of the gods is that which belongs to humanity1 and announces itself as his passion1 resolve1 and will4 ,it is1 however1 equally true that the gods must not only be assumed to be and comprehended as independent from man individually considered in their actual existence1 but1 furthermore1 as the forces at the root of all his activity and determination4 ,and this1 too1 in such a way that we are forced to consider the same determinations at one time as personified in the self-subsistent and ,divine personality1 and at another that which appears most essentially to belong to the human heart4 ,and it is for this reason that the free self-subsistency of the gods no less than the freedom of human individuals in their activity is seriously compromised if1 to the detriment of human independence1 which we have already stated to be of most essential importance to the ,ideal of ,art1 we ascribe an exclusive power of command to the gods4 ,and we may observe this is precisely the same kind of difficulty which confronts us in the form of the religious conceptions of ,christianity4 ,it is stated in terms that the spirit of ,god leads up to ,god4 ,taken strictly such a phrase can only imply that the inward life of man is regarded as a purely passive ground1 upon which the spirit of ,god labours4 ,in such a conception the human will disappears as a free will1 and at the same time the ,divine purpose which motives the in working above mentioned can only appear to man as a kind of ,fate1 under which he fails to come by his own true personality#cdd4 77 ,if1 however1 this question of mutual relation#cde is so understood that man in his action is conceived as standing in a purely external opposition to ,god1 here posited as eternal substance1 the relation of both is one of pure matter of fact#cdf4 ,god gives a command1 and man is obliged to hearken4 ,even great poets have found themselves unable to dispense with this conception of external opposition between gods and men4 ,in the ,philoctetes of ,sophocles1 for example1 we find that ,philoctetes1 after he has confounded the deceit of ,odysseus1 persists in his determination not to return to the ,grecian camp until ,heracles appears at length as ,deus ex machina1 and orders him to yield to the entreaty of ,neoptolimus4 ,the content of this apparition is1 no doubt1 sufficiently motived1 and answers to our own expectation2 the catastrophe itself1 however1 is for all that not rightly homogeneous1 but rather outside the action2 and in his noblest tragedies ,sophocles makes no such use of this kind of representation1 according to which1 if we but carry it one step further1 the gods are reduced to lifeless machines1 and individual men simply to the instruments of a foreign caprice4 ,in a similar way we constantly in epic poetry meet with the active intervention of the gods represented in a mode which is external to human freedom4 ,hermes1 for example1 conducts ,priam to ,achilles2 ,apollo gives ,patroclus the blow between the shoulders which ends his life4 ,we also frequently find mythological traits treated in such a way that they appear as wholly external to the actual lives of the individuals thus affected4 ,achilles1 for example1 is dipped by his mother in the ,styx and thereby rendered invulnerable and invincible to the one point of his heels4 ,if we reflect on this rationally it is obvious that all real bravery disappears1 and all that is heroic in the character of ,achilles is converted from a real trait of his essential manhood to a purely physical advantage4 ,such a mode of representation is1 however1 far more permissible to the epic than it is to the dramatic type of poetry1 for the good reason that in the epic that aspect of spiritual life which is directly concerned with the intention implied in the execution of objects falls into the background and a larger field is1 in general1 offered for the play of external characteristics4 ,such a criticism of the prosaic understanding as the one above1 which charges a poet with the absurdity that his heroes are no heroes at all1 should only be advanced with the greatest caution1 for it is partly in such traits as will appear shortly1 that the poetical relation between gods and men is preserved4 ,it is another matter1 and we have nothing left us but prose1 when in addition the powers1 which are posited as substantive individuals1 are mere empty shadows1 the creations of the caprice of fancy and the arbitrariness of a false originality4 ,they are then for the most part only the adjuncts of superstition or imbecility4 77 ,the truly poetic relation of ideality consists1 then1 in the identity of gods and men2 and this must assert itself even though the universal powers are presented as independent and free from the particularity of human beings and passions4 ,in other words1 all that we attribute to the gods must at the same time establish itself as that which is essentially cognate with the spiritual life of particular men in this sense1 that while the dominating powers appear as essentially personified1 yet at the same time all that is thus posited in an external relation to man is none the less clearly that which is immanent in his own spirit and character4 ,the true function of the artist is1 therefore1 to introduce a mediating link between the difference involved in these two aspects1 to bind them1 in short1 by a finely conceived thread of relation which1 while clearly emphasizing their springs in the spiritual life of man1 shall make no less visible the universal and essential element which is therein implied and present such to the imagination in individual form4 ,the emotional life of man must reveal itself in the gods1 who1 in fact1 are the self-subsistent and universal embodiments of that which is active and dominant in his own spiritual experience4 ,then alone are the gods at the same time gods in cognate relation with his own heart and emotions4 ,when1 for example1 we are told by the ancients that ,venus or ,amor has put a constraint upon the heart1 no doubt in the first place these divinities are apprehended as external powers2 but human love is equally a stimulus and a passion1 which is implanted in the heart and is part of that it independently contains4 ,in much the same sense is the frequent reference to the ,eumenides4 ,we have to picture in the first instance no doubt these avenging maidens as ,furies1 who pursue the transgressor in an external form4 ,but this pursuit is but another aspect of the ,fury which drives through the soul of the perpetrator of crime2 and ,sophocles in the dipus ,colonus 7,i4 #adcd7 actually refers to them in this sense of inward spiritual forces1 as the ,eumenides of dipus himself1 that is to say1 who signify the father's curse as the result of the stress of emotion caused by the conduct of his sons4 ,we have1 then1 and equally have not reason on our side whether we identify the gods with powers external to man1 or find in them that which belongs exclusively to his spiritual life4 ,they are in fact both4 ,in ,homer1 for example1 the activity of gods and men is a constantly involved skein#cdg4 ,the gods appear to accomplish what is foreign to human activity1 and yet for all that execute only that which is in vital co-ordination with his own emotional life4 ,in the ,iliad1 for example1 when ,achilles1 in the stress of controversy1 is about to raise his sword against ,agamemnon1 ,athene steps forth behind him and takes hold of his head of flaxen hair1 visible only to himself4 ,hero1 who is equally anxious over ,achilles and ,agamemnon1 sends for them from ,olympus1 and their admission there appears to be wholly independent of the desire of ,achilles4 ,on the other hand we have no difficulty in seeing that the sudden appearance of ,athene1 the wisdom which puts constraint upon the hero's wrath1 is simply a reflection of internal conflict1 that the entire description but states in imaginative form what was experienced in the heart of our hero4 ,in fact ,homer himself points this out a few verses previously 7,iliad1 ,i1 v1 #aij71 when he relates about the debate that took place in his heart in the following terms3 1 1 4#cdh ,this inward breaking up of anger into a divided self1 this constraint1 for it is in opposition to the anger1 and ,achilles appears at first to be wholly filled with wrath1 the epic poet has a perfect right to represent at the same time as an external event4 ,in a similar case in the ,odyssey we find ,minerva acting the part of escort for ,telemachus4 ,this attendance is rather more difficult to grasp as a personal experience of the emotional life of ,telemachus1 although we can readily fix on certain points of contact between the external image and the emotion experienced4 ,and this it is we may generally say which constitutes the cheerful buoyancy of the ,homeric gods1 and the irony implied in the honour paid to them4 ,their self-consistency and seriousness are characteristics which tend to dissolve like a cloud1 precisely to the extent that they unfold themselves as the very powers which are native to man's emotional life1 and thereby1 in their manifestation1 leave humanity alone with its own possessions4 ,however1 it is not necessary to look so far abroad for a complete example of the conversion of a purely mechanical conception of ,divine activity into the atmosphere of the subjective consciousness1 the sphere1 that is1 of freedom and ethical beauty4 ,in his ,iphigenia in ,tauris ,goethe has in this connection carried the process through with a beauty that we cannot sufficiently admire4 ,in the drama of ,euripides ,orestes in complicity with ,iphigenia carries off the statue of ,diana4 ,this is simply an act of stealing4 ,then ,thoas comes on the scene1 and orders their pursuit1 and the recovery of the bust of the goddess4 ,finally1 in very prosaic fashion1 ,athene appears and orders ,thoas to stay his hand on the ground that she has independently commended ,orestes to the charge of ,poseidon1 and he1 in deference to her wishes1 has already carried ,orestes far over seas4 ,thoas submits to her advice and replies to it in the following terms 7v1 #addb1 #dc73 ,lady ,athene1 whoever1 on hearing the words of the gods1 does not obey them is but a fool4 ,for how could it be right and fit to contend with the mighty gods4 ,in this relation we can only see the bare external command of ,athene on the one side1 and an equally futile submission of ,thoas on the other4 ,in ,goethe's treatment of the subject1 on the contrary1 ,iphigenia becomes herself exalted to the rank of a goddess1 in reliance upon the truth she feels within herself1 the truth of a human heart4 ,in this sense she turns to ,thoas and exclaims3 ,is it then man alone who has the right ,to accomplish things none ever heard before6 ,shall he alone impress upon the strength ,of hearts heroic the impossible8 ,that which in the drama of ,euripides the command of ,athene effects1 the change in the attitude of ,thoas1 ,goethe's ,iphigenia endeavours to bring about1 and in fact does bring about1 through the depth of the feelings and ideas with which she confronts him4 ,with motions strange ,an enterprise audacious soars within me2 ,a vast reproach and ills yet graver still ,will break on me if the event miscarry2 ,but1 see1 ,i place it on your knees6 ,be true1 ,be only true and worthy of your fame1 ,so your assistance shall declare it truth1 ,truth glorified through me4 ,and to this reply of ,thoas3 ,what6 you believe ,the ,scythian wild and the barbarian ,hear the wise voice of ,truth and hearts humane ,when ,atreus of ,greece still failed to hear4 she answers with the gentlest1 purest trust3 ,nay1 all thus hear ,beneath whatever sky their birth was laid2 ,all needs must hear for whom the springs of life ,flow without let and purely through the soul4 ,then it is she makes the final call upon her greatness of soul1 and the tenderness of her faith at its highest point of effort2 her entreaty touches1 then masters and wrings from him1 in a way that must appeal to every heart1 the permission to return to her own4 ,this alone is necessary4 ,she has no need of the statue of the goddess2 she can depart on her journey without deceit or betrayal of trust4 ,and it is with the finest sense of beauty that ,goethe refers here to the oracular word of the god3 ,bring but to ,greece again the sister who ,all loth at heart in holy temple bides ,on shores of ,tauris1 and the curse is gone4 ,the very human reconciliation disclosed in these words is clearly that the pure and holy ,iphigenia1 the sister1 is in fact the divine personification and the protectress of the house4 ,noble and beautiful ,i wot in sooth ,all that the goddess counselled seemed to me1 exclaims ,orestes to ,thoas and ,iphigenia3 ,like to a holy picture ,the fate unalterable which walled our town ,by one mysterious word1 one word ,divine1 ,is banished1 now that city takes thee back1 ,who art the true protectress of our home2 ,reserve thyself in holy quietness1 ,a blessing to thy brother and thine own2 ,it seemed that all deliverance on ,earth ,had passed away1 and all comes back with thee4 ,in the spirit of these healing words of reconciliation ,iphigenia has already revealed herself to ,orestes by virtue of the purity and ethical beauty of her inner life4 ,it is true that her discernment drives him half mad1 who in the convulsion of his spirit has lost all faith in peace2 but the pure love of the sister does not fail to heal him from every pang with which he is tortured by the ,furies of his soul3 ,within thine arms ,the evil clawed me with its direst clutch ,for the last time1 and to the very marrow ,i shuddered horribly3 and then it vanished1 ,e'en as a serpent to its lair4 ,anew1 ,and all through thee1 the day's breadth ,i enjoy4 ,here1 as elsewhere throughout it1 we can hardly emphasize sufficiently our admiration for the profound beauty of this poem4 ,the material which has the impress of ,christianity upon it is more open to criticism than that which was the subject-matter of antique art4 ,in the sacred legends1 and generally speaking where the religious conceptions of ,christendom prevail1 no doubt we may find the appearance of ,christ1 the ,virgin ,mary and other saints the subject of universal belief2 but along with them the imagination has clothed itself with fanciful aberrations in every direction1 so that witches1 ghosts1 and every sort of spectral apparition are yet more conspicuous objects4 ,in the face of such conceptions1 so far at least as they appear foreign powers to our human nature1 and man submits himself unreservedly to the charm1 seduction1 and influence of their illusions1 artistic representation is wholly given up to every kind of folly and caprice of mere contingency4 ,it is of unique importance that in the treatment of such material the artist take care that the freedom and independence of judgment are in no way impaired4 ,shakespeare has shown us how to do this in most noble fashion4 ,the witches in ,macbeth1 for example1 appear as external powers1 who foretell for ,macbeth his future destiny4 ,what they do foretell1 however1 is precisely that which is his own most secret wish1 which is reflected back on him and declared in this1 merely in appearance1 external form#cdi4 ,with a still closer regard to beauty1 yet profounder insight1 is the ghost in ,hamlet treated as the purely objective embodiment of ,hamlet's own intuitions4 ,we find ,hamlet in the first instance overpowered with a vague feeling that something horrible has taken place4 ,his father's ghost then appears and gives definite form to these awful premonitions4 ,we naturally expect that ,hamlet1 after receiving the facts set forth in his father's warning1 will at once proceed with energy and bring the murderer to book1 a revenge which appears to have ample excuse4 ,but he delays and delays4 ,critics have made this inactivity a matter of reproach to ,shakespeare1 blamed him1 in fact1 as though for this reason the play to some extent never gets properly off4 ,but we must remember ,hamlet is not a strongly practical nature1 rather a finely strung one1 with emotions held in persistent reserve2 a nature which finds it difficult to tear itself from its internal harmony2 melancholy too1 prone to subtleties1 hypochondriacal1 with emotions deeply rooted4 ,for this reason it is obvious that he is prima facie indisposed to prompt action4 ,and this is fundamentally ,goethe's conception of him when he tells us that what ,shakespeare sought to represent was the imposition of some supreme action on a soul whose growth was unadapted to its execution4 ,he in fact interprets the entire drama relatively to this conception of ,hamlet4 ,we have here1 he maintains1 an oak tree planted in an exquisite vase1 which ought really only to contain and shelter the fair flowers2 the roots spread1 the vase is shattered4 ,but it should be noticed that ,shakespeare1 when referring to the apparition of the ghost1 contributes a far profounder trait of character in explanation of this debated point4 ,hamlet delays1 because he does not right off wholly believe in the ghost4 ,the spirit that ,i have seen ,may be a devil3 and the devil hath power ,to assume a pleasing shape2 yea and perhaps1 ,out of my weakness and my melancholy1 ,as he is very potent with such spirits1 ,abuses me to damn me3 ,i'll have grounds ,more relative than this3 the play's the thing1 ,wherein ,i'll catch the conscience of the king4 ,in this passage it is obvious that the apparition as such does not leave ,hamlet merely devoid of all stability#cej1 but that he entertains a reasonable doubt1 and is determined to make his conviction a certainty by his own experiments before he proceeds to act upon it4 77 ,as a summary description of these universal powers1 which appear not merely in their external independence1 but are the vital and moving forces in the human heart and all that is implied in its most intimate life1 we may borrow an expression in use among the ancients1 that is to say ,pathos 747 ,to translate this word adequately is not easy4 ,passion almost always implies as its concomitant an element of meanness or baseness4 ,we contend in ordinary parlance that a man should not surrender himself to his passions4 ,it must therefore be understood that we use the expression pathos in a nobler and more universal sense than this without the slightest implication of anything blameworthy or egotistic4 ,the devoted love of the sister ,antigone is an excellent example of a pathos in the full significance of the ,greek use of the term4 ,pathos in this sense is a power of the emotional life which completely justifies itself1 an essential part of the content of rationality and the free will4 ,orestes1 for example1 kills his mother not so much on account of any force of his emotional life which we strictly can call passion2 rather it is a pathos in itself fully considered upon and essentially sane which carries him on to the awful deed4 ,thus understood we may add that it is impossible to say that the gods possess pathos4 ,they are merely the universal content of that which is the stimulating energy in the resolves and actions of human individuality4 ,the gods as such continue in their repose and freedom from passion1 and however much they may quarrel or contend among themselves1 there is nothing really serious in it all1 or their strife possessed merely a symbolical significance in the view we may take of it as a universal war of the gods4 ,we must therefore strictly limit pathos to the actions of mankind1 and conceive thereunder the essential or rational content1 which is present in the human consciousness identical with itself and throughout suffuses the emotional life4 77 ,we may say1 then1 that pathos constitutes the true mediating link#cea1 the veritable domain of art4 ,the representation of it is the most truly effective part of a work of art1 as it is its influence upon those who look at it4 ,pathos sets a string in motion1 which vibrates through every human heart4 ,every one must know the type of worth and reason1 which underlies the content of a genuine example of pathos1 must recognize it at once when he sees it4 ,and the cause of this is that pathos moves us because it is that which is essentially the vital force of our human existence4 ,and it equally follows that that which is wholly external1 the natural environment and particular scene1 in its active support of the effect of pathos1 need only be treated quite subordinately4 ,nature must in consequence be drawn upon as a fact essentially symbolical and suffer the pathos to re-echo from her walls1 which is the most real subject-matter of artistic representation4 ,landscape is1 for example1 a type or genre of painting of less importance than historical painting2 but even there we find that the school of landscape most independent should not be without a general harmonic relation to human feeling1 and1 in fact1 possesses a certain type of pathos4 ,in this sense we are told art generally ought to touch the emotions4 ,before accepting this principle1 however1 we ought first to inquire through what means this peculiar effect of art must be brought about4 ,to touch the emotions is in general the activity of something in union with feeling1 and mankind1 more particularly the mankind of to-day1 are1 or a more considerable portion of them are1 only too readily open to such experiments4 ,the man who showers tears on us1 starts the seeds of tears1 which grow up fast enough4 ,in art1 however1 only that ought to move us which contains in itself the real import of pathos4 77 ,for such reasons we may affirm that neither in comedy nor in tragedy ought pathos to be that which is only folly or personal idiosyncracy4 ,shakespeare's ,timon1 for example1 is on purely material grounds a misanthrope2 his friends have eaten him up1 consumed his substance1 and when he himself requires their gold desert him4 ,he consequently becomes a passionate enemy of mankind4 ,the situation is both conceivable and consistent with nature1 but it contains no pathos that can be justified on principle4 ,even to a more striking extent is the hate we find in ,the ,misanthrope1 that play of ,schiller's apprenticeship1 purely a vagary of modern ideas4 ,for in this latter case the misanthrope is in addition a thoughtful1 perspicacious1 and entirely noble man1 great-hearted towards his peasants1 whom he has freed from their villeinage1 and devoted to his daughter1 who is1 apart from her beauty1 in all respects worthy of his love4 ,in much the same way1 in that novel of ,august ,lafontaine1 ,quintius ,heimeran von ,flaming is worried with the follies of mankind4 ,it is1 however1 our most latter-day poetry which1 above all1 loves to wind itself into every conceivable knot of fantastical falsehood#ceb1 attempting thereby to secure an effect through mere oddity1 but failing to find the slightest response in any sane person for the reason that every vestige of what is really present in human life has vanished from such refinements of mental athletics4 ,in another direction we may remark that everything which depends solely1 that is to say1 in so far as scientific apprehension is the main requirement1 upon instruction1 testimony to the truth1 and insight of what is offered as such1 is no fit subject-matter for the representation of a genuine pathos4 ,the facts of scientific knowledge are a part of this material4 ,and the reason of this is that science demands a particular form of education1 an effort towards and a knowledge of the specific forms of science and their relative importance of exceptional variety and extension2 an interest in this type of study is by no means a universally moving influence in the hearts of men1 but is limited and must ever remain limited to a narrow circle of votaries4 ,the treatment of purely religious instruction presents similar difficulty1 if we mean by that the development of the same in its profoundest import4 ,no doubt the universal content of religion1 such as the belief in ,god and similar theses1 is of the deepest interest to anyone worthy of it4 ,art is1 however1 not directly concerned either in the exposition of religious dogmas1 nor1 indeed1 in any exceptional insight into their truth2 it is consequently of importance that she should be held aloof front such disquisitions4 ,it is all the more necessary that we should through art entrust every type of pathos to the human heart1 every motive of ethical significance1 which are of practical and vital interest4 ,the influence of religious ideas is rather upon the subjective world of emotion1 the heaven of the heart1 the ever-repeated consolation and uplifting of the individual life1 than upon direct action in the strict sense4 ,for that which is ,divine in religion on its practical side is morality and the powers which are potent in the ethical life4 ,these powers1 however1 in contrast with the heaven of religion in its purest form1 are in definite relation to the world and that which is entirely human4 ,among the ancients this worldly content was fundamentally included in their conception of ,deity1 and consequently their gods could be related directly to human action and its artistic presentation4 ,from all this it will readily appear that the significant moments of volitional activity which present to us the pathos we have just endeavoured to define are numerically small and the range of them restricted4 ,in the opera especially it is inevitable that the sphere from which such may be selected is a narrow one2 we consequently have for ever dinned in our ears the plaints and delights1 the misfortunes and happiness of love1 fame1 honour1 friendship1 maternal and marital devotion4 77 ,now a pathos of this kind requires for its display not merely the power of exposition1 but also that of perfected elaboration#cec4 ,and what is more1 the soul which entrusts to its pathos the spiritual wealth it possesses must be one with real wealth to dispose of1 and not one that can rest in a condition of purely intensive self-concentration4 ,it must1 in short1 be ready to give an outward semblance to its self-expression and rise to the finished perfection of that4 ,the distinction between this power of self-concentration and that of self-revelation is of great importance2 and we shall find that in this respect the types of individuality such as generically represent different races offer essential points of contrast4 ,nations whose reflective consciousness has been highly trained are more eloquent in the expression of their passions than others who are not so4 ,the ancients1 for example1 were accustomed to unfold the pathos1 which is the animating principle of human personality1 in its profoundest significance1 without running off into cold generalities or empty tattle4 ,the ,french also in this respect are naturally gifted1 and their eloquence in the expression of passion is not by any means always merely a piling up of words1 as we ,germans1 following the bent of our national reserve1 to which the repeated expression of emotion appears to be a kind of wrong inflicted upon it1 are only too ready to think it is4 ,in fact1 we have gone so far in this direction that we could mention a distinct phase in our poetical history1 when the younger spirits1 at any rate1 sick to death of that which they dubbed the flush of ,french rhetorical water-drops1 yearned to such an extent after the simplicity of ,nature that their artistic energy could only express itself for the most part in interjections4 ,it is hardly necessary to observe1 however1 that we shall arrive at no open sesame with ,ahs and ,ohs1 a damn here and there thrown in1 or any other random note of storm and bluster4 ,the inspiration of mere interjections is a feeble one1 or rather is simply the way in which the still unrefined nature expresses itself4 ,the spirit which is to reveal to us pathos must be a spirit which is full to running over1 which is able to spread itself abroad and give expression to its virtue4 ,we may add1 too1 that in this respect ,goethe and ,schiller present a most marked contrast4 ,goethe is less pathetic than ,schiller1 makes use of a mode of artistic expression which is more intensive2 more especially in his lyrics we are struck by this characteristic of self-reserve4 ,his songs1 and this is the true quality of the pure lyric1 go naturally on their way1 without entirely giving us all that they contain4 ,schiller1 on the contrary1 is clearly anxious to unfold the pathos of his subject to its furthest limit1 and with all the clearness and force of expression he can muster4 ,claudius in ,wands-becker ,boten#ced has contrasted ,voltaire and ,shakespeare in much the same fashion1 maintaining that the one is what the other only appears to be4 ,master ,arouet tells us3 ',i weep'2 ,shakespeare really weeps6 ,to this we can only reply that it is precisely with such telling and appearance that art is concerned and not with the mere positive fact4 ,if ,shakespeare merely wept while ,voltaire made others think he wept1 so much the worse for the poet ,shakespeare4 ,to conclude1 then1 it is necessary that pathos1 in order to be in itself concrete1 as it should be in ideal art1 be presented in its artistic manifestation as the pathos issuing from a spiritual nature1 rich and comprehensive4 ,and this result carries us forward to that third aspect of our consideration of the action already adverted to1 that is to say1 an inquiry into what is implied by character in this connection4 7c7 ,character ,we will summarize the proceeding argument4 ,our point of departure was the universal and substantive powers which are the original stimulus to action4 ,such require as the medium of their active realization human individuality1 in which they then appear as affecting pathos#cee4 ,but1 furthermore1 the universal inherent in these powers must in particular individuals acquire the concentrated unity and concreteness of a whole1 and a single whole4 ,this totality is man apprehended in his fulfilled spiritual content and the subjectivity therein comprised1 in one word the entire self-contained human individuality which we designate as character4 ,the gods are born into the pathos of men1 and pathos in its more concrete form of activity is human character4 ,in character1 then1 we find the real focus#cef of the ideal exposition of art1 that is to say in so far as the embodiment unites in itself the separate aspects of it already developed as consistent phases1 in the construction of its own totality4 ,for the ,idea as ,ideal1 by which we mean as clothed in a form within the grasp of sensuous imagination and perception1 and in its activity as action and accomplishment1 is1 if we define it strictly1 just this self-relation of the subjective individuality4 ,the individuality1 however1 which is truly free1 and nothing short of this will satisfy the ,ideal1 has not merely to declare itself as universality1 but at the same time1 to assert its nature as concrete singularity1 as the mediating bond which unites and transpierces both sides thus related1 which in their self-related actuality subsist as unity4 ,and this is precisely what we understand by character1 the ideal form of which consists in the wealth of energy with which all the constituent aspects of the subjective life are welded in one whole4 ,we will now inquire rather more closely into the nature of this conception of character viewed under three distinct aspects4 ,first1 as co-extensive#ceg individuality1 that is to say1 with1 our attention directed to the wealth of substance contained in it4 ,secondly1 with direct reference to its particularity1 the form in which it is bound to appear1 albeit still a totality1 as one that is more defined or specific4 ,thirdly1 in our final apprehension of it as a unity which is fully identified with its own determinate form1 that is1 which is throughout fused with the same by virtue of its own principle of subjective self-identity1 and thereby attaches to the whole the significance of an essentially assured character4 ,we will now develop and elucidate more fully what we conceive to be implied in the above general propositions4 77 ,and first we would draw attention to the fact that this pathos1 though an essential feature in the development of completed individuality1 is not1 in the specific form of its appearance1 the sole or exclusive interest of the individuality portrayed4 ,it is1 in fact1 merely one aspect of the efficient#ceh character1 if one of paramount importance4 ,to put it in rather a strong way1 the human soul does not merely carry within it one god as the original of its pathos2 on the contrary1 the spiritual scope of humanity has wider borders1 and we