,,chess ,,generalship ,,by ,,franklin ,k4 ,,young ,vol4 ,i4 ,,grand ,,reconnaissance4 8,he who first devised chessplay1 made a model of the ,art ,militarie1 representing therein all the concurrents and contemplations of ,war1 without omitting any40 8,examen de ,ingenios40 ,juan ,huarte1 #afaf4 8,chess is the deepest of all games2 it is constructed to carry out the principal of a battle1 and the whole theory of ,chess lies in that form of action40 ,emanuel ,lasker4 ,,boston ,,international ,,publishing ,,co4 #aiaj ,copyright1 #aiaj1 ,,by ,,franklin ,k4 ,,young4 ,entered at ,stationers' ,hall4 ,all rights reserved4 8,chess is the gymnasium for the mind--it does for the brain what athletics does for the body40 ,henry ,thomas ,buckle4 ,,george ,e4 ,,crosby ,,co41 ,,printers1 ,,boston1 ,,mass4 ,,young',s ,,chess ,,works ,,minor ,,tactics ,,of ,,chess #a4jj ,an eminently attractive treatment of the game of ,chess4--,scientific ,american4 ,,major ,,tactics ,,of ,,chess #b4ej ,in this book one finds the principles of strategy and logistics applied to ,chess in a unique and scientific way4--,army and ,navy ,register4 ,,grand ,,tactics ,,of ,,chess #c4ej ,for the student who desires to enter the broader channels of ,chess1 the best books are by ,,franklin ,k4 ,,young3 his 8,minor ,tactics0 and his more elaborate 8,grand ,tactics0 are the most important productions of modern ,chess literature4--,american ,chess ,magazine4 ,,chess ,,strategetics ,,illustrated #b4ej ,we know no work outside of the masterpieces of ,newton1 ,hamilton and ,darwin1 which so organizes and systematizes human thought4--,chicago ,evening ,post4 99 99 99 99 99 8,there are secrets that the children ,are not taught in public school2 ,if these secrets were broadcasted1 ,how could we the masses rule8 ,if they understood ,religion1 ,jurisprudence1 ,trade and ,war1 ,would they groan and sweat and labor-- ,make our bricks and furnish straw80 ,anon4 99 99 99 99 99 ,,to ,the ,memory ,,of ,,epaminondas ,,the ,,inventor ,,of ,,scientific ,,warfare 99 99 99 99 99 8,i leave no sons ,to perpetuate my name2 ,but ,i leave two daughters-- ,,leuctra and ,,mantinea ,who will transmit my fame ,to remotest posterity40 99 99 99 99 99 8,for empire and greatness it importeth most that a people do profess arms as their principal honor1 study and occupation40--,sir ,francis ,bacon4 99 99 99 99 99 8,there is nothing truly imposing but ,military ,glory40--,napoleon4 99 99 99 99 99 8,the conquered in war1 sinking beneath the tribute exacted by the victor and not daring to utter their impotent hatred1 bequeath to their children miseries so extreme that the aged have not further evil to fear in death1 nor the youthful any good to hope in life40--,xenocles4 99 99 99 99 99 8,war is an element established by the ,deity in the order of the ,world2 perpetual peace upon this ,earth we inhabit is a dream40--,von ,moltke4 ,,preface 8,to become a good ,general one well may begin by playing at ,chess40--,prince de ,cond4 ,except the theatre of actual ,warfare1 no spot known to man furnishes such facilities for the practice of combined strategy1 tactics and logistics as does the surface of the ,chess-board4 ,to those familiar with the ,science of ,strategetics1 it needs no proof that ability to play a good game at ,chess1 indicates the possession of faculties common to all great military commanders4 ,at a certain point1 the talent of ,morphy for ,chess-play and the talent of ,napoleon for ,warfare become merged2 and beyond this point1 their methods of thought and of action are identical4 ,opportunity to display1 and in most spectacular fashion1 their singular and superlative genius1 was not wanting to either4 ,but unlike the ferocious ,corsican1 whose 8only desire is to find myself on the battlefield10 the greatest of all ,masters at ,chess1 found in the slaughter of his fellow-creatures no incentive sufficient to call forth those unsurpassed strategetical powers1 which recorded ,chess-play shows he possessed4 ,from this sameness of talent1 common to the great ,chess-player and the great military commander1 arises the practical utility of the ,royal ,game4 ,for by means of ,chess-play1 one may learn and practice in their highest interpretation1 mental and physical processes of paramount importance to the community in time of extreme peril4 ,from such considerations and for the further reason that in a true ,republic all avenues to greatness are open to merit1 scientific ,chess-play should be intelligently and systematically taught in the public schools4 8,a people desirous of liberty will entrust its defense to none but themselves10 says the ,roman maxim1 and in crises1 woe to that land where the ruler is but a child in arms1 and where the disinclination of the people towards its exercise is equalled by their unfamiliarity with the military habit4 ,despite the ethics of civilization1 the optimism of the 8unco guid0 and the unction even of our own heart's deep desire1 there seems no doubt but that each generation will have its wars4 8,pax perpetua10 writes ,leibnitz1 8exists only in ,god's acre40 ,here on earth1 if seems that men forever will continue to murder one another for various reasons2 all of which1 in the future as in the past1 will be good and sufficient to the fellow who wins2 and this by processes differing only in neatness and despatch4 ,whether this condition is commendable or not1 depends upon the point of view4 ,being irremediable1 such phase of the subject hardly is worth discussing4 ,however1 the following by a well-qualified observer1 is interesting and undeniably an intelligent opinion1 viz43 ,from the essay on 8,,war10 read by ,prof4 ,john ,ruskin at ,woolwich1 7,eng47 ,military ,academy4 8,all the pure and noble arts of ,peace are founded on ,war2 no great ,art ever rose on ,earth1 but among a nation of soldiers4 8,as ,peace is established or extended the ,arts decline4 ,they reach an unparalleled pitch of costliness1 but lose their life1 enlist themselves at last on the side of luxury and corruption and among wholly tranquil nations1 wither utterly away4 8,so when ,i tell you that ,war is the foundation of all the ,arts1 ,i mean also that it is the foundation of all the high virtues and faculties of men4 8,it was very strange for me to discover this and very dreadful--but ,i saw it to be quite an undeniable fact4 8,we talk of ,peace and ,learning1 of ,peace and ,plenty1 of ,peace and ,civilization2 but ,i found that those were not the words which the ,muse of ,history coupled together2 but that on her lips the words were--,peace and ,selfishness1 ,peace and ,sensuality1 ,peace and ,corruption1 ,peace and ,death4 8,i found in brief1 that all great nations learned their truth of word and strength of thought in ,war2 that they were nourished in ,war and wasted in ,peace2 taught by ,war and deceived by ,peace2 trained by ,war and betrayed by ,peace2 that they were born in ,war and expired in ,peace4 8,creative1 or foundational ,war1 is that in which the natural restlessness and love of contest among men1 is disciplined into modes of beautiful--though it may be fatal--play2 in which the natural ambition and love of ,power is chastened into aggressive conquest of surrounding evil2 and in which the natural instincts of self-defence are sanctified by the nobleness of the institutions which they are appointed to defend4 8,for such ,war as this all men are born2 in such ,war as this any man may happily die2 and forth from such ,war as this have arisen throughout the ,ages1 all the highest sanctities and virtues of ,humanity40 99 99 99 99 99 ,that our own country may escape the common lot of nations1 is something not even to be hoped4 ,defended by four almost bottomless ditches1 nevertheless it is a certainty that coming generations of ,americans must stand in arms1 not only to repel foreign aggression1 but to uphold even the integrity of the ,great ,republic2 and with the hand-writing of coming events flaming on the wall1 posterity well may heed the solemn warning of by-gone centuries3 8,as man is superior to the brute1 so is a trained and educated soldier superior to the merely brave1 numerous and enthusiastic40 99 99 99 99 99 8,the evils to be apprehended from a standing army are remote and in my judgment1 not to be dreaded2 but the consequence of lacking one is inevitable ruin40--,washington4 ,,contents ,,page ,,preface ,,vii ,,introductory ,,xiii ,,chess ,,generalship #c ,,grand ,,reconnaissance #bc ,military ,examples #bh ,,organization #de ,military ,examples #ei ,,topography #gc ,military ,examples #he ,,mobility #ig ,military ,examples #aaf ,,numbers #abc ,military ,examples #abg ,,time #aci ,military ,examples #adb ,,position #adg ,military ,examples #aeh ,,prime ,,strategetic ,,means #afi ,,prime ,,strategetic ,,proposition #ahe 8,the progress of ,science universally is retarded1 because sufficient attention is not paid to explaining essentials in particular and exactly to define the terms employed40--,euclid4 99 99 99 99 99 8,the first care of the sage should be to discover the true character of his pupils4 ,by his questions he should assist them to explain their own ideas and by his answers he should compel them to perceive their falsities4 ,by accurate definitions he should gradually dispel the incongruities in their earlier education and by his subtlety in arousing their doubts1 he should redouble their curiosity and eagerness for information2 for the art of the instructor consists in inciting his pupils to that point at which they cannot endure their manifest ignorance4 8,many1 unable to undergo this trial and confounded by offended self-conceit and lacking the fortitude to sustain correction1 forsake their master1 who should not be eager to recall them4 ,others who learn from humiliation to distrust themselves should no longer have snares spread for their vanity4 ,the master should speak to them neither with the severity of a censor nor with the haughtiness of a sophist1 nor deal in harsh reproaches nor importunate complaints2 his discourse should be the language of reason and friendship in the mouth of experience40--,socrates4 ,,introductory 8,the test is as true of cerebral power1 as if a hundred thousand men lay dead upon the field2 or a score of hulks were swinging blackened wrecks1 after a game between two mighty admirals40--,dr4 ,oliver ,wendell ,holmes4 7,opening ,address at ,morphy ,banquet1 ,boston1 #ahei47 ,men whose business it is to understand war and warfare often are amused by senseless comparisons made by writers who1 as their writings show1 are ignorant even of the rudiments of military art and science4 ,of course a certain license in expression of thought is not to be denied the layman2 he cannot be expected to talk with the exactness of the man who knows4 ,at the same time there is a limit beyond which the non-technical man passes at his peril1 and this limit is reached when he poses as a critic and presumes to dogmatize on matters in regard to which he is uninformed4 ,the fanciful conjectures of such people1 well are illustrated by the following editorial faux pas1 perpetrated by a leading metropolitan daily1 viz43 8,everyone knows now that a future war between states having similar and substantially equal equipments will be a different affair from any war of the past2 characterized by a different order of generalship and a radically novel application of the principles of strategy and tactics40 ,many in the struggle to obtain their daily bread1 are tempted to essay the unfamiliar1 and for a stipulated wage to pose as teachers to the public4 ,such always will do well to write modestly in regard to sciences which they have not studied and of arts which they never practiced1 and especially in future comments on ,military matters1 such people may profit by the appended modicum of that ancient history1 which newspaper men as a class so affect to despise1 and in regard to which1 as a rule1 they are universally and lamentably1 ignorant4 ,what orders of ,generalship can exist in the future1 different from those which always have existed since war was made1 viz43 good generalship and bad generalship8 ,ability properly to conduct an army is a concrete thing2 it does not admit of comparison4 ,says ,frederic the ,great3 8,there are only two kinds of ,generals--those who know their trade and those who do not40 ,hence1 8a different order of ,generalship10 suggested by the editorial quoted1 implies either a higher or a lesser degree of ability in the 8general of the future02 and as obviously1 it is impossible that he can do worse than many already have done1 it is necessary to assume that the commander of tomorrow will be an improvement over his predecessors4 ,consequently1 to the military mind it becomes of paramount interest to inquire as to the form and manner in which such superiority will be tangibly and visibly manifested1 viz43 ,will the general of the future be a better general than ,epaminondas1 ,alexander1 ,hannibal1 ,caesar1 ,gustavus ,adolphus1 ,turenne1 ,eugene1 ,frederic1 ,washington1 ,napoleon1 ,von ,moltke8 ,will he improve upon that application of the principles of strategy and tactics to actual warfare which comes down to us of today1 stamped with the approval of these superlative military geniuses8 ,will the general of the future know a better way for making war than acting against the enemy's communications8 ,will he devise a better method of warfare than that whose motive is the concentration of a superior force upon the strategetic objective8 ,will the processes of his prime logistic operations be preferable to those of men who won their victories before their battles were fought1 by combining with their troops the topography of the country1 and causing rivers and mountains to take the place of corps d'armee8 ,will the general of the future renounce as obsolete and worthless that military organization founded centuries before the ,christian ,era1 by the great ,theban1 ,epaminondas1 the father of scientific warfare2 that system adopted by every captain of renown and which may be seen in its purity in the greater military establishments from the days of ,rome to the present ,imperial ,north ,german ,confederation8 ,will the general of the future renounce as obsolete and worthless that system of ,minor ,tactics utilized by every man who has made it his business to conquer the ,world8 ,will he propose to us something more perfect than the primary formation of forces depicted in ,plate ,,xiii of the ,secret ,strategical ,instructions of ,frederic ,,ii8 ,will the general of the future renounce as obsolete and worthless those intricate1 but mathematically exact1 evolutions of the combined arms1 which appertain to the ,major ,tactics of men who are remembered to this day for the battles that they won8 ,will he invent processes more destructive than those whereby ,epaminondas crushed at ,leuctra and ,mantinea the power of ,sparta1 and the women of ,lacedaemon saw the smoke of an enemy's camp fire for the first time in six hundred years8 ,than those whereby ,alexander1 a youth of eighteen1 won ,greece for his father at ,chaeronea and the ,world for himself at ,issus and ,arbela8 ,than those whereby ,hannibal destroyed seriatim four ,roman armies at ,trebia1 ,thrasymenus1 ,cannae and ,herdonea8 ,will he find out processes more sudden and decisive than those whereby ,caesar conquered ,gaul and ,pompey and the son of ,mithridates1 and which are fitly described only in his own language2 8,veni1 vidi1 vici08 ,what will the general of the future substitute for the three contiguous sides of the octagon whereby ,tamerlane the ,great with his #a1djj1jjj veterans at the ,plains of ,angora1 enveloped the ,emperor ,bajazet and #ijj1jjj ,turks in the most gigantic battle of record8 ,will he eclipse the pursuit of these latter by ,mizra1 the son of ,tamerlane1 who with the ,hunnish light cavalry rode two hundred and thirty miles in five days and captured the ,turkish capital1 the ,emperor ,bajazet1 his harem and the royal treasure8 ,will he excel ,gustavus ,adolphus1 who dominated ,europe for twenty years1 and ,turenne1 the military ,atlas who upheld that magnificent civilization which embellishes the reign of ,louis ,,xiv8 ,will he do better than ,prince ,eugene1 who victoriously concluded eighteen campaigns and drove the ,turks out of ,christendom8 ,will he discover processes superior to those whereby ,frederic the ,great with #bb1jjj troops destroyed at ,rosbach a ,french army of #fj1jjj regulars in an hour and a half1 at the cost of three hundred men2 and at ,leuthern with #cc1jjj troops1 killed1 wounded or captured #ed1jjj out of #ic1jjj ,austrians1 at a cost of #c1ijj men8 ,will he improve on those processes whereby ,napoleon with #dj1jjj men1 destroyed in a single year five ,austrian armies and captured #aej1jjj prisoners8 ,will he improve on ,rivoli1 ,austerlitz1 ,jena1 ,friedland1 ,wagram1 ,dresden1 and ,ligny8 ,will the general of the future renounce as obsolete and worthless that system of ,grand ,tactics1 by means of which the mighty ones of ,earth have swept before them all created things8 ,will his system surpass in grandeur of conception and exactness of execution the march of ,alexander to the ,indus8 ,will he reply to his rival's prayers for peace and amity as did the great ,macedonian2 8,there can be but one ,master of the ,world02 and to the dissuasions of his friend2 8,so would ,i do1 were ,i ,parmenio08 ,will he do things more gigantic than ,hannibal's march across the ,alps8 ,than the operation of ,alesia by ,caesar2 where the ,romans besieging one ,gallic army in a fortified city1 and themselves surrounded by a second ,gallic army1 single handed destroyed both8 ,than the circuit of the ,caspian ,sea by the #bjj1jjj light cavalry of ,tamerlane1 a feat of mountain climbing which never has been duplicated8 ,than that marvelous combination of the principles of tactics and of field fortification1 whereby in the position of ,bunzelwitz1 ,frederic the ,great1 with #ee1jjj men1 successfully upheld the last remaining prop of the ,prussian nation1 against #bej1jjj ,russian and ,austrian regular troops1 commanded by the best generals of the age8 ,will he conceive anything more scientific and artistic than the manoeuvre of ,trenton and ,princeton by ,washington8 ,than the capture of ,burgoyne at ,saratoga and ,cornwallis at ,yorktown8 ,than the manoeuvres of ,ulm1 of ,jena1 of ,landshut8 ,than the manoeuvres of ,napoleon in #ahad8 ,than the manoeuvre of ,charleroi in #ahae1 declared by ,jomini to be ,napoleon's masterpiece8 ,will he excel the manoeuvres of ,kutosof and ,wittsengen in #ahab-ac and of ,blucher on ,paris in #ahad and on ,waterloo in #ahae2 each of which annihilated for the time being the military power of ,france8 ,will he devise military conceptions superior to those whereby ,von ,moltke overthrew ,denmark in six hours1 ,austria in six days1 and ,france in six weeks8 99 99 99 99 99 ,the sapient race of quill-drivers ever has hugged to its breast many delusions2 some of which border upon the outer intellectual darkness4 ,one of these delusions is that most persistently advertised1 least substantial1 but forever darling first favorite of timid and inexperienced minds3 8,the pen is mightier than the sword40 ,explanation of the invincible ignorance of the penny-a-liner is simple1 viz43 ,of the myriad self-appointed educators to the public1 few are familiar even with the rudimentary principles of ,military ,science and almost none are acquainted even with the simplest processes of ,strategetic ,art4 ,hence1 like all who discourse on matters which they do not understand1 such writers continually confound together things which have no connection4 ,ignorant of war and the use of weapons2 bewildered by the prodigious improvements in mechanical details1 they immoderately magnify the importance of such improvements1 oblivious to the fact that these latter relate exclusively to elementary tactics and in no way affect the system of ,strategy1 ,logistics1 and the higher branches of ,tactics4 ,of such people1 the least that can be said and that in all charity1 is1 that before essaying the role of the pedagogue1 they should endeavor to grasp that most obvious of all truths3 8,a man cannot teach what he never has learned40 ,says ,frederic the ,great3 8,improvements and new discoveries in implements of warfare will be made continually2 and generals then alive must modify tactics to comply with these novelties4 ,but the ,grand ,art of taking advantage of topographical conditions and of the faulty disposition of the opposing forces1 ,,eternally ,,will ,,remain ,,unchanged in the military system40 99 99 99 99 99 ,naturally1 the student now is led to inquire3 ,what then is this immutable military system8 ,what are its text books1 where is it taught and from whom is it to be learned8 ,in answer it may be stated3 ,at the present day1 private military schools make no attempt to teach more than elementary tactics4 ,even the ,governmental academy curriculum aims little higher than the school of the battalion4 ,scientific ,chess-play begins where these institutions leave off1 and ends at that goal which none of these institutions even attempt to reach4 ,chess teaches to conduct campaigns1 to win battles1 and to move troops securely and effectively in the presence of and despite the opposition of an equal or superior enemy4 ,military schools graduate boys as second-lieutenants commanding a platoon4 ,chess graduates ,generals1 able to mobilize ,corps d'armee1 whatever their number or location2 to develop these into properly posted integers of a grand ,strategic ,front and to manoeuvre and operate the army as a ,strategetic ,unit1 in accordance to the laws of the ,strategetic art and the principles of the ,strategetic science4 ,by precept and by actual practice1 ,chess teaches what is ,,not taught in any military school--that least understood and most misunderstood2 that best guarded and most invaluable of all ,state ,secrets-- ,the profession of ,,generalship4 99 99 99 99 99 8,books will speak plain when counsellors blanch4 ,therefore it is good to be conversant with them2 especially the books of such as themselves have been actors upon the stage40--,sir ,francis ,bacon4 99 99 99 99 99 8,at this moment1 ,europe1 which fears neither ,god nor devil1 grovels in terror before a little man hardly five feet in height2 who1 clad in a cocked hat and grey great-coat and mounted upon a white horse1 plods along through mud and darkness2 followed by the most enthusiastic1 most devoted and most efficient band of cut-throats and robbers1 the world has ever seen40 99 99 99 99 99 8,many good soldiers are but poor generals40--,hannibal4 99 99 99 99 99 8,no soldier serving under a victorious commander1 ever has enough of war40--,caesar4 99 99 99 99 99 8,officers always should be chosen from the nobility and never from the lower orders of society2 for the former1 no matter how dissolute1 always retain a sense of honor1 while the latter1 though guilty of atrocious actions1 return to their homes without compunction and are received by their families without disapprobation40--,frederic the ,great4 99 99 99 99 99 ,at the terrible disaster of ,cannae1 the ,patrician ,consul ,aemilius ,paulus and #hj1jjj ,romans died fighting sword in hand2 while the ,plebian ,consul1 ,varro1 fled early in the battle4 ,upon the return of the latter to ,rome1 the ,senate1 instead of ordering his execution1 with withering sarcasm formally voted him its thanks and the thanks of the ,roman people1 8that he did not despair of the ,republic40 99 99 99 99 99 8,among us we have a man of singular character--one ,phocion4 ,he seems not to know that he lives in our modern age and at incomparable ,athens4 ,he is poor1 yet is not humiliated by his poverty2 he does good1 yet never boasts of it2 and gives advice1 though he is certain it will not be followed4 ,he possesses talent without ambition and serves the state without regard to his own interest4 ,at the head of the army1 he contents himself with restoring discipline and beating the enemy4 ,when addressing the assembly1 he is equally unmoved by the disapprobation or the applause of the multitude4 8,we laugh at his singularities and we have discovered an admirable secret for revenging ourselves for his contempt4 ,he is the only general we have left--but we do not employ him2 he is the most upright and perhaps the most intelligent of our counsellors--but we do not listen to him4 ,it is true1 we cannot make him change his principles1 but1 by ,heaven1 neither shall he induce us to change ours2 and it never shall be said that by the example of his superannuated virtues and the influence of his antique teachings1 ,phocion was able to correct the most polished and amiable people in the world40--,callimedon4 ,,generalship ,,chess ,,generalship 8,in ,chess the soldiers are the men and the ,general is the mind of the player40--,emanuel ,lasker4 99 99 99 99 99 8,it is neither riches nor armies that make a nation formidable2 but the courage and genius of the ,commander-in-,chief40--,frederic the ,great4 99 99 99 99 99 8,ho6 ,ye ,macedonians6 ,because together we have conquered the ,world1 think ye to give law to the blood of ,achilles and to withstand the dictates of the ,son of ,jupiter8 8,choose ye a new commander1 draw yourselves up for battle2 ,i will lead against you those ,persians whom ye so despise1 and if you are victorious1 by ,mehercule1 ,i will do everything that you desire40--,alexander the ,great4 99 99 99 99 99 8,it is ,i and ,i alone1 who give you your glory and your success40--,napoleon4 99 99 99 99 99 8,my thoughts are not your thoughts1 neither are your ways1 ,my ways1 saith the ,lord40--,holy ,bible4 ,by authority indisputable1 the ex-cathedra dictum of the greatest of the ,great ,captains1 we have been informed that the higher processes of the military system1 eternally will remain unchanged4 ,as a necessary corollary1 it follows that these processes always have been and always will be comprehended and employed by every great ,captain4 ,equally1 it is self-evident1 that capability to comprehend these higher processes1 united with ability properly to utilize them to win battles and campaigns1 constitutes genius for ,warfare4 ,moreover1 we are further informed by the same unimpeachable authority1 that so irresistible is genius for warfare1 that united to courage1 it is formidable beyond the united financial and military resources of the ,state4 ,in corroboration of this1 we have the testimony of well-qualified judges4 ,says the ,count de ,saxe3 8,unless a man is born with talent for war and this talent is brought to perfection1 it is impossible for him to be more than an indifferent general40 99 99 99 99 99 ,in these days1 more or less degenerate from the soldierly standpoint1 the fantastic sophistries of ,helvetius have vogue1 and most people believe book-learning to be all-in-all4 ,many are so weak-minded1 as really to believe1 that because born in the ,twentieth ,century1 they necessarily are the repository of all the virtues1 and particularly of all the knowledge acquired by their ancestors from remotest generations4 ,few seem to understand that the child1 even of ultra-modern conditions1 is born just as ignorant and often invincibly so1 as were the sons of ,ham1 ,shem and ,japhet1 and most appear to be unaware1 that3 ,only by intelligent reflection upon their own experience and upon the experiences of others1 can one acquire knowledge4 ,the triviality of crowding the memory with things that may or may not be true1 is the merest mimicry of education4 ,real education is nothing more than the fruit of experience2 and he who acts in conformity to such knowledge1 alone is wise4 ,thus to act1 implies ability to comprehend4 ,but there are those in whom capability is limited2 hence1 all may not be wise who wish to be so1 and these necessarily remain through life very much as they are born4 ,the use of knowledge would be infinitely more certain1 if our understanding of its accurate application were as extensive as our needs require4 ,we have only a few ideas of the attributes of matter and of the laws of mechanics1 out of an infinite number of secrets which mankind never can hope to discover4 ,this renders our feeble adaptations in practice of the knowledge we possess1 oftimes inadequate for the result we desire2 and it seems obvious that if ,nature had intended man to attain to the superlative1 she would have endowed him with intelligence and have communicated to him information1 infinitely superior to that we possess4 ,the universal blunder of mankind arises from an hallucination that all minds are created equal2 and that by mere book-learning1 i4e41 simply by memorizing what somebody says are facts it is possible for any man to attain to superior and even to superlative ability4 99 99 99 99 99 ,such profoundly1 but utterly mis-educated people1 not unnaturally may inquire1 by what right speaks the eminent warrior previously quoted4 ,these properly may be informed in the words of ,frederic the ,great3 8,the ,count de ,saxe is the hero of the bravest action ever done by man40 viz41 ,a great battle was raging4 ,within a magnificent ,pavilion in the centre of the ,french camp1 the ,king1 the nobility and the high ,ecclesiastics of the realm were grouped about a plain iron cot4 ,prone upon this cot1 wasted by disease1 lay the ,count de ,saxe1 in that stupor which often precedes and usually presages dissolution4 ,the last rites of the ,church had been administered1 and the assemblage in silence and apprehension1 awaited the approach of a victorious enemy and the final gasp of a general who had never lost a battle4 ,the din of strife drawing nearer1 penetrated the coma which enshrouded the soul of the great ,field-,marshal4 ,saxe opened his eyes4 ,his experienced ear told him that his army1 routed and disordered1 was flying before an exultant enemy4 ,the giant whose pastime it was to tear horseshoes in twain with his bare hands and to twist nails into corkscrews with his fingers1 staggered to his feet1 hoarsely articulating fierce and mandatory ejaculations4 ,hastily clothed1 the ,count de ,saxe was placed in a litter and borne out of his pavilion into that chaos of ruin and carnage which invariably accompanies a lost battle4 ,around him1 behind and in front1 swarmed his broken battalions and disorganized squadrons2 while in pursuit advanced majestically in solid column1 the triumphant ,english4 ,saxe demanded his horse and armor4 ,clad in iron and supported in the saddle on either hand1 this modern ,achilles galloped to the front of his army2 then1 at the head of the ,scotch ,guards1 the ,irish ,brigade1 and ,french ,household troops1 ,saxe in person1 led that series of terrific hand-to-hand onslaughts which drove the ,english army from the field of battle1 and gained the famous victory