,transcribed from the #ahic ,cassell ,company edition by ,david ,price1 email ccx#jgdpglaf4org ,transcriber's note3 ,changed 8considering that the most barbarous1 rude1 and unlearned times have been most subject to tumults1 seditious1 and changes0 to 8considering that the most barbarous1 rude1 and unlearned times have been most subject to tumults1 seditions1 and changes04 ,,cassell',s ,,national ,,library4 99 99 99 99 99 ,,the ,,advancement ,,of ,,learning4 ,,by ,,francis ,,bacon4 ,picture3 ,decorative graphic ,,cassell ,,company1 ,limited3 ,,london1 ,,paris ,,melbourne4 #ahic4 ,,introduction4 8,,the ,,tvvoo ,bookes of ,francis ,bacon4 ,of the proficience and aduancement of ,learning1 divine and humane4 ,to the ,king4 ,at ,london4 ,printed for ,henrie ,tomes1 and are to be sould at his shop at ,graies ,inne ,gate in ,holborne4 #afje40 ,that was the original title-page of the book now in the reader's hand--a living book that led the way to a new world of thought4 ,it was the book in which ,bacon1 early in the reign of ,james the ,first1 prepared the way for a full setting forth of his ,new ,organon1 or instrument of knowledge4 ,the ,organon of ,aristotle was a set of treatises in which ,aristotle had written the doctrine of propositions4 ,study of these treatises was a chief occupation of young men when they passed from school to college1 and proceeded from ,grammar to ,logic1 the second of the ,seven ,sciences4 ,francis ,bacon as a youth of sixteen1 at ,trinity ,college1 ,cambridge1 felt the unfruitfulness of this method of search after truth4 ,he was the son of ,sir ,nicholas ,bacon1 ,queen ,elizabeth's ,lord ,keeper1 and was born at ,york ,house1 in the ,strand1 on the #bbnd of ,january1 #aefa4 ,his mother was the ,lord ,keeper's second wife1 one of two sisters1 of whom the other married ,sir ,william ,cecil1 afterwards ,lord ,burleigh4 ,sir ,nicholas ,bacon had six children by his former marriage1 and by his second wife two sons1 ,antony and ,francis1 of whom ,antony was about two years the elder4 ,the family home was at ,york ,place1 and at ,gorhambury1 near ,st4 ,albans1 from which town1 in its ancient and its modern style1 ,bacon afterwards took his titles of ,verulam and ,st4 ,albans4 ,antony and ,francis ,bacon went together to ,trinity ,college1 ,cambridge1 when ,antony was fourteen years old and ,francis twelve4 ,francis remained at ,cambridge only until his sixteenth year2 and ,dr4 ,rawley1 his chaplain in after-years1 reports of him that 8whilst he was commorant in the ,university1 about sixteen years of age 7as his lordship hath been pleased to impart unto myself71 he first fell into dislike of the philosophy of ,aristotle2 not for the worthlessness of the author1 to whom he would ascribe all high attributes1 but for the unfruitfulness of the way1 being a philosophy 7as his lordship used to say7 only strong for disputatious and contentions1 but barren of the production of works for the benefit of the life of man2 in which mind he continued to his dying day40 ,bacon was sent as a youth of sixteen to ,paris with the ambassador ,sir ,amyas ,paulet1 to begin his training for the public service2 but his father's death1 in ,february1 #aegi1 before he had completed the provision he was making for his youngest children1 obliged him to return to ,london1 and1 at the age of eighteen1 to settle down at ,gray's ,inn to the study of law as a profession4 ,he was admitted to the outer bar in ,june1 #aehb1 and about that time1 at the age of twenty-one1 wrote a sketch of his conception of a ,new ,organon that should lead man to more fruitful knowledge1 in a little ,latin tract1 which he called 8,temporis ,partus ,maximus0 78,the ,greatest ,birth of ,time074 ,in ,november1 #aehd1 ,bacon took his seat in the ,house of ,commons as member for ,melcombe ,regis1 in ,dorsetshire4 ,in ,october1 #aehf1 he sat for ,taunton4 ,he was member afterwards for ,liverpool2 and he was one of those who petitioned for the speedy execution of ,mary ,queen of ,scots4 ,in ,october1 #aehi1 he obtained the reversion of the office of ,clerk of the ,council in the ,star ,chamber1 which was worth #a1fjj or #b1jjj a year2 but for the succession to this office he had to wait until #afjh4 ,it had not yet fallen to him when he wrote his 8,two ,books of the ,advancement of ,learning40 ,in the ,parliament that met in ,february1 #aeic1 ,bacon sat as member for ,middlesex4 ,he raised difficulties of procedure in the way of the grant of a treble subsidy1 by just objection to the joining of the ,lords with the ,commons in a money grant1 and a desire to extend the time allowed for payment from three years to six2 it was1 in fact1 extended to four years4 ,the ,queen was offended4 ,francis ,bacon and his brother ,antony had attached themselves to the young ,earl of ,essex1 who was their friend and patron4 ,the office of ,attorney-,general became vacant4 ,essex asked the ,queen to appoint ,francis ,bacon4 ,the ,queen gave the office to ,sir ,edward ,coke1 who was already ,solicitor-,general1 and by nine years ,bacon's senior4 ,the office of ,solicitor-,general thus became vacant1 and that was sought for ,francis ,bacon4 ,the ,queen1 after delay and hesitation1 gave it1 in ,november1 #aeie1 to ,serjeant ,fleming4 ,the ,earl of ,essex consoled his friend by giving him 8a piece of land0--,twickenham ,park--which ,bacon afterwards sold for #a1hjj--;equal1 say1 to #ab1jjj in present buying power4 ,in #aeig ,bacon was returned to ,parliament as member for ,ipswich1 and in that year he was hoping to marry the rich widow of ,sir ,william ,hatton1 ,essex helping2 but the lady married1 in the next year1 ,sir ,edward ,coke4 ,it was in #aeig that ,bacon published the ,first ,edition of his ,essays4 ,that was a little book containing only ten essays in ,english1 with twelve 8,meditationes ,sacr10 which were essays in ,latin on religious subjects4 ,from #aeig onward to the end of his life1 ,bacon's ,essays were subject to continuous addition and revision4 ,the author's ,second ,edition1 in which the number of the ,essays was increased from ten to thirty-eight1 did not appear until ,november or ,december1 #afab1 seven years later than these two books on the 8,advancement of ,learning20 and the final edition of the ,essays1 in which their number was increased from thirty-eight to fifty-eight1 appeared only in #afbe2 and ,bacon died on the #ith of ,april1 #afbf4 ,the edition of the ,essays published in #aeig1 under ,elizabeth1 marked only the beginning of a course of thought that afterwards flowed in one stream with his teachings in philosophy4 ,in ,february1 #afja1 there was the rebellion of ,essex4 ,francis ,bacon had separated himself from his patron after giving him advice that was disregarded4 ,bacon1 now ,queen's ,counsel1 not only appeared against his old friend1 but with excess of zeal1 by which1 perhaps1 he hoped to win back the ,queen's favour1 he twice obtruded violent attacks upon ,essex when he was not called upon to speak4 ,on the #beth of ,february1 #afja1 ,essex was beheaded4 ,the genius of ,bacon was next employed to justify that act by 8,a ,declaration of the ,practices and ,treasons attempted and committed by ,robert late ,earle of ,essex and his ,complices40 ,but ,james of ,scotland1 on whose behalf ,essex had intervened1 came to the throne by the death of ,elizabeth on the #bdth of ,march1 #afjc4 ,bacon was among the crowd of men who were made knights by ,james ,i41 and he had to justify himself under the new order of things by writing 8,sir ,francis ,bacon his ,apologie in certain ,imputations concerning the late ,earle of ,essex40 ,he was returned to the first ,parliament of ,james ,i4 by ,ipswich and ,st4 ,albans1 and he was confirmed in his office of ,king's ,counsel in ,august1 #afjd2 but he was not appointed to the office of ,solicitor-,general when it became vacant in that year4 ,that was the position of ,francis ,bacon in #afje1 when he published this work1 where in his ,first ,book he pointed out the discredits of learning from human defects of the learned1 and emptiness of many of the studies chosen1 or the way of dealing with them4 ,this came1 he said1 especially by the mistaking or misplacing of the last or furthest end of knowledge1 as if there were sought in it 8a couch whereupon to rest a searching and restless spirit2 or a terrace for a wandering and variable mind to walk up and down with a fair prospect2 or a tower of state for a proud mind to raise itself upon2 or a fort or commanding ground for strife and contention2 or a shop for profit or sale2 and not a rich storehouse for the glory of the ,creator and the relief of man's estate40 ,the rest of the ,first ,book was given to an argument upon the ,dignity of ,learning2 and the ,second ,book1 on the ,advancement of ,learning1 is1 as ,bacon himself described it1 8a general and faithful perambulation of learning1 with an inquiry what parts thereof lie fresh and waste1 and not improved and converted by the industry of man2 to the end that such a plot made and recorded to memory may both minister light to any public designation and also serve to excite voluntary endeavours40 ,bacon makes1 by a sort of exhaustive analysis1 a ground-plan of all subjects of study1 as an intellectual map1 helping the right inquirer in his search for the right path4 ,the right path is that by which he has the best chance of adding to the stock of knowledge in the world something worth labouring for2 and the true worth is in labour for 8the glory of the ,creator and the relief of man's estate40 ,h4 ,m4 ,,the ,,first ,,book ,,of ,,francis ,,bacon2 ,,of ,,the ,,proficience ,,and ,,advancement ,,of ,,learning1 ,,divine ,,and ,,human4 ,to the ,king4 ,,there were under the law1 excellent ,king1 both daily sacrifices and freewill offerings2 the one proceeding upon ordinary observance1 the other upon a devout cheerfulness3 in like manner there belongeth to kings from their servants both tribute of duty and presents of affection4 ,in the former of these ,i hope ,i shall not live to be wanting1 according to my most humble duty and the good pleasure of your ,majesty's employments3 for the latter1 ,i thought it more respective to make choice of some oblation which might rather refer to the propriety and excellency of your individual person1 than to the business of your crown and state4 ,wherefore1 representing your ,majesty many times unto my mind1 and beholding you not with the inquisitive eye of presumption1 to discover that which the ,scripture telleth me is inscrutable1 but with the observant eye of duty and admiration1 leaving aside the other parts of your virtue and fortune1 ,i have been touched--yea1 and possessed--with an extreme wonder at those your virtues and faculties1 which the philosophers call intellectual2 the largeness of your capacity1 the faithfulness of your memory1 the swiftness of your apprehension1 the penetration of your judgment1 and the facility and order of your elocution3 and ,i have often thought that of all the persons living that ,i have known1 your ,majesty were the best instance to make a man of ,plato's opinion1 that all knowledge is but remembrance1 and that the mind of man by ,nature knoweth all things1 and hath but her own native and original notions 7which by the strangeness and darkness of this tabernacle of the body are sequestered7 again revived and restored3 such a light of ,nature ,i have observed in your ,majesty1 and such a readiness to take flame and blaze from the least occasion presented1 or the least spark of another's knowledge delivered4 ,and as the ,scripture saith of the wisest king1 8,that his heart was as the sands of the sea20 which1 though it be one of the largest bodies1 yet it consisteth of the smallest and finest portions2 so hath ,god given your ,majesty a composition of understanding admirable1 being able to compass and comprehend the greatest matters1 and nevertheless to touch and apprehend the least2 whereas it should seem an impossibility in ,nature for the same instrument to make itself fit for great and small works4 ,and for your gift of speech1 ,i call to mind what ,cornelius ,tacitus saith of ,augustus ,csar3 ,augusto profluens1 et qu principem deceret1 eloquentia fuit4 ,for if we note it well1 speech that is uttered with labour and difficulty1 or speech that savoureth of the affectation of art and precepts1 or speech that is framed after the imitation of some pattern of eloquence1 though never so excellent2 all this hath somewhat servile1 and holding of the subject4 ,but your ,majesty's manner of speech is1 indeed1 prince-like1 flowing as from a fountain1 and yet streaming and branching itself into ,nature's order1 full of facility and felicity1 imitating none1 and inimitable by any4 ,and as in your civil estate there appeareth to be an emulation and contention of your ,majesty's virtue with your fortune2 a virtuous disposition with a fortunate regiment2 a virtuous expectation 7when time was7 of your greater fortune1 with a prosperous possession thereof in the due time2 a virtuous observation of the laws of marriage1 with most blessed and happy fruit of marriage2 a virtuous and most ,christian desire of peace1 with a fortunate inclination in your neighbour princes thereunto3 so likewise in these intellectual matters there seemeth to be no less contention between the excellency of your ,majesty's gifts of ,nature and the universality and perfection of your learning4 ,for ,i am well assured that this which ,i shall say is no amplification at all1 but a positive and measured truth2 which is1 that there hath not been since ,christ's time any king or temporal monarch which hath been so learned in all literature and erudition1 divine and human4 ,for let a man seriously and diligently revolve and peruse the succession of the ,emperors of ,rome1 of which ,csar the ,dictator 7who lived some years before ,christ7 and ,marcus ,antoninus were the best learned1 and so descend to the ,emperors of ,grcia1 or of the ,west1 and then to the lines of ,france1 ,spain1 ,england1 ,scotland1 and the rest1 and he shall find this judgment is truly made4 ,for it seemeth much in a king if1 by the compendious extractions of other men's wits and labours1 he can take hold of any superficial ornaments and shows of learning1 or if he countenance and prefer learning and learned men2 but to drink1 indeed1 of the true fountains of learning--nay1 to have such a fountain of learning in himself1 in a king1 and in a king born--is almost a miracle4 ,and the more1 because there is met in your ,majesty a rare conjunction1 as well of divine and sacred literature as of profane and human2 so as your ,majesty standeth invested of that triplicity1 which in great veneration was ascribed to the ancient ,hermes3 the power and fortune of a king1 the knowledge and illumination of a priest1 and the learning and universality of a philosopher4 ,this propriety inherent and individual attribute in your ,majesty deserveth to be expressed not only in the fame and admiration of the present time1 nor in the history or tradition of the ages succeeding1 but also in some solid work1 fixed memorial1 and immortal monument1 bearing a character or signature both of the power of a king and the difference and perfection of such a king4 ,therefore ,i did conclude with myself that ,i could not make unto your ,majesty a better oblation than of some treatise tending to that end1 whereof the sum will consist of these two parts3 the former concerning the excellency of learning and knowledge1 and the excellency of the merit and true glory in the augmentation and propagation thereof2 the latter1 what the particular acts and works are which have been embraced and undertaken for the advancement of learning2 and again1 what defects and undervalues ,i find in such particular acts3 to the end that though ,i cannot positively or affirmatively advise your ,majesty1 or propound unto you framed particulars1 yet ,i may excite your princely cogitations to visit the excellent treasure of your own mind1 and thence to extract particulars for this purpose agreeable to your magnanimity and wisdom4 ,i4 7#a7 ,in the entrance to the former of these--to clear the way and1 as it were1 to make silence1 to have the true testimonies concerning the dignity of learning to be better heard1 without the interruption of tacit objections--,i think good to deliver it from the discredits and disgraces which it hath received1 all from ignorance1 but ignorance severally disguised2 appearing sometimes in the zeal and jealousy of divines1 sometimes in the severity and arrogancy of politics1 and sometimes in the errors and imperfections of learned men themselves4 7#b7 ,i hear the former sort say that knowledge is of those things which are to be accepted of with great limitation and caution2 that the aspiring to overmuch knowledge was the original temptation and sin whereupon ensued the fall of man2 that knowledge hath in it somewhat of the serpent1 and1 therefore1 where it entereth into a man it makes him swell2 ,scientia inflat2 that ,solomon gives a censure1 8,that there is no end of making books1 and that much reading is weariness of the flesh20 and again in another place1 8,that in spacious knowledge there is much contristation1 and that he that increaseth knowledge increaseth anxiety20 that ,saint ,paul gives a caveat1 8,that we be not spoiled through vain philosophy20 that experience demonstrates how learned men have been arch-heretics1 how learned times have been inclined to atheism1 and how the contemplation of second causes doth derogate from our dependence upon ,god1 who is the first cause4 7#c7 ,to discover1 then1 the ignorance and error of this opinion1 and the misunderstanding in the grounds thereof1 it may well appear these men do not observe or consider that it was not the pure knowledge of ,nature and universality1 a knowledge by the light whereof man did give names unto other creatures in ,paradise as they were brought before him according unto their proprieties1 which gave the occasion to the fall2 but it was the proud knowledge of good and evil1 with an intent in man to give law unto himself1 and to depend no more upon ,god's commandments1 which was the form of the temptation4 ,neither is it any quantity of knowledge1 how great soever1 that can make the mind of man to swell2 for nothing can fill1 much less extend the soul of man1 but ,god and the contemplation of ,god2 and1 therefore1 ,solomon1 speaking of the two principal senses of inquisition1 the eye and the ear1 affirmeth that the eye is never satisfied with seeing1 nor the ear with hearing2 and if there be no fulness1 then is the continent greater than the content3 so of knowledge itself and the mind of man1 whereto the senses are but reporters1 he defineth likewise in these words1 placed after that calendar or ephemerides which he maketh of the diversities of times and seasons for all actions and purposes1 and concludeth thus3 8,god hath made all things beautiful1 or decent1 in the true return of their seasons4 ,also ,he hath placed the world in man's heart1 yet cannot man find out the work which ,god worketh from the beginning to the end0--declaring not obscurely that ,god hath framed the mind of man as a mirror or glass1 capable of the image of the universal world1 and joyful to receive the impression thereof1 as the eye joyeth to receive light2 and not only delighted in beholding the variety of things and vicissitude of times1 but raised also to find out and discern the ordinances and decrees which throughout all those changes are infallibly observed4 ,and although he doth insinuate that the supreme or summary law of ,nature 7which he calleth 8the work which ,god worketh from the beginning to the end07 is not possible to be found out by man1 yet that doth not derogate from the capacity of the mind2 but may be referred to the impediments1 as of shortness of life1 ill conjunction of labours1 ill tradition of knowledge over from hand to hand1 and many other inconveniences1 whereunto the condition of man is subject4 ,for that nothing parcel of the world is denied to man's inquiry and invention1 he doth in another place rule over1 when he saith1 8,the spirit of man is as the lamp of ,god1 wherewith ,he searcheth the inwardness of all secrets40 ,if1 then1 such be the capacity and receipt of the mind of man1 it is manifest that there is no danger at all in the proportion or quantity of knowledge1 how large soever1 lest it should make it swell or out-compass itself2 no1 but it is merely the quality of knowledge1 which1 be it in quantity more or less1 if it be taken without the true corrective thereof1 hath in it some nature of venom or malignity1 and some effects of that venom1 which is ventosity or swelling4 ,this corrective spice1 the mixture whereof maketh knowledge so sovereign1 is charity1 which the ,apostle immediately addeth to the former clause2 for so he saith1 8,knowledge bloweth up1 but charity buildeth up20 not unlike unto that which he deilvereth in another place3 8,if ,i spake10 saith he1 8with the tongues of men and angels1 and had not charity1 it were but as a tinkling cymbal40 ,not but that it is an excellent thing to speak with the tongues of men and angels1 but because1 if it be severed from charity1 and not referred to the good of men and mankind1 it hath rather a sounding and unworthy glory than a meriting and substantial virtue4 ,and as for that censure of ,solomon concerning the excess of writing and reading books1 and the anxiety of spirit which redoundeth from knowledge1 and that admonition of ,st4 ,paul1 8,that we be not seduced by vain philosophy10 let those places be rightly understood2 and they do1 indeed1 excellently set forth the true bounds and limitations whereby human knowledge is confined and circumscribed1 and yet without any such contracting or coarctation1 but that it may comprehend all the universal nature of things2 for these limitations are three3 the first1 8,that we do not so place our felicity in knowledge1 as we forget our mortality20 the second1 8,that we make application of our knowledge1 to give ourselves repose and contentment1 and not distaste or repining20 the third1 8,that we do not presume by the contemplation of ,nature to attain to the mysteries of ,god40 ,for as touching the first of these1 ,solomon doth excellently expound himself in another place of the same book1 where he saith3 8,i saw well that knowledge recedeth as far from ignorance as light doth from darkness2 and that the wise man's eyes keep watch in his head1 whereas this fool roundeth about in darkness3 but withal ,i learned that the same mortality involveth them both40 ,and for the second1 certain it is there is no vexation or anxiety of mind which resulteth from knowledge otherwise than merely by accident2 for all knowledge and wonder 7which is the seed of knowledge7 is an impression of pleasure in itself2 but when men fall to framing conclusions out of their knowledge1 applying it to their particular1 and ministering to themselves thereby weak fears or vast desires1 there groweth that carefulness and trouble of mind which is spoken of2 for then knowledge is no more ,lumen siccum1 whereof ,heraclitus the profound said1 ,lumen siccum optima anima2 but it becometh ,lumen madidum1 or maceratum1 being steeped and infused in the humours of the affections4 ,and as for the third point1 it deserveth to be a little stood upon1 and not to be lightly passed over2 for if any man shall think by view and inquiry into these sensible and material things to attain that light1 whereby he may reveal unto himself the nature or will of ,god1 then1 indeed1 is he spoiled by vain philosophy2 for the contemplation of ,god's creatures and works produceth 7having regard to the works and creatures themselves7 knowledge1 but having regard to ,god no perfect knowledge1 but wonder1 which is broken knowledge4 ,and1 therefore1 it was most aptly said by one of ,plato's school1 8,that the sense of man carrieth a resemblance with the sun1 which 7as we see7 openeth and revealeth all the terrestrial globe2 but then1 again1 it obscureth and concealeth the stars and celestial globe3 so doth the sense discover natural things1 but it darkeneth and shutteth up divine40 ,and hence it is true that it hath proceeded1 that divers great learned men have been heretical1 whilst they have sought to fly up to the secrets of the ,deity by this waxen wings of the senses4 ,and as for the conceit that too much knowledge should incline a man to atheism1 and that the ignorance of second causes should make a more devout dependence upon ,god1 which is the first cause2 first1 it is good to ask the question which ,job asked of his friends3 8,will you lie for ,god1 as one man will lie for another1 to gratify him80 ,for certain it is that ,god worketh nothing in ,nature but by second causes2 and if they would have it otherwise believed1 it is mere imposture1 as it were in favour towards ,god1 and nothing else but to offer to the ,author of truth the unclean sacrifice of a lie4 ,but further1 it is an assured truth1 and a conclusion of experience1 that a little or superficial knowledge of philosophy may incline the mind of men to atheism1 but a further proceeding therein doth bring the mind back again to religion4 ,for in the entrance of philosophy1 when the second causes1 which are next unto the senses1 do offer themselves to the mind of man1 if it dwell and stay there it may induce some oblivion of the highest cause2 but when a man passeth on further and seeth the dependence of causes and the works of ,providence2 then1 according to the allegory of the poets1 he will easily believe that the highest link of ,nature's chain must needs he tied to the foot of ,jupiter's chair4 ,to conclude1 therefore1 let no man upon a weak conceit of sobriety or an ill-applied moderation think or maintain that a man can search too far1 or be too well studied in the book of ,god's word1 or in the book of ,god's works1 divinity or philosophy2 but rather let men endeavour an endless progress or proficience in both2 only let men beware that they apply both to charity1 and not to swelling2 to use1 and not to ostentation2 and again1 that they do not unwisely mingle or confound these learnings together4 ,,ii4 7#a7 ,and as for the disgraces which learning receiveth from politics1 they be of this nature3 that learning doth soften men's minds1 and makes them more unapt for the honour and exercise of arms2 that it doth mar and pervert men's dispositions for matter of government and policy1 in making them too curious and irresolute by variety of reading1 or too peremptory or positive by strictness of rules and axioms1 or too immoderate and overweening by reason of the greatness of examples1 or too incompatible and differing from the times by reason of the dissimilitude of examples2 or at least1 that it doth divert men's travails from action and business1 and bringeth them to a love of leisure and privateness2 and that it doth bring into states a relaxation of discipline1 whilst every man is more ready to argue than to obey and execute4 ,out of this conceit ,cato1 surnamed the ,censor1 one of the wisest men indeed that ever lived1 when ,carneades the philosopher came in embassage to ,rome1 and that the young men of ,rome began to flock about him1 being allured with the sweetness and majesty of his eloquence and learning1 gave counsel in open senate that they should give him his despatch with all speed1 lest he should infect and enchant the minds and affections of the youth1 and at unawares bring in an alteration of the manners and customs of the state4 ,out of the same conceit or humour did ,virgil1 turning his pen to the advantage of his country and the disadvantage of his own profession1 make a kind of separation between policy and government1 and between arts and sciences1 in the verses so much renowned1 attributing and challenging the one to the ,romans1 and leaving and yielding the other to the ,grecians3 ,tu regere imperio popules1 ,romane1 memento1 ,h tibi erunt artes1 c4 ,so likewise we see that ,anytus1 the accuser of ,socrates1 laid it as an article of charge and accusation against him1 that he did1 with the variety and power of his discourses and disputatious1 withdraw young men from due reverence to the laws and customs of their country1 and that he did profess a dangerous and pernicious science1 which was to make the worse matter seem the better1 and to suppress truth by force of eloquence and speech4 7#b7 ,but these and the like imputations have rather a countenance of gravity than any ground of justice3 for experience doth warrant that1 both in persons and in times1 there hath been a meeting and concurrence in learning and arms1 flourishing and excelling in the same men and the same ages4 ,for as #8for men1 there cannot be a better nor the hike instance as of that pair1 ,alexander the ,great and ,julius ,csar1 the ,dictator2 whereof the one was ,aristotle's scholar in philosophy1 and the other was ,cicero's rival in eloquence2 or if any man had rather call for scholars that were great generals1 than generals that were great scholars1 let him take ,epaminondas the ,theban1 or ,xenophon the ,athenian2 whereof the one was the first that abated the power of ,sparta1 and the other was the first that made way to the overthrow of the monarchy of ,persia4 ,and this concurrence is yet more visible in times than in persons1 by how much an age is greater object than a man4 ,for both in ,egypt1 ,assyria1 ,persia1 ,grcia1 and ,rome1 the same times that are most renowned for arms are1 likewise1 most admired for learning1 so that the greatest authors and philosophers1 and the greatest captains and governors1 have lived in the same ages4 ,neither can it otherwise he3 for as in man the ripeness of strength of the body and mind cometh much about an age1 save that the strength of the body cometh somewhat the more early1 so in states1 arms and learning1 whereof the one correspondeth to the body1 the other to the soul of man1 have a concurrence or near sequence in times4 7#c7 ,and for matter of policy and government1 that learning1 should rather hurt1 than enable thereunto1 is a thing very improbable2 we see it is accounted an error to commit a natural body to empiric physicians1 which commonly have a few pleasing receipts whereupon they are confident and adventurous1 but know neither the causes of diseases1 nor the complexions of patients1 nor peril of accidents1 nor the true method of cures2 we see it is a like error to rely upon advocates or lawyers which are only men of practice1 and not grounded in their books1 who are many times easily surprised when matter falleth out besides their experience1 to the prejudice of the causes they handle3 so by like reason it cannot be but a matter of doubtful consequence if states be managed by empiric statesmen1 not well mingled with men grounded in learning4 ,but contrariwise1 it is almost without instance contradictory that ever any government was disastrous that was in the hands of learned governors4 ,for howsoever it hath been ordinary with politic men to extenuate and disable learned men by the names of pedantes2 yet in the records of time it appeareth in many particulars that the governments of princes in minority 7notwithstanding the infinite disadvantage of that kind of state7--have nevertheless excelled the government of princes of mature age1 even for that reason which they seek to traduce1 which is that by that occasion the state hath been in the hands of pedantes3 for so was the state of ,rome for the first five years1 which are so much magnified1 during the minority of ,nero1 in the hands of ,seneca1 a pedenti2 so it was again1 for ten years' space or more1 during the minority of ,gordianus the younger1 with great applause and contentation in the hands of ,misitheus1 a pedanti3 so was it before that1 in the minority of ,alexander ,severus1 in like happiness1 in hands not much unlike1 by reason of the rule of the women1 who were aided by the teachers and preceptors4 ,nay1 let a man look into the government of the ,bishops of ,rome1 as by name1 into the government of ,pius ,quintus and ,sextus ,quintus in our times1 who were both at their entrance esteemed but as pedantical friars1 and he shall find that such ,popes do greater things1 and proceed upon truer principles of state1 than those which have ascended to the papacy from an education and breeding in affairs of state and courts of princes2 for although men bred in learning are perhaps to seek in points of convenience and accommodating for the present1 which the ,italians call ragioni di stato1 whereof the same ,pius ,quintus could not hear spoken with patience1 terming them inventions against religion and the moral virtues2 yet on the other side1 to recompense that1 they are perfect in those same plain grounds of religion1 justice1 honour1 and moral virtue1 which if they be well and watchfully pursued1 there will be seldom use of those other1 no more than of physic in a sound or well-dieted body4 ,neither can the experience of one man's life furnish examples and precedents for the event of one man's life4 ,for as it happeneth sometimes that the grandchild1 or other descendant1 resembleth the ancestor more than the son2 so many times occurrences of present times may sort better with ancient examples than with those of the later or immediate times2 and lastly1 the wit of one man can no more countervail learning than one man's means can hold way with a common purse4 7#d7 ,and as for those particular seducements or indispositions of the mind for policy and government1 which learning is pretended to insinuate2 if it be granted that any such thing be1 it must be remembered withal that learning ministereth in every of them greater strength of medicine or remedy than it offereth cause of indisposition or infirmity4 ,for if by a secret operation it make men perplexed and irresolute1 on the other side by plain precept it teacheth them when and upon what ground to resolve2 yea1 and how to carry things in suspense1 without prejudice1 till they resolve4 ,if it make men positive and regular1 it teacheth them what things are in their nature demonstrative1 and what are conjectural1 and as well the use of distinctions and exceptions1 as the latitude of principles and rules4 ,if it mislead by disproportion or dissimilitude of examples1 it teacheth men the force of circumstances1 the errors of comparisons1 and all the cautions of application2 so that in all these it doth rectify more effectually than it can pervert4 ,and these medicines it conveyeth into men's minds much more forcibly by the quickness and penetration of examples4 ,for let a man look into the errors of ,clement ,,vii41 so lively described by ,guicciardini1 who served under him1 or into the errors of ,cicero1 painted out by his own pencil in his ,epistles to ,atticus1 and he will fly apace from being irresolute4 ,let him look into the errors of ,phocion1 and he will beware how he be obstinate or inflexible4 ,let him but read the fable of ,ixion1 and it will hold him from being vaporous or imaginative4 ,let him look into the errors of ,cato ,,ii41 and he will never be one of the ,antipodes1 to tread opposite to the present world4 7#e7 ,and for the conceit that learning should dispose men to leisure and privateness1 and make men slothful3 it were a strange thing if that which accustometh the mind to a perpetual motion and agitation should induce slothfulness1 whereas1 contrariwise1 it may be truly affirmed that no kind of men love business for itself but those that are learned2 for other persons love it for profit1 as a hireling that loves the work for the wages2 or for honour1 as because it beareth them up in the eyes of men1 and refresheth their reputation1 which otherwise would wear2 or because it putteth them in mind of their fortune1 and giveth them occasion to pleasure and displeasure2 or because it exerciseth some faculty wherein they take pride1 and so entertaineth them in good-humour and pleasing conceits towards themselves2 or because it advanceth any other their ends4 ,so that as it is said of untrue valours1 that some men's valours are in the eyes of them that look on1 so such men's industries are in the eyes of others1 or1 at least1 in regard of their own designments2 only learned men love business as an action according to nature1 as agreeable to health of mind as exercise is to health of body1 taking pleasure in the action itself1 and not in the purchase1 so that of all men they are the most indefatigable1 if it be towards any business which can hold or detain their mind4 7#f7 ,and if any man be laborious in reading and study1 and yet idle in business and action1 it groweth from some weakness of body or softness of spirit1 such as ,seneca speaketh of3 ,quidam tam sunt umbratiles1 ut putent in turbido esse quicquid in luce est2 and not of learning3 well may it be that such a point of a man's nature may make him give himself to learning1 but it is not learning that breedeth any such point in his nature4 7#g7 ,and that learning should take up too much time or leisure3 ,i answer1 the most active or busy man that hath been or can be1 hath 7no question7 many vacant times of leisure while he expecteth the tides and returns of business 7except he be either tedious and of no despatch1 or lightly and unworthily ambitious to meddle in things that may be better done by others71 and then the question is but how those spaces and times of leisure shall be filled and spent2 whether in pleasure or in studies2 as was well answered by ,demosthenes to his adversary schines1 that was a man given to pleasure1 and told him 8,that his orations did smell of the lamp40 8,indeed10 said ,demosthenes1 8there is a great difference between the things that you and ,i do by lamp-light40 ,so as no man need doubt that learning will expel business1 but rather it will keep and defend the possession of the mind against idleness and pleasure1 which otherwise at unawares may enter to the prejudice of both4 7#h7 ,again1 for that other conceit that learning should undermine the reverence of laws and government1 it is assuredly a mere depravation and calumny1 without all shadow of truth4 ,for to say that a blind custom of obedience should be a surer obligation than duty taught and understood1 it is to affirm that a blind man may tread surer by a guide than a seeing man can by a light4 ,and it is without all controversy that learning doth make the minds of men gentle1 generous1 manageable1 and pliant to government2 whereas ignorance makes them churlish1 thwart1 and mutinous3 and the evidence of time doth clear this assertion1 considering that the most barbarous1 rude1 and unlearned times have been most subject to tumults1 seditions1 and changes4 7#i7 ,and as to the judgment of ,cato the ,censor1 he was well punished for his blasphemy against learning1 in the same kind wherein he offended2 for when he was past threescore years old1 he was taken with an extreme desire to go to school again1 and to learn the ,greek tongue1 to the end to peruse the ,greek authors2 which doth well demonstrate that his former censure of the ,grecian learning was rather an affected gravity1 than according to the inward sense of his own opinion4 ,and as for ,virgil's verses1 though it pleased him to brave the world in taking to the ,romans the art of empire1 and leaving to others the arts of subjects1 yet so much is manifest--that the ,romans never ascended to that height of empire till the time they had ascended to the height of other arts4 ,for in the time of the two first ,csars1 which had the art of government in greatest perfection1 there lived the best poet1 ,virgilius ,maro2 the best historiographer1 ,titus ,livius2 the best antiquary1 ,marcus ,varro2 and the best or second orator1 ,marcus ,cicero1 that to the memory of man are known4 ,as for the accusation of ,socrates1 the time must be remembered when it was prosecuted2 which was under the ,thirty ,tyrants1 the most base1 bloody1 and envious persons that have governed2 which revolution of state was no sooner over but ,socrates1 whom they had made a person criminal1 was made a person heroical1 and his memory accumulate with honours divine and human2 and those discourses of his which were then termed corrupting of manners1 were after acknowledged for sovereign medicines of the mind and manners1 and so have been received ever since till this day4 ,let this1 therefore1 serve for answer to politiques1 which in their humorous severity1 or in their feigned gravity1 have presumed to throw imputations upon learning2 which redargution nevertheless 7save that we know not whether our labours may extend to other ages7 were not needful for the present1 in regard of the love and reverence towards learning which the example and countenance of two so learned princes1 ,queen ,elizabeth and your ,majesty1 being as ,castor and ,pollux1 lucida sidera1 stars of excellent light and most benign influence1 hath wrought in all men of place and authority in our nation4 ,,iii4 7#a7 ,now therefore we come to that third sort of discredit or diminution of credit that groweth unto learning from learned men themselves1 which commonly cleaveth fastest3 it is either from their fortune1 or from their manners1 or from the nature of their studies4 ,for the first1 it is not in their power2 and the second is accidental2 the third only is proper to be handled3 but because we are not in hand with true measure1 but with popular estimation and conceit1 it is not amiss to speak somewhat of the two former4 ,the derogations therefore which grow to learning from the fortune or condition of learned men1 are either in respect of scarcity of means1 or in respect of privateness of life and meanness of employments4 7#b7 ,concerning want1 and that it is the case of learned men usually to begin with little1 and not to grow rich so fast as other men1 by reason they convert not their labours chiefly to lucre and increase1 it were good to leave the commonplace in commendation of povery to some friar to handle1 to whom much was attributed by ,machiavel in this point when he said1 8,that the kingdom of the clergy had been long before at an end1 if the reputation and reverence towards the poverty of friars had not borne out the scandal of the superfluities and excesses of bishops and prelates40 ,so a man might say that the felicity and delicacy of princes and great persons had long since turned to rudeness and barbarism1 if the poverty of learning had not kept up civility and honour of life2 but without any such advantages1 it is worthy the observation what a reverent and honoured thing poverty of fortune was for some ages in the ,roman state1 which nevertheless was a state without paradoxes4 ,for we see what ,titus ,livius saith in his introduction3 ,cterum aut me amor negotii suscepti fallit aut nulla unquam respublica nec major1 nec sanctior1 nec bonis exemplis ditior fuit2 nec in quam tam sero avaritia luxuriaque immigraverint2 nec ubi tantus ac tam diu paupertati ac parsimoni honos fuerit4 ,we see likewise1 after that the state of ,rome was not itself1 but did degenerate1 how that person that took upon him to be counsellor to ,julius ,csar after his victory where to begin his restoration of the state1 maketh it of all points the most summary to take away the estimation of wealth3 ,verum hc et omnia mala pariter cum honore pecuni desinent2 si neque magistratus1 neque alia vulgo cupienda1 venalia erunt4 ,to conclude this point3 as it was truly said that ,paupertas est virtutis fortuna1 though sometimes it come from vice1 so it may be fitly said that1 though some times it may proceed from misgovernment and accident4 ,surely ,solomon hath pronounced it both in censure1 ,qui festinat ad divitias non erit insons2 and in precept1 8,buy the truth1 and sell it not2 and so of wisdom and knowledge20 judging that means were to be spent upon learning1 and not learning to be applied to means4 ,and as for the privateness or obscureness 7as it may be in vulgar estimation accounted7 of life of contemplative men1 it is a theme so common to extol a private life1 not taxed with sensuality and sloth1 in comparison and to the disadvantage of a civil life1 for safety1 liberty1 pleasure1 and dignity1 or at least freedom from indignity1 as no man handleth it but handleth it well2 such a consonancy it hath to men's conceits in the expressing1 and to men's consents in the allowing4 ,this only ,i will add1 that learned men forgotten in states and not living in the eyes of men1 are like the images of ,cassius and ,brutus in the funeral of ,junia1 of which1 not being represented as many others were1 ,tacitus saith1 ,eo ipso prfulgebant quod non visebantur4 7#c7 ,and for meanness of employment1 that which is most traduced to contempt is that the government of youth is commonly allotted to them2 which age1 because it is the age of least authority1 it is transferred to the disesteeming of those employments wherein youth is conversant1 and which are conversant about youth4 ,but how unjust this traducement is 7if you will reduce things from popularity of opinion to measure of reason7 may appear in that we see men are more curious what they put into a new vessel than into a vessel seasoned2 and what mould they lay about a young plant than about a plant corroborate2 so as this weakest terms and times of all things use to have the best applications and helps4 ,and will you hearken to the ,hebrew rabbins8 8,your young men shall see visions1 and your old men shall dream dreams30 say they1 youth is the worthier age1 for that visions are nearer apparitions of ,god than dreams8 ,and let it be noted that howsoever the condition of life of pedantes hath been scorned upon theatres1 as the ape of tyranny2 and that the modern looseness or negligence hath taken no due regard to the choice of schoolmasters and tutors2 yet the ancient wisdom of the best times did always make a just complaint1 that states were too busy with their laws and too negligent in point of education3 which excellent part of ancient discipline hath been in some sort revived of late times by the colleges of the ,jesuits2 of whom1 although in regard of their superstition ,i may say1 ,quo meliores1 eo deteriores2 yet in regard of this1 and some other points concerning human learning and moral matters1 ,i may say1 as ,agesilaus said to his enemy ,pharnabazus1 ,talis quum sis1 utunam noster esses4 ,and that much touching the discredits drawn from the fortunes of learned men4 7#d7 ,as touching the manners of learned men1 it is a thing personal and individual3 and no doubt there be amongst them1 as in other professions1 of all temperatures3 but yet so as it is not without truth which is said1 that ,abeunt studua in mores1 studies have an influence and operation upon the manners of those that are conversant in them4 7#e7 ,but upon an attentive and indifferent review1 ,i for my part cannot find any disgrace to learning can proceed from the manners of learned men2 not inherent to them as they are learned2 except it be a fault 7which was the supposed fault of ,demosthenes1 ,cicero1 ,cato ,,ii41 ,seneca1 and many more7 that because the times they read of are commonly better than the times they live in1 and the duties taught better than the duties practised1 they contend sometimes too far to bring things to perfection1 and to reduce the corruption of manners to honesty of precepts or examples of too great height4 ,and yet hereof they have caveats enough in their own walks4 ,for ,solon1 when he was asked whether he had given his citizens the best laws1 answered wisely1 8,yea1 of such as they would receive30 and ,plato1 finding that his own heart could not agree with the corrupt manners of his country1 refused to bear place or office1 saying1 8,that a man's country was to be used as his parents were1 that is1 with humble persuasions1 and not with contestations40 ,and ,csar's counsellor put in the same caveat1 ,non ad vetera instituta revocans qu jampridem corruptis moribus ludibrio sunt2 and ,cicero noteth this error directly in ,cato ,,ii4 when he writes to his friend ,atticus1 ,cato optime sentit1 sed nocet interdum reipublic2 loquitur enim tanquam in republic ,platonis1 non tanquam in fce ,romuli4 ,and the same ,cicero doth excuse and expound the philosophers for going too far and being too exact in their prescripts when he saith1 ,isti ipse prceptores virtutis et magistri videntur fines officiorum paulo longius quam natura vellet protulisse1 ut cum ad ultimum animo contendissemus1 ibi tamen1 ubi oportet1 consisteremus3 and yet himself might have said1 ,monitis sum minor ipse meis2 for it was his own fault1 though not in so extreme a degree4 7#f7 ,another fault likewise much of this kind hath been incident to learned men1 which is1 that they have esteemed the preservation1 good1 and honour of their countries or masters before their own fortunes or safeties4 ,for so saith ,demosthenes unto the ,athenians3 8,if it please you to note it1 my counsels unto you are not such whereby ,i should grow great amongst you1 and you become little amongst the ,grecians2 but they be of that nature as they are sometimes not good for me to give1 but are always good for you to follow40 ,and so ,seneca1 after he had consecrated that ,quinquennium ,neronis to the eternal glory of learned governors1 held on his honest and loyal course of good and free counsel after his master grew extremely corrupt in his government4 ,neither can this point otherwise be1 for learning endueth men's minds with a true sense of the frailty of their persons1 the casualty of their fortunes1 and the dignity of their soul and vocation1 so that it is impossible for them to esteem that any greatness of their own fortune can be a true or worthy end of their being and ordainment1 and therefore are desirous to give their account to ,god1 and so likewise to their masters under ,god 7as kings and the states that they serve7 in those words1 ,ecce tibi lucrefeci1 and not ,ecce mihi lucrefeci2 whereas the corrupter sort of mere politiques1 that have not their thoughts established by learning in the love and apprehension of duty1 nor never look abroad into universality1 do refer all things to themselves1 and thrust themselves into the centre of the world1 as if all lines should meet in them and their fortunes1 never caring in all tempests what becomes of the ship of state1 so they may save themselves in the cockboat of their own fortune2 whereas men that feel the weight of duty and know the limits of self-love use to make good their places and duties1 though with peril2 and if they stand in seditious and violent alterations1 it is rather the reverence which many times both adverse parts do give to honesty1 than any versatile advantage of their own carriage4 ,but for this point of tender sense and fast obligation of duty which learning doth endue the mind withal1 howsoever fortune may tax it1 and many in the depth of their corrupt principles may despise it1 yet it will receive an open allowance1 and therefore needs the less disproof or excuse4 7#g7 ,another fault incident commonly to learned men1 which may be more properly defended than truly denied1 is that they fail sometimes in applying themselves to particular persons1 which want of exact application ariseth from two causes--the one1 because the largeness of their mind can hardly confine itself to dwell in the exquisite observation or examination of the nature and customs of one person1 for it is a speech for a lover1 and not for a wise man1 ,satis magnum alter alteri theatrum sumus4 ,nevertheless ,i shall yield that he that cannot contract the sight of his mind as well as disperse and dilate it1 wanteth a great faculty4 ,but there is a second cause1 which is no inability1 but a rejection upon choice and judgment4 ,for the honest and just bounds of observation by one person upon another extend no further but to understand him sufficiently1 whereby not to give him offence1 or whereby to be able to give him faithful counsel1 or whereby to stand upon reasonable guard and caution in respect of a man's self4 ,but to be speculative into another man to the end to know how to work him1 or wind him1 or govern him1 proceedeth from a heart that is double and cloven1 and not entire and ingenuous2 which as in friendship it is want of integrity1 so towards princes or superiors is want of duty4 ,for the custom of the ,levant1 which is that subjects do forbear to gaze or fix their eyes upon princes1 is in the outward ceremony barbarous1 but the moral is good2 for men ought not1 by cunning and bent observations1 to pierce and penetrate into the hearts of kings1 which the ,scripture hath declared to be inscrutable4 7#h7 ,there is yet another fault 7with which ,i will conclude this part7 which is often noted in learned men1 that they do many times fail to observe decency and discretion in their behaviour and carriage1 and commit errors in small and ordinary points of action1 so as the vulgar sort of capacities do make a judgment of them in greater matters by that which they find wanting in them in smaller4 ,but this consequence doth oft deceive men1 for which ,i do refer them over to that which was said by ,themistocles1 arrogantly and uncivilly being applied to himself out of his own mouth1 but1 being applied to the general state of this question1 pertinently and justly1 when1 being invited to touch a lute1 he said1 8,he could not fiddle1 but he could make a small town a great state40 ,so no doubt many may be well seen in the passages of government and policy which are to seek in little and punctual occasions4 ,i refer them also to that which ,plato said of his master ,socrates1 whom he compared to the gallipots of apothecaries1 which on the outside had apes and owls and antiques1 but contained within sovereign and precious liquors and confections2 acknowledging that1 to an external report1 he was not without superficial levities and deformities1 but was inwardly replenished with excellent virtues and powers4 ,and so much touching the point of manners of learned men4 7#i7 ,but in the meantime ,i have no purpose to give allowance to some conditions and courses base and unworthy1 wherein divers professors of learning have wronged themselves and gone too far2 such as were those trencher philosophers which in the later age of the ,roman state were usually in the houses of great persons1 being little better than solemn parasites1 of which kind1 ,lucian maketh a merry description of the philosopher that the great lady took to ride with her in her coach1 and would needs have him carry her little dog1 which he doing officiously and yet uncomely1 the page scoffed and said1 8,that he doubted the philosopher of a ,stoic would turn to be a ,cynic40 ,but1 above all the rest1 this gross and palpable flattery whereunto many not unlearned have abased and abused their wits and pens1 turning 7as ,du ,bartas saith7 ,hecuba into ,helena1 and ,faustina into ,lucretia1 hath most diminished the price and estimation of learning4 ,neither is the modern dedication of books and writings1 as to patrons1 to be commended1 for that books 7such as are worthy the name of books7 ought to have no patrons but truth and reason4 ,and the ancient custom was to dedicate them only to private and equal friends1 or to entitle the books with their names2 or if to kings and great persons1 it was to some such as the argument of the book was fit and proper for2 but these and the like courses may deserve rather reprehension than defence4 7#aj7 ,not that ,i can tax or condemn the morigeration or application of learned men to men in fortune4 ,for the answer was good that ,diogenes made to one that asked him in mockery1 8,how it came to pass that philosophers were the followers of rich men1 and not rich men of philosophers80 ,he answered soberly1 and yet sharply1 8,because the one sort knew what they had need of1 and the other did not40 ,and of the like nature was the answer which ,aristippus made1 when having a petition to ,dionysius1 and no ear given to him1 he fell down at his feet1 whereupon ,dionysius stayed and gave him the hearing1 and granted it2 and afterwards some person1 tender on the behalf of philosophy1 reproved ,aristippus that he would offer the profession of philosophy such an indignity as for a private suit to fall at a tyrant's feet2 but he answered1 8,it was not his fault1 but it was the fault of ,dionysius1 that had his ears in his feet40 ,neither was it accounted weakness1 but discretion1 in him that would not dispute his best with ,adrianus ,csar1 excusing himself1 8,that it was reason to yield to him that commanded thirty legions40 ,these and the like1 applications1 and stooping to points of necessity and convenience1 cannot be disallowed2 for though they may have some outward baseness1 yet in a judgment truly made they are to be accounted submissions to the occasion and not to the person4 ,,iv4 7#a7 ,now ,i proceed to those errors and vanities which have intervened amongst the studies themselves of the learned1 which is that which is principal and proper to the present argument2 wherein my purpose is not to make a justification of the errors1 but by a censure and separation of the errors to make a justification of that which is good and sound1 and to deliver that from the aspersion of the other4 ,for we see that it is the manner of men to scandalise and deprave that which retaineth the state and virtue1 by taking advantage upon that which is corrupt and degenerate1 as the heathens in the primitive ,church used to blemish and taint the ,christians with the faults and corruptions of heretics4 ,but nevertheless ,i have no meaning at this time to make any exact animadversion of the errors and impediments in matters of learning1 which are more secret and remote from vulgar opinion1 but only to speak unto such as do fall under or near unto a popular observation4 7#b7 ,there be therefore chiefly three vanities in studies1 whereby learning hath been most traduced4 ,for those things we do esteem vain which are either false or frivolous1 those which either have no truth or no use2 and those persons we esteem vain which are either credulous or curious2 and curiosity is either in matter or words3 so that in reason as well as in experience there fall out to be these three distempers 7as ,i may term them7 of learning--the first1 fantastical learning2 the second1 contentious learning2 and the last1 delicate learning2 vain imaginations1 vain altercations1 and vain affectations2 and with the last ,i will begin4 ,martin ,luther1 conducted1 no doubt1 by a higher ,providence1 but in discourse of reason1 finding what a province he had undertaken against the ,bishop of ,rome and the degenerate traditions of the ,church1 and finding his own solitude1 being in nowise aided by the opinions of his own time1 was enforced to awake all antiquity1 and to call former times to his succours to make a party against the present time4 ,so that the ancient authors1 both in divinity and in humanity1 which had long time slept in libraries1 began generally to be read and revolved4 ,this1 by consequence1 did draw on a necessity of a more exquisite travail in the languages original1 wherein those authors did write1 for the better understanding of those authors1 and the better advantage of pressing and applying their words4 ,and thereof grew1 again1 a delight in their manner of style and phrase1 and an admiration of that kind of writing1 which was much furthered and precipitated by the enmity and opposition that the propounders of those primitive but seeming new opinions had against the schoolmen1 who were generally of the contrary part1 and whose writings were altogether in a differing style and form2 taking liberty to coin and frame new terms of art to express their own sense1 and to avoid circuit of speech1 without regard to the pureness1 pleasantness1 and 7as ,i may call it7 lawfulness of the phrase or word4 ,and again1 because the great labour then was with the people 7of whom the ,pharisees were wont to say1 ,execrabilis ista turba1 qu non novit legem71 for the winning and persuading of them1 there grew of necessity in chief price and request eloquence and variety of discourse1 as the fittest and forciblest access into the capacity of the vulgar sort2 so that these four causes concurring--the admiration of ancient authors1 the hate of the schoolmen1 the exact study of languages1 and the efficacy of preaching--did bring in an affectionate study of eloquence and copy of speech1 which then began to flourish4 ,this grew speedily to an excess2 for men began to hunt more after words than matter--more after the choiceness of the phrase1 and the round and clean composition of the sentence1 