,,the ,,logic ,,of ,,hegel              
,,translated ,,from    ,,the            
,,encyclopaedia ,,of ,,the              
,,philosophical ,,sciences    ,,william 
,,wallace1 ,m4,a1 ,,ll4,d4    ,,fellow  
,,of ,,merton ,,college  ,,and          
,,whyte',s ,,professor ,,of ,,moral     
,,philosophy  ,,in ,,the ,,university   
,,of ,,oxford    ,,second ,,edition1    
,,revised ,,and ,,augmented    ,,oxford 
,,university ,,press    #ahib           
,,note      ,the present volume contains
 a translation1 which has been revised  
throughout and compared with the        
original1 of the ,logic as given in the 
first part of ,hegel's ,encyclopaedia1  
preceded by a bibliographical  account  
of the three editions and extracts from 
the prefaces of that  work1 and followed
 by notes and illustrations of a        
philological rather  than a             
philosophical character on the text4    
,this introductory chapter  and these   
notes were not included in the previous 
edition4    ,the volume containing my   

,prolegomena is under revision and will 
be  issued shortly4                     
,w4 ,w4          ,,contents             
,,bibliographical ,,notice ,,on ,,the   
,,three ,,editions ,,and ,,three        
,,prefaces ,,of ,,the  ,,encyclopaedia  
,,of ,,the ,,philosophical ,,sciences   
,,the ,,science ,,of ,,logic4           
,,chapter ,i4                           
,,introduction                          
,,chapter ,,ii4                         
,,preliminary ,,notion                  
,,chapter ,,iii4                 ,,first
 ,,attitude ,,of ,,thought ,,to         
,,objectivity                           
,,chapter ,,iv4                ,,second 
,,attitude ,,of ,,thought ,,to          
,,objectivity3                          
,i4 ,empiricism                    ,,ii4
 ,the ,critical ,philosophy             
,,chapter ,v4                ,,third    
,,attitude ,,of ,,thought ,,to          
,,objectivity3--                        
,immediate or ,intuitive ,knowledge     
,,chapter ,,vi4                         

,,logic ,,further ,,defined ,,and       
,,divided                               
,,chapter ,,vii4         ,,first        
,,subdivision ,,of ,,logic3--,the       
,doctrine of ,being                     
,,chapter ,,viii4       ,,second        
,,subdivision ,,of ,,logic3--,the       
,doctrine of ,essence                   
,,chapter ,,ix4      ,,third            
,,subdivision ,,of ,,logic3--,the       
,doctrine of the ,notion                
,,notes ,,and ,,illustrations4          
,,on ,,chapter                          
,i                                      
,,ii                                    
,,iii                                   
,,iv                                    
,v                                      
,,vi                                    
,,vii                                   
,,viii                                  
,,ix              ,,bibliographical     
,,notice      ,,on ,,the ,,three        
,,editions ,,and ,,three ,,prefaces ,,of
 ,,the ,,encyclopaedia      ,,the       

,,encyclopaedia ,,of ,,the              
,,philosophical ,,sciences ,,in         
,,outline is the third  in time of the  
four works which ,hegel published4 ,it  
was preceded by  the ,phenomenology of  
,spirit1 in #ahjg1 and the ,science of  
,logic 7in  two volumes71 in #ahab-af1  
and was followed by the ,outlines of the
  ,philosophy of ,law in #ahbj4 ,the    
only other works which came directly    
from his hand are a few essays1         
addresses1 and reviews4 ,the earliest   
of these appeared in the ,critical      
,journal of ,philosophy1 issued by  his 
friend ,schelling and himself1 in       
#ahjb--when ,hegel was one and  thirty1 
which1 as ,bacon thought1 'is a great   
deal of sand in the  hour-glass'2 and   
the latest were his contributions to the
 ,jahrbcher  fr wissenschaftliche       
,kritik1 in the year of his death       
7#ahca74    ,this ,encyclopaedia is the 
only complete1 matured1 and authentic   
statement of ,hegel's philosophical     
system4 ,but1 as the title-page  bears1 

it is only an outline2 and its primary  
aim is to supply a manual  for the      
guidance of his students4 ,in its mode  
of exposition the free  flight of       
speculation is subordinated to the needs
 of the professorial  class-room4       
,pegasus is put in harness4 ,paragraphs 
concise in form and  saturated with     
meaning postulate and presuppose the    
presiding spirit  of the lecturer to    
fuse them into continuity and raise them
 to higher  lucidity4 ,yet in two       
directions the works of ,hegel furnish a
 supplement  to the defects of the      
,encyclopaedia4    ,one of these aids to
 comprehension is the ,phenomenology of 
,spirit1  published in his              
thirty-seventh year4 ,it may be going   
too far to say  with ,david ,strauss    
that it is the ,alpha and ,omega of     
,hegel1 and his  later writings only    
extracts from it4#a ,yet here the       
,pegasus of mind  soars free through    
untrodden fields of air1 and tastes the 
joys of  first love and the pride of    

fresh discovery in the quest for truth4 
,the  fire of young enthusiasm has not  
yet been forced to hide itself and      
smoulder away in apparent calm4 ,the    
mood is ,olympian--far above the        
turmoil and bitterness of lower earth1  
free from the bursts of temper  which   
emerge later1 when the thinker has to   
mingle in the fray and  endure the      
shafts of controversy4 ,but the         
,phenomenology1 if not less  than the   
,encyclopaedia it contains the diamond  
purity of ,hegelianism1  is a key which 
needs consummate patience and skill to  
use with  advantage4 ,if it commands a  
larger view1 it demands a stronger wing 
of  him who would join its voyage       
through the atmosphere of thought up to 
its purest empyrean4 ,it may be the     
royal road to the ,idea1 but only a     
kingly soul can retrace its course4     
,the other commentary on the            
,encyclopaedia is supplied partly by    
,hegel's other published writings1 and  
partly by the volumes 7,,ix-,,xv in  the

 ,collected works7 in which his editors 
have given his ,lectures on  the        
,philosophy of ,history1 on ,aesthetic1 
on the ,philosophy of ,religion1  and on
 the ,history of ,philosophy4 ,all of   
these lectures1 as well as  the         
,philosophy of ,law1 published by       
himself1 deal however only with  the    
third part of the philosophic system4   
,that system 7p4 #bh7 includes  7i7     
,logic1 7ii7 ,philosophy of ,nature1 and
 7iii7 ,philosophy of ,spirit4  ,it is  
this third part--or rather it is the    
last two divisions therein  7embracing  
the great general interests of humanity1
 such as law and  morals1 religion and  
art1 as well as the development of      
philosophy  itself7 which form the      
topics of ,hegel s most expanded        
teaching4 ,it  is in this region that he
 has most appealed to the liberal       
culture of  the century1 and influenced 
7directly or by reaction7 the progress  
of  that philosophical history and      
historical philosophy of which our own  

generation is reaping the               
fast-accumulating fruit4 ,if one may    
foist  such a category into systematic  
philosophy1 we may say that the study   
of the ',objective' and ',absolute      
,spirit' is the most interesting part   
of ,hegel4    ,of the second part of the
 system there is less to be said4 ,for  
nearly  half a century the study of     
nature has passed almost completely out 
of the hands of the philosophers into   
the care of the specialists of  science4
 ,there are signs indeed everywhere--and
 among others ,helmholtz  has lately    
reminded us--that the higher order of   
scientific students  are ever and anon  
driven by the very logic of their       
subject into the  precincts or the      
borders of philosophy4 ,but the name of 
a ,philosophy  of ,nature still recalls 
a time of hasty enthusiasms and         
over-grasping  ambition of thought      
which1 in its eagerness to understand   
the mystery  of the universe jumped to  
conclusions on insufficient grounds1    

trusted  to bold but fantastic          
analogies1 and lavished an unwise       
contempt on the  plodding industry of   
the mere hodman of facts and            
experiments4 ,calmer  retrospection will
 perhaps modify this verdict1 and sift  
the various  contributions 7towards a   
philosophical unity of the sciences7    
which  are now indiscriminately damned  
by the title of ,naturphilosophie4  ,for
 the present purpose it need only be    
said that1 for the second  part of the  
,hegelian system1 we are restricted for 
explanations  to the notes collected by 
the editors of ,vol4 ,,vii4 part i4 of  
the  ,collected works--notes derived    
from the annotations which ,hegel       
himself  supplied in the eight or more  
courses of lectures which he gave on the
  ,philosophy of ,nature between #ahjd  
and #ahcj4    ,quite other is the case  
with the ,logic--the first division of  
the  ,encyclopaedia4 ,there we have the 
collateral authority of the  ',science  
of ,logic1' the larger ,logic which     

appeared whilst ,hegel was  schoolmaster
 at ,nrnberg4 ,the idea of a new ,logic 
formed the natural  sequel to the       
publication of the ,phenomenology in    
#ahjg4 ,in that  year ,hegel was glad to
 accept1 as a stop-gap and pot-boiler1  
the post  of editor of the ,bamberg     
,journal4 ,but his interests lay in     
other  directions1 and the circumstances
 of the time and country helped to      
determine their special form4 ',in      
,bavaria1' he says in a letter#b1  'it  
looks as if organisation were the       
current business4' ,a very mania  of    
reform1 says another1 prevailed4        
,hegel's friend and fellow-,swabian1    
,niethammer1 held an important position 
in the ,bavarian education  office1 and 
wished to employ the philosopher in the 
work of carrying  out his plans of      
re-organising the higher education of   
the ,protestant  subjects of the crown4 
,he asked if ,hegel would write a logic 
for school  use1 and if he cared to     
become rector of a grammar school4      

,hegel1 who  was already at work on his 
larger ,logic1 was only half-attracted  
by  the suggestion4 ',the traditional   
,logic1' he replied#c1 'is a subject  on
 which there are text-books enough1 but 
at the same time it is one  which can by
 no means remain as it is3 it is a thing
 nobody can make  anything of3 'tis     
dragged along like an old heirloom1 only
 because  a substitute--of which the    
want is universally felt--is not yet in 
existence4 ,the whole of its rules1     
still current1 might be written  on two 
pages3 every additional detail beyond   
these two is perfectly  fruitless       
scholastic subtlety2--or if this logic  
is to get a thicker  body1 its expansion
 must come from psychological           
paltrinesses1' ,still  less did he like 
the prospect of instructing in theology1
 as then  rationalised4 ',to write a    
logic and to be theological instructor  
is as  bad as to be white-washer and    
chimney-sweep at once4' ',shall he1 who 
for many long years built his eyry on   

the wild rock beside the eagle  and     
learned to breathe the free air of the  
mountains1 now learn to feed  on the    
carcases of dead thoughts or the        
still-born thoughts of the  moderns1 and
 vegetate in the leaden air of mere     
babble#d8'    ,at ,nrnberg he found the 
post of rector of the 'gymnasium' by no 
means a sinecure4 ,the school had to be 
made amid much lack of funds  and       
general bankruptcy of apparatus3--all   
because of an all-powerful  and         
unalterable destiny which is called the 
course of business4' ,one  of his tasks 
was 'by graduated exercises to introduce
 his pupils to  speculative             
thought1'--and that in the space of four
 hours weekly#e4  ,of its               
practicability--and especially with     
himself as instrument--he  had grave    
doubts4 ,in theory1 he held that an     
intelligent study of  the ancient       
classics was the best introduction to   
philosophy2 and  practically he         
preferred starting his pupils with the  

principles  of law1 morality and        
religion1 and reserving the logic and   
higher  philosophy for the highest      
class4 ,meanwhile he continued to work  
on  his great ,logic1 the first volume  
of which appeared in two parts1 #ahab1  
#ahac1 and the second in #ahaf4    ,this
 is the work which is the real          
foundation of the ,hegelian  philosophy4
 ,its aim is the systematic             
reorganisation of the  commonwealth of  
thought4 ,it gives not a criticism1 like
 ,kant2 not  a principle1 like ,fichte2 
not a bird's eye view of the fields of  
nature and history1 like ,schelling2 it 
attempts the hard work of               
re-constructing1 step by step1 into     
totality the fragments of the  organism 
of intelligence4 ,it is scholasticism1  
if scholasticism means  an absolute and 
all-embracing system2 but it is a       
protest against  the old school-system  
and those who tried to rehabilitate it  
through  their comprehensions of the    
,kantian theory4 ,apropos of the logic  

of  his contemporary ,fries 7whom he did
 not love71 published in #ahaa1 he      
remarks3 ',his paragraphs are mindless1 
quite shallow1 bald1 trivial2  the      
explanatory notes are the dirty linen of
 the professorial chair1  utterly slack 
and unconnected4'#f ,of himself he thus 
speaks3 ',i am  a schoolmaster who has  
to teach philosophy1--who1 possibly for 
that  reason1 believes that philosophy  
like geometry is teachable1 and  must no
 less than geometry have a regular      
structure4 ,but again1 a  knowledge of  
the facts in geometry and philosophy is 
one thing1 and the  mathematical or     
philosophical talent which procreates   
and discovers is  another3 my province  
is to discover that scientific form1 or 
to aid  in the formation of it#g4' ,so  
he writes to an old college friend2  and
 in a letter to the rationalist         
theologian ,paulus1 in #ahadh1 he       
professes3 ',you know that ,i have had  
too much to do not merely with  ancient 
literature1 but even with mathematics1  

latterly with the higher  analysis1     
differential calculus1 chemistry1 to let
 myself be taken in  by the humbug of   
,naturphilosophie1 philosophising       
without knowledge of  fact and by mere  
force of imagination1 and treating mere 
fancies1 even  imbecile fancies1 as     
,ideas4'    ,in the autumn of #ahaf     
,hegel became professor of philosophy at
  ,heidelberg4 ,in the following year   
appeared the first edition of his       
,encyclopaedia3 two others appeared in  
his lifetime 7in #ahbg and  #ahcj74 ,the
 first edition is a thin octavo volume  
of pp4 xvi4 #bhh1  published 7like the  
others7 at ,heidelberg4 ,the ,logic in  
it occupies  pp4 #a-abf 7of which #ab   
pp4 are ,einleitung and #ah pp4         
,vorbegriff72 the  ,philosophy of       
,nature1 pp4 #abg-bjd2 and the          
,philosophy of ,mind 7,spirit71  pp4    
#bje-bhh4    ,in the ,preface the book  
is described 7p4 iv7 as setting forth 'a
 new  treatment of philosophy on a      
method which will1 as ,i hope1 yet be   

recognised as the only genuine method   
identical with the content4'            
,contrasting his own procedure with a   
mannerism of the day which  used an     
assumed set of formulas to produce in   
the facts a show of  symmetry even more 
arbitrary and mechanical than the       
arrangements  imposed ab extra in the   
sciences1 he goes on3 ',this wilfulness 
we  saw also take possession of the     
contents of philosophy and ride out  on 
an intellectual knight-errantry--for a  
while imposing on honest  true-hearted  
workers1 though elsewhere it was only   
counted grotesque1  and grotesque even  
to the pitch of madness4 ,but oftener   
and more  properly its teachings--far   
from seeming imposing or mad--were found
  out to be familiar trivialities1 and  
its form seen to be a mere trick  of    
wit1 easily acquired1 methodical and    
premeditated1 with its quaint           
combinations and strained               
eccentricities1--the mien of earnestness
 only  covering self-deception and fraud

 upon the public4 ,on the other side1   
again1 we saw shallowness and           
unintelligence assume the character of  
a scepticism wise in its own eyes and of
 a criticism modest in its  claims for  
reason1 enhancing their vanity and      
conceit in proportion  as their ideas   
grew more vacuous4 ,for a space of time 
these two  intellectual tendencies have 
befooled ,german earnestness1 have tired
  out its profound craving for          
philosophy1 and have been succeeded by  
an indifference and even a contempt for 
philosophic science1 till at  length a  
self-styled modesty has the audacity to 
let its voice be heard  in controversies
 touching the deepest philosophical     
problems1 and to  deny philosophy its   
right to that cognition by reason1 the  
form of  which was what formerly was    
called demonstration4'    ',the first of
 these phenomena may be in part         
explained as the youthful  exuberance of
 the new age which has risen in the     
realm of science no  less than in the   

world of politics4 ,if this exuberance  
greeted with  rapture the dawn of the   
intellectual renascence1 and without    
profounder  labour at once set about    
enjoying the ,idea and revelling for a  
while in  the hopes and prospects which 
it offered1 one can more readily forgive
  its excesses2 because it is sound at  
heart1 and the surface vapours  which it
 had suffused around its solid worth    
must spontaneously clear  off4 ,but the 
other spectacle is more repulsive2      
because it betrays  exhaustion and      
impotence1 and tries to conceal them    
under a hectoring  conceit which acts   
the censor over the philosophical       
intellects of all  the centuries1       
mistaking them1 but most of all         
mistaking itself4    ',so much the more 
gratifying is another spectacle yet-to  
be noted2 the  interest in philosophy   
and the earnest love of higher knowledge
 which  in the presence of both         
tendencies has kept itself              
single-hearted and  without affectation4

 ,occasionally this interest may have   
taken too  much to the language of      
intuition and feeling2 yet its          
appearance  proves the existence of that
 inward and deeper-reaching impulse of  
reasonable intelligence which alone     
gives man his dignity1--proves it  above
 all1 because that standpoint can only  
be gained as a result  of philosophical 
consciousness2 so that what it seems to 
disdain is  at least admitted and       
recognised as a condition4 ,to this     
interest  in ascertaining the truth ,i  
dedicate this attempt to supply an      
introduction and a contribution towards 
its satisfaction4'    ,the second       
edition appeared in #ahbg4 ,since the   
autumn of #ahah ,hegel  had been        
professor at ,berlin3 and the manuscript
 was sent thence 7from  ,august #ahbf   
onwards7 to ,heidelberg1 where ,daub1   
his friend--himself  a master in        
philosophical theology--attended to the 
revision of the  proofs4 ',to the       
,introduction1' writes ,hegel#i1 ',i    

have given perhaps  too great an        
amplitude3 but it1 above all1 would have
 cost me time and  trouble to bring     
within narrower compass4 ,tied down and 
distracted  by lectures1 and sometimes  
here in ,berlin by other things too1 ,i 
have--without a general survey--allowed 
myself so large a swing that  the work  
has grown upon me1 and there was a      
danger of its turning into  a book4 ,i  
have gone through it several times4 ,the
 treatment of the  attitudes 7of        
thought7 which ,i have distinguished in 
it was to meet an  interest of the day4 
,the rest ,i have sought to make more   
definite1 and  so far as may be clearer2
 but the main fault is not mended--to do
 which  would require me to limit the   
detail more1 and on the other hand make 
the whole more surveyable1 so that the  
contents should better answer  the title
 of an ,encyclopaedia4' ,again1 in ,dec4
 #ahbf1 he writes#aj3 ',in  the         
,naturphilosophie ,i have made essential
 changes1 but could not help  here and  

there going too far into a detail which 
is hardly in keeping  with the tone of  
the whole4 ,the second half of the      
,geistesphilosophie  ,i shall have to   
modify entirely4' ,in ,may #ahbg1 ,hegel
 offers his  explanation of delay in the
 preface1 which1 like the concluding    
paragraphs1 touches largely on          
contemporary theology4 ,by ,august of   
that  year the book was finished1 and   
,hegel off to ,paris for a holiday4     
,in the second edition1 which           
substantially fixed the form of the     
,encyclopaedia1 the pages amount to     
xlii1 #ecd--nearly twice as many  as the
 first1 which1 however1 as ,professor   
,caird remarks1 'has a  compactness1 a  
brief energy and conclusiveness of      
expression1 which  he never surpassed4' 
,the ,logic now occupies pp4 #abad1     
,philosophy of  ,nature #bae-ced1 and   
,philosophy of ,spirit from #cee-ecd4   
,the second part  therefore has gained  
least2 and in the third part the chief  
single  expansions occur towards the    

close and deal with the relations of    
philosophy1 art1 and religion in the    
,state2 viz4  #efc 7which in the  third 
edition is transposed to  #eeb71 and    
#egc 7where two pages are  enlarged to  
#ah74 ,in the first part1 or the ,logic1
 the main increase  and alteration falls
 within the introductory chapters1 where
 #if pages  take the place of #cj4 ,the 
,vorbegriff 7preliminary notion7 of the 
first  edition had contained the        
distinction of the three logical        
'moments'  7see p4 #adb71 with a few    
remarks on the methods1 first1 of       
metaphysic1  and then 7after a brief    
section on empiricism71 of the          
',critical  ,philosophy through which   
philosophy has reached its close4'      
,instead  of this the second edition    
deals at length1 under this head1 with  
the  three 'attitudes 7or positions7 of 
thought to objectivity2' where1  besides
 a more lengthy criticism of the        
,critical philosophy1 there is a        
discussion of the doctrines of ,jacobi  

and other ,intuitivists4    ,the        
,preface1 like much else in this second 
edition1 is an assertion  of the right  
and the duty of philosophy to treat     
independently of  the things of ,god1   
and an emphatic declaration that the    
result of  scientific investigation of  
the truth is1 not the subversion of  the
 faith1 but 'the restoration of that sum
 of absolute doctrine  which thought at 
first would have put behind and beneath 
itself--a  restoration of it however in 
the most characteristic and the freest  
element of the mind4' ,any opposition   
that may be raised against  philosophy  
on religious grounds proceeds1 according
 to ,hegel1 from a  religion which has  
abandoned its true basis and entrenched 
itself in  formulae and categories that 
pervert its real nature4 ',yet1' he adds
  7p4 vii71 'especially where religious 
subjects are under discussion1          
philosophy is expressly set aside1 as if
 in that way all mischief were  banished
 and security against error and illusion

 attained2' 444 'as if  philosophy--the 
mischief thus kept at a distance--were  
anything but  the investigation of      
,truth1 but with a full sense of the    
nature and  value of the intellectual   
links which give unity and form to all  
fact  whatever4' ',lessing1' he         
continues 7p4 xvi71 'said in his time   
that  people treat ,spinoza like a dead 
dog#aa4 ,it cannot be said that in      
recent times ,spinozism and speculative 
philosophy in general have been  better 
treated4'    ,the time was one of       
feverish unrest and unwholesome         
irritability4 ,ever  since the so-called
 ,carlsbad decrees of #ahai all the     
agencies of the  higher literature and  
education had been subjected to an      
inquisitorial  supervision which        
everywhere surmised political           
insubordination and  religious heresy4  
,a petty provincialism pervaded what was
 then still  the small ,residenz-,stadt 
,berlin2 and the ,king1 ,frederick      
,william  ,,iii1 cherished to the full  

that paternal conception of his position
  which has not been unusual in the     
royal house of ,prussia4 ,champions  of 
orthodoxy warned him that ,hegelianism  
was unchristian1 if not even            
anti-christian4 ,franz von ,baader1 the 
,bavarian religious philosopher  7who   
had spent some months at ,berlin during 
the winter of #ahbc-d1  studying the    
religious and philosophical teaching of 
the universities  in connexion with the 
revolutionary doctrines which he saw    
fermenting  throughout ,europe71        
addressed the king in a communication   
which  described the prevalent          
,protestant theology as infidel in its  
very  source1 and as tending directly to
 annihilate the foundations of  the     
faith4 ,hegel himself had to remind the 
censor of heresy that  'all speculative 
philosophy on religion maybe carried to 
atheism3  all depends on who carries it2
 the peculiar piety of our times and    
the malevolence of demagogues will not  
let us want carriers#ab4'  ,his own     

theology was suspected both by the      
,rationalists and by the  ,evangelicals4
 ,he writes to his wife 7in #ahbg7 that 
he had looked at  the university        
buildings in ,louvain and ,lige with the
 feeling that  they might one day afford
 him a resting-place 'when the parsons  
in  ,berlin make the ,kupfergraben      
completely intolerable for him#ac4'     
',the  ,roman ,curia1' he adds1 'would  
be a more honourable opponent than the  
miserable cabals of a miserable boiling 
of parsons in ,berlin4' ,hence  the tone
 in which the preface proceeds 7p4      
xviii74    ',religion is the kind and   
mode of consciousness in which the      
,truth  appeals to all men1 to men of   
every degree of education2 but the      
scientific ascertainment of the ,truth  
is a special kind of this               
consciousness1 involving a labour which 
not all but only a few  undertake4 ,the 
substance of the two is the same2 but as
 ,homer says of  some stars that they   
have two names1 the one in the language 

of the  gods1 the other in the language 
of ephemeral men--so for that substance 
there are two languages1--the one of    
feeling1 of pictorial thought1  and of  
the limited intellect that makes its    
home in finite categories  and          
inadequate abstractions1 the other the  
language of the concrete  notion4 ,if we
 propose then to talk of and to         
criticise philosophy from  the religious
 point of view1 there is more requisite 
than to possess  a familiarity with the 
language of the ephemeral consciousness4
 ,the  foundation of scientific         
cognition is the substantiality at its  
core1  the indwelling idea with its     
stirring intellectual life2 just as the 
essentials of religion are a heart fully
 disciplined1 a mind awake to           
self-collectedness1 a wrought and       
refined substantiality4 ,in modern      
times religion has more and more        
contracted the intelligent expansion  of
 its contents and withdrawn into the    
intensiveness of piety1 or even  of     

feeling1--a feeling which betrays its   
own scantiness and emptiness4  ,so long 
however as it still has a creed1 a      
doctrine1 a system of dogma1  it has    
what philosophy can occupy itself with  
and where it can find for  itself a     
point of union with religion4 ,this     
however is not to be taken  in the wrong
 separatist sense 7so dominant in our   
modern religiosity7  representing the   
two as mutually exclusive1 or as at     
bottom so capable  of separation that   
their union is only imposed from        
without4 ,rather1  even in what has gone
 before1 it is implied that religion may
 well  exist without philosophy1 but    
philosophy not without religion--which  
it rather includes4 ,true               
religion--intellectual and spiritual    
religion--must have body and substance1 
for spirit and intellect are  above all 
consciousness1 and consciousness implies
 an objective body  and substance4      
',the contracted religiosity which      
narrows itself to a point in the  heart 

must make that heart's softening and    
contrition the essential  factor of its 
new birth2 but it must at the same time 
recollect that it  has to do with the   
heart of a spirit1 that the spirit is   
the appointed  authority over the heart1
 and that it can only have such         
authority so  far as it is itself born  
again4 ,this new birth of the spirit out
 of  natural ignorance and natural error
 takes place through instruction and    
through that faith in objective truth   
and substance which is due to the       
witness of the spirit4 ,this new birth  
of the spirit is besides ipso  facto a  
new birth of the heart out of that      
vanity of the one-sided  intellect 7on  
which it sets so much7 and its          
discoveries that finite is  different   
from infinite1 that philosophy must     
either be polytheism1 or1  in acuter    
minds1 pantheism1 c4 ,it is1 in short1 a
 new birth out of the  wretched         
discoveries on the strength of which    
pious humility holds its  head so high  

against philosophy and theological      
science4 ,if religiosity  persists in   
clinging to its unexpanded and therefore
 unintelligent  intensity1 then it can  
be sensible only of the contrast which  
divides  this narrow and narrowing form 
from the intelligent expansion of       
doctrine as such1 religious not less    
than philosophical4'    ,after an       
appreciative quotation from ,franz von  
,baader1 and noting his  reference to   
the theosophy of ,bhme1 as a work of the
 past from which  the present generation
 might learn the speculative            
interpretation of  ,christian doctrines1
 he reverts to the position that the    
only mode in  which thought will admit a
 reconciliation with religious          
doctrines1 is  when these doctrines have
 learned to 'assume their worthiest     
phase--the  phase of the notion1 of     
necessity1 which binds1 and thus also   
makes  free everything1 fact no less    
than thought4' ,but it is not from ,bhme
  or his kindred that we are likely to  

get the example of a philosophy  equal  
to the highest theme--to the            
comprehension of divine things4 ',if    
old things are to be revived--an old    
phase1 that is2 for the burden  of the  
theme is ever young--the phase of the   
,idea such as ,plato and1  still better1
 as ,aristotle conceived it1 is far more
 deserving of being  recalled1--and for 
the further reason that the disclosure  
of it1 by  assimilating it into our     
system of ideas1 is1 ipso facto1 not    
merely  an interpretation of it1 but a  
progress of the science itself4 ,but  to
 interpret such forms of the ,idea by no
 means lies so much on the  surface as  
to get hold of ,gnostic and ,cabbalistic
 phantasmagorias2 and  to develope      
,plato and ,aristotle is by no means the
 sinecure that it is  to note or to hint
 at echoes of the ,idea in the          
medievalists4'    ,the third edition of 
the ,encyclopaedia1 which appeared in   
#ahcj1  consists of pp4 lviii1 #fjj--;a 
slight additional increase4 ,the        

increase  is in the ,logic1 eight pages2
 in the ,philosophy of ,nature1         
twenty-three  pages2 and in the         
,philosophy of ,spirit1 thirty-four     
pages4 ,the concrete  topics1 in short1 
gain most4    ,the preface begins by    
alluding to several criticisms on his   
philosophy1--'which for the most part   
have shown little vocation for  the     
business'--and to his discussion of them
 in the ,jahrbcher of  #ahbi            
7,vermischte ,schriften1 ii4 #adi74     
,there is also a paragraph  devoted to  
the quarrel originated by the attack in 
,hengstenberg's  ,evangelical ,journal  
on the rationalism of certain professors
 at ,halle  7notably ,gesenius and      
,wegscheider71--7an attack based on the 
evidence  of students' note-books71 and 
by the protest of students and          
professors  against the insinuations4   
',it seemed a little while ago1' says   
,hegel  7p4 xli71 'as if there was an   
initiation1 in a scientific spirit  and 
on a wider range1 of a more serious     

inquiry1 from the region of  theology   
and even of religiosity1 touching ,god1 
divine things1 and  reason4 ,but the    
very beginning of the movement checked  
these hopes2  the issue turned on       
personalities1 and neither the          
pretensions of the  accusing pietists   
nor the pretensions of the free reason  
they accused1  rose to the real subject1
 still less to a sense that the subject 
could only be discussed on philosophic  
soil4 ,this personal attack1 on  the    
basis of very special externalities of  
religion1 displayed the  monstrous      
assumption of seeking to decide by      
arbitrary decree as to  the             
,christianity of individuals1 and to    
stamp them accordingly with  the seal of
 temporal and eternal reprobation4      
,dante1 in virtue of the  enthusiasm of 
divine poesy1 has dared to handle the   
keys of ,peter1 and  to condemn by name 
to the perdition of hell many--already  
deceased  however--of his               
contemporaries1 even ,popes and         

,emperors4 ,a modern  philosophy has    
been made the subject of the infamous   
charge that in  it human individuals    
usurp the rank of ,god2 but such a      
fictitious  charge--reached by a false  
logic--pales before the actual          
assumption  of behaving like judges of  
the world1 prejudging the ,christianity 
of  individuals1 and announcing their   
utter reprobation4 ,the ,shibboleth  of 
this absolute authority is the name of  
the ,lord ,christ1 and the  assertion   
that the ,lord dwells in the hearts of  
these judges4' ,but the  assertion is   
ill supported by the fruits they        
exhibit1--the monstrous  insolence with 
which they reprobate and condemn4       
,but the evangelicals are not alone to  
blame for the bald and  undeveloped     
nature of their religious life2 the same
 want of free and  living growth in     
religion characterises their opponents4 
',by their  formal1 abstract1 nerveless 
reasoning1 the rationalists have emptied
  religion of all power and substance1  

no less than the pietists by the        
reduction of all faith to the           
,shibboleth of ,lord6 ,lord6 ,one is no 
whit better than the other3 and when    
they meet in conflict there is  no      
material on which they could come into  
contact1 no common ground1  and no      
possibility of carrying on an inquiry   
which would lead to  knowledge and      
truth4 ,liberal theology on its side has
 not got beyond  the formalism of       
appeals to liberty of conscience1       
liberty of thought1  liberty of         
teaching1 to reason itself and to       
science4 ,such liberty no  doubt        
describes the infinite right of the     
spirit1 and the second  special         
condition of truth1 supplementary to the
 first1 faith4 ,but  the rationalists   
steer clear of the material point3 they 
do not tell  us the reasonable          
principles and laws involved in a free  
and genuine  conscience1 nor the import 
and teaching of free faith and free     
thought2  they do not get beyond a bare 

negative formalism and the liberty to   
embody their liberty at their fancy and 
pleasure--whereby in the end  it matters
 not how it is embodied4 ,there is a    
further reason for  their failure to    
reach a solid doctrine4 ,the ,christian 
community must  be1 and ought always to 
be1 unified by the tie of a doctrinal   
idea1  a confession of faith2 but the   
generalities and abstractions of the    
stale1 not living1 waters of rationalism
 forbid the specificality of  an        
inherently definite and fully developed 
body of ,christian doctrine4  ,their    
opponents1 again1 proud of the name     
,lord6 ,lord6 frankly and  openly       
disdain carrying out the faith into the 
fulness of spirit1  reality1 and truth4'
    ,in ordinary moods of mind there is 
a long way from logic to religion4  ,but
 almost every page of what ,hegel has   
called ,logic is witness to  the belief 
in their ultimate identity4 ,it was no  
new principle of  later years for him4  
,he had written in post-student days to 

his  friend ,schelling3 ',reason and    
freedom remain our watch-word1 and our  
point of union the invisible church#ad4'
 ,his parting token of faith  with      
another youthful comrade1 the poet      
,hlderlin1 had been ',god's             
kingdom#ae4'    ,but after #ahbg this   
religious appropriation of philosophy   
becomes  more apparent1 and in #ahbi    
,hegel seemed deliberately to accept the
  position of a ,christian philosopher  
which ,gschel had marked out for  him4  
',a philosophy without heart and a faith
 without intellect1' he  remarks#af1    
'are abstractions from the true life of 
knowledge and  faith4 ,the man whom     
philosophy leaves cold1 and the man whom
 real faith  does not illuminate may be 
assured that the fault lies in them1 not
 in  knowledge and faith4 ,the former is
 still an alien to philosophy1 the      
latter an alien to faith4'    ,this is  
not the place--in a philological        
chapter--to discuss the issues  involved
 in the announcement that the truth     

awaits us ready to hand#ag  'in all     
genuine consciousness1 in all religions 
and philosophies4'  ,yet one remark may 
be offered against hasty interpretations
 of a  'speculative' identity4 ,if there
 is a double edge to the proposition    
that the actual is the reasonable1 there
 is no less caution necessary  in       
approaching and studying from both sides
 the far-reaching import  of that       
equation to which ,joannes ,scotus      
,erigena gave expression ten  centuries 
ago3 ',non alia est philosophia1 i4e4   
sapientiae studium1  et alia religio4   
,quid est aliud de philosophia tractare 
nisi verae  religionis regulas          
exponere8'      #a ,christian ,mrklin1  
cap4 #c4    #b ,hegel's ,briefe1 i4     
#ada4    #c ,ibid4 i4 #agb4    #d       
,hegel's ,briefe1 i4 #ach4    #e ,ibid4 
i4 #cci4    #f ,hegel's ,briefe1 i4     
#cbh4    #g ,ibid4 i4 #bgc4    #h ,ibid4
 i4 #cgc4    #i ,hegel's ,briefe1 ii4   
#bjd4    #aj ,ibid4 ii4 #bcj4    #aa    
,jacobi's ,werke1 iv4 ,a1 p4 #fc4    #ab

 ,hegel's ,briefe1 ii4 #ed4    #ac      
,ibid4 ii4 #bgf4    #ad ,hegel's        
,briefe1 i4 #ac4    #ae ,hlderlin's     
,leben 7,litzmann71 p4 #ahc4    #af     
,verm4 ,sehr4 ii4 #add4    #ag ,hegel's 
,briefe1 ii4 #hj4           99       99 
99       99       99    ,the following  
,errata in the ,edition of the ,logic as
 given in the  ,collected ,works 7,vol4 
,,vi47 are corrected in the translation4
 ,the  references in brackets are to the
 ,german text4    ,page #ie1 line #a4   
,und ,objektivitt has dropped out after 
der  ,subjektivitt4 ,,vi4 #ih1 l4 #aj   
from bottom4    ,p4 #ig1 l4 #b4 ,the    
#bnd ed4 reads 7die ,gedanken7 nicht in 
,solchem1 instead  of nicht als in      
,solchem 7#crd ed474 ,,vi4 p4 #ajj1 l4  
#c from bottom4    ,p4 #afi1 l4 #ac from
 bottom4 ,instead of the reading of the 
,werke and of  the #crd ed4 read as in  
ed4 ,,ii4 ,also ist dieser ,gegenstand  
nichts4 ,,vi4  p4 #agh1 l4 #aa4    ,p4  
#agg1 l4 #c from bottom4 ,verstandes2   
,gegenstandes is a mistake for          

,verstandes2 ,gegensatzes1 as in edd4   
,,ii and ,,iii4 ,,vi4 p4 #ahh1 l4 #b4   
,p4 #bca1 l4 #ai4 weiten should be      
weitern4 ,,vi4 p4 #bea1 l4 #c from      
bottom4    ,p4 #caf1 l4 #ae4            
,dinglichkeit is a misprint for         
,dingheit1 as in ,hegel's  own editions4
 ,,vi4 p4 #cdg1 l4 #a4    ,p4 #ceb1 l4  
#ad from bottom1 for seine ,realitt read
 seiner ,realitt4  ,,vi4 p4 #che1 l4 #h4
          ,,the ,,science ,,of ,,logic  
7,,the ,,first ,,part ,,of ,,the        
,,encyclopaedia ,,of ,,the              
,,philosophical ,,sciences ,,in         
,,outline7      ,,by ,g4 ,w4 ,f4 ,,hegel
          ,,the ,,science ,,of ,,logic  
,,chapter ,i4      ,,introduction4      
#a4 ,,philosophy misses an advantage    
enjoyed by the other sciences4 ,it      
cannot like them rest the existence of  
its objects on the natural  admissions  
of consciousness1 nor can it assume that
 its method of  cognition1 either for   
starting or for continuing1 is one      
already  accepted4 ,the objects of      

philosophy1 it is true1 are upon the    
whole the  same as those of religion4   
,in both the object is ,truth1 in that  
supreme  sense in which ,god and ,god   
only is the ,truth4 ,both in like manner
 go on  to treat of the finite worlds of
 ,nature and the human ,mind1 with their
  relation to each other and to their   
truth in ,god4 ,some acquaintance  with 
its objects1 therefore1 philosophy may  
and even must presume1 that  and a      
certain interest in them to boot1 were  
it for no other reason  than this3 that 
in point of time the mind makes general 
images of  objects1 long before it makes
 notions of them1 and that it is only   
through these mental images1 and by     
recourse to them1 that the thinking     
mind rises to know and comprehend       
thinkingly4    ,but with the rise of    
this thinking study of things1 it soon  
becomes  evident that thought will be   
satisfied with nothing short of showing 
the necessity of its facts1 of          
demonstrating the existence of  its     

objects1 as well as their nature and    
qualities4 ,our original  acquaintance  
with them is thus discovered to be      
inadequate4 ,we can  assume nothing1 and
 assert nothing dogmatically2 nor can we
 accept the  assertions and assumptions 
of others4 ,and yet we must make a      
beginning3  and a beginning1 as primary 
and underived1 makes an assumption1 or  
rather is an assumption4 ,it seems as if
 it were impossible to make a  beginning
 at all4    #b4 ,this thinking study of 
things may serve1 in a general way1 as  
a description of philosophy4 ,but the   
description is too wide4 ,if it  be     
correct to say1 that thought makes the  
distinction between man and  the lower  
animals1 then everything human is human1
 for the sole and  simple reason that it
 is due to the operation of thought4    
,philosophy1  on the other hand1 is a   
peculiar mode of thinking--a mode in    
which  thinking becomes knowledge1 and  
knowledge through notions4 ,however     
great therefore may be the identity and 

essential unity of the two  modes of    
thought1 the philosophic mode gets to be
 different from the  more general       
thought which acts in all that is human1
 in all that gives  humanity its        
distinctive character4 ,and this        
difference connects itself  with the    
fact that the strictly human and        
thought-induced phenomena of            
consciousness do not originally appear  
in the form of a thought1 but as  a     
feeling1 a perception1 or mental        
image--all of which aspects must be     
distinguished from the form of thought  
proper4    ,according to an old         
preconceived idea1 which has passed into
 a trivial  proposition1 it is thought  
which marks the man off from the        
animals4  ,yet trivial as this old      
belief may seem1 it must1 strangely     
enough1  be recalled to mind in presence
 of certain preconceived ideas of the   
present day4 ,these ideas would put     
feeling and thought so far apart as  to 
make them opposites1 and would represent

 them as so antagonistic1  that feeling1
 particularly religious feeling1 is     
supposed to be  contaminated1 perverted1
 and even annihilated by thought4 ,they 
also  emphatically hold that religion   
and piety grow out of1 and rest upon    
something else1 and not on thought4 ,but
 those who make this separation  forget 
meanwhile that only man has the capacity
 for religion1 and that  animals no more
 have religion than they have law and   
morality4    ,those who insist on this  
separation of religion from thinking    
usually  have before their minds the    
sort of thought that may be styled      
after-thought4 ,they mean 'reflective'  
thinking1 which has to deal  with       
thoughts as thoughts1 and brings them   
into consciousness4  ,slackness to      
perceive and keep in view this          
distinction which  philosophy definitely
 draws in respect of thinking is the    
source of  the crudest objections and   
reproaches against philosophy4          
,man1--and  that just because it is his 

nature to think1--is the only being that
  possesses law1 religion1 and morality4
 ,in these spheres of human life1       
therefore1 thinking1 under the guise of 
feeling1 faith1 or generalised  image1  
has not been inactive3 its action and   
its productions are  there present and  
therein contained4 ,but it is one thing 
to have such  feelings and generalised  
images that have been moulded and       
permeated by  thought1 and another thing
 to have thoughts about them4 ,the      
thoughts1  to which after-thought upon  
those modes of consciousness gives rise1
  are what is comprised under           
reflection1 general reasoning1 and the  
like1 as well as under philosophy       
itself4    ,the neglect of this         
distinction between thought in general  
and the  reflective thought of          
philosophy has also led to another and  
more  frequent misunderstanding4        
,reflection of this kind has been often 
maintained to be the condition1 or even 
the only way1 of attaining a            

consciousness and certitude of the      
,eternal and ,true4 ,the 7now somewhat  
antiquated7 metaphysical proofs of      
,god's existence1 for example1 have     
been treated1 as if a knowledge of them 
and a conviction of their truth  were   
the only and essential means of         
producing a belief and conviction  that 
there is a ,god4 ,such a doctrine would 
find its parallel1 if we  said that     
eating was impossible before we had     
acquired a knowledge  of the chemical1  
botanical1 and zoological characters of 
our food2  and that we must delay       
digestion till we had finished the study
 of  anatomy and physiology4 ,were it   
so1 these sciences in their field1  like
 philosophy in its1 would gain greatly  
in point of utility2 in  fact1 their    
utility would rise to the height of     
absolute and universal                  
indispensableness4 ,or rather1 instead  
of being indispensable1 they  would not 
exist at all4    #c4 ,the ,content1 of  
whatever kind it be1 with which our     

consciousness  is taken up1 is what     
constitutes the qualitative character of
 our  feelings1 perceptions1 fancies1   
and ideas2 of our aims and duties2  and 
of our thoughts and notions4 ,from this 
point of view1 feeling1  perception1 c4 
are the forms assumed by these contents4
 ,the contents  remain one and the same1
 whether they are felt1 seen1           
represented1 or  willed1 and whether    
they are merely felt1 or felt with an   
admixture of  thoughts1 or merely and   
simply thought4 ,in any one of these    
forms1 or  in the admixture of several1 
the contents confront consciousness1 or 
are its object4 ,but when they are thus 
objects of consciousness1 the  modes of 
the several forms ally themselves with  
the contents2 and each  form of them    
appears in consequence to give rise to a
 special object4  ,thus what is the same
 at bottom1 may look like a different   
sort of  fact4    ,the several modes of 
feeling1 perception1 desire1 and will1  
so far  as we are aware of them1 are in 

general called ideas 7mental            
representations73 and it may be roughly 
said1 that philosophy puts  thoughts1   
categories1 or1 in more precise         
language1 adequate notions1  in the     
place of the generalised images we      
ordinarily call ideas4 ,mental          
impressions such as these may be        
regarded as the metaphors of thoughts   
and notions4 ,but to have these figurate
 conceptions does not imply  that we    
appreciate their intellectual           
significance1 the thoughts and  rational
 notions to which they correspond4      
,conversely1 it is one thing  to have   
thoughts and intelligent notions1 and   
another to know what  impressions1      
perceptions1 and feelings correspond to 
them4    ,this difference will to some  
extent explain what people call the     
unintelligibility of philosophy4 ,their 
difficulty lies partly in an            
incapacity--which in itself is nothing  
but want of habit--for abstract         
thinking2 i4e4 in an inability to get   

hold of pure thoughts and move  about in
 them4 ,in our ordinary state of mind1  
the thoughts are clothed  upon and made 
one with the sensuous or spiritual      
material of the hour2  and in           
reflection1 meditation1 and general     
reasoning1 we introduce a  blend of     
thoughts into feelings1 percepts1 and   
mental images4 7,thus1  in propositions 
where the subject-matter is due to the  
senses--e4g4  ',this leaf is green'--we 
have such categories introduced1 as     
being and  individuality47 ,but it is a 
very different thing to make the        
thoughts  pure and simple our object4   
,but their complaint that philosophy is 
unintelligible is as much due to        
another reason2 and that is an impatient
 wish to have before them as a  mental  
picture that which is in the mind as a  
thought or notion4 ,when  people are    
asked to apprehend some notion1 they    
often complain that  they do not know   
what they have to think4 ,but the fact  
is that in a  notion there is nothing   

further to be thought than the notion   
itself4  ,what the phrase reveals1 is a 
hankering after an image with which we  
are already familiar4 ,the mind1 denied 
the use of its familiar ideas1  feels   
the ground where it once stood firm and 
at home taken away from  beneath it1    
and1 when transported into the region of
 pure thought1  cannot tell where in the
 world it is4    ,one consequence of    
this weakness is that authors1          
preachers1 and  orators are found most  
intelligible1 when they speak of things 
which  their readers or hearers already 
know by rote1--things which the latter  
are conversant with1 and which require  
no explanation4    #d4 ,the philosopher 
then has to reckon with popular modes of
 thought1  and with the objects of      
religion4 ,in dealing with the ordinary 
modes  of mind1 he will first of all1 as
 we saw1 have to prove and almost  to   
awaken the need for his peculiar method 
of knowledge4 ,in dealing  with the     
objects of religion1 and with truth as a

 whole1 he will have  to show that      
philosophy is capable of apprehending   
them from its own  resources2 and should
 a difference from religious conceptions
 come to  light1 he will have to justify
 the points in which it diverges4    #e4
 ,to give the reader a preliminary      
explanation of the distinction  thus    
made1 and to let him see at the same    
moment that the real import  of our     
consciousness is retained1 and even for 
the first time put  in its proper light1
 when translated into the form of       
thought and  the notion of reason1 it   
may be well to recall another of these  
old  unreasoned beliefs4 ,and that is   
the conviction that to get at the truth 
of any object or event1 even of         
feelings1 perceptions1 opinions1 and    
mental ideas1 we must think it over4    
,now in any case to think things  over  
is at least to transform feelings1      
ordinary ideas1 c4 into  thoughts4      
,nature has given every one a faculty of
 thought4 ,but thought is all  that     

philosophy claims as the form proper to 
her business3 and thus  the inadequate  
view which ignores the distinction      
stated in  #c1 leads  to a new delusion1
 the reverse of the complaint previously
 mentioned  about the unintelligibility 
of philosophy4 ,in other words1 this    
science  must often submit to the slight
 of hearing even people who have never  
taken any trouble with it talking as if 
they thoroughly understood all  about   
it4 ,with no preparation beyond an      
ordinary education they do  not         
hesitate1 especially under the influence
 of religious sentiment1  to            
philosophise and to criticise           
philosophy4 ,everybody allows that  to  
know any other science you must have    
first studied it1 and that  you can only
 claim to express a judgment upon it in 
virtue of such  knowledge4 ,everybody   
allows that to make a shoe you must have
 learned  and practised the craft of the
 shoemaker1 though every man has a model
  in his own foot1 and possesses in his 

hands the natural endowments for  the   
operations required4 ,for philosophy    
alone1 it seems to be imagined1  such   
study1 care1 and application are not in 
the least requisite4    ,this           
comfortable view of what is required for
 a philosopher has  recently received   
corroboration through the theory of     
immediate or  intuitive knowledge4      
#f4 ,so much for the form of            
philosophical knowledge4 ,it is no less 
desirable1 on the other hand1 that      
philosophy should understand that  its  
content is no other than actuality1 that
 core of truth which1  originally       
produced and producing itself within the
 precincts of the  mental life1 has     
become the world1 the inward and outward
 world1 of  consciousness4 ,at first we 
become aware of these contents in what  
we  call ,experience4 ,but even         
,experience1 as it surveys the wide     
range  of inward and outward existence1 
has sense enough to distinguish  the    
mere appearance1 which is transient and 

meaningless1 from what  in itself really
 deserves the name of actuality4 ,as it 
is only in  form that philosophy is     
distinguished from other modes of       
attaining  an acquaintance with this    
same sum of being1 it must necessarily  
be  in harmony with actuality and       
experience4 ,in fact1 this harmony may  
be viewed as at least an extrinsic means
 of testing the truth of a  philosophy4 
,similarly it may be held the highest   
and final aim of  philosophic science to
 bring about1 through the ascertainment 
of this  harmony1 a reconciliation of   
the self-conscious reason with the      
reason  which is in the world1--in other
 words1 with actuality4    ,in the      
preface to my ,philosophy of ,law1 p4   
xix1 are found the  propositions3       
,what is reasonable is actual2      and1
 ,what is actual is reasonable4         
,these simple statements have given rise
 to expressions of surprise and         
hostility1 even in quarters where it    
would be reckoned an insult to  presume 

absence of philosophy1 and still more of
 religion4 ,religion  at least need not 
be brought in evidence2 its doctrines of
 the divine  government of the world    
affirm these propositions too decidedly4
 ,for  their philosophic sense1 we must 
pre-suppose intelligence enough to      
know1 not only that ,god is actual1 that
 ,he is the supreme actuality1  that ,he
 alone is truly actual2 but also1 as    
regards the logical  bearings of the    
question1 that existence is in part mere
 appearance1  and only in part          
actuality4 ,in common life1 any freak of
 fancy1 any  error1 evil and everything 
of the nature of evil1 as well as every 
degenerate and transitory existence     
whatever1 gets in a casual way  the name
 of actuality4 ,but even our ordinary   
feelings are enough to  forbid a casual 
7fortuitous7 existence getting the      
emphatic name of an  actual2 for by     
fortuitous we mean an existence which   
has no greater  value than that of      
something possible1 which may as well   

not be as  be4 ,as for the term         
,actuality1 these critics would have    
done well to  consider the sense in     
which ,i employ it4 ,in a detailed      
,logic ,i had  treated amongst other    
things of actuality1 and accurately     
distinguished  it not only from the     
fortuitous1 which1 after all1 has       
existence1  but even from the cognate   
categories of existence and the other   
modifications of being4    ,the         
actuality of the rational stands opposed
 by the popular fancy  that ,ideas and  
ideals are nothing but chimeras1 and    
philosophy a mere  system of such       
phantasms4 ,it is also opposed by the   
very different  fancy that ,ideas and   
ideals are something far too excellent  
to have  actuality1 or something too    
impotent to procure it for themselves4  
,this  divorce between idea and reality 
is especially dear to the analytic      
understanding which looks upon its own  
abstractions1 dreams though they  are1  
as something true and real1 and prides  

itself on the imperative  'ought1' which
 it takes especial pleasure in          
prescribing even on the  field of       
politics4 ,as if the world had waited on
 it to learn how it  ought to be1 and   
was not6 ,for1 if it were as it ought to
 be1 what would  come of the precocious 
wisdom of that 'ought'8 ,when           
understanding  turns this 'ought'       
against trivial external and transitory 
objects1  against social regulations or 
conditions1 which very likely possess a 
great relative importance for a certain 
time and special circles1 it  may often 
be right4 ,in such a case the           
intelligent observer may meet  much that
 fails to satisfy the general           
requirements of right2 for  who is not  
acute enough to see a great deal in his 
own surroundings  which is really far   
from being as it ought to be8 ,but such 
acuteness  is mistaken in the conceit   
that1 when it examines these objects and
  pronounces what they ought to be1 it  
is dealing with questions of            

philosophic science4 ,the object of     
philosophy is the ,idea3 and the ,idea  
is not so impotent as merely to have a  
right or an obligation to exist  without
 actually existing4 ,the object of      
philosophy is an actuality of  which    
those objects1 social regulations and   
conditions1 are only the  superficial   
outside4    #g4 ,thus                   
reflection--thinking things over--in a  
general way involves  the principle     
7which also means the beginning7 of     
philosophy4 ,and when  the reflective   
spirit arose again in its independence  
in modern times1  after the epoch of the
 ,lutheran ,reformation1 it did not1 as 
in its  beginnings among the ,greeks1   
stand merely aloof1 in a world of its   
own1  but at once turned its energies   
also upon the apparently illimitable    
material of the phenomenal world4 ,in   
this way the name philosophy came  to be
 applied to all those branches of       
knowledge1 which are engaged  in        
ascertaining the standard and ,universal

 in the ocean of empirical              
individualities1 as well as in          
ascertaining the ,necessary element1 or 
,laws1 to be found in the apparent      
disorder of the endless masses of  the  
fortuitous4 ,it thus appears that modern
 philosophy derives its  materials from 
our own personal observations and       
perceptions of the  external and        
internal world1 from nature as well as  
from the mind and  heart of man1 when   
both stand in the immediate presence of 
the observer4    ,this principle of     
,experience carries with it the         
unspeakably important  condition that1  
in order to accept and believe any fact1
 we must be  in contact with it2 or1 in 
more exact terms1 that we must find the 
fact united and combined with the       
certainty of our own selves4 ,we must   
be in touch with our subject-matter1    
whether it be by means of our  external 
senses1 or1 else1 by our profounder mind
 and our intimate                       
self-consciousness4--,this principle is 

the same as that which has in  the      
present day been termed faith1 immediate
 knowledge1 the revelation  in the      
outward world1 and1 above all1 in our   
own heart4    ,those sciences1 which    
thus got the name of philosophy1 we call
  empirical sciences1 for the reason    
that they take their departure  from    
experience4 ,still the essential results
 which they aim at and  provide1 are    
laws1 general propositions1 a           
theory--the thoughts of what  is found  
existing4 ,on this ground the ,newtonian
 physics was called  ,natural           
,philosophy4 ,hugo ,grotius1 again1 by  
putting together and  comparing the     
behaviour of states towards each other  
as recorded in  history1 succeeded1 with
 the help of the ordinary methods of    
general  reasoning1 in laying down      
certain general principles1 and         
establishing  a theory which may be     
termed the ,philosophy of ,international
 ,law4 ,in  ,england this is still the  
usual signification of the term         

philosophy4  ,newton continues to be    
celebrated as the greatest of           
philosophers3 and  the name goes down as
 far as the price-lists of              
instrument-makers4  ,all instruments1   
such as the thermometer and barometer1  
which do not  come under the special    
head of magnetic or electric apparatus1 
are  styled philosophical instruments#a4
 ,surely thought1 and not a mere        
combination of wood1 iron1 c4 ought to  
be called the instrument of  philosophy6
 ,the recent science of ,political      
,economy in particular1  which in       
,germany is known as ,rational ,economy 
of the ,state1 or  intelligent national 
economy1 has in ,england especially     
appropriated  the name of philosophy4#b 
#h4 ,in its own field this empirical    
knowledge may at first give             
satisfaction2 but in two ways it is seen
 to come short4 ,in the first  place    
there is another circle of objects which
 it does not embrace4  ,these are       
,freedom1 ,spirit1 and ,god4 ,they      

belong to a different  sphere1 not      
because it can be said that they have   
nothing to do with  experience2 for     
though they are certainly not           
experiences of the  senses1 it is quite 
an identical proposition to say that    
whatever is  in consciousness is        
experienced4 ,the real ground for       
assigning them to  another field of     
cognition is that in their scope and    
content these  objects evidently show   
themselves as infinite4    ,there is an 
old phrase often wrongly attributed to  
,aristotle1 and  supposed to express the
 general tenor of his philosophy4       
',nihil  est in intellectu quod non     
fuerit in sensu'3 there is nothing in   
thought which has not been in sense and 
experience4 ,if speculative  philosophy 
refused to admit this maxim1 it can only
 have done so from  a misunderstanding4 
,it will1 however1 on the converse side 
no less  assert3 ',nihil est in sensu   
quod non fuerit in intellectu4' ,and    
this  may be taken in two senses4 ,in   

the general sense it means that  or     
spirit 7the more profound idea of  in   
modern thought7 is the cause  of the    
world4 ,in its special meaning 7see  #b7
 it asserts that the  sentiment of      
right1 morals1 and religion is a        
sentiment 7and in that  way an          
experience7 of such scope and such      
character that it can spring  from and  
rest upon thought alone4    #i4 ,but in 
the second place in point of form the   
subjective reason  desires a further    
satisfaction than empirical knowledge   
gives2 and  this form1 is1 in the widest
 sense of the term1 ,necessity 7 #a74   
,the  method of empirical science       
exhibits two defects4 ,the first is that
 the  ,universal or general principle   
contained in it1 the genus1 or kind1 c1 
is1 on its own account1 indeterminate   
and vague1 and therefore not on  its own
 account connected with the ,particulars
 or the details4 ,either  is external   
and accidental to the other2 and it is  
the same with the  particular facts     

which are brought into union3 each is   
external and  accidental to the others4 
,the second defect is that the          
beginnings are  in every case data and  
postulates1 neither accounted for nor   
deduced4  ,in both these points the form
 of necessity fails to get its due4     
,hence  reflection1 whenever it sets    
itself to remedy these defects1 becomes 
speculative thinking1 the thinking      
proper to philosophy4 ,as a species  of 
reflection1 therefore1 which1 though it 
has a certain community  of nature with 
the reflection already mentioned1 is    
nevertheless  different from it1        
philosophic thought thus possesses1 in  
addition to  the common forms1 some     
forms of its own1 of which the ,notion  
may be  taken as the type4    ,the      
relation of speculative science to the  
other sciences may be  stated in the    
following terms4 ,it does not in the    
least neglect the  empirical facts      
contained in the several sciences1 but  
recognises and  adopts them3 it         

appreciates and applies towards its own 
structure the  universal element in     
these sciences1 their laws and          
classifications3  but besides all this1 
into the categories of science it       
introduces1 and  gives currency to1     
other categories4 ,the difference1      
looked at in this  way1 is only a change
 of categories4 ,speculative ,logic     
contains all  previous ,logic and       
,metaphysics3 it preserves the same     
forms of thought1  the same laws and    
objects1--while at the same time        
remodelling and  expanding them with    
wider categories4    ,from notion in the
 speculative sense we should distinguish
 what  is ordinarily called a notion4   
,the phrase1 that no notion can ever    
comprehend the ,infinite1 a phrase which
 has been repeated over and over  again 
till it has grown axiomatic1 is based   
upon this narrow estimate  of what is   
meant by notions4    #aj4 ,this thought1
 which is proposed as the instrument of 
philosophic  knowledge1 itself calls for

 further explanation4 ,we must          
understand in  what way it possesses    
necessity or cogency3 and when it claims
 to be  equal to the task of            
apprehending the absolute objects 7,god1
 ,spirit1  ,freedom71 that claim must be
 substantiated4 ,such an explanation1   
however1 is itself a lesson in          
philosophy1 and properly falls within   
the scope of the science itself4 ,a     
preliminary attempt to make matters     
plain would only be unphilosophical1 and
 consist of a tissue of  assumptions1   
assertions1 and inferential pros and    
cons1 e4g4 of  dogmatism without        
cogency1 as against which there would be
 an equal  right of counter-dogmatism4  
,a main line of argument in the         
,critical ,philosophy bids us pause     
before  proceeding to inquire into ,god 
or into the true being of things1 and   
tells us first of all to examine the    
faculty of cognition and see  whether it
 is equal to such an effort4 ,we ought1 
says ,kant1 to become  acquainted with  

the instrument1 before we undertake the 
work for which  it is to be employed2   
for if the instrument be insufficient1  
all our  trouble will be spent in vain4 
,the plausibility of this suggestion has
  won for it general assent and         
admiration2 the result of which has been
  to withdraw cognition from an interest
 in its objects and absorption in  the  
study of them1 and to direct it back    
upon itself2 and so turn it to  a       
question of form4 ,unless we wish to be 
deceived bywords1 it is easy  to see    
what this amounts to4 ,in the case of   
other instruments1 we can  try and      
criticise them in other ways than by    
setting about the special  work for     
which they are destined4 ,but the       
examination of knowledge can  only be   
carried out by an act of knowledge4 ,to 
examine this so-called  instrument is   
the same thing as to know it4 ,but to   
seek to know before  we know is as      
absurd as the wise resolution of        
,scholasticus1 not to  venture into the 

water until he had learned to swim4     
,reinhold saw the confusion with which  
this style of commencement is           
chargeable1 and tried to get out of the 
difficulty by starting with a           
hypothetical and problematical stage of 
philosophising4 ,in this way he         
supposed that it would be possible1     
nobody can tell how1 to get along1      
until we found ourselves1 further on1   
arrived at the primary truth  of truths4
 ,his method1 when closely looked into1 
will be seen to be  identical with a    
very common practice4 ,it starts from a 
substratum  of experiential fact1 or    
from a provisional assumption which has 
been brought into a definition2 and then
 proceeds to analyse this               
starting-point4 ,we can detect in       
,reinhold's argument a perception of    
the truth1 that the usual course which  
proceeds by assumptions and             
anticipations is no better than a       
hypothetical and problematical mode  of 
procedure4 ,but his perceiving this does

 not alter the character of  this       
method2 it only makes clear its         
imperfections4    #aa4 ,the special     
conditions which call for the existence 
of philosophy  maybe thus described4    
,the mind or spirit1 when it is sentient
 or  perceptive1 finds its object in    
something sensuous2 when it imagines1   
in a picture or image2 when it wills1 in
 an aim or end4 ,but in contrast  to1 or
 it may be only in distinction from1    
these forms of its existence  and of its
 objects1 the mind has also to gratify  
the cravings of  its highest and most   
inward life4 ,that innermost self is    
thought4  ,thus the mind renders thought
 its object4 ,in the best meaning of the
  phrase1 it comes to itself2 for       
thought is its principle1 and its  very 
unadulterated self4 ,but while thus     
occupied1 thought entangles  itself in  
contradictions1 e4g4 loses itself in the
 hard-and-fast  non-identity of its     
thoughts1 and so1 instead of reaching   
itself1  is caught and held in its      

counterpart4 ,this result1 to which     
honest  but narrow thinking leads the   
mere understanding1 is resisted by the  
loftier craving of which we have spoken4
 ,that craving expresses the            
perseverance of thought1 which continues
 true to itself1 even in this  conscious
 loss of its native rest and            
independence1 'that it may  overcome'   
and work out in itself the solution of  
its own contradictions4    ,to see that 
thought in its very nature is           
dialectical1 and that1 as               
understanding1 it must fall into        
contradiction1--the negative of  itself1
 will form one of the main lessons of   
logic4 ,when thought  grows hopeless of 
ever achieving1 by its own means1 the   
solution of  the contradiction which it 
has by its own action brought upon      
itself1  it turns back to those         
solutions of the question with which the
 mind  had learned to pacify itself in  
some of its other modes and forms4      
,unfortunately1 however1 the retreat of 

thought has led it1 as ,plato  noticed  
even in his time1 to a very uncalled-for
 hatred of reason  7misology72 and it   
then takes up against its own endeavours
 that  hostile attitude of which an     
example is seen in the doctrine that    
'immediate' knowledge1 as it is called1 
is the exclusive form in which  we      
become cognisant of truth4    #ab4 ,the 
rise of philosophy is due to these      
cravings of thought4 ,its  point of     
departure is ,experience2 including     
under that name both our  immediate     
consciousness and the inductions from   
it4 ,awakened1 as it  were1 by this     
stimulus1 thought is vitally            
characterised by raising  itself above  
the natural state of mind1 above the    
senses and inferences  from the senses  
into its own unadulterated element1 and 
by assuming1  accordingly1 at first a   
stand-aloof and negative attitude       
towards  the point from which it        
started4 ,through this state of         
antagonism to  the phenomena of sense   

its first satisfaction is found in      
itself1 in  the ,idea of the universal  
essence of these phenomena3 an ,idea    
7the  ,absolute1 or ,god7 which may be  
more or less abstract4 ,meanwhile1 on   
the other hand1 the sciences1 based on  
experience1 exert upon the  mind a      
stimulus to overcome the form in which  
their varied contents  are presented1   
and to elevate these contents to the    
rank of necessary  truth4 ,for the facts
 of science have the aspect of a vast   
conglomerate1  one thing coming side by 
side with another1 as if they were      
merely  given and presented1--as in     
short devoid of all essential or        
necessary  connexion4 ,in consequence of
 this stimulus thought is dragged out   
of its unrealised universality and its  
fancied or merely possible              
satisfaction1 and impelled onwards to a 
development from itself4 ,on  one hand  
this development only means that thought
 incorporates the  contents of science1 
in all their speciality of detail as    

submitted4 ,on  the other it makes these
 contents imitate the action of the     
original  creative thought1 and present 
the aspect of a free evolution          
determined  by the logic of the fact    
alone4    ,on the relation between      
'immediacy' and 'mediation' in          
consciousness  we shall speak later1    
expressly and with more detail4 ,here it
 may be  sufficient to premise that1    
though the two 'moments' or factors     
present  themselves as distinct1 still  
neither of them can be absent1 nor can  
one exist apart from the other4 ,thus   
the knowledge of ,god1 as of every      
supersensible reality1 is in its true   
character an exaltation above           
sensations or perceptions3 it           
consequently involves a negative        
attitude  to the initial data of sense1 
and to that extent implies mediation4   
,for to mediate is to take something as 
a beginning and to go onward to  a      
second thing2 so that the existence of  
this second thing depends on  our having

 reached it from something else         
contradistinguished from it4  ,in spite 
of this1 the knowledge of ,god is no    
mere sequel1 dependent  on the empirical
 phase of consciousness3 in fact1 its   
independence is  essentially secured    
through this negation and               
exaltation4--,no doubt1 if  we attach an
 unfair prominence to the fact of       
mediation1 and represent  it as implying
 a state of conditionedness1 it may be  
said--not that the  remark would mean   
much--that philosophy is the child of   
experience1 and  owes its rise to a     
posteriori fact4 7,as a matter of fact1 
thinking  is always the negation of what
 we have immediately before us47 ,with  
as much truth however we may be said to 
owe eating to the means of  nourishment1
 so long as we can have no eating       
without them4 ,if we take  this view1   
eating is certainly represented as      
ungrateful3 it devours  that to which it
 owes itself4 ,thinking1 upon this view 
of its action1  is equally ungrateful4  

,but there is also an a priori aspect of
 thought1 where by a  mediation1 not    
made by anything external but by a      
reflection into self1  we have that     
immediacy which is universality1 the    
self-complacency  of thought which is so
 much at home with itself that it feels 
an  innate indifference to descend to   
particulars1 and in that way to the     
development of its own nature4 ,it is   
thus also with religion1 which1  whether
 it be rude or elaborate1 whether it be 
invested with scientific  precision of  
detail or confined to the simple faith  
of the heart1  possesses1 throughout1   
the same intensive nature of contentment
 and  felicity4 ,but if thought never   
gets further than the universality of   
the ,ideas1 as was perforce the case in 
the first philosophies 7when  the       
,eleatics never got beyond ,being1 or   
,heraclitus beyond ,becoming71  it is   
justly open to the charge of formalism4 
,even in a more advanced  phase of      
philosophy1 we may often find a doctrine

 which has mastered  merely certain     
abstract propositions or formulae1 such 
as1 ',in the  absolute all is one1'     
',subject and object are                
identical1'--and only  repeating the    
same thing when it comes to particulars4
 ,bearing in  mind this first period of 
thought1 the period of mere generality1 
we  may safely say that experience is   
the real author of growth and  advance  
in philosophy4 ,for1 firstly1 the       
empirical sciences do not  stop short at
 the mere observation of the individual 
features of a  phenomenon4 ,by the aid  
of thought1 they are able to meet       
philosophy  with materials prepared for 
it1 in the shape of general             
uniformities1  i4e4 laws1 and           
classifications of the phenomena4 ,when 
this is done1  the particular facts     
which they contain are ready to be      
received into  philosophy4 ,this1       
secondly1 implies a certain compulsion  
on thought  itself to proceed to these  
concrete specific truths4 ,the reception

 into  philosophy of these scientific   
materials1 now that thought has removed 
their immediacy and made them cease to  
be mere data1 forms at the same  time a 
development of thought out of itself4   
,philosophy1 then1 owes  its development
 to the empirical sciences4 ,in return  
it gives their  contents what is so     
vital to them1 the freedom of           
thought1--gives them1  in short1 an a   
priori character4 ,these contents are   
now warranted  necessary1 and no longer 
depend on the evidence of facts merely1 
that  they were so found and so         
experienced4 ,the fact as experienced   
thus  becomes an illustration and a copy
 of the original and completely         
self-supporting activity of thought4    
#ac4 ,stated in exact terms1 such is the
 origin and development of  philosophy4 
,but the ,history of ,philosophy gives  
us the same process  from an historical 
and external point of view4 ,the stages 
in the  evolution of the ,idea there    
seem to follow each other by accident1  

and  to present merely a number of      
different and unconnected principles1   
which the several systems of philosophy 
carry out in their own way4  ,but it is 
not so4 ,for these thousands of years   
the same ,architect has  directed the   
work3 and that ,architect is the one    
living ,mind whose  nature is to think1 
to bring to self-consciousness what it  
is1 and1  with its being thus set as    
object before it1 to be at the same time
  raised above it1 and so to reach a    
higher stage of its own being4  ,the    
different systems which the history of  
philosophy presents are  therefore not  
irreconcilable with unity4 ,we may      
either say1 that it  is one philosophy  
at different degrees of maturity3 or    
that the  particular principle1 which is
 the groundwork of each system1 is  but 
a branch of one and the same universe of
 thought4 ,in philosophy  the latest    
birth of time is the result of all the  
systems that have  preceded it1 and must
 include their principles2 and so1 if1  

on other  grounds1 it deserve the title 
of philosophy1 will be the fullest1 most
  comprehensive1 and most adequate      
system of all4    ,the spectacle of so  
many and so various systems of          
philosophy suggests  the necessity of   
defining more exactly the relation of   
,universal to  ,particular4 ,when the   
universal is made a mere form and       
co-ordinated  with the particular1 as if
 it were on the same level1 it sinks    
into a  particular itself4 ,even common 
sense in every-day matters is above the 
absurdity of setting a universal beside 
the particulars4 ,would any  one1 who   
wished for fruit1 reject cherries1      
pears1 and grapes1 on the  ground that  
they were cherries1 pears1 or grapes1   
and not fruit8 ,but  when philosophy is 
in question1 the excuse of many is that 
philosophies  are so different1 and none
 of them is the philosophy1--that each  
is  only a philosophy4 ,such a plea is  
assumed to justify any amount of        
contempt for philosophy4 ,and yet       

cherries too are fruit4 ,often1 too1 a  
system1 of which the principle is the   
universal1 is put on a level with       
another of which the principle is a     
particular1 and with theories which     
deny the existence of philosophy        
altogether4 ,such systems are said to   
be only different views of philosophy4  
,with equal justice1 light and  darkness
 might be styled different kinds of     
light4    #ad4 ,the same evolution of   
thought which is exhibited in the       
history  of philosophy is presented in  
the ,system of ,philosophy itself4      
,here1  instead of surveying the        
process1 as we do in history1 from the  
outside1 we see the movement of thought 
clearly defined in its native  medium4  
,the thought1 which is genuine and      
self-supporting1 must be  intrinsically 
concrete2 it must be an ,idea2 and when 
it is viewed in  the whole of its       
universality1 it is the ,idea1 or the   
,absolute4 ,the  science of this ,idea  
must form a system4 ,for the truth is   

concrete2  that is1 whilst it gives a   
bond and principle of unity1 it also    
possesses an internal source of         
development4 ,truth1 then1 is only      
possible as a universe or totality of   
thought2 and the freedom of the  whole1 
as well as the necessity of the several 
sub-divisions1 which it  implies1 are   
only possible when these are            
discriminated and defined4    ,unless it
 is a system1 a philosophy is not a     
scientific production4  ,unsystematic   
philosophising can only be expected to  
give expression to  personal            
peculiarities of mind1 and has no       
principle for the regulation  of its    
contents4 ,apart from their             
interdependence and organic union1  the 
truths of philosophy are valueless1 and 
must then be treated as  baseless       
hypotheses1 or personal convictions4    
,yet many philosophical  treatises      
confine themselves to such an exposition
 of the opinions and  sentiments of the 
author4    ,the term system is often    

misunderstood4 ,it does not denote a    
philosophy1 the principle of which is   
narrow and to be distinguished  from    
others4 ,on the contrary1 a genuine     
philosophy makes it a principle  to     
include every particular principle4     
#ae4 ,each of the parts of philosophy is
 a philosophical whole1 a circle        
rounded and complete in itself4 ,in each
 of these parts1 however1 the           
philosophical ,idea is found in a       
particular specificality or medium4     
,the single circle1 because it is a real
 totality1 bursts through the  limits   
imposed by its special medium1 and gives
 rise to a wider circle4  ,the whole of 
philosophy in this way resembles a      
circle of circles4 ,the  ,idea appears  
in each single circle1 but1 at the same 
time1 the whole  ,idea is constituted by
 the system of these peculiar phases1   
and each is  a necessary member of the  
organisation4    #af4 ,in the form of an
 ,encyclopaedia1 the science has no room
 for a  detailed exposition of          

particulars1 and must be limited to     
setting  forth the commencement of the  
special sciences and the notions of     
cardinal importance in them4    ,how    
much of the particular parts is         
requisite to constitute a  particular   
branch of knowledge is so far           
indeterminate1 that the part1  if it is 
to be something true1 must be not an    
isolated member merely1  but itself an  
organic whole4 ,the entire field of     
philosophy therefore  really forms a    
single science2 but it may also be      
viewed as a total1  composed of several 
particular sciences4    ,the            
encyclopaedia of philosophy must not be 
confounded with ordinary                
encyclopaedias4 ,an ordinary            
encyclopaedia does not pretend to be    
more  than an aggregation of sciences1  
regulated by no principle1 and merely   
as experience offers them4 ,sometimes it
 even includes what merely bear  the    
name of sciences1 while they are nothing
 more than a collection of  bits of     

information4 ,in an aggregate like this1
 the several branches of  knowledge owe 
their place in the encyclopaedia to     
extrinsic reasons1  and their unity is  
therefore artificial3 they are arranged1
 but we  cannot say they form a system4 
,for the same reason1 especially as the 
materials to be combined also depend    
upon no one rule or principle1  the     
arrangement is at best an experiment1   
and will always exhibit  inequalities4  
,an encyclopaedia of philosophy excludes
 three kinds of partial science4  ,i4   
,it excludes mere aggregates of bits of 
information4 ,philology in  its prima   
facie aspect belongs to this class4     
,,ii4 ,it rejects the  quasi-sciences1  
which are founded on an act of arbitrary
 will alone1  such as ,heraldry4        
,sciences of this class are positive    
from beginning to  end4 ,,iii4 ,in      
another class of sciences1 also styled  
positive1 but which  have a rational    
basis and a rational beginning1         
philosophy claims that  constituent as  

its own4 ,the positive features remain  
the property of  the sciences           
themselves4    ,the positive element in 
the last class of sciences is of        
different  sorts4 7,i7 ,their           
commencement1 though rational at bottom1
 yields to the  influence of            
fortuitousness1 when they have to bring 
their universal  truth into contact with
 actual facts and the single phenomena  
of  experience4 ,in this region of      
chance and change1 the adequate notion  
of science must yield its place to      
reasons or grounds of explanation4      
,thus1 e4g4 in the science of           
jurisprudence1 or in the system of      
direct and indirect taxation1 it is     
necessary to have certain points        
precisely and definitively settled which
 lie beyond the competence of  the      
absolute lines laid down by the pure    
notion4 ,a certain latitude  of         
settlement accordingly is left3 and each
 point may be determined  in one way on 
one principle1 in another way on        

another1 and admits of  no definitive   
certainty4 ,similarly the ,idea of      
,nature1 when parcelled  out in detail1 
is dissipated into contingencies4       
,natural history1  geography1 and       
medicine stumble upon descriptions of   
existence1 upon  kinds and distinctions1
 which are not determined by reason1 but
 by  sport and adventitious incidents4  
,even history comes under the same      
category4 ,the ,idea is its essence and 
inner nature2 but1 as it appears1       
everything is under contingency and in  
the field of voluntary action4  7,,ii7  
,these sciences are positive also in    
failing to recognise the  finite nature 
of what they predicate1 and to point out
 how these  categories and their whole  
sphere pass into a higher4 ,they assume 
their  statements to possess an         
authority beyond appeal4 ,here the fault
 lies  in the finitude of the form1 as  
in the previous instance it lay in  the 
matter4 7,,iii7 ,in close sequel to     
this1 sciences are positive in          

consequence of the inadequate grounds on
 which their conclusions rest3  based as
 these are on detached and casual       
inference1 upon feeling1  faith1 and    
authority1 and1 generally speaking1 upon
 the deliverances  of inward and outward
 perception4 ,under this head we must   
also class  the philosophy which        
proposes to build upon anthropology1'   
facts of  consciousness1 inward sense1  
or outward experience4 ,it may happen1  
however1 that empirical is an epithet   
applicable only to the form of          
scientific exposition2 whilst intuitive 
sagacity has arranged what are  mere    
phenomena1 according to the essential   
sequence of the notion4 ,in  such a case
 the contrasts between the varied and   
numerous phenomena  brought together    
serve to eliminate the external and     
accidental  circumstances of their      
conditions1 and the universal thus comes
 clearly  into view4 ,guided by such an 
intuition1 experimental physics will    
present the rational science of         

,nature1--as history will present the   
science of human affairs and actions--in
 an external picture1 which  mirrors the
 philosophic notion4    #ag4 ,it may    
seem as if philosophy1 in order to start
 on its course1  had1 like the rest of  
the sciences1 to begin with a subjective
  presupposition4 ,the sciences         
postulate their respective objects1 such
  as space1 number1 or whatever it be2  
and it might be supposed that           
philosophy had also to postulate the    
existence of thought4 ,but the  two     
cases are not exactly parallel4 ,it is  
by the free act of thought  that it     
occupies a point of view1 in which it is
 for its own self1 and  thus gives      
itself an object of its own production4 
,nor is this all4  ,the very point of   
view1 which originally is taken on its  
own evidence  only1 must in the course  
of the science be converted to a        
result1--the  ultimate result in which  
philosophy returns into itself and      
reaches  the point with which it began4 

,in this manner philosophy exhibits the 
appearance of a circle which closes with
 itself1 and has no beginning  in the   
same way as the other sciences have4 ,to
 speak of a beginning of  philosophy has
 a meaning only in relation to a person 
who proposes to  commence the study1 and
 not in relation to the science as      
science4 ,the  same thing may be thus   
expressed4 ,the notion of science--the  
notion  therefore with which we         
start--which1 for the very reason that  
it is  initial1 implies a separation    
between the thought which is our object1
  and the subject philosophising which  
is1 as it were1 external to the  former1
 must be grasped and comprehended by the
 science itself4 ,this  is in short the 
one single aim1 action1 and goal of     
philosophy--to  arrive at the notion of 
its notion1 and thus secure its return  
and its  satisfaction4    #ah4 ,as the  
whole science1 and only the whole1 can  
exhibit what the  ,idea or system of    
reason is1 it is impossible to give in a

 preliminary  way a general impression  
of a philosophy4 ,nor can a division of 
philosophy into its parts be            
intelligible1 except in connexion with  
the  system4 ,a preliminary division1   
like the limited conception from which  
it comes1 can only be an anticipation4  
,here however it is premised that  the  
,idea turns out to be the thought which 
is completely identical  with itself1   
and not identical simply in the         
abstract1 but also in its  action of    
setting itself over against itself1 so  
as to gain a being of  its own1 and yet 
of being in full possession of itself   
while it is in  this other4 ,thus       
philosophy is subdivided into three     
parts3    ,i4 ,logic1 the science of the
 ,idea in and for itself4    ,,ii4 ,the 
,philosophy of ,nature3 the science of  
the ,idea in its otherness4    ,,iii4   
,the ,philosophy of ,mind3 the science  
of the ,idea come back to  itself out of
 that otherness4    ,as observed in     
#ae1 the differences between the several

 philosophical  sciences are only       
aspects or specialisations of the one   
,idea or system  of reason1 which and   
which alone is alike exhibited in these 
different  media4 ,in ,nature nothing   
else would have to be discerned1 except 
the  ,idea3 but the ,idea has here      
divested itself of its proper being4 ,in
  ,mind1 again1 the ,idea has asserted a
 being of its own1 and is on the  way to
 become absolute4 ,every such form in   
which the ,idea is expressed1  is at the
 same time a passing or fleeting stage3 
and hence each of  these subdivisions   
has not only to know its contents as an 
object which  has being for the time1   
but also in the same act to expound how 
these  contents pass into their higher  
circle4 ,to represent the relation      
between them as a division1 therefore1  
leads to misconception2 for it          
co-ordinates the several parts or       
sciences one beside another1 as if  they
 had no innate development1 but were1   
like so many species1 really  and       

radically distinct4      #a ,the        
journal1 too1 edited by ,thomson is     
called ',annals of  ,philosophy2 or1    
,magazine of ,chemistry1 ,mineralogy1   
,mechanics1 ,natural  ,history1         
,agriculture1 and ,arts4' ,we can easily
 guess from the title  what sort of     
subjects are here to be understood under
 the term  'philosophy4' ,among the     
advertisements of books just published1 
,i  lately found the following notice in
 an ,english newspaper3 ',the ,art of   
,preserving the ,hair1 on ,philosophical
 ,principles1 neatly printed in  post   
#hvo1 price seven shillings4' ,by       
philosophical principles for the        
preservation of the hair are probably   
meant chemical or physiological         
principles4      #b ,in connexion with  
the general principles of ,political    
,economy1  the term 'philosophical' is  
frequently heard from the lips of       
,english  statesmen1 even in their      
public speeches4 ,in the ,house of      
,commons1 on  the #bnd ,feb4 #ahbe1     

,brougham1 speaking oh the address in   
reply to the  speech from the throne1   
talked of 'the statesman-like and       
philosophical  principles of            
,free-trade1--for philosophical they    
undoubtedly are--upon  the acceptance of
 which his majesty this day             
congratulated the ,house4'  ,nor is this
 language confined to members of the    
,opposition4 ,at the  shipowners' yearly
 dinner in the same month1 under the    
chairmanship  of the ,premier ,lord     
,liverpool1 supported by ,canning the   
,secretary of  ,state1 and ,sir ,c4     
,long the ,paymaster-,general of the    
,army1 ,canning  in reply to the toast  
which had been proposed said3 ',a period
 has  just begun1 in which ministers    
have it in their power to apply to  the 
administration of this country the sound
 maxims of a profound  philosophy4'     
,differences there may be between       
,english and ,german  philosophy3 still1
 considering that elsewhere the name of 
philosophy  is used only as a nickname  

and insult1 or as something odious1 it  
is  a matter of rejoicing to see it     
still honoured in the mouth of the      
,english ,government4          ,,chapter
 ,,ii4      ,,preliminary ,,notion4     
#ai4 ,,logic ,,is ,,the ,,science ,,of  
,,the ,,pure ,,idea2 pure1 that is1     
because the  ,idea is in the abstract   
medium of ,thought4    ,this definition1
 and the others which occur in these    
introductory  outlines1 are derived from
 a survey of the whole system1 to which 
accordingly they are subsequent4 ,the   
same remark applies to all  prefatory   
notions whatever about philosophy4      
,logic might have been defined as the   
science of thought1 and of its  laws and
 characteristic forms4 ,but thought1 as 
thought1 constitutes  only the general  
medium1 or qualifying circumstance1     
which renders  the ,idea distinctively  
logical4 ,if we identify the ,idea with 
thought1  thought must not be taken in  
the sense of a method or form1 but in   
the  sense of the self-developing       

totality of its laws and peculiar terms4
  ,these laws are the work of thought   
itself1 and not a fact which it  finds  
and must submit to4    ,from different  
points of view1 ,logic is either the    
hardest or the  easiest of the sciences1
 ,logic is hard1 because it has to deal 
not with  perceptions1 nor1 like        
geometry1 with abstract representations 
of the  senses1 but with pure           
abstractions2 and because it demands a  
force and  facility of withdrawing into 
pure thought1 of keeping firm hold on   
it1  and of moving in such an element4  
,logic is easy1 because its facts are   
nothing but our own thought and its     
familiar forms or terms3 and these  are 
the acme of simplicity1 the abc of      
everything else4 ,they are also  what we
 are best acquainted with3 such as1     
',is' and ',is not'3 quality  and       
magnitude3 being potential and being    
actual3 one1 many1 and so on4  ,but such
 an acquaintance only adds to the       
difficulties of the study2  for while1  

on the one hand1 we naturally think it  
is not worth our  trouble to occupy     
ourselves any longer with things so     
familiar1 on the  other hand1 the       
problem is to become acquainted with    
them in a new way1  quite opposite to   
that in which we know them already4     
,the utility of ,logic is a matter which
 concerns its bearings upon the         
student1 and the training it may give   
for other purposes4 ,this logical       
training consists in the exercise in    
thinking which the student has  to go   
through 7this science is the thinking of
 thinking73 and in the  fact that he    
stores his head with thoughts1 in their 
native unalloyed  character4 ,it is true
 that ,logic1 being the absolute form of
 truth1 and  another name for the very  
truth itself1 is something more than    
merely  useful4 ,yet if what is noblest1
 most liberal and most independent is   
also most useful1 ,logic has some claim 
to the latter character4 ,its  utility  
must then be estimated at another rate  

than exercise in thought  for the sake  
of the exercise4    7#a7 ,the first     
question is3 ,what is the object of our 
science8 ,the  simplest and most        
intelligible answer to this question is 
that ,truth  is the object of ,logic4   
,truth is a noble word1 and the thing is
 nobler  still4 ,so long as man is sound
 at heart and in spirit1 the search for 
truth must awake all the enthusiasm of  
his nature4 ,but immediately  there     
steps in the objection--,are we able to 
know truth8 ,there  seems to be a       
disproportion between finite beings like
 ourselves and  the truth which is      
absolute3 and doubts suggest themselves 
whether  there is any bridge between the
 finite and the infinite4 ,god is       
truth3 how shall we know ,him8 ,such an 
undertaking appears to stand in         
contradiction with the graces of        
lowliness and humility4--,others who    
ask whether we can know the truth have a
 different purpose4 ,they want  to      
justify themselves in living on         

contented with their petty1 finite      
aims4 ,and humility of this stamp is a  
poor thing4    ,but the time is past    
when people asked3 ,how shall ,i1 a poor
 worm of the  dust1 be able to know the 
truth8 ,and in its stead we find vanity 
and  conceit3 people claim1 without any 
trouble on their part1 to breathe  the  
very atmosphere of truth4 ,the young    
have been flattered into the  belief    
that they possess a natural birthright  
of moral and religious  truth4 ,and in  
the same strain1 those of riper years   
are declared to  be sunk1 petrified1    
ossified in falsehood4 ,youth1 say these
 teachers1  sees the bright light of    
dawn3 but the older generation lies in  
the  slough and mire of the common day4 
,they admit that the special sciences   
are something that certainly ought to be
 cultivated1 but merely as  the means to
 satisfy the needs of outer life4 ,in   
all this it is not  humility which holds
 back from the knowledge and study of   
the truth1  but a conviction that we are

 already in full possession of it4 ,and 
no  doubt the young carry with them the 
hopes of their elder compeers2 on  them 
rests the advance of the world and      
science4 ,but these hopes are  set upon 
the young1 only on the condition that1  
instead of remaining as  they are1 they 
undertake the stern labour of mind4     
,this modesty in truth-seeking has still
 another phase3 and that is the  genteel
 indifference to truth1 as we see it in 
,pilate's conversation  with ,christ4   
,pilate asked ',what is truth8' with the
 air of a man who  had settled accounts 
with everything long ago1 and concluded 
that  nothing particularly matters3--he 
meant much the same as ,solomon when  he
 says3 ',all is vanity4' ,when it comes 
to this1 nothing is left but            
self-conceit4    ,the knowledge of the  
truth meets an additional obstacle in   
timidity4  ,a slothful mind finds it    
natural to say3 ',don't let it be       
supposed  that we mean to be in earnest 
with our philosophy4 ,we shall be glad  

inter alia to study ,logic3 but ,logic  
must be sure to leave us as  we were    
before4' ,people have a feeling that1 if
 thinking passes the  ordinary range of 
our ideas and impressions1 it cannot but
 be on the  evil road4 ,they seem to be 
trusting themselves to a sea on which   
they  will be tossed to and fro by the  
waves of thought1 till at length they   
again reach the sandbank of this        
temporal scene1 as utterly poor as  when
 they left it4 ,what coines of such a   
view1 we see in the world4 ,it  is      
possible within these limits to gain    
varied information and many             
accomplishments1 to become a master of  
official routine1 and to be  trained for
 special purposes4 ,but it is quite     
another thing to educate  the spirit for
 the higher life and to devote our      
energies to its  service4 ,in our own   
day it may be hoped a longing for       
something better  has sprung up among   
the young1 so that they will not be     
contented with  the mere straw of outer 

knowledge4    7#b7 ,it is universally   
agreed that thought is the object of    
,logic4 ,but  of thought our estimate   
may be very mean1 or it may be very     
high4 ,on  one hand1 people say3 ',it is
 only a thought4' ,in their view thought
  is subjective1 arbitrary and          
accidental--distinguished from the thing
  itself1 from the true and the real4   
,on the other hand1 a very high         
estimate may be formed of thought2 when 
thought alone is held adequate  to      
attain the highest of all things1 the   
nature of ,god1 of which the  senses can
 tell us nothing4 ,god is a spirit1 it  
is said1 and must be  worshipped in     
spirit and in truth4 ,but the merely    
felt and sensible1  we admit1 is not the
 spiritual2 its heart of hearts is in   
thought2  and only spirit can know      
spirit4 ,and though it is true that     
spirit  can demean itself as feeling and
 sense--as is the case in religion1  the
 mere feeling1 as a mode of             
consciousness1 is one thing1 and its    

contents another4 ,feeling1 as feeling1 
is the general form of the  sensuous    
nature which we have in common with the 
brutes4 ,this form1  viz4 feeling1 may  
possibly seize and appropriate the full 
organic  truth3 but the form has no real
 congruity with its contents4 ,the form 
of feeling is the lowest in which       
spiritual truth can be expressed4  ,the 
world of spiritual existences1 ,god     
himself1 exists in proper  truth1 only  
in thought and as thought4 ,if this be  
so1 there fore1  thought1 far from being
 a mere thought1 is the highest and1 in 
strict  accuracy1 the sole mode of      
apprehending the eternal and absolute4  
,as of thought1 so also of the science  
of thought1 a very high or a  very low  
opinion may be formed4 ,any man1 it is  
supposed1 can think  without ,logic1 as 
he can digest without studying          
physiology4 ,if he  have studied ,logic1
 he thinks afterwards as he did before1 
perhaps  more methodically1 but with    
little alteration4 ,if this were all1   

and  if ,logic did no more than make men
 acquainted with the action of  thought 
as the faculty of comparison and        
classification1 it would  produce       
nothing which had not been done quite as
 well before4 ,and in  point of fact    
,logic hitherto had no other idea of its
 duty than this4  ,yet to be            
well-informed about thought1 even as a  
mere activity of the  subject-mind1 is  
honourable and interesting for man4 ,it 
is in knowing  what he is and what he   
does1 that man is distinguished from the
 brutes4  ,but we may take the higher   
estimate of thought--as what alone can  
get  really in touch with the supreme   
and true4 ,in that case1 ,logic as the  
science of thought occupies a high      
ground4 ,if the science of ,logic  then 
considers thought in its action and its 
productions 7and thought  being no      
resultless energy produces thoughts and 
the particular thought  required71 the  
theme of ,logic is in general the       
supersensible world1  and to deal with  

that theme is to dwell for a while in   
that world4  ,mathematics is concerned  
with the abstractions of time and space4
 ,but  these are still the object of    
sense1 although the sensible is abstract
  and idealised4 ,thought bids adieu    
even to this last and abstract          
sensible3 it asserts its own native     
independence1 renounces the field  of   
the external and internal sense1 and    
puts away the interests and             
inclinations of the individual4 ,when   
,logic takes this ground1 it is a       
higher science than we are in the habit 
of supposing4    7#c7 ,the necessity of 
understanding ,logic in a deeper sense  
than as  the science of the mere form of
 thought is enforced by the interests   
of religion and politics1 of law and    
morality4 ,in earlier days men  meant no
 harm by thinking3 they thought away    
freely and fearlessly4  ,they thought   
about ,god1 about ,nature1 and the      
,state2 and they felt  sure that a      
knowledge of the truth was obtainable   

through thought  only1 and not through  
the senses or any random ideas or       
opinions4  ,but while they so thought1  
the principal ordinances of life began  
to be seriously affected by their       
conclusions4 ,thought deprived  existing
 institutions of their force4           
,constitutions fell a victim to         
thought3 religion was assailed by       
thought3 firm religious beliefs  which  
had been always looked upon as          
revelations were undermined1 and  in    
many minds the old faith was upset4 ,the
 ,greek philosophers1 for  example1     
became antagonists of the old religion1 
and destroyed its  beliefs4             
,philosophers were accordingly banished 
or put to death1 as  revolutionists who 
had subverted religion and the state1   
two things  which were inseparable4     
,thought1 in short1 made itself a power 
in the  real world1 and exercised       
enormous influence4 ,the matter ended by
  drawing attention to the influence of 
thought1 and its claims were  submitted 

to a more rigorous scrutiny1 by which   
the world professed to  find that       
thought arrogated too much and was      
unable to perform what  it had          
undertaken4 ,it had not--people         
said--learned the real being of  ,god1  
of ,nature and ,mind4 ,it had not       
learned what the truth was4 ,what  it   
had done1 was to overthrow religion and 
the state4 ,it became urgent  therefore 
to justify thought1 with reference to   
the results it had  produced3 and it is 
this examination into the nature of     
thought and  this justification which in
 recent times has constituted one of the
  main problems of philosophy4    #bj4  
,if we take our prima facie impression  
of thought1 we find on  examination     
first 7a7 that1 in its usual subjective 
acceptation1  thought is one out of many
 activities or faculties of the mind1   
co-ordinate with such others as         
sensation1 perception1 imagination1     
desire1 volition1 and the like4 ,the    
product of this activity1 the form  or  

character peculiar to thought1 is the   
,,universal1 or1 in general1  the       
abstract4 ,thought1 regarded as an      
activity1 may be accordingly  described 
as the active universal1 and1 since the 
deed1 its product1  is the universal    
once more1 may be called a              
self-actualising universal4  ,thought   
conceived as a subject 7agent7 is a     
thinker1 and the subject  existing as a 
thinker is simply denoted by the term   
',i4'    ,the propositions giving an    
account of thought in this and the      
following  sections are not offered as  
assertions or opinions of mine on the   
matter4 ,but in these preliminary       
chapters any deduction or proof would   
be impossible1 and the statements may be
 taken as matters in evidence4  ,in     
other words1 every man1 when he thinks  
and considers his thoughts1  will       
discover by the experience of his       
consciousness that they possess  the    
character of universality as well as the
 other aspects of thought  to be        

afterwards enumerated4 ,we assume of    
course that his powers of  attention and
 abstraction have undergone a previous  
training1 enabling  him to observe      
correctly the evidence of his           
consciousness and his  conceptions4     
,this introductory exposition has       
already alluded to the distinction      
between ,sense1 ,conception1 and        
,thought4 ,as the distinction is of     
capital importance for understanding the
 nature and kinds of knowledge1  it will
 help to explain matters if we here call
 attention to it4 ,for  the explanation 
of ,sense1 the readiest method certainly
 is1 to refer  to its external          
source--the organs of sense4 ,but to    
name the organ  does not help much to   
explain what is apprehended by it4 ,the 
real  distinction between sense and     
thought lies in this--that the essential
  feature of the sensible is            
individuality1 and as the individual    
7which1  reduced to its simplest terms1 
is the atom7 is also a member of a      

group1 sensible existence presents a    
number of mutually exclusive  units1--of
 units1 to speak in more definite and   
abstract formulae1  which exist side by 
side with1 and after1 one another4      
,conception or  picture-thinking works  
with materials from the same sensuous   
source4  ,but these materials when      
conceived are expressly characterised as
 in  me and therefore mine3 and         
secondly1 as universal1 or simple1      
because  only referred to self4 ,nor is 
sense the only source of materialised   
conception4 ,there are conceptions      
constituted by materials emanating  from
 self-conscious thought1 such as those  
of law1 morality1 religion1  and even of
 thought itself1 and it requires some   
effort to detect  wherein lies the      
difference between such conceptions and 
thoughts  having the same import4 ,for  
it is a thought of which such conception
 is  the vehicle1 and there is no want  
of the form of universality1 without    
which no content could be in me1 or be a

 conception at all4 ,yet here  also the 
peculiarity of conception is1 generally 
speaking1 to be sought  in the          
individualism or isolation of its       
contents4 ,true it is that1 for         
example1 law and legal provisions do not
 exist in a sensible space1  mutually   
excluding one another4 ,nor as regards  
time1 though they appear  to some extent
 in succession1 are their contents      
themselves conceived  as affected by    
time1 or as transient and changeable in 
it4 ,the fault  in conception lies      
deeper4 ,these ideas1 though implicitly 
possessing  the organic unity of mind1  
stand isolated here and there on the    
broad  ground of conception1 with its   
inward and abstract generality4 ,thus   
cut adrift1 each is simple1 unrelated3  
,right1 ,duty1 ,god4 ,conception in     
these circumstances either rests        
satisfied with declaring that ,right  is
 ,right1 ,god is ,god3 or in a higher   
grade of culture1 it proceeds to        
enunciate the attributes2 as1 for       

instance1 ,god is the ,creator of the   
world1 omniscient1 almighty1 c4 ,in this
 way several isolated1 simple           
predicates are strung together3 but in  
spite of the link supplied  by their    
subject1 the predicates never get beyond
 mere contiguity4  ,in this point       
,conception coincides with              
,understanding3 the only  distinction   
being that the latter introduces        
relations of universal  and particular1 
of cause and effect1 c41 and in this way
 supplies a  necessary connexion to the 
isolated ideas of conception2 which last
 has  left them side by side in its     
vague mental spaces1 connected only by a
  bare 'and4'    ,the difference between
 conception and thought is of special   
importance3  because philosophy may be  
said to do nothing but transform        
conceptions  into thoughts1--though it  
works the further transformation of a   
mere  thought into a notion4            
,sensible existence has been            
characterised by the attributes of      

individuality and mutual exclusion of   
the members4 ,it is well to  remember   
that these very attributes of sense are 
thoughts and general  terms4 ,it will be
 shown in the ,logic that thought 7and  
the universal7  is not a mere opposite  
of sense3 it lets nothing escape it1    
but1  outflanking its other1 is at once 
that other and itself4 ,now language  is
 the work of thought3 and hence all that
 is expressed in language  must be      
universal4 ,what ,i only mean or suppose
 is mine3 it belongs  to me1--this      
particular individual4 ,but language    
expresses nothing  but universality2 and
 so ,i cannot say what ,i merely mean4  
,and the  unutterable1--feeling or      
sensation1--far from being the highest  
truth1  is the most unimportant and     
untrue4 ,if ,i say ',the individual1'   
',this  individual1' 'here1' 'now1' all 
these are universal terms4 ,everything  
and anything is an individual1 a 'this1'
 and if it be sensible1 is  here and    
now4 ,similarly when ,i say1 ',i1' ,i   

mean my single self to  the exclusion of
 all others3 but what ,i say1 viz4 ',i1'
 is just  every ',i1' which in like     
manner excludes all others from itself4 
,in  an awkward expression which ,kant  
used1 he said that ,i accompany  all my 
conceptions1--sensations1 too1 desires1 
actions1 c4 ',i' is  in essence and act 
the universal3 and such partnership is a
 form1  though an external form1 of     
universality4 ,all other men have it in 
common with me to be ',i'3 just as it is
 common to all my sensations  and       
conceptions to be mine4 ,but ',i1' in   
the abstract1 as such1 is the  mere act 
of self-concentration or self-relation1 
in which we make  abstraction from all  
conception and feeling1 from every state
 of mind  and every peculiarity of      
nature1 talent1 and experience4 ,to this
  extent1 ',i' is the existence of a    
wholly abstract universality1 a         
principle of abstract freedom4 ,hence   
thought1 viewed as a subject1 is  what  
is expressed by the word ',i'3 and since

 ,i am at the same time in  all my      
sensations1 conceptions1 and states of  
consciousness1 thought  is everywhere   
present1 and is a category that runs    
through all these  modifications4       
,our first impression when we use the   
term thought is of a subjective         
activity--one amongst many similar      
faculties1 such as memory1  imagination 
and will4 ,were thought merely an       
activity of the  subject-mind and       
treated under that aspect by logic1     
logic would  resemble the other sciences
 in possessing a well-marked object4 ,it
  might in that case seem arbitrary to  
devote a special science to  thought1   
whilst will1 imagination and the rest   
were denied the same  privilege4 ,the   
selection of one faculty however might  
even in this view  be very well grounded
 on a certain authority acknowledged to 
belong to  thought1 and on its claim to 
be regarded as the true nature of man1  
in  which consists his distinction from 
the brutes4 ,nor is it unimportant  to  

study thought even as a subjective      
energy4 ,a detailed analysis  of its    
nature would exhibit rules and laws1 a  
knowledge of which is  derived from     
experience4 ,a treatment of the laws of 
thought1 from this  point of view1 used 
once to form the body of logical        
science4 ,of that  science ,aristotle   
was the founder4 ,he succeeded in       
assigning to thought  what properly     
belongs to it4 ,our thought is extremely
 concrete3 but  in its composite        
contents we must distinguish the part   
that properly  belongs to thought1 or to
 the abstract mode of its action4 ,a    
subtle  spiritual bond1 consisting in   
the agency of thought1 is what gives    
unity to all these contents1 and it was 
this bond1 the form as form1  that      
,aristotle noted and described4 ,up to  
the present day1 the logic  of          
,aristotle continues to be the received 
system4 ,it has indeed been  spun out to
 greater length1 especially by the      
labours of the medieval  ,schoolmen who1

 without making any material additions1 
merely refined  in details4 ,the moderns
 also have left their mark upon this    
logic1  partly by omitting many points  
of logical doctrine due to ,aristotle   
and  the ,schoolmen1 and partly by      
foisting in a quantity of psychological 
matter4 ,the purport of the science is  
to become acquainted with the  procedure
 of finite thought3 and1 if it is       
adapted to its pre-supposed  object1 the
 science is entitled to be styled       
correct4 ,the study of this  formal     
logic undoubtedly has its uses4 ,it     
sharpens the wits1 as the  phrase goes1 
and teaches us to collect our thoughts  
and to abstract  --whereas in common    
consciousness we have to deal with      
sensuous  conceptions which cross and   
perplex one another4 ,abstraction       
moreover  implies the concentration of  
the mind on a single point1 and thus    
induces the habit of attending to our   
inward selves4 ,an acquaintance  with   
the forms of finite thought may be made 

a means of training the  mind for the   
empirical sciences1 since their method  
is regulated by  these forms3 and in    
this sense logic has been designated    
,instrumental4  ,it is true1 we may be  
still more liberal1 and say3 ,logic is  
to be  studied not for its utility1 but 
for its own sake2 the super-excellent   
is not to be sought for the sake of mere
 utility4 ,in one sense this is  quite  
correct3 but it may be replied that the 
super-excellent is also  the most       
useful3 because it is the all-sustaining
 principle which1  having a subsistence 
of its own1 may therefore serve as the  
vehicle of  special ends which it       
furthers and secures4 ,and thus1 special
 ends1  though they have no right to be 
set first1 are still fostered by the    
presence of the highest good4 ,religion1
 for instance1 has an absolute  value of
 its own2 yet at the same time other    
ends flourish and succeed  in its train4
 ,as ,christ says3 ',seek ye first the  
kingdom of ,god1 and  all these things  

shall be added unto you4' ,particular   
ends can be  attained only in the       
attainment of what absolutely is and    
exists in its  own right4    #ba4 7b7   
,thought was described as active4 ,we   
now1 in the second place1  consider this
 action in its bearings upon objects1 or
 as reflection  upon something4 ,in this
 case the universal or product of its   
operation  contains the value of the    
thing--is the essential1 inward1 and    
true4    ,in  #e the old belief was     
quoted that the reality in object1      
circumstance1 or event1 the intrinsic   
worth or essence1 the thing on  which   
everything depends1 is not a            
self-evident datum of consciousness1  or
 coincident with the first appearance   
and impression of the object2  that1 on 
the contrary1 ,reflection is required in
 order to discover the  real            
constitution of the object--and that by 
such reflection it will be  ascertained4
    ,to reflect is a lesson which even  
the child has to learn4 ,one of his     

first lessons is to join adjectives with
 substantives4 ,this obliges  him to    
attend and distinguish3 he has to       
remember a rule and apply it  to the    
particular case4 ,this rule is nothing  
but a universal3 and the  child must see
 that the particular adapts itself to   
this universal4  ,in life1 again1 we    
have ends to attain4 ,and with regard to
 these we  ponder which is the best way 
to secure them4 ,the end here represents
  the universal or governing principle3 
and we have means and instruments  whose
 action we regulate in conformity to the
 end4 ,in the same way  reflection is   
active in questions of conduct4 ,to     
reflect here means to  recollect the    
right1 the duty1--the universal which   
serves as a fixed  rule' to guide our   
behaviour in the given case4 ,our       
particular act  must imply and recognise
 the universal law4--,we find the same  
thing  exhibited in our study of natural
 phenomena4 ,for instance1 we observe   
thunder and lightning4 ,the phenomenon  

is a familiar one1 and we often         
perceive it4 ,but man is not content    
with a bare acquaintance1 or with  the  
fact as it appears to the senses2 he    
would like to get behind the  surface1  
to know what it is1 and to comprehend   
it4 ,this leads him to  reflect3 he     
seeks to find out the cause as something
 distinct from  the mere phenomenon3 he 
tries to know the inside in its         
distinction  from the outside4 ,hence   
the phenomenon becomes double1 it splits
 into  inside and outside1 into force   
and its manifestation1 into cause and   
effect4 ,once more we find the inside or
 the force identified with the          
universal and permanent3 not this or    
that flash of lightning1 this  or that  
plant--but that which continues the same
 in them all4 ,the  sensible appearance 
is individual and evanescent3 the       
permanent in  it is discovered by4      
reflection4 ,nature shows us a countless
 number  of individual forms and        
phenomena4 ,into this variety we feel a 

need  of introducing unity3 we compare1 
consequently1 and try to find the       
universal of each single case4          
,individuals are born and perish3 the   
species abides and recurs in them all3  
and its existence is only  visible to   
reflection4 ,under the same head fall   
such laws as those  regulating the      
motion of the heavenly bodies4 ,to-day  
we see the stars  here1 and to-morrow   
there3 and our mind finds something     
incongruous1 in  this chaos--something  
in which it can put no faith1 because it
 believes  in order and in a simple1    
constant1 and universal law4 ,inspired  
by this  belief1 the mind has directed  
its reflection towards the phenomena1   
and learnt their laws4 ,in other words1 
it has established the movement  of the 
heavenly bodies to be in accordance with
 a universal law from  which every      
change of position may be known and     
predicted4 ,the case is  the same with  
the influences which make themselves    
felt in the infinite  complexity of     

human conduct4 ,there1 too1 man has the 
belief in the sway  of a general        
principle4--,from all these examples it 
may be gathered  how reflection is      
always seeking for something fixed and  
permanent1  definite in itself and      
governing the particulars4 ,this        
universal which  cannot be apprehended  
by the senses counts as the true and    
essential4  ,thus1 duties and rights are
 all-important in the matter of conduct3
 and  an action is true when it conforms
 to those universal formulae4    ,in    
thus characterising the universal1 we   
become aware of its antithesis  to      
something else4 ,this something else is 
the merely immediate1  outward and      
individual1 as opposed to the mediate1  
inward and  universal4 ,the universal   
does not exist externally to the outward
 eye  as a universal4 ,the kind as kind 
cannot be perceived3 the laws of the    
celestial motions are not written on the
 sky4 ,the universal is neither  seen   
nor heard1 its existence is only for the

 mind4 ,religion leads us  to a         
universal1 which embraces all else      
within itself1 to an ,absolute  by which
 all else is brought into being3 and    
this ,absolute is an object  not of the 
senses but of the mind and of thought4  
#bb4 7c7 ,by the act of reflection      
something is altered in the way in      
which the fact was originally presented 
in sensation1 perception1 or            
conception4 ,thus1 as it appears1 an    
alteration of the object must be        
interposed before its true nature can be
 discovered4    ,what reflection        
elicits1 is a product of our thought4   
,solon1 for  instance1 produced out of  
his head the laws he gave to the        
,athenians4  ,this is half of the truth3
 but we must not on that account forget 
that the universal 7in ,solon's case1   
the laws7 is the very reverse of  merely
 subjective1 or fail to note that it is 
the essential1 true1  and objective     
being of things4 ,to discover the truth 
in things1  mere attention is not       

enough2 we must call in the action of   
our own  faculties to transform what is 
immediately before us4 ,now1 at first   
sight1 this seems an inversion of the   
natural order1 calculated to  thwart the
 very purpose on which knowledge is     
bent4 ,but the method is  not so        
irrational as it seems4 ,it has been the
 conviction of every age  that the only 
way of reaching the permanent substratum
 was to transmute  the given phenomenon 
by means of reflection4 ,in modern times
 a doubt  has for the first time been   
raised on this point in connexion with  
the  difference alleged to exist between
 the products of our thought and the    
things in their own nature4 ,this real  
nature of things1 it is said1  is very  
different from what we make out of them4
 ,the divorce between  thought and thing
 is mainly the work of the ,critical    
,philosophy1  and runs counter to the   
conviction of all previous ages1 that   
their  agreement was a matter of course4
 ,the antithesis between them is  the   

hinge on which modern philosophy turns4 
,meanwhile the natural  belief of men   
gives the lie to it4 ,in common life we 
reflect1 without  particularly reminding
 ourselves that this is the process of  
arriving  at the truth1 and we think    
without hesitation1 and in the firm     
belief  that thought coincides with     
thing4 ,and this belief is of the       
greatest  importance4 ,it marks the     
diseased state of the age when we see it
 adopt  the despairing creed that our   
knowledge is only subjective1 and that  
beyond this subjective we cannot go4    
,whereas1 rightly understood1 truth  is 
objective1 and ought so to regulate the 
conviction of every one1  that the      
conviction of the individual is stamped 
as wrong when it does  not agree with   
this rule4 ,modern views1 on the        
contrary1 put great  value on the mere  
fact of conviction1 and hold that to be 
convinced is  good for its own sake1    
whatever be the burden of our           
conviction1--there  being no standard by

 which we can measure its truth4    ,we 
said above that1 according to the old   
belief1 it was the  characteristic right
 of the mind to know the truth4 ,if this
 be so1 it  also implies that everything
 we know both of outward and inward     
nature1  in one word1 the objective     
world1 is in its own self the same as it
 is  in thought1 and that to think is to
 bring out the truth of our object1  be 
it what it may4 ,the business of        
philosophy is only to bring into        
explicit consciousness what the world in
 all ages has believed about  thought4  
,philosophy therefore advances nothing  
new2 and our present  discussion has led
 us to a conclusion which agrees with   
the natural  belief of mankind4    #bc4 
7d7 ,the real nature of the object is   
brought to light in  reflection2 but it 
is no less true that this exertion of   
thought is  my act4 ,if this be so1 the 
real nature is a product of my mind1  in
 its character of thinking              
subject--generated by me in my simple   

universality1 self-collected and removed
 from extraneous influences1  --in one  
word1 in my ,freedom4    ,think for     
yourself1 is a phrase which people often
 use as if it had  some special         
significance4 ,the fact is1 no man can  
think for another1  any more than he can
 eat or drink for him3 and the          
expression is a  pleonasm4 ,to think is 
in fact ipso facto to be free1 for      
thought as  the action of the universal 
is an abstract relating of self to self1
  where1 being at home with ourselves1  
and as regards our subjectivity1        
utterly blank1 our consciousness is1 in 
the matter of its contents1  only in the
 fact and its characteristics4 ,if this 
be admitted1 and  if we apply the term  
humility or modesty to an attitude where
 our  subjectivity is not allowed to    
interfere by act or quality1 it is  easy
 to appreciate the question touching the
 humility or modesty and  pride of      
philosophy4 ,for in point of contents1  
thought is only true in  proportion as  

it sinks itself in the facts2 and in    
point of form it  is no private or      
particular state or act of the subject1 
but rather  that attitude of            
consciousness where the abstract self1  
freed from  all the special limitations 
to which its ordinary states or         
qualities  are liable1 restricts itself 
to that universal action in which it is 
identical with all individuals4 ,in     
these circumstances philosophy may  be  
acquitted of the charge of pride4 ,and  
when ,aristotle summons the  mind to    
rise to the dignity of that attitude1   
the dignity he seeks is  won by letting 
slip all our individual opinions and    
prejudices1 and  submitting to the sway 
of the fact4    #bd4 ,with these        
explanations and qualifications1        
thoughts may be termed  ,objective      
,thoughts1--among which are also to be  
included the forms  which are more      
especially discussed in the common      
logic1 where they are  usually treated  
as forms of conscious thought only4     