may affirm that many gods make their dwelling in one true man1 or1 rather1 all the powers which are scattered throughout the heaven of the gods are enclosed within that one breast4 ,it is co-extensive with the entire field of ,olympus4 ,in this sense one of old has said3 ,out of thine own passions1 ,o man1 hast thou created the gods4 ,and1 as a matter of fact1 in proportion as the intelligence of the ,hellenic folk quickened1 the number of their gods increased2 and1 furthermore1 the gods of their earliest days were less intelligent1 that is to say1 they were god-like figures deficient both in individuality and determinate character4 ,in this wealth of content1 accordingly1 it is necessary that the character adequate to ideal art should display itself4 ,and this is just that which creates the interest we feel in a character1 namely1 that a totality such as that we have above described emerges from it1 and the character1 while reposing on its abundance1 nevertheless persists in perfect equality with itself1 as one secure and self-excluding subject4 ,if the character1 however1 be not conceived and depicted as this rounded and subjective unity1 is abstract in the sense that it is entirely the sport of one passion1 such must then appear as self-destructive#cei1 or at least cracked1 weak1 and without real fibre4 ,for the weakness and inertness of individuals is just this very thing1 that the eternal forces of which we have spoken never assert themselves in them as a real part of their most essential substance1 as1 to put it logically1 predicates which adhere to them as the subjects of such4 ,in ,homer#cfj1 for example1 every hero is the living focus of a whole congeries of qualities and traits4 ,achilles is the most youthful hero in the host1 but his youthful exuberance is represented as quite compatible with all other entirely human qualities1 and ,homer unfolds before us this variety through situations which offer the finest contrast4 ,he loves his mother1 ,thetis1 he weeps for ,briseis1 when she is snatched from him1 and his violated sense of honour drives him into the conflict with ,agamemnon1 which is the original fount of all the events that follow after it in the ,iliad4 ,add to this he is the truest friend of ,patroclus and ,antilochus2 moreover1 he is the most blooming1 fiery youth1 swift of foot1 brave1 yet full of reverence for gray hairs2 the faithful ,phoenix and trusty servant are at his feet1 and at the funeral of ,patroclus the hoary ,nestor is treated with the highest deference and honour4 ,and1 in contrast to all this1 ,achilles is represented as inflammable to a degree1 effervescent1 revengeful1 and full of the most brutal austerity when face to face with the foe4 ,he binds the slain ,hector to his chariot1 trails the corpse in fell hunter's fashion three times round the walls of ,troy2 yet stays his anger when the old ,priam comes to his tent1 and1 as he thinks within his heart of his own old father1 reaches to the weeping king the hand which has done to death his son4 ,of ,achilles we may well exclaim3 here is a man indeed1 and human nature1 ay1 noble human too1 in all the length and breadth of its riches1 is unveiled before us in this one man6 ,it is just the same with all the other ,homeric characters---,odysseus1 ,diomedes1 ,ajax1 ,agamemnon1 ,hector1 ,andromache--every one of them is a whole1 a world in itself1 a complete and living member of humanity1 something very different at least from your allegorical abstract of some one particular trait4 ,what frosty1 faded personalities1 despite all their vigour and rigour1 are the horned ,siegfried1 ,hagen of ,troy1 nay1 even ,volker1 the musician1 in comparison4 ,it is this variety of characterization1 and this alone1 which can give to a character the interest of life4 ,at the same time this fulness of detail must really appear as included in the personality itself1 that is1 it must not strike us as the mere diversion1 passing freak1 or suggestion of an excited fancy1 such as we see in the case of children who will take up everything in turn1 and even make something out of it1 yet1 for all that1 are without essential character4 ,character in this latter sense will penetrate and make itself a home in the most diverse phases of the emotional life of man1 will steep itself to overflowing with that abundance1 and1 at the same time1 not remain thus immersed1 but throughout all the congeries of interest1 objects1 qualities1 all the traits that distinguish or arrest it1 maintain the form of its self-exclusive and alert subjectivity intact4 ,for the representation of such exhaustive types of character epic poetry is1 above all others1 adapted1 dramatic and lyrical poetry are less so4 77 ,art1 however1 will not be content to remain at the point which the course of our inquiry has reached1 namely1 the notion of character as a mere congeries of traits4 ,for the object we have before us now is the ,ideal in its specific determination1 and singularity1 or1 rather1 concrete individuality1 are both of them prominent and necessary features4 ,action1 more than anything else1 in its conflict and reaction is impossible without some restriction and clear definition of form4 ,for this reason the heroes of dramatic poetry are for the most part of simpler definition than those of epic poetry4 ,and the way we get at a clear definition is through some pathos out of the ordinary which is so portrayed as to make some essential trait of character stand out in bold relief1 and itself to be the stimulus to particular objects1 resolves1 and actions4 ,if1 however1 this simplification is carried so far that any character appears as though it were pared down to a mere shadow-like semblance of any form of pathos1 such as love or honour1 all real vitality and spiritual depth must necessarily vanish1 and the representation1 as is not unfrequently the case in the ,french school of drama for this very reason1 can only offer us a cold and jejune result4 ,we may therefore conclude that in this aspect of particularity the prominent feature which asserts itself pre-eminently will be this1 that within the borders of this very limitation the fulness of life is completely preserved1 so that the personality in question has free scope allowed it for further expansion in many directions1 a power to adapt itself to every variety of situation1 and1 in short1 is able to unfold and express in every possible way the wealth of a truly complete spiritual life#cfa4 ,despite the supreme simplicity of their pathos the characters in the ,sophoclean drama possess this intrinsic vitality4 ,we may indeed compare them in their plastic self-seclusion to the figures of sculpture4 ,for it is also quite possible that sculpture express very various delineations of character despite all the tenacity of its definition4 ,in contrast to the bluster of overpowering passion1 which concentrates all its forces upon one single point1 it exhibits out of its tranquillity and speechlessness that predominant neutrality1 which peacefully envelops all powers within itself2 but this unperturbed unity does not1 however1 persist in any indissoluble union with mere formal definition1 but1 rather1 in virtue of its beauty1 suffers at the same time the birth-throes of all that pertains to it to disrobe itself as through a cloud of immediate possibility into fresh relations of every variety4 ,in the finest figures of sculpture we behold a tranquil depth1 which unfolds1 as it were1 the pregnant womb1 from which all other potencies may be born4 ,in contrast with sculpture it is yet of more vital importance to the arts of painting1 music1 and poetry1 that they should display the inmost complexity of character1 and real artists of every age have recognized this4 ,in ,shakespeare's ,romeo and ,juliet1 for example1 the most pathetic characteristic of ,romeo is his love3 but he is also placed before us under relations of the greatest contrast1 whether it be in reference to his parents1 his friends1 his love troubles1 or his affair of honour in which he fights with ,tybalt1 his attitude of deference and trust to the monk1 nay1 even on the verge of the grave his conversation with the apothecary1 from whom he purchases the poison4 ,throughout he is the same worthy and noble man of deep emotions4 ,in the same way the character of ,juliet is unfolded throughout the range of her relations to father1 mother1 nurse1 the ,count ,paris1 and father ,lawrence4 ,and1 despite of this1 she is as deeply immersed#cfb in her one preoccupation as she is in every one of these situations1 and her entire character is transpierced with and carried away by the one single emotion1 her passionate love for her lover1 which is as deep and broad as the unbounded sea1 so that it is but the simple truth when she exclaims1 ,the more ,i give1 the more ,i possess1 both are infinite4 ,from all this it appears that even when there is but one pathos visible1 it must unfold itself as the wealth of all it possesses4 ,and this is what really happens even in lyrical poetry1 where we find the pathos is not attached to actions determined by positive circumstances and conditions4 ,for in this latter case the pathos can only assert itself as the spiritual state of an emotional nature otherwise complete in itself1 which is1 that is to say1 free to express itself in any other conceivable circumstance and situation which may confront it4 ,the use of words of vital significance1 an imagination which can associate itself with all the world1 can restore the ,past to the ,present1 can transform the entire external environment of man's life to a symbolical expression of his spirit1 can bravely adventure into the depths of comprehensive thought1 and1 while doing so1 reveal an exuberant1 capacious1 clear1 exalted1 and noble nature--a wealth of character such as this1 freely expressing such a world1 is a prize indeed for the ,lyric ,muse4 ,no doubt a purely logical reflection may find it impossible that such1 variety of character should co-exist with a masterful clearness of type4 ,we may be asked1 for instance1 in reference to the heroic character of ,achilles1 whose strength of youth is the pre-eminent1 trait of his beauty1 how it is possible to reconcile the tender heart so manifest in his relations to his father and his friend with the cruel act of revenge wherewith he drags ,hector round the walls4 ,precisely the same kind of inconsequence is to be met with in ,shakespeare's clowns4 ,they are1 with scarcely an exception1 bubbling over with wit and the humour of genius4 ,and1 no doubt1 there will always be fools enough to ask us how men thus spiritually gifted could ever betake themselves to such tomfooleries4 ,the truth is that the reflection of the formal logic is sure to emphasize one aspect of a character1 and conclude that the entire man is minted under its impression to the exclusion of all others4 ,to such everything that asserts itself as alien to the hallmark of its beggarly mintage can only appear as an inconsequence4 ,in the truely rational contemplation of the whole as distinct from the parts1 and thereby of the living thing1 that which appears as inconsequent will be precisely that which brings all into fit co-ordination4 ,for our humanity is just this very paradox4 ,we have not merely to carry#cfc the contradictions of our complex nature1 but to suffer the load#cfc with patience1 and throughout prove staunch to our burden4 77 ,we may conclude1 then1 that character must fuse together its particularity in the element of its spiritual substance2 it should possess a definite type1 and at the same time retain in this distinction the force and stability of a single fully self-consistent pathos4 ,where we find our humanity represented without such a centre of unity1 the different aspects of such variety it may possess will lose all relative meaning or significance and fall away from each other4 ,in art we shall find that what we distinguish in our conception of personality as infinite or the ,divine is just this self-consistency in unity4 ,if this view be a just one it is obvious that such characterizations as stability and determination are of great importance in the ideal representation of character4 ,and we shall only obtain such a result1 as already observed1 in so far as the universality of the powers inherent in our humanity are permitted to transpierce the mere particularity of the individual character and1 by virtue of the unity thus set up1 create a subjective and at the same time individual life which supplies its own principle of unity and self-identity4 ,such a condition is all important1 and we must now advert to a number of artistic compositions1 more particularly of later times1 in express relation to it4 ,in the ,cid of ,corneille1 for example1 the collision between the opposing principles of love and honour is a match1 no doubt1 of brilliant effects4 ,a pathos of this kind1 involved as it is in the opposition of distinct forces may1 no doubt1 be the operative ground of conflicts2 but when we find such portrayed as the spiritual struggle of one and the same character1 though such antagonism may very readily supply us with the material for brilliant rhetoric and effective monologue1 the cataclysm which is here presented in the emotional life of one person driven thus by turns from its abstract subjection to honour into the equally abstract one of love1 and forthwith hounded back again1 is not favourable to the portrayal of a character of genuine stability and homogeneousness4 ,it is equally inconsistent with the delineation of resolute personality when a leading character1 already under the predominant influence of some specific pathos1 is portrayed as one overmastered by the direction or persuasion of a subordinate character1 such is thus enabled to shift the responsibility upon other shoulders4 ,this is what actually takes place in the ,phedra of ,racine when the mind of ,phedra is depicted as entirely motived by the words of ,oenone4 ,a character of real distinction acts out of its own initiative1 and will not suffer the views of a mere stranger to be that which determines its own resolution4 ,only when action is the direct result of its own reflections do we get that clear relation between personal initiative and the consequent result which carries with it the full weight of guilt or responsibility4 ,we find yet another type of this instability of character as quite a peculiar possession of the more recent literary output of ,germany4 ,it is a type of character in which a kind of flatulence in emotion is the rule no less than the source4 ,the classic example is the ,werther of ,goethe's romance1 a thoroughly morbid type of character1 without any vestige of real manliness such as might carry him beyond the egotism of his love-passion4 ,what makes him interesting is the passion and beauty of his emotional life1 the intimate fellowship between himself and ,nature which the course of his spiritual experience and the pliability of his temperament accentuate4 ,this effeminacy has yet more recently embodied itself in many other forms of expression which descend with increasing rapidity to the lowest circle of jejune and tasteless egotism4 ,we must not even omit1 for instance1 to include in our list that illustration of the lovely soul which we find in ,jacobi's ,woldemar4 ,in this romance we are made a present of the glory of emotional volubility in all its pretensions4 ,it would be difficult1 indeed1 to cite a better example of the self-deceptive illusion of personal virtue and excellence4 ,here we have all that sublimity and divinity of soul1 which relates itself crookedly to every possible aspect of the actual world2 that type of feebleness which is wholly unable to share in or tolerate any portion of the labours or interests of practical life as it really is4 ,so rooted is it in its own consciousness of superiority it passes everything as unworthy of it on the other side4 ,it is1 in fact1 a peculiar feature of this type of lovely soul that1 even when face to face with the truly ethical interests and wholly sane objects of life1 instead of meeting them frankly1 it retires into the seclusion of itself1 where it weaves its own threads of finery and passes its time in hatching out its exquisite brood of religious and moral reflections4 ,and connected closely with this personal enthusiasm for our superabundant excellence1 which we set forth in front of ourselves with such a brave show1 there will always be an intense sensitiveness for all other beings who may appear at any moment to sympathize with1 comprehend1 and appreciate this beauty of the solitary life4 ,if such fellow-feeling is not forthcoming we find the very heart of us troubled to its depths and infinitely bruised4 ,we have lost at one stroke all humanity1 friendship1 and love4 ,we are unable to put away with whatever act of pedantry or rudeness may be in question1 some trivial circumstance or stupidity over which the vision of any character of breadth or strength would pass without a tremor4 ,it whirls away the thought of everything else1 and that which is by itself of least significance proves to be that which finally most reduces us to despair4 ,such is the source of all that endless train of melancholy1 trouble1 heartache1 peevishness1 sickness1 dejection1 and poverty of spirit which follows1 such the spring of all those self-torturing reflections one on the top of another1 that cramp and obstinacy1 nay1 finally1 that cruelty of soul1 through which the wretchedness and weakness of the spiritual content of such a type1 of loveliness consummates and declares itself4 ,no heart that is truly sound can wish to unite itself with such an emotional hermitage4 ,for it is a fundamental characteristic of all genuine character that it carries within itself both the courage and the strength to do and to will some actual thing4 ,the interest1 therefore1 that such natures which are for ever revolving round themselves may arouse in us is after all an empty interest1 and necessarily so despite all the conviction with which such natures may assure us that they belong to a higher and purer sphere than our own1 a sphere which has revealed to our vision that peculiar type of the ,divine they have uncovered from their secret parts and finally present to us1 to borrow an apt figure1 en neglige4 ,this want of genuine solidity of character appears in yet another form where we find the particular manifestations of this world of fine feelings turned as it were upside down and hypostatized as independent forces4 ,much that passes for magic1 magnetism1 spiritualism1 the apparitions of clairvoyance1 the morbid condition of sleep-walking1 is attributable to this source4 ,the living person in question is placed in a relation to these abstruse powers1 which from one point of view identifies him with them1 and in another makes them appear as something foreign to his spiritual life1 which determines and controls it4 ,it is assumed that underlying these undefined forces there is some inexplicable truth which borders on the marvellous1 or at any rate passes comprehension4 ,from the world of art1 however1 all such powers of darkness should be banished4 ,in art there is no darkness at all1 but all is lucid and transparent1 and in adventuring after such types of myopy speech merely flounders into spiritual disease1 or plays loose as poetry with the nebulous1 empty1 and trivial1 a good example of which is the verse of ,hoffmann1 and that piece by ,henry von ,klust entitled the ,prince of ,homburg4 ,the truly ideal character has nothing in his composition1 or the pathos which expresses it1 of another world and its ghosts1 but only actual interests1 in which he finds himself at home4 ,more particularly is this feature of clairvoyance become a trivial and vulgar recipe of our more modern poets4 ,in ,schiller's ,tell1 on the contrary1 when the old ,attinghausen on the brink of the grave foretells the destiny of his country1 the prophetic instinct is quite in its right place4 ,it is always1 however1 a misfortune for an artist to find himself forced to exchange the sanity of a character with some malady of the soul whether it be to motive the collision or excite interest4 ,for this reason he should only avail himself of the condition of insanity in quite exceptional cases4 ,in conclusion we may connect with these distortions of a sane vision1 which are so much opposed to all real unity and consistency of character1 the principle of our latter-day irony4 ,this false theory has betrayed the poet into grafting upon his characters qualities so essentially diverse that they are incapable of all homogeneous relation2 the essential unity of every character is thus confounded4 ,according to this theory a character is first presented as characterized in a certain way1 and immediately after we have that very determination converted into its opposite1 and the character itself is propounded to us as nothing more than the negation of what it was and is4 ,moreover this very futility is accepted by this irony as the supreme discovery of art4 ,an audience should not1 in short1 be carried away by an essentially positive interest1 but should be pulled up at the critical moment1 much as the irony itself is no sooner launched upon anything than it is off again4 ,they would even explain the characters of ,shakespeare according to such a principle4 ,we are informed that ,lady ,macbeth was an irreproachable wife of the tenderest feeling1 despite the fact that she not only falls in with the suggestion of the murder1 but actually eggs her husband on to its execution4 ,but if the signet mark of ,shakespeare is conspicuous on any one quality it is on the firm and decisive delineation of his characters1 even when it is only the formal greatness and consistency of evil that is in question4 ,hamlet1 it is true1 is a case of mental indecision1 but even he is only in doubt as to the way he shall carry out his purpose1 not at all as to what has to be done4 ,yet nowadays they would assimilate even ,shakespeare's characters to a world of ghosts1 and appear to think that this futility and indecision of ups and downs1 this general squeamishness#cfd in short can by itself contribute to our interest4 ,the ,ideal1 however1 is centred in this1 that ,idea is made actual1 and our humanity is associated with such actuality as subject and consequently as a unity which is essentially firm-rooted4 ,we may here1 so far at least as this portion of our inquiry is concerned1 bring our observations upon the individuality which is consistent with real character to a close4 ,that which we have mainly sought to emphasize is a pathos which is at once self-determined and essential1 the possession of a rich and complete nature1 the spiritual world of which such a pathos transfuses under such a form that this process of transfusion no less than the pathos itself receives its artistic presentment4 ,at the same time this pathos must not be allowed to come into conflict with itself in the hearts of men so as to stultify its very nature and consistency as pathos4 ,,iii4 ,,the ,,external ,,determination ,,of ,,the ,,ideal ,our consideration of the determination of the ,ideal was in the first instance occupied with the general inquiry why it was and how it came about that the ,ideal ever received at all the definite embodiment of a particular form4 ,following after this we arrived at the conclusion that inherent process was essential to our notion of it1 that in fact the element of difference was only by this means asserted within it1 and that this process viewed as a whole is presented us in the action4 ,we discovered1 however1 that in virtue of the action the ,ideal passes over into actual relations with the external world2 we have therefore1 and this is the third important step1 to solve the further question what kind of form this its final aspect1 as associated with external reality1 the ,ideal will receive under adequate artistic representation4 ,we would recall the fact that the ,ideal is the ,idea under a form which is in union with its own actuality4 ,up to the present point of our inquiry our attention has been exclusively occupied with that aspect or phase of this actuality which we may call in general terms human individuality and its character4 ,man is1 however1 also in possession of a concrete and external existence4 ,in separation from this it is true he concentrates his spiritual life to a point in self-consciousness1 but he remains for all that1 even in this subjective unity1 immediately related to the external world4 ,to the actual existence of mankind the surrounding sphere of a world is as indispensable as the protection of a temple is to the statues of the god it contains4 ,and for this very reason we must now advert to all or some of those many diverse threads1 whereby the ,ideal is woven in with this external environment and is shown in relief against it#cfe4 ,this opens to our view a practically immeasurable expanse of relations and modes under which the process of the external and relative world is determined4 ,for in the first place we are confronted at once with the bare facts of external ,nature such as particular locality1 situation1 whether habitable or not1 temporal condition1 the nature of the prevailing climate1 whether in our earth's northern or southern hemispheres1 and in fact in whatever direction we advance we have a fresh picture before us4 ,moreover1 external ,nature is made use of by man to satisfy his own needs and purposes2 and all the ways under which he converts her to that use1 that is to say the adroitness with which he discovers and then equips himself with tools and a home to live in1 with weapons1 with seats to recline upon1 carriages to ride in1 nay1 all that the art of cooking may bring with it for his food1 the entire apparatus of his luxury no less than his comfort1 all this and much more fall within the limits of our inquiry4 ,add to this the further and yet more important consideration that every man lives within a comprehensive and equally real world of spiritual relations1 which itself1 too1 presents to his view all the different modes under which command and submission is maintained1 that is to say the family1 blood-relationship1 property1 country and town life1 the cultus of religion1 the organization of defence and offence1 civic and political associations1 private society1 in short every conceivable form under which ethical customs and usages are organized in the institutions and permanent activities which contribute to the actual environment of human existence4 ,in all the directions enumerated above the ,ideal is in immediate contact with the reality of the practical world in its everyday dress1 or in other words1 with the commonplace prose of life4 ,and impressed by this fact we may easily be led to the conclusion1 if we have already accepted the nebulous conception of idealism elaborated recently1 that art can have no alternative but to dissever herself absolutely from all connection with this world of relative appearances4 ,such at least can only be logically inferred from a theory which assumes that this relation of externality is one of pure indifference1 or rather1 in contrast to the subjective world of spirit1 is of no substantive significance or worth4 ,agreeably to this view art is a spiritual dominion1 whose sole object is to exalt us above the sphere of material wants1 necessities1 and dependence1 and to liberate us from the logic1 and we may add the comedy1 of facts1 which in this field claim the exclusive attention of our humanity4 ,for1 apart from any other consideration1 all that meets us upon this terra firma of life's prose is for the most part of a purely conventional character1 and1 conditioned as it is by time1 space1 and custom1 simply a congeries of contingent facts1 which it is derogatory to the nature of art to accept4 ,this view of ideality1 which is really an illusive one1 is in part due to one of those highly flavoured abstractions of our latter-day thinking1 in which we merely find that the thinker's courage has failed him to come to terms with the external world in question2 in part also it is due to that type of prepossession which drives a man to assert summarily his independence of practical necessities when the advantages of birth1 status1 and social position have not already effected this for him4 ,for such a man the only relief available is a complete withdrawal into the secret world of the emotions1 a prison-house of unreality he steps out of never4 ,here he remains in what he conceives to be the temple of wisdom gazing ecstatic at what he takes to be the stars1 and naturally values at the price of a nutshell all that is found on the ,earth4 ,the real ,ideal1 however1 is not confined to the shadow-like world of the emotions1 but in its perfected whole must freely borrow from the definite structure of external objects of sight in every direction4 ,and the reason of this is that man himself1 whose nature is the central source that gives to that ,ideal all its significance1 is alive1 and his life is only actual in a particular place and time1 as one with the ,present1 as the individualized type of infinity#cff2 and in short the opposition of an external garland of ,nature is a fundamental characteristic of his life and its association with him and his activity is imperative4 ,it follows that if this activity is to be apprehended by art1 not merely as belonging to man alone1 but in the specific form it may take in that world of appearance1 the mode of its existence there will assert itself1 as the mobility1 reaction1 and animating force of life itself in contact and transfusion with the material complex which surrounds it4 ,man is1 however1 in virtue of his self-consciousness a world in himself#cfg1 and as such is differentiated from the external world of ,nature which confronts him2 and this external world is equally with himself a rounded whole whose unity asserts itself in the principle of causality4 ,this self-exclusion of these two worlds is1 however1 only apparent2 they are in their separation essentially related1 and it is precisely this association which constitutes concrete reality1 whose artistic embodiment is the content of the ,ideal4 ,and this brings us once more to the question already mooted1 namely1 in what semblance or form the external material which we find in this mutually related world we have referred to as concrete reality#cfh can be presented to us by art in a manner consistent with the ,ideal of art4 ,we will once more accept the triple division of our subject-matter1 and examine a work of art from three distinct points of view4 ,first1 there is the material of externality accepted in the bare abstractness of its forms1 such as space1 figure1 time1 colour1 which we must consider relatively to the artistic form most adapted to it4 ,secondly1 we must consider externality in its full and actualized concreteness1 as above explained1 a mode of reality which imperatively requires in a work of art that it should be in close affiliation with the subjective content of the spiritual life of man immediately related to it4 ,thirdly1 our consideration will be directed to the important fact that a work of art is created for the delight of human perceptions1 for a public in short1 which justly claims that the objects of art should bring home to it the interests of its spiritual life1 its real beliefs1 emotions1 and ideas1 so that it may enter with a genuine response into their artistic presentation4 #a4 ,,the ,,condition ,,of ,,externality ,,in ,,its ,,simple ,,abstractness ,the ,ideal in passing out of the bare image of its essential form into external or determinate existence secures for itself a reality which presents two distinct aspects4 ,from one point of view we see that a work of art discloses necessarily in the content of the ,ideal the concrete semblance of reality1 that is to say it presents that content as a definite situation or particular circumstance1 action1 event or character1 and presents it moreover in the mode of external existence4 ,from another it is equally obvious that art makes some specific and sensuous material the vehicle of the particular content in its entirety of all that we have above summarized2 it creates in short a new world sensible to eye and ear1 the world of art4 ,under both these aspects we may further observe that art penetrates to the remotest limits of externality which are compatible with its form as the self-including unity of the ,ideal and conformable to its appearance as a concrete whole permeated with the energy of spirit#cfi4 ,a work of art moreover itself may1 as an object qualified