,,benedetto ,,croce    ,,an             
,,introduction ,,to ,,his ,,philosophy  
by    ,,raffaello ,,piccoli    ,,with ,a
 ,,foreword ,,by    ,h4 ,,wildon ,,carr 
,,jonathan ,,cape    ,,eleven ,,gower   
,,street1 ,,london    #aibb             
,,foreword      ,this book is the       
account of the life and activity of one 
who is  living and acting4 ,herodotus   
tells us the ,greeks had a proverb which
  forbade them to pronounce any man     
happy before he is dead4 ,we may        
certainly take his warning to this      
extent1--that we should refrain  from   
attempting to fix a philosopher's       
thought so long as he continues  to     
think4 ,benedetto ,croce has1 it is     
true1 presented his ,philosophy  of     
,mind in such questionable shape1 that  
it gives the student the  impression of 
finality1 the feeling that a doctrine   
which throughout  the history of        
philosophy has been struggling for      
expression has now  at last come to     
light4 ,but this appearance of finality 

is due to a  certain artistic power     
which ,croce possesses in an eminent    
degree1 the  power of reliving the past 
and making history interpret life4      
,beneath  all his systematization there 
is the germ of a new life1 a new life1  
which1 will take form in new problems4  
,while then we may say that no  living  
philosopher has given so complete an    
appearance of finality to  his doctrine 
as ,croce has done in his ,philosophy of
 ,mind it is really  the reflection of a
 work of art which serves only to       
conceal the living  thought4    ,the    
publishers of this ,introduction to the 
philosophy of ,benedetto  ,croce by ,dr4
 ,raffaello ,piccoli have courteously   
invited me to write  this foreword      
inasmuch as ,i was the first to         
introduce this philosophy1  otherwise   
than by translations1 to the attention  
of ,english students4 ,i  do so very    
gladly4 ,my own work was confined to the
 purely philosophical  writings1 my     
interest in them having been first      

aroused by the striking  address on     
sthetic delivered by ,croce to the      
,international ,congress of  ,philosophy
 at ,heidelberg in #aijh4 ,when ,i wrote
 my book1 the ,philosophy  of ,mind     
consisted of three volumes1 the         
,estetica1 the ,logica1  and the        
,pratica1 but before ,i had completed my
 account ,i read in  ,croce's ,journal  
,critica the announcement of the        
forthcoming publication  of the fourth  
volume on the ,theory and ,history of   
the ,writing of  ,history4 ,croce had1  
it seemed to me1 closed his book on     
,practice  with the plain indication1   
not that he had solved every            
philosophical  problem1 nor that        
philosophy was not an external problem1 
but that  he had given an exhaustive    
account of the stages or degrees in     
their  order as moments of the          
developing life of the mind1 and that   
outside  these degrees there were no    
others4 ,the new work did not1 indeed1  
either negative or qualify this         

conclusion1 but it bore evidence of the 
ceaseless activity of his mind4 ,are we 
then1 because the philosophy of  ,croce 
is still developing1 to refrain from the
 attempt to interpret  it on the ground 
that any meaning we may find in it is   
indefinite and  insecure8 ,certainly    
not1 for a philosopher's thinking       
unfolds and  develops like a living     
thing1 it is not constructed like a     
building1  nor does it rest on          
foundations which may be unsound4       
,dr4 ,raffaello ,piccoli1 a professor in
 the ,university of ,pisa1 and  the     
author of this book1 was born in        
,naples1 ,croce's city1 in #ahhf4  ,he  
himself as a young student came under   
the personal spell of the  philosopher  
he writes about1 and grew up in the     
intellectual atmosphere  which his      
philosophy was creating4 ,to this great 
advantage he has added  another1 for    
first in ,australia1 and later in the   
,universities of  ,england and ,america 
he has acquired a perfect command of our

 language  and a thorough knowledge of  
our philosophy4 ,he is specially        
qualified1  therefore1 to give a        
first-hand account of ,croce's literary 
and  philosophical activity1 and the    
kind of influence it has had in forming 
the mind of ,modern ,italy4    ,the     
author has not confined himself to an   
exposition of the philosophy  of ,croce 
in its narrow and technical meaning1 he 
has given us an  account of the whole of
 his literary and historical activity4  
,he  has traced the origin of his       
philosophy in the circumstances of his  
parentage1 early life and education1 and
 has followed biographically  the       
formation of his philosophical theories 
and the direction of his  philosophical 
interest4 ,he has shown how his general 
trend of thought1  his literary tastes  
and historical studies without any      
professional  spur1 by the very nature  
and force of the problems with which    
they  confronted him1 led to philosophy 
as the dominant and culminating         

interest of life4    ,philosophers and  
philosophies have had in our generation 
to undergo the  trial of a fiery        
furnace4 ,the ,great ,war and the       
passions aroused by  it and the         
estrangement between nations nurtured in
 the same ,western  culture have been a 
fierce test of principles4 ,in regard to
 every  great leader we ask first how he
 reacted to the conflicting emotions  of
 the international struggle4 ,dr4       
,piccoli has dealt with this latest  and
 crucial period of ,croce's activity in 
a very sympathetic spirit4  ,croce's    
attitude at one time exposed him to an  
extreme unpopularity4  ,this was largely
 the result of misunderstanding4 ,he has
 come through  the ordeal with enhanced 
reputation4 ,this1 at least1 is the     
author's  judgment--the judgment of one 
who himself fought and suffered severely
  in the ,war4    ,the two great        
achievements of ,croce are in the domain
 of sthetical and  ethical theory4 ,dr4 
,piccoli shows us each doctrine in its  

historical  origin and in its relation  
to contemporary philosophy4 ,the first  
is  a reaction against the              
intellectualism of ,hegel4 ,in its      
affirmation  of intuition it is in      
rather striking agreement with the      
philosophy  of ,bergson1 although as    
,croce's approach is from the side of   
art  and literature1 and not like       
,bergson's from the study of biological 
science1 it rather supplements than     
elucidates ,bergson's theory4  ,the     
second is a reaction against the school 
of ,karl ,marx and its  materialistic   
interpretation of history4    ,at the   
present time ,croce is directing his    
criticism on the new line of            
development which his own friends and   
colleagues are taking in regard  to his 
own principles1 in particular to the    
actual idealism of his  colleague       
,professor ,giovanni ,gentile4 ,to      
,croce this new doctrine spells         
mysticism1 and of mysticism in all its  
forms he is the open enemy4 ,on  this   

point we may1 ,i think1 detect an       
inclination on the part of ,dr4         
,piccoli to disagree with ,croce4 ,it   
will be seen1 therefore1 that we  have  
in this book a very full and a very     
welcome account1 brought right  up to   
date1 of one who is1 as far as          
contemporaries can judge1 forming  the  
mind of the present age4    ,h4 ,wildon 
,carr          ,,preface      ,when1    
about a year ago1 ,i undertook to write 
this little book for its  present       
publishers1 all that ,i had in my mind  
was a brief exposition  of the solutions
 given by ,croce to a number of         
philosophical problems  of vital        
interest to the students of what were   
once called the ,moral  ,sciences4 ,i   
thought at the time that it would be    
possible to abstract  such solutions and
 problems from the body of his          
,philosophy of ,mind1  which is a       
coherent and austere theory of knowledge
 of a kind that in  the modern decadence
 of philosophical studies and of general

 culture  is rapidly becoming           
unintelligible even to the most highly  
cultivated4  ,i hoped that the          
specialized reader1 for whom the larger 
aspects of  ,croce's thought have no    
appeal1 and therefore no meaning1 would 
be able  to apply those particular      
solutions to the problems that          
confronted him  in his particular branch
 of studies1 by translating them into   
terms of  his own nave philosophy4      
,this plan had also a personal          
advantage1 inasmuch as it did not compel
  me to a conscious revision of my own  
position in regard to those  larger     
aspects of ,croce's philosophy4 ,but as 
soon as ,i began to think  consistently 
of this book1 the history of my own     
reactions to ,croce's  work came back to
 me so vividly that ,i found it         
impossible to set it  aside2 and ,i     
discovered that this supposed advantage 
was a delusion1  towards which ,i had   
probably been drawn by a very human1    
very natural  desire of avoiding the    

most obvious difficulties of my task4   
,as a young man1 in my student days in  
,italy1 ,i was a fervid and             
enthusiastic follower of ,croce's ideas3
 one of the many who used to  swear1 as 
we were wont to say1 in verba ,crucis4  
,to the generation  who opened the eyes 
of their intellect in the dawn of the   
century1  he had revealed what seemed to
 be the only safe path between the two  
precipices of a pseudo-scientific       
materialism on one hand1 and of a       
mysticism on the other1 which in all its
 many forms 7traditionalism1  modernism1
 pragmatism1 intuitionism1 stheticism1  
super-humanism1  futurism7 could not be 
anything less than an abdication of     
thought for  the sake of the emotions4  
,and it should not be wondered at1 if   
,croce's  books1 appearing at short     
intervals between #aijj and #aiaj1 and  
building  up what presented itself to us
 as a complete system of answers to     
all1 or practically all1 our most       
pressing spiritual questions1 were      

received by us with deep gratitude but  
with very little constructive           
criticism4 ,they covered such an        
enormous space on the map of ,european  
culture1 that even for the most         
ambitious among us1 they were very      
often the first introduction to entirely
 new fields of studies1 and all  we     
could do was to follow our guide in his 
voyages of rediscovery3 to  repeat      
within ourselves the strenuous          
experience of which each of those  books
 was a report and a testimony4          
,impatience with a master who was not of
 the kind we had been accustomed  to1   
who could not be easily digested1       
surpassed and disposed of1 but  had as  
much energy and courage1 as light a step
 and as curious a mind1  as the most    
gifted among his pupils1 prompted a good
 deal of immature  and capricious       
criticism1 which was but a means for an 
arbitrary  liberation4 ,it was an       
amusing sight to see ,croce assailed    
and1 to the  satisfaction of his        

critics1 destroyed1 with weapons that   
nobody could  have provided but ,croce  
himself1 and a dwarf victoriously       
brandishing  against the giant a        
toothpick for a sword4 ,but there is no 
epic of  thought without such comic     
interludes4    ,my own faith in ,croce  
was not shaken until intercourse with   
one of the  greatest critical minds of  
our day1 and the representative of a    
totally  different philosophical        
tradition1 a mathematician and a        
philosopher1  showed me the weakness of 
the foundations not of ,croce's1 but of 
my own  idealism4 ,and a long residence 
in ,england1 where ,i became intimately 
acquainted with certain logical habits  
utterly unlike our ,latin ways of       
thought1 made me profoundly sceptical of
 the intellectual advantages of         
whatever dogmatism might have been in   
me4 ,yet ,i continued for a long  time  
to keep as it were in separate          
compartments those that had seemed  to  
me to be established truths in ,croce's 

system1 and speculations of  a quite    
different order on problems which were  
forced upon me by my  own experience of 
life and by contact with a new moral and
 cultural  environment4    ,all this was
 in the happy days of peace4 ,the war   
from its very  beginning appeared to me1
 then living in one of the most purely  
intellectual centres of ,europe1 at one 
of the oldest ,universities  of         
,england1 as the catastrophe of our     
whole intellectual life4 ,from  the     
trials of the war ,i emerged with       
infinitely less faith in the  value of  
our intellectual possessions than ,i    
ever had had before1 and  at the same   
time with the firm conviction that      
intelligence1 more  intelligence1 a     
deeper1 purer1 more active1 charitable1 
courageous and  pervasive intelligence1 
is our only hope for the future4    ,it 
was with such a disposition that ,i took
 up this work1 and read what  ,croce had
 been writing during the war4 ,three    
things1 in the course  of this new      