and the sweet falling of the clauses1 and the varying and illustration of their works with tropes and figures1 than after the weight of matter1 worth of subject1 soundness of argument1 life of invention1 or depth of judgment4 ,then grew the flowing and watery vein of ,osorius1 the ,portugal bishop1 to be in price4 ,then did ,sturmius spend such infinite and curious pains upon ,cicero the ,orator and ,hermogenes the ,rhetorician1 besides his own books of ,periods and ,imitation1 and the like4 ,then did ,car of ,cambridge and ,ascham with their lectures and writings almost deify ,cicero and ,demosthenes1 and allure all young men that were studious unto that delicate and polished kind of learning4 ,then did ,erasmus take occasion to make the scoffing echo1 ,decem annos consuumpsi in legendo ,cicerone2 and the echo answered in ,greek1 ,one1 ,asine4 ,then grew the learning of the schoolmen to be utterly despised as barbarous4 ,in sum1 the whole inclination and bent of those times was rather towards copy than weight4 7#c7 ,here therefore is the first distemper of learning1 when men study words and not matter2 whereof1 though ,i have represented an example of late times1 yet it hath been and will be secundum majus et minus in all time4 ,and how is it possible but this should have an operation to discredit learning1 even with vulgar capacities1 when they see learned men's works like the first letter of a patent or limited book1 which though it hath large flourishes1 yet it is but a letter8 ,it seems to me that ,pygmalion's frenzy is a good emblem or portraiture of this vanity2 for words are but the images of matter1 and except they have life of reason and invention1 to fall in love with them is all one as to fall in love with a picture4 7#d7 ,but yet notwithstanding it is a thing not hastily to be condemned1 to clothe and adorn the obscurity even of philosophy itself with sensible and plausible elocution4 ,for hereof we have great examples in ,xenophon1 ,cicero1 ,seneca1 ,plutarch1 and of ,plato also in some degree2 and hereof likewise there is great use1 for surely1 to the severe inquisition of truth and the deep progress into philosophy1 it is some hindrance because it is too early satisfactory to the mind of man1 and quencheth the desire of further search before we come to a just period4 ,but then if a man be to have any use of such knowledge in civil occasions1 of conference1 counsel1 persuasion1 discourse1 or the like1 then shall he find it prepared to his hands in those authors which write in that manner4 ,but the excess of this is so justly contemptible1 that as ,hercules1 when he saw the image of ,adonis1 ,venus' minion1 in a temple1 said in disdain1 ,nil sacri es2 so there is none of ,hercules' followers in learning--that is1 the more severe and laborious sort of inquirers into truth--but will despise those delicacies and affectations1 as indeed capable of no divineness4 ,and thus much of the first disease or distemper of learning4 7#e7 ,the second which followeth is in nature worse than the former3 for as substance of matter is better than beauty of words1 so contrariwise vain matter is worse than vain words3 wherein it seemeth the reprehension of ,st4 ,paul was not only proper for those times1 but prophetical for the times following2 and not only respective to divinity1 but extensive to all knowledge3 ,devita profanas vocum novitates1 et oppositiones falsi nominis scienti4 ,for he assigneth two marks and badges of suspected and falsified science3 the one1 the novelty and strangeness of terms2 the other1 the strictness of positions1 which of necessity doth induce oppositions1 and so questions and altercations4 ,surely1 like as many substances in nature which are solid do putrefy and corrupt into worms2--so it is the property of good and sound knowledge to putrefy and dissolve into a number of subtle1 idle1 unwholesome1 and 7as ,i may term them7 vermiculate questions1 which have indeed a kind of quickness and life of spirit1 but no soundness of matter or goodness of quality4 ,this kind of degenerate learning did chiefly reign amongst the schoolmen1 who having sharp and strong wits1 and abundance of leisure1 and small variety of reading1 but their wits being shut up in the cells of a few authors 7chiefly ,aristotle their dictator7 as their persons were shut up in the cells of monasteries and colleges1 and knowing little history1 either of nature or time1 did out of no great quantity of matter and infinite agitation of wit spin out unto us those laborious webs of learning which are extant in their books4 ,for the wit and mind of man1 if it work upon matter1 which is the contemplation of the creatures of ,god1 worketh according to the stuff and is limited thereby2 but if it work upon itself1 as the spider worketh his web1 then it is endless1 and brings forth indeed cobwebs of learning1 admirable for the fineness of thread and work1 but of no substance or profit4 7#f7 ,this same unprofitable subtility or curiosity is of two sorts3 either in the subject itself that they handle1 when it is a fruitless speculation or controversy 7whereof there are no small number both in divinity and philosophy71 or in the manner or method of handling of a knowledge1 which amongst them was this--upon every particular position or assertion to frame objections1 and to those objections1 solutions2 which solutions were for the most part not confutations1 but distinctions3 whereas indeed the strength of all sciences is1 as the strength of the old man's faggot1 in the bond4 ,for the harmony of a science1 supporting each part the other1 is and ought to be the true and brief confutation and suppression of all the smaller sort of objections4 ,but1 on the other side1 if you take out every axiom1 as the sticks of the faggot1 one by one1 you may quarrel with them and bend them and break them at your pleasure3 so that1 as was said of ,seneca1 ,verborum minutiis rerum frangit pondera1 so a man may truly say of the schoolmen1 ,qustionum minutiis scientiarum frangunt soliditatem4 ,for were it not better for a man in fair room to set up one great light1 or branching candlestick of lights1 than to go about with a small watch-candle into every corner8 ,and such is their method1 that rests not so much upon evidence of truth proved by arguments1 authorities1 similitudes1 examples1 as upon particular confutations and solutions of every scruple1 cavillation1 and objection2 breeding for the most part one question as fast as it solveth another2 even as in the former resemblance1 when you carry the light into one corner1 you darken the rest2 so that the fable and fiction of ,scylla seemeth to be a lively image of this kind of philosophy or knowledge2 which was transformed into a comely virgin for the upper parts2 but then ,candida succinctam latrantibus inguina monstris3 so the generalities of the schoolmen are for a while good and proportionable2 but then when you descend into their distinctions and decisions1 instead of a fruitful womb for the use and benefit of man's life1 they end in monstrous altercations and barking questions4 ,so as it is not possible but this quality of knowledge must fall under popular contempt1 the people being apt to contemn truths upon occasion of controversies and altercations1 and to think they are all out of their way which never meet2 and when they see such digladiation about subtleties1 and matters of no use or moment1 they easily fall upon that judgment of ,dionysius of ,syracusa1 ,verba ista sunt senum otiosorum4 7#g7 ,notwithstanding1 certain it is that if those schoolmen to their great thirst of truth and unwearied travail of wit had joined variety and universality of reading and contemplation1 they had proved excellent lights1 to the great advancement of all learning and knowledge2 but as they are1 they are great undertakers indeed1 and fierce with dark keeping4 ,but as in the inquiry of the divine truth1 their pride inclined to leave the oracle of ,god's word1 and to vanish in the mixture of their own inventions2 so in the inquisition of nature1 they ever left the oracle of ,god's works1 and adored the deceiving and deformed images which the unequal mirror of their own minds1 or a few received authors or principles1 did represent unto them4 ,and thus much for the second disease of learning4 7#h7 ,for the third vice or disease of learning1 which concerneth deceit or untruth1 it is of all the rest the foulest2 as that which doth destroy the essential form of knowledge1 which is nothing but a representation of truth3 for the truth of being and the truth of knowing are one1 differing no more than the direct beam and the beam reflected4 ,this vice therefore brancheth itself into two sorts2 delight in deceiving and aptness to be deceived2 imposture and credulity2 which1 although they appear to be of a diverse nature1 the one seeming to proceed of cunning and the other of simplicity1 yet certainly they do for the most part concur3 for1 as the verse noteth-- 8,percontatorem fugito1 nam garrulus idem est10 an inquisitive man is a prattler2 so upon the like reason a credulous man is a deceiver3 as we see it in fame1 that he that will easily believe rumours will as easily augment rumours and add somewhat to them of his own2 which ,tacitus wisely noteth1 when he saith1 ,fingunt simul creduntque3 so great an affinity hath fiction and belief4 7#i7 ,this facility of credit and accepting or admitting things weakly authorised or warranted is of two kinds according to the subject3 for it is either a belief of history1 or1 as the lawyers speak1 matter of fact2 or else of matter of art and opinion4 ,as to the former1 we see the experience and inconvenience of this error in ecclesiastical history2 which hath too easily received and registered reports and narrations of miracles wrought by martyrs1 hermits1 or monks of the desert1 and other holy men1 and their relics1 shrines1 chapels and images3 which though they had a passage for a time by the ignorance of the people1 the superstitious simplicity of some and the politic toleration of others holding them but as divine poesies1 yet after a period of time1 when the mist began to clear up1 they grew to be esteemed but as old wives' fables1 impostures of the clergy1 illusions of spirits1 and badges of ,antichrist1 to the great scandal and detriment of religion4 7#aj7 ,so in natural history1 we see there hath not been that choice and judgment used as ought to have been2 as may appear in the writings of ,plinius1 ,cardanus1 ,albertus1 and divers of the ,arabians1 being fraught with much fabulous matter1 a great part not only untried1 but notoriously untrue1 to the great derogation of the credit of natural philosophy with the grave and sober kind of wits3 wherein the wisdom and integrity of ,aristotle is worthy to be observed1 that1 having made so diligent and exquisite a history of living creatures1 hath mingled it sparingly with any vain or feigned matter2 and yet on the other side hath cast all prodigious narrations1 which he thought worthy the recording1 into one book1 excellently discerning that matter of manifest truth1 such whereupon observation and rule was to be built1 was not to be mingled or weakened with matter of doubtful credit2 and yet again1 that rarities and reports that seem uncredible are not to be suppressed or denied to the memory of men4 7#aa7 ,and as for the facility of credit which is yielded to arts and opinions1 it is likewise of two kinds2 either when too much belief is attributed to the arts themselves1 or to certain authors in any art4 ,the sciences themselves1 which have had better intelligence and confederacy with the imagination of man than with his reason1 are three in number3 astrology1 natural magic1 and alchemy2 of which sciences1 nevertheless1 the ends or pretences are noble4 ,for astrology pretendeth to discover that correspondence or concatenation which is between the superior globe and the inferior2 natural magic pretendeth to call and reduce natural philosophy from variety of speculations to the magnitude of works2 and alchemy pretendeth to make separation of all the unlike parts of bodies which in mixtures of natures are incorporate4 ,but the derivations and prosecutions to these ends1 both in the theories and in the practices1 are full of error and vanity2 which the great professors themselves have sought to veil over and conceal by enigmatical writings1 and referring themselves to auricular traditions and such other devices1 to save the credit of impostures4 ,and yet surely to alchemy this right is due1 that it may be compared to the husbandman whereof sop makes the fable2 that1 when he died1 told his sons that he had left unto them gold buried underground in his vineyard2 and they digged over all the ground1 and gold they found none2 but by reason of their stirring and digging the mould about the roots of their vines1 they had a great vintage the year following3 so assuredly the search and stir to make gold hath brought to light a great number of good and fruitful inventions and experiments1 as well for the disclosing of nature as for the use of man's life4 7#ab7 ,and as for the overmuch credit that hath been given unto authors in sciences1 in making them dictators1 that their words should stand1 and not consuls1 to give advice2 the damage is infinite that sciences have received thereby1 as the principal cause that hath kept them low at a stay without growth or advancement4 ,for hence it hath come1 that in arts mechanical the first deviser comes shortest1 and time addeth and perfecteth2 but in sciences the first author goeth furthest1 and time leeseth and corrupteth4 ,so we see artillery1 sailing1 printing1 and the like1 were grossly managed at the first1 and by time accommodated and refined2 but contrariwise1 the philosophies and sciences of ,aristotle1 ,plato1 ,democritus1 ,hippocrates1 ,euclides1 ,archimedes1 of most vigour at the first1 and by time degenerate and imbased3 whereof the reason is no other1 but that in the former many wits and industries have contributed in one2 and in the latter many wits and industries have been spent about the wit of some one1 whom many times they have rather depraved than illustrated2 for1 as water will not ascend higher than the level of the first spring-head from whence it descendeth1 so knowledge derived from ,aristotle1 and exempted from liberty of examination1 will not rise again higher than the knowledge of ,aristotle4 ,and1 therefore1 although the position be good1 ,oportet discentem credere1 yet it must be coupled with this1 ,oportet edoctum judicare2 for disciples do owe unto masters only a temporary belief and a suspension of their own judgment till they be fully instructed1 and not an absolute resignation or perpetual captivity2 and therefore1 to conclude this point1 ,i will say no more1 but so let great authors have their due1 as time1 which is the author of authors1 be not deprived of his due--which is1 further and further to discover truth4 ,thus have ,i gone over these three diseases of learning2 besides the which there are some other rather peccant humours than formed diseases1 which1 nevertheless1 are not so secret and intrinsic1 but that they fall under a popular observation and traducement1 and1 therefore1 are not to be passed over4 ,v4 7#a7 ,the first of these is the extreme affecting of two extremities3 the one antiquity1 the other novelty2 wherein it seemeth the children of time do take after the nature and malice of the father4 ,for as he devoureth his children1 so one of them seeketh to devour and suppress the other2 while antiquity envieth there should be new additions1 and novelty cannot be content to add but it must deface2 surely the advice of the prophet is the true direction in this matter1 ,state super vias antiquas1 et videte qunam sit via recta et bona et ambulate in ea4 ,antiquity deserveth that reverence1 that men should make a stand thereupon and discover what is the best way2 but when the discovery is well taken1 then to make progression4 ,and to speak truly1 ,antiquitas sculi juventus mundi4 ,these times are the ancient times1 when the world is ancient1 and not those which we account ancient ordine retrogrado1 by a computation backward from ourselves4 7#b7 ,another error induced by the former is a distrust that anything should be now to be found out1 which the world should have missed and passed over so long time3 as if the same objection were to be made to time that ,lucian maketh to ,jupiter and other the heathen gods2 of which he wondereth that they begot so many children in old time1 and begot none in his time2 and asketh whether they were become septuagenary1 or whether the law ,papia1 made against old men's marriages1 had restrained them4 ,so it seemeth men doubt lest time is become past children and generation2 wherein contrariwise we see commonly the levity and unconstancy of men's judgments1 which1 till a matter be done1 wonder that it can be done2 and as soon as it is done1 wonder again that it was no sooner done3 as we see in the expedition of ,alexander into ,asia1 which at first was prejudged as a vast and impossible enterprise2 and yet afterwards it pleaseth ,livy to make no more of it than this1 ,nil aliud qum bene ausus vana contemnere4 ,and the same happened to ,columbus in the western navigation4 ,but in intellectual matters it is much more common1 as may be seen in most of the propositions of ,euclid2 which till they be demonstrate1 they seem strange to our assent2 but being demonstrate1 our mind accepteth of them by a kind of relation 7as the lawyers speak71 as if we had known them before4 7#c7 ,another error1 that hath also some affinity with the former1 is a conceit that of former opinions or sects after variety and examination the best hath still prevailed and suppressed the rest2 so as if a man should begin the labour of a new search1 he were but like to light upon somewhat formerly rejected1 and by rejection brought into oblivion2 as if the multitude1 or the wisest for the multitude's sake1 were not ready to give passage rather to that which is popular and superficial than to that which is substantial and profound for the truth is1 that time seemeth to be of the nature of a river or stream1 which carrieth down to us that which is light and blown up1 and sinketh and drowneth that which is weighty and solid4 7#d7 ,another error1 of a diverse nature from all the former1 is the over-early and peremptory reduction of knowledge into arts and methods2 from which time commonly sciences receive small or no augmentation4 ,but as young men1 when they knit and shape perfectly1 do seldom grow to a further stature1 so knowledge1 while it is in aphorisms and observations1 it is in growth2 but when it once is comprehended in exact methods1 it may1 perchance1 be further polished1 and illustrate and accommodated for use and practice1 but it increaseth no more in bulk and substance4 7#e7 ,another error which doth succeed that which we last mentioned is1 that after the distribution of particular arts and sciences1 men have abandoned universality1 or philosophia prima1 which cannot but cease and stop all progression4 ,for no perfect discovery can be made upon a flat or a level2 neither is it possible to discover the more remote and deeper parts of any science if you stand but upon the level of the same science1 and ascend not to a higher science4 7#f7 ,another error hath proceeded from too great a reverence1 and a kind of adoration of the mind and understanding of man2 by means whereof1 men have withdrawn themselves too much from the contemplation of nature1 and the observations of experience1 and have tumbled up and down in their own reason and conceits4 ,upon these intellectualists1 which are notwithstanding commonly taken for the most sublime and divine philosophers1 ,heraclitus gave a just censure1 saying3--8,men sought truth in their own little worlds1 and not in the great and common world20 for they disdain to spell1 and so by degrees to read in the volume of ,god's works2 and contrariwise by continual meditation and agitation of wit do urge and1 as it were1 invocate their own spirits to divine and give oracles unto them1 whereby they are deservedly deluded4 7#g7 ,another error that hath some connection with this latter is1 that men have used to infect their meditations1 opinions1 and doctrines with some conceits which they have most admired1 or some sciences which they have most applied1 and given all things else a tincture according to them1 utterly untrue and improper4 ,so hath ,plato intermingled his philosophy with theology1 and ,aristotle with logic2 and the second school of ,plato1 ,proclus and the rest1 with the mathematics2 for these were the arts which had a kind of primogeniture with them severally4 ,so have the alchemists made a philosophy out of a few experiments of the furnace2 and ,gilbertus our countryman hath made a philosophy out of the observations of a loadstone4 ,so ,cicero1 when reciting the several opinions of the nature of the soul1 he found a musician that held the soul was but a harmony1 saith pleasantly1 ,hic ab arte sua non recessit1 c4 ,but of these conceits ,aristotle speaketh seriously and wisely when he saith1 ,qui respiciunt ad pauca de facili pronunciant4 7#h7 ,another error is an impatience of doubt1 and haste to assertion without due and mature suspension of judgment4 ,for the two ways of contemplation are not unlike the two ways of action commonly spoken of by the ancients3 the one plain and smooth in the beginning1 and in the end impassable2 the other rough and troublesome in the entrance1 but after a while fair and even4 ,so it is in contemplation3 if a man will begin with certainties1 he shall end in doubts2 but if he will be content to begin with doubts1 he shall end in certainties4 7#i7 ,another error is in the manner of the tradition and delivery of knowledge1 which is for the most part magistral and peremptory1 and not ingenuous and faithful2 in a sort as may be soonest believed1 and not easiest examined4 ,it is true1 that in compendious treatises for practice that form is not to be disallowed2 but in the true handling of knowledge men ought not to fall either on the one side into the vein of ,velleius the ,epicurean1 ,nil tam metuens quam ne dubitare aliqua de revideretur3 nor1 on the other side1 into ,socrates1 his ironical doubting of all things2 but to propound things sincerely with more or less asseveration1 as they stand in a man's own judgment proved more or less4 7#aj7 ,other errors there are in the scope that men propound to themselves1 whereunto they bend their endeavours2 for1 whereas the more constant and devote kind of professors of any science ought to propound to themselves to make some additions to their science1 they convert their labours to aspire to certain second prizes3 as to be a profound interpreter or commentor1 to be a sharp champion or defender1 to be a methodical compounder or abridger1 and so the patrimony of knowledge cometh to be sometimes improved1 but seldom augmented4 7#aa7 ,but the greatest error of all the rest is the mistaking or misplacing of the last or furthest end of knowledge4 ,for men have entered into a desire of learning and knowledge1 sometimes upon a natural curiosity and inquisitive appetite2 sometimes to entertain their minds with variety and delight2 sometimes for ornament and reputation2 and sometimes to enable them to victory of wit and contradiction2 and most times for lucre and profession2 and seldom sincerely to give a true account of their gift of reason to the benefit and use of men3 as if there were sought in knowledge a couch whereupon to rest a searching and restless spirit2 or a terrace for a wandering and variable mind to walk up and down with a fair prospect2 or a tower of state1 for a proud mind to raise itself upon2 or a fort or commanding ground1 for strife and contention2 or a shop1 for profit or sale2 and not a rich storehouse for the glory of the ,creator and the relief of man's estate4 ,but this is that which will indeed dignify and exalt knowledge1 if contemplation and action may be more nearly and straitly conjoined and united together than they have been3 a conjunction like unto that of the two highest planets1 ,saturn1 the planet of rest and contemplation2 and ,jupiter1 the planet of civil society and action1 howbeit1 ,i do not mean1 when ,i speak of use and action1 that end before-mentioned of the applying of knowledge to lucre and profession2 for ,i am not ignorant how much that diverteth and interrupteth the prosecution and advancement of knowledge1 like unto the golden ball thrown before ,atalanta1 which1 while she goeth aside and stoopeth to take up1 the race is hindered1 8,declinat cursus1 aurumque volubile tollit40 #ci ,neither is my meaning1 as was spoken of ,socrates1 to call philosophy down from heaven to converse upon the earth--that is1 to leave natural philosophy aside1 and to apply knowledge only to manners and policy4 ,but as both heaven and earth do conspire and contribute to the use and benefit of man1 so the end ought to be1 from both philosophies to separate and reject vain speculations1 and whatsoever is empty and void1 and to preserve and augment whatsoever is solid and fruitful2 that knowledge may not be as a courtesan1 for pleasure and vanity only1 or as a bond-woman1 to acquire and gain to her master's use2 but as a spouse1 for generation1 fruit1 and comfort4 7#ab7 ,thus have ,i described and opened1 as by a kind of dissection1 those peccant humours 7the principal of them7 which have not only given impediment to the proficience of learning1 but have given also occasion to the traducement thereof3 wherein1 if ,i have been too plain1 it must be remembered1 fidelia vulnera amantis1 sed dolosa oscula malignantis4 ,this ,i think ,i have gained1 that ,i ought to be the better believed in that which ,i shall say pertaining to commendation2 because ,i have proceeded so freely in that which concerneth censure4 ,and yet ,i have no purpose to enter into a laudative of learning1 or to make a hymn to the ,muses 7though ,i am of opinion that it is long since their rites were duly celebrated71 but my intent is1 without varnish or amplification justly to weigh the dignity of knowledge in the balance with other things1 and to take the true value thereof by testimonies and arguments1 divine and human4 ,,vi4 7#a7 ,first1 therefore1 let us seek the dignity of knowledge in the archetype or first platform1 which is in the attributes and acts of ,god1 as far as they are revealed to man and may be observed with sobriety2 wherein we may not seek it by the name of learning1 for all learning is knowledge acquired1 and all knowledge in ,god is original1 and therefore we must look for it by another name1 that of wisdom or sapience1 as the ,scriptures call it4 7#b7 ,it is so1 then1 that in the work of the creation we see a double emanation of virtue from ,god2 the one referring more properly to power1 the other to wisdom2 the one expressed in making the subsistence of the matter1 and the other in disposing the beauty of the form4 ,this being supposed1 it is to be observed that for anything which appeareth in the history of the creation1 the confused mass and matter of heaven and earth was made in a moment1 and the order and disposition of that chaos or mass was the work of six days2 such a note of difference it pleased ,god to put upon the works of power1 and the works of wisdom2 wherewith concurreth1 that in the former it is not set down that ,god said1 8,let there be heaven and earth10 as it is set down of the works following2 but actually1 that ,god made heaven and earth3 the one carrying the style of a manufacture1 and the other of a law1 decree1 or counsel4 7#c7 ,to proceed1 to that which is next in order from ,god1 to spirits3 we find1 as far as credit is to be given to the celestial hierarchy of that supposed ,dionysius1 the senator of ,athens1 the first place or degree is given to the angels of love1 which are termed seraphim2 the second to the angels of light1 which are termed cherubim2 and the third1 and so following places1 to thrones1 principalities1 and the rest1 which are all angels of power and ministry2 so as this angels of knowledge and illumination are placed before the angels of office and domination4 7#d7 ,to descend from spirits and intellectual forms to sensible and material forms1 we read the first form that was created was light1 which hath a relation and correspondence in nature and corporal things to knowledge in spirits and incorporal things4 7#e7 ,so in the distribution of days we see the day wherein ,god did rest and contemplate ,his own works was blessed above all the days wherein ,he did effect and accomplish them4 7#f7 ,after the creation was finished1 it is set down unto us that man was placed in the garden to work therein2 which work1 so appointed to him1 could be no other than work of contemplation2 that is1 when the end of work is but for exercise and experiment1 not for necessity2 for there being then no reluctation of the creature1 nor sweat of the brow1 man's employment must of consequence have been matter of delight in the experiment1 and not matter of labour for the use4 ,again1 the first acts which man performed in ,paradise consisted of the two summary parts of knowledge2 the view of creatures1 and the imposition of names4 ,as for the knowledge which induced the fall1 it was1 as was touched before1 not the natural knowledge of creatures1 but the moral knowledge of good and evil2 wherein the supposition was1 that ,god's commandments or prohibitions were not the originals of good and evil1 but that they had other beginnings1 which man aspired to know1 to the end to make a total defection from ,god and to depend wholly upon himself4 7#g7 ,to pass on3 in the first event or occurrence after the fall of man1 we see 7as the ,scriptures have infinite mysteries1 not violating at all the truth of this story or letter7 an image of the two estates1 the contemplative state and the active state1 figured in the two persons of ,abel and ,cain1 and in the two simplest and most primitive trades of life2 that of the shepherd 7who1 by reason of his leisure1 rest in a place1 and lying in view of heaven1 is a lively image of a contemplative life71 and that of the husbandman1 where we see again the favour and election of ,god went to the shepherd1 and not to the tiller of the ground4 7#h7 ,so in the age before the flood1 the holy records within those few memorials which are there entered and registered have vouchsafed to mention and honour the name of the inventors and authors of music and works in metal4 ,in the age after the flood1 the first great judgment of ,god upon the ambition of man was the confusion of tongues2 whereby the open trade and intercourse of learning and knowledge was chiefly imbarred4 7#i7 ,to descend to ,moses the lawgiver1 and ,god's first pen3 he is adorned by the ,scriptures with this addition and commendation1 8,that he was seen in all the learning of the ,egyptians10 which nation we know was one of the most ancient schools of the world3 for so ,plato brings in the ,egyptian priest saying unto ,solon1 8,you ,grecians are ever children2 you have no knowledge of antiquity1 nor antiquity of knowledge40 ,take a view of the ceremonial law of ,moses2 you shall find1 besides the prefiguration of ,christ1 the badge or difference of the people of ,god1 the exercise and impression of obedience1 and other divine uses and fruits thereof1 that some of the most learned ,rabbins have travailed profitably and profoundly to observe1 some of them a natural1 some of them a moral sense1 or reduction of many of the ceremonies and ordinances4 ,as in the law of the leprosy1 where it is said1 8,if the whiteness have overspread the flesh1 the patient may pass abroad for clean2 but if there be any whole flesh remaining1 he is to be shut up for unclean20 one of them noteth a principle of nature1 that putrefaction is more contagious before maturity than after2 and another noteth a position of moral philosophy1 that men abandoned to vice do not so much corrupt manners1 as those that are half good and half evil4 ,so in this and very many other places in that law1 there is to be found1 besides the theological sense1 much aspersion of philosophy4 7#aj7 ,so likewise in that excellent hook of ,job1 if it be revolved with diligence1 it will be found pregnant and swelling with natural philosophy2 as for example1 cosmography1 and the roundness of the world1 ,qui extendit aquilonem super vacuum1 et appendit terram super nihilum2 wherein the pensileness of the earth1 the pole of the north1 and the finiteness or convexity of heaven are manifestly touched4 ,so again1 matter of astronomy3 ,spiritus ejus ornavit clos1 et obstetricante manu ejus eductus est ,coluber tortuoses4 ,and in another place1 ,nunquid conjungere valebis micantes stellas ,pleiadas1 aut gyrum ,arcturi poteris dissipare8 ,where the fixing of the stars1 ever standing at equal distance1 is with great elegancy noted4 ,and in another place1 ,qui facit ,arcturum1 et ,oriona1 et ,hyadas1 et interiora ,austri2 where again he takes knowledge of the depression of the southern pole1 calling it the secrets of the south1 because the southern stars were in that climate unseen4 ,matter of generation3 ,annon sicut lac mulsisti me1 et sicut caseum coagulasti me8 c4 ,matter of minerals3 ,habet argentum venarum suarum principia2 et auro locus est in quo conflatur1 ferrum de terra tollitur1 et lapis solutus calore in s vertitur2 and so forwards in that chapter4 7#aa7 ,so likewise in the person of ,solomon the king1 we see the gift or endowment of wisdom and learning1 both in ,solomon's petition and in ,god's assent thereunto1 preferred before all other terrene and temporal felicity4 ,by virtue of which grant or donative of ,god ,solomon became enabled not only to write those excellent parables or aphorisms concerning divine and moral philosophy1 but also to compile a natural history of all verdure1 from the cedar upon the mountain to the moss upon the wall 7which is but a rudiment between putrefaction and an herb71 and also of all things that breathe or move4 ,nay1 the same ,solomon the king1 although he excelled in the glory of treasure and magnificent buildings1 of shipping and navigation1 of service and attendance1 of fame and renown1 and the like1 yet he maketh no claim to any of those glories1 but only to the glory of inquisition of truth2 for so he saith expressly1 8,the glory of ,god is to conceal a thing1 but the glory of the king is to find it out20 as if1 according to the innocent play of children1 the ,divine ,majesty took delight to hide ,his works1 to the end to have them found out2 and as if kings could not obtain a greater honour than to be ,god's playfellows in that game2 considering the great commandment of wits and means1 whereby nothing needeth to be hidden from them4 7#ab7 ,neither did the dispensation of ,god vary in the times after our ,saviour came into the world2 for our ,saviour himself did first show ,his power to subdue ignorance1 by ,his conference with the priests and doctors of the law1 before ,he showed ,his power to subdue nature by ,his miracles4 ,and the coming of this ,holy ,spirit was chiefly figured and expressed in the similitude and gift of tongues1 which are but vehicula scienti4 7#ac7 ,so in the election of those instruments1 which it pleased ,god to use for the plantation of the faith1 notwithstanding that at the first ,he did employ persons altogether unlearned1 otherwise than by inspiration1 more evidently to declare ,his immediate working1 and to abase all human wisdom or knowledge2 yet nevertheless that counsel of ,his was no sooner performed1 but in the next vicissitude and succession ,he did send ,his divine truth into the world1 waited on with other learnings1 as with servants or handmaids3 for so we see ,st4 ,paul1 who was only learned amongst the ,apostles1 had his pen most used in the ,scriptures of the ,new ,testament4 7#ad7 ,so again we find that many of the ancient bishops and fathers of the ,church were excellently read and studied in all the learning of this heathen2 insomuch that the edict of the ,emperor ,julianus 7whereby it was interdicted unto ,christians to be admitted into schools1 lectures1 or exercises of learning7 was esteemed and accounted a more pernicious engine and machination against the ,christian ,faith than were all the sanguinary prosecutions of his predecessors2 neither could the emulation and jealousy of ,gregory1 the first of that name1 ,bishop of ,rome1 ever obtain the opinion of piety or devotion2 but contrariwise received the censure of humour1 malignity1 and pusillanimity1 even amongst holy men2 in that he designed to obliterate and extinguish the memory of heathen antiquity and authors4 ,but contrariwise it was the ,christian ,church1 which1 amidst the inundations of the ,scythians on the one side from the north-west1 and the ,saracens from the east1 did preserve in the sacred lap and bosom thereof the precious relics even of heathen learning1 which otherwise had been extinguished1 as if no such thing had ever been4 7#ae7 ,and we see before our eyes1 that in the age of ourselves and our fathers1 when it pleased ,god to call the ,church of ,rome to account for their degenerate manners and ceremonies1 and sundry doctrines obnoxious and framed to uphold the same abuses2 at one and the same time it was ordained by the ,divine ,providence that there should attend withal a renovation and new spring of all other knowledges4 ,and on the other side we see the ,jesuits1 who partly in themselves1 and partly by the emulation and provocation of their example1 have much quickened and strengthened the state of learning2 we see 7,i say7 what notable service and reparation they have done to the ,roman see4 7#af7 ,wherefore1 to conclude this part1 let it be observed1 that there be two principal duties and services1 besides ornament and illustration1 which philosophy and human learning do perform to faith and religion4 ,the one1 because they are an effectual inducement to the exaltation of the glory of ,god4 ,for as the ,psalms and other ,scriptures do often invite us to consider and magnify the great and wonderful works of ,god1 so if we should rest only in the contemplation of the exterior of them as they first offer themselves to our senses1 we should do a like injury unto the majesty of ,god1 as if we should judge or construe of the store of some excellent jeweller by that only which is set out toward the street in his shop4 ,the other1 because they minister a singular help and preservative against unbelief and error4 ,for our ,saviour saith1 8,you err1 not knowing the ,scriptures1 nor the power of ,god20 laying before us two books or volumes to study1 if we will be secured from error3 first the ,scriptures1 revealing the will of ,god1 and then the creatures expressing ,his power2 whereof the latter is a key unto the former3 not only opening our understanding to conceive the true sense of the ,scriptures by the general notions of reason and rules of speech1 but chiefly opening our belief1 in drawing us into a due meditation of the omnipotency of ,god1 which is chiefly signed and engraven upon ,his works4 ,thus much therefore for divine testimony and evidence concerning the true dignity and value of learning4 ,,vii4 7#a7 ,as for human proofs1 it is so large a field1 as in a discourse of this nature and brevity it is fit rather to use choice of those things which we shall produce1 than to embrace the variety of them4 ,first1 therefore1 in the degrees of human honour amongst the heathen1 it was the highest to obtain to a veneration and adoration as a ,god4 ,this unto the ,christians is as the forbidden fruit4 ,but we speak now separately of human testimony1 according to which--that which the ,grecians call apotheosis1 and the ,latins relatio inter divos--was the supreme honour which man could attribute unto man1 specially when it was given1 not by a formal decree or act of state 7as it was used among the ,roman ,emperors71 but by an inward assent and belief4 ,which honour1 being so high1 had also a degree or middle term2 for there were reckoned above human honours1 honours heroical and divine3 in the attribution and distribution of which honours we see antiquity made this difference2 that whereas founders and uniters of states and cities1 lawgivers1 extirpers of tyrants1 fathers of the people1 and other eminent persons in civil merit1 were honoured but with the titles of worthies or demigods1 such as were ,hercules1 ,theseus1 ,minus1 ,romulus1 and the like2 on the other side1 such as were inventors and authors of new arts1 endowments1 and commodities towards man's life1 were ever consecrated amongst the gods themselves1 as was ,ceres1 ,bacchus1 ,mercurius1 ,apollo1 and others4 ,and justly2 for the merit of the former is confined within the circle of an age or a nation1 and is like fruitful showers1 which though they be profitable and good1 yet serve but for that season1 and for a latitude of ground where they fall2 but the other is1 indeed1 like the benefits of heaven1 which are permanent and universal4 ,the former again is mixed with strife and perturbation1 but the latter hath the true character of ,divine ,presence1 coming in aura leni1 without noise or agitation4 7#b7 ,neither is certainly that other merit of learning1 in repressing the inconveniences which grow from man to man1 much inferior to the former1 of relieving the necessities which arise from nature1 which merit was lively set forth by the ancients in that feigned relation of ,orpheus' theatre1 where all beasts and birds assembled1 and1 forgetting their several appetites--some of prey1 some of game1 some of quarrel--stood all sociably together listening unto the airs and accords of the harp1 the sound whereof no sooner ceased1 or was drowned by some louder noise1 but every beast returned to his own nature2 wherein is aptly described the nature and condition of men1 who are full of savage and unreclaimed desires1 of profit1 of lust1 of revenge2 which as long as they give ear to precepts1 to laws1 to religion1 sweetly touched with eloquence and persuasion of books1 of sermons1 of harangues1 so long is society and peace maintained2 but if these instruments be silent1 or that sedition and tumult make them not audible1 all things dissolve into anarchy and confusion4 7#c7 ,but this appeareth more manifestly when kings themselves1 or persons of authority under them1 or other governors in commonwealths and popular estates1 are endued with learning4 ,for although he might be thought partial to his own profession that said 8,then should people and estates be happy when either kings were philosophers1 or philosophers kings20 yet so much is verified by experience1 that under learned princes and governors there have been ever the best times3 for howsoever kings may have their imperfections in their passions and customs1 yet1 if they be illuminate by learning1 they have those notions of religion1 policy1 and morality1 which do preserve them and refrain them from all ruinous and peremptory errors and excesses1 whispering evermore in their ears1 when counsellors and servants stand mute and silent4 ,and senators or counsellors1 likewise1 which be learned1 to proceed upon more safe and substantial principles1 than counsellors which are only men of experience2 the one sort keeping dangers afar off1 whereas the other discover them not till they come near hand1 and then trust to the agility of their wit to ward or avoid them4 7#d7 ,which felicity of times under learned princes 7to keep still the law of brevity1 by using the most eminent and selected examples7 doth best appear in the age which passed from the death of ,domitianus the emperor until the reign of ,commodus2 comprehending a succession of six princes1 all learned1 or singular favourers and advancers of learning1 which age for temporal respects was the most happy and flourishing that ever the ,roman ,empire 7which then was a model of the world7 enjoyed--a matter revealed and prefigured unto ,domitian in a dream the night before he was slain3 for he thought there was grown behind upon his shoulders a neck and a head of gold1 which came accordingly to pass in those golden times which succeeded2 of which princes we will make some commemoration2 wherein1 although the matter will be vulgar1 and may be thought fitter for a declamation than agreeable to a treatise infolded as this is1 yet1 because it is pertinent to the point in hand--,neque semper arcum tendit ,apollo--and to name them only were too naked and cursory1 ,i will not omit it altogether4 ,the first was ,nerva1 the excellent temper of whose government is by a glance in ,cornelius ,tacitus touched to the life3 ,postquam divus ,nerva res oluim insociabiles miscuisset1 imperium et libertatem4 ,and in token of his learning1 the last act of his short reign left to memory was a missive to his adopted son1 ,trajan1 proceeding upon some inward discontent at the ingratitude of the times1 comprehended in a verse of ,homer's-- 8,telis1 ,phbe1 tuis1 lacrymas ulciscere nostras40 7#e7 ,trajan1 who succeeded1 was for his person not learned2 but if we will hearken to the speech of our ,saviour1 that saith1 8,he that receiveth a prophet in the name of a prophet shall have a prophet's reward10 he deserveth to be placed amongst the most learned princes2 for there was not a greater admirer of learning or benefactor of learning1 a founder of famous libraries1 a perpetual advancer of learned men to office1 and familiar converser with learned professors and preceptors who were noted to have then most credit in court4 ,on the other side how much ,trajan's virtue and government was admired and renowned1 surely no testimony of grave and faithful history doth more lively set forth than that legend tale of ,gregorius ,magnum1 ,bishop of ,rome1 who was noted for the extreme envy he bare towards all heathen excellency2 and yet he is reported1 out of the love and estimation of ,trajan's moral virtues1 to have made unto ,god passionate and fervent prayers for the delivery of his soul out of hell1 and to have obtained it1 with a caveat that he should make no more such petitions4 ,in this prince's time also the persecutions against the ,christians received intermission upon the certificate of ,plinius ,secundus1 a man of excellent learning and by ,trajan advanced4 7#f7 ,adrian1 his successor1 was the most curious man that lived1 and the most universal inquirer3 insomuch as it was noted for an error in his mind that he desired to comprehend all things1 and not to reserve himself for the worthiest things1 falling into the like humour that was long before noted in ,philip of ,macedon1 who1 when he would needs overrule and put down an excellent musician in an argument touching music1 was well answered by him again--8,god forbid1 sir10 saith he1 8that your fortune should be so bad as to know these things better than ,i40 ,it pleased ,god likewise to use the curiosity of this emperor as an inducement to the peace of ,his ,church in those days2 for having ,christ in veneration1 not as a ,god or ,saviour1 but as a wonder or novelty1 and having his picture in his gallery matched with ,apollonius 7with whom in his vain imagination he thought its had some conformity71 yet it served the turn to allay the bitter hatred of those times against the ,christian name1 so as the ,church had peace during his time4 ,and for his government civil1 although he did not attain to that of ,trajan's in glory of arms or perfection of justice1 yet in deserving of the weal of the subject he did exceed him4 ,for ,trajan erected many famous monuments and buildings1 insomuch as ,constantine the ,great in emulation was wont to call him ,parietaria1 8wall-flower10 because his name was upon so many walls2 but his buildings and works were more of glory and triumph than use and necessity4 ,but ,adrian spent his whole reign1 which was peaceable1 in a perambulation or survey of the ,roman ,empire1 giving order and making assignation where he went for re-edifying of cities1 towns1 and forts decayed1 and for cutting of rivers and streams1 and for making bridges and passages1 and for policing of cities and commonalties with new ordinances and constitutions1 and granting new franchises and incorporations2 so that his whole time was a very restoration of all the lapses and decays of former times4 7#g7 ,antoninus ,pius1 who succeeded him1 was a prince excellently learned1 and had the patient and subtle wit of a schoolman1 insomuch as in common speech 7which leaves no virtue untaxed7 he was called ,cymini ,sector1 a carver or a divider of cummin seed1 which is one of the least seeds4 ,such a patience he had and settled spirit to enter into the least and most exact differences of causes1 a fruit no doubt of the exceeding tranquillity and serenity of his mind1 which being no ways charged or encumbered1 either with fears1 remorses1 or scruples1 but having been noted for a man of the purest goodness1 without all fiction or affectation1 that hath reigned or lived1 made his mind continually present and entire4 ,he likewise approached a degree nearer unto ,christianity1 and became1 as ,agrippa said unto ,st4 ,paul1 8half a ,christian10 holding their religion and law in good opinion1 and not only ceasing persecution1 but giving way to the advancement of ,christians4 7#e7 ,there succeeded him the first ,divi fratres1 the two adoptive brethren--,lucius ,commodus ,verus1 son to lius ,verus1 who delighted much in the softer kind of learning1 and was wont to call the poet ,martial his ,virgil2 and ,marcus ,aurelius ,antoninus3 whereof the latter1 who obscured his colleague and survived him long1 was named the 8,philosopher10 who1 as he excelled all the rest in learning1 so he excelled them likewise in perfection of all royal virtues2 insomuch as ,julianus the emperor1 in his book entitled ,crsares1 being as a pasquil or satire to deride all his predecessors1 feigned that they were all invited to a banquet of the gods1 and ,silenus the jester sat at the nether end of the table and bestowed a scoff on everyone as they came in2 but when ,marcus ,philosophus came in1 ,silenus was gravelled and out of countenance1 not knowing where to carp at him1 save at the last he gave a glance at his patience towards his wife4 ,and the virtue of this prince1 continued with that of his predecessor1 made the name of ,antoninus so sacred in the world1 that though it were extremely dishonoured in ,commodus1 ,caracalla1 and ,heliogabalus1 who all bare the name1 yet1 when ,alexander ,severus refused the name because he was a stranger to the family1 the ,senate with one acclamation said1 ,quomodo ,augustus1 sic et ,antoninus4 ,in such renown and veneration was the name of these two princes in those days1 that they would have had it as a perpetual addition in all the emperors' style4 ,in this emperor's time also the ,church for the most part was in peace2 so as in this sequence of six princes we do see the blessed effects of learning in sovereignty1 painted forth in the greatest table of the world4 7#i7 ,but for a tablet or picture of smaller volume 7not presuming to speak of your ,majesty that liveth71 in my judgment the most excellent is that of ,queen ,elizabeth1 your immediate predecessor in this part of ,britain2 a prince that1 if ,plutarch were now alive to write lives by parallels1 would trouble him1 ,i think1 to find for her a parallel amongst women4 ,this lady was endued with learning in her sex singular1 and rare even amongst masculine princes--whether we speak of learning1 of language1 or of science1 modern or ancient1 divinity or humanity--and unto the very last year of her life she accustomed to appoint set hours for reading1 scarcely any young student in a university more daily or more duly4 ,as for her government1 ,i assure myself 7,i shall not exceed if ,i do affirm7 that this part of the island never had forty-five years of better tines1 and yet not through the calmness of the season1 but through the wisdom of her regiment4 ,for if there be considered1 of the one side1 the truth of religion established1 the constant peace and security1 the good administration of justice1 the temperate use of the prerogative1 not slackened1 nor much strained2 the flourishing state of learning1 sortable to so excellent a patroness2 the convenient estate of wealth and means1 both of crown and subject2 the habit of obedience1 and the moderation of discontents2 and there be considered1 on the other side1 the differences of religion1 the troubles of neighbour countries1 the ambition of ,spain1 and opposition of ,rome1 and then that she was solitary and of herself2 these things1 ,i say1 considered1 as ,i could not have chosen an instance so recent and so proper1 so ,i suppose ,i could not have chosen one more remarkable or eminent to the purpose now in hand1 which is concerning the conjunction of learning in the prince with felicity in the people4 7#aj7 ,neither hath learning an influence and operation only upon civil merit and moral virtue1 and the arts or temperature of peace and peaceable government2 but likewise it hath no less power and efficacy in enablement towards martial and military virtue and prowess1 as may be notably represented in the examples of ,alexander the ,great and ,csar the ,dictator 7mentioned before1 but now in fit place to be resumed71 of whose virtues and acts in war there needs no note or recital1 having been the wonders of time in that kind2 but of their affections towards learning and perfections in learning it is pertinent to say somewhat4 7#aa7 ,alexander was bred and taught under ,aristotle1 the great philosopher1 who dedicated divers of his books of philosophy unto him2 he was attended with ,callisthenes and divers other learned persons1 that followed him in camp1 throughout his journeys and conquests4 ,what price and estimation he had learning in doth notably appear in these three particulars3 first1 in the envy he used to express that he bare towards ,achilles1 in this1 that he had so good a trumpet of his praises as ,homer's verses2 secondly1 in the judgment or solution he gave touching that precious cabinet of ,darius1 which was found among his jewels 7whereof question was made what thing was worthy to be put into it1 and he gave his opinion for ,homer's works72 thirdly1 in his letter to ,aristotle1 after he had set forth his books of nature1 wherein he expostulateth with him for publishing the secrets or mysteries of philosophy2 and gave him to understand that himself esteemed it more to excel other men in learning and knowledge than in power and empire4 ,and what use he had of learning doth appear1 or rather shine1 in all his speeches and answers1 being full of science and use of science1 and that in all variety4 7#ab7 ,and herein again it may seem a thing scholastical1 and somewhat idle to recite things that every man knoweth2 but yet1 since the argument ,i handle leadeth me thereunto1 ,i am glad that men shall perceive ,i am as willing to flatter 7if they will so call it7 an ,alexander1 or a ,csar1 or an ,antoninus1 that are dead many hundred years since1 as any that now liveth2 for it is the displaying of the glory of learning in sovereignty that ,i propound to myself1 and not a humour of declaiming in any man's praises4 ,observe1 then1 the speech he used of ,diogenes1 and see if it tend not to the true state of one of the greatest questions of moral philosophy3 whether the enjoying of outward things1 or the contemning of them1 be the greatest happiness2 for when he saw ,diogenes so perfectly contented with so little1 he said to those that mocked at his condition1 8were ,i not ,alexander1 ,i would wish to be ,diogenes40 ,but ,seneca inverteth it1 and saith1 8,plus erat1 quod hic nollet accipere1 qum quod ille posset dare40 ,there were more things which ,diogenes would have refused than those were which ,alexander could have given or enjoyed4 7#ac7 ,observe1 again1 that speech which was usual with him1--8,that he felt his mortality chiefly in two things1 sleep and lust20 and see if it were not a speech extracted out of the depth of natural philosophy1 and liker to have come out of the mouth of ,aristotle or ,democritus than from ,alexander4 7#ad7 ,see1 again1 that speech of humanity and poesy1 when1 upon the bleeding of his wounds1 he called unto him one of his flatterers1 that was wont to ascribe to him divine honour1 and said1 8,look1 this is very blood2 this is not such a liquor as ,homer speaketh of1 which ran from ,venus' hand when it was pierced by ,diomedes40 7#ae7 ,see likewise his readiness in reprehension of logic in the speech he used to ,cassander1 upon a complaint that was made against his father ,antipater2 for when ,alexander happened to say1 8,do you think these men would have come from so far to complain except they had just cause of grief80 and ,cassander answered1 8,yea1 that was the matter1 because they thought they should not be disproved20 said ,alexander1 laughing1 8,see the subtleties of ,aristotle1 to take a matter both ways1 pro et contra1 c40 7#af7 ,but note1 again1 how well he could use the same art which he reprehended to serve his own humour3 when bearing a secret grudge to ,callisthenes1 because he was against the new ceremony of his adoration1 feasting one night where the same ,callisthenes was at the table1 it was moved by some after supper1 for entertainment sake1 that ,callisthenes1 who was an eloquent man1 might speak of some theme or purpose at his own choice2 which ,callisthenes did1 choosing the praise of the ,macedonian nation for his discourse1 and performing the same with so good manner as the hearers were much ravished2 whereupon ,alexander1 nothing pleased1 said1 8,it was easy to be eloquent upon so good a subject2 but10 saith he1 8turn your style1 and let us hear what you can say against us20 which ,callisthenes presently undertook1 and did with that sting and life that ,alexander interrupted him1 and said1 8,the goodness of the cause made him eloquent before1 and despite made him eloquent then again40 7#ag7 ,consider further1 for tropes of rhetoric1 that excellent use of a metaphor or translation1 wherewith he taxeth ,antipater1 who was an imperious and tyrannous governor2 for when one of ,antipater's friends commended him to ,alexander for his moderation1 that he did not degenerate as his other lieutenants did into the ,persian pride1 in uses of purple1 but kept the ancient habit of ,macedon1 of black4 8,true10 saith ,alexander2 8but ,antipater is all purple within40 ,or that other1 when ,parmenio came to him in the plain of ,arbela and showed him the innumerable multitude of his enemies1 specially as they appeared by the infinite number of lights as it had been a new firmament of stars1 and thereupon advised him to assail them by night2 whereupon he answered1 8,that he would not steal the victory40 7#ah7 ,for matter of policy1 weigh that significant distinction1 so much in all ages embraced1 that he made between his two friends ,hephstion and ,craterus1 when he said1 8,that the one loved ,alexander1 and the other loved the king30 describing the principal difference of princes' best servants1 that some in affection love their person1 and other in duty love their crown4 7#ai7 ,weigh also that excellent taxation of an error1 ordinary with counsellors of princes1 that they counsel their masters according to the model of their own mind and fortune1 and not of their masters4 ,when upon ,darius' great offers ,parmenio had said1 8,surely ,i would accept these offers were ,i as ,alexander20 saith ,alexander1 8,so would ,i were ,i as ,parmenio40 7#bj7 ,lastly1 weigh that quick and acute reply which he made when he gave so large gifts to his friends and servants1 and was asked what he did reserve for himself1 and he answered1 8,hope40 ,weigh1 ,i say1 whether he had not cast up his account aright1 because hope must be the portion of all that resolve upon great enterprises2 for this was ,csar's portion when he went first into ,gaul1 his estate being then utterly overthrown with largesses4 ,and this was likewise the portion of that noble prince1 howsoever transported with ambition1 ,henry ,duke of ,guise1 of whom it was usually said that he was the greatest usurer in ,france1 because he had turned all his estate into obligations4 7#ba7 ,to conclude1 therefore1 as certain critics are used to say hyperbolically1 8,that if all sciences were lost they might be found in ,virgil10 so certainly this may be said truly1 there are the prints and footsteps of learning in those few speeches which are reported of this prince1 the admiration of whom1 when ,i consider him not