by externality1 be viewed in two distinct ways4 ,we may regard it simply as an external thing1 and as such only conformable to a unity that is external in the sense external objects are such4 ,in considering it from this latter point of view we have once more to consider that relation of externality which we found it necessary to discuss in our examination of the beauty of ,nature4 ,and for this reason we shall again have to make use of those specific determinants which we previously discussed1 and even then primarily in their connection with art4 ,the modes under which external form was in the previous section exhaustively considered were then treated in a twofold way4 ,first we analysed such conceptions as uniformity1 symmetry1 and conformity to rule2 we then examined unity itself regarded as the simplicity and purity of the sensuous material1 which art makes use of as the external medium for the existence of her expositions4 7a7 ,we will start our inquiry by examining the position in which we now find ourselves relatively to such conceptions as uniformity and symmetry4 ,it is obvious that these1 expressing as they do the entirely lifeless unity of the geometrical logic1 can by no means exhaust the nature of a work of art even when entirely regarded as an external object4 ,such determinations are only exhaustive in their relation to what is in itself lifeless1 such as time and the configuration of space4 ,confined in this way though they be to the barest forms of externality1 they are then true witnesses both to the power and substance of reason4 ,and consequently we find they assert themselves in a twofold manner even in art4 ,in the first of these1 it is this very quality of their abstractness which operates by way of contrast to the living pulse of art1 which is forced even in the confines of its sensuous material to raise itself over and beyond mere symmetry into the freedom of the ,ideal4 ,in this process of liberation which may be exemplified in the melodies of the art of music we do not1 however1 find that the conformity to rule disappears altogether1 it is merely made subservient as a foundation4 ,in the second1 this principle of measure and rule in its application to the indefinite and unlimited is the one and only qualifying principle which certain arts can accept owing to the nature of the media which those arts make use of4 ,in such cases uniformity is itself and alone raised to the ideal significance of the art4 ,the principal example of an art of this type is that of architecture2 and the reason of this is that a work of art which is wholly architectonic is directed to the one object of reconstituting1 by means of an artistic form1 that which is essentially the external and inorganic environment of spirit4 ,in this art1 consequently1 all that is rectilinear1 right-angled1 circular1 or presents uniformity of pillars1 windows1 arches1 piers1 vaults1 and so forth is the dominant principle of unity4 ,the artistic structure of architecture is not erected entirely as an object in itself1 but rather as an external frame1 embellishment and local habitation for something else which it subserves4 ,a building is not complete until it has received the statue of the god or the society of human beings who make their dwelling therein4 ,an artistic work of this kind should not therefore receive all or indeed the main attention4 ,holding this in our minds1 it will appear obviously to the purpose that uniformity and symmetry should be here the prevailing characteristic of the structure2 the mind passes over very readily one that is throughout uniform1 and will not trouble itself about it for any length of time4 ,of course1 we cannot here discuss the symbolical significance1 which1 in addition to that above examined1 may attach to architectural form in its immediate relation to the spiritual content it envelops and emphasizes with a positive localization4 ,the same principle applies to the art of making gardens1 which we may define as a specific mode of architecture1 in so far at least as an artistic conformation is imposed on external ,nature#cgj4 ,in the garden no less than in the building man himself is the main object4 ,there are two distinct types in this art of garden-construction4 ,the one adopts as its main principle uniformity and symmetry2 the other those of variety and irregularity4 ,as an artistic product the former is to be preferred4 ,labyrinths1 however numerous and intricate1 garden-beds in endless alternation of spiral lines1 bridges over water usually stagnant1 with every conceivable surprise that gothic church1 temples1 ,chinese pagodas1 hermitages1 urns1 summer-houses1 mounds1 statues may claim to afford us--one glance and only one glance at such things is sufficient1 the vulgar and artificial pretensions of it all is too patent1 and we do not seek for another4 ,it is quite another matter when we cross any actual situation of real natural beauty1 which has not at least been exploited expressly for our enjoyment#cga1 and by its own exceptional merit makes an irresistible appeal to our love of ,nature and our sense of her beauty4 ,a garden laid out with strict reference to the other extreme of regularity1 makes no such attempts at surprises1 but permits human beings to appear as the principal object in the external framework of natural beauty#cgb4 ,and this is really what a garden should be4 ,again in the art of painting the principle of uniformity and symmetry is clearly visible in the co-ordination of the whole1 the grouping of the figures1 their place and pose in the composition4 ,but inasmuch as in painting the animation of life can assert itself through objects in a far profounder degree than is possible in architecture we find that it presents much less scope for the purely formal unity of the symmetrical1 and the rule of uniformity in all its severity is for the most part to be traced only as the fundamental principle of composition in the earliest phases of art1 making way in its more advanced forms to the freer line1 which is associated in our minds with organic form rather than such we meet with in the pyramid and similar geometrical shapes4 ,conformity to rule and symmetry are further important factors in the composition of music and poetry4 ,owing to the incident of duration in the length of tones we find in these arts an aspect of what is intrinsically a purely external relation1 which is incompatible with any other more concrete mode of presentation4 ,if we take the spatial condition it is obvious that here everything which lies in juxtaposition can be seen at a glance4 ,it is otherwise with that which occurs in ,time4 ,here we have merely a succession of moments1 every one of which takes the place of another1 and in this vanishing procession they flow on for ever4 ,and it is precisely this indeterminacy which it is the function of musical time or beat to inform by adding thereto a real definition capable of uniform repetition4 ,in this way the indefinite progression is subordinated to a rational principle4 ,in musical time we have a power which exerts such a fascination upon us1 that1 so far from being able to treat it with indifference1 we not unfrequently find ourselves beating time quite unconsciously with it while listening4 ,this constant recurrence of equal lengths of time according to a definite measure has nothing to do with tones and their duration as we find them in ,nature4 ,tone simply as musical sound and time abstractly regarded1 are both of them equally indifferent to such uniform divisions and repetitions4 ,musical time is consequently something wholly created by the human mind2 and indeed there is more than a suggestion of this in the fact that in listening to musical time we are at once impressed with the conviction1 that we have1 in this control of time according to fixed rule1 nothing less than a real reflection of our spiritual nature1 or rather that of the fundamental truth of self-identity1 an illustration absolutely precise of the way in which the subject of consciousness applies this very principle of uniformity1 unity with itself1 that is to say1 in constant recurrence1 throughout all the variety and most intricate multiplicity of experience4 ,and it is for this reason that the beat of musical time meets with such a startling response in the very depths of our being1 gripping hold1 as it does1 of that self-identity1 which is the fundamental abstract principle of our inmost life4 ,considered in this relation it is not2 the spiritual content1 not the concrete soul of our emotions1 any more than it is the musical tone as tone1 which appeals to us so intimately2 it is simply the formal unity which the unity of consciousness transfers to the temporal process1 and which is thus re-echoed back to our conscious life4 ,and the same remarks apply to the measure and rhyme of poetry4 ,the sensuous medium is here1 too1 in the same way carried out of the sphere of that which is external to ourselves1 and at once asserts there the presence of something over and above that which is expressed by our ordinary consciousness1 which in its general use treats the time-divisions of tones with indifference or caprice4 ,a uniformity of similar character1 if not so consistently defined1 may be traced still further1 and is involved in the living content of poetry itself1 although the relation here is quite an external one4 ,by this we mean that in an epic poem or a drama1 both of which have their particular subdivisions1 cantos1 or acts1 whatever may be the specific term applicable1 there is an approximate principle of equality apparent in the division of subject-matter4 ,and the same characteristic is generally true in the grouping of the subject in pictures1 although such should not appear to be a necessary result of the nature of the subject-matter itself1 nor create the impression that this uniform distribution is due to any controlling principle of first importance4 ,conformity to rule and symmetry1 which are the abstract unity and definition of all that is essentially spatial and its configuration no less than of all which is external under temporal condition1 are mainly the co-ordinating principles of quantity and size1 as we have already noticed in our consideration of the beauty of ,nature4 ,all that which does not1 in virtue of its own specific medium#cgc1 strictly form part of external extension1 is consequently freed from the range of those principles which assert themselves exclusively in the relations of quantity1 and are determined through relations of deeper significance1 and the unity which co-ordinates them4 ,it follows from this that the further art embraces subject-matter which is independent of the external condition1 so much the less significant the principle of uniformity becomes1 in the co-ordination of that art's subject-matter and the more completely is it restricted to a subordinate position4 ,it will be1 perhaps1 advisable here to close the above discussion of symmetry with a few general observations upon harmony4 ,the relation of harmony is no longer one to mere quantity1 but rather one to essential distinctions of quality1 differences of tone1 that is to say1 which do not persist against each other in their native opposition1 but as harmony or music have to be brought into concord4 ,in music we find that the relation of the tonic to the mediant and dominant notes of the scale is no relation of bare quantity#cgd1 but implies the presence of tones whose difference is essentially a qualitative difference2 which1 that is to say1 combine naturally in a unity1 rather than continue to assert their distinguishing timbre in all its glaring antithesis and contradiction4 ,the true discord1 on the contrary1 requires its harmonic resolution4 ,the same qualitative consistency is to be found in the harmony of colour1 in reference to which it is likewise one of the requirements of art that it should neither manifest itself in a picture as a motley and haphazard juxtaposition of pigments1 nor as a neutral surface whereon all fundamental distinction is dissolved#cge1 but as the artistic expression of a whole in which essential contrast is mediated through some principle of harmonious unity4 ,furthermore1 we observe that harmony contains in itself a definite number of contrasted differences1 which have naturally a particular significance of their own4 ,thus we find under the differentiation of colour a definite number known as the cardinal colours1 which are primary derivatives of the fundamental notion of colour1 and are not due to accidental composition4 ,harmony consists in bringing together a number of positive colours such as this classification implies1 and uniting them in concordant unity4 ,we must1 that is to say1 have in a picture not merely all the primary colours1 yellow1 blue1 green1 and red present1 but also a harmonious scheme under which they are related2 and the old masters have1 without direct consciousness of the principle involved1 paid express attention to this completeness of effect and arrived at artistic results which flowed out of it4 ,and furthermore1 for the very reason that we find in harmony the beginnings of a release from the bare condition of externality it is duly qualified to absorb and express a spiritual content of wider significance4 ,we may mark an illustration of this in the way the old masters distinguished between the drapery of their principal figures and of those of less importance1 painting that of the former in elementary colours of absolute purity1 but only conceding to that of the rest compound varieties4 ,the mantle of the ,virgin ,mary is almost always blue2 blue in its assuaging sense of tranquillity is accepted as the counterfeit of the repose and tenderness of the heart4 ,it is only rarely that we find her in a drapery of emphatic red4 7b7 ,the second aspect of externality is the relation it occupies directly in the various material which art employs in the various media of its presentations4 ,the unity here consists in the clear definition and homogeneousness of the material1 which ought not to deviate in the direction of a vague characterization and mere confusion1 or1 speaking generally1 give us the impression of dirtiness4 ,this determinacy is also entirely dependent upon the spatial condition1 that is to say1 upon the purity of its delineation1 the distinctness of its rectilinear and circular lines1 and so on1 no less than upon a consistent definition of ,time such as we find in the accurate measure of the musical beat4 ,it depends furthermore on the translucency both of specific tones and colours4 ,in a good picture we shall find that there is nothing unclean or dirty#cgf in the colours employed1 but everything is clear and asserts itself openly for what it is4 ,the directness of its purity is1 in fact1 that which constitutes the lovely impression of colour upon our sense2 and those colours which are most direct in their simplicity1 such as a yellow which has no dash of green in it1 or a red that is wholly independent of blue or yellow1 produce the most emphatic effect4 ,on the other hand1 it is obviously more difficult to maintain a harmony of the whole when colours are thus contrasted in all their pristine simplicity4 ,yet in despite of this these essentially simple colours form the foundation of every true colour scheme1 and although it may be impossible to dispense with a considerable use of their compounds1 even these should not be allowed to appear in one dead and dull interfusion1 but with their simple and luminous derivations shining through them#cgg2 otherwise instead of the clear lambency of colour we shall get nothing but a muddy residuum4 ,we shall find that the same thing is necessary in the timbre of musical tone4 ,in the case of strings whether of metal or catgut it is the vibration of the material1 and1 moreover1 of a material of definite tension and length1 which educes the musical note4 ,if the tension is insufficient1 or the length of the string which is struck is not the right one1 the tone inevitably loses its clearness of definition1 rings false1 as we say1 owing to the interfusion with it of other tones#cgh4 ,we have the same kind of result when a purely mechanical fretting or scraping is suffered to interfere with the purity of the vibratory motion1 and so to render the emitted sound confused and harsh4 ,in the same way1 it is of the first importance to the art of singing that the human voice should be produced from throat and chest freely and with purest intonation2 the voice should be heard without the least indication of its organic instrument1 or1 as in the case of hoarseness1 with an obstructive accompaniment the singer fails to repress4 ,we may conclude1 then1 that this translucency and purity1 free from all admixture with anything foreign to it1 and consistent throughout in its clearness1 is that which creates the beauty of tone as immediately apprehended by our senses1 and which distinguishes it from every kind of mere noise4 ,and we may add further it is this which in human speech conspicuously applies to the articulation of the vowels4 ,a language which enunciates the five vowels with distinction and purity1 as is strongly the case in the ,italian1 is essentially musical and adapted to song4 ,the diphthongs1 on the contrary1 always produce a confused tone4 ,in literature little attention is paid to the direct reproduction of folk-dialects2 we find them rather reduced to the simplest form of expression4 ,in actual speech1 however1 this clearness of intonation only too often entirely disappears1 so that we find1 and markedly so in the case of dialects such as the ,south ,german1 ,swabian1 and ,swiss1 men actually speak with an articulation of sound it is quite impossible to write down4 ,we do not regard this1 however1 to be necessarily a defect in human speech1 but rather a reflection of the rawness of the common folk4 ,and here we must close our observations upon that external aspect of art1 which1 from the fact that it is external1 and nothing more1 is only capable of receiving an external and abstract unity4 ,now according to its more comprehensive definition it is the concrete individuality of the ,ideal impregnated with reason1 which takes to itself externality as the form of its embodiment1 and1 moreover1 in such a way that the external semblance1 which is thus the medium of its expression1 is throughout suffused with the mind inherent in this concrete individual form4 ,in consequence of this such modes of relation as uniformity1 symmetry1 and harmony1 or1 in other words1 the more simple determinations of the sensuous material are no longer adequate4 ,this defect naturally extends our inquiry to that second aspect of the external determination of the ,ideal already stated4 #b4 ,,the ,,coalescence ,,of ,,the ,,concrete ,,ideal ,,with ,,its ,,external ,,reality ,the fundamental truth which we shall endeavour to substantiate before everything in the matter which now immediately engages our attention is this1 that man is under an obligation to make himself at peace and at home in the environment of the world2 or1 to put it rather differently1 his individuality must live itself into ,nature and all the conditions of that external world1 and by doing so assert its freedom visibly4 ,and1 moreover1 this must take place in such a way that these two related factors1 that is1 on the one side1 the entirety of his inward life and the character it possesses or displays in all conditions or actions whatsoever1 and1 on the other1 that objective entirety of external existence which confronts him1 must wholly lose the appearance of two worlds which are either indifferent to or not homogeneous with#cgi each other1 and forthwith proclaim themselves as harmoniously related and identical in substance4 ,this externally objective world must1 in so far as it is the reality of the ,ideal1 surrender the semblance of its own objective self-subsistency and stubbornness1 in order that its fundamental unity with that to which it supplies the external and particular embodiment may be exhibited in truth4 ,to establish this unity with more conclusiveness we propose now to examine our subject under three different heads of discussion4 ,first1 we may investigate the same from the point of view that this unity which binds the two factors already defined is merely a bond which possesses no positive reality#chj1 but is merely a mysterious and secret connection both in its origin and appearance1 by virtue of which our humanity is looped together with its environment4 ,secondly1 however1 as a deduction from the fact that it is the concrete spiritual life of man and the individuality which pertains to it which constitutes the point of departure1 or rather the essential content of the ,ideal1 we shall further examine this association1 as in truth the creation of human activity itself and only possible as such a creation4 ,finally1 we shall prove that this unified world created by the human ,spirit is itself a complete entirety1 which1 in the determinate form of its existence1 is objectively valid1 and in essential relation with which every unit of our common humanity who is actively engaged with the vital concerns of art must infallibly remain4 ,in opening our discussion of the position we proposed first we would at once point out an important conclusion involved in it4 ,we have here posited that the environment of the ,ideal is not directly due to human activity1 it can therefore only be regarded in this first step of our inquiry as something external to man1 that is to say ,nature4 ,how1 then1 is this something outside man to be exhibited in the ideal work of art8 ,we will discuss this at least in its more general terms1 and here1 too1 draw attention to three aspects of importance4 77 ,in the first place external ,nature1 so far as the reproduction of its external form is concerned1 is in every respect a reality which is embodied in some definite shape4 ,if our representation is in every respect to satisfy really all that is implied in this condition it must be the exact counterpart of the phenomenal truth of ,nature4 ,we have1 however1 already drawn attention to material points of difference between the truth of ,nature and its reproduction by art which cannot be disregarded4 ,we may1 however1 observe that it is an almost universal characteristic of the great masters that they are conspicuously true in their delineation and elaboration of the broad facts of ,nature4 ,and this is not so much due to a love of imitation as it is due to the fact that ,nature is not merely in a general way the objective facts of a heaven and an ,earth with humanity suspended1 as it were1 in a vacuo between them2 but rather that the emotional life and activity of man can only be rightly conceived as alive and operative in a given place with all its associations of streams1 rivers1 hills1 mountains1 plains1 dales1 and forests4 ,take the case1 for example1 of ,homer1 who is not at all a poet of the picturesque in natural scenery as we now understand it2 we shall1 nevertheless1 find even in him the descriptions and indications he gives us of actual places or natural features such as the rivers ,scamander or ,simois1 the coast and bays of the sea and so forth correspond with such truth to ,nature that geographical investigators only quite recently have been able to map out the locality to which he refers in entire accordance with his descriptions4 ,the ballad-singers of the ,middle ,ages present a sordid#cha contrast to him in this respect1 no less than in their power of depicting character2 the effect of their productions either way is bald1 jejune and nebulous4 ,even in the case of the ,meistersingers1 though they versify old biblical stories which they locate in ,jerusalem and elsewhere1 it is little more than the bare names which we get4 ,in the ,book of heroes#chb the effect is precisely similar4 ,otnith rides through the pine-forest1 fights with the dragon1 but it is no world of men or distinct locality we can recognize1 and our imagination is consequently in this respect left without any support4 ,even in the ,nibelungenlied there is no real increase of local interest4 ,it is true the names of ,worms1 the ,rhine1 and the ,danube are mentioned2 but practically all further detail is omitted and the result is as barren as before4 ,and yet it is clearly through this very clearness of definition that our narration becomes individual and real2 without this it is a mere abstraction which directly gives the lie to the concrete reality it proposes to present4 77 ,in addition to these fundamental requirements of clear definition and correspondence with the natural facts a certain elaboration of detail will frequently much assist us in presenting the external aspects of a picture which our perception or imagination can readily seize4 ,unquestionably1 owing to the nature of the particular medium in which the several arts express themselves1 there will be a marked difference of range to which1 in any particular case1 this process may be carried4 ,if we take the art of sculpture1 for example1 we shall find that the repose and universality1 which are the fundamental features of its characterization1 are less consistent with this elaboration of external detail than is the case in some other arts4 ,externality is here neither defined as a particular place nor a particular environment1 but is entirely concentrated upon such details as drapery1 arrangement of hair1 dress1 weapons of war1 mode of seat and the like4 ,nay more1 the actual definition of many figures in antique sculpture is only obtained through an entirely conventional arrangement of drapery or hair1 or other distinguishing accessories4 ,this is not1 however1 the place to discuss further the significance of the conventional4 ,it is obviously outside the sphere of natural fact and rather related to the contingent2 or1 to put the matter in this particular case more fully1 it is the means through which we arrive at that which is more universal and persistent in our final artistic effect4 ,as a reverse case to that of sculpture the subject-matter of lyrical poetry is pre-eminently man's emotional life2 for this reason it is not so necessary in this type of poetry to lay stress on the detail of actual facts even when reference is made to the external world4 ,it is1 on the other hand1 part of the function of epic poetry to state events as actual facts1 to be precise as to the place where actions occurred and in what manner they were performed2 and1 in short1 of all types of poetry it is the one to which the widest latitude and the closest accuracy of local detail is most essential4 ,and1 furthermore1 if we contrast all the arts together in this respect we shall find that not one of them is1 by virtue of its medium#chc1 so exclusively occupied with the detail of external ,nature as that of painting4 ,at the same time we must add a word that applies equally to all of them4 ,whatever the definition of ,nature may be1 it never ought to give the erroneous impression of ,nature's prose reality1 that is to say1 as the immediate imitation of such2 nor should that fulness of detail1 which is devoted to the spiritual aspect of individual life and its events1 be carried by enthusiasm out of the due relation of its importance to the whole4 ,and generally we may affirm of both that such exclusive definition ought not to be all that is anywhere presented1 inasmuch as everywhere in a work of art that which is a natural fact should only receive its artistic embodiment in close relation to man's spiritual life4 77 ,we have here struck the very note we wish particularly to emphasize4 ,we have already remarked that there are two essential conditions to any effective presentation of a real personality2 we must have before us both the reflection of the man's inner life and the natural environment which surrounds him4 ,and in order that this external surrounding appear as one that is truly his own an essential bond of relation must be established between him and it1 one which to a greater or less degree is part of his own spiritual substance1 where we may1 doubtless1 cross many traces of contingent matter and yet find the spiritual bed of this nexus still maintained4 ,throughout the entire spiritual apparatus of the heroes of ,epic poetry1 for example1 their mode of life1 that is1 opinions1 emotions1 and all that they do we ought to be able to recognize a subtle homogeneousness1 a harmonious en rapport1 which fuses the two aspects of such a life into one concordant whole4 ,the ,arab is thus united with ,nature1 and1 indeed1 apart from his sky1 his stars1 his torrid deserts1 his tents1 his camels1 and his horses is unintelligible4 ,he is only truly himself and at home under such conditions4 ,in the same way the heroes of ,ossian possess in the highest degree an intense inward life2 but in their very gloominess and melancholy they appear as the genuine growth of their hills of heather1 whose thistles are swept by the wind1 of their rain-clouds1 mists1 mountains1 and dark caves4 ,the physiognomy of the conditions under which they live reveals to us as nothing else can the secret of that inner life of emotion which is lived through with all its sadness1 mourning1 its pains1 its battles1 and its mist-like apparitions in such a natural setting2 they are1 in short1 entirely at home in it and in it alone4 ,such considerations supply us with ample ground for the statement we let fall previously unsupported that the subject-matter of history offers unrivalled opportunities for perfecting this intimate relation between the two aspects of human life we have been discussing1 and enabling1 us to carry the same directly into the minutest particulars4 ,very rarely1 indeed1 are we likely to find that the imagination can simply through its own initiative create such a harmony1 although we ought to feel its presence throughout1 however little it may1 in fact1 have produced of the raw material it combines into artistic completeness4 ,no doubt there is a common tendency to rate what we fancy is the free creation of imaginative genius above the effort of assimilating in artistic form a material which is borrowed2 but it is for all that quite impossible that the imagination should alone create that harmonious entente1 the unity of the ,ideal requires in the consistent and defined form which lies before us in actual existence1 where national traits1 to cite the examples above1 are the veritable growth of such a harmony4 ,and here we close our consideration of the principle accordant with which we have rendered more clear that aspect of the unity of the inner life with its natural environment which we posited as secret or potential1 not at any rate directly due to human activity4 7b7 ,the second phase of this harmonious relation may be explained more positively1 being expressly due to man's own activity and his adaptation of means to ends4 ,for man adapts external objects to his own uses and1 by means of the satisfaction which his work supplies1 places himself in a harmonious relation to them4 ,in contrast therefore to our first indefinite#chd1 and1 in fact1 entirely general type of harmonious association the present one is directly concerned with what is particular1 as exemplified in the particular needs of man and their satisfaction by his converting to his use such natural objects as he may require4 ,the range of his wants and the consequent impulse of their satisfaction is of a practically unlimited variety2 yet it is nothing in comparison with the variety of ,nature herself4 ,simplification is therefore inseparable from the task whereby1 our humanity imposes on the facts of ,nature its own vital purposes1 and interpenetrates the external world with its own volitions4 ,in this way man's environment is humanized2 he proves by his own acts that it is capable of satisfying his nature and is unable to preserve any predominant independence over against him4 ,here at last1 by virtue1 that is1 of his own productive exertions1 we find him no longer in a merely general sense of the term1 but actually in every detail of his particular surroundings a real centre of his own substance and at home4 ,the fundamental conception which it is most important to emphasize as that which affects art throughout in its relation to all we have above considered may be thus stated4 ,if we look closely at the relative position man occupies in all the infinite variety of his material wants1 desires1 and aims1 we shall find that it is not one merely of general significance1 but one of actual dependence4 ,the absence of freedom implied in this relative position is antagonistic to