of ,fontenoy4 99 99 99 99 99 8,furthermore10 declares this illustrious ,generalissimo of ,louis ,,xiv2 8,it is possible to make war without trusting anything to accident2 this is the highest point of skill and perfection within the province of a general40 8,most men10 writes ,vergetius1 8imagine that strength and courage are sufficient to secure victory4 ,such are ignorant that when they exist1 stratagem vanquishes strength and skill overcomes courage40 ,in his celebrated work1 ,institutorum ,rei ,militaris1 that source from whence all writers derive their best knowledge of the military methods of the ancients2 and by means of which1 he strove to revive in his degenerate countrymen that intelligent valor which distinguishes their great ancestors--the famous ,roman reiterates this solemn warning3 8,victory in war depends not on numbers1 nor on courage2 skill and discipline only1 can ensure it40 ,the emphasis thus laid by these great warriors on genius for warfare is still further accentuated by men whose dicta few will dispute1 viz41 8,the understanding of the ,commander10 says ,frederic the ,great1 8has more influence on the outcome of the battle or campaign1 than has the prowess of his troops40 ,says ,napoleon3 8,the general is the head1 the whole of an army4 ,it was not the ,roman army that subjugated ,gaul1 it was ,caesar2 nor was it the ,carthagenian army that made the ,republic tremble to the gates of ,rome1 it was ,hannibal2 it was not the ,macedonian army which reached the ,indus1 it was ,alexander2 it was not the ,french army which carried war to the ,weser and the ,inn1 it was ,turenne2 it was not the ,prussian army which for seven years defended ,prussia against the three strongest powers of ,europe1 it was ,frederic the ,great40 ,from such opinions by men whose careers evince superlative knowledge of the subject1 it is clear1 that3 ,i4 ,there exists a system of ,strategetics common to all great commanders2 ,,ii4 ,that understanding of this system is shown by the skillful use of it2 ,,iii4 ,that such skill is derived from innate capability2 ,,iv4 ,that those endowed by ,nature with this talent1 must bring their gifts to perfection1 by intelligent study4 ,so abstruse are the processes of this greatest of all professions1 that comprehension of it has been evidenced by eleven men only1 viz43 ,epaminondas1 ,alexander1 ,caesar1 ,hannibal1 ,gustavus ,adolphus1 ,turenne1 ,eugene1 ,frederic1 ,washington1 ,napoleon1 ,von ,moltke4 ,comprehension of this system can be attained1 only by innate capability brought to perfection by intelligent study of the words and achievements of these great ,captains4 ,for life is so short and our memories in general so defective1 that we ought to seek instruction only from the purest sources4 ,none but men endowed by ,nature with the military mind and trained in the school of the great ,captains1 are able to write intelligently on the acts and motives of generals of the first order4 ,all the writings of mere literati relative to these uncommon men1 no matter how excellent such authors may be1 never can rise to anything more than elegant phraseology4 ,it is of enlightened critics1 such as the former1 that the youthful student always is first in need4 ,such will guide him along a road1 in which he who has no conductor may easily lose himself4 ,they will correct his blunders considerately1 recollecting that should these be ridiculed or treated with severity1 talent might be stifled which might hereafter bloom to perfection4 ,it is a difficult matter to form the average student1 and to impart to him that degree of intelligent audacity and confident prudence which is requisite for the proper practice of the ,art of ,strategetics4 ,to secure proficiency1 the student from the beginning must cheerfully submit himself to a mental discipline1 which properly may be termed severe2 in order to make his faculties obedient to his will4 ,secondly1 he must regularly exercise these faculties1 in order to make them active and to acquire the habit of implicitly conforming to the laws of the ,art2 to make himself familiar with its processes1 and to establish in his mind that confidence in its practice which can come only through experience4 ,the student daily should exercise his mind in the routine of deployments1 developments1 evolutions1 manoeuvres1 and operations1 both on the offensive and on the defensive4 ,these exercises should be imprinted on the memory by closely reviewing the lesson of the previous day4 ,even with all this severe and constant effort1 time is necessary for practical tactics to become habitual2 for the student must become so familiar with these movements and formations that he can execute them instantly and with precision4 ,to acquire this degree of perfection1 much study is necessary2 it is a mistake to think otherwise4 ,but this study is its own sufficient reward1 for the student soon will find that it has extended his ideas1 and that he is beginning to think in the ,,great4 ,at the same time the student should thoroughly instruct himself in military history1 topography1 logic1 mathematics1 and the science of fortification4 ,with all of these the strategist must be familiar4 ,but his chief aim must be to perfect his judgment and to bring it to the highest degree of broadness and exactness4 ,this is best done by contemplation of the works of the ,great ,masters4 ,the past history of ,chess-play1 is the true school for those who aspire to precedence in the ,royal ,game4 ,it is their first duty to inform themselves of the processes of the great in every age1 in order to shun their errors and to avail of their methods4 ,it is essential to grasp that system of play common to the ,masters2 to pursue it step by step4 ,particularly is it necessary to learn that he who can best deduce consequences in situations whose outcome is in doubt1 is the competitor who will carry off the prize from others who act less rationally than himself4 ,especially1 should the student be wary in regard to what is termed chess analysis1 as applied to the so-called 8openings0 and to the mid-game4 ,most chess analysts are compilers of falsities occasionally interspersed with truth4 ,among the prodigious number of variations which they pretend to establish or refute1 none may be implicitly relied on in actual play2 few are of value except for merely elementary purposes1 and many are fallacies fatal to the user4 ,the reason for this is3 whenever men invited by curiosity1 seek to examine circumstantially even the less intricate situations on the ,chess-board1 they at once become lost in a labyrinth abounding in obscurities and contradictions4 ,those1 who ignorant of the synthetic method of calculation1 are compelled to depend upon their analytic powers1 quickly find that these1 on account of the number of unknown quantities1 are utterly inadequate4 ,any attempt to calculate the true move in ,chess-play by analysis1 other than in situations devoid of unknown quantities1 is futile4 ,yet it is of such folly that the mediocre mind is most enamoured4 ,content with seeing much1 it is oblivious to what it cannot see2 and the analytical system consists merely in claiming that there is nothing to see1 other than what it does see4 ,this is that slender reed upon which the so-called 8chess-analyst0 hangs his claims1 oblivious to the basic truth that in analysis1 unless all is known1 nothing is known4 ,many delude themselves to the contrary and strive to arrive at correct conclusions without first having arranged clearly before their minds all the facts4 ,hence1 their opinions and judgments1 being founded in ignorance of all the facts1 are to that extent defective2 and their conclusions necessarily wrong4 ,through action taken upon incomplete knowledge1 men are beguiled into error2 and it is to such unreason that most human catastrophes are to be attributed4 99 99 99 99 99 ,most of those who attempt to write on ,strategetics1 and whether applied to ,chess-play or to ,warfare1 very quickly are compelled to seek refuge in vague phrases2 in order to conceal their uncertain grasp on the subject discussed4 ,the uninformed believe in them1 because of their reputation1 and are satisfied that the thing is so1 without understanding ,,why4 ,words intended to convey instruction1 should not be used except in their proper meaning4 ,each word should be defined for the student and its use regulated4 ,the true use of words being established1 there is no longer danger from a play upon them2 or1 from different and confused ideas annexed to them1 either by the persons who read1 or who employ them4 ,by means of this warning1 the student easily may detect the empty mouthings of enthusiastic inexperience1 and equally so1 the casuistries of the subtle expert2 who often uses language merely to conceal from youthful talent1 knowledge which if imparted1 might be fatal to his domination4 ,as the student progresses toward proficiency1 he1 sooner or later1 will come to realize1 that of all disgusting things1 to a mind which revolts at nonsense1 reasoning ill is the worst4 ,it is distressing1 to be afflicted with the absurdities of men1 who1 victims of the fancy1 confound enthusiasm with capability and mistake mania for talent4 ,the world is full of such people1 who1 in all honesty thinking themselves philosophers1 are only visionaries enamoured of their own lunatic illusions4 ,the true discipline for the student who aspires to proficiency at ,chess-play1 is1 in every succeeding game1 to imitate more closely the play of the ,great ,masters2 and to endeavor to take his measures with more attention and judgment than in any preceding4 ,every player at ,chess has defects2 many have very great ones4 ,in searching for these one should not treat himself tenderly1 and when examining his faults1 he should grant himself no quarter4 ,particularly should the student cultivate confidence in and rigidly adhere to the standard of skill1 as interpreted by that immutable ,system of ,chess-play1 of which ,morphy is the unapproachable and all-sufficient exponent4 ,observing the lack of method displayed by the incompetent ,chess-commander1 the student of this system will remark with astonishment1 the want of plan and the entire absence of co-operation between the various ,chessic corps d'armee1 which under such leadership are incapable of a general effort4 ,how dense is such a leader in the selection of a project1 how slow and slovenly in its execution2 how many opportunities does he suffer to escape him and how many enormous faults does he not commit8 ,to such things1 the numerically weaker but more skillful opponent1 often is indebted for safety and ultimately for success4 ,one who is opposed by such blockheads1 necessarily must gain advantages continually2 for conduct so opposite to all the laws of the ,art1 is1 in itself1 sufficient to incur ruin4 ,it is for such negligence on his own part that one often has cause bitterly to reproach himself4 ,but such errors1 especially on the part of great players1 are exemplary lessons for the student1 who from them may learn to be more prudent1 circumspect1 and wise4 99 99 99 99 99 ,those who make a mere pastime of ,chess1 who have no desire for the true benefit of the game1 do not deserve information4 ,such people are more numerous than may be supposed4 ,they have few coherent ideas and are usually influenced by mere chatter and by writers whose sole excuse is enthusiasm4 ,these players at the game cannot benefit by example4 ,the follies of others afford them no useful lesson4 ,each generation of such 8wood-shifters10 has blindly followed in the footsteps of those preceding and daily is guilty of errors which times innumerable have been fully exposed4 ,it is the darling habit of such folk to treat the great things in ,chess with levity and to dignify those insignificant matters which appertain to the game when used as a plaything4 ,such people are merely enthusiastic2 usually they are equally frivolous4 ,they do everything from fancy1 nothing from design4 ,their zeal is strong1 but they can neither regulate nor control it4 ,such bear about their ,chessic disabilities in their character4 ,inflated in good fortune1 groveling in adversity1 these players never attain to that sage contemplation1 which renders the scientific practice of ,chess so indescribably beautiful4 ,there is another class of ,chess-players who from mere levity of mind are incapable of steadily pursuing any fixed plan2 but who overturn1 move by move1 even such advantages as their good fortune may have procured4 ,there are others1 who1 although possessed of great vivacity of mind and eager for information1 yet lack that patience necessary to receive instruction4 ,lastly1 there are not a few whose way of thinking and the validity of whose calculations1 depend upon their good or ill digestion4 ,it is in vain that such people endeavor to divine things beyond their understanding4 ,hence it is1 that among those incapable of thought1 or too indolent for mental effort1 the game proceeds in easy fashion until routine is over4 ,afterward1 at each move1 the most probable conjecture passes for the best reason and victory ultimately rests with him whose blunders are least immediately consequential4 99 99 99 99 99 ,understanding of high art is dispensed only to the few2 the great mass neither can comprehend nor enjoy it4 ,in spite of the good natured ,helvetius1 all are not wise who wish to be so and men ever will remain what ,nature made them4 ,it is impossible for the stream to rise higher than its source4 8,the progress of human reason10 writes the great ,frederic1 8is more slow than is imagined2 the true cause of which is that most men are satisfied with vague notions of things and but few take time for examination and deep inquiry4 8,some1 fettered by prejudice from their infancy1 wish not1 or are unable to break their chains2 others1 delighting in frivolity know not a word of mathematics and enjoy life without allowing their pleasures to be interrupted by a moment of reflection4 ,should one thinking man in a thousand be discovered it will be much2 and it is for him that men of talent write4 8,the rest naturally are offended1 for nothing so enrages the mediocre mind as to be compelled to admit to itself its own inferiority4 ,consequently1 they consign book1 author1 and reader conjointly to ,satan4 ,so much easier is it to condemn than to refute1 or to learn40 99 99 99 99 99 ,the early success of many young students does not permit them to observe that they often have departed from the rules of the ,art4 ,as they have escaped punishment for their errors1 they remain unacquainted with the dangers to which they were exposed4 ,constant good fortune finally makes them over-confident and they do not suspect it necessary to change their measures1 even when in the presence of an able foe4 ,thus1 the youthful tyro1 inconsiderate1 inconsistent1 and turbulent1 and oblivious to the innumerable dangers by which he is surrounded1 plays his pieces hither and thither1 as fancy and inclination dictate1 culling bouquets of the most gorgeous flowers of the imagination2 thoughtless of the future and perfectly happy because he cannot reflect4 ,to reason exactly1 the student first must rid his mind of all preconceived notions2 he must regard the matter under consideration as a blank sheet of paper1 upon which nothing is to be written save those things which by the processes of logic and demonstration1 are established as facts4 ,there is much difference between the ,art of ,logic and mere conjecture4 ,the calculations of arithmeticians1 though rigorous and exact1 are never difficult2 because they relate to known quantities and to the palpable objects of nature4 ,but when it is required to argue from combining circumstances1 the least ignorance of uncertain and obscure facts breaks the chain and we are deceived every moment4 ,this is no defect of the understanding1 but error arising from plausible ideas1 which wear the face of and are too quickly accepted for truth4 ,a long chapter can be written on the different ways in which men lose themselves in their conjectures4 ,innumerable examples of this are not wanting1 and all because they have suffered themselves to be hurried away and thus to be precipitate in drawing their conclusions4 ,the part that the ,general1 whether in ,chess-play or in ,warfare1 has to act1 always is more difficult because he must not permit himself the least mistake1 but is bound to behave with prudence and sagacity throughout a long series of intricate processes4 ,a single false deduction1 or a movement of the enemy unintelligible to a commander1 may lead him to commit an irremediable error2 and in cases wherein the situation is beyond comprehension1 his ignorance is invincible4 ,for however extensive the human mind may be1 it never is sufficiently so to penetrate those minute combinations necessary to be developed in order to foresee and regulate events1 the sequence1 utility and even existence of which1 depend upon future contingencies4 ,incidents which are past1 can be explained clearly1 because the reasons therefor are manifest4 ,but men easily deceive themselves concerning the future1 which1 by a veil of innumerable and impenetrable secondary causes1 is concealed from the most prying inspection4 ,in such situations1 how puerile are the projects even of the greatest ,strategist4 ,to him1 as much as to the tyro1 is the future hidden2 he knows not what shall happen1 even on the next move4 ,how then may he foresee those situations which secondary causes later may produce8 ,circumstances most often oblige him to act contrary to his wishes2 and in the flux and reflux of fortune1 it is the part of prudence to conform to system and to act with consistency4 ,it is impossible to foresee all events4 99 99 99 99 99 8,it is not possible10 writes the ,count de ,saxe1 8to establish a system without first being acquainted with the principles that must necessarily support it40 ,in corroboration of this is the opinion of ,frederic the ,great3 8,condemned by my unfortunate stars to philosophies on contingencies and on probabilities ,i employ my whole attention to examine the principle on which my argument must rest and to procure all possible information on that point4 ,deprived of such precaution1 the edifice ,i erect1 wanting a base1 would fall like a house of cards40 ,everyone who does not proceed on principle1 is inconsistent in his conduct4 ,equally so1 whenever the principle on which one acts is false1 i4e41 does not apply to the existing situation2 all deductions based thereon1 if applied to the existing situation1 necessarily are false4 8,those principles which the ,art of ,warfare prescribes1 never should be departed from10 writes ,frederic the ,great1 8and generals rigidly should adhere to those circumspections and never swerve from implicit obedience to laws1 upon whose exact observance depends the safety of their armies and the success of their projects40 ,thus the student will clearly see that all other calculations1 though never so ingeniously imagined1 are of small worth in comparison with comprehension of the use of ,strategetic principles4 ,by means of these latter1 we are taught to control the raging forces which dominate in the competitive arts and to compel obedience from friend and foe alike4 8,to the shame of humanity it must be confessed10 writes ,frederic the ,great1 8that what often passes for authority and consequence is mere assumption1 used as a cloak to conceal from the layman the extreme of official indolence and stupidity4 8,to follow the routine of service1 to be busied concerning food and clothing1 and to eat when others eat1 to fight when others fight1 are the whole warlike deeds of the majority and constitute what is called having seen service and grown grey in arms4 8,the reason why so many officers remain in a state of mediocrity1 is because they neither know1 nor trouble themselves to inquire into the causes either of their victories or defeats1 although such causes are exceedingly real40 ,in this connection1 writes ,polybius1 the friend and biographer of ,hannibal3 8,having made ourselves masters of the subject of ,warfare1 we shall no longer ascribe success to ,fortune and blindly applaud mere conquerors1 as the ignorant do2 but we shall approve and condemn from ,principle and ,reason40 ,to the ,chess-student nothing can be more conclusive than the following3 8,my success at ,chess-play10 writes ,paul ,morphy1 8is due to rigid adherence to fixed rules and ,principles40 99 99 99 99 99 8,chess is best fought on ,principles1 free from all deception and trickery40--,wilhelm ,steinitz4 ,,grand ,,reconnaissance 8,man can sway the future1 only by foreseeing through a clear understanding of the present1 to what far off end matters are tending40--,caesar4 99 99 99 99 99 8,from the erroneous ideas they form in regard to good and evil1 the ignorant1 the mis-educated and the inexperienced always act without precisely knowing what they ought to desire1 or what they ought to fear2 and it is not in the end they propose1 but in the choice of means1 that most deceive themselves40--,aristotle4 ,,grand ,,reconnaissance 8,in every situation the principal strategical requirements must clearly be defined and all other things must be subordinated to these considerations40--,frederic the ,great4 99 99 99 99 99 8,one should seek to obtain a knowledge of causes1 rather than of effects2 and should endeavor to reason from the known1 to the unknown40--,euclid4 ,the province of ,grand ,reconnaissance is exactly to determine the relative advantages and disadvantages in time1 numbers1 organization1 topography1 mobility and position1 which appertain to hostile armies contained in the same strategetic plane2 and to designate those ,corps d'armee by which such advantages are materially expressed4 ,those processes which appertain to the making of ,grand ,reconnaissance1 necessarily are argumentative2 inasmuch as all the facts never are determinate4 ,consequently1 talent of the highest order is required for the deducing of conclusions which never can be based upon exact knowledge1 and which always must contemplate the presence of numerous unknown quantities4 ,the responsibilities inherent to ,grand ,reconnaissance never are to be delegated to1 nor thrust upon subordinates4 ,scouts1 spies1 and informers of every kind1 have their manifold and proper uses1 but such uses never rise above furnishing necessary information in regard to topographical1 tactical1 and logistic details4 ,the ,commander-in-chief alone is presumed to possess knowledge and skill requisite to discern what strategetically is fact and what is not fact2 and to ascribe to each fact its proper place and sequence4 ,lack of military talent and of ,strategetic knowledge1 never is more strikingly shown than by negligence or inability in this regard4 ,incompetents1 ignorant of this truth1 and oblivious to its importance1 devolve such vital responsibility upon subordinates2 and later1 these legalized murderers palliate the slaughter of their troops and the national shame by publicly reprimanding men serving at shillings per month1 for failing in a service1 which were the latter able to perform1 would entitle them to the gold epaulets and general's pay1 of which their commander is the unfit recipient4 99 99 99 99 99 ,knowledge of the number1 organization1 position and movements of the enemy's troops is the basic element for correct calculation in campaign and battle4 ,such things to be accurately estimated must be closely inspected4 ,all speculation and all conjecture in regard to these matters is but frivolity4 ,it is by being precipitate and hasty in making such conclusions1 that men are deceived1 for to judge rightly of things before they become clearly shown is most difficult4 ,to act on uncertainty is ,,wrong4 ,we do not know all the facts and a single iota of light later on may oblige us to condemn that which we previously have approved4 99 99 99 99 99 ,in the making of ,grand ,reconnaissance1 one always must be wary of placing too much confidence in appearances and in first impressions4 ,especially must care be taken not to magnify the weaknesses of the hostile army1 nor the efficacy of the kindred position4 ,also1 one never should underrate3 #a4 ,the talents of the opposing commander2 nor #b4 ,the advantages possessed by the opposing army3 7a7 ,in numbers1 7b7 ,in organization1 7c7 ,in position1 7d7 ,in topography1 7e7 ,in time1 7f7 ,in mobility4 ,it is a first essential1 constantly to note the movements of the enemy1 in order to detect his plans and the exact location of his corps4 ,these things are the only reliable guides for determining the true course of procedure4 ,it must be left to the enemy to show by his movements and the posts which he occupies1 the measures he projects for the future1 and until these are known1 it is not proper to ,,act4 ,hence3 ,,principle ,all movements of ,corps ,offensive should be governed by the ,,position of the hostile army1 and all movements of ,corps ,defensive should be governed by the ,,movements of the hostile army4 ,as soon as the enemy begins a movement1 his intentions become clear4 ,it is then possible to make precise calculations4 ,but be not hasty to build conclusions upon uncertain information and do not take any resolutions until certain what are the numbers1 the position1 the objectives1 and the projects of the enemy4 ,however interesting an undertaking may appear1 one should not be seduced by it while ill-informed of the obstacles to be met and the possibility of not having sufficient force in the theatre of action4 ,chimerical schemes should be abandoned at their inception4 ,reason1 instead of extravagancies of the fancy1 always must be the guide4 ,men1 most courageous1 often undertake fearful difficulties1 but impracticable things they leave to lunatics4 ,in all situations1 one must beware of venturing beyond his depth4 ,it is wiser to keep within the limits which the knowledge we possess shall prescribe4 ,especially in crises1 one must proceed most cautiously until sure information is acquired2 for over-haste is exceedingly dangerous1 when exact knowledge is lacking of the enemy's numbers1 position1 and movements4 ,,principle ,situations always should be contemplated as they ,,exist1 never as they ,,ought to be1 or1 perhaps1 ,,may be4 ,in every important juncture1 each step must be profoundly considered2 as little as possible should be left to chance4 ,particularly1 must one never be inflated and rendered careless and negligent by success2 nor made spiritless and fearful by reverses4 ,at all times the ,general should see things only as they are and attempt what is dictated by that ,strategetic ,principle which dominates the given situation4 ,fortune often does the rest4 99 99 99 99 99 8,napoleon bending over and sometimes lying at full length upon his map1 with a pair of dividers opened to a distance on the scale of from #ag to #bj miles1 equal to #bb to #be miles over country1 and marking the positions of his own and of the hostile armies by sticking into the map pins surmounted by little balls made of diverse colored sealing wax2 in the twinkling of an eye calculated those wonderful concentrations of his ,corps d'armee upon decisive points and dictated those instructions to his ,marshals which in themselves are a title to glory40--,baron de ,jomini4 ,,military ,,examples 8,phillip1 ,king of ,macedonia1 is the single confidant of his own secrets1 the sole dispenser of his treasure1 the most able general of all ,greece1 the bravest soldier in his army4 ,he foresees and executes everything himself2 anticipates events1 derives all possible advantages from them and yields to them when to yield is necessary4 ,his troops are extremely well disciplined1 he exercises them incessantly4 ,always himself at their head1 they perform with arms and baggage marches of three hundred stadia with alarming expedition and making no difference between summer or winter1 between fatigue and rest4 ,he takes no step without mature reflection1 nor proceeds to a second until he is assured of the success of the first and his operations are always dominated by considerations of time and place40--,apollodorus4 ,the facility with which one familiar with the ,strategetic ,art may make ,grand ,reconnaissance1 even of an invisible theatre of action1 and may evolve accurate deductions from a mass of inexact and contradictory reports is illustrated by the following practical examples1 viz43 ,,first ,,example4 7,from the ,new ,york ,journal1 ,dec4 #bf1 #ahii ,by ,franklin ,k4 ,young47 8,the position of the ,british armies is deplorable4 8,with the single exception of ,gen4 ,buller's force1 the situation of these bodies of ,british troops1 thus unfortunately circumstanced1 is cause for the greatest anxiety4 8,strong indications point to a grand offensive movement on the part of the ,boers1 with the object of terminating the war in one campaign and by a single blow4 8,true1 this movement may be but a feint1 but if it be a true movement1 it is difficult to over-estimate the gravity of the situation of the ,british in ,south ,africa4 8,for if this movement is a true military movement1 it shows as clearly as the sun in the sky to those who know the ,strategetic ,art1 that the ,boer armies are in transition from the defensive to an offensive plan of campaign1 with the purpose of capturing ,de,arr and from thence advancing in force against the chief ,british depot1 ,capetown40 99 99 99 99 99 ,the ,united ,states ,war ,department1 ,report on the ,british-,boer ,war1 published ,june #ad1 #aija1 contains the following3 7,by ,capt4 ,s4 ,l',h4 ,slocum1 ,december #be1 #ahii4 ,u4 ,s4 ,military ,attache with the ,british ,army47 8,i consider the present situation to be the most critical for the ,english forces1 since hostilities began4 ,should the ,boers assume offensive operations1 the ,english armies with their long and thinly guarded lines of communication1 would be placed in great jeopardy40 99 99 99 99 99 7,by ,chas4 ,s4 ,goldmann1 war correspondent with ,gen4 ,buller and ,lord ,roberts in the ,south ,african ,campaign4 ,mac,millan ,co41 #aijb47 8,had the defence 7of ,cape ,colony7 been entrusted to less capable hands than those of ,gen4 ,french1 who1 with a mere handful of troops succeeded not only in checking the ,boer advance1 but in driving them back on ,colesberg1 it is not unreasonable to suppose that the enemy would have been able to push on south and west to ,craddock and ,hex ,river range and thus bring about a state of affairs which might have shaken ,british rule in ,south ,africa to its foundation40 ,,second ,,example4 7,boston ,globe1 ,jan4 #ab1 #aijj4 ,by ,franklin ,k4 ,young47 8,lord ,roberts' first object will be the rescue of ,lord ,methuen's army now blockaded near ,magersfontein by ,gen4 ,conje4 8,as the first