acquaintance with him1 and while ,i was 
meditating and  lecturing on him during 
my ,american peregrinations1 became very
 clear  to me4 ,the first1 that his     
thought is not a system in the ordinary 
sense of the word1 but a method2 that   
therefore it is impossible  to sever    
parts of his philosophy from the main   
body1 the truth of  particular          
propositions being dependent upon an    
understanding of the  whole4    ,the    
second1 that in the last few years the  
progress of his thought has  been so    
considerable that an attempt at giving a
 general exposition of  his philosophy  
without any regard to the successive    
stages of growth1  at describing as a   
static structure what is a dynamic      
process1 would  inevitably lead to the  
construction of a fanciful system1 of an
 image  totally different from the      
original4    ,the third1 that whatever  
our individual position may be in       
relation to  his ideas1 his work before1
 during and after the war will remain as

 the  most solemn contemporary monument 
of that intellectual civilization  of   
,europe1 of which we have seen so many  
false idols1 so many white  sepulchres1 
go under during these seven years of    
passion4    ,the conclusion to be drawn 
from these considerations was obvious3  
first1 that ,i had to give up my former 
plan1 and this with no regret1  as ,i   
ought to have remembered what ,croce has
 taught again and again1  that to the   
nave philosophy of the specialist his   
own solutions of his  particular        
problems1 however childish they may     
appear from a higher  standpoint1 are   
perfectly adequate1 that ready-made1    
formal solutions  are no solutions at   
all1 and the only truth is the one that 
we conquer  by our own effort1 under the
 impulse of our own need4 ,and second1  
that1 however conscious ,i was and am of
 my own limitations1 ,i had to  take a  
first step in the direction of          
constructive criticism by trying  to    
retrace the history1 the ideal          

biography1 of the philosophy of  ,croce4
 ,with the exception of a little book   
written by ,croce himself1  there is    
very little help to be found for a work 
of this kind in the  vast literature    
that has grown in the last twenty years1
 in ,europe  and in ,america1 around his
 work4 ,and ,i firmly believe that there
  is not one man in ,europe or in       
,america who is qualified to do that    
work of creative interpretation which   
ought to be at the same time a  history 
and a criticism of ,croce's             
philosophical activity3 least of  all1  
the professional philosopher1 who has   
dealt all his life with  the conceptual 
residuum of the problems of life1 and   
has no direct  experience of any of     
them4 ,croce1 as this little book will  
try to show1  has always come to the    
concept from the concrete1 particular   
problem1  and has occupied himself with 
such a variety of problems1 going into  
them so deeply and so thoroughly1 that a
 complete valuation of his work  will   

never be possible to a single man1 but  
will take place1 will  happen1 in the   
history of the various disciplines1 and 
in the general  history of thought1 for 
years and years to come4 ,for the       
present1 and  as long as he will be     
alive and thinking1 the only creative   
interpreter  of ,croce is ,croce        
himself4    ,this book does not         
therefore intend to substitute itself1  
not even as  a summary and a short cut  
for lazy minds1 to the works of ,croce4 
,it  is rather an introduction to those 
works1 and at the same time the         
confession of one individual experience 
of that philosophy4 ,it is  an          
historical sketch1 and implicitly a     
criticism1 since our way of             
understanding a thought is our judgment 
of that thought 7when not a  judgment   
that that thought passes on us72 a      
sketch which ,i think ,i can  honestly  
write because so much of that philosophy
 has been the daily  food of my         
intellectual life1 my own history1 for  

years4 ,before the  war ,i should       
probably have been able to write it with
 less difficulty1  with more complete   
adhesion2 but the perspective of these  
few years  will make it perhaps less    
passionate and more reflective4 ,an     
explicit  criticism of the whole        
philosophy of ,croce it is not1 and it  
does  not attempt to be3 the reader may 
find traces of my doubts and of my      
preoccupations in it1 but ,i have humbly
 tried to give not more1 and ,i  hope   
not less1 than what he has a right to   
expect from the title4    ,i do not     
write this book for the professors of   
philosophy4 ,those among  them who know 
,croce will not need it2 and those who  
either have not as  yet taken any notice
 of him1 or from a casual acquaintance  
with one of  his books have proceeded to
 damn most vigorously what they have    
hardly  understood1 are certainly beyond
 my power4 ,i write it for the young1   
from the heart of my own now fast       
receding youth1 trying to raise  before 

their eyes1 in the words of ,dante to   
,brunetto ,latini1        la cara e     
buona immagine paterna      di voi1     
quando 4444 ad ora ad ora               
m'insegnavate come l'uom s'eterna4    ,i
 trust that they will find in it what   
they need not less than we of an  older 
generation needed it1 and what ,i know  
they are thirsting for3 an  example of  
intellectual energy and of moral        
strength converging into  a life of     
unremitting devotion to the service of  
that truth which is  light and love and 
joy1--our only light against the menace 
of darkness4    ,raffaello ,piccoli4    
,northampton1 ,mass41 ,june-,october1   
#aica4          ,,table ,,of ,,contents 
,introduction        ,i4 ,the           
,beginnings     ,,ii4 ,early            
,environment    ,,iii4 ,the ,origins of 
his ,thought    ,,part ,,first    ,from 
,philology to ,philosophy 7#ahic-ahii7  
,i4 ,history as ,art     ,,ii4 ,on      
,literary ,criticism    ,,iii4 ,history 
and ,economics    ,,part ,,second       

,the ,philosophy of ,mind 7#aijj-aiaj7  
,i4 ,the ,growth of the ,system         
,,ii4 ,intuition and ,expression        
,,iii4 ,the ,concept of ,art     ,,iv4  
,criticism and ,technique      ,v4 ,the 
,pure ,concept     ,,vi4 ,the ,forms of 
,knowledge    ,,vii4 ,the ,theory of    
,error   ,,viii4 ,the ,practical        
,activity     ,,ix4 ,economics and      
,ethics      ,x4 ,the ,laws    ,,part   
,,third    ,philosophy as ,history      
7#aiaa-aiba7        ,i4 ,works and ,days
     ,,ii4 ,the ,theory of ,history     
,,iii4 ,criticism and ,history     ,,iv4
 ,veritas filta temporis                
,bibliographical ,note    ,index        
,,benedetto ,,croce                     
,,introduction      ,croce's family1 and
 early education--,his religion--,life  
in ,rome in  the eighties--,labriola's  
influence--,meditations on              
ethics--,return  to ,naples2 life as a  
scholar--,travels2 and the problem of   
history  --,philosophus fit--,the       
intellectual conditions of ,italy after 

the  ,risorgimento--,contemporary       
,european culture--,american analogies  
--,two leaders of ,italian              
thought--,francesco de ,sanctis--,giosu 
,carducci--,croce's approach to         
philosophy1 and his method of work--,his
  relations to the philosophical        
practition--,vico and the philosophy of 
the ,renaissance--,bruno and            
,campanella--,the humanism of           
,vico--,naturalism  and spiritualism--,a
 philosophy of the human spirit4        
,i4 ,the ,beginnings      ,benedetto    
,croce was born in #ahff1 in a small    
town in the ,italian  province of       
,aquila1 the only son of an             
old-fashioned1 ,catholic1 and           
conservative ,neapolitan family4 ,his   
grandfather had been a high  magistrate1
 untouched by the new liberal currents  
in his devotion to  the old rgime and to
 the ,bourbon dynasty then reigning in  
,naples4 ,his  father followed the      
traditional maxim of the good people of 
,naples3  that an honest man must take  

care of his family and of his business1 
and keep away from the intrigues of     
political life4 ,his mother was  a woman
 of culture and taste1 such as the old  
type of education  for women1 which is  
now as completely forgotten as if it had
 never  existed1 used to produce4       
,bertrando ,spaventa1 the philosopher1  
and  ,silvio ,spaventa1 a statesman who 
had brought to his enthusiasm for the   
national cause all the traditions of his
 ,neapolitan conservatism1 were  her    
brothers3 both of them1 however1        
estranged from ,croce's family  because 
of their political ideas4    ,the child 
grew in this greyish1 subdued           
atmosphere1 in which the only  touches  
of colour were added by his own passion 
for books of history  and romance1 and  
by the visits to the beautiful old      
churches to which  he accompanied his   
mother4 ,to the circumstances of his    
childhood1 ,croce  attributes the       
relative delay in the development of his
 political  feelings and ideals1 for a  

long time submerged by his interests in 
literature and erudition4 ,but because  
every fault brings with itself  some    
compensation1 he also owed to them his  
critical attitude towards  partisan     
political legends1 his impatience       
towards the rhetoric of  liberalism1 his
 vehement dislike of great emphatic     
words1 and of any  kind of pomp and     
ceremony1 together with a power to      
appreciate what is  useful and effectual
 in the actions of men1 wherever it may 
come from4    ,as a boy1 he went to a   
,catholic collegio or boarding school1  
and  in this too his experience differed
 from that of the majority of his       
contemporaries4 ,the insistence on lay  
education imparted by the ,state1  and  
the preference for the day school1 which
 allows the family to  supplement the   
work of the school1 in fact1 to take    
care of the moral  and social side of   
education1 as distinct from the purely  
intellectual  one1 are characteristics  
of the new ,italian methods1 obviously  

in  keeping with the general tendencies 
of the age4 ,i remember that to  myself 
as a boy it was inexplicable why anybody
 should be sent to a  collegio unless he
 were an orphan or an unmanageable      
scamp4 ,but ,croce  seems to have       
enjoyed his experience1 to which he was 
submitted merely  in accordance with the
 habits of his family2 and even now he  
praises  the system for breeding in him 
those feelings of loyalty and honour1   
which are the result of life in common  
with boys of one's own age1 and  of the 
necessity of adapting oneself to a      
variety of dispositions and             
temperaments4    ,classical secondary   
education in ,italy roughly corresponds 
in its  scope1 even to-day1 to that     
which is imparted in ,anglo-,saxon      
countries  by secondary schools and     
liberal colleges4 ,it is supposed to end
 the  formative phase of education1 and 
to lead to the higher phase in the      
,universities1 which is1 whether        
cultural or professional1 of a highly   

specialized and informative kind4 ,it is
 the direct outcome of the  humanistic  
tradition1 and rather more so in the    
clerical schools1 like  the one which   
,croce attended1 than in the public     
ones4 ,by the time he  was ready for the
 ,university1 he must have had a good   
knowledge of the  classics1 as a general
 background to a mainly literary and    
historical  culture1 in which the       
elements of scientific knowledge1 and a 
good deal  of mathematics1 had also     
their place4    ,the religion which     
played such an important part in his    
family and  school life was probably    
little more than a habit with him3 a set
  of answers to certain fundamental     
problems which1 accepted on the         
authority of parents and teachers1      
released his mind for the pursuit  of   
his favourite studies4 ,and yet1 there  
is no doubt that we can  find traces of 
this religious education in all his     
work3 a personal  experience of the     
catholic catechism and of catholic      

morality brings  a spirit in contact    
with some of the great ideas and of the 
great  realities of life in a much more 
intimate and profound way than the      
purely intellectual apprehensions of the
 same ideas and realities ever  will4   
,it creates habits of mind and moral    
tastes which will still be  recognizable
 even after the individual mind to which
 they belong has  undergone the most    
radical changes4 ,in a philosopher1 in  
particular1 it  forms a kind of personal
 background to thought1 similar to that 
which  modern philosophy actually has in
 its own history3 it reproduces in the  
youth of one man that religious phase   
which corresponds to the youth of  a    
civilization1 and is the source of the  
intellectual development of a  more     
conscious age4 ,at intervals during his 
adolescence1 ,croce's faith  intensified
 itself into passing aspirations towards
 a life of devotion1  until it quietly  
vanished1 so to speak1 from his         
consciousness1 through  no great        

