,,prolegomena ,,to ,,the ,,study ,,of ,,hegel',s ,,philosophy ,,and ,,especially ,,of ,,his ,,logic ,,by ,,william ,,wallace1 ,m4,a41 ,,ll4,d4 ,,fellow ,,of ,,merton ,,college ,,and ,,whyte',s ,,professor ,,of ,,moral ,,philosophy ,,in ,,the ,,university ,,of ,,oxford ,,second ,,edition1 ,,revised ,,and ,,augmented ,,oxford ,,at ,,the ,,clarendon ,,press #ahid ,,in ,,remembrance ,,of ,b4 ,,jowett ,,late ,,regius ,,professor ,,of ,,greek ,,and ,,master ,,of ,,balliol ,,college ,,oxford ,,preface ,the present volume of ,prolegomena completes the second edition of my ,,logic ,,of ,,hegel which originally appeared in #ahgd4 ,the translation1 which was issued as a separate volume in the autumn of #ahib1 had been subjected to revision throughout3 such faults as ,i could detect had been amended1 and many changes made in the form of expression with the hope of rendering the interpretation clearer and more adequate4 ,but1 with a subject so abstruse and complicated as ,hegel's ,logic1 and a style so abrupt and condensed as that adopted in his ,encyclopaedia1 a satisfactory translation can hardly fall within the range of possibilities4 ,only the enthusiasm of youth could have thrown itself upon such an enterprise2 and later years have but to do what they may to fulfil the obligations of a task whose difficulties have come to seem nearly insuperable4 ,the translation volume was introduced by a sketch of the growth of the ,encyclopaedia through the three editions published in its author's lifetime3 and an appendix of notes supplied some literary and historical elucidations of the text1 with quotations bearing on the philosophical development between ,kant and ,hegel4 ,the ,prolegomena1 which have grown to more than twice their original extent1 are two-thirds of them new matter4 ,the lapse of twenty years could not but involve a change in the writer's attitude1 at least in details1 towards both facts and problems4 ,the general purpose of the work1 however1 still remains the same1 to supply an introduction to the study of ,hegel1 especially his ,logic1 and to philosophy in general4 ,but1 in the work of altering and inserting1 ,i can hardly imagine that ,i have succeeded in adjusting the additions to the older work with that artful juncture which would simulate the continuity of organic growth4 ,to perform that feat would require a master who surveyed from an imperial outlook the whole system of ,hegelianism in its history and meaning2 and ,i at least do not profess such a mastery4 ,probably therefore a critical review will discern inequalities in the ground1 and even discrepancies in the statement1 of the several chapters4 ,to remove these strains of inconsistency would in any case have been a work of time and trouble3 and1 after all1 mere differences in depth or breadth of view may have their uses4 ,the writer cannot always compel the reader to understand him1 as he himself has not always the same faculty to penetrate and comprehend the problems he deals with4 ,in these arduous paths of research it may well happen that the clearest and truest perceptions are not always those which communicate themselves with fullest persuasion and gift of insight4 ,schopenhauer has somewhere compared the structure of his philosophical work to the hundred-gated ,thebes3 so many1 he says1 are the points of access it offers for the pilgrims after truth to reach its central dogma4 ,so--if one may parallel little things with his adventurous quest--even the less speculative chapters1 and the less consecutive discourse1 of these ,prolegomena may prove helpful to some individual mood or phase of mind4 ,if--as ,i suspect--the ,second ,book should elicit the complaint that the reader has been kept wandering too long and too deviously in the ,porches of ,philosophy1 ,i will hope that sometimes in the course of these rovings he may come across a wicket-gate where he can enter1 and--which is the main thing--gather truth fresh and fruitful for himself4 ,fourteen chapters1 viz4 ,,ii1 ,,xxiv1 and the group from ,,vii to ,,xviii inclusive1 are in this edition almost entirely new4 ,three chapters of the first edition1 numbered ,,xix1 ,,xxii1 ,,xxiii1 have been dropped4 ,for the rest1 ,chaps4 ,,iii-,,vi in the present correspond to ,chaps4 ,,ii-,v in the first edition3 ,chap4 ,,xix to parts of ,,vii1 ,,viii3 ,chaps4 ,,xx-,,xxiii to ,chaps4 ,,ix-,,xii3 ,chaps4 ,,xxv-,,xxx to ,chaps4 ,,xiii-,,xviii3 and ,chaps4 ,,xxxi1 ,,xxxii to ,chaps4 ,,xx1 ,,xxi4 ,but some of those nominally retained have been largely rewritten4 ,the new chapters present1 amongst other things1 a synopsis of the progress of thought in ,germany during the half-century which is bisected by the year #ahjj1 with some indication of the general conditions of the intellectual world1 and with some reference to the interconnexion of speculation and actuality4 ,jacobi and ,herder1 ,kant1 ,fichte1 and ,schelling have been especially brought under succinct review4 ,in the first edition ,i did ,kant less than justice4 ,i have now1 so far as my limits allowed1 tried to rectify the impression2 and even more perhaps1 by a clear palinode1 to tender my apology for the meagre and somewhat inappreciative notice ,i gave to the great names of ,fichte and ,schelling4 ,for like reasons1 and from a growing perception how much post-,kantian thought owed to the pre-,kantian thinkers1 ,spinoza and ,leibniz have been partly brought within my range4 ,if1 furthermore1 ,i may seem to have transgressed the due amount of allusions and comparisons drawn from ,plato and ,aristotle1 ,bacon and ,mill1 the excuse must be sought in that fixture of philosophical horizon which can hardly but creep on after a quarter of a century spent in teaching philosophy under the customs and ordinances of the ,oxford ,school of ,classical ,philology4 ,it would be to mistake the scope of this survey to seek in it a history of the philosophers of the period ,i have named4 ,they have been presented1 not in and for themselves1 but as momenta or constituent6 factors in producing ,hegel's conception of the aim and method of philosophy4 ,to do this it was necessary to lay stress on their inner purport and implications3 to treat the individual thinker in subordination to the general movement of ideas3 to give1 as far as was possible1 a constructive conception of them rather than an analysis and chronicle4 ,yet as the picture had to be done1 so to say1 with a few vigorous touches1 and made characteristic rather than descriptive1 it cannot have that fairness and completeness which only patient study of every feature and untiring experiment in reconstruction can enable even the artist to produce4 ,i may have seemed to confine the environment too exclusively to continental thinkers3 but this is not1 ,i think1 due to any anti-patriotic bias4 ,english 7by which term1 ,i may explain to my countrymen1 ,i mean ,english-writing7 thought1 if it has its own intrinsic value1 has after all been only an occasional influence1 of suggestion and modification1 in ,germany4 ,it is not therefore an integral portion of my theme4 ,even in ,kant's case1 too much may be made of the stimulus he received from ,hume4 ,even twenty years ago1 my translation could hardly be described literally as a voice crying in the wilderness4 ,but since that time there has been a considerable out-put of history1 translation1 and criticism referring to the great age of ,german philosophy1 and a comparatively numerous group of writers1 more or less familiar with the aims and principles of that period1 have treated various parts of philosophy with notable independence and originality4 ,to these writers it has sometimes been found convenient to give the title of ,neo-,kantians1 or ,neo-,hegelians4 ,the prefix suggests that they do not in all points reproduce the ideal or the caricature which vulgar tradition fancied1 and perhaps still fancies1 to be implied in ,german 'transcendentalism4' ,and that for the good reason that the springs of the movement lie in the natural and national revulsion of ,english habits of mind4 ,slowly1 but at length1 the storms of the great ,european revolution found their way to our intellectual world1 and shook church and state1 society and literature4 ,the homeless spirit of the age had to reconsider the task of rebuilding its house of life4 ,it may have been that some of the seekers1 in the fervour of a first impression1 spoke unadvisedly1 as if salvation could and would come to ,english philosophy only by ,kant and ,hegel4 ,yet1 there was a real foundation for the belief that the insularity--however necessary in its season1 and however admirable in some of its results--which had secluded and narrowed the ,british mind since the middle of the eighteenth century1 needed something deeper and stronger than ,french 'ideology' to bring it abreast of the requirements of the age4 ,whatever may be the drawbacks of transcendentalism1 they are virtues when set beside the vulgar ideals of enlightenment by superficialisation4 ,mill has well pointed out how the spirit of ,coleridge was for the higher intellectual life a needful complement to the spirit of ,bentham4 ,yet the spirit of ,coleridge had but caught some of the side-lights and romantic illuminations3 it had not dared to face the central sun either in literature or philosophy4 ,the scholar who has given us excellent versions of ,fichte's lighter works1 those who have translated and expounded ,kant1 and the great author who opened ,german literature to the ,british public1 have brought us nearer the higher teaching of ,germany4 ,in ,germany itself it has always been the possession only of the few4 ,even at the height of the classical period there were litterateurs who vended thousands of their books for ,goethe's hundreds1 and the great philosophers had ten opponents to one follower even amongst the teachers of their day4 ,yet ,goethe and not ,kotzebue gave the permanent law to literature2 ,hegel1 and not ,krug or ,fries1 has influenced philosophy4 ,to have had the resolution to learn in this school is the merit of ',neo-,hegelianism4' ,it has probably not found ,kant free from puzzles and contradictions1 or ,hegel always intelligible4 ,but the example of the ,germans has served to widen and deepen our ideas of philosophy3 to make us think more highly of its function1 and to realise that it is essentially science1 and the science of supreme reality4 ,and it has at least familiarised many with the heresy that dilettantism and occasional fits of speculativeness are worth as little in philosophy as elsewhere4 ,to have striven for dignity in its scope1 and scientific security in its method1 is something4 ,if the ,neo-,hegelian has not given philosophy a settled language1 it may be urged that a philosophical language cannot be created by the easy device of inventing a few ,hellenistic-seeming vocables4 ,i could have wished to make these volumes a worthier contribution to the work whereby these and other writers have recently enriched our island philosophy4 ,not least because of the honoured name ,i have ventured to write on the dedication-page4 ,if1 as ,epicurus said1 we should above all be grateful to the past1 the first meed is from the scholar due to the teachers of earlier years1 and not least those who have now entered into their rest4 ,i do not forget what ,i1 and others1 owed to ,t4 ,h4 ,green1 my predecessor in the ,chair of ,moral ,philosophy2 that example of high-souled devotion to truth1 and of earnest and intrepid thinking on the deep things of eternity4 ,but at this season the memory of my ,oxford tutor and friend is naturally most prominent4 ,the late ,master of ,balliol ,college was more than a mere scholar or a mere philosopher4 ,he seemed so idealist and yet so practical3 so realist and yet so full of high ideals3 so delicately kind and yet so severely reasonable4 ,you felt he saw life more steadily and saw it more whole than others3 as one reality in which religion and philosophy1 art and business1 the sciences and theology1 were severally but elements and aspects4 ,to the amateurs of novelty1 to the slaves of specialisation1 to the devotees of any narrow way1 such largeness might1 with the impatience natural to limited minds1 have seemed indifference4 ,so must appear those who on higher planes hear all the parts in the harmony of humanity1 and with the justice of a wise love maintain an intellectual ,sprosyn4 ,on his pupils this secret power of an other-world serenity laid an irresistible spell1 and bore in upon them the conviction that beyond scholarship and logic there was the fuller truth of life and the all-embracing duty of doing their best to fulfil the amplest requirements of their place4 ,in earlier days ,jowett had been keenly interested in ,german philosophy1 and had made a version 7most of which was still extant in #ahfh7 of the ,logic ,i have translated4 ,but ,greek literature1 and above all ,plato1 drew him to more congenial fields4 ,it was on his suggestion1--or shall ,i say injunction--at that date1 that the work ,i had casually begun was some years later prosecuted to completion4 ,it was his words1 again1 two years ago1 that bade me spare no labour in the work of revision4 ,,oxford1 ,december1 #ahic4 ,,from ,,the ,,preface ,,to ,,the ,,first ,,edition ,the ',logic of ,hegel' is a name which may be given to two separate books4 ,one of these is the ',science of ,logic' 7,wissenschaft der ,logik71 first published in three volumes 7#ahab-ahaf71 while its author was schoolmaster at ,nremberg4 ,a second edition was on its way1 when ,hegel was suddenly cut off1 after revising the first volume only4 ,in the ',secret of ,hegel1' the earlier part of this ,logic has been translated by ,dr4 ,hutchison ,stirling1 with whose name ,german philosophy is chiefly associated in this country4 ,the other ,logic1 of which the present work is a translation1 forms the ,first ,part in the ',encyclopaedia of the ,philosophical ,sciences4' ,the first edition of the ,encyclopaedia appeared at ,heidelberg in #ahag2 the second in #ahbg2 and the third in #ahcj4 ,it is well to bear in mind that these dates take us back forty or fifty years1 to a time when modern science and ,inductive ,logic had yet to win their laurels1 and when the world was in many ways different from what it is now4 ,the earliest edition of the ,encyclopaedia contained the pith of the system4 ,the subsequent editions brought some new materials1 mainly intended to smooth over and explain the transitions between the various sections1 and to answer the objections of critics4 ,the work contained a synopsis of philosophy in the form of paragraphs1 and was to be supplemented by the viva voce remarks of the lecturer4 ,the present volume is translated from the edition of #ahdc1 forming the ,sixth ,volume in ,hegel's ,collected ,works4 ,it consists of two nearly equal portions4 ,one halt here printed in more open type1 contains ,hegel's ,encyclopaedia1 with all the author's own additions4 ,the first paragraph under each number marks the earliest and simplest statement of the first edition4 ,the other half1 here printed in closer type1 is made up of the notes taken in lecture by the editor 7,henning7 and by ,professors ,hotho and ,michelet4 ,these notes for the most part connect the several sections1 rather than explain their statements4 ,their genuineness is vouched for by their being almost verbally the same with other parts of ,hegel's own writings4 ,the translation has tried to keep as closely as possible to the meaning1 without always adhering very rigorously to the words of the original4 ,it is1 however1 much more literal in the later and systematic part1 than in the earlier chapters4 ,the ,prolegomena which precede the translation have not been given in the hope or with the intention of expounding the ,hegelian system4 ,they merely seek to remove certain obstacles1 and to render ,hegel less tantalizingly hard to those who approach him for the first time4 ,how far they will accomplish this1 remains to be seen4 ,,oxford1 ,september1 #ahgc4 ,,contents ,,book ,i4 ,,outlooks ,,and ,,approaches ,,to ,,hegel4 ,,chapter ,i4 ,,why ,,hegel ,,is ,,hard ,,to ,,understand #c ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,,why ,,translate ,,hegel8 #ad ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,,english ,,philosophy ,,and ,,hegel #ba ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,,hegel ,,and ,,theology #cj ,,chapter ,v4 ,,pseudo-,,idealism3 ,,jacobi #cg ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,,the ,,sciences ,,and ,,philosophy #eg ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,,anticipatory ,,sketch ,,of ,,the ,,scope ,,of ,,philosophy #gb ,,chapter ,,viii4 ,,the ,,sceptical ,,doubt3 ,,hume #hh ,,chapter ,,ix4 ,,the ,,attempt ,,at ,a ,,critical ,,solution3 ,,kant #ih ,,chapter ,x4 ,,the ,,critical ,,solution 7continued73 ,,kant #aab ,,chapter ,,xi4 ,,synthesis ,,and ,,reconstruction3 ,,fichte #abd ,,chapter ,,xii4 ,,the ,,beginnings ,,of ,,schelling #acf ,,chapter ,,xiii4 ,,the ,,philosophy ,,of ,,nature ,,and ,,idealism #adg ,,chapter ,,xiv4 ,,transition ,,to ,,hegel #afc ,,book ,,ii4 ,,in ,,the ,,porches ,,of ,,philosophy4 ,,chapter ,,xv4 ,,the ,,two ,,ages ,,of ,,reason #age ,,chapter ,,xvi4 ,,the ,,new ,,idealism #ahi ,,chapter ,,xvii4 ,,methods1 ,,artificial ,,and ,,natural #bjb ,,chapter ,,xviii4 ,,the ,,range ,,of ,,personality #bcj ,,chapter ,,xix4 ,,genesis ,,in ,,mental ,,life #bfa ,,chapter ,,xx4 ,,general ,,law ,,of ,,the ,,philosophy ,,of ,,history #bgg ,,chapter ,,xxi4 ,,abstract ,,and ,,concrete3 ,,and ,,the ,,ordinary ,,logic #bib ,,chapter ,,xxii4 ,,from ,,sense ,,to ,,thought #cjg ,,chapter ,,xxiii4 ,,figurate ,,or ,,representative ,,thought #cbc ,,chapter ,,xxiv4 ,,from ,,substance ,,to ,,subject #cce ,,chapter ,,xxv4 ,,reason ,,and ,,the ,,dialectic ,,of ,,understanding #cdh ,,book ,,iii4 ,,logical ,,outlines4 ,,chapter ,,xxvi4 ,,thought ,,pure ,,and ,,entire #cfe ,,chapter ,,xxvii4 ,,absolute ,,and ,,relative3 ,,or ,,the ,,categories #chc ,,chapter ,,xxviii4 ,,the ,,three ,,parts ,,of ,,logic #cid ,,chapter ,,xxix4 ,,the ,,search ,,for ,a ,,first ,,principle #djd ,,chapter ,,xxx4 ,,the ,,logic ,,of ,,description3 ,,natural ,,realism3 ,,being #dae ,,chapter ,,xxxi4 ,,the ,,logic ,,of ,,explanation ,,and ,,realistic ,,metaphysics3 ,,essence #ddj ,,chapter ,,xxxii4 ,,the ,,logic ,,of ,,comprehension ,,and ,,idealism3 ,,the ,,notion #dei ,,prolegomena ,book ,i ,,outlooks ,,and ,,approaches ,,to ,,hegel ,,chapter ,i4 ,,why ,,hegel ,,is ,,hard ,,to ,,understand4 ',the condemnation1' says ,hegel1 'which a great man lays upon the world1 is to force it to explain him#a4' ,the greatness of ,hegel1 if it be measured by this standard1 must be something far above common4 ,interpreters of his system have contradicted each other1 almost as variously as the several commentators on the ,bible4 ,he is claimed as their head by widely different schools of thought1 all of which appeal to him as the original source of their line of argument4 ,the ,right wing1 and the ,left1 as well as the ,centre1 profess to be the genuine descendants of the prophet1 and to inherit the mantle of his inspiration4 ,if we believe one side1 ,hegel is only to be rightly appreciated when we divest his teaching of every shred of religion and orthodoxy which it retains4 ,if we believe another class of expositors1 he was the champion of ,christianity4 ,these contradictory views may be safely left to abolish each other4 ,but diversity of opinion on such topics is neither unnatural1 nor unusual4 ,the meaning and the bearings of a great event1 or a great character1 or a great work of reasoned thought1 will be estimated and explained in different ways1 according to the effect they produce on different minds and different levels of life and society4 ,those effects1 perhaps1 will not present themselves in their true character1 until long after the original excitement has passed away4 ,to some minds1 the chief value of the ,hegelian system will lie in its vindication of the truths of natural and revealed religion1 and in the agreement of the elaborate reasonings of the philosopher with the simple aspirations of mankind towards higher things4 ,to others that system will have most interest as a philosophical history of thought1--an exposition of that organic development of reason1 which underlies and constitutes all the varied and complex movement of the world4 ,to a third class1 again1 it may seem at best an instrument or method of investigation1 stating the true law by which knowledge proceeds in its endeavour to comprehend and assimilate existing nature4 ,while these various meanings may be given to the ,hegelian scheme of thought1 the majority of the world either pronounce ,hegel to be altogether unintelligible1 or banish him to the limbo of a priori thinkers1--that bourne from which no philosopher returns4 ,to argue with those who start from the latter conviction would be an ungrateful1 and probably a superfluous task4 ,wisdom is justified1 we may be sure1 of all her children4 ,but it may be possible to admit the existence of difficulties1 and agree to some extent with those who complain that ,hegel is impenetrable and hard as adamant4 ,there can be no doubt of the forbidding aspect of the most prominent features in his system4 ,he is hard in himself1 and his readers find him hard4 ,his style is not of the best1 and to foreign eyes seems unequal4 ,at times he is eloquent1 stirring1 and striking3 again his turns are harsh1 and his clauses tiresome to disentangle3 and we are always coming upon that childlikeness of literary manner1 which ,english taste fancies it can detect in some of the greatest works of ,german genius2 ,there are faults in ,hegel1 which obscure his meaning3 but more obstacles are due to the nature of the work1 and the pre-occupations of our minds4 ,there is something in him which fascinates the thinker1 and which inspires a sympathetic student with the vigour and the hopefulness of the spring-time4 ,perhaps the main hindrance in the way of a clear vision is the contrast which ,hegelian philosophy offers to our ordinary habits of mind4 ,generally speaking1 we rest contented if we can get tolerably near our object1 and form a general picture of it to set before ourselves4 ,it might almost be said that we have never thought of such a thing as being in earnest either with our words or with our thoughts4 ,we get into a way of speaking with an uncertain latitude of meaning1 and leave a good deal to the fellow-feeling of our hearers1 who are expected to mend what is defective in our utterances4 ,for most of us the place of exact thought is supplied by metaphors and pictures1 by mental images1 and figures generalised from the senses4 ,and thus it happens that1 when we come upon a single precise and definite statement1 neither exceeding nor falling short in its meaning1 we are thrown out of our reckoning4 ,our fancy and memory have nothing left for them to do3 and1 as fancy and memory make up the greater part of what we loosely call thinking1 our powers of thought seem to be brought to a standstill4 ,those who crave for fluent reading1 or prefer easy writing1 something within the pale of our usual mental lines1 are more likely to find what they seek in the ten partially correct and approximate ways commonly used to give expression to a truth1 than in the one simple and accurate statement of the thought4 ,we prefer a familiar name1 and an accustomed image1 on which our faculties may work4 ,but in the atmosphere of ,hegelian thought1 we feel very much as if we had been lifted into a vacuum1 where we cannot breathe1 and which is a fit habitation for unrecognisable ghosts only4 ,nor is this all4 ,the traveller1 as his train climbs the heights of ,alps or ,apennines1 occasionally1 after circling in grand curve upon the mountain-side1 and perhaps after having been dragged mysterious distances through the gloom of a tunnel1 finds himself as it would seem back at the same place as he looked forth from some minutes before2 and it is only after a brief comparison that he realises he now commands a wider view from a point some hundreds of feet higher4 ,so the student of ,hegel--7and it might be the case with ,fichte also7 as the machinery of the dialectical method1 with its thesis1 antithesis1 and synthesis1 carries him round and round from term to term of thought--like the ,logos and the ,spirit1 which blow us whithersoever they list--begins to suffer from dizziness at the apprehension that he has been the victim of phantasmagoria and has not really moved at all4 ,it is only later--if ever--that he recognises that the scene1 though similar1 is yet not altogether the same4 ,it is only later--if ever--that he understands that the path of philosophy is no wandering from land to land more remote in search of a lost ,absolute1 a vanished ,god2 no setting forth of new and strange facts1 of new ,gods1 but the revelation in fuller and fuller truth of the immanent reality in whom we live1 and move1 and have our being1--the manifestation in more closely-knit unity and more amply-detailed significance of that ,infinite and ,eternal1 which was always present among us1 though we saw but few1 perhaps even no1 traces of its power and glory4 ,to read ,hegel often reminds us of the process we have to go through in trying to answer a riddle4 ,the terms of the problem to be solved are all given to us3 the features of the object are1 it may be1 fully described3 and yet somehow we cannot at once tell what it is all about1 or add up the sum of which we have the several items4 ,we are waiting to learn the subject of the proposition1 of which all these statements may be regarded as the predicates4 ,something1 we feel1 has undoubtedly been said3 but we are at a loss to see what it has been said about4 ,our mind wanders round from one familiar object to another1 and tries them in succession to see whether any one satisfies the several points in the statement and includes them all4 ,we grope here and there for something we are acquainted with1 in which the bits of the description may cohere1 and get a unity which they cannot give themselves4 ,when once we have hit upon the right object1 our troubles are at an end3 and the empty medium is now peopled with a creature of our imagination4 ,we have reached a fixed point in the range of our conception1 around which the given features may cluster4 ,all this trouble caused by the ,hegelian theory of what philosophy involves--viz4 really beginning at the beginning1 is saved by a device well known to the several branches of ,science4 ,it is the way with them to assume that the student has a rough general image of the objects which they examine2 and under the guidance1 or with the help of this generalised image1 they go on to explain and describe its outlines more completely4 ,they start with an approximate conception1 such as anybody may be supposed to have2 and this they seek to render more definite4 ,the geologist1 for example1 could scarcely teach geology'1 unless he could pre-suppose or produce some acquaintance on the part of his pupils with what ,hume would have called an 'impression' or an 'idea' of the rocks and formations of which he has to treat4 ,the geometer gives a short1 and1 as it were1 popular explanation of the sense in which angles1 circles1 triangles1 c4 are to be understood 3 and then by the aid of these provisional definitions we come to a more scientific notion of the same terms4 ,the third book of ,euclid1 for example1 brings before us a clearer notion of what a circle is1 than the nominal explanation in the list of definitions4 ,by means of these temporary aids1 or1 as we may call them1 leading-strings for the intellect1 the progress of the ordinary scientific student is made tolerably easy4 ,but v in philosophy1 as it is found in ,hegel1 there is quite another way of working4 ,the helps in question are absent3 and until it be seen that they are not even needed1 the ,hegelian theory will remain a sealed mystery4 ,for that which the first glance seemed to show as an enigma1 is only the plain and unambiguous statement of thought4 ,instead of casting around for images and accustomed names1 we have only to accept the several terms and articles in the development of thought as they present themselves4 ,these terms merely require to be apprehended4 ,they stand in no immediate need of illustration from our experience4 ,what we have to bring to the work1 is patience1 self-restraint1 the sacrifice of our cherished habits of mind1 the surrender of the natural wish to see at once what it all comes to1 what it is good for1 how it squares with other convictions4 ,as ,bacon reminded his age1 ,into the kingdom of philosophy1 as into the kingdom of heaven1 none can enter1 nisi sub persona infantis3 i4 e4 unless he at least steadfastly resolve to renounce that world which lieth in the ,evil4 ,ordinary knowledge consists in referring a new object to a class of objects1 that is to say1 to a generalised image with which we are already acquainted4 ,it is not so much cognition as re-cognition4 ',what is the truth8' asked ,lady ,chettam of ,mrs4 ,cadwallader in ,middle-march4 ,the truth he is as bad as the wrong physic--nasty to take1 and sure to disagree4 ,there could not be anything worse than that1 said ,lady ,chettam1 with so vivid a conception of the physic that she seemed to have learned something exact about ,mr4 ,casaubon's 'disadvantages4' ,once we have referred the new individual to a familiar category or a convenient metaphor1 once we have given it a name1 and introduced it into the society of our mental drawing-room1 we are satisfied4 ,we have put a fresh object in its appropriate drawer in the cabinet of our ideas3 and hence1 with the pride of a collector1 we can calmly call it our own4 ,but such acquaintance1 proceeding from a mingling of memory and naming1 is not the same thing as knowledge in the strict sense of the term4#b ',what is he8' ',do you know him8' ,these are our questions3 and we are satisfied when we learn his name and his calling4 ,we may never have penetrated into the inner nature of those objects1 with whose tout ensemble1 or rough outlines1 we are so much at home1 that we fancy ourselves thoroughly cognisant of them4 ,classifications are only the first steps in science3 and we do not understand a thought because we can view it under the guise of some of its illustrations4 ,in the case of the ,english reader of ,hegel some peculiar hindrances spring from the foreign language4 ,in strong contrast to most of the well-known ,german philosophers1 he may be said to write in the popular and national dialect of his country4 ,of course there are tones and shades of meaning given to his words by the general context of his system4 ,but upon the whole he did what he promised to ,j4 ,h4 ,voss--the translator of ,homer1 and the poet of the ,luise1 in a letter written from ,jena in #ahje4 ,he there says of his projects3 ',luther has made the ,bible1 and you have made ,homer speak ,german4 ,no greater gift than this could be given to the nation4 ,so long as a nation is not acquainted with a noble work in its own language1 it is still barbarian1 and does not regard the work as its own4 ,forget these two examples1 and ,i may describe my own efforts as an attempt to teach philosophy to speak in ,german4#c ,yet1 in this matter of nationalising or ,germanising philosophy1 he only carried a step further what ,wolff and even ,kant had begun2 just as1 on the other hand1 he falls a long way short of what ,k4 ,c4 ,f4 ,krause1 his contemporary1 attempted in the same direction4 ,such an attempt1 by its very nature1 could never command a popular success4 ,it runs directly counter to that tendency already noted1 to escape the requirement to think and think for ourselves1 by taking refuge under the shadow of a familiar term1 which conceals in its apparent simplicity a great complex of ill-apprehended elements4 ,the ordinary mind--and the more readily perhaps the more vulgar it is--flees for ease and safety to a cosmopolitan term1 to the denationalised vocable of learned origin1 to the language of general ,european culture4 ,to such an ordinary mind--and up at least to a certain extent we all at times come under that heading--the effort to remain in the pellucid air of our unadulterated mother-tongue is too embarrassing to be long continued4 ,nor1 after all1 is it more than partially practicable4 ,the well of ,german undefiled is apt to run dry4 ,hegel himself never shrinks when it is needful to appropriate non-,teutonic words1 and is in the habit of employing the synonymous terms of native and of classical origin with a systematic difference of meaning #d ,hegel is unquestionably par excellence the philosopher of ,germany1--,german through and through4 ,for philosophy1 though the common birthright of full-grown reason in all ages and countries1 must like other universal and cosmopolitan interests1 such as the ,state1 the ,arts1 or the ,church1 submit to the limits and peculiarities imposed upon it by the natural divisions of race and language4 ,the subtler nuances1 as well as the coarser differences of national speech1 make themselves vividly felt in the systems of philosophy1 and defy translation4 ,if ,greek philosophy cannot1 no more can ,german philosophy be turned into a body of ,english thought by a stroke of the translator's pen4 ,there is a difference in this matter1 a difference at least in degree1 between the special sciences and philosophy4 ,the several sciences have a de-nationalised and cosmopolitan character1 like the trades and industries of various nations2 they are pretty much the same in one country and another1 especially when we consider the details1 and neglect the general subdivisions4 ,but in the political body1 in the works of high art1 and in the systems of philosophy1 the whole of the character and temperament of the several peoples finds its expression1 and stands distinctly marked1 in a shape of its own4 ,if the form of ,german polity be not transferable to this side of the ,channel1 no more will ,german philosophy4 ,direct utilisation for ,english purposes is out of the question3 the circumstances are too different4 ,but the study of the great works of foreign thought is not on that account useless1 any more than the study of the great works of foreign statesmanship4 ,hegel did good service1 at least1 by freeing philosophy from that aspect of an imported luxury1 which it usually had1--as if it were an exotic plant removed from the bright air of ,greece into the melancholy mists of ,western ,europe4 ',we have still1' he says1 'to break down the partition between the language of philosophy1 and that of ordinary consciousness3 we have to overcome the reluctance against thinking what we are familiar with#e4' ,philosophy must be brought face to face with ordinary life1 so as to draw its strength from the actual and living present1 and not from the memories or traditions of the past4 ,it has to become the organised and completed thinking of what is contained blindly and vaguely in the various levels of popular intelligence1 as these are more or less educated and ordered4 ,it must grow naturally1 as in ancient ,greece1 from the necessities of the social situation1 and not be a product of artificial introduction and nurture3 the revelation by the mind's own energy of an implicit truth1 not the communication of a mystery sacramentally received4 ,to suppose that a mere change of words can give this grace1 would be absurd4 ,yet where the national life pulses strong1 as that of ,germany in those days did at first in letters and then in social reform1 the dominant note will make itself felt even in the neutral regions of speculation4 ,it was a step on the right road to banish a pompous and aristocratic dialect from philosophy1 and to lead it back to those words and forms of speech1 which are at least in silent harmony with the national feeling4 ,footnote #a3 ,hegel's ,leben 7,rosenkranz71 p4 #eee4 ,footnote #b3 ',das ,bekannte berhaupt ist darum1 weil es bekannt ist1 nicht erkannt4' ,phenomenologie des ,geistes1 p4 #bd4 ,footnote #c3 ,vermischte ,schriften1 vol4 ii4 p4 #dgd4 ,footnote #d3 e4 g4 ,dasein and ,existenz3 ,wirklichkeit and ,realitt3 ,wesen and ,substanz4 ,it is the same habit of curiously pondering over the tones and shades of language which leads him to something very like playing on words1 and to etymologising1 as one may call it1 on unetymological principles3 e4 g4 the play on ,mein and ,meinung 7vol4 ii4 #cb3 cf4 ,werke1 ii4 #ge73 the literal rendering of ,erinnerung 7,encycl4 #bcd and #dej72 and the abrupt transitions1 as it would seem1 from literal to figurative use of such a term as ,grund4 ,at the same time it is well not to be prosaically certain that a free play of thought does not follow the apparently fortuitous assonance of words4 ,footnote #e3 ,hegel's ,leben 7,rosenkranz71 p4 #eec4 ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,,why ,,translate ,,hegel8 ',but1' it is urged1 'though it be well to let the stream of foreign thought irrigate some of our philosophical pastures1 though we should not for ever entrench ourselves in our insularity--why try to introduce ,hegel1 of all philosophers confessedly the most obscure8 ,why not be content with the study and the exploitation of ,kant1 whom ,germans themselves still think so important as to expound him with endless comment and criticism1 and who has at length found1 after some skirmishes1 a recognised place in the ,english philosophical curriculum8 ,why seek for more ,teutonic thinking that can be found in ,schopenhauer1 and found there in a clear and noble style1 luminous in the highest degree1 and touching with no merely academic abstruseness the problems of life and death8 ,or--as that song is sweetest to men which is the newest to ring in their ears--why not render accessible to ,english readers the numerous and suggestive works of ,eduard von ,hartmann1 and of ,friedrich ,nietzsche--not to mention ,robert ,hamerling#a8 ,or1 finally1 why not give us more and ever more translations of the works in logic1 ethics1 psychology1 or metaphysics1 of those many admirable teachers in the ,german universities1 whom it would be invidious to try to single out by name8 ,as for ,hegel1 his system1 in the native land of the philosopher1 is utterly discredited2 its influence is extinct2 it is dead as a door-nail4 ,it is a pity to waste labour and distract attention1 and that in ,english lands1 where there are plenty of problems of our own to solve1 by an attempt1 which must perforce be futile1 to resuscitate these defunctitudes8' ,that ,hegelianism has been utterly discredited1 in certain quarters1 is no discovery reserved for these later days4 ,but on this matter perhaps we may borrow an analogy4 ,if the reader will be at the trouble to take up two ,english newspapers of opposite partisanship and compare the reports from their foreign correspondents on some question of home politics1 he may1 if a novice1 be surprised to learn that according to one1 the opinion e4 g4 of ,vienna is wholly adverse to the measure1 while1 according to the other1 that opinion entirely approves4 ,it is no new thing to find ,hegelianism in general obloquy4 ,even in #ahcj the ,catholic philosopher and theologian ,gnther#b--;an admirer1 but by no means a follower of ,hegel--wrote that1 'for some years it had been the fashion in learned ,germany to look upon philosophy1 and above all ,hegelian philosophy1 as a door-mat on which everybody cleaned his muddy boots before entering the sanctuary of politics and religion4' ,what is true as regards the alleged surcease of ,hegelianism is that in the reaction which from various causes turned itself against philosophy in the two decennia after #ahdh1 that system1 as the most deeply committed part of the 'metaphysical' host1 suffered most severely4 ,history and science seemed to triumph along the whole line4 ,but it may be perhaps permissible to remark that ,hegelianism had predicted for itself the fate that it proved had fallen on all other philosophies4 ,after the age of ,idealism comes the turn of ,realism4 ,the ,idea had to die--had to sink as a germ in the fields of nature and history before it could bear its fruit4 ,above all it is not to be expected that such a system1 so ambitious in aim and concentrated in expression1 could find immediate response and at once disclose all its meaning4 ,his first disciples are not the--truest interpreters of any great teacher4 ,what he saw in the one comprehensive glance of genius1 his successors must often be content to gather by the slow accumulation of years1 and perhaps centuries1 of experience4 ,it is not to ,theophrastus that we go for the truest and fullest conception of ,aristotelianism2 nor is ,plato to be measured by what his immediate successors in the ,academy managed to make out of him4 ,it is now more than a century since ,kant gave his lesson to the public1 and we are still trying to get him focussed in a single view3 it may be even longer till ,hegel comes fully within the range of our historians of thought4 ,aristotelianism too had to wait centuries till it fully entered the consciousness even of the thinking world4 ,it is to be said too that without ,hegel it would be difficult to imagine what even teachers1 like ,lotze1 who were very unlike him1 would have had to say4 ,it does not need a very wide soul1 nor need one be a mere dilettantist eclectic1 to find much of ,schopenhauer's work far from incompatible with his great1 and as some have said1 complementary opposite4 ,it is not indeed prudent as yet for a writer in ,germany who wishes to catch the general ear to affix too openly a profession of ,hegelian principles1 and he will do well to ward off suspicion by some disparaging remarks on the fantastic methods1 the overfondness for system1 the contempt for common sense and scientific results which1 as he declares1 vitiate all the speculations of the period from #agid to #ahcj4 ,but under the names of ,spinoza and of ,leibniz the leaven of ,hegelian principles has been at work3 and if the ,philistines solve the riddle of the intellectual ,samson1 it is because they have ploughed with his heifer1--because his ideas are part of the modern stock of thought1--not from what they literally read in the great thinkers at the close of the seventeenth century4 ,last year saw appear in ,germany two excellent treatises describable as popular introductions to philosophy#c1 one by a thinker who has never disguised his obligations to ,hegel1 the other by a teacher in the ,university of ,berlin who may in many ways be considered as essentially kindred with our general ,english style of thought4 ,but both treatises are more allied in character to the spirit of the ,hegelian attempts to comprehend man and ,god than to the formalistic and philological disquisitions which have for some years formed the staple of ,german professorial activity4 ,and1 lastly1 the vigorous thinker1 who a quarter of a century ago startled the reading public by the portent of a new metaphysic which should be the synthesis of ,schelling and ,schopenhauer1 has lately informed us#d that his affinity to ,hegel is1 taken all in all1 greater than his affinity to any other philosopher'2 and that that affinity extends to all that in ,hegel has essential and permanent value4 ,but it is not on ,eduard von ,hartmann's commendation that we need rest our estimate of ,hegelianism4 ,we shall rather say that1 till more of ,hegel has been assimilated1 he must still block the way4 ,things have altered greatly in the last twenty years1 it is true2 and ideas of more or less ,hegelian origin have taken their place in the common stock of philosophic commodities4 ,but it will probably be admitted by those best qualified to speak on the subject1 that the shower has not as yet penetrated very deeply into the case-hardened soil1 still less saturated it in the measure most likely to cause fruitful shoots to grow forth4 ,we have to go back to ,hegel in the same spirit as we go to ,kant1 and1 for that matter1 to ,plato or ,descartes3 or1 as the moderns may go back--to borrow from another sphere--to ,dante or ,shakespeare4 ,we do not want the modern poet to resuscitate the style and matter of ,king ,lear or of the ,inferno4 ,yet as the ,greek tragedian steeped his soul in the language and the legend of ,homeric epic1 as ,dante nurtured his spirit on the noble melodies of ,mantua's poet2 so philosophy1 if it is to go forth strong and effective1 must mould into its own substance the living thought of former times4 ,it would be as absurd1 and as impossible to be literally and simply a ,hegelian1--if that means one for whom ,hegel sums up all philosophy and all truth--as it is to be at the present day in the literal sense a ,platonist or an ,aristotelian4 ,the world may be slow1 the world of opinion and thought may linger3 e pur si muove4 ,we too have our own problems--the same1 no doubt1 in a sense1 from age to age1 and yet infinitely varying and never in two ages alike4 ,new stars have appeared on the spiritual sky2 and whether they have in them the eternal light or only the flash and glare of a passing meteor1 they alter the aspects of the night in which we are still waiting for the dawn4 ,a new language1 born of new relations of ideas1 or of new ideas1 is perforce for our generation the vehicle of all utterances1 and we cannot again speak the dialect1 however imposing or however quaint1 of a vanished day4 ,and for that reason there must always be a new philosophy1 couched in the language of the age1 sympathetic with its hopes and fears1 conscious of its beliefs1 more or less sensible of its problems--as indeed we may be confident there always will be4 ,but1 perhaps1 the warrior in that battle against illusion and prejudice1 against the sloth which takes things as they are and the poorness of spirit which is satisfied with first appearances1 will not do wisely to disdain the past4 ,he will not indeed equip himself with rusty swords and clumsy artillery from the old arsenals4 ,but he will not disdain the lessons of the past1--its methods and principles of tactics and strategy4 ,recognising perhaps some defects and inequalities in the methods and aims of thought most familiar to him and current in his vicinity1 he may go abroad for other samples1 even though they be not in all respects worth his adoption4 ,and so without taking ,hegel as omniscient1 or pledging himself to every word of the master1 he may think from his own experience that there is much in the system that will be helpful1 when duly estimated and assimilated1 to others4 ,there is--and few can be so bigoted or so positive-minded as to regret it--there is unquestionably a growing interest in ,english-speaking countries in what may be roughly called philosophy--the attempt1 unprejudiced by political1 scientific1 or ecclesiastical dogma1 to solve the questions as to what the world really is1 and what man's place and function is4 ',the burthen of the mystery1 the heavy and the weary weight of all this unintelligible world' is felt--felt widely and sometimes felt deeply4 ,to the direct lightening of that burthen and that mystery it is the privilege of our profoundest thinkers and our far-seeing poets and artists to contribute4 ,to the translator of ,hegel there falls the humbler task of making accessible1 if it may be1 something of one of the later attempts at a solution of the enigma of life and existence1--an attempt which for a time dazzled some of the keenest intellects of its age1 and which has at least impressed many others with the conviction1 born of momentary flashes from it of vast illuminant power1 that--si sic omnia--there was here concealed a key to many puzzles1 and a guard against many illusions likely to beset the inquirer after truth4 ,footnote #a3 ,a book by ,v4 ,knauer published last year 7,hauptprobleme der ,philosophie71 a series of popular lectures1 gives one-sixth of its space to the ',atomistic of ,will' by the ,austrian poet ,hamerling4 ,footnote #b3 ,hegel's ,briefe1 ii4 #cdi4 ,footnote #c3 ,j4 ,volkelt1 ,vortrge zur ,einfhrung in die ,philosophie der ,gegenwart 7,mnchen #ahib73 ,f4 ,paulsen1 ,einleitung in die ,philosophie 7,berlin #ahib74 ,footnote #d3 ,e4 v4 ,hartmann1 ,kritische ,wanderungen1 p4 #gd4 ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,,english ,,philosophy ,,and ,,hegel4 ,although we need not take too seriously ,hegel's remark 7vol4 ii4 p4 #ac7 on the ,english conception of philosophy1 it may be admitted that1 by the dominant school of ,english thought1 philosophy1 taken in the wide sense it has predominantly born abroad1 was1 not so very long ago1 all but entirely ignored4 ,causes of various kinds had turned the energy of the ,english mind into other directions1 not less essential to the common welfare4 ,practical needs and an established social system helped--to bind down studies to definite and particular objects1 and to exclude what seemed vague and general investigations with no immediate bearing on the business of life4 ,hence philosophy in ,england could hardly exist except when it was reduced to the level of a special branch of science1 or when it could be used as a receptacle for the principles and methods common to all the sciences4 ,the general term was often used to denote the wisdom of this world1 or the practical exhibition of self-control in life and action4 ,for those researches1 which are directed to the objects once considered proper to philosophy1 the more definite and characteristic term came to be ,mental and ,moral ,science4 ,the old name was in certain circles restricted to denote the vague and irregular speculations of those thinkers1 who either lived before the rise of exact science1 or who acted in defiance of its precepts and its example4 ,one large and influential class of ,english thinkers inclined to sweep philosophy altogether away1 as equivalent to metaphysics and obsolete forms of error2 and upon the empty site thus obtained they sought to construct a psychological theory of mind1 or they tried to arrange and codify those general remarks upon the general procedure of the sciences which are known under the name of ,inductive ,logic4 ,a smaller1 but not less vigorous1 school of philosophy looked upon their business as an extension and rounding off of science into a complete unification of knowledge4 ,the first is illustrated by the names of ,j4 ,s4 ,mill and ,mr4 ,bain3 the second is the doctrine of ,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer4 ,the encyclopaedic aggregate of biological1 psychological1 ethical and social investigation which ,mr4 ,spencer pursues1 under the general guidance of the formula of evolution by differentiation and integration1 still proceeds on its course3 but though its popularity--as such popularity goes--is vast and more than national1 it does not and probably cannot find many imitators4 ,very differently stand matters with the movement in psychology and logic4 ,here the initiative has led to divergent and unexpected developments4 ,psychology1 which at first was partly an ampler and a more progressive logic1 a theory of the origin and nature of knowledge1 partly a propaedeutic to the more technical logic and ethics1 and pursued in a loosely introspective way1 has gravitated more and more towards its experimental and physiological side1 with occasional velleities to assume the abstractly-mathematical character of a psycho-physical science4 ,logic1 on the other hand1 has also changed its scope4 ,not content to be a mere tool of the sciences or a mere criterion for the estimation of evidence1 it has in one direction grown into a systematic effort to become an epistemology--a system of the first principles of knowledge and reality--a metaphysic of science2 and in another it has sought to realise the meaning of those old forms of inference which the logicians of half a century ago were inclined to pooh-pooh as obsolete4 ,most remarkable--and most novel of all--is the vast increase of interest and research in the problems of ethics and v of what is called the philosophy of religion--subjects which at that date were literally burning questions1 apt to scorch the fingers of those who touched them4 ,in all of this1 but especially marked in some leading thinkers1 the ruling feature is the critical--the sceptical1 i4 e4 the eager1 watchful1 but self-restrained--attitude towards its themes4 ,ever driving on to find a deeper unity than shows on the surface1 and to get at principles1 the modern thinker--and in this we see the permanent and almost overwhelming influence of ,kant upon him--recoils from the dogmatism of system1 at the very moment it seems to be within his grasp4 ,thus the recent products of ,english thought have been1 as ,mr4 ,spencer has taught us to say1 partly in the line of differentiation1 partly of integration4 ,at one moment it seems as if the ancient queen of the sciences sat like ,hecuba1 exul1 inops1 while her younger daughters enjoyed the freedom and progress of specialisation4 ,the wood seems lost behind the trees4 ,and at another1 again1 the centripetal force seems to preponderate3 every department1 logic1 ethics1 psychology1 sociology1 rapidly carries its students on and up to fundamental questions1 if not to fundamental principles4 ,philosophy--the one and undivided truth and quest of truths--emerges fresh1 vigorous1 and as yet rather indeterminate1 from the mass of detailed investigations4 ,that the position is now altered from what it was in times when knowledge had fewer departments1 is obvious4 ,the task of the 'synoptic' mind--which ,plato claims for the philosopher--grows increasingly difficult3 but that is hardly a reason for performing it in a more perfunctory way4 ,it seems rather as if in such a crisis one of the great reconstructive systems of a preceding age might be in some measure helpful4 ,if we consult history1 it is at once clear that philosophy1 or the pursuit of ultimate reality and permanent truth1 went hand in hand with scientific researches into facts and their particular explanations4 ,in their earlier stages the two tendencies of thought were scarcely distinguishable4 ,the philosophers of ,ionia and ,magna ,graecia were also the scientific pioneers of their time4 ,their fragmentary remains remind us at times of the modern theories of geology and biology1--at other times of the teachings of idealism4 ,the same thing is comparatively true of the earlier philosophers of ,modern ,europe4 ,the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries1 in spite of ,bacon and ,newton1 endeavoured to study the mental and moral life by a method which was a strange mixture of empiricism and metaphysics4 ,in words1 indeed1 the thinkers from ,descartes to ,wolff duly emphasise1 perhaps over-emphasise1 the antithesis between the extended and the intellectual4 ,but in practice their course is not so clear4 ,their mental philosophy is often only a preliminary medicina mentis to set the individual mind in good order for undertaking the various tasks awaiting a special research4 ,they are really eager to get on to business1 and only1 as it were1 with regret spend time in this clearance of mental faculty4 ,and when they do deal with objects1 the material and extended tends to become the dominant conception1 the basis of reality4 ,the human mind1 that nobilissima substantia1 is treated only as an aggregate1 or a receptacle1 of ideas1 and the mens1--with them all nearly as with ,spinoza1--is only an idea corporis1 and that phrase not taken so highly as ,spinoza's perhaps should be taken4 ,in the works of these thinkers1 as of the pre-,socratics1 there is one element which may be styled philosophical1 and another element which maybe styled scientific1--if we use both words vaguely4 ,but with ,socrates in the ancient1 and with ,kant in the modern epoch of philosophy1 an attempt was made to get the boundary between the two regions definitively drawn4 ,the distinction was in the first place accompanied by something like turning the back upon science and popular conceptions4 ,socrates withdrew thought from disquisitions concerning the nature of all things1 and fixed it upon man and the state of man4 ,kant left the broad fields of actually-attained knowledge1 and inquired into the central principle on which the acquisition of science1 the laws of human life1 and the ideals of art and religion1 were founded4 ,the change thus begun was not unlike that which ,copernicus effected in the theory of ,astronomy4 ,human personality1 either in the actualised forms of the ,state1 or in the abstract shape of the ,reason1--that intellectual liberty1 which is a man's true world1--was1 at least by implication1 made the pivot around which the system of the sciences might turn4 ,in the contest1 which according to ,reid prevails between ,common ,sense and ,philosophy1 the presumptions of the former have been distinctly reversed1 and ,kant1 like ,socrates1 has shown that it is not the several items of fact1 but the humanity1 the moral law1 the thought1 which underlies these doctrines1 which give the real resting-point and true centre of movement4 ,but this negative attitude of philosophy to the sciences is only the beginning1 needed to secure a standing-ground4 ,in the ancient world ,aristotle1 and in the modern ,hegel 7as the inheritor of the labours of ,fichte and ,schelling71 exhibit the movement outwards to reconquer the universe1 proceeding from that principle which ,socrates and ,kant had emphasised in its fundamental worth4 ,mr4 ,mill1 in the closing chapter of his ,logic1 has briefly sketched the ideal of a science to which he gives the name of ,teleology1 corresponding in the ethical and practical sphere to a ,philosophia ,prima1 or ,metaphysics1 in the theoretical4 ,this ideal and ultimate court of appeal is to be valid in ,morality1 and also in ,prudence1 ,policy and ,taste4 ,but the conception1 although a desirable one1 falls short of the work which ,hegel assigns to philosophy4 ,what he intended to accomplish with detail and regular evolution was not a system of principles in these departments of action only1 but a theory which would give its proper place in our total ,idea of reality to ,art1 ,science1 and ,religion1 to all the consciousness of ordinary life1 and to the evolution of the physical universe4 ,philosophy ranges over the--whole field of actuality1 or existing fact4 ,abstract principles are all very well in their way2 but they are not philosophy4 ,if the world in its historical and its present life develops into endless detail in regular lines1 philosophy must equally develop the narrowness of its first principles into the plenitude of a ,system1--into what ,hegel calls1 the ,idea4 ,his point of view may be gathered from the following remarks in a review of ,hamann1 an erratic friend and fellow-citizen of ,kant's4 ,hamann would not put himself to the trouble1 which in an higher sense ,god undertook4 ,the ancient philosophers have described ,god under the image of a round ball4 ,but if that be ,his nature1 ,god has unfolded it2 and in the actual world ,he has opened the closed shell of truth into a system of ,nature1 into a ,state-system1 a system of ,law and ,morality1 into the system of the world's ,history4 ,the shut fist has become an open hand1 the fingers of which reach out to lay hold of man's mind1 and draw it to ,himself4 ,nor is the human mind a self-involved intelligence1 blindly moving within its own secret recesses4 ,it is no mere feeling and groping about in a vacuum1 but an intelligent system of rational organisation4 ,of that system ,thought is the summit in point of form3 and ,thought maybe described as the capability of going beyond the mere surface of ,god's self-expansion1--or rather as the capability1 by means of reflection upon it1 of entering into it1 and then when the entrance has been secured1 of retracing in thought ,god's expansion of ,himself4 ,to take this trouble is the express duty and end of ends set before the thinking mind1 ever since ,god laid aside ,his rolled-up form1 and revealed ,himself#a4' ,enthusiastic admirers have often spoken as if the salvation of the time could only come from the ,hegelian philosophy4 ',grasp the secret of ,hegel1' they say1 'and you will find a cure for the delusions of your own mind1 and the remedy which will set right the wrongs of the world4' ,these high claims to be a panacea were never made by ,hegel himself4 ,according to him1 as according to ,aristotle1 philosophy as such can produce nothing new4 ,practical statesmen1 and theoretical reformers1 may do their best to correct the inequalities of their time4 ,but the very terms in which ,bacon scornfully depreciated one great concept of philosophy are to be accepted in their literal truth4 ,like a virgin consecrated to ,god1 she bears no fruit#b4 ,she represents the spirit of the world1 resting1 as it were1 when one step in the progress has been accomplished1 and surveying the advance which has been made4 ,philosophy is not1' says ,fichte1 'even a means to shape life3 for it lies in a totally different world1 and what is to have an influence upon life must itself have sprung from life4 ,philosophy is only a means to the knowledge of life4' ,nor has it the vocation to edify men1 and take the place of religion on the higher levels of intellect4 ',the philosopher1' ,fichte boldly continues1 'has no ,god at all and can have no ,god3 he has only a concept of the concept or of the ,idea of ,god4 ,it is only in life that there is ,god and religion3 but the philosopher as such is not the whole complete man1 and it is impossible for any one to be only a philosopher#c4' ,philosophy does not profess to bring into being what ought to be1 but is not yet4 ,it sets up no mere ideals1 which must wait for some future day in order to be realised4 ,enough for it if it show what the world is1 if it were what it professes to be1 and what in a way it must be1 otherwise it could not be even what it is4 ,the subject-matter of philosophy is that which is always realising and always realised--the world in its wholeness as it is and has been4 ,it seeks to put before us1 and embody in permanent outlines1 the universal law of spiritual life and growth1 and not the local1 temporary1 and individual acts of human will4 ,those who ask philosophy to construe1 or to deduce a priori a single blade of grass1 or a single act of a man1 must not be grieved if their request sounds absurd and meets with no answer4 ,the sphere of philosophy is the ,universal4 ,we may say1 if we like1 that it is retrospective4 ,it is the spectator of all time and all existence3 it is its duty to view things sub specie aeternitatis4 ,to comprehend the universe of thought in all its formations and all its features1 to reduce the solid structures1 which mind has created1 to fluidity and transparency in the pure medium of thought1 to set free the fossilised intelligence which the great magician who wields the destinies of the world has hidden under the mask of ,nature1 of the ,mind of man1 of the works of ,art1 of the institutions of the ,state and the orders of ,society1 and of religious forms and creeds3--such is the complicated problem of philosophy4 ,its special work is to comprehend the world1 not try to make it better4 ,if it were the purpose of philosophy to reform and improve the existing state of things1 it comes a little too late for such a task4 ',as the thought of the world1' says ,hegel1 'it makes its first appearance at a time1 when the actual fact has consummated its process of formation1 and is now fully matured4 ,this is the doctrine set forth by the notion of philosophy2 but it is also the teaching of history4 ,it is only when the actual world has reached its full fruition that the ideal rises to confront the reality1 and builds up1 in the shape of an intellectual realm1 that same world grasped in its substantial being4 ,when philosophy paints its grey in grey1 some one shape of life has meanwhile grown old3 and grey in grey1 though it brings it into knowledge1 cannot make it young again4 ,the owl of ,minerva does not start upon its flight1 until the evening twilight has begun to fall#d4' ,footnote #a3 ,vermischte ,schriften1 vol4 ii4 p4 #hg4 ,footnote #b3 ,de ,augm4 ,scient4 iii4 #e4 ,footnote #c3 ,the passages occur in some notes 7written down by ,f4 in reference to the charge of ,atheism7 published in his ,werke1 v4 pp4 #cdb1 #cdh4 ,footnote #d3 ,philosophie des ,rechts1 p4 #bj 7,werke1 viii74 ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,,hegel ,,and ,,theology4 ,even an incidental glance into ,hegel's ,logic cannot fail to discover the frequent recurrence of the name of ,god1 and the discussion of matters not generally touched upon1 unless in works bearing upon religion4 ,there were two questions which seem to have had a certain fascination for ,hegel4 ,one of them1 a rather unpromising problem1 referred to the distances between the several planets in the solar system1 and the law regulating these intervals#a4 ,the other and more intimate problem turned upon the value of the proofs usually offered in support of the being of ,god4 ,that ,god is the supreme certitude of the mind1 the basis of all reality and knowledge1 is what ,hegel no more put in question1 than did ,descartes1 ,spinoza1 or ,locke4 ,what he often repeated was that the matter in these proofs must be distinguished from the imperfect manner in which the arguers presented it4 ,again and again in his ,logic1 as well as in other discussions more especially devoted to it1 he examines this problem4 ,his persistence in this direction might earn for him that title of ',knight of the ,holy ,ghost1' by which ,heine1 in one of the delightful poems of his ',reisebilder1' describes himself to the maid of ,klausthal in the ,harz4 ,the poet of ,love and of ,freedom had undoubted rights to rank among the sacred band3 but so also had the philosopher4 ,like the ,socrates whom ,plato describes to us1 he seems to feel that he has been commissioned to reveal the truth of ,god1 and quicken men by an insight into the right wisdom4 ,nowhere in the modern period of philosophy has higher spirit breathed in the utterances of a thinker4 ,the same theme is claimed as the common heritage of philosophy and religion4 ,a letter to ,duboc#b1 the father of a modern ,german novelist1 lets us see how important this aspect of his system was to ,hegel himself4 ,he had been asked to give a succinct explanation of his standing-ground3 and his answer begins by pointing out that philosophy seeks to apprehend in reasoned knowledge the same truth which the religious mind has in its faith4 ,words like these may at first sight suggest the bold soaring of ancient speculation in the times of ,plato and ,aristotle1 or even the theories of the medieval ,schoolmen4 ,they sound as if he proposed to do for the modern world1 and in the full light of modern knowledge1 what the ,schoolmen tried to accomplish within the somewhat narrow conceptions of medieval ,christianity and ,greek logic4 ,still there is a difference between the two cases4 ,while the ,doctors of the ,church1 in appearance at least1 derived the form of exposition1 and the matter of their systems1 from two independent and apparently heterogeneous sources1 the modern ,scholastic of ,hegel claims to be a harmonious unity1 body finding soul1 and soul giving itself body4 ,and while the ,hegelian system has the all-embracing and encyclopaedic character by which ,scholastic science threw its arms around heaven and earth1 it has also the untrammeled liberty of the ,greek thinkers4 ,hegel1 in short1 shows the union of these two modes of speculation3 free as the ancient1 and comprehensive as the modern4 ,his theory is the explication of ,god2 but of ,god in the actuality and plenitude of the world1 and not as a transcendent ,being1 such as an over-reverent philosophy has sometimes supposed him1 in the solitude of a world beyond4 ,the greatness of a philosophy is its power of comprehending facts4 ,the most characteristic fact of modern times is ,christianity4 ,the general thought and action of the civilised world has been alternately fascinated and repelled1 but always influenced1 and to a high degree permeated1 by the ,christian theory of life1 and still more by the faithful vision of that life displayed in the ,son of ,man4 ,to pass that great cloud of witness and leave it on the other side1 is to admit that your system is no key to the secret of the world1--even if we add1 as some will prefer1 of the world as it is and has been4 ,and therefore the ,hegelian system1 if it is to be a philosophy at all1 must be in this sense ,christian4 ,but it is neither a critic1 nor an apologist of historical ,christianity4 ,the voice of philosophy is as that of the ,jewish doctor of the ,law3 ',if this council or this work be of men1 it will come to nought3 but if it be of ,god1 ye cannot overthrow it1 ,philosophy examines what is1 and not what1 according to some opinions1 ought to be4 ,such a point of view requires no discussion of the ',how' or the ',why' of ,christianity4 ,it involves no inquiry into historical documents1 or into the belief in miracles3 for to it ,christianity rests only incidentally on the evidence of history2 and miracles1 as vulgarly explained1 can find no reception in a philosophical system4 ,for it ,christianity is 'absolute religion'3 religion i4 e4 which has fully become and realised all that religion meant to be4 ,that religion has1 of course1 its historical side3 it appeared at a definite epoch in the annals of our race3 it revealed itself in a unique personality in a remarkable nation4 ,and at an early period of his life ,hegel had tried to gather up in one conception the traits of that august figure1 in his life and speech and death4 ,but1 in the light of philosophy1 this historical side shrivels up as comparatively unimportant4 ,not the personality1 but the 'revelation of reason' through man's spirit3 not the annals of a life once spent in serving ,god and men1 but the words of the ',eternal ,gospel are henceforth the essence of ,christianity4 ,thus the controlling and central conception of life and actuality1 which is the final explanation of all that man thinks and does1 has a twofold aspect4 ,there is1 as it were1 a double ,absolute--for under this name philosophy has what in religion corresponds to ,god4 ,it is true that in the final form of his system the ,absolute ,spirit has three phases--each as it were passing on into and incorporated with the next--,art working out its implications till it appears as ,religion1 and ,religion calling for its perfection in ,philosophy4 ,but in the ,phenomenology1 his first work1 the religion of ,art only intervenes as a grade from 'natural' religion to religion manifest or revealed2 and in the first edition of the ,encyclopaedia what is subsequently called ,art is entitled the ,religion of ,art4 ,it is in entire accordance with these indications when in the ,lectures on ,aesthetics#c it is said 'the true and original position of ,art is to be the first-come immediate self-satisfaction of ,absolute ,spirit'2 though in our days 7it is added7 'its form has ceased to be the highest need of the spirit4' ,it is hardly too much then to say that1 for ,hegel1 the ,absolute has two phases1 ,religion and ,philosophy4 ,the ,hegelian view presents itself most decisively1 though perhaps with a little lecture-like over-insistance1 in the ,philosophy of ,religion#d4 ',the object of religion as of philosophy is the eternal truth in its very objectivity1--,god and nothing but ,god1--and the explication of ,god4 ,philosophy is not a wisdom of the world1 but cognition of the non-worldly3 not a cognition of the external mass of empirical existence and life1 but cognition of what is eternal1 what is ,god1 and what flows from ,his nature4 ,for this nature must reveal and develop itself4 ,hence philosophy explicates itself only when it explicates religion2 and in explicating itself it explicates religion4444 ,thus religion and philosophy coincide3 in fact1 philosophy is itself a divine service1 is a religion3 for it is the same renunciation of subjective fancies and opinions1 and is engaged with ,god alone4' ,again1 it may be asked in what sense philosophy has to deal with ,god and with ,truth4 ,these two terms are often synonyms in ,hegel4 ,all the objects of science1 all the terms of thought1 all the forms of reality1 lead out of themselves1 and seek for a centre and resting-point4 ,they are severally inadequate and partial1 and they crave adequacy and completeness4 ,they tend to organise themselves2 to call out more and more distinctly the fuller reality which they presuppose1--which must have been1 otherwise they could not have been3 they reduce their first appearance of completeness to its due grade of inadequacy and bring out their complementary side1 so as to constitute a system or universe2 and in this tendency to a self-correcting unity consists their progress to truth4 ,their untruth lies in isolation and pretended independence or finality4 ,this completed unity1 in which all things receive their entireness and become adequate1 is their ,truth3 and that ,truth1 as known in religious language1 is ,god4 ,rightly or wrongly1 ,god is thus interpreted in the ,logic of ,hegel4 ,such a position must seem very strange to one who is familiar only with the sober studies of ,english philosophy4 ,in whatever else the leaders of the several schools in this country disagree1 they are nearly all at one in banishing ,god and religion to a world beyond the present sublunary sphere1 to an inscrutable region beyond the scope of scientific inquiry1 where statements may be made at will1 but where we have no power of verifying any statement whatever4 ,this is the common doctrine of ,spencer and ,mansel1 of ,hamilton and ,mill4 ,even those ,english thinkers1 who show some anxiety to support what is at present called ,theism1 generally rest content with vindicating for the mind the vague perception of a ,being beyond us1 and differing from us incommensurably4 ,god is to them a residual phenomenon1 a marginal existence4 ,outside the realm of experience and knowledge there is not-nothing--a something--beyond definite circumscription3 incalculable1 and therefore an object1 possibly of fear1 possibly of hope3 the reflection in the utter darkness of a great ,what-may-it-not-be8 ,he is the ,unknown ,power1 felt by what some of these writers call intuition1 and others call experience4 ,they do not however allow to knowledge any capacity of apprehending in detail the truths which belong to the kingdom of ,god4 ,now the whole teaching of ,hegel is the overthrow of the limits thus set to religious thought4 ,to him all thought1 and all actuality when it is grasped by knowledge1 is from man's side1 an exaltation of the mind towards ,god3 while1 when regarded from the divine standing-point1 it is the manifestation by ,god of ,his own nature in its infinite variety4 ,it is only when we fix our eyes clearly on these general features in his speculation1 that we can understand why he places the maturity of ancient philosophy in the time of ,plotinus and ,proclus4 ,not that these ,neo-,platonists are1 as thinkers1 of power equal to their master of ,athens4 ,but1 in the realm of the blind the one-eyed may be king4 ,the later thinkers set their vision more distinctly and persistently on the land that is eternal--'on the further side of being1' to quote ,plato's phrase4 ,it is for the same reason ,hegel gives so much attention to the religious or semi-religious theories of ,jacob ,bhme and of ,jacobi1 though these men were in many ways so unlike himself4 ,footnote #a3 ,hegel's ,leben1 p4 #aee4 ,it was in his dissertation de ,orbitis ,planetarum1 that the notorious contretemps occurred1 whereby1 whilst the philosopher1 leaning to a ,pythagorean proportion1 hinted--in a line--that it was unnecessary to expect a planet between ,mars and ,jupiter1 astronomers in the same year discovered ,ceres1 the first-detected of the ,planetoids4 ,a good deal has been made out of this trifle2 but it has not yet been shown that the corroboration was anything but the luck of the other hypothesis4 ,footnote #b3 ,vermischte ,schriften1 vol4 ii4 p4 #ebj4 ,duboc was a retired hatter1 of ,french origin1 who had settled at ,hamburg 7,hegel's ,briefe1 ii4 #gf seqq474 ,footnote #c3 ,werke1 x4 ,i1 p4 #aca4 ,footnote #d3 ,werke1 xi4 p4 #ba4 ,,chapter ,v4 ,,pseudo-,,idealism3 ,,jacobi4 ,it is hazardous to try to sum up the net result of a philosophy in a few paragraphs4 ,since ,aristotle separated the pure 'energy' of philosophy from the activities which leave works made and deeds done behind them1 it need scarcely be repeated that the result of a philosophical system is nothing palpable or tangible1--nothing on which you can put your finger1 and say definitely3 ,here it is4 ,the spirit of a philosophy always refuses to be incarcerated in a formula1 however deftly you may try to charm it there4 ,the statement of the principle or tendency of a philosophical system tells not what that system is1 but what it is not4 ,it marks off the position from contiguous points of view2 and on that account never gets beyond the borderland1 which separates that system from something else4 ,the method and process of reasoning is as essential in knowledge1 as the result to which it leads3 and the method in this case is thoroughly bound up with the subject-matter4 ,a mere analysis of the method1 therefore1 or a mere record of the purpose and outcome of the system1 would be1 the one as well as the other1 a fruitless labour1 and come to nothing but words4 ,thus any attempt to convey a glimpse of the truth in a few sentences and in large outlines seems foreclosed4 ,the theory of ,hegel has an abhorrence of mere generalities1 of abstractions with no life in them1 and no growth out of them4 ,his principle has to prove and verify itself to be true and adequate3 and that verification fills up the whole circle of circles1 of which philosophy is said to consist4 ,it seems as if there were in ,hegel two distinct habits of mind which the world--the outside observer--rarely sees except in separation4 ,on one hand there is a sympathy with mystical and intuitional minds1 with the upholders of immediate knowledge and of innate ideas1 with those who find that science and demonstration rather tend to distract from the one thing needful--who would 'lie in ,abraham's bosom all the year1'--those who would fain lay their grasp upon the whole before they have gone through the drudgery of details4 ,on the other hand1 there is within him a strongly 'rationalising' and non-visionary intellect1 with a practical and realistic bent1 and the full scientific spirit4 ,schelling1 in an angry mood1 could describe him as 'the quintessence of all that is prosaic1 both outside and in#a4' ,yet1 seen from other points of view1 ,hegel has been accused of dreaminess1 pietism1 and mystical theology4 ,his merging of the ordinary contrasts of thought in a completer truth1 and what would popularly be described as his mixing up of religious with logical questions1 and the general unfathomableness of his doctrine1--all seem to support such a charge4 ,yet all this is not inconsistent with a rough and incisive vigour of understanding1 a plainness of reason1 and a certain hardness of temperament4 ,this philosopher is in many ways not distinguishable from the ordinary citizen1 and there are not unfrequent moments when his wife hears him groan over the providence that condemned him to be a philosopher#b4 ,he is contemptuous towards all weakly sentimentalism1 and almost brutal in his emphasis on the reasonableness of the actual and on the folly of dreaming the might-have-been2 and keeps his household accounts as carefully as the average head of a family4 ,and1 perhaps1 this convergence of two tendencies of thought may be noticed in the gradual maturing of his ideas4 ,in the period of his ',lehrjahre1' or apprenticeship1 from #agic to #ahjj1 we can see the study of religion in the earlier part of that time at ,bern succeeded by the study of politics and philosophy at ,frankfort-on-the-,main4 ,his purpose on the whole may be termed an attempt to combine breadth with depth1 the intensity of the mystic who craves for union with ,truth1 with the extended range and explicitness of those who multiply knowledge4 ',the depth of the mind is only so deep as its courage to expand and lose itself in its explication#c4 ,it must prove its profundity by the ordered fullness of the knowledge which it has realised4 ,the position and the work of ,hegel will not be intelligible unless we keep in view both of these antagonistic points4 ,the purpose of philosophy--as has been pointed out--is1 for ,hegel--to know ,god1 which is to know things in their ,truth--to see all things in ,god--to comprehend the world in its eternal significance4 ,supposing the purpose capable of being achieved1 what method is open to its attainment8 ,there is on one hand the method of ordinary science in dealing with its objects4 ,these are things1 found as it were projected into space before the observer1 lying outside one another in prima facie independence1 though connected 7by a further finding7 with each other by certain 'accidents' called qualities and relations4 ,among the objects of knowledge1 there are included1 by the somewhat nave intellect that accepts tradition like a physical fact1 certain 'things' of a rather peculiar character4 ,one of these is ,god3 the others1 which a historical criticism has subjoined1 are the ,soul and the ,world4 ,and whatever may be said of the thinghood1 reality1 or existence of the ,world1 there is no doubt that ,god and the ,soul figure1 and figure largely1 in the consciousness of the human race as entities1 differing probably in many respects from other things1 but still possessed of certain fundamental features in common1 and thus playing a part as distinct realities amongst other realities4 ,given such objects1 it is natural for a reflecting mind to attempt to make out a science of ,god and a science of the ,soul1 just as of other 'things4' ,and to these1 a system-loving philosopher might add a science of the world 7,cosmology7#d4 ,it was felt1 indeed1 that these objects were peculiar and unique4 ,thus1 for example1 as regards ,god1 it was held necessary by the logician who saw tradition in its true light to prove ,his existence'3 and various arguments to that end were at different times devised4 ,with regard to the human ,soul1 similarly1 it was considered essential to establish its independent reality as a thing really separate from the bodily organism with which its phenomena were obviously connected1--to prove1 in short1 its substantial existence1 and its emancipation from the bodily fate of dissolution and decay4 ,with reference to the ,world1 the problem was rather different3 it was felt that the name suggested problems for thought rather than denoted reality4 ,how can we predicate of the whole what is predicable of its parts8 ,this or that may have a beginning and a cause1 may have a limit and an end3 but can the totality be presented under these aspects1 without leading to self-contradiction8 ,and the result of these questions in the case of ',cosmology' was to shed in the long run similar doubts on ',rational' ,theology and ',rational' ,psychology4 ,practically this metaphysical science--which is so called as dealing with a province or provinces of being beyond the ordinary or natural 7physical7 realities--treated ,god and the ,soul by the same terms 7or categories7 as it used in dealing with 'material' objects4 ,god e4 g4 was a force1 a cause1 a being2 so1 too1 was the ,soul4 ,the main butt of ,kant's destructive ,criticism of pare ,reason is to challenge the justice of including ,god and the ,soul among the objects of science1--among the things we can know as we may know plants or stars4 ,to make an object of knowledge 7in the strict sense71 to make a thing1 the prerequisite1 ,kant urges1 is perception in space and time4 ,without a sensation--and that sensation1 as it were1 laid out in place and duration--an object of science is impossible4 ,no mere demonstration will conjure it into existence4 ,and with that requirement the old theology and psychology1 which professed to expound the object-,god and the object-soul1 were ruled out-of-order in the list of sciences1 and reduced to mere dialectical exercises4 ,the circle of the sciences1 therefore1 does not lead beyond the conditioned1' beyond the regions of space and time4 ,it has nothing to say of a 'first cause' or of an ultimate end4 ,such was the result that might fairly be read from ,kant's ,criticism of pare ,reason1--especially if read without its supplementary sequels1 and1 above all1 if read by those in whom feeling was stronger than thought1 or who were by nature more endowed with the craving for faith than with the mind of philosophy4 ,such a personality appeared in ,j4 ,h4 ,jacobi1 the younger brother of a poet not undistinguished in his day4 ,amid the duties of public office and the cares of business1 he found time to study ,spinoza1 the ,english and ,scotch moralists1 and above all to follow with interest the development of ,kant from the year #agfc onwards4 ,his house at ,dsseldorf was the scene of many literary reunions1 and ,jacobi himself maintained familiar intercourse with the leaders of the literary and intellectual world1 such as ,lessing1 ,hamann1 ,goethe4 ,his first considerable works were two novels1 in letters1--,allwill1 begun in a serial magazine in #agge1 and ,woldemar1 begun in another magazine in #aggg2 both being issued as complete works in #agha4 ,both turn on a moral antithesis1 and both leave the antithesis as they found it4 ,here pleads the advocate of the heart3 'it is the heart which alone and directly tells man what is good'3 'virtue is a fundamental instinct of human nature'3 the true basis of morals is an immediate certainty2 and the supreme standard is an 'ethical genius' which as it were discovered virtue and which still is a paramount authority in those exceptional situations in life when the 'grammar of virtue' fails to supply adequate rules1 and where1 therefore1 the immediate voice of conscience must in a 'licence of sublime poesy#e' dare1 as ,burke says1 to 'suspend its own rules in favour of its own principles4' ,there1 on the other hand1 is the champion of reason1 who declares all this sentimentalism 'a veritable mysticism of antinomianism and a quietism of immorality#f'3 ',to humanity1' he says1 'and to every man 7every complete man7 principles1 and some system of principles1 are indispensable4' ,woldemar concludes with the pair of mottoes3 ',whosoever trusts to his own heart is a fool1' and ',trust love3 it takes everything1 but it gives everything4' ,in #aghj ,jacobi had his historic conversation with ,lessing at ,wolfenbttel#g4 ,the talk turned on ,spinoza4 ,for many years the philosophy of ,spinoza had seemed to vanish from the world4 ,his name was only heard in a reference of obloquy1 as if it were dangerous to be even suspected of infection with the taint of ,atheism4 ,but both ,lessing and ,jacobi had found him out4 ,the former saw in him an ally in that struggle for higher light and wider views which he undertook in a spirit and with a scope hardly surmised by those he usually wrought with4 ,jacobi1 on the contrary1 saw in him personified the conjunction of all those irreligious tendencies which all philosophy in some degree exhibited3 the tendency to veil or set aside ,god and personality4 ',i believe1' says ,jacobi1 as he began the conversation 'in an intelligent personal cause of the world4' ',then ,i am going1' replied ,lessing1 'to hear something quite new'3 and he dryly put aside the other's rhapsody on the 'personal extra-mundane deity with the remark ',words1 my dear ,jacobi1 words4' ,jacobi's work ,letters on the doctrine of ,spinoza 7it appeared in #aghe7 was the beginning of a controversy in which ,mendelssohn and ,herder took part1 and in which ,goethe took an interest under ,herders tutorship4 ,to the exact philological study of ,spinoza it did not contribute much3 for the ,spinoza whom ,herder and ,goethe saw as their spiritual forefather was transfigured in their thought to a figure to which ,leibniz had almost an equal right to give his name4 ,he upheld to them the symbol of the immanence of the divine in nature3 he was the leader in the battle against 'philistine' deism and utilitarianism4 ,with the ,kantian criticism of the pseudo-science of theology ,jacobi had in one way no fault to find4 ,that reasoning by its demonstration cannot find out ,god1 was to him an axiomatic belief4 ,but the 'man of feeling' felt uneasy at the trenchant methods of the ,knigsberg man of logic4 ,he seemed to see the world of men and things passing under ,kant's manipulation into a mere collection of phenomena and ideas of the mind4 ,still more was he sensible to the loss of his ,god4 ,that surrogate of an argument for theism which ,kant seemed to offer in the implications of the ,moral ,law did not give what ,jacobi wanted4 ,mere morality is a cold and mechanical principle--he thinks--compared with that infinite life and love which we deem we have in ,god4 ,the son of man1 he felt1 was1 in virtue of an indwelling genius of conscience1 supreme over the moral law3 how much more1 then1 the ,absolute and ,eternal on a higher grade of being than its mechanical regularities6 ,if the way of reasoning will not carry us to the ,absolute1 still less 7and that is whither ,jacobi wishes to reach7 to ,god1 there must be another way3 for something in him1 which may be called ,faith or ,feeling1 ,spiritual ,sense or ,reason1 proclaims itself certain of the reality both of ,god and ,nature4 ,there is an objective reality--outside and beyond him--yet somehow to be reached by a daring leap1--whereby1 out of sheer force of will1 he1 shutting his eyes to the temporal and the mechanical1 finds himself carried over the dividing gulf into the land of eternal life and love4 ',i appeal' he says in his latest utterances#h 'to an imperative1 an invincible feeling as the first and underived ground of all philosophy and all religion1--to a feeling which lets man become aware of and alive to the fact that he has a sense for the supersensuous4' ',as it is religion which makes man man1' he continues1 'and which alone lifts him above the animals1 so it also makes him a philosopher4' ,such an organ for the supersensuous is what in his later writings he calls ,vernunft 7,reason7 and distinguishes from ,verstand 7,understanding74 ',this reason1' says ,coleridge 7to whom we owe this use of the terms in ,english7 in the ,friend1 'is an organ bearing the same relation to spiritual objects as the eye bears to material phenomena1' ,it is 'that intuition of things which arises when we possess ourselves as one with the whole and is opposed to that 'science of the mere understanding' in which 'transferring reality to the negations of reality 7to the ever-varying framework of the uniform life7 we think of ourselves as separated beings1 and place nature in antithesis to the mind1 as object to subject1 thing to thought1 death to life4' ,but this ,reason is even more than this4 ,it is the direct contact with reality1 which it affirms and even is4 ,it apprehends the me and the thee1 it apprehends above all the great ,thee1 ,god3 apprehends1 and we may even say appropriates#i4 ,and it apprehends them at one bound--in one salto mortale--because it is really in implicit possession of them4 ,call the step a miracle1 if you will3 you must admit1 he adds1 that 'some time or other every philosophy must have recourse to a miracle#aj4' ,and yet the asseveration rings false--it shows a womanish wilfulness and weakness in its reiteration4 ,he has the reality2 yet he has it not4 ',were a ,god known1' he says in one place1 ',he would not be ,god4' ,he yearns with passionate longing to find the living and true3 he feels himself and the ,eternal clasped in one3 his faith effects the reality of things hoped for4 ,but1 he adds1 ',we never see the ,absolute'3 the primal light of reason is but faint4 ,it is but a presage--a pre-supposition--of the ,everlasting4 ,this reason1 in short1 needs discipline and development1 it needs the ethical life to raise it3 'without morality no religiosity1' he says4 ',light1' he complains1 'is in my heart1' but at the moment ,i want to bring it into the understanding1 the light goes out4' ,and yet he knows--and ,coleridge repeats--'the consciousness of reason and of its revelations is only possible in an understanding4' ',there seem to be one or two motives acting upon ,jacobi4 ,the 'plain man1' especially if he be of high character and of 'noble' religiosity1 has a feeling that the lust of philosophising disturbs the security of life1 and endangers things which are deservedly dear to him4 ,in such an one the 'enthusiasm of logic'--the calm pursuit of truth at all costs1 so characteristic of ,lessing--is inferior to the 'enthusiasm of life1'--a passion in which the terrestrial and the celestial are inextricably blended1 where one clings to ,god as the stronghold of self1 and sets personality--our human personality--in the throne of the ,eternal4 ,he will be all that is noble and good1 if only he be not asked utterly to surrender self4 ,so1 too1 ,jacobi's ,god--or ,absolute 7for he leaves his 'non-philosophy' so far as to use both names71 is rather the final aim of a grand1 overpowering yearning1 than a calm1 self-centred1 self-expanding life which carries man along with it4 ,it would be1 he feels1 so very terrible1 if at the last there were no ,god to meet us--to find the throne of the universe vacant4 ,avaunt philosophy1 therefore6 ,let us cling to the faith of our nature and our childhood1 and refuse her treacherous consolations6 ,with the central proposition of ,jacobi1 ,hegel1 for one1 is not inclined to quarrel4 ,he too1 as he asks and answers the question as to the issues of this and of the better life1 might say ',question1 answer presuppose ,two points3 that the thing itself which questions1 answers1--is1 it knows2 ,as it also knows the thing perceived outside itself--a force ,actual ere its own beginning1 operative through its course1 ,unaffected by its end1--that this thing likewise needs must be2 ,call this--,god1 then1 call that--,soul1 and both the only facts for me4 ,prove them facts8 that they o'erpass my power of proving proves them such3 ,fact it is1 ,i know1 ,i know not something which is fact as much4' ,but when ,jacobi goes on to say that it is the supreme and final duty of the true sage 'to unveil reality1'--meaning thereby that1 given the feeling1 he has only to ',define it well ,for fear divine ,philosophy ,should push beyond her mark and be ,procuress to the ,lords of ,hell1' ,hegel withdraws4 ,it is the duty of philosophy to labour to make the perception--the fleeting1 uncertain1 trembling perception--of faith1 a clear1 sure1 inwardly consistent knowledge3 to show1 and not merely to assert1 that 'the path of 7this world's7 duty is the way to 7that world's7 glory4' ,there is1 ,hegel himself has said more than once1 something opposed to ordinary ways of thinking in the procedure of the philosopher4 ,to the outsider1 it seems like standing on your head4 ,it involves something like what1 in religious language1 is termed conversion--a new birth--becoming a new man4 ,but though such a change always seems to culminate in a moment of sudden transformation1--as if the continuity of old and new were disrupted1 the process has a history and a preparation4 ,of that pilgrim's progress of the world-distracted soul to its discovery of its true being in ,god1 philosophy is the record3 a record which ,hegel has written both in the ,phenomenology of ,mind1 and1 more methodically1 in his ,encyclopaedia4 ,the passage from nature to ,god--or from man's limitations to the divine fullness--must be made1 he urged1 in the open day and not in the secret vision when sleep falls upon men4 ,when the aged ,jacobi read these requirements of ,hegel1 he wrote to a friend3 ',he may be right1 and ,i should like once again to experiment with him all that the power of thinking can do alone1 were not the old man's head too weak for it#aa4' ',for a philosophy like this1' says ,hegel#ab1 'individual man and humanity are the ultimate standpoint3--as a fixed invincible finitude of reason1 not as a reflection of the eternal beauty1 or as a spiritual focus of the universe1 but as an ultimate sense-nature1 which however with the power of faith can daub itself over here and there with an alien supersensible4 ,let us suppose an artist restricted to portrait-painting2 he might so far idealise as to introduce in the eye of a commonplace countenance a yearning look1 and on its lips a melancholy smile1 but he would be utterly debarred from depicting the ,gods1 sublime over yearning and melancholy--as if the delineation of eternal pictures were only possible at the cost of humanity4 ,so too ,philosophy--on this view--must not portray the ,idea of man1 but the abstraction of a humanity empirical and mingled with short-comings1 and must bear a body impaled on the stake of the absolute antithesis2 and when it clearly feels its limitation to the sensible1 it must at the same time bedeck itself with the surface colour of a supersensible1 and point the finger of faith to a something ,higher4 ',but the truth cannot be defrauded by such a consecration if finitude be still left subsisting2 the true consecration must annihilate it4 ,the artist1 who fails to give actuality the true truth by letting fall upon it the ethereal illumination and taking it completely in that light1 and who can only depict actuality in its bare ordinary reality and truth 7a reality however which is neither true nor real7 may apply the pathetic remedy to actuality1 the remedy of tenderness and sentimentality1 everywhere putting tears on the cheeks of the commonplace1 and an ,o ,god6 in their mouth4 ,no doubt his figures in this way direct their look over the actual heavenwards1 but like bats they belong neither to the race of birds nor beasts1 neither to earth nor heaven4 ,their beauty is not free from ugliness1 nor their morals without weakness and meanness3 the intelligence they haply may show is not without banality3 the success which enters into it is not without vulgarity1 and the misfortune not without cowardice and terror2 and both success and misfortune have something contemptible4 ,so too philosophy1 if it takes the finite and subjectivity as absolute truth in the logical form habitual to her1 cannot purify them by bringing them into relation with an infinite3 for that infinite is not itself the true1 because it is unable to consume finitude4 ,but where a philosophy consumes the temporal as such and burns up reality1 its action is pronounced a cruel dissection1 which does not leave man complete1 and a forcible abstraction which has no truth1 above all no truth for life4 ,and such an abstraction is treated as a painful amputation of an essential piece from the completeness of the whole3 that essential piece1 and absolute substantiality being believed to consist in the temporal and empirical1 and in privation4 ,it is as if a person1 who sees only the feet of a work of art1 were to complain1 should the whole work be unveiled to his eyes1 that he was deprived of the privation1 that the incomplete was decompleted4' ,jacobi has been spoken of as the leader of this ',un-philosophy' of faith4 ,as such his allies lie on one side among philosophers who hold by the deliverances of 'common sense1' by the consciousness of the unsophisticated man shrinking from the waywardness of an idealism that deprives him of his solidest realities4 ,the type of such a philosopher has been drawn by ,hegel#ac in ,krug4 ,but1 on the other side1 ,jacobi touched hands--though not in a sympathetic spirit--with a somewhat motley band which also had set its face to go to the everlasting gates1 but had turned aside to aimless wandering on the ,hill ,difficulty1 or sought too soon the repose of the ,delectable ,mountains1 without due sojourn in the valley of ,humiliation or descent under the ,shadow of ,death4 ,like ,wordsworth1 they felt that the world is too much with us3 that our true self is frittered away into fragments and passing stages1 in which we are not ourselves1--whereby we also lose the true perception of the essential life of nature4 ,gradually we have sunk into the deadening arms of habit1 reduced ourselves to professional and conventional types1 and lost the freer and larger mobility of spiritual being4 ,we have grown into verstndige ,leute--people of practical sense and worldly wisdom4 ,to such1 philosophy would come--if it could come--as the great breath of life--of 'reason' 7,vernunft7 which transcends the separations inevitable in practical will and knowledge4 ,but to this band--which has been styled the ,romantic ,school of ,germany--the liberation came in ways more analogous to that craved for by ,jacobi4 ,their way was the way of ,romance and ,imagination4 ,the principle of ,romance is the protest against confining man and nature to the dull round of uniformities which custom and experience have imprisoned them in4 ,boundless life1 infinite spontaneity is surging within us and the world1 ready to break down the dams convention and inertia have established4 ,that inner power is an ever-fresh1 ever-restless ,irony1 which sets up and overthrows1 which refuses to be bound or stereotyped1 which is never weary1 never exhausted1--free in the absolute sense4 ,it is the mystic force of ,nature1 which they seemed to see ever on the spring to work its magic transformations1 and burst the bulwarks of empirical law4 ,it is the princely jus aggratiandi1 the sportive sovereignty of the true artist1 who is able at any moment to enter into direct communion with the heart of things4 ,the beginning of the nineteenth century in ,germany1 as well as in ,england1 was a period of effervescence3--there was a good deal of fire1 and naturally there was also a good deal of smoke4 ,genius was exultant in its aspirations after ,freedom1 ,truth1 and ,wisdom4 ,the ,romantic ,school1 which had grown up under the stimulus of ,fichte's resolve to enact thought1 and had for a time been closely allied with ,schelling1 counted amongst its literary chiefs the names of the ,schlegels1 of ,tieck1 ,novalis1 and perhaps ,richter4 ,the world1 as that generation dreamed1 was to be made young again1--first by drinking1 where ,wordsworth led1 from the fresh springs of nature1--afterwards when1 as often has happened1 doubts arose as to where ,nature was really to be found1 by an elixir distilled from the withered flowers of medieval ,catholicism and chivalry1 ',since the ,mid-,age was the ,heroic ,time' and even from the old roots of primeval wisdom4 ,the good old times of faith and harmonious beauty were to be brought back again by the joint labours of ideas and poetry4-- ',so1 all that the old ,dukes had been1 without knowing it1 ,this ,duke would fain know he was without being it4' ,to that period of incipient and darkling energy ,hegel stands in very much the same position as ,luther did to the pre-,reformation mystics1 to ,meister ,eckhart1 and the unknown author of the ',german ,theology4' ,it was from this side1 from the school of ,genius and ,romance in philosophy1 that ,hegel was proximately driven1 not into sheer re-action1 but into system1 development1 and science4 ,to elevate philosophy from a love of wisdom into the possession of real wisdom1 into a system and a science1 is the aim which he distinctly set before himself from the beginning4 ,in almost every work1 and every course of lectures1 whatever be their subject1 he cannot let slip the chance of an attack upon the mode of philosophising which substituted the strength of belief or conviction for the intervention of reasoning and argument4 ,there may have been a strong sympathy in him with the end which these ,german contemporaries and1 in some ways1 analogues to ,coleridge1 ,shelley1 ,wordsworth1 and ,byron had in view4 ,no one who reads his criticism of ,kant can miss perceiving his bent towards the ,infinite4 ,but he utterly rejects the vision of feeling1 whether as longing faith or devout enjoyment1 as an adequate exposition of the means to this end4 ,whereas these fantastic seers and sentimentalists either disparage science as a limitation to the spirit1 in the calm trust of their life in ,god1 or yearn throughout life for a peace which they never quite reach1 ,hegel is bent upon showing men that the ,infinite is not unknowable1 as ,kant would have it1 and yet that man can not1 as ,jacobi would have it1 naturally and without an effort enjoy the things of ,god#ad4 ,he will prove that the way of ,truth is open1 and prove it by describing in detail every step of the road4 ,philosophy for him must be reasoned truth4 ,she does not visit favoured ones in visions of the night1 but comes to all who win her by patient study4 ',for those1' he says1 'who ask for a royal road to science1 no more convenient directions can be given than to trust to their own sound common sense1 and1 if they wish to keep up with the age and with philosophy1 to read the reviews criticising philosophical works1 and perhaps even the prefaces and the first paragraphs in these works themselves4 ,the introductory remarks state the general and fundamental principles2 and the reviews1 besides their historical information1 contain a critical estimate1 which1 from the very fact that it is such1 is beyond and above what it criticises4 ,this is the road of ordinary men3 and it may be traversed in a dressing-gown4 ,the other way is the way of intuition4 ,it requires you to don the vestments of the high-priest4 ,along that road stalks the ennobling sentiment of the ,eternal1 the ,true1 the ,infinite4 ,but it is wrong to call this a road4 ,these grand sentiments find themselves1 naturally and without taking a single step1 centred in the very sanctuary of truth4 ,so mighty is genius1 with its deep original ideas and its high flashes of wit4 ,but a depth like this is not enough to lay bare the sources of true being1 and these rockets are not the empyrean4 ,true thoughts and scientific insights are only to be gained by the labour which comprehends and grasps its object4 ,and that thorough grasp alone can produce the universality of science4 ,contrasted with the vulgar vagueness and scantiness of common sense1 that universality is a fully-formed and rounded intellect2 and1 contrasted with the un-vulgar generality of the natural gift of reason when it has been spoilt by the laziness and self-conceit of genius1 it is truth put in possession of its native form1 and thus rendered the possible property of every self-conscious reason#ae4' ,these words which were taken to heart 7unnecessarily1 perhaps7 by the patron of the ,intellectual ,intuition rung the knell to the friendship of ,hegel with his great contemporary ,schelling4 ,yet this hard saying is also the keynote to the subsequent work of the philosopher4 ,in ,hegel we need expect no brilliant apergus of genius1 no intellectual legerdemain1 but only the patient unraveling of the clue of thought through all knots and intricacies3 a deliberate tracing and working-out of the