step to effect this1 the ,british commander-in-chief at once and with all his force1 will occupy the line from ,naauwpoort to ,de ,arr4 ,there1 he will await the arrival of twenty-two transports now en route from ,england4 8,with these reinforcements1 he will advance directly to the ,modder ,river by the route previously taken by ,lord ,methuen40 99 99 99 99 99 7,by ,chas4 ,s4 ,goldmann1 ,sp4 ,cor4 ,british ,army47 8,slow to recognize their opportunities1 the enemy were still in the midst of preparation1 when ,gen4 ,french reached ,de ,arr4 ,meanwhile a detachment under ,major ,mc,cracken occupied ,naauwpoort1 to which place thirty days' supplies for #cjjj men and #aajj animals had been ordered4 8,in the ten weeks of fighting which ensued1 prior to the arrival of the ,british main army1 ,gen4 ,french by his skillful tactics held a powerful force of ,boers at bay1 checked their descent into the southern part of the colony1 defeated their attempt to display the ,vierkleur across the cape peninsular1 and materially influenced1 if not absolutely determined1 the entire future of the campaign40 99 99 99 99 99 7,by ,chas4 ,s4 ,goldmann1 ,sp4 ,cor4 with ,british ,army47 8,arriving at ,capetown on ,jan4 #aj1 ,lord ,roberts decided that the line of march should lead by way of ,bloemfontein to ,pretoria1 initiating the operation by the concentration of large forces on the ,modder ,river1 forming there an advanced base40 ,,third ,,example4 7,boston ,globe1 ,jan4 #ba1 #aijj4 ,by ,franklin ,k4 ,young47 8,it is plain that when the ,boers took position at ,colenso they prepared their plan for the protection of their flanks2 to deny this would be to assume that men who had displayed superb military sagacity were ignorant of the simplest processes of warfare4 8,what that plan is will be unfolded very rapidly should ,gen4 ,buller attempt to pierce the line of ,boer vedettes posted upon the ,spion ,kop and concealing as near as can be determined from the present meagre facts1 either the ,second1 or the ,fourth ,ambuscade4 8,in either case it signifies that the ,boers are confident of annihilating ,gen4 ,buller's army if it should cross the ,tugela4 8,about this time the ,boers are watching ,gen4 ,warren and his command and watching him intently4 ,something may happen to him40 99 99 99 99 99 7,london ,times1 ,jan4 #bb1 #aijj47 8,on ,friday1 ,jan4 #ai1 ,gen4 ,warren began a long1 circuitous march to the westward for the purpose of turning the right of the ,boer position4 8,this attempt was abandoned on account of the long ridge running from ,spion ,kop being occupied by the ,boers in such strength as to command the entire route4 8,saturday1 ,jan4 #bj1 ,gen4 ,warren1 having crossed the ,tugela ,river with the bulk of his troops1 ordered a frontal attack4 ,our men behaved splendidly under a heavy cross-fire for seven hours4 ,our casualties were slight4 ,three lines of rifle fire#a were visible along the ,boer main position40 #a ,the ,second ,ambuscade4 ,vide 8,secret ,instructions0 of ,frederic the ,great4 99 99 99 99 99 7,british ,war ,office ,bulletin1 ,jan4 #bb1 #aijj47 8,gen4 ,warren has been engaged all day chiefly on his left1 which he has swung forward a couple of miles40 7,signed7 ,buller4 99 99 99 99 99 7,british ,war ,office ,bulletin1 ,jan4 #bd1 #aijj47 8,gen4 ,warren holds the position he gained two days ago4 ,the ,boer position is on higher ground than ours and can be approached only over bare and open slopes4 ,an attempt will be made tonight to seize ,spion ,kop40 7,signed7 ,buller4 99 99 99 99 99 7,british ,war ,office ,bulletin1 ,jan4 #be1 #aijj47 8,gen4 ,warren's troops last night occupied ,spion ,kop1 surprising the small#b garrison which fled40 7,signed7 ,buller4 #b ,merely the outposts and vedettes of the ,second ,ambuscade4 99 99 99 99 99 7,british ,war ,office ,bulletin1 ,jan4 #bf1 #aijj47 8,gen4 ,warren's garrison1 ,i am sorry to say1 ,i find this morning had in the night abandoned ,spion ,kop40 7,signed7 ,buller4 99 99 99 99 99 7,british ,war ,office ,bulletin1 ,jan4 #bh1 #aijj47 8,i decided that a second attack on ,spion ,kop was useless#c and that the enemy's right was too strong to allow me to force it4 ,accordingly ,i decided to withdraw the troops to the south side of the ,tugela ,river40 7,signed7 ,buller4 #c ,the proffer of an untenable post always is the bait of the ,second ,ambuscade4 99 99 99 99 99 7,london ,daily ,mail1 ,jan4 #bi1 #aijj47 8,the richest and what was hitherto considered the most powerful nation in the world is today in the humiliating position of seeing its armies beaten back with heavy losses by two small states40 ,,fourth ,,example4 7,boston ,globe1 ,feb4 #af1 #aijj1 by ,franklin ,k4 ,young47 8,lord ,roberts' communications for nearly two hundred miles are exposed to the attack of an enemy1 who at any moment is liable to capture and destroy his supply and ammunition trains and to reduce the ,british army to a condition wherein it will be obliged to fight a battle under most disadvantageous circumstances40 99 99 99 99 99 7,from ,united ,states ,war ,department ,report on the ,british ,boer ,war4 ,by ,capt4 ,s4 ,l',h4 ,slocum1 ,u4 ,s4 ,attache with ,british ,army47 8,feb4 #ae1 #aijj4 ,the main supply park of the army was attacked by the enemy near ,watervale ,drift4 8,this park consisted of one hundred ox-wagons containing rations and one hundred more wagons filled with ammunition4 ,one hundred and fifty of these wagons and three thousand oxen were captured by the ,boers4 8,the loss of these rations and munitions was a most serious blow4 ,lord ,roberts was here confronted by a crisis which would have staggered and been the undoing of many commanders-in-chief placed as he was4 8,he was in the enemy's country1 cut off from his base of supplies on the railroad and with an unknown number of the enemy in his rear and upon his line of communication4 ,his transport was nearly all captured and his army was suddenly reduced to three days full rations on the eve of a great movement and the country afforded no food whatever4 ,the crisis still further developed when a courier brought the report that the ,boers were in position at ,watervale ,drift and commanding the ford with artillery40 ,,fifth ,,example4 7,boston ,globe1 ,feb4 #be1 #aijj4 ,by ,franklin ,k4 ,young47 8,there is reason to believe that should worse come to worse1 the ,boer ,army1 should it be compelled to abandon its position1 will be able to save its personnel by a rapid flight across the ,modder4 ,of course1 in this case1 the ,boers would lose their supplies and cannon40 99 99 99 99 99 7,from ,united ,states ,war ,department1 ,report on the ,british ,boer ,war4 ,by ,capt4 ,s4 ,l',h4 ,slocum1 ,u4 ,s4 ,attache1 with ,british ,army47 8,the enemy1 under ,cronje1 with all his transport was in all practical effect surrounded1 although by abandoning his wagons and supplies1 a large number of the ,boers undoubtedly could have escaped40 99 99 99 99 99 7,boston ,sunday ,times1 ,march1 #aijj4 ,by ,franklin ,k4 ,young47 8,cronje's conduct was heroic and imbecile in the extreme4 ,as the commander on the ground he is entitled to all the glory and must assume all the blame4 ,one of the ablest of the ,boer generals1 he is the only one in the whole war to make a mistake4 8,cronje's first duty was to decide whether he should stand or run2 he decided to run1 which was proper1 but having so decided he should have run at once and not have stopped running until safe on the north bank of the ,vaal ,river4 8,properly he sent his siege guns and trains off to the north across the ,vaal and improperly held his position in force on the ,british front1 instead of withdrawing his personnel after his material4 8,this blunder1 like all blunders of a commander-in-chief1 quickly produced blunders by his subordinates4 ,commander ,ferrera permitted ,french to get around ,cronje's left flank without a battle4 ,the presence of this force on his rear cut ,cronje off from his natural line of retreat across the ,vaal and compelled him to flee toward ,bloemfontein4 8,even now ,cronje was all right2 he easily and brilliantly out-manoeuvred the ,british and gained the protection of the ,modder ,river4 ,but a second time he blundered4 ,instead of first executing ,ferrera and then abandoning everything and devoting all his efforts to saving his men1 he neglected an obvious and imperative military duty and clung to his slow-moving cannon and wagons4 8,finally he took position on the ,modder and resolved to fight the whole ,british army4 ,this was fatal4 8,then for the fourth time he blundered4 ,having made his decision to fight he should not have surrendered to the ,british on the anniversary of ,majuba ,hill4 ,on the contrary1 surrounded by the mightiest army the ,british empire ever put in the field and enveloped in the smoke of a hundred cannon1 ,cronje1 upon a rampart formed by his dead army and with his last cartridge withstanding the destroyers of his country1 would have presented to posterity a more spectacular and seemingly a more fitting termination of the career of the ,lion of ,south ,africa40 99 99 99 99 99 8,mere hope of attaining their desires1 coupled with ignorance of the processes necessary to their accomplishment1 is the common delusion and the certain destruction of the inexperienced40--,plato4 ,,organization 8,to employ in warfare an uninstructed people is to destroy the nation40--,chinese ,saying4 99 99 99 99 99 ,antiochus1 ,king of ,syria1 reviewing his immense but untrained and undisciplined army at ,ephesus1 asked of ,hannibal1 8if they were not enough for the ,romans40 8,yes10 replied the great ,carthagenian1 8enough to glut the bloodthirstiness1 even of the ,romans40 99 99 99 99 99 8,a man in the vigor of life and capable of sustaining the heaviest fatigues1 but untrained in warfare1 is fitted not to bear arms1 but to bear baggage40--,timoleon4 ,,organization 8,the chief distinction between an army and a mob is the good order and discipline of the former and the disorderly behavior of the latter40--,washington4 99 99 99 99 99 8,it is the duty of the commander-in-chief frequently to assemble the most prudent and experienced of his generals and to consult with them as to the state of his own and of the enemies' troops4 8,he must examine which army has the better weapons1 which is the better trained and disciplined2 superior in condition and most resolute in emergencies4 8,he must note whether himself or the adversary has the superior infantry1 cavalry or artillery1 and particularly must he discern any marked lack in quantity and quality of men or horses1 and any difference in equipment of those corps which necessarily will be or because of such reason1 advantageously may be opposed to each other4 8,advantages in ,organization determine the field of battle to be preferred1 which latter should be selected with the view of profiting to the uttermost by the use of specially equipped corps1 to whom the enemy is not able to oppose similar troops4 8,if a general finds himself superior to his enemy he must use all means to bring on an engagement1 but if he sees himself inferior1 he must avoid battle and endeavor to succeed by surprises1 stratagems and ambuscades2 which last skillfully managed often have gained the victory over foemen superior in numbers and in strength40--,vergetius4 ,advantage in ,organization consists in having one or more ,corps d'armee which in equipment or in composition are so superior to the hostile corps to which they may become opposed1 as entails to them exceptional facilities for the execution of those major tactical evolutions that appertain to any tactical area made up of corresponding geometric or sub-geometric symbols4 ,,principle ,advantage in ,organization determines the choice of a prospective battlefield2 and the latter always should be composed of those tactical areas which permit of the fullest exercise of the powers peculiar to kindred corps d'armee4 ,every corps d'armee thus especially equipped should be constantly and energetically employed in the prospective battle2 and usually it will eventuate as the ,prime ,tactical ,factor in the decisive ,major ,tactical evolution4 99 99 99 99 99 ,notions most mistaken prevail in regard to the ,pawns and ,pieces of the ,chessboard4 ,to suppose that the ,chessmen per se may be utilized to typify the different arms of the military service is a fallacy4 ,many unfamiliar with the technicalities of ,strategetic ,science delude themselves that the ,pawns1 on account of their slow and limited movements properly are to be regarded as ,infantry2 that the ,knights because topped by horses' heads thereby qualify as light ,cavalry2 the ,bishops1 for reasons unknown1 often are held to represent ,artillery2 the ,rooks1 because of their swift1 direct and far-reaching movements are thought to duplicate heavy ,cavalry2 while the ,queen1 in most of these unsophisticated philosophies1 is supposed to constitute a ,reserve4 ,nothing can be further from the truth than such assumptions4 ,as a fundamental of military organization applied to ,chessplay1 each ,chesspiece typifies in itself a complete ,corps d'armee4 ,each of these ,chessic corps d'armee is equal to every other in strength1 but all differ1 more or less1 in construction and in facilities1 essential to the performance of diverse and particular duties4 ,thus it is that while every ,chesspiece represents a perfectly appointed and equally powerful body of troops1 these corps d'armee in ,chessplay as in scientific warfare are not duplicates1 except to others of their own class4 ,each of these corps d'armee is made up of ,infantry1 ,cavalry and ,artillery in correct proportion to the service they are to perform and such proportions are determined not by simple arithmetic1 but by those deployments1 developments1 evolutions1 and manoeuvres1 which such corps d'armee is constructed promptly and efficiently to execute4 ,the ,chessmen1 therefore1 do not as individuals represent either infantry1 cavalry or artillery4 ,but in the same manner as the movements of troops over the surface of the earth1 exemplify the attributes of the three kindred grand columns in the greater logistics of a campaign2 so do those peculiarities which appertain to the moves of the different ,chesspieces exemplify the action of the three chief arms of the military service2 either singly or in combination against given points in given times1 in the evolutions of the battlefield1 viz43 ,,corps ,d',,armee ,,en ,,march4 ,the march of3 7a7 ,infantry1 alone1 or of 7b7 ,cavalry1 alone1 or of 7c7 ,artillery1 alone1 or of 7d7 ,infantry and ,cavalry1 or of 7e7 ,infantry and ,artillery1 or of 7f7 ,cavalry and ,artillery1 or of 7g7 ,infantry1 ,cavalry and ,artillery1 is indicated by the movement of any ,chesspiece from a given point to an unoccupied adjacent point4 ,the march of3 7a7 ,cavalry1 alone1 or of 7b7 ,artillery1 alone1 or of 7c7 ,cavalry and ,artillery1 is indicated by the movement of any ,chesspiece from a given point to an unoccupied point1 not an adjacent point4 ,,corps ,d',,armee ,,en ,,assault4 ,the ,charge of ,infantry is indicated by the movement of any ,chesspiece from a given point to an occupied adjacent point2 posting itself thereon and capturing the adverse piece there located4 ,the ,charge of ,cavalry is indicated by the movement of any ,chesspiece from a given point to an occupied point not an adjacent point2 posting itself thereon and capturing the adverse piece there located4 ,,corps ,d',,armee ,,fire ,,effect4 ,infantry3 ,offensive ,fire ,effect4 ,compelling an adverse piece to withdraw from its post upon an adjacent occupied point4 ,defensive ,fire ,effect4 ,preventing an adverse piece from occupying an adjacent unoccupied point4 ,artillery3 ,offensive ,fire ,effect4 ,compelling an adverse piece to withdraw from its post upon an occupied point not an adjacent point4 ,defensive ,fire ,effect4 ,preventing an adverse piece from occupying an unoccupied point not an adjacent point4 ,,chessic ,,corps ,d',,armee4 ,the ,corps d'armee of the ,chessboard are divided into two classes3 viz43 ,i4 ,corps of ,position4 ,,ii4 ,corps of ,evolution4 ,,corps ,d',,armee ,,of ,,position4 8,the ,pawns are the soul of ,chess2 upon their good or bad arrangement depends the gain or loss of the game40--,philidor4 ,the eight ,pawns1 by reason of their limited movements1 their inability to move backward and the peculiarity of their offensive and defensive powers1 are best adapted of the ,chesspieces to perform those functions which in the ,military ,art appertain to ,corps of ,position4 ,each ,corps of ,position has its particular and designated ,point of ,mobilization and of ,development1 which differ with the various ,strategic ,fronts4 ,upon each ,corps of ,position devolves the duties of maintaining itself as a consistent integer of the established1 or projected kindred ,pawn ,integral2 as a possible kindred ,promotable ,factor and as a ,point of ,impenetrability upon the altitude of an opposing ,pawn4 ,corps of ,position take their individual appelation from their posts in a given formation1 viz43 #a4 ,base ,corps4 #b4 ,pivotal ,corps4 #c4 ,minor ,vertex ,corps4 #d4 ,minor ,corps ,aligned4 #e4 ,major ,vertex ,corps4 #f4 ,major ,corps ,aligned4 #g4 ,corps ,enpotence4 #h4 ,minor ,corps ,enceinte4 #i4 ,major ,corps ,enceinte4 #aj4 ,corps ,echeloned4 #aa4 ,corps ,en ,appui4 #ab4 ,base ,corps ,refused4 #ac4 ,pivotal ,corps ,refused4 #ad4 ,minor ,vertex ,corps ,refused4 #ae4 ,minor ,corps ,aligned ,refused4 #af4 ,major ,vertex ,corps ,refused4 #ag4 ,major ,corps ,aligned ,refused4 #ah4 ,major ,corps ,refused ,enpotence4 #ai4 ,corps en ,major ,crochet4 #bj4 ,corps en ,minor ,crochet4 #ba4 ,corps en ,crochet ,aligned4 #bb4 ,corps ,doubly ,aligned4 #bc4 ,grand ,vertex ,corps4 ,the above formations by ,corps of ,position are described and illustrated in detail in preceding text-books by the author1 entitled3 ,the ,minor ,tactics of ,chess4 ,the ,grand ,tactics of ,chess4 ,the normal use of ,corps of ,position is limited to ,lines of ,mobilization1 of ,development and to the ,simple ,line of ,manoeuvre4 ,,corps ,d',,armee ,,of ,,evolution4 8,every man in ,alexander's army is so well trained and obedient that at a single word of command1 officers and soldiers make any movement and execute any evolution in the art of warfare4 8,only such troops as themselves can check their career and oppose their bravery and expertness40--,caridemus4 ,the eight ,pieces1 by reason of their ability to move in all directions1 the scope of their movements and the peculiar exercises of their offensive and defensive powers1 are best adapted of the ,chesspieces to perform those functions which in the ,military ,art appertain to ,corps of ,evolution4 ,corps of ,evolution acting offensively1 take their individual appelations from the points which constitute their objective in the true ,strategetic ,horizon1 viz43 #a4 ,corps of the ,right4 #b4 ,corps of the ,centre4 #c4 ,corps of the ,left4 ,corps of ,evolution acting defensively1 take their individual appelations from the particular duties they are required to perform1 viz43 #a4 ,supporting ,corps4 #b4 ,covering ,corps4 #c4 ,sustaining ,corps4 #d4 ,corps of ,impenetrability4 #e4 ,corps of ,resistance4 ,the normal use of ,corps of ,evolution is limited to ,lines of ,manoeuvre4 ,when acting on a ,simple ,line of ,manoeuvre1 a ,corps of ,evolution may deploy on the corresponding ,line of ,mobilization2 but it has nothing in common with the ,line of ,development1 which latter appertains exclusively to ,corps of ,position4 ,any corps d'armee1 whether of ,position or of ,evolution may be utilized upon a ,line of ,operations4 ,,the ,,king4 ,regarded as a ,chessic ,corps d'armee1 the ,king marches as infantry1 cavalry and artillery2 but it attacks as infantry exclusively and never as cavalry or artillery4 ,although every situation upon the ,chessboard contemplates the presence of both ,kings1 either1 or neither1 or both1 may1 or may not be present in any given ,strategetic ,horizon4 ,whenever the ,king is present in a given ,strategetic ,horizon the effect of his co-operation is mathematically outlined1 thus3 ,i4 ,at his maximum of efficiency1 the ,king occupies the centre of a circle of one point radius4 ,his offensive power is equally valid against all eight points contained in his circumference1 but his defensive power is valid for the support from a minimum of one point to a maximum of five points4 ,,ii4 ,at his medium of efficiency the ,king occupies the centre of a semi-circle of one point radius4 ,his offensive power is valid against all five points contained in his semi-circumference1 and his defensive power is valid for the support from a minimum of one1 to a maximum of five points4 ,,iii4 ,at his minimum of efficiency1 the ,king occupies the centre of a quadrant of one point radius4 ,both his offensive and his defensive powers are valid against all three points contained in his segment4 ,,the ,,queen4 ,regarded as a ,chessic ,corps d'armee the ,queen marches and attacks as infantry1 cavalry and artillery4 ,either1 neither1 or both ,queens may be present in any given ,strategetic ,horizon2 and whenever present the effect of her co-operation mathematically is outlined1 viz43 ,at her maximum of efficiency the ,queen occupies the common vertex of one or more unequal triangles1 whose aggregate area is from a minimum of #ba to a maximum of #bg points4 ,her offensive power is equally valid against all of these points2 but her defensive power is valid for the support from a minimum of one point to a maximum of five points4 ,,the ,,rook4 ,regarded as a ,chessic ,corps d'armee the ,rook marches and attacks as infantry1 cavalry and artillery4 ,from one to four ,rooks may be present in any given ,strategetic ,horizon2 and whenever present the effect of its co-operation mathematically is outlined1 viz43 ,at her maximum of efficiency1 the ,rook occupies the common angle of four quadrilaterals1 whose aggregate area always is #ad points4 ,the ,offensive ,power of the ,rook is equally valid against all these points1 but his defensive power is valid for the support of only two points4 ,,the ,,bishop4 ,regarded as a ,chessic ,corps d'armee1 the ,bishop marches and attacks as infantry1 cavalry and artillery4 ,from one to four ,bishops may be present in any ,strategetic ,horizon2 and whenever present the effect of its co-operation mathematically is outlined1 viz43 ,at its maximum of efficiency1 the ,bishop occupies the common vertex of four unequal triangles1 having a maximum of #ac and a minimum of #i points4 ,his offensive power is valid against all of these points but his defensive power is valid only for the support of two points4 ,,knight4 ,regarded as a ,chessic ,corps d'armee the ,knight marches and attacks as cavalry and artillery4 ,from one to four ,knights may be present in any given ,strategetic ,horizon2 and whenever present the effect of its co-operation mathematically is outlined1 viz43 ,at its maximum of efficiency1 the ,knight occupies the centre of an octagon of two points radius1 having a minimum of two points and a maximum of eight points area4 ,his offensive power is equally valid against all of these eight points1 but his defensive power is valid for the support of only one point4 ,,the ,,pawn4 ,regarded as a ,chessic ,corps d'armee1 the ,pawn at its normal post marches as infantry and cavalry4 ,should an adverse corps1 however1 take post within the kindred side of the ,chessboard2 that ,pawn upon whose altitude the adverse ,piece appears1 at once loses its equestrian attributes and marches and attacks exclusively as infantry4 ,located at any other point than at its normal post1 the ,pawn is composed exclusively of infantry and never acts either as cavalry or artillery4 ,from one to eight ,pawns may be present in any ,strategetic ,horizon2 and whenever present the effect of its co-operation mathematically is outlined as follows3 ,at its maximum of efficiency the ,pawn occupies the vertex of a triangle of two points4 ,its offensive power is equally valid against both of these points2 but its defensive power is valid for the support of only one point4 ,,potential ,,complements4 ,subjoined is a table of the potential complements of the ,chesspieces4 ,the ,king #f units4 ,the ,queen #bb 0 ,the ,rook #ad 0 ,the ,bishop #h 0 ,the ,knight #e 0 ,the ,pawn #a 0 ,the student clearly should understand that this table does not indicate prowess1 but relates exclusively to normal facilities for bringing force into action4 99 99 99 99 99 ,the relative advantage in ,organization possessed by one army over an opposing army always can be determined by the following1 viz43 ,,rule4 #a4 ,above a line1 set down in order those abbreviations which properly designate the ,white corps d'armee present in a given ,strategetic ,situation2 and below the line1 set down those abbreviations which in like manner designate the ,black corps d'armee1 viz43 ,k,q,r,r,p,p,p,p ---------------- ,k,q,r,b,p,p,p,p,p #b4 ,cancel all like symbols and resolve the unlike symbols remaining1 into their respective ,potential complements1 viz43 ,r #ad --- ------- --- ,b,p #h #a #aj #c4 ,subtract the lesser ,potential total from the greater and the difference will be the relative advantage in ,organization4 #d4 ,to utilize the relative advantage in ,organization select a battlefield in which the ,strategic ,key1 the ,tactical ,keys and the ,points of ,command of the ,true ,strategetic ,horizon are situated upon the perimeters of those geometric and sub-geometric symbols which appertain to the corps d'armee whose superior potentiality is established by ,section #b4 #e4 ,to neutralize the relative disadvantage in ,organization1 occupy the necessary posts upon the battlefield selected in such a manner that the kindred decisive points are situated not upon the perimeters of the geometric and sub-geometric symbols appertaining to the adverse corps d'armee of superior potentiality2 while the adverse decisive points are situated upon the perimeters of the geometric and sub-geometric symbols which appertain to the kindred corps d'armee of inferior potentiality4 ,,military ,,examples 8,men habituated to luxury cannot contend with an army accustomed to fatigue and inured to want40--,caesar4 99 99 99 99 99 8,that wing with which you propose to engage the enemy should be composed of your best troops40--,epaminondas4 ,the ,sacred ,band of the ,thebans was composed of men selected for valor and character4 ,epaminondas called them ,comrades and by honorable rewards and distinctions induced them to bear without murmur the hardest fatigues and to confront with intrepidity the greatest dangers4 ,at ,leuctra 7#cga ,b4,c47 and again at ,mantinea 7#cfb ,b4,c47 the right wing of the ,lacedaemonian ,army1 composed exclusively of ,spartans and for six hundred years invincible1 was overthrown and destroyed by the ,sacred ,band led by ,epaminondas4 ,this formidable body of ,theban warriors was massacred by ,alexander the ,great at the ,battle of ,chaeronea 7#cch ,b4,c47 99 99 99 99 99 ,the ,macedonian ,phalanx was devised by ,philip1 ,king of ,macedon4 ,it was made up of heavy infantry accoutred with cuirass1 helmet1 greaves1 and shield4 ,the principal weapon was a pike twenty-four feet long4 ,the ,phalanx had a front of two hundred and fifty-six files and a depth of sixteen ranks4 ,a file of sixteen men was termed ,lochos2 two files were called ,dilochie2 four files made a ,tetrarchie2 eight files a ,taxiarchie and thirty-two of the last constituted a simple ,phalanx of #djif men4 ,a grand ,phalanx had a front of one thousand and twenty-four files and a depth of sixteen ranks4 ,it was made up of four simple ,phalanxes and contained #af1chd men4 ,with this formation of his infantry1 ,alexander the ,great1 when eighteen years of age1 destroyed the ,allied ,athenian--,theban--,boeotian army at ,chaeronea1 the hosts of ,persia at the river ,grancius 7#ccd ,b4,c47 at ,issus 7#ccc ,b4,c47 and ,arbela 7#cca ,b4,c47 and conquered ,porus1 ,king of ,india at the ,hydaspes 7#cbf ,b4,c474 99 99 99 99 99 ,the ,spanish ,heavy ,cavalry and ,nubian ,infantry of ,hannibal was a reproduction of that ,macedonian organization whereby ,alexander the ,great had conquered the world4 ,with this formation ,hannibal maintained himself for fifteen years in the richest provinces of ,italy and destroyed seven ,roman armies1 at the ,trebia 7#bah ,b4,c47 at ,lake ,trasymenus 7#bag ,b4,c47 at ,cannae 7#baf ,b4,c47 and at ,herdonea 7#bab ,b4,c47 at ,herdonea 7#baj ,b4,c47 at ,locri 7#bjh ,b4,c47 and at ,apulia 7#bjh ,b4,c474 ,at ,zama 7#bjb ,b4,c47 ,hannibal's effacement as a military factor was directly due to his lack of that organization which had been the instrument of his previous successes2 a circumstance thus commented on by the victorious ,roman commander1 ,scipio ,africanus2 8,hitherto ,i have been opposed by an army without a general2 now they send against me a ,general without an army40 99 99 99 99 99 ,the ,tenth ,legion of ,caesar was the quintessence of that perfection in elementary tactics devised by the ,romans to accord with the use of artillery4 ,the fundamentals of minor tactics as elucidated by ,epaminondas and exploited by ,alexander the ,great and ,hannibal are unchanged in the ,legion1 but by subdivision of the simple ,phalanx into ten ,cohorts1 a necessary and maximum gain in mobility was effected4 ,the ,roman ,legion consisted of #fajj infantry and #gbf cavalry1 divided into the ,militarain ,cohort of #aaje heavy foot1 #acb ,cuirassiers and nine ordinary ,cohorts1 each containing #eee heavy foot and #ff ,cuirassiers4 ,the ,legion was drawn up in three lines2 the first of which was termed ,principes1 the second ,hastati1 and the third ,triarii4 ,the infantry were protected by helmet1 cuirass1 greaves and shield2 their arms were a long sword1 a short sword1 five javelins and two large spears4 ,with this formation ,caesar over-run ,spain1 ,gaul1 ,germany1 ,britain1 ,africa1 ,greece1 and ,italy4 ,the ,scots alone withstood him and the ruins of a triple line of ,roman entrenchments extending from the ,north to the ,irish ,seas to this day mark the southern boundary of the ,scottish ,highlands and the northern limit of ,roman dominion4 ,at ,pharseleus1 ,pompey made the inexplicable blunder of placing his best troops in his right wing1 which was covered by the river ,enipeus and inferior troops on his left wing which was in the air4 ,by its first charge1 the ,tenth ,legion destroyed the latter1 outflanked the entire ,pompeian army1 drove it backward into the river and single handed won for ,caesar undisputed dominion of the ,earth4 99 99 99 99 99 ,the ,scots ,volunteers of ,gustavus ,adolphus consisted of two brigades aggregating about #ab1jjj foot1 made up of ,scottish gentlemen who for various reasons were attracted to the ,continental ,wars4 ,at ,leipsic1 7,sept4 #g1 #afca7 #bj1jjj ,saxons1 constituting one-half of the allied ,protestant army1 were routed at the first charge1 put to flight and never seen again4 ,tilly's victorious right wing then turned upon the flank of the ,king's army4 ,three regiments of the ,scots ,volunteers on foot held in check in open field #ab1jjj of the best infantry and cavalry in ,europe1 until ,gustavus had destroyed the ,austrian main body and hastened to their aid with the ,swedish heavy cavalry4 ,the ,castle of ,oppenheim was garrisoned by #hjj ,spanish infantry4 ,gustavus drew up #b1jjj ,swedes to escalade the place4 ,thirty ,scots ,volunteers1 looking on observed that the ,spaniards1 intently watching the ,king had neglected to guard the opposite side of the fortress4 ,beckoning to their aid about a hundred of their comrades1 they scaled the wall1 captured the garrison and opened the gates to the king4 ,gustavus entered on foot1 hat in hand4 8,my brave ,scots10 said he1 8you carry in your scabbards1 the key to every castle in ,europe40 99 99 99 99 99 ,the ,van-,guard of ,frederic the ,great is the perfect adaptation of the minor tactics of ,epaminondas to gunpowder4 ,this choice body was made up of the best troops in the army divided into infantry1 cuirassiers1 dragoons and light artillery4 ,the ,van-,guard1 a miniature army in itself1 always marched between the main body and the enemy2 it always led in the attack1 followed by that wing containing the best soldiers1 in two lines2 and supported by the heavy cavalry on that flank4 ,at ,rosbach 7,nov4 #e1 #ageg7 the ,prussian ,van-,guard1 composed of #d1hjj infantry1 #b1ejj cavalry and #cj guns1 annihilated #gj1jjj ,french regular troops1 by evolutions so rapidly executed that the ,prussian main army was unable to overtake either pursuers or pursued and had no part in the battle1 other than as highly interested spectators4 ,the ,continentals of the ,revolutionary army under ,washington were made up of troops enlisted for the war and trained by ,baron von ,steuben1 a ,major-,general in the ,prussian service1 who had served throughout the ,seven ,years ,war under ,frederic the ,great4 ,the ,continentals1 without firing a shot1 carried by assault1 ,stony ,point 7,july #af1 #aggi71 ,paulus ,hook 7,july #bj1 #aggi7 and the ,british intrenchments at ,yorktown 7,oct4 #ai1 #agha74 ,of these troops1 the ,baron von ,steuben writes3 8,i am satisfied with having shown to those who understand the ,art of ,warfare1 an ,american army worthy of their approbation2 officers who know their profession and who would do honor to any army in ,europe2 an infantry such as ,england has never brought into the field1 soldiers temperate1 well-drilled and obedient and the equal of any in the world40 99 99 99 99 99 ,the ,consular ,guard was the reproduction of the ,van ,guard of ,frederic the ,great1 but its sphere of action was strangely restricted by ,bonaparte1 who1 instead of placing his best troops in the front of his army1 as is the practice of all other of the ,great ,captains2 subordinated their functions to that of a reserve and to personal attendance upon himself4 ,this ,corps d'elite was but once notably in action2 at ,marengo 7,june #ad1 #ahjj7 it undoubtedly saved the day for ,france1 by maintaining the battle until the arrival of ,gen4 ,desaix and his division4 99 99 99 99 99 ,the ,imperial ,guard of ,napoleon was the development of the ,consular ,guard of ,bonaparte4 ,under the ,empire the ,guard became an independent army1 consisting of light and heavy infantry1 horse and field artillery1 cuirassiers1 dragoons1 hussars and chasseurs1 and composed of the best troops in the ,french service4 ,the functions of this fine body1 like that of its prototype1 was limited to the duties of a reserve and to attendance upon the person of the ,emperor2 and perhaps next to announcement of victory1 ,napoleon's favorite bulletin always read1 8,the ,imperial ,guard was not engaged40 ,many were the unavailing remonstrances made by his advisors against this policy1 which judged by the practice of the great masters of warfare1 is putting the cart before the horse2 and seemingly is that speck of cloud in ,napoleon's political sky1 which properly may be deemed a precursor of ,st4 ,helena4 ,at ,austerlitz 7,dec4 #b1 #ahje71 the cuirassiers of the ,french ,imperial ,guard routed a like body of ,russian cavalry4 ,at ,eylau 7,nov4 #g1 #ahjg7 the ,guard1 as at ,marengo again saved the day1 after the corps d'armee of ,soult and ,angereau had been destroyed1 by maintaining the battle until the arrival of ,ney and ,davoust4 ,in the retreat from ,russia 7#ahab7 the ,guard then numbering #fd1jjj men was nearly destroyed4 ,what was left of it won at ,ligny 7,june #af1 #ahae71 ,napoleon's last victory and at ,waterloo 7,june #ah1 #ahae71 one of its two surviving divisions covered the flight of the ,french army1 while the other escorted ,napoleon in safety to ,paris4 99 99 99 99 99 ,the ,royal ,prussian ,guard1 under ,von ,moltke1 was organized and utilized in accord with the teachings of ,frederic the ,great4 ,its most notable achievement occurred in the campaign of #ahgj4 ,the right flank of the ,french having been turned by the battle of ,woerth 7,aug4 #d1 #ahgj7 and ,marshal ,mac,mahon's army being driven to the westward1 it became the paramount object of ,von ,moltke to seize the country in rear of ,metz and thus prevent the retreat of ,marshall ,bazine across the ,moselle ,river4 ,the ,royal ,prussian ,guard out-marching both friends and enemies first reached the ,nancy road 7,aug4 #ah1 #ahgj7 and until the ,german corps reached the battlefield this body of picked troops successfully withstood the assault of nearly the entire ,french army4 ,in the first half-hour the ,guard lost #h1jjj men4 ,as the result of all this1 ,marshal ,bazine with #aej1jjj men was forced back into and taken in the intrenched camp at ,metz2 and the ,emperor ,napoleon ,,iii1 ,marshal ,mac,mahon and a second ,french army of #adj1jjj men was captured at ,sedan 7,sept4 #a1 #ahgj71 in an attempt to rescue ,marshal ,bazine4 8,i must tell you beforehand this will be a bloody touch4 ,tilly has a great army of old lads with iron faces that dare look an enemy in the eye2 they are confident of victory1 have never been beaten and do not know what it means to fly4 ,tilly tells his men he will beat me and the old man is as likely to do it as to say it40--,gustavus ,adolphus4 8,tilly's men were rugged1 surly fellows2 their faces mangled by wounds and scars had an air of hardy courage4 ,i observed of them that their clothes were always dirty1 their armor rusty from winter storms and bruised by musket-balls1 their weapons sharp and bright4 ,they were used to camp in the open fields and to sleep in the frosts and rain4 ,the horses like the men were strong and hardy and knew by rote their exercises4 ,both men and animals so well understood the trade of arms that a general command was sufficient2 every man was fit to command the whole1 and all evolutions were performed in order and with readiness1 at a note of the trumpet or a motion of their banners4 8,the #gth of ,sept4 7#afca7 before sunrise1 the ,swedish army marched from ,dieben to a large field about a mile from ,leipsic1 where we found old ,tilly's army in full battalia in admirable order1 which made a show both glorious and terrible4 8,tilly1 like a fair gamester1 had taken up but one side of the plain1 and left the other side clear and all the avenues open to the ,king's approach1 nor did he stir to the charge until the ,swedish army was fully drawn up and was advancing toward him4 ,he had with him #dd1jjj old soldiers and a better army ,i believe never was so soundly beaten4''' 8,then was made a most dreadful slaughter1 and yet there was no flying4 ,tilly's men might be killed or knocked down1 but no man turned his back1 nor would give an inch of ground1 save as they were marched1 wheeled1 or retreated by their officers4''' ,about six o'clock the field was cleared of the enemy except at one place on the ,king's front1 where some of them rallied2 and though they knew that all was lost1 they would take no quarter1 but fought it out to the last man1 being found dead the next day in rank and file as they were drawn up40 99 99 99 99 99 ,perfection in ,organization is attained when troops instantly and intelligently act according to order and execute with exactness and precision any and every prescribed evolution4 ,,topography 8,let us not consider where we shall give battle1 but where we may gain the victory40--,phocion4 99 99 99 99 99 8,there can be no discretion in a movement which forsakes the advantage in ground40--,gustavus ,adolphus4 99 99 99 99 99 8,that battlefield is best which is adapted to the full use of the chief constituents of your army and unfavorable to the mass of the enemy40--,napoleon4 ,,topography 8,the ground is the ,,chessboard of we cannibals2 and it is the selection and use made of it1 that decides the knowledge or the ignorance of those by whom it is occupied40--,frederic the ,great4 ,the highest use of ,topography consists in reducing a superior adverse force to the inferior force1 by minimizing the radius of action of the hostile ,corps d'armee4 ,this is effected by so posting the kindred corps that in the resulting ,strategetic ,horizons1 impassable natural barriers are presented to the march of hostile corps toward their respective objectives4 ,on the surface of the earth such natural barriers are formed by mountains1 rivers1 lakes1 swamps1 forests1 deserts1 the ocean1 and the boundaries of neutral ,states4 ,on the ,chess-board these topographical conditions are typified by peculiarities and limitations in the movements of the ,chess-pieces1 viz43 ,i4 ,the sides of the ,chess-board which terminate all movements of the chess pieces4 ,,ii4 ,that limitation of the movements of the ,chesspieces which makes it impossible for them to move other than in straight lines4 ,,iii4 ,the inability of the ,queen to move on obliques4 ,,iv4 ,the inability of the ,rook to move either on obliques or on diagonals4 ,v4 ,the inability of the ,bishop to move either on obliques1 verticals1 or horizontals4 ,,vi4 ,the inability of the ,knight to move either on diagonals1 verticals1 or horizontals1 and the limitation of its move to two squares distance4 ,,vii4 ,the inability of the ,pawn to move either on obliques or horizontals1 and the limitation of its first move to two squares and of its subsequent moves to one square4 ,,viii4 ,the limitation of the ,king's move to one square4 ,these limitations and impediments to the movements of the ,chess-pieces1 are equivalent in ,chess-play to obstacles interposed by ,nature to the march of troops over the surface of the earth4 ,prefect ,generalship1 in its calculations1 so combines these insurmountable barriers with the relative positions of the contending armies1 that the kindred army becomes at every vital point the superior force4 ,this effect is produced by merely causing rivers and mountains to take the place of kindred ,corps d'armee4 ,it is only by the study of ,chessic topography that the tremendous problems solved by the chess player become manifest3 ,instead of calculations limited to one visible and unchangeable ,chess-board of sixty-four squares1 the divinations of the ,chess-master comprehend and harmonize as many invisible ,chess-boards as there are ,chess-pieces contained in the ,topographical ,zone4 ,furthermore1 all these surfaces differ to the extent and in conformity to that particular sensible horizon1 appertaining to the ,chess-piece from which it emanates4 ,the enormous difficulties of ,chess-play1 like those of warfare1 arise from the necessity of combining in a single composite topographical horizon1 all those differing1 sensible horizons which appertain1 not merely to the kindred1 but also to the hostile corps2 and to do this in such a manner1 as to minimize the hostile powers for offence and defence1 by debarring one or more of the hostile pieces from the true ,strategetic ,horizon4 ,to divide up the enemy's force1 by making natural barriers take the place of troops1 is the basis of those processes which dominate ,grand ,manoeuvres4 ,of all the deductions of ,chess-play and of warfare1 such combinations of ,strategy and ,topography are the most subtle and intangible4 ,the highest talent is required in its interpretation1 and mastery of it1 more than of any other branch of ,strategetics1 proclaims the great ,captain at war1 or at chess4 ,,topography ,,of ,,the ,,king ,from the view-point of the ,king1 the surface of the ,chess-board takes on the topographical aspect of a vast expanse of open1 level country4 ,this vista is void of insurmountable natural obstacles1 other than the sides and extremities4 ,the latter collectively may be regarded1 for strategical purposes1 either as the ,ocean1 or the boundaries of neutral ,states4 ,to the ,king1 this vast territory is accessible in all directions4 ,at his pleasure he may move to and occupy either of the sixty-four squares of the ,chess-board1 in a minimum of one and in a maximum of seven moves4 ,the only obstacles to his march are distance and the opposition of an enemy4 ,the ,strategical weakness of the ,topographical ,horizon peculiar to the ,king arises from its always taking on and maintaining the physical form of a plain4 ,consequently it is vulnerable to attack from all sides and what is far worse1 it readily is commanded and from a superior topographical post1 by every adverse piece1 except the ,king and ,pawn4 ,thus1 the hostile ,queen1 without being attacked in return1 may enfilade the ,king along all verticals1 horizontals and diagonals2 the ,rooks1 along all verticals and horizontals2 the ,bishops1 along all diagonals of like color2 and the ,knights along all obliques4 ,,topography ,,of ,,the ,,queen ,from the view-point of the ,queen1 the surface of the ,chess-board takes on the topographical aspect of a series of wide1 straight valleys separated by high1 impassable mountain ranges1 unfordable rivers1 and impenetrable forests and morasses4 ,these valleys1 which number never less than three1 nor more than eight1 in the same group1 are of varying length and always converge upon and unite with each other at the point occupied by the ,queen4 ,these valleys contained in the ,queen's topographical horizon may be classified1 viz43 ,class ,i1 consists of those groups made up of three valleys4 ,class ,,ii1 of those groups made up of five valleys4 ,class ,,iii1 of those groups made up of eight valleys of lesser area2 and ,class ,,iv1 of those groups made up of eight valleys of greater area4 ,groups of the first class always have an area of twenty points2 those of the second have an area of twenty-three points2 those of the third have an area of twenty-five points1 and those of the fourth have an area of twenty-seven points4 ,such areas always are exclusive of that point upon which the ,queen is posted4 ,although impassable natural barriers restrict the movement of the ,queen to less than one-half of the ,topographical ,zone1 these obstacles always are intersected by long stretches of open country formed by intervening valleys4 ,hence1 the march of this most mobile of the ,chesspieces always is open either in three1 five1 or eight directions1 and it always is possible for her1 unless impeded by the interference of kindred or hostile corps1 to reach any desired point on the ,chess-board in two moves4 ,the weakness peculiar to the ,topographical ,horizon which appertains to the ,queen1 originates in the fact that it never commands the origins of obliques4 ,consequently1 every post of the ,queen1 is open to unopposed attack by the hostile ,knights4 ,,topography ,,of ,,the ,,rook ,from the view-point of the ,rook1 the surface of the ,chess-board takes on a topographical aspect which varies with the post occupied4 ,placed at either ,r#a or ,r#h the ,rook occupies the central point of a great valley1 #ae points in length1 which winds around the slope of an immense and inaccessible mountain range4 ,this latter1 in extent1 includes the remainder of the ,topographical ,zone4 ,with the ,rook placed at ,r#b or ,r#g1 this great mountain wall becomes pierced by a long valley running at right angles to the first1 but the area open to the movement of the ,rook is not increased4 ,placed at ,kt#b1 ,b#c1 ,k#d1 or ,q#d1 the ,rook becomes enclosed amid impassable natural barriers4 ,but although in such cases it always occupies the point of union of four easily traversed although unequal valleys1 its area of movement is neither increased nor diminished1 remaining always at fourteen points open to occupation4 ,unless impeded by the presence of kindred or adverse corps on its logistic radii1 the ,rook always may move either in two1 three1 or four directions1 and it may reach any desired point on the ,chess-board in two moves4 ,the weakness peculiar to the ,topographical ,horizon of the ,rook lies in the fact that it never commands the origins of diagonals or obliques4 ,hence it is open to unopposed attack along the first from adverse ,queen1 ,king1 ,bishops and ,pawns1 and along the second from adverse ,knights4 ,,topography ,,of ,,the ,,bishop ,from the view-point of the ,bishop1 the surface of the ,chess-board takes on a topographical aspect most forbidding4 ,to this ,chess-piece at least one-half of the ,topographical ,zone is inaccessible1 and under any circumstances his movements are limited to the thirty-two squares of his own color4 ,thus1 the ,topographical ,horizon of the ,bishop takes the form of a broken country1 dotted with high hills1 deep lakes1 impenetrable swamps1 and thick woodlands4 ,but between these obstacles thus set about by ,nature1 run level valleys1 varied in extent and easy of access4 ,this fact so modifies this harshest of all sensible horizons as to make the ,bishop next in activity to the ,rook4 ,within its limited sphere of action1 the ,bishop may move in either one or four directions with a minimum of nine and a maximum of fourteen points open to his occupation4 ,unimpeded by other corps blocking his route of march1 the ,bishop may reach any desired point of his own color on the chess board in two moves4 ,the weakness peculiar to the topographical horizon of the ,bishop is its liability to unopposed attack along verticals and horizontals by the hostile ,king1 ,queen and ,rooks2 and along obliques by the hostile ,knights4 ,,topography ,,of ,,the ,,knight ,from the view-point of the ,knight1 the surface of the ,chess-board takes on the aspect of a densely wooded and entirely undeveloped country2 made up of a profusion of ponds1 rivulets1 swamps1 etc41 none of which are impassable although sufficient to impede progress4 ,unless interfered with by kindred or hostile corps1 or the limitations of the ,chess-board1 the ,knight always may move either in two1 four1 six1 or eight directions4 ,it may reach any desired point in a minimum of one and a maximum of six moves1 and may occupy the sixty-four squares of the ,chess-board in the same number of marches4 ,the weakness of the topographical horizon of the ,knight lies in the fact that it never commands adjacent points1 nor any of those distant1 other than the termini of its own obliques4 ,hence it is open to unopposed attack along verticals and horizontals from the adverse ,king1 ,queen and ,rooks1 and along diagonals from the adverse ,king1 ,queen1 ,bishop and ,pawns4 ,,topography ,,of ,,the ,,pawn ,from the point of view of the ,pawn1 the surface of the ,chess-board takes on the topographical aspect of a country which as it is entered1 constantly becomes wilder and more rugged4 ,the march of the ,pawn always is along a valley situated between impracticable natural barriers1 and the possible movements of the ,pawn always decrease as the distance traveled increases4 ,unhindered by either kindred or hostile corps1 the ,pawn may reach any point of junction in the kindred ,logistic ,horizon1 which is contained within its altitude1 in a minimum of five and in a maximum of six moves4 ,it may march only in one direction1 except in capturing1 when it may acquire the option of acting in three directions4 ,the weakness of the topographical horizon of the ,pawn originates in its inability to command the adjacent country4 ,therefore1 it is exposed to unopposed attack along verticals and horizontals by the hostile ,king1 ,queen and ,rooks2 along diagonals by the adverse ,king1 ,queen and ,bishops1 and along obliques by the adverse ,knights4 ,,topography ,,of ,,the ,,topographical ,,zone ,that normal and visible surface of the ,chess-board termed the ,topographical ,zone is bounded by four great natural barriers1 impassable to any ,chess-piece4 ,the two sides of the zone may be held to typify either the ,ocean or the boundaries of neutral ,states4 ,the two extremities of the ,chess-board while holding the previously announced relation to ,chess-pieces contained in the ,topographical ,zone1 also holds another and radically different relation to those ,chess-pieces not contained in the ,topographical ,zone1 viz43 ,in the latter case1 the two extremities of the chessboard are to be regarded as two great mountain ranges1 each of which is pierced by eight defiles1 the latter being the sixteen points of junction contained in the kindred and adverse logistic horizons4 ,in the arena thus formed by these four great natural barriers1 two hostile armies composed of the thirty-two ,chess-pieces1 are contending for the mastery4 ,meanwhile1 beyond these great mountain ranges1 are advancing to the aid of the combatants1 two other armies1 represented by the power of promotion possessed by the ,pawns4 ,each of these two hypothetical armies is assailing the outer slope of that range of mountains which lies in the rear of the hostile force4 ,its effort is to pass one of the eight defiles and by occupying a ,point of ,junction in the kindred ,logistic ,horizon1 to gain entrance into the ,topographical ,zone4 ,then in the array of a ,queen1 or some other kindred piece1 it purposes to attack decisively1 the adverse ,strategetic ,rear4 ,to oppose the attack of this hypothetical hostile army1 whose movements always are typified by the advance of the adverse ,pawns1 is the duty of the kindred column of manoeuvre4 ,primarily this labor falls upon the kindred ,pawns4 ,upon each ,pawn devolves the duty of guarding that defile situated directly on its front1 by maintaining itself as a ,point of ,impenetrability between the corresponding hostile pawn and the kindred ,strategic ,rear4 ,conversely1 a second duty devolves upon each ,pawn2 and as an integer of the ,column of ,support1 it continually must threaten and whenever opportunity is presented it decisively must assault the defile on its front1 for the purpose of penetrating to the kindred logistic horizon and becoming promoted to such kindred piece1 as by attacking the adverse ,determinate ,force in flank1 in rear1 or in both1 may decide the victory in favor of the kindred army4 ,every variety of topography has peculiar requirements for its attack and its defence2 and situations even though but little different from each other1 nevertheless must be treated according to their particular nature4 ,in order to acquire the habit of selecting at a glance the correct posts for an army and of making proper dispositions of the kindred corps with rapidity and precision1 topography should be studied with great attention1 for most frequently it happens that circumstances do not allow time to do these things with deliberation4 ,,principle ,acting either offensively or defensively1 one never should proceed in such a way as to allow the enemy the advantage of ground2 ,that is to say3 ,kindred corps never should be exposed to unopposed adverse radii of offence1 when the effect of such exposure is the loss of kindred material1 or of time much better to be employed1 than in making a necessary and servile retreat from an untenable post4 ,on the contrary1 every kindred topographical advantage should unhesitatingly be availed of2 and particular attention continually should be paid to advancing the kindred corps to points offensive where they cannot be successfully attacked4 ,pains always must be taken to select advantageous ground4 ,indifferent posts must never be occupied from sheer indolence or from over-confidence in the strength of the kindred1 or the weakness of the adverse army4 ,particularly must one beware of permitting the enemy to retain advantages in topography2 always and at once he should be dislodged from posts whose continued occupation may facilitate his giving an unforeseen and often a fatal blow4 ,the full importance of topography perhaps is best expressed in the following dictum by the great ,frederic3 ,,principle 8,whenever a general and decisive topographical advantage is presented1 one has merely to avail of this1 without troubling about anything further40 ,the relative advantage in ,topography possessed by one army over an opposing army1 always can be determined by the following1 viz43 ,,rule #a4 ,if the principal adverse ,corps of ,position are situated upon points of a given color1 and if the principal ,kindred ,corps of ,position are situated upon points not of the given color1 then3 ,that army which has the more ,corps of ,evolution able to act against points of the given color1 and the equality in ,corps of ,evolution able to act against points of the opposite color1 has the relative advantage in ,topography4 #b4 ,to utilize the relative advantage in ,topography1 construct a position in which the kindred ,corps of ,position necessary to be defended shall occupy a point upon the sub-geometric symbol of a kindred ,corps of ,evolution2 which point shall be a ,tactical ,key of a ,true ,strategetic ,horizon of which the kindred ,corps of ,evolution is the ,corps of the ,centre and of which either the adverse ,king or an undefendable adverse piece is the second ,tactical ,key4 #c4 ,to neutralize the relative disadvantage in ,topography1 eliminate that adverse ,corps d'armee which is able to act simultaneously by its geometric symbol against the principal ,kindred ,corps of ,position upon a given color2 and by its sub-geometric symbol against points of opposite color4 99 99 99 99 99 ,perfection in ,defensive ,topography is attained whenever the ground occupied nullifies hostile advantages in ,time1 ,organization1 ,mobility1 ,numbers and ,position4 ,perfection in ,offensive ,topography is attained whenever the ground occupied accentuates the kindred advantages in ,time1 ,organization1 ,mobility1 ,numbers and ,position4 ,,military ,,examples 8,when you intend to engage in battle endeavor that your ,,chief advantage shall arise from the ground occupied by your army40--,vegetius4 ,to cross the ,granicus1 ,alexander the ,great selected a fordable spot where the river made a long1 narrow bend1 and attacked the salient and both sides simultaneously4 ,the ,persians thus outflanked were easily and quickly routed2 whereupon the ,grecian army in line of ,phalanxes1 both flanks covered by the river and its retreat assured by the fords in rear1 advanced to battle in harmony with all requirements of ,strategetic ,art4 99 99 99 99 99 ,at ,issus1 ,alexander the ,great so manoeuvred that the ,persian army of more than a million men was confined in a long valley not over three miles in width1 having the sea on the left hand and the ,amanus ,mountains on the right1 thus the ,grecians had a battlefield fitted to the size of their army1 and fought in ,phalanxes in line1 both wings covered by impassable natural barriers and retreat assured1 by open ground in rear4 99 99 99 99 99 ,at the ,trebia1 ,hannibal by stratagems now undiscernible1 induced the consul ,sempronius to pass the river and following along the easterly bank to take position with his army upon the lowlands between an unfordable part of the stream and the ,carthagenians4 ,upon this1 ,hannibal detached his youngest brother ,margo to cut off the retreat of the ,romans from the ford by which they had crossed the ,trebia2 advanced his infantry by ,phalanxes in line and overthrowing the few ,roman horse1 assailed the hostile left wing with #aj1jjj heavy cavalry4 ,the destruction of the ,roman army was completed by the simultaneous attack of their right wing by ,margo and the impossibility of repassing the river in their rear4 99 99 99 99 99 ,by one of the most notable marches in surprise recorded in military annals1 ,hannibal crossed the seemingly impassible marshes of the river ,po1 and turned the left flank of the ,roman army1 commanded by the ,consul ,c4 ,flaminius4 ,then the great ,carthagenian advanced swiftly toward the city of ,rome1 devasting the country on either hand4 ,in headlong pursuit the ,consul entered a long narrow valley1 having ,lake ,trasymenus on the one hand and the mountains on the other4 ,suddenly while entombed in this vast ravine1 the ,roman army was attacked by infantry from the high ground along its right flank2 and in front and rear by the ,carthagenian heavy cavalry1 while the lake extending along its left flank made futile all attempts to escape4 99 99 99 99 99 ,at ,cannae1 ,hannibal reproduced the evolutions of ,alexander the ,great at the passage of the ,granicus4 ,selecting a long bend in the ,aufidus1 ,hannibal forded the river and took position by ,phalanxes in line1 his flanks covered by unfordable parts of the stream and his retreat assured by the fords by which he had crossed1 while as at ,issus1 the ground on his front though fitting his own army1 was so confined as to prevent the ,romans engaging a force greater than his own4 ,beyond ,hannibal's front1 the hostile army was posted in a wide level plain1 suited to the best use of the vastly superior ,carthagenian heavy cavalry1 both for the evolutions of the battle and the subsequent pursuit and massacre of the ,romans4 99 99 99 99 99 ,at the ,river ,arar 7#eh ,b4,c47 ,caesar achieved his first victory4 ,following leisurely but closely the marauding ,helvetii1 he permitted three-fourths of their army to cross to the westerly side of the river2 then he fell upon the remainder with his whole army4 99 99 99 99 99 ,an eye-witness thus describes the famous passage of the ,lech by ,gustavus ,adolphus3 8,resolved to view the situation of the enemy1 his majesty went out the #bnd of ,april 7#afcb7 with a strong body of horse1 which ,i had the honor to command4 ,we marched as near as we could to the bank of the river1 not to be too much exposed to the enemy's cannon2 and having gained a height where the whole course of the river might be seen1 we drew up and the king alighted and examined every reach and turning of the river with his glass4 ,toward the north1 he found the river fetching a long reach and doubling short upon itself4 #8,there is the point will do our business1' says the king1 #8and if the ground be good1 we will pass there1 though ,tilly do his worst'40 ,he