dramatic crisis1 but merely in          
consequence of a course  of lessons on  
the philosophy of religion1 which were  
intended to  strengthen it and make it  
more resistant to criticism1 during the 
last  years of his secondary education4 
,at about the same time1 having come    
under the influence of both ,carducci   
and ,de ,sanctis1 he began to write1    
and contributed his first articles to a 
literary weekly1 the ,fanfulla  della   
,domenica1 which represented the most   
vigorous and advanced  tendencies of the
 day4    ,in #ahhc1 in the earthquake of
 ,casamicciola1 in the island of ,ischia
  near ,naples1 ,croce lost both his    
parents and his only sister1 he  himself
 remaining buried for several hours     
under the ruins1 and broken  in several 
parts of his body4 ,the years           
immediately following were  the saddest 
and darkest of his life1 and he spent   
them in ,rome in  the house of his uncle
 ,silvio ,spaventa1 which was one of the
 most  conspicuous political and        

intellectual centres of the capital of  
the new kingdom4 ,spaventa was one of   
the leaders of the ,right1 or           
,conservative party1 which had been     
thrown out of office by the ,left1 or   
,liberal party1 a few years before2 by  
him and by his friends the young  ,croce
 was strengthened in his mistrust of the
 prevailing ideas and  methods1 which he
 heard bitterly and sarcastically       
criticised by men of  great culture and 
of profound political honesty4 ,while   
his temperament  and the shadow of his  
grief kept him away from the brilliant  
social  life of the ,roman jeunesse dore
 his relations with the men of a  party 
which had little hope of ever coming    
back to power prevented him  from taking
 any part in active political life1 in  
sharp contrast with  the habits of the  
majority of ,italian university         
students1 to whom  politics are what the
 major sports are to ,anglo-,saxon      
students4 ,he  divided his time between 
the ,university and the great ,roman    

libraries1  among which the one he loved
 best was the ,casanatense1 in those    
years  still served by ,dominican monks1
 a typical old monastic library1 its    
benches provided with old-fashioned     
inkhorns1 sandboxes with golden  sand1  
and goose-quills4 ,anyone seeing him    
there1 buried among his  ancient and    
curious books1 and not suspecting the   
deep perpetual  dissatisfaction and     
unhappiness which accompanied him in a  
work which  seemed to be but a work of  
love1 would have prophesied for him the 
life  of one of those ascetics of       
erudition1 intoxicated by the romantic  
dust  of the past1 who still haunt the  
solemn halls and the dark corridors of  
the libraries of the old world4    ,but 
the great event of his ,university life1
 the one which awakened  him from the   
torpor of mere erudition1 and set before
 him a new goal  and a higher hope1 was 
the lessons on moral philosophy which he
 heard  from ,antonio ,labriola4 ,croce 
himself has described this new1 decisive

  experience3 ,those lessons came       
unexpectedly to meet my harrowing need  
of rebuilding for myself in a rational  
form a faith in life1 and in  the aims  
and duties of life2 ,i had lost the     
guidance of a religious  doctrine1 and  
at the same time ,i was feeling the     
obscure danger of  materialistic        
theories1 whether sensistic or          
associationistic1 about  which ,i had no
 illusions at all1 as ,i clearly        
perceived in them the  substantial      
negation of morality itself1 resolved   
into a more or less  disguised egotism4 
,herbart's ethics taught by ,labriola   
restored in my  mind the majesty of the 
ideal1 of that which has to be as       
opposed  to that which is1 and          
mysterious in its opposition1 but       
because of  this same mysteriousness1   
absolute and uncompromising4#a          
,labriola's  influence on ,croce was not
 limited to the classroom2 the professor
  and the student became friends1 and   
,croce enjoyed the benefit of his       

wonderful gifts as a conversationalist1 
on which even more than on  his academic
 activity1 or on his published work1 his
 fame rests4 ,he  seems to have been an 
awakener of souls1 an intellectual      
stimulant in  the fashion of the ,greek 
philosophers1 a breaker of new paths and
 a  spiritual guide such as a younger   
generation had in the mathematician     
,vailati4    ,the mind of the young     
scholar is henceforth constantly        
occupied by  meditations on the concepts
 of pleasure and duty1 of purity and    
impurity1 of actions prompted by the    
attraction of the pure1 moral  idea1 and
 of actions which result in apparent    
moral effects through  psychic          
associations1 through habits1 through   
the impulse of the  passions4 ,it is    
easy to discover the dependence of such 
meditations on  the early religious     
education of ,croce2 they are the link1 
in fact1  between his religion and his  
philosophy1 since we find them1 at a    
more mature and elaborate stage1        

reflected in the third volume of his    
,philosophy of ,mind1 which1 to the eyes
 of its author1 has still an  almost    
autobiographical aspect1 entirely       
concealed from the reader by  its       
didascalic form4    ,the plan of life   
that he sketched for himself about this 
time1 was a  distinctly disillusioned   
and pessimistic one3 on one hand1 he    
would  pursue his erudite and literary  
work1 partly because of his natural     
inclination towards it1 and partly      
because one has anyhow to do  something 
in this world2 and he would1 on the     
other hand1 fulfil his  moral duties to 
the best of his capacity1 conceiving    
them to be above  all duties of         
compassion4 ,in later years he          
criticised this view as a  purely       
selfish one1 since the true and high    
compassion is that which  one practices 
by setting the whole of one's self in   
harmony with the  ends of reality1 and  
by compelling others too to move towards
 those  ends1 and a kind heart makes    

itself truly and seriously kind only    
through an ever broader and deeper      
understanding4#b    ,after three years  
of residence in ,rome1 ,croce returned  
to ,naples1 where  he lived in the      
society of curious and learned old men1 
librarians  and archivists1 all absorbed
 in minute and painstaking historical   
researches4 ,the moderate fortune which 
he had inherited from his  parents gave 
him the independence he needed for his  
quiet1 laborious  tastes1 and allowed   
him gradually to collect in his own     
house a very  large and precious        
library4 ,to it he owed also the        
possibility of  learning without        
teaching1 and therefore of keeping his  
own work  entirely free from any        
academic taint3 of subordinating his    
studies  rather to the necessities of   
the development of his own personality  
than to those of professional           
specialization4    ,practically all the 
production of the years between #ahhf   
and #ahib is  concerned with one aspect 

or another of the history of ,naples4   
,through  his researches on the         
,neapolitan theatres1 on ,neapolitan    
life in the  eighteenth century1 and on 
the literature of the seventeenth       
century1  he acquired an intimate and   
exhaustive knowledge of the minutest    
literary1 political1 social and         
archological details of that life  of   
his own city1 which was the immediate   
historical background of  his own life4 
,towards the end of this period1 this   
complex activity  crystallized itself   
into two rather ambitious enterprises3  
the editing  of a ,biblioteca letteraria
 napoletana1 for the publication of     
texts  and documents of ,neapolitan     
literature2 and of a periodical1 ,napoli
  ,nobilissima1 which in the fifteen    
years of its existence collected an     
enormous amount of material for the     
history and archology of ,naples1  and  
to which ,croce himself contributed the 
essays of his ,storie e  leggende       
napoletane4    ,we have here a ,croce1  

who1 though not a professor1 was yet    
truly a  specialist3 one of that great  
host of local and municipal historians  
which are to be met with in even the    
least important ,italian towns4  ,and   
undoubtedly this kind of activity       
offered him1 as he willingly            
acknowledges1 not only an outlet for his
 youthful imagination1 in  the          
reconstruction of an adventurous and    
picturesque past1 but a  formal         
discipline of precision and thoroughness
 in scientific work4  ,but it must be   
remembered that municipal or regional   
history in ,italy  has in many cases the
 breadth and depth of national history  
in other  countries1 because of the     
number and variety of divergent         
political1  literary and artistic       
traditions which are present in the life
 of each  ,italian city or state4 ,and  
,naples1 though she never had as        
preponderant  a part in the formation of
 the national consciousness as either   
,rome  or ,florence1 was a world in     

herself1 with her own art and poetry1   
with  her own philosophical and         
political tendencies1 with her peculiar 
relations to non-,italian states and    
cultures1 such as ,france and ,spain4   
,croce's ,neapolitan researches1 however
 specialized and barren they  may appear
 at first sight1 were therefore well    
fitted to give him1  in one particular  
instance1 that direct and concrete      
experience of  historical reality1 of a 
complex and variegated historical       
reality1  which is among the necessary  
premises of his philosophical thought4  
,they gave him also a clearer           
consciousness of the processes of       
thought  which were naturally connected 
with that particular experience1 and    
they thus helped him to penetrate the   
minds of his two great ,neapolitan      
predecessors1 ,vico and ,de ,sanctis4   
,and finally1 especially through  his   
interest in the cultural relations      
between ,naples and ,spain1 they        
enlarged his horizon from the problems  

of local to those of general  ,european 
history4    ,he visited1 always as a    
scholar1 not only ,spain1 but ,france   
and  ,england and ,germany1 constantly  
widening the range of his excursions  in
 libraries and archives4 ,but the more  
he acquired of the knowledge  of        
individual facts1 the deeper he felt the
 futility and vacuity of  their purely  
material accumulation4 ,there was no    
end1 apparently1 to  the labor of       
research and erudition1 unless a guiding
 and limiting  principle should be      
found3 by the mere piling up of         
historical  information1 however minute 
and exact1 it would be forever          
impossible  to decipher the secret of   
the past4 ,no amount of erudition would 
ever  make history4 ,it is no wonder    
that to a mind which already had been   
preoccupied with religious and moral    
problems1 the problem of its own  work  
should present itself with the same     
intensity and in the same  shape as a   
moral experience4 ,he began to feel a   

satiety and distaste  for that which he 
had once thought would be the labour of 
his whole  life1 and a yearning for a   
more satisfying1 more intimate form of  
activity4 ,he felt a vague attraction   
towards a new type of history1  moral   
history1 in relation to which all his   
previous researches  appeared as a kind 
of amorphous and unconscious            
preparation4 ,he planned  a book on the 
psychological and spiritual history of  
,italy from the  ,renaissance to our own
 times1 and he undertook a series of    
studies  on the relations between ,spain
 and ,italy1 to be followed by similar  
work in regard to the other nations of  
,europe1 as necessary to a full         
understanding of his main theme4    ,but
 his old methods and habits followed him
 in the new field3 again  it seemed to  
him that there would be no end to his   
merely preparatory  work1 once he had   
undertaken it in what was practically   
still his old  spirit4 ,in fact he had  
sensed a spiritual need which had       

announced  itself by that peculiar      
feeling so closely resembling one of    
moral  dissatisfaction1 but he had not  
been able as yet to formulate the terms 
of his problem4 ,it is probable that    
what kept him for quite a long time     
from doing so was partly the character  
of his literary education1 and  partly a
 kind of intellectual humility1 which   
made him distrust his own  powers1 on   
entering into a completely new form of  
mental activity4    ,the problem which  
he had to solve for himself was1 indeed1
 not an  historical1 or philological1 or
 archological one1 but a purely         
philosophical one3 the problem of the   
nature of history and of science4  ,we  
know with what religious awe ,croce     
regarded the professional  philosophers 
at the time2 and certainly nothing could
 have been more  painful to the young   
and modest scholar than the thought of  
stepping  beyond the limits of his own  
specialty1 and invading a ground so     
powerfully occupied and defended4 ,but  