contradictions and mysteries in thought1 until the contradiction and the mystery disappear4 ,perseverance is the secret of ,hegel4 ,this characteristic of patient work is seen1 for example1 in the incessant prosecution of hints and glimpses1 until they grew into systematic and rounded outline4 ,instead of vague anticipations and guesses at truth1 fragments of insight1 his years of philosophic study are occupied with writing and re-writing1 in the ,v endeavour to clear up and arrange the masses of his ideas4 ,essay after essay1 and sketch after sketch of a system1 succeed each other amongst his papers4 ,his first great work was not published before his #cgth year1 after six years spent in university work at ,jena1 following as many spent in preliminary lucubration4 ,the notes which he used to dictate some years afterwards to the boys in the ,gymnasium at ,nrnberg bear evidence of constant remodelling1 and the same is true of his professorial lectures4 ,such insistance in tracing every suggestion of truth to its place in the universe of thought is the peculiar character and difficulty of ,hegelian argument4 ,other observers have now and again noticed1 accentuated1 and1 it may be1 popularised some one point or some one law in the evolution of reason4 ,here and there1 as we reflect1 we are forced to recognise what ,hegel termed the dialectical nature in thought1--the tendency1 by which a principle1 when made to be all that it implied1 when1 as the phrase is1 it is carried to extremes1 recoils and leaves us confronted by its antithesis4 ,we cannot1 for example1 study the history of ancient thought without noting this phenomenon4 ,thus1 the persistence with which ,plato and ,aristotle taught and enforced the doctrine that the community was the guide and safeguard of the several citizens1 very soon issued in the schools of ,zeno and ,epicurus1 teaching the rights of self-seeking and of the independent self-realisation of the individual4 ,but the passing glimpse of an indwelling discord in the terms1 by which we argue1 is soon forgotten1 and is set aside under the head of accidents1 instead of being referred to a general law4 ,most of us take only a single step to avoid what has turned out wrong1 and when we have overcome the seeming absoluteness of one idea1 we are content and even eager to throw ourselves under the yoke of another1 not less one-sided than its predecessor4 ,sometimes one feels tempted to say that the course of human thought as a whole1 as well as that branch of it termed science1 exhibits nothing but a succession of illusions1 which enclose us in the belief that some idea is all-embracing as the universe1--illusions1 from which the mind is time after time liberated1 only in a little while to sink under the sway of some partial correction1 as if it and it only were the complete truth4 ,or1 again1 the ,positive ,philosophy exhibits as one of its features an emphatic and popular statement of a fallacy much discussed in ,hegel4 ,one of the best deeds of that school has been to protest against a delusive belief in certain words and notions2 particularly by pointing out the insufficiency of what it calls metaphysical terms1 i4 e4 those abstract entities formed by reflective thought1 which are little else than a double of the phenomenon they are intended to explain4 ,to account for the existence of insanity by an assumed basis for it in the 'insane neurosis1' or to attribute the sleep which follows a dose of opium to the soporific virtues of the drug1 are some exaggerated examples of the metaphysical intellect which is so rampant in much of our popular1 and even of our esoteric science4 ,positivism by its logical precepts ought at least to have instilled general distrust of abstract talk about essences1 laws1 forces and causes1 whenever they claim an inherent and independent value1 or profess to be more than a reflex of sensation4 ,but all this is only a desultory perception1 the reflection of an intelligent observer4 ,when we come to ,hegel1 the ,comtian perception of the danger lying in the terms of metaphysics is replaced by the ,second ,part of ,logic1 the ,theory of ,essential ,being1 where substances1 causes1 forces1 essences1 matters1 are confronted with what ,mr4 ,bain has called their 'suppressed correlative#af4' ,footnote #a3 ,aus ,schellings ,leben 7,plitt471 ii4 #afa4 ,footnote #b3 ,hegel's ,briefe1 ii4 #cgg4 ,footnote #c3 ,phenomenologie des ,geistes1 p4 #i4 ,footnote #d3 ,cf4 ,notes and ,illustrations in vol4 ii4 #cif1 and chapter iii4 of the ,logic4 ,footnote #e3 ,jacobi's ,werke1 v4 #gi1 ,,iii1 #aae1 #dag4 ,footnote #f3 ,ibid41 i4 #agh4 ,footnote #g3 ,jacobi's ,werke1 iv4 i4 ,abth4 p4 #ee seqq4 ,footnote #h3 ,jacobi's ,werke1 iv4 i1 p4 xxi4 ,footnote #i3 ,jacobi's ,briefwechsel1 i4 #ccj4 ,footnote #aj3 ,jacobi's ,werke1 iii4 #ec4 ,footnote #aa3 ,jacobi's ,briefwechsel1 ii4 #dfh4 ,footnote #ab3 ,hegel's ,werke1 i4 #ae4 ,footnote #ac3 ,hegel's ,vermischte ,schriften1 i4 #ej4 ,footnote #ad3 ,compare pages #aba-adb of the ,logic4 ,footnote #ae3 ,phenomenologie des ,geistes1 p4 #ed 7,werke1 ii74 ,footnote #af3 ,practical ,essays1 p4 #dc4 ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,,the ,,sciences ,,and ,,philosophy4 ,by asserting the rights of philosophy against the dogmatism of self-inspired 'unphilosophy1' and by maintaining that we must not feel the truth1 with our eyes as it were closed1 but must open them full upon it1 ,hegel does not reduce philosophy to the level of one of the finite sciences4 ,the name 'finite1' like the name 'empirical1' is not a title of which the sciences have any cause to be ashamed4 ,they are called empirical1 because it is their glory and their strength to found upon experience4 ,they are called finite1 because they have a fixed object1 which they must expect and cannot alter2 because they have an end and a beginning1--presupposing something where they begin1 and leaving something for the sciences which come after4 ,botany rests upon the researches of chemistry3 and astronomy hands over the record of cosmical movements to geology4 ,science is interlinked with science2 and each of them is a fragment4 ,nor can these fragments ever1 in the strict sense of the word1 make up a whole or total4 ,they have broken off1 sometimes by accident1 and sometimes for convenience1 from one another4 ,the sciences have budded forth here and there upon the tree of popular knowledge and ordinary consciousness1 as the interest and needs of the time drew attention closer to various points and objects in the world surrounding us4 ,prosecute the popular knowledge about any point far enough1 substituting completeness and accuracy for vagueness1 and especially giving numerical definiteness in weight1 size1 and figure1 until the little drop of fact has grown into an ocean1 and the mere germ has expanded into a structure with complex interconnexion1--and you will have a science4 ,by its point of origin this luminous body of facts is united to the great circle of human knowledge and ignorance4 ,each special science is a part1 which presupposes a total of much lower organisation1 but much wider range than itself3 each branch of scientific knowledge grows out of the already existent tree of acquaintance with things4 ,but the part very soon assumes an independence of its own1 and adopts a hostile or negative attitude towards the general level of unscientific opinion4 ,this process of what we may1 from the vulgar point of view1 call abnormal development1 is repeated irregularly at various points along the surface of ordinary consciousness4 ,at one time it is the celestial movements calling for the science of astronomy3 at another the problem of dividing the soil calling for the geometrician4 ,each of these outgrowths naturally re-acts and modifies the whole range of human knowledge1 or what we may call popular science2 and thus1 while keeping up its own life1 it quickens the parent stock with an infusion of new vigour1 and raises the general intelligence to a higher level and into a higher element4 ,the order of the outcome of the sciences in time1 therefore1 and their connexions with one another1 cannot be explained or understood1 if we look only to the sciences themselves4 ,we must first of all descend into the depths of natural thought1 or of general culture1 and trace the lines which unite science with science in that general medium4 ,the systematic interdependence of the sciences must be chiefly sought for in the workings of thought as a whole in its popular phases1 and in the action and reaction of that general human thought with the sciences1 those definite organisations of knowledge which form sporadically round the nuclei here and there presented in what would superficially be described as the inorganic mass and medium of popular knowledge4 ,thus1 by means of the sciences in their aggregate action1 the material of common consciousness is expanded and developed1 at least in certain parts1 though the expansion may be neither consistent nor systematic4 ,but so long as this work is incomplete1 so long1 that is to say1 as every point in the line of popular knowledge has not received its due elaboration and equal study1 the sciences merely succeed each other in a certain imperfect sequence1 or exist in juxtaposition3 they do not form a total4 ,the whole of scientific knowledge will only be formed1 when science shall be as completely rounded and unified1 as in its lower sphere and more inadequate element the ordinary consciousness of the world is now4 ,up to a certain point the method of science is but the method of ordinary consciousness pursued knowingly and steadily4 ,but ere long the method acquires a distinctive character of its own4 ,it shakes off the pressure of that immediate subservience in which ordinary knowledge stands to man's needs1 wishes and interests4 ,knowledge is pursued--within a wide range--for its own sake1 and by a class more or less definitely set apart by humanity for its scientific service1--which is thus performed more systematically and continuously4 ,but the great step which carries ordinary knowledge into its higher region is the discovery1 due to reflection and comparison1 that there is a double grade of reality-a permanent1 essential1 uniform1 substantial being1 which is contrasted with an evanescent1 apparent1 varying and accidental4 ,to know a thing is in all cases to relate it to something else3 to know it in the higher sense--vere scire--is to relate it to its essence1 its substantial or universal form1 its permanent self4 ,ordinary knowledge1 e4 g41 fixes a thing by referring to its antecedents3 scientific knowledge refers it to its 'invariable1 'unconditional' or 'essential' antecedent1--to something which contains it implicitly1 and necessarily1 and is not merely by accident or juxtaposition associated with it4 ,to discover this permanent1 underlying substance or reality comes to be the problem of science--a problem which may be taken in the widest generality1 or restricted to some one group of existences4 ,what is asked for1 e4g41 may be the uniformity and essence in the appearance of the diurnal journey of the sun1 or it may be the underlying1 invisible1 nature which displays itself in all the variety of minerals1 and in animal and plant life4 ,the one-and-the-same in a diversity of many2 the type-form in individuals3 the cause which is the key to understanding an effect that always and unconditionally follows it2 the force which finds different expression in actions--are what ,science seeks4 ,in that search two points emerge as regards the method4 ,the first is the importance of quantitative statements or numerical appreciations1 and the general law that variations in the qualitative are in some ratio concomitant with variations in the quantitative4 ,mathematics1 in a word1 is found to be an invaluable instrument for recording with accuracy the minutest as well as the most immense differences of quality4 ,first1 it is seen that qualitative differences within a given range1 e4g4 various colours or various musical notes1 can be accurately expressed by a numerical ratio4 ,but1 secondly1 it soon appears that even greater divergences of quality1 e4g4 those of colour and of chemical quality1 may possibly be reduced to stages on one quantitative scale4 ,it is not unnatural that such experiences should give rise to a hope--and in sanguine minds1 an assurance--that all the phenomena of nature are ultimately phases of some common nature--some elementary being--which runs through an infinite gamut of numerically defined adjustments4 ,but the numerical prepossession--as we may call it--creates another assumption4 ,every number consists of units3 every cube can be regarded as an aggregation of smaller cubes1 and in measurement is 7implicitly at least7 so regarded4 ,transferring this to the physical world1 every object is regarded as a composite--a ,large1 made up by the addition and juxtaposition of many 7relatively7 ,littles4 ,the essentials of the composite are here the elements that compose it3 these1 by a natural tendency1 we proceed to conceive as remaining always unchanged1 and giving rise by their peculiar juxtaposition to certain perceptions in the human being4 ,you whirl rapidly a blazing piece of wood1 and instead of a discontinuous series of flashes you see one orbit of luminous matter3 or1 let falling rain-drops take up a particular position in reference to your eyes and the sun1 and a rainbow is visible4 ,in both cases there is what may be called an illusion--the illusion1 above all1 of unity and continuity4 ,now what is in these cases obviously and demonstrably seen1 is1 as ,leibniz in particular has reminded us1 the general law of all matter as such4 ,in the extended and material world there is nowhere a real unity discoverable4 ,the small is made up of the smaller ad infinitum#a4 ,but the conclusion 7which ,leibniz drew7--that unity belongs only to v1' ,monads and never by any possibility to a material substance1 was not that commonly reached or accepted4 ,there are--or there must be1--said the prevalent creed1 ultimates1 indivisibles1 indecomposables1 simples1 atoms4 ,these are the final bricks of reality1 out of which the apparent universe is built3 each with a maximum1--a ne plus ultra--of resistibility1 hardness1 fullness1 and unsqueezable bulk4 ,into further details of these ultimate irreducibles we need not enter4 ,it is sufficient to denote the general purport of the conception1 and the tendency it implies4 ,in these ultimates supreme reality is understood to lie2 and on them at last1 and indeed always1 rests whatever reality truly exists in any object4 ,all else is secondary--and1 comparatively speaking1 illusory1--unreal4 ,any phenomena that may be noted only affect the surface or show of these reals3 the inner reality continues one and unchanged4 ,outside them1 around them1 is the void--emptiness1 non-entity4 ,yet null and void as it may be1 we may1 in passing1 reply1--this circumambient is the source of all that gives these masses of atoms any distinctive reality--any character of true being4 ,space may be empty enough1--a mere spectre-shell2 and yet it is their differences in spatial circumstance that bring out and actualise what they implicitly are4 ,these 'individua' these units of reality1 these atoms1 are real and knowable only in their relations4 ,so too ,time may be contemptuously treated as a passive receptacle3 yet it is only by its connexions in the past and the future that the present moment has any actuality it may claim4 ,and time and space are potent agencies--in popular mode of utterance--whatever the mechanical philosophy may say4 ,but all of these relations are in the realm of unreality4 ,the atoms alone are3 and yet the void1 which ought not to be1 in an unmistakable way is also4 ,to this mysterious vacuum which lies outside 7and yet not outside7 reality1 to this not-being which is1 there can only be given a half-negative and baffling name4 ,let it be called ,chance--or let it be called ,necessity2 let it be called inexplicable ,law of co-existence and sequence1--the ,force which is the beginning of motion4 ,it is the ultimate key to the mystery--but it is at least a key which no human hand can use1 or even lay hold of4 ,it is enough for science if1 leaving this ultimate inexplicability untouched1 it trace in each separate instance the exact equation between the sum of the constituents and the total which they compose1--if it prove that the several items when put together exactly give the sum proposed4 ,identification--the establishment of quantitative equations--is the work of science4 ,identity is its canon1 working on the presumption or axiom that there can be nothing in the result which was not in the antecedents or conditions4 ,ex nihilo nihil fit4 ,the quantity of energy must always be the same1 though its phases may vary1 or temporarily avoid detection4 ,matter1 i4e4 the ultimate reality1 is indestructible4 ,in short1 the method of analysis and synthesis1 as that of addition and subtraction1 is a calculus which takes the form of an equation4 ,so far the inorganic1 inanimate world has been mainly in view4 ,if we now turn to the organisms1 we find the popular creed expressed in the adage ,omne vivum e vivo4 ,no eye has ever seen--though fanatical observers have sometimes so deluded themselves as to think they saw--a living being directly emerge from inorganic stuff4 ,the saner student of physiology contents himself with leaving for the while the crux of the genesis of ,life1 and examining only the building up of the living creature out of its constituents4 ,here the atom is called the cell3 every organism is a synthesis of cells1 and in the cell we have the primary element of organic reality3 ,omnis cellula e cellula1 ,in the atom we have the ultimate element2 in the cell a relative element1--the absolute beginning of a new order of things1--which we may1 if we like1 choose to treat 7though only for logical simplicity's sake7 as a gradual development from the other and more primitive1 but which1 so far as experience and history teach1 is equally ultimate in its kind4 ,but be the final constituent 7physical7 atom1 or 7physiological7 cell1 the relation of these constituents is at first conceived by science only as composition1 or mechanical synthesis4 ,it is only gradually that science begins to have doubts as to the inviolability and unalterableness of the elements4 ,when the idea--not altogether new--of a 'latent meta-schematism' and latent process within the constituents is entertained and carried out in earnest1 science has passed on to a new stage3 from mechanical atomism to a dynamic and organic theory of existence4 ,and the governing ideas of scientific logic have then ceased to be co-existence1 and sequence1 correlation and composition3 the new category is intus-susception1 development1 adaptation not only external but internal4 ,divide et impera is the motto of ,science4 ,to isolate one thing or one group of facts from its context1--to penetrate beneath the apparent simplicity1 which time and custom have taught ordinary eyes to see in the concrete object1 to the multitude of underlying simple elements1--to leave everything extraneous out of sight1--to abolish the teleology which imposes upon ,nature a permanent tribute 7direct or indirect7 towards the supply of human wants1--and to take1 as it were1 one thing at a time and study it for itself disinterestedly2 that is the problem of the sciences4 ,and to accomplish that end they do not hesitate to break the charmed links which in common vision hold the world together1--to disregard the spiritual harmony which the sense of beauty finds in the scene1--to strip off the relations of means and end1 which reflection has thrown from thing to thing1 and the sensuous atmosphere of so-called 'secondary' qualities in which human sense has enveloped each2 and finally to sever its connexion by which 'the whole round world is every way ,bound by gold chains about the feet of ,god4' ,in those days when reflection had not set in1--when humanity had not yet found itself a stranger in the house of ,nature1 and had not yet dared to regard her as a mere automatic slave1 men had no doubts as to the meaning of things4 ,they lived sympathetically her life4 ',man1 once descried1 imprints for ever ,his presence on all lifeless things3 the winds ,are henceforth voices1 wailing or a shout1 ,a querulous mutter1 or a quick gay laugh4' ,to the extent of his abilities and his culture1 indeed man has in all ages read himself into the phenomena external to him4 ,such readings1 in times when he feared and loved his kinsfolk of ,nature1 were fetichism and anthropomorphism4 ,gradually1 however1 forgetting his community1 he claimed to be the measure and master of all things3 to decree their use and function4 ,but in course of time1 when the sciences had emancipated themselves from the yoke of philosophy1 they refused to borrow any such help in reading the riddle of the universe1 and resolved to begin1 ab ovo1 from the atom or cell1 and leave the elements to work out their own explanation4 ,modern science in so doing practises the lessons learned from ,spinoza and ,hume4 ,the former teaches that all conception of order1 i4 e4 of adaptation and harmony in nature1 and indeed all the methods by which nature is popularly explained1 are only modes of our emotional imagination1 betraying how imperfect has been in most of us the emancipation of human intellect from the servitude to the affections#b4 ,the latter points out that all connexions between things are solely mental associations1 ingrained habits of expectation1 the work of time and custom1 accredited only by experience#c4 ,there must be no pre-suppositions allowed in the studies of science1 no help derived prematurely from the later terms in the process to elucidate the earlier4 ,let man1 it is said1 be explained by those laws1 and by the action of those primary elements which build up every other part of nature3 let molecules by mechanical union construct the thinking organism1 and then construct society4 ,the elements which we find by analysis must be all that is required to make the synthesis4 ,thus in modern times science carries out1 fully and with the details of actual knowledge in several branches1 the principles of the atom and the void1 which ,democritus suggested4 ,the scientific spirit1 however1 the spirit of analysis and abstraction 7or of ',mediation' and ',reflection'71 is not confined in its operations to the physical world4 ,the criticism of ordinary beliefs and conventions has been applied--and applied at an earlier period--to what has been called the ,spiritual world1 to ,art1 ,religion1 ,morality1 and the institutions of human ,society4 ,under these names the agency of ages1 acting by their individual minds1 has created organic systems1 unities which have claimed to be permanent1 inviolable1 and divine4 ,such unities or organic structures are the ,family1 the ,state1 the works of ,art1 the forms1 doctrines1 and systems of ,religion1 existing and recognised in ordinary consciousness4 ,but in these cases1 as in ,nature1 the reflective principle may come forward and ask what right these unities have to exist4 ,this is the question which the ',encyclopaedic1' the ',aufklrung1' the ',rationalist' and ',freethinking' theories1 raise and have raised in the last century and the present4 ,what is the ,family1 it is said1 but a fiction or convention1 which is used to give a decent1 but somewhat transparent covering to a certain animal appetite1 and its probable consequences8 ,what is the ,state1 and what is ,society1 but a fiction or compact1 by which the weak try to make themselves seem strong1 and the unjust seek to shelter themselves from the consequences of their own injustice8 ,what is ,religion1 it is said1 but a delusion springing from the fears and weakness of the crowd1 and the cunning of the few1 which men have fostered until it has wrapped humanity in its snaky coils8 ,and ,poetry1 we are assured1 like its sister ,arts1 will perish and its illusions fade away1 when ,science1 now in the cradle1 has become the full-grown ,hercules4 ,as for ,morality and ,law1 and the like1 the same condemnation has been prepared from of old4 ,all of them1 it is said1 are but the inventions of power and craft1 or the phantoms of human imagination1 which the strength of positive science and bare facts is destined in no long time to dispel4 ,when they insisted upon a severance of the elements in the vulgarly-accepted unities of the world1 ,science and ,freethinking1 like ,epicurus in an older day1 have believed that they were liberating the world from its various superstitions1 from the bonds which instinct and custom had fastened upon things so as to combine them into systems more or less arbitrary4 ,they denied the supremacy and reality of those ideas which insist on the essential unity and self-sameness in things that visibly and tangibly have a separate existence of their own1 and branded these ideas comprehensively as mysticism and metaphysics4 ,they sought to disabuse us of spirits1 vital forces1 divine right of governments1 final causes1 et hoc genus omne4 ,they were exceedingly jealous for the independence of the individual1 and for his right to demand satisfaction for the questioning1 ground-seeking faculty of his nature4 ,but while they did so they hardly realised how entirely the spectator is the part1 the product of what he surveys1 and while surveying treats as if it were but a spot or mark on the circumference of the circle that lies--some way off--around him4 ',phenomenalism1' as this mode of looking at things has been called1 is false to life1 and would cut away the ground from philosophy4#d ,to some extent philosophy returns to the position of the wider consciousness1 to the general belief in harmony and symmetry4 ,it reverts to the unity or connexion1 which the natural presumptions of mankind find in the picture of the world4 ,the nolo philosophari of the intuitivist1 in reaction from the supposed excesses of the sciences1 simply reverted to the bare re-statement of the popular creed4 ,if science1 e4 g41 had shown that the perception of an external world pre-supposed for its accomplishment an unsuspected series of intermediate steps1 the mere intuitivist simply denied the intermediation by appealing to ,common ,sense1 or to the natural instincts and primary beliefs of mankind4 ,conviction and natural instinct were declared to counterbalance the abstractions of science4 ,but philosophy which seeks to comprehend existence cannot take the same ground as the intuitional school1 or neglect the testimony of science4 ,if the spiritual unity of the world has been denied and lost to sight1 mere assertion that we feel and own its pervading power will not do much good4 ,it is necessary to reconcile the contrast between the wholeness of the natural vision1 and the fragmentary1 but in its fragments elaborated1 result of science4 ,the sciences break up the rough generalisations or vulgar concepts of everyday use1 and make their fixed distinctions yield to analysis4 ,they thus render continuous things which were looked at as only separate4 ,but they tend again to substitute the results of their analysis as a new and permanent distinction and principle of things4 ,they are like revolutionists who upset and perturb an old order1 and set up a new and minuter tyranny in its place4 ,gradually1 the general culture1 the average educated intelligence gathers up the fruit of scientific research into the total development of humanity3 and uses the work of science to fill up the lacunae1 the gaps1 which make popular consciousness so irregular and disconnected4 ,a sort of popular philosophy comes to sum up and estimate what science has accomplished3 and therein is as it were the spirit of the world taking into his own hand the acquisitions won by the more audacious and self-willed of his sons1 and investing them in the common store4 ,they are set aside and preserved there1 at first in an abstract and technical form1 but destined soon to pass into the possession of all1 and form that mass of belief and instinctive or implanted knowledge whence a new generation will draw its mental supplies4 ,each great scientific discovery is in its turn reduced to a part of the common stock4 ,it leaves the technical field1 and spreads into the common life of men1 becoming embodied in their daily beliefs1--a seed of thought1 from which1 by the agency of intelligent experience1 new increments of science will one day spring4 ,philosophy properly so called is also the unification of science1 but in a new sphere1 a higher medium not recognised by the sciences themselves4 ,the reconciliation which the philosopher believes himself to accomplish between ordinary consciousness and science is identified by either side with a phase of its antagonist error4 ,science will term philosophy a modified form of the old religious superstition4 ,the popular consciousness of truth1 and especially religion1 will see in philosophy only a repetition or an aggravation of the evils of science4 ,the attempt at unity will not approve itself to either1 until they enter upon the ground which philosophy occupies1 and move in that element4 ,and that elevation into the philosophic ether calls for a tension of thought which is the sternest labour imposed upon man3 so that the continuous action of philosophising has been often styled superhuman4 ,if anywhere1 it is in pure philosophy that proof becomes impossible1 unless for those who are willing to think for themselves#e4 ,the philosophic lesson cannot be handed on to a mere recipient3 the result1 when cut off from the process which produced it1 vanishes like the palace in the fairy tale4 ',the whole of philosophy is nothing but the study of the specific forms or types of unity4#f ,there are many species and grades of this unity4 ,they are not merely to be enumerated and asserted in a vague way1 as they here and there force themselves upon the notice of the popular mind4 ,philosophy sees in that unity neither an ultimate and unanalysable fact1 nor a deception1 but a growth 7which is also a struggle71 a revealing or unfolding1 which issues in an organism or system1 constructing itself more and more completely by a force of its own4 ,this system formed by these types of the fundamental unity is called the ',idea1' of which the highest law is development4 ,philosophy essays to do for this connective and unifying nature1 i4 e4 for the thought in things1 something like what the sciences have done or would like to do for the facts of sense and matter1--to do for the spiritual binding-element in its integrity1 what is being done for the several facts which are more or less combined4 ,it retraces the universe of thought from its germinal form1 where it seems1 as it were1 an indecomposable point1 to the fully matured system or organism1 and shows not merely that one phase of pure thought passes into another1 but how it does so1 and yet is not lost1 but subsists suspended and deprived of its narrowness in the maturer phase4 ,footnote #a3 ,leibniz1 ed4 ,gerhardt1 iii4 #ejg3 ',les atomes sont l'effet de la foiblesse de nostre imagination1 qui aime se reposer et se hater venir une fin dans les sous-divisions et analyses3 il n'en est pas ainsi dans la nature qui vient de l'infini et va l'infini4' ,footnote #b3 ,spinoza1 ,ethica1 i4 #cf1 ,app4 ',quoniam ea nobis prae ceteris grata sunt quae facile imaginari possumus1 ideo homines ordinem confusioni praeferunt2 quasi ordo aliquid in natura praeter respectum ad nostram imaginationem esset444 ,videmus itaque omnes rationes quibus vulgus solet naturam explicare modos esse tantummodo imaginandi4' ,cf4 ,eth4 iv4 praef43 ,epist4 xxxii4 ,footnote #c3 ',this transition of thought from the ,cause to the ,effect proceeds not from ,reason4 ,it derives its origin altogether from ,custom and ,experience4' ,hume1 ,essay ,v4 7,enquiry concerning ,human ,understanding47 ',all inferences from ,experience therefore are effects of ,custom4' 7,ibid47 ,footnote #d3 ,j4 ,grote1 ,exploratio ,philosophica4 ,footnote #e3 ,cf4 vol4 ii4 p4 #d4 ,footnote #f3 ,philosophie der ,religion1 i4 p4 #ig3 ',die ganze ,philosophie ist nichts ,anderes als das ,studium der ,bestimmungen der ,einheit4' ,see especially ,encycl4 #egc 7,philosophy of ,mind1 pp4 #aib seqq474 ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,,anticipatory ,,sketch ,,of ,,the ,,scope ,,of ,,philosophy4 ,the psychology of the ,greeks has to all appearance given the mere intellect an undue pre-eminence1 if it has not even treated it as man's essential self4 ,whether the appearance is altogether sound might be a profitable inquiry for those who most criticise it4 ,at any rate1 a later psychology has taught us to regard man as at once a cognitive1 an emotional1 and a volitional being4 ,it has arrived at this conclusion as it looked at the division that parted off the systems of science from the sphere of conduct and social life1 and both from the inner life of sentiment1 of love1 admiration and reverence4 ,and the inference was justifiable1 in the same way as ,plato's when1 as he surveyed the triple sphere into which the outward world of his contemporary society was divided1 he concluded a triplicity of the soul4 ,if it was justifiable1 it was also1 as in his case1 somewhat misleading4 ,in the outward manifestation1 where the letters are posted up on a gigantic scale1 one tends to forget that they only spell one word4 ,their difference and distance seem increased1 and we fail to note that1 though there are three aspects1 yet there is only one power or soul1 which exhibits itself under one or other of the three tones or modes4 ,in the actual human being1 cognition is always of some emotional interest and always leads up to some practical result4 ,from different points of view one or other is occasionally declared to be primary and original2 the others derivative and secondary4 ,at any rate we may say that in the ordinary human being who is still in the garden of preparation and has not yet stepped forth on one of the separate routes of life1 his knowledge1 his emotional and his active life are in a tolerable harmony1 and that each in its little development is constantly followed by the other4 ,but with the outward differentiation an inward went hand in hand4 ,in some cases the intellectual or scientific1 in others the emotional1 in others the active faculties became predominant4 ,human nature in order to attain all its completeness had first of all1 as it were1 to lose its life in order to gain it4 ,the individual had to sacrifice part of his all-sided development in order that he might gain it again1 and in a larger measure1 through the medium of society4 ,this process is the process of civilisation3 the long and1 as it often seems1 weary road by which man can only realise himself by self-sacrifice3 can only reach unity through the way of diversity1 and must die to live4 ,it is a process in which it is but too easy to notice only one stage and speak of it as if it were the whole4 ,it is possible sometimes to identify civilisation with the material increase in the means of producing enjoyment1 or with the progress of scientific teaching as to the laws of those material phenomena on which material civilisation is largely dependent4 ,it is possible sometimes to take as its test the stores of artistic works1 and the extension of a lively and delicate love of all that is beautiful and tasteful4 ,one may identify it with a high-toned moral life1 and with an orderly social system4 ,or one may maintain that the real civilisation of a country presupposes a lofty conception and reverent attitude to the supreme source of all that is good1 and true1 and beautiful4 ,the question is important as bearing on the relation of philosophy to the special sciences4 ,philosophy is sometimes identified with the sum of sciences3 sometimes with their complete unification4 ,philosophy1 says a modern1 is knowledge completely unified4 ,it is of course to some extent a question of words in what sense a term is to be defined4 ,and no one will dispute that the scientific element is in point of form the most conspicuous aspect of philosophy4 ,yet if we look at the historical use of the term1 one or two considerations suggest themselves4 ,philosophy1 said an ancient1 is the knowledge of things human and divine4 ,again and again1 it has claimed for its task to be a guide and chart of human life--to reveal the form of good and of beauty4 ,but to do this1 it must be more than a mere science1 or than a mere system of the sciences4 ,again1 it has been urged by modern critics that ,kant at last discovered for philosophy her true province--the study of the conditions and principles of human knowledge4 ,but though epistemology is all-important1 the science of knowledge is not identical with philosophy3 nor did ,kant himself think it was4 ,rather his view is on the whole in accord with what he has called the 'world's 7as opposed to the scholar's7 conception of philosophy#a1' as the science of the bearing of all ascertainable truths on the essential aims of human reason--teleologia humanae rationis1--in accord1 too1 with the world's conception of the philosopher as no mere logician1 but the legislator of human reason4 ,this1 it need hardly be added1 is the conception of philosophy which is implicitly the basis of ,hegel's use4 ,let us hear ,schelling4 ',a philosophy which in its principle is not already religion is no true philosophy#b4' ,or again1 as to the place of ,ethics3 ',morality is ,godlike disposition1 an uplifting above the influence of the concrete into the realm of the utterly universal4 ,philosophy is a like elevation1 and for that reason intimately one with morality1 not through subordination1 but through essential and inner likeness#c4' ,but1 again1 it has more than once been felt that philosophy is kindred with ,art4 ,it has been said--not as a compliment--that philosophy is only a form of gratifying the aesthetic instincts4 ,schopenhauer has suggested--as a novelty--that the true way to philosophy was not by science1 but through ,art4 ,and ,schelling before him had--while asserting the inner identity of the two--even gone so far as to assert#d that ',art is the sole1 true and eternal organon as well as the ostensible evidence of philosophy4' ,philosophy1 therefore1 is one of a triad in which the human spirit has tried to raise itself above its limitations and to become god-like4 ,and philosophy is the climax2 ,art the lowest2 ,religion in the mean4 ,but this does not mean that ,religion supersedes ,art1 and that ,philosophy supersedes religion2 or1 if we retain the term 'supersede1' we must add that the superseded is not left behind and passed aside3 it is rather an integral constituent of what takes its place4 ,philosophy is true and adequate only as it has given expression to all that religion had or aimed at4 ,so1 too1 ,religion is not the destruction of ,art3 though here the attitude may often seem to be more obviously negative4 ,a religion which has no place for art is1 again1 no true religion4 ,and thus again1 ,philosophy becomes a reconciler of ,art and ,religion3 of the visible ideal and the invisible ,god4 ,art1 on the other hand1 is a foretaste and a prophecy of religion and philosophy4 ,but ,art1 ,religion1 and ,philosophy1 again1 rest upon1 grow out of1 and are the fulfilment of an ethical society-a state of human life where an ordered commonwealth in outward visibility is animated and sustained by the spirit of freedom and self-realisation4 ,and that public objective existence of social humanity in its turn reposes on the will and intelligence of human beings1 of souls which in various relations of discipline and interaction with their environment have become free-agents1 and have risen to be more than portions of the physical world1 sympathetic with its changes1 and become awake to themselves and their surroundings4 ,such is the mental or spiritual life as it rises to full sense of its power1 recognises its kindred with the general life1 carries out that kindred in its social organisation1 and at length through the strength social union gives floats boldly in the empyrean of spiritual life1 in art1 religion1 and philosophy4 ,but1 what about the special relationship of philosophy to the sciences8 ,undoubtedly the philosophers of the early years of the century have used lordly language in reference to the sciences4 ,they have asserted--from ,fichte downwards--that the philosophical construction1 of the universe must justify itself to itself--must be consistent1 continuous1 and coherent--and that it had not to wait for experience to give it confirmation4 ,even the cautious ,kant#e had gone so far as to assert that the 'understanding gives us nature'--i4 e4 as he explains1 natura formaliter spectata1 viz41 the order and regularity in the phenomena--that it is the source of the laws of nature and of its formal unity4 ,the so-called proofs of natural laws are only instances and exemplifications1 which no more prove them1 than we prove that #f x #d #bd1 because #f yards of cloth at #ds4 must be paid for by #bd shillings4 ,to assert that this instance is no proof1 is not to reject experience--still less to refuse respect to the new discoveries of science4 ,but it is unquestionably to assert that there is something prior to the sciences--prior1 i4 e4 in the sense that ,kant speaks of the a priori1 something which is fundamental to them1 and constitutes them what they are--something which is assumed as real if their syntheses 7and every scientific truth is a synthesis7 are to be possible4 ,the analysis and exhibition in its organic completeness of this ,kantian a priori is the theme of the ,hegelian ,logic4 ,the ,philosophy of ,nature stands in the ,hegelian system between ,logic and ,mental or ,spiritual ,philosophy4 ,man--intelligent1 moral1 religious and artistic man--rests upon the basis of natural existence3 he is the child of the earth1 the offspring of natural organisation4 ,but ,nature itself--such is the hypothesis of the system--is only intelligible as the reflex of that a priori which has been exhibited in ,logic4 ,the whole scheme by which the natural world is scientifically held together1 apprehended by ordinary consciousness and elaborated by mathematical analysis1 presupposes the organism of the categories--these fundamental habits of thought or form of conception which are the framework of the existence we know4 ,yet ,nature never shows this intelligible world--the ,idea--in its purity and entirety4 ,in the half-literal1 half-figurative phrases of ,hegel1 ,nature shows the ,idea beside itself1 out of its mind1 alienated1 non compos mentis4 ',it is a mad world1 my masters1' ',the impotence of nature--,ohnmacht der ,natur#f--;is a frequent phrase1 by which he indicates the a-logical1 if not illogical1 character of the physical world4 ,here we come across the negation of mind3 chance plays its part3 contingency is everywhere4 ,if you expect that the physical universe will display unquestioning obedience to the laws of reason and of the higher logic1 you will be disappointed4 ,what you see is fragmentary1 chaotic1 irregular4 ,to the bodily sense--even when that sense has been rendered more penetrating by all the many material and methodical aids of advanced civilisation--the ,idea is in the natural world presented only in traces1 indications1 portions1 which it requires a well-prepared mind to descry1 still more to unite4 ,yet at the same time the indications of that unity are everywhere1 and the hypothesis of the logical scheme or organisation of the ,idea is the only theory which seems fully to correspond with the data4 ,nature#g1 says ,hegel1 is the ,idea as it shows itself in sense-perception1 not as it shows itself in thought4 ,in thought a clear all-comprehending total2 in sense a baffling fragment4 ,the ,idea--the unity of life and knowledge--is everywhere in nature1 but nowhere clearly1 or whole1 or otherwise than a glimpse2 not a logical scheme or compact theory4 ,nature is the sensible in which the intelligible is bound--the reality which is the vehicle of the ideal4 ,but the ideal treasure is held in rough and fragile receptacles which half disclose and half conceal the light within4 ,nature in short contains1 but disguised1 the idea1 in fainter and clearer evidences3 it is the function of man1 by his scientific intelligence and ethical work1 building up a social organisation1 to provide the ground on which the ultimate significance and true foundation of the world may be deciphered1 guessed1 or believed1 or imaginatively presented4 ,the verification of the guess or deciphering1 of course1 lies in its adequacy to explain and colligate the facts4 ,the true method and true conception is that which needs no subsequent adjustments--no epicycles to make it work--which is no mere hypothesis useful for subjective arrangement1 but issues with uncontrollable force and self-evidence from the facts4 ,what ,hegel has called the 'impotence of nature1' ,schopenhauer has styled the irrational ,will1 and it is from that end1 so to speak1 that ,schopenhauer's philosophy begins4 ,nature--the basis of all things--the fundamental prius--is an irresistible and irregular appetite or craving to be1 to do1 to live1--but an appetitus or nisus which ascends from grade to grade--from mere mechanical forces acting in movement up to the highest form of animal activity4 ,but as this ',will' or blind lust of being and instinct of life gets above the inorganic world1 and manifests itself in the animal organism1 there emerges a new order of existence--the intellect1 or the ideal world4 ,seen from the underside1 indeed1 all that has appeared now in the animal is a brain and a nerve-system--a new species of matter4 ,but there is another side to the ,mind which has thus awakened out of the sleep of natural forces4 ,this intellect is unaware and can never be made aware that it is a child of nature3 it acknowledges no superior1 and no beginning or end in time4 ,its natal day is infinitely beyond the age when the cosmic process began its race2 before stars gathered their masses of luminosity1 and the earth received the first germs of life4 ,as the genius of ,art1 it arrests the toiling struggle of existence to produce new forms and destroy old ones2 it sets free in typical forms of eternal beauty the great ideas that nature vainly seeks to embody1 and as moral and religious life its aim is to annihilate the craving and the lust for more and ever more being and to enter in passionless and calm union with the ,one-and-,all4 ,thus it is1 if not absurd1 at least misleading1 to speak of ,hegel's system as ,panlogism4 ,strictly speaking1 it is only of the ,logic that this is the proper name3 there1 unquestionably1 reason is all and in all4 ,yet to hold that reason is the very life and centre of things is for philosophy the cardinal article--the postulate which must inspire her first and last steps and guide her throughout4 ,but the ,logical ,idea1 if put at the beginning1 is at first only put as a presupposition1 which it is the task of human intelligence to work out and organise4 ,if it be the key which is to explain nature and render it intelligible1 it is a key which has only been gained in the process--the long process--by which man has risen from his natural origin--never however parting company with it--to survey and comprehend himself and his setting4 ,the faculty of 'pure thinking1' which is the pre-condition of ,logical study1 is the result of a gradual development in which animal sense has grown1 and metamorphosed1 and worked itself up to be a free intelligence and a good will capable of discerning and fulfilling the universal and the eternal4 ,thus in the ,logic the system constructs the pure ,idea--the ideal timeless organisation of thoughts or on which all knowledge of reality rests--the diamond net which suffers nothing to escape its meshes3 in the ,philosophy of ,nature it tries to put together in unity and continuity the phases and partial aspects which the physical universe presents in graduated exemplification of the central truth3 and in the ,philosophy of ,mind it traces the steps by which a merely natural being becomes the moral and aesthetic idealist in whom man approaches deity4 ,it is indeed ,hegel's fundamental axiom that actuality is reasonable4 ,but the actuality is not the appearance--the temporary phases--the succession of event3 it is the appearance rooted in its essence--the succession concentrated 7yet not lost7 in its unity4 ,there is room for much so-called irrationality within these ranges4 ,for1 when human beings pronounce something irrational1 they only mean that their practical intelligence would have adopted other methods to arrive at certain conclusions4 ,they judge1 in fact1 by their limited understandings and not ex ordine universi4 ,hegel's doctrine is after all only another way of stating the maintenance of the fittest2 and it is liable to the v same misconception by those who employ their personal aims as the standards of judgment4 ,so too there is reason--there is the ,idea--in ,nature4 ,but it is there only for the artist1 the religious man1 and the philosopher2 and they see it respectively by the eye of genius1 by the power of faith1 by the thought of reason4 ,they see it from the standpoint of the absolute--sub specie quadam aeternitatis4 ,it is therefore a recalcitrant matter in which ,nature presents the ,idea3 or1 if recalcitrant suggests a positive opposition1 let us say rather a realm in which the ,idea fails to come out whole and clear1 where unity has to be forced upon and read into the facts4 ,science1 says one writer1 is an ideal construction3 it implies an abstraction from irregularities and inequalities3 it smoothes and sublimates the rough and imperfect material into a more rounded and perfect whole4 ,its object1 which it terms a reality1 is a non-sensible1 imperceptible reality3 what one might as well call an ideality1 were it not that here again the popular imagination twists the word into a subjective sense to mean the private and personal ideas of the student4 ,but the obvious individual reality never quite in its obviousness equals the 'golden mediocrity' of the ideal4 ,its myriad grapes must be crushed to yield the wine of the spirit4 ',it's a lifelong toil till our lump be leavened' --till the ore be transformed into the fine gold4 ,but the gold is there1 and in the great laboratory of natura naturans is the principle and agent of its own purification4 ',nature is made better by no mean1 but nature makes that mean'--for nature is spirit in disguise4 ,it is on this side that a certain analogy of ,hegel's and ,schelling's philosophy of nature with the ,romantic school comes out4 ,nature is felt1 as it were1 to be spirit-haunted1 to give glimpses of a solidarity1 a design1 a providentiality1 which runs counter to that general outward indifference in which part seems to have settled beside part1 each utterly indifferent to the other4 ,romance is the unexpected coincidence1 the sudden jumping together of what seemed set worlds apart and utterly alien4 ,it was the sense of this ,romance which wove its wild legends of nymph and cobold1 of faun and river-god1 of imp and fairy1 wielding the powers of the elements and guiding the life of even the so-called inanimate world4 ,but it is no less the theme of the fairy tale of science4 ,even in the austere demonstrations of geometry1 and the constructions of mechanics1 the un-looked-for slips upon us with gipsy tread4 ,who has not--in his early studies of mathematics--been fain to marvel at the almost unexpected consilience of property with property in a figure1 suddenly placing in almost 'eery' relief the conjunction of what was apparently poles asunder8 ,it is not a mere form of words to speak of beautiful properties of a conic section or a curve4 ,custom perhaps has blunted our sense for the symmetries of celestial dynamics1 but they are none the less admirable1 because we are otherwise engrossed4 ,to the first generation of our century the phenomena of chemistry1 magnetism and electricity appealed--as they have never since done--with a tangible demonstration of that appetitus ad invicem1 that instinct of union ,bacon speaks of2 and this time in a higher form than in mere mechanism4 ,polarity--the bifurcation of reality into a pair of opposites which yet sought their complement in each other--eternally dividing only eternally to unite1 and thus only to exist--became a process pressed into general service4 ,lastly1 what more admirable than that adaptation of the individual to the environment--and of the environment to the individual--of the organs in him to his total1 and of his total to his organs4 ,one in all and ,all in one3 one life in perpetual transformation1 animals1 plants1 and earth and air2 one organism1 developing in absolute coherence4 ,this was the vision which the genius of ,schelling and his contemporaries saw--the same vision which1 by accumulation of facts and pictorial history1 ,darwin and his disciples have impressed in some measure even on the dullest4 ,but there is a profound difference between the spirit of a ,philosophy of ,nature and the aggregate of the physical sciences4 ,each science takes the particular quarry which accident or providence has assigned to it1 and does its best to 'put out' every piece of rock it contains4 ,but it seldom goes1 unless by constraint1 and in these days of specialisation it does so less and less1 to examine the neighbouring excavation1 and see if there be any connexion between the strata4 ,even within its own domain it is ashamed to put forward too much parade of system4 ,its method is often like that of the showman in the travelling menagerie3 ',and now1 please pass to the next carriage4' ,it respects the compartmental arrangement into which it finds the world broken up1 and often thinks it has deserved well if it has filled the compartment fuller than before1 or succeeded in creating a few sub-compartments within the old bounds4 ,even the so-called mental and moral sciences when they lose their philosophical character tend to imitate these features4 ,yet in every science there is an outlook and an outlet1 for whosoever has the will and the power1 to emerge from his narrow domain on the open fields and free prospect into the first fountains and last great ocean of being4 ,always1 and not least in our own day1 the physicist1 the chemist1 the physiologist1 the psychologist1 the sociologist1 and the economist1 have made their special field a platform where they might discourse de omnibus rebus1 and become for the nonce philosophers and metaphysicians4 ,it would be a silly intolerance and a misconception of the situation to exclaim ,ne sutor ultra crepidam4 ,in the organic system of things 'each moment even independent of the whole is the whole2 and to see this is to penetrate to the heart of the thing4' ,we need hardly go to ,hegel to be told that to know one thing thoroughly well is to know all things4 ,the finite1 which we inertly rest content with1 would1 if we were in full sympathy with it1 open up its heart and show us the infinite4 ,and yet if the specialist when he rises from his shoe-making1 with a heart full of the faith that 'there is nothing like leather1' should proclaim his discovery of it in regions where it was hitherto unsurmised1 one may smile incredulous and be no cynic4 ,philosophy then keeps open eye and ear--as far as may be no doubt for the finer shades and delicate details--but essentially for the music of humanity and the music of the spheres--for the general purpose and drift of all sciences--from mathematics to sociology--as they help to make clear the life of nature and further the emancipation of man4 ,it will seem occasionally to over-emphasise the continuity of science and to make light of its distinctions3 it will seem occasionally more anxious as to the order than as to the contents of the sciences3 it will remind the sciences of the hypothetical and formal character of much of their method and some of their principles3 and sometimes will treat as unimportant1 results on which the mere scholar or dogmatist of science lays great weight4 ,from his habit of dealing with the limitations and mutual implication of principles and conceptions1 the philosopher will often be able--and perhaps only too willing--to point out cases where the mere specialist has allowed himself to attribute reality to his abstraction4 ,he will tell the analyst of the astronomical motions that he must not take the distinction of centrifugal and centripetal force1 into which mechanics disintegrate the planetary orbit1 as if it really meant that the planet was pulled inward by one force and sent on spinning forward by another#h4 ,and the scientist1 proud of his mathematics1 will resent and laugh at the philosopher who lets fall a word about the planets moving in grand independence like 'blessed gods4' ,the philosopher will hint to the chemist that his formulae of composition and decomposition of bodies are1 as he uses them1 somewhat mythological1 picturing water as atom of oxygen locked up with atom of hydrogen2 and the chemist will go away muttering something about a fool who does not believe in the well-ascertained chemical truth that water is composed of these two gases4 ,if the philosopher further hints that it is not the highest ideal of a chemical science to be content with enumerating fifty or sixty elements1 and detecting their several properties and affinities#i2 that it would be well to find some principle of gradation1 some unity or law which brought meaning into meaningless juxtaposition1 the mere dogmatist1 whose chemistry is his living and who shrinks from disendowment1 will scent a propensity towards the heresy which sinks all elements in one4 ,and yet1 even among chemists1 the instinct for law and unity begins to demand satisfaction4 ,a still richer store of amazing paradox and perplexing analogies awaits anyone who will turn over the volume in ,hegel's ,werke 7vii4 i7 and select the plums which lie thick in the lecture-notes4 ,he will find a great deal--and probably more1 the less he really knows of any of the subjects under discussion--that he cannot make head or tail of3 language where he cannot guess whether it should be taken literally or figuratively4 ,for ,hegel seriously insists on the essential unity and identity of all the compartments of the physical universe2 he will not keep time and space on one level1 matter and motion on another1 and senses1 suns1 plants1 passions1 all in their proper province4 ,going far beyond the theory which supposes that all the complex difference of organisation has grown up in endless1 endless ages from a primitive indistinctness1 so that the gap of time acts as a wall to keep early and late apart1 ,hegel insists upon their essential unity to-day4 ,and that sounds hard--the herald of anarchy1 of the collapse of the ordered polity of the scientific state4 ,it is no doubt probable that ,hegel1 like other men1 made mistakes2 that he over-estimated the supposed discoveries of the day3 that he indulged in false analogies1 and that he was attracted by a daring paradox4 ,all this has nothing to do with his main thesis3 which is1 that the natural realm is as it stands an a-logical realm where reason has gone beside itself1 and yet containing an instrument--man1 and that is mind--by which its rationality may be realised and restored4 ,in that point at least he and ,schopenhauer are at one4 ,footnote #a3 ,kant's ,kritik d4 r4 ,vernunft3 ,methodenl4 ,architektonik d4 r4 ,vern4 ,footnote #b3 ,schelling's ,werke1 v4 #aaf4 ,footnote #c3 ,ibid4 v4 #bgf4 ,footnote #d3 ,ibid4 iii4 #bfg4 ,footnote #e3 ,kant1 ,kritik d4 r4 ,vern41 ,deduction of the ,categories1 ,sect4 ,,iii4 ,footnote #f3 ,encyclopaedie1 #bej4 ,footnote #g3 ,encycl4 ,sect4 #bdd 7,logic1 p4 #cgi74 ,footnote #h3 ,encyclop4 #bff1 #bfi2 cf4 the lecture-note as given in ,werke vii i4 p4 #ig4 ,a large number of paradoxical analogies from ,hegel's ,naturphilosophie has been collected by ,riehl in his ,philosophisher ,criticismus1 ii4 #b1 #abj4 ,footnote #i3 ,see notes and illustrations in vol4 ii4 #dai4 ,,chapter ,,viii4 ,,the ,,sceptical ,,doubt3 ,,hume4 ,we have seen that an innate tendency leads the human mind to connect and set in relation1--to connect1 it may be erroneously1 or without proper scrutiny1 or under the influence of passions or prejudices1--but at any rate to connect4 ,criticism occasionally has impatiently banned this tendency as a mere fountain of errors4 ,the human mind1 says ,francis ,bacon1 always assumes a greater uniformity in things than it finds2 it expects symmetry1 is bold in neglecting exceptional cases1 and would fain go beyond all limits in its everlasting cry1 ,why and ,to what end4 ,it varies in individuals between a passion for discovering similarities and an intent acuteness to every shade of unlikeness4 ,but notwithstanding these warnings of the hen1 the ugly duckling ,reason will go beyond what is given3 it knows no insuperable limitation4 ,it may be guilty of what ,bacon calls 'anticipation'--an induction on evidence insufficient--or it may subdue itself to the duty of 'interpretation' of nature by proper methods3 in either case1 it is an act of association1 synthesis1 unification4 ,for ,nous is arch1 and knows that it is3 it will not yield to clamour or mere rebuke3 it1 too1 cannot be commanded1 unless by first obeying it3 and ,bacon1 having duly objurgated the 'mind left to itself1' is obliged to let it go to gather the grapes before they are quite ripe1 and to indulge it with a 'prerogative' of instances4 ,as ,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer and many others are never weary of telling us3 ',we think in relations4 ,this is truly the form of all thought3 and if there are any other forms they must be derived from this#a4' ,man used to be defined as a thinking or rational animal3 which means that man is a connecting and relation-giving animal2 and from this1 ,aristotle's definition1 making him out to be a 'political' animal1 is only a corollary1 most applicable in the region of ,ethics4 ,here is the ultimate point1 from which the natural consciousness1 and the energies of science1 art1 and religion equally start upon their special missions4 ,in ordinary life we attach but little importance to this machinery of cognition4 ,we incline to let the fact of synthesis drop out of sight1 as if it required no further study or notice1 and we regard the things connected as exclusively worth attending to4 ,the interest centres on the object--on the matter3 the formal element--the connective tissue--is only an instrument of no importance1 except in view of the end it helps us to4 ,we use general and half-explained terms1 such as development1 evolution1 continuity1 as bridges from one thing to another1 without giving any regard to the means of locomotion on their own account4 ,some one thing is the product of something else3 we let the term 'product' slip out of the proposition as unimportant3 and then read the statement so as to explain the one thing by turning it into the other4 ,things1 according to this opinion1 are all-important3 the rest is mere words4 ,these relations between things are not open to further investigation or definition3 they are each sui generis1 or peculiar3 and even if the logician in his analysis of inference finds it advisable to deal with them1 he will be content1 if he can classify them in some approximate way1 as a basis for his subdivision of propositions4 ,this is certainly one way of getting rid of ,metaphysics--for the time4 ,but there are epochs in life1 and epochs in universal history1 when the mind withdraws from its immersion in active life1 and reflects upon its own behaviour as on the proceedings of some strange creature1 of which it is a mere spectator4 ,at such seasons when we stop to reflect upon the partial scene1 and close our eyes to the totality1 doubts begin to arise1 whether our procedure is justified when we unify and combine the isolated phenomena4 ,have we any right to throw our own subjectivity1 the laws of our imagination and thought1 into the natural world8 ,would it not be more proper to refrain altogether from the use of such conceptions8 ,philosophy1 said one of the ancients#b1 begins in wonder1 and ends in wonder4 ,it begins from the surprise that something could be what it purports to be3 it ends in the marvel of our having thought anything else possible4 ,such a phrase well becomes the naive age in which the soul goes freely forth1 wandering from one novelty to another1 curious to find out all that can be known1--like the young wanderer on the sea-shore whom fresh pebbles and new shells tempt endlessly to fill his basket4 ,but as the ages roll on1 and the accumulations of the past grow heavier in the receptacle1 the need of a re-examination of the stores becomes imperative4 ,the bright colours have faded--and generally they fade soon3 there has been much picked up in the inexperience of youthful enthusiasm which maturer reflection hardly can think worth carrying further4 ,the duty of doubt and of re-examination of what tradition has bequeathed has been enforced by philosophy in all ages4 ,for it is the cardinal principle of philosophy to be free--to possess its soul--never to be a mere machine or mere channel of tradition4 ,but1 in some ages1 this assertion of its freedom has had for the soul a pre-eminently negative aspect4 ,it has meant only freedom from--and not also freedom in and through--its environing1 or rather constituting1 substance4 ,such an epoch was seen in the ancient world when the ,new ,academy1 with its sceptical abstention from all objective assertions1 had to protest against the dogmatism of the ,stoic and ,epicurean schoolmen4 ,in modern times the initial shudder before plunging in has been a recurrent crisis4 ,each thinker--as he personally resolved to thread his way through the wilderness of current opinion to the realm of certified truth--has had to remind himself 7and his contemporaries7 that in knowledge at least no possessions are secured property unless they have been earned by the sweat of their owner's brow4 ,this is the common theme of ,bacon's aphorisms in the beginning of the ,novum ,organum1 of ,descartes' ,discourse of ,method1 and of ,spinoza's unfinished essay on the ,emendation of the ,intellect4 ,there is indeed a discrepancy in these utterances as to the measure in which they severally think it needful to insist as preliminary on a kind of moral and religious consecration of life to the service of truth4 ,but a more compelling division arises4 ,the maxim may be understood to say1 ',divest thy mind of its ill-gotten gains1 its evil habits1 prejudices1 and system1 and in childlike simplicity prepare thine eye and ear to receive in pure vessels the stores of truth which are ready to stream in from the world4' ,or it may rather be held to say1 ',remember that thou art a conscious1 waking mind1 and that every idea thou hast is thine by thine own assent3 insist upon thy right of free intelligence1 and give no place to any belief which thou hast not raised into full light of consciousness1 and found to be completely consistent with the whole power and content of thy clearest thought4' ,and1 we may add1 if the maxim be obeyed too exclusively in either way1 it will be obeyed amiss4 ,with ,locke the question comes into even greater prominence4 ,on what conditions can ,i have knowledge8 ,how can ,i be certified that my ideas--the subjective images in my mind--have a reference to something objective and real8 ,locke's answer is1 not unnaturally perhaps1 somewhat prolix1 and wanting in fundamental precision of principles4 ,after dismissing the view that1 even before experience1 there are certain common ideas spontaneously and by original endowment present in all human beings1 he goes on to show how we can sufficiently account for the ideas we actually find by supposing in us an almost unlimited power of joining and disjoining1 of comparing1 relating1 and unifying the various elementary 'ideas' which make their way into the empty chambers of our mind by the senses4 ,as to the source1 the channel1 and the nature of these sense-ideas1 ,locke is obscure and apparently inconsistent3 though clearly it should be all important to know how an idea can be caused by1 or spring from1 a material thing4 ,when in his fourth book he comes to the question of what is the reality1 or the meaning of our ideas1 he does not really get beyond a few--rather dubiously reasoned-out--conclusions that1 although strictly we cannot go beyond 'the present testimony of our senses employed about the particular objects that do affect them1' we may for practical purposes allow a good deal to the presumptions of general probability4 ,but ,locke had also begun to criticise our ideas1 in his account of their formation out of the 'simple ideas'-- 7which neither ,locke nor any other atomist of mind has succeeded in making clear7--which the several senses give1 and by observing or reflecting on what goes on or is present in our minds1 we 'form1' he says1 various ideas4 ,in a style of discussion which is on the borderland between vulgar and philosophical analysis-- 7never quite false1 but nearly always inadequate1 because it almost invariably assumes what it ostensibly proposes to explain17 ,locke tells us how we get one idea by 'enlarging1' another by 'repeating1' as we please1 the bounteous data of the touch and sight4 ,but amongst the compounds there are some of more disputable origin4 ,there are some--e4g4 ideas of punishable acts or legalised states--which are 'voluntary collections of ideas put together in the mind independent from any original patterns in nature1' ,these1 though entirely subjective1 are entirely real1 because they only serve as patterns by which we may judge or designate things so and so4 ,it is worse with the idea of power1 which we only 'collect' or 'infer1' and that not from matter1 where it is invisible1 but only in a clear light when we consider ,god and spirits4 ,still worse1 perhaps1 is it with the idea of substance1 which is a 'collection' of simple ideas with the 'supposition' of an 'incomprehensible' something in which the collection 'subsists4' ,hump put all this rather more pointedly4 ,we have 'impressions1' i4 e4 lively perceptions by sense4 ,we have also 'ideas1' i4 e4 fainter images of these1 but otherwise identical4 ,an idea should be a copy of an impression4 ,if you cannot point out any such impression1 you may be certain you are mistaken when you imagine you have any such idea4 ,there is prevalent in the mental world a kind of association2 a 'gentle force' connects ideas in our imagination according to certain relations they possess4 ,this 'mind' or this 'imagination' is only a bundle or collection of impressions and ideas2 but a collection which is continually and rapidly changing in its constituents1 and in the scale of liveliness possessed by each constituent4 ,when an idea is particularly fresh and forcible1 it is a belief or it is believed in3 when faint1 not so4 ,or1 otherwise put1 the object of an idea is said to exist1 when the idea itself is vividly felt#c4 ,really there is no such thing as 'external existence' taken literally4 ',our universe is the universe of the imagination'3 all existence is for a consciousness4 ,impressions arise in certain orders of sequence or co-existence4 ,when two impressions frequently recur and always in the same order1 the custom binds them so closely together1 that1 should one of them only be given as impression1 we cannot help having an idea of the other1 which1 growing more vivid by the contagion of the contiguous impression1 creates1 or is1 a belief in its reality4 ,between the perceptions as such1 there is no connexion2 they are distinct and independent existences4 ,they only get a connexion through our feeling2 we feel a 'determination' of our thought to pass from one to another4 ,the one impression has no power to produce the other2 the one thing does not cause the other4 ',we never have any impression that contains any power or efficacy#d1' ,hence the power and necessity we attribute to the so-called causal agent and to the connexion are an illegitimate transference from our feeling1 and a mistranslation of our incapacity to resist the force of habitual association into a real bond between the two impressions themselves1 ,the necessity is in the mind--as a habit-caused compulsion--not in the objects4 ,as with the relation of cause and effect1 so it is with others4 ,the identity of continued existence is only another name--an objective transcript--of the feeling of smooth uninterrupted succession of impressions in which our thought glides along from one in easy transition to another4 ,and here the coherence and continuity of perceptions need not be absolute4 ,a vivid impression of unbroken connexion in a part will1 if predominant1 by association fill up the gaps and weak points1 and behind the admitted breaks in the line of our ideas will suppose--invent--or create an imperceptible but real continuity in the supposed things4 ,and by this fiction of a continuous existence of our perceptions1 we easily lapse into the doctrine that our perceptions have an independent existence as objects or things in themselves3--a doctrine which according to ,hume is contrary to the plainest experience4 ,but if the world is always the world of imagination--of ,vorstellung--of mental representation1 ,hume is aware that we must admit two orders or grades of such representation4 ,we must distinguish1 he remarks#e1 'in the imagination betwixt the principles which are permanent1 irresistible and universal 7such as the customary transition from causes to effects and from effects to causes71 and the principles which are changeable1 weak and irregular4 ,the former are the foundation of all our thoughts and actions1' ,there are1 in other words1 normal and general laws of association--such as the relation of cause and effect--which persuade us of real existence4 ,by its own laws1 therefore1 within the realm of ,vorstellung or ,mental idea1 there grows up a permanent1 objective world for all1 contrasted with the temporary1 accidental perception of the individual and of the moment2 and this serves as the standard or the one common measure by which occasional perturbations are to be measured4 ,within the limits of the subjective in general there arises a subjective of higher order1 which is truly objective4 ,this same change of front--as it may be called--,hume makes in morals4 ,there the mind can modify and control its passions according as it can feel the objects of them near or far2 and though each of us has his 'peculiar position1' we can--so creating the ethical basis--'fix on some steady and general points of view1 and always in our thoughts place ourselves in them1 whatever may be our present situation#f'3 we can 'choose some common point of view1' and from the vantage-ground of a permanent principle1 however distant1 we have a chance of gaining the victory over our passion1 however near4 ,thus far ,hume had gone in the development of idealism1' ,whether his theory is consistent from end to end1 need not be here discussed4 ,but it is evident that ,hume was not lost in the quagmire of subjective idealism4 ,the objective and the subjective are with him akin3 the objective is the subjective1 which is universal1 permanent1 and normal4 ,the causal relation has1 in the first instance1 only a subjective necessity2 but through that subjective necessity or its irresistible belief1 it generates an objective world4 ,but it has been and is the fortune of philosophers to be known in the philosophical world by some conspicuous red rag of their system which first caught the eye of the bull-like leaders of the human herd4 ,it was so notably with ,hobbes and ,spinoza2 and most of the thinkers whose names appear in the pages of ,kant suffer from this curtailment4 ,descartes1 ,locke1 ,leibniz1 ,berkeley1 ,hume1 are there not the real philosophers1 discoverable in their works1 but the creatures of historic reputation and of popular simplification who do duty for them4 ,kant's ,hume is therefore a somewhat imaginary being3 the product1 partly of imperfect knowledge of ,hume's writings1 partly of prepossessions derived from a long previous training in ,german rationalism4 ,such a ,hume was--or would have been1 had he existed--a philosopher who 'took the objects of experience for things in themselves1' who 'treated the conception of cause as a false and deceptive illusion1' who did not indeed venture to assail the certainty of mathematics1 but held--as regards all knowledge about the existence of things-- 'empiricism to be the sole source of principles1' founding his conclusion mainly on an examination of the causal nexus#g4 ,this 'note of warning' sounded against the claims of pure reason--as he calls ,hume's ,enquiry was what about #agfb broke ,kant's dogmatic slumber and forced him to give his researches in speculative philosophy a new direction4 ,his first step was to generalise ,hume's problem from an inquiry into the origin of the causal idea into a general study of the synthetic principles in knowledge4 ,his next was to attempt to fix the number of these concepts and synthetic principles4 ,and his third was to 'deduce' them3 i4 e41 to prove the reciprocal implication between experience or knowledge and the concepts or categories of intelligence4 ,footnote #a3 ,first ,principles1 p4 #afb4 ,it may be as well to remark that ,relation is scarcely an adequate description of the nature of thought as a whole4 ,we shall see when we come to the theory of logic1 that the term is applicable--and then somewhat imperfectly--only to the second phase of thought1 the categories of reflection1 which are the favourite categories of science and popular metaphysics4 ,footnote #b3 ,arist4 ,metaph4 i4 #b4 #bf4 ,footnote #c3 ,treatise of ,human ,nature 7,understanding71 iii4 #g and ii4 #f4 ,footnote #d3 ,ibid4 iii4 #ad4 ,footnote #e3 ,treatise of ,human ,nature 7,understanding iv4 #d47 ,footnote #f3 ,treatise of ,human ,nature 7,morals71 iii4 i4 ,footnote #g3 ,kant1 ,prolegomena to ,metaph4 ,introduction and ,crit4 of ,practical ,reason 7on the ,claim of ,pure ,reason1 ,werke1 viii4 #afg74 ,,chapter ,,ix4 ,,the ,,attempt ,,at ,a ,,critical ,,solution3 ,,kant4 ,the ,criticism of ,pure ,reason has been described by its author as a generalisation of ,hume's problem4 ,hume1 he thought1 had treated his question on the 'relations of ideas' in their bearing upon 'matters of fact' mainly with reference to the isolated case of cause and effect4 ,kant extended the inquiry so as to comprise all those connective and unifying ideas which form the subject-matter of metaphysics4 ,in his own technical language--which has lost its meaning for the present day--he asked1 ',are ,synthetic judgments a priori possible8'--a question which in another place he has translated into the form1 ',is the metaphysical faith of men sound1 and is a metaphysical science possible8' ,by a metaphysics he meant in the first instance the belief in a more than empirical reality1 and secondly the science which should give real knowledge of ,god1 ,freedom and ,immortality1--a science whose objects would be ,god1 the ,world1 and the ,soul4 ,from a comparatively early date 7#agfb-d7 ,kant had been inclined to suspect and distrust the claims of metaphysics to replace faith1 and to give knowledge of spiritual reality2 and he had tried to vindicate for the moral and religious life an independence of the conclusions and methods of the metaphysical theology and psychology of the day4 ,but it was not till some years later--in #aggj--that he formulated any very definite views as to the essential conditions of scientific knowledge3 and it was not till #agha that his theory on the subject was put together in a provisionally complete shape4 ,what then are the criteria of a science8 ,when is our thought knowledge1 and of objective reality8 ,in the first place1 there must be a given something--a sens-datum--an 'impression' as ,hume might have said4 ,if there be no impression1 therefore1 there can be no scientific idea1 no real knowledge4 ,there must be the primary touch--the feeling--the affection--the je ne sais quoi of contact with reality4 ,secondly1 what is given can only be received if taken up by the recipient1 and in such measure as he is able to appropriate it4 ,the given is received in a certain mode4 ,in the present case1 the sensation is apprehended and perceived under the forms of space and time4 ,perception1 in other words1 whatever may be its special quality or its sensuous material1 is always an act of dating and localisation4 ,the distinction between the mere lump of feeling or sensibility and the perception is that the latter implies a field of extended and mutually excluding parts of space1 and a series of points of time1 both field and series being continuous1 and1 so far as inexhaustibility goes1 infinite4 ,thirdly1 even in the reception of the given there is a piece of action and spontaneity4 ,if the more passive recipiency be called ,sense1 this active element in the adaptation may be termed ,intellect4 ,intellect is a power or process of choice1 selection1 comparison1 distinguishing and dividing1 analysis and synthesis1 affirmation and negation1 numeration1 of judgment and doubt1 of connexion and disjunction1 differentiation and integration4 ,its general aspect is by ,kant sometimes described as ,judgment--the act of thought which correlates by distinguishing2 sometimes as ,apperception1 and the unity of apperception4 ,it is1 i4 e41 an active unity and a synthetic energy2 it unifies1 and always unifies4 ,it links perception to perception1 correlating one with another--interpreting one by another2 estimating the knowledge-value of one by the rest4 ,it thus 'apperceives4' ,it is a faculty of association and consociation of ideas4 ,but the association is inward and 'ideal' union3 the one idea interpenetrates and fuses with the other1 even while it remains distinct4 ,kant's work may be described--in its first stage--as an analysis and a criticism of experience4 ,the term ,experience is an ambiguous one4 ,it sometimes means what has been called the 'raw material' of experience3 the crude1 indigested mass of poured-in matter-of-knowledge4 ,if there be such a shapeless lump anywhere1--which has to be considered presently--it1 at any rate1 is not on ,kant's view properly entitled to the name of ,experience4 ,the ,given must be felt and apprehended3 and--to put the point paradoxically--to be felt it must be more than felt1--it must be perceived4 ,it must1 in other words1 be projected--set in space and time3 let out of the mere dull inner subjectivity of feeling into the clear and distinct outer subjectivity of perception4 ,but1 again1 to be perceived1 it must be apperceived3 to be set in time and space1 it must first of all be in the hands of the unifying consciousness1 which is the lord of time and space4 ,for in so far as space and time mean a place and an order--in so far as they mean more than an empty inconceivable receptacle for bulks of sensation1 in the same degree do they presuppose an intellectual1 synthetic genius1 which is in all its perceptions one and the same1--the fundamental1 original unity of consciousness4 ,and this analysis of experience is transcendental4' ,beginning with the assumed datum--the object of or in experience--it shows that this object which is supposed to be there--to exist by itself and wait for perception--is created by and in the very act which apprehends it4 ,climbing up and rising above its habitual absorption in the thing1 consciousness 7that of the philosophic observer and analyst7 sees the thing in the act of making1 and watches its growth4 ,we have seen that ,kant made free use of the metaphor of giving and receiving4 ,but it is hardly possible to use such metaphors and retain independence of judgment4 ,the associations customarily attached to the figurative language carry one away easily1 and often for a long way1 on the familiar paths of imagination4 ,the analogy is used even where--if all were looked into--its terms become meaningless4 ,no reader of ,locke can have failed1 e4 g41 to notice how he is misled by his own images of the dark room and the empty cabinet3--images1 useful and perhaps even necessary1 but requiring constant restraint in him who would ply them wisely and to his reader's good4 ,from what has been said above it will be clear that the acquisition of experience1 the growth of knowledge1 is a unique species of gift and acceptance4 ,the consciousness which ,kant describes may be the consciousness of ,john ,doe or ,richard ,roe3 but as ,kant describes it1 the limitations of their personality1 i4e4 of their individual body and soul1 have been neglected4 ,it is consciousness in general which is ,kant's theme1 just as it is granite in general--and not the block in yonder field1--which is the theme of the geologist4 ,once get that clear1 and you will also see clearly that consciousness is at once giver and recipient--neither or both3 at once receptivity and spontaneity4 ,but--you may reply--does not the material object act 7chemically1 optically1 mechanically1 c47 on the sense-organ on the periphery of my body1 does not the nerve-string convey the impression to the brain2 and is not perception the effect of that process1 in which the material object is the initial cause8 ,in this exposition--which is not unknown in vulgar philosophy--there is a monstrous1 almost inextricable1 complication of fact with inference1 of truth with error4 ,so long as there is an uncertainty--and metaphysicians themselves1 we may be reminded1 are not agreed upon the matter--as to what we are to understand by cause1 effect1 and act1 what an impression is1 and how brain and intelligence mutually stand to each other1 it is hardly possible to pronounce judgment upon this mode of statement4 ,yet perhaps we may go so far as to say that while the terms quoted bear an intelligible meaning when applied within the physiological process they are vain when used of relations of mind to body4 ,there is a sense in which we may speak of the action of mind on body1 and of body on mind3 but what we mean would perhaps be more unmistakably expressed by saying that the higher intellectual and volitional energies are never in our experience entirely independent of the influences of the lower sensitive and emotional nature4 ,in the metaphysical sense which the terms are here made to bear1 they mislead4 ,action and re-action can only take place in the separateness of space1 where one is here and another there3 7though1 be it added1 they cannot take place even on these terms1 unless the here and the there be somehow unified in a medium which embraces both74 ,mens1 said ,spinoza1 is the idea corporis#a3 he would hardly have said ,corpus habet ideam4 ,what he meant would scarcely have been well described by calling it a parallelism or mutual independence1 yet with harmony or identity1 of body and mind4 ,apart from body1 no doubt1 mind is for him a nullity3 for body is what gives it reality4 ,but1 on the other hand1 ,mind is the enveloping and including ',attribute' of the two3 idealism overlaps realism4 ,this was the fundamental proposition which ,kant contended for2 what he spoke of as his own ,copernican discovery3 though1 in reality1 for the student of the history of philosophy it was only the re-statement1 in some respects the clearer statement1 of the idealism which even ,hume1 not to mention ,spinoza and ,leibniz1 had maintained4 ,the world of experience--the empirical1 objective1 and real world--is a world of ideas1 of representations which have place only in mind1 of appearances4 ,space and time are subjective3 the forms of thought are subjective3 and yet they constitute phenomenal or empirical or real objectivity4 ,such language is--it would seem inevitably--misunderstood3 and in his second edition1 ,kant--besides many other minor modifications of statement1--had to defend himself by inserting a 'confutation of idealism1' i4e4 of the theory which holds that the existence of objects outside us in space is doubtful1 if not even impossible4 ,but no end of argument will ever confute the view that ,kant's doctrine is such idealism3 until people can be got to rise to a new view of what is subjectivity--what is an idea--and what is existence outside us4 ,by 'subjective' the world is in the way of understanding what is due to personal prepossession1 void of general acceptability1 a product of individual feeling1 peculiar and inexplicable tastes4 ,by subjective ,kant means what belongs to the subject or knowing mind as such and in its generality3 what is constitutive of intelligence in general1 what sense and intellect are semper et ubique4 ,into the question how the human being came to have such an intellectual endowment--the question which ,nativist psychology is supposed to settle in one way2 and ,evolutionism in another--,kant does not enter2 he merely says where there is knowledge1 there is a knower1--a knowing subject so constituted4 ,it comes after all to the tautology that the reality we know is a known reality3 that knowledge is a growth in the knower1 and not an accidental product due to things otherwise unknown4 ,the predicate 7or category7 'is' is contained1 implicit1 in the predicate 'is known1' or what 'is' puts implicitly1 'is known' puts explicitly and truly4 ,by 'appearance' the world understands a sham1 or at least somewhat short of reality4 ,by appearance ,kant understands a reality which has appeared3 or1 as that is going too far1 a something which is real so far as it goes 7a prima facie fact71 but only a candidate for admission into the circle of reals4 ,and such reality depends on nothing more than its thorough-going coherence with other appearances1 its explaining the rest1 and being in turn explained by them1--its absolute adaptation to its environment4 ,and this environment all lies in the common field of consciousness1 and in the one correlating and unifying apperceptivity of the ego1--that ,ego which is the inseparable comrade1 vehicle1 and judge1 of all our perceptions4 ,it is the appearance--but as yet not the appearance of something1--but rather an appearance to or for something4 ,by an 'idea' the world in general understands what it is sometimes ready to call a mere idea4 ,and by a mere idea is meant something which is not reality1 but a peculiarity of an individual mind1 or group of minds-a fancy1 without objective truth3--something1 we may even add1 which for many people is located in their own head or brain1 cut off by blank bone-walls from the open air of real being4 ,by idea 7representation1 ,vorstellung7 ,kant meant that an object is always and essentially the object of a mind3 always relative to a subject consciousness1 and implying it1 just as a subject consciousness always implies an object4 ,and by 'existence outside us' the world probably means--for it is imprudent to define and refine too much in this hazy medium of words where we all drowse--existence of things on an independent footing beyond the limits of our personal1 i4 e4 bodily and sentient1 self4 ,as regards our own trunk and limbs1 most of us1 except in some most strange insanity1 are not likely ever to be in doubt1 and are indeed more likely1 after ,schopenhauer's model1 to take the knowledge of these personalia as the one thing immediately and intuitively certain4 ,we talk freely enough1 it is true1 about existence outside our own minds2 but it is only a drastic method of stating the difference between a fancy and a fact4 ,and probably we labour under a half-unconscious hallucination that our minds are localised in some material 'seat1' somewhere in our bodily limits1 and more especially in the central nerve-organs4 ,but1 as has been said elsewhere#b1 the point of view under which ,mind is regarded by ,kant is that of ,consciousness1 and especially perceptive consciousness4 ,he describes1 as we have put it above1 the steps or conditions under which the single sense-observation is elevated into the rank of an experience claiming universality and necessity4 ,but the whole machinery of consciousness--the form of sensibility and the category of intellect--is originally set in motion by an impetus from without3 or at least the manipulating machinery requires a raw material on which to operate4 ,consciousness1 or the observer who takes this point of view1 feels that it is being played upon by an unknown performer--or that it is attempting to apprehend something1 which1 because the act of apprehension is also to some extent 7and to what extent1 who can say87 a transmutation1 it must for ever fail to apprehend truly4 ,it is haunted by the phantom of a real1--a thing in its own right1 which can only appear in forms of sense and intellect1 never in its own essential being4 ,it is only a short step further--and ,kant1 if one may judge him by several isolated passages1 has more than once crossed the interval1--to treat1 after the manner of uneducated consciousness and of popular science1 the thing in its independent being as the cause which produces the sensation1 or as the original which the mental idea reproduces under the distortions or modifications rendered necessary by the sensuous-intellectual medium4 ,for1 if under the terms of one analogy the perception is an effect of the thing1 under those of another it is an image or copy of external reality4 ,if this be ,kantian philosophy--and it can quote chapter and verse in its favour--,kantian philosophy is one version of the great dogma of the relativity of knowledge4 ,that unhappy phrase seems to have many meanings1 but none of absolutely catholic acceptation4 ,it may mean that knowledge of things states their relations--the way they behave in reference to this or that1 in these or those circumstances2 and that of an utterly unrelated and absolutely isolated thing1 our knowledge is and must be nil4 ,of a thing-in-itself we can know nothing2 for there is nothing to know4 ,it may mean that knowledge is relative to the recipient or the knower1--that it is not a product which can stand by itself1 but needs a vehicle and an object in close relation4 ,in this way1 too1 knowledge is relative to age and circumstances3 grows from period to period1 and may even decay4 ,and thirdly1 the relativity of knowledge may be taken to mean that we 7and all human beings7 can never know the reality2 because we can only know the phenomenon1 i4 e4 the modified1 transmuted1 reflected thing which has reconstituted an image of itself after passing the interfering medium4 ,for1 first of all1 we must strip it--this 'image' so-called 7the vulgar call it the 'thing'7--of the secondary qualities 7sound1 colour1 taste1 resistance7 which it has in the consciousness of a being dependent on his sense-organs3 and then1 we must get rid also of those quantitative attributes 7figure1 number1 size7 which it has in the consciousness of a spatially and temporally perceptive being2--and then2--but the prospect is too horrible to continue further and face the ,gorgon's head in the outer darkness1 where man denudes appearance in the hope to meet reality4 ,the fact is1 there are too many strands in the web which ,kant is weaving1 for him or perhaps for any man to keep them all well in hand and lose none of the symmetry of the pattern he designs4 ,to be just1 we must1 in dealing with him as with any other philosopher1 try to keep in view the unity of that design instead of insisting too minutely and too definitely upon its occasional defects4 ,it is easy to work the pun that a 'critical' philosophy must itself expect to be criticised2 it is more important to remember that by a criticism ,kant meant an attempt to steer a course between the always enticing extremes of dogmatism and scepticism1--an attempt to be fair1 i4 e4 just to both sides1 and yet neither to sink into the systematised placidity of the former1 nor to rove in a mere guerilla warfare with the latter4 ,and it is the mere privateer who in the popular sense of the word is the mere critic4 ,of ,kant we must remember that he has the defects of his qualities4 ,he prides himself on his distinctions of sense and intellect1 of imagination and understanding1 of understanding and reason2 and with justice3 but his distinctions are sometimes so decisive that it is hard work both for him and for his reader to reconstitute their unity4 ,he is fond of utilising old classifications to embody his new doctrine3 and occasionally the result is like what we have been taught to expect from pouring new wine into old bottles4 ,he draws hard and fast lines1 and then has to create1 as it seems1 supplementary links of connexion1 which1 if they operate1 can only do so because they are the very unity he began by ignoring4 ,one gets perfectly lost in the multitude of syntheses1 in the labyrinth of categories1 schemata1 and principles1 of paralogisms1 antinomies1 and ideals of pure reason4 ,one part of this formalism may be set down to the pedantry and pipeclay of the age of the ,great ,frederick--pedantry1 from which1 as we console ourselves1 our modern souls are freed4 ,but it arises rather from the necessity of pursuing the battle between truth and error through every complicated passage in that great fortress which ages of scholasticism had--on various plans--gradually constructed4 ,kant is always a little of the martinet and the schoolmaster2 but it is because he knows that true liberty cannot be secured without forms and must capture the old before it can plant the new4 ,the forms as they stand in his grouping may often appear stiff and lifeless3 but a more careful study1 more sympathetically intent1 will find that there is latent life and undisplayed connexion in the terms4 ,unfortunately the classified cut-and-dried specimens are more welcome to the collector1 and can more easily be put in evidence in the examination-room4 ,thus the original question1 ,are synthetic judgments a priori possible8 is answered--somewhat piecemeal--in a way that leads the reader to suppose it is a question of psychology4 ,he hears so much of sense1 imagination1 intellect1 in the discussion1 that he fancies it is an account of a process carried on by the faculties of an individual mind4 ,and of course nobody need suppose these processes are ever carried on otherwise than by individual thinkers1 human beings with proper names4 ,but scientific investigation is concerned only with the essential and universal4 ,for it1 really1 sense1 imagination1 c4 are not so many faculties in a thinking agent3 they are grades and aspects of consciousness1-- 'powers' in a process of gradual mental complication 7involution74 ,kant is really dealing with a 'normal' thought with its distinguishable constituent aspects4 ,only--he fails to 'make this explicit and clear4 ,the individualism--the un-historical prepossession--of his age is upon his phraseology1 if not upon his thought3 and one hardly realises that he is really engaged on human thought and knowledge as a substantial subject of itself apart from its individual vehicles1--on that thought1 which lives and grows in social institutions and products1--in language1 science1 literature1 and moral usage1--the common stock which one age bequeathes to the next1 but which the later-comer can only inherit if he works for and creates it afresh4 ,if it be a psychology1 therefore1 it is a psychology which does not assume a soul with qualities1 but which expounds the steps in the constitution of a normal intelligence4 ,one may note1 without insisting on them too much1 the defects of his treatment of the forms of thought4 ,it may be said that1 in the first place1 the table of the categories was incomplete4 ,it had been borrowed1 as ,kant himself tells us1 from the old logical subdivision of judgments1 derived more or less directly from ,aristotle and the ,schoolmen4 ,now many of the relations occurring in ordinary thought could not be reduced to any of the twelve forms1 without doing violence to them4 ,but ,kant expressly disclaims exhaustiveness in detail4 ,he could1 if he would3 but that is for another season4 ,in the second place1 the classification did not expressly put forward any principle or reason1 and gave ground for no development4 ,that there should be four fundamental categories1 each with three divisions1 making twelve in all1 seems as inexplicable as that there should be four ,athenian tribes in early times and twelve ,phratriai4 ,the twelve patriarchs of thought stand as if in equal authority1 with little or no bearing upon one another4 ,we have here1 in short1 what seems an artificial and not a natural classification of the types of thought4 ,but ,kant himself has given some explanation of the triad1 and a sympathetic interpretation has shown how the four main groups are steps in the solution of one problem#c ,in the third place1 the question as taken up seems largely psychological1 or subjective1 concerning the constitution of the human mind as a percipient and cognitive faculty4 ,but this is necessary1 perhaps1 to the restricted nature of ,kant's problem4 ,he is dealing with the elements that form our objective or scientific consciousness of the physical world4 ,the deeper question of the place and work of mind in life in general1 in law and morality and religion1 does not at this stage come before him4 ,that problem in fact only gradually emerges with the ,criticism of the ,moral ,faculty and the ,aesthetic ,judgment4 ,logic--as the doctrine of the ,logos which is the principle of all things1 even of its own ,other--had to wait for its preparation till it could be matured4 ,in ,hegel1 the question assumes a wider scope1 and receives a more thorough-going answer4 ,in the first place the question about the ,categories is transferred from what we have called the epistemological or psychological1 to what ,hegel terms the logical1 sphere4 ,it is transferred from the ,reason subjectively considered as a mere receptive and synthetic human consciousness to the ,reason which is in the world and in history1--a ,reason1 which our ,reason1 as it were1 touches1 and so becomes possessed of knowledge4 ,in the second place1 the ,categories become a vast multitude4 ,the intellectual telescope discovers new stars behind the constellations named in ancient lore4 ,there is no longer1 if there ever was1 any mystic virtue supposed to inhere in the number twelve3 while the triadic arrangement is made radical and everywhere recurs4 ,the modern chemist of thought vastly amplifies the number of its elementary types and factors1 and proves that many of the old ,categories are neither simple nor indecomposable4 ,thirdly1 there is a systematic development or process which links the ,categories together1 and shows how the most simple1 abstract1 and inadequate1 inevitably lead up to the most complex and adequate4 ,each term or member in the organism of thought has its place conditioned by all the others3 each of them is the germ1 or the ripe fruit of another4 ,footnote #a3 ,spinoza1 ,eth4 ii4 #g-ac4 ,footnote #b3 ,encyclopaedia1 #dae1 #dbj4 ,consciousness is only as it were the surface of the ocean of mind2 and reflects only the lights and shadows in the sky above it4 ,footnote #c3 ,it is not the least of the merits of the exposition in ,caird's ,critical ,philosophy of ,immanuel ,kant1 vol4 i4 to have brought out this4 ,,chapter ,x4 ,,the ,,critical ,,solution1 ,,continued3 ,,kant4 ,kant's answer to his question was briefly this4 ,intelligence is essentially synthetic1 always supplementing the given by something beyond1 instituting relationships1 unifying the many1 and thus building up concrete totalities4 ,in pure mathematics this is obvious3 the process of numeration shows it creating number out of units1 and geometry shows elementary propositions leading on to complicated theorems4 ,in abstract physics it is hardly less obvious3 there1 e4g41 the principle of reason and consequent or the persistence of substance are rational and legitimate steps beyond the mere datum4 ,the more important question follows4 ,how are these 'pure' syntheses applicable to real fact8 ,to that ,kant replies3 ,they apply1 because in all that we call real or objective fact there is a subjective element or constituent4 ,what appears to be purely given1 and independent of our perceptions1 is a product of perceptual and conceptual conditions1--is constituted by a synthesis in perception1 imagination1 conception4 ,our world is a mental growth--not our individual product1 but the work of that common mind in which we live and think1 and which lives and thinks in us4 ,anyhow it is not an isolated self-existing un-intelligent world for ever materially outside us--an other world1 eternally separate from us2 but bone of our bone1 flesh of our flesh1 the work realised by our great 'elder brother1'--the ,idea of human collectivity--the ,reason or ,spirit in which we are all one soul4 ,it is therefore no unwarranted step on to a foreign property when we apply the categories of thought and forms of sense to determine objective reality3 for objective reality has been for ever made1 and is now making1 objective and reality by the conscious or unconscious syntheses of perception and imagination4 ,there remains the answer to the same question as regards the objects of ,metaphysics4 ,these objects are according to ,kant inferences1 and illegitimate inferences4 ,they are not necessary elements or factors in the constitution of experience4 ,in order that there should be experience1 knowledge1 science1 there must be an endless hold of space and time in which to stow it clearly and distinctly away3 and there must also be ties and relations binding it part to part1 links of reference and correlation1 a sort of logical elastic band that will stretch to include infinitely copious materials4 ,but each real knowledge attaches to a definite assignable perception1 in a single place and time4 ,from this point we can travel--by means of like points--practically without limit in any direction4 ,but though the old margin fades forever and forever as we move1 a new margin takes its place3 the limitation and finitude remain3 and new acquisitions are always balanced in part by the loss of the old4 ,yet the heart and the imagination are clamorous1 and the intellect is ready to serve them4 ,such an intellect ,kant has called ,reason1 and its products 7,platonic7 ',ideas4' ,the 7,platonic7 ,idea expresses not so much an object of knowledge as a postulate1 a problem1 an act of faith4 ,the ',vaulting ambition' ,intelligence 'o'erleaps itself and falls on t'other1' ,unsatisfied with a bundle of sensations and ideas1 it demands their abiding unity in a substantial ,soul4 ,to simplify the endlessness of physical phenomena1 it sums them up in a ,universe4 ,to gather all mental and physical diversities and divisions into one life1 it creates the ideal of ,god4 ,each single experience1 and the collected aggregate of these experiences1 is felt to fall short of a complete total3 and yet this complete total1 the ultimate unity1 is itself not an experience at all4 ,but1 if it be no object of experience1 it is still an idea on which