as ,alexander the ,great1 but as ,aristotle's scholar1 hath carried me too far4 7#bb7 ,as for ,julius ,csar1 the excellency of his learning needeth not to be argued from his education1 or his company1 or his speeches2 but in a further degree doth declare itself in his writings and works3 whereof some are extant and permanent1 and some unfortunately perished4 ,for first1 we see there is left unto us that excellent history of his own wars1 which he entitled only a ,commentary1 wherein all succeeding times have admired the solid weight of matter1 and the real passages and lively images of actions and persons1 expressed in the greatest propriety of words and perspicuity of narration that ever was2 which that it was not the effect of a natural gift1 but of learning and precept1 is well witnessed by that work of his entitled ,de ,analogia1 being a grammatical philosophy1 wherein he did labour to make this same ,vox ad placitum to become ,vox ad licitum1 and to reduce custom of speech to congruity of speech2 and took as it were the pictures of words from the life of reason4 7#bc7 ,so we receive from him1 as a monument both of his power and learning1 the then reformed computation of the year2 well expressing that he took it to be as great a glory to himself to observe and know the law of the heavens1 as to give law to men upon the earth4 7#bd7 ,so likewise in that book of his1 ,anti-,cato1 it may easily appear that he did aspire as well to victory of wit as victory of war3 undertaking therein a conflict against the greatest champion with the pen that then lived1 ,cicero the orator4 7#be7 ,so1 again1 in his book of ,apophthegms1 which he collected1 we see that he esteemed it more honour to make himself but a pair of tables1 to take the wise and pithy words of others1 than to have every word of his own to be made an apophthegm or an oracle1 as vain princes1 by custom of flattery1 pretend to do4 ,and yet if ,i should enumerate divers of his speeches1 as ,i did those of ,alexander1 they are truly such as ,solomon noteth1 when he saith1 ,verba sapientum tanquam aculei1 et tanquam clavi in altum defixi3 whereof ,i will only recite three1 not so delectable for elegancy1 but admirable for vigour and efficacy4 7#bf7 ,as first1 it is reason he be thought a master of words1 that could with one word appease a mutiny in his army1 which was thus3 ,the ,romans1 when their generals did speak to their army1 did use the word ,milites1 but when the magistrates spake to the people they did use the word ,quirites4 ,the soldiers were in tumult1 and seditiously prayed to be cashiered2 not that they so meant1 but by expostulation thereof to draw ,csar to other conditions2 wherein he being resolute not to give way1 after some silence1 he began his speech1 ,ego ,quirites1 which did admit them already cashiered--wherewith they were so surprised1 crossed1 and confused1 as they would not suffer him to go on in his speech1 but relinquished their demands1 and made it their suit to be again called by the name of ,milites4 7#bg7 ,the second speech was thus3 ,csar did extremely affect the name of king2 and some were set on as he passed by in popular acclamation to salute him king4 ,whereupon1 finding the cry weak and poor1 he put it off thus1 in a kind of jest1 as if they had mistaken his surname3 ,non ,rex sum1 sed ,csar2 a speech that1 if it be searched1 the life and fulness of it can scarce be expressed4 ,for1 first1 it was a refusal of the name1 but yet not serious2 again1 it did signify an infinite confidence and magnanimity1 as if he presumed ,csar was the greater title1 as by his worthiness it is come to pass till this day4 ,but chiefly it was a speech of great allurement toward his own purpose1 as if the state did strive with him but for a name1 whereof mean families were vested2 for ,rex was a surname with the ,romans1 as well as ,king is with us4 7#bh7 ,the last speech which ,i will mention was used to ,metellus1 when ,csar1 after war declared1 did possess himself of this city of ,rome2 at which time1 entering into the inner treasury to take the money there accumulate1 ,metellus1 being tribune1 forbade him4 ,whereto ,csar said1 8,that if he did not desist1 he would lay him dead in the place40 ,and presently taking himself up1 he added1 8,young man1 it is harder for me to speak it than to do it--,adolescens1 durius est mihi hoc dicere qum facere40 ,a speech compounded of the greatest terror and greatest clemency that could proceed out of the mouth of man4 7#bi7 ,but to return and conclude with him1 it is evident himself knew well his own perfection in learning1 and took it upon him1 as appeared when upon occasion that some spake what a strange resolution it was in ,lucius ,sylla to resign his dictators1 he1 scoffing at him to his own advantage1 answered1 8,that ,sylla could not skill of letters1 and therefore knew not how to dictate40 7#cj7 ,and here it were fit to leave this point1 touching the concurrence of military virtue and learning 7for what example should come with any grace after those two of ,alexander and ,csar871 were it not in regard of the rareness of circumstance1 that ,i find in one other particular1 as that which did so suddenly pass from extreme scorn to extreme wonder3 and it is of ,xenophon the philosopher1 who went from ,socrates' school into ,asia in the expedition of ,cyrus the younger against ,king ,artaxerxes4 ,this ,xenophon at that time was very young1 and never had seen the wars before1 neither had any command in the army1 but only followed the war as a voluntary1 for the love and conversation of ,proxenus1 his friend4 ,he was present when ,falinus came in message from the great king to the ,grecians1 after that ,cyrus was slain in the field1 and they1 a handful of men1 left to themselves in the midst of the king's territories1 cut off from their country by many navigable rivers and many hundred miles4 ,the message imported that they should deliver up their arms and submit themselves to the king's mercy4 ,to which message1 before answer was made1 divers of the army conferred familiarly with ,falinus2 and amongst the rest ,xenophon happened to say1 8,why1 ,falinus1 we have now but these two things left1 our arms and our virtue2 and if we yield up our arms1 how shall we make use of our virtue80 ,whereto ,falinus1 smiling on him1 said1 8,if ,i be not deceived1 young gentleman1 you are an ,athenian1 and ,i believe you study philosophy1 and it is pretty that you say2 but you are much abused if you think your virtue can withstand the king's power40 ,here was the scorn2 the wonder followed3 which was that this young scholar or philosopher1 after all the captains were murdered in parley by treason1 conducted those ten thousand foot1 through the heart of all the king's high countries1 from ,babylon to ,grcia in safety1 in despite of all the king's forces1 to the astonishment of the world1 and the encouragement of the ,grecians in times succeeding to make invasion upon the kings of ,persia1 as was after purposed by ,jason the ,thessalian1 attempted by ,agesilaus the ,spartan1 and achieved by ,alexander the ,macedonian1 all upon the ground of the act of that young scholar4 ,,viii4 7#a7 ,to proceed now from imperial and military virtue to moral and private virtue2 first1 it is an assured truth1 which is contained in the verses3-- 8,scilicet ingenuas didicisse fideliter artes ,emollit mores nec sinit esse feros40 ,it taketh away the wildness and barbarism and fierceness of men's minds2 but indeed the accent had need be upon fideliter2 for a little superficial learning doth rather work a contrary effect4 ,it taketh away all levity1 temerity1 and insolency1 by copious suggestion of all doubts and difficulties1 and acquainting the mind to balance reasons on both sides1 and to turn back the first offers and conceits of the mind1 and to accept of nothing but examined and tried4 ,it taketh away vain admiration of anything1 which is the root of all weakness4 ,for all things are admired1 either because they are new1 or because they are great4 ,for novelty1 no man that wadeth in learning or contemplation thoroughly but will find that printed in his heart1 ,nil novi super terram4 ,neither can any man marvel at the play of puppets1 that goeth behind the curtain1 and adviseth well of the motion4 ,and for magnitude1 as ,alexander the ,great1 after that he was used to great armies1 and the great conquests of the spacious provinces in ,asia1 when he received letters out of ,greece1 of some fights and services there1 which were commonly for a passage or a fort1 or some walled town at the most1 he said3--8,it seemed to him that he was advertised of the battles of the frogs and the mice1 that the old tales went of40 ,so certainly1 if a man meditate much upon the universal frame of nature1 the earth with men upon it 7the divineness of souls except7 will not seem much other than an ant-hill1 whereas some ants carry corn1 and some carry their young1 and some go empty1 and all to and fro a little heap of dust4 ,it taketh away or mitigateth fear of death or adverse fortune1 which is one of the greatest impediments of virtue and imperfections of manners4 ,for if a man's mind be deeply seasoned with the consideration of the mortality and corruptible nature of things1 he will easily concur with ,epictetus1 who went forth one day and saw a woman weeping for her pitcher of earth that was broken1 and went forth the next day and saw a woman weeping for her son that was dead1 and thereupon said1 8,heri vidi fragilem frangi1 hodie vidi mortalem mori40 ,and1 therefore1 ,virgil did excellently and profoundly couple the knowledge of causes and the conquest of all fears together1 as concomitantia4 8,felix1 qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas1 ,quique metus omnes1 et inexorabile fatum ,subjecit pedibus1 strepitumque ,acherontis avari40 7#b7 ,it were too long to go over the particular remedies which learning doth minister to all the diseases of the mind3 sometimes purging the ill humours1 sometimes opening the obstructions1 sometimes helping digestion1 sometimes increasing appetite1 sometimes healing the wounds and exulcerations thereof1 and the like2 and1 therefore1 ,i will conclude with that which hath rationem totius--which is1 that it disposeth the constitution of the mind not to be fixed or settled in the defects thereof1 but still to be capable and susceptible of growth and reformation4 ,for the unlearned man knows not what it is to descend into himself1 or to call himself to account1 nor the pleasure of that suavissima vita1 indies sentire se fieri meliorem4 ,the good parts he hath he will learn to show to the full1 and use them dexterously1 but not much to increase them4 ,the faults he hath he will learn how to hide and colour them1 but not much to amend them2 like an ill mower1 that mows on still1 and never whets his scythe4 ,whereas with the learned man it fares otherwise1 that he doth ever intermix the correction and amendment of his mind with the use and employment thereof4 ,nay1 further1 in general and in sum1 certain it is that ,veritas and ,bonitas differ but as the seal and the print2 for truth prints goodness1 and they be the clouds of error which descend in the storms of passions and perturbations4 7#c7 ,from moral virtue let us pass on to matter of power and commandment1 and consider whether in right reason there be any comparable with that wherewith knowledge investeth and crowneth man's nature4 ,we see the dignity of the commandment is according to the dignity of the commanded2 to have commandment over beasts as herdmen have1 is a thing contemptible2 to have commandment over children as schoolmasters have1 is a matter of small honour2 to have commandment over galley-slaves is a disparagement rather than an honour4 ,neither is the commandment of tyrants much better1 over people which have put off the generosity of their minds2 and1 therefore1 it was ever holden that honours in free monarchies and commonwealths had a sweetness more than in tyrannies1 because the commandment extendeth more over the wills of men1 and not only over their deeds and services4 ,and therefore1 when ,virgil putteth himself forth to attribute to ,augustus ,csar the best of human honours1 he doth it in these words3-- 8,victorque volentes ,per populos dat jura1 viamque affectat ,olympo40 ,but yet the commandment of knowledge is yet higher than the commandment over the will2 for it is a commandment over the reason1 belief1 and understanding of man1 which is the highest part of the mind1 and giveth law to the will itself4 ,for there is no power on earth which setteth up a throne or chair of estate in the spirits and souls of men1 and in their cogitations1 imaginations1 opinions1 and beliefs1 but knowledge and learning4 ,and therefore we see the detestable and extreme pleasure that arch-heretics1 and false prophets1 and impostors are transported with1 when they once find in themselves that they have a superiority in the faith and conscience of men2 so great as if they have once tasted of it1 it is seldom seen that any torture or persecution can make them relinquish or abandon it4 ,but as this is that which the author of the ,revelation calleth the depth or profoundness of ,satan1 so by argument of contraries1 the just and lawful sovereignty over men's understanding1 by force of truth rightly interpreted1 is that which approacheth nearest to the similitude of the divine rule4 7#d7 ,as for fortune and advancement1 the beneficence of learning is not so confined to give fortune only to states and commonwealths1 as it doth not likewise give fortune to particular persons4 ,for it was well noted long ago1 that ,homer hath given more men their livings1 than either ,sylla1 or ,csar1 or ,augustus ever did1 notwithstanding their great largesses and donatives1 and distributions of lands to so many legions4 ,and no doubt it is hard to say whether arms or learning have advanced greater numbers4 ,and in case of sovereignty we see1 that if arms or descent have carried away the kingdom1 yet learning hath carried the priesthood1 which ever hath been in some competition with empire4 7#e7 ,again1 for the pleasure and delight of knowledge and learning1 it far surpasseth all other in nature4 ,for1 shall the pleasures of the affections so exceed the pleasure of the sense1 as much as the obtaining of desire or victory exceedeth a song or a dinner8 and must not of consequence the pleasures of the intellect or understanding exceed the pleasures of the affections8 ,we see in all other pleasures there is satiety1 and after they be used1 their verdure departeth1 which showeth well they be but deceits of pleasure1 and not pleasures2 and that it was the novelty which pleased1 and not the quality4 ,and1 therefore1 we see that voluptuous men turn friars1 and ambitions princes turn melancholy4 ,but of knowledge there is no satiety1 but satisfaction and appetite are perpetually interchangeable2 and1 therefore1 appeareth to be good in itself simply1 without fallacy or accident4 ,neither is that pleasure of small efficacy and contentment to the mind of man1 which the poet ,lucretius describeth elegantly3-- 8,suave mari magno1 turbantibus quora ventis1 c40 8,it is a view of delight10 saith he1 8to stand or walk upon the shore side1 and to see a ship tossed with tempest upon the sea2 or to be in a fortified tower1 and to see two battles join upon a plain4 ,but it is a pleasure incomparable1 for the mind of man to be settled1 landed1 and fortified in the certainty of truth2 and from thence to descry and behold the errors1 perturbations1 labours1 and wanderings up and down of other men40 7#f7 ,lastly1 leaving the vulgar arguments1 that by learning man excelleth man in that wherein man excelleth beasts2 that by learning man ascendeth to the heavens and their motions1 where in body he cannot come2 and the like3 let us conclude with the dignity and excellency of knowledge and learning in that whereunto man's nature doth most aspire1 which is immortality1 or continuance2 for to this tendeth generation1 and raising of houses and families2 to this tend buildings1 foundations1 and monuments2 to this tendeth the desire of memory1 fame1 and celebration2 and in effect the strength of all other human desires4 ,we see then how far the monuments of wit and learning are more durable than the monuments of power or of the hands4 ,for have not the verses of ,homer continued twenty-five hundred years1 or more1 without the loss of a syllable or letter2 during which the infinite palaces1 temples1 castles1 cities1 have been decayed and demolished8 ,it is not possible to have the true pictures or statues of ,cyrus1 ,alexander1 ,csar1 no nor of the kings or great personages of much later years2 for the originals cannot last1 and the copies cannot but leese of the life and truth4 ,but the images of men's wits and knowledges remain in books1 exempted from the wrong of time and capable of perpetual renovation4 ,neither are they fitly to be called images1 because they generate still1 and cast their seeds in the minds of others1 provoking and causing infinite actions and opinions in succeeding ages4 ,so that if the invention of the ship was thought so noble1 which carrieth riches and commodities from place to place1 and consociateth the most remote regions in participation of their fruits1 how much more are letters to be magnified1 which as ships pass through the vast seas of time1 and make ages so distant to participate of the wisdom1 illuminations1 and inventions1 the one of the other8 ,nay1 further1 we see some of the philosophers which were least divine1 and most immersed in the senses1 and denied generally the immortality of the soul1 yet came to this point1 that whatsoever motions the spirit of man could act and perform without the organs of the body1 they thought might remain after death1 which were only those of the understanding and not of the affection2 so immortal and incorruptible a thing did knowledge seem unto them to be4 ,but we1 that know by divine revelation that not only the understanding but the affections purified1 not only the spirit but the body changed1 shall be advanced to immortality1 do disclaim in these rudiments of the senses4 ,but it must be remembered1 both in this last point1 and so it may likewise be needful in other places1 that in probation of the dignity of knowledge or learning1 ,i did in the beginning separate divine testimony from human1 which method ,i have pursued1 and so handled them both apart4 7#g7 ,nevertheless ,i do not pretend1 and ,i know it will be impossible for me1 by any pleading of mine1 to reverse the judgment1 either of sop's cock1 that preferred the barleycorn before the gem2 or of ,midas1 that being chosen judge between ,apollo1 president of the ,muses1 and ,pan1 god of the flocks1 judged for plenty2 or of ,paris1 that judged for beauty and love against wisdom and power2 or of ,agrippina1 occidat matrem1 modo imperet1 that preferred empire with any condition never so detestable2 or of ,ulysses1 qui vetulam prtulit immortalitati1 being a figure of those which prefer custom and habit before all excellency1 or of a number of the like popular judgments4 ,for these things must continue as they have been2 but so will that also continue whereupon learning hath ever relied1 and which faileth not3 ,justificata est sapientia a filiis suis4 ,,the ,,second ,,book4 ,to the ,king4 #a4 ,,it might seem to have more convenience1 though it come often otherwise to pass 7excellent ,king71 that those which are fruitful in their generations1 and have in themselves the foresight of immortality in their descendants1 should likewise be more careful of the good estate of future times1 unto which they know they must transmit and commend over their dearest pledges4 ,queen ,elizabeth was a sojourner in the world in respect of her unmarried life1 and was a blessing to her own times2 and yet so as the impression of her good government1 besides her happy memory1 is not without some effect which doth survive her4 ,but to your ,majesty1 whom ,god hath already blessed with so much royal issue1 worthy to continue and represent you for ever1 and whose youthful and fruitful bed doth yet promise many the like renovations1 it is proper and agreeable to be conversant not only in the transitory parts of good government1 but in those acts also which are in their nature permanent and perpetual4 ,amongst the which 7if affection do not transport me7 there is not any more worthy than the further endowment of the world with sound and fruitful knowledge4 ,for why should a few received authors stand up like ,hercules' columns1 beyond which there should be no sailing or discovering1 since we have so bright and benign a star as your ,majesty to conduct and prosper us8 ,to return therefore where we left1 it remaineth to consider of what kind those acts are which have been undertaken and performed by kings and others for the increase and advancement of learning1 wherein ,i purpose to speak actively1 without digressing or dilating4 #b4 ,let this ground therefore be laid1 that all works are over common by amplitude of reward1 by soundness of direction1 and by the conjunction of labours4 ,the first multiplieth endeavour1 the second preventeth error1 and the third supplieth the frailty of man4 ,but the principal of these is direction1 for claudus in via antevertit cursorem extra viam2 and ,solomon excellently setteth it down1 8,if the iron be not sharp1 it requireth more strength1 but wisdom is that which prevaileth10 signifying that the invention or election of the mean is more effectual than any enforcement or accumulation of endeavours4 ,this ,i am induced to speak1 for that 7not derogating from the noble intention of any that have been deservers towards the state of learning71 ,i do observe nevertheless that their works and acts are rather matters of magnificence and memory than of progression and proficience1 and tend rather to augment the mass of learning in the multitude of learned men than to rectify or raise the sciences themselves4 #c4 ,the works or acts of merit towards learning are conversant about three objects--the places of learning1 the books of learning1 and the persons of the learned4 ,for as water1 whether it be the dew of heaven or the springs of the earth1 doth scatter and leese itself in the ground1 except it be collected into some receptacle where it may by union comfort and sustain itself2 and for that cause the industry of man hath made and framed springheads1 conduits1 cisterns1 and pools1 which men have accustomed likewise to beautify and adorn with accomplishments of magnificence and state1 as well as of use and necessity2 so this excellent liquor of knowledge1 whether it descend from divine inspiration1 or spring from human sense1 would soon perish and vanish to oblivion1 if it were not preserved in books1 traditions1 conferences1 and places appointed1 as universities1 colleges1 and schools1 for the receipt and comforting of the same4 #d4 ,the works which concern the seats and places of learning are four--foundations and buildings1 endowments with revenues1 endowments with franchises and privileges1 institutions and ordinances for government--all tending to quietness and privateness of life1 and discharge of cares and troubles2 much like the stations which ,virgil prescribeth for the hiving of bees3 8,principio sedes apibus statioque petenda1 ,quo neque sit ventis aditus1 c40 #e4 ,the works touching books are two--first1 libraries1 which are as the shrines where all the relics of the ancient saints1 full of true virtue1 and that without delusion or imposture1 are preserved and reposed2 secondly1 new editions of authors1 with more correct impressions1 more faithful translations1 more profitable glosses1 more diligent annotations1 and the like4 #f4 ,the works pertaining to the persons of learned men 7besides the advancement and countenancing of them in general7 are two--the reward and designation of readers in sciences already extant and invented2 and the reward and designation of writers and inquirers concerning any parts of learning not sufficiently laboured and prosecuted4 #g4 ,these are summarily the works and acts wherein the merits of many excellent princes and other worthy personages1 have been conversant4 ,as for any particular commemorations1 ,i call to mind what ,cicero said when he gave general thanks1 ,difficile non aliquem1 ingratum quenquam prterire4 ,let us rather1 according to the ,scriptures1 look unto that part of the race which is before us1 than look back to that which is already attained4 #h4 ,first1 therefore1 amongst so many great foundations of colleges in ,europe1 ,i find strange that they are all dedicated to professions1 and none left free to arts and sciences at large4 ,for if men judge that learning should be referred to action1 they judge well2 but in this they fall into the error described in the ancient fable1 in which the other parts of the body did suppose the stomach had been idle1 because it neither performed the office of motion1 as the limbs do1 nor of sense1 as the head doth2 but yet notwithstanding it is the stomach that digesteth and distributeth to all the rest4 ,so if any man think philosophy and universality to be idle studies1 he doth not consider that all professions are from thence served and supplied4 ,and this ,i take to be a great cause that hath hindered the progression of learning1 because these fundamental knowledges have been studied but in passage4 ,for if you will have a tree bear more fruit than it hath used to do1 it is not anything you can do to the boughs1 but it is the stirring of the earth and putting new mould about thee roots that must work it4 ,neither is it to be forgotten1 that this dedicating of foundations and dotations to professory learning hath not only had a malign aspect and influence upon the growth of sciences1 but hath also been prejudicial to states1 and governments4 ,for hence it proceedeth that princes find a solitude in regard of able men to serve them in causes of estate1 because there is no education collegiate which is free1 where such as were so disposed might give themselves in histories1 modern languages1 books of policy and civil discourse1 and other the like enablements unto service of estate4 #i4 ,and because founders of colleges do plant1 and founders of lectures do water1 it followeth well in order to speak of the defect which is in public lectures2 namely1 in the smallness1 and meanness of the salary or reward which in most places is assigned unto them1 whether they be lectures of arts1 or of professions4 ,for it is necessary to the progression of sciences that readers be of the most able and sufficient men2 as those which are ordained for generating and propagating of sciences1 and not for transitory use4 ,this cannot be1 except their condition and endowment be such as may content the ablest man to appropriate his whole labour and continue his whole age in that function and attendance2 and therefore must have a proportion answerable to that mediocrity or competency of advancement1 which may be expected from a profession or the practice of a profession4 ,so as1 if you will have sciences flourish1 you must observe ,david's military law1 which was1 8,that those which stayed with the carriage should have equal part with those which were in the action20 else will the carriages be ill attended4 ,so readers in sciences are indeed the guardians of the stores and provisions of sciences1 whence men in active courses are furnished1 and therefore ought to have equal entertainment with them2 otherwise if the fathers in sciences be of the weakest sort or be ill maintained1 8,et patrum invalidi referent jejunia nati40 #aj4 ,another defect ,i note1 wherein ,i shall need some alchemist to help me1 who call upon men to sell their books1 and to build furnaces2 quitting and forsaking ,minerva and the ,muses as barren virgins1 and relying upon ,vulcan4 ,but certain it is1 that unto the deep1 fruitful1 and operative study of many sciences1 specialty natural philosophy and physic1 books be not only the instrumentals2 wherein also the beneficence of men hath not been altogether wanting4 ,for we see spheres1 globes1 astrolabes1 maps1 and the like1 have been provided as appurtenances to astronomy and cosmography1 as well as books4 ,we see likewise that some places instituted for physic have annexed the commodity of gardens for simples of all sorts1 and do likewise command the use of dead bodies for anatomies4 ,but these do respect but a few things4 ,in general1 there will hardly be any main proficience in the disclosing of nature1 except there be some allowance for expenses about experiments2 whether they be experiments appertaining to ,vulcanus or ,ddalus1 furnace or engine1 or any other kind4 ,and therefore as secretaries and spials of princes and states bring in bills for intelligence1 so you must allow the spials and intelligencers of nature to bring in their bills2 or else you shall be ill advertised4 #aa4 ,and if ,alexander made such a liberal assignation to ,aristotle of treasure for the allowance of hunters1 fowlers1 fishers1 and the like1 that he might compile a history of nature1 much better do they deserve it that travail in arts of nature4 #ab4 ,another defect which ,i note is an intermission or neglect in those which are governors in universities1 of consultation1 and in princes or superior persons1 of visitation3 to enter into account and consideration1 whether the readings1 exercises1 and other customs appertaining unto learning1 anciently begun and since continued1 be well instituted or no2 and thereupon to ground an amendment or reformation in that which shall be found inconvenient4 ,for it is one of your ,majesty's own most wise and princely maxims1 8,that in all usages and precedents1 the times be considered wherein they first began2 which if they were weak or ignorant1 it derogateth from the authority of the usage1 and leaveth it for suspect40 ,and therefore inasmuch as most of the usages and orders of the universities were derived from more obscure times1 it is the more requisite they be re-examined4 ,in this kind ,i will give an instance or two1 for example sake1 of things that are the most obvious and familiar4 ,the one is a matter1 which though it be ancient and general1 yet ,i hold to be an error2 which is1 that scholars in universities come too soon and too unripe to logic and rhetoric1 arts fitter for graduates than children and novices4 ,for these two1 rightly taken1 are the gravest of sciences1 being the arts of arts2 the one for judgment1 the other for ornament4 ,and they be the rules and directions how to set forth and dispose matter3 and therefore for minds empty and unfraught with matter1 and which have not gathered that which ,cicero calleth sylva and supellex1 stuff and variety1 to begin with those arts 7as if one should learn to weigh1 or to measure1 or to paint the wind7 doth work but this effect1 that the wisdom of those arts1 which is great and universal1 is almost made contemptible1 and is degenerate into childish sophistry and ridiculous affectation4 ,and further1 the untimely learning of them hath drawn on by consequence the superficial and unprofitable teaching and writing of them1 as fitteth indeed to the capacity of children4 ,another is a lack ,i find in the exercises used in the universities1 which do snake too great a divorce between invention and memory4 ,for their speeches are either premeditate1 in verbis conceptis1 where nothing is left to invention1 or merely extemporal1 where little is left to memory4 ,whereas in life and action there is least use of either of these1 but rather of intermixtures of premeditation and invention1 notes and memory4 ,so as the exercise fitteth not the practice1 nor the image the life2 and it is ever a true rule in exercises1 that they be framed as near as may be to the life of practice2 for otherwise they do pervert the motions and faculties of the mind1 and not prepare them4 ,the truth whereof is not obscure1 when scholars come to the practices of professions1 or other actions of civil life2 which when they set into1 this want is soon found by themselves1 and sooner by others4 ,but this part1 touching the amendment of the institutions and orders of universities1 ,i will conclude with the clause of ,csar's letter to ,oppius and ,balbes1 ,hoc quemadmodum fieri possit1 nonnulla mihi in mentem veniunt1 et multa reperiri possunt3 de iis rebus rgo vos ut cogitationem suscipiatis4 #ac4 ,another defect which ,i note ascendeth a little higher than the precedent4 ,for as the proficience of learning consisteth much in the orders and institutions of universities in the same states and kingdoms1 so it would be yet more advanced1 if there were more intelligence mutual between the universities of ,europe than now there is4 ,we see there be many orders and foundations1 which though they be divided under several sovereignties and territories1 yet they take themselves to have a kind of contract1 fraternity1 and correspondence one with the other1 insomuch as they have provincials and generals4 ,and surely as nature createth brotherhood in families1 and arts mechanical contract brotherhoods in communalties1 and the anointment of ,god superinduceth a brotherhood in kings and bishops1 so in like manner there cannot but be a fraternity in learning and illumination1 relating to that paternity which is attributed to ,god1 who is called the ,father of illuminations or lights4 #ad4 ,the last defect which ,i will note is1 that there hath not been1 or very rarely been1 any public designation of writers or inquirers concerning such parts of knowledge as may appear not to have been already sufficiently laboured or undertaken2 unto which point it is an inducement to enter into a view and examination what parts of learning have been prosecuted1 and what omitted4 ,for the opinion of plenty is amongst the causes of want1 and the great quantity of books maketh a show rather of superfluity than lack2 which surcharge nevertheless is not to be remedied by making no more books1 but by making more good books1 which1 as the serpent of ,moses1 might devour the serpents of the enchanters4 #ae4 ,the removing of all the defects formerly enumerate1 except the last1 and of the active part also of the last 7which is the designation of writers71 are opera basilica2 towards which the endeavours of a private man may be but as an image in a crossway1 that may point at the way1 but cannot go it4 ,but the inducing part of the latter 7which is the survey of learning7 may be set forward by private travail4 ,wherefore ,i will now attempt to make a general and faithful perambulation of learning1 with an inquiry what parts thereof lie fresh and waste1 and not improved and converted by the industry of man1 to the end that such a plot made and recorded to memory may both minister light to any public designation1 and1 also serve to excite voluntary endeavours4 ,wherein1 nevertheless1 my purpose is at this time to note only omissions and deficiences1 and not to make any redargution of errors or incomplete prosecutions4 ,for it is one thing to set forth what ground lieth unmanured1 and another thing to correct ill husbandry in that which is manured4 ,in the handling and undertaking of which work ,i am not ignorant what it is that ,i do now move and attempt1 nor insensible of mine own weakness to sustain my purpose4 ,but my hope is1 that if my extreme love to learning carry me too far1 ,i may obtain the excuse of affection2 for that 8,it is not granted to man to love and to be wise40 ,but ,i know well ,i can use no other liberty of judgment than ,i must leave to others2 and ,i for my part shall be indifferently glad either to perform myself1 or accept from another1 that duty of humanity--,nam qui erranti comiter monstrat viam1 c4 ,i do foresee likewise that of those things which ,i shall enter and register as deficiences and omissions1 many will conceive and censure that some of them are already done and extant2 others to be but curiosities1 and things of no great use2 and others to be of too great difficulty1 and almost impossibility to be compassed and effected4 ,but for the two first1 ,i refer myself to the particulars4 ,for the last1 touching impossibility1 ,i take it those things are to be held possible which may be done by some person1 though not by every one2 and which may be done by many1 though not by any one2 and which may be done in the succession of ages1 though not within the hourglass of one man's life2 and which may be done by public designation1 though not by private endeavour4 ,but1 notwithstanding1 if any man will take to himself rather that of ,solomon1 8,dicit piger1 ,leo est in via10 than that of ,virgil1 8,possunt quia posse videntur10 ,i shall be content that my labours be esteemed but as the better sort of wishes2 for as it asketh some knowledge to demand a question not impertinent1 so it requireth some sense to make a wish not absurd4 ,i4 7#a7 ,the parts of human learning have reference to the three parts of man's understanding1 which is the seat of learning3 history to his memory1 poesy to his imagination1 and philosophy to his reason4 ,divine learning receiveth the same distribution2 for1 the spirit of man is the same1 though the revelation of oracle and sense be diverse4 ,so as theology consisteth also of history of the ,church2 of parables1 which is divine poesy2 and of holy doctrine or precept4 ,for as for that part which seemeth supernumerary1 which is prophecy1 it is but divine history1 which hath that prerogative over human1 as the narration may be before the fact as well as after4 7#b7 ,history is natural1 civil1 ecclesiastical1 and literary2 whereof the first three ,i allow as extant1 the fourth ,i note as deficient4 ,for no man hath propounded to himself the general state of learning to be described and represented from age to age1 as many have done the works of ,nature1 and the state1 civil and ecclesiastical2 without which the history of the world seemeth to me to be as the statue of ,polyphemus with his eye out1 that part being wanting which doth most show the spirit and life of the person4 ,and yet ,i am not ignorant that in divers particular sciences1 as of the jurisconsults1 the mathematicians1 the rhetoricians1 the philosophers1 there are set down some small memorials of the schools1 authors1 and books2 and so likewise some barren relations touching the invention of arts or usages4 ,but a just story of learning1 containing the antiquities and originals of knowledges and their sects1 their inventions1 their traditions1 their diverse administrations and managings1 their flourishings1 their oppositions1 decays1 depressions1 oblivions1 removes1 with the causes and occasions of them1 and all other events concerning learning1 throughout the ages of the world1 ,i may truly affirm to be wanting2 the use and end of which work ,i do not so much design for curiosity or satisfaction of those that are the lovers of learning1 but chiefly for a more serious and grave purpose1 which is this in few words1 that it will make learned men wise in the use and administration of learning4 ,for it is not ,saint ,augustine's nor ,saint ,ambrose's works that will make so wise a divine as ecclesiastical history thoroughly read and observed1 and the same reason is of learning4 7#c7 ,history of ,nature is of three sorts2 of ,nature in course1 of ,nature erring or varying1 and of ,nature altered or wrought2 that is1 history of creatures1 history of marvels1 and history of arts4 ,the first of these no doubt is extant1 and that in good perfection2 the two latter are bandied so weakly and unprofitably as ,i am moved to note them as deficient4 ,for ,i find no sufficient or competent collection of the works of ,nature which have a digression and deflexion from the ordinary course of generations1 productions1 and motions2 whether they be singularities of place and region1 or the strange events of time and chance1 or the effects of yet unknown properties1 or the instances of exception to general kinds4 ,it is true ,i find a number of books of fabulous experiments and secrets1 and frivolous impostures for pleasure and strangeness2 but a substantial and severe collection of the heteroclites or irregulars of ,nature1 well examined and described1 ,i find not1 specially not with due rejection of fables and popular errors4 ,for as things now are1 if an untruth in ,nature be once on foot1 what by reason of the neglect of examination1 and countenance of antiquity1 and what by reason of the use of the opinion in similitudes and ornaments of speech1 it is never called down4 7#d7 ,the use of this work1 honoured with a precedent in ,aristotle1 is nothing less than to give contentment to the appetite of curious and vain wits1 as the manner of ,mirabilaries is to do2 but for two reasons1 both of great weight3 the one to correct the partiality of axioms and opinions1 which are commonly framed only upon common and familiar examples2 the other because from the wonders of ,nature is the nearest intelligence and passage towards the wonders of art1 for it is no more but by following and1 as it were1 hounding ,nature in her wanderings1 to be able to lead her afterwards to the same place again4 ,neither am ,i of opinion1 in this history of marvels1 that superstitious narrations of sorceries1 witchcrafts1 dreams1 divinations1 and the like1 where there is an assurance and clear evidence of the fact1 be altogether excluded4 ,for it is not yet known in what cases and how far effects attributed to superstition do participate of natural causes2 and1 therefore1 howsoever the practice of such things is to be condemned1 yet from the speculation and consideration of them light may be taken1 not only for the discerning of the offences1 but for the further disclosing of ,nature4 ,neither ought a man to make scruple of entering into these things for inquisition of truth1 as your ,majesty hath showed in your own example1 who1 with the two clear eyes of religion and natural philosophy1 have looked deeply and wisely into these shadows1 and yet proved yourself to be of the nature of the sun1 which passeth through pollutions and itself remains as pure as before4 ,but this ,i hold fit1 that these narrations1 which have mixture with superstition1 be sorted by themselves1 and not to be mingled with the narrations which are merely and sincerely natural4 ,but as for the narrations touching the prodigies and miracles of religions1 they are either not true or not natural2 and1 therefore1 impertinent for the story of ,nature4 7#e7 ,for history of ,nature1 wrought or mechanical1 ,i find some collections made of agriculture1 and likewise of manual arts2 but commonly with a rejection of experiments familiar and vulgar2 for it is esteemed a kind of dishonour unto learning to descend to inquiry or meditation upon matters mechanical1 except they be such as may be thought secrets1 rarities1 and special subtleties2 which humour of vain and supercilious arrogancy is justly derided in ,plato1 where he brings in ,hippias1 a vaunting sophist1 disputing with ,socrates1 a true and unfeigned inquisitor of truth2 where1 the subject being touching beauty1 ,socrates1 after his wandering manner of inductions1 put first an example of a fair virgin1 and then of a fair horse1 and then of a fair pot well glazed1 whereat ,hippias was offended1 and said1 8,more than for courtesy's sake1 he did think much to dispute with any that did allege such base and sordid instances40 ,whereunto ,socrates answereth1 8,you have reason1 and it becomes you well1 being a man so trim in your vestments10 c41 and so goeth on in an irony4 ,but the truth is1 they be not the highest instances that give the securest information1 as may be well expressed in the tale so common of the philosopher that1 while he gazed upwards to the stars1 fell into the water2 for if he had looked down he might have seen the stars in the water1 but looking aloft he could not see the water in the stars4 ,so it cometh often to pass that mean and small things discover great1 better than great can discover the small2 and therefore ,aristotle noteth well1 8,that the nature of everything is best seen in his smallest portions40 ,and for that cause he inquireth the nature of a commonwealth1 first in a family1 and the simple conjugations of man and wife1 parent and child1 master and servant1 which are in every cottage4 ,even so likewise the nature of this great city of the world1 and the policy thereof1 must be first sought in mean concordances and small portions4 ,so we see how that secret of ,nature1 of the turning of iron touched with the loadstone towards the north1 was found out in needles of iron1 not in bars of iron4 7#f7 ,but if my judgment be of any weight1 the use of history mechanical is of all others the most radical and fundamental towards natural philosophy2 such natural philosophy as shall not vanish in the fume of subtle1 sublime1 or delectable speculation1 but such as shall be operative to the endowment and benefit of man's life4 ,for it will not only minister and suggest for the present many ingenious practices in all trades1 by a connection and transferring of the observations of one art to the use of another1 when the experiences of several mysteries shall fall under the consideration of one man's mind2 but further1 it will give a more true and real illumination concerning causes and axioms than is hitherto attained4 ,for like as a man's disposition is never well known till he be crossed1 nor ,proteus ever changed shapes till he was straitened and held fast2 so the passages and variations of nature cannot appear so fully in the liberty of nature as in the trials and vexations of art4 ,,ii4 7#a7 ,for civil history1 it is of three kinds2 not unfitly to be compared with the three kinds of pictures or images4 ,for of pictures or images we see some are unfinished1 some are perfect1 and some are defaced4 ,so of histories we may find three kinds3 memorials1 perfect histories1 and antiquities2 for memorials are history unfinished1 or the first or rough drafts of history2 and antiquities are history defaced1 or some remnants of history which have casually escaped the shipwreck of time4 7#b7 ,memorials1 or preparatory history1 are of two sorts2 whereof the one may be termed commentaries1 and the other registers4 ,commentaries are they which set down a continuance of the naked events and actions1 without the motives or designs1 the counsels1 the speeches1 the pretexts1 the occasions1 and other passages of action4 ,for this is the true nature of a commentary 7though ,csar1 in modesty mixed with greatness1 did for his pleasure apply the name of a commentary to the best history of the world74 ,registers are collections of public acts1 as decrees of council1 judicial proceedings1 declarations and letters of estate1 orations1 and the like1 without a perfect continuance or contexture of the thread of the narration4 7#c7 ,antiquities1 or remnants of history1 are1 as was said1 tanquam tabula naufragii3 when industrious persons1 by an exact and scrupulous diligence and observation1 out of monuments1 names1 words1 proverbs1 traditions1 private records and evidences1 fragments of stories1 passages of books that concern not story1 and the like1 do save and recover somewhat from the deluge of time4 7#d7 ,in these kinds of unperfect histories ,i do assign no deficience1 for they are tanquam imperfecte mista2 and therefore any deficience in them is but their nature4 ,as for the corruptions and moths of history1 which are epitomes1 the use of them deserveth to be banished1 as all men of sound judgment have confessed1 as those that have fretted and corroded the sound bodies of many excellent histories1 and wrought them into base and unprofitable dregs4 7#e7 ,history1 which may be called just and perfect history1 is of three kinds1 according to the object which it propoundeth1 or pretendeth to represent3 for it either representeth a time1 or a person1 or an action4 ,the first we call chronicles1 the second lives1 and the third narrations or relations4 ,of these1 although the first be the most complete and absolute kind of history1 and hath most estimation and glory1 yet the second excelleth it in profit and use1 and the third in verity and sincerity4 ,for history of times representeth the magnitude of actions1 and the public faces and deportments of persons1 and passeth over in silence the smaller passages and motions of men and matters4 ,but such being the workmanship of ,god1 as ,he doth hang the greatest weight upon the smallest wires1 maxima minimis1 suspendens1 it comes therefore to pass1 that such histories do rather set forth the pomp of business than the true and inward resorts thereof4 ,but lives1 if they be well written1 propounding to themselves a person to represent1 in whom actions1 both greater and smaller1 public and private1 have a commixture1 must of necessity contain a more true1 native1 and lively representation4 ,so again narrations and relations of actions1 as the war of ,peloponnesus1 the expedition of ,cyrus ,minor1 the conspiracy of ,catiline1 cannot but be more purely and exactly true than histories of times1 because they may choose an argument comprehensible within the notice and instructions of the writer3 whereas he that undertaketh the story of a time1 specially of any length1 cannot but meet with many blanks and spaces1 which he must be forced to fill up out of his own wit and conjecture4 7#f7 ,for the history of times1 ,i mean of civil history1 the providence of ,god hath made the distribution4 ,for it hath pleased ,god to ordain and illustrate two exemplar states of the world for arms1 learning1 moral virtue1 policy1 and laws2 the state of ,grcia and the state of ,rome2 the histories whereof occupying the middle part of time1 have more ancient to them histories which may by one common name be termed the antiquities of the world2 and after them1 histories which may be likewise called by the name of modern history4 7#g7 ,now to speak of the deficiences4 ,as to the heathen antiquities of the world it is in vain to note them for deficient4 ,deficient they are no doubt1 consisting most of fables and fragments2 but the deficience cannot be holpen2 for antiquity is like fame1 caput inter nubila condit1 her head is muffled from our sight4 ,for the history of the exemplar states1 it is extant in good perfection4 ,not but ,i could wish there were a perfect course of history for ,grcia1 from ,theseus to ,philopmen 7what time the affairs of ,grcia drowned and extinguished in the affairs of ,rome71 and for ,rome from ,romulus to ,justinianus1 who may be truly said to be ultimus ,romanorum4 ,in which sequences of story the text of ,thucydides and ,xenophon in the one1 and the texts of ,livius1 ,polybius1 ,sallustius1 ,csar1 ,appianus1 ,tacitus1 ,herodianus in the other1 to be kept entire1 without any diminution at all1 and only to be supplied and continued4 ,but this is a matter of magnificence1 rather to be commended than required2 and we speak now of parts of learning supplemental1 and not of supererogation4 7#h7 ,but for modern histories1 whereof there are some few very worthy1 but the greater part beneath mediocrity1 leaving the care of foreign stories to foreign states1 because ,i will not be curiosus in aliena republica1 ,i cannot fail to represent to your ,majesty the unworthiness of the history of ,england in the main continuance thereof1 and the partiality and obliquity of that of ,scotland in the latest and largest author that ,i have seen3 supposing that it would be honour for your ,majesty1 and a work very memorable1 if this island of ,great ,britain1 as it is now joined in monarchy for the ages to come1 so were joined in one history for the times passed1 after the manner of the sacred history1 which draweth down the story of the ten tribes and of the two tribes as twins together4 ,and if it shall seem that the greatness of this work may make it less exactly performed1 there is an excellent period of a much smaller compass of time1 as to the story of ,england2 that is to say1 from the uniting of the ,roses to the uniting of the kingdoms2 a portion of time wherein1 to my understanding1 there hath been the rarest varieties that in like number of successions of any hereditary monarchy hath been known4 ,for it beginneth with the mixed adoption of a crown by arms and title2 an entry by battle1 an establishment by marriage2 and therefore times answerable1 like waters after a tempest1 full of working and swelling1 though without extremity of storm2 but well passed through by the wisdom of the pilot1 being one of the most sufficient kings of all the number4 ,then followeth the reign of a king1 whose actions1 howsoever conducted1 had much intermixture with the affairs of ,europe1 balancing and inclining them variably2 in whose time also began that great alteration in the state ecclesiastical1 an action which seldom cometh upon the stage4 ,then the reign of a minor2 then an offer of a usurpation 7though it was but as febris ephemera74 ,then the reign of a queen matched with a foreigner2 then of a queen that lived solitary and unmarried1 and yet her government so masculine1 as it had greater impression and operation upon the states abroad than it any ways received from thence4 ,and now last1 this most happy and glorious event1 that this island of ,britain1 divided from all the world1 should be united in itself1 and that oracle of rest given to ,neas1 antiquam exquirite matrem1 should now be performed and fulfilled upon the nations of ,england and ,scotland1 being now reunited in the ancient mother name of ,britain1 as a full period of all instability and peregrinations4 ,so that as it cometh to pass in massive bodies1 that they have certain trepidations and waverings before they fix and settle1 so it seemeth that by the providence of ,god this monarchy1 before it was to settle in your majesty and your generations 7in which ,i hope it is now established for ever71 it had these prelusive changes and varieties4 7#i7 ,for lives1 ,i do find strange that these times have so little esteemed the virtues of the times1 as that the writings of lives should be no more frequent4 ,for although there be not many sovereign princes or absolute commanders1 and that states are most collected into monarchies1 yet are there many worthy personages that deserve better than dispersed report or barren eulogies4 ,for herein the invention of one of the late poets is proper1 and doth well enrich the ancient fiction4 ,for he feigneth that at the end of the thread or web of every man's life there was a little medal containing the person's name1 and that ,time waited upon the shears1 and as soon as the thread was cut caught the medals1 and carried them to the river of ,lathe2 and about the bank there were many birds flying up and down1 that would get the medals and carry them in their beak a little while1 and then let them fall into the river4 ,only there were a few swans1 which if they got a name would carry it to a temple where it was consecrate4 ,and although many men1 more mortal in their affections than in their bodies1 do esteem desire of name and memory but as a vanity and ventosity1 8,animi nil magn laudis egentes20 which opinion cometh from that root1 ,non prius laudes contempsimus1 quam laudanda facere desivimus3 yet that will not alter ,solomon's judgment1 ,memoria justi cum laudibus1 at impiorum nomen putrescet3 the one flourisheth1 the other either consumeth to present oblivion1 or turneth to an ill odour4 ,and therefore in that style or addition1 which is and hath been long well received and brought in use1 felicis memori1 pi memori1 bon memori1 we do acknowledge that which ,cicero saith1 borrowing it from ,demosthenes1 that bona fama propria possessio defunctorum2 which possession ,i cannot but note that in our times it lieth much waste1 and that therein there is a deficience4 7#aj7 ,for narrations and relations of particular actions1 there were also to be wished a greater diligence therein2 for there is no great action but hath some good pen which attends it4 ,and because it is an ability not common to write a good history1 as may well appear by the small number of them2 yet if particularity of actions memorable were but tolerably reported as they pass1 the compiling of a complete history of times might be the better expected1 when a writer should arise that were fit for it3 for the collection of such relations might be as a nursery garden1 whereby to plant a fair and stately garden when time should serve4 7#aa7 ,there is yet another partition of history which ,cornelius ,tacitus maketh1 which is not to be forgotten1 specially with that application which he accoupleth it withal1 annals and journals3 appropriating to the former matters of estate1 and to the latter acts and accidents of a meaner nature4 ,for giving but a touch of certain magnificent buildings1 he addeth1 ,cum ex dignitate populi ,romani repertum sit1 res illustres annalibus1 talia diurnis urbis actis mandare4 ,so as there is a kind of contemplative heraldry1 as well as civil4 ,and as nothing doth derogate from the dignity of a state more than confusion of degrees1 so it doth not a little imbase the authority of a history to intermingle matters of triumph1 or matters of ceremony1 or matters of novelty1 with matters of state4 ,but the use of a journal hath not only been in the history of time1 but likewise in the history of persons1 and chiefly of actions2 for princes in ancient time had1 upon point of honour and policy both1 journals kept1 what passed day by day4 ,for we see the chronicle which was read before ,ahasuerus1 when he could not take rest1 contained matter of affairs1 indeed1 but such as had passed in his own time and very lately before4 ,but the journal of ,alexander's house expressed every small particularity1 even concerning his person and court2 and it is yet a use well received in enterprises memorable1 as expeditions of war1 navigations1 and the like1 to keep diaries of that which passeth continually4 7#ab7 ,i cannot likewise be ignorant of a form of writing which some grave and wise men have used1 containing a scattered history of those actions which they have thought worthy of memory1 with politic discourse and observation thereupon3 not incorporate into the history1 but separately1 and as the more principal in their intention2 which kind of ruminated history ,i think more fit to place amongst books of policy1 whereof we shall hereafter speak1 than amongst books of history4 ,for it is the true office of history to represent the events themselves together with the counsels1 and to leave the observations and conclusions thereupon to the liberty and faculty of every man's judgment4 ,but mixtures are things irregular1 whereof no man can define4 7#ac7 ,so also is there another kind of history manifoldly mixed1 and that is history of cosmography3 being compounded of natural history1 in respect of the regions themselves2 of history civil1 in respect of the habitations1 regiments1 and manners of the people2 and the mathematics1 in respect of the climates and configurations towards the heavens3 which part of learning of all others in this latter time hath obtained most proficience4 ,for it may be truly affirmed to the honour of these times1 and in a virtuous emulation with antiquity1 that this great building of the world had never through-lights made in it1 till the age of us and our fathers4 ,for although they had knowledge of the antipodes1 8,nosque ubi primus equis ,oriens afflavit anhelis1 ,illic sera rubens accendit lumina ,vesper10 yet that might be by demonstration1 and not in fact2 and if by travel1 it requireth the voyage but of half the globe4 ,but to circle the earth1 as the heavenly bodies do1 was not done nor enterprised till these later times3 and therefore these times may justly bear in their word1 not only plus ultra1 in precedence of the ancient non ultra1 and imitabile fulmen1 in precedence of the ancient non imitabile fulmen1 8,demens qui nimbos et non imitabile fulmen10 c4 but likewise imitabile clum2 in respect of the many memorable voyages after the manner of heaven about the globe of the earth4 7#ad7 ,and this proficience in navigation and discoveries may plant also an expectation of the further proficience and augmentation of all sciences2 because it may seem they are ordained by ,god to be coevals1 that is1 to meet in one age4 ,for so the prophet ,daniel speaking of the latter times foretelleth1 ,plurimi pertransibunt1 et multiplex erit scientia3 as if the openness and through-passage of the world and the increase of knowledge were appointed to be in the same ages2 as