,croce discovered through his  own      
experience that you cannot reject a     
problem1 once it is forced  upon you by 
the facts of your own life1 and that    
philosophus fit  with the same kind of  
necessity with which poeta nascitur4 ,it
 is  from this point that we can observe
 the transformation of the young        
scholar into a philosopher2 his         
philosophical career will appear to  us 
as a continued effort towards the       
solution of that first problem1  and of 
all the problems which followed in its  
train4 ,the last answer  to it is in    
,croce's theory of the identity of      
history and philosophy2  and the        
dependence of this theory on the first  
impulse from which the  whole of his    
philosophy arose is clearly visible in  
the desire which  he has again and again
 expressed and partly fulfilled in his  
latest  writings1 of going back from    
abstract and formal philosophy to the   
philosophy of particular facts or       
history3 storia pensata2 since  this is 

the meaning of the identity of          
philosophy and history1 that we         
philosophize whenever we think1 whatever
 may be the subject or form of  our     
thought4#c ,the philosophy of ,croce1   
which begins with the raw  material of  
history1 presenting itself as a dense1  
impenetrable mass1  ends in a new       
conception of history1 which is         
permeated in all its  parts by the      
vivifying breath of thought4    ,i may  
add here1 since it will be very hard to 
interrupt the history  of his           
intellectual development with           
biographical details1 that the  new     
direction of his thought did not alter  
,croce's external mode of  life2 that   
the discipline acquired in his early    
work remained the norm  of all his later
 activity2 that he accepted public      
offices in his  own town1 and later as a
 senator 7which in ,italy is a          
life-office7  and as a ,minister of     
,public ,education in the last ,giolitti
 ,cabinet1  certainly more out of the   

consciousness of a moral obligation than
  through his inclination or his        
ambition4 ,his life on the whole has    
been  and is essentially that of the    
scholar and of the thinker3 his work1 a 
political work only in the wide meaning 
which ,plato gives to the word4         
,footnote #a3 ,contributo1 pp4 #ba1 #bb2
 and passim1 pp4 #a-cj1 for  practically
 the whole substance of this section4   
,footnote #b3 ,contributo1 p4 #bc4      
,footnote #c3 ,contributo1 p4 #ha4      
,,ii4 ,early ,environment               
,benedetto ,croce was thirty-four years 
old in nineteen hundred3 his  education 
7if it is possible to set a term to the 
education of  a philosopher7 is         
therefore the work of the last quarter  
of the  nineteenth century4 ,a rapid    
examination of the intellectual         
conditions  of ,italy during those years
 will help us to see that education in  
its  true light1 that is1 as a reaction 
to1 rather than a fruit of1 the         
environment4    ,the ,risorgimento1 with

 its fifty years of wars and revolutions
  coming close on the heels of the great
 ,napoleonic upheaval1 left  ,italy     
materially and morally exhausted4 ,after
 centuries of foreign  domination1 of   
political and spiritual servitude1 all  
the elements  of ,italian culture had   
been gathered by the two generations of 
the  ,risorgimento into a new culture1  
which was much more an instrument  of   
combat1 for the conquest of unity and   
independence1 considered as  the        
necessary premises of national life1    
than the best soil for the  spiritual   
growth of that life after the conquest4 
,this new culture1 in  the poets who had
 announced and formed it1 ,parini1      
,alfieri1 ,foscolo1  ,leopardi1         
,manzoni1 in its philosophers1 ,rosmini 
and ,gioberti1 and in  its prophet and  
apostle1 ,mazzini1 had forms and        
spirits1 the value and  meaning of which
 by far transcended the importance of   
its immediate  historical purpose2 but  
through the difficulties and labors of  

the  practical effort1 it reached the   
end of the period shorn of a good deal  
of what was deepest1 most beautiful1    
nearest to the universal1 in it4  ,italy
 in #ahgj was very much like the        
sprinter who wins the race1 but         
collapses at the crossing of the line4  
,the culture of ,italy had been for     
centuries oscillating between  the      
pursuit and discovery of certain        
universal values1 which had  gradually  
become part of the common ,european     
culture 7the ,roman  idea1 the          
,christian idea1 the main principles1   
sthetic and moral1  of the              
,renaissance71 and the development of   
purely local1 regional  characteristics4
 ,at the end of the ,risorgimento1 the  
links that had  kept ,italian culture in
 constant contact with the rest of      
,europe were  broken1 and on the other  
hand the local cultures found           
themselves1  as it were1 lost and       
submerged in the new political          
readjustment1  threatened in their very 

existence by the new claim of loyalty   
advanced  by a literary and abstract    
national ideal4 ,the duties of ,italian 
culture1 clearer to us now than to the  
men who lived in the midst of  those    
events1 were then1 on one side1 to      
re-establish the connection  between    
,italian and ,european culture1 and this
 time more by learning  than by         
teaching--and on the other side to      
utilize the less particular  elements of
 the regional cultures as a foundation  
for a real and  concrete and diffused   
cultural life in the nation4    ,thus   
,italy becomes1 at the beginning of her 
new1 unified existence1  little more    
than a province of ,european thought4   
,she looks around  herself and she is   
compelled to take notice of what had    
happened beyond  her frontiers during   
the last two or three centuries4 ,it is 
interesting  to compare the             
characteristics of the other great      
nations of ,europe  as they appear to   
,italy during and after the             

,risorgimento4 ,england1  who had been a
 symbol of political liberty1 a source  
of political and  economic wisdom1      
reappears as a model of industrial      
development and  at the same time as the
 proclaimer of a new creed to the world1
 the  creed of evolution1 which after   
having infused a fresh spirit in the    
natural sciences with ,darwin1 seems to 
promise a new interpretation of  human  
life1 a new organization of science and 
of social thought1 with  ,spencer4      
,france1 the mother of revolutions1 the 
deliverer of the spirit  of man from the
 shackles of divine and earthly tyranny1
 remains1 in  a vague and hazy fashion1 
through the many disappointments that   
her  policies give to her ,italian      
lovers during all this period1 the same 
kind of inspiration that she has been   
ever since the ,encyclopdie and  the    
,revolutions2 but contributes to the new
 effort little more than her  veristic  
fiction1 in which art itself is reduced 
to a handmaid of the  goddess of the    

hour1 biological and social science4    
,germany had saturated with the romantic
 atmosphere of her poetry the           
passionate struggle of the times1 and   
she had captured a little band  of      
thoughtful patriots1 among whom we find 
,croce's uncle1 ,bertrando  ,spaventa1  
with the fascination of her new         
metaphysics1 in which they  found the   
fulfilment of all the promises of       
,italian thought in the  foregoing      
centuries2 but after her victory over   
,france1 the same cause  that makes     
,french influence less vigorous1 makes  
also ,german influence  less deep and   
less inspiring4 ,a ,germany who has like
 ,faust sold her  romantic and          
metaphysical soul1 yields only a shadow 
of her great  historical and            
philosophical culture of the eighteenth 
and of the  first half of the nineteenth
 century1 though a tremendously powerful
  one1 and such that for a long time it 
overawes the academic mind not  of      
,italy only1 but of the whole continent4

 ,a narrow and materialistic  philology1
 under the name of historical method1   
becomes the heir to  the humanistic     
tradition1 and substitutes itself for   
every native  impulse1 even in fields in
 which ,italian thought had been master 
for  centuries1 as in that of law3 where
 it mercilessly destroys1 of the        
ideologies of the ,risorgimento1 not    
only that which was arbitrary and       
fanciful1 and therefore destined to     
perish1 but even that which through  the
 subsequent course of history was to    
prove vital and sound4 ,the  ,italian   
school of international law1 the new    
conception of the ,law of  ,nations1 for
 instance1 which was the fruit of the   
,italian juridical  tradition during the
 experiences of the ,risorgimento1 and  
which is  the more or less consciously  
accepted foundation of all the doctrines
  of international relations striving   
for realization in our times1 in  no    
country and in no schools was so        
resolutely repudiated as in the         

,italian universities4 ,and it could not
 have been otherwise1 since the  new    
philology was as static and             
deterministic a doctrine1 only more     
logically and rigorously so1 as the     
evolutionary positivism which we  had   
learnt from ,england4    ,the faults of 
,italian culture during this period are 
therefore the  faults of the other      
,european cultures which ,italy had to  
assimilate3  at a time when ,italy was  
most in need of cultural help from      
without1  she found that1 for reasons   
infinitely complex and totally different
  from those which had caused her own   
exhaustion1 the other nations of        
,europe were also spiritually exhausted4
 ,and yet it cannot be said that  from  
these very faults ,italy did not draw   
some useful lessons4 ,the  so-called    
historical method1 which completely     
disregarded the great  forces of        
history1 and made of the least          
significant historical datum  a ,ding an
 sich in which the mind of the scholar  

seemed to find its  ultimate object1    
proved in the end to be a salutary      
discipline as  against the facile and   
enthusiastic generalizations of the     
historians  of the ,risorgimento4       
,positivism1 however barbarous and      
uncouth in  itself1 was a powerful      
weapon for the destruction of the last  
remnants  of a more or less mythological
 metaphysics1 and in that sense it      
afforded an example of intellectual     
honesty2 and at the same time it        
awakened the consciousness of the       
continuity of natural and spiritual     
life1 announcing1 though in a hasty and 
imperfect synthesis1 what  every        
philosophy of the future will have to   
be4 ,and about the middle  of the period
 which we are now considering1 the only 
real contribution  of ,germany to       
,european thought in the second half of 
the century  became known in ,italy with
 the advent of ,marxism1 in which we    
found  a new conception of history1 in  
so far adequate to the true spirit  and 

conditions of the times1 as it afforded 
to blind social forces1  striving for   
political expression1 an interpretation 
of their needs and  a rationalized      
programme of action4    ,the analogies  
between this general cultural           
atmosphere1 and the present  conditions 
of the intellectual world in ,america1  
are1 provided we  do not stress them too
 hard1 so striking that ,i cannot       
refrain from  calling the attention of  
the reader to them4 ,i believe this will
 help  him to apply a good many of      
,croce's criticisms and ideas to        
tendencies  and problems with which he  
is thoroughly familiar4 ,the most recent
  forms of ,american philosophy1        
pragmatism1 instrumentalism1 realism1   
are indigenous elaborations of that same
 ,english positivism and  empiricism    
which was dominant in ,italy a          
generation ago3 the relations  between  
science and philosophy are seen in the  
same light in ,america  to-day as in    
,italy before the beginning of this     

century4 ,and the two  most significant 
and far-reaching directions of research1
 social  psychology and psychoanalysis1 
branching out into every ramification   
of social and moral and sthetic thought1
 are based on assumptions1  and lead to 
results1 very similar to those of the   
,spencerian sociology  and of the       
,lombrosian theory of insanity and      
genius4 ,even in fiction  ,america is   
to-day trying her hand at verism1 and in
 poetry1 apart  from a few marked       
exceptions1 she is experimenting in the 
same spirit  in which we began to       
follow1 about the end of the period1 the
 most  recent fashions of ,paris in     
verslibrism and decadentism4 ,in        
academic  circles ,german philology has 
maintained its sway for a much longer   
time than in ,europe1 and the war has   
brought about more an emotional  than an
 intellectual consciousness of the need 
of a vaster and deeper  understanding of
 history4 ,finally1 certain aspirations 
towards ancient  and totally different  

systems of moral and sthetic standards1 
embraced  with an enthusiasm that is    
akin to an act of faith--the hope to    
discover a refuge and a consolation from
 the chaos of modernity in a            
restoration of classical or medival     
ideals--are ,american varieties  of an  
attitude of mind which found its        
satisfaction in ,italy in  patterns     
which we drew after the models of       
,ruskinism and of ,french               
traditionalism4    ,on the whole1       
,italian culture was suffering from the 
effects of the  same delusion which     
accounts for the straits in which       
,american culture  is to-day3 that      
,european culture could be assimilated  
through its  representatives at one     
particular moment only1 and as if it    
were at  the surface of time1 rather    
than by the only legitimate and fruitful
  method1 which is that of delving      
beneath that surface for the truly      
fundamental contributions that each     
nation has made to the common  mind4    