the ,ideal2 and in order that man may become a suitable object for art1 he must have already released himself from the travail of this enforced condition1 and thrown off the chains of his dependence4 ,moreover1 this act of mutual accommodation1 when we trace it to its origin1 may strike us in one of two different ways4 ,either he may conclude that ,nature in all friendliness on her own part supplies man with what he needs1 and so far from throwing obstacles in the path of his interests and objects1 rather freely gives them him as one who meets him half way wherever he goes4 ,or1 on the contrary1 we shall not fail to observe that our humanity has wants and desires1 whose immediate satisfaction ,nature is quite unable to secure4 ,in cases that fall under the second type it is obvious that man can only work out the self-satisfaction vital to him through his own energies2 he must take possession of that which ,nature possesses1 set to rights the defects which appear1 modify their form1 removing all that stands in his way with adroitness2 and1 in short1 convert ,nature's raw material into means through which he will be able to attain all that he proposes4 ,the relation in which the unity between man and his environment will be most conspicuous must be sought for in an example1 where there is already a real contact between them1 where1 that is to say1 human ability is on such good terms with the amenability of ,nature that all the severity of a conflict between them as unreconciled forces disappears1 and we have forthwith the completed symphony under our eyes4 ,for the reasons1 then1 already advanced the ideal province of art must be held secure from the bare necessities of life4 ,property and the favour of circumstances1 in so far as they supply a condition1 under which poverty and labour vanish not merely for this or that hour1 but for the most part altogether1 are for this reason1 we will not say incompatible with art1 but rather in full concurrence with the ,ideal4 ,yet it would only betray a real lack of comprehension#che1 if in cases where the conditions of our art compelled us to consider the facts of life in all their multifold variety1 we nevertheless omitted from our composition all reference to the relation in which human life is placed to these very natural constraints4 ,it is true enough that such are purely finite conditions2 but art is not therefore able to dispense with them4 ,they must not1 in fact1 even be treated by her as something merely bad4 ,it is rather her function to reconcile them with the ,real in her embracing unity4 ,and indeed the finest actions and opinions which she reflects on her mirror1 if we consider the particular form of the determination and content alone#chf1 are necessarily limited and consequently finite4 ,that ,i find it necessary to provide myself with nourishment1 food and drink1 a house to live in1 and clothing to wear1 seats to sit upon1 and everything else incidental to domestic life is no doubt an inevitable concomitant of the fact that ,i live in the world2 but the life that only ,i myself experience within me permeates1 this external aspect of my life so completely1 that men are fain to clothe and arm the very gods themselves1 and to picture them under conditions inseparable from a variety of things they seek to possess1 and find their satisfaction in obtaining4 ,in short1 for art to be possible1 this satisfaction of the necessities of life must be assured to us4 ,or to take an example where this is not so1 there is that of adventurous knights who only secure their immunity from external hardship through the continued success of their enterprise1 which is therefore itself but a contingency1 in much the same way as the prosperity of savages is contingent upon the amenities of ,nature4 ,the conditions in both cases are not favourable to ,art4 ,her true ,ideal is not merely to be found where our humanity is barely lifted above the most rigorous condition of dependence upon the smiles or frowns of ,nature1 but is most of all at home in that superfluity which suffers it in conjunction with ,nature's bounty to expatiate with freedom no less than delight4 ,the above remarks are obviously of very general application4 ,two considerations1 however1 of a somewhat more restricted interest may be deduced from them4 77 ,the first of these relates to the kind of use to which mankind put the objects of ,nature in seeking for a satisfaction which is wholly aesthetic1 or due to some habit of the mind4 ,everything in the nature of ornament and finery1 or1 in general terms1 everything that men convert to their use for the sake of mere show comes under this head4 ,and the point to which we draw attention is this1 that when we find men thus decorating themselves no less than their immediate surroundings1 we ought not so much to conclude that all that they thus collect together from ,nature's most costly and beautiful storehouse1 whatever may most attract their eyes in the same--whether it be gold1 precious stones1 pearls1 ivory1 or precious raiment--that all this unrivalled rarity and brilliancy1 in short1 is that which for its own sake1 and primarily as a product of ,nature1 interests them3 rather their interest in it all is essentially personal as a thing suitable for the houses they live in1 or for that which they most love and honour1 whether it be their rulers1 their temples1 or their gods4 ,a man selects in this way that which already appears to him as externally beautiful1 pure translucent colour1 glitter of metals1 fragrant woods1 marble1 and all the rest4 ,poetry1 and particularly ,oriental poetry1 makes a willing use of such wealth1 a fact we may even illustrate from such a poem as the ,nibelungenlied3 and generally it is true enough that ,art in such matters is not merely content with a general description of the beauty or value of such fine things2 but1 where the artistic form and the occasion allows1 will describe such works in all the detail of their workmanship with as royal a bounty as the works themselves4 ,there was no stint of either gold or ivory on the statue of ,pallas at ,athens1 or that of ,zeus at ,olympia2 and the temples of the ancient gods1 the churches of ,christendom1 the pictures of saints1 and the palaces of kings1 are notable illustrations among all nations that possess any of them1 to what kind of service splendour and brilliant show may be devoted2 thus have nations in every age delighted in seeing upon their gods the visible presence of their own wealth1 precisely as they have found delight in the splendour of their princes as a glory they still possessed1 though ravished from themselves4 ,we all know1 of course1 that type of moralist who is only too ready to disturb the vision of such an enjoyment4 ,we shall1 no doubt1 be reminded how many poor ,athenians the aegis of ,pallas could have supplied with a hearty meal1 or how many slaves could have thus been liberated2 and1 doubtless1 we must admit that in the case of the ancient world1 no less than in days more near to our own wealth1 all that has been lavished on temple1 cloister1 or cathedral1 or other objects of public utility1 has been expended under social conditions of the direst need to many4 ,nay1 we may carry such melancholy reflections yet further1 and find in them a condemnation not merely of particular works of art1 but of ,art herself and all that she gives us4 ,what sums of money are involved in the building by the ,state of an ,academy of ,arts1 or the purchase of ancient and modern works of art1 and the appropriate embellishment of public galleries1 theatres1 and museums6 ,but whatever the effect of such reflections may be upon us1 whether ethical or otherwise1 such is1 after all1 only due to the fact that we are once more reminded of those very constraints and hardships whose removal is a vital condition of the appearance of ,fine ,art4 ,the appropriation of a unique sphere in its life for the exposition of its artistic treasures1 which stands safe above the stress of that reality to which it contributes so largely1 can therefore only redound to the glory and supreme honour of any people4 77 ,but1 further1 mankind is not merely interested in the adornment of individuals and the environment of their life1 but is actively employed in adapting the objects of ,nature to its practical needs and purposes4 ,it is on this plane that we come into contact for the first time with all the labour and struggle which the dependence of our humanity upon the prose of its finite life implies4 ,and the question inevitably arises1 how far all that is involved in this practical effort is suitable to artistic presentation4 77 ,in attempting some answer to this problem1 we would draw attention to the historical fact that the earliest way in which ,art attempted to banish all the prose reality of human life was the conception of the well-known golden age or1 if we care to call it so1 the idyllic state4 ,in this we have ,nature depicted as satisfying man's every want with no trouble to himself3 while he1 for his part1 enjoys in a state of innocence all that mead1 wood1 flocks1 garden1 shelter1 and so forth1 can supply him with nourishment1 dwelling1 and all other comforts incidental to such a life4 ,of the passions of ambition or avarice1 indeed of every impulse that may appear to run counter to the nobility of man's spiritual nature1 we hear no word at all4 ,at first blush1 no doubt1 a state of this description may strike us more or less as ideal1 and certain types of art1 limited in their range1 may find definite satisfaction in presenting us with a picture of it4 ,but we have only to penetrate further below the surface and we shall quickly have enough of such a vision4 ,the writings of ,gessner are little read nowadays1 and when we do read them we find in such little satisfaction4 ,the truth is that a restricted state of life1 such as the above described1 presupposes a very elementary stage in human development4 ,manhood which has attained to any real fulness of spiritual stature is moved by impulses of loftier range1 and is not likely to be satisfied with the life which clings closest to ,nature and its immediate products4 ,in such idyllic poverty of soul no man ought to live1 but rather to accept his birthright of toil3 that which his spiritual impulse urges him forward to1 that he must secure through his own activity4 ,once regard the matter in this way and these very physical wants of man will be found to bring into being a wide and diverse range of activities1 implanting in him the conscious sense of his own powers1 from the heart of which the profounder interests and forces of his life can slowly unravel themselves4 ,but1 at the same time1 it is necessary that here1 too1 the harmonious relation between the outward and inner life should be maintained as the fundamental principle of artistic presentation4 ,few things are more offensive to our aesthetic taste than to find in a work of art the severity of some physical disaster portrayed through every detail of horror4 ,dante flashes on us the starvation of ,ugolino in a few trenchant strokes4 ,when a ,gerstenberg1 in his tragedy of ,ugolino1 wrings out every detail of the catastrophe to the last drop1 telling us precisely how first ,ugolino's two sons1 and after them their father1 were done to death by starvation1 we feel at once that the subject1 as thus handled1 is entirely at variance with the principles of fine art4 77 ,we shall1 however1 find that the condition of life which offers the strongest contrast to that we have described as the idyllic state1 we will call it the generally civilized life#chg1 presents1 though on other grounds1 difficulties to an ideal exposition which are equally serious4 ,in a ,culture-,state the complexus of social wants and labour1 of interests and all that may go to satisfying the same1 is throughout and in all its comprehensiveness completely evolved4 ,every individual here is immersed in an infinite network of relations with other units of the whole1 and with so much loss to his complete independence4 ,what he himself requires for himself is either nothing at all1 or only1 in a quite insignificant fraction of it1 the result of his own labour3 add to this the tendency of all a man's normal activities is to become more and more mechanical4 ,we find1 too1 at the heart of this industrial development and the interchange of employment and rejection of human labour which it implies1 on the one hand the most ruthless conditions of poverty1 and on the other a class which1 raised as it is above the bare necessities of existence1 stands out in relief as wealthy1 entirely released from all toil for the sake of a subsistence1 able at any rate to devote individual attention to the finer interests of life and its pathetic contrasts4 ,no doubt the possession of such a superfluity may create an impression as though for the favoured few the constant recurrence of a position of dependence had passed away1 and a man is just so much the more released from the accidents incidental to property because his hands are at length free from the grime which soils them in securing it4 ,but such a consolatory reflection will never make a man thoroughly at home in all that immediately surrounds him in the real sense that such is the garland of his own labour4 ,for he is the centre of that to the upraising of which he has not himself been instrumental2 it has come there out of that provision store which was already full without him1 which quite other persons and for the most part in a quite mechanical and1 therefore1 formal way have provided1 and to which he is only introduced after a long series of effort and struggle wholly strange to himself4 77 ,we are consequently led to the conclusion that it is rather a third type of human society1 a society which we may place halfway between the idyllic golden age and the burgher ,state in its fully developed industrial form1 which is most fitted to be the subject matter of ideal art4 ,we have already analysed this state of society in another connection under the description of the heroic and pre-eminently ideal world-condition4 ,the heroic age is no longer restricted to that idyllic garden of spiritual attenuation1 but includes within its borders passions and aims of deeper moment2 and yet withal that which in the circle of the individual life touches closest the satisfaction of each man's immediate wants is still the entire product of his own activity4 ,moreover1 the means of nourishment such as honey1 milk1 and wine are less complex and consequently lend themselves more readily to ideal treatment#chh4 ,a diet which includes coffee1 brandy1 and such like luxuries is associated in our minds with countless industries which are necessary to their preparation4 ,our heroes1 on the contrary1 kill and roast their own food1 break in their own chargers1 are the makers to a considerable extent of all their household gods2 ploughs1 armour for defence1 shields1 coats of mail1 swords1 spears1 all are either the work of the possessor1 or are made directly under his supervision4 ,in a condition of life of this kind a man necessarily feels that in all the things he makes use of1 and in all that encircles him1 he is in touch with something produced by himself2 that in contact with external objects he is in contact with his own substance rather than with objects which emanate from a world strange to himself and outside that in which he is himself master4 ,it is1 of course1 assumed that all the energy he expends upon working up the material into forms adapted for his use is not so much troublesome labour1 but a work which1 through the satisfaction it brings him1 falls easy from his shoulders1 a work1 in short1 which he can carry over every obstacle to success4 ,we find a society of this type in ,homer4 ,agamemnon's sceptre is a family staff which his ancestor himself shaped from the block and left as an heirloom to his descendants4 ,odysseus put together with his own hands the mighty bed he shared with ,penelope2 and if the famous weapons of ,achilles are no work of his own we only find the various and interfused array of his own activities abated that a god1 ,hephaestus himself1 may provide them at the request of his mother ,thetis4 ,in a word1 we meet everywhere the youthful delight in novel discovery1 the freshness of personal possession1 the victorious sense of enjoyment4 ,everything is in its place and at home1 in everything a man discovers the energy of his own sinew1 the adroitness of his own hand1 the cunning of his own spirit1 or somewhat that follows from his own courage and bravery4 ,in this way1 and by this alone1 the instruments which satisfy our human sense are not as yet relegated to a merely external relation1 but men have before them the living process of the instruments themselves1 the vital consciousness of the human worth they attach to them2 and they find it there inasmuch as for them they are not mere lifeless things or things which habit has made lifeless1 but creations impregnated with their own energies4 ,and for the same reason we find here an idyllic condition of things1 it is true1 but not in that restricted sense of the term that the ,earth and her streams1 seas1 forests1 and cattle supply to mankind their sustaining substance1 while man himself is only visible to us as a passive creature limited by the active powers which support him and their enjoyment4 ,rather we already see within this morning-time of human life deep interests at work1 in relation to which the great world itself is but a subordinate realm1 the ground and the instrument for bringing into being the higher aims which are present1 as a ground and environment1 however1 over which that harmonious concord1 yet withal independence1 of both sides of our human world prevails2 and which does prevail in the sight of all for this reason that everything there exists as the product and for the use of human life1 is at the same time the creation and enjoyment of the man who creates and enjoys its use#chi4 ,to apply such a mode of artistic presentation to material borrowed from more recent times1 whose completed culture offers the strongest contrast to the heroic age above-mentioned1 is always beset with extreme difficulty and liable to failure4 ,yet for all that ,goethe in his ,hermann and ,dorothea has furnished us in this respect with an admirable masterpiece4 ,here an attempt will only be made to elucidate a few significant points by contrasting the same with a composition of similar type4 ,voss1 in his famous romance ,louise1 had depicted on much the same idyllic lines our human life and activity in a quiet circle of narrow range1 if also marked with independent characteristics of its own4 ,the country parson1 the tobacco-pipe1 the dressing-gown1 the garden-bench1 and finally our coffee-pot1 have all of them here important parts to play4 ,coffee and sugar are1 however1 products1 which are really here out of place2 they belong to an entirely different world#cij throughout associated with all the varied ramifications of commercial and textile industries4 ,this circle of country life is consequently not self-inclusive4 ,in the beautiful picture of ,hermann and ,dorothea we are1 on the contrary1 under no necessity to demand such a consistency4 ,as we already have pointed out in another connection1 we find interwoven with the main threads of this poem1 which is1 no doubt1 in its prevailing atmosphere entirely idyllic1 the great political interests of the time1 the struggles of the ,french ,revolution1 the defence of the ,fatherland1 asserted in a worthy way no less than with decision4 ,the more limited scope of family life in a little country town is not so presented us as a whole which can even possibly remain in total ignorance of that mighty wave of the great world under stress of a real cataclysm of events1 which is the view we are given of the pastor in the ,louise of ,voss4 ,in ,goethe's poem we have1 on the contrary1 by means of the interfusion of these great world-movements1 within which the idyllic characters and events are portrayed1 the picture of a life with a typical character of its own set in the frame of a world of more significant content2 and the apothecary1 who is here presented as the out-and-out ,philistine1 and who merely lives within the more narrow borders of that country life's surroundings1 affected by that only1 is excellently sketched for us with the good heart1 but at the same time peevish isolation1 which we find so natural4 ,add to this1 in that which most closely touches the life of the characters thus portrayed1 we find a particular emphasis laid on the fundamental aspect of this idyllic life as previously indicated in our former discussion of it4 ,to mention one point only1 we may observe that the host does not by any means drink coffee with his guests1 the parson and the apothecary2 on the contrary1 to cite a line or two3 ,carefully brought in the mother the sparkling and glorious red-wine1 ,poured in the clear-cut glasses1 with rimlets all polished of pewter1 ,brought in the green-coloured rummers1 those goblets most fit for the ,rhine-wine4 ,they drink in the fresh air what has been grown at home1 of the '#hc vintage1 and withal in glasses that1 as home-made1 are just the right ones for ,rhine-wine4 ,a few lines further on our fancy is yet further kindled with the streams of the ,rhine river and its dearly-loved banks1 and we are even introduced to the vineyard of the host behind the house itself2 and1 in short1 there is nothing to arrest our attention outside the typical circle of a self-contented life which of its own bounty provides for its wants4 7c7 ,in addition to both these types of human environment we must mention yet another in close association with which we all necessarily live4 ,it is no other than the universally prevailing spiritual surroundings of our life whether they be religious1 legal1 or moral1 the organization of the ,state1 that is to say1 the constitution of the government1 the judicial institutions1 the family1 the institutions of both public and private life1 and all other social relations4 ,for the ideal character is not merely to be portrayed in its relation to all that satisfies material wants1 but as itself a focus of spiritual interests4 ,it is certainly true that all that is truly substantive1 divine1 and essentially necessary in all these relations is fundamentally an envisagement of one reality4 ,in the objective world1 however1 the forms under which this reality is manifested are various1 and they are1 one and all1 involved in that which is wholly contingent in particular examples1 and the conventional usages which are only valid for definite periods of time and distinct nations4 ,in this variety of form all the interests of men's spiritual life receive an external embodiment of reality1 with which every man is confronted in the customs1 usages1 and habits of society4 ,every man thereby1 in addition to possessing a self-exclusive individuality of his own1 becomes1 in virtue of his association with such spiritual realities1 even more a member of a whole cognate with and vital to himself than as a unit of that external world of ,nature with which he is similarly conjoined4 ,speaking generally1 we may attach to this spiritual association1 of human life very much the same terms and significance we have already discussed in the foregoing sections2 consequently we will for the present pass over the more detailed consideration of it1 whose most important features will apply more strictly to another aspect of our inquiry1 and will then be more appropriately discussed4 #c4 ,,the ,,externality ,,of ,,the ,,ideal ,,work ,,of ,,art ,,in ,,its ,,relation ,,to ,a ,,public ,it is therefore necessary that art1 as the representation of the ,ideal1 must embody this ,ideal in all the relations to external reality we have above described1 and thereby associate the inward possessions of character with the objective world4 ,a work of art1 however much in form it may be a self-including and harmonious world by itself1 exists none the less as such an object1 both real and particular1 not for itself but for such as behold and enjoy it1 that is the ,public4 ,actors1 for example1 in the representation they give us of a particular drama do not merely enter into converse with one another1 but appeal directly to ourselves1 their audience2 and it is equally important that they make themselves intelligible under both these aspects4 ,every work of art is in fact a direct appeal to the intelligence of everyone who confronts it4 ,now it is indeed true that the real ,ideal1 as envisaged for us in the universal interests and passions of its gods and men1 is so far intelligible to everyone as it gives us a view of its characters within some typical external world of customs1 usages1 and everything else that characteristically distinguishes it4 ,but the condition of art we have above formulated makes it further necessary that this element of external reality is not merely one with which the characters thereby represented are harmoniously associated1 but must be also one within which we ourselves to whom the work is addressed feel equally at home4 ,the appropriateness of the external environment to the characters enfolded within it must apply with equal force to our own attitude of mind in regarding both4 ,but it so happens that from whatever period of the world's history the subject-matter of a work of art may be borrowed it will be sure to contain essential features1 which are quite distinct from those which specifically determine other nations and periods4 ,in other words artists of every description1 whether they be poets1 painters1 sculptors1 or musicians1 select subject-matter from the ,past1 which in their particular state of culture and intelligence1 ethical customs1 usages1 and the form of their government1 differ from the civilization of the times they live in4 ,moreover1 as we have already observed1 this return upon the ,past possesses the considerable advantage that in having thus recourse to memory instead of being face to face with all the facts of the present1 there is an appreciable diminution of the material from which the artist selects his subject1 and this he cannot readily dispense with4 ,at the same time the artist belongs only to his own century1 and it is in the ethical customs1 modes of conception1 and generally the intellectual outlook of that he lives4 ,the ,homeric poems ,homer1 to take him for once as the individual creator of both ,iliad and ,odyssey1 may have actually lived through or he may not2 but in any case they are at least four hundred years later#cia than the time of the ,trojan war2 and further a period twice as long separates the great ,greek tragedians from the days of the ancient heroes1 who1 as translated into the atmosphere of their own time1 form the subject-matter of their poetry4 ,it is just the same in the case of the ,niebelungenlied and the artist who finally fused together the various saga which that poem contains into one homogeneous work4 ,we may no doubt admit that the artist finds himself entirely on congenial ground when dealing with everything truly pathetic1 either in the history of gods or men2 but the external and actual conditions of that ancient world1 whose characters and actions he endeavours to portray1 have altered in essential features and become consequently strange to him4 ,and further than this a poet creates for the sake of a ,public1 and primarily for his own nation and his time1 both of which should be able to enter into such a work of art with intelligence1 and feel at home in it4 ,the most genuine works of art no doubt assert a further claim to immortality1 a hope that they may continue to be a source of delight to all times and nations4 ,but even in the case of works of the highest class it is none the less true that nations and times situated far away from those which produced them can only fully apprehend them with the assistance of an extensive apparatus of geographical1 historical1 and it may be even philosophical knowledge and the results of much critical investigation4 ,bearing in mind these fundamental1 and to some extent incompatible differences which characterize the various points of view from which a work of art must be regarded1 the question arises what kind of form relatively to its external framework of locality1 custom1 usage1 and generally any and every condition of religious1 political or ethical significance a particular work of art should receive4 ,should an artist suffer his own times to pass from his mind altogether1 and attempt only to secure the substantial appearance of the ,past and what actually then existed1 so that his work become simply a true portrayal of that2 or is he not merely justified1 but rather under an obligation1 to pay an exclusive attention to his own nation and the life around him1 elaborating his work with express regard to the principle that it should stand in harmonious relation to his own times8 ,or1 to put the same thing in rather more technical language1 we may propound the problem thus3 ,is the subject-matter of a work of art to be objectively valid in its content as one entirely appropriate historically considered1 or should such matter be treated subjectively1 that is1 in complete subordination to the artist's personal standpoint relatively to the culture and social conditions of his own time8 ,we would rather observe that both these positions1 if thus pressed unduly1 land us in extreme conclusions equally false2 and we propose now to examine them briefly that we may by their means elucidate a more satisfactory theory4 ,and we would consider three fundamental aspects which this problem suggests4 ,we will first examine what is implied in the above subjective assertion of the particular culture of the artist's own time2 secondly1 there is the question what may be regarded as exclusively and objectively true when we refer to the ,past2 thirdly1 we have to consider what may still be objectively valid in the true sense1 though we still have a representation and appropriation of material borrowed from a time and nationality foreign to that of the artists4 7a7 ,now to start with1 if we consider this purely subjective assertion1 it is obvious that when we press the position closely we are finally driven to exclude the objective embodiment of the ,past altogether1 and to maintain that artistic representation is exclusively concerned with the appearance of present times4 77 ,such a result may be doubtless1 under one aspect of it1 presented by mere ignorance of the ,past4 ,it is1 then1 rather the result of a navet1 which is unable to feel the contradiction between the object itself and the representation given1 or at least fails to bring the same to consciousness4 ,such a form of artistic presentation is therefore fundamentally due to lack of sufficient culture4 ,we could hardly wish for a more vivid illustration of this than we find in the nave productions of ,hans ,sachs1 who has1 no doubt with a vivid freshness of imaginative vigour and spirit1 as we may truly say1 domesticated among us#cib our dear ,lord and ,father ,god no less than ,adam1 ,eve1 and the rest of the patriarchs4 ,here1 for example1 ,god the ,father is portrayed as teaching a school in which ,cain1 ,abel1 and the rest of ,adam's children--are the pupils1 precisely as any pedagogue of the time might have done4 ,he catechizes them upon the ten commandments and the ,lord's ,prayer4 ,abel knows his lesson as a pious and good boy ought to4 ,cain on the contrary behaves and replies to his teachers as only naughty and wicked boys would think of doing2 and when it is his turn to repeat the commandments turns them inside out3 thou shalt steal1 thou shalt not honour thy father and mother1 and so forth4 ,a representation of much the same crude simplicity having for its subject the tale of our ,lord's ,passion used to be carried out in ,south ,germany1 was then made illegal1 and has since once more been resuscitated4 ,in this ,pilate is portrayed in the character of an insolent1 rough1 and arrogant official1 the common soldiers much in the same familiar way our own might1 offer ,christ surreptitiously a pinch of tobacco2 he disdains it1 and they flatten it out on his nose4 ,vulgarity finds all the more jest in such an incident for the reason that it wholly conforms to its notions of piety and reverence1 indeed calls up such feelings all the more readily through its immediate reference to that which it finds in its own world1 thereby making more vivid its own sense of devotional fervour4 ,no doubt there is a certain justification for this mode of translating1 