reason is inevitably driven3 and the attempt to apprehend it1 in the absence of experience1 gives rise to the theories of ,metaphysics4 ,everything1 however1 which can be in the strict sense of the word known1 must be perceived in space and time1 or1 in other words1 must lie open to experience4 ,where experience ends1 human reason meets a barrier which checks any efficient progress1 but refuses to recognise the check as due to a natural limit which it is really impossible to pass4 ,the idea of completeness1 of a rounded system1 or unconditional unity1 is still left1 after the categories of the understanding have done their best3 and is not destroyed although its realisation or explication is declared to be impossible4 ,there is thus left unexplained a totality which encompasses all the single members of experience--a unity compared to which the several categories are only a collection of fragments--an infinite which commands and regulates the finite concepts of the experiential intellect4 ,but in the region of rational thought there is no objective and independent standard by which we can verify the conclusions of ,reason4 ,there are no definite objects1 lying beyond the borders of experience1 towards which it might unerringly turn2 and its sole authentic use1 accordingly1 is to see that the understanding is thorough and exact1 when it deals in the co-ordination of experiences4 ,in this want of definite objects1 ,reason1 whenever it acts for itself1 can only fall into perpetual contradictions and sophistries4 ,pure ,reason1 therefore1 the faculty of ideas1 the organ of ,metaphysics1 does not of itself 'constitute' knowledge1 but merely 'regulates' the action of the understanding4 ,by this rigour of demonstration ,kant dealt a deadly blow1 as it seemed1 to the dogmatic ,metaphysics1 and the ,deism of his time4 ,hume had shaken the certainty of ,metaphysics and thrown doubt upon ,theology3 but ,kant apparently made an end of ,metaphysics1 and annihilated ,deistic theology4 ,the ,german philosopher1 as ,hegel has said and ,heine has repeated1 did thoroughly and with systematic demonstration what ,voltaire did with literary graces and not without the witticisms with which the ,french executioner gives the coup de grce4 ,when a great idea had been degraded into a vulgar doctrine and travestied in common reality1 the ,frenchman met its inadequacies with graceful satire1 and showed that these half-truths were not eternal verities4 ,the ,german made a theory and a system of what was only a sally of criticism2 and rendered the criticism wrong1 by making it too consistent and too logical#a4 ,science--such is ,kant's conclusion--is of the definite and detailed1 of the conditioned4 ,it goes from point to point1 within the enveloping unity of what we call experience1 and which rests upon the transcendental and original unity of consciousness4 ,but a knowledge of the whole--of the enveloping unity--is a contradiction in terms4 ,to know is to synthetise3 you cannot synthetise synthesis4 ,knowledge is of the relative3 but an absolute and unconditional totality has no relations4 ,we may therefore1 possibly1 feel1 believe in1 presuppose the absolute3 but know it in the stricter sense1 we cannot4 ,it may be the object of a rational faith4 ,but as for knowledge1 we can get on in psychology without the invisible and immortal soul3 we can carry out sciences of the physical universe1 without troubling ourselves about the 'cosmological' questions of ultimate atoms or ultimate void1 of first beginning and final end3 and no proofs will ever prove the existence of that 'ideal' of reason--briefly termed ,god--which transcends and completes and creates all existence4 ,not that such ,ideas are useless even in science4 ,they represent--if not without risks--the faith and the presupposition which underlie the spirit of scientific progress1 and set before it an ideal perfection which it will do well to strive after1 though it can never get beyond approximations4 ,what is perhaps more important3 this faith of reason science is as little competent to disprove1 as it is incompetent to prove it4 ,science is not all in all3 we are more than mere theoretical and cognitive beings4 ,the logic of science is not the sole code of our spiritual or higher intellectual life2 ',we live by admiration1 hope1 and love4' ,the sequel and development of the first ,criticism are found in ,kant's works on ethics1 aesthetics1 teleology and religion4 ,only in one supplementary chapter1 and in casual indications as need arises1 has ,kant made any pronouncement on his view of ,philosophy as a whole and as a system4 ,that it is and can only be a system1 when it really engages on reconstruction in theory1 was of course his fundamental insight4 ,but in his stage of ,zetesis#b1 of testing and sifting the sound from the professed1 he has confined himself to breaking up the mass piecemeal1 and leaving each result in its turn to corroborate and correct the other4 ,sense and intellect may spring from a common stem2 but let us1 he says1 deal with them in their apparent separateness4 ,reason practical must no doubt be identical at bottom with reason theoretical3 all the more convincing will be the undesigned coincidence between the results of an inquiry into the principles of science1 and one into the principles of morals4 ,we have seen that science ultimately rests--though it does not discuss it and would indeed be incompetent to do so--on a faith1 a hope1 a postulate of the ultimate supremacy of intelligence1--the faith of reason in its own power 7not verifiable indeed by an exhaustive list of actual results7--or in the rationality of the world4 ,for science--though a kind of action and a part of conduct--is a sort of inactive action3 an enclave in the busy world1 a period of preparation for the battle of life4 ,in the field of conduct the ultimate presupposition1 which was for the luxury of science called a reasonable faith or faith of reason1 makes itself felt in the more forcible form of a categorical imperative4 ,or1 at least1 so it seems on first acquaintance4 ,the command of duty1 addressed to the sensuously-conditioned nature1 brooks no opposition and condescends to no reasons in explanation or promises by way of attraction4 ,the moral law claims unconditional authority3 towards its sublime aspect reverence and sheer obeisance is due1 utter loyalty to duty for duty's sake4 ,nothing short of this absolute identification with the ,ought and a willingly willed self-surrender of the whole self to it can entitle an agent to the full rank of moral goodness4 ,such is the form--the synthetic link which joins the sensuous will indissolubly with the will reasonable of moral law4 ,now for its explanation4 ,humanity1 though in the world of appearance and experience always subject to sensuous conditions1 is also a power of transcending these conditions4 ,man is more than he can ever show in visibly single act4 ,he has in him the hope1 the faith1 the vision of absolute perfection and completeness3 but has it not as positive attained vision1 but as the perpetual unrest of unsatisfied endeavour1 as the feeling and the anticipation of an unachieved idea4 ,and that perfection1 that completeness he believes himself to be2 he even in some sense is4 ,lapses and ill-success cannot quench the faith3 for so long as there is life1 there is hope4 ,as he pictures out this invisible self1 it may assume various forms more or less imaginative4 ,at times it may seem a far away1 and yet intimately near1 being of beings1--the common father of all souls1 the eternal self-existent centre of life and love1 the omnipresent bond of nature1 the omniscient heart of hearts1--on whom he can lean in closest communion2 though he is only too well aware how often he lives as if ,god were not1 and human beings were roaming specks in chaos4 ,at other times1 he looks up to it as to an inner and better self1 his conscience1 the true and permanent being1 which controls his choices and avoidances1 which approves and disapproves1 commands and condemns3 his soul of soul1 genius1 and guardian spirit4 ,in such a mood to be true to his own self--to follow the very voice of his nature--is to realise his law of life4 ,his ,ego is the absolute ego--the reason which is all things4 ,and lastly1 there are times when he conceives this better self and true essence as the community of the faithful1 as the congregation of reasonable beings1 of all perfected humanity4 ,in ,kantian phraseology1 man under one visible form is the union of an intelligence and a sensibility1 of a nomenal with a phenomenal being4 ,he is1 indeed1 says ,kant1 the former only in idea3 it is only a standpoint which he assumes4 ,but it is a standpoint he always does assume1 if he is to be practical1 i4 e4 if he is to move and modify the world he finds around him4 ,and what standpoint is that8 ,what is the law that has to govern his action1 the law of the spiritual world8 ,its supreme law is the law of liberty2 and that law is autonomy4 ,action--always under law--but that law a self-imposed one4 ,so act that thy will may be thy law1 and with thy will the law of all others whatsoever2 so act that no other human being may by thy act be deprived of full freedom and treated merely as a thing3 so act as to respect the dignity of every human being as implicitly a sovereign legislative4 ,in other words1 ,morality is a stage of struggle and of progress which bears witness to something beyond4 ,the ',i ought' represents a transition stage towards the ',i will1' or rather it is the translation of it into the language of the phenomenal world4#c ,morality1 in a sense-being1 always presents itself as a contest between the good and the evil principle3 but in the transcendent and nomenal being which such a being essentially is1--in the reasonable or good will1 the victory is already won by the good4 ,good is the law which governs the world1 and which is the strength of the individual life4 ,to the sensuous imagination1 indeed1 which here is apt to usurp the place of reason1 things appear under a somewhat different aspect4 ,there the certainty of self-conquest is forced by the difficulties of apparent failure to veil itself under the picture of a perpetual approximation through endless ages towards the standard of perfect goodness3 the confidence that the world is reasonable is presented under the conception of a ,god who makes all things work together for good to the righteous3 and the autonomy of reason presents itself as the postulate of freedom to begin afresh1 absolutely untrammeled by all that has gone before4 ,thus the kingdom of reason is represented as having its times and seasons2 as making determinate starts1 and working up to a consummation in the end of ages4 ,but implicitly ,kant's idea of reason's autonomy1--of the ',i ought' as in its supreme truth an ',i will1'--is an eternal truth4 ,the 'standpoint1' so to call it after ,kant1 is the standpoint which explains life and conduct and which makes conduct possible4 ,it is the assertion that the completeness is1 and is my inmost being1 the source of my action1 my chief good1 and that chief good not a gratification or satisfaction to be looked forward to as reward1 but essential life and self-realisation4 ,and this joy is what is hidden under the austere gravity of the categorical imperative4 ,the ,criticism of the ,judgment-faculty is ,kant's next step towards providing a completer philosophy4 ,ostensibly it owes its origin to the need of supplementing the treatment of ,understanding and ,reason by a discussion of ,judgment1 and of considering our emotional as well as our cognitive and volitional appreciations4 ,what it really does is to minimise still further the gulf left between the intellect and nature--between the natural and the spiritual world4 ,the intellect1 said the first criticism1 makes nature3 it makes possible the general outlines of our conception of the world around us as a causally-connected system1 in which a permanent being undergoes perpetual alteration1 and manifests phenomena subject to mathematical conditions4 ,intellect1 in short1 has staked out the world which is the object of the practical man1 and of his adviser the scientist4 ,but there is another world--the world of beauty and sublimity--the world which art imitates and realises4 ,the interpretation ,kant gives to the aesthetic world is as follows4 ,the fact of beauty is a witness to the presence in the mere copiousness of sensible existence of a sub-conscious symmetry or spirit of harmony which realises without compulsion and as if by free grace all the proportion and coherence which intellect requires4 ,nature itself has something which does the work that intellect was charged with1 and does it with a subtle secret hand which does not suggest the artificer4 ,the fact of sublimity1 on the other hand1 indicates the presence of an even greater spirit4 ,for beauty may seem--from what has been said--to be only an unbought accrement to the commodities of life--facilitating the task of the practical intellect4 ,but the sublime in nature speaks of something which is greater than human utilities and practical conveniences4 ,it reveals a something which is in sympathy with our essential and higher self1 and therefore stirs within us the keen rapture of the traveller who sees from afar his home in 'rocky ,ithaca1' but a something which is cold to daily wants and vulgar satisfactions1 and therefore strikes upon us a gelid awe4 ,another world yet remains1 which appeals neither to our utilitarian science1 nor to our higher sentiments of artistic perfection4 ,this is the world as the home of organic life1 and perhaps itself an organism4 ,the organism is apt to be a poser for the ordinary categories of mechanical science4 ,here the part contains the whole1 not less than the whole contains the part3 the cause is an effect1 as well as cause1 of its effect4 ,one thing is in another1 and the other in it3 'the present is charged with the past1 and pregnant of the future1'--as the great founder of modern teleology often said4 ,in the plant and the animal the natural world has to a certain degree reached an ideal unity which is also real4 ,reason--the syllogism--is here not merely introduced from without1 as when man manipulates1 but is the immanent law of a natural life1--the end working out itself by its own means and act4 ,the fact admitted in these creatures suggests extending the conception of organism 7or teleology7 to nature as a whole4 ,from this point of view ,nature may almost be said to have a history--because it is almost conceived as having one abiding self which in apparent unconsciousness wonderfully simulates the purposive adaptation of conscious life4 ,the older vulgar teleology was somewhat mechanical3 it regarded the natural world outside of--or as it said1 below--man as having no end of its own1 but in its series subserving man's commodities4 ,in the teleology of ,kant the supreme end is still in a way man1 and still there is a little of the mechanical about it3 but it is not to promote man's happiness1 understood as that probably must be in a selfish sense1 but to produce in him the worthiest agent to carry on to its highest the rational process of development4 ,the struggles and pains of natural existence1 the laws of life1 the competition of rivals1 are all means in the hands of nature to produce an autonomous being4 ,kant says1 a moral agent4 ,but a moral agent has been already explained as an intelligence certified unto truth and a self-centred will whose law is the law of the cosmos1--whose plan of life1 if we so put of it1 is essentially a concentration in miniature and in individuality of the system ordained by the all-present ,god4 ,it is true that ,kant1 after all these soarings1 checks enthusiasm by the words 'not that we can know this1 or that it is so3 but our nature with unmistakable tendency bids us act as if it were so4 ,logic will hardly justify it--but life seems to demand it4' ,and some have replied3 'let us trust the larger hope4' ,footnote #a3 ,hegel's ,werke1 vol4 i4 p4 #adj4 ,footnote #b3 ,kant from #agfb onwards continues to insist on the necessity for philosophy taking up an analytic and critical attitude to current conceptions3 see especially ,werke1 i4 #ie and #bib4 ,footnote #c3 ,foundation of ,metaph4 of ,eth4 7,werke1 viii4 #hb1 #hi73 ',dieses ,sollen ist eigentlich ein ,wollen4' ,,chapter ,,xi4 ,,synthesis ,,and ,,reconstruction3 ,,fichte4 ,to get the full effect of a new doctrine it must be brought into contact with a mind unshackled by those traditional prepossessions which clung to its original author4 ,kant1 essentially by training a man of the school1 was by heart and character essentially a seeker after the wider ends of the larger world4 ,his lesson is on one hand the scholar's disproof of pretended science1 and on another an appeal and an example to the mere scholar to make his philosophy ample for the whole life1 and co-extensive with the whole field of reality4 ,his first disciples who stand forward as teachers caught only the first part of his message1 and sought to set theoretical philosophy on a sounder basis4 ,johann ,gottlieb ,fichte--perhaps the least professional of great philosophical professors--with a resolute will1 a passion for logical thoroughness1 and great impulse to force mankind to be free and to realise liberty in an institution--was the first who really grappled with the searching questions that arose out of ,kant's message to his age4 ,his was a ,kantism1 not certainly always of the letter1 nor indeed always of the spirit3 yet for all that1 there was substantial justice in his claim that his system supplied the presupposition which gives meaning and interconnexion to ,kant's utterances#a4 ,it is1 says the proverb1 the first step that costs4 ,and ,fichte took that step4 ,before his impetuosity the cautelous clauses which besmirched the great purpose of ,criticism shrunk away1 the central truth was disengaged from its old-fashioned swaddling clothes1 and openly announced itself as a renovating1 almost a revolutionary principle4 ,but1 as was to be expected1 the unity and force are paid for by a considerable surrender of catholicity4 ,if ,kant's utterances are fused into comparative simplicity1 the unification does not embrace the whole of the ,kantian gospels4 ,what ,fichte did in his earlier stage--the stage by which he counts in the history of philosophy--was to emphasise and exhibit in his systematic statement that priority or supremacy of the 'practical' over the 'theoretical' reason which ,kant had enunciated1 and to put in the very foreground that self or ,ego which ,kant had indicated1 under the title of 'transcendental unity of apperception1' as the focus which gives coherence and objectivity to experience4 ,but to put the final presupposition at the head and front of all1 as a principle originating and governing the whole line of procedure1 is really to modify in a thorough-going way the whole aspect of a doctrine and its inner constitution4 ,kant's way is quiet analysis3 from the given1 or what is supposed given1 up regressively to its final presuppositions1 its latent prius4 ,he shows you the thing is so1 apparently without effort1 by judicious application of the proper re-agent1 as it were4 ,fichte1 on the contrary1 pours forth a strong current of deduction3 ,let it be assumed that so and so is1 then must1 or then shall1 something else be2 and so onwards4 ,instead of a glance at the secret substructure of the world1 you see it1 at a magician's mandate1 building itself up2 stone calling to stone1 and beam to beam1 to fill up the gaps and bind the walls together4 ,and you must not merely read or listen4 ,you are summoned as a partner in the work2 a work the author feels1 only half-consciously1 he has not yet quite accomplished1 and where therefore he complains of the bystander's dullness4 ,this1 one may say1 was a new conception1 certainly a new practice1 of philosophy4 ,kant had indeed hinted that the pupil in philosophy must 'symphilosophise'2 but practically1 even his aim had been to describe or narrate a process of thought with such quasi-historical vividness and detail that the listener was sympathetically carried through the succession of ideas which were called up before him4 ,what had been generally given in philosophical literature was a sort of historical account of how thoughts happened3 a succession of pictures presented with the interposition here and there of a little reasoning1 expository of connexions4 ,you enlisted your reader's sympathy3 you set his imagination to work by translating the logical process into a historical event--the ,logos into a ,mythos--and blending with your narrative a little explanation as to general drift and relations1 you left him to himself to enjoy the ,theoria4 ,the nearest approach ,fichte makes to this polite and easy method is in the ',sun-clear ,statement1' where he1 as he says1 attempts to 'force the reader to understand' him4 ,but probably these things cannot be forced4 ,and for the rest ,fichte's characteristic attitude is to request1 or command1 his reader 7or pupil7 to think with him1 to put himself in the posture required1 to perform the act of thought described4 ,he has not merely to be present at the lecture1 but personally to perform the experiment4 ,it is not a mere story to be heard and admired and forgotten4 ,de te ,o pupil6 fabula narratur4 ,if it be a play1 you are the actor as well as the onlooker3 and the play is not a play1 but the drama--the nameless drama--of the soul transacted in the unseen sub-conscious depths which bear up its visible life4 ,you do not therefore begin by getting a fact put before you4 ,your fact1 in philosophy1 must be your own act3 not something done and dead1 passive1 a thing1 but something doing1 alive1 active3 your introspection must be1 let us say1 an experiment in the growing1 responsive1 quick life1 not anatomy of the mere cadaver4 ,think1 therefore1 and catch yourself in the act of thinking4 ,get something before your mind's eye1 and see what it involves4 ,it matters not what you perceive or feel3 only realise it fully and penetrate its meaning and implications4 ,it is of course the perception of something here and now4 ,and you would be1 in ordinary life1 eager to get on to something else--to associate the present fact to something perceived elsewhere1 to draw conclusions about things yet to come4 ,but if you philosophise1 you must check this practical-minded impatience and concede yourself leisure to ponder deeply all that the single perception involves4 ,be content to sit awhile with ,mary1 by the side of ,rachel of old4 ,let ,martha bustle about4 ,fichte tells you that your perception rests1--and you1 you see that it rests1 on the ',i am that ,i am1'--on the ,i ,i1 i4 e4 on the continuity1 identity1 and unity of the percipient self4 ,make the statement of what you perceive1 believe it1 that is1 assert it3 and you have--done what8 ,you have pledged your whole self--falsus in uno1 falsus in omnibus--to its truth3 its background is your whole and one mental life4 ,and is that all8 ,you have also called the world to witness3 your statement--if1 as it professes1 it form an item however slight in the realm of knowledge--requests and expects every other ',i' to acknowledge your perception4 ,your certainty of the fact rests on the certainty of your self3 and your self is a self certified by its ever-postulated identity with other selves1 so on ad infinitum4 ,in affirming this 7whatever be your statement7 you affirm the ,absolute ,infinite ,ego4 ,heaven and earth are at stake in every jot and tittle#b4 ,at which plain frankness there was much cachinnation and even muttering among the baser sort4 ,even wiser heads forgot--if they ever knew--that ,leibniz a century before had startled the world of his day by a view that 'the ,ego or something like it#c was1 under the name of monad1 the presupposition of each and every detail of existence in any organic total4 ,it was useless for ,fichte to repeat#d that his philosophical ,ego was not the empirical or individual ego which he in this every-day world had to provide clothes and company for4 ,it is hard to persuade the world that it does not know that ',i am ,i1' and what that means4 ,later1 therefore1 ,fichte1 going along with the movement of contemporary speculation1 and willing to avoid one source of confusion1 tended to keep off the name of ,ego from the absolute basis of all knowledge and experienced reality4 ,but unquestionably the absolutising of the ,ego is the characteristic note of his first period in philosophy3 and it rings with the spirit of the heaven-storming ,titan4 ,it means that the cardinal principle and foundation of man's conscious moral and intellectual life is identical with the principle of the ,universe1 even if the ,universe seem not to know it4 ,it means that self-consciousness--the certainty that ,i am ,i and one in all my manifestations--is the highest word yet uttered4 ,in1 or under1 the surface of human knowledge and belief in reality1 there is a transcendental ,ego--a self identical with all other selves1-- infinite1 unlimited1 unconditional1 absolute4 ,the certainty of human knowledge--and therefore of all reality in consciousness--is the ,absolute1--an absolute certainty and knowledge--but an absolute with which ,i identify myself1--which ,i am1 and which is me4 ,this is the absolute thesis--the nerve and utter basis-laying--at the ground1 or rather under the ground1 of all ,i know1 feel1 and will4 ,this1 then1 is the thesis at the very foundation of all ,wissenschaft3 and therefore figures at the head of the ,wissenschaftslehre1--the name ,fichte gives his fundamental philosophy4 ,but alone it is powerless4 ,a foundation is only a foundation1 by being built upon4 ,the position must be defined by counterposition3 thesis by antithesis3 ego by non-ego4 ,ego1 in fact1 is first made such1 as set against you4 ,in other words1 the perception we assumed to start with does not merely suppose and indeed pre-suppose the absolute ,ego2 but it sets in the absolute ,ego an ego and a non-ego1--sets against the lesser ego1 something limiting and limited1 something defining it in one particular direction2 or1 if the original consciousness we started to examine was an act of will1 then1 it may be said1 the non-ego appears as about to be limited and defined by the ,ego4 ,be our consciousness1 therefore1 practical or theoretical1 of action or of knowledge1 its fundamental characteristic is the conjunction 7correlation with subjugation7 of an ego and a non-ego4 ,it is always a synthesis of an original antithesis#e2 of self and not-self4 ,but every such synthesis which brings together into one a self and a not-self1 is possible only in the original thesis of a greater self--an absolute ,ego--which includes the not-self and the self it contrasts within its larger self4 ,the unity of the first principle#f 7,a ,a1 or ,i ,i7 parting or distinguishing itself into the opposition of ,a versus not-,a1 ,ego set against non-ego1 re-asserts itself again in consciousness 7perception of objects1 and action upon them by will7 as synthesis1 i4 e4 a conjunction 7not a real union74 ,and this synthesis is either the limitation of the ,ego by the non-ego or the limitation of the non-ego by the ,ego4 ,the former gives the formula of theoretical1 the latter that of practical consciousness4 ,we begin with the absolute ,ego4 ,it is absolute activity1 utter freedom4 ,it is the source of all action1 all life4 ,yet if thus implicitly everything1 it is actually nothing4 ,to be something1 it must restrict itself1 set up in itself an antithesis3--by the setting up of a not-self1 at once limit and realise itself3 translate itself from ideal absoluteness and unconditionality into a reality which is also limited and partial4 ,all consciousness and action exhibit this antithesis of a limited self and an outside and adversative other-being2 but the antithesis rests upon the medium of a larger life1 a thesis which transcends and includes the antithesis1 and which leads to that alternating adaptation of the two sides to one another 7their synthesis7 which actual experience presents as its recurring phase#g4 ,the ,wissenschaftslehre leaving the absolute ,ego in the background deals with the play that goes on in human experience between the correlatives to which it has reduced itself2--the antagonism1 but the moderated and overruled antagonism1 of ,ego and non-ego4 ,observe the contrast to the ordinary methods of expression4 ,popular language--if the popular philosophers are to be trusted as its exponents--says 'an impression is produced by an external object on the senses1 and causes an idea in the mind4' ,the 'object' works a series of marvellous effects on a mind1 which--to begin with--is hardly describable as anything more than an imagined point of resistance1 getting reality by being repeatedly impinged upon4#h ,fichte's statements are rather interpreters of the vulgar phrases1 which say ',i hear1 ,i see'2--as if1 forsooth1 the ',i' did it all4 ,according to ,fichte1 the ',i1'--the absolute ',i1' is the real 7but secret7 source of the position in which consciousness finds itself limited by a non-ego4 ,but within the finite ego and its consciousness there is no reminiscence or awareness of this its great co-partner's--the absolute ego's--act4 ,for the finite consciousness1 the beginning of its activity--i4 e4 of all empirical consciousness1 lies in an impulse or stimulus from without--a mere somewhat of which we can predicate the very minimum of attributes4 ,it is only felt as opposing3 and this is the first stage or grade of theoretical consciousness3 ,sensation4 ,but in the perpetual antithesis--in the self-opposition which is the radical act of consciousness--the mere limitation of ,ego by non-,ego is confronted by the underlying activity of the ,ego which re-asserts the limitation as its own act4 ,thus while we are1 as it were1 impressed1 we re-act against that impression--we set it forth before us1 as ours1 and free ourselves from its immediate incumbency and oppression4 ,instead of mere sentiency or feeling1 we have a perception 7or intuition7 of it4 ,it would be out of place1 here1 to try to write the interpretation of that marvellous and difficult piece of dialectic--the ,wissenschaftslehre2--a theme to which ,fichte returned again and again up to his death1 ever modifying details1 selecting new modes of exposition1 and gradually1 perhaps1 changing the centre of gravity of his system4 ,it will be sufficient to note the two purposes which it keeps in view4 ,on the one hand it is a systematic theory of the categories4 ,it begins1 as we have seen1 with the three co-ordinates of all reflection1--identity1 difference1 and reason why2 it proceeds to the co-relative principles of activity and passivity2 to condition1 quantity1 c4 ,and its work is to show how these forms naturally emerge in the recurrent antithesis which arises in consciousness1 and how again they are brought together by the overmastering ,absolute thesis into a synthesis1 from which the same process re-appears4 ,how much this corresponds in general conception to the ,hegelian ,logic is obvious1 and ,fichte has the merit of the original suggestion4 ,with this however he conjoins--what ,hegel has relegated to his ,psychology--an evolutional or developmental theory of the mental powers4 ,we have already seen how sensation is forced by the latent intelligence to rise into perception 7,anschauung73 the line of psychological development is carried on by ,fichte through imagination to understanding and reason4 ,hegel's work is far more complete1 definite1 and detailed3 but that need not keep us from giving due homage to the suggestive sketch of the originator of the conception#i4 ,but the theoretical consciousness is not all2 and as we already know1 the practical ,ego is supreme over it4 ,in it lies the key to the mystery of the stimulus--the shock from the unknown--which awakened the activity of the ,ego4 ,the non-ego is only a mass of resistance created by the ,ego so that it may be active2 only a stepping-stone on which it may walk2 a spring-board from which it may bound4 ,only so much reality has the non-ego2 the reality of something which may be shaped1 made1 made use of4 ,call the something which the stimulus 7,anstoss7 pre-supposes1 the thing-in-itself 7after ,kant73 and if you ask ,how are things-in-themselves constituted1 you get from the ,wissenschaftslehre the answer3 ',they are as we should make them#aj1' ,or1 as it is said in another place3 ',my world is--object and sphere of my duties and absolutely nothing else#aa3' if you ask whether there is really such a world1 the only sound reply ,i can give is3 ',i have certainly and truthfully these definite duties1 which take the form of duties towards such1 and in such1 objects2 and it is only in a world such as ,i there represent and not elsewhere that ,i can perform these duties which ,i cannot conceive otherwise1' ,this is a grand word3 and yet we feel that1 in the intensity of intellectual consecutiveness and moral inflexibleness1 we have lost some elements to which ,kant had given their place in the philosophy of life4 ,the third of ,kant's three ,criticisms is conspicuous by its absence from the ,fichtean field of view1 and has no recognition in this scheme of the universe3 and the great conception of the natural world as an organism1 in which natural man is only a part1 and all is controlled by an autonomous principle of life1 has been for the while allowed to drop4 ,even more than in ,kant religion tends to be an epilogue or appendix to morality3 and ,god is identified with the moral order of the world4 ,it is customary to speak of ,fichte's idealism as ethical1 or as subjective3 and so long as these words are understood1 no harm is done4 ,but to call it subjective does not mean that ,fichte was so far beside himself as to believe the world was only a picture or a function of his individual brain4 ,it means that he throws the weight too much on the side of subjectivity4 ,the ,absolute is1 for him in his first stage1 described as an ,absolute ,ego--and thereby the natural world seems to be left without ,god3 and subjective duty has too exclusively thrown on it the weight of certifying objective existence4 ,the world1 as we shall see1 and have indeed indirectly gathered from ,kant1 is too good and worthy to be the mere block of stone out of which our duties are to be hewn4 ,and similarly1 to call ,fichte an ethical idealist is only to name him right1 when we add that his were idealist ethics4 ,the world is not here merely that social decorum may be maintained1 and that puritanical virtue may pronounce that all is so well1 that thenceforth there shall be no cakes and ale1 nor ginger be hot in the mouth4 ,the friend of the two brothers ,schlegel1 and their remarkable wives1 ,dorothea and ,caroline1 touched hands with a social group#ab which1 for good and for ill1 had emancipated itself from all codes except that which bids ',to thine own self be true3 ,thou canst not then be false to any man4' ,to him1 as to ,kant1 morality presented itself as autonomy1 as the dignity and grace of human nature in freest development2 but to him1 more than to ,kant1 there commended itself the ideal of a city of reason1 a thoroughly socialised community#ac1 in which the welfare of each would be an obligation on all1 and the machinery of government would be so marvellously self-corrective that all would do right and all fare well4 ,fichte's place in the annals of philosophy depends on his academic treatises of #agid-ih1 and on his more popular works from the first date down to #ahjh4 ,in a study of the philosopher as a whole it would be necessary to go beyond these dates1 and take account of the displacement which a development of thought1 which there is no good reason to suppose other than gradual1 made in the scale of his earlier views4 ,but for our purposes that is out of the question4 ,in justice1 however1 it must be added that some things that seem inadequately treated1 some shortcomings in catholicity of mind1 would appear in another light if the later writings--not published till after ,hegel's death--were duly taken into account4 ,but even at the close of the century the advancing thought of ,germany was seeking other leaders4 ,footnote #a3 ,cf4 notes and illustrations in vol4 ii4 p4 #cii4 ,footnote #b3 ,cf4 notes and illustrations in vol4 ii4 p4 #chg4 ,footnote #c3 ,leibniz1 ,werke1 ed4 ,gerhardt1 iv4 p4 #cib4 ,footnote #d3 ,cf4 notes and illustrations in vol4 ii4 p4 #cic4 ,footnote #e3 ,the antithesis has two members3 the partial ego1 and the non-ego1 which confronts4 ,the synthesis is a putting together two separate things1 so as to correlate them2 but it falls short of what would be understood in some present usage by 'synthetic unity' which has a certain mystical ring4 ,it is important for a student of ,schelling or ,hegel to remember this distinction of synthesis from 'absolute unity e4g4 ,schelling1 ,werke1 v4 #dc4 ,footnote #f3 ,a ,a is the more purely logical formula3 ,i,i presents it as a personal and metaphysical identity4 ,the ,a1 which is -,a1 is to be distinguished from the ,a which is opposed to not-,a4 ,but it is ,fichte's standpoint to insist on their being one ,ego4 ,footnote #g3 ,to give this interpretation of the larger ,ego as ,life and ,blessedness is to assume that the teaching1 e4 g4 of the ,anweisung zum ,seligen ,leben1 is the logical deepening of the earlier language about the ,ego4 ,footnote #h3 ,cf4 the description of mind as #d a bundle of impressions4' ,footnote #i3 ,especially given in the ,grundriss des ,eigenthmlichen der ,wiss4 7,werke1 i4 #cca74 ,of course ,fichte goes through a corresponding 'deduction' of the emotional or moral nature4 ,schelling 7,system des transcend4 ,idealismus7 works out the 'deduction' still more at length4 ,footnote #aj3 ,fichte1 ,werke1 i4 #bhf4 ,footnote #aa3 ,ibid4 ii4 #bfa4 ,footnote #ab3 ,it is perhaps hardly necessary to say that the state of affairs alluded to1 which has its literary memorials in ,f4 ,schlegel's ,lucinde1 and in the warm defense of that book by ,scheiermacher1 was only a passing experiment in which a high-strung idealism amid a lax society sought for truth at all costs and dared a noble lie4 ,footnote #ac3 ,in the ,geschlossener ,handelstaat 7of #ahjj71 the 'classical' document of characteristic ,german ,socialism in its earlier and idealist phase4 ,,chapter ,,xii4 ,,the ,,beginnings ,,of ,,schelling4 ,schelling and ,hegel had been fellow-students at ,tbingen1 where1 besides the ostensible lessons of the class-room1 they had drunk gladly of the springs of thought ,lessing had set running1 had felt the hopes and the fears of the struggle republican ,france waged against the ,german powers1 and had seen that ,kantian criticism contained within it a fire which would burn up the hay and stubble of old theology4 ,hegel1 five years the elder of the two1 had passed through his college career in a very creditable but by no means brilliant way4 ,among his fellows he had gained the reputation of a quiet1 and rather reflective mind1 which1 however1 under an old-fashioned exterior1 breathed a deep impassioned zeal for that higher life of which the nobler spirits among the young then1 as now1 longed to accelerate the advent4 ,schelling1 singularly gifted with speculative ability1 literary art1 and the receptivity of genius to catch and string together the theories that rose to the top in science and letters1 had already made his mark as a philosophic writer1 while his senior compatriot1 leading the inconspicuous life of a private tutor1 was only working up and widening his ideas4 ,schelling's first essays in metaphysics trod the same lines as ,fichte2 but in #agig 7when he was aged #bb7 appeared his ,ideas towards a ,philosophy of ,nature4 ,a year later he was lecturing at ,jena1 in friendly association with the ,schlegels1 and with ,fichte1 who1 however1 soon quitted the place4 ,in #ahjj appeared the ,system of ,transcendental ,idealism1 and in #ahja the ,exposition of my ,system2 followed in #ahjb by ,bruno1 and in #ahjc by the ,lectures on ,university ,studies4 ,brief periods of academic teaching at ,wrzburg1 ,erlangen1 and ,munich1 and after #ahda at ,berlin1 broke the silence which set in after his ,inquiries into the nature of human liberty in #ahji2 but little certain was known to the outside public of the final standpoint till the publication of his collected works 7#ahef-fa74 ,an involuntary touch of sadness falls upon they historian as he surveys ,schelling's career4 ,seldom had a thinker's life begun with better promise1 and more distinguished performance2 seldom had a nobler inspiration1 a more liberal catholicity of mood1 guided and propelled the intellectual interest2 seldom had expectation of greater things yet to come followed a writer's traces than was the lot of ,schelling4 ,on one hand1 a lively and active appropriation of the results of scientific discovery1 at least in its more suggestive advances3 on the other1 a mastery of words and style which fitted him to hold his own amongst the literary leaders2 and1 again1 a sympathy1 that seemed to be religious1 with the movement which sought lucem ex ,oriente1 and wisdom from the treasures of the world's purer youth4 ,and yet--in the main--the net result1 oblivion more complete than has ever befallen a great thinker4 ,at first1 one is inclined to pass on with the remark that even books and thinkers have their fates1 and that some momentary forgetfulness let the tide slip unused4 ,but it is possible to be less oracularly-obscure3 and without detracting from the splendid faculty and great achievement of ,schelling to note some of the causes of his lapse into a mere episode4 ,in the first place1 though his conception is of a system1 his performance is only a succession of fragments4 ,the nearest approach to an encyclopaedic exposition of his ideas is found in his popular ,lectures on the ,studies of ,university4 ,more than once he starts on the task of exposition1 but lets it break off about the middle4 ,again1 at each new occasion1 the features of his scheme of thought have slightly altered1 and not merely does his philosophy profess at first to present two distinct sides1 but these two sides of the shield vary4 ,thirdly1 the interest in scientific novelties1 always disposed to seek the curious1 the far-reaching and suggestive1 more than the sounder generalisations1 tends as time goes on to fasten too greedily on the miraculous and mysterious night-side of nature1 on magic powers and mystic discernments--a path which descends to the abyss of a 'positive1' i4e4 a quasi-materialistic1 theosophy4 ,the matter-of-fact rationalists 7both the ,catholics in ,bavaria1 and the ,protestant theologian ,paulus1 once a friend1 but latterly his bitterest foe7 regard him as a crypto-catholic1 the advocate of medieval obscurantism so hateful to true enlightenment4 ,even his literary art renders him suspected3 for there is an old quarrel between philosophy and fiction2 and grave-eyed wisdom is jealous of her gipsy rival4 ,ill-advised indications of a sense of lofty superiority to the average teacher increased the numbers and the venom of his opponents4 ,nor is it perhaps beneath the dignity of history to suggest that his first wife1 ,caroline1 with all her wonderful attractions of intellect and character1 and notwithstanding all that she had been to ,schelling in encouragement and counsel1 was too clever and too critical not to sow many jealousies1 and to add through the female line to the ranks of those with whom he stood suspect4 ,but perhaps the real reason of ,schelling's failure was a certain excess of objectivity4 ,fichte had drawn attacks down by an abnormal subjectivity which would fain reform the surroundings wherever he went4 ,schelling stood more apart--animated by an immense curiosity1 a boundless interest in all the expanse of objective existence2 but withal he seemed not to have his heart1 deeply set and pledged to a distinctively human interest4 ,his first love is the ,romance in nature2 and when he turns to history it is by preference to ages far remote4 ,his ideal of philosophy is to see it achieve its work by the instrumentality of ,art4 ,religion seems to culminate for him in a mythology4 ,reflection and speculation are to him always somewhat of a disease--whence philosophy is to carry us--almost magically if possible--to rest again in the primeval unity of life4 ,it is only an instrument towards a great end--and that end a godlike1 even if you like a religious1 ,epicurean life4 ,from such a standpoint it would be easy1 in youth1 to relapse into naturalism2 it would be equally easy1 in later life1 to fall into supernaturalism4 ,philosophy--at least as ,hegel understood it--is merely neither3 but the life1 which never can quite cease to be an effort1 of idealism4 ,and so ,schelling could not earn the confidence which only goes to those who are felt to be fellow-fighters with those they lead4 ,with ,schelling occurs the confluence1 into the main current of philosophy1 of streams of idea and research which had already exercised a stimulative effect on the tone and products of the higher literature of ,germany4 ,as early as #agfc 7at the very date ,kant let the ,english and ,scotch 'empiricists' shake him out of his 'rationalist' dogmatism7 ,lessing--in a couple of pages ,on the reality of things outside ,god--threw doubts on the tenability of the ordinary deistic arrangement of his day1 which set ,god there and man and his surroundings here1 each side1 for the time at least1 undisturbedly enjoying his own4 ,lessing read ,leibniz by the light of ,spinoza1 and ,spinoza by the light of ,leibniz3 and1 if he emphasised the absolute right to the completest individual self-development on one hand1 he no less declared on the other that 'nothing in the world is insulated1 nothing without consequences1 nothing without eternal consequences4' ',i thank the ,creator that ,i must1--must the best1' he adds 7#aggd74 ,of his conversations on these high topics with ,jacobi1 we have already spoken4 ,while ,spinoza and ,leibniz were either decried1 or--what is worse--misunderstood1 by the established masters of instruction1 they were welcomed by a more sympathetic and1 with all its drawbacks1 more appreciative study from the non-academic leaders of thought4 ,amongst these one of the most interesting and influential was ,herder4 ,herder1 who had been amongst ,kant's students in #agfc1 and who has expressed his admiration of his then teacher1 came as years passed-by to consider himself the appointed antagonist of the ,kantian system4 ,the two men were mentally and morally of different types3 and in ,herder's case1 a sense of injury1 in the end1 positively blinded him to the meaning no less than to the merits of a doctrine he had decreed to be pernicious4 ,in ,herder's opinion1 the ,kantian system laboured throughout from the fault of a dead logical formalism and abstractness3 it inhabited a sort of limbo1 cut off alike from the fresh breath of nature and the growing life of history1 and from the eternal spirit of divine truth3 it undermined 7so his experience at ,weimar#a indicated7 the traditional faith1 and inspired its 'adepts' with a revolutionary superciliousness to all dogma4 ,its cut-and-dried logicality1 its trenchant divisions and analyses were obnoxious to his poetically-fervid1 largely-enthusiastic1 and essentially-historical soul4 ,man--in his concrete completeness1 in his physical surroundings and his corporeal structure1 in his social organisation1 in his literary and artistic life1 above all in his poetry and traditions of religion--was the theme of his studies2 and he looked with distrust on every attempt to analyse and disintegrate the total unity of humanity by a criticism first of this1 and then a criticism of that side of it1 carried on separately4 ,ossian had been an early favourite of his2 and the twilight that hovers with the haze of pensive myth around the figures of that visionary world hangs with a charm and a confusion around the ultimate horizon of ,herder's ideas4 ,in #aggd and #agge ,herder wrote and wrote again an essay 7published #aggh7 for a prize offered by the ,berlin ,academy on the subject of ',sensation and ,cognition in the human ,soul4' ,its fundamental points are that 'no psychology is possible1 which is not at every step a distinct physiology'3 that 'cognition and volition are only one energy of the soul'3 that 'all our thought has arisen out of and through sensation1 and in spite of all distillation still contains copious traces of it'3 that there are not separate faculties of thought1 but one divine power1 which unifies all the broad stream of inflowing sensation1--'one energy1 and elasticity of the soul1 which reaches its height through the medium of language4' ',what is material1 what non-material in man1 ,i know not1' he says2 'but ,i am in the faith that nature has not fastened iron plates between them1' ',man is a slave of mechanism 7but a mechanism disguised in the garb of a lucid celestial reason7 and fancies himself free1' ',self-feeling and fellow-feeling 7a new phase of expansion and contraction7 are the two expressions of the elasticity of our will'3 they vary directly with each other3 and 'love therefore is the highest reason'--a proposition1 adds ,herder1 for which 'if we will not trust ,st4 ,john1 we may trust the undoubtedly more divine ,spinoza1 whose philosophy and ethics turn wholly upon this axis4' ,herder's great work1 however1--which1 side by side with ,lessing's ,education of the ,human ,race1 and with ,kant's ,idea for a ,universal ,history1 helped to constitute that conception of history1 as philosophy in concrete form1 which appears in ,schelling1 ,schlegel1 and ,hegel1--was the ,ideas for a ,philosophy of ,history4 ,it is the pendant and contrast to ,kant's three ,criticisms1 with which it is nearly contemporaneous 7#aghd-ia74 ,even in history ,kant emphasises the work of intelligence1 of reason3 and puts the intelligently-organised state--if possible1 the world-commonwealth1 when war shall be transformed into merely stimulating competition1--as the final triumph of the reason4 ,to ,herder1 while on the one hand the nature-basis is all-essential1 and must form the foundation of any genetic explanation of spiritual phenomena1 the ideal of humanity presents itself rather as a free development of the many-sided individual--a development tempered by the association of the family and the claims of friendship4 ,in ,kant's view of civilisation1 natural reason by its indwelling presuppositions works out the end of culture3 ,herder1 on the contrary1 allows himself to introduce--but only in and from the dim background--a supernatural aid to actualise the germs of rationality latent in man's nature4 ,yet1 though at the first step into history the ,godhead appears1 and a deified humanity looms ahead as the consummation of the process of evolution1 the development between these two extreme poles is homogeneous and indeed one4 ,the same law governs it throughout3 ',ethics is only a higher physics of the mind4' ,man is from the first endowed with tendencies which1 through the medium of society and tradition1 carry him on to the double end1 so hard to combine1 of 'humanity and happiness1' 'humanity and religion4' ,but1 for this training of the spirit he is prepared by a special natural endowment of the body3 and ,herder can go so far as to say that 'in order to delineate the duties of man1 we need only delineate his form4' ,developing under the influence of cosmic and geographical conditions1 and formed of the same protoplasm and on the same type as other animals1 man possesses an unique organisation1 a definitely proportioned mechanism1 which is his distinctive and permanent specific character4 ,general identity of plan and condition prevails for man and animals2 but ,herder keeps back from the ,darwinian inference which interprets the graduated diversity of type as indicating that man is the phase reached pro tempore in the gradual slide along which the continuous change of environment carries the unstable types which earlier environments have helped to form4 ,for ,herder's conception of nature there are fixed differences beyond which research cannot go2 and we shall see that both ,schelling and ,hegel accept this reservation4 ,herder1 finally1 struck a blow in the war that was waged after ,lessing's death between the friends and foes of ,spinozism4 ,his little book ,god 7#aghg7 is a vindication v of ,spinoza against ,jacobi's attack4 ,antiquarian accuracy it can lay no claim to3 the picture of ,spinozism1 one-sided at the best1 is further vitiated by an interpretation of the doctrine which leavens it to indistinctness with the ideas of ,leibniz and ,shaftesbury4 ,it was a grand--but it was also an audacious--vision of ,spinozism which found it not inconsistent with a fundamental theism on one side and with the poetry of nature on the other4 ,yet ,herder had the merit of being perhaps the first to pierce the hard logical shell of rationalism under which ,spinoza had lain hidden1 and to reveal the mystic passion for ,god which so quaintly called itself amor erga rem infinitam et aeternam4 ',spinoza1' says ,herder1 'was an enthusiast for the being of ,god1' ,even where he translates ,spinoza's terms into ample equivalents1 he does service by teaching men that the vapid inanities they associate with terms like substance1 mode1 cause1 are inadequate to interpret the intensity of meaning they had for the philosopher4 ,to remove the seals which rendered both ,leibniz and ,spinoza a mystery for the world was to prepare the way for ,schelling and ,hegel#b4 ,it is under the aegis of ,spinoza and ,leibniz that ,schelling begins his first characteristic work1--the ,ideas towards a philosophy of ,nature4 ,in these thinkers he found first proclaimed as the fundamental standpoint of philosophy the unity of the finite and the infinite1 of the real and the ideal1 of the absolutely active and the absolutely passive4 ,they differed indeed in this1 that whereas this unity is pre-supposed by ,spinoza as infinite and absolute substance1 of which all separate existence1 body or mind1 is only a modus1 it is taken by ,leibniz as the universal characteristic of every individual being4 ,every monad--and the human soul is the typical monad--is at once finite and infinite1 real and ideal1 active and passive4 ,but--whether as underlying substance1 or as unity of reality--both hold the cardinal doctrine that the absolute 7the ',object' of philosophy7 is the unity and unification--the identity--of what outside it appears as two sides or orders of being1 the real and the ideal4 ,to philosophise1 therefore--or to see things in the absolute--is 7not as ,hegel's malicious joke puts it#c1 to look at them 'in the night when all cows are dark1'--but7 to see them in the intense light that proceeds from the identity of the ,spirit within us with the ,nature without us4 ,fichte had caught hold of this standpoint4 ,he had seen that the original antithesis which confronts us1 and the conjunction 7synthesis7 of its members1 presupposed a still more fundamental and indeed absolute thesis1--an aboriginal and active unity4 ,that antithesis is the opposition of ego and not-ego2 that synthesis is every act of knowledge and will1 by which each of these powers is in turn limited by the other4 ,such a synthesis 7volition or cognition7 would be impossible unless on the fundamental thesis 7or hypothesis7 of a unity1 or identity1 which gives rise to the antithesis and has the power of overcoming it4 ,such an original unity is what he calls the absolute ,ego4 ,i am what ,i know and will1 and what ,i know and will is ,me4 ,such is the equation 7briefly written1 ,i ,i7 which identifies subject and object 7of knowledge and will74 ,but the associations clinging to the terms ,fichte used gave this thought a one-sided direction4 ,the ',i' is opposed to the ',thee1' and the ',them1' and the ',it4' ,the 'thing'--or non-ego--is depreciated as compared with the thinker and willer4 ,it is postulated ad majorem gloriam of the ,ego3 in order that ,i may work out the full fruition of my being4 ,it is what ,i ought to make out of it4 ,it is nothing but what it will be--or will be if ,i do what ,i ought to do4 ,the identity of the two sides therefore is left as 'the object of an endless task1 an absolute imperative4' ,the ,absolute is not yet3--it is only the forecast of a postulated result4 ',if this be what ,fichte teaches1 and be called subjective idealism1 then for ,schelling the first thing is to quit the house of bondage4 ,let us leave out of view the ,ego1 with its misleading associations1 and begin with the two fields which are known to us1 the fields of ,nature and ,spirit4 ,nature--not ,matter--is the one side3 ,mind or ,spirit the other4 ,each of them furnishes the object of one branch of philosophy--a philosophy of ,nature1 on one hand1 and a transcendental idealism on the other4 ,the former is new1 and more especially ,schelling's own proper continuation of ,kant3 the other partly a continuation of ,fichte's work4 ,but as they are both philosophy1 they must coincide or meet4 ,the whole philosophy may therefore call itself a philosophy of ,identity2 but1 for the while1 it will present itself under the two aspects of a philosophy of ,nature1 conceived as the blind and unconscious1 a philosophy of ,mind and history1 as the free and conscious product of intelligence4#d ,footnote #a3 ,he held posts of large general superintendence over church and school affairs at ,weimar4 ,footnote #b3 ,see notes and illustrations in vol4 ii4 p4 #dbj4 ,footnote #c3 ,hegel1 ,werke1 ii4 #ac4 ,footnote #d3 ,see notes and illustrations in vol4 ii4 p4 #cib4 ,,chapter ,,xiii4 ,,the ,,philosophy ,,of ,,nature ,,and ,,idealism4 ,what is meant by a 'philosophy of ,nature'8 ',to philosophise on ,nature1' says ,schelling1 'means to lift it up out of the dead mechanism in which it appears immersed1--to inspire it1 so to speak1 with liberty1 and to set it in free process of evolution3 it means1 in other words1 to tear ourselves away from the vulgar view which sees in ,nature only occurrences1 or at the best sees the action as a fact1 not the action itself in the action#a4' ,there is in short a process in nature parallel in character to what ,fichte had exhibited for consciousness4 ,the natural world is no longer subordinated1 but to appearance co-ordinate3 and evolution or development1 exhibited under the logical title of a 'deduction1' is the common law of both4 ,the real order and the ideal order of the world are equally the work of an infinite and unconditioned activity1 'which never quite exhausts itself in any finite product1 and of which everything individual is only as it were a particular expression4' ,the nature which we see broken up in groups and masses1 and individual objects1 is to be explained as a series of steps in a process of development3 the steps in a single continuous product which has been arrested at several stages1--which presents distinct epochs1 but nevertheless all approximations1 with divergences1 to a single original ideal4 ,in ,nature1 as in ,mind1 the most typical phenomenon is an original heterogeneity1 duplicity1 or difference1 which1 however1 points back to a still more fundamental homogeneity1 unity1 or identity4 ,this primary unity or ground of unification does not indeed appear to sight2 the 'soul of ,nature1' the anima mundi1 nowhere presents itself as such in its undivided simplicity2 but only as the perpetually recurring re-union of what has been divided4 ,but though unapparent1 the absolute identity is the necessary presupposition of all life and existence1 as of all knowledge and action4 ,it is the link or 'copula' which perpetually reduces the antithesis to unity1 and the heterogeneity to homogeneity1 and the different to redintegration4 ,to this fact of antithesis1 presupposing and continually reverting to an original unity1 ,schelling gives the name ',polarity1' ',it is impossible to construe the main physical phenomena without such a conflict of opposite principles4 ,but this conflict only exists at the instant of the phenomenon itself4 ,each natural force awakes its opposite4 ,but that force has no independent existence3 it only exists in this contest1 and it is only this contest which gives it for the moment a separate existence4 ,as soon as this contest ceases1 the force vanishes1 by retreating into the sphere of homogeneous forces#b4' ,polarity1 therefore1 is a general law of the cosmos4 ,a ceaseless1 limitless activity1 therefore1 as the basis or groundwork of all1 for ever crossing1 arresting1 and limiting itself3 an eternal war1 which1 however1 is always being led back to peace1--a process of differentiation which rests upon1 is the product of1 and is for ever forced back to integration1 is the perpetual rhythm of the natural universe4 ,it is a process in which can be traced three grades1 stages1 or 'powers' 7first1 second1 and third1 c474 ,by its more generally descriptive name it is called ,organisation4 ',organism1' says ,schelling1 'is the principle of things4 ,it is not a property of single natural objects2 but1 on the contrary1 single natural objects are so many limitations1 or single modes of apprehending the universal organism#c4' ',the world is an organisation2 and a universal organism itself is the condition 7and to that extent the positive7 of mechanism#d4' ',mechanism is to be explained from organism3 not organism from mechanism4' ',the essential of all things is life3 the accidental is only the kind of their life3 and even the dead in ,nature is not utterly dead1--it is only extinct life4' ,but if the conception of an organism be thus the adequate or complete idea of ,nature as a whole1 that idea is only realised as a third 'power' supervening on1 and by means of two subordinate or inferior ranges or 'powers4' ,the first stage is that occupied by the mathematical and mechanical conception of the world1--the bare skeleton or framework which has to be clothed upon and informed with life and growth4 ,this first 'power' in the world-process of antithetical forces1 under the control of1 and on the basis supplied by1 the original thetic unity which synthetises them1 is ,matter4 ,in ,matter we have the equilibrium and statical indifference of two opposing forces--one centrifugal1 accelerating1 repulsive1 the other contripetal1 retarding1 attractive--which1 working under the synthetising unity supplied by the force of universal gravitation1 build up in their momentary arrests or epochs the various material forms4 ,in this first 'power' we have as it were the scheme or machinery through which organisation will work3 the outward and 'abstract1 organism4 ,and the essential feature of this 'construction' or 'deduction' of matter is that it does not take material atoms and build them into a world1 but 'deduces' the properties of matter as issuing from the play of opposing forces1 and as due to the temporary syntheses resulting from the presence of unity making itself felt in the opposites4 ,a second and higher 'power' is seen in the physical universe as it presents1 itself to the sciences of electricity1 magnetism1 and chemistry4 ,if the former briefly be denominated the mechanical1 this is the chemical world4 ,the law of polarity is here especially prominent3 the neutrality or indifference of parts is replaced by an intenser antithesis and affinity3 and the return from heterogeneity to homogeneity takes place with more striking and even sudden effect4 ,here1 matter1 even as inorganised1 has a certain simulacrum of life and sensibility3 there is in it the trace of a spirit which emerges above the mere contiguity and juxtaposition of mechanical atoms4 ,the atomic theory shows itself less and less adequate as an attempt to represent the whole phenomena of inanimate matter1 and the material universe is already charged with sympathies and antipathies which are full of the promise and the potency of the organic world4 ,the mechanical theory of the universe1 in the ordinary sense1 which deals with the mathematical formulation of the laws of planetary movement1 had been the work of the seventeenth century4 ,the eighteenth century had seen attempts to explain the status quo of the planetary system as a resultant from the evolution of an elementary molecular state of the cosmic mass4 ,with the close of the eighteenth century there appeared a group of new sciences dealing with subtler energies of matter1--with electricity1 galvanism1 and above all with the connexions of chemical1 electric1 and magnetic science4 ,the ideas thus suggested--embraced with some generality under the title ,polarity--threw light backward upon the old mechanical conceptions1 and gave them a decidedly dynamic character4 ,even the tranquil rest of geometrical figures came to be explained as a meeting point and transition moment of opposite forces4 ,but these ideas produced an even greater effect on biology4 ,here1 too1 the need of a special 'vital force' to explain life and organisation disappeared3 organism was but a higher stage1 a completer truth of mechanism3 and both found their explanation in the antithesis and synthesis of forces1 or in differentiation and integration of what has recently been termed an 'ide-force4' ,in this direction1 so far as ,schelling was concerned1 the obvious stimulus came from the programme sketched by ,kielmeyer at ,stuttgart in #agic1 in a lecture 'on the proportions of organic forces1' ,according to ,kielmeyer there are three types of force in the animal organisation1 sensibility1 irritability and reproduction#e4 ,the last of these is the basic force which builds up and propagates the animal system4 ,with irritability1 or contraction in response to external stimuli--material adaptation to environment--a higher level of animal life is reached4 ,but the highest of all forces in the living being is sensibility4 ,in this same order may we reasonably conceive that the 'plan of nature' proceeds4 ,her first products show little beyond that reproductive power which makes broad and high the pyramid of life4 ,but as the creature acquires increasing heterogeneity and a comparatively independent position1 it plays the part of a re-agent against stimuli1 and a source of movements4 ,lastly1 it not merely responds to1 but assimilates and appropriates the impression into a sensation3 it internalises the external1 and carries within itself by means of the sensibility an ever-increasing picture of the world around it4 ,the idea of ,evolution or ,development1 thus introduced by ,schelling into philosophy as a governing principle in the study of matter and of mind1 is not to be confused either with the older use of these terms or with their current applications to-day#f4 ,by evolution 7or development7 and involution 7or envelopment7 the earlier speculation on biology had denoted the view that the organic germ contained in parvo all that the matured organism showed in large4 ,as the mature bulb of the healthy hyacinth shows1 when cut open1 to the naked eye1 the stem and flowers that will issue from it next spring2 so in general the seed can be treated as a miniature organism needing only an increase of bulk to make it fully visible in details4 ,growth is thus not accretion1 but explication and enlargement of a microscopic organism subsisting in the germ4 ,evolution1 in the present time1 and especially since ,darwin1 means something more than this4 ,it implies a theory of descent of the variety of existing organisms from other organisms of a previous age1 less individualised in forms and functions4 ,from comparatively simple and homogeneous creatures there have issued in the course of ages creatures of more complex1 more highly differentiated structure2 and this process of gradual differentiation may be conceived as going on through an all but infinite period4 ,at one end we may conceive matter1 just endowed with the faculties of life and organisation1 but in a minimal degree2 at the other end of the developmental process1 creatures which have organised within themselves powers1 maximal both in range and variety4 ,the result 7so far as we at present go7 is a genealogy of organism which1 to quote ,darwin1 pictures before us a 'great tree of life which fills with its dead and broken branches the crust of the earth and covers the surface with its ever branching and beautiful ramifications4' ,even ,bugon1 seeing how naturally he could regard 'the wolf1 the fox1 and the jackal' as 'degenerate species of a single family1' concluded we could not go wrong in supposing that 'nature could have with time drawn from a single being all other organised beings4' ,erasmus ,darwin 7#agid7 had insisted on the power of 'appetency' in the organs of a living creature to create and acquire new structures which it handed down to its posterity4 ,g4 ,r4 ,treviranus#g in his ,biology 7#ahjb-e7 had noted the influence of environment1 and ,jean ,lamarck in his ,philosophie ,zoologique 7#ahji7 had--after assuming that 'nature created none but the lowest organisms'--maintained that need and use 7or disuse7 can so effectively modify a creature that it may even produce new organs1 and give rise by imperceptible degrees to a variety of creatures as widely divergent as they now appear4 ,e4 g4 ',the giraffe owes its long neck to its continued habit of browsing upon trees4' ,and gradually it had become recognised by speculators on this subject that1 as ,mr4 ,h4 ,spencer wrote in #aheb1 'by small increments of modification any amount of modification may in time be generated4' ,finally1 in #ahei1 ,darwin1 with an ample resource of illustrative examples1 enforced the doctrine that the existing fauna and flora of the earth represent the result of a struggle for existence1 protracted during vast ages1 in which those creature's have been preserved 7selected to live7 which1 among all the variously-endowed offspring of any kind1 were best fitted to appropriate the means of subsistence in the circumstances in which they for the time found themselves placed4 ,the circumstances of life on the globe are perpetually varying from place to place and time to time3 progeny never exactly reproduce their parents1 and diverge widely from each other3 hence each form of life is perpetually sliding on from phase to phase1 and only those survive which are best adapted to the new conditions of life4 ,so far as ,darwinism is an attempt to show that the classes of plants and animals are not a mere juxtaposition and aggregation1 but are to be explained by reference to a single genetic principle1 it is in harmony with the ,evolution taught by ,schelling and ,hegel4 ,both alike overthrow the hard and fast lines of division which semi-popular science insists upon1 and restore the continuity of existence4 ,both regard ,nature as an organic realm1 developing by action and re-action within itself1 living a common life in thorough sympathy and solidarity1 and not a mere machine in which the several parts retain without change the features and functions impressed upon them at creation by some supernal architect4 ,but they differ in other points4 ,ordinary ,darwinism1 at least1 talks as if circumstances and organism were independent originally1 and only brought as it were1 incidentally1 in contact and correlation4 ,it fails to keep hold of the fact--of which it is abstractly aware--that the two act upon and modify each other because they are members of a larger organism4 ,it forgets1 in short1 what ,schelling so thoroughly realised1 that the organic and inorganic1 ordinarily so called1 are both in a wider sense organic4 ,it wants the courage of recognising its own tacit presuppositions4 ,but the characteristic difference between the evolution theory of to-day and that meant by the philosophers is different from this1 though connected with it4 ',the assertion1' says ,schelling1 'that the various organisms have formed themselves by gradual development from one another1 is a misconception of an ,idea which really lies in reason#h4' ,and ,hegel no less decidedly asserts that ',metamorphosis' 7as the term was then applied1 e4 g4 by ,goethe1 to what we now call ,evolution7 really exists as a fact only in the case of the living individual1--not in the supposed or theoretical continuity of the species4 ',it is an awkward way both ancient and modern speculative biology have had of presenting the development and transition of one physical form and sphere into a higher one as an outwardly-actual production1--which1 however1 in order to make it clearer1 has been thrown back into the darkness of the past4'#i ,yet notwithstanding these and even later protests1 there is a great charm for many minds in the evolutionist picture1 e4 g41 of the horse of to-day as the literal descendant through nearly fifty great stages 7called species7 from some creature of the eocene age1 which gradually transformed itself in consequence of innate instability or variability of construction and in obedience to changes in its environment4 ,but whatever value there may be in these as yet hypothetical aids to the imagination in grasping and unifying the variety of organic life1 they run on another line from the philosophical evolution4 ,that evolution is in the ,idea1 the ,notion4 ,it is the 'fluidity' of terms of thought that is here sought1 not of the kinds of things1--except in a secondary way4 ,and above all1 philosophy does not deal with a problem in time1 with a mere sequence2 if it deals with a history of nature1 the agents of that history are powers and forces--and powers which are ideal no less than real4 ,a nearer approach to the philosophic conception is to be found in the views which modern physiology takes of the nature of organic structure and function#aj4 ,in the simplest phases of protoplasm1 the apparently homogeneous mass is really undergoing a series of changes1 and indeed only exists as such1 because it is the ever-renewed resultant of two correlated processes1--a movement up 7anabolic change7 by which dead matter is assimilated and built into it1 and a movement down 7katabolic changes7 by which its composing elements are disintegrated and left behind1 with accompanying liberation of energy4 ,protoplasm or 'living matter' is the incessantly formed and re-formed thin line on which these two currents for the moment converge1-a temporary crest of white foam1 as it were1 raising itself on the ,heraclitean wave of vicissitude1 where all things flow on and nothing abides4 ,but wherever protoplasm arises and maintains itself on this borderline of ascending and descending states1 it exhibits the three well-known properties of assimilation1 contractility1 and sensitiveness4 ,protoplasm1 placed as it were in the mean between these two processes1 is or has the synthetic power which governs them and keeps them in one4 ,it is no mere chemical substance1 undergoing composition and decomposition1 but rather1 if looked at from the somewhat speculative standpoint of molecular physics1 a kind of intricate movement or dance of particles1 a shape or 'form' instinct with the power of producing and reproducing itself1 and1 ultimately1 in some highly differentiated phases 7nerve-system71 with a power of producing and reproducing a world of imagination4 ,a philosophy of ,nature is only half a philosophy4 ,its purport is to set free the spirit in nature1 to release intelligence from its imprisonment in material encasements which hide it from the ordinary view1 and to gather together the disjecta membra of the divine into the outlines of one continuous organisation4 ,it seeks to spiritualise nature1 i4 e4 to present the inner idea1 unity1 and genetic interdependence of all its phenomena3 to delineate natura formaliter spectata not as a logical skeleton of abstract categories1 but in its organisation and continuous life4 ,there remains the problem of what ,schelling calls ',transcendental ,idealism'3--called 'transcendental' to avoid confusion with the vulgar idealism which supposes the world to be what it calls a mere 'idea' or phantom of the mind4 ,schelling's is on the contrary an ',ideal-,realism'3 it 'materialises the laws of intelligence to laws of nature#aa4' ,we need not in details consider the genesis of ,reality from the action of the ,ego4 ,substantially it is the same as that given by ,fichte4 ,an activity1 which is at once self-limiting and superior to all limit1 rises through stage to stage1 from sensation and intuition1 to reflection and intelligence1 till it becomes the consciousness of a world of ob2 ective reality4 ',give me1' says the transcendental philosopher1 'a nature with opposing activities1 of which the one goes to infinity1 and the other endeavours to behold itself in this infinity1--and from that ,i will show you intelligence arising with the whole system of its ideas#ab4' ,in the first phase the 'ideal-real' world arises by the synthetic action of the 'productive intuition1' ,ideas1 as it were1 live and move3 they grow and build up3 causality is neither a category nor a schema1 but an intelligent 'form' which is also a force--an 'ide-force1' ,they are 7in the ,hegelian sense7 ',ideas1' i4e4 neither merely objective nor merely subjective1 but both at once4 ,but such an ideal world is outside and beyond consciousness3 it belongs to the same region as that higher ,ego where there is no distinction between the ,ego ,i am and the ,ego ,i know4 ,to follow the movement in this region needs a combination of mental vision and visual intellect1 which ,schelling has called the ',intellectual ,intuition4' ,it is a power which rising above the materialism of sense yet retains its realism2 which1 while intellectual1 is free from abstractness4 ,it is synthetic1 and widely different from mere logical analysis4 ,it is1 in short1 analogous to the artistic genius3 it creates a quasi-objectivity1 an ideal-reality1 without which the mere words of the speculator are meaningless4 ,by means of this 'organ1' philosophy can 'freely imitate and repeat the original series of actions in which the one act of self-consciousness is evolved#ac4 ,but the 'productive intuition' is1 as ,kant would say1 blind3 it is unconscious in its operation3 and it is only after an arrest1 a ,sabbath when it surveys and judges its work1 that it begins to realise itself through a process of analysis and reflection which elicits and fixes the categories that have been operative in it4 ,by this abstraction intelligence rises out of mere production to intelligent and conscious production1 i4e4 to volition1 where it has an ideal and realises it4 ,with volition and voluntary action1 objectivity is to appearance further certified and fortified4 ,it is as active1 i4 e4 as free1 and even moral1 agents1 that we set forward categorically the reality of the world4 ,so1 too1 ,fichte had declared4 ,but1 as ,schelling reminds us1 with this intensified assertion of a law and an ideal to which the real must and shall correspond1--with the declaration that the realm of absolute consistency and ideal truth of reason is the true and real for ever and ever--we come across the fundamental antithesis of the ',is' and the ',ought1#e of the objective and subjective1 of unconscious necessity and self-conscious freedom4 ,with an attempt to get a philosophy of history1--i4 e4 of man and mind as the culminating truth of things1 we see ourselves confronted with the opposition of fatalism and chance4 ,on one hand history is only possible for beings who have an ideal in view1--one persistent aim and principle which their work and will is the means of realising4 ,and yet it is an ideal which only the series of generations1 only the whole race1 can realise4 ,man's license to do or to refrain rests upon a larger1 latent1 divine necessity which constrains it4 ,what human agents by their free choice determine and carry out1 is carried out1 in the long run1 by the force of an everlasting and unchanging order1 to which their wills seem but a mere plaything4 ,but that man's free agency should thus harmonise with the constrained uniformities of nature is only possible on the assumption that both are phenomena of a common ground1 or basis of identity1 of an 'absolute identity1 in which there is no duplication1 and which for that reason1 because the condition of all consciousness is duplication1 can never reach consciousness4 ,this ever-,unconscious1 which1 as it were the everlasting ,sun in the spirit-kingdom1 is hidden in its own undimmed light1 and which1 though it is never an object1 still impresses its identity on all free objects1 is simultaneously the same for all intelligences1 the invisible root of which all intelligences are only the powers1 and the everlasting mediator between the self-determining subjective in us and the objective or percipient1--simultaneously the ground of the uniformity in freedom1 and of the freedom in uniformity of the objective#ad4' ,to rise to the sense of this ,absolute ,identity1 as common basis of harmony between the ',ought' and the ',is1' is to recognise ,providence3 it is ,religion4 ,but this ',absolute' is never in history completely revealed--we cannot see free action coincide with predetermination4 ,thus if ,history as a whole be conceived as a 'continuous and gradual self-revelation2 of the ,absolute1' ',god never is1 if is means exhibition2 in the objective world3 if ,god were1 we should not be#ae4' ,nor is the ,absolute so revealed in ,nature4 ,yet1 even as the apparent contingency of human action throws us back on an everlasting necessity which is yet freedom1 so the apparent uniformity of natural order shows us in organic life the traces of a free self-regulating development4 ,to apprehend the truth at which both seem to point we want an organ of intelligence which shall unite in itself the conscious activity of free production with the unconscious instinct of natural creation4 ,such an organ is found in they aesthetic power of genius1 in the ,artist4 ,the artistic product is the work of two intimately-conjoined principles3--of the art 7in the narrower sense7 which can be taught and learned1 and is exercised consciously and with reflection1 and of that 'poesy in ,art1' the unconscious grace of genius which can neither be handed down nor acquired1 but can only be inborn by free gift of nature4 ,in the work thus brought to birth there is something definite1 precise1 and capable of exposition in finite formulae3 there is also something which no 'prose' can ever explicate1 something which tells us of the infinite and eternal1 which ever reveals and yet conceals the ,absolute and ,perfect4 ,art1 thus springing from 'imagination1 the one sole power by which we can think and conjoin even the contradictory1' gives objectivity and outward shape to that 'intellectual intuition' by which the philosopher subjectively 7in his own consciousness7 sought to realise to himself the unity of thought and existence4 ',to the philosopher1' ,schelling concludes1 ',art is supreme1 because it as it were opens to him the ,holy of ,holies1 where in everlasting and original unity there burns1 as it were in one flame1 what is parted asunder in nature and history1 and what in life and conduct1 no less than in thinking1 must for ever flee apart4 ,the view the philosopher artificially makes for himself of nature is for ,art the original and natural4 ,what we call nature is a poem which is locked up in strange and secret characters4 ,yet could the riddle be disclosed1 we should recognise in it the ,odyssey of the mind1 which1 strangely deceived1 in seeking itself1 flees from itself3 for through the sense-world there is a glimpse1 only as through words of the meaning1 only as through half-transparent mist of the land of imagination1 after which we yearn4 ,that splendid picture emerges1 as it were1 by the removal of the invisible partition-wall which sunders the actual and the ideal world1 and is only the opening by which those figures and regions of the world of imagination1 that but imperfectly glimmer through the actual1 come forward in all their fulness4 ,nature is to the artist no more than it is to the philosopher1 viz4 the ideal world as it appears under constant limitations1 or only the imperfect reflex of a world which does not exist outside him1 but within him4' ',if it is ,art alone1 then1 which can succeed in making objective and universally accepted what the philosopher can only exhibit subjectively1 it may also be expected that philosophy1 as it was in the infancy of science born and nourished by poetry1 and with it all those sciences which were by it carried on towards perfection1 will after their completion flow back as so many single streams into the universal ocean of poetry from which they issued4 ,nor is it in general hard to say what will be the means for the return of science to poetry3 for such a means has existed in mythology before this1 as it now seems1 irrevocable separation took place4 ,but as to how a new mythology1--which cannot be the invention of the single poet1 but of a new generation1 as it were representing only a single poet1--can itself arise1 is a problem1 the solution of which is to be expected only from the future destinies of the world and the further course of history#af4' ,footnote #a3 ,schelling1 ,werke1 iii4 #ac4 7,references always to the first series47 ,footnote #b3 ,schelling1 ,werke1 ii4 #dji4 ,footnote #c3 ,schelling1 ,werke1 ii4 #ejj4 ,footnote #d3 ,ibid4 ii4 #cej4 ,footnote #e3 ,compare vol4 ii4 #cfj and #dbi4 ,footnote #f3 ,see notes and illustrations in vol4 ii4 p4 #dbd4 ,footnote #g3 ',every inquiry into the influence of general nature on living beings1' says ,treviranus1 'must start from the principle that all living forms are products of physical influences which still go on at the present time and are altered only in degree and direction4' ,footnote #h3 ,schelling1 ,werke1 iii4 #fc4 ,footnote #i3 ,hegel1 ,encyclopaedie1 #bdi4 ,footnote #aj3 ,see e4 g4 ,professor ,michael ,fosters article on ,physiology in the ,encyclopaedia ,britannica4 ,footnote #aa3 ,schelling1 iii4 #ceb1 #chf4 ,footnote #ab3 ,ibid4 iii4 #dbg4 ,footnote #ac3 ,schelling1 iii4 #cig4 ,footnote #ad3 ,schelling1 iii4 #fjj4 ,footnote #ae3 ,ibid4 iii4 #fjc4 ,footnote #af3 ,schelling1 iii4 #fbh4 ,,chapter ,,xiv4 ,,transition ,,to ,,hegel4 ,thus far ,schelling 7aetat4 #be7 had gone in #ahjj4 ,two sides of philosophy had been alternately presented as complementary to each other2 and now the task lay before him to publish the ,system itself which formed the basis of those complementary views4 ,to that task ,schelling set himself in #ahja 7in his ,journal for ,speculative ,physics73 but the ,darstellung meines ,systems remained a torso4 ,the ,absolute was abruptly 'shot from the pistol'3 but little followed save a restatement in new terms of the ,philosophy of ,nature4 ,meanwhile ,hegel1 who had inherited some little means by his father's death1 began to think that the hour had struck for his entrance into the literary and philosophical arena1 and wrote in the end of #ahjj to ,schelling asking his aid in finding a suitable place and desirable surroundings from which to launch himself into action4 ,what answer or advice he received is unknown3 at any rate in the early days of #ahja he took up his quarters at ,jena1 and in the autumn he gave his first lectures at the ,university4 ,gossip suggested that ,schelling1 left alone 7since ,fichte's departure7 to sustain the onset of respectability and orthodoxy upon the extravagances of the new ,transcendentalism1 had summoned his countryman and old friend to bear a part in the fray4 ,and the rumour seemed to receive corroboration4 ,the two friends issued conjointly a ,critical ,journal of ,philosophy1 which ran through two years4 ,so closely were the two editors associated that in one article it seems as if the younger had supplied his more fluent pen to expound the ideas of his senior4 ,the influence of ,hegel is to be seen in the ,bruno1 or on the ,divine and ,natural ,principle of ,things1 published in #ahjb4 ,it is a dialogue1 in form closely modelled after the ,timaeus of ,plato1 dealing with the old theme of the relation of art 7poesy7 and philosophy1 and with the eternal creation of the universe4 ,it presents philosophy as a higher than ,art2 for while ,art achieves only an individual truth and beauty1 philosophy cognises truth and beauty in its essence and actuality 7an und fr sich74 ,philosophy itself ,bruno 7the chief speaker of the dialogue7 does not profess to set forth1 but 'only the ground and soil on which it must be built up and carried out'3 and that soil is 'the ,idea of something in which all antitheses are not so much combined1 as rather one1 and not so much superseded1 as rather not at all parted1'--'a unity1 in which unity and antithesis1 the self-similar with the dissimilar1 are one#a4' ,from such a standpoint it is not wonderful that 'in the finite understanding 7,verstand17 compared with the supreme ,idea and the way in which all things are in it1 everything seems reversed1 and as if standing on its head1 exactly like the things we see mirrored on the surface of water#b4' ,this supreme ,unity is essentially a trinity3 an ,eternal1 embracing infinite and finite2 an eternal and invisible father of all things1 who1 never issuing forth from his eternity1 comprehends infinite and finite in one and the same act of divine knowledge4 ,the infinite1 again1 is the ,spirit1 who is the unity of all things2 while the finite1 though potentially equal to the infinite#c1 is by its own will a ,god suffering and made subject to the conditions of time#d4 ,this trinity in unity 7which is the ,absolute7 is by logic--a mere science of understanding--rent asunder3 and the one ,subject-object of philosophy becomes for reflection and understanding the three independent objects which such a 'logical' philosophy calls respectively the ,soul 7erewhile the infinite71 the world 7once the finite71 and ,god 7the eternal unity74 ',opposing and separating the world of intelligence from the world of nature1 men have learned to see nature outside ,god1 and ,god outside nature1 and withdrawing nature from the holy necessity1 have subordinated it to the unholy which they name mechanical1 while by the same act they have made the ideal world the scene of a lawless liberty4 ,at the same time as they defined nature as a merely passive entity1 they supposed they had gained the right of defining ,god1 whom they elevated above nature1 as pure activity1 utter actuosity1 as if the one of these concepts did not stand and fall with the other1 and none had truth by itself#e4' ,the problem therefore of philosophy is on one hand to 'find the expression for an activity which is as reposeful as the deepest repose1 for a rest which is as active as the highest activity#f4' ,on the other hand2 'to find the point of unity is not the greatest thing1 but from it also to develop its opposite1 this is the proper and deepest secret of art#g4' ,the world as it first presents itself labours under a radical antithesis3 it offers a double face1 body and soul1 finite and infinite4 ,but to an absolute philosophy1 or that high idealism which sees all things in the light of the ,eternal1 the two sides are not so separate as they first appeared4 ,each is also the whole and one1 but under a phase1 a ',differenz' a preponderating aspect which disguises the essential identity of both4 ,behind mind1 as it were1 looms body3 through body shines mind4 ,the ideal is but a co-aspect with the real4 ,the difference of nature and spirit presupposes and leads back to the indifference of the ,absolute ,one4 ',wherever in a thing soul and body are equated1 in that thing is an imprint of the ,idea1 and as the ,idea in the ,absolute is also itself being and essence1 so in that thing1 its copy1 the form is also the substance and the substance the form#h4' ',thus1' so ,bruno concludes1 'we shall1 first in the absolute equality of essence and form1 know how both finite and infinite stream forth from its heart1 and how the one is necessarily and for ever with the other1 and comprehend how that simple ray1 which issues from the ,absolute and is the very ,absolute1 appears parted into difference and indifference1 finite and infinite4 ,we shall precisely define the mode of parting and of unity for each point of the universe1 and prosecute the universe to that place where that absolute point of unity appears parted into two relative unities4 ,we shall recognise in the one the source whence springs the real and naturals world2 in the other1 of the ideal and divine world4 ,with the former we shall celebrate the incarnation of ,god from all eternity2 with the latter the necessary deification of man4 ,and while we move freely and without resistance up and down on this spiritual ladder1 we shall1 now1 as we descend1 see the unity of the divine and natural principle parted1 now1 as we ascend and again dissolve everything into one1 see nature in ,god and ,god in nature#i4' ,such was the programme which ,schelling offered4 ,hegel accepting it1--or perhaps helping to frame it--made two not unimportant changes4 ,he attempted in his ,phenomenology to lead up step by step to1 and so warrant1 that strange position of idealism u which claims to be the image of the ,absolute4 ,he tried in his ,logic to give for this point of view a systematic basis and a filling out of the bare ,idea of a ,unity1 neither objective nor subjective1 neither form nor substance1 neither real nor ideal1 but including and absorbing these4 ,he tried1 in short1 to trace in the ,absolute itself the inherent difference which issued in two different worlds1 and to show its unity and identity there4 ,a ,system of philosophy1 and a philosophy of the ,absolute6 ,the project to the sober judgment of common sense stands self-condemned1 palpably beyond the tether of humanity4 ,for if there be anything agreed upon1 it is that the knowledge of finite beings like us can never be more than a--comparatively poor--collection of fragments1 and can never reach to that which--and such is the supposed character of the ,absolute--is utterly un-related1 rank non-relativity4 ,but in the first place1 let us not be the slaves of words1 and let us not be terrified by unfamiliar terms4 ,after all1 a ,system is only our old friend the unity of knowledge1 and the ,absolute is not something let quite loose1 but the consummation and inter-connexion of all ties4 ,it is no doubt an audacious enterprise to set forth on the quest of the unity of knowledge1 and the completion of all definition and characterisation4 ,but1 on the other hand1 it may perhaps claim to be more truly modest than the self-complacent modesty of its critics4 ,for ordinary belief and knowledge rest upon presuppositions which they dare not or will not subject to revision4 ,they too are sure that things on the whole1 or that the system of things1 or that nature and history1 are a realm of uniformity1 subject to unvarying law1 in thorough interdependence4 ,they are good enough1 occasionally1 to urge that they hold these beliefs on the warranty of experience1 and not as1 what they are pleased to call1 intuitions1 a priori ideas1 and what not4 ,but to base a truth on experience is a loose manner of talking3 not one whit better than the alleged ,indian foundation of the earth on the elephant1 and the elephant erected on the tortoise4 ,for by ,experience it means experiences2 and these rest one upon another1 one upon another1 till at length1 if this be all that holds them together1 the last hangs unsupported1 7and with its superincumbent load71 ready to drop in the abyss of ,nought4 ,this 'transcendental1' 'absolutist1' 'a priori' philosophy1 which stands so strange and menacing on the threshold of the nineteenth century1 is after all only1 as ,kant sometimes called it1 an essay to comprehend and see the true measures and dimensions of this much-quoted ,experience4 ,all knowledge rests in 7not on7 the unity of ,experience4 ,all the several experiences rest in the totality of one experience1--ultimate1 all-embracing1 absolute1 infinite1 unconditioned2 universal and yet individual1 necessary and yet free1--eternal1 and yet filling all the nooks of time1--ideal1 and yet the mother of all reality1--unextended1 and yet spread through the spaces of the universe4 ,call it1 if you like1 the experience of the race1 but remember that that apparently more realistic and scientific phrase connotes neither more nor less 7if rightly understood7 than normal1 ideal1 universal1 infinite1 absolute experience4 ,this is the ,unconditioned1 which is the basis and the builder of all conditions3 the ,absolute1 which is the home and the parent of all relations4 ,experience is no doubt yours and mine1 but it is also much more than either yours or mine4 ,he who builds on and in ,experience1 builds on and in the ,absolute1 in the ,system--a system which is not merely his4 ,in his every utterance he claims to speak as the mouth-piece of the ,absolute1 the ,unconditioned2 his words expect and require assent1 belief1 acceptance2--they are candidates 7not necessarily1 or always successful7 for the rank of universal and necessary truth3 they are dogmatic assertions1 and even in their humblest tones1 none the less infected with the fervour of certainty4 ,for1 indeed1 otherwise1 it would be a shame and an insult to let them cross the lips4 ,it is the aim of the ,absolute a priori philosophy to raise this certainty to truth3 or1 as one may rather say1 to reduce this certainty to its kernel of truth4 ,it seeks to determine the limits--not of this absolute and basic experience 7for it has no external limits7--but in this experience3 the anatomy and physiology of the ,absolute1--the correlations and inclusions1 the distinctions and syntheses in the unconditioned field4 ,it examines the foundation of all knowledge4 ,but--if this be the phrase--we must be on our guard against a misapprehension of its terms4 ,the foundations are also knowledge3 they are in all knowledge and experience1 its synthetic link and its analytic distinctions4 ,we must not shrink from paradoxes in expression4 ,the house of knowledge1 the world of experience1 is as self-centred and self-sustaining1 and even more so1 than the planetary system4 ,it is a totality in which each part hangs upon and helps to hold up the others1 but which needs no external help1 resting and yet moving1 self-poised and free4 ,we may be spared1 therefore1 verbal criticism on the ,absolute and ,unconditioned4 ,the ,absolute1 and ,infinite1 and ,eternal is no mere negation3--the only pure negation is ,,not1 and even that has a flaw in its claim4 ,it is perfectly true--and it can only be babes and sucklings that need to be reminded of the fact--that none of us realises and attains the ne plus ultra of knowledge and that all our systems have their day1--have their day and cease to be4 ',the coasts of the ,happy ,isles of philosophy where we would fain arrive are covered only with fragments of shattered ships1 and we behold no intact vessel in their bays#aj4' ,so too the whole earth is full of graves2 and yet humanity lives on1 charged with the attainments of the past and full of the promise of the future4 ,let us by all means be critical and not dogmatic3 let us never entirely forget that each utterance1 each science1 each system of ours falls short of what it wanted to be1 and for a moment at least thought it was4 ,but let us not carry our critical abstinence into dogmatic non-intervention3 or1 if so1 let us silently accept the great renunciation of all utterance henceforth4 ,system we all presuppose in our words and deeds1 and should be much hurt if our defect in it were seriously alleged3 the ,absolute we all rest in1 though amid so many self-imposed and other distractions we feel and see it not4 ,the philosopher proposes for his task--or rather the philosopher is one on whom this task forces itself as for him the one thing inevitable--to determine what is that system and what that ,absolute1 or1 if the phrase be preferred1 the philosopher traces to its unity1 and retraces into its differences that ,experience--that felt1 known1 and willed synthesis of ,reality1--that realised ideal world--on which and in which we live and move4 ,he does not make the system1 nor does he set up the ,absolute4 ,he only tries to discover the system1 and to construe the ,absolute4 ,it may be said that the best of philosophers can do no more than give us a ,system and an ,absolute4 ,undoubtedly that is so4 ,each philosophy is from one point of view a strictly individualist performance4 ,it is not1 in one way1 the ,absolute truth1 which it promises or hopes to disclose4 ,the truth is seen through one being's eyes2 and his 'measure1' as ,protagoras might have said1 is upon it4 ,yet it is still the ,absolute1 as seen through those eyes2 it is still in a marvellous measure that truth1 that absolute truth1 'which the actual generations garble4' ,for both the artist and the philosopher1 if they create1 only re-create or imitate2 if they are makers1 they are still more seers3 and their power of 'imitation' and of 'vision' rests on their capacity to de-individualise themselves of their eccentricities and idiosyncrasies1 and to bring out only that in them which is the common truth of all essential thought and vision4 ,in proportion as they purge themselves of this evil subjectivity are they true artists and philosophers4 ,they are both--and so1 too1 is the religious genius--idealists3 but the test of the value of their idealism is its power of including and synthetising reality4 ,that is their verification3 that1 and not their concord with this or that opinion1 this or that theory of individuals or of groups4 ,not that the views either of groups or individuals are unimportant4 ,but often they are but frozen lumps in the stream1 temporary islands which have lost their fluidity1 and which imagine themselves continental and permanent4 ,truth1 then1 reasoned truth1 harmonious experience1 absolute system1 is the theme of philosophy4 ,or1 in ,hegelian language1 its theme is the ,truth1 and that ,truth1 ,god4 ,not alum1 an aggregate1 or even what is ordinarily styled a system1 of truths3 but the one and yet diverse pulse of truth1 which beats through all3 the supreme point of view in which all the parts and differences1 occasionally standing out as if independent1 sink into their due relation and are seen in their right proportion4 ,footnote #a3 ,schelling1 iv4 #bca1 #bce1 #bcf4 ,footnote #b3 ,ibid4 #bdd4 ,footnote #c3 ',in things thou seest nought but the misplaced images of that absolute unity2 and even in knowledge1 so far as it is a relative unity1 thou seest nought but an image--only drawn amiss in another direction--of that absolute cognition1 in which being is as little determined by thought as thought by being4' ,footnote #d3 ,schelling1 iv4 #beb4 ,see further1 iv4 #cbg3 ',the pure subject1 that absolute knowledge1 the absolute ,ego1 the form of all forms1 is the only-begotten ,son of the ,absolute1 equally eternal with him1 not diverse from his ,essence1 but one with it4' ,footnote #e3 ,schelling1 iv4 #cjf4 ,cp4 for actuosity1 notes in vol4 ii4 #cif4 ,spinoza1 ,cogit4 ,met4 ii4 #aa1 speaks of the actuosa essentia of ,god4 ,footnote #f3 ,schelling1 iv4 #cje4 ,footnote #g3 ,ibid4 iv4 #cbh4 ,footnote #h3 ,ibid4 iv4 #cjf4 ,footnote #i3 ,schelling1 iv4 #cbh4 ,footnote #aj3 ,hegel1 ,werke1 i4 #aff4 ,,prolegomena ,,book ,,ii ,,in ,,the ,,porches ,,of ,,philosophy ,,chapter ,,xv4 ,,the ,,two ,,ages ,,of ,,reason4 ,the eighteenth century--it has been often said--was a rationalising1 unhistorical1 age3 and1 in contrast1 the nineteenth has been declared to be par excellence the founder and the patron of the historical method4 ,in the one1 the tendency governing the main movement of ,european civilisation was towards cosmopolitan and universal enlightenment4 ,a common ideal1 and1 because common1 necessarily rather general and abstract1 perhaps even somewhat vulgarly utilitarian1 pervaded ,western ,europe1 and threw its influence for good and evil on literature and art1 on religion and polity4 ,it grew out of a revulsion1 in many ways natural1 from the religious extravagances of the century-and-a-half preceding1 which had led prudent thinkers to reduce religion to a 'reasonable' minimum1 and to reject all things that savoured of or suggested enthusiasm1 fanaticism1 and superstition4 ,in politics the same one type or system of government and laws was aimed at1 more or less1 in all advancing states4 ,national peculiarities and patriotism were looked at askance1 as unworthy of the free 'humanity' which was set forward as the end of all training4 ,to simplify1 to level1 to render intelligible1 and self-consistent was the task of enlightenment in dealing with all institutions4 ,to remove all anomalies and inequalities1 to give security for liberty and to facilitate the right to pursue happiness#a1 was the chief watchword of this movement4 ,its questions were--,is religion1 ,is art and science1 ,is political organisation1 a source of happiness8 ,are poetry1 and a belief in divine things1 and abstruse knowledge1 upon the whole for human advantage and benefit8 ,only such civilisation can be justified as1 taken all in all1 is a blessing2 if not 7cried some7 we may as well cling to the happiness of the barbarian4 ,that these are important questions1 and that the purposes above-mentioned are in many ways good1 is clear4 ,but before we can answer the questions1 or decide as to the feasibility of the aims1 there are some things to be brought and to be kept in view4 ,and these things were not as a rule brought and kept in view4 ,it was assumed that the standard of adjudication was found in the averagely educated and generally cultured individual among the class of more or less 'advanced thinkers' who asked the questions and set up the aims4 ,that class1 already denationalised by function1 forming a commonwealth or rather a friendly fraternity throughout the capitals of ,europe1 had cut itself off from the narrower and the deeper sympathies of the national life4 ,forming a sort of mean or middle stratum in the social organisation1 they tended to ignore or despise equally the depths below them and the heights above4 ,they took themselves as the types of humanity1 and what their understandings found acceptable they dubbed rational3 all else was a survival from the ages of darkness4 ,they forgot utterly that they were only a part1 a class1 a member in the social body3 and that they could only be and do what they were and did1 because what they were not and did not do was otherwise supplied4 ,it takes all sorts of people to make a world3 but each class--and the order of literature and intelligence is no exception--tends to set itself up as the corner-stone 7if not something more7 of the social edifice4 ,what is more3 in such a loose aggregate as the intelligent upper-middle class1 the individual tends more and more to count as something1 detached and by himself1 to be an equal and free unit of judgment and choice1 to be emancipated from all the bonds which hold in close affinity members of a group whose functions are unlike each other's1 and yet decidedly complementary4 ,such a class1 