,logic therefore  coincides with        
,metaphysics1 the science of things set 
and held in  thoughts1--thoughts        
accredited able to express the essential
 reality  of things4    ,an exposition  
of the relation in which such forms as  
notion1 judgment1  and syllogism stand  
to others1 such as causality1 is a      
matter for the  science itself4 ,but    
this much is evident beforehand4 ,if    
thought tries  to form a notion of      
things1 this notion 7as well as its     
proximate  phases1 the judgment and     
syllogism7 cannot be composed of        
articles and  relations which are alien 
and irrelevant to the things4           
,reflection1 it  was said above1        
conducts to the universal of things3    
which universal  is itself one of the   
constituent factors of a notion4 ,to say
 that  ,reason or ,understanding is in  
the world1 is equivalent in its import  
to the phrase ',objective ,thought4'    
,the latter phrase however has the      
inconvenience that thought is usually   

confined to express what belongs  to the
 mind or consciousness only1 while      
objective is a term applied1  at least  
primarily1 only to the non-mental4      
7#a7 ,to speak of thought or objective  
thought as the heart and soul  of the   
world1 may seem to be ascribing         
consciousness to the things of  nature4 
,we feel a certain repugnance against   
making thought the inward  function of  
things1 especially as we speak of       
thought as marking the  divergence of   
man from nature4 ,it would be necessary1
 therefore1 if  we use the term thought 
at all1 to speak of nature as the system
 of  unconscious thought1 or1 to use    
,schelling's expression1 a petrified    
intelligence4 ,and in order to prevent  
misconception1 thought-form or          
thought-type should be substituted for  
the ambiguous term thought4    ,from    
what has been said the principles of    
logic are to be sought  in a system of  
thought-types or fundamental categories1
 in which  the opposition between       

subjective and objective1 in its usual  
sense1 vanishes4 ,the signification thus
 attached to thought and its            
characteristic forms may be illustrated 
by the ancient saying that  ' governs   
the world1' or by our own phrase that   
',reason is in the  world3 which means  
that ,reason is the soul of the world it
 inhabits1  its immanent principle1 its 
most proper and inward nature1 its      
universal4 ,another illustration is     
offered by the circumstance that  in    
speaking of some definite animal we say 
it is 7an7 animal4 ,now1  the animal1 qu
 animal1 cannot be shown2 nothing can be
 pointed out  excepting some special    
animal4 ,animal1 qu animal1 does not    
exist3 it  is merely the universal      
nature of the individual animals1 whilst
 each  existing animal is a more        
concretely1 defined and particularised  
thing4  ,but to be an animal1--the law  
of kind which is the universal in this  
case1--is the property of the particular
 animal1 and constitutes its  definite  

essence4 ,take away from the dog its    
animality1 and it becomes  impossible to
 say what it is4 ,all things have a     
permanent inward  nature1 as well as an 
outward existence4 ,they live and die1  
arise and  pass away2 but their         
essential and universal part is the     
kind2 and this  means much more than    
something common to them all4    ,if    
thought is the constitutive substance of
 external things1 it is also  the       
universal substance of what is          
spiritual4 ,in all human perception     
thought is present2 so too thought is   
the universal in all the acts of        
conception and recollection2 in short1  
in every mental activity1 in  willing1  
wishing and the like4 ,all these        
faculties are only further1             
specialisations of thought4 ,when it is 
presented in this light1 thought  has a 
different part to play from what it has 
if we speak of a faculty  of thought1   
one among a crowd of other faculties1   
such as perception1  conception and     

will1 with which it stands on the same  
level4 ,when it  is seen1 to be the true
 universal of all that nature and mind  
contain1  it extends its scope far      
beyond all these1 and becomes the basis 
of  everything4 ,from this view of      
thought1 in its objective meaning as    
greek3 nous1 we may next pass to        
consider the subjective sense of the    
term4 ,we say first1 ,man is a being    
that thinks2 but we also say at the     
same time1 ,man is a being that         
perceives and wills4 ,man is a thinker1 
and is universal3 but he is a thinker   
only because he feels his own           
universality4 ,the animal too is by     
implication universal1 but the          
universal is not consciously felt by it 
to be universal3 it feels only  the     
individual4 ,the animal sees a singular 
object1 for instance1 its  food1 or a   
man4 ,for the animal all this never goes
 beyond an individual  thing4           
,similarly1 sensation has to do with    
nothing but singulars1 such  as this    

pain or this sweet taste4 ,nature does  
not bring its   into consciousness3 it  
is man who first makes himself double so
 as  to be a universal for a universal4 
,this first happens when man knows  that
 he is ',i4' ,by the term ',i' ,i mean  
myself1 a single and altogether         
determinate person4 ,and yet ,i really  
utter nothing peculiar to myself1  for  
every one else is an ',i' or ',ego1' and
 when ,i call myself ',i1'  though ,i   
indubitably mean the single person      
myself1 ,i express a  thorough          
universal4 ',i1' therefore1 is mere     
being-for-self1 in which  everything    
peculiar or marked is renounced and     
buried out of sight2  it is as it were  
the ultimate and unanalysable point of  
consciousness  ,we may say ',i' ,i and  
thought are the same1 or1 more          
definitely1 ',i'  is thought as a       
thinker4 ,what ,i have in my            
consciousness1 is for me4  ',i' is the  
vacuum or receptacle for anything and   
everything3 for which  everything is and

 which stores up everything in itself4  
,every man is a  whole world of         
conceptions1 that lie buried in the     
night of the ',ego4'  ,it follows that  
the ',ego' is the universal in which we 
leave aside all  that is particular1 and
 in which at the same time all the      
particulars  have a latent existence4   
,in other words1 it is not a mere       
universality  and nothing more1 but the 
universality which includes in it       
everything4  ,commonly we use the word  
',i' without attaching much importance  
to it1  nor is it an object of study    
except to philosophical analysis4 ,in   
the  ',ego1' we have thought before us  
in its utter purity4 ,while the brute   
cannot say ',i1' man can1 because it is 
his nature to think4 ,now in the  ',ego'
 there are a variety of contents1       
derived both from within and  from1     
without1 and according to the nature of 
these contents our state  may be        
described as perception1 or conception1 
or reminiscence4 ,but  in all of them   

the ',i' is found3 or in them all       
thought is present4  ,man1 therefore1 is
 always thinking1 even in his           
perceptions3 if he  observes anything1  
he always observes it as a universal1   
fixes on a  single point which he places
 in relief1 thus withdrawing his        
attention  from other points1 and takes 
it as abstract and universal1 even if   
the  universality be only in form4      
,in the case of our ordinary            
conceptions1 two things may happen4     
,either  the contents are moulded by    
thought1 but not the form3 or1 the form 
belongs to thought and not the contents4
 ,in using such terms1 for  instance1 as
 anger1 rose1 hope1 ,i am speaking of   
things which ,i have  learnt in the way 
of sensation1 but ,i express these      
contents in a  universal mode1 that is1 
in the form of thought4 ,i have left out
 much  that is particular and given the 
contents in their generality3 but  still
 the contents remain sense-derived4 ,on 
the other hand1 when ,i  represent ,god1

 the content is undeniably a product of 
pure thought1  but the form still       
retains the sensuous limitations which  
it has as  ,i find it immediately       
present in myself4 ,in these generalised
 images  the content is not merely and  
simply sensible1 as it is in a visual   
inspection2 but either the content is   
sensuous and the form appertains  to    
thought1 or vice vers4 ,in the first    
case the material is given to  us1 and  
our thought supplies the form3 in the   
second case the content  which has its  
source in thought is by means of the    
form turned into a  something given1    
which accordingly reaches the mind from 
without4    7#b7 ,logic is the study of 
thought pure and simple1 or of the pure 
thought-forms4 ,in the ordinary sense of
 the term1 by thought we  generally     
represent to ourselves something more   
than simple and  unmixed thought2 we    
mean some thought1 the material of which
 is from  experience4 ,whereas in logic 
a thought is understood to include      

nothing  else but what depends on       
thinking and what thinking has brought  
into  existence4 ,it is in these        
circumstances that thoughts are pure    
thoughts4 ,the mind is then in its own  
home-element and therefore free3  for   
freedom means that the other thing with 
which you deal is a second  self--so    
that you never leave your own ground but
 give the law to  yourself4 ,in the     
impulses or appetites the beginning is  
from something  else1 from something    
which we feel to be external4 ,in this  
case then  we speak of dependence4 ,for 
freedom it is necessary that we should  
feel no presence of something else which
 is not ourselves4 ,the natural  man1   
whose motions follow the rule only of   
his appetites1 is not his  own master4  
,be he as self-willed as he may1 the    
constituents of his  will and opinion   
are not his own1 and his freedom is     
merely formal4  ,but when we think1 we  
renounce our selfish and particular     
being1  sink ourselves in the thing1    

allow thought to follow its own course1 
and1--if we add anything of our own1 we 
think ill4    ,if in pursuance of the   
foregoing remarks we consider-1 ,logic  
to be  the system of the pure types of  
thought1 we find that the other         
philosophical sciences1 the ,philosophy 
of ,i ,nature and the ,philosophy  of   
,mind1 take the place1 as it were1 of an
 ,applied ,logic1 and that  ,logic is   
the soul which animates them both4      
,their problem in that  case is only to 
recognise the logical forms under the   
shapes they  assume in ,nature and      
,mind1--shapes which are only a         
particular mode  of expression for the  
forms of pure thought4 ,if for instance 
we take  the syllogism 7not as it was   
understood in the old formal logic1 but 
at its real value71 we shall find it    
gives expression to the law that  the   
particular is the middle term which     
fuses together the extremes of  the     
universal and the singular4 ,the        
syllogistic form is a universal  form of

 all things4 ,everything that exists is 
a particular1 which  couples together   
the universal and the singular4 ,but    
,nature is weak  and fails to exhibit   
the logical forms in their purity4 ,such
 a feeble  exemplification of the       
syllogism may be seen in the magnet4 ,in
 the  middle or point of indifference of
 a magnet1 its two poles1 however  they 
may be distinguished1 are brought into  
one4 ,physics also teaches  us to see   
the universal or essence in ,nature3 and
 the only difference  between it and the
 ,philosophy of ,nature is that the     
latter brings  before our mind the      
adequate forms of the notion in the     
physical world4    ,it will now be      
understood that ,logic is the           
all-animating spirit of  all the        
sciences1 and its categories the        
spiritual hierarchy4 ,they  are the     
heart and centre of things3 and yet at  
the same time they  are always on our   
lips1 and1 apparently at least1         
perfectly familiar  objects4 ,but things

 thus familiar are usually the greatest 
strangers4  ,being1 for example1 is a   
category of pure thought3 but to make   
',is'  an object of investigation never 
occurs to us4 ,common fancy puts the    
,absolute far away in a world beyond4   
,the ,absolute is rather directly       
before us1 so present that so long as we
 think1 we must1 though without  express
 consciousness of it1 always carry it   
with us and always use it4  ,language is
 the main depository of these types of  
thought2 and one use  of the grammatical
 instruction which children receive is  
unconsciously  to turn their attention  
to distinctions of thought4    ,logic is
 usually said to be concerned with forms
 only and to derive  the material for   
them from elsewhere4 ,but this 'only1'  
which assumes  that the logical thoughts
 are nothing in comparison with the rest
  of the contents1 is not the word to   
use about forms which are the           
absolutely-real ground of everything4   
,everything else rather is an  'only'   

compared with these thoughts4 ,to make  
such abstract forms a  problem          
pre-supposes in the inquirer a higher   
level of culture than  ordinary2 and to 
study them in themselves and for their  
own sake  signifies in addition that    
these thought-types must be deduced out 
of  thought itself1 and their truth or  
reality examined by the light of  their 
own laws4 ,we do not assume them as data
 from without1 and then  define them or 
exhibit their value and authority by    
comparing them with  the shape they take
 in our minds4 ,if we thus acted1 we    
should proceed  from observation and    
experience1 and should1 for instance1   
say we  habitually employ the term      
'force' in such a case1 and such a      
meaning4  ,a definition like that would 
be called correct1 if it agreed with the
  conception of its object present in   
our ordinary state of mind4 ,the  defect
 of this empirical method is that a     
notion is not defined as it  is in and  
for itself1 but in terms of something   

assumed1 which is then  used as a       
criterion and standard of correctness4  
,no such test need be  applied3 we have 
merely to let the thought-forms follow  
the impulse of  their own organic life4 
,to ask if a category is true or not1   
must sound strange to the ordinary      
mind3 for a category apparently becomes 
true only when it is applied  to a given
 object1 and apart from this application
 it would seem  meaningless to inquire  
into its truth4 ,but this is the very   
question on  which everything turns4 ,we
 must however in the first place        
understand  clearly what we mean by     
,truth4 ,in common life truth means the 
agreement  of an object with our        
conception of it4 ,we thus pre-suppose  
an object  to which our conception must 
conform4 ,in the philosophical sense of 
the  word1 on the other hand1 truth may 
be described1 in general abstract       
terms1 as the agreement of a            
thought-content with itself4 ,this      
meaning  is quite different from the one

 given above4 ,at the same time the     
deeper and philosophical meaning of     
truth can be partially traced even  in  
the ordinary usage of language4 ,thus we
 speak of a true friend2 by  which we   
mean a friend whose manner of conduct   
accords with the notion  of friendship4 
,in the same way we speak of a true work
 of ,art4 ,untrue  in this sense means  
the same as bad1 or self-discordant4 ,in
 this sense  a bad state is an untrue   
state2 and evil and untruth may be said 
to  consist in the contradiction        
subsisting between the function or      
notion  and the existence of the object4
 ,of such a bad object we may form  a   
correct representation1 but the import  
of such representation is  inherently   
false4 ,of these correctnesses2 which   
are at the same time  untruths1 we may  
have many in our heads4--,god alone is  
the thorough  harmony of notion and     
reality4 ,all finite things involve an  
untruth3  they have a notion and an     
existence1 but their existence does not 

meet  the requirements of the notion4   
,for this reason they must perish1 and  
then the incompatibility between their  
notion and their existence  becomes     
manifest4 ,it is in the kind that the   
individual animal has its  notion3 and  
the kind liberates itself from this     
individuality by death4    ,the study of
 truth1 or1 as it is here explained to  
mean1 consistency1  constitutes the     
proper problem of logic4 ,in our        
every-day mind we  are never troubled   
with questions about the truth of the   
forms of  thought4--,we may also express
 the problem of logic by saying that it 
examines the forms of thought touching  
their capability to hold truth4  ,and   
the question comes to this3 ,what are   
the forms of the infinite1 and  what are
 the forms of the finite8 ,usually no   
suspicion attaches to the  finite forms 
of thought2 they are allowed to pass    
unquestioned4 ,but it  is from          
conforming to finite categories in      
thought and action that all  deception  

originates4    7#c7 ,truth may be       
ascertained by several methods1 each of 
which however  is no more than a form4  
,experience is the first of these       
methods4 ,but  the method is only a     
form3 it has no intrinsic value of its  
own4 ,for  in experience everything     
depends upon the mind we bring to bear  
upon  actuality4 ,a great mind is great 
in its experience2 and in the motley    
play of phenomena at once perceives the 
point of real significance4 ,the  idea  
is present1 in actual shape1 not        
something1 as it were1 over the  hill   
and far away4 ,the genius of a ,goethe1 
for example1 looking into  nature or    
history1 has great experiences1 catches 
sight of the living  principle1 and     
gives expression to it4 ,a second method
 of apprehending  the truth is          
,reflection1 which defines it by        
intellectual relations of  condition and
 conditioned4 ,but in these two modes   
the absolute truth  has not yet found   
its appropriate form4 ,the most perfect 

method of  knowledge proceeds in the    
pure form of thought3 and here the      
attitude  of man is one of entire       
freedom4    ,that the form of thought is
 the perfect form1 and that it presents 
the truth as it intrinsically and       
actually is1 is the general dogma  of   
all philosophy4 ,to give a proof of the 
dogma there is1 in the  first instance1 
nothing to do but show that these other 
forms of  knowledge are finite4 ,the    
grand ,scepticism of antiquity          
accomplished  this task when it         
exhibited the contradictions contained  
in every  one of these forms4 ,that     
,scepticism indeed went further3 but    
when  it ventured to assail the forms of
 reason1 it began by insinuating  under 
them something finite upon which it     
might fasten4 ,all the  forms of finite 
thought will make their appearance in   
the course of  logical development1 the 
order in which they present themselves  
being  determined by necessary laws4    
,here in the introduction they could    

only  be unscientifically assumed as    
something given4 ,in the theory of logic
  itself these forms will be exhibited1 
not only on their negative1 but  also on
 their positive side4    ,when we       
compare the different forms of          
ascertaining truth with one  another1   
the first of them1 immediate knowledge1 
may perhaps seem the  finest1 noblest   
and most appropriate4 ,it includes      
everything which  the moralists term    
innocence as well as religious feeling1 
simple  trust1 love1 fidelity1 and      
natural faith4 ,the two other forms1    
first  reflective1 and secondly         
philosophical cognition1 must leave that
  unsought natural harmony behind4 ,and 
so far as they have this in  common1 the
 methods which claim to apprehend the   
truth by thought  may naturally be      
regarded as part and parcel of the pride
 which leads  man to trust to his own   
powers for a knowledge of the truth4    
,such a  position involves a            
thorough-going disruption1 and1 viewed  

in that  light1 might be regarded as the
 source of all evil and wickedness--the 
original transgression4 ,apparently     
therefore they only way of being        
reconciled and restored to peace is to  
surrender all claims to think or  know4 
,this lapse from natural unity has not  
escaped notice1 and nations from  the   
earliest times have asked the meaning of
 the wonderful division of  the spirit  
against itself4 ,no such inward disunion
 is found in nature3  natural things do 
nothing wicked4    ,the ,mosaic legend  
of the ,fall of ,man has preserved an   
ancient picture  representing the origin
 and consequences of this disunion4 ,the
  incidents of the legend form the basis
 of an essential article of the  creed1 
the doctrine of original sin in man and 
his consequent need of  succour4 ,it may
 be well at the commencement of logic to
 examine the  story which treats of the 
origin and the bearings of the very     
knowledge  which logic has to discuss4  
,for1 though philosophy must not allow  

herself to be overawed by religion1 or  
accept the position of existence  on    
sufferance1 she cannot afford to neglect
 these popular conceptions4  ,the tales 
and allegories of religion1 which have  
enjoyed for thousands  of years the     
veneration of nations1 are not to be set
 aside as  antiquated even now4    ,upon
 a closer inspection of the story of the
 ,fall we find1 as was  already said1   
that it exemplifies the universal       
bearings of knowledge  upon the         
spiritual life4 ,in its instinctive and 
natural stage1  spiritual life wears the
 garb of innocence and confiding        
simplicity3  but the very essence of    
spirit implies the absorption of this   
immediate  condition in something       
higher4 ,the spiritual is distinguished 
from the  natural1 and more especially  
from the animal1 life1 in the           
circumstance  that it does not continue 
a mere stream of tendency1 but sunders  
itself  to self-realisation4 ,but this  
position of severed life has in its turn

  to be suppressed1 and the spirit has  
by its own act to win its way  to       
concord again4 ,the final concord then  
is spiritual2 that is1 the  principle of
 restoration is found in thought1 and   
thought only4 ,the  hand that inflicts  
the wound is also the hand which heals  
it4    ,we are told in our story that   
,adam and ,eve1 the first human beings1 
the types of humanity1 were placed in a 
garden1 where grew a tree of  life and a
 tree of the knowledge of good and evil4
 ,god1 it is said1  had forbidden them  
to eat of the fruit of this latter tree3
 of the  tree of life for the present   
nothing further is said4 ,these words   
evidently assume that man is not        
intended to seek knowledge1 and ought   
to remain in the state of innocence4    
,other meditative races1 it may  be     
remarked1 have held the same belief that
 the primitive state of  mankind was one
 of innocence and harmony4 ,now all this
 is to a certain  extent correct4 ,the  
disunion that appears throughout        

humanity is not  a condition to rest in4
 ,but it is a mistake to regard the     
natural and  immediate harmony as the   
right state4 ,the mind is not mere      
instinct3  on the contrary1 it          
essentially involves the tendency to    
reasoning  and meditation4 ,childlike   
innocence no doubt has in it something  
fascinating and attractive3 but only    
because it reminds us of what the       
spirit must win for itself4 ,the        
harmoniousness of childhood is a gift   
from the hand of nature3 the second     
harmony must spring from the labour  and
 culture of the spirit4 ,and so the     
words of ,christ1 ',except ye  become as
 little children1' c41 are very far from
 telling us that we  must always remain 
children4    ,again1 we find in the     
narrative of ,moses that the occasion   
which led  man to leave his natural     
unity is attributed to solicitation from
  without4 ,the serpent was the tempter4
 ,but the truth is1 that the step  into 
opposition1 the awakening of            

consciousness1 follows from the  very   
nature of man3 and the same history     
repeats itself in every son  of ,adam4  
,the serpent represents likeness to ,god
 as consisting in the  knowledge of good
 and evil3 and it is just this knowledge
 in which man  participates when he     
breaks with the unity of his instinctive
 being  and eats of the forbidden fruit4
 ,the first reflection of awakened      
consciousness in men told them that they
 were naked4 ,this is a nave  and       
profound trait4 ,for the sense of shame 
bears evidence to the  separation of man
 from his natural and sensuous life4    
,the beasts never  get so far as this   
separation1 and they feel no shame4 ,and
 it is in  the human feeling of shame   
that we are to seek the spiritual and   
moral  origin of dress1 compared with   
which the merely physical need is a     
secondary matter4    ,next comes the    
,curse1 as it is called1 which ,god     
pronounced upon  man4 ,the prominent    
point in that curse turns chiefly on the

 contrast  between man and nature4 ,man 
must work in the sweat of his brow3 and 
woman bring forth in sorrow4 ,as to     
work1 if it is the result of the        
disunion1 it is also the victory over   
it4 ,the beasts have nothing more  to do
 but to pick up the materials required  
to satisfy their wants3 man  on the     
contrary can only satisfy his wants by  
himself producing and  transforming the 
necessary means4 ,thus even in these    
outside things man  is dealing with     
himself4    ,the story does not close   
with the expulsion from ,paradise4 ,we  
are  further told1 ,god said1 ',behold  
,adam is become as one of us1 to  know  
good and evil4' ,knowledge is now spoken
 of as divine1 and not1  as before1 as  
something wrong and forbidden4 ,such    
words contain a  confutation of the idle
 talk that philosophy pertains only to  
the  finitude of the mind4 ,philosophy  
is knowledge1 and it is through         
knowledge that man first realises his   
original vocation1 to be the  image of  

,god4 ,when the record adds that ,god   
drove men out of the ,garden  of ,eden  
to prevent their eating of the tree of  
life1 it only means  that on his natural
 side certainly man is finite and       
mortal1 but in  knowledge infinite4     
,we all know the theological dogma that 
man's nature is evil1 tainted  with what
 is called ,original ,sin4 ,now while we
 accept the dogma1 we  must give up the 
setting of incident which represents    
original sin as  consequent upon an     
accidental act of the first man4 ,for   
the very notion  of spirit is enough to 
show that man is evil by nature1 and it 
is an  error to imagine that he could   
ever be otherwise4 ,to such extent as   
man  is and acts like a creature of     
nature1 his whole behaviour is what it  
ought not to be4 ,for the spirit it is a
 duty to be free1 and to realise  itself
 by its own act4 ,nature is for man only
 the starting-point which  he has to    
transform4 ,the theological doctrine of 
original sin is a  profound truth2 but  

modern enlightenment prefers to believe 
that man is  naturally good1 and that he
 acts right so long as he continues true
 to  nature4    ,the hour when man      
leaves the path of mere natural being   
marks the  difference between him1 a    
self-conscious agent1 and the natural   
world4  ,but this schism1 though it     
forms a necessary element in the very   
notion  of spirit1 is not the final goal
 of man4 ,it is to this state of inward 
breach that the whole finite action of  
thought and will belongs4  ,in that     
finite sphere man pursues ends of his   
own and draws from  himself the material
 of his conduct4 ,while he pursues these
 aims to  the uttermost1 while his      
knowledge and his will seek himself1 his
 own  narrow self apart from the        
universal1 he is evil2 and his evil is  
to be  subjective4    ,we seem at first 
to have a double evil here3 but both are
 really the  same4 ,man in so far as he 
is spirit is not the creature of nature3
 and  when he behaves as such1 and      

follows the cravings of appetite1 he    
wills  to be so4 ,the natural wickedness
 of man is therefore unlike the natural 
life of animals4 ,a mere natural life   
may be more exactly defined by  saying  
that the natural man as such is an      
individual3 for nature in  every part is
 in the bonds of individualism4 ,thus   
when man wills to be  a creature of     
nature1 he wills in the ,same degree to 
be an individual  simply4 ,yet against  
such impulsive and appetitive action1   
due to  the individualism of nature1    
there also steps in the law or general  
principle4 ,this law may either be an   
external force1 or have the form  of    
divine authority4 ,so long as he        
continues in his natural state1 man  is 
in bondage to the law4--,it is true that
 among the instincts and  affections of 
man1 there are social or benevolent     
inclinations1 love1  sympathy1 and      
others1 reaching beyond his selfish     
isolation4 ,but so  long as these       
tendencies are instinctive1 their       

virtual universality  of scope and      
purport is vitiated by the subjective   
form which always  allows free play to  
self-seeking and random action4    #be4 
,the term ',objective ,thoughts'        
indicates the truth--the truth  which is
 to be the absolute object of           
philosophy1 and not merely the  goal at 
which it aims4 ,but the very expression 
cannot fail to suggest  an opposition1  
to characterise and appreciate which is 
the main motive  of the philosophical   
attitude of the present time1 and which 
forms the  real problem of the question 
about truth and our means of            
ascertaining  it4 ,if the thought-forms 
are vitiated by a fixed antithesis1 i4  
e4 if they are only of a finite         
character1 they are unsuitable for  the 
self-centred universe of truth1 and     
truth can find no adequate  receptacle  
in thought4 ,such thought1 which--- can 
produce only limited  and partial       
categories and ,i proceed by their      
means2 is what in the  stricter sense of

 the word is termed ,understanding4 ,the
 finitude1  further1 of these categories
 lies in two points4 ,firstly1 they are 
only  subjective1 and the antithesis of 
an objective permanently clings to      
them4 ,secondly1 they are always of     
restricted content1 and so persist  in  
antithesis to one another and still more
 to the ,absolute4 ,in order  more fully
 to explain the position and import here
 attributed to logic1  the attitudes in 
which thought is supposed to stand to   
objectivity will  next be examined by   
way of further introduction4    ,in my  
,phenomenology of the ,spirit1 which on 
that account was at its  publication    
described as the first part of the      
,system of ,philosophy1  the method     
adopted was to begin with the first and 
simplest phase of  mind1 immediate      
consciousness1 and to show how that     
stage gradually  of necessity worked    
onward to the philosophical point of    
view1 the  necessity of that view being 
proved by the process4 ,but in these    

circumstances it was impossible to      
restrict the quest to the mere form  of 
consciousness4 ,for the stage of        
philosophical knowledge is the  richest 
in material and organisation1 and       
therefore1 as it came before  us in the 
shape of a result1 it pre-supposed the  
existence of the  concrete formations of
 consciousness1 such as individual and  
social  morality1 art and religion4 ,in 
the development of consciousness1 which 
at first sight appears limited to the   
point of form merely1 there is  thus at 
the same time included the development  
of the matter or of the  objects        
discussed in the special branches of    
philosophy4 ,but the latter  process    
must1 so to speak1 go on behind         
consciousness1 since those  facts are   
the essential nucleus which is raised   
into consciousness4  ,the exposition    
accordingly is rendered more intricate1 
because so much  that properly belongs  
to the concrete branches is prematurely 
dragged  into the introduction4 ,the    

survey which follows in the present work
 has  even more the inconvenience of    
being only historical and inferential in
  its method4 ,but it tries especially  
to show how the questions men have      
proposed1 outside the school1 on the    
nature of ,knowledge1 ,faith and the    
like1--questions which they imagine to  
have no connexion with abstract         
thoughts1--are really reducible to the  
simple categories1 which first  get     
cleared up in ,logic4          ,,chapter
 ,,iii4      ,,first ,,attitude ,,of    
,,thought ,,to ,,objectivity4      #bh4 
,the first of these attitudes of thought
 is seen in the method  which has no    
doubts and no sense of the contradiction
 in thought1 or of  the hostility of    
thought against itself4 ,it entertains  
an unquestioning  belief that reflection
 is the means of ascertaining the truth1
 and of  bringing the objects before the
 mind as they really are4 ,and in this  
belief it advances straight upon its    
objects1 takes the materials  furnished 

by sense and perception1 and reproduces 
them from itself as  facts of thought2  
and then1 believing this result to be   
the truth1 the  method is content4      
,philosophy in its earliest stages1 all 
the sciences1  and even the daily action
 and movement of consciousness1 live in 
this  faith4    #bg4 ,this method of    
thought has never become aware1 of the  
antithesis  of subjective and objective3
 and to that extent there is nothing to 
prevent its statements from possessing a
 genuinely philosophical and            
speculative character1 though it is just
 as possible that they may  never get   
beyond finite categories1 or the stage  
where the antithesis  is still          
unresolved4 ,in the present introduction
 the main question  for us is to observe
 this attitude of thought in its extreme
 form2  and we shall accordingly first  
of all examine its second and inferior  
aspect as a philosophic system4 ,one of 
the clearest instances of it1  and one  
lying nearest to ourselves1 may be found

 in the ,metaphysic of  the ,past as it 
subsisted among us previous to the      
philosophy of ,kant4  ,it is however    
only in reference to the history of     
philosophy that this  ,metaphysic can be
 said to belong to the past3 the thing  
is always and  at all places to be      
found1 as the view which the abstract   
understanding  takes of the objects of  
reason4 ,and it is in this point that   
the real  and immediate good lies of a  
closer examination of its main scope and
  its modus operandi4    #bh4 ,this     
metaphysical system took the laws and   
forms of thought to be  the fundamental 
laws and forms of things4 ,it assumed   
that to think a  thing was the means of 
finding its very self and nature3 and to
 that  extent it occupied higher ground 
than the ,critical4 ,philosophy which   
succeeded it4 ,but in the first instance
 7i7 these terms of thought  were cut   
off from their connexion1 their         
solidarity2 each was believed  valid by 
itself and capable of serving as a      

predicate of the truth4 ,it  was the    
general assumption of this metaphysic   
that a knowledge of the  ,absolute was  
gained by assigning predicates to it4   
,it neither inquired  what the terms of 
the understanding specially meant or    
what they were  worth1 nor did it test  
the method which characterises the      
,absolute by  the assignment of         
predicates4    ,as an example of such   
predicates may be taken2 ,existence1 in 
the  proposition1 ',god has existence3' 
,finitude or ,infinity1 as in the       
question1 ',is the world-finite or      
infinite8'3 ,simple and ,complex1  in   
the proposition1 ',the soul is          
simple1'--or again1 ',the thing is  a   
unity1 a whole1' c4 ,nobody asked       
whether such predicates had any         
intrinsic and independent truth1 or if  
the propositional form could be  a form 
of truth4    ,the ,metaphysic of the    
past assumed1 as unsophisticated belief 
always  does that thought apprehends the
 very self of things1 and that things1  

to become what they truly are1 require  
to be thought4 ,for ,nature and  the    
human soul are a very ,proteus in their 
perpetual transformations2  and it soon 
occurs to the observer that the first   
crude impression of  things is not their
 essential being4--,this is a point of  
view the very  reverse of the result    
arrived at by the ,critical ,philosophy2
 a result1  of which it may be said1    
that it bade man go and feed on mere    
husks and  chaff4    ,we must look more 
closely into the procedure of that old  
metaphysic4  ,in the first place it     
never went beyond the province of the   
analytic  understanding4 ,without       
preliminary inquiry it adopted the      
abstract  categories of thought and let 
them rank as predicates of truth4 ,but  
in  using the term thought we must not  
forget the difference between finite  or
 discursive thinking and the thinking   
which is infinite and rational4  ,the   
categories1 as they meet us prima facie 
and in isolation1 are  finite forms4    

,but truth is always infinite1 and      
cannot be expressed  or presented to    
consciousness in finite terms4 ,the     
phrase infinite  thought may excite     
surprise1 if we adhere to the modern    
conception  that thought is always      
limited4 ,but it is1 speaking rightly1  
the very  essence of thought to be      
infinite4 ,the nominal explanation of   
calling  a thing finite is that it has  
an end1 that it exists up to a certain  
point only1 where it comes into contact 
with1 and is limited by1 its  other4    
,the finite therefore subsists in       
reference to its other1 which  is its   
negation and presents itself as its     
limit4 ,now thought is always  in its   
own sphere2 its relations are with      
itself1 and it is its own  object4 ,in  
having a thought for object1 ,i am at   
home with myself4  ,the thinking power1 
the ',i1' is therefore infinite1        
because1 when it  thinks1 it is in      
relation to an object which is itself4  
,generally  speaking1 an object means a 

something else1 a negative confronting  
me4  ,but in the case where thought     
thinks itself1 it has an object which   
is at the same time no object3 in other 
words1 its objectivity is  suppressed   
and transformed into an idea4 ,thought1 
as thought1 therefore  in its unmixed   
nature involves no limits2 it is finite 
only when it  keeps to limited          
categories1 which it believes to be     
ultimate4 ,infinite  or speculative     
thought1 on the contrary1 while it no   
less defines1  does in the very act of  
limiting and defining make that defect  
vanish4  ,and so infinity is not1 as    
most frequently happens1 to be conceived
 as  an abstract away and away for ever 
and ever1 but in the simple manner      
previously indicated4    ,the thinking  
of the old metaphysical system was      
finite4 ,its whole mode  of action was  
regulated by categories1 the limits of  
which it believed  to be permanently    
fixed and not subject to any further    
negation4 ,thus1  one of its questions  

was3 ,has ,god existence8 ,the question 
supposes that  existence is an          
altogether positive term1 a sort of ne  
plus ultra4  ,we shall see however at a 
later point that existence is by no     
means a  merely positive term1 but one  
which is toe low for the ,absolute      
,idea1  and unworthy of ,god4 ,a second 
question in these metaphysical systems  
was3 ,is the world finite or infinite8  
,the very terms of the question  assume 
that the finite is a permanent          
contradictory to the infinite3  and one 
can easily see that1 when they are so   
opposed1 the infinite1  which of course 
ought to be the whole1 only appears as a
 single aspect  and suffers restriction 
from the finite4 ,but a restricted      
infinity is  itself only a finite4 ,in  
the same way it was asked whether the   
soul was  simple or composite4          
,simpleness was1 in other words1 taken  
to be an  ultimate characteristic1      
giving expression to a whole truth4 ,far
 from  being so1 simpleness is the      

expression of a half-truth1 as one-sided
  and abstract as existence3--a term of 
thought1 which1 as we shall  hereafter  
see1 is itself untrue and hence unable  
to hold truth4 ,if the  soul be viewed  
as merely and abstractly simple1 it is  
characterised in  an inadequate and     
finite way4    ,it was therefore the    
main question of the pre-,kantian       
metaphysic to  discover whether         
predicates of the kind mentioned were to
 be ascribed  to its objects4 ,now these
 predicates are after all only limited  
formulae of the understanding which1    
instead of expressing the truth1  merely
 impose a limit4 ,more than this1 it    
should be noted that the  chief feature 
of the method lay in 'assigning' or     
'attributing'  predicates to the object 
that was to be cognised1 for example1 to
  ,god4 ,but attribution is no more than
 an external reflection about the       
object3 the predicates by which the     
object is to be determined are  supplied
 from the resources of picture-thought1 

and are applied in  a mechanical way4   
,whereas1 if we are to have genuine     
cognition1 the  object must characterise
 its own self and not derive its        
predicates  from without4 ,even         
supposing we follow the method of       
predicating1 the  mind cannot help      
feeling that predicates of this sort    
fail to exhaust  the object4 ,from the  
same point of view the ,orientals are   
quite correct  in calling ,god the      
many-named or the myriad-named ,one4    
,one after  another of these finite     
categories leaves the soul unsatisfied1 
and  the ,oriental sage is compelled    
unceasingly to seek for more and more   
of such predicates4 ,in finite things it
 is no doubt the case that they  have to
 be characterised through finite        
predicates3 and with these  things the  
understanding finds proper scope for its
 special action4  ,itself finite1 it    
knows only the nature of the finite4    
,thus1 when  ,i call some action a      
theft1 ,i have characterised the action 

in its  essential facts3 and such a     
knowledge is sufficient for the judge4  
,similarly1 finite things stand to each 
other as cause and effect1  force and   
exercise1 and when they are apprehended 
in these categories1  they are known in 
their finitude4 ,but the objects of     
reason cannot be  defined by these      
finite predicates4 ,to try to do so was 
the defect of  the old metaphysic4      
#bi4 ,predicates of this kind1 taken    
individually1 have but a limited  range 
of meaning1 and no one can fail to      
perceive how inadequate they  are1 and  
how far they fall below the fulness of  
detail which our  imaginative thought   
gives1 in the case1 for example1 of     
,god1 ,mind1 or  ,nature4 ,besides1     
though the fact of their being all      
predicates of one  subject supplies them
 with a certain connexion1 their several
 meanings  keep them apart3 and         
consequently each is brought in as a    
stranger in  relation to the others4    
,the first of these defects the         

,orientals sought to remedy1 when1 for  
example1 they defined ,god by           
attributing to ,him many names2 but     
still  they felt that the number of     
names would have had to be infinite4    
#cj4 7#b7 ,in the second place1 the     
metaphysical systems adopted a  wrong   
criterion4 ,their objects were no doubt 
totalities which in  their own proper   
selves belong to reason1--that is1 to   
the organised  and                      
systematically-developed universe1 of   
thought4 ,but these  totalities--,god1  
the ,soul1 the ,world1--were taken by   
the metaphysician  as subjects made and 
ready1 to form the basis for an         
application of  the categories of the   
understanding4 ,they were assumed from  
popular  conception4 ,accordingly       
popular conception was the only canon   
for  settling whether or not the        
predicates were suitable and sufficient4
    #ca4 ,the common conceptions of     
,god1 the ,soul1 the ,world1 may be     
supposed to afford thought a firm and   

fast footing4 ,they do not really  do   
so4 ,besides having1 a particular and   
subjective character clinging  to them1 
and thus leaving room for great variety 
of interpretation1  they themselves     
first of all require a firm and fast    
definition by  thought4 ,this may be    
seen in any of these propositions where 
the  predicate1 or in philosophy the    
category1 is needed to indicate what    
the subject1 or the conception we start 
with1 is4    ,in such a sentence as     
',god is eternal1' we begin with the    
conception of  ,god1 not knowing as yet 
what he is3 to tell us that1 is the     
business of  the predicate4 ,in the     
principles of logic1 accordingly1 where 
the terms  formulating the              
subject-matter are those of thought     
only1 it is not  merely superfluous to  
make these categories predicates to     
propositions  in which ,god1 or1 still  
vaguer1 the ,absolute1 is the subject1  
but it  would also have the disadvantage
 of suggesting another canon than  the  

nature of thought4 ,besides1 the        
propositional form 7and for             
proposition1 it would be more correct to
 substitute judgment7 is not  suited to 
express the concrete--and the true is   
always concrete--or  the speculative4   
,every judgment is by its form one-sided
 and1 to that  extent1 false4    ,this  
metaphysic was not free or objective    
thinking4 ,instead of letting  the      
object freely and spontaneously expound 
its own characteristics1  metaphysic    
pre-supposed it ready-made4 ,if any one 
wishes to know what  free thought means1
 he must go to ,greek philosophy3 for   
,scholasticism1  like these metaphysical
 systems1 accepted its facts1 and       
accepted them  as a dogma from the      
authority of the ,church4 ,we moderns1  
too1 by our  whole up-bringing1 have    
been initiated into ideas which it is   
extremely  difficult to overstep1 on    
account of their far-reaching           
significance4  ,but the ancient         
philosophers were in a different        

position4 ,they were  men who lived     
wholly in the perceptions of the senses1
 and who1  after their rejection of     
mythology and its fancies1 pre-supposed 
nothing but the heaven above and the    
earth around4 ,in these material1       
non-metaphysical surroundings1 thought  
is free and enjoys its own              
privacy1--cleared of everything         
material1 and thoroughly at home4 ,this 
feeling that we are all our own is      
characteristic of free thought--of  that
 voyage into the open1 where nothing is 
below us or above us1 and  we stand in  
solitude with ourselves alone4    #cb4  
7#c7 ,in the third place1 this system of
 metaphysic turned into  ,dogmatism4    
,when our thought never ranges beyond   
narrow and rigid  terms1 we are forced  
to assume that of two opposite          
assertions1 such as  were the above     
propositions1 the one must be true and  
the other false4    ,dogmatism may be   
most simply described as the contrary of
 ,scepticism4  ,the ancient ,sceptics   

gave the name of ,dogmatism to every    
philosophy  whatever holding a system of
 definite doctrine4 ,in this large sense
  ,scepticism may apply the name even to
 philosophy which is properly           
,speculative4 ,but in the narrower      
sense1 ,dogmatism consists in the       
tenacity which draws a hard and fast    
line between certain terms  and others  
opposite to them4 ,we may see this      
clearly in the strict  ',either--or'3   
for instance1 ,the world is either      
finite or infinite2  but one of these   
two it must be4 ,the contrary of this   
rigidity is the  characteristic of all  
,speculative truth4 ,there no such      
inadequate  formulae are allowed1 nor   
can they possibly exhaust it4 ,these    
formulae  ,speculative truth holds in   
union as a totality1 whereas1 ,dogmatism
  invests them in their isolation with a
 title to fixity and truth4    ,it often
 happens in philosophy that the         
half-truth takes its place  beside the  
whole truth and assumes on its own      

account the position  of something      
permanent4 ,but the fact is that the    
half-truth1 instead  of being a fixed or
 self-subsistent principle1 is a mere   
element  absolved and included in the   
whole4 ,the metaphysic of understanding 
is  dogmatic1 because it maintains      
half-truths in their isolation3 whereas 
the idealism of speculative philosophy  
carries out the principle of  totality  
and shows that it can reach beyond the  
inadequate formularies  of abstract     
thought4 ,thus idealism would say3--,the
 soul is neither  finite only1 nor      
infinite only2 it is really the one just
 as much as  the other1 and in that way 
neither the one nor the other4 ,in other
  words2 such formularies in their      
isolation are inadmissible1 and only    
come into account as formative elements 
in a larger notion4 ,such  idealism we  
see even in the ordinary phases of      
consciousness4 ,thus we  say of sensible
 things1 that they are changeable3 that 
is1 they are1  but it is equally true   

that they are not4 ,we show more        
obstinacy  in dealing with the          
categories of the understanding4 ,these 
are terms  which we believe to be       
somewhat firmer--or even absolutely firm
 and  fast4 ,we look upon them as       
separated from each other by an infinite
  chasm1 so that opposite categories can
 never get at each other4 ,the  battle  
of reason is the struggle to break up   
the rigidity to which the  understanding
 has reduced everything4    #cc4 ,the   
first part of this metaphysic in its    
systematic form is  ,ontology1 or the   
doctrine of the abstract characteristics
 of ,being4  ,the multitude of these    
characteristics1 and the limits set to  
their  applicability1 are not founded   
upon any principle4 ,they have in       
consequence to be enumerated as         
experience and circumstances direct1    
and the import ascribed to them is      
founded only upon common sensualised    
conceptions1 upon assertions that       
particular words are used in a          

particular sense1 and even perhaps upon 
etymology4 ,if experience  pronounces   
the list to be complete1 and if the     
usage of language1 by  its agreement1   
shows the analysis to be correct1 the   
metaphysician is  satisfied2 and the    
intrinsic and independent truth and     
necessity of  such characteristics is   
never made a matter of investigation at 
all4    ,to ask if being1 existence1    
finitude1 simplicity1 complexity1 c4 are
  notions intrinsically and             
independently true1 must surprise those 
who  believe that a question about truth
 can only concern propositions 7as  to  
whether a notion is or is not with truth
 to be attributed1 as the  phrase is1 to
 a subject71 and that falsehood lies in 
the contradiction  existing between the 
subject in our ideas1 and the notion to 
be  predicated of it4 ,now as the notion
 is concrete1 it and every character  of
 it in general is essentially a         
self-contained unity of distinct        
characteristics4 ,if truth then were    

nothing more than the absence  of       
contradiction1 it would be first of all 
necessary in the case of  every-notion  
to examine whether it1 taken            
individually1 did not contain  this sort
 of intrinsic contradiction4    #cd4    
,the second branch of the metaphysical  
system was ,rational  ,psychology or    
,pneumatology4 ,it dealt with the       
metaphysical nature of  the ,soul1--that
 is1 of the ,mind regarded as a thing4  
,it expected to  find immortality in a  
sphere dominated by the laws of         
composition1  time1 qualitative change1 
and quantitative increase or decrease4  
,the name 'rational1' given to this     
species of psychology1 served  to       
contrast it with empirical modes of     
observing the phenomena of  the soul4   
,rational psychology viewed the soul in 
its metaphysical  nature1 and through   
the categories supplied by abstract     
thought4 ,the  rationalists endeavoured 
to ascertain the inner nature of the    
soul as  it is in itself and as it is   

for thought4--,in philosophy at present 
we  hear little of the soul3 the        
favourite term now is mind 7spirit74    
,the  two are distinct1 soul being as it
 were the middle term between body  and 
spirit1 or the bond between the two4    
,the mind1 as soul1 is immersed  in     
corporeity1 and the soul is the         
animating principle of the body4    ,the
 pre-,kantian metaphysic1 we say1 viewed
 the soul as a thing4 ',thing'  is a    
very ambiguous word4 ,by a thing1 we    
mean1 firstly1 an immediate  existence1 
something we represent in sensuous form3
 and in this meaning  the term has been 
applied to the soul4 ,hence the question
 regarding the  seat of the soul4 ,of   
course1 if the soul have a seat1 it is  
in space  and sensuously envisaged4 ,so1
 too1 if the soul be viewed as a thing1 
we can ask whether the soul is simple or
 composite4 ,the question is  important 
as bearing on the immortality of the    
soul1 which is supposed  to depend on   
the absence of composition4 ,but the    

fact is1 that in  abstract simplicity we
 have a category1 which as little       
corresponds to  the nature of the soul1 
as that of compositeness4    ,one word  
on the relation of rational to empirical
 psychology4 ,the  former1 because it   
sets itself to apply thought to cognise 
mind and  even to demonstrate the result
 of such thinking1 is the higher2       
whereas  empirical psychology starts    
from perception1 and only recounts and  
describes what perception supplies4 ,but
 if we propose to think the  mind1 we   
must not be quite so shy of its special 
phenomena4 ,mind is  essentially active 
in the same sense as the ,schoolmen said
 that ,god  is 'absolute actuosity4'    
,but if the mind is active it must as it
 were  utter itself4 ,it is wrong       
therefore to take the mind for a        
processless  ens1 as did the old        
metaphysic which divided the processless
 inward  life of the mind from its      
outward life4 ,the mind1 of all things1 
must  be looked at in its concrete      

actuality1 in its energy2 and in such a 
way that its manifestations are seen to 
be determined by its inward  force4     
#ce4 ,the third branch of metaphysics   
was ,cosmology4 ,the topics  it embraced
 were the world1 its contingency1       
necessity1 eternity1  limitation in time
 and space3 the laws 7only formal7 of   
its changes3  the freedom of man and the
 origin of evil4    ,to these topics it 
applied what were believed to be        
thorough-going  contrasts3 such as      
contingency and necessity2 external and 
internal  necessity2 efficient and final
 cause1 or causality in general and     
design2 essence or substance and        
phenomenon2 form and matter2 freedom    
and necessity2 happiness and pain2 good 
and evil4    ,the object of ,cosmology  
comprised not merely ,nature1 but ,mind 
too1 in  its external complication in   
its phenomenon--in fact1 existence in   
general1 or the sum of finite things4   
,this object however it viewed not  as a
 concrete whole1 but only under certain 

abstract points of view4  ,thus the     
questions ,cosmology attempted to solve 
were such as these3 ,is  accident or    
necessity dominant in the world8 ,is the
 world eternal or  created8 ,it was     
therefore a chief concern of this study 
to lay down  what were called general   
,cosmological laws3 for instance1 that  
,nature  does not act by fits and       
starts4 ,and by fits and starts 7saltus7
 they  meant a qualitative difference or
 qualitative alteration showing itself  
without any antecedent determining mean3
 whereas1 on the contrary1 a  gradual   
change 7of quantity7 is obviously not   
without intermediation4    ,in regard to
 ,mind as it makes itself felt in the   
world1 the questions  which ,cosmology  
chiefly discussed turned upon the       
freedom of man and  the origin of evil4 
,nobody can deny that these are         
questions of the  highest importance4   
,but to give them a satisfactory answer1
 it is above  all things necessary not  
to claim finality for the abstract      

formulae  of understanding1 or to       
suppose that each of the two terms in an
  antithesis has an                     
independent-subsistence or can be       
treated in its  isolation as a complete 
and self-centred truth4 ,this however is
 the  general position taken by the     
metaphysicians before ,kant1 and appears
  in their cosmological discussions1    
which for that reason were incapable  of
 compassing their purpose1 to understand
 the phenomena of the world4  ,observe  
how they proceed with the distinction   
between freedom and  necessity1 in their
 application of these categories to     
,nature and  ,mind4 ,nature they regard 
as subject in its workings to necessity2
  ,mind they hold to be free4 ,no doubt 
there is a real foundation for  this    
distinction in the very core of the     
,mind itself3 but freedom and           
necessity1 when thus abstractly opposed1
 are terms applicable only in  the      
finite world to which1 as such1 they    
belong4 ,a freedom involving no         

necessity1 and mere necessity without   
freedom1 are abstract and in this  way  
untrue formulae of thought4 ,freedom is 
no blank indeterminateness3  essentially
 concrete1 and unvaryingly              
self-determinate1 it is so far at  the  
same time necessary4 ,necessity1 again1 
in the ordinary acceptation  of the term
 in popular philosophy1 means           
determination from without  only1--as in
 finite mechanics1 where a body moves   
only when it is  struck by another body1
 and moves in the direction communicated
 to it  by the impact4--,this however is
 a merely external necessity1 not the   
real inward necessity which is identical
 with freedom4    ,the case is similar  
with the contrast of ,good and          
,evil1--the favourite  contrast of the  
introspective modern world4 ,if we      
regard ,evil as  possessing a fixity of 
its own1 apart and distinct from ,good1 
we are  to a certain extent right3 there
 is an opposition between them3 nor  do 
those who maintain the apparent and     

relative character of the  opposition   
mean that ,evil and ,good in the        
,absolute are one1 or1 in  accordance   
with the modern phrase1 that a thing    
first becomes evil  from our way of     
looking at it4 ,the error arises when we
 take ,evil as a  permanent positive1   
instead of--what it really is--a        
negative which1  though it would fain   
assert itself1 has no real persistence1 
and is1 in  fact1 only the absolute     
sham-existence of negativity in itself4 
#cf4 ,the fourth branch of metaphysics  
is ,natural or ,rational  ,theology4    
,the notion of ,god1 or ,god as a       
possible being1 the proofs of  his      
existence1 and his properties1 formed   
the study of this branch4    7a7 ,when  
understanding thus discusses the ,deity1
 its main purpose is  to find what      
predicates correspond or not to the fact
 we have in our  imagination as ,god4   
,and in so doing it assumes the contrast
 between  positive and negative to be   
absolute2 and hence1 in the long run1   

nothing is left for the notion as       
understanding takes it1 but the empty   
abstraction of indeterminate ,being1 of 
mere reality or positivity1 the         
lifeless product of modern ',deism4'    
7b7 ,the method of demonstration        
employed in finite knowledge must       
always lead to an inversion of the true 
order4 ,for it requires the  statement  
of some objective ground for ,god's     
being1 which thus acquires  the         
appearance of being derived from        
something else4 ,this mode of  proof1   
guided as it is by the canon of mere    
analytical identity1  is embarrassed by 
the difficulty of passing from the      
finite to the  infinite4 ,either the    
finitude of the existing world1 which is
 left as  much a fact as it was before1 
clings to the notion of ,deity1 and ,god
  has to be defined as the immediate    
substance of that world1--which is      
,pantheism3 or ,he remains an object set
 over against the subject1 and in  this 
way1 finite1--which is ,dualism4    7c7 

,the attributes of ,god which ought to  
be various and precise1 had1  properly  
speaking1 sunk and disappeared in the   
abstract notion of pure  reality1 of    
indeterminate ,being4 ,yet in our       
material thought1 the  finite world     
continues1 meanwhile1 to have a real    
being1 with ,god as a  sort of          
antithesis3 and thus arises the further 
picture of different  relations of ,god 
to the world4 ,these1 formulated as     
properties1 must1  on the one hand1 as  
relations to finite circumstances1      
themselves  possess a finite character  
7giving us such properties as just1     
gracious1 mighty1 wise1 c472 on the     
other hand they must be infinite4  ,now 
on this level of thought the only means1
 and a hazy one1 of  reconciling these  
opposing requirements was quantitative  
exaltation  of the properties1 forcing  
them into indeterminateness1--into the  
sensus eminentior4 ,but it was an       
expedient which really destroyed the    
property and left a mere name4    ,the  

object of the old metaphysical theology 
was to see how far  unassisted reason   
could go in the knowledge of ,god4      
,certainly a  reason-derived knowledge  
of ,god is the highest problem of       
philosophy4  ,the earliest teachings of 
religion are figurate conceptions of    
,god4  ,these conceptions1 as the ,creed
 arranges them1 are imparted to us in   
youth4 ,they are the doctrines of our   
religion1 and in so far as the          
individual rests his faith on these     
doctrines and feels them to be  the     
truth1 he has all he needs as a         
,christian4 ,such is faith3 and the     
science of this faith is ,theology4 ,but
 until ,theology is something more  than
 a bare enumeration and compilation of  
these doctrines ab extra1  it has no    
right to the title of science4 ,even the
 method so much in  vogue at            
present--the purely historical mode of  
treatment--which for  example reports   
what has been said by this or the other 
,father of the  ,church--does not invest

 theology with a scientific character4  
,to get  that1 we must go on to         
comprehend the facts by thought1--which 
is the  business of philosophy4 ,genuine
 theology is thus at the same time a    
real philosophy of religion1 as it was1 
we may add1 in the ,middle ,ages4       
,and now let us examine this rational   
theology more narrowly4 ,it was  a      
science which approached ,god not by    
reason but by understanding1  and1 in   
its mode of thought1 employed the terms 
without any sense of  their mutual      
limitations and connexions4 ,the notion 
of ,god formed the  subject of          
discussion2 and yet the criterion of our
 knowledge was  derived from such an    
extraneous source as the materialised   
conception  of ,god4 ,now thought must  
be free in its movements4 ,it is no     
doubt to  be remembered1 that the result
 of independent thought harmonises with 
the import of the ,christian            
religion3--for the ,christian religion  
is  a revelation of reason4 ,but such a 

harmony surpassed the efforts of        
rational theology4 ,it proposed to      
define the figurate conception of ,god  
in terms of thought2 but it resulted in 
a notion of ,god which was what  we may 
call the abstract of positivity or      
reality1 to the exclusion  of all       
negation4 ,god was accordingly defined  
to be the most real of  all beings4 ,any
 one can see however that this most real
 of beings1 in  which negation forms no 
part1 is the very opposite of what it   
ought  to be and of what understanding  
supposes it to be4 ,instead of being    
rich and full above all measure1 it is  
so narrowly conceived that it  is1 on   
the contrary1 extremely poor and        
altogether empty4 ,it is with  reason   
that the heart craves a concrete body of
 truth2 but without  definite feature1  
that is1 without negation1 contained in 
the notion1  there can only be an       
abstraction4 ,when the notion of ,god is
 apprehended  only as that of the       
abstract or most real being1 ,god is1 as

 it were1  relegated to another world   
beyond3 and to speak of a knowledge of  
him  would be meaningless4 ,where there 
is no definite quality1 knowledge is    
impossible4 ,mere light is mere         
darkness4    ,the second problem of     
rational theology was to prove the      
existence  of ,god4 ,now1 in this       
matter1 the main point to be noted is   
that demonstration1 as the understanding
 employs it1 means the  dependence of   
one truth on another4 ,in such proofs we
 have a  pre-supposition--something firm
 and fast1 from which something else    
follows2 we exhibit the dependence of   
some truth from an assumed              
starting-point4 ,hence1 if this mode of 
demonstration is applied to the         
existence of ,god1 it can only mean that
 the being of ,god is to depend  on     
other terms1 which will then constitute 
the ground of his being4  ,it is at once
 evident that this will lead ,i to some 
mistake3 for ,god  must be simply and   
solely the ,i ground of everything1 and 

in so far  not dependent upon anything  
else4 ,and a perception of this danger  
has  in modern times led some to say    
that ,god's existence is not capable  of
 proof1 but must be immediately or      
intuitively apprehended4 ,reason1       
however1 and even sound common sense    
give demonstration a meaning quite      
different from that of the              
understanding4 ,the demonstration of    
reason  no doubt starts from something  
which is not ,god4 ,but1 as it advances1
  it does not leave the starting-point a
 mere unexplained fact1 which is  what  
it was4 ,on the contrary it exhibits    
that point as derivative and  called    
into being1 and then ,god is seen to be 
primary1 truly immediate  and           
self-subsisting1 with the means of      
derivation wrapt up and absorbed  in    
himself4 ,those who say3 ',consider     
,nature1 and ,nature will-lead you  to  
,god2 you will find an absolute final   
cause3 'do not mean that ,god  is       
something derivative3 they mean that it 

is we who proceed to ,god  himself from 
another2 and in this way ,god1 though   
the consequence1 is  also the absolute' 
ground of the initial step4 ,the        
relation of the two  things is reversed2
 and what came as a consequence1 being  
shown to be  an antecedent1 the original
 antecedent is reduced to a consequence4
  ,this is always the way1 moreover1    
whenever reason demonstrates4    ,if in 
the light of the present discussion we  
cast one glance more on  the            
metaphysical method as a whole1 we find 
its main characteristic  was to make    
abstract identity its principle and to  
try to apprehend  the objects of reason 
by the abstract and finite categories of
 the  understanding4 ,but this infinite 
of the understanding1 this pure         
essence1 is still finite3 it has        
excluded all the variety of particular  
things1 which thus limit and deny it4   
,instead of winning a concrete1  this   
metaphysic stuck fast on an abstract1   
identity4 ,its good point was  the      

perception that thought alone           
constitutes the essence of all that  is4
 ,it derived its materials from earlier 
philosophers1 particularly  the         
,schoolmen4 ,in speculative philosophy  
the understanding undoubtedly  forms a  
stage1 but not a stage at which we      
should keep for ever  standing4 ,plato  
is no metaphysician of this imperfect   
type1 still less  ,aristotle1 although  
the contrary is generally believed4     
,,chapter ,,iv4      ,,second ,,attitude
 ,,of ,,thought ,,to ,,objectivity4     
,i4 ,empiricism4      #cg4 ,under these 
circumstances a double want began to be 
felt4 ,partly  it was the need of a     
concrete subject-matter1 as a           
counterpoise to the  abstract theories  
of the understanding1 which is unable to
 advance  unaided from its generalities 
to specialisation and determination4    
,partly1 too1 it was the demand for     
something fixed and secure1 so as  to   
exclude the possibility of proving      
anything and everything in the  sphere1 

and according to the method1 of the     
finite formulae of thought4  ,such was  
the genesis of ,empirical philosophy1   
which abandons the search  for truth in 
thought itself1 and goes to fetch it    
from ,experience1 the  outward and the  
inward present4    ,the rise of         
,empiricism is due to the need thus     
stated of concrete  contents1 and a firm
 footing--needs which the abstract      
metaphysic of  the understanding failed 
to satisfy4 ,now by concreteness of     
contents  it is meant that we must know 
the objects of consciousness as         
intrinsically determinate and as the    
unity of distinct characteristics4      
,but1 as we have already seen1 this is  
by no means the case with the           
metaphysic of understanding1 if it      
conform to its principle4 ,with the     
mere understanding1 thinking is limited 
to the form of an abstract  universal1  
and can never advance to the            
particularisation of this  universal4   
,thus we find the metaphysicians engaged

 in an attempt to  elicit by the        
instrumentality of thought1 what was the
 essence or  fundamental attribute of   
the ,soul ,the ,soul1 they said1 is     
simple4  ,the simplicity thus ascribed  
to the ,soul meant a mere and utter     
simplicity1 from which difference is    
excluded3 difference1 or in other  words
 composition1 being made the fundamental
 attribute of body1 or  of matter in    
general4 ,clearly1 in simplicity of this
 narrow type we  have a very shallow    
category1 quite incapable of embracing  
the wealth  of the soul or of the mind4 
,when it thus appeared that abstract    
metaphysical thinking was inadequate1 it
 was felt that resource must be  had to 
empirical psychology4 ,the same happened
 in the case of ,rational  ,physics4    
,the current phrases there were1 for    
instance1 that space is  infinite1 that 
,nature makes no leap1 c4 ,evidently    
this phraseology was  wholly            
unsatisfactory in presence of the       
plenitude and life of nature4    #ch4   

,to some extent this source from which  
,empiricism draws is common  to it with 
metaphysic4 ,it is in our materialised  
conceptions1 i4e4  in facts which       
emanate1 in the first instance1 from    
experience1  that metaphysic also finds 
the guarantee for the correctness of its
  definitions 7including both its       
initial assumptions and its more        
detailed body of doctrine74 ,but1 on the
 other hand1 it must be noted  that the 
single sensation is not the same thing  
as experience1 and  that the ,empirical 
,school elevates the facts included     
under sensation1  feeling1 and          
perception into the form of general     
ideas1 propositions or  laws4 ,this1    
however1 it does with the reservation   
that these general  principles 7such as 
force71 are to have no further import or
 validity  of their own beyond that     
taken from the sense-impression1 and    
that  no connexion shall be deemed      
legitimate except what can be shown to  
exist in phenomena4 ,and on the         

subjective side ,empirical cognition has
  its stable footing in the fact that in
 a sensation consciousness is  directly 
present and certain of itself4    ,in   
,empiricism lies the great principle    
that whatever is true must  be in the   
actual world and present to sensation4  
,this principle  contradicts that 'ought
 to be' on the strength of which        
'reflection'  is vain enough to treat   
the actual present with scorn and to    
point to  a scene beyond--a scene which 
is assumed to have place and being only 
in the understanding of those who talk  
of it4 ,no less than ,empiricism1       
philosophy 7 #g7 recognises only what   
is1 and has nothing to do with  what    
merely ought to be and what is thus     
confessed not to exist4 ,on the         
subjective side1 too1 it is right to    
notice the valuable principle of        
freedom involved in ,empiricism4 ,for   
the main lesson of ,empiricism is  that 
man must see for himself and feel that  
he is present in every fact  of         

knowledge which he has to accept4       
,when it is carried out to its          
legitimate consequences1                
,empiricism--being in its facts limited 
to the finite sphere--denies the        
super-sensible in general1 or at least  
any knowledge of it which would  define 
its nature2 it leaves thought no powers 
except abstraction and  formal          
universality and identity4 ,but there is
 a fundamental delusion  in all         
scientific empiricism4 ,it employs the  
metaphysical categories of  matter1     
force1 those of one1 many1 generality1  
infinity1 c42 following  the clue given 
by these categories it proceeds to draw 
conclusions1 and  in so doing           
pre-supposes and applies the syllogistic
 form4 ,and all the  while it is unaware
 that it contains metaphysics--in       
wielding which1 it  makes use of those  
categories and their combinations in a  
style utterly  thoughtless and          
uncritical4           99       99       
99       99       99    ,from           

,empiricism came the cry3 ',stop roaming
 in empty abstractions1 keep  your eyes 
open1 lay hold on man and nature as they
 are here before  you1 enjoy the present
 moment4' ,nobody can deny that there is
 a good  deal of truth in these words4  
,the every-day world1 what is here and  
now1 was a good exchange for the futile 
other-world--for the mirages  and the   
chimeras of the abstract understanding4 
,and thus was acquired  an infinite     
principle1--that solid footing so much  
missed in the old  metaphysic4 ,finite  
principles are the most that the        
understanding  can pick out--and these  
being essentially unstable and          
tottering1  the structure they supported
 must collapse with a crash4 ,always the
  instinct of reason was to find an     
infinite principle4 ,as yet1 the  time  
had not come for finding it in thought4 
,hence1 this instinct  seized upon the  
present1 the ,here1 the ,this1--where   
doubtless there is  implicit infinite   
form1 but not in the genuine existence  

of that form4  ,the external world is   
the truth1 if it could but know it3 for 
the truth  is actual and must exist4    
,the infinite principle1 the            
self-centred  truth1 therefore1 is in   
the world for reason to discover3 though
 it  exists in an individual and        
sensible shape1 and not in its truth4   
,besides1 this school makes             
sense-perception the form in which fact 
is to be apprehended3 and in this       
consists the defect of ,empiricism4     
,sense-perception as such is always     
individual1 always transient3 not       
indeed that the process of knowledge    
stops short at sensation3 on the        
contrary1 it proceeds to find out the   
universal and permanent element  in the 
individual apprehended by sense4 ,this  
is the process leading  from simple     
perception to experience4    ,in order  
to form experiences1 ,empiricism makes  
especial use of the  form of ,analysis4 
,in the impression of sense we have a   
concrete of  many elements1 the several 

attributes of which we are expected to  
peel off one by one1 like the coats of  
an onion4 ,in thus dismembering  the    
thing1 it is understood that we         
disintegrate and take to pieces  these  
attributes which have coalesced1 and add
 nothing but our own  act of            
disintegration4 ,yet analysis is the    
process from the immediacy  of sensation
 to thought3 those attributes1 which the
 object analysed  contains in union1    
acquire the form of universality by     
being separated4  ,empiricism therefore 
labours under a delusion1 if it supposes
 that1  while analysing the objects1 it 
leaves them as they were3 it really     
transforms the concrete into an         
abstract4 ,and as a consequence of this 
change the living thing is killed3 life 
can exist only in the concrete  and one4
 ,not that we can do without this       
division1 if it be our  intention to    
comprehend4 ,mind itself is an inherent 
division4 ,the error  lies in forgetting
 that this is only one-half of the      

process1 and that  the main point is the
 re-union of what has been parted4 ,and 
it is where  analysis never gets beyond 
the stage of partition that the words of
 the  poet are true3                    
',encheiresin ,naturae nennt's die      
,chemie1      ,spottet ihrer ,selbst1   
und weiss nicht1 wie3      ,hat die     
,teile in ,ihrer ,hand      ,fehlt      
leider nur das geistige ,band4'         
,analysis starts from the concrete2 and 
the possession of this material  gives  
it a considerable advantage over the    
abstract thinking of the  old           
metaphysics4 ,it establishes the        
differences in things3 and this is  very
 important3 but these very differences  
are nothing after all but  abstract     
attributes1 e4g4 thoughts4 ,these       
thoughts1 it is assumed1  contain the   
real essence of the objects2 and thus   
once more we see the  axiom of bygone   
metaphysics reappear1 that the truth of 
things lies in  thought4    ,let us next
 compare the empirical theory with that 

of metaphysics in  the matter of their  
respective contents4 ,we find the       
latter1 as already  stated1 taking for  
its theme the universal objects of the  
reason1 viz4  ,god1 the ,soul1 and the  
,world3 and these themes1 accepted from 
popular  conception1 it was the problem 
of philosophy to reduce into the form   
of thoughts4 ,another specimen of the   
same method was the ,scholastic         
philosophy1 the theme pre-supposed by   
which was formed by the dogmas  of the  
,christian ,church3 and it aimed at     
fixing their meaning and  giving them a 
systematic arrangement through          
thought4--,the facts on  which          
,empiricism is based are of entirely    
different kind4 ,they are  the sensible 
facts of nature and the facts of the    
finite mind4 ,in  other words1          
,empiricism deals with a finite         
material--and the old  metaphysicians   
had an infinite1--though1 let us add1   
they made this  infinite content finite 
by the finite form of the understanding4

 ,the  same finitude of form reappears  
in ,empiricism--but here the facts are  
finite also4 ,to this exigent1 then1    
both modes of philosophising have  the  
same method2 both proceed from data or  
assumptions1 which they  accept as      
ultimate4 ,generally speaking1          
,empiricism finds the truth in  the     
outward world2 and even if it allow a   
super-sensible world1 it  holds         
knowledge of that world to be           
impossible1 and would restrict us  to   
the province of sense-perception4 ,this 
doctrine when systematically  carried   
out produces what has been latterly     
termed ,materialism4  ,materialism of   
this stamp looks upon matter1 qu matter1
 as the  genuine objective world4 ,but  
with matter we are at once introduced   
to an abstraction1 which as such cannot 
be perceived3 and it may be  maintained 
that there is no matter1 because1 as it 
exists1 it is always  something definite
 and concrete4 ,yet the abstraction we  
term matter is  supposed to lie at the  

basis of the whole world of sense1 and  
expresses  the sense-world in its       
simplest terms as out-and-out           
individualisation1  and hence a         
congeries of points in mutual exclusion4
 ,so long then as  this sensible sphere 
is and continues to be for ,empiricism a
 mere  datum1 we have a doctrine of     
bondage3 for we become free1 when we    
are confronted by no absolutely alien   
world1 but depend upon a fact  which we 
ourselves are4 ,consistently with the   
empirical point of view1  besides1      
reason and unreason can only be         
subjective3 in other words1  we must    
take what is given just as it is1 and we
 have no right to ask  whether and to   
what extent it is rational in its own   
nature4    #ci4 ,touching this principle
 it has been justly observed that in    
what we call ,experience1 as distinct   
from mere single perception of  single  
facts1 there are two elements4 ,the one 
is the matter1 infinite  in its         
multiplicity1 and as it stands a mere   

set of singulars3 the  other is the     
form1 the characteristics of            
universality and necessity4  ,mere      
experience no doubt offers many1 perhaps
 innumerable cases of  similar          
perceptions3 but1 after all1 no         
multitude1 however great1  can be the   
same thing as universality4 ,similarly1 
mere experience  affords perceptions of 
changes succeeding each other and of    
objects in  juxtaposition2 but it       
presents no necessary connexion4 ,if    
perception1  therefore1 is to maintain  
its claim to be the sole basis of what  
men hold for truth1 universality and    
necessity appear something              
illegitimate3 they become an accident of
 our minds1 a mere custom1 the  content 
of which might be otherwise constituted 
than it is4    ,it is an important      
corollary of this theory1 that on this  
empirical  mode of treatment legal and  
ethical principles and laws1 as well as 
the  truths of religion1 are exhibited  
as the work of chance1 and stripped  of 

their objective character and inner     
truth4    ,the scepticism of ,hume1 to  
which this conclusion was chiefly due1  
should be clearly marked off from ,greek
 scepticism4 ,hume assumes the  truth of
 the empirical element1 feeling and     
sensation1 and proceeds to  challenge   
universal principles and laws1 because  
they have no warranty  from             
sense-perception4 ,so far was ancient   
scepticism from making  feeling and     
sensation the canon of truth1 that it   
turned against the  deliverances of     
sense first of all4 7,on ,modern        
,scepticism as compared  with ,ancient1 
see ,schelling and ,hegel's ,critical   
,journal of ,philosophy3  #ahjb1 vol4   
,i4 i47        ,,ii4 ,the ,critical     
,philosophy4      #dj4 ,in common with  
,empiricism the ,critical ,philosophy   
assumes that  experience affords the one
 sole foundation for cognitions2 which  
however it does not allow to rank as    
truths1 but only as knowledge of        
phenomena4    ,the ,critical theory     

starts originally from the distinction  
of elements  presented in the analysis  
of experience1 viz4 the matter of sense1
 and  its universal relations4 ,taking  
into account ,hume's criticism on this  
distinction as given in the preceding   
section1 viz4 that sensation  does not  
explicitly apprehend more than an       
individual or more than a  mere event1  
it insists at the same time on the fact 
that universality  and necessity are    
seen to perform a function equally      
essential in  constituting what is      
called experience4 ,this element1 not   
being derived  from the empirical facts 
as such1 must belong to the spontaneity 
of  thought2 in other words1 it is a    
priori4 ,the ,categories or ,notions  of
 the ,understanding constitute the      
objectivity of experiential  cognitions4
 ,in every case they involve a          
connective reference1 and  hence through
 their means are formed synthetic       
judgments a priori1  that is1 primary   
and underivative connexions of          

opposites4    ,even ,hume's scepticism  
does not deny that the characteristics  
of  universality and necessity are found
 in cognition4 ,and even in ,kant  this 
fact remains a presupposition after all2
 it may be said1 to use  the ordinary   
phraseology of the sciences1 that ,kant 
did no more than  offer another         
explanation of the fact4    #da4 ,the   
,critical ,philosophy proceeds to test  
the value of the  categories employed in
 metaphysic1 as well as in other        
sciences  and in ordinary conception4   
,this scrutiny however is not directed  
to the content of these categories1 nor 
does it inquire into the  exact relation
 they bear to one another3 but simply   
considers them  as affected by the      
contrast between subjective and         
objective4 ,the  contrast1 as we are to 
understand it here1 bears upon the      
distinction  7see preceding 7 of the two
 elements in experience4 ,the name of   
objectivity is here given to the element
 of universality and necessity1  i4e4 to

 the categories themselves1 or what is  
called the a priori  constituent4 ,the  
,critical ,philosophy however widened   
the contrast in  such away1 that the    
subjectivity comes to embrace the       
ensemble of  experience1 including both 
of the aforesaid elements2 and nothing  
remains on the other side but the       
'thing-in-itself4'    ,the special forms
 of the a priori element1 in other      
words1 of  thought1 which in spite of   
its objectivity is looked upon as a     
purely  subjective act1 present         
themselves as follows in a systematic   
order  which1 it may be remarked1 is    
solely based upon psychological and     
historical grounds4           99        
99       99       99       99    7#a7 ,a
 very important step was undoubtedly    
made1 when the terms of the  old        
metaphysic were subjected to scrutiny4  
,the plain thinker pursued  his         
unsuspecting way in those categories    
which had offered themselves  naturally4
 ,it never occurred to him to ask to    

what extent these  categories had a     
value and authority of their own4 ,if1  
as has been  said1 it is characteristic 
of free thought to allow no assumptions 
to  pass unquestioned1 the old          
metaphysicians were not free thinkers4  
,they  accepted their categories as they
 were1 without further trouble1 as an  a
 priori datum1 not yet tested by        
reflection4 ,the ,critical philosophy   
reversed this4 ,kant undertook to       
examine how far the forms of thought    
were capable of leading to the knowledge
 of truth4 ,in particular he  demanded a
 criticism of the faculty of cognition  
as preliminary to  its exercise4 ,that  
is a fair demand1 if it mean that even  
the forms  of thought must be made an   
object of investigation4 ,unfortunately 
there soon creeps in the misconception  
of already knowing before you           
know1--the error of refusing to enter   
the water until you have learnt  to     
swim4 ,true1 indeed1 the forms of       
thought should be subjected to a        

scrutiny before they are used3 yet what 
is this scrutiny but ipso  facto a      
cognition8 ,so that what we want is to  
combine in our process  of inquiry the  
action of the forms of thought with a   
criticism of  them4 ,the forms of       
thought must be studied in their        
essential nature  and complete          
development3 they are at once the object
 of research and  the action of that    
object4 ,hence they examine themselves3 
in their own  action they must determine
 their limits1 and point out their      
defects4  ,this is that action of       
thought1 which will hereafter be        
specially  considered under the name of 
,dialectic1 and regarding which we need 
only at the outset observe that1 instead
 of being brought to bear upon  the     
categories from without1 it is immanent 
in their own action4    ,we may         
therefore state the first point in      
,kant's philosophy as follows3  ,thought
 must itself investigate its own        
capacity of knowledge4 ,people  in the  

present day have got over ,kant and his 
philosophy3 everybody  wants to get     
further4 ,but there are two ways of     
going further--a  back-1 ward and a     
forward4 ,the light of criticism soon   
shows that many  of our modern essays in
 philosophy are mere repetitions of the 
old  metaphysical method1 an endless and
 uncritical thinking in a groove        
determined by the natural bent of each  
man's mind4    7#b7 ,kant's examination 
of the categories suffers from the grave
 defect  of viewing them1 not absolutely
 and for their own sake1 but in order to
  see whether they are subjective or    
objective4 ,in the language of  common  
life we mean by objective what exists   
outside of us and reaches  us from      
without by means of sensation4 ,what    
,kant did1 was to deny that  the        
categories1 such as cause and effect1   
were1 in this sense of the  word1       
objective1 or given in sensation1 and to
 maintain on the contrary  that they    
belonged to our own thought itself1 to  

the spontaneity of  thought4 ,to that   
extent therefore1 they were subjective4 
,and yet in  spite of this1 ,kant gives 
the name objective to what is thought1  
to the  universal and necessary1 while  
he describes as subjective whatever is  
merely felt4 ,this arrangement          
apparently reverses the first-mentioned 
use of the word1 and has caused ,kant to
 be charged with confusing  language4   
,but the charge is unfair if we more    
narrowly consider the  facts of the     
case4 ,the vulgar believe that the      
objects of perception  which confront   
them1 such as an individual animal1 or a
 single star1  are independent and      
permanent existences1 compared with     
which1 thoughts  are unsubstantial and  
dependent on something else4 ,in fact   
however  the perceptions of sense are   
the properly dependent and secondary    
feature1 while the thoughts are really  
independent and primary4 ,this  being   
so1 ,kant gave the title objective to   
the intellectual factor1 to  the        

universal and necessary3 and he was     
quite justified in so doing4  ,our      
sensations on the other hand are        
subjective2 for sensations lack         
stability in their own nature1 and are  
no less fleeting and evanescent  than   
thought is permanent and                
self-subsisting4 ,at the present day1   
the  special line of distinction        
established by ,kant between the        
subjective  and objective is adopted by 
the phraseology of the educated world4  
,thus  the criticism of a work of art   
ought1 it is said1 to be not subjective1
  but objective2 in other words1 instead
 of springing from the particular  and  
accidental feeling or temper of the     
moment1 it should keep its eye  on those
 general points of view which the laws  
of art establish4 ,in  the same         
acceptation we can distinguish in any   
scientific pursuit the  objective and   
the subjective interest of the          
investigation4    ,but after all1       
objectivity of thought1 in ,kant's      

sense1 is again to  a certain extent    
subjective4 ,thoughts1 according to     
,kant1 although  universal and necessary
 categories1 are only our               
thoughts--separated  by an impassable   
gulf from the thing1 as it exists apart 
from our  knowledge4 ,but the true1     
objectivity of thinking means that the  
thoughts1 far from being merely ours1   
must at the same time be the real       
essence of the things1 and of whatever  
is an object to us4    ,objective and   
subjective are convenient expressions in
 current use1  the employment of which  
may easily lead to confusion4 ,up to    
this  point1 the discussion has shown   
three meanings of objectivity4 ,first1  
it means what has external existence1 in
 distinction from which the  subjective 
is what is only supposed1 dreamed1 c4   
,secondly1 it has  the meaning1 attached
 to it by ,kant1 of the universal and   
necessary1  as distinguished from the   
particular1 subjective and occasional   
element which belongs to our sensations4

 ,thirdly1 as has been just  explained1 
it means the thought-apprehended essence
 of the existing  thing1 in             
contradistinction from what is merely   
our thought1 and what  consequently is  
still separated from the thing itself1  
as it exists in  independent essence4   
#db4 7a7 ,the ,theoretical              
,faculty4--,cognition qu cognition4     
,the specific ground of the categories  
is declared by the ,critical  system to 
lie in the primary identity of the ',i' 
in thought1--what  ,kant calls the      
'transcendental unity of                
self-consciousness4'  ,the impressions  
from feeling and perception are1 if we  
look to  their contents1 a multiplicity 
or miscellany of elements3 and the      
multiplicity is equally conspicuous in  
their form4 ,for sense is marked  by a  
mutual exclusion of members2 and that   
under two aspects1 namely  space and    
time1 which1 being the forms1 that is to
 say1 the universal  type of perception1
 are themselves a priori4 ,this         

congeries1  afforded by sensation and   
perception1 must however be reduced to  
an  identity or primary synthesis4 ,to  
accomplish this the ',i' brings it in   
relation to itself and unites it there  
in one consciousness which  ,kant calls 
'pure apperception4' ,the specific modes
 in which the ,ego  refers to itself the
 multiplicity of sense are the pure     
concepts of the  understanding1 the     
,categories4    ,kant1 it is well known1
 did not put himself to much trouble in 
discovering the categories4 ',i1' the   
unity of self-consciousness1  being     
quite abstract and completely           
indeterminate1 the question  arises1 how
 are we to get at the specialised forms 
of the ',i1' the  categories8           
,fortunately1 the common logic offers to
 our hand an  empirical classification  
of the kinds of judgment4 ,now1 to judge
  is the same as to think of a          
determinate object4 ,hence the various  
modes of judgment1 as enumerated to our 
hand1 provide us with the  several      

categories of thought4 ,to the          
philosophy of ,fichte belongs  the great
 merit of having called attention to the
 need of exhibiting  the necessity of   
these categories and giving a genuine   
deduction  of them4 ,fichte ought to    
have produced at least one effect on the
  method of logic4 ,one might have      
expected that the general laws of       
thought1 the usual stock-in-trade of    
logicians1 or the classification  of    
notions1 judgments1 and syllogisms1     
would be no longer taken merely  from   
observation and so only empirically     
treated1 but be deduced from  thought   
itself4 ,if thought is to be capable of 
proving anything at all1  if logic must 
insist upon the necessity of proofs1 and
 if it proposes  to teach the theory of 
demonstration1 its first care should be 
to give  a reason for its own           
subject-matter1 and to see that it is   
necessary4    7i7 ,kant therefore holds 
that the categories have their source in
 the  ',ego1' and that the ',ego'       

consequently supplies the               
characteristics  of universality and    
necessity4 ,if we observe what we have  
before us  primarily1 we may describe it
 as a congeries or diversity3 and in the
  categories we find the simple points  
or units1 to which this congeries  is   
made to converge4 ,the world of sense is
 a scene of mutual exclusion3  its being
 is outside itself4 ,that is the        
fundamental feature of the  sensible4   
',now' has no meaning except in         
reference to a before and a  hereafter4 
,red1 in the same way1 only subsists by 
being opposed to  yellow and blue4 ,now 
this other thing is outside the         
sensible2 which  latter is1 only in so  
far as it is not the other1 and only in 
so far  as that other is4 ,but thought1 
or the ',ego1' occupies a position the  
very reverse of the sensible1 with its  
mutual exclusions1 and its  being       
outside itself4 ,the ',i' is the primary
 identity--at one with  itself and all  
at home in itself4 ,the word ',i'       

expresses the mere act  of              
bringing-to-bear-upon-self3 and whatever
 is placed in this unit or  focus1 is   
affected by it and transformed into it4 
,the ',i' is as it  were the crucible   
and the fire which consumes the loose   
plurality of  sense and reduces it to   
unity4 ,this is the process which ,kant 
calls  pure apperception in distinction 
from the common apperception1 to  which 
the plurality it receives is a plurality
 still2 whereas pure  apperception is   
rather an act by which the ',i' makes   
the materials  'mine4'    ,this view has
 at least the merit of giving a correct 
expression to the  nature of all        
consciousness4 ,the tendency of all     
man's endeavours is to  understand the  
world1 to appropriate and subdue it to  
himself3 and to  this end the positive  
reality of the world must be as it were 
crushed  and pounded1 in other words1   
idealised4 ,at the same time we must    
note  that it is not the mere act of our
 personal self-consciousness1 which     

introduces an absolute unity into the   
variety of sense4 ,rather1 this         
identity is itself the absolute4 ,the   
absolute is1 as it were1 so kind  as to 
leave individual things to their own    
enjoyment1 and it again  drives them    
back to the absolute unity4    7#b7     
,expressions like 'transcendental unity 
of self-consciousness' have  an ugly    
look about them1 and suggest a monster  
in the background3  but their meaning is
 not so abstruse as it looks4 ,kant's   
meaning of  transcendental may be       
gathered by the way he distinguishes it 
from  transcendent4 ,the transcendent   
may be said to be what steps out  beyond
 the categories of the understanding3 a 
sense in which the term  is first       
employed in mathematics4 ,thus in       
geometry you are told to  conceive the  
circumference of a circle as formed of  
an infinite number  of infinitely small 
straight lines4 ,in other words1        
characteristics  which the understanding
 holds to be totally different1 the     

straight  line and the curve1 are       
expressly invested with identity4       
,another  transcendent of the same kind 
is the self-consciousness which is      
identical with itself and infinite in   
itself1 as distinguished from  the      
ordinary consciousness which derives its
 form and tone from finite  materials4  
,that unity of self-consciousness1      
however1 ,kant called  transcendental   
only2 and he meant thereby that the     
unity was only in  our minds and did not
 attach to the objects apart from our   
knowledge of  them4    7#c7 ,to regard  
the categories as subjective only1 i4e4 
as a part  of ourselves1 must seem very 
odd to the natural mind2 and no doubt   
there is something queer about it4 ,it  
is quite true however that the          
categories are not contained in the     
sensation as it is given us4 ,when1  for
 instance1 we look at a piece of sugar1 
we find it is hard1 white1  sweet1 c4   
,all these properties we say are united 
in one object4 ,now  it is this unity   

that is not found in the sensation4 ,the
 same thing  happens if we conceive two 
events to stand in the relation of cause
  and effect4 ,the senses only inform us
 of the two several occurrences  which  
follow each other in time4 ,but that the
 one is cause1 the other  effect1--in   
other words1 the causal nexus between   
the two1--is not  perceived by sense2 it
 is only evident to thought4 ,still1    
though the  categories1 such as unity1  
or cause and effect1 are strictly the   
property of thought1 it by no means     
follows that they must be ours  merely  
and not also characteristics of the     
objects4 ,kant however  confines them to
 the subject-mind1 and his philosophy   
may be styled  subjective idealism3 for 
he holds that both the form and the     
matter of  knowledge are supplied by the
 ,ego--or knowing subject--the form by  
our  intellectual1 the matter by our    
sentient ego4    ,so far as regards the 
content of this subjective idealism1 not
 a word  need be wasted4 ,it might      

perhaps at first sight be imagined1 that
  objects would lose their reality when 
their unity was transferred to  the     
subject4 ,but neither we nor the objects
 would have anything to gain  by the    
mere fact that they possessed being4    
,the main point is not1  that they are1 
but what they are1 and whether or not   
their content  is true4 ,it does no good
 to the things to say merely that they  
have  being4 ,what has being1 will also 
cease to be when time creeps over it4   
,it might also be alleged that          
subjective idealism tended to promote   
self-conceit4 ,but surely if a man's    
world be the sum of his sensible        
perceptions1 he has no reason to be vain
 of such a world4 ,laying aside         
therefore as unimportant this           
distinction between subjective and      
objective1 we are chiefly interested in 
knowing what a thing is3 i4e4  its      
content1 which is no more objective than
 it is subjective4 ,if mere  existence  
be enough to make objectivity1 even a   

crime is objective3 but  it is an       
existence which is nullity at the core1 
as is definitely made  apparent when the
 day of punishment comes4    #dc4 ,the  
,categories may be viewed in two        
aspects4 ,on the one hand it  is by     
their instrumentality that the mere     
perception of sense rises to            
objectivity and experience4 ,on the     
other hand these notions are unities  in
 our consciousness merely3 they are     
consequently conditioned by the         
material given to them1 and having      
nothing of their own they can be        
applied to use only within the range of 
experience4 ,but the other  constituent 
of experience1 the impressions of       
feeling and perception1  is not one whit
 less subjective than the categories4   
,to assert that the categories taken by 
themselves are empty can  scarcely be   
right1 seeing that they have a content1 
at all events1 in  the special stamp and
 significance which they possess4 ,of   
course the  content of the categories is

 not perceptible to the senses1 nor is  
it  in time and space3 but that is      
rather a merit than a defect4 ,a glimpse
  of this meaning of content may be     
observed to affect our ordinary         
thinking4 ,a book or a speech for       
example is said to have a great  deal in
 it1 to be full of content1 in          
proportion to the greater number  of    
thoughts and general results to be found
 in it3 whilst1 on the  contrary1 we    
should never say that any book1 e4g4    
novel1 had much in  it1 because it      
included a great number of single       
incidents1 situations1  and the like4   
,even the popular voice thus recognises 
that something  more than the facts of  
sense is needed to make a work pregnant 
with  matter4 ,and what is this         
additional desideratum but thoughts1 or 
in the  first instance the categories8  
,and yet it is not altogether wrong1 it 
should be added1 to call the categories 
of themselves empty1 if it be  meant    
that they and the logical ,idea1 of     

which they are the members1 do  not     
constitute the whole of philosophy1 but 
necessarily lead onwards in  due        
progress to the real departments of     
,nature and ,mind4 ,only let the        
progress not be misunderstood4 ,the     
logical ,ideal does not thereby come    
into possession of a content originally 
foreign to it3 but by its own  native   
action is specialised and developed to  
,nature and ,mind4    #dd4 ,it follows  
that the categories are no fit terms to 
express  the ,absolute--the ,absolute   
not being given in perception2--and     
,understanding1 or knowledge by means of
 the categories1 is consequently        
incapable of knowing the                
,things-in-themselves4    ,the          
,thing-in-itself 7and under 'thing' is  
embraced even ,mind and ,god7  expresses
 the object when we leave out of sight  
all that consciousness  makes of it1 all
 its emotional aspects1 and all specific
 thoughts  of it4 ,it is easy to see    
what is left1--utter abstraction1 total 

emptiness1 only described still as an   
'other-world'--the negative of  every   
image1 feeling1 and definite thought4   
,nor does it require much  penetration  
to see that this caput mortuum is still 
only a product  of thought1 such as     
accrues when thought is carried on to   
abstraction  unalloyed3 that it is the  
work of the empty ',ego1' which makes an
  object out of this empty self-identity
 of its own4 ,the negative              
characteristic which this abstract      
identity receives as an object1 is  also
 enumerated among the categories of     
,kant1 and is no less familiar  than the
 empty identity aforesaid4 ,hence one   
can only read with  surprise the        
perpetual remark that we do not know the
 ,thing-in-itself4  ,on the contrary    
there is nothing we can know so easily4 
#de4 ,it is ,reason1 the faculty of the 
,unconditioned1 which discovers  the    
conditioned nature of the knowledge     
comprised in experience4 ,what  is thus 
called the object of ,reason1 the       

,infinite or ,unconditioned1  is nothing
 but self-sameness1 or the primary      
identity of the ',ego'  in thought      
7mentioned in  #db74 ,reason itself is  
the name given to  the abstract ',ego'  
or thought1 which makes this pure       
identity its aim  or object 7cf4 note to
 the preceding 74 ,now this identity1   
having  no definite attribute at all1   
can receive no illumination from the    
truths of experience1 for the reason    
that these refer always to  definite    
facts4 ,such is the sort of             
,unconditioned that is supposed to  be  
the absolute truth of ,reason1--what is 
termed the ,idea2 whilst  the cognitions
 of experience are reduced to the level 
of untruth and  declared to be          
appearances4    ,kant was the first     
definitely to signalise the distinction 
between  ,reason and ,understanding4    
,the object of the former1 as he applied
 the  term1 was the infinite and        
unconditioned1 of the latter the finite 
and conditioned4 ,kant did valuable     

service when he enforced the finite     
character of the cognitions of the      
understanding founded merely upon       
experience1 and stamped their contents  
with the name of appearance4  ,but his  
mistake was to stop at the purely       
negative point of view1 and  to limit   
the unconditionality of ,reason to an   
abstract self-sameness  without any     
shade of distinction4 ,it degrades      
,reason to a finite and  conditioned    
thing1 to identify it with a mere       
stepping beyond the  finite and         
conditioned range of understanding4 ,the
 real infinite1  far from being a mere  
transcendence of the finite1 always     
involves  the absorption of the finite  
into its own fuller nature4 ,in the same
  way ,kant restored the ,idea to its   
proper dignity3 vindicating it for      
,reason1 as a thing distinct from       
abstract analytic determinations or     
from the merely sensible conceptions    
which usually appropriate to  themselves
 the name of ideas4 ,but as respects the

 ,idea also1 he never  got beyond its   
negative aspect1 as what ought to be but
 is not4    ,the view that the objects  
of immediate consciousness1 which       
constitute  the body of experience1 are 
mere appearances 7phenomena71 was       
another  important result of the        
,kantian philosophy4 ,common ,sense1    
that mixture  of sense and              
understanding1 believes the objects of  
which it has  knowledge to be severally 
independent and self-supporting2 and    
when  it becomes evident that they tend 
towards and limit one another1 the      
interdependence of one upon another is  
reckoned something foreign to  them and 
to their true nature4 ,the very opposite
 is the truth4 ,the  things immediately 
known are mere appearances--in other    
words1 the  ground of their being is not
 in themselves but in something else4   
,but then comes the important step of   
defining what this something  else is4  
,according to ,kant1 the things that we 
know about are to us  appearances only1 

and we can never know their essential   
nature1 which  belongs to another world 
we cannot approach4 ,plain minds have   
not  unreasonably taken exception to    
this subjective idealism1 with its      
reduction of the facts of consciousness 
to a purely personal world1  created by 
ourselves alone4 ,for the true statement
 of the case is  rather as follows4 ,the
 things of which we have direct         
consciousness  are mere phenomena1 not  
for us only1 but in their own nature2   
and the  true and proper case of these  
things1 finite as they are1 is to have  
their existence founded not in          
themselves but in the universal divine  
,idea4 ,this view of things1 it is true1
 is as idealist as ,kant's2  but in     
contradistinction to the subjective     
idealism of the ,critical  philosophy   
should be termed absolute idealism4     
,absolute idealism1  however1 though it 
is far in advance of vulgar realism1 is 
by no means  merely restricted to       
philosophy4 ,it lies at the root of all 

religion2  for religion too believes the
 actual world we see1 the sum total of  
existence1 to be created and governed by
 ,god4    #df4 ,but it is not enough    
simply to indicate the existence of the 
object of ,reason4 ,curiosity impels us 
to seek for knowledge of this  identity1
 this empty thing-in-itself4 ,now       
knowledge means such  an acquaintance   
with the object as apprehends its       
distinct and  special subject-matter4   
,but such subject-matter involves a     
complex  inter-connexion in the object  
itself1 and supplies a ground of        
connexion with many other objects4 ,in  
the present case1 to express the  nature
 of the features of the ,infinite or    
,thing-in-itself1 ,reason would  have   
nothing except the categories3 and in   
any endeavour so to employ  them ,reason
 becomes over-soaring or 'transcendent4'
    ,here begins the second stage of the
 ,criticism of ,reason--which1 as  an   
independent piece of work1 is more      
valuable than the first4 ,the  first    

part1 as has been explained above1      
teaches that the categories  originate  
in the unity of self-consciousness2 that
 any knowledge which  is gained by their
 means has nothing objective in it1 and 
that the  very objectivity claimed for  
them is only subjective4 ,so far as this
  goes1 the ,kantian ,criticism presents
 that 'common' type of idealism  known  
as ,subjective ,idealism4 ,it asks no   
questions about the meaning  or scope of
 the categories1 but simply considers   
the abstract form of  subjectivity and  
objectivity1 and that even in such a    
partial way1 that  the former aspect1   
that of subjectivity1 is retained as a  
final and  purely affirmative term of   
thought4 ,in the second part1 however1  
when  ,kant examines the application1 as
 it is called1 which ,reason makes  of  
the categories in order to know its     
objects1 the content of the  categories1
 at least in some points of view1 comes 
in for discussion3  or1 at any rate1 an 
opportunity presented itself for a      

discussion of  the question4 ,it is     
worth while to see what decision ,kant  
arrives at on  the subject of           
metaphysic1 as this application of the  
categories to the  unconditioned is     
called4 ,his method of procedure we     
shall here briefly  state and criticise4
    #dg4 7a7 ,the first of the          
unconditioned entities which ,kant      
examines  is the ,soul 7see above1      
#cd74 ',in my consciousness1' he says1  
',i  always find that ,i 7#a7 am the    
determining subject3 7#b7 am singular1  
or  abstractly simple3 7#c7 am          
identical1 or one and the same1 in all  
the  variety of what ,i am conscious of3
 7#d7 distinguish myself as thinking    
from all the things outside me4'    ,now
 the method of the old metaphysic1 as   
,kant correctly states it1  consisted in
 substituting for these statements of   
experience the  corresponding categories
 or metaphysical terms4 ,thus arise     
these four  new propositions3 7a7 the   
,soul is a substance3 7b7 it is a simple

  substance3 7c7 it is numerically      
identical at the various periods of     
existence3 7d7 it stands in relation to 
space4    ,kant discusses this          
translation1 and draws attention to the 
,paralogism  or mistake of confounding  
one kind of truth with another4 ,he     
points out  that empirical attributes   
have here been replaced by categories3  
and  shows that we are not entitled to  
argue from the former to the latter1  or
 to put the latter in place of the      
former4    ,this criticism obviously but
 repeats the observation of ,hume  7    
#ci7 that the categories as a           
whole1--ideas of universality  and      
necessity1--are entirely absent from    
sensation2 and that the  empirical fact 
both in form and contents differs from  
its intellectual  formulation4    ,if   
the purely empirical fact were held to  
constitute the credentials  of the      
thought1 then no doubt it would be      
indispensable to be able  precisely to  
identify the 'idea' in the 'impression4'

    ,and in order to make out1 in his   
criticism of the metaphysical           
psychology1 that the soul cannot be     
described as substantial1 simple1       
self-same1 and as maintaining its       
independence in intercourse with  the   
material world1 ,kant argues from the   
single ground1 that the  several        
attributes of the soul1 which           
consciousness lets us feel in           
experience1 are not exactly the same    
attributes as result from the  action of
 thought thereon4 ,but we have seen     
above1 that according  to ,kant all     
knowledge1 even experience1 consists in 
thinking our  impressions--in other     
words1 in transforming into intellectual
  categories the attributes primarily   
belonging to sensation4                 
,unquestionably one good result of the  
,kantian criticism was that  it         
emancipated mental philosophy from the  
'soul-thing1' from the  categories1 and1
 consequently1 from questions about the 
simplicity1  complexity1 materiality1 c4

 of the soul4 ,but even for the common  
sense  of ordinary men1 the true point  
of view1 from which the inadmissibility 
of these forms best appears1 will be1   
not that they are thoughts1 but  that   
thoughts of such a stamp neither can nor
 do contain truth4    ,if thought and   
phenomenon do not perfectly correspond  
to one another1  we are free at least to
 choose which of the two shall be held  
the  defaulter4 ,the ,kantian idealism1 
where it touches on the world of        
,reason1 throws the blame on the        
thoughts2 saying that the thoughts are  
defective1 as not being exactly fitted  
to the sensations and to a mode  of mind
 wholly restricted within the range of  
sensation1 in which as  such there are  
no traces of the presence of these      
thoughts4 ,but as to  the actual content
 of the thought1 no question is raised4 
,paralogisms are a species of unsound   
syllogism1 the especial vice of  which  
consists in employing one and the same  
word in the two premisses  with a       

different meaning4 ,according to ,kant  
the method adopted by the  rational     
psychology of the old metaphysicians1   
when they assumed that  the qualities of
 the phenomenal soul1 as given in       
experience1 formed  part of its own real
 essence1 was based upon such a         
,paralogism4 ,nor  can it be denied that
 predicates like simplicity1 permanence1
 c1 are  inapplicable to the soul4 ,but 
their unfitness is not due to the ground
  assigned by ,kant1 that ,reason1 by   
applying them1 would exceed its         
appointed bounds4 ,the true ground is   
that this style of abstract terms  is   
not good enough for the soul1 which is  
very2 much more than a mere  simple or  
unchangeable sort of thing4 ,and thus1  
for example1 while the  soul may be     
admitted to be simple self-sameness1 it 
is at the same time  active and         
institutes distinctions in its own      
nature4 ,but whatever  is merely or     
abstractly simple is as such also a mere
 dead thing4 ,by  his polemic against   

the metaphysic of the past ,kant        
discarded those  predicates from the    
soul or mind4 ,he did well2 but when he 
came to  state his reasons1 his failure 
is apparent4    #dh4 77 ,the second     
unconditioned object is the ,world 7    
#ce74 ,in the  attempt which reason     
makes to comprehend the unconditioned   
nature of  the ,world1 it falls into    
what are called ,antinomies4 ,in other  
words  it maintains two opposite        
propositions about the same object1 and 
in  such a way that each of them has to 
be maintained with equal necessity4     
,from this it follows that the body of  
cosmical fact1 the specific  statements 
descriptive of which run into           
contradiction1 cannot be a              
self-subsistent reality1 but only an    
appearance4 ,the explanation  offered by
 ,kant alleges that the contradiction   
does not affect the  object in its own  
proper essence1 but attaches only to the
 ,reason which  seeks to comprehend it4 
,in this way the suggestion was broached

 that the contradiction is  occasioned  
by the subject-matter itself1 or by the 
intrinsic quality  of the categories4   
,and to offer the idea that the         
contradiction  introduced into the world
 of ,reason by the categories of        
,understanding  is inevitable and       
essential1 was to make one of the most  
important  steps in the progress of     
,modern ,philosophy4 ,but the more      
important the  issue thus raised the    
more trivial was the solution4 ,its only
 motive  was an excess of tenderness for
 the things of the world4 ,the blemish  
of contradiction1 it seems1 could not be
 allowed to mar the essence of  the     
world3 but there could be no objection  
to attach it to the thinking  ,reason1  
to the essence of mind4 ,probably nobody
 will feel disposed to  deny that the   
phenomenal world presents contradictions
 to the observing  mind2 meaning by     
'phenomenal' the world as it presents   
itself to the  senses and understanding1
 to the subjective mind4 ,but if a      

comparison  is instituted between the   
essence of the world and the essence of 
the  mind1 it does seem strange to hear 
how calmly and confidently the  modest  
dogma has been advanced by one1 and     
repeated by others1 that  thought or    
,reason1 and not the ,world1 is the seat
 of contradiction4  ,it is no escape to 
turn round and explain that ,reason     
falls into  contradiction only by       
applying the categories4 ,for this      
application  of the categories is       
maintained to be necessary1 and ,reason 
is not  supposed to be equipped with any
 other forms but the categories for  the
 purpose of cognition4 ,but cognition is
 determining and determinate  thinking3 
so that1 if ,reason be mere empty       
indeterminate thinking1 it  thinks      
nothing4 ,and if in the end ,reason be  
reduced to mere identity  without       
diversity 7see next 71 it will in the   
end also win a happy  release from      
contradiction at the slight sacrifice of
 all its facts and  contents4    ,it may

 also be noted that his failure to make 
a more thorough study  of ,antinomy was 
one of the reasons why ,kant enumerated 
only four  ,antinomies4 ,these four     
attracted his notice1 because1 as may be
 seen  in his discussion of the         
so-called ,paralogisms of ,reason1 he   
assumed  the list of the categories as a
 basis of his argument4 ,employing  what
 has subsequently become a favourite    
fashion1 he simply put the  object under
 a rubric otherwise ready to hand1      
instead of deducing  its characteristics
 from its notion4 ,further deficiencies 
in the  treatment of the ,antinomies ,i 
have pointed out1 as occasion offered1  
in my ',science of ,logic' ,here it will
 be sufficient to say that  the         
,antinomies are not confined to the four
 special objects taken  from ,cosmology3
 they appear in all objects of every    
kind1 in all  conceptions1 notions and  
,ideas4 ,to be aware of this and to know
 objects  in this property of theirs1   
makes a vital part in a philosophical   

theory4 ,for the property thus indicated
 is what we shall afterwards  describe  
as the ,dialectical influence in logic4 
99       99       99       99       99  
,the principles of the metaphysical     
philosophy gave rise to the belief      
that1 when cognition lapsed into        
contradictions1 it was a mere           
accidental aberration1 due to some      
subjective mistake in argument  and     
inference4 ,according to ,kant1 however1
 thought has a natural  tendency to     
issue in contradictions or antinomies1  
whenever it seeks  to apprehend the     
infinite4 ,we have in the latter part of
 the above  paragraph referred to the   
philosophical importance of the         
antinomies of  reason1 and shown how the
 recognition of their existence helped  
largely  to get rid of the rigid        
dogmatism of the metaphysic of          
understanding1  and to direct attention 
to the ,dialectical movement of thought4
 ,but  here too ,kant1 as we must add1  
never got beyond the negative result    

that the thing-in-itself is unknowable1 
and never penetrated to the  discovery  
of what the antinomies really and       
positively mean4 ,that true  and        
positive meaning of the antinomies is   
this3 that every actual  thing involves 
a coexistence of opposed1 elements4     
,consequently to  know1 or1 in other    
words1 to comprehend an object is       
equivalent to  being conscious of it as 
a concrete unity of opposed             
determinations4  ,the old4 metaphysic1  
as we have already seen1 when it studied
 the  objects of which it sought a      
metaphysical knowledge1 went to work by 
applying categories abstractly and to   
the exclusion of their opposites4       
,kant1 on the other hand1 tried to prove
 that the statements1 issuing  through  
this method1 could be met by other      
statements of contrary  import with     
equal warrant and equal necessity4 ,in  
the enumeration of  these antinomies he 
narrowed his ground to the cosmology of 
the old  metaphysical system1 and in his

 discussion made out four antinomies1 a 
number which rests upon the list of the 
categories4 ,the first antinomy  is on  
the question3 ,whether we are or are not
 to think the world  limited in space   
and time4 ,in the second antinomy we    
have a discussion  of the dilemma3      
,matter must be conceived either as     
endlessly divisible1  or as consisting  
of atoms4 ,the third antinomy bears upon
 the antithesis  of freedom and         
necessity1 to such extent as it is      
embraced in the  question1 ,whether     
everything in the world must be supposed
 subject to  the condition of causality1
 or if we can also assume free beings1  
in  other words1 absolute initial points
 of action1 in the world4 ,finally1  the
 fourth antinomy is the dilemma3 ,either
 the world as a whole has a  cause or it
 is uncaused4    ,the method which ,kant
 follows in discussing these antinomies 
is as  follows4 ,he puts the two        
propositions implied in the dilemma over
  against each other as thesis and      

antithesis1 and seeks to prove both3    
that is to say he tries to exhibit them 
as inevitably issuing from  reflection  
on the question4 ,he particularly       
protests against the charge  of being a 
special pleader and of grounding his    
reasoning on illusions4  ,speaking      
honestly1 however1 the arguments which  
,kant offers for his  thesis and        
antithesis are mere shams of            
demonstration4 ,the thing to  be proved 
is invariably implied in the assumption 
he starts from1 and  the speciousness of
 his proofs is only due to his prolix   
and apagogic  mode of procedure4 ,yet it
 was1 and still is1 a great achievement 
for  the ,critical philosophy1 when it  
exhibited these antinomies3 for  in this
 way it gave some expression 7at first  
certainly subjective  and unexplained7  
to the actual unity of those categories 
which are  kept persistently separate by
 the understanding4 ,the first of the   
cosmological antinomies1 for example1   
implies a recognition of the  doctrine  

that space and time present a discrete  
as well as a continuous  aspect3 whereas
 the old metaphysic1 laying exclusive   
emphasis on the  continuity1 had been   
led to treat the world as unlimited in  
space  and time4 ,it is quite correct to
 say that we can go beyond every        
definite space and beyond every definite
 time3 but it is no less  correct that  
space and time are real and actual only 
when they are  defined or specialised   
into 'here' and 'now1'--a specialisation
 which  is involved in the very notion  
of them4 ,the same observations apply to
  the rest of the antinomies4 ,take1 for
 example1 the antinomy of freedom  and  
necessity4 ,the main gist of itis that  
freedom and necessity as  understood by 
abstract thinkers are not independently 
real1 as these  thinkers suppose1 but   
merely ideal factors 7moments7 of the   
true  freedom and the true necessity1   
and that to abstract and isolate either 
conception is to make it false4    #di4 
7y7 ,the third object of the ,reason is 