immediately ordered a small party of horse to bring him word how high the bank was on each side and at the point1 8and he shall have fifty dollars0 says the king1 8who will tell me how deep the water is40 ''' ,the depth and breadths of the stream having been ascertained1 and the bank on our side being ten to twelve feet higher than the other and of a hard gravel1 the king resolved to cross there2 and himself gave directions for such a bridge as ,i believe never army passed before nor since4 ,the bridge was loose plank placed upon large tressels as bricklayers raise a scaffold to build a wall4 ,the tressels were made some higher and some lower to answer to the river as it grew deeper or shallower2 and all was framed and fitted before any attempt was made to cross4 ,at night1 ,april #dth the king posted about #b1jjj men near the point and ordered them to throw up trenches on either side and quite around it2 within which at each end the king placed a battery of six pieces and six cannon at the point1 two guns in front and two at each side4 ,by daylight1 all the batteries were finished1 the trenches filled with musketeers and all the bridge equipment at hand in readiness for use4 ,to conceal this work the king had fired all night at other places along the river4 ,at daylight1 the ,imperialists discovered the king's design1 when it was too late to prevent it4 ,the musketeers and the batteries made such continual fire that the other bank twelve feet below was too hot for the ,imperialists2 whereupon old ,tilly to be ready for the king on his coming over on his bridge1 fell to work and raised a twenty-gun battery right against the point and a breast-work as near the river as he could to cover his men2 thinking that when the ,king should build his bridge1 he might easily beat it down with his cannon4 ,but the ,king had doubly prevented him2 first by laying his bridge so low that none of ,tilly's shot could hurt it1 for the bridge lay not above half a foot above the water's edge2 and the angle of the river secured it against the batteries on the other side1 while the continual fire beat the ,imperialists from those places where they had no works to cover them4 ,now1 in the second place1 the ,king sent over four hundred men who cast up a large ravelin on the other bank just where he planned to land2 and while this was doing the ,king laid over his bridge4 ,both sides wrought hard all the day and all the night as if the spade1 not the sword1 was to decide the controversy2 meanwhile the musketry and cannon-balls flew like hail and both sides had enough to do to make the men stand to their work4 ,the carnage was great2 many officers were killed4 ,both the ,king and ,tilly animated the troops by their presence4 ,about one o'clock about the time when the ,king had his bridge finished and in heading a charge of #cjjj foot against our ravelin was brave old ,tilly slain by a musket bullet in the thigh4 ,we knew nothing of this disaster befallen them1 and the ,king1 who looked for blows1 the bridge and ravelin being finished1 ordered to run a line of palisades to take in more ground and to cover the first troops he should send over4 ,this work being finished the same night1 the ,king sent over his ,guards and six hundred ,scots to man the new line4 ,early in the morning a party of ,scots under ,capt4 ,forbes of ,lord ,rae's regiment was sent abroad to learn something of the enemy and ,sir ,john ,hepburn with the ,scots ,brigade was ordered to pass the bridge1 draw up outside the ravelin1 and to advance in search of the enemy as soon as the horse were come over4 ,the ,king was by this time at the head of his army in full battle array1 ready to follow his van-guard and expecting a hot day's work of it4 ,sir ,john sent messenger after messenger entreating for permission to advance1 but the ,king would not suffer it2 for he was ever on his guard and would not risk a surprise4 ,so the army continued on this side of the ,lech all day and the next night4 ,in the morning the ,king ordered #cjj horse1 #fjj horse and #hjj dragoons to enter the wood by three ways1 but sustaining each other2 the ,scots ,brigade to follow to the edge of the wood in support of all1 and a brigade of ,swedish infantry to cover ,sir ,john's troops4 ,so warily did this famous warrior proceed4 ,the next day the cavalry came up with us led by ,gustavus ,horn2 and the ,king and the whole army followed1 and we marched on through the heart of ,bavaria4 ,his ,majesty when he saw the judgment with which old ,tilly had prepared his works and the dangers we had run1 would often say1 8,that day's work is every way equal to the victory of ,leipsic40 99 99 99 99 99 ,with but #ee1jjj troops in hand and surrounded by the united ,austrian and ,russian armies aggregating a quarter of a million men2 ,frederic the ,great availing of a swamp1 a few hills1 a rivulet and a fortified town1 constructed a battlefield upon which his opponents dared not engage him4 ,this famous camp of ,bunzlewitz is one of the wonders of the military art4 ,it also is an illustration of the inability of the ,anglo-,saxon to reason2 for to this day many who wear epaulets1 accepting the dictum of a skillfully hoodwinked ,french diplomat at the siege of ,neisse1 7,dec41 #agdj7 commonly assert that 8the great ,frederic was a bad engineer40 99 99 99 99 99 ,washington compelled the ,british to evacuate ,boston1 merely by occupying with artillery ,dorchester ,heights1 the tactical key of the theatre of action and thus preventing either ingress or egress from the harbor4 99 99 99 99 99 ,at ,trenton the ,hessian column was unable to escape from ,washington's accurate evolutions1 on account of being imprisoned in an angle formed by the unfordable ,delaware river4 99 99 99 99 99 ,at ,yorktown1 the ,british army under ,lord ,cornwallis was captured entire1 being cut off from all retreat by the ocean on the right flank and the ,james river in rear4 99 99 99 99 99 ,bonaparte made his reputation at ,toulon 7#agic7 merely by following the method employed by ,washington in the siege of ,boston4 99 99 99 99 99 ,bonaparte gained his first success in ,italy because the allied ,piedmontese and ,austrian armies1 although thrice his numbers1 were separated by the ,apennine mountains4 99 99 99 99 99 ,bonaparte's success at ,castiglione was due to the separation of the ,austrian army into two great isolated columns by the ,lake of ,garda4 99 99 99 99 99 ,at ,arcola1 ,bonaparte occupied a great swamp upon the hostile strategic center and the ,austrian army was destroyed by its efforts to dislodge him4 99 99 99 99 99 ,at ,rivoli1 the ,austrian army purposed to unite its five detached wings upon a plateau of which ,bonaparte was already in possession4 ,all were ruined in the effort to dislodge the ,french from this ,tactical ,center4 99 99 99 99 99 ,the ,austrian army was unable to escape after ,marengo on account of the ,po river in its rear4 99 99 99 99 99 ,at ,austerlitz the left wing of the ,austro-,russian army was caught between the ,french army and a chain of lakes and rivulets and totally destroyed4 99 99 99 99 99 ,at ,friedland the ,russian army was caught between the ,french in front and the ,vistula river in rear and totally destroyed4 99 99 99 99 99 ,at ,krasnoe1 the ,russians under ,kutosof1 occupied the strategic center and were covered by the ,dnieper4 ,to force the passage of the river cost ,napoleon #cj1jjj men4 99 99 99 99 99 ,at the ,beresina1 the ,russians under ,benningsen1 occupied the ,strategic ,center and were covered by the unfordable river4 ,to force the passage cost ,napoleon #bj1jjj men4 99 99 99 99 99 ,at ,leipsic1 ,napoleon was caught between the allied army and the ,elbe4 ,the retreat across the river cost the ,french #ej1jjj men4 99 99 99 99 99 ,at ,waterloo1 the high plateau sloping gradually to a plain1 various hamlets on front and flank and the forest in rear1 made a perfect topography for a defensive battle4 99 99 99 99 99 ,at ,sedan1 the ,emperor1 ,napoleon ,,iii1 and his army were enclosed between the ,prussian army and the frontier of ,belgium and captured4 99 99 99 99 99 8,where the real general incessantly sees prepared by ,nature means admirably adapted for his needs1 the commander lacking such talents sees nothing40--,hannibal4 ,,mobility 8,success in an operation depends upon the secrecy and celerity with which the movements are made40--,napoleon4 99 99 99 99 99 8,an eye unskilled and a mind untutored can see but little where a trained observer detects important movements40--,von ,moltke4 99 99 99 99 99 8,caesar is a marvel of vigilance and rapidity1 he finishes a war in a march40--,cicero4 ,,mobility 8,victory lies in the legs of the soldier40--,frederic the ,great4 99 99 99 99 99 8,the principal part of the soldier's efficiency depends upon his legs4 8,the personal abilities required in all manoeuvres and in battles are totally confined to them4 8,whoever is of a different opinion is a dupe to ignorance and a novice in the profession of arms40--,count de ,saxe4 8,it is easier to beat an enemy than commonly is supposed10 says ,napoleon1 8the great ,art lies in making nothing but decisive movements40 ,to the proficient in ,strategetics the truth of the foregoing dictum is self-evident4 ,nevertheless1 it remains to instruct the student how to select from a multitude of possible movements1 that particular movement or series of movements1 which in a given situation are best calculated to achieve victory4 ,whatever may be such series of movements1 obviously1 it must have an object1 i4e41 a specific and clearly defined purpose4 ,equally so1 all movements made on such line of movement must each have an objective1 i4e41 a terminus4 ,these objectives1 like cogs in a gear1 intimately are connected with other objectives or termini1 so that the project thus formed constitutes always an exact and often a vast scheme4 ,frequently it happens that the occupation of an objective1 valid in a given situation1 is not valid in an ensuing situation for the reasons3 #a4 ,that the object of the given line of movement is become unattainable1 or1 #b4 ,because it has become no longer worth attaining1 or1 #c4 ,because such belated attainment may be direct cause of disaster4 ,,principle ,in order to select the decisive movement in a given situation it is necessary first to determine both the object and the objective1 not merely of the required movement1 but also of that series of movements1 which collectively constitute the projected line of movement2 together with the object and the objective of every movement contained therein4 ,the mathematician readily will perceive1 and the student doubtless will permit himself to be informed1 that3 ,before the true object and the true objective of any movement can be determined it first is necessary to deduce the common object of all movement4 99 99 99 99 99 ,as is well known1 the combined movements of the ,chess-pieces over the surface of the ,chess-board during a game at ,chess are infinite4 ,these calculations are so complex that human perception accurately can forecast ultimate and even immediate results only in comparatively few and simple situations4 ,such calculable outcomes are limited to the earlier stages of the opening1 to the concluding phases of a game2 and to situations in the mid-game wherein the presence of but few adverse pieces minimizes the volume of effort possible to the opponent4 ,consequently1 it is self-evident1 that3 ,,principle ,situations on the ,chess-board require for their demonstration a degree of skill which decreases as the hostile power of resistance decreases4 ,all power for resistance possessed by an army emanates from its ability to move4 ,this faculty of ,mobility is that inestimable quality without which nothing and by means of which everything1 can be done4 ,from this truth it is easy to deduce the common object of all movement1 which obviously is3 ,to minimize the mobility of the opposing force4 ,the hostile army having the ability to move and consequently a power for resistance equal to that possessed by the kindred army2 it becomes of the first importance to discover in what way the kindred army is superior to that adverse force1 which in the ,normal ,situation on the ,chess-board is its exact counterpart in material1 position and formation4 ,such normal superiority of the ,white army over the ,black army is found in the fact that3 #a4 ,the former has the privilege of making the initial move of the game4 #b4 ,this privilege of first move is the absolute advantage in ,time4 ,while no mathematical demonstration of the outcome of a game at ,chess is possible1 nevertheless there are rational grounds for assuming that with exact play1 ,white should win4 ,this decided and probably decisive advantage possessed by ,white can be minimized only by correcting a mathematical blemish in the game of ,chess as at present constructed2 which blemish1 there is reason to believe1 did not originally exist4 ,this imperfection seemingly is the result of unscientific modifications of the ,italian method of ,castling2 which latter1 from the standpoint of mathematics and of ,strategetics1 embodies the true spirit of that delicate and vital evolution4 ,to the mathematician and to the ,strategist1 it is clear that ,chess as first devised was geometrically perfect4 ,the abortions played during successive ages and in various parts of the ,earth1 merely are crude and unscientific deviations from the perfect original4 ,thus1 strategetically1 the correct post of deployment for the ,chess-,king is at the extremity of a straight line drawn from the center of that ,grand ,strategic ,front which appertains to the existing formation4 ,hence1 in the grand front by the right1 the ,king in ,castling ,k ,r1 properly goes in one move to ,k,kt#a1 his proper post4 ,conversely1 in ,castling ,q ,r1 he also should go in one move to ,q,kt#a1 his proper post corresponding to the grand front by the left4 ,again1 whenever the formation logically points to the grand front by the right refused1 the ,king should go in one move from ,k#a to ,,kr#a4 ,when the formations indicate the grand front by the left refused1 the ,king should go in one move from ,k#a to ,,qr#a4 ,in each and every case the co-operating ,rook should be posted at the corresponding ,bishop's square1 in order to support the alignment by ,p-,b#d1 of the front adopted4 ,the faulty mode of castling today in vogue clearly is not the product either of the mathematic nor of the strategetic mind4 ,the infantile definition of 8the books10 viz41 8,the ,king in ,castling moves two squares either to the right or to the left10 displays all that mania for the commonplace1 which characterizes the dilettante4 ,all that can be done is to call attention to this baleful excrescence on the great ,game4 ,of course1 it is useless to combat it4 ,in the words of the ,count de ,saxe3 8,the power of custom is absolute4 ,to depart from it is a crime1 and the most inexcusable of all crimes is to introduce innovations4 ,for most people1 it is sufficient that a thing is so1 to forever allow it to remain so40 ,says the great ,frederic2 8,man hardly may eradicate in his short lifetime all the prejudices that are imbibed with his mother's milk2 and it is well nigh impossible to successfully wrestle with custom1 that chief argument of fools40 ,also bearing in mind the irony of ,cicero1 who regarded himself fortunate in that he had not fallen victim to services rendered his countrymen1 it suffices to say3 ,the true ,chessic dictum in regard to the double evolution of the ,king and ,rook should read3 8,the ,king of ,castling should deploy in one move to that point where1 as the ,base of ,operations1 it mathematically harmonizes with that ,strategic ,front1 which is1 or must become1 established40 ,the change in the present form of ,castling1 herein suggested1 should be made in the true interests of the ,royal ,game4 ,the instant effect of such change will be3 #a4 ,largely to increase the defensive resources both of ,white and ,black2 #b4 ,to minimize the handicap on the second player1 due to ,white's advantage of first move2 #c4 ,to permit open play on the ,queen's side of the board and thus provide a broader and more resplendent field for ,strategetic genius4 99 99 99 99 99 ,in all our modern-day mis-interpretations of the ethics of ,chess and our characteristic ,twentieth ,century looseness of practice as applied to ,chess-play1 perhaps there exists no greater absurdity1 than that subversion of ordinary intelligence1 daily evinced by permitting a piece which cannot move1 to give check4 ,it is a well known and in many ways a deserved reproach1 cast by the ,german erudite1 that the mind of the ,anglo-,saxon is not properly developed1 that it is able to act correctly only when dealing with known quantities1 and is inadequate for the elucidation of indeterminate things4 ,in consequence1 they say1 the argumentative attempts of the ,anglo-,saxon are puerile2 the natural result of a mental limitation which differs from that of monkeys and parrots1 merely in ability to count beyond two4 ,surely it would seem that a very young child readily would sense that3 ,a ,chess-piece1 which by law is debarred from movement1 is1 by the same law1 necessarily debarred from capturing adverse material2 inasmuch as in order to capture1 a piece must move4 ,nevertheless consensus of opinion today among children of every growth and whether ,anglo-,saxon or ,german1 universally countenance the paradox that3 ,a piece which is pinned on its own ,king1 can give check i4e41 threaten to move and capture the adverse ,king4 ,to argue this question correctly and to deduce the logical solution1 it is necessary to revert to first principles and to note that3 ,it is a fundamental of ,chess mathematics that the ,king cannot be exposed to capture4 ,furthermore1 it is to be noted as equally fundamental1 that3 #a4 ,a piece exerts no force against that point upon which it is posted2 #b4 ,that whatever power a piece exerts1 always is exerted against some other point than the point upon which it stands2 and that2 #c4 ,in order to exert such power1 it is an all-essential that the piece move from the point which it occupies to the point at which its power is to be exerted4 ,hence1 it is obvious and may be mathematically demonstrated1 that1 #a4 ,a piece which cannot move1 cannot capture4 #b4 ,a piece which cannot capture1 does not exercise any threat of capture2 and #c4 ,consequently1 a piece deprived of its right to move2 which cannot capture nor exercise any threat to capture1 obviously and by mathematical demonstration1 cannot give check1 inasmuch1 as 8check0 merely is the threat by a piece to move and capture the adverse ,king4 ,therefore1 whatever may be the normal area of movement belonging to a piece1 whenever from any cause such piece loses its power of movement1 then1 ,it no longer can capture1 nor exercise any threat of capture1 upon the points contained within said area2 and consequently such points so far as said immovable piece is concerned1 may be occupied in safety by any adverse piece including the adverse ,king1 for the reason that3 ,an immovable piece cannot move2 and not being able to move it cannot capture1 and not being able to capture1 it does not exercise any threat of capture1 and consequently it cannot give check4 ,this incongruity of permitting an immovable piece to give check constitutes the second mathematical blemish in the game of ,chess1 as at present constructed4 ,this fallacy1 the correction of which any schoolboy may mathematically demonstrate1 is defended1 even by many who would know better1 if they merely would take time for reflection2 by the inane assumption1 that3 ,a piece which admittedly is disqualified and rendered dormant by all the fundamentals of the science of ,chess1 and which therefore cannot legally move and consequently cannot legally capture anything2 by some hocus-pocus may be made to move and to capture that most valuable of all prizes1 the adverse ,king2 and this at a time and under circumstances when1 as is universally allowed1 it cannot legally move against1 nor legally capture any other adverse piece4 ,the basis of this illogical1 illegal1 and untenable assumption is3 ,the pinned piece1 belonging to that force which has the privilege of moving1 can abandon its post1 and capture the adverse ,king2 this stroke ends the game and the game being ended1 the pinning piece never can avail of the abandonment of the covering post by the pinned piece to capture the ,king thus exposed4 ,the insufficiency of this subterfuge is clear to the mathematical mind4 ,its subtlety lies in confounding together things which have no connection1 viz43 ,admittedly the given body of ,chess-pieces has the right to move1 but it is of the utmost importance to note that this privilege of moving extends only to a single piece and from this privilege of moving the pinned piece is debarred by a specific and fundamental law of the game1 which declares that3 8,a piece shall not by removing itself uncover the kindred ,king to the attack of a hostile piece40 ,thus1 it is clear1 that a pinned piece is a disqualified piece2 its powers are dormant and by the laws of the game it is temporarily reduced to an inert mass1 and deprived of every faculty normally appertaining to it as a ,chess-piece4 ,on the other hand1 as is equally obvious1 the pinning piece is in full possession of its normal powers and is qualified to perform every function4 ,to hold that a piece disqualified by the laws of the game can nullify the activities of a piece in full possession of its powers1 is to assert that black is white1 that the moon is made of green cheese1 that the tail can wag the dog1 or any other of those things which have led the ,german to promulgate his caustic formula on the ,anglo-,saxon4 ,hence1 artificially to nullify the normal powers of an active and potential piece which is operating in conformity to the laws of the game1 and artificially to revivify the dormant powers of a piece disqualified by the same laws2 to debar the former from exercising its legitimate functions and to permit the latter to exercise functions from which by law1 it specifically is debarred1 is a self-evident incongruity and any argument whereby such procedure is upheld1 necessarily and obviously1 is sophistry4 99 99 99 99 99 ,no less interesting than instructive and conclusive1 is reference of this question to those intellectual principles which give birth to the game of ,chess1 per se1 viz43 ,as a primary fundamental1 with the power to give check1 is associated concurrently the obligation upon the ,king thus checked1 not to remain in check4 ,secondly3 ,the totality of powers assigned to the ,chess-pieces is the ability to move1 provided the ,king be free from check4 ,this totality of powers may be denoted by the indefinite symbol1 ,x4 ,the play thus has for its object3 ,the reduction to zero of the adverse ,x1 by the operation of the kindred ,x4 ,this result is checkmate in its generalized form4 ,in effect1 it is the destruction of the power of the adverse pieces to move1 by means of check made permanent4 ,by the law of continuity it is self-evident that3 ,the power to move appertaining either to ,white or to ,black1 runs from full power to move any piece 7a power due to freedom from check71 down to total inability to move any piece1 due to his ,king being permanently checked1 i4e41 checkmated4 ,this series cannot be interrupted without obvious violation of the ethics of the game2 because1 so long as any part of ,x remains1 the principle from which the series emanated still operates1 and this without regard to quantity of ,x remaining unexpended4 ,thus1 a game of ,chess is a procedure from total ability to total disability2 i4e41 from one logical whole to another2 otherwise1 from ,x to zero4 ,checkmate1 furnishes the limit to the series2 the game and ,x vanish together4 ,this is in perfect keeping with the law of continuity1 which acts and dominates from beginning to end of the series1 and so long as any part of ,x remains4 ,hence to permit either ,white or ,black to move any piece1 leaving his ,king in check1 is an anomaly4 99 99 99 99 99 ,denial to the ,pawn of ability to move to the rear is an accurate interpretation of military ethics4 ,of those puerile hypotheses common to the man who does not know1 one of the most entrancing to the popular mind1 is the notion that ,corps d'armee properly are of equal numbers and of the same composition4 ,this supposition is due to ignorance of the fact that the multifarious duties of applied ,strategetics1 require for their execution like variety of instruments1 which diversity of means is strikingly illustrated by the differing movements of the ,chess-pieces4 ,the inability of the ,pawn to move backward strategically harmonizes with its functions as a ,corps of ,position1 in contradiction to the movements of the pieces1 which latter are ,corps of ,evolution4 ,this restriction in the move of the ,pawn is in exact harmony with the inability of the ,queen to move on obliques1 of the ,rook to move on obliques or on diagonals1 of the ,bishop to move on obliques1 verticals and horizontals1 of the ,knight to move on diagonals1 verticals1 and horizontals1 and of the ,king to move like any other piece4 99 99 99 99 99 ,possessed of the invaluable privilege of making the first move in the game1 knowing that no move should be made without an object1 understanding that the true object of every move is to minimize the adverse power for resistance and comprehending that all power for resistance is derived from facility of movement1 the student easily deduces the true object of ,white's initial move in every game of ,chess1 viz43 ,,principle ,to make the first of a series of movements1 each of which shall increase the mobility of the kindred pieces and correspondingly decrease the mobility of the adverse pieces4 ,as the effect of such policy1 the power for resistance appertaining to ,black1 ultimately must become so insufficient that he no longer will be able adequately to defend3 #a4 ,his base of operations4 #b4 ,the communications of his army with its base4 #c4 ,the communications of his corps d'armee with each other1 or1 #d4 ,to prevent the ,white hypothetical force penetrating to its ,logistic ,horizon4 ,to produce this fatal weakness in the ,black position by the advantage of the first move is much easier for ,white than commonly is supposed4 ,the process consists in making only those movements by means of which the kindred corps d'armee1 progressively occupying specified objectives1 are advanced1 viz43 ,i4 ,to the ,strategetic ,objective1 when acting against the communications of the adverse ,determinate ,force and its ,base of ,operations4 ,,ii4 ,to the ,logistic ,horizon1 when acting against the communications between the adverse ,determinate and the adverse ,hypothetical ,forces4 ,,iii4 ,to the ,strategic ,vertices1 when acting against the communications of the hostile corps d'armee with each other4 ,to bring about either of these results against an opponent equally equipped and capable1 of course is a much more difficult task than to checkmate an enemy incapable of movement4 ,yet such achievement is possible to ,white and with exact play it seemingly is a certainty that he succeeds in one or the other1 owing to his inestimable privilege of first move4 ,for the normal advantage that attaches to the first move in a game of ,chess is vastly enhanced by a peculiarity in the mathematical make-up of the surface of the ,chess-board1 whereby1 he who makes the first move may secure to himself the advantage in mobility1 and conversely may inflict upon the second player a corresponding disadvantage in mobility4 ,this peculiar property emanates from this fact3 ,the sixty-four points1 i4e41 the sixty-four centres of the squares into which the surface of the ,chess-board is divided1 constitute1 when taken collectively1 the quadrant of a circle1 whose radius is eight points in length4 ,hence1 in ,chessic mathematics1 the sides of the ,chessboard do not form a square1 but the segment of a circumference4 ,to prove the truth of this1 one has but to count the points contained in the verticals and horizontals and in the hypothenuse of each corresponding angle1 and in every instance it will be found that the number of points contained in the base1 perpendicular1 and hypothenuse1 is the same4 ,for example3 ,let the eight points of the ,king's ,rook's file form the perpendicular of a right angle triangle1 of which the kindred first horizontal forms the base2 then1 the hypothenuse of the given angle1 will be that diagonal which extends from ,,qr#a to ,,kr#h4 ,now1 merely by the processes of simple arithmetic1 it may be shown that there are1 #a4 ,eight points in the base4 #b4 ,eight points in the perpendicular4 #c4 ,eight points in the hypothenuse4 ,consequently the three sides of this given right angled triangle are equal to each other1 which is a geometric impossibility4 ,therefore1 it is self-evident that there exists a mathematical incongruity in the surface of the ,chess-board4 ,that is1 what to the eye seems a right angled triangle1 is in its relations to the movements of the ,chess-pieces1 an equilateral triangle4 ,hence1 the ,chess-board1 in its relations to the pieces when the latter are at rest1 properly may be regarded as a great square sub-divided into sixty-four smaller squares2 but on the contrary1 in those calculations relating to the ,chess-pieces in motion1 the ,chess-board must be regarded as the quadrant of a circle of eight points radius4 ,the demonstration follows1 viz43 ,connect by a straight line the points ,,kr#h and ,,qr#h4 ,connect by another straight line the points ,,qr#h and ,,qr#a4 ,connect each of the fifteen points through which these lines pass with the point ,,kr#a1 by means of lines passing through the least number of points intervening4 ,then the line ,,kr#h and ,,qr#h will represent the segment of a circle of which latter the point ,,kr#a is the center4 ,the lines ,,kr#a-,,kr#h and ,,kr#a-,,qr#a will represent the sides of a quadrant contained in the given circle and bounded by the given segment1 and the lines drawn from ,,kr#a to the fifteen points contained in the given segment of the given circumference1 will be found to be fifteen equal radii each eight points in length4 99 99 99 99 99 ,having noted the form of the ,static or positional surface of the ,chess-board and its relations to the pieces at rest1 and having established the configuration of the ,dynamic surface upon which the pieces move1 it is next in sequence to deduce that fundamental fact and to give it that geometric expression which shall mathematically harmonize these conflicting geometric figures in their relations to ,chess-play4 ,as the basic fact of applied ,chessic forces1 it is to be noted1 that3 ,,principle ,the ,king is