we see it is already performed in great part3 the learning of these later times not much giving place to the former two periods or returns of learning1 the one of the ,grecians1 the other of the ,romans4 ,,iii4 7#a7 ,history ecclesiastical receiveth the same divisions with history civil3 but further in the propriety thereof may be divided into the history of the ,church1 by a general name2 history of prophecy2 and history of providence4 ,the first describeth the times of the militant ,church1 whether it be fluctuant1 as the ark of ,noah1 or movable1 as the ark in the wilderness1 or at rest1 as the ark in the ,temple3 that is1 the state of the ,church in persecution1 in remove1 and in peace4 ,this part ,i ought in no sort to note as deficient2 only ,i would that the virtue and sincerity of it were according to the mass and quantity4 ,but ,i am not now in hand with censures1 but with omissions4 7#b7 ,the second1 which is history of prophecy1 consisteth of two relatives--the prophecy and the accomplishment2 and1 therefore1 the nature of such a work ought to be1 that every prophecy of the ,scripture be sorted with the event fulfilling the same throughout the ages of the world1 both for the better confirmation of faith and for the better illumination of the ,church touching those parts of prophecies which are yet unfulfilled3 allowing1 nevertheless1 that latitude which is agreeable and familiar unto divine prophecies1 being of the nature of their ,author1 with whom a thousand years are but as one day1 and therefore are not fulfilled punctually at once1 but have springing and germinant accomplishment throughout many ages1 though the height or fulness of them may refer to some one age4 ,this is a work which ,i find deficient1 but is to be done with wisdom1 sobriety1 and reverence1 or not at all4 7#c7 ,the third1 which is history of ,providence1 containeth that excellent correspondence which is between ,god's revealed will and ,his secret will2 which though it be so obscure1 as for the most part it is not legible to the natural man--no1 nor many times to those that behold it from the tabernacle--yet1 at some times it pleaseth ,god1 for our better establishment and the confuting of those which are as without ,god in the world1 to write it in such text and capital letters1 that1 as the prophet saith1 8,he that runneth by may read it0--that is1 mere sensual persons1 which hasten by ,god's judgments1 and never bend or fix their cogitations upon them1 are nevertheless in their passage and race urged to discern it4 ,such are the notable events and examples of ,god's judgments1 chastisements1 deliverances1 and blessings2 and this is a work which has passed through the labour of many1 and therefore ,i cannot present as omitted4 7#d7 ,there are also other parts of learning which are appendices to history4 ,for all the exterior proceedings of man consist of words and deeds1 whereof history doth properly receive and retain in memory the deeds2 and if words1 yet but as inducements and passages to deeds2 so are there other books and writings which are appropriate to the custody and receipt of words only1 which likewise are of three sorts--orations1 letters1 and brief speeches or sayings4 ,orations are pleadings1 speeches of counsel1 laudatives1 invectives1 apologies1 reprehensions1 orations of formality or ceremony1 and the like4 ,letters are according to all the variety of occasions1 advertisements1 advises1 directions1 propositions1 petitions1 commendatory1 expostulatory1 satisfactory1 of compliment1 of pleasure1 of discourse1 and all other passages of action4 ,and such as are written from wise men1 are of all the words of man1 in my judgment1 the best2 for they are more natural than orations and public speeches1 and more advised than conferences or present speeches4 ,so again letters of affairs from such as manage them1 or are privy to them1 are of all others the best instructions for history1 and to a diligent reader the best histories in themselves4 ,for apophthegms1 it is a great loss of that book of ,csar's2 for as his history1 and those few letters of his which we have1 and those apophthegms which were of his own1 excel all men's else1 so ,i suppose would his collection of apophthegms have done2 for as for those which are collected by others1 either ,i have no taste in such matters or else their choice hath not been happy4 ,but upon these three kinds of writings ,i do not insist1 because ,i have no deficiences to propound concerning them4 7#e7 ,thus much therefore concerning history1 which is that part of learning which answereth to one of the cells1 domiciles1 or offices of the mind of man1 which is that of the memory4 ,,iv4 7#a7 ,poesy is a part of learning in measure of words1 for the most part restrained1 but in all other points extremely licensed1 and doth truly refer to the imagination2 which1 being not tied to the laws of matter1 may at pleasure join that which nature hath severed1 and sever that which nature hath joined1 and so make unlawful matches and divorces of things--,pictoribus atque poetis1 c4 ,it is taken in two senses in respect of words or matter4 ,in the first sense1 it is but a character of style1 and belongeth to arts of speech1 and is not pertinent for the present4 ,in the latter1 it is--as hath been said--one of the principal portions of learning1 and is nothing else but feigned history1 which may be styled as well in prose as in verse4 7#b7 ,the use of this feigned history hath been to give some shadow of satisfaction to the mind of man in those points wherein the nature of things doth deny it1 the world being in proportion inferior to the soul2 by reason whereof there is1 agreeable to the spirit of man1 a more ample greatness1 a more exact goodness1 and a more absolute variety1 than can be found in the nature of things4 ,therefore1 because the acts or events of true history have not that magnitude which satisfieth the mind of man1 poesy feigneth acts and events greater and more heroical4 ,because true history propoundeth the successes and issues of actions not so agreeable to the merits of virtue and vice1 therefore poesy feigns them more just in retribution1 and more according to revealed ,providence4 ,because true history representeth actions and events more ordinary and less interchanged1 therefore poesy endueth them with more rareness and more unexpected and alternative variations4 ,so as it appeareth that poesy serveth and conferreth to magnanimity1 morality and to delectation4 ,and therefore1 it was ever thought to have some participation of divineness1 because it doth raise and erect the mind1 by submitting the shows of things to the desires of the mind2 whereas reason doth buckle and bow the mind unto the nature of things4 ,and we see that by these insinuations and congruities with man's nature and pleasure1 joined also with the agreement and consort it hath with music1 it hath had access and estimation in rude times and barbarous regions1 where other learning stood excluded4 7#c7 ,the division of poesy which is aptest in the propriety thereof 7besides those divisions which are common unto it with history1 as feigned chronicles1 feigned lives1 and the appendices of history1 as feigned epistles1 feigned orations1 and the rest7 is into poesy narrative1 representative1 and allusive4 ,the narrative is a mere imitation of history1 with the excesses before remembered1 choosing for subjects commonly wars and love1 rarely state1 and sometimes pleasure or mirth4 ,representative is as a visible history1 and is an image of actions as if they were present1 as history is of actions in nature as they are 7that is7 past4 ,allusive1 or parabolical1 is a narration applied only to express some special purpose or conceit2 which latter kind of parabolical wisdom was much more in use in the ancient times1 as by the fables of sop1 and the brief sentences of the seven1 and the use of hieroglyphics may appear4 ,and the cause was 7for that it was then of necessity to express any point of reason which was more sharp or subtle than the vulgar in that manner7 because men in those times wanted both variety of examples and subtlety of conceit4 ,and as hieroglyphics were before letters1 so parables were before arguments2 and nevertheless now and at all times they do retain much life and rigour1 because reason cannot be so sensible nor examples so fit4 7#d7 ,but there remaineth yet another use of poesy parabolical1 opposite to that which we last mentioned2 for that tendeth to demonstrate and illustrate that which is taught or delivered1 and this other to retire and obscure it--that is1 when the secrets and mysteries of religion1 policy1 or philosophy1 are involved in fables or parables4 ,of this in divine poesy we see the use is authorised4 ,in heathen poesy we see the exposition of fables doth fall out sometimes with great felicity3 as in the fable that the giants being overthrown in their war against the gods1 the earth their mother in revenge thereof brought forth ,fame3 8,illam terra parens1 ira irritat ,deorum1 ,extremam1 ut perhibent1 ,co ,enceladoque soroem1 ,progenuit40 ,expounded that when princes and monarchs have suppressed actual and open rebels1 then the malignity of people 7which is the mother of rebellion7 doth bring forth libels and slanders1 and taxations of the states1 which is of the same kind with rebellion but more feminine4 ,so in the fable that the rest of the gods having conspired to bind ,jupiter1 ,pallas called ,briareus with his hundred hands to his aid3 expounded that monarchies need not fear any curbing of their absoluteness by mighty subjects1 as long as by wisdom they keep the hearts of the people1 who will be sure to come in on their side4 ,so in the fable that ,achilles was brought up under ,chiron1 the centaur1 who was part a man and part a beast1 expounded ingeniously but corruptly by ,machiavel1 that it belongeth to the education and discipline of princes to know as well how to play the part of a lion in violence1 and the fox in guile1 as of the man in virtue and justice4 ,nevertheless1 in many the like encounters1 ,i do rather think that the fable was first1 and the exposition devised1 than that the moral was first1 and thereupon the fable framed2 for ,i find it was an ancient vanity in ,chrysippus1 that troubled himself with great contention to fasten the assertions of the ,stoics upon the fictions of the ancient poets2 but yet that all the fables and fictions of the poets were but pleasure and not figure1 ,i interpose no opinion4 ,surely of these poets which are now extant1 even ,homer himself 7notwithstanding he was made a kind of scripture by the later schools of the ,grecians71 yet ,i should without any difficulty pronounce that his fables had no such inwardness in his own meaning4 ,but what they might have upon a more original tradition is not easy to affirm1 for he was not the inventor of many of them4 7#e7 ,in this third part of learning1 which is poesy1 ,i can report no deficience2 for being as a plant that cometh of the lust of the earth1 without a formal seed1 it hath sprung up and spread abroad more than any other kind4 ,but to ascribe unto it that which is due1 for the expressing of affections1 passions1 corruptions1 and customs1 we are beholding to poets more than to the philosophers' works2 and for wit and eloquence1 not much less than to orators' harangues4 ,but it is not good to stay too long in the theatre4 ,let us now pass on to the judicial place or palace of the mind1 which we are to approach and view with more reverence and attention4 ,v4 7#a7 ,the knowledge of man is as the waters1 some descending from above1 and some springing from beneath3 the one informed by the light of nature1 the other inspired by divine revelation4 ,the light of nature consisteth in the notions of the mind and the reports of the senses2 for as for knowledge which man receiveth by teaching1 it is cumulative and not original1 as in a water that besides his own spring-head is fed with other springs and streams4 ,so then1 according to these two differing illuminations or originals1 knowledge is first of all divided into divinity and philosophy4 7#b7 ,in philosophy the contemplations of man do either penetrate unto ,god1 or are circumferred to nature1 or are reflected or reverted upon himself4 ,out of which several inquiries there do arise three knowledges--divine philosophy1 natural philosophy1 and human philosophy or humanity4 ,for all things are marked and stamped with this triple character--the power of ,god1 the difference of nature and the use of man4 ,but because the distributions and partitions of knowledge are not like several lines that meet in one angle1 and so touch but in a point1 but are like branches of a tree that meet in a stem1 which hath a dimension and quantity of entireness and continuance before it come to discontinue and break itself into arms and boughs2 therefore it is good1 before we enter into the former distribution1 to erect and constitute one universal science1 by the name of philosophia prima1 primitive or summary philosophy1 as the main and common way1 before we come where the ways part and divide themselves2 which science whether ,i should report as deficient or no1 ,i stand doubtful4 ,for ,i find a certain rhapsody of natural theology1 and of divers parts of logic2 and of that part of natural philosophy which concerneth the principles1 and of that other part of natural philosophy which concerneth the soul or spirit--all these strangely commixed and confused2 but being examined1 it seemeth to me rather a depredation of other sciences1 advanced and exalted unto some height of terms1 than anything solid or substantive of itself4 ,nevertheless ,i cannot be ignorant of the distinction which is current1 that the same things are handled but in several respects4 ,as for example1 that logic considereth of many things as they are in notion1 and this philosophy as they are in nature--the one in appearance1 the other in existence2 but ,i find this difference better made than pursued4 ,for if they had considered quantity1 similitude1 diversity1 and the rest of those extern characters of things1 as philosophers1 and in nature1 their inquiries must of force have been of a far other kind than they are4 ,for doth any of them1 in handling quantity1 speak of the force of union1 how and how far it multiplieth virtue8 ,doth any give the reason why some things in nature are so common1 and in so great mass1 and others so rare1 and in so small quantity8 ,doth any1 in handling similitude and diversity1 assign the cause why iron should not move to iron1 which is more like1 but move to the loadstone1 which is less like8 ,why in all diversities of things there should be certain participles in nature which are almost ambiguous to which kind they should be referred8 ,but there is a mere and deep silence touching the nature and operation of those common adjuncts of things1 as in nature2 and only a resuming and repeating of the force and use of them in speech or argument4 ,therefore1 because in a writing of this nature ,i avoid all subtlety1 my meaning touching this original or universal philosophy is thus1 in a plain and gross description by negative3 8,that it be a receptacle for all such profitable observations and axioms as fall not within the compass of any of the special parts of philosophy or sciences1 but are more common and of a higher stage40 7#c7 ,now that there are many of that kind need not be doubted4 ,for example3 ,is not the rule1 ,si inqualibus qualia addas1 omnia erunt inqualia1 an axiom as well of justice as of the mathematics8 and is there not a true coincidence between commutative and distributive justice1 and arithmetical and geometrical proportion8 ,is not that other rule1 ,qu in eodem tertio conveniunt1 et inter se conveniunt1 a rule taken from the mathematics1 but so potent in logic as all syllogisms are built upon it8 ,is not the observation1 ,omnia mutantur1 nil interit1 a contemplation in philosophy thus1 that the quantum of nature is eternal8 in natural theology thus1 that it requireth the same omnipotency to make somewhat nothing1 which at the first made nothing somewhat8 according to the ,scripture1 ,didici quod omnia opera1 qu fecit ,deus1 perseverent in perpetuum2 non possumus eis quicquam addere nec auferre4 ,is not the ground1 which ,machiavel wisely and largely discourseth concerning governments1 that the way to establish and preserve them is to reduce them ad principia--a rule in religion and nature1 as well as in civil administration8 ,was not the ,persian magic a reduction or correspondence of the principles and architectures of nature to the rules and policy of governments8 ,is not the precept of a musician1 to fall from a discord or harsh accord upon a concord or sweet accord1 alike true in affection8 ,is not the trope of music1 to avoid or slide from the close or cadence1 common with the trope of rhetoric of deceiving expectation8 ,is not the delight of the quavering upon a stop in music the same with the playing of light upon the water8 8,splendet tremulo sub lumine pontus40 ,are not the organs of the senses of one kind with the organs of reflection1 the eye with a glass1 the ear with a cave or strait1 determined and bounded8 ,neither are these only similitudes1 as men of narrow observation may conceive them to be1 but the same footsteps of nature1 treading or printing upon several subjects or matters4 ,this science therefore 7as ,i understand it7 ,i may justly report as deficient2 for ,i see sometimes the profounder sort of wits1 in handling some particular argument1 will now and then draw a bucket of water out of this well for their present use2 but the spring-head thereof seemeth to me not to have been visited1 being of so excellent use both for the disclosing of nature and the abridgment of art4 ,,vi4 7#a7 ,this science being therefore first placed as a common parent like unto ,berecynthia1 which had so much heavenly issue1 omnes clicolas1 omnes supera alta tenetes2 we may return to the former distribution of the three philosophies--divine1 natural1 and human4 ,and as concerning divine philosophy or natural theology1 it is that knowledge or rudiment of knowledge concerning ,god which may be obtained by the contemplation of ,his creatures2 which knowledge may be truly termed divine in respect of the object1 and natural in respect of the light4 ,the bounds of this knowledge are1 that it sufficeth to convince atheism1 but not to inform religion2 and therefore there was never miracle wrought by ,god to convert an atheist1 because the light of nature might have led him to confess a ,god2 but miracles have been wrought to convert idolaters and the superstitious1 because no light of nature extendeth to declare the will and true worship of ,god4 ,for as all works do show forth the power and skill of the workman1 and not his image1 so it is of the works of ,god1 which do show the omnipotency and wisdom of the ,maker1 but not ,his image4 ,and therefore therein the heathen opinion differeth from the sacred truth3 for they supposed the world to be the image of ,god1 and man to be an extract or compendious image of the world2 but the ,scriptures never vouchsafe to attribute to the world that honour1 as to be the image of ,god1 but only the work of ,his hands2 neither do they speak of any other image of ,god but man4 ,wherefore by the contemplation of nature to induce and enforce the acknowledgment of ,god1 and to demonstrate ,his power1 providence1 and goodness1 is an excellent argument1 and hath been excellently handled by divers1 but on the other side1 out of the contemplation of nature1 or ground of human knowledges1 to induce any verity or persuasion concerning the points of faith1 is in my judgment not safe2 ,da fidei qu fidei sunt4 ,for the heathen themselves conclude as much in that excellent and divine fable of the golden chain1 8,that men and gods were not able to draw ,jupiter down to the earth2 but1 contrariwise1 ,jupiter was able to draw them up to heaven40 ,so as we ought not to attempt to draw down or submit the mysteries of ,god to our reason1 but contrariwise to raise and advance our reason to the divine truth4 ,so as in this part of knowledge1 touching divine philosophy1 ,i am so far from noting any deficience1 as ,i rather note an excess2 whereunto ,i have digressed because of the extreme prejudice which both religion and philosophy hath received and may receive by being commixed together2 as that which undoubtedly will make an heretical religion1 and an imaginary and fabulous philosophy4 7#b7 ,otherwise it is of the nature of angels and spirits1 which is an appendix of theology1 both divine and natural1 and is neither inscrutable nor interdicted4 ,for although the ,scripture saith1 8,let no man deceive you in sublime discourse touching the worship of angels1 pressing into that he knoweth not10 c41 yet notwithstanding if you observe well that precept1 it may appear thereby that there be two things only forbidden--adoration of them1 and opinion fantastical of them1 either to extol them further than appertaineth to the degree of a creature1 or to extol a man's knowledge of them further than he hath ground4 ,but the sober and grounded inquiry1 which may arise out of the passages of ,holy ,scriptures1 or out of the gradations of nature1 is not restrained4 ,so of degenerate and revolted spirits1 the conversing with them or the employment of them is prohibited1 much more any veneration towards them2 but the contemplation or science of their nature1 their power1 their illusions1 either by ,scripture or reason1 is a part of spiritual wisdom4 ,for so the apostle saith1 8,we are not ignorant of his stratagems40 ,and it is no more unlawful to inquire the nature of evil spirits1 than to inquire the force of poisons in nature1 or the nature of sin and vice in morality4 ,but this part touching angels and spirits ,i cannot note as deficient1 for many have occupied themselves in it2 ,i may rather challenge it1 in many of the writers thereof1 as fabulous and fantastical4 ,,vii4 7#a7 ,leaving therefore divine philosophy or natural theology 7not divinity or inspired theology1 which we reserve for the last of all as the haven and sabbath of all man's contemplations7 we will now proceed to natural philosophy4 ,if then it be true that ,democritus said1 8,that the truth of nature lieth hid in certain deep mines and caves20 and if it be true likewise that the alchemists do so much inculcate1 that ,vulcan is a second nature1 and imitateth that dexterously and compendiously1 which nature worketh by ambages and length of time1 it were good to divide natural philosophy into the mine and the furnace1 and to make two professions or occupations of natural philosophers--some to be pioneers and some smiths2 some to dig1 and some to refine and hammer4 ,and surely ,i do best allow of a division of that kind1 though in more familiar and scholastical terms3 namely1 that these be the two parts of natural philosophy--the inquisition of causes1 and the production of effects2 speculative and operative2 natural science1 and natural prudence4 ,for as in civil matters there is a wisdom of discourse1 and a wisdom of direction2 so is it in natural4 ,and here ,i will make a request1 that for the latter 7or at least for a part thereof7 ,i may revive and reintegrate the misapplied and abused name of natural magic1 which in the true sense is but natural wisdom1 or natural prudence2 taken according to the ancient acception1 purged from vanity and superstition4 ,now although it be true1 and ,i know it well1 that there is an intercourse between causes and effects1 so as both these knowledges1 speculative and operative1 have a great connection between themselves2 yet because all true and fruitful natural philosophy hath a double scale or ladder1 ascendent and descendent1 ascending from experiments to the invention of causes1 and descending from causes to the invention of new experiments2 therefore ,i judge it most requisite that these two parts be severally considered and handled4 7#b7 ,natural science or theory is divided into physic and metaphysic2 wherein ,i desire it may be conceived that ,i use the word metaphysic in a differing sense from that that is received4 ,and in like manner1 ,i doubt not but it will easily appear to men of judgment1 that in this and other particulars1 wheresoever my conception and notion may differ from the ancient1 yet ,i am studious to keep the ancient terms4 ,for hoping well to deliver myself from mistaking1 by the order and perspicuous expressing of that ,i do propound1 ,i am otherwise zealous and affectionate to recede as little from antiquity1 either in terms or opinions1 as may stand with truth and the proficience of knowledge4 ,and herein ,i cannot a little marvel at the philosopher ,aristotle1 that did proceed in such a spirit of difference and contradiction towards all antiquity2 undertaking not only to frame new words of science at pleasure1 but to confound and extinguish all ancient wisdom2 insomuch as he never nameth or mentioneth an ancient author or opinion1 but to confute and reprove2 wherein for glory1 and drawing followers and disciples1 he took the right course4 ,for certainly there cometh to pass1 and hath place in human truth1 that which was noted and pronounced in the highest truth3--,veni in nomine partis1 nec recipits me2 si quis venerit in nomine suo eum recipietis4 ,but in this divine aphorism 7considering to whom it was applied1 namely1 to antichrist1 the highest deceiver71 we may discern well that the coming in a man's own name1 without regard of antiquity or paternity1 is no good sign of truth1 although it be joined with the fortune and success of an eum recipietis4 ,but for this excellent person ,aristotle1 ,i will think of him that he learned that humour of his scholar1 with whom it seemeth he did emulate2 the one to conquer all opinions1 as the other to conquer all nations4 ,wherein1 nevertheless1 it may be1 he may at some men's hands1 that are of a bitter disposition1 get a like title as his scholar did3-- 8,felix terrarum prdo1 non utile mundo ,editus exemplum1 c40 ,so1 8,felix doctrin prdo40 ,but to me1 on the other side1 that do desire as much as lieth in my pen to ground a sociable intercourse between antiquity and proficience1 it seemeth best to keep way with antiquity usque ad aras2 and1 therefore1 to retain the ancient terms1 though ,i sometimes alter the uses and definitions1 according to the moderate proceeding in civil government2 where1 although there be some alteration1 yet that holdeth which ,tacitus wisely noteth1 eadem magistratuum vocabula4 7#c7 ,to return1 therefore1 to the use and acception of the term metaphysic as ,i do now understand the word2 it appeareth1 by that which hath been already said1 that ,i intend philosophia prima1 summary philosophy and metaphysic1 which heretofore have been confounded as one1 to be two distinct things4 ,for the one ,i have made as a parent or common ancestor to all knowledge2 and the other ,i have now brought in as a branch or descendant of natural science4 ,it appeareth likewise that ,i have assigned to summary philosophy the common principles and axioms which are promiscuous and indifferent to several sciences2 ,i have assigned unto it likewise the inquiry touching the operation or the relative and adventive characters of essences1 as quantity1 similitude1 diversity1 possibility1 and the rest1 with this distinction and provision2 that they be handled as they have efficacy in nature1 and not logically4 ,it appeareth likewise that natural theology1 which heretofore hath been handled confusedly with metaphysic1 ,i have enclosed and bounded by itself4 ,it is therefore now a question what is left remaining for metaphysic2 wherein ,i may without prejudice preserve thus much of the conceit of antiquity1 that physic should contemplate that which is inherent in matter1 and therefore transitory2 and metaphysic that which is abstracted and fixed4 ,and again1 that physic should handle that which supposeth in nature only a being and moving2 and metaphysic should handle that which supposeth further in nature a reason1 understanding1 and platform4 ,but the difference1 perspicuously expressed1 is most familiar and sensible4 ,for as we divided natural philosophy in general into the inquiry of causes and productions of effects1 so that part which concerneth the inquiry of causes we do subdivide according to the received and sound division of causes4 ,the one part1 which is physic1 inquireth and handleth the material and efficient causes2 and the other1 which is metaphysic1 handleth the formal and final causes4 7#d7 ,physic 7taking it according to the derivation1 and not according to our idiom for medicine7 is situate in a middle term or distance between natural history and metaphysic4 ,for natural history describeth the variety of things2 physic the causes1 but variable or respective causes2 and metaphysic the fixed and constant causes4 8,limus ut hic durescit1 et hc ut cera liquescit1 ,uno eodemque igni40 ,fire is the cause of induration1 but respective to clay2 fire is the cause of colliquation1 but respective to wax4 ,but fire is no constant cause either of induration or colliquation2 so then the physical causes are but the efficient and the matter4 ,physic hath three parts1 whereof two respect nature united or collected1 the third contemplateth nature diffused or distributed4 ,nature is collected either into one entire total1 or else into the same principles or seeds4 ,so as the first doctrine is touching the contexture or configuration of things1 as de mundo1 de universitate rerum4 ,the second is the doctrine concerning the principles or originals of things4 ,the third is the doctrine concerning all variety and particularity of things2 whether it be of the differing substances1 or their differing qualities and natures2 whereof there needeth no enumeration1 this part being but as a gloss or paraphrase that attendeth upon the text of natural history4 ,of these three ,i cannot report any as deficient4 ,in what truth or perfection they are handled1 ,i make not now any judgment2 but they are parts of knowledge not deserted by the labour of man4 7#e7 ,for metaphysic1 we have assigned unto it the inquiry of formal and final causes2 which assignation1 as to the former of them1 may seem to be nugatory and void1 because of the received and inveterate opinion1 that the inquisition of man is not competent to find out essential forms or true differences2 of which opinion we will take this hold1 that the invention of forms is of all other parts of knowledge the worthiest to be sought1 if it be possible to be found4 ,as for the possibility1 they are ill discoverers that think there is no land1 when they can see nothing but sea4 ,but it is manifest that ,plato1 in his opinion of ideas1 as one that had a wit of elevation situate as upon a cliff1 did descry that forms were the true object of knowledge2 but lost the real fruit of his opinion1 by considering of forms as absolutely abstracted from matter1 and not confined and determined by matter2 and so turning his opinion upon theology1 wherewith all his natural philosophy is infected4 ,but if any man shall keep a continual watchful and severe eye upon action1 operation1 and the use of knowledge1 he may advise and take notice what are the forms1 the disclosures whereof are fruitful and important to the state of man4 ,for as to the forms of substances 7man only except1 of whom it is said1 ,formavit hominem de limo terr1 et spiravit in faciem ejus spiraculum vit1 and not as of all other creatures1 ,producant aqu1 producat terra71 the forms of substances ,i say 7as they are now by compounding and transplanting multiplied7 are so perplexed1 as they are not to be inquired2 no more than it were either possible or to purpose to seek in gross the forms of those sounds which make words1 which by composition and transposition of letters are infinite4 ,but1 on the other side1 to inquire the form of those sounds or voices which make simple letters is easily comprehensible2 and being known induceth and manifesteth the forms of all words1 which consist and are compounded of them4 ,in the same manner to inquire the form of a lion1 of an oak1 of gold2 nay1 of water1 of air1 is a vain pursuit2 but to inquire the forms of sense1 of voluntary motion1 of vegetation1 of colours1 of gravity and levity1 of density1 of tenuity1 of heat1 of cold1 and all other natures and qualities1 which1 like an alphabet1 are not many1 and of which the essences 7upheld by matter7 of all creatures do consist2 to inquire1 ,i say1 the true forms of these1 is that part of metaphysic which we now define of4 ,not but that physic doth make inquiry and take consideration of the same natures2 but how8 ,only as to the material and efficient causes of them1 and not as to the forms4 ,for example1 if the cause of whiteness in snow or froth be inquired1 and it be rendered thus1 that the subtle intermixture of air and water is the cause1 it is well rendered2 but1 nevertheless1 is this the form of whiteness8 ,no2 but it is the efficient1 which is ever but vehiculum form4 ,this part of metaphysic ,i do not find laboured and performed2 whereat ,i marvel not2 because ,i hold it not possible to be invented by that course of invention which hath been used2 in regard that men 7which is the root of all error7 have made too untimely a departure1 and too remote a recess from particulars4 7#f7 ,but the use of this part of metaphysic1 which ,i report as deficient1 is of the rest the most excellent in two respects3 the one1 because it is the duty and virtue of all knowledge to abridge the infinity of individual experience1 as much as the conception of truth will permit1 and to remedy the complaint of vita brevis1 ars longa2 which is performed by uniting the notions and conceptions of sciences4 ,for knowledges are as pyramids1 whereof history is the basis4 ,so of natural philosophy1 the basis is natural history2 the stage next the basis is physic2 the stage next the vertical point is metaphysic4 ,as for the vertical point1 opus quod operatur ,deus principio usque ad finem1 the summary law of nature1 we know not whether man's inquiry can attain unto it4 ,but these three be the true stages of knowledge1 and are to them that are depraved no better than the giants' hills3-- 8,ter sunt conati imponere ,pelio ,ossam1 ,scilicet atque ,oss frondsum involvere ,olympum40 ,but to those which refer all things to the glory of ,god1 they are as the three acclamations1 ,sante1 sancte1 sancte6 holy in the description or dilatation of ,his works2 holy in the connection or concatenation of them2 and holy in the union of them in a perpetual and uniform law4 ,and1 therefore1 the speculation was excellent in ,parmenides and ,plato1 although but a speculation in them1 that all things by scale did ascend to unity4 ,so then always that knowledge is worthiest which is charged with least multiplicity1 which appeareth to be metaphysic2 as that which considereth the simple forms or differences of things1 which are few in number1 and the degrees and co-ordinations whereof make all this variety4 ,the second respect1 which valueth and commendeth this part of metaphysic1 is that it doth enfranchise the power of man unto the greatest liberty and possibility of works and effects4 ,for physic carrieth men in narrow and restrained ways1 subject to many accidents and impediments1 imitating the ordinary flexuous courses of nature4 ,but lat undique sunt sapientibus vi2 to sapience 7which was anciently defined to be rerum divinarum et humanarum scientia7 there is ever a choice of means4 ,for physical causes give light to new invention in simili materia4 ,but whosoever knoweth any form1 knoweth the utmost possibility of superinducing that nature upon any variety of matter2 and so is less restrained in operation1 either to the basis of the matter1 or the condition of the efficient2 which kind of knowledge ,solomon likewise1 though in a more divine sense1 elegantly describeth3 non arctabuntur gressus tui1 et currens non habebis offendiculum4 ,the ways of sapience are not much liable either to particularity or chance4 7#g7 ,the second part of metaphysic is the inquiry of final causes1 which ,i am moved to report not as omitted1 but as misplaced4 ,and yet if it were but a fault in order1 ,i would not speak of it2 for order is matter of illustration1 but pertaineth not to the substance of sciences4 ,but this misplacing hath caused a deficience1 or at least a great improficience in the sciences themselves4 ,for the handling of final causes1 mixed with the rest in physical inquiries1 hath intercepted the severe and diligent inquiry of all real and physical causes1 and given men the occasion to stay upon these satisfactory and specious causes1 to the great arrest and prejudice of further discovery4 ,for this ,i find done not only by ,plato1 who ever anchoreth upon that shore1 but by ,aristotle1 ,galen1 and others which do usually likewise fall upon these flats of discoursing causes4 ,for to say that 8the hairs of the eyelids are for a quickset and fence about the sight20 or that 8the firmness of the skins and hides of living creatures is to defend them from the extremities of heat or cold20 or that 8the bones are for the columns or beams1 whereupon the frames of the bodies of living creatures are built20 or that 8the leaves of trees are for protecting of the fruit20 or that 8the clouds are for watering of the earth20 or that 8the solidness of the earth is for the station and mansion of living creatures20 and the like1 is well inquired and collected in metaphysic1 but in physic they are impertinent4 ,nay1 they are1 indeed1 but remoras and hindrances to stay and slug the ship from further sailing2 and have brought this to pass1 that the search of the physical causes hath been neglected and passed in silence4 ,and1 therefore1 the natural philosophy of ,democritus and some others1 who did not suppose a mind or reason in the frame of things1 but attributed the form thereof able to maintain itself to infinite essays or proofs of ,nature1 which they term fortune1 seemeth to me 7as far as ,i can judge by the recital and fragments which remain unto us7 in particularities of physical causes more real and better inquired than that of ,aristotle and ,plato2 whereof both intermingled final causes1 the one as a part of theology1 and the other as a part of logic1 which were the favourite studies respectively of both those persons2 not because those final causes are not true and worthy to be inquired1 being kept within their own province1 but because their excursions into the limits of physical causes hath bred a vastness and solitude in that tract4 ,for otherwise1 keeping their precincts and borders1 men are extremely deceived if they think there is an enmity or repugnancy at all between them4 ,for the cause rendered1 that 8the hairs about the eyelids are for the safeguard of the sight10 doth not impugn the cause rendered1 that 8pilosity is incident to orifices of moisture--muscosi fontes1 c40 ,nor the cause rendered1 that 8the firmness of hides is for the armour of the body against extremities of heat or cold10 doth not impugn the cause rendered1 that 8contraction of pores is incident to the outwardest parts1 in regard of their adjacence to foreign or unlike bodies20 and so of the rest1 both causes being true and compatible1 the one declaring an intention1 the other a consequence only4 ,neither doth this call in question or derogate from ,divine ,providence1 but highly confirm and exalt it4 ,for as in civil actions he is the greater and deeper politique that can make other men the instruments of his will and ends1 and yet never acquaint them with his purpose1 so as they shall do it and yet not know what they do1 than he that imparteth his meaning to those he employeth2 so is the wisdom of ,god more admirable1 when ,nature intendeth one thing and ,providence draweth forth another1 than if ,he had communicated to particular creatures and motions the characters and impressions of ,his ,providence4 ,and thus much for metaphysic2 the latter part whereof ,i allow as extant1 but wish it confined to his proper place4 ,,viii4 7#a7 ,nevertheless1 there remaineth yet another part of natural philosophy1 which is commonly made a principal part1 and holdeth rank with physic special and metaphysic1 which is mathematic2 but ,i think it more agreeable to the nature of things1 and to the light of order1 to place it as a branch of metaphysic4 ,for the subject of it being quantity1 not quantity indefinite1 which is but a relative1 and belongeth to philosophia prima 7as hath been said71 but quantity determined or proportionable1 it appeareth to be one of the essential forms of things1 as that that is causative in ,nature of a number of effects2 insomuch as we see in the schools both of ,democritus and of ,pythagoras that the one did ascribe figure to the first seeds of things1 and the other did suppose numbers to be the principles and originals of things4 ,and it is true also that of all other forms 7as we understand forms7 it is the most abstracted and separable from matter1 and therefore most proper to metaphysic2 which hath likewise been the cause why it hath been better laboured and inquired than any of the other forms1 which are more immersed in matter4 ,for it being the nature of the mind of man 7to the extreme prejudice of knowledge7 to delight in the spacious liberty of generalities1 as in a champaign region1 and not in the inclosures of particularity1 the mathematics of all other knowledge were the goodliest fields to satisfy that appetite4 ,but for the placing of this science1 it is not much material3 only we have endeavoured in these our partitions to observe a kind of perspective1 that one part may cast light upon another4 7#b7 ,the mathematics are either pure or mixed4 ,to the pure mathematics are those sciences belonging which handle quantity determinate1 merely severed from any axioms of natural philosophy2 and these are two1 geometry and arithmetic1 the one handling quantity continued1 and the other dissevered4 ,mixed hath for subject some axioms or parts of natural philosophy1 and considereth quantity determined1 as it is auxiliary and incident unto them4 ,for many parts of ,nature can neither be invented with sufficient subtlety1 nor demonstrated with sufficient perspicuity1 nor accommodated unto use with sufficient dexterity1 without the aid and intervening of the mathematics1 of which sort are perspective1 music1 astronomy1 cosmography1 architecture1 engineery1 and divers others4 ,in the mathematics ,i can report no deficience1 except it be that men do not sufficiently understand this excellent use of the pure mathematics1 in that they do remedy and cure many defects in the wit and faculties intellectual4 ,for if the wit be too dull1 they sharpen it2 if too wandering1 they fix it2 if too inherent in the sense1 they abstract it4 ,so that as tennis is a game of no use in itself1 but of great use in respect it maketh a quick eye and a body ready to put itself into all postures1 so in the mathematics that use which is collateral and intervenient is no less worthy than that which is principal and intended4 ,and as for the mixed mathematics1 ,i may only make this prediction1 that there cannot fail to be more kinds of them as ,nature grows further disclosed4 ,thus much of natural science1 or the part of ,nature speculative4 7#c7 ,for natural prudence1 or the part operative of natural philosophy1 we will divide it into three parts--experimental1 philosophical1 and magical2 which three parts active have a correspondence and analogy with the three parts speculative1 natural history1 physic1 and metaphysic4 ,for many operations have been invented1 sometimes by a casual incidence and occurrence1 sometimes by a purposed experiment2 and of those which have been found by an intentional experiment1 some have been found out by varying or extending the same experiment1 some by transferring and compounding divers experiments the one into the other1 which kind of invention an empiric may manage4 ,again1 by the knowledge of physical causes there cannot fail to follow many indications and designations of new particulars1 if men in their speculation will keep one eye upon use and practice4 ,but these are but coastings along the shore1 premendo littus iniquum2 for it seemeth to me there can hardly be discovered any radical or fundamental alterations and innovations in ,nature1 either by the fortune and essays of experiments1 or by the light and direction of physical causes4 ,if1 therefore1 we have reported metaphysic deficient1 it must follow that we do the like of natural magic1 which hath relation thereunto4 ,for as for the natural magic whereof now there is mention in books1 containing certain credulous and superstitious conceits and observations of sympathies and antipathies1 and hidden proprieties1 and some frivolous experiments1 strange rather by disguisement than in themselves1 it is as far differing in truth of ,nature from such a knowledge as we require as the story of ,king ,arthur of ,britain1 or ,hugh of ,bourdeaux1 differs from ,csar's ,commentaries in truth of story2 for it is manifest that ,csar did greater things de vero than those imaginary heroes were feigned to do4 ,but he did them not in that fabulous manner4 ,of this kind of learning the fable of ,ixion was a figure1 who designed to enjoy ,juno1 the goddess of power1 and instead of her had copulation with a cloud1 of which mixture were begotten centaurs and chimeras4 ,so whosoever shall entertain high and vaporous imaginations1 instead of a laborious and sober inquiry of truth1 shall beget hopes and beliefs of strange and impossible shapes4 ,and1 therefore1 we may note in these sciences which hold so much of imagination and belief1 as this degenerate natural magic1 alchemy1 astrology1 and the like1 that in their propositions the description of the means is ever more monstrous than the pretence or end4 ,for it is a thing more probable that he that knoweth well the natures of weight1 of colour1 of pliant and fragile in respect of the hammer1 of volatile and fixed in respect of the fire1 and the rest1 may superinduce upon some metal the nature and form of gold by such mechanic as longeth to the production of the natures afore rehearsed1 than that some grains of the medicine projected should in a few moments of time turn a sea of quicksilver or other material into gold4 ,so it is more probable that he that knoweth the nature of arefaction1 the nature of assimilation of nourishment to the thing nourished1 the manner of increase and clearing of spirits1 the manner of the depredations which spirits make upon the humours and solid parts1 shall by ambages of diets1 bathings1 anointings1 medicines1 motions1 and the like1 prolong life1 or restore some degree of youth or vivacity1 than that it can be done with the use of a few drops or scruples of a liquor or receipt4 ,to conclude1 therefore1 the true natural magic1 which is that great liberty and latitude of operation which dependeth upon the knowledge of forms1 ,i may report deficient1 as the relative thereof is4 ,to which part1 if we be serious and incline not to vanities and plausible discourse1 besides the deriving and deducing the operations themselves from metaphysic1 there are pertinent two points of much purpose1 the one by way of preparation1 the other by way of caution4 ,the first is1 that there be made a calendar1 resembling an inventory of the estate of man1 containing all the inventions 7being the works or fruits of ,nature or art7 which are now extant1 and whereof man is already possessed2 out of which doth naturally result a note what things are yet held impossible1 or not invented1 which calendar will be the more artificial and serviceable if to every reputed impossibility you add what thing is extant which cometh the nearest in degree to that impossibility2 to the end that by these optatives and potentials man's inquiry may be the more awake in deducing direction of works from the speculation of causes4 ,and secondly1 that these experiments be not only esteemed which have an immediate and present use1 but those principally which are of most universal consequence for invention of other experiments1 and those which give most light to the invention of causes2 for the invention of the mariner's needle1 which giveth the direction1 is of no less benefit for navigation than the invention of the sails which give the motion4 7#d7 ,thus have ,i passed through natural philosophy and the deficiences thereof2 wherein if ,i have differed from the ancient and received doctrines1 and thereby shall move contradiction1 for my part1 as ,i affect not to dissent1 so ,i purpose not to contend4 ,if it be truth1 8,non canimus surdis1 respondent omnia sylv10 the voice of ,nature will consent1 whether the voice of man do or no4 ,and as ,alexander ,borgia was wont to say of the expedition of the ,french for ,naples1 that they came with chalk in their hands to mark up their lodgings1 and not with weapons to fight2 so ,i like better that entry of truth which cometh peaceably with chalk to mark up those minds which are capable to lodge and harbour it1 than that which cometh with pugnacity and contention4 7#e7 ,but there remaineth a division of natural philosophy according to the report of the inquiry1 and nothing concerning the matter or subject3 and that is positive and considerative1 when the inquiry reporteth either an assertion or a doubt4 ,these doubts or non liquets are of two sorts1 particular and total4 ,for the first1 we see a good example thereof in ,aristotle's ,problems which deserved to have had a better continuance2 but so nevertheless as there is one point whereof warning is to be given and taken4 ,the registering of doubts hath two excellent uses3 the one1 that it saveth philosophy from errors and falsehoods2 when that which is not fully appearing is not collected into assertion1 whereby error might draw error1 but reserved in doubt2 the other1 that the entry of doubts are as so many suckers or sponges to draw use of knowledge2 insomuch as that which if doubts had not preceded1 a man should never have advised1 but passed it over without note1 by the suggestion and solicitation of doubts is made to be attended and applied4 ,but both these commodities do scarcely countervail and inconvenience1 which will intrude itself if it be not debarred2 which is1 that when a doubt is once received1 men labour rather how to keep it a doubt still1 than how to solve it1 and accordingly bend their wits4 ,of this we see the familiar example in lawyers and scholars1 both which1 if they have once admitted a doubt1 it goeth ever after authorised for a doubt4 ,but that use of wit and knowledge is to be allowed1 which laboureth to make doubtful things certain1 and not those which labour to make certain things doubtful4 ,therefore these calendars of doubts ,i commend as excellent things2 so that there he this caution used1 that when they be thoroughly sifted and brought to resolution1 they be from thenceforth omitted1 discarded1 and not continued to cherish and encourage men in doubting4 ,to which calendar of doubts or problems ,i advise be annexed another calendar1 as much or more material which is a calendar of popular errors3 ,i mean chiefly in natural history1 such as pass in speech and conceit1 and are nevertheless apparently detected and convicted of untruth1 that man's knowledge be not weakened nor embased by such dross and vanity4 ,as for the doubts or non liquets general or in total1 ,i understand those differences of opinions touching the principles of nature1 and the fundamental points of the same1 which have caused the diversity of sects1 schools1 and philosophies1 as that of ,empedocles1 ,pythagoras1 ,democritus1 ,parmenides1 and the rest4 ,for although ,aristotle1 as though he had been of the race of the ,ottomans1 thought he could not reign except the first thing he did he killed all his brethren2 yet to those that seek truth and not magistrality1 it cannot but seem a matter of great profit1 to see before them the several opinions touching the foundations of nature4 ,not for any exact truth that can be expected in those theories2 for as the same phenomena in astronomy are satisfied by this received astronomy of the diurnal motion1 and the proper motions of the planets1 with their eccentrics and epicycles1 and likewise by the theory of ,copernicus1 who supposed the earth to move1 and the calculations are indifferently agreeable to both1 so the ordinary face and view of experience is many times satisfied by several theories and philosophies2 whereas to find the real truth requireth another manner of severity and attention4 ,for as ,aristotle saith1 that children at the first will call every woman mother1 but afterward they come to distinguish according to truth1 so experience1 if it be in childhood1 will call every philosophy mother1 but when it cometh to ripeness it will discern the true mother4 ,so as in the meantime it is good to see the several glosses and opinions upon ,nature1 whereof it may be everyone in some one point hath seen clearer than his fellows1 therefore ,i wish some collection to be made painfully and understandingly de antiquis philosophiis1 out of all the possible light which remaineth to us of them3 which kind of work ,i find deficient4 ,but here ,i must give warning1 that it be done distinctly and severedly2 the philosophies of everyone throughout by themselves1 and not by titles packed and faggoted up together1 as hath been done by ,plutarch4 ,for it is the harmony of a philosophy in itself1 which giveth it light and credence2 whereas if it be singled and broken1 it will seem more foreign and dissonant4 ,for as when ,i read in ,tacitus the actions of ,nero or ,claudius1 with circumstances of times1 inducements1 and occasions1 ,i find them not so strange2 but when ,i read them in ,suetonius ,tranquillus1 gathered into titles and bundles and not in order of time1 they seem more monstrous and incredible3 so is it of any philosophy reported entire1 and dismembered by articles4 ,neither do ,i exclude opinions of latter times to be likewise represented in this calendar of sects of philosophy1 as that of ,theophrastus ,paracelsus1 eloquently reduced into an harmony by the pen of ,severinus the ,dane2 and that of ,tilesius1 and his scholar ,donius1 being as a pastoral philosophy1 full of sense1 but of no great depth2 and that of ,fracastorius1 who1 though he pretended not to make any new philosophy1 yet did use the absoluteness of his own sense upon the old2 and that of ,gilbertus our countryman1 who revived1 with some alterations and demonstrations1 the opinions of ,xenophanes2 and any other worthy to be admitted4 7#f7 ,thus have we now dealt with two of the three beams of man's knowledge2 that is radius directus1 which is referred to nature1 radius refractus1 which is referred to ,god1 and cannot report truly because of the inequality of the medium4 ,there resteth radius reflexus1 whereby man beholdeth and contemplateth himself4 ,,ix4 7#a7 ,we come therefore now to that knowledge whereunto the ancient oracle directeth us1 which is the knowledge of ourselves2 which deserveth the more accurate handling1 by how much it toucheth us more nearly4 ,this knowledge1 as it is the end and term of natural philosophy in the intention of man1 so notwithstanding it is but a portion of natural philosophy in the continent of ,nature4 ,and generally let this be a rule1 that all partitions of knowledges be accepted rather for lines and veins than for sections and separations2 and that the continuance and entireness of knowledge be preserved4 ,for the contrary hereof hath made particular sciences to become barren1 shallow1 and erroneous1 while they have not been nourished and maintained from the common fountain4 ,so we see ,cicero1 the orator1 complained of ,socrates and his school1 that he was the first that separated philosophy and rhetoric2 whereupon rhetoric became an empty and verbal art4 ,so we may see that the opinion of ,copernicus1 touching the rotation of the earth1 which astronomy itself cannot correct1 because it is not repugnant to any of the phenomena1 yet natural philosophy may correct4 ,so we see also that the science of medicine if it be destituted and forsaken by natural philosophy1 it is not much better than an empirical practice4 ,with this reservation1 therefore1 we proceed to human philosophy or humanity1 which hath two parts3 the one considereth man segregate or distributively1 the other congregate or in society2 so as human philosophy is either simple and particular1 or conjugate and civil4 ,humanity particular consisteth of the same parts whereof man consisteth3 that is1 of knowledges which respect the body1 and of knowledges that respect the mind4 ,but before we distribute so far1 it is good to constitute4 ,for ,i do take the consideration in general1 and at large1 of human nature to be fit to be emancipate and made a knowledge by itself1 not so much in regard of those delightful and elegant discourses which have been made of the dignity of man1 of his miseries1 of his state and life1 and the like adjuncts of his common and undivided nature2 but chiefly in regard of the knowledge concerning the sympathies and concordances between the mind and body1 which being mixed cannot be properly assigned to the sciences of either4 7#b7 ,this knowledge hath two branches3 for as all leagues and amities consist of mutual intelligence and mutual offices1 so this league of mind and body hath these two parts3 how the one discloseth the other1 and how the one worketh upon the other2 discovery and impression4 ,the former of these hath begotten two arts1 both of prediction or prenotion2 whereof the one is honoured with the inquiry of ,aristotle1 and the other of ,hippocrates4 ,and although they have of later time been used to be coupled with superstitions and fantastical arts1 yet being purged and restored to their true state1 they have both of them a solid ground in ,nature1 and a profitable use in life4 ,the first is physiognomy1 which discovereth the disposition of the mind by the lineaments of the body4 ,the second is the exposition of natural dreams1 which discovereth the state of the body by the imaginations of the mind4 ,in the former of these ,i note a deficience4 ,for ,aristotle hath very ingeniously and diligently handled the factures of the body1 but not the gestures of the body1 which are no less comprehensible by art1 and of greater use and advantage4 ,for the lineaments of the body do disclose the disposition and inclination of the mind in general2 but the motions of the countenance and parts do not only so1 but do further disclose the present humour and state of the mind and will4 ,for as your majesty saith most aptly and elegantly1 8,as the tongue speaketh to the ear so the gesture speaketh to the eye40 ,and1 therefore1 a number of subtle persons1 whose eyes do dwell upon the faces and fashions of men1 do well know the advantage of this observation1 as being most part of their ability2 neither can it be denied1 but that it is a great discovery of dissimulations1 and a great direction in business4 7#c7 ,the latter branch1 touching impression1 hath not been collected into art1 but hath been handled dispersedly2 and it hath the same relation or antistrophe that the former hath4 ,for the consideration is double--either how and how far the humours and affects of the body do alter or work upon the mind1 or1 again1 how and how far the passions or apprehensions of the mind do alter or work upon the body4 ,the former of these hath been inquired and considered as a part and appendix of medicine1 but much more as a part of religion or superstition4 ,for the physician prescribeth cures of the mind in frenzies and melancholy passions1 and pretendeth also to exhibit medicines to exhilarate the mind1 to control the courage1 to clarify the wits1 to corroborate the memory1 and the like2 but the scruples and superstitions of diet and other regiment of the body in the sect of the ,pythagoreans1 in the heresy of the ,manichees1 and in the law of ,mahomet1 do exceed4 ,so likewise the ordinances in the ceremonial law1 interdicting the eating of the blood and the fat1 distinguishing between beasts clean and unclean for meat1 are many and strict2 nay1 the faith itself being clear and serene from all clouds of ceremony1 yet retaineth the use of fastlings1 abstinences1 and other macerations and humiliations of the body1 as things real1 and not figurative4 ,the root and life of all which prescripts is 7besides the ceremony7 the consideration of