,god 7#cf73 ,he also must  be known and 
defined in terms of thought4 ,but in    
comparison with  an unalloyed identity1 
every defining term as such seems to the
  understanding to be only a limit and a
 negation3 every reality  accordingly   
must be taken as limitless1 i4e4        
undefined4 ,accordingly  ,god1 when ,he 
is defined to be the sum of all         
realities1 the most real  of beings1    
turns into a mere abstract4 ,and the    
only term under which  that most real of
 real1 things can be defined is that of 
,being--itself  the height of           
abstraction4 ,these are the two         
elements1 abstract  identity1 on one    
hand1 which is spoken of in this place  
as the notion2  and ,being on the       
other1--which ,reason seeks to unify4   
,and their union  is the ,ideal of      
,reason4    #ej4 ,to carry out this     
unification two ways or two forms are   
admissible4 ,either we may begin with   
,being and proceed to the  abstraction  
of ,thought3 or the movement may begin  

with the  abstraction and end in ,being4
    ,we shall1 in the first place1 start
 from ,being4 ,but ,being1 in its       
natural aspect1 presents itself to view 
as a ,being of infinite variety1  a     
,world in all its plenitude4 ,and this  
world may be regarded in two  ways3     
first1 as a collection of innumerable   
unconnected facts2 and  second1 as a    
collection of innumerable facts in      
mutual relation1  giving evidence of    
design4 ,the first aspect is emphasised 
in the  ,cosmological proof3 the latter 
in the proofs of ,natural ,theology4    
,suppose now that this fulness of being 
passes under the agency of  thought4    
,then it is stripped of its isolation   
and unconnectedness1 and  viewed as a   
universal and absolutely necessary being
 which determines  itself and acts by   
general purposes or laws4 ,and this     
necessary and  self-determined being1   
different from the being at the         
commencement1 is  ,god4    ,the main    
force of ,kant's criticism on this      

process attacks it for being  a         
syllogising1 i4e4 a transition4         
,perceptions1 and that aggregate  of    
perceptions we call the world1 exhibit  
as they stand no traces of  that        
universality which they afterwards      
receive from the purifying act  of      
thought4 ,the empirical conception of   
the world therefore gives no  warrant   
for the idea of universality4 ,and so   
any attempt on the part  of thought to  
ascend from the empirical conception of 
the world to  ,god is checked by the    
argument of ,hume 7as in the            
paralogisms1  #dg71  according to which 
we have no right to think sensations1   
that is1 to  elicit universality and    
necessity from them4    ,man is         
essentially a thinker3 and therefore    
sound ,common ,sense1 as well  as       
,philosophy1 will not yield up their    
right of rising to ,god from  and out of
 the empirical view of the world4 ,the  
only basis on which  this rise is       
possible is the thinking study of the   

world1 not the bare  sensuous1 animal1  
attuition of it4 ,thought and thought   
alone has eyes  for the essence1        
substance1 universal power1 and ultimate
 design of the  world4 ,and what men    
call the proofs of ,god's existence are1
 rightly  understood1 ways of describing
 and analysing the native course of the 
mind1 the course of thought thinking the
 data of the senses4 ,the  rise of      
thought beyond the world of sense1 its  
passage from the finite  to the         
infinite1 the leap into the             
super-sensible which it takes when  it  
snaps asunder the chain of sense1 all   
this transition is thought and  nothing 
but thought4 ,say there is no such      
passage1 and you say there is  to be no 
thinking4 ,and in sooth1 animals make no
 such transition4 ,they  never get      
further than sensation and the          
perception of the senses1 and  in       
consequence they have no religion4      
,both on general grounds1 and in the    
particular case1 there are two  remarks 

to be made upon the criticism of this   
exaltation in thought4  ,the first      
remark deals with the question of form4 
,when the exaltation  is exhibited in a 
syllogistic process1 in the shape of    
what we call  proofs of the being of    
,god1 these reasonings cannot but start 
from  some sort of theory of the world1 
which makes it an aggregate either  of  
contingent facts or of final causes and 
relations involving design4  ,the merely
 syllogistic thinker may deem this      
starting-point a solid  basis and       
suppose that it remains throughout in   
the same empirical  light1 left at last 
as it was at the first4 ,in this case1  
the bearing  of the beginning upon the  
conclusion to which it leads has a      
purely  affirmative aspect1 as if we    
were only reasoning from one thing which
  is and continues to be1 to another    
thing which in like manner  is4 ,but the
 great error is to restrict our notions 
of the nature  of thought to its form in
 understanding alone4 ,to think think   

the  phenomenal world rather1 means to  
re-cast its form1 and transmute it  into
 a universal4 ,and thus the             
action-of-thought1 has also1 negative   
effect upon its basis3 and the matter of
 sensation1 when it receives  the stamp 
of universality1 at once loses its first
 and phenomenal  shape4 ,by the removal 
and negation of the shell1 the kernel   
within the  sense2 v percept is brought 
to the light 7 #ac and #bc74 ,and it is 
because they do not1 with sufficient    
prominence1 express the negative        
features implied in the exaltation of   
the mind from the world to ,god1  that  
the metaphysical proofs of the being of 
a ,god are defective  interpretations   
and descriptions of the process4 ,if the
 world is only a  sum of incidents1 it  
follows that it is also deciduous and   
phenomenal1  in esse and posse null4    
,that upward spring of the mind         
signifies1  that the being which the    
world has is only a semblance1 no real  
being1  no absolute truth2 it signifies 

that1 beyond and above that appearance1 
truth abides in ,god1 so that true being
 is another name for ,god4 ,the  process
 of exaltation might thus appear to be  
transition and to involve  a means1 but 
it is not a whit less true1 that every  
trace of transition  and means is       
absorbed2 since the world1 which might  
have seemed to be  the means of reaching
 ,god1 is explained to be a nullity4    
,unless the  being of the world is      
nullified1 the point d'appui for the    
exaltation  is lost4 ,in this way the   
apparent means vanishes1 and the process
  of derivation is cancelled in the very
 act by which it proceeds4 ,it  is the  
affirmative aspect of this relation1 as 
supposed to subsist  between two things1
 either of which is as much as the      
other1 which  ,jacobi mainly has in his 
eye when he attacks the demonstrations  
of the  understanding4 ,justly censuring
 them for seeking conditions 7i4e4  the 
world7 for the unconditioned1 he remarks
 that the ,infinite or  ,god must on    

such a method be presented as dependent 
and derivative4  ,but that elevation1 as
 it takes place in the mind1 serves to  
correct  this semblance3 in fact1 it has
 no other meaning than to correct that  
semblance4 ,jacobi1 however1 failed to  
recognise the genuine nature of         
essential thought--by which it cancels  
the mediation in the very act of        
mediating2 and consequently1 his        
objection1 though it tells against the  
merely 'reflective' understanding1 is   
false when applied to thought as  a     
whole1 and in particular to reasonable  
thought4    ,to explain what we mean by 
the neglect of the negative factor in   
thought1 we may refer by way of         
illustration to the charges of          
,pantheism and ,atheism brought against 
the doctrines of ,spinoza4 ,the         
absolute ,substance of ,spinoza         
certainly falls short of absolute       
spirit1  and it is a right and proper   
requirement that ,god should be defined 
as absolute spirit4 ,but when the       

definition in ,spinoza is said to       
identify the world with ,god1 and to    
confound ,god with nature and the       
finite world1 it is implied that the    
finite world possesses a genuine        
actuality and affirmative reality4 ,if  
this assumption be admitted1 of  course 
a union of ,god with the world renders  
,god completely finite1  and degrades   
,him to the bare finite and adventitious
 congeries of  existence4 ,but there are
 two objections to be noted4 ,in the    
first place  ,spinoza does not define   
,god as the unity of ,god with the      
world1 but as  the union of thought with
 extension1 that is1 with the material  
world4  ,and secondly1 even if we accept
 this awkward popular statement as to   
this unity1 it would still be true that 
the system of ,spinoza was not  ,atheism
 but ,acosmism1 defining the world to be
 an appearance lacking in  true reality4
 ,a philosophy1 which affirms that ,god 
and ,god-alone is1  should not be       
stigmatised as atheistic1 when even     

those nations which  worship the ape1   
the cow1 or images of stone and brass1  
are credited  with some religion4 ,but  
as things stand the imagination of      
ordinary men  feels a vehement          
reluctance to surrender its dearest     
conviction1 that  this aggregate of     
finitude1 which it calls a world1 has   
actual reality2  and to hold that there 
is no world is a way of thinking they   
are fain  to believe impossible1 or at  
least much less possible than to        
entertain  the idea that there is no    
,god4 ,human nature1 not much to its    
credit1 is  more ready to believe that a
 system denies ,god1 than that it denies
 the  world4 ,a denial of ,god seems so 
much more intelligible than a denial of 
the world4    ,the second remark bears  
on the criticism of the material        
propositions  to which that elevation in
 thought in the first instance leads4   
,if  these propositions have for their  
predicate such terms as substance of    
the world1 its necessary essence1 cause 

which regulates and directs it          
according to design1 they are certainly 
inadequate to express what is  or ought 
to be understood by ,god4 ,yet apart    
from the trick of adopting  a           
preliminary popular conception of ,god1 
and criticising a result by  this       
assumed standard1 it is certain that    
these characteristics have  great value1
 and are necessary factors in the idea  
of ,god4 ,but if we  wish in this way to
 bring before thought the genuine idea  
of ,god1  and give its true value and   
expression to the central truth1 we must
  be careful not to start from a        
subordinate level of facts4 ,to speak   
of the 'merely contingent' things of the
 world is a very inadequate  description
 of the premisses4 ,the organic         
structures1 and the evidence  they      
afford of mutual adaptation1 belong to a
 higher province1 the  province of      
animated nature4 ,but even without      
taking into consideration  the possible 
blemish which the study of animated     

nature and of the  other teleological   
aspects of existing things may contract 
from the  pettiness of the final causes1
 and from puerile instances of them and 
their bearings1 merely animated nature  
is1 at the best1 incapable of  supplying
 the material for a truthful expression 
to the idea of ,god4  ,god is more than 
life3 ,he is ,spirit4 ,and therefore if 
the thought of  the ,absolute takes a   
starting-point for its rise1 and desires
 to take  the nearest1 the most true and
 adequate starting-point will be found  
in  the nature of spirit alone4    #ea4 
,the other way of unification by which  
to realise the ,ideal of  ,reason is to 
set out from the abstractum of ,thought 
and seek to  characterise it3 for which 
purpose ,being is the only available    
term4  ,this is the method of the       
,ontological proof4 ,the opposition1    
here  presented from a merely subjective
 point of view1 lies between ,thought   
and ,being2 whereas in the first way of 
junction1 being is common to the  two   

sides of the antithesis1 and the        
contrast lies only between its          
individualisation and universality4     
,understanding meets this second way    
with what is implicitly the same        
objection1 as it made to the first4  ,it
 denied that the empirical involves the 
universal3 so it denies that  the       
universal involves the specialisation1  
which specialisation in this  instance  
is being4 ,in other words it says3      
,being cannot be deduced from  the      
notion by any analysis4    ,the         
uniformly favourable reception and      
acceptance which attended  ,kant's      
criticism of the ,ontological proof was 
undoubtedly due to the  illustration    
which he made use of4 ,to explain the   
difference between  thought and being1  
he took the instance of a hundred       
sovereigns1  which1 for anything it     
matters to the notion1 are the same     
hundred  whether they are real or only  
possible1 though the difference of the  
two cases is very perceptible in their  

effect on a man's purse4 ,nothing  can  
be more obvious than that anything we   
only think or conceive is not  on that  
account actual3 that mental             
representation1 and even notional       
comprehension1 always falls short of    
being4 ,still it may not unfairly  be   
styled a barbarism in language1 when the
 name of notion is given  to things like
 a hundred sovereigns4 ,and1 putting    
that mistake aside1  those who          
perpetually urge against the philosophic
 ,idea the difference  between ,being   
and ,thought1 might have admitted that  
philosophers  were not wholly ignorant  
of the fact4 ,can there be any          
proposition  more trite than this8 ,but 
after all1 it is well to remember1 when 
we  speak of ,god1 that we have an      
object of another kind than any hundred 
sovereigns1 and unlike any one          
particular notion1 representation1 or   
however else it may be styled4 ,it is in
 fact this and this alone which  marks  
everything finite3--its being in time   

and space is discrepant  from its       
notion4 ,god1 on the contrary1 expressly
 has to be what can  only be 'thought as
 existing'2 ,his notion involves being4 
,it is this  unity of the notion and    
being that constitutes the notion of    
,god4    ,if this were all1 we should   
have only a formal expression of the    
divine  nature which would not really go
 beyond a statement of the nature of    
the notion itself4 ,and that the notion1
 in its most abstract terms1  involves  
being is plain4 ,for the notion1        
whatever other determination  it may    
receive1 is at least reference back on  
itself1 which results  by abolishing the
 intermediation1 and thus is immediate4 
,and what is  that reference to self1   
but being8 ,certainly it would be       
strange if the  notion1 the very inmost 
of mind1 if even the ',ego1' or above   
all1 the  concrete totality we call     
,god1 were not rich enough to include so
 poor  a category as being1 the very    
poorest and most abstract of all4 ,for1 

if we look at the thought it holds1     
nothing can be more insignificant  than 
being4 ,and yet there may be something  
still more insignificant  than          
being1--that which at first sight is    
perhaps supposed to be1 an  external and
 sensible existence1 like that of the   
paper lying before  me4 ,however1 in    
this matter1 nobody proposes to speak of
 the sensible  existence of a limited   
and perishable thing4 ,besides1 the     
petty  stricture of the ,kritik that    
'thought and being are different' can at
  most molest the path of the human mind
 from the thought of ,god to the        
certainty that ,he is3 it cannot take it
 away4 ,it is this process of           
transition1 depending on the absolute   
inseparability of the thought  of ,god  
from ,his being1 for which its proper   
authority has been  re-vindicated in the
 theory of faith or immediate           
knowledge1--whereof  hereafter4    #eb4 
,in this way thought1 at its highest    
pitch1 has to go outside for  any       

determinateness3 and although it is     
continually termed ,reason1 is          
out-and-out abstract thinking4 ,and the 
result of all is that ,reason  supplies 
nothing beyond the formal unity required
 to simplify and  systematise           
experiences2 it is a canon1 not an      
organon of truth1  and can furnish only 
a criticism of knowledge1 not a doctrine
 of  the infinite4 ,in its final        
analysis this criticism is summed up in 
the  assertion that in strictness       
thought is only the indeterminate unity 
and the action of this indeterminate    
unity4        ,kant undoubtedly held    
reason to be the faculty of the         
unconditioned2 but if reason be reduced 
to abstract identity      only1 it by   
implication renounces its               
unconditionality and is      in reality 
no better than empty understanding4 ,for
 reason is      unconditioned1 only in  
so far as its character and quality are 
not      due to an extraneous and       
foreign content1 only in so far as it   

is self-characterising1 and thus1 in    
point of content1 is its own            
master4 ,kant1 however1 expressly       
explains that the action of reason      
consists solely in applying the         
categories to systematise the           
matter given by perception1 e4 to place 
it in an outside order1      under the  
guidance of the principle of            
non-contradiction4    #ec4 7b7 ,the     
,practical ,reason is understood by     
,kant to mean a  thinking ,will1 i4e4 a 
,will that determines itself on         
universal  principles4 ,its office is to
 give objective1 imperative laws of     
freedom1--laws1 that is1 which state    
what ought to happen4 ,the warrant  for 
thus assuming thought to be an activity 
which makes itself felt  objectively1   
that is1 to be really a ,reason1 is the 
alleged possibility  of proving         
practical freedom by experience1 that   
is1 of showing it in  the phenomenon of 
self-consciousness4 ,this experience in 
consciousness  is at once met by all    

that the ,necessitarian produces from   
contrary  experience1 particularly by   
the sceptical induction 7employed       
amongst  others by ,hume7 from the      
endless diversity of what men regard as 
right  and duty1--i4e4 from the         
diversity apparent in those professedly 
objective laws of freedom4    #ed4      
,what1 then1 is to serve as the law     
which the ,practical  ,reason embraces  
and obeys1 and as the criterion in its  
act of  self-determination8 ,there is no
 rule at hand but the same abstract     
identity of understanding as before3    
,there must be no contradiction in  the 
act of self-determination4 ,hence the   
,practical ,reason never shakes  off the
 formalism which is represented as the  
climax of the ,theoretical  ,reason4    
,but this ,practical ,reason does not   
confine the universal principle of  the 
,good to its own inward regulation3 it  
first becomes practical1  in the true   
sense of the word1 when it insists on   
the ,good being  manifested in the world

 with an outward objectivity1 and       
requires that  the thought shall be     
objective throughout1 and not merely    
subjective4  ,we shall speak of this    
postulate of the ,practical ,reason     
afterwards4        ,the free            
self-determination which ,kant denied to
 the speculative1      he has expressly 
vindicated for the practical reason4 ,to
 many minds      this particular aspect 
of the ,kantian philosophy made it      
welcome2      and that for good reasons4
 ,to estimate rightly what we owe to    
,kant in the matter1 we ought to set    
before our minds the form of            
practical philosophy and in particular  
of 'moral philosophy1' which            
prevailed in his time4 ,it may be       
generally described as a system      of 
,eudaemonism1 which1 when asked what    
man's chief end ought to      be1       
replied ,happiness4 ,and by happiness   
,eudaemonism understood the             
satisfaction of the private appetites1  
wishes and wants of the      man3 thus  

raising the contingent and particular   
into a principle      for the will and  
its actualisation4 ,to this             
,eudaemonism1 which was      destitute  
of stability and consistency1 and which 
left the 'door      and gate' wide open 
for every whim and caprice1 ,kant       
opposed the      practical reason1 and  
thus emphasised the need for a principle
      of will which should be universal 
and lay the same obligation      on all4
 ,the theoretical reason1 as has been   
made evident in the      preceding      
paragraphs1 is identified by ,kant with 
the negative      faculty of the        
infinite2 and as it has no positive     
content of its      own1 it is          
restricted to the function of detecting 
the finitude of      experiential       
knowledge4 ,to the practical reason1 on 
the contrary1      he has expressly     
allowed a positive infinity1 by         
ascribing to the      will the power of 
modifying itself in universal modes1    
i4e4 by      thought4 ,such a power the 

will undoubtedly has3 and it is well    
to remember that man is free only in so 
far as he possesses it      and avails  
himself of it in his conduct4 ,but a    
recognition of the      existence of    
this power is not enough and does not   
avail to tell      us what are the      
contents of the will or practical       
reason4 ,hence to      say1 that a man  
must make the ,good the content of his  
will1 raises      the question1 what    
that content is1 and what are the means 
of      ascertaining what good is4 ,nor 
does one get over the difficulty by     
the principle that the will must be     
consistent with itself1 or by      the  
precept to do duty for the sake of duty4
    #ee4 7c7 ,the ,reflective ,power of 
,judgment is invested by ,kant  with the
 function of an ,intuitive              
,understanding4 ,that is to say1        
whereas the particulars had hitherto    
appeared1 so far as the universal  or   
abstract identity was concerned1        
adventitious and incapable of  being    

deduced from it1 the ,intuitive         
,understanding apprehends the           
particulars as moulded and formed by the
 universal itself4 ,experience  presents
 such universalised particulars in the  
products of ,art and of  organic nature4
    ,the capital feature in ,kant's     
,criticism of the ,judgment is1 that in 
it he gave a representation and a name1 
if not even an intellectual  expression1
 to the ,idea4 ,such a representation1  
as an ,intuitive  ,understanding1 or an 
inner adaptation1 suggests a universal  
which  is at the same time apprehended  
as essentially a concrete unity1 ,it  is
 in these aperus alone that the ,kantian
 philosophy rises to the  speculative   
height4 ,schiller1 and others1 have     
found in the idea of  artistic beauty1  
where thought and sensuous conception   
have grown  together into one1 a way of 
escape from the abstract and separatist 
understanding4 ,others have found the   
same relief in the perception  and      
consciousness of life and of living     

things1 whether that life  be natural or
 intellectual4--,the work of ,art1 as   
well as the living  individual1 is1 it  
must be owned1 of limited content4 ,but 
in the  postulated harmony of nature 7or
 necessity7 and free purpose1--in the   
final purpose of the world conceived as 
realised1 ,kant has put before  us the  
,idea1 comprehensive even in its        
content4 ,yet what may be called  the   
laziness of thought1 when dealing with  
this supreme ,idea1 finds a  too easy   
mode of evasion in the 'ought to be'3   
instead of the actual  realisation of   
the ultimate end1 it clings hard to the 
disjunction  of the notion from reality4
 ,yet if thought will not think the     
ideal  realised1 the senses and the     
intuition can at any rate see it in the 
present reality of living organisms and 
of the beautiful in ,art4 ,and          
consequently ,kant's remarks on these   
objects were well adapted to lead  the  
mind on to grasp and think the concrete 
,idea4    #ef4 ,we are thus led to      

conceive a different relation between   
the  universal of understanding and the 
particular of perception1 than that  on 
which the theory of the ,theoretical and
 ,practical ,reason is founded4  ,but   
while this is so1 it is not supplemented
 by a recognition that the  former is   
the genuine relation and the very truth4
 ,instead of that1  the unity 7of       
universal with particular7 is accepted  
only as it exists  in finite phenomena1 
and is adduced only as a fact of        
experience4  ,such experience1 at first 
only personal1 may come from two        
sources4  ,it may spring from ,genius1  
the faculty which produces 'aesthetic   
ideas'2 meaning by aesthetic ideas1 the 
picture-thoughts of the free            
imagination which subserve an idea and  
suggest thoughts1 although their        
content is not expressed in a notional  
form1 and even admits of no  such       
expression4 ,it may also be due to      
,taste1 the feeling of congruity        
between the free play of intuition or   

imagination and the uniformity of       
understanding4    #eg4 ,the principle by
 which the ,reflective faculty of       
,judgment  regulates and arranges the   
products of animated nature is described
  as the ,end or final cause1--the      
notion in action1 the universal at  once
 determining and determinate in itself4 
,at the same time ,kant is  careful to  
discard the conception of external or   
finite adaptation1 in  which the ,end is
 only an adventitious form for the means
 and material  in which it is realised4 
,in the living organism1 on the         
contrary1 the  final cause is a moulding
 principle and an energy immanent in the
  matter1 and every member is in its    
turn a means as well as an end4    #eh4 
,such an ,idea evidently radically      
transforms the relation which the       
understanding institutes between means  
and ends1 between subjectivity  and     
objectivity4 ,and yet in the face of    
this unification1 the ,end or  design is
 subsequently explained to be a cause   

which exists and acts  subjectively1    
i4e4 as our idea only3 and teleology is 
accordingly  explained to be only a     
principle of criticism1 purely personal 
to our  understanding4    ,after the    
,critical philosophy had settled that   
,reason can know  phenomena only1 there 
would still have been an option for     
animated  nature between two equally    
subjective modes of thought4 ,even      
according  to ,kant's own exposition1   
there would have been an obligation to  
admit1  in the case of natural          
productions1 a knowledge not confined to
 the  categories of quality1 cause and  
effect1 composition1 constituents1  and 
so on4 ,the principle of inward         
adaptation or design1 had it been  kept 
to and carried out in scientific        
application1 would have led to a        
different and a higher method of        
observing nature4    #ei4 ,if we adopt  
this principle1 the ,idea1 when all     
limitations were  removed from it1 would
 appear as follows4 ,the universality   

moulded by  ,reason1 and described as   
the absolute and final end or the ,good1
 would  be realised in the world1 and   
realised moreover by means of a third   
thing1 the power which proposes this    
,end as well as realises it1--that  is1 
,god4 ,thus in ,him1 who is the absolute
 truth1 those oppositions of  universal 
and individual1 subjective and          
objective1 are solved and  explained to 
be neither self-subsistent nor true4    
#hj4 ,but ,good1--which is thus put     
forward as the final cause of the       
world1--has been already described as   
only our good1 the moral law  of our    
,practical ,reason4 ,this being so1 the 
unity in question  goes no further than 
make the state of the world and the     
course of  its events harmonise with our
 moral standards4#a ,besides1 even with 
this limitation1 the final cause1 or    
,good1 is a vague abstraction1  and the 
same vagueness attaches to what is to be
 ,duty4 ,but1 further1  this harmony is 
met by the revival and re-assertion of  

the antithesis1  which it by its own    
principle had nullified4 ,the harmony is
 then  described as merely subjective1  
something which merely ought to be1  and
 which at the same time is not real1--a 
mere article of faith1  possessing a    
subjective certainty1 but without truth1
 or that  objectivity which is proper to
 the ,idea4 ,this contradiction may seem
  to be disguised by adjourning the     
realisation of the ,idea to a future1   
to a time when the ,idea will also be4  
,but a sensuous condition like  time is 
the reverse of a reconciliation of the  
discrepancy2 and an  infinite           
progression--which is the corresponding 
image adopted by the  understanding--on 
the very face of it only repeats and    
re-enacts the  contradiction4    ,a     
general remark may still be offered on  
the result to which the  ,critical      
philosophy led as to the nature of      
knowledge2 a result  which has grown one
 of the current 'idols' or axiomatic    
beliefs of  the day4 ,in every dualistic

 system1 and especially in that of      
,kant1  the fundamental defect makes    
itself visible in the inconsistency of  
unifying at one moment1 what a moment   
before had been explained to  be        
independent and therefore incapable of  
unification4 ,and then1 at  the very    
moment after unification has been       
alleged to be the truth1  we suddenly   
come upon the doctrine that the two     
elements1 which1 in  their true status  
of unification1 had been refused all    
independent  subsistence1 are only true 
and actual in their state of separation4
  ,philosophising of this kind wants the
 little penetration needed to  discover1
 that this shuffling only evidences how 
unsatisfactory each  one of the two     
terms is4 ,and it fails simply because  
it is incapable  of bringing two        
thoughts together4 7,and in point of    
form there are  never more than two47   
,it argues an utter want of consistency 
to say1  on the one hand1 that the      
understanding only knows phenomena1 and1

 on  the other1 assert the absolute     
character of this knowledge1 by such    
statements as ',cognition can go no     
further'2 ',here is the natural and     
absolute limit of human knowledge4' ,but
 'natural' is the wrong word  here4 ,the
 things of nature are limited and are   
natural things only to  such extent as  
they are not aware of their universal   
limit1 or to such  extent as their mode 
or quality is a limit from our point of 
view1  and not from their own4 ,no one  
knows1 or even feels1 that anything  is 
a limit or defect1 until he is at the   
same time above and beyond  it4 ,living 
beings1 for example1 possess the        
privilege of pain which  is denied to   
the inanimate3 even with living beings1 
a single mode or  quality passes into   
the feeling of a negative4 ,for living  
beings as  such possess within them a   
universal vitality1 which overpasses and
  includes the single mode2 and thus1 as
 they maintain themselves in  the       
negative of themselves1 they feel the   

contradiction to exist  within them4    
,but the contradiction is within them1  
only in so far as  one and the same     
subject includes both the universality  
of their sense  of life1 and the        
individual mode which is in negation    
with it4 ,this  illustration will show  
how a limit or imperfection in knowledge
 comes  to be termed a limit or         
imperfection1 only when it is compared  
with the  actually-present ,idea of the 
universal1 of a total and perfect4 ,a   
very  little consideration might show1  
that to call a thing finite or limited  
proves by implication the very presence 
of the infinite and unlimited1  and that
 our knowledge of a limit can only be   
when the unlimited is on  this side in  
consciousness4    ,the result however of
 ,kant's view of cognition suggests a   
second  remark4 ,the philosophy of ,kant
 could have no influence on the method  
of  the sciences4 ,it leaves the        
categories and method of ordinary       
knowledge  quite unmolested4            

,occasionally1 it may be1 in the first  
sections of a  scientific work of that  
period1 we find propositions borrowed   
from the  ,kantian philosophy3 but the  
course of the treatise renders it       
apparent  that these propositions were  
superfluous decoration1 and that the few
  first pages might have been omitted   
without producing the least change  in  
the empirical contents4#b    ,we may    
next institute a comparison of ,kant    
with the metaphysics of the  empirical  
school4 ,natural plain ,empiricism1     
though it unquestionably  insists most  
upon sensuous perception1 still allows a
 super-sensible  world or spiritual     
reality1 whatever may be its structure  
and  constitution1 and whether derived  
from intellect1 or from imagination1  c4
 ,so far as form goes1 the facts of this
 super-sensible world rest on  the      
authority of mind1 in the same way as   
the other facts1 embraced  in empirical 
knowledge1 rest on the authority of     
external perception4  ,but when         

,empiricism becomes reflective and      
logically consistent1 it  turns its arms
 against this dualism in the ultimate   
and highest species  of fact2 it denies 
the independence of the thinking        
principle and of  a spiritual world     
which developes itself in thought4      
,materialism or  ,naturalism1 therefore1
 is the consistent and thorough-going   
system  of ,empiricism4 ,in direct      
opposition to such an ,empiricism1 ,kant
  asserts the principle of thought and  
freedom1 and attaches himself  to the   
first-mentioned form of empirical       
doctrine1 the general  principles of    
which he never departed from4 ,there is 
a dualism in  his philosophy also4 ,on  
one side stands the world of sensation1 
and  of the understanding which reflects
 upon it4 ,this world1 it is true1  he  
alleges to be a world of appearances4   
,but that is only a title  or formal    
description2 for the source1 the facts1 
and the modes of  observation continue  
quite the same as in ,empiricism4 ,on   

the other side  and independent stands a
 self-apprehending thought1 the         
principle of  freedom1 which ,kant has  
in common with ordinary and bygone      
metaphysic1  but emptied of all that it 
held1 and without his being able to     
infuse  into it anything new4 ,for1 in  
the ,critical doctrine1 thought1 or1 as 
it  is there called1 ,reason1 is        
divested of every specific form1 and    
thus  bereft of all authority4 ,the main
 effect of the ,kantian philosophy has  
been to revive the consciousness of     
,reason1 or the absolute inwardness  of 
thought4 ,its abstractness indeed       
prevented that inwardness from          
developing into anything1 or from       
originating any special forms1  whether 
cognitive principles or moral laws2 but 
nevertheless it  absolutely refused to  
accept or indulge anything possessing   
the  character of an externality4       
,henceforth the principle of the        
independence of ,reason1 or of its      
absolute self-subsistence1 is made  a   

general principle of philosophy1 as well
 as a foregone conclusion of  the time4 
7#a7 ,the ,critical philosophy has one  
great negative merit4 ,it has  brought  
home the conviction that the categories 
of understanding are  finite in their   
range1 and that any cognitive process   
confined within  their pale falls short 
of the truth4 ,but ,kant had only a     
sight of  half the truth4 ,he explained 
the finite nature of the categories to  
mean that they were subjective only1    
valid only for our thought1 from  which 
the thing-in-itself was divided by an   
impassable gulf4 ,in fact1  however1 it 
is not because they are subjective1 that
 the categories are  finite3 they are   
finite by their very nature1 and it is  
on their own  selves that it is         
requisite to exhibit their finitude4    
,kant however  holds that what we think 
is false1 because it is we who think it4
 ,a  further deficiency in the system is
 that it gives only an historical       
description of thought1 and a mere      

enumeration of the factors of           
consciousness4 ,the enumeration is in   
the main correct3 but not a word        
touches upon the necessity of what is   
thus empirically colligated4 ,the       
observations1 made on the various stages
 of consciousness1 culminate  in the    
summary statement1 that the content of  
all we are acquainted  with is only an  
appearance4 ,and as it is true at least 
that all finite  thinking is concerned  
with appearances1 so far the conclusion 
is  justified4 ,this stage of           
'appearance' however--the phenomenal    
world--is  not the terminus of thought3 
there is another and a higher region4   
,but  that region was to the ,kantian   
philosophy an inaccessible 'other       
world4'    7#b7 ,after all it was only  
formally1 that the ,kantian system      
established  the principle that thought 
is spontaneous and self-determining4    
,into  details of the manner and the    
extent of this self-determination of    
thought1 ,kant never went4 ,it was      

,fichte who first noticed the omission2 
and who1 after he had called attention  
to the want of a deduction for  the     
categories1 endeavoured really to supply
 something of the kind4  ,with ,fichte1 
the ',ego' is the starting-point in the 
philosophical  development3 and the     
outcome of its action is supposed to be 
visible  in the categories4 ,but in     
,fichte the ',ego' is not really        
presented  as a free1 spontaneous       
energy2 it is supposed to receive its   
first  excitation by a shock or impulse 
from without4 ,against this shock  the  
',ego' will1 it is assumed1 react1 and  
only through this reaction  does it     
first become conscious of itself4       
,meanwhile1 the nature of  the impulse  
remains a stranger beyond our pale3 and 
the ',ego1' with  something else always 
confronting it1 is weighted with a      
condition4  ,fichte1 in consequence1    
never advanced beyond ,kant's           
conclusion1 that  the finite only is    
knowable1 while the infinite transcends 

the range  of thought4 ,what ,kant calls
 the thing-by-itself1 ,fichte calls the 
impulse from without--that abstraction  
of something else than ',i1' not        
otherwise describable or definable than 
as the negative or non-,ego in  general4
 ,the ',i' is thus looked at as standing
 in essential relation  with the not-,i1
 through which its act of               
self-determination is first  awakened4  
,and in this manner the ',i' is but the 
continuous act of  self-liberation from 
this impulse1 never gaining a real      
freedom1  because with the surcease of  
the impulse the ',i1' whose being is    
its action1 would also cease to be4 ,nor
 is the content produced by  the action 
of the ',i' at all different from the   
ordinary content of  experience1 except 
by the supplementary remark1 that this  
content is  mere appearance4        #a  
,even ,hermann's ',handbook of ,prosody'
 begins with paragraphs of  ,kantian    
philosophy4 ,in  #h it is argued that a 
law of rhythm must be  7#a7 objective1  

7a7 formal1 and 7#c7 determined  priori4
 ,with these  requirements and with the 
principles of ,causality and            
,reciprocity which  follow later1 it    
were well to compare the treatment of   
the various  measures1 upon which those 
formal principles do not exercise the   
slightest influence4    #b ,in ,kant's  
own words 7,criticism of the ,power of  
,judgment1 p4 #dbg73  ',final ,cause is 
merely a notion of our practical reason4
 ,it cannot  be deduced from any data of
 experience as a theoretical criterion  
of  nature1 nor can it be applied to    
know nature4 ,no employment of this     
notion is possible except solely for the
 practical reason1 by moral  laws4 ,the 
final purpose of the ,creation is that  
constitution of the  world which        
harmonises with that to which alone we  
can give definite  expression on        
universal principles1 viz4 the final    
purpose of our pure  practical reason1  
and with that in so far as it means to  
be practical4'          ,,chapter ,v4   

,,third ,,attitude ,,of ,,thought ,,to  
,,objectivity4      ,immediate or       
,intuitive ,knowledge4      #fa4 ,if we 
are to believe the ,critical philosophy1
 thought is  subjective1 and its        
ultimate and invincible mode is abstract
  universality or formal identity4      
,thought is thus set in opposition  to  
,truth1 which is no abstraction1 but    
concrete universality4 ,in this  highest
 mode of thought1 which is entitled     
,reason1 the ,categories  are left out  
of account4--,the extreme theory on the 
opposite side  holds thought to be an   
act of the particular only1 and on that 
ground declares it incapable of         
apprehending the ,truth4 ,this is the   
,intuitional theory4    #fb4 ,according 
to this theory1 thinking1 a private and 
particular  operation1 has its whole    
scope and product in the ,categories4   
,but1  these ,categories1 as arrested by
 the understanding1 are limited         
vehicles of thought1 forms of the       
conditioned1 of the dependent  and      

derivative4 ,a thought limited to these 
modes has no sense of  the ,infinite and
 the ,true1 and cannot bridge over the  
gulf that  separates it from them4      
7,this stricture refers to the proofs of
 ,god's  existence47 ,these inadequate  
modes or categories are also spoken of  
as  notions3 and to get a notion of an  
object therefore can only mean1  in this
 language1 to grasp it under the form of
 being conditioned and  derivative4     
,consequently1 if the object in question
 be the ,true1 the  ,infinite1 the      
,unconditioned1 we change it by our     
notions into a finite  and conditioned2 
whereby1 instead of apprehending the    
truth by thought1  we have perverted it 
into untruth4    ,such is the one simple
 line of argument advanced for the      
thesis that  the knowledge of ,god and  
of truth must be immediate1 or          
intuitive4 ,at  an earlier period all   
sort of anthropomorphic conceptions1 as 
they  are termed1 were banished from    
,god1 as being finite and therefore     

unworthy of the infinite2 and in this   
way ,god had been reduced to  a         
tolerably blank being4 ,but in those    
days the thought-forms were  in general 
not supposed to come under the head of  
anthropomorphism4  ,thought was believed
 rather to strip finitude from the      
conceptions of  the ,absolute1--in      
agreement with the above-mentioned      
conviction of all  ages1 that reflection
 is the only road to truth4 ,but now1 at
 length1  even the thought-forms are    
pronounced anthropomorphic1 and thought 
itself is described as a mere faculty of
 finitisation4    ,jacobi has stated    
this charge most distinctly in the      
seventh supplement  to his ,letters on  
,spinoza1--borrowing his line of        
argument from the  works of ,spinoza    
himself1 and applying it as a weapon    
against knowledge  in general4 ,in his  
attack knowledge is taken to mean       
knowledge of  the finite only1 a process
 of thought from one condition in a     
series  to another1 each of which is at 

once conditioning and conditioned4      
,according to such a view1 to explain   
and to get the notion of  anything1 is  
the same as to show it to be derived    
from something else4  ,whatever such    
knowledge embraces1 consequently1 is    
partial1 dependent  and finite1 while   
the infinite or true1 i4e4 ,god1 lies   
outside  of the mechanical              
inter-connexion to which knowledge is   
said to be  confined4--,it is important 
to observe that1 while ,kant makes the  
finite  nature of the ,categories       
consist mainly in the formal            
circumstance  that they are subjective1 
,jacobi discusses the ,categories in    
their  own proper character1 and        
pronounces them to be in their very     
import  finite4 ,what ,jacobi chiefly   
had before his eyes1 when he thus       
described  science1 was the brilliant   
successes of the physical or 'exact'    
sciences in ascertaining natural forces 
and laws4 ,it is certainly not  on the  
finite ground occupied by these sciences

 that we can expect to  meet the        
in-dwelling presence of the infinite4   
,lalande was right when  he said he had 
swept the whole heaven with his glass1  
and seen no ,god4  7,see note to  #fj47 
,in the field of physical science1 the  
universal1  which is the final result of
 analysis1 is only the indeterminate    
aggregate1--of the external finite1--in 
one word1 ,matter3 and ,jacobi  well    
perceived that there was no other issue 
obtainable in the way of a  mere advance
 from one explanatory clause or law to  
another4    #fc4 ,all the while the     
doctrine that truth exists for the mind 
was so  strongly maintained by ,jacobi1 
that ,reason alone is declared to be    
that  by which man lives4 ,this ,reason 
is the knowledge of ,god4 ,but1 seeing  
that derivative knowledge is restricted 
to the compass of finite facts1  ,reason
 is knowledge underivative1 or ,faith4  
,knowledge1 ,faith1 ,thought1 ,intuition
 are the categories that we meet  with  
on this line of reflection4 ,these      

terms1 as presumably familiar to  every 
one1 are only too frequently subjected  
to an arbitrary use1 under  no better   
guidance than the conceptions and       
distinctions of psychology1  without any
 investigation into their nature and    
notion1 which is the  main question     
after all4 ,thus1 we often find         
knowledge contrasted with  faith1 and   
faith at the same time explained to be  
an underivative  or intuitive           
knowledge3--so that it must be at least 
some sort of  knowledge4 ,and1 besides1 
it is unquestionably a fact of          
experience1  firstly1 that what we      
believe is in our consciousness1---which
 implies  that we know about it2 and    
secondly1 that this belief is a         
certainty  in our consciousness1--which 
implies that we know it4 ,again1 and    
especially1 we find thought opposed to  
immediate knowledge and faith1  and1 in 
particular1 to intuition4 ,but if this  
intuition be qualified  as intellectual1
 we must really mean intuition which    

thinks1 unless1  in a question about the
 nature of ,god1 we are willing to      
interpret  intellect to mean images and 
representations of imagination4 ,the    
word  faith or belief1 in the dialect of
 this system1 comes to be employed  even
 with reference to common objects that  
are present to the senses4  ,we believe1
 says ,jacobi1 that we have a body1--we 
believe in the  existence of the things 
of sense4 ,but if we are speaking of    
faith in  the ,true and ,eternal1 and   
saying that ,god is given and revealed  
to us  in immediate knowledge ,,of      
intuition1 we are concerned not with the
  things of sense1 but with objects     
special to our thinking mind1 with      
truths of inherently universal          
significance4 ,and when the individual  
',i1' or in other words personality1 is 
under discussion--not the ',i' of       
experience1 or a single private         
person--above all1 when the personality 
of ,god is before us1 we are speaking of
 personality unalloyed1--of a           

personality in its own nature universal4
 ,such personality is a thought1  and   
falls within the province of thought    
only4 ,more than this4 ,pure and  simple
 intuition is completely the same as    
pure and simple thought4  ,intuition and
 belief1 in the first instance1 denote  
the definite  conceptions we attach to  
these words in our ordinary employment  
of  them3 and to this extent they differ
 from thought in certain points  which  
nearly every one can understand4 ,but   
here they are taken in a  higher sense1 
and must be interpreted to mean a belief
 in ,god1 or an  intellectual intuition 
of ,god2 in short1 we must put aside all
 that  especially distinguishes thought 
on the one side from belief and         
intuition on the other4 ,how belief and 
intuition1 when transferred to  these   
higher regions1 differ from thought1 it 
is impossible for any one  to say4 ,and 
yet1 such are the barren distinctions of
 words1 with which  men fancy that they 
assert an important truth3 even while   

the formulae  they maintain are         
identical with those which they impugn4 
,the term ,faith brings with it the     
special advantage of suggesting  the    
faith of the ,christian religion2 it    
seems to include ,christian  faith1 or  
perhaps even to coincide with it2 and   
thus the ,philosophy of  ,faith has a   
thoroughly orthodox and ,christian look1
 on the strength of  which it takes the 
liberty of uttering its arbitrary dicta 
with greater  pretension and authority4 
,but we must not let ourselves be       
deceived by  the semblance              
surreptitiously secured by a merely     
verbal similarity4  ,the two things are 
radically distinct4 ,firstly1 the       
,christian faith  comprises in it an    
authority of the ,church3 but the faith 
of ,jacobi's  philosophy has no other   
authority than that of a personal       
revelation4  ,and1 secondly1 the        
,christian faith is a copious body of   
objective  truth1 a system of knowledge 
and doctrine3 while the scope of the    

philosophic faith is so utterly         
indefinite1 that1 while it has room for 
the faith of the ,christian1 it equally 
admits a belief in the divinity  of the 
,dalai-lama1 the ox1 or the             
monkey1--thus1 so far as it goes1       
narrowing ,deity down to its simplest   
terms1 a ',supreme ,being4' ,faith      
itself1 taken in this professedly       
philosophical sense1 is nothing but  the
 sapless abstract of immediate          
knowledge1--a purely formal category    
applicable to very different facts2 and 
it ought never to be confused  or       
identified with the spiritual fulness of
 ,christian faith1 whether we  look at  
that faith in the heart of the believer 
and the in-dwelling of  the ,holy       
,spirit1 or in the system of theological
 doctrine4    ,with what is here called 
faith or immediate knowledge must also  
be  identified inspiration1 the heart's 
revelations1 the truths implanted  in   
man by nature1 and also in particular1  
healthy reason or ,common  ,sense1 as it

 is called4 ,all these forms agree in   
adopting as their  leading principle the
 immediacy1 or self-evident way1 in     
which a fact  or body of truths is      
presented in consciousness4    #hd4     
,this immediate knowledge consists in   
knowing that the ,infinite1  the        
,eternal1 the ,god which is in our idea1
 really is3 or1 it asserts  that in our 
consciousness there is immediately and  
inseparably bound up  with this idea the
 certainty of its actual being4    ,to  
seek to controvert these maxims of      
immediate knowledge is the last  thing  
philosophers would think of4 ,they may  
rather find occasion for                
self-gratulation when these ancient     
doctrines1 expressing as they  do the   
general tenor of philosophic teaching1  
have1 even in this  unphilosophical     
fashion1 become to some extent universal
 convictions  of the age4 ,the true     
marvel rather is that any one could     
suppose that  these principles were     
opposed to philosophy1--the maxims1     

viz41 that  whatever is held to be true 
is immanent in the mind1 and that there 
is truth for the mind 7 #fc74 ,from a   
formal point of view1 there is a        
peculiar interest in the maxim that the 
being of ,god is immediately and        
inseparably bound up with the thought of
 ,god1 that objectivity is bound  up    
with the subjectivity which the thought 
originally presents4 ,not  content with 
that1 the philosophy of immediate       
knowledge goes so far in  its one-sided 
view1 as to affirm that the attribute of
 existence1 even  in perception1 is     
quite as inseparably connected with the 
conception  we have of our own bodies   
and of external things1 as it is with   
the  thought of ,god4 ,now it is the    
endeavour of philosophy to prove such  a
 unity1 to show that it lies in the very
 nature of thought and  subjectivity1 to
 be inseparable from being and          
objectivity4 ,in these  circumstances   
therefore1 philosophy1 whatever estimate
 may be formed of  the character of     

these proofs1 must in any case be glad  
to see it shown  and maintained that its
 maxims are facts of consciousness1 and 
thus  in harmony with experience4 ,the  
difference between philosophy and the   
asseverations of immediate knowledge    
rather centres in the exclusive         
attitude which immediate knowledge      
adopts1 when it sets itself up  against 
philosophy4    ,and yet it was as a     
self-evident or immediate truth that the
 ',cogito1  ergo sum1' of ,descartes1   
the maxim on which may be said to hinge 
the  whole interest of ,modern          
,philosophy1 was first stated by its    
author4  ,the man who calls this a      
syllogism1 must know little more about a
  syllogism than that the word ',ergo'  
occurs in it4 ,where shall we look  for 
the middle term8 ,and a middle term is a
 much more essential point  of a        
syllogism than the word ',ergo4' ,if we 
try to justify the name1 by  calling the
 combination of ideas in ,descartes an  
'immediate' syllogism1  this superfluous

 variety of syllogism is a mere name for
 an utterly  unmediated synthesis of    
distinct terms of thought4 ,that being  
so1 the  synthesis of being with our    
ideas1 as stated in the maxim of        
immediate  knowledge1 has no more and no
 less claim to the title of syllogism   
than  the axiom of ,descartes has4 ,from
 ,hotho's ',dissertation on the         
,cartesian  ,philosophy' 7published     
#ahbf71 ,i borrow the quotation in which
 ,descartes  himself distinctly declares
 that the maxim ',cogito1 ergo sum1' is 
no  syllogism4 ,the passages are        
,respons4 ad ,,ii ,object43 ,de ,methodo
 ,,iv3  ,ep4 ,i4 #aah4 ,from the first  
passage ,i quote the words more         
immediately  to the point4 ,descartes   
says3 ',that we are thinking beings is  
prima  quaedam notio quae ex nullo      
syllogismo concluditur' 7a certain      
primary notion1 which is deduced from no
 syllogism72 and goes on3  'neque cum   
quis dicit2 ,ego cogito1 ergo sum sive  
existo1 existentiam  ex cogitatione per 

syllogismum deducit4' 7,nor1 when one   
says1 ,i think1  therefore ,i am or     
exist1 does he deduce existence from    
thought by means  of a syllogism47      
,descartes knew what it implied in a    
syllogism1 and  so he adds that1 in     
order to make the maxim admit of a      
deduction by  syllogism1 we should have 
to add the major premiss3 ',illud omne  
quod  cogitat1 est sive existit4'       
7,everything which thinks1 is or        
exists47  ,of course1 he remarks1 this  
major premiss itself has to be deduced  
from  the original statement4    ,the   
language of ,descartes on the maxim that
 the ',i' which thinks must  also at the
 same time be1 his saying that this     
connexion is given and  implied in the  
simple perception of                    
consciousness1--that this connexion  is 
the absolute first1 the principle1 the  
most certain and evident of  all things1
 so that no scepticism can be conceived 
so monstrous as not  to admit it3--all  
this language is so vivid and distinct1 

that the  modern statements of ,jacobi  
and others on this immediate connexion  
can  only pass for needless repetitions4
    #fe4 ,the theory of which we are    
speaking is not satisfied when it has   
shown that mediate knowledge taken      
separately is an adequate vehicle  of   
truth4 ,its distinctive doctrine is that
 immediate knowledge alone1  to the     
total exclusion of mediation1 can       
possess a content which is  true4 ,this 
exclusiveness is enough to show that the
 theory is a relapse  into the          
metaphysical understanding1 with its    
pass-words ',either--or4'  ,and thus it 
is really a relapse into the habit of   
external mediation1  the gist of which  
consists in clinging to those narrow and
 one-sided  categories of the finite1   
which it falsely imagined itself to have
 left  for ever behind4 ,this point1    
however1 we shall not at present discuss
  in detail4 ,an exclusively immediate  
knowledge is asserted as a fact  only1  
and in the present ,introduction we can 

only study it from this  external point 
of view4 ,the real significance of such 
knowledge will  be explained1 when we   
come to the logical question of the     
opposition  between mediate and         
immediate4 ,but it is characteristic of 
the view  before us to decline to       
examine the nature of the fact1 that is1
 the  notion of it2 for such an         
examination would itself be a step      
towards  mediation and even towards     
knowledge4 ,the genuine discussion on   
logical  ground1 therefore1 must be     
deferred till we come to the proper     
province  of ,logic itself4    ,the     
whole of the second part of ,logic1 the 
,doctrine of ,essential ,being1  is a   
discussion of the intrinsic and         
self-affirming unity of immediacy  and  
mediation4    #ff4 ,beyond this point   
then we need not go3 immediate knowledge
 is  to be accepted as a fact4 ,under   
these circumstances examination is      
directed to the field of experience1 to 
a psychological phenomenon4 ,if  that be

 so1 we need only note1 as the commonest
 of experiences1 that  truths1 which we 
well know to be results of complicated  
and highly  mediated trains of thought1 
present themselves immediately and      
without  effort to the mind of any man  
who is familiar with the subject4 ,the  
mathematician1 like every one who has   
mastered a particular science1  meets   
any problem with ready-made solutions   
which pre-suppose most  complicated     
analyses3 and every educated man has a  
number of general  views and maxims     
which he can muster without trouble1 but
 which  can only have sprung from       
frequent reflection and long experience4
  ,the facility we attain in any sort of
 knowledge1 art1 or technical           
expertness1 consists in having the      
particular knowledge or kind of  action 
present to our mind in any case that    
occurs1 even we may say1  immediate in  
our very limbs1 in an out-going         
activity4 ,in all these  instances1     
immediacy of knowledge is so far from   

excluding mediation1  that the two      
things are linked together1--immediate  
knowledge being  actually the product   
and result of mediated knowledge4    ,it
 is no less obvious that immediate      
existence is bound up with  its         
mediation4 ,the seed and the parents are
 immediate and initial  existences in   
respect of the off-spring which they    
generate4 ,but the  seed and the        
parents1 though they exist and are      
therefore immediate1  are yet in their  
turn generated3 and the child1 without  
prejudice to  the mediation of its      
existence1 is immediate1 because it is4 
,the fact  that ,i am in ,berlin1 my    
immediate presence here1 is mediated by 
my  having made the journey hither4     
#fg4 ,one thing may be observed with    
reference to the immediate  knowledge of
 ,god1 of legal and ethical principles  
7including under  the head of immediate 
knowledge1 what is otherwise termed     
,instinct1  ,implanted or ,innate       
,ideas1 ,common ,sense1 ,natural        

,reason1 or whatever  form1 in short1 we
 give to the original spontaneity74 ,it 
is a matter  of general experience that 
education or development is required to 
bring out into consciousness what is    
therein contained4 ,it was so even  with
 the ,platonic reminiscence2 and the    
,christian rite of baptism1  although a 
sacrament1 involves the additional      
obligation of a ,christian  up-bringing4
 ,in short1 religion and morals1 however
 much they may be  faith or immediate   
knowledge1 are still on every side      
conditioned by  the mediating process   
which is termed development1 education1 
training4    ,the adherents1 no less    
than the assailants1 of the doctrine of 
,innate  ,ideas have been guilty        
throughout of the like exclusiveness and
  narrowness as is here noted4 ,they    
have drawn a hard and fast line  between
 the essential and immediate union 7as  
it may be described7 of  certain        
universal principles with the soul1 and 
another union which has  to be brought  

about in an external fashion1 and       
through the channel of  given objects   
and conceptions1 ,there is one          
objection1 borrowed from  experience1   
which was raised against the doctrine of
 ,innate ideas4 ,all  men1 it was said1 
must have these ideas2 they must have1  
for example1  the maxim of              
contradiction1 present in the           
mind1--they must be aware  of it2 for   
this maxim and others like it were      
included in the class  of ,innate ideas4
 ,the objection may be set down to      
misconception2 for  the principles in   
question1 though innate1 need not on    
that account  have the form of ideas or 
conceptions of something we are aware   
of4  ,still1 the objection completely   
meets and overthrows the crude theory   
of immediate knowledge1 which expressly 
maintains its formulae in so  far as    
they are in consciousness4--,another    
point calls for notice4 ,we  may suppose
 it admitted by the intuitive school1   
that the special case  of religious     

faith involves supplementing by a       
,christian or religious  education and  
development4 ,in that case it is acting 
capriciously when  it seeks to ignore   
this admission when speaking about      
faith1 or it  betrays a want of         
reflection not to know1 that1 if the    
necessity of  education be once         
admitted1 mediation is pronounced       
indispensable4        ,the reminiscence 
of ideas spoken of by ,plato is         
equivalent to      saying that ideas    
implicitly exist in man1 instead of     
being1 as      the ,sophists assert1 a  
foreign importation into his mind4 ,but 
to      conceive knowledge as           
reminiscence does not interfere with1 or
      set aside as useless1 the         
development of what is implicitly in    
man2--which development is another word 
for mediation4 ,the same      holds good
 of the innate ideas that we find in    
,descartes and the      ,scotch         
philosophers4 ,these ideas are only     
potential in the first      instance1   

and should be looked at as being a sort 
of mere capacity      in man4    #hh4   
,in the case of these experiences the   
appeal turns upon something  that shows 
itself bound up with immediate          
consciousness4 ,even if  this           
combination be in the first instance    
taken as an external and  empirical     
connexion1 still1 even for empirical    
observation1 the fact  of its being     
constant shows it to be essential and   
inseparable4 ,but1  again1 if this      
immediate consciousness1 as exhibited in
 experience1  be taken separately1 so   
far as it is a consciousness of ,god and
  the divine nature1 the state of mind  
which it implies is generally  described
 as an exaltation above the finite1     
above the senses1 and  above the        
instinctive desires and affections of   
the natural heart3  which exaltation    
passes over into1 and terminates in1    
faith in ,god and  a divine order4 ,it  
is apparent1 therefore1 that1 though    
faith may be an  immediate knowledge and

 certainty1 it equally implies the      
interposition  of this process as its   
antecedent and condition4    ,it has    
been already observed1 that the         
so-called proofs of the being  of ,god1 
which start from finite being1 give an  
expression to this  exaltation4 ,in that
 light they are no inventions of an     
over-subtle  reflection1 but the        
necessary and native channel in which   
the movement  of mind runs3 though it   
may be that1 in their ordinary form1    
these  proofs have not their correct and
 adequate expression4    #fi4 ,it is the
 passage 7 #fd7 from the subjective     
,idea to being which  forms the main    
concern of the doctrine of immediate    
knowledge4 ,a  primary and self-evident 
inter-connexion is declared to exist    
between  our ,idea and being4 ,yet      
precisely this central point of         
transition1  utterly irrespective of any
 connexions which show in experience1   
clearly involves a mediation4 ,and the  
mediation is of no imperfect or  unreal 

kind1 where the mediation takes place   
with and through something  external1   
but one comprehending both antecedent   
and conclusion4    #gj4 ,for1 what this 
theory asserts is that truth lies       
neither in the  ,idea as a merely       
subjective thought1 nor in mere being on
 its own  account2--that mere being per 
se1 a being that is not of the ,idea1   
is the sensible finite being of the     
world4 ,now all this only affirms1      
without demonstration1 that the ,idea   
has truth only by means of being1  and  
being has truth only by means of the    
,idea4 ,the maxim of immediate          
knowledge rejects an indefinite empty   
immediacy 7and such is abstract  being1 
or pure unity taken by itself71 and     
affirms in its stead the  unity of the  
,idea with being4 ,and it acts rightly  
in so doing4 ,but it  is stupid not to  
see that the unity of distinct terms or 
modes is not  merely a purely immediate 
unity1 i4e4 unity empty and             
indeterminate1  but that--with equal    

emphasis--the one term is shown to have 
truth only  as mediated through the     
other2--or1 if the phrase be preferred1 
that  either term is only mediated with 
truth through the other4 ,that the      
quality of mediation is involved in the 
very immediacy of intuition  is thus    
exhibited as a fact1 against which      
understanding1 conformably  to the      
fundamental maxim of immediate knowledge
 that the evidence of  consciousness is 
infallible1 can have nothing to object4 
,it is only  ordinary abstract          
understanding which takes the terms of  
mediation and  immediacy1 each by itself
 absolutely1 to represent an inflexible 
line  of distinction1 and thus draws    
upon its own head the hopeless task of  
reconciling them4 ,the difficulty1 as we
 have shown1 has no existence in  the   
fact1 and it vanishes in the speculative
 notion4    #ga4 ,the one-sidedness of  
the intuitional school has certain      
characteristics attending upon it1 which
 we shall proceed to point out  in their

 main features1 now that we have        
discussed the fundamental  principle4   
,the first of these corollaries is as   
follows4 ,since the  criterion of truth 
is found1 not in the nature of the      
content1 but in  the mere fact of       
consciousness1 every alleged truth has  
no other basis  than subjective         
certitude and the assertion that we     
discover a certain  fact in our         
consciousness4 ,what ,i discover in my  
consciousness is thus  exaggerated into 
a fact of the consciousness of all1 and 
even passed  off for the very nature of 
consciousness4    ,among the so-called  
proofs of the existence of ,god1 there  
used to stand  the consensus gentium1 to
 which appeal is made as early as       
,cicero4  ,the consensus gentium is a   
weighty authority1 and the transition is
  easy and natural1 from the            
circumstance that a certain fact is     
found  in the consciousness of every    
one1 to the conclusion that it is a     
necessary element in the very nature of 

consciousness4 ,in this category  of    
general agreement there was latent the  
deep-rooted perception1 which  does not 
escape even the least cultivated mind1  
that the consciousness  of the          
individual is at the same time          
particular and accidental4 ,yet  unless 
we examine the nature of this           
consciousness itself1 stripping  it of  
its particular and accidental elements  
and1 by the toilsome  operation of      
reflection1 disclosing the universal in 
its entirety and  purity1 it is only a  
unanimous agreement upon a given point  
that can  authorize a decent presumption
 that that point is part of the very    
nature of consciousness4 ,of course1 if 
thought insists on seeing the  necessity
 of what is presented as a fact of      
general occurrence1 the  consensus      
gentium is certainly not sufficient4    
,yet even granting the  universality of 
the fact to be a satisfactory proof1 it 
has been found  impossible to establish 
the belief in ,god on such an argument1 

because  experience shows that there are
 individuals and nations without any    
such faith4#a ,but there can be nothing 
shorter and more convenient  than to    
have the bare assertion to make1 that we
 discover a fact in  our consciousness1 
and are certain that it is true3 and to 
declare  that this certainty1 instead of
 proceeding from our particular mental  
constitution only1 belongs to the very  
nature of the mind4    #gb4 ,a second   
corollary which results from holding    
immediacy of  consciousness to be the   
criterion of truth is that all          
superstition  or idolatry is allowed to 
be truth1 and that an apology is        
prepared  for any contents of the will1 
however wrong and immoral4 ,it is       
because  he believes in them1 and not   
from the reasoning and syllogism of     
what is termed mediate knowledge1 that  
the ,hindoo finds ,god in the  cow1 the 
monkey1 the ,brahmin1 or the ,lama4 ,but
 the natural desires  and affections    
spontaneously carry and deposit their   

interests in  consciousness1 where also 
immoral aims make themselves naturally  
at  home3 the good or bad character     
would thus express the definite being   
of the will1 which would be known1 and  
that most immediately1 in the  interests
 and aims4    #gc4 ,thirdly and lastly1 
the immediate consciousness of ,god goes
 no  further than to tell us that ,he   
is3 to tell us what ,he is1 would be  an
 act of cognition1 involving mediation4 
,so that ,god as an object of  religion 
is expressly narrowed down to the       
indeterminate supersensible1  ,god in   
general3 and the significance of        
religion is reduced to a  minimum4      
,if it were really needful to win back  
and secure the bare belief that  there  
is a ,god1 or even to create it1 we     
might well wonder at the  poverty of the
 age which can see a gain in the merest 
pittance of  religious consciousness1   
and which in its church has sunk so low 
as to  worship at the altar that stood  
in ,athens long ago1 dedicated to the   

',unknown ,god4'    #gd4 ,we have still 
briefly to indicate the general nature  
of the  form of immediacy4 ,for it is   
the essential one-sidedness of the      
category1 which makes whatever comes    
under it one sided and1 for  that       
reason1 finite4 ,and1 first1 it makes   
the universal no better  than an        
abstraction external to the particulars1
 and ,god a being  without determinate  
quality4 ,but ,god can only be called a 
spirit  when ,he is known to be at once 
the beginning and end1 as well as  the  
mean1 in the process of mediation4      
,without this unification of  elements  
,he is neither concrete1 nor living1 nor
 a spirit4 ,thus the  knowledge of ,god 
as a spirit necessarily implies         
mediation4 ,the form  of immediacy1     
secondly1 invests the particular with   
the character of  independent or        
self-centred being4 ,but such predicates
 contradict the  very essence of the    
particular1--which is to be referred to 
something  else outside4 ,they thus     

invest the finite with the character of 
an  absolute4 ,but1 besides1 the form of
 immediacy is altogether abstract3  it  
has no preference for one set of        
contents more than another1  but is     
equally susceptible of all3 it may as   
well sanction what is  idolatrous and   
immoral as the reverse4 ,only when we   
discern that the  content1--the         
particular1 is not self-subsistent1 but 
derivative from  something else1 are its
 finitude and untruth shown in their    
proper  light4 ,such discernment1 where 
the content we discern carries with  it 
the ground of its dependent nature1 is a
 knowledge which involves  mediation4   
,the only content which can be held to  
be the truth is one  not mediated with  
something else1 not limited by other    
things3 or1  otherwise expressed1 it is 
one mediated by itself1 where mediation 
and  immediate reference-to-self        
coincide4 ,the understanding that       
fancies  it has got clear of finite     
knowledge1 the identity of the          

analytical  metaphysicians and the old  
'rationalists1' abruptly takes again as 
principle and criterion of truth that   
immediacy which1 as an abstract         
reference-to-self1 is the same as       
abstract identity4 ,abstract thought    
7the scientific form used by            
'reflective' metaphysic7 and abstract   
intuition 7the form used by immediate   
knowledge7 are one and the same4        
,the stereotyped opposition between the 
form of immediacy and that      of      
mediation gives to the former a halfness
 and inadequacy1 that      affects every
 content which is brought under it4     
,immediacy means1      upon the whole1  
an abstract reference-to-self1 that is1 
an abstract      identity or abstract   
universality4 ,accordingly the essential
 and      real universal1 when taken    
merely in its immediacy1 is a mere      
abstract universal2 and from this point 
of view ,god is conceived      as a     
being altogether without determinate    
quality4 ,to call ,god      spirit is in

 that case only a phrase3 for the       
consciousness and                       
self-consciousness1 which spirit        
implies1 are impossible without a       
distinguishing of it from itself and    
from something else1 i4e4      without  
mediation4    #ge4 ,it was impossible   
for us to criticise this1 the third     
attitude1  which thought has been made  
to take towards objective truth1 in any 
other mode than what is naturally       
indicated and admitted in the  doctrine 
itself4 ,the theory asserts that        
immediate knowledge is a  fact4 ,it has 
been shown to be untrue in fact to say  
that there is an  immediate knowledge1 a
 knowledge without mediation either by  
means of  something else or in itself4  
,it has also been explained to be false 
in fact to say that thought advances    
through finite and conditioned          
categories only1 which are always       
mediated by a something else1 and to    
forget that in the very act of mediation
 the mediation itself vanishes4  ,and to

 show that1 in point of fact1 there is a
 knowledge which advances  neither by   
unmixed immediacy nor by unmixed        
mediation1 we can point to  the example 
of ,logic and the whole of philosophy4  
#gf4 ,if we view the maxims of immediate
 knowledge in connexion with the        
uncritical metaphysic of the past from  
which we started1 we shall learn  from  
the comparison the reactionary nature of
 the school of ,jacobi4 ,his  doctrine  
is a return to the modern starting-point
 of this metaphysic  in the ,cartesian  
philosophy4 ,both ,jacobi and ,descartes
 maintain the  following three points3  
7#a7 ,the simple inseparability of the  
thought and being of the  thinker4      
',cogito1 ergo sum' is the same doctrine
 as that the being1  reality1 and       
existence of the ',ego' is immediately  
revealed to me  in consciousness4       
7,descartes1 in fact1 is careful to     
state that by  thought he means         
consciousness in general4 ,princip4     
,phil4 ,i4 #i47 ,this  inseparability is

 the absolutely first and most certain  
knowledge1 not  mediated or             
demonstrated4    7#b7 ,the              
inseparability of existence from the    
conception of ,god3 the  former is      
necessarily implied in the latter1 or   
the conception never  can be without the
 attribute of existence1 which is thus  
necessary and  eternal4#b    7#c7 ,the  
immediate consciousness of the existence
 of external things4  ,by this nothing  
more is meant than sense-consciousness4 
,to have such  a thing is the slightest 
of all cognitions3 and the only thing   
worth  knowing about it is that such    
immediate knowledge of the being of     
things external is error and delusion1  
that the sensible world as such  is     
altogether void of truth2 that the being
 of these external things is  accidental
 and passes away as a show2 and that    
their very nature is to  have only an   
existence which is separable from their 
essence and notion4    #gg4 ,there is   
however a distinction between the two   

points of view3    7#a7 ,the ,cartesian 
philosophy1 from these unproved         
postulates1 which  it assumes to be     
unprovable1 proceeds to wider and wider 
details of  knowledge1 and thus gave    
rise to the sciences of modern times4   
,the  modern theory 7of ,jacobi71 on the
 contrary1 7 #fb7 has come to what is   
intrinsically a most important          
conclusion that cognition1 proceeding   
as it must by finite mediations1 can    
know only the finite1 and never  embody 
the truth2 and would fain have the      
consciousness of ,god go no  further    
than the aforesaid very abstract belief 
that ,god is4#c    7#b7 ,the modern     
doctrine on the one hand makes no change
 in the  ,cartesian method of the usual 
scientific knowledge1 and conducts on   
the same plan the experimental and      
finite sciences that have sprung  from  
it4 ,but1 on the other hand1 when it    
comes to the science which  has infinity
 for its scope1 it throws aside that    
method1 and thus1  as it knows no other1

 it rejects all methods4 ,it abandons   
itself to  wild vagaries of imagination 
and assertion1 to a moral priggishness  
and sentimental arrogance1 or to a      
reckless dogmatising and lust  of       
argument1 which is loudest against      
philosophy and philosophic  doctrines4  
,philosophy of course tolerates no mere 
assertions or  conceits1 and checks the 
free play of argumentative see-saw4     
#gh4 ,we must then reject the opposition
 between an independent  immediacy in   
the contents or facts of consciousness  
and an equally  independent mediation1  
supposed incompatible with the former4  
,the  incompatibility is a mere         
assumption1 an arbitrary assertion4 ,all
 other  assumptions and postulates must 
in like manner be left behind at the    
entrance to philosophy1 whether they are
 derived from the intellect or  the     
imagination4 ,for philosophy is the     
science1 in which every such            
proposition must first be scrutinised   
and its meaning and oppositions  be     

ascertained4    ,scepticism1 made a     
negative science and systematically     
applied to all  forms of knowledge1     
might seem a suitable introduction1 as  
pointing out  the nullity of such       
assumptions4 ,but a sceptical           
introduction would  be not only an      
ungrateful but also a useless course2   
and that because  ,dialectic1 as we     
shall soon make appear1 is itself an    
essential element  of affirmative       
science4 ,scepticism1 besides1 could    
only get hold of  the finite forms as   
they were suggested by experience1      
taking them  as given1 instead of       
deducing them scientifically4 ,to       
require such  a scepticism accomplished 
is the same as to insist on science     
being  preceded by universal doubt1 or a
 total absence of presupposition4       
,strictly speaking1 in the resolve that 
wills pure thought1 this  requirement is
 accomplished by freedom which1         
abstracting from  everything1 grasps its
 pure abstraction1 the simplicity of    

thought4        #a ,in order to judge of
 the greater or less extent lo which    
,experience  shows cases of ,atheism or 
of the belief in ,god1 it is            
all-important  to know if the mere      
general conception of deity suffices1 or
 if a  more definite knowledge of ,god  
is required4 ,the ,christian world would
  certainly refuse the title of ,god to 
the idols of the ,hindoos and the       
,chinese1 to the fetiches of the        
,africans1 and even to the gods of      
,greece themselves4 ,if so1 a believer  
in these idols would not be a  believer 
in ,god4 ,if it were contended1 on the  
other hand1 that such  a belief in idols
 implies some sort of belief in ,god1 as
 the species  implies the genus1 then   
idolatry would argue not faith in an    
idol  merely1 but faith in ,god4 ,the   
,athenians took an opposite view4 ,the  
poets and philosophers who explained    
,zeus to be a cloud1 and maintained     
that there was only one ,god1 were      
treated as atheists at ,athens4    ,the 

danger in these questions lies in       
looking at what the mind may make  out  
of an object1 and not what that object  
actually and explicitly  is4 ,if we fail
 to note this distinction1 the commonest
 perceptions of  men's senses will be   
religion3 for every such perception1 and
 indeed  every act of mind1 implicitly  
contains the principle which1 when it   
is purified and developed1 rises to     
religion4 ,but to be capable of         
religion is one thing1 to have it       
another4 ,and religion yet implicit is  
only a capacity or a possibility4       
,thus in modern times1 travellers have  
found tribes 7as ,captains ,ross  and   
,parry found the ,esquimaux7 which1 as  
they tell us1 have not even  that small 
modicum of religion possessed by        
,african sorcerers1 the  gotes of       
,herodotus4 ,on the other hand1 an      
,englishman1 who spent the  first months
 of the last ,jubilee at ,rome1 says1 in
 his account of the  modern ,romans1    
that the common people are bigots1      

whilst those who can  read and write are
 atheists to a man4    ,the charge of   
,atheism is seldom heard in modern      
times3 principally  because the facts   
and the requirements of religion are    
reduced to a  minimum4 7,see  #gc47     
#b ,descartes1 ,princip4 ,phil4 ,i4 #ae3
 ,magis hoc 7ens summe perfectum        
existere7 credet1 si attendat1 nullius  
alterius rei ideam apud  se inveniri1 in
 qua eodem modo necessariam existentiam 
contineri  animadveriat2--intelliget    
illam ideam exhibere veram et           
immutabilem  naturam1 quaeque non potest
 non existere1 cum necessaria existentia
 in  ea contineatur4 7,the reader will  
be more disposed to believe that  there 
exists a being supremely perfect1 if he 
notes that in the case  of nothing else 
is there found in him an idea1 in which 
he notices  necessary existence to be   
contained in the same way4 ,he will see 
that  that idea exhibits a true and     
unchangeable nature1--a nature which    
cannot but exist1 since necessary       

existence is contained in it47 ,a       
remark which immediately follows1 and   
which sounds like mediation or          
demonstration1 does not really prejudice
 the original principle4    ,in ,spinoza
 we come upon the same statement that   
the essence or  abstract conception of  
,god implies existence4 ,the first of   
,spinoza's  definitions1 that of the    
,causa ,sui 7or ,self-,cause71 explains 
it to  be cujus essentia involvit       
existentiam1 sive id cujus natura non   
potest concipi nisi existens 7that of   
which the essence involves  existence1  
or that whose nature cannot be conceived
 except as  existing74 ,the             
inseparability of the notion from being 
is the main  point and fundamental      
hypothesis in his system4 ,but what     
notion is  thus inseparable from being8 
,not the notion of finite things1 for   
they  are so constituted as to have a   
contingent and a created existence4     
,spinoza's #aath proposition1 which     
follows with a proof that ,god exists   

necessarily1 and his #bjth1 showing that
 ,god's existence and his essence  are  
one and the same1 are really            
superfluous1 and the proof is more  in  
form than in reality4 ,to say1 that ,god
 is ,substance1 the only  ,substance1   
and that1 as ,substance is ,causa ,sui1 
,god therefore exists  necessarily1 is  
merely stating that ,god is that of     
which the notion and  the being are     
inseparable4      #c ,anselm on the     
contrary says3 ,negligentiae mihi       
videtur1 si  post-quam confirmati sumus 
in fide1 non studemus1 quod credimus1   
intelligere4 7,methinks it is           
carelessness1 if1 after we have been    
confirmed in the faith1 we do not exert 
ourselves to see the meaning  of what we
 believe47 ,tractat4 ,cur ,deus ,homo8  
,these words of ,anselm1  in connexion  
with the concrete truths of ,christian  
doctrine1 offer a  far harder problem   
for investigation1 than is contemplated 
by this  modern faith4                  
,,chapter ,,vi4      ,,logic ,,further  

,,defined ,,and ,,divided4      #gi4 ,in
 point of form ,logical doctrine has    
three sides3 77 the  ,abstract side1 or 
that of understanding3 77 the           
,dialectical1 or that  of negative      
reason3 7y7 the ,speculative1 or that of
 positive reason4    ,these three sides 
do not make three parts of logic1 but   
are stages  or 'moments' in every       
logical entity1 that is1 of every notion
 and  truth whatever4 ,they may all be  
put under the first stage1 that of      
understanding1 and so kept isolated from
 each other2 but this would  give an    
inadequate conception of them4--,the    
statement of the dividing  lines and the
 characteristic aspects of logic is at  
this point no more  than historical and 
anticipatory4    #hj4 77 ,thought1 as   
,understanding1 sticks to fixity of     
characters  and their distinctness from 
one another3 every such limited abstract
 it  treats as having a subsistence and 
being of its own4    ,in our ordinary   
usage of the term thought and even      

notion1 we often  have before our eyes  
nothing more than the operation of      
,understanding4  ,and no doubt thought  
is primarily an exercise of             
,understanding3--only  it goes further1 
and the notion is not a function of     
,understanding  merely4 ,the action of  
,understanding may be in general        
described as  investing its             
subject-matter with the form of         
universality4 ,but this  universal is an
 abstract universal3 that is to say1 its
 opposition to  the particular is so    
rigorously maintained1 that it is at the
 same  time also reduced to the         
character of a particular again4 ,in    
this  separating and abstracting        
attitude towards its objects1           
,understanding  is the reverse of       
immediate perception and sensation1     
which1 as such1  keep completely to     
their native sphere of action in the    
concrete4    ,it is by referring to this
 opposition of ,understanding to        
sensation or  feeling that we must      

explain the frequent attacks made upon  
thought  for being hard and narrow1 and 
for leading1 if consistently developed1 
to ruinous and pernicious results4 ,the 
answer to these charges1 in so  far as  
they are warranted by their facts1 is1  
that they do not touch  thinking in     
general1 certainly not the thinking of  
,reason1 but only the  exercise of      
,understanding4 ,it must be added       
however1 that the merit and  rights of  
the mere ,understanding should          
unhesitatingly be admitted4 ,and  that  
merit lies in the fact1 that apart from 
,understanding there is no  fixity or   
accuracy in the region either of theory 
or of practice4    ,thus1 in theory1    
knowledge begins by apprehending        
existing objects in  their specific     
differences4 ,in the study of nature1   
for example1 we  distinguish matters1   
forces1 genera and the like1 and        
stereotype each  in its isolation4      
,thought is here acting in its analytic 
capacity1  where its canon is identity1 

a simple reference of each attribute to 
itself4 ,it is under the guidance of the
 same identity that the process  in     
knowledge is effected from one          
scientific truth to another4 ,thus1  for
 example1 in mathematics magnitude is   
the feature which1 to the  neglect of   
any other1 determines our advance4      
,hence in geometry we  compare one      
figure with another1 so as to bring out 
their identity4  ,similarly in other    
fields of knowledge1 such as            
jurisprudence1 the  advance is primarily
 regulated by identity4 ,in it we argue 
from one  specific law or precedent to  
another3 and what is this but to proceed
  on the principle of identity8    ,but 
,understanding is as indispensable in   
practice as it is in theory4  ,character
 is an essential in conduct1 and a man  
of character is an  understanding man1  
who in that capacity has definite ends  
in view and  undeviatingly pursues them4
 ,the man who will do something great   
must  learn1 as ,goethe says1 to limit  

himself4 ,the man who1 on the contrary1 
would do everything1 really would do    
nothing1 and fails4 ,there is a  host of
 interesting things in the world3       
,spanish poetry1 chemistry1  politics1  
and music are all very interesting1 and 
if any one takes  an interest in them we
 need not find fault4 ,but for a person 
in a  given situation to accomplish     
anything1 he must stick to one definite 
point1 and not dissipate his' forces in 
many directions4 ,in every  calling1    
too1 the great thing is to pursue it    
with understanding4 ,thus  the judge    
must stick to the law1 and give his     
verdict in accordance  with1 it1        
undeterred by one motive or another1    
allowing no excuses2  and looking       
neither left nor right4 ,understanding1 
too1 is always an  element in thorough  
training4 ,the trained-intellect is not 
satisfied  with cloudy and indefinite   
impressions1 but grasps the objects in  
their  fixed character3 whereas the     
uncultivated man wavers unsettled1 and  

it  often costs a deal of trouble to    
come to an understanding with him on    
the matter under discussion1 and to     
bring him to fix his eye on the         
definite point in question4    ,it has  
been already explained that the ,logical
 principle in general1  far from being  
merely a subjective action in our minds1
 is rather the  very universal1 which as
 such is also objective4 ,this doctrine 
is  illustrated in the case of          
understanding1 the first form of logical
  truths4 ,understanding in this larger 
sense corresponds to what we call  the  
goodness of ,god1 so far as that means  
that finite things are and  subsist4 ,in
 nature1 for example1 we recognise the  
goodness of ,god in  the fact that the  
various classes or species of animals   
and plants are  provided with whatever  
they need for their preservation and    
welfare4  ,nor is man excepted1 who1    
both as an individual and as a nation1  
possesses partly in the given           
circumstances of climate1 of quality    

and products of soil1 and partly in his 
natural parts or talents1 all  that is  
required for his maintenance and        
development4 ,under this shape          
,understanding is visible in every      
department of the objective world2  and 
no object in that world can ever be     
wholly perfect which does  not give full
 satisfaction to the canons of          
understanding4 ,a state1  for example1  
is imperfect1 so long as it has not     
reached a clear  differentiation of     
orders and callings1 and so long as     
those functions  of politics and        
government1 which are different in      
principle1 have not  evolved for        
themselves special organs1 in the same  
way as we see1 for  example1 the        
developed animal organism provided with 
separate organs  for the functions of   
sensation1 motion1 digestion1 c4    ,the
 previous course of the discussion may  
serve to show1 that  understanding is   
indispensable even in those spheres and 
regions of  action which the popular    

fancy would deem furthest from it1 and  
that in  proportion as understanding1 is
 absent from them1 imperfection is the  
result4 ,this particularly holds good of
 ,art1 ,religion1 and ,philosophy4  ,in 
,art1 for example1 understanding is     
visible where the forms of  beauty1     
which differ in principle1 are kept     
distinct and exhibited in  their purity4
 ,the same thing holds good also of     
single works of art4  ,it is part of the
 beauty and perfection of a dramatic    
poem that the  characters of the several
 persons should be closely and          
faithfully  maintained1 and that the    
different aims and interests involved   
should  be plainly and decidedly        
exhibited4 ,or again1 take the province 
of  ,religion4 ,the superiority of      
,greek over ,northern mythology 7apart  
from  other differences of              
subject-matter and conception7 mainly   
consists in  this3 that in the former   
the individual gods are fashioned into  
forms  of sculpture-like distinctness of

 outline1 while in the latter the       
figures fade away vaguely and hazily    
into one another4 ,lastly comes         
,philosophy4 ,that ,philosophy never can
 get on without the understanding       
hardly calls for special remark after   
what has been said4 ,its foremost       
requirement is that every thought shall 
be grasped in its full  precision1 and  
nothing allowed to remain vague and     
indefinite4    ,it is usually added that
 understanding must not go too far4     
,which is  so far correct1 that         
understanding is not an ultimate1 but on
 the  contrary finite1 and so           
constituted that when carried to        
extremes it  veers round to its         
opposite4 ,it is the fashion of youth to
 dash about  in abstractions3 but the   
man who has learnt to know life steers  
clear  of the abstract 'either--or1' and
 keeps to the concrete4    #ha4 77 ,in  
the ,dialectical stage these finite     
characterisations or  formulae supersede
 themselves1 and pass into their        

opposites4    7#a7 ,but when the        
,dialectical principle is employed by   
the understanding  separately and       
independently1--especially as seen in   
its application  to philosophical       
theories1 ,dialectic becomes            
,scepticism2 in which the  result that  
ensues from its action is presented as a
 mere negation4    7#b7 ,it is customary
 to treat ,dialectic as an adventitious 
art1 which  for very wantonness         
introduces confusion and a mere         
semblance of  contradiction into        
definite notions4 ,and in that light1   
the semblance  is the nonentity1 while  
the true reality is supposed to belong  
to the  original dicta of understanding4
 ,often1 indeed1 ,dialectic is nothing  
more than a subjective see-saw of       
arguments pro and con1 where  the       
absence of sterling thought is disguised
 by the subtlety which  gives birth to  
such arguments4 ,but in its true and    
proper character4  ,dialectic is the    
very nature and essence of everything   

predicated by  mere understanding1--the 
law of things and of the finite as a    
whole4  ,dialectic is different from    
',reflection4' ,in the first instance1  
,reflection is that movement out beyond 
the isolated predicate of a  thing which
 gives it some reference1 and brings out
 its relativity1  while still in other  
respects leaving it its isolated        
validity4 ,but  by ,dialectic is meant  
the in-dwelling tendency outwards by    
which the  one-sidedness and limitation 
of the predicates of understanding is   
seen  in its true light1 and shown to be
 the negation of them4 ,for anything  to
 be finite is just to suppress itself   
and put itself aside4 ,thus  understood 
the ,dialectical principle constitutes  
the life and soul of  scientific        
progress1 the dynamic which alone gives 
immanent connexion  and necessity to the
 body of science2 and1 in a word1 is    
seen to  constitute the real and true1  
as opposed to the external1 exaltation  
above the finite4    7#a7 ,it is of the 

highest importance to ascertain and     
understand rightly  the nature of       
,dialectic4 ,wherever there is movement1
 wherever there is  life1 wherever      
anything is carried into effect in the  
actual world1  there ,dialectic is at   
work4 ,it is also the soul of all       
knowledge  which is truly scientific4   
,in the popular way of looking at       
things1  the refusal to be bound by the 
abstract deliverances of understanding  
appears as fairness1 which1 according to
 the proverb ,live and let  live1       
demands that each should have its turn2 
we admit the one1 but  we admit the     
other also4 ,but when we look more      
closely1 we find that  the limitations  
of the finite do not merely come from   
without2 that  its own nature is the    
cause of its abrogation1 and that by its
 own  act it passes into its            
counterpart4 ,we say1 for instance1 that
 man is  mortal1 and seem to think that 
the ground of his death is in external  
circumstances only2 so that if this way 

of looking were correct1 man  would have
 two special properties1 vitality       
and--also--mortality4 ,but  the true    
view of the matter is that life1 as     
life1 involves the germ  of death1 and  
that the finite1 being radically        
self-contradictory1  involves its own   
self-suppression4    ,nor1 again1 is    
,dialectic to be confounded with mere   
,sophistry4 ,the  essence of ,sophistry 
lies in giving authority to a partial   
and abstract  principle1 in its         
isolation1 as may suit the interest and 
particular  situation of the individual 
at the time4 ,for example1 a regard to  
my  existence1 and my having the means  
of existence1 is a vital motive  of     
conduct1 but if ,i exclusively emphasise
 this consideration or  motive of my    
welfare1 and draw the conclusion that ,i
 may steal or  betray my country1 we    
have a case of ,sophistry4 ,similarly1  
it is a  vital principle in conduct that
 ,i should be subjectively free1 that   
is to say1 that ,i should have an       

insight into what ,i am doing1 and  a   
conviction that it is right4 ,but if my 
pleading insists on this  principle     
alone ,i fall into ,sophistry1 such as  
would overthrow all the  principles of  
morality4 ,from this sort of            
party-pleading ,dialectic is  wholly    
different2 its purpose is to study      
things in their own being and  movement 
and thus to demonstrate the finitude of 
the partial categories  of              
understanding4    ,dialectic1 it may be 
added1 is no novelty in philosophy4     
,among the  ancients ,plato is termed   
the inventor of ,dialectic2 and his     
right to  the name rests on the fact1   
that the ,platonic philosophy first gave
  the free scientific1 and thus at the  
same time the objective1 form to        
,dialectic4 ,socrates1 as we should     
expect from the general character  of   
his philosophising1 has the dialectical 
element in a predominantly  subjective  
shape1 that of ,irony4 ,he used to turn 
his ,dialectic1  first against ordinary 

consciousness1 and then especially      
against  the ,sophists4 ,in his         
conversations he used to simulate the   
wish for  some clearer knowledge about  
the subject under discussion1 and after 
putting all sorts of questions with that
 intent1 he drew on those with  whom he 
conversed to the opposite of what their 
first impressions  had pronounced       
correct4 ,if1 for instance1 the         
,sophists claimed to  be teachers1      
,socrates by a series of questions      
forced the ,sophist  ,protagoras to     
confess that all learning is only       
recollection4 ,in his  more strictly    
scientific dialogues ,plato employs the 
dialectical method  to show the finitude
 of all hard and fast terms of          
understanding4  ,thus in the ,parmenides
 he deduces the many from the one1 and  
shows  nevertheless that the many cannot
 but define itself as the one4 ,in  this
 grand style did ,plato treat           
,dialectic4 ,in modern times it was1    
more than any other1 ,kant who          

resuscitated the name of ,dialectic1 and
  restored it to its post of honour4 ,he
 did it1 as we have seen 7 #dh71  by    
working out the ,antinomies of the      
reason4 ,the problem of these           
,antinomies is no mere subjective piece 
of work oscillating between  one set of 
grounds and another2 it really serves to
 show that every  abstract proposition  
of understanding1 taken precisely as it 
is given1  naturally veers round into   
its opposite4    ,however reluctant     
,understanding may be to admit the      
action of  ,dialectic1 we must not      
suppose that the recognition if its     
existence  is peculiarly confined to the
 philosopher4 ,it would be truer to say 
that ,dialectic gives expression to a   
law which is felt in all other  grades  
of consciousness1 and in general        
experience4 ,everything that  surrounds 
us may be viewed as an instance of      
,dialectic4 ,we are aware  that         
everything finite1 instead of being     
stable and ultimate1 is rather          

changeable and transient2 and this is   
exactly what we mean by that  ,dialectic
 of the finite1 by which the finite1 as 
implicitly other than  what it is1 is   
forced beyond its own immediate or      
natural being to  turn suddenly into its
 opposite4 ,we have before this 7 #hj7  
identified  ,understanding with what is 
implied in the popular idea of the      
goodness  of ,god2 we may now remark of 
,dialectic1 in the same objective       
signification1 that its principle       
answers to the idea of his power4  ,all 
things1 we say1--that is1 the finite    
world as such1--are doomed2  and in     
saying so1 we have a vision of          
,dialectic as the universal and         
irresistible power before which nothing 
can stay1 however secure and  stable it 
may deem itself4 ,the category of power 
does not1 it is true1  exhaust the depth
 of the divine nature or the notion of  
,god2 but it  certainly forms a vital   
element in all religious consciousness4 
,apart from this general objectivity of 

,dialectic1 we find traces of its       
presence in each of the particular      
provinces and phases of the natural  and
 the spiritual world4 ,take as an       
illustration the motion of the  heavenly
 bodies4 ,at this moment the planet     
stands in this spot1 but  implicitly it 
is the possibility of being in another  
spot2 and that  possibility of being    
otherwise the planet brings into        
existence by  moving4 ,similarly the    
'physical' elements prove to be         
,dialectical4 ,the  process of          
meteorological action is the exhibition 
of their ,dialectic4  ,it is the same   
dynamic that lies at the root of every  
other natural  process1 and1 as it were1
 forces nature out of itself4 ,to       
illustrate  the presence of ,dialectic  
in the spiritual world1 especially in   
the  provinces of law and morality1 we  
have only to recollect how general      
experience shows us the extreme of one  
state or action suddenly  shifting into 
its opposite3 a ,dialectic which is     

recognised in many  ways in common      
proverbs4 ,thus summum jus summa        
injuria3 which means1  that to drive an 
abstract right to its extremity is to do
 a wrong4  ,in political life1 as every 
one knows1 extreme anarchy and extreme  
despotism naturally lead to one another4
 ,the perception of ,dialectic  in the  
province of individual ,ethics is seen  
in the well-known adages1  ,pride comes 
before a fall3 ,too much wit outwits    
itself4 ,even feeling1  bodily as well  
as mental1 has its ,dialectic4 ,every   
one knows how  the extremes of pain and 
pleasure pass into each other3 the heart
  overflowing with joy seeks relief in  
tears1 and the deepest melancholy  will 
at times betray its presence by a smile4
    7#b7 ,scepticism should not be      
looked upon merely as a doctrine of     
doubt4  ,it would be more correct to say
 that the ,sceptic has no doubt of his  
point1 which is the nothingness of all  
finite existence4 ,he who only  doubts  
still clings to the hope that his doubt 

may be resolved1 and  that one or other 
of the definite views1 between which he 
wavers1  will turn out solid and true4  
,scepticism properly so called is a     
very different thing3 it is complete    
hopelessness about all which            
understanding counts stable1 and the    
feeling to which it gives birth  is one 
of unbroken calmness and inward repose4 
,such at least is the  noble ,scepticism
 of antiquity1 especially as exhibited  
in the writings  of ,sextus ,empiricus1 
when in the later times of ,rome it had 
been  systematised as a complement to   
the dogmatic systems of ,stoic and      
,epicurean4 ,of far other stamp1 and to 
be strictly distinguished from  it1 is  
the modern ,scepticism already mentioned
  7#ci71 which partly  preceded the     
,critical ,philosophy1 and partly sprung
 out of it4 ,that  later ,scepticism    
consisted solely in denying the truth   
and certitude  of the super-sensible1   
and in pointing to the facts of sense   
and of  immediate sensations as what we 

have to keep to4    ,even to this day   
,scepticism is often spoken of as the   
irresistible  enemy of all positive     
knowledge1 and hence of philosophy1 in  
so far  as philosophy is concerned with 
positive knowledge4 ,but in these       
statements there is a misconception4 ,it
 is only the finite thought  of abstract
 understanding which has to fear        
,scepticism1 because  unable to         
withstand it3 philosophy includes the   
sceptical principle  as a subordinate   
function of its own1 in the shape of    
,dialectic4 ,in  contradistinction to   
mere ,scepticism1 however1 philosophy   
does not  remain content with the purely
 negative result of ,dialectic4 ,the    
sceptic mistakes the true value of his  
result1 when he supposes it to  be no   
more than a negation pure and simple4   
,for the negative1 which  emerges as the
 result of dialectic1 is1 because a     
result1 at the same  time the positive3 
it contains what it results from1       
absorbed into  itself1 and made part of 

its own nature4 ,thus conceived1        
however1 the  dialectical stage has the 
features characterising the third grade 
of  logical truth1 the speculative form1
 or form of positive reason4    #hb4 7y7
 ,the ,speculative stage1 or stage of   
,positive ,reason1  apprehends the unity
 of terms 7propositions7 in their       
opposition1--the  affirmative1 which is 
involved in their disintegration and in 
their  transition4    7#a7 ,the result  
of ,dialectic is positive1 because it   
has a definite  content1 or because its 
result is not empty and abstract        
nothing1 but  the negation of certain   
specific propositions which are         
contained in  the result1--for the very 
reason that it is a resultant and not an
  immediate nothing4 7#b7 ,it follows   
from this that the 'reasonable'  result1
 though it be only a thought and        
abstract1 is still a concrete1  being   
not a plain formal unity1 but a unity of
 distinct propositions4  ,bare          
abstractions or formal thoughts are     

therefore no business of  philosophy1   
which has to deal only with concrete    
thoughts4 7#c7 ,the  logic of mere      
,understanding is involved in           
,speculative logic1 and  can at will be 
elicited from it1 by the simple process 
of omitting  the dialectical and        
'reasonable' element4 ,when that is     
done1 it  becomes what the common logic 
is1 a descriptive collection of sundry  
thought-forms and rules which1 finite   
though they are1 are taken to be        
something infinite4    ,if we consider  
only what it contains1 and not how it   
contains it1  the true reason-world1 so 
far from being the exclusive property of
  philosophy1 is the right of every     
human being on whatever grade of        
culture or mental growth he may stand2  
which would justify man's  ancient title
 of rational being4 ,the general mode by
 which experience  first makes us aware 
of the reasonable order of things is by 
accepted  and unreasoned belief2 and the
 character of the rational1 as already  

noted 7 #de71 is to be unconditioned1   
and thus to be self-contained1          
self-determining4 ,in this sense man    
above all things becomes aware of  the  
reasonable order1 when he knows of ,god1
 and knows ,him to be the  completely   
self-determined4 ,similarly1 the        
consciousness a citizen has  of his     
country and its laws is a perception of 
the reason-world1 so  long as he looks  
up to them as unconditioned and likewise
 universal  powers1 to which he must    
subject his individual will4 ,and in the
 same  sense1 the knowledge and will of 
the child is rational1 when he knows    
his parents' will1 and wills it4        
,now1 to turn these rational 7of course 
positively-rational7 realities  into    
speculative principles1 the only thing  
needed is that they be  thought4 ,the   
expression ',speculation' in common life
 is often used  with a very vague and at
 the same time secondary sense1 as when 
we  speak of a matrimonial or a         
commercial speculation4 ,by this we only

  mean two things3 first1 that what is  
immediately at hand has to be  passed   
and left behind2 and secondly1 that the 
subject-matter of such  speculations1   
though in the first place only          
subjective1 must not  remain so1 but be 
realised or translated into objectivity4
    ,what was some time ago remarked    
respecting the ,idea1 may be applied  to
 this common usage of the term          
'speculation'3 and we may add that      
people who rank themselves amongst the  
educated expressly speak of  speculation
 even as if it were something purely    
subjective4 ,a certain  theory of some  
conditions and circumstances of nature  
or mind may be1  say these people1 very 
fine and correct as a matter of         
speculation1  but it contradicts        
experience and nothing of the sort is   
admissible in  reality4 ,to this the    
answer is1 that the speculative is in   
its true  signification1 neither        
preliminarily nor even definitively1    
something  merely subjective3 that1 on  

the contrary1 it expressly rises above  
such oppositions as that between        
subjective and objective1 which the     
understanding cannot get over1 and      
absorbing them in itself1 evinces  its  
own concrete and all-embracing nature4  
,a one-sided proposition  therefore can 
never even give expression to a         
speculative truth4 ,if  we say1 for     
example1 that the absolute is the unity 
of subjective and  objective1 we are    
undoubtedly in the right1 but so far    
one-sided1 as we  enunciate the unity   
only and lay the accent upon it1        
forgetting that in  reality the         
subjective and objective are not merely 
identical but also  distinct4           
,speculative truth1 it may also be      
noted1 means very much the same as      
what1 in special connexion with         
religious experience and doctrines1     
used to be called ,mysticism4 ,the term 
,mysticism is at present used1  as a    
rule1 to designate what is mysterious   
and incomprehensible3 and  in proportion

 as their general culture and way of    
thinking vary1 the  epithet is applied  
by one class to denote the real and the 
true1 by  another to name everything    
connected with superstition and         
deception4  ,on which we first of all   
remark that there is mystery in the     
mystical1  only however for the         
understanding which is ruled by the     
principle  of abstract identity2 whereas
 the mystical1 as synonymous with the   
speculative1 is the concrete unity of   
those propositions1 which  understanding
 only accepts in their separation and   
opposition4 ,and if  those who recognise
 ,mysticism as the highest truth are    
content to leave  it in its original    
utter mystery1 their conduct only proves
 that for  them too1 as well as for     
their antagonists1 thinking means       
abstract  identification1 and that in   
their opinion1 therefore1 truth can only
 be  won by renouncing thought1 or as it
 is frequently expressed1 by leading    
the reason captive4 ,but1 as we have    

seen1 the abstract thinking of          
understanding is so far from being      
either ultimate or stable1 that it      
shows a perpetual tendency to work its  
own dissolution and swing round  into   
its opposite4 ,reasonableness1 on the   
contrary1 just1 consists in  embracing  
within itself these opposites as        
unsubstantial elements4 ,thus  the      
reason-world may be equally styled      
mystical1--not however because  thought 
cannot both reach and comprehend it1 but
 merely because it lies  beyond the     
compass of understanding4    #hc4 ,logic
 is subdivided into three parts3--      
,i4 ,the ,doctrine of ,being3    ,,ii4  
,the ,doctrine of ,essence3    ,,iii4   
,the ,doctrine of ,notion and ,idea4    
,that is1 into the ,theory of ,thought3 
,i4 ,in its immediacy3 the notion       
implicit and in germ4    ,,ii4 ,in its  
reflection and mediation3 the           
being-for-self and show of the  notion4 
,,iii4 ,in its return into itself1 and  
its developed abiding by itself3  the   

notion in and for itself4    ,the       
division of ,logic now given1 as well as
 the whole of the previous  discussion  
on the nature of thought1 is            
anticipatory3 and the  justification1 or
 proof of it1 can only result from the  
detailed  treatment of thought itself4  
,for in philosophy1 to prove means to   
show how the subject by and from itself 
makes itself what it is4 ,the  relation 
in which these three leading grades of  
thought1 or of the  logical ,idea1 stand
 to each other must be conceived as     
follows4 ,truth  comes only with the    
notion3 or1 more precisely1 the notion  
is the  truth of being and essence1 both
 of which1 when separately maintained   
in their isolation1 cannot but be       
untrue1 the former because it is        
exclusively immediate1 and the latter   
because it is exclusively  mediate4 ,why
 then1 it may be asked1 begin with the  
false and not at  once with the true8   
,to which we answer that truth1 to      
deserve the name1  must authenticate its

 own truth3 which authentication1 here  
within the  sphere of logic1 is given1  
when the notion demonstrates itself to  
be  what is mediated by and with itself1
 and thus at the same time to be  truly 
immediate4 ,this relation between the   
three stages of the logical  ,idea      
appears in a real and concrete shape    
thus3 ,god1 who is the truth1  is known 
by us in ,his truth1 that is1 as        
absolute spirit1 only in so  far as we  
at the same time recognise that the     
world which ,he created1  nature and the
 finite spirit1 are1 in their difference
 from ,god1  untrue4          ,,chapter 
,,vii4      ,,first ,,sub-,,division    
,,of ,,logic4      ,,the ,,doctrine ,,of
 ,,being4      #hd4 ,being is the notion
 implicit only3 its special forms have  
the  predicate 'is'2 when they are      
distinguished they are each of them an  
'other'3 and the shape which dialectic  
takes in them1 i4e4 their  further      
specialisation1 is a passing over into  
another4 ,this further  determination1  

or specialisation1 is at once a         
forth-putting and in  that way a        
disengaging of the notion implicit in   
being2 and at the  same time the        
withdrawing of being inwards1 its       
sinking deeper into  itself4 ,thus the  
explication of the notion in the sphere 
of being does  two things3 it brings out
 the totality of being1 and it abolishes
 the  immediacy of being1 or the form of
 being as such4    #he4 ,being itself   
and the special sub-categories of it    
which  follow1 as well as those of logic
 in general1 may be looked upon as      
definitions of the ,absolute1 or        
metaphysical definitions of ,god3 at    
least the first and third category in   
every triad may1--the first1  where the 
thought-form of the triad is formulated 
in its simplicity1  and the third1 being
 the return from differentiation to a   
simple  self-reference4 ,for a          
metaphysical definition of ,god is the  
expression  of ,his nature in thoughts  
as such3 and logic embraces all thoughts

 so  long as they continue in the       
thought-form4 ,the second sub-category  
in  each triad1 where the grade of      
thought is in its differentiation1      
gives1 on the other hand1 a definition  
of the finite4 ,the objection to  the   
form of definition is that it implies a 
something in the mind's eye  on which   
these predicates may fasten4 ,thus even 
the ,absolute 7though  it purports to   
express ,god in the style and character 
of thought7 in  comparison with its     
predicate 7which really and distinctly  
expresses  in thought what the subject  
does not71 is as yet only an inchoate   
pretended thought--the indeterminate    
subject of predicates yet to  come4 ,the
 thought1 which is here the matter of   
sole importance1 is  contained only in  
the predicate3 and hence the            
propositional form1 like  the said      
subject1 viz4 the ,absolute1 is a mere  
superfluity 7cf4  #ca1  and below1 on   
the ,judgment74    ,each of the three   
spheres of the logical idea proves to be

 a systematic  whole of thought-terms1  
and a phase of the ,absolute4 ,this is  
the case  with ,being1 containing the   
three grades of quality1 quantity1 and  
measure4 ,quality is1 in the first      
place1 the character identical with     
being3 so identical1 that a thing ceases
 to be what it is1 if it loses  its     
quality4 ,quantity1 on the contrary1 is 
the character external  to being1 and   
does not affect the being at all4 ,thus 
e4g4 a house  remains what it is1       
whether it be greater or smaller2 and   
red remains  red1 whether it be brighter
 or darker4 ,measure1 the third grade of
  being1 which is the unity of the first
 two1 is a qualitative quantity4  ,all  
things have their measure3 i4e4 the     
quantitative terms of their  existence1 
their being so or so great1 does not    
matter within certain  limits2 but when 
these limits are exceeded by an         
additional more or  less1 the things    
cease to be what they were4 ,from       
measure follows the  advance to the     

second sub-division of the idea1        
,essence4    ,the three forms of being  
here mentioned1 just because they are   
the  first1 are also the poorest1 i4e4  
the most abstract4 ,immediate           
7sensible7 consciousness1 in so far as  
it simultaneously includes  an          
intellectual element1 is especially     
restricted to the abstract  categories  
of quality and quantity4 ,the sensuous  
consciousness is in  ordinary estimation
 the most concrete and thus also the    
richest2 but  that is only true as      
regards materials1 whereas1 in reference
 to the  thought it contains1 it is     
really the poorest and most abstract4   
,a4--,,quality4    7a7 ,being4    #hf4  
,pure ,being makes the beginning3       
because it is on one hand pure  thought1
 and on the other immediacy itself1     
simple and indeterminate2  and the first
 beginning cannot be mediated by        
anything1 or be further  determined4    
,all doubts and admonitions1 which might
 be brought against beginning  the      

science with abstract empty being1 will 
disappear1 if we only  perceive what a  
beginning naturally implies4 ,it is     
possible to define  being as ',i  ,i1'  
as ',absolute ,indifference' or         
,identity1 and so on4  ,where it is felt
 necessary to begin either with what is 
absolutely  certain1 i4e4 the certainty 
of oneself1 or with a definition or     
intuition of the absolute truth1 these  
and other forms of the kind  may be     
looked on as if they must be the first4 
,but each of these  forms contains a    
mediation1 and hence cannot be the real 
first3 for  all mediation implies       
advance made from a first on to a       
second1 and  proceeding from something  
different4 ,if ,i  ,i1 or even the      
intellectual  intuition1 are really     
taken to mean no more than the first1   
they are in  this mere immediacy        
identical with being3 while conversely1 
pure being1  if abstract no longer1 but 
including in it mediation1 is pure      
thought  or intuition4    ,if we        

enunciate ,being as a predicate of the  
,absolute1 we get the first  definition 
of the latter4 ,the ,absolute is ,being4
 ,this is 7in thought7  the absolutely  
initial definition1 the most abstract   
and stinted4  ,it is the definition     
given by the ,eleatics1 but at the same 
time is  also the well-known definition 
of ,god as the sum of all realities4 ,it
  means1 in short1 that we are to set   
aside that limitation which is in  every
 reality1 so that ,god shall be only the
 real in all reality1 the  superlatively
 real4 ,or1 if we reject reality1 as    
implying a reflection1  we get a more   
immediate or unreflected statement of   
the same thing1  when ,jacobi says that 
the ,god of ,spinoza is the principium  
of being  in all existence4    7#a7     
,when thinking is to begin1 we have     
nothing but thought in its  merest      
indeterminateness3 for we cannot        
determine unless there is  both one and 
another2 and in the beginning there is  
yet no other4 ,the  indeterminate1 as we

 here have it1 is the blank we begin    
with1 not a  featurelessness reached by 
abstraction1 not the elimination of all 
character1 but the original             
featurelessness which precedes all      
definite  character and is the very     
first of all4 ,and this we call ,being4 
,it is  not to be felt1 or perceived by 
sense1 or pictured in imagination3  it  
is only and merely thought1 and as such 
it forms the beginning4  ,essence also  
is indeterminate1 but in another sense3 
it has traversed  the process of        
mediation and contains implicit the     
determination it has  absorbed4    7#b7 
,in the history of philosophy the       
different stages of the logical  ,idea  
assume the shape of successive systems1 
each based on a particular  definition  
of the ,absolute4 ,as the logical ,idea 
is seen to unfold  itself in a process  
from the abstract to the concrete1 so in
 the  history of philosophy the earliest
 systems are the most abstract1 and     
thus at the same time the poorest4 ,the 

relation too of the earlier  to the     
later2 systems of philosophy is much    
like the relation of the  corresponding 
stages of the logical ,idea3 in other   
words1 the earlier  are preserved in the
 later2 but subordinated and submerged4 
,this is  the true meaning of a much    
misunderstood phenomenon in the history 
of  philosophy--the refutation of one   
system by another1 of an earlier by  a  
later4 ,most commonly the refutation is 
taken in a purely negative  sense to    
mean that the system refuted has ceased 
to count for anything1  has been set    
aside and done for4 ,were it so1 the    
history of philosophy  would be of all  
studies most saddening1 displaying1 as  
it does1  the refutation of every system
 which time has brought forth4 ,now1    
although it may be admitted that every  
philosophy has been refuted1  it must be
 in an equal degree maintained1 that no 
philosophy has been  refuted1 nay1 or   
can be refuted4 ,and that in two ways4  
,for first1  every philosophy that      

deserves the name always embodies the   
,idea3 and  secondly1 every system      
represents one particular factor or     
particular  stage in the evolution of   
the ,idea4 ,the refutation of a         
philosophy1  therefore1 only means that 
its barriers are crossed1 and its       
special  principle reduced to a factor  
in the completer principle that follows4
  ,thus the history of philosophy1 in   
its true meaning1 deals not with a      
past1 but with an eternal and veritable 
present3 and1 in its results1  resembles
 not a museum of the aberrations of the 
human intellect1  but a ,pantheon of    
,godlike figures4 ,these figures of     
,gods are the  various stages of the    
,idea1 as they come forward one after   
another in  dialectical development4 ,to
 the historian of philosophy it belongs 
to  point out more precisely1 how far   
the gradual evolution of his theme      
coincides with1 or swerves from1 the    
dialectical unfolding of the pure       
logical ,idea4 ,it is sufficient to     

mention here1 that logic begins  where  
the proper history of philosophy begins4
 ,philosophy began in the  ,eleatic     
school1 especially with ,parmenides4    
,parmenides1 who conceives  the absolute
 as ,being1 says that ',being alone is  
and ,nothing is not4'  ,such was the    
true starting-point of philosophy1 which
 is always  knowledge by thought3 and   
here for the first time we find pure    
thought  seized and made an object to   
itself4    ,men indeed thought from the 
beginning3 7for thus only were they     
distinguished from the animals74 ,but   
thousands of years had to elapse  before
 they came to apprehend thought in its  
purity1 and to see in it  the truly     
objective4 ,the ,eleatics are celebrated
 as daring thinkers4  ,but this nominal 
admiration is often accompanied by the  
remark that  they went too far1 when    
they made ,being alone true1 and denied 
the  truth of every other object of     
consciousness4 ,we must go further than 
mere ,being1 it is true3 and yet it is  

absurd to speak of the other  contents  
of our consciousness as somewhat as it  
were outside and beside  ,being1 or to  
say that there are other things1 as well
 as ,being4 ,the  true state of the case
 is rather as follows4 ,being1 as       
,being1 is  nothing fixed or ultimate3  
it yields to dialectic and sinks into   
its  opposite1 which1 also taken        
immediately1 is ,nothing4 ,after all1   
the  point is1 that ,being is the first 
pure ,thought2 whatever else you may    
begin with 7the ,i  ,i1 the absolute    
indifference1 or ,god ,himself71  you   
begin with a figure of materialised     
conception1 not a product of  thought2  
and that1 so far as its thought content 
is concerned1 such  beginning is merely 
,being4    #hg4 ,but this mere ,being1  
as it is mere abstraction1 is therefore 
the  absolutely negative3 which1 in a   
similarly immediate aspect1 is just     
,nothing4    7#a7 ,hence was derived the
 second definition of the ,absolute2 the
  ,absolute is the ,nought4 ,in fact    

this definition is implied in saying    
that the thing-in-itself is the         
indeterminate1 utterly without form  and
 so without content1--or in saying that 
,god is only the supreme  ,being and    
nothing more2 for this is really        
declaring ,him to be the same           
negativity as above4 ,the ,nothing which
 the ,buddhists make the universal      
principle1 as well as the final aim and 
goal of everything1 is the same         
abstraction4    7#b7 ,if the opposition 
in thought is stated in this immediacy  
as ,being  and ,nothing1 the shock of   
its nullity is too great not to         
stimulate  the attempt to fix ,being and
 secure it against the transition into  
,nothing4 ,with this intent1 reflection 
has recourse to the plan of  discovering
 some fixed predicate for ,being1 to    
mark it off from  ,nothing4 ,thus we    
find ,being identified with what        
persists amid all  change1 with matter1 
susceptible of innumerable              
determinations1--or  even1              

unreflectingly1 with a single existence1
 any chance object of  the senses or of 
the mind4 ,but every additional and more
 concrete  characterisation causes      
,being to lose that integrity and       
simplicity it  has in the beginning4    
,only in1 and by virtue of1 this mere   
generality  is it ,nothing1 something   
inexpressible1 whereof the distinction  
from  ,nothing is a mere intention or   
meaning4    ,all that is wanted is to   
realise that these beginnings are       
nothing but  these empty abstractions1  
one as empty as the other4 ,the instinct
 that  induces us to attach a settled   
import to ,being1 or to both1 is the    
very  necessity which leads to the      
onward movement of ,being and ,nothing1 
and gives them a true or concrete       
significance4 ,this advance is the      
logical deduction and the movement of   
thought exhibited in the sequel4  ,the  
reflection which finds a profounder     
connotation for ,being and  ,nothing is 
nothing but logical thought1 through    

which such connotation  is evolved1 not1
 however1 in an accidental1 but a       
necessary way4 ,every  signification1   
therefore1 in which they afterwards     
appear1 is only a  more precise         
specification and truer definition of   
the ,absolute4 ,and  when that is done1 
the mere abstract ,being and ,nothing   
are replaced  by a concrete in which    
both these elements form an organic     
part4--,the  supreme form of ,nought as 
a separate principle would be ,freedom3 
but  ,freedom is negativity in that     
stage1 when it sinks self-absorbed to   
supreme intensity1 and is itself an     
affirmation1 and even absolute          
affirmation4    ,the distinction between
 ,being and ,nought is1 in the first    
place1  only implicit1 and not yet      
actually made3 they only ought to be    
distinguished4 ,a distinction of course 
implies two things1 and that one  of    
them possesses an attribute which is not
 found in the other4 ,being  however is 
an absolute absence of attributes1 and  

so is ,nought4 ,hence  the distinction  
between the two is only meant to be2 it 
is a quite  nominal distinction1 which  
is at the same time no distinction4 ,in 
all  other cases of difference there is 
some common point which comprehends     
both things4 ,suppose e4g4 we speak of  
two different species3 the  genus forms 
a common ground for both4 ,but in the   
case of mere ,being and  ,nothing1      
distinction is without a bottom to stand
 upon3 hence there can  be no           
distinction1 both determinations being  
the same bottomlessness4  ,if it be     
replied that ,being and ,nothing are    
both of them thoughts1 so  that thought 
may be reckoned common ground1 the      
objector forgets that  ,being is not a  
particular or definite thought1 and     
hence1 being quite  indeterminate1 is a 
thought not to be distinguished from    
,nothing4--,it  is natural too for us to
 represent ,being as absolute riches1   
and  ,nothing as absolute poverty4 ,but 
if when we view the whole world we  can 

only say that everything is1 and nothing
 more1 we are neglecting  all speciality
 and1 instead of absolute plenitude1 we 
have absolute  emptiness4 ,the same     
stricture is applicable to those who    
define ,god  to be mere ,being2 a       
definition not a whit better than that  
of the  ,buddhists1 who make ,god to be 
,nought1 and who from that principle    
draw  the further conclusion that       
self-annihilation is the means by which 
man  becomes ,god4    #hh4 ,nothing1 if 
it be thus immediate and equal to       
itself1 is also  conversely the same as 
,being is4 ,the truth of ,being and of  
,nothing is  accordingly the unity of   
the two3 and this unity is ,becoming4   
7#a7 ,the proposition that ,being and   
,nothing is the same seems so           
paradoxical to the imagination or       
understanding1 that it is perhaps  taken
 for a joke4 ,and indeed it is one of   
the hardest things thought  expects     
itself to do3 for ,being and ,nothing   
exhibit the fundamental  contrast in all

 its immediacy1--that is1 without the   
one term being  invested with any       
attribute which would involve its       
connexion with  the other4 ,this        
attribute however1 as the above         
paragraph points out1  is implicit in   
them--the attribute which is just the   
same in both4 ,so  far the deduction of 
their unity is completely analytical3   
indeed the  whole progress of           
philosophising in every case1 if it be a
 methodical1  that is to say a          
necessary1 progress1 merely renders     
explicit what  is implicit in a         
notion4--,it is as correct however to   
say that ,being  and ,nothing are       
altogether different1 as to assert their
 unity4 ,the  one is not what the other 
is4 ,but since the distinction has not  
at  this point assumed definite shape   
7,being and ,nothing are still the      
immediate71 it is1 in the way that they 
have it1 something unutterable1  which  
we merely mean4    7#b7 ,no great       
expenditure of wit is needed to make fun

 of the maxim that  ,being and ,nothing 
are the same1 or rather to adduce       
absurdities which1  it is erroneously   
asserted1 are the consequences and      
illustrations of  that maxim4    ,if    
,being and ,nought are identical1 say   
these objectors1 it follows that  it    
makes no difference whether my home1 my 
property1 the air ,i breathe1  this     
city1 the sun1 the law1 mind1 ,god1 are 
or are not4 ,now in some of  these      
cases1 the objectors foist in private   
aims1 the utility a thing  has for me1  
and then ask1 whether it be all the same
 to me if the  thing exist and if it do 
not4 ,for that matter indeed1 the       
teaching of  philosophy is precisely    
what frees man from the endless crowd of
 finite  aims and intentions1 by making 
him so insensible to them1 that their   
existence or non-existence is to him a  
matter of indifference4 ,but it  is     
never to be forgotten that1 once mention
 something substantial1 and  you thereby
 create a connexion with other          

existences and other purposes  which are
 ex hypothesi worth having3 and on such 
hypothesis it comes  to depend whether  
the ,being and not-,being of a          
determinate subject are  the same or    
not4 ,a substantial distinction is in   
these cases secretly  substituted for   
the empty distinction of ,being and     
,nought4 ,in others  of the cases       
referred to1 it is virtually absolute   
existences and  vital ideas and aims1   
which are placed under the mere category
 of  ,being or not-,being4 ,but there is
 more to be said of these concrete      
objects1 than that they merely are or   
are not4 ,barren abstractions1  like    
,being and ,nothing--the initial        
categories which1 for that reason1  are 
the scantiest anywhere to be found--are 
utterly inadequate to  the nature of    
these objects4 ,substantial truth is    
something far  above these abstractions 
and their oppositions4--,and always when
 a  concrete existence is disguised     
under the name of ,being and not-,being1

  empty-headedness makes its usual      
mistake of speaking about1 and having   
in the mind an image of1 something else 
than what is in question3 and  in this  
place the question is about abstract    
,being and ,nothing4    7#c7 ,it may    
perhaps be said that nobody can form a  
notion of the  unity of ,being and      
,nought4 ,as for that1 the notion of the
 unity is  stated in the sections       
preceding1 and that is all3 apprehend   
that1  and you have comprehended this   
unity4 ,what the objector really means  
by comprehension--by a notion--is more  
than his language properly  implies3 he 
wants a richer and more complex state of
 mind1 a pictorial  conception which    
will propound the notion as a concrete  
case and one  more familiar to the      
ordinary operations of thought4 ,and so 
long as  incomprehensibility means only 
the want of habituation for the effort  
needed to grasp an abstract thought1    
free from all sensuous admixture1  and  
to seize a speculative truth1 the reply 

to the criticism is1 that  philosophical
 knowledge is undoubtedly distinct in   
kind from the  mode of knowledge best   
known in common life1 as well as from   
that  which reigns in the other         
sciences4 ,but if to have no notion     
merely  means that we cannot represent  
in imagination the oneness of ,being    
and ,nought1 the statement is far from  
being true2 for every one has  countless
 ways of envisaging this unity4 ,to say 
that we have no such  conception can    
only mean1 that in none of these images 
do we recognise  the notion in question1
 and that we are not aware that they    
exemplify  it4 ,the readiest example of 
it is ,becoming42 ,every one has a      
mental  idea of ,becoming1 and will even
 allow that it is one idea3 he will     
further allow that1 when it is analysed1
 it involves the attribute  of ,being1  
and also what is the very reverse of    
,being1 viz4 ,nothing3  and that these  
two attributes lie undivided in the one 
idea3 so that  ,becoming is the unity of