again--though there are of course conspicuous exceptions--is1 by the stress of special interests1 removed from direct contact with nature and reality1 and lives what in the main may be styled an artificial life4 ,when such a class asked what were the benefits of art or religion1 it thought first of itself2 and it looked upon art and religion--and the same would be true of philosophy and science1 or of political sanctions--as merely objective and outward entities1 foreign to the individual1 yet by some mechanical influences brought into connexion with him1--as one might apply to him a drug or a viand4 ,but clearly to a person of practical aims1 bent on conveying information and enlightenment1 bent on making all men as like each other as possible in the medium range of cultivation which he thinks desirable1 the utility of some of these things is questionable and limited4 ,it is only a little modicum of religion1 of art and of science1 which can be justified by its obvious pleasure-giving power2 and it is easy to point the thesis against enthusiasm in these regions1 by reference to the disastrous wars fanned by religion1 to the license that has followed the steps of art1 and to the lives wasted in the zeal for increasing knowledge4 ,in his ideal of human life such a practical reformer will tend to suppress all that bears too clear a trace of natural1 infra-rational1 non-intelligent kindred1--all that ties us too closely to mother earth and universal nature4 ,but if this was the dominant tone of the literary teachers who had chief audience from the public ear1 there was no lack of dissentient voices who appealed to nature1 who loved the past1 who set sentiment and imagination above intellect1 and who never bowed the knee to the great idols of enlightened middle-class utilitarianism4 ,even in the leaders of the enlightening host--amongst the chiefs of the ,aufklrung--there is a breadth and a depth of human interest which sets them far above their average followers1 and which should prevent us from joining without discrimination in the depreciatory judgments so often passed on the eighteenth century4 ,the pioneers in the great emancipatory movement of modern times should not be allowed to suffer from the exaggerations and haste of their more vulgar imitators--still less refused the meed of gratitude we owe them4 ,but when their ideas were violently translated into reality1 when the levelling1 unshackling process was set at work by vulgar hands1 the shortcomings of their theories were made to show even greater than they were3 and inevitable reaction set in4 ,even the revolutionist himself has come to admit that fraternity at that time came badly off in comparison with liberty and equality#b4 ,but these drawbacks were accentuated when the cosmopolitan reform-movement1 by its haste and intolerance1 awakened the spirit of national jealousy4 ,the deeper instincts of life rose in protest against the supposed superiority of intellect3 the heart claimed its rights against the head3 the man of nature and feeling was roused up to meet the man of reasoning and criticism4 ,the spirit of war evoked those energies of human nature--some of them not its least valuable--which had slumbered in times of easy-going peace4 ,the days of adversity and humiliation taught men that the march of literary culture is not the all-in-all of life and history4 ,it was made apparent1 practically at least1 that intelligence1 with its hard and fast formulae1 its logical principles1 its keen analysis1 was not deep enough or wide enough to justify its claim to the august title of reason4 ,to be reasonable implies a more comprehensive1 patient1 many-sided observation than is necessary to prove the claim to mere intelligence4 ,to be intelligent is to seize the right means to execute a given or accepted end--it is to be quick and correct in the practice of life1 to carry out in detail what has been determined on in general4 ,understanding plays upon the surface of life and deals with the momentary case3 and its greatest praise is to be fleet in the application of principles1 apt to detect the point on which to direct action1 correct in its estimate of means to ends4 ,clearsighted1 prudent1 and direct1 it is the supreme virtue in a given sphere3 but the sphere must be given1 and its end constituted in the measured round of practical life1 its system complete3 or1 understanding is bewildered before a hopeless puzzle4 ,understanding is--the improvident cynic might say--a certain animal-like sagacity--7such cynical philosophers were perhaps ,hobbes and ,schopenhauer#c7--;a mere power of carrying out a given rule in a new but similar case1 and of doing so1 perhaps1 through a long chain of intermediate links and means4 ,but there are more things in heaven and earth than are heard of in the philosophy of the logical intellect4 ,the subtilitas naturae#d far surpasses the refinements of the practical intellect3 and if the latter is ever to overcome or be equal to the former1 it must1 so to speak1 wait patiently upon it1 as a handmaiden upon the hands of her mistress4 ,such a trained and disciplined intellect which has conquered nature by obedience is what the philosophers at the beginning of this century called reason#e4 ,it is in life as much as in our mind4 ,it comes not by self-assertion1 by the attempt to force our ends and views on nature1 but by feeling and thinking ourselves in and along with nature4 ,or1 briefly1 it breaks down the middle wall of partition by which man had treated nature as a mere world of objects--things to be used and to minister to his pleasure--but always alien to him1 always mere matter to be manipulated ab extra4 ,yet even to get full use and enjoyment out of a thing it is well to be in closer community with it1 and on terms of friendly acquaintance4 ,the function of this fuller reason cannot be performed without something analogous to sympathy and imagination4 ,sympathy1 which realises the inner unity of the so-called 'thing' with ourselves3 imagination1 which sets it in the full circumstances of those relationships which the practical intelligence is inclined to abstract from and to neglect4 ,yet only something analogous to sympathy and imagination3 if1 as may well be the case1 we attach to these terms any association of irregular or mere emotional operation4 ,the imagination in question is the 'scientific' imagination--the power of wide large vision which sets the object fully in reality1 and is not content with a mere name or abstract face of a fact--a name which represents a fact no doubt1 but represents it1 as many such 'agents' or deputies do1 in a hard and wooden spirit4 ,the sympathy in question is the transcending of the antithesis between subjective and objective2 not a fantastic or fortuitous choice of one or a few out of many on whom to lavish locked-up stores of affection1 but the full recognition of unity as pervading differences1 and reducing them to no more than aspects in correlation4 ,what has been said of sympathy and imagination1 as the allies and ministers of reason1 might be extended and applied to humour1 to wit1 to irony4 ,these also it may be said--and with the same qualifications--are essential to a philosopher in the highest sense4 ,the humour1 viz41 which strides over the barriers set up by institution and convention between the high and the humble1 and sees man's superficial distinctions overpowered by a half-grim1 half-jubilant ,ananke1--which notes how human proposal is overcome1 not without grace1 by divine and natural disposal1 how the deep inner identity in all estates breaks triumphantly through the fences of custom and deliberate intention4 ,the wit1 which upsets the hardened fixity of classes and groups1 flits from one to another1 shows glimpses of affinity between remote provinces of idea1 and all this1 without laboured and artificial search for analogies1 though to the slower-following practical mind1 hampered by its solid limits1 these leaps from province to province seem paradoxical and whimsical4 ,the irony1 which notes the tragicomedy of life under its apparent regularity of prose1--which detects the vanity of all efforts to check the flux of vitality and make the volatile permanent2 which contrasts the apparent with the real1 the obviously and officiously meant with the truly desired and willed1 and shows how diplomatically-close design is dissipated in a jest1 or the soul bent on many years of enjoyment is plunged into torment4 ,thus1 in a way1 imagination1 sympathy1 wit1 humour1 irony and paradox are elements that go to the making of a philosopher3 but in the serenity of reasoned wisdom they lose their frolicsome and fantastic mood1 and fill their minor place with sober cheer4 ,wedded to the lord of wisdom1 the ,muse of poesy and wit loses her sprightly laugh and her dancing step1 becoming a subdued1 yet gracious matron1 who1 with her offspring1 sheds gleams of brightness and warmth and colour in the somewhat austere household4 ,yet still the free maiden of poesy1 in the open fields where the shadow of reflective thought has not yet fallen1 has the greater charm2 and a certain jealousy not unfrequently reigns between the married sister and the virgin yet untamed4 ,but though poetry and the allied arts of words were very helpful to philosophy--witness the services which1 though in widely different ways1 ,goethe and ,schiller rendered to the higher thinking of ,germany--even more stimulative and fruitful was the research into nature and history4 ,nature and history3 but they lie closer together than the conjunction suggests4 ,it is true that in recent times we have been forcibly taught to separate civil from natural history1 if we have not even been further taught that the latter is an improper application of the term4 ,but when ,aristotle said that ',poetry is more philosophical than ,history' he was probably not restricting his remark to the story of nations and states2 even as when ,bacon set history as the field of memory beside the fields of imagination and reasoning1 he was not solely referring to the records of the human past4 ,the distinction between natural and civil history is no doubt for practical education a distinction of supreme importance4 ,but it is so1 because in this scholastic phase the conception of both1 under these comprehensive names1 was superficial and abstract4 ,natural history meant only the classificatory description of animals1 plants1 and minerals3 civil history the tale composed to string together the succession of human actions on the public and national field of life4 ,we have seen in an earlier chapter the advances which ,lessing1 ,kant1 and above all ,herder1 made in this direction#f4 ,emphasising in their several ways the great dictum of ,spinoza that human passions1 and the whole scheme of human life1 are res naturales1 quae communes naturae leges sequuntur1 they gave to history a higher1 more philosophical1 more scientific scope than what the name used to connote4 ,neither in ,spinoza himself1 nor in these his followers1 did this insistence on the unity of nature at all lead them to neglect the difference--almost equivalent1 it may be said1 in the end to an ,imperium in imperio--by which rational man marks himself off to a special kindred with the divine#g4 ,we have seen too what ,schelling did to show that history1 if in one aspect it be the product of free human volitions1 is1 in another and as he thought a superior aspect1 the realm subject to a divine or natural necessity4 ,the whole tendency of this epoch of thought--the tendency which entitles it above all to the name of speculative--is its impulse to over-ride this distinction between ,nature and ,history2 to over-ride it1 however1 not in the sense of simply ignoring or denying it1 but of carrying it up into a unity which would do justice to both1 without exclusively favouring either1 and hardly without clipping both of any extravagant claims4 ,the distinction remains1--no longer an abrupt division1 but now tempered and mellowed by the presence of a paramount unity4 ,nature now has a real history3 no longer a mere factitious aggregate of classified facts1 it is the phenomenon of a 'latent process1' due to a 'latent schematism1' and a 'form' or principle of organisation4 ,classification does not cease3 but it ceases to be an end in itself1 and becomes only subordinate or auxiliary to a higher scientific end4 ,the main theme is to construe the complete cycle of life-change and the complete organisation of life-state from the evidence pieced out and put together from the various orders1 classes1 and species of living creatures4 ,and on the other side the mere tale or narrative of history1 with its gossip of personalities1 and its accidents of war and intrigue1 tends to become insignificant in the presence of the great popular life1 in its deep and subtle connexion with agencies of nature hitherto unsurmised1 in its dependence upon necessities and uniformities which envelope or rather permeate and constitute the human will4 ,it is not indeed that the force of great personalities has come to be treated as a quantity we may neglect4 ,the force of the great leader1 of the genius1 of the hero1 is not less admirable to the wise philosophical historian to-day than it ever was to his story-telling predecessor4 ,but he flatters himself that he understands better1 and can better take account of1 the conditions which make the genius and the hero possible4 ,achilles still counts for more than a thousand common soldiers1 and ,homer himself is not merely the composite image by which a long tradition has fused into a dim pictorial unity the countless bards who sang for ages on the isles of ,greece and the coasts of ,ionia4 ,yet we feel sure that ,achilles did what he did1 because of the race he sprang from1 the inspiration he felt around him1 the companionship in body and spirit of his peers4 ,we feel that the hero derives his strength from earth and air1 from the spiritual and material substance in which he draws his breath4 ,true1 we cannot explain him1 as if he and his heroisms were a mere product of mathematical and mechanical forces4 ,but where we once recognise that behind the single visible deed and agent there is a spiritual nature--an underlying agency--which1 unperceived1 keeps the hearth-fire of public life burning in the celestial temple of ,vesta1 we can at least see that though genius is a marvel and a mystery1 yet it is according to law1 and no mere will-o'-the-wisp4 ,but when we say that the actions and sayings even of the foremost individuals are to be comprehended only in the light of universal forces and laws1 there is an error which is only too ready to substitute itself for the truth4 ,it soon appears for example that1 among the general causes which control the development of civilisation and the acts of individuals1 the economical condition is of great and prominent effect4 ,and1 above all1 it is easily measurable1 and subject to palpable standards 7such as statistics of exports and imports1 c474 ,it was natural therefore that a school of historico-social philosophers should arise who maintained that the economical state of a given society was the fundamental principle or form of its life1 of which all other phases of its civilisation1 religious1 aesthetic1 c41 were only variable dependent functions4 ,this view1 which comes out in the socialist theory of ,marx1 is clearly the exaggeration or abstract statement of a partial truth into a pseudo-complete theory4 ,the truth is one which found expression as early as ,plato4 ,it is this3 that in the economical system of a society we find the first and somewhat external or mechanical suggestion of the organism to which the state is yet to grow4 ,in the economic law of reciprocity there is a 'certain faint image' of the principle of social organisation or political life4 ,but when we go beyond1 and interpret this first phase to mean the original foundation1 we are stating a figment which has a plausibility only when by the economic state we mean a great deal more than abstractly economic facts include4 ,and this again arises because it is really impossible to carry out thoroughly the abstraction of one aspect of social life from the others4 ,there are no purely economic facts which are independent of other social influences1--of ideals1 e4 g4 moral or aesthetic1--ideals which nobody would call economic1 though they never quite part company from economical conditions4 ,so again there is occasionally a tendency to magnify the influence of what in the narrowest sense may be termed political systems4 ,forms of government1 and titles of sovereignty are regarded as forces to which individuals--even the highest--must bow4 ,but here again the exaggeration of a principle need not tempt us to rush with ,tom ,paine into the opposite extravagance that government and state-power are superfluities1 or quasi-ornamental additions to a social fabric1 which can do without them and1 like other beasts of low organisation1 can1 when shorn of them1 reproduce them with ease4 ,and thus though we may dissent from the view that laws and constitutions are omnipotent1 we may admit that in them the central unity and controlling principle of social life finds its dominant expression in great outlines4 ,we shall not agree with him who said ',let who will make the laws of a nation if ,i may make its ballads'3 because we know that the nation will in the end have the chief voice in determining what are to be its ballads no less than its laws4 ,we shall not quite accept the dictum that the intellectual class which formulates ideas and sets up programmes of ideals gives the real lead to the process of civilisation2 for we shall remember that real ideas are not formed by individuals1 but are the slow work of concrete experience in the so-called inorganic masses1 finding at length utterance through the lips of those appointed to that end by the natural and divine order4 ,yet we shall1 on the other hand1 see that the high things of the world are dependent on the lowly3 that a song-maker is sometimes not less potent than a legislature3 that pecuniary conditions are effective in the sanctuaries of religion and the high places of art3 and that the noblest ideas of great thinkers draw their strength and life through roots that run unseen through very humble ground4 ,la ,raison1 says ,leibniz1 est l'enchainement des vrits4#h ,truth linked into truth1 and so made truer3 truth1 with which all things harmonise and nothing cries dissent3 truth1 which is neither the prerogative of the mere demos1 nor of the intellectual aristocracy1 but of that rarer unity which1 when they can exercise several and mutually-tendered self-abnegation1 is the real spirit of both3 truth1 thus conceived1 is that king of life1 that sun of ,reason which lighteth every man4 ,truth--to use again the language of ,leibniz1--which is not merely the aggregate of monads1--but the monad of monads1 their mutual penetration and corrective completion1 in that ,idea-reality where they retain their individuality1 but retain it in the fullness and fruition of the absolute which each essentially or implicitly is4 ,this kingdom of suffering and yet triumphant truth is the true age of ,reason--not outwardly-critical1 individualistically-reforming1 mere intellectual and abstract intelligence1--but intelligence1 charged with emotion1 full of reverence1 reverent above all to the majesty of that divinity which1 much disguised1 and weather-beaten1 like ,glaucus of the sea1 resides in common and natural humanity4 ,this is the ,reason of ,german idealism at the commencement of the century4 ,to the clear-cut dogmas of the abstract intellect it savours of mysticism4 ,if it is friendly to distinctions and constantly makes them1 it is the pronounced enemy of hard and fast separations4 ,begin where you like1 the reason of things1 if you allow it to work1 carries you round till you also see identity where you only saw difference1 or effects where you only looked for causes4 ,you begin1 as the inductive logician1 with the belief that the process is from the known to the unknown4 ,you start with your basis of fact1 as you called it4 ,the nemesis of things forces you to admit that your facts were partly fictions which waited for the unknown to give them a truer and fuller reality4 ,you talk at first of induction1 as if it were a single and simple process1 which out of facts builds up generalities and uniformities4 ,you learn as you go on that the only induction that operates1 except in cases which have been artificially simplified by supposing half the task done before you apply your experimental methods1 is an induction of which the major part is deductive1 and where your conclusion will be recurrently made your premiss4 ,your induction only works on the basis of a hypothesis1 and must itself be linked in the 'concatenation of truths1'--a concatenation which is also a criticism and a correction4 ,footnote #a3 ',we hold1' says the ,american ,declaration of ,independence 7#aggf71 'these truths to be self-evident2 that all men are created equal3 that they are endowed by their ,creator with certain inalienable rights3 that among these are life1 liberty1 and the pursuit of happiness1' c4 ,footnote #b3 ,louis ,blanc1 ,history of the ,revolution1 vol4 i4 ,footnote #c3 ,hobbes1 ,leviathan1 ,part ,i4 chaps4 #b and #c2 and elsewhere4 ,schopenhauer1 ,welt als ,wille1 ,book ,i4 #f4 ,footnote #d3 ,bacon1 ,novum ,organum1 i4 #aj4 ,footnote #e3 ,see notes and illustrations in vol4 ii4 p4 #djj4 ,footnote #f3 ,see ,chapter ,,xii4 ,footnote #g3 ,cf4 ,ethica1 iv4 #cg1 ,schol4 ,i4 contrasting rerum externarum communis constitutio with ipsa hominis natura1 in se sola considerata4 ,footnote #h3 ,see the ,discours prliminaire to the ,theodicee4 ,,chapter ,,xvi4 ,,the ,,new ,,idealism4 ,this new idealism which conjures by the name of ,reason is a different thing from the pseudo-idealism of ,jacobi1 as it is from the 'rationalism1' so-called1 of the mere intellectualist4 ,its ideal is not a desperate refuge from the hard and bitter reality1 only to be reached by the plunge of faith1--which seems rather the leap of despair3 not a mere other-world1--always other1 longed for1 presaged1 beheld in dreamy vision1 but unperceived by the clear light of intelligence3 clutched at1 but elusive of every effort4 ,it is not won by turning the back on reality and flying on the wings of morning faith to the better land and the presence of the divine3 but by persistence in unfolding1 expanding1 adjusting1 re-combining1 and fortifying those partial glimpses of the unseen which occur in every vision of the seen4 ,it is true the ideal is1 in a way1 always an other world3 but not a mere other world2 it is another1 and yet not another1 but the same1 seen1 if you like to say1 transfigured1 idealised4 ,but idealisation1 if so applied1 means not an addition here and a subtraction there made in reality1 from some source outside--from some indeterminable ,whence 7,whence indeed should such additions come874 ,it does not mean a correction of faults and failures in the real1 at the will of an artist who is dissatisfied with his subject-model and would mend it out of other faces and forms stored up in memory or sketch-book4 ,this idealism does not in that sense idealise 7so as to falsify74 ,it means complete reality2 absolute1 systematic1 unconditioned reality3 nowhere fragmentary1 nowhere referring outside1 but completing itself in all its members4 ,it means--to quote the ,hegelian term--seeing all things in the ,idea--their notion 7or ideality71 i4 e4 their unifying 'grip1' reflecting itself in their objectivity1 and their reality completing itself in art1 religion1 and philosophy to that ideal which to the non-artistic1 non-religious1 non-philosophic mood is only dimly suggested and partially supposed4 ,still less is it an idealism which1 as popularly understood1 turns reality and historic fact into mere ideas4 ,but1 as perhaps may have been apparent1 to call this way of thought idealism need not keep us from acknowledging that the same philosophy is also realism4 ,if it insists1 so to say1 on the idealism of--what we sometimes call material--nature1 it no less insists on the realism of--what is supposed immaterial--mind4 ,the mental or spiritual world loses its unsubstantial intangibleness1 its mere supposedness1 its 'ideal' or merely-ideal character4 ,to the older1 and we may say vulgar1 view the mind or soul was a mere 'thought1' something of which all that could be seen were certain acts or phenomena4 ,it was a mere idea1 which one could pretty well get on without--so long as he kept1 as the phrase was1 to the phenomena--phenomena without reality4 ,how vague and aery again was the subject-matter of morals6 ,a few virtues and vices1 confessedly general descriptive titles1 a talk about will and conscience1--all of them merely several predicates of an unknown1 spoken of1 postulated1 but unproducible4 ,compared with this mere supposedness the spiritual world in ,schelling and ,hegel acquires the reality of a quasi-organism 7really supra-organic71 growing and constituting itself1 and making room in it for a host of human relationships4 ,the abstract faculties of mind get reality 7not indeed sensible73 the intangible notions of morals become almost palpable3 the kingdom of mind becomes a real pendant to the kingdom of nature4 ,and1 on the other hand1 the kingdom of nature gets its ideality recognised3 its unity and continuity made effective in an ,idea which embraces1 co-ordinated and systematised1 its disparate and unconnected portions4 ,this new ,idealism1 if it led men back from the historical world to nature1 was yet hardly in all respects a pupil of ,rousseau4 ,not ',back from civilisation and artificiality to nature and the freedom of the woodland1' was its cry3 but rather ',remember that man always rests on and grows out of nature1 always has his ideals made directly or indirectly visible in physical 7sensible7 structures2 and that1 when culture turns away from sense and nature to some supposed higher1 it is really entering on a path which leads to abysses1' ,its voice1 in fact1 was much like the longing expressed in ,schiller's ,gods of ,greece2 it wished man more godlike and the divine more human4 ,but instead of backward1--its motto was forward3 or back to nature1 only to resume the true starting-point1 and retreat from a path of civilisation whose end is perdition4 ,man also was nature#a--;if he is never mere nature1 i4 e4 the nature unexalted to its truth--but he brought to expression1 and might bring to ever clearer and fuller expression1 a something which was in infra-human nature1 but which nature elsewhere had failed adequately to present4 ,thus the relation of ,man to ,nature was apparently twofold4 ,on one hand1 the physical world was essentially a world of reason and intelligence--though of intelligence petrified#b4 ,so far ,hegel agreed with ,schelling4 ,but1 on the other hand 7and here ,hegel took up the great paradox of ,fichte71 man's place in the universe is to fulfil the promise and implication of ,nature to the full reality of ,spirit1 to fulfil it by law and morality2 but 7here he completes ,fichte by the help of ,schelling7 also in higher measure1 by art1 religion1 and science4 ,the world of intelligence and reason which man constructs as an ethical1 artistic1 and religious being1 is the full truth of the natural world1--the higher meaning1 and fuller1 more consistent1 and complete reality of the sensible3 and it is so1 because the lord of ,nature is one with the lord of the human soul4 ,the new way of philosophy therefore1 if it could be ever charged with saying that the so-called real things of ordinary life were only ideas1 or mental images1 meant that1 as taken by the unthinking or imperfectly thinking perception1 they were something of which all that could be said was to describe their relations to something else1 of which in turn the same remark might be made2 so that--as far as they went--reality was never with us1 but only an assurance 7soon to be proved vain7 that it was next door#c4 ,on the contrary--in its use of the term ,idea--what this idealism asserted rather was that the objects of ,nature in their prima facie apprehension were not yet an ,idea3 if1 i4e41 an ,idea is a mental or spiritual reality which explains and completes itself1 instead of sending us on endless fool's errands elsewhere--1 is a concept which is exactly adequate to reality1 and has gathered in it the power of reality4 ,the new idealism is not subversive of realism1 but includes it and makes it the reality it professed to be4 ,it may therefore1 as ,schelling proposed#d1 be called an ideal-realism1 or a real-idealism4 ,if any body likes1 he may even1 if he is no ,greek scholar1 call it ,monism2 but in that case he had better begin by admitting to himself that any ,monism1 which can stand its ground and serve for an explanation of the universe1 will not exclude ,dualism4 ,all is indeed one life1 one being1 one thought2 but a life1 a being1 a thought1 which only exists as it opposes itself within itself1 sets itself apart from itself1 projects its meaning and relations outwards and upwards1 and yet retains and carries out the power of reuniting itself4 ,the ,absolute may be called ,one3 but it is also the ,all2 it is a ,one which makes and overcomes difference3 it is1 and it essentially is1 in the antithesis of ,nature and ,spirit1 ,object and ,subject1 ,matter and ,mind2 but under and over the antithesis it is fundamental and completed unity4 ,monism1 literally understood1 is absurd--for it ignores1 what cannot be ignored1 the many3 and ,dualism1 which is offered sometimes as a competitive scheme1 is not much better2 unless we understand the ,dualism to be no fixed bisection1 but an ever-appearing and ever-superseded antithesis which is the witness to the power and the freedom of the ,one1--which is not alone1 but ,one and ,all1 ,one in ,all1 and ,all in ,one4 ,the central or cardinal point of ,idealism is its refusal to be kept standing at a fixed disruption between ,subject and ,object1 between ,spirit and ,nature4 ,its ,idea is the identity or unity 7not without the difference7 of both4 ,in its purely logical or epistemological aspect one can easily see that1 as ,schopenhauer was so fond of repeating1 ,there is no ,object without a ,subject and no ,subject without an ,object#e4 ,the difficulty arises in remembering these excellent truisms when one of the correlatives is out of sight1 and the other seems to be independent and to come before us with a title to recognition apparently all its own4 ,when the ,subject figures as the individual consciousness1 encased1 it may perhaps be added1 in an individual body1 and the ,object as a thing apparently out there in a world beyond all by itself1 then the lapse from this rudimentary idealism becomes easy4 ,in the practice of life and business1 each of us1 self-conscious and autonomous subject as he may be1 comes to rank in the estimate of others1 and ere long to some extent in his own1 as also a part of the aggregate of objects4 ,all reality and substance seem as it were to slide over into the object-side4 ,the conscious subject counts as a mere onlooker or the passive spectator of a performance that goes on in an outside field of event1--yet that outside is his own object-mind2 his mind counts as a mere idea1 or rather as a succession of ideas1 i4 e4 of mental pictures with a certain meaning in them4 ,a little step more and the very subject-mind itself is turned into an object4 ,there stands indeed--according to the ordinary introspective psychology--as it were in one corner1 or at one loop-hole of vision1 a mind looking on1 observing and criticising another thing which is also called a mind2 but the mind observing can only reflect or register1 and the mind which is observed is very much thing-like1 apparently acted upon by other things1 and acting upon them in turn4 ,this object-mind1 a real among other reals1 in relations of cause and effect with them1 does not1 if we can trust the words of those who tell about it1 see itself1 but lies open to the inspection of this other mind1 represented by the psychological observer1 who is good enough to report to us something of its blind and dark estate4 ,its re-actions1 he informs us1 exhibit a remarkable peculiarity4 ,they are equivalent to states of consciousness3 and even to acts of will and knowledge4 ,as when a violin is touched in certain ways by the bow1 you get a musical note1 so when certain agents come in contact with this peculiar real1 they elicit a re-action1 termed sense or idea4 ,to distinguish in this manner between mental passivity and activity is natural and right4 ,the basis of all consciousness and mental activity is an original division1 a 'judgment' or dijudication of self from self4 ,but1 once the dijudication made for such ends1 it is a mistake to forget its initiation and lose sight entirely of the fact that the observing mind is also the active1 and that the object-self is not merely in relation to the subject-self1 but in a higher unity is identifiable therewith4 ,still the thing is done1 habitually done4 ,we all profess this faith of ordinary realism in our first reflections upon ourselves4 ,and the effect of the oblivion is that we seek elsewhere for the initial activity1 which we have abstracted from and lost sight of4 ,the receptive passive mind1--called subject still1 but now become a subject in the sense of the anatomist1--has to be set in motion1 to be impinged upon or impressed4 ,the psychical event which you call knowledge1 and which no doubt means knowledge1--the mental 'state' which you observe--or1 it may even1 if your authority is a particularly obstinate and intransigcant realist1 be the molecular change in brain cells1--requires an antecedent event to account for it4 ,the origin of the movement which issued in the given psychical or molecular change is sought in a self-subsistent thing which out there gives rise to a series of movements which in here result in a sensation4 ,or1 a thing somehow produces an attenuated image of itself in the brain1 or in the mind2 for1 in this mythological tale of psychical occurrence1 accuracy is unattainable1 and one must not seek to be too precise4 ,in any case the relationship between thing and idea is conceived after the analogy of the nexus of cause and effect1 or original and copy2 and the verbal imagination of the analogical reasoner is satisfied4 ,what ,hegel1 after ,schelling1 teaches1 on the other side1 is that the process of sense-impression and the manipulations to which it is subjected by intellect presuppose1 for their existence and their objective truth1 a ,reason which is the unity of subject and object1 an original identity uniting knowledge to being4 ,but the same defect of unphilosophic consciousness has another phase which philosophy has to remember4 ,popular language speaks of things1--of things here and things there1 which act upon each other and upon the so-called mind3 i4 e4 on this imagined and supposed passive mind4 ,for things1 a more 'scientific' conception has been substituted--that of forces2 which1 whether attached to atoms or not1 are asserted to be the real sources of the change and event which fill the world of our experience4 ,and as1 according to some psychologists1 the mind is only a vacant ground or space with more or less narrow limits of room1 on which the entities called ideas are for that reason forced into more or less close relationships1 without any nearer or more essential tie2 so1 too1 the mind is apt to be treated by others only as a battle-field or wrestling-ground of opposing forces4 ,here the atom-forces1 as in the other case the atom-ideas1 are1 it is assumed1 merely and purely independent3 and yet such is the force of a limited environment--shall we say1 in more popular language1 the force of space and time8--that they must meet with one another1 must1 as it were1 form associations1 connexions1 relationships4 ,great1 verily1 is the force of juxtaposition4 ,space and time1 because they are essentially limiting1 correlating1 defining1 weld links which the great prophet of this empirical school has not scrupled to call insoluble1 ineradicable1 inseparable4 ,space and time1 says his great successor1 are infinite4 ,but they are infinite only in the sense that they can never be exhausted3 they are everywhere1 and for ever3 but as real they are only here and now4 ,time can precede time1 and space fade away into remoter space3 but every space and every time is finite1 defining1 limiting1 relative1 and synthetic4 ,and1 if we look closer1 space and time may come to seem the visible1 ghostly1 abstract outline--on one hand stiffening and bodying-out the ideal synthesis of thought and intelligence1 on the other1 faintly reproducing or fore-casting the real synthesis of organisation and living nature4 ,in saying this we give the reasonable interpretation of 'association'3--so far at least as association is supposed to be brought about by juxtaposition in time and space4 ,time and space1 as ,kant might say1 give the schema--the sensible and visible reflex of the eternal and universal thought-relation3 they are a priori because they are in the physical world the primitive1 the first phase and the lowest manifestation of that unity which as we know it in nature and mind always blends with sense1 or displays itself in sensible forms4 ,they are the first stamp of reality1 of real ,nature3 with them we are in ,nature1 but it is an abstract shadowy nature4 ,they mark the ascent 7which only from the mere logician's standpoint shall we call the descent7 of the abstract 7pure7 idea into the element of multiplicity1 of opposition1 of life and consciousness4 ,in the psychical and intellectual world1 again1 as it rises to more perfect ideality 7as it elicits more meaning from crude fact7 they lose their prominence2 they sink into the powers of memory and imagination1 which build up past and future into the unity of the ever present1 until in their consummation they leave as their residual product the abstract element of pure thought3 a thought which claims the attributes of universality and eternity1 which claims1 i4 e41 to merge or submerge in it all space and all time#f4 ,it is evident therefore that if an associationist theory1 like that of ,hume1 proposes to explain the actual field of mental life by elements given in it1 and by no other1 it can only do so on certain assumptions1 which may be summed up in the proposition that the mind--the real mental space and time even 7and not its supposed 'image'7--is at once subjective and objective1 at once real and ideal1 at once the field of operation1 the force which directs operations1 and the mind which is aware of itself and its acts4 ,to say1 as ,hume appears to do1 that an unintermittent long-established custom breeds in us certain irresistible and essential habits of thought1 can only refer to an unexplained and unnoticed duplication of the self4 ,there is here1 one self1 which is only a bundle of fragments1 of ideas intrinsically separate and only incidentally connected by outside pressure1 which enter into ties1 peradventure necessary or indissoluble1 though not due to inner affinity4 ,and there is another self which is a self-same unity1 dividing and growing1 or assimilating1 acted upon but only because it solicits action1 and in a way controlling the process going on within it4 ,the difficulty for the investigator is to realise that these two selves are one4 ,no amount of ingenuity will ever succeed in honestly showing unity to be the mere resultant--even should it be a fictitious or phenomenal unity--of the collisions and fortuitous attachments or detachments of different and independent reals4 ,the reals which behave in such a way as to engender unities1 to cause syntheses1 are reals in a mind2 and the mind must not merely1 as it were1 flow around them1 but have them fluid members of itself4 ,if they are reals1 they are ideal-reals4 ,you must begin with an ideal-unity which is also a real-unity1 in which variety can play and by which it is controlled4 ',forces1' no less than 'things1' are terms of thought1 names of reality indeed1 but inadequate because due to an abstraction and leaving their correlatives out of sight--names of momentary elements seized in the flux1 and made with more or less success to indicate 'moments' and 'factors' or 'aspects' in the total sum and power of reality4 ,explanation by permanent and separate forces labours under the same disadvantages as that by things4 ,science1 grown more self-critical1 begins to see that in forces1 c41 it has names and formulae which are not the full reality1 but only useful 7if useful7 abstractions4 ,neither things nor forces1 though called real1 are so in the full sense4 ,hume said1--and said not untruly1 though with some relish of paradox1--that we never had any real impression or idea of power and force4 ,the statement should be taken along with another that what we mistake for power in things is only our own want of power to overcome a suggested association1 or to break a customary train of ideas4 ,lotze1 again1 has remarked that the supposed consciousness of power exerted in voluntary movement is confused with a feeling of work done1 or inertia overcome4 ,whatever may be the truth about the psychological experience1 there can be no doubt for the epistemologist that the so-called perception of force is an interpretation of one aspect of experience which1 with a certain amount of arbitrary arrest and simplification1 renders it intelligible and real by means of an antithesis and correlation4 ,force in fact only exists1 or arises1 in relation or opposition to a counter-force3 action and re-action are always equal and opposite1 says the mathematical formula4 ,two forces are as little independent as an up and a down1 or as a west and a north2 force solicits force1 and force only is in so far as it is solicited4 ,the soliciting can only solicit because it is solicited4 ,in other words1 it is not enough to say that the forces which thus confront each other are correlatives4 ,the relationship must be carried up a stage higher3 the forces themselves get their pseudo-real character1 only so long as they are kept apart forcibly or by inertia4 ,carry out their implications3 and they re-unite 7not however to the loss of all distinction7 in a higher idea1 an intelligible unity which1 by its division and return to unity1 makes possible and real their contention4 ,it is this carrying-out of implications to their explicit truth which is at the root of ,schopenhauer's playing fast and loose with the distinction between force and will4 ,but with him the two terms are taken up vague and indefinite1 in the haze of popular conception or want of conception1 and are without effort or justification identified3 whereas in ,hegel1 there is1 on the lowest estimate1 an attempt made to trace the somewhat intricate steps which mediate the metamorphosis4 ,the new idealism thus maintains the organic and even supra-organic nature of thought and being4 ,the world of experience1 when taken in its reality and fullness1 is an organism which lives and knows and wills1 and which is life1 action1 knowledge2 its own means and its own end4 ,the subject acting1 living1 knowing is action1 knowledge1 life4 ,in the ordinary organism there is a subject of functions1 a being in relation to an inorganic world4 ,in the world-organism 7if the inadequate name is still to be retained7 there is no outside world1 no inorganic or extra-organic thing4 ,in the world-organism the organ and its environment is combined in one1 re-united3 the plant or animal is not without its place1 and its place is not without plant or animal4 ,they are not merely in correlation1 but essentially and actually one4 ,quid prosunt leges sine moribus8 asks the moralist3 but in the ,absolute or the supra-organic ,idea1 law and morality are not apart3 the necessity is also freedom3 the law is not severed from its phenomenon4 ,such an organism which is life1 thinking1 will1 is what ,hegel calls the ,idea3 an organism which is completely organic1 with no mere matter3 and that ,idea is the foundation of his ,idealism4 ,conceived under its conditions1 the forces which are sometimes represented as struggling with each other on the field of man's life1 are no longer independent2 still less completely separable forces4 ,they are the inner division by which the spirit re-establishes and makes secure its unity3 their antagonisms are the breath of life4 ,and they have their relations in their common service1 building up one life4 ,they form a certain hierarchy of organisation2 in which however the higher or more developed does not merely supervene upon the cruder1 but in a way supersedes it1 and yet contrives to retain its worth and its real truth4 ,footnote #a3 ,cf4 ,spinoza's remark on ,body1 ,eth4 ,,iii4 pr4 #b ,schol43 ',etenim quod corpus possit1 nemo hucusque determinavit2 hoc est neminem hucusque experientia docuit quid corpus ex solis legibus naturae quatenus corporea tantum consideratur possit agere1' c4 ,footnote #b3 ,see vol4 ii1 notes and illustrations1 p4 #cib4 ,footnote #c3 ,schopenhauers well-known description of this recurrent throwing back of the responsibility of reality on something else is here suggested 7',world as ,will and ,idea1' #ag74 ,footnote #d3 ,see p4 #aeg 7chap4 xiii74 ,footnote #e3 ,satz vom ,grunde1 #af3 ,welt als ,wille und ,vorstellung3 ,ergnzungen4 ,cap4 i4 ,footnote #f3 ,see later1 chapter xxvi4 ,,chapter ,,xvii4 ,,methods1 ,,artificial ,,and ,,natural4 ,when modern philosophy took its first steps1 it was disdainful and depreciatory to the past1 both ,medieval and ,old-,greek4 ,bacon and ,hobbes1 ,descartes and ,spinoza1--be their other differences what they may--all echo the same disparagement4 ,like ,wordsworth's ,rob ,roy1 they cry-- ',what need of books8 ,burn all the statutes and their shelves4 ,we'll show that we can help to frame ,a world of other stuff4' ,on this iconoclastic age supervenes the attempt of ,leibniz to combine in one all that was good in the new corpuscular philosophy with all that was precious in the old ,platonic idealism as expanded by ,aristotle4 ,so1 at the later philosophic crisis towards the close of the eighteenth century1 the somewhat destructive and revolutionary tendencies of ,kant and ,fichte lead up by a natural revulsion and complement to the reconstructive systems of ,schelling and ,hegel4 ,in them the conservative instinct comes to supplement the defects of the radical go-ahead4 ,instead of tossing the past away to the winds1 and crying out crasez l'infme1--instead of throwing medievalism behind1 breaking all the restrictions on individual liberty which feudal ,europe had created to secure and safeguard the communities that housed its early freedom1 the new spirit of the time saw that the problems of modern life were not solved by merely throwing overboard as encumbrances and refuse all checks and forms4 ,on the contrary1 the reflective mind saw that forms and checks so-called there must be1 and that the art of statesmanship1 though it could not entirely consist in copying the old1 had still to work in some way after the analogy of the old methods3 i4 e4 to do under new circumstances what would solve the same requisites1 as the old constitution had done for its time4 ,the change is well illustrated by the attitude towards state organisation shown by ,william von ,humboldt at different epochs of his life4 ,people talk glibly of the ,historical ,method1 and what it has done for us4 ,to hear what is sometimes said it might be supposed that this was the method that had been always habitual in history1 but which in these latter days had been applied to other topics1 and had proved its value on the new ground by achieving results that had hitherto been mere desiderata4 ,this however is pretty nearly to reverse the true state of the case4 ,it was long till history came to have any method worthy of the name4 ,in most of those who figure as great historians the object had been to tell a good tale1 to keep the thread of events distinct1 to subordinate incidents to the main issue1 to portray personal and public character and its influence on events4 ,history was practised--we may even say--more as an art than as a science4 ,if it dealt with causes1 it dealt with individual1 concrete1 living causes1 not with cold1 dead abstractions of forces1 laws1 or tendencies4 ,if it did not altogether ignore the suggestions of a quest for principles to be found in ,thucydides and ,polybius1 it was much more enamoured of the art of ,livy and ,tacitus1 or even of the navet of ,herodotus4 ,of such history who has not felt the power2 who has not admired the genius that reconstructs the men and circumstances of the past1 and makes them live over again their deeds1 and again in the end yield the palm to inevitable fate6 ,but it was not from such history that the historical method arose4 ,the historical method was the product of the new conception of nature and mind in their mutual relations which has been already noted4 ,to estimate the labours of thinkers towards this view of history would be an interesting but complex inquiry4 ,leibniz in particular by his principles of development1 of continuity1 of general analogy1 should have made two things for ever clear4 ,and these two results that might have been supposed secure were1 first1 that the present existence 7which at first seems to be alone real7 is only a narrow transition line between a past and a future1--a line of points intersecting a complex movement or development2 and secondly1 that all development is of something which is essentially infinite1 which requires nothing external1 no fillip from circumstances or from an external providence1 to set it going1 but is in itself a synthesis of active and passive force in a something at least analogous to an ,ego4 ,the first principle is embalmed in ,leibniz's maxim3 ',the present is laden with the past1 and full of the future'3 and the second1 in the maxim 'the ,monads have no doors or windows4' ,in virtue of the first1 the existent 7of this instant7 is only a stage or grade1 rooted in what has been1 and insignificant unless in reference to what is to come4 ,in virtue of the second1 all development is from within1 and presupposes therefore that the developing individual includes within it a great deal which a cursory view would at first sight assume to be without it1 and only accidentally in contact with it4 ,it might indeed be well to add a third principle--what ,leibniz has sometimes called the ,law of ,continuity--the law that1 as he says1 distinct and noticeable perceptions are the resultants of an infinite number of insensible or little perceptions4 ,but continuity proper is not this3 continuity proper or identity is a pure idea4 ,the visible or sensible discontinuity reposes on1 and is to be explained by1 an invisible or ideal continuity4 ,each body1 for instance1 in nature1 appearing to have a separate existence of its own1 is only a stage isolated or insulated in a continuing process3 and that process1 binding1 as it does1 past to future1 is the process of a ,mind4 ,omne ,corpus1 wrote ,leibniz in #afga1 est mens momentanea seu carens recordatione4 ,every physical and material object is an intelligence1 but an intelligence which neither looks before nor after1 but is limited for itself to the mere instant3 an intelligence which has no history4 ,yet to the intelligent observer it has a past1--it has a memory1 it bears in it the traces of its antecedent4 ,yet to read that book of memory1 to decipher the 'insensible perceptions' which are buried beneath the momentary present1 beneath its unspiritual reality1 and to knit present with past and future1 is the work of an intelligence1 in and to whom the material discloses its store of meaning1 or in whom it is re-spiritualised4 ,in other words1 the presupposition of this historical method is the ideal continuity of being1 transcending and absorbing the differences of time4 ,but the teaching of ,leibniz--even more perhaps than that of ,spinoza--fell on an evil age3 if it was not actually choked with thorns1 it found a soil with little depth1 and its brief verdure was soon followed by a fearful withering4 ,anxious as ,leibniz was to commend his theories to all men1--and not least perhaps to win the suffrages of some illustrious and intelligent women--he was led to present them under forms and phrases which were to each correspondent specially familiar4 ,and the natural consequence was not absent4 ,the forms of accommodation were what told3 they stuck1 and the truth they were meant to convey slipped away3 the ,leibnitian theory was re-interpreted into the doctrines it had been meant to supersede4 ,as with ,spinoza1 so with ,leibniz1 a keen apprehension of his meaning came first to the thinkers on the borderland of literature and philosophy1 to ,lessing and ,herder1 and found an appreciative welcome in the more academic systems first from ,schelling and ,hegel4 ,above all1 this theory of 'petites perceptions' so closely bound up 7as was to be expected7 with his mathematical discoveries in the ,calculus1 is what marks him as having a finer ear for the secret harmonies and principles of existence than the coarser organs of popular philosophy could catch up or appreciate4 ',in order1' says ,leibniz1 'to get a clearer idea of the little perceptions which we cannot distinguish in the crowd1 ,i am accustomed to employ the example of the roar or noise of the sea which strikes us upon the shore4 ,to hear this sound1 as we do hear it1 we must hear the parts which compose this total1 i4 e4 the sounds of each wave1 though each of these little sounds only makes itself perceptible in the confused assemblage of all the others together1 7that is to say1 in that same roar17 and would not be noticed if this wave which causes it were alone4 ,for we must be a little affected by the movement of that wave1 and we must have some perception of each of these sounds1 however small they may be2 otherwise we should never have the perception of a hundred thousand waves1 since a hundred thousand zeros would never make anything4444 ,these little perceptions are of greater efficiency by their consequences than we suppose4 ,it is they which form that ,je ne sais quoi1 those tastes1 those images of sensible qualities1 clear in the assemblage1 but confused in the parts2 those impressions made upon us by surrounding bodies which envelop the infinite1 that nexus which each being has with all the rest of the universe4 ,it may even be said that in virtue of these little perceptions the present is big with the future and laden with the past1 that everything conspires together3 and that in the least of substances1 eyes as piercing as those of ,god could read the whole sequel of the things of the universe4 ',these insensible perceptions1 further1 mark and constitute the same individual1 who is characterised by the traces or expressions which they preserve of the preceding states of that individual1 thus forming the connexion with his present state4 ,these may be known by a superior spirit1 though that individual himself should not feel them1 i4 e4 though express memory should no longer be there4 ,but these perceptions also supply the means of rediscovering that memory1 at need1 by periodic developments1 which may one day happen4444 ,it is also by these insensible perceptions that ,i explain that admirable pre-established harmony of mind and body1 and even of all monads or simple substances1--which takes the place of the impossible influence of one upon another4444 ,after this1 ,i should add but little if ,i said that it is these small perceptions which determine us in many conjunctures without our thinking of it1 and which deceive the vulgar by the appearance of an indifference of equilibrium1 as if we were entirely indifferent whether we turned1 e4 g41 to right or to left4 ',i have remarked also that in virtue of insensible variations two individual things could never be perfectly alike1 and that they ought always to differ more than numero4 ,and with this we have done once for all with the empty tablets of the mind1 a soul without thought1 a substance without action1 the void of space1 the atoms1 and even parcels not actually divided in matter2 we have done with pure repose1 entire uniformity in a portion of time1 of place or of matter1444 and a thousand other fictions of philosophers which come from their incomplete notions1 fictions which the nature of things does not suffer1 and which our ignorance and the little attention we have for the insensible lets pass1 but which could never be rendered tolerable1 unless we confine them to abstractions of the mind which protests that it does not deny what it puts aside and considers out of place in any present consideration4 ,otherwise1 if we took it quite in earnest1 to mean that things which we do not perceive do not exist in the soul or body1 we should fail in philosophy as in politics by neglecting 1 insensible steps of progress3--whereas an abstraction is not an error provided we know that what we put out of sight is still there4' ,this was the conception which ,bacon had shadowed out1 which ,leibniz had presented under many names and with many applications1 as the olive-branch between ,plato and ,democritus2 it now became through philosophical and extra-philosophic acceptance a current maxim in the general field of knowledge4 ,nature assimilated to history1 and history assimilated to nature3 freedom built upon necessity1 and efficient causes rounded off1 though not entirely merged1 in final4 ,it is the recognition of law1 order1 causality in the psychical world1 yet not of mere so-called natural law2 and therefore without reducing it to a merely physical and material world4 ,it is in fact the new method which is inevitable and necessary1 as soon as it is manifest that life1 organisation1 development is the underlying truth and central notion of things4 ,you look at the world at first1 let us say1 as a mere collection of separate things in varying degrees of juxtaposition3 and all that you think of doing to them1 either by way of theory or practice1 is to put them together1 to link them closer1 or separate them more widely4 ,you do so from outside by an arranging force2 for they are assumed to be purely passive1 waiting to be touched1 each set in its place--from which it can only be moved by a push or a pull4 ,this is the method of mathematics or mechanics4 ,it shows the dexterity of the agent or of the expositor3 but you feel that it is artificial1 and arbitrary4 ,it is analytic or synthetic--but not auto-analysis or auto-synthesis4 ,the director of the movement 7we may call it 'construction'7 may no doubt have the real secret3 he may work the things well and fairly1 and unite or divide them according to inner affinities2 but we cannot1 as matters stand1 be sure of this4 ,the things1 in fact1 he deals with have been already emptied of all life and peculiarity of their own3 they are alike in quality1 only differing by a more or less1--a difference which at any moment may be altered by an act of subtraction or addition4 ,no doubt you can build up what are called systems--compounds of a kind--in this way3 but they do not really hang and grow together2 they are only prevented from breaking up by the absence of any empty place to which the parts may withdraw4 ,bit holds up bit2 but how all the bits have found themselves so caged up without exit is a mystery4 ,absolute neutrality or indifference of each part to others1 and yet absolute equilibrium#a in the total composite1--such is the situation4 ,the chemical method 7taking chemistry as a type of the sciences like optics1 electricity1 c47 is a revelation of a different state of affairs4 ,the elements of things are here seen to be unique and incomparable2 yet in each there is a latent sympathy ready to break out when the proper occasion arrives4 ,bring two things together1 and their affinity suddenly1 in the proper circumstances1 leads to their complete fusion3 a product arises which1 when formed1 hardly betrays its origin and composition4 ,in a way this is the converse of the mechanical or mathematical method4 ,in it was no fusion1 no inner mixture3 each part after composition lay beside the other1 and their union was only in the ideas of the onlooker4 ,it was mere juxtaposition still1--though now closer3 an abnormally keen eye would still have been able to descry the dividing lines and measure the gaps4 ,at least mere mechanical physics tends so to conceive it4 ,here1 on the contrary1 there is union--but only at the moment of fusion3 once that is accomplished1 the result is apparently simple1 and bears no suggestion of being a compound4 ,in the mechanical union the result is exactly equal to the sum of the elements which go to make it3 in the chemical there is something positively new1 something1 i4 e41 of which the premises gave no indication and made no promise4 ,either of these methods1--of these conceptions of existence--works well in a certain region4 ,but both of them only do their work on a certain hypothesis1 or with a certain abstraction4 ,the mechanical method supposes that objects are all qualitatively alike1 differing only in quantity or weight3 all therefore entirely comparable with each other1 and capable of being substituted for each other in an equation4 ,where this assumption holds good1 the method of addition and division1 the method of the calculus does its work#b4 ,the chemical method works on another assumption1--the assumption of a number of qualitatively-differenced elements1 of elements which also are1 so to speak1 set on edge against some1 and ready to leap into the arms of others4 ,if the observer in the first case had the game entirely in his own hand1--could build up and separate at his pleasure1 could determine results a priori3 he is here baffled by the unexpected1 and can only wait and watch to learn a posteriori the behaviour of the bodies possessed of this occult and non-predictable affinity4 ,at the best he can only formulate what he observes1 try to classify it1 ascertain any common principles running through it1 any serial recurrences1 or the like3 and that is all that chemical philosophy can achieve4 ,chemical affinity--the fact that certain elements combine in certain ways1 and refuse to enter into certain alliances--is a great fact3 but to a priori reasoning or abstract syllogising it is an entire inexplicability1 one of the accidents in the universe which must be reckoned with1 but cannot be understood4 ,it is probably evident that1 if we want to get a comprehension of the life and concrete reality of things1 neither of these methods will quite answer the purpose4 ,with the first alone1 if it could be universally carried out1 the universe would be thoroughly explained3 everything would be exactly equivalent to some sum or multiple of every other3 there would be no mystery1 nothing unique1 and strictly individual4 ,given time1 we could find a formula for every reality1 and a predicate exactly fitted to any subject4 ,yet even mathematics has to confess the existence of irrationals1 surds1 infinite series1 and the like4 ,for our unities and standards are always arbitrary1 artificial1 and one-sided1 and fall short of the subtlety of nature4 ,even our simpler types of surfaces--the circle and the square--remain irreducible to each other3 and we only avoid the collision by the remark that practically and with any required amount of exactness the discrepancy between the two can be adjusted4 ,if we turn to the chemical method1 again1 there is a nearer approach to actuality in the recognition of the presence of something more than mere composition and juxtaposition4 ,it is not that there is something which is not juxtaposition3 but rather it is much more than mere juxtaposition4 ,there may be degrees of this something more3 but it is only to a gross or abstract view that it is not present at all4 ,mere cohesion even shows a unity in things juxta-posed4 ,mere contact is contagious3 it infects4 ',when a violin has been played on frequently by a tyro1' says ,g4 ,h4 ,lewes1 'its tone deteriorates1 its molecules become re-arranged1 so that one mode of vibration is more ready than another#c4' ',toute impression1' he quotes from ,delboeuf1 'laisse une certaine trace ineffaable4' ,so-called chemical composition is only a conspicuous instance1 with peculiarities1 of this alteration in state produced by what1 from the mechanical standpoint1 are called inner molecular displacements4 ,but to recognise a fact is one thing3 to give its explanation is another4 ,yet1 on the other hand1 to recognise the fact is to note an important point which had been omitted by the mechanical construction of things4 ,there the result could hardly be called new3 it was exactly equal to its constituent elements3 and the equation was transparent4 ,and it was transparent because the whole process1 analysis and synthesis1 was not a work or process of the observed thing1 but the work of the observing mind3 it makes the 7artificial7 unities1 numbers them1 and adds them or subtracts4 ,but with the chemical result1 though it also is equal to its elements1 there is something new4 ,water1 no doubt1 is oxygen and hydrogen1 but here1 at least1 there is no doubt that the plus sign unduly simplifies the relationship1 and rather indicates or represents a nexus than accurately defines it4 ,and yet1 there is nothing in water which was not1 in some--shall we say mysterious8--way1 in the oxygen and the hydrogen4 ,chemical physics1 therefore1 brings out clearly1 or comparatively clearly1 something which the ordinary and coarser simplicity-loving theory is obliged and is able to neglect3 it realises the virtue that lies in juxtaposition1 and shows that the mere outer change of quantity goes with a deeper inward and qualitative one4 ,the result does more than sum up and condense what was spread out in extension and dispersed in parts before3 it brings out or reveals something which previously was unsurmised4 ,always1 in a liberal interpretation of the maxim1 it is true that ,ex nihilo nihil fit3 but here1 especially1 the effect actually discloses what was--but was latent or unperceived--in the premises4 ,the maxim1 to be fairly treated1 must be read backwards as well as forwards4 ,but we must go a step further if we wish the full explanation4 ,if the premises are to be adequate to support the conclusion1 they must be restated in terms which hint at the conclusion--which in a way contain it1 but contain it in potentiality and promise1 not in act4 ,this is the method of development1 which is the method that is applicable to full concrete reality1 not like the others to parts abstracted from or insulated in reality4 ,so long as you deal with these selected bits of fact--abstracted from their surroundings1 subject to strict observation or strict experiment1 you can apply a comparatively simple and straightforward method4 ,you are dealing with abstracted1 mutilated1 prepared fact4 ,you are guided in these cases by the canons of identity and difference3 you add and subtract1 or subtract and add2 and that is all4 ,you use what are called the rules of experimental method4 ,but these canons do not directly apply--except by happy accident--to the real world1 where antecedent and consequents are not separate and tabulated1 as the logical canons1 the rules of formal logic1 require4 ,in dealing with this concrete reality1 a much more complex method is needed1 a method which has to blend induction with deduction1 and to start from both ends in the series of causation at once4 ,you can apply observation or experiment1 only when the issues have already been extremely simplified and narrowed down3 when the question has been rendered so definite that it is next-door to the answer1 and the removal of a slight partition-wall will as it were make the two one clear space4 ,where observation and experiment are available1 indeed1 is where the general outlines and principles of the subject are settled1 where the scheme of reality is defined in large1 but a variety of minor issues still remains to be settled4 ,unless this general framework is fixed1 neither observation nor experiment1 with their canon of identity and difference1 are of any avail4 ,these methods1 therefore1 only apply in sciences which are in principle or substantially complete1 though admitting of possibly infinite extension in details and particulars4 ,where the science is yet to constitute1 i4 e4 in dealing with the kinds of real things in their completeness1 and not as viewed in some definite aspect1 induction and deduction must go hand in hand and help each other at every step3 and if they1 as they must1 have recourse to experiment and observation1 it will be at first in a very unsatisfactory and tentative way4 ,such is the way the contrast between the simplicity belonging to an artificial method dealing with picked instances1 and the complexity that real concrete organic nature demands1 presented itself to ,j4 ,s4 ,mill as he advanced in his inquiry4 ,the only complete method for the investigation of unsophisticated nature1 not yet mapped out and defined in general departments1 is the deductive-inductive method in which induction and deduction separately have a subordinate place1--using induction in the narrow sense the term has been hitherto allowed to bear4 ,and that sense1 it may be added1 is1 as in some passages of ,aristotle1 little else than a reverse of syllogism1 or to speak more accurately1 it is a syllogism which goes up to generals instead of descending from them4 ,it is like the syllogistic deduction formal and abstract in character4 ,the 7deductive7 syllogism assumes the existence of major premises--of general propositions which in the last resort1 if they are real bases1 must be primary and true1 or self-evident facts4 ,but a critic1 like ,mill1 had little difficulty in showing that a general truth rests upon and presupposes the very particular conclusions which it is used to establish4 ,unless every singular is true1 the universal which embraces or unifies them cannot really be true4 ,therefore the conclusion is really implied and presupposed in the principles of its premises4 ,but1 unfortunately for the application and supposed sequel of this not unjust remark1 a similar remark may be made on the ordinary exposition of the inductive method4 ,induction1 it is said1 infers from or on a basis of single facts4 ,but if a single truth is really1 i4 e4 unconditionally true1 it is indistinguishable from the universal4 ,if it is really true once1 it is true for ever4 ,the assertion of the individual proposition as true1 if it can be supported--7and unless it be true1 what basis can it afford for the general conclusion87--implies the truth of the universal it is sometimes used to establish4 ,the inductive logician tells us to build on singular and definite facts1 on truths of definite and individual experience3 but a definite or determinate truth rests upon universality 7indeed is a universal71 and cannot be found unless we have already found the special total or organism of truth in which it forms a part4 ,individuals and universals presuppose each other1 and do not1 as the first impression leads us to think1 stand apart as two unconnected termini1 from either of which1 if we happen to be so located1 we can without road or railway make a legitimate passage to the other4 ,if it be urged1 as it may naturally be1 that on this showing there is no solid or 'absolute' starting-point at all1 the contention may be conceded4 ,the only fixed and steady points in knowledge are points hypothetically fixed1--certified1 that is1 for the time and in the circumstances we employ them4 ,but in the open field--or rather in the wilderness--of knowledge1 where the ground of fact is not staked off1 and the unexpected may always turn up1 the only test of truth is the corroboration given by the consilience of paths initiated from different points3 it is only by an undesigned coincidence in the results of independent operations that you can succeed in orienting yourself4 ,you begin your road at two ends1 and you meet3 you locate or fix your point by drawing its co-ordinates to two direction-lines taken anyhow at first1 and only in formed science diverging at a fixed angle4 ,and in the absolute your direction-lines cannot be supposed fixed3 you can only gradually adjust them to each other as you proceed4 ,intelligence1 says ,aristotle1 is a principle1 a beginning2 and intelligence1 he says again1 supplies beginnings#d4 ,science1 in the technical sense1 only comes into operation1--or1 in other words1 deduction and 7in the narrower sense used by ,mill1 and proceeding by pure observation and experiment7 induction only find a way1--where beginnings and principles have been set up1 where an approximate order or provisional system has been established4 ,and if logic1 in its stricter sense1 is the method of sciences already made and in their essentials constituted1 then logic can be asked to do no more than to provide a theory of such formal processes4 ,if it traces the path which leads 'from the known to the unknown1' if it always proceeds on the hypothesis of a given knowledge1 then such induction or deduction 7from certain and approved singular facts1 or from certain and approved general truths7 fully satisfies the practical need of the scientific reasoner4 ,but if ,logic be1 as it sometimes is1 and may very reasonably be1 taken in the wider sense of an epistemology1--a theory of the nature and origin of knowledge as a whole1 and not of mere inference or syllogism2--if it does not merely ask how we can satisfactorily get from one piece of knowledge 7we are supposed to have7 to another 7not yet supposed to be71 but how we come to have knowledge at all2 then its problem must go behind the rudiments of vulgar induction and deduction4 ,it must ask--what1 so far as one can see1 ,mill and his mere followers have never seriously asked at all--what induction is1 what are its relations with deduction1 and what is the place of either in the process of knowledge4 ,and as the process of knowledge is the path to reality1 it must also ask about the nature of this goal1--reality and truth4 ,it is all very well for the narrower ,logic to formulate in terms the methods actually employed in sciences3 to state in abstract canons what is there seen in life and action4 ,but a ,science of ,logic--an epistemology--7and a genuine epistemology cannot claim to be anything short of an ontology7 must face the fact of science itself--must ask how the ideas of the knower must--or otherwise they are not knowledge--embrace and contain the reality of the known4 ,the other and narrower ,logic is and will remain a theory of forms of reasoning-a transcript in fainter terms of the procedure of science in any given step it takes upward to generals or downward to particulars3 but the logic which deals with knowledge as such1 in its systematic entirety1--the transcendental ,logic1 in short1 must have a real value1 an invincible relation to reality4 ,the formal ,logic--the logic of ,mill and ,hamilton--must be carried back to its principles1 to its first step3 and that first step which will also be the last step1 and the inspiring principle of every intermediate step1 is that of ,intelligence 7,aristotle's 71 of which the products or manifestations are 1 i4 e4 definite conceptions1 categories1 formulations of rules and principles of definite range1--determinations or special types of unity4 ,mill really faced the problem of method to better effect when he came to deal with a class of questions in which he was really interested1 and which moreover have for epistemological purposes the advantage of being as yet unreduced into the rank and file of disciplined science4 ,these questions are those dealing with man1 his mental and moral nature1 and history4 ,even its advocates or patrons occasionally admit that there is no accepted idea of what ,sociology is or does4 ,its name at least expresses a longing towards a unity1 or a presentiment that there is some underlying unity and common method in the group of what are loosely called the moral1 or the historical1 or the social and political sciences4 ,but sociology is1 as most people will allow1 the name of a science unrealised--the felt and consciously-apprehended need of a science1 and the dissatisfaction with the existing state of knowledge in certain departments4 ,and undoubtedly it was with problems of social science1--problems of politico-economic and socio-ethical or socio-religious matters1 that ,mill's interests were mainly engaged4 ,like his master in this department1 ,auguste ,comte1 he wanted to carry into the topics which he was chiefly bent upon that 'scientific' precision which they by pretty general admission lacked1 and which revolutionary movements had shown they greatly needed4 ,but he could not help seeing that the 'induction' of dynamics and physics was not exactly the instrument he was in search of4 ,theory and hypothesis here demanded a much larger share in the process than in the more mathematical sciences4 ,causes and effects in reality here rolled round into each other1 instead of remaining calmly fixed1 one set here1 and the other there4 ,of course even here--i4 e4 in organic and concrete sciences--it is possible to introduce observation and experiment1--no doubt1 with greater effort and constraint1 but still not altogether impracticable4 ,but the artificial and mutilative character of such experimentation is felt here in a way different from its pressure in other cases4 ,and what is more important1 to institute an experiment or set on foot a scientific observation 7and to observe means to watch a definitely restricted natural process with a view to answer some question about it71 presupposes--as we have already seen--a tolerably definite provisional theory as to the general lie of the country to be investigated4 ,only when the country has been reasonably well mapped out in provinces and provided with some system of roads1 can these problems of detail--questions to be answered ,yes or ,no--be profitably put4 ,and it is--in some parts of the historical sciences at least--somewhat premature to put questions requiring a categorical reply4 ,there is only the vague malaise of felt difficulty to guide us4 ,we do not1 in many cases1 know what it is that we want to know2 for1 it demands a good deal of wisdom and trained art to put the proper or reasonable question1--so much so1 indeed1 that to succeed in formulating your question fully is equivalent or nearly equivalent to being able to answer it4 ,the value of observations and experiments--which are ways of putting nature to the question and it may be to the torture--depends entirely upon the knowledge and the command of general ideas possessed by the observer and experimenter4 ,and the same may be said of the reduced and tabulated conspectuses of the results of many observations and experiments which are called ,statistics4 ,their value depends on the truth and breadth of view which presided at their collection and arrangement#e4 ,the historical or genetic method is the method of ,science in general1 but considered and employed under a limited aspect4 ,and under its more comprehensive aspect it may be called--though no name is unimpeachable--the method of development4 ,now the essence of the idea of development--as was clearly shown by ,leibniz--is the refusal to admit external interference1 and the resolve to let a thing explain itself by itself4 ,it does not1 like the mechanical method1 manipulate the thing from outside--try to add it up out of factors or items fashioned and fabricated after some external standard4 ,nor does it1 like the chemical1 look at the result as an inexplicable alteration1 due apparently to a mere stroke of combination or disintegration--yet not obviously reducible to a mere equivalent of its elements4 ,on the contrary1 it recognises in the object a certain independence or originality1 yet also the presence of an immanent law which does not wait for the outsider to put it together1 but constructs itself1 as it were1 after a plan of its own4 ,there is in the so-called object1 though we do not at first sight recognise it1 the same originative principle both analytic and synthetic1 as we own in thought4 ,the object is--in a true logic--a process1 a self-completing process1 and not merely an object1 mechanical1 or other object4 ,it changes1 grows or decays1 while we observe1 unless for brief instants we cut it off from its connexions and arrest its development4 ,and our observation1 if truly scientific1 must be sympathetic with its process of change4 ,it is neither a mere thing to be explained and construed ab extra3 nor a mystery of sudden transformation to be passively accepted2 but a growth1 a history1 to be sympathetically watched and understood1--understood1 because it follows the same order as the movement of our own thought in the process of knowledge4 ,similia similibus cognoscuntur#f4 ,one sometimes hears it asked by paradoxical critics at which end a history should begin4 ,and to ordinary dogmatic recklessness1 paradoxical the question may well seem4 ,begin at the beginning1 no doubt1 is the vulgar reply2 which in this case is understood to mean from the earliest point in date 7that1 of course1 being easily ascertained1 and a thing known to all men74 ,but1--so ,plato long ago well raised the difficulty which will always confront us1--are we to go from the beginnings1 or towards the beginnings8 ,and it does not quite solve the question to say that we are to begin with what is known3 for under that word the same difficulty re-appears4 ,can you really know one end without the other8 ,to the vulgar partisan of historical method1 its precept means ,go to the earlier1 if you wish to understand the meaning1 the value1 and the elements constitutive of the later and subsequent4 ,begin with origins1 with the earliest elements1 the phases that first appear2 and thus you will get light to see the later as they really stand4 ,that this is a common interpretation of the historical method is notorious4 ,to explain ,homo sapiens1 one is told to study the ape1--the nearest analogue of his lost or missing progenitor3 to understand the contemporary horse1 go to eohippus1 or hipparion1 or however his early prototype may be at present named and recognised4 ,and in all this there is a truth--or least a half-truth4 ,but let us equally recognise the other half of the truth4 ,if past throws light on present1 present throws not less light on past4 ,you propose1 let us say1 to write a history of ,greece4 ,a wordy philosophy1 wise in its own conceit and in fine phrases1 will advise you to approach the subject without prepossession or prejudice4 ,so far1 good4 ,but what is meant by the absence of prepossession or prejudice8 ,not a blank openness to impression1 not a mere passivity2 but if passivity at all1 a wise passivity3 if openness1 the openness of the trained judge4 ,the advice1 so often associated with ,francis ,bacon1 to get rid of all false pre-conceptions1 of all idola1 is one which it is easy to mistake in an over-zeal to follow it4 ,that mere negation of prejudices which we call childish innocence is no match for the craft by which ,nature seeks to keep or disguise her secrets4 ,the free consciousness1 the unbiassed mind1 is not the easy result of one great act of renunciation1 but the work of continued self-discipline1 self-conquest1 self-realisation4 ,if you are not to impose upon the thing a pre-conception alien to it1 neither must you rashly give yourself away to the thing1 or to the first whims which accident puts upon you as the thing4 ,what seems a fact or thing is only a candidate for the post of thing or fact3 and its credentials need to be examined1 and compared with other evidences4 ,to detect a fact1 therefore1 is only possible for a tried and tested consciousness which by patience and self-mastery has won the key of interpretation4 ,what ,bacon apparently meant--though1 as often happens1 in his eagerness to combat a prevailing folly1 he sometimes overshot himself in statement--was to insist on the eternal wedlock of the mind and things1 of things and the mind1 as the sole and sufficient condition for the reality of knowledge and truth4 ,the mind may not presume to do without things1 or things to domineer the mind2--or the result is a windy and frothy vanity4 ,and the wedlock is eternal3 in his own eloquent words1 'the mind itself is but an accident to knowledge#g1' and he might have added1 so also are things3 for1 as he says1 'the truth of being and the truth of knowing is all one'3 only in the bond of knowledge are things true and real1--being otherwise only 'permanent possibilities1' or possibilities barely even permanent--or not even possibilities4 ,yet he scarcely realised that his 'due rejections and exclusions' and negations were a fundamental constitutive element in those facts of which he habitually emphasises only the positive side4 ,he therefore who would understand--or would write--the history of ,greece must really in his studies begin at both ends--both at the ,greece of to-day1 and at the ,greece of ,solon1 or what earlier period may be taken as the start of ,greek history4 ,with perhaps the least qualified dogmatism1 one may assert that he will begin with the ,greece of to-day2 or if he deals solely with ,ancient ,greece he will begin with the full blaze of ,hellenic civilisation which still has a pale reflection in the modern world1 and gradually work back to the beginnings4 ,it is no doubt customary to begin ,greek history1 say1 with the ,homeric ,age1 and work downwards1 as it is customary to begin a formal treatise on geography with the general features of the earth's shape and surface4 ,but that beginning represents really the temporarily accredited and accepted result of a process which1 starting from the other end1 has worked backwards to commencements or origins4 ,and the teacher1 in particular1 will do well not to imitate too slavishly the method of the formal treatise4 ,a day may come--or may have come--for example1 for ,greek history to start from periods long anterior to the supposed or traditional date of the wars around the wall of ,troy4 ,but when it does so1 it will have done so by more thoroughly ransacking the ,greece of to-day3 and so disclosing the secrets of what is termed pre-historic ,greece4 ,then1 conversely1 when modern diggings on ,greek soil reveal the features of an earlier than what was erewhile to older historians its earliest past1 the reconstruction of that early people's life reflects a new light on the directions and the limitations of its subsequent civilisation4 ,we see better into the reality of ,homer1 and even of ,demosthenes--into their ideal glory and their historical limitations1 when we explore the cradle in which their race's life was erst fostered1 and the rock out of which they and nature hewed them4 ,and this is no peculiarity of ,greece4 ,the deepest research into the social institutions which control the ,england of to-day is the best propaedeutic for the study of ,anglo-,saxon times2 and the same is true vice versa4 ,nor1 again1 is the truth of the proposition confined to what we ordinarily mean by history4 ,the ,greek poet has said ',art had to wait on and welcome chance1 and chance to wait on ,art'3 or as we may paraphrase it1 if every invention and discovery is in a measure a lucky chance1 it is a luck that only falls to the wisely prepared head and hand4 ,the casual event falls as a germ of new construction or theory only on an intelligence ready to welcome it1--prepared with its complement in the spirit of an idea1 eager to take shape4 ,the means again1 in the arts and crafts1 is not only a means to something else2 it is also a means to its own end1 to realise or perfect itself4 ,the rude tool of the savage1 for instance1 is not merely a means to supply his wants3 it is also a means towards completing and improving itself1 and towards perfecting itself by constructing an ampler tool1 which supersedes it1 because it can do all and more than all the work of the earlier1 or can do it more economically4 ,all progress that deserves the name is an incessant and continuous revision of a first step3 a re-adaptation of an old instrument3 a repeated and unending self-correction4 ,it is only a partially-true symbol of human advance to speak of it as a line3 unless we add1 by another piece of symbolism1 that the line is only the protracted or extended phase in which the form of time drags out for us the magnified and organised point-nucleus4 ,it is a truth--which we are only too ready to forget or discount--that the savage 7and he bears with justice both epithets1 'the noble savage1' and 'the brute barbarian'7 is not something left happily behind us1 in the onward march of civilisation2 but that he is1 however much we may fancy him suppressed and superseded1 still present1 at least 'ideally' in the finest products of humanity1 and may hap only too likely--as the ,russian is said1 when scratched1 to betray his original ,tartar breed--to burst put on provocation into a grim reality4 ,the ,pullman car of to-day retains within it for the archaeologically-trained eye the rudiments of the primitive wain of the primitive nomade3 and the careful study of either end of the scale will not merely throw a marvellous light on the excellencies or the defects of the other1 but will probably also tend in the impartial observer to moderate the self-gratulations of modern advance4 ,for it is only those whose view ranges within narrow limits that are over-impressed by the magnitude of the advance made in the 'last new thing4' ,if progress were but the addition of bit to bit1 of new bits to what is already there1 or if we could change this1 and leave that unchanged1--as the word perhaps verbally means1 and as many people at any rate seem to understand it1 progress might indeed seem an easy thing1 and to be undertaken with a light heart4 ,for1 it would appear as if we could lose nothing1 and might probably 7indeed1 as enthusiasm and forgetfulness of the merits of the past are in certain periods ready to urge1 must certainly7 gain4 ,but it is a more serious matter when we realise that we must move altogether1 if we really are to move at all2 i4 e4 really are to make progress1 and not merely change1 so to speak1 from one foot to rest on another4 ,for progress1--if it be what it is expected to be1 and what it must be if it does what it is expected to do--is an organic1 and not merely a mechanical or chemical change4 ,a mechanical change is only a nominal or formal change3 a chemical is more than change2 but in organic change1 that which changes also abides1 and the new is not merely other than the old1 and not merely a re-arrangement of the old1 but the old transmuted1--the same yet not the mere same#h4 ,progress in short is always the unity of differentiation and integration4 ,it must not be an externality1 nor a mere dead product of a transformation scene1 but a continuous growth1 inwardly digested1 made part and parcel of the collective life1 which it has thereby rendered more full1 real1 and not merely made less intense at the cost of some extension4 ,in true progress1 which is only another name for true growth1 nothing is quite lost1 but only changed1 retained in a richer shape and a fuller reality4 ,how far such progress is possible1 except in limited and finite spheres3 how far progress in one involves necessarily deterioration in another and how1 therefore1 progress is not attributable to the ,absolute1 are questions we need not here discuss4 ,but so far at least we may go as to say that a progress which does not follow the natural law of development and carry on into the future the worth and substance of the past1 is not a progress which any general enthusiasm ought to be spent upon4 ,development then has two faces1 one to the future and another to the past4 ,and what is called the historical method is apt to emphasise only one of the two aspects1 just as1 it may be added1 practical considerations are often likely to produce an opposite but equally partial bias in favour of the future4 ,the historical method in incapable hands is liable to lead to unprofitable sighs1--not unaccompanied by a certain luxury of tears--over the lowly hole of the pit--it may even be the filth and brutishness1 out of which so much of noble humanity 7for thither the interest of development always reverts7 has been dug2 and in empty heads the practical1 the vulgarly-utilitarian satisfaction is liable to equally vain fits of self-applause on our magnificent progress4 ,but both the self-depreciation of him who loiters regretfully round the beggarly rudiments1 and the self-laudation of glorious 'improvements' looking derisively on less glorious days1 are unworthy of the reasonable and scientific spirit4 ,the philosophical method does not allow itself to be imposed upon by the lapse of time1 and insists that in a sense the past contained the present--that1 as the poet says1 the child is father of the man4 ,not indeed contained in any grosser or more delicate mechanical way4 ,the coming development does not necessarily lie prefigured--if we had the proper microscope to see it--as a germ in the first and original state4 ,that may be1 or may not be4 ,yet prefigured it is by the law of its structure1 or in the intelligible unity by which only can its existence be understood and construed4 ,but if this be the method of real development1 in the growth of nature1 and the progress of history1 it is also the method of that supreme product of historical progress1 the spirit and system of philosophy4 ,thought1 also1 the culminating stage in which the spirit of man becomes conscious of itself and of its universe1 will move or grow on the same lines as that of which it is the comprehension and theory4 ,it will begin at the two ends1 and each beginning will complete and presuppose the other4 ,nature will suppose and yet lead up to ,spirit or ,mind3 ,spirit or ,mind will throw light on the mystery of ,nature3 ,being will point to knowledge or ,idea2 and ,idea show itself the basis of ,being4 ,or1 if we consider the triple division of the philosophic system1 as it runs in ,hegel's ,encyclopaedia1 we can see how misleading it may be to take that one order as absolute4 ,to understand it thoroughly we must begin with each of the three in turn3 so as thus to realise that each does not except figuratively succeed the other1 but that in each an aspect of the whole truth is presented which had been put by the other parts somewhat in the background4 ,in each part there is a definition and a revelation of the ,absolute4 ,but each is also1 as it were1 a projection1 a perspective view1 a condensed or expanded image of the other4 ,in each the ,absolute is one and whole1 in some more veiled1 more restricted1 and more meagre than in others2 but the veil1 and the restriction1 and the emptying1 are self-imposed3 and for that reason the veil is really transparent1 the restriction is negatived1 and the emptying is not only a self-humiliating but a self-ennobling irony--the irony of the ,absolute4 ,footnote #a3 ,of course the term 'equilibrium' may be used loosely to mean a great deal more than this1--how much will depend on the context4 ,these quasi-mathematical analyses have great fascination3 their apparent simplicity imposes upon us4 ,footnote #b3 ,the distinction1 it will be observed1 lies between the method of mathematical physics and that of physics which has learned something from the researches of electricity or chemistry4 ,if the method or principles of chemistry are thus said to be reduced to those of physics1 this is because the conceptions of physics have been revolutionised from the side of chemistry1 c41 and even of biology4 ,this tendency of modern science is precisely in the line indicated by ,schelling and ,hegel4 ,footnote #c3 ,problems of ,life and ,mind1 iii4 p4 #eh4 ,footnote #d3 ,eth4 vii4 #g 3 #f4 #f 4 ,footnote #e3 ,statistics only define--and primarily for the imagination--the general laws and principles on which they rest4 ,the clear-cut mathematical form strikes and 'catches on1' where a more universal statement sounds vague and glides off4 ,hence1 as one says1 they may prove anything4 ,the fact is1 they prove nothing4 ,they only illustrate in diagrammatic form the theory which presided at their collection4 ,to emphasise the fundamental nature of ethics for human development you need only say that conduct is three-fourths or 7as to some minds the precision rises with the denominator of the fraction #ag_/bj7 of human life4 ,footnote #f3 ,the resolute misinterpretation--as it often seems--of the maxim that like is known by like1--is a curious chapter in the history of ,logic4 ,all knowledge is based upon1--or1 to speak more simply1 is--the identity of differents3 of differents1 which in knowledge are identified1--of identity which in knowledge is put under difference4 ,and yet the ordinary meaningless talk on this matter seems to assimilate knower and known to two separate things 7or persons71 who casually and1 we may add1 inexplicably know each other3 which is mythology1 perhaps1 but not epistemology4 ,footnote #g3 ,bacon3 ',in ,praise of ,knowledge' 7a mere leaflet of much significance towards estimating his true grandeur74 ,on the ,conjugium of ,mens and ,universus see ,novum ,organum1 distrib4 op4 ,footnote #h3 ,the said mere same is not really the same at all4 ,nobody in his senses predicates sameness except where he also sees differences3 or1 the term always implies relation4 ,,chapter ,,xviii4 ,,the ,,range ,,of ,,personality4 ,the difference between the conceptions of reality held by ,aristotle and ,plato respectively is that where ,plato said ,being1 ,essence or ,substance 771 ,aristotle said ,activity 774 ,to be is to act1 to be active4 ,to the outsider--the plain man of philosophic legend1 it seems at first that a thing must be before it can do3 that you must have an agent before you get an action4 ,and1 in a way1 ,aristotle admits this not quite satisfactory criticism4 ,every activity presupposes1 he allows1 a power to act1 a potentiality3 every actual presupposes an implicit or a mere possibility4 ,existence seems1 as it were1 to be doubled2 or the mere surface-being is turned into a subject which has a predicate4 ,but if the existence is to be real1 it has to include both elements1 and with the latter or the actuality1 as its crown4 ,nor is this all4 ,the possibility which issues forth in action may be fairly called self-realisation4 ,that is to say3 ,a--the hypothetical agent--acts1 does something3 and in so doing1 seems to go forth and beyond itself1 to externalise itself4 ,or1 ,a is acted upon1 and thus seems to be diminished4 ,but what it externalises1 or puts forth1 is after all what it is3 it puts forth itself3 and1 on the other hand1 if it be a patient1 it is no less an agent and self-limitative4 ,what a thing really is1 is what it makes itself be3 what it allows itself to be made1 that it really is4 ,yet further1 if the word self-realisation be taken in its fullness of meaning1--if there be really a self1 and it be realised1 then this self-realisation1 which is the truth or more developed conception of being1 seems to imply or postulate in it a self-consciousness1 an awareness of the process of completed being1--completed in its return from utterance of possibility to self-fruition or in its re-assumption of itself4 ,to us1 of course1 as beings aware of what we do and achieve1 this is simple enough3 but it is also true of things1 that we only understand them1 in so far as we put them in1 or invest them with1 the same activity and apperception of activity as we are familiar with in our own experience4 ,the veriest materialist cannot help speaking of things as agents1 as behaving1 as having a function4 ,he would1 no doubt1 if he were to be cross-examined1 refuse to identify himself with the primitive anthropomorphism1 or at least zomorphism of the natural man who sees the river run and the clouds sweep the sky2 and he would probably mutter something referring to people who cannot see when they ride a metaphor to death4 ,still less1 perhaps1 would he be inclined to adopt the spiritualistic or animistic hypothesis of philosophising physicists1 like ,fechner1 who would accredit even the plants at our feet1 and the stars in the sky1 with souls1 or soul-like centres of their life4 ,but1 however he may shrink from what we may call the ontological consequences of his language1 there is no doubt that for him the meaning of the world1 its reality and truth1 is obtained by an interpretation in terms which1 rigidly employed1 imply their environment by a self-consciousness to which they are relative4 ,take from him the tacit assumption 7which he often finds it difficult to realise just because it is the foundation of all his language7 that reality is in the last resort a self-conscious reality1 and his words become meaningless1 or what he might think worse1 metaphorical4 ,to ,bacon1 who1 though not without a strong speculative impulse1 approached philosophic dicta from the standpoint of an average intelligent ,englishman 7and it is on that account that his remarks are often so instructive71 it seemed a grave fault of the ,stagirite to define the soul1 that 'most noble substance1' by words of the second intention4 ,without substance--a solid something as basis of act and event--the reality of the soul seemed likely to fare badly4 ,behind consciousness he1 like many others1 felt there must be a something of which consciousness is the state1 act1 or predicate and attribute4 ,the thinking must come from a thinker4 ,there must be a permanent subject of thought--a persistent substance which does not disappear when thinking for the nonce stops4 ,and thinking is according to common experience very liable to stops and interruptions4 ,both ,bacon and ,locke felt that without this refuge to fall back upon1 personal identity was in a bad way1 or personality itself little better than a delusion4 ,and therefore when ,aristotle1 and his modern followers1 treated soul and mind as essentially definable by the terms activity1 self-realisation1 it has been freely urged against them that they are tampering with the pearl of great price which all our hopes and aspirations fondly guard4 ,and this is a subject on which there is inevitably a good deal of misunderstanding4 ,and the misunderstanding will probably last so long as one set of writers flaunts over it that blessed word ,personality as a holy1 a sacrosanct thing1 like the visionary cross with its inscription ,in hoc signo vinces3 and as another set treats it as a mere fetish1 under which is hidden nothing better than stock or stone1 or a heap of old bones4 ,perhaps some concessions might well be made on both sides4 ,and the first of them would be to try to come to some clearer understanding what the term in question means4 ,and1 on that point1 if we follow the example of ,aristotle and examine popular usage1 to see if it can help us to any consistent use of the term1 we shall find that by personal as opposed to real we mean something peculiarly attached to the individual1 of which he cannot divest himself as of other outward things1 though it also is an outward thing#a ,the person in this narrowest sense means the body2 and if the epithet is further extended it still expresses what is directly manipulated through the members of the living agent1 and is more or less closely attached to it4 ,yet if it means the body1 we must be careful to add that it is the body1 regarded not as such but as the representative1 the outward manifestation1 the inseparable sign or symbol of a spirit1 an intelligence and a will4 ,the person is the visible or tangible phenomenon of something inward1--the phase or function by which an individual agent takes his place in the common world of human intercourse and interaction--his peculiar and definite part in the general or universal world and field4 ,personality thus mingles or unifies in it an universal and an individual aspect or element3 it hints that the universal work always has in reality an individually-determinate tone1--that nothing in the world1 even if it be called the same1 is really and actively the same4 ,si duo idem faciunt1 non est idem quod faciunt4 ,thus1 what separates personality from individuality is simply that in the narrower or abstracter use of the latter term there is an absence of the due subordination of all individuality to universality1 and of all universality to individuality4 ,personality1 in short1 is an individuality which is not a mere freak1 not merely different from other things1 but also in itself charged with a universal meaning or function4 ,yet even this is not enough to describe it4 ,it is the individuality of an intelligence3 the flesh and blood1 and1 in a secondary degree1 the outward things1 stamped with intelligence4 ,every member of a kind1 every natural existence1 has this double character2 this convergence or union of universal and individual4 ,in being this individual object1 it is at the same time a universal1 and vice versa4 ,but in the attribution of personality there is involved something beyond what is common to all creatures4 ,and that something1 we may first of all say1 is this4 ,whereas in the case of other things the individuality is distinctly subordinate1 and each is reckoned primarily by its kind1 in the case of persons we can almost declare that the universality is subordinate to the individuality4 ,this union of individuality and universality in a single manifestation1 with the implication that the individuality is the essential and permanent element to which the universality is almost in the nature of an accident1 is what forms the cardinal point in ,personality4 ,and one can understand1 when the distinction is thus put1 the obvious and palpable antagonism in which the view stands to the central principles of ,spinoza#b ,we speak of a man as a ,personality when we wish to note the fact that he is no mere manufactured article1 the representative of a common type1 with nothing to choose between him and a thousand others1 but that he is1 as it were1 one of a thousand1 one ',whom nature printed and then broke the type1' that he has in the highest sense 'distinction1' the nobility of nature's own patent4 ,other things exist1 so to speak1 for the sake of their kind1 and for the sake of other things2 a person1 in the strictest sense1 is never a mere means to something beyond1 but always at the same time an end in itself or himself4 ,other things are mere examples in illustration of a law that rides superior to them and overrules them3 the person is a law unto himself4 ,he has the royal and divine right of creating law--of starting by his exception a new law which shall henceforth be a canon and a standard4 ,for in such a personality when he claims his full rights there is the visible immanence of the divine and universal--or there is the visible unity of the eternal and the temporal4 ,he rules as the natural king1 the great ruler whose judgment and authority are better than the complex code of