that dependency which the affections of the mind are submitted unto upon the state and disposition of the body4 ,and if any man of weak judgment do conceive that this suffering of the mind from the body doth either question the immortality1 or derogate from the sovereignty of the soul1 he may be taught1 in easy instances1 that the infant in the mother's womb is compatible with the mother1 and yet separable2 and the most absolute monarch is sometimes led by his servants1 and yet without subjection4 ,as for the reciprocal knowledge1 which is the operation of the conceits and passions of the mind upon the body1 we see all wise physicians1 in the prescriptions of their regiments to their patients1 do ever consider accidentia animi1 as of great force to further or hinder remedies or recoveries3 and more specially it is an inquiry of great depth and worth concerning imagination1 how and how far it altereth the body proper of the imaginant2 for although it hath a manifest power to hurt1 it followeth not it hath the same degree of power to help4 ,no more than a man can conclude1 that because there be pestilent airs1 able suddenly to kill a man in health1 therefore there should be sovereign airs1 able suddenly to cure a man in sickness4 ,but the inquisition of this part is of great use1 though it needeth1 as ,socrates said1 8a ,delian diver10 being difficult and profound4 ,but unto all this knowledge de communi vinculo1 of the concordances between the mind and the body1 that part of inquiry is most necessary which considereth of the seats and domiciles which the several faculties of the mind do take and occupate in the organs of the body2 which knowledge hath been attempted1 and is controverted1 and deserveth to be much better inquired4 ,for the opinion of ,plato1 who placed the understanding in the brain1 animosity 7which he did unfitly call anger1 having a greater mixture with pride7 in the heart1 and concupiscence or sensuality in the liver1 deserveth not to be despised1 but much less to be allowed4 ,so1 then1 we have constituted 7as in our own wish and advice7 the inquiry touching human nature entire1 as a just portion of knowledge to be handled apart4 ,x4 7#a7 ,the knowledge that concerneth man's body is divided as the good of man's body is divided1 unto which it referreth4 ,the good of man's body is of four kinds--health1 beauty1 strength1 and pleasure3 so the knowledges are medicine1 or art of cure2 art of decoration1 which is called cosmetic2 art of activity1 which is called athletic2 and art voluptuary1 which ,tacitus truly calleth eruditus luxus4 ,this subject of man's body is1 of all other things in nature1 most susceptible of remedy2 but then that remedy is most susceptible of error2 for the same subtlety of the subject doth cause large possibility and easy failing1 and therefore the inquiry ought to be the more exact4 7#b7 ,to speak1 therefore1 of medicine1 and to resume that we have said1 ascending a little higher3 the ancient opinion that man was microcosmus--an abstract or model of the world--hath been fantastically strained by ,paracelsus and the alchemists1 as if there were to be found in man's body certain correspondences and parallels1 which should have respect to all varieties of things1 as stars1 planets1 minerals1 which are extant in the great world4 ,but thus much is evidently true1 that of all substances which nature hath produced1 man's body is the most extremely compounded4 ,for we see herbs and plants are nourished by earth and water2 beasts for the most part by herbs and fruits2 man by the flesh of beasts1 birds1 fishes1 herbs1 grains1 fruits1 water1 and the manifold alterations1 dressings1 and preparations of these several bodies before they come to be his food and aliment4 ,add hereunto that beasts have a more simple order of life1 and less change of affections to work upon their bodies1 whereas man in his mansion1 sleep1 exercise1 passions1 hath infinite variations3 and it cannot be denied but that the body of man of all other things is of the most compounded mass4 ,the soul1 on the other side1 is the simplest of substances1 as is well expressed3 8,purumque reliquit thereum sensum atque aura simplicis ignem40 ,so that it is no marvel though the soul so placed enjoy no rest1 if that principle be true1 that ,motus rerum est rapidus extra locum1 placidus in loco4 ,but to the purpose4 ,this variable composition of man's body hath made it as an instrument easy to distemper2 and1 therefore1 the poets did well to conjoin music and medicine in ,apollo1 because the office of medicine is but to tune this curious harp of man's body and to reduce it to harmony4 ,so1 then1 the subject being so variable hath made the art by consequent more conjectural2 and the art being conjectural hath made so much the more place to be left for imposture4 ,for almost all other arts and sciences are judged by acts or masterpieces1 as ,i may term them1 and not by the successes and events4 ,the lawyer is judged by the virtue of his pleading1 and not by the issue of the cause2 this master in this ship is judged by the directing his course aright1 and not by the fortune of the voyage2 but the physician1 and perhaps this politique1 hath no particular acts demonstrative of his ability1 but is judged most by the event1 which is ever but as it is taken3 for who can tell1 if a patient die or recover1 or if a state be preserved or ruined1 whether it be art or accident8 ,and therefore many times the impostor is prized1 and the man of virtue taxed4 ,nay1 we see the weakness and credulity of men is such1 as they will often refer a mountebank or witch before a learned physician4 ,and therefore the poets were clear-sighted in discerning this extreme folly when they made sculapius and ,circe1 brother and sister1 both children of the sun1 as in the verses-- 8,ipse repertorem medicin talis et artis ,fulmine ,phbigenam ,stygias detrusit ad undas40 ,and again-- 8,dives inaccessos ubi ,solis filia lucos10 c4 ,for in all times1 in the opinion of the multitude1 witches and old women and impostors1 have had a competition with physicians4 ,and what followeth8 ,even this1 that physicians say to themselves1 as ,solomon expresseth it upon a higher occasion1 8,if it befall to me as befalleth to the fools1 why should ,i labour to be more wise80 ,and therefore ,i cannot much blame physicians that they use commonly to intend some other art or practice1 which they fancy more than their profession2 for you shall have of them antiquaries1 poets1 humanists1 statesmen1 merchants1 divines1 and in every of these better seen than in their profession2 and no doubt upon this ground that they find that mediocrity and excellency in their art maketh no difference in profit or reputation towards their fortune3 for the weakness of patients1 and sweetness of life1 and nature of hope1 maketh men depend upon physicians with all their defects4 ,but1 nevertheless1 these things which we have spoken of are courses begotten between a little occasion and a great deal of sloth and default2 for if we will excite and awake our observation1 we shall see in familiar instances what a predominant faculty the subtlety of spirit hath over the variety of matter or form4 ,nothing more variable than faces and countenances1 yet men can bear in memory the infinite distinctions of them2 nay1 a painter1 with a few shells of colours1 and the benefit of his eye1 and habit of his imagination1 can imitate them all that ever have been1 are1 or may be1 if they were brought before him4 ,nothing more variable than voices1 yet men can likewise discern them personally3 nay1 you shall have a buffon or pantomimus will express as many as he pleaseth4 ,nothing more variable than the differing sounds of words2 yet men have found the way to reduce them to a few simple letters4 ,so that it is not the insufficiency or incapacity of man's mind1 but it is the remote standing or placing thereof that breedeth these mazes and incomprehensions2 for as the sense afar off is full of mistaking1 but is exact at hand1 so is it of the understanding1 the remedy whereof is1 not to quicken or strengthen the organ1 but to go nearer to the object2 and therefore there is no doubt but if the physicians will learn and use the true approaches and avenues of nature1 they may assume as much as the poet saith3 8,et quoniam variant morbi1 variabimus artes2 ,mille mali species1 mille salutis erunt40 ,which that they should do1 the nobleness of their art doth deserve3 well shadowed by the poets1 in that they made sculapius to be the son of the sun1 the one being the fountain of life1 the other as the second-stream2 but infinitely more honoured by the example of our ,saviour1 who made the body of man the object of ,his miracles1 as the soul was the object of ,his doctrine4 ,for we read not that ever ,he vouchsafed to do any miracle about honour or money 7except that one for giving tribute to ,csar71 but only about the preserving1 sustaining1 and healing the body of man4 7#c7 ,medicine is a science which hath been 7as we have said7 more professed than laboured1 and yet more laboured than advanced2 the labour having been1 in my judgment1 rather in circle than in progression4 ,for ,i find much iteration1 but small addition4 ,it considereth causes of diseases1 with the occasions or impulsions2 the diseases themselves1 with the accidents2 and the cures1 with the preservations4 ,the deficiences which ,i think good to note1 being a few of many1 and those such as are of a more open and manifest nature1 ,i will enumerate and not place4 7#d7 ,the first is the discontinuance of the ancient and serious diligence of ,hippocrates1 which used to set down a narrative of the special cases of his patients1 and how they proceeded1 and how they were judged by recovery or death4 ,therefore having an example proper in the father of the art1 ,i shall not need to allege an example foreign1 of the wisdom of the lawyers1 who are careful to report new cases and decisions1 for the direction of future judgments4 ,this continuance of medicinal history ,i find deficient2 which ,i understand neither to be so infinite as to extend to every common case1 nor so reserved as to admit none but wonders3 for many things are new in this manner1 which are not new in the kind2 and if men will intend to observe1 they shall find much worthy to observe4 7#e7 ,in the inquiry which is made by anatomy1 ,i find much deficience3 for they inquire of the parts1 and their substances1 figures1 and collocations2 but they inquire not of the diversities of the parts1 the secrecies of the passages1 and the seats or nestling of the humours1 nor much of the footsteps and impressions of diseases4 ,the reason of which omission ,i suppose to be1 because the first inquiry may be satisfied in the view of one or a few anatomies2 but the latter1 being comparative and casual1 must arise from the view of many4 ,and as to the diversity of parts1 there is no doubt but the facture or framing of the inward parts is as full of difference as the outward1 and in that is the cause continent of many diseases2 which not being observed1 they quarrel many times with the humours1 which are not in fault2 the fault being in the very frame and mechanic of the part1 which cannot be removed by medicine alterative1 but must be accommodated and palliated by diets and medicines familiar4 ,and for the passages and pores1 it is true which was anciently noted1 that the more subtle of them appear not in anatomies1 because they are shut and latent in dead bodies1 though they be open and manifest in life3 which being supposed1 though the inhumanity of anatomia vivorum was by ,celsus justly reproved2 yet in regard of the great use of this observation1 the inquiry needed not by him so slightly to have been relinquished altogether1 or referred to the casual practices of surgery2 but might have been well diverted upon the dissection of beasts alive1 which notwithstanding the dissimilitude of their parts may sufficiently satisfy this inquiry4 ,and for the humours1 they are commonly passed over in anatomies as purgaments2 whereas it is most necessary to observe1 what cavities1 nests1 and receptacles the humours do find in the parts1 with the differing kind of the humour so lodged and received4 ,and as for the footsteps of diseases1 and their devastations of the inward parts1 impostumations1 exulcerations1 discontinuations1 putrefactions1 consumptions1 contractions1 extensions1 convulsions1 dislocations1 obstructions1 repletions1 together with all preternatural substances1 as stones1 carnosities1 excrescences1 worms1 and the like2 they ought to have been exactly observed by multitude of anatomies1 and the contribution of men's several experiences1 and carefully set down both historically according to the appearances1 and artificially with a reference to the diseases and symptoms which resulted from them1 in case where the anatomy is of a defunct patient2 whereas now upon opening of bodies they are passed over slightly and in silence4 7#f7 ,in the inquiry of diseases1 they do abandon the cures of many1 some as in their nature incurable1 and others as past the period of cure2 so that ,sylla and the ,triumvirs never proscribed so many men to die1 as they do by their ignorant edicts3 whereof numbers do escape with less difficulty than they did in the ,roman prescriptions4 ,therefore ,i will not doubt to note as a deficience1 that they inquire not the perfect cures of many diseases1 or extremities of diseases2 but pronouncing them incurable do enact a law of neglect1 and exempt ignorance from discredit4 7#g7 ,nay further1 ,i esteem it the office of a physician not only to restore health1 but to mitigate pain and dolors2 and not only when such mitigation may conduce to recovery1 but when it may serve to make a fair and easy passage4 ,for it is no small felicity which ,augustus ,csar was wont to wish to himself1 that same ,euthanasia2 and which was specially noted in the death of ,antoninus ,pius1 whose death was after the fashion1 and semblance of a kindly and pleasant sheep4 ,so it is written of ,epicurus1 that after his disease was judged desperate1 he drowned his stomach and senses with a large draught and ingurgitation of wine2 whereupon the epigram was made1 ,hinc ,stygias ebrius hausit aquas2 he was not sober enough to taste any bitterness of the ,stygian water4 ,but the physicians contrariwise do make a kind of scruple and religion to stay with the patient after the disease is deplored2 whereas in my judgment they ought both to inquire the skill1 and to give the attendances1 for the facilitating and assuaging of the pains and agonies of death4 7#e7 ,in the consideration of the cures of diseases1 ,i find a deficience in the receipts of propriety1 respecting the particular cures of diseases3 for the physicians have frustrated the fruit of tradition and experience by their magistralities1 in adding and taking out and changing quid pro qua in their receipts1 at their pleasures2 commanding so over the medicine1 as the medicine cannot command over the disease4 ,for except it be treacle and mithridatum1 and of late diascordium1 and a few more1 they tie themselves to no receipts severely and religiously4 ,for as to the confections of sale which are in the shops1 they are for readiness and not for propriety4 ,for they are upon general intentions of purging1 opening1 comforting1 altering1 and not much appropriate to particular diseases4 ,and this is the cause why empirics and old women are more happy many times in their cures than learned physicians1 because they are more religious in holding their medicines4 ,therefore here is the deficience which ,i find1 that physicians have not1 partly out of their own practice1 partly out of the constant probations reported in books1 and partly out of the traditions of empirics1 set down and delivered over certain experimental medicines for the cure of particular diseases1 besides their own conjectural and magistral descriptions4 ,for as they were the men of the best composition in the state of ,rome1 which either being consuls inclined to the people1 or being tribunes inclined to the senate2 so in the matter we now handle1 they be the best physicians1 which being learned incline to the traditions of experience1 or being empirics incline to the methods of learning4 7#i7 ,in preparation of medicines ,i do find strange1 specially considering how mineral medicines have been extolled1 and that they are safer for the outward than inward parts1 that no man hath sought to make an imitation by art of natural baths and medicinable fountains3 which nevertheless are confessed to receive their virtues from minerals2 and not so only1 but discerned and distinguished from what particular mineral they receive tincture1 as sulphur1 vitriol1 steel1 or the like2 which nature1 if it may be reduced to compositions of art1 both the variety of them will be increased1 and the temper of them will be more commanded4 7#aj7 ,but lest ,i grow to be more particular than is agreeable either to my intention or to proportion1 ,i will conclude this part with the note of one deficience more1 which seemeth to me of greatest consequence3 which is1 that the prescripts in use are too compendious to attain their end2 for1 to my understanding1 it is a vain and flattering opinion to think any medicine can be so sovereign or so happy1 as that the receipt or miss of it can work any great effect upon the body of man4 ,it were a strange speech which spoken1 or spoken oft1 should reclaim a man from a vice to which he were by nature subject4 ,it is order1 pursuit1 sequence1 and interchange of application1 which is mighty in nature2 which although it require more exact knowledge in prescribing1 and more precise obedience in observing1 yet is recompensed with the magnitude of effects4 ,and although a man would think1 by the daily visitations of the physicians1 that there were a pursuance in the cure1 yet let a man look into their prescripts and ministrations1 and he shall find them but inconstancies and every day's devices1 without any settled providence or project4 ,not that every scrupulous or superstitious prescript is effectual1 no more than every straight way is the way to heaven2 but the truth of the direction must precede severity of observance4 7#aa7 ,for cosmetic1 it hath parts civil1 and parts effeminate3 for cleanness of body was ever esteemed to proceed from a due reverence to ,god1 to society1 and to ourselves4 ,as for artificial decoration1 it is well worthy of the deficiences which it hath2 being neither fine enough to deceive1 nor handsome to use1 nor wholesome to please4 7#ab7 ,for athletic1 ,i take the subject of it largely1 that is to say1 for any point of ability whereunto the body of man may be brought1 whether it be of activity1 or of patience2 whereof activity hath two parts1 strength and swiftness2 and patience likewise hath two parts1 hardness against wants and extremities1 and endurance of pain or torment2 whereof we see the practices in tumblers1 in savages1 and in those that suffer punishment4 ,nay1 if there be any other faculty which falls not within any of the former divisions1 as in those that dive1 that obtain a strange power of containing respiration1 and the like1 ,i refer it to this part4 ,of these things the practices are known1 but the philosophy that concerneth them is not much inquired2 the rather1 ,i think1 because they are supposed to be obtained1 either by an aptness of nature1 which cannot be taught1 or only by continual custom1 which is soon prescribed which though it be not true1 yet ,i forbear to note any deficiences2 for the ,olympian games are down long since1 and the mediocrity of these things is for use2 as for the excellency of them it serveth for the most part but for mercenary ostentation4 7#ac7 ,for arts of pleasure sensual1 the chief deficience in them is of laws to repress them4 ,for as it hath been well observed1 that the arts which flourish in times while virtue is in growth1 are military2 and while virtue is in state1 are liberal2 and while virtue is in declination1 are voluptuary3 so ,i doubt that this age of the world is somewhat upon the descent of the wheel4 ,with arts voluptuary ,i couple practices joculary2 for the deceiving of the senses is one of the pleasures of the senses4 ,as for games of recreation1 ,i hold them to belong to civil life and education4 ,and thus much of that particular human philosophy which concerns the body1 which is but the tabernacle of the mind4 ,,xi4 7#a7 ,for human knowledge which concerns the mind1 it hath two parts2 the one that inquireth of the substance or nature of the soul or mind1 the other that inquireth of the faculties or functions thereof4 ,unto the first of these1 the considerations of the original of the soul1 whether it be native or adventive1 and how far it is exempted from laws of matter1 and of the immortality thereof1 and many other points1 do appertain3 which have been not more laboriously inquired than variously reported2 so as the travail therein taken seemeth to have been rather in a maze than in a way4 ,but although ,i am of opinion that this knowledge may be more really and soundly inquired1 even in nature1 than it hath been1 yet ,i hold that in the end it must be hounded by religion1 or else it will be subject to deceit and delusion4 ,for as the substance of the soul in the creation was not extracted out of the mass of heaven and earth by the benediction of a producat1 but was immediately inspired from ,god1 so it is not possible that it should be 7otherwise than by accident7 subject to the laws of heaven and earth1 which are the subject of philosophy2 and therefore the true knowledge of the nature and state of the soul must come by the same inspiration that gave the substance4 ,unto this part of knowledge touching the soul there be two appendices2 which1 as they have been handled1 have rather vapoured forth fables than kindled truth3 divination and fascination4 7#b7 ,divination hath been anciently and fitly divided into artificial and natural3 whereof artificial is1 when the mind maketh a prediction by argument1 concluding upon signs and tokens2 natural is1 when the mind hath a presention by an internal power1 without the inducement of a sign4 ,artificial is of two sorts3 either when the argument is coupled with a derivation of causes1 which is rational2 or when it is only grounded upon a coincidence of the effect1 which is experimental3 whereof the latter for the most part is superstitious1 such as were the heathen observations upon the inspection of sacrifices1 the flights of birds1 the swarming of bees2 and such as was the ,chaldean astrology1 and the like4 ,for artificial divination1 the several kinds thereof are distributed amongst particular knowledges4 ,the astronomer hath his predictions1 as of conjunctions1 aspects1 eclipses1 and the like4 ,the physician hath his predictions1 of death1 of recovery1 of the accidents and issues of diseases4 ,the politique hath his predictions2 ,o urbem venalem1 et cito perituram1 si emptorem invenerit6 which stayed not long to be performed1 in ,sylla first1 and after in ,csar3 so as these predictions are now impertinent1 and to be referred over4 ,but the divination which springeth from the internal nature of the soul is that which we now speak of2 which hath been made to be of two sorts1 primitive and by influxion4 ,primitive is grounded upon the supposition that the mind1 when it is withdrawn and collected into itself1 and not diffused into the organs of the body1 hath some extent and latitude of prenotion2 which therefore appeareth most in sleep1 in ecstasies1 and near death1 and more rarely in waking apprehensions2 and is induced and furthered by those abstinences and observances which make the mind most to consist in itself4 ,by influxion1 is grounded upon the conceit that the mind1 as a mirror or glass1 should take illumination from the foreknowledge of ,god and spirits3 unto which the same regiment doth likewise conduce4 ,for the retiring of the mind within itself is the state which is most susceptible of divine influxions2 save that it is accompanied in this case with a fervency and elevation 7which the ancients noted by fury71 and not with a repose and quiet1 as it is in the other4 7#c7 ,fascination is the power and act of imagination intensive upon other bodies than the body of the imaginant1 for of that we spake in the proper place4 ,wherein the school of ,paracelsus1 and the disciples of pretended natural magic1 have been so intemperate1 as they have exalted the power of the imagination to be much one with the power of miracle-working faith4 ,others1 that draw nearer to probability1 calling to their view the secret passages of things1 and specially of the contagion that passeth from body to body1 do conceive it should likewise be agreeable to nature that there should be some transmissions and operations from spirit to spirit without the mediation of the senses2 whence the conceits have grown 7now almost made civil7 of the mastering spirit1 and the force of confidence1 and the like4 ,incident unto this is the inquiry how to raise and fortify the imagination2 for if the imagination fortified have power1 then it is material to know how to fortify and exalt it4 ,and herein comes in crookedly and dangerously a palliation of a great part of ceremonial magic4 ,for it may be pretended that ceremonies1 characters1 and charms do work1 not by any tacit or sacramental contract with evil spirits1 but serve only to strengthen the imagination of him that useth it2 as images are said by the ,roman ,church to fix the cogitations and raise the devotions of them that pray before them4 ,but for mine own judgment1 if it be admitted that imagination hath power1 and that ceremonies fortify imagination1 and that they be used sincerely and intentionally for that purpose2 yet ,i should hold them unlawful1 as opposing to that first edict which ,god gave unto man1 ,in sudore vultus comedes panem tuum4 ,for they propound those noble effects1 which ,god hath set forth unto man to be bought at the price of labour1 to be attained by a few easy and slothful observances4 ,deficiences in these knowledges ,i will report none1 other than the general deficience1 that it is not known how much of them is verity1 and how much vanity4 ,,xii4 7#a7 ,the knowledge which respecteth the faculties of the mind of man is of two kinds--the one respecting his understanding and reason1 and the other his will1 appetite1 and affection2 whereof the former produceth position or decree1 the latter action or execution4 ,it is true that the imagination is an agent or nuncius in both provinces1 both the judicial and the ministerial4 ,for sense sendeth over to imagination before reason have judged1 and reason sendeth over to imagination before the decree can be acted4 ,for imagination ever precedeth voluntary motion4 ,saving that this ,janus of imagination hath differing faces3 for the face towards reason hath the print of truth1 but the face towards action hath the print of good2 which nevertheless are faces1 8,quales decet esse sororum40 ,neither is the imagination simply and only a messenger2 but is invested with1 or at least wise usurpeth no small authority in itself1 besides the duty of the message4 ,for it was well said by ,aristotle1 8,that the mind hath over the body that commandment1 which the lord hath over a bondman2 but that reason hath over the imagination that commandment which a magistrate hath over a free citizen10 who may come also to rule in his turn4 ,for we see that1 in matters of faith and religion1 we raise our imagination above our reason1 which is the cause why religion sought ever access to the mind by similitudes1 types1 parables1 visions1 dreams4 ,and again1 in all persuasions that are wrought by eloquence1 and other impressions of like nature1 which do paint and disguise the true appearance of things1 the chief recommendation unto reason is from the imagination4 ,nevertheless1 because ,i find not any science that doth properly or fitly pertain to the imagination1 ,i see no cause to alter the former division4 ,for as for poesy1 it is rather a pleasure or play of imagination than a work or duty thereof4 ,and if it be a work1 we speak not now of such parts of learning as the imagination produceth1 but of such sciences as handle and consider of the imagination4 ,no more than we shall speak now of such knowledges as reason produceth 7for that extendeth to all philosophy71 but of such knowledges as do handle and inquire of the faculty of reason3 so as poesy had his true place4 ,as for the power of the imagination in nature1 and the manner of fortifying the same1 we have mentioned it in the doctrine ,de ,anima1 whereunto most fitly it belongeth4 ,and lastly1 for imaginative or insinuative reason1 which is the subject of rhetoric1 we think it best to refer it to the arts of reason4 ,so therefore we content ourselves with the former division1 that human philosophy1 which respecteth the faculties of the mind of man1 hath two parts1 rational and moral4 7#b7 ,the part of human philosophy which is rational is of all knowledges1 to the most wits1 the least delightful1 and seemeth but a net of subtlety and spinosity4 ,for as it was truly said1 that knowledge is pabulum animi2 so in the nature of men's appetite to this food most men are of the taste and stomach of the ,israelites in the desert1 that would fain have returned ad ollas carnium1 and were weary of manna2 which1 though it were celestial1 yet seemed less nutritive and comfortable4 ,so generally men taste well knowledges that are drenched in flesh and blood1 civil history1 morality1 policy1 about the which men's affections1 praises1 fortunes do turn and are conversant4 ,but this same lumen siccum doth parch and offend most men's watery and soft natures4 ,but to speak truly of things as they are in worth1 rational knowledges are the keys of all other arts1 for as ,aristotle saith aptly and elegantly1 8,that the hand is the instrument of instruments1 and the mind is the form of forms20 so these be truly said to be the art of arts4 ,neither do they only direct1 but likewise confirm and strengthen2 even as the habit of shooting doth not only enable to shoot a nearer shoot1 but also to draw a stronger bow4 7#c7 ,the arts intellectual are four in number1 divided according to the ends whereunto they are referred--for man's labour is to invent that which is sought or propounded2 or to judge that which is invented2 or to retain that which is judged2 or to deliver over that which is retained4 ,so as the arts must be four--art of inquiry or invention2 art of examination or judgment2 art of custody or memory2 and art of elocution or tradition4 ,,xiii4 7#a7 ,invention is of two kinds much differing--the one of arts and sciences1 and the other of speech and arguments4 ,the former of these ,i do report deficient2 which seemeth to me to be such a deficience as if1 in the making of an inventory touching the state of a defunct1 it should be set down that there is no ready money4 ,for as money will fetch all other commodities1 so this knowledge is that which should purchase all the rest4 ,and like as the ,west ,indies had never been discovered if the use of the mariner's needle had not been first discovered1 though the one be vast regions1 and the other a small motion2 so it cannot be found strange if sciences be no further discovered1 if the art itself of invention and discovery hath been passed over4 7#b7 ,that this part of knowledge is wanting1 to my judgment standeth plainly confessed2 for first1 logic doth not pretend to invent sciences1 or the axioms of sciences1 but passeth it over with a cuique in sua arte credendum4 ,and ,celsus acknowledgeth it gravely1 speaking of the empirical and dogmatical sects of physicians1 8,that medicines and cures were first found out1 and then after the reasons and causes were discoursed2 and not the causes first found out1 and by light from them the medicines and cures discovered40 ,and ,plato in his 8,thetetus0 noteth well1 8,that particulars are infinite1 and the higher generalities give no sufficient direction2 and that the pith of all sciences1 which maketh the artsman differ from the inexpert1 is in the middle propositions1 which in every particular knowledge are taken from tradition and experience40 ,and therefore we see1 that they which discourse of the inventions and originals of things refer them rather to chance than to art1 and rather to beasts1 birds1 fishes1 serpents1 than to men4 8,dictamnum genetrix ,creta carpit ab ,ida1 ,puberibus caulem foliis et flore camantem ,purpureo2 non illa feris incognita capris ,gramina1 cum tergo volucres hsere sagitt40 ,so that it was no marvel 7the manner of antiquity being to consecrate inventors7 that the ,egyptians had so few human idols in their temples1 but almost all brute3 8,omnigenumque ,deum monstra1 et latrator ,anubis1 ,contra ,neptunum1 et ,venerem1 contraque ,minervam1 c40 ,and if you like better the tradition of the ,grecians1 and ascribe the first inventions to men1 yet you will rather believe that ,prometheus first stroke the flints1 and marvelled at the spark1 than that when he first stroke the flints he expected the spark2 and therefore we see the ,west ,indian ,prometheus had no intelligence with the ,european1 because of the rareness with them of flint1 that gave the first occasion4 ,so as it should seem1 that hitherto men are rather beholden to a wild goat for surgery1 or to a nightingale for music1 or to the ibis for some part of physic1 or to the pot-lid that flew open for artillery1 or generally to chance or anything else than to logic for the invention of arts and sciences4 ,neither is the form of invention which ,virgil describeth much other3 8,ut varias usus meditande extunderet artes ,paulatim40 ,for if you observe the words well1 it is no other method than that which brute beasts are capable of1 and do put in ure2 which is a perpetual intending or practising some one thing1 urged and imposed by an absolute necessity of conservation of being4 ,for so ,cicero saith very truly1 ,usus uni rei deditus et naturam et artem spe vincit4 ,and therefore if it be said of men1 8,labor omnia vincit ,improbus1 et duris urgens in rebus egestas10 it is likewise said of beasts1 ,quis psittaco docuit suum 8 ,who taught the raven in a drought to throw pebbles into a hollow tree1 where she spied water1 that the water might rise so as she might come to it8 ,who taught the bee to sail through such a vast sea or air1 and to find the way from a field in a flower a great way off to her hive8 ,who taught the ant to bite every grain of corn that she burieth in her hill1 lest it should take root and grow8 ,add then the word extundere1 which importeth the extreme difficulty1 and the word paulatim1 which importeth the extreme slowness1 and we are where we were1 even amongst the ,egyptians' gods2 there being little left to the faculty of reason1 and nothing to the duty or art1 for matter of invention4 7#c7 ,secondly1 the induction which the logicians speak of1 and which seemeth familiar with ,plato1 whereby the principles of sciences may be pretended to be invented1 and so the middle propositions by derivation from the principles2 their form of induction1 ,i say1 is utterly vicious and incompetent2 wherein their error is the fouler1 because it is the duty of art to perfect and exalt nature2 but they contrariwise have wronged1 abused1 and traduced nature4 ,for he that shall attentively observe how the mind doth gather this excellent dew of knowledge1 like unto that which the poet speaketh of1 ,arei mellis clestia dona1 distilling and contriving it out of particulars natural and artificial1 as the flowers of the field and garden1 shall find that the mind of herself by nature doth manage and act an induction much better than they describe it4 ,for to conclude upon an enumeration of particulars1 without instance contradictory1 is no conclusion1 but a conjecture2 for who can assure 7in many subjects7 upon those particulars which appear of a side1 that there are not other on the contrary side which appear not8 ,as if ,samuel should have rested upon those sons of ,jesse which were brought before him1 and failed of ,david which was in the field4 ,and this form 7to say truth71 is so gross1 as it had not been possible for wits so subtle as have managed these things to have offered it to the world1 but that they hasted to their theories and dogmaticals1 and were imperious and scornful toward particulars2 which their manner was to use but as lictores and viatores1 for sergeants and whifflers1 ad summovendam turbam1 to make way and make room for their opinions1 rather than in their true use and service4 ,certainly it is a thing may touch a man with a religious wonder1 to see how the footsteps of seducement are the very same in divine and human truth2 for1 as in divine truth man cannot endure to become as a child1 so in human1 they reputed the attending the inductions 7whereof we speak71 as if it were a second infancy or childhood4 7#d7 ,thirdly1 allow some principles or axioms were rightly induced1 yet1 nevertheless1 certain it is that middle propositions cannot be deduced from them in subject of nature by syllogism--that is1 by touch and reduction of them to principles in a middle term4 ,it is true that in sciences popular1 as moralities1 laws1 and the like1 yea1 and divinity 7because it pleaseth ,god to apply ,himself to the capacity of the simplest71 that form may have use2 and in natural philosophy likewise1 by way of argument or satisfactory reason1 ,qu assensum parit operis effta est2 but the subtlety of nature and operations will not be enchained in those bonds4 ,for arguments consist of propositions1 and propositions of words1 and words are but the current tokens or marks of popular notions of things2 which notions1 if they be grossly and variably collected out of particulars1 it is not the laborious examination either of consequences of arguments1 or of the truth of propositions1 that can ever correct that error1 being 7as the physicians speak7 in the first digestion4 ,and1 therefore1 it was not without cause1 that so many excellent philosophers became sceptics and academics1 and denied any certainty of knowledge or comprehension2 and held opinion that the knowledge of man extended only to appearances and probabilities4 ,it is true that in ,socrates it was supposed to be but a form of irony1 ,scientiam dissimulando simulavit2 for he used to disable his knowledge1 to the end to enhance his knowledge2 like the humour of ,tiberius in his beginnings1 that would reign1 but would not acknowledge so much4 ,and in the later academy1 which ,cicero embraced1 this opinion also of acatalepsia 7,i doubt7 was not held sincerely2 for that all those which excelled in copy of speech seem to have chosen that sect1 as that which was fittest to give glory to their eloquence and variable discourses2 being rather like progresses of pleasure than journeys to an end4 ,but assuredly many scattered in both academies did hold it in subtlety and integrity4 ,but here was their chief error3 they charged the deceit upon the senses2 which in my judgment 7notwithstanding all their cavillations7 are very sufficient to certify and report truth1 though not always immediately1 yet by comparison1 by help of instrument1 and by producing and urging such things as are too subtle for the sense to some effect comprehensible by the sense1 and other like assistance4 ,but they ought to have charged the deceit upon the weakness of the intellectual powers1 and upon the manner of collecting and concluding upon the reports of the senses4 ,this ,i speak1 not to disable the mind of man1 but to stir it up to seek help2 for no man1 be he never so cunning or practised1 can make a straight line or perfect circle by steadiness of hand1 which may be easily done by help of a ruler or compass4 7#e7 ,this part of invention1 concerning the invention of sciences1 ,i purpose 7if ,god give me leave7 hereafter to propound1 having digested it into two parts3 whereof the one ,i term experientia literata1 and the other interpretatio natur2 the former being but a degree and rudiment of the latter4 ,but ,i will not dwell too long1 nor speak too great upon a promise4 7#f7 ,the invention of speech or argument is not properly an invention2 for to invent is to discover that we know not1 and not to recover or resummon that which we already know2 and the use of this invention is no other but1 out of the knowledge whereof our mind is already possessed to draw forth or call before us that which may be pertinent to the purpose which we take into our consideration4 ,so as to speak truly1 it is no invention1 but a remembrance or suggestion1 with an application2 which is the cause why the schools do place it after judgment1 as subsequent and not precedent4 ,nevertheless1 because we do account it a chase as well of deer in an enclosed park as in a forest at large1 and that it hath already obtained the name1 let it be called invention2 so as it be perceived and discerned1 that the scope and end of this invention is readiness and present use of our knowledge1 and not addition or amplification thereof4 7#g7 ,to procure this ready use of knowledge there are two courses1 preparation and suggestion4 ,the former of these seemeth scarcely a part of knowledge1 consisting rather of diligence than of any artificial erudition4 ,and herein ,aristotle wittily1 but hurtfully1 doth deride the sophists near his time1 saying1 8,they did as if one that professed the art of shoemaking should not teach how to make up a shoe1 but only exhibit in a readiness a number of shoes of all fashions and sizes40 ,but yet a man might reply1 that if a shoemaker should have no shoes in his shop1 but only work as he is bespoken1 he should be weakly customed4 ,but our ,saviour1 speaking of divine knowledge1 saith1 8,that the kingdom of heaven is like a good householder1 that bringeth forth both new and old store20 and we see the ancient writers of rhetoric do give it in precept1 that pleaders should have the places1 whereof they have most continual use1 ready handled in all the variety that may be2 as that1 to speak for the literal interpretation of the law against equity1 and contrary2 and to speak for presumptions and inferences against testimony1 and contrary4 ,and ,cicero himself1 being broken unto it by great experience1 delivereth it plainly1 that whatsoever a man shall have occasion to speak of 7if he will take the pains71 he may have it in effect premeditate and handled in thesi4 ,so that when he cometh to a particular he shall have nothing to do1 but to put to names1 and times1 and places1 and such other circumstances of individuals4 ,we see likewise the exact diligence of ,demosthenes2 who1 in regard of the great force that the entrance and access into causes hath to make a good impression1 had ready framed a number of prefaces for orations and speeches4 ,all which authorities and precedents may overweigh ,aristotle's opinion1 that would have us change a rich wardrobe for a pair of shears4 7#h7 ,but the nature of the collection of this provision or preparatory store1 though it be common both to logic and rhetoric1 yet having made an entry of it here1 where it came first to be spoken of1 ,i think fit to refer over the further handling of it to rhetoric4 7#i7 ,the other part of invention1 which ,i term suggestion1 doth assign and direct us to certain marks1 or places1 which may excite our mind to return and produce such knowledge as it hath formerly collected1 to the end we may make use thereof4 ,neither is this use 7truly taken7 only to furnish argument to dispute1 probably with others1 but likewise to minister unto our judgment to conclude aright within ourselves4 ,neither may these places serve only to apprompt our invention1 but also to direct our inquiry4 ,for a faculty of wise interrogating is half a knowledge4 ,for as ,plato saith1 8,whosoever seeketh1 knoweth that which he seeketh for in a general notion2 else how shall he know it when he hath found it80 ,and1 therefore1 the larger your anticipation is1 the more direct and compendious is your search4 ,but the same places which will help us what to produce of that which we know already1 will also help us1 if a man of experience were before us1 what questions to ask2 or1 if we have books and authors to instruct us1 what points to search and revolve2 so as ,i cannot report that this part of invention1 which is that which the schools call topics1 is deficient4 7#aj7 ,nevertheless1 topics are of two sorts1 general and special4 ,the general we have spoken to2 but the particular hath been touched by some1 but rejected generally as inartificial and variable4 ,but leaving the humour which hath reigned too much in the schools 7which is1 to be vainly subtle in a few things which are within their command1 and to reject the rest71 ,i do receive particular topics2 that is1 places or directions of invention and inquiry in every particular knowledge1 as things of great use1 being mixtures of logic with the matter of sciences4 ,for in these it holdeth ars inveniendi adolescit cum inventis2 for as in going of a way1 we do not only gain that part of the way which is passed1 but we gain the better sight of that part of the way which remaineth1 so every degree of proceeding in a science giveth a light to that which followeth2 which light1 if we strengthen by drawing it forth into questions or places of inquiry1 we do greatly advance our pursuit4 ,,xiv4 7#a7 ,now we pass unto the arts of judgment1 which handle the natures of proofs and demonstrations1 which as to induction hath a coincidence with invention2 for all inductions1 whether in good or vicious form1 the same action of the mind which inventeth1 judgeth--all one as in the sense4 ,but otherwise it is in proof by syllogism1 for the proof being not immediate1 but by mean1 the invention of the mean is one thing1 and the judgment of the consequence is another2 the one exciting only1 the other examining4 ,therefore1 for the real and exact form of judgment1 we refer ourselves to that which we have spoken of interpretation of ,nature4 7#b7 ,for the other judgment by syllogism1 as it is a thing most agreeable to the mind of man1 so it hath been vehemently end excellently laboured4 ,for the nature of man doth extremely covet to have somewhat in his understanding fixed and unmovable1 and as a rest and support of the mind4 ,and1 therefore1 as ,aristotle endeavoureth to prove1 that in all motion there is some point quiescent2 and as he elegantly expoundeth the ancient fable of ,atlas 7that stood fixed1 and bare up the heaven from falling7 to be meant of the poles or axle-tree of heaven1 whereupon the conversion is accomplished1 so assuredly men have a desire to have an ,atlas or axle-tree within to keep them from fluctuation1 which is like to a perpetual peril of falling4 ,therefore men did hasten to set down some principles about which the variety of their disputatious might turn4 7#c7 ,so1 then1 this art of judgment is but the reduction of propositions to principles in a middle term4 ,the principles to be agreed by all and exempted from argument2 the middle term to be elected at the liberty of every man's invention2 the reduction to be of two kinds1 direct and inverted3 the one when the proposition is reduced to the principle1 which they term a probation ostensive2 the other1 when the contradictory of the proposition is reduced to the contradictory of the principle1 which is that which they call per incommodum1 or pressing an absurdity2 the number of middle terms to be as the proposition standeth degrees more or less removed from the principle4 7#d7 ,but this art hath two several methods of doctrine1 the one by way of direction1 the other by way of caution3 the former frameth and setteth down a true form of consequence1 by the variations and deflections from which errors and inconsequences may be exactly judged4 ,toward the composition and structure of which form it is incident to handle the parts thereof1 which are propositions1 and the parts of propositions1 which are simple words4 ,and this is that part of logic which is comprehended in the ,analytics4 7#e7 ,the second method of doctrine was introduced for expedite use and assurance sake1 discovering the more subtle forms of sophisms and illaqueations with their redargutions1 which is that which is termed elenches4 ,for although in the more gross sorts of fallacies it happeneth 7as ,seneca maketh the comparison well7 as in juggling feats1 which1 though we know not how they are done1 yet we know well it is not as it seemeth to be2 yet the more subtle sort of them doth not only put a man besides his answer1 but doth many times abuse his judgment4 7#f7 ,this part concerning elenches is excellently handled by ,aristotle in precept1 but more excellently by ,plato in example2 not only in the persons of the sophists1 but even in ,socrates himself1 who1 professing to affirm nothing1 but to infirm that which was affirmed by another1 hath exactly expressed all the forms of objection1 fallace1 and redargution4 ,and although we have said that the use of this doctrine is for redargution1 yet it is manifest the degenerate and corrupt use is for caption and contradiction1 which passeth for a great faculty1 and no doubt is of very great advantage1 though the difference be good which was made between orators and sophisters1 that the one is as the greyhound1 which hath his advantage in the race1 and the other as the hare1 which hath her advantage in the turn1 so as it is the advantage of the weaker creature4 7#g7 ,but yet further1 this doctrine of elenches hath a more ample latitude and extent than is perceived2 namely1 unto divers parts of knowledge1 whereof some are laboured and other omitted4 ,for first1 ,i conceive 7though it may seem at first somewhat strange7 that that part which is variably referred1 sometimes to logic1 sometimes to metaphysic1 touching the common adjuncts of essences1 is but an elenche2 for the great sophism of all sophisms being equivocation or ambiguity of words and phrase1 specially of such words as are most general and intervene in every inquiry1 it seemeth to me that the true and fruitful use 7leaving vain subtleties and speculations7 of the inquiry of majority1 minority1 priority1 posteriority1 identity1 diversity1 possibility1 act1 totality1 parts1 existence1 privation1 and the like1 are but wise cautions against ambiguities of speech4 ,so1 again1 the distribution of things into certain tribes1 which we call categories or predicaments1 are but cautions against the confusion of definitions and divisions4 7#h7 ,secondly1 there is a seducement that worketh by the strength of the impression1 and not by the subtlety of the illaqueation--not so much perplexing the reason1 as overruling it by power of the imagination4 ,but this part ,i think more proper to handle when ,i shall speak of rhetoric4 7#i7 ,but lastly1 there is yet a much more important and profound kind of fallacies in the mind of man1 which ,i find not observed or inquired at all1 and think good to place here1 as that which of all others appertaineth most to rectify judgment1 the force whereof is such as it doth not dazzle or snare the understanding in some particulars1 but doth more generally and inwardly infect and corrupt the state thereof4 ,for the mind of man is far from the nature of a clear and equal glass1 wherein the beams of things should reflect according to their true incidence2 nay1 it is rather like an enchanted glass1 full of superstition and imposture1 if it be not delivered and reduced4 ,for this purpose1 let us consider the false appearances that are imposed upon us by the general nature of the mind1 beholding them in an example or two2 as first1 in that instance which is the root of all superstition1 namely1 that to the nature of the mind of all men it is consonant for the affirmative or active to affect more than the negative or privative4 ,so that a few times hitting or presence countervails ofttimes failing or absence1 as was well answered by ,diagoras to him that showed him in ,neptune's temple the great number of pictures of such as had escaped shipwreck1 and had paid their vows to ,neptune1 saying1 8,advise now1 you that think it folly to invocate ,neptune in tempest40 8,yea1 but10 saith ,diagoras1 8where are they painted that are drowned80 ,let us behold it in another instance1 namely1 that the spirit of man1 being of an equal and uniform substance1 doth usually suppose and feign in nature a greater equality and uniformity than is in truth4 ,hence it cometh that the mathematicians cannot satisfy themselves except they reduce the motions of the celestial bodies to perfect circles1 rejecting spiral lines1 and labouring to be discharged of eccentrics4 ,hence it cometh that whereas there are many things in ,nature as it were monodica1 sui juris1 yet the cogitations of man do feign unto them relatives1 parallels1 and conjugates1 whereas no such thing is2 as they have feigned an element of fire to keep square with earth1 water1 and air1 and the like4 ,nay1 it is not credible1 till it be opened1 what a number of fictions and fantasies the similitude of human actions and arts1 together with the making of man communis mensura1 have brought into natural philosophy2 not much better than the heresy of the ,anthropomorphites1 bred in the cells of gross and solitary monks1 and the opinion of ,epicurus1 answerable to the same in heathenism1 who supposed the gods to be of human shape4 ,and1 therefore1 ,velleius the ,epicurean needed not to have asked why ,god should have adorned the heavens with stars1 as if ,he had been an dilis1 one that should have set forth some magnificent shows or plays4 ,for if that great ,work-master had been of a human disposition1 ,he would have cast the stars into some pleasant and beautiful works and orders like the frets in the roofs of houses2 whereas one can scarce find a posture in square1 or triangle1 or straight line1 amongst such an infinite number1 so differing a harmony there is between the spirit of man and the spirit of ,nature4 7#aj7 ,let us consider again the false appearances imposed upon us by every man's own individual nature and custom in that feigned supposition that ,plato maketh of the cave2 for certainly if a child were continued in a grot or cave under the earth until maturity of age1 and came suddenly abroad1 he would have strange and absurd imaginations4 ,so1 in like manner1 although our persons live in the view of heaven1 yet our spirits are included in the caves of our own complexions and customs1 which minister unto us infinite errors and vain opinions if they be not recalled to examination4 ,but hereof we have given many examples in one of the errors1 or peccant humours1 which we ran briefly over in our first book4 7#aa7 ,and lastly1 let us consider the false appearances that are imposed upon us by words1 which are framed and applied according to the conceit and capacities of the vulgar sort2 and although we think we govern our words1 and prescribe it well loquendum ut vulgus sentiendum ut sapientes1 yet certain it is that words1 as a ,tartar's bow1 do shoot back upon the understanding of the wisest1 and mightily entangle and pervert the judgment4 ,so as it is almost necessary in all controversies and disputations to imitate the wisdom of the mathematicians1 in setting down in the very beginning the definitions of our words and terms1 that others may know how we accept and understand them1 and whether they concur with us or no4 ,for it cometh to pass1 for want of this1 that we are sure to end there where we ought to have begun1 which is1 in questions and differences about words4 ,to conclude1 therefore1 it must be confessed that it is not possible to divorce ourselves from these fallacies and false appearances because they are inseparable from our nature and condition of life2 so yet1 nevertheless1 the caution of them 7for all elenches1 as was said1 are but cautions7 doth extremely import the true conduct of human judgment4 ,the particular elenches or cautions against these three false appearances ,i find altogether deficient4 7#ab7 ,there remaineth one part of judgment of great excellency which to mine understanding is so slightly touched1 as ,i may report that also deficient2 which is the application of the differing kinds of proofs to the differing kinds of subjects4 ,for there being but four kinds of demonstrations1 that is1 by the immediate consent of the mind or sense1 by induction1 by syllogism1 and by congruity1 which is that which ,aristotle calleth demonstration in orb or circle1 and not a notioribus1 every of these hath certain subjects in the matter of sciences1 in which respectively they have chiefest use2 and certain others1 from which respectively they ought to be excluded2 and the rigour and curiosity in requiring the more severe proofs in some things1 and chiefly the facility in contenting ourselves with the more remiss proofs in others1 hath been amongst the greatest causes of detriment and hindrance to knowledge4 ,the distributions and assignations of demonstrations according to the analogy of sciences ,i note as deficient4 ,,xv4 7#a7 ,the custody or retaining of knowledge is either in writing or memory2 whereof writing hath two parts1 the nature of the character and the order of the entry4 ,for the art of characters1 or other visible notes of words or things1 it hath nearest conjugation with grammar1 and1 therefore1 ,i refer it to the due place2 for the disposition and collocation of that knowledge which we preserve in writing1 it consisteth in a good digest of common-places1 wherein ,i am not ignorant of the prejudice imputed to the use of common-place books1 as causing a retardation of reading1 and some sloth or relaxation of memory4 ,but because it is but a counterfeit thing in knowledges to be forward and pregnant1 except a man be deep and full1 ,i hold the entry of common-places to be a matter of great use and essence in studying1 as that which assureth copy of invention1 and contracteth judgment to a strength4 ,but this is true1 that of the methods of common-places that ,i have seen1 there is none of any sufficient worth1 all of them carrying merely the face of a school and not of a world2 and referring to vulgar matters and pedantical divisions1 without all life or respect to action4 7#b7 ,for the other principal part of the custody of knowledge1 which is memory1 ,i find that faculty in my judgment weakly inquired of4 ,an art there is extant of it2 but it seemeth to me that there are better precepts than that art1 and better practices of that art than those received4 ,it is certain the art 7as it is7 may be raised to points of ostentation prodigious2 but in use 7as is now managed7 it is barren1 not burdensome1 nor dangerous to natural memory1 as is imagined1 but barren1 that is1 not dexterous to be applied to the serious use of business and occasions4 ,and1 therefore1 ,i make no more estimation of repeating a great number of names or words upon once hearing1 or the pouring forth of a number of verses or rhymes extempore1 or the making of a satirical simile of everything1 or the turning of everything to a jest1 or the falsifying or contradicting of everything by cavil1 or the like 7whereof in the faculties of the mind there is great copy1 and such as by device and practice may be exalted to an extreme degree of wonder71 than ,i do of the tricks of tumblers1 funambuloes1 baladines2 the one being the same in the mind that the other is in the body1 matters of strangeness without worthiness4 7#c7 ,this art of memory is but built upon two intentions2 the one prenotion1 the other emblem4 ,prenotion dischargeth the indefinite seeking of that we would remember1 and directeth us to seek in a narrow compass1 that is1 somewhat that hath congruity with our place of memory4 ,emblem reduceth conceits intellectual to images sensible1 which strike the memory more2 out of which axioms may be drawn much better practice than that in use2 and besides which axioms1 there are divers more touching help of memory not inferior to them4 ,but ,i did in the beginning distinguish1 not to report those things deficient1 which are but only ill managed4 ,,xvi4 7#a7 ,there remaineth the fourth kind of rational knowledge1 which is transitive1 concerning the expressing or transferring our knowledge to others1 which ,i will term by the general name of tradition or delivery4 ,tradition hath three parts3 the first concerning the organ of tradition2 the second concerning the method of tradition2 and the third concerning the illustration of tradition4 7#b7 ,for the organ of tradition1 it is either speech