 ,being and ,nothing4--,another         
tolerably plain  example is a           
,beginning4 ,in its beginning1 the thing
 is not yet1 but  it is more than merely
 nothing1 for its ,being is already in  
the  beginning4 ,beginning is itself a  
case of ,becoming2 only the former term 
is employed with an eye to the further  
advance4--,if we were to adapt  logic to
 the more usual method of the sciences1 
we might start with the  representation 
of a ,beginning as abstractly thought1  
or with ,beginning  as such1 and then   
analyse this representation1 and perhaps
 people  would more readily admit1 as a 
result of this analysis1 that ,being and
  ,nothing present themselves as        
undivided in unity4    7#d7 ,it remains 
to note that such phrases as ',being and
 ,nothing are  the same1' or ',the unity
 of ,being and ,nothing'--like all other
  such unities1 that of subject and     
object1 and others--give rise to        
reasonable objection4 ,they misrepresent
 the facts1 by giving an  exclusive     

prominence to the unity1 and leaving the
 difference which  undoubtedly exists in
 it 7because it is ,being and ,nothing1 
for example1  the unity of which is     
declared7 without any express mention or
 notice4  ,it accordingly seems as if   
the diversity had been unduly put out of
  court and neglected4 ,the fact is1 no 
speculative principle can be  correctly 
expressed by any such propositional     
form1 for the unity has  to be conceived
 in the diversity1 which is all the     
while present and  explicit4 ',to       
become' is the true expression for the  
resultant of ',to  be' and ',not to be'2
 it is the unity of the two2 but not    
only is it  the unity1 it is also       
inherent unrest1--the unity1 which is no
 mere  reference-to-self and therefore  
without movement1 but which1 through    
the diversity of ,being and ,nothing    
that is in it1 is at war within         
itself4--,determinate being1 on the     
other hand1 is this unity1 or  ,becoming
 in this form of unity3 hence all that  

'is there and so1' is  one-sided and    
finite4 ,the opposition between the two 
factors seems to  have vanished2 it is  
only implied in the unity1 it is not    
explicitly  put in it4    7#e7 ,the     
maxim of ,becoming1 that ,being is the  
passage into ,nought1  and ,nought the  
passage into ,being1 is controverted by 
the maxim of  ,pantheism1 the doctrine  
of the eternity of matter1 that from    
nothing  comes nothing1 and that        
something can only come out of          
something4 ,the  ancients saw plainly   
that the maxim1 ',from nothing comes    
nothing1  from something something1'    
really abolishes ,becoming3 for what it 
comes from and what it becomes are one  
and the same4 ,thus explained1  the     
proposition is the maxim of abstract    
identity as upheld by the               
understanding4 ,it cannot but seem      
strange1 therefore1 to hear such  maxims
 as1 ',out of nothing comes nothing3    
,out of something comes  something1'    
calmly taught in these days1 without the

 teacher being in  the least aware that 
they are the basis of ,pantheism1 and   
even without  his knowing that the      
ancients have exhausted all that is to  
be said  about them4    ,becoming is the
 first concrete thought1 and therefore  
the first  notion3 whereas ,being and   
,nought are empty abstractions4 ,the    
notion  of ,being1 therefore1 of which  
we sometimes speak1 must mean ,becoming2
  not the mere point of ,being1 which is
 empty ,nothing1 any more than          
,nothing1 which is empty ,being4 ,in    
,being then we have ,nothing1 and in    
,nothing ,being3 but this ,being which  
does not lose itself in ,nothing  is    
,becoming4 ,nor must we omit the        
distinction1 while we emphasise the     
unity of ,becoming3 without that        
distinction we should once more return  
to abstract ,being4 ,becoming is only   
the explicit statement of what  ,being  
is in its truth4    ,we often hear it   
maintained that thought is opposed to   
being4 ,now in  the face of such a      

statement1 our first question ought to  
be1 what is  meant by being4 ,if we     
understand being as it is defined by    
reflection1  all that we can say of it  
is that it is what is wholly identical  
and  affirmative4 ,and if we then look  
at thought1 it cannot escape us that    
thought also is at least what is        
absolutely identical with itself4 ,both 
,i therefore1 being as well as thought1 
have the same attribute4    ,this       
identity of being and thought is not    
however to be ,i taken in  a concrete   
sense1 as if we could say that a stone1 
so far as it has  being1 is the same as 
a thinking man4 ,a concrete thing is    
always very  different from the abstract
 category as such4 ,and in the case of  
being1  we are speaking of nothing      
concrete3 for being is the utterly      
abstract4  ,so far then the question    
regarding the being of ,god--a being    
which is  in itself concrete above all  
measure--is of slight importance4    ,as
 the first concrete thought-term1       

,becoming is the first adequate  vehicle
 of truth4 ,in the history of           
philosophy1 this stage of the  logical  
,idea finds its analogue in the system  
of ,heraclitus4 ,when  ,heraclitus says 
',all is flowing' 7 71 he enunciates    
,becoming  as the fundamental feature of
 all existence1 whereas the ,eleatics1  
as already remarked1 saw the only truth 
in ,being1 rigid processless  ,being4   
,glancing at the principle of the       
,eleatics1 ,heraclitus then goes  on to 
say3 ,being no more is than not-,being 7
 on      os 73 a statement expressing   
the negativity of abstract ,being1  and 
its identity with not-,being1 as made   
explicit in ,becoming3 both             
abstractions being alike untenable4     
,this maybe looked at as an instance  of
 the real refutation of one system by   
another4 ,to refute a ,philosophy  is to
 exhibit the dialectical movement in its
 principle1 and thus  reduce it to a    
constituent member of a higher concrete 
form of the8  ,idea4 ,even ,becoming    

however1 taken at its best on its own   
ground1 is an  extremely poor term3 it  
needs to grow in depth and weight of    
meaning4  ,such deepened force we find  
e4g4 in ,life4 ,life is a ,becoming2 but
  that is not enough to exhaust the     
notion of life4 ,a still higher form  is
 found in ,mind4 ,here too is ,becoming1
 but richer and more intensive  than    
mere logical ,becoming4 ,the elements1  
whose unity constitutes  mind1 are not  
the bare abstracts of ,being and of     
,nought1 but the system  of the logical 
,idea and of ,nature4    7b7 ,being     
,determinate4    #hi4 ,in ,becoming the 
,being which is one with ,nothing1 and  
the ,nothing  which is one with ,being1 
are only vanishing factors2 they are and
  they are not4 ,thus by its inherent   
contradiction ,becoming collapses  into 
the unity in which the two elements are 
absorbed4 ,this result is  accordingly  
,being ,determinate 7,being there and   
so74    ,in this first example we must  
call to mind1 once for all1 what was    

stated in  #hb and in the note there3   
the only way to secure any growth  and  
progress in knowledge is to hold results
 fast in their truth4 ,there  is        
absolutely nothing whatever in which we 
cannot and must not point  to           
contradictions or opposite attributes2  
and the abstraction made by             
understanding therefore means a forcible
 insistence on a single aspect1  and a  
real effort to obscure and remove all   
consciousness of the other  attribute   
which is involved4 ,whenever such       
contradiction1 then1 is  discovered in  
any object or notion1 the usual         
inference is1 ,hence  this object is    
nothing4 ,thus ,zeno1 who first showed  
the contradiction  native to motion1    
concluded that there is no motion3 and  
the ancients1  who recognised origin and
 decease1 the two species of ,becoming1 
as  untrue categories1 made use of the  
expression that the ,one or ,absolute   
neither arises nor perishes4 ,such a    
style of dialectic looks only at  the   

negative aspect of its result1 and fails
 to notice1 what is at the  same time   
really present1 the definite result1 in 
the present case a  pure nothing1 but a 
,nothing which includes ,being1 and1 in 
like manner1  a ,being which includes   
,nothing4 ,hence ,being ,determinate is 
7#a7 the  unity of ,being and ,nothing1 
in which we get rid of the immediacy in 
these determinations1 and their         
contradiction vanishes in their mutual  
connexion1--the unity in which they are 
only constituent elements4 ,and  7#b7   
since the result is the abolition of the
 contradiction1 it comes  in the shape  
of a simple unity with itself3 that is  
to say1 it also  is ,being1 but ,being  
with negation or determinateness3 it is 
,becoming  expressly put in the form of 
one of its elements1 viz4 ,being4       
,even our ordinary conception of        
,becoming implies that somewhat  comes  
out of it1 and that ,becoming therefore 
has a result4 ,but this  conception     
gives rise to the question1 how         

,becoming does not remain  mere         
,becoming1 but has a result ,the answer 
to this question follows  from what     
,becoming has already shown itself to   
be4 ,becoming always  contains ,being   
and ,nothing in such a way1 that these  
two are always  changing into each      
other1 and reciprocally cancelling each 
other4  ,thus ,becoming stands before us
 in utter restlessness--unable however  
to maintain itself in this abstract     
restlessness3 for since ,being and      
,nothing vanish in ,becoming 7and that  
is the very notion of ,becoming71  the  
latter must vanish also4 ,becoming is as
 it were a fire1 which  dies out in     
itself1 when it consumes its material4  
,the result of this  process however is 
not an empty ,nothing but ,being        
identical with the  negation1--what we  
call ,being ,determinate 7being then and
 there73 the  primary import of which   
evidently is that it has become4    #ij4
 77 ,determinate ,being is ,being with a
 character or mode--which  simply is2   

and such un-mediated character is       
,quality4 ,and as  reflected into itself
 in this its character or mode1         
,determinate ,being  is a somewhat1 an  
existent4--,the categories1 which issue 
by a closer  analysis of ,determinate   
,being1 need only be mentioned briefly4 
,quality may be described as the        
determinate mode immediate and          
identical with ,being--as distinguished 
from ,quantity 7to come  afterwards71   
which1 although a mode of ,being1 is no 
longer immediately  identical with      
,being1 but a mode indifferent and      
external to it4 ,a  ,something is what  
it is in virtue of its quality1 and     
losing its  quality it ceases to be what
 it is4 ,quality1 moreover1 is          
completely a  category only of the      
finite1 and for that reason too it has  
its proper  place in ,nature1 not in the
 world of ,mind4 ,thus1 for example1 in 
,nature  what are styled the elementary 
bodies1 oxygen1 nitrogen1 c1 should  be 
regarded as existing qualities4 ,but in 

the sphere of mind1 ,quality  appears in
 a subordinate way only1 and not as if  
its qualitativeness  could exhaust any  
specific aspect of mind4 ,if1 for       
example1 we consider  the subjective    
mind1 which forms the object of         
psychology1 we may  describe what is    
called 7moral and mental7 character1 as 
in logical  language identical with     
,quality4 ,this however does not mean   
that  character is a mode of being which
 pervades the soul and is immediately   
identical with it1 as is the case in the
 natural world with the  elementary     
bodies before mentioned4 ,yet a more    
distinct manifestation  of ,quality as  
such1 in mind even1 is found in the case
 of besotted or  morbid conditions1     
especially in states of passion and when
 the passion  rises to derangement4 ,the
 state of mind of a deranged person1    
being one  mass of jealousy1 fear1 c1   
may suitably be described as ,quality4  
#ia4 ,quality1 as determinateness which 
is1 as contrasted with the  ,negation   

which is involved in it but             
distinguished from it1 is  ,reality4    
,negation is no longer an abstract      
nothing1 but1 as  a determinate being   
and somewhat1 is only a form on such    
being--it  is as ,otherness4 ,since this
 otherness1 though a determination of   
,quality itself1 is in the first        
instance distinct from it1 ,quality is  
,being-for-another--an expansion of the 
mere point of ,determinate  ,being1 or  
of ,somewhat4 ,the ,being as such of    
,quality1 contrasted with  this         
reference to somewhat else1 is          
,being-by-self4    ,the foundation of   
all determinateness is negation 7as     
,spinoza says1  ,omnis determinatio est 
negatio74 ,the unreflecting observer    
supposes  that determinate things are   
merely positive1 and pins them down     
under  the form of being4 ,mere being   
however is not the end of the           
matter3--it  is1 as we have already     
seen1 utter emptiness and instability   
besides4  ,still1 when abstract being is

 contused in this way with being        
modified  and determinate1 it implies   
some perception of the fact that1 though
  in determinate being there is involved
 an element of negation1 this  element  
is at first wrapped up1 as it were1 and 
only comes to the  front and receives   
its due in ,being-for-self4--,if we go  
on to consider  determinate ,being as a 
determinateness which is1 we get in this
 way  what is called ,reality4 ,we      
speak1 for example1 of the reality of a 
plan or a purpose1 meaning thereby that 
they are no longer inner and            
subjective1 but have passed into        
being-there-and-then4 ,in the same      
sense the body may be called the reality
 of the soul1 and the law the  reality  
of freedom1 and the world altogether the
 reality of the divine  idea4 ,the word 
'reality' is however used in another    
acceptation to mean  that something     
behaves conformably to its essential    
characteristic or  notion4 ,for example1
 we use the expression3 ,this is a real 

occupation3  ,this is a real man4 ,here 
the term does not merely mean outward   
and  immediate existence3 but rather    
that some existence agrees with its     
notion4 ,in which sense1 be it added1   
reality is not distinct from the        
ideality which we shall in the first    
instance become acquainted with in  the 
shape of ,being-for-self4    #ib4 77    
,being1 if kept distinct and apart from 
its determinate  mode1 as it is in      
,being-by-self 7,being implicit71 would 
be only the  vacant abstraction of      
,being4 ,in ,being 7determinate there   
and then71  the determinateness is one  
with ,being2 yet at the same time1 when 
explicitly made a negation1 it is a     
,limit1 a ,barrier4 ,hence the          
otherness is not something indifferent  
and outside it1 but a function  proper  
to it4 ,somewhat is by its              
quality1--firstly finite1--secondly     
alterable2 so that finitude and         
variability appertain to its being4     
,in ,being-there-and-then1 the negation 

is still directly one with the  ,being1 
and this negation is what we call a     
,limit 7,boundary74 ,a thing  is what it
 is1 only in and by reason of its limit4
 ,we cannot therefore  regard the limit 
as only paternal to being which is then 
and there4 ,it  rather goes through and 
through the whole of such existence4    
,the view  of limit1 as merely an       
external characteristic of              
being-there-and-then1  arises from a    
confusion of quantitative with          
qualitative limit4 ,here  we are        
speaking primarily of the qualitative   
limit4 ,if1 for example1  we observe a  
piece of ground1 three acres large1 that
 circumstance is  its quantitative      
limit4 ,but1 in addition1 the ground is1
 it may be1 a  meadow1 not a wood or a  
pond4 ,this is its qualitative          
limit4--,man1  if he wishes to be       
actual1 must be-there-and-then1 and to  
this end he  must set a limit to        
himself4 ,people who are too fastidious 
towards the  finite never reach         

actuality1 but linger lost in           
abstraction1 and their  light dies away4
    ,if we take a closer look at what a 
limit implies1 we see it involving a    
contradiction in itself1 and thus       
evincing its dialectical nature4 ,on    
the one side the limit makes the reality
 of a thing2 on the other it  is its    
negation4 ,but1 again1 the limit1 as the
 negation of something1  is not an      
abstract nothing but a nothing which    
is1--what we call an  'other4' ,given   
something1 and up starts an other to us3
 we know that  there is not something   
only1 but an other as well4 ,nor1 again1
 is the  other of such a nature that we 
can think something apart from it2 a    
something is implicitly the other of    
itself1 and the somewhat sees  its limit
 become objective to it in the other4   
,if we now ask for the  difference      
between something and another1 it turns 
out that they are  the same3 which      
sameness is expressed in ,latin by      
calling the pair  aliud--aliud4 ,the    

other1 as opposed to the something1 is  
itself a  something1 and hence we say   
some other1 or something else2 and so on
  the other hand the first something    
when opposed to the other1 also  defined
 as something1 is itself an other4 ,when
 we say 'something  else' our first     
impression is that something taken      
separately is only  something1 and that 
the quality of being another attaches to
 it only  from outside considerations4  
,thus we suppose that the moon1 being   
something else than the sun1 might very 
well exist without the sun4  ,but really
 the moon1 as a something1 has its other
 implicit in it3  ,plato says3 ,god made
 the world out of the nature of the     
'one' and the  'other' 7 73 having      
brought these together1 he formed from  
them a third1 which is of the nature of 
the 'one' and the 'other4'  ,in these   
words we have in general terms a        
statement of the nature  of the finite1 
which1 as something1 does not meet the  
nature of the  other as if it had no    

affinity to it1 but1 being implicitly   
the other  of itself1 thus undergoes    
alteration4 ,alteration thus exhibits   
the  inherent contradiction which       
originally attaches to determinate      
being1  and which forces it out of its  
own bounds4 ,to materialised conception 
existence stands in the character of    
something solely positive1 and  quietly 
abiding within its own limits3 though we
 also know1 it is  true1 that everything
 finite 7such as existence7 is subject  
to change4  ,such changeableness in     
existence is to the superficial eye a   
mere  possibility1 the realisation of   
which is not a consequence of its own   
nature4 ,but the fact is1 mutability    
lies in the notion of existence1  and   
change is only the manifestation of what
 it implicitly is4 ,the  living die1    
simply because as living they bear in   
themselves the germ  of death4    #ic4  
,something becomes an other3 this other 
is itself somewhat3  therefore it       
likewise becomes an other1 and so on ad 

infinitum4    #id4 ,this ,infinity is   
the wrong or negative infinity3 it is   
only a  negation of a finite3 but the   
finite rises again the same as ever1 and
  is never got rid of and absorbed4 ,in 
other words1 this infinite only         
expresses the ought-to-be elimination of
 the finite4 ,the progression  to       
infinity never gets further than a      
statement of the contradiction  involved
 in the finite1 viz4 that it is somewhat
 as well as somewhat  else4 ,it sets up 
with endless iteration the alternation  
between these  two terms1 each of which 
calls up the other4    ,if we let       
somewhat and another1 the elements of   
determinate ,being1  fall asunder1 the  
result is that some becomes other1 and  
this other  is itself a somewhat1 which 
then as such changes likewise1 and so   
on ad infinitum4 ,this result seems to  
superficial reflection  something very  
grand1 the grandest possible4 ,besuch a 
progression to  infinity is not the real
 infinite4 ,that consists in being at   

home  with itself in its other1 or1 if  
enunciated as a process1 in coming  to  
itself in its other4 ,much depends on   
rightly apprehending the  notion of     
infinity1 and not stopping short at the 
wrong infinity of  endless progression4 
,when time and space1 for example1 are  
spoken of  as infinite1 it is in the    
first place the infinite progression on 
which our thoughts fasten4 ,we say1     
,now1 ,this time1 and then we keep      
continually going forwards and backwards
 beyond this limit4 ,the case  is the   
same with space1 the infinity of which  
has formed the theme of  barren         
declamation to astronomers with a talent
 for edification4 ,in the  attempt to   
contemplate such an infinite1 our       
thought1 we are commonly  informed1 must
 sink exhausted4 ,it is true indeed that
 we must abandon  the unending          
contemplation1 not however because the  
occupation is too  sublime1 but because 
it is too tedious4 ,it is tedious to    
expatiate in  the contemplation of this 

infinite progression1 because the same  
thing  is constantly recurring4 ,we lay 
down a limit3 then we pass it3 next we  
have a limit once more1 and so on for   
ever4 ,all this is but superficial      
alternation1 which never leaves the     
region of the finite behind4 ,to        
suppose that by stepping out and away   
into that infinity we release  ourselves
 from the finite1 is in truth but to    
seek the release which  comes by flight4
 ,but the man who flees is not yet free3
 in fleeing he  is still conditioned by 
that from which he flees4 ,if it be also
 said1  that the infinite is            
unattainable1 the statement is true1 but
 only  because to the idea of infinity  
has been attached the circumstance  of  
being simply and solely negative4 ,with 
such empty and other world  stuff       
philosophy has nothing to do4 ,what     
philosophy has to do with is            
always--something concrete and in the   
highest sense present4    ,no doubt     
philosophy has also sometimes been set  

the task of finding  an answer to the   
question1 how the infinite comes to the 
resolution  of issuing out of itself4   
,this question1 founded1 as it is1 upon 
the  assumption of a rigid opposition   
between finite and infinite1 may be     
answered by saying that the opposition  
is false1 and that in point  of fact the
 infinite eternally proceeds out of     
itself1 and yet does  not proceed out of
 itself4 ,if we further say that the    
infinite is the  not-finite1 we have in 
point of fact virtually expressed the   
truth3  for as the finite itself is the 
first negative1 the not-finite is the   
negative of that negation1 the negation 
which is identical with itself  and thus
 at the same time a true affirmation4   
,the infinity of reflection here        
discussed is only an attempt to  reach  
the true ,infinity1 a wretched          
neither-one-thing-nor-another4          
,generally speaking1 it is the point of 
view which has in recent times  been    
emphasised in ,germany4 ,the finite1    

this theory tells us1 ought  to be      
absorbed2 the infinite ought not to be a
 negative merely1 but  also a positive4 
,that 'ought to be' betrays the         
incapacity of actually  making good a   
claim which is at the same time         
recognised to be right4  ,this stage was
 never passed by the systems of ,kant   
and ,fichte1 so far  as ethics are      
concerned4 ,the utmost to which this way
 brings us is only  the postulate of a  
never-ending approximation to the law of
 ,reason3  which postulate has been made
 an argument for the immortality of the 
soul4    #ie4 77 ,what we now in point  
of fact have before us1 is that somewhat
  comes to be an other1 and that the    
other generally comes to be an  other4  
,thus essentially relative to another1  
somewhat is virtually an  other against 
it3 and since what is passed into is    
quite the same as  what passes over1    
since both have one and the same        
attribute1 viz4  to be an other1 it     
follows that something in its passage   

into other  only joins with itself4 ,to 
be thus self-related in the passage1 and
  in the other1 is the genuine          
,infinity4 ,or1 under a negative aspect3
  what is altered is the other1 it      
becomes the other of the other4 ,thus   
,being1 but as negation of the negation1
 is restored again3 it is now           
,being-for-self4    ,dualism1 in putting
 an insuperable opposition between      
finite and  infinite1 fails to note the 
simple circumstance that the infinite is
  thereby only one of two1 and is       
reduced to a particular1 to which the   
finite forms the other particular4 ,such
 an infinite1 which is only a           
particular1 is co-terminous with the    
finite which makes for it a limit  and a
 barrier3 it is not what it ought to be1
 that is1 the infinite1  but is only    
finite4 ,in such circumstances1 where   
the finite is on this  side1 and the    
infinite on that1--this world as the    
finite and the other  world as the      
infinite1--an equal dignity of          

permanence and independence  is ascribed
 to finite and to infinite4 ,the being  
of the finite is made  an absolute      
being1 and by this dualism gets         
independence and stability4  ,touched1  
so to speak1 by the infinite1 it would  
be annihilated4 ,but  it must not be    
touched by the infinite4 ,there must be 
an abyss1 an  impassable gulf between   
the two1 with the infinite abiding on   
yonder  side and the finite steadfast on
 this4 ,those who attribute to the      
finite this inflexible persistence in   
comparison with the infinite  are not1  
as they imagine1 far above metaphysic3  
they are still on the  level of the most
 ordinary metaphysic of understanding4  
,for the same  thing occurs here as in  
the infinite progression4 ,at one time  
it is  admitted that the finite has no  
independent actuality1 no absolute      
being1 no root and development of its   
own1 but is only a transient4  ,but next
 moment this is straightway forgotten2  
the finite1 made a mere  counterpart to 

the infinite1 wholly separated from it1 
and rescued from  annihilation1 is      
conceived to be persistent in its       
independence4 ,while  thought thus      
imagines itself elevated to the         
infinite1 it meets with  the opposite   
fate3 it comes to an infinite which is  
only a finite1 and  the finite1 which it
 had left behind1 has always to be      
retained and  made into an absolute4    
,after this examination 7with which it  
were well to compare ,plato's           
,philebus71 tending to show the nullity 
of the distinction made by              
understanding between the finite and the
 infinite1 we are liable  to glide into 
the statement that the infinite and the 
finite are  therefore one1 and that the 
genuine infinity1 the truth1 must be    
defined and enunciated as the unity of  
the finite and infinite4 ,such  a       
statement would be to some extent       
correct2 but is just as open to         
perversion and falsehood as the unity of
 ,being and ,nothing already  noticed4  

,besides it may very fairly be charged  
with reducing the  infinite to finitude 
and making a finite infinite4 ,for1 so  
far as  the expression goes1 the finite 
seems left in its place1--it is not     
expressly stated to be absorbed4 ,or1 if
 we reflect that the finite1  when      
identified with the infinite1 certainly 
cannot remain what it  was out of such  
unity1 and will at least suffer some    
change in its  characteristics--as an   
alkali1 when combined with an acid1     
loses some  of its properties1 we must  
see that1 the same fate awaits the      
infinite1  which1 as the negative1 will 
on its part likewise have its edge1 as  
it were1 taken off on the other4 ,and   
this does really happen with the        
abstract one-sided infinite of          
understanding4 ,the genuine infinite    
however is not merely in the position of
 the one-sided acid1 and so  does not   
lose itself4 ,the negation of negation  
is not a neutralisation3  the infinite  
is the affirmative1 and it is only the  

finite which is  absorbed4    ,in       
,being-for-self enters the category of  
,ideality4  ,being-there-and-then1 as in
 the first instance apprehended in its  
being  or affirmation1 has reality 7    
#ia73 and thus even finitude in the     
first  instance is in the category of   
reality4 ,but the truth of the finite is
  rather its ideality4 ,similarly1 the  
infinite of understanding1 which  is    
co-ordinated with the finite1 is itself 
only one of two finites1  no whole      
truth1 but a non-substantial element4   
,this ideality of the  finite is the    
chief maxim of philosophy2 and for that 
reason every  genuine philosophy is     
idealism4 ,but everything depends upon  
not taking  for the infinite what1 in   
the very terms of its characterisation1 
is4  at the same time made a particular 
and finite4--,for this reason we  have  
bestowed a greater amount of attention  
on this distinction4 ,the  fundamental  
notion of philosophy1 the genuine       
infinite1 depends upon  it4 ,the        

distinction is cleared up by the simple1
 and for that reason  seemingly         
insignificant1 but incontrovertible     
reflections1 contained in  the first    
paragraph of this section4    7c7       
,being-for-self4    #if4 77 ,being-for  
self1 as reference to itself1 is        
immediacy1 and  as reference of the     
negative to itself1 is a                
self-subsistent1 the  ,one4 ,this unit1 
being without distinction in itself1    
thus  excludes the other from itself4   
,to be for self--to be one--is completed
 ,quality1 and as such1 contains        
abstract ,being and ,being modified as  
non-substantial elements4 ,as  simple   
,being1 the ,one is simple              
self-reference2 as ,being modified it   
is determinate3 but the determinateness 
is not in this case a finite            
determinateness--a somewhat in          
distinction from an other--but infinite1
  because it contains distinction       
absorbed and annulled in itself4    ,the
 readiest instance of ,being-for-self is

 found in the ',i4' ,we know  ourselves 
as existents1 distinguished in the first
 place from other  existents1 and with  
certain relations thereto4 ,but we also 
come to  know this expansion of         
existence 7in these relations7 reduced1 
as it  were1 to a point in the simple   
form of being-for-self4 ,when we say    
',i1'  we express the reference-to-self 
which is infinite1 and at the same  time
 negative4 ,man1 it may be said1 is     
distinguished from the animal  world1   
and in that way from nature altogether1 
by knowing himself as  ',i'3 which      
amounts to saying that natural things   
never attain a free  ,being-for-self1   
but as limited to ,being-there-and-then1
 are always and  only ,being for an     
other4--,again1 ,being-for-self may be  
described as  ideality1 just as         
,being-there-and-then was described as  
reality4 ,it is  said1 that besides     
reality there is also an ideality4 ,thus
 the two  categories are made equal and 
parallel4 ,properly speaking1 ideality  

is  not somewhat outside of and beside  
reality3 the notion of ideality  just   
lies in its being the truth of reality4 
,that is to say1 when  reality is       
explicitly put as what it implicitly is1
 it is at once seen  to be ideality4    
,hence ideality has not received its    
proper estimation1  when you allow that 
reality is not all in all1 but that an  
ideality  must be recognised outside of 
it4 ,such an ideality1 external to or it
  may be even beyond reality1 would be  
no better than an empty name4  ,ideality
 only has a meaning when it is the      
ideality of something3 but  this        
something is not a mere indefinite this 
or that1 but existence  characterised as
 reality1 which1 if retained in         
isolation1 possesses  no truth4 ,the    
distinction between ,nature and ,mind is
 not improperly  conceived1 when the    
former is traced back to reality1 and   
the latter  to ideality as a fundamental
 category4 ,nature however is far from  
being so fixed and complete1 as to      

subsist even without ,mind3 in ,mind  it
 first1 as it were1 attains its goal and
 its truth4 ,and similarly1  ,mind on   
its part is not merely a world beyond   
,nature and nothing more3  it is really1
 and with full proof1 seen to be mind1  
only when it  involves ,nature as       
absorbed in itself4--,apropos of this1  
we should  note the double meaning of   
the ,german word aufheben 7to put by1 or
  set aside74 ,we mean by it 7#a7 to    
clear away1 or annul3 thus1 we say1 a   
law or a regulation is set aside3 7#b7  
to keep1 or preserve3 in which  sense we
 use it when we say3 something is well  
put by4 ,this double  usage of language1
 which gives to the same word a positive
 and negative  meaning1 is not an       
accident1 and gives no ground for       
reproaching  language as a cause of     
confusion4 ,we should rather recognise  
in it the  speculative spirit of our    
language rising above the mere          
',either--or'  of understanding4    #ig4
 77 ,the relation of the negative to    

itself is a negative relation1  and so a
 distinguishing of the ,one from itself1
 the repulsion of  the ,one2 that is1 it
 makes ,many ,ones4 ,so far as regards  
the  immediacy of the self-existents1   
these ,many are3 and the repulsion of   
every ,one of them becomes to that      
extent their repulsion against each     
other as existing units1--in other      
words1 their reciprocal exclusion4      
,whenever we speak of the ,one1 the     
,many usually come into our mind at  the
 same time4 ,whence1 then1 we are forced
 to ask1 do the ,many come8  ,this      
question is unanswerable by the         
consciousness which pictures the  ,many 
as a primary datum1 and-treats the ,one 
as only one among the ,many4  ,but the  
philosophic notion teaches1             
contrariwise1 that the ,one forms  the  
pre-supposition of the ,many3 and in the
 thought of the ,one is  implied that it
 explicitly make itself ,many4 ,the     
self-existing unit is  not1 like ,being1
 void of all connective reference3 it is

 a reference1  as well as               
,being-there-and-then was1 not however a
 reference connecting  somewhat with an 
other1 but1 as unity of the some and the
 other1 it is  a connexion with itself1 
and this connexion be it noted is a     
negative  connexion4 ,hereby the ,one   
manifests an utter incompatibility with 
itself1 a self-repulsion3 and what it   
makes itself explicitly be1 is  the     
,many4 ,we may denote this side in the  
process of ,being-for-self  by the      
figurative term ,repulsion4 ,repulsion  
is a term originally  employed in the   
study of matter1 to mean that matter1 as
 a ,many1 in  each of these many ,ones1 
behaves as exclusive to all the others4 
,it  would be wrong however to view the 
process of repulsion1 as if the  ,one   
were the repellent and the ,many the    
repelled4 ,the ,one1 as already         
remarked1 just is self-exclusion and    
explicit putting itself as the  ,many4  
,each of the ,many however is itself a  
,one1 and in virtue of its so  behaving1

 this all-round repulsion is by one     
stroke converted into its               
opposite1--,attraction4    #ih4 77 ,but 
the ,many are one the same as another3  
each is ,one1 or  even one of the ,many2
 they are consequently one and the same4
 ,or when  we study all that ,repulsion 
involves1 we see that as a negative     
attitude of many ,ones to one another1  
it is just as essentially a  connective 
reference of them to each other2 and as 
those to which the  ,one is related in  
its act of repulsion are ones1 it is in 
them thrown  into relation with itself4 
,the repulsion therefore has an equal   
right  to be called ,attraction2 and the
 exclusive ,one1 or ,being-for-self1    
suppresses itself4 ,the qualitative     
character1 which in the ,one or unit    
has reached the extreme point of its    
characterisation1 has thus passed  over 
into determinateness 7quality7          
suppressed1 i4e4 into ,being as         
,quantity4    ,the philosophy of the    
,atomists is the doctrine in which the  

,absolute  is formulated as             
,being-for-self1 as ,one1 and many ones4
 ,and it is  the repulsion1 which shows 
itself in the notion of the ,one1 which 
is assumed as the fundamental force in  
these atoms4 ,but instead of            
attraction1 it is ,accident1 that is1   
mere unintelligence1 which  is expected 
to bring them together4 ,so long as the 
,one is fixed  as one1 it is certainly  
impossible to regard its congression    
with  others as anything but external   
and mechanical4 ,the ,void1 which is    
assumed as the complementary principle  
to the atoms1 is repulsion  and nothing 
else1 presented under the image of the  
nothing existing  between the           
atoms4--,modern ,atomism--and physics is
 still in principle  atomistic--has     
surrendered the atoms so far as to pin  
its faith  on molecules or particles4   
,in so doing1 science has come closer   
to sensuous conception1 at the cost of  
losing the precision of  thought4--,to  
put an attractive by the side of a      

repulsive force1 as  the moderns have   
done1 certainly gives completeness to   
the contrast3  and the discovery of this
 natural force1 as it is called1 has    
been a  source of much pride4 ,but the  
mutual implication of the two1 which    
makes what is true and concrete in them1
 would have to be wrested from  the     
obscurity and confusion in which they   
were left even in ,kant's  ,metaphysical
 ,rudiments of ,natural ,science4--,in  
modern times the  importance of the     
atomic theory is even more evident in   
political than  in physical science4    
,according to it1 the will of           
individuals as such  is the creative    
principle of the ,state3 the attracting 
force is the  special wants and         
inclinations of individuals2 and the    
,universal1 or  the ,state itself1 is   
the external nexus of a compact4    7#a7
 ,the ,atomic philosophy forms a vital  
stage in the historical  evolution of   
the ,idea4 ,the principle of that system
 may be described  as ,being-for-self in

 the shape of the ,many4 ,at present1   
students of  nature who are anxious to  
avoid metaphysics turn a favourable ear 
to  ,atomism4 ,but it is not possible to
 escape metaphysics and cease to  trace 
nature back to terms of thought1 by     
throwing ourselves into the  arms of    
,atomism4 ,the atom1 in fact1 is itself 
a thought2 and hence the  theory which  
holds matter to consist of atoms is a   
metaphysical theory4  ,newton gave      
physics an express warning to beware of 
metaphysics1 it is  true2 but1 to his   
honour be it said1 he did not by any    
means obey his  own warning4 ,the only  
mere physicists are the animals3 they   
alone do  not think3 while man is a     
thinking being and a born metaphysician4
 ,the  real question is not whether we  
shall apply metaphysics1 but whether    
our metaphysics are of the right kind3  
in other words1 whether we are  not1    
instead of the concrete logical ,idea1  
adopting one-sided forms of  thought1   
rigidly fixed by understanding1 and     

making these the basis of  our          
theoretical as well as our practical    
work4 ,it is on this ground  that one   
objects to the ,atomic philosophy4 ,the 
old ,atomists viewed the  world as a    
many1 as their successors often do to   
this day4 ,on chance  they laid the task
 of collecting the atoms which float    
about in the  void4 ,but1 after all1 the
 nexus binding the many with one another
 is  by no means a mere accident3 as we 
have already remarked1 the nexus is     
founded on their very nature4 ,to ,kant 
we owe the completed theory of  matter  
as the unity of repulsion and           
attraction4 ,the theory is correct1  so 
far as it recognises attraction to be   
the other of the two elements  involved 
in the notion of ,being-for-self3 and to
 be an element no less  essential than  
repulsion to constitute matter4 ,still  
this dynamical  construction of matter1 
as it is termed1 has the fault of taking
 for  granted1 instead of deducing1     
attraction and repulsion4 ,had they been

  deduced1 we should then have seen the 
,how and the ,why of a unity which  is  
merely asserted4 ,kant indeed was       
careful to inculcate that ,matter  must 
not be taken to be in existence per se1 
and then as it were  incidentally to be 
provided with the two forces mentioned1 
but must  be regarded as consisting     
solely in their unity4 ,german          
physicists  for some time accepted this 
pure dynamic4 ,but in spite of this1 the
  majority of these physicists i n      
modern times have found it more         
convenient to return to the ,atomic     
point of view1 and in spite of the      
warnings of ,kstner1 one of their       
number1 have begun to regard ,matter  as
 consisting of infinitesimally small    
particles1 termed 'atoms'--which  atoms 
have then to be brought into relation   
with one another by the  play of forces 
attaching to them1--attractive1         
repulsive1 or whatever  they may be4    
,this too is metaphysics2 and           
metaphysics which1 for its  utter       

unintelligence1 there would be          
sufficient reason to guard against4     
7#b7 ,the transition from ,quality to   
,quantity1 indicated in the paragraph   
before us1 is not found in our ordinary 
way of thinking1 which deems  each of   
these categories to exist independently 
beside the other4 ,we  are in the habit 
of saying that things are not merely    
qualitatively1  but also quantitatively 
defined2 but whence these categories    
originate1  and how they are related to 
each other1 are questions not further   
examined4 ,the fact is1 quantity just   
means quality superseded and  absorbed3 
and it is by the dialectic of quality   
here examined that this  supersession is
 effected4 ,first of all1 we had ,being3
 as the truth of  ,being1 came          
,becoming3 which formed the passage to  
,being ,determinate3  and the truth of  
that we found to be ,alteration4 ,and in
 its result  ,alteration showed itself  
to be ,being-for-self1 exempt from      
implication  of another and from passage

 into another2--which ,being-for-self1  
finally1 in the two sides of its        
process1 ,repulsion and ,attraction1    
was clearly seen to annul itself1 and   
thereby to annul quality in the         
totality of its stages4 ,still this     
superseded and absorbed quality is      
neither an abstract nothing1 nor an     
equally abstract and featureless  being3
 it is only being as indifferent to     
determinateness or character4  ,this    
aspect of being is also what appears as 
quantity in our ordinary  conceptions4  
,we observe things1 first of all1 with  
an eye to their  quality--which we take 
to be the character identical with the  
being  of the thing4 ,if we proceed to  
consider their quantity1 we get the     
conception of an indifferent and        
external character or mode1 of such a   
kind that a thing remains what it is1   
though its quantity is altered1  and the
 thing becomes greater or less4         
,b4--,,quantity4    77 ,pure ,quantity4 
#ii4 ,quantity is pure being1 where the 

mode or character is  no longer taken as
 one with the being itself1 but         
explicitly put as  superseded or        
indifferent4    7i7 ,the expression     
,magnitude especially marks determinate 
,quantity1 and is for that reason not a 
suitable name for ,quantity  in general4
 7#b7 ,mathematics usually define       
magnitude as what can be  increased or  
diminished4 ,this definition has the    
defect of containing  the thing to be   
defined over again3 but it may serve to 
show that the  category of magnitude is 
explicitly understood to be changeable  
and  indifferent1 so that1 in spite of  
its being altered by an increased       
extension or intension1 the thing1 a    
house1 for example1 does not cease  to  
be a house1 and red to be red4 7#c7 ,the
 ,absolute is pure ,quantity4  ,this    
point of view is upon the whole the same
 as when the ,absolute is  defined to be
 ,matter1 in which1 though form         
undoubtedly is present1 the  form is a  
characteristic of no importance one way 

or another4 ,quantity  too constitutes  
the main characteristic of the          
,absolute1 when the  ,absolute is       
regarded as absolute indifference1 and  
only admitting of  quantitative         
distinction4--,otherwise pure space1    
time1 c4 may be taken  as examples of   
,quantity1 if we allow ourselves to     
regard the real as  whatever fills up   
space and time1 it matters not with     
what4    ,the mathematical definition of
 magnitude as what may be increased  or 
diminished1 appears at first sight to be
 more plausible and  perspicuous than   
the exposition of the notion in the     
present  section4 ,when closely         
examined1 however1 it involves1 under   
cover  of pre-suppositions and images1  
the same elements as appear in the      
notion of quantity reached by the method
 of logical development4 ,in  other     
words1 when we say that the notion of   
magnitude lies in the  possibility of   
being increased or diminished1 we state 
that magnitude  7or more correctly1     

quantity71 as distinguished from        
quality1 is a  characteristic of such   
kind that the characterised thing is not
 in the  least affected by any change in
 it4 ,what then1 it may be asked1 is    
the fault which we have to find with    
this definition8 ,it is that to         
increase and to diminish is the same    
thing as to characterise magnitude      
otherwise4 ,if this aspect then were an 
adequate account of it1 quantity  would 
be described merely as whatever can be  
altered4 ,but quality is  no less than  
quantity open to alteration2 and the    
distinction here  given between quantity
 and quality is expressed by saying     
increase  or diminution3 the meaning    
being that1 towards whatever side the   
determination of magnitude be altered1  
the thing still remains what it  is4    
,one remark more4 ,throughout philosophy
 we do not seek merely for  correct1    
still less for plausible definitions1   
whose correctness  appeals directly to  
the popular imagination2 we seek        

approved or  verified definitions1 the  
content of which is not assumed merely  
as  given1 but is seen and known to     
warrant itself1 because warranted  by   
the free self-evolution of thought4 ,to 
apply this to the present  case4        
,however correct and self-evident the   
definition of quantity  usual in        
,mathematics may be1 it will still fail 
to satisfy the wish to  see how far this
 particular thought is founded in       
universal thought1  and in that way     
necessary4 ,this difficulty1 however1 is
 not the only  one4 ,if quantity is not 
reached through the action of thought1  
but  taken uncritically from our        
generalised image of it1 we are liable  
to exaggerate the range of its validity1
 or even to raise it to the  height of  
an absolute category4 ,and that such a  
danger is real1 we see  when the title  
of exact science is restricted to those 
sciences the  objects of which can be   
submitted to mathematical calculation4  
,here we  have another trace of the bad 

metaphysics 7mentioned in  #ih1 note7   
which replace the concrete idea by      
partial and inadequate categories of    
understanding4 ,our knowledge would be  
in a very awkward predicament if  such  
objects as freedom1 law1 morality1 or   
even ,god ,himself1 because  they cannot
 be measured and calculated1 or         
expressed in a mathematical  formula1   
were to be reckoned beyond the reach of 
exact knowledge1 and  we had to put up  
with a vague generalised image of them1 
leaving their  details or particulars to
 the pleasure of each individual1 to    
make  out of them what he will4 ,the    
pernicious consequences1 to which such  
a theory gives rise in practice1 are at 
once evident4 ,and this mere            
mathematical view1 which identifies with
 the ,idea one of its special  stages1  
viz4 quantity1 is no other than the     
principle of ,materialism4  ,witness the
 history of the scientific modes of     
thought1 especially in  ,france since   
the middle of last century4 ,matter1 in 

the abstract1 is  just what1 though of  
course there is form in it1 has that    
form only as  an indifferent and        
external attribute4    ,the present     
explanation would be utterly            
misconceived if it were  supposed to    
disparage mathematics4 ,by calling the  
quantitative  characteristic merely     
external and indifferent1 we provide no 
excuse  for indolence and               
superficiality1 nor do we assert that   
quantitative  characteristics may be    
left to mind themselves1 or at least    
require no  very careful handling4      
,quantity1 of course1 is a stage of the 
,idea3 and  as such it must have its    
due1 first as a logical category1 and   
then  in the world of objects1 natural  
as well as spiritual4 ,still even so1   
there soon emerges the different        
importance attaching to the category  of
 quantity according as its objects      
belong to the natural or to the         
spiritual world4 ,for in ,nature1 where 
the form of the ,idea is to be  other   

than1 and at the same time outside1     
itself1 greater importance is  for that 
very reason attached to quantity than in
 the spiritual world1  the world of free
 inwardness4 ,no doubt we regard even   
spiritual facts  under a quantitative   
point of view2 but it is at once        
apparent that in  speaking of ,god as a 
,trinity1 the number three has by no    
means the same  prominence1 as when we  
consider the three dimensions of space  
or the  three sides of a triangle2--the 
fundamental feature of which last is    
just to be a surface bounded by three   
lines4 ,even inside the realm of        
,nature we find the same distinction of 
greater or less importance of           
quantitative features4 ,in the inorganic
 world1 ,quantity plays1 so to  say1 a  
more prominent part than in the organic4
 ,even in organic nature  when we       
distinguish mechanical functions from   
what are called chemical1  and in the   
narrower sense1 physical1 there is the  
same difference4  ,mechanics is of all  

branches of science1 confessedly1 that  
in which the  aid of mathematics can be 
least dispensed with1--where indeed we  
cannot  take one step without them4 ,on 
that account mechanics is regarded next 
to mathematics as the science par       
excellence2 which leads us to  repeat   
the remark about the coincidence of the 
materialist with the  exclusively       
mathematical point of view4 ,after all  
that has been said1  we cannot but hold 
it1 in the interest of exact and        
thorough knowledge1  one of the most    
hurtful prejudices1 to seek all         
distinction and  determinateness of     
objects merely in quantitative          
considerations4 ,mind  to be sure is    
more than ,nature and the animal is more
 than the plant3  but we know very      
little of these objects and the         
distinction between  them1 if a more and
 less is enough for us1 and if we do not
 proceed to  comprehend them in their   
peculiar1 that is their qualitative     
character4    #ajj4 ,quantity1 as we    

saw1 has two sources3 the exclusive     
unit1 and  the identification or        
equalisation of these units4 ,when we   
look  therefore at its immediate        
relation to self1 or at the             
characteristic  of self-sameness made   
explicit by attraction1 quantity is     
,continuous  magnitude2 but when we look
 at the other characteristic1 the ,one  
implied in it1 it is ,discrete          
magnitude4 ,still continuous quantity   
has  also a certain discreteness1 being 
but a continuity of the ,many3 and      
discrete quantity is no less continuous1
 its continuity being the ,one  or      
,unit1 that is1 the self-same point of  
the many ,ones4    7#a7 ,continuous and 
,discrete magnitude1 therefore1 must not
 be supposed  two species of magnitude1 
as if the characteristic of the one did 
not  attach to the other4 ,the only     
distinction between them is that the    
same whole 7of quantity7 is at one time 
explicitly put under the one1  at       
another under the other of its          

characteristics4 7#b7 ,the ,antinomy of 
space1 of time1 or of matter1 which     
discusses the question of their  being  
divisible for ever1 or of consisting of 
indivisible units1 just  means that we  
maintain quantity as at one time        
,discrete1 at  another ,continuous4 ,if 
we explicitly invest time1 space1 or    
matter with  the attribute of           
,continuous quantity alone1 they are    
divisible ad  infinitum4 ,when1 on the  
contrary1 they are invested with the    
attribute  of ,discrete quantity1 they  
are potentially divided already1 and    
consist  of indivisible units4 ,the one 
view is as inadequate as the other4     
,quantity1 as the proximate result of   
,being-for-self1 involves the  two sides
 in the process of the latter1          
attraction and repulsion1 as            
constitutive elements of its own idea4  
,it is consequently ,continuous  as well
 as ,discrete4 ,each of these two       
elements involves the other  also1 and  
hence there is no such thing as a merely

 ,continuous or a  merely ,discrete     
quantity4 ,we may speak of the two as   
two particular and  opposite species of 
magnitude2 but that is merely the result
 of our  abstracting reflection1 which  
in viewing definite magnitudes waives   
now  the one1 now the other1 of the     
elements contained in inseparable unity 
in the notion of quantity4 ,thus1 it may
 be said1 the space occupied by  this   
room is a continuous magnitude1 and the 
hundred men1 assembled  in it1 form a   
discrete magnitude4 ,and yet the space  
is continuous and  discrete at the same 
time2 hence we speak of points of space1
 or we  divide space1 a certain length1 
into so many feet1 inches1 c1 which  can
 be done only on the hypothesis that    
space is also potentially  discrete4    
,similarly1 on the other hand1 the      
discrete magnitude1 made  up of a       
hundred men1 is also continuous3 and the
 circumstance on which  this continuity 
depends1 is the common element1 the     
species man1 which  pervades all the    

individuals and unites them with each   
other4    7b7 ,quantum 7,how ,much74    
#aja4 ,quantity1 essentially invested   
with the exclusionist character  which  
it involves1 is ,quantum 7or ,how       
,much73 i4e4 limited  quantity4         
,quantum is1 as it were1 the determinate
 ,being of quantity3 whereas mere       
quantity corresponds to abstract ,being1
 and the ,degree1 which is next  to be  
considered1 corresponds to              
,being-for-self4 ,as for the details  of
 the advance from mere quantity to      
quantum1 it is founded on this3  that   
whilst in mere quantity the distinction1
 as a distinction of  continuity and    
discreteness1 is at first only implicit1
 in a quantum  the distinction is       
actually made1 so that quantity in      
general now  appears as distinguished or
 limited4 ,but in this way the quantum  
breaks  up at the same time into an     
indefinite multitude of ,quanta or      
definite  magnitudes4 ,each of these    
definite magnitudes1 as distinguished   

from  the others1 forms a unity1 while  
on the other hand1 viewed per se1 it  is
 a many4 ,and1 when that is done1 the   
quantum is described as ,number4        
#ajb4 ,in ,number the quantum reaches   
its development and perfect  mode4 ,like
 the ,one1 the medium in which it       
exists1 ,number involves two            
qualitative factors or functions2       
,annumeration or ,sum1 which depends on 
the factor discreteness1 and ,unity1    
which depends on continuity4    ,in     
arithmetic the several kinds of         
operation are usually presented as      
accidental modes of dealing with        
numbers4 ,if necessity and meaning  is  
to be found in these operations1 it must
 be by a principle3 and  that must come 
from the characteristic elements in the 
notion of  number itself4 7,this        
principle must here be briefly          
exhibited47 ,these  characteristic      
elements are ,annumeration on the one   
hand1 and ,unity on  the other1 which   
together constitute number4 ,but ,unity1

 when applied  to empirical numbers1 is 
only the equality of these numbers3     
hence the  principle of arithmetical    
operations must be to put numbers in the
  ratio of ,unity and ,sum 7or amount71 
and to elicit the equality of these  two
 modes4    ,the ,ones or the numbers    
themselves are indifferent towards each 
other1  and hence the unity into which  
they are translated by the arithmetical 
operation takes the aspect of an        
external colligation4 ,all reckoning is 
therefore making up the tale3 and the   
difference between the species of  it   
lies only in the qualitative            
constitution of the numbers of which we 
make up the tale4 ,the principle for    
this constitution is given by the  way  
we fix ,unity and ,annumeration4        
,numeration comes first3 what we may    
call1 making number2 a colligation  of  
as many units as we please4 ,but to get 
a species of calculation1  it is        
necessary that what we count up should  
be numbers already1 and no  longer a    

mere unit4    ,first1 and as they       
naturally come to hand1 ,numbers are    
quite vaguely  numbers in general1 and  
so1 on the whole1 unequal4 ,the         
colligation1 or  telling the tale of    
these1 is ,addition4    ,the second     
point of view under which we regard     
numbers is as equal1  so that they make 
one unity1 and of such there is an      
annumeration or  sum before us4 ,to tell
 the tale of these is ,multiplication4  
,it makes  no matter in the process1 how
 the functions of ,sum and ,unity are   
distributed between the two numbers1 or 
factors of the product2 either  may be  
,sum and either may be ,unity4    ,the  
third and final point of view is the    
equality of ,sum 7amount7 and  ,unity4  
,to number together numbers when so     
characterised is ,involution2  and in   
the first instance raising them to the  
square power4 ,to  raise the number to  
higher power means in point of form to  
go on  multiplying a number with itself 
an indefinite amount of times4--,since  

this third type of calculation exhibits 
the complete equality of the  sole      
existing distinction in number1 viz4 the
 distinction between ,sum  or amount and
 ,unity1 there can be no more than these
 three modes of  calculation4           
,corresponding to the integration we    
have the dissolution  of numbers        
according to the same features4 ,hence  
besides the three  species mentioned1   
which may to that extent be called      
positive1 there  are three negative     
species of arithmetical operation4      
,number1 in general1 is the quantum in  
its complete specialisation4  ,hence we 
may employ it not only to determine what
 we call discrete1 but  what are called 
continuous magnitudes as well4 ,for that
 reason even  geometry must call in the 
aid of number1 when it is required to   
specify  definite figurations of space  
and their ratios4    7c7 ,degree4       
#ajc4 ,the limit 7in a quantum7 is      
identical with the whole of the  quantum
 itself4 ,as in itself multiple1 the    

limit is ,extensive  magnitude2 as in   
itself simple determinateness           
7qualitative  simplicity71 it is        
,intensive magnitude or ,degree4    ,the
 distinction between ,continuous and    
,discrete magnitude differs  from that  
between ,extensive and ,intensive in the
 circumstance that  the former apply to 
quantity in general1 while the latter   
apply to  the limit or determinateness  
of it as such4 ,intensive and ,extensive
  magnitude are not1 any more than the  
other1 two species1 of which the  one   
involves a character not possessed by   
the other3 what is ,extensive  magnitude
 is just as much ,intensive1 and vice   
vers4    ,intensive magnitude or ,degree
 is in its notion distinct from         
,extensive  magnitude or the ,quantum4  
,it is therefore inadmissible to refuse1
  as many do1 to recognise this         
distinction1 and without scruple to     
identify the two forms of magnitude4    
,they are so identified in  physics1    
when difference of specific gravity is  

explained by saying1  that a body1 with 
a specific gravity twice that of        
another1 contains  within the same space
 twice as many material parts 7or atoms7
 as the  other4 ,so with heat and light1
 if the various degrees of temperature  
and brilliancy were to be explained by  
the greater or less number of  particles
 7or molecules7 of heat and light4 ,no  
doubt the physicists1  who employ such a
 mode of explanation1 usually excuse    
themselves1 when  they are remonstrated 
with on its untenableness1 by saying    
that the  expression is without         
prejudice to the confessedly unknowable 
essence  of such phenomena1 and employed
 merely for greater convenience4 ,this  
greater convenience is meant to point to
 the easier application of the          
calculus3 but it is hard to see why     
,intensive magnitudes1 having1 as  they 
do1 a definite numerical expression of  
their own1 should not be  as convenient 
for calculation as ,extensive           
magnitudes4 ,if convenience  be all that

 is desired1 surely it would be more    
convenient to banish  calculation and   
thought altogether4 ,a further point    
against the apology  offered by the     
physicists is1 that1 to engage in       
explanations of this  kind1 is to       
overstep the sphere of perception and   
experience1 and  resort to the realm of 
metaphysics and of what at other times  
would be  called idle or even pernicious
 speculation4 ,it is certainly a fact of
  experience that1 if one of two purses 
filled with shillings is twice  as heavy
 as the other1 the reason must be1 that 
the one contains1 say  two hundred1 and 
the other only one hundred shillings4   
,these pieces  of money we can see and  
feel with our senses3 atoms1 molecules1 
and  the like1 are on the contrary      
beyond the range of sensuous perception2
  and thought alone can decide whether  
they are admissible1 and have  a        
meaning4 ,but 7as already noticed in    
#ih1 note7 it is abstract  understanding
 which stereotypes the factor of        

multeity 7involved in the  notion of    
,being-for-self7 in the shape of atoms1 
and adopts it as an  ultimate principle4
 ,it is the same abstract understanding 
which1 in  the present instance1 at     
equal variance with unprejudiced        
perception  and with real concrete      
thought1 regards ,extensive magnitude as
 the  sole form of quantity1 and1 where 
,intensive magnitudes occur1 does not   
recognise them in their own character1  
but makes a violent attempt by a  wholly
 untenable hypothesis to reduce them to 
,extensive magnitudes4    ,among the    
charges made against modern philosophy1 
one is heard more  than another4 ,modern
 philosophy1 it is said1 reduces        
everything to  identity4 ,hence its     
nickname1 the ,philosophy of ,identity4 
,but the  present discussion may teach  
that it is philosophy1 and philosophy   
alone1 which insists on distinguishing  
what is logically as well as  in        
experience different2 while the         
professed devotees of experience  are   

the people who erect abstract identity  
into the chief principle  of knowledge4 
,it is their philosophy which might more
 appropriately  be termed one of        
identity4 ,besides it is quite correct  
that there are  no merely ,extensive and
 merely ,intensive magnitudes1 just as  
little  as there are merely continuous  
and merely discrete magnitudes4 ,the    
two characteristics of quantity are not 
opposed as independent kinds4  ,every   
,intensive magnitude is also ,extensive1
 and vice vers4 ,thus a  certain degree 
of temperature is an ,intensive         
magnitude1 which has a  perfectly simple
 sensation corresponding to it as such4 
,if we look at a  thermometer1 we find  
this degree of temperature has a certain
 expansion  of the column of mercury    
corresponding to it2 which ,extensive   
magnitude  changes simultaneously with  
the temperature or ,intensive magnitude4
 ,the  case is similar in the world of  
mind3 a more intensive character has a  
wider range with its effects than a less

 intensive4    #ajd4 ,in ,degree the    
notion of quantum is explicitly put4 ,it
 is  magnitude as indifferent on its own
 account and simple3 but in such  a way 
that the character 7or modal being7     
which makes it a quantum  lies quite    
outside it in other magnitudes4 ,in this
 contradiction1  where the independent  
indifferent limit is absolute           
externality1  the ,infinite             
,quantitative ,progression is made      
explicit--an immediacy  which           
immediately veers round into its        
counterpart1 into mediation 7the        
passing beyond and over the quantum just
 laid down71 and vice vers4    ,number  
is a thought1 but thought in its        
complete self-externalisation4  ,because
 it is a thought1 it does not belong to 
perception3 but it is a  thought which  
is characterised by the externality of  
perception4--,not  only therefore may   
the quantum be increased or diminished  
without  end3 the very notion of quantum
 is thus to push out and out beyond     

itself4 ,the infinite quantitative      
progression is only the meaningless     
repetition of one and the same          
contradiction1 which attaches to the    
quantum1 both generally and1 when       
explicitly invested with its special    
character1 as degree4 ,touching the     
futility of enunciating this            
contradiction in the form of infinite   
progression1 ,zeno1 as quoted by        
,aristotle1 rightly says1 ',it is the   
same to say a thing once1 and to  say it
 for ever4'    7#a7 ,if we follow the   
usual definition of the mathematicians1 
given in   #ii1 and say that magnitude  
is what can be increased or diminished1 
there may be nothing to urge against the
 correctness of the perception  on which
 it is founded2 but the question        
remains1 how we come to  assume such a  
capacity of increase or diminution4 ,if 
we simply appeal  for an answer to      
experience1 we try an unsatisfactory    
course2 because  apart from the fact    
that we should merely have a material   

image of  magnitude1 and not the thought
 of it1 magnitude would come out as a   
bare possibility 7of increasing or      
diminishing7 and we should have no  key 
to the necessity for its exhibiting this
 behaviour4 ,in the way of  our logical 
evolution1 on the contrary1 quantity is 
obviously a grade  the process of       
self-determining thought2 and it has    
been shown that it  lies in the very    
notion of quantity to shoot out beyond  
itself4 ,in that  way1 the increase or  
diminution 7of which we have heard7 is  
not merely  possible1 but necessary4    
7#b7 ,the quantitative infinite         
progression is what the reflective      
understanding usually relies upon when  
it is engaged with the  general question
 of ,infinity4 ,the same thing however  
holds good of  this progression1 as was 
already remarked on the occasion of the 
qualitatively1 infinite progression4 ,as
 was then said1 it is not the           
expression of a true1 but of a wrong    
infinity2 it never gets further  than a 

bare 'ought1' and thus really remains   
within the limits  of finitude4 ,the    
quantitative form of this infinite      
progression1  which ,spinoza rightly    
calls a mere imaginary infinity         
7infinitum  imaginationis17 is an image 
often employed by poets1 such as ,haller
  and ,klopstock1 to depict the         
infinity1 not of ,nature merely1 but    
even  of ,god ,himself4 ,thus we find   
,haller1 in a famous description of     
,god's  infinity1 saying3        ,ich   
hufe ungeheure ,zahlen1      ,gebirge   
,millionen auf1      ,ich sesse ,zeit   
auf ,zeit      ,und ,welt auf ,welt zu  
,hauf1      ,und wenn ich von der       
grausen ,hh'      ,mit ,schwindel wieder
 nach ,dir seh3      ,ist alle ,macht   
der ,zahl1      ,vermehrt zu            
,tausendmal1      ,noch nicht ein ,theil
 von ,dir4    ,i heap up monstrous      
numbers1 mountains of millions2 ,i pile 
time upon  time1 and world on the top of
 world2 and when from the awful height  
,i  cast a dizzy look towards ,thee1 all

 the power of number1 multiplied a      
thousand times1 is not yet one part of  
,thee4    ,here then we meet1 in the    
first place1 that continual extrusion of
  quantity1 and especially of number1   
beyond itself1 which ,kant describes  as
 'eery4' ,the only really 'eery' thing  
about it is the wearisomeness  of ever  
fixing1 and anon unfixing a limit1      
without advancing a single  step4 ,the  
same poet however well adds to that     
description of false  infinity the      
closing line3        ,ich zieh sie ab1  
und ,du liegst ganz vor mir4    ,these  
,i remove1 and ,thou liest all before   
me4    ,which means1 that the true      
infinite is more than a mere world      
beyond  the finite1 and that we1 in     
order to become conscious of it1 must   
renounce that progressus in infinitum4  
7#c7 ,pythagoras1 as is well known1     
philosophised in numbers1 and  conceived
 number as the fundamental principle of 
things4 ,to the  ordinary mind this view
 must at first glance seem an utter     

paradox1  perhaps a mere craze4 ,what1  
then1 are we to think of it8 ,to answer 
this question1 we must1 in the first    
place1 remember that the problem  of    
philosophy consists in tracing back     
things to thoughts1 and1 of  course1 to 
definite thoughts4 ,now1 number is      
undoubtedly a thought3 it  is the       
thought nearest the sensible1 or1 more  
precisely expressed1 it  is the thought 
of the sensible itself1 if we take the  
sensible to mean  what is many1 and in  
reciprocal exclusion4 ,the attempt to   
apprehend  the universe as number is    
therefore the first step to metaphysics4
 ,in  the history of philosophy1        
,pythagoras1 as we know1 stands between 
the  ,ionian philosophers and the       
,eleatics4 ,while the former1 as        
,aristotle  says1 never get beyond      
viewing the essence of things as        
material 771  and the latter1 especially
 ,parmenides1 advanced as far as pure   
thought1  in the shape of ,being1 the   
principle of the ,pythagorean philosophy

  forms1 as it were1 the bridge from the
 sensible to the super-sensible4    ,we 
may gather from this1 what is to be said
 of those who suppose that  ,pythagoras 
undoubtedly went too far1 when he       
conceived the essence  of things as mere
 number4 ,it is true1 they admit1 that  
we can number  things2 but1 they        
contend1 things are far more than mere  
numbers4 ,but  in what respect are they 
more8 ,the ordinary sensuous            
consciousness1  from its own point of   
view1 would not hesitate to answer the  
question  by handing us over to sensuous
 perception1 and remarking1 that things 
are not merely numerable1 but also      
visible1 odorous1 palpable1 c4 ,in  the 
phrase of modern times1 the fault of    
,pythagoras would be described  as an   
excess of idealism4 ,as may be gathered 
from what has been said  on the         
historical position of the ,pythagorean 
school1 the real state  of the case is  
quite the reverse4 ,let it be conceded  
that things are  more than numbers2 but 

the meaning of that admission must be   
that the  bare thought of number is     
still insufficient to enunciate the     
definite  notion or essence of things4  
,instead1 then1 of saying that          
,pythagoras  went too far with his      
philosophy of number1 it would be nearer
 the  truth to say that he did not go   
far enough2 and in fact the ,eleatics   
were the first to take the further step 
to pure thought4    ,besides1 even if   
there are not things1 there are states  
of things1 and  phenomena of nature     
altogether1 the character of which      
mainly rests on  definite numbers and   
proportions4 ,this is especially the    
case with the  difference of tones and  
their harmonic concord1 which1 according
 to a  well-known tradition1 first      
suggested to ,pythagoras to conceive the
  essence of things as number4 ,though  
it is unquestionably important to       
science to trace back these phenomena to
 the definite numbers on which  they are
 based1 it is wholly inadmissible to    

view the characterisation  by thought as
 a whole1 as merely numerical4 ,we may  
certainly feel  ourselves prompted to   
associate the most general              
characteristics of  thought with the    
first numbers3 saying1 #a is the simple 
and immediate2  #b is difference and    
mediation2 and #c the unity of both of  
these4 ,such  associations however are  
purely external3 there is nothing in the
 mere  numbers to make them express     
these definite thoughts4 ,with every    
step  in this method1 the more arbitrary
 grows the association of definite      
numbers with definite thoughts4 ,thus1  
we may view #d as the unity of  #a and  
#c1 and of the thoughts associated with 
them1 but #d is just as  much the double
 of #b2 similarly #i is not merely the  
square of #c1 but  also the sum of #h   
and ,i1 of #g and #b1 and so on4 ,to    
attach1 as do some  secret societies of 
modern times1 importance to all sorts of
 numbers  and figures1 is to some extent
 an innocent amusement1 but it is also a

  sign of deficiency of intellectual    
resource4 ,these numbers1 it is said1   
conceal a profound meaning1 and suggest 
a deal to think about4 ,but the  point  
in philosophy is1 not what you may      
think1 but what you do think3  and the  
genuine air of thought is to be sought  
in thought itself1 and  not in          
arbitrarily selected symbols4    #aje4  
,that the ,quantum in its independent   
character is external to  itself1 is    
what constitutes its quality4 ,in that  
externality it  is itself and referred  
connectively to itself4 ,there is a     
union in  it of externality1 i4e4 the   
quantitative1 and of independency       
7,being-for-self71--the qualitative4    
,the ,quantum when explicitly put  thus 
in its own self1 is the ,quantitative   
,ratio1 a mode of being  which1 while1  
in its ,exponent1 it is an immediate    
quantum1 is also  mediation1 viz4 the   
reference of some one quantum to        
another1 forming  the two sides of the  
ratio4 ,but the two quanta are not      

reckoned at  their immediate value3     
their value is only in this relation4   
,the quantitative infinite progression  
appears at first as a continual         
extrusion of number beyond itself4 ,on  
looking closer1 it is1 however1         
apparent that in this progression       
quantity returns to itself3 for  the    
meaning of this progression1 so far as  
thought goes1 is the fact  that number  
is determined by number4 ,and this gives
 the quantitative  ratio4 ,take1 for    
example1 the ratio #b3d4 ,here we have  
two magnitudes  7not counted in their   
several immediate values7 in which we   
are only  concerned with their mutual   
relations4 ,this relation of the two    
terms  7the exponent of the ratio7 is   
itself a magnitude1 distinguished from  
the related magnitudes by this1 that a  
change in it is followed by a  change of
 the ratio1 whereas the ratio is        
unaffected by the change of  both its   
sides1 and remains the same so long as  
the exponent is not  changed4           

,consequently1 in place of #b3d1 we can 
put #c3f without changing  the ratio2 as
 the exponent #b remains the same in    
both cases4    #ajf4 ,the two sides of  
the ratio are still immediate quanta3   
and the  qualitative and quantitative   
characteristics still external to one   
another4 ,but in their truth1 seeing    
that the quantitative itself in its     
externality is relation to self1 or     
seeing that the independence and  the   
indifference of the character are       
combined1 it is ,measure4    ,thus      
quantity by means of the dialectical    
movement so far studied  through its    
several stages1 turns out to be a return
 to quality4 ,the  first notion of      
quantity presented to us was that of    
quality abrogated  and absorbed4 ,that  
is to say1 quantity seemed an external  
character not  identical with ,being1 to
 which it is quite immaterial4 ,this    
notion1 as  we have seen1 underlies the 
mathematical definition of magnitude as 
what can be increased or diminished4 ,at

 first sight this definition  may create
 the impression that quantity is merely 
whatever can be  altered3--increase and 
diminution alike implying determination 
of  magnitude otherwise--and may tend to
 confuse it with determinate ,being1    
the second stage of quality1 which in   
its notion is similarly conceived  as   
alterable4 ,we can1 however1 complete   
the definition by adding1 that  in      
quantity we have an alterable1 which in 
spite of alterations still  remains the 
same4 ,the notion of quantity1 it thus  
turns out1 implies an  inherent         
contradiction4 ,this1 contradiction is  
what forms the dialectic  of quantity4  
,the result of the dialectic however is 
not a mere return  to quality1 as if    
that were the true and quantity the     
false notion1 but  an advance to the    
unity and truth of both1 to qualitative 
quantity1 or  ,measure4    ,it may be   
well therefore at this point to observe 
that whenever in  our study of the      
objective world we are engaged in       

quantitative  determinations1 it is in  
all cases ,measure which we have in     
view1 as  the goal of our operations4   
,this is hinted at even in language1    
when  the ascertainment of quantitative 
features and relations is called        
measuring4 ,we measure1 e4g4 the length 
of different chords that have  been put 
into a state of vibration1 with an eye  
to the qualitative  difference of the   
tones caused by their vibration1        
corresponding to  this difference of    
length4 ,similarly1 in chemistry1 we try
 to ascertain  the quantity of the      
matters brought into combination1 in    
order to find  out the measures or      
proportions conditioning such           
combinations1 that  is to say1 those    
quantities which give rise to definite  
qualities4  ,in statistics1 too1 the    
numbers with which the study is engaged 
are  important only from the qualitative
 results conditioned by them4 ,mere     
collection of numerical facts1          
prosecuted without regard to the ends   

here noted1 is justly called an exercise
 of idle curiosity1 of neither          
theoretical nor practical interest4     
#ajg4 ,measure is the qualitative       
quantum1 in the first place as          
immediate1--a quantum1 to which a       
determinate being or a quality is       
attached4    ,measure1 where quality and
 quantity are in one1 is thus the       
completion  of ,being4 ,being1 as we    
first apprehend it1 is something utterly
  abstract and characterless3 but it is 
the very essence of ,being to           
characterise itself1 and its complete   
characterisation is reached  in         
,measure4 ,measure1 like the other      
stages of ,being1 may serve as a        
definition of the ,absolute3 ,god1 it   
has been said1 is the ,measure of  all  
things4 ,it is this idea which forms the
 ground-note of many of the  ancient    
,hebrew hymns1 in which the             
glorification of ,god tends in the  main
 to show that ,he has appointed to      
everything its bound3 to the  sea and   

the solid land1 to the rivers and       
mountains2 and also to the  various     
kinds of plants and animals4 ,to the    
religious sense of the  ,greeks the     
divinity of measure1 especially in      
respect of social ethics1  was          
represented by ,nemesis4 ,that          
conception implies a general theory     
that all human things1 riches1 honour1  
and power1 as well as joy and  pain1    
have their definite measure1 the        
transgression of which brings  ruin and 
destruction4 ,in the world of objects1  
too1 we have measure4 ,we  see1 in the  
first place1 existences in ,nature1 of  
which measure forms  the essential      
structure4 ,this is the case1 for       
example1 with the solar  system1 which  
may be described as the realm of free   
measures4 ,as we  next proceed to the   
study of inorganic nature1 measure      
retires1 as it  were1 into the          
background2 at least we often find the  
quantitative and  qualitative           
characteristics showing indifference to 

each other4 ,thus  the quality of a rock
 or a river is not tied to a definite   
magnitude4  ,but even these objects when
 closely inspected are found not to be  
quite  measureless3 the water of a      
river1 and the single constituents of a 
rock1 when chemically analysed1 are seen
 to be qualities conditioned  by        
quantitative ratios between the matters 
they contain4 ,in organic  nature1      
however1 measure again rises full into  
immediate perception4  ,the various     
kinds of plants and animals1 in the     
whole as well as in  their parts1 have a
 certain measure3 though it is worth    
noticing that  the more imperfect forms1
 those which are least removed from     
inorganic  nature1 are partly           
distinguished from the higher forms by  
the greater  indefiniteness of their    
measure4 ,thus among fossils1 we find   
some  ammonites discernible only by the 
microscope1 and others as large as a    
cart-wheel4 ,the same vagueness of      
measure appears in several plants1      

which stand on a low level of organic   
development1--for instance1 ferns4      
#ajh4 ,in so far as in ,measure quality 
and quantity are only in  immediate     
unity1 to that extent their difference  
presents itself in  a manner equally    
immediate4 ,two cases are then possible4
 ,either the  specific quantum or       
measure is a bare quantum1 and the      
definite being  7there-and-then7 is     
capable of an increase or a diminution1 
without  ,measure 7which to that extent 
is a ,rule7 being thereby set completely
  aside4 ,or the alteration of the      
quantum is also an alteration of the    
quality4    ,the identity between       
quantity and quality1 which is found in 
,measure1  is at first only implicit1   
and not yet explicitly realised4 ,in    
other  words1 these two categories1     
which unite in ,measure1 each claim an  
independent authority4 ,on the one hand1
 the quantitative features of  existence
 may be altered1 without affecting its  
quality4 ,on the other  hand1 this      

increase and diminution1 immaterial     
though it be1 has  its limit1 by        
exceeding which the quality suffers     
change4 ,thus the  temperature of water 
is1 in the first place1 a point of no   
consequence  in respect of its          
liquidity3 still with the increase or   
diminution  of the temperature of the   
liquid water1 there comes a point where 
this state of cohesion suffers a        
qualitative change1 and the water  is   
converted into steam or ice4 ,a         
quantitative change takes place1        
apparently without any further          
significance3 but there is something    
lurking behind1 and a seemingly innocent
 change of quantity acts as a  kind of  
snare1 to catch hold of the quality4    
,the antinomy of ,measure  which this   
implies was exemplified under more than 
one garb among the  ,greeks4 ,it was    
asked1 for example1 whether a single    
grain makes a heap  of wheat1 or whether
 it makes a bald-tail to tear out a     
single hair  from the horse's tail4 ,at 

first1 no doubt1 looking at the nature  
of  quantity as an indifferent and      
external character of ,being1 we are    
disposed to answer these questions in   
the negative4 ,and yet1 as we  must     
admit1 this indifferent increase and    
diminution has its limit3  a point is   
finally reached1 where a single         
additional grain makes a  heap of wheat2
 and the bald-tail is produced1 if we   
continue plucking  out single hairs4    
,these examples find a parallel in the  
story of the  peasant who1 as his ass   
trudged cheerfully along1 went on adding
 ounce  after ounce to its load1 till at
 length it sunk under the unendurable   
burden4 ,it would be a mistake to treat 
these examples as pedantic  futility2   
they really turn on thoughts1 an        
acquaintance with which is  of great    
importance in practical life1 especially
 in ethics4 ,thus in  the matter of     
expenditure1 there is a certain latitude
 within which  a more or less does not  
matter2 but when the ,measure1 imposed  

by the  individual circumstances of the 
special case1 is exceeded on the one    
side or the other1 the qualitative      
nature of ,measure 7as in the above     
examples of the different temperature of
 water7 makes itself felt1  and a       
course1 which a moment before was held  
good economy1 turns into  avarice or    
prodigality4 ,the same principle may be 
applied in politics1  when the          
constitution of a state has to be looked
 at as independent of1  no less than as 
dependent on1 the extent of its         
territory1 the number  of its           
inhabitants1 and other quantitative     
points of the same kind4 ,if  we look   
e4g4 at a state with a territory of ten 
thousand square miles  and a population 
of four millions1 we should1 without    
hesitation1 admit  that a few square    
miles of land or a few thousand         
inhabitants more or  less could exercise
 no essential influence on the character
 of its  constitution4 ,but1 on the     
other hand1 we must not forget1 that by 

the  continual increase or diminishing  
of a state1 we finally get to a point   
where1 apart from all other             
circumstances1 this quantitative        
alteration  alone necessarily draws with
 it an alteration in the quality of the 
constitution4 ,the constitution of a    
little ,swiss canton does not suit  a   
great kingdom2 and1 similarly1 the      
constitution of the ,roman republic  was
 unsuitable when transferred to the     
small imperial towns of ,germany4       
#aji4 ,in this second case1 when a      
measure through its quantitative  nature
 has gone in excess of its qualitative  
character1 we meet1 what  is at first an
 absence of measure1 the ,measureless4  
,but seeing  that the second            
quantitative ratio1 which in comparison 
with the first  is measureless1 is none 
the less qualitative1 the measureless is
 also a  measure4 ,these two            
transitions1 from quality to quantum1   
and from the  latter back again to      
quality1 may be represented under the   

image of an  infinite progression--as   
the self-abrogation and restoration of  
measure  in the measureless4            
,quantity1 as we have seen1 is not only 
capable of alteration1 i4e4  of increase
 or diminution3 it is naturally and     
necessarily a tendency  to exceed       
itself4 ,this tendency is maintained    
even in measure4 ,but if  the quantity  
present in measure exceeds a certain    
limit1 the quality  corresponding to it 
is also put in abeyance4 ,this however  
is not a  negation of quality           
altogether1 but only of this definite   
quality1 the  place of which is at once 
occupied by another4 ,this process of   
measure1  which appears alternately as a
 mere change in quantity1 and then as a 
sudden revulsion of quantity into       
quality1 may be envisaged under the     
figure of a nodal 7knotted7 line4 ,such 
lines we find in ,nature under  a       
variety of forms4 ,we have already      
referred to the qualitatively  different
 states of aggregation water exhibits   

under increase or  diminution of        
temperature4 ,the same phenomenon is    
presented by the  different degrees in  
the oxidation of metals4 ,even the      
difference of  musical notes may be     
regarded as an example of what takes    
place in  the process of measure1--the  
revulsion from what is at first merely  
quantitative into qualitative           
alteration4    #aaj4 ,what really takes 
place here is that the immediacy1 which 
still  attaches to measure as such1 is  
set aside4 ,in measure1 at first1       
quality and quantity itself are         
immediate1 and measure is only their    
'relative' identity4 ,but measure shows 
itself absorbed and superseded  in the  
measureless3 yet the measureless1       
although it be the negation  of measure1
 is itself a unity of quantity and      
quality4 ,thus in the  measureless the  
measure is still seen to meet only with 
itself4    #aaa4 ,instead of the more   
abstract factors1 ,being and ,nothing1  
some  and other1 c41 the ,infinite1     

which is affirmation as a negation  of  
negation1 now finds its factors in      
quality and quantity4 ,these  77 have in
 the first place passed over1 quality   
into quantity1 7  #ih71 and quantity    
into quality 7 #aje71 and thus are both 
shown up  as negations1 77 ,but in their
 unity1 that is1 in measure1 they are   
originally distinct1 and the one is only
 through the instrumentality of  the    
other4 ,and 77 after the immediacy of   
this unity has turned out to  be        
self-annulling1 the unity is explicitly 
put as what it implicitly  is1 simple   
relation-to-self1 which contains in it  
being and all its  forms                
absorbed4--,being or immediacy1 which by
 the negation of itself  is a mediation 
with self and a reference to            
self1--which consequently  is also a    
mediation which cancels itself into     
reference-to-self1 or  immediacy1--is   
,essence4    ,the process of measure1   
instead of being only the wrong infinite
 of  an endless progression1 in the     

shape of an ever-recurrent recoil  from 
quality to quantity1 and from quantity  
to quality1 is also  the true infinity  
of coincidence with self in another4 ,in
 measure1  quality and quantity         
originally confront each other1 like    
some and  other4 ,but quality is        
implicitly quantity1 and conversely     
quantity  is implicitly quality4 ,in the
 process of measure1 therefore1 these   
two pass into each other3 each of them  
becomes what it already was  implicitly3
 and thus we get ,being thrown into     
abeyance and absorbed1  with its several
 characteristics negatived4 ,such ,being
 is ,essence4  ,measure is implicitly   
,essence2 and its process consists in   
realising  what it is implicitly4--,the 
ordinary consciousness conceives things 
as being1 and studies them in quality1  
quantity1 and measure4 ,these  immediate
 characteristics however soon show      
themselves to be not fixed  but         
transient2 and ,essence is the result of
 their dialectic4 ,in the  sphere of    

,essence one category does not pass into
 another1 but refers  to another merely4
 ,in ,being1 the form of reference is   
purely due to  our reflection on what   
takes place3 but it is the special and  
proper  characteristic of ,essence4 ,in 
the sphere of ,being1 when somewhat     
becomes another1 the somewhat has       
vanished4 ,not so in ,essence3 here     
there is no real other1 but only        
diversity1 reference of the one  to its 
other4 ,the transition of ,essence is   
therefore at the same  time no          
transition3 for in the passage of       
different into different1  the different
 does not vanish3 the different terms   
remain in their  relation4 ,when we     
speak of ,being and ,nought1 ,being is  
independent1 so  is ,nought4 ,the case  
is otherwise with the ,positive and the 
,negative4  ,no doubt these possess the 
characteristic of ,being and ,nought4   
,but  the positive by itself has no     
sense2 it is wholly in reference to the 
negative4 ,and it is the same with the  

negative4 ,in the sphere of ,being  the 
reference of one term to another is only
 implicit2 in ,essence on  the contrary 
it is explicit ,and this in general is  
the distinction  between the forms of   
,being and ,essence3 in ,being          
everything is  immediate1 in ,essence   
everything is relative4                 
,,chapter ,,viii4      ,,second         
,,sub-,,division ,,of ,,logic4          
,,the ,,doctrine ,,of ,,essence4        
#aab4 ,the terms in ,essence are always 
mere pairs of correlatives1 and  not yet
 absolutely reflected in themselves3    
hence in essence the actual  unity of   
the notion is not realised1 but only    
postulated by reflection4               
,essence1--which is ,being coming into  
mediation with itself through the       
negativity of itself--is                
self-relatedness1 only in so far as it  
is  relation to an ,other1--this ,other 
however coming to view at first not  as 
something which is1 but as postulated   
and hypothetised4--,being has  not      

vanished3 but1 firstly1 ,essence1 as    
simple self-relation1 is ,being1  and   
secondly as regards its one-sided       
characteristic of immediacy1  ,being is 
deposed to a mere negative1 to a seeming
 or reflected  light--,essence          
accordingly is ,being thus reflecting   
light into itself4    ,the ,absolute is 
the ,essence4 ,this is the same         
definition as the  previous one that the
 ,absolute is ,being1 in so far as      
,being likewise  is simple              
self-relation4 ,but it is at the same   
time higher1 because  ,essence is ,being
 that has gone into itself3 that is to  
say1 the  simple self-relation 7in      
,being7 is expressly put as negation of 
the negative1 as immanent               
self-mediation4--,unfortunately when the
  ,absolute is defined to be the        
,essence1 the negativity which this     
implies is often taken only to mean the 
withdrawal of all determinate           
predicates4 ,this negative action of    
withdrawal or abstraction thus  falls   

outside of the ,essence--which is thus  
left as a mere result apart  from its   
premisses1--the caput mortuum of        
abstraction4 ,but as this  negativity1  
instead of being external to ,being1 is 
its own dialectic1  the truth of the    
latter1 viz4 ,essence1 will be ,being as
 retired within  itself1--immanent      
,being4 ,that reflection1 or light      
thrown into itself1  constitutes the    
distinction between ,essence and        
immediate ,being1 and is  the peculiar  
characteristic of ,essence itself4      
99       99       99       99       99  
,any mention of ,essence implies that we
 distinguish it from ,being3  the latter
 is immediate1 and1 compared with the   
,essence1 we look upon  it as mere      
seeming4 ,but this seeming is not an    
utter nonentity and  nothing at all1 but
 ,being superseded and put by4 ,the     
point of view  given by the ,essence is 
in general the standpoint of            
',reflection4'  ,this word 'reflection' 
is originally applied1 when a ray of    

light in  a straight line impinging upon
 the surface of a mirror is thrown back 
from it4 ,in this phenomenon we have two
 things1--first an immediate  fact which
 is1 and secondly the deputed1          
derivated1 or transmitted  phase of the 
same4--,something of this sort takes    
place when we reflect1  or think upon an
 object2 for here we want to know the   
object1 not in  its immediacy1 but as   
derivative or mediated4 ,the problem or 
aim of  philosophy is often represented 
as the ascertainment of the essence of  
things3 a phrase which only means that  
things instead of being left  in their  
immediacy1 must be shown to be mediated 
by1 or based upon1  something else4 ,the
 immediate ,being of things is thus     
conceived under  the image of a rind or 
curtain behind which the ,essence lies  
hidden4    ,everything1 it is said1 has 
an ,essence2 that is1 things really are 
not  what they immediately show         
themselves4 ,there is therefore         
something  more to be done than merely  

rove from one quality to another1 and   
merely to advance from qualitative to   
quantitative1 and vice vers3  there is a
 permanent in things1 and that permanent
 is in the first  instance their        
,essence4 ,with respect to other        
meanings and uses of the  category of   
,essence1 we may note that in the       
,german auxiliary verb  'sein' the past 
tense is expressed by the term for      
,essence 7,wesen73  we designate past   
being as gewesen4 ,this anomaly of      
language implies  to some extent a      
correct perception of the relation      
between ,being and  ,essence4 ,essence  
we may certainly regard as past ,being1 
remembering  however meanwhile that the 
past is not utterly denied1 but only    
laid  aside and thus at the same time   
preserved4 ,thus1 to say1 ,caesar was   
in ,gaul1 only denies the immediacy of  
the event1 but not his sojourn  in ,gaul
 altogether4 ,that sojourn is just what 
forms the import of  the proposition1 in
 which however it is represented as over

 and  gone4--',wesen' in ordinary life  
frequently means only a collection  or  
aggregate3 ,zeitungswesen 7the ,press71 
,postwesen 7the ,post-,office71         
,steuerwesen 7the ,revenue74 ,all that  
these terms mean is that the things  in 
question are not to be taken single1 in 
their immediacy1 but as a  complex1 and 
then1 perhaps1 in addition1 in their    
various bearings4  ,this usage of the   
term is not very different in its       
implication from  our own4    ,people   
also speak of finite ,essences1 such as 
man4 ,but the very term  ,essence       
implies that we have made a step beyond 
finitude3 and the title  as applied to  
man is so far inexact4 ,it is often     
added that there is  a supreme ,essence 
7,being73 by which is meant ,god4 ,on   
this two remarks  may be made4 ,in the  
first place the phrase 'there is'       
suggests a  finite only3 as when we say1
 there are so many planets1 or1 there   
are  plants of such a constitution and  
plants of such an other4 ,in these      

cases we are speaking of something which
 has other things beyond and  beside it4
 ,but ,god1 the absolutely infinite1 is 
not something outside  and beside whom  
there are other essences4 ,all else     
outside f ,god1 if  separated from ,him1
 possesses no essentiality3 in its ,i   
isolation it  becomes a mere show or    
seeming1 without stay or essence of its 
own4  ,but1 secondly1 it is a poor way  
of talking to call ,god the highest  or 
supreme ,essence4 ,the category of      
quantity which the phrase employs  has  
its proper place within the compass of  
the finite4 ,when we call  one mountain 
the highest on the earth1 we have a     
vision of other  high mountains beside  
it4 ,so too when we call any one the    
richest or  most learned in his country4
 ,but ,god1 far from being a ,being1    
even  the highest1 is the ,being4 ,this 
definition1 however1 though such  a     
representation of ,god is an important  
and necessary stage in the  growth of   
the religious consciousness1 does not by

 any means exhaust  the depth of the    
ordinary ,christian idea of ,god4 ,if we
 consider ,god as  the ,essence only1   
and nothing more1 we know ,him only as  
the universal  and irresistible ,power2 
in other words1 as the ,lord4 ,now the  
fear of  the ,lord is1 doubtless1 the   
beginning1--but only the beginning1 of  
wisdom4 ,to look at ,god in this light1 
as the ,lord1 and the ,lord alone1  is  
especially characteristic of ,judaism   
and also of ,mohammedanism4  ,the defect
 of these religions lies in their scant 
recognition of the  finite1 which1 be it
 as natural things or as finite phases  
of mind1  it is characteristic of the   
heathen and 7as they also for that      
reason  are7 polytheistic religions to  
maintain intact4 ,another not uncommon  
assertion is that ,god1 as the supreme  
,being1 cannot be known4 ,such is  the  
view taken by modern 'enlightenment' and
 abstract understanding1  which is      
content to say1 ,il y a un tre suprme3  
and there lets  the matter rest4 ,to    

speak thus1 and treat ,god merely as the
 supreme  other-world ,being1 implies   
that we look upon the world before us in
  its immediacy as something permanent  
and positive1 and forget that  true     
,being is just the superseding of all   
that is immediate4 ,if ,god  be the     
abstract super-sensible ,being1 outside 
whom therefore lies all  difference and 
all specific character1 ,he is only a   
bare name1 a mere  caput mortuum of     
abstracting understanding4 ,the true    
knowledge of ,god  begins when we know  
that things1 as they immediately are1   
have no truth4    ,in reference also to 
other subjects besides ,god the category
 of ,essence  is often liable to an     
abstract use1 by which1 in the study of 
anything1  its ,essence is held to be   
something unaffected by1 and subsisting 
in  independence of1 its definite       
phenomenal embodiment4 ,thus we say1 for
  example1 of people1 that the great    
thing is not what they do or how  they  
behave1 but what they are4 ,this is     

correct1 if it means that a  man's      
conduct should be looked at1 not in its 
immediacy1 but only as  it is explained 
by his inner self1 and as a revelation  
of that inner  self4 ,still it should be
 remembered that the only means by which
 the  ,essence and the inner self can be
 verified1 is their appearance in       
outward reality2 whereas the appeal     
which men make to the essential  life1  
as distinct from the material facts of  
conduct1 is generally  prompted by a    
desire to assert their own subjectivity 
and to elude an  absolute and objective 
judgment4    #aac4 ,self-relation in    
,essence is the form of ,identity or of 
reflection-into-self1 which has here    
taken the place of the immediacy  of    
,being4 ,they are both the same         
abstraction1--self-relation4    ,the    
unintelligence of sense1 to take        
everything limited and finite for       
,being1 passes into the obstinacy of    
understanding1 which views the  finite  
as self-identical1 not inherently       

self-contradictory4    #aad4 ,this      
identity1 as it has descended from      
,being1 appears in the  first place only
 charged with the characteristics of    
,being1 and  referred to ,being as to   
something external4 ,this external      
,being1 if  taken in separation from the
 true ,being 7of ,essence71 is called   
the  ,unessential4 ,but that turns out a
 mistake4 ,because ,essence is          
,being-in-self1 it is essential only to 
the extent that it has in itself  its   
negative1 e4 reference to another1 or   
mediation4 ,consequently1  it has the   
unessential as its own proper seeming   
7reflection7 in  itself4 ,but in seeming
 or mediation there is distinction      
involved3  and since what is            
distinguished 7as distinguished from the
 identity  out of which it arises1 and  
in which it is not1 or lies as seeming17
  receives itself the form of identity1 
the semblance is still in the  mode of  
,being1 or of self-related immediacy4   
,the sphere of ,essence  thus turns out 

to be a still imperfect combination of  
immediacy and  mediation4 ,in it every  
term is expressly invested with the     
character  of self-relatedness1 while   
yet at the same time one is forced      
beyond  it4 ,it has ,being1--reflected  
being1 a being in which another shows1  
and which shows in another4 ,and so it  
is also the sphere in which the         
contradiction1 still implicit in the    
sphere of ,being1 is made explicit4     
,as the one notion is the common        
principle underlying all logic1 there   
appear in the development of ,essence   
the same attributes or terms as  in the 
development of ,being1 but in a reflex  
form4 ,instead of ,being  and ,nought we
 have now the forms of ,positive and    
,negative2 the former  at first as      
,identity corresponding to pure and     
uncontrasted ,being1 the  latter        
developed 7showing in itself7 as        
,difference4 ,so also1 we have          
,becoming represented by the ,ground of 
determinate ,being3 which itself1  when 

reflected upon the ,ground1 is          
,existence4    ,the theory of ,essence  
is the most difficult branch of ,logic4 
,it  includes the categories of         
metaphysic and of the sciences in       
general4  ,these are products of        
reflective understanding1 which1 while  
it assumes  the differences to possess a
 footing of their own1 and at the same  
time also expressly affirms their       
relativity1 still combines the two      
statements1 side by side1 or one after  
the other1 by an ',also1' without       
bringing these thoughts into one1 or    
unifying them into the notion4          
,a4--,,essence ,,as ,,ground ,,of       
,,existence4    7a7 ,the pure principles
 or categories of ,reflection4    77    
,identity4    #aae4 ,the ,essence lights
 up in itself or is mere reflection3 and
  therefore is only self-relation1 not  
as immediate but as reflected4 ,and     
that reflex relation is self-,identity4 
,this ,identity becomes an ,identity in 
form only1 or of the  understanding1 if 

it be held hard and fast1 quite aloof   
from  difference4 ,or1 rather1          
abstraction is the imposition of this   
,identity  of form1 the transformation  
of something inherently concrete into   
this  form of elementary simplicity4    
,and this may be done in two ways4      
,either  we may neglect a part of the   
multiple features which are found in the
  concrete thing 7by what is called     
analysis7 and select only one of  them2 
or1 neglecting their variety1 we may    
concentrate the multiple  characters    
into one4    ,if we associate ,identity 
with the ,absolute1 making the ,absolute
 the  subject of a proposition1 we get3 
,the ,absolute is what is identical     
with itself4 ,however true this         
proposition may be1 it is doubtful      
whether it be meant in its truth3 and   
therefore it is at least  imperfect in  
the expression4 ,for it is left         
undecided1 whether it means  the        
abstract ,identity of                   
understanding1--abstract1 that is1      

because  contrasted with the other      
characteristics of ,essence1 or the     
,identity  which is inherently concrete4
 ,in the latter case1 as will be seen1  
true ,identity is first discoverable in 
the ,ground1 and1 with a higher  truth1 
in the ,notion4--,even the word         
,absolute is often used to mean no  more
 than 'abstract4' ,absolute space and   
absolute time1 for example1 is  another 
way of saying abstract space and        
abstract time4    ,when the principles  
of ,essence are taken as essential      
principles of  thought they become      
predicates of a pre-supposed subject1   
which1  because they are essential1 is  
',everything1' ,the propositions thus   
arising have been stated as universal   
,laws of ,thought4 ,thus the first  of  
them1 the maxim of ,identity1 reads3    
,everything is identical with  itself1  
,a,a3 and1 negatively1 ,a cannot at the 
same time be ,a and not  ,a4--,this     
maxim1 instead of being a true law of   
thought1 is nothing  but the law of     

abstract understanding4 ,the            
propositional form itself  contradicts  
it3 for a proposition always promises a 
distinction  between subject and        
predicate2 while the present one does   
not fulfil  what its form requires4 ,but
 the ,law is particularly set aside by  
the following so-called ,laws of        
,thought1 which make laws out of its    
opposite4--,it is asserted that the     
maxim of ,identity1 though it  cannot be
 proved1 regulates the procedure of     
every consciousness1  and that          
experience shows it to be accepted as   
soon as its terms  are apprehended4 ,to 
this alleged experience of the          
logic-books may  be opposed the         
universal experience that no mind thinks
 or forms  conceptions or speaks1 in    
accordance with this law1 and that no   
existence of any kind whatever conforms 
to it4 ,utterances after the  fashion of
 this pretended law 7,a planet is--a    
planet2 ,magnetism  is--magnetism2 ,mind
 is--mind7 are1 as they deserve to be1  

reputed  silly4 ,that is certainly      
matter of general experience4 ,the logic
 which  seriously propounds such laws   
and the scholastic world in which alone 
they are valid have long been           
discredited with practical common sense 
as well as with the philosophy of       
reason4    99       99       99       99
       99       99    ,identity is1 in  
the first place1 the repetition of what 
we had earlier  as ,being1 but as       
become1 through supersession of its     
character of  immediateness4 ,it is     
therefore ,being as ,ideality4--,it is  
important  to come to a proper          
understanding on the true meaning of    
,identity3  and1 for that purpose1 we   
must especially guard against taking it 
as abstract ,identity1 to the exclusion 
of all ,difference4 ,that is  the       
touchstone for distinguishing all bad   
philosophy from what alone  deserves the
 name of philosophy4 ,identity in its   
truth1 as an ,ideality  of what         
immediately is1 is a high category for  

our religious modes  of mind as well as 
all other forms of thought and mental   
activity4  ,the true knowledge of ,god1 
it may be said1 begins when we know ,him
 as  identity1--as absolute identity4   
,to know so much is to see that all  the
 power and glory of the world sinks into
 nothing in ,god's presence1  and       
subsists only as the reflection of ,his 
power and ,his glory4 ,in  the same way1
 ,identity1 as self-consciousness1 is   
what distinguishes  man from nature1    
particularly from the brutes which never
 reach the  point of comprehending      
themselves as ',i1' that is1 pure       
self-contained  unity4 ,so again1 in    
connexion with thought1 the main thing  
is not to  confuse the true ,identity1  
which contains ,being and its           
characteristics  ideally transfigured in
 it1 with an abstract ,identity1        
identity of bare  form4 ,all the charges
 of narrowness1 hardness1               
meaninglessness1 which  are so often    
directed against thought from the       

quarter of feeling and  immediate       
perception1 rest on the perverse        
assumption that thought  acts only as a 
faculty of abstract ,identification4    
,the ,formal ,logic  itself confirms    
this assumption by laying down the      
supreme law of  thought 7so-called7     
which has been discussed above4 ,if     
thinking were no  more than an abstract 
,identity1 we could not but own it to be
 a most  futile and tedious business4   
,no doubt the notion1 and the idea too1 
are  identical with themselves3 but     
identical only in so far as they at the 
same time involve distinction4    77    
,difference4    #aaf4 ,essence is mere  
,identity and reflection in itself only 
as it is  self-relating negativity1 and 
in that way self-repulsion4 ,it contains
  therefore essentially the             
characteristic of ,difference4          
,other-being is here no longer          
qualitative1 taking the shape of the    
character or limit4 ,it is now in       
,essence1 in self-relating essence1 and 

therefore the negation is at the same   
time a relation1--is1 in short1         
,distinction1 ,relativity1 ,mediation4  
,to ask1 ',how ,identity comes to       
,difference1' assumes that ,identity as 
mere abstract ,identity is something of 
itself1 and ,difference also  something 
else equally independent4 ,this         
supposition renders an answer  to the   
question impossible4 ,if ,identity is   
viewed as diverse from  ,difference1 all
 that we have in this way is but        
,difference2 and hence  we cannot       
demonstrate the advance to difference1  
because the person  who asks for the    
,how of the progress thereby implies    
that for him  the starting-point is     
non-existent4 ,the question then when   
put to  the test has obviously no       
meaning1 and its proposer may be met    
with  the question what he means by     
,identity2 whereupon we should soon see 
that he attaches no idea to it at all1  
and that ,identity is for him  an empty 
name4 ,as we have seen1 besides1        