the ,,source from whence the ,chess-pieces derive all power of movement2 and from his ability to move1 emanates ,,all power for attack and for defence possessed by a ,chessic army4 ,this faculty of mobility1 derived from the existence of the kindred ,king1 is the all essential element in ,chess-play1 and to increase the mobility of the kindred pieces and to reduce that of the adverse pieces is the simple1 sure and only scientific road to victory2 and by comparison of the ,static with the ,dynamic surface of the ,chess-board1 the desired principle readily is discovered1 viz41 ,the ,static surface of the ,chess-board being a square1 its least division is into two great right angled triangles having a common hypothenuse4 ,the ,dynamic surface being the quadrant of a circle1 its least division also is into two great sections1 one of which is a right angled triangle and the other a semi-circle4 ,comparing the two surfaces of the ,chess-board thus divided1 it will be seen that these three great right angled triangles are equal1 each containing thirty-six points2 and having for their common vertices1 the points ,,kr#a1 ,,qr#a and ,r#h4 ,furthermore1 it will be seen that the hypothenuse common to these triangles1 also is the chord of that semi-circle which appertains to the ,dynamic surface4 ,again1 it will be perceived that this semi-circle1 like the three right angled triangles1 is composed of thirty-six points1 and consequently that all of the four sub-divisions of the ,static and ,dynamic surfaces of the ,chess-board are equal4 ,thus it obviously follows1 that3 #a4 ,the great central diagonal1 always is one side of each of the four chief geometric figures into which the ,chess board is divided2 that3 #b4 ,it mathematically perfects each of these figures and harmonizes each to all1 and that3 #c4 ,by means of it each figure becomes possessed of eight more points than it otherwise would contain4 ,hence1 the following is self-evident3 ,,principle ,that ,chessic army which can possess itself of the great central diagonal1 thereby acquires the larger number of points upon which to act and consequently greater facilities for movement2 and conversely3 ,by the loss of the great central diagonal1 the mobility of the opposing army is correspondingly decreased4 ,it therefore is clear that the object of any series of movements by a ,chessic army acting otherwise than on ,line of ,operations1 should be3 ,,principle ,form the kindred army upon the hypothenuse of the right angled triangle which is contained within the ,dynamic surface of the ,chess-board2 and conversely1 ,compel the adverse army to act exclusively within that semi-circle which appertains to the same surface4 ,under these circumstances1 the kindred corps will be possessed of facilities for movement represented by thirty-six squares2 while the logistic area of the opposing army will be restricted to twenty-eight squares4 ,there are1 of course1 two great central diagonals of the ,chess-board2 but as the student is fully informed that great central diagonal always is to be selected1 which extends towards the ,objective ,plane4 99 99 99 99 99 ,mobility1 per se1 increases or decreases with the number of squares open to occupation4 ,but in all situations there will be points of no value1 while other points are of value inestimable2 for the reason that the occupation of the former will not favorably affect the play1 or may even lose the game2 while by the occupation of the latter1 victory is at once secured4 ,but it is not the province of ,mobility to pass on the values of points2 this latter is the duty of ,strategy4 ,it is sufficient for ,mobility that it provide superior facilities for movement2 it is for ,strategy to define the ,line of ,movement2 for ,logistics1 by means of this ,line of ,movement1 to bring into action in proper times and sequence1 the required force1 and for ,tactics1 with this force1 to execute the proper evolutions4 ,mobility derives its importance from three things which may occur severally or in combination1 viz43 #a4 ,all power for offense or for defense is eliminated from a ,chess-piece the instant it loses its ability to move4 #b4 ,the superiority possessed by corps acting offensively over adverse corps acting defensively1 resides in that the attack of a piece is valid at every point which it menaces2 while the defensive effort of a piece1 as a rule1 is valid only at a single point4 ,consequently3 ,,principle ,increased facilities for movement enhance the power of attacking pieces in a much greater degree than like facilities enhance the power of defending pieces4 ,such increasing facilities for movement ultimately render an attacking force irresistible1 for the reason that it finally becomes a physical impossibility for the opposing equal force to provide valid defences for the numerous tactical keys1 which at a given time become simultaneously assailed4 ,hence3 ,,principle ,superior facilities for occupying any point at any time and with any force1 always ensure the superior force at a given point1 at a given time4 ,the relative advantage in mobility possessed by one army over an opposing army always can be determined by the following1 viz43 ,,rule #a4 ,that army whose strategic front of operations is established upon the ,strategetic ,center has the relative advantage in ,mobility4 #b4 ,to utilize the advantage in ,mobility extend the ,strategic ,front in the direction of the objective plane4 #c4 ,to neutralize the relative disadvantage in ,mobility eliminate that adverse ,corps d'armee which tactically expresses such adverse advantage2 or so post the ,prime ,strategetic ,point as to vitiate the adverse ,strategic front4 ,advantage in ,mobility is divided into two classes1 viz43 ,i4 ,general ,advantage in ,mobility4 ,,ii4 ,special ,advantage in ,mobility4 ,a ,general ,advantage in ,mobility consists in the ability to act simultaneously against two or more vital points by means of interior logistic radii due to position between3-- #a4 ,the adverse army and its ,base of ,operations4 #b4 ,two or more adverse ,grand ,columns4 #c4 ,the wings of a hostile ,grand ,column4 #d4 ,two or more isolated adverse ,corps d'armee4 ,such position upon interior lines of movement is secured by occupying either of the ,prime ,offensive ,origins1 i4e43 #a4 ,strategic ,center vs4 ,adverse ,formation in ,mass4 #b4 ,logistic ,center vs4 ,adverse ,formation by ,grand ,columns4 #c4 ,tactical ,center vs4 ,adverse ,formation by ,wings4 #d4 ,logistic ,triune vs4 ,adverse ,formation by ,corps4 ,special ,advantage in ,mobility consists in the ability of a corps d'armee to traverse greater or equal distances in lesser times than opposing corps4 ,,military ,,examples 8,never interrupt your enemy when he is making a false movement40--,napoleon4 ,in the year 7#cff ,b4,c47 the ,king of ,sparta1 with an army of #cj1jjj men marched to the aid of the ,mantineans against ,thebes4 ,epaminondas took up a post with his army from whence he equally threatened ,mantinea and ,sparta4 ,agesilaus incautiously moved too far towards the coast1 whereupon ,epaminondas1 with #gj1jjj men precipitated himself upon ,lacedaemonia1 laying waste the country with fire and sword1 all but taking by storm the city of ,sparta and showing the women of ,lacedaemonia the campfire of an enemy for the first time in six hundred years4 99 99 99 99 99 ,flaminius advancing incautiously to oppose ,hannibal1 the latter took up a post with his army from whence he equally threatened the city of ,rome and the army of the ,consul4 ,in the endeavor to rectify his error1 the ,roman general committed a worse and was destroyed with his entire army4 99 99 99 99 99 ,at ,thapsus1 ,april #f1 #df ,b4,c41 ,caesar took up a post with his army from whence he equally threatened the ,roman army under ,scipio and the ,african army under ,juba4 ,scipio having marched off with his troops to a better camp some miles distant1 ,caesar attacked and annihilated ,juba's army4 99 99 99 99 99 ,at ,pirna1 ,frederic the ,great1 captured the ,saxon army entire1 and at ,rossbach1 ,leuthern and ,zorndorf destroyed successively a ,french1 an ,austrian and a ,russian army merely by occupying a post from whence he equally threatened two or more vital points1 awaiting the time when one would become inadequately defended4 99 99 99 99 99 ,washington won the ,revolutionary ,war merely by occupying a post from whence he equally threatened the ,british armies at ,new ,york and ,philadelphia2 refusing battle and building up an army of ,continental regular troops enlisted for the war and trained by the ,baron von ,steuben in the system of ,frederic the ,great4 99 99 99 99 99 ,bonaparte won at ,montenotte1 ,castiglione1 ,arcola1 ,rivoli and ,austerlitz his most perfect exhibitions of generalship1 merely by passively threatening two vital points and in his own words3 8,by never interrupting an enemy when he is making a false movement40 99 99 99 99 99 ,perfection in ,mobility is attained whenever the kindred army is able to act unrestrainedly in any and all directions1 while the movements of the hostile army are restricted4 ,,numbers 8,in warfare the advantage in numbers never is to be despised40--,von ,moltke4 99 99 99 99 99 8,arguments avail but little against him whose opinion is voiced by thirty legions40--,roman ,proverb4 99 99 99 99 99 8,that king who has the most iron is master of those who merely have the more gold40--,solon4 99 99 99 99 99 8,it never troubles the wolf how many sheep there are40--,agesilaus4 ,,numbers 8,a handful of troops inured to ,warfare proceed to certain victory2 while on the contrary1 numerous hordes of raw and undisciplined men are but a multitude of victims dragged to slaughter40--,vegetius4 99 99 99 99 99 8,turenne always was victorious with armies infinitely inferior in numbers to those of his enemies2 because he moved with expedition1 knew how to secure himself from being attacked in every situation and always kept near his enemy40--,count de ,saxe4 99 99 99 99 99 8,numbers are of no significance when troops are once thrown into confusion40--,prince ,eugene4 ,humanity is divisible into two groups1 one of which relatively is small and the other1 by comparison1 very large4 ,the first of these groups is made up comparatively of but a few persons1 who1 by virtue of circumstances are possessed of everything except adequate physical strength2 and the second group consists of those vast multitudes of mankind1 which are destitute of everything except of incalculable prowess1 due to their overwhelming numbers4 ,hence1 at every moment of its existence1 organized ,society is face to face with the possibility of collision into the ,under ,world2 and because of the knowledge that such encounter is inevitable1 unforeseeable and perhaps immediately impending1 ,civilization1 so-called1 ever is beset by an unspeakable and all-corroding fear4 ,to deter a multitude1 destitute of everything except the power to take1 from despoiling by means of its irresistible physique1 those few who are possessed of everything except ability to defend themselves1 in all ,ages has been the chiefest problem of mankind2 and to the solution of this problem has been devoted every resource known to ,education1 ,legislation1 ,ecclesiasticism and ,jurisprudence4 ,this condition further is complicated by a peculiar outgrowth of necessary expedients1 always more or less unstable1 due to that falsity of premise in which words do not agree with acts4 ,of these expedients the most incongruous is the arming and training of the children of the mob for the protection of the upper stratum2 and that peculiar mental insufficiency of hoi polloi1 whereby it ever is induced to accept as its leaders the sons of the ,patrician class4 ,that a social structure founded upon such anomalies should endure1 constitutes in itself the real ,nine ,wonders of the ,world2 and is proof of that marvellous ingenuity with which the ,house of ,have profits by the chronic predeliction of the ,house of ,want to fritter away time and opportunity1 feeding on vain hope4 99 99 99 99 99 ,the advantage in ,numbers consists in having in the aggregate more ,corps d'armee than has the adversary4 ,all benefit to be derived from the advantage in ,numbers is limited to the active and scientific use of every corp d'armee2 otherwise excess of ,numbers1 not only is of no avail1 but easily may degenerate into fatal disadvantage by impeding the decisive action of other kindred corps4 ,says ,napoleon3 8,it is only the troops brought into action1 that avails in battles and campaigns--the rest does not count40 ,a loss in ,numbers at chess-play occurs only when two pieces are lost for one1 or three for two1 or one for none1 and the like4 ,no diminution in aggregate of force can take place on the ,chess-board1 so long as the number of the opposing pieces are equal4 ,this is true although all the pieces on one side are ,queens and those of the other side all ,pawns4 ,the reason for this is3 ,all the ,chess-pieces are equal in strength1 one to the other4 ,the ,pawn can overthrow and capture any piece--the ,queen can do no more4 ,that is to say1 at its turn to move1 any piece can capture any adverse piece2 and this is all that any piece can do4 ,it is true that the ,queen1 on its turn to move1 has a maximum option of twenty-seven squares1 while the ,pawn's maximum never is more than three4 ,but as the power of the ,queen can be exerted only upon one point1 obviously1 her observation of the remaining twenty-six points is merely a manifestation of mobility1 and her display of force is limited to a single square4 ,hence1 the result in each case is identical1 and the display of force equal4 ,the relative advantage in ,numbers possessed by one army over an opposing army always can be determined by the following1 viz43 ,,rule ,that army which contains more ,corps d'armee than an opposing army has the relative advantage in ,numbers4 8,with the inferiority in ,numbers1 one must depend more upon conduct and contrivance than upon strength40--,caesar4 ,,military ,,examples 8,he who has the advantage in ,numbers1 if he be not a blockhead1 incessantly will distract his enemy by detachments1 against all of which it is impossible to provide a remedy40--,frederic the ,great4 99 99 99 99 99 8,he that hath the advantage in ,numbers usually should exchange pieces freely1 because the fewer that remain the more readily are they oppressed by a superior force40--,dal ,rio4 ,at ,thymbra1 ,cyrus the ,great1 king of the ,medes and ,persians1 with #aj1jjj horse cuirassiers1 #bj1jjj heavy infantry1 #cjj chariots and #aff1jjj light troops1 conquered ,croesus1 ,king of ,assyria whose army consisted of #cfj1jjj infantry and #fj1jjj cavalry4 ,this victory made ,persia dominant in ,asia4 99 99 99 99 99 ,at ,marathon1 #aj1jjj ,athenian and #a1jjj ,plataean heavy infantry1 routed #aaj1jjj ,medes and ,persians4 ,this victory averted the overthrow of ,grecian civilization by ,asiatic barbarism4 99 99 99 99 99 ,at ,leuctra1 ,epaminondas1 general of the ,thebans1 with #fjjj heavy infantry and #djj heavy horse1 routed the ,lacedaemonean army1 composed of #bb1jjj of the bravest and most skillful soldiers of the known world1 and extinguished the military ascendency which for centuries ,sparta had exercised over the ,grecian commonwealths4 ,at ,issus1 ,alexander the ,great with #dj1jjj heavy infantry and #g1jjj heavy cavalry destroyed the army of ,darius ,codomannus1 ,king of ,persia1 which consisted of #a1jjj1jjj infantry1 #dj1jjj cavalry1 #bjj chariots and #ae elephants4 ,this battle1 in which white men encountered elephants for the first time1 established the military supremacy of ,europe over ,asia4 99 99 99 99 99 ,alexander the ,great invaded ,asia 7,may1 #ccd ,b4,c47 whose armies aggregated #c1jjj1jjj men trained to war2 with #cj1jjj heavy infantry1 #djjj heavy cavalry1 #bbe1jjj dollars in money and thirty days' provisions4 ,at ,arbela1 ,alexander the ,great with #de1jjj heavy infantry and #h1jjj heavy horse1 annihilated the last resources of ,darius and reduced ,persia to a ,greek province4 ,the ,persian army consisted of about #fjj1jjj infantry and cavalry1 of whom #cjj1jjj were killed4 99 99 99 99 99 ,hannibal began his march from ,spain 7#bah ,b4,c47 to invade the ,roman commonwealth1 with #ij1jjj heavy infantry and #ab1jjj heavy cavalry4 ,he arrived at ,aosta in ,october 7#bah ,b4,c47 with only #bj1jjj infantry and #f1jjj cavalry to encounter a ,state that could put into the field #gjj1jjj of the bravest and most skillful soldiers then alive4 99 99 99 99 99 ,at ,cannae1 ,hannibal destroyed the finest army ,rome ever put in the field4 ,out of #ij1jjj of the flower of the commonwealth only about #c1jjj escaped4 ,the ,carthagenian army consisted of #dj1jjj heavy infantry and #aj1jjj heavy cavalry4 99 99 99 99 99 ,at ,alesia1 7#ea ,b4,c47 ,caesar completed the subjugation of ,gaul1 by destroying in detail two hostile armies aggregating #dgj1jjj men4 ,the ,roman army consisted of #dc1jjj heavy infantry1 #aj1jjj heavy cavalry and #aj1jjj light cavalry4 99 99 99 99 99 ,at ,pharsaleus1 7#dh ,b4,c47 ,caesar with #bb1jjj ,roman veterans routed #de1jjj soldiers under ,pompey and acquired the chief place in the ,roman state4 99 99 99 99 99 ,at ,angora1 7#adjb7 ,tamerlane1 with #a1djj1jjj ,asiatics1 destroyed the ,turkish army of #ijj1jjj men1 commanded by the ,ottoman ,sultan ,bajazet1 in the most stupendous battle of authentic record4 ,after giving his final instructions to his officers1 ,tamerlane1 it is recorded1 betook himself to his tent and played at ,chess until the crisis of the battle arrived1 whereupon he proceeded to the decisive point and in person directed those evolutions which resulted in the destruction of the ,ottoman army4 ,the assumption that the great ,asiatic warrior was playing at ,chess during the earlier part of the battle of ,angora1 undoubtedly is erroneous4 ,most probably he followed the progress of the conflict by posting chess-pieces upon the ,chessboard and moving these according to reports sent him momentarily by his lieutenants4 ,obviously1 in the days when the field telegraphy and telephone were unknown1 such method was entirely feasible and satisfactory to the ,master of ,strategetics and far superior to any attempt to overlook such a confused and complicated concourse4 99 99 99 99 99 ,at ,bannockburne 7,june #bd1 #acad71 ,robert ,bruce1 ,king of ,scotland1 with #cj1jjj ,scots annihilated the largest army that ,england ever put upon a battlefield4 ,this army was led by ,edward ,,ii and consisted of over #ajj1jjj of the flower of ,england's nobility1 gentry and yeomanry4 ,the victory established the independence of ,scotland and cost ,england #cj1jjj troops1 which could not be replaced in that generation4 99 99 99 99 99 ,gustavus ,adolphus invaded ,germany with an army of #bg1jjj men1 over one-half of whom were ,scots and ,english4 ,at that time the ,catholic armies in the field aggregated several hundred thousand trained and hardened soldiers1 led by brave and able generals4 ,at ,leipsic1 after #bj1jjj ,saxon allies had fled from the battlefield1 ,gustavus ,adolphus with #bb1jjj ,swedes1 ,scots and ,english routed #dd1jjj of the best troops of the day1 commanded by ,gen4 ,tilly4 ,this victory delivered the ,protestant princes of ,continental ,europe from ,catholic domination4 99 99 99 99 99 ,at ,zentha 7,sept4 #aa1 #afig71 ,prince ,eugene with #fj1jjj ,austrians routed #aej1jjj ,turks1 commanded by the ,sultan ,kara-,mustapha1 with the loss of #ch1jjj killed1 #d1jjj prisoners and #afj cannon4 ,this victory established the military reputation of this celebrated ,french ,general4 99 99 99 99 99 ,at ,turin 7,sept4 #g1 #agjf7 ,prince ,eugene with #cj1jjj ,austrians routed #hj1jjj ,french under the ,duke of ,orleans4 ,gen4 ,daun1 whose brilliant evolutions decided the battle1 afterward1 as ,field-,marshal of the ,austrian armies1 was routed by ,frederic the ,great at ,leuthern4 99 99 99 99 99 ,at ,peterwaradin 7,aug4 #e1 #agaf7 ,prince ,eugene with #fj1jjj ,austrians destroyed #aej1jjj ,turks4 ,this victory delivered ,europe for all time from the menace of ,mahometan dominion4 99 99 99 99 99 ,at ,belgrade 7,aug4 #bf1 #agag7 ,prince ,eugene with #ee1jjj ,austrians destroyed a ,turkish army of #bjj1jjj men4 99 99 99 99 99 ,at ,rosbach 7,nov4 #e1 #ageg7 ,frederic the ,great with #bb1jjj ,prussians1 in open field1 destroyed a ,french army of #gj1jjj regulars commanded by the ,prince de ,soubisse4 99 99 99 99 99 ,at ,leuthern 7,dec4 #e1 #ageg7 ,frederic the ,great with #cc1jjj ,prussians destroyed in open field1 an ,austrian army of #ic1jjj regulars1 commanded by ,field-,marshal ,daun4 ,the ,austrians lost #ed1jjj men and #bjj cannon4 99 99 99 99 99 ,at ,zorndorf 7,aug4 #be1 #ageh7 ,frederic the ,great with #de1jjj ,prussians destroyed a ,russian army of #fj1jjj men commanded by ,field-,marshal ,fermor4 ,the ,russians left #ah1jjj men dead on the field4 99 99 99 99 99 ,at ,leignitz 7,aug4 #ae1 #agfj7 ,frederic the ,great with #cj1jjj men out-manoeuvred1 defeated with the loss of #aj1jjj men and escaped from the combined ,austrian and ,russian armies aggregating #acj1jjj men4 99 99 99 99 99 ,at ,torgau 7,nov4 #e1 #agfj7 ,frederic the ,great with #de1jjj ,prussians destroyed an ,austrian army of #ij1jjj men1 commanded by ,field-,marshal ,daun4 99 99 99 99 99 ,washington1 with #g1jjj ,americans1 while pursued by #bj1jjj ,british and ,hessians under ,lord ,cornwallis1 captured a ,hessian advance column at ,trenton 7,dec4 #be1 #aggf7 and destroyed a ,british detachment at ,princeton1 7,jan4 #c1 #aggg74 99 99 99 99 99 ,bonaparte1 with #cj1jjj infantry1 #c1jjj cavalry and #dj cannon1 invaded ,italy1 7,march #bf1 #agif7 which was defended by #ajj1jjj ,piedmontese and ,austrian regulars under ,generals ,colli and ,beaulieu4 ,in fifteen days he had captured the former1 driven the latter to his own country and compelled ,piedmont to sign a treaty of peace and alliance with ,france4 ,at ,castiglione1 ,arcole1 ,bassano and ,rivoli1 with an army not exceeding #dj1jjj men ,bonaparte destroyed four ,austrian armies1 each aggregating about #ajj1jjj men4 99 99 99 99 99 ,at ,wagram1 ,napoleon1 with less than #ajj1jjj men1 overthrew the main ,austrian army of #aej1jjj men1 foiled the attempts at succor of the secondary ,austrian army of #dj1jjj men1 and compelled ,austria to accept peace with ,france4 ,in the campaign of #ahad1 ,napoleon1 with never more than #gj1jjj men1 twice repulsed from the walls of ,paris and drove backward nearly to the ,rhine ,river an allied army of nearly #cjj1jjj ,austrians1 ,prussians and ,russians4 99 99 99 99 99 ,in the year #dhj ,b4,c41 ,xerxes1 ,king of ,persia1 invaded ,greece with an army1 which by ,herodotus1 ,plutarch and ,isocrates1 is estimated at #b1fda1faj men at arms and exclusive of servants1 butlers1 women and camp followers4 ,arriving at the ,pass of ,thermopolae1 the march of the invaders was arrested by ,leonidas1 ,king of ,sparta1 with an army made up of #cjj ,spartans1 #djj ,thebans1 #gjj ,thespians1 #a1jjj ,phocians and #c1jjj from various ,grecian ,states1 posted behind a barricade built across the entrance4 ,this celebrated defile is about a mile in length4 ,it runs between ,mount ,oeta and an impassible morass1 which forms the edge of the ,gulf of ,malia and at each end is so narrow that a wagon can barely pass4 ,xerxes at once sent a herald who demanded of the ,grecians the surrender of their arms1 to which ,leonidas replied3 8,come and take them40 ,on the fifth day the ,persian army attacked1 but was unable to force an entrance into the pass4 ,on the sixth day the ,persian ,immortals likewise were repulsed1 and on the seventh day these troops again failed4 ,that night ,ephialtes1 a ,malian1 informed ,xerxes of a foot path around the mountains to the westward1 and a ,persian detachment was sent by a night march en surprise against the ,grecian rear4 ,on the approach of this hostile body1 the ,phocians1 who had been detailed by ,leonidas to guard this path1 abandoned their post without fighting and fled to the summit of the mountains1 leaving the way open to the enemy1 who1 wasting no time in pursuit1 at once marched against the rear of the ,grecian position4 ,at the command of ,leonidas1 all his allies1 with the exception of the #gjj ,thespians1 who refused to leave him1 abandoned ,thermopolae in haste and returned safely to their own countries4 ,xerxes waited until day was well advanced and his detachment had taken post upon the ,grecian rear4 ,then both ,persian columns attacked simultaneously4 ,the first part of this final conflict was fought outside and to the north of the barricade4 ,leonidas being slain and their numbers reduced over half1 the remaining ,greeks retired behind the barricade and took post upon a slight elevation1 where one after another they were killed by arrows and javelins4 ,the four days of fighting cost the ,persians over #bj1jjj of their best troops4 ,upon the summit of the hill where the ,spartans perished a marble lion was erected1 bearing the inscription3 8,go tell the ,lacedymonians1 ,o1 ,stranger1 ,that we died here in obedience to the law40 ,a second inscription engraved upon a stone column erected upon the scene of conflict read3 8,upon this spot four thousand ,pelleponesians contended against three hundred myriads40 99 99 99 99 99 ,the largest army commanded by ,epaminondas was about #gj1jjj men4 ,alexander the ,great1 after ,arbela1 had #ace1jjj trained troops4 ,hannibal never led more than #fj1jjj men in action1 nor ,caesar more than #hj1jjj4 ,gustavus ,adolphus1 just before ,lutzen1 marshalled #ge1jjj of the best soldiers in the world under the banners of ,protestantism4 ,turenne never fought with more than #dj1jjj troops2 ,prince ,eugene often had #aej1jjj in hand1 and ,frederic the ,great several times commanded #bjj1jjj men4 ,at ,yorktown1 ,washington had #af1jjj ,continentals1 #f1jjj ,french regulars and #ah1jjj ,provincial volunteers3 ,napoleon's largest army1 that of the ,austerlitz campaign1 consisted of #ahj1jjj men1 while von ,moltke personally directed at ,sadowa1 #bej1jjj men2 at ,gravelotte1 #baa1jjj men and at ,sedan1 #bjj1jjj men4 99 99 99 99 99 ,perfection in ,numbers is attained whenever the kindred army has the most troops in the theatre of decisive action4 ,,time 8,you lose the time for action in frivolous deliberations4 ,your generals instead of appearing at the head of your armies1 parade in processions and add splendor to public ceremonies4 ,your armies are composed of mercenaries1 the dregs of foreign nations1 vile robbers1 a terror only to yourselves and your allies4 ,indecision and confusion prevail in your counsels2 your projects have neither plan nor foresight4 ,you are the slaves of circumstance and opportunities continually escape you4 ,you hurry aimlessly hither and thither and arrive only in time to witness the success of your enemy40--,demosthenes4 ,,time 8,that greatest of all advantages--,,time60--,frederic the ,great4 99 99 99 99 99 8,ask me for anything except--,,time40--,napoleon4 99 99 99 99 99 8,time is the cradle of hope1 the grave of ambition1 the solitary counsel of the wise and the stern corrector of fools4 ,wisdom walks before it1 opportunities with it and repentance behind it4 ,he that hath made it his friend hath nothing to fear from his enemies1 but he that hath made it his enemy hath little to hope even from his friends40--,anon4 ,the absolute advantage of ,time consists in being able to move while the adversary must remain stationary4 ,the conditioned advantage in ,time i4e41 the ,initiative1 consists in artificially restricting the adverse ability to move4 ,advantage in ,time is divided into two classes3 ,i4 ,the ,initiative4 ,,ii4 ,absolute4 ,the ,initiative treats of restrictions to the movements of an army1 due to the necessity of supporting1 covering or sustaining ,points or corps d'armee1 menaced with capture by adverse corps offensive4 ,the absolute advantage in ,time is the ability to move1 while the adverse army must remain immovable4 ,whenever the right to move is unrestricted1 any desired ,piece may be moved to any desired ,point4 ,but whenever the right to move is restricted it follows that the ,piece desired cannot be moved2 or1 that if moved it cannot be moved to the desired ,point2 or1 that a piece not desired1 must be moved and usually to a ,point not desired4 ,such restrictions of the right to move1 quickly produce fatal defects in the kindred ,formation2 and from the fact that such fatal defects in ,formation can be produced by restricting the right to move1 arises the inestimable value of the advantage in ,time4 ,perfection in ,time is attained whenever the kindred army is able to move while the hostile army must remain stationary4 ,the object of the active or absolute advantage in ,time always is to remain with the ,initiative1 or ,passive ,advantage in ,time2 which consists in operating by the movement made1 such menaces1 as compel the enemy3 #a4 ,to move corps d'armee which he otherwise would not move and #b4 ,prevents him from moving corps d'armee which he otherwise would move4 ,,principle ,given superior brute strength and no matter how blunderingly and clumsily it be directed1 it always will end by accomplishing its purpose1 unless it is opposed by ,skill4 ,skill is best manifested by the proper use of ,time4 ,such ability is acquired only through study and experience1 guided by reflection1 and it can be retained only by systematic and unremitting practice4 ,most people imagine that ,skill is to be attained merely from study2 many believe it but the natural and necessary offshoot of long experience2 and there are some of the opinion that dilettante dabbling in book lore is an all-sufficient substitute for that sustained and laborious mental and physical effort1 which alone can make perfect in the competitive arts4 ,only by employing his leisure in reflection upon the events of the ,past can one get to understand those things which make for success in ,warfare and in ,chessplay1 and develop that all-essential ability to detect equivalents in any situation4 ,for in action there is no time for such reflection1 much less for development4 ,then1 moments of value inestimable for the achieving of results are not to be wasted in the weighing and comparison of things1 whose relative importance should be discerned in the twinkling of an eye1 by reason of prior familiarity with similar conditions4 ,the relative advantage in time possessed by one army over an opposing army always can be determined by the following1 viz43 ,,rule #a4 ,that army which is in motion while the opposing army must remain stationary has the absolute advantage in ,time4 #b4 ,that army which although at rest can dictate the movement of an opposing army in motion has the conditioned advantage in ,time1 i4e41 the ,initiative4 99 99 99 99 99 8,one may lose more by letting