,not one of the nations of ,europe was  
then1 or is now1 at one of  those       
turning points in the history of culture
 in which principles of  universal value
 are elaborated within the limits of a  
single national  group4 ,the only       
possible exception was that of ,russia1 
sending out to  an age-worn ,europe a   
fresh message of human pity and         
,christian love in  a succession of epic
 masterpieces2 but the quality of the   
message was  such as to affect the heart
 much more than the intellect1 to       
produce a  new and deeper feeling rather
 than a sounder knowledge4    ,two great
 individual figures1 however1 dominate  
the whole period1 and  among so many    
contrasting currents of thought and     
feeling1 among the  fluctuating fashions
 of the times1 connect the new          
generations with  the traditional       
elements of ,italian culture4 ,that     
breadth of vision1  that sense of the   
perspective of history1 which was       
totally lacking in  the prevailing      

cosmopolitan thought1 was a conspicuous 
characteristic  of the work of a great  
critic1 ,francesco de ,sanctis1 and of a
 great  poet1 ,giosu ,carducci4 ,and    
what made the secret of the strength of 
the one as well as of the other1 was    
their fidelity to the regional          
traditions from which they were issued1 
coupled with a power to invest  them    
with a much broader significance than   
they had ever possessed4  ,with ,de     
,sanctis1 the speculative trend of the  
,southern ,italian mind1  with ,carducci
 the humanism of ,florence and ,tuscany1
 for the first time  in history become  
real elements of a greater national     
consciousness4  ,neither the one nor the
 other was1 moreover1 without a         
knowledge of1  and a taste for1 foreign 
cultures2 but what they gained from     
these  were elements of more permanent  
value than the ones which attracted  the
 attention of the crowds1 and they both 
succeeded in grafting those  foreign    
elements on their native dispositions in

 such a way and with  so little violence
 that they seemed to belong rightfully  
to them4 ,this  is true of what ,de     
,sanctis learnt from the idealistic     
philosophers  of ,germany1 and          
particularly from ,hegel1 as well as of 
what ,carducci  acquired from the great 
poets and historians of the two previous
  generations in ,france1 in ,england1  
and in ,germany4 ,nor should we marvel  
at this1 since by going deep enough or  
high enough into any of the  ,european  
cultures1 it is always possible to find 
a level that is common  to all of them4 
,francesco de ,sanctis was not a        
philosopher in the strict meaning  of   
the word2 yet1 among all the ,european  
critics of the nineteenth  century1 he  
is the only one from whose works it is  
possible to derive  a consistent line of
 sthetical thought4 ,his education had  
been partly  philosophical1 of old      
,italian and modern ,german philosophy2 
and partly  grammatical and rhetorical1 
in those literary doctrines of the old  

school which embodied a secular         
experience1 and in comparison with      
which the modern science of literature  
is ineffably shallow and  puerile4 ,it  
was through a philosophical elaboration 
of those doctrines1  and through a      
criticism of the intellectualistic      
sthetics of ,hegel  and his followers1  
for whom art was the sensuous clothing  
of the  concept1 that ,de ,sanctis1     
guided by an unerring taste and by a    
unique  power for discerning the        
essential and vital element in poetry1  
came  to his conception of form as not  
an a priori1 a thing by itself and      
different from the content1 but         
something that is generated by the      
content itself when active in the mind  
of the artist4 ,this is the  principle  
which he had constantly in mind in      
approaching the concrete  works of      
poetry1 and which enabled him to analyze
 and reproduce the  terms of the        
spiritual experiences of which they are 
an expression4  ,thus his ,essays and   

his ,history of ,italian ,literature1   
though  in a sense the purest and most  
genuine kind of literary criticism1  are
 at the same time a complete spiritual  
history of a people1 as it  reveals     
itself in its literary manifestations1  
such as no other country  possesses4    
,the immediate influence of his work was
 not as great as it  ought to have been3
 the generation of philologists who     
immediately  followed him was unable to 
see in him more than a brilliant        
exponent of  what was then              
contemptuously called sthetic criticism1
 and could never  forgive him for his   
apparent lack of method1 due to the     
circumstances  of his life as an exile  
and a politician4 ,it was only          
unwittingly1 and  through the           
intermediary of a ,german disciple of   
,de ,sanctis1 ,gaspary1  who wrote a    
standard handbook of ,italian           
literature1 that they came to  accept   
the greatest part of his                
interpretations1 and followed the main  

directions of his thought in their own  
researches4    ,giosu ,carducci was a   
disciple of ,parini and ,alfieri1 of    
,foscolo  and ,leopardi1 and in a sense 
of all that lineage of ,italian poets1  
beginning with ,dante and ,petrarch1 for
 whom poetry was not less an  arduous   
discipline for the attainment of a      
certain standard of formal  beauty1 set 
down once and forever by the poets of   
the classical  tradition1 than a moral  
and political function in the life of   
the  nation4 ,as his predecessors had   
been1 he was not only a poet1 but  also 
a student and historian of literature1  
of literature as the  only field in     
which that life had truly realized      
itself4 ,but though  his contributions  
to the study of ,italian literature were
 many and  important1 and the knowledge 
and taste which were the instruments of 
his art made of him an exquisite critic 
of poetry1 yet what even in  his        
historical and critical prose attracts  
us most is his lyrical  imagination1 his

 poetry4 ,and his poetry1 on the other  
hand1 is mainly  the poetry of the      
history and of the historical and       
poetical landscape  of ,italy1--of an   
,italy which was to him not merely one  
among the  nations of ,europe1 but the  
heir of ,greece and of ,rome1 the cradle
 of  western civilization2 not a land   
and a community limited in space  and in
 time1 or not that only1 but an ideal of
 beauty1 of freedom1  of right1 of a    
full and harmonious life1 which was     
,italian1 as it  had been ,greek and    
,roman1 because it was universally      
human4 ,in his  early works1 the        
contrast between this ideal and the     
actual conditions  of ,italy in his     
times found expression in a strain of   
invective  and satire1 from which the   
poet lifted but rarely his soul to the  
contemplation of the great deeds and    
thoughts of the past2 of a past  which  
in some cases was very recent1 as some  
of the men of the ,french  ,revolution  
and of the ,risorgimento were among his 

favourite heroes4  ,but later1 and      
especially in his ,odi ,barbare1 for    
which he adapted a  new technique from  
the metres of ancient ,greece1 while he 
added many  personal notes to his lyre1 
his historical inspiration became higher
  and deeper and purer1 and ,italy had  
in his poetry that which she had  lacked
 in all the course of her literature1 a 
true epos1 though in a  lyrical form1 of
 her secular life1 from the fabulous    
kings and priests  of ,etruria to that  
most legendary of all her heroes1       
,garibaldi4    ,the influence of        
,carducci1 not a purely literary1 but a 
moral and  political one1 on the        
generation to which ,croce belongs1 can 
hardly be  overestimated2 and ,croce    
himself calls his own generation        
carducciana  ,and the two other great   
poets that ,italy has produced after    
him1  ,d',annunzio and ,pascoli1 were   
both disciples of ,carducci at the      
beginning of their careers4 ,but the    
formation of their personalities1  so   

widely divergent in their later         
developments1 is contemporaneous  with  
what we have called the education of    
,croce1 and therefore outside  the scope
 of this rapid review of the            
circumstances under which that          
education took place4 ,the growth of the
 erotic-heroic poetry of  ,d',annunzio  
and that of the idyllic-humanitarian    
poetry of ,pascoli are  no longer among 
those circumstances but rather products 
of the same  environment4               
,,iii4 ,the ,origins of ,his ,thought   
,there are philosophers for whom it is  
possible1 and relatively easy1  to trace
 the roots of their speculations and of 
their systems in the  thought of one or 
a few predecessors4 ,the research of    
what we might  call their sources1 or   
more precisely of the terms in which    
certain  problems were handed down to   
them through the particular             
philosophical  tradition to which they  
belong1 would probably not lead us very 
far in  space or very deep in time3 it  

might be useful in such cases to preface
  the history of their thought by a     
brief summary of these immediate        
antecedents4 ,but in the case of        
,benedetto ,croce1 such a summary ought 
to extend1 in relation to the problems  
in which he is or has been  interested1 
to the whole range of the history of    
human thought4 ,this is  due partly to  
his peculiar approach to the problems of
 philosophy1 and  partly to his method  
of work4    ,philosophy is to him       
neither a special science nor a         
specialized  technique3 not a discipline
 which requires a scholastic training1  
and  which you can definitely acquire   
after a given number of years of  study1
 but just what it was in the beginning3 
that love of wisdom  which prompts every
 man to the exercise of his thinking    
powers4 ,the  problems of philosophy    
cannot be enumerated and defined1 but   
that which  happens to you1 or your own 
doings1 in your life1 in your conduct1  
in  your work1 in your study1 is the    

perpetually renewed material for your   
meditation4 ,problems are not given to  
you from outside1 as puzzles at  which  
you might try your skill or duties      
imposed by a pedagogue3 they  are your  
experience1 and your philosophy is your 
conscious logical  reaction to them4    
,this unprofessional and broadly human  
view of philosophy was not1  however1 an
 obvious and spontaneous attitude of    
,croce's spirit1 but a  laborious       
conquest4 ,in the years of his erudite  
and unphilosophical  youth1 at his first
 coming in contact with philosophy in   
the strict  and technical meaning of the
 word1 with philosophical treatises and 
dissertations1 his attitude was one of  
profound respect for the  professors of 
philosophy1 as ,i was persuaded1 7he    
tells us in his  autobiographical       
notes71 that they1 as specialists1      
should possess  that abstruse science1  
of whose sacred curtain ,i had hardly   
lifted a  few folds1 and ,i did not know
 that in a few years ,i should with     

wonder  and irritation discover that    
most of them did not possess anything1  
not  even that very little which ,i1    
merely by my good will to understand1   
had succeeded in acquiring4#d ,the fact 
is that these professors and            
specialists could hardly be termed      
philosophers at all1 while ,croce had   
already in himself that obscure and     
tormenting desire for intellectual      
clarity1 which is the beginning of      
philosophy4    ,but in this initial     
ignorance1 in his coming as if unaware  
to the  gates of the temple1 we shall   
find the reasons of ,croce's method of  
work4 ,when a given problem presents    
itself to him1 not as a subject of      
learned controversy1 but as a spiritual 
necessity1 he becomes suddenly          
conscious of the duty of following the  
history of that particular  problem     
through centuries of thought4 ,the first
 impulse may come from  a mere attempt  
at understanding the terms under which  
the problem  presents itself to him3 a  

clarification of words4 ,his mental     
habits  are1 in fact1 those of the      
conscientious and painstaking           
philologist1  and he brings the method  
and discipline of the severest erudition
 into  the field of logic4 ,there is no 
problem for him that is purely logical1 
in an abstract and formal sense2 still  
less1 purely psychological4 ,the  mere  
occasion for his speculation is         
sometimes offered1 as we shall  see1 by 
contemporary discussions1 but he feels  
from the very beginning  that these     
discussions are merely concerned with   
the surface of things1  are taking place
 on a plane of thought1 mechanical and  
dilettantesque1  on which all           
conclusions are equally legitimate and  
equally irrelevant4  ,very soon1 and    
long before any trace can be found in   
his writings of  his final              
identification of philosophy with       
history1 he practically  identifies each
 problem with its own history1 by       
retracing1 generally  in an inversely   

chronological order1 the original       
meanings of terms  and theories of which
 contemporary culture gave him only a   
pale and  distorted reflection4    ,but 
this intimate and vital contact with the
 past never leads him  to that attitude 
of reaction1 which our forefathers      
typified in the  laudator temporis acti1
 and which even to-day is so abundantly 
exemplified by the scholar who1 having  
laboriously climbed the  heights of the 
thought of one man or of one epoch1     
feels himself  in the possession of     
final truth1 and smiles contemptuously  
on the  childishness of the moderns4 ,he
 is as much on his guard against  the   
idols of the school as against the idols
 of the market place4  ,his relation to 
the great thinkers of the past is not   
one of blind  discipleship1 but of      
critical collaboration4 ,the favourite  
process of  his own thought might be    
defined as one of historical            
integration4    ,by emphasizing one     
aspect or another of ,croce's           

philosophy1 it is  possible1 however1 to
 connect him more particularly with one 
or another  philosopher4 ,the name that 
is most frequently pronounced in this   
connection is that of ,hegel1 probably  
because ,hegel stands1 in the mind  of  
the positivist and of the pragmatist1   
for a certain type of thought1  much    
more ancient than ,hegel himself and    
practically coextensive with  the       
history of philosophy1 rather than for  
what ,hegelianism actually  is4 ,the    
facile critic of ,croce1 who condemns   
and rejects him as a  ,hegelian1 would  
probably find it very hard to define the
 actual  points of contact between the  
two thinkers2 but we know that the word 
,hegelian is more a term of abuse1 in   
such cases1 than the expression  of a   
critical judgment4 ,croce himself has   
defined his attitude towards  ,hegel1   
and generally towards the philosophers  
of the past1 in the  conclusion of his  
examination of ,hegel's thought3 ,i am1 
and ,i believe  one has to be1          