common laws3 he guides as the artistic genius who sees truth steadily in a single intuition and in that single picture sees it whole#c4 ,but when we ask if such a personality is found in the field of actual experience and history1 there arises a divergence of opinions4 ,it is at any rate matter of common experience that there is a good deal of unjustified identification of the self with the universal--identification in which the universal suffers violence and is taken by force4 ,there are only too often cases where the personal interest is allowed to disguise itself under a semblance of zeal for the common good1 and that even without conscious intent or act of deception4 ,no good and noble deed1 ,hegel has said1 can ever be done without faith in its goodness1 and zeal for its attainment3 without a holy passion and fervour of devotion1 which exceeds the cold service of duty rendered for duty's sake#d4 ,but it is equally true and equally to be remembered that this interference of personal passion and disinterested interest has defaced the noblest causes and made flow endless torrents of fanaticism and persecution4 ,a personality in which the universal was perfectly incarnated in the individual would be in truth a ,god amongst men4 ,and it is probably a more likely occurrence that where the individual as such arrogates to himself the privilege of the universal1 there should be seen not the deeds of the god1 but the ebullitions of the beast that is in man4 ,a personality1 then1 in popular language1 and perhaps also in popular philosophy1 is the living and conscious individual in whom general forces1 truths1 or ideas become real1 active1 efficient forces1 truths1 and ideas4 ,and the importance of the conception resides in the safeguard thus supposed to arise1 which will prevent the realities of the world from being dissipated away into the endless and restless flux of the terms of thought1 ',la bufera infernal che mai non resta4' ,to such a common frame of mind ideas1 truths1 forces are vacant1 ghostly forms1 devoid of true life and reality3 to get such they need blood and flesh to clothe them1 to give them substance and power4 ,now ,hegel1 no less than those who offer this criticism1 regards ideas 7in the ordinary sense of that term71 truths and forces1 also as abstractions which need something to make them powers in the real world of nature and the ideal world of mind4 ,hegel1 like ,schelling1 has a sublime contempt for mere universals4 ,but as to the something else1 there is a divergence of view4 ,two well-known answers are given by the popular philosophy known as materialism or spiritualism3 two systems which are probably not so wide apart as the contrast of their names might imply4 ,according to the former1 thinking1 ideas1 truths1 goodness and beauty are special functions 7the grosser materialists say secretions7 of a special kind of matter--of something which is accessible to ordinary mechanical and chemical tests1 but which exhibits also1 in certain cases1 the exceptional phenomena of consciousness4 ,here the essential reality is a something1 permanent and essentially indestructible1--something which no man has seen1 nor indeed can see1--but which is called ,matter4 ,the spiritualistic philosopher 7as distinguished from the idealist7 regards as the essential realities in the universe what he calls spirits4 ,what these are1 also1 nobody has as yet 7any more than in ,kant's time#e7 given any very authoritative account1 but so far as the quasi-scientific expositions in regard to them throw any general light on the subject1 we may say that they suggest only a differently-constituted matter1 a matter e4 g4 of less or more dimensions than that we are most familiar with4 ,now the advocate of spiritual reality1 who protests most strongly against the injury done to personality by reducing it to something fluid and not fixed1 something in process and not in persistent substance1 seems mostly to lean to a quasi-spiritualistic hypothesis1 or to the--so-called--higher materialism4 ,he is an advocate of what we may describe as the soul-thing1 of a permanent1 7he would even hold1 an absolutely permanent7 substance or substratum of psychical reality which1 no doubt1 exhibits certain properties1 but is always more than any one1 or any mere series of its phenomena4 ,it has been said1 indeed1 by one who spoke with authority that he that will save his soul shall lose it1 and he that will lose it shall find it4 ,but this has always been a hard saying1 which has been as far as possible explained away by exegesis4 ,yet its moral import is not so very far removed from its philosophical equivalent4 ,the true life is not that of self-seeking pleasure1 but the life spent in the service of truth and love1 the life dedicated to impersonal interests1 and ideal good4 ,so also the reality of the human soul as we first know it lies not in itself1 but in its transfiguration1 its purification1 and liberation to higher forms of being4 ,the ,soul1 in its first avatar in each of us1 is after all of the earth1 earthy1 unless it continue on that path of growth and development on which it has entered4 ,it is as ,aristotle said1 and said well1 the first actualisation#f--the proximate ideality of an organic body4 ,in soul organic body carries out its promise3 in soul we1 the observers1 or untrained psychologists1 note our first awareness of mental life in its organic environment4 ,but there are other grades1 other heights of achievement1 yet set before the principle of life1 which is more than mere life and mere soul3 or soul contains a germ which must bear higher fruit4 ,to be itself1 or to become all that it in promise and potency contains1 it must dispossess itself of what clings to it and possess itself of what is its own2 and so transmute its first phase into one more adequate4 ,the soul is1 as ,hegel has said1 the awakening of mind from the sleep of nature#g3 it is nature gathering itself out of its absorption in its dispersion1 the breath of life and feeling striving through the scattered members of the material world1 and finding itself at first half-asleep1 a pervading1 unifying current that flows through and makes continuous the various portions of the universe4 ,it is the earliest real1 felt unity in which the logical or synthetic pulse--as yet purely potential in ,nature1 and only surmised by science--re-appears in the actual concrete world4 ,and as the earliest1 it is1 like first loves1 what one clings to hardest as our prime and fundamental differentia4 ,here at least we are something--a centre of being1 and not a mere centreless expanse of extension3 something emerging from the world of silence and of night--something in which each feels ',i am not what ,i see1 ,and other than the things ,i touch4' ,and that something we would not lose1 at any cost4--,but the only way not to lose it1 is to use it as a stepping-stone to higher things4 ,the metaphor1 indeed1 like metaphors in general1 must not be pressed too far4 ,for it is more than a stepping-stone and it is never left behind as a mere dead self3 there is ',nothing of it that doth fade ,but doth suffer a sea-change ,into something rich and strange4' ,and that richer result into which it is transformed is the consciousness of a self1 and the intelligence which wills and knows4 ,if it be asked in what respects the result is richer1 the answer is as follows4 ,the soul1--this 'first entelechy--is exclusive1 and it is immersed in its natural limits of organic life4 ,it has yet to go through the school of self-detachment1 the process of 'erecting itself above itself'2 and of thus extending its view and its range of control over a wider field of objects4 ,gradually it attains to the rank of a consciousness before which is unrolled the spectacle of a world of objects set over against it1 and even of a world within it2 itself as an object deposed to the rank of something to be surveyed4 ,as such1 it seems almost to have left all immersion in corporeity completely behind1 and to have completely divested itself of any limitation4 ,it floats freely above the real psychical life out of which it emerged--a detached but somewhat shadowy self1 not burdened by any restrictions of nature or circumstance4 ,as such a mere ,ego1 or logical self--as the mere theatre on which the play of ideas takes place1 it surveys its real psychical self far below2 it finds itself as a strange sort of thing1 and says ,this was me 7which however is not exactly the same as ,i am ,i1 ,i ,i74 ,yet it was a great step to have thus ceased to be absorbed in its qualities1 to be the mere breath of life and feeling1 stirring in its several affections and modifications4 ,in order to get forward1 it was necessary to recoil a little3 to save itself--and that must mean to get itself in fuller and richer being--the mind had1 as it were1 to measure and realise the full depth of its nonentity1 and to surrender all that it had hitherto clung to as its own4 ,in an attitude of reflection upon itself it fancies that it is the empty room1 the tabula rasa1 on which experience is to write itself3 but in its secret heart it retains the faith and acts upon it1 that it is the power of intelligent and intelligible unity which makes the writing intelligible1 if it does not even itself play the writer4 ,what it now seems to find--what fills up its consciousness1 presumed empty and merely receptive1--it gradually recognises to be its very and original own4 ,through labour and experiment it fills up the vacant form 7the passive half of itself to which it deposed itself7 of consciousness2 and thus1 as an intelligent self1 a true mind1 it has for itself and realises as in itself all the life and reality which in its earlier stage of soul it only was and felt itself naturally to be4 ,but on this stage of free intelligence it is no longer bound up with its natural being in such a way as to feel itself a fixed and restricted centre1 sunk in the living environment so as to see no further1 and to deem itself in its seclusion the permanent reality1 the exclusive fact4 ,it is no longer exclusive and self-concentrated1 but inclusive and all-embracing4 ,it is no longer a mere consciousness--a mere receptive and synthetic unity of apperception--but a reason and a mind4 ,and a reason and a mind already refuse to be narrowed and confined by the same limits as seem appropriate to the soul4 ,in the province of free self-realised intelligence we at least seem to occupy a ground on which others can equally come1--to have nothing peculiar or merely individual4 ,in ,knowledge1 which is reasoned perception1 and in ,will1 which is reasoned impulse1 there is a king's highway1 a public forum1 where souls meet and converse and perform a collective work2--and in both mere1 i4 e4 essentially restricted1 individuality is at a discount#h4 ,such would be the course of development if we looked at it only in the inwardness or subjectivity of psychical1 conscious1 and intelligent life4 ,but an analogous or parallel development may be observed if we look at man as an active1 i4 e4 a practical and moral being1 a being who makes ,nature his own1 stamps it with his title of possession1 and who gives to his fellowship with other souls an objective1 outward existence in the forms and institutions of social life4 ,here too his first achievement is the affirmation of his individuality1 the distinction in outward and tangible shape of the ,mine from the ,thine3 the creation of property1 and the projection of himself in a world of mutually-recognised personalities4 ,as the individual soul in the inner life1 so the personal being with its property is the solid1 insoluble basis of the life in public--the field of social ethics4 ,the same instinct1 which in its dread of dissolution clings to the perpetuity of the inner nucleus of soul1 upholds the other as containing the stable and eternal security of all social well-being4 ,the immortality of soul in the inner world3 the sacro-sanctity of property in the outer4 ,but if these postulates are to be permitted1 if individuality and personality are to abide1 they must1 in the one case as in the other1 bow to the law of development1 the law of history and of life4 ,they must correct themselves1 re-adjust themselves1--include what they excluded1 and re-combine their elements1 transmute themselves into what we have1 after ,hegel1 called their truth3 must redintegrate themselves with suppressed correlatives1 and carry out their implications of larger unity4 ,the soul1 exclusive and fast-clad in its mere organic vestment1 in which it is as yet only the name and form of intellectual life1 has first of all to retract itself into the bare abstract consciousness1 or mere self1 on which the masses of reality stream1 to fill its vacant rooms and empty forms up with ideas4 ,so too the person--that close concretion or coalescence of mind with material--that identification of self with its 'clothes1' its property and all it can vulgarly be said to own1 is only an aspect of truth which tends to be over-estimated when it is reflected upon1 and must notwithstanding be over-ridden and merged4 ,withdrawing itself from its clothing of earth and water1 and even perhaps from its inner mansion of flesh and bone1 personality floats in the free air as the impersonal personality of conscience1--the ethereal realm where pure practical reason rules4 ,in that ether where morals reign absolutely is the home of the categorical imperative1 of the ,stoical law of duty1 of the conscience which1 here at least1 has might as it has right4 ,it too1 like its parallel1 consciousness1 in the inner mental life1 has1 or seems to have1 all its fulfilment from without4 ,as even ,kant admits1 it is itself a vacant form2 yet a form of such influence as to impress on whatever comes within its range an obligation to be universal and to be uniform4 ,here too1 as in the parallel stage1 it was of inestimable importance that mind should1 in the socio-ethical sphere1 see itself supreme in its innermost dignity and personality1--the personality which lies within1--even though that supremacy were at first no better than as a law1 a form1 a category1 recognised as authoritative and imperative4 ,for conscience1 like the field of consciousness1 is after all only a quasi-passive self--a remarkable property or endowment1 a sort of innate principle or idea by which the mind was seen to be distinguished in a unique way from all things else4 ,to realise once for all the fact that consciousness and conscience form an absolute tribunal from which there can be no appeal3 that the 'synthetic unity of apperception' in the theoretical1 and the 'autonomy of the rational will' in the practical sphere1 are the ultimate and final a priori3 this is a great thing to do1--even though it only expands and defines the ,cartesian principle of clear and distinct ideas1 and will remain as ,kant's title of honour in the history of philosophy4 ,he thus fenced off or consecrated the sanctuary of the mental and moral life4 ,but it was not enough to set apart the sacred principle1 the central hearth-fire of truth and goodness4 ,if at an earlier stage1--earlier1 i4e4 in this logical analysis1--the formal was wholly sunk in the material1 if i4 e4 the mere series of legal formulae in their hard and brittle outlines were absolutely identified--without doubt or hesitation--with the morally and socially good2 the formal side1 or mere spirit and will of good1 the abstract principle of morality1 is now invested with an equally undue prominence4 ,the actual or concrete ethical community--be it family or state1 or other social organisation--is animated and maintained by a spirit which transcends and includes alike the outward shell of civil law and the inward law of conscience4 ,for1 curiously enough1 as it may seem at first1 both conscience and civil legislation assume the form of imperative and definite commands--laws political or civil1 and laws moral4 ,both fall therefore into an inflexibility1 a rigorous and mechanical hardness in their enouncements4 ,both worship the lord of what men call logic1 i4 e4 of formal consistency and formal uniformity1 to an excess which sometimes issues in fantastic irregularities4 ,their several maxims of legal conformity and of duty for duty's sake are in first appearance excellent3 but a further reflection shows that the ,law covers a good many inconsistent or at least unrelated laws within its code1 and ,duty is often sadly to seek in presence of the collisions between what offer themselves as prima facie duties in any given case4 ,the amplest code of laws that ever existed will always leave lots of loop-holes for negligence and villainy1 and would never work for an instant1 were it not for ever supplemented by the spirit of faith and love1 by social piety and political loyalty1 by the thousand ties of sentiment and feeling which really vivify its dry bones4 ,so too the abstractions of the conscientious imperative1 of the law of duty1 of the moral tribunal1 of the man within the breast1 and of the dignity and beauty of human nature1 would effect nothing unless they could always tacitly count on the support of recognised and authoritative social law and usage4 ,outward rests upon inward2 and rules direct feelings4 ,here1 again1 as in the purely intellectual or cognitive sphere1 it is evident that the spirit of man has its source of life neither in its abstract self-hood 7in consciousness and conscience7 nor in its mere natural environment and organic endowment 7in sense-affections1 and social law and usage71 but in the unity of both1--a unity which transcends either4 ,both individual and society live and grow1 because they are continuous and one3 because they presuppose an ideal unity or a living ,idea at the root of their being1 as their inner and essential guiding-principle1 at once constitutive and regulative of their action4 ,the machinery of language supplies to the intellectual sphere a sort of sensible meeting-ground and common field in which the development of knowledge becomes possible3 and the same purpose is subserved in the social sphere by the machinery of ethical and political forms and institutions4 ,these are the field1 the home of freedom1 as the other are of knowledge4 ,it is in these collective and objective structures that we get the expression of the law of human development3 the visible sign1 viz4 of the essentially universal nature of the individual4 ,the individual in these attains his relative truth3 for they show the weakness of the individuality of the mere individual4 ,they show that his exclusiveness1 his quasi-originality1 is only an appearance3--confronted1 no doubt1 by an appearance of an opposite character1 as if the originality and the reality lay in the environment and the collective body4 ,they point therefore beyond and behind both foci to a common centre or inclusive unity of life4 ,but they do not destroy personality and individuality3 they only transform it and made it a more adequate and consistent representation of reality1 by giving in it a place to factors or 'moments' which1 though always effective1 were not recognised as constitutive elements1 and treated only as externally interfering agencies4 ,it may be a question1 of course1 how far it is wise to retain the term after its meaning has thus been altered by expansion and redistribution of elements4 ,on the whole it seems impracticable--and it would be undesirable1 perhaps1 even if it were more feasible--to be too hard and fast in our use of denotations4 ,it is hardly the province of philosophy to coin new terms in which to deposit the results of her researches4 ,a term no doubt--particularly if1 as the phrase runs1 it be luckily discovered1 or judiciously selected--may save the expenditure of thought4 ,but it is hardly the business of philosophy to encourage economy in this direction4 ,much more is it the perpetual task of philosophy to counteract the ossification that sets in in terms1--to reinterpret the meaning which is absorbed in these 'counters of thought1' and make them once more sterling money for the market of life4 ,what1 for instance1 is the work of ,aristotle's ,ethics1 but to set free the genii which the black magic of every-day intercourse has incarcerated in the non-significant ,greek term 8 ,like our own ,happiness1 it flits from lip to lip1 little better than a mere name1 which is still prized1 but--except for a few synonyms that are equally vague with itself--is attached to things which a little reflection shows it cannot truly denote4 ,aristotle seeks--we may say--to define it4 ,but the phrase 'definition' seems barely applicable to the complex process thus implied1--a process of which definition1 as ordinarily understood1 is only one small portion4 ,for to define happiness1 is to reconstruct the conception4 ,or1 to be more accurate1 it is really to construct it or reproduce in consciousness its construction4 ,as it stands1 the thing to be defined is a name and a thing1 of which certain relations to other things soon begin to show themselves1 which is more or less similar to one thing1 and more or less to be distinguished from another4 ,to mark it off from these co-terminous things1 and to show how they are related to it on different sides1--this would be what we may perhaps call strict1 or formal1 or nominal1 or mere definition4 ,now whatever be the other uses of such definitions--and they are serviceable at the outgoing in any branch of enquiry1--they are not precisely the work we expect a philosopher to do for us4 ,and assuredly it is not ,aristotle who would stop short at that sort of definitions4 ,we find accordingly that for the purpose of realising what happiness--the common name for human good--means1 he is obliged to bring into the field the whole system of his thought in its cardinal notions of ,energy1 ,soul1 c4 ,aristotle here as elsewhere retraces the path of thought which carries us from mere1 vulgar1 inadequately-apprehended happiness 7he follows the same process in his treatment of pleasure1 friendship c4--to take only ethical examples7 to true1 essential and completely-apprehended happiness1--or1 to use ,hegel's technical phrases1 from happiness as it is an-sich 7in or at itself7 or as it is fr-sich 7for or to itself71 to happiness as it is an-und-fr-sich4 ,in so 'defining' happiness ,aristotle is thus obliged to bring in his conceptions of man and of society1 of human life and its powers1 of natural and acquired faculty1 of mind in its relations to nature2 and if not to expound1 at least to employ1 his fundamental categories of philosophical thought4 ,such a machinery can hardly be called less than a construction1 i4 e4 a re-construction by conscious effort of the latent but actual concatenation of the elements in the fact4 ,in this case we traverse the distance which separates mere happiness from true happiness1 from happiness imperfectly or abstractly conceived to happiness adequately and concretely conceived4 ,of course when we say real or true happiness1 we use these terms as they are used within the ordinary range of human speech4 ,an ultimate and absolute in truth and reality is for us at any given time only a comparatively or relatively ultimate and absolute4 ,it is that which1 so far as we can see and think 7all philosophising presumably goes on under this stipulation1 tacit or express71 gives an expression1 an interpretation1 a meaning and a construction to reality which leaves no feature unrecognised1 no contradiction unsolved1 no discord unreconciled1 which leaves nothing outside and alien to it1 and suppresses without acknowledgment nothing that has ever been recognised within it4 ,it is1 if you like so to call it1 the completest1 or 7if you are really in earnest with your philosophising and have carried it on to what for you is the end7 the complete formula of the ,absolute--of that which in a transcendent sense is1 is all1 is the infinite and eternal one4 ,yet1 after all1 it is a formula4 ,but here that undying adversary of all thought steps in and says ,a mere formula4 ,and to that we must here as elsewhere rejoin3 ,no1 not a mere formula4 ,a mere formula would be not even a formula1--a formula only in name--and with no reality which it served to formulate4 ,it is a real and true formula1 if it be a formula at all1 and not something which merely swaggers about under that title4 ,nay more1 if it be a true and real formula1 it is the truth and the reality in its day and generation1 until at least a truer truth and a more real reality shall have been discovered4 ,let us by all means be modest3 but there is a false humility which becomes no man and is the guise of hypocrisy or insincere sincerity4 ,let us--in other words--never assume that 'we are the men1 and that wisdom will die with us'3 but equally let us hold fast the faith of reason that what we know as true and real can never be false1 i4 e4 utterly false1 however much it may turn out one day to be surmounted4 ,and1 on the other hand1 let us equally remember that in the mere and abstract commencement--the unreal and the untrue1 as we must perforce style it by contrast with the 7pro tempore7 truth and reality--there is no utter and sheer error or unreality4 ,it has always been felt to be one of the most loveable sides of ,aristotelianism--this recognition of the reasonableness of all actual fact1 or of the truth latent in the honest1 though narrow and ill-defined judgments of the mass4 ,thus1 coming back to personality1 let us admit that the mere personality which at first sight seemed only worth rejecting1 is an element1 at least1 in true personality1--or is a part which1 because an organic member and no mere mechanical part1 is full of traces and indications which involve and postulate the whole4 ,the true personality and the true individuality of being is something which presupposes for its completeness the social state--the organic community4 ,it is no doubt familiar to us that1 according to an old but never quite dormant view1 the collective community is but the aggregate or congeries of individuals4 ,but the individuals whose aggregation makes the community are themselves products of the social union4 ,complete1 all-round1 harmonious personality1 it is sometimes said1 is the highest fruit to be yielded by social development4 ,or1 as the last century would have preferred to put it1 the main or sole aim of the ,state is furtherance towards ,humanity--to the stature of the perfect man4 ,and these are true sayings1--but perhaps only half true4 ,if all must grow so that one and each may grow1 so and not less must each one grow so that the all--the commonwealth of reason and the kingdom of ,god--may be more and more present1 'may come4' ,and that kingdom only comes when ,all is in ,each1 and ,each is in ,all3 and when1 without loss or diminution1 each is each and all is all4 ,then and not till then does personality become true and infinite1 free and harmonious individuality1 which is in the same instant universality4 ,the monad--to use the language of the great ,idealist who did not find individuality at all incompatible with universality--never ceases to be a monad3 it is eternal and indestructible1 an absolute centre of being4 ,the monad in its individual measure 'expresses' or 'envelops' the ,infinite or ,absolute3 it is1 i4 e4 under a subjective limitation1 identical with the absolute1 a concentration or condensation of it into an impenetrable1 i4 e4 literally an individual1 point1--but a point which is in the psychical or intellectual world never entirely carens recordatione1 or oblivious of its essential totality4 ,but if the monad 'expresses' the ,absolute1 it no less concords or sympathises in harmonious development with all its congeners1 the other monads3 so that while it neither interferes with them1 nor suffers violence from them1 it yet exists and acts in an ideal identity1 that is1 in a real fellowship1 with them4 ,again1 the monad has what may be called its side of passivity1 but passivity here does not mean mere passivity1 but rather the essential limitation due to its special and peculiar stand-point--a limitation which in the higher orders of being becomes transparent or is transcended4 ,how far ,leibniz succeeds in reconciling this apparent contradiction--how far even any one can reveal the mystic indwelling of universal and individual in each other1 this is a serious question in its place3 but it is only bare justice to ,leibniz to say that he at least never failed to emphasise both aspects of reality1 and that if one 'moment' is predominant and fundamental in his work it is not the monad1 but the ,monad of ,monads4 ,if necessity be the right word to express the relation of the ,universal ,law to the individual being and to affirm that the individual is not a loose self-supporting unit 7and ,leibniz1 far from thinking so1 always uses in its stead the phrase inclinat1 non necessitat#i1 to emphasise the immanence of law1 or the autonomy of every completed being71 then ,leibniz is not less1 but more necessitarian than ,spinoza4 ,his difference from ,spinoza1 in fact1 lies mainly1 if not solely1 in his clearer recognition of the transcendence1 no less than the immanence1 of the ,absolute1 which ,spinoza has somewhat veiled under the apparent insignificance of the difference between natura naturans and natura naturata4 ,yet the ,monad of ,monads is no supra-mundane1 or merely transcendent ,god4 ,but if we further ask whether such personality is attainable in the world of experience and describable in terms of thought--whether there be any actual and visible agent possessed of this true personality1 as we have agreed to call it1 we are in face with a higher stage of the problem of personality4 ,and that question in other words brings us back to where we began4 ,a true and real personality1 a complete individuality is something which so transmutes all that we are most accustomed to call by that name that it is hardly any use clinging to it1 unless to protest against the danger of mistaking such expansion and transmutation to be only a blank negation4 ,yet to cling to it too much involves a danger for the true recognition of that transcendent's universality4 ,all human personality1 all natural individuality is1 as ,lotze has eloquently pointed out#aj1 something which falls far short of what it professes to be4 ,but in the general failure to unite the universal with the particular1 or the fact with the idea1 there are degrees2 and we can at least affirm so much as this that the truest individuality and the most real personality is not that which is least permeated by thought1 but that in which thought has had the largest share4 ,individuality is something more than a mere sum of general qualities2--that is certainly the fact2 but it is not less the fact1 that for us an individuality and personality is more perfect and true in proportion as more general function and universal character coalesce into harmony and power in it4 ,assert then the initial presence and virtue of individuality and personality in the human soul3 but remember that it has this virtue1 not for what it is1 but for what it promises and may reasonably be expected to be1 and that1 to realise the promise1 it has to behave inclusively1 rather than exclusively1 gather up into itself and make its own all content1 rather than set itself up in reserve and isolation4 ,we have seen that the social organisation1 animated as it is by the moral idea1 is rather the arena on which the true union of mind and matter1 of idea and nature1 of thought and fact may be worked for1 than itself the fruition of such an effort4 ,all-important is the ,state2 all-important the ethical idea which pervades it4 ,but the world of freedom--the ideal world so far made actual--is not what it promised to be4 ',is it not1' said ,plato1 'the nature of things that the actual should always lack the perfection of theory8' ,in the visible world the ,state1 indeed1 rules supreme3 'it is1' as ,hegel might say in the words of his great predecessor in political theory1 'that ,leviathan or mortal ,god to whom under the immortal ,god we owe our welfare and safety4' ,but there is something in the ,state which the ,state in its palpable reality cannot adequately express4 ,if it is highest in the hierarchy of this world1 the lowest in the ideal kingdom of the ,absolute is higher than it4 ,above the ,state as the embodiment and the guarantee of the moral life1 there is the realm of ,art1 ,religion1 and ,philosophy4 ,in them man's craving for individuality and personality finds a satisfaction it could never hope for below them3 they at least restore the truth and reality of man's life and of the universe in a measure far exceeding what even morality could do4 ,if we ask then what ,art1 ,religion1 and ,science have to show of ,personality or true realised individuality1 the answer is briefly as follows4 ,had it not been that august names have spoken of imitation as the essence of ,art-work1 we should hardly have deemed it possible that men should speak of ,realistic ,art4 ,yet here1 as in ,religion and in ,science1 the epithet is introduced to guard against a misconception of the province of ,idealism4 ,all ,art1 all ,religion1 all ,science1 are and must be idealistic3 but they can never be--as the familiar phrase puts it--merely idealistic1 i4 e4 visionary1 fantastic1 unreal4 ,all of them1 in other words1 may be said to show us 'the light that never was on sea or land'--the heavenly city--the eternal truth of things4 ,but they must1 on their peril1 show it here and now1 and not in a pretended or other world4 ,they must--no less than law and morality--work in terrestrial materials1 and not with superfine celestialities4 ,mentem mortalia tangunt4 ,it is out of the oldest and commonest realities of life and death that the poet and the painter make the melodies of heaven sound in our ears1 and gladden us with the rays of the empyrean4 ,it is out of the hard rock of the real that the artist's rod must strike the well-spring of the ideal4 ,so too1 in like manner1 a religion must show the ,divine1 but show ,him immanent3 an immanence which1 on one hand1 shall not drag ,godhead down to the level of casual reality1 nor on the other set ,him far off in lonely transcendence4 ,the aesthetic faculty1 awakened as it is by the natural response of man's perceptions to the harmonies of existence1 to the spontaneous coherency of its many parts in a united whole1 and stimulated by the creative work of human art1 which moulds even the naturally discordant or unconnected into a concordant expression 7sometimes it may be1 as in handicraft1 only to satisfy human needs71 lifts us above the imperfections and fragmentariness of things1 above our selfish interest in them1 into a frame of mind where they are seen whole and perfect1 and yet one and veritably individual4 ,in its supreme or comprehensive phase it does not deal merely with the beautiful1 nor merely with the beautiful and sublime4 ,all true art1 whether it awakes awe or admiration1 laughter or tears1 whether it melts the soul1 or steels it to endurance1 has a common characteristic2 and that is to raise the single instance1 the prosaic or commonplace fact1 into its universal1 eternal1 infinite significance4 ,it frees the fact from the limitations which our distractions1 our practicality1 our temporary hopes and fears1 have deeply stamped upon it4 ,it is still1 after art has dealt with it1 to all appearance a single fact3 but it now has the universe behind it and within it4 ,it carries us away from the incompleteness1 the pressure of externals1 the solicitude for the future and the regrets for the past1 into a self-contained1 self-satisfying totality1 into freedom and leisure1 rest which is not stolid1 and action which involves no toil4 ,such a result is partly1 as was said1 the gift of common nature1 which speaks peace1 comfort1 joy1 self-possessed fruition for all her children when their sense is open and free3 partly it comes through those select ones among these children who have a larger perception of the meaning and inner truth of her works1 and who can by a sensible reconstruction1 which if it is fair and successful will only bring out more clearly the unity and harmony which deeper insight detects1 help others to see and enjoy what they have felt and rejoiced over4 ,such are the poets--in the widest sense--the makers1 the seers1 who in verse1 in music1 in picture and sculpture--who1 in human lives1 it may be even in the conduct of their own1 show us how divine a thing is nature and humanity3 show us the secret and unheard harmonies that to the full-opened ear absorb and transmute the lower discords of life and vulgar reality4 ,it is they who give immortality and divinity1 who make heroes and demigods#aa4 ,or1 if they may not be said to make them1 they half-reveal and half-construct the ideal figures which stand high and beneficent in the history of the world4 ,and by those who thus half-construct1 and half-reveal1 are meant not merely the single artists in whom the process culminates to final outline and publicity1 but the many-voiced poesy of the collective human heart which out of its myriad elemental springs constitutes the total figure1 the august image of the hero1 and the saint1 lending him from its plenitude all that his abstract self seemed to want4 ,it is on the tide of national and human enthusiasm that the individual artist is lifted up to realise the full significance of his ideal figure1 and his imaginative craft can only be inspired by the vigour and warmth of the collective passion for noble ends and high action4 ,nowhere it would seem is the ideal of personality and many-sided individuality more adequately realised4 ,here1 at last1 the whole truth of life1 the indwelling of individual and universal in one body1 seems to be realised4 ,but it is realised in an ideal4 ,it is--if we analyse it--a synthesis of three elements2 partly in the material reality which serves as bodily vehicle2 partly in the conception and technique of the artist2 partly in the general mind which inspires both the material and the form with its own larger life4 ,it is--as its name implies--an artificial product--a synthesis of elements which tend to fall apart4 ,technique varies1 conceptions lose their interest1 the tone of general culture alters1 and materials are dependent on locality4 ,when that happens1 the work of art is left high and dry3 no longer a living ,god1 but a dead idol1 still wondrous1 but speaking no more its human language4 ,so it is with the heroic figures who rise into the purer air of universal history4 ,they also--so far as they live with a personal power--are works of art3 works of real-idealism4 ,for all history which deserves the name1 and is not mere abstract dry-as-dust chronicle 7as to the possibility of which utter aridity there may be legitimate doubts71 is a work of fiction or invention1 of reconstruction4 ,it seeks to understand its characters4 ,but to understand them it is not 7and as historical art cannot be7 content with a mere reference to motives acting on them from outside4 ,it seeks to understand them with and in their times--to see in them the full measure of contemporary life and thought which elsewhere has found so meagre expression4 ,such is the artistic completion of personality in the ideal1--whether in what is called history1 or what is called art4 ,it exaggerates a truth1 because it loses sight of the background4 ,and that background1 which helps to constitute such ideal personality1 is no constant element4 ,the centuries and generations as they roll contribute their varying quota to set1 as they say1 the historical character in its true light1 in its fulness and truth of reality4 ,and thus this personality of the great leaders of human life is only an image and a sign--a fruit of development1 no bare fact which remains unchanged and always the same4 ,it is rather a personification than a personality4 ,it incarnates the living spirit who is universal and eternal in the limits of a sensuously-defined individual1 and indeed incarnates there only so much as the generation it speaks to can see of complete truth4 ,it is only after all a vehicle of truth2 though a nobler vehicle than social and personal ethics can afford4 ,as it is felt that the treasure of the idea--that the full power of spiritual life--cannot be adequately stored in the earthen vessels of mortality1 the consummation of personality is forced to recede into the invisible if it would be still conceived as attainable4 ',true personality1' says ,lotze1 'is with the ,infinite1' ,what here is fragmentary1 is there a rounded total1 a perfect unity3 ,he alone is absolutely self-determining1 self-explaining3 is all that ,he means to be1 and means all that ,he is4 ,in a sense1 philosophy does not hesitate to countersign all this4 ,but1 in adopting it1 philosophy must reserve the right of noting the danger and the ambiguity of such language4 ,religion does well1 philosophy may say1 in thus insisting upon the dependence of all appearance on one ,absolute reality2 but it is well also not to forget that all appearance is also the appearance of that reality or ,absolute4 ,and in so saying1 be it added1 philosophy assumes no essential superiority to religion4 ,religion in its fulness1 and apart from any theories that may grow up under its wing1 is more than theory1 more than mere philosophy3 it is the consummating unity of life--the enthusiasm and supreme power of life1 its consecration and divinisation by its assured immanence in the eternal and universal4 ,it is1 in short1 as was long ago said of it1 the true life1 the light which is the light and life of men2 and its inspiring principles are faith1 hope1 and love4 ,but when unassisted religion proceeds to set before itself the meaning and lesson of its life1 when it proceeds to formulate a theory of the world and set out a scheme of world-history1 it trespasses on the field of knowledge1 and is amenable to the criticisms of the reflective spirit--the spirit of philosophy4 ,and that criticism briefly is to the effect that the religious theory in its ordinary form is an imperfect interpretation of the religious experience4 ,nor is this to derogate from the prerogative of the friends of ,god4 ,it is only to criticise the formulae and phrases of dogmatic theology--a theology1 however1 which is as old as religion itself1 and which takes different forms from age to age1 and from one level of thought to another1 always in its measure translating religious reality1 truth1 or experience into the categories1 naive or artificial1 simple or complex1 of the science 7it may be the pseudo-science7 of the time4 ,philosophy1 therefore1 is the criticism of the science of ,god--that is of theology--as it is the criticism of other sciences4 ,for criticism philosophy always is3 always the reflection upon fixed dogma1 and the discussion of it till it becomes sensible of its defects1 and stands upon another and higher plane4 ,and to some it may seem that this is the sole function which philosophy can legitimately undertake4 ',yet1' as ,aristotle remarked1 'the good critic must know what he criticises4' ,he must not merely reflect upon it from outside1 but deal with it from the plenitude of experience1 from the abundance of the heart4 ,if he be a critic then1 he cannot be a mere critic1 but also an agent in the work of reconstruction4 ,or1 if we put the thing otherwise2 though1 as ,fichte said 7p4 #bh71 philosophy is a different thing from life1 the true philosopher can never be a mere philosopher1 but must1 if he is to reach the height of his vocation1 have also entered into the full experience of reality1 into the whole truth of life4 ,his philosophy will then not be outside of religion and aesthetic perception4 ,in its comprehension of all grades and forms of reality and truth1 goodness1 holiness1 beauty1 will have their place4 ,he also will be among the theologians4 ,and when the philosopher deals with personality in this high1 this supreme sphere1 he will submit that the truth of personality is subordinate to the truth of spirituality4 ,he will argue that by sticking too closely and fixedly to personality we are running a risk of bringing down the divine to the level of the human4 ,if1 with ,dante1 he can say that in its very heart the ,light ,eternal ',mi parve pinta della nostra effige2' he will undoubtedly add with ,dante ',oh quanto corto 'l dire e come fioco ,al mio concetto2' or1 with the first philosophical theologian who interpreted the experience of ,christian life1 he will rise from the historical ,jesus to the inward witness of the ,spirit4 ,footnote #a3 ,the legal use of the distinction between 'real' and 'personal' is only partly 'logical1' and largely retains traces of the larger logic of life and history4 ,yet1 roughly speaking1 personal property is what we can1 so to speak1 carry on our backs or in our pockets4 ,footnote #b3 ,see ,spinoza1 ,cogitata ,metaph41 ,pars ,,ii4 cap4 #h3 ',nec fugit nos vocabulum 7,personalitatis scilicet7 quod theologi passim usurpant ad rem explicandam3 verum quamvis vocabulum non ignoremus eius tamen significationem ignoramus3 quamvis constanter credamus1 in visione ,dei beatissima ,deum hoc suis revelaturum4' ,for ,hegel1 it may be noted1 ,person1 so far as he uses the term at all1 bears its restricted legal and juridical sense4 ,a person is a free intelligence1 which realises that independence by appropriating an external thing as its sign and property4 ,it probably belongs therefore to a world in which people count rather by what they have than by what they are2 the world of law where rights and duties tend to oppose each other4 ,this is not the highest kind of world for human beings4 ,footnote #c3 ,this one may call the ,platonic ideal of the ,state1 where ,equity rules supreme in the incarnate spirit of wisdom1--a guide adapting its measures to circumstances1 not tied down to the inflexible letter of one law in an incoherent and imperfect code4 ,see the ,politicus1 p4 #bid2 ,phaedrus1 p4 #bge2 and compare ,aristotle's ,wise man whose conduct is not but 4 ,footnote #d3 ,see e4 g4 ,encyclopaedia1 #dge4 ,footnote #e3 ,see his ',dreams of a ,spirit-seer1 illustrated by ,dreams of ,metaphysics4' 7,werke1 ed4 ,ros4 und ,schub4 ,bd4 ,,vii4 p4 #ch sqq47 ,footnote #f3 ,it is perilous and misleading 7said the ancient ,graiae1 who dwell on the way to the ,hesperides of philosophy7 to interpret an old system by the language of modern 7and especially ,german7 idealism4 ,it is much worse1 replied ,perseus1 not to interpret it at all1 but to repeat its magic ipsissima verba1--carefully ,latinised1 as if they belonged to a cabinet of fossils4 ,footnote #g3 ,encyclopaedia1 #chg1 #chi4 ,footnote #h3 ,the above is an attempt to give a very condensed synopsis of ,hegel's ,philosophy of ,mind 7,encyclopaedia74 ,footnote #i3 ,see especially in the ,theodicee1 part ,i4 #dc seqq4 ,cf4 ,nouv4 ,ess4 ,,ii4 #i1 incline sans necessiter3 ,i4 #ac1 ,la ncessit ne doit pas tre confondue avec la dtermination4 ,footnote #aj3 ,microcosmus1 ,book ,,ix4 chap4 #d4 ,footnote #aa3 ,see the well-known passage in ,wilhelm ,meisters ,lehrjahre1 ,book ,,ii4 chap4 a4 ,,chapter ,,xix4 ,,genesis ,,in ,,mental ,,life4 ,aristotle1 who saw into the nature of abstract entities1 remarked that the mind was nothing before it exercised itself#a4 ,the mind1--and the same will turn out true of many things else where it is at first unsurmised1--is not a fixed thing1 a sort of exceedingly refined substance1 which we can lay hold of without further trouble4 ,it is what it has become1 or what it makes itself to be4 ,this point1 that ',to be' ',to have become1' or rather to have made itself1 is an axiom never to be lost sight of in dealing with the mind4 ,it is easy to talk of and about conscience and freewill1 as if these were existing things in a sort of mental space1 as hard to miss or mistake as a stone and an orange1 or as if they were palpable organs of mind1 as separately observable as the eye or ear4 ,one asks if the will is free or not1 as glibly as one might ask whether an orange is sweet2 and the answer can be given with equal ease1 affirmatively or negatively1 in both cases4 ,everything in these cases depends on whether the will has made itself free or not1 whether indeed we are speaking of the will at all1 and on what we mean by freedom4 ,to ask the question in an abstract way1 taking no account of circumstances1 is one of those temptations which lead the intellect astray and produce only confusion and wordy war--as a good deal of so-called popular metaphysics has done4 ,the mind and its phenomena1 as they are called1 cannot be dissected with the same calmness of analysis as other substances which adapt themselves to the scalpel3 nor is dissection after all more than a part of the scientific process1 subject to the control of the synthesis in physiology4 ,the ordinary metaphysician makes his own task easy and his thoughtful reader's a burden1 by plunging too lightly in medias res4 ,he wants patience--often1 perhaps1 because he thinks too much of his reader's impatience at analysis--to unravel the tangled mass which human experience1 when first looked at1 presents4 ,he is apt to catch at any end which promises to effect a temporary clearance4 ,true philosophy1 on the contrary1 must show that it has got hold of what it means to discuss3 it has to construct its subject-matter3 and it constructs it by tracing every step and movement in its construction shown in actual history4 ,the mind is what it has been made and has made itself2 and to see what it is we must consider it not as an ,alpha and ,omega of research1 as popular conception and language tend to represent it1 but in the stages constituting its process1 in the fluidity of its development1 in the elements out of which it results4 ,we must penetrate the apparent fixity and simplicity under which it comes forward1 and see through it into the process which bears it into being4 ,for1 otherwise1 the object of our investigation is taken1 as if it were the most unmistakable thing of sense and fancy1--as if everybody were agreed that this and no other were the point in question4 ,but in this matter of stability and the reverse1 there is a broad distinction between the natural and the spiritual world4 ,in ,nature every step in the organisation1 by which the ,cosmos is developed1 has an independent existence of its own3 and the lowest formation confronts the highest1 each standing by itself beside the other4 ,matter and motion1 for example1 are not merely found as subordinate elements entering into the making of a plant or an animal4 ,they have a free existence of their own3 and the free existence of matter in motion is seen in the shape of the planetary system4 ,so1 too1 chemical or electrical phenomena can be observed by themselves1 operating in spheres where they are untrammeled by the influence of biological conditions4 ,it seems1 at least at first sight1 to be different in the case of mind4 ,there the specific types or several stages in the integrating process of mental development seem to have no substantive existence in the earlier part of the range1 and to appear only as states or factors entering into1 and merged in1 the higher grades of development4 ,this causes a peculiar difficulty in the study of mind4 ,we cannot seize a formation in an independent shape of its own3 we must trace it in the growth of the whole4 ,mental fusion and coalescence of elements is peculiarly close1 and hardly leaves any traces of its constituent factors#b4 ,sensation1 for instance1 in its purity1 as mere sensation1 is apparently something which we can never study in isolation4 ,all the sensation which we can1 in the strictly psychological 7as opposed to the physiological7 mode of study1 examine1 i4 e4 which we can reproduce in ourselves1 is more than mere sensation3 it includes elements of thought1 and probably of desire and will4 ,this1 of course1 makes the difficulties of so-called introspection3 difficulties so great and real that they have provoked in natural reaction a set against introspection altogether1 and the adoption of the external observation 7physiological or so-called psycho-physical7 employed in the 'objective' sciences4 ,and hence when we accept the name1 such as intellect1 conscience1 will1 c41 as if it expressed something specially existent in a detached shape of its own1 we make an assumption which it is impossible to justify4 ,we are reckoning with paper-money which belongs to no recognised currency1 and may be stamped as the dealer wills4 ,the consequence is that the thing with which we begin our examination is an opaque point1--a mere terminus a quo1 from which we start on our journey of explication1 leaving the terminus itself behind us unexplained4 ,the constituents of mind do not lie side by side tranquilly co-existent1 like the sheep beside the herbage on which it browses4 ,their existence is maintained in an inward movement1 by which1 while they differentiate themselves1 they still keep up an identity4 ,in our investigations we cannot begin with what is to be defined4 ,the botanist1 if he is to give us a science of the plant1 must begin with something whose indwelling aim it is to be itself and to realise its own possibility4 ,he must begin with what is not the plant1 and end with what is2 begin1 let us say1 with the germ which has the tendency to pass into the plant4 ,the speculative science of biology begins with a cell1 and builds these cells up into the tissues and structures out of which vegetables and animals are constituted4 ,the object of the science appears as the result of the scientific process3 or1 a science is the ideal construction of its object4 ,as in these cases1 so in the case of thought4 ,we must see it grow up from its simplest element1 from the bare point of being1 the mere speck of being which1 if actually no better than nothing1 is yet a germ which in the air of thought will grow and spread2 and see it appear as a result due to the ingrowing and outgrowing union of many elements1 none of which satisfies by itself1 but leads onward from abstractions to the meeting of abstractions in what is more and more concrete4 ,the will and conscience1 understanding and reason1 of man are not matter-of-fact units to be picked up and examined4 ,you must1 first of all1 make sure what you have in hand3 and to be sure of that is to see that the mind is the necessary outcome of a course of development4 ,the mind is not an immediate datum1 with nothing behind it1 coming upon the field of mental vision with a divinely-bestowed array of faculties2 but a mediated unity1 i4 e4 a unity which has grown up through a complex interaction of forces1 and which lives in differences through comprehending and reconciling antagonisms4 ,if the mind be not thus exhibited in its process1 in the sum and context of its relations1 we may mean what we like with each mental object that comes under our observation3 but with as much right another observer may mean something else4 ,we may1 of course1 define as we please3 we may build up successive definitions into a consistent total3 but such a successful arrangement is not a real science4 ,unless we show how this special form of mind is constituted1 we are dealing with abstractions1 with names which we may analyse1 but which remain as they were when our analysis is over1 and which seem like unsubstantial ghosts defying our coarse engines of dissection4 ,they are not destroyed3 like immaterial and aery beings they elude the sword which smites them1 and part but to re-unite4 ,the name1 and the conception bodied forth in it1 is indeed stagnant1 and will to all appearance become the ready prey of analysis3 but there is something behind this materialised and solidified conception1 this worn-out counter or sign1 which mere analysis cannot even reach4 ,and that underlying nature is a process or movement1 a meeting of elements1 which it is the business of philosophy to unfold4 ,the analyst in this case has dealt with ideas as if they were a finer sort of material product1 a fixed and assailable point3 and this is perhaps the character of the generalised images1 which take the place of thoughts in our customary habits of mind4 ,but ideas1 when they have real force and life1 are not hard and solid1 but1 as it were1 fluid and transparent1 and can easily escape the divisions and lines which the analytical intellect would impose4 ,perhaps some may think that it is unwise to fight with ghosts like these1 and that the best plan would be to disregard this war of words altogether4 ,but1 on the other hand1 it may be urged that such unsubstantial forms have a decided reality in life3 that men will talk of them and conjure by their means1 with or without intelligence2 and that the best course is to understand them4 ,it will then be seen that it is our proper work as philosophers to watch the process1 by which the spiritual unity divides and yet retains its divided members in unity4 ,even in the first steps we take to get a real hold of an object we see this4 ,to understand it1 we must deprive it of its seeming independence4 ,every individual object is declared by the logician to be the meeting of two currents1 the coincidence of two movements4 ,it concentrates into an undecompounded unit1--at least such it appears to representative or material thought1--two elements1 each of which it is in turn identifiable with4 ,the one of these elements has been called the self-same 7or identity71 the universal1 the genus1 the whole3 while the second is called the difference1 the particular1 the part4 ,and by these two points of reference it is fixed1--by two points which are for the moment accepted as stationary4 ,what has thus been stated in the technical language of ,logic is often repeated in the scientific parlance of the day1 but with more materialised conceptions and in more concrete cases4 ,the dynamic theory of matter represents it as a unity of attraction and repulsion4 ,a distinguished ,darwinian remarks that 'all the various forms of organisms are the necessary products of the unconscious action and reaction between the two properties of adaptability and heredity1 reducible as these are to the functions of nutrition and reproduction#c4 ,the terms 'action and reaction' are hardly sufficient1 it may be1 to express the sort of unity which is called for3 but the statement at least shows the reduction of an actual fact to the interaction of two forces1 the meeting of two currents4 ,the one of these is the power of the kind1 or universal1 which tends to keep things always the same3 the other the power of localised circumstances and particular conditions1 which tends to render things more and more diversified4 ,the one may be called a centripetal1 the other a centrifugal force4 ,if the one be synthetic1 the other is analytic4 ,but such names are of little value1 save for temporary distinction1 and must never be treated as permanent differences which explain themselves4 ,the centre is relative1 and so is the totality4 ,thus it is that the so-called ,evolutionist explains the origin of natural kinds4 ,they are what they severally are by reason of a process1 a struggle1 by alliances and divisions1 by re-unions and selections4 ,they are not independent of the inorganic world around them3 it has entered into their blood and structure1 and made them what they are4 ,to understand them we must learn all we can of the simpler and earlier forms1 which have left traces in their structure3 traces which1 without the existence of such more primitive forms1 we might have misunderstood1 or have passed by unperceived4 ,and1 again1 we learn that our hard and fast distinctions are barely justified by ,nature4 ,there1 kind in its extreme examples seems to run into kind1 and we do not find the logically-exact type accurately embodied anywhere4 ,our classifications into genera and species turn out to be in the first instance prompted by a practical need to embrace the variety in a simple shape4 ,but though perfectly valid1 so far as we use them for such ends1 they tend to lead us false1 if we press them too far4 ,and when we have seen so much1 we may learn the further lesson that the variety of organisation1 animal and vegetable1 is only the exhibition in an endless detail by single pictures1 more or less complementary1 more or less inclusive of each other1 of that one vital organisation in principle and construction which we could not otherwise have had presented to us4 ,in a million lessons from the vast ranges of contemporary and of extinct life there is impressed upon the biological observer the idea of that system of life-function and life-structure which is the goal of biological science4 ,the interest in the mere variety whether of modern or of primeval forms of life is as such merely historical2 its truer use is to enable the scientific imagination to rise above local or temporary limitations4 ,and thus in the end the records and guesses of evolution in time and place serve to build up a theory of the timeless universal nature of life and organisation4 ,and what is true of ,nature is equally true of the ,mind4 ,for these two1 as we have already seen1 are not isolable from each other4 ,neither the mind nor the so-called external world are either of them self-subsistent existences1 issuing at once and ready-made out of nothing4 ,the mind does not come forth1 either equipped or un-equipped1 to conquer the world3 the world is not a prey prepared for the spider1 waiting for the mind to comprehend and appropriate it4 ,the mind and the world1 the so-called 'subject' and so-called 'object1' are equally the results of a process3 and it is only when we isolate the terminal aspects of that process1 and in the practical business of life forget the higher theoretical point of view1 that we lose sight of their origin1 and have two worlds facing each other4 ,as the one side or aspect of the process gathers feature and form1 so does the other4 ,as the depth and intensity of the intellect increases1 the limits of the external world extend also4 ,for the psychical life is just the power which maintains a continuing correlation between the body and its environment1 and between the various elements in that environment4 ,it is the unity in which that correlation lives and is aware of itself4 ,it is the subject-object1 which sets one element against another1 and gives it quasi-independence4 ,the mind of the savage is exactly measured by the world he has around him4 ,the dull1 almost animal1 sensation and feeling1 which is what we may call his mental action1 is just the obverse of the narrow circumference that girdles his external world4 ,the beauty and interest of the grander phenomena of terrestrial nature1 and of the celestial movements1 are ideally non-existent for a being1 whose whole soul is swallowed up in the craving for food1 the fear of attack1 and the lower enjoyments of sense4 ,in the course of history we can see the intellect growing deeper and broader1 and the limits of the world recede simultaneously with the advance of the mind4 ,this process or movement of culture takes place in the sequence of generations1 and in the variety of races and civilisations spread over the face of the world4 ,but here too1 the higher science1 not resting in the merely historical inquiry1 takes no interest in the medium of time1 and merely uses it to supply material for the rational sequence of ideas#d4 ,the objective world of knowledge is really at one with the subjective world3 they spring from a common source1 what ,kant called the 'original synthetic unity of apperception4' ,the distinction between them flows from abstraction1 from failure to keep in view the whole round of life and experience4 ,the subjective world--the mind of man--is really constituted by the same force as the objective world of nature3 the latter has been translated from the world of extension1 with its externality of parts in time and space1 into an inner world of thought where unity1 the fusion or coalescence of all types and forms1 is the leading feature4 ,the difficulty of passing from the world of being to the world of thoughts1 from notion to thing1 from subject to object1 from ,ego to ,non-ego1 is a difficulty which men have unduly allowed to grow upon them4 ,it grows by talking of and analysing mere being1 mere thought1 mere notion1 or mere thing4 ,and it will be dispelled when it is seen that there is no mere being1 and no mere thought3 that these two halves of the unity of experience--the unity we divide and the division we unify in every judgment we make--are continually leaning out of themselves1 each towards the other4 ,but men1 beginning as they must from themselves1 and failing to revise and correct their stand-point till it became an 1 argued from a belief that the individual mind was a fixed and absolute centre1 from which the universe had to be evaluated4 ,in ,hegel's words1 they made man and not ,god the object of their philosophy#e4 ,so that ,kant really showed the outcome of a system which acted on the hypothesis that man in his individual capacity was all in all4 ,hegel1 on his own showing1 came to prove that the real scope of philosophy was ,god2--that the ,absolute is the 'original synthetic unity' from which the external world and the ,ego have issued by differentiation1 and in which they return to unity4 ,if this be so1 then there is behind the external world and behind the mind an organism of pure types or forms of thought1--an organism which presents itself1 in a long array of fragments1 to the senses in the world of nature1 where all things lie outside of one another1 and which then is1 as it were1 reflected back into itself so as to constitute the mind1 or spiritual world1 where all parts tend to coalesce in a more than organic unity4 ,the deepest craving of thought1 and the fundamental problem of philosophy1 will accordingly be to discover the nature and law of that totality or primeval unity1--the totality which we see appearing in the double aspect of nature and mind1 and which we first become acquainted with as it is manifested in this state of dis-union4 ,to satisfy this want is what the ,logic of ,hegel seeks4 ,it lays bare the kingdom of those potent shades1--the phases of the ,idea--which embodies itself more concretely in the external world of body1 and the inward world of mind4 ,the psychological or individualist conditions1 which even in the ,kantian criticism sometimes seem to set up mind as an entity parallel to the objects of nature1 and antithetic to nature as a whole1 have fallen away4 ,reason has to be taken in the whole of its actualisation as a world of reason1 not in its bare possibility1 not in the narrow ground of an individual's level of development1 but in the realised formations of reasonable knowledge and action1 as shown in ,art and ,life1 ,science and ,religion4 ,in this way we come to a reason which might be in us or in the world1 but which1 being to a certain extent different from either1 was the focus of two orders of manifestations4 ,to ascertain that ultimate basis of the world and mind was the chief thing philosophy had to see to4 ,but in order to do this1 a good deal of preliminary work was necessary4 ,the work of ,logic1 as understood by ,hegel1 involves a stand-point which is not that of every-day life or reflection on experience4 ,it presupposes the whole process from the provisional starting-point which seems at first sight simplest and universally acceptable1 upwards to the unhypothetical principle which--though at a long distance--it involves and leads up to1 or presupposes4 ,we all know ,aristotle's dictum 3 ,nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu4 ,the fact of sense and feeling is the fact of experience3 or rather the fact and reality of experience is the underlying truth which the expression of it in terms of sense and perception inadequately interprets4 ,even in the principles of sensation there is judgment1 thought1 reasoning3 but it needs eliciting1 re-statement1 opening up1 and explanation4 ,the ,phenomenology of ,mind is1 as ,hegel himself has said1 his voyage of discovery4 ,it traces the path1 and justifies the work of traversing it1 from the ill-founded and imperfect certainties of sense and common-sense1 up through various scientific1 moral1 and religious modes of interpreting experience and expressing its net sum of reality1 till it culminates in the stand-point of 'pure thought1' of supreme or 'absolute' consciousness4 ,it is certainly not a history of the individual mind3 and equally little is it a history of the process of the intellectual development of the race4 ,in a way it mixes up both4 ,for its main interest is not on the purely historical side4 ,it indulges in bold transitions1 in sudden changes of scene from ancient ,greece and ,rome to modern ,germany1 from public facts and phases of national life to works of fiction 7compare its use of ,goethe's ,faust and his version of ,rameau's ,nephew74 ,it lingers--for historical accuracy and proportion unduly--over the period of ,kant and ,fichte1 and reads ,seneca by the light of the ,sorrows of ,werther4 ,for its aim is to gather from the inspection of all ways in which men have attempted to reach reality the indication of their several content of truth1 and of the several defects from it1 so as to show the one necessary path on which even all their errors converge and which they serve to set out in clearer light4 ,hegel's philosophy is undoubtedly the outcome of a vast amount of historical experience1 particularly in the ancient world1 and implies a somewhat exhaustive study of the products of art1 science1 politics1 and religion4 ,by experience he was led to his philosophy1 not by what is called a priori reasoning4 ,it is curious indeed to observe the prevalent delusion that ,german philosophy is the 'high priori road1'--to hear its profundity admired1 but its audacity and neglect of obvious facts deplored4 ,the fact is that without experience neither ,hegel nor anybody else will come to anything4 ,but1 on the other hand1 experience is in one sense only the yet undeciphered mass of feeling and reality1 the yet unexpounded psychical content of his life2 or1 taken in another acceptation1 it is only a form which in one man's case means a certain power of vision1 and in another a different degree4 ,one man sees the idea which explains and unifies experience as actuality3 to the other man it is only a subjective notion4 ,and even when it is seen1 there are differences in the subsequent development4 ,one man sees it1 asserts it on all hands1 and then closes4 ,another sees it1 and asks if this is all1 or if it is only part of a system4 ,an appeal to 'my experience' is very much like an appeal to 'my sentiments' or 'my feelings'3 it may prove as much or as little as can be imagined3 in other words1 it can prove nothing4 ,the same is true of the appeal to consciousness1 that oracle on whose dicta it has sometimes been proposed to found a system of philosophy4 ,by that name seems meant the deliverances of some primal and unerring nucleus of mind1 some real and central self1 whose voice can be clearly distinguished from the mere divergent cries of self-interest and casual opinion4 ,that such discernment is possible no philosophy will seek to deny3 but it is a discernment which involves comparison1 examination1 and reasoning4 ,and in that case the appeal to consciousness is the exhortation to clear and deliberate thinking4 ,while1 on another side1 it hints that philosophy does not--in the end--deal with mere abstractions1 but with the real concrete life of mind4 ,and if an appeal to other people's experience is meant1 that is only an argument from authority4 ,what other people experience is their business1 not mine4 ,experience means a great deal for which it is not the right name3 and to give an explanation of what it is1 and what it does1 would render a great service to ,english methodologists4 ,there are1 however1 two modes in which these studies to discover the truth may appear4 ,in the one case they are reproduced in all their fragmentary and patch-work character4 ,they are supposed to possess a value of their own1 and are enunciated with all the detail of historic incident4 ,the common-place books of a man are1 as it were1 published to instruct the world and give some hint of the extent of his reading4 ,but1 in the other case1 the scaffolding of incident and externality may be removed4 ,the single facts1 which gave the persuasion of the idea1 are dismissed1 as interesting only for the individual student on his way to truth3 or1 if the historical vehicle of truth be retained at all1 it is translated into another and intellectual medium4 ,such a history1 the quintessence of extensive and deep research1 is presented in the ,phenomenology4 ,the names of persons and places have faded from the record1 as if they had been written in evanescent inks1--dates are wanting1--individualities and their biographies yield up their place to universal and timeless principles4 ,such typical forms are the concentrated essence of endless histories4 ,they remind one of the descriptions which ,plato in his ,republic gives of the several forms of temporal government4 ,or1 to take a modern instance1 the ,hegelian panorama of thought which presents only the universal evolution of thought1--that evolution in which the whole mind of the world takes the place of all his children1 whether they belong to the common level1 or stand amongst representative heroes1--may be paralleled to ,english readers by ,browning's poem of ,sordello4 ,there can be no question that such a method is exposed to criticism1 and likely to excite misconception4 ,if it tend to give artistic completeness to the work1 it also tantalises the outsider who has a desire to reach his familiar standing-ground4 ,he wishes a background of time and space1 where the forms of the abstract ideas may be embodied to his mind's eye4 ,in most ages1 and with good ground1 the world has been sceptical1 when it perceived no reference to authorities1 no foot-notes1 no details of experiments made3 nor is it better disposed to accept provisorily1 and find1 as the process goes on1 that it verifies itself to intelligence4 ,footnote #a3 ,de ,anima1 iii4 #d4 ,footnote #b3 ,a philological parallel may make this clearer4 ',the ,indo-,german1' says ,misteli 7,typen des ,sprachbaues1 p4 #cfc71 'embraces or condenses several categories in a single idea in a way which though less logical is more fruitful2 for in this way he procures graspable totals with which he can work further1 and not patch-work which would crumble away in his hands4 ,our ,he includes four grammatical categories1 which work not separately1 but as a whole3--third person1 masculine gender1 singular1 nominative2 whereas the ,magyar is the vehicle only of one category1 the third person1 which is either determined as singular by the context1 or as plural by the addition of k3 gender in these languages does not exist3 and as subject again is specially interpreted from the context4 ,the unification of the four categories makes ,he an individual and a word2 the generality and isolation of one category makes an abstract and a stem4' ,footnote #c3 ,hckel1 ,natrliche ,schpfungs-,geschichte1 p4 #aeg4 ,footnote #d3 ,see above1 pp4 #aee1 #aih4 ,footnote #e3 ,hegel's ,werke1 vol4 i4 p4 #ae4 ,,chapter ,,xx4 ,,general ,,law ,,of ,,the ,,philosophy ,,of ,,history4 ',the order and concatenation of ideas1' says ,spinoza1 'is the same as the order and concatenation of things#a4' ,the objective world at least of acts and institutions develops parallel with the growth and system of men's ideas4 ,in the tangled skein which human life and reality present to the observer1 the only promising clue is to be found in the process by which in history the past throws light on the present and gets light in return4 ,there in the stream of time and in the expanses of space the condensed results1 the hard knots1 which present life offers for explanation1 are broken up into a vast number of problems1 each presenting a different aspect1 and one helping towards a fairer and clearer appreciation of another4 ,the present medium of general intelligence and theory in which we live embraces in a way the results of all that has preceded it1 of all the steps of culture through which the world has risen4 ,but in this body of intellectual beliefs and ideas with which our single soul is clad1--in this common soil of thought1--the several contributions of the past have been half or even wholly obliterated1 and are only the shadows of their old selves4 ,what in a former day was a question of all-engrossing interest has left but a trace3 the complete and detailed formations of ancient thought have lost their distinctness of outline1 and have shrunk into mere shadings in the contour of our intellectual world4 ,questions1 from which the ancient philosophers could never shake themselves loose1 are now only a barely perceptible nuance in the complex questions of the present day4 ,discussions about the bearings of the 'one' and the 'many1' puzzles like those of ,zeno1 and the casuistry of statesmanship such as is found in the ,politics of ,aristotle1 have for most people little else than an antiquarian interest4 ,we scarcely detect the faint traces they have left in the 'burning questions' of our own age4 ,we are too ready to forget that the past is never altogether annihilated1 and that every step1 however slight it may seem1 which has once been taken in the movement of intellect1 must be traversed again in order to understand the constitution of our present intellectual world4 ,to outward appearance the life and work of past generations have so completely lost their organic nature1 with its unified and vital variety1 that in their present phase they have turned into hard and opaque atoms of thought4 ,the living forces of growth1 as geologists tell us1 which pulsed through the vegetables of one period are suspended and put in abeyance3 and these vegetables turn into what we call the inorganic and inanimate strata of the earth4 ,similarly1 when all vitality has been quenched or rendered torpid in the structures of thought1 they sink into the material from which individuals draw their means of intellectual support4 ,this inorganic material of thought stands to the mind1 almost in the same way as the earth and its products stand to the body of a man4 ,if the one is our material1 the other is our spiritual substance4 ,in the one our mind1 as in the other our body1 lives1 moves1 and has its being4 ,but in each case besides the practical need1 which bids us consume the substance as dead matter1 and apply it to use1 there is the theoretical bent which seeks to reproduce ideally the past as a living and fully developed organism4 ',this past1' says ,hegel1 'is traversed by the individual1 in the same way as one who begins to study a more advanced science repeats the preliminary lessons with which he had long been acquainted1 in order to bring their information once more before his mind4 ,he recalls them3 but his interest and study are devoted to other things4 ,in the same way the individual must go through all that is contained in the several stages in the growth of the universal mind3 but all the while he feels that they are forms of which the mind has divested itself1--that they are steps on a road which has been long ago completed and levelled4 ,thus1 points of learning1 which in former times tasked the mature intellects of men1 are now reduced to the level of exercises1 lessons1 and even games of boyhood3 and in the progress of the schoolroom we may recognise the course of the education of the world1 drawn1 as it were1 in shadowy outline#b4' ,the scope of historical investigation therefore is this4 ,it shows how every shading in the present world of thought1 which makes our spiritual environment1 has been once living and actual with an independent being of its own4 ,but it also reveals the presence of shades and elements in the present which if our eyes had looked on the present alone we should scarcely have suspected3 and it thus enables us to interpolate stages in development of which the result preserves only rudimentary traces4 ,and1 when carried out in a philosophical spirit1 it shows further1 that in those formations1 which are produced in each period of the structural development of reason1 the universe of thought1 or the ,idea1 is always whole and complete1 but characterised in some special mode which for that period seems absolute and final4 ,each form or 'dimension' of thought1 in which the totality is grasped and unified1 is therefore not so simple or elementary as it may seem to casual observers regarding only the simplicity of language3 it is a total1 embracing more or less of simpler elements1 each of which was once an inferior total1 though in this larger sphere they are reduced to unity4 ,thus each term or period in the process is really an individualised whole1 with a complex interconnexion and contrast included in it3 it is concrete4 ,no single word or phrase explains it3 yet it is one totality1--a rounded life1 from which its several spheres of life must be explained4 ,but when that period is passing away1 the form of its idea is separated1 and retained1 apart from the life and mass of the elements which constituted it a real totality2 and then the mere shading or shell1 with only part of its context of thought1 is left abstract4 ,when that time has come1 a special form1 a whole act in the drama1 of humanity has been transformed into an empty husk1 and is only a name4 ,the sensuous reality of life1 as it is limited in space and time1 and made palpable in matter and motion1 is however the earliest cradle of humanity4 ,the environment of sense is prior in the order of time to the environment of thought4 ,who1 it may be asked1 first wrought their way out of that atmosphere of sense into an ether of pure thought8 ,who first saw that in sense there was yet present something more than sensation1--that the deliverances of sense-perception rest upon and involve relations1 ties1 distinctions1 which contradict its self-confidence and carry us beyond its simple indications84 ,who laid the first foundations of that world of reason in which the civilised nations of the modern period live and move8 ,the answer is1 the ,greek philosophers3 and in the first place the philosophers of ,elea4 ,for ,hegel the history of thought begins with ,greece4 ,all that preceded the beginnings of ,greek speculation1 and most that lies outside it1 has only a secondary interest for the culture of the ,west4 ,but 'many heroes lived before the days of ,agamemnon1' ,the records of culture no longer begin with ,greece4 ,even in ,hegel's own day1 voices1 like those of the poet ,rckert 7in his 'habilitation'-exercise71 were heard declaring that the true fountain of ,european thought1 the real philosophy1 was to be sought in the remoter ,east4 ,since the time of ,hegel1 the study of primitive life1 and of the rise of primitive ideas in morals and religion1 has enabled us to some extent to trace the early gropings of barbarian fancy and reason4 ,the comparative study of languages has1 on the other hand1 partly revealed the contrivances by which human reason has risen from one grade of consciousness to another4 ,the sciences of language and of primitive culture have revealed new depths in the development of thought1 where thought is still enveloped in nature and sense and symbols1--depths which were scarcely dreamed of in the earlier part of the present century4 ,here and there1 investigators have even supposed that they had found the cradle of some elements in art1 religion1 and society1 or1 it may be1 of humanity itself4 ,these researches have accomplished much1 and they promise to accomplish more4 ,they help us perhaps to take a juster view of the early ,greek thinkers1 and show how much they still laboured under conditions of thought and speech from which their struggles have partly freed us4 ,but for the present1 and with certain explanations to be given later1 it may still be said that the birthday of our modern world is the moment when the ,greek sages began to construe the facts of the universe4 ,before their time the world lay1 as it were1 in a dream-life4 ,unconsciously in the womb of time the spirit of the world was growing1--its faculties forming in secresy and silence1--until the day of birth when the preparations were completed1 and the young spirit drew its first breath in the air of thought4 ,a new and to us all-important epoch in the history of thought begins with the ,greeks3 and the utterances of ,parmenides mark the first hard1 and still somewhat material1 outlines of the spiritual world in which we live4 ,other nations of an older day had gathered the materials3 in their languages1 customs1 religions1 c41 there was an unconscious deposit of reason4 ,it was reserved for the ,greeks to recognise that reason3 and thus in them reason became conscious4 ,for us1 then1 it was the ,greek philosophers who distinctly drew the distinction between sense and thought1 and who first translated the actual forms of our natural life into their abbreviated equivalents in terms of logic4 ,the struggle to carry through this transition1 this elevation into pure thought1 is what gives the dramatic interest to the ,dialogues of ,plato and keeps the sympathy of his readers always fresh4 ,socrates1 we are told1 first taught men to seek a general definition3 not to be content with having--like ,pythagoreans--their meaning wrapped up inseparably in psychical images and quasi-material symbols4 ,he taught them to refer word to fellow word1 to elicit the underlying idea by the collision and comparison of instances1 to get at the 'content' which was identical in all the multiplicity of forms4 ,he taught them1 in--brief1 to think3 and ,plato carried out widely and deeply the lesson4 ,the endeavour to create an ideal world1 which1 at its very creation1 seems often to be transformed into a refined and attenuated copy of the sense-world1 meets us in almost every page of his ,dialogues4 ,in ,aristotle this effort1 with its concomitant tendency to give 'sensible' form to the ideal1 is so far over and past2 and some sort of intellectual world1 perhaps narrow and inadequate1 is reached1--the logical scheme in which immediate experience was expressed and codified4 ,what these thinkers began1 succeeding ages have inherited and promoted4 ,in the environment of reason1 therefore1 which encompasses the consciousness of our age1 are contained under a generalised form and with elimination of all the particular circumstances1 the results won in the development of mind and morals4 ,these results now constitute the familiar joints and supports in the framework of ordinary thought3 around and upon them cluster our beliefs and imaginations4 ,during each epoch of history1 the consciousness of the world1 at first by the mouth of its great men1 its illustrious statesmen1 artists1 and philosophers1 has explicitly recognised1 and translated into terms of thought1--into logical language1--that synthesis of the world which the period had practically secured by the action of its children4 ,that activity went on1 as is the way of natural activities1 spontaneously1 through the pressure of need1 by an immanent adaptation of means to ends1 not in conscious straining after a result4 ,for the conscious or reflective effort of large bodies of men is often in a direction contrary to the ,spirit of the ,time4 ,this ,spirit of the ,time1 the absolute mind1 which is neither religious nor irreligious1 but infinite and absolute in its season1 is the real motive principle of the world4 ,but that ,spirit of the ,time is not always the voice that is most effective at the poll1 or rings loudest in public rhetoric4 ,it is often a still small voice1 which only the wise1 the self-restrained1 the unselfish hear4 ,and he who hears it and obeys it1 not he who follows the blatant crowd1 is the hero4 ,it is only to a mistaken or an exaggerated hero-worship1 therefore1 that ,hegel can be said to be a foe4 ,great men are great3 but the ,spirit of the ,time is greater3 their greatness lies in understanding it and bringing it to consciousness4 ,the man1 who would act independently of his time and in antagonism to it1 is only the exponent of its latent tendencies4 ,nor need the synthesis be always formulated by a philosopher in order to leaven the minds of the next generation4 ,the whole system of thought1--the theory of the time1--its world1 in short1 influences minds1 although it is not explicitly formulated and stated3 it becomes the nursery of future thought and speculation4 ,philosophy in its articulate utterances only gives expression to the silent and half-conscious grasp of reason over its objects4 ,but when the adaptation is not merely reached but seen and felt1 when the synthesis or world of that time is made an object of self-consciousness1 the exposition has made an advance upon the period which preceded4 ,for that period started in its growth from the last exposition1 the preceding system of philosophy1 after it had become the common property of the age1 and taken its place in their mental equipment4 ,each exposition or perception of the synthesis by the philosopher restores or re-affirms the unity which in the divided energies of the period1 in its progressive1 reforming1 and reactionary aspects1 in its differentiating time1 had to a great extent been lost4 ,by the reforming1 progressive1 and scientific movement of which each period is full1 the unity or totality with which it began is shown to be defective4 ,the value of the initial synthesis is impaired2 its formula is found inadequate to comprehend the totality3 and the differences which that unity involved1 or which were implicitly in it1 are now explicitly affirmed4 ,but the bent towards unity is a natural law making itself felt even in the period of differentiation4 ,and it makes itself felt in the pain of contradiction1 of discord1 of broken harmony4 ,and that pain--which is the sign of an ever-present life that refuses to succumb to the encroaching elements--is the stimulus to re-construction4 ,only so far as pain ceases to be pain1 as it benumbs1 and deadens1 does it involve stagnation3 as pain proper1 felt as resistance to an inner implicitly victorious principle1 it stimulates and quickens to efforts to make life whole again4 ,the integrating principle is present and active4 ,there is then an effort1 a re-action2 the feeling has to do something to make itself outwardly felt3 the implicit has to be actually put in its place1 forced as it were into action and set forth#c3 and the existing contrasts and differences which the re-forming agency has called into vigorous life are lifted from their isolation1 and show of independence1 and kept1 as it were1 suspended in the unity#d4 ,the differences are not lost or annihilated3 but they come back to a centre1 they find themselves1 as it were1 at home3 they lose their unfair prominence and self-assertion1 and sink into their places as constituents in the embracing organism#e4 ,the unity which comes is not however the same as the unity which disappeared1 however much it may seem so4 ,the mere notion--the inner sense and inner unity--has put itself forward into the real world3 it is no longer a mere subjective principle1 but as moulded into actuality1 into the objective world1 it has become an ,idea4 7,begriff is now ,idee47 ,for the ,idea is always more than a notion3 it is a notion translated into objectivity1 and yet in objectivity not sinking into a mere congeries of independent parts1 but retaining them 'ideally'--united by links of thought and service--in its larger ideal-reality4 ,it is all that the object ought to be 7and which in a sense it must be1 if it is at all71 and all that the subject sought to be and looked forward to4 ,the mind of the world moves1 as it were1 in cycles1 but with each new cycle a difference supervenes1 a new tone is perceptible4 ,history1 which reflects the changing aspects of reality1 does and does not repeat itself4 ,the distinctions and the unity are neither of them the same after each step as they were before it3 they have both suffered a change3 it is a new scene that comes above the horizon1 however like the last it may seem to the casual observer4 ,thus when the process of differentiation is repeated anew1 it is repeated in higher terms1 multiplied1 and with a higher power or wider range of meaning#f4 ,each unification however is a perfect world1 a complete whole3 it is the same sum of being2 but in each successive level of advance it receives a fuller expression1 and a more complexly-grouped type of features#g4 ,such is the rhythmic movement1--the ebb and flow of the world1 always recurring with the same burden but1 as we cannot but hope1 with richer variety of tones1 and fuller sense of itself4 ,the sum of actuality1 the ,absolute1 is neither increased nor diminished4 ,the world1 the ultimate reality of experience and life1 was as much a rounded total to the ,hebrew ,patriarchs as it is to us3 without advancing1 it has been1 we may say1 in its expression deepened1 developed1 and organised4 ,in one part of the sway of thought1 however1 there is a harder1 narrower1 insistance 7by practical and business minds7 on the sufficiency of a definite principle to satisfy all wants and to make all mysteries plain1 and a disposition to ignore all other elements of life3 at another1 there is a fuller recognition of the differences1 gaps1 and contradictions1 involved in the last synthesis1--which recognition it is the tendency of scientific inquiry1 of reforming efforts1 of innovation1 to produce3 and in the last period of the sway1 there is a stronger and more extended grasp taken by the unity pervading these differences1--which is the work appointed to philosophy gathering up the results of science and practical amendments4 ,to this rhythmical movement ,hegel has appropriated the name of ,dialectic4 ,the name came in the first instance from ,kant1 but ultimately from ,plato1 where it denotes the process which brings the 'many' under the 'one1' and divides the 'one' into the 'many4' ,but how1 it may be asked1 does difference spring up1 if we begin with unity1 and how do the differences return into the unity8 ,in other words1 given a universal1 how are we ever to get at particulars1 and how will these particulars ever give rise to a real individual8 ,such is the problem1 in the technical language of the ,logic of the ',notion4' ,and we may answer1 that the unity or universal in question is either a true and adequate or an imperfect unity4 ,in the latter case it is a mere unit1 amid other units1 bound to them and serving to recall them by relations of contrast1 complement1 similarity4 ,it is one of many1--a subordinate member in a congeries1 and not the ,one4 ,if1 on the contrary1 it be a true ,unity1 it is a concrete universal1--the parent of perpetual variety4 ,the unity1 if it be its genuine shape which is formulated by philosophers1 is not mere monotony without differences4 ,if it is a living and real ,idea1 containing a complex inter-action of principles3 it is not a single line of action1 but the organic confluence of several4 ,no one single principle by itself is enough to state a life1 a character1 or a period4 ,but as the unity comes before the eye of the single thinker1 it is seldom or never grasped with all its fulness of life and difference4 ,the whole synthesis1 although it is implicitly present and underlies experience and life as its essential basis1 is not consciously apprehended1 but for the most part taken on one side only1 one emphatic aspect into which it has concentrated itself4 ,and even if the master could grasp the whole1 could see the unity of actuality in all its differences1 7and we may doubt whether any man or any philosopher can thus incarnate the prerogative of reason17 his followers and the popular mind would not imitate him4 ,while his grasp of comprehension may possibly have been thorough1 though he may have seen life whole through all its differences1 inequalities1 and schisms1 and with all these reduced or idealised to their due proportions1 into the unity beyond1 the crowd who follow him are soon compelled to lay exclusive stress on some one side of his theory4 ,some of them see the totality from one aspect1 some from another4 ,it is indeed the whole which in a certain sense they see3 but it is the whole narrowed down to a point4 ,while his theory was a comprehensive and concrete grasp1 including and harmonising many things which seem otherwise wide apart1 theirs is abstract and inadequate3 it fixes on a single point1 which is thus withdrawn from its living and meaning-giving context1 and left as an empty name4 ,now it is the very nature of popular reasoning to tend to abstractions1 in this sense of the word4 ,popular thought wants the time and perseverance necessary to retain a whole truth1 and so is contented with a partial image4 ,it seeks for simple and sharp precision3 it likes to have something distinctly before it1 visible to the eye of imagination1 and capable of being stated in a clear and unambiguous formula for the intellect4 ,and popular thought--the dogmatic insistence on one-sided truth--is not confined to the so-called non-philosophic world3 just as1 on the other hand1 the inclusive and comprehensive unity of life and reality is seen and felt and recognised by many--and felt by them first--who have no claim to the technical rank of philosophers4 ,popular thought is the thought which skims the surface of reality1 which addresses itself to the level of opinion prevalent in all members of the mass as such1 and does not go beyond that into the ultimate and complex depths of experience4 ,thus it comes about that the concrete or adequate synthesis which should have appeared in the self-conscious thought of the period1 when it reflected upon what it was1 has been replaced by a narrow and one-sided formula1 an abstract and formal universal1 a universal which does not express all the particulars4 ,one predominant side of the synthesis steals the place of the total3 what should have been a comprehensive universal has lowered itself into a particular4 ,not indeed the same particular as existed before the union3 because it has been influenced by the synthesis1 so as to issue with a new colouring1 as if it had been steeped in a fresh liquid4 ,but still it is really a particular3 and as such1 it evokes a new particular in antagonism to it and exhibiting an element latent in the synthesis4 ,if the first side of the antithesis which claims unduly to be the total1 or universal1 be called ,conservative1 the second must be called ,reforming or ,progressive4 ,if the first step is ,dogmatic1 the second is ,sceptical4 ,if the one side assumes to be the whole1 the other practically refutes the assumption4 ,if the one agency clings blindly to the unity1--as when pious men rally round the central idea of religion1 the other as tenaciously and narrowly holds to the difference1--as when science displays the struggle for existence and the empire of chance among the myriads of aimless organisms4 ,they are two warring abstractions1 each in a different direction4 ,but as they are the offspring of one parent1--as they have each in their own way narrowed the whole down to a point1 it cannot but be that when they evolve or develop all that is in them1 they will ultimately coincide1 and complete each other4 ,the contradiction will not disappear until it has been persistently worked out1--when each opposing member which was potentially a total has become what it was by its own nature destined to be4 ,and this disappearance of the antithesis is the reappearance of the unity in all its strength1 reinforced with all the wealth of new distinctions4 ,thus on a large scale we have seen the law of growth1 of development1 of life4 ,it may be called growth by antagonism4 ,but the antagonism here is over-ruled1 and subject to the guidance of an indwelling unity4 ,mere antagonism--if there be such a thing--would lead to nothing4 ,a mere positive or affirmative point of being would lead to no antithesis1 were it not1 so to speak1 a point floating in an ether of larger life and being1 whence it draws an outside element which it overcomes1 assimilates and absorbs4 ,a bare national mind only grows to richer culture1 because it lives in a universal human life1 and can say ,nihil humani a me alienum puto4 ,so too the mere unit is always tainted with a dependence on outside3 or it is always implicitly more than a mere unit3 and what seems to come upon it from outside1 is really an enemy from within1 and it falls because there is treason within its walls4 ,the revolution succeeds because the party of conservative order is not so hard and homogeneous as it appears4 ,so1 too1 it is the immanent presence of the complete thought1 of the ,idea1 which is the heart and moving spring that sets going the pulse of the universal movement of thought1 and which reappears in every one of these categories to which the actualised thought of an age has been reduced4 ,in every term of thought there are three stages or elements3 the original narrow definiteness1 claiming to be self-sufficient1--the antagonism and criticism to which this gives rise1--and the union which results when the two supplement and modify each other4 ,in the full life and organic unity of every notion there is a definite kernel1 with rigid outlines as if it were immovable3 there is a revulsion against such exclusiveness1 a questioning and critical attitude3 and there is the complete notion1 where the two first stages interpenetrate4 ,footnote #a3 ,eth4 ii #g4 ,footnote #b3 ,phenomenologiedes ,geistes1 p4 #bb4 ,footnote #c3 ,gesetzt4 ,footnote #d3 ,aufgehoben4 ,footnote #e3 ,idee3 ,ideeller ,weise4 ,footnote #f3 ,potenz4 ,footnote #g3 ',nicht nur die ,einsicht in die ,abhngigkeit des ,einzelnen vom ,ganzen ist allein das ,wesentliche2 ebenso dass jedes ,moment selbst unabhngig vom ,ganzen das ,ganze ist1 und dies ist das ,vertiefen in die ,sache4' 7,hegels ,leben1 p4 #edh47 ,,chapter ,,xxi4 ,,abstract ,,and ,,concrete ,i ,,and ,,the ,,ordinary ,,logic4 ,the ordinary logic-books have made us all familiar with the popular distinction between ,abstract and ,concrete4 ,by a concrete term they mean the name of an existence or reality which is obvious to the senses1 and is found in time and place2--or they mean the name of an attribute when we expressly or tacitly recognise its dependence upon such a thing of the senses4 ,when1 on the contrary1 the attribute is forcibly withdrawn from its context and made an independent entity in the mind1 the term expressing it becomes in the usual phraseology abstract4 ,any term therefore which denotes a non-sensible or intelligible object would probably be called abstract4 ,and there is something to be said for the distinction1 which1 though unsuccessful in its expression1 has some feeling of the radical antithesis between mere being and mere thought4 ,it is true1 that in the totality of sense and feeling1 in the full sense-experience1 there is a concrete fulness1 as it were1 an infinite store of features and phases waiting for subsequent analysis to detect4 ,in the real kind of actual nature there is an inexhaustible mine of properties1 which no artificial classification and description can ever come to the end of4 ,every quality which we state1 every relation which we predicate1 is a partial and incomplete element in this presupposed reality1 this implicit concrete2 and as such is abstract1 and comparatively unreal4 ,it is something forcibly torn out of and held apart from its context4 ,but on the other hand the concrete reality is not at first real1 but implicit3 it becomes really concrete only as it re-embraces1 and re-constitutes in its totality the elements detected by analysis4 ,but the popular distinction forgets this1 and gives the title and rank of concrete to what very poorly deserves the name1 viz4 to the yet undiscerned reality denoted by a substantive name4 ,yet there can be little doubt that the popular use of these terms1 or the popular apprehension of what constitutes reality1--for that is what it comes to1--is sufficiently represented by the ordinary logic-books4 ,so that1 if the whole business of the logician lies in formulating the distinctions prevalent in popular thought1 the ordinary logic is correct4 ,now the popular logic of the day1--the logic which has long been taught in our schools and universities--has three sources4--,in the first place1 but in a slight degree1 it trenches upon the province of psychology1 and gives some account of the operation by which concepts or general ideas are supposed to be formed1 and of the errors or fallacies which naturally creep into the process of reasoning4 ,this is the more strictly modern1 the descriptive part of our logic-books4--,but1 secondly1 the logic of our youth rests in a much higher degree upon the venerable authority of ,aristotle4 ,that logic1 within its own compass1 was a masterpiece of analysis1 and for many centuries maintained an ascendency over the minds of men1 which it well deserved4 ,but it was not an analysis of thought or knowledge as a whole1 and it treated its subject in fragments4 ,it gave in one place an analysis of science and in another an analysis of certain methods1 which could be observed in popular discussions and practical oratory4 ,as ,lord ,bacon remarked1 it did little else than state and1 it may be1 exaggerate the rationale of argumentation4 ,a high level of popular thought it unquestionably was1 which ,aristotle had to investigate1--a level which many generations of less favoured races were unable to reach4 ,but there were defects in this ,logic which fatally marred its general usefulness1 when the limited scope of its original intention had been lost sight of4 ,the thoughts of ,greece1 it has been said1 were greatest and most active in the line of popular action for the city and the public interest1 in the discussions1 the quibbles1 the fallacies1 and rhetorical arts of the barber's shop and the 'agora4' ,the aim of such exercises was to convince1 to demonstrate1 to persuade1 to overcome2--it might be for good and truth1 but also it might not4 ,and accordingly the ,logic of ,aristotle has been said to have for its end and canon the power to convince and to give demonstrative certainty4 ,there is some ground1 it may be1 for this charge4 ,the ancient logician seems to luxuriate in a rank growth of forms of sophism1 and in an almost childlike fondness for variety of argumentative method4 ,he seems resolved to trace the wayward tricks of thought and its phases through every nook and cranny1 to exhaust all the permutations and complications of its elements4 ,but let us be just1 and remember that all this was in the main a speculative inquiry--for the sake of theory4 ,it developed the powers of judgment and inference1 just as the modern research for new metals1 new plants1 or new planets1 develops the powers of observation4 ,both have some value in the material results they discover3 but1 after all1 the mental culture they give is the main thing4 ,and the talents quickened by deductive research are no whit less valuable than those owed to