slip a decisive opportunity than afterwards can be gained by ten battles40--,gustavus ,adolphus4 8,it is the exact moment that must be seized2 one minute too soon or too late and the movement is utterly futile40--,napoleon4 ,,military ,,examples 8,the movements of an army should be characterized by decision and rapidity40--,hannibal4 99 99 99 99 99 8,in order to escape from a dilemma it first of all is necessary to gain ,time40--,napoleon4 ,thebes having revolted1 ,alexander the ,great marched #djj miles in fourteen days2 attacked and captured the city and razed it to the ground 7#cce ,b4,c47 sparing only the house and family of ,pindar1 the poet2 massacred all males capable of bearing arms and sold #cj1jjj women and children into slavery4 99 99 99 99 99 ,to gain time to occupy the ,strategic center and to cut the communications with ,rome of the army of the ,consul ,flaminius1 ,hannibal marched his army for three days and nights through the marshes of the ,po4 99 99 99 99 99 ,caesar marched from ,rome to ,sierra-,modena in ,spain1 a distance of #acej miles in twenty-three days4 99 99 99 99 99 ,frederic the ,great in order to gain time usually marched at midnight4 99 99 99 99 99 ,bonaparte finished his first ,italian campaign by winning the battles of ,st4 ,michaels1 ,rivoli and ,mantua1 marching #bjj miles and taking #bj1jjj prisoners1 all in less than four days4 ,in #ahje1 the ,french infantry in the manoeuvres which captured #fj1jjj ,austrians1 marched from #be to #cj miles a day4 ,in #ahjf the ,french infantry pursued the ,prussians at the same speed4 ,in #ahad1 ,napoleon's army marched at the rate of #cj miles per day1 besides fighting a battle every #bd hours4 ,retrograding for the succor of ,paris1 ,napoleon marched #ge miles in thirty-six hours4 ,on the return from ,elba1 #ahae1 the ,imperial ,guard marched #ej miles the first day1 #bjj miles in six days and reached ,paris1 a distance of #fjj miles1 in twenty days4 99 99 99 99 99 8,the fate of a battle always is decided by the lack of the few minutes required to bring separated bodies of troops into co-operation40--,napoleon4 ,,position ,,position 8,war is a business of position40--,napoleon4 ,by the term ,position is signified those relative advantages and disadvantages in location1 which appertain to the aggregate posts occupied by the kindred army1 as compared with the aggregate posts occupied by the adverse army4 ,advantages and disadvantages in ,position are of three classes1 viz43 7a7 ,those which appertain to the ,column of ,attack 7b7 ,those which appertain to the ,column of ,support4 7c7 ,those which appertain to the ,column of ,manoeuvre4 ,,strategetic ,,situations ,a ,strategic ,situation1 and whether in warfare or in ,chess-play1 is produced by the presence1 in any ,strategetic ,plane1 i4e41 theatre of conflict1 of two or more opposing ,strategetic ,entireties1 i4e41 contending armies4 ,these latter are of four classifications and are denominated as follows3 7a7 ,the ,kindred ,determinate ,force4 7b7 ,the ,adverse ,determinate ,force4 7c7 ,the ,kindred ,hypothetical ,force4 7d7 ,the ,adverse ,hypothetical ,force4 ,,rule ,i ,given the ,strategetic ,entireties present in a given ,strategetic ,situation1 designate the opposing ,prime ,strategetic ,factors and express the relative values of each in the terms of the ,strategic ,syllogism4 ,,the ,,strategic ,,syllogism ,having classified the existing ,strategetic ,situation1 it is necessary next to designate the opposing ,columns of ,attack1 of ,support1 and of ,manoeuvre4 ,then1 by comparing these ,prime ,strategetic ,factors1 to determine the net advantage1 disadvantage1 or equality that exist between them and to express this condition in the terms of the resulting ,strategic ,syllogism4 ,in the construction of a ,strategic ,syllogism1 the ,strategic1 i4e41 the positional value of each of the opposing ,prime ,strategetic ,factors contained in a given ,strategetic ,situation1 is expressed in terms made up of letters and symbols1 viz41 ,a ,signifies ,column of ,attack4 ,s 0 ,column of ,support4 ,m 0 ,column of ,manoeuvre4 0 ,advantage in ,position4 - 0 ,disadvantage in ,position4 0 ,equality in ,position4 ,the positional values of the several ,prime ,strategetic ,factors are obtained as follows3 ,,column ,,of ,,attack ,that ,column of ,attack which is posted upon the superior ,strategic front as compared to the front occupied by the immediately opposing formation 7cf1 ,grand ,tactics1 pp4 #aag to #bge71 has the advantage in position4 ,this relative advantage and disadvantage in position of the ,column of ,attack is expressed by the first term of the ,strategic ,syllogism1 viz43 7,i47 ,a ---- -,a or 7,,ii47 -,a ----- ,a ,in the first instance 7,i71 the ,white ,column of ,attack has the advantage and the ,black formation has the disadvantage2 in the second case 7,,ii71 this condition is reversed4 ,,column ,,of ,,support ,a ,column of ,support has the superiority in position1 as compared with the adverse ,column of ,support1 whenever it contains more than the latter of the following advantages1 viz43 ,i4 ,one1 or more1 ,passed ,pawns4 ,,ii4 ,two united ,pawns1 overlapping an adverse ,pawn4 ,,iii4 ,two isolated ,pawns adjacent to a single adverse ,pawn4 ,,iv4 ,three1 or more1 united ,pawns at their fifth squares1 opposed by a like number of adverse ,pawns posted on their ,normal ,base ,line4 ,v4 ,a majority of kindred ,pawns on that side of the ,board farthest from the adverse ,king4 ,the relative advantage and disadvantage of one ,column of ,support1 over the opposing ,column of ,support1 is expressed by the second term of the ,strategic ,syllogism1 thus3 7,i47 ,s ---- -,s or 7,,ii47 -,s ----- ,s ,in the first case 7,i71 ,white has the advantage and ,black has the disadvantage4 ,in the second case 7,,ii71 this condition is reversed4 ,,column ,,of ,,manoeuvre ,columns of ,manoeuvre are not compared with each other4 ,the advantage of one over another is determined by comparing their respective powers of resistance to the attack of the corresponding adverse ,columns of ,support4 ,that ,column of ,manoeuvre which longest can debar the adverse promotable ,factors from occupying a point of junction on the kindred ,strategetic ,rear1 has the advantage4 ,the relative advantage and disadvantage of the column of ,manoeuvre is expressed by the third term of the ,strategic ,syllogism1 viz43 7,i47 ,m ---- -,m or 7,,ii47 -,m ----- ,m ,in the first case 7,i71 ,white1 has the advantage and ,black the disadvantage4 ,in the second case 7,,ii71 this condition is reversed4 ,in recording the values of the opposing ,prime ,strategetic ,factors1 the terms relating to ,white are written above and those relating to ,black1 below the line4 ,the terms expressing the relative values of the ,columns of ,attack always are placed at the left2 those for the ,columns of ,support in the center1 and those for the ,columns of ,manoeuvre at the right4 ,the ,strategic ,syllogisms are twenty-seven in number and are formulated1 viz43 ,,table ,,of ,,strategic ,,syllogisms ,no4 #a4 ,a,s,m ------ -,a-,s-,m ,no4 #b4 ,a,s,m ------ -,a-,s,m ,no4 #c4 ,a,s-,m ------ -,a-,s,m ,no4 #d4 ,a,s,m ------ -,a,s-,m ,no4 #e4 ,a,s,m ------ -,a,s,m ,no4 #f4 ,a,s-,m ------ -,a,s,m ,no4 #g4 ,a-,s,m ------ -,a,s-,m ,no4 #h4 ,a-,s,m ------ -,a,s,m ,no4 #i4 ,a-,s-,m ------ -,a,s,m ,no4 #aj4 ,a,s,m ------ ,a-,s-,m ,no4 #aa4 ,a,s,m ------ ,a-,s,m ,no4 #ab4 ,a,s-,m ------ ,a-,s,m ,no4 #ac4 ,a,s,m ------ ,a,s-,m ,no4 #ad4 ,a,s,m ------ ,a,s,m ,no4 #ae4 ,a,s-,m ------ ,a,s,m ,no4 #af4 ,a-,s,m ------ ,a,s-,m ,no4 #ag4 ,a-,s,m ------ ,a,s,m ,no4 #ah4 ,a-,s-,m ------ ,a,s,m ,no4 #ai4 -,a,s,m ------ ,a-,s-,m ,no4 #bj4 -,a,s,m ------ ,a-,s,m ,no4 #ba4 -,a,s-,m ------ ,a-,s,m ,no4 #bb4 -,a,s,m ------ ,a,s-,m ,no4 #bc4 -,a,s,m ------ ,a,s,m ,no4 #bd4 -,a,s-,m ------ ,a,s,m ,no4 #be4 -,a-,s,m ------ ,a,s-,m ,no4 #bf4 -,a-,s,m ------ ,a,s,m ,no4 #bg4 -,a-,s-,m ------ ,a,s,m ,,strategic ,,elementals4 ,each of the terms contained in the ,strategic ,syllogism should have its counterpart in a tangible and competent mass of troops4 ,this principle of ,strategetics1 when applied to warfare1 is absolute1 and admits of no exception4 ,the catastrophies sustained by the ,french armies in the campaigns of #ahab1 #ahac1 #ahad and #ahae are each and every one directly due to the persistent violation by ,napoleon of this basic truth1 in devolving the duties of a column of support and a column of manoeuvre upon a single ,strategic ,elemental4 ,in solemn contrast to that fatal and indefensible rashness which cost ,napoleon five great armies and ultimately his crown1 is the dictum by one whose transcendent success in warfare1 is the antithesis of the utter ruination which terminated the career of the famous ,corsican4 ,says ,frederic the ,great3 8,i adhere to those universal laws which all the elements obey2 these1 for me are sufficient40 ,singularly enough1 it seemingly has escaped the notice of the great in warfare1 owing to the subtle mathematical construction of the ,chess-board1 its peculiar relations to the moves of the ,chess-pieces1 and of the latter to each other1 that3 ,,principle ,i4 ,the functions of all three terms contained in a ,strategic ,syllogism may be combined in a single chess ,pawn1 and1 that3 ,,ii4 ,all three functions are contemplated in and should be expressed by every movement of every ,chess-piece2 and every move upon the ,chess-board is weak and unscientific1 to the extent that it disregards either of these obligations4 99 99 99 99 99 ,those advantages in position1 which are denoted by the plus signs of the ,strategic ,syllogism1 have their material manifestation upon the surface of the earth by ,corps d'armee1 and by ,pieces which are equivalents of these latter1 upon the ,chess-board4 ,the sign ,a in the ,strategic ,syllogism denotes the superior ,strategic ,front4 ,that point whose occupation by a kindred piece demonstrates such superiority in position is termed the ,key of ,position4 ,the kindred ,corps occupying such point constitutes a ,corps en ,line1 and is termed the ,first ,strategic ,elemental4 ,the sign ,s in the ,strategic ,syllogism denotes the larger number of pawn altitudes open to the kindred promotable factors4 ,those points occupied by such kindred promotable factors are termed ,logistic ,origins4 ,the kindred ,corps which occupy such points constitute ,corps en ,route and collectively are termed the ,second ,strategic ,elemental4 ,the objective of ,corps en ,route always is the ,kindred ,logistic ,horizon4 ,the sign ,m in the ,strategic ,syllogism denotes that the shortest open pawn altitude is occupied by a kindred promotable factor4 ,such kindred promotable factor is termed the ,corps en ,touch1 and the point occupied by such ,corps is termed the ,point of ,proximity4 ,the ,objective of such ,corps always is a designated ,point of ,junction in the ,kindred ,logistic ,horizon1 and such ,corps constitutes the ,third ,strategic ,elemental4 ,in ,warfare it is imperative that each of these ,strategic ,elementals be represented by one or more ,corps d'armee4 ,but it is a second peculiarity of the ,chessic mechanism that a single ,chessic ,corps d'armee may represent in itself1 one1 two or three ,strategic ,elementals and thus constitute even the entire ,strategic ,ensemble4 ,hence1 in ,chess play1 the ,strategic ,ensemble may be either single1 double1 or triple1 viz43 ,a ,single ,strategic ,ensemble consists either of3 7a7 #a4 ,major ,vertex4 #b4 ,grand ,vertex4 7b7 ,logistic ,origin4 7c7 ,point of ,proximity4 ,a ,double ,strategic ,ensemble consists of either3 7a7 #a4 ,major ,vertex1 plus a ,kindred ,logistic ,origin4 #b4 ,grand ,vertex1 plus a ,kindred ,logistic ,origin4 7b7 #a4 ,major ,vertex1 plus a ,kindred ,point of ,proximity4 #b4 ,grand ,vertex1 plus a ,kindred ,point of ,proximity4 7c7 ,logistic ,origin1 plus a ,kindred ,point of ,proximity4 ,a ,triple ,strategic ,ensemble consists of3 #a4 ,major ,vertex1 plus a ,kindred ,logistic ,origin1 plus a ,kindred ,point of ,proximity4 #b4 ,grand ,vertex1 plus a ,kindred ,point of ,proximity1 plus a ,kindred ,logistic ,origin4 ,,principle ,the relative positional advantage expressed by the plus signs of the ,strategic ,syllogism decreases as the number of plus signs in the ,strategic ,syllogism exceeds the number of corresponding ,strategic ,elementals4 ,failure to observe the amalgamation of the duties of the three ,grand ,columns in each and every move upon the ,chess-board1 and to note that the tangible and material expression of these powers and advantages may be expressed either by three1 by two1 or even by a single ,chessic ,corps d'armee1 has caused doubt of the exact analogy between ,chess and ,war2 and hence a like doubt of the utility of ,chess-play4 ,recognizing the truth of the foregoing1 the ,asiatic conqueror1 ,tamerlane1 sought to rectify this discrepancy between the mechanism of ,chess and that of ,war1 by increasing the size of the ,chess-board to one hundred and forty-four squares1 and the number of pieces to forty-eight4 ,by this innovation the geometric harmony existing between the ,dynamic and the ,static surfaces of the ,chess-board was destroyed2 and this without substituting therefor another like condition of mathematic perfection4 ,ultimately1 this remedy was abandoned1 a fate which sooner or later1 has overtaken all attempts to improve that superlative intellectual exercise of which says ,voltaire3 8,of all games1 ,chess does most honor to the human mind40 ,the reason why the scheme devised by ,tamerlane did not satisfy even himself1 and why all attempted alterations in the machinery of ,chess prove unacceptable in practice1 is due to the present perfect adaptation of the ,board and the ,pieces for exemplifying the processes of ,strategetic ,art4 ,any change in the construction of the ,chess-board and the ,chess-pieces1 to be effective1 must largely increase the number of ,chessmen1 correspondingly increase the number of squares1 and equally so1 increase the number of moves permitted to each player at his turn to play4 ,that is to say3 ,such innovation to be correct must permit each player at his turn to play to move one of the ,corps d'armee contained in the ,column of ,attack1 a second in the ,column of ,support1 and a third in the ,column of ,manoeuvre4 ,necessarily1 the number of pieces must be increased in order to provide ,corps d'armee for the make-up of each ,grand ,column1 and obviously1 the ,board must be sufficiently enlarged to accommodate not merely this increased mass1 but also to permit full scope for the increased number of possible movements4 ,the student thus readily will perceive1 that it is only one step from such an elaboration of ,chess1 to an army and the theatre of actual campaigning4 99 99 99 99 99 ,perfection in ,position is attained whenever the kindred army is acting or is posted as a unit1 while the hostile army is not so posted nor able so to act4 ,,military ,,examples ,,column ,,of ,,attack 8,frontal attacks are to be avoided1 and the preference always is to be given to the assault of a single wing1 with your center and remaining wing held back2 because if your attack is successful you equally destroy the enemy without the risk of being routed if you fail40--,frederic the ,great4 ,at ,leuctra and ,mantinea1 ,epaminondas won by the oblique or ,strategic order of battle4 ,alexander the ,great won by the same order at ,issus and the ,haspades4 ,cyrus won at ,thymbra and ,hannibal won at ,trebia1 ,thrasymene1 ,cannae and ,herdonea1 by the three sides of an octagon or enveloping formation4 ,caesar won by the oblique order at ,pharsaleus4 99 99 99 99 99 ,gustavus ,adolphus won at ,leipsic by acting from the ,tactical ,center and ,turenne and ,prince ,eugene gained their victories by the same means4 99 99 99 99 99 ,frederic the ,great won at ,hohenfriedberg1 ,sohr1 ,rosbach1 ,leuthern1 ,zorndorf and ,leignitz by the oblique order and at ,torgau by acting from the tactical center4 99 99 99 99 99 ,washington won at ,trenton and ,princeton acting by three contiguous sides of an octagon4 ,bonaparte won at ,montenotte1 ,castiglione1 ,arcola1 ,rivoli1 ,ulm1 ,austerlitz1 ,jena1 ,friedland1 ,wagram and ,ligny1 by acting from the tactical center4 ,never did he attack by the oblique order of battle4 99 99 99 99 99 ,von ,moltke's victories all were won by acting in strict accord with the system laid down for the use of the ,prussian army by ,frederic the ,great4 ,,column ,,of ,,support ,the most magnificent illustration both of the proper and of the improper use of the ,column of ,support is found in that ,grand ,operation executed by the ,roman consuls1 ,claudius ,nero and ,marcus ,livius1 whereby the ,carthagenian ,army under ,hasdrubal was destroyed at the river ,metaurus #bjg ,b4,c4 ,hannibal1 with the main ,carthagenian army1 posted in the south of ,italy near ,canusium1 was observed by ,nero and his troops2 while in the west1 ,hasdrubal1 observed by ,livius was slowly advancing southward to form a junction with his brother1 a most unscientific procedure4 ,livius permitted ,hasdrubal to penetrate into ,italy to a point a few miles south of the ,metaurus ,river2 whereupon ,nero1 taking #g1jjj of his best troops1 by a rapid march of #bjj miles united with ,livius2 and the two consuls at once falling upon ,hasdrubal utterly annihilated the ,carthagenian army4 ,nero returned at all speed and the first news of his march and of the death blow to the ,carthagenian projects against ,rome was furnished by the sight of his brother's head1 which ,nero cast into ,hannibal's camp from a military machine4 ,the true method for uniting the ,columns of ,support to a ,column of ,attack is thus shown by ,gustavus ,adolphus3 8,we encamped about ,nuremberg the middle of ,june1 the army after so many detachments was not above #aa1jjj infantry and #h1jjj horse and dragoons4 ,the ,king posted his army in the suburbs and drew intrenchments around the circumference so that he begirt the whole city with his army4 ,his works were large1 the ditch deep1 planked by innumerable bastions1 ravelins1 horn-works1 forts1 redoubts1 batteries and palisades1 the incessant labor of #hjjj men for fourteen days4 8,on the #cjth of ,june the ,imperialists1 joined to the ,bavarian army arrived and sat down #fj1jjj strong1 between the city and the friendly states2 in order to intercept the ,king's provisions and to starve him out4 8,the ,king had three great detachments and several smaller ones1 acting abroad1 reducing to his power the castles and towns of the adjacent countries and these he did not hasten to join him until their work was done4 8,the two chief armies had now lain for five or six weeks in sight of each other and the ,king thinking all was ready1 ordered his generals to join him4 ,gustavus ,horn was on the ,moselle1 ,chancellor ,oxenstern about ,mentz and ,cologne and ,dukes ,william and ,bernard and ,gen4 ,bannia in ,bavaria4 8,our friends were not backward in obeying the ,king's command1 and having drawn together their forces from various parts and ,,all joined the chancellor ,oxenstern1 they set out in full march for ,nuremburg1 where they arrived ,aug4 #ba1 being #cj1jjj old soldiers commanded by officers of the greatest conduct and experience in the world40 99 99 99 99 99 ,only once1 at the battle of ,torgau1 7,nov4 #e1 #agfj7 did ,frederick the ,great rely upon the co-operation of his ,columns of ,support for victory4 ,as the result1 his ,column of ,attack of #be1jjj men fought the entire battle and was so ruined by the fire and sabres of #ij1jjj enemies and #djj pieces of artillery that1 as the sun went down the ,king charged at the head of two battalions1 his sole remaining troops4 ,at this moment ,gen4 ,zeithen1 with the ,column of ,support1 of #bb1jjj men occupied ,siptka ,hill1 the tactical key of the battlefield1 and fired a salvo of artillery to inform the ,king of their presence4 ,the astonished ,austrians turned and fled2 the ,king's charge broke their line of battle and ,frederic grasped a victory1 8for which0 says ,napoleon1 8he was indebted to ,fortune and the only one in which he displayed no talent40 ,this comment of course is not true4 ,frederic displayed magnificent talent that day1 by holding in check a force of thrice his numbers and so shattering it by his incessant attacks that it crumbled to pieces before the mere presence and at sight of his fresh and vigorous ,column of ,support4 ,had ,napoleon displayed such talent in the personal conduct of battles during #ahac1 #ahad and #ahae it is possible that he would have terminated his career at some other place than at ,st4 ,helena4 ,the experience1 however1 was enough to fully satisfy ,frederic1 and never again did he attempt a ,logistic battle4 99 99 99 99 99 ,the capture of ,lord ,cornwallis at ,yorktown is perhaps the nearest approach to the achievement of ,nero and ,livius in the annals of the military art4 ,decoyed by the retrograde movements of ,gen4 ,greene1 the ,british army was deluded into taking up a position at ,yorktown1 having the unfordable ,james ,river in rear1 and within striking distance of the main ,american army under ,washington about ,new ,york ,city4 ,lafayette was ordered to reinforce ,greene2 ,count d',esting was induced to bring the ,french fleet from the ,west ,indies to ,chesapeake ,bay to prevent the rescue of ,cornwallis by ,british coming by the ocean1 and ,count ,rochambeau was requested to join ,washington with the ,french army then in ,rhode ,island4 ,all this took time1 but everything was executed like clockwork4 ,the ,french fleet arrived in the ,chesapeake2 the next day came a ,british fleet to rescue the ,earl's army4 ,in the naval fight which ensued1 the ,british were driven to sea and so damaged as to compel their return to ,new ,york4 ,by a swift march1 ,washington1 with his ,continentals and the ,french1 joined ,greene and ,lafayette1 and two of his redoubts being taken by storm1 ,lord ,cornwallis surrendered4 ,this victory established the independence of the ,american ,colonies4 99 99 99 99 99 ,the ,logistic ,battle1 i4e41 the combination of the ,columns of ,attack and of ,support was first favorite with ,napoleon and to his partiality for this particular form of the tactical offensive was due both the spectacular successes and the annihilating catastrophes which mark his astonishing career4 ,the retrieving of his lost battle of ,marengo1 by the fortuitous arrival of ,dessaix column1 seems to have impressed ,napoleon to the extent that he ever after preferred to win by such process1 rather than by any other4 ,the first attempt to put his new hypothesis into practice was at ,jena4 ,single handed his column of attack destroyed the ,prussian main body1 while ,davoust with the column of manoeuvre held in check over three times his numbers4 ,the ,french ,column of ,support under ,bernadotte did not arrive in season to fire a shot4 99 99 99 99 99 ,at ,eylau1 the ,french ,column of ,support under ,davoust was four hours in advancing six miles against the opposition of the ,russian general ,doctoroff4 ,the second ,french ,column of ,support under ,ney did not reach the field until the battle was over4 99 99 99 99 99 ,in the retreat from ,russia1 the ,french ,column of ,support under the ,duke of ,belluno was driven from its position at ,smolensko1 thus permitting the ,russians under ,kutosof to occupy the ,strategic center1 which disaster cost ,napoleon #cj1jjj men in clearing his communications4 99 99 99 99 99 ,in #ahac1 the ,column of ,support under ,ney at ,bautzen was misdirected and the battle rendered indecisive by its lack of co-operation with the ,french ,column of ,attack4 99 99 99 99 99 ,in #ahad1 ,napoleon conformed to the ,art by acting in three columns1 but yielding to his besetting military sin1 he joined his ,column of ,support to his ,column of ,attack and through the open space thus created in the ,french ,strategetic ,front1 ,blucher advanced triumphantly to ,paris4 99 99 99 99 99 ,in the ,waterloo campaign1 ,napoleon properly began with three ,grand ,columns4 ,at the battle of ,ligny1 his ,column of ,support arrived upon ,blucher's left flank and then without firing a shot1 wheeled about and marched away4 ,at ,waterloo1 by uniting his ,columns of ,attack and of ,support prematurely1 ,napoleon permitted ,blucher to penetrate the ,french ,strategetic ,front and to win in the same manner and as decisively as he did at ,paris4 99 99 99 99 99 ,von ,moltke won the battle of ,sadowa by the arrival of the ,prussian ,column of ,support1 commanded by ,prince ,frederic ,william4 ,but in the interim1 the ,german main army was driven in several miles by the ,austrians1 and ,prince ,bismark's first white hairs date from that day4 ,,column ,,of ,,manoeuvre 8,a small body of brave and expert men1 skillfully handled and favored by the ground1 easily may render difficult the advance of a large army40--,frederic the ,great4 ,at the river ,metaurus1 the ,roman ,consul ,livius gave a fine example of the duties of a ,column of ,manoeuvre which are slowly and securely to retreat before an advancing enemy and never to be induced into a pitched battle until the arrival of the kindred main body4 99 99 99 99 99 ,frederic the ,great made great use of ,columns of ,manoeuvre4 ,in the ,seven ,years ,war he constantly maintained such a column against the armies of each ,state with whom ,prussia was at war2 while himself and his brother ,henry operated as ,columns of ,attack4 99 99 99 99 99 ,in the ,revolutionary ,war1 ,washington maintained a ,column of ,manoeuvre against the ,british in ,rhode ,island1 another against the ,british in the south and a third against the hostile ,indian tribes of the southwest4 99 99 99 99 99 ,napoleon constantly used ,columns of ,manoeuvre in all his campaigns2 notably at ,montenotte1 ,castiglione1 ,arcole1 ,rivoli1 ,ulm1 ,austerlitz1 ,jena1 in #ahab1 #ahac1 #ahad and at ,ligny and ,waterloo in #ahae4 ,,prime ,,strategetic ,,means ,,prime ,,strategetic ,,means 8,it is necessary exactly to weigh the means we possess in opposition to the enemy in order to determine beforehand which must ultimately predominated40--,frederic the ,great4 ,those elemental quantities whose comparative values are determined by ,grand ,reconnaissance and which are termed3 ,organization1 ,topography1 ,mobility1 ,numbers1 ,time1 and ,position1 collectively constitute ,prime ,strategetic ,means whose proper employment is the basis of every true ,prime ,strategetic ,process4 ,,policy ,,of ,,campaign ,that relative advantage in ,numbers expressed by the larger aggregate of ,chess-pieces is materially manifested upon the ,chess-board by additional geometric and sub-geometric symbols4 ,excess or deficiency in ,numbers determines the policy of ,campaign4 ,the policy of the inferior force is3 #a4 ,to preserve intact its ,corps d'armee1 and #b4 ,to engage in battle only when victory can be assured by other advantages in ,strategetic means1 which nullify the adverse advantage in ,numbers2 and even then only when such victory is decisive of the ,campaign4 ,hence1 the policy of ,campaign of that army superior in ,numbers1 is3 ,incessantly to proffer battles which3 7a7 ,accepted1 constantly reduces the inferior army and increases its disproportion in numbers1 or1 7b7 ,evaded1 compels the inferior army to abandon important posts1 for whose defence it cannot afford the resulting loss of troops2 thus permitting to the numerically superior army a continually increasing advantage in ,position4 ,,principle ,all else being equal the advantage of ,numbers is decisive of victory in battle and ,campaign4 ,things being unequal1 the advantage in ,numbers may be nullified by adverse advantages in ,organization1 ,topography1 ,mobility1 ,time and ,position4 ,victory resulting from advantage in ,numbers is achieved by simultaneously attacking two or more ,tactical ,keys from a ,kindred ,strategic ,key and two or more ,kindred ,points of ,command4 ,,to ,,locate ,,the ,,area ,,of ,,concentration ,that relative advantage in ,mobility expressed by the situation of the ,strategic ,front upon the ,strategetic ,center is materially manifested upon the ,chess-board by ,kindred ,chess-pieces posted upon that great central diagonal which extends towards the ,objective ,plane4 ,such advantage determines those points which should be occupied in the proper development of the front so posted2 and consequently designates the direction and location of that battlefield upon which the kindred army may concentrate in overwhelming force1 despite all possible resistance by the enemy4 ,,most ,,favorable ,,battlefield ,that relative advantage in ,organization expressed by superior potential totality1 is materially manifested upon the ,chess-board by the geometric and sub-geometric symbols of those ,chess-pieces possessed of the superior potential complement4 ,such symbols taken in combination1 describe that field of battle most favorable for the execution of those ,major ,tactical evolutions which appertain to the ,chess-pieces of superior organization4 ,,posts ,,of ,,maximum ,,security ,that relative defensive advantage in ,topography expressed by inaccessibility to hostile attack is materially manifested upon the ,chess-board by ,corps of ,position1 posted upon points of different color to that occupied by the adverse ,bishop2 and this advantage designates those posts situated on a projected field of battle which may be occupied with the maximum of security4 ,that relative offensive advantage in ,topography expressed by accessibility to kindred attack is materially manifested upon the ,chess-board by ,corps of ,position posted upon points of the same color as that occupied by the kindred ,bishop2 and this advantage designates those posts situated on a projected field of battle which may be attacked with the maximum facility4 ,,character ,,of ,,the ,,most ,,favorable ,,battle ,that relative advantage in ,position with the ,column of ,attack1 expressed3 #a4 ,by superior location1 direction and development of the ,kindred ,strategic ,front of ,operations2 and #b4 ,by the occupation of ,points of ,departure1 of ,manoeuvre1 of ,command and of the ,strategic ,key of a ,true ,strategic ,horizon1 indicates that a ,strategic ,grand ,battle in the first instance2 and in the second case that a ,tactical ,grand ,battle is most favorable in the existing situation4 ,that relative advantage in ,position with the ,column of ,support1 expressed by superior facilities for occupying with the ,kindred ,promotable ,factors their corresponding ,points of ,junction in the ,kindred ,logistic ,horizon1 is materially manifested upon the ,chess-board by the larger number of ,pawn ,altitudes which either are open1 or may be opened1 despite all possible resistance by the enemy2 and such advantage designates those adverse ,points of ,impenetrability and ,points of ,resistance to the