,identity is undoubtedly a              
negative1--not however an abstract empty
 ,nought1 but the negation of  ,being   
and its characteristics4 ,being so1     
,identity is at the same time           
self-relation1 and1 what is more1       
negative self-relation2 in other  words1
 it draws a distinction between it and  
itself4    #aag4 ,difference is1 first  
of all1 7#a7 immediate difference1 e4g4 
,diversity or ,variety4 ,in ,diversity  
the different things are each           
individually what they are1 and         
unaffected by the relation in which     
they stand to each other4 ,this relation
 is therefore external to them4  ,in    
consequence of the various things being 
thus indifferent to the  difference     
between them1 it falls outside them into
 a third thing1 the  agent of           
,comparison4 ,this external difference1 
as an identity of the  objects related1 
is ,likeness2 as a non-identity of them1
 is ,unlikeness4    ,the gap which      
understanding allows to divide these    

characteristics1 is  so great1 that     
although comparison has one and the same
 substratum for  likeness and           
unlikeness1 which are explained to be   
different aspects  and points of view in
 it1 still likeness by itself is the    
first of the  elements alone1 viz4      
identity1 and unlikeness by itself is   
difference4    ,diversity has1 like     
,identity1 been transformed into a      
maxim3  ',everything is various or      
different'3 or1',there are no two things
  completely like each other4' ,here    
,everything is put under a predicate1   
which is the reverse of the identity    
attributed to it in the first  maxim2   
and therefore under a law contradicting 
the first4 ,however there  is an        
explanation4 ,as the diversity is       
supposed due only to external           
comparison1 anything taken per se is    
expected and understood always  to be   
identical with itself1 so that the      
second law need not interfere  with the 
first4 ,but1 in that case1 variety does 

not belong to the  something or         
everything in question3 it constitutes  
no intrinsic  characteristic of the     
subject3 and the second maxim on this   
showing  does not admit of being stated 
at all4 ,if1 on the other hand1 the     
something itself is as the maxim says   
diverse1 it must be in virtue  of its   
own proper character3 but in this case  
the specific difference1  and not       
variety as such1 is what is intended4   
,and this is the meaning  of the maxim  
of ,leibnitz4    ,when understanding    
sets itself to study ,identity1 it has  
already passed  beyond it1 and is       
looking at ,difference in the shape of  
bare ,variety4  ,if we follow the       
so-called law of ,identity1 and         
say1--,the sea is the  sea1 ,the air is 
the air1 ,the moon is the moon1 these   
objects pass for  having no bearing on  
one another4 ,what we have before us    
therefore is  not ,identity1 but        
,difference4 ,we do not stop at this    
point however1 or  regard things merely 

as different4 ,we compare them one with 
another1  and thus discover the features
 of likeness and unlikeness4 ,the work  
of  the finite sciences lies to a great 
extent in the application of these      
categories1 and the phrase 'scientific  
treatment' generally means no  more than
 the method which has for its aim       
comparison of the objects  under        
examination4 ,this method has           
undoubtedly led to some important       
results2--we may particularly mention   
the great advance of modern times  in   
the provinces of comparative anatomy and
 comparative linguistic4  ,but it is    
going too far to suppose that the       
comparative method can be  employed with
 equal success in all branches of       
knowledge4 ,nor--and this  must be      
emphasised--can mere comparison ever    
ultimately satisfy the  requirements of 
science4 ,its results are indeed        
indispensable1 but they  are still      
labours only preliminary to truly       
intelligent cognition4    ,if it be the 

office of comparison to reduce existing 
differences to  ,identity1 the science1 
which most perfectly fulfils that end1  
is  mathematics4 ,the reason of that is1
 that quantitative difference is  only  
the difference which is quite external4 
,thus1 in geometry1 a  triangle and a   
quadrangle1 figures qualitatively       
different1 have this  qualitative       
difference discounted by abstraction1   
and are equalised to  one another in    
magnitude4 ,it follows from what has    
been formerly said  about the mere      
,identity of understanding that1 as has 
also been pointed  out 7 #ii1 note71    
neither philosophy nor the empirical    
sciences need  envy this superiority of 
,mathematics4    ,the story is told     
that1 when ,leibnitz propounded the     
maxim of ,variety1  the cavaliers and   
ladies of the court1 as they walked     
round the garden1  made efforts to      
discover two leaves indistinguishable   
from each other1  in order to confute   
the law stated by the philosopher4      

,their device was  unquestionably a     
convenient method of dealing with       
metaphysics1--one  which has not ceased 
to be fashionable4 ,all the same1 as    
regards the  principle of ,leibnitz1    
difference must be understood to mean   
not an  external and indifferent        
diversity merely1 but difference        
essential4  ,hence the very nature of   
things implies that they must be        
different4      #aah4 ,likeness is an   
,identity only of those things which are
 not  the same1 not identical with each 
other3 and ,unlikeness is a  relation of
 things unlike4 ,the two therefore do   
not fall on different  aspects or points
 of view in the thing1 without any      
mutual affinity3  but one throws light  
into the other4 ,variety thus comes to  
be reflexive  difference1 or difference 
7distinction7 implicit and essential1   
determinate or specific difference4     
99       99       99       99       99  
99    ,while things merely various show 
themselves unaffected by each other1    

likeness and unlikeness on the contrary 
are a pair of characteristics  which are
 in completely reciprocal relation4 ,the
 one of them cannot  be thought without 
the other4 ,this advance from simple    
variety to  opposition appears in our   
common acts of thought1 when we allow   
that  comparison has a meaning only upon
 the hypothesis of an existing          
difference1 and that on the other hand  
we can distinguish only on the          
hypothesis of existing similarity4      
,hence1 if the problem be the discovery 
of a difference1 we attribute  no great 
cleverness to the man who only          
distinguishes those objects1  of which  
the difference is palpable1 e4g4 a pen  
and a camel3  and similarly1 it implies 
no very advanced faculty of comparison1 
when the objects compared1 e4g4 a beech 
and an oak1 a temple and  a church1 are 
near akin4 ,in the case of difference1  
in short1 we  like to sec identity1 and 
in the case of identity we like to see  
difference4 ,within the range of the    

empirical sciences however1 the  one of 
these two categories is often allowed to
 put the other out of  sight and mind4  
,thus the scientific problem at one time
 is to reduce  existing differences to  
identity2 on another occasion1 with     
equal  one-sidedness1 to discover new   
differences4 ,we see this especially in 
physical science4 ,there the problem    
consists1 in the first place1 in  the   
continual search for new 'elements1' new
 forces1 new genera1 and  species4 ,or1 
in another direction1 it seeks to show  
that all bodies  hitherto believed to be
 simple are compound3 and modern        
physicists and  chemists smile at the   
ancients1 who were satisfied with four  
elements1  and these not simple4        
,secondly1 and on the other hand1 mere  
identity  is made the chief question4   
,thus electricity and chemical affinity 
are regarded as the same1 and even the  
organic processes of digestion  and     
assimilation are looked upon as a mere  
chemical operation4 ,modern  philosophy 

has often been nicknamed the ,philosophy
 of ,identity4 ,but1 as  was already    
remarked 7 #ajc1 note71 it is precisely 
philosophy1 and in  particular          
speculative logic1 which lays bare the  
nothingness of the  abstract1           
undifferentiated identity1 known to     
understanding2 though it  also          
undoubtedly urges its disciples not to  
rest at mere diversity1 but  to         
ascertain the inner unity of all        
existence4    #aai4 ,difference implicit
 is essential difference1 the ,positive 
and the ,negative3 and that is this way4
 ,the ,positive is the  identical       
self-relation in such a way as not to be
 the ,negative1 and  the ,negative is   
the different by itself so as not to be 
the ,positive4  ,thus either has an     
existence of its own in proportion as it
 is not the  other4 ,the one is made    
visible in the other1 and is only in so 
far as  that other is4 ,essential       
difference is therefore ,opposition2    
according  to which the different is not

 confronted by any other but by its     
other4 ,that is1 either of these two    
7,positive and ,negative7 is stamped    
with a characteristic of its own only in
 its relation to the other3 the  one is 
only reflected into itself as it is     
reflected into the other4  ,and so with 
the other4 ,either in this way is the   
other's own other4    ,difference       
implicit or essential gives the maxim1  
,everything is  essentially distinct2   
or1 as it has also been expressed1 ,of  
two  opposite predicates the one only   
can be assigned to anything1 and  there 
is no third possible4 ,this maxim of    
,contrast or ,opposition  most expressly
 controverts the maxim of ,identity3 the
 one says a  thing should be only       
self-relation1 the other says that it   
must be  an opposite1 a relation to its 
other4 ,the native unintelligence of    
abstraction betrays itself by setting in
 juxtaposition two contrary  maxims1    
like these1 as laws1 without even so    
much as comparing  them4--,the ,maxim of

 ,excluded ,middle is the maxim of the  
definite  understanding1 which would    
fain avoid contradiction1 but in so     
doing  falls into it4 ,a must be either 
,a or - ,a1 it says4 ,it virtually      
declares in these words a third ,a which
 is neither  nor--1 and which  at the   
same time is yet invested with  and -   
characters4 ,if  ,w mean  #f miles to   
the ,west1 and - ,w mean #f miles to the
 ,east1 and if the   and - cancel each  
other1 the #f miles of way or space     
remain what they  were with and without 
the contrast4 ,even the mere plus and   
minus of  number or abstract direction  
have1 if we like1 zero1 for their third3
  but it need not be denied that the    
empty contrast1 which understanding     
institutes between plus and minus1 is   
not without its value in such           
abstractions as number1 direction1 c4   
,in the doctrine of contradictory       
concepts1 the one notion is1 say1  blue 
7for in this doctrine even the sensuous 
generalised image of a  colour is called

 a notion7 and the other not-blue4 ,this
 other then  would not be an            
affirmative1 say1 yellow1 but would     
merely be kept at  the abstract         
negative4--,that the ,negative in its   
own nature is quite as  much ,positive  
7see next 71 is implied in saying that  
what is opposite  to another is its     
other4 ,the inanity of the opposition   
between what  are called contradictory  
notions is fully exhibited in what we   
may call  the grandiose formula of a    
general law1 that ,everything has the   
one and  not the other of all predicates
 which are in such opposition4 ,in this 
way1 mind is either white or not-white1 
yellow or not-yellow1 c1 ad  infinitum4 
,it was forgotten that ,identity and    
,opposition are themselves opposed1  and
 the maxim of ,opposition was taken even
 for that of ,identity1  in the shape of
 the principle of ,contradiction4 ,a    
notion1 which  possesses neither or both
 of two mutually contradictory marks1   
e4g4  a quadrangular circle1 is held to 

be logically false4 ,now though a       
multangular circle and a rectilineal arc
 no less contradict this  maxim1        
geometers never hesitate to treat the   
circle as a polygon with  rectilineal   
sides4 ,but anything like a circle 7that
 is to say its mere  character or       
nominal definition7 is still no notion4 
,in the notion  of a circle1 centre and 
circumference are equally essential3    
both  marks belong to it3 and yet centre
 and circumference are opposite and     
contradictory to each other4    ,the    
conception of ,polarity1 which is so    
dominant in physics1 contains  by       
implication the more correct definition 
of ,opposition4 ,but physics  for its   
theory of the laws of thought adheres to
 the ordinary logic2 it  might therefore
 well be horrified in case it should    
ever work out the  conception of        
,polarity1 and get at the thoughts which
 are implied in it4    7#a7 ,with the   
positive we return to identity1 but in  
its higher truth  as identical          

self-relation1 and at the same time with
 the note that it  is not the negative4 
,the negative per se is the same as     
difference  itself4 ,the identical as   
such is primarily the yet               
uncharacterised3  the positive on the   
other hand is what is self-identical1   
but with the  mark of antithesis to an  
other4 ,and the negative is difference  
as such1  characterised as not identity4
 ,this is the difference of difference  
within its own self4    ,positive and   
negative are supposed to express an     
absolute difference4  ,the two however  
are at bottom the same3 the name of     
either might be  transferred to the     
other4 ,thus1 for example1 debts and    
assets are not  two particular1         
self-subsisting species of property4    
,what is negative  to the debtor1 is    
positive to the creditor4 ,a way to the 
east is also  a way to the west4        
,positive and negative are therefore    
intrinsically  conditioned by one       
another1 and are only in relation to    

each other4 ,the  north pole of the     
magnet cannot be without the south pole1
 and vice  vers4 ,if we cut a magnet in 
two1 we have not a north pole in one    
piece1 and a south pole in the other4   
,similarly1 in electricity1 the         
positive and the negative are not two   
diverse and independent fluids4  ,in    
opposition1 the different is not        
confronted by any other1 but by  its    
other4 ,usually we regard different     
things as unaffected by each  other4    
,thus we say3 ,i am a human being1 and  
around me are air1 water1  animals1 and 
all sorts of things4 ,everything is thus
 put outside of  every other4 ,but the  
aim of philosophy is to banish          
indifference1 and  to ascertain the     
necessity of things4 ,by that means the 
other is seen  to stand over against its
 other4 ,thus1 for example1 inorganic   
nature  is not to be considered merely  
something else than organic nature1 but 
the necessary antithesis of it4 ,both   
are in essential relation to one        

another2 and the one of the two is1 only
 in so far as it excludes the  other    
from it1 and thus relates itself        
thereto4 ,nature in like manner  is not 
without mind1 nor mind without nature4  
,an important step has  been taken1 when
 we cease in thinking to use phrases    
like3 ,of course  something else is also
 possible4 ,while we so speak1 we are   
still  tainted with contingency3 and all
 true thinking1 we have already said1   
is a thinking of necessity4    ,in      
modern physical science the opposition1 
first observed to exist  in magnetism as
 polarity1 has come to be regarded as a 
universal law  pervading the whole of   
nature4 ,this would be a real scientific
 advance1  if care were at the same time
 taken not to let mere variety revert   
without explanation1 as a valid         
category1 side by side with opposition4 
,thus at one time the colours are       
regarded as in polar opposition to one  
another1 and called complementary       
colours3 at another time they are       

looked at in their indifferent and      
merely quantitative difference of  red1 
yellow1 green1 c4    7#b7 ,instead of   
speaking by the maxim of ,excluded      
,middle 7which is the  maxim of abstract
 understanding7 we should rather say3   
,everything is  opposite4 ,neither in   
heaven nor in earth1 neither in the     
world of  mind nor of nature1 is there  
anywhere such an abstract ',either--or' 
as the understanding maintains4         
,whatever exists is concrete1 with      
difference and opposition in itself4    
,the finitude of things will then  lie  
in the want of correspondence between   
their immediate being1 and  what they   
essentially are4 ,thus1 in inorganic    
nature1 the acid is  implicitly at the  
same time the base3 in other words1 its 
only being  consists in its relation to 
its other4 ,hence also the acid is not  
something that persists quietly in the  
contrast3 it is always in effort  to    
realise what it potentially is4         
,contradiction is the very moving       

principle of the world3 and it is       
ridiculous to say that contradiction  is
 unthinkable4 ,the only thing correct in
 that statement is that  contradiction  
is not the end of the matter1 but       
cancels itself4 ,but  contradiction1    
when cancelled1 does not leave abstract 
identity2 for  that is itself only one  
side of the contrariety4 ,the proximate 
result  of opposition 7when realised as 
contradiction7 is the ,ground1 which    
contains identity as well as difference 
superseded and deposed to  elements in  
the completer notion4    #abj4          
,contrariety then has two forms4 ,the   
,positive is the aforesaid  various     
7different7 which is understood to be   
independent1 and yet  at the same not to
 be unaffected by its relation to its   
other4 ,the  ,negative is to be1 no less
 independently1 negative self-relating1 
self-subsistent1 and yet at the same    
time as ,negative must on every  point  
have this its self-relation1 i4e4 its   
,positive1 only in the  other4 ,both    

,positive and ,negative are therefore   
explicit contradiction2  both are       
potentially the same4 ,both are so      
actually also2 since either  is the     
abrogation of the other and of itself4  
,thus they fall to the  ,ground4--,or as
 is plain1 the essential difference1 as 
a difference1 is  only the difference of
 it from itself1 and thus contains the  
identical3  so that to essential and    
actual difference there belongs itself  
as  well as identity4 ,as self-relating 
difference it is likewise virtually     
enunciated as the self-identical4 ,and  
the opposite is in general that  which  
includes the one and its other1 itself  
and its opposite4 ,the  immanence of    
essence thus defined is the ,ground4    
77 ,the ,ground4    #aba4 ,the ,ground  
is the unity of identity and difference1
 the  truth of what difference and      
identity have turned out to be1--the    
reflection-into-self1 which is equally a
 reflection-into-an-other1 and  vice    
vers4 ,it is essence put explicitly as a

 totality4    ,the maxim of the ,ground 
runs thus3 ,everything has its          
,sufficient  ,ground3 that is1 the true 
essentiality of any thing is not the    
predication of it as identical with     
itself1 or as different 7various71  or  
merely positive1 or merely negative1 but
 as having its ,being in  an other1     
which1 being its self-same1 is its      
essence4 ,and to this  extent the       
essence is not abstract reflection into 
self1 but into an  other4 ,the ,ground  
is the essence in its own inwardness2   
the essence is  intrinsically a ground2 
and it is a ground only when it is a    
ground of  somewhat1 of an other4    ,we
 must be careful1 when we say that the  
ground is the unity of  identity and    
difference1 not to understand by this   
unity an abstract  identity4 ,otherwise 
we only change the name1 while we still 
think the  identity 7of understanding7  
already seen to be false4 ,to avoid this
  misconception we may say that the     
ground1 besides being the unity1  is    

also the difference of identity and     
difference4 ,in that case in  the       
ground1 which promised at first to      
supersede contradiction1 a new          
contradiction seems to arise4 ,it is    
however a contradiction which1 so  far  
from persisting quietly in itself1 is   
rather the expulsion of it  from itself4
 ,the ground is a ground only to the    
extent that it affords  ground3 but the 
result which thus issued from the ground
 is only  itself4 ,in this lies its     
formalism4 ,the ground and what is      
grounded are  one and the same content3 
the difference between the two is the   
mere  difference of form which separates
 simple self-relation1 on the one  hand1
 from mediation or derivativeness on the
 other4 ,inquiry into the  grounds of   
things goes with the point of view      
which1 as already noted  7note to       
#aab71 is adopted by ,reflection4 ,we   
wish1 as it were1 to see  the matter    
double1 first in its immediacy1 and     
secondly in its ground1  where it is no 

longer immediate4 ,this is the plain    
meaning of the law  of sufficient       
ground1 as it is called2 it asserts that
 things should  essentially be viewed as
 mediated4 ,the manner in which ,formal 
,logic  establishes this law of thought1
 sets a bad example to other sciences4  
,formal ,logic asks these sciences not  
to accept their subject-matter as  it is
 immediately given2 and yet herself lays
 down a law of thought  without deducing
 it1--in other words1 without exhibiting
 its mediation4  ,with the same justice 
as the logician maintains our faculty of
 thought  to be so constituted that we  
must ask for the ground of everything1  
might the physicist1 when asked why a   
man who falls into water is  drowned1   
reply that man happens to be so         
organised that he cannot live  under    
water2 or the jurist1 when asked why a  
criminal is punished1  reply that civil 
society happens to be so constituted    
that crimes  cannot be left unpunished4 
,yet even if logic be excused the duty  

of giving a ground for the law  of the  
sufficient ground1 it might at least    
explain what is to be  understood by a  
ground4 ,the common explanation1 which  
describes the  ground as what has a     
consequence1 seems at the first glance  
more lucid  and intelligible than the   
preceding definition in logical terms4  
,if you  ask however what the           
consequence is1 you are told that it is 
what has  a ground2 and it becomes      
obvious that the explanation is         
intelligible  only because it assumes   
what in our case has been reached as the
  termination of an antecedent movement 
of thought4 ,and this is the  true      
business of logic3 to show that those   
thoughts1 which as usually  employed    
merely float before consciousness       
neither understood nor  demonstrated1   
are really grades in the                
self-determination of thought4  ,it is  
by this means that they are understood  
and demonstrated4    ,in common life1   
and it is the same in the finite        

sciences1 this  reflective form is often
 employed as a key to the secret of the 
real  condition of the objects under    
investigation4 ,so long as we deal with 
what may be termed the household needs  
of knowledge1 nothing can be  urged     
against this method of study4 ,but it   
can never afford definitive             
satisfaction1 either in theory or       
practice4 ,and the reason why it  fails 
is that the ground is yet without a     
definite content of its own2  ,i so that
 to regard anything as resting upon a   
ground merely gives  the formal         
difference of mediation in place of     
immediacy4 ,we see an  electrical       
phenomenon1 for example1 and we ask for 
its ground 7or  reason73 we are told    
that electricity is the ground of this  
phenomenon4  ,what is this but the same 
content as we had immediately before us1
 only  translated into the form of      
inwardness8    ,the ground however is   
not merely simple self-identity1 but    
also  different3 hence various grounds  

may be alleged for the same sum  of     
fact4 ,this variety of grounds1 again1  
following the logic of  difference1     
culminates in opposition of grounds pro 
and contra4  ,in any action1 such as a  
theft1 there is a sum of fact in which  
several aspects may be distinguished4   
,the theft has violated the  rights of  
property3 it has given the means of     
satisfying his wants to  the needy      
thief3 possibly too the man1 from whom  
the theft was made1  misused his        
property4 ,the violation of property is 
unquestionably  the decisive point of   
view before which the others must give  
way3  but the bare law of the ground    
cannot settle that question4 ,usually   
indeed the law is interpreted to speak  
of a sufficient ground1 not  of any     
ground whatever3 and it might be        
supposed therefore1 in the  action      
referred to1 that1 although other points
 of view besides the  violation of      
property might be held as grounds1 yet  
they would not be  sufficient grounds4  

,but here comes a dilemma4 ,if we use   
the phrase  'sufficient ground1' the    
epithet is either otiose1 or of such a  
kind  as to carry us past the mere      
category of ground4 ,the predicate is   
otiose and tautological1 if it only     
states the capability of giving a       
ground or reason3 for the ground is a   
ground1 only in so far as it has  this  
capability4 ,if a soldier runs away from
 battle to save his life1  his conduct  
is certainly a violation of duty3 but it
 cannot be held  that the ground which  
led him so to act was insufficient1     
otherwise  he would have remained at his
 post4 ,besides1 there is this also to  
be said4 ,on one hand any ground        
suffices3 on the other no ground        
suffices as mere ground2 because1 as    
already said1 it is yet void of  a      
content objectively and intrinsically   
determined1 and is therefore  not       
self-acting and productive4 ,a content  
thus objectively and  intrinsically     
determined1 and hence self-acting1 will 

hereafter come  before us as the notion3
 and it is the notion which ,leibnitz   
had in his  eye when he spoke of        
sufficient ground1 and urged the study  
of things  under its point of view4 ,his
 remarks were originally directed       
against  that merely mechanical method  
of conceiving things so much in vogue   
even now2 a method which he justly      
pronounces insufficient4 ,we may  see an
 instance of this mechanical theory of  
investigation1 when the  organic process
 of the circulation of the blood is     
traced back merely  to the contraction  
of the heart2 or when certain theories  
of criminal  law explain the purpose of 
punishment to lie in deterring people   
from  crime1 in rendering the criminal  
harmless1 or in other extraneous        
grounds of the same kind4 ,it is unfair 
to ,leibnitz to suppose that he  was    
content with anything so poor as this   
formal law of the ground4 ,the  method  
of investigation which he inaugurated is
 the very reverse of a  formalism which 

acquiesces in mere grounds1 where a full
 and concrete  knowledge is sought4     
,considerations to this effect led      
,leibnitz to  contrast causae           
efficientes and causae finales1 and to  
insist in  the place of final causes as 
the conception to which the efficient   
were  to lead up4 ,if we adopt this     
distinction1 light1 heat1 and moisture  
would be the causae efficientes1 not the
 causa finalis of the  growth of plants3
 the causa finalis is the notion of the 
plant itself4    ,to get no further than
 mere grounds1 especially on questions  
of law and  morality1 is the position   
and principle of the ,sophists4         
,sophistry1  as we ordinarily conceive  
it1 is a method of investigation which  
aims  at distorting what is just and    
true1 and exhibiting things in a false  
light4 ,such however is not the proper  
or primary tendency of ,sophistry3  the 
standpoint of which is no other than    
that of ',raisonnement4' ,the  ,sophists
 came on the scene at a time when the   

,greeks had begun to grow  dissatisfied 
with mere authority and tradition and   
felt the need of  intellectual          
justification for what they were to     
accept as obligatory4  ,that desideratum
 the ,sophists supplied by teaching     
their countrymen  to seek for the       
various points of view under which      
things may be  considered3 which points 
of view are the same as grounds4 ,but   
the  ground1 as we have seen1 has no    
essential and objective principles of   
its own1 and it is as easy to discover  
grounds for what is wrong and  immoral  
as for what is moral and right4 ,upon   
the observer therefore it  depends to   
decide what points are to have most     
weight4 ,the decision in  such          
circumstances is prompted by his        
individual views and sentiments4  ,thus 
the objective foundation of what ought  
to have been of absolute  and essential 
obligation1 accepted by all1 was        
undermined3 and  ,sophistry by this     
destructive action deservedly brought   

upon itself  the bad name previously    
mentioned4 ,socrates1 as we all know1   
met the  ,sophists at every point1 not  
by a bare re-assertion of authority and 
tradition against their argumentations1 
but by showing dialectically  how       
untenable the mere grounds were1 and by 
vindicating the obligation  of justice  
and goodness1--by reinstating the       
universal or notion of the  will4 ,in   
the present day such a method of        
argumentation is not quite  out of      
fashion4 ,nor is that the case only in  
the discussion of secular  matters4 ,it 
occurs even in sermons1 such as those   
where every possible  ground of         
gratitude to ,god is propounded4 ,to    
such pleading ,socrates  and ,plato     
would not have scrupled to apply the    
name of ,sophistry4  ,for ,sophistry has
 nothing to do with what is             
taught3--that may very  possibly be     
true4 ,sophistry lies in the formal     
circumstance of teaching  it by grounds 
which are as available for attack as for

 defence4 ,in a  time so rich in        
reflection and so devoted to            
raisonnement as our  own1 he must be a  
poor creature who cannot advance a good 
ground for  everything1 even for what is
 worst and most depraved4 ,everything in
 the  world that has become corrupt has 
had good ground for its corruption4  ,an
 appeal to grounds at first makes the   
hearer think of beating a  retreat3 but 
when experience has taught him the real 
state of these  matters1 he closes his  
ears against them1 and refuses to be    
imposed  upon any more4        #abb4 ,as
 it first comes1 the chief feature of   
,essence is show in itself  and         
intermediation in itself4 ,but when it  
has completed the circle  of            
intermediation1 its unity with itself is
 explicitly put as the  self-annulling  
of difference1 and therefore of         
intermediation4 ,once  more then we come
 back to immediacy or ,being1--but      
,being in so far as  it is intermediated
 by annulling the intermediation4 ,and  

that ,being is  ,existence4    ,the     
ground is not yet determined by         
objective principles of its  own1 nor is
 it an end or final cause3 hence it is  
not active1 nor  productive4 ,an        
,existence only proceeds from the       
ground4 ,the  determinate ground is     
therefore a formal matter3 that is to   
say1 any  point will do1 so long as it  
is expressly put as self-relation1 as   
affirmation1 in correlation with the    
immediate existence depending on  it4   
,if it be a ground at all1 it is a good 
ground3 for the term 'good'  is employed
 abstractly as equivalent to            
affirmative2 and any point 7or  feature7
 is good which can in any way be        
enunciated as confessedly  affirmative4 
,so it happens that a ground can be     
found and adduced for  everything3 and a
 good ground 7for example1 a good motive
 for action7  may effect something or   
may not1 it may have a consequence or it
 may  not4 ,it becomes a motive         
7strictly so called7 and effects        

something1  e4g4 through its reception  
into a will2 there and there only it    
becomes active and is made a cause4     
7b7 ,existence4    #abc4 ,existence is  
the immediate unity of                  
reflection-into-self and                
reflection-into-another4 ,it follows    
from this that existence is the         
indefinite multitude of existents as    
reflected-into-themselves1 which  at the
 same time equally throw light upon one 
another1--which1 in  short1 are         
co-relative1 and form a world of        
reciprocal dependence and  of infinite  
interconnexion between grounds and      
consequents4 ,the grounds  are          
themselves existences3 and the existents
 in like manner are in many  directions 
grounds as well as consequents4    ,the 
phrase ',existence' 7derived from       
existere7 suggests the fact of  having  
proceeded from something4 ,existence is 
,being which has proceeded  from the    
ground1 and been reinstated by annulling
 its intermediation4  ,the ,essence1 as 

,being set aside and absorbed1          
originally came  before us as shining or
 showing in self1 and the categories of 
this  reflection are identity1          
difference and ground4 ,the last is the 
unity  of identity and difference2 and  
because it unifies them it has at the   
same time to distinguish itself from    
itself4 ,but that which is in  this way 
distinguished from the ground is as     
little mere difference1  as the ground  
itself is abstract sameness4 ,the ground
 works its  own suspension3 and when    
suspended1 the result of its negation is
  existence4 ,having issued from the    
ground1 existence contains the ground   
in it 'the ground does not remain1 as it
 were1 behind existence1 but by  its    
very nature supersedes itself and       
translates itself into existence4  ,this
 is exemplified even in our ordinary    
mode of thinking1 when we  look upon the
 ground of a thing1 not as something    
abstractly inward1  but as itself also  
an existent4 ,for example1 the          

lightning-flash  which has set a house  
on fire would be considered the ground  
of the  conflagration3 or the manners of
 a nation and the condition of its  life
 would be regarded as the ground of its 
constitution4 ,such indeed  is the      
ordinary aspect in which the existent   
world originally appears  to            
reflection1--an indefinite crowd of     
things existent1 which being            
simultaneously reflected on themselves  
and on one another are related          
reciprocally as ground and consequence4 
,in this motley play of the  world1 if  
we may so call the sum of existents1    
there is nowhere a  firm footing to be  
found3 everything bears an aspect of    
relativity1  conditioned by and         
conditioning something else4 ,the       
reflective  understanding makes it its  
business to elicit and trace these      
connexions running out in every         
direction2 but the question touching an 
ultimate design is so far left          
unanswered1 and therefore the craving of

  the reason after knowledge passes with
 the further development of the  logical
 ,idea beyond this position of mere     
relativity4    #abd4 ,the               
reflection-on-another of the existent is
 however inseparable  from the          
reflection-on-self3 the ground is their 
unity1 from which  existence has issued4
 ,the existent therefore includes       
relativity1 and  has on its own part its
 multiple interconnexions with other    
existents3  it is reflected on itself as
 its ground4 ,the existent is1 when so  
described1 a ,thing4    ,the            
'thing-by-itself' 7or thing in the      
abstract71 so famous in the  philosophy 
of ,kant1 shows itself here in its      
genesis4 ,it is seen to be  the abstract
 reflection-on-self1 which is clung to1 
to the exclusion of                     
reflection-on-other-things and of all   
predication of difference4 ,the         
thing-by-itself therefore is the empty  
substratum for these predicates  of     
relation4    ,if to know means to       

comprehend an object in its concrete    
character1  then the thing-by-itself1   
which is nothing but the quite abstract 
and indeterminate thing in general1 must
 certainly be as unknowable  as it is   
alleged to be4 ,with as much reason     
however as we speak  of the             
thing-by-itself1 we might speak of      
quality-by-itself or                    
quantity-by-itself1 and of any other    
category4 ,the expression would  then   
serve to signify that these categories  
are taken in their abstract  immediacy1 
apart from their development and inward 
character4 ,it is  no better than a whim
 of the understanding1 therefore1 if we 
attach  the qualificatory 'in or        
by-itself' to the thing only4 ,but this 
'in or by-itself' is also applied to the
 facts of the mental as well  as the    
natural world3 as we speak of           
electricity or of a plant in  itself1 so
 we speak of man or the state in itself4
 ,by this 'in-itself'  in these objects 
we are meant to understand what they    

strictly and  properly are4 ,this usage 
is liable to the same criticism as the  
phrase 'thing-in-itself4' ,for if we    
stick to the mere 'in-itself' of  an    
object1 we apprehend it not in its      
truth1 but in the inadequate  form of   
mere abstraction4 ,thus the man1 by or  
in himself1 is the  child4 ,and what the
 child has to do is to rise out of this 
abstract  and undeveloped 'in-himself1' 
and become 'for himself what he is at   
first only 'in-himself1' a free and     
reasonable being4 ,similarly1 the       
state-in-itself is the yet immature and 
patriarchal state1 where the  various   
political functions1 latent in the      
notion of the state1 have  not received 
the full logical constitution which the 
logic of political  principles demands4 
,in the same sense1 the germ may be     
called the  plant-in-itself4 ,these     
examples may show the mistake of        
supposing  that the 'thing-in-itself' or
 the 'in-itself' of things is something 
inaccessible to our cognition4 ,all     

things are originally in-themselves1    
but that is not the end of the matter4  
,as the germ1 being the                 
plant-in-itself1 means self-development1
 so the thing in general passes  beyond 
its in-itself1 7the abstract reflection 
on self17 to manifest  itself further as
 a reflection on other things4 ,it is in
 this sense  that it has properties4    
7c7 ,the ,thing4    #abe4 77 ,the ,thing
 is the totality--the development in    
explicit  unity--of the categories of   
the ground and of existence4 ,on the    
side  of one of its factors1 viz4       
reflection-on-other-things1 it has in it
  the differences1 in virtue of which it
 is a characterised and concrete  thing4
 ,these characteristics are different   
from one another2 they have  their      
reflection-into-self not on their own   
part1 but on the part of  the thing4    
,they are ,properties of the thing3 and 
their relation to the  thing is         
expressed by the word 'have4'    ,as a  
term of relation1 'to have' takes the   

place of 'to be4' ,true1  somewhat has  
qualities on its part too3 but this     
transference of  ',having' into the     
sphere of ,being is inexact1 because the
 character as  quality is directly one  
with the somewhat1 and the somewhat     
ceases to  be when it loses its quality4
 ,but the thing is reflection-into-self3
  for it is an identity which is also   
distinct from the difference1  i4e4 from
 its attributes4--,in many languages    
'have' is employed  to denote past time4
 ,and with reason3 for the past is      
absorbed or  suspended being1 and the   
mind is its reflection-into-self2 in the
 mind  only it continues to             
subsist1--the mind however              
distinguishing from  itself this being  
in it which has been absorbed or        
suspended4           99       99        
99       99       99    ,in the ,thing  
all the characteristics of reflection   
recur as existent4  ,thus the thing1 in 
its initial aspect1 as the              
thing-by-itself1 is the  self-same or   

identical4 ,but identity1 it was proved1
 is not found  without difference3 so   
the properties1 which the thing has1 are
 the  existent difference in the form of
 diversity4 ,in the case of diversity   
or variety each diverse member exhibited
 an indifference to every  other1 and   
they had no other relation to each      
other1 save what was  given by a        
comparison external to them4 ,but now in
 the thing we have a  bond which keeps  
the various properties in union4        
,property1 besides1  should not be      
confused with quality4 ,no doubt1 we    
also say1 a thing  has qualities4 ,but  
the phraseology is a misplaced one3     
'having' hints  at an independence1     
foreign to the ',somewhat1' which is    
still directly  identical with its      
quality4 ,somewhat is what it is only by
 its  quality3 whereas1 though the thing
 indeed exists only as it has its       
properties1 it is not confined to this  
or that definite property1 and  can     
therefore lose it1 without ceasing to be

 what it is4    #abf4 77 ,even in the   
ground1 however1 the                    
reflection-on-something-else  is        
directly convertible with               
reflection-on-self4 ,and hence the      
properties are not merely different from
 each other2 they are also              
self-identical1 independent1 and        
relieved from their attachment to the   
thing4 ,still1 as they are the          
characters of the thing distinguished   
from one another 7as                    
reflected-into-self71 they are not      
themselves  things1 if things be        
concrete2 but only existences reflected 
into themselves as abstract characters4 
,they are what are called  ,matters4    
,nor is the name 'things' given to      
,matters1 such as magnetic and  electric
 matters4 ,they are qualities proper1 a 
reflected ,being1--one  with their      
,being1--they are the character that has
 reached immediacy1  existence3 they are
 'entities4'    ,to elevate the         
properties1 which the ,thing has1 to the

 independent  position of matters1 or   
materials of which it consists1 is a    
proceeding  based upon the notion of a  
,thing3 and for that reason is also     
found  in experience4 ,thought and      
experience however alike protest against
  concluding from the fact that certain 
properties of a thing1 such  as colour1 
or smell1 may be represented as         
particular colouring or  odorific       
matters1 that we are then at the end of 
the inquiry1 and  that nothing more is  
needed to penetrate to the true secret  
of things  than a disintegration of them
 into their component materials4 ,this  
disintegration into independent matters 
is properly restricted to  inorganic    
nature only4 ,the chemist is in the     
right therefore when1  for example1 he  
analyses common salt or gypsum into its 
elements1 and  finds that the former    
consists of muriatic acid and soda1 the 
latter of  sulphuric acid and calcium4  
,so too the geologist does well to      
regard  granite as a compound of quartz1

 felspar1 and mica4 ,these matters1     
again1 of which the thing consists1 are 
themselves partly things1  which in that
 way may be once more reduced to more   
abstract matters4  ,sulphuric acid1 for 
example1 is a compound of sulphur and   
oxygen4 ,such  matters or bodies can as 
a matter of fact be exhibited as        
subsisting by  themselves3 but          
frequently we find other properties of  
things1 entirely  wanting this          
self-subsistence1 also regarded as      
particular matters4  ,thus we hear      
caloric1 and electrical or magnetic     
matters spoken of4  ,such matters are at
 the best figments of understanding4    
,and we see  here the usual procedure of
 the abstract reflection of             
understanding4  ,capriciously adopting  
single categories1 whose value entirely 
depends  on their place in the gradual  
evolution of the logical idea1 it       
employs  them in the pretended interests
 of explanation1 but in the face of     
plain1 unprejudiced perception and      

experience1 so as to trace back to  them
 every object investigated4 ,nor is this
 all4 ,the theory1 which  makes things  
consist of independent matters1 is      
frequently applied in a  region where it
 has neither meaning nor force4 ,for    
within the limits of  nature even1      
wherever there is organic life1 this    
category is obviously  inadequate4 ,an  
animal may be said to consist of bones1 
muscles1 nerves1  c43 but evidently we  
are here using the term 'consist' in a  
very  different sense from its use when 
we spoke of the piece of granite as     
consisting of the above-mentioned       
elements4 ,the elements of granite are  
utterly indifferent to their            
combination3 they could subsist as well 
without it4 ,the different parts and    
members of an organic body on the       
contrary subsist only in their union3   
they cease to exist as such1 when  they 
are separated from each other4    #abg4 
,thus ,matter is the mere abstract or   
indeterminate                           

reflection-into-something-else1 or      
reflection-into-self at the same  time  
as determinate2 it is consequently      
,thinghood which then and there         
is1--the subsistence of the thing4 ,by  
this means the thing has on the  part of
 the matters its reflection-into-self   
7the reverse of  #abe72  it subsists not
 on its own part1 but consists of the   
matters1 and is  only a superficial     
association between them1 an external   
combination of  them4    #abh4 77       
,matter1 being the immediate unity of   
existence with itself1  is also         
indifferent towards specific character4 
,hence the numerous  diverse matters    
coalesce into the one ,matter1 or into  
existence  under the reflective         
characteristic of identity4 ,in contrast
 to this  one ,matter these distinct    
properties and their external relation  
which  they have to one another in the  
thing1 constitute the ,form1--the       
reflective category of difference1 but a
 difference which exists and is  a      

totality4    ,this one featureless      
,matter is also the same as the         
,thing-by-itself  was3 only the latter  
is intrinsically quite abstract1 while  
the former  essentially implies relation
 to something else1 and in the first    
place  to the ,form4           99       
99       99       99       99    ,the   
various matters of which the thing      
consists are potentially the  same as   
one another4 ,thus we get one ,matter in
 general to which the  difference is    
expressly attached externally and as a  
bare form4 ,this  theory which holds    
things all round to have one and the    
same matter at  bottom1 and merely to   
differ externally in respect of form1 is
 much in  vogue with the reflective     
understanding4 ,matter in that case     
counts for  naturally indeterminate1 but
 susceptible of any determination2 while
 at  the same time it is perfectly      
permanent1 and continues the same amid  
all change and alteration4 ,and in      
finite things at least this disregard   

of matter for any determinate form is   
certainly exhibited4 ,for example1  it  
matters not to a block of marble1       
whether it receive the form of  this or 
that statue or even the form of a       
pillar4 ,be it noted however  that a    
block of marble can disregard form only 
relatively1 that is1 in  reference to   
the sculptor3 it is by no means purely  
formless4 ,and so  the mineralogist     
considers the relatively formless marble
 as a special  formation of rock1       
differing from other equally special    
formations1  such as sandstone or       
porphyry4 ,therefore we say it is an    
abstraction  of the understanding which 
isolates matter into a certain natural  
formlessness4 ,for properly speaking the
 thought of matter includes the         
principle of form throughout1 and no    
formless matter therefore appears       
anywhere even in experience as existing4
 ,still the conception of  matter as    
original and pre-existent1 and as       
naturally formless1 is a  very ancient  

one2 it meets us even among the ,greeks1
 at first in the  mythical shape of     
,chaos1 which is supposed to represent  
the unformed  substratum of the existing
 world4 ,such a conception must of      
necessity  tend to make ,god not the    
,creator of the world1 but a mere       
world-moulder  or demiurge4 ,a deeper   
insight into nature reveals ,god as     
creating the  world out of nothing4 ,and
 that teaches two things4 ,on the one   
hand it  enunciates that matter1 as     
such1 has no independent subsistence1   
and on  the other that the form does not
 supervene upon matter from without1    
but as a totality involves the principle
 of matter in itself4 ,this free  and   
infinite form will hereafter come before
 us as the notion4    #abi4 ,thus the   
,thing suffers a disruption into ,matter
 and ,form4 ,each  of these is the      
totality of thinghood and subsists for  
itself4 ,but  ,matter1 which is meant to
 be the positive and indeterminate      
existence1  contains1 as an existence1  

reflection-on-another1 every whit as    
much as it contains self-enclosed being4
 ,accordingly as uniting  these         
characteristics1 it is itself the       
totality of ,form4 ,but ,form1  being a 
complete whole of characteristics1 ipso 
facto involves  reflection-into-self2 in
 other words1 as self-relating ,form it 
has the  very function attributed to    
,matter4 ,both are at bottom the same4  
,invest  them with this unity1 and you  
have the relation of ,matter and ,form1 
which are also no less distinct4        
#acj4 ,the ,thing1 being this totality1 
is a contradiction4 ,on the side  of its
 negative unity it is ,form in which    
,matter is determined and  deposed to   
the rank of properties 7 #abe74 ,at the 
same time it consists  of ,matters1     
which in the                            
reflection-of-the-thing-into-itself are 
as  much independent as they are at the 
same time negatived4 ,thus the thing  is
 the essential existence1 in such a way 
as to be an existence that  suspends or 

absorbs itself in itself4 ,in other     
words1 the thing is an  ,appearance or  
,phenomenon4    ,the negation of the    
several matters1 which is insisted on in
 the  thing no less than their          
independent existence1 occurs in        
,physics as  porosity4 ,each of the     
several matters 7colouring matter1      
odorific  matter1 and if we believe some
 people1 even sound-matter1--not        
excluding caloric1 electric matter1 c37 
is also negated3 and in this  negation  
of theirs1 or as interpenetrating their 
pores1 we find the  numerous other      
independent matters1 which1 being       
similarly porous1  make room in turn for
 the existence of the rest4 ,pores are  
not  empirical facts2 they are figments 
of the understanding1 which uses  them  
to represent the element of negation in 
independent matters4  ,the further      
working-out of the contradictions is    
concealed by the  nebulous imbroglio in 
which all matters are independent and   
all no less  negated in each other4--,if

 the faculties or activities are        
similarly  hypostatised in the mind1    
their living unity similarly turns to   
the  imbroglio of an action of the one  
on the others4    ,these pores 7meaning 
thereby not the pores in an organic     
body1 such as  the pores of wood or of  
the skin1 but those in the so-called    
'matters1'  such as colouring matter1   
caloric1 or metals1 crystals1 c47 cannot
 be  verified by observation4 ,in the   
same way matter itself1--furthermore    
form which is separated from            
matter1--whether that be the thing as   
consisting of matters1 or the view that 
the thing itself subsists and  only has 
proper ties1--is all a product of the   
reflective understanding  which1 while  
it observes and professes to record only
 what it observes1  is rather creating a
 metaphysic1 bristling with             
contradictions of which  it is          
unconscious4      ,b4--,,appearance4    
#aca4 ,the ,essence must appear or shine
 forth4 ,its shining or reflection  in  

it is the suspension and translation of 
it to immediacy1 which1  whilst as      
reflection-on-self it is matter or      
subsistence1 is also form1              
reflection-on-something-else1 a         
subsistence which sets itself aside4 ,to
  show or shine is the characteristic by
 which essence is distinguished  from   
being1--by which it is essence2 and it  
is this show which1 when  it is         
developed1 shows itself1 and is         
,appearance4 ,essence accordingly  is   
not something beyond or behind          
appearance1 but just because it  is the 
essence which exists--the existence is  
,appearance  7,forth-shining74          
99       99       99       99       99  
,existence stated explicitly in its     
contradiction is ,appearance4 ,but      
appearance 7forth-shining7 is not to be 
confused with a mere show  7shining74   
,show is the proximate truth of ,being  
or immediacy4 ,the  immediate1 instead  
of being1 as we suppose1 something      
independent1  resting on its own self1  

is a mere show1 and as such it is packed
 or  summed up under the simplicity of  
the immanent essence4 ,the essence  is1 
in the first place1 the sum total of the
 showing itself1 shining  in itself     
7inwardly72 but1 far from abiding in    
this inwardness1 it  comes as a ground  
forward into existence2 and this        
existence being  grounded not in itself1
 but on something else1 is just         
appearance4  ,in our imagination we     
ordinarily combine with the term        
appearance  or phenomenon the conception
 of an indefinite congeries of things   
existing1 the being of which is purely  
relative1 and which consequently  do not
 rest on a foundation of their own1 but 
are esteemed only as  passing stages4   
,but in this conception it is no less   
implied that  essence does not linger   
behind or beyond appearance4 ,rather it 
is1 we  may say1 the ,infinite kindness 
which lets its own show freely issue    
into immediacy1 and graciously allows it
 the joy of existence4 ,the  appearance 

which is thus created does not stand on 
its own feet1 and  has its being not in 
itself but in something else4 ,god who  
is the  essence1 when ,he lends         
existence to the passing stages of ,his 
own show  in ,himself1 may be described 
as the goodness that creates a world3   
but  ,he is also the power above it1 and
 the righteousness1 which manifests  the
 merely phenomenal character of the     
content of this existing world1         
whenever it tries to exist in           
independence4    ,appearance is in every
 way a very important grade of the      
logical idea4  ,it may be said to be the
 distinction of philosophy from ordinary
  consciousness that it sees the merely 
phenomenal character of what the  latter
 supposes to have a self-subsistent     
being4 ,the significance of  appearance 
however must be properly grasped1 or    
mistakes will arise4  ,to say that      
anything is a mere appearance may be    
misinterpreted to  mean that1 as        
compared with what is merely phenomenal1

 there is greater  truth in the         
immediate1 in that which is4 ,now in    
strict fact1 the  case is precisely the 
reverse4 ,appearance is higher than mere
 ,being1--a  richer category because it 
holds in combination the two elements of
  reflection-into-self and              
reflection-into-another3 whereas ,being 
7or  immediacy7 still mere              
relationlessness and apparently rests   
upon itself  alone4 ,still1 to say that 
anything is only an appearance suggests 
a  real flaw1 which consists in this1   
that ,appearance is still divided       
against itself and without intrinsic    
stability4 ,beyond and above mere       
appearance comes in the first place     
,actuality1 the third grade of          
,essence1 of which we shall afterwards  
speak4    ,in the history of ,modern    
,philosophy1 ,kant has the merit of     
first  rehabilitating this distinction  
between the common and the philosophic  
modes of thought4 ,he stopped half-way  
however1 when he attached to            

,appearance a subjective meaning only1  
and put the abstract essence  immovable 
outside it as the thing-in-itself beyond
 the reach of our  cognition4 ,for it is
 the very nature of the world of        
immediate objects  to be appearance     
only4 ,knowing it to be so1 we know at  
the same time  the essence1 which1 far  
from staying behind or beyond the       
appearance1  rather manifests its own   
essentiality by deposing the world to a 
mere  appearance4 ,one can hardly       
quarrel with the plain man who1 in his  
desire for totality1 cannot acquiesce in
 the doctrine of subjective  idealism1  
that we are solely concerned with       
phenomena4 ,the plain man1  however1 in 
his desire to save the objectivity of   
knowledge1 may very  naturally return to
 abstract immediacy1 and maintain that  
immediacy  to be true and actual4 ,in a 
little work published under the title1  
,a ,report1 clear as day1 to the larger 
,public touching the proper  nature of  
the ,latest ,philosophy3 an ,attempt to 

force the reader to  understand1'       
,fichte examined the opposition between 
subjective  idealism and immediate      
consciousness in a popular form1 under  
the shape  of a dialogue between the    
author and the reader1 and tried hard to
  prove that the subjective idealist's  
point of view was right4 ,in this       
dialogue the reader complains to the    
author that he has completely  failed to
 place himself in the idealist's        
position1 and is inconsolable  at the   
thought that things around him are no   
real things but mere  appearances4 ,the 
affliction of the reader can scarcely be
 blamed when  he is expected to consider
 himself hemmed in by an impervious     
circle  of purely subjective            
conceptions4 ,apart from this subjective
 view of  ,appearance1 however1 we have 
all reason to rejoice that the things   
which environ us are appearances and not
 steadfast and independent  existences2 
since in that case we should soon perish
 of hunger1 both  bodily and mental4    

7a7 ,the ,world of ,appearance4    #acb4
 ,the ,apparent or ,phenomenal exists in
 such a way1 that its  subsistence is   
ipso facto thrown into abeyance or      
suspended and  is only one stage in the 
form itself4 ,the form embraces in it   
the  matter or subsistence as one of its
 characteristics4 ,in this way  the     
phenomenal has its ground in this 7form7
 as its essence1 its                    
reflection-into-self in contrast with   
its immediacy1 but1 in so doing1  has it
 only in another aspect of the form4    
,this ground of its is no  less         
phenomenal than itself1 and the         
phenomenon accordingly goes on to  an   
endless mediation of subsistence by     
means of form1 and thus equally  by     
non-subsistence4 ,this endless          
inter-mediation is at the same time  a  
unity of self-relation2 and existence is
 developed into a totality1  into a     
world of phenomena1--of reflected       
finitude4    7b7 ,content and ,form4    
#acc4 ,outside one another as the       

phenomena in this phenomenal  world are1
 they form a totality1 and are wholly   
contained in their  self-relatedness4   
,in this way the self-relation of the   
phenomenon is  completely specified1 it 
has the ,form in itself3 and because it 
is in this identity1 has it as essential
 subsistence4 ,so it comes about  that  
the form is ,content3 and in its mature 
phase is the ,law  of the ,phenomenon4  
,when the form1 on the contrary1 is not 
reflected  into self1 it is equivalent  
to the negative of the phenomenon1 to   
the non-independent and changeable3 and 
that sort of form is the  indifferent or
 ,external ,form4    ,the essential     
point to keep in mind about the         
opposition of ,form and  ,content is    
that the content is not formless1 but   
has the form in its  own self1 quite as 
much as the form is external to it4     
,there is thus  a doubling of form4 ,at 
one time it is reflected into itself2   
and then  is identical with the content4
 ,at another time it is not reflected   

into itself1 and then is the external   
existence1 which does not at  all affect
 the content4 ,we are here in presence1 
implicitly1 of the  absolute correlation
 of content and form3 viz4 their        
reciprocal  revulsion1 so that content  
is nothing but the revulsion of form    
into  content1 and form nothing but the 
revulsion of content into form4 ,this   
mutual revulsion is one of the most     
important laws of thought4 ,but it  is  
not explicitly brought out before the   
,relations of ,substance and            
,causality4    ,form and content are a  
pair of terms frequently employed by the
  reflective understanding1 especially  
with a habit of looking on the  content 
as the essential and independent1 the   
form on the contrary as  the unessential
 and dependent4 ,against this it is to  
be noted that both  are in fact equally 
essential2 and that1 while a formless   
content can  be as little found as a    
formless matter1 the two 7content and   
matter7  are distinguished by this      

circumstance1 that matter1 though       
implicitly  not without form1 still in  
its existence manifests a disregard of  
form1  whereas the content1 as such1 is 
what it is only because the matured     
form is included in it4 ,still the form 
comes before us sometimes as  an        
existence indifferent and external to   
content1 and does so for  the reason    
that the whole range of ,appearance     
still suffers from  externality4 ,in a  
book1 for instance1 it certainly has no 
bearing upon  the content1 whether it be
 written or printed1 bound in paper or  
in  leather4 ,that however does not in  
the least imply that apart from such  an
 indifferent and external form1 the     
content of the book is itself  formless4
 ,there are undoubtedly books enough    
which even in reference  to their       
content may well be styled formless3 but
 want of form in this  case is the same 
as bad form1 and means the defect of the
 right form1  not the absence of all    
form whatever4 ,so far is this right    

form from  being unaffected by the      
content that it is rather the content   
itself4 ,a  work of art that wants the  
right form is for that very reason no   
right  or true work of art3 and it is a 
bad way of excusing an artist1 to say   
that the content of his works is good   
and even excellent1 though they  want   
the right form4 ,real works of art are  
those where content and form  exhibit a 
thorough identity4 ,the content of the  
,iliad1 it may be said1  is the ,trojan 
war1 and especially the wrath of        
,achilles4 ,in that we  have everything1
 and yet very little after all2 for the 
,iliad is made  an ,iliad by the poetic 
form1 in which that content is moulded4 
,the  content of ,romeo and ,juliet may 
similarly be said to be the ruin of two 
lovers through the discord between their
 families3 but something more  is needed
 to make ,shakespeare's immortal        
tragedy4    ,in reference to the        
relation of form and content in the     
field of  science1 we should recollect  

the difference between philosophy and   
the rest of the sciences4 ,the latter   
are finite1 because their mode  of      
thought1 as a merely formal act1 derives
 its content from without4  ,their      
content therefore is not known as       
moulded from within through  the        
thoughts which lie at the ground of it1 
and form and content do  not thoroughly 
interpenetrate each other4 ,this        
partition disappears in  philosophy1 and
 thus justifies its title of infinite   
knowledge4 ,yet  even philosophic       
thought is often held to be a merely    
formal act2 and  that logic1 which      
confessedly deals only with thoughts qu 
thoughts1  is merely formal1 is         
especially a foregone conclusion4 ,and  
if content  means no more than what is  
palpable and obvious to the senses1 all 
philosophy and logic in particular must 
be at once acknowledged to  be void of  
content1 that is to say1 of content     
perceptible to the  senses4 ,even       
ordinary forms of thought however1 and  

the common usage of  language1 do not in
 the least restrict the appellation of  
content to  what is perceived by the    
senses1 or to what has a being in place 
and  time4 ,a book without content is1  
as every one knows1 not a book with     
empty leaves1 but one of which the      
content is as good as none4 ,we shall   
find as the last result on closer       
analysis1 that by what is called        
content an educated mind means nothing  
but the presence and power of  thought4 
,but this is to admit that thoughts are 
not empty forms without  affinity to    
their content1 and that in other spheres
 as well as in art  the truth and the   
sterling value of the content           
essentially depend on  the content      
showing itself identical with the form4 
#acd4 ,but immediate existence is a     
character of the subsistence itself  as 
well as of the form3 it is consequently 
external to the character of  the       
content2 but in an equal degree this    
externality1 which the content  has     

through the factor of its subsistence1  
is essential to it4 ,when  thus         
explicitly stated1 the phenomenon is    
relativity or correlation3  where one   
and the same thing1 viz4 the content or 
the developed  form1 is seen as the     
externality and antithesis of           
independent  existences1 and as their   
reduction to a relation of identity1 in 
which  identification alone the two     
things distinguished are what they are4 
7c7 ,relation or ,correlation4    #ace4 
77 ,the immediate relation is that of   
the ,whole and the  ,parts4 ,the content
 is the whole1 and consists of the parts
 7the  form71 its counterpart4 ,the     
parts are diverse one from another4 ,it 
is  they that possess independent being4
 ,but they are parts1 only when they    
are identified by being related to one  
another2 or1 in so far as they  make up 
the whole1 when taken together4 ,but    
this ',together' is the  counterpart and
 negation of the part4    ,essential    
correlation is the specific and         

completely universal  phase in which    
things appear4 ,everything that exists  
stands in  correlation1 and this        
correlation is the veritable nature of  
every  existence4 ,the existent thing in
 this way has no being of its own1 but  
only in something else3 in this other   
however it is self-relation2 and        
correlation is the unity of the         
self-relation and relation-to-others4   
,the relation of the whole and the parts
 is untrue to this extent1 that  the    
notion and the reality of the relation  
are not in harmony4 ,the  notion of the 
whole is to contain parts3 but if the   
whole is taken  and made what its notion
 implies1 i4e4 if it is divided1 it at  
once  ceases to be a whole4 ,things     
there are1 no doubt1 which correspond   
to this relation3 but for that very     
reason they are low and untrue          
existences4 ,we must remember however   
what 'untrue' signifies4 ,when  it      
occurs in a philosophical discussion1   
the term 'untrue' does not  signify that

 the thing to which it is applied is    
non-existent4 ,a bad  state or a sickly 
body may exist all the same2 but these  
things are  untrue1 because their notion
 and their reality are out of harmony4  
,the relation of whole and parts1 being 
the immediate relation1 comes  easy to  
reflective understanding2 and for that  
reason it often  satisfies when the     
question really turns on profounder     
ties4 ,the limbs  and organs1 for       
instance1 of an organic body are not    
merely parts of  it3 it is only in their
 unity that they are what they are1 and 
they  are unquestionably affected by    
that unity1 as they also in turn affect 
it4 ,these limbs and organs become mere 
parts1 only when they pass under  the   
hands of the anatomist1 whose           
occupation1 be it remembered1 is not    
with the living body but with the       
corpse4 ,not that such analysis is      
illegitimate3 we only mean that the     
external and mechanical relation of     
whole and parts is not sufficient for   

us1 if we want to study organic  life in
 its truth4 ,and if this be so in       
organic life1 it is the case  to a much 
greater extent when we apply this       
relation to the mind and  the formations
 of the spiritual world4 ,psychologists 
may not expressly  speak of parts of the
 soul or mind1 but the mode in which    
this  subject is treated by the analytic
 understanding is largely founded  on   
the analogy of this finite relation4 ,at
 least that is so1 when the  different  
forms of mental activity are enumerated 
and described merely  in their isolation
 one after another1 as so-called special
 powers and  faculties4    #acf4 77 ,the
 one-and-same of this correlation 7the  
self-relation  found in it7 is thus     
immediately a negative self-relation4   
,the  correlation is in short the       
mediating process whereby one and the   
same is first unaffected towards        
difference1 and secondly is the         
negative self-relation1 which repels    
itself as reflection-into-self to       

difference1 and invests itself 7as      
reflection-into-something-else7 with    
existence1 whilst it conversely leads   
back this reflection-into-other  to     
self-relation and indifference4 ,this   
gives the correlation of  ,force and its
 ,expression4    ,the relationship of   
whole and part is the immediate and     
therefore  unintelligent 7mechanical7   
relation1--a revulsion of self-identity 
into mere variety4 ,thus we pass from   
the whole to the parts1 and from  the   
parts to the whole3 in the one we forget
 its opposition to the  other1 while    
each on its own account1 at one time the
 whole1 at another  the parts1 is taken 
to be an independent existence4 ,in     
other words1  when the parts are        
declared to subsist in the whole1 and   
the whole  to consist of the parts1 we  
have either member of the relation at   
different times taken to be permanently 
subsistent1 while the other is          
non-essential4 ,in its superficial form 
the mechanical nexus consists in  the   

parts being independent of each other   
and of the whole4    ,this relation may 
be adopted for the progression ad       
infinitum1  in the case of the          
divisibility of matter3 and then it     
becomes an  unintelligent alternation   
with the two sides4 ,a thing at one time
 is  taken as a whole3 then we go on to 
specify the parts3 this specifying  is  
forgotten1 and what was a part is       
regarded as a whole3 then the           
specifying of the part comes up again1  
and so on for ever4 ,but if this        
infinity be taken as the negative which 
it is1 it is the negative  self-relating
 element in the correlation1--,force1   
the self-identical  whole1 or immanency2
 which yet supersedes this immanency and
 gives  itself expression2--and         
conversely the expression which vanishes
 and  returns into ,force4    ,force1   
notwithstanding this infinity1 is also  
finite3 for the content1  or the one and
 the same of the ,force and its         
out-putting1 is this  identity at first 

only for the observer3 the two sides of 
the relation  are not yet1 each on its  
own account1 the concrete identity of   
that  one and same1 not yet the         
totality4 ,for one another they are     
therefore  different1 and the           
relationship is a finite one4 ,force    
consequently  requires solicitation from
 without3 it works blindly3 and on      
account of  this defectiveness of form1 
the content is also limited and         
accidental4  ,it is not yet genuinely   
identical with the form3 not yet is it  
as a  notion and an end2 that is to say1
 it is not intrinsically and actually   
determinate4 ,this difference is most   
vital1 but not easy to apprehend3  it   
will assume a clearer formulation when  
we reach ,design4 ,if it be  overlooked1
 it leads to the confusion of conceiving
 ,god as ,force1 a  confusion from which
 ,herder's ,god especially suffers4     
,it is often said that the nature of    
,force itself is unknown and only  its  
manifestation apprehended4 ,but1 in the 

first place1 it may be  replied1 every  
article in the import of ,force is the  
same as what  is specified in the       
,exertion3 and the explanation of a     
phenomenon  by a ,force is to that      
extent a mere tautology4 ,what is       
supposed to  remain unknown1 therefore1 
is really nothing but the empty form of 
reflection-into-self1 by which alone the
 ,force is distinguished from  the      
,exertion1--and that form too is        
something familiar4 ,it is a form  that 
does not make the slightest addition to 
the content and to the  law1 which have 
to be discovered from the phenomenon    
alone4 ,another  assurance always given 
is that to speak of forces implies no   
theory as  to their nature3 and that    
being so1 it is impossible to see why   
the  form of ,force has been introduced 
into the sciences at all4 ,in the       
second place the nature of ,force is    
undoubtedly unknown3 we are still       
without any necessity binding and       
connecting its content together in      

itself1 as we are without necessity in  
the content1 in so far as it is         
expressly limited and hence has its     
character by means of another thing     
outside it4    7#a7 ,compared with the  
immediate relation of whole and parts1  
the  relation between force and its     
putting-forth may be considered         
infinite4 ,in it that identity of the   
two sides is realised1 which in  the    
former relation only existed for the    
observer4 ,the whole1 though  we can see
 that it consists of parts1 ceases to be
 a whole when it  is divided3 whereas   
force is only shown to be force when it 
exerts  itself1 and in its exercise only
 comes back to itself4 ,the exercise is 
only force once more4 ,yet1 on further  
examination even this relation  will    
appear finite1 and finite in virtue of  
this mediation3 just  as1 conversely1   
the relation of whole and parts is      
obviously finite  in virtue of its      
immediacy4 ,the first and simplest      
evidence for the  finitude of the       

mediated relation of force and its      
exercise is1 that  each and every force 
is conditioned and requires something   
else than  itself for its subsistence4  
,for instance1 a special vehicle of     
magnetic  force1 as is well known1 is   
iron1 the other properties of which1    
such  as its colour1 specific weight1 or
 relation to acids1 are independent  of 
this connexion with magnetism4 ,the same
 thing is seen in all other  forces1    
which from one end to the other are     
found to be conditioned  and mediated by
 something else than themselves4        
,another proof of  the finite nature of 
force is that it requires solicitation  
before  it can put itself forth4 ,that  
through which the force is solicited1   
is itself another exertion of force1    
which cannot put itself forth  without  
similar solicitation4 ,this brings us   
either to a repetition of  the infinite 
progression1 or to a reciprocity of     
soliciting and being  solicited4 ,in    
either case we have no absolute         

beginning of motion4  ,force is not as  
yet1 like the final cause1 inherently   
self-determining3  the content is given 
to it as determined1 and force1 when it 
exerts  itself1 is1 according to the    
phrase1 blind in its working4 ,that     
phrase  implies the distinction between 
abstract force-manifestation and        
teleological action4    7#b7 ,the       
oft-repeated statement1 that the        
exercise of the force and  not the force
 itself admits of being known1 must be  
rejected as  groundless4 ,it is the very
 essence of force to manifest itself1   
and  thus in the totality of            
manifestation1 conceived as a law1 we at
 the  same time discover the force      
itself4 ,and yet this assertion that    
force  in its own self is unknowable    
betrays a well-grounded presentiment    
that this relation is finite4 ,the      
several manifestations of a force at    
first meet us in indefinite             
multiplicity1 and in their isolation    
seem  accidental3 but1 reducing this    

multiplicity to its inner unity1 which  
we term force1 we see that the          
apparently contingent is necessary1 by  
recognising the law that rules it4 ,but 
the different forces themselves  are a  
multiplicity again1 and in their mere   
juxtaposition seem to be  contingent4   
,hence in empirical physics1 we speak of
 the forces of  gravity1 magnetism1     
electricity1 c1 and in empirical        
psychology of  the forces of memory1    
imagination1 will1 and all the other    
faculties4  ,all this multiplicity again
 excites a craving to know these        
different  forces as a single whole1 nor
 would this craving be appeased even if 
the several forces were traced back to  
one common primary force4 ,such  a      
primary force would be really no more   
than an empty abstraction1  with as     
little content as the abstract          
thing-in-itself4 ,and besides  this1 the
 correlation of force and manifestation 
is essentially a  mediated correlation  
7of reciprocal dependence71 and it must 

therefore  contradict the notion of     
force to view it as primary or resting  
on  itself4    ,such being the case with
 the nature of force1 though we may     
consent to  let the world be called a   
manifestation of divine forces1 we      
should  object to have ,god ,himself    
viewed as a mere force4 ,for force is   
after  all a subordinate and finite     
category4 ,at the so-called renascence  
of  the sciences1 when steps were taken 
to trace the single phenomena of  nature
 back to underlying forces1 the ,church 
branded the enterprise  as impious4 ,the
 argument of the ,church was as follows4
 ,if it be the  forces of gravitation1  
of vegetation1 c4 which occasion the    
movements  of the heavenly bodies1 the  
growth of plants1 c41 there is nothing  
left for divine providence1 and ,god    
sinks to the level of a leisurely       
on-looker1 surveying this play of       
forces4 ,the students of nature1 it is  
true1 and ,newton more than others1 when
 they employed the reflective  category 

of force to explain natural phenomena1  
have expressly pleaded  that the honour 
of ,god1 as the ,creator and ,governor  
of the world1 would  not thereby be     
impaired4 ,still the logical issue of   
this explanation  by means of forces is 
that the inferential understanding      
proceeds to  fix each of these forces1  
and to maintain them in their finitude  
as  ultimate4 ,and contrasted with this 
deinfinitised world of independent      
forces and matters1 the only terms in   
which it is possible still to  describe 
,god will present ,him in the abstract  
infinity of an unknowable  supreme      
,being in some other world far away4    
,this is precisely the  position of     
materialism1 and of modern              
'free-thinking1' whose theology  ignores
 what ,god is and restricts itself to   
the mere fact that ,he  is4 ,in this    
dispute therefore the ,church and the   
religious mind have  to a certain extent
 the right on their side4 ,the finite   
forms of  understanding certainly fail  

to fulfil the conditions for a knowledge
  either of ,nature or of the formations
 in the world of ,mind as they  truly   
are4 ,yet on the other side it is       
impossible to overlook the  formal right
 which1 in the first place1 entitles the
 empirical sciences  to vindicate the   
right of thought to know the existent   
world in all  the speciality of its     
content1 and to seek something further  
than the  bare statement of mere        
abstract faith that ,god creates and    
governs the  world4 ,when our religious 
consciousness1 resting upon the         
authority of  the ,church1 teaches us   
that ,god created the world by ,his     
almighty will1  that ,he guides the     
stars in their courses1 and vouchsafes  
to all ,his  creatures their existence  
and their well-being1 the question ,why8
 is  still left to answer4 ,now it is   
the answer to this question which forms 
the common task of empirical science and
 of philosophy4 ,when religion  refuses 
to recognise this problem1 or the right 

to put it1 and appeals  to the          
unsearchableness of the decrees of ,god1
 it is taking up the same  agnostic     
ground as is taken by the mere          
,enlightenment of understanding4  ,such 
an appeal is no better than an arbitrary
 dogmatism1 which  contravenes the      
express command of ,christianity1 to    
know ,god in spirit  and in truth1 and  
is prompted by a humility which is not  
,christian1 but  born of ostentatious   
bigotry4    #acg4 ,force is a whole1    
which is in its own self negative       
self-relation2 and as such a whole it   
continually pushes  itself off from     
itself and puts itself forth4 ,but since
 this  reflection-into-another          
7corresponding to the distinction       
between the  ,parts of the ,whole7 is   
equally a reflection-into-self1 this    
out-putting  is the way and means by    
which ,force that returns back into     
itself is  as a ,force4 ,the very act of
 out-putting accordingly sets in        
abeyance  the diversity of the two sides

 which is found in this correlation1    
and expressly states the identity which 
virtually constitutes their  content4   
,the truth of ,force and utterance      
therefore is that relation1  in which   
the two sides are distinguished only as 
,outward and ,inward4    #ach4 77 ,the  
,inward 7,interior7 is the ground1 when 
it  stands as the mere form of the one  
side of the ,appearance and  the        
,correlation1--the empty form of        
reflection-into-self4 ,as a  counterpart
 to it stands the ,outward              
7,exterior71--,existence1  also as the  
form of the other side of the           
correlation1 with the  empty            
characteristic of                       
reflection-into-something-else4 ,but    
,inward  and ,outward are identified3   
and their identity is identity brought  
to fulness in the content1 that unity of
 reflection-into-self and               
reflection-into-other which was forced  
to appear in the movement of  force4    
,both are the same one totality1 and    

this unity makes them the  content4     
#aci4 ,in the first place then1         
,exterior is the same content as        
,interior4 ,what is inwardly is also    
found outwardly1 and vice vers4  ,the   
appearance shows nothing that is not in 
the essence1 and in the  essence there  
is nothing but what is manifested4      
#adj4 ,in the second place1 ,inward and 
,outward1 as formal terms1  are also    
reciprocally opposed1 and that          
thoroughly4 ,the one is the  abstraction
 of identity with self2 the other1 of   
mere multiplicity  or reality4 ,but as  
stages of the one form1 they are        
essentially  identical3 so that whatever
 is at first explicitly put only in the 
one  abstraction1 is also as plainly and
 at one step only in the other4         
,therefore what is only internal is also
 only external3 and what is only        
external1 is so far only at first       
internal4    ,it is the customary       
mistake of reflection to take the       
essence to be  merely the interior4 ,if 

it be so taken1 even this way of looking
 at  it is purely external1 and that    
sort of essence is the empty external   
abstraction4        ,ins ,innere der    
,natur      ,dringt sein erschaffner    
,geist1      ,zu glcklich wenn er nur   
,die uere ,schaale weist4#a    ,it ought
 rather to have been said that1 if the  
essence of nature is  ever described as 
the inner part1 the person who so       
describes it  only knows its outer      
shell4 ,in ,being as a whole1 or even in
 mere  sense-perception1 the notion is  
at first only an inward1 and for that   
very reason is something external to    
,being1 a subjective thinking  and      
being1 devoid of truth4--,in ,nature as 
well as in ,mind1 so long  as the       
notion1 design1 or law are at first the 
inner capacity1 mere  possibilities1    
they are first only an external1        
inorganic nature1  the knowledge of a   
third person1 alien force1 and the like4
 ,as a man  is outwardly1 that is to say
 in his actions 7not of course in his   

merely bodily outwardness71 so is he    
inwardly3 and if his virtue1  morality1 
c4 are only inwardly his1--that is if   
they exist only in his  intentions and  
sentiments1 and his outward acts are not
 identical with  them1 the one half of  
him is as hollow and empty as the other4
    ,the relation of ,outward and       
,inward unites the two relations that   
precede1 and at the same time sets in   
abeyance mere relativity and            
phenomenality in general4 ,yet so long  
as understanding keeps the ,inward  and 
,outward fixed in their separation1 they
 are empty forms1 the one  as null as   
the other4 ,not only in the study of    
nature1 but also of the  spiritual      
world1 much depends on a just           
appreciation of the relation  of inward 
and outward1 and especially on avoiding 
the misconception  that the former only 
is the essential point on which         
everything turns1  while the latter is  
unessential and trivial4 ,we find this  
mistake made  when1 as is often done1   

the difference between nature and mind  
is  traced back to the abstract         
difference between inner and outer4 ,as 
for  nature1 it certainly is in the     
gross external1 not merely to the mind1 
but even on its own part4 ,but to call  
it external 'in the gross' is  not to   
imply an abstract externality--for there
 is no such thing4 ,it  means rather    
that the ,idea which forms the common   
content of nature and  mind1 is found in
 nature as outward only1 and for that   
very reason only  inward4 ,the abstract 
understanding1 with its ',either--or1'  
may struggle  against this conception of
 nature4 ,it is none the less obviously 
found  in our other modes of            
consciousness1 particularly in religion4
 ,it is  the lesson of religion that    
nature1 no less than the spiritual      
world1  is a revelation of ,god3 but    
with this distinction1 that while nature
  never gets so far as to be conscious  
of its divine essence1 that             
consciousness is the express problem of 

the mind1 which in the matter  of that  
problem is as yet finite4 ,those who    
look upon the essence of  nature as mere
 inwardness1 and therefore inaccessible 
to us1 take up  the same line as that   
ancient creed which regarded ,god as    
envious and  jealous2 a creed which both
 ,plato and ,aristotle pronounced       
against long  ago4 ,all that ,god is1   
,he imparts and reveals2 and ,he does   
so1 at first1  in and through nature4   
,any object indeed is faulty and        
imperfect when it is only inward1 and   
thus at the same time only outward1 or1 
7which is the same thing17 when  it is  
only an outward and thus only an inward4
 ,for instance1 a child1  taken in the  
gross as human being1 is no doubt a     
rational creature2  but the reason of   
the child as child is at first a mere   
inward1 in the  shape of his natural    
ability or vocation1 c4 ,this mere      
inward1 at the  same time1 has for the  
child the form of a more outward1 in the
 shape  of the will of his parents1 the 

attainments of his teachers1 and the    
whole world of reason that environs him4
 ,the education and instruction  of a   
child aim at making him actually and for
 himself what he is at  first           
potentially and therefore for others1   
viz4 for his grown-up  friends4 ,the    
reason1 which at first exists in the    
child only as an  inner possibility1 is 
actualised through education3 and       
conversely1 the  child by these means   
becomes conscious that the goodness1    
religion1 and  science which he had at  
first looked upon as an outward         
authority1 are  his own and inward      
nature4 ,as with the child so it is in  
this matter  with the adult1 when1 in   
opposition to his true destiny1 his     
intellect  and will remain in the       
bondage of the natural man4 ,thus1 the  
criminal  sees the punishment to which  
he has to submit as an act of violence  
from without3 whereas in fact the       
penalty is only the manifestation of    
his own criminal will4    ,from what has

 now been said1 we may learn what to    
think of a man who1  when blamed for his
 shortcomings1 it may be1 his           
discreditable acts1  appeals to the     
7professedly7 excellent intentions and  
sentiments of  the inner self he        
distinguishes therefrom4 ,there         
certainly may be  individual cases1     
where the malice of outward             
circumstances frustrates  well-meant    
designs1 and disturbs the execution of  
the best-laid plans4  ,but in general   
even here the essential unity between   
inward and outward  is maintained4 ,we  
are thus justified in saying that a man 
is what he  does2 and the lying vanity  
which consoles itself with the feeling  
of  inward excellence1 may be confronted
 with the words of the gospel3 ',by     
their fruits ye shall know them4' ,that 
grand saying applies primarily  in a    
moral and religious aspect1 but it also 
holds good in reference  to performances
 in art and science4 ,the keen eye of a 
teacher who  perceives in his pupil     

decided evidences of talent1 may lead   
him to  state his opinion that a        
,raphael or a ,mozart lies hidden in the
 boy3  and the result will show how far 
such an opinion was well-founded4  ,but 
if a daub of a painter1 or a poetaster1 
soothe themselves by the  conceit that  
their head is full of high ideals1 their
 consolation is  a poor one2 and if they
 insist on being judged not by their    
actual  works but by their projects1 we 
may safely reject their pretensions  as 
unfounded and unmeaning4 ,the converse  
case however also occurs4 ,in  passing  
judgment on men who have accomplished   
something great and good1  we often make
 use of the false distinction between   
inward and outward4  ,all that they have
 accomplished1 we say1 is outward       
merely2 inwardly  they were acting from 
some very different motive1 such as a   
desire to  gratify their vanity or other
 unworthy passion4 ,this is the spirit  
of  envy4 ,incapable of any great action
 of its own1 envy tries hard to         

depreciate greatness and to bring it    
down to its own level4 ,let us1  rather1
 recall the fine expression of ,goethe1 
that there is no remedy  but ,love      
against great superiorities of others4  
,we may seek to rob  men's great actions
 of their grandeur1 by the insinuation  
of hypocrisy2  but1 though it is        
possible that men in an instance now and
 then may  dissemble and disguise a good
 deal1 they cannot conceal the whole of 
their inner self1 which infallibly      
betrays itself in the decursus  vitae4  
,even here it is true that a man is     
nothing but the series of  his actions4 
,what is called the 'pragmatic' writing 
of history has in modern times          
frequently sinned in its treatment of   
great historical characters1 and        
defaced and tarnished the true          
conception of them by this fallacious   
separation of the outward from the      
inward4 ,not content with telling  the  
unvarnished tale of the great acts which
 have been wrought by  the heroes of the

 world's history1 and with acknowledging
 that their  inward being corresponds   
with the import of their acts1 the      
pragmatic  historian fancies himself    
justified and even obliged to trace the 
supposed secret motives that lie behind 
the open facts of the record4  ,the     
historian1 in that case1 is supposed to 
write with more depth in  proportion as 
he succeeds in tearing away the aureole 
from all that  has been heretofore held 
grand and glorious1 and in depressing   
it1 so  far as its origin and proper    
significance are concerned1 to the level
  of vulgar mediocrity4 ,to make these  
pragmatical researches in history       
easier1 it is usual to recommend the    
study of psychology1 which is  supposed 
to make us acquainted with the real     
motives of human actions4  ,the         
psychology in question however is only  
that petty knowledge of  men1 which     
looks away from the essential and       
permanent in human  nature to fasten its
 glance on the casual and private       

features shown  in isolated instincts   
and passions4 ,a pragmatical psychology 
ought  at least to leave the historian1 
who investigates the motives at the     
ground of great actions1 a choice       
between the 'substantial' interests  of 
patriotism1 justice1 religious truth and
 the like1 on the one hand1  and the    
subjective and 'formal' interests of    
vanity1 ambition1 avarice  and the like1
 on the other4 ,the latter however are  
the motives which  must be viewed by the
 pragmatist as really efficient1        
otherwise the  assumption of a contrast 
between the inward 7the disposition of  
the  agent7 and the outward 7the import 
of the action7 would fall to the        
ground4 ,but inward and outward have in 
truth the same content2 and the  right  
doctrine is the very reverse of this    
pedantic judicially4 ,if the  heroes of 
history had been actuated by subjective 
and formal interests  alone1 they would 
never have accomplished what they have4 
,and if we  have due regard to the unity

 between the inner and the outer1 we    
must  own that great men willed what    
they did1 and did what they willed4     
#ada4 ,the empty abstractions1 by means 
of which the one identical  content     
perforce continues in the two           
correlatives1 suspend themselves  in the
 immediate transition1 the one in the   
other4 ,the content is  itself nothing  
but their identity 7 #ach73 and these   
abstractions are  the seeming of        
essence1 put as seeming4 ,by the        
manifestation of force  the inward is   
put into existence3 but this putting is 
the mediation by  empty abstractions4   
,in its own self the intermediating     
process vanishes  to the immediacy1 in  
which the inward and the outward are    
absolutely  identical and their         
difference is distinctly no more than   
assumed and  imposed4 ,this identity is 
,actuality4      ,c4--,,actuality4      
#adb4 ,actuality is the unity1 become   
immediate1 of essence with  existence1  
or of inward with outward4 ,the         

utterance of the actual  is the actual  
itself3 so that in this utterance it    
remains just as  essential1 and only is 
essential1 in so far as it is in        
immediate  external existence4    ,we   
have ere this met ,being and ,existence 
as forms of the immediate4  ,being is1  
in general1 unreflected immediacy and   
transition into  another4 ,existence is 
immediate unity of being and reflection2
 hence  appearance3 it comes from the   
ground1 and falls to the ground4 ,in    
actuality this unity is explicitly put1 
and the two sides of the  relation      
identified4 ,hence the actual is        
exempted from transition1 and  its      
externality is its energising4 ,in that 
energising it is reflected  into itself3
 its existence is only the manifestation
 of itself1 not of  an other4           
,actuality and thought 7or ,idea7 are   
often absurdly opposed4 ,how  commonly  
we hear people saying that1 though no   
objection can be urged  against the     
truth and correctness of a certain      

thought1 there is  nothing of the kind  
to be seen in actuality1 or it cannot be
 actually  carried out6 ,people who use 
such language only prove that they have 
not properly apprehended the nature     
either of thought or of actuality4      
,thought in such a case is1 on one hand1
 the synonym for a subjective           
conception1 plan1 intention or the like1
 just as actuality1 on the  other1 is   
made synonymous with external and       
sensible existence4 ,this  is all very  
well in common life1 where great laxity 
is allowed in the  categories and the   
names given to them3 and it may of      
course happen  that e4g4 the plan1 or   
so-called idea1 say of a certain method 
of  taxation1 is good and advisable in  
the abstract1 but that nothing of  the  
sort is found in so-called actuality1 or
 could possibly be carried  out under   
the given conditions4 ,but when the     
abstract understanding  gets hold of    
these categories and exaggerates the    
distinction they  imply into a hard and 

fast line of contrast1 when it tells us 
that in  this actual world we must knock
 ideas out of our heads1 it is necessary
  energetically to protest against these
 doctrines1 alike in the name of        
science and of sound reason4 ,for on the
 one hand ,ideas are not confined  to   
our heads merely1 nor is the ,idea1 upon
 the whole1 so feeble as to  leave the  
question of its actualisation or        
non-actualisation dependent  in our     
will4 ,the ,idea is rather the          
absolutely active as well ,i as  actual4
 ,and on the other hand actuality is not
 so bad and irrational1  as purblind or 
wrong-headed and muddle-brained would-be
 reformers  imagine4 ,so far is         
actuality1 as distinguished from mere   
appearance1  and primarily presenting a 
unity of inward and outward1 from being 
in  contrariety with reason1 that it is 
rather thoroughly reasonable1 and       
everything which is not reasonable must 
on that very ground cease to  be held   
actual4 ,the same view may be traced in 

the usages of educated  speech1 which   
declines to give the name of real poet  
or real statesman  to a poet or a       
statesman who can do nothing really     
meritorious or  reasonable4    ,in that 
vulgar conception of actuality which    
mistakes for it what is  palpable and   
directly obvious to the senses1 we must 
seek the ground  of a wide-spread       
prejudice about the relation of the     
philosophy of  ,aristotle to that of    
,plato4 ,popular opinion makes the      
difference to be  as follows4 ,while    
,plato recognises the idea and only the 
idea as the  truth1 ,aristotle1         
rejecting the idea1 keeps to what is    
actual1 and is  on that account to be   
considered the founder and chief of     
empiricism4  ,on this it may be         
remarked3 that although actuality       
certainly is  the principle of the      
,aristotelian philosophy1 it is not the 
vulgar  actuality of what is immediately
 at hand1 but the idea as actuality4    
,where then lies the controversy of     

,aristotle against ,plato8 ,it lies in  
this4 ,aristotle calls the ,platonic    
idea a mere 1 and establishes  in       
opposition to ,plato that the idea1     
which both equally recognise to  be the 
only truth1 is essentially to be viewed 
as an 1 in other  words1 as the inward  
which is quite to the fore1 or as the   
unity of  inner and outer1 or as        
actuality1 in the emphatic sense here   
given to  the word4    #adc4 ,such a    
concrete category as ,actuality includes
 the  characteristics aforesaid and     
their difference1 and is therefore also 
the development of them1 in such a way  
that1 as it has them1 they are  at the  
same time plainly understood to be a    
show1 to be assumed or  imposed 7 #ada74
    77 ,viewed as an identity in        
general1 ,actuality is first of all     
,possibility--the reflection-into-self  
which1 as in contrast with  the concrete
 unity of the actual1 is taken and made 
an abstract and  unessential            
essentiality4 ,possibility is what is   

essential to reality1  but in such a way
 that it is at the same time only a     
possibility4    ,it was probably the    
import of ,possibility which induced    
,kant to regard  it along with necessity
 and actuality as ,modalities1 'since   
these  categories do not in the least   
increase the notion as object1 but only 
express its relation to the faculty of  
knowledge4' ,for ,possibility is  really
 the bare abstraction of                
reflection-into-self1--what was formerly
  called the ,inward1 only that it is   
now taken to mean the external  inward1 
lifted out of reality and with the being
 of a mere supposition1  and is thus1   
sure enough1 supposed only as a bare    
modality1 an  abstraction which comes   
short1 and1 in more concrete terms1     
belongs  only to subjective thought4 ,it
 is otherwise with ,actuality and       
,necessity4 ,they are anything but a    
mere sort and mode for something  else3 
in fact the very reverse of that4 ,if   
they are supposed1 it is as  the        

concrete1 not merely supposititious1 but
 intrinsically complete4    ,as         
,possibility is1 in the first instance1 
the mere form of  identity-with-self 7as
 compared with the concrete which is    
actual71  the rule for it merely is that
 a thing must not be self-contradictory4
  ,thus everything is possible2 for an  
act of abstraction can give any  content
 this form of identity4 ,everything     
however is as impossible as  it is      
possible4 ,in every content1--which is  
and must be concrete1--the  speciality  
of its nature may be viewed as a        
specialised contrariety  and in that way
 as a contradiction4 ,nothing therefore 
can be more  meaningless than to speak  
of such possibility and impossibility4  
,in  philosophy1 in particular1 there   
should never be a word said of showing  
that ',it is possible1' or ',there is   
still another possibility1' or1 to      
adopt another phraseology1 ',it is      
conceivable4' ,the same consideration   
should warn the writer of history       

against employing a category which  has 
now been explained to be on its own     
merits untrue3 but the subtlety  of the 
empty understanding finds its chief     
pleasure in the fantastic  ingenuity of 
suggesting possibilities and lots of    
possibilities4    ,our picture-thought  
is at first disposed to see in          
possibility the  richer and more        
comprehensive1 in actuality the poorer  
and narrower  category4 ,everything1 it 
is said1 is possible1 but everything    
which  is possible is not on that       
account actual4 ,in real truth1 however1
 if  we deal with them as thoughts1     
actuality is the more comprehensive1    
because it is the concrete thought which
 includes possibility as an  abstract   
element4 ,and that superiority is to    
some extent expressed  in our ordinary  
mode of thought when we speak of the    
possible1 in  distinction from the      
actual1 as only possible4 ,possibility  
is often  said to consist in a thing's  
being thinkable4 ',think1' however1 in  

this  use of the word1 only means to    
conceive any content under the form of  
an abstract identity4 ,now every content
 can be brought under this form1  since 
nothing is required except to separate  
it from the relations in  which it      
stands4 ,hence any content1 however     
absurd and nonsensical1 can  be viewed  
as possible4 ,it is possible that the   
moon might fall upon  the earth         
to-night2 for the moon is a body        
separate from the earth1  and may as    
well fall down upon it as a stone thrown
 into the air does4  ,it is possible    
that the ,sultan may become ,pope2 for1 
being a man1 he  may be converted to the
 ,christian faith1 may become a         
,catholic priest1  and so on4 ,in       
language like this about possibilities1 
it is chiefly  the law of the sufficient
 ground or reason which is manipulated  
in the  style already explained4        
,everything1 it is said1 is possible1   
for which  you can state some ground4   
,the less education a man has1 or1 in   

other  words1 the less he knows of the  
specific connexions of the objects  to  
which he directs his observations1 the  
greater is his tendency to  launch out  
into all sorts of empty possibilities4  
,an instance of this  habit in the      
political sphere is seen in the         
pot-house politician4  ,in practical    
life too it is no uncommon thing to see 
ill-will and  indolence slink behind the
 category of possibility1 in order to   
escape  definite obligations4 ,to such  
conduct the same remarks apply as were  
made in connexion with the law of       
sufficient ground4 ,reasonable and      
practical men refuse to be imposed upon 
by the possible1 for the simple  ground 
that it is possible only4 ,they stick to
 the actual 7not meaning  by that word  
merely whatever immediately is now and  
here74 ,many of  the proverbs of common 
life express the same contempt for what 
is  abstractly possible4 ',a bird in the
 hand is worth two in the bush4'        
,after all there is as good reason for  

taking everything to be  impossible1 as 
to be possible3 for every content 7a    
content is always  concrete7 includes   
not only diverse but even opposite      
characteristics4  ,nothing is so        
impossible1 for instance1 as this1 that 
,i am3 for ',i' is  at the same time    
simple self-relation and1 as            
undoubtedly1 relation  to something     
else4 ,the same may be seen in every    
other fact in the  natural or spiritual 
world4 ,matter1 it may be said1 is      
impossible3  for it is the unity of     
attraction and repulsion4 ,the same is  
true of  life1 law1 freedom1 and above  
all1 of ,god ,himself1 as the true1 e4g4
  the triune ,god1--a notion of ,god1   
which the abstract ',enlightenment'  of 
,understanding1 in conformity with its  
canons1 rejected on the  allegation that
 it was contradictory in thought4       
,generally speaking1  it is the empty   
understanding which haunts these empty  
forms3 and  the business of philosophy  
in the matter is to show how null and   

meaningless they are4 ,whether a thing  
is possible or impossible1  depends     
altogether on the subject-matter3 that  
is1 on the sum total of  the elements in
 actuality1 which1 as it opens itself   
out1 discloses  itself to be necessity4 
#add4 77 ,but the ,actual in its        
distinction from possibility 7which  is 
reflection-into-self7 is itself only the
 outward concrete1 the  unessential     
immediate4 ,in other words1 to such     
extent as the actual  is primarily 7    
#adb7 the simple merely immediate unity 
of ,inward  and ,outward1 it is         
obviously made an unessential outward1  
and thus  at the same time 7 #adj7 it is
 merely inward1 the abstraction of      
reflection-into-self4 ,hence it is      
itself characterised as a merely        
possible4 ,when thus valued at the rate 
of a mere possibility1 the  actual is a 
,contingent or ,accidental1 and1        
conversely1  possibility is mere        
,accident itself or ,chance4    #adf4   
,possibility and ,contingency are the   

two factors of  ,actuality1--,inward and
 ,outward1 put as mere forms which      
constitute the  externality of the      
actual4 ,they have their                
reflection-into-self on the  body of    
actual fact1 or content1 with its       
intrinsic definiteness which  gives the 
essential ground of their               
characterisation4 ,the finitude of  the 
contingent and the possible lies1       
therefore1 as we now see1 in the        
distinction of the form-determination   
from the content3 and1 therefore1  it   
depends on the content alone whether    
anything is contingent and  possible4   
,as possibility is the mere inside of   
actuality1 it is for that  reason a mere
 outside actuality1 in other words1     
,contingency4 ,the  contingent1 roughly 
speaking1 is what has the ground of its 
being  not in itself but in somewhat    
else4 ,such is the aspect under which   
actuality first comes before            
consciousness1 and which is often       
mistaken  for actuality itself4 ,but the

 contingent is only one side of the     
actual1--the side1 namely1 of reflection
 on somewhat else4 ,it is the  actual1  
in the signification of something merely
 possible4 ,accordingly  we consider the
 contingent to be what may or may not   
be1 what may be  in one way or in       
another1 whose being or not-being1 and  
whose being  on this wise or otherwise1 
depends not upon itself but on something
  else4 ,to overcome this contingency   
is1 roughly speaking1 the problem  of   
science on the one hand2 as in the range
 of practice1 on the other1  the end of 
action is to rise above the contingency 
of the will1 or  above caprice4 ,it has 
however often happened1 most of all in  
modern  times1 that contingency has been
 unwarrantably elevated1 and had a      
value attached to it1 both in nature and
 the world of mind1 to which  it has no 
just claim4 ,frequently ,nature--to take
 it first1--has been  chiefly admired   
for the richness and variety of its     
structures4 ,apart1  however1 from what 

disclosure it contains of the ,idea1    
this richness  gratifies none of the    
higher interests of reason1 and in its  
vast  variety of structures1 organic and
 inorganic1 affords us only the         
spectacle of a contingency losing itself
 in vagueness4 ,at any rate1  the       
chequered scene presented by the several
 varieties of animals and  plants1      
conditioned as it is by outward         
circumstances1--the complex  changes in 
the figuration and grouping of clouds1  
and the like1 ought  not to be ranked   
higher than the equally casual fancies  
of the mind  which surrenders itself to 
its own caprices4 ,the wonderment with  
which  such phenomena are welcomed is a 
most abstract frame of mind1 from  which
 one should advance to a closer insight 
into the inner harmony and  uniformity  
of nature4    ,of contingency in respect
 of the ,will it is especially important
 to  form a proper estimate4 ,the       
,freedom of the ,will is an expression  
that  often means mere free-choice1 or  

the will in the form of contingency4    
,freedom of choice1 or the capacity of  
determining ourselves towards one  thing
 or another1 is undoubtedly a vital     
element in the will 7which in  its very 
notion is free72 but instead of being   
freedom itself1 it is  only in the first
 instance a freedom in form4 ,the       
genuinely free will1  which includes    
free choice as suspended1 is conscious  
to itself that  its content is          
intrinsically firm and fast1 and knows  
it at the same  time to be thoroughly   
its own4 ,a will1 on the contrary1 which
 remains  standing on the grade of      
option1 even supposing it does decide in
  favour of what is in import right and 
true1 is always haunted by the  conceit 
that it might1 if it had so pleased1    
have decided in favour of  the reverse  
course4 ,when more narrowly examined1   
free choice is seen  to be a            
contradiction1 to this extent that its  
form and content stand  in antithesis4  
,the matter of choice is given1 and     

known as a content  dependent not on the
 will itself1'but on outward            
circumstances4 ,in  reference to such a 
given content1 freedom lies only in the 
form of  choosing1 which1 as it is only 
a freedom in form1 may consequently be  
regarded as freedom only in supposition4
 ,on an ultimate analysis it  will be   
seen that the same outwardness of       
circumstances1 on which is  founded the 
content that the will finds to its hand1
 can alone account  for the will giving 
its decision for the one and not the    
other of the  two alternatives4         
,although contingency1 as it has thus   
been shown1 is only one aspect in  the  
whole of actuality1 and therefore not to
 be mistaken for actuality  itself1 it  
has no less than the rest of the forms  
of the idea its due  office in the world
 of objects4 ,this is1 in the first     
place1 seen in  ,nature4 ,on the surface
 of ,nature1 so to speak1 ,chance ranges
 unchecked1  and that contingency must  
simply be recognised1 without the       

pretension  sometimes erroneously       
ascribed to philosophy1 of seeking to   
find in it  a                           
could-only-be-so-and-not-otherwise4 ,nor
 is contingency less visible  in the    
world of ,mind4 ,the will1 as we have   
already remarked1 includes  contingency 
under the shape of option or            
free-choice1 but only as a  vanishing   
and abrogated element4 ,in respect of   
,mind and its works1  just as in the    
case of ,nature1 we must guard against  
being so far  misled by a well-meant    
endeavour after rational knowledge1 as  
to try  to exhibit the necessity of     
phenomena which are marked by a decided 
contingency1 or1 as the phrase is1 to   
construe them a priori4 ,thus  in       
language 7although it be1 as it were1   
the body of thought7 ,chance  still     
unquestionably plays a decided part2 and
 the same is true of the  creations of  
law1 of art1 c4 ,the problem of science1
 and especially of  philosophy1         
undoubtedly consists in eliciting the   

necessity concealed  under the semblance
 of contingency4 ,that however is far   
from meaning  that the contingent       
belongs to our subjective conception    
alone1 and  must therefore be simply set
 aside1 if we wish to get at the truth4 
,all scientific researches which pursue 
this tendency exclusively1  lay         
themselves fairly open to the charge of 
mere jugglery and an  over-strained     
precisianism4    #adf4 ,when more       
closely examined1 what the aforesaid    
outward side  of actuality implies is   
this4 ,contingency1 which is actuality  
in its immediacy1 is the self-identical1
 essentially only as a  supposition     
which is no sooner made than it is      
revoked and leaves  an existent         
externality4 ,in this way1 the external 
contingency is  something pre-supposed1 
the immediate existence of which is at  
the  same time a possibility1 and has   
the vocation to be suspended1 to  be the
 possibility of something else4 ,now    
this possibility is the  ,condition4    

,the ,contingent1 as the immediate      
actuality1 is at the same time  the     
possibility of somewhat else1--no longer
 however that abstract  possibility     
which we had at first1 but the          
possibility which is4 ,and  a           
possibility existent is a ,condition4   
,by the ,condition of a thing  we mean  
first1 an existence1 in short an        
immediate1 and secondly  the vocation of
 this immediate to be suspended and     
subserve the  actualising of something  
else4--,immediate actuality is in       
general  as such never what it ought to 
be2 it is a finite actuality with an    
inherent flaw1 and its vocation is to be
 consumed4 ,but the other  aspect of    
actuality is its essentiality4 ,this is 
primarily the inside1  which as a mere  
possibility is no less destined to be   
suspended4  ,possibility thus suspended 
is the issuing of a new actuality1 of   
which  the first immediate actuality was
 the pre-supposition4 ,here we see  the 
alternation which is involved in the    

notion of a ,condition4 ,the            
,conditions of a thing seem at first    
sight to involve no bias anyway4        
,really however an immediate actuality  
of this kind includes in it  the germ of
 something else altogether4 ,at first   
this something else  is only a          
possibility3 but the form of possibility
 is soon suspended  and translated into 
actuality4 ,this new actuality thus     
issuing is the  very inside of the      
immediate actuality which it uses up4   
,thus there  comes into being quite an  
other shape of things1 and yet itis not 
an  other3 for the first actuality is   
only put as what it in essence was4     
,the conditions which are sacrificed1   
which fall to the ground and are  spent1
 only unite with themselves in the other
 actuality4 ,such in  general is the    
nature of the process of actuality4 ,the
 actual is no  mere case of immediate   
,being1 but1 as essential ,being1 a     
suspension of  its own immediacy1 and   
thereby mediating itself with itself4   

#adg4 77 ,when this externality 7of     
actuality7 is thus developed into  a    
circle of the two categories of         
possibility and immediate actuality1    
showing the intermediation of the one by
 the other1 it is what is  called ,real 
,possibility4 ,being such a circle1     
further1 it  is the totality1 and thus  
the content1 the actual fact or affair  
in  its all-round definiteness4 ,whilst 
in like manner1 if we look at the       
distinction between the two             
characteristics in this unity1 it       
realises  the concrete totality of the  
form1 the immediate self-translation  of
 inner into outer1 and of outer into    
inner4 ,this self-movement of  the form 
is ,activity1 carrying into effect the  
fact or affair as a  real ground which  
is self-suspended to actuality1 and     
carrying into  effect the contingent    
actuality1 the conditions2 i4e4 it is   
their  reflection-in-self1 and their    
self-suspension to an other actuality1  
the actuality of the actual fact4 ,if   

all the conditions are at hand1  the    
fact 7event7 must be actual2 and the    
fact itself is one of the  conditions3  
for being in the first place only inner1
 it is at first  itself only            
pre-supposed4 ,developed actuality1 as  
the coincident  alternation of inner and
 outer1 the alternation of their        
opposite  motions combined into a single
 motion1 is ,necessity4    ,necessity   
has been defined1 and rightly so1 as the
 union of possibility  and actuality4   
,this mode of expression1 however1 gives
 a superficial  and therefore           
unintelligible description of the very  
difficult notion  of necessity4 ,it is  
difficult because it is the notion      
itself1 only  that its stages or factors
 are still as actualities1 which are yet
 at  the same time to be viewed as forms
 only1 collapsing and transient4 ,in    
the two following paragraphs therefore  
an exposition of the factors  which     
constitute necessity must be given at   
greater length4           99       99   

99       99       99    ,when anything  
is said to be necessary1 the first      
question we ask is1  ,why8 ,anything    
necessary accordingly comes before us as
 something due to  a supposition1 the   
result of certain antecedents4 ,if we go
 no further  than mere derivation from  
antecedents however1 we have not gained 
a  complete notion of what necessity    
means4 ,what is merely derivative1  is  
what it is1 not through itself1 but     
through something else2 and in  this way
 it too is merely contingent4 ,what is  
necessary1 on the other  hand1 we would 
have be what it is through itself2 and  
thus1 although  derivative1 it must     
still contain the antecedent whence it  
is derived  as a vanishing element in   
itself4 ,hence we say of what is        
necessary1  ',it is4' ,we thus hold it  
to be simple self-relation1 in which all
  dependence on something else is       
removed4    ,necessity is often said to 
be blind4 ,if that means that in the    
process  of necessity the ,end or final 

cause is not explicitly and overtly     
present1 the statement is correct4 ,the 
process of necessity begins  with the   
existence of scattered circumstances    
which appear to have no  inter-connexion
 and no concern one with another4 ,these
 circumstances  are an immediate        
actuality which collapses1 and out of   
this negation  a new actuality proceeds4
 ,here we have a content which in point 
of  form is doubled1 once as content of 
the final realised fact1 and once  as   
content of the scattered circumstances  
which appear as if they  were positive1 
and make themselves at first felt in    
that character4  ,the latter content is 
in itself nought and is accordingly     
inverted  into its negative1 thus       
becoming content of the realised fact4  
,the  immediate circumstances fall to   
the ground as conditions1 but are at    
the same time retained as content of the
 ultimate reality4 ,from such           
circumstances and conditions there has1 
as we say1 proceeded quite  another     

thing1 and it is for that reason that we
 call this process of  necessity blind4 
,if on the contrary we consider         
teleological action1 we  have in the end
 of action a content which is already   
fore-known4 ,this  activity therefore is
 not blind but seeing4 ,to say that the 
world is  ruled by ,providence implies  
that design1 as what has been absolutely
  pre-determined1 is the active         
principle1 so that the issue corresponds
  to what has been fore-known and       
fore-willed4    ,the theory however     
which regards the world as determined   
through  necessity and the belief in a  
divine providence are by no means       
mutually excluding points of view4 ,the 
intellectual principle  underlying the  
idea of divine providence will hereafter
 be shown to be  the notion4 ,but the   
notion is the truth of necessity1 which 
it contains  in suspension in itself2   
just as1 conversely1 necessity is the   
notion  implicit4 ,necessity is blind   
only so long as it is not understood4   

,there is nothing therefore more        
mistaken than the charge of blind       
fatalism made against the ,philosophy of
 ,history1 when it takes for its        
problem to understand the necessity of  
every event4 ,the philosophy of  history
 rightly understood takes the rank of a 
,thodice2 and those1  who fancy they    
honour ,divine ,providence by excluding 
necessity from  it1 are really degrading
 it by this exclusiveness to a blind and
  irrational caprice4 ,in the simple    
language of the religious mind which    
speaks of ,god's eternal and immutable  
decrees1 there is implied an  express   
recognition that necessity forms part of
 the essence of ,god4 ,in  his          
difference from ,god1 man1 with his own 
private opinion and will1  follows the  
call of caprice and arbitrary humour1   
and thus often finds  his acts turn out 
something quite different from what he  
had meant and  willed4 ,but ,god knows  
what ,he wills1 is determined in ,his   
eternal will  neither by accident from  

within nor from without1 and what ,he   
wills ,he  also accomplishes1           
irresistibly4    ,necessity gives a     
point of view which has important       
bearings upon our  sentiments and       
behaviour4 ,when we look upon events as 
necessary1 our  situation seems at first
 sight to lack freedom completely4 ,in  
the  creed of the ancients1 as we know1 
necessity figured as ,destiny4 ,the     
modern point of view1 on the contrary1  
is that of ,consolation4 ,and           
,consolation means that1 if we renounce 
our aims and interests1 we do so  only  
in prospect of receiving compensation4  
,destiny1 on the contrary1  leaves no   
room for ,consolation4 ,but a close     
examination of the ancient  feeling     
about destiny1 will not by any means    
reveal a sense of bondage  to its power4
 ,rather the reverse4 ,this will clearly
 appear1 if we  remember1 that the sense
 of bondage springs from inability to   
surmount  the antithesis1 and from      
looking at what is1 and what happens1 as

  contradictory to what ought to be and 
happen4 ,in the ancient mind the        
feeling was more of the following kind3 
,because such a thing is1 it  is1 and as
 it is1 so ought it to be4 ,here there  
is no contrast to be  seen1 and         
therefore no sense of bondage1 no pain1 
and no sorrow4 ,true1  indeed1 as       
already remarked1 this attitude towards 
destiny is void of  consolation4 ,but   
then1 on the other hand1 it is a frame  
of mind which  does not need            
consolation1 so long as personal        
subjectivity has not  acquired its      
infinite significance4 ,it is this point
 on which special  stress should be laid
 in comparing the ancient sentiment with
 that of  the modern and ,christian     
world4    ,by ,subjectivity1 however1 we
 may understand1 in the first place1    
only  the natural and finite            
subjectivity1 with its contingent and   
arbitrary  content of private interests 
and inclinations1--all1 in short1 that  
we call person as distinguished from    

thing3 taking 'thing' in the  emphatic  
sense of the word 7in which we use the  
7correct7 expression  that it is a      
question of things and not of persons74 
,in this sense  of sub-activity we      
cannot help admiring the tranquil       
resignation of  the ancients to destiny1
 and feeling that it is a much higher   
and  worthier mood than that of the     
moderns1 who obstinately pursue their   
subjective aims1 and when they find     
themselves constrained to resign  the   
hope of reaching them1 console          
themselves with the prospect of a       
reward in some other shape4 ,but the    
term subjectivity is not to be  confined
 merely to the bad and finite kind of it
 which is contrasted  with the thing    
7fact74 ,in its truth subjectivity is   
immanent in the  fact1 and as a         
subjectivity thus infinite is the very  
truth of the  fact4 ,thus regarded1 the 
doctrine of consolation receives a newer
 and  a higher significance4 ,it is in  
this sense that the ,christian religion 

is to be regarded as the religion of    
consolation1 and even of absolute       
consolation4 ,christianity1 we know1    
teaches that ,god wishes all men  to be 
saved4 ,that teaching declares that     
subjectivity has an infinite  value4    
,and that consoling power of            
,christianity just lies in the fact     
that ,god ,himself is in it known as the
 absolute subjectivity1 so that1        
inasmuch as subjectivity involves the   
element of particularity1 our           
particular personality too is recognised
 not merely as something to be  solely  
and simply nullified1 but as at the same
 time something to be  preserved4 ,the  
gods of the ancient world were also1 it 
is true1 looked  upon as personal2 but  
the personality of a ,zeus and an       
,apollo is not  a real personality3 it  
is only a figure in the mind4 ,in other 
words1  these gods are mere             
personifications1 which1 being such1 do 
not know  themselves1 and are only      
known4 ,an evidence of this defect and  

this  powerlessness of the old gods is  
found even in the religious beliefs  of 
antiquity4 ,in the ancient creeds not   
only men1 but even gods1  were          
represented as subject to destiny 7 or  
71 a  destiny which we must conceive as 
necessity not unveiled1 and thus as     
something wholly impersonal1 selfless1  
and blind4 ,on the other hand1  the     
,christian ,god is ,god not known       
merely1 but also self-knowing2 ,he is  a
 personality not merely figured in our  
minds1 but rather absolutely  actual4   
,we must refer to the ,philosophy of    
,religion for a further discussion of   
the points here touched4 ,but we may    
note in passing how important it  is for
 any man to meet everything that befalls
 him with the spirit of  the old proverb
 which describes each man as the        
architect of his own  fortune4 ,that    
means that it is only himself after all 
of which a man  has the usufruct4 ,the  
other way would be to lay the blame of  
whatever  we experience upon other men1 

upon unfavourable circumstances1 and the
  like4 ,and this is a fresh example of 
the language of unfreedom1 and at  the  
same time the spring of discontent4 ,if 
man saw1 on the contrary1  that whatever
 happens to him is only the outcome of  
himself1 and that  he only bears his own
 guilt1 he would stand free1 and in     
everything  that came upon him would    
have the consciousness that he suffered 
no  wrong4 ,a man who lives in dispeace 
with himself and his lot1 commits  much 
that is perverse and amiss1 for no other
 reason than because of  the false      
opinion that he is wronged by others4   
,no doubt too there is a  great deal of 
chance in what befalls us4 ,but the     
chance has its root in  the 'natural'   
man4 ,so long however as a man is       
otherwise conscious that  he is free1   
his harmony of soul and peace of mind   
will not be destroyed  by the           
disagreeables that befall him4 ,it is   
their view of necessity1  therefore1    
which is at the root of the content and 

discontent of men1  and which in that   
way determines their destiny itself4    
#adh4 ,among the three elements in the  
process of necessity--the  ,condition1  
the ,fact1 and the ,activity--    a4    
,the ,condition is 77 what is           
pre-supposed or ante-stated1 e4g4  it is
 not only supposed or stated1 and so    
only a correlative to the  fact1 but    
also prior1 and so independent1 a       
contingent and external  circumstance   
which exists without respect to the     
fact4 ,while thus  contingent1 however1 
this pre-supposed or ante-stated term1  
in respect  withal of the fact1 which is
 the totality1 is a complete circle of  
conditions1 77 ,the conditions are      
passive1 are used as materials for  the 
fact1 into the content of which they    
thus enter4 ,they are likewise          
intrinsically conformable to this       
content1 and already contain its  whole 
characteristic4    b4 ,the ,fact is also
 77 something pre-supposed or           
ante-stated1 i4e4  it is at first1 and  

as supposed1 only inner and possible1   
and also1  being prior1 an independent  
content by itself1 77 ,by using up the  
conditions1 it receives its external    
existence1 the realisation of  the      
articles of its content1 which          
reciprocally correspond to the          
conditions1 so that whilst it presents  
itself out of these as the fact1  it    
also proceeds from them4    c4 ,the     
,activity similarly has 77 an           
independent existence of its own  7as a 
man1 a character71 and at the same time 
it is possible only  where the          
conditions are and the fact1 77 ,it is  
the movement which  translates the      
conditions into fact1 and the latter    
into the former as  the side of         
existence1 or rather the movement which 
educes the fact  from the conditions in 
which it is potentially present1 and    
which gives  existence to the fact by   
abolishing the existence possessed by   
the  conditions4    ,in so far as these 
three elements stand to each other in   

the shape  of independent existences1   
this process has the aspect of an       
outward  necessity4 ,outward necessity  
has a limited content for its fact4 ,for
  the fact is this whole1 in phase of   
singleness4 ,but since in its form  this
 whole is external to itself1 it is     
self-externalised even in its  own self 
and in its content1 and this            
externality1 attaching to the  fact1 is 
a limit of its content4    #adi4        
,necessity1 then1 is potentially the one
 essence1 self-same but  now full of    
content1 in the reflected light of which
 its distinctions  take the form of     
independent realities4 ,this            
self-sameness is at the  same time1 as  
absolute form1 the activity which       
reduces into dependency  and mediates   
into immediacy4--,whatever is necessary 
is through an  other1 which is broken up
 into the mediating ground 7the ,fact   
and  the ,activity7 and an immediate    
actuality or accidental circumstance1   
which is at the same time a ,condition4 