so to speak1 the appearance and form of objective history into modern equivalents1 such as we have found in our literature2 and we may even attach a kind of greatness to the courage of ,hans ,sachs in making himself so familiar with ,god ,almighty1 and those old religious ideas that without the least vestige of impiety he could rivet them deep within the conditions of our most commonplace life4 ,at the same time such an attempt is none the less a rude intrusion upon our feelings1 and indicates lack of cultivation1 inasmuch as it not merely disallows to the object itself a right to assert itself as it really is1 but forces upon it a mode of appearance so directly contrary to that which it possesses1 that the result can only impress us as an emphatic caricature4 77 ,as an antithesis to the above type of subjectivity we find another equally supreme asserting itself out of sheer pride in its own culture under the belief that the views peculiar to its own times1 its ethical customs1 and social conventions are those alone worth preservation or acceptance4 ,owing to a bias of this kind it is quite unable to enjoy the content of a work of art until such a form of culture prevails in it4 ,an illustration of this latter type is the so-called classical good taste of the ,french school4 ,everything that is here attempted must forthwith be ,frenchified1 and all that it presents under the form of any other nationality and more particularly with any reference to the ,middle ,ages is voted incorrect and barbarous and is cast on one side with absolute contempt4 ,voltaire expressed anything but the truth when he said that the ,french have improved the works of the ancient world4 ,what they have done is to nationalize them2 and by this process of recasting have corrupted them with every kind of foreign and angular quality of their own that such a taste as theirs could develop to any extent1 requiring as it did throughout a culture absolutely based on court etiquette1 and a conformity to conventional rule and generalization in both the meaning and mode of any dramatic work4 ,indeed1 we shall find the trail of this abstraction of a superfine culture visible in the very diction of their poetry4 ,not a poet among them dare venture to use the word cochon1 or add their own nomenclature to spoons1 forks1 and a thousand other simple objects4 ,consequently we have roundabout definitions and circumlocutions4 ,we cannot have our spoons and forks2 we get instead an instrument of the hand which conveys our victuals in a liquid or arid state to the mouth2 and this by no means stands alone4 ,and with all its refinement their taste is vulgar to a degree2 for the simple truth is that genuine art1 so far from planing away and polishing its content to one flat and unruffled surface of generalities1 is most of all anxious to set in full relief all that makes toward the well-defined characterization of life4 ,it is on account of this very taste that the ,french can make less of ,shakespeare than any other poet4 ,and when they have attempted to work him up to their graces they have clipped off from him precisely that portion which we ,germans find nearest to our hearts4 ,for the same reason ,voltaire makes merry over ,pindar because he has made the remark1 4#cic ,and1 consequently1 in their works of art they find it necessary to make ,chinese1 ,americans1 or the heroes of ,greek or ,roman antiquity all speak in one tongue and in one manner--that of their ,french court4 ,achilles1 for instance1 in the ,iphigenie en ,aulide#cid is nothing more or less than a ,french prince2 and if we had no name to help us no one could conceivably discover one particle of ,achilles in him4 ,it is true that in the theatrical representation of this drama he was habited as a ,greek1 appeared at least in helmet and coat of mail2 but at the same time his hair was curled and powdered1 with broad hips through poschen#cie1 with red claws worked on shoes fastened on the foot with coloured ribbons2 and what is more1 the ,esther of ,racine was expressly popular in the time of ,louis ,,xiv1 for the particular reason that ,ahasuerus1 on his first entrance on the stage1 copied the appearance of ,louis ,,xiv himself1 when he entered the great hall of audience4 ,no doubt1 in this transcript1 there was a considerable admixture of the oriental luxuriance2 but a ,ahasuerus he was none the less fully powdered and wearing the royal mantle of ermine1 and followed by a complete retinue of curled and powdered chamberlains got up thoroughly en habit franais with their wigs1 their feathered caps under arm1 their vests and hoses of drap d'or1 with their silk stockings and red buckles on their shoes4 ,all that the court and a select circle of the privileged few were only permitted to see de facto was here open to all classes alike--the entre of the king paraded in the poet's verses4 ,the writing of history in ,france is not unfrequently conducted on very much the same principle4 ,that is to say1 history itself and the real objects of history are not the main purpose of the historian1 whose interest is rather concentrated either on giving the government in vogue a lesson or teaching others how they ought to detest it4 ,and in the same way there are a host of dramas which1 either expressly throughout their entire content or in passing episodes1 divert the attention to the events of the day2 or1 if passages occur in pieces which refer to former times presenting anything which may bear on matters of contemporary interest1 the parallel or the contrast is deliberately emphasized with every expression of enthusiasm4 77 ,a third type of this personal treatment by the artist of his subject-matter may be sufficiently described as the separation of the same from all genuine artistic form whether it be characteristic of past or present works of art1 a mode of production in fact which simply presents us with the entirely evanescent colour of the man in the street in his ordinary everyday action and vocation without adding aught to the same4 ,in other words we may describe it as the bare counterpart of what the man of commonsense is conscious in the prosaic facts of life1 that and nothing more4 ,in such an atmosphere of prose no doubt everyone finds himself at home readily enough2 or rather1 he will only not find himself at home who takes up such a work with some definite conception of that which the very conditions of a work of art demand1 and consequently is aware that it is precisely from this type of handling that ,art undertakes to liberate us4 ,kotzebue1 in his day1 obtained all his popular effects through compositions of this kind1 which aimed at nothing else but letting the general public both see and hear life's troubles and vexations1 the pocketing of silver spoons1 the risking of the pillory1 or1 to take particular characters1 parsons1 chamberlains1 ensign-bearers1 secretaries1 and cavalry-majors1 in their naked colours4 ,everyone might here recognize his own household1 or1 at least1 that of some relation or friend1 might see at a glance where in his own precious circumstances and aims of life the shoe pinched4 ,an originality of this sort necessarily fails to stir any real sense or idea of that which is the vital content of a work of art1 however much it may awake an interest for its productions in hearts that are wont to ask for so little and are so ready to put up with the commonplaces of so-called ethical reflections4 ,we may conclude1 then1 that the artistic presentation of the facts of external reality under any one of these three types just examined is subjective in a one-sided way1 that is to say1 it wholly fails to present us with any adequate form of that objective world as it really exists4 7b7 ,we next propose to examine a mode of presentation the reverse of the above1 one which endeavours to restore us the characters and events of the past so far as may be with every local detail of their former environment no less than any and every ethical or other particular characteristic which formerly distinguished them4 ,we ,germans have particularly come to the front in this class of work4 ,as a rule we are1 in striking contrast to the ,french1 the most painstaking recorders of all that is peculiar in nations other than our own1 and consequently make fidelity to the characteristic usages1 dress1 weapons1 and all such antiquarian detail appropriate to particular epochs and localities a first requisite of our art4 ,add to this we have the necessary patience to put ourselves to no end of trouble in the way of hard study in order that we may thoroughly enter into the modes of thought and perception which belong to foreign nations and centuries distant from our own1 and make ourselves thoroughly conversant with all their peculiarities4 ,this power of looking at facts from many and diverse points of view in order to both apprehend and comprehend the spirit of every kind of national existence makes us not merely tolerant in our art towards all that strikes us as exceptionally strange in foreign customs1 but clamorous even to a painful degree in our insistence that we have before us accurate correspondence with objective truth down to the most insignificant detail4 ,the ,french are1 no doubt1 full of resource and energetic1 but1 however highly educated and practical men they may be1 such qualities do not increase1 but rather diminish the patience which they possess for quiet and exhaustive study4 ,criticism is always of first importance with them4 ,we ,germans1 on the contrary1 are by nature inclined to accept any picture of real truth for what it is1 and particularly this is so with foreign works of art4 ,from whatever part of ,nature's storehouse such may come1 whether it is plants or other creations of foreign growth1 implements of any kind or form1 dogs and cats1 even absurdities1 we accept them all genially2 and the result of this is we are able to be on excellent terms with modes of thought the most removed from our own1 ay1 sacrificial customs1 legends of the saints and all the extraordinary follies that go with them1 to say nothing of a host of other marvels equally surprising4 ,and for the same reasons it only appears essentially rational that in attempting to represent characters in action we should make their conversation and pursuits conformable to their own substance1 that is to say1 in strict accord with the times when they lived and their own national characteristics1 whether regarded individually or in association with each other4 ,this fundamental idea that the objective truth of a work of art is established by virtue of the type of historical accuracy above described has obtained currency in comparatively recent times1 mainly1 that is to say1 since the literary work of ,frederick von ,schlegel4 ,from that time the importance of a first principle in literary criticism has attached to it2 and further than this1 it is asserted that our purely personal interest should above all restrict itself to the enjoyment we may derive from historical accuracy of this kind and the life it thus reproduces4 ,once accept these hard and fast rules and the conclusion is obvious that we are allowed no additional interest of any superior quality which an enquiry into the essential significance of any artistic content may or may not provide for us any more than we are permitted to derive any interest more vital to ourselves from aspects of such a work directly associated with the culture and aims of our own times4 ,it is much on these lines that we find also in ,germany1 where the enthusiasm of ,herder in this direction started a closer attention on all sides to the ,volkslied1 a poetic inundation of national folk-songs imitating native tones of every sort of nationality whether it be the ,iroquois1 latter-day ,greek1 ,lap1 ,turk1 ,tartar1 ,mongol1 and many another2 and1 of course1 it is assumed to be indicative of nothing less than first-rate genius#cif to possess the power of thus diving into the ways and ideas of other folk1 and converting all we discover into poetry4 ,at the same time it is clear that however completely your poet may work his way into and emotionally realize all this strange kind of world1 it remains and must continue to remain for that public to whose enjoyment these songs are addressed as something very much aloof from it4 ,the truth is that such a theory1 if pressed to its abstract logical conclusion1 limits its boundaries solely to the truth of history in its formal accuracy1 and by doing so neglects all consideration of the nature of ,art's content and questions relative to its essential significance1 just as it disregards every aspect of it in which the culture and resources of modern thought and contemporary life are asserted4 ,but it is as impossible to detach ourselves from the truth implied in this theory as it is from equally important truths which it neglects2 all equally claim satisfaction1 and imperatively force upon us the necessity of finding a further solution in which the claims of historical truth may be reconciled with these rival aspects of truth in a very different way to that just examined4 ,and this brings us to the third question we proposed as to the nature of that objectivity and subjectivity which can be fully sustained together as the reality to which a genuine work of art conforms4 7c7 ,the point of essential importance which we should before all others wish to emphasize here is this1 that no one of those various aspects of truth we have above indicated should be allowed a predominant significance such as would impair the relative force of the others2 and1 further1 or rather notwithstanding this1 historical accuracy pure and simple in external matters1 such as local conditions1 customs1 usages1 and social institutions generally1 must receive in a work of art their due place1 if a subordinate one1 it being only right that the interest of mere historical truth should give way before that of a vitally true and imperishable content for the present no less than the past4 ,we cannot1 perhaps1 do better by way of explaining what we consider to be the true form of artistic representation than by setting up in contrast a few examples of some we take to be defective4 77 ,now1 to start with1 the presentation of the characteristic features of a given period may be entirely just1 accurate1 and impregnated with life1 nay more1 wholly intelligible to a modern audience1 and notwithstanding fail to escape the ordinary atmosphere of prose1 and present us with the real substance of poetry4 ,goethe's ,gtz von ,berlichingen will alone furnish us with notable illustrations of this defect4 ,it is only necessary to open the book at the first scene1 which introduces us to an inn near ,schwarzenberg in ,franconia2 the dramatis personae are ,metzler1 and ,sievers sitting at a table1 two grooms by the fire1 also the landlord4 ,sievers4 ,another glass of brandy1 ,hans1 my boy1 and good ,christian measure4 ,landlord4 ,you carry a glass that is never full4 ,metzler4 ,aside to ,sievers4 ,tell us that once again about ,berlichingen2 the ,bambergers are in a pretty fume out there2 ay1 black as thunder 7etc474 ,the same kind of thing we find in the third ,act4 ,george4 ,enters with a gutter-spout4 ,there you have lead and to spare2 spot the target with but one half of it1 and devil a soul shall get off1 who is like to say to your ,majesty1 that's a miss this time#cig4 ,lerse4 ,aloud4 ,a fine piece of metal4 ,george4 ,the rain may take another road for all ,i care2 a brave knight and a real good rain get through most things4 ,lerse4 ,pours into glass4 ,hold the spoon4 ,goes to the window4 ,there's one of those imperial cockades prowling about with his musket2 they believe we have aimed a point too far4 ,he shall have a taste of my bullet1 hot too and fresh from the pan4 ,loads4 ,george4 ,drops the spoon4 ,let me have a look4 ,lerse4 ,fires4 ,there lies the fool 7etc474 ,all this is exceedingly vivid1 intelligible1 depicted in perfect keeping with the situation and the characters portrayed4 ,yet for all that these scenes are both trivial to a degree and essentially prosaic4 ,all we get from either the matter or the form is just the ordinary man's way of seeing things and reality as it appears to him or rather all of us to some extent4 ,we find the same tendency in many another of ,goethe's youthful productions1 which no doubt were deliberately directed against everything which previously had passed for the rule of the guild1 and which sought for their most impressive effect by means of the nearness made clear to ourselves1 an impression gained by the extraordinary grasp with which the poet's imagination and feeling seized upon everything4 ,but the nearness was itself too near1 and the vital content in part so petty1 that such compositions ran constantly into mere triviality4 ,we are most conscious of this kind of triviality in dramatic works when we see them on the stage2 it is then that after being worked up to some excitement by all the concomitants of a theatrical performance1 lights1 well-dressed folk1 and the rest of it1 we expect to see something more than a couple of peasants1 and troopers and a glass of schnapps thrown in#cih4 ,this phase has mainly found its admirers in readers2 it never had a long run on the stage4 77 ,if we now consider our subject from an opposite point of view it may be admitted that we can sufficiently make ourselves acquainted with and assimilate the historical content of a former mythology and all that is most strange to ourselves in earlier conditions of state-life and national custom to secure through such an intimacy with1 the general culture then prevailing a varied knowledge of the past4 ,in fact1 this acquaintance with the art1 mythology1 literature1 cultus1 and usages of antiquity is the starting point of our present system of education4 ,every schoolboy knows something about the gods and heroes of ,greece and the prominent characters in ancient history4 ,it is therefore quite possible1 in so far as they really enter into the imaginative life of our own times1 that we may find enjoyment in the imaginative representation of such characters and interests4 ,it is further impossible to predict whether or no such an intimacy may not be eventually carried equally as far in the case of the ,indian1 ,egyptian1 and ,scandinavian mythologies4 ,we may further observe that in the religious conceptions of all these peoples the ,universal ,god is presented4 ,the determinate form1 however1 of such conceptions1 that is to say1 the particular gods of ,greece or ,india1 are no longer true for us as so personified4 ,we do not believe in their existence1 and the pleasure we take in them is derived from their appeal to our imagination4 ,for this reason they stand entirely apart from our deepest emotional life1 and we can imagine nothing more empty and cold than such exclamations we hear only too often in opera3 ,o ye gods6 or ,o ,jupiter6 or even ,o ,isis and ,osiris6 ,and the folly of it all reaches its height when we have the wretched saws of oracular wisdom thrown in--and the opera can seldom get along without them--a position of dignity which nowadays for the first time in tragic drama is occupied by pure folly and clairvoyance4 ,the same criticism applies with equal truth to all other historical material relating to national customs1 laws1 and the like4 ,such historical fact is excellent in its way1 but it belongs to the past2 and when it has once ceased to have anything in common with present life it necessarily ceases1 in spite of all our knowledge of it1 to belong to us4 ,we have1 in short1 no interest#cii in what has passed away on the mere ground that it once existed4 ,what is historical can only truly be said to belong to us when it is the possession of the nation1 to which we ourselves belong1 or when we are able to regard the present as in a general way casually connected with the events in question1 to whose continuous series the characters or actions represented are united by a bond of essential membership4 ,for if we carefully consider the matter we shall find that the mere fact of being formerly bound together with the same external environment and people to which we ourselves belong is not sufficient--rather the very part of our nation must present features in still closer relation to the conditions1 life1 and existence of our own times4 ,to take an example of what we mean1 we find ourselves in the ,niebelungenlied geographically on a soil that belongs to us still1 but the ,burgundians and ,king ,etzel are so absolutely cut off from all that touches our present civilization and every interest which is now coincident with patriotism that1 without borrowing anything from the learning of the subject1 it is but simple truth to say we feel infinitely more at home in the poems of ,homer#djj4 ,klopstock1 no doubt1 in his enthusiasm for everything that concerned the ,fatherland1 was prompted to substitute his ,scandinavian gods for those of ,hellenic mythology2 but1 for all his zeal1 ,wotan1 ,walhalla1 and ,freja remain mere names for us1 which appeal to our imaginations and patriotic emotions even less than ,zeus and his compeers of ,olympus4 ,the point above all we desire to emphasize is this4 ,works of art are not composed primarily for the mere student or the professor1 but with the express purpose that they shall be intelligible on their face1 and a source of enjoyment without any one having to undertake first a circuitous route of extensive historical investigation4 ,for ,art is not addressed to a small and select circle of the privileged few1 but to the nation at large4 ,what1 moreover1 is generally valid for a work of art applies also to the external form of the historical reality therein portrayed4 ,such exposition also must express itself with clearness open to the common apprehension requiring no considerable research to make it intelligible1 must be clear to ourselves as representations of our century and our own people1 so that we may be able to find ourselves entirely at home in it1 and not have before us a world foreign to that we live in1 if not actually unintelligible4 77 ,considerations such as the foregoing have already brought us within reach of the truer conception of the objective truth of art and the mode under which it assimilates the material of past history4 ,we propose now to offer further illustrations in support of the same4 77 ,and we may start at once by drawing attention to a characteristic which is common alike to the genuine national poetry of all peoples and in every period of past history1 namely1 that the historical and formal aspect of that poetry is entirely national1 that is to say1 it retains nothing incongruous to the people for whom it is composed4 ,this is a feature shared alike by the great epics of ,india1 the ,homeric poems and the ,greek drama4 ,sophocles never made his ,philoctetes1 ,antigone1 ,ajax1 ,orestes1 dipus1 his choregi and choruses speak in the speech and manner that would have been entirely appropriate to their own times4 ,the ,spaniards have written their romances of the ,cid under the same guiding principle4 ,tasso in his ,jerusalem ,liberated celebrated the universal interests of ,catholic ,christendom4 ,camoens1 the poet of ,portugal1 depicted the discovery of the seaway to the ,east ,indies round the ,cape of ,good ,hope1 and all the infinitely various adventures of the sea heroes that made it possible2 and these acts of daring were the acts of his own people4 ,shakespeare threw into dramatic form the tragic history of his own country and even a ,voltaire wrote his ,henriade4 ,far indeed have we ,germans strayed from the path thus marked for us when we hope to work up into national epics histories remote from our own1 which carry no longer with them a national interest of any kind4 ,bodmer's ,noachide and ,kloptock's ,messias have started a new fashion of their own1 ay1 as they have overturned that old one which taught us that it redounds to a nation's glory to have its ,homer1 to say nothing of its ,pindar and ,sophocles4 ,those biblical stories1 it is true1 present points of special affinity with the national imagination owing to our close acquaintance with the old and new ,testaments2 but the historical material in its association with ancient custom and the like remains for all that only intelligible to the savant1 and all the most of us can pick up from such epics is the prosaic interfusion of events and characters1 which1 in such a process of translation1 have merely some novel form of speech thrust into their mouths1 and the final result can only impress us as hollow and artificial4 77 ,at the same time art cannot be restricted wholly to material borrowed from one nation4 ,and as a matter of fact the more nationalities have come into contact with one another1 the more their poets have looked abroad among all nations and times for the subject-matter of their poems4 ,but however this may be the case1 it is none the less an error to suppose that the mere fact that a poet is able1 so to speak1 to live into times aloof from his own at once stamps him as a man of creative genius4 ,it is more to the point to recollect that this historical framework must1 in the co-ordination of a poem1 be retained only in strict subordination1 and as a means of expressing that which permanently belongs to our humanity4 ,precisely in this way the ,middle ,ages long ago borrowed much from antiquity1 but so absolutely suffused it with the content of its own epoch that1 in this respect verging on the opposite extreme1 we really get nothing from that antiquity but the bare names of ,alexander1 ,aeneas1 and the emperor ,octavius4 ,first in importance1 then1 is this permanent condition of true art1 immediate intelligibility4 ,it will be found an invariable truth that all nations have emphasized precisely that in this life which was most agreeable to their artistic sense1 their desire being always to find what was most intimate to themselves1 their life and existence in their art4 ,it was this independent flavour of patriotism which ,calderon worked into such characters as his ,zenobia and ,semiramis2 and ,shakespeare in the same way was able to imprint upon the most varied subject-matter the hall-mark of his ,english ancestry1 although he knew how to preserve along with it the essential traits of historical characters belonging to nations foreign to his own1 the ,roman for example1 in a far profounder degree than was possible to the ,spanish poets4 ,even the ,greek tragedians had their eyes constantly directed to the actual conditions of their times and the particular city in which they lived4 ,the dipus ,colonus in its local references is not merely in a peculiar way associated with ,athens but1 by virtue of the fact that dipus dies in this locality1 at once indicates him as the future ,preserver of that city4 ,in somewhat other associations the ,eumenides of ,aeschylus is1 owing to the decisive sentence of the ,areopagus1 marked by an interest of more vital interest to the ,athenians#dja4 ,on the other hand ,greek mythology1 despite all the varied and oft repeated use that has been made of it since the revival of the arts and learning1 has never fully come home to the general sense of modern emotions and in various degrees in the plastic arts and still more in poetry1 despite its very extensive influence here1 has failed to arouse real enthusiasm4 ,no one thinks now of writing an ode to ,venus1 ,zeus1 or ,pallas#djb4 ,sculpture1 it is true1 can hardly get along even in modern times without the assistance of the ,greek ,pantheon1 but for that very reason it is mainly only appreciated by and intelligible to a select circle of cultivated men who are either connoisseurs or critics4 ,as one of these1 ,goethe spared no pains in his endeavour to arouse in contemporary artists an enthusiasm which should go so far as to imitate the pictures of ,philostratus1 but for the most part his pains were thrown away4 ,such examples of the work of antiquity1 on account of the very flavour of past time and a life that has vanished1 which clings to them1 remain as strange to contemporary art as they do to the general public4 ,as a contrary example of real success on the part of ,goethe we may instance the far profounder insight he has shown us during the later period of his poetic activity in fusing by means of his ,weststlicher ,divan the colour of the ,east with the poetry that really appeals to us to-day1 giving to the ,orient1 in fact1 its modern embodiment4 ,in this process of assimilation he has clearly shown himself alive to the fact that he is a poet of the ,west and a ,german as well1 and consequently while preserving the fundamental key-note of the ,oriental spirit in his delineation of characters and situations to which it was appropriate1 was able at the same time fully to satisfy the claims of the modern spirit and those of his own personality4 ,subject to such reservations it is undoubtedly in the province of a poet to borrow his material from remote regions1 past centuries and foreign nations1 maintaining in their broad and most characteristic outlines the historical form of ancient mythology1 custom1 and institution4 ,at the same time he will take care to utilize such forms only as the external frame of his delineations1 never permitting the essential content of such productions to fall into any disharmony with the profounder instincts of his own native world4 ,as the most extraordinary example of this ,goethe's ,iphigenia still stands without a rival4 ,in their relation to such a transformation the several arts dispose of their material very differently4 ,in the love-poems of lyrical poetry very little use is made of local associations depicted with historical accuracy4 ,the emotional situation and the movement of sentiment is here the main thing4 ,we receive1 for example1 in the sonnets of ,petrarch a very small substratum of natural fact relatively to ,laura1 hardly anything more than her name1 which might just as well have been another4 ,of local interest we get the barest scraps1 and that entirely of general significance1 such as the existence of the fountain of ,vaucluse and things of that kind4 ,epical poetry1 on the contrary1 requires the greatest detail in its natural descriptions1 and we are most readily pleased with their historical truth1 provided always that the picture is both clear and intelligible4 ,the use of the external truth of historical facts presents the greatest pitfalls to dramatic art1 more particularly in reference to its theatrical presentation1 where everything is directly addressed to an audience1 or purports to strike upon sense with the vividness of life1 so that we are willing to recognize and entrust ourselves therein with equal directness4 ,here the delineation of historical truth in its external aspects must for the most part be of subsidiary importance1 in fact retain little more than the framework of it4 ,it must1 in short1 remain true to that natural relation we find in love-poetry1 in which at the same time that we are able completely to sympathize with the feelings expressed in every way another name is given to the beloved than that of the lady most loved by ourselves#djc4 ,it does not here in the least signify whether or no our critics fail to discover absolute precision in the picture presented of the particular manners1 culture1 and emotional expression of the time4 ,in ,shakespeare's historical dramas we find a great deal that remains strange to us and of no considerable interest4 ,we are contented enough on a mere reading1 but in the theatre our enjoyment ceases4 ,critics and men of learning no doubt stick fast to their idea that such exquisite scraps of genuine history should be presented on the stage on their own merits and come down severely upon the wretched taste of the public1 when it lets us see how bored it is over such things4 ,unfortunately a work of art and the direct enjoyment we receive from it is in no sense particularly for critics or savants1 but for this very public4 ,critics have really no reason to give themselves such airs4 ,they are after all but units of this public1 and the mere attention to historical detail can be of as little serious interest to them as any other members of it4 ,for this reason the ,english nowadays in their theatrical performances only include such scenes from the ,shakespearean drama which require nothing further to make them clear and intelligible1 being happily free from the pedantry of our aesthetic professors who held that all that is most remote in historical incident from the apprehension of an average audience should be thrust before their