or writing2 for ,aristotle saith well1 8,words are the images of cogitations1 and letters are the images of words40 ,but yet it is not of necessity that cogitations be expressed by the medium of words4 ,for whatsoever is capable of sufficient differences1 and those perceptible by the sense1 is in nature competent to express cogitations4 ,and1 therefore1 we see in the commerce of barbarous people that understand not one another's language1 and in the practice of divers that are dumb and deaf1 that men's minds are expressed in gestures1 though not exactly1 yet to serve the turn4 ,and we understand further1 that it is the use of ,china and the kingdoms of the ,high ,levant to write in characters real1 which express neither letters nor words in gross1 but things or notions2 insomuch as countries and provinces which understand not one another's language can nevertheless read one another's writings1 because the characters are accepted more generally than the languages do extend2 and1 therefore1 they have a vast multitude of characters1 as many1 ,i suppose1 as radical words4 7#c7 ,these notes of cogitations are of two sorts3 the one when the note hath some similitude or congruity with the notion2 the other ad placitum1 having force only by contract or acceptation4 ,of the former sort are hieroglyphics and gestures4 ,for as to hieroglyphics 7things of ancient use and embraced chiefly by the ,egyptians1 one of the most ancient nations71 they are but as continued impresses and emblems4 ,and as for gestures1 they are as transitory hieroglyphics1 and are to hieroglyphics as words spoken are to words written1 in that they abide not2 but they have evermore1 as well as the other1 an affinity with the things signified4 ,as ,periander1 being consulted with how to preserve a tyranny newly usurped1 bid the messenger attend and report what he saw him do2 and went into his garden and topped all the highest flowers1 signifying that it consisted in the cutting off and keeping low of the nobility and grandees4 ,ad placitum1 are the characters real before mentioned1 and words3 although some have been willing by curious inquiry1 or rather by apt feigning1 to have derived imposition of names from reason and intendment2 a speculation elegant1 and1 by reason it searcheth into antiquity1 reverent1 but sparingly mixed with truth1 and of small fruit4 ,this portion of knowledge touching the notes of things and cogitations in general1 ,i find not inquired1 but deficient4 ,and although it may seem of no great use1 considering that words and writings by letters do far excel all the other ways2 yet because this part concerneth1 as it were1 the mint of knowledge 7for words are the tokens current and accepted for conceits1 as moneys are for values1 and that it is fit men be not ignorant that moneys may be of another kind than gold and silver71 ,i thought good to propound it to better inquiry4 7#d7 ,concerning speech and words1 the consideration of them hath produced the science of grammar4 ,for man still striveth to reintegrate himself in those benedictions1 from which by his fault he hath been deprived2 and as he hath striven against the first general curse by the invention of all other arts1 so hath he sought to come forth of the second general curse 7which was the confusion of tongues7 by the art of grammar2 whereof the use in a mother tongue is small1 in a foreign tongue more2 but most in such foreign tongues as have ceased to be vulgar tongues1 and are turned only to learned tongues4 ,the duty of it is of two natures3 the one popular1 which is for the speedy and perfect attaining languages1 as well for intercourse of speech as for understanding of authors2 the other philosophical1 examining the power and nature of words1 as they are the footsteps and prints of reason3 which kind of analogy between words and reason is handled sparsim1 brokenly though not entirely2 and1 therefore1 ,i cannot report it deficient1 though ,i think it very worthy to be reduced into a science by itself4 7#e7 ,unto grammar also belongeth1 as an appendix1 the consideration of the accidents of words2 which are measure1 sound1 and elevation or accent1 and the sweetness and harshness of them3 whence hath issued some curious observations in rhetoric1 but chiefly poesy1 as we consider it1 in respect of the verse and not of the argument4 ,wherein though men in learned tongues do tie themselves to the ancient measures1 yet in modern languages it seemeth to me as free to make new measures of verses as of dances2 for a dance is a measured pace1 as a verse is a measured speech4 ,in these things this sense is better judge than the art3 8,cn fercula nostr ,mallem convivis quam placuisse cocis40 ,and of the servile expressing antiquity in an unlike and an unfit subject1 it is well said1 8,quod tempore antiquum videtur1 id incongruitate est maxime novum40 7#f7 ,for ciphers1 they are commonly in letters or alphabets1 but may be in words4 ,the kinds of ciphers 7besides the simple ciphers1 with changes1 and intermixtures of nulls and non-significants7 are many1 according to the nature or rule of the infolding1 wheel-ciphers1 key-ciphers1 doubles1 c4 ,but the virtues of them1 whereby they are to be preferred1 are three2 that they be not laborious to write and read2 that they be impossible to decipher2 and1 in some cases1 that they be without suspicion4 ,the highest degree whereof is to write omnia per omnia2 which is undoubtedly possible1 with a proportion quintuple at most of the writing infolding to the writing infolded1 and no other restraint whatsoever4 ,this art of ciphering hath for relative an art of deciphering1 by supposition unprofitable1 but1 as things are1 of great use4 ,for suppose that ciphers were well managed1 there be multitudes of them which exclude the decipherer4 ,but in regard of the rawness and unskilfulness of the hands through which they pass1 the greatest matters are many times carried in the weakest ciphers4 7#g7 ,in the enumeration of these private and retired arts it may be thought ,i seek to make a great muster-roll of sciences1 naming them for show and ostentation1 and to little other purpose4 ,but let those1 which are skilful in them1 judge whether ,i bring them in only for appearance1 or whether in that which ,i speak of them 7though in few words7 there be not some seed of proficience4 ,and this must be remembered1 that as there be many of great account in their countries and provinces1 which1 when they come up to the seat of the estate1 are but of mean rank and scarcely regarded2 so these arts1 being here placed with the principal and supreme sciences1 seem petty things3 yet to such as have chosen them to spend their labours and studies in them1 they seem great matters4 ,,xvii4 7#a7 ,for the method of tradition1 ,i see it hath moved a controversy in our time4 ,but as in civil business1 if there be a meeting1 and men fall at words1 there is commonly an end of the matter for that time1 and no proceeding at all2 so in learning1 where there is much controversy1 there is many times little inquiry4 ,for this part of knowledge of method seemeth to me so weakly inquired as ,i shall report it deficient4 7#b7 ,method hath been placed1 and that not amiss1 in logic1 as a part of judgment4 ,for as the doctrine of syllogisms comprehendeth the rules of judgment upon that which is invented1 so the doctrine of method containeth the rules of judgment upon that which is to be delivered2 for judgment precedeth delivery1 as it followeth invention4 ,neither is the method or the nature of the tradition material only to the use of knowledge1 but likewise to the progression of knowledge3 for since the labour and life of one man cannot attain to perfection of knowledge1 the wisdom of the tradition is that which inspireth the felicity of continuance and proceeding4 ,and therefore the most real diversity of method is of method referred to use1 and method referred to progression3 whereof the one may be termed magistral1 and the other of probation4 7#c7 ,the latter whereof seemeth to be via deserta et interclusa4 ,for as knowledges are now delivered1 there is a kind of contract of error between the deliverer and the receiver4 ,for he that delivereth knowledge desireth to deliver it in such form as may be best believed1 and not as may be best examined2 and he that receiveth knowledge desireth rather present satisfaction than expectant inquiry2 and so rather not to doubt1 than not to err3 glory making the author not to lay open his weakness1 and sloth making the disciple not to know his strength4 7#d7 ,but knowledge that is delivered as a thread to be spun on ought to be delivered and intimated1 if it were possible1 in the same method wherein it was invented3 and so is it possible of knowledge induced4 ,but in this same anticipated and prevented knowledge1 no man knoweth how he came to the knowledge which he hath obtained4 ,but yet1 nevertheless1 secundum majus et minus1 a man may revisit and descend unto the foundations of his knowledge and consent2 and so transplant it into another1 as it grew in his own mind4 ,for it is in knowledges as it is in plants3 if you mean to use the plant1 it is no matter for the roots--but if you mean to remove it to grow1 then it is more assured to rest upon roots than slips3 so the delivery of knowledges 7as it is now used7 is as of fair bodies of trees without the roots2 good for the carpenter1 but not for the planter4 ,but if you will have sciences grow1 it is less matter for the shaft or body of the tree1 so you look well to the taking up of the roots4 ,of which kind of delivery the method of the mathematics1 in that subject1 hath some shadow3 but generally ,i see it neither put in use nor put in inquisition1 and therefore note it for deficient4 7#e7 ,another diversity of method there is1 which hath some affinity with the former1 used in some cases by the discretion of the ancients1 but disgraced since by the impostures of many vain persons1 who have made it as a false light for their counterfeit merchandises2 and that is enigmatical and disclosed4 ,the pretence whereof is1 to remove the vulgar capacities from being admitted to the secrets of knowledges1 and to reserve them to selected auditors1 or wits of such sharpness as can pierce the veil4 7#f7 ,another diversity of method1 whereof the consequence is great1 is the delivery of knowledge in aphorisms1 or in methods2 wherein we may observe that it hath been too much taken into custom1 out of a few axioms or observations upon any subject1 to make a solemn and formal art1 filling it with some discourses1 and illustrating it with examples1 and digesting it into a sensible method4 ,but the writing in aphorisms hath many excellent virtues1 whereto the writing in method doth not approach4 7#g7 ,for first1 it trieth the writer1 whether he be superficial or solid3 for aphorisms1 except they should be ridiculous1 cannot be made but of the pith and heart of sciences2 for discourse of illustration is cut off2 recitals of examples are cut off2 discourse of connection and order is cut off2 descriptions of practice are cut off4 ,so there remaineth nothing to fill the aphorisms but some good quantity of observation2 and therefore no man can suffice1 nor in reason will attempt1 to write aphorisms1 but he that is sound and grounded4 ,but in methods1 8,tantum series juncturaque pollet1 ,tantum de medio sumptis accedit honoris10 as a man shall make a great show of an art1 which1 if it were disjointed1 would come to little4 ,secondly1 methods are more fit to win consent or belief1 but less fit to point to action2 for they carry a kind of demonstration in orb or circle1 one part illuminating another1 and therefore satisfy4 ,but particulars being dispersed do best agree with dispersed directions4 ,and lastly1 aphorisms1 representing a knowledge broken1 do invite men to inquire further2 whereas methods1 carrying the show of a total1 do secure men1 as if they were at furthest4 7#h7 ,another diversity of method1 which is likewise of great weight1 is the handling of knowledge by assertions and their proofs1 or by questions and their determinations4 ,the latter kind whereof1 if it be immoderately followed1 is as prejudicial to the proceeding of learning as it is to the proceeding of an army to go about to besiege every little fort or hold4 ,for if the field be kept1 and the sum of the enterprise pursued1 those smaller things will come in of themselves3 indeed a man would not leave some important piece enemy at his back4 ,in like manner1 the use of confutation in the delivery of sciences ought to be very sparing2 and to serve to remove strong preoccupations and prejudgments1 and not to minister and excite disputatious and doubts4 7#i7 ,another diversity of method is1 according to the subject or matter which is handled4 ,for there is a great difference in delivery of the mathematics1 which are the most abstracted of knowledges1 and policy1 which is the most immersed4 ,and howsoever contention hath been moved1 touching a uniformity of method in multiformity of matter1 yet we see how that opinion1 besides the weakness of it1 hath been of ill desert towards learning1 as that which taketh the way to reduce learning to certain empty and barren generalities2 being but the very husks and shells of sciences1 all the kernel being forced out and expulsed with the torture and press of the method4 ,and1 therefore1 as ,i did allow well of particular topics for invention1 so ,i do allow likewise of particular methods of tradition4 7#aj7 ,another diversity of judgment in the delivery and teaching of knowledge is1 according unto the light and presuppositions of that which is delivered4 ,for that knowledge which is new1 and foreign from opinions received1 is to be delivered in another form than that that is agreeable and familiar2 and therefore ,aristotle1 when he thinks to tax ,democritus1 doth in truth commend him1 where he saith 8,if we shall indeed dispute1 and not follow after similitudes10 c4 ,for those whose conceits are seated in popular opinions need only but to prove or dispute2 but those whose conceits are beyond popular opinions1 have a double labour2 the one to make themselves conceived1 and the other to prove and demonstrate4 ,so that it is of necessity with them to have recourse to similitudes and translations to express themselves4 ,and therefore in the infancy of learning1 and in rude times when those conceits which are now trivial were then new1 the world was full of parables and similitudes2 for else would men either have passed over without mark1 or else rejected for paradoxes that which was offered1 before they had understood or judged4 ,so in divine learning1 we see how frequent parables and tropes are1 for it is a rule1 that whatsoever science is not consonant to presuppositions must pray in aid of similitudes4 7#aa7 ,there be also other diversities of methods vulgar and received3 as that of resolution or analysis1 of constitution or systasis1 of concealment or cryptic1 c41 which ,i do allow well of1 though ,i have stood upon those which are least handled and observed4 ,all which ,i have remembered to this purpose1 because ,i would erect and constitute one general inquiry 7which seems to me deficient7 touching the wisdom of tradition4 7#ab7 ,but unto this part of knowledge1 concerning method1 doth further belong not only the architecture of the whole frame of a work1 but also the several beams and columns thereof2 not as to their stuff1 but as to their quantity and figure4 ,and therefore method considereth not only the disposition of the argument or subject1 but likewise the propositions3 not as to their truth or matter1 but as to their limitation and manner4 ,for herein ,ramus merited better a great deal in reviving the good rules of propositions-- 1 c4--than he did in introducing the canker of epitomes2 and yet 7as it is the condition of human things that1 according to the ancient fables1 8the most precious things have the most pernicious keepers07 it was so1 that the attempt of the one made him fall upon the other4 ,for he had need be well conducted that should design to make axioms convertible1 if he make them not withal circular1 and non-promovent1 or incurring into themselves2 but yet the intention was excellent4 7#ac7 ,the other considerations of method1 concerning propositions1 are chiefly touching the utmost propositions1 which limit the dimensions of sciences3 for every knowledge may be fitly said1 besides the profundity 7which is the truth and substance of it1 that makes it solid71 to have a longitude and a latitude2 accounting the latitude towards other sciences1 and the longitude towards action2 that is1 from the greatest generality to the most particular precept4 ,the one giveth rule how far one knowledge ought to intermeddle within the province of another1 which is the rule they call 2 the other giveth rule unto what degree of particularity a knowledge should descend3 which latter ,i find passed over in silence1 being in my judgment the more material4 ,for certainty there must be somewhat left to practice2 but how much is worthy the inquiry8 ,we see remote and superficial generalities do but offer knowledge to scorn of practical men2 and are no more aiding to practice than an ,ortelius' universal map is to direct the way between ,london and ,york4 ,the better sort of rules have been not unfitly compared to glasses of steel unpolished1 where you may see the images of things1 but first they must be filed3 so the rules will help if they be laboured and polished by practice4 ,but how crystalline they may be made at the first1 and how far forth they may be polished aforehand1 is the question1 the inquiry whereof seemeth to me deficient4 7#ad7 ,there hath been also laboured and put in practice a method1 which is not a lawful method1 but a method of imposture3 which is1 to deliver knowledges in such manner as men may speedily come to make a show of learning1 who have it not4 ,such was the travail of ,raymundus ,lullius in making that art which bears his name2 not unlike to some books of typocosmy1 which have been made since2 being nothing but a mass of words of all arts1 to give men countenance1 that those which use the terms might be thought to understand the art2 which collections are much like a fripper's or broker's shop1 that hath ends of everything1 but nothing of worth4 ,,xviii4 7#a7 ,now we descend to that part which concerneth the illustration of tradition1 comprehended in that science which we call rhetoric1 or art of eloquence1 a science excellent1 and excellently well laboured4 ,for although in true value it is inferior to wisdom 7as it is said by ,god to ,moses1 when he disabled himself for want of this faculty1 8,aaron shall be thy speaker1 and thou shalt be to him as ,god071 yet with people it is the more mighty2 for so ,solomon saith1 ,sapiens corde appellabitur prudens1 sed dulcis eloquio majora reperiet1 signifying that profoundness of wisdom will help a man to a name or admiration1 but that it is eloquence that prevaileth in an active life4 ,and as to the labouring of it1 the emulation of ,aristotle with the rhetoricians of his time1 and the experience of ,cicero1 hath made them in their works of rhetoric exceed themselves4 ,again1 the excellency of examples of eloquence in the orations of ,demosthenes and ,cicero1 added to the perfection of the precepts of eloquence1 hath doubled the progression in this art2 and therefore the deficiences which ,i shall note will rather be in some collections1 which may as handmaids attend the art1 than in the rules or use of the art itself4 7#b7 ,notwithstanding1 to stir the earth a little about the roots of this science1 as we have done of the rest1 the duty and office of rhetoric is to apply reason to imagination for the better moving of the will4 ,for we see reason is disturbed in the administration thereof by three means--by illaqueation or sophism1 which pertains to logic2 by imagination or impression1 which pertains to rhetoric2 and by passion or affection1 which pertains to morality4 ,and as in negotiation with others1 men are wrought by cunning1 by importunity1 and by vehemency2 so in this negotiation within ourselves1 men are undermined by inconsequences1 solicited and importuned by impressions or observations1 and transported by passions4 ,neither is the nature of man so unfortunately built1 as that those powers and arts should have force to disturb reason1 and not to establish and advance it4 ,for the end of logic is to teach a form of argument to secure reason1 and not to entrap it2 the end of morality is to procure the affections to obey reason1 and not to invade it2 the end of rhetoric is to fill the imagination to second reason1 and not to oppress it2 for these abuses of arts come in but ex oblique1 for caution4 7#c7 ,and therefore it was great injustice in ,plato1 though springing out of a just hatred to the rhetoricians of his time1 to esteem of rhetoric but as a voluptuary art1 resembling it to cookery1 that did mar wholesome meats1 and help unwholesome by variety of sauces to the pleasure of the taste4 ,for we see that speech is much more conversant in adorning that which is good than in colouring that which is evil2 for there is no man but speaketh more honestly than he can do or think2 and it was excellently noted by ,thucydides1 in ,cleon1 that because he used to hold on the bad side in causes of estate1 therefore he was ever inveighing against eloquence and good speech1 knowing that no man can speak fair of courses sordid and base4 ,and therefore1 as ,plato said elegantly1 8,that virtue1 if she could be seen1 would move great love and affection20 so seeing that she cannot be showed to the sense by corporal shape1 the next degree is to show her to the imagination in lively representation2 for to show her to reason only in subtlety of argument was a thing ever derided in ,chrysippus and many of the ,stoics1 who thought to thrust virtue upon men by sharp disputations and conclusions1 which have no sympathy with the will of man4 7#d7 ,again1 if the affections in themselves were pliant and obedient to reason1 it were true there should be no great use of persuasions and insinuations to the will1 more than of naked proposition and proofs2 but in regard of the continual mutinies and seditious of the affections-- 8,video meliora1 proboque1 ,deteriora sequor10 reason would become captive and servile1 if eloquence of persuasions did not practise and win the imagination from the affections' part1 and contract a confederacy between the reason and imagination against the affections2 for the affections themselves carry ever an appetite to good1 as reason doth4 ,the difference is1 that the affection beholdeth merely the present2 reason beholdeth the future and sum of time4 ,and1 therefore1 the present filling the imagination more1 reason is commonly vanquished2 but after that force of eloquence and persuasion hath made things future and remote appear as present1 then upon the revolt of the imagination reason prevaileth4 7#e7 ,we conclude1 therefore1 that rhetoric can be no more charged with the colouring of the worst part1 than logic with sophistry1 or morality with vice2 for we know the doctrines of contraries are the same1 though the use be opposite4 ,it appeareth also that logic differeth from rhetoric1 not only as the fist from the palm--the one close1 the other at large--but much more in this1 that logic handleth reason exact and in truth1 and rhetoric handleth it as it is planted in popular opinions and manners4 ,and therefore ,aristotle doth wisely place rhetoric as between logic on the one side1 and moral or civil knowledge on the other1 as participating of both2 for the proofs and demonstrations of logic are toward all men indifferent and the same1 but the proofs and persuasions of rhetoric ought to differ according to the auditors3 8,orpheus in sylvis1 inter delphinas ,arion40 ,which application in perfection of idea ought to extend so far that if a man should speak of the same thing to several persons1 he should speak to them all respectively and several ways2 though this politic part of eloquence in private speech it is easy for the greatest orators to want3 whilst1 by the observing their well-graced forms of speech1 they leese the volubility of application2 and therefore it shall not be amiss to recommend this to better inquiry1 not being curious whether we place it here or in that part which concerneth policy4 7#f7 ,now therefore will ,i descend to the deficiences1 which1 as ,i said1 are but attendances2 and first1 ,i do not find the wisdom and diligence of ,aristotle well pursued1 who began to make a collection of the popular signs and colours of good and evil1 both simple and comparative1 which are as the sophisms of rhetoric 7as ,i touched before74 ,for example-- 8,sophisma4 ,quod laudatur1 bonum3 quod vituperatur1 malum4 ,redargutio4 ,laudat venales qui vult extrudere merces40 ,malum est1 malum est 7inquit emptor73 sed cum recesserit1 tum gloriabitur6 ,the defects in the labour of ,aristotle are three--one1 that there be but a few of many2 another1 that there elenches are not annexed2 and the third1 that he conceived but a part of the use of them3 for their use is not only in probation1 but much more in impression4 ,for many forms are equal in signification which are differing in impression1 as the difference is great in the piercing of that which is sharp and that which is flat1 though the strength of the percussion be the same4 ,for there is no man but will be a little more raised by hearing it said1 8,your enemies will be glad of this0-- 8,hoc ,ithacus velit1 et magno mercentur ,atrid40 than by hearing it said only1 8,this is evil for you40 7#g7 ,secondly1 ,i do resume also that which ,i mentioned before1 touching provision or preparatory store for the furniture of speech and readiness of invention1 which appeareth to be of two sorts3 the one in resemblance to a shop of pieces unmade up1 the other to a shop of things ready made up2 both to be applied to that which is frequent and most in request4 ,the former of these ,i will call antitheta1 and the latter formul4 7#h7 ,antitheta are theses argued pro et contra1 wherein men may be more large and laborious2 but 7in such as are able to do it7 to avoid prolixity of entry1 ,i wish the seeds of the several arguments to be cast up into some brief and acute sentences1 not to be cited1 but to be as skeins or bottoms of thread1 to be unwinded at large when they come to be used2 supplying authorities and examples by reference4 8,pro verbis legis4 ,non est interpretatio1 sed divinatio1 qu recedit a litera3 ,cum receditur a litera1 judex transit in legislatorem4 ,pro sententia legis4 ,ex omnibus verbis est eliciendus sensus qui interpretatur singula40 7#i7 ,formul are but decent and apt passages or conveyances of speech1 which may serve indifferently for differing subjects2 as of preface1 conclusion1 digression1 transition1 excusation1 c4 ,for as in buildings there is great pleasure and use in the well casting of the staircases1 entries1 doors1 windows1 and the like2 so in speech1 the conveyances and passages are of special ornament and effect4 8,a conclusion in a deliberative4 ,so may we redeem the faults passed1 and prevent the inconveniences future40 ,,xix4 7#a7 ,there remain two appendices touching the tradition of knowledge1 the one critical1 the other pedantical4 ,for all knowledge is either delivered by teachers1 or attained by men's proper endeavours3 and therefore as the principal part of tradition of knowledge concerneth chiefly writing of books1 so the relative part thereof concerneth reading of books2 whereunto appertain incidently these considerations4 ,the first is concerning the true correction and edition of authors2 wherein nevertheless rash diligence hath done great prejudice4 ,for these critics have often presumed that that which they understand not is false set down3 as the priest that1 where he found it written of ,st4 ,paul ,demissus est per sportam1 mended his book1 and made it ,demissus est per portam2 because sporta was a hard word1 and out of his reading3 and surely their errors1 though they be not so palpable and ridiculous1 yet are of the same kind4 ,and therefore1 as it hath been wisely noted1 the most corrected copies are commonly the least correct4 ,the second is concerning the exposition and explication of authors1 which resteth in annotations and commentaries3 wherein it is over usual to blanch the obscure places and discourse upon the plain4 ,the third is concerning the times1 which in many cases give great light to true interpretations4 ,the fourth is concerning some brief censure and judgment of the authors2 that men thereby may make some election unto themselves what books to read4 ,and the fifth is concerning the syntax and disposition of studies2 that men may know in what order or pursuit to read4 7#b7 ,for pedantical knowledge1 it containeth that difference of tradition which is proper for youth2 whereunto appertain divers considerations of great fruit4 ,as first1 the timing and seasoning of knowledges2 as with what to initiate them1 and from what for a time to refrain them4 ,secondly1 the consideration where to begin with the easiest1 and so proceed to the more difficult2 and in what courses to press the more difficult1 and then to turn them to the more easy2 for it is one method to practise swimming with bladders1 and another to practise dancing with heavy shoes4 ,a third is the application of learning according unto the propriety of the wits2 for there is no defect in the faculties intellectual1 but seemeth to have a proper cure contained in some studies3 as1 for example1 if a child be bird-witted1 that is1 hath not the faculty of attention1 the mathematics giveth a remedy thereunto2 for in them1 if the wit be caught away but a moment1 one is new to begin4 ,and as sciences have a propriety towards faculties for cure and help1 so faculties or powers have a sympathy towards sciences for excellency or speedy profiting3 and therefore it is an inquiry of great wisdom1 what kinds of wits and natures are most apt and proper for what sciences4 ,fourthly1 the ordering of exercises is matter of great consequence to hurt or help3 for1 as is well observed by ,cicero1 men in exercising their faculties1 if they be not well advised1 do exercise their faults and get ill habits as well as good2 so as there is a great judgment to be had in the continuance and intermission of exercises4 ,it were too long to particularise a number of other considerations of this nature1 things but of mean appearance1 but of singular efficacy4 ,for as the wronging or cherishing of seeds or young plants is that that is most important to their thriving1 and as it was noted that the first six kings being in truth as tutors of the state of ,rome in the infancy thereof was the principal cause of the immense greatness of that state which followed1 so the culture and manurance of minds in youth hath such a forcible 7though unseen7 operation1 as hardly any length of time or contention of labour can countervail it afterwards4 ,and it is not amiss to observe also how small and mean faculties gotten by education1 yet when they fall into great men or great matters1 do work great and important effects3 whereof we see a notable example in ,tacitus of two stage players1 ,percennius and ,vibulenus1 who by their faculty of playing put the ,pannonian armies into an extreme tumult and combustion4 ,for there arising a mutiny amongst them upon the death of ,augustus ,csar1 ,blsus the lieutenant had committed some of the mutineers1 which were suddenly rescued2 whereupon ,vibulenus got to be heard speak1 which he did in this manner3--8,these poor innocent wretches appointed to cruel death1 you have restored to behold the light2 but who shall restore my brother to me1 or life unto my brother1 that was sent hither in message from the legions of ,germany1 to treat of the common cause8 and he hath murdered him this last night by some of his fencers and ruffians1 that he hath about him for his executioners upon soldiers4 ,answer1 ,blsus1 what is done with his body8 ,the mortalest enemies do not deny burial4 ,when ,i have performed my last duties to the corpse with kisses1 with tears1 command me to be slain besides him2 so that these my fellows1 for our good meaning and our true hearts to the legions1 may have leave to bury us40 ,with which speech he put the army into an infinite fury and uproar3 whereas truth was he had no brother1 neither was there any such matter2 but he played it merely as if he had been upon the stage4 7#c7 ,but to return3 we are now come to a period of rational knowledges2 wherein if ,i have made the divisions other than those that are received1 yet would ,i not be thought to disallow all those divisions which ,i do not use4 ,for there is a double necessity imposed upon me of altering the divisions4 ,the one1 because it differeth in end and purpose1 to sort together those things which are next in nature1 and those things which are next in use4 ,for if a secretary of estate should sort his papers1 it is like in his study or general cabinet he would sort together things of a nature1 as treaties1 instructions1 c4 ,but in his boxes or particular cabinet he would sort together those that he were like to use together1 though of several natures4 ,so in this general cabinet of knowledge it was necessary for me to follow the divisions of the nature of things2 whereas if myself had been to handle any particular knowledge1 ,i would have respected the divisions fittest for use4 ,the other1 because the bringing in of the deficiences did by consequence alter the partitions of the rest4 ,for let the knowledge extant 7for demonstration sake7 be fifteen4 ,let the knowledge with the deficiences be twenty2 the parts of fifteen are not the parts of twenty2 for the parts of fifteen are three and five2 the parts of twenty are two1 four1 five1 and ten4 ,so as these things are without contradiction1 and could not otherwise be4 ,,xx4 7#a7 ,we proceed now to that knowledge which considereth of the appetite and will of man3 whereof ,solomon saith1 ,ante omnia1 fili1 custodi cor tuum3 nam inde procedunt actiones vit4 ,in the handling of this science1 those which have written seem to me to have done as if a man1 that professed to teach to write1 did only exhibit fair copies of alphabets and letters joined1 without giving any precepts or directions for the carriage of the hand and framing of the letters4 ,so have they made good and fair exemplars and copies1 carrying the draughts and portraitures of good1 virtue1 duty1 felicity2 propounding them well described as the true objects and scopes of man's will and desires4 ,but how to attain these excellent marks1 and how to frame and subdue the will of man to become true and conformable to these pursuits1 they pass it over altogether1 or slightly and unprofitably4 ,for it is not the disputing that moral virtues are in the mind of man by habit and not by nature1 or the distinguishing that generous spirits are won by doctrines and persuasions1 and the vulgar sort by reward and punishment1 and the like scattered glances and touches1 that can excuse the absence of this part4 7#b7 ,the reason of this omission ,i suppose to be that hidden rock whereupon both this and many other barks of knowledge have been cast away2 which is1 that men have despised to be conversant in ordinary and common matters1 the judicious direction whereof nevertheless is the wisest doctrine 7for life consisteth not in novelties nor subtleties71 but contrariwise they have compounded sciences chiefly of a certain resplendent or lustrous mass of matter1 chosen to give glory either to the subtlety of disputatious1 or to the eloquence of discourses4 ,but ,seneca giveth an excellent check to eloquence1 ,nocet illis eloquentia1 quibus non rerum cupiditatem facit1 sed sui4 ,doctrine should be such as should make men in love with the lesson1 and not with the teacher2 being directed to the auditor's benefit1 and not to the author's commendation4 ,and therefore those are of the right kind which may be concluded as ,demosthenes concludes his counsel1 ,qu si feceritis1 non oratorem dumtaxat in prsentia laudabitis1 sed vosmetipsos etiam non ita multo post statu rerum vestraram meliore4 7#c7 ,neither needed men of so excellent parts to have despaired of a fortune1 which the poet ,virgil promised himself1 and indeed obtained1 who got as much glory of eloquence1 wit1 and learning in the expressing of the observations of husbandry1 as of the heroical acts of neas3 8,nec sum animi dubius1 verbis ea vincere magnum ,quam sit1 et angustis his addere rebus honorem40 ,and surely1 if the purpose be in good earnest1 not to write at leisure that which men may read at leisure1 but really to instruct and suborn action and active life1 these ,georgics of the mind1 concerning the husbandry and tillage thereof1 are no less worthy than the heroical descriptions of virtue1 duty1 and felicity4 ,wherefore the main and primitive division of moral knowledge seemeth to be into the exemplar or platform of good1 and the regiment or culture of the mind3 the one describing the nature of good1 the other prescribing rules how to subdue1 apply1 and accommodate the will of man thereunto4 7#d7 ,the doctrine touching the platform or nature of good considereth it either simple or compared2 either the kinds of good1 or the degrees of good2 in the latter whereof those infinite disputatious which were touching the supreme degree thereof1 which they term felicity1 beatitude1 or the highest good1 the doctrines concerning which were as the heathen divinity1 are by the ,christian faith discharged4 ,and as ,aristotle saith1 8,that young men may be happy1 but not otherwise but by hope20 so we must all acknowledge our minority1 and embrace the felicity which is by hope of the future world4 7#e7 ,freed therefore and delivered from this doctrine of the philosopher's heaven1 whereby they feigned a higher elevation of man's nature than was 7for we see in what height of style ,seneca writeth1 ,vere magnum1 habere fragilitatem hominis1 securitatem ,dei71 we may with more sobriety and truth receive the rest of their inquiries and labours4 ,wherein for the nature of good positive or simple1 they have set it down excellently in describing the forms of virtue and duty1 with their situations and postures2 in distributing them into their kinds1 parts1 provinces1 actions1 and administrations1 and the like3 nay further1 they have commended them to man's nature and spirit with great quickness of argument and beauty of persuasions2 yea1 and fortified and entrenched them 7as much as discourse can do7 against corrupt and popular opinions4 ,again1 for the degrees and comparative nature of good1 they have also excellently handled it in their triplicity of good1 in the comparisons between a contemplative and an active life1 in the distinction between virtue with reluctation and virtue secured1 in their encounters between honesty and profit1 in their balancing of virtue with virtue1 and the like2 so as this part deserveth to be reported for excellently laboured4 7#f7 ,notwithstanding1 if before they had come to the popular and received notions of virtue and vice1 pleasure and pain1 and the rest1 they had stayed a little longer upon the inquiry concerning the roots of good and evil1 and the strings of those roots1 they had given1 in my opinion1 a great light to that which followed2 and specially if they had consulted with nature1 they had made their doctrines less prolix and more profound3 which being by them in part omitted and in part handled with much confusion1 we will endeavour to resume and open in a more clear manner4 7#g7 ,there is formed in everything a double nature of good--the one1 as everything is a total or substantive in itself2 the other1 as it is a part or member of a greater body2 whereof the latter is in degree the greater and the worthier1 because it tendeth to the conservation of a more general form4 ,therefore we see the iron in particular sympathy moveth to the loadstone2 but yet if it exceed a certain quantity1 it forsaketh the affection to the loadstone1 and like a good patriot moveth to the earth1 which is the region and country of massy bodies2 so may we go forward1 and see that water and massy bodies move to the centre of the earth2 but rather than to suffer a divulsion in the continuance of nature1 they will move upwards from the centre of the earth1 forsaking their duty to the earth in regard of their duty to the world4 ,this double nature of good1 and the comparative thereof1 is much more engraven upon man1 if he degenerate not1 unto whom the conservation of duty to the public ought to be much more precious than the conservation of life and being2 according to that memorable speech of ,pompeius ,magnus1 when being in commission of purveyance for a famine at ,rome1 and being dissuaded with great vehemency and instance by his friends about him1 that he should not hazard himself to sea in an extremity of weather1 he said only to them1 ,necesse est ut eam1 non ut vivam4 ,but it may be truly affirmed that there was never any philosophy1 religion1 or other discipline1 which did so plainly and highly exalt the good which is communicative1 and depress the good which is private and particular1 as the ,holy ,faith2 well declaring that it was the same ,god that gave the ,christian law to men1 who gave those laws of nature to inanimate creatures that we spake of before2 for we read that the elected saints of ,god have wished themselves anathematised and razed out of the book of life1 in an ecstasy of charity and infinite feeling of communion4 7#h7 ,this being set down and strongly planted1 doth judge and determine most of the controversies wherein moral philosophy is conversant4 ,for first1 it decideth the question touching the preferment of the contemplative or active life1 and decideth it against ,aristotle4 ,for all the reasons which he bringeth for the contemplative are private1 and respecting the pleasure and dignity of a man's self 7in which respects no question the contemplative life hath the pre-eminence71 not much unlike to that comparison which ,pythagoras made for the gracing and magnifying of philosophy and contemplation1 who being asked what he was1 answered1 8,that if ,hiero were ever at the ,olympian games1 he knew the manner1 that some came to try their fortune for the prizes1 and some came as merchants to utter their commodities1 and some came to make good cheer and meet their friends1 and some came to look on2 and that he was one of them that came to look on40 ,but men must know1 that in this theatre of man's life it is reserved only for ,god and angels to be lookers on4 ,neither could the like question ever have been received in the ,church1 notwithstanding their ,pretiosa in oculis ,domini mors sanctorum ejus1 by which place they would exalt their civil death and regular professions1 but upon this defence1 that the monastical life is not simple contemplative1 but performeth the duty either of incessant prayers and supplications1 which hath been truly esteemed as an office in the ,church1 or else of writing or taking instructions for writing concerning the law of ,god1 as ,moses did when he abode so long in the mount4 ,and so we see ,enoch1 the seventh from ,adam1 who was the first contemplative and walked with ,god1 yet did also endow the ,church with prophecy1 which ,saint ,jude citeth4 ,but for contemplation which should be finished in itself1 without casting beams upon society1 assuredly divinity knoweth it not4 7#i7 ,it decideth also the controversies between ,zeno and ,socrates1 and their schools and successions1 on the one side1 who placed felicity in virtue simply or attended1 the actions and exercises whereof do chiefly embrace and concern society2 and on the other side1 the ,cyrenaics and ,epicureans1 who placed it in pleasure1 and made virtue 7as it is used in some comedies of errors1 wherein the mistress and the maid change habits7 to be but as a servant1 without which pleasure cannot be served and attended2 and the reformed school of the ,epicureans1 which placed it in serenity of mind and freedom from perturbation2 as if they would have deposed ,jupiter again1 and restored ,saturn and the first age1 when there was no summer nor winter1 spring nor autumn1 but all after one air and season2 and ,herillus1 which placed felicity in extinguishment of the disputes of the mind1 making no fixed nature of good and evil1 esteeming things according to the clearness of the desires1 or the reluctation2 which opinion was revived in the heresy of the ,anabaptists1 measuring things according to the motions of the spirit1 and the constancy or wavering of belief2 all which are manifest to tend to private repose and contentment1 and not to point of society4 7#aj7 ,it censureth also the philosophy of ,epictetus1 which presupposeth that felicity must be placed in those things which are in our power1 lest we be liable to fortune and disturbance2 as if it were not a thing much more happy to fail in good and virtuous ends for the public1 than to obtain all that we can wish to ourselves in our proper fortune3 as ,consalvo said to his soldiers1 showing them ,naples1 and protesting he had rather die one foot forwards1 than to have his life secured for long by one foot of retreat4 ,whereunto the wisdom of that heavenly leader hath signed1 who hath affirmed that 8a good conscience is a continual feast20 showing plainly that the conscience of good intentions1 howsoever succeeding1 is a more continual joy to nature than all the provision which can be made for security and repose4 7#aa7 ,it censureth likewise that abuse of philosophy which grew general about the time of ,epictetus1 in converting it into an occupation or profession2 as if the purpose had been1 not to resist and extinguish perturbations1 but to fly and avoid the causes of them1 and to shape a particular kind and course of life to that end2 introducing such a health of mind1 as was that health of body of which ,aristotle speaketh of ,herodicus1 who did nothing all his life long but intend his health2 whereas if men refer themselves to duties of society1 as that health of body is best which is ablest to endure all alterations and extremities1 so likewise that health of mind is most proper which can go through the greatest temptations and perturbations4 ,so as ,diogenes' opinion is to be accepted1 who commended not them which abstained1 but them which sustained1 and could refrain their mind in prcipitio1 and could give unto the mind 7as is used in horsemanship7 the shortest stop or turn4 7#ab7 ,lastly1 it censureth the tenderness and want of application in some of the most ancient and reverend philosophers and philosophical men1 that did retire too easily from civil business1 for avoiding of indignities and perturbations2 whereas the resolution of men truly moral ought to be such as the same ,consalvo said the honour of a soldier should be1 e tel crassiore1 and not so fine as that everything should catch in it and endanger it4 ,,xxi4 7#a7 ,to resume private or particular good1 it falleth into the division of good active and passive2 for this difference of good 7not unlike to that which amongst the ,romans was expressed in the familiar or household terms of promus and condus7 is formed also in all things1 and is best disclosed in the two several appetites in creatures2 the one to preserve or continue themselves1 and the other to dilate or multiply themselves1 whereof the latter seemeth to be the worthier2 for in nature the heavens1 which are the more worthy1 are the agent1 and the earth1 which is the less worthy1 is the patient4 ,in the pleasures of living creatures1 that of generation is greater than that of food4 ,in divine doctrine1 beatius est dare quam accipere4 ,and in life1 there is no man's spirit so soft1 but esteemeth the effecting of somewhat that he hath fixed in his desire1 more than sensuality1 which priority of the active good is much upheld by the consideration of our estate to be mortal and exposed to fortune4 ,for if we might have a perpetuity and certainty in our pleasures1 the state of them would advance their price4 ,but when we see it is but magni stimamus mori tardius1 and ne glorieris de crastino1 nescis partum diei1 it maketh us to desire to have somewhat secured and exempted from time1 which are only our deeds and works2 as it is said1 ,opera eorum sequuntur eos4 ,the pre-eminence likewise of this active good is upheld by the affection which is natural in man towards variety and proceeding1 which in the pleasures of the sense1 which is the principal part of passive good1 can have no great latitude4 ,cogita quamdiu eadem feceris2 cibus1 somnus1 ludus per hunc circulum curritur2 mori velle non tantum fortis1 aut miser1 aut prudens1 sed etiam fastidiosus potest4 ,but in enterprises1 pursuits1 and purposes of life1 there is much variety2 whereof men are sensible with pleasure in their inceptions1 progressions1 recoils1 reintegrations1 approaches and attainings to their ends4 ,so as it was well said1 ,vita sine proposito languida et vaga est4 ,neither hath this active good an identity with the good of society1 though in some cases it hath an incidence into it4 ,for although it do many times bring forth acts of beneficence1 yet it is with a respect private to a man's own power1 glory1 amplification1 continuance2 as appeareth plainly1 when it findeth a contrary subject4 ,for that gigantine state of mind which possesseth the troublers of the world1 such as was ,lucius ,sylla and infinite other in smaller model1 who would have all men happy or unhappy as they were their friends or enemies1 and would give form to the world1 according to their own humours 7which is the true theomachy71 pretendeth and aspireth to active good1 though it recedeth furthest from good of society1 which we have determined to be the greater4 7#b7 ,to resume passive good1 it receiveth a subdivision of conservative and effective4 ,for let us take a brief review of that which we have said3 we have spoken first of the good of society1 the intention whereof embraceth the form of human nature1 whereof we are members and portions1 and not our own proper and individual form2 we have spoken of active good1 and supposed it as a part of private and particular good4 ,and rightly1 for there is impressed upon all things a triple desire or appetite proceeding from love to themselves3 one of preserving and continuing their form2 another of advancing and perfecting their form2 and a third of multiplying and extending their form upon other things3 whereof the multiplying1 or signature of it upon other things1 is that which we handled by the name of active good4 ,so as there remaineth the conserving of it1 and perfecting or raising of it1 which latter is the highest degree of passive good4 ,for to preserve in state is the less1 to preserve with advancement is the greater4 ,so in man1 8,igneus est ollis vigor1 et clestis origo40 ,his approach or assumption to divine or angelical nature is the perfection of his form2 the error or false imitation of which good is that which is the tempest of human life2 while man1 upon the instinct of an advancement1 formal and essential1 is carried to seek an advancement local4 ,for as those which are sick1 and find no remedy1 do tumble up and down and change place1 as if by a remove local they could obtain a remove internal1 so is it with men in ambition1 when failing of the mean to exalt their nature1 they are in a perpetual estuation to exalt their place4 ,so then passive good is1 as was said1 either conservative or perfective4 7#c7 ,to resume the good of conservation or comfort1 which consisteth in the fruition of that which is agreeable to our natures2 it seemeth to be most pure and natural of pleasures1 but yet the softest and lowest4 ,and this also receiveth a difference1 which hath neither been well judged of1 nor well inquired2 for the good of fruition or contentment is placed either in the sincereness of the fruition1 or in the quickness and vigour of it2 the one superinduced by equality1 the other by vicissitude2 the one having less mixture of evil1 the other more impression of good4 ,whether of these is the greater good is a question controverted2 but whether man's nature may not be capable of both is a question not inquired4 7#d7 ,the former question being debated between ,socrates and a sophist1 ,socrates placing felicity in an equal and constant peace of mind1 and the sophist in much desiring and much enjoying1 they fell from argument to ill words3 the sophist saying that ,socrates' felicity was the felicity of a block or stone2 and ,socrates saying that the sophist's felicity was the felicity of one that had the itch1 who did nothing but itch and scratch4 ,and both these opinions do not want their supports4 ,for the opinion of ,socrates is much upheld by the general consent even of the epicures themselves1 that virtue beareth a great part in felicity2 and if so1 certain it is1 that virtue hath more use in clearing perturbations then in compassing desires4 ,the sophist's opinion is much favoured by the assertion we last spake of1 that good of advancement is greater than good of simple preservation2 because every obtaining a desire hath a show of advancement1 as motion though in a circle hath a show of progression4 7#e7 ,but the second question1 decided the true way1 maketh the former superfluous4 ,for can it be doubted1 but that there are some who take more pleasure in enjoying pleasures than some other1 and yet1 nevertheless1 are less troubled with the loss or leaving of them8 ,so as this same1 ,non uti ut non appetas1 non appetere ut non metuas1 sunt animi pusilli et diffidentis4 ,and it seemeth to me that most of the doctrines of the philosophers are more fearful and cautious than the nature of things requireth4 ,so have they increased the fear of death in offering to cure it4 ,for when they would have a man's whole life to be but a discipline or preparation to die1 they must needs make men think that it is a terrible enemy1 against whom there is no end of preparing4 ,better saith the poet3-- 8,qui finem vit extremum inter munera ponat ,natur40 ,so have they sought to make men's minds too uniform and harmonical1 by not breaking them sufficiently to contrary motions2 the reasons whereof ,i suppose to be1 because they themselves were men dedicated to a private1 free1 and unapplied course of life4 ,for as we see1 upon the lute or like instrument1 a ground1 though it be sweet and have show of many changes1 yet breaketh not the hand to such strange and hard stops and passages1 as a set song or voluntary2 much after the same manner was the diversity between a philosophical and civil life4 ,and1 therefore1 men are to imitate the wisdom of jewellers3 who1 if there be a grain1 or a cloud1 or an ice which may be ground forth without taking too much of the stone1 they help it2 but if it should lessen and abate the stone too much1 they will not meddle with it3 so ought men so to procure serenity as they destroy not magnanimity4 7#f7 ,having therefore deduced the good of man which is private and particular1 as far as seemeth fit1 we will now return to that good of man which respecteth and beholdeth society1 which we may term duty2 because the term of duty is more proper to a mind well framed and disposed towards others1 as the term of virtue is applied to a mind well formed and composed in itself2 though neither can a man understand virtue without some relation to society1 nor duty without an inward disposition4 ,this part may seem at first to pertain to science civil and politic2 but not if it be well observed4 ,for it concerneth the regiment and government of every man over himself1 and not over others4 ,and as in architecture the direction of framing the posts1 beams1 and other parts of building1 is not the same with the manner of joining them and erecting the building2 and in mechanicals1 the direction how to frame an instrument or engine is not the same with the manner of setting it on work and employing it2 and yet1 nevertheless1 in expressing of the one you incidently express the aptness towards the other2 so the doctrine of conjugation of men in society differeth from that of their conformity thereunto4 7#g7 ,this part of duty is subdivided into two parts3 the common duty of every man1 as a man or member of a state2 the other1 the respective or special duty of every man in his profession1 vocation1 and place4 ,the first of these is extant and well laboured1 as hath been said4 ,the second likewise ,i may report rather dispersed than deficient2 which manner of dispersed writing in this kind of argument ,i acknowledge to be best4 ,for who can take upon him to write of the proper duty1 virtue1 challenge1 and right of every several vocation1 profession1 and place8 ,for although sometimes a looker on may see more than a gamester1 and there be a proverb more arrogant than sound1 8,that the vale best discovereth the hill20 yet there is small doubt but that men can write best and most really and materially in their own professions2 and that the writing of speculative men of active matter for the most part doth seem to men of experience1 as ,phormio's argument of the wars seemed to ,hannibal1 to be but dreams and dotage4 ,only there is one vice which accompanieth them that write in their own professions1 that they magnify them in excess4 ,but generally it were to be wished 7as that which would make learning indeed solid and fruitful7 that active men would or could become writers4 7#h7 ,in which kind ,i cannot but mention1 honoris causa1 your ,majesty's excellent book touching the duty of a king2 a work richly compounded of divinity1 morality1 and policy1 with great aspersion of all other arts2 and being in some opinion one of the most sound and healthful writings that ,i have read3 not distempered in the heat of invention1 nor in the coldness of negligence2 not sick of dizziness1 as those are who leese themselves in their order1 nor of convulsions1 as those which cramp in matters impertinent2 not savouring of perfumes and paintings1 as those do who seek to please the reader more than nature beareth2 and chiefly well disposed in the spirits thereof1 being agreeable to truth and apt for action2 and far removed from that natural infirmity1 whereunto ,i noted those that write in their own professions to be subject--which is1 that they exalt it above measure4 ,for your ,majesty hath truly described1 not a king of ,assyria or ,persia in their extern glory1 but a ,moses or a ,david1 pastors of their people4 ,neither can ,i ever leese out of my remembrance what ,i heard your ,majesty in the same sacred spirit of government deliver in a great cause of judicature1 which was1 8,that kings ruled by their laws1 as ,god did by the laws of nature2 and ought as rarely to put in use their supreme prerogative as ,god doth ,his power of working miracles40 ,and yet notwithstanding in your book of a free monarchy1 you do well give men to understand1 that you know the plenitude of the power and right of a king1 as well as the circle of his office and duty4 ,thus have ,i presumed to allege this excellent writing of your ,majesty1 as a prime or eminent example of tractates concerning special and respective duties2 wherein ,i should have said as much1 if it had been written a thousand years since4 ,neither am ,i moved with certain courtly decencies1 which esteem it flattery to praise in presence4 ,no1 it is flattery to praise in absence--that is1 when either the virtue is absent1 or the occasion is absent2 and so the praise is not natural1 but forced1 either in truth or in time4 ,but let ,cicero be read in his oration pro ,marcello1 which is nothing but an excellent table of ,csar's virtue1 and made to his face2 besides the example of many other excellent persons1 wiser a great deal than such observers2 and we will never doubt1 upon a full occasion1 to give just praises to present or absent4 7#i7 ,but to return2 there belongeth further to the handling of this part1 touching the duties of professions and vocations1 a relative or opposite1 touching the frauds1 cautels1 impostures1 and vices of every profession1 which hath been likewise handled2 but how8 rather in a satire and cynically1 than seriously and wisely2 for men have rather sought by wit to deride and traduce much of that which is good in professions1 than with judgment to discover and sever that which is corrupt4 ,for1 as ,solomon saith1 he that cometh to seek after knowledge with a mind to scorn and censure shall be sure to find matter for his humour1 but no matter for his instruction3 ,qurenti derisori