,the necessary1 being through  an other1
 is not in and for itself3 hypothetical1
 it is a mere result  of assumption4    
,but this intermediation is just as     
immediately however  the abrogation of  
itself4 ,the ground and contingent      
condition is  translated into immediacy1
 by which that dependency is now lifted 
up  into actuality1 and the fact has    
closed with itself4 ,in this return  to 
itself the necessary simply and         
positively is1 as unconditioned         
actuality4 ,the necessary is so1        
mediated through a circle of            
circumstances3 it is so1 because the    
circumstances are so1 and at the  same  
time it is so1 unmediated3 it is so1    
because it is4    7a7 ,relationship of  
,substantiality4    #aej4 ,the necessary
 is in itself an absolute correlation of
 elements1  i4e4 the process developed  
7in the preceding paragraphs71 in which 
the correlation also suspends itself to 
absolute identity4    ,in its immediate 
form it is the relationship of          

,substance and ,accident4  ,the absolute
 self-identity of this relationship is  
,substance as such1  which as necessity 
gives the negative to this form of      
inwardness1 and  thus invests itself    
with actuality1 but which also gives the
 negative  to this outward thing4 ,in   
this negativity1 the actual1 as         
immediate1  is only an accidental which 
through this bare possibility passes    
over  into another actuality4 ,this     
transition is the identity of substance1
  regarded as form-activity 7 #adh1     
#adi74    #aea4 ,substance is           
accordingly the totality of the         
,accidents1  revealing itself in them as
 their absolute negativity1 7that is to 
say1 as absolute power17 and at the same
 time as the wealth of all  content4    
,this content however is nothing but    
that very revelation1  since the        
character 7being reflected in itself to 
make content7 is  only a passing stage  
of the form which passes away in the    
power of  substance4 ,substantiality is 

the absolute form-activity and the power
  of necessity3 all content is but a    
vanishing element which merely  belongs 
to this process1 where there is an      
absolute revulsion of form  and content 
into one another4           99       99 
99       99       99    ,in the history 
of philosophy we meet with ,substance as
 the principle  of ,spinoza's system4   
,on the import and value of that        
much-praised and  no less decried       
philosophy there has been great         
misunderstanding and  a deal of talking 
since the days of ,spinoza4 ,the atheism
 and1 as a  further charge1 the         
pantheism of the system has formed the  
commonest  ground of accusation4 ,these 
cries arise because of ,spinoza's       
conception  of ,god as substance1 and   
substance only4 ,what we are to think of
 this  charge follows1 in the first     
instance1 from the place which substance
  takes in the system of the logical    
idea4 ,though an essential stage in  the
 evolution of the idea1 substance is not

 the same with absolute  ,idea1 but the 
idea under the still limited form of    
necessity4 ,it is  true that ,god is    
necessity1 or1 as we may also put it1   
that ,he is the  absolute ,thing3 ,he is
 however no less the absolute ,person4  
,that ,he is  the absolute ,person      
however is a point which the philosophy 
of ,spinoza  never reached3 and on that 
side it falls short of the true notion  
of  ,god which forms the content of     
religious consciousness in              
,christianity4  ,spinoza was by descent 
a ,jew2 and it is upon the whole the    
,oriental way  of seeing things1        
according to which the nature of the    
finite world  seems frail and transient1
 that has found its intellectual        
expression  in his system4 ,this        
,oriental view of the unity of substance
 certainly  gives the basis for all real
 further development4 ,still it is not  
the  final idea4 ,it is marked by the   
absence of the principle of the ,western
  ,world1 the principle of              

individuality1 which first appeared     
under a  philosophic shape1             
contemporaneously with ,spinoza1 in the 
,monadology of  ,leibnitz4    ,from this
 point we glance back to the alleged    
atheism of ,spinoza4 ,the  charge will  
be seen to be unfounded if we remember  
that his system1  instead of denying    
,god1 rather recognises that ,he alone  
really is4  ,nor can it be maintained   
that the ,god of ,spinoza1 although he  
is  described as alone true1 is not the 
true ,god1 and therefore as good as  no 
,god4 ,if that were a just charge1 it   
would only prove that all other         
systems1 where speculation has not gone 
beyond a subordinate stage  of the      
idea1--that the ,jews and ,mohammedans  
who know ,god only as the  ,lord1--and  
that even the many ,christians for whom 
,god is merely the  most high1          
unknowable1 and transcendent being1 are 
as much atheists as  ,spinoza4 ,the     
so-called atheism of ,spinoza is merely 
an exaggeration of  the fact that he    

defrauds the principle of difference or 
finitude of  its due4 ,hence his system1
 as it holds that there is properly     
speaking  no world1 at any rate that the
 world has no positive being1 should    
rather be styled ,acosmism1 ,these      
considerations will also show what is   
to be said of the charge of ,pantheism4 
,if ,pantheism means1 as it often  does1
 the doctrine which takes finite things 
in their finitude and in  the complex of
 them to be ,god1 we must acquit the    
system of ,spinoza of  the crime of     
,pantheism4 ,for in that system1 finite 
things and the world  as a whole are    
denied all truth4 ,on the other hand1   
the philosophy  which is ,acosmism is   
for that reason certainly pantheistic4  
,the shortcoming thus acknowledged to   
attach to the content turns out  at the 
same time to be a shortcoming in respect
 of form4 ,spinoza puts  substance at   
the head of his system1 and defines it  
to be the unity  of thought and         
extension1 without demonstrating how he 

gets to this  distinction1 or how he    
traces it back to the unity of          
substance4 ,the  further treatment of   
the subject proceeds in what is called  
the  mathematical method4 ,definitions  
and axioms are first laid down3 after   
them comes a series of theorems1 which  
are proved by an analytical  reduction  
of them to these unproved postulates4   
,although the system  of ,spinoza1 and  
that even by those who altogether reject
 its contents  and results1 is praised  
for the strict sequence of its method1  
such  unqualified praise of the form is 
as little justified as an unqualified   
rejection of the content4 ,the defect of
 the content is that the form  is not   
known as immanent in it1 and therefore  
only approaches it as an  outer and     
subjective form4 ,as intuitively        
accepted by ,spinoza without a  previous
 mediation by dialectic1 ,substance1 as 
the universal negative  power1 is as it 
were a dark shapeless abyss which       
engulfs all definite  content as        

radically null1 and produces from itself
 nothing that has a  positive           
subsistence of its own4    #aeb4 ,at the
 stage1 where substance1 as absolute    
power1 is the  self-relating power      
7itself a merely inner possibility7     
which thus  determines itself to        
accidentality1--from which power the    
externality  it thereby creates is      
distinguished--necessity is a           
correlation  strictly so called1 just as
 in the first form of necessity1 it is  
substance4 ,this is the correlation of  
,causality4    7b7 ,relationship of     
,causality4    #aec4 ,substance is      
,cause1 in so far as substance reflects 
into  self as against its passage into  
accidentality and so stands as the      
primary fact1 but again no less suspends
 this reflection-into-self  7its bare   
possibility71 lays itself down as the   
negative of itself1 and  thus produces  
an ,effect1 an actuality1 which1 though 
so far only  assumed as a sequence1 is  
through the process that effectuates it 

at  the same time necessary4    ,as     
primary fact1 the cause is qualified as 
having absolute independence  and a     
subsistence maintained in face of the   
effect3 but in the  necessity1 whose    
identity constitutes that primariness   
itself1 it  is wholly passed into the   
effect4 ,so far again as we can speak of
 a  definite content1 there is no       
content in the effect that is not in    
the cause4 ,that identity in fact is the
 absolute content itself3 but  it is no 
less also the form-characteristic4 ,the 
primariness of the  cause is suspended  
in the effect in which the cause makes  
itself a  dependent being4 ,the cause   
however does not for that reason vanish 
and  leave the effect to be alone       
actual4 ,for this dependency is in like 
manner directly suspended1 and is rather
 the reflection of the cause  in itself1
 its primariness3 in short1 it is in the
 effect that the  cause first becomes   
actual and a cause4 ,the cause          
consequently is in  its full truth causa

 sui4--,jacobi1 sticking to the partial 
conception  of mediation 7in his        
,letters on ,spinoza1 second edit4 p4   
#daf71 has  treated the causa sui 7and  
the effectus sui is the same71 which is 
the absolute truth of the cause1 as a   
mere formalism4 ,he has also made  the  
remark that ,god ought to be defined not
 as the ground of things1  but          
essentially as cause4 ,a more thorough  
consideration of the nature  of cause   
would have shown that ,jacobi did not by
 this means gain what  he intended4     
,even in the finite cause and its       
conception we can see  this identity    
between cause and effect in point of    
content4 ,the rain  7the cause7 and the 
wet 7the effect7 are the self-same      
existing water4  ,in point of form the  
cause 7rain7 is dissipated or lost in   
the effect  7wet73 but in that case the 
result can no longer be described as    
effect2 for without the cause it is     
nothing1 and we should have only  the   
unrelated wet left4    ,in the common   

acceptation of the causal relation the  
cause is finite1  to such extent as its 
content is so 7as is also the case with 
finite  substance71 and so far as cause 
and effect are conceived as two several 
independent existences2 which they are1 
however1 only when we leave  the causal 
relation out of sight4 ,in the finite   
sphere we never get  over the difference
 of the form-characteristics in their   
relation3 and  hence we turn the matter 
round and define the cause also as      
something  dependent or as an effect4   
,this again has another cause1 and thus 
there  grows up a progress from effects 
to causes ad infinitum4 ,there is a     
descending progress too3 the effect1    
looked at in its identity with the      
cause1 is itself defined as a cause1 and
 at the same time as another  cause1    
which again has other effects1 and so on
 for ever4    ,the way understanding    
bristles up against the idea of         
substance is  equalled by its readiness 
to use the relation of cause and effect4

  ,whenever it is proposed to view any  
sum of fact as necessary1 it  is        
especially the relation of causality to 
which the reflective  understanding     
makes a point of tracing it back4 ,now1 
although this  relation does undoubtedly
 belong to necessity1 it forms only one 
aspect  in the process of that category4
 ,that process equally requires the     
suspension of the mediation involved in 
causality and the exhibition  of it as  
simple self-relation4 ,if we stick to   
causality as such1 we  have it not in   
its truth4 ,such a causality is merely  
finite1 and its  finitude lies in       
retaining the distinction between cause 
and effect  unassimilated4 ,but these   
two terms1 if they are distinct1 are    
also  identical4 ,even in ordinary      
consciousness that identity may be      
found4  ,we say that a cause is a cause1
 only when it has an effect1 and vice   
vers4 ,both cause and effect are thus   
one and the same content3 and  the      
distinction between them is primarily   

only that the one lays down1  and the   
other is laid down4 ,this formal        
difference however again  suspends      
itself1 because the cause is not only a 
cause of something  else1 but also a    
cause of itself2 while the effect is not
 only an  effect of something else1 but 
also an effect of itself4 ,the finitude 
of things consists accordingly in this4 
,while cause and effect are in  their   
notion identical1 the two forms present 
themselves severed so  that1 though the 
cause is also an effect1 and the effect 
also a cause1  the cause is not an      
effect in the same connexion as it is a 
cause1 nor  the effect a cause in the   
same connexion as it is an effect4 ,this
  again gives the infinite progress1 in 
the shape of an endless series  of      
causes1 which shows itself at the same  
time as an endless series of  effects4  
#aed4 ,the effect is different from the 
cause4 ,the former as such has  a being 
dependent on the latter4 ,but such a    
dependence is likewise                  

reflection-into-self and immediacy3 and 
the action of the cause1 as it          
constitutes the effect1 is at the same  
time the pre-constitution of  the       
effect1 so long as effect is kept       
separate from cause4 ,there is  thus    
already in existence another substance  
on which the effect takes  place4 ,as   
immediate1 this substance is not a      
self-related negativity  and active1 but
 passive4 ,yet it is a substance1 and it
 is therefore  active also3 it therefore
 suspends the immediacy it was          
originally put  forward with1 and the   
effect which was put into it3 it reacts1
 e4g4  suspends the activity of the     
first substance4 ,but this first        
substance  also in the same way sets    
aside its own immediacy1 or the effect  
which  is put into it2 it thus suspends 
the activity of the other substance  and
 reacts4 ,in this manner causality      
passes into the relation of  ,action and
 ,reaction1 or ,reciprocity4    ,in     
,reciprocity1 although causality is not 

yet invested with its true              
characteristic1 the rectilinear movement
 out from causes to effects1  and from  
effects to causes1 is bent round and    
back into itself1 and  thus the progress
 ad infinitum of causes and effects is1 
as a  progress1 really and truly        
suspended4 ,this bend1 which transforms1
 the  infinite progression into a       
self-contained relationship1 is here as 
always the plain reflection that in the 
above meaningless repetition  there is  
only one and the same thing1 viz4 one   
cause and another1 and  their connexion 
with one another4 ,reciprocity--which is
 the development  of this               
relation-itself however only            
distinguishes turn and turn  about      
7--not causes1 but7 factors of          
causation1 in each of which--just       
because they are inseparable 7on the    
principle of the identity that the      
cause is cause in the effect1 and vice  
vers7--the other factor is  also equally
 supposed4    7c7 ,reciprocity or       

,action and ,reaction4    #aee4 ,the    
characteristics which in ,reciprocal    
,action are retained as  distinct are 77
 potentially the same4 ,the one side is 
a cause1 is  primary1 active1 passive1  
c1 just as the other is4 ,similarly the 
pre-supposition of another side and the 
action upon it1 the immediate           
primariness and the dependence produced 
by the alternation1 are one and  the    
same on both sides4 ,the cause assumed  
to be first is on account  of its       
immediacy passive1 a dependent being1   
and an effect4 ,the  distinction of the 
causes spoken of as two is accordingly  
void3 and  properly speaking there is   
only one cause1 which1 while it suspends
  itself 7as substance7 in its effect1  
also rises in this operation only  to   
independent existence as a cause4       
#aef4 ,but this unity of the double     
cause is also 77 actual4 ,all this      
alternation is properly the cause in act
 of constituting itself and in  such    
constitution lies its being4 ,the       

nullity of the distinctions is  not only
 potential1 or a reflection of ours 7   
#aee74 ,reciprocal action  just means   
that each characteristic we impose is   
also to be suspended  and inverted into 
its opposite1 and that in this way the  
essential  nullity of the 'moments' is  
explicitly stated4 ,an effect is        
introduced  into the primariness2 in    
other words1 the primariness is         
abolished3 the  action of a cause       
becomes reaction1 and so on4            
,reciprocal action realises the causal  
relation in its complete  development4  
,it is this relation1 therefore1 in     
which reflection  usually takes shelter 
when the conviction grows that things   
can no  longer be studied satisfactorily
 from a causal point of view1 on        
account of the infinite progress already
 spoken of4 ,thus in historical         
research the question may be raised in a
 first form1 whether the  character and 
manners of a nation are the cause of its
 constitution and  its laws1 or if they 

are not rather the effect4 ,then1 as the
 second  step1 the character and manners
 on one side and the constitution and   
laws on the other are conceived on the  
principle of reciprocity3 and  in that  
case the cause in the same connexion as 
it is a cause will at  the same time be 
an effect1 and vice vers4 ,the same     
thing is done  in the study of ,nature1 
and especially of living organisms4     
,there  the several organs and functions
 are similarly seen to stand to each    
other in the relation of reciprocity4   
,reciprocity is undoubtedly the         
proximate truth of the relation of cause
 and effect1 and stands1 so  to say1 on 
the threshold of the notion2 but on that
 very ground1  supposing that our aim is
 a thoroughly comprehensive idea1 we    
should  not rest content with applying  
this relation4 ,if we get no further    
than  studying a given content under the
 point of view of reciprocity1 we are   
taking up an attitude which leaves      
matters utterly incomprehensible4  ,we  

are left with a mere dry fact2 and the  
call for mediation1 which  is the chief 
motive in applying the relation of      
causality1 is still  unanswered4 ,and it
 we look more narrowly into the         
dissatisfaction  felt in applying the   
relation of reciprocity1 we shall see   
that it  consists in the circumstance1  
that this relation1 instead of being    
treated as an equivalent for the notion1
 ought1 first of all1 to be  known and  
understood in its own nature4 ,and to   
understand the relation  of action and  
reaction we must not let the two sides  
rest in their  state of mere given      
facts1 but recognise them1 as has been  
shown in  the two paragraphs preceding1 
for factors of a third and higher1 which
  is the notion and nothing else4 ,to   
make1 for example1 the manners of  the  
,spartans the cause of their            
constitution and their constitution     
conversely the cause of their manners1  
may no doubt be in a way  correct4 ,but1
 as we have comprehended neither the    

manners nor the  constitution of the    
nation1 the result of such reflections  
can never  be final or satisfactory4    
,the satisfactory point will be reached 
only  when these two1 as well as all    
other1 special aspects of ,spartan life 
and ,spartan history are seen to be     
founded in this notion4    #aeg4 ,this  
pure self-reciprocation is therefore    
,necessity unveiled  or realised4 ,the  
link of necessity qu necessity is       
identity1 as  still inward and          
concealed1 because it is the identity of
 what are  esteemed actual things1      
although their very self-subsistence is 
bound  to be necessity4 ,the circulation
 of substance through causality  and    
reciprocity therefore only expressly    
makes out or states that                
self-subsistence is the infinite        
negative self-relation--a relation      
negative1 in general1 for in it the act 
of distinguishing and  intermediating   
becomes a primariness of actual things  
independent  one against the other1--and

 infinite self-relation1 because their  
independence only lies in their         
identity4    #aeh4 ,this truth of       
necessity1 therefore1 is ,freedom3 and  
the  truth of substance is the          
,notion1--an independence which1 though 
self-repulsive into distinct independent
 elements1 yet in that  repulsion is    
self-identical1 and in the movement of  
reciprocity still  at home and          
conversant only with itself4            
99       99       99       99       99  
,necessity is often called hard1 and    
rightly so1 if we keep only to          
necessity as such1 i4e4 to its immediate
 shape4 ,here we have1  first of all1   
some state or1 generally speaking1 fact1
 possessing an  independent subsistence3
 and necessity primarily implies that   
there  falls upon such a fact something 
else by which it is brought low4  ,this 
is what is hard and sad in necessity    
immediate or abstract4 ,the  identity of
 the two things1 which necessity        
presents as bound to each  other and    

thus bereft of their independence1 is at
 first only inward1  and therefore has  
no existence for those under the yoke of
 necessity4  ,freedom too from this     
point of view is only abstract1 and is  
preserved  only by renouncing all that  
we immediately are and have4 ,but1 as we
  have seen already1 the process of     
necessity is so directed that it        
overcomes the rigid externality which it
 first had and reveals its  inward      
nature4 ,it then appears that the       
members1 linked to one another1  are not
 really foreign to each other1 but only 
elements of one whole1  each of them1 in
 its connexion with the other1 being1 as
 it were1 at  home1 and combining with  
itself4 ,in this way necessity is       
transfigured  into freedom1--not the    
freedom that consists in abstract       
negation1  but freedom concrete and     
positive4 ,from which we may learn what 
a  mistake it is to regard freedom and  
necessity as mutually exclusive4        
,necessity indeed qu necessity is far   

from being freedom3 yet  freedom        
pre-supposes necessity1 and contains it 
as an unsubstantial  element in itself4 
,a good man is aware that the tenor of  
his conduct  is essentially obligatory  
and necessary4 ,but this consciousness  
is  so far from making any abatement    
from his freedom1 that without it  real 
and reasonable freedom could not be     
distinguished from arbitrary  choice1--a
 freedom which has no reality and is    
merely potential4 ,a  criminal1 when    
punished1 may look upon his punishment  
as a restriction  of his freedom4       
,really the punishment is not foreign   
constraint to  which he is subjected1   
but the manifestation of his own act3   
and if he  recognises this1 he comports 
himself as a free man4 ,in short1 man is
  most independent when he knows himself
 to be determined by the absolute  idea 
throughout4 ,it was this phase of mind  
and conduct which ,spinoza  called ,amor
 intellectualis ,dei4    #aei4 ,thus the
 ,notion is the truth of ,being and     

,essence1 inasmuch as  the shining or   
show of self-reflection is itself at the
 same time  independent immediacy1 and  
this being of a different actuality is  
immediately only a shining or show on   
itself4    ,the ,notion has exhibited   
itself as the truth of ,being and       
,essence1 as  the ground to which the   
regress of both leads4 ,conversely it   
has been  developed out of being as its 
ground4 ,the former aspect of the       
advance  may be regarded as a           
concentration of being into its depth1  
thereby  disclosing its inner nature3   
the latter aspect as an issuing of the  
more perfect from the less perfect4     
,when such development is viewed on  the
 latter side only1 it does prejudice to 
the method of philosophy4  ,the special 
meaning which these superficial thoughts
 of more imperfect  and more perfect    
have in this place is to indicate the   
distinction of  being1 as an immediate  
unity with itself1 from the notion1 as  
free  mediation with itself4 ,since     

being has shown that it is an element in
  the notion1 the latter has thus       
exhibited itself as the truth of being4 
,as this its reflection in itself and as
 an absorption of the mediation1  the   
notion is the pre-supposition of the    
immediate--a pre-supposition  which is  
identical with the return to self2 and  
in this identity lie  freedom and the   
notion4 ,if the partial element         
therefore be called the  imperfect1 then
 the notion1 or the perfect1 is         
certainly a development  from the       
imperfect2 since its very nature is thus
 to suspend its  pre-supposition4 ,at   
the same time it is the notion alone    
which1 in the  act of supposing itself1 
makes its pre-supposition2 as has been  
made  apparent in causality in general  
and especially in reciprocal action4    
,thus in reference to ,being and        
,essence the ,notion is defined as      
,essence  reverted to the simple        
immediacy of ,being1--the shining or    
show of  ,essence thereby having        

actuality1 and its actuality being at   
the same  time a free shining or show in
 itself4 ,in this manner the notion has 
being as its simple self-relation1 or as
 the immediacy of its immanent  unity4  
,being is so poor a category that it is 
the least thing which can  be shown to  
be found in the notion4    ,the passage 
from necessity to freedom1 or from      
actuality into the  notion1 is the very 
hardest1 because it proposes that       
independent  actuality shall be thought 
as having all its substantiality in the 
passing over and identity with the other
 independent actuality4 ,the  notion1   
too1 is extremely hard1 because it is   
itself just this very  identity4 ,but   
the actual substance as such1 the cause1
 which in its  exclusiveness resists all
 invasion1 is ipso facto subjected to   
necessity or the destiny of passing into
 dependency3 and it is this  subjection 
rather where the chief hardness lies4   
,to think necessity1 on  the contrary1  
rather tends to melt that hardness4 ,for

 thinking means  that1 in the other1 one
 meets with one's self4--,it means a    
liberation1  which is not the flight of 
abstraction1 but consists in that which 
is  actual having itself not as         
something else1 but as its own being and
  creation1 in the other actuality with 
which it is bound up by the force  of   
necessity4 ,as existing in an individual
 form1 this liberation is  called ,i3 as
 developed to its totality1 it is free  
,spirit2 as feeling1  it is ,love2 and  
as enjoyment1 it is ,blessedness4--,the 
great vision  of substance in ,spinoza  
is only a potential liberation from     
finite  exclusiveness and egoism3 but   
the notion itself realises for its own  
both the power of necessity and actual  
freedom4           99       99       99 
99       99    ,when1 as now1 the notion
 is called the truth of ,being and      
,essence1  we must expect to be asked1  
why we do not begin with the notion8    
,the  answer is that1 where knowledge by
 thought is our aim1 we cannot begin    

with the truth1 because the truth1 when 
it forms the beginning1 must  rest on   
mere assertion4 ,the truth when it is   
thought must as such  verify itself to  
thought4 ,if the notion were put at the 
head of ,logic1  and defined1 quite     
correctly in point of content1 as the   
unity of  ,being and ,essence1 the      
following question would come up3 ,what 
are we  to think under the terms        
',being' and ',essence1' and how do they
 come  to be embraced in the unity of   
the ,notion8 ,but if we answered these  
questions1 then our beginning with the  
notion would be merely nominal4  ,the   
real start would be made with ,being1 as
 we have here done3 with  this          
difference1 that the characteristics of 
,being as well as those  of ,essence    
would have to be accepted uncritically  
from figurate  conception1 whereas we   
have observed ,being and ,essence in    
their own  dialectical development and  
learnt how they lose themselves in the  
unity of the notion4      #a ,compare   

,goethe's indignant outcry--',to        
,natural ,science1' vol4 i4  pt4 #c3    
,das hr' ich sechzig ,jahre wiederholen1
      ,und fluche drauf1 aber           
verstohlen1--      ,natur hat weder     
,kern noch ,schaale1      ,alles ist sie
 mit einem ,male4            ,,chapter  
,,ix4      ,,third ,,sub-,,division ,,of
 ,,logic4      ,,the ,,doctrine ,,of    
,,the ,,notion4      #afj4 ,the ,notion 
is the principle of freedom1 the power  
of  substance self-realised4 ,it is a   
systematic whole1 in which each of its  
constituent functions is the very total 
which the notion is1 and is put  as     
indissolubly one with it4 ,thus in its  
self-identity it has original  and      
complete determinateness4    ,the       
position taken up by the notion is that 
of absolute idealism4  ,philosophy is a 
knowledge through notions because it    
sees that what  on other grades of      
consciousness is taken to have ,being1  
and to be  naturally or immediately     
independent1 is but a constituent stage 

in the  ,idea4 ,in the logic of         
understanding1 the notion is generally  
reckoned  a mere form of thought1 and   
treated as a general conception4 ,it is 
to  this inferior view of the notion    
that the assertion refers1 so often     
urged on behalf of the heart and        
sentiment1 that notions as such are     
something dead1 empty1 and abstract4    
,the case is really quite the  reverse4 
,the notion is1 on the contrary1 the    
principle of all life1 and  thus        
possesses at the same time a character  
of thorough concreteness4  ,that it is  
so follows from the whole logical       
movement up to this point1  and need not
 be here proved4 ,the contrast between  
form and content1  which is thus used to
 criticise the notion when it is alleged
 to be  merely formal1 has1 like all the
 other contrasts upheld by reflection1  
been already left behind and overcome   
dialectically or through itself4  ,the  
notion1 in short1 is what contains all  
the earlier categories of  thought      

merged in it4 ,it certainly is a form1  
but an infinite and  creative form1     
which includes1 but at the same time    
releases from  itself1 the fulness of   
all content4 ,and so too the notion may1
 if it  be wished1 be styled abstract1  
if the name concrete is restricted to   
the concrete facts of sense or of       
immediate perception4 ,for the notion   
is not palpable to the touch1 and when  
we are engaged with it1 hearing  and    
seeing must quite fail us4 ,and yet1 as 
it was before remarked1 the  notion is a
 true concrete2 for the reason that it  
involves ,being and  ,essence1 and the  
total wealth of these two spheres with  
them1 merged in  the unity of thought4  
,if1 as was said at an earlier point1   
the different stages of the  logical    
idea are to be treated as a series of   
definitions of the  ,absolute1 the      
definition which now results for us is  
that the ,absolute  is the ,notion4     
,that necessitates a higher estimate of 
the notion1  however1 than is found in  

formal conceptualist ,logic1 where the  
notion  is a mere form of our subjective
 thought1 with no original content of   
its own4 ,but if ,speculative ,logic    
thus attaches a meaning to the term     
notion so very different from that      
usually given1 it may be asked why  the 
same word should be employed in two     
contrary acceptations1 and an  occasion 
thus given for confusion and            
misconception4 ,the answer is  that1    
great as the interval is between the    
speculative notion and the  notion of   
,formal ,logic1 a closer examination    
shows that the deeper  meaning is not so
 foreign to the general usages of       
language as it  seems at first sight4   
,we speak of the deduction of a content 
from the  notion1 e4g4 of the specific  
provisions of the law of property from  
the notion of property2 and so again we 
speak of tracing back these  material   
details to the notion4 ,we thus         
recognise that the notion is no  mere   
form without a content of its own3 for  

if it were1 there would be  in the one  
case nothing to deduce from such a form1
 and in the other  case to trace a given
 body of fact back to the empty form of 
the notion  would only rob the fact of  
its specific character1 without making  
it  understood4    #afa4 ,the onward    
movement of the notion is no longer     
either  a transition into1 or a         
reflection on something else1 but       
,development4 ,for in the notion1 the   
elements distinguished are  without more
 ado at the same time declared to be    
identical with one  another and with the
 whole1 and the specific character of   
each is a  free being of the whole      
notion4           99       99       99  
99       99    ,transition into         
something else is the dialectical       
process within the  range of ,being3    
reflection 7bringing something else into
 light71 in  the range of ,essence4 ,the
 movement of the ,notion is development3
 by  which that only is explicit which  
is already implicitly present4 ,in  the 

world of nature it is organic life that 
corresponds to the grade  of the notion4
 ,thus e4g4 the plant is developed from 
its germ4 ,the  germ virtually involves 
the whole plant1 but does so only       
ideally or in  thought3 and it would    
therefore be a mistake to regard the    
development  of the root1 stem1 leaves1 
and other different parts of the plant1 
as  meaning that they were realiter     
present1 but in a very minute form1  in 
the germ4 ,that is the so-called        
'box-within-box' hypothesis2 a  theory  
which commits the mistake of supposing  
an actual existence of  what is at first
 found only as a postulate of the       
completed thought4  ,the truth of the   
hypothesis on the other hand lies in its
 perceiving  that in the process of     
development the notion keeps to itself  
and  only gives rise to alteration of   
form1 without making any addition in    
point of content4 ,it is this nature of 
the notion--this manifestation  of      
itself in its process as a development  

of its own self1--which is  chiefly in  
view with those who speak of innate     
ideas1 or who1 like  ,plato1 describe   
all learning merely as reminiscence4 ,of
 course that  again does not mean that  
everything which is embodied in a mind1 
after  that mind has been formed by     
instruction1 had been present in that   
mind  beforehand1 in its definitely     
expanded shape4    ,the movement of the 
notion is as it were to be looked upon  
merely as  play3 the other which it sets
 up is in reality not an other4 ,or1 as 
it is expressed in the teaching of      
,christianity3 not merely has ,god      
created a world which confronts ,him as 
an other2 ,he has also from all         
eternity begotten a ,son in whom ,he1 a 
,spirit1 is at home with ,himself4      
#afb4 ,the doctrine of the notion is    
divided into three parts4 7#a7 ,the     
first is the doctrine of the ,subjective
 or ,formal ,notion4  7#b7 ,the second  
is the doctrine of the notion invested  
with the  character of immediacy1 or of 

,objectivity4 7#c7 ,the third is the    
doctrine of the ,idea1 the              
subject-object1 the unity of notion  and
 objectivity1 the absolute truth4       
,the ,common ,logic covers only the     
matters which come before us here  as a 
portion of the third part of the whole  
system1 together with  the so-called    
,laws of ,thought1 which we have already
 met2 and in the  ,applied ,logic it    
adds a little about cognition4 ,this is 
combined with  psychological1           
metaphysical1 and all sorts of empirical
 materials1  which were introduced      
because1 when all was done1 those forms 
of  thought could not be made to do all 
that was required of them4 ,but  with   
these additions the science lost its    
unity of aim4 ,then there was  a further
 circumstance against the ,common       
,logic4 ,those forms1 which  at least do
 belong to the proper domain of ,logic1 
are supposed to be  categories of       
conscious thought only1 of thought too  
in the character  of understanding1 not 

of reason4    ,the preceding logical    
categories1 those viz4 of ,being and    
,essence1 are1  it is true1 no mere     
logical modes or entities3 they are     
proved to be  notions in their          
transition or their dialectical element1
 and in their  return into themselves   
and totality4 ,but they are only in a   
modified  form notions 7cp4  #hd and    
#aab71 notions rudimentary1 or1 what is 
the same thing1 notions for us4 ,the    
antithetical term into which each       
category passes1 or in which it shines1 
so producing correlation1 is  not       
characterised as a particular4 ,the     
third1 in which they return  to unity1  
is not characterised as a subject or an 
individual3 nor is  there any explicit  
statement that the category3 is         
identical in its  antithesis1--in other 
words1 its freedom is not expressly     
stated3 and  all this because the       
category is not universality4--,what    
generally  passes current under the name
 of a notion is a mode of understanding1

  or1 even1 a mere general              
representation1 and therefore1 in short1
 a  finite mode of thought 7cp4  #fb74  
,the ,logic of the ,notion is usually   
treated as a science of form only1  and 
understood to deal with the form of     
notion1 judgment1 and syllogism  as     
form1 without in the least touching the 
question whether anything  is true4 ,the
 answer to that question is supposed to 
depend on the  content only4 ,if the    
logical forms of the notion were really 
dead and  inert receptacles of          
conceptions and thoughts1 careless of   
what they  contained1 knowledge about   
them would be an idle curiosity which   
the  truth might dispense with4 ,on the 
contrary they really are1 as forms  of  
the notion1 the vital spirit of the     
actual world4 ,that only is  true of the
 actual which is true in virtue of these
 forms1 through  them and in them4 ,as  
yet1 however1 the truth of these forms  
has never  been considered or examined  
on their own account any more than their

  necessary interconnexion4             
,a4--,,the ,,subjective ,,notion4    7a7
 ,the ,notion as ,notion4    #afc4 ,the 
,notion as ,notion contains the three   
following 'moments' or  functional      
parts4 7#a7 ,the first is               
,universality--meaning that it  is in   
free equality with itself in its        
specific character4 7#b7 ,the  second is
 ,particularity--that is1 the specific  
character1 in  which the universal      
continues serenely equal to itself4 7#c7
 ,the third  is ,individuality--meaning 
the reflection-into-self of the         
specific characters of universality and 
particularity2--which negative          
self-unity has complete and original    
determinateness1 without any loss  to   
its self-identity or universality4      
,individual and actual are the same     
thing3 only the former has issued  from 
the notion1 and is thus1 as a universal1
 stated expressly as a  negative        
identity with itself4 ,the actual1      
because it is at first no  more than a  

potential or immediate unity of essence 
and existence1  may possibly have       
effect3 but the individuality of the    
notion is  the very source of           
effectiveness1 effective moreover no    
longer as the  cause is1 with a show of 
effecting something else1 but effective 
of  itself4--,individuality1 however1 is
 not to be understood to mean the       
immediate or natural individual1 as when
 we speak of individual things  or      
individual men3 for that special phase  
of individuality does not  appear till  
we come to the judgment4 ,every function
 and 'moment' of  the notion is itself  
the whole notion 7 #afj72 but the       
individual or  subject is the notion    
expressly put as a totality4    7#a7    
,the notion is generally associated in  
our minds with abstract  generality1 and
 on that account it is often described  
as a general  conception4 ,we speak1    
accordingly1 of the notions of colour1  
plant1  animal1 c4 ,they are supposed to
 be arrived at by neglecting the        

particular features which distinguish   
the different colours1 plants1  and     
animals from each other1 and by         
retaining those common to them all4     
,this is the aspect of the notion which 
is familiar to understanding2  and      
feeling is in the right when it         
stigmatises such hollow and empty       
notions as mere phantoms and shadows4   
,but the universal of the notion  is not
 a mere sum of features common to       
several things1 confronted  by a        
particular which enjoys an existence of 
its own4 ,it is1 on the  contrary1      
self-particularising or self-specifying1
 and with undimmed  clearness finds     
itself at home in its antithesis4 ,for  
the sake both of  cognition and of our  
practical conduct1 it is of the utmost  
importance  that the real universal     
should not be confused with what is     
merely held  in common4 ,all those      
charges which the devotees of feeling   
make against  thought1 and especially   
against philosophic thought1 and the    

reiterated  statement that it is        
dangerous to carry thought to what they 
call too  great lengths1 originate in   
the confusion of these two things4      
,the universal in its true and          
comprehensive meaning is a thought      
which1 as we know1 cost thousands of    
years to make it enter into the         
consciousness of men4 ,the thought did  
not gain its full recognition  till the 
days of ,christianity4 ,the ,greeks1 in 
other respects so  advanced1 knew       
neither ,god nor even man in their true 
universality4  ,the gods of the ,greeks 
were only particular powers of the mind2
 and  the universal ,god1 the ,god of   
all nations1 was to the ,athenians still
  a ,god concealed4 ,they believed in   
the same way that an absolute gulf      
separated themselves from the           
barbarians4 ,man as man was not then    
recognised to be of infinite worth and  
to have infinite rights4  ,the question 
has been asked1 why slavery has vanished
 from modern  ,europe4 ,one special     

circumstance after another has been     
adduced in  explanation of this         
phenomenon4 ,but the real ground why    
there are  no more slaves in ,christian 
,europe is only to be found in the very 
principle of ,christianity itself1 the  
religion of absolute freedom4  ,only in 
,christendom is man respected as man1 in
 his infinitude and  universality4 ,what
 the slave is without1 is the           
recognition that he is  a person3 and   
the principle of personality is         
universality4 ,the master  looks upon   
his slave not as a person1 but as a     
selfless thing4 ,the  slave is not      
himself reckoned an ',i'2--his ',i' is  
his master4    ,the distinction referred
 to above between what is merely in     
common1 and  what is truly universal1 is
 strikingly expressed by ,rousseau in   
his  famous ',contrat ,social1' when he 
says that the laws of a state must      
spring from the universal will 7volont  
gnrale17 but need not on  that account  
be the will of all 7volont de tous47    

,rousseau would  have made a sounder    
contribution towards a theory of the    
state1 if he  had always keep this      
distinction in sight4 ,the general will 
is the  notion of the will3 and the laws
 are the special clauses of this will   
and based upon the notion of it4    7#b7
 ,we add a remark upon the account of   
the origin and formation of  notions    
which is usually given in the ,logic of 
,understanding4 ,it is  not we who frame
 the notions4 ,the notion is not        
something which  is originated at all4  
,no doubt the notion is not mere ,being1
 or the  immediate3 it involves         
mediation1 but the mediation lies in    
itself4 ,in  other words1 the notion is 
what is mediated through itself and with
  itself4 ,it is a mistake to imagine   
that the objects which form the  content
 of our mental ideas come first and that
 our subjective agency  then supervenes1
 and by the aforesaid operation of      
abstraction1 and  by colligating the    
points possessed in common by the       

objects1 frames  notions of them4       
,rather the notion is the genuine first2
 and things  are what they are through  
the action of the notion1 immanent in   
them1  and revealing itself in them4 ,in
 religious language we express this  by 
saying that ,god created the world out  
of nothing4 ,in other words1  the world 
and finite things have issued from the  
fulness of the divine  thoughts and the 
divine decrees4 ,thus religion          
recognises thought and  7more exactly7  
the notion to be the infinite form1 or  
the free creative  activity1 which can  
realise itself without the help of a    
matter that  exists outside it4    #afd4
 ,the notion is concrete out and out3   
because the negative  unity with itself1
 as characterisation pure and entire1   
which is  individuality1 is just what   
constitutes its self-relation1 its      
universality4 ,the functions or         
'moments' of the notion are to this     
extent indissoluble4 ,the categories of 
'reflection' are expected to be         

severally apprehended and separately    
accepted as current1 apart from  their  
opposites4 ,but in the notion1 where    
their identity is expressly  assumed1   
each of its functions can be immediately
 apprehended only from  and with the    
rest4    ,universality1 particularity1  
and individuality are1 taken in the     
abstract1 the same as identity1         
difference1 and ground4 ,but the        
universal is the self-identical1 with   
the express qualification1  that it     
simultaneously contains the particular  
and the individual4  ,again1 the        
particular is the different or the      
specific character1 but  with the       
qualification that it is in itself      
universal and is as an  individual4     
,similarly the individual must be       
understood to be a subject  or          
substratum1 which involves the genus and
 species in itself and  possesses a     
substantial existence4 ,such is the     
explicit or realised  inseparability of 
the functions of the notion in their    

difference 7  #afj7--what may be called 
the clearness of the notion1 in which   
each  distinction causes no dimness or  
interruption1 but is quite as much      
transparent4    ,no complaint is oftener
 made against the notion than that it is
  abstract4 ,of course it is abstract1  
if abstract means that the medium  in   
which the notion exists is thought in   
general and not the sensible  thing in  
its empirical concreteness4 ,it is      
abstract also1 because the  notion falls
 short of the idea4 ,to this extent the 
subjective notion  is still formal4     
,this however does not mean that it     
ought to have  or receive another       
content than its own4 ,it is itself the 
absolute  form1 and so is all specific  
character1 but as that character is in  
its truth4 ,although it be abstract     
therefore1 it is the concrete1  concrete
 altogether1 the subject as such4 ,the  
absolutely concrete is  the mind 7see   
end of  #aei7--the notion when it exists
 as notion  distinguishing itself from  

its objectivity1 which notwithstanding  
the  distinction still continues to be  
its own4 ,everything else which is      
concrete1 however rich it be1 is not so 
intensely identical with itself  and    
therefore not so concrete on its own    
part1--least of all what is  commonly   
supposed to be concrete1 but is only a  
congeries held together  by external    
influence4--,what are called notions1   
and in fact specific  notions1 such as  
man1 house1 animal1 c1 are simply       
denotations  and abstract               
representations4 ,these abstractions    
retain out of all  the functions of the 
notion only that of universality2 they  
leave  particularity and individuality  
out of account and have no development  
in these directions4 ,by so doing they  
just miss the notion4    #afe4 ,it is   
the element of ,individuality which     
first explicitly  differentiates the    
elements of the notion4 ,individuality  
is the  negative reflection of the      
notion into itself1 and it is in that   

way at  first the free differentiating  
of it as the first negation1 by which   
the specific character of the notion is 
realised1 but under the form  of        
particularity4 ,that is to say1 the     
different elements are in the  first    
place only qualified as the several     
elements of the notion1 and1  secondly1 
their identity is no less explicitly    
stated1 the one being  said to be the   
other4 ,this realised particularity of  
the notion is the  ,judgment4    ,the   
ordinary classification of notions1 as  
clear1 distinct and  adequate1 is no    
part of the notion2 it belongs to       
psychology4  ,notions1 in fact1 are here
 synonymous with mental representations2
  a clear notion is an abstract simple  
representation3 a distinct  notion is   
one where1 in addition to the           
simplicity1 there is one 'mark'  or     
character emphasised as a sign for      
subjective cognition4 ,there is  no more
 striking mark of the formalism and     
decay of ,logic than the  favourite     

category of the 'mark4' ,the adequate   
notion comes nearer  the notion proper1 
or even the ,idea3 but after all it     
expresses only  the formal circumstance 
that a notion or representation agrees  
with its  object1 that is1 with an      
external thing4--,the division into what
 are  called subordinate and co-ordinate
 notions implies a mechanical           
distinction of universal from particular
 which allows only a mere  correlation  
of them in external comparison4 ,again1 
an enumeration  of such kinds as        
contrary and contradictory1 affirmative 
and  negative notions1 c1 is only a     
chance-directed gleaning of logical     
forms which properly belong to the      
sphere of ,being or ,essence1 7where    
they have been already examined17 and   
which have nothing to do with  the      
specific notional character as such4    
,the true distinctions in the  notion1  
universal1 particular1 and individual1  
may be said also to  constitute species 
of it1 but only when they are kept      

severed from  each other by external    
reflection4 ,the immanent               
differentiating and  specifying of the  
notion come to sight in the judgment3   
for to judge is  to specify the notion4 
7b7 ,the ,judgment4    #aff4 ,the       
,judgment is the notion in its          
particularity1 as a  connexion which is 
also a distinguishing of its functions1 
which are  put as independent and yet as
 identical with themselves1 not with one
  another4    ,one's first impression   
about the ,judgment is the independence 
of the  two extremes1 the subject and   
the predicate4 ,the former we take to be
  a thing or term per se1 and the       
predicate a general term outside  the   
said subject and somewhere in our heads4
 ,the next point is for us  to bring the
 latter into combination with the       
former1 and in this way  frame a        
,judgment4 ,the copula 'is' however     
enunciates the predicate of  the        
subject1 and so that external subjective
 subsumption is again put  in abeyance1 

and the ,judgment taken as a            
determination of the object             
itself4--,the etymological meaning of   
the ,judgment 7,urtheil7 in  ,german    
goes deeper1 as it were declaring the   
unity of the notion to be  primary1 and 
its distinction to be the original      
partition4 ,and that is  what the       
,judgment really is4    ,in its abstract
 terms a ,judgment is expressible in the
 proposition3  ',the individual is the  
universal4' ,these are the terms under  
which  the subject and the predicate    
first confront each other1 when the     
functions of the notion are taken in    
their immediate character or  first     
abstraction4 ,propositions such as1     
',the particular is the  universal1' and
 ',the individual is the particular1'   
belong to the  further specialisation of
 the judgment4 ,it shows a strange want 
of observation in the logic-books1 that 
in none of them is the fact  stated1    
that in every judgment there is such a  
statement made1 as1  ,the individual is 

the universal1 or still more definitely1
 ,the subject  is the predicate3 7e4g4  
,god is absolute spirit74 ,no doubt     
there is  also a distinction between    
terms like individual and universal1    
subject  and predicate3 but it is none  
the less the universal fact1 that every 
judgment states them to be identical4   
,the copula 'is' springs from the nature
 of the notion1 to be  self-identical   
even in parting with its own4 ,the      
individual and  universal are its       
constituents1 and therefore characters  
which  cannot be isolated4 ,the earlier 
categories 7of reflection7 in their     
correlations also refer to one another3 
but their interconnexion is  only       
'having' and not 'being1' i4e4 it is not
 the identity which is  realised as     
identity or universality4 ,in the       
judgment1 therefore1 for  the first time
 there is seen the genuine particularity
 of the notion3  for it is the          
speciality or distinguishing of the     
latter1 without  thereby losing         

universality4           99       99     
99       99       99    ,judgments are  
generally looked upon as combinations of
 notions1 and1  be it added1 of         
heterogeneous notions4 ,this theory of  
judgment is  correct1 so far as it      
implies that it is the notion which     
forms the  presupposition of the        
judgment1 and which in the judgment     
comes up  under the form of difference4 
,but on the other hand1 it is false to  
speak of notions differing in kind4 ,the
 notion1 although concrete1  is still as
 a notion essentially one1 and the      
functions which it  contains are not    
different kinds of it4 ,it is equally   
false to speak  of a combination of the 
two sides in the judgment1 if we        
understand  the term 'combination' to   
imply the independent existence of the  
combining members apart from the        
combination4 ,the same external view  of
 their nature is more forcibly apparent 
when judgments are described  as        
produced by the ascription of a         

predicate to the subject4 ,language     
like this looks upon the subject as     
self-subsistent outside1 and the        
predicate as found somewhere in our     
head4 ,such a conception of the         
relation between subject and predicate  
however is at once contradicted  by the 
copula 'is4' ,by saying ',this rose is  
red1' or ',this picture  is beautiful1' 
we declare1 that it is not we who from  
outside attach  beauty to the picture or
 redness to the rose1 but that these are
 the  characteristics proper to these   
objects4 ,an additional fault in the    
way in which ,formal ,logic conceives   
the judgment is1 that it makes  the     
judgment look as if it were something   
merely contingent1 and  does not offer  
any proof for the advance from notion on
 to judgment4  ,for the notion does not1
 as understanding supposes1 stand still 
in  its own immobility4 ,it is rather an
 infinite form1 of boundless  activity1 
as it were the punctum saliens of all   
vitality1 and  thereby                  

self-differentiating4 ,this disruption  
of the notion into the  difference of   
its constituent functions'1--a          
disruption imposed by the  native act of
 the notion1 is the judgment4 ,a        
judgment therefore means  the           
particularising of the notion4 ,no doubt
 the notion is implicitly  the          
particular4 ,but in the notion as notion
 the particular is not yet  explicit1   
and still remains in transparent unity  
with the universal4  ,thus1 for example1
 as we remarked before 7 #afj1 note71   
the germ of a  plant contains its       
particular1 such as root1 branches1     
leaves1 c43  but these details are at   
first present only potentially1 and are 
not  realised till the germ uncloses4   
,this unclosing is1 as it were1 the     
judgment of the plant4 ,the illustration
 may also serve to show how  neither the
 notion nor the judgment are merely     
found in our head1 or  merely framed by 
us4 ,the notion is the very heart of    
things1 and makes  them what they are4  

,to form a notion of an object means    
therefore to  become aware of its       
notion3 and when we proceed to a        
criticism or  judgment of the object1 we
 are not performing a subjective act1   
and  merely ascribing this or that      
predicate to the object4 ,we are1 on the
  contrary1 observing the object in the 
specific character imposed by its       
notion4    #afg4 ,the ,judgment is      
usually taken in a subjective sense as  
an  operation and a form1 occurring     
merely in self-conscious thought4 ,this 
distinction1 however1 has no existence  
on purely logical principles1  by which 
the judgment is taken in the quite      
universal signification  that all things
 are a judgment4 ,that is to say1 they  
are individuals1  which are a           
universality or inner nature in         
themselves1--a universal  which is      
individualised4 ,their universality and 
individuality are  distinguished1 but   
the one is at the same time identical   
with the other4    ,the interpretation  

of the judgment1 according to which it  
is assumed  to be merely subjective1 as 
if we ascribed a predicate to a subject1
  is contradicted by the decidedly      
objective expression of the judgment4   
,the rose is red2 ,gold is a metal4 ,it 
is not by us that something  is first   
ascribed to them4--,a judgment is       
however distinguished from a            
proposition4 ,the latter contains a     
statement about the subject1 which  does
 not stand to it in any universal       
relationship1 but expresses some  single
 action1 or some state1 or the like4    
,thus1 ',caesar was born at  ,rome in   
such and such a year1 waged war in ,gaul
 for ten years1 crossed  the ,rubicon1  
c41' are propositions1 but not          
judgments4 ,again it is  absurd to say  
that such statements as1 ',i slept well 
last night1' or  ',present arms6' may be
 turned into the form of a judgment4 ',a
 carriage  is passing by'--would be a   
judgment1 and a subjective one at best1 
only  if it were doubtful1 whether the  

passing object was a carriage1 or       
whether it and not rather the point of  
observation was in motion3--in  short1  
only if it were desired to specify a    
conception which was still  short of    
appropriate specification4    #afh4 ,the
 judgment is an expression of finitude4 
,things from its point  of view are said
 to be finite1 because they are a       
judgment1 because  their definite being 
and their universal nature1 7their body 
and their  soul17 though united indeed  
7otherwise the things would be nothing71
  are still elements in the constitution
 which are already different and  also  
in any case separable4    #afi4 ,the    
abstract terms of the judgment1 ',the   
individual is the  universal1' present  
the subject 7as negatively              
self-relating7 as what  is immediately  
concrete1 while the predicate is what is
 abstract1  indeterminate1 in short1 the
 universal4 ,but the two elements are   
connected together by an 'is'3 and thus 
the predicate 7in its  universality7    

must also contain the speciality of the 
subject1 must1  in short1 have          
particularity3 and so is realised the   
identity between  subject and predicate2
 which1 being thus unaffected by this   
difference  in form1 is the content4    
,it is the predicate which first gives  
the subject1 which till then was  on its
 own account a bare mental              
representation or an empty name1 its    
specific character and content4 ,in     
judgments like ',god is the most  real  
of all things1' or ',the ,absolute is   
the self-identical1' ,god and  the      
,absolute are mere names2 what they are 
we only learn in the  predicate4 ,what  
the subject may be in other respects1 as
 a concrete  thing1 is no concern of    
this judgment4 7,cp4  #ca47    ,to      
define the subject as that of which     
something is said1 and the  predicate as
 what is said about it1 is mere         
trifling4 ,it gives no  information     
about the distinction between the two4  
,in point of  thought1 the subject is   

primarily the individual1 and the       
predicate  the universal4 ,as the       
judgment receives further development1  
the  subject ceases to be merely the    
immediate individual1 and the predicate 
merely the abstract universal3 the      
former acquires the additional          
significations of particular and        
universal1--the latter the additional   
significations of particular and        
individual4 ,thus while the same names  
are given to the two terms of the       
judgment1 their meaning passes  through 
a series of changes4    #agj4 ,we now go
 closer into the speciality of subject  
and predicate4  ,the subject as negative
 self-relation 7 #afc1 #aff7 is the     
stable  substratum in which the         
predicate has its subsistence and where 
it  is ideally present4 ,the predicate1 
as the phrase is1 inheres in  the       
subject4 ,further1 as the subject is in 
general and immediately  concrete1 the  
specific connotation of the predicate is
 only one of the  numerous characters of

 the subject4 ,thus the subject is      
ampler and  wider than the predicate4   
,conversely1 the predicate as universal 
is self-subsistent1 and  indifferent    
whether this subject is or not4 ,the    
predicate outflanks  the subject1       
subsuming it under itself3 and hence on 
its side is wider  than the subject4    
,the specific content of the predicate 7
 #afi7 alone  constitutes the identity  
of the two4    #aga4 ,at first1 subject1
 predicate1 and the specific content or 
the  identity are1 even in their        
relation1 still put in the judgment  as 
different and divergent4 ,by            
implication1 however1 that is1 in  their
 notion1 they are identical4 ,for the   
subject is a concrete  totality1--which 
means not any indefinite multiplicity1  
but  individuality alone1 the particular
 and the universal in an identity3  and 
the predicate too is the very same unity
 7 #agj74--,the copula  again1 even     
while stating the identity of subject   
and predicate1  does so at first only by

 an abstract 'is4' ,conformably to such 
an  identity the subject has to be put  
also in the characteristic of the       
predicate4 ,by this means the latter    
also receives the characteristic of  the
 former3 so that the copula receives its
 full complement and full  force4 ,such 
is the continuous specification by which
 the judgment1  through a copula charged
 with content1 comes to be a syllogism4 
,as it  is primarily exhibited in the   
judgment1 this gradual specification    
consists in giving to an originally     
abstract1 sensuous universality the     
specific character of allness1 of       
species1 of genus1 and finally of the   
developed universality of the notion4   
,after we are made aware of this        
continuous specification of the         
judgment1 we can see a meaning and an   
interconnexion in what are  usually     
stated as the kinds of judgment4 ,not   
only does the ordinary  enumeration seem
 purely casual1 but it is also          
superficial1 and even  bewildering in   

its statement of their distinctions4    
,the distinction  between positive1     
categorical and assertory judgments1 is 
either a pure  invention of fancy1 or is
 left undetermined4 ,on the right       
theory1 the  different judgments follow 
necessarily from one another1 and       
present  the continuous specification of
 the notion2 for the judgment itself is 
nothing but the notion specified4       
,when we look at the two preceding      
spheres of ,being and ,essence1 we see  
that the specified notions as judgments 
are reproductions of these  spheres1 but
 put in the simplicity of relation      
peculiar to the notion4           99    
99       99       99       99    ,the   
various kinds of judgment are no        
empirical aggregate4 ,they are  a       
systematic whole based on a principle2  
and it was one of ,kant's  great merits 
to have first emphasised the necessity  
of showing  this4 ,his proposed         
division1 according to the headings in  
his table  of categories1 into judgments

 of quality1 quantity1 relation and     
modality1 can not be called             
satisfactory1 partly from the merely    
formal  application of this categorical 
rubric1 partly on account of their      
content4 ,still it rests upon a true    
perception of the fact that the         
different species of judgment derive    
their features from the universal  forms
 of the logical idea itself4 ,if we     
follow this clue1 it will  supply us    
with three chief kinds of judgment      
parallel to the stages  of ,being1      
,essence1 and ,notion4 ,the second of   
these kinds1 as required  by the        
character of ,essence1 which is the     
stage of differentiation1  must be      
doubled4 ,we find the inner ground for  
this systematisation of  judgments in   
the circumstance that when the ,notion1 
which is the unity  of ,being and       
,essence in a comprehensive thought1    
unfolds1 as it does in  the judgment1 it
 must reproduce these two stages in a   
transformation  proper to the notion4   

,the notion itself meanwhile is seen to 
mould and  form the genuine grade of    
judgment4    ,far from occupying the    
same level1 and being of equal value1   
the  different species of judgment form 
a series of steps1 the difference  of   
which rests upon the logical            
significance of the predicate4 ,that    
judgments differ in value is evident    
even in our ordinary ways of  thinking4 
,we should not hesitate to ascribe a    
very slight faculty of  judgment to a   
person who habitually framed only such  
judgments as1  ',this wall is green1'   
',this stove is hot4' ,on the other hand
 we should  credit with a genuine       
capacity of judgment the person whose   
criticisms  dealt with such questions as
 whether a certain work of art was      
beautiful1 whether a certain action was 
good1 and so on4 ,in judgments  of the  
first-mentioned kind the content forms  
only an abstract quality1  the presence 
of which can be sufficiently detected by
 immediate  perception4 ,to pronounce a 

work of art to be beautiful1 or an      
action to  be good1 requires on the     
contrary a comparison of the objects    
with what  they ought to be1 i4e4 with  
their notion4    77 ,qualitative        
,judgment4    #agb4 ,the immediate      
judgment is the judgment of definite    
,being4 ,the  subject is invested with a
 universality as its predicate1 which is
  an immediate1 and therefore a sensible
 quality4 ,it may be 7#a7 a  ,positive  
judgment3 ,the individual is a          
particular4 ,but the  individual is not 
a particular3 or in more precise        
language1 such  a single quality is not 
congruous with the concrete nature of   
the  subject4 ,this is 7#b7 a ,negative 
judgment4    ,it is one of the          
fundamental assumptions of dogmatic     
,logic that  ,qualitative judgments such
 as1 ',the rose is red1' or 'is not     
red1' can  contain truth4 ,correct they 
may be1 i4e4 in the limited circle  of  
perception1 of finite conception and    
thought3 that depends on the  content1  

which likewise is finite1 and1 on its   
own merits1 untrue4  ,truth1 however1 as
 opposed to correctness1 depends solely 
on the form1  viz4 on the notion as it  
is put and the reality corresponding to 
it4  ,but truth of that stamp is not    
found in the ,qualitative judgment4     
,in common life the terms truth and     
correctness are often treated  as       
synonymous3 we speak of the truth of a  
content1 when we are only  thinking of  
its correctness4 ,correctness1 generally
 speaking1 concerns  only the formal    
coincidence between our conception and  
its content1  whatever the constitution 
of this content may be4 ,truth1 on the  
contrary1 lies in the coincidence of the
 object with itself1 that is1  with its 
notion4 ,that a person is sick1 or that 
some one has committed  a theft1 may    
certainly be correct4 ,but the content  
is untrue4 ,a sick  body is not in      
harmony with the notion of body1 and    
there is a want  of congruity between   
theft and the notion of human conduct4  

,these  instances may show that an      
immediate judgment1 in which an abstract
  quality is predicated of an           
immediately individual thing1 however   
correct it may be1 cannot contain truth4
 ,the subject and predicate of  it do   
not stand to each other in the relation 
of reality and notion4    ,we may add   
that the untruth of the immediate       
judgment lies in the  incongruity       
between its form and content4 ,to say   
',this rose is red1'  involves 7in      
virtue of the copula 'is'7 the          
coincidence of subject and  predicate4  
,the rose however is a concrete thing1  
and so is not red  only3 it has also an 
odour1 a specific form1 and many other  
features  not implied in the predicate  
red4 ,the predicate on its part is an   
abstract universal1 and does not apply  
to the rose alone4 ,there are  other    
flowers and other objects which are red 
too4 ,the subject and  predicate in the 
immediate judgment touch1 as it were1   
only in a single  point1 but do not     

cover each other4 ,the case is different
 with the  notional judgment4 ,in       
pronouncing an action to be good1 we    
frame a  notional judgment4 ,here1 as we
 at once perceive1 there is a closer and
  a more intimate relation than in the  
immediate judgment4 ,the predicate  in  
the latter is some abstract quality     
which may or may not be applied  to the 
subject4 ,in the judgment of the notion 
the predicate is1 as it  were1 the soul 
of the subject1 by which the subject1 as
 the body of  this soul1 is             
characterised through and through4      
#agc4 ,this negation of a particular    
quality1 which is the first  negation1  
still leaves the connexion of the       
subject with the predicate  subsisting4 
,the predicate is in that manner a sort 
of relative  universal1 of which a      
special phase only has been negatived4  
,to say1  that the rose is not red1     
implies that it is still coloured--in   
the  first place with another colour2   
which however would be only one more    

positive judgment4 ,the individual      
however is not a universal4 ,hence  7#c7
 the judgment suffers disruption into   
one of two forms4 ,it is either  7a7 the
 ,identical judgment1 an empty identical
 relation stating  that the individual  
is the individual2 or it is 7b7 what is 
called the  ,infinite judgment1 in which
 we are presented with the total        
incompatibility of subject and          
predicate4    ,examples of the latter   
are3 ',the mind is no elephant3' ',a    
lion is  no table2' propositions which  
are correct but absurd1 exactly like    
the identical propositions3 ',a lion is 
a lion2' ',mind is mind4'  ,propositions
 like these are undoubtedly the truth of
 the immediate1 or1  as it is called1   
,qualitative judgment4 ,but they are not
 judgments at  all1 and can only occur  
in a subjective thought where even an   
untrue  abstraction may hold its        
ground4--,in their objective aspect1    
these  latter judgments express the     
nature of what is1 or of sensible       

things1  which1 as they declare1 suffer 
disruption into an empty identity on the
  one hand1 and on the other a          
fully-charged relation--only that this  
relation is the qualitative antagonism  
of the things related1 their  total     
incongruity4           99       99      
99       99       99    ,the            
negatively-infinite judgment1 in which  
the subject has no relation  whatever to
 the predicate1 gets its place in the   
,formal ,logic solely as  a nonsensical 
curiosity4 ,but the infinite judgment is
 not really a mere  casual form adopted 
by subjective thought4 ,it exhibits the 
proximate  result of the dialectical    
process in the immediate judgments      
preceding  7the positive and            
simply-negative71 and distinctly        
displays their  finitude and untruth4   
,crime may be quoted as an objective    
instance of  the negatively-infinite    
judgment4 ,the person committing a      
crime1 such  as a theft1 does not1 as in
 a suit about civil rights1 merely deny 

the particular right of another person  
to some one definite thing4  ,he denies 
the right of that person in general1 and
 therefore he is  not merely forced to  
restore what he has stolen1 but is      
punished in  addition1 because he has   
violated law as law1 i4e4 law in        
general4  ,the civil-law suit on the    
contrary is an instance of the negative 
judgment pure and simple where merely   
the particular law is violated1  whilst 
law in general is so far acknowledged4  
,such a dispute is  precisely paralleled
 by a negative judgment1 like1 ',this   
flower is not  red3' by which we merely 
deny the particular colour of the       
flower1 but  not its colour in general1 
which may be blue1 yellow1 or any other4
  ,similarly death1 as a                
negatively-infinite judgment1 is        
distinguished  from disease as          
simply-negative4 ,in disease1 merely    
this or that  function of life is       
checked or negatived3 in death1 as we   
ordinarily  say1 body and soul part1    

i4e4 subject and predicate utterly      
diverge4    77 ,judgment of ,reflection4
    #agd4 ,the individual put as        
individual 7i4e4 as reflected-into-self7
  into the judgment1 has a predicate1 in
 comparison with which the  subject1 as 
self-relating1 continues to be still an 
other thing4--,in  existence the subject
 ceases to be immediately qualitative1  
it is in  correlation1 and              
inter-connexion with an other           
thing1--with an external  world4 ,in    
this way the universality of the        
predicate comes to signify  this        
relativity--7e4g47 useful1 or dangerous2
 weight or acidity2 or  again1 instinct2
 are examples of such relative          
predicates4    ,the ,judgment of        
,reflection is distinguished from the   
,qualitative  judgment by the           
circumstance that its predicate is not  
an immediate  or abstract quality1 but  
of such a kind as to exhibit the subject
  as in relation to something else4     
,when we say1 e4g4 ',this rose is  red4'

 we regard the subject in its immediate 
individuality1 and  without reference to
 anything else4 ,if1 on the other hand1 
we frame  the judgment1 ',this plant is 
medicinal1' we regard the subject1      
plant1  as standing in connexion with   
something else 7the sickness which it   
cures71 by means of its predicate 7its  
medicinality74 ,the case is the  same   
with judgments like3 ,this body is      
elastic3 ,this instrument is  useful3   
,this punishment has a deterrent        
influence4 ,in every one of  these      
instances the predicate is some category
 of reflection4 ,they all  exhibit an   
advance beyond the immediate            
individuality of the subject1  but none 
of them goes so far as to indicate the  
adequate notion of it4  ,it is in this  
mode of judgment that ordinary          
raisonnement luxuriates4  ,the greater  
the concreteness of the object in       
question1 the more points  of view does 
it offer to reflection2 by which however
 its proper nature  or notion is not    

exhausted4    #age4 7#a7 ,firstly then  
the subject1 the individual as          
individual 7in  the ,singular judgment71
 is a universal4 ,but 7#b7 secondly1 in 
this relation it is elevated above its  
singularity4 ,this enlargement is       
external1 due to subjective reflection1 
and at first is an indefinite  number of
 particulars4 7,this is seen in the     
,particular judgment1  which is         
obviously negative as well as positive3 
the individual is  divided in itself3   
partly it is self-related1 partly       
related to  something else47 7#c7       
,thirdly1 ,some are the universal3      
particularity is  thus enlarged to      
universality3 or universality is        
modified through the  individuality of  
the subject1 and appears as allness     
,community1  the ordinary universality  
of reflection4           99       99    
99       99       99    ,the subject1   
receiving1 as in the ,singular judgment1
 a universal  predicate1 is carried out 
beyond its mere individual self4 ,to    

say1  ',this plant is wholesome1'       
implies not only that this single plant 
is  wholesome1 but that some or several 
are so4 ,we have thus the particular    
judgment 7some plants are wholesome1    
some men are inventive1 c74 ,by  means  
of particularity the immediate          
individual comes to lose its            
independence1 and enters into an        
inter-connexion with something else4    
,man1 as this man1 is not this single   
man alone3 he stands beside  other men  
and becomes one in the crowd1 just by   
this means however he  belongs to his   
universal1 and is consequently          
raised4--,the particular  judgment is as
 much negative as positive4 ,if only    
some bodies are  elastic1 it is evident 
that the rest are not elastic4    ,on   
this fact again depends the advance to  
the third form of the  ,reflective      
judgment1 viz4 the judgment of allness  
7all men are mortal1  all metals conduct
 electricity74 ,it is as 'all' that the 
universal  is in the first instance     

generally encountered by reflection4    
,the  individuals form for reflection   
the foundation1 and it is only our      
subjective action which collects and    
describes them as 'all4' ,so far  the   
universal has the aspect of an external 
fastening1 that holds  together a number
 of independent individuals1 which have 
not the least  affinity towards it4     
,this semblance of indifference is      
however unreal3  for the universal is   
the ground and foundation1 the root1 and
 substance  of the individual4 ,if e4g4 
we take ,caius1 ,titus1 ,sempronius1 and
  the other inhabitants of a town or    
country1 the fact that all of them  are 
men is not merely something which they  
have in common1 but their  universal or 
kind1 without which these individuals   
would not be at all4  ,the case is very 
different with that superficial         
generality falsely  so called1 which    
really means only what attaches1 or is  
common1 to  all the individuals4 ,it has
 been remarked1 for example1 that men1  

in contradistinction from the lower     
animals1 possess in common the          
appendage of ear-lobes4 ,it is evident1 
however1 that the absence of  these     
ear-lobes in one man or another would   
not affect the rest of  his being1      
character1 or capacities3 whereas it    
would be nonsense  to suppose that      
,caius1 without being a man1 would still
 be brave1  learned1 c4 ,the individual 
man is what he is in particular1 only in
 so  far as he is before all things a   
man as man and in general4 ,and that    
generality is not something external to1
 or something in addition to  other     
abstract qualities1 or to mere features 
discovered by reflection4  ,it is what  
permeates and includes in it everything 
particular4    #agf4 ,the subject being 
thus likewise characterised as a        
universal1  there is an express         
identification of subject and predicate1
 by which  at the same time the         
speciality of the judgment form is      
deprived of  all importance4 ,this unity

 of the content 7the content being the  
universality which is identical with the
 negative reflection-in-self of  the    
subject7 makes the connexion in judgment
 a necessary one4    ,the advance from  
the reflective judgment of allness to   
the judgment  of necessity is found in  
our usual modes of thought1 when we say 
that  whatever appertains to all1       
appertains to the species1 and is       
therefore  necessary4 ,to say all       
plants1 or all men1 is the same thing as
 to say  the plant1 or the man4    77   
,judgment of ,necessity4    #agg4 ,the  
,judgment of ,necessity1 i4e4 of the    
identity of the content  in its         
difference 7#a71 contains1 in the       
predicate1 partly the substance  or     
nature of the subject1 the concrete     
universal1 the genus2 partly1  seeing   
that this universal also contains the   
specific character as  negative1 the    
predicate represents the exclusive      
essential character1  the species4 ,this
 is the ,categorical judgment4    7#b7  

,conformably to their substantiality1   
the two terms receive the  aspect of    
independent actuality4 ,their identity  
is then inward only2  and thus the      
actuality of the one is at the same time
 not its own1 but  the being of the     
other4 ,this is the ,hypothetical       
judgment4    7#c7 ,if1 in this          
self-surrender and self-alienation of   
the notion1  its inner identity is at   
the same time explicitly put1 the       
universal  is the genus which is        
self-identical in its mutually-exclusive
  individualities4 ,this judgment1 which
 has this universal for both its  terms1
 the one time as a universal1 the other 
time as the circle of  its              
self-excluding particularisation in     
which the 'either--or' as much  as the  
'as well as' stands for the genus1 is   
the ,disjunctive  judgment4             
,universality1 at first as a genus1 and 
now also as the  circuit of its species1
 is thus described and expressly put as 
a  totality4           99       99      

99       99       99    ,the            
,categorical judgment 7such as ',gold is
 a metal1' ',the rose is a  plant'7 is  
the un-mediated judgment of necessity1  
and finds within the  sphere of ,essence
 its parallel in the relation of        
substance4 ,all things  are a           
,categorical judgment4 ,in other words1 
they have their substantial  nature1    
forming their fixed and unchangeable    
substratum4 ,it is only  when things are
 studied from the point of view of their
 kind1 and as  with necessity determined
 by the kind1 that the judgment first   
begins  to be real4 ,it betrays a       
defective logical training to place upon
 the  same level judgments like 'gold is
 dear1' and judgments like 'gold  is a  
metal4' ,that 'gold is dear' is a matter
 of external connexion  between it and  
our wants or inclinations1 the costs of 
obtaining it1  and other circumstances4 
,gold remains the same as it was1 though
 that  external reference is altered or 
removed4 ,metalleity1 on the contrary1  

constitutes the substantial nature of   
gold1 apart from which it1 and  all else
 that is in it1 or can be predicated of 
it1 would be unable to  subsist4 ,the   
same is the case if we say1 ',caius is a
 man4' ,we express  by that1 that       
whatever else he may be1 has worth and  
meaning1 only when  it corresponds to   
his substantial nature or manhood4      
,but even the ,categorical judgment is  
to a certain extent defective4 ,it      
fails to give due place to the function 
or element of particularity4  ,thus     
'gold is a metal1' it is true2 but so   
are silver1 copper1 iron3  and          
metalleity as such has no leanings to   
any of its particular  species4 ,in     
these circumstances we must advance from
 the ,categorical to  the ,hypothetical 
judgment1 which may be expressed in the 
formula3 ,if  ,a is1 ,b is4 ,the present
 case exhibits the same advance as      
formerly  took place from the relation  
of substance to the relation of cause4  
,in  the ,hypothetical judgment the     

specific character of the content shows 
itself mediated and dependent on        
something else3 and this is exactly  the
 relation of cause and effect4 ,and if  
we were to give a general               
interpretation to the ,hypothetical     
judgment1 we should say that it         
expressly realises the universal in its 
particularising4 ,this brings  us to the
 third form of the ,judgment of         
,necessity1 the ,disjunctive  judgment4 
,a is either ,b or ,c or ,d4 ,a work of 
poetic art is  either epic or lyric or  
dramatic4 ,colour is either yellow or   
blue or  red4 ,the two terms in the     
,disjunctive judgment are identical4    
,the genus  is the sum total of the     
species1 and the sum total of the       
species  is the genus4 ,this unity of   
the universal and the particular is the 
notion3 and it is the notion which1 as  
we now see1 forms the content of  the   
judgment4    77 ,judgment of the        
,notion4    #agh4 ,the ,judgment of the 
,notion has for its content the notion1 

the  totality in simple form1 the       
universal with its complete speciality4 
,the subject is1 7#a7 in the first      
place1 an individual1 which has  for its
 predicate the reflection of the        
particular existence on its  universal2 
or the judgment states the agreement or 
disagreement of  these two aspects4     
,that is1 the predicate is such a term  
as good1 true1  correct4 ,this is the   
,assertory judgment4    ,judgments1 such
 as whether an object1 action1 c4 is    
good1 bad1 true1  beautiful1 c1 are     
those to which even ordinary language   
first applies  the name of judgment4 ,we
 should never ascribe judgment to a     
person who  framed positive or negative 
judgments like1 ,this rose is red1 ,this
  picture is red1 green1 dusty1 c4      
,the ,assertory judgment1 although      
rejected by society as out of place     
when it claims authority on its own     
showing1 has however been made the      
single and all-essential form of        
doctrine1 even in philosophy1 through   

the influence of the principle of       
immediate knowledge and faith4 ,in the  
so-called philosophic works which       
maintain this principle1 we may read    
hundreds and hundreds of assertions     
about reason1 knowledge1 thought1  c4   
which1 now that external authority      
counts for little1 seek to  accredit    
themselves by an endless restatement of 
the same thesis4    #agi4 ,on the part  
of its at first un-mediated subject1 the
 ,assertory  judgment does not contain  
the relation of particular with         
universal  which is expressed in the    
predicate4 ,this judgment is            
consequently  a mere subjective         
particularity1 and is confronted by a   
contrary  assertion with equal right1 or
 rather want of right4 ,it is therefore 
at once turned into 7#b7 a              
,problematical judgment4 ,but when we   
explicitly attach the objective         
particularity to the subject and make   
its speciality the constitutive feature 
of its existence1 the subject  7#c7 then

 expresses the connexion of that        
objective particularity with  its       
constitution1 i4e4 with its genus2 and  
thus expresses what  forms the content  
of the predicate 7see  #agh74 ,this 7the
 immediate  individuality7 house 7the   
genus17 being so and so constituted     
7particularity17 is good or bad4 ,this  
is the ,apodictic  judgment4 ,all things
 are a genus 7i4e4 have a meaning and   
purpose7 in  an individual actuality of 
a particular constitution4 ,and they are
  finite1 because the particular in them
 may and also may not conform to  the   
universal4    #ahj4 ,in this manner     
subject and predicate are each the whole
 judgment4  ,the immediate constitution 
of the subject is at first exhibited as 
the intermediating ground1 where the    
individuality of the actual  thing meets
 with its universality1 and in this way 
as the ground of  the judgment4 ,what   
has been really made explicit is the    
oneness of  subject and predicate1 as   
the notion itself1 filling up the empty 

'is'  of the copula4 ,while its         
constituent elements are at the same    
time  distinguished as subject and      
predicate1 the notion is put as their   
unity1 as the connexion which serves to 
intermediate them3 in short1 as  the    
,syllogism4    7c7 ,the ,syllogism4     
#aha4 ,the ,syllogism brings the notion 
and the judgment into one4  ,it is      
notion1--being the simple identity into 
which the distinctions of  form in the  
judgment have retired4 ,it is           
judgment1--because it is at  the same   
time set in reality1 that is1 put in the
 distinction of its  terms4 ,the        
,syllogism is the reasonable1 and       
everything reasonable4    ,even the     
ordinary theories represent the         
,syllogism to be the form of            
reasonableness1 but only a subjective   
form2 and no inter-connexion  whatever  
is shown to exist between it and any    
other reasonable content1  such as a    
reasonable principle1 a reasonable      
action1 idea1 c4 ,the name  of reason is

 much and often heard1 and appealed to3 
but no one thinks  of explaining its    
specific character1 or saying what it   
is1--least of  all that it has any      
connexion with ,syllogism4 ,but formal  
,syllogism  really presents what is     
reasonable in such a reasonless way that
 it  has nothing to do with any         
reasonable matter4 ,but as the matter in
  question can only be rational in      
virtue of the same quality by which     
thought is reason1 it can be made so by 
the form only3 and that  form is        
,syllogism4 ,and what is a ,syllogism   
but an explicit putting1  i4e4 realising
 of the notion1 at first in form only1  
as stated  above8 ,accordingly the      
,syllogism is the essential ground of   
whatever  is true3 and at the present   
stage the definition of the ,absolute is
  that it is the ,syllogism1 or stating 
the principle in a proposition3         
,everything is a ,syllogism4 ,everything
 is a notion1 the existence of  which is
 the differentiation of its members or  

functions1 so that the  universal nature
 of the ,notion gives itself external   
reality by means  of particularity1 and 
thereby1 and as a negative              
reflection-into-self1  makes itself an  
individual4 ,or1 conversely3 the actual 
thing is an  individual1 which by means 
of particularity rises to universality  
and  makes itself identical with        
itself4--,the actual is one3 but it is  
also  the divergence from each other of 
the constituent elements of the  notion2
 and the ,syllogism represents the orbit
 of intermediation of its  elements1 by 
which it realises its unity4    ,the    
,syllogism1 like the notion and the     
judgment1 is usually described  as a    
form merely of our subjective thinking4 
,the ,syllogism1 it is said1  is the    
process of proving the judgment4 ,and   
certainly the judgment does  in every   
case refer us to the ,syllogism4 ,the   
step from the one to the  other however 
is not brought about by our subjective  
action1 but by the  judgment itself     

which puts itself as ,syllogism1 and in 
the conclusion  returns to the unity of 
the notion4 ,the precise point by which 
we  pass to the ,syllogism is found in  
the ,apodictic judgment4 ,in it we  have
 an individual which by means of its    
qualities connects itself  with its     
universal or notion4 ,here we see the   
particular becoming the  mediating mean 
between the individual and the          
universal4 ,this gives  the fundamental 
form of the ,syllogism1 the gradual     
specification of  which1 formally       
considered1 consists in the fact that   
universal and  individual also occupy   
this place of mean4 ,this again paves   
the way for  the passage from           
subjectivity to objectivity4    #ahb4   
,in the 'immediate' ,syllogism the      
several aspects of the notion  confront 
one another abstractly1 and stand in an 
external relation  only4 ,we have first 
the two extremes1 which are             
,individuality and  ,universality2 and  
then the notion1 as the mean for locking

 the two  together1 is in like manner   
only abstract ,particularity4 ,in this  
way  the extremes are put as independent
 and without affinity either towards    
one another or towards their mean4 ,such
 a ,syllogism contains reason1  but in  
utter notionlessness1--the formal       
,syllogism of ,understanding4 ,in  it   
the subject is coupled with an other    
character2 or the universal  by this    
mediation subsumes a subject external to
 it4 ,in the rational  ,syllogism1 on   
the contrary1 the subject is by means of
 the mediation  coupled with itself4 ,in
 this manner it first comes to be a     
subject3 or1  in the subject we have the
 first germ of the rational ,syllogism4 
,in the following examination1 the      
,syllogism of ,understanding1 according 
to the interpretation usually put upon  
it1 is expressed in its  subjective     
shape2 the shape which it has when we   
are said to make  such ,syllogisms4 ,and
 it really is only a subjective         
syllogising4 ,such  ,syllogism however  

has also an objective meaning2 it       
expresses only the  finitude of things1 
but does so in the specific mode which  
the form  has here reached4 ,in the case
 of finite things their subjectivity1   
being only thinghood1 is separable from 
their properties or their               
particularity1 but also separable from  
their universality3 not only  when the  
universality is the bare quality of the 
thing and its external  inter-connexion 
with other things1 but also when it is  
its genus and  notion4           99     
99       99       99       99    ,on the
 above-mentioned theory of syllogism1 as
 the rational form par  excellence1     
reason has been defined as the faculty  
of syllogising1  whilst understanding is
 defined as the faculty of forming      
notions4 ,we  might object to the       
conception on which this depends1 and   
according to  which the mind is merely a
 sum of forces or faculties existing    
side  by side4 ,but apart from that     
objection1 we may observe in regard to  

the parallelism of understanding with   
the notion1 as well as of reason  with  
syllogism1 that the notion is as little 
a mere category of the  understanding as
 the syllogism is without qualification 
definable  as rational4 ,for1 in the    
first place1 what the ,formal ,logic    
usually  examines in its theory of      
syllogism1 is really nothing but the    
mere  syllogism of understanding1 which 
has no claim to the honour of being     
made a form of rationality1 still less  
to be held as the embodiment of  all    
reason4 ,the notion1 in the second      
place1 so far from being a form  of     
understanding1 owes its degradation to  
such a place entirely to  the influence 
of that abstract mode of thought4 ,and  
it is not unusual  to draw such a       
distinction between a notion of         
understanding and a  notion of reason4  
,the distinction however does not mean  
that notions  are of two kinds4 ,it     
means that our own action often stops   
short at  the mere negative and abstract

 form of the notion1 when we might also 
have proceeded to apprehend the notion  
in its true nature1 as at once  positive
 and concrete4 ,it is e4g4 the mere     
understanding1 which  thinks liberty to 
be the abstract contrary of necessity1  
whereas the  adequate rational notion of
 liberty requires the element of        
necessity  to be merged in it4          
,similarly the definition of ,god1 given
 by what is  called ,deism1 is merely   
the mode in which the understanding     
thinks ,god3  whereas ,christianity1 to 
which ,he is known as the ,trinity1     
contains the  rational notion of ,god4  
77 ,qualitative ,syllogism4    #ahc4    
,the first syllogism is a syllogism of  
definite being1--a  ,qualitative        
,syllogism1 as stated in the last       
paragraph4 ,its form 7#a7 is            
,i--,p--,u3 i4e4 a subject as           
,individual is coupled 7concluded7 with 
a  ,universal character by means of a   
7,particular7 quality4    ,of course the
 subject 7terminus minor7 has other     

characteristics  besides individuality1 
just as the other extreme 7the predicate
 of the  conclusion1 or terminus major7 
has other characteristics than mere     
universality4 ,but here the interest    
turns only on the characteristics       
through which these terms make a        
syllogism4    ,the syllogism of         
existence is a syllogism of             
understanding merely1 at  least in so   
far as it leaves the individual1 the    
particular1 and the  universal to       
confront each other quite abstractly4   
,in this syllogism  the notion is at the
 very height of self-estrangement4 ,we  
have in it  an immediately individual   
thing as subject3 next some one         
particular  aspect or property attaching
 to this subject is selected1 and by    
means  of this property the individual  
turns out to be a universal4 ,thus we   
may say1 ,this rose is red3 ,red is a   
colour3 ,therefore1 this rose  is a     
coloured object4 ,it is this aspect of  
the syllogism which the  common logics  

mainly treat of4 ,there was a time when 
the syllogism was  regarded as an       
absolute rule for all cognition1 and    
when a scientific  statement was not    
held to be valid until it had been shown
 to follow  from a process of syllogism4
 ,at present1 on the contrary1 the      
different  forms of the syllogism are   
met nowhere save in the manuals of      
,logic2  and an acquaintance with them  
is considered a piece of mere pedantry1 
of no further use either in practical   
life or in science4 ,it would  indeed be
 both useless and pedantic to parade the
 whole machinery of  the formal         
syllogism on every occasion4 ,and yet   
the several forms of  syllogism make    
themselves constantly felt in our       
cognition4 ,if any one1  when awaking on
 a winter morning1 hears the creaking of
 the carriages  on the street1 and is   
thus led to conclude that it has frozen 
hard in  the night1 he has gone through 
a syllogistic operation3--an operation  
which is every day repeated under the   

greatest variety of conditions4  ,the   
interest1 therefore1 ought at least not 
to be less in becoming  expressly       
conscious of this daily action of our   
thinking selves1 than  confessedly      
belongs to the study of the functions of
 organic life1 such  as the processes of
 digestion1 assimilation1 respiration1  
or even the  processes and structures of
 the nature around us4 ,we do not1      
however1  for a moment deny that a study
 of ,logic is no more necessary to teach
  us how to draw correct conclusions1   
than a previous study of anatomy  and   
physiology is required in order to      
digest or breathe4    ,aristotle was the
 first to observe and describe the      
different forms1  or1 as they are       
called1 figures of syllogism1 in their  
subjective  meaning3 and he performed   
his work so exactly and surely1 that no 
essential addition has ever been        
required4 ,but while sensible of the    
value of what he has thus done1 we must 
not forget that the forms of  the       

syllogism of understanding1 and of      
finite thought altogether1  are not what
 ,aristotle has made use of in his      
properly philosophical  investigations4 
7,see  #ahi47    #ahd4 ,this syllogism  
is completely contingent 77 in the      
matter of its  terms4 ,the ,middle      
,term1 being an abstract particularity1 
is nothing  but any quality whatever of 
the subject3 but the subject1 being     
immediate and thus empirically concrete1
 has several others1 and could          
therefore be coupled with exactly as    
many other universalities as it         
possesses single qualities4 ,similarly a
 single particularity may have  various 
characters in itself1 so that the same  
medius terminus would  serve to connect 
the subject with several different      
universals4    ,it is more a caprice of 
fashion1 than a sense of its            
incorrectness1  which has led to the    
disuse of ceremonious syllogising4 ,this
 and the  following section indicate the
 uselessness of such syllogising for the

  ends of truth4    ,the point of view  
indicated in the paragraph shows how    
this style of  syllogism can            
'demonstrate' 7as the phrase goes7 the  
most diverse  conclusions4 ,all that is 
requisite is to find a medius terminus  
from  which the transition can be made  
to the proposition sought4 ,another     
medius terminus would enable us to      
demonstrate something else1 and  even   
the contrary of the last4 ,and the more 
concrete an object is1 the  more aspects
 it has1 which may become such middle   
terms4 ,to determine  which of these    
aspects is more essential than another1 
again1 requires  a further syllogism of 
this kind1 which fixing on the single   
quality  can with equal ease discover in
 it some aspect or consideration by     
which it can make good its claims to be 
considered necessary and  important4    
,little as we usually think on the      
,syllogism of ,understanding in the     
daily business of life1 it never ceases 
to play its part there4 ,in  a civil    

suit1 for instance1 it is the duty of   
the advocate to give  due force to the  
legal titles which make in favour of his
 client4 ,in  logical language1 such a  
legal title is nothing but a middle     
term4  ,diplomatic transactions afford  
another illustration of the same1 when1 
for instance1 different powers lay claim
 to one and the same territory4  ,in    
such a case the laws of inheritance1 the
 geographical position of  the country1 
the descent and the language of its     
inhabitants1 or any  other ground1 may  
be emphasised as a medius terminus4     
#ahe4 77 ,this syllogism1 if it is      
contingent in point of its terms1  is no
 less contingent in virtue of the form  
of relation which is  found in it4 ,in  
the syllogism1 according to its notion1 
truth lies in  connecting two distinct  
things by a ,middle ,term in which they 
are one4  ,but connexions of the        
extremes with the ,middle ,term 7the    
so-called  premisses1 the major and the 
minor premiss7 are in the case of this  

syllogism much more decidedly immediate 
connexions4 ,in other words1  they have 
not a proper ,middle ,term4    ,this    
contradiction in the syllogism exhibits 
a new case of the infinite  progression4
 ,each of the premisses evidently calls 
for a fresh  syllogism to demonstrate   
it3 and as the new syllogism has two    
immediate  premisses1 like its          
predecessor1 the demand for proof is    
doubled at  every step1 and repeated    
without end4    #ahf4 ,on account of its
 importance for experience1 there has   
been  here noted a defect in the        
syllogism1 to which in this form        
absolute  correctness had been ascribed4
 ,this defect however must lose itself  
in  the further specification of the    
syllogism4 ,for we are now within the   
sphere of the notion2 and here          
therefore1 as well as in the judgment1  
the opposite character is not merely    
present potentially1 but is  explicit4  
,to work out the gradual specification  
of the syllogism1  therefore1 there need

 only be admitted and accepted what is  
at each  step realised by the syllogism 
itself4    ,through the immediate       
syllogism ,i--,p--,u1 the ,individual is
 mediated  7through a ,particular7 with 
the ,universal1 and in this conclusion  
put  as a universal4 ,it follows that   
the individual subject1 becoming itself 
a universal1 serves to unite the two    
extremes1 and to form their ground  of  
intermediation4 ,this gives the second  
figure of the syllogism1 7#b7           
,u--,i--,p4 ,it expresses the truth of  
the first2 it shows in other words  that
 the intermediation has taken place in  
the individual1 and is thus  something  
contingent4    #ahg4 ,the universal1    
which in the first conclusion was       
specified  through individuality1 passes
 over into the second figure and there  
now occupies the place that belonged to 
the immediate subject4 ,in the  second  
figure it is concluded with the         
particular4 ,by this conclusion         
therefore the universal is explicitly   

put as particular--and is now  made to  
mediate between the two extremes1 the   
places of which are  occupied by the two
 others 7the particular and the         
individual74 ,this is  the third figure 
of the syllogism3 7#c7 ,p--,u--,i4      
,what are called the ,figures of the    
syllogism 7being three in  number1 for  
the fourth is a superfluous and even    
absurd addition of  the ,moderns to the 
three known to ,aristotle7 are in the   
usual mode of  treatment put side by    
side1 without the slightest thought of  
showing  their necessity1 and still less
 of pointing out their import and value4
  ,no wonder then that the figures have 
been in later times treated as an  empty
 piece of formalism4 ,they have however 
a very real significance1  derived from 
the necessity for every function or     
characteristic  element of the notion to
 become the whole itself1 and to stand  
as  mediating ground4--,but to find out 
what 'moods' of the propositions  7such 
as whether they may be universals1 or   

negatives7 are needed  to enable us to  
draw a correct conclusion in the        
different figures1  is a mechanical     
inquiry1 which its purely mechanical    
nature and its  intrinsic               
meaninglessness have very properly      
consigned to oblivion4  ,and ,aristotle 
would have been the last person to give 
any countenance  to those who wish to   
attach importance to such inquiries or  
to the  syllogism of understanding in   
general4 ,it is true that he described  
these1 as well as numerous other forms  
of mind and nature1 and that  he        
examined and expounded their            
specialities4 ,but in his metaphysical  
theories1 as well as his theories of    
nature and mind1 he was very  far from  
taking as basis1 or criterion1 the      
syllogistic forms of the                
'understanding4' ,indeed it might be    
maintained that not one of these        
theories would ever have come into      
existence1 or been allowed to exist1  if
 it had been compelled to submit to the 

laws of understanding4 ,with  all the   
descriptiveness and analytic faculty    
which ,aristotle after his  fashion is  
substantially strong in1 his ruling     
principle is always the  speculative    
notion2 and that syllogistic of         
'understanding' to which he  first gave 
such a definite expression is never     
allowed to intrude in  the higher domain
 of philosophy4           99       99   
99       99       99    ,in their       
objective sense1 the three figures of   
the syllogism declare  that everything  
rational is manifested as a triple      
syllogism2 that  is to say1 each one of 
the members takes in turn the place of  
the  extremes1 as well as of the mean   
which reconciles them4 ,such1 for       
example1 is the case with the three     
branches of philosophy2 the ,logical    
,idea1 ,nature1 and ,mind4 ,as we first 
see them1 ,nature is the middle  term   
which links the others together4        
,nature1 the totality immediately       
before us1 unfolds itself into the two  

extremes of the ,logical ,idea  and     
,mind4 ,but ,mind is ,mind only when it 
is mediated through nature4  ,then1 in  
the second place1 ,mind1 which we know  
as the principle of  individuality1 or  
as the actualising principle1 is the    
mean2 and ,nature  and the ,logical     
,idea are the extremes4 ,it is ,mind    
which cognises the  ,logical ,idea in   
,nature and which thus raises ,nature to
 its essence4  ,in the third place again
 the ,logical ,idea itself becomes the  
mean3 it  is the absolute substance both
 of mind and of nature1 the universal   
and all-pervading principle4 ,these are 
the members of the ,absolute            
,syllogism4    #ahh4 ,in the round by   
which each constituent function assumes 
successively the place of mean and of   
the two extremes1 their specific        
difference from each other has been     
superseded4 ,in this form1 where  there 
is no distinction between its           
constituent elements1 the syllogism  at 
first has for its connective link       

equality1 or the external identity  of  
understanding4 ,this is the             
,quantitative or ,mathematical          
,syllogism3  if two things are equal to 
a third1 they are equal to one another4 
99       99       99       99       99  
,everybody knows that this ,quantitative
 syllogism appears as a  mathematical   
axiom1 which like other axioms is said  
to be a principle  that does not admit  
of proof1 and which indeed being        
self-evident does  not require such     
proof4 ,these mathematical axioms       
however are really  nothing but logical 
propositions1 which1 so far as they     
enunciate  definite and particular      
thoughts1 are deducible from the        
universal and  self-characterising      
thought4 ,to deduce them1 is to give    
their proof4  ,that is true of the      
,quantitative syllogism1 to which       
mathematics  gives the rank of an axiom4
 ,it is really the proximate result of  
the qualitative or immediate syllogism4 
,finally1 the ,quantitative  syllogism  

is the syllogism in utter formlessness4 
,the difference  between the terms which
 is required by the notion is suspended4
  ,extraneous circumstances alone can   
decide what propositions are to be      
premisses here3 and therefore in        
applying this syllogism we make a       
pre-supposition of what has been        
elsewhere proved and established4       
#ahi4 ,two results follow as to the     
form4 ,in the first place1 each         
constituent element has taken the place 
and performed the function of  the mean 
and therefore of the whole1 thus        
implicitly losing its partial  and      
abstract character 7 #ahb and  #ahd72   
secondly1 the mediation has  been       
completed 7 #ahe71 though the completion
 too is only implicit1  that is1 only as
 a circle of mediations which in turn   
pre-suppose each  other4 ,in the first  
figure ,i--,p--,u the two premisses ,i  
is ,p and ,p is  ,u are yet without a   
mediation4 ,the former premiss is       
mediated in the  third1 the latter in   

the second figure4 ,but each of these   
two figures1  again1 for the mediation  
of its premisses pre-supposes the two   
others4    ,in consequence of this1 the 
mediating unity of the notion must be   
put  no longer as an abstract           
particularity1 but as a developed unity 
of the  individual and universal--and in
 the first place a reflected unity of   
these elements4 ,that is to say1 the    
individuality gets at the same time  the
 character of universality4 ,a mean of  
this kind gives the ,syllogism  of      
,reflection4    77 ,syllogism of        
,reflection4    #aij4 ,if the mean1 in  
the first place1 be not only an abstract
  particular character of the subject1  
but at the same time all the  individual
 concrete subjects which possess that   
character1 but possess  it only along   
with others1 7#a7 we have the ,syllogism
 of ,allness4  ,the major premiss1      
however1 which has for its subject the  
particular  character1 the terminus     
medius1 as allness1 pre-supposes the    

very  conclusion which ought rather to  
have pre-supposed it4 ,it rests         
therefore 7#b7 on an ,induction1 in     
which the mean is given by the  complete
 list of individuals as such1--a1 b1 c1 
d1 c4 ,on account of  the disparity1    
however1 between universality and an    
immediate and  empirical individuality1 
the list can never be complete4         
,induction  therefore rests upon 7#c7   
,analogy4 ,the middle term of ,analogy  
is an individual1 which however is      
understood as equivalent to its         
essential universality1 its genus1 or   
essential character4--,the first        
syllogism for its intermediation turns  
us over to the second1 and the  second  
turns us over to the third4 ,but the    
third no less demands an  intrinsically 
determinate ,universality1 or an        
individuality as type of  the genus1    
after the round of the forms of external
 connexion between  individuality and   
universality has been run through in the
 figures of  the ,reflective ,syllogism4

    ,by the ,syllogism of ,allness the  
defect in the first form of the         
,syllogism of ,understanding1 noted in  
#ahd1 is remedied1 but only to  give    
rise to a new defect4 ,this defect is   
that the major premiss itself           
pre-supposes what really ought to be the
 conclusion1 and pre-supposes  it as    
what is thus an 'immediate' proposition4
 ,all men are mortal1  therefore ,caius 
is mortal3 ,all metals conduct          
electricity1 therefore  e4g4 copper does
 so4 ,in order to enunciate these major 
premisses1  which when they say 'all'   
mean the 'immediate' individuals and are
  properly intended to be empirical     
propositions1 it is requisite that  the 
propositions about the individual man   
,caius1 or the individual  metal copper1
 should previously have been ascertained
 to be correct4  ,everybody feels not   
merely the pedantry1 but the unmeaning  
formalism of  such syllogisms as3 ,all  
men are mortal1 ,caius is a man1        
therefore ,caius  is mortal4    ,the    

syllogism of ,allness hands us over to  
the syllogism of ,induction1  in which  
the individuals form the coupling mean4 
',all metals conduct  electricity1' is  
an empirical proposition derived from   
experiments  made with each of the      
individual metals4 ,we thus get the     
syllogism of  ,induction ,i in the      
following shape ,p--,i--,u4 ,i 4 4 4    
,gold is a metal3 silver is a metal3 so 
is copper1 lead1 c4 ,this is  the major 
premiss4 ,then comes the minor premiss3 
,all these bodies  conduct electricity2 
and hence results the conclusion1 that  
all metals  conduct electricity4 ,the   
point which brings about a combination  
here  is individuality in the shape of  
allness4 ,but this syllogism once  more 
hands us over to another syllogism4 ,its
 mean is constituted by  the complete   
list of the individuals4 ,that          
pre-supposes that over  a certain region
 observation and experience are         
completed4 ,but the  things in question 
here are individuals2 and so again we   

are landed  in the progression ad       
infinitum 7i1 i1 i1 c474 ,in other      
words1 in  no ,induction can we ever    
exhaust the individuals4 ,the 'all      
metals1'  'all plants1' of our          
statements1 mean only all the metals1   
all the  plants1 which we have hitherto 
become acquainted with4 ,every          
,induction  is consequently imperfect4  
,one and the other observation1 many it 
may  be1 have been made3 but all the    
cases1 all the individuals1 have not    
been observed4 ,by this defect of       
,induction we are led on to ,analogy4   
,in the syllogism of ,analogy we        
conclude from the fact that some things 
of a certain kind possess a certain     
quality1 that the same quality is       
possessed by other things of the same   
kind4 ,it would be a syllogism of       
,analogy1 for example1 if we said3 ,in  
all planets hitherto discovered  this   
has been found to be the law of motion1 
consequently a newly  discovered planet 
will probably move according to the same

 law4 ,in the  experiential sciences    
,analogy deservedly occupies a high     
place1 and  has led to results of the   
highest importance4 ,analogy is the     
instinct  of reason1 creating an        
anticipation that this or that          
characteristic1  which experience has   
discovered1 has its root in the inner   
nature or  kind of an object1 and       
arguing on the faith of that            
anticipation4  ,analogy it should be    
added may be superficial or it may be   
thorough4  ,it would certainly be a very
 bad analogy to argue that since the man
  ,caius is a scholar1 and ,titus also  
is a man1 ,titus will probably be a     
scholar too3 and it would be bad because
 a man's learning is not an             
unconditional consequence of his        
manhood4 ,superficial analogies of  this
 kind however are very frequently met   
with4 ,it is often argued1  for example3
 ,the earth is a celestial body1 so is  
the moon1 and it  is therefore in all   
probability inhabited as well as the    

earth4 ,the  analogy is not one whit    
better than that previously mentioned4  
,that  the earth is inhabited does not  
depend on its being a celestial body1   
but in other conditions1 such as the    
presence of an atmosphere1 and of  water
 in connexion with the atmosphere1 c43  
and these are precisely  the conditions 
which the moon1 so far as we know1 does 
not possess4  ,what has in modern times 
been called the ,philosophy of ,nature  
consists  principally in a frivolous    
play with empty and external analogies1 
which1 however1 claim to be considered  
profound results4 ,the natural          
consequence has been to discredit the   
philosophical study of nature4    77    
,syllogism of ,necessity4    #aia4 ,the 
,syllogism of ,necessity1 if we look to 
its purely abstract  characteristics or 
terms1 has for its mean the ,universal  
in the same  way as the ,syllogism of   
,reflection has the ,individual1 the    
latter  being in the second1 and the    
former in the third figure 7 #ahg74     