,hegelian2 but in the same sense in     
which any man who  to-day has a         
philosophical mind and culture1 is and  
feels himself1 at  the same time1       
,eleatic1 ,heraclitean1 ,socratic1      
,platonic1 ,aristotelian1  ,stoic1      
,sceptic1 ,neoplatonic1 ,christian1     
,buddhist1 ,cartesian1 ,spinozian1      
,leibnitzian1 ,vichian1 ,kantian1 and so
 on4 ,that is1 in the sense that  no    
thinker1 and no historical movement of  
thought1 can have passed  without fruit1
 without leaving behind an element of   
truth1 which is an  either conscious or 
unconscious part of living and modern   
thought4 ,a  ,hegelian1 in the meaning  
of a servile and bigoted follower1      
professing  to accept every word of the 
master1 or of a religious sectarian1 who
  considers dissension as a sin1 no sane
 person wants to be1 and no more  ,i4   
,hegel has discovered1 as others have   
done1 one phase of truth2 and  this     
phase one has to recognize and defend3  
this is all4 ,if this shall  not take   

place now1 it matters little4 ',the     
,idea is not in haste1' as  ,hegel was  
wont to say4 ,to the same content of    
truth we shall come1  some day1 through 
a different road1 and1 if we shall not  
have availed  ourselves of his direct   
help1 looking back on the history of    
thought  we shall have to proclaim him1 
with many an expression of wonder1 a    
forerunner4#e    ,this last hypothesis  
describes what actually happened in the 
case of  another among the ancestors of 
,croce's ,philosophy of ,mind4 ,for two 
centuries either unknown or             
misunderstood1 ,vico came into his own  
only  a few years ago1 and mainly       
through the efforts of ,croce himself4  
,in  ,vico1 that is in ,italy at the    
beginning of the eighteenth century1    
practically all the germs of the        
idealistic philosophy1 and of the       
historical and critical culture of the  
nineteenth century1 were already        
present1 as a natural development of the
 philosophical and humanistic           

,renaissance4 ,and it is through what1  
in ,vichian style1 we may call the      
discovery of the true ,vico1 that ,croce
 inserts himself in the central         
tradition of ,italian1 and ,european1   
culture1 and is saved from the  dangers 
inherent in his catholic attitude       
towards the philosophers of  the past1  
that of a material1 mosaic-like         
eclecticism on one side1 and  that of a 
metaphysical syncretism1 such as led    
,hegel to the dialectic  constructions  
of his ,philosophy of ,history1 on the  
other4    ,the philosophy of the        
,renaissance1 in which the fundamental  
impulses  that are the soul of that     
movement find their clear and distinct  
expression1 had produced a new          
naturalism and a new spiritualism  with 
,giordano ,bruno and ,tomaso            
,campanella3 that is1 two widely        
divergent views of reality1 which       
however had sprung from a common        
source1 the opposition to that          
scholastic synthesis in which all  the  

transcendental elements of ,greek and   
,roman philosophy had been  gathered to 
the support of medival theology1 in     
direct relation with  the medival       
description of the cosmos4 ,there has   
probably never been  made in the world1 
either before or after the ,middle      
,ages1 such a  resolute and             
comprehensive attempt at an intellectual
 understanding  of the moral and        
material universe1 as the one that is   
the work of  medival philosophy3 but    
that attempt had been made possible1 and
 had  brought definite results1 only    
through the acceptation of the limits   
of revealed truth1 which1 however freely
 accepted1 proved in the end  to be much
 more compelling than to the modern     
scientist are the freely  accepted      
limits of external reality4 ,revealed   
truth could not be a mere  object of    
thought1 as it carried within itself1   
under the mythological  disguise1 its   
own metaphysics and its own ethics3 a   
new principle1 in  fact1 a more absolute

 and intimate spirituality than had been
 known  to either the ,greeks or the    
,romans1 which attracted to itself all  
the  kindred elements in ancient        
thought1 and determined the essential   
characteristics of medival speculation4 
,the discovery and establishment of this
 spiritual principle1 as a  universal   
reality which transcends nature and the 
spirit of man1  and which to this       
natural and human world is as a law     
dictated from  outside and from above1  
is the message of the ,middle ,ages1 not
 in  pure philosophy only1 but in       
religion and ethics1 in science and in  
the life of society4 ,the ,renaissance  
is the beginning of our modern  world1  
inasmuch as it is1 through the infinite 
variety of its artistic1  social1       
religious1 scientific manifestations1 an
 effort to see that  same spiritual     
principle no longer as a transcending   
reality1 but as  the active1 immanent1  
all-pervading soul of immediate reality1
 both  natural and human4 ,the          

,ptolemaic cosmography1 which is the    
visible form  of medival thought1 a     
system of the finite universe1 of which 
the  ,earth is the centre1 and which    
leaves an infinite space for the seat   
of the only real1 transcending          
existences1 beyond the compass of the   
heavenly spheres1 and as if it were     
outside itself1 loses its hold on  the  
imagination1 and therefore on the       
conscience of men1 long before          
,copernicus and ,galileo read in the    
skies a new system of an infinite       
universe1 within which1 or nowhere1 the 
divine principle must live and  work4   
,the impulse towards the identification 
of the spirit with nature1 on  one side1
 and with man on the other1 had been at 
work in ,italian life  and thought all  
through the ,renaissance2 but it is only
 at the end of  that miraculous spring  
of ,western civilization1 between the   
close of  the sixteenth and the         
beginning of the seventeenth century1   
that it  expresses itself in the        

philosophies of ,bruno and ,campanella4 
,bruno  presents himself as an expounder
 and defender of ,copernican astronomy1 
and ,campanella writes the apology of   
,galileo4 ,and to each of them the      
scientific discoveries are much more    
than mere helps and suggestions  for    
metaphysical speculation2 they are the  
revelation1 in one field of  human      
thought1 of a new logic which has to be 
recognized1 in one form  or another1 as 
the fundamental principle of modern     
civilization4    ,both in ,bruno and    
,campanella1 inert remnants of the      
ancient and  medival logic are still    
part of the structure in which their new
  intuitions try to express themselves2 
but such remnants are to be met  with   
even in much later philosophers1 and    
constantly reappear1 as  blind spots in 
the active process of thought1 in the   
whole history  of ,european philosophy  
down to our days4 ,what is significant  
of each  thinker1 what marks him as the 
legitimate interpreter of the deepest   

spiritual life of his times1 is not his 
system as a whole1 but the  particular  
new intuition on which in each case the 
system is founded3  in ,bruno1 the      
conception of an infinite universe1 and 
of the infinite  life of ,god in the    
universe2 in ,campanella1 the           
affirmation of the  value of human      
experience and human consciousness1 to  
which ,god is  present per tactum       
intrinsecum1 intrinsically1 and in which
 knowing  and being coincide4    ,the   
two main directions of modern thought1  
or rather of all human  thought1 are    
thus represented in the naturalism of   
,bruno and in the  spiritualism of      
,campanella1 at the conclusion of the   
,renaissance1  respectively prefiguring 
the pantheism of ,spinoza and the       
rationalism  of ,descartes1 that is1 the
 two systems through which similar      
conceptions became active and effective 
in all subsequent developments  of      
,european philosophy4 ,and it is useful 
to recall their names as  an            

introduction to the exposition of the   
ideas of a modern ,italian  philosopher1
 because we are to-day only too prone to
 identify certain  forms of common      
,european thought1 originating from     
,greece and from  ,italy1 with what was 
only their last expression in the great 
idealistic  movement in ,germany in the 
nineteenth century2 where ,bruno and    
,spinoza  reappear in ,schelling1 and   
,campanella and ,descartes1 through the 
intermediary of the ,english thinkers of
 the eighteenth century1 in ,kant  and  
,hegel4    ,i am not trying to establish
 an ,italian pedigree for the kind of   
philosophy to which ,croce belongs3     
nowhere are national distinctions so    
futile as in the history of thought4    
,but the ,italy of the ,renaissance     
shares with ,india and with ,greece the 
purely material privilege of  having    
given birth to a vision of the world and
 its problems1 which is  national only  
in the sense that it was elaborated for 
a certain time at  least by minds       

belonging to a single nation4 ,the value
 of that vision1  however1 does not     
reside in any tribal or national        
characteristic1 but  in those elements  
of universality1 which made of the      
,italian culture  of the ,renaissance1  
and of its inherent logic1 the basis of 
all modern  ,european culture4 ,what can
 still be recognized as peculiarly      
,italian1  or ,french1 or ,english1 or  
,german in the thought of modern        
philosophers1  is not that phase of     
truth1 which may be present in it1 but  
the element  of prejudice1 of           
crowd-mindedness1 of spiritual inertia1 
which even the  greatest among them have
 in common with their weaker brothers4  
,in ,bruno and ,campanella we find an   
interest in certain problems of         
thought1 which we may call either       
religious or1 more technically1         
ontological3 the problems of the        
relations of being and knowing4 ,in     
,vico1 who is infinitely nearer to      
,croce in intellectual temper1 the      

centre of interest is shifted4 ,vico is 
apparently satisfied with  ,catholicism 
as a religion2 and he spends all his    
efforts in creating  a philosophy out of
 the purely humanistic and historical   
side of  ,renaissance culture4 ,and yet1
 long before ,kant's ,prolegomena1 he   
foresees the necessity of the new       
metaphysics being the metaphysics1  as  
he says1 of human ideas1 and his theory 
of knowledge is founded on  a principle 
which bears an external resemblance to  
certain aspects of  pragmatism1 but is  
in reality of a quite different1 and    
much deeper1  character3 that of the    
interchangeability of the factum with   
the  verum1 of that which we make with  
that which we know4 ,it was a           
commonplace of the schools that perfect 
science is to be found in ,god  only who
 is the author of all things3 ,vico     
transfers this logical  formula from    
,god to man1 and applies it1 in the     
first stage of his  thought1 to         
mathematics1 which appears to him as of 

man's own making1  in a narrow and      
abstract sense1 and later to the whole  
world of history  and human thought and 
action1 which1 in a much truer and      
broader sense1  is made by man4    ,vico
 was brought to this second and final   
form of his theory of  knowledge by his 
studies on the history of law1 of       
religion1 of  language and poetry3 his  
philosophy is essentially a philosophy  
of  the moral sciences1 of philology in 
its widest meaning4 ,and the whole  of  
his speculation1 in his ,scienza ,nuova 
takes the shape of an enquiry  into the 
origins and development of human        
society3 not essentially of  a          
sociology1 an empirical and inductive   
science of man 7though this  aspect is  
undoubtedly also present in his mind71  
but rather1 through  the unity of the   
human spirit that informs and gives life
 to this  world of nations1 of an ideal 
and eternal history of mankind1 a       
philosophy of the human mind4    ,a     
contemporary and an antagonist of       