march of the ,kindred ,promotable ,factors1 which it is necessary to nullify4 ,that relative advantage in ,position with the ,column of ,manoeuvre1 expressed by the security of the ,kindred and the exposure of the adverse ,strategetic ,rear to attack by the ,kindred ,column of ,support1 is materially manifested upon the ,chess-board by the occupation by a ,kindred ,promotable ,factor of the ,point of ,proximity2 and such advantage indicates that the advance with all possible celerity of such ,promotable ,factor and ,point of ,proximity toward the corresponding ,point of ,junction is a dominating influence in the existing situation4 ,,projected ,,grand ,,battle ,from the advantage in ,position appertaining to the three ,grand ,columns is deduced the character of the ,grand ,battle properly in sequence4 ,advantage in ,position with the ,column of ,attack indicates the opportunity1 all else being equal1 to engage in a victorious ,strategic ,grand ,battle against the hostile ,formation in ,mass1 or in a ,tactical ,grand ,battle against the hostile ,formation by ,wings4 ,advantage in ,position with the ,column of ,support indicates the opportunity to engage effectively in a series of minor battles1 as though having the advantage in ,numbers4 ,advantage in ,position with the ,column of ,manoeuvre indicates the opportunity to engage in a victorious ,logistic ,grand ,battle against the adverse ,formation by ,grand ,columns4 ,,least ,,favorable ,,adverse ,,condition ,that relative advantage in ,time expressed by restrictions of the adversary's choice of movements at his turn to play1 is materially manifested upon the ,chess-board by ,feints operated by ,kindred ,chess-pieces against adverse vital points2 and such advantage of the ,initiative dictates the next move of the opposing army4 ,the advantage of the ,initiative determines which of the adverse corps d'armee may and may not move4 ,the material expression of this advantage always is a ,feint by a ,kindred ,corps against a vital point either occupied or unoccupied1 which necessitates that upon his next move1 the enemy either evacuate1 support1 cover or sustain the post so menaced4 ,such feint1 therefore1 restricts the move of the enemy to those of his corps as are able to obviate the threatened loss and proportionately reduces the immediate activity of his army4 ,,relative ,,advantages ,,in ,,location 8,it is only the force brought into action that avails in battles and campaigns--the rest does not count40--,napoleon4 ,the distance which separates opposing ,corps d'armee always modifies the values of the ,prime ,strategetic ,means4 ,hence in the making of ,grand ,reconnaissance1 it is next in sequence to determine whether the ,chess-pieces are3 ,i4 ,in ,contact4 ,,ii4 ,in ,presence4 ,,iii4 ,at ,distance4 ,corps d'armee are in ,contact with each other whenever their logistic radii intersect2 or1 their radii offensive and the corresponding adverse radii defensive are opposed to each other4 ,corps d'armee are in ,presence whenever the posts which they occupy are contained within the same ,strategic front1 the same ,strategetic ,horizon1 or are in communication with their corresponding posts of mobilization1 development1 or manoeuvre4 ,corps d'armee are at ,distance when the posts which they occupy are not in communication with ,kindred ,corps d'armee posted upon the strategic front adopted1 or with posts of mobilization or development contained within the corresponding ,primary ,base of ,operations1 or1 within the ,true ,strategetic ,horizon4 ,,requisites ,,for ,,successful ,,campaigning ,every ,campaign1 whether upon the surface of the ,earth or upon the ,chess-board is decided and usually is terminated by a ,grand ,battle4 ,those movements of opposing ,grand ,columns1 whereby such decisive conflict is brought about under circumstances which ensure victory1 by reason of superior advantages in ,strategetic ,means1 are termed ,grand ,manoeuvres2 and a proper series of ,grand ,manoeuvres1 combined with their corresponding feints1 strategems1 ambuscades and minor battles1 the whole terminated by a resulting ,grand ,battle1 is termed a ,grand ,operation4 ,those processes of ,grand ,manoeuvre1 which produce an opportunity to victoriously engage in battle1 are the most subtle and difficult known to the ,strategetic ,art4 ,successful application of these processes in practice depends wholly upon proper use of the ,,means at hand and the doing of the utmost that can be done in the ,,time available4 ,nothing can be more repugnant to high art in ,strategetics than those crudities termed in the specious mouthings of pretentious mediocrity 8waiting moves10 8delayed strokes10 8defensive-offensives10 8masterly inactivities10 and the like4 8,time past is gone and cannot be regained2 time future is not and may never be2 time present is0 and with it ,opportunity1 which an instant later may be gone4 ,the gain of but 8a foot of ground and a minute of time0 would have saved the ,french army at ,rosbach and have cost ,frederic the ,great one of his most lustrous victories and perhaps his army and his crown4 ,,principle ,in ,strategetics there is but a single method whereby ,opportunity may be availed of1 and that is by so augmenting kindred advantages and so depreciating adverse advantages as to acquire for the kindred army that particular advantage of ,strategetic means which in the given situation is the proper basis of the ,strategetic movement next in sequence4 99 99 99 99 99 ,at ,distance4 ,the chief requisite for success when acting against an adverse army at ,distance1 is the advantage in ,,mobility4 ,the primary process is that of a ,grand ,manoeuvre against an adverse army acting in the formation by ,grand ,columns1 and the object of such ,grand ,manoeuvre always is1 by superior celerity of movement1 to occupy3 #a4 ,the ,strategic ,center by the ,kindred ,column of ,attack1 thus intersecting the ,route of ,communication between the adverse main body and its ,base of ,operation2 or to occupy3 #b4 ,the ,logistic ,center with the ,kindred ,columns of ,support and of ,manoeuvre1 thus intersecting the ,route of ,communication between the adverse main body and its ,chief ,supporting ,column and clearing the way for the advance of the ,kindred ,column of ,support against the flank and rear of the adverse ,main ,body4 ,obviously1 the united ,kindred ,columns of ,attack and of ,support always will constitute an overwhelming superiority in ,numbers as compared with the adverse main body4 ,in ,presence4 ,the chief requisite for success when acting against an adverse ,grand ,column in ,presence1 is the advantage in ,,position4 ,the primary process is that of a ,grand ,manoeuvre against an adverse army acting in the ,formation by ,wings1 and the object of such ,grand ,manoeuvre always is1 by availing to the uttermost of its situation upon the ,tactical ,center1 i4e41 upon the area midway between the adverse ,wings thus isolated from each other2 to act in overwhelming ,numbers1 first against one and then against the other hostile bodies4 ,in ,contact4 ,the chief requisite for success when acting offensively against an adverse ,grand ,column1 or ,wing1 or ,corps d'armee1 in ,contact1 is the advantage in ,,numbers4 ,the primary process is that of a ,grand ,battle in which the kindred army has an overwhelming superiority in ,numbers in contact1 and at least the equality in all other ,prime ,strategetic ,means4 ,in this circumstance1 the object of such ,grand ,battle always is3 #a4 ,to attack the hostile ,formation in ,mass frontally at the center1 and upon both wings obliquely2 all three attacks being made simultaneously and the evolutions so executed that the hostile army never is able to penetrate between either kindred wing and the kindred center1 nor to outflank that kindred wing which may be in the air4 #b4 ,in case the kindred army has the equality or inferiority in all other ,prime ,strategetic ,means1 then the object of a ,grand ,battle on the ,offensive is to attack the hostile ,formation in ,mass obliquely with the whole kindred army1 and preferably upon that wing which covers the route of communication of the adverse army with its ,base of ,operations1 but always upon that wing which contains the ,tactical ,key of the actual ,battlefield4 ,obviously1 the concentration of the entire kindred army against a single adverse wing always will constitute an overwhelming superiority in ,numbers4 ,in making such attack obliquely against a single adverse wing1 the center and remaining wing of the kindred army must not engage until the kindred ,van and ,corps of ,position of the attacking wing first have formed the center of three sides of an octagon2 of which the ,kindred ,corps of ,evolution will form the farthest side and the ,kindred ,center and left wing ,corps d'armee will form the nearest and latest constructed side4 99 99 99 99 99 ,the chief requisite for success when acting defensively against a ,grand ,column1 or ,wing1 or ,corps d'armee is the advantage in ,,topography4 ,the primary process is that of a ,grand ,battle in which the kindred army1 decidedly inferior in ,numbers in the aggregate1 has the advantage in ,topography and equality in all other ,prime ,strategetic ,means4 ,in this case the object is to support both flanks of the inferior army upon impassable natural barriers1 strengthening both wings at the expense of the center1 both in quantity and in quality of troops4 ,if the ,tactical ,defensive be selected1 the center should retire before the oncoming of the hostile army in order to enclose it between the ,kindred ,wings1 which will then overwhelm it by superior ,numbers1 while the natural barriers on the flanks being impassable will prevent the remaining hostile corps from participating in the battle otherwise than as spectators4 ,should the ,tactical ,offensive be selected1 that kindred wing best adapted for attack should engage supported by all kindred ,corps of ,evolution1 while advancing the ,kindred ,center in reserve and holding the remaining wing refused and in observation4 ,all else being equal1 relative advantage in either branch of ,prime ,strategetic ,means is sufficient to ensure victory in battle1 and the proper use of such advantage for securing victory is outlined thus3 ,,principle ,utilize advantage in ,prime ,strategetic ,means to obtain the superiority in ,numbers at the ,point of ,contact in an ,offensive ,battle2 and to nullify the adverse superiority in ,numbers at the point of contact in a ,defensive ,battle4 99 99 99 99 99 ,between ,war and ,chess there is a seeming incongruity1 which is the basis of that doubt of the utility of ,chess-play1 so commonly held by laymen1 and which fallacy few1 even among proficients1 are competent to combat4 ,this doubt most frequently is voiced by the query3 ,if ,chess and ,war are analagous1 why was not ,napoleon a ,master ,chess-player and ,morphy a great military ,commander8 ,this query readily is answered in the words of ,frederic the ,great1 viz43 8,to be possessed of talent is not sufficient4 ,opportunity to display such talent and to its full extent is necessary4 ,all depends on the time in which we live40 ,the ,strategetic talent possessed in common by ,morphy and ,napoleon1 in both was brought to perfection by long and expert training4 ,but circumstances placed the twelve year old ,napoleon in the midst of soldiers and in an era of war1 while circumstances placed the twelve year old ,morphy in the midst of ,chess-players and in an era of ,peace4 ,napoleon was educated a ,general2 ,morphy was educated a lawyer4 ,to develop his self-evident and superlative ,strategetic talent1 ,napoleon's education was of the best2 to develop his self-evident and superlative ,strategetic talent1 ,morphy's education was of the worst4 ,napoleon succeeded as a ,general2 ,morphy failed as a lawyer4 ,the innate capability of ,napoleon for ,strategetics was developed in the direction of ,warfare2 the innate capability of ,morphy for ,strategetics was developed in the direction of ,chess-play4 ,in ,war1 ,napoleon is superlative2 in ,chess1 ,morphy is superlative4 ,educated in the law1 ,napoleon might have proved like ,morphy a non-entity2 educated in ,chess1 ,napoleon might have proved like ,morphy a phenomenon4 ,educated in ,war1 ,morphy might have rivalled ,napoleon4 ,for the ,chess-play of ,morphy displays that perfect comprehension of ,strategetics1 to which none but the great ,captains in warfare have attained4 ,perfection in ,strategetics consists in exactly interpreting in battle and campaign1 the ,system of ,warfare invented by ,epaminondas4 ,those able to do this in ,war have achieved greatness1 and the great at ,chess-play are those who best have imitated that exactness with which ,morphy employed this system on the ,chess-board4 ,to those who imagine that ,strategetic talent1 as exemplified in ,warfare1 is different from ,strategetic talent as exemplified in ,chess-play1 the following may afford matter for reflection4 99 99 99 99 99 8,frederic the ,great was one of the finest ,chess-players that ,germany ever produced40--,wilhelm ,steinitz4 ,,prime ,,strategetic ,,proposition ,,section ,,one ,,prime ,,strategetic ,,proposition ,,section ,,one 7,,first ,,phase47 ,in the consideration of every ,strategetic ,situation possible in ,warfare1 or in ,chess-play1 the initial process always is a ,grand ,reconnaissance4 ,grand ,reconnaissance is that exact scrutiny of existing conditions1 whereby is determined the relative advantages and disadvantages possessed by the opposing armies in3 #a4 ,time4 #b4 ,numbers4 #c4 ,position4 #d4 ,organization4 #e4 ,mobility4 #f4 ,topography4 ,the ,first ,phase in the demonstration of every ,prime ,strategetic ,proposition consists3 #a4 ,in determining by comparison of the relative advantages and disadvantages in ,time1 which of the opposing armies has the ability to ,,move1 while the other must remain stationary4 #b4 ,in deducing the ,,motif of such movement4 #c4 ,in designating the ,,direction of such movement4 ,the making of ,grand ,reconnaissance is a special privilege which exclusively appertains to the advantage in ,time4 ,it always should be made by the ,commander-in-chief of that army which is able to put itself in motion1 while the opposing army must remain stationary1 and it never should be confounded with the advance of the ,cavalry ,corps1 nor confused with the work of scouts and spies2 all of which are matters entirely separate and distinct from ,grand ,reconnaissance4 ,in the ,grand ,reconnaissance of any given ,strategetic ,situation the element of ,numbers primarily is to be considered1 for the reason that the basic fact of the ,science of ,strategetics is3 8,,the ,,greater ,,force ,,always ,,overcomes ,,the ,,lesser40--,napoleon4 ,hence1 unless more immediately vital considerations prevent1 superiority in ,numbers1 of itself1 is decisive of victory2 and thus it readily is to be deduced that all else being equal1 the advantage in ,time plus the advantage in ,numbers constitutes the easiest and simplest winning combination known to ,strategetic ,art4 ,but it so happens that the advantage in ,time may be combined not only with the greater force1 but also with an equal1 or even with the lesser force1 and from this it is self-evident that ,strategetic ,situations are divided into three classes1 viz43 ,i4 ,numerical superiority1 plus right to move4 ,,ii4 ,numerical equality1 plus right to move4 ,,iii4 ,numerical inferiority1 plus right to move4 ,there are two primary methods for availing of superiority in ,numbers to destroy the opposing lesser force1 viz43 #a4 ,by the ,process of ,attrition1 i4e41 by maintaining an incessant tactical offensive and thus wearing down the opposing army by exchanging pieces at every opportunity4 #b4 ,by ,acting in ,detachments1 i4e41 by means of the extra corps1 simultaneously to attack more points of vital importance than the hostile army is able simultaneously to defend4 ,from the foregoing it is obvious that conversely there are two principal considerations1 which all else being equal1 must dominate the procedure of the ,numerically inferior force1 viz43 ,i4 ,to avoid further diminution of its aggregate4 ,,ii4 ,to avoid creating indefensible vital points4 99 99 99 99 99 ,the second consideration in the making of a ,grand ,reconnaissance by the commander-in-chief of an army having the advantage in ,time1 is the element of ,position2 for the reason that by unscientific posting of ,corps d'armee1 relative advantages in ,time1 or in ,numbers or in both1 may be rendered nugatory1 on account of inability of the kindred ,columns of ,attack1 of ,support and of ,manoeuvre to perform their functions4 ,in case the ,corps are scientifically posted and are in positions to avail of advantage in ,time and ,numbers1 those adverse vital points whose occupation may be effected by superior force1 always will be the objectives of the movements of the latter4 ,hence1 the following3 ,,principle ,as the advantage in ,time gives the right to ,,move and the advantage in ,numbers indicates the ,,motif of movement2 so does the advantage in ,position1 as expressed by the ,strategic ,syllogism1 specify the ,,direction of that movement which normally appertains to the army having the advantage in ,time4 ,the proper direction of that movement which normally appertains to the advantage in ,time always is indicated by the plus signs in the ,strategic ,syllogism1 viz43 ,a4 ,signifies that the ,normal direction of movement for the army having the advantage in ,time is along the ,strategetic ,center towards the ,objective ,plane4 ,s4 ,signifies that the ,normal direction of movement for the army having the advantage in ,time is along one or more pawn altitudes towards the ,kindred ,logistic ,horizon4 ,m4 ,signifies that the ,normal direction of movement for the army having the advantage in ,time is along the shortest open pawn altitude towards the ,kindred ,point of ,junction4 ------- ,a,s4 ,signifies that the ,normal direction of movement for the army having the advantage in ,time is double1 i4e41 ,a4 towards the ,objective ,plane4 ,s4 along one or more open ,pawn altitudes toward the ,kindred ,logistic ,horizon4 ------- ,a,m4 ,signifies that the ,normal direction of movement for the army having the advantage in ,time1 is double1 i4e41 ,a4 towards the ,objective ,plane4 ,m4 ,along the shortest open pawn altitude toward the ,kindred ,point of ,junction4 ------- ,s,m4 ,signifies that the ,normal direction of movement for the army having the advantage in ,time is double1 i4e41 ,s4 ,along one or more open ,pawn altitudes toward the ,kindred ,logistic ,horizon4 ,m4 ,along the shortest open ,pawn ,altitude toward the ,kindred ,point of ,junction4 ------- ,a,s,m4 ,signifies that the ,normal direction of movement is triple1 i4e41 ,a4 ,toward the ,objective ,plane4 ,s4 ,along one or more open ,pawn altitudes1 toward the ,kindred ,logistic ,horizon4 ,m4 ,along the shortest open ,pawn altitude1 toward the ,kindred ,point of ,junction4 ,the ,first ,phase in the demonstration of every ,strategetic ,proposition is determined by the following3 ,,theorem ,given the ,normal ability to move1 to determine the ,normal motif and direction of movement4 #a4 ,designate that army having the advantage in ,time and express such advantage by the symbol ,t1 express the corresponding disadvantage in ,time which appertains to the opposing army1 by the symbol -,t1 and such symbols will constitute the ,first ,term of the ,first ,phase of the demonstration of any ,prime ,strategetic ,proposition4 #b4 ,express that superiority1 equality1 or inferiority in ,numbers1 which appertains to each of the opposing armies by the symbols ,n1 ,n1-,n1 respectively2 and such symbols will constitute the ,second ,term of the ,first ,phase of the demonstration of any ,prime ,strategetic ,proposition4 #c4 ,express the objectives designated by the plus terms of the ,strategic ,syllogism1 viz43 7a7 ,objective of ,a ,objective ,plane1 i4e41 ,o4 ,p4 7b7 0 ,s ,logistic ,horizon1 i4e41 ,l4 ,h4 7c7 0 ,m ,point of ,junction1 i4e41 ,p4 ,j4 and the symbols denoting such objectives will constitute the ,third ,term in the ,first ,phase of the demonstration of any ,prime ,strategetic ,proposition4 #d4 ,combine those three terms which appertain to the advantage in ,time1 then combine those three terms which appertain to the disadvantage in ,time1 and the resulting equation when expanded will depict3 7a7 ,the normal ability to move4 7b7 ,the normal motif of movement4 7c7 ,the normal directions of movement which appertain to each of the opposing armies4 ,,example ,white4 7,t,n7 7,a,s,m7 ----------------- ,black4 7-,t-,n7 7-,a-,s-,m7 ,,expanded ,first ,term4 ,t ,normal ability to move4 ,second ,term4 ,n ,normal motif of movement1 7a7 ,detachments1 7b7 ,exchanges4 ,third ,term ,o4 ,p4 ,normal objective of ,a4 ,l4 ,h4 0 0 0 ,s4 ,p4 ,j4 0 0 0 ,m4 ,hence1 in the foregoing example the normal direction of movement for ,white may be either toward the ,objective ,plane with the ,column of ,attack1 or toward the ,logistic ,horizon1 or the ,point of ,junction with the ,column of ,support1 or toward both objectives1 with both columns simultaneously4 ,meanwhile1 the ,black army having the disadvantage in ,time is unable to move1 and consequently is stationary4 ,furthermore1 ,white having the superiority in ,numbers may move with an equal force against either objective designated by the ,third ,term of the equation1 and with his excess force against one or more adverse vital points1 simultaneously1 against which latter movement1 ,black obviously has no adequate defence4 ,,tactico-,,logistic ,,inequality ,the ,tactico-,logistic ,inequality is the algebraic expression of the relative advantages and disadvantages in ,time and in ,numbers appertaining to opposing ,strategetic ,entireties4 ,such advantages and disadvantages are denoted by the terms1 viz43 ,t4 ,signifies the absolute advantage in ,time1 i4e41 the ability of an army1 a grand column1 a wing or a corps d'armee to move1 while the opposing force must remain stationary4 -,t4 ,signifies the absolute disadvantage in ,time1 i4e41 the obligation of an army1 a grand column1 a wing1 or a corps d'armee to remain stationary1 while the opposing force is in motion4 ,n4 ,signifies the absolute advantage in ,numbers1 i4e41 the larger number of corps d'armee4 -,n4 ,signifies the absolute disadvantage in ,numbers1 i4e41 the smaller number of corps d'armee4 ,n4 ,signifies the equality in ,numbers1 i4e41 the same number of corps d'armee4 ,there are six forms of the ,tactico-,logistic ,inequality1 viz43 #a4 ,t,n ------ -,t-,n #b4 ,t,n ------ -,t,n #c4 ,t-,n ------ -,t,n #d4 -,t,n ------ ,t-,n #e4 -,t,n ------ ,t,n #f4 -,t-,n ------ ,t,n ,,initial ,,strategetic ,,equation ,the ,initial ,strategetic ,equation is made up of those terms which compose the ,strategic ,syllogism and the ,tactico-,logistic ,inequality1 viz43 ----------------- ----------------- 7,a,s,m7 7,t,n7 - 7-,a-,s-,m7 7-,t-,n7 the ,normal ,motif and ,direction of ,effort4 ,,rule #a4 ,set down in parenthesis those terms of the ,strategic ,syllogism which appertain to ,white4 ,set down in parenthesis those terms of the ,tactico-,logistic ,inequality which appertain to ,white4 ,connect the two kindred terms thus constructed1 by the sign of addition1 to show that each is to augment the other1 and superscore all by the same vincula to show that all are to be taken together to form one side of the resulting equation4 99 99 99 99 99 #b4 ,repeat this process for the ,black terms to construct the second side of the ,initial ,strategetic ,equation1 and separate the ,white from the ,black terms by a minus sign4 ,,strategetic ,,values ,the ,strategetic ,values of the terms contained in the ,strategic ,syllogism and in the ,tactico-,logistic ,inequality are shown by the appended tables1 viz43 ,,table ,,of ,,strategic ,,values4 ,term4 ,post4 ,direction4 ,motif4 #a4 ,a ,grand ,vertex ,tactical ,key of ,to give checkmate ,objective ,plane #b4 ,m ,point ,proximity ,point of ,junction ,to queen a ,pawn en command #c4 ,a ,major ,vertex #a4 ,grand ,vertex ,to gain winning ,position #b4 ,point ,aligned with ,column of ,attack #c4 ,point en ,potence #d4 ,m ,point ,proximity ,point en ,command ,to gain winning ,position en ,menace with ,column of ,support #e4 ,m ,point ,proximity ,point en ,menace ,to gain winning ,position en ,presence with ,column of ,support #f4 ,a ,minor ,vertex #a4 ,major ,vertex ,to gain ,superior ,position #b4 ,point ,aligned with ,column of ,attack #g4 ,s ,point ,proximity ,point en ,presence ,to gain ,superior ,position en ,observation with ,column of ,support #h4 ,s ,point ,proximity ,point en ,observation ,to gain superior ,position en ,route with ,column of ,support #i4 ,s ,point ,proximity ,point en ,route ,to gain advantage with ,remote ,column of ,support ,,table ,,of ,,logistic ,,values ,term4 #a4 ,t ,unrestricted privilege to move any ,piece4 #b4 ,t ,restricted to moving a ,sustaining ,piece en counter attack4 #c4 ,t ,restricted to moving an aggressive ,covering ,piece4 #d4 ,t ,restricted to moving a ,passive ,covering ,piece4 #e4 ,t ,restricted to moving a ,supporting ,piece4 #f4 ,t ,restricted to moving the ,king out of check4 #g4 ,t ,restricted to moving the ,king from an untenable ,objective ,plane4 #h4 ,t ,restricted to moving a ,piece to reduce the value of the ,kindred ,king's ,logistic ,radii4 ,,table ,,of ,,tactical ,,values ,term4 #a4 ,n ,larger numbers of ,grand ,corps d'armee of ,evolution4 #b4 ,n ,larger numbers of ,major ,corps d'armee of ,evolution4 #c4 ,n ,larger numbers of ,minor ,corps d'armee of ,evolution4 #d4 ,n ,larger numbers of ,corps d'armee of ,position4 ,,prime ,,strategetic ,,proposition ,,section ,,two ,,prime ,,strategetic ,,proposition ,,section ,,two ,,theorem4 ,given any ,strategetic ,situation to determine the ,true ,tactical ,sequence4 ,,demonstration4 7,first ,phase47 ,let the term ,a in its degree represent the relative advantage in ,position of the ,column of ,attack2 ,s in its degree the relative advantage in ,position of the ,column of ,support1 and ,m in its degree the relative advantage in ,position of the ,column of ,manoeuvre2 let equality in ,position of the several ,columns be represented by the terms ,a1 ,s1 ,m1 and let inferiority in ,positions of the several ,columns be represented by the terms -,a1 -,s1 -,m1 and let those terms appertaining to the ,white ,columns be written above a line and those terms appertaining to the ,black ,columns be written below the line1 and let that collection of terms containing the plus and equal signs of greater ,strategetic value be the ,major ,premise and that collection of terms containing the signs of lesser strategetic value be the ,minor ,premise of the ,strategic ,syllogism thus constructed4 ,let the ability to move while the opposing force must remain stationary be represented by the term ,t1 and let the converse be represented by the term -,t1 and let superiority in ,numbers be represented by the term ,n2 the equality in ,numbers by the term ,n1 and inferiority in ,numbers by the term -,n1 and let the combining of any form of the terms ,t and ,n constitute a ,tactico-,logistic ,inequality4 ,let any combination of that ,strategic ,syllogism which appertains to a given ,strategetic ,situation with the corresponding ,tactico-,logistic ,inequality1 form the ,initial ,strategetic ,equation4 ,let the plus terms and the equality terms1 which are contained in the ,initial ,strategetic ,equation1 be expanded into their highest forms according to the table of ,strategetic ,values1 and annex to each of such terms that numeral which expresses the relative rank of such term in those calculations which appertain to the pending ,prime ,strategetic ,proposition4 ,compare the values so obtained and let the highest ,strategetically be regarded as the menace most immediately decisive1 then3 ,if the term ,t appertain to the ,piece operating such menace1 let such ,piece be regarded as the ,corps d'armee en ,menace1 and the ,objective of such menace as the ,prime ,decisive ,point2 the occupation of such ,point by such ,piece as the ,normal ,motif of ,offensive ,effort1 and the ,logistic ,radius connecting the ,point of ,departure occupied by such ,piece and the ,prime ,decisive ,point as the ,normal ,direction of ,offensive ,effort4 ,if the term ,t does ,,not apply to that menace which combined with the term ,t would be most immediately decisive1 then3 ,by further comparison of the terms of the ,initial ,strategetic ,equation1 select that ,decisive ,menace strategetically next in sequence to which the term ,t does appertain2 and let the ,piece operating such ,decisive ,menace be regarded as the ,corps d'armee en ,menace2 the ,objective of such menace as the ,prime ,decisive ,point2 the occupation of such ,point by such ,piece as the ,normal ,motif of ,offensive ,effort1 and the ,logistic ,radius connecting the ,point of ,departure occupied by such ,piece and the ,prime ,decisive ,points as the ,normal direction of ,offensive ,effort4 ,provided3 ,whenever the term ,t appertains to a ,menace not so immediately decisive as another menace operated by an adverse army1 column1 wing or corps d'armee1 but to which the term ,t does not appertain1 then3 the ,normal motif of ,effort is defensive1 and the ,normal direction of ,defensive ,effort is along the ,logistic ,radius between the ,point of ,departure of that ,kindred ,piece1 which by the advantage of the term ,a1 is able to nullify the adverse most immediately ,decisive ,menace and that ,point of ,command which is the ,objective of such ,effort en ,defence and from whence such adverse most immediately ,decisive ,menace may be nullified4 99 99 99 99 99 ,the second or ,intermediate ,phase of the ,prime ,strategetic ,proposition appertains to ,grand ,manoeuvres2 and the third1 or ,final ,phase1 appertains to ,grand ,operations4 ,however vast one's capabilities may be1 there is no mind so comprehensive but that it has much to learn from other minds which have preceded it1 and no talent is so potential but that its development is proportional to its exercise4 ,for no matter how broad and exact one's knowledge1 the application of such knowledge alone constitutes ,art1 and the value of such knowledge always is commensurate to the degree of skill attained in the use of it4 ,hence1 there is a training of the physical senses which gives quickness and strength to the eye1 the ear and the hand2 a training of the nervous organism which gives courage to the heart1 clearness to the brain1 and steadiness to the body2 a training of the intellect which fructifies in originality1 ingenuity1 profundity and exactness of calculation4 ,such training is to be acquired only from systematic study of the best productions by ,masters of the ,art1 and by incessant practice with the best proficients4