the other4 ,forms are essential1 even if it be possible to make the terrible mistake of regarding them as all-important to the exclusion of matter4 ,and then1 this is not the whole truth4 ,there is a perfectly serious ,greek science--,mathematics--a science of many branches3 a science which1 from ,plato downwards1 always stood in alliance with the studies of philosophy4 ,now1 it might be said1 perhaps with ground1 that the conception of mathematical method too much dominated all attempts to get at the rationale of science1 and led to the supremacy of syllogism4 ,it would be fairer perhaps to put this objection in another shape4 ,we should then say that the logic of ,aristotle1--the ,analytics--is too much restricted to dealing with the most general and elementary principles of reasoning4 ,but this is not in itself a fault4 ,it becomes a fault only where there is no growth in philosophy--when it is merely handed on from master to pupil2 and where there is a tendency to put philosophic doctrine to immediate use4 ,to expend the whole energy of intellect in laying bare the general principles1 the fundamental method1 of knowledge and inference1 is precisely what the founder of a science has a duty to do4 ,but the beginning thus made requires development--and development which is fruitful must proceed by correction and antithesis1 no less than by positive additions4 ,it was not given to ,aristotle's logic to be so carried on4 ,his logic1 like his system in general1 had no real successor to carry it on in the following generation3 and when in the less original ages of early ,byzantine rule it again found students1 it had become a quasi-sacred text which could only be commented on1 not modified and developed4 ,from the great ,exegetai of ,greece it passed westward to ,boethius and eastward to the ,syrian and ,persian commentators in the early centuries of the ,caliphate4 ,from these1 and from other intermediaries1 it may be1 it finally culminated in the work of the ,latin ,schoolmen of the later ,middle ,ages4 ,but the very reverence which all these expositors felt for the text of the ,philosopher rendered true development impossible4 ,then1 on the other hand1 the lust of practical utility caused a grave misconception of what logic can do4 ,for ,aristotle1 logic is a scientific analysis of the modes of inference2 its uses are those which follow intrinsically from all noble activity freely and zealously prosecuted4 ,but with the death of ,aristotle the great days of knowledge for the sake of knowledge and divine wisdom were over4 ,the ,stoics into whose hands the chief sceptre of philosophy1 directly or indirectly1 passed never rose above the conception of life as a task and a duty1 and of all other things1 literature1 science1 and art1 as subservient to the performance of that task4 ,the conception is an ennobling one3 but only with a relative or comparative nobility4 ,it ennobles1 if it is set beside and against the view that life is a frivolous play1 a sport of caprice and selfishness4 ,but it darkens and narrows the outlook of humanity1 when it loses sight of life as a joy1 a self-enlarging and self-realising freedom1 of life as in its supreme phase --or the enjoyment of ,god4 ,to the ,stoic1 therefore1--and to the dominant ,christian theory which entered to some extent on the ,stoic inheritance--logic1 like the rest of philosophy1 was something only valuable because ultimately it helped to save the soul4 ,it thus sunk into the position of an ,organon or instrument4 ,to the ,stoic1--for instance to ,epictetus--its value was its use to establish the doctrines of the ,stoic faith1 by confuting the ill-arranged and futile inferences on which were founded the aims and approvals of ordinary worldly life4 ,to the ,christian1 again1 it served as a method for putting into systematic shape 7under the guidance of certain supreme categories or principles also borrowed from ,greek thought7 the variety of fundamental and derivative aspects which successive minds1 pondering on the power and mystery of the ,christian faith1 had set forward as its essential dogmas4 ,it thus helped to build up 7out of the leading ideas of ,greek metaphysics1 and the principles emerging in the earliest attempts to formulate the law of ,christ7 that amalgam of the power of a divine life with the reflective thought of the teachers of successive generations1 which constitutes the dogmatic creed of ,christendom4 ,such a reconstruction in thought of the reality which underlies experience--7in this case the experience of the ,christian life71 is inevitable if man is to be man1 a free intelligence1 and not a mere animal-like feeling4 ,but its success is largely1 if not entirely1 dependent on the value of the logic and metaphysics which it employs3 and it would be a bold thing to say that the subtle1 abstract1 and unreal system of ,neo-,platonist and ,neo-,aristotelian thought was an organon adequate to cope with the breadth and depth1 latent if not very explicit1 in the fulness and reality of the religious life4 ,yet even as an ,organon1 ,logic had to sink to a lower rank4 ,as traditionalism grew supreme1 and religion ossified into a stereotyped form of belief and practice1 logic had less to do as an organiser of dogma4 ,it sank1 or seemed to sink 7for it would be rash to speak too categorically of an epoch of thought so far removed from modern sympathy and understanding as the age of the ,schoolmen71 into a futile 7and as it seems occasionally almost a viciously-despairing7 play with pro and contra1--into a lust of argumentation which in masters like ,ockam comes perilously close to scepticism or agnosticism4 ,more and more1 ,scholastic thought1 which1 at one time1 had been in the centre of such intellectual life as there was1 came to be stranded on the shore1 while the onward-flowing tide spread in other directions4 ,these were the great days of logical sway1 when it seemed as if logic could create new truth3 as if forms could beget matter4 ,so at least ran an outside rumour1 which was probably based on some amount of real folly4 ,but the more important point was that the old logic had lost touch with reality4 ,new problems were arising1 which it was--without a profound reconstruction--quite incapable of solving4 ,of these there were obviously two--not unconnected perhaps1 but arising in different spheres of life4 ,there was the revival of religious experience1 growing especially since the thirteenth century with an ever-swelling stream in the souls of men and women1 till it burst through all bounds of outward organisation in the catastrophe of the ,reformation4 ,luther may have been historically unjust 7as ,bacon afterwards was7 to the 'blind heathen master1' as he called ,aristotle3 but he was governed by a true instinct when 7unlike the compromise-loving ,melanchthon7 he found the traditional system of logic and metaphysics no proper organon for the new phase of faith and theory4 ,so1 too1 the new attempts at an inception and instauration of the sciences grew up outside the walls of old tradition1 and were at first perhaps discouraged and persecuted as infidel and heretical1 and were1 even without that burden1 pursued at much hap-hazard and with much ignorance both in aims and methods4 ,intelligent onlookers1--especially if inspired by an enthusiasm for the signs of an age happier for human welfare--could not but sec how needful it was to come to some understanding on the aims and methods of the rising sciences4 ,this want1 which he keenly felt1 ,francis ,bacon tried to satisfy4 ,he pointed out1 vaguely1 but zealously and in a noble spirit1 the end which that new logic had to accomplish4 ,bacon1 however1 could not do more than state these bold suggestions3 he had not the power to execute them4 ,he imagined indeed that he could display a method1 by which science would make incredible advances1 and the kingdom of truth in a few years come into the world4 ,but this is a sort of thing which no man can do4 ,plato1 if we take his ,republic for a political pamphlet1 had tried to do it for the social life of ,athens4 ,what ,plato could not do for the political world of ,greece1 ,bacon could not do for the intellectual world in his time3 for as the ,athenian worked under the shadow of his own state1 over-mastered even without his knowledge by the ordinances of ,athens1 so the ,englishman was evidently enthralled by the medieval conceptions and by the logic which he condemned4 ,what ,aristotle had for ages been supposed to do1 no philosopher could do for the new spirit of inquiry which had risen in and before the days of ,bacon4 ,that spirit1 as exhibited in his great contemporaries1 ,bacon1 as he has himself shown1 could not rightly understand or appreciate4 ,he failed1 above all1 to recognise the self-corrective1 tentative1 and hypothetical nature1 of all open inquiry4 ,but one need not for this disparage his work4 ,it showed a new sense of the magnitude of the modern problem3 it set prominently forward the comprehensive aim of human welfare3 and by its conception of the 'forma' it kept science pledged to a high ideal4 ,but ,bacon could only play the part of the guide-post3 he could not himself lay down the road4 ,and negatively he could warn against the belief that mathematics could generate or do more indeed than define the sciences4 ,the spirit of free science1 of critical investigation1 of inductive inquiry1 must and did constitute its forms1 legislation1 and methods for itself4 ,for no philosopher can lay down laws or methods beforehand which the sciences must follow4 ,the logician only comes after1 and1 appreciating and discovering the not always conspicuous methods of knowledge1 endeavours to gather them up and give them their proper place in the grand total of human thought1 correcting its inadequacies by their aid1 and completing their divisions by its larger unities4 ,or rather this is a picture of what ,english logic might have done4 ,but it does not do so in the ordinary and accepted text-books on the subject4 ,what it does do1 is rather as follows4 ,to the second and fundamental part which it subjects to a few unimportant alterations1--i4 e4 to the doctrine of terms1 propositions1 and reasonings1--it subjoins an enumeration of the methods used in the sciences4 ,to the rude minds of the ,teutonic peoples the logical system of ,aristotle had seemed almost a divine revelation4 ,from the brilliant intellect of ,greece a hand was stretched to help them in the arrangement of their religious beliefs4 ,the ,church accepted the aid of logic1 foreign though logic was to its natural bent1 as eagerly as the young society tried for a while to draw support from the ancient forms of the ,roman ,empire4 ,so with the advance of the ,sciences in modern times some hopeful spirits looked upon the ,inductive ,logic of ,mill in the light of a new revelation4 ,the vigorous action of the sciences hailed a systematic account of its methods almost as eagerly as the strong1 but untaught intellect of the barbarian world welcomed the lessons of ancient philosophy4 ,for the first time the sciences1 which had been working blindly or instinctively1 but with excellent success1 found their procedure stated clearly and definitely1 yet without any attempt to reduce their varied life to the ,procrustean bed of mathematics1 which had once been held to possess a monopoly of method4 ,the enormous influence of the physical sciences saw itself reflected in a distinct logical outline3 and the new logic became the dominant philosophy4 ,such for a while was the proud position of the ,inductive ,logic4 ,enthusiastic students of science in all countries1 who were not inaccessible to wider culture1 used quotations from ,mill to adorn and authorise their attempts at generalisation and theory4 ,a period of speculation in the scientific world succeeded the period of experiment1 in which facts had been collected and registered4 ,a chapter on ,method became a necessary introduction to all higher scientific treatises4 ,in our universities methodology was prodigally applied to the study of ancient philosophy4 ,and so long as the scientific epoch lasts in its one-sided prominence1 so long the theory of inductive and experimental methods may dominate the intellectual world4 ,but the ,inductive ,logic hardly rose to the due sense of its situation4 ,it has not held to the same high ideal as ,bacon set before it4 ,it has planted itself beside what it was good enough to call the ,deductive ,logic1 and given the latter a certain toleration as a harmless lunatic1 or an old pauper who had seen better days4 ,retaining the latter with certain modifications1 although it has now lost its meaning in the changed outlines of the intellectual world1 ,inductive ,logic adds a methodology of the sciences1 without however founding this methodology upon a comprehensive analysis of knowledge as a whole1 when enlarged and enlightened by the work of the sciences4 ,hence the two portions1--the old logic1 mutilated and severed from the ,greek world it grew out of1 and the new ,inductive or specially-scientific logic1 not going beyond a mere classification of methods1--can never combine1 any more than oil and water4 ,and the little psychology1 which is sometimes added1 does not facilitate the harmony4 ,but ,inductive ,logic should have adopted a more thorough policy4 ,there can only be one ,logic1 which must be both inductive and deductive1 but exclusively1 and in parts1 neither4 ,to achieve that task however ,logic must not turn its back indifferently on what it calls metaphysics1 and it must rise to a higher conception of the problems of what it calls psychology4 ,in these circumstances the ordinary logic1 in its fundamental terms1 is more on the level of popular thought1 than in a strictly scientific region1 and does not attempt to unite the two regions1 and examine the fundamental basis of thought on which scientific methods rest4 ,the case of ,concrete and ,abstract will illustrate what has been said4 ,to popular thought the sense-world is concrete3 the intellectual world abstract4 ,and so it is in the ordinary logic4 ,to ,hegel1 on the contrary1 the intellectual interpretation of the world of reality and experience is a truer and thus a more concrete description of it than that contained in a series of sense-terms4 ,now the difference between the two uses of the term is not a mere arbitrary change of names4 ,when the philosopher denies the concreteness of the sense-world1 and declares that it1 as merely sensible1 is only a mass of excluding elements1 a 'manifold1' and in the second instance a series of abstractions1 drawn out of this congeries by perception1 the change of language marks the total change of position between the philosophic and the popular consciousness4 ,reality and concreteness as estimated by the one line of thought are the very reverse of those of the other4 ,a mere sense-world to the philosopher is a world which wants unity1 which is made up of bits imperfectly adjusted to each other1 and always leading us to look for an explanation of them in sources outside them4 ,the single things we say we perceive1--the here and the now we perceive them in--are found1 upon reflection and analysis1 to depend upon general laws1 on relations that go beyond the single1--on what is neither here nor now1 but everywhere and timeless4 ,the reality of the thing is found to imply a general system of relations which make it what it is4 ,sense-perception in short is the beginning of knowledge3 and it begins by taking up its task piecemeal4 ,it rests upon a felt totality3 and to raise this to an intelligible totality1 it must at first only isolate one attribute at a time4 ,the apprehension of a thing from one side or aspect1--the apprehension of one thing apart from its connexions1--the retention of a term or formula apart from its context1--is what ,hegel terms 'abstract4' ,ordinary terms are essentially abstract4 ,they spring from the analysis of something which would1 in the first stage of the process1 in strictness be described not as concrete1 but as chaos3--as the indefinite or 'manifold' of sensation4 ,but the first conceptions1 which spring from this group when it is analysed1 are abstract3 they are each severed from the continuity of their reality4 ,to interpret our feeling1 our experience as felt1 we must break it up4 ,but the first face that presents itself is apt to impress us unduly1 and seems more real1 because nearer feeling3 on the other it is more unreal1 because less adequate as a total expression of the felt unity4 ,in the same sense we call ,political ,economy an abstract science1 because it looks upon man as a money-making and money-distributing creature1 and keeps out of sight his other qualities4 ,our notions in this way are more abstract or more concrete1 according as our grasp of thought extends to less or more of the relations which are necessarily pre-supposed by them4 ,on the other hand1 when a term of thought owns and emphasises its solidarity with others1 when it is not circumscribed to a single relation1 but becomes a focus in which a variety of relations converge1 when it is placed in its right post in the organism of thought1 its limits and qualifications as it were recognised and its degree ascertained1--then that thought is rendered 'concrete4' ,a concrete notion is a notion in its totality1 looking before and after1 connected indissolubly with others3 a unity of elements1 a meeting-point of opposites4 ,an abstract notion is one withdrawn from everything that naturally goes along with it1 and enters into its constitution4 ,all this is no disparagement of abstraction4 ,to abstract is a necessary stage in the process of knowledge4 ,but it is equally necessary to insist on the danger of clinging1 as to an ultimate truth1 to the pseudo-simplicity of abstraction1 which forgets altogether what it is in certain situations desirable for a time to overlook4 ,in a short essay1 with much grim humour and quaint illustrations1 ,hegel tried to show what was meant by the name 'abstract1' which in his use of it denotes the cardinal vice of the 'practical' habit of mind4 ,from this essay1 entitled ',who is the ,abstract ,thinker#a8' it may be interesting to quote a few lines4 ,a murderer is1 we may suppose1 led to the scaffold4 ,in the eyes of the multitude he is a murderer and nothing more4 ,the ladies perhaps may make the remark that he is a strong1 handsome1 and interesting man4 ,at such a remark the populace is horrified4 ,what6 a murderer handsome8 ,can anybody's mind be so low as to call a murderer handsome8 ,you must be little better yourselves4 ,and perhaps a priest who sees into the heart1 and knows the reasons of things1 will point to this remark1 as evidence of the corruption of morals prevailing among the upper classes4 ,a student of character1 again1 inquires into the antecedents of the criminal's up-bringing3 he finds that he owes his existence to ill-assorted parents2 or he discovers that this man has suffered severely for some trifling offence1 and that under the bitter feelings thus produced he has spurned the rules of society1 and cannot support himself otherwise than by crime4 ,no doubt there will be people who when they hear this explanation will say ,does this person then mean to excuse the murderer8 ,in my youth ,i remember hearing a city magistrate complain that book-writers were going too far1 and trying to root out ,christianity and good morals altogether4 ,some one1 it appeared1 had written a defence of suicide4 ,it was horrible6 too horrible6 ,on further inquiry it turned out that the book in question was the ,sorrows of ,werther4 ',by abstract thinking1 then1 is meant that in the murderer we see nothing but the simple fact that he is a murderer1 and by this single quality annihilate all the human nature which is in him4 ,the polished and sentimental world of ,leipsic thought otherwise4 ,they threw their bouquets1 and twined their flowers round the wheel and the criminal who was fastened to it4--,but this also is the opposite pole of abstraction4--,it was in a different strain that ,i once heard a poor old woman1 an inmate of the workhouse1 rise above the abstraction of the murderer4 ,the sun shone1 as the severed head was laid upon the scaffold4 ,how finely1 said the woman1 does ,god's gracious sun lighten up ,binder's head6 ,we often say of a poor creature who excites our anger that he is not worth the sun shining on him4 ,that woman saw that the murderer's head was in the sunlight1 and that it had not become quite worthless4 ,she raised him from the punishment of the scaffold into the sunlit grace of ,god4 ,it was not by wreaths of violets or by sentimental fancies that she brought about the reconciliation3 she saw him in the sun above received into grace4' ,footnote #a3 ',wer denkt abstrakt6' 7,vermischte ,schriften1 vol4 ii4 p4 #djb47 ,,chapter ,,xxii4 ,,from ,,sense ,,to ,,thought4 ,induction and ,experience are names to which is often assigned the honour of being the source of all our knowledge4 ,but what induction and experience consist in1 is what we are supposed to be already aware of2 and that is--it may be briefly said--the concentration of the felt and sense-given fragments into an intimate unity4 ,the accidents and fortunes that have befallen us in lapses of time1 the scenes that have been set before and around us in breadths of space1 are condensed into a mood of mind1 a habitual shading of judgment1 or frame of thought4 ,the details of fact re-arrange themselves into a general concept2 their essence gets distilled into a concentrated form4 ,their meaning disengages itself from its embodiment1 and floats as a self-sustaining form in an ideal world4 ,thus if we look at the larger process of history1 we see every period trying to translate the sensuous fact of its life into a formula of thought1 and to fix it in definite characters4 ,the various parts of existence1 and existence as a whole1 are stripped of their sensible or factual nature1 in which we originally feel and come into contact with them1 and are reduced to their simple equivalents in terms of thought4 ,from sense and immediate feeling there is1 in the first place1 generated an image or idea which at least represents and stands for reality2 and from that1 in the second place1 comes a thought or notion proper1 which holds the facts in unity4 ,the phenomenon may1 perhaps1 be illustrated by the case of numbers4 ,to the adult ,european1 numbers and numbering are an obvious and essential part of our scheme of things that seems to need no special explanation4 ,but the experience of children suggests its artificiality1 and the evidence from the history of language corroborates that surmise4 ,if number be in a way describable as part of the sense-experience1 or total impression1 it certainly does not come upon us with the same passivity on our part as the perception of taste or colour1 or even of shape4 ,it postulates a higher grade of activity4 ,as ,plato says1 it 'awakes the intelligence'3 it implies a question and looks forward to an answer3 it is thus the first appearance of what in its later fullness will be called ',dialectic1' ,to put it otherwise3 ,numbering can only proceed where there is a unit1 and an identity3 it implies a one1 and it implies an infinite repetibility of that one#a ,it thus postulates the double mental act1 first of reducing the various to its basis of identity1 and1 secondly1 of performing a synthesis of the identical units thus created4 ,in the highly artificial world in which we live all this seems simple enough4 ,the products of machinery1 articles of furniture1 dress1 c41 c41 are already uniform items3 and the strokes of a clock seem almost to invite summation4 ,but in free nature this similarity is much less obviously stamped on things3 and the products of primitive art--of literal manu-facture--display an individuality1 an element of personal taste1 even1 which is necessarily lacking in things turned out by machinery4 ,thus it was necessary1 before we could number1 to reduce the qualitatively different to a quantitative equality or comparability4 ,there are indeed some instances1 in that nearest of things to us1 the human body1 which might help4 ,there is the obvious similarity of organs and limbs which go in pairs1 and which might easily suggest a dual1 as1 so to speak1 a sensuous fact amongst other facts4 ,again1 there is the hand and its five fingers1 or the two hands and the ten fingers4 ,the five or ten1 as a whole naturally given1 suggest a grouping of numbers in natural aggregates4 ,the fingers1 again1 7and here we may keep at first to the fingers proper1 minus the thumb17 may be without much ingenuity said to give us a set of four1 naturally distinct1 yet naturally alike1 and needing1 so to speak1 the minimum of intelligence to create the numerical scale from one to four4 ,it is by them1 indeed1 that ,plato1 it may be unconsciously1 illustrates the genesis of number4 ,here in short you have the natural abacus of the nations1 but one restricted1 first1 perhaps to the group #a-d1 secondly to the group #a-aj4 ,we have seen how the dual was1 in certain instances1 almost a natural perceptive fact4 ,but when it is so envisaged1 it is hardly recognised as number strictly so called4 ,it is only a fresh and peculiar sensuous attribute of things3 a thing which has the quality of duplication1 not a thought which is the synthesis of two identical units4 ,it is a sort of accident1 not part of a regular system or series4 ,so again with the plural1 which may appear in several shapes before it is assigned to its proper place as a systematic function of the singular4 ,if the ,malay1 in order to say 'the king of all apes' has to enumerate one after another the several sub-species of ape1 or if to express 'houses' he has to reduplicate the singular1 to insert a word meaning 'all' or 'many1' we can see that the conception of number is for him still in the bonds of sense4 ,it is not a synthetic category1 but only a material multitude4 ,but in other cases the plural proper is almost confounded with the so-called 'collective4' ,it is not an unfamiliar fact in ,greek and ,latin that the plural has acquired a meaning of its own1--not the mere multiple of its singular2 as also that the collective term is occasionally used as an abstract1 occasionally as the more or less indeterminate collection of the individuals4 ,such plurals and such collectives represent a stage of language and conception when the aggregate of singulars form a uniquely-qualified case of the object4 ,and the peculiarity of them is seen in the way the plurality is immersed in and restricted to the special class of objects3 as e4 g4 when in ,english the plurality of a number of ships is verbally stereotyped as against the plurality of a number of sheep1 or of partridges 7fleet1 flock1 covey74 ,in such instances the category of number is completely pervaded and modified by the quality of the objects it is applied to4 ,so1 in the ,semitic languages1 the so-called 'broken plural' is a quasi-collective1 which grammatically counts as a feminine singular 7like so many ,latin and ,greek collectives73 and whereas the more regular plural is generally shown by separable affix1 this quasi-collective plural enters the very body of the word by vowel-change1 indicating as it were by this absorption the constitution of a specifically new view of things4 ,on the other hand1 it may be said1 there is in this collective a trace of the emergence of the universal and identical element through the generalisation due to the conjunction of several similars all acting as one#b ,in a true plural1 on the contrary1 it is required that the sign of number be clearly eliminated from any peculiarities of its special object1 and be distinctly separated from the collective4 ,and similarly the true numeral has to be realised in its abstractness1 as a category per se4 ,and to do this requires some amount of abstraction4 ,in ,greek1 for example1 we meet the distinction between numbers in the abstract1 pure numbers 7such as four and six71 and bodily or physical numbers 7such as four men1 six trees7#c4 ,the geometrical aspect under which numbers were regarded by the ,greeks1 e4 g4 as oblong or square numbers1 bears in the same direction4 ,but another phenomenon in language tells the tale more distinctly#d4 ,abundantly in ,sanscrit and ,greek1 more rarely in ,zend and ,teutonic1 and here and there in the ,semitic languages1 we meet with what is known as the dual number1 a special grammatical form intended to express a pair of objects4 ,the witty remark of ,du ,ponceau#e concerning the ,greek dual1 that it had apparently been invented only for lovers and married people1 may illustrate its uses1 but hardly suffices to explain its existence in language4 ,but a comparison of barbarian dialects serves to show that the dual is1 as it were1 a prelude to the plural1--a first attempt to grasp the notion of plurality in a definite way1 which served its turn in primitive society1 but afterwards disappeared1 when the plural had been developed1 and the numerals had attained a form of their own4 ,if this be so1 the dual is what physiologists call a rudimentary organ1 and tells the same story as these organs do of the processes of nature4 ,the language of the ,melanesian island of ,annatom1 one of the ,new ,hebrides1 may be taken as an instance of a state of speech in which the dual is natural4 ,that language possesses a fourfold distinction of number in its personal pronouns1 a different form to mark the singular1 dual1 trial1 and plural3 and the pronoun of the first person plural distinguishes in addition whether the person addressed is or is not included in the 'we-two1' 'we-three1' or 'we-many' of the speaker#f4 ,the same language however possesses only the first three numerals1 and in the translation of the ,bible into this dialect it was necessary to introduce the ,english words1 four1 five1 c4 ,the two facts must be taken together3 the luxuriance of the personal pronouns and the scanty development of numerals in such languages are two phenomena of the same law4 ,the numeral 'four' to these tribes is said to bear the meaning of 'many' or 'several1' ,another fact points in the same direction4 ,in many languages1 such as those of ,china1 ,further ,india and ,mexico1 it is customary in numbering to use what ,w4 von ,humboldt has called class-words4 ,here it is felt that an artificial unity has to be created1 a common denominator found1 and all reduced to it1 before any summation can be carried out4 ,scholars and officials1 in ,chinese1 can only be classed under the rubric of 'jewel' or dignity3 and animals or fish by 'tails1' as if thereby only could one get a handle to hold them and count them4 7,the idiom still lingers in western languages3 as in ,english1 heads of cabbage1 or of cattle3 or ,german1 sechs ,mann ,soldaten47 ,so in ,malay1 instead of 'five boys' the phrase used is 'boy five-man'3 in other words1 the numerals are supposed to inhere as yet in objects of a special kind or common occurrence#g4 ,and among the ,south ,sea ,islanders the consciousness of number is decidedly personal3 that is to say1 the distinction between one and two is first conceived as a distinction between ',i' and 'we two4' ,even this amount of simplification surpasses what is found amongst some ,australian tribes4 ,there we find four duals3 one for brothers and sisters3 one for parents and children3 one for husbands and wives3 and one between brothers-in-law#h4 ,each pair has a different form4 ,we thus seem to see to what early language is applied3 not to designate the objects of nature1 but the members of the primitive family and their interests4 ,the consciousness of numbers was first awakened by the need of distinguishing and combining the things that belonged to and specially interested men and women in the narrow circle of barbarian life#i4 ,it is not altogether imaginative in principle1 though it may be occasionally surmise in details1 to connect the rise of grammatical forms with the temperament and character of the people1 and therefore with its social organisation4 ,if the ,bantoo or ,caffir languages of ,southern ,africa instead of a single third personal pronoun and third personal termination to the verb use the separate forms corresponding to the ten class-prefixes of the nouns1 it must be in accordance with the general spirit and system of these tribes4 ,the various plural forms1 if they persist1 will reflect contemporary modes of life4 ,numbers were at first immersed in the persons1 and then1 as things came to be considered also1 in the things numbered4 ,the mind seems to have proceeded slowly from the vague one to definite numbers4 ,and the first decided step was taken towards an apprehension of numbers when two was distinguished from one1 and the distinction was made part of the personal terminations4 ,the plural was a further step in the same direction3 the real value of which1 however1 did not become apparent until the numerals had been separately established in forms of their own4 ,when that was accomplished1 the special form of the dual became useless3 it had outlived its purpose1 and henceforth it ceased to have1 any but that poetical beauty of old association which often adorns the once natural1 but now obsolete growths of the past4 ,when the numerals were thus emancipated from their material and sensuous environment1 quantity was translated from outward being in its embodiments into a form of thought4 ,at first1 indeed1 it was placed in an ethereal or imaginative space1 the counterpart as it were of the sensuous space in which it had been previously immersed4 ,it became a denizen of the mental region1 as it had been before a habitant of the sense-world4 ,the mind was informed with quantity in the shape of number3 but it does not follow from this1 that the new product was comprehended1 or the process of its production kept in view4 ,like all new inventions 7and numeration may fairly be classed under that head71 it was laid hold of1 and all its consequences1 results1 and uses estimated and realised by the practical and defining intellect4 ,in one direction1 it became1 like many new inventions in the early days of society1 a magic charm1 and was invested with mystery1 sacredness1 and marvellous powers4 ,but the intelligent mind1--the understanding1--resolved to make better use of the new instrument3 and that in two ways1 in practical work and in theory4 ,on the one hand it was applied practically in the dealings of life1--in commerce1 contracts1 legislation1 and religion4 ,on the other hand1 the new conception of number1 which common sense and the instinctive action of men had evolved1 was carried out in all its theory3 it was analysed in all directions1 and its elements combined in all possible ways4 ,the result was the science of arithmetic1 and mathematics in general4 ,such consequences did the reflective understanding derive from the analysis of its datum1--the fact of quantity freed from its sensuous envelope4 ,the general action of understanding1 and of practical thought1 is of this kind4 ,it accepts the representative images which have emerged from sensation1 as they occur3 and tries to appreciate them1 to give them precision1 to carry them into details1 and to analyse them until their utmost limits of meaning are explored4 ,where they have come from1 and where they lead to1--the process out of which they spring1 and which fixes the extent of their validity1--are questions of no interest to the understanding#aj4 ,it takes its objects1 as given in popular conception1 as fixed and ultimate entities to be expounded in detail4 ,we have taken number as one example of the transference of a sensible or sense-immersed fact into a form of thought3 but a form which is still placed in a superior or mental space4 ,one advantage of taking number as illustration1 is that numbered things are distinguished from numbers in an emphatic and recognised way4 ,nobody will dispute that the abstraction1 as it is called1 has an existence of its own1 and can be made a legitimate object of independent investigation4 ,but if the process be more obvious in the case of the numerals1 there must have been a similar course of development leading to the pronouns1 the prepositions1 and the auxiliary verbs--to what has been called the 'formal' or 'pronominal' or 'demonstrative' element1 the connective and constructive tissue of language4 ,whether these pronominal 'roots' form a special and originally-distinct class of their own1 or are derived from a transmutation of more material or substantial elements1 is a question on which linguistic research casts as yet no very certain light4 ,it is true that on the one hand etymology is mainly silent on the origin of pronouns1 numerals1 and the more fundamental prepositions 7i4 e4 cannot refer them to roots significant of qualitative being73 and one need not lay much stress on remarks1 like that of ,gabelenz#aa1 that in the ,indo-,chinese languages the words for ,i1 five1 fish have a like sound1 as do those for thou1 two1 ear1 or that ,i am1 originally means ,i breathe4 ,in all languages--though with immense diversities of degree1 this formal element has attained a certain independence4 ,and in many instances we can more or less trace the process by which there grew up in language an independent world of thought3 we can see the natural existence passing out of the range of the senses into spiritual relations4 ,before our eyes a world of reason is slowly constituting itself in the history of culture3 and we1 who live now1 enter upon the inheritance which past ages have laid up for us4 ,there is1 however1 a difference between the way in which these results look to us now1 and the way in which they originally organised themselves4 ,the child who begins to learn a language in the lesson-books and the grammars finds the members of it all1 as it were1 upon one level3 adjectives1 adverbs1 prepositions1 and verbs confront him with the same authority and rank4 ,this appearance is deceptive3 it may easily suggest that the words are not members in an organism1 in and out of which they have developed4 ,and this organism of thought has its individual types1 expressed in the great families of human speech4 ,its generic form 7as drawn out in a logical system7 appears in different grades1 with different degrees of fullness1 in ,altaic and ,dravidian from what it does in ,malay1 or in ,chinese1 and these again have their own predominant categories as compared with those used in the ,american or ,african languages1 or in ,indo-,germanic and ,semitic4 ,if the ,altaic languages e4 g4 are wanting in the verb proper1 and manage with possessive suffixes and nouns2 if the ,semitic tenses display a poverty which contrasts with their wealth in ,greek2 and yet each group performs its function1 we may infer that each speech has a complete organism1 though it does not bring all its parts to adequate expression4 ,all this distinction of 'parts of speech1' of forms1 prefixes and suffixes1 c41 is part of the life of language1 embodying in more or less distinct organs the organisation of thought in the individual form it reached in that speech-type4 ,thus in ,chinese there are strictly speaking no isolated words1 nouns1 or verbs3 there are only abstract parts of a concrete sentence2 and grammar in ,chinese therefore has no accidence 7no declensions1 conjugations1 c47 but only syntax4 ,yet it is these abstract fragments which exist and seem to have independence and inherent meaning3 whereas the unity in which they cohere to form a concrete context is the fleeting sentence of the moment4 ,at the opposite extreme1 again1 the ,mexican family of languages tend to incorporate relations to subject and object with the verb1 in such a degree that the word almost becomes a sentence4 ,facts like these suggest that a science of the forms of language1 in proportion as it generalises1 tends to approach logic2 and that logic will have a converse tendency to elevate to an unduly typical position the grammatical form of the languages with which the logician is best acquainted4 ,if these points were remembered1 there would be less absurd employment of the grammatical categories of one group of languages to systematise another4 ,greek and ,sanscrit grammar plays sad havoc with the organism of a ,semitic tongue1 and it is not less out of place as a schema for delineating e4 g4 ,south ,african dialect4 ,isolated words even in an ,indo-,germanic language--even1 we may say1 in such a language as ,english--are still fractional1 and do not get life and individuality except in their context4 ,and it needs but a little experience to show how various that individuality may be4 ,it needs perhaps still more meditation to realise that it is in this individuality that the real life of language lies3 in the words said and written to express the thought of a personality4 ,but1 first1 because language has its material and mechanical side1 and secondly1 because in civilised countries it further acquires a more stereotyped mechanism in written and printed language1 its parts tend to gain a pseudo-independence4 ,it is one aim of a philosophical dictionary to restore the organic interconnexion which in the mere sequence of vocables in juxtaposition is apt to be lost4 ,what we call the meaning of a word is something which carries us beyond that mere word1--which restores the connexions which have been broken off and forgotten4 ,in the form of a dictionary1 of course1 this can only be done piece-meal3 but if each piece is done thoroughly1 it can hardly fail to bring out certain comprehensive connexions4 ,the mere word seems a simple thing2 and one is at first disposed to get rid of its difficulty by substituting a so-called synonym4 ,but a deeper study reveals the fact that an exact synonym is a thing one can no more find than two peas which are absolutely indistinguishable4 ,a synonym is only a practical pis aller4 ,but every word is really as it were a point in an infinitely complex organic life1 with its essence or meaning determined by the currents to and fro which meet in it4 ,words as we see them prima facie in a printed page do look separate entities4 ,they stand1 one here and another there1 in a quasi-extension1 with marks of direction and connexion pointing from one to another1 but of connexion apparently extraneous to the more solid points which are represented by nouns and verbs1 or names of substances1 actions1 and attributes4 ,results1 as they are1 of that practical analysis which the need of writing down language has led to1 they are treated as complete wholes1 which by the speaker are forced into certain temporary connexions4 ,but this is an illusion which1 because a thing changes its relationships1 assumes that it can exist out of all relationships whatever4 ,every word of ,language is such an abstraction1 isolated from its context4 ,but amid these contexts there are certain similarities3 identical elements are detected3 and these identical elements are the common names of language1 the terms of general significance4 ,in all cases1 however1 what an utterance of language describes or expresses is a definite individual event or scene1 conceived as a concrete of several parts4 ,each separate vocable is a contribution to the total3 a step towards the real redintegration of the whole out of its several parts4 ,but the total itself--the content of fact in any single sentence--is only an abstraction1--a part of the universe which human interest and need have isolated from the comprehensive scope of things4 ,thus1 in two degrees1 we may say1 the picture produced in the sentence falls short of the truth of things4 ,each statement is an arbitrary or accidental cutting out of the totality3 each element of the cutting is dependent on that abstraction1 and relative to it4 ,but--as in a given group of speech1 the same sets of circumstances will naturally be selected1 and tend to recur again and again1--the terms which describe them will acquire a certain association with the objects1 and will come to be called the common names of these agents1 acts1 and qualities4 ,they denote or 'represent' the things and acts1 conceived however in certain aspects and relations1 and not in their entirety and totality of nature4 ,in this product of intellectual movement above the limits of sensation we have the 'representation'#ab as ,hegel calls it1 on which the ,understanding turns its forces4 ,we have one product of the organic whole of thought taken by itself as if it were independent1 set forth as a settled nucleus for further acquaintance3 and this one point discussed fully and with precision1 elaborated in all detail and consequence1 to the neglect of its context1 and the necessary limitations involved in the notion4 ,the process of name-giving may illustrate this tendency in human thought to touch its objects only in one point4 ,the names given to objects do not embrace the whole nature of these objects1 but give expression only to one striking feature in them4 ,thus the name of the horse points it out as 'the strong' or 'the swift'3 the moon is 'the measurer' or 'the shining one'2 and so in all cases4 ,the object as expressed in these names is viewed from one aspect1 or in one point3 and the name1 which originally at least corresponds to the conception1 meets the object1 properly speaking1 on that side only1 or in that relation4 ,the object is not studied in its own nature1 and in its total world1 but as it specially enters the range of human interest1 and serves human utilities4 ,one can at least guess why it should be so3 why a name should1 in logical language1 express an 'accidens' and not the 'essentia' of the object4 ,for the investigation of primitive language seems to show that words1 as we know them in separate existence1 are a secondary formation3 and that the first significant speech was an utterance intended to describe a scene1 an action1 a phenomenon1 or complex of event4 ,in point of time1 the primary fact of language is an agglomeration or aggregate1--we may call it either word or clause 7 in short7--which describes in one breath a highly individualised action or phenomenon4 ,the spirit or unifying principle in this group might be the accent4 ,such a word-group denotes a highly specialised form of being3 and if we call it a word1 we may say that the earliest words1 and the words of barbarous tribes1 are ingeniously special4#ac ,but it would be more correct to say1 that in such a group the elements of the scene enter only from a single aspect or in a single relation4 ,accordingly when disintegration begins1 the result is as follows4 ,the elements of the group1 having now become independent words held together by the syntax of the sentence1 are adopted to denote the several objects which entered into the total phenomenon4 ,but these words1 or fragments of the word-group1 'represent' the objects in question from a certain point of view1 and not in their integrity4 ,the names of things therefore touch them only in one point1 and express only one aspect4 ,and thus1 although different names will arise for the same thing1 as it enters into different groups1 in each case the name will connote only a general attribute and not the nature of the thing4 ,these names are in the ,hegelian sense of the term 'abstract4' ,in popular phraseology1 they are only 'signs' of things3 i4 e4 not 'symbols' 7though they may have been in some cases symbolic in origin71 for in a symbol there is a natural correspondence or sensible analogy to the thing symbolised1 but something 'instituted1' due to an 'understanding' or convention4 ,footnote #a3 ,see vol4 ii4 p4 #aij1 7,logic1 #ajb74 ,footnote #b3 ,see ,max ,mller in ,mind1 vol4 i4 #cde4 ,footnote #c3 ,pure number is 3 applied number is or 4 ,aristotle1 ,metaph4 ,n4 #e1 speaks of 4 ,but this is only ,greek idiom3 as we say ',greek history' instead of ',history of ,greece3' or vice versa1 when we translate ,populus ,romanus by 'people of ,rome4' ,aristotle is speaking of 'proportions' or 'amounts' of fire or earth in the compounds of these elements4 ,footnote #d3 ,see ,l4 ,geiger1 ,ursprung und ,entwickelung der menschlichen ,sprache und ,vernunft 7vol4 i4 p4 #chj74 ,and ,gabelenz ',die melanesischen ,sprachen' in the ,abhandlungen der ,schsischen ,gesellschaft der ,wissenschaften 7,,viii71 #ahfa1 pp4 #hi-ia4 ,footnote #e3 ,mmoire sur le ,systeme grammatical1 c4 p4 #aee4 ,footnote #f3 ,cf4 nous and nous autres4 ,the same distinction is found in some ,american languages4 ,there is a dual in the language of the ,greenlanders2 but it is not1 however1 used when a natural duality seems to call for it1 but in cases when1 though there might have been several things1 only two are actually found4 ,footnote #g3 ,w4 von ,humboldt1 ,verschiedenheit des menschlichen ,sprachbaues1 p4 #dbc 7ed4 #ahda72 ,misteli1 ,typen des ,sprachbaues 7#ahic74 ,footnote #h3 ,capt4 ,grey1 ,vocabulary of the dialects of ,s4 ,w4 ,australia1 pp4 xxi and #ajd 7#ahdj74 ,footnote #i3 ,the sharp distinction between the first and second personal pronouns and the third3 the want of any apparent connexion in the ,indo-,germanic languages between the first and second persons singular and the plural form seems to point in the same direction4 ,footnote #aj3 ,cf4 vol4 ii4 ,notes and ,illustrations1 p4 #djj4 ,footnote #aa3 ,die ,sprachwissenschaft1 p4 #afh4 ,footnote #ab3 ',vorstellung1' as distinguished from ',begriff4' ,footnote #ac3 ,thus in ,malay1 there are about twenty words for strike1 according as it is done with thick or thin wood1 downwards1 horizontally1 or upwards1 with the hand1 with the fist1 with the flat hand1 with a club1 with the sharp edge1 with a hammer1 c4 7,see ,misteli1 ,typen des ,sprachbaues1 p4 #bfe47 ,,chapter ,,xxiii4 ,,figurate ,,or ,,representative ,,thought4 ,the compensating dialectic whereby reason1 under the guise of imagination1 overthrows the narrowness of popular estimates1 makes itself observed even in the popular use of the terms abstract and concrete4 ,terms like state1 mind1 wealth1 may from one point of view be called abstract1 from another concrete4 ,at a certain pitch these abstractions cease to be abstract1 and become even to popular sense very concrete realities4 ,in the tendency to personification in language we see the same change from abstract to concrete3 as when ,virtue is called a goddess1 or ,fashion surnamed the despot of womankind4 ,in such instances1 imagination1 more or less in the service of art and religion1 upsets the narrow vulgar estimates of reality4 ,but it upsets them1 so to speak1 by giving to the abstraction 7through its creative power7 that sensuous concreteness which the mere abstract lacks and which the ordinary mind alone recognises as real4 ,it 'stoops to conquer4' ,such a representation is1 as ,hegel says#a1 'the synthetic combination of the ,universal and ,individual'3 'synthetic1' because not their free1 spontaneous1 and essential unity1 but the supreme product of the artistic will and hand1 which1 rather than let the universal perish by neglect1 build for it1 the eternal and omnipresent1 'a temple made with hands4' ,in mythology we can see the same process3 by which1 as it is phrased1 an abstract term becomes concrete3 by which1 as we may more correctly say1 a thought is transformed into1 or rather stops short at1 a representative picture4 ,the many gods of polytheism are the fixed and solidified shapes in which the several degrees of religious growth have taken 'a local habitation and a name'3 or they bear witness to the failure of the greater part of the world to grasp the idea of ,deity in its unity and totality apart from certain local and temporary conditions4 ,so1 too1 terms like force1 law1 matter1--the abstractions of the mere popular mind--are by certain periods reduced to the level of sensuous things1 and spoken of as real entities1 somewhere and somehow existent1 apart from the thinking medium to which they belong4 ,such terms1 again1 as property1 wealth1 truth1 are popularly identified with the objects in which they are for the time and place manifested or embodied4 ,in these ways the abstract1 in the ordinary meaning1 becomes in the ordinary meaning concrete4 ,the distinction between abstract and concrete is turned into a distinction between understanding and sense1 instead of1 as ,hegel makes it1 a distinction in the adequacy and completeness of thought itself4 ,thought 7the ,idea71 as has been more than once pointed out1 is the principle of unification or unification itself3 it is organisation plus the consciousness of organisation3 it is the unifier1 the unity1 and the unified1--subject as well as object1 and eternal copula of both4 ,an attempt is at first made in two degrees to represent the thought in terms of the senses as a sort of superior or higher-class sensible4 ,when the impossibility of that attempt is seen1 common sense ends by denying what it has learned to call the super-sensible altogether4 ,these three plans may be called respectively the mythological1 the metaphysical1 and the positive or nominalist fallacies of thought4 ,in the mythological1 or strictly anthropomorphic fallacy1 thought is conceived under the bodily shape and the physical qualities of humanity1 as a separate unifying1 controlling1 synthetic agent1 through whose interference the several things1 otherwise dead and motionless1 acquire a semblance of life and action1 though in reality but puppets or marionettes3 that is to say1 it is identified with a subject of like passions with ourselves1 a repetition of the particular human personality1 with its narrowness and weakness4 ,the action of the ,idea is here replaced by the agency of supposed living beings1 invested with superhuman powers4 ,in the metaphysical or realist fallacy we have a feeble ghostly reproduction of the mythological4 ,the living personal deity is replaced by a faint scare-crow of abstract deity4 ,the cause of the changes that go on in nature is now attributed to indwelling sympathies and animosities1 to the abhorrence of a vacuum1 to selection1 affinity1 and the like3 to essences and laws conceived of as somehow existent in a mystic space and time4 ,in the positive or nominalist fallacy1 the failure of these two theories begins to be felt3 and the mind1 which had only heard of unifying reason under these two phases and is meanwhile sure of its sense-perceptions1 treats the objective synthesis as a dream and a delusion4 ,or1 at best1 it regards the synthesis as essentially subjective--as a complementary idealising activity of ours which ekes out the defects of reality1 and brings continuity into the discontinuous4 ,our thought--7it is only our thought7--is but an instrument1 distinct from us and from the reality3 yet acting as a bridge to connect these two opposing shores--a bridge however which does not really reach the other side1 but only an artificial image1 which simulates to us1 and will for ever simulate1 the inaccessible reality4 ,this last view is the utterance of the popular matter-of-fact reason1 when in weariness and tedium it turns from the attempt to grasp thought pure and simple1 and instead of reducing the metaphysical antitheses to the transparent unity of comprehension1 relapses into mere acceptance of a given reality4 ,in some of these cases the full step into pure thought is never made4 ,the creations of mythology1 for example1 display an unfinished and baffled attempt to rise from the separation of sense to the unity and organisation of thought4 ,the gods of heathenism are only individuals--and individuals only meant to be1 and by the act of faith and devotion set forth as reality before the worshipper3 but they are individuals in which imagination embodies a unified and centralised system of forces or principles4 ,they mean the powers of nature and of mind1 but the sceptre in their hands is only a sign of power attributed by the believer2 and far away1 encompassing alike them and him1 is the great relentless necessity4 ,in other cases there is a relapse3 when the higher stage of thought has been attained1 it is instantaneously lost4 ,terms which are really thoughts are again reduced to the level of the things of sense1 individualised in some object1 which1 though it is only a representation or sign1 is allowed to usurp the place of the thought which it but partially and by extraneous institution embodies4 ,the intuition of the sensuous imagination at every step throws its spells on the products of thought1 and turns them into a representative picture1 which in popular use and wont occupies the place of the notion4 ,instead of being retained in their native timelessness1 the terms of the ,idea are brought under the laws of ,sense-perception1 under the conditions of space and time4 ,the term 'representation1' which ,hegel employs to name these picture-thoughts or figurate conceptions1 corresponds to the facts of their nature4 ,a 'representation' is one of two things3 either a particular thing sent out accredited with general functions1 or a universal narrowed down into a particular thing4 ,thus1 as it has been seen1 a general name implies or connotes a universal relation or attribute1 but confines it to denote a particular object or class4 ',swift1' for example1 was an epithet tied down to express the horse4 ,in the first instance we may suppose the name to be a sort of metaphor3 differing only by its simplicity and frequency of suggestion from those endless epithets1 which in ,norse or ,arabic poetry veil and adorn the object which they are meant to designate4 ,that is1 we conceive the object as an embodiment or representation of the quality1 as an eagle is the emblem of strength3 only in the latter case we distinguish between the object and its metaphorical signification4 ,in the second place1 however1 the object of experience is allowed completely to coincide with the aspect discriminated by the selective epithet1 and we can no longer in ordinary thought separate the imaging object from the general relation which it images forth4 ,this is the level of thought to which ,hegel appropriates the term 'representation4' ,it includes under it the three fallacies of thought already noted and saves the trouble of comprehending the reality4 ,in the ,hegelian sense1 a representation is abstract2 because it solidifies1 hardens1 and isolates the term of thought1 makes it a particular1 and never rises above the single case to the general notion embodied in it4 ,the world of representative thought is a world of independent points in juxtaposition1 which we arrange as seems best to us4 ,it lies in an undefinable borderland between us and things4 ,it is a would-be1 but not an actual1 reality4 ,it is not like a true ,idea--the unity of subjective and objective3 but only a make-believe4 ,we have put it there1 and yet we credit it with an effective existence4 ,when our mind moves amongst these picture-thoughts1 it can only institute external relations between the terms4 ,a judgment1 in that case1 is interpreted to mean the conjunction of two terms1 which at once step into the rank of subject and predicate by means of the copula4 ,a sentence is an arrangement of words ab extra in conscious or unconscious conformity with the rules of grammar4 ,the world of knowledge1 or the ,idea1 as a whole is turned into a plane surface with its typical terms1--the members of the organism of reason1--like dots put in co-ordination and juxtaposition1 not spontaneously affected towards each other4 ,even if they are not embodied and reduced to a sensuous level of existence1 they are held to be originally separate and unconnected4 ,how they all came into being1 and whether they do not all by gradations and differentiation-proceed from one root1 are questions neither asked nor answered4 ,the level of representative thinking--thinking i4 e4 which is not the grasp 7,begriff7 of the reality1 but only the apprehension of something which stands for and represents it--is the level on which we all come1 more or less1 to stand in our non-philosophic moments4 ,it is1 in essentials1 the realm of what ,plato called 1--the level of consciousness which fails to rise to see the unity of essence in the many single goods and beauties1 which holds its knowledge 7such at is7 at the mercy of accidents1 not bound by the conclusions of reasoning1--the realm which is not without reality1 but an immature and uncertain reality4 ,it is1 in essentials1 the same as what1 as opposed to intellectus1 ,spinoza styled imaginatio4 ,imagination1 to ,spinoza1 is an understanding under the bondage of particular passions and temporary interests1 which loses sight of the great bond of being or ,substantia1 and fixes its glance on the parts in subordinate and infra-essential relationships3 which is always finite1 i4 e4 never really comprehensive and self-sustaining in its view1 but always limited by a tacit reference to something outside itself4 ,the ',representation' is the idea1 in the loose and inexact use of that word1 which goes with the phrase mere idea1--i4 e4 a mere mental image1 which is not the reality1 though it is believed to do duty for and to represent it#b4 ,yet it is not a mere thought3 rather its whole aim and meaning is to refer to reality1 to suggest it1 to bring it nearer us4 ,its fault is that it is an imperfect1 partial1 one-sided1 or even one-pointed idea4 ,it is really an instance and phase of the ignava ratio1 to which a date or name serves as a of explanation4 ',at ,kilne there was no weathercock1 ,and that's the reason why4' ,such 'representation1' according to ,hegel1 is1 e4 g41 the mode of intelligence accessible to those who cling to the mere1 or abstractly1 religious mood1 and who cannot or will not rise to the comprehension of their creed4 ,its facts or dogmas present themselves to such a restricted conception as the parts of a picture or the stages of a history1 in visible or imaginatively-construable space1 and in a succession of times4 ,the essence of religion1 of course1 for ,hegel as for other exponents of its inmost nature1 is a feeling of certitude or faith which transcends the gulfs and separations of the secular consciousness1 which sees with the believing soul the inner peace1 the absolute harmony of the true reality4 ,pectus facit theologum4 ,the sense of utter dependence on ,god1 in complete identity with the sense of absolute independence in ,god--that strength of faith is the very life of religion4 ,but when religion seeks to give an intelligent expression of her faith1 when she tries to give a reason acceptable to the outside world1 she is apt1 unless specially trained in the high things of the spirit1 to base her creed not on the rock of ages1 but on the signs and miracles of the times4 ,she has tried to theorise the faith3 but1 although her faith may be sound and true1 the religious spirit1 unless it be also the spirit of wisdom and reasoned truth1 runs a risk of falling into the fallacy of ,post hoc1 ergo propter hoc4 ,she descends therefore to the region of representation3 she uses the language of sense and analogy2 she presents the spiritual under the guise of the natural4 ,yet in her heart of hearts these things are only a parable1--they are but ',flesh and blood ,to which she links a truth divine4' ,hegel--in the introduction to his lectures on the ,philosophy of ,religion--is reported to have given the following characteristics of 'representation1' 7a7 ,it is still trammeled by the senses4 ,thought and sensation strive for the mastery in it4 ,thought is bound fast to an illustration3 and of this illustration it cannot as representative thought divest itself3--the eternally living idea is chained to the transient and perishable form of sense4 ,it is metaphorical and material thinking1 which is helpless without the metaphor and the matter4 7b7 ,representative thought envisages what is timeless and infinite under the conditions of time and space4 ,it loses sight of the moral and spirit of historical development under the semblance of the names1 incidents1 and forms in which it is displayed4 ,the historical and philosophical sense is lost under the antiquarian4 ,representative thought keeps the shell1 and throws away the kernel4 7c7 ,the terms by which such a materialised thought describes its objects are not internally connected3 each is independent of the other2 and we only bring them together for the occasion by an act of subjective arrangement#c4 ,the thing--the so-called subject of the properties1 of which it is really no more than the substratum--affords no sufficient ground for the unity of the properties attached to it4 ,the substratum or subject of the proposition is given1 and we then look around to see what other properties accompany the primary characteristic for which the name was applied4 ,but the term of popular language is not a real unity capable of supporting differences2 it is only one aspect of a thing1 a single point fixed and isolated in the process of language by the action of natural selection4 ,and so1 to ask how the properties are related to the thing1 is to ask how one aspect1 taken out of its setting1 is related to another isolated aspect3 which is evidently an unanswerable question4 ,science is right in rejecting the 'thing' of popular conception4 ,if a is a1 and nothing more1 as the law of ,identity informs us1 then it is for ever impossible to get on to b1 c1 d1 and the rest4 ,the union between the thing divided or defined1 and its divided or defining members1 is what is termed extra-logical2 in other words1 it is not evident from what is given or stated in the popular conception4 ,that union must be sought elsewhere1 and deeper4 ,and when we step in to overcome the repugnance which the point of conception1 or what is supposed the subject1 shows against admitting a diversity of predicates1--when we force it into union with these properties3 or when we try to remove the separation which leaves the cause and effect as two independent things to fall apart2 our action1 by which we effect a unification of differences1 may1 from another and a universal point of view1 be said to be the notion1 or grasp of thought1 coming to the consciousness of itself4 ,thought1 as it were1 recognises itself and its image in those objects of representative conception1 which seem to be given and imposed upon the intellect4 ,the two worlds1 which the understanding accepts as each solid and independent1--the world of external objects or conceptions1 and the world of self1--meet and coincide in the free agency of thought1 developing itself under a double aspect4 ,it is the 'original synthetical unity of apperception' 7to quote ,kant's words71 from which the ,ego or thinking subject1 and the 'manifold' or body and world1 are simultaneously differentiated4 ,thus1 on the one hand1 we ourselves no longer remain a rigid unity1 existing in antithesis to the objects presupposed or referred to by representative thought3 and on the other hand the so-called thing loses its hardness and fragmentary independence1 as distinguished from our apprehension of it4 ,our action1 as we incline to call it1 which mends the inadequacies of terms1 is from a philosophic point of view1 the notion itself coming to the front and claiming recognition4 ,the process of thought is then seen to be a totality1 of which our faculties1 on the one hand1 and the existing thing1 on the other1 are isolated abstractions1 supposed habitually to exist on their own account4 ,to view either of these systems1 the mental1 on the one hand1 and the objective world1 on the other1 as self-subsistent1 has been the error in much of our metaphysics1 and in the popular conceptions of what constitutes reality4 ,the idealism of metaphysicians has been often as narrow and insufficient as the realism of common sense4 ,an adequate philosophy1 on the contrary1 recognises the presence of both elements1 in a subordinate and formative position4 ,representations may be compared to the little pools left here and there by the sea amongst the rocks and sand3 the notion1 or grasp of thought1 is the tidal wave1 which left them there to stagnate1 but comes back again to restore their continuity with the great sea4 ,in our thinking we are only the ministers and interpreters of the ,idea1--of the organic and self-developing system of thought4 ,the difference between a representative conception and a thought proper may be illustrated by the case of the term ',money4' ,money may be either a materialised thought1 i4 e4 a ,representative ,conception1 or a ,notion ,proper4 ,in the former case1 money is identified with a piece of money4 ,it is probably1 in the first instance1 embodied in coins of gold1 silver1 and bronze4 ,in the second place1 a wide gulf is placed between it and the other articles for which it is given in exchange4 ,if other things are regarded as money1 they are generally treated on the assumption that they can in case of need be reduced to coinage4 ,the conception of money by the unscientific vulgar considers it separately from other commodities3 and the laws which forbade its exportation gave a vigorous expression to the belief that it was something sui generis1 and subject to conditions of its own4 ,the scientific notion of money modifies this belief in the peculiarity and fixity of money4 ,science does so historically1 when it can point to a time and a race where money in our sense of the word does not exist1 and where barter takes the place of buying and selling4 ,science does so philosophically1 when it expounds what may be called the process of money1--the inter-action or meeting of conditions to which the existence of money is due4 ,the notion of money1 as given in the ,ethics of ,aristotle1 says that it is the common measure of utility or demand4 ,when we leave out of sight the specific quality of an object1 and consider only its capacity of satisfying human wants1 we have what is called its worth or value4 ,this value of the thing1--the psychological fact which is left1 when all the qualities marking the objective thing are reduced to their social efficiency--is the notion1 of which the currency is the representation1 reducing thought to the level of the senses1 and embodying the 'ideality' of value in a tangible and visible object4 ,so long as this 'idea' of value is kept in view1 the currency is comprehended3 but when the perception of the notion disappears1 money is left a mere piece of currency1 the general notion being narrowed down to the coinage4 ,thus the notion of money1 like other notions in their ideal truth1 is not in us1 nor in the things merely3 it is what from a minor point of view1 when we and the things are regarded under the head of want or need1 may be called the truth of both1 the unity of the two sides4 ,thus considered1 money falls into its proper place in the order of things4 ,footnote #a3 ,werke1 ii4 #ebi1 #eee4 ,footnote #b3 ,hegel's ,werke1 ii4 #dca3 ',wobei das ,selbst nur reprsentirt und vorgestellt ist1 da ist es nicht wirklich3 we es vertreten ist1 ist es nicht4' ,cf4 ib4 #daf4 ,footnote #c3 ,philosophie der ,religion1 i4 p4 #acg seqq4 ,,chapter ,,xxiv4 ,,from ,,substance ,,to ,,subject4 ',it is1 in my view1 all important1' says ,hegel#a1 'to apprehend and express the ,true not as ,substance1 but equally much as ,subject4' ,substance1 as ,spinoza defines it1 is that which is in itself and which is conceived through itself1 something which does not need the conception of something else by which its concept may be formed#b4 ,substance1 in other words1 is something which serves to explain itself1 which is causa sui4 ,the mind1 looking out on the wide world of mutable and manifold objects1 finds its rest in the great calm of a something at their base1 the eternal nature which1 itself unmoved1 is the one foundation1 complete and sufficient1 of all things1--a res aeterna et infinita1 which can feed the mind with joy alone#c4 ,these words suggest only an object--a transcendent object--the basis of an objective order4 ,they seem to leave little for the contemplating subject to do save to discern it and1 so discerning1 to rest in it and to love4 ,they seem to leave substance a mere datum1 a far-off all-embracing end in which the variety of human effort can find a central object and a final close4 ,yet1 in the end it appears#d that this ,res aeterna loves himself with an intellectual love1 and this love is identified with the love of man to ,god1 so far at least as man's mind1 considered sub specie aeternitatis1 can be said to 'explicate' ,deity4 ,from this conclusion it might be said that ,spinoza rises above the mere category of substance3 ,god is no longer the mere foundation of things--the absolute object of all objects4 ,he rises in human spirit 7regarded in its eternal significance7 to the rank of a true subject4 ,he is not merely known as the ,true2 but ,he himself1 living and moving in the essential spirit of man1 knows himself and acquiesces in his infinite beatitude4 ,but if this be the legitimate inference to be drawn from the closing sections of the ,ethics1 it is not the view ordinarily suggested by the mention of ,spinoza's doctrine4 ,that doctrine1 on the contrary1 seems1 as it first confronts us1 and as it has taken its place in history1 to omit the subjectivity which had found so decided a recognition in the commencement of ,cartesianism4 ,in the cogito ergo sum so much at least is clearly stated3 true being--the true--is not merely known1 but itself knows2 not a mere object1 but a subject3 a subject-object1 or1 an ,idea4 ,it is to be admitted1 indeed1 that ,descartes hardly remains at this altitude1 but he touches it for a moment4 ,even when he finds in the conception of ,god a security for truth and reality1 and thus seems to base these on a one-sidedly objective standard1 he regards ,god as1 on the other hand1 the truth and reality postulated and presupposed by the structural system of our ideas4 ,god--such seems the tendency of his so-called 'proof'--is the inevitable prius and presupposition of our thought and being3 ,he makes us know1 as much as ,he is ultimately the object known3 ,he is the unity and the creator of subject and object4 ,but it is hardly possible to get in philosophy the full recognition of the antithesis between subject and substance and the inclusion of both in the fuller ,idea1 till after the time of ,kant4 ,kant himself is1 in essentials1 the antithesis of ,spinoza1 but it is not till ,fichte that the full force of that antithesis is expressly recognised4 ,with ,hegel1 the two opposite points of view are equally insisted on3 the immanence and the transcendence of the ,true1 the ,real1 the ,absolute3 or1 in other words1 the unity in it of subject and object1 or of thought and existence4 ,or1 in the words of the religious spirit1 though heaven and the heaven of heavens cannot contain ,him1 ,he dwells in the spirit of the righteous1 and is not far from any one of us4 ,the truth is not the correspondence or agreement of an idea with a further reality which it represents4 ,such an idea or 'representation' is a projection which has escaped from our hands1 which has slipped from our grip1 and which1 while owning its mere vicarious character1 at the same time beckons us on to seek a reality we can never find4 ,the 'representation' is in a way objective--it is set over against us3 but yet it is not truly objective1 not self-subsistent and self-possessed4 ,its objectivity is the objectivity of a name3 a quasi-objectivity1 which requires to be dipped in the living waters of intelligence before it can really exist and act4 ,it seems1 to the untrained observer1 to point only outwards to the real object which it copies or designates3 to a deeper reflection1 it is seen to point equally inward to the mind which informed it and projected it4 ,thus the knowing subject1 and the known object1 with the representation which acts as a perpetual mediator to connect and yet not unify the one of these terms with the other1--all at last take their place1 reduced and transfigured1 in the unity of the ,idea4 ,according to the ,spinozist point of view1 thought1 it might seem by a sort of miracle1 dispels the mists that envelop and bewilder it1 sees through the multeity of modes1 and the isolated pictures of imagination1 to the true reality1 one1 infinite and eternal4 ,before that august vision of absolute wholeness the only attitude of a finite mind would seem to be resignation1 worship1 reverence1--deeply shading into the submission of absorption4 ,for in it intellect and will are declared to have no place#e4 ,with such a statement1 we get that first aspect of religion which has found its most imposing representative in the faith of ,islam4 ,in every religion there must1 however1 be more than this3 or it would fail to do what all religion essentially does4 ,sheer dependence--,schlechthinnige ,abhngigkeit 7as ,schleiermacher has named it7--can never be the whole burden of a religious teacher's message4 ,always--at least in the background--there is a contradictory element--in apparent discrepancy with the first--the deification of the worshipper4 ,and as the ,ethics of ,spinoza--like every complete system of speculative truth--deals with a problem parallel to1 if not even identical with1 that of religion1 its initial definitions and main programme must never let us forget the tacit presuppositions worked out to explicitness1 as they are partly1 in its conclusion4 ,when ,intellect and ,will are denied to the ,deus ,natura ,substantia1 it is meant that the ,absolute is and has more than intellect and will can well name1 and that in ,him 7or ,her1 or ,it1 for the pronominal distinctions of gender matter nothing here71 the separation of will from intellect is a fallacy which can have no place4 ,what ,spinoza casts out are the lower passions1 the affections of weakness2 these as such1 i4 e4 as elements of weakness1 can have no place in ,him4 ,but in ,god1 as in the free man who most resembles ,god1 and in whose love ,he loves himself1 there is--but that also in terms we cannot fathom--abundance of joy--the joy of infinite self-realisation4 ,partly by the complementary theory of ,leibniz1 partly by the antagonist theories of ,kant1 the way had been prepared for setting forth1 and in fuller outline1 the implications so tardily admitted by ,spinoza4 ,it was only by a misuse or mal-extension of a word that ,herder's ,god--a ,god who is ,force--and the ,force of ,forces--could be supposed an advance upon ,spinoza4 ,there is in ,force an analogue of ,life2 but it is life in dependence1 life not self-centred1 always going forth1 and when it goes forth dissipated4 ,it is as it were pushed from behind1 and is lost in what comes after it4 ,if a ,force of ,forces means anything1 it means something more than ,force3 it means a master of force1 a force-controller and force-adjuster1 a unity and principle of forces4 ,and ,substance1 as ,spinoza understood it1 is more than this variability1 this deification of instability4 ,it is the unity in which the variety and disparity of existence1 the multiplicity of vicissitude1 is merged and lost1 only again to issue from it1 and yet not leave it behind1 in the infinitely-various modes of its two great and conspicuous attributes of consciousness and extensionality4 ,if ,hegel then sought to go beyond ,spinoza1 he sought to find a formula which would lose nothing that ,spinoza had reached1 but would at the same time bring out what ,spinoza had left an implication1 or noted in a partial rectification4 ,as in religion1 besides the utter dependence on ,god 7so that1 ,god failing1 ,i perish71 there must be also an absolute union1 complete reconciliation--complete as culminating in unity and identity 7so that ,god shall not be ,god1 unless ,i am ,i73 so it is in philosophy4 ,the ,absolute cannot merely be1 and be far away--the last goal in which the variety of life is made one1 and the turmoil of the passionate existences laid to rest4 ,the ,soul which is 7as some of the medieval ,christians would say7 still in itinere1 a wayfarer1 is such because its glance is turned on outward circumstances3 but country is no accident3 the soul even here carries with it that patria1 'which is the heavenly1' in its longings1 and has it1 even while yet on pilgrimage1 in that strong possession of all things by itself1 which the theologian styles ,faith4 ,this goal determines the pilgrimage1 fixes its direction1 gives progress to its steps4 ,in the myth-loving language of ,plato 7and of ,wordsworth in his ,platonic ode7 the ,soul has in other spheres of being dwelt with the gods and seen the secret of the world3 it is itself one of the immortals1 and as it is here and now1 is in a land of exile4 ,at the morning of birth1 the living sample of humanity has left his original glory behind2 and a deep forgetfulness--only short of absolute--cuts it off from his every-day consciousness4 ,in his present reality he finds himself in a land of darkness1 fast bound in a hollow of the rock1 looking out only on the ghostly images that flit across his prison wall1 cast there by the objects that move between his back and the light of a mysterious fire behind him and them4 ,such is his natural estate1 as it meets the bodily eye3 the estate of the lowly savage1 whom superstition and ignorance seem to hold as their captive for ever4 ,but1 though his high home and his glory of other days have left no conscious memory in the soul1 asleep and imbruted in its fleshly house1 they have not departed without leaving a trace behind4 ,for forgetfulness is not blank non-existence4 ,the sample of humanity inherits the birthright of his fathers--he has hopes and fears1 duties and rights1 which are his1 if he can mature himself to take possession of them4 ,he suffers from the pains of growth1 from the sense of disparity between what he is and what he may and should be--from the noble uneasiness and dissatisfaction of a being who feels--if he does not know--his infinite potentialities4 ,for these potentialities--otherwise they have no title even to that name--are also actualities1 yet actualities which protest their own incompleteness1 and crave imperiously for what they lack4 ,what he has is his right1 but his right only in so far as it is also his duty4 ,it is as such1 and only as such1 that he still retains the soul in all its prerogatives3 as the right1 which is the duty1 of knowledge4 ,such a pre-figured and promised1 but yet to be realised1 possession is what ,plato has called ,eros1 or ,love4 ,but it is a ,love whose wings are at first invisible1 and who often seems rather to crawl among ignoble things than to soar in the free fresh air4 ,the process of experience has been by ,plato called ,anamnesis or ,recollection4 ,but ,recollection is not always an easy1 and never a merely passive1 process2 and sometimes the forgetfulness seems so deep that no extraneous stimulus can at all move it4 ,we have seen already one of these stimuli which rouse the sleeping sense--the mystery of numbers3 and there are many others4 ,but1 we have also learned1 that in the psychical sphere items of memory are not1 as reckless fancy puts it1 stored up in compartments1 sorted and arranged1 ready to be pulled out4 ,the process of recollection is a complicated affair3 an affair of give and take1 of comparison and selection and rejection1 of construction and reconstruction4 ,you cannot haul up ready-made memories from the mine4 ,and this perhaps was sometimes forgotten by ,plato2 it certainly has been by more than one of his commentators4 ,you may1 no doubt1 call up ideas from the vasty deep3 but they come by laws and principles of their own4 ,even when they come1 which they sometimes do unexpectedly1 they come as an echo of the calling mind4 ,recollection involves intellectual process3 as ,kant said1 the synthesis of imagination reposes upon the synthesis in the concept4 ,yet--and this is the point which ,plato's title of ,anamnesis accentuates--unless 'the soul had been such as to be affected in this way' 7the words are those of ,aristotle71 unless the soul had been implicitly intellectual in tone and faculty1 it would not have grasped the presented universe under the categories which it uses4 ,there is1 says ,aristotle1 in the barest act of sensation a congenital power of judgment2 there is1 says ,plato1 an eye of the soul--a natural virtue of intelligence1 which can never be put into it1 and must always be presupposed in any theory of its processes4 ,there are1 therefore1 no innate ideas1 says ,cudworth in explanation of ,plato1 if these ideas mean formed and completed products of knowledge4 ,all ideas in this sense begin and grow within the range of experience1 and the history of their growth or development in literature and art can be at least approximately traced4 ,we can trace1 that is1 the successions and connexions of the various types of beauty1 or goodness3 can show how the idea at one time dwelt in one of its aspects1 at another in a different one4 ,we can observe the variation1 and it may be the progress1 in men's conception of ,god4 ,but it is another matter when we seek to explain these ideas themselves out of other elements1 heterogeneous to them4 ,when that question is asked1 then with ,plato we seem1 in the absence of any theory of origins1 obliged to own that it is by the ,beautiful that beautiful things come to be beautiful4 ,the s--the crossing of essential boundaries--which ,aristotle forbids to science1 still raises its eternal barrier in the logical1 if it cease to hold good 7as has been suggested7 in the physical sphere4 ,in the totality which we call the world and experience of reality there are1 so to say1 ultimate and irreducible provinces4 ,the utmost that philosophy1 i4 e4 science1 can do with these is to co-ordinate them1--to show their mutual filiations1 adaptations1 and harmonies1--to note their inadequacies and discrepancies4 ,they are not all of equal rank1 perhaps2 they have to yield to each other1 it may be in turn3 but none of them can be arbitrarily expunged from the totality1 and none of them shown to be a mere phase of others4 ,to do that is to strip the universe of its variety and--it may be added--of its beauty and its interest4 ,if it be a false philosophy that does it1 there is a good deal of false philosophy abroad4 ,there is a lust of explanation which is never content till it has found an equation for everything1 till it has expressed everything in terms of the common-place1 till it has emptied everything of all that made it individual and real1 and turned it into an abstract1 identical 7as only abstracts can be7 with some other abstract4 ,such abstractions are of course useful1 and therefore need no excuse1 when restricted to a special sphere4 ,so long1 that is1 as we remember that it is an abstraction we are making1 and that we are arbitrarily simplifying the real natural problem1 no harm is done by these artificial constructions2 and they are important steps in a larger process4 ,but what is correct and useful within a range whose limits we can define1 becomes dangerous when carried beyond all bounds4 ,its approximate truth then becomes misleading error4 ,it is these irreducible elements--these great provinces in human experience1 in reality1 in the system of reason--that correspond to the more important of what are known as ,platonic ideas4 ,as ultimate constituents of the actual world they are in the narrower sense inexplicable4 ,one does not amount to an exact sum of some others1 nor is one got from another by the simple process of subtraction4 ,but if they cannot be explained1 by being reduced to multiples of some one basis1 they can be comprehended in the respective implication and explication they exhibit with their co-realities4 ,they can be correlated1 reduced1 and unified3 we may even say1 they can be identified2 but if we use such a term1 we must mean that there is some totality beyond and above them in which they all find a place and all are harmonious2 in which all when brought to their ,truth are really one and the same4 ,this birthright of human nature in all ages and countries--this central essence of man's spirit--is the realm of ,platonic ideas4 ,they are the great elements1 or constituent members1 of humanity and of reality3 the framework of his mind and of the world4 ,how in each case they may be wrought out in detail1 to what degree they may here be evolved1 and there stunted1 is a matter of historical research4 ,and1 in a sense1 even it is not wrong to try to trace them one to another3 to explain them1 as the phrase is1 one by another4 ,for they are essentially connected3 they are members of one system3 they are unified and harmonised in a way for which even the word 'organism' is wholly insufficient4 ,they are the poles and lines on which the tent of human life1 of intelligent life1 is stretched3 but they are also the invisible ties which bind together the earth and heavens1 and all that is therein4 ,these ideas therefore are immanent in man3 for they are the basis of human nature4 ,but to name1 to disentangle them1 to measure out their bounds and describe their connexions--that is no easy work4 ,and that is the work of ,platonic recollection4 ,that is the process of historical experience4 ,but it is a small thing for ,plato to say that these ideas are innate in man4 ,what he is more concerned to make clear is that in the possession or vision of these eternal forms1 the human soul is a partner of the gods1 a citizen of the heavens4 ,in less mythical language1 man1 as an intelligent1 artistic1 moral1 and religious being1 is not a mere accidental on-looker on the surface of things1 but near their central and abiding truth4 ,the forms of his mind1 to speak after the manner of ,kant1 are the objective essences of the real world of experience4 ,degrees there may be in the reality which they possess--less or larger measures of truth to full experience--but true and real they are3 never mere falsity or emptiness4 ,to estimate the amounts of that reality is a problem ,plato often tried4 ,at one time it seems as if the ,good were in his estimate the form of forms1 the real of reals3 but when we look closely1 we see that it is a goodness which is synonymous with real reality or perfect being4 ,at another time truth1 i4 e4 reality1 seems to be lord of all3 at another1 beauty3 and again he seems to confess his inability to lay down the order of precedence in this hierarchy4 ,of one thing only he is perfectly clear3 and that is the unreality1 the non-entity of the sense-world as merely perceived1 and the true being of the world of reason4 ,but he has no doubts as to the central truth that in the good1 the true1 and the beautiful1 there is a higher reality--a more far-reaching and deep-piercing influence than in all the mere variety of sensation1 the mere multitude of sensible fact4 ,what ,plato has sometimes called the act of reminiscence1 what he has sometimes called the instinct of ,love1 is also known to him as the process of ,dialectic4 ,for reminiscence has to watch and wrestle with the inertia of oblivion1 has to set the imagined beside the real1 and to correct percepts by concepts1 concepts by percepts1 has to brace up its energies1 and to advance not by mere pressing onward1 but by tacking and zigzagging through contrary difficulties finally realise itself4 ,and love too is a battle1 where the craving for union has to measure its force with the instinct of independence1 where selfishness and self-surrender seek a reconciliation1 and where in the close1 if the close be love1 each is self-retained only as self-abandoned1 and each rises to a higher union in which lower selfhoods are absorbed4 ,even so in the course of ,dialectic4 ,it is the art which divides and conjoins1 which unifies and distinguishes3 the art of asking and answering4 ,to ,plato it appears in the main as an action of the intelligent subject3 but an action which1 as he hints1 is almost a natural instinct1 which through discipline has become an art4 ,in the hands of its typical artist1 it proceeds1 or seems to proceed1 as if unconscious of its principle and end4 ,socrates has1 as he professes1 no overt conception of the result3 he has no knowledge of the positive conclusion to be reached4 ,it is the ,logos--the logic of reality--which sustains the movement4 ,abandoning any subjective humour of carrying the argument to a preconceived end1 one is swept on by the current of real logic--the reason in things4 ,the dogma we have set up and seemed to see before us1 will1 if we are dispassionate1 carry us on beyond itself1 and suggest aspects calling for recognition and acceptance4 ,if only we refrain from arresting the movement of criticism1--a course to which prudence1 ease1 custom1 and every form of the ignava ratio counsel us1--truth will reveal itself in us1 and by us4 ,it is because other aims1 personal and particular1 are so ever-present with us1 that speculative free inquiry seems so hard4 ,it is we who insist on closing up the door1 not the truth that is reluctant to show itself4 ,truth1 then1 is self-revelation or development4 ,not a result which is to be accepted1 bowed to1 and reverenced3 but the result issuing 7and only valuable as issuing7 from a process in which we and objectivity are fellow-workers4 ,the truth may no doubt be presented--as ,spinoza does present it--in definitions1 stating the net result as fundamental fact4 ,fundamental fact it is2 but as so stated1 as ,substance1 it comes as a stranger1 almost as an enemy3 the great vision1 suddenly offered to untrained eyes1 overwhelms and alarms the living sense of self1 of personality4 ,hegel wishes to show it as a friend1 as our very own1--as ,subject 7but not merely subject74 ,it is for this that philosophy runs through its cycle and returns into itself4 ,man points to nature and nature to man3 universal to individual3 thought to things3 the self to ,god1 and ,god to the human soul4 ,footnote #a3 ,hegel1 ,werke1 ii4 #ad4 ,footnote #b3 ,spinoza1 ,eth4 ,def4 #c4 ,footnote #c3 ,spin4 ,de inteil4 ,em4 i4 #aj4 ,footnote #d3 ,spin4 ,eth4 v4 #ce4 ,footnote #e3 ,eth4 i4 #ag schol4 ,,chapter ,,xxv4 ,,reason ,,and ,,the ,,dialectic ,,of ,,understanding4 ,representative conceptions1 besides being the burden of our ordinary materialising consciousness1 are also the data of science1 accepted and developed in their consequences4 ,because they are so accepted1 as given into our hand1 scientific reasoning can only institute relations between them4 ,its business as thus conceived is progressive unification1 comparing objects with one another1 demonstrating the similarities which exist between them1 and combining them with each other4 ,the exercise of thought which deals with such objects is limited by their existence3 it is only formal4 ,it is finite thought1 because it is only subjective3 it begins at a given point and stops somewhere1 and never gets quite round its materials so as to call them truly its own4 ,each of the objects on which it is turned seems to be outside of it1 and independent of it4 ,each point of fact1 again1 when it is carried out to its utmost1 meets with other thoughts which limit it1 and claim to be equally self-centred4 ,such knowledge creeps on from point to point4 ,to this thinking ,german philosophy from the time of ,kant and ,jacobi applied a name1 which since the days of ,coleridge has been translated by ',understanding'#a4 ,this degree or mode of thinking --not a faculty of thought--is the systematised and thorough exercise of what in ,england is called ',common ,sense4' ,in the first place1 it is synonymous with practical intelligence4 ,it takes what it calls facts1 or things1 as given1 and aims only at arranging and combining them and drawing from them counsels of prudence or rules of art4 ,seeing things on a superficies1 as it were so many unconnected points1 here itself and there the various things of the world1 it tries to bring them into connexion4 ,it accepts existing distinctions1 and seeks to render them more precise by pointing out and sifting the elements of sameness4 ,its greatest merit is an abhorrence of vagueness1 inconsistency1 and what it stigmatises as mysticism3 it wishes to be clear1 distinct1 and practical4 ,in its proper sphere1--and it has an indispensable function to perform even in philosophy3 wherever1 that is1 it is unnecessary to go into the essential truth of things1 and one has only to do good work in a clearly defined sphere1--the understanding has an independent value of its own#b ,nor is this true merely of practical life1 where a man must accommodate himself to facts3 it is equally applicable in the higher theoretic life1--in art1 religion1 and philosophy4 ,if intelligent definiteness does not make itself apparent in these1 there is something wrong about them4 ,it is only when this exercise of thought is regarded as a ne plus ultra1 and its mandates to restrict investigation by the limits of foregone conclusions find obedience1 that understanding deserves the reproachful language which was lavished upon it by the ,german philosophers at the close of the last century4 ,the understanding is abstract3 this sums up its offences in one word4 ,its objects1 that is the things it deals with and believes utterly real1 are only partly so1 and when that incompleteness is unrecognised1 are only abstractions4 ,both in its contracted forms1 such as faith and common sense1 and in its systematic form1 the logical or narrowly-consistent intellect1 it is partial and liable to be tenacious of half-truths4 ,only that whereas in feeling and common-sense there is often a great deal which they cannot express1--whereas the heart is often more liberal than its interpreting mind will allow--the reverse is true of the logically-consistent intellect4 ,the narrowness of the latter is1 in its own opinion1 exactly equal to the truth of things3 and whatever it expresses is asserted without qualification to be the absolute fact4 ,its business is1 given the initial point 7which is assumed to be certain and perspicuous71 to see all which that point will necessarily involve or lead to4 ,for example1 ,order may be supposed to be the chief end of the ,state4 ,let us consider1 says the intelligent arguer 7without wasting time on abstruse inquiries as to what ,order is or means1 and what sort of ,order we want71 to what consequences and institutions this conception will lead us4 ,or1 again1 the chief end of the ,state is assumed to be ,liberty4 ,to what special forms of organisation will this hypothesis 7also assumed a self-evident conception7 lead8 ,or we may go a step further4 ,it is evident1 some will say1 that in a ,state there must be a certain admixture of ,order and ,liberty4 ,how are we to proceed--what laws and ordinances will be necessary1 to secure the proper equilibrium of these two principles8 ,the two must be blended1 and each have its legitimate influence4 ,these are examples of the operation of ,understanding4 ,it can only reach a synthesis 7or conjunction71 never a real unity1 because it believes in the omnipotence of the abstractions with which it began3 but must either carry out one partial principle to its consequences1 or allow an alternate and combined force to two opposite principles4 ,its canon is identity3 given something1 let us see what follows when we keep the same point always in view1 and compare other points with the one which we are supposed to know4 ,its method is analytic3 given a conception in which popular thought supposes itself at home1 and let us see all the elements of truth which can be deduced from it4 ,its statements are abstract and narrow3 or1 in the words of ,anaxagoras1 one thing is cut off from another with a hatchet#c4 ,in its excess it degenerates into dogmatism1 whether that dogmatism be theological or naturalistic4 ,the fact is that the ,understanding1 as this analytic1 abstract1 and finite action of mind is called1--the thought which holds objective ideas distinct from one another1 and from the subjective faculties of thought as a whole1--that this ,understanding is1 when it claims to be heard and obeyed in science1 not sufficiently thorough-going4 ,it begins at a point which is not so isolated as it seems1 but is a member of a body of thought3 nor is it aware that the whole of this body of thought is in organic1 and even more than organic1 union4 ,it errs in taking too much for granted3 and in not seeing how this given point is the result of a process1--that in it1 in any thought or idea1 several tendencies or elements converge and are held in union1 but with the possibility of working their way into a new independence4 ,in other words1 the ,understanding requires1 as the organon and method of philosophy1 to be replaced by the ,reason#d1--;by infinite thought1 concrete1 at once analytic and synthetic4 ,how then1 it may be asked1 can we make the passage from the inadequate to the adequate8 ,to that question the answer may be given that it is our act of arbitrary arrest which halts at the inadequate3 that in complete ,reason1 which is the constituent nature both of us and of things1 the ,understanding is only a grade which points beyond itself1 and therefore presupposes and struggles up to the adequate thought4 ,in other words1 it is ,reason which creates or lays down for behoof of its own organisation the aims1 conditions1 and fixed entities1--the objects1 by which it is bound and limited in its analytic exercise as understanding4 ,reason1 therefore1 is the implicit tendency to correct its own inadequacy3 and we have only to check self-will and prejudice so far that the process may be accomplished4 ,the movement is not at one step3 it has a middle term or mean which often seems as if it were a step backward4 ,progress in knowledge is usually described as produced by the mode of demonstration or the mode of experience4 ,formal ,logic prefers the first mode of describing it3 ,applied ,logic prefers the second4 ,either mode may serve1 if we properly comprehend what demonstration and experience mean4 ,and that will not be done unless we keep equally before us the affirmative and the negative element in the process4 ,the law of rational progress in knowledge1 of the dialectical movement of consciousness1 or in one word of experience1 is not simple movement in a straight line1 but movement by negation and absorption of the premisses4 ,the conclusion or the new object of knowledge is a product into which the preceding object is reduced or absorbed4 ,thus the movement from faith 7which is concentrated and wholly personal knowledge7 to open and universal knowledge1 which is capable of becoming the possession of a community1--truth and not merely conviction1 must pass through doubt4 ,the premisses from which we start1 and the original object with which we begin1 are not left in statu quo3 they are destroyed in their own shape1 and become only materials to build up a new object and a conclusion4 ,it is on the stepping-stones of discarded ideas that we rise to higher truth3 and it is on the abrogation of the old objects of knowledge that the new objects are founded4 ,not merely does a new object come in to supplement the old1 and correct its inadequacies by the new presence3 not merely do we add new ranges to our powers of vision1 retaining the old faculties and subjoining others4 ,the whole world--alike inward and outward1--the consciousness and its object--is subjected to a thorough renovation3 every feature is modified1 and the system re-created4 ,the old perishes3 but in perishing contributes to constitute the new4 ,thus the new is at once the affirmation and negation of the old4 ,and such is the invariable nature of intelligent progress1 of which the old and not a few modern logicians failed to render a right account1 because they missed the negative element1 and did not see that the immediate premisses must be abolished in order to secure a conclusion1--even as the grapes must be crushed before the wine can be obtained4 ,this is the real meaning of ,experience1 when it is called the teacher of humanity3 and it was for this reason that ,bacon described it as 'far the best demonstration4'#e ,experience is that absolute process1 embracing both us and things1 which displays the nullity of what is immediately given1 or baldly and nakedly accepted1 and completes it by the rough remedy of contradiction4 ,the change comes over both us and the things3 neither the one side nor the other is left as it was before4 ,and it is here that the advantage of ,experience over demonstration consists4 ,demonstration tends to be looked upon as subjective only 7constringit assensum1 non res73 whereas ,experience is also objective4 ,but ,experience is more than merely objective3 it is the absolute process of thought pure and entire2 and as such it is described by ,hegel as ,dialectic1 or ,dialectical movement4 ,this ,dialectic covers the ground of demonstration1--a fragment of it especially described and emphasised in the ,formal ,logic1--and of ,experience1--under which name it is better known in actual life1 and in the philosophy of the sciences#f4 ,dialectic is the negative or destructive aspect of reason1 as preparatory to its affirmative or constructive aspect4 ,it is the spirit of dissent and criticism3 the outgoing as opposed to the indwelling3 the restless as distinguished from the quiet3 the reproductive as opposed to the nutritive instinct3 the centrifugal as opposed to the centripetal force3 the radical and progressive tendency as opposed to the conservative4 ,but no one of these examples sufficiently or accurately describes it4 ,for it is the utterance of an implicit contradiction1--the recognition of an existing and felt1 but hitherto unrecognised and unformulated want4 ,dialectic does not supervene from without upon the fixed ideas of understanding3 it is the evidence of the higher nature which lies behind them1 of the dependence on a larger unity which understanding implicitly or explicitly denies4 ,that higher nature1 the notion or grasp of reasonable thought1 comes forward1 and has at first1 in opposition to the one-sided products of understanding1 the look of a destructive agent4 ,if we regard the understanding and its object1 as ultimate and final1--and they are so regarded in the ordinary estimation of the world1--then this negative action of reason seems utterly pernicious1 and tends to end in the subversion of all fixity whatever1 of everything definite4 ,in this light ,dialectic is what is commonly known as ,scepticism2 just as the understanding in its excess is known as ,dogmatism4 ,but in the total grasp of the rational or speculative notion1 ,dialectic ceases to be ,scepticism1 and ,understanding ceases to be ,dogmatism4 ,still there can be no doubt that the ,dialectic of reason is dangerous1 if taken abstractly and as if it were a whole truth4 ,for the thoughts of ordinary men tend to be more abstract than their materials warrant4 ,men seek to formulate their feelings1 faith1 and conduct3 but the rationale of their inmost belief1--their creed1--is generally narrower than it might be4 ,out of the undecomposed and massive 'substance1' on which their life and conduct is founded1 they extract one or two ingredients3 they emphasise with undue stress one or two features in their world1 and attach to these partial formulae a value which would be deserved only if they really represented the whole facts4 ,hence when the narrow outlines of their