scientiam ipsa se abscondit2 sed studioso fit obviam4 ,but the managing of this argument with integrity and truth1 which ,i note as deficient1 seemeth to me to be one of the best fortifications for honesty and virtue that can be planted4 ,for1 as the fable goeth of the basilisk--that if he see you first1 you die for it2 but if you see him first1 he dieth--so is it with deceits and evil arts1 which1 if they be first espied they leese their life2 but if they prevent1 they endanger4 ,so that we are much beholden to ,machiavel and others1 that write what men do1 and not what they ought to do4 ,for it is not possible to join serpentine wisdom with the columbine innocency1 except men know exactly all the conditions of the serpent2 his baseness and going upon his belly1 his volubility and lubricity1 his envy and sting1 and the rest--that is1 all forms and natures of evil4 ,for without this1 virtue lieth open and unfenced4 ,nay1 an honest man can do no good upon those that are wicked1 to reclaim them1 without the help of the knowledge of evil4 ,for men of corrupted minds presuppose that honesty groweth out of simplicity of manners1 and believing of preachers1 schoolmasters1 and men's exterior language4 ,so as1 except you can make them perceive that you know the utmost reaches of their own corrupt opinions1 they despise all morality4 ,non recipit stultus verba prudenti1 nisi ea dixeris qu1 versantur in corde ejus4 7#aj7 ,unto this part1 touching respective duty1 doth also appertain the duties between husband and wife1 parent and child1 master and servant4 ,so likewise the laws of friendship and gratitude1 the civil bond of companies1 colleges1 and politic bodies1 of neighbourhood1 and all other proportionate duties2 not as they are parts of government and society1 but as to the framing of the mind of particular persons4 7#aa7 ,the knowledge concerning good respecting society doth handle it also1 not simply alone1 but comparatively2 whereunto belongeth the weighing of duties between person and person1 case and case1 particular and public4 ,as we see in the proceeding of ,lucius ,brutus against his own sons1 which was so much extolled1 yet what was said8 8,infelix1 utcunque ferent ea fata minores40 ,so the case was doubtful1 and had opinion on both sides4 ,again1 we see when ,m4 ,brutus and ,cassius invited to a supper certain whose opinions they meant to feel1 whether they were fit to be made their associates1 and cast forth the question touching the killing of a tyrant being a usurper1 they were divided in opinion2 some holding that servitude was the extreme of evils1 and others that tyranny was better than a civil war3 and a number of the like cases there are of comparative duty4 ,amongst which that of all others is the most frequent1 where the question is of a great deal of good to ensue of a small injustice4 ,which ,jason of ,thessalia determined against the truth3 ,aliqua sunt injuste facienda1 ut multa juste fieri possint4 ,but the reply is good3 ,auctorem prsentis justiti habes1 sponsorem futur non habes4 ,men must pursue things which are just in present1 and leave the future to the ,divine ,providence4 ,so then we pass on from this general part touching the exemplar and description of good4 ,,xxii4 7#a7 ,now1 therefore1 that we have spoken of this fruit of life1 it remaineth to speak of the husbandry that belongeth thereunto1 without which part the former seemeth to be no better than a fair image or statue1 which is beautiful to contemplate1 but is without life and motion2 whereunto ,aristotle himself subscribeth in these words3 ,necesse est scilicet de virtute dicere1 et quid sit1 et ex quibus gignatur4 ,inutile enum fere fuerit virtutem quidem nosse1 acquirend autem ejus modos et vias ignorare4 ,non enum de virtute tantum1 qua specie sit1 qurendum est1 sed et quomodo sui copiam faciat3 utrumque enum volumeus1 et rem ipsam nosse1 et ejus compotes fieri3 hoc autem ex voto non succedet1 nisi sciamus et ex quibus et quomodo4 ,in such full words and with such iteration doth he inculcate this part4 ,so saith ,cicero in great commendation of ,cato the second1 that he had applied himself to philosophy1 ,non ita disputandi causa1 sed ita vivendi4 ,and although the neglect of our times1 wherein few men do hold any consultations touching the reformation of their life 7as ,seneca excellently saith1 ,de partibus vit quisque deliberat1 de summa nemo71 may make this part seem superfluous2 yet ,i must conclude with that aphorism of ,hippocrates1 ,qui gravi morbo correpti dolores non sentiunt1 iis mens grotat4 ,they need medicine1 not only to assuage the disease1 but to awake the sense4 ,and if it be said that the cure of men's minds belongeth to sacred divinity1 it is most true2 but yet moral philosophy may be preferred unto her as a wise servant and humble handmaid4 ,for as the ,psalm saith1 8,that the eyes of the handmaid look perpetually towards the mistress10 and yet no doubt many things are left to the discretion of the handmaid to discern of the mistress' will2 so ought moral philosophy to give a constant attention to the doctrines of divinity1 and yet so as it may yield of herself 7within due limits7 many sound and profitable directions4 7#b7 ,this part1 therefore1 because of the excellency thereof1 ,i cannot but find exceeding strange that it is not reduced to written inquiry2 the rather1 because it consisteth of much matter1 wherein both speech and action is often conversant2 and such wherein the common talk of men 7which is rare1 but yet cometh sometimes to pass7 is wiser than their books4 ,it is reasonable1 therefore1 that we propound it in the more particularity1 both for the worthiness1 and because we may acquit ourselves for reporting it deficient1 which seemeth almost incredible1 and is otherwise conceived and presupposed by those themselves that have written4 ,we will1 therefore1 enumerate some heads or points thereof1 that it may appear the better what it is1 and whether it be extant4 7#c7 ,first1 therefore1 in this1 as in all things which are practical we ought to cast up our account1 what is in our power1 and what not2 for the one may be dealt with by way of alteration1 but the other by way of application only4 ,the husbandman cannot command neither the nature of the earth nor the seasons of the weather2 no more can the physician the constitution of the patient nor the variety of accidents4 ,so in the culture and cure of the mind of man1 two things are without our command3 points of ,nature1 and points of fortune4 ,for to the basis of the one1 and the conditions of the other1 our work is limited and tied4 ,in these things1 therefore1 it is left unto us to proceed by application3-- 8,vincenda est omnis fertuna ferendo30 and so likewise1 8,vincenda est omnis ,natura ferendo40 ,but when that we speak of suffering1 we do not speak of a dull and neglected suffering1 but of a wise and industrious suffering1 which draweth and contriveth use and advantage out of that which seemeth adverse and contrary2 which is that properly which we call accommodating or applying4 ,now the wisdom of application resteth principally in the exact and distinct knowledge of the precedent state or disposition1 unto which we do apply2 for we cannot fit a garment except we first take measure of the body4 7#d7 ,so1 then1 the first article of this knowledge is to set down sound and true distributions and descriptions of the several characters and tempers of men's natures and dispositions1 specially having regard to those differences which are most radical in being the fountains and causes of the rest1 or most frequent in concurrence or commixture2 wherein it is not the handling of a few of them in passage1 the better to describe the mediocrities of virtues1 that can satisfy this intention4 ,for if it deserve to be considered1 that there are minds which are proportioned to great matters1 and others to small 7which ,aristotle handleth1 or ought to have bandied1 by the name of magnanimity71 doth it not deserve as well to be considered that there are minds proportioned to intend many matters1 and others to few8 ,so that some can divide themselves3 others can perchance do exactly well1 but it must be but in few things at once2 and so there cometh to be a narrowness of mind1 as well as a pusillanimity4 ,and again1 that some minds are proportioned to that which may be dispatched at once1 or within a short return of time2 others to that which begins afar off1 and is to be won with length of pursuit3-- 8,jam tum tenditqus fovetque40 ,so that there may be fitly said to be a longanimity1 which is commonly also ascribed to ,god as a magnanimity4 ,so further deserved it to be considered by ,aristotle1 8,that there is a disposition in conversation 7supposing it in things which do in no sort touch or concern a man's self7 to soothe and please1 and a disposition contrary to contradict and cross20 and deserveth it not much better to be considered4 8,that there is a disposition1 not in conversation or talk1 but in matter of more serious nature 7and supposing it still in things merely indifferent71 to take pleasure in the good of another2 and a disposition contrariwise1 to take distaste at the good of another80 which is that properly which we call good nature or ill nature1 benignity or malignity2 and1 therefore1 ,i cannot sufficiently marvel that this part of knowledge1 touching the several characters of natures and dispositions1 should be omitted both in morality and policy1 considering it is of so great ministry and suppeditation to them both4 ,a man shall find in the traditions of astrology some pretty and apt divisions of men's natures1 according to the predominances of the planets3 lovers of quiet1 lovers of action1 lovers of victory1 lovers of honour1 lovers of pleasure1 lovers of arts1 lovers of change1 and so forth4 ,a man shall find in the wisest sort of these relations which the ,italians make touching conclaves1 the natures of the several cardinals handsomely and lively painted forth4 ,a man shall meet with in every day's conference the denominations of sensitive1 dry1 formal1 real1 humorous1 certain1 huomo di prima impressione1 huomo di ultima impressione1 and the like2 and yet1 nevertheless1 this kind of observations wandereth in words1 but is not fixed in inquiry4 ,for the distinctions are found 7many of them71 but we conclude no precepts upon them3 wherein our fault is the greater1 because both history1 poesy1 and daily experience are as goodly fields where these observations grow2 whereof we make a few posies to hold in our hands1 but no man bringeth them to the confectionary that receipts might be made of them for use of life4 7#e7 ,of much like kind are those impressions of ,nature1 which are imposed upon the mind by the sex1 by the age1 by the region1 by health and sickness1 by beauty and deformity1 and the like1 which are inherent and not extern2 and again1 those which are caused by extern fortune1 as sovereignty1 nobility1 obscure birth1 riches1 want1 magistracy1 privateness1 prosperity1 adversity1 constant fortune1 variable fortune1 rising per saltum1 per gradus1 and the like4 ,and1 therefore1 we see that ,plautus maketh it a wonder to see an old man beneficent1 benignitas hujis ut adolescentuli est4 ,saint ,paul concludeth that severity of discipline was to be used to the ,cretans1 increpa eos dure1 upon the disposition of their country1 ,cretensus semper mendaces1 mal besti1 ventres4 ,sallust noteth that it is usual with kings to desire contradictories3 ,sed plerumque regi voluntates1 ut vehementes sunt1 sic mobiles1 speque ips sibi advers4 ,tacitus observeth how rarely raising of the fortune mendeth the disposition3 solus ,vespasianus mutatus in melius4 ,pindarus maketh an observation1 that great and sudden fortune for the most part defeateth men qui magnam felicitatem concoquere non possunt4 ,so the ,psalm showeth it is more easy to keep a measure in the enjoying of fortune1 than in the increase of fortune2 ,diviti si affluant1 nolite cor apponere4 ,these observations and the like ,i deny not but are touched a little by ,aristotle as in passage in his ,rhetorics1 and are handled in some scattered discourses2 but they were never incorporate into moral philosophy1 to which they do essentially appertain2 as the knowledge of this diversity of grounds and moulds doth to agriculture1 and the knowledge of the diversity of complexions and constitutions doth to the physician1 except we mean to follow the indiscretion of empirics1 which minister the same medicines to all patients4 7#f7 ,another article of this knowledge is the inquiry touching the affections2 for as in medicining of the body1 it is in order first to know the divers complexions and constitutions2 secondly1 the diseases2 and lastly1 the cures3 so in medicining of the mind1 after knowledge of the divers characters of men's natures1 it followeth in order to know the diseases and infirmities of the mind1 which are no other than the perturbations and distempars of the affections4 ,for as the ancient politiques in popular estates were wont to compare the people to the sea1 and the orators to the winds2 because as the sea would of itself be calm and quiet1 if the winds did not move and trouble it2 so the people would be peaceable and tractable if the seditious orators did not set them in working and agitation3 so it may be fitly said1 that the mind in the nature thereof would be temperate and stayed1 if the affections1 as winds1 did not put it into tumult and perturbation4 ,and here again ,i find strange1 as before1 that ,aristotle should have written divers volumes of ,ethics1 and never handled the affections which is the principal subject thereof2 and yet in his ,rhetorics1 where they are considered but collaterally and in a second degree 7as they may be moved by speech71 he findeth place for them1 and handleth them well for the quantity2 but where their true place is he pretermitteth them4 ,for it is not his disputations about pleasure and pain that can satisfy this inquiry1 no more than he that should generally handle the nature of light can be said to handle the nature of colours2 for pleasure and pain are to the particular affections as light is to particular colours4 ,better travails1 ,i suppose1 had the ,stoics taken in this argument1 as far as ,i can gather by that which we have at second hand4 ,but yet it is like it was after their manner1 rather in subtlety of definitions 7which in a subject of this nature are but curiosities71 than in active and ample descriptions and observations4 ,so likewise ,i find some particular writings of an elegant nature1 touching some of the affections3 as of anger1 of comfort upon adverse accidents1 of tenderness of countenance1 and other4 ,but the poets and writers of histories are the best doctors of this knowledge2 where we may find painted forth1 with great life1 how affections are kindled and incited2 and how pacified and refrained2 and how again contained from act and further degree2 how they disclose themselves2 how they work2 how they vary2 how they gather and fortify3 how they are enwrapped one within another2 and how they do fight and encounter one with another2 and other the like particularities4 ,amongst the which this last is of special use in moral and civil matters2 how1 ,i say1 to set affection against affection1 and to master one by another2 even as we used to hunt beast with beast1 and fly bird with bird1 which otherwise percase we could not so easily recover3 upon which foundation is erected that excellent use of prmium and pna1 whereby civil states consist3 employing the predominant affections of fear and hope1 for the suppressing and bridling the rest4 ,for as in the government of states it is sometimes necessary to bridle one faction with another1 so it is in the government within4 7#g7 ,now come we to those points which are within our own command1 and have force and operation upon the mind1 to affect the will and appetite1 and to alter manners3 wherein they ought to have handled custom1 exercise1 habit1 education1 example1 imitation1 emulation1 company1 friends1 praise1 reproof1 exhortation1 fame1 laws1 books1 studies3 these as they have determinate use in moralities1 from these the mind suffereth1 and of these are such receipts and regiments compounded and described1 as may serve to recover or preserve the health and good estate of the mind1 as far as pertaineth to human medicine3 of which number we will insist upon some one or two1 as an example of the rest1 because it were too long to prosecute all2 and therefore we do resume custom and habit to speak of4 7#h7 ,the opinion of ,aristotle seemeth to me a negligent opinion1 that of those things which consist by ,nature1 nothing can be changed by custom2 using for example1 that if a stone be thrown ten thousand times up it will not learn to ascend2 and that by often seeing or hearing we do not learn to see or hear the better4 ,for though this principle be true in things wherein ,nature is peremptory 7the reason whereof we cannot now stand to discuss71 yet it is otherwise in things wherein ,nature admitteth a latitude4 ,for he might see that a strait glove will come more easily on with use2 and that a wand will by use bend otherwise than it grew2 and that by use of the voice we speak louder and stronger2 and that by use of enduring heat or cold we endure it the better1 and the like3 which latter sort have a nearer resemblance unto that subject of manners he handleth1 than those instances which he allegeth4 ,but allowing his conclusion1 that virtues and vices consist in habit1 he ought so much the more to have taught the manner of superinducing that habit3 for there be many precepts of the wise ordering the exercises of the mind1 as there is of ordering the exercises of the body1 whereof we will recite a few4 7#i7 ,the first shall be1 that we beware we take not at the first either too high a strain or too weak3 for if too high1 in a diffident nature you discourage1 in a confident nature you breed an opinion of facility1 and so a sloth2 and in all natures you breed a further expectation than can hold out1 and so an insatisfaction in the end3 if too weak1 of the other side1 you may not look to perform and overcome any great task4 7#aj7 ,another precept is to practise all things chiefly at two several times1 the one when the mind is best disposed1 the other when it is worst disposed2 that by the one you may gain a great step1 by the other you may work out the knots and stonds of the mind1 and make the middle times the more easy and pleasant4 7#aa7 ,another precept is that which ,aristotle mentioneth by the way1 which is to bear ever towards the contrary extreme of that whereunto we are by nature inclined2 like unto the rowing against the stream1 or making a wand straight by bending him contrary to his natural crookedness4 7#ab7 ,another precept is that the mind is brought to anything better1 and with more sweetness and happiness1 if that whereunto you pretend be not first in the intention1 but tanquam aliud agendo1 because of the natural hatred of the mind against necessity and constraint4 ,many other axioms there are touching the managing of exercise and custom1 which being so conducted doth prove indeed another nature2 but1 being governed by chance1 doth commonly prove but an ape of ,nature1 and bringeth forth that which is lame and counterfeit4 7#ac7 ,so if we should handle books and studies1 and what influence and operation they have upon manners1 are there not divers precepts of great caution and direction appertaining thereunto8 ,did not one of the fathers in great indignation call poesy vinum dmonum1 because it increaseth temptations1 perturbations1 and vain opinions8 ,is not the opinion of ,aristotle worthy to be regarded1 wherein he saith1 8,that young men are no fit auditors of moral philosophy1 because they are not settled from the boiling heat of their affections1 nor attempered with time and experience08 ,and doth it not hereof come1 that those excellent books and discourses of the ancient writers 7whereby they have persuaded unto virtue most effectually1 by representing her in state and majesty1 and popular opinions against virtue in their parasites' coats fit to be scorned and derided71 are of so little effect towards honesty of life1 because they are not read and revolved by men in their mature and settled years1 but confined almost to boys and beginners8 ,but is it not true also1 that much less young men are fit auditors of matters of policy1 till they have been thoroughly seasoned in religion and morality2 lest their judgments be corrupted1 and made apt to think that there are no true differences of things1 but according to utility and fortune1 as the verse describes it1 ,prosperum et felix scelus virtus vocatur2 and again1 ,ille crucem pretium sceleris tulit1 hic diadema3 which the poets do speak satirically and in indignation on virtue's behalf2 but books of policy do speak it seriously and positively2 for so it pleaseth ,machiavel to say1 8,that if ,csar had been overthrown1 he would have been more odious than ever was ,catiline20 as if there had been no difference1 but in fortune1 between a very fury of lust and blood1 and the most excellent spirit 7his ambition reserved7 of the world8 ,again1 is there not a caution likewise to be given of the doctrines of moralities themselves 7some kinds of them71 lest they make men too precise1 arrogant1 incompatible2 as ,cicero saith of ,cato1 ,in ,marco ,catone hc bona qu videmus divina et egregia1 ipsius scitote esse propria2 qu nonunquam requirimus ea sunt omnia non a natura1 sed a magistro8 ,many other axioms and advices there are touching those proprieties and effects1 which studies do infuse and instil into manners4 ,and so1 likewise1 is there touching the use of all those other points1 of company1 fame1 laws1 and the rest1 which we recited in the beginning in the doctrine of morality4 7#ad7 ,but there is a kind of culture of the mind that seemeth yet more accurate and elaborate than the rest1 and is built upon this ground2 that the minds of all men are at some times in a state more perfect1 and at other times in a state more depraved4 ,the purpose1 therefore1 of this practice is to fix and cherish the good hours of the mind1 and to obliterate and take forth the evil4 ,the fixing of the good hath been practised by two means1 vows or constant resolutions1 and observances or exercises2 which are not to be regarded so much in themselves1 as because they keep the mind in continual obedience4 ,the obliteration of the evil hath been practised by two means1 some kind of redemption or expiation of that which is past1 and an inception or account de novo for the time to come4 ,but this part seemeth sacred and religious1 and justly2 for all good moral philosophy 7as was said7 is but a handmaid to religion4 7#ae7 ,wherefore we will conclude with that last point1 which is of all other means the most compendious and summary1 and again1 the most noble and effectual to the reducing of the mind unto virtue and good estate2 which is1 the electing and propounding unto a man's self good and virtuous ends of his life1 such as may be in a reasonable sort within his compass to attain4 ,for if these two things be supposed1 that a man set before him honest and good ends1 and again1 that he be resolute1 constant1 and true unto them2 it will follow that he shall mould himself into all virtue at once4 ,and this indeed is like the work of nature2 whereas the other course is like the work of the hand4 ,for as when a carver makes an image1 he shapes only that part whereupon he worketh2 as if he be upon the face1 that part which shall be the body is but a rude stone still1 till such times as he comes to it4 ,but contrariwise when nature makes a flower or living creature1 she formeth rudiments of all the parts at one time4 ,so in obtaining virtue by habit1 while a man practiseth temperance1 he doth not profit much to fortitude1 nor the like but when he dedicateth and applieth himself to good ends1 look1 what virtue soever the pursuit and passage towards those ends doth commend unto him1 he is invested of a precedent disposition to conform himself thereunto4 ,which state of mind ,aristotle doth excellently express himself1 that it ought not to be called virtuous1 but divine4 ,his words are these3 ,immanitati autem consentaneum est opponere eam1 qu supra humanitatem est1 heroicam sive divinam virtutem2 and a little after1 ,nam ut fer neque vitium neque virtus est1 swic neque ,dei3 sed hic quidem status altius quiddam virtute est1 ille aluid quiddam a vitio4 ,and therefore we may see what celsitude of honour ,plinius ,secundus attributeth to ,trajan in his funeral oration1 where he said1 8,that men needed to make no other prayers to the gods1 but that they would continue as good lords to them as ,trajan had been20 as if he had not been only an imitation of divine nature1 but a pattern of it4 ,but these be heathen and profane passages1 having but a shadow of that divine state of mind1 which religion and the holy faith doth conduct men unto1 by imprinting upon their souls charity1 which is excellently called the bond of perfection1 because it comprehendeth and fasteneth all virtues together4 ,and as it is elegantly said by ,menander of vain love1 which is but a false imitation of divine love1 ,amor melior ,sophista lvo ad humanam vitam--that love teacheth a man to carry himself better than the sophist or preceptor2 which he calleth left-handed1 because1 with all his rules and preceptions1 he cannot form a man so dexterously1 nor with that facility to prize himself and govern himself1 as love can do3 so certainly1 if a man's mind be truly inflamed with charity1 it doth work him suddenly into greater perfection than all the doctrine of morality can do1 which is but a sophist in comparison of the other4 ,nay1 further1 as ,xenophon observed truly1 that all other affections1 though they raise the mind1 yet they do it by distorting and uncomeliness of ecstasies or excesses2 but only love doth exalt the mind1 and nevertheless at the same instant doth settle and compose it3 so in all other excellences1 though they advance nature1 yet they are subject to excess4 ,only charity admitteth no excess4 ,for so we see1 aspiring to be like ,god in power1 the angels transgressed and fell2 ,ascendam1 et ero similis altissimo3 by aspiring to be like ,god in knowledge1 man transgressed and fell2 ,eritis sicut ,dii1 scientes bonum et malum3 but by aspiring to a similitude of ,god in goodness or love1 neither man nor angel ever transgressed1 or shall transgress4 ,for unto that imitation we are called3 ,diligite inimicos vestros1 benefacite eis qui oderunt vos1 et orate pro persequentibus et calumniantibus vos1 ut sitis filii ,patris vestri qui in clis est1 qui solem suum oriri facit super bonos et malos1 et pluit super justos et injustos4 ,so in the first platform of the divine nature itself1 the heathen religion speaketh thus1 ,optimus ,maximus3 and the sacred ,scriptures thus1 ,miscericordia ejus super omnia opera ejus4 7#af7 ,wherefore ,i do conclude this part of moral knowledge1 concerning the culture and regiment of the mind2 wherein if any man1 considering the arts thereof which ,i have enumerated1 do judge that my labour is but to collect into an art or science that which hath been pretermitted by others1 as matter of common sense and experience1 he judgeth well4 ,but as ,philocrates sported with ,demosthenes1 8,you may not marvel 7,athenians7 that ,demosthenes and ,i do differ2 for he drinketh water1 and ,i drink wine20 and like as we read of an ancient parable of the two gates of sleep-- 8,sunt gemin somni port3 quarum altera fertur ,cornea1 qua veris facilis datur exitus umbris3 ,altera candenti perfecta nitens elephanto1 ,sed falsa ad clum mittunt insomnia manes30 so if we put on sobriety and attention1 we shall find it a sure maxim in knowledge1 that the more pleasant liquor 78of wine07 is the more vaporous1 and the braver gate 78of ivory07 sendeth forth the falser dreams4 7#ag7 ,but we have now concluded that general part of human philosophy1 which contemplateth man segregate1 and as he consisteth of body and spirit4 ,wherein we may further note1 that there seemeth to be a relation or conformity between the good of the mind and the good of the body4 ,for as we divided the good of the body into health1 beauty1 strength1 and pleasure1 so the good of the mind1 inquired in rational and moral knowledges1 tendeth to this1 to make the mind sound1 and without perturbation2 beautiful1 and graced with decency2 and strong and agile for all duties of life4 ,these three1 as in the body1 so in the mind1 seldom meet1 and commonly sever4 ,for it is easy to observe1 that many have strength of wit and courage1 but have neither health from perturbations1 nor any beauty or decency in their doings2 some again have an elegancy and fineness of carriage which have neither soundness of honesty nor substance of sufficiency2 and some again have honest and reformed minds1 that can neither become themselves nor manage business2 and sometimes two of them meet1 and rarely all three4 ,as for pleasure1 we have likewise determined that the mind ought not to be reduced to stupid1 but to retain pleasure2 confined rather in the subject of it1 than in the strength and vigour of it4 ,,xxiii4 7#a7 ,civil knowledge is conversant about a subject which of all others is most immersed in matter1 and hardliest reduced to axiom4 ,nevertheless1 as ,cato the ,censor said1 8,that the ,romans were like sheep1 for that a man were better drive a flock of them1 than one of them2 for in a flock1 if you could get but some few go right1 the rest would follow30 so in that respect moral philosophy is more difficile than policy4 ,again1 moral philosophy propoundeth to itself the framing of internal goodness2 but civil knowledge requireth only an external goodness2 for that as to society sufficeth4 ,and therefore it cometh oft to pass that there be evil times in good governments3 for so we find in the ,holy story1 when the kings were good1 yet it is added1 ,sed adhuc poulus non direxerat cor suum ad ,dominum ,deum patrum suorum4 ,again1 states1 as great engines1 move slowly1 and are not so soon put out of frame3 for as in ,egypt the seven good years sustained the seven bad1 so governments for a time well grounded do bear out errors following2 but the resolution of particular persons is more suddenly subverted4 ,these respects do somewhat qualify the extreme difficulty of civil knowledge4 7#b7 ,this knowledge hath three parts1 according to the three summary actions of society2 which are conversation1 negotiation1 and government4 ,for man seeketh in society comfort1 use1 and protection2 and they be three wisdoms of divers natures which do often sever--wisdom of the behaviour1 wisdom of business1 and wisdom of state4 7#c7 ,the wisdom of conversation ought not to be over much affected1 but much less despised2 for it hath not only an honour in itself1 but an influence also into business and government4 ,the poet saith1 ,nec vultu destrue verba tuo3 a man may destroy the force of his words with his countenance2 so may he of his deeds1 saith ,cicero1 recommending to his brother affability and easy access2 ,nil interest habere ostium apertum1 vultum clausum3 it is nothing won to admit men with an open door1 and to receive them with a shut and reserved countenance4 ,so we see ,atticus1 before the first interview between ,csar and ,cicero1 the war depending1 did seriously advise ,cicero touching the composing and ordering of his countenance and gesture4 ,and if the government of the countenance be of such effect1 much more is that of the speech1 and other carriage appertaining to conversation2 the true model whereof seemeth to me well expressed by ,livy1 though not meant for this purpose3 ,ne aut arrogans videar1 aut obnoxius2 quorum alterum est lien libertatis obliti1 alterum su3 the sum of behaviour is to retain a man's own dignity1 without intruding upon the liberty of others4 ,on the other side1 if behaviour and outward carriage be intended too much1 first it may pass into affectation1 and then ,quid deformius quam scenam in vitam transferre--to act a man's life8 ,but although it proceed not to that extreme1 yet it consumeth time1 and employeth the mind too much4 ,and therefore as we use to advise young students from company keeping1 by saying1 ,amici fures temporis3 so certainly the intending of the discretion of behaviour is a great thief of meditation4 ,again1 such as are accomplished in that form of urbanity please themselves in it1 and seldom aspire to higher virtue2 whereas those that have defect in it do seek comeliness by reputation2 for where reputation is1 almost everything becometh2 but where that is not1 it must be supplied by puntos and compliments4 ,again1 there is no greater impediment of action than an over-curious observance of decency1 and the guide of decency1 which is time and season4 ,for as ,solomon saith1 ,qui respicit ad ventos1 non seminat2 et qui respicit ad nubes1 non metet3 a man must make his opportunity1 as oft as find it4 ,to conclude1 behaviour seemeth to me as a garment of the mind1 and to have the conditions of a garment4 ,for it ought to be made in fashion2 it ought not to be too curious2 it ought to be shaped so as to set forth any good making of the mind and hide any deformity2 and above all1 it ought not to be too strait or restrained for exercise or motion4 ,but this part of civil knowledge hath been elegantly handled1 and therefore ,i cannot report it for deficient4 7#d7 ,the wisdom touching negotiation or business hath not been hitherto collected into writing1 to the great derogation of learning and the professors of learning4 ,for from this root springeth chiefly that note or opinion1 which by us is expressed in adage to this effect1 that there is no great concurrence between learning and wisdom4 ,for of the three wisdoms which we have set down to pertain to civil life1 for wisdom of behaviour1 it is by learned men for the most part despised1 as an inferior to virtue and an enemy to meditation2 for wisdom of government1 they acquit themselves well when they are called to it1 but that happeneth to few2 but for the wisdom of business1 wherein man's life is most conversant1 there be no books of it1 except some few scattered advertisements1 that have no proportion to the magnitude of this subject4 ,for if books were written of this as the other1 ,i doubt not but learned men with mean experience would far excel men of long experience without learning1 and outshoot them in their own bow4 7#e7 ,neither needeth it at all to be doubted1 that this knowledge should be so variable as it falleth not under precept2 for it is much less infinite than science of government1 which we see is laboured and in some part reduced4 ,of this wisdom it seemeth some of the ancient ,romans in the saddest and wisest times were professors2 for ,cicero reporteth1 that it was then in use for senators that had name and opinion for general wise men1 as ,coruncanius1 ,curius1 ,llius1 and many others1 to walk at certain hours in the ,place1 and to give audience to those that would use their advice2 and that the particular citizens would resort unto them1 and consult with them of the marriage of a daughter1 or of the employing of a son1 or of a purchase or bargain1 or of an accusation1 and every other occasion incident to man's life4 ,so as there is a wisdom of counsel and advice even in private causes1 arising out of a universal insight into the affairs of the world2 which is used indeed upon particular causes propounded1 but is gathered by general observation of causes of like nature4 ,for so we see in the book which ,q4 ,cicero writeth to his brother1 ,de petitione consulatus 7being the only book of business that ,i know written by the ancients71 although it concerned a particular action then on foot1 yet the substance thereof consisteth of many wise and politic axioms1 which contain not a temporary1 but a perpetual direction in the case of popular elections4 ,but chiefly we may see in those aphorisms which have place amongst divine writings1 composed by ,solomon the king1 of whom the ,scriptures testify that his heart was as the sands of the sea1 encompassing the world and all worldly matters1 we see1 ,i say1 not a few profound and excellent cautions1 precepts1 positions1 extending to much variety of occasions2 whereupon we will stay a while1 offering to consideration some number of examples4 7#f7 ,sed et cunctis sermonibus qui dicuntur ne accommodes aurem tuam1 ne forte audias servum tuum maledicentem tibi4 ,here is commended the provident stay of inquiry of that which we would be loth to find3 as it was judged great wisdom in ,pompeius ,magnus that he burned ,sertorius' papers unperused4 ,vir sapiens1 si cum stulto contenderit1 sive irascatur1 sive rideat1 non inveniet requiem4 ,here is described the great disadvantage which a wise man hath in undertaking a lighter person than himself2 which is such an engagement as1 whether a man turn the matter to jest1 or turn it to heat1 or howsoever he change copy1 he can no ways quit himself well of it4 ,qui delicate a pueritia nutrit servum suum1 postea sentiet eum contumacem4 ,here is signified1 that if a man begin too high a pitch in his favours1 it doth commonly end in unkindness and unthankfulness4 ,vidisti virum velocem in opere suo8 coram regibus stabit1 nec erit inter ignobiles4 ,here is observed1 that of all virtues for rising to honour1 quickness of despatch is the best2 for superiors many times love not to have those they employ too deep or too sufficient1 but ready and diligent4 ,vidi cunctos viventes qui ambulant sub sole1 cum adolescente secundo qui consurgit pro eo4 ,here is expressed that which was noted by ,sylla first1 and after him by ,tiberius4 ,plures adorant solem orientem quam occidentem vel meridianum4 ,si spiritus potestatem habentis ascenderit super te1 locum tuum ne demiseris2 quia curatio faciet cessare peccata maxima4 ,here caution is given1 that upon displeasure1 retiring is of all courses the unfittest2 for a man leaveth things at worst1 and depriveth himself of means to make them better4 ,erat civitas parva1 et pauci in ea viri3 venit contra eam rex magnus1 et vallavit eam1 instruxitque munitones per gyrum1 et perfecta est obsidio2 inventusque est in ea vir pauper et sapiens1 et liberavit eam per sapientiam suam2 et nullus deinceps recordatus est huminis illius pauperis4 ,here the corruption of states is set forth1 that esteem not virtue or merit longer than they have use of it4 ,millis responsio frangit iram4 ,here is noted that silence or rough answer exasperateth2 but an answer present and temperate pacifieth4 ,iter pigrorum quasi sepes spinarum4 ,here is lively represented how laborious sloth proveth in the end2 for when things are deferred till the last instant1 and nothing prepared beforehand1 every step findeth a briar or impediment1 which catcheth or stoppeth4 ,melior est finis orationis quam principium4 ,here is taxed the vanity of formal speakers1 that study more about prefaces and inducements1 than upon the conclusions and issues of speech4 ,qui cognoscit in judicio faciem1 non bene facit2 iste et pro buccella panis deseret veritatem4 ,here is noted1 that a judge were better be a briber than a respecter of persons2 for a corrupt judge offendeth not so lightly as a facile4 ,vir pauper calumnians pauperes simils est imbri vehementi1 in quo paratur fames4 ,here is expressed the extremity of necessitous extortions1 figured in the ancient fable of the full and the hungry horseleech4 ,fons turbatus pede1 et vena corrupta1 est justus cadens coram impio4 ,here is noted1 that one judicial and exemplar iniquity in the face of the world doth trouble the fountains of justice more than many particular injuries passed over by connivance4 ,qui subtrahit aliquid a patre et a matre1 et dicit hoc non esse peccatum1 particeps est homicidii4 ,here is noted that1 whereas men in wronging their best friends use to extenuate their fault1 as if they might presume or be bold upon them1 it doth contrariwise indeed aggravate their fault1 and turneth it from injury to impiety4 ,noli esse amicus homini iracundo1 nec ambulato cum homine furioso4 ,here caution is given1 that in the election of our friends we do principally avoid those which are impatient1 as those that will espouse us to many factions and quarrels4 ,qui conturbat domum suam1 possidebit ventum4 ,here is noted1 that in domestical separations and breaches men do promise to themselves quieting of their mind and contentment2 but still they are deceived of their expectation1 and it turneth to wind4 ,filius sapiens ltificat patrem3 filius vero stultus mstitia est matri su4 ,here is distinguished1 that fathers have most comfort of the good proof of their sons2 but mothers have most discomfort of their ill proof1 because women have little discerning of virtue1 but of fortune4 ,qui celat delictum1 qurit amicitiam2 sed qui altero sermone repetit1 separat fderatos4 ,here caution is given1 that reconcilement is better managed by an amnesty1 and passing over that which is past1 than by apologies and excuses4 ,in omni opere bono erit abundantia2 ubi autem verba sunt plurima1 ibi frequenter egestas4 ,here is noted1 that words and discourse aboundeth most where there is idleness and want4 ,primus in sua causa justus3 sed venit altera pars1 et inquiret in eum4 ,here is observed1 that in all causes the first tale possesseth much2 in sort1 that the prejudice thereby wrought will be hardly removed1 except some abuse or falsity in the information be detected4 ,verba bilinguis quasi simplicia1 et ipsa perveniunt ad interiora ventris4 ,here is distinguished1 that flattery and insinuation1 which seemeth set and artificial1 sinketh not far2 but that entereth deep which hath show of nature1 liberty1 and simplicity4 ,qui erudit derisorem1 ipse sibi injuriam facit2 et qui arguit impium1 sibi maculam generat4 ,here caution is given how we tender reprehension to arrogant and scornful natures1 whose manner is to esteem it for contumely1 and accordingly to return it4 ,da sapienti occasionem1 et addetur ei sapientia4 ,here is distinguished the wisdom brought into habit1 and that which is but verbal and swimming only in conceit2 for the one upon the occasion presented is quickened and redoubled1 the other is amazed and confused4 ,quomodo in aquis resplendent vultus prospicientium1 sic corda hominum manifesta sunt prudentibus4 ,here the mind of a wise man is compared to a glass1 wherein the images of all diversity of natures and customs are represented2 from which representation proceedeth that application1 8,qui sapit1 innumeris moribus aptus erit40 7#g7 ,thus have ,i stayed somewhat longer upon these sentences politic of ,solomon than is agreeable to the proportion of an example2 led with a desire to give authority to this part of knowledge1 which ,i noted as deficient1 by so excellent a precedent2 and have also attended them with brief observations1 such as to my understanding offer no violence to the sense1 though ,i know they may be applied to a more divine use3 but it is allowed1 even in divinity1 that some interpretations1 yea1 and some writings1 have more of the eagle than others2 but taking them as instructions for life1 they might have received large discourse1 if ,i would have broken them and illustrated them by deducements and examples4 7#h7 ,neither was this in use only with the ,hebrews1 but it is generally to be found in the wisdom of the more ancient times2 that as men found out any observation that they thought was good for life1 they would gather it and express it in parable or aphorism or fable4 ,but for fables1 they were vicegerents and supplies where examples failed3 now that the times abound with history1 the aim is better when the mark is alive4 ,and therefore the form of writing which of all others is fittest for this variable argument of negotiation and occasions is that which ,machiavel chose wisely and aptly for government2 namely1 discourse upon histories or examples4 ,for knowledge drawn freshly and in our view out of particulars1 knoweth the way best to particulars again4 ,and it hath much greater life for practice when the discourse attendeth upon the example1 than when the example attendeth upon the discourse4 ,for this is no point of order1 as it seemeth at first1 but of substance4 ,for when the example is the ground1 being set down in a history at large1 it is set down with all circumstances1 which may sometimes control the discourse thereupon made1 and sometimes supply it1 as a very pattern for action2 whereas the examples alleged for the discourse's sake are cited succinctly1 and without particularity1 and carry a servile aspect towards the discourse which they are brought in to make good4 7#i7 ,but this difference is not amiss to be remembered1 that as history of times is the best ground for discourse of government1 such as ,machiavel handleth1 so histories of lives is the most popular for discourse of business1 because it is more conversant in private actions4 ,nay1 there is a ground of discourse for this purpose fitter than them both1 which is discourse upon letters1 such as are wise and weighty1 as many are of ,cicero ad ,atticum1 and others4 ,for letters have a great and more particular representation of business than either chronicles or lives4 ,thus have we spoken both of the matter and form of this part of civil knowledge1 touching negotiation1 which we note to be deficient4 7#aj7 ,but yet there is another part of this part1 which differeth as much from that whereof we have spoken as sapere and sibi sapere1 the one moving as it were to the circumference1 the other to the centre4 ,for there is a wisdom of counsel1 and again there is a wisdom of pressing a man's own fortune2 and they do sometimes meet1 and often sever4 ,for many are wise in their own ways that are weak for government or counsel2 like ants1 which is a wise creature for itself1 but very hurtful for the garden4 ,this wisdom the ,romans did take much knowledge of3 ,nam pol sapiens 7saith the comical poet7 fingit fortunam sibi2 and it grew to an adage1 ,faber quisque fortun propri2 and ,livy attributed it to ,cato the first1 ,in hoc viro tanta vis animi et ingenii inerat1 ut quocunque loco natus esset sibi ipse fortunam facturus videretur4 7#aa7 ,this conceit or position1 if it be too much declared and professed1 hath been thought a thing impolitic and unlucky1 as was observed in ,timotheus the ,athenian1 who1 having done many great services to the state in his government1 and giving an account thereof to the people as the manner was1 did conclude every particular with this clause1 8,and in this fortune had no part40 ,and it came so to pass1 that he never prospered in anything he took in hand afterwards4 ,for this is too high and too arrogant1 savouring of that which ,ezekiel saith of ,pharaoh1 ,dicis1 ,fluvius est neus et ego feci memet ipsum2 or of that which another prophet speaketh1 that men offer sacrifices to their nets and snares2 and that which the poet expresseth1 8,dextra mihi ,deus1 et telum quod missile libro1 ,nunc adsint60 ,for these confidences were ever unhallowed1 and unblessed2 and1 therefore1 those that were great politiques indeed ever ascribed their successes to their felicity and not to their skill or virtue4 ,for so ,sylla surnamed himself ,felix1 not ,magnus4 ,so ,csar said to the master of the ship1 ,csarem portas et fortunam ejus4 7#ab7 ,but yet1 nevertheless1 these positions1 ,faber quisque fortun su3 ,sapiens dominabitur astris3 ,invia virtuti null est via1 and the like1 being taken and used as spurs to industry1 and not as stirrups to insolency1 rather for resolution than for the presumption or outward declaration1 have been ever thought sound and good2 and are no question imprinted in the greatest minds1 who are so sensible of this opinion as they can scarce contain it within4 ,as we see in ,augustus ,csar 7who was rather diverse from his uncle than inferior in virtue71 how when he died he desired his friends about him to give him a plaudite1 as if he were conscious to himself that he had played his part well upon the stage4 ,this part of knowledge we do report also as deficient2 not but that it is practised too much1 but it hath not been reduced to writing4 ,and1 therefore1 lest it should seem to any that it is not comprehensible by axiom1 it is requisite1 as we did in the former1 that we set down some heads or passages of it4 7#ac7 ,wherein it may appear at the first a new and unwonted argument to teach men how to raise and make their fortune2 a doctrine wherein every man perchance will be ready to yield himself a disciple1 till he see the difficulty3 for fortune layeth as heavy impositions as virtue2 and it is as hard and severe a thing to be a true politique1 as to be truly moral4 ,but the handling hereof concerneth learning greatly1 both in honour and in substance4 ,in honour1 because pragmatical men may not go away with an opinion that learning is like a lark1 that can mount and sing1 and please herself1 and nothing else2 but may know that she holdeth as well of the hawk1 that can soar aloft1 and can also descend and strike upon the prey4 ,in substance1 because it is the perfect law of inquiry of truth1 that nothing be in the globe of matter1 which should not be likewise in the globe of crystal or form2 that is1 that there be not anything in being and action which should not be drawn and collected into contemplation and doctrine4 ,neither doth learning admire or esteem of this architecture of fortune otherwise than as of an inferior work1 for no man's fortune can be an end worthy of his being1 and many times the worthiest men do abandon their fortune willingly for better respects3 but nevertheless fortune as an organ of virtue and merit deserveth the consideration4 7#ad7 ,first1 therefore1 the precept which ,i conceive to be most summary towards the prevailing in fortune1 is to obtain that window which ,momus did require2 who seeing in the frame of man's heart such angles and recesses1 found fault there was not a window to look into them2 that is1 to procure good informations of particulars touching persons1 their natures1 their desires and ends1 their customs and fashions1 their helps and advantages1 and whereby they chiefly stand1 so again their weaknesses and disadvantages1 and where they lie most open and obnoxious1 their friends1 factions1 dependences2 and again their opposites1 enviers1 competitors1 their moods and times1 ,sola viri molles aditus et tempora noras2 their principles1 rules1 and observations1 and the like3 and this not only of persons but of actions2 what are on foot from time to time1 and how they are conducted1 favoured1 opposed1 and how they import1 and the like4 ,for the knowledge of present actions is not only material in itself1 but without it also the knowledge of persons is very erroneous3 for men change with the actions2 and whilst they are in pursuit they are one1 and when they return to their nature they are another4 ,these informations of particulars1 touching persons and actions1 are as the minor propositions in every active syllogism2 for no excellency of observations 7which are as the major propositions7 can suffice to ground a conclusion1 if there be error and mistaking in the minors4 7#ae7 ,that this knowledge is possible1 ,solomon is our surety1 who saith1 ,consilium in corde viri tanquam aqua profunda2 sed vir prudens exhauriet illud4 ,and although the knowledge itself falleth not under precept because it is of individuals1 yet the instructions for the obtaining of it may4 7#af7 ,we will begin1 therefore1 with this precept1 according to the ancient opinion1 that the sinews of wisdom are slowness of belief and distrust2 that more trust be given to countenances and deeds than to words2 and in words rather to sudden passages and surprised words than to set and purposed words4 ,neither let that be feared which is said1 ,fronti nulla fides1 which is meant of a general outward behaviour1 and not of the private and subtle motions and labours of the countenance and gesture2 which1 as ,q4 ,cicero elegantly saith1 is ,animi janua1 8the gate of the mind40 ,none more close than ,tiberius1 and yet ,tacitus saith of ,gallus1 ,etenim vultu offensionem conjectaverat4 ,so again1 noting the differing character and manner of his commending ,germanicus and ,drusus in the ,senate1 he saith1 touching his fashion wherein he carried his speech of ,germanicus1 thus3 ,magis in speciem adornatis verbis1 quam ut penitus sentire crederetur2 but of ,drusus thus3 ,paucioribus sed intentior1 et fida oratione2 and in another place1 speaking of his character of speech when he did anything that was gracious and popular1 he saith1 8,that in other things he was velut eluctantium verborum20 but then again1 solutius loquebatur quando subveniret4 ,so that there is no such artificer of dissimulation1 nor no such commanded countenance 7vultus jussus71 that can sever from a feigned tale some of these fashions1 either a more slight and careless fashion1 or more set and formal1 or more tedious and wandering1 or coming from a man more drily and hardly4 7#ag7 ,neither are deeds such assured pledges as that they may be trusted without a judicious consideration of their magnitude and nature3 ,fraus sibi in parvis fidem prstruit ut majore emolumento fallat2 and the ,italian thinketh himself upon the point to be bought and sold1 when he is better used than he was wont to be without manifest cause4 ,for small favours1 they do but lull men to sleep1 both as to caution and as to industry2 and are1 as ,demosthenes calleth them1 ,alimenta socordi4 ,so again we see how false the nature of some deeds are1 in that particular which ,mutianus practised upon ,antonius ,primus1 upon that hollow and unfaithful reconcilement which was made between them2 whereupon ,mutianus advanced many of the friends of ,antonius1 ,simul amicis ejus prfecturas et tribunatus largitur3 wherein1 under pretence to strengthen him1 he did desolate him1 and won from him his dependents4 7#ah7 ,as for words1 though they be like waters to physicians1 full of flattery and uncertainty1 yet they are not to be despised specially with the advantage of passion and affection4 ,for so we see ,tiberius1 upon a stinging and incensing speech of ,agrippina1 came a step forth of his dissimulation when he said1 8,you are hurt because you do not reign20 of which ,tacitus saith1 ,audita hc raram occulti pectoris vocem elicuere3 correptamque ,grco versu admonuit1 ideo ldi quia non regnaret4 ,and1 therefore1 the poet doth elegantly call passions tortures that urge men to confess their secrets3-- 8,vino torus et ira40 ,and experience showeth there are few men so true to themselves and so settled but that1 sometimes upon heat1 sometimes upon bravery1 sometimes upon kindness1 sometimes upon trouble of mind and weakness1 they open themselves2 specially if they be put to it with a counter-dissimulation1 according to the proverb of ,spain1 ,di mentira1 y sacar as verdad3 8,tell a lie and find a truth40 7#ai7 ,as for the knowing of men which is at second hand from reports3 men's weaknesses and faults are best known from their enemies1 their virtues and abilities from their friends1 their customs and times from their servants1 their conceits and opinions from their familiar friends1 with whom they discourse most4 ,general fame is light1 and the opinions conceived by superiors or equals are deceitful2 for to such men are more masked3 ,verior fama e domesticis emanat4 7#bj7 ,but the soundest disclosing and expounding of men is by their natures and ends1 wherein the weakest sort of men are best interpreted by their natures1 and the wisest by their ends4 ,for it was both pleasantly and wisely said 7though ,i think very untruly7 by a nuncio of the ,pope1 returning from a certain nation where he served as lidger2 whose opinion being asked touching the appointment of one to go in his place1 he wished that in any case they did not send one that was too wise2 because no very wise man would ever imagine what they in that country were like to do4 ,and certainly it is an error frequent for men to shoot over1 and to suppose deeper ends and more compass reaches than are3 the ,italian proverb being elegant1 and for the most part true3-- 8,di danari1 di senno1 e di fede1 ,c' ne manco che non credi40 8,there is commonly less money1 less wisdom1 and less good faith than men do account upon40 7#ba7 ,but princes1 upon a far other reason1 are best interpreted by their natures1 and private persons by their ends4 ,for princes being at the top of human desires1 they have for the most part no particular ends whereto they aspire1 by distance from which a man might take measure and scale of the rest of their actions and desires2 which is one of the causes that maketh their hearts more inscrutable4 ,neither is it sufficient to inform ourselves in men's ends and natures of the variety of them only1 but also of the predominancy1 what humour reigneth most1 and what end is principally sought4 ,for so we see1 when ,tigellinus saw himself outstripped by ,petronius ,turpilianus in ,nero's humours of pleasures1 metus ejus rimatur1 he wrought upon ,nero's fears1 whereby he broke the other's neck4 7#bb7 ,but to all this part of inquiry the most compendious way resteth in three things2 the first1 to have general acquaintance and inwardness with those which have general acquaintance and look most into the world2 and specially according to the diversity of business1 and the diversity of persons1 to have privacy and conversation with some one friend at least which is perfect and well-intelligenced in every several kind4 ,the second is to keep a good mediocrity in liberty of speech and secrecy2 in most things liberty2 secrecy where it importeth2 for liberty of speech inviteth and provoketh liberty to be used again1 and so bringeth much to a man's knowledge2 and secrecy on the other side induceth trust and inwardness4 ,the last is the reducing of a man's self to this watchful and serene habit1 as to make account and purpose1 in every conference and action1 as well to observe as to act4 ,for as ,epictetus would have a philosopher in every particular action to say to himself1 ,et hoc volo1 et etiam institutum servare2 so a politic man in everything should say to himself1 ,et hoc volo1 ac etiam aliquid addiscere4 ,i have stayed the longer upon this precept of obtaining good information because it is a main part by itself1 which answereth to all the rest4 ,but1 above all things1 caution must be taken that men have a good stay and hold of themselves1 and that this much knowing do not draw on much meddling2 for nothing is more unfortunate than light and rash intermeddling in many matters4 ,so that this variety of knowledge tendeth in conclusion but only to this1 to make a better and freer choice of those actions which may concern us1 and to conduct them with the less error and the more dexterity4 7#bc7 ,the second precept concerning this knowledge is1 for men to take good information touching their own person1 and well to understand themselves2 knowing that1 as ,st4 ,james saith1 though men look oft in a glass1 yet they do suddenly forget themselves2 wherein as the divine glass is the ,word of ,god1 so the politic glass is the state of the world1 or times wherein we live1 in the which we are to behold ourselves4 7#bd7 ,for men ought to take an impartial view of their own abilities and virtues2 and again of their wants and impediments2 accounting these with the most1 and those other with the least2 and from this view and examination to frame the considerations following4 7#be7 ,first1 to consider how the constitution of their nature sorteth with the general state of the times2 which if they find agreeable and fit1 then in all things to give themselves more scope and liberty2 but if differing and dissonant1 then in the whole course of their life to be more close retired1 and reserved2 as we see in ,tiberius1 who was never seen at a play1 and came not into the senate in twelve of his last years2 whereas ,augustus ,csar lived ever in men's eyes1 which ,tacitus observeth1 alia ,tiberio morum via4 7#bf7 ,secondly1 to consider how their nature sorteth with professions and courses of life1 and accordingly to make election1 if they be free2 and1 if engaged1 to make the departure at the first opportunity2 as we see was done by ,duke ,valentine1 that was designed by his father to a sacerdotal profession1 but quitted it soon after in regard of his parts and inclination2 being such1 nevertheless1 as a man cannot tell well whether they were worse for a prince