eyes4 ,it follows also from our view of the matter that when foreign dramas are reproduced on the stage the public is clearly entitled to have them considerably remodelled#djd4 ,even that which is excellent in itself may require some alteration4 ,no doubt it will be contended that what is essentially first-rate art retains its excellence for all times2 but a work of art has also an aspect of transitory worth1 which yields to the years1 and it is this of course which requires remodelling4 ,as people change so too the sense of beauty alters2 and it is important that the particular public1 before whom any work is represented1 should feel themselves quite at home in the whole of such a work including that aspect which derives all its significance from external history4 ,it is this conditional acceptance of historical truth which at once explains and justifies that which is generally known in ,art as anachronism1 and which is usually attributed to artists as a serious defect4 ,primarily such examples of anachronism will be found to attach to matters of purely external interest4 ,that a ,falstaff should talk about pistols is no matter of consequence whatever4 ,the case is more serious when we have a violin placed in the hands of ,orpheus1 for here the association of such prehistorical times with an instrument so essentially modern as the violin1 one which everybody knows was not invented in those days1 presents too glaring a violation of truth4 ,for this reason it is now the fashion in theatrical circles to bestow incredible pains and care upon the historical accuracy of details in the matter of costume and the getting up of a piece1 as1 for example1 the infinite trouble lavished upon the historical procession in the ,maid of ,orleans4#dje ,such efforts are in the majority of eases lost labour1 for the simple reason that they only concern matters of relative interest or points that might be wholly passed over4 ,the more important type of anachronisms has nothing whatever to do with stage costume and all that with which stage business is concerned1 but consists in making characters express their emotions and ideas1 venture upon soliloquies and actions in a form or of a substance which absolutely contradicts the conditions of their times and culture1 their religious and general preconceptions4 ,it is common to apply the conception of natural truth to such examples of anachronism1 in other words1 to say that it is unnatural for characters to speak or act otherwise than they would have spoken and acted in their own days4 ,if we stick1 however1 too closely to the logic of this naturalism we shall only land ourselves in further complications#djf4 ,for an artist1 in depicting the emotional life with all that results from it1 and the fundamental passions that belong to it1 being mainly interested in the affirmation of individuality1 ought not merely to repeat that life under its ordinary daily dress2 it is rather his business to show every true manifestation of pathos in the particular light which best reveals its real quality4 ,the whole object of his attainment as an artist is not merely to understand what is of vital significance in the truth he faces1 but to be able to give it the precise form which will best direct our own eyes and ears and heart to his own discovery4 ,to attain this it is obvious that he must keep in view the particular culture of his own time no less than all its various powers of expression4 ,in the time of the ,trojan war the kind of speech in general use1 and indeed the whole fabric of social life1 was as far removed from the type of culture which is reflected on us from the pages of the ,iliad as the mass of the nation and the pre-eminent worthies of the royal houses then reigning in ,greece were separated from the fully developed form of ideas and expression such as arouse our wonder when we read our ,aeschylus1 or behold the perfected beauty of the style of ,sophocles4 ,a violation of the so-called path of ,nature of this kind is in art an anachronism implied in her laws4 ,the inward kernel of that which she reveals remains unaffected1 but the more developed power at the artist's command1 in revealing and disclosing this essential core of his subject1 renders some change in the mode of its expression inevitable4 ,it is a wholly different matter when a modification of this kind proceeds so far as to impose ideas and conceptions of a later form of the religious and moral consciousness on a century or a nation whose entire spiritual outlook is opposed to such more recent conceptions4 ,the ,christian religion has gathered in its train forms of the moral life1 which were entirely foreign to the moral consciousness of ancient ,greece4 ,that inward introspection of conscience1 for example1 ever on the alert to decide the ethical significance of action1 with its accompanying remorse and repentance1 first appears in the moral culture of a more modern date4 ,the heroic character knows nothing of a repentance which sets itself in hostility to its past4 ,what it has done it abides by4 ,orestes does not repent of his mother's murder4 ,the ,furies that rise out of the shadow of his action pursue him1 no doubt2 but the ,eumenides are1 at the same time1 represented as universal powers1 and not as voices that cry out to him from his own conscience simply4 ,this very heart and substance of a given period of man's history a poet must master1 and only when we find him interfusing with this central core of reality matter that directly contradicts it is he guilty of any truly grave anachronism4 ,in conclusion1 then1 we may say that it is indeed part of the poet's function to live into the spirit of past times and foreign peoples1 for this substance of their life1 if it be truly such1 remains a possession for all time2 but to attempt to reflect with every accuracy of detail all the definition of that external show now buried beneath the rust of antiquity is merely the effort of a learning essentially childish1 intent on preserving what is itself shadow rather than substance4 ,no doubt even in this direction1 the truth of general outlines should be carefully respected1 but never to such lengths as would compel art to forfeit her claim of drawing upon the fiction of her invention1 and the truth of fact with equal impartiality4 77 ,we are now in a better condition to understand all that is really implied in the assimilation by art of that which is strange in the external features of remote history1 and the true conception of the objective life of her creations4 ,a work of art must primarily enclose for us within its embrace the higher interests of spirit and volitional power1 all that is essentially human1 and possesses real weight1 the depths1 that is to say1 of man's emotional life4 ,the main thing of all is that this embodied content#djg should transpierce all purely external conditions of manifestation1 should ring1 as it were1 through all that is less vital in its significance#djh this fundamental chord of truth4 ,the real objectivity1 therefore1 unfolds as from a sheath1 the pathos1 that is the substantive content of a situation1 unfolds1 moreover1 the rich and powerful personality in which the essential phases of spirit are alive1 and find their realization and expression4 ,for such embodiment all that is absolutely indispensable is a definition and determination of the real1 which is generally suitable to the object thus defined1 and which requires nothing further to explain it4 ,if we have once got hold of such a form unfolded in strict accordance with our ,ideal principle1 then we have a work of art essentially objective in the true sense1 and the question whether each and every historical detail is justified is of no further importance4 ,we have before us a work of art which appeals directly to our inner life1 and one which is our own possession4 ,once possessed of that1 and we may take as much as we please of that element of the form which lay more closely to periods of life which have passed2 but the eternal foundation is that which appeals to all men in all places1 which is carried forward with a power that never wanes or fails to influence us1 and it does so because the objective life it reveals is the same that abounds in and overflows our own souls4 ,that which is merely historical in the appearance is1 on the contrary1 the element that vanishes2 and1 in dealing with works of art created in days remote from our own1 we must do our best to resolve the discordance1 and1 indeed1 must be fully prepared to blot out from our vision similar defects in works that spring from our own times4 ,thus it is that the ,psalms of ,david1 with their immortal celebration of the ,lord in ,his goodness1 and the wrath of ,his almightiness1 no less than the profound sorrows of the ,hebrew prophets as they face ,babylon and ,zion1 touch men with the same force to-day as they did of old time3 nay1 even a moral diatribe1 such as is sung by ,sarastro in the ,zauberflte1 may come home to the hearts of us all1 including the sons of ,egypt#dji1 owing to the soul and vitality which rings through its melodies4 ,and we may add that every individual to whom a work of art objective in this1 the true sense1 is presented1 must on his part discard his own false prepossessions1 wherein he merely wishes to find his own idiosyncrasies repeated4 ,on the first reproduction of ,william ,tell1 it appears1 not a single ,swiss among the audience was satisfied4 ,in much the same way1 when the most beautiful love-songs have been sung1 many another1 failing to find therein his own passions reflected1 has presumed to think the beauty untrue to life2 just as so many more1 whose knowledge of love is confined to the perusal of romances1 have imagined that the love-god would only then be their immortal possession when they found themselves face to face with precisely the same emotions and situations their favourite studies had propounded4 ,c4 ,,the ,,artist ,we have1 in this first part of our aesthetical philosophy1 examined as a first step the universal ,idea of beauty2 we then proceeded to inquire in what respects it was defective in its existence as the beauty of ,nature1 and after thus clearing the way we were in a position to grasp the complete notion of the ,ideal as the adequate realization of beauty4 ,we developed the ,ideal1 first1 as conceived abstractly according to the general notion of it1 and having determined that were assisted thereby to elucidate the modes of its particular manifestations4 ,inasmuch1 however1 as a work of art has its origin in the human spirit it requires the pregnant activity of an individual life from which it proceeds1 and as the creation of the same exists for others1 that is1 a ,public which is emotionally receptive4 ,this spiritual and informing activity is the imagination of the artist4 ,we have consequently now1 and this is the third and last aspect of the ,ideal to which we shall refer1 to raise the question how it comes about that this product of men's inner world is not the direct and native growth#daj of that world1 but receives its due form through the creative impulse of particular men1 in other words1 by virtue of the genius and talent of the artist4 ,at the same time we must admit that the question is only raised that we may be able to add the statement that it really is excluded from the sphere of scientific investigation1 or1 at the most1 we can only furnish a few general remarks towards its solution4 ,yet it is undoubtedly a question frequently raised this1 namely1 from what source an artist receives the gift and faculty of conception and execution with which he creates his work4 ,we should all of us like1 no doubt1 to have a ready prescription1 a recipe of what we must exactly do1 what conditions we must impose on ourselves to produce something as wonderful4 ,we would emulate ,cardinal von ,este when he asked ,ariosto1 with reference to his raging ,roland3 ,but1 ,master ,louis1 where in the world did you get all this damned stuff from8 ,raphael replied to a similar question in a letter we still possess1 that he was hunting after a certain idea4 ,the more obvious aspects of artistic activity we propose to examine under the following heads of discussion3 ,first1 we will give our definition of the general conception of artistic genius and the inspiration it implies4 ,secondly1 we will make a few observations on the objective character of this creative activity4 ,thirdly1 we will endeavour to ascertain in virtue of what real artistic originality consists4 #a4 ,,imagination1 ,,genius1 ,,and ,,inspiration ,before inquiring more closely into the meaning of the term genius we must obviously limit the field within which we propose to discuss it4 ,genius is an expression of very wide connotation1 and is used not merely in its application to artists1 but equally when we refer to great generals and kings1 as also to the heroic captains of scientific discovery4 ,for the sake of simplification we would once more discuss the distinctions involved under a triple division of our subject-matter4 7a7 ,the ,imagination#daa ,the most conspicuous faculty of an artist which arrests our attention when we direct it expressly upon the capacities implied in artistic productivity is the imagination4 ,and we must be careful here not to confuse it with a visionary fancy which is wholly passive4 ,the imagination creates4 77 ,and1 in the first place1 we shall find that this creative activity carries with it in possession and endowment a peculiar power of grasping reality and the forms it presents1 all that through the channels of alert eyes and ears imprints pictures of infinite variety caught from the external world upon the mind1 and further implies an exceptionally retentive memory wherein to store up this varied world of innumerable reflections4 ,the artist1 therefore1 in this initial stage of our analysis is not merely thrown back upon images of his own creation1 but is rather compelled to turn aside from the dull level of ideals falsely so called and to boldly enter the fields of ,nature and ,life4 ,to attempt art or poetry merely with fanciful ideas of our own is always a suspicious way of starting on our journey2 for the artist must mould his creations from the abundance of his life and by no means from the overplus of abstract generalities4 ,it is not1 as in philosophy1 thoughts1 but the real external forms of what actually exists which furnishes the material for artistic production4 ,in contact with this raw material to work upon the artist must feel thoroughly at home4 ,he must have seen much1 heard much1 and stored away a great deal as well2 and in illustration of this we almost invariably find that a great personality is distinguished by a capacious memory4 ,all that interests mankind he will lay hold of1 and the more profound his spirit the more it will enlarge the field of its interests in countless directions4 ,this was the way in which we find the genius of ,goethe first opened its wings1 and throughout his life the circle of his spirit's restless horizon broadened and broadened4 ,this peculiar gift of receptiveness1 this interest in the comprehension of facts after their true definitions and colour1 their steadfast adherence to the truth of experience is the first thing we look for in a great artist4 ,and this accurate knowledge of the truth of form must be accompanied in equal measure by a proved acquaintance with the souls of men1 the passions that rise in the heart1 and everything that it yearns and strives for4 ,and1 in addition to this twofold armory of knowledge1 he must understand yet further all the various ways that this world of the human soul expresses itself on the face of the reality which confronts his senses1 transpiercing thus the outer veil4 77 ,but1 in the second place1 this imaginative power is not exhausted with merely receiving that which is presented to the senses1 or is inferred as the content of the human soul4 ,the ideal work of art does not merely embrace the outward semblance of the inward spirit as clothed in the forms of its actual existence1 but should rather succeed in manifesting the essential truth and reason of the real itself4 ,this element of reason1 as determined in the particular object the artist has selected1 must not merely be pressed in his own consciousness1 as an active influence1 but must already have been reflected upon in that essential and rich significance which brings it into relation with the entire breadth and depth of reality4 ,without reflection no man can grasp fully the wealth that is in him1 and it is consequently an inseparable feature of any great work of art that everything which attaches to it both as a whole and in its detail has been long and deeply weighed and thought out4 ,no artistic work of real sterling value can be thrown off with any mere imaginative tour de force4#dab ,we do not1 of course1 suggest that the artist must therefore comprehend in the form of philosophical thought this essential core of reason in his experience2 albeit such is the fundamental rock upon which religion no less than philosophy and art is based4 ,philosophy is by no means essential to his outfit2 and1 in fact1 if he once begins to think about things as a philosopher1 he busies himself with modes of thought which are diametrically opposed to that which should engage an artist's attention4 ,for what the imagination undertakes to do and only to do is not to bring to consciousness this inner core of reason in the form of general propositions and conceptions1 but to apprehend it clothed in the concrete form of actual existence and individuality4 ,all that ferments within his life the artist must reproduce in the body and envisagement1 whose connected picture and general outlines he has already assimilated from the world outside1 making such so far subservient to his creative effort that they in their turn may participate in the truth of his own substance and enable him to crown it with complete expression4 ,in this interfusion of an intelligible content with an embodiment received from actual existence the artist will avail himself of the ever wakeful circumspection of his reflective faculties no less than the deep resources of emotional life which leave the stamp of vitality on his work4 ,it is consequently but one more sample of critical aberration to imagine that poems such as the ,homeric were introduced to our poet in his sleep4 ,without intelligent alertness1 division1 and distinctions of each part as related to the whole1 an artist will be unable to assert his mastery over any form whatsoever that he may wish for2 only fools are of the opinion that the genuine artist does not in the least know what his hands and senses are about4 ,moreover1 the concentration of the artist's emotional life on each aspect of his work is also as necessary to its success as the concentration of his mind4 ,for it is mainly through the impression of emotion1 which permeates and gives a vital colour to the entire work1 that the artist asserts his claim to the substance and embodiment of his creation as a part of his own spiritual substance1 as something he1 a given personality1 may peculiarly call his own4 ,for the external aspect of his work1 the mere picture of it as we may say1 tends rather to place us outside it and apart2 it is the emotional energy it expresses which primarily unites it with affinity to our very souls4 ,only when thus understood shall we be able to realize the truth that an artist must not merely have much looked about him in the world and assimilated a rich knowledge both of its outward show and the very substance of its life1 but1 further1 must himself have experienced many things and great things1 things that have moved him to the quick and left their life-roots in his own heart and spirit--he must1 as we say1 have gone through much and lived abundantly--before he will find himself able to build from his stores in the concrete types of his art something approaching ,life's unsounded repletion4 ,and this will at once explain and justify the bluster and ferment of genius in its youth1 as amply reflected in the lives of ,goethe and ,schiller4 ,but only the age of maturity and gray hairs will bring us the perfect work of art in all its rounded ripeness#dac4 7b7 ,talent and ,genius ,this productive activity of the imagination by means of which the artist gives1 by a process of elaboration to that which is essentially rational in its nature1 a real embodiment1 a creation more his own than anything else--this is what is usually summarized as genius and talent4 77 ,we have already drawn attention to those characteristics which are most obviously referable to genius4 ,genius is the general capacity of creating a genuine example of fine art no less than the energy implied in the execution and elaboration of the same4 ,moreover1 this capability and the power which goes with it is essentially the property of a human soul2 that is to say1 self-conscious individuality alone is able to create in this sense that a spiritual creation of this quality is just what it sets before itself to produce4 ,critics1 intent on closer definition1 are wont to distinguish sharply between genius and talent4 ,and1 in fact1 they are not absolutely the same things1 although it is necessary to find them united in the artist who would give us artistic work of the highest class4 ,to be more exact1 ,art1 in so far as it generally becomes a particular art1 and is exemplified for us in the real and definite appearance of its products1 requires various accomplishments appropriate to the peculiar modes of its realization4 ,such forms of executive versatility we may call with propriety talent1 as we may say that anyone possesses a talent for perfect playing on the violin1 or anyone else for singing4 ,but a mere talent for this or that can only effect for us anything really good in the1 so to speak1 insulated nooks and corners of art#dad2 it moreover itself requires for its true perfection something of more universal art-capacity as also that soul-animation1 something more which is essentially the hall-mark of genius4 ,talent1 in short1 without the vital spark of genius1 never gets much beyond a purely mechanical facility4 77 ,it is also an opinion very commonly held that superior talent and genius are inborn4 ,here again we must distinguish2 for if there is a sense in which this is true1 from another point of view it is equally mistaken4 ,no doubt every man1 by virtue of his humanity1 receives at his birth the potential gifts of religion1 thought1 and science4 ,in other words he would not strictly be a man if he did not already possess a capacity to grasp the idea of a ,supreme ,being1 and generally to become the subject of a thinking consciousness4 ,all that he requires to gain these things1 in addition to the fact of his human birth1 are education1 culture1 and perseverance4 ,with art1 however1 the matter stands differently4 ,art requires specific aptitude#dae1 in which unquestionably natural endowment plays an essential part4 ,as1 that is to say1 beauty is itself the ,idea realized in that which is apprehended as real by the senses1 and a work of art embodies the workings of ,spirit in a form of existence immediately cognized by the eye and the ear1 in the same way the artist must discover and embody the content of his art not in the exclusively spiritual form of thought1 but within the sphere of sensuous perception and feeling1 and indeed as creator in actual relation to a given sensuous material and within the limits of the same4 ,this artistic creativeness consequently encloses within itself1 as art does throughout1 the aspect of immediacy envisaged with the directness of ,nature's own creations1 and it is this appearance1 which the individual is unable to evolve from himself1 but has to find it1 if he finds it at all1 as immediately presented to him4 ,herein lies the significance of the statement1 and herein alone1 that genius and talent are innate4 ,in much the same way the several arts adapt themselves as by a kind of natural affinity to particular nations4 ,song and melody are1 we may almost say1 the birth-gift of an ,italian2 with our northern peoples1 on the contrary1 music#daf and the opera1 though seriously cultivated and with great success1 are as far from being a real home growth as the orange trees4 ,the ,greeks are conspicuous for the native and elaborate beauty of their epic poetry1 and most of all for the unique perfection of their sculpture4 ,the ,romans never possessed an art that was in any strict sense exclusively their own4 ,all that grew into blossom on their soil was transplanted from the gardens of ,greece4 ,the art whose growth has the widest natural range is that of poetry2 and the reason of this is that in it we require least to draw upon a sensuous vehicle for its expressed presentment4 ,within the province of poetry the folk-song is most of all native to a people and inseparably yoked with their natural conditions4 ,for this very reason the folk-song breaks into blossom even in times of the rudest culture and for the most part retains the unconscious simplicity of ,nature herself4 ,of this ,goethe himself is an example4 ,though he produced works in every type of poetical expression his first songs still go deepest and carry least dust from the study4 ,in them1 too1 there is least the flavour of culture4 ,the latter-day ,greek is still a living witness to a people whose native gift it is both to write poetry and sing4 ,fauriel has published a collection of modern ,greek songs1 taken for the most part just as women1 nurses1 and school-girls were heard singing them1 who could not for the world understand what he found so wonderful in them4 ,and this is a good illustration of the way that we find ,art and its specific appearance associate itself with a particular national type4 ,in the same way the art of improvization is more than anywhere else the native growth of ,italy and exemplified there with quite extraordinary talent4 ,an ,italian will even to-day improvize for you a five-act drama1 and not a word of it is committed to memory2 all grows up out of his experience of human passions and situations and the deeply-excited inspiration of the moment4 ,as an example we mention the fact that a certain poor improvizer after rhapsodizing in this way for a considerable time1 and then finally trudging off on his round to collect his pence from the bystanders in a battered hat1 was still in such a fume of poetic frenzy that he could not bring his declamations to a stop1 waved about in fact so lustily with his arms and hands that in the end all the money he had begged was shaken to the winds4 77 ,it is1 thirdly#dag1 a characteristic of genius that it should possess1 and indeed it is a part of this natural endowment#dah1 facility in creating that which it is impelled to create1 and in adapting itself to the technical requirements of all the subsidiary aspects of artistic work4 ,we talk1 for instance1 of the fetters with which the verse1 measure1 and rhyme shackle a poet2 or1 when referring to a painter1 of the endless difficulties that draughtsmanship1 knowledge of tints1 chiaroscuro1 and the rest fling in the way of invention and execution4 ,unquestionably a long course of study is a necessary condition of success in all the arts1 a perseverance that never tires1 a facility that is continually assisted by repetition2 the greater the native strength1 however1 of the genius or superior gift1 and the richer its resources the less it will feel the weight of its effort in securing all the necessary accomplishments involved in creative excellence#dai4 ,a really first-rate artist has the lust of work born in him and an imperative impulse akin to any other natural want to give artistic form to his emotional and imaginative life that is in him4 ,his emotional life and his ideas irresistibly run into this artistic mould2 he finds as it were the instrument already within him made to the hand1 so fitted to express his soul-life that all the pains it takes him to learn it are as nothing4 ,a musician can thus unfold to us in his melodies the depths of all that stirs and moves his soul and only by this means4 ,what he feels is at once wafted into melody1 just as the life of a painter is impressed upon form and colour1 or that of a poet is transmuted into the creations of his imagination1 that poetry which clothes his ideas in the beauty and music of the written word4 ,and this gift of vital form the artist does not merely possess as an imaginative power1 a phantasy1 an emotional impulse that leaves not a wrack behind1 but as a direct stimulus of feeling to active enterprise1 as a gift1 that is1 of real executive accomplishment4 ,both of these aspects are united in the real artist4 ,what springs to life in his imagination is immediately alert upon his mobile fingers1 precisely as the sudden thought of our mind breaks into word from the tips1 or as our most intimate thoughts1 ideas1 and emotions are reflected on the outward man and his demeanour4 ,genius of the real stamp1 whenever and wherever found1 is easily quit of the difficulties presented by the technical workshop2 and indeed has found the most beggarly and apparently impracticable material to accept and embody as it pleased the inward shapes of imagination4 ,no doubt the endowment which the artist finds as a direct gift to himself must be kept alive and alert by indefatigable recourse to it1 but he must also possess naturally a practical power of immediate execution4 ,without this all the facility he may have acquired in imaginative conception will never produce an essentially creative work of art4 ,the very notion of art demands of us that both things should go together hand in hand1 the productive energy of the soul and its technical realization in the forms of art4 7c7 ,inspiration ,the activity of the imagination1 then1 and the power of technical execution1 taking both together as the inseparable antecedents of a real artist1 are commonly understood as inspiration4#dbj 77 ,the first question that presents itself to us for solution with regard to it is under what conditions it arises1 as to which many different views have been held4 77 ,there is1 for instance1 the strange notion1 to some extent arising from the general truth of the peculiar intimacy with which genius attaches itself to the worlds of conscious life and ,nature1 that inspiration can be conjured up through mere excitation of the senses4 ,but making our blood dance will not carry us far2 we are still a long way off from the ,muses1 despite the champagne bottle1 ,such1 at least1 was the experience of ,marmontel1 for he tells us that he tried it in a wine-cellar with six thousand bottles of champagne to choose from2 but not a breath of the ,muses passed over him#dba4 ,ay1 your genius may be as great as he lists1 and for all that stretch himself many a time morning and evening on the green grass1 while the fresh breeze floats over him1 and stare up into the sky1 and not a whisper shall the inspired ,muses breathe in his ear4 77 ,just as little is it likely that we shall make the charmed gates of inspiration spring open by merely presenting ourselves before them with a desire to enter4 ,whoever fondly imagines that he is in the right mood to compose a poem1 or paint a picture1 or run off a first-rate melody without already possessing the stuff in him to quicken that spark into vital form1 and has first to hunt about for something to say1 despite all his talent1 will find himself no better off for his best intuitions1 quite unable1 at any rate1 to conceive any complete thing of beauty1 or perfect a really sterling work of art4 ,neither the mere tickling of our senses nor any act of will or determination can father on us true inspiration4 ,to attempt such things simply proves that both the emotional life and the imagination have as yet no real object of artistic interest4 ,when once we have the artistic impulse of the real kind1 we may conclude the interest there has already its fixed seal and object1 a content that it intends to master4 77 ,true inspiration consequently is fixed in the presence of a specific content1 which the imagination takes up in order to give artistic expression to it4 ,it is1 in fact1 the object of this active process of giving form both as inwardly made visible to the mind1 and as outwardly reproduced in the execution of a work of art4 ,inspiration is equally necessary for both these aspects of artistic activity4 ,the question once more presents itself to us1 in what way such a material will come to an artist1 in order to bring about this inspiration4 ,we find many various opinions