,descartes1 ,vico is one of the last    
among ,european philosophers to embrace 
practically the whole range  of         
contemporary culture4 ,but while        
,descartes lays the foundations  of his 
theory of knowledge on the certainty of 
mathematical method1  mistrusting the   
imperfection and vagueness of any other 
form of  science1 ,vico is enabled by   
his intimate contact with rhetoric  and 
history1 with that philology which had  
been the soul of the  intellectual life 
of the ,renaissance1 and which through  
the erudition  of his century was       
preparing the historical consciousness  
of the  following one1 to anticipate the
 general principles of idealistic       
philosophy and1 on the theories of art1 
of language1 of law1 of  religion1 as   
well as on a large number of particular 
historical  problems1 the general       
development of subsequent ,european     
thought4    ,at a later stage in our    
exposition1 we shall examine in greater 
detail  the indebtedness of ,croce to   

,vico1 especially as regards the theory 
of art and language2 but the            
similarities of circumstance and of     
temperament between the two philosophers
 are already apparent4 ,both  ,vico and 
,croce came to philosophy through       
erudition and philology2 and  in ,croce 
as well as in ,vico1 the fundamental    
philosophic attitude1  their theory of  
knowledge1 their idealism 7what in the  
case of ,croce  has been called his     
,hegelism71 is the intrinsic and        
necessary logic of  the same humanistic 
tradition1 the natural outcome of the   
centering  of their intellectual        
interests on the history of the human   
spirit  rather than on the mathematical 
or natural sciences4 ,it is only after  
,descartes and ,vico1 and through the   
independent progress of scientific      
thought in the last two centuries       
7during the ,renaissance1 science is    
constantly in contact with philology1   
and there is no scientist who  is not   
also a humanist7--that the two divergent

 attitudes of mind  which we have seen  
exemplified in ,bruno and ,campanella1  
naturalism and  spiritualism1 are       
finally divorced from each other1 and   
respectively  linked with the scientific
 or with the historical aspect of modern
  ,european culture4 ,rationalism1      
intellectualism1 positivism1 pragmatism1
  on one side1 are the more and more    
rarefied logics of science1 in  its     
progressive estrangement from the       
humanities2 and because of  the         
increasing prestige of scientific       
thought1 we see them making  constant   
inroads even in the fields of the       
historical and philological             
disciplines4 ,idealism1 on the other    
side1 represents in its many  forms the 
central tradition of ,european culture1 
and is heir to the  religious thought of
 the ,middle ,ages as well as to the    
humanism of  the ,renaissance2 but in   
many of its exponents1 and to my mind1  
even  in some aspects of ,croce's       
philosophy1 it suffers from that same   

condition of things which is the cause  
of the poverty and narrowness  of the   
so-called scientific philosophies3 from 
that inability to  grasp both nature and
 the spirit of man1 the world of science
 and  the world of history1 which is a  
characteristic of our times4 ,the       
recurrence of the realistic position1   
after every great affirmation  of       
idealistic philosophy1 is certainly not 
the mere recurrence of  error1 the      
obstinate permanence of human folly     
after the pronouncements  of wisdom1 but
 rather the restatement of a logical    
exigency which  cannot be entirely      
satisfied and disposed of by any of the 
idealistic  solutions of the problem of 
reality4 ,idealism and realism in modern
  philosophy are two distinct and       
divergent elaborations of different     
fields of modern culture3 that unity of 
the intellectual vision1 which  is      
perfect1 within its accepted            
limitations1 in medival philosophy1  and
 which is never entirely lost sight of  

in the thought of the  ,renaissance1 is 
the goal towards which both realism and 
idealism  continually tend1 but which   
will not be reached by either1 until the
  disiecta membra of our intellectual   
consciousness will be brought  together 
through a higher synthesis than the one 
from which they fell  apart at the end  
of the ,renaissance4    ,we are now in a
 position to understand why it would be 
vain to look  in the work of ,croce for 
either an organized synthesis of        
scientific  thought1 understood as a    
means through which the mind of man     
grasps the  reality of nature1 or a     
system of metaphysics attempting to     
explain  the facts of our human life by 
reference to an order of superhuman and 
supernatural realities4 ,these are two  
types of philosophy1 a criticism  of    
which is implicit in every step of      
,croce's philosophical career1  as well 
as in the quality of his philosophical  
ancestry4 ,but in their  place we shall 
find a series of meditations on the     

problems of the  human spirit in its    
actual historical development2 on the   
distinctions  and inter-relations of the
 various forms of spiritual activity1   
not  as they appear1 in a purely        
abstract and external consideration1 to 
the eye of the psychologist1 but as they
 reveal themselves in the  intimacy of  
those spiritual and historical          
processes1 in which man  creates at the 
same time his own being and his own     
truth4 ,as we have  stated already1 the 
philosophy of ,croce is essentially a   
philosophy of  the humanistic tradition1
 of that ,italian and ,european         
tradition the  consciousness of which   
seems to be fast disappearing even among
 those  who consider themselves as its  
exponents and defenders2 and which in   
his thought not only justifies and      
understands itself1 but brings that     
justification and that understanding to 
a greater depth1 to a more              
comprehensive clarity1 than it ever     
reached during the many centuries  of   

its existence4      ,footnote #d3       
,contributo1 p4 #bf4    ,footnote #e3   
,hegel1 pp4 #adg-h4          ,,part     
,,first      ,,from ,,philology ,,to    
,,philosophy      7#ahic-ahii7          
,i4 ,,history ,,as ,,art      ,croce's  
first philosophical essay--,is history  
an art or a science8--,the  essence of  
art--,history as the representation of  
reality1 and  therefore1 art--,the      
distinction between art and science--,a 
tentative  definition of history4       
,croce's first philosophical essay is a 
short memoir1 ,la ,storia ridotta  sotto
 il concetto generale dell' ,arte1 which
 he read to the ,accademia  ,pontaniana 
of ,naples in ,march1 #ahic4 ,in his    
autobiographical notes1  ,croce tells us
 that this memoir was sketched by him   
one evening in  ,february or ,march of  
the same year1 after a whole day of     
intense  meditation4#a ,but the reader  
cannot help feeling that those few      
pages are very far from being an        
improvisation2 and this1 not only       

because of the ease with which the      
author finds his way among the          
literature of his subject1 but          
especially because one realizes that    
only a discipline so constant and so    
severe as to become a kind of  second   
nature could give him that sure grasp of
 the essentials of his  problem1 which  
he shows from the very beginning of his 
speculation4  ,the majority of          
historians and philologists1 when they  
turn their  attention to what ,croce    
calls the logic of their discipline1 are
 apt to  trust themselves exclusively to
 their immediate experience of their    
work1 and to disregard the very obvious 
fact that an inquiry into the  general  
principles of a certain branch of       
knowledge is1 and cannot  be anything   
but1 philosophy3 they are therefore     
either unwilling or  unable to follow   
the implications of that logic on to    
their ultimate  consequences1 as this   
operation would inevitably lead them    
away from  their own safe and solid     

ground into a discussion of unfamiliar  
concepts and ideas4 ,they seem to       
perceive but dimly that the problems  of
 that logic have been intimately        
connected with the whole development  of
 philosophical thought from the         
,sophists to our day2 and therefore     
even when they go back to philosophical 
authorities in their treatment  of these
 problems1 when they quote ,plato or    
,aristotle1 or ,leibnitz or  ,hegel1    
they are content with mere fragments1   
arbitrarily understood1  unconnected    
with the general body of thought from   
which they derive  their meaning4 ,the  
result is1 at best1 a futile rediscovery
 of truths  and truisms which have their
 place in the history of thought1 but   
are  meaningless in their modern        
context4 ,an examination of the greatest
  part of the methodological literature 
of the last fifty years1 both in        
,europe and in ,america1 would easily   
bear out this contention3 that it  is   
hard to find a more shallow and         

imcompetent philosophy than that of  the
 average historian and critic4    ,what 
saved ,croce from the academic weakness 
which seems to be  congenital to this   
kind of lucubrations was1 besides the   
native temper  of his mind1 an          
instinctive realization of the true     
philosophical  import of the problems   
involved4 ,the question1 whether        
,history is an  art or a science1 had   
been a favourite one with the generation
 to which  ,croce's masters belonged2   
and it was really threatening to become 
an  endless1 insoluble one1 since no    
attempt was ever made to solve it  by   
the only method which could give        
positive results1 that is1 by  an       
accurate definition of the concepts of  
both art and science4 ,the  most common 
answer to it1 and the one that most     
clearly proved the  confused state of   
mind of those who formulated it1 was    
that history  was at the same time a    
science and an art4 ,the traditional    
humanistic  view1 which considered      

history as one of the arts1 and to which
 the  inclusion of ,clio in the college 
of the ,muses bears witness1 found but  
little favour in a time which was       
entirely under the domination of the    
pseudo-scientific philosophy of ,herbert
 ,spencer1 and could therefore  hardly  
admit of any form of knowledge which was
 not scientific  knowledge4 ,the third  
solution1 history as a science1 was in  
fact  the most usually accepted one1    
being but one aspect of that general    
tendency of the age1 superficial and    
uncritical1 through which all  forms of 
knowledge were striving hard to         
assimilate themselves to the            
mathematical and natural sciences4 ,this
 tendency which was present  in all     
fields of philology1 manifested itself  
in history either in  the attempt to    
transform history into sociology1 and to
 substitute a  system of institutional  
schemes or of so-called general laws for
 the  actual historical processes1 or in
 the raising of the usual canons and    

criteria of historical method1 that is1 
of a collection of maxims and  precepts 
for the proper handling of sources1     
documents1 and monuments1  to the       
dignity of a supposititious science4 ,it
 is characteristic of  ,croce1 that he  
did not directly attack the ,english and
 ,french and  ,italian sociologism which
 was so popular in his day3 to a mind   
which  had received its first logical   
training at the hands of a ,thomistic   
schoolmaster1 and had been introduced to
 modern philosophy through  ,labriola's 
,herbartism1 the logic of the average   
sociologist was so  abhorrent in its    
barbarity1 that it did not even afford  
him a starting  point for his own       
criticism4 ,the fallacy of sociologism  
is made evident  in the course of the   
discussion1 but rather by implication   
than through  a direct animadversion4   
,he chose his own adversary among the   
exponents  of the other form of the same
 error1 among the ,german critics1 whose
  ideas were more clearly defined and   

logically more consistent4    ,their    
main position can be stated in a few    
words3 history is a science  and not an 
art1 because its aim is not to give     
sthetic pleasure1 but  knowledge4 ,the  
premises of this formula are a          
hedonistic conception of  art1 and the  
identification of all forms of knowledge
 with science3  that is1 a too narrow   
definition of art1 and a too broad      
definition of  science4 ,croce's        
demonstration takes the form of a       
rigorous syllogism3  he defines the     
concept of art and the concept of       
science1 the two  definitions forming so
 to speak the two horns of a dilemma2   
history is  shown by its own definition 
to be included in the definition of art1
  and the only remaining question is    
that of the distinction1 within the     
same concept1 between art in the strict 
sense and history4    ,the most         
important part of this demonstration is 
that which concerns  art4 ,croce's      
object was to discover the nature of    

history1 but his real  achievement in   
his first essay was that of stating the 
sthetic problem  in its true terms4 ,his
 opinions about history and about       
science were  destined to undergo many  
changes in the further development of   
his  thought2 but his whole theory of   
sthetics is already virtually present   
in these few pages about art and the    
,beautiful4    ,art is an activity      
aiming at the production of the         
,beautiful4#b  ,a purely psychological  
doctrine of sthetics1 which considers   
not art  as an activity1 but the objects
 of art as a collection of stimuli1 a   
doctrine of sthetic appreciation rather 
than of sthetic creation1 of  the land  
that has flourished in ,germany and in  
,england during the last  twenty years1 
especially in the field of the graphic  
and plastic arts1  will therefore be    
incapable of even grasping that which is
 the specific  subject of sthetics4 ,but
 ,croce does not lose his time in       
attacking  the psychologists4 ,the error