,the ,universal is expressly put as in  
its very nature intrinsically           
determinate4 ,in the first place 7#a7   
the ,particular1 meaning by the         
particular the specific genus or        
species1 is the term for mediating  the 
extremes--as is done in the ,categorical
 syllogism4 7#b7 ,the  same office is   
performed by the ,individual1 taking the
 individual as  immediate being1 so that
 it is as much mediating as             
mediated3--as  happens in the           
,hypothetical syllogism4 7#c7 ,we have  
also the  mediating ,universal          
explicitly put as a totality of its     
particular  members1 and as a single    
particular1 or exclusive                
individuality3--which  happens in the   
,disjunctive syllogism4 ,it is one and  
the same  universal which is in these   
terms of the ,disjunctive syllogism2    
they  are only different forms for      
expressing it4    #aib4 ,the syllogism  
has been taken conformably to the       
distinctions  which it contains2 and the

 general result of the course of their  
evolution has been to show that these   
differences work out their own          
abolition and destroy the notion's      
outwardness to its own self4 ,and1  as  
we see1 in the first place1 7#a7 each of
 the dynamic elements has  proved itself
 the systematic whole of these elements1
 in short a whole  syllogism1--they are 
consequently implicitly identical4 ,in  
the second  place1 7#b7 the negation of 
their distinctions and of the mediation 
of  one through another constitutes     
independency2 so that it is one and  the
 same universal which is in these forms1
 and which is in this way  also         
explicitly put as their identity4 ,in   
this ideality of its dynamic  elements1 
the syllogistic process may be described
 as essentially  involving the negation 
of the characters through which its     
course runs1  as being a mediative      
process through the suspension of       
mediation1--as  coupling the subject not
 with another1 but with a suspended     

other1 in  one word1 with itself4       
99       99       99       99       99  
,in the common logic1 the doctrine of   
syllogism is supposed to conclude  the  
first part1 or what is called the       
'elementary' theory4 ,it is  followed by
 the second part1 the doctrine of       
,method1 which proposes  to show how a  
body of scientific knowledge is created 
by applying to  existing objects the    
forms of thought discussed in the       
elementary part4  ,whence these objects 
originate1 and what the thought of      
objectivity  generally speaking implies1
 are questions to which the ,logic of   
,understanding vouchsafes no further    
answer4 ,it believes thought to  be a   
mere subjective and formal activity1 and
 the objective fact1  which confronts   
thought1 to have a separate and         
permanent being4 ,but  this dualism is a
 half-truth3 and there is a want of     
intelligence in  the procedure which at 
once accepts1 without inquiring into    
their  origin1 the categories of        

subjectivity and objectivity4 ,both of  
them1  subjectivity as well as          
objectivity1 are certainly              
thoughts--even  specific thoughts3 which
 must show themselves founded on the    
universal  and self-determining thought4
 ,this has here been done--at least for 
subjectivity4 ,we have recognised it1 or
 the notion subjective 7which  includes 
the notion proper1 the judgment1 and the
 syllogism7 as the  dialectical result  
of the first two main stages of the     
,logical ,idea1  ,being and ,essence4   
,to say that the notion is subjective   
and subjective  only1 is so far quite   
correct3 for the notion certainly is    
subjectivity  itself4 ,not less         
subjective than the notion are also the 
judgment and  syllogism3 and these      
forms1 together with the so-called ,laws
 of ,thought  7the ,laws of ,identity1  
,difference1 and ,sufficient ,ground71  
make up the  contents of what is called 
the ',elements' in the common logic4    
,but we  may go a step further4 ,this   

subjectivity1 with its functions of     
notion1  judgment1 and syllogism1 is not
 like a set of empty compartments which 
has to get filled from without by       
separately-existing objects4 ,it would  
be truer to say that it is subjectivity 
itself which1 as dialectical1  breaks   
through its own barriers and opens out  
into objectivity by means  of the       
syllogism4    #aic4 ,this 'realisation' 
of the notion1--a realisation in which  
the  universal is this one totality     
withdrawn back into itself 7of which    
the different members are no less the   
whole1 and7 which has given  itself a   
character of 'immediate' unity by       
merging the mediation3--this            
realisation of the notion is the        
,object4    ,i his transition from the  
,subject1 the notion in general1 and    
especially the syllogism1 to the        
,object1 may1 at the first glance1      
appear strange1 particularly if we look 
only at the ,syllogism  of              
,understanding1 and suppose syllogising 

to be only an act of  consciousness4    
,but that strangeness imposes on us no  
obligation to seek  to make the         
transition plausible to the image-loving
 conception4 ,the  only question which  
can be considered is1 whether our usual 
conception  of what is called an        
'object' approximately corresponds to   
the object  as here described4 ,by      
'object' is commonly understood not an  
abstract  being1 or an existing thing   
merely1 or any sort of actuality1 but   
something independent1 concrete1 and    
self-complete1 this completeness  being 
the totality of the notion4 ,that the   
object 7,objekt7 is also  an object to  
us 7,gegenstand7 and is external to     
something else1  will be more precisely 
seen1 when it puts itself in contrast   
with  the subjective4 ,at present1 as   
that into which the notion has passed   
from its mediation1 it is only immediate
 object and nothing more1  just as the  
notion is not describable as subjective1
 previous to the  subsequent contrast   

with objectivity4    ,further1 the      
,object in general is the one total1 in 
itself still  unspecified1 the          
,objective ,world as a whole1 ,god1 the 
,absolute ,object4  ,the object1        
however1 has also difference attaching  
to it3 it falls  into pieces1 indefinite
 in their multiplicity 7making an       
objective  world72 and each of these    
individualised parts is also an object1 
an  intrinsically concrete1 complete1   
and independent existence4              
,objectivity has been compared with     
being1 existence1 and actuality2  and so
 too the transition to existence and    
actuality 7not to being1  for it is the 
primary and quite abstract immediate7   
maybe compared  with the transition to  
objectivity4 ,the ground from which     
existence  proceeds1 and the reflective 
correlation which is merged in          
actuality1  are nothing but the as yet  
imperfectly realised notion4 ,they are  
only  abstract aspects of it1--the      
ground being its merely essence-bred    

unity1 and the correlation only the     
connexion of real sides which are       
supposed to have only self-reflected    
being4 ,the notion is the unity of  the 
two2 and the object is not a merely     
essence-like1 but inherently  universal 
unity1 not only containing real         
distinctions1 but containing  them as   
totalities in itself4    ,it is evident 
that in all these transitions there is a
 further purpose  than merely to show   
the indissoluble connexion between the  
notion or  thought and being4 ,it has   
been more than once remarked that being 
is  nothing more than simple            
self-relation1 and this meagre category 
is  certainly implied in the notion1 or 
even in thought4 ,but the meaning  of   
these transitions is not to accept      
characteristics or categories1  as only 
implied2--a fault which mars even the   
,ontological argument for  ,god's       
existence1 when it is stated that being 
is one among realities4  ,what such a   
transition does1 is to take the notion1 

as it ought to be  primarily            
characterised per se as a notion1 with  
which this remote  abstraction of being1
 or eve of objectivity1 has as yet      
nothing to do1  and looking at its      
specific character as a notional        
character alone1 to  see when and       
whether it passes over into a form which
 is different from  the character as it 
belongs to the notion and appears in it4
    ,if the ,object1 the product of this
 transition1 be brought into relation   
with the notion1 which1 so far as its   
special form is concerned1 has  vanished
 in it1 we may give a correct expression
 to the result1 by  saying that notion  
or1 if it be preferred1 subjectivity and
 object are  implicitly the same4 ,but  
it is equally correct to say that they  
are  different4 ,in short1 the two modes
 of expression are equally correct  and 
incorrect4 ,the true state of the case  
can be presented in no  expressions of  
this kind4 ,the 'implicit' is an        
abstraction1 still more  partial and    

inadequate than the notion itself1 of   
which the inadequacy  is upon the whole 
suspended1 by suspending itself to the  
object with  its opposite inadequacy4   
,hence that implicitness also must1 by  
its  negation1 give itself the character
 of explicitness4 ,as in every case1    
speculative identity is not the         
above-mentioned triviality of an        
implicit identity of subject and object4
 ,this has been said often  enough4 ,yet
 it could not be too often repeated1 if 
the intention were  really to put an end
 to the stale and purely malicious      
misconception in  regard to this        
identity3--of which however there can be
 no reasonable  expectation4    ,looking
 at that unity in a quite general way1  
and raising no objection  to the        
one-sided form of its implicitness1 we  
find it as the well-known               
pre-supposition of the ontological proof
 for the existence of ,god4  ,there1 it 
appears as supreme perfection4 ,anselm1 
in whom the notable  suggestion of this 

proof first occurs1 no doubt originally 
restricted  himself to the question     
whether a certain content was in our    
thinking  only4 ,his words are briefly  
these3 ',certe id quo majus cogitari    
nequit1 non potest esse in intellectu   
solo4 ,si enim vel in solo  intellectu  
est1 potest cogitari esse et in re3 quod
 majus est4  ,si ergo id quo majus      
cogitari non potest1 est in solo        
intellectu2 id  ipsum quo majus cogitari
 non potest1 est quo majus cogitari     
potest4  ,sed certe hoc esse non        
potest4' 7,certainly that1 than which   
nothing  greater can be thought1 cannot 
be in the intellect alone4 ,for even  if
 it is in the intellect alone1 it can   
also be thought to exist in  fact3 and  
that is greater4 ,if then that1 than    
which nothing greater  can be thought1  
is in the intellect alone2 then the very
 thing1 which  is greater than anything 
which can be thought1 can be exceeded in
  thought4 ,but certainly this is       
impossible47 ,the same unity received  a

 more objective expression in           
,descartes1 ,spinoza and others3 while  
the theory of immediate certitude or    
faith presents it1 on the  contrary1 in 
somewhat the same subjective aspect as  
,anselm4 ,these  ,intuitionalists hold  
that in our consciousness the attribute 
of being  is indissolubly associated    
with the conception of ,god4 ,the theory
 of  faith brings even the conception of
 external finite things under the  same 
inseparable nexus between the           
consciousness and the being of  them1 on
 the ground that perception presents    
them conjoined with the  attribute of   
existence3 and in so saying1 it is no   
doubt correct4 ,it  would be utterly    
absurd1 however1 to suppose that the    
association in  consciousness between   
existence and our conception of finite  
things  is of the same description as   
the association between existence and   
the conception of ,god4 ,to do so would 
be to forget that finite things  are    
changeable and transient1 i4e4 that     

existence is associated  with them for a
 season1 but that the association is    
neither eternal  nor inseparable4       
,speaking in the phraseology of the     
categories before  us1 we may say that1 
to call a thing finite1 means that its  
objective  existence is not in harmony  
with the thought of it1 with its        
universal  calling1 its kind and its    
end4 ,anselm1 consequently1 neglecting  
any  such conjunction as occurs in      
finite things1 has with good reason     
pronounced that only to be the ,perfect 
which exists not merely in a            
subjective1 but also in an objective    
mode4 ,it does no good to put  on airs  
against the ,ontological proof1 as it is
 called1 and against  ,anselm thus      
denning the ,perfect4 ,the argument is  
one latent in every  unsophisticated    
mind1 and it recurs in every philosophy1
 even against  its wish and without its 
knowledge--as may be seen in the theory 
of  immediate belief4    ,the real fault
 in the argumentation of ,anselm is one 

which is  chargeable on ,descartes and  
,spinoza1 as well as on the theory of   
immediate knowledge4 ,it is this4 ,this 
unity which is enunciated as the        
supreme perfection or1 it may be1       
subjectively1 as the true knowledge1  is
 pre-supposed1 i4e4 it is assumed only  
as potential4 ,this identity1  abstract 
as it thus appears1 between the two     
categories may be at  once met and      
opposed by their diversity2 and this was
 the very answer  given to ,anselm long 
ago4 ,in short1 the conception and      
existence of  the finite is set in      
antagonism to the infinite2 for1 as     
previously  remarked1 the finite        
possesses objectivity of such a kind as 
is at  once incongruous with and        
different from the end or aim1 its      
essence  and notion4 ,or1 the finite is 
such a conception and in such a way     
subjective1 that it does not involve    
existence4 ,this objection and this     
antithesis are got over1 only by showing
 the finite to be untrue and  these     

categories in their separation to be    
inadequate and null4 ,their  identity is
 thus seen to be one into which they    
spontaneously pass  over1 and in which  
they are reconciled4    ,b4--,,the      
,,object4    #aid4 ,the ,object is      
immediate being1 because insensible to  
difference1  which in it has suspended  
itself4 ,it is1 further1 a totality in  
itself1  whilst at the same time 7as    
this identity is only the implicit      
identity of its dynamic elements7 it is 
equally indifferent to its  immediate   
unity4 ,it thus breaks up into distinct 
parts1 each of which  is itself the     
totality4 ,hence the object is the      
absolute contradiction  between a       
complete independence of the            
multiplicity1 and the equally  complete 
non-independence of the different       
pieces4    ,the definition1 which states
 that the ,absolute is the ,object1 is  
most  definitely implied in the         
,leibnizian ,monad4 ,the ,monads are    
each an  object1 but an object          

implicitly 'representative1' indeed the 
total  representation of the world4 ,in 
the simple unity of the ,monad1 all     
difference is merely ideal1 not         
independent or real4 ,nothing from      
without comes into the monad3 ,it is the
 whole notion in itself1 only           
distinguished by its own greater or less
 development4 ,none the less1  this     
simple totality parts into the absolute 
multeity of differences1  each becoming 
an independent monad4 ,in the monad of  
monads1 and the  ,pre-established       
,harmony of their inward developments1  
these substances  are in like manner    
again reduced to 'ideality' and         
unsubstantiality4  ,the philosophy of   
,leibnitz1 therefore1 represents        
contradiction in its  complete          
development4           99       99      
99       99       99    ,as ,fichte in  
modern times has especially and with    
justice insisted1  the theory which     
regards the ,absolute or ,god as the    
,object and there  stops1 expresses the 

point of view taken by superstition and 
slavish  fear4 ,no doubt ,god is the    
,object1 and1 indeed1 the ,object out   
and  out1 confronted with which our     
particular or subjective opinions and   
desires have no truth and no validity4  
,as absolute object however1 ,god  does 
not therefore take up the position of a 
dark and hostile power  over against    
subjectivity4 ,he rather involves it as 
a vital element in  ,himself4 ,such also
 is the meaning of the ,christian       
doctrine1 according  to which ,god has  
willed that all men should be saved and 
all attain  blessedness4 ,the salvation 
and the blessedness of men are attained 
when  they come to feel themselves at   
one with ,god1 so that ,god1 on the     
other  hand1 ceases to be for them mere 
object1 and1 in that way1 an object  of 
fear and terror1 as was especially the  
case with the religious  consciousness  
of the ,romans4 ,but ,god in the        
,christian religion is  also known as   
,love1 because in ,his ,son1 who is one 

with ,him1 ,he has  revealed ,himself to
 men as a man amongst men1 and thereby  
redeemed  them4 ,all which is only      
another way of saying that the          
antithesis of  subjective and objective 
is implicitly overcome1 and that it is  
our  affair to participate in this      
redemption by laying aside our immediate
  subjectivity 7putting off the old     
,adam71 and learning to know ,god as    
our true and essential self4    ,just as
 religion and religious worship consist 
in overcoming the  antithesis of        
subjectivity and objectivity1 so science
 too and  philosophy have no other task 
than to overcome this antithesis by the 
medium of thought4 ,the aim of knowledge
 is to divest the objective  world that 
stands opposed to us of its strangeness1
 and1 as the phrase  is1 to find        
ourselves at home in it3 which means no 
more than to trace  the objective world 
back to the notion1--to our innermost   
self4 ,we  may learn from the present   
discussion the mistake of regarding the 

antithesis of subjectivity and          
objectivity as an abstract and permanent
  one4 ,the two are wholly dialectical4 
,the notion is at first only            
subjective3 but without the assistance  
of any foreign material or stuff  it    
proceeds1 in obedience to its own       
action1 to objectify itself4 ,so1  too1 
the object is not rigid and processless4
 ,its process is to show  itself as what
 is at the same time subjective1 and    
thus form the step  onwards to the idea4
 ,any one who1 from want of familiarity 
with the  categories of subjectivity and
 objectivity1 seeks to retain them in   
their abstraction1 will find that the   
isolated categories slip through  his   
fingers before he is aware1 and that he 
says the exact contrary of  what he     
wanted to say4    7#b7 ,objectivity     
contains the three forms of ,mechanism1 
,chemism1  and ,teleology4 ,the object  
of mechanical type is the immediate and 
undifferentiated object4 ,no doubt it   
contains difference1 but the  different 

pieces stand1 as it were1 without       
affinity to each other1  and their      
connexion is only extraneous4 ,in       
chemism1 on the contrary1  the object   
exhibits an essential tendency to       
differentiation1 in such  a way that the
 objects are what they are only by their
 relation to  each other3 this tendency 
to difference constitutes their quality4
  ,the third type of objectivity1 the   
teleological relation1 is the  unity of 
mechanism and chemism4 ,design1 like the
 mechanical object1  is a self-contained
 totality1 enriched however by the      
principle of  differentiation which came
 to the fore in chemism1 and thus       
referring  itself to the object that    
stands over against it4 ,finally1 it is 
the  realisation of design which forms  
the transition to the ,idea4    7a7     
,mechanism4    #aif4 ,the object 7#a7 in
 its immediacy is the notion only       
potentially2  the notion as subjective  
is primarily outside it2 and all its    
specific character is imposed from      

without4 ,as a unity of differents1     
therefore1 it is a composite1 an        
aggregate2 and its capacity of  acting  
on anything else continues to be an     
external relation4 ,this is  ,formal    
,mechanism4--,notwithstanding1 and in   
this connexion and  non-independence1   
the objects remain independent and offer
 resistance1  external to each other4   
,pressure and impact are examples of    
mechanical relations4 ,our knowledge  is
 said to be mechanical or by rote1 when 
the words have no meaning  for us1 but  
continue external to sense1 conception1 
thought2 and  when1 being similarly     
external to each other1 they form a     
meaningless  sequence4 ,conduct1 piety1 
c4 are in the same way mechanical1 when 
a  man's behaviour is settled for him by
 ceremonial laws1 by a spiritual        
adviser1 c42 in short1 when his own mind
 and will are not in his  actions1 which
 in this way are extraneous to himself4 
99       99       99       99       99  
,mechanism1 the first form of           

objectivity1 is also the category which 
primarily offers itself to reflection1  
as it examines the objective  world4 ,it
 is also the category beyond which      
reflection seldom goes4  ,it is1        
however1 a shallow and superficial mode 
of observation1 one  that cannot carry  
us through in connexion with ,nature and
 still less  in connexion with the world
 of ,mind4 ,in ,nature it is only the   
veriest  abstract relations of matter in
 its inert masses which obey the law of 
mechanism4 ,on the contrary the         
phenomena and operations of the province
  to which the term 'physical' in its   
narrower sense is applied1 such as  the 
phenomena of light1 heat1 magnetism1 and
 electricity1 cannot be  explained by   
any mere mechanical processes1 such as  
pressure1 impact1  displacement of      
parts1 and the like4 ,still less        
satisfactory is it  to transfer these   
categories and apply them in the field  
of organic  nature2 at least if it be   
our aim to understand the specific      

features  of that field1 such as the    
growth and nourishment of plants1 or1 it
  may be1 even animal sensation4 ,it is 
at any rate a very deep-seated1  and    
perhaps the main1 defect of modern      
researches into nature1 that1  even     
where other and higher categories than  
those of mere mechanism  are in         
operation1 they still stick obstinately 
to the mechanical laws2  although they  
thus conflict with the testimony of     
unbiassed perception1  and foreclose the
 gate to an-adequate knowledge of       
nature4 ,but even  in considering the   
formations in the world of ,mind1 the   
mechanical  theory has been repeatedly  
invested with an authority which it has 
no  right to4 ,take as an instance the  
remark that man consists of soul and    
body4 ,in this language1 the two things 
stand each self-subsistent1 and         
associated only from without4 ,similarly
 we find the soul regarded as a  mere   
group of forces and faculties1          
subsisting independently side by  side4 

,thus decidedly must we reject the      
mechanical mode of inquiry when it      
comes forward and arrogates to itself   
the place of rational cognition  in     
general1 and seeks to get mechanism     
accepted as an absolute  category4 ,but 
we must not on that account forget      
expressly to vindicate  for mechanism   
the right and import of a general       
logical category4 ,it  would be1        
therefore1 a mistake to restrict it to  
the special physical  department from   
which it derives its name4 ,there is no 
harm done1 for  example1 in directing   
attention to mechanical actions1 such as
 that  of gravity1 the lever1 c1 even in
 departments1 notably in physics  and in
 physiology1 beyond the range of        
mechanics proper4 ,it must  however be  
remembered1 that within these spheres   
the laws of mechanism  cease to be final
 or decisive1 and sink1 as it were1 to a
 subservient  position4 ,to which may be
 added1 that1 in ,nature1 when the      
higher  or organic functions are in any 

way checked or disturbed in their       
normal efficiency1 the otherwise        
subordinate category of mechanism  is   
immediately seen to take the upper hand4
 ,thus a sufferer from  indigestion     
feels pressure on the stomach1 after    
partaking of certain  food in slight    
quantity2 whereas those whose digestive 
organs are sound  remain free from the  
sensation1 although they have eaten as  
much4 ,the  same phenomenon occurs in   
the general feeling of heaviness in the 
limbs1 experienced in bodily            
indisposition4 ,even in the world of    
,mind1  mechanism has its place2 though 
there1 too1 it is a subordinate one4 ,we
  are right in speaking of mechanical   
memory1 and all sorts of mechanical     
operations1 such as reading1 writing1   
playing on musical instruments1  c4 ,in 
memory1 indeed1 the mechanical quality  
of the action is  essential3 a          
circumstance1 the neglect of which has  
not unfrequently  caused great harm in  
the training of the young1 from the     

misapplied  zeal of modern              
educationalists for the freedom of      
intelligence4 ,it  would betray bad     
psychology1 however1 to have recourse to
 mechanism for  an explanation of the   
nature of memory1 and to apply          
mechanical laws  straight off to the    
soul4 ,the mechanical feature in memory 
lies merely  in the fact that certain   
signs1 tones1 c4 are apprehended in     
their  purely external association1 and 
then reproduced in this association1    
without attention being expressly       
directed to their meaning and inward    
association4 ,to become acquainted with 
these conditions of mechanical  memory  
requires no further study of mechanics1 
nor would that study  tend at all to    
advance the special inquiry of          
psychology4    #aif4 ,the want of       
stability in itself which allows the    
object to suffer  violence1 is possessed
 by it 7see preceding 7 only in so far  
as it  has a certain stability4 ,now as 
the object is implicitly invested  with 

the character of notion1 the one of     
these characteristics is not  merged    
into its other2 but the object1 through 
the negation of itself  7its lack of    
independence71 closes with itself1 and  
not till it so  closes1 is it           
independent4 ,thus at the same time in  
distinction from  the outwardness1 and  
negativing that outwardness in its      
independence1  does this independence   
form a negative unity with              
self1--,centrality  7subjectivity74 ,so 
conceived1 the object itself has        
direction and  reference towards the    
external4 ,but this external object is  
similarly  central in itself1 and being 
so1 is no less only referred towards the
  other centre2 so that it no less has  
its centrality in the other4 ,this  is  
7#b7 ,mechanism with ,affinity 7with    
bias1 or 'difference'71 and  may be     
illustrated by gravitation1 appetite1   
social instinct1 c4    #aig4 ,this      
relationship1 when fully carried out1   
forms a syllogism4 ,in  that syllogism  

the immanent negativity1 as the central 
individuality  of an object1 7abstract  
centre17 relates itself to              
non-independent  objects1 as the other  
extreme1 by a mean which unites the     
centrality  with the non-independence of
 the objects1 7relative centre47 ,this  
is  7#c7 ,absolute ,mechanism4    #aih4 
,the syllogism thus indicated           
7,i--,p--,u7 is a triad of syllogisms4  
,the wrong individuality of             
non-independent objects1 in which formal
  ,mechanism is at home1 is1 by reason  
of that non-independence1 no  less      
universality1 though it be only         
external4 ,hence these objects  also    
form the mean between the absolute and  
the relative centre  7the form of       
syllogism being ,u--,i--,p73 for it is  
by this want of  independence that those
 two are kept asunder and made extremes1
 as  well as related to one another4    
,similarly absolute centrality1 as the  
permanently-underlying universal        
substance 7illustrated by the gravity   

which continues identical71 which as    
pure negativity equally includes        
individuality in it1 is what mediates   
between the relative centre and  the    
non-independent objects 7the form of    
syllogism being ,p--,u--,i74 ,it  does  
so no less essentially as a             
disintegrating force1 in its character  
of immanent individuality1 than in      
virtue of universality1 acting as an    
identical bond of union and tranquil    
self-containedness4    ,like the solar  
system1 so for example in the practical 
sphere the state  is a system of three  
syllogisms4 7#a7 ,the ,individual or    
person1 through  his particularity or   
physical or mental needs 7which when    
carried  out to their full development  
give civil society71 is coupled with    
the universal1 i4e4 with society1 law1  
right1 government4 7#b7 ,the  will or   
action of the individuals is the        
intermediating force which  procures for
 these needs satisfaction in society1 in
 law1 c1 and  which gives to society1   

law1 c4 their fulfilment and            
actualisation4  7#c7 ,but the universal1
 that is to say the state1 government1  
and law1  is the permanent underlying   
mean in which the individuals and their 
satisfaction have and receive their     
fulfilled reality1 inter-mediation1  and
 persistence4 ,each of the functions of 
the notion1 as it is brought  by        
intermediation to coalesce with the     
other extreme1 is brought  into union   
with itself and produces itself3 which  
production is  self-preservation4--,it  
is only by the nature of this triple    
coupling1  by this triad of syllogisms  
with the name termini1 that a whole is  
thoroughly understood in its            
organisation4    #aii4 ,the immediacy of
 existence1 which the objects have in   
,absolute  ,mechanism1 is implicitly    
negatived by the fact that their        
independence  is derived from1 and due  
to1 their connexions with each other1   
and  therefore to their own want of     
stability4 ,thus the object must be     

explicitly stated as in its existence   
having an ,affinity 7or a  bias7 towards
 its other1--as not-indifferent4    7b7 
,chemism4    #bjj4 ,the not-indifferent 
7biassed7 object has an immanent mode   
which  constitutes its nature1 and in   
which it has existence4 ,but as it is   
invested with the character of total    
notion1 it is the contradiction  between
 this totality and the special mode of  
its existence4  ,consequently it is the 
constant endeavour to cancel this       
contradiction  and to make its definite 
being equal to the notion4           99 
99       99       99       99           
,chemism is a category of objectivity   
which1 as a rule1 is not  particularly  
emphasised1 and is generally put under  
the head of  mechanism4 ,the common name
 of mechanical relationship is applied  
to  both1 in contra-distinction to the  
teleological4 ,there is a reason for    
this in the common feature which belongs
 to mechanism and chemism4 ,in  them the
 notion exists1 but only implicit and   

latent1 and they are thus  both marked  
off from teleology where the notion has 
real independent  existence4 ,this is   
true3 and yet chemism and mechanism are 
very  decidedly distinct4 ,the object1  
in the form of mechanism1 is primarily  
only an indifferent reference to self1  
while the chemical object is  seen to be
 completely in reference to something   
else4 ,no doubt even  in mechanism1 as  
it develops itself1 there spring up     
references to  something else3 but the  
nexus of mechanical objects with one    
another is  at first only an external   
nexus1 so that the objects in connexion 
with  one another still retain the      
semblance of independence4 ,in nature1  
for  example2 the several celestial     
bodies1 which form our solar system1    
compose a kinetic system1 and thereby   
show that they are related to  one      
another4 ,motion1 however1 as the unity 
of time and space1 is a  connexion which
 is purely abstract and external4 ,and  
it seems therefore  as if these         

celestial bodies1 which are thus        
externally connected with  each other1  
would continue to be what they are1 even
 apart from this  reciprocal relation4  
,the case is quite different with       
chemism4 ,objects  chemically biassed   
are what they are expressly by that bias
 alone4  ,hence they are the absolute   
impulse towards integration by and in   
one  another4    #bja4 ,the product of  
the chemical process consequently is the
 ,neutral  object1 latent in the two    
extremes1 each on the alert4 ,the notion
  or concrete universal1 by means of the
 bias of the objects 7the               
particularity71 coalesces with the      
individuality 7in the shape of the      
product71 and in that only with itself4 
,in this process too the other          
syllogisms are equally involved4 ,the   
place of mean is taken both by          
individuality as activity1 and by the   
concrete universal1 the essence  of the 
strained extremes2 which essence reaches
 definite being in the  product4        

#bjb4 ,chemism1 as it is a reflectional 
nexus of objectivity1 has  pre-supposed1
 not merely the bias or non-indifferent 
nature of the  objects1 but also their  
immediate independence4 ,the process of 
chemism  consists in passing to and fro 
from one form to another2 which forms   
continue to be as external as           
before4--,in the neutral product the    
specific properties1 which the extremes 
bore towards each other1 are  merged4   
,but although the product is conformable
 to the notion1 the  inspiring principle
 of active differentiation does not     
exist in it2 for  it has sunk back to   
immediacy4 ,the neutral body is         
therefore capable  of disintegration4   
,but the discerning principle1 which    
breaks up the  neutral body into biassed
 and strained extremes1 and which gives 
to  the indifferent object in general   
its affinity and animation towards      
another2--that principle1 and the       
process as a separation with tension1   
falls outside of that first process4    

99       99       99       99       99  
,the chemical process does not rise     
above a conditioned and finite  process4
 ,the notion as notion is only the heart
 and core of the  process1 and does not 
in this stage come to an existence of   
its own4  ,in the neutral product the   
process is extinct1 and the existing    
cause  falls outside it4    #bjc4 ,each 
of these two processes1 the reduction of
 the biassed  7not-indifferent7 to the  
neutral1 and the differentiation of the 
indifferent or neutral1 goes its own way
 without hindrance from the  other4 ,but
 that want of inner connexion shows that
 they are finite1  by their passage into
 products in which they are merged and  
lost4  ,conversely the process exhibits 
the nonentity of the pre-supposed       
immediacy of the not-indifferent        
objects4--,by this negation of          
immediacy and of externalism in which   
the notion as object was sunk1  it is   
liberated and invested with independent 
being in face of that  externalism and  

immediacy4 ,in these circumstances it is
 the ,end 7,final  ,cause74           99
       99       99       99       99    
,the passage from chemism to the        
teleological relation is implied in the 
mutual cancelling of both of the forms  
of the chemical process4 ,the  result   
thus attained is the liberation of the  
notion1 which in chemism  and mechanism 
was present only in the germ1 and not   
yet evolved4 ,the  notion in the shape  
of the aim or end thus comes into       
independent  existence4    7c7          
,teleology4    #bjd4 ,in the ,end the   
notion has entered on free existence    
and has a being of its own1 by means of 
the negation of immediate  objectivity4 
,it is characterised as subjective1     
seeing that this  negation is1 in the   
first place1 abstract1 and hence at     
first the  relation between it and      
objectivity still one of contrast4 ,this
  character of subjectivity1 however1   
compared with the totality of the       
notion1 is one-sided1 and that1 be it   

added1 for the ,end itself1 in  which   
all specific characters have been put as
 subordinated and merged4  ,for it      
therefore even the object1 which it     
pre-supposes1 has only  hypothetical    
7ideal7 reality1--essentially           
no-reality4 ,the ,end in short  is a    
contradiction of its self-identity      
against the negation stated in  it1 i4e4
 its antithesis to objectivity1 and     
being so1 contains the  eliminative or  
destructive activity which negates the  
antithesis and  renders it identical    
with itself4 ,this is the realisation of
 the ,end3  in which1 while it turns    
itself into the other of its            
subjectivity and  objectifies itself1   
thus cancelling the distinction between 
the two1 it  has only closed with       
itself1 and retained itself4    ,the    
notion of ,design or ,end1 while on one 
hand called redundant1 is on  another   
justly described as the rational notion1
 and contrasted with  the abstract      
universal of understanding4 ,the latter 

only subsumes  the particular1 and so   
connects it with itself3 but has it not 
in its  own nature4--,the distinction   
between the ,end or final cause1 and the
  mere efficient cause 7which is the    
cause ordinarily so called71 is of      
supreme importance4 ,causes1 properly so
 called1 belong to the sphere of        
necessity1 blind1 and not yet laid bare4
 ,the cause therefore appears  as       
passing into its correlative1 and losing
 its primordiality there by  sinking    
into dependency4 ,it is only by         
implication1 or for us1 that  the cause 
is in the effect made for the first time
 a cause1 and that  it there returns    
into itself4 ,the ,end1 on the other    
hand1 is expressly  stated as containing
 the specific character in its own      
self1--the  effect1 namely1 which in the
 purely causal relation is never free   
from  otherness4 ,the ,end therefore in 
its efficiency does not pass over1 but  
retains itself1 i4e4 it carries into    
effect itself only1 and is at  the end  

what it was in the beginning or         
primordial state4 ,until it thus        
retains itself1 it is not genuinely     
primordial4--,the ,end then requires  to
 be speculatively apprehended as the    
notion1 which itself in the  proper     
unity and ideality of its               
characteristics contains the judgment   
or negation1--the antithesis of         
subjective and objective1--and which to 
an equal extent suspends that           
antithesis4    ,by ,end however we must 
not at once1 nor must we ever merely1   
think  of the form which it has in      
consciousness as a mode of mere mental  
representation4 ,by means of the notion 
of ,inner ,design ,kant has             
resuscitated the ,idea in general and   
particularly the idea of life4          
,aristotle's definition of life         
virtually implies inner design1 and is  
thus far in advance of the notion of    
design in modern ,teleology1 which  had 
in view finite and outward design only4 
,animal wants and appetites are some of 

the readiest instances of  the ,end4    
,they are the felt contradiction1 which 
exists within  the living subject1 and  
pass into the activity of negating this 
negation which mere subjectivity still  
is4 ,the satisfaction of the  want or   
appetite restores the peace between     
subject and object4 ,the  objective     
thing which1 so long as the             
contradiction exists1 i4e4  so long as  
the want is felt1 stands on the other   
side1 loses this  quasi-independence1 by
 its union with the subject4 ,those who 
talk of  the permanence and immutability
 of the finite1 as well subjective as   
objective1 may see the reverse          
illustrated in the operations of every  
appetite4 ,appetite is1 so to speak1 the
 conviction that the subjective  is only
 a half-truth1 no more adequate than the
 objective4 ,but appetite  in the second
 place carries out its conviction4 ,it  
brings about the  supersession of these 
finites3 it cancels the antithesis      
between the  objective which would be   

and stay an objective only1 and the     
subjective  which in like manner would  
be and stay a subjective only4    ,as   
regards the action of the ,end1         
attention may be called to the fact1    
that in the syllogism1 which represents 
that action1 and shows the end  closing 
with itself by the means of realisation1
 the radical feature is  the negation of
 the termini4 ,that negation is the one 
just mentioned  both of the immediate   
subjectivity appearing in the ,end as   
such1 and  of the immediate objectivity 
as seen in the means and the objects    
pre-supposed4 ,this is the same         
negation1 as is in operation when the   
mind leaves the contingent things of the
 world as well as its own  subjectivity 
and rises to ,god4 ,it is the 'moment'  
or factor which 7as  noticed in the     
,introduction and  #aib7 was overlooked 
and neglected in  the analytic form of  
syllogisms1 under which the so-called   
proofs of  the ,being of a ,god         
presented this elevation4    #bje4 ,in  

its primary and immediate aspect the    
,teleological relation  is external     
design1 and the notion confronts a      
pre-supposed object4  ,the ,end is      
consequently finite1 and that partly in 
its content1  partly in the circumstance
 that it has an external condition in   
the  object1 which has to be found      
existing1 and which is taken as material
  for its realisation4 ,its             
self-determining is to that extent in   
form  only4 ,the un-mediatedness of the 
,end has the further result that  its   
particularity or content--which as      
form-characteristic is the  subjectivity
 of the ,end--is reflected into self1   
and so different from  the totality of  
the form1 subjectivity in general1 the  
notion4 ,this  variety constitutes the  
finitude of ,design within its own      
nature4 ,the  content of the ,end4 in   
this way1 is quite as limited1          
contingent1 and  given1 as the object is
 particular and found ready to hand4    
99       99       99       99       99  

,generally speaking1 the final cause is 
taken to mean nothing more  than        
external design4 ,in accordance with    
this view of it1 things are  supposed   
not to carry their vocation in          
themselves1 but merely to be  means     
employed and spent in realising a       
purpose which lies outside  of them4    
,that may be said to be the point of    
view taken by ,utility1  which once     
played a great part even in the         
sciences1 but of late has  fallen into  
merited disrepute1 now that people have 
begun to see that  it failed to give a  
genuine insight into the nature of      
things4 ,it is  true that finite things 
as finite ought in justice to be viewed 
as  non-ultimate1 and as pointing beyond
 themselves4 ,this negativity of  finite
 things however is their own dialectic1 
and in order to ascertain  it we must   
pay attention to their positive content4
    ,teleological observations on things
 often proceed from a well-meant  wish  
to display the wisdom of ,god as it is  

especially revealed in  nature4 ,now in 
thus trying to discover final causes for
 which the  things serve as means1 we   
must remember that we are stopping short
  at the finite1 and are liable to fall 
into trifling reflections3 as1  for     
instance1 if we not merely studied the  
vine in respect of its  well-known use  
for man1 but proceeded to consider the  
cork-tree in  connexion with the corks  
which are cut from its bark to put into 
the  wine-bottles4 ,whole books used to 
be written in this spirit4 ,it is easy  
to see that they promoted the genuine   
interest neither of religion nor  of    
science4 ,external design stands        
immediately in front of the idea3  but  
what thus stands on the threshold often 
for that reason is least  adequate4     
#bjf4 ,the teleological relation is a   
syllogism in which the subjective  end  
coalesces with the objectivity external 
to it1 through a middle  term which is  
the unity of both4 ,this unity is on one
 hand the  purposive action1 on the     

other the ,means1 i4e4 objectivity made 
directly subservient to purpose4        
99       99       99       99       99  
,the development from ,end to ,idea     
ensues by three stages1 first1          
,subjective ,end2 second1 ,end in       
process of accomplishment2 and third1   
,end accomplished4 ,first of all we have
 the ,subjective ,end2 and that1  as the
 notion in independent being1 is itself 
the totality of the  elementary         
functions of the notion4 ,the first of  
these functions  is that of             
self-identical universality1 as it were 
the neutral  first water1 in which      
everything is involved1 but nothing as  
yet  discriminated4 ,the second of these
 elements is the particularising  of    
this universal1 by which it acquires a  
specific content4 ,as this  specific    
content again is realised by the agency 
of the universal1 the  latter returns by
 its means back to itself1 and coalesces
 with itself4  ,hence too when we set   
some end before us1 we say that we      

'conclude' to  do something3 a phrase   
which implies that we were1 so to speak1
 open  and accessible to this or that   
determination4 ,similarly we also at a  
further step speak of a man 'resolving' 
to do something1 meaning that  the agent
 steps forward out of his self-regarding
 inwardness and enters  into dealings   
with the environing objectivity4 ,this  
supplies the step  from the merely      
,subjective ,end to the purposive action
 which tends  outwards4    #bjg4 7#a7   
,the first syllogism of the final cause 
represents the  ,subjective ,end4 ,the  
universal notion is brought to unite    
with  individuality by means of         
particularity1 so that the individual   
as self-determination acts as judge4    
,that is to say1 it not only            
particularises or makes into a          
determinate content the still           
indeterminate universal1 but also       
explicitly puts an antithesis of        
subjectivity and objectivity1 and at the
 same time is in its own self  a return 

to itself2 for it stamps the            
subjectivity of the notion1             
pre-supposed as against objectivity1    
with the mark of defect1 in  comparison 
with the complete and rounded totality1 
and thereby at the  same time turns     
outwards4    #bjh4 7#b7 ,this action    
which is directed outwards is the       
individuality1  which in the ,subjective
 ,end is identical with the             
particularity  under which1 along with  
the content1 is also comprised the      
external  objectivity4 ,it throws itself
 in the first place immediately upon the
  object1 which it appropriates to      
itself as a ,means4 ,the notion is this 
immediate power2 for the notion is the  
self-identical negativity1 in  which the
 being of the object is characterised as
 wholly and merely  ideal4--,the whole  
,means then is this inward power of the 
notion1 in the  shape of an agency1 with
 which the object as ,means is          
'immediately'  united and in obedience  
to which it stands4    ,in finite       

teleology the ,means is thus broken up  
into two elements  external to each     
other1 7a7 the action and 7b7 the object
 which serves  as ,means4 ,the relation 
of the final cause as power to this     
object1 and  the subjugation of the     
object to it1 is immediate 7it forms the
 first  premiss in the syllogism7 to    
this extent1 that in the teleological   
notion as the self-existent ideality the
 object is put as potentially  null4    
,this relation1 as represented in the   
first premiss1 itself  becomes the      
,means1 which at the same time involves 
the syllogism1 that  through this       
relation--in which the action of the    
,end is contained and  dominant--the    
,end is coupled with objectivity4       
99       99       99       99       99  
,the execution of the ,end is the       
mediated mode of realising the ,end2 but
  the immediate realisation is not less 
needful4 ,the ,end lays hold of the     
object immediately1 because it is the   
power over the object1 because  in the  

,end particularity1 and in particularity
 objectivity also1 is  involved4--,a    
living being has a body2 the soul takes 
possession of it  and without           
intermediary has objectified itself in  
it4 ,the human soul  has much to do1    
before it makes its corporeal nature    
into a means4 ,man  must1 as it were1   
take possession of his body1 so that it 
may be the  instrument of his soul4     
#bji4 7#c7 ,purposive action1 with its  
,means1 is still directed outwards1     
because the ,end is also not identical  
with the object1 and must  consequently 
first be mediated with it4 ,the ,means  
in its capacity of  object stands1 in   
this second premiss1 in direct relation 
to the other  extreme of the syllogism1 
namely1 the material or objectivity     
which is  pre-supposed4 ,this relation  
is the sphere of chemism and mechanism1 
which have now become the servants of   
the ,final ,cause1 where lies their     
truth and free notion4 ,thus the        
,subjective ,end1 which is the power    

ruling these processes1 in which the    
objective things wear themselves  out on
 one another1 contrives to keep itself  
free from them1 and to  preserve itself 
in them4 ,doing so1 it appears as the   
,cunning of reason4           99        
99       99       99       99    ,reason
 is as cunning as it is powerful4       
,cunning may be said to lie  in the     
inter-mediative action which1 while it  
permits the objects to  follow their own
 bent and act upon one another till they
 waste away1  and does not itself       
directly interfere in the process1 is   
nevertheless  only working out its own  
aims4 ,with this explanation1 ,divine   
,providence  may be said to stand to the
 world and its process in the capacity  
of  absolute cunning4 ,god lets men do  
as they please with their particular    
passions and interests2 but the result  
is the accomplishment of--not  their    
plans1 but ,his1 and these differ       
decidedly from the ends  primarily      
sought by those whom ,he employs4       

#baj4 ,the realised ,end is thus the    
overt unity of subjective and           
objective4 ,it is however essentially   
characteristic of this unity1 that  the 
subjective and objective are neutralised
 and cancelled only in the  point of    
their one-sidedness1 while the objective
 is subdued and made  conformable to the
 ,end1 as the free notion1 and thereby  
to the power  above it4 ,the ,end       
maintains itself against and in the     
objective  for it is no mere one-sided  
subjective or particular1 it is also the
  concrete universal1 the implicit      
identity of both4 ,this universal1 as   
simply reflected in itself1 is the      
content which remains unchanged  through
 all the three termini of the syllogism 
and their movement4    #baa4 ,in finite 
design1 however1 even the executed ,end 
has the same  radical rift or flaw as   
had the ,means and the initial ,end4 ,we
 have  got therefore only a form        
extraneously impressed on a pre-existing
  material3 and this form1 by reason of 

the limited content of the ,end1  is    
also a contingent characteristic4 ,the  
,end achieved consequently is  only an  
object1 which again becomes a ,means or 
material for other ,ends1  and so on for
 ever4    #bab4 ,but what virtually     
happens in the realising of the ,end is 
that  the one-sided subjectivity and the
 show of objective independence         
confronting it are both cancelled4 ,in  
laying hold of the means1 the  notion   
constitutes itself the very implicit    
essence of the object4 ,in  the         
mechanical and chemical processes the   
independence of the object  has been    
already dissipated implicitly1 and in   
the course of their  movement under the 
dominion of the ,end1 the show of that  
independence1  the negative which       
confronts the notion1 is got rid of4    
,but in the fact  that the ,end achieved
 is characterised only as a ,means and a
 material1  this object1 viz4 the       
teleological1 is there and then put as  
implicitly  null1 and only 'ideal4'     

,this being so1 the antithesis between  
form  and content has also vanished4    
,while the ,end by the removal and      
absorption of all form-characteristics  
coalesces with itself1 the form  as     
self-identical is thereby put as the    
content1 so that the notion1  which is  
the action of form1 has only itself for 
content4 ,through this  process1        
therefore1 there is made explicitly     
manifest what was the  notion of design3
 viz4 the implicit unity of subjective  
and objective  is now realised4 ,and    
this is the ,idea4           99       99
       99       99       99    ,this    
finitude of the ,end consists in the    
circumstance1 that1 in the  process of  
realising it1 the material1 which is    
employed as a means1  is only externally
 subsumed under it and made conformable 
to it4 ,but1  as a matter of fact1 the  
object is the notion implicitly3 and    
thus  when the notion1 in the shape of  
,end1 is realised in the object1 we     
have but the manifestation of the inner 

nature of the object itself4            
,objectivity is thus1 as it were1 only a
 covering under which the notion  lies  
concealed4 ,within the range of the     
finite we can never see or  experience  
that the ,end has been really secured4  
,the consummation of  the infinite ,end1
 therefore1 consists merely in removing 
the illusion  which makes it seem yet   
unaccomplished4 ,the ,good1 the         
absolutely ,good1  is eternally         
accomplishing itself in the world3 and  
the result is that  it needs not wait   
upon us1 but is already by implication1 
as well as in  full actuality1          
accomplished4 ,this is the illusion     
under which we live4  ,it alone supplies
 at the same time the actualising force 
on which the  interest in the world     
reposes4 ,in the course of its process  
the ,idea  creates that illusion1 by    
setting an antithesis to confront it2   
and its  action consists in getting rid 
of the illusion which it has created4   
,only out of this error does the truth  

arise4 ,in this fact lies the           
reconciliation with error and with      
finitude4 ,error or other-being1 when   
superseded1 is still a necessary dynamic
 element of truth3 for truth  can only  
be where it makes itself its own result4
      ,c4--,,the ,,idea4    #bac4 ,the  
,idea is truth in itself and for        
itself1--the absolute  unity of the     
notion and objectivity4 ,its 'ideal'    
content is nothing  but the notion in   
its detailed terms3 its 'real' content  
is only the  exhibition which the notion
 gives itself in the form of external   
existence1 whilst yet1 by enclosing this
 shape in its ideality1 it  keeps it in 
its power1 and so keeps itself in it4   
,the definition1 which declares the     
,absolute to be the ,idea1 is itself    
absolute4 ,all former definitions come  
back to this4 ,the ,idea is  the ,truth3
 for ,truth is the correspondence of    
objectivity with the  notion3--not of   
course the correspondence of external   
things with my  conceptions1--for these 

are only correct conceptions held by me1
  the individual person4 ,in the idea we
 have nothing to do with the            
individual1 nor with figurate           
conceptions1 nor with external things4  
,and yet1 again1 everything actual1 in  
so far as it is true1 is the  ,idea1 and
 has its truth by and in virtue of the  
,idea alone4 ,every  individual being is
 some one aspect of the ,idea3 for      
which1 therefore1  yet other actualities
 are needed1 which in their turn appear 
to have  a self-subsistence of their    
own4 ,it is only in them altogether and 
in their relation that the notion is    
realised4 ,the individual by  itself    
does not correspond to its notion4 ,it  
is this limitation of its  existence    
which constitutes the finitude and the  
ruin of the individual4    ,the ,idea   
itself is not to be taken as an idea of 
something or other1  any more than the  
notion is to be taken as merely a       
specific notion4  ,the ,absolute is the 
universal and one idea1 which1 by an act

 of  'judgment1' particularises itself  
to the system of specific ideas2  which 
after all are constrained by their      
nature to come back to the one  idea    
where their truth lies4 ,as issued out  
of this 'judgment' the ,idea  is in the 
first place only the one universal      
substance3 but its  developed and       
genuine actuality is to be as a subject 
and in that way  as mind4    ,because it
 has no existence for starting-point and
 point d'appui1  the ,idea is frequently
 treated as a mere logical form4 ,such a
 view must  be abandoned to those       
theories1 which ascribe so-called       
reality and  genuine actuality to the   
existent thing and all the other        
categories  which have not yet          
penetrated as far as the ,idea4 ,it is  
no less false  to imagine the ,idea to  
be mere abstraction4 ,it is abstract    
certainly1  in so far as everything     
untrue is consumed in it3 but in its own
 self  it is essentially concrete1      
because it is the free notion giving    

character to itself1 and that character1
 reality4 ,it would be an  abstract     
form1 only if the notion1 which is its  
principle1 were taken  as an abstract   
unity1 and not as the negative return of
 it into self  and as the subjectivity  
which it really is4           99        
99       99       99       99    ,truth 
is at first taken to mean that ,i know  
how something is4 ,this  is truth1      
however1 only in reference to           
consciousness2 it is formal  truth1 bare
 correctness4 ,truth in the deeper sense
 consists in the  identity between      
objectivity and the notion4 ,it is in   
this deeper sense  of truth that we     
speak of a true state1 or of a true work
 of art4 ,these  objects are true1 if   
they are as they ought to be1 i4e4 if   
their  reality corresponds to their     
notion4 ,when thus viewed1 to be untrue 
means much the same as to be bad4 ,a bad
 man is an untrue man1 a man  who does  
not behave as his notion or his vocation
 requires4 ,nothing  however can        

subsist1 if it be wholly devoid of      
identity between the  notion and        
reality4 ,even bad and untrue things    
have being1 in so far  as their reality 
still1 somehow1 conforms to their       
notion4 ,whatever  is thoroughly bad or 
contrary to the notion1 is for that very
 reason  on the way to ruin4 ,it is by  
the notion alone that the things in the 
world have their subsistence2 or1 as it 
is expressed in the language of         
religious conception1 things are what   
they are1 only in virtue of the  divine 
and thereby creative thought which      
dwells within them4    ,when we hear the
 ,idea spoken of1 we need not imagine   
something far  away beyond this mortal  
sphere4 ,the idea is rather what is     
completely  present3 and it is found1   
however confused and degenerated1 in    
every consciousness4 ,we conceive the   
world to ourselves as a great  totality 
which is created by ,god1 and so created
 that in it ,god has  manifested        
,himself to us4 ,we regard the world    

also as ruled by ,divine  ,providence3  
implying that the scattered and divided 
parts of the world  are continually     
brought back1 and made conformable1 to  
the unity from  which they have issued4 
,the purpose of philosophy has always   
been the  intellectual ascertainment of 
the ,idea2 and everything deserving the 
name of philosophy has constantly been  
based on the consciousness  of an       
absolute unity where the understanding  
sees and accepts only  separation4--,it 
is too late now to ask for proof that   
the ,idea is  the truth4 ,the proof of  
that is contained in the whole deduction
 and  development of thought up to this 
point4 ,the idea is the result of  this 
course of dialectic4 ,not that it is to 
be supposed that the idea  is mediate   
only1 i4e4 mediated through something   
else than itself4  ,it is rather its own
 result1 and being so1 is no less       
immediate than  mediate4 ,the stages    
hitherto considered1 viz4 those of      
,being and  ,essence1 as well as those  

of ,notion and of ,objectivity1 are not1
 when  so distinguished1 something      
permanent1 resting upon themselves4     
,they  have proved to be dialectical2   
and their only truth is that they are   
dynamic elements of the idea4    #bad4  
,the ,idea may be described in many     
ways4 ,it may be called reason  7and    
this is the proper philosophical        
signification of reason72               
subject-object2 the unity of the ideal  
and the real1 of the finite and  the    
infinite1 of soul and body2 the         
possibility which has its actuality  in 
its own self2 that of which the nature  
can be thought only as  existent1 c4    
,all these descriptions apply1 because  
the ,idea contains  all the relations of
 understanding1 but contains them in    
their infinite  self-return and         
self-identity4    ,it is easy work for  
the understanding to show that          
everything said  of the ,idea is        
self-contradictory4 ,but that can quite 
as well be  retaliated1 or rather in the

 ,idea the retaliation is actually made4
 ,and  this work1 which is the work of  
reason1 is certainly not so easy as     
that of the understanding4              
,understanding may demonstrate that the 
,idea  is self-contradictory3 because   
the subjective is subjective only and is
  always confronted by the              
objective1--because being is different  
from  notion and therefore cannot be    
picked out of it1--because the finite   
is finite only1 the exact antithesis of 
the infinite1 and therefore  not        
identical with it2 and so on with every 
term of the description4  ,the reverse  
of all this however is the doctrine of  
,logic4 ,logic shows  that the          
subjective which is to be subjective    
only1 the finite which  would be finite 
only1 the infinite which would be       
infinite only1 and so  on1 have no      
truth1 but contradict themselves1 and   
pass over into their  opposites4 ,hence 
this transition1 and the unity in which 
the extremes  are merged and become     

factors1 each with a merely reflected   
existence1  reveals itself as their     
truth4    ,the understanding1 which     
addresses itself to deal with the ,idea1
  commits a double misunderstanding4 ,it
 takes first the extremes of  the ,idea 
7be they expressed as they will1 so long
 as they are in their  unity71 not as   
they are understood when stamped with   
this concrete  unity1 but as if they    
remained abstractions outside of it4 ,it
 no less  mistakes the relation between 
them1 ever when it has been expressly   
stated4 ,thus1 for example it overlooks 
even the nature of the copula  in the   
judgment1 which affirms that the        
individual1 or subject1 is  after all   
not individual1 but universal4 ,but1 in 
the second place1  the understanding    
believes its 'reflection1'--that the    
self-identical  ,idea contains its own  
negative1 or contains contradiction1--to
 be an  external reflection which does  
not lie within the ,idea itself4 ,but   
the  reflection is really no peculiar   

cleverness of the understanding4 ,the   
,idea itself is the dialectic which for 
ever divides and distinguishes  the     
self-identical from the differentiated1 
the subjective from the  objective1 the 
finite from the infinite1 soul from     
body4 ,only on  these terms is it an    
eternal creation1 eternal vitality1 and 
eternal  spirit4 ,but while it thus     
passes or rather translates itself into 
the  abstract understanding1 it for ever
 remains reason4 ,the ,idea is the      
dialectic which again makes this mass of
 understanding and diversity  understand
 its finite nature and the              
pseudo-independence in its  productions1
 and which brings the diversity back to 
unity4 ,since this  double movement is  
not separate or distinct in time1 nor   
indeed in any  other way--otherwise it  
would be only a repetition of the       
abstract  understanding--the ,idea is   
the eternal vision of itself in the     
other1  --notion which in its           
objectivity has carried out             

itself1--object  which is inward design1
 essential subjectivity4    ,the        
different modes of apprehending the     
,idea as unity of ideal and  real1 of   
finite and infinite1 of identity and    
difference1 c4 are more  or less formal4
 ,they designate some one stage of the  
specific notion4  ,only the notion      
itself1 however1 is free and the genuine
 universal3  in the ,idea1 therefore1   
the specific character of the notion is 
only the notion itself1--an objectivity1
 viz4 into which it1 being  the         
universal1 continues itself1 and in     
which it has only its own  character1   
the total character4 ,the ,idea is the  
infinite judgment1 of  which the terms  
are severally the independent totality2 
and in which1  as each grows to the     
fulness of its own nature1 it has       
thereby at the  same time passed into   
the other4 ,none of the other specific  
notions  exhibits this totality complete
 on both its sides as the notion itself 
and objectivity4    #bae4 ,the ,idea is 

essentially a process1 because its      
identity is the  absolute and free      
identity of the notion1 only in so far  
as it is  absolute negativity and for   
that reason dialectical4 ,it is the     
round of  movement1 in which the notion1
 in the capacity of universality which  
is individuality1 gives itself the      
character of objectivity and of the     
antithesis thereto2 and this externality
 which has the notion for its           
substance1 finds its way back to        
subjectivity through its immanent       
dialectic4    ,as the idea is 7a7 a     
process1 it follows that such an        
expression for  the ,absolute as unity  
of thought and being1 of finite and     
infinite1  c4 is false2 for unity       
expresses an abstract and merely        
quiescent  identity4 ,as the ,idea is   
7b7 subjectivity1 it follows that the   
expression is equally false on another  
account4 ,that unity of which  it speaks
 expresses a merely virtual or          
underlying presence of the  genuine     

unity4 ,the infinite would thus seem to 
be merely neutralised  by the finite1   
the subjective by the objective1 thought
 by being4 ,but  in the negative unity  
of the ,idea1 the infinite overlaps and 
includes  the finite1 thought overlaps  
being1 subjectivity overlaps            
objectivity4  ,the unity of the ,idea is
 thought1 infinity1 and subjectivity1   
and  is in consequence to be essentially
 distinguished from the ,idea as        
substance1 just as this overlapping     
subjectivity1 thought1 or  infinity is  
to be distinguished from the one-sided  
subjectivity1  one-sided thought1       
one-sided infinity to which it descends 
in judging  and defining4           99  
99       99       99       99    ,the   
idea as a process runs through three    
stages in its development4  ,the first  
form of the idea is ,life3 that is1 the 
idea in the form of  immediacy4 ,the    
second form is that of mediation or     
differentiation2  and this is the idea  
in the form of ,knowledge1 which appears

 under  the double aspect of the        
,theoretical and ,practical idea4 ,the  
process  of knowledge eventuates in the 
restoration of the unity enriched by    
difference4 ,this gives the third form  
of the idea1 the ,absolute ,idea3  which
 last stage of the logical idea evinces 
itself to be at the same  time the true 
first1 and to have a being due to itself
 alone4    7a7 ,life4    #baf4 ,the     
immediate idea is ,life4 ,as soul1 the  
notion is  realised in a body of whose  
externality the soul is the immediate   
self-relating universality4 ,but the    
soul is also its particularisation1  so 
that the body expresses no other        
distinctions than follow from the       
characterisations of its notion4 ,and   
finally it is the ,individuality  of the
 body as infinite negativity1--the      
dialectic of that bodily  objectivity1  
with its parts lying out of one another1
 conveying  them away from the semblance
 of independent subsistence back into   
subjectivity1 so that all the members   

are reciprocally momentary  means as    
well as momentary ends4 ,thus as life is
 the initial  particularisation1 so it  
results in the negative self-asserting  
unity3  in the dialectic of its         
corporeity it only coalesces with       
itself4  ,in this way life is           
essentially something alive1 and in     
point of  its immediacy this individual 
living thing4 ,it is characteristic of  
finitude in this sphere that1 by reason 
of the immediacy of the idea1  body and 
soul are separable4 ,this constitutes   
the mortality of the  living being4 ,it 
is only1 however1 when the living being 
is dead1 that  these two sides of the   
idea are different ingredients4         
99       99       99       99       99  
,the single members of the body are what
 they are only by and in  relation to   
their unity4 ,a hand e4g4 when hewn off 
from the body is1  as ,aristotle has    
observed1 a hand in name only1 not in   
fact4 ,from the  point of view of       
understanding1 life is usually spoken of

 as a mystery1  and in general as       
incomprehensible4 ,by giving it such a  
name1 however1  the ,understanding only 
confesses its own finitude and nullity4 
,so far  is life from being             
incomprehensible1 that in it the very   
notion is  presented to us1 or rather   
the immediate idea existing as a notion4
 ,and  having said this1 we have        
indicated the defect of life4 ,its      
notion and  reality do not thoroughly   
correspond to each other4 ,the notion of
 life  is the soul1 and this notion has 
the body for its reality4 ,the soul is1 
as it were1 infused into its corporeity2
 and in that way it is at first         
sentient only1 and not yet freely       
self-conscious4 ,the process of life    
consists in getting the better of the   
immediacy with which it is still  beset3
 and this process1 which is itself      
threefold1 results in the idea  under   
the form of judgment1 i4e4 the idea as  
,cognition4    #bag4 ,a living being is 
a syllogism1 of which the very elements 

are in  themselves systems and          
syllogisms 7 #aih1 #bja1 #bjg74 ,they   
are however  active syllogisms or       
processes2 and in the subjective unity  
of the  vital agent make only one       
process4 ,thus the living being is the  
process  of its coalescence with itself1
 which runs on through three processes4 
#bah4 7#a7 ,the first is the process of 
the living being inside itself4  ,in    
that process it makes a split on its own
 self1 and reduces its  corporeity to   
its object or its inorganic nature4     
,this corporeity1 as  an aggregate of   
correlations1 enters in its very nature 
into difference  and opposition of its  
elements1 which mutually become each    
other's  prey1 and assimilate one       
another1 and are retained by producing  
themselves4 ,yet this action of the     
several members 7organs71 is only  the  
living subject's one act to which their 
productions revert2 so that  in these   
productions nothing is produced except  
the subject3 in other  words1 the       

subject only reproduces itself4         
99       99       99       99       99  
,the process of the vital subject within
 its own limits has in ,nature  the     
threefold form of ,sensibility1         
,irritability1 and ,reproduction4 ,as   
,sensibility1 the living being is       
immediately simple self-relation--it  is
 the soul omnipresent in its body1 the  
outsideness of each member of  which to 
others has for it no truth4 ,as         
,irritability1 the living being  appears
 split up in itself2 and as             
,reproduction1 it is perpetually        
restoring itself from the inner         
distinction of its members and organs4  
,a vital agent only exists as this      
continually self-renewing process       
within its own limits4    #bai4 7#b7    
,but the judgment of the notion         
proceeds1 as free1 to  discharge the    
objective or bodily nature as an        
independent totality  from itself2 and  
the negative relation of the living     
thing to itself  makes1 as immediate    

individuality1 the pre-supposition of an
 inorganic  nature confronting it4 ,as  
this negative of the animate is no less 
a  function in the notion of the animate
 itself1 it exists consequently  in the 
latter 7which is at the same time a     
concrete universal7 in the  shape of a  
defect or want4 ,the dialectic by which 
the object1 being  implicitly null1 is  
merged1 is the action of the            
self-assured living  thing1 which in    
this process against an inorganic nature
 thus retains1  develops1 and           
objectifies itself4           99        
99       99       99       99    ,the   
living being stands face to face with an
 inorganic nature1 to which  it comports
 itself as a master and which it        
assimilates to itself4  ,the result of  
the assimilation is not1 as in the      
chemical process1 a  neutral product in 
which the independence of the two       
confronting sides  is merged2 but the   
living being shows itself as large      
enough to embrace  its other which      

cannot withstand its power4 ,the        
inorganic nature  which is subdued by   
the vital agent suffers this fate1      
because it is  virtually the same as    
what life is actually4 ,thus in the     
other the  living being only coalesces  
with itself4 ,but when the soul has fled
  from the body1 the elementary powers  
of objectivity begin their play4  ,these
 powers are1 as it were1 continually on 
the spring1 ready to begin  their       
process in the organic body2 and life is
 the constant battle  against them4     
#bbj4 7#c7 ,the living individual1 which
 in its first process comports  itself  
as intrinsically subject and notion1    
through its second  assimilates its     
external objectivity and thus puts the  
character of  reality into itself4 ,it  
is now therefore implicitly a ,kind1    
with  essential universality of nature4 
,the particularising of this ,kind is   
the relation of the living subject to   
another subject of its ,kind3 and  the  
judgment is the tie of ,kind over these 

individuals thus appointed  for each    
other4 ,this is the ,affinity of the    
,sexes4    #bba4 ,the process of ,kind  
brings it to a being of its own4 ,life  
being  no more than the idea immediate1 
the product of this process breaks  up  
into two sides4 ,on the one hand1 the   
living individual1 which was  at first  
pre-supposed as immediate1 is now seen  
to be mediated and  generated4 ,on the  
other1 however1 the living              
individuality1 which1 on  account of its
 first immediacy1 stands in a negative  
attitude towards  universality1 sinks in
 the superior power of the latter4      
99       99       99       99       99  
,the living being dies1 because it is a 
contradiction4 ,implicitly it is  the   
universal or ,kind1 and yet immediately 
it exists as an individual  only4 ,death
 shows the ,kind to be the power that   
rules the immediate  individual4 ,for   
the animal the process of ,kind is the  
highest point of  its vitality4 ,but the
 animal never gets so far in its ,kind  

as to have  a being of its own2 it      
succumbs to the power of ,kind4 ,in the 
process  of ,kind the immediate living  
being mediates itself with itself1 and  
thus rises above its immediacy1 only    
however to sink back into it  again4    
,life thus runs away1 in the first      
instance1 only into the false  infinity 
of the progress ad infinitum4 ,the real 
result1 however1  of the process of     
life1 in the point of its notion1 is to 
merge and  overcome that immediacy with 
which the idea1 in the shape of life1 is
  still beset4    #bbb4 ,in this manner 
however the idea of life has thrown off 
not some  one particular and immediate  
',this1' but this first immediacy as a  
whole4 ,it thus comes to itself1 to its 
truth3 it enters upon existence  as a   
free ,kind self-subsistent4 ,the death  
of merely immediate and  individual     
vitality is the 'procession' of spirit4 
7b7 ,cognition in general4    #bbc4 ,the
 idea exists free for itself1 in so far 
as it has universality  for the medium  

of its existence1--as objectivity itself
 has  notional being1--as the idea is   
its own object4 ,its subjectivity1  thus
 universalised1 is pure self-contained  
distinguishing of the  idea1--intuition 
which keeps itself in this identical    
universality4  ,but1 as specific        
distinguishing1 it is the further       
judgment of  repelling itself as a      
totality from itself1 and thus1 in the  
first  place1 pre-supposing itself as an
 external universe4 ,there are two      
judgments1 which though implicitly      
identical are not yet explicitly put  as
 identical4    #bbd4 ,the relation of   
these two ideas1 which implicitly and as
 life are  identical1 is thus one of    
correlation3 and it is that             
correlativity  which constitutes the    
characteristic of finitude in this      
sphere4 ,it  is the relationship of     
reflection1 seeing that the             
distinguishing of  the idea in its own  
self is only the first                  
judgment--presupposing the  other and   

not yet supposing itself to constitute  
it4 ,and thus for the  subjective idea  
the objective is the immediate world    
found ready to  hand1 or the idea as    
life is in the phenomenon of individual 
existence4  ,at the same time1 in so far
 as this judgment is pure distinguishing
  within its own limits 7 #bbc71 the    
idea realises in one both itself and    
its other4 ,consequently it is the      
certitude of the virtual identity       
between itself and the objective        
world4--,reason comes to the world  with
 an absolute faith in its ability to    
make the identity actual1 and  to raise 
its certitude to truth2 and with the    
instinct of realising  explicitly the   
nullity of that contrast which it sees  
to be implicitly  null4    #bbe4 ,this  
process is in general terms ,cognition4 
,in ,cognition  in a single act the     
contrast is virtually superseded1 as    
regards both  the one-sidedness of      
subjectivity and the one-sidedness of   
objectivity4  ,at first1 however1 the   

supersession of the contrast is but     
implicit4  ,the process as such is in   
consequence immediately infected with   
the  finitude of this sphere1 and splits
 into the twofold movement of the       
instinct of reason1 presented as two    
different movements4 ,on the one  hand  
it supersedes the one-sidedness of the  
,idea's subjectivity by  receiving the  
existing world into itself1 into        
subjective conception  and thought2 and 
with this objectivity1 which is thus    
taken to be  real and true1 for its     
content it fills up the abstract        
certitude of  itself4 ,on the other     
hand1 it supersedes the one-sidedness of
 the  objective world1 which is now1 on 
the contrary1 estimated as only a  mere 
semblance1 a collection of contingencies
 and shapes at bottom  visionary4 ,it   
modifies and informs that world by the  
inward nature of  the subjective1 which 
is here taken to be the genuine         
objective4 ,the  former is the instinct 
of science after ,truth1 ,cognition     

properly so  called3--the ,theoretical  
action of the idea4 ,the latter is the  
instinct  of the ,good to fulfil the    
same--the ,practical activity of the    
idea or  ,volition4    77 ,cognition    
proper4    #bbf4 ,the universal finitude
 of ,cognition1 which lies in the  one  
judgment1 the pre-supposition of the    
contrast 7 #bbd71--;a  pre-supposition  
in contradiction of which its own act   
lodges protest1  specialises itself more
 precisely on the face of its own idea4 
,the  result of that specialisation is1 
that its two elements receive the       
aspect of being diverse from each other1
 and1 as they are at least  complete1   
they take up the relation of            
'reflection1' not of 'notion1'  to one  
another4 ,the assimilation of the       
matter1 therefore1 as a datum1  presents
 itself in the light of a reception of  
it into categories which  at the same   
time remain external to it1 and which   
meet each other in  the same style of   
diversity4 ,reason is active here1 but  

it is reason in  the shape of           
understanding4 ,the truth which such    
,cognition can reach  will therefore be 
only finite3 the infinite truth 7of the 
notion7 is  isolated and made           
transcendent1 an inaccessible goal in a 
world of its  own4 ,still in its        
external action cognition stands under  
the guidance  of the notion1 and        
notional principles form the secret clue
 to its  movement4           99       99
       99       99       99    ,the     
finitude of ,cognition lies in the      
pre-supposition of a world  already in  
existence1 and in the consequent view of
 the knowing subject  as a tabula rasa4 
,the conception is one attributed to    
,aristotle2  but no man is further than 
,aristotle from such an outside theory  
of  ,cognition4 ,such a style of        
,cognition does not recognise in itself 
the  activity of the notion--an activity
 which it is implicitly1 but not        
consciously4 ,in its own estimation its 
procedure is passive4 ,really  that     

procedure is active4    #bbg4 ,finite   
,cognition1 when it pre-supposes what is
 distinguished  from it to be something 
already existing and confronting it1--to
 be  the various facts of external      
nature or of consciousness--has1 in the 
first place1 7#a7 ,formal identity or   
the abstraction of universality for  the
 form of its action4 ,its activity      
therefore consists in analysing  the    
given concrete object1 isolating its    
differences1 and giving them  the form  
of abstract universality4 ,or it leaves 
the concrete thing as  a ground1 and by 
setting aside the unessential-looking   
particulars1  brings into relief a      
concrete universal1 the ,genus1 or      
,force and ,law4  ,this is the          
,analytical ,method4           99       
99       99       99       99    ,people
 generally speak of the analytical and  
synthetical methods1  as if it depended 
solely on our choice which we pursued4  
,this is  far from the case4 ,it depends
 on the form of the objects of our      

investigation1 which of the two methods1
 that are derivable from the  notion of 
finite cognition1 ought to be applied4  
,in the first place1  cognition is      
analytical4 ,analytical cognition deals 
with an object  which is presented in   
detachment1 and the aim of its action is
 to  trace back to a universal the      
individual object before it4 ,thought   
in such circumstances means no more than
 an act of abstraction or of  formal    
identity4 ,that is the sense in which   
thought is understood by  ,locke and all
 empiricists4 ,cognition1 it is often   
said1 can never do  more than separate  
the given concrete objects into their   
abstract  elements1 and then consider   
these elements in their isolation4 ,it  
is1  however1 at once apparent that this
 turns things upside down1 and that     
cognition1 if its purpose be to take    
things as they are1 thereby falls  into 
contradiction with itself4 ,thus the    
chemist e4g4 places a piece  of flesh in
 his retort1 tortures it in many ways1  

and then informs us  that it consists of
 nitrogen1 carbon1 hydrogen1 c4 ,true3  
but these  abstract matters have ceased 
to be flesh4 ,the same defect occurs in 
the reasoning of an empirical           
psychologist when he analyses an action 
into the various aspects which it       
presents1 and then sticks to these      
aspects in their separation4 ,the object
 which is subjected to analysis  is     
treated as a sort of onion from which   
one coat is peeled off after  another4  
#bbh4 ,this universality is 7#b7 also a 
specific universality4 ,in this  case   
the line of activity follows the three  
'moments' of the notion1  which 7as it  
has not its infinity in finite          
cognition7 is the specific  or definite 
notion of understanding4 ,the reception 
of the object into  the forms of this   
notion is the ,synthetic ,method4       
99       99       99       99       99  
,the movement of the ,synthetic method  
is the reverse of the ,analytical       
method4 ,the latter starts from the     

individual1 and proceeds to the         
universal2 in the former the            
starting-point is given by the universal
  7as a definition71 from which we      
proceed by particularising 7in          
division7 to the individual 7the        
theorem74 ,the ,synthetic method thus   
presents itself as the development of   
the 'moments' of the notion on  the     
object4    #bbi4 77 ,when the object has
 been in the first instance brought by  
cognition into the form of the specific 
notion in general1 so that  in this way 
its genus and its universal character or
 speciality are  explicitly stated1 we  
have the ,definition4 ,the materials and
 the  proof of ,definition are procured 
by means of the ,analytical method 7    
#bbg74 ,the specific character however  
is expected to be a 'mark' only3  that  
is to say it is to be in behoof only of 
the purely subjective  cognition which  
is external to the object4           99 
99       99       99       99           
,definition involves the three organic  

elements of the  notion3 the universal  
or proximate genus genus proximum1  the 
particular or specific character of the 
genus 7qualitas  specified17 and the    
individual1 or object defined4--,the    
first  question that definition         
suggests1 is where it comes from4  ,the 
general answer to this question is to   
say1 that definitions  originate by way 
of analysis4 ,this will explain how it  
happens that people quarrel about the   
correctness of proposed  definitions2   
for here everything depends on what     
perceptions we started from1 and what   
points of view we  had before our eyes  
in so doing4 ,the richer the object to  
be defined is1 that is1 the more        
numerous are the aspects  which it      
offers to our notice1 the more various  
are the definitions  we may frame of it4
 ,thus there are quite a host of        
definitions of life1 of the state1 c4   
,geometry1 on the contrary1  dealing    
with a theme so abstract as space1 has  
an easy  task in giving definitions4    

,again1 in respect of the matter or     
contents of the objects defined1 there  
is no constraining  necessity present4  
,we are expected to admit that space    
exists1 that there are plants1 animals1 
c1 nor is it the business  of geometry1 
botany1 c4 to demonstrate that the      
objects  in question necessarily are4   
,this very circumstance makes  the      
synthetical method of cognition as      
little suitable for  philosophy as the  
analytical3 for philosophy has above all
  things to leave no doubt of the       
necessity of its objects4 ,and  yet     
several attempts have been made to      
introduce the synthetical  method into  
philosophy4 ,thus ,spinoza1 in          
particular1  begins with definitions4   
,he says1 for instance1 that  substance 
is the causa sui4 ,his definitions are  
unquestionably  a storehouse of the most
 speculative truth1 but it takes the    
shape of dogmatic assertions4 ,the same 
thing is also true  of ,schelling4      
#bcj4 77 ,the statement of the second   

element of the notion1 i4e4 of  the     
specific character of the universal as  
particularising1 is given by  ,division 
in accordance with some external        
consideration4           99       99    
99       99       99    ,division we are
 told ought to be complete4 ,that       
requires a principle  or ground of      
division so constituted1 that the       
division based upon it  embraces the    
whole extent of the region designated by
 the definition  in general4 ,but1 in   
division1 there is the further          
requirement that  the principle of it   
must be borrowed from the nature of the 
object in  question4 ,if this condition 
be satisfied1 the division is natural   
and  not merely artificial1 that is to  
say1 arbitrary4 ,thus1 in zoology1  the 
ground of division adopted in the       
classification of the mammalia  is      
mainly afforded by their teeth and      
claws4 ,that is so far sensible1  as the
 mammals themselves distinguish         
themselves from one another by  these   

parts of their bodies2 back to which    
therefore the general type  of their    
various classes is to be traced4 ,in    
every case the genuine  division must be
 controlled by the notion4 ,to that     
extent a division1  in the first        
instance1 has three members3 but as     
particularity  exhibits itself as       
double1 the division may go to the      
extent even  of four members4 ,in the   
sphere of mind trichotomy is            
predominant1 a  circumstance which ,kant
 has the credit of bringing into notice4
    #bca4 77 ,in the concrete           
individuality1 where the mere unanalysed
  quality of the definition is regarded 
as a correlation of elements1  the      
object is a synthetical nexus of        
distinct characteristics4 ,it is  a     
,theorem4 ,being different1 these       
characteristics possess but  a mediated 
identity4 ,to supply the materials1     
which form the middle  terms1 is the    
office of ,construction3 and the process
 of mediation  itself1 from which       

cognition derives the necessity of that 
nexus1 is  the ,demonstration4    ,as   
the difference between the analytical   
and synthetical methods is  commonly    
stated1 it seems entirely optional which
 of the two we employ4  ,if we assume1  
to start with1 the concrete thing which 
the synthetic  method presents as a     
result1 we can analyse from it as       
consequences  the abstract propositions 
which formed the pre-suppositions and   
the  material for the proof4 ,thus1     
algebraical definitions of curved lines 
are theorems in the method of geometry4 
,similarly even the ,pythagorean        
theorem1 if made the definition of a    
right-angled triangle1 might yield  to  
analysis those propositions which       
geometry had already demonstrated  on   
its behoof4 ,the optionalness of either 
method is due to both alike  starting   
from an external pre-supposition4 ,so   
far as the nature of  the notion is     
concerned1 analysis is prior2 since it  
has to raise the  given material with   

its empirical concreteness into the form
 of general  abstractions1 which may    
then be set in the front of the         
synthetical  method as definitions4     
,that these methods1 however            
indispensable and brilliantly successful
  in their own province1 are            
unserviceable for philosophical         
cognition1  is self-evident4 ,they have 
pre-suppositions2 and their style of    
cognition is that of understanding1     
proceeding under the canon of  formal   
identity4 ,in ,spinoza1 who was         
especially addicted to the use of  the  
geometrical method1 we are at once      
struck by its characteristic  formalism4
 ,yet his ideas were speculative in     
spirit2 whereas the system  of ,wolf1   
who carried the method out to the height
 of pedantry1 was  even in              
subject-matter a metaphysic of the      
understanding4 ,the abuses  which these 
methods with their formalism once led to
 in philosophy  and science have in     
modern times been followed by the abuses

 of what  is called ',construction4'    
,kant brought into vogue the phrase that
  mathematics 'construes' its notions4  
,all that was meant by the phrase  was  
that mathematics has not to do with     
notions1 but with abstract  qualities of
 sense-perceptions4 ,the name           
',construction 7construing7  of notions'
 has since been given to a sketch or    
statement of sensible  attributes which 
were picked up from perception1 quite   
guiltless  of any influence of the      
notion1 and to the additional formalism 
of  classifying scientific and          
philosophical objects in a tabular form 
on some pre-supposed rubric1 but in     
other respects at the fancy and         
discretion of the observer4 ,in the     
background of all this1 certainly1      
there is a dim consciousness of the     
,idea1 of the unity of the notion  and  
objectivity1--a consciousness1 too1 that
 the idea is concrete4 ,but  that play  
of what is styled 'construing' is far   
from presenting this  unity             

adequately--a unity which is none other 
than the notion properly  so called3 and
 the sensuous concreteness of perception
 is as little the  concreteness of      
reason and the idea4    ,another point  
calls for notice4 ,geometry works with  
the sensuous but  abstract perception of
 space2 and in space it experiences no  
difficulty  in isolating and defining   
certain simple analytic modes4 ,to      
geometry  alone therefore belongs in its
 perfection the synthetical method of   
finite cognition4 ,in its course1       
however 7and this is the remarkable     
point71 it finally stumbles upon what   
are termed irrational and               
incommensurable quantities2 and in their
 case any attempt at further            
specification drives it beyond the      
principle of the understanding4  ,this  
is only one of many instances in        
terminology1 where the title  rational  
is perversely applied to the province of
 understanding1  while we stigmatise as 
irrational that which shows a beginning 

and a  trace of rationality4 ,other     
sciences1 removed as they are from the  
simplicity of space or number1 often and
 necessarily reach a point  where       
understanding permits no further        
advance3 but they get over the          
difficulty without trouble4 ,they make a
 break in the strict sequence  of their 
procedure1 and assume whatever they     
require1 though it be  the reverse of   
what preceded1 from some external       
quarter1--opinion1  perception1         
conception or any other source4 ,its    
inobservancy as to  the nature of its   
methods and their relativity to the     
subject-matter  prevents this finite    
cognition from seeing that1 when it     
proceeds by  definitions and divisions1 
c41 it is really led on by the necessity
  of the laws of the notion4 ,for the   
same reason it cannot see when it  has  
reached its limit2 nor1 if it have      
transgressed that limit1 does it        
perceive that it is in a sphere where   
the categories of understanding1  which 

it still continues rudely to apply1 have
 lost all authority4    #bcb4 ,the      
necessity1 which finite cognition       
produces in the  ,demonstration1 is1 in 
the first place1 an external necessity1 
intended  for the subjective            
intelligence alone4 ,but in necessity as
 such1  cognition itself has left behind
 its presupposition and starting-point1 
which consisted in accepting its content
 as given or found4  ,necessity qu      
necessity is implicitly the             
self-relating notion4 ,the  subjective  
idea has thus implicitly reached an     
original and objective                  
determinateness1--a something not-given1
 and for that reason immanent  in the   
subject4 ,it has passed over into the   
idea of ,will4           99       99    
99       99       99    ,the necessity  
which cognition reaches by means of the 
demonstration is  the reverse of what   
formed its starting-point4 ,in its      
starting-point  cognition had a given   
and a contingent content2 but now1 at   

the close  of its movement1 it knows its
 content to be necessary4 ,this         
necessity  is reached by means of       
subjective agency4 ,similarly1          
subjectivity  at starting was quite     
abstract1 a bare tabula rasa4 ,it now   
shows  itself as a modifying and        
determining principle4 ,in this way we  
pass  from the idea of cognition to that
 of will4 ,the passage1 as will be      
apparent on a closer examination1 means 
that the universal1 to be  truly        
apprehended1 must be apprehended as     
subjectivity1 as a notion  self-moving1 
active1 and form-imposing4      77      
,volition4    #bcc4 ,the subjective idea
 as original and objective              
determinateness1  and as a simple       
uniform content1 is the ,good4 ,its     
impulse  towards self-realisation is in 
its behaviour the reverse of the idea of
  truth1 and rather directed towards    
moulding the world it finds before  it  
into a shape conformable to its purposed
 ,end4--,this ,volition has1  on the one

 hand1 the certitude of the nothingness 
of the pre-supposed  object2 but1 on the
 other1 as finite1 it at the same time  
pre-supposes  the purposed ,end of the  
,good to be a mere subjective idea1 and 
the  object to be independent4    #bcd4 
,this action of the ,will is finite3 and
 its finitude lies in  the contradiction
 that in the inconsistent terms applied 
to the  objective world the ,end of the 
,good is just as much not executed  as  
executed1--the end in question put as   
unessential as much as  essential1--as  
actual and at the same1 time as merely  
possible4 ,this  contradiction presents 
itself to imagination as an endless     
progress in  the actualising of the     
,good2 which is therefore set up and    
fixed as  a mere 'ought1' or goal of    
perfection4 ,in point of form however   
this  contradiction vanishes when the   
action supersedes the subjectivity of   
the purpose1 and along with it the      
objectivity1 with the contrast which    
makes both finite2 abolishing           

subjectivity as a whole and not merely  
the one-sidedness of this form of it4   
7,for another new subjectivity of  the  
kind1 that is1 a new generation of the  
contrast1 is not distinct  from that    
which is supposed to be past and gone47 
,this return into  itself is at the same
 time the content's own 'recollection'  
that it  is the ,good and the implicit  
identity of the two sides1--it is a     
'recollection' of the pre-supposition of
 the theoretical attitude  of mind 7    
#bbd7 that the objective world is its   
own truth and  substantiality4          
99       99       99       99       99  
,while ,intelligence merely proposes to 
take the world as it is1 ,will  takes   
steps to make the world what it ought to
 be4 ,will looks upon  the immediate and
 given present not as solid being1 but  
as mere  semblance without reality4 ,it 
is here that we meet those              
contradictions  which are so bewildering
 from the standpoint of abstract        
morality4  ,this position in its        

'practical' bearings is the one taken by
 the  philosophy of ,kant1 and even by  
that of ,fichte4 ,the ,good1 say these  
writers1 has to be realised3 we have to 
work in order to produce it3  and ,will 
is only the ,good actualising itself4   
,if the world then were  as it ought to 
be1 the action of ,will would be at an  
end4 ,the ,will  itself therefore       
requires that its ,end should not be    
realised4 ,in  these words1 a correct   
expression is given to the finitude of  
,will4  ,but finitude was not meant to  
be the ultimate point3 and it is the    
process of ,will itself which abolishes 
finitude and the contradiction  it      
involves4 ,the reconciliation is        
achieved1 when ,will in its result      
returns to the pre-supposition made by  
cognition4 ,in other words1 it  consists
 in the unity of the theoretical and    
practical idea4 ,will  knows the end to 
be its own1 and ,intelligence apprehends
 the world as  the notion actual4 ,this 
is the right attitude of rational       

cognition4  ,nullity and transitoriness 
constitute only the superficial features
  and not the real essence of the world4
 ,that essence is the notion in  posse  
and in esse3 and thus the world is      
itself the idea4 ,all  unsatisfied      
endeavour ceases1 when we recognise that
 the final purpose  of the world is     
accomplished no less than ever          
accomplishing itself4  ,generally       
speaking1 this is the man's way of      
looking2 while the young  imagine that  
the world is utterly sunk in wickedness1
 and that the  first thing needful is a 
thorough transformation4 ,the religious 
mind1  on the contrary1 views the world 
as ruled by ,divine ,providence1 and    
therefore correspondent with what it    
ought to be4 ,but this harmony  between 
the 'is' and the 'ought to be' is not   
torpid and rigidly  stationary4 ,good1  
the final end of the world1 has being1  
only while it  constantly produces      
itself4 ,and the world of spirit and the
 world of  nature continue to have this 

distinction1 that the latter moves only 
in  a recurring cycle1 while the former 
certainly also makes progress4    #bce4 
,thus the truth of the ,good is laid    
down as the unity of the  theoretical   
and practical idea in the doctrine that 
the ,good is  radically and really      
achieved1 that the objective world is in
 itself  and for itself the ,idea1 just 
as it at the same time eternally lays   
itself down as ,end1 and by action      
brings about its actuality4 ,this life  
which has returned to itself from the   
bias and finitude of cognition1  and    
which by the activity of the notion has 
become identical with it1  is the       
,speculative or ,absolute ,idea4        
7c7 ,the ,absolute ,idea4    #bcf4 ,the 
,idea1 as unity of the ,subjective and  
,objective ,idea1 is  the notion of the 
,idea1--a notion whose object           
7,gegenstand7 is the  ,idea as such1 and
 for which the objective 7,objekt7 is   
,idea1--an  ,object which embraces all  
characteristics in its unity4 ,this     

unity  is consequently ,i the absolute  
and all truth1 the ,idea which thinks   
itself1--and here at least as a thinking
 or ,logical ,idea4           99        
99       99       99       99    ,the   
,absolute ,idea is1 in the first place1 
the unity of the theoretical  and       
practical idea1 and thus at the same    
time the unity of the idea  of life with
 the idea of cognition4 ,in cognition we
 had the idea in a  biassed1 one-sided  
shape4 ,the process of cognition has    
issued in the  overthrow of this bias   
and the restoration of that unity1 which
 as  unity1 and in its immediacy1 is in 
the first instance the ,idea of ,life4  
,the defect of life lies in its being   
only the idea implicit or natural3      
whereas cognition is in an equally      
one-sided way the merely conscious      
idea1 or the idea for itself4 ,the unity
 and truth of these two is the          
,absolute ,idea1 which is both in itself
 and for itself4 ,hitherto we  have had 
the idea in development through its     

various grades as our  object1 but now  
the idea comes to be its own object4    
,this is the    which ,aristotle long   
ago termed the supreme form of the      
idea4    #bcg4 ,seeing that there is in 
it no transition1 or presupposition1    
and in general no specific character    
other than what is fluid and            
transparent1 the ,absolute ,idea is for 
itself the pure form of the  notion1    
which contemplates its content as its   
own self4 ,it is its own  content1 in so
 far as it ideally distinguishes itself 
from itself1  and the one of the two    
things distinguished is a self-identity 
in  which however is contained the      
totality of the form as the system of   
terms describing its content4 ,this     
content is the system of ,logic4 ,all   
that is at this stage left as form for  
the idea is the ,method of this         
content1--the specific consciousness of 
the value and currency of the  'moments'
 in its development4           99       
99       99       99       99    ,to    

speak of the absolute idea may suggest  
the conception that we are  at length   
reaching the right thing and the sum of 
the whole matter4  ,it is certainly     
possible to indulge in a vast amount of 
senseless  declamation about the idea   
absolute4 ,but its true content is only 
the  whole system of which we have been 
hitherto studying the development4  ,it 
may also be said in this strain that the
 absolute idea is the  universal1 but   
the universal not merely as an abstract 
form to which  the particular content is
 a stranger1 but as the absolute form1  
into  which all the categories1 the     
whole fullness of the content it has    
given being to1 have retired4 ,the      
absolute idea may in this respect be    
compared to the old man who utters the  
same creed as the child1 but  for whom  
it is pregnant with the significance of 
a lifetime4 ,even if  the child         
understands the truths of religion1 he  
cannot but imagine  them to be something
 outside of which lies the whole of life

 and the  whole of the world4 ,the same 
may be said to be the case with human   
life  as a whole and the occurrences    
with which it is fraught4 ,all work is  
directed only to the aim or end2 and    
when it is attained1 people are         
surprised to find nothing else but just 
the very thing which they had  wished   
for4 ,the interest lies in the whole    
movement4 ,when a man traces  up the    
steps of his life1 the end may appear to
 him very restricted3  but in it the    
whole decursus vitae is comprehended4   
,so1 too1 the  content of the absolute  
idea is the whole breadth of ground     
which has  passed under our view up to  
this point4 ,last of all comes the      
discovery  that the whole evolution is  
what constitutes the content and the    
interest4 ,it is indeed the prerogative 
of the philosopher to see that          
everything1 which1 taken apart1 is      
narrow and restricted1 receives  its    
value by its connexion with the whole1  
and by forming an organic  element of   

the idea4 ,thus it is that we have had  
the content already1  and what we have  
now is the knowledge that the content is
 the living  development of the idea4   
,this simple retrospect is contained in 
the  form of the idea4 ,each of the     
stages hitherto reviewed is an image  of
 the absolute1 but at first in a limited
 mode1 and thus it is forced  onwards to
 the whole1 the evolution of which is   
what we termed ,method4    #bch4 ,the   
several steps or stages of the          
,speculative ,method are1  first of all1
 7a7 the ,beginning1 which is ,being or 
,immediacy3  self-subsistent1 for the   
simple reason that it is the beginning4 
,but  looked at from the speculative    
idea1 ,being is its self-specialising   
act1 which as the absolute negativity or
 movement of the notion makes  a        
judgment and puts itself as its own     
negative4 ,being1 which to the          
beginning as beginning seems mere       
abstract affirmation1 is thus rather    
negation1 dependency1 derivation1 and   

pre-supposition4 ,but it is the  notion1
 of which ,being is the negation3 and   
the notion is completely  self-identical
 in its otherness1 and is the certainty 
of itself4 ,being  therefore is the     
notion implicit1 before it has been     
explicitly put as  a notion4 ,this      
,being therefore1 as the still          
unspecified notion1--a  notion that is  
only implicitly or 'immediately'        
specified--is equally  describable as   
the ,universal4    ,when it means       
immediate being1 the beginning is taken 
from sensation  and perception--the     
initial stage in the analytical method  
of finite  cognition4 ,when it means    
universality1 it is the beginning of the
  synthetic method4 ,but since the      
,logical ,idea is as much a universal as
  it is in being--since it is           
pre-supposed by the notion as much as it
  itself immediately is1 its beginning  
is a synthetical as well as an          
analytical beginning4           99      
99       99       99       99           

,philosophical method is analytical as  
well as synthetical1 not indeed  in the 
sense of a bare juxtaposition or mere   
alternating employment  of these two    
methods of finite cognition1 but rather 
in such a way  that it holds them merged
 in itself4 ,in every one of its        
movements  therefore it displays an     
attitude at once analytical and         
synthetical4  ,philosophical thought    
proceeds analytically1 in so far as it  
only  accepts its object1 the ,idea1 and
 while allowing it its own way1 is      
only1 as it were1 an on-looker at its   
movement and development4 ,to this      
extent philosophising is wholly passive4
 ,philosophic thought however is        
equally synthetic1 and evinces itself to
 be the action of the notion  itself4   
,to that end1 however1 there is required
 an effort to keep back  the incessant  
impertinence of our own fancies and     
private opinions4    #bci4 7b7 ,the     
,advance renders explicit the judgment  
implicit in  the ,idea4 ,the immediate  

universal1 as the notion implicit1 is   
the  dialectical force which on its own 
part deposes its immediacy and          
universality to the level of a mere     
stage or 'moment4' ,thus is put  the    
negative of the beginning1 its specific 
character3 it supposes a  correlative1 a
 relation of different terms1--the stage
 of ,reflection4    ,seeing that the    
immanent dialectic only states          
explicitly what was  involved in the    
immediate notion1 this advance is       
,analytical2 but  seeing that in this   
notion this distinction was not yet     
stated1--it is  equally ,synthetical4   
99       99       99       99       99  
,in the advance of the idea1 the        
beginning exhibits itself as what  it is
 implicitly4 ,it is seen to be mediated 
and derivative1 and  neither to have    
proper being nor proper immediacy4 ,it  
is only for  the consciousness which is 
itself immediate1 that ,nature forms the
  commencement or immediacy1 and that   
,spirit appears as what is mediated  by 

,nature4 ,the truth is that ,nature is  
the creation of ,spirit1 and it  is     
,spirit itself which gives itself a     
pre-supposition in ,nature4    #bdj4    
,the abstract form of the advance is1 in
 ,being1 an other and  transition into  
an other2 in ,essence showing or        
reflection in the  opposite2 in ,notion1
 the distinction of individual from     
universality1  which continues itself as
 such into1 and is as an identity with1 
what  is distinguished from it4    #bda4
 ,in the second sphere the primarily    
implicit notion has come as  far as     
shining1 and thus is already the idea in
 germ4 ,the development  of this sphere 
becomes a regress into the first1 just  
as the  development of the first is a   
transition into the second4    ,it is   
only by means of this double movement1  
that the difference first  gets its due1
 when each of the two members           
distinguished1 observed  on its own     
part1 completes itself to the totality1 
and in this way  works out its unity    

with the other4 ,it is only by both     
merging their  one-sidedness on their   
own part1 that their unity is kept from 
becoming  one-sided4    #bdb4 ,the      
second sphere developes the relation of 
the differents to  what it primarily    
is1--to the contradiction in its own    
nature4 ,that  contradiction which is   
seen in the infinite progress is        
resolved  7c7 into the end or terminus1 
where the differenced is explicitly     
stated as what it is in notion4 ,the end
 is the negative of the first1  and as  
the identity with that1 is the          
negativity of itself4 ,it is            
consequently the unity in which both of 
these ,firsts1 the immediate  and the   
real ,first1 are made constituent stages
 in thought1 merged1  and at the same   
time preserved in the unity4 ,the       
notion1 which from  its implicitness    
thus comes by means of its              
differentiation and the  merging of that
 differentiation to close with itself1  
is the realised  notion1--the notion    

which contains the relativity or        
dependence of its  special features in  
its own independence4 ,it is the idea   
which1 as  absolutely first 7in the     
method71 regards this terminus as merely
 the  disappearance of the show or      
semblance1 which made the beginning     
appear  immediate1 and made itself seem 
a result4 ,it is the knowledge that the 
idea is the one systematic whole4       
#bdc4 ,it thus appears that the method  
is not an extraneous form1  but the soul
 and notion of the content1 from which  
it is only  distinguished1 so far as the
 dynamic elements of the notion even on 
their own part come in their own        
specific character to appear as the     
totality of the notion4 ,this specific  
character1 or the content1 leads  itself
 with the form back to the idea2 and    
thus the idea is presented  as a        
systematic totality which is only one   
idea1 of which the several  elements are
 each implicitly the idea1 whilst they  
equally by the  dialectic of the notion 

produce the simple independence of the  
idea4  ,the science in this manner      
concludes by apprehending the notion of 
itself1 as of the pure idea for which   
the idea is4    #bdd4 ,the ,idea which  
is independent or for itself1 when      
viewed on the  point of this its unity  
with itself1 is ,perception or          
,intuition1 and  the percipient ,idea is
 ,nature4 ,but as intuition the idea is1
 through  an external 'reflection1'     
invested with the one-sided             
characteristic  of immediacy1 or of     
negation4 ,enjoying however an absolute 
liberty1  the ,idea does not merely pass
 over into life1 or as finite cognition 
allow life to show in it3 in its own    
absolute truth it resolves to let  the  
'moment' of its particularity1 or of the
 first characterisation  and            
other-being1 the immediate idea1 as its 
reflected image1 go forth  freely as    
,nature4           99       99       99 
99       99    ,we have now returned to 
the notion of the ,idea with which we   

began4  ,this return to the beginning is
 also an advance4 ,we began with ,being1
  abstract ,being3 where we now are we  
also have the ,idea as ,being3 but  this
 ,idea which has ,being is ,nature4     
,,notes ,,and ,,illustrations           
,,chapter ,i4      ,page #e1  #b4       
,after-thought  ,nachdenken1 e4g4       
thought which retraces  and reproduces  
an original1 but submerged1 thought 7cf4
 ,hegel's  ,werke1 vi4 p4 xv73 to be    
distinguished from ,reflexion 7cf4      
,werke1 i4 #agd74    ,p4 #g1  #c4 ,on   
the blending of universal 7thought7 and 
individual  7sensation7 in what is      
called perception 7,wahrnehmen7 see     
,encycl4   #dbj1 #dba4    ,p4 #h1  #c4  
,cf4 ,fichte1 ,werke1 ii4 #ded3 ',hence 
for the common sort of  hearers and     
readers the uncommon intelligibility of 
certain sermons and  lectures and       
writings1 not one word of which is      
intelligible to the  man who thinks for 
himself1--because there is really no    
intelligence  in them4 ,the old woman   

who frequents the church--for whom by   
the way ,i  cherish all possible        
respect--finds a sermon very            
intelligible and very  edifying which   
contains lots of texts and verses of    
hymns she knows  by rote and can repeat4
 ,in the same way readers1 who fancy    
themselves  far superior to her1 find a 
work very instructive and clear which   
tells them what they already know1 and  
proofs very stringent which  demonstrate
 what they already believe4 ,the        
pleasure the reader takes in  the writer
 is a concealed pleasure in himself4    
,what a great man6 7he  says to         
himself72 it is as if ,i heard or read  
myself4    ,p4 #aj1  #f4 ,cf4 ,hegel1   
,werke viii4 #ag3 ',in this conviction  
7that  what is reasonable is actual1 and
 what is actual is reasonable7 stands   
every plain man1 as well as the         
philosopher2 and from it philosophy     
starts in the study both of the         
spiritual and of the natural            
universe----,the great thing however is1

 in the show of the temporal  and the   
transient to recognise the substance    
which is immanent and the  eternal which
 is present4 ,for the work of reason    
7which is synonymous  with the ,idea71  
when in its actuality it simultaneously 
enters external  existence1 emerges with
 an infinite wealth of forms1 phenomena 
and  phases1 and envelopes its kernel   
with the motley rind with which         
consciousness is earliest at home1--a   
rind which the notion must  penetrate   
before it can find the inward pulse and 
feel it still beating  even in the      
outward phases4 ,but the infinite       
variety of circumstance  which is formed
 in this externality by the light of the
 essence shining  in it1--all this      
infinite material1 with its             
regulations1--is not  the object of     
philosophy4444 ,to comprehend what is1  
is the task of  philosophy3 for what is 
is reason4 ,as regards the individual1  
each1  whatever happens1 is a son of his
 time4 ,so too philosophy is its  time  

apprehended in thoughts4 ,it is just as 
foolish to fancy that a  philosophy can 
overleap its present world as that an   
individual can  overleap his time4 ,if  
his theory really goes beyond           
actualities1 if it  constructs an ideal1
 a world as it ought to be1 then such   
existence  as it has is only in his     
intentions--a yielding element in which 
anything you please may be              
fancy-formed4' ,cf4 ,schelling1 ,werke1 
iv4  #cij3 ',there are very many things1
 actions1 c4 of which we may judge1     
after vulgar semblance1 that they are   
unreasonable4 ,all the same we          
presuppose and assume that everything   
which is or which happens is            
reasonable1 and that reason is1 in one  
word1 the prime matter and the  real of 
all being4'    ,p4 #aa1  #f4 ,actuality 
7,wirklichkeit7 in ,werke1 iv4 #agh     
seqq4    ,p4 #ab1  #g4 ,cf4 ,fichte1    
,werke1 ii4 #ccc3 ',man has nothing at  
all  but experience2 and everything he  
comes to be comes to only through       

experience1 through life itself4 ,all   
his thinking1 be it loose or            
scientific1 common or transcendental1   
starts from experience and has          
experience ultimately in view4 ,nothing 
has unconditional value and             
significance but life2 all other        
thinking1 conception1 knowledge has     
value only in so far as in some way or  
other it refers to the fact of  life1   
starts from it1 and has in view a       
subsequent return to it4'    ,p4 #ac1   
#g 7note74 ,thomas ,thomson             
7#aggc-aheb71 ,professor of ,chemistry  
at ,glasgow1 distinguished in the early 
history of chemistry and allied         
sciences4 ,the ,annals of ,philosophy   
appeared from #ahac to #ahbf4--,the  art
 of preserving the hair was published   
7anonymous7 at ,london in #ahbe4    ,p4 
#ad1  #g 7note74 ,the speech from the   
throne was read on ,feb4 #crd1  #ahbe4  
,the shipowners' dinner was on ,feb4    
#ab4 ,the ,times of ,feb4 #ad gives as  
,canning's the words 'the just and wise 

maxims of sound not spurious            
philosophy4'    ,p4 #ag1  #aj4          
',scholasticus' is the guileless        
'freshman1' hero of  certain ,facetiae  
7attributed to the ,pythagorean         
philosopher ,hierocles7  which used     
occasionally to form part of the early  
,greek reading of  schoolboys4    ,k4   
,l4 ,reinhold 7#aged-ahbc7 presents in  
his intellectual history a  picture of  
the development of ideas in his age4 ,at
 the beginning  his ,attempt of a new   
theory of the human representative      
faculty  7#aghi7 is typical of the      
tendency to give a subjective           
psychological  interpretation of ,kant's
 theory of knowledge ,but the period of 
,reinhold's teaching here referred to is
 that of ,contributions to an  easier   
survey of the condition of philosophy at
 the beginning of the  nineteenth       
century 7,beitrge1 #ahja73 the tendency 
which ,hegel1 who  reviewed him in the  
,critical ,journal of ,philosophy       
7,werke1 i4 #bfg  seqq471 calls         

'philosophising before philosophy4'--,a 
similar spirit  is operative in ,krug's 
proposal 7in his ,fundamental           
,philosophy1 #ahjc7  to start with what 
he called 'philosophical problematics4' 
,p4 #ai1  #aa4 ,plato1 ,phaedo1 p4 #hi1 
where ,socrates protests against  the   
tendency to confound the defect of a    
particular piece of reasoning  with the 
incompetence of human reason altogether4
    ,p4 #bb1  #ac4 ,the dictum that the 
historical succession of philosophical  
systems is identical with their logical 
sequence should not be  taken too       
literally and mechanically4 ,its        
essential point is simply  the theorem  
that history is not a casual series of  
unconnected  events--the deeds of       
particular persons1 but is an evolution 
under  laws and uniformities3--it is    
this theorem applied to philosophies4   
,but difficulties may easily arise in   
the application of the general          
principle3 e4g4 it will be seen 7by     
comparison of  #hf and   #ajd7 that     

though ,pythagoras precedes ,parmenides1
 and number is a  stepping-stone to pure
 thought still pure ,being comes at an  
earlier  stage than ,quantity4    ,p4   
#bc1  #ac4 ,there is a silent reference 
to what ,reinhold professed  to make the
 subject of his teaching at             
,jena--'philosophy without  surnames'   
7ohne ,beinamen71--i4e4 not a 'critical'
 philosophy2--or  to the ',philosophy   
which may not bear any man's name of    
,beck4 ,as ,hegel  says1 ,werke1 xvi4   
#ach1 ',the solicitude and apprehension 
against being  one-sided is only too    
often part of the weakness which is     
capable only  of many-sided illogical   
superficiality4'    ,p4 #bg1  #af4 ,by  
'anthropology' is meant not the         
anthropology of modern  writers1 who use
 the name to denote mainly the history  
of human culture  in its more           
rudimentary stages1 and as exhibited    
chiefly in material  products1 but the  
study of those aspects of psychology    
which are most  closely allied with     

physiological conditions4    ,with the  
power of the intuition of genius to give
 almost all that  logical synthesis can 
produce1 cf4 ,werke1 ,i4 #cca3 ',in this
 way  a grand and pure intuition is     
able1 in the purely architectonic       
features of its picture1 though the     
inter-connection of necessity and  the  
mastery of form does not come forward   
into visibility1 to give  expression to 
the genuine ethical organism--like a    
building which  silently exhibits the   
spirit of its author in the several     
features of  its mass1 without the image
 of that spirit being set forth anywhere
  in one united shape4 ,in such a       
delineation1 made by help of notions1   
it is only a want of technical skill    
which prevents reason from  raising the 
principle it embraces and pervades into 
the ideal form  and becoming aware of it
 as the ,idea4 ,if the intuition only   
remains  true to itself and does not let
 analytic intellect disconcert it1 it   
will probably--just because it cannot   

dispense with notions for its           
expression--behave awkwardly in dealing 
with them1 assume distorted  shapes in  
its passage through consciousness1 and  
be 7to the speculative  eye7 both       
incoherent and contradictory3 but the   
arrangement of the  parts and of the    
self-modifying characters betray the    
inward spirit of  reason1 however       
invisible4 ,and so far as this          
appearance of that spirit  is regarded  
as a product and a result1 it will as   
product completely  harmonise with the  
,idea4' ,probably ,goethe is before     
,hegel's mind4    ,p4 #bh1  #ag4 ,the   
triplicity in unity of thought--its     
forthgoing  'procession1' 7cf4 p4 #cfb  
seqq47 and its return1 which is yet an  
abiding in itself 7,bei3sich3sein7 was  
first explicitly schematised  by        
,proclus1 the consummator of            
,neo-,platonism4 ,in his ,institutio    
,theologica he lays it down that the    
essential character of all  spiritual   
reality 7a7 is to be   1 e4g4  to return

 upon itself1 or to be a unity in and   
with difference1--to  be an original and
 spontaneous principle of movement 7c4  
#ae73 or1 as  in ,c #ca3   o   '      ' 
4 ,its movement1 therefore1 is circular 
7c4 #cc73 for everything must at the    
same time remain  altogether in the     
cause1 and proceed from it1 and revert  
to it 7c4 #ce74  ,such an essence is    
self-subsistent 771--is at once agent   
77 and patient 774 ,this 'mysticism' 7of
 a trinity  which is also unity of      
motion which is also rest71 with its o1 
ro1 and 1 is taken up1 in his own way1  
by ,scotus ,erigena  7,de ,divisione    
,naturae7 as processio 7or divisio71    
reditus1  and adunatio4 ,from ,god      
'proceed'--by an eternal creation--the  
creatures1 who however are not outside  
the divine nature2 and to ,god  all     
things created eternally return4        
,,chapter ,,ii4    ,p4 #ca1  #ai4       
,truth3--as early as ,werke1 i4 #hb1    
i4e4 #ahja1 ,hegel had  come--perhaps   
influenced by the example of ,jacobi--to

 the conclusion  that ',truth is a word 
which1 in philosophical discourse1      
deserves to be  used only of the        
certainty of the ,eternal and           
non-empirical ,actual4'  7,and so       
,spinoza1 ii4 #caj47    ,p4 #cb4 ',the  
young have been flattered'--e4g4 by     
,fichte1 ,werke1 i4  #dce3 ',hence this 
science too promises itself few         
proselytes amongst men  already formed3 
if it can hope for any at all1 it hopes 
for them rather  from the young world1  
whose inborn force has not yet been     
ruined in the  laxity of the age4'      
,p4 #ch1  #bj4 ,what ,kant actually said
 7,kritik der reinen ,vernunft3         
,elementarlehre1  #af71 was ',the ,i    
think must be able to accompany  all my 
conceptions' 7,vorstellungen74 ,here1 as
 often elsewhere4 ,hegel  seems to quote
 from memory1--with some shortcoming    
from absolute  accuracy4    ,from this  
point ,fichte's idealism takes its      
spring1 e4g4 ,werke1 ii4  #eje3 ',the   
ground of all certainty1--of all        

consciousness of fact in  life1 and of  
all demonstrative knowledge in science1 
is this3 ,in and  with the single thing 
we affirm 7setzen7 7and whatever we     
affirm is  necessarily something single7
 we also affirm the absolute totality as
  such4444 ,only in so far as we have so
 affirmed anything1 is it certain  for  
us1--from the single unit we have       
comprehended under it away to  every    
single thing in the infinity we shall   
comprehend under it1--from  the one     
individual who has comprehended it1 to  
all individuals who  will comprehend    
it4444 ,without this absolute positing  
of the absolute  totality in the        
individual1 we cannot 7to employ a      
phrase of ,jacobi's7  come to bed and   
board4'    ',obviously therefore you    
enunciate not the judgment of a single  
observation1 but you embrace and posit  
the sheer infinitude and  totality of   
all possible observations3--an infinity 
which is not at  all compounded out of  
finites1 but out of which1 conversely1  

the  finites themselves issue1 and of   
which finite things are the mere        
always-uncompleted analysis4 ,this--how 
shall ,i call it1 procedure1  positing1 
or whatever you prefer--this            
manifestation of the absolute  totality1
 ,i call intellectual vision            
7,anschauung74 ,i regard it--just       
because ,i cannot in any way get beyond 
intelligence--as immanent in            
intelligence1 and name it so far egoity 
7,ichheit71--not objectivity  and not   
subjectivity1 but the absolute identity 
of the two3--an  egoity1 however1 which 
it was to be hoped would not be taken to
 mean  individuality4 ,there lies in it1
 what you' 7he is addressing ,reinhold1 
who here follows ,bardili7' call a      
repetibility ad infinitum4 ,for me1     
therefore1 the essence of the finite is 
composed of an immediate vision  of the 
absolutely timeless infinite 7with an   
absolute identity of  subjectivity and  
objectivity71 and of a separation of the
 two latter1  and an analysis 7continued

 ad infinitum7 of the infinite4 ,in that
  analysis consists the temporal life3  
and the starting-point of this  temporal
 life is the separation into subject and
 object1 which through  the intellectual
 vision 7intuition7 are still both held 
together4'    ,p4 #dd1  #bb1 the mere   
fact of conviction4 ,cf4                
,rechtsphilosophie1   #adj 7,werke1     
viii4 #aia73 ',finally the mere         
conviction which holds  something to be 
right is given out as what decides the  
morality of  an action4 ,the good we    
will to do not yet having any content1  
the  principle of conviction adds the   
information that the subsumption of an  
action under the category of good is    
purely a personal matter4 ,if this  be  
so1 the very pretence of an ethical     
objectivity is utterly lost4 ,a         
doctrine like this is closely allied    
with the self-styled philosophy  which  
denies that the true is cognoscible3    
because for the ,will1  truth--i4e4 the 
rationality of the ,will--lies in the   

moral laws4  ,giving out1 as such a     
system does1 that the cognition of the  
true is an  empty vanity1 far           
transcending the range of science 7which
 recognises  only appearance71 it must1 
in the matter of conduct1 also find its 
principle in the apparent2 whereby moral
 distinctions are reduced to  the       
peculiar theory of life held by the     
individual and to his private           
conviction4 ,at first no doubt the      
degradation into which philosophy has   
thus sunk seems an affair of supreme    
indifference1 a mere incident in  the   
futilities of the scholastic world3 but 
the view necessarily makes  itself a    
home in ethics1 which is an essential   
part of philosophy2 and  it is then in  
the actual world that the world learns  
the true meaning  of such theories4     
',as the view spreads that subjective   
conviction1 and it alone1 decides  the  
morality of an action1 it follows that  
the charge of hypocrisy1  once so       
frequent1 is now rarely heard4 ,you can 

only qualify wickedness  as hypocrisy on
 the assumption that certain actions are
 inherently  and actually misdeeds1     
vices1 and crimes1 and that the         
defaulter  necessarily is aware of them 
as such1 because he is aware of and     
recognises the principles and outward   
acts of piety and honesty1 even  in the 
pretence to which he misapplies them4   
,in other words1 it was  generally      
assumed as regards immorality that it is
 a duty to know the  good1 and to be    
aware of its distinction from the bad4  
,in any case it  was an absolute        
injunction which forbade the commission 
of vicious and  criminal acts1 and which
 insisted on such actions being imputed 
to the  agent1 so far as he was a man1  
not a beast4 ,but if the good heart1    
the good intention1 the subjective      
conviction1 are set forth as the  true  
sources of moral worth1 then there is no
 longer any hypocrisy1 or  immorality at
 all3 for whatever one does1 he can     
always justify it by  the reflection on 

it of good aims and motives2 and by the 
influence of  that conviction it is     
good4 ,there is no longer anything      
inherently  vicious or criminal3 instead
 of the frank and free1 hardened and    
unperturbed sinner1 comes the person    
whose mind is completely justified  by  
intention and conviction4 ,my good      
intention in my act1 and my  conviction 
of its goodness1 make it good4 ,we speak
 of judging and  estimating an act4 ,but
 on this principle it is only the aim   
and  conviction of the agent--his       
faith--by which he ought to be judged4  
,and that not in the sense in which     
,christ requires faith in objective     
truth1 so that for one who has a bad    
faith1 e4g4 a conviction bad  in its    
content1 the judgment to be pronounced  
must be bad1 e4g4  conformable to this  
bad content4 ,but faith here means only 
fidelity to  conviction4 ,has the man   
7we ask7 in acting kept true to his     
conviction8  ,it is formal subjective   
conviction on which alone the obligation

 of  duty is made to depend4    ',a     
principle like this1 where conviction is
 expressly made something  subjective1  
cannot but suggest the thought of       
possible error1 with the  further       
implied presupposition of an            
absolutely-existing law4 ,but the  law  
is no agent3 it is only the actual human
 being who acts2 and in the  aforesaid  
principle the only question in          
estimating human actions is  how far he 
has received the law into his           
conviction4 ,if1 therefore1 it  is not  
the actions which are to be estimated   
and generally measured by  that law1 it 
is impossible to see what the law is    
for1 and what end it  can serve4 ,such a
 law is degraded to a mere outside      
letter1 in fact an  empty word2 which is
 only made a law1 i4e4 invested with    
obligatory  force1 by my conviction4    
',such a law may claim its authority    
from ,god or the ,state3 it may even    
have the authority of tens of centuries 
during which it served as  the bond that

 gave men1 with all their deed and      
destiny1 subsistence  and coherence4    
,and these are authorities in which are 
condensed the  convictions of countless 
individuals4 ,and for me to set against 
that  the authority of my single        
conviction--for as my subjective        
conviction  its sole validity is        
authority--that self-conceit1 monstrous 
as it at  first seems1 is1 in virtue of 
the principle that subjective conviction
  is to be the rule1 pronounced to be no
 self-conceit at all4    ',even if      
reason and conscience--which shallow    
science and bad sophistry  can never    
altogether expel--admit1 with a noble   
illogicality1 that  error is possible1  
still by describing crime and wickedness
 as  only an error we minimise the      
fault4 ,for to err is human3--,who has  
not been mistaken on one point or       
another1 whether he had fresh or        
pickled cabbage for dinner1 and about   
innumerable things more or less         
important8 ,but the difference of more  

or less importance disappears if        
everything turns on the subjectivity of 
conviction and on persistency  in it4   
,but the said noble illogicality which  
admits error to be  possible1 when it   
comes round to say that a wrong         
conviction is only an  error1 really    
only falls into a further               
illogicality--the illogicality  of      
dishonesty4 ,one time conviction is made
 the basis of morality and  of man's    
supreme value1 and is thus pronounced   
the supreme and holy4  ,another time all
 we have to do with is an error3 my     
conviction is  something trivial and    
casual1 strictly speaking something     
outside1  that may turn out this way or 
that4 ,and1 really1 my being convinced  
is something supremely trivial8 if ,i   
cannot know truth1 it is  indifferent   
how ,i think2 and all that is left to my
 thinking is that  empty good1--a mere  
abstraction of generalisation4    ',it  
follows further that1 on this principle 
of justification by  conviction1 logic  

requires me1 in dealing with the way    
others act  against my action1 to admit 
that1 so far as they in their belief and
  conviction hold my actions to be      
crimes1 they are quite in the right4    
,on such logic not merely do ,i gain    
nothing1 ,i am even deposed from the    
post of liberty and honour into a       
situation of slavery and dishonour4     
,justice--which in the abstract is mine 
as well as theirs--,i feel only  as a   
foreign subjective conviction1 and in   
the execution of justice ,i  fancy      
myself to be only treated by an external
 force4'    ,p4 #dd1  #bc4              
,selbstdenken--to think and not merely  
to read or listen is  the recurrent cry 
of ,fichte 7e4g4 ,werke1 ii4 #cbi74     
,according to the  editors of ,werke1   
xv4 #ehb1 the reference here is to      
,schleiermacher  and to his ,monologues4
 ,really it is to the ,romantic         
principle in  general1 especially ,f4   
,schlegel4    ,p4 #de1  #bc4 ',fichte'  
,werke1 ii1 #djd3 ',philosophy          