expressed on this head4 ,on the one hand it is frequently required of an artist that the material of his work should be drawn up from the world within him4 ,no doubt this may be so when the poet sings as a bird from the bough4 ,his own cheerfulness of spirit is then the incentive which enables him to represent a particular mood of his own as the content of his production1 and by this very expression of it he gives vent to his enjoyment of the same4 ,a song of this kind1 straight from the heart#dbb1 is indeed a rich reward4 ,but quite as often1 however1 the greatest works of art are created from the suggestion of objects wholly external to himself4 ,the odes of ,pindar were frequently the result of direct commissions2 and1 in the same way1 the object and subject has times without number been given to artists both for buildings and pictures1 and they have been able to arouse in themselves an enthusiasm for such4 ,indeed1 it is only too frequently the express complaint of artists that they have not the subject-matter on which to work4 ,such a reference to things outside1 and its stimulus to artistic production1 presents just that relation of the artist to ,nature and her immediacy which is essential to the notion of superior executive gifts#dbc1 and is at the same time a condition to the appearance of genuine inspiration4 ,if we consider the artist from this point of view1 we shall find that it is here that this natural endowment relates itself immediately to a material already found for him1 and through the incentive thereby offered him1 through the inspiration of actual fact1 or as1 for example1 was the case with ,shakespeare1 through that which was presented by old tales1 ballads1 romances1 and chronicles1 proceeds to embody such material in artistic form1 and thereby generally to express his own personality4 ,the impulse to production can therefore be given by something entirely outside the artist's life1 and the only condition essential to a successful result is that the interest1 which fixes the artist's attention should be of real artistic significance1 and that he is able to reproduce the same in all its vitality4 ,such conditions virtually imply the presence of rare inspiration4 ,and an artist who is really alive and awake himself1 by reason of this very vitality of his own powers1 discovers endless opportunities for actively asserting the same1 and feeling inspired while doing so1 opportunities which pass over other people without similarly affecting them4 77 ,if we ask further1 viz41 of what precisely this artistic inspiration consists1 we may perhaps best describe it by saying that it is the capacity of being entirely absorbed in a given subject1 a capacity not merely wholly to realize it1 but incapable of resting until the same is completely minted anew1 and rounded off in its artistic form4 77 ,moreover1 when an artist has thus entirely appropriated his subject1 it is but saying the same thing the other way to affirm that he must know how to forget his own individual idiosyncrasies1 and all that accidentally attaches to them2 he must1 in short1 on his part lose himself in the matter on hand4 ,he must make his artistic personality the pure form under which the content he has assimilated is clothed and embodied4 ,an inspiration in which the particular individual receives too emphatic a predominance and assertion1 rather than being the vitally active instrument which displays the ideal significance of the material worked upon1 is an inferior type of inspiration4 ,this truth opens the way to a fuller consideration of what is generally understood as the objective character of artistic production4 #b4 ,,the ,,objective ,,character ,,of ,,the ,,representation 7a7 ,in the ordinary sense of the word we understand objectivity to mean that the content in any work of art necessarily receives the form of the reality already given1 and in its artistic embodiment we have the same clearly repeated4 ,in this sense1 that we desire to see objective truth reproduced for us1 we are entitled to call ,kotzebue an objective poet4 ,in his work we undoubtedly find ordinary reality simply as it is again4 ,the object of art is1 however1 more precisely stated1 to strip away not merely the appearance1 but the actual content of all that meets us every day1 and by means of the spiritual activity of the artist most personal to himself1 to work out that which is essentially rational in that content in its really adequate external form4 ,indeed1 if we look at yet better examples of art than ,kotzebue's1 such as those we have already glanced at in the youthful productions of ,goethe1 we shall find that this realistic type of objectivity can be made essentially living in its expression1 and by virtue of this quality prove highly attractive to ourselves1 and yet1 on account of the fact that the artistic form remains defective1 fail to arrive at the real beauty of art4 ,purely external objectivity1 therefore1 which still lacks the abiding and substantial significance1 is not that for which an artist should strive4 7b7 ,a second type of objective realization presents itself to us in the case where we find the external is not the artistic aim1 but the artist has seized hold of his subject with all the depth and strength of his emotional life4 ,this inward aspect of his work remains1 however1 so entirely enclosed within itself and concentrated that it fails to assert itself with a clearness thoroughly possessed1 or to unfold itself in its full truth4 ,the eloquence of pathos simply restricts itself by means of illustrations external to it1 without possessing either the power or the culture to be able to present the fulness of that content in an explicit form4 ,folksongs pre-eminently belong to such a mode of artistic production4 ,extremely simple as they are in their form1 they suggest an emotional life which lies at their root of still wider range and depth1 but which they are unable clearly to express4 ,their art1 in fact1 is itself not sufficiently elaborate or complete enough to carry into the light of day with transparent reflection all that it would unfold1 and is forced to rest satisfied with suggesting to our sympathies the same by means of an external symbolism4 ,the heart remains thrown back and concentrated upon itself1 and in order to make its life intelligible to others1 casts but a fainter reflection of its world upon entirely finite and external circumstances and phenomena1 which1 no doubt1 are thus eloquent in a degree1 albeit we receive from them only a far-off echo of the emotions and life they would bring home to us4 ,goethe has himself written many quite exquisite songs of this kind4 ,the ,shepherd's ,lament is one of the most beautiful4 ,in this refrain a heart that is broken with pain and yearning still remains silent and reserved beneath the purely external traits which would fain relieve it2 and1 despite of this1 we hear1 as through an undertone1 all the concentrated depth of emotion it fails to express4 ,in the ,erl-king1 and many other of his songs1 we hear the same tone4 ,this tone1 however1 we may also meet in degenerate form right down to the most futile barbarism1 unable to grasp either the essential character of the facts or the situation1 merely clinging to their most finite aspects in all their crudeness and absence of artistic taste4 ,an example we may give from the ,drummer-comrade of the boy ,wunderhorn1#dbd such inanities as ,o thou dwelling house of man1 ,o gallows1 or ,adjutant sir corporal1 expressions which are supposed to move us deeply4 ,when on the contrary ,goethe sings3 ,der ,strauss1 den ich gepflcket1 ,grsse ,dich viel tausendmal1 ,ich habe mich oft gebcket ,und ihn aus ,herz gedrcket1 ,ach1 wie viel tausendmal#dbe4 strong emotion is suggested in a very different way1 which brings before our mind nothing trivial or contrary to the main idea4 ,what however is1 as a rule1 defective in this particular type of poetical realization is the expression of emotion in all its true intensity4 ,this1 in the rarest art1 should not be suffered to remain a depth shut away1 which merely reflects a distant echo through the external objects presented3 it should either break forth in its full character1 or be seen through the vehicle with complete transparency4 ,schiller1 for example1 brings out his soul in its full strength in the pathos of his work1 withal a great soul1 which penetrates to the very core of his subject1 and is able to express its very deepest significance in the freest and most perspicuous way through the wealth and music of his verse4 7c7 ,in conformity1 then1 with the notion of the ,ideal1 we may conclude that even when we are dealing with the mere expression of emotional life1 we shall never fully establish our title to truly objective art so long as any part of all that is comprised in the subject-matter1 which stirs the artistic inspiration1 remains still wrapped up within the soul that seeks to express itself2 rather all that lies there should be completely unfolded1 and unfolded in a way which not merely shall reveal to us the essential soul and substance of the content selected1 but shall embody it in some completely homogeneous type of individual art1 through which1 as through a transparency1 both soul and substance shall radiate4 ,for that which is highest and most excellent is not by any means that we are unable to express1 as though the poet contained in himself still greater depths than those expressed on the face of his work4 ,the work of an artist is the consummate fruit of that artist1 and reflects precisely what he is1 and only what he is1 and all that remains behind in the temple of his soul is a naught or nothing#dbf4 #c4 ,,manner1 ,,style1 ,,and ,,originality ,however much it may be imperatively required of the artist that he should give to his work an objective character such as we have above indicated1 this must not make us oblivious to the fact that the artist's production is at the same time the work of his inspiration2 it is he alone who has1 by his entire identification of his personality with the specific subject-matter and its artistic embodiment1 brought into being the entire creation out of the life of his own emotional nature and imagination4 ,and it is this identity of the free personality of the artist and the truly objective construction of his artistic creation which constitutes the third fundamental aspect of his activity as set forth above and which we must now shortly consider1 in so far as we may be thus enabled to unite that which we have hitherto separated in our independent consideration of the conceptions of genius and the objective presentment of a work of art4 ,we may characterize such a unity as the conception of true artistic originality4 ,before1 however1 we come to close quarters with all that is implied in this conception1 it is necessary to clearly grasp two points of view already related to it whose insufficiency we have to expose on the ground of their one-sidedness before a true conception of originality can be fully appreciated4 ,these may be sufficiently indicated by the terms subjective manner#dbg and style4 7a7 ,the ,subjective ,manner ,the point of first importance in discussing the meaning of the expression artistic manner is to differentiate it fundamentally from artistic originality4 ,the term manner1 in our view1 is only used in direct relation to the specific and consequently accidental idiosyncrasies of the artist1 that is1 merely in so far as such qualities assert themselves as effective in his work without being called forth by the nature of the subject itself and its ideal exposition4 77 ,a manner thus interpreted has no connection with the universal types of art1 that is to say1 types which require an essentially different mode of representation1 as1 for instance1 the landscape painter necessarily treats the objects of ,nature in quite a different way from that under which a historical painter would so treat them2 or the epic poet would handle similar subject-matter in a different way from that appropriate to the dramatic poet4 ,on the contrary1 a manner is a form of artistic expression wholly emanating from a particular individuality1 an entirely supposititious idiosyncrasy of executive ability which may be carried so far as to contradict absolutely the true notion of the ,ideal4 ,as thus defined manner stands at the bottom of the scale among the forms which may characterize an artist's general handling4 ,an artist who thus expresses his individuality simply gives free rein to any chance notions of his own without testing them as subject to the substantive claims of art4 ,but it is a fundamental principle of art that it should abolish precisely all that is merely accidental to its content no less than to its artistic or rather external mode of presentment4 ,and this is only to say that it requires of the artist that he should efface from his work all traces of purely personal tastes and idiosyncrasies he shares with no one else#dbh4 77 ,and for these reasons we would point out that a manner of this kind is not so much to be contrasted directly with the true exposition of art as to be considered in relation to the purely external aspects of art where the individuality of the particular mode of treatment comes into play4 ,this kind of manner is most conspicuous in the arts of painting and music for the reason that these arts#dbi present to the artist the widest variety of external characterization for him to seize upon and reproduce4 ,what we find here is a certain artificial manner of general execution entirely peculiar to some particular artist and the school of imitators or pupils who follow him1 which through constant repetition degenerates into mere habit4 77 ,and its tendency is to develop on one of two ways in which we may regard the artistic work4 ,first1 there is the aspect of its composition4 ,to take painting1 for example1 we have all the variety of ways under which the prevailing atmospheric tone1 the arrangement of foliage1 the contrast of light and shade1 in short the entire scheme of colour may be treated4 ,most particularly in this feature of the general scheme#dcj of the colouring and lighting of a picture we find that painters permit themselves the most varied freedom of individual preference and distaste4 ,of course such a prevailing tone may appear to us as that we do not find in ,nature for the simple reason that we have not had our attention directed to it although it is really there4 ,but we shall often find that such a scheme has simply been adopted by this or that artist on grounds of personal taste or convenience#dca1 and it becomes simply a habit in him to use everything now as subject to that particular scheme4 ,and what we have observed with reference to colouring is equally true when applied to the treatment of natural objects1 their grouping1 position1 motion1 and general characterization4 ,this inferior mode of treatment is particularly to be observed in the works of the ,dutch school4 ,take the case of ,van der ,neer's night-scenes and his artificial presentation of moonlight1 or ,van der ,goyen's sand-hills in so many of his landscapes4 ,the ever-repeated reflections of light from satin and silk stuffs that we find in so many pictures of other masters of the same school are indications of the same artificial mode of handling4 77 ,a manner of this type may be still further1 traced in the execution of other details1 the handling of brush or pencil1 the laying on and blending of tints and many other features of executive work4 77 ,the general conclusion we come to1 after considering all such examples of specialized handling and conception in which constant repetition grows at last habitual to1 and indeed becomes a second nature of the artist1 is this1 that just in proportion as the manner adopted is more specialized#dcb1 there is an increasing and dangerous tendency for it to degenerate into that which is nothing more than a soulless and consequently arid repetition and mechanical exercise1 throughout which the artist is no longer present with the fulness of his spiritual resources and the entire strength of his inspiration4 ,when this takes place his art necessarily sinks to the level of a mere executive facility or accomplishment of his hands1 and a manner1 otherwise innocent enough1 may very readily grow starved and lifeless4 77 ,the more truly artistic manner has consequently to disengage itself from such jejune peculiarities1 to broaden out into a freer atmosphere#dcc1 so that no specialized mode of handling shall be suffered to sterilize itself into what is simply a matter of habit4 ,in this way an artist will approach the facts of ,nature with a breadth of view more in keeping with her own1 and will understand how to identify his larger conceptions and the general technique of his craft with the same ideal spirit4 ,in something of the same sense we may describe it as a peculiar manner of ,goethe that he is particularly apt in concluding not merely poems of society but also openings to works of a more serious character with a sudden turn of pleasantry1 in order to remove the impression of or throw into the background the serious nature of previous reflection or situation4 ,we meet with the same characteristic in the correspondence of ,horace4 ,it is1 in fact1 an application of the art of conversation and general sociability1 which1 in order to avoid following up any matter more deeply1 comes to a stop1 breaks off and cleverly diverts the serious into more cheerful channels4 ,such a mode of the literary art is undoubtedly part of the manner of the artist and his individual style1 but the individuality thus exemplified is based upon a broader principle1 and is asserted in a way wholly justified by the artistic purpose of the work in hand4 ,and this particular type of an artistic manner will enable us to pass readily to the consideration of style generally4 7b7 ,style ,le style c'est l'homme mme is a famous phrase of the ,french4 ,style is here generally understood as the unique characterization of personality1 the particular mode of expression1 however it may be applied1 which wholly reveals to us its substance4 ,herr von ,rumohr1 on the other hand 7,italian ,investigations1 i1 p4 #hg71 endeavours to interpret the expression as a mode habitual through its constant repetition of bringing together the most vital characteristics of the subject-matter artistically treated1 by virtue of which the sculptor informs his figures with reality1 and the painter gives to his the appearance of life4 ,he further adds important observations upon the appropriate form of representation which1 in the case of an art such as sculpture1 the specific sensuous material either permits or proscribes4 ,it is1 however1 not necessary to attach the expression style solely to this aspect of sensuous material2 we may unquestionably extend it to all those determinations and rules of artistic production which apply naturally to any particular type of art1 and in virtue of which an object is reproduced in the medium of any one of them4 ,we consequently distinguish in the art of music the style of church music from that of opera1 and in that of painting1 the historical style from the style of genre painting4 ,style is therefore a mode of artistic presentation1 which not merely follows closely the fundamental conditions of its material1 but asserts itself as adequate to all that any particular type of art demands for its composition and execution and in strict conformity with the laws which apply to the subject-matter on hand4 ,defect of style will then1 in this extension of the meaning1 either imply an inability to present a composition in accordance with such necessary conditions1 or will amount to a personal caprice which rather gives free rein to its own particular predilections than accepts the conditions of composition which are really proposed to it1 in other words adopts an inferior manner of its own4 ,consequently it is inadmissible1 as ,herr von ,rumohr has already pointed out1 to apply principles peculiar to one type of art to another1 as ,mengs has done in his famous museum in the villa ,albani1 where both in the general conception and execution of his ,apollo he adopts the modes of colouring applicable only to sculpture4 ,a defect of the same kind may be traced in many of the pictures of ,drer1 where we see that even in painting1 especially in the folding of his drapery1 he adopts the style of wood-cut in which he is so consummate a master4 7c7 ,originality ,the final result1 then1 of our inquiry on this head is that true originality does not consist in merely conforming to the paramount conditions of style1 but in a kind of inspired state#dcd personal to the artist which1 instead of committing itself wholly to a mere external manner of composition1 seizes hold of a particular subject-matter that is essentially rational1 and by virtue of its own resources and quality1 re-clothes the same as from within the artist himself and not merely in a way conformable to the essential notion of the art adopted1 but also in a form adequate to the universal notion of the ,ideal4 77 ,true originality is consequently identical with true objectivity1 and combines that which is due to the personality of the artist and the actual subject-matter of his work in such a way that both aspects of his artistic product are held together in complete accord4 ,looked at in one way1 such a work appears to reveal to us the very essence of the artist's personality1 while regarded from another we only find there the essence of the subject-matter artistically treated1 so that this very uniqueness of expression appears to arise from the unique characteristics of the material to which it is applied2 and we may say with equal truth either that the expressed form is due to those characteristics1 or that this unique impression we obtain from them proceeds from the creative unity of the artist4 77 ,true originality must be entirely kept distinct from individual caprice and every kind of personal expression that is due to fortuitous causes4 ,a common idea of originality is simply the stringing together of so many curiosities1 things which this particular individual and no other could perpetuate or even faintly imagine4 ,that is1 however1 merely idiosyncracy gone mad4 ,no people on earth are more original in this meaning of the term than ,englishmen1 a country where every one prides himself on committing some folly or other1 which no man in his senses is likely to repeat1 and then fondly imagines his performance to be original4 ,we may in this connection briefly refer to what has been so extolled1 and never more than in our own days as the originality of wit and humour4 ,an artist of this type of humour starts off from a point of view or an experience wholly personal to himself1 and constantly recurs to the same so that the real object of his artistic production is merely treated as the peg on which he may hang1 or the field in which he may give full play to1 whatever wittiness1 jest1 quirks1 and sallies his mood may chance to light upon4 ,in this way the real object of his art and that which should render it vital in himself fall entirely apart1 and we have a capricious mode of artistic production1 in which the idiosyncrasy of the artist is made to appear as of first importance4 ,a humour of this kind is often replete with intellectual brilliance and deep feeling1 and in its general result is very apt to impose on us2 yet for all that it is not generally such a difficult matter as is commonly believed4 ,to constantly interrupt the rational content of that which we are really dealing with1 interrupting all steady progress with a stream of capricious fresh starts and conclusions1 a sort of patchwork of whims and emotional excursions1 and thereby to create a caricature of imaginative vigour is far easier than to develop and round off with completeness an artistic whole of sterling quality throughout such as will testify to the real ,ideal4 ,moreover1 our humour nowadays is only too ready to give us the repulsive features of a talent for wit essentially crude1 and is constantly degenerating into coarse buffoonery and emptiness4 ,we do not often get from it real humour at all4 ,the stalest trivialities are wont to pass now for brilliancy and depth of soul provided they only rig themselves out in the pretentious motley of humour4 ,shakespeare1 on the contrary1 possessed a grand and profound sense of humour1 but even his works are by no means destitute of shallows4 ,the humour of ,jean ,paul too often surprises us with the depth of its wit and the beauty of its sentiment1 but we are quite as often repelled by the absurdly eccentric way in which he hitches together his subjects1 or rather leaves them with the bare jointure to lie apart1 and then floods all he has to say with a kind of humour that leaves it almost impossible to make head or tail of4 ,no humourist1 however great he may be1 is likely to find anything resembling it in his memory2 and our main impression is frequently1 even in the case of ,jean ,paul's kaleidoscopic effects1 that they are rather the result of mechanical pasting together than a spontaneous product from the crucible of genius4 ,for this reason ,jean ,paul finds it necessary1 in order continually to present new effects1 to drag into books differing wholly in kind1 botanical1 legal and philosophical disquisitions1 no less than descriptions of travel2 whatever whim in fact may strike his fancy at the time is promptly inserted4 ,even when his subject relates to scientific discovery he will run together the most heterogeneous material such as a collection of ,brazilian plants and observations upon the old imperial chamber#dce4 ,there are people who will praise a motley of this kind as original4 ,but it is really precisely the kind of caprice which originality of the genuine stamp excludes4 ,while we are on this topic it will not be out of place to add some further remarks upon irony1 which particularly prides itself upon presenting us with the very flower of originality on just those occasions when it has ceased to treat any artistic material with seriousness and converts the whole affair into a subject of witticism1 only worth notice for the sake of the wit it suggests4 ,looked at from another point of view this irony rakes together a lot of things which are quite foreign to the essence of the matter in hand1 things the deeper significance of which the poet keeps to himself1 and his notion seems to be that by this subtle exercise of his powers the imagination will be enlarged4 ,and it is just in external associations of this sort that we get what we have already described as the poetry of a poetry1 wherein everything that is deepest and most excellent is concealed from us for no other reason than this1 that we must not be allowed to look at it because it is so profound4 ,and we really find in ,friedrich von ,schlegel's poetry1 more particularly when he became vain over his title to the rank of poet1 that which clearly is set forth as the aroma of all is just that which is never expressed3 no wonder this poetry of poetry turns out to be the flattest prose4 77 ,a genuine work of art must consequently be held intact from all originality of this perverse type4 ,true originality will be asserted throughout by this and this alone1 that the work has the appearance of being the unique creation of one individual mind1 which does not go about picking up scraps from around it and then make thereof a patchwork1 but permits the material of that work1 in complete accordance with the unity most congenial to its own substance1 to bind itself together in a whole all parts of which are strictly related1 as truly stamped with one mint as the founder's cast4 ,when we find scenes and motives introduced upon grounds that are foreign to the real artistic purpose1 that is to say1 which do not directly grow out of the true subject1 we must inevitably lose that subtle and necessary connection of all the parts which create this unity1 and what we thus interpolate will unavoidably impress us as something fortuitously attached by personal caprice4 ,much in this way it has been the fashion to give exceptional praise to the ,gtz von ,berlichingen of ,goethe on the grounds of its great originality4 ,no doubt it is true enough1 as we have above remarked1 that in this drama ,goethe has with much intrepidity given the lie direct to and turned his back upon all that had been taken as the established principles of the aesthetic science of his age2 the execution of this work1 however1 does not bear the stamp of genuine originality4 ,one finds1 on the contrary1 in this youthful production indications of the poverty of the material upon which it is founded1 so that many traits and entire scenes appear to have been raked together and united by connections foreign to the subject from material of an interest contemporary with that of the artist's life instead of being the genuine elaboration of the fundamental subject-matter4 ,the scene1 for example1 between ,gtz and brother ,martin1 where ,martin ,luther is clearly suggested1 contains ideas which ,goethe could only have borrowed from a time such as his own when people began once more to wail over the conditions of monastic life1 how they durst not drink wine1 could only sleep off their meals1 were at the mercy of evil desires and generally must submit to the three intolerable vows of poverty1 chastity1 and obedience4 ,brother ,martin1 on the other hand1 grows enthusiastic over the knightly life of ,gtz1 how he recalled to memory the load of booty he took from his foe1 whom he ran through with lance on horseback before he could shoot1 then tumbled over1 horse and all1 and finally returned to his castle and wife4 ,whereupon the good monk drinks the health of the dame ,elizabeth1 wiping his eyes the while4 ,with mundane reflections of this sort ,luther never started on his journey1 but rather as a pious monk who had penetrated to their depths the religious conceptions and convictions of ,augustine1 another source altogether4 ,subject to precisely similar defects are the pedagogical references to that period which occur in the following scene and for which ,vasedow is mainly responsible4 ,we are informed that children of that age are taught much that is unintelligible1 that the true method of instruction should rather educate their minds through the senses and experience4 ,karl1 for example1 repeats phrases to his father by heart precisely similar to those current in ,goethe's own younger days3 ,junthausen is a village and castle on the ,junt and for two hundred years has been the ancestral property of the lords of ,berlichingen4 ,when ,gtz asks him if he knows any lord of ,berlichingen personally the lad stares blankly at him and through sheer over-teaching does not know his own father4 ,gtz declares that he knew every path and road in the country before he knew the names of a single river1 village1 or mountain4 ,all this kind of thing is mere literary stucco which has nothing to do with the actual subject at all4 ,and when an occasion does arise in which we ought to find some really characteristic grip of the very marrow of the subject1 as in the conversations between ,gtz and ,weisslingen1 we get nothing more than cold reflections upon the times4 ,we find much the same association of irrelevant matter in the same poet's ,wahlverwandschaften4#dcf ,the laying out of pleasure grounds1 the living pictures1 the observations upon pendulum oscillations1 the testing of metals1 the headaches1 the entire description of elective affinities1 which is borrowed straight from chemical science1 are all of this category4 ,it may1 of course1 be freely admitted that in a romance1 referring to an essentially prosaic age1 such things are prima facie admissible1 and more particularly so when we have a ,goethe to introduce them so cleverly and apply them so charmingly2 moreover no work of art of any kind can be kept wholly unaffected by the culture of the artist's own age4 ,it is one thing to allow the reflection of contemporary culture to appear as part of the artistic whole1 quite another to bring together such material of research in a way that places it as something wholly outside and independent of the genuine substance of the composition4 ,for the true originality of the artist no less than that of his work consists exclusively in their being vitally bound up with that which is only intelligible as part of the real subject-matter treated4 ,when the artist has fully ,appropriated this objective reason1 without mixing up with it1 to the detriment of its clarity1 