creed are submitted to dialectic1--when the inlying contradictions are exposed1 men feel as if the system of the world had sunk beneath them4 ,but it is not the massive structure of their world1 the organic unity in which they live1 that is struck by dialectic3 it is only those luminous points1 the representative terms of material thought1 which float before their consciousness1 and which have been formulated in hard and fast outlines by the understanding4 ,these points1 as so defined and exaggerated1 are what dialectic shakes4 ,not an alien force1 but the inherent power of thought1 destroys the temporary constructions of the understanding4 ,the infinite comes to show the inadequacy of the finite which it has made4 ,in philosophy this second stage is as essential as the first4 ,the one-sidedness of the first abstraction is corrected by the one-sidedness of the other4 ,in the ,philosophy of ,plato1 as has been noted1 the dialectical energy of thought is sometimes spoken of under the analogy of sexual passion--the ,love which1 in the words of ,sophocles1 'falls upon possessions' and makes all fixed ordinance of no account1 and finds no obstacles insuperable to its strong desire4 ,but ,love1 as the speaker explains1 is a child of ,wealth and ,want3 he is never poor1 and never rich3 he is in a mean between ignorance and knowledge#g4 ,thus is described the active unrest of growth1 the 'inquietude poussante1' as ,leibniz called it1--the quickening force of the negative and of contradiction4 ,at the word 'contradiction' there is heard a murmur of objection1 partly on technical1 partly on material grounds4 ,there are1 it is said1 other ways of getting from one idea to another than by contradiction3 and it is not right to give the title to mere cases of contrast and correlation4 ,now it may be the case that the relations of ideas are many and various4 ,in particular there is to many people a decided pleasure in the mere accumulation of bits of knowledge4 ,in their mental stock there are only aggregates1--conjunctions due to accidents of time and place1--associations and fusions which do not reach organised unity4 ,in all of us1 perhaps1 there are more or less miscellaneous collections of beliefs1 perceptions1 hopes1 and wishes1 in no very obvious connexion with one another4 ,an united self1 one1 harmonious1 and complete1 is probably rather an ideal of development than a fact realised4 ,there are in each two or three discordant selves1--among which it might sometimes be difficult to select the right and true one 7for that will depend on the momentary point of view74 ,the deeper consciousness may go on entirely independent of the train of the more superficial ideas3 the world of reality may glide past without touching the world of dream or of fiction3 our business part may live in a region parted off from our religion by gulfs inscrutable4 ,in all these cases there cannot be said to be any contradiction4 ,but ,hegel speaks of the essential progress of knowledge1 and of that true self or real mind which has attained complete harmony--the self and mind that is implicitly or explicitly ,absolute4 ,in such a mind where the finite has passed or is passing into the infinite1 in a mind that is really becoming one and total1 its parts must meet and modify each other4 ,at each phase1 if that phase is earnest1 self-certain1 and real1 it claims to be complete1 and can brook no rival4 ,the bringer of new things must appear as an enemy3 for the old system1 however imperfect as a mere form1 has behind it the strength of an infinite and perfect content3 it is more than it has explicated3 but as it 7from its imperfection and honesty7 identifies itself with its form1 it is resolved to resist change4 ,progress then must be by antagonism3 it cannot be real progress otherwise1 but only the mere shifting of dilettante doubt and dilettante toleration4 ,both new and old are worth something1 and they must prove their value by neither being lost1 but both recognised1 in a completer scheme of things4 ,yet there is a difference in the measure of contradiction at different stages of thought4 ,it is always greatest when there is least to be opposed about4 ,the more meagre an idea1 a creed1 a term of thought1 the more violent the antitheses to it4 ,the more abstractly we hold a doctrine1 the more readily are we disposed to sniff opposition4 ,and as in more concrete belief1 so in the more abstract terms of thought4 ,they seem so wide apart--like ',is' and ',is not'--and yet1 taken alone1 they are really so ready to recoil into one another4 ,as thought deepens1 contradiction takes a more modified form4 ,the relativity of things becomes apparent3 and what were erewhile opposed as contradictory1 turn out as pairs of correlatives1 neither of which is fully what it professed to be1 unless it also is all that seemed reserved for the other4 ,lastly1 and in the full truth of development1 progress is seen to be not merely a sudden recoil from one abstraction to another1 nor merely a continual reference to an underlying correlative1 but the movement of one totality which advances by self-opposition1 self-reconciliation1 and self-reconstruction4 ,in this stage1 the weight and bulk of unity keeps the contradiction in its place of due subordination4 ,but both elements are equally essential1 and if the unity is less palpable in the abstract beginnings1 and the divergence less wide at the close1 at neither beginning nor close can either be absent4 ,but if we merely look at the differentiation or negation involved in the action of reason1 we miss the half of its meaning3 and the new statement is as one-sided as the old4 ,we have not grasped the full meaning until we see that what1 as understanding1 affirmed a finite1 denies1 as dialectic1 the absoluteness or adequacy of that finite4 ,both the partial views have a right to exist1 because each gives its contribution to the science of truth4#h ,if we penetrate behind the surface1--if we do not look at the two steps in the process abstractly and in separation1--it will be seen that these two elements coincide and unite4 ,but we must be careful here4 ,this coincidence or identification of opposites has not annihilated their opposition or difference4 ,that difference subsists1 but in abeyance1 reduced to an element or 'moment' in the unity4 ,each of the two elements has been modified by the union3 and thus when each issues from the unity it has a richer significance than it had before4 ,this unity1 in which difference is lost and found1 is the rational notion1--the speculative grasp of thought4 ,it is the product of experience1--the ampler affirmative which is founded upon an inclusion of negatives4 ,we began with the bare unit1 or simple and unanalysed point1 which satisfied popular language and popular imagination as its nucleus3--the representation which had caught and half-idealised a point1 moment1 or aspect in the range of feeling and sensation4 ,in this stage the notion or thought proper is yet latent4 ,in the first place1 the nucleus of imagination was analysed1 defined1 and1 as we may surmise1 narrowed in the ,intellect4 ,and this grade of thought is known as the ,understanding4 ,in the second place1 the definite and precise term1 as understanding supposes it1 was subjected to criticism3 its contradictions displayed2 and the very opposite of the first definition established in its place4 ,this is the action of ,dialectic4 ,in the third place1 by means of this second stage1 the real nature or truth was seen to lie in a union where the opposites interpenetrate and mould each other4 ,thus we have as a conscious unity1--conscious because it1 as unity1 yet embraces a difference as difference--what we started with as an unconscious unity1 the truth of feeling1 faith1 and inspiration4 ,the first was an immediate unity3--that is to say1 we were in the midst of the unity1 sunk in it1 and making a part of it3 the second is a mediated unity1 which has been reached by a process of reflection1 and which as a conscious unity involves that process4 ,reason1 then1 is infinite1 as opposed to understanding1 which is finite thinking4 ,the limits which are found and accepted by the analytic intellect1 are limits which reason has imposed1 and which it can take away3 the limits are in it1 and not over it4 ,the larger reason has been laying down those limits1 which our little minds at first tend to suppose absolute4 ,let us put the same law in more concrete terms4 ,it is reason1--the ,idea1--or1 to give it an inadequate and abstract name1 ,natural ,selection--which has created the several forms of the animal and vegetable world3 it is reason1 again1 which in the struggle for existence contradicts the very inadequacies which it has brought into being3 and it is reason1 finally1 which affirms both these actions1--the hereditary descent1 and the adaptation--in the provisionally permanent and adequate forms which result from the struggle4 ,the three stages thus enumerated are therefore not merely stages in our human reason as subjective4 ,they state the law of rational development in pure thought1 in ,nature1 and in the world of ,mind1--the world of ,art1 ,morals1 and ,science4 ,they represent the law of thought or reason in its most general or abstract terms4 ,they state1 mainly in reference to the method or form of thought1 that ,triplicity1 which will be seen in those real formations or phases to which thought moulds itself1--the typical species of reason4 ,they reappear hundreds of times1 in different multiples1 in the system of philosophy4 ,the abstract point of the ,notion which parts asunder in the ,judgment1 and returns to a unity including difference in the ,syllogism3--the mere generality of the ,universal1 which1 by a disruption into ,particulars and detail1 gives rise to the real and actual ,individual3--the ,identity which has to be combined with ,difference in order to furnish a possible ,ground for ,existence3--the baldness and nakedness of an ,immediate belief1 which comes to the full and direct certainty of itself1 to true immediacy1 only by gathering up the full sense of the antithesis which can separate conviction from truth1 or by realising the ,mediation connecting them3--all these are illustrations of the same law really applied which has been formally stated as the necessity for a defining1 a dialectical1 and a speculative element in thought4 ,the three parts of ,logic are an instance of the same thing3 and when the ,idea1 or organism of thought1 appears developed in the series of ,natural forms1 it is only to prepare the kingdom of reason actualised in the world of ,mind4 ,the ,understanding1 on the field of the world1 corresponds1 says ,hegel#i1 to the conception of ,divine ,goodness4 ,the life of nature goes on in the independence and self-possession of all its parts1 each as fixed and proud of its own1 as if its share of earth were for ever assured4 ,the finite being then has his season of self-satisfied ease3 while the gods live in quiet1 away from the sight of man's doings4 ,the dialectical stage1 again1 corresponds to the conception of ,god as an omnipotent ,lord3 when the ,power of the universe waxes terrific1 destroying the complacency of the creatures and making them feel their insufficiency1--when the once beneficent appears jealous and cruel1 and the joyous equanimity of human life is oppressed by the terrors of the inscrutable hand of fate4 ,the easy-minded ,greek lived for the most part in the former world3 the uneasy ,hebrew to a great extent in the latter4 ,but the truth lay neither in the placid wisdom of ,zeus1 leaving the world to its own devices1 nor in the jealous ,jehovah of ,mount ,sinai3 the true speculative union is found in the mystical unity of ,godhead with human nature4 ,in this comprehensive spirit did ,hegel treat ,logic4 ,this ,triplicity runs through ,hegel's works4 ,if you open one1 the main divisions are marked with the capitals ,a1 ,b1 ,c4 ,one of these1 it may be1 is broken up into chapters headed by the ,roman numerals ,i1 ,,ii1 ,,iii4 ,under one or more of these probably come severally the ,arabic numerals #a1 #b1 #c4 ,any one of these again may be subdivided1 and gives rise to sections1 headed by the small letters a1 b1 c4 ,and1 lastly1 any one of these may be treated to a distribution under the three titles 1 1 4 ,of course the division is not in each case carried equally far3 nor does the subject always permit it3 nor is ,hegel's knowledge alike vigorous1 or his interest in all directions the same4 ,footnote #a3 ',verstand1' ,footnote #b3 ',die ,vernunft ohne ,verstand ist ,nichts2 der ,verstand doch ,etwas ohne ,vernunft4' ,hegel's ,leben1 p4 #edf4 ,footnote #c3 v vi 4 ,simplic4 ,phys4 fol4 #ch a 7ed4 ,diels1 p4 #agf74 ,footnote #d3 ',vernunft4' ,footnote #e3 ,novum ,organum1 ,book ,i4 #gj4 ,footnote #f3 ,phenomenologie des ,geistes1 p4 #fg4 ,footnote #g3 ,plato1 ,symposion1 #bjc4 ,footnote #h3 ,cf4 ,dante1 ,parad4 iv4 #acj4 ,footnote #i3 ,see in the ,logic 7vol4 ii4 p4 #ade74 ,,prolegomena ,,book ,,iii ,,logical ,,outlines ,,chapter ,,xxvi4 ,,thought ,,pure ,,and ,,entire4 ,the ,english reader may probably be taken to be familiar with the conception of ,logic as the ,science of the ,form of ,thought4 ,he may also have heard this explained as equivalent to the ,science of ,thought as ,thought1 or of ,thought as ,form1 or of ,formal ,thought4 ,but1 probably1 also1 he brings to the lesson no very high estimate of form as such4 ,in the old language of ,greek philosophy1 transmitted through the ,schoolmen of the ,west1 and still lingering in the phraseology of ,bacon and ,shakespeare#a1 ,forms and substantial forms were powers in the world of reality4 ,but a generation arose which knew them not3 to which they were only belated survivals of the past4 ,the forms had lost connexion with matter and content1 and had come to seem something occult1 transcendent1 and therefore1 to a practical and realistic age1 something fantastic and superfluous4 ,yet it may be well to recall that the same author who has put on record his view that forms are only mental figments1 unless they be fully 'determinate in matter1' has equally laid it down that the so-called 'causes' of vulgar philosophy--the matter and the agent--are only 'vehicles of the form1' ,thus spontaneously did ,bacon reconstruct the ,aristotelian theory of the interdependence of form and matter1 that form is always form of 7or in7 matter1 and that matter is always for form4 ,the relativity of form and matter1 or of form and content1 is indeed almost a commonplace of popular discussion on logical subjects4 ,but like other uncritical applications of great truths1 this is both carried beyond its proper bounds1 and is not carried out with sufficient thoroughness4 ,there cannot--it is said--be a formal logic1 because every exercise of thought is internally affected or modified by the material--the subject-matter--with which it deals4 ,it is implied in such an argument that the 'subject-matter' finds no difficulty in existing by itself1 but that the 'thought' is a mere vacuity or un-characterised something which owes its every character to the said matter4 ,but a subject-matter which has content and character has therefore form3 it is already known1 already thought4 ,and as to this thought1 which is said to approach its matter with a self so blank1 so impartial1 so neutral--what is it8 ,it is a thought or a thinking which has never as yet thought1--which is only named 'thought' by right of expectation1 but is itself nothing actual4 ,of such --fictitious--thought there can hardly be a science4 ,on the other hand1 that may be easily called a formal logic1 which is much more than formal3 and that may be called material1 which is only a species of formal4 ,great indeed is the virtue of names1 to suppress and to replace thought4 ,when forms hang on as mysterious names after their day is passed--when they are retained in a certain honour1 while the real working methods have assumed other titles2 then these forms become purely formal and antiquated4 ,thus the ,logic of ,aristotle seemed in its unfamiliar language to a later generation to be purely formal and superfluous4 ,it was only another side of the same mistake when the new forms--the forms efficient and active in matter1--were not recognised as formal1 but were boldly styled material3 and the ,logic which discussed such matter-marked forms was called a material ,logic4 ,the phrase ,matter of ,thought1 like its many congeners1 is a fruitful mother of misconceptions4 ,caught up by the pictorial imagination1 which is always at hand to anticipate thought1 it suggests a matter1 which is not thought1 but is there1 all the same1 lying in expectation of it4 ,it suggests two things--7for are there not two words1 and a preposition or term of relation between them874 ,but there are not two things4 ,this matter is just as much a nonentity as the aforesaid thought3 a matter of thought is a thought matter1--matter1 thought once1 and possibly to be thought again4 ,all this talk about the ,relativity of form and matter is insincere1 and semi-conventional4 ,it is 7like the well-known antithesis between ,matter and ,mind1 of which indeed it is only a variation7 a halting between two views4 ,that which it chiefly leans to1 is that there can be no form without matter1 though there may well be matter which is not yet formed4 ,at the best it goes no further than to admit or assert that besides the one there is also the other4 ,it establishes a see-saw1 and is proud of it4 ,this is ,dualism4 ,its maxim is1 ,don't forget that there is an ,other4 ,you have explored the ,one3 you have perhaps done well4 ,but there is also and always the ,other4 ,the second view is not the mere negation of this dualism4 ,that there is a dualism is a fact which it acknowledges4#b ,all life and reality is manifested in dualism--in antithesis3 but the life and the reality is one4 ,mind--,geist--actualised and intelligent experience--is the one ultimate and essential reality4#c ,in the face of its unity1 mere matter is only a half-truth1 and mere thought is only another4 ,the reality1 the unity1 and the truth1 is matter as formed1 nature as reflected in mind4 ,in the reality of experience there is always the presence of thought3 and thought is only real when it is wedded with nature in the truth of man's mind4 ,so far ,bacon and ,hegel coincide4 ,man--in so far as he is ,mind--and of course ,mind in its fullness is not merely subjective nor merely objective1 but absolute--is the measure of all things1 the central and comprehensive reality4 ,such a man--and such a mind--is1 we need hardly add1 not the man in the street1 nor the man in the study3 but the infinite1 universal1 eternal mind in whom these and all others essentially have their being4 ,such truth of ,man--such ,mind--is the ,absolute3 it is sometimes named ,god3 it is the ideal of all aspiration1 and the fountain of all truth4 ',logic1' says ,hegel#d1 'is the science of the ,idea in the medium of mere thought4' ,it exhibits the truth in one partial aspect1 or shows one appearance of the total unity of the world1--the aspect it would wear if we could for a moment suppose the reality of ,nature to vanish out of sight1 and the ideality of ,mind reduced to a ghost4 ,it dissects the underlying organisation--the scheme of unification--which the world of mental or spiritual experience presents in all its concreteness4 ,and it does so because it exhibits the last result of the ever clearer and clearer experience which ,mind achieves as it comes to see and realise itself4 ,the logical skeleton is the sublimated product of a rich concrete experience4 ,it has been a curious delusion of some who were probably satisfied by a casual glance at ,hegel's ,logic1 especially in its earlier chapters1 to suppose that the ,logic was meant to be the absolute beginning3 and that pure or mere thought was the congenital endowment of the heaven-born philosopher#e4 ,to ,hegel1 on the contrary1 ,logic was an abstraction from a fuller1 more concrete reality4 ,he did not indeed suppose that the symbolical conception of ,movement--in its popular pictorialness--would be an adequate substitute or representative for thought2 but he knew that the energy of mental development was the fact1 and the truth1 of which 'becoming' is a meagre1 abstract phase4 ,logic1 then1 is not the ,science of mere or pure thought1 but of the ,idea 7which is co-terminous with reality7--of the ,mind's synthetic unity of experience--looked at1 however1 abstractly1 in the medium of pure thought4 ,just so1 ,nature-philosophy is the same ,idea1 as it turns up bit after bit distracted1 fragmentary1 and more or less mutilated1 in the multiplication1 the time and space division1 of physical phenomena4 ,but as science requires us to go from the simple to the more complex1 as the truth has to prove itself true1 by serving in its conclusion as the corroboration of all its premisses or presuppositions2 so the system of philosophy begins with the ,logic4 ,yet it can only begin there1 because it has already apprehended itself in its completeness3 and it can only move onward because it is the concentrated essence--the implicit being--of all that it actually and explicitly is4 ,it may appear to emerge from a point3 but that point has at its back the intellectual unity of a philosophy which embraces the world4 ,it presupposes the complete philosopher who shall be the complete organ of absolute intelligence1 of universal and eternal ,spirit4 ,a satisfactory ,logic then presupposes or implies a complete system of philosophy4 ,no doubt1 for a logic which deals with the minor problems of ratiocination or formal induction1 all that is needed is a certain general acquaintance with popular conceptions1 and with the results or methods of physical science4 ,but if logic takes its business seriously1 it must go behind these presuppositions4 ,it must trace back reasoning to its roots1 fibres1 and first principles4 ,and to do that it is not enough to put at the front a psychological chapter4 ,far from helping1 psychology in these matters is much more in need of being helped itself4 ,till it has learned a little of the puzzle of the one and the many1 the same and the diverse1 being1 quality1 and essence1 psychology will be as little use to ,logic as blind guides generally are4 ,nor need this prevent us from saying that when psychology has thoroughly learned these mysteries1 it will give fresh life and reality to the logic which it touches upon4 ,the principles of ,logic lie in another field1#f and are deeper in the ground1 than obvious psychological gossip4 ,if ,logic then deals with form1 it deals with a form of forms--the form of the world1 of life1 and of reality4 ,it is a form1 which is a unity in diversity1 an organism1--a form which is infinitely manifold1 and yet in all its multiplicity one4 ,logic is the morphology of thought1--of that thought which in ,nature is concealed under the variety and divisions of things1 and which in the theory of mental and spiritual life is resumed into a complete biology of the world-organism4 ,the problem of ,logic then demands an abstraction--an effort of self-concentration--an effort by which the whole machinery of the sensible universe shall be left behind1 and the accustomed clothing of our thoughts be removed4 ,to move in this ether of pure thought is clearly one of the hardest of problems4 ,like ,plato1 we may occasionally feel that we have caught a glimpse of the super-sensible world unveiled2 but it disappears as the senses regain their hold4 ,we can probably fix a firm eye on one term of reason1 and criticise its value3 but it is less easy to survey the ,bacchic dance from term to term#g1 and allow them to criticise themselves4 ,the distracting influence of our associations1 or of outside things1 is always leading us astray4 ,either we incline to treat thoughts as psychological products or species1 the outcome of a mental process1 which are 7a7 given to us from the beginning1 and so a priori or innate1 or which 7b7 spring up in the course of experience by mutual friction between our mind and the outside world1 and so are a posteriori or derivative4 ,or disregarding the subjective side of thoughts1 we act as if they were more correctly called things3 we speak of relations between phenomena3 we suppose things1 and causes1 and quantities to form part of the so-called external universe1 which science explores4 ,the one estimate of thought1 like the other1 keeps in view1 though at some distance1 and so as not to interfere with their practical discussions1 the separate and equal existence of thoughts and things4 ,the psychologists or subjectivists of logic scrutinise the world within us first of all1 and purpose to accomplish what can be done for the mind as possessing a faculty of thought1 before they turn to the world of things4 ,the realists or objectivists of logic think it better for practical work to allow thought only the formal or outside labour of surveying and analysing the laws of phenomena out of the phenomena which contain them4 ,neither of them examines thought--'the original synthetic unity'--in its own integrity as a movement in its own self1 an inner organisation1 of which subject and object1 the mind and the things called external1 are the vehicles1 or1 in logical language1 the accidents4 ,if it is possible to treat the history of the ,english ,constitution as an object of inquiry in itself and for its own sake1 without reference to the individuals who in course of time marred and mended it1 or to the setting of events in which its advance is exhibited1 why not treat the thought1 which is the universal element of all things1 of ,english ,constitution1 and ,italian ,art1 and ,greek ,philosophy1 in the same way1--absolutely1 i4 e4 in itself and for its own sake8 ,when that is done1 distinctions rigidly sustained between a priori and a posteriori become meaningless because now seen to belong to a distinction of earlier and later in the history of the individual consciousness4 ,there is at best only a modified justification for such mottoes and cries1 as ',art for ,art's sake1' or ',science must be left free and unchecked1' or ',the rights of the religious conscience ought always to be respected'3 but there can be no demur or limitation to the cry that ,thought must be studied in ,thought by ,thought and for the sake of ,thought4 ,for ,art1 and ,science1 and ,religion are specialised modes in which the totality or truth of things presents itself to mankind1 and none of them can claim an unconditioned sway3 their claims clash1 and each must be admitted to be after all a partial interpretation1 a more or less one-sided interpretation of the true reality of the world4 ,thought on the other hand is unlimited3 for it exists not merely in its own abstract modes1 but interpenetrates and rules all the other concrete forms of experience1 manifesting itself in ,art and ,religion1 not less than in ,science4 ,and thus when we study ,thought1 we study that which is in itself and for itself1--we study ,absolute ,being4 ,on the other side it must be noted that in ,logic it is ,absolute ,being1 only when and as it is thought1 which we study4 ,the two sides1 ,being and ,thought1 must both come forward3 and come in unity1 although in some phases of the ,idea the thought-element1 in others the being-element is more pronounced4 ,thought1 too1 is ,being4 ,an old distinction of the ,stoics1 which not inaptly represents popular views on this matter1 set on one side 1 existences 7which were always corporeal1 whether they were the things we touch and feel1 or the words and breathings by which we utter them71 and on the other side the meanings or thoughts proper or 7which were incorporeal74 ,these 1 as they were otherwise called1 were to the ,stoics the proper sphere of ,logic4 ,in the sense therefore which the ,stoics and popular consciousness give to being1 the object of logic does not possess being4 ,it is not corporeal4 ,it cannot however be said to be in the sphere of non-being4 ,it is rather a part of reality--of concrete being--which can be considered apart1 as if it stood alone4 ,alone it does not stand4 ,and yet it holds a position so fundamental1--is the same theme again and again repeated under endless variations1--is so obviously the universal of things--that it may properly form the subject of independent study4 ,it is1 moreover1 a part of ,reality1 which may well claim to stand for the whole4 ,it is1 so to say1 the score of the musical composition1 rolled up in its bare1 silent1 unadorned lineaments2 the articulated theme1 besides1 and not the mere germinal concept1 of all the variety of melody4 ,but it is only laid up there in abstracto1 because in the soul of the composer it had already taken concrete form1 due to his capacity and training1 his mental force1 his art and science4 ,it is there that the score has its source4 ,but secondly1 the musical work exists in the performance of the orchestra3 in the manipulations of the several instruments1 in the notes of the singers1 in all the diversity of parts which make up the mechanism for unfolding the meaning or theme--that unreality1 that mere thought1 which to the stricter ,stoic might be said to have no 1 or bodily subsistence4 ,and there are still people who will be disposed to assert that it is only in the multitude of notes of violin1 trombone1 flute1 c41 that the music is real3--though perhaps these hardy realists do not quite mean what they say4 ,for what they probably mean1 and what is the fact1 is that the music exists as a complete reality in those who have ears and minds capable of comprehending and enjoying it3 in those who can reunite meaning and theme to execution and orchestration3 and we may even add that it is more and more real1 in proportion to the greater power with which they can bring these two into one4 ,we shall rather say then that thought points to reality1 and that mere nature seeks for interpretation3 that mere thought and mere being both seek for reunion4 ,yet if in the complete reality we thus distinguish two elements1 we may follow ,hegel in setting the pure ,idea first4 ,it is no doubt in a way true that1 as has been said1 ,hegel may be often read most easily if we first begin with his concluding paragraphs4 ,in psychology and ethics the fundamental principles have assumed a more imposing1 a larger1 a more humanly-interesting shape1 than they bear in the intangible outlines of ,logic4 ,there they are written in blacker ink and broader lines than in the grey on grey4 ,but after all1 it is only for those who have grasped the faint--yet fixed--outlines that the full-contoured figure speaks its amplest truth4 ,the true sculptor must begin with a thorough study of anatomy4 ,for those therefore who do not care merely for results1 it is indispensable to begin--or at least to turn back to the beginning--to the ,logic4 ,no doubt the full tones of the heard and sounded harmony are the true and adequate presentation of the composer's purpose3 but they will be best comprehended and appreciated by those who have thoroughly grasped the score4 ,in ,logic1 so regarded1 thought is no longer merely our thought4 ,it is the constructive1 relational1 unifying element of reality4 ,without it reality would not articulately be anything for us3 and such thoughts seem to be its net extract1 its quintessence1 its concentrated meaning4 ,but really they are only the potent form of reality4 ,or1 more exactly1 in its limits1 under its phases1 must come all reality if it is to be part and parcel of our intelligent possession1 our certified property4 ,such a thought is the frame-work1 the shape-giver of our world1 of our communicable experience4 ,it is the formative principle of our intelligent life1 as it is the principle through which things have meaning for us1 and we have meaning for and fellowship with others4 ,it is not so rich as religion and art1 perhaps it does not have the intensity of feeling and faith3 but it is at the very basis of all of these1 or it is the concentrated essence of what in them is explicated and developed4 ,humanity in these its highest energies is more than mere thought--more than mere logic3 but it is still at the root thought1 and it is still governed by the laws and movement of this higher logic4 ,for this is a logic which is no mere instrument of technical reasoning1 for proof or disproof3 no mere code of rules for the evaluation of testimony4 ,it is a logic which deals with a thought--or an ,idea in thought-form--which is the principle of all life and reality3 the way of self-criticism which leads to truth3 a thought which is at home in all the phases and provinces of experience4 ,under the same name1 ,logic1 therefore1 we find something quite different from what the example of ,aristotle and his ancient and modern followers had accustomed us to4#h ,under the auspices of ,kant and his ',transcendental logic' there has emerged the need of something more corresponding to the title4 ,for the word itself was not used either by ,aristotle or the ,stoics4 ,neither the ,analytics and ,topics of the one1 nor the ,dialectic of the other1 exhaust the conception of the science1 or1 to put it more accurately1 they are only inceptions of a science1 the fulfilment of which was reserved for a later time4 ,bacon and ,locke1 ,descartes and ,spinoza1 all the thinkers of modern ,europe call for a deeper probing of the logical problem3 for a grasp of it which shall be more worthy of its conventional name1 ,logic1 the theory of ,reason4 ,and we may even say that what is wanted is a unification of the problem of the ,organon with that of the first philosophy1 a unification of ,logic with ,metaphysics3 a recognition that the problem of reason is not merely the method of reasoning1 but the whole theory as to the correlations of perception and conception1 of thinking and reality4 ,this conception of ,logic as the self-developing system of ,thought pure and entire1 is the distinctive achievement of ,hegel4 ',i cannot imagine1' he says1 'that the method which ,i have followed in this system of ,logic1 or rather the method which this system follows in its own self1 is otherwise than susceptible of much improvement1 and many completions of detail3 but ,i know at the same time that it is the only genuine method4 ,this is evident from the circumstance that it is nothing distinct from its object and subject-matter3 for it is the subject-matter within itself1 or its inherent dialectic1 which moves it along4'#i ,but how is this universe of thought to be discovered1 and its law of movement to be described8 ,from times beyond the reach of history1 from nations and tribes of which we know only by tradition and vague conjectures1 in all levels of social life and action1 the synthetic energy of thought has been productive1 and its evolution in the field of time has been going on4 ,for thousands of years the intellectual city has been rearing its walls3 and much of the process of its formation lies beyond the scope of observation4 ,but fortunately there is a help at hand1 which will enable us to discover at least the main outlines in the system of thought4 ,the key to the solution was found somewhat in the same way as led to the ,darwinian theory concerning the ,origin of ,species4 ,when the question touching the causes of variation and persistence in the natural kinds of plants and animals seemed so complex as to baffle all attempts at an answer1 ,darwin found what seemed a clue likely to lead to a theory of descent4 ,the methods adopted in order to keep up1 or to vary1 a species under domestication were open to anybody's inspection3 and those principles1 which were consciously pursued in artificial selection by the breeder1 suggested a theory of similar selection in free nature4 ,in studying the phenomena of thought1 of which the species or types were no less numerous and interesting than those in organic nature1 it was perhaps impossible to survey the whole history of humanity4 ,but it was comparatively easy to observe the process of thought in those cases where its growth had been fostered consciously and distinctly4 ,the history of philosophy records the steps in the conscious and artificial manipulation of what for the far greater part is transacted in the silent workshops of nature4 ,philosophy1 in short1 is to the general growth of intelligence what artificial breeding is to the variation of species under natural conditions4 ,in the successive systems of philosophy1 the order and concatenation of ideas was1 as it were1 clarified out of the perturbed medium of real life1 and expressed in its bare equivalents in terms of thought1 and thus first really acquired4 ,half of his task was already performed for the logician1 and there remained the work1 certainly no slight one--of showing the unity and organic development which marked the conscious reasoning1 and of connecting it with the general movement of human thought4 ,the logician had to break down the rigid lines which separated one system of philosophy from another1--to see what was really involved in the contradiction of one system by its successor1--and to show that the negation thus given to an antecedent principle was a definite negation1 ending not in mere zero or vacuity1 but in a distinct result1 and making an advance upon the previous height of intelligence4 ,to say this was to give a new value to the history of philosophy4 ,for it followed that each system was no mere opinion or personal view1 but was in the main a genuine attempt of the thinker to give expression to the tacit or struggling consciousness of his age4 ,behind the individual--who is often unduly regardless of his contemporaries and predecessors1 and who writes or thinks with little knowledge or sympathy for them1 there is the general bearing and interest of the age1 its powerful solidarity of purpose and conception4 ,the philosopher is the prophet1 because he is in a large part the product of his age4 ,he is an organ of the mind of his age and nation2 and both he and it play a part in the general work of humanity4 ,on the other hand1 it is dangerous to insist too forcibly on the rationality of the history of philosophy4 ,for it may be taken to mean--probably only by blinded or wooden commentators--that each step in the evolution and concatenation of the logical idea is to be identified with some historical system1 and that these systems must have appeared in this precise order4 ,and this would be to expect too much from the 'impotence of nature' which plays its part in the historical world also3 as that on one side forms part of the ,natural4 ,there is ,reason in the world--and in the world of history2 but not in the pellucid brightness and distinct outlines proper to the ,idea in the abstract element of thought4 ,it may take several philosophers to make one step in thought2 and sometimes one philosopher of genius may take several steps at once4 ,there may even be co-eval philosophies3 and there may be philosophies which appear to run on in independent or parallel lines of development4 ,it may well be that ,hegel has underestimated these divergencies1 and that he has been too apt to see in all history the co-operation to one dominant purpose4 ,but these errors in the execution of a philosophy of history1 and especially of the history of philosophy1 should not diminish our estimate of its principle4#aj ,at first this process was seen in the medium of time4 ,but the conditions of time are of practical and particular interest only4 ,the day when the first leaves appear1 and the season when the fruit ripens on a tree1 are questions of importance to practical arboriculture4 ,but botany deals only with the general theory of the plant's development1 in which such considerations have to be generalised4 ,so logic leaves out of account those points of time and chance which the interests of individuals and nations find all-important4 ,and when this element of time has been removed1 there is left a system of the types of thought pure and entire1--embalming the life of generations in mere words4 ,the same self-identical thought is set forth from its initial narrowness and poverty on to its final amplitude and wealth of differences4 ,at each stage it is the ,absolute3 outside of it there is nothing4 ,it is the whole1 pure and entire3 always the whole4 ,but in its first totality it is all but a void3 in its last a fully-formed and articulated world1--because it holds all that it ever threw out of itself resumed into its grasp4 ,in these circumstances nothing can sound higher and nobler than the ,theory of ,logic4 ,it presents the ,truth unveiled in its proper form and absolute nature4 ,if the philosopher may call this absolute totality of thought ever staying the same in its eternal development1--this adequacy of thought to its own requirements--by the name of ,god1 then we may say with ,hegel that ,logic exhibits ,god as ,he is in ,his eternal ,being before the creation of ,nature and a finite ,mind4#aa ,but the logical ,idea is only a phantom ,deity--the bare possibility of a ,god or of absolute reality in all the development of its details4 ,the first acquaintance with the abstract theory is likely to dash cold water on the enthusiasm thus awakened1 and may sober our views of the magic efficacy of ,logic4 ',the student on his first approach to the ,science1' says ,hegel1 'sees in ,logic at first only one system of abstractions apart and limited to itself1 not extending so as to include other facts and sciences4 ,on the contrary1 when it is contrasted with the variety abounding in our generalised picture of the world1 and with the tangible realities embraced in the other sciences1--when it is compared with the promise of the ,absolute ,science to lay bare the essence of that variety1 the inner nature of the mind and the world1 or1 in one word1 the ,truth1--this science of ,logic in its abstract outline1 in the colourless cold simplicity of its mere terms of thought1 seems as if it would perform anything sooner than this promise1 and in the face of that variety seems very empty indeed4 ,a first introduction to the study of ,logic leads us to suppose that its significance is restricted to itself4 ,its doctrines are not believed to be more than one separate branch of study engaged with the terms or dimensions of thought1 besides which the other scientific occupations have a proper material and body of their own4 ,upon these occupations1 it is assumed1 ,logic may exert a formal influence1 but it is the influence of a natural and spontaneous logic for which the scientific form and its study may be in case of need dispensed with4 ,the other sciences have upon the whole rejected the regulation-method1 which made them a series of definitions1 axioms1 and theorems1 with the demonstration of these theorems4 ,what is called ,natural ,logic rules in the sciences with full sway1 and gets along without any special investigation in the direction of thought itself4 ,the entire materials and facts of these sciences have detached themselves completely from ,logic4 ,besides they are more attractive for sense1 feeling1 or imagination1 and for practical interests of every description4 ,and so it comes about that ,logic has to be learned at first1 as something which is perhaps understood and seen into1 but of which the compass1 the depth1 and further import are in the earliest stages unperceived4 ,it is only after a deeper study of the other sciences that logical theory rises before the mind of the student into a universal1 which is not merely abstract1 but embraces within it the variety of particulars4--,the same moral truth on the lips of a youth1 who understands it quite correctly1 does not possess the significance or the burden of meaning which it has in the mind of the veteran1 in whom the experience of a lifetime has made it express the whole force of its import4 ,in the same way1 ,logic is not appreciated at its right value until it has grown to be the result of scientific experience4 ,it is then seen to be the universal truth1--not a special study beside other matters and other realities1 but the essence of all these other facts together4#ab ,footnote #a3 ,e4 g4 'formal' in ,hamlet1 iv4 #e4 #bae2 'informal' in ,measure for ,measure1 v4 #bcf4 ,footnote #b3 ,encycl4 #egd 7,philosophy of ,mind1 p4 #aif74 ,footnote #c3 ,encycl4 #cgg4 ,footnote #d3 ,logic1 vol4 ii4 p4 #cj4 ,footnote #e3 ,the criticisms of ,a4 ,trendelenburg1 in his ,logische ,untersuchungen1 rest on such assumptions4 ',trendelenburg1' says ,hartmann1 'means low-water mark in ,german philosophy4' ,footnote #f3 ,see above all ,bradley's ,principles of ,logic1 and ,bosanquet's ,logic1 c4 ,footnote #g3 ',das ,wahre ist der bacchantische ,taumel1 an dem kein ,glied nicht trunken ist2 und weil jedes1 indem es sich absondert1 ebenso unmittelbar sich auflst1--ist es ebenso die durchsichtige und einfache ,ruhe4' ,phenom4 des ,geistes1 p #ce4 ,footnote #h3 ,prantl1 ,geschichte der ,logik1 i4 #hg4 ,footnote #i3 ,wissenschaft der ,logik1 i4 p4 #ci4 ,footnote #aj3 ,see ,encyclop4 #edi 7,philosophy of ,mind1 pp4 #adh seqq474 ,it is1 of course1 quite another question--to be answered by intelligent research--how far in particular cases ,hegel has accurately studied a thinker1 and faithfully interpreted him4 ,some of his critics in this line appear to mistake philology--which is a highly important authority in its own field--for philosophy3 and will no doubt go on doing so4 ,footnote #aa3 ,hegel's ,werke1 iii41 #cc4 ,footnote #ab3 ,wissenschaft der ,logik1 i4 p4 #dc4 ,,chapter ,,xxvii4 ,,absolute ,,and ,,relative3 ,,or ,,the ,,categories4 ,according to the strict reasonings of ,kant in his ,criticism of ,pure ,reason1 and the somewhat looser discussions of ,mr4 ,spencer in his ,first ,principles a science of ,metaphysics or theory of the ,infinite1 ,absolute1 or ,unconditioned is impossible4 ,as a result of the criticism by ,kant1 ,jacobi claimed the ,absolute for ,faith3 and ,spencer banishes the ,absolute or ,unknowable to the sphere of ,religion to be worshipped or ignored1 but in either case blindly4 ,as we have already seen1 ,hegel does not accept this distribution of provinces between religion and philosophy4 ,there is only one world1 one reality3 but it is known more or less fully1 more or less truly and adequately4 ,it is presented in one way to the sensuous imagination3 in another to the scientific analyst3 in a third to the philosopher4 ,to the first it is a mere succession or expanse of pictures1 facts1 appearances3 and outside it--somewhere1 but not here1--there is a land1 a being of perfect wholeness and harmony4 ,to the second it is an unending chain of causes and effects1 of one thing simplified by being referred to another till at last a mighty all-explaining nullity1 called an ',ultimate ,cause1' is presumed to linger1 eternally unperceived at the infinitely-distant end of the series4 ,to the third everything is seen in connexion1 but not a mere uni-linear connexion3 each1 when studied1 more and more completes itself by including those relations which seemed to stand outside3 each fully realised1 or completely invested with its ideal implications1 is seen no longer to be an incident or isolated fact1 but an implicit infinite1 and a vice-gerent of the eternal4 ,philosophy thus releases both ordinary and scientific knowledge from their limitations2 it shows the finite passing into the infinite4 ,and ,hegel1 accordingly1 purposes to show that this unfathomable ,absolute is very near us1 and at our very door3 in our hands1 as it were1 and especially present in our every-day language4 ,if we are ever to gain the ,absolute1 we must be careful not to lose one jot or tittle of the ,relative#a4 ,the ,absolute--this term1 which is to some so offensive and to others so precious--always presents itself to us in ,relatives3 and when we have persistently traced the ,proteus through all its manifestations1--when we have1 so to speak1 seen the ,absolute ,relativity of ,relation1 there is very little more needed in order to apprehend the ,absolute pure and entire4 ,one may say of the ,absolute what ,goethe#b says of ,nature3 ',she lives entirely in her children3 and the mother1 where is she8' ,it is a great step1 when we have detected the ,relativity of what had hitherto seemed ,absolute1--when a new aspect of the infinite fullness of the world1 the truth of things1 dawns upon us4 ,but it is even a greater step when we see that the ,relativity which we have thus discovered is itself ,relative4 ,and this is one advantage of first studying the value of the categories of ethics and physics on ,logical ground4 ,on the concreter region of ,nature and ,mind1 the several grades and species into which reality is divided have a portentous firmness and grandeur about them1 and the intrinsic dialectic seems scarcely adequate to shaking the foundations of their stability4 ,they severally stand as independent self-sustaining entities1 separate from each other1 and stereotyped in their several formations4 ,but in the ether of abstract ,idea1 in the fluid and transparent form of mere thoughts1 the several stages in the development of the ,absolute1 the various grades of category1 clearly betray their ,relativity1 and by the negation of this ,relativity lead on to a higher ,absolute4 ,to the practical man1--so long as his reflection does not go deep1--the concepts on which his knowledge and faith are built seem eternal1 unshifting rock1 parts of the inmost fabric of things4 ,he accepts them as ultimate validities4 ,to him matter and force1 cause and effect1 distinctions between form and content1 whole and part1 quantity and quality1 belong to the final constitution of the world4 7,and so1 in a sense1 they do47 ,if he ever overcome the absoluteness which popular thought attributes to the individual things of sense and imagination1 and show their relativity1 he does so only to fall under the glamour of a new deception4 ,causes and matters1 forces and atoms1 become new ultimates1 new absolutes1 of another order4 ,fictions or postulates of the understanding take the place of the figments of imagination4 ,the ordinary scientific man labours especially under the 'metaphysical' fallacy3 he realises abstractions in their abstractness4 ,as against this it is the business of the logician to show how such terms are to be interpreted as steps in a process of interpretation--containing so much that others of simpler structure have handed on1 and themselves presupposing by implication a great deal they fail properly to explicate4 ,thus1 the logician evinces at one blow the relativity of each term in its mereness1 abstractness1 or false absoluteness1 and the ideal absoluteness which always carries it beyond itself1 and makes it mean more than it says4 ,the natural mind always hastens to substantiate the terms it employs4 ,it makes them a fixed1 solid foundation1 an hypostasis1 on which further building may be raised4 ,if such pseudo-absolutising of concepts is to be called metaphysics1 then logic has to free us from the illusions of metaphysics1 to de-absolutise them1 to disabuse us of a false ,absolute4 ,the false ,absolute is what ,hegel calls the ,abstract3 it is the part which1 because it succeeded in losing sight of its dependence1 had believed itself to be a whole4 ,logic shows--in the phrase of ,hegel--that each such term or concept is only an attempt to express1 explicate1 or define the ,absolute#c3 a predicate of the ,absolute1 but falling short of its subject1 or only uttering part of the whole truth of reality4 ,but while ,logic shows it only to be an attempt1 and therefore in an aspect relative1 it equally shows its ingrained tendency to complete itself1 to carry out to realisation its ideal implication1--shows1 in short1 that e4 g4 force is more than mere force1 that thing-in-itself is not properly even a thing2 that a veritable notion 7,begriff7 or grasp of a thing is more than a mere 7subjective7 notion1 c4 ,thus the true ,absolute is not the emptiest and most meagre of abstractions1--what is left as a residual after the relative in all its breadth and length has been cut out of it2 it is the concretest of all being1 the whole which includes without destroying all partial aspects4 ,yet as it includes them1 it shows itself their master and more than master3 making each lose and win in the other1 till all are satisfied in unity1 and no shade of individuality is utterly lost in the totality of the ,universal4 ,accordingly1 ,metaphysics and ,logic tend to form one body4 ,for the distant and transcendent ,absolute1 which was the object of older ,metaphysics1 was substituted an ,absolute1 self-revealing in the terms of thought4 ,being is deposed from its absoluteness1 and made the first postulate of thought4 ,former ,metaphysics had dashed itself in vain against the reefs that girdle the island of the supersensible and nomenal1 the supposed world of true ,being3 and the struggle at last grew so disastrous that ,kant gave the signal to retreat1 and to leave the world of true ,being1 the impregnable ,thing-in-itself1 to its repose4 ,his advice to metaphysicians#d was that1 while scientific research continued to concentrate the attack of analysis upon single experiences conforming to certain conditions1 they should investigate these' conditions of possible experience or foundations of objectivity4 ,in other words1 he turned observation to what he called ,transcendental ,logic4 ,it was by means of this suggestion1 understood in the widest sense1 that ,hegel was led to treat ,logic as the science of ultimate reality4 ,he had to show how these conditions when carried out in full gave the ,unconditioned4 ,he attacked the ,absolute1 if we may say so1 in detail4 ,the ,absolute1 as the totality1 universe or system of ,relativity1 lays itself open to observation by deposing itself to a ,relative4 ,it possesses the differentiating power of separating itself as an object in passivity1 from itself as a subject in action1--of deposing itself to appearance1 of being for itself1 and also in and for itself4 ,and thus ,thought is the active universal1--which actualises itself more and more out of abstraction into concreteness4 ,hegel1 then1 solved the problem of ,metaphysics by turning it into ,logic4 ,the same principle1 ,thought1 appeared in both3 in the former as a fixed and passive result1 showing no traces of spontaneity1--in the latter as an activity1 with a mere power of passing from object to object1 discovering and establishing connexions and relations4 ,the two sciences were fragments1 unintelligible and untenable1 when taken in abstract isolation4 ,this is the justification1 if justification be required1 for ,hegel's unification of ,logic and ,metaphysics4 ,the ,hegelian ,logic falls into three parts3 the theory of ,transitory ,being3 the theory of ,relative ,being3 and the theory of the ,notion4 ,the first and second of these in his ,science of ,logic are called ,objective ,logic2 they also might be described as ,metaphysics4 ,the third part is more strictly on ,logical ground4 ,or perhaps it is best to describe the whole as the ,metaphysics of ,logic4 ,the ,logic of ,hegel is the ,science of ,thought as an organic system of its characteristic forms1 which in their entirety constitute the ,idea4 ,these forms or types of thought1 the moulds in which the ,idea confines itself in its evolution1 are not unlike what have been otherwise called the ,categories4 7,of course the foreign word ',categories' does not commend itself to ,hegel74#e ,they are the modifications or definite forms1 the articulated and distinct shapes1 in which the process of ,thought ever and anon culminates in the course of its movement4 ,the ,infinite and ,absolute at these points conditions itself1 and as so conditioned or differentiated is apprehended and stamped with a name4 ,they specify the unspecified1 and give utterance to the ineffable4 ,they are the names by which reason grasps the totality of things1--the names by which the truth 7or ,god7 reveals itself1 however inadequately4 ,from one point of view they constitute a series1 each evolved from the other1 a more completely detailed term or utterance of thought resulting by innate contradiction from a less detailed4 ,from another point of view the total remains perpetually the same2 and the change seems only on the surface4 ,the one aspect of the movement conceals the ,absolute3 the other puts the ,relative into the background4 ,what then are the ,categories8 ,we may answer3 ,they are the ways in which expression is given to the unifying influence of thought3 and we have to consider them as points or stations in the progress of this unification1 and in the light of this influence4 ,these ,categories are the typical structures marking the definite grades in the growth of thought1--the moulds or forms which thought assumes and places itself in1--those instants when the process of thought takes a determinate form1 and admits of being grasped4 ,the growth of thought1 like other growths1 is often imperceptible and impalpable4 ,and then1 unexpectedly1 a condensation takes place1 a form is precipitated out of the transparent medium4 ,a new concept1 a new grasp of reality1 emerges from the solution of elements3 and a name is created to realise the new shade of the ,idea4 ,these thought-terms are the world of ,platonic forms1 if we consider his 'form of ,good' as corresponding to the ',idea' of ,hegel4 ,for if we look carefully into this mystic word ',good' which plays so brilliant a part in ancient philosophy1 we shall see that it only expresses in a more concrete and less analytic form1 as ancient thought often does1 the same thing as so many moderns love to speak of as ,relativity1 and which is also implied in ,aristotle's conception of an ,end4 ,to see things sub specie boni--which ,plato describes as the supreme quality of the truth-seeker who is to guide men into uprightness1 or into conformity with the true nature of things1--is to see them elevated above their partial self-subsistence into the harmony and totality of that which is always and unvaryingly its real self4 ,the ,good is the sun-light in which things lose their earlier character 7which they had in the days of our bondage and ignorance7 of mysterious and perplexing spectres of the night4 ,in the light of the ,good1 things are shorn of their false pretence of self-subsistence and substantiality1 deposed by comparison with the perfect and unspotted1 and as it were stung into seeking a higher form of being by struggle4 ,and this is the abstract moral way of looking4 ,but to see them in the form of ,good means also that they are seen to be more and better than we thought1 that they are not condemned to inadequacy1 but bear in them the witness and revelation of infinity and absoluteness4 ,and this is rather the faith of religion and the vision of art4 ,and the 'form of ,good' is only a brief and undeveloped vision of an ,absolute1 which is the 'form of ,relativity1'--,relativity elevated into an ,absolute4 ,a ,category is often spoken of as if it were the highest extreme of generalisation1 the most abstract and most widely applicable term possible4 ,if we climb sufficiently far and high up the ,porphyry's tree of thought1 we may expect1 thought the old logicians1 to reach the 'summa genera' or highest species of human thought4 ,nor have modern logicians always refrained from this byway4 ,but these quantitative distinctions of greater and less1 in which the ,formal ,logic revels1 are not very suitable to any of the terms or processes of thought1 and they certainly give an imperfect description of the ,categories4 ,the essential function which the ,categories perform in the fabric of thought and language is1 in the first place1 to combine1 affirm1 demonstrate1 relate1 and unify1--and not to generalise4#f ,their action may be better compared to that fulfilled by those symbols in an algebraical expression1 which like plus and minus denote an operation to be performed in the way of combining or relating1 than to the office of the symbols which in these expressions denote the magnitudes themselves4 ,to the student of language the ,categories sometimes present themselves as pronominal1 or formal roots1--those roots which1 as it is said1 do not denote things1 but relations between things4 ,he meets them in the inflections of nouns and verbs2 in the signs of number1 gender1 case1 and person3 but1 as thus presented1 their influence is subordinate to the things of which they are1 as it were1 the accidents4 ,he meets them in a more independent and tangible shape in the articles1 pronouns1 prepositions1 conjunctions1 and numerals1 and in what are called the auxiliary verbs4 ,in these apparently trifling1 and in some languages almost non-existent words or parts of words1 we have the symbols of relations1--the means of connexion between single words1--the cement which binds significant speech together4 ,there are languages1 such as the older and classical forms of ,chinese1 where these categorising terms are1 as it were1 in the air3 where they are only felt in accent and position1 and have no separate existence of their own4 ,but in the languages of the ,indo-,european family they gradually appear1 at first in combination1 perhaps1 with the more material roots1 and only in the course of time asserting an independent form4 ,originally they appear to denote the relations of space and time1--the generalised or typical links between the parts of our sense-perceptions3 but from there they are afterwards1 and in a little while1 transferred into the service of intellect4 ,these little words are the very life-blood of a language1--its spirit and force4 ,it is in these categories1 as they show themselves in the different linguistic families1 that a nation betrays its mode and tone of thought4 ,the language of the ,altaic races1 e4 g41 expresses activity only as a piece of property1 an appropriation of a substance1 and knows no true distinction of noun and verb3 the ,semitic ,tongues in their tense-system perhaps betray the intense inwardness of the race3 whereas the immense inflectionalism of the ,indo-,european seems not unconnected with his greater versatility and energy4 ,complete mastery in the manipulation of these particles and forms is what makes an idiomatic knowledge of a language1 as distinct from a mere remembrance of the vocabulary4 ,and philosophy is the recognition of their import and significance4 ,thus in ,greek philosophy the central questions turn upon such words as ,being and not-,being3 ,becoming3 that out of which3 that for the sake of which3 the what-was-being3 the what is3 the other3 the one3 the great and small3 that which is upon the whole3 what is according to each3 this somewhat3 c4#g ,and again in ,modern ,philosophy1 how often has the battle raged about the meaning of such words as ,i3 will3 can3 must3 because3 same and different3 self3 c46 ,footnote #a3 ,cf4 ,herbart's maxim1 ',wie viel ,schein1 so viel ,hindeutung auf ,sein4' 7,hauptpunkte der ,metaphysik47 ,footnote #b3 ,die ,natur 7#aghj73 ',sie lebt in lauter ,kindern3 und die ,mutter1 wo ist sie84444 ,sie ist ganz und doch immer unvollendet4444 ,sie verbirgt sich in tausend ,namen und ,termen1 und ist immer dieselbe4' ,footnote #c3 ,logic 7,encyclop47 #he1 #hg1 #aab1 #aid1 c4 ,footnote #d3 ,metaphysic is1 in ,kant's usage1 ambiguous4 ,it means 7a7 a supposed science of the supersensible or unconditioned reality2 7b7 a study of the conditions or presuppositions--the ,kantian a priori--of some aspect of ,experience1 e4 g4 a ,metaphysic of ,moral rules4 ,footnote #e3 ,his usual term is ,denkbestimmungen1 the several expressions or specific forms of the unification which thought is4 ,the term ,categories has been identified by ,kant with his list of ,stammbegriffe4 and by ,mill with his classes of nameable things1--with some critical remarks on ,aristotle's use of the word4 ,that use--to denote the elements of predicable reality1 what ,grote called ens--is probably not so 'rhapsodical' as ,kant1 with his new-born zeal for the contrast of sensibility and intellect1 was inclined to suppose4 ,a real history of the ,category-theory would be almost a history of philosophy4 ,perhaps the name might be more sparingly used4 ,footnote #f3 ,generalisation is only one small aspect of thought1 with specialisation as its1 at least as important1 pendant4 ,to read certain logics1 one might think the all-comprehensive virtue of truths were to be general1--not to be true4 ,footnote #g3 and 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 ' 3 ' 3 4 ,,chapter ,,xxviii4 ,,the ,,three ,,parts ,,of ,,logic4 ,logic1 as it is understood in these pages1 is the critical history of the terms of thought by which reality1 the sum of experience1 the world1 is described or expressed4 ,it is the philosophical criticism of the concepts1 or elements of conception1 by which we define or develop the ,totality1 the ,absolute4 ,it describes the constitution of the intellectual realm1 by and in which we give body1 coherence1 unity1 and system to reality4 ,it is the self-developing organisation of the thoughts by which we think things1 and by which things are what they are4 ,it is the ripe fruit of the experience of the ages of humanity1 and it therefore bears in itself a principle of growth4 ,but if it be a fruit1 it is a fruit which can watch its own growth1 which reflects upon its own life4 ,its three parts show the main stages of its development1 beginning with the least adequate and most abstract or general description of reality4 ,the first part of ,logic1 the theory of ,being#a1 may be called the theory of unsupported and freely-floating ,being4 ,we do not mean something which is1 but the mere 'is1' the bare fact of ,being1 without any substratum4 ,the degree of condensation or development1 where substantive and attribute1 or noun and verb1 co-exist1 has not yet come4 ,the terms or forms of ,being float as it were freely in the air1 and we go from one to another1 or--to put it more correctly--one passes into another4 ,the terms in question are ,is and ,not3 ,become3 ,there is3 ,some and ,other3 ,each3 ,one3 ,many3 and so on through the terms of number to degree and numerical specificality4 ,this ,being is immediate3 i4e4 it contains no reference binding it with anything beyond itself1 but stands forward baldly and nakedly1 as if alone2 and1 if hard pressed1 it turns over into something else4 ,it includes the three stages of ,quality1 ,quantity1 and ,measure4 ,the ether of ',is' presumes no substratum1 or further connexion with anything3 and we only meet a series of points as we travel along the surface of thought4 ,to name1 to number1 to measure1 are the three grades of our ordinary and natural thought3 so simple1 that one is scarcely disposed to look upon them as grades of thought at all4 ,and yet if thought is self-specification1 what more obvious forms of specifying it are there than to name 7so pointing it out1 or qualifying it71 to number 7so quantifying it1 or stating its dimensions71 and to measure it8 ,these are the three primary specificates by which we think1--the three primary dimensions of thought4 ,thought1 in so determining1 plays upon the surface1 and has no sense of the interdependence of its terms4 ,and if we could imagine a natural state of consciousness in which sensations had not yet hardened into permanent things1 and into connexions between things1 we should have something like the range of ,immediate ,being4 ,colours and sounds1 a series of floating qualities1 pass before the eye and the ear3 these colours and sounds are in course of time counted3 and then1 by applying the numbers to these qualities1 we get the proportions or limits ascertained4 ,when this process in actual life1--the advance from the vague feelings which tell us of sweet1 cold1 c41 by means of a definite enumeration of their phenomena1 to the rules guiding their operation1--is reduced to its most abstract terms1 we have the process of ,being4 ,it would be the period when a distinction between things and their actions or properties has not arisen4 ,the demonstrative pronouns and the numerals are among the linguistic expressions of ,being in its several stages4 ,perhaps too we may illustrate it by the so-called 'impersonal' verb--which has hardly reached the stage of verb proper1 having no subject3 or by the name which still fluctuates between the stage of substantive or adjective4 ,the first sphere was that of ,being directly confronting us1 and using the demonstrative pronouns first of all4 ,the second is ,relative or ,reflective ,being3 and in this we have to deal with the relative pronouns4 ,the surface of ,being is now seen to exhibit a secondary formation1 to involve a sort of permanent standard in itself1 and to be essentially relative4 ,the mere quality1 when reduced to number1 is seen to be subjected to a certain measure1 rule1 sort1 or standard3 and this reflex of itself always haunts it1 modifying and determining it4 ,thus instead of qualities1 we begin to speak of the properties of a thing3 we have1 as it were1 two levels of ,being1 in intimate and necessary connexion1 where there was only one before4 ,at first it was but a mere surface-picture1 one thing here and another there3 a this and a that2 one1 now1 and another1 then4 ,this1 it might be1 was round1 and that square3 now1 it was bright1 and then1 it was dull3 here was a head1 and there was a limb4 ,but the comparison of quality with quantity1 measuring one by the other1 gave rise to the conception of something permanent1 a true nucleus amid the changes4 ,the fact1 previously single1 is now become double3 the mere event is now a phenomenon1 a temporary and outward manifestation of something inner4 ,we now see each that is1 in the halo of what it has been1 or will be3 the passing modification in the light of the permanent type4 ,but as yet the permanent and the passing are separate1 and only throw light on each other3 ,a explaining itself by ,b and ,b by ,a4 ,we have apparently two facts2 neither of which can however stand by itself and therefore refers us to the other4 ,but to get a real rest in this incessant round of mutual reference of one to another we must take a higher stand-point4 ,in this sphere of ,relativity the terms expressive of things come in pairs3 such as ,same and ,different1 ,like and ,unlike3 ,true ,being and ,show or ,semblance3 ,cause and ,effect3 ,substance and ,accident3 ,matter and ,form3 and the like4 ,if we compare mere ,being to the cell in its simple state1 we may say that in the second sphere of ,logic a nucleus has been formed1--that a distinction has sprung up between two elements1 which are still in closest interconnexion4 ,we have penetrated behind the seeming simplicity of the surface3 and in fact discovered it to be mere seeming in the light of the substratum1 cause1 or essence1 upon which it is now reflected4 ,in immediate ,being one category1 or specificate1 or dimension of thought passes over into another1 and then disappears3 but in mediated ,being one category has a meaning only by its relation to another1--only by its reflection on another1--only by the light which another casts upon it4 ,thus a cause has no meaning except in connexion with its effect3 a force implies or postulates an exertion of that force3 an essence is constituted by the existence which issues from it4 ,instead of 'is1' therefore1 which denotes resting-upon-self1 or connexion-with-self1 the verb of the second sphere is 'has1' denoting reference1 or connexion-with-something-else3 e4g4 the cause has an effect3 the thing has properties4 ,instead of numerals1 come the prepositions and pronouns of relation1 such as which1 same1 like1 as1 by1 because4 ,the only conjunction in the first stage or ,being was ',and1'--mere juxtaposition2 and even that conjunction was perhaps premature1 and due to reflective thought1 going beyond what was immediately before it1 and tracing out connexions with other things4 ,the first stage1 as we have seen1 treated of the terms of natural thought present in the action of the senses3 the second stage--that of ,essential ,being--deals with scientific1 reflective1 or mediate thought4 ,what1 why1 are the questions3 comparison and connexion the methods3 the establishment of relations of similarity1 causation1 and co-existence1 the purpose in this range of logical method4 ,its categories are those most familiar to science in its reflective and comparative stage4 ,it is the peculiar home of what are known as ,metaphysical subtleties4 ,the natural but delusive tendency of reasoning is to throw the emphasis on one side of the relation1 and to regard the other as accessary and secondary4 ,contrasts between essentia and existentia3 substantia and modi3 cause and effect3 real and apparent3 constantly occur4 ,if the first branch of ,logic was the sphere of simple ,being in a point or series of points1 the second is that of difference and discordant ,being1 broken up in itself4 ,the progress in this second sphere--of ,essentia or ,relative being--consists in gradually overcoming the antithesis and discrepancy between the two sides in it--the ,permanent and the ,phenomenal4 ,at first the stress rests upon the ,permanent and true ,being which lies behind the seeming--upon the essence or substratum in the background1 on which the show of immediate ,being has been proved by the process in the first sphere really to rest4 ,then1 secondly1 ,existence comes to the front1 and ,appearances or ,phenomena are regarded as the only realities with which science can deal4 ,and yet even in this case we cannot but distinguish between matter and form1 between the phenomena and their laws1 between force and its exercises3 and thus repeat the relativity1 though both terms in it are now on the whole transferred into the range of the ,phenomenal world4 ,the third range of ,essential ,being is known as ,actuality1 where the two elements in relation rise to the level of independent existences1 essences in phenomenal guise--bound together1 and deriving their very characteristics from that close union4 ,relativity or correlation is now clearly apparent in actual form1 and comprises the three heads of ,substantial ,relation1 ,causal ,relation1 and ,reciprocal ,relation4 ,in this case while the two members of the relation are now indissolubly linked together1 they are no more submitted to each other than they are independent4 ,according to ,reciprocity everything actual is at once cause and effect3 it is the meeting-point of relations3 a whole with independent elements in mutual interconnexion4 ,such a total is the ,notion4 ,this brings us to the third branch of ,logic1--the theory of the ,notion1 or ,grasp of ,thought4#b ,the theory of ,causality1 with which the second branch closed1 continued to let the thought fall asunder into two unequal halves--always however in relation or connexion with each other4 ,but in the present part of the ,logic the two halves are re-united1 or in their difference their identity is also recognised4 ,instead of a cause of a thing 7which is separate from it in order71 we have a concept which is its principle of unity1 its universal in which it is individualised4 ,instead of incessant and endless ,relativity1 we have ,development4 ,by development is meant self-specification1 or self-actualisation3 the thing is what it becomes1 or while it changes it remains identical with itself4 ,the ,category or ,development is the category or method of philosophic or speculative science3 just as ,being corresponded to natural thought1 and ,relativity or ,reflection to metaphysical and realistic science4 ,according to the law of ,development diversity and unity both receive their due4 ,mere unity or ,being reappears now as ,universality or ,generality4 ,mere diversity1 or the relativity of essence1 re-appears as ,particularity1 or the speciality of details4 ,and the union of the two is seen in the ,individualised notion or real object4 ,in other words1 the true thought which really grasps and gets all round its object1 which is a real whole1 is a ,triplicity3 it is first seen all as the ground or self-same1 the possibility--secondly1 all as the existence in details1 and difference1 the actuality or contingency--and thirdly1 all as the self-same in difference1 and the possible in actuality4 ,every object in its full reality is an innate movement2 and to grasp it wholly we must apprehend it as such a self-evolving and self-involving unity of elements1 in each of which however it is whole and entire4 ,thus the ,notion embraces the three elements or factors of universal1 particular and individual4 ,these three elements first rise to independence and get their full significance or explication in the syllogism1 with its three terms and judgments1 exhibiting the various ways in which any two of these elements in thought are brought into unity by means of the third4 ,this adequate form is a system or organic unity which contains in itself the premisses of its conclusion or the means to its realisation1--which is a process within itself1 and when complete and self-supporting perforce gives itself reality4 ,the ,notion or ,begriff is where ,hegel makes his special mark on ,logic4 ,schelling1 even1 following on ,kant1 had 7like ,schopenhauer after him7 lauded the merit of the ,intuition at the expense of the mere notion#c and expressed himself surprised at ,hegel's use of the word4 ,but what ,hegel wants first to insist upon is that the ,intuition or ,perception 7,anschauung7 is built upon the ,notion--that it is only because there is a universal principle in its details that the individual reality of the percept is assured4 ,that we can elicit a notion from a perception is only possible because it is implicitly dominated by a universal4 ,secondly1 ,hegel wishes to note 7as elsewhere7 that the full adequate notion1 the notion as self-explaining and self-constituting1 is all that is meant by the object4 ,thus the ,notion or ,subject--,causa ,sui--when it is fully realised in the plenitude of its elements or differences1--when each element has scope of its own1 is the ,object--the actual and individualised total of thought1 or syllogism in reality4 ,this objective world or ,object appears in three forms4 ,an ,object is either a mechanical1 a chemical1 or a teleological object4 ,the terms mechanical and chemical are not to be understood in the narrow sense of a machine or chemical compound4 ,they are to be taken in an analogical sense1 just as ,j4 ,s4 ,mill speaks of a chemical or geometrical method of treating social problems4 ,the object or realised notion is mechanical1 when the unification of the members in the totality comes or seems to come from without1 so that the whole or universal they form is external and almost indifferent to the particulars1 and only arranges them4 ,an object is chemical1 when the connexion or genesis of the compound from its factors is not evident3 when the elements are as it were lost1 and only give rise to a fresh particular4 ,an object is teleological1 when the universal is1 though not distinctly conceived as realised1 still always as tending to be realised by the particulars4 ,and in each of these grades the object comes more and more to be seen to be a self-enacting1 self-legislating being2 more and more a due pendant to the subject-notion4 ,modern science is a vehement opponent of teleology3 and with justice1 so far as in teleology1 means and end fall apart4 ,but it is mistaken in supposing itself to return to the mechanical point of view4 ,on the contrary its success is most generally secured by rising to the point of view given by the ,idea of ,life1 and by looking upon the objective world as an ,organism1 that is1 as the notion in objectivity1 soul indissolubly united with body4 ,but even the ,idea of ,life1 in which we enter the third stage of the notion1 is defective as a representation of the truth of ,objectivity3 for body and soul must part4 ,the conception of an ,organism or living being is too crude4 ,reality is no doubt well described as alive3 the ,absolute well defined as ,life4 ,but here again ,life is taken in a higher than its sense of mere ,life3 it is life as intelligent and volitional energy4 ,if the universe--the ,absolute--can be said to be living1 it must be said also that it is more than ,living4 ,such a life--such existence--is what ,aristotle has called and of the highest in man4 ,it is mental and spiritual life4 ,in its consummation it is the ,idea--the absolute ,idea--the totality which is and is aware of itself1--the developed unity of the ,notion with ,objectivity4 ,this unity thus presented is what lies implicit to our perception in ,nature3 and thus the ,idea1 as developed in ,logic1 forms the prologue and presupposition to the ,philosophy of ,nature4 ,footnote #a3 ,being 7das ,seyn7 probably conveys much more to an ,english reader than is here meant or wanted4 ,it is ,being1 where the distinction between essence and appearance has not yet emerged or been thought of4 ,if being 1 then essence 7,wesen7 1 the being which underlies and yet includes appearance4 ,wesen has more right to the substantival vocable of ,being3 ,seyn is little better than an ',is' or ',be4' ,in writers of ,locke's time1 ',being seems to mean a reality1 an actually existing object1 e4g4 ,clarke3 ',there has existed from eternity some one unchangeable and independent ,being4' ',what the substance or essence of that ,being is1 we have no idea4' ',essence1' says ,locke1 'may be taken for the very being of anything1 whereby it is what it is4' ,of course ,aristotle long ago noted ,being as one of the terms with variety of implication2 and his own fluctuation about is an obvious illustration of this4 ,in the translation of the ,logic1 ,wesen is occasionally rendered by ,being 7e4 g4 ,supreme ,being72 ,seyn1 by existence4 ,seyn here means so little that one can hardly find any word of sufficiently minimal content for it4 ,footnote #b3 ,no doubt1 as ,dr4 ,w4 ,t4 ,harris remarks1 ,notion 7used by ,dr4 ,stirling7 is a quite insignificant rendering of ,hegel's ,begriff3--for which he proposes ,self-activity4 ,but1 as he admits1 that is just ,hegel's way3 he coins brand-new the old terms1 and forces us1 if we will follow him1 to think full meaning into them4 ,footnote #c3 ,see vol4 ii1 ,notes and ,illustrations1 p4 #djh4 ,,chapter ,,xxix4 ,,the ,,search ,,for ,a ,,first ,,principle4 ,if there be one thing which1 more than another1 distinguishes ,modern ,philosophers from the ,ancient ,philosophy of ,athens1 it is the desire to discover a ,first ,principle of certainty1 a handle by which they may get hold of and set in due order the perplexed mass of reality4 ,they find themselves born to an inheritance of tradition1 a mass of belief and lore which overwhelms where it does not support4 ,the long watches of the ,middle ,ages had been a time of preparation--even if the 'cerebration' had been somewhat unconscious4 ,the mind had been by discipline trained to freedom4 ,as it worked amid the material and tried to order it and defend it1 the intellect grew to recognise its lordship over the load of authority4 ,overt revolts indeed against coercion by decrees and by canons of dogma had never been wanting even in the quietest of the so-called 'ages of faith4' ,but it is not in the loudest outcry or the most rampant dissent that progress shows its most effective course4 ,the 'catholic' and 'orthodox' tradition equally bears witness to a movement to emancipation1 to self-centred intelligence4 ,such an emancipation however cannot be complete and self-realised without a sharp and painful wrench at the moment of mental birth4 ,the great word of disruption1 of self-assertion1 of defiance to the past and to the dominant1 must be said3 and1 as human beings are constituted1 it will be said in a tone of acerbity for which neither the revolutionist nor the reactionary are severally alone responsible4 ,thus to hear the brave words and the bold defiance hurled out by the thinkers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries1 one might fancy they1 like ,archimedes1 sought a supernal vantage-ground from which they could move the world4 ,yet1 unlike the material earth1 the intellectual globe is a burden we each carry with us1--which we find upon us when--if ever--we begin to shake ourselves out of the slothful unconsciousness of our merely vegetative life4 ,for though we all carry it1 we do not all feel its weight4 ,in some individuals and in some ages there is so accurate a proportion between the inner power and the outer pressure that the load of belief and custom is but a well-fitting garb1 almost a second nature4 ,to others there is a felt disproportion1 a sense of superincumbent clothes and uncongenial1 unnatural trappings4 ,out of such struggles to be free1 grow1 occasionally1 philosophers1 and reformers4 ,to the former the burden is the burden of the unintelligible3 to the latter the burden of the unbearable and intolerable4 ,to the philosopher the removal of the burden consists in such a re-adjustment of the intellectual world that it shall be no longer a foreign thing1 but bone of his bone and flesh of his flesh4 ,but1 to re-adjust and to re-organise1 one must stand back from the objective3 one must cast it forth1 and look about for a clue to an exit from the maze of confusion4 ,the given and subsistent is put on probation3 not rejected1 but for the moment declined3 not denied1 but asked to present its credentials4#a ,this is the of the sceptical schools of later ,greece2 the invitation to doubt addressed by ,descartes to his own soul4 ,it is the protest against that vulgar precipitancy which in primitive and modern credulity is ready to give itself away to any doctrine which has the voice and the garb of outward authority4 ,or is it the assertion6 of the royal and inalienable sovereignty of the ,subjectivity to be certain of whatever claims to be objective and true3 the assertion that what is true must be seen and experienced to be true4 ,or it is1 in another way1 the principle of ,socrates3 that the beginning of knowledge1 the first step in the way of wisdom1 is to know that you know nothing--to realise the absolute supremacy of self-consciousness4 ,it is in short the same demand as ,augustine's4 ,there is indeed a wide gulf of temperament and circumstances dividing the bishop of ,hippo from the mathematician ,descartes and the rationalist ,spinoza4 ,but in the cry for the knowledge of ',god and my ,soul' as the first1 the indispensable1 the sole knowledge3 as the one knowledge which binds the finite and the infinite together1--the knowledge on which turns the truth of science1 and the reality of experience1 the great thinkers of these diverse ages are at one4#b ,they turn their backs upon the external that they may find rest in the truly internal1 on the inner certainty1 which is not a mere subjective but a very objective also3 not a mere anima mea1 but in close unity therewith ,deus meus4 ,this is perhaps more explicit in ,spinoza1 in some points1 than in ,descartes1 and in many respects more decisively put by ,augustine than by either4 ,but this is what is really meant by the initial concentration of suspense3 this is what is sought when a ,principle is sought4 ,nothing short of this unity of subjective and objective in an ,absolute--we may say--,ego1 is a principle4 ,but 'principles' like other terms are sometimes lightly taken2 and can be in the plural--just as in lower levels of religion and society there can be gods many and lords many4 ,nor in a way wrongly4 ,for1 as has been before pointed out1 a principle is the unity of beginning and end3 it is only caught hold of by approaching from different directions3 it loses its life and power when cut off from the many organs by which it distributes itself so as to grasp reality4 ,if it be essentially one1 it is not a bare unit3 it cannot1 without injury1 be reduced to utter simplicity1 and accepted in the shape of a single term4 ,and yet this is what almost inevitably happens to every so-called principle4 ,like a deus ex machina1 or a trick of the trade1 it is applied to unloose every knot1 and to clear any difficulties that arise4 ,but a principle of this stamp possesses no intimate connexion or organic solidarity with the theory which it helps to prop4 ,it is always at hand as a ready-made schema or heading1 and can be attached to the most incongruous orders of fact4 ,thus in the works of ,aristotle1 the principle of ',end' or ',activity' has sometimes seemed to be applied to whatever subject comes forward1 and like a hereditary official vestment to suit all its wearers equally well or equally ill4 ,what is true 'on the whole' is not always true 'of each'3 the never quite equals the ' 4 ,the modern principle of ,utility is equally flexible in its application to the problems of moral and social life4 ,it costs no trouble to pronounce the magic word1 and even 'such as are of weaker capacity' may make something out of such a formula4 ,but an abstract formula1 which is equally applicable to everything1 is not particularly applicable to anything4 ,while it seems to save trouble1 and is so plain as to be almost tautological 7as when the worth of a thing or act is explained to mean its utility71 it really suggests fresh questions in every case1 and multiplies the difficulty4 ,having an outward adaptability to every kind of fact1 the principle has no true sympathy with any3 it becomes a mere form1 which we use as we do a measuring-rod1 moving it along from one thing to another4 ,we are always reverting to first principles as our last principles also4 ,even ,aristotle1 when he remarked that an object had to be criticised from its own principles and not from general formulae1 saw through the fallacy of this style of argument4 ,this is like asking for bread and getting a stone4 ,the philosopher1 who ought to take us through the shut chambers of the world1 merely hands us a key at the gate1 telling us that it will unlock every door1 and then the insides will speak for themselves4 ,but we would have our philosopher do a little more than this4 ,not being ourselves omniscient1 we should be glad of a guide-book at the least1 and perhaps even of the services of an interpreter to explain some peculiarities1 some startling phenomena1 and sights even more unpleasant than those which appalled the spouse of the notorious ,bluebeard4 ,or1 dropping metaphor1 we wish the formula to be applied systematically and thoroughly4 ,when that is done the formula loses its abstractness2 it gains those necessary amplifications and qualifications1 as we call them1 without which no theory explains much or gives much information4 ,and thus1 instead of fancying that our initial formula contains the truth in a nutshell1 we shall find that it is only one step to be taken on the way to truth1 and that its narrow statement sinks more and more into insignificance1 as its amplified theory gains in significance4 ,but an adequate principle must have other qualities4#c ,what has been said up to this point1 only amounts to a condition1 that our principle must cease to be abstract and formal1 and must become concrete and real4 ,what we want1 it may be said1 is a ,beginning4 ,but a beginning is not exactly the same thing as a principle3 a beginning is to a large extent a matter of choice and convenience1--a matter depending on the state and prospects of the beginner2 and the main point is not where we should begin1 but that we should be thorough in our treatment4 ,it is otherwise1 however1 in the present case4 ,for the skill of the expositor simply lies in the exactitude with which he reproduces the spontaneous movement of growth in his object4 ,his art is celare artem3 to retire1 as it were1 into the background1 and seem to leave the object to expound itself4 ,in a dramatic work it is no doubt the hand of the dramatist that seems to set the whole of the characters in motion1 that weaves destinies and snips the thread of life4 ,and yet in a perfect work of dramatic art everything must seem to flow on by a necessity of character1 a consecution of inner fate4 ,the true artist dare not act or allow the deus ex machina4 ,so every genuine work of science--which is more than a compilation1 a school-book1 a bundle of notes1 and contributions toward a subject--must be a self-determined unity--a self-justifying scheme in which the personality of the worker enters into and is absorbed in the system of his work4 ,if this is generally true1 it is above all a canon to rule the logician4 ,he at least must follow the ,logos and the ,logos alone4 ,his theme must be a law unto itself3 all its movements must be freely and nobly objective4 ,for his subject-matter is at least an organism1 and develops according to an inward law4 ,but it is even more than an organism3 it must not merely develop1 as organisms do1--not merely live and grow--but know that it develops and as it were will its own development--and in that harmony of being1 willing1 and knowing1 be essentially one4 ,in ,hegelian language it must not merely be implicit--an sich or fr uns--the subject of a change which it undergoes and feels1 but without definitely realising1--the subject of a change which we 7the historians7 perceive4 ,it must also be fr sich3 aware of its modifications1 an agent in bringing them about3 and yet withal in so looking forth and willing1 be self-possessed1 and self-enjoying4 ,the principle of ,hegelianism is the principle of ,development1 the principle of the ,notion--but a ,notion which is objective as well as subjective--the ,idea4 ,that principle then determines the beginning of ,logic4 ,we must know the whole course of growth and history before we can say where is the true commencement4 ,it must be that out of which the end can obviously and spontaneously issue4 ,in a sense1 it must implicitly contain the end4 ,it must show us the very beginning of thought1 before it has yet come to the full consciousness of itself1--when the truth of what it is still lurks in the background and has to be developed4 ,we must see thought in its first and fundamental calling4 ,as the biologist1 when he describes the structure of a plant1 rests upon the assumption of a previous development of parts1 in an existing plant1 which has resulted in a seed1--but begins with the seed from which the plant is derived3 so the logician must begin with a point which in a way presupposes the system to which it leads4 ,but in its beginning this presupposition is not apparent3 and in fact1 the presupposition will only appear when the development of the system is complete4 ,the first step in a process1 just because it is a step1 may be said to presuppose the completed process4 ,thus the beginning of ,logic presumes the fullest realisation of ,mind1 as the beginning of botany can only be told by one who knows the whole story of the plant4 ,it is from this circumstance that ,hegel describes philosophy as a circle rounded in itself1 where the end meets with the beginning1 or says that philosophy has to grasp its original grasp or conceive its concept4 ,in other words1 it is not till we reach the conclusion that we see1 in the light thus shed upon the beginning1 what that beginning really was4 ,from the general analogy of the sciences we should not expect that the beginning of thought would be full-grown thought1 or indeed seem to the undiscerning eye to be thought at all4 ,in many cases1 the embryonic organism shows but little similarity to the adult1 and occasionally a violent abruptness seems1 on cursory glance1 to mark off one stage of a creation's growth from the next4 ,who that knew not the result could in the seed prefigure to himself the tree8 ,the beginning is not usually identifiable with the final issue1 except by some effort to trace the process of connexion4 ,the object of science only appears in its truth when the science has done its work4 ,the beginning of philosophy must hold a germ of development1 however dead and motionless it may seem4 ,but it must also to some extent be a result1--the result of the development or concentration of consciousness2--of the other forms of which it is the hypothetical foundation1 or1 of which it is 7otherwise viewed7 the first appearance4 ,the variety of imaginative conception1 and the chaos of sense1 must vanish in a point1 by an act of abstraction1 which leaves out all the variety and the chaos1--or rather by an act of distillation1 which draws out of them their real essence and concentrated virtue4 ,this variety1 when thoroughly examined and tested1 shrivels up into a point3--it only is4 ,everything definite as we call it1 the endless repetitions of existence1 have disappeared1 and have left only the energy of concentration1 the unitary point of ,being4 ,we may describe the process in two ways4 ,we may say that we have left out of sight all existing differences1--that we have stripped off every vestige of empirical conceptions1 and left a residue of pure thought4 ,the thought is pure1 perhaps1 but it is not entire4 ,in this way of describing it1 pure thought is the most abstract thought1--the last outcome of those operations which have divested our conceptions of everything real and concrete about them4 ,but thus to speak of the process as ,abstraction would be to express half of the truth only3 and would really leave us a mere zero1 or gulf of vacuity4 ,in the beginning there would then be nothing--the mere annihilation of all possible and actual existence4 ,and it is certainly true that in the beginning there can be nothing4--,on the other hand1 and secondly1 there is affirmation as well as negation involved in the ultimate action by which sense and imagination pass into thought4 ,they are not left behind1 and the emptiness only retained3 they are carried into their primary consequence1 or into their proximate truth4 ,they are reduced to their simplest equivalent or their lowest term in the vocabulary of thought3 which is ,being4 ,the process which creates the initial point of pure thought is at once an abstraction from everything1 and a concentration upon itself in a point3-- which point1 accordingly1 is a unity or inter-penetration of positive and negative4 ,this absolute self-concentration into a point is the primary step by which ,mind comes to know itself1--the first step in the ,absolute's process of self-cognition--that process which it is the purpose of ,logic to trace1 so far as it is conducted in the range of mere thought4 ,the bare point of ,being and nothing more is the beginning in the process of the ,absolute's self-cognition3 it is1 in other words1 our first and rudimentary apprehension of reality1--the narrow edge by which we come in contact with the universe of ,reason4 ,for these are two aspects of the same4 ,the process of the self-cognition or manifestation of the ,absolute ,idea is the very process by which philosophers 7not philosophers only7 have built up the edifice of thought4 ,what the one statement views from the universal side or the totality1 the other views in connexion with the several achievements of individual thinkers4 ,of course the evolution of the system of thought1 as it is brought about by individuals1 leaves plenty of room for the play of what is known as ,chance4 ,the ,natural ,history of ,thought or the ,history of ,philosophers has to regard the action of national character upon individual minds1 and the reciprocal action of these minds upon one another4 ,the ,history of ,organic ,nature similarly presents the dependence of the species upon their surroundings1 and of one species upon another in the medium of its conditions4 ,gradually ,physical ,science reduces these conditions to their universal forms1 and may try to exhibit the evolution of the animal through its species in all grades of development4 ,so in the ,science of the development of this ,idea the accidents1 as we may call them1 disappear3 and the temporary and local questions1 which once engrossed the deepest attention1 fade away into generalised forms of universal application4 ,philosophy1 as it historically presents itself in the world1 is not an accidental production1 or dependent on the arbitrary choice of men4 ,the accident1 if such there be1 is that these particular men should have been the philosophers1 and not that such should have been their philosophy4 ,they were1 according to their several capacity for utterance1 only the mouth-pieces of the ,spirit of the ,times1--of the absolute mind under the superficial limitations of their period4 ,they saw the ,idea of their world more clearly and distinctly than other men2 and therein lies their title to fame3 but really their words were only a reflex1--an almost involuntary and necessary movement1 due to the pressure of the cosmical reason4 ,the great philosophers are1 like all men in all estates1 and according to their measure1 the ministers of the ,truth1--apostles charged to bring about that consummation of the times in which reality is more fully apprehended and more adequately estimated4 ,necessity is laid upon them to consecrate themselves to the service of the ,idea1 and to devote their lives to the noble but austere work of speculation--the work which seeks sine ira et studio to reconstruct that city of ,god which is the permanent1 if it often be the hidden1 foundation of human life4 ,footnote #a3 ,cf4 p4 #ij4 ,footnote #b3 ,augustin4 ,soliloq4 i4 #g4 ',deum et animam scire cupio4 ,nihilne plus8 ,nihil omnino4' ,footnote #c3 ',a ,principle1' says ,herbart 7,psychologie als ,wissenschaft1 ,einl47 'should have the double property of having originally a certainty of its own1 and of generating other certainty4 ,the way and manner in which the second comes about is the ,method4' ,,chapter ,,xxx4 ,,the ,,logic ,,of ,,description3 ,,natural ,,realism3 ,,being4 ,the antithesis between thought and being1 between idea and actuality1 between notion and object1 is almost a commonplace of criticism4 ,between the ideas of the subject and objectivity a great gulf seems to yawn fixed and impassable4 ,thinkers1 like ,anselm and ,descartes1 have 7it is asserted7 attempted by a trick which cheated themselves to get from the notion to the object4 ,but--as ,kant is supposed to have for ever shown--these decepti deceptores are now universally discredited4#a ,yet the same ,kant had shown that the 'things' of ordinary experience are only ideas or appearances in consciousness4 ,these latter ideas1 however1 were verified by the necessity of interdependence in which they stood1 as given by sense4 ,from the notions which ,anselm and ,descartes proposed to invest with objectivity1 there was absent the feature of sense-perception4 ,they were not limited and real ideas1 but synthetic laws1 general and abstract aspects of reality1 modes of conception4 ,they were not definite and individualised things1 but terms or conditions for all concepts and realities4 ,they were forms1--forms essential to the explication of reality--and never mere parts of reality4 ,with such 'forms' or 'thought-terms1' such abstractions1 ,logic 7 la mode de ,hegel7 has to deal4 ,and in dealing with them it has to counteract this popular distinction 7which ,kant inclines toward7 which sets up an insuperable division between thought and being1 between reality and syllogism1 between is and is known4 ,certain of these denominators which thinking employs to describe reality the popular mind wholly identifies with reality4 ,that being is a thought1 that force and thing are only modes of conception1 sounds to the untrained intellect only a verbal quibble4 ,things1 beings1 are there--out there1 it says3 force is 'ultimate reality4' ,it is perhaps ready to allow that substances are only mental figments3 but it is more doubtful about causes1 and inclines to assume them to be in outside nature1 and to generate a real necessity in things4 ,on the other hand1 it has little doubt that concepts and syllogism are only our ways of looking at reality1--the reality of substances and phenomena1 with quality and quantity3 that 'final cause' is a mere subjective principle of explanation3 and that ideas and knowledge are altogether additions superinduced on a real world4 ,now what the ,logic shows is that1 on one hand1 all these terms are ideal and regulative2 and on the other that they are real1 because constitutive of reality4 ,showing--or shall we say1 reminding us--that being is after all a form of thought1 it shows us that knowledge1 at the other end1 contains or implies reality4 ,it is the business of logic as a fundamental philosophy to dispel the illusion that sensations are fixed reality3 that causes and effects are an absolutely real order2 whereas concepts and sciences and still more aesthetic and moral principles are not4 ,its doctrine is that all ,our thought-terms1 the most vulgar and the most delicate1 are1 as we may put it1 symbolical of reality3 explications and manifestations of it4 ,absolutely real--if that means utterly unideal--none of them are4 ,on the other hand1 absolutely ideal1--if that means utterly unreal--none of them are either4 ,if you call them real1 their reality is that of thought4 ,if you call them ideal1 it is an ideality of a real4 ,being is not a fixed and solid substratum1 a hard rock of reality1 on which we may build our relations and further determinations4 ,it also is a thought3 it also lives in relation1 and becomes more real by further determination4#b ,but the habit comes natural to the majority to attribute essential and independent reality 7total reality7 to the thought-modes it is familiar with in practice3 whereas the modes familiar to more advanced intelligence are put aside as merely ideal4 ,thus in proportion as ,logic insists on the reality of idea1 it insists also on the ideality of being4 ,being is after all a thought3 when separate from the relations of experience1 a very poor thought4 ,a 'supreme being' even is a thought4 ,and the question of questions for ,logic is what degree of reality1 what amount of truth does each result of unification express4 ,is it self-consistent and complete1 or does it imply further elements1 and if so1 in what direction does it suggest and receive completion8 ,but at the best the reality of a logical term is an abstract or formal reality1 and consists in its power to interpret1 to expound1 to define the ,absolute4 ,its more concrete and material reality it has in ,nature and in ,mind4 ,there however ,philosophy has in a further measure to repeat its earlier lesson and show that ,nature is not without its ideal aspect1 and that ,mind is founded on physical reality4 ,all science tends to carry us over the hard lines of separation which practical interests treat as if ultimate disruptions4 ,the sciences of ,nature1 for instance1 in their completed circle must carry us from the inorganic to the organic3 must in some way make a path from the lifeless to the alive4 ,the science of thought has a corresponding task4 ,it has to show that the incommensurability between thought and being1 or between the idea and actuality1 disappears on closer examination4 ,when we trace the development of thought sufficiently far1 we see that ,being is an imperfect or inadequate thought1--certainly not adequate to the ,idea1 but not for that reason generically differing from it4 ,the fixity of ,being as more than1 and superior to1 mere ,thought is a habit of mind1 due to the same worldly-minded immobility as leads us all to believe 7and1 within the limited practical range1 to believe rightly7 that the earth is solidly at rest1 notwithstanding all the demonstrations of the ,copernicans4 ,but ,thought has not deposited all its burden1 or uttered all its meaning in ,being4 ,being is the veriest abstraction1--the very rudiment of thought--meagre as meagre can be4 ,it is on one side the bare position or affirmation of thought3 on the other hand it is the very negation of thought1--if thought be only possible under difference4 ,for a mere ',is' is a mere indescribable without-difference4 ,there is no such thing as mere ,being3 or mere ,being is mere nothing3 mere ,being is not4 ,the first category of ,ontology is that of ,being4 ,it is the merest simplicity and meagreness1 with nothing definite in it at all3 and for that very reason constantly liable to be confused with categories of more concrete burden4 ,it denotes all things1 and connotes next to nothing4 ,it does not however mean something which has being2 it does not mean definite being3 still less does it mean permanent and substantial being4 ,ordinary language certainly uses being in all these senses4 ,but if we are to be logical1 we must not mix up categories with one another3 we must take terms at their precise value4 ,mere ,being then is the mere ',is1' which can give no explanation or analysis of itself3 which indescribable in itself3 which is an ',is' and nothing more4 ,the simplest answer to those who invest ,being with so much signification1 is to ask them to consider the logical copula4 ',every school-boy knows' that the ',is' of the copula disappears in several languages3 that it is far from indispensable in ,latin3 that in ,greek e4 g4 the demonstrative article serves the same purpose4 ,in ,hebrew too the pronouns officiate for the so-called substantive verb3 and the same verb probably does not exist in the ,polynesian family of languages1 where its place is supplied by what we call the demonstrative pronoun4#c ,in the copula1 which according to ,m4 ,laromiguiere1 as quoted by ,mr4 ,mill1 expresses only 'un rapport spcial entre le sujet et l'attribut1' we encounter the mere undeveloped and unexplained unifying of thought1 the very abstraction of relativity#d4 ,in the beginning1 then1 there is nothing and yet that nothing is4 ,such is the fundamental antithesis of thought3 or the discrepancy which makes itself felt between each several term of thought and the whole ,idea of which they are the expression4 ,being is the term emphasised as absolute by understanding3 then the dialectical power1 or the consciousness of the whole1 steps in to counteract the one-sided element4 ,in other words1 thought1 the total thought1 asks what is ,being1 mere and simple2 and answers mere nothing4#e ,the one aspect of the point is as justifiable as the other4 ,in other words the two aspects are indissoluble3 they are in one4 ,the term ',unity1' applied to the relation of ,being and ,not1 may perhaps mislead3 and it is therefore better to say that the two points of view are 7as ,mr4 ,spencer puts it7 at once 'antithetical and inseparable1' ,an unrelated being1 an 'absolute' 7i4 e4 separate and transcendent7 reality is an ,unknowable1 i4 e4 an ineffable1 an unspeakable of which we can legitimately predicate a not- 1 leaving imagination to fill up the blank after the hyphen4 ,a mere ,not1 with no substratum which it negatives1 is mere ,being3 and a mere ,being1 which has no substratum1 is a mere ,not4 ,the movement upward and the movement downward are here illustrated3 and it is evident that they are the same movement#f1--the same unrest1 only differentiated as up and down by some termini not yet explicitly brought into view4 ,each--,is and ,not--as it seeks to differentiate itself1 to make itself clear1 passes into the other4 ,in fact1 the very vocation1 calling1 or notion of ,being and ,nothing1 is not ,being and ,nothing1 but the tendency of each to pass into the other4 ,their truth1 in short1 is not in themselves1 but in their process1--and that process by which the one passes into the other is ',to become4' ,try to get at mere ,being and you are left with ,nought3 of mere ,nought you can only say it is4 ,the two abstractions have no truth except in the passage into one another3 and this passage or transition is ',to become4' ,take reality apart from what it leads on to1 and from what it has come from1 apart from its end or purpose and from its cause1 take it as mere being3 then this being in its supposed singleness and self-subsistence is really annihilated3 stat magni nominis umbra3 but it is the name of nothing4 ,true being is always on the way to or from being3 to stop is fatal4 ,this unity or inseparability of opposite elements in a truth or real notion is the stumbling-block to the incipient ,hegelian4 ,the respectable citizens of ,germany were amazed1 says ,heine1 at the shamelessness of ,j4 ,g4 ,fichte1 when he proclaimed that the ,ego produced the world1 as if that had cast doubts on their reality2 and the ladies were curious to know whether ,madame ,fichte was included in the general denial of substantial existence#g4 ,if easy-going critics treated ,fichte in this way1 they had even better source for amusement in ,hegel4 ,that ,being and ,nothing is the same was a perpetual fund for jokes1 too tempting to be missed4 ,now1 in the baldness1 and occasionally paradoxical style1 of ,hegel's statements1 there is some excuse for such exaggerations4 ,being and ,nothing are not merely the same3 they are also different3 they at least tend to pass into each other4 ,in the technical language of logicians1 the question is not what being denotes1 but what it connotes4 ,the word 'is' had1 it may be1 originally a 'demonstrative' meaning1 a 'pronominal' force1 which in course of time passed from a local or sensuous meaning to express a thought4 ,no doubt 'is' and 'is not' are wide enough apart in our application of them as copula of a proposition3 but if we subtract the two terms and leave only the copula standing1 the difference of the two becomes inexpressible and unanalysable4 ,in both there is the same statement of immediacy or face-to-faceness3 that two things are brought to confront each other1--united1 as it were1 without producing any real or specific sort of union4 ,if ,thought be unifying1 ,being is the minimum of unification3 if ,thought be relating1 ,being is the most abstract of relations4 ,so abstract1 indeed1 that its relativity is completely lost sight of3 so utterly one1 that it vanishes in a point4 ,and just because it is 7as it seems7 out of relations1 it must be nothing4 ,no doubt1 between the two terms ,being and not-,being a difference is meant2 when they are employed1 a difference is thrown into them2 and then they are not the same3 but if we keep out of sight what is meant1 and stick to the ultimate point which is said1 we shall find that mere being and mere nothing are alike inapprehensible by themselves1 and that to institute a difference we must go out of and beyond them4 ,perhaps some approach to the right point of comprehension may be made1 if we note that when two people quarrel and can give no reason or further development to their opposite assertions1 the one person's 'is' is exactly equal 7apart from subsequent explanations7 to the other's 'is not4' ,the mere ',is' and ',is not' have precisely the same amount of content3 a mere affirmation or assertion1 which is mere nothing1--because connecting1 where there is nothing to connect4 ,the truth of 'is' then turns out 'become'3 nothing is3 all things are coming to be and passing out of being4 ,this illustrates the meaning of the word 'truth' in ,hegel4 ,it is partly synonymous with 'concrete1' partly with the 'notion4' ,with concrete3 because to get at the truth1 we must take into account a new element1 kept out of sight in the mere affirmation of being4 ,with notion3 because if we wish to comprehend being1 we must grasp it as 'becoming4' ,for truth lies in transcending the first or merely given4 ,we have to go forward1 and to go backward1 as it were3 forward from being1 backward to being3 we look before and after4 ,the attempt to isolate the mere point of being is impossible in thought3 it would only lead to the 'representation' of being1--i4 e4 the notion of being would be arrested in its development1 and identified probably with a sensible thing1 i4 e4 with something1 and some concrete thing said to be4 ,if being1 however1 is truly apprehended as a passage from the unknown to the known1 or as emergence from bare vacuity1 then it implies a definiteness1 which we missed before4 ,somewhat has become3 or the indeterminate being has been invested with definiteness and distinct character4 ,mere being 7mere ,is7 is nothing3 to be something is must be not something else4 ,the second step in the process to self-realisation therefore is reached3 ,being has become ,somewhat2 which is more1 because it professes less4 ,the fluid unity or movement from 'is' to 'is not1' and vice versa1 has crystallised3 and ',there is' is the still imperfectly unified result precipitated4 ,by this term we imply the finitude of being1--imply that a portion has been cut off from the vague1 and contrasted with something else4 ,in the ordinary application of the word1 ,being is especially employed to denote this stage of definite being#h4 ,thus we speak of bringing something into being3 by which we mean1 not mere being1 but a definite being1 or1 in short1 reality4 ,reality is determinateness1 as opposite to mere vagueness4 ,to be real1 it is necessary to be somewhat1--to limit and define4 ,whatever is anything or is real1 is eo facto finite4 ,even an infinite therefore to be real must submit to self-limitation4 ,this is the necessity of finitude3 in order to be anything more and higher1 there must come1 first of all1 a determinate being and reality4 ,but reality1 as we have seen1 implies negation3 it implies limiting1 distinction1 and dependence4 ,everything finite1 every 'somewhat1' has somewhat else to counteract1 narrow1 and thwart it4 ,to be somewhat 7esse aliquid7 is an object of ambition1 as ,juvenal implies3 but it is only an unsatisfactory goal after all4 ,for somewhat always implies something else1 by which it is limited3 whereas mere being1 just because it is nothing1 is free from the check of an other4 ,this1 then1 is the price to be paid for rising into reality1 and coming to be somewhat3 there is always somewhat else to be minded4 ,the very point which makes a 'somewhat1' as above a mere 'nothing1' is its determinateness3 and determinateness1 as at first determinateness from outside1 a given and passive determinateness1 is also a negation and limit4 ,now the limit of a thing is that point where it begins to be somewhat else3 where it passes out of itself and yields to another4 ,accordingly in the very act of being determined1 somewhat is passing over into another3 it is altering1 and becoming somewhat else4 ,thus a some-thing' implies for its being the being of somewhat else3 its being is as it were only to be beside something else1--it is finite1 and alterable1 a this with a that always in the neighbourhood4 ,such is the character of determinate being4 ,it leads to an endless series from some to an other1 and so on ad infinitum3 everything as a somewhat1 as a determinate being1 in reality1 presupposes a something else1 and that again has some third thing2 and so the chain is extended with its everlasting ,and1 ,and1 ,and1 7as in the children's way of telling a story74 ,somewhat-ness is always vexed by the fact that it is not somewhat else3 and for that very reason1 ceasing to be the primary object1 it becomes somewhat else itself2 and the other term becomes the somewhat4 ,and so the same story is repeated in endless progression1 till one gets wearied with the repetition of finitude which is held out as infinite4 ,thus in determinate being as in mere being we see the apparent fixity resolved into a double movement--the alteration from some to somewhat else1 and vice versa4 ,but a movement like this implies after all that there is a something which alters3 which is alterable1 but which alters into somewhat4 ,this somewhat which alters into somewhat1 and thus retains itself1 is a being which has risen above alteration1 which is independent of it because including it3 which is for itself1 and not for somewhat else4 ,thus in order to advance a step further from determinate and alterable being1 we have only to keep a firm grasp on both sides of the process1 and not suffer the one to slip away from the other4 ,we must not merely say1 but energise the unity of the two 'antithetical yet inseparable' elements we are naturally disposed to take and leave only as ,one and an ,other4 ,something becomes something else3 in short1 the one side passes on to the other side of the antithesis1 and the limitation is absorbed4 ,the new result is something in something else3 the limit is taken up within3 and this being which results is its own limit1 i4 e4 no restrictive limit at all1 but self-imposed characteristic and definiteness4 ,it is ,being-for-self3--the third step in the process of thought under the general category of ,being4 ,the range of ,being which began in a vague nebula1 and passed into a series of points1 is now reduced to a single point1 self-complete and whole4 ,this ,being-for-self is a kind of true infinite1 which results by absorption of the finite4 ,the false infinite1 which has already come before us1 is the endless range of finitude1 passing from one finite to another1 from somewhat to somewhat else1 until satiety sets in with weariness4 ,the true infinite is satisfaction1--the inclusion of the other being into self1 so that it is no longer a limit1 but a constituent part in the being4 ,such inclusion in the unity of an idea1 of elements which are realistically separate1 is termed 'ideality4' ,the antithesis is reduced to become an organic and dependent part4 ,it still exists1 but as no longer outside and independent4 ,thus in determinate being the determinateness is found in somewhat else3 in being-for-self the determinateness is self-realisation4 ,being-for-self may be shortly expressed by 'one' or 'each'3 as determinate being a1 or an1 or by 'some'3 and ,being simple has no nominal equivalent4 ,as 'some' is always fractional or partial1 'each' is always a whole or unit4 ,mere ,being has not the consistency of any noun or pronoun3 it is the bare 7impersonal7 verb4 ,but 'each for self' expresses the sentiment of an armed neutrality with implicit leanings to universal war1--the bellum omnium contra omnes4 ,each is self-centred1 independent1 resting upon self1 and not minding anything else1--which is now thrown out as indifferent into the background4 ,each is centripetal2 anything else is for it a matter of no moment4 ,if determinate being was something to be explained by something other1 this is or professed to be self-explanatory1 and rests upon itself4 ,it seems purely affirmative1 and promises to give a definite unity4 ,but we cannot free thought from negation in this sphere1 any more than in the earlier4 ,we may1 if we like1 assert the absolute self-sufficingness1 primariness1 and unalterability of each2 but a very little reflection shows the opposite to be true4 ,the very notion of each is exclusiveness towards the rest3 a negative and1 as it were1 polemical attitude towards others is the very basis of ,being-for-self4 ,one after one1 they each rise to confront each1 each excluding each1 until their self-importance is reduced to be a mere point in a series of points1 one amongst many4 ,when that is clearly seen1 their qualitative character has disappeared3 and there is left only their quantity4#i ,the negative attitude of each to each forms a sort of bond connecting them4 ,if to the reference which connects we give the name of attraction1 then we may say that the repulsion of each against each is exactly equal to their mutual attraction4 ,and thus1 in the language of ,hobbes1 the universal quarrel is only the other side of the general union in the great ,leviathan3 repulsion1 in the shape of mutual fear1 is the principle of attraction4 ,thus each for self is repeated endlessly3 instead of the atom or unit we have a multitude1 utterly indifferent to what each is for itself4 ,the mere fact that it is1 entitles it to count1 and so constitutes quantity4 ,here we may shortly recapitulate the categories of ,quality or ,being ,proper4 ,it forms three steps or grades3 those of indeterminate being3 determinate being3 self-determined being3 or if we speak of them as processes1 we have becoming3 alteration3 attraction and repulsion#aj4 ,from the extreme of abstraction and concentration thought1 under the form of ,being1 passes on to greater determinateness and development4 ,the fixity of mere ,being is seen to imply a distinction of elements1 and a dependence of one upon the other3 where the 'is' and 'is not' part from each other sufficiently to let us distinguish them4 ,this is the stage of finitude3 when we say that there is somewhat1 but there are others1 and imply that any one has an end1 a limit1 a negation in its nature4 ,these words describe the finite scene1--a fragmentary being which makes an advance upon indeterminateness1 but loses its wholeness and is always and necessarily leading on to something else4 ,it is the revulsion from the vague and yet unspecified universal to definite and limited particulars4 ,in the third stage the limit is uplifted and included in the particular1 which now contains its negation in itself1--is 7by accepting its dependence7 independent1 is its own ground1 and may be called an individual4 ,but an individual1 again1 implies an aggregate of ones1 or a multitude4 ,this being-for-self is an individual or atom3 it is the basis of those higher developments known as subjectivity and personality4 ,these are1 as it were1 higher multiples of it4 ,this first sphere of thought1 apparently so abstruse and unreal in its abstractions1 had to be thus narrowly discussed because it presents all the difficulties and peculiarities of ,hegel in their elementary form4 ,they are clearly the fundamental problems of ancient ,greek philosophy--of that first or fundamental philosophy which discusses ,being and its intrinsic attributes or accidents4 ,modern superficiality has sometimes reproached these old thinkers 7who1 forsooth1 'knew no language but their own'7 for their tiresome insistence on this problem of ,is and ,is not4 ,compared1 indeed1 with what are called topics of interest1 e4 g4 the ,soul and the ,hereafter1 or the origins of the ,cosmic process1 tiresome such inquiry is4 ,but it is the bitter lesson of experience that till such fundamentals are at least critically surveyed1 the interesting topics will still 7and in more than one sense7 belong to the ,unknowable4 ,herbart not less than ,hegel sees it is the prime business of philosophical criticism 7i4 e4 of philosophy7 to examine thoroughly those primary notions on which the whole structure of thought rests4 ,it is on the comprehension of the radical limitations latent in the seemingly simplest terms of thought1 that the profoundest problems of human interest ultimately turn4 ,thus1 in the first place1 the process of ,being1 as seen in the light of the whole system of ,logic1 shows that reality is truly known only as a trinity1--or perhaps rather as a duality in unity4 ,this is the ',notion' or ',grasp' of ,being4 ,first1 reality seems an unspecialised and self-centred being1--and that by itself is mere nothing3 a mere universal4 ,second1 it appears a specialised and differentiated being of some and other3 a mere particular1 limited by other particulars1 and so finite4 ,third1 as a combination of the two earlier stages3 as wholeness with determinateness1 as unity2 and so an individual which is the true or complete and authentic character of all being4 ,in the metaphysics of ,being these three elements follow1 one after another3 but in the logic of the notion they interpenetrate1 and each of them is the others and the total4 ,the truth or the notion of being takes it in ,being-for-self as a universalised particular or as an individual4--,in the second place3 the sphere of mere ,being is that of mere identity3 that of determinate being is the sphere of otherness1 difference3 that of self-determined being is the sphere of well-grounded existence4--,thirdly3 the first sphere may be illustrated by the freedom of indeterminateness1 expressed by the word 'may'3 the second by necessity or determinateness1 expressed by the word 'must'3 and the third1 by the freedom which even in its determinateness is self-determining1 expressed by the word 'will4'--,fourthly3 these steps illustrate the meaning of the ,hegelian technical terms setzen3 aufheben3 an sich3 fr sich3 ,idealitt3 ,realitt4 ,thus ,determinate ,being or somewhat is an sich or implicitly 7by implication7 somewhat else3 and the process of determinate being is to lay it down or express 7setzen7 it as such4 ,when this explicitly-stated 'other' or limit is included in the ,being1 and reduced into a unity with somewhat in each ,being-for-self1 it is said to be 'aufgehoben'--uplifted1 as it were1 so that it is no longer a separate existent1 but is still an efficient element4 ,as being partly this1 and partly that1 now one1 and now an other1 which limits and is limited1 determinate being is ,realitt4 ,the characteristic of reality is externality of its parts1 which are thus left side by side quasi-independent3 that of ideality is unity and solidarity of function4 ,when the mutual dependence of elements is tightened till it becomes equivalent to unity and totality1 these elements are seen in their ,ideality 7,idealitt74 ,such a total has the others in it as elements 7,momente72 they are there ideally 7ideller ,weise17 as it were 7in the loose analogical use of that term7 organically3 that is1 they are denied the privilege1 which their total has1 of being-for-themselves4 ,they do not enjoy the benefit of their own being1 though their presence is felt4--,fifthly3 ,being-for-self is absolute negativity2 i4e4 the negation of negation4 ,determinate being was a negation of ,being mere and simple3 ,being-for-self is the negation of this1 and so a return to true affirmation1 as including the element of negation4 ,being seemed to describe a complete reality4 ,but its latent limitation has become explicit4 ,it only retains itself by a self-assertion which leaves it a mere abstract unit1 or atom1--a unit with nothing in it to be united1-and where it matters not whether it be somewhat or other4 ,the quality of ,being1 in which all qualitative attributes are lost and sunk1 is ,quantity3 the characteristic of which is to be a matter of no importance to ,being1 as it originally presents itself4 ,in other words1 whilst ,quality is identical with ,being1--while ,being means qualitativeness1 and the ,being of a thing means its quality1 or constitution2 ,quantity is external to ,being1 and a thing is1 while its quantity undergoes all sorts of variation4 ,at least this is true within certain limits3 for quantity is not an ultimate category any more than quality4 ,but for the present the truth of quality is quantity2 or1 in other words1 if a thing is to be anything definite it must ultimately rest on a solid atom3 must be a unit and amenable to measurement4 ,first come qualities1 such as sweet1 green1 and the like3 these seem to be truth and reality to the senses and the natural mind3 and in their universality are represented by the abstract terms of qualitative being4 ,the first step in the progress of knowledge consists in seeing that quality presupposes quantity4 ,number1 in short1 is the proximate truth to which the vague qualitative distinction of a1 some1 and each is to be reduced4 ,the qualitative differences of sounds are reduced to relations or ratios of number3 and so are the other data of sensation4 ,we see this truth recognised in the ,atomic ,school1 which may be taken to represent the summing-up of that period of thought which begins with the ',being' of ,parmenides1 and the ',becoming' of ,heraclitus4 ,when ,democritus says that1 although bitter and sweet are conventional distinctions1 yet in reality there is only atoms and void#aa1 he is introducing a distinction between real and apparent4 ,but again the irregular and sporadic appearances of species of quality are replaced by a gradual and regular series of quantities4 ,with mere ,being you have a conception quite unfit for describing the manifold reality4 ,but by breaking up the whole ,being into a countless number of atoms of being1 you get the means of establishing an equation between a given sensible and some multiple of the atomic unit4 ,thus ,atomism1 with its many bits of being and its interfluent non-being in which they can unite1 replaces the total and complete universe of being and its attendant shadow of unreality1 the world of opinion4 ,still the ,is not clings to the ,is3 if each atom seems complete1 they are subject to a necessity which forces them by negation1 i4 e4 by the void 7as ,atomism figuratively calls the repulsion of the atoms7 to meet each other and form apparent unities4 ,before a step could be made to higher problems1 it was necessary to see that the proximate truth of the qualitative world1--or world of sense proper 7 7 is in its simplest terms a quantitative world1 or world of common sensibles 7 71 universalised sensibles1 number and quantity4 ,the sphere of quantity need only be briefly sketched4 ,it has its three heads3 7#a7 quantity in general1--the universal and vague notion of quantitativeness1 the mere conception of reality as the ,great and the ,little1 or the ,more and ,less#ab3 7#b7 ,quantum1 or defined quantity1 expressed in the shape of a number3 and 7#c7 the quantitative ratio or degree1 which is the individualisation or self-determination of numbers1 or their application to one another1--which gives the real meaning and value of numbers4 ,the fundamental antithesis1 which we found in quality1 comes before us here more definitely as the opposition of many ones in one number4 ,in every quantity there are the two elements3 the 'one1' unity or solidarity1 which renders a total number possible1 and the 'many' or multiplicity1 which gives it real body and character4 ,by this quantitative law1 reality must always be both ,continuous and ,discrete4 ,thus when ,i regard a line as consisting of a number of points ,i treat it as a discrete quantity3 as many in one4 ,when1 on the other hand1 ,i regard the line as the unity of these points1 it becomes a continuous quantity4 ,these distinctions are not so trivial as they may appear3 they lie at the bases of paradoxes like those by which ,zeno disproved the ordinary representations of motion1 and when a ,m4,p4 informs the ,house of ,commons that it is impossible to divide #gcl4 #as4 #f;d4 by #al4 #bs4 #f;d41 he is1 like ,zeno1 and perhaps more unconsciously1 forgetting that these quantities are not merely continuous but discrete4 ,the ,pythagoreans1 according to the tradition of antiquity1 philosophised number4 ,in it they found the reality1 or the principle of things1--the characteristic feature which dominated existence1 and by which the world in all its multiplicity could be made coherent and intelligible4 ,they saw it composed of two elements3 a limit or limiting1 and an unlimited3 the latter as it were a dark ground1 measureless and endless1 on which definiteness was gradually marked out4 ,such a limiting principle would be e4 g4 the unit of number4 ,but the full definiteness of number only comes out when a numerical scale is fixed on1 in which each number bears a definite ratio to what goes before and what comes after4 ,each number in such a scale is really a multiple of its unit3 a product of its unity into its multeity1 of the monad into the indefinite duad4 ,it is this view of each number1 as the product of its prime unit with the ratio1 which comes explicitly to the fore in ,degree1 or quantitative ratio4 ,each so-called quantitative statement is thus a ratio between a given quantity in the object and an assumed standard or unit of number4 ,these implications latent in quantitative order or determination come out in mensuration4 ,if quantitative or numerical precision is to have a real basis1 it presupposes the existence of a qualitative atom or unit which shall be the ,measure4 ,measure is therefore the truth and the unity of quantity and quality3 each refers forward and backward to the other1 and both lead up to or imply a modulus1 or standard unit4 ,such a standard unit may seem1 at first sight1 to be a matter of arbitrary choice and imposition4 ,there seems to be no ultimate reason for taking the foot or the cubit as unit of measurement3 and if the original foot or cubit be the king's limb1 it is easy to say that the whole thing is conventional and artificial4 ,but it is evident on further reflection1 first that the foot or the pace is the natural and primitive measurer of lengths of space for the human being1 and secondly that the particular foot which is imposed as the measure is taken as being normal and typical4 ,so too it is partly arbitrary choice which fixes upon the starting-point for the scale of temperatures3 but here also the range from freezing-point to boiling-point of the commonest of liquids affords a sufficient standard from which naturally to carry on the scale above or below it4 ,what happens is therefore that what is the rule1 the standard1--we may also say1 the test of being1 is the natural mean or average4 ,the measure presents itself as the permanent and regular proportion of quantity and quality4 ,it is the amount or quantity at which things settle down in equilibrium and produce the quality or characteristic feature of the object4 ,to say that ,measure is the supreme category or the truth of being--of that superficial being which merely is--of the mere fact of perception--is to say that the prime or governing feature of reality1 its obviously dominant characteristic in this sphere1 is a self-imposing harmony and proportion4 ,it naturally arranges itself--defines and describes itself in rhythmic series1 in regular scales1 in symmetrical schemes4 ,all things are in geometrical proportion1 self-defined and uniformly graded4 ,such a conception and category of reality may be said to be peculiarly ,greek4 ,the doctrine of the ,mean is well known as a principle of their popular ,ethics4 ,but the ,mean is an average which is regarded as a ,normal1--a regular and permanent mode of being which is equivalent to a standard4 ,the rule is given by the logic of facts and of nature4 ,there is in it an apparent optimism--a belief that what is predominant and fundamental is right3 a doctrine of immanent symmetry and order4 ,the mere habitual custom is as such held to be the right and good4 ,it is true1 no doubt1 that ,protagoras came to point out that this ,measure was not inherent in things1 but came from ,man1 the measure of all things3 and that the later philosophy had to show how the conception of reality should be re-construed1 if the objectivity of ,measure and symmetry in the universe were still to be maintained4 ,still even with this correction the belief remained down to the ,stoic ,school that being is essentially self-ordering3 that ,nature is immanent proportion4 ,the ,measure thus emerging as the ,mean1 which stands out as the permanent background or recurrent same amidst varying extremes1 is set against these divergencies and used to measure them4 ,it has to serve as a denominator for all of these3 or each of these differences has a definite ratio to it4 ,for that purpose it must be so graded or present such a scale that the smallest difference from it that exists may be measured1 estimated and defined in terms of it4 ,it is here out of place to consider how this can be accomplished1--how mensuration in any case is solved as a problem of scientific determination4 ,what is more important is to note the fact that appearances everywhere start up to testify to the incompatibility of the two elements in measure1--to their tendency to fly away from each other4 ,it is only within certain ranges that quantity and quality change proportionately to each other4 ,the colour spectrum1 the scale of musical notes1 the series of chemical combination1 the order of the planets1 all are found in experience up to some point to follow a symmetrical order1 and exhibit a measure4 ,but after that point is reached1 a sudden change or transition occurs4 ,there is a break in the continuity of being3 without warning1 a new series of physical manifestation1 having a new rule or measure1 emerges by a sort of catastrophe4 ,so also1 it is only to a certain portion of the process of physical order in the human body that psychical changes are found to correspond4 ,everywhere the correspondence or harmony or proportion of immediate fact has its breaks1--its sudden emergencies into a new range of being4 ,it is on the repeated evidence of this fact--the discontinuity of immediate being1 the inexplicable gulfs which separate its ordered provinces from one another1 that we rise to the distinction of two orders or grades of being3 a double aspect of reality4 ,the primitive consciousness is1 we may suppose1 confined to one level of being1 one world4 ,and so long as the facts remain within limits there is no need to go further4 ,the measure is the rule4 ,but the uniformity breaks down abruptly#ac3 the rule has its inevitable exceptions3 it is no law or principle1 but only the factual majority within a fixed range4 ,thus the measure1 to fulfil all that is expected of it1 and be a full expression or definition of reality1 must go beyond a mere measure3 must become the essence1 or rather give place to the essence4 ,in order to explain the irregularity and want of measure which turns up if we exceed the narrow provinces of being1 we are forced on the conception of a being1 one permanent and the same1 set in relation1 antithetical but inseparable1 to an other being1 manifold1 changing1 and different4 ,the undying rhythm1 the ceaseless symmetry retreat into the further region--the world beyond3 while the older surface-being1 as set against it1 comes to be a mere phenomenon or appearance1 a derivative and dependent something1 which has its roots of being in the underlying law and essential reality4 ,but the two planes are still in intimate connexion1 in a correlation which becomes more and more palpable as its implications are disclosed and realised4 ,this change from ,measure to ,essential ,being is one which ,greek philosophy seems to exhibit in the step from ,pythagoreanism to ,platonism4 ,plato himself has noted the passage from what have been called the mathematical to the metaphysical categories1 and insisted on the essential and higher truth to which mathematics only point4 ,mathematical terms give the supreme definiteness to the world of being2 they show it as in its several compartments a world immanently ordered and measured4 ,as in ,greek ,art1 all seems to be fully brought to the surface3 as the image suggests no further and deeper meaning1 but affords an absolute identity of aspect and purport2 so the natural and semi-popular philosophy of ,greece was satisfied for its ethics with the proportionate1 the becoming1 the beautiful4 ,plato however passes beyond the surface1 and reflects the apparent fact on a deeper permanent reality behind4 ,that reality is still1 in name1 only the 'form' or 'shape'-- only the regular and permanent type--only the measure4 ,but it is called the really real1 the 1--the being of being4 ,in it the truth is clear1 transparent1 one and systematic1 which in the sensible or immediate world is obscure1 confused1 multiple4 ,it is the key to explain the difficulties and irregularities of the first and visible scene4 ,yet even ,plato never for a moment forgets the essential correspondence of the two realms1 however he may insist upon their separation1 and however hard he may find it to explain how being can be duplicated1 how the one can be many and yet not cease to be one1 how appearance has part in reality4 ,this indeed is not a difficulty confined to ,plato4 ,it is1 after all1 the same antithesis as we found in the beginning3 the ,is which lapses into the ,is not4 ,it now becomes the play of positive and negative--of perpetual relativity3 of a known dependent on an unknown1 and an unknown interpreted by a known3 an essence guaranteed by its show or seeming and a ,schein which supposes permanent ,sein4 ,how can a thing be1 and yet not be true8 ,how can pleasures seem and not be real8 ,aristotle1 taking up the ,platonic antithesis of true and apparent being1 carries it on into greater detail4 ,matter and form3 possibility and actuality3 are amongst his cardinal pairs of correlatives4 ,but he is anxious to maintain their essential relativity3 to show that reality only is and maintains itself as the unity of the two poles of universal and particular1 reason and sense1 or as a syllogism and a development4 ,so far as he succeeds in doing this1 ,aristotle rises above the correlational view of reality into the comprehension of it as a unity1 which carries itself through difference into self-realisation4 ,footnote #a3 ,what he did show was that these ,ideas were not objects in the vulgar sense of reality1 or things4 ,footnote #b3 ,cf4 the controversy between ,schiller and ,goethe as to idea and observation1 quoted by ,whewell1 ,scientific ,ideas1 i4 #cf4 ,footnote #c3 ,the use of the substantival form ,being for the verbal 7participle1 infinitive1 or indicative7 suggests an idea of permanence and substance1 or essence4 ,so potentiality seems much more real than may or can4 ,and yet the phrase ,he knows is only equivalent to ,he can or may know 7 or 74 ,footnote #d3 ,when it is said that3 ',it is strange that so profound a thinker as ,hegel should not have seen that the conception of definite objects1 such as a dog and cat1 is prior no less in nature than in knowledge to the conception of abstract relations1 such as is and is not1' it is difficult to say what the writer meant4 ,had he ever heard of geometry8 ,both in nature and in knowledge 7i4 e4 in the natural process from sense to thought7 chairs and tables are prior to lines and surface4 ,the mathematical point and line are abstractions1 i4 e4 thoughts1 and no image of sensuous reality4 ,it is also true that the ordinary conception of the sun's movements was 'prior no less in nature than in knowledge' to the theory of the earth's rotation4 ,and no doubt ,hegel1 sedate though his boyhood was1 had made the acquaintance of dog and cat in his pre-logical days3 as of balls and windows before he was turned upon ,euclid4 ,see ,mansel's ,letters1 ,lectures1 c41 p4 #bji4 ,footnote #e3 ,as ,being to ordinary unthinkingness seems to mean a great deal it cannot expound1 so the mind full of the mystic depths of time and space is disgusted to find them turn so empty and shallow when it would set forth its wealth4 ,see ,augustin4 ,confess4 xi4 #ad4 ,footnote #f3 ,this may be illustrated by saying that to affirm is the same energy of thought as to deny1 and that the difference lies in the terms related by the judgment4 ,in themselves1 the one act is as empty or meaningless as the other4 ,footnote #g3 ,heine1 ,ueber ,deutschland 7,werke71 v4 #bac4 ,footnote #h3 7,ar4 ,cat4 #e74 ,footnote #i3 ,hence the disparaging sense in which the term 'individual' may be used4 ,footnote #aj3 ,these latter terms being used in a metaphorical sense4 ,footnote #aa3 4 ,democritus ap4 ,sext4 ,empir4 adv4 ,math4 vii4 #ace4 ,footnote #ab3 ,aristotle's 3 see ,metaph4 i4 #f a 4 ,footnote #ac3 ,thus1 the sharp break at death suggests the reference of vital phenomena to a substantial soul4 ,,chapter ,,xxxi4 ,,the ,,logic ,,of ,,explanation ,,and ,,realistic ,,metaphysics3 ,,essence4 ,the coherence and consistency of being was1 it appeared in the last chapter1 only to be maintained by assuming it to fall into two planes1 or orders1 always however relative to each other4 ,the need of a measure forced itself upon even the superficial student4 ,in the ordinary business of economical life one commodity of common use or of general acceptability steps into the place of a common measure4 ,at first it is no more than one amongst many1 a more suitable and convenient means of discharging the task of mensuration4 ,but gradually it draws away into a world of its own1 and acquires in common estimation a unique and peculiar dignity4 ,it becomes a commodity of a higher order than the common1 and is even treated as if it had intrinsic and inherent worth1 apart from all relations of exchange4 ,in a further stage it rises to rank as an invariable and almost supersensible standard1 which amid all the fluctuations of currency tends to remain unchanged4 ,one loses sight of the movement out of which it grew and in which it exists--the social give and take1 the interaction of individual needs and general opinion4 ,the characteristic feature of this sphere of thought is the perpetual antithesis of terms4 ,and its tragedy is the result of the tendency to separate the terms1 and treat them as independently real4 ,it matters not how often this error may be detected4 ,each side of the antithesis no doubt reflects itself upon the other4 ,but we as constantly fail to note that reflection4 ,even the philosopher who most loudly preaches relativity falls into the common trap1 and speaks of relatives as ultimate and absolute4 ,he talks of an ,unknowable1 as if it could be without a ,known 7or ,knowable73 whereas no such term fully manifests itself4 ,each term owes its distinct existence to its correlative3 each gives itself over to the other1 and invests it with meaning and authority4 ,accordingly when even the ordinary mind1 which takes these categories as they are given1 is asked what each means1 it can only reply by referring to the other4 ,a cause is that which has an effect4 ,the dialectic in the nature of thought1--its self-revising self-conscious nature--which was concealed in the ,first ,part of ,logic1 where one term1 when carried to its extreme1 passed over into another1 is made obvious in the ,second ,part1 where each term postulates and even points to its correlative1 and1 however it may be contra-distinguished1 cannot be thought without it4 ,thus1 force is a meaningless abstraction without the correlative expression or utterance of force3 and matter means nothing except in its distinction from1 and yet reflection on1 form4 ,these1 it may be said1 are simple and tautological statements4 ,they are principles1 however1 which every day sees disregarded4 ,have they1 for example1 been remembered by those theorists who tell us that everything is ultimately reducible to matter1 or who propose to improve upon that theory by explaining that matter is after all only another name for force8 ,forgetting how this reduction is made1 they are dealing with abstractions or mental figments1 and losing their way in an endless maze of metaphysics4 ,do those who speak so confidently of laws of nature as something real and effective ever reflect that the two terms are more or less relative to each other1 and that there is some latent metaphor in the phrase8 ,or if they prefer to speak of laws of phenomena1 on which word is the accent to be laid8 ,those who thus speak of matter and force1 really speak of a matter which is formed and form-possessed1 capable of determining its own form1 and of a force which can rule its own exertions3 and for such conceptions the words in question are scarcely adequate representatives4 ,they use the language of the ,second1 to express notions which properly belong to the ,third branch of ,logic4 ,the whole range of ,essence or ,relativity exhibits a sort of see-saw3 while one term goes up in importance1 the other term goes down4 ,the several antitheses1 too1 have their day of fashion1 and give place to others4 ,those inquirers who speak of the phenomena of nature shrug their shoulders at the very mention of essences3 and the practical man1 whose field is actuality1 acquires a very pronounced contempt for both abstractions4 ,one class of investigators glories in the perpetual discovery of differences1 and stigmatises the seekers after identity and similarity as dreamers3 while the latter retort1 and name the specialisers empiricists4 ,one intellect considers an action almost solely by its grounds or motives3 another almost solely by its consequences4 ,some console themselves for their degradation by piquing themselves on what they might have been3 others despise these 'would-be' minds for what they practically are4 ,what a wealth there lies in each of us1 which our nearest friends know nothing of1 and which has never been made outward6 ,but in this mode of thought1 it is the persistent delusion1 misleading science no less than metaphysics and the reflective thinking of ordinary life1 to suppose that either of two relative terms has an existence and value of its own4 ,in ,germany paper-money is sometimes known as ',schein' or ,show4 ,that term marks its relativity to the gold or silver currency of the realm3 and it would be as absurd to pay with ,austrian paper-money in ,persia1 as to take one term of ,essence apart from its correlative4 ,the disputes about essences1 about matters and forces1 about substance1 about freedom and necessity1 or cause and effect1 are generally aggravated by a forced abstraction of one term from another on which its meaning and existence depend4 ,the essence may be roughly defined as that measure or standard which corresponds to the variation of immediate being1 and yet remains identical in all variation4 ,or1 if we like1 we may say that this immediate being1 which1 as derivative1 may now be called existence#a1 has its ground in the essence4 ,the essence is the ground of existence3 and essence which exists is a 'thing1' ,such an existing essence or thing subsists in its properties2 and these properties are only found in the thing4 ,thus the essence1 when it comes into existence as a thing1 turns out to be a mere phenomenon or appearance4--,such briefly stated is the development of essence proper into appearance4 ,with the idea of essential being--a permanent which yet changes1 there emerge the problems connected with the double aspect of relation as identity and difference1--the favourite categories of reflection4 ,these terms indeed the popular logician would fain avoid as savouring of pedantic accuracy1 and prefers the psychological titles of similarity and contrast4 ,these1 he tends to insinuate1 are unique experiences1 direct feelings1 beyond which it is impossible to go in analysis4 ,the logician1 on the other hand1 must insist on dealing with the more radical phase of the terms4 ,and he must note their essential interdependence and their intrinsic contradictoriness4 ,abstract sameness1 or sameness which does not presuppose a tinge of difference1 is a fiction of weak thought1 which wishes to simplify the subtlety of nature4 ,identity is a relative term1 and for that very reason presupposes difference3 and for the same reason difference presupposes identity and is meaningless without it4 ,the whole dispute about ',personal ,identity1' as it descends from one ,english psychologist to another1 is enveloped in the obscurity which springs from failure to grasp the logical antinomy on which the question turns4 ,when ,i feel that my friend whom ,i have not met for years is still the same1 should ,i take the trouble to express myself in this manner1 unless with reference to the difference betwixt ,then and ,now8 ,if ,i remark that two men are different1 would the remark be worth making or hearing unless there was some identity which made that difference all the more striking8 ,the essence is1 in short1 the unity of sameness and difference3 and when so apprehended1 it is the ground by which we explain existence4 ,the essence1 ground1 or possibility1 is at once itself and not itself3 if it is self-identical1 it is for the same reason self-distinguishing4 ,if it is to be itself1 it can only be so by negativing what in it is other than itself4 ,the affirmation of self implies the negation of the other of self1--the redintegration 7though not the blank absorption7 of the other in it4 ,this is the crux which lies in ,ex nihilo nihil fit3 what exists must not be other than the essence 7the effect not more than the cause71 and yet unless it is other and different1 there has been no passage from essence to existence4 ,the tendency to identify1 and the tendency to distinguish1 alternate both in scientific thought and in general culture4 ,but whichever prevail for the moment1 it is only as a re-action and a protest against the one-sided predominance of the other4 ,and thus both ultimately rest upon and presuppose a ground of existence which is neither mere sameness nor mere difference4 ,it is only when the two tendencies meet and interpenetrate that science accomplishes its end1 and discovers the ground of existence4 ,in the first instance the world presents to incipient science the aspect of mere identity and of mere difference4 ,likeness is confounded with sameness1 and unlikeness with diversity4 ,the popular and the infant minds do not draw fine distinctions4 ,things to them are either the same or different3 one point of sameness may in certain conditions obliterate whole breadths of difference2 and tiny divergence may make as nothing all the many points of agreement1 purely and simply1 i4 e4 abstractly4 ,but the process of comparison1 setting things beside each other1 teaches us to refine a little1 and speak of things as ,like or ,unlike4 ,one thing is like another when the element of identity preponderates3 it is unlike1 when the difference is uppermost4 ,thus while we distinguish things from one another1 we connect them4 ,from mere variety1 and mere sameness1 we have risen1 secondly1 to distinctions of like and unlike4 ,but1 thirdly1 this distinction of same and different is in the thing itself4 ,everything includes an antithesis or contradiction in it3 it is at once positive and negative4 ,one can only be virtuous1 so long as one is not utterly virtuous4#b ,to be a philosopher1 implies that you are not wholly or merely a philosopher4 ,the rational animal is so1 because of an inherent irrationality1 and is so1 only as rising upon and superseding it4 ,every epithet1 so to speak1 by which you describe any reality1 presupposes in it the negative of the quality4 ,not only does every negation presuppose an attempted or surmised affirmation1 but an affirmation is always1 it may be said1 a re-affirmation against an incipient doubt4 ,every stage of reality involves the presence of antithetical but inseparable elements3 every light implies a shadow to set it forth4 ,the epithet of each real is only a potiori4 ,while it retains itself1 it must lose itself4 ,its positivity is only secured by its self-negation and its identity is based upon its self-distinction4 ,every proposition which conveys real knowledge is a statement that self-sameness is combined with difference4 ,every such proposition is synthetical3 it unites or identifies what is supposed to be implicitly different1 or differentiates what seemed only identical4 ,here we have that coincidentia oppositorum1 which is the truth of essence4 ,thus1 e4 g4 the essence of the ,self is the contradiction between its self-centred unity and its existence by self-differentiation into elements4 ,essence1 thus comprehended as the unity of identity and difference1 as that which is and is not the same1 is the ,ground1 from which an ,existence comes as the ,consequent4 ,or1 otherwise expressed1 the ground is the source of the differences1--the point where they converge into unity1 and whence they diverge into existence4 ,everything in existence has such a ground3 or1 as it is somewhat tautologically stated in the common formula1 a sufficient ground4 ,on that account1 it is no great matter to give reasons or grounds for a thing1 and no amount of them can render a thing either right or wrong1 unless in reference to some given and supposedly fixed point4 ,for the ground only states the same thing over again in a mediate or reflected form4 ,it carries back the actual fact to its antecedent3 and thus deprives it of its abruptness or inexplicability1 by showing you it was there implicitly2 and therefore as you accepted the ground you cannot complain of what but serves to continue it4 ,to refer to the ground is to say there is really nothing new3 and as you raised no objection before1 you need raise none now4 ,the ,existent world--a world of existents1 each conditioning and conditioned--is popularly described as a world of ,things4 ,these ,things are the solid hinges on which turns our ordinary conception of change and action4 ,they act1 and exhibit properties4 ,being is partly substantive1 partly adjective4 ,the ,thing itself is the ground of its properties3 i4 e4 each thing is looked upon as a unity in which different relations converge1 or an identity which subsists through its changing states4 ,this is the side emphasised in ordinary life1 when a thing is regarded as the permanent and enduring subject1 which has certain properties4 ,but a little science or a little reflection soon turns the tables upon the thing1 and shows that the properties are independent matters1 which1 temporarily it may be1 converge or combine into a factitious unity which we term a thing4 ,but these very matters cannot be independent or whole1 just because they interpenetrate each other in the thing4 ,the thing1 which from one point of view seemed permanent1 and the properties1 which from another point of view seemed self-subsistent matters1 are neither of them more than appearance4 ,for they must be at one1 and at one they cannot be4 ,and if we reduce the various matters to one1 and speak of ,matter in general1 we have a mere abstraction--a something which only becomes real by being stamped with a special form4 ,mere ,matter like mere ,thing 7thing in itself7 is a knowable ,unknowable4 ,in this way we pass from the talk about essence1 things1 and matter into an other range of the sphere of relativity4 ,we no longer have one order of being behind or in the depth1 and another referring back to it4 ,we now speak 7as ,mill does7 of ,phenomena3--not phenomena of an unknown1 but1 simply disregarding the background1 we find all we want upon the surface4 ,for neither is thing more real than property1 nor essence than existence4 ,each is exactly equal in reality to the other1 and that reality is its relation to the other4 ,the thing and the essence with their claim to truth disappear4 ,nothing truly is3 but only appears to be4 ,the semblance 7,schein7 may refer to an essential4 ,but the appearance 7,erscheinung7 only refers to another appearance1 and so on4 ,the phenomenal world is all on one level3--as was the world of immediate being4 ,but1 there1 each term of being presented itself as independent3 here1 nothing is independent--nothing ever really is1 but only represents something else1 which is in its turn representative4 ,yet even here there is a pretence of hierarchy in existence4 ,in the phenomenon a certain superiority is attributed to its ,law4 ,but the conception of ,law is hard to keep in its proper place4 ,either it assumes a permanency--even were it but a permanent possibility--as contrasted with the coming and passing phenomenon3 and then it is apt to be confounded with a real ,essence4 ,or1 on the other hand1 it comes to be looked on as a mere way of colligating phenomena1--as a mere appearance in the variety of appearance 7as it were an iris in the rain-drops7--a phenomenon of a phenomenon4 ,such a distinction between the phenomenon and its law2 therefore1 is and must be illusory1 or itself only an appearance4 ,as such it is described as the difference of ,form and ,content3 two terms1 which are incessantly opposed1 but which more than most antitheses reveal when pressed the hollowness of their opposition4 ,for true or developed ,form is ,content1 and vice versa4 ,instead however of this practical identification of the law of the phenomenon with the duly-formulated phenomenon itself1 it is more natural to emphasise the discordance of the two aspects of reality1 and yet to acknowledge their essential relativity4 ,this essential relativity in the phenomenon has a threefold aspect3 the relation of whole and parts2 of force and the exertion of force2 of inward and outward4 ,the relation of whole and parts tends to explain by statical composition3 the relation of force and its exertion1 by dynamical construction4 ,according to the former the parts are constituted by their dependence upon and in the whole1 and yet the whole is composed by the addition of the several parts together4 ,each extreme is what it is only through the other4 ,only those parts can make up a whole1 which somehow have the whole in them3 and to become the whole1 they must contrive to wholly obliterate their partitional character4 ,a better exhibition of the inner unity and the difference between form and contents is seen in the relation of a force to its exertion4 ,here the contents appear under a double form3 first1 under the form of mere identity1 as force1--secondly1 under the form of mere distinction1 as the manifestation of that force4 ,yet a force is only such in its utterance or manifestation1 while in that utterance1 if abstracted from the force it carries forth1 all energy has been superseded4 ,this separation of content and form1 or of content as developed in two forms1 appears still more clearly in the third relation3 that of outward and inward4 ,this is a popular distinction of very wide application in reference to phenomena4 ,but neither outside nor inside is anything apart from its correlative4 ,if the elements implied in the conception of phenomena are to have full justice done them1 it must be expanded so as to give expression to these two phases1 to include the outward and the inward4 ,but at first only by reverting to something like the old distinction of essence and existence1--an essence however which is existent or phenomenal1 and an existence which stands independent1 though in correlation4 ,such being is ,actuality--being1 i4 e4 which is what it must be1 and must be what it is4 ,actuality1 though it comes under the general head of ,essence1 tends to pass away into another sphere4 ,here1 as elsewhere1 we see that the general rubric of a sphere is only partially applicable to some of its subordinate sections4 ,in essence proper there were1 or were assumed to be1 two grades of being--a real or essential1 and an unessential or seeming3 or being was regarded 7contradictorily7 both as ideal 7as one thing7 and real 7as having several properties74 ,in ,appearance or ,manifestation the aspects of being are supposed to lie on a level2 but they are always a pair of aspects1 one side of which is entirely dependent for its explanation on a reflection from the other1 e4 g4 whole and parts1 the favourite category for explaining the larger unities4 ,but in the category of actuality there is nothing so merely potential1 so unessential as mere essence recognised3 and each actual is something firm and self-supporting which does not1 like a phenomenon1 merely borrow its reality from its antithesis or correlative4 ,thus we have1 in a way1 got back to the characteristics of immediate being3 only1 as we find it1 we have this affirmation of the self-subsistence of reals contradictorily accompanied with the conviction of their necessary interdependence4 ,it is a reflective 7or correlated71 not an immediate reality4 ,there is no other world of being to have recourse to for explanation now3 nor can we play back and forward from aspect to aspect of a reality which never comes forward itself1 but only as a reflection on or from another4 ,the world of reality is a self-contained world3 its parts and phases are each hard realities3 and for that reason they bear hard upon each other in the bond of necessity4 ,the total actuality falls naturally in our conception into three elements4 ,we separate first the central fact--the nucleus of the business1 the concentrated reality in reality3 the fact in its mere identity and inner abstractness3 the ultimate drift or inner possibility of things4 ,then we turn to the rest of the concrete fact--all without which the fact would not be itself--the detail and particularity3 this we treat as a sort of materials or passive conditions from which the real fact is to be produced1 on which it is dependent and which precede it in time4 ,lastly1 in order to get back the unity of the fact from these two unconnected elements1 we refer to some agency which puts them together4 ,the ,end--or thing to be realised--7so to speak7 has to be brought out by a motive agency 7efficient cause7 which imposes the form 7or general character7 on the matter and makes these one4 ,by this analysis1 however1 we have only put asunder what is one experience and introduced a mechanical 7external7 unifier needlessly4 ,the name of conditions is given to the particulars or details1 considered apart from the rest of the fact1 and hypothetically invested with an existence anterior to it1 with the implication1 first1 that they are self-subsistent1 and secondly1 that they to some extent involve the rest of it4 ,again1 the general fact1 the fact in its mere nominal or abstract generality or essence1 its mere possibility1 does not exist separately3 every fact when in thought completed has its so-called conditions not outside it1 but as constituent elements1 aspects1 or factors in it4 ,lastly1 the so-called agency is the active element itself in the act1 an aspect or factor in the totality3 the aspect which keeps actuality together as a self-energising fact--a ,thathandlung and not a mere ,thatsache 7to quote ,fichte's phrase74 ,our practical and technical habits1 where the agent is other than his materials and aims1 lead us to draw the same distinctions in the realm of total ,nature3 they are aspects useful in ordine ad hominem which we1 without due modification1 apply in ordine ad ,universum4 ,it is originally in our practical operations that the distinctions of necessary and possible emerge1--with a view to the accomplishment of our desires and purposes4 ,that is necessary which is required and needed if some bare plan is projected and is to be actualised3 it is the condition or conditions without which the end cannot be attained4 ,it is an epithet of the means4 ,possible1 on the contrary1 is an epithet of the end or plan1 and denotes that there are means for its attainment1 without however always specifying that this is known of the present or given instance4 ,it is clear that everything as regards the application of these terms will depend on the definiteness with which the plan is conceived1 both in itself so to speak and in its relations with the rest of the circumstances4 ,on the other hand1 when a result emerges without being included in the purpose1 and without any means having been employed for attaining it1 it is said to be a chance1 accident1 or contingency4 ,these terms are applied by analogy to the uses of theoretical explanation4 ,just as in will you have a general aim to begin with1 which becomes more and more determinate as it moves forward in the volitional process to execution2 so in the attempt to understand the world you suppose it first of all the mere shadow or phantom of itself1 a promise and potentiality of things to come3 a next-to-nothing1 which however you credit with a magic wealth of potential being4 ,so much indeed may this possibility be emphasised that nothing more is needed3 it is possible1 and1 without a thought of difficulties and counteractives1 you could swear that it is actual#c4 ,being removed above this solid land of actuality1 cut off from the ties and bonds of conditions1 it fancies itself moving in its vacuum2 and being free from all bonds of actuality fancies itself actually free1 or self-disposing1 whereas it can only claim this liberum arbitrium indifferentiae1 so long as it remains bare and powerless possibility--a mere may-be1 which1 apart from all conditions1 would exist only by a mere contingency1 or freak of chance4 ,this mere potentiality--being only an ante-dated1 presupposed1 and hypothetical actuality--being only a substance or substratum--must be raised out of its supposititious existence into reality by means of appropriate conditions4 ,these conditions are necessary to its resuming its place or reaching a place in actuality4 ,thus each object becomes actual or real from a presupposed possibility by means of an external necessity4 ,as in the former case the possibility was identified with power1 and conditions were left out of sight as comparatively unimportant3 so here the possibility--taken to lie at the root of the thing--is made a mere susceptibility1 which would be nothing actual unless stimulated and necessitated from outside4 ,this necessity in the very heart of actuality 7which is its characteristic to the reflectional mode of mind7 thus arises from the separation and hypostatisation of its elements into independent powers which are so far in stress and opposition4 ,this is the climax of metaphysics--if metaphysics be the investiture of the dynamic factors of the notion with the power and character of supposed agents or forces4 ,it appears in three phases1 with the three categories of substance1 cause1 and reciprocity4 ,to the first1 reality is regarded as dominated by its mere underlying potentiality3 the reality of the mere superficial contingents is controlled by the necessity of its latent or substantial being4 ,to explain event or incident1 here1 is merely to bind it to the generic nature or the intrinsic doom1 which--unexplained and inexplicable--manifests itself in an extrinsically fluctuating appearance of facts3 e4 g4 the single crime is explained as the product of social conditions4 ,under the conception of ,causality1 each thing is a mere might-be which owes all its actuality to a definite antecedent or cause1--an antecedent termed for the moment unconditional1 but anon reduced to dependence on further conditions4 ,the effect is as a fact3 but would not have been so unless for an earlier fact--i4 e4 unless the effect in a supposed earlier stage of its growth had been helped on by certain conditions or circumstances to acquire actual and full being in the effect4 ,and cause and conditions can change places1 according to what we happen to regard as the central nucleus or inner possibility of the effect4 ,lastly1 the conception of reciprocity recognises that causality is rather an arbitrary simplification of reality into strands of rectilinear event2 it remembers that ,substance emphasises the dependence of each non-independent element on the supposed totality which they grow from1 and doing so1 it lays down the reversibility and essential elasticity of the causal relation4 ,the cause in causing re-acts upon itself1 and the effect is itself a cause of the effect1 active as well as passive4 ,the dependence in short is all-environing3 nowhere is there any loop-hole to escape from necessity4 ,motives act on purpose1 and purpose acts on motives3 the stone hurls back the hand that hurled it4 ,explanation is thus baffled and thus forced to recognise its own limitations4 ,the simplest fact is beyond all the powers of explanatory science to do full justice to3 for to know fully the 'flower in the crannied wall' after this method of explanation would involve endless multiples of action and re-action4 ,the antinomy between necessity and contingency arose by following out the antithesis1 so natural to us1 between selfsame and different1 essence and existence1 substance and accidents1 till they were invested with a right to independent place and function4 ,but the separation of the abstract receptacle of possibility1 self-same and essential1 from the equally abstract conditions which fill it up and make it actual1 is only the great human instrumentality of comprehension1 which however is not reached until each thing is realised and idealised as an individual1 which has universality and has particularity1 but never either alone4 ,its universality is possibility--its particularity the aspect of contingency3 but these aspects are in submission to an inclusive unity4 ,the real when ill known seems contingent2 when somewhat better known it seems necessary by external 7physical7 compulsion2 in its truth to intelligence1 the real is a self-active1 a causa sui1 or it is necessary by that self-determination which is the freedom of autonomy4 ,the view of the world under the category of actuality 7,reality71 and as dominated by the law of causality1 is the culminating stand-point of scientific or reflective realism4 ,it began with a mere descriptive science1 naming and qualifying the successive aspects of being1--with description which passed through numeration into the definiteness of measurement4 ,but all such determination was found to imply the existence of a permanent reality1 or at least to involve the reference of one reality to another1 outside of it1 and yet not independent of relations to it1 which had to make part of its nature4 ,to the scientific realist the sum of fact presents itself independent of consciousness1 as a complicated mass of real elements governed by laws and subject to necessities4 ,each thing or state of a thing is explained by reference to something outside it1 which is its cause1 and measured by something inside it which is its unit or atomic standard4 ,alternately the reference1 and the unit are designated arbitrary 7contingent7 and necessary 7essential73 i4 e4 they are sometimes considered as only a way of looking at reality#d--;and sometimes as inevitable implications and conditions of reality4 ,all this is ,objective ,logic3 or1 so far as it does not realise its implications1 it is ,metaphysics4 ,its terms of thought#e are in practice treated as elements of a reality which is what it is1 apart from thought-conditions1 apart from consciousness4 ,as ,hegel exhibits them in their interdependence1 they hint their underlying thought-nature1 which in their empirical applications is hardly apparent4 ,for to the realistic stand-point mind and subjectivity are left out of account as only passive onlookers4 ,the realist may no doubt speak of a ,subject3 but he means a real1 a corporeal self1 an actual amongst other actuals4 ,if he speaks of mind and will1 such mind and will are parts and ingredients in a general scheme of causes and effects2 they are points of transition through which passes the moving stream of event4 ,they also are things and substances4 ,they are agents and patients1 always both1 no doubt but the chief circumstance to note is that they are actuals1 and that even knowledge and will are regarded as species of action and motion4 ,when ,protagoras laid down his maxim that ,man is the measure of all things1 he stated1 apparently in an ambiguous manner1 that the fact of measure 7and all that mensuration implies71 and 7we may add7 the existence of correlation in actuality1 presupposed for their explanation the assumption of ,mind and subjectivity4 ,mind thus became the basis of all actuality which claimed to be objective--claimed1 in short1 to be actual4 ,the truth and objectivity of the objective lies in the subjective2 ,mind is its own measure1 i4 e4 the absolute measure1 and it is self-relation4 ,so ,kant had taught and ,fichte enforced4 ,the basis of objectivity is the subjective2 but a subjective different from that so-called by the plain man or by the naive psychologist4 ,by the subjective he does not1 as the plain man1 understand the compound of body and soul1 the living and breathing organism amid outer objects--nor1 as the psychological idealist does1 a psychical process1 a series or bundle of states of consciousness1 always contrasted with a reality1 the reality outside consciousness4 ,it is true that his language resembles the language of psychology3 as ,herbart and others have said1 that is to be expected1 for he talks of mind and consciousness4 ,but the consciousness he speaks of is a unity that includes all space and all time3 it is one and all-embracing1 infinite1 because not as individual 7psychological7 consciousness set in antithesis to reality1 as the other half of the duality of existence4 ,it is consciousness generalised--,bewusstsein berhaupt-- an eternal1 i4 e4 a timeless consciousness1 an universal i4 e4 not a localised1 mind3--a necessary ,idea1 but with an inward self-regulating necessity4 ,such a consciousness ,fichte called the ,absolute ,ego3 but as we saw before1 the adjective transforms the substantive4 ,such a consciousness1 which is absolute self-consciousness1 is the ,idea3--no psychical event1 but the logical condition and explanation of reality whether physical or psychical4 ,the ,idea is the presupposition of epistemology1 but of an epistemology which claims to occupy the place of old usurped by metaphysics4 ,metaphysics has no higher category than actuality3 transcendental logic shows that actuality rests in the ,idea1--reality conceived and conception realised4 ,footnote #a3 ,existence1 as opposed to ,dasein1 should thus imply the emergence into efficient being from a state of quietude or passive latency 7,wesen74 ,footnote #b3 ,as ,aristotle says1 ,the brave man stands his ground1 yet fearing3 7cf4 ,tolstoi3 ,siege of ,sevastopol74 ,if he does not fear1 brave is not the word for him4 ,footnote #c3 ,put into ,greek1 the mere 7licet1 or forsitan7 is taken as equivalent to 7possum74 ,footnote #d3 ,herbart's ,zufllige ,ansicht1 or contingent aspect4 ,footnote #e3 ',denkbestimmungen4' ,,chapter ,,xxxii4 ,,logic ,,of ,,comprehension ,,and ,,idealism3 ,,the ,,notion4 ,the distinction between the psychical or psychological idea and the logical concept has been more than once alluded to4 ,the idea or representation is under psychical form exactly equivalent to the undigested and passively accepted thing to which we give the title of physical or external4 ,it is the ideal1 in the sense of the psychical1 pendant to the real3 and hangs up in the mental view in the same way as the real object to the physical perception4 ,it is in brief the crude object1 considered not as existing1 but as a state of consciousness--it is a reduplication in inner space of the thing in outer space4 ,if we cannot say it is altogether mythological1 we must however note that it is simply a psychical reflex1 which has an existence only through abstraction1 and is neither more or less than the object apprehended without comprehension4 ,the concept or notion is more than an image1 and less than an image4 ,an idea-image is symbolical of the unanalysed totality of the thing4 ,but the notion is in the first instance due to an analysis1 and secondly1 a reconstruction of the thing4 ,it takes up the thing in its relations3 it thinks it1 i4 e4 it abstracts and mutilates it1 and artificially recombines4 ,it implies analysis and synthesis4 ,it produces a sort of manufactured thing3 a mental construction4 ,but the construction--as contrasted with the passivity that says first ,a and then ,b and a connexion of them--has the traces of subjective or mental violence about it3 for violence there is in the act of comprehension4 ,we have however got together in unity what actuality in the process of history let fall asunder1 and could only1 at the best1 show as independent reals held against their will in ubiquitous relations of reciprocity4 ,but the unity in which the individual sets the universal and the particular is an imported unity1 which though it gives place and explanation to the elements of reality1 seems to impose its synthesis upon reality4 ,so far the concept is subjective only4 ,it is an ample explanation including the facts1 but not quite self-explanatory4 ,we conceive1 and judge1 and reason3 but all this is alien to the object4 ,but there is a counterpart almost in antagonism to this4 ,there is a concept1 i4 e4 a grouping of existence into totals mediated by necessary links1 which presents itself as embodied in things3 and this embodied concept is the objective world4 ,that world1 apart from our interpretation and conception1 offers itself as a synthesis of universal1 particular and individual4 ,it groups itself into systems1 mechanical1 chemical1 and teleological4 ,but in all of these there is lacking the evidence of the inward and subjective principle of unification4 ,the unity is external1 the members are held in a vice3 their unity is given as a fact3 it follows through certain laws and does not reveal itself4 ,there is a want of perspicuity of connexion3 logic--the need of inner explanation--in short1 is not satisfied by this logic of facts4 ,it is rather a realm of necessity than of freedom4 ,it wants life2 wants true self-activity4 ,as in the subjective notion1 the facts resented the hand of the logician 7for here is the sphere of logic proper in the old ,aristotelian sense71 and refused to show themselves in the simple and transparent transitions of his argument3 so the objective synthesis of the members of a mechanical system1 or of a kingdom of means and ends1 lacks the freedom and lucidity of inner movement which logical insight demands4 ,objectivity--the logic of fact--is a syllogism of necessity1 so hardened and fixed that the necessity of the conclusion is more obvious than the self-determination by the syllogism4 ,the third stage of the ,notion shows the union of the pellucidity and ideality of the syllogistic progress with the necessity and reality of the objective order4 ,here actuality and the concept are at one4 ,at first as a mere fact--or more fact than idea4 ,life1 organic life1 is no doubt development3 a totality which is in all its parts1 and where parts have their being in the total4 ,but life as such1 the so-called vital principle1 does not emancipate itself to a true universal3 it is immersed in its particulars4 ,intellectual life1 on the contrary1--the form of consciousness--rises independent and distinct from the totality of life4 ,psychology follows ,biology4 ,but as such--under the form of intellect and will--it has an antithesis no less fatal to its absoluteness than the opposite one-sidedness of life4 ,there is--to put it in language more familiar to the present day--there is an analogue of life in all nature2 and all reality1 even the rock and the crystal1 has its life-history4 ,there is1 properly speaking1 no mere inorganic reality3 organic life is universal4 ,and then1 going a step further1 we attribute to all reality something analogous to a soul1 or a consciousness4 ,we talk1 in rash moods1 of mind-stuff and feelings1 even in molecules4 ,but as ,spinoza has reminded us1 terms like ,will and ,intellect have about them something finite1 because they imply an antagonism to an object3 they are predominantly subjective4 ,the reality in its final truth must be a subject-object3 the adequacy of thought and being1 the equation of real and ideal1 the intellection which is life4 ,and this is called ,absolute ,idea4 ,it is natural to translate such an equation1 when made a result1 into a mere blank4 ,and a blank it would be1 if we suppose all that has gone before obliterated1 and only the result left4 ,then1 in the coincidence of opposites1 we have only a zero of a gulf of negation4 ,a life which is consciousness may seem to fade away like a vague ideal with no reality4 ,a consciousness which is life can be no consciousness at all4 ,the is and the is known dare not coincide or they perish both4 ,a categorical proposition1 says ,hegel1 can never express a speculative truth4 ,that is to say3 the subject over-rides the predicate1 or the predicate makes you ignore the subject4 ,the affirmation keeps out of sight the negation4 ,to say that life is consciousness makes us forget that the very assertion would not and could not be made1 unless also life were other than consciousness4 ,in its full proportion of meaning1 therefore1 the proposition must imply a return to unity through difference1 to identity through otherness4 ,affirmation1 fully realised1 is re-affirmation through negation4 ,cognition is but recognition deepened by contrast4 ,this law which governs--or rather which is--logic2 the principle of identity through contradiction--must not be lost sight of in the supreme struggle of thought4 ,the ,idea is the unity of life and consciousness3 but it is a unity in which they are 7aufgehoben7--not a zero in which they utterly collapse4 ,we may illustrate in two ways4 ,in the first we may compare the ' of ,aristotle4 ,that is his formula of reality4 ,nominally it only means activity and actuality3 and sums up the metaphysical formula for what really is1--the hard fact of being4 ,but through it there glimmers the meaning of consciousness4 ,it not merely is1 but it means what it is4 ,energy of ,soul is the end of life--the supreme fulfilling of desire1 and consummation of tendency4 ,as such it is1 and feels that it is4 ,it is the virtuous deed1 which is its own reward4 ,but ,aristotle seems sometimes to fall from that identification of being and consciousness4 ,the world of praxis parts from the world of ,theoria4 ,in that case the activity is a mere activity--the outward shell of action3 and then1 as a supplement or complement to the abstract result of the activity the consciousness of achievement gets a distinct position as ,pleasure3 and the activity1 now no consummation1 but only a means to an end1 get its completion from this arbitrarily abstracted shadow of reality4#a ,the second illustration may come from ,mr4 ,spencer4 ',we can think of ,matter only in terms of ,mind4 ,we can think of ,mind only in terms of ,matter4 ,when we have pushed our explorations of the first to the uttermost limit we are referred to the second for a final answer3 and when we have got the final answer of the second we are referred back to the first for an interpretation of it4' ,beyond this see-saw indeed we cannot go1 so as to leave it behind3 but in reality we transcend it4 ,the ,mind that is in terms of ,matter is partly the region of psychic event1 partly the world of science1 art and religion4 ,and psychic event is always antithetical to physical reality4 ,but the spiritual world already includes the antithesis of psychical and physical1 and including it keeps it as a principle of life and consciousness4 ,the supreme or absolute mind does not indeed rise above ,physis and ,psyche so as to have no antagonism3 but it is the unity of antitheses4 ,what those who crave for something higher than this rest in unrest1 this life in consciousness and consciousness in life1 want1 would destroy the very condition of reality4 ,still philosophising1 they would be above philosophy4 ,they want an objective reality in which they may still their beating hearts1--a 'repose which ever is the same' and yet is not annihilation3--to sink into the great sea of being1 and leave consciousness with its radical division behind4 ,such a craving philosophy1 in ,hegers hands1 has no power of satisfying4 ,it cannot1 in the sense in which ,jacobi and ,schelling used the words1 reveal ,being4 ,it cannot get at the ,that except by means of the ,what1 and is the eternal antithesis and correlation of these two4 ,it will always be rational and logical--for it is its function to think being3 and it will re-affirm that an unthought and a-logical being is a mere name1 which in the language of humanity at least has no meaning1 whatever it may stand for in the ,volapk of imagined gods4 ,to go beyond this correlation of ,being and ,thought is therefore no advance1 but a relapse into the ,natura ,naturans1 which1 in its abstract completeness1 is1 but dare not be anything4 ,philosophy therefore in its supreme ,idea is still the ' of 1 and not bare 4 ,for it mere ,being is always ,nothing4 ,and to be actual it must live in antithesis and live victorious over antithesis4 ,it follows the law of humanity 7,und das heisst ein ,kmpfer sein7--which can only exist in warfare as a church militant1 but for continuous existence must also be a church triumphant4 ,like religion and art1 it sometimes craves for utter union in the fullness of ,being4 ,such a fullness is the unspeakable and the vain1--which we may picture as the apathy of ,nirvana2 but which is the absorption of ,art1 ,religion and ,philosophy1--the cease of consciousness and an abyss4 ,we may call it--it matters not--,being4 ,these stages of the ,notion must be examined in somewhat fuller detail4 ,the subjective notion is the effort at the comprehension 7at first subjective7 of the two correlated elements into which actuality as such has been seen to fall--and to fall again and again without end4 ,it brings out1 or explicates 7and with some opposition to the divisions of reality7 the unity which was presupposed by the antagonist and inseparable reals4 ,hitherto we have had two things or aspects in relation and move from one to the other by an act of reflection4 ,but to get two points in relation1 they must belong to or exist in a unity4 ,the divided reality of cause and effect must1 if it is to be intelligible1 submit to a unification of its elements4 ,it is comparatively easy to get on if we are always allowed to have one foot on solid ground1 and can move the other4 ,give us a standing-point1 and explanation is simplified4 ,but to get a notion of things is1 it may seem1 to transcend them1 or get beneath them1 and take a stand-point outside actuality which shall unify them4 ,if we added to immediate being a further element to explain it1 it may be said we now superadd a third to explain the two others4 ,over and above the different and related elements1 there is assumed to be a unity4 ,and at first it is certainly such a superimposed element1 added to the facts1 and regarded as our way of looking at them1 as a subjective notion or grasp1 holding together what is in itself reluctant to be unified4 ,the three aspects or factors in a ,concept are the ,universal1 the ,particular1 and the ,individual4 ,these are what ,hegel calls the 'moments' or 'vanishing factors' of the notion4 ,they are 'vanishing1' because in their logical mobility they form a pellucid union3 if they are distinct1 yet they refuse to be independent of one another4 ,or1 we may say1 each in its truth is the meeting-ground and unification of the two others1 thus forming a sort of cycle of perpetual movement4 ,and in this way we may see that the addition of the third has really been a simplification3 it has made two one4 ,for the ,unit which welds together is not a tertium quid1 but simply the explicit statement and assertion of the truth implied in the antithesis1 which was yet inseparability1 of the two others4 ,and for the same reason1 neither mere universal nor mere particular nor mere individual are full reality1 when taken apart4 ,one can understand how ,hegel could speak of the ',bacchantelike intoxication' of the concept4 ,it may be illustrated by the following utterances in which a modern psychologist labours to express the complex unity of mental fact4 ,first we are told that a 'nervous shock1' e4 g4 the awakening caused by a sudden blow1 or a simple sensation 7so-called71 is the ultimate unit of consciousness4 ,and if this were all1 it would correspond to the qualities of immediate being1 which we can suppose measurable3 we should get a science of purely empirical psychology based on psychical atoms4 ,but1 immediately after1 it appears that the 'relational element' is never absent from the lowest stage of consciousness4 ,accordingly1 besides feelings1 there must be relations between feelings4 ,and that means a good deal3 especially if we also note the proposition that1 in truth1 'neither a feeling nor a relation is an independent element of consciousness1' ,evidently you cannot have either without both1 and it seems difficult to have both when neither is independent4 ,nor does it mend matters to learn that 'a relation is a momentary feeling'3 for that only seems a way of implying that it is1 and yet is not1 a feeling4 ,such are the difficulties that beset the sincere attempt to comprehend4 ,the fixed points of explanation stagger under the burden of truth2 and their unsteadiness shows that they lack the full foundation4 ,yet that foundation--it must be repeated--is not something extra3 it is the underlying unity which gives life to the relativity of the separates4 ,for the peculiarity of the ,notional stand-point is that it insists on thorough comprehension4 ,the usual explanation refers us from a later to an earlier1 from a strange to a familiar1 from a complex to a simple1 from compound to elements4 ,it keeps analysis and synthesis1 induction and deduction apart4 ,to comprehend is1 on the other hand1 to light up earlier by later and later by earlier1 and carry both into their unity4 ,it does not merely refer existence to its ground1 phenomenon to law1 or effect to cause2 because beyond these it has still to reveal the unity of nature which carries on one of these into the other4 ,thus1 the explanatory method in ,social ,science may either refer us to the simple elements or parts out of which the total is composed1 or to an earlier stage in the same institution's life4 ,the analytical sociologist does the former3 the historical the latter4 ,neither really faces the problem4 ,for if the whole is made up of parts1 it is made up of parts which have been characterised by the whole4 ,if the later has come from the earlier1 that only shows that the nature of the earlier was inadequately ascertained4 ,development--which implies a permanent which changes1 an identity which is also different1--is thus more than mere reference to an antecedent2 because the antecedent must also figure as a simultaneous4 ,cessante causa1 cessat et effectus4 ,but here1 in the concept 7or 7 or syllogism1 the permanent exists as the--may we call it--consciousness which binds together the elements of reality1 as the life and the history1 which is ideally continuous through real changes1 and is a real unity through the distinctions of appearance4 ,such a comprehension e4 g4 of the ,state would show that though it must have a universal aspect1 a particular1 and an individual1 yet these are not severally identifiable with the divisions of sovereign1 executive1 and people1 but that in each of the latter the three moments of the notion must appear1 and that e4 g4 the people is not mere people1 but also executive and sovereign1 just as the sovereign is no mere sovereign1 but also executive and of the people4 ,the same may be illustrated in the so-called individual4 ,a man in his special department and sphere of action may very likely lose the sense of his wholeness and his integrity1--perhaps in more senses than one6 ,he may reduce himself to the limits of his profession4 ,but in so doing he becomes untrue1 or1 in ,hegelian parlance1 abstract3 he fails to recognise the universality of his position4 ,all work1 however petty1 which is done in the right spirit1 is holy4 ',one place performs1 like any other place1 ,the proper service every place on earth ,was framed to furnish man with3 serves alike ,to give him note1 that through the place he sees ,a place is signified he never saw4' ,it is a false patriotism1 for example1 which is inconsistent with the spirit of universal brotherhood3 and there is something radically wrong with the religion1 on the other hand1 which cannot be carried into act amid the pettiness of ordinary practical interests4 ,the universal1 again1 is not a world beyond this world of sense and individuals3 if it were so1 it would itself be a mere particular4 ,it is rather the world of sense unified1 organised1 and1 if we may say so1 spiritualised4 ,and an individual which is merely and simply individual is an utter abstraction1 which is quite meaningless1 and in the real world impossible4 ,or1 if we prefer to express the same thing in connexion with the mind1 sensation apart from thought is an inconceivable abstraction4 ,sensation is always alloyed with thought1 and we can at the most suppose pure sensation to exist amongst the brutes4 ,the mere individual opens out and expands3 and in that expansion we see the universal3 7sensation is thought in embryo74 ,but1 on the other hand1 the developed universal concentrates itself into a point3 7thought returns into the centre of feeling74 ,the same process of particular1 individual and universal1 which thus goes on under the apparent point of the notion1 is more distinctly and explicitly seen1 with due emphasis on the several members1 in the evolution of the notion into the ,judgment and the ,syllogism4 ,the judgment is the statement of what each individual notion implicitly is1 viz4 a universal or inward nature in itself1 or that it is a universal which individualises itself4 ,the judgment may1 therefore1 in its simplest terms be formulated as3 ,the ,individual is the ,universal4 ,the connective link1--the copula 'is1' expresses however at first no more than a mere point-like contact of the two terms1 not their complete identity4 ,by a graduated series of judgments this identity between the two terms is drawn closer1 until in the three terms and propositions of a syllogism the unity of the three factors of the notion finds its most adequate expression in 7subjective7 thought4 ,it may be a question how far syllogisms as they are ordinarily found are calculated to impress this synthesis of the three elements upon the observer4 ,the three elements there tend to bid each other good-bye1 and are only kept together by the awkward means of the middle term1 and the conjunction 'therefore4' ,in these circumstances it becomes easy to show1 that the major premiss is a superfluity1 not adding anything to the cogency of the argument4 ,but under the prominence of this criticism of form1 we are apt to let slip the real question touching the nature of the syllogism4 ,and that nature is to give their due place to the three elements in the notion3 which in the syllogism have each a quasi-independence and difference as separate terms1 while they are also reduced to unity4 ,the syllogism expresses in definite outlines that everything which we think1 or the comprehension which constitutes an object1 is a particular which is individualised by means of its universal nature4 ,as always1 thought refers to reality2 and a notion has to be carried out into objectivity4 ,but as ,aristotle complained1 matter is recalcitrant to form4 ,the objective appears at first only as an opposite1 and instead of revealing1 it rather obscures and condenses the features of subjectivity4 ,objectivity1 or the thought which has forgotten its origin and stands out as a world1 may be taken in three aspects3 ,mechanical1 ,chemical1 and ,teleological4 ,that is to say1 the mode in which groups or systems naturally present themselves in the objective world1 is threefold4 ,the contradiction which stands in the way of comprehending objectivity comes from the fact that it contains subjectivity absorbed in it4 ,in other words1 the object is at once active and passive2 as thought and subjectivity it should be its own synthetiser1 as objectivity it is necessitated to interdependence1 and the subjectivity1 at this stage1 is in abeyance4 ,consequently1 either the two attributes co-exist1 or they cancel each other1 or they are in mutual connexion4 7#a7 ,in the first case the objects are independent1 and yet are connected with one another4 ,such connexion is an external one1 due to force1 impulse1 and outward authority4 ,the principle of union is implied3 but the objects are mutually determined from without4 ,the more1 for example1 an object acts upon the imagination1 the more vehement is the reaction of the mind towards it4--7#b7 ,but if the object is independent1 as has been allowed1 then the determination from without must really come from within4 ,thus desire is a turning or bent towards the object which draws it4 ,the desiring soul leans out of itself4 ,it gravitates towards a centre3 and it is its own nature to be thus centripetal4 ,the lesser objects of themselves draw closer around the more prominent object4--7#c7 ,but if this gravitation were absolute1 the objects would lose their independence altogether1 and sink into their centre4 ,accordingly if the independence of these objects is to remain1 there must be1 as it were1 a double centre1 the relative centre of each object1 and the absolute centre of the system to which it belongs4 ,in each of these three forms of mechanical combination1 the objects continue external and independent4 ,a mechanical theory of the state regards classes as independent1 seeks to produce a balance between them1 separates individuals and associations from the state1 and1 in short1 conceives the state as one large centralising force with a number of minor spheres depending upon it1 but with a greater or less amount of self-centred action in each of them4 ,the fact is that an object cannot really be thought as thus independently subsistent4 ,its real nature is rather affinity1--a tendency to combine with another3 it requires to receive its complement4 ,every object is naturally in a state of unstable equilibrium1 with a tendency to quit its isolation and form a union4 ,this theory1 which is called the ,chemical theory of an object1 regards it as the reverse of indifferent3 as in a permanent state of susceptibility4 ,when objects thus open and eager for foreign influences combine1 there results a new product1 in which both the constituents are lost1 so far as their qualities go4 ,the qualities of the constituents are neutralised4 ,a man's mind1 for example1 prepared by certain culture1 meets a new stimulus in some strange doctrine1 and the result is a new form of intellectual life4 ,but at this point the process1 which such a form of objectivity represents1 is closed3 all that remains is for the product to break up one day into its constituent factors4 ,there is no provision made for carrying it on further4 ,hence if we are to have a self-regulating system of objectivity1 we must rise above the ,chemical theory of objects4 ,and to do that1 the first course is to look at the objective world as regulated 7though not immanently constituted7 by the ,notion4 ,the ,notion as regulative of objectivity1--as independent and self-subsistent1 but as in necessary connexion with ,objectivity1--is the ,end1 ,aim1 or ,final ,cause4 ,according to this1 the ,teleological and practical theory of the ,universe#b1 the object is considered as bound to reproduce and carry out the notion1 and the notion is looked upon as meant to execute itself in reality4 ,the two sides1 subjective and objective1 are1 in other words1 in necessary connexion with each other1 but not identical4 ,this is the contrast of the ,end and the ,means4 ,by the ',means' is meant an object which is determined by an ,end1 and which operates upon other objects4--7#a7 ,the ,end is originally subjective3 an instinct or desire after something-- a feeling of want and the wish to remedy it4 ,it is confronted by an objective mass1 which is indifferent to these wishes3 and manifests itself as a tendency outwards1--an appetite towards action4 ,it seizes and uses up the objective world4--7#b7 ,but the ,end in the second place reduces this indifferent mass to be an instrument or ,means3 makes it the middle term between itself and the object4--7#c7 ,but the means is only valuable as a preparation to the ,end regarded as ,realised1 which thus counts as the truth of the thing4 ,these are the three terms of the ,syllogism of ,teleology3 the ,subjective ,end1 the ,means1 and the ,end ,realised4 ,it is the process of adaptation by which each thing is conceived as the means to some end1 and which actively transforms the thing into something by which that end is realised4 ,in the last resort it presents us with an objective world in which utility or design is the principle of systematisation3 and in which therefore there is an endless series of ends which become means to other and higher ends4 ,after all is done1 the object remains foreign to the notion1 and is only subsumed under it1 and adapted to it4 ,we want a notion which shall be identifiable with objectivity--which shall permeate it through and through1 as soul does body4 ,such a unity of ,subjective and ,objective--the ,motion in 7and not merely in relation to7 ,objectivity--is what ,hegel terms the ,idea4 ,the first form of the ,idea is ,life1 taking that as a logical category1 or as equivalent to self-organisation4 ,the living1 as organisms1 are contrasted with mere mechanisms4 ,the essential progress of modern science lies in its emphasis on this aspect of the ,idea3 which includes all that the teleological period taught about adaptation1 and only sets aside the externality of means to ends there found4 ,the savant of the last century and the beginning of the present dealt with the object of his inquiries as a mechanical1 chemical1 or teleological object4 ,the modern theorist tends to see the world as one self-evolving ,life4 ,according to the naturalist of last century1 kinds of animals and plants were viewed as convenient1 and perhaps arbitrary arrangements3 according to the moderns1 these kinds represent the grades or steps in the life of the natural world4 ,what1 then1 is the nature of the process which we call ,life8 ,is it adequately or definitely defined as 'a continuous adjustment of internal to external relations'8 ,or is it a good deal more than anything the word 'correspondence' implies8 ,according to ,hegel it is nothing so simple1 but a syllogism with three terms1 and a syllogism moreover which permutates its terms and premisses4 ,there is1 in the first place1 the term1 which is also a process1 of self-production4 ,the living must articulate itself1 create for itself limbs and members1 and keep up a perpetual re-creation of morphological and structural system of parts4 ,secondly1 there is the assimilation of what is external to the living individual4 ,if there is to be life1 spiritual or bodily1 there must be a physiological intus-susception of foreign elements4 ,without this the first term or process is impossible4 ,thirdly1 there must be a term or process of ,reproduction or generation by which the living being passes itself on as a new unit4 ,all life1 mental or bodily1 involves ,reproduction4--,these are the three terms of the process of vitality4 ,but such a life1 considered as merely organic1 the life studied in ,biology1 is only a fragment4 ,the truer life is in the genus1 not in the individual3 the consciousness1 the sensation which inwardly unifies the diversity of organic processes4 ,the universal has become the medium in which the ,idea exists3 it exists no longer in immediacy4 ,the mere natural life gives place to the life of the ,spirit4 ,the life of the ,spirit has the double form of ,cognition and ,will3--the theoretical and the practical action of the ,idea3 or ,truth and ,goodness4 ,in short1 the ,idea divides into two halves1 which yet remain the same at bottom3 ,reason and the ,world3 but yet there is reason in the world4 ,the action of the ,idea1 or its process at this stage1 is to bring these two terms into connexion1 and show their ideal unity4 ,beginning with ,reason1 it goes on to discover reason in the ,world4 ,truth consists in the adequacy of object to notion4 ,such adequacy is the ,idea3 and an object which thus corresponds with its notion is an ideal object4 ,the ideal man is the ,true ,man4 ,truth is the revelation of rationality from the objective world3 and ,cognition is the name for that process4 ,on the other hand1 ,goodness is the realisation of rationality in the objective world3 and the ,will is the name for that process4 ,truth proceeds from the ,objectivity3 ,goodness from the ,subjectivity4 ,but truth can only proceed 7analytically7 from the objective world1 in so far as it is produced 7synthetically7 by the subjectivity4 ,and1 on the other hand1 when the good is realised in objectivity1 it is submitted to the process of ,cognition4 ,with the unity of ,life and ,consciousness1 the ,absolute ,idea1 we reach the supreme effort of ,logic4 ,in ,bacon's words1 'the truth of being and the truth of knowing is all one' 7cf4 p4 #bbd74 ,that is the absolute condition of comprehending reality3 the principle of ,absolute ,idealism1 so far apart from its psychological wraith1 and yet compelled to employ the same language4 ,but after all it is ,logic1 i4 e41 only the supreme logical condition of the reality of the physical and psychical world4 ,and it gains reality at the cost of the disruption of its elements3 it lets the ,is slip from the ,is known-- the est from the cogitatur--,being from consciousness4 ,or1 in less mysterious language1 fundamental philosophy1 or ,logic1 gives place to the concreter system of ,philosophy--the ,philosophy of the ,outward and of the ,inward actuality1--of ,nature and ,mind4 ,the reader of the ,divina ,commedia may hardly need to be reminded that1 at each of the grander changes of scene and grade in his pilgrimage1 ,dante suddenly finds himself without obvious means transported into a new region of experience4 ,there are catastrophes in the process of development3 not unprepared1 but summing up1 as in a flash of insight1 the gradual and unperceived process of growth4 ,there is birth and death in the spiritual world3 and such are moments of sudden lapse1 abrupt conversion1 when the waters of ,lethe close around1 and thereafter all things are new4 ,there are such moments of accumulated and abnormal intensity also in the ,hegelian philosophy when a new cycle of idea suddenly appears4 ,such are the epochs of change at the great crises from ,being to ,essence1 and from ,essence to ,notion4 ,there is a revulsion1 a sharp turn of the path which dialectic can enforce but cannot smooth away1--on that path which dialectic indeed1 as opposed to the old logic of identity1 shows not to be a mere smooth continuity4 ,all development is by breaks1 and yet makes for continuity4 ,this is again exemplified in the passage from ,logic to ,physics4 ,the reality which presents itself to the philosopher as ,nature is a world of reason--but1 as it stands1 it only lives as some speechless work of art4 ,it is1 so to speak1 the picture on the wall--the reflection that is cast by the fuller reality of experience4 ,reason here is in the garb of sense-perception4 ,nature is the silent image--the tableau vivant--which becomes intelligent1 speaking1 and real1 in the observing and comprehending mind4 ,it is the statue of ,condillac1 not yet invested with the minimum of sensibility and consciousness4 ,nature is or shows all that the ,idea contained1 but contained only in possibility1 as a logical condition of reality4 ,it shows it in reality--and that is a reality spread through endless times and spaces4 ,its unity1 its meaning1 its continuity are broken up into fragments4 ,yet as ,nature1 i4 e4 in its structural unity1 and not in the dispersion of things and elements1 it is all a unity of development and has a life-history written in its organism for intelligence to read and to reconstitute1 on the assumption that all its accident and irregularity is but the inevitable imperfection of reality as given in parts and successions4