7,wissenschaftslehre71 besides 7for the 
reason above noted that it has  no      
auxiliary1 no vehicle of the intuition  
at all1 except the intuition  itself71  
elevates the human mind higher than any 
geometry can ,it gives  the mind not    
only attentiveness1 dexterity1          
stability1 but at the same  time        
absolute independence1 forcing it to be 
alone with itself1 and  to live and     
manage by itself4 ,compared with it1    
every other mental  operation is        
infinitely easy2 and to one who has been
 exercised in  it nothing comes hard4   
,besides as it prosecutes all objects of
 human  lore to the centre it accustoms 
the eye to hit the proper point at      
first glance' in everything presented to
 it1 and to prosecute it  undeviatingly 
,for such a practical philosopher       
therefore there can be  nothing dark1   
complicated1 and confused1 if only he is
 acquainted with  the object of         
discussion4 ,it comes always easiest to 
him to construct  everything afresh and 

ab initio1 because he carries within him
 plans  for every scientific edifice4   
,he finds his way easily1 therefore1 in 
any complicated structure4 ,add to this 
the security and confidence of  glance  
which he has acquired in philosophy--the
 guide which conducts in  all           
raisonnement and the imperturbability   
with which his eye meets  every         
divergence from the accustomed path and 
every paradox4 ,it would  be quite      
different with all human concerns1 if   
men could only resolve  to believe their
 eyes4 ,at present they inquire at their
 neighbours and  at antiquity what they 
really see1 and by this distrust in     
themselves  errors are eternalised4     
,against this distrust the possessor of 
philosophy is for ever protected4 ,in a 
word1 by philosophy the mind  of man    
comes to itself1 and from henceforth    
rests on itself without  foreign aid1   
and is completely master of itself1 as  
the dancer of his  feet1 or the boxer of
 his hands4'    ,p4 #de1  #bc4          

,aristotle1 ,metaph4 i4 #b1 #ai 7cf4    
,eth4 x4 #g74 ,see also  ,werke1 xiv4   
#bhj seqq4    ,p4 #df1  #bd4            
,schelling's expression1 'petrified     
intelligence4' ,the  reference is to    
some verses of ,schelling in ,werke1 iv4
 #edf 7first  published in ,zeitschrift 
fr speculative ,physik1 #ahjj74 ,we have
 no  reason to stand in awe of the      
world1 he says1 which is a tame and     
quiet  beast--        ,sterft zwar ein  
,riesengeist darinnen1      ,ist aber   
versteinert mit allen ,sinnen2      ,in 
todten und lebendigen ,dingen      ,thut
 nach ,bewustseyn mchtig ringen4    ,in 
human shape he at length awakes from the
 iron sleep1 from the long  dream3 but  
as man he feels himself a stranger and  
exile2 he would  fain return to great   
,nature2 he fears what surrounds him and
 imagines  spectres1 not knowing he     
might say of ,nature to himself--       
,ich bin der ,gott1 den sie im ,busen   
hegt1      ,der ,geist1 der sich in     
allem bewegt3      ,vom frhsten ,ringen 

dunkler ,krfte      ,bis zum ,erguss der
 ersten ,lebenssfte1      4    4    4   
4    4    4    4      herauf zu des     
,gedankens ,jugendkraft      ,wodurch   
,natur verjngt sich wieder schafft1     
,ist eine kraft1 ein ,wechselspiel und  
,weben1      ,ein ,trieb und ,drang nach
 immer hherm ,leben4    ,cf4 ,oken1     
,naturphilosophie1 #biac3 ',a natural   
body is a thought of  the primal act1   
turned rigid and crystallised1--a word  
of ,god4'    ,phrases of like import are
 not infrequent in ,schelling's works   
7about  #ahjj-a71 e4g4 ,werke1#a4 ,abth4
 iii4 #cda3 ',the dead and unconscious  
products of nature are only unsuccessful
 attempts to reflect itself2  so-called 
dead nature is in all cases an immature 
intelligence'  7unreife ,intelligenz71  
or iv4 #gg1 ',nature itself is an       
intelligence1  as it were1 turned to    
rigidity 7erstarrte7 with all its       
sensations and  perceptions'2 and ii4   
#bbf 7,ideen zu einer ,philosophie der  
,natur1  #agig71 ',hence nature is only 

intelligence turned into the rigidity of
  being2 its qualities are sensations   
extinguished to being2 bodies are  its  
perceptions1 so to speak1 killed4'    ,a
 close approach to the phrase quoted is 
found in the words of another  of the   
',romantic' philosophers3 ',nature is a 
petrified magic-city'  7versteinerte    
,zauberstadt74 7,novalis1 ,schriften1   
ii4 #adi47    ,p4 #dh1  #bd4 ,cf4       
,fichte to ,jacobi3 7,jacobi's          
,briefwechsel1 ii4 #bjh7  ',my absolute 
,ego is obviously not the individual3   
that explanation  comes from injured    
snobs and peevish philosophers1 seeking 
to  impute to me the disgraceful        
doctrine of practical egoism4 ,but the  
individual must be deduced from the     
absolute ego4 ,to that task my          
philosophy will proceed in the ,natural 
,law4 ,a finite being--it may  be       
deductively shown--can only think itself
 as a sense-being in a  sphere of       
sense-beings1--on one part of which     
7that which has no power  of            

origination7 it has causality1 while    
with the other part 7to which  it       
attributes a subjectivity like its own7 
it stands in reciprocal  relations4 ,in 
such circumstances it is called an      
individual1 and the  conditions of      
individuality are called rights4 ,as    
surely as it affirms  its individuality1
 so surely does it affirm such a sphere 
the two  conceptions indeed are         
convertible4 ,so long as we look upon   
ourselves  as individuals--and we always
 so regard ourselves in life1 though not
  in philosophy and abstract            
imagination--we stand on what ,i call   
the  practical point of view in our     
reflections 7while to the standpoint  of
 the absolute ego ,i give the name      
speculative74 ,from the former  point of
 view there exists for us a world       
independent of us1--a world  we can only
 modify2 whilst the pure ego 7which even
 on this altitude  does not altogether  
disappear from us17 is put outside us   
and called  ,god4 ,how else could we get

 the properties we ascribe to ,god and  
deny to  ourselves1 did we not after all
 find them within us1 and only refuse   
them to ourselves in a certain respect1 
i4e41 as individuals8 ,when this        
practical point of view predominates in 
our reflections1 realism  is supreme3   
when speculation itself deduces and     
recognises that  standpoint1 there      
results a complete reconciliation       
between philosophy  and common sense as 
premised in my system4    ',for what    
good1 then1 is the speculative          
standpoint and the whole of  philosophy 
therewith1 if it be not for life8 ,had  
humanity not tasted  of this forbidden  
fruit1 it might dispense with all       
philosophy4 ,but in  humanity there is a
 wish implanted to behold that region   
lying beyond  the individual2 and to    
behold it not merely in a reflected     
light but  face to face4 ,the first who 
raised a question about ,god's existence
  broke through the barriers1 he shook  
humanity in its main foundation         

pillars1 and threw it out of joint into 
an intestine strife which is  not yet   
settled1 and which can only be settled  
by advancing boldly  to that supreme    
point from which the speculative and the
 practical  appear to be at one4 ,we    
began to philosophise from pride of     
heart1 and  thus lost our innocence3 we 
beheld our nakedness1 and ever since we 
philosophise from the need of our       
redemption4'    ,p4 #ej4 ,physics and   
,philosophy of ,nature3 cf4 ,werke1 vii4
 i1 p4 #ah3  ',the ,philosophy of       
,nature takes up the material1 prepared 
for it by  physics out of experience1 at
 the point to which physics has brought 
it1 and again transforms it1 without    
basing it ultimately on the  authority  
of experience4 ,physics therefore must  
work into the hands of  philosophy1 so  
that the latter may translate into a    
true comprehension  7,begriff7 the      
abstract universal transmitted to it1   
showing how it  issues from that        
comprehension as an intrinsically       

necessary whole4 ,the  philosophic way  
of putting the facts is no mere whim    
once in a way1  by way of change1 to    
walk on the head1 after walking a long  
while on  the legs1 or once in a way to 
see our every-day face besmeared with   
paint4 ,no2 it is because the method of 
physics does not satisfy the            
comprehension1 that we have to go on    
further4'    ,p4 #ea1  #bd4 ,the        
distinction of ordinary and speculative 
,logic  is partly like that made by     
,fichte 7i4 #fh7 between ,logic and     
,wissenschaftslehre4 ',the former1' says
 ,fichte1 'is conditioned and           
determined by the latter4' ,logic deals 
only with form2 epistomology  with      
import as well4    ,p4 #ed1  #bd4 ,the  
,mosaic legend of the ,fall2 cf4 similar
 interpretations  in ,kant3 ,religion   
innerhalb der ,grenzen der blossen      
,vernunft1  #aster ,stck2 and           
,schelling1 ,werke1 i4 7#a4 ,abth47 #cd4
      ,,chapter ,,iii4    ,p4 #fa1  #bh4
 ,fichte--to emphasise the experiential 

truth of his  system--says 7,werke1 ii4 
#cca73 ',there was a philosophy which   
professed to be able to expand by mere  
inference the range thus  indicated for 
philosophy4 ,according to it1 thinking  
was--not1 as we  have described it1 the 
analysis of what was given and the      
recombining  of it in other forms1 but  
at the same time--a production and      
creation  of something quite new4 ,in   
this system the philosopher found       
himself  in the exclusive possession of 
certain pieces of knowledge which the   
vulgar understanding had to do without4 
,in it the philosopher could  reason out
 for himself a ,god and an immortality  
and talk himself into  the conclusion   
that he was wise and good4'    ,wolfs   
definition of philosophy is 'the        
,science of the possible in so  far as  
it can be'2 and the possible  the       
non-contradictory4    ,p4 #fd1  #bi4    
,the oriental sage corresponds 7cf4     
,hegel1 ,werke1 xii4  #bbi7 to the      
writer known as ,dionysius the          

,areopagite 7,de ,mystica  ,theologia1  
and ,de ,divitus ,nominibus47--,the same
 problem as to the  relation of the     
,infinite 7,god7 to the ,finite 7world7 
is discussed in  ,jewish speculation 7by
 ,saadia1 ,mamuni1 c47 as the question  
of the  divine names1--a dogma founded  
on the thirteen names 7or attributes7   
applied to ,god in ,exodus xxxiv4 #f4   
7,cf4 ,d4 ,kaufmann1 ,geschichte der    
,attributenlehre47 ,the same spirit has 
led to the list of ninety-nine          
'excellent names' of ,allah in ,islam1 a
 list which tradition derives  from     
,mohammed4    ,p4 #fe1  #ca4 ,cf4       
,werke1 ii4 #dg seqq43 ',the nature of  
the judgment  or proposition--involving 
as it does a distinction of subject and 
predicate--is destroyed by the          
speculative proposition4 ,this conflict 
of the propositional form with the unity
 of comprehension which  destroys it is 
like the antagonism in rhythm between   
metre and accent4  ,the rhythm results  
from the floating mean and unification  

of the two4  ,hence even in the         
philosophical proposition the identity  
of subject  and predicate is not meant  
to annihilate their difference          
7expressed by  the propositional form73 
their unity is meant to issue as a      
harmony4  ,the propositional form lets  
appear the definite shade or accent     
pointing to a distinction in its        
fulfilment3 whereas in the predicate    
giving expression to the substance1 and 
the subject itself falling  into the    
universal1 we have the unity in which   
that accent is heard no  more4 ,thus in 
the proposition ,god is ,being the      
predicate is ,being2 it  represents the 
substance in which the subject is       
dissolved away4 ,being  is here meant   
not to be predicate but essence3 and in 
that way ,god  seems to cease to be what
 he is--by his place in the             
proposition--viz4  the permanent        
subject4 ,the mind--far from getting    
further forward in  the passage from    
subject to predicate--feels itself      

rather checked1  through the loss of the
 subject1 and thrown back1 from a sense 
of its  loss1 to the thought of the     
subject4 ,or1--since the predicate      
itself  is enunciated as a subject 7as  
,being or as ,essence7 which exhausts   
the  nature of the subject1 it again    
comes face to face with the subject     
even in the predicate4--,thought thus   
loses its solid objective ground  which 
it had on the subject3 yet at the same  
time in the predicate it  is thrown back
 upon it1 and instead of getting to rest
 in itself it  returns upon the subject 
of the content4--,to this unusual check 
and  arrest are in the main due the     
complaints as to the unintelligibility  
of philosophical works1--supposing the  
individual to possess any other         
conditions of education needed for      
understanding them4'    ,p4 #ff1  #cb4  
,on the relation of dogmatism and       
scepticism see the  introduction to     
,kant's ,criticism of ,pure ,reason1 and
 compare ,caird's  ,critical ,philosophy

 of ,i4 ,kant1 vol4 i4 chap4 i4    ,p4  
#fg1  #cc4 ,the subdivision of          
'theoretical' philosophy or metaphysics 
into the four branches1 ,ontology1      
,cosmology1 ,psychology 7rational and   
empirical71 and ,natural ,theology1 is  
more or less common to the whole        
,wolfian ,school4 ,wolf's special       
addition to the preceding scholastic    
systems is found in the conception of a 
general ,cosmology4 ,metaphysics        
precedes physics1 and the departments of
 practical philosophy4 ,in  front of all
 stands logic or rational philosophy4   
,empirical psychology  belongs properly 
to physics1 but reasons of practical    
convenience put  it elsewhere4    ,p4   
#fi1  #cd4 ,the question of the ',seat  
of the ,soul' is well known in  the     
writings of ,lotze 7e4g4 ,metaphysic1   
#bia74    ,absolute actuosity4 ,the     
,notio ,dei according to ,thomas        
,aquinas1 as  well as the dogmatics of  
post-,reformation times1 is actus purus 
7or actus purissimus74 ,for ,god nihil  

potentialitatis habet4 ,cf4  ,werke1    
xii4#bbh3 ',aristotle especially has    
conceived ,god under the  abstract      
category of activity4 ,pure activity is 
knowledge 7,wissen7--in  the scholastic 
age1 actus purus--3 but in order to be  
put as  activity1 it must be put in its 
moments4 ,for knowledge we require      
another thing which is known3 and which1
 when knowledge knows it1 is  thereby   
appropriated4 ,it is implied in this    
that ,god--the eternal and              
self-subsistent--eternally begets       
himself as his ,son1--distinguishes     
himself from himself4 ,but what he thus 
distinguishes from himself1  has not the
 shape of an otherness3 but what is     
distinguished is  ipso facto identical  
with what it is parted from4 ,god is    
spirit3  no darkness1 no colouring or   
mixture enters this pure light4 ,the    
relationship of father and son is taken 
from organic life and used              
metaphorically--the natural relation is 
only pictorial and hence does  not quite

 correspond to what is to be expressed4 
,we say1 ,god eternally  begets his     
,son1 ,god distinguishes himself from   
himself3 and thus we  begin from ,god1  
saying he does this1 and in the other he
 creates is  utterly with himself 7the  
form of ,love73 but we must be well     
aware  that ,god is this whole action   
itself ,god is the beginning2 he does   
this3 but equally is he only the end1   
the totality3 and as such  totality he  
is spirit4 ,god as merely the ,father is
 not yet the true  7it is the ,jewish   
religion where he is thus without the   
,son73 ,he is  rather beginning and end3
 ,he is his presupposition1 makes       
himself a  presupposition 7this is only 
another form of distinguishing73 ,he is 
the  eternal process4'    ,nicolaus     
,cusanus speaks of ,god 7,de docta      
,ignorantia1 ii4 ,i7 as  infinita       
actualitas quae est actu omnis essendi  
possibilitas4 ,the  term 'actuosity'    
seems doubtful4    ,p4 #gc1  #cf4       
,sensus eminentior4 ,theology           

distinguishes three modes in  which the 
human intelligence can attain a         
knowledge of ,god4 ,by the via          
causalitatis it argues that ,god is2 by 
the via negationis1 what he  is not2 by 
the via eminentiae1 it gets a glimpse of
 the relation in  which he stands to us4
 ,it regards ,god i4e4 as the cause of  
the finite  universe2 but as ,god is    
infinite1 all that is predicated of him 
must be  taken as merely approximative  
7sensu eminentiori7 and there is left  a
 vast remainder which can only be filled
 up with negations ,durandus  de ,s4    
,porciano on the ,sentent1 i4 #c4 ,i4   
,the sensus eminentior is  the subject  
of ,spinoza's strictures1 ,ep4 #f 7#ef  
in ,opp4 ii4 #bjb73 while  ,leibniz     
adopts it in the preface to ,thodice1   
',les perfections de  ,dieu sont celles 
de nos mes1 mais il les possde sans     
bornes3 il est  un ocan1 dont nous      
n'avons reu que les gouttes2 il y a en  
nous  quelque puissance1 quelque        
connaissance1 quelque bont2 mais elles  

sont  toutes entires en ,dieu4'    ,the 
via causalitatis infers e4g41 from the  
existence of morality  and intelligence 
here1 a ,being whose will finds         
expression therein3 the  via eminentiae 
infers that that will is good1 and that 
intelligence  wise in the highest       
measure1 and the via negationis sets    
aside in the  conception of ,god all the
 limitations and conditions to which    
human  intelligence and will are        
subject4      ,,chapter ,,iv4    ,p4    
#hj1  #ch4 ,the verses 7forming part of 
the advice which  ,mephistopheles1      
personating ,faust1 gives to the        
recently-arrived  pupil7 stand in the   
original in a different order3 beginning
 ,dann hat  er die ,theile in seiner    
,hand1 c4 ,the meaning of these and the 
two  preceding lines is somewhat as     
follows1 in versification even laxer    
than ,goethe's3--        ,if you want to
 describe life and gather its meaning1  
,to drive out its spirit most be your   
beginning1      ,then though fast in    

your hand lie the parts one by one      
,the spirit that linked them1 alas6 is  
gone4      ,and ',nature's ,laboratory' 
is only a name      ,that the chemist   
bestows on't to hide his own shame4     
,one may compare ,wilhelm ,meister's    
,wanderjahre1 iii4 #c1 where it is      
remarked1 in reference to some          
anatomical exercises3 ',you will learn  
ere long that building-up is more       
instructive than tearing-down1          
combining more than separating1         
animating the dead more than killing    
again what was killed already4444       
,combining means more than separating3  
reconstructing more than onlooking4'    
,the first part of ,faust appeared      
#ahjh3 the ,wanderjahre1 #ahbh-i4    ,p4
 #hb1  #ci4 ,the article on the         
',relation of scepticism to philosophy1 
an exposition of its various            
modifications1 and comparison of the    
latest with the ancient'--in form a     
review of ,g4 ,e4 ,schulze's  ,criticism
 of ,theoretical ,philosophy'--was      

republished in vol4 xvi4 of  ,hegel's   
,werke 7vol4 i4 of the ,vermischte      
,schriften74    ,p4 #hg1  #db4 ,in an   
earlier review of ,kant's work 7,werke1 
i4 #hc7 on  ,glauben und ,wissen 7an    
article in ,sendling and ,hegel's       
,journal7  ,hegel attaches more weight  
to a factor in the critical theory of   
knowledge1 here neglected4 ,kant1 he    
says1 has--within the limits  allowed by
 his psychological terms of             
thought--'put 7in an excellent  way7 the
  priori of sensibility into the        
original identity and  multiplicity1 and
 that as transcendental imagination in  
the higher  power of an immersion of    
unity in multiplicity3 whilst           
,understanding  7,verstand7 he makes to 
consist in the elevation to universality
 of this   priori synthetic unity of    
sensibility1--whereby this identity is  
invested with a comparative antithesis  
to the sensibility3 and ,reason         
7,vernunft7 is presented as a still     
higher power over the preceding         

comparative antithesis1 without however 
this universality and infinity  being   
allowed to go beyond the stereotyped    
formal pure infinity4  ,this genuinely  
rational construction by which1 though  
the bad name  faculties is left1 there  
is in truth presented a single identity 
of them all1 is transformed by ,jacobi  
into a series of faculties1  resting one
 upon another4'    ,p4 #hg1  #db4       
,fichte3 cf4 ,werke1 i4 #dbj3 ',i have  
said before1 and  say it here again1    
that my system is no other than the     
,kantian4 ,that  means3 it contains the 
same view of facts1 but in its method is
 quite  independent of the ,kantian     
exposition4' ',kant1 up to now1 is a    
closed  book4'--i4 #ddb4 ,there are two 
ways of critical idealism4 ',either' 7as
  ,fichte7 'it actually deduces from the
 fundamental laws of intelligence1  that
 system of necessary modes of action1   
and with it1 at the same  time1 the     
objective conceptions thus arising1 and 
thus lets the whole  compass of our     

conceptions gradually arise under the   
eyes of the reader  or hearer2 or' 7like
 ,kant and his unprogressive disciples7 
'it gets  hold of these laws from       
anywhere and anyhow1 as they are        
immediately  applied to objects1        
therefore on their lowest grade 7--on   
this grade  they are called categories71
 and then asseverates that it is by     
these that objects are determined and   
arranged4' ,and i4 #dgh3 ',i know  that 
the categories which ,kant laid down are
 in no way proved by  him to be         
conditions of self-consciousness1 but   
only said to be so3  ,i know that space 
and time and what in the original       
consciousness is  inseparable from them 
and fills them both1 are still less     
deduced as  such conditions1 for of them
 it is not even said expressly--as of   
the  categories--that they are so1 but  
only inferentially4 ,but ,i believe     
quite as surely that ,i know that ,kant 
had the thought of such a system3  that 
everything he actually propounds are    

fragments and results of this  system2  
and that his statements have meaning and
 coherence only on this                 
presupposition4' ,cf4 viii4 #cfb4    ,p4
 #hi1  #db4 ,transcendental unity of    
self-consciousness4 ,kant's ,kritik  der
 reinen ,vernunft1  #af3 ',the ,i think 
must be able to accompany  all my       
ideas4444 ,this idea is an act of       
spontaneity4 444 ,i name it  pure       
apperception 444 or original            
apperception 444 because it is that     
self-consciousness which can be         
accompanied by none further4 ,the unity 
of it ,i also call the transcendental   
unity of self-consciousness1 in  order  
to denote the possibility of cognition  
priori from it4'    ,p4 #ib1  #dd4      
,caput mortuum3 a term of the           
,alchemists to denote the  non-volatile 
precipitate left in the retort after the
 spirit had been  extracted3 the fixed  
or dead remains1 'quando spiritus animam
 sursum  vexit4'    ,p4 #ib1  #de4      
,reason and ,understanding4 ,in the     

,wolfian ,school 7e4g4  in ,baumgarten's
 ,metaphysik1  #dfh7 the term intellect 
7,verstand7  is used of the general     
faculty of higher cognition1 while ratio
  7,vernunft7 specially denotes the     
power of seeing distinctly the          
connexions of things4 ,so ,wolff        
7,vernnftige ,gedanken von ,gott1 c4    
#bgg7 defines ,verstand as 'the faculty 
of distinctly representing the          
possible1' and ,vernunft 7 #cfh7 as 'the
 faculty of seeing into the  connexion  
of truths4' ,it is on this use of       
,reason as the faculty of  inference    
that ,kant's use of the term is founded3
 though it soon widely  departs from its
 origin4 ,for upon the 'formal' use of  
reason as the  faculty of syllogising1  
,kant superinduces a transcendental use 
as a  'faculty of principles1' while the
 understanding is only 'a faculty  of   
rules4' ',reason1' in other words1      
'itself begets conceptions1'  and       
'maxims1 which it borrows neither from  
the senses nor from the  understanding4'

 7,kritik d4 r4 ,vern41 ,dialektik1     
,einleit4 ii4 ,a47 ,and  the essential  
aim of ,reason is to give unity to the  
various cognitions  of understanding4   
,while the unity given by understanding 
is 'unity of  a possible experience1'   
that sought by reason is the discovery  
of an  unconditioned which will complete
 the unity of the former 7,dial4        
,einleit4 iv71 or of 'the totality of   
the conditions to a given  conditioned4'
 7,dial1 vii47    ,it is this           
distinction of the terms which is       
dominant in ,fichte and  ,hegel1 where  
,verstand is the more practical         
intellect which seeks  definite and     
restricted results and knowledges1 while
 ,vernunft is  a deeper and higher power
 which aims at completeness4 ,in        
,goethe's  more reflective prose we see 
illustrations of this usage3 e4g4       
,wilh4 ,meister's ,wanderjahre1 i4 it is
 said to be the object of  the          
'reasonable' man 'das entgegengesetzte  
zu berschauen und in  ,uebereinstimmung 

zu bringen'3 or ,bk4 ii4 ,reasonable men
 when they have  devised something      
verstndig to get this or that difficulty
 out of the  way1 c4 ,goethe1 in his    
,sprche in ,prosa 7#hif71 ,werke1 iii4  
#bha1  says ',reason has for its        
province the thing in process 7das      
,werdende71  understanding the thing    
completed 7das ,gewordene73 the former  
does not  trouble itself about the      
purpose1 the latter asks not whence4    
,reason  takes delight in developing2   
understanding wishes to keep everything 
as  it is1 so as to use it4' 7,similarly
 in ,eckermann's ,convers4 ,feb4 #ac1   
#ahbi47 ,cf4 ,oken1 ,naturphilosophie1  
#biad4 ,verstand ist ,microcosmus1      
,vernunft ,macrocosmus4    ,kant's use  
of the term ,reason1 coupled with his   
special view of  ,practical ,reason and 
his use of the term ,faith 7,glaube71   
leads on to  the terminology of ,jacobi4
 ,in earlier writings ,jacobi had       
insisted on  the contrast between the   
superior authority of feeling and faith 

7which  are in touch with truth7 and the
 mechanical method of intelligence and  
reasoning 7,verstand and ,vernunft74 ,at
 a later period however he changed  and 
fixed the nomenclature of his           
distinction4 ,what he had first called  
,glaube he latterly called              
,vernunft1--which is in brief a 'sense  
for  the supersensible'--an intuition   
giving higher and complete or total     
knowledge--an immediate apprehension of 
the real and the true4 ,as  contrasted  
with this reasonable faith or feeling1  
he regards ,verstand  as a mere faculty 
of inference or derivative knowledge1   
referring one  thing to another by the  
rule of identity4    ,this distinction  
which is substantially reproduced by    
,coleridge  7though with certain clauses
 that show traces of ,schellingian      
influence7 has connexions--like so much 
else in ,jacobi--with the  usage of     
,schopenhauer1 ',nobody1' says ,jacobi1 
'has ever spoken of an  animal          
,vernunft3 a mere animal ,verstand      

however we all know and speak  of4'     
7,jacobi's ,werke1 iii4 #h47            
,schopenhauer repeats and enforces  the 
remark4 ,all animals possess1 says      
,schopenhauer1 the power of             
apprehending causality1 of cognising    
objects3 a power of immediate and       
intuitive knowledge of real things3 this
 is ,verstand4 ,but ,vernunft1  which is
 peculiar to man1 is the cognition of   
truth 7not of reality73  it is an       
abstract judgment with a sufficient     
reason 7,welt als ,w4 i4   #f74    ,one 
is tempted to connect the modern        
distinction with an older one  which    
goes back in its origin to ,plato and   
,aristotle1 but takes form in  the      
,neo-,platonist ,school1 and enters the 
,latin world through ,bothius4  ,consol4
 ,phil4 iv4 #f3 ,igitur uti est ad      
intellectum ratiocinatio1  ad id quod   
est id quod gignitur1 ad aeternitatem   
tempus1 and in v4  #d there is a full   
distinction of sensus1 imaginatio1 ratio
 and  intelligentia in ascending order4 

,ratio is the discursive knowledge  of  
the idea 7universali consideratione     
perpendit73 intelligentia  apprehends it
 at once1 and as a simple forma 7pura   
mentis acie  contuetur73 cf4 ,stob4 ,ed4
 i4 #hbf-hcb3 ,porphyr4 ,sentent4#ae4   
,reasoning belongs to the human species1
 just as intelligence to the  divine    
alone4 ,yet it is assumed--in an attempt
 to explain divine  foreknowledge and   
defend freedom--that man may in some    
measure place  himself on the divine    
standpoint 7v4 #e74    ,this contrast   
between a higher mental faculty 7mens7  
and a lower  7ratio7 which even ,aquinas
 adopts from the interpretation of      
,aristotle 7,summa ,theol4 i4 #gi1 #i7  
is the favourite weapon in the  hands of
 mysticism4 ,after the example of       
,dionysius ,areop41 ,nicolaus of  ,cusa1
 ,reuchlin1 and other thinkers of the   
,renaissance depreciate mere  discursive
 thought and logical reasoning4 ,it is  
the inner mens--like  a simple ray of   
light--penetrating by an immediate and  

indivisible  act to the divine--which   
gives us access to the supreme science4 
,this  simplex intelligentia1-- superior
 to imagination or reasoning--as        
,gerson says1 ,consid4 de ,th4 #aj1 is  
sometimes named mens1 sometimes         
,spiritus1 the light of intelligence1   
the shadow of the angelical  intellect1 
the divine light4 ,from ,scotus ,erigena
 to ,nicolas of ,cusa  one tradition is 
handed down3 it is taken up by men like 
,everard ,digby  7in his ,theoria       
,analytica7 and the group of ,cambridge 
,platonists and  by ,spinoza in the     
seventeenth century1 and it reappears1  
profoundly  modified1 in the ,german    
idealism between #agij and #ahbj4    ,p4
 #ii1  #dh4 ',science of ,logic'2       
,hegel's large work on the subject1     
published between #ahab-af4 ,the        
discussions on the ,antinomies belong   
chiefly to the first part of it4    ,p4 
#ajb1  #ej4 ',natural ,theology1' here  
to be taken in a narrower sense  than in
 p4 #gc1 where it is equivalent to      

,rational ,theology in general4  ,here  
it means ',physico-theology'--the       
argument from design in nature4    ,p4  
#ajc1  #ej4 ,spinoza--defining ,god as  
'the union of thought with  extension4' 
,this is not verbally accurate2 for     
according to ,ethica1  i4 pr4 #aa1 ,god1
 or the substance1 consists of infinite 
attributes1  each of which expresses the
 eternal and infinite essence4 ,but     
,spinoza  mentions of 'attributes' only 
two3 ,ethica1 ii4 pr4 #a4 ,i ,thought is
  an attribute of ,god3 pr4 #b1         
,extension is an attribute of ,god4 ,and
 he  adds1 ,ethica1 i4 pr4 #aj1 ,schol4 
',all the attributes substance has  were
 always in it together1 nor can one be  
produced by another4' ,and  in ,ethica1 
ii4 #g4 ,sch4 it is said3 ',thinking    
substance and extended  substance is one
 and the same substance which is        
comprehended now under  this1 now under 
that attribute4'    ,p4 #aaj1  #ed4     
',practical in the true sense of the    
word4' ,cf4 ,kant1  ,werke1 ,ros4 and   

,sch4 i4 #eha3 ',a great                
misunderstanding1 exerting an  injurious
 influence on scientific methods1       
prevails with regard to what  should be 
considered practical in such sense as to
 justify its place  in practical        
philosophy4 ,diplomacy and finance1     
rules of economy no  less than rules of 
social intercourse1 precepts of health  
and dietetic  of the soul no less than  
the body1 have been classed as practical
  philosophy on the mere ground that    
they all contain a collection of        
practical propositions4 ,hut although   
such practical propositions  differ in  
mode of statement from the theoretical  
propositions which  have for import the 
possibility of things and the exposition
 of their  nature1 they have the same   
content4 ,practical1 properly so called1
  are only those propositions which     
relate to ,liberty under laws4 ,all     
others whatever are nothing but the     
theory of what pertains to the  nature  
of things--only that theory is brought  

to bear on the way in  which the things 
may be produced by us in conformity with
 a principle2  i4e4 the possibility of  
the things is presented as the result of
  a voluntary action which itself too   
may be counted among physical  causes4' 
,and ,kant1 ,werke1 iv4 #aj4 ',hence a  
sum of practical precepts  given by     
philosophy does not form a special part 
of it 7co-ordinate  with the            
theoretical7 merely because they are    
practical4 ,practical  they might be1   
even though their principle were wholly 
derived from  the theoretical knowledge 
of nature1--as technico-practical rules4
  ,they are practical in the true sense1
 when and because their principle  is   
not borrowed from the nature-conception 
7which is always sensuously             
conditioned7 and rests therefore on the 
supersensible1 which the  conception of 
liberty alone makes knowable by formal  
laws4 ,they are  therefore              
ethico-practical1 i4e4 not merely       
precepts and rules with  this or that   

intention1 but laws without antecedent  
reference to ends  and intentions4'     
,p4 #aaa1  #ed4 ,eudaemonism4 ,but there
 is ,eudaemonism and ,eudaemonism2  as  
,cf4 ,hegel1 ,werke1 i4 #h4 #d ,the time
 had come when the infinite  longing    
away beyond the body and the world had  
reconciled itself  with the reality of  
existence4 ,yet the reality which the   
soul was  reconciled to--the objective  
which the subjectivity recognised--was  
actually only empirical existence1      
common world and actuality4444 ,and     
though the reconciliation was in its    
heart and ground sure and fast1  it     
still needed an objective form for this 
ground3 the very necessity  of nature   
made the blind certitude of immersion in
 the reality of  empirical existence    
seek to provide itself with a           
justification and a  good conscience4   
,this reconciliation for consciousness  
was found in the  ,happiness-doctrine3  
the fixed point it started from being   
the empirical  subject1 and what it was 

reconciled to1 the vulgar actuality1    
whereon  it might now confide1 and to   
which it might surrender itself without 
sin4 ,the profound coarseness and utter 
vulgarity1 which is at the basis  of    
this happiness-doctrine1 has its only   
elevation in its striving  after        
justification and a good conscience1    
which however can get no  further than  
the objectivity of mere intellectualism4
    ',the dogmatism of eudaemonism and  
of popular philosophy 7,aufklrung7      
therefore did not consist in the fact   
that it made happiness and  enjoyment   
the supreme good4 ,for if ,happiness be 
comprehended as an  ,idea1 it ceases to 
be something empirical and casual--as   
also to be  anything sensuous4 ,in the  
supreme existence1 reasonable act       
7,thun7 and  supreme enjoyment are one4 
,so long as supreme blessedness is      
supreme  ,idea it matters not whether we
 try to apprehend the supreme existence 
on the side of its ideality1--which1 as 
isolated may be first called  reasonable

 act--or on the side of its             
reality--which as isolated may  be first
 called enjoyment and feeling4 ,for     
reasonable act and supreme  enjoyment1  
ideality and reality are both alike in  
it and identical4  ,every philosophy has
 only one problem--to construe supreme  
blessedness  as supreme ,idea4 ,so long 
as it is by reason that supreme         
enjoyment is  ascertained1 the          
distinguishability of the two at once   
disappears3  for this comprehension and 
the infinity which is dominant in act1  
and  the reality and finitude which is  
dominant in enjoyment1 are taken up     
into one another4 ,the controversy with 
happiness becomes a meaningless         
chatter1 when happiness is known as the 
blessed enjoyment of the  eternal       
intuition4 ,but what was called         
eudaemonism meant--it must  be said--an 
empirical happiness1 an enjoyment of    
sensation1 not the  eternal intuition   
and blessedness4'    ,p4 #aab1  #ee4    
,schiller4 ,ueber die aesthetische      

,erziehung des  ,menschen7#agie71 #ahth 
letter4 ',through beauty the sensuous   
man is led  to form and to thought2     
through beauty the intellectual man is  
led back  to matter and restored to the 
sense-world4 ,beauty combines two states
  which are opposed to one another4'    
,letter #be4 ',we need not then have    
any difficulty about finding a way from 
sensuous dependence to moral  liberty1  
after beauty has given a case where     
liberty can completely  co-exist with   
dependence1 and where man in order to   
show himself an  intelligence need not  
make his escape from matter4 ,if--as the
 fact  of beauty teaches--man is free   
even in association with the senses1    
and if--as the conception necessarily   
involves--liberty is something  absolute
 and supersensible1 there can no longer 
be any question how  he comes to elevate
 himself from limitations to the        
absolute3 for  in beauty this has       
already come to pass4' ,cf4 ,ueber      
,anmuth und  ,wrde7#agic74 ',it is in a 

beautiful soul1 then1 that sense and    
reason1  duty and inclination harmonize2
 and grace is their expression in the   
appearance4 ,only in the service of a   
beautiful soul can nature at the  same  
time possess liberty4' 7,see            
,bosanquet's ,history of ,aesthetic47   
,p4 #aae1  #fj4 ,the quotation in the   
note comes from  #hg of the ,kritik  der
 ,urtheilskraft 7,werke1 ed4 ,ros4 and  
,sch4 iv4 #ceg74    ,p4 #abj1  #fj4     
,fichte1 ,werke1 i4 #bgi4 ',the         
principle of life and  consciousness1   
the ground of its possibility1 is 7as   
has been shown7  certainly contained in 
the ,ego3 yet by this means there arises
 no  actual life1 no empirical life in  
time--and another life is for us        
utterly unthinkable4 ,if such an actual 
life is to be possible1 there  is still 
needed for that a special impulse       
7,aufstoss7 striking the  ,ego from the 
,non-ego4 ,according to my system1      
therefore1 the ultimate  ground of all  
actuality for the ,ego is an original   

action and re-action  between the ,ego  
and something outside it1 of which all  
that can be said  is that it must be    
completely opposed to the ,ego4 ,in this
 reciprocal  action nothing is brought  
into the ,ego1 nothing foreign imported2
  everything that is developed from it  
ad infinitum is developed from  it      
solely according to its own laws4 ,the  
,ego is merely put in motion by  that   
opposite1 so as to act2 and without such
 a first mover it would  never have     
acted2 and1 as its existence consists   
merely in action1 it  would not even    
have existed4 ,but the source of motion 
has no further  attributes than to set  
in motion1 to be an opposing force which
 as such  is only felt4    ',my         
philosophy therefore is realistic4 ,it  
shows that the consciousness  of finite 
natures cannot at all be explained1     
unless we assume a force  existing      
independently of them1 and completely   
opposed to them2--on  which as regards  
their empirical existence they are      

dependent4 ,but  it asserts nothing     
further than such an opposed force1     
which is  merely felt1 but not cognised1
 by finite beings4 ,all possible        
specifications of this force or non-ego1
 which may present themselves  ad       
infinitum in our consciousness1 my      
system engages to deduce from  the      
specifying faculty of the ,ego4444      
',that the finite mind must necessarily 
assume outside it something  absolute 7a
 ,ding3an3sich71 and yet must on the    
other hand acknowledge  that this       
something only exists for the mind 7is a
 necessary nomenon73  this is the circle
 which may be infinitely expanded1 but  
from which the  finite mind can never   
issue4' ,cf4 ,fichte's ,werke1 i4 #bdh1 
ii4 #dgh4      ,,chapter ,v4    ,p4     
#aba1  #fb4 ,f4 ,h4 ,jacobi 7,werke1 v4 
#hb7 in his ,woldemar 7a  romance       
contained in a series of letters1 first 
published as a whole  in #agha7 writes3 
',the philosophical understanding       
7,verstand7 is jealous  of everything   

unique1 everything immediately certain  
which makes itself  true1 without       
proofs1 solely by its existence4 ,it    
persecutes this  faith of reason even   
into our inmost consciousness1 where it 
tries to  make us distrust the feeling  
of our identity and personality4' ',what
  is absolutely and intrinsically true1'
 he adds 7v4 #abb71 'is not got  by way 
of reasoning and comparison3 both our   
immediate consciousness  7,wissen7--,i  
am--and our conscience 7,gewissen7 are  
the work of a secret  something in which
 heart1 understanding1 and sense        
combine4' ',notions  7,begriffe71 far   
from embalming the living1 really turn  
it into a  corpse' 7v4 #chj74    ,cf4   
,fichte's words 7,werke1 ii4 #bee71 ,aus
 dem ,gewissen allein stammt  die       
,wahrheit1 c4    ,p4 #abb1  #fb4 ,the   
,letters on the doctrine of ,spinoza1   
published in  #aghe1 were re-issued in  
#aghi with eight supplements4    ',a    
science1' says ,jacobi in his latest    
utterance 7,werke1 iv4 pref4  xxx47 'is 

only a systematic register of cognitions
 mutually referring  to one another--the
 first and last point in the series is  
wanting4'    ,p4 #abc1  #fb4 ,lalande's 
dictum is referred to by ,fries         
7,populre  ,vorlesungen ber ,sternkunde1
 #ahac7 quoted by ,jacobi in his ,werke1
  ii4 #ee4 ,what ,lalande has actually  
written in the preface to his work on   
astronomy is that the science as he     
understands it has no relation to       
natural theology--in other words1 that  
he is not writing a ,bridgewater        
treatise4    ,p4 #abc1  #fc4 ,jacobi1   
,werke1 ii4 #bbb4 ',for my part1 ,i     
regard the  principle of reason as all  
one with the principle of life4' ,and   
ii4  #cdc3 ',evidently reason is the    
true and proper life of our nature4'    
,it is in virtue of our inner tendency  
and instinct towards the  eternal       
7,richtung und ,trieb auf das           
,ewige71--of our sense for the          
supersensible--that we1 human beings1   
really subsist 7iv4 #f4 #aeb74 ,and     

this ,organ der ,vernehmung des         
,uebersinnlichen is ,reason 7iii4 #bjc1 
c74    ,the language of ,jacobi         
fluctuates1 not merely in words1 but in 
the  intensity of his intuitionalism4   
,thus1 e4g4 iii4 #cb3 ',the reason man  
has is no faculty giving the science of 
the true1 but only a presage'  7,ahndung
 des ,wahren74 ',the belief in a ,god1' 
he says1 at one time 7iii4  #bjf7 'is as
 natural to man as his upright          
position'3 but that belief  is1 he says 
elsewhere1 only 'an inborn devotion     
7,andacht7 before an  unknown ,god4'    
,thus1 if we have an immediate awareness
 7,wissen7 of  ,god1 this is not        
knowledge or science 7,wissenschaft74   
,such intuition  of reason is described 
7ii4 #i7 as 'the faculty of presupposing
 the  intrinsically 7an sich7 true1     
good1 and beautiful1 with full          
confidence  in the objective validity of
 the presupposition4' ,but that object  
we  are let see only in feeling 7ii4    
#fa74 ',our philosophy1' he says 7iii4  

#f7 'starts from feeling--of course an  
objective and pure feeling4'    ,p4     
#abd1  #fc4 ,jacobi 7,werke1 iv4 a1 p4  
#baa73 ',through faith 7,glaube7  we    
know that we have a body4' ,such        
immediate knowledge of our own          
activity--'the feeling of ,i am1 ,i act'
 7iii4 #daa7--the sense of  'absolute   
self-activity' or freedom 7of which the 
'possibility cannot  be cognised1'      
because logically a contradiction7 is   
what ,jacobi calls  ,anschauung         
7,intuition74 ,he distinguishes a       
sensuous1 and a rational  intuition     
7iii4 #ei74    ,p4 #abe1  #fc4 ,jacobi  
expressly disclaims identification of   
his ,glaube  with the faith of          
,christian doctrine 7,werke1 iv4 a1 p4  
#baj74 ,in  defence he quotes from      
,hume1 ,inquiry ,v1 and from ,reid1     
passages to  illustrate his usage of the
 term 'belief--by the distinction       
between  which and faith certain        
ambiguities are no doubt avoided4    ,p4
 #abi1  #ff4 ,kant had said ',concepts  

without intuitions are empty'  ,it is an
 exaggeration of this half-truth 7the   
other half is ,intuitions  without      
concepts are blind7 that is the basis of
 these statements of  ,jacobi 7and of   
,schopenhauer7--a view of which the     
following passage  from ,schelling      
7,werke1 ii4 #abe7 is representative4   
',concepts  7,begriffe7 are only        
silhouettes of reality4 ,they are       
projected by  a serviceable faculty1 the
 understanding1 which only comes into   
action when reality is already on the   
scene1--which only comprehends1         
conceives1 retains what it required a   
creative faculty to produce4444  ,the   
mere concept is a word without          
meaning4444 ,all reality that can       
attach to it is lent to it merely by the
 intuition 7,anschauung7 which  preceded
 it4 444 ,nothing is real for us except 
what is immediately  given us1 without  
any mediation by concepts1 without our  
feeling at  liberty4 ,but nothing       
reaches us immediately except through   

intuition4'  ,he adds1 however1         
',intuition is due to the activity of   
mind 7,sein73  it demands a disengaged  
sense 7freier ,sinn7 and an intellectual
 organ  7geistiges ,organ74'    ,p4     
#acd4 ,cicero3 ,de ,natura ,deorum1 i4  
#af2 ii4 #d1 ,de quo autem omnium       
natura consentit1 id verum esse necesse 
est2 cf4 ,seneca1 ,epist4 cxvii4  #f4   
,the principle is common to ,stoics and 
,epicureans3 it is the maxim  of        
,catholic truth ,quod semper1 quod      
ubique1 quod ab omnibus creditum        
est--equivalent to ,aristotle's   1 '   
--,but as  ,aristotle remarks 7,an4     
,post4 i4 #ca7        4    ,jacobi3     
,werke1 vi4 #ade4 ',the general opinion 
about what is true and  good must have  
an authority equal to reason4'    ,p4   
#acf1  #gb4 ,cf4 ,encyclop4  #djj3      
',that the heart and the feeling  is not
 the form by which anything is justified
 as religious1 moral1  true1 and just1  
and that an appeal to heart and feeling 
either means  nothing or means something

 bad1 should hardly need enforcing4 ,can
 any  experience be more trite than that
 hearts and feelings are also bad1      
evil1 godless1 mean1 c48 ,ay1 that the  
heart is the source of such  feelings   
only1 is directly said in the words3    
,out of the heart proceed  evil         
thoughts1 c4 ,in times when the heart   
and the sentiment are1 by  scientific   
theology and philosophy1 made the       
criterion of goodness1  religion1 and   
morality1 it is necessary to recall     
these trivial  experiences4'            
,,chapter ,,vi4    ,p4 #ade1  #hj4      
,goethe2 the reference is to ,werke1 ii4
 #bfh 7,natur und  ,kunst73        ,wer 
,groszes will1 mu sich zusammenraffen3  
,in der ,beschrnkung zeigt sich erst der
 ,meister1      ,und das ,gesetz nur    
kann uns ,freiheit geben4    ,such      
'limitation' of aim and work is a       
frequent lesson in ,wilhelm  ,meister's 
,wanderjahre1 e4g4 i4 ch4 #d4           
',many-sidedness prepares1  properly    
speaking1 only the element in which the 

one-sided can act4444  ,the best thing  
is to restrict oneself to a handi-work4'
 ,and i4 ch4 #ab3  ',to be acquainted   
with and to exercise one thing rightly  
gives higher  training than mere        
tolerableness 7halfness7 in a hundred   
sorts of  things4' ,and ii4 ch4 #ab3    
',your general training and all         
establishments  for the purpose are     
fool's farces4'    ,p4 #adg1  #ha4 ,cf4 
,fichte1 ,werke1 ii4 #cg4 ',yet it is   
not we who  analyse3 but knowledge      
analyses itself1 and can do so1 because 
in all  its being it is a for-self      
7,fr3sich71' c4    ,p4 #adi1  #ha4      
,plato1 the inventor of ,dialectic4     
,sometimes on the  authority of         
,aristotle1 as reported by ,diog4       
,laert4 ix4 #be1 ,zeno of  ,elea gets   
this title2 but ,hegel refers to such   
statements as ,diog4  ,laer1'1 ii4 #cd  
1    4    ,protagoras4 ,but it is rather
 in the dialogue ,meno1 pp4 #ha-ig1     
that ,plato exhibits this view of       
knowledge4 ,cf4 ,phaedo1#gb ,e1 and     

,phaedrus1 #bde4    ,parmenides2        
especially see ,plat4 ,parmen4 pp4 #adb1
 #aff2 cf4 ,hegel1  ,werke1 xi v4 #bjd4 
,with ,aristotle dialectic is set in    
contrast to apodictic1 and treated  as  
7in the modern sense7 a quasi-inductive 
process 7,ar4 ,top4 ,lib4  viii473 with 
the ,stoics1 dialectic is the name of   
the half-rhetorical  logic which they1  
rather than ,aristotle1 handed on to the
 schoolmen of  the ,middle ,ages4    ,p4
 #aej1  #ha4 ,the physical elements are 
fire1 air1 earth1 and water4            
,earthquakes1 storms1 c1 are examples of
 the 'meteorological process4'  ,cf4    
,encyclop4  #bha-bhi4    ,p4 #aeb1  #hb4
 ,dialectic2 cf3 ,werke1 v4 #cbf seqq4  
,p4 #aed1  #hb4 ,mysticism2 cf4 ,mill's 
,logic1 bk4 v1 ch4 #c1  #d3  ',mysticism
 is neither more nor less than ascribing
 objective existence  to the subjective 
creations of the mind's own faculties1  
to mere ideas  of the intellect2 and    
believing that by watching and          
contemplating  these ideas of its own   

making1 it can read in them what takes  
place in  the world without4' ,mill thus
 takes it as equivalent to an           
ontological  mythology--probably a rare 
use of the term4      ,,chapter ,,vii4  
,p4 #aef1  #he4 ,the ,absolute4 ,the    
term1 in something like its modern      
usage1 is at least as old as ,nicolaus  
,cusanus4 ,god1 according to him1  is   
the absoluta omnium quidditas           
7,apol4#djf71 the esse absolutum1 or    
ipsum esse in existentibus 7,de ludo    
,globi1 ii4 #afa a71 the unum           
absolutum1 the vis absoluta1 or         
possibilitas absoluta1 or valor         
absolutus3 absoluta vita1 absoluta      
ratio3 absoluta essendi forma4 ,on  this
 term and its companion infinities he   
rings perpetual changes4  ,but its      
distinct employment to denote the       
'metaphysical ,god' is much  more       
modern4 ,in ,kant1 e4g4 the             
',unconditioned' 7,das ,unbedingte7  is 
the metaphysical1 corresponding to the  
religious1 conception of  deity2 and the

 same is the case with ,fichte1 who     
however often makes  use of the         
adjective 'absolute4' ,it is with       
,schelling that the term  is naturalised
 in philosophy3 it already appears in   
his works of #agic  and #agie3 and from 
him apparently it finds its way into    
,fichte's  ,darstellung der             
,wissenschaftslehre of #ahja 7,werke1   
ii4 #ac7 ',the  absolute is neither     
knowing nor being2 nor is it identity1  
nor is it  indifference of the two2 but 
it is throughout merely and solely the  
absolute4'    ,the term comes into      
,english philosophical language through 
,coleridge  and later borrowers from the
 ,german4 ,see ,ferrier's ,institutes of
  ,metaphysic1 ,prop4 xx1 and ,mill's   
,examination of ,hamilton1 chap4 iv4    
,p4 #aeh1  #hf4 ,cf4 ,schelling1 iii4   
#cgb3 ,i  ,i expresses the identity     
between the ',i1' in so far as it is the
 producing1 and the ',i' as the         
produced2 the original synthetical and  
yet identical proposition3 the          

cogitosum of ,schelling4    ,p4 #aei4   
,definition of ,god as ,ens realissimum1
 e4g4 ,meier's  ,baumgarten's           
,metaphysic1  #fje4    ,jacobi1 ,werke1 
iv4 #f1 thus describes ,spinoza's ,god4 
,as to the beginning cf4 ,fichte1       
,werke1 ii4 #ad 7speaking of 'absolute  
knowing'73 ',it is not a knowing of     
something1 nor is it a knowing of       
nothing 7so that it would be a knowing  
of somewhat1 but this somewhat  be      
nothing73 it is not even a knowing of   
itself1 for it is no knowledge  at all  
of2--nor is it a knowing 7quantitatively
 and in relation71  but it is 7the7     
knowing 7absolutely qualitatively74 ,it 
is no act1 no  event1 or that somewhat  
is in knowing2 but it is just the       
knowing1 in  which alone all acts and   
all events1 which are there set down1   
can be  set down4'    ,history of       
,philosophy2 cf4 ,hegel1 ,werke1 i4     
#afe4 ',if the ,absolute1  like its     
phenomenon ,reason1 be 7as it is7       
eternally one and the same1  then each  

reason1 which has turned itself upon and
 cognised itself1  has produced a true  
philosophy and solved the problem which1
 like its  solution1 is at all times the
 same4 ,the reason1 which cognises      
itself1  has in philosophy to do only   
with itself3 hence in itself too lies   
its whole work and its activity2 and as 
regards the inward essence of           
philosophy there are neither            
predecessors nor successors4    ',just  
as little1 as of constant improvements1 
can there be talk of  peculiar views of 
philosophy4444 ,the true peculiarity of 
a philosophy  is the interesting        
individuality1 in which reason has      
organised itself  a form from the       
materials of a particular age2 in it the
 particular  speculative reason finds   
spirit of its spirit1 flesh of its      
flesh2 it  beholds itself in it as one  
and the same1 as another living being4  
,each philosophy is perfect in itself1  
and possesses totality1 like a  work of 
genuine art4 ,as little as the works of 

,apelles and ,sophocles1  if ,raphael   
and ,shakespeare had known them1 could  
have seemed to them  mere preliminary   
exercises for themselves--but as cognate
 spiritual  powers2--so little can      
reason in its own earlier formations    
perceive  only useful preparatory       
exercises4' ,cf4 ,schelling1 iv4 #dja4  
,p4 #afj1  #hf4 ,parmenides 7ap4        
,simplic4 ,phys473 of the two ways of   
investigation the first is that it is1  
and that not-to-be is not4              
,p4 #afa1  #hg4 ,the ,buddhists4 ,cf4   
,hegel1 ,werke1 xi4 #chg4 ,modern       
histories of ,buddhism insist upon the  
purely ethico-religious character  of   
the teaching4 ,writers like von         
,hartmann 7,religionsphilosophie1 p4    
#cbj7 on the contrary hold that         
,buddhism carried out the esoteric      
theory  of ,brahmanism to the           
consequence that the abstract one is    
nothing4  ,according to ,vassilief1 ,le 
,bouddhisme1 p4 #cah seqq41 one of the  
,buddhist metaphysical schools1 the     

,madhyamikas1 founded by ,ngrdjuna  #djj
 years after ,buddha1 taught that ,all  
is ,void4--,such metaphysics were       
probably reactions of the underlying    
,brahmanist idea4    ,but generally     
,buddhism 7as was not unnatural #fj     
years ago7 is hardly  taken here in its 
characteristic historical features4     
,p4 #afg1  #hh4 ,aristotle1 ,phys1 i4 #h
 7#aia a4 #bf73 ',those philosophers    
who first sought the truth and the real 
substance of things got on a  false     
track1 like inexperienced travellers who
 fail to discover the  way1 and declared
 that nothing can either come into being
 or disappear1  because it is necessary 
that what comes into being should come  
into  being either from what is or from 
what is not1 and that it is from both   
of these impossible3 for what is does   
not become 7it already is71 and  nothing
 would become from what is not4'    7#e7
 is an addition of ed4 #c 7#ahcj72 cf4  
,werke1 xvii4 #aha4    ,p4 #afh1  #hh4  
,the view of ,heraclitus here taken is  

founded on the  interpretation given by 
,plato 7in the ,theaetetus1#aeb2        
,cratylus1  #dja7 and by ,aristotle1 of 
a fundamental doctrine of the           
,ephesian--which  however is expressed  
in the fragments by the name of the     
everliving  fire4 ,the other phrase     
7,ar4 ,met4 i4 #d7 is used by ,aristotle
 to  describe the position1 not of      
,heraclitus1 but of ,leucippus and      
,democritus4 ,cf4 ,plutarch1 adv4       
,colotem1 #d4 #b           2 cf4        
,simplic4 in ,ar4 ,phys4 fol4 #g4    ,p4
 #afi1  #hi4 ,daseyn3 ,determinate      
being4 ,cf4 ,schelling1 i4 #bji4        
',being 7,seyn7 expresses the absolute1 
,determinate being 7,daseyn7 a          
conditional1 'positing'3 ,actuality1 one
 conditioned in a definite sort  by a   
definite condition4 ,the single         
phenomenon in the whole system  of the  
world has actuality2 the world of       
phenomena in general has  ,daseyn2 but  
the absolutely-posited1 the ,ego1 is4 ,i
 am is all the ,ego  can say of itself4'

    ,p4 #aga1  #ia4 ,being-by-self3     
,an3sich3seyn4    ,spinoza1 ,epist4 #ej1
 figura non aliud quam determinatio et  
determinatio negatio est4    ,p4 #agb1  
#ib4 ,grenze 7limit or boundary71 and   
,schranke 7barrier or  check7 are       
distinguished in ,werke1 iii4 #abh-aci  
7see ,stirling's  ,secret of ,hegel1 i4 
#cgg seqq474 ,cf4 ,kant's remark1 ,krit4
 d4 r4  ,vernunft1 p4 #gie1 that ,hume  
only erschrnkt our intellect1 ohne ihn  
zu  begrenzen4    ,p4 #agc1  #ib4       
,plato1 ,timaeus1 c4 #ce 7formation of  
the world-soul73  ',from the individual 
and ever-identical essence 77 and the   
divisible which is corporeal1 he        
compounded a third intermediate  species
 of essence4444 ,and taking these1 being
 three1 he compounded  them all into one
 form 771 adjusting perforce the        
unmixable nature  of the other and the  
same1 and mingling them all with the    
essence1 and  making of three one again1
 he again distributed this total into as
 many  portions as were fitting1 but    

each of them mingled out of the same and
  the other and the essence4'    ,p4    
#age1  #id4 ,philosophy4 ,cf4           
,schelling1 ,werke1 ii4 #cgg4 ',a       
various  experience has taught me that  
for most men the greatest obstacle to   
the  understanding and vital            
apprehension of philosophy is their     
invincible  opinion that its object is  
to be sought at an infinite distance4   
,the consequence is1 that while they    
should fix their eye on what is  present
 7das ,gegenwrtige71 every effort of    
their mind is called out  to get hold of
 an object which is not in question     
through the whole  inquiry4' 444 ',the  
aim of the sublimest science can only be
 to show the  actuality1--in the        
strictest sense the actuality1 the      
presence1 the  vital existence          
7,daseyn7--of a ,god in the whole of    
things and in each  one4444 ,here we    
deal no longer with an extra-natural or 
supernatural  thing1 but with the       
immediately near1 the alone-actual to   

which we  ourselves also belong1 and in 
which we are4'    ,p4 #agg1  #ie4       
,plato's ,philebus1 ch4 xii-xxiii 7pp4  
#bc-ch73 cf4  ,werke1 xiv4 #bad seqq43  
',the absolute is therefore what in one 
unity  is finite and infinite4'    ,p4  
#agh4 ,idealism of ,philosophy3 cf4     
,schelling1 ii4 #fg4 ',every  philosophy
 therefore is and remains ,idealism2 and
 it is only under  itself that it       
embraces realism and idealism2 only that
 the former  ,idealism should not be    
confused with the latter1 which is of a 
merely  relative kind4'    ,hegel1      
,werke1 iii4 #afc4 ',the proposition    
that the finite is ideal  constitutes   
,idealism4 ,in nothing else consists the
 ,idealism of  philosophy than in       
recognising that the finite has no      
genuine being4444  ,the contrast of     
idealistic and realistic philosophy is  
therefore of  no importance4 ,a         
philosophy that attributed to finite    
existences as  such a genuine ultimate  
absolute being would not deserve the    

name  philosophy4444 ,by ideal is meant 
existing as a representation in         
consciousness3 whatever is in a mental  
concept1 idea or imagination is  ideal3 
ideal is just another word for in       
imagination1--something  not merely     
distinct from the real1 but essentially 
not real4 ,the mind  indeed is the great
 idealist3 in the sensation1            
representation1 thought  of the mind the
 fact has not what is called real       
existence2 in the  simplicity of the    
,ego such external being is only        
suppressed1 existing  for me1 and       
ideally in me4 ,this subjective idealism
 refers only to  the representational   
form1 by which an import is mine4'      
,p4 #ahj1  #if4 ,the distinction of     
nature and mind as real and ideal is    
especially ,schelling's3 ,see e4g4 his  
,einleitung1 c4 iii4 #bgb4 ',if  it is  
the problem of ,transcendental          
,philosophy to subordinate the real  to 
the ideal1 it is on the contrary the    
problem of the philosophy of  nature to 

explain the ideal from the real4'    ,p4
 #ahc1  #ih4 ,newton3 see ,scholium at  
the end of the ,principia1 and  cf4     
,optics1 iii4 qu4 #bh4    ,modern       
,atomism1 besides the conception of     
particles or molecules1 has  that of    
mathematical centres of force4    ,kant1
 ,werke1 v4 #cgi 7ed4 ,rosenk474 ',the  
general principle of the  dynamic of    
material nature is that all reality in  
the objects of the  external senses must
 be regarded as moving force3 whereby   
accordingly  so-called solid or absolute
 impenetrability is banished from       
natural  science as a meaningless       
concept1 and repellent force put in its 
stead2 whereas true and immediate       
attraction is defended against all  the 
subtleties of a self-misconceiving      
metaphysic and declared to be a         
fundamental force necessary for the very
 possibility of the concept of  matter4'
    ,p4 #ahd1  #ih4 ,abraham ,gottheit  
,kstner 7#agai-ahjj71 professor         
forty-four years at ,gttingen1 enjoyed  

in the latter half of the  eighteenth   
century a considerable repute1 both in  
literature and in  mathematical science4
 ,some of1 his epigrams are still       
quoted4    ,p4 #aij1  #ajb4 ,the two    
'moments' of number ,unity1 and ,sum    
7,anzahl71  may be compared with the    
,greek distinction between one and      
7cf4 ,arist4 ,phys4 iv4 #ab    74       
,according  to ,rosenkranz 7,leben      
,hegels7 the classification of          
arithmetical  operations often engaged  
,hegel's research4 ,note the relation in
 ,greek  between  and 4 ,cf4 ,kant's    
view of the 'synthesis' in  arithmetic4 
,p4 #aic1  #ajc4 ,intensive magnitude4  
,cf4 ,kant1 ,kritik der reinen          
,vernunft1 p4 #bjg1 on ,anticipation of 
,perception 7,wahrnehmung71 and p4      
#dad1 in application to the question of 
the soul's persistence4    ,p4 #aie1    
#ajd4 ,not ,aristotle1 but rather       
,simplicius on the ,physics  of         
,aristotle1 fol4 #cjf3 giving ,zeno's   
argument against the alleged            

composition of the line from a series of
 points4 ,what you can say of  one      
supposed small real unit1 you can say of
 a smaller1 and so on ad  infinitum4    
7,cf4 ,burnet's ,early ,greek           
,philosophy1 p4 #cbi47    ,p4 #aif1     
#ajd4 ,the distinction between          
imagination and intellect made  by      
,spinoza in ,ep4 xii4 7olim xxix47 in   
,opp4 ed4 ,land vol4 ii4 #dj  seqq4 is  
analogous to that already noted 7p4     
#djb7 between ratio and  intellegentia1 
and is connected1 as by ,bothius1 with  
the distinction  which ,plato1 ,timaeus1
 #cg1 draws between eternity 77 and     
time4    ,the infinite 7,eth4 i4 prop4  
#h4 ,schol4 ,i7 is the 'absolute        
affirmation  of a certain nature's      
existence1' as opposed to finitude which
 is  really ex parte negatio4 ',the     
problem has always been held extremely  
difficult1 if not inextricable1 because 
people did not distinguish  between what
 is concluded to be infinite by its own 
nature and the  force of its definition1

 and what has no ends1 not in virtue of 
its  essence1 but in virtue of its      
cause4 ,it was difficult also because   
they did not distinguish between what is
 called infinite because it  has no     
ends1 and that whose parts 7though we   
may have a maximum and  minimum of it7  
we cannot equate or explicate by any    
number4 ,lastly  because they lid not   
distinguish between what we can only    
understand  7intelligere17 but not      
imagine1 and what we can also imagine4' 
,to illustrate his meaning1 ,spinoza    
calls attention to the distinction  of  
substance from mode1 of eternity from   
duration4 ,we can 'explicate'  the      
existence only of modes by duration3    
that of substance1 'by  eternity1 i4e4  
by an infinite fruition of existence or 
being' 7per  aeternitatem1 hoc est1     
infinitam existendi1 sive1 invita       
latinitate1  essendi fruitionem47 ,the  
attempt therefore to show that extended 
substance is composed of parts is an    
illusion1--which arises because  we look

 at quantity 'abstractly or             
superficially1 as we have it in         
imagination by means of the senses4' ,so
 looking at it1 as we are liable  to do1
 a quantity will be found divisible1    
finite1 composed of parts  and manifold4
 ,but if we look at it as it really     
is1--as a ,substance  --as it is in the 
intellect alone--7which is a work of    
difficulty71 it  will be found infinite1
 indivisible1 and unique4 ',it is only  
therefore  when we abstract duration and
 quantity from substance1 that we use   
time to determine duration and measure  
to determine quantity1 so as to  be able
 to imagine them4 ,eternity and         
substance1 on the other hand1  are no   
objects of imagination but only of      
intellect2 and to try to  explicate them
 by such notions as measure1 time1 and  
number--which are  only modes of        
thinking or rather of imagining--is no  
better than to  fall into imaginative   
raving4' ',nor will even the modes of   
,substance  ever be rightly understood1 

should they be confounded with this sort
  of entia rationis' 7i4e4 modi         
cogitandi subserving the easier         
retention1 explication and imagination  
of things understood7'  or aids to      
imagination4 ,for when we do so1 we     
separate them from  substance1 and from 
the mode in which they flow from        
eternity1 without  which they cannot be 
properly understood4' 7,cf4 ,hegel's    
,werke1 i4 #fc47    ,the verses from    
,albr4 von ,haller come from his poem on
 ,eternity 7#agcf74  ,hegel seems to    
quote from an edition before #aggf1 when
 the fourth line  was added in the      
stanza as it thus finally stood3--      
,ich hufe ungeheure ,zahlen1            
,gebrge ,millionen auf1      ,ich welze 
,zeit auf ,zeit und ,welt auf ,welten   
hin1      ,und wenn ich auf der ,march  
des endlichen nun bin1      ,und von der
 frchterlichen ,hhe      ,mit           
,schwindeln wieder nach dir sehe1       
,ist alle ,macht der ,zahl1 vermehrt mit
 tausend ,malen1      ,noch nicht ein   

,theil von dir4      ,ich tilge sie1 und
 du liegst ganz vor mir4    ,kant1      
,kritik d4 r4 ,vernunft1 p4 #fda4 ',even
 ,eternity1 however eerily  sublime may 
be its description by ,haller1' c4      
,p4 #aig1  #ajd4 ,pythagoras in order of
 time probably comes between            
,anaximenes 7of ,ionia7 and ,xenophanes 
7of ,elea74 ,but the mathematical  and  
metaphysical doctrines attributed to the
 ,pythagorean are known  to us only in  
the form in which they are represented  
in ,plato and  ,aristotle1 i4e4 in a    
later stage of development4 ,the        
,platonists 7cf4  ,arist4 ,met4 i4 #f2  
xi4 #a4 #ab2 xii4 #a4 #g2 cf4 ,plat4    
,rep4 p4 #eaj7  treated mathematical    
fact as mid-way between 'sensibles' and 
'ideas'2  and ,aristotle himself places 
mathematics as a science between        
physical  and metaphysical 7theological7
 philosophy4    ,the tradition 7referred
 to p4 #aih7 about ,pythagoras is given 
by  ,iamblichus1 ,vita ,pyth4 #aae      
seqq43 it forms part of the later       

,neo-,pythagorean legend1 which entered 
literature in the first centuries  of   
the ,christian era4    ,p4 #bja1  #ajg4 
,hebrew hymns3 e4g4 ,psalms lxxiv4 and  
civ42 ,proverbs  viii4 and ,job xxxviii4
 ,vetus verbum est1 says ,leibniz 7ed4  
,erdmann1  p4 #afb71 ,deum omnia        
pondere1 mensura1 numero1 fecisse4      
,p4 #bjb1  #ajh4 ,the antinomy of       
measure4 ,these logical puzzles  are the
 so-called fallacy of ,sorites 7a       
different thing from the                
chain-syllogism of the logic-books72 cf4
 ,cic4 ,acad4 ii4 #bh1 #bi2 ,de  ,divin4
 ii4 #d--;and the  cf4 ,horace1 ,epist4 
ii4 #a-de4      ,,chapter ,,viii4    ,p4
 #baa1  #aac4 ,self-relation--7sich7 auf
 sich beziehen4    ,p4 #bac1  #aae4 ,the
 'laws of thought' is the magniloquent  
title given  in the ,formal ,logic since
 ,kant's day to the principles or maxims
  7principia1 ,grundstze7 which ,kant   
himself described as 'general and       
formal criteria of truth4' ,they include
 the so-called principle of             

contradiction1 with its developments1   
the principle of identity and  excluded 
middle3 to which1 with a desire for     
completeness1 eclectic  logicians have  
added the ,leibnizian principle of the  
reason4 ,hegel  has probably an eye to  
,krug and ,fries in some of his remarks4
 ,the  three laws may be compared and   
contrasted with the three principles1   
--homogeneity1 specification1 and       
continuity of forms1 in ,kant's  ,kritik
 d4 r4 ,vern4 p4 #fhf4    ,p4 #bag1     
#aag4 ,leibniz1 ,nouveaux ,essais1 ,liv4
 ii4 ch4 #bg1  #c 7ed4  ,erdmann1 p4    
#bgc3 cf4 fourth ,letter to ,clarke74   
,il n'y a point deux  individus         
indiscernables4 ,un gentilhomme d'esprit
 de mes amis1 en  parlant avec moi en   
prsence de ,madame l',electrice dans le 
jardin de  ,herrenhausen1 crut qu'il    
trouverait bien deux feuilles entirement
  semblables4 ,madame l',electrice l'en 
dfia1 et il courut longtems en  vain    
pour en chercher4    ,the principle of  
individuation or indiscernibility is3   

',if two  individuals were perfectly    
alike and equal and1 in a word1         
indistinguishable by themselves1 there  
would be no principle of  individuation3
 7,leibniz1 ed4 ,erdm4 p4 #bgg7 ,poser  
deux choses  indiscernables est poser la
 mme chose sous deux noms 7p4 #gef74    
,principium individuationis idem est    
quod absolutae specificationis qu  res  
ita sit determinata1 ut ab aliis omnibus
 distingui possit4    ,p4 #bba1  #aai4  
,polarity4 ,schelling1 ii4 #dhi4 ',the  
law of ,polarity is a  universal law of 
nature'2 cf4 ii4 #dei3 ',it is a first  
principle of a  philosophic theory of   
nature to have a view 7in the whole of  
nature71  on polarity and dualism4' ,but
 he adds 7#dgf71 ',it is time to define 
more accurately the concept of          
polarity4' ,so ,oken1 ,naturphilosophie3
  #gf3 ',a force consisting of two      
principles is called ,polarity4'  #gg3  
',polarity is the first force which     
makes its appearance in the world4'     
#ha3 ',the original movement is a result

 of the original polarity4'    ,p4 #bbc1
  #aai4 ,cf4 ,fichte1 ii4 #ec4 ',to     
everything but this the  logically      
trained thinker can rise4 ,he is on his 
guard against  contradiction4 ,but1 in  
that case1 how about the possibility of 
the  maxim of his own logic that we can 
think no contradiction4 ,in some way  he
 must have got hold of contradiction and
 thought it1 or he could  make no       
communications about it4 ,had such      
people only once regularly  asked       
themselves how they came to think the   
merely possible or  contingent 7the     
not-necessary71 and how they actually do
 so6 ,evidently  they here leap through 
a not-being1 not-thinking1 c1 into the  
utterly  unmediated1 self-initiating1   
free1--into bent non-being1--in short1  
the above contradiction1 as it was laid 
down4 ,with consistent thinkers  the    
result of this incapacity is nothing but
 the utter abolition of  freedom1--the  
most absolute fatalism and ,spinozism4  
,p4 #bbg1 #aba4 ,leibniz 7ed4 ,erdmann1 

p4 #eae74 ',the principle of la  raison 
dterminante is that nothing ever occurs 
without there being a  cause for it1 or 
at least a determinant reason1 i4e4     
something which  may serve to render a  
reason  priori why that is existent     
rather  than in any other way4 ,this    
great principle holds good in all       
events4'  ,cf4 p4 #gjg4 ',the principle 
of sufficient reason is that in virtue  
of which we consider that no fact could 
be found true or consistent1  no        
enunciation truthful1 without there     
being a sufficient reason why  it is so 
and not otherwise4444 ,when a truth is  
necessary1 we can find  the reason of it
 by analysis1 resolving it into simpler 
ideas and  truths1 until we come to     
primitive ideas4444 ,but the sufficient 
reason  ought also to be found in       
contingent truths or truths of fact1    
i4e4  in the series of things spread    
through the universe of creatures1  or  
the resolution into particular reasons  
might go into a limitless  detail3 444  

and as all this detail embraces only    
other antecedent1 or  more detailed     
contingencies1 444 the sufficient or    
final 7dernire7  reason must be outside 
the succession or series of this detail 
of  contingencies1 however infinite it  
might be4 ,and it is thus that the      
final reason of things must be in a     
necessary substance1 in which the       
detail of the changes exists only       
eminenter1 as in the source1--and  it is
 what we call ,god4' 7,monadology       
#cb-ch47    ,hence the supremacy of     
final causes4 ,thus ,opp4 ed4 ,erdmann1 
p4 #fgh3  ,ita fit ut efficientes causae
 pendeant a finalibus1 et spiritualia   
sint natura priora materialibus4        
,accordingly he urges1 p4 #aee1 that    
final cause has not merely a moral and  
religious value in ethics and  theology1
 but is useful even in physics for the  
detection of deep-laid  truths4 ,cf4 p4 
#ajf3 ,c'est sanctifier la ,philosophie 
que de faire  couler ses ruisseaux de la
 fontaine des attributs de ,dieu4 ,bien 

loin  d'exclure les causes finales et la
 considration d'un tre agissant  avec   
sagesse1 c'est de l qu'il faut tout     
dduire en ,physique4 ,cf4  also         
,principes de la ,nature 7,leibn4 ed4   
,erdm4 p4 #gaf73 ',it is  surprising    
that by the sole consideration of       
efficient causes or  of matter1 we could
 not render a reason for those laws of  
movement  discovered in our time4 ,il y 
faut recourir aux causes finales4'      
,p4 #bbh1  #aba ,socrates4 ,the         
antitheses between ,socrates and the    
,sophists belongs in the main to the    
,platonic dialogues1--not co the        
historical ,socrates4 ,it is the        
literary form in which the philosophy of
  ,plato works out its development      
through the criticism of contemporary   
opinions and doctrines4 ,and even in    
,plato's writings the antagonism is     
very unlike what later interpretations  
have made out of it4    ,p4 #bca1  #abd4
 ,thing by itself 7thing in itself7 the 
,ding3an3sich4    ,p4 #bce1  #abf4 ,cf4 

,encycl4  #ccd 7,werke1 viii4 #a4 p4    
#daa74 ',in  empirical chemistry the    
chief object is the particularity of the
  matters and products1 which are       
grouped by superficial abstract         
features which make impossible any      
system in the special detail4 ,in  these
 lists1 metals1 oxygen1 hydrogen1       
c4--metalloids1 sulphur1  phosphorus    
appear side by side as simple chemical  
bodies on the same  level4 ,the great   
physical variety of these bodies must of
 itself create  a prepossession against 
such coordination2 and their chemical   
origin1  the process from which they    
issue1 is clearly no less various4 ,but 
in an equally chaotic way1 more abstract
 and more real processes are  put on the
 same level4 ,if all this is to get     
scientific form1 every  product ought to
 be determined according to the grade of
 the concrete  and completely developed 
process from which it essentially       
issues1 and  which gives it its peculiar
 significance2 and for that purpose it  

is  not less essential to distinguish   
grades in abstractness or reality  of   
the process4 ,animal and vegetable      
substances in any case belong  to a     
quite other order3 so little can their  
nature be understood from  the chemical 
process1 that they are rather destroyed 
in it1 and only  the way of their death 
is apprehended4 ,these substances1      
however1  ought above all to serve to   
counter-act the metaphysic predominant  
in chemistry as in physics1--the ideas  
or rather wild fancies of the           
unalterability of matters under all     
circumstances1 as well as the           
categories of the composition and the   
consistence of bodies from  such        
matters4 ,we see it generally admitted  
that chemical matters lose  in          
combination the properties which they   
show in separation3 and yet  we find the
 idea prevailing that they are the same 
things without the  properties as they  
are with them1--so that as things with  
these  properties they are not results  

of the process4'--,cf4 ,werke1 vii4 a4  
#cgb3 ',air does not consist of oxygen  
and nitrogen3 but these are the  forms  
under which air is put1' cf4 ib4#djc4   
,p4 #bda1  #aca4 ,fichte's ,sonnenklarer
 ,bericht appeared in #ahja4    ,p4     
#bdg1  #acf4 ,herder's ,gott3 ,gesprche 
ber ,spinoza's ,system1 #aghg1  #bnd ed4
 #ahjj4 ',god is1 in the highest and    
unique sense of the word1  ,force1 i4e4 
the primal force of all forces1 the soul
 of all souls'  7p4 #fc71 ',all that we 
call matter1 therefore1 is more or less 
animate3  it is a realm of efficient    
forces4 ,one force predominates3        
otherwise  there were no one1 no whole' 
7p4 #bjg74 ',the supreme being 7,daseyn7
  could give its creatures nothing      
higher than being4 7,theophron47 ,but1  
my friend1 being and being1 however     
simple in the concept1 are in their     
estate very different2 and what do you  
suppose1 ,philolaus1 marks its  grades  
and differences8 7,phil47 ,nothing but  
forces4 ,in ,god himself  we found no   

higher conception2 but all his forces   
were only one4 ,the  supreme force could
 not be other than supreme goodness and 
wisdom1  ever-living1 ever-active4      
7,theoph47 ,now you yourself see1       
,philolaus1  that the supreme1 or rather
 the ,all 7for ,god is not a supreme    
unit in  a scale of beings like         
himself71 could not reveal himself      
otherwise  than in the universe as      
active4 ,in him nothing could slumber1  
and what  he expressed was himself4 ,he 
is before everything1 and everything    
subsists in him3 the whole world an     
expression1 an appearance of his        
ever-living1 ever-acting forces' 7p4    
#bjj74    ',it was the mistake of       
,spinoza1' says ,herder1 'to be unduly  
influenced  by the ,cartesian           
phraseology4 ,had he chosen the         
conception of force and  effect1        
everything would have gone easier1 and  
his system become much  more distinct   
and coherent4 ',had he developed the    
conception of power1  and the conception

 of matter1 he must in conformity with  
his system  necessarily have come to the
 conception of forces1 which work as    
well  in matter as in organs of         
thinking3 he would in that case have    
regarded  power and thought as forces1  
e4g4 as one4' 7,cf4 ,h4 ,spencer1       
',force1  the ,ultimate of ,ultimates4' 
,first ,princ4 p #afi7    ,according to 
,rosenkranz 7,leben ,hegels1 p4 #bbc7   
there exists in  manuscript a criticism 
by ,hegel on the second edition of      
,herder's  ,god4 ,herder's ,dialogue    
belongs to the controversy aroused by   
,jacobi's  letters on ,spinoza4    ,p4  
#bej1  #acf4 ,newton4 ,leibniz charges  
him with the view that ,god needs  from 
time to time remonter sa montre1        
otherwise it would cease going3  that   
his machine requires to be cleaned      
7dcrasser7 by extraordinary  aid' 7ed4  
,erdm4 p4 #gdf74    ,p4 #beb1  #adj4    
,the verses quoted occur in ,goethe's   
,werke ii4 #cgf1  under the heading     
,allerdings4 ,originally the first four 

lines appeared  in ,haller's poem ,die  
menschlichen ,tugenden thus--           
,ins ,innre der ,natur bringt sein      
erschaffner ,geist3      ,zu glcklich1  
wenn sie noch die ure ,schale weist6    
7,to nature's heart there penetrates no 
mere created mind3      ,too happy if   
she but display the outside of her      
rind47    ,hegel--reading weizt for     
weist--takes the second line as         
,too happy1 if he can but know the      
outside of her rind4    ,goethe's attack
 upon a vulgar misuse of the lines      
belongs to his  dispute with the        
scientists4 ,his verses appeared in     
#ahbj as ,heiteres  ,reimstck at the end
 of ,heft #c zur ,morphologie1--of which
 the  closing section is entitled       
,freundlicher ,zuruf 7,werke xxvii4     
#afa71  as follows3--        ,ins ,innre
 der ,natur1      ,o du ,philister6--   
,dringt kein erschaffner ,geist4      4 
4    4    4    4    4      ,glckselig6  
wem sie nur      ,die ure ,schale       
weis't4      ,das hr' ich sechzig ,jahre

 wiederholen1      ,ich fluche drauf1   
aber verstohlen3      ,sage mir taufend 
tausendmale3      ,alles giebt sie      
reichlich und gern2      ,natur hat     
weder ,stern      ,noch ,schale1        
,alles ist sie mit einem ,male4    ,the 
last seven lines may be thus paraphrased
 in continuation3        ,i swear--of   
course but to myself--as rings within my
 ears      ,that same old warning o'er  
and o'er again for sixty years1         
,and thus a thousand thousand times ,i  
answer in my mind3      --,with gladsome
 and ungrudging hand metes nature from  
her store3      ,she keeps not back the 
core1      ,nor separates the rind1     
,but all in each both rind and core has 
evermore combined4    ,p4 #bed1  #adj4  
,plato and ,aristotle3 cf4 ,plato1      
,phaedrus1 #bdg ,a  7o    o 72 ,timaeus1
 #bi ,e2 and ,aristotle1  ,metaph4 i4   
#b4 #bb4    ,p4 #bef1  #adj4 ,goethe3   
,smmtl4 ,werke1 iii4 #bjc 7,maxime und  
,reflexionen74 ,gegen groe ,vorzge eines
 ,andern giebt es kein  ,rettungsmittel 

als die ,liebe4 ,cf4 ,schiller to       
,goethe1 #b ,july1 #agif4  ',how vividly
 ,i have felt on this occasion 444 that 
against surpassing  merit nothing but   
,love gives liberty' 7da es dem         
,vortrefflichen  gegenber seine         
,freiheit giebt als die ,liebe74        
',pragmatic4' ,this word1 denoting a    
meddlesome busybody in older ,english   
and sometimes made a vague term of      
abuse1 has been in the present  century 
used in ,english as it is here employed 
in ,german4    ,according to ,polybius1 
ix4 ,i4 #b1 the      is that which has a
 directly utilitarian aim4 ,so ,kant1   
,foundation of  ,metaph4 of ,ethic      
7,werke1 viii4 #da1 note73 ',a history  
is pragmatically  composed when it      
renders prudent1 i4e4 instructs the     
world how it may  secure its advantage  
better or at least as well as the ages  
preceding4'  ,schelling 7v4 #cjh7 quotes
 in illustration of pragmatic           
history-writing  the words of ,faust to 
,wagner 7,goethe1 xi4 #bf73        ,was 

ihr den ,geist der ,zeiten heisst1      
,das ist im ,grund der herren eigner    
,geist11      ,in dem die ,zeiten sich  
bespiegeln4    ,cf4 also ,hegel1 ,werke1
 ix4 #h4 ',a second kind of reflectional
 history  is the pragmatic4 ,when we    
have to do with the past and are engaged
  with a distant world1 the mind sees   
rising before it a present1 which  it   
has from its own action as a reward for 
its trouble4 ,the events are  different2
 but their central and universal fact1  
their structural  plan is identical4    
,this abolishes the past and makes the  
event  present4 ,pragmatic reflections1 
however abstract they be1 are thus in   
reality the present1 and vivify the     
tales of the past with the life of      
to-day4--,here too a word should        
specially be given to the moralising    
and the moral instructions to be gained 
through history1--for which it  was     
often studied4444 ,rulers1 statesmen1   
nations1 are especially bidden  learn   
from the experience of history4 ,but    

what experience and history  teach is   
that nations and governments never have 
learned anything from  history1 or acted
 upon teaching which could have been    
drawn from it4'    ,cf4 ,froude3        
,divorce of ,catherine1 p4 #b4 ',the    
student 7of history7  looks for an      
explanation 7of political conduct7 in   
elements which he  thinks he            
understands--in pride1 ambition1 fear1  
avarice1 jealousy1 or  sensuality4'     
,p4 #beg1  #ada4 ,cf4 ,goethe1 xxiii1   
#bih4 ',what is the outside of an       
organic nature but the ever-varied      
phenomenon of the inside8 ,this         
outside1 this surface is so exactly     
adapted to a varied1 complex1  delicate1
 inward structure that it thus itself   
becomes an inside3  both aspects1 the   
outside and the inside1 standing in most
 direct  correlation alike in the       
quietest existence and in the most      
violent  movement4'    ,p4 #bfj1  #adc4 
,kant1 ,kritik der reinen ,vernunft1    
#bnd ed4 p4 #bff4    ,p4 #bfi1  #adg4   

,cf4 ,schelling1 ,werke1 v4 #bij 7cf4   
iii4 #fjc74 ',there  are three periods  
of history1 that of nature1 of destiny1 
and of  providence4 ,these three ideas  
express the same identity1 but in a     
different way4 ,destiny too is          
providence1 but recognised in the real1 
as providence1 is also destiny1 but     
beheld 7angeschaut7 in the ideal4'      
,p4 #bge1  #aea4 ,on the relation       
between ,spinoza and ,leibniz cf4       
,hegel1  ,werke1 iv4 #ahg-aic4 ,it would
 be a mistake1 however1 to represent    
,leibniz as mainly engaged in a work of 
conscious antagonism to ,spinoza4    ,p4
 #bgg1  #aec4 ,jacobi4--,jacobi 7like   
,schopenhauer7 insists specially on  the
 distinction between grounds            
7,grnde7--which are formal1 logical1    
and verbal1 and causes                  
7,ursachen7--which carry us into reality
 and  life and nature4 ,to transform the
 mere ,because into the cause  we must  
7he says7 pass from logic and the       
analytical understanding  to experience 

and the inner life4 ,instead of the     
timelessness of  simultaneity which     
characterises the logical relation cf   
ground and  consequent1 the nexus of    
cause and effect introduces the element 
of time1--thereby acquiring reality     
7,jacobi1 ,werke1 iii4 #deb74  ,the     
conception of ,cause--meaningless as a  
mere category of abstract  thought--gets
 reality as a factor in experience1 ein 
,erfahrungsbegriff1  and is immediately 
given to us in the consciousness of our 
own  causality 7,jacobi1 ,werke1 iv4    
#ade-aeh74 ,cf4 ,kant1 ,kritik der      
reinen  ,vern4 p4 #aaf4    ,p4 #bhc1    
#aeh4 ,the ,amor intellectualis ,dei    
7,spinoza1 ,eth4 v4 #cb7  is described  
as a consequence of the third grade of  
cognition1 viz4  the scientia intuitiva 
which 'proceeds from an adequate idea of
 the  formal essence of certain         
attributes of ,god to the adequate      
cognition  of the essence of things 7ii4
 #dj1 ,schol4 #b74 ,from it arises 7v4  
#bg71 the highest possible acquiescentia

 mentis1 in which the mind  contemplates
 all things sub specie aeternitatis 7v4 
#bi71 knows itself  to be in ,god and   
sees itself and all things in their     
divine essence4  ,but this intellectual 
love of mind towards ,god is part of the
 infinite  love wherewith ,god loves    
himself 7v4 #cf7 ',from these things we 
clearly  understand in what our         
salvation or blessedness or liberty     
consists3 to  wit1 in the constant and  
eternal love towards ,god1 or in the    
love of  ,god towards men' 7,schol4 to  
v4 #cf74      ,,chapter ,,ix4    ,page  
#bhi1  #afa4 ,evolution and development 
in the stricter sense  in which these   
terms were originally used in the       
seventeenth and  eighteenth centuries   
imply a theory of preformation1         
according  to which the growth of an    
organic being is simply a process of    
enlarging and filling out a miniature   
organism1 actual but invisible1  because
 too inconspicuous4 ,such was the       
doctrine adopted by ,leibniz            

7,considrations sur le principe de vie2 
,systme nouveau de la ,nature1  c74     
,according to it development is no real 
generation of new parts1  but only an   
augmentation into bulk and visibility of
 parts already  outlined4 ,this doctrine
 of preformation 7as opposed to         
epigenesis7  is carried out by ,charles 
,bonnet1 who in his ,considrations sur  
les  corps organiss 7#agfb7 propounds   
the further hypothesis that the  'germs'
 from which living beings proceed       
contain1 enclosed one within  another1  
the germs of all creatures yet to be4   
,this is the hypothesis  of             
',embotement4' ',the system which       
regards generations as mere  educts'    
says ,kant 7,kritik der ,urteilskraft1  
#hj2 ,werke1 iv4 #cah7  'is called that 
of individual preformation or the       
evolution theory3  the system which     
regards them as products is called      
,epigenesis4--which  might also be      
called the theory of generic            
preformation1 considering  that the     

productive powers of the gnrants follow 
the inherent  tendencies belonging to   
the family characteristics1 and that the
  specific form is therefore a 'virtual'
 preformation1 in this way the  opposing
 theory of individual preformation might
 be better called  the involution       
theory1 or theory of ,einschachtelung   
7,embotement47  ,cf4 ,leibniz 7,werke1  
,erdmann1 #gae74 ',as animals generally 
are not  entirely born at conception or 
generation1 no more do they entirely    
perish at what we call death2 for it is 
reasonable that what does  not commence 
naturally1 does not finish either in the
 order of nature4  ,thus quitting their 
mask or their rags1 they only return to 
a subtler  theatre1 where however they  
can be as sensible and well regulated as
  in the greater4444 ,thus not only the 
souls1 but even the animals are  neither
 generable nor perishable3 they are only
 developed1 enveloped1  re-clothed1     
unclothed1--transformed4 ,the souls     
never altogether quit  their body1 and  

do not pass from one body into another  
body which is  entirely new to them4    
,there is therefore no metempsychosis1  
but there  is metamorphosis4 ,the       
animals change1 take and quit only      
parts3 which  takes place little by     
little and by small imperceptible       
parcels1 but  continually1 in nutrition3
 and takes place suddenly notably but   
rarely1  at conception1 or at death1    
which make them gain or lose much all at
  once4'    ,the theory of ,embotement  
or ,envelopment1 according to ,bonnet   
7,considrations1 c4 ch4 ,i7 is that 'the
 germs of all the organised  bodies of  
one species were inclosed 7renferms7 one
 in another1  and have been developed   
successively4' ,so according to ,haller 
7,physiology1 ,tome vii4  #b7 'it is    
evident that in plants the  mother-plant
 contains the germs of several          
generations2 and there is  therefore no 
inherent improbability in the view that 
tous les enfans1  except un1 fussent    
renferms dans l'ovaire de la premire    

,fille  d',eve4' ,cf4 ,weismann's       
,continuity of the ,germ-plasma4 ,yet   
,bonnet  7,contemplation de la ,nature1 
part vii4 ch4 #i1 note #b71 says1 ',the 
germs are not enclosed like boxes or    
cases one in another1 but a germ  forms 
part of another germ1 as a grain forms  
part of the plant in which  it is       
developed4'    ,p4 #bic1  #afc4         
,rousseau1 ,contrat ,social1 liv4 ii4   
ch4 #c4    ,p4 #bif1  #afe4 ,the        
'adequate' idea is a sub-species of the 
'distinct4'  ,when an idea does not     
merely distinguish a thing from others  
7when  it is clear71 or in addition     
represent the characteristic marks      
belonging to the object so distinguished
 7when it is distinct71 but  also brings
 out the farther characteristics of     
these characteristics1  the idea is     
adequate4 ,thus adequate is a sort of   
second power of  distinct4 7,cf4        
,baumeister's ,instit4 ,philos4 ,ration4
 #agfe1  #fd-id47  ,hegel's description 
rather agrees with the 'complete idea'  

'by which  ,i put before my mind singly 
marks sufficient to discern the thing   
represented from all other things in    
every case1 state1 and time'            
7,baumeister1 ib4  #hh74 ,but cf4       
,leibniz1 ed4 ,erdm4 p4 #gi3 notitia    
adaequata4    ,p4 #bih1  #aff4 ,cf4     
,baumeister1 ,instit4 ,phil4 ,rat4      
#ahe3 ,judicium  est idearum conjunctio 
vel separatio4    ,p4 #bii1  #aff4      
,punctum saliens3 the punctum sanguineum
 saliens of  ,harvey 7de ,generat4      
,animal1 exercit4 #ag71 or first        
appearance of the  heart3 the   in the  
egg1 of which ,aristotle 7,hist4  ,anim4
 vi4 #c7 says o       4    ,p4 #cja1    
#afi4 ,cf4 ,whately1 ,logic 7,bk4 ii4   
ch4 ,i1  #b71 ',of these  terms that    
which is spoken of is called the        
subject2 that which is  said of it1 the 
predicate4'    ,p4 #cjc1  #aga4 ,kant1  
,kritik der reinen ,vernunft 7p4 #ie1   
#bnd ed47  #i4    ,p4 #cjd1  #agb4 ,cf4 
,jevons1 ,principles of ,science1 ch4   
#c1 'on limited  identities' and        

'negative propositions4'    ,p4 #cji4   
,ear-lobes4 ,the remark is due to       
,blumenbach3 cf4 ,hegel's  ,werke1 v4   
#bhe4    ,p4 #cab4 ,colours1 i4e4       
painters' colours2 cf4 ,werke1 vii4 #a4 
#cad  7lecture-note74 ',painters are not
 such fools as to be ,newtonians3 they  
have red1 yellow1 and blue1 and out of  
these they make their other  colours4'  
,p4 #cae1  #aha4 ,for the genetic       
classification of judgments and         
syllogisms and the passage from the     
former to the latter compare  especially
 ,lotze's ,logic1 ,book i4 ,and for the 
comprehensive  exhibition of the        
systematic process of judgment and      
inference see ,b4  ,bosanquet's ,logic1 
or the ,morphology of ,knowledge4 ,the  
passage from  ,hegel's ,werke1 v4 #aci1 
quoted at the head of that work is      
parallel to  the sentence in p4 #cah1   
',the interest1 therefore1' c4    ,p4   
#cbj1  #ahf4 ,the letters ,i-,p-,u1 of  
course1 stand for ,individual1          
,particular1 and ,universal4    ,p4     

#cba1  #ahg4 ,fourth figure4 ,this      
so-called ,galenian figure was          
differentiated from the first figure by 
the separation of the five  moods1 which
 7after ,arist4 ,an4 pr4 i4 #g and ii4  
,i7 ,theophrastus and  the later pupils1
 down at least to ,bothius1 had         
subjoined to the four  recognised types 
of perfect syllogism4 ,but its ,galenian
 origin is more  than doubtful4    ,p4  
#cbe1  #aij4 ,cf4 ,mill's ,logic1 ,bk4  
ii4 ch4 #c4 ',in every syllogism        
considered as an argument to prove the  
conclusion there is a petitio           
principii4'    ,hegel's ,induction is   
that strictly so called or complete     
induction1 the  argument from the sum of
 actual experiences--that per           
enumerationem  simplicem1 and  4 ,of    
course except by accident or by         
artificial arrangement such completeness
 is impossible in rerum  natura4    ,p4 
#cbf1  #aij4 ,the 'philosophy of        
,nature' referred to here is probably   
that of ,oken and the ,schellingians2   

but later critics 7e4g4 ,riehl1         
,philosoph4 ,criticismus1 iii4 #abj7    
have accused ,hegel himself of even     
greater enormities in this department4  
,p4 #cbh1  #aib4 ,elementarlehre3       
,theory of the ,elements1 called by     
,hamilton 7,lectures on ,logic1 i4 #fe7 
,stoicheiology as opposed to            
methodology4 ,cf4 the ,port ,royal      
,logic4 ,kant's ,kritik observes the    
same division of the subject4    ,p4    
#ccb1  #aic4 ,anselm1 ,proslogium1 c4   
#b4 ,in the ,monologium ,anselm         
expounds the usual argument from        
conditioned to unconditioned 7,est      
igitur unum aliquid1 quod solum maxime  
et summe omnium est2 per quod  est      
quidquid est bonum vel magnum1 el omnino
 quidquid aliquid est4  ,monol4 c4 #c74 
,but in the ,proslogium he seeks an     
argument quod nullo  ad se probandum    
quam se solo indigeret--i4e4 from the   
conception of  7,god as7 the highest and
 greatest that can be 7aliquid quo nihil
 majus  cogitari potest7 he infers its  

being 7sic ergo vere ,,est aliquid  quo 
majus cogitari non potest1 ut nec       
cogitari possit non esse47 ,the         
absolute would not be absolute if the   
idea of it did not ipso facto  imply    
existence4    ,gaunilo of ,marmoutier in
 the ,liber pro insipiente made the     
objection  that the fact of such        
argument being needed showed that idea  
and  reality were prima facie different4
 ,and in fact the argument of  ,anselm  
deals with an ,absolute which is object 
rather than subject1  thought rather    
than thinker2 in human consciousness    
realised1 but  not essentially          
self-affirming--implicit 7an3sich7 only1
 as said in  pp4 #cca1 #ccc4 ,and       
,anselm admits c4 #ae ,domine1 non solum
 es1 quo  majus cogitari nequit1 sed es 
quiddam majus quam cogitari potest      
7transcending our thought74    ,p4 #ccc1
 line #b4 ,this sentence has been       
transposed in the translation4  ,in the 
original it occurs after the quotation  
from the ,latin in p4 #ccb4    ,p4 #ccd1

  #aid4 ,leibniz3 for a brief account of
 the ,monads see ,caird's  ,crit4       
,philosophy of ,j4 ,kant1 i4 #hf-ie4    
,a monad is the simple substance or     
indivisible unity corresponding  to a   
body4 ,it is as simple what the world is
 as a multiplicity3 it  'represents1'   
i4e4 concentrates into unity1 the       
variety of phenomena3  is the expression
 of the material in the immaterial1 of  
the compound in  the simple1 of the     
extended outward in the inward4 ,its    
unity and its  representative capacity  
go together 7cf4 ,lotze1 ,mikrokosmus47 
,it is  the 'present which is full of   
the future and laden with the past' 7ed4
  ,erdm4 p4 #aig72 the point which is   
all-embracing1 the totality of the      
universe4 ,and yet there are monads--in 
the plural4    ,p4 #ccd1  #aid4 ,fichte1
 ,werke1 i4 #dcj4 ',every thorough-going
 dogmatic  philosopher is necessarily a 
fatalist4'    ,p4 #cch1  #aie4 ,cf4     
,encyclop4  #dfc4 ',this supreme        
inwardising of  ideation 7,vorstellung7 

is the supreme self-divestment of       
intelligence1  reducing itself to the   
mere being1 the general space of mere   
names and  meaningless words4 ,the ego1 
which is this abstract being1 is1       
because  subjectivity1 at the same time 
the power over the different names1 the 
empty link which fixes in itself series 
of them and keeps them in fixed  order4'
    ,contemporaneously with ,hegel1     
,herbart turned psychology in the line  
of  a 'statics and dynamics of the      
mind4' ,see 7besides earlier            
suggestions7  his ,de ,attentionis      
mensura causisque primariis 7#ahbb7 and 
his  ,ueber die ,mglichkeit und         
,notwendigkeit1 ,mathematik auf         
,psychologie  anzuwenden 7#ahbb74    ,p4
 #cdj1  #aih4 ,civil society3           
distinguished as the social  and        
economical organisation of the          
bourgeoisie1 with their                 
particularist-universal aims1 from the  
true universal unity of  citoyens in the
 state or ethico-political organism4    

,p4 #cde1  #bjd4 ,inner design3 see     
,kant's ,kritik der ,urtheilskraft1     
#fb4    ,aristotle1 ,de ,anima1 ii4 #d  
7#dae4 b4 #g7  '        3 ii4 #b    '   
4    ,p4 #cdg1  #bjf4 ,neutral first    
water1 cf4 ,encyclop4 #bhd1 'without    
independent individuality1 without      
rigidity and intrinsic  determination1 a
 thorough-going equilibrium4' ,cf4      
,werke1 vii4 #f4  #afh4 ',water is      
absolute neutrality1 not like salt1 an  
individualised  neutrality2 and hence it
 was at an early date called the mother 
of  everything particular4' ',as the    
neutral it is the solvent of acids and  
alkalis4' ,cf4 ,oken's ,lehrbuch der    
,naturphilosophie1  #bid and #dcb4      
,p4 #cdh1  #bjf4 ,conclude              
beschliessen3 ,resolve  entschliessen4  
,cf4  ,chr4 ,sigwart1 ,kleine           
,schriften1 ii4 #aae1 seqq4    ,p4 #cei1
  #baf4 ,aristotle1 ,de ,anim4 ,generat4
 i4 7#gbf4 b4 #bd7            4         
,arist4 ,metaph4 viii4 #f 7#ajde4 b4    
#aa7   7oi7        4    ,p4 #cfj1  #bah4

 ,sensibility1 c4 ,this triplicity 7as  
partly  distinguished by ,haller after  
,glisson7 of the functions of organic   
life  is largely worked out in          
,schelling1 ii4 #dia4    ,p4 #cfa1      
#bai4 ,cf4 ,schelling1 ii4 #edj4 ,as    
walking is a constantly  prevented      
falling1 so life is a constantly        
prevented extinction of the  vital      
process4    ,p4 #cfg1  #bbi4 ,spinoza   
7,eth4 i4 def4 ,i7 defines causa sui as 
id cujus essentia involvit existentiam1 
and 7in def4 #c7 defines  substantia as 
id quod in se est et per se concipitur4 
,schelling3 e4g4 ,darstellung meines    
,systems der ,philosophie 7#ahja71      
7,werke1 iv4 #aad73 ',i call reason the 
absolute reason1 or reason1  in so far  
as it is thought as total indifference  
of subjective and  objective4'    ,p4   
#cfg1  #bcj4 ',mammals distinguish      
themselves'3 unter2 unter3scheiden1     
instead of scheiden3 cf4 ,werke1 ii4    
#aha4 ',the distinctive marks of        
animals1 e4g4 are taken from the claws  

and teeth3 for in fact it  is not merely
 cognition which by this means          
distinguishes one animal  from another3 
but the animal thereby separates itself 
off3 by these  weapons it keeps itself  
to itself and separate from the         
universal4'  ,cf4 ,werke1 vii4 a4 #fea  
seqq4 7,encycl4  #cgj7 where reference  
is  made to ,cuvier1 ,recherches sur les
 ossements fossiles des quadrupdes      
7#ahab71 c4    ,p4 #cfh1  #bcj4 ,kant1  
,kritik der ,urtheilskraft3 ,einleitung1
  #i  7note71 7,werke1 ed4 ,ros4 iv4    
#ci72 see ,caird's ,critical ,philosophy
 of  ,i4 ,kant1 ,book i4 ch4 #e2 also   
,hegel's ,werke1 ii4 #c4    ,p4 #cfi1   
#bca4 ,an example of ,wolfs pedantry is 
given in ,hegel1 ,werke1  v4 #cjg1 from 
,wolfs ,rudiments of ,architecture1     
,theorem viii4 ',a window  must be broad
 enough for two persons to recline      
comfortably in it1 side  by side4       
,proof4 ,it is customary to recline with
 another person on the  window to look  
about4 ,but as the architect ought to   

satisfy the main  views of the owner 7  
,i7 he must make the window broad enough
 for two  persons to recline comfortably
 side by side4'    ',construction'3 cf4 
,werke1 ii4 #ch4 ',instead of its own   
internal life  and spontaneous movement1
 such a simple mode 7as subject1 object1
  cause1 substance1 c47 has expression  
given to it by perception 7here         
sense-consciousness7 on some superficial
 analogy3 and this external  and empty  
application of the formula is called    
,construction4 ,the  procedure shares   
the qualities of all such formalism4    
,how stupid-headed  must be the man1 who
 could not in a quarter of an hour      
master the  theory of asthenic1 sthenic 
and indirectly asthenic diseases' 7this 
is  pointed at ,schelling's ,werke1 iii4
 #bcf7 'and the three corresponding     
curative methods1 and who1 when1 no long
 time since1 such instruction  was      
sufficient1 could not in this short     
period be transformed from  a mere      
practitioner into a scientific          

physician8 ,the formalism of            
,naturphilosophie may teach e4g4 that   
understanding is electricity1  or that  
the animal is nitrogen1 or even that it 
is like the ,south or  the ,north1 or   
that it represents it1--as baldly as is 
here expressed  or with greater         
elaboration in terminology4 ,at such    
teachings the  inexperienced may fall   
into a rapture of admiration1 may       
reverence the  profound genius it       
implies1--may take delight in the       
sprightliness  of language which instead
 of the abstract concept gives the more 
pleasing perceptual image1 and may      
congratulate itself on feeling its  soul
 akin to such splendid achievement4 ,the
 trick of such a wisdom is  as soon     
learnt as it is easy to practice2 its   
repetition1 when it grows  familiar1    
becomes as intolerable as the repetition
 of juggling once  detected4 ,the       
instrument of this monotonous formalism 
is not harder to  manipulate than a     
painter's palette with two colours on   

it1 say red and  green1 the former to   
dye the surface if a historic piece1 the
 latter if  a landscape is asked for4'  
,kant 7,werke1 iii4 #cf7 in the         
',prolegomena to every future           
,metaphysic1'  #g1 says3 ',we find1     
however1 it is the peculiarity  of      
mathematical science that it must first 
exhibit its concept in  a percept1 and  
do so  priori1--hence in a pure percept4
 ,this  observation with regard to the  
nature of mathematics gives a hint as to
  the first and supreme condition of its
 possibility3 it must be based  on some 
pure percept in which it can exhibit all
 its concepts in  concreto and yet      
priori1 or1 as it is called1 construe   
them4'    ,the phrase1 and the emphasis 
on the doctrine1 that perception must be
  taken as an auxiliary in mathematics1'
 belong specially to the second  edition
 of the ,kritik1 e4g4 ,pref4 xii4 ,to   
learn the properties of  the isosceles  
triangle the mathematical student must  
'produce 7by  'construction'7 what he   

himself thought into it and exhibited   
priori according to concepts4'          
',construction1 in general1' says       
,schelling 7,werke1 v4 #beb3  cf4 iv4   
#djg7 'is the exhibition of the         
universal and particular  in            
unity'3--'absolute unity of the ideal   
and the real4' v4 #bbe4  ,darstellung in
 intellektueller ,anschauung ist        
philosophische  ,konstruktion4    ,p4   
#cgb4 ',recollection'  ,erinnerung3 e4g4
 the return from  differentiation and   
externality to simplicity and           
inwardness3  distinguished from         
,gedchtniss  memory 7specially of       
words74    ,p4 #cgc1  #bcf4 ,cf4        
,schelling1 ,werke1 iv4 #dje4 ',every   
particular  object is in its            
absoluteness the ,idea2 and accordingly 
the ,idea is  also the absolute object  
7,gegenstand7 itself1--as the absolutely
 ideal  also the absolutely real4'      
,p4 #cgd1  #bcf4 ,aristotle1 ,metaphys4 
xi4 #i 7#ajgd4 #f4 #cd7     7   71    1 
4 ,cf4 ,arist4 ,metaph4 xii4 #g4    ,p4 

#cgg1 #bci4 ',supposes a correlative'   
ist fr ,eines4 ,on ,seyn3 fr  ,eines1   
cf4 ,werke1 iii4 #afh4 ,das ,idelle ist 
notwendig fr3,eines1 aber  es ist nicht 
fr ein ,anderes3 das ,eine fr welches es
 ist1 ist nur es  selbst4444 ,god is    
therefore for-self 7to himself7 in so   
far as he  himself is that which is for 
him4    ,p4 #cgi1  #bdd4 ,the percipient
 idea 7anschauende ,idee71 of course    
both  object and subject of intuition1  
is opposed to the ,idea 7as logical7  in
 the element of ,thought3 but still as  
,idea and not--to use  ,kant's phrase   
7,kritik der r4 ,vern4  #bf7--;as natura
 materialiter  spectata4        ,,the   
,,end4