details he may have borrowed from his personal experience or other sources which do not strictly belong to it2 in that case alone will he stamp the material with the genuine mark of his own artistic mintage4 ,this personal effect upon his work merely serves him as a bridge of ,life over which he passes to secure a work of art wholly complete in itself1 just as in all genuine thought and action true freedom consists in allowing that which is of essential significance to assert itself without restraint1 so that it becomes itself the force which dominates both the particular thought and volition of the man who thus appropriates it1 and by so doing reconciles every vestige of opposition4 ,in this way the originality of art absorbs every accidental trait peculiar to a given personality2 but it only absorbs it that the artist may follow without reserve the impulse and bent of his genius as inspired through every fibre of the material he moulds1 and instead of reflecting a purely barren wilfulness and caprice of his own may give an objective form to his true artistic individuality conjoined with consummate accomplishment4 ,to have no manner was ever the one great manner1 and in this sense alone can we ascribe originality to ,homer1 ,sophocles1 ,rafael1 and ,shakespeare4 ,footnote #bga3 ,einer specifischen ,seele4 ,we certainly should not in ordinary speech say that inorganic objects possessed a soul4 ,the phrase indeed is difficult to follow1 except as explained by the previous technical discussion of ,einzelheit4 ,footnote #bgb3 ,the expression in dieser der ,allgemeinheit entgegengehobenen usserlichkeit refers to the manifold in opposition to which the principle of universality is posited as a test for the selection of those aspects which manifest it as vital individuality4 ,footnote #bgc3 ,seligkeit4 ,footnote #bgd3 ,heiterkeit4 ,i cannot satisfy myself with one ,english word4 ,it seems to combine both blithesomeness and cheerfulness in the literal meaning of the word4 ,footnote #bge3 ,in das einfache ,beisichseyn4 ,self-containedness would be more literal4 ,footnote #bgf3 ,eine ,vershnung des ,gemths4 ,i think this refers to the emotions of the spectators4 ,the use of the word in the next sentence points to this4 ,footnote #bgg3 ,diese ,festigkeit1 e4g41 such a religiously austere mode of treatment1 rather this than rigorously true1 is ,i think the sense4 ,footnote #bgh3 ,compare that wonderful poem of ,g4 ,meredith1 ,theodolinda4 ,footnote #bgi3 ,schnthuerei4 ,footnote #bhj3 ,see ,introduction1 pp4 #hf1 #hg4 ,footnote #bha3 ,such appears to me the sense of the above passage1 but it is not very clearly expressed4 ,hegel states the case of those who contend that a picture must be a good one because the ideal element is the main thing and to get that you have merely to borrow from poetry4 ,he then takes an example to show this is not so4 ,footnote #bhb3 ,here commences the more thorough exposition of the difficulty4 ,footnote #bhc3 ,vorstellung1 world of ideas would be perhaps better4 ,footnote #bhd3 ,apart from an error in punctuation ,i think this sentence is not as ,hegel wrote it1 certainly it is not as he would have left it after revision2 as it stands the grammatical construction is entirely split into two discordant sections4 ,i have at least made it grammatical4 ,footnote #bhe3 ,die ,vorstellung1 i4e41 the imaginative conception4 ,footnote #bhf3 ,there is1 however1 the question of positive characterization imposed on the work by the artist4 ,the work of ,michelangelo is of course an extreme example4 ,this is here rather overlooked4 ,footnote #bhg3 ,that is to say1 it remains the potency of many forms2 it is left in its abstract formality to be variously formed by limbs in their motion and not cut into the forms devised by a tailor4 ,footnote #bhh3 ,infinite1 of course1 not in the sense of extension1 but because it is a constituent of the universal medium of thought1 infinite as the judgment is so4 ,footnote #bhi3 ,this analysis of ,dutch painting is remarkable for its insight and impartiality1 and may be contrasted in this respect with the writings of ,ruskin4 ,footnote #bij3 ,die hhere ,seele4 ,the ideal atmosphere throughout4 ,footnote #bia3 ,it will be recalled that it was precisely this picture1 or one much resembling1 that ,ruskin1 with less sympathy1 criticized severely4 ,footnote #bib3 ,no doubt these were other pictures in the exhibition of pictures contemporary with the date of ,hegel's lecture4 ,footnote #bic3 ,ideal4 ,footnote #bid3 ,auf willkrlich festgesetzten ,zeichen4 ,footnote #bie3 ,not a very lucid sentence4 ,i presume the words bei deren ,anblick refer1 to the forms1 not to the beauty which reposes on them4 ,the abstractness of such a point of view is obvious4 ,footnote #bif3 ,i think sein eigenes ,wollen must practically amount to this4 ,but it is all very vague4 ,footnote #big3 ,handlung4 ,see below4 ,footnote #bih3 ,vollbringen des ,menschen4 ,the bringing up to fuller content4 ,footnote #bii3 ,lit41 turned outside upon to confront1 like a coat turned inside out that the inside may face external facts4 ,footnote #cjj3 ,the ,german term is ,selbstndigkeit4 ,it may often be better translated by independence4 ,footnote #cja3 ,durchgreifende4 ,that which penetrates the whole as the causa efficiens4 ,the whole passage is difficult and technical4 ,footnote #cjb3 ,fr sich selbst4 ,that is to say1 a substance that is not dependent on another for its reality but is explicit as such out of its own resources4 ,footnote #cjc3 ,fr das ,allgemeine4 ,footnote #cjd3 ,in einer ,nacht4 ,a condensed description of the true story apparently4 ,footnote #cje3 ,that is to say1 it is made up of units all ready to pull in different directions4 ,footnote #cjf3 ,a remarkable instance of the type in our own days was ,general ,gordon4 ,a perusal of his correspondence from ,khartoum makes it sufficiently clear that he considered it his duty to remain despite all orders to the contrary1 so long as the garrison remained unwithdrawn2 no doubt he considered the reverse course dishonourable to ,england1 but first of all it was dishonourable to himself4 ,footnote #cjg3 ,frsicheinsiehen4 ,footnote #cjh3 ,das ,vornehme4 ,there is probably here a further allusion to the respectability associated with grandeur4 ,the same is true of the compositions of the great ,italian painters4 ,footnote #cji3 ,ausgebildeten4 ,i have hesitated to translate this cultivated as the context appears to suggest rather the kind of regime we find in the highly official centralization of such a monarchy as that of ,prussia in ,hegel's time or the artificial eighteenth century4 ,but the whole passage rings rather strangely to modern ideas1 or at least to ,english notions of democracy4 ,footnote #caj3 ,gtz von ,berlichengen was ,goethe's first drama1 published in the year #aggc1 though the first version of it was written in #agga4 ,footnote #caa3 ,das ,waltende1 e4g41 a force which is predominant4 ,footnote #cab3 ,gehalt1 content1 that is1 in its configurative energy4 ,footnote #cac3 ,sichverwirklichen1 that is1 objective self-realization4 ,footnote #cad3 ,the whole of this passage is difficult to follow and translate1 and has roots1 no doubt1 in some of the most disputed positions in ,hegelian philosophy1 such as the independent reality of ,nature1 and the use that ,hegel makes of such conceptions as ,chance 7,zuflligkeit7 in his explanation of it4 ,all that can be attempted here is to give some kind of intelligible interpretation of the expressions employed literally4 ,the student will do well to consult ,professor ,a4 ,c4 ,bradley's criticism of ,hegel's ,idea of tragedy in his ,lectures on ,poetry4 ,footnote #cae3 ,the situation without defined situation4 ,footnote #caf3 ,festigkeit4 ,staunchness is perhaps better4 ,footnote #cag3 ,harmlosigkeit1 e4g41 its inability to cause conflict4 ,footnote #cah3 ,such as painting and sculpture4 ,footnote #cai3 ,by positive he means that in themselves they are not actually discordant or negative but only render such discordance possible in their relation to spirit4 ,footnote #cbj3 ,that is1 where a collision depends upon natural causes4 ,footnote #cba3 ,positive1 that is1 relative to a particular concrete condition4 ,footnote #cbb3 ,perhaps ,erfindung would here be better translated with invention4 ,both processes are involved in the word4 ,footnote #cbc3 ,auf den natrlichen usserlichen ,verlauf4 ,footnote #cbd3 ,this must be implied1 for it can only be asserted with qualification of sculpture and it is not true of music4 ,footnote #cbe3 ,in betreff seiner ,besinnung4 ,besinnung suggests1 no doubt1 something more of mind than ,gemth4 ,it is the entire content of self-consciousness on its sensuous side4 ,footnote #cbf3 ,die allgemeinen ,mchte4 ,this phrase is explained in the paragraph which follows4 ,footnote #cbg3 ,die ,bethtigung4 ,the actualization would be a better word perhaps4 ,footnote #cbh3 ,it may surprise some readers in such a context suddenly to be confronted with such serious matters4 ,but with ,hegel such surprises must be expected4 ,with him the root of all spiritual activity is never far absent1 and the relation of the ,state is founded on the same basis as that of the ,church4 ,and if we mean anything by the phrase of the ,divine ,immanence we shall at least be able to follow him4 ,footnote #cbi3 ,die ewigen4 ,eternal because essentially belonging to the explication of reason4 ,footnote #ccj3 ,wrde4 ,worthiness of personal characteristics1 i4e41 ethical character4 ,footnote #cca3 ,das nur userlich ,feststehende4 ,the organizations of ,spirit are the most permanent realities is1 ,i think1 the meaning4 ,footnote #ccb3 ,etwas bizarres oder widriges1 i4e41 that which is arbitrary and merely awakes curiosity or excites a feeling of repulsion4 ,footnote #ccc3 ,there is obviously a symbolic meaning in this poem of ,hartmann which ,hegel appears to have overlooked1 the sacrifice which the monks prescribed not necessarily involving a physical sacrifice1 but merely the gift of a love which would be equal to such a sacrifice4 ,footnote #ccd3 ,this passage is not easy to follow4 ,i think der innre ,begriff must mean the entire notion of the personality evolved in the action as distinct from all particular aspects which are negative and evil4 ,the main difficulty of the passage consists in the abstract conception of evil or the negative upon which ,hegel centres the attention4 ,footnote #cce3 ,halt1 i4e41 stable self-consistency4 ,footnote #ccf3 ,die innre haltlose ,zerrissenkeit4 ,footnote #ccg3 ,abgeschlossenheit1 i4e41 self-exclusive individuality4 ,footnote #cch3 ,zur subjektiven ,innerlichkeit4 ,that is to say1 the entire self-concentration on the spiritual centre of conscious life4 ,footnote #cci3 ,lit41 ,their individuality remains rather external form1 in such a way that it fails to penetrate through to absolutely inward subjectivity4 ,footnote #cdj3 ,noth1 the constraint of necessary conditions4 ,footnote #cda3 ,mit der ,bestimmten1 i4e41 with the definite subject-matter of temporal life4 ,footnote #cdb3 ,in the conception1 that is to say1 which is at the root of the ,greek idea of ,divinity4 ,footnote #cdc3 ,i presume what ,hegel means is as individual gods4 ,footnote #cdd3 ,er nicht mit seinem eigenen ,selbst dabei ist4 ,he fails to obtain the determinate freedom of the self-excluding subject4 ,footnote #cde3 ,i4e41 between gods and men4 ,footnote #cdf3 ,ganz prosaisch4 ,viewed practically1 that is to say1 rather than metaphysically4 ,the examples explain the meaning4 ,footnote #cdg3 ,das ,thun geht stets herber und hinber4 ,is a skein in which the threads run over and under one another4 ,footnote #cdh3 ,iliad1 ,i1 v1 #aij4 ,footnote #cdi3 ,this view may be well contrasted with the less vital criticism of ,schiller on this subject1 which induced him actually to exclude the feature from his amended edition of the play4 ,in fact ,hegel shows more insight here than ,coleridge4 ,footnote #cej3 ,nicht ber ,hamlet haltlos verfgt4 ,it is also obvious1 ,i think1 that such a passage need not necessarily be opposed to ,goethe's main conception4 ,such ideas may readily be explained as the excuses of a man who inherently shrinks from forming a grave resolve of vigorous action4 ,no doubts are suggested when ,hamlet sees the ghost4 ,footnote #cea3 ,den eigentlichen ,mittelpunkt4 ,between what8 ,i think the examples show that it is both between a work of human art and ,nature and between the work of art itself and those to whom it is addressed4 ,footnote #ceb3 ,lit41 ,screws itself like a corkscrew into4 ,footnote #cec3 ,ausmalung4 ,the metaphor is taken from the art of painting and technically refers to the finish of the same in all its details4 ,it is here used generally4 ,footnote #ced3 ,vol4 i1 p4 #aec4 ,i do not know the book4 ,footnote #cee3 ,als bewegendes ,pathos4 ,this may mean as the motive principle of pathos1 but ,i incline to the interpretation as the pathos which affects others4 ,footnote #cef3 ,this appears at first sight to be somewhat contrary to the statement made above 7p4 #cji7 that ,we cannot affirm pathos of the gods4 ,but if my translation in the above passage is the right one ,die ,gtter werden zum menschlichen ,pathos1 ,i think we must understand ,die ,gtter here in a more universal sense of the ,divine than in the former passage1 and find the emphasis here is laid upon the word menschlichen4 ,it is1 in fact1 but another way of stating the incarnation of the ,divine in humanity4 ,footnote #ceg3 ,als totale ,individualitt1 i4e41 all that is comprised in its essential notion4 ,footnote #ceh3 ,der handelnden ,character1 i4e41 ,character manifest in the action4 ,footnote #cei3 ,ausser sich1 goes to the dogs1 as we say in vulgar parlance1 i4e41 ceases to be character in the true sense at all4 ,footnote #cfj3 ,this example shows us that by the expression frheren ,gtter above ,hegel must be referring to prehistoric times and quite archaic conceptions of ,greek godhead4 ,footnote #cfa3 ,eines in sick gebildeten ,innern4 ,gebildet here used in the sense of perfected1 rounded to a co-ordinated content4 ,footnote #cfb3 ,hineingegraben1 lit41 buried in4 ,footnote #cfc3 ,i am unable to express in two words the contrast presented by the ,german tragen and ertragen4 ,footnote #cfd3 ,it is not easy to strike the exact interpretation of such a word as ,quetschlichkeit4 ,apparently this or the more usual term ,quabbelig have the sense of shaking4 ,i believe there is a synonym for quaker's grass1 viz41 quatch-grass4 ,footnote #cfe3 ,und durch sie sich hindurchziehen4 ,the most obvious sense of these words would be3 and 7i4e41 the threads7 carry themselves on through it 7i4e41 externality74 ,perhaps the meaning is that the relations in question not merely unite the ,ideal to the world but are carried beyond 7with the ,ideal7 the natural external world into that higher plane of the objective spiritual world4 ,in my translation ,i have practically evaded the difficulty and assumed there is either something missing1 or we must understand1 ,i admit1 a very harsh change of subject4 ,footnote #cff3 ,through self-consciousness he is both the individual subject and the form of an infinite content4 ,footnote #cfg3 ,eine subjektive ,totalitt4 ,footnote #cfh3 ,i have amplified this sentence to make it quite clear to which of the three worlds1 viz41 7a7 the subjective world in its abstraction1 7b7 the external world in its abstraction or1 finally1 the world of reality1 in which a and b are mutually related1 the writer here refers4 ,footnote #cfi3 ,in welche die in sick totale ,einheit des ,ideals nicht mehr ihrer konkreten ,geistigkeit nach hineinzuscheinen befhigt ist4 ,lit41 ,into which the self-complete unity of the ,ideal is no longer capable of penetrating by virtue of the concrete spirituality which it essentially is4 ,footnote #cgj3 ,an obvious distinction between the arts of architecture and garden-construction is that in the former all the materials used have been already informed by human hands at least where building is in any advanced stage4 ,footnote #cga3 ,hegel's actual words would seem to imply that the fact a garden is created for use and enjoyment is detrimental to its beauty4 ,footnote #cgb3 ,it must be admitted that this summary treatment of gardens is not very satisfactory4 ,no doubt the best authorities concur in the view that the formal garden is more artistic than the landscape1 but hardly on the main ground given here4 ,landscape gardening such as we find it in our great ,english country houses has a real justification of its own4 ,and with regard to the reason given that a garden should be entirely subordinate to the human object do we not strike here upon a weakness which is to a certain extent apparent also in ,hegel's theory of the artistic purpose of architecture4 ,i think it must be admitted that though it is true the object of both these arts is not entirely for their own beauty1 and in certain cases1 not even primarily so1 as in the case of a senate-house or ordinary garden1 yet where the artistic purpose is manifested throughout with great deliberation they may be essentially an independent work of art2 take the case14of a cathedral1 for example1 or a really beautiful and homogeneous formal garden4 ,footnote #cgc3 ,element1 subject-matter would be really a better word4 ,footnote #cgd3 ,kein bloss quantatives4 ,they are not like a heap of stones1 for example1 but they possess relations which qualify each other1 as of course the heap of stones will do in so far as it is distinguished by diversity of colour4 ,footnote #cge3 ,i think this must be the meaning of the words noch ah blass aufgelste ,gegenstze auftreten4 ,footnote #cgf3 ,grau is the word ,hegel uses1 but ,i think he must use it in the sense ,i have translated it4 ,gray in itself is a very beautiful compound1 and the subtlety of its use is that which is one of the distinguishing characteristics of the very greatest colourists such as ,turner and ,velazquez4 ,footnote #cgg3 ,i am not quite sure that ,hegel means this exactly1 but it is no doubt what an artist would mean and in water-colour especially it is of the utmost importance4 ,compare the flesh colour of the artists such as our ,watts or ,titian with that of ,leighton4 ,one of the most marvellous examples ,i know is a small picture of ,titian1 the subject of which is ,herodias with the head of ,john the ,baptist1 in one of the palaces at ,rome4 ,but a modern critic would1 apart from the question of dirtiness1 about which there can be no doubt1 say that ,hegel insists too much1 precisely as ,ruskin does1 on the superiority of the pure single colour4 ,footnote #cgh3 ,hegel appears to be himself slightly incorrect here4 ,no doubt a string may ring false if it is not tightly fastened or if too slack or too long it may produce sounds the human ear is unable to appreciate4 ,but primarily what musicians mean by a string ringing false1 with wolf notes and so on1 is due to the bad material or false composition of the string itself4 ,footnote #cgi3 ,disparat1 i4e41 composed of different elements1 not merely separate in position4 ,footnote #chj3 ,i think the expression ein blosses an-sich must mean this here4 ,of course the usual meaning is that of something potential1 unrealized1 but here ,i think it rather signifies not objectively or really valid4 ,no doubt in relation to the heads of discussion it is potential also4 ,footnote #cha3 ,die traurige ,bnkelsngerei4 ,i think the adjective must here rather refer to the contrast than to the nature of the poetry4 ,i presume the ,minnesingers are referred to4 ,footnote #chb3 ,i do not know what book this is1 nor have ,i ever heard of a hero with the name of ,otnith4 ,footnote #chc3 ,or rather by virtue both of its medium and object4 ,ihrer ,natur nach are ,hegel's words4 ,footnote #chd3 ,jenem ersten ,ansichseyenden4 ,that is to say1 a relation indefinite1 but essentially implying a further realization4 ,footnote #che3 ,es nur eine unwahre ,abstraction bezeigen wrde4 ,lack of comprehensiveness would1 of course1 be more literal4 ,footnote #chf3 ,in ihrem abstracten ,gehalt4 ,that is1 regarded simply as the opinions of a private individual1 and apart from all that may be implied in it under more universal relations4 ,footnote #chg3 ,der ,zustand der allgemeinen ,bildung1 not an easy phrase to translate3 the ,culture-,state perhaps sums it up most completely4 ,the state of universal education is too indefinite or goes too far4 ,footnote #chh3 ,the whole spirit of this passage is a striking witness to ,hegel's admiration for classical art4 ,whether the arguments brought forward are wholly sound when we consider them in connection with the ,elizabethan drama1 for example1 may readily admit of a question4 ,at the same time1 as ,hegel himself points out1 ,shakespeare unquestionably throws the time back to what is practically a mythical age in at least three of his greatest tragedies1 ,hamlet1 ,macbeth1 and above all ,king ,lear4 ,footnote #chi3 ,for the element of beauty implied in ordinary craftsmanship1 and the modern view1 pressed so strongly by ,william ,morris and others1 of this aspect of art and its modern necessity1 the reader should peruse ,professor ,bosanquet's valuable ,three ,lectures on ,aesthetic 7see particularly ,lecture ,,ii1 p4 #fa et seq474 ,footnote #cij3 ,even an admirer of our author must admit1 ,i think1 here that the argument is somewhat overstrained4 ,that ,hegel possessed real humour and yet more irony few will deny who have studied him1 but at times the man with a theory rather tends1 as is so frequently the case with our ,german cousins1 ,goethe himself not excepted1 to swallow up such sanative juices altogether4 ,footnote #cia3 ,i presume the meaning is that the poem in the shape we now have it dates some #djj years after the ,trojan war4 ,but it is not very clear from ,hegel's language whether he regards ,homer as the poet who1 as in the case of his example of the poet of the ,niebelungenlied1 fused that together or no4 ,for if he did how could he have lived through the poems1 an expression itself which is rather vague1 more particularly as the better opinion is that they represent a different age themselves4 ,footnote #cib3 ,vernrnbergert4 ,a word of course coined by ,hegel4 ,made them1 that is to say1 at home in the ,nuremberg of ,hans ,sachs4 ,footnote #cic3 ,best of all things water4 ,compare ,meredith's exquisite poem ,phoebus with ,admetus1 ,water1 first of singers o'er rocky mount and mead1 etc41 stanza #c4 ,footnote #cid3 ,the drama of ,racine4 ,footnote #cie3 ,what this word means ,i do not know--possibly quill-feathers4 ,footnote #cif3 ,eine grosse ,genialitt4 ,first-rate genius is rather too strong1 talents of the highest rank would be more literal4 ,we have no word that expresses ,genialitt4 ,as the passage is ironical ,i have allowed genius to pass4 ,footnote #cig3 ,wir haben schlecht gestanden4 ,literally1 there is some mistake between us4 ,but the idiomatic sense ,i presume is1 ,you've made a bad shot this time4 ,footnote #cih3 ,what would ,hegel have said of the first scene in the ,merchant of ,venice8 ,no doubt ,shakespeare's play contains very much more than such scenes1 and there is a profound significance in that opening scene1 for it at once emphasizes the collision of families upon which the entire tragedy turns4 ,but is such a defence needed8 ,there appears to be indubitably a certain deficiency in the above criticism4 ,there is no reason that a scene in which a couple of peasants and two troopers are the dramatis personae should not be infinitely amusing provided a ,shakespeare1 or even a ,goethe1 when he is not in one of his dull moods1 performs the office of teaching them how to speak4 ,footnote #cii3 ,this surely goes too far unless interest is taken strictly to mean artistic interest which would appear to be so from the context4 ,everything that has once interested or affected mankind1 however remote1 has at heart an historical and antiquarian interest1 and ,i am not sure that we should not be right in adding a general human interest4 ,at least such is almost a dogma with a poet of the type of ,browning4 ,footnote #djj3 ,i do not know the ,teutonic poem here referred to4 ,but what about ,wagner's famous tetralogy8 ,the above arguments1 though containing much that is true1 appear to overlook for one thing the symbolic significance of mythological history1 and in a certain sense to be lacking in sympathy for everything that is not modern or ,hellenic4 ,how very differently ,carlyle1 for example1 referred to this very mythology1 and his learning was not profound in the ,german sense4 ,footnote #dja3 ,the intention of ,aeschylus went1 of course1 much farther than this1 and the entire play is essentially one written by a staunch conservative against modern innovation4 ,footnote #djb3 ,it is strange that ,hegel should have ventured such a generalization in the face of his old friend ,holderlein's poetry4 ,in ,england some fine poems have been written such as ,lady ,margaret ,sackville's hymn to ,dionysus and ,swinburne's to ,proserpine4 ,but for a good essay in support of the main contention ,i know none equal to ,russell ,lowell's ,essay on ,swinburne's ,atalanta4 ,i think that both our author and the critic who supports him somewhat fail to recognize the permanent reality1 whether symbolical or directly spiritual1 that an increasing number of men find in these ,hellenic personalities1 as illustrated in the poetry of ,meredith1 to take the finest flavour of the type4 ,footnote #djc3 ,i presume this is the meaning of unserer eigenen ,geliebten1 but from the example given of ,petrarch's ,laura one would rather have expected that it was the poet's beloved whose name was not given4 ,in any case the sense is rather obscure4 ,footnote #djd3 ,i think it must be admitted that ,hegel goes too far in the other extreme4 ,the best tendency of our times is to reproduce ,shakespeare as near to the best authenticated text as possible4 ,no doubt our adaptation of ,french plays is in a certain sense an illustration of ,hegel's contention2 but generally it is recognized that where a work is great1 as for example in the case of our ,greek plays1 it is far better to let them speak for themselves1 and attempt no botching4 ,footnote #dje3 ,schiller's play4 ,footnote #djf3 ,schiefheiten1 errors that divert truth from its path4 ,footnote #djg3 ,we should rather have expected ,erhalt than ,gehalt here4 ,gehalt means1 therefore1 the essential part of the entire manifestation4 ,footnote #djh3 ,durch all das anderweitige ,getriebe1 i4e41 through all that is otherwise mechanical4 ,footnote #dji3 ,i am not certain whether there is a definite allusion here to anything in particular1 or whether the ,egyptian is taken to signify any folk outside ,western culture1 with possibly some subtle suggestion of those who held the favoured people in bondage1 ,philistines in short4 ,footnote #daj3 ,herausgeboren ist1 cast forth1 that is to say1 as the natural growth of it--as ,minerva from the head of ,zeus4 ,footnote #daa3 ,imagination appears to me the best translation of ,phantasie4 ,our ,english word1 however1 seems rather to lie between it and ,vorstellung4 ,practically ,hegel means here what we mean when we distinguish it from fancy 7,einbildungskraft71 though in ,ruskin's original and most suggestive analysis of the terms1 fancy of course implied a limited power of creative activity or at least associative activity4 ,footnote #dab3 ,leichtfertigkeit der ,phantasie1 i4e41 a careless facility of imaginative activity4 ,footnote #dac3 ,it must not be overlooked1 however1 that1 especially in the arts of music and painting1 genius may have reached maturity at a very early period1 as was the case with ,mozart1 ,rafael1 and many another4 ,footnote #dad3 ,ganz vereinzelten ,seite4 ,it is a little strange to find such an expression applied to the arts of violin-playing or singing4 ,but the emphasis is not so much on the art as a whole as to the technical aspect of execution4 ,footnote #dae3 ,anlage1 lit41 a laying to1 an impulse in a certain direction4 ,footnote #daf3 ,this statement is rather surprising from a fellow countryman of ,bach1 ,handel1 ,mozart1 etc41 down to ,wagner and ,strauss4 ,the explanation appears first to be due to the distinction between a national impulse toward popular singing which the ,italian no doubt possesses1 and a deep-rooted emotional life which finally discovers its supreme mode of expression in the art of instrumental music as developed by the ,teuton stock4 ,secondly1 it is quite clear1 ,i think1 from ,hegel's correspondence that he had no real sympathy for orchestral music though an enthusiastic admirer of opera1 particularly ,italian opera4 ,footnote #dag3 ,the other two aspects were3 7a7 ,that genius is a spiritual activity and in its operation offers a contrast to talent1 where the personal initiative is not so prominent1 7b7 ,it has a certain aspect which may be called innate4 ,footnote #dah3 ,it is a little surprising to find ,hegel tracing technical accomplishment to the native gift4 ,at least all technical accomplishment has to be learned4 ,footnote #dai3 ,this is the real point4 ,whatever ignoramuses may say of the shackles of verse poets know only too well that they supply a supreme stimulus to imaginative powers both in virtue of the atmosphere of music into which they are thus carried and the suggestiveness of the words themselves4 ,what ,hegel's analysis appears rather to fail in is his perception of the unconscious work in the greatest men when working in most inspired moments whether in painting or poetry--the extraordinary power of their intuition4 ,footnote #dbj3 ,no doubt ,hegel does not use our word inspiration in quite the sense it is usually used1 and ,i should have said even less so the ,german word4 ,at the same time we do apply the word inspiration to the technical execution and most justly where it is used as a distinction4 ,footnote #dba3 ,meredith in a letter to a correspondent expresses the same conviction4 ,he even adds that he thinks ,schiller's compositions were by no means improved by artificial stimulants4 ,footnote #dbb3 ,the ,germans say1 a song which rings straight from the throat1 der aus der ,kehle dringt4 ,footnote #dbc3 ,welche zum ,begriff des ,talente gehrt4 ,talent no doubt to some extent includes genius here1 but mainly in its aspect of productive power4 ,footnote #dbd3 ,i do not know the composition and cannot make much of the quotations4 ,for all ,i know ,tamboure-gesellen may be the drummer-boy himself4 ,footnote #dbe3 ,this translation may pass perhaps3 ,this little nosegay plucked by me ,a thousand times may it greet thee6 ,how many thousand times have ,i ,bowed over it2 how many times ,pressed it to heart2 how many times6 ,footnote #dbf3 ,or1 as ,hegel puts it1 that he is not4 ,footnote #dbg3 ,we should rather say a personal or individual manner perhaps4 ,footnote #dbh3 ,i have translated ,zuflligen here with the words he shares with no one else4 ,the suggestion is that there is no warrant or principle to support them4 ,footnote #dbi3 ,it is rather surprising to find ,hegel including music here rather than sculpture or architecture1 especially the latter1 which seems peculiarly adapted to illustrate what ,i understand to be his general point of view4 ,his own illustrations throw no light on the matter as they are borrowed from painting or poetry4 ,footnote #dcj3 ,i presume the difference here alluded to is such as we may see if we contrast the tone of a ,correggio1 for instance1 with that of a ,titian or a ,rembrandt4 ,footnote #dca3 ,er hat ihn sich angeeignet4 ,lack of artistic power is the main factor in an artificial style4 ,though there are doubtless many examples of men forced to paint in a way much below their true powers to obtain a living4 ,but it must be admitted ,hegel does not express himself very clearly4 ,individuality of handling is essential to a great master4 ,the real point is that it should not crystallize into a mere habit1 as in the ,bologna school of painters4 ,footnote #dcb3 ,artificial would perhaps come closer to the mark4 ,footnote #dcc3 ,in sich selbst zu erweitern4 ,the phrase at once suggests by contrast that expression so frequently used by painters of tightness1 incapacity to enlarge1 which is such a characteristic of artificial handling1 and indeed of most academic work1 and so frequently gives to the original sketch of an artist a greater artistic value than to the highly finished work4 ,footnote #dcd3 ,in der subjektiven ,begeistrung4 ,footnote #dce3 ,the chamber at ,wetzlar4 ,footnote #dcf3 ,elective ,affinities4 ,,end ,,of ,,vol4 ,i