or for a priest4 7#bg7 ,thirdly1 to consider how they sort with those whom they are like to have competitors and concurrents2 and to take that course wherein there is most solitude1 and themselves like to be most eminent2 as ,csar ,julius did1 who at first was an orator or pleader2 but when he saw the excellency of ,cicero1 ,hortensius1 ,catulus1 and others for eloquence1 and saw there was no man of reputation for the wars but ,pompeius1 upon whom the state was forced to rely1 he forsook his course begun towards a civil and popular greatness1 and transferred his designs to a martial greatness4 7#bh7 ,fourthly1 in the choice of their friends and dependents1 to proceed according to the composition of their own nature2 as we may see in ,csar1 all whose friends and followers were men active and effectual1 but not solemn1 or of reputation4 7#bi7 ,fifthly1 to take special heed how they guide themselves by examples1 in thinking they can do as they see others do2 whereas perhaps their natures and carriages are far differing4 ,in which error it seemeth ,pompey was1 of whom ,cicero saith that he was wont often to say1 ,sylla potuit1 ego non potero8 ,wherein he was much abused1 the natures and proceedings of himself and his example being the unlikest in the world2 the one being fierce1 violent1 and pressing the fact2 the other solemn1 and full of majesty and circumstance1 and therefore the less effectual4 ,but this precept touching the politic knowledge of ourselves hath many other branches1 whereupon we cannot insist4 7#cj7 ,next to the well understanding and discerning of a man's self1 there followeth the well opening and revealing a man's self2 wherein we see nothing more usual than for the more able man to make the less show4 ,for there is a great advantage in the well setting forth of a man's virtues1 fortunes1 merits2 and again1 in the artificial covering of a man's weaknesses1 defects1 disgraces2 staying upon the one1 sliding from the other2 cherishing the one by circumstances1 gracing the other by exposition1 and the like4 ,wherein we see what ,tacitus saith of ,mutianus1 who was the greatest politique of his time1 ,omnium qu dixerat feceratque arte quadam ostentator1 which requireth indeed some art1 lest it turn tedious and arrogant2 but yet so1 as ostentation 7though it be to the first degree of vanity7 seemeth to me rather a vice in manners than in policy2 for as it is said1 ,audacter calumniare1 semper aliquid hret2 so1 except it be in a ridiculous degree of deformity1 ,audacter te vendita1 semper aluquid hret4 ,for it will stick with the more ignorant and inferior sort of men1 though men of wisdom and rank do smile at it and despise it2 and yet the authority won with many doth countervail the disdain of a few4 ,but if it be carried with decency and government1 as with a natural1 pleasant1 and ingenious fashion2 or at times when it is mixed with some peril and unsafety 7as in military persons72 or at times when others are most envied2 or with easy and careless passage to it and from it1 without dwelling too long1 or being too serious2 or with an equal freedom of taxing a man's self1 as well as gracing himself2 or by occasion of repelling or putting down others' injury or insolency2 it doth greatly add to reputation3 and surely not a few solid natures1 that want this ventosity and cannot sail in the height of the winds1 are not without some prejudice and disadvantage by their moderation4 7#ca7 ,but for these flourishes and enhancements of virtue1 as they are not perchance unnecessary1 so it is at least necessary that virtue be not disvalued and embased under the just price1 which is done in three manners--by offering and obtruding a man's self1 wherein men think he is rewarded when he is accepted2 by doing too much1 which will not give that which is well done leave to settle1 and in the end induceth satiety2 and by finding too soon the fruit of a man's virtue1 in commendation1 applause1 honour1 favour2 wherein if a man be pleased with a little1 let him hear what is truly said3 ,cave ne insuetus rebus majoribus videaris1 si hc te res parva sicuti magna delectat4 7#cb7 ,but the covering of defects is of no less importance than the valuing of good parts2 which may be done likewise in three manners--by caution1 by colour1 and by confidence4 ,caution is when men do ingeniously and discreetly avoid to be put into those things for which they are not proper2 whereas contrariwise bold and unquiet spirits will thrust themselves into matters without difference1 and so publish and proclaim all their wants4 ,colour is when men make a way for themselves to have a construction made of their faults or wants1 as proceeding from a better cause or intended for some other purpose4 ,for of the one it is well said1 8,spe latet vitium proximitate boni10 and therefore whatsoever want a man hath1 he must see that he pretend the virtue that shadoweth it2 as if he be dull1 he must affect gravity2 if a coward1 mildness2 and so the rest4 ,for the second1 a man must frame some probable cause why he should not do his best1 and why he should dissemble his abilities2 and for that purpose must use to dissemble those abilities which are notorious in him1 to give colour that his true wants are but industries and dissimulations4 ,for confidence1 it is the last but the surest remedy--namely1 to depress and seem to despise whatsoever a man cannot attain2 observing the good principle of the merchants1 who endeavour to raise the price of their own commodities1 and to beat down the price of others4 ,but there is a confidence that passeth this other1 which is to face out a man's own defects1 in seeming to conceive that he is best in those things wherein he is failing2 and1 to help that again1 to seem on the other side that he hath least opinion of himself in those things wherein he is best3 like as we shall see it commonly in poets1 that if they show their verses1 and you except to any1 they will say1 8,that that line cost them more labour than any of the rest20 and presently will seem to disable and suspect rather some other line1 which they know well enough to be the best in the number4 ,but above all1 in this righting and helping of a man's self in his own carriage1 he must take heed he show not himself dismantled and exposed to scorn and injury1 by too much dulceness1 goodness1 and facility of nature2 but show some sparkles of liberty1 spirit1 and edge4 ,which kind of fortified carriage1 with a ready rescussing of a man's self from scorns1 is sometimes of necessity imposed upon men by somewhat in their person or fortune2 but it ever succeedeth with good felicity4 7#cc7 ,another precept of this knowledge is by all possible endeavour to frame the mind to be pliant and obedient to occasion2 for nothing hindereth men's fortunes so much as this3 ,idem manebat1 neque idem decebat--men are where they were1 when occasions turn3 and therefore to ,cato1 whom ,livy maketh such an architect of fortune1 he addeth that he had versatile ingenium4 ,and thereof it cometh that these grave solemn wits1 which must be like themselves and cannot make departures1 have more dignity than felicity4 ,but in some it is nature to be somewhat vicious and enwrapped1 and not easy to turn4 ,in some it is a conceit that is almost a nature1 which is1 that men can hardly make themselves believe that they ought to change their course1 when they have found good by it in former experience4 ,for ,machiavel noted wisely how ,fabius ,maximus would have been temporising still1 according to his old bias1 when the nature of the war was altered and required hot pursuit4 ,in some other it is want of point and penetration in their judgment1 that they do not discern when things have a period1 but come in too late after the occasion2 as ,demosthenes compareth the people of ,athens to country fellows1 when they play in a fence school1 that if they have a blow1 then they remove their weapon to that ward1 and not before4 ,in some other it is a lothness to lose labours passed1 and a conceit that they can bring about occasions to their ply2 and yet in the end1 when they see no other remedy1 then they come to it with disadvantage2 as ,tarquinius1 that gave for the third part of ,sibylla's books the treble price1 when he might at first have had all three for the simple4 ,but from whatsoever root or cause this restiveness of mind proceedeth1 it is a thing most prejudicial2 and nothing is more politic than to make the wheels of our mind concentric and voluble with the wheels of fortune4 7#cd7 ,another precept of this knowledge1 which hath some affinity with that we last spoke of1 but with difference1 is that which is well expressed1 ,fatis accede deisque1 that men do not only turn with the occasions1 but also run with the occasions1 and not strain their credit or strength to over-hard or extreme points2 but choose in their actions that which is most passable3 for this will preserve men from foil1 not occupy them too much about one matter1 win opinion of moderation1 please the most1 and make a show of a perpetual felicity in all they undertake3 which cannot but mightily increase reputation4 7#ce7 ,another part of this knowledge seemeth to have some repugnancy with the former two1 but not as ,i understand it2 and it is that which ,demosthenes uttereth in high terms3 ,et quemadmodum receptum est1 ut exercitum ducat imperator1 sic et a cordatis viris res ips ducend2 ut quipsis videntur1 ea gerantur1 et non ipsi eventus persequi cogantur4 ,for if we observe we shall find two differing kinds of sufficiency in managing of business3 some can make use of occasions aptly and dexterously1 but plot little2 some can urge and pursue their own plots well1 but cannot accommodate nor take in2 either of which is very imperfect without the other4 7#cf7 ,another part of this knowledge is the observing a good mediocrity in the declaring or not declaring a man's self3 for although depth of secrecy1 and making way 7qualis est via navis in mari1 which the ,french calleth sourdes menes1 when men set things in work without opening themselves at all71 be sometimes both prosperous and admirable2 yet many times dissimulatio errores parit1 qui dissimulatorem ipsum illaqueant4 ,and therefore we see the greatest politiques have in a natural and free manner professed their desires1 rather than been reserved and disguised in them4 ,for so we see that ,lucius ,sylla made a kind of profession1 8that he wished all men happy or unhappy1 as they stood his friends or enemies40 ,so ,csar1 when he went first into ,gaul1 made no scruple to profess 8that he had rather be first in a village than second at ,rome40 ,so again1 as soon as he had begun the war1 we see what ,cicero saith of him1 ,alter 7meaning of ,csar7 non recusat1 sed quodammodo postulat1 ut 7ut est7 sic appelletur tyrannus4 ,so we may see in a letter of ,cicero to ,atticus1 that ,augustus ,csar1 in his very entrance into affairs1 when he was a darling of the senate1 yet in his harangues to the people would swear1 ,ita parentis honores consequi liceat 7which was no less than the tyranny71 save that1 to help it1 he would stretch forth his hand towards a statue of ,csar's that was erected in the place3 and men laughed and wondered1 and said1 8,is it possible80 or1 8,did you ever hear the like80 and yet thought he meant no hurt2 he did it so handsomely and ingenuously4 ,and all these were prosperous3 whereas ,pompey1 who tended to the same ends1 but in a more dark and dissembling manner as ,tacitus saith of him1 ,occultior non melior1 wherein ,sallust concurreth1 ,ore probo1 animo inverecundo1 made it his design1 by infinite secret engines1 to cast the state into an absolute anarchy and confusion1 that the state might cast itself into his arms for necessity and protection1 and so the sovereign power be put upon him1 and he never seen in it3 and when he had brought it 7as he thought7 to that point when he was chosen consul alone1 as never any was1 yet he could make no great matter of it1 because men understood him not2 but was fain in the end to go the beaten track of getting arms into his hands1 by colour of the doubt of ,csar's designs3 so tedious1 casual1 and unfortunate are these deep dissimulations3 whereof it seemeth ,tacitus made this judgment1 that they were a cunning of an inferior form in regard of true policy2 attributing the one to ,augustus1 the other to ,tiberius2 where1 speaking of ,livia1 he saith1 ,et cum artibus mariti simulatione filii bene compostia3 for surely the continual habit of dissimulation is but a weak and sluggish cunning1 and not greatly politic4 7#cg7 ,another precept of this architecture of fortune is to accustom our minds to judge of the proportion or value of things1 as they conduce and are material to our particular ends2 and that to do substantially and not superficially4 ,for we shall find the logical part 7as ,i may term it7 of some men's minds good1 but the mathematical part erroneous2 that is1 they can well judge of consequences1 but not of proportions and comparison1 preferring things of show and sense before things of substance and effect4 ,so some fall in love with access to princes1 others with popular fame and applause1 supposing they are things of great purchase1 when in many cases they are but matters of envy1 peril1 and impediment4 ,so some measure things according to the labour and difficulty or assiduity which are spent about them2 and think1 if they be ever moving1 that they must needs advance and proceed2 as ,csar saith in a despising manner of ,cato the second1 when he describeth how laborious and indefatigable he was to no great purpose1 ,hc omnia magno studio agebat4 ,so in most things men are ready to abuse themselves in thinking the greatest means to be best1 when it should be the fittest4 7#ch7 ,as for the true marshalling of men's pursuits towards their fortune1 as they are more or less material1 ,i hold them to stand thus4 ,first the amendment of their own minds4 ,for the removal of the impediments of the mind will sooner clear the passages of fortune than the obtaining fortune will remove the impediments of the mind4 ,in the second place ,i set down wealth and means2 which ,i know most men would have placed first1 because of the general use which it beareth towards all variety of occasions4 ,but that opinion ,i may condemn with like reason as ,machiavel doth that other1 that moneys were the sinews of the wars2 whereas 7saith he7 the true sinews of the wars are the sinews of men's arms1 that is1 a valiant1 populous1 and military nation3 and he voucheth aptly the authority of ,solon1 who1 when ,crsus showed him his treasury of gold1 said to him1 that if another came that had better iron1 he would be master of his gold4 ,in like manner it may be truly affirmed that it is not moneys that are the sinews of fortune1 but it is the sinews and steel of men's minds1 wit1 courage1 audacity1 resolution1 temper1 industry1 and the like4 ,in the third place ,i set down reputation1 because of the peremptory tides and currents it hath2 which1 if they be not taken in their due time1 are seldom recovered1 it being extreme hard to play an after-game of reputation4 ,and lastly ,i place honour1 which is more easily won by any of the other three1 much more by all1 than any of them can be purchased by honour4 ,to conclude this precept1 as there is order and priority in matter1 so is there in time1 the preposterous placing whereof is one of the commonest errors3 while men fly to their ends when they should intend their beginnings1 and do not take things in order of time as they come on1 but marshal them according to greatness and not according to instance2 not observing the good precept1 ,quod nunc instat agamus4 7#ci7 ,another precept of this knowledge is not to embrace any matters which do occupy too great a quantity of time1 but to have that sounding in a man's ears1 ,sed fugit interea fugit irreparabile tempus3 and that is the cause why those which take their course of rising by professions of burden1 as lawyers1 orators1 painful divines1 and the like1 are not commonly so politic for their own fortune1 otherwise than in their ordinary way1 because they want time to learn particulars1 to wait occasions1 and to devise plots4 7#dj7 ,another precept of this knowledge is to imitate nature1 which doth nothing in vain2 which surely a man may do if he do well interlace his business1 and bend not his mind too much upon that which he principally intendeth4 ,for a man ought in every particular action so to carry the motions of his mind1 and so to have one thing under another1 as if he cannot have that he seeketh in the best degree1 yet to have it in a second1 or so in a third2 and if he can have no part of that which he purposed1 yet to turn the use of it to somewhat else2 and if he cannot make anything of it for the present1 yet to make it as a seed of somewhat in time to come2 and if he can contrive no effect or substance from it1 yet to win some good opinion by it1 or the like4 ,so that he should exact an account of himself of every action1 to reap somewhat1 and not to stand amazed and confused if he fail of that he chiefly meant3 for nothing is more impolitic than to mind actions wholly one by one4 ,for he that doth so loseth infinite occasions which intervene1 and are many times more proper and propitious for somewhat that he shall need afterwards1 than for that which he urgeth for the present2 and therefore men must be perfect in that rule1 ,hc oportet facere1 et illa non imittere4 7#da7 ,another precept of this knowledge is1 not to engage a man's self peremptorily in anything1 though it seem not liable to accident2 but ever to have a window to fly out at1 or a way to retire3 following the wisdom in the ancient fable of the two frogs1 which consulted when their plash was dry whither they should go2 and the one moved to go down into a pit1 because it was not likely the water would dry there2 but the other answered1 8,true1 but if it do1 how shall we get out again80 7#db7 ,another precept of this knowledge is that ancient precept of ,bias1 construed not to any point of perfidiousness1 but to caution and moderation1 ,et ama tanquam inimicus futurus et odi tanquam amaturus4 ,for it utterly betrayeth all utility for men to embark themselves too far into unfortunate friendships1 troublesome spleens1 and childish and humorous envies or emulations4 7#dc7 ,but ,i continue this beyond the measure of an example2 led1 because ,i would not have such knowledges1 which ,i note as deficient1 to be thought things imaginative or in the air1 or an observation or two much made of1 but things of bulk and mass1 whereof an end is more hardly made than a beginning4 ,it must be likewise conceived1 that in these points which ,i mention and set down1 they are far from complete tractates of them1 but only as small pieces for patterns4 ,and lastly1 no man ,i suppose will think that ,i mean fortunes are not obtained without all this ado2 for ,i know they come tumbling into some men's laps2 and a number obtain good fortunes by diligence in a plain way1 little intermeddling1 and keeping themselves from gross errors4 7#dd7 ,but as ,cicero1 when he setteth down an idea of a perfect orator1 doth not mean that every pleader should be such2 and so likewise1 when a prince or a courtier hath been described by such as have handled those subjects1 the mould hath used to be made according to the perfection of the art1 and not according to common practice3 so ,i understand it1 that it ought to be done in the description of a politic man1 ,i mean politic for his own fortune4 7#de7 ,but it must be remembered all this while1 that the precepts which we have set down are of that kind which may be counted and called ,bon ,artes4 ,as for evil arts1 if a man would set down for himself that principle of ,machiavel1 8,that a man seek not to attain virtue itself1 but the appearance only thereof2 because the credit of virtue is a help1 but the use of it is cumber30 or that other of his principles1 8,that he presuppose that men are not fitly to be wrought otherwise but by fear2 and therefore that he seek to have every man obnoxious1 low1 and in straits10 which the ,italians call seminar spine1 to sow thorns3 or that other principle1 contained in the verse which ,cicero citeth1 ,cadant amici1 dummodo inimici intercidant1 as the triumvirs1 which sold every one to other the lives of their friends for the deaths of their enemies3 or that other protestation of ,l4 ,catilina1 to set on fire and trouble states1 to the end to fish in droumy waters1 and to unwrap their fortunes1 ,ego si quid in fortunis meis excitatum sit incendium1 id non aqua sed ruina restinguam3 or that other principle of ,lysander1 8,that children are to be deceived with comfits1 and men with oaths30 and the like evil and corrupt positions1 whereof 7as in all things7 there are more in number than of the good3 certainly with these dispensations from the laws of charity and integrity1 the pressing of a man's fortune may be more hasty and compendious4 ,but it is in life as it is in ways1 the shortest way is commonly the foulest1 and surely the fairer way is not much about4 7#df7 ,but men1 if they be in their own power1 and do bear and sustain themselves1 and be not carried away with a whirlwind or tempest of ambition1 ought in the pursuit of their own fortune to set before their eyes not only that general map of the world1 8,that all things are vanity and vexation of spirit10 but many other more particular cards and directions3 chiefly that1 that being without well-being is a curse1 and the greater being the greater curse2 and that all virtue is most rewarded and all wickedness most punished in itself3 according as the poet saith excellently3 8,qu vobis1 qu digna1 viri pro laudibus istis ,prmia posse rear solvi8 pulcherrima primum ,dii moresque dabunt vestri40 ,and so of the contrary4 ,and secondly they ought to look up to the ,eternal ,providence and ,divine ,judgment1 which often subverteth the wisdom of evil plots and imaginations1 according to that scripture1 8,he hath conceived mischief1 and shall bring forth a vain thing40 ,and although men should refrain themselves from injury and evil arts1 yet this incessant and ,sabbathless pursuit of a man's fortune leaveth not tribute which we owe to ,god of our time2 who 7we see7 demandeth a tenth of our substance1 and a seventh1 which is more strict1 of our time3 and it is to small purpose to have an erected face towards heaven1 and a perpetual grovelling spirit upon earth1 eating dust as doth the serpent1 ,atque affigit humo divin particulam aur4 ,and if any man flatter himself that he will employ his fortune well1 though he should obtain it ill1 as was said concerning ,augustus ,csar1 and after of ,septimius ,severus1 8,that either they should never have been born1 or else they should never have died10 they did so much mischief in the pursuit and ascent of their greatness1 and so much good when they were established2 yet these compensations and satisfactions are good to be used1 but never good to be purposed4 ,and lastly1 it is not amiss for men1 in their race towards their fortune1 to cool themselves a little with that conceit which is elegantly expressed by the ,emperor ,charles ,v41 in his instructions to the king his son1 8,that fortune hath somewhat of the nature of a woman1 that if she he too much wooed she is the farther off40 ,but this last is but a remedy for those whose tastes are corrupted3 let men rather build upon that foundation which is as a corner-stone of divinity and philosophy1 wherein they join close1 namely that same ,primum qurite4 ,for divinity saith1 ,primum qurite regnum ,dei1 et ista omnia adjicientur vobis3 and philosophy saith1 ,primum qurite bona animi2 ctera aut aderunt1 aut non oberunt4 ,and although the human foundation hath somewhat of the sands1 as we see in ,m4 ,brutus1 when he broke forth into that speech1 8,te colui 7,virtus7 ut rem2 ast tu nomen inane es20 yet the divine foundation is upon the rock4 ,but this may serve for a taste of that knowledge which ,i noted as deficient4 7#dg7 ,concerning government1 it is a part of knowledge secret and retired in both these respects in which things are deemed secret2 for some things are secret because they are hard to know1 and some because they are not fit to utter4 ,we see all governments are obscure and invisible3 8,totamque infusa per artus ,mens agitat molem1 et magno se corpore miscet40 ,such is the description of governments4 ,we see the government of ,god over the world is hidden1 insomuch as it seemeth to participate of much irregularity and confusion4 ,the government of the soul in moving the body is inward and profound1 and the passages thereof hardly to be reduced to demonstration4 ,again1 the wisdom of antiquity 7the shadows whereof are in the poets7 in the description of torments and pains1 next unto the crime of rebellion1 which was the giants' offence1 doth detest the offence of futility1 as in ,sisyphus and ,tantalus4 ,but this was meant of particulars3 nevertheless even unto the general rules and discourses of policy and government there is due a reverent and reserved handling4 7#dh7 ,but contrariwise in the governors towards the governed1 all things ought as far as the frailty of man permitteth to be manifest and revealed4 ,for so it is expressed in the ,scriptures touching the government of ,god1 that this globe1 which seemeth to us a dark and shady body1 is in the view of ,god as crystal3 ,et in conspectu sedis tanquam mare vitreum simile crystallo4 ,so unto princes and states1 and specially towards wise senates and councils1 the natures and dispositions of the people1 their conditions and necessities1 their factions and combinations1 their animosities and discontents1 ought to be1 in regard of the variety of their intelligences1 the wisdom of their observations1 and the height of their station where they keep sentinel1 in great part clear and transparent4 ,wherefore1 considering that ,i write to a king that is a master of this science1 and is so well assisted1 ,i think it decent to pass over this part in silence1 as willing to obtain the certificate which one of the ancient philosophers aspired unto2 who being silent1 when others contended to make demonstration of their abilities by speech1 desired it might be certified for his part1 8,that there was one that knew how to hold his peace40 7#di7 ,notwithstanding1 for the more public part of government1 which is laws1 ,i think good to note only one deficiency2 which is1 that all those which have written of laws have written either as philosophers or as lawyers1 and none as statesmen4 ,as for the philosophers1 they make imaginary laws for imaginary commonwealths1 and their discourses are as the stars1 which give little light because they are so high4 ,for the lawyers1 they write according to the states where they live what is received law1 and not what ought to be law2 for the wisdom of a law-maker is one1 and of a lawyer is another4 ,for there are in nature certain fountains of justice whence all civil laws are derived but as streams2 and like as waters do take tinctures and tastes from the soils through which they run1 so do civil laws vary according to the regions and governments where they are planted1 though they proceed from the same fountains4 ,again1 the wisdom of a law-maker consisteth not only in a platform of justice1 but in the application thereof2 taking into consideration by what means laws may be made certain1 and what are the causes and remedies of the doubtfulness and uncertainty of law2 by what means laws may be made apt and easy to be executed1 and what are the impediments and remedies in the execution of laws2 what influence laws touching private right of meum and tuum have into the public state1 and how they may be made apt and agreeable2 how laws are to be penned and delivered1 whether in texts or in ,acts1 brief or large1 with preambles or without2 how they are to be pruned and reformed from time to time1 and what is the best means to keep them from being too vast in volume1 or too full of multiplicity and crossness2 how they are to be expounded1 when upon causes emergent and judicially discussed1 and when upon responses and conferences touching general points or questions2 how they are to be pressed1 rigorously or tenderly2 how they are to be mitigated by equity and good conscience1 and whether discretion and strict law are to be mingled in the same courts1 or kept apart in several courts2 again1 how the practice1 profession1 and erudition of law is to be censured and governed2 and many other points touching the administration and 7as ,i may term it7 animation of laws4 ,upon which ,i insist the less1 because ,i purpose 7if ,god give me leave71 having begun a work of this nature in aphorisms1 to propound it hereafter1 noting it in the meantime for deficient4 7#ej7 ,and for your ,majesty's laws of ,england1 ,i could say much of their dignity1 and somewhat of their defect2 but they cannot but excel the civil laws in fitness for the government1 for the civil law was nonhos qusitum munus in usus2 it was not made for the countries which it governeth4 ,hereof ,i cease to speak because ,i will not intermingle matter of action with matter of general learning4 ,,xxiv4 ,thus have ,i concluded this portion of learning touching civil knowledge2 and with civil knowledge have concluded human philosophy2 and with human philosophy1 philosophy in general4 ,and being now at some pause1 looking back into that ,i have passed through1 this writing seemeth to me 7si nunquam fallit imago71 as far as a man can judge of his own work1 not much better than that noise or sound which musicians make while they are in tuning their instruments1 which is nothing pleasant to hear1 but yet is a cause why the music is sweeter afterwards4 ,so have ,i been content to tune the instruments of the ,muses1 that they may play that have better hands4 ,and surely1 when ,i set before me the condition of these times1 in which learning hath made her third visitation or circuit in all the qualities thereof2 as the excellency and vivacity of the wits of this age2 the noble helps and lights which we have by the travails of ancient writers2 the art of printing1 which communicateth books to men of all fortunes2 the openness of the world by navigation1 which hath disclosed multitudes of experiments1 and a mass of natural history2 the leisure wherewith these times abound1 not employing men so generally in civil business1 as the states of ,grcia did1 in respect of their popularity1 and the state of ,rome1 in respect of the greatness of their monarchy2 the present disposition of these times at this instant to peace2 the consumption of all that ever can be said in controversies of religion1 which have so much diverted men from other sciences2 the perfection of your ,majesty's learning1 which as a phnix may call whole volleys of wits to follow you2 and the inseparable propriety of time1 which is ever more and more to disclose truth2 ,i cannot but be raised to this persuasion1 that this third period of time will far surpass that of the ,grecian and ,roman learning2 only if men will know their own strength and their own weakness both2 and take1 one from the other1 light of invention1 and not fire of contradiction2 and esteem of the inquisition of truth as of an enterprise1 and not as of a quality or ornament2 and employ wit and magnificence to things of worth and excellency1 and not to things vulgar and of popular estimation4 ,as for my labours1 if any man shall please himself or others in the reprehension of them1 they shall make that ancient and patient request1 ,verbera1 sed audi3 let men reprehend them1 so they observe and weigh them4 ,for the appeal is lawful 7though it may be it shall not be needful7 from the first cogitations of men to their second1 and from the nearer times to the times further off4 ,now let us come to that learning1 which both the former times were not so blessed as to know1 sacred and inspired divinity1 the ,sabbath and port of all men's labours and peregrinations4 ,,xxv4 7#a7 ,the prerogative of ,god extendeth as well to the reason as to the will of man3 so that as we are to obey ,his law1 though we find a reluctation in our will1 so we are to believe ,his word1 though we find a reluctation in our reason4 ,for if we believe only that which is agreeable to our sense we give consent to the matter1 and not to the author2 which is no more than we would do towards a suspected and discredited witness2 but that faith which was accounted to ,abraham for righteousness was of such a point as whereat ,sarah laughed1 who therein was an image of natural reason4 7#b7 ,howbeit 7if we will truly consider of it7 more worthy it is to believe than to know as we now know4 ,for in knowledge man's mind suffereth from sense3 but in belief it suffereth from spirit1 such one as it holdeth for more authorised than itself and so suffereth from the worthier agent4 ,otherwise it is of the state of man glorified2 for then faith shall cease1 and we shall know as we are known4 7#c7 ,wherefore we conclude that sacred theology 7which in our idiom we call divinity7 is grounded only upon the word and oracle of ,god1 and not upon the light of nature3 for it is written1 ,cli enarrant gloriam ,dei2 but it is not written1 ,cli enarrant voluntatem ,dei3 but of that it is said1 ,ad legem et testimonium3 si non fecerint secundum verbum istud1 c4 ,this holdeth not only in those points of faith which concern the great mysteries of the ,deity1 of the creation1 of the redemption1 but likewise those which concern the law moral1 truly interpreted3 8,love your enemies3 do good to them that hate you2 be like to your heavenly ,father1 that suffereth ,his rain to fall upon the just and unjust40 ,to this it ought to be applauded1 ,nec vox hominem sonat3 it is a voice beyond the light of nature4 ,so we see the heathen poets1 when they fall upon a libertine passion1 do still expostulate with laws and moralities1 as if they were opposite and malignant to nature3 ,et quod natura remittit1 invida jura negant4 ,so said ,dendamis the ,indian unto ,alexander's messengers1 that he had heard somewhat of ,pythagoras1 and some other of the wise men of ,grcia1 and that he held them for excellent men3 but that they had a fault1 which was that they had in too great reverence and veneration a thing they called law and manners4 ,so it must be confessed that a great part of the law moral is of that perfection whereunto the light of nature cannot aspire3 how then is it that man is said to have1 by the light and law of nature1 some notions and conceits of virtue and vice1 justice and wrong1 good and evil8 ,thus1 because the light of nature is used in two several senses3 the one1 that which springeth from reason1 sense1 induction1 argument1 according to the laws of heaven and earth2 the other1 that which is imprinted upon the spirit of man by an inward instinct1 according to the law of conscience1 which is a sparkle of the purity of his first estate3 in which latter sense only he is participant of some light and discerning touching the perfection of the moral law2 but how8 sufficient to check the vice but not to inform the duty4 ,so then the doctrine of religion1 as well moral as mystical1 is not to be attained but by inspiration and revelation from ,god4 7#d7 ,the use notwithstanding of reason in spiritual things1 and the latitude thereof1 is very great and general3 for it is not for nothing that the apostle calleth religion 8our reasonable service of ,god20 insomuch as the very ceremonies and figures of the old law were full of reason and signification1 much more than the ceremonies of idolatry and magic1 that are full of non-significants and surd characters4 ,but most specially the ,christian faith1 as in all things so in this1 deserveth to be highly magnified2 holding and preserving the golden mediocrity in this point between the law of the heathen and the law of ,mahomet1 which have embraced the two extremes4 ,for the religion of the heathen had no constant belief or confession1 but left all to the liberty of agent2 and the religion of ,mahomet on the other side interdicteth argument altogether3 the one having the very face of error1 and the other of imposture2 whereas the ,faith doth both admit and reject disputation with difference4 7#e7 ,the use of human reason in religion is of two sorts3 the former1 in the conception and apprehension of the mysteries of ,god to us revealed2 the other1 in the inferring and deriving of doctrine and direction thereupon4 ,the former extendeth to the mysteries themselves2 but how8 by way of illustration1 and not by way of argument4 ,the latter consisteth indeed of probation and argument4 ,in the former we see ,god vouchsafeth to descend to our capacity1 in the expressing of ,his mysteries in sort as may be sensible unto us2 and doth graft ,his revelations and holy doctrine upon the notions of our reason1 and applieth ,his inspirations to open our understanding1 as the form of the key to the ward of the lock4 ,for the latter there is allowed us a use of reason and argument1 secondary and respective1 although not original and absolute4 ,for after the articles and principles of religion are placed and exempted from examination of reason1 it is then permitted unto us to make derivations and inferences from and according to the analogy of them1 for our better direction4 ,in nature this holdeth not2 for both the principles are examinable by induction1 though not by a medium or syllogism2 and besides1 those principles or first positions have no discordance with that reason which draweth down and deduceth the inferior positions4 ,but yet it holdeth not in religion alone1 but in many knowledges1 both of greater and smaller nature1 namely1 wherein there are not only posita but placita2 for in such there can be no use of absolute reason4 ,we see it familiarly in games of wit1 as chess1 or the like4 ,the draughts and first laws of the game are positive1 but how8 merely ad placitum1 and not examinable by reason2 but then how to direct our play thereupon with best advantage to win the game is artificial and rational4 ,so in human laws there be many grounds and maxims which are placita juris1 positive upon authority1 and not upon reason1 and therefore not to be disputed3 but what is most just1 not absolutely but relatively1 and according to those maxims1 that affordeth a long field of disputation4 ,such therefore is that secondary reason1 which hath place in divinity1 which is grounded upon the placets of ,god4 7#f7 ,here therefore ,i note this deficiency1 that there hath not been1 to my understanding1 sufficiently inquired and handled the true limits and use of reason in spiritual things1 as a kind of divine dialectic3 which for that it is not done1 it seemeth to me a thing usual1 by pretext of true conceiving that which is revealed1 to search and mine into that which is not revealed2 and by pretext of enucleating inferences and contradictories1 to examine that which is positive4 ,the one sort falling into the error of ,nicodemus1 demanding to have things made more sensible than it pleaseth ,god to reveal them1 ,quomodo possit homo nasci cum sit senex8 ,the other sort into the error of the disciples1 which were scandalised at a show of contradiction1 ,quid est hoc quod dicit nobis8 ,modicum et non videbitis me2 et iterum1 modicum1 et videbitis me1 c4 7#g7 ,upon this ,i have insisted the more1 in regard of the great and blessed use thereof2 for this point well laboured and defined of would in my judgment be an opiate to stay and bridle not only the vanity of curious speculations1 wherewith the schools labour1 but the fury of controversies1 wherewith the ,church laboureth4 ,for it cannot but open men's eyes to see that many controversies do merely pertain to that which is either not revealed or positive2 and that many others do grow upon weak and obscure inferences or derivations3 which latter sort1 if men would revive the blessed style of that great doctor of the ,gentiles1 would be carried thus1 ego1 non dominus2 and again1 secundum consilium meum1 in opinions and counsels1 and not in positions and oppositions4 ,but men are now over-ready to usurp the style1 non ego1 sed dominus2 and not so only1 but to bind it with the thunder and denunciation of curses and anathemas1 to the terror of those which have not sufficiently learned out of ,solomon that 8,the causeless curse shall not come40 7#h7 ,divinity hath two principal parts3 the matter informed or revealed1 and the nature of the information or revelation2 and with the latter we will begin1 because it hath most coherence with that which we have now last handled4 ,the nature of the information consisteth of three branches3 the limits of the information1 the sufficiency of the information1 and the acquiring or obtaining the information4 ,unto the limits of the information belong these considerations3 how far forth particular persons continue to be inspired2 how far forth the ,church is inspired2 and how far forth reason may be used2 the last point whereof ,i have noted as deficient4 ,unto the sufficiency of the information belong two considerations3 what points of religion are fundamental1 and what perfective1 being matter of further building and perfection upon one and the same foundation2 and again1 how the gradations of light according to the dispensation of times are material to the sufficiency of belief4 7#i7 ,here again ,i may rather give it in advice than note it as deficient1 that the points fundamental1 and the points of further perfection only1 ought to be with piety and wisdom distinguished2 a subject tending to much like end as that ,i noted before2 for as that other were likely to abate the number of controversies1 so this is likely to abate the heat of many of them4 ,we see ,moses when he saw the ,israelite and the ,egyptian fight1 he did not say1 8,why strive you80 but drew his sword and slew the ,egyptian2 but when he saw the two ,israelites fight1 he said1 8,you are brethren1 why strive you80 ,if the point of doctrine be an ,egyptian1 it must be slain by the sword of the ,spirit1 and not reconciled2 but if it be an ,israelite1 though in the wrong1 then1 8,why strive you80 ,we see of the fundamental points1 our ,saviour penneth the league thus1 8,he that is not with us is against us20 but of points not fundamental1 thus1 8,he that is not against us is with us40 ,so we see the coat of our ,saviour was entire without seam1 and so is the doctrine of the ,scriptures in itself2 but the garment of the ,church was of divers colours and yet not divided4 ,we see the chaff may and ought to be severed from the corn in the ear1 but the tares may not be pulled up from the corn in the field4 ,so as it is a thing of great use well to define what1 and of what latitude1 those points are which do make men mere aliens and disincorporate from the ,church of ,god4 7#aj7 ,for the obtaining of the information1 it resteth upon the true and sound interpretation of the ,scriptures1 which are the fountains of the water of life4 ,the interpretations of the ,scriptures are of two sorts3 methodical1 and solute or at large4 ,for this divine water1 which excelleth so much that of ,jacob's well1 is drawn forth much in the same kind as natural water useth to be out of wells and fountains2 either it is first forced up into a cistern1 and from thence fetched and derived for use2 or else it is drawn and received in buckets and vessels immediately where it springeth4 ,the former sort whereof1 though it seem to be the more ready1 yet in my judgment is more subject to corrupt4 ,this is that method which hath exhibited unto us the scholastical divinity2 whereby divinity hath been reduced into an art1 as into a cistern1 and the streams of doctrine or positions fetched and derived from thence4 7#aa7 ,in this men have sought three things1 a summary brevity1 a compacted strength1 and a complete perfection2 whereof the two first they fail to find1 and the last they ought not to seek4 ,for as to brevity1 we see in all summary methods1 while men purpose to abridge1 they give cause to dilate4 ,for the sum or abridgment by contraction becometh obscure2 the obscurity requireth exposition1 and the exposition is deduced into large commentaries1 or into commonplaces and titles1 which grow to be more vast than the original writings1 whence the sum was at first extracted4 ,so we see the volumes of the schoolmen are greater much than the first writings of the fathers1 whence the master of the sentences made his sum or collection4 ,so in like manner the volumes of the modern doctors of the civil law exceed those of the ancient jurisconsults1 of which ,tribonian compiled the digest4 ,so as this course of sums and commentaries is that which doth infallibly make the body of sciences more immense in quantity1 and more base in substance4 7#ab7 ,and for strength1 it is true that knowledges reduced into exact methods have a show of strength1 in that each part seemeth to support and sustain the other2 but this is more satisfactory than substantial1 like unto buildings which stand by architecture and compaction1 which are more subject to ruin than those that are built more strong in their several parts1 though less compacted4 ,but it is plain that the more you recede from your grounds1 the weaker do you conclude2 and as in nature1 the more you remove yourself from particulars1 the greater peril of error you do incur2 so much more in divinity1 the more you recede from the ,scriptures by inferences and consequences1 the more weak and dilute are your positions4 7#ac7 ,and as for perfection or completeness in divinity1 it is not to be sought1 which makes this course of artificial divinity the more suspect4 ,for he that will reduce a knowledge into an art will make it round and uniform2 but in divinity many things must be left abrupt1 and concluded with this3 ,o altitudo sapienti et scienti ,dei6 quam incomprehensibilia sunt juducua ejus1 et non investigabiles vi ejus4 ,so again the apostle saith1 ,ex parte scimus3 and to have the form of a total1 where there is but matter for a part1 cannot be without supplies by supposition and presumption4 ,and therefore ,i conclude that the true use of these sums and methods hath place in institutions or introductions preparatory unto knowledge2 but in them1 or by deducement from them1 to handle the main body and substance of a knowledge is in all sciences prejudicial1 and in divinity dangerous4 7#ad7 ,as to the interpretation of the ,scriptures solute and at large1 there have been divers kinds introduced and devised2 some of them rather curious and unsafe than sober and warranted4 ,notwithstanding1 thus much must be confessed1 that the ,scriptures1 being given by inspiration and not by human reason1 do differ from all other books in the ,author1 which by consequence doth draw on some difference to be used by the expositor4 ,for the ,inditer of them did know four things which no man attains to know2 which are--the mysteries of the kingdom of glory1 the perfection of the laws of nature1 the secrets of the heart of man1 and the future succession of all ages4 ,for as to the first it is said1 8,he that presseth into the light shall be oppressed of the glory40 ,and again1 8,no man shall see ,my face and live40 ,to the second1 8,when ,he prepared the heavens ,i was present1 when by law and compass ,he enclosed the deep40 ,to the third1 8,neither was it needful that any should bear witness to ,him of man1 for ,he knew well what was in man40 ,and to the last1 8,from the beginning are known to the ,lord all ,his works40 7#ae7 ,from the former two of these have been drawn certain senses and expositions of ,scriptures1 which had need be contained within the bounds of sobriety--the one anagogical1 and the other philosophical4 ,but as to the former1 man is not to prevent his time3 ,videmus nunc per speculum in nigmate1 tunc autem facie ad faciem2 wherein nevertheless there seemeth to be a liberty granted1 as far forth as the polishing of this glass1 or some moderate explication of this enigma4 ,but to press too far into it cannot but cause a dissolution and overthrow of the spirit of man4 ,for in the body there are three degrees of that we receive into it--aliment1 medicine1 and poison2 whereof aliment is that which the nature of man can perfectly alter and overcome2 medicine is that which is partly converted by nature1 and partly converteth nature2 and poison is that which worketh wholly upon nature1 without that nature can in any part work upon it4 ,so in the mind1 whatsoever knowledge reason cannot at all work upon and convert is a mere intoxication1 and endangereth a dissolution of the mind and understanding4 7#af7 ,but for the latter1 it hath been extremely set on foot of late time by the school of ,paracelsus1 and some others1 that have pretended to find the truth of all natural philosophy in the ,scriptures2 scandalising and traducing all other philosophy as heathenish and profane4 ,but there is no such enmity between ,god's ,word and ,his works2 neither do they give honour to the ,scriptures1 as they suppose1 but much embase them4 ,for to seek heaven and earth in the ,word of ,god1 whereof it is said1 8,heaven and earth shall pass1 but ,my word shall not pass10 is to seek temporary things amongst eternal3 and as to seek divinity in philosophy is to seek the living amongst the dead1 so to seek philosophy in divinity is to seek the dead amongst the living3 neither are the pots or lavers1 whose place was in the outward part of the temple1 to be sought in the holiest place of all where the ark of the testimony was seated4 ,and again1 the scope or purpose of the ,spirit of ,god is not to express matters of nature in the ,scriptures1 otherwise than in passage1 and for application to man's capacity and to matters moral or divine4 ,and it is a true rule1 ,auctoris aliud agentis parva auctoritas4 ,for it were a strange conclusion1 if a man should use a similitude for ornament or illustration sake1 borrowed from nature or history according to vulgar conceit1 as of a basilisk1 a unicorn1 a centaur1 a ,briareus1 a hydra1 or the like1 that therefore he must needs be thought to affirm the matter thereof positively to be true4 ,to conclude therefore these two interpretations1 the one by reduction or enigmatical1 the other philosophical or physical1 which have been received and pursued in imitation of the rabbins and cabalists1 are to be confined with a a noli akryn sapere1 sed time4 7#ag7 ,but the two latter points1 known to ,god and unknown to man1 touching the secrets of the heart and the successions of time1 doth make a just and sound difference between the manner of the exposition of the ,scriptures and all other books4 ,for it is an excellent observation which hath been made upon the answers of our ,saviour ,christ to many of the questions which were propounded to ,him1 how that they are impertinent to the state of the question demanded3 the reason whereof is1 because not being like man1 which knows man's thoughts by his words1 but knowing man's thoughts immediately1 ,he never answered their words1 but their thoughts4 ,much in the like manner it is with the ,scriptures1 which being written to the thoughts of men1 and to the succession of all ages1 with a foresight of all heresies1 contradictions1 differing estates of the ,church1 yea1 and particularly of the elect1 are not to be interpreted only according to the latitude of the proper sense of the place1 and respectively towards that present occasion whereupon the words were uttered1 or in precise congruity or contexture with the words before or after1 or in contemplation of the principal scope of the place2 but have in themselves1 not only totally or collectively1 but distributively in clauses and words1 infinite springs and streams of doctrine to water the ,church in every part4 ,and therefore as the literal sense is1 as it were1 the main stream or river1 so the moral sense chiefly1 and sometimes the allegorical or typical1 are they whereof the ,church hath most use2 not that ,i wish men to be bold in allegories1 or indulgent or light in allusions3 but that ,i do much condemn that interpretation of the ,scripture which is only after the manner as men use to interpret a profane book4 7#ah7 ,in this part touching the exposition of the ,scriptures1 ,i can report no deficiency2 but by way of remembrance this ,i will add4 ,in perusing books of divinity ,i find many books of controversies1 and many of commonplaces and treatises1 a mass of positive divinity1 as it is made an art3 a number of sermons and lectures1 and many prolix commentaries upon the ,scriptures1 with harmonies and concordances4 ,but that form of writing in divinity which in my judgment is of all others most rich and precious is positive divinity1 collected upon particular texts of ,scriptures in brief observations2 not dilated into commonplaces1 not chasing after controversies1 not reduced into method of art2 a thing abounding in sermons1 which will vanish1 but defective in books which will remain1 and a thing wherein this age excelleth4 ,for ,i am persuaded1 and ,i may speak it with an absit invidia verbo1 and nowise in derogation of antiquity1 but as in a good emulation between the vine and the olive1 that if the choice and best of those observations upon texts of ,scriptures which have been made dispersedly in sermons within this your ,majesty's ,island of ,brittany by the space of these forty years and more 7leaving out the largeness of exhortations and applications thereupon7 had been set down in a continuance1 it had been the best work in divinity which had been written since the ,apostles' times4 7#ai7 ,the matter informed by divinity is of two kinds3 matter of belief and truth of opinion1 and matter of service and adoration2 which is also judged and directed by the former--the one being as the internal soul of religion1 and the other as the external body thereof4 ,and1 therefore1 the heathen religion was not only a worship of idols1 but the whole religion was an idol in itself2 for it had no soul2 that is1 no certainty of belief or confession3 as a man may well think1 considering the chief doctors of their church were the poets2 and the reason was because the heathen gods were no jealous gods1 but were glad to be admitted into part1 as they had reason4 ,neither did they respect the pureness of heart1 so they might have external honour and rites4 7#bj7 ,but out of these two do result and issue four main branches of divinity3 faith1 manners1 liturgy1 and government4 ,faith containeth the doctrine of the nature of ,god1 of the attributes of ,god1 and of the works of ,god4 ,the nature of ,god consisteth of three persons in unity of ,godhead4 ,the attributes of ,god are either common to the ,deity1 or respective to the persons4 ,the works of ,god summary are two1 that of the creation and that of the redemption2 and both these works1 as in total they appertain to the unity of the ,godhead1 so in their parts they refer to the three persons3 that of the creation1 in the mass of the matter1 to the ,father2 in the disposition of the form1 to the ,son2 and in the continuance and conservation of the being1 to the ,holy ,spirit4 ,so that of the redemption1 in the election and counsel1 to the ,father2 in the whole act and consummation1 to the ,son2 and in the application1 to the ,holy ,spirit2 for by the ,holy ,ghost was ,christ conceived in flesh1 and by the ,holy ,ghost are the elect regenerate in spirit4 ,this work likewise we consider either effectually1 in the elect2 or privately1 in the reprobate2 or according to appearance1 in the visible ,church4 7#ba7 ,for manners1 the doctrine thereof is contained in the law1 which discloseth sin4 ,the law itself is divided1 according to the edition thereof1 into the law of nature1 the law moral1 and the law positive2 and according to the style1 into negative and affirmative1 prohibitions and commandments4 ,sin1 in the matter and subject thereof1 is divided according to the commandments2 in the form thereof it referreth to the three persons in ,deity3 sins of infirmity against the ,father1 whose more special attribute is power2 sins of ignorance against the ,son1 whose attribute is wisdom2 and sins of malice against the ,holy ,ghost1 whose attribute is grace or love4 ,in the motions of it1 it either moveth to the right hand or to the left2 either to blind devotion or to profane and libertine transgression2 either in imposing restraint where ,god granteth liberty1 or in taking liberty where ,god imposeth restraint4 ,in the degrees and progress of it1 it divideth itself into thought1 word1 or act4 ,and in this part ,i commend much the deducing of the law of ,god to cases of conscience2 for that ,i take indeed to be a breaking1 and not exhibiting whole of the bread of life4 ,but that which quickeneth both these doctrines of faith and manners is the elevation and consent of the heart2 whereunto appertain books of exhortation1 holy meditation1 ,christian resolution1 and the like4 7#bb7 ,for the liturgy or service1 it consisteth of the reciprocal acts between ,god and man2 which1 on the part of ,god1 are the preaching of the word1 and the sacraments1 which are seals to the covenant1 or as the visible word2 and on the part of man1 invocation of the name of ,god2 and under the law1 sacrifices2 which were as visible prayers or confessions3 but now the adoration being in spiritu et veritate1 there remaineth only vituli labiorum2 although the use of holy vows of thankfulness and retribution may be accounted also as sealed petitions4 7#bc7 ,and for the government of the ,church1 it consisteth of the patrimony of the ,church1 the franchises of the ,church1 and the offices and jurisdictions of the ,church1 and the laws of the ,church directing the whole2 all which have two considerations1 the one in themselves1 the other how they stand compatible and agreeable to the civil estate4 7#bd7 ,this matter of divinity is handled either in form of instruction of truth1 or in form of confutation of falsehood4 ,the declinations from religion1 besides the privative1 which is atheism and the branches thereof1 are three--heresies1 idolatry1 and witchcraft3 heresies1 when we serve the true ,god with a false worship2 idolatry1 when we worship false gods1 supposing them to be true2 and witchcraft1 when we adore false gods1 knowing them to be wicked and false4 ,for so your ,majesty doth excellently well observe1 that witchcraft is the height of idolatry4 ,and yet we see though these be true degrees1 ,samuel teacheth us that they are all of a nature1 when there is once a receding from the ,word of ,god2 for so he saith1 ,quasi peccatum ariolandi est repugnare1 et quasi scelus idololatri nolle acquiescere4 7#be7 ,these things ,i have passed over so briefly because ,i can report no deficiency concerning them3 for ,i can find no space or ground that lieth vacant and unsown in the matter of divinity1 so diligent have men been either in sowing of good seed1 or in sowing of tares4 99 99 99 99 99 ,thus have ,i made as it were a small globe of the intellectual world1 as truly and faithfully as ,i could discover2 with a note and description of those parts which seem to me not constantly occupate1 or not well converted by the labour of man4 ,in which1 if ,i have in any point receded from that which is commonly received1 it hath been with a purpose of proceeding in melius1 and not in aliud2 a mind of amendment and proficiency1 and not of change and difference4 ,for ,i could not be true and constant to the argument ,i handle if ,i were not willing to go beyond others2 but yet not more willing than to have others go beyond me again3 which may the better appear by this1 that ,i have propounded my opinions naked and unarmed1 not seeking to preoccupate the liberty of men's judgments by confutations4 ,for in anything which is well set down1 ,i am in good hope that if the first reading move an objection1 the second reading will make an answer4 ,and in those things wherein ,i have erred1 ,i am sure ,i have not prejudiced the right by litigious arguments2 which certainly have this contrary effect and operation1 that they add authority to error1 and destroy the authority of that which is well invented4 ,for question is an honour and preferment to falsehood1 as on the other side it is a repulse to truth4 ,but the errors ,i claim and challenge to myself as mine own4 ,the good1 it any be1 is due tanquam adeps sacrificii1 to be incensed to the honour1 first of the ,divine ,majesty1 and next of your ,majesty1 to whom on earth ,i am most bounden4 ,,footnotes4 #ci ,stoops in the rice and takes the speeding gold4 ,ovid4 ,metam1 x4 #ffg4