 of their ways has its philosophical    
expression in ,sensualism and in        
,formalism1 which he summarily dismisses
  together with ,rationalism or         
,abstract ,idealism3 the ,beautiful as  
pleasure1 the ,beautiful as a system of 
formal relations1 the ,beautiful  as    
abstractly one with the ,good and the   
,true4 ,the fourth solution of  the     
problem of the ,beautiful1 which he     
accepts1 is that of the ,concrete       
,idealism of ,hegel and ,hartmann3 the  
,beautiful as expression1 as the        
sensuous manifestation of the ideal4    
,but ,croce was guided by his ,latin    
moderation 7and probably also helped by 
his1 at the time1 insufficient          
understanding of ,german ,idealism7 to  
give to this formula not the            
intellectualistic interpretation which  
rightly belongs to it1 but the  very    
simple meaning of an adequate and       
efficacious representation of  reality4 
,the difference between this conception 
of ,art--as an activity  aiming at the  

representation of reality--and the one  
that we shall find  in ,croce's later   
elaborations of his sthetic theory1 does
 not lie in  the conception itself1 but 
in its context of general thought4 ,here
 he  is still working under the         
common-sense assumption of a double     
reality1  of being and of thought1 and  
this explains why he still speaks of    
form  and content1 and why he still     
admits of a category of ,beauty of      
nature  side by side with artistic      
,beauty4 ,later1 the relation between   
form  and content will transform itself 
into that of the sthetic activity  with 
the other forms of spiritual activity2  
but even such a momentous  change in the
 foundations of his theory does but     
slightly impair the  substantial truth  
of the words in which he first expressed
 it3 ,an  object is either beautiful or 
ugly according to the category through  
which we perceive it4 ,art is a category
 of apperception1 and in art1  the whole
 of natural and human reality--which is 

either beautiful or  ugly according to  
its various aspects--becomes beautiful  
because it is  perceived as reality in  
general1 which we want to see fully     
expressed4  ,every character1 or action1
 or object1 entering into the world of  
art1  loses1 artistically speaking1 the 
qualifications it has in real life1  and
 is judged only inasmuch as art         
represents it with more or less         
perfection4 ,caliban is a monster in    
reality1 but no longer a monster  as an 
artistic creation4#c ,as to natural     
,beauty1 ,croce observes  that it is not
 inanimate1 as ,hegel and his followers 
would have it1  but animated by the     
spirit of the beholder1 and its         
contemplation is  therefore a kind of   
artistic creation3#d but this           
observation1 in  which the later        
doctrine is present in germ1 is set     
forth timidly in  a note1 and remains   
for the moment sterile and as if        
incapable able  of yielding its obvious 
logical results4 ,if it were admitted   

that  history is a representation of    
reality1 its inclusion in the concept   
of art would be obvious4 ,but the       
adverse contention is that history is  a
 scientific study of reality1 or to use 
,bernheim's definition1 the  science of 
the development of men in their activity
 as social beings4  ,croce's answer is  
that history is not a science1 because  
history is  constantly concerned with   
the exposition of particular facts1 and 
not  with the formation of concepts1    
which is the proper sphere of science4  
,there may be a science or philosophy of
 history1 investigating the             
philosophical problems connected with   
the facts of history1 but such  a       
science or philosophy1 which cannot be  
distinguished as a separate  organism   
from the philosophy of reality as a     
whole1 is not history4  ,history does   
not elaborate concepts1 but reproduces  
reality in its  concreteness3 it is     
therefore not science but art4          
,sociology1 on the other hand1 which    

renounces the concreteness of  history  
in the quest for the general laws of    
human development1  is neither art nor  
science4 ,when compared with the        
concepts or  laws of science1 the laws  
of sociology appear as vague and empty  
generalizations1 and sometimes as mere  
pseudo-scientific enunciations  of      
contemporary social and political       
ideologies4 ,the sociology which  ,croce
 had in mind in his criticism was1 in   
substance1 because of the  fallacy of   
its logical premises1 either inferior   
science or poor  philosophy2 but because
 of the uncertainty of his own idea of  
the  relations between science and      
philosophy1 it was easier for him to    
reject it than to define it4 ,his       
reaction was the instinctive one of  a  
sound logical organism against a mental 
hybrid4 ,he was certain that  sociology1
 whatever else it might have been1 was  
not history4    ,this part of ,croce's  
argument is undoubtedly the weakest4    
,his  conception of science was         

inadequate1 and his discussion of the   
relations of history with science       
suffered from this inadequacy3 the      
problem which he had attacked could not 
be solved at this stage of  his         
speculation4 ,while his sthetics was    
contained in germ in his  conception of 
art1 his logic was not even adumbrated  
in his conception  of science4 ,in fact1
 the only real function of the latter   
was to mark  the limits of the former3  
,in the presence of an object1 human    
mind can  perform but two operations of 
knowledge4 ,it can ask itself3 what is  
it81 and it can represent to itself that
 object in its concreteness4  ,it can   
wish to understand it1 or merely to     
contemplate it4 ,it can  submit it to a 
scientific elaboration1 or to what we   
are wont to call  an artistic           
elaboration4 ,either we make science1 or
 we make art4  ,whenever we assume the  
particular under the general1 we make   
science2  whenever we represent the     
particular as such1 we make art4#e      

,this distinction is the old ,platonic  
one between logos and mythos2  a        
distinction that appears in one form or 
another in practically  every system of 
philosophy1 but the true import of which
 has never  been completely grasped     
before ,vico4 ,from ,vico ,croce quotes 
in this  connection the following       
passage3 ,metaphysics abstracts the mind
 from  the senses1 the poetical faculty 
must submerge the whole mind in the     
senses2 metaphysics lifts itself above  
the universal1 the poetical  faculty    
must plunge itself in the particulars4#f
 ,this quotation  shows how decisive was
 ,vico's influence in the determination 
of the  main theses of ,croce's         
sthetics3 of which we already find here 
the  three fundamental ones1 that is1   
the recognition of art1 or the  sthetic 
activity1 as one of the fundamental     
forms of knowledge2 the  distinction of 
the sthetic activity from1 and its      
opposition to1 the  logical activity2   
and1 finally1 the exclusion of any other

 form of  knowledge besides the sthetic 
and the logical1 which exhausts the     
whole of man's theoretical activity4    
,the rest of this particular discussion 
is not as fruitful or as  interesting4  
,having included history in the concept 
of art1 ,croce  proceeds to draw a      
distinction between art in the strict   
sense1 which  is a representation of    
imaginary or merely possible reality1   
and  history1 which represents that     
portion of reality which has actually   
happened4 ,his final definition of      
history is3 ,that kind of artistic      
production the object of which is to    
represent that which has really         
happened4#g ,the value of this          
definition is what we might call a      
value of reaction against the           
pseudo-scientific sociology of his day3 
it consists in the emphasis laid on the 
concreteness and individuality  of      
historical processes1 against the void  
schematism of general laws4  ,but by    
introducing the distinction between the 

possible and the real1  ,croce had in   
fact recognized the presence of a       
conceptual element in  history--a       
conceptual element totally different    
from the concepts  of the sciences1     
which were all that he could then see   
outside the  sthetic activity in human  
knowledge4 ,in a preface to a reprint of
 his  early philosophical essays1       
written twenty-five years later1 ,croce 
explained the conditions which prevented
 him from perceiving the new  problem at
 once1 in a page of admirable           
self-criticism3 ,why did ,i not         
perceive it8 ,because ,i was full of the
 first truth which ,i had found1  and   
for the moment ,i did not feel any other
 need3 ,i had violently  rejected the   
weight of sensism and sociologism1 and  
,i could breathe4  ,and in my culture at
 that time the impulses towards that    
other need  were lacking2 because       
neither my scholastic logic nor         
,labriola's  ,herbartism opened my mind 
to a distinction between the concepts of

 the  sciences and the speculative      
concept2 and ,de ,sanctis1 entirely     
given  to the criticism of poetry1 gave 
little attention to logical problems4   
,the authority of my first masters of   
philosophy induced me1 in regard  to the
 problems which ,i had not experienced  
in myself1 to content  myself with      
temporary formulas and solutions1 which 
attracted me  through some aspects of   
truth1 and to be satisfied with an      
imagination  of the ,ideal above the    
real1 and of the world of ,concepts     
above the  world of representations4 ,by
 this separation1 by this collocation in
  the ,empyrean1 it seemed to me that ,i
 could better attest my reverence  for  
concepts and ideals1 which positivists  
and evolutionists were  dragging in the 
mud1 or lowering to the status of       
superstitions and  hallucinations4 ,now1
 running again through my pages1 it is  
not  possible for me to think those     
transcendental doctrines again1 not     
because ,i thought them in the past1 and

 what is past is past1 but1 on  the     
contrary1 because ,i did not truly think
 them even then1 but only  received them
 or imagined them1 so that what ,i can  
think now is only  the way in which1    
then1 ,i was brought to imagine them1   
and to believe  that ,i thought them4#h 
,footnote #a3 ,contributo1 p4 #cb4      
,footnote #b3 ,primi ,saggi1 p4 #h4     
,footnote #c3 ,primi ,saggi1 p4 #ad4    
,footnote #d3 ,primi ,saggi1 p4 #adj4   
,footnote #e3 ,primi ,saggi1 p4 #bc4    
,footnote #f3 ,primi ,saggi1 p4 #bcj4   
,footnote #g3 ,primi ,saggi1 p4 #cf4    
,footnote #h3 ,primi ,saggi1 pp4        
,,xi-,,xii4          ,,ii4 ,,on         
,,literary ,,criticism      ,the problem
 of literary criticism--,the three      
phases3 exposition1  valuation1         
history--sthetic judgment and history of
 art3 the exigency  of a new            
sthetics--,the place of sthetics in     
,croce's thought--,moral  and logical   
preoccupations--,croce and ,spaventa4   
,at the end of the following year       

7#ahid71 ,croce interrupted again the   
steady flow of his erudite production   
with the publication of a little  book1 
,la ,critica ,letteraria3 questioni     
teoriche1 which was the  outcome of a   
discussion he had had during the summer 
with a friend1 a  professor of          
philosophy4 ,as the net result of his   
first philosophical  effort had been the
 conquest of a clearer conception of    
art1 it was  natural that he should     
proceed to investigate the relations    
between  history and the subject-matter 
of history in that field in which he    
felt he had already been able to find   
some light4 ,the general problem  of the
 nature of history1 of which he had seen
 but one aspect1 was set  aside for the 
moment1 giving way to a close           
examination of the methods  of          
historical thought in the study of      
literature4    ,only a few of the       
conclusions of this particular research 
were destined  to have any kind of      
permanency in ,croce's theories2 but it 

is useful  to recall them1 not only as a
 step in the development of his thought1
  but as representing a marked progress 
in that conception of literary          
criticism which is still predominant    
wherever the influence of that  thought 
has not yet been felt4 ,croce submitted 
that conception to a  process similar to
 what a ,french critic calls a          
disassociation of  ideas1 trying to     
establish which can be said to be the   
essential  operations of literary       
criticism1 and the relations between    
these and  the various kinds of possible
 works on literary material4 ,given this
  method1 which is that of abstract     
classification1 and having approached   
his problem through criticism itself    
instead of starting from the other  end 
and deducing the concept of criticism   
from the concept of art  and literature1
 he was bound to reach a number of      
abstract concepts1  apparently          
irreducible to each other1 and the      
fundamental unity of  which he could    

only later affirm through the general   
progress of his  theory of sthetics4    
,literary criticism1 which until fifty  
or sixty years ago1 stood only  for the 
judgment and valuation of literary      
works1 to-day usually  includes1 beside 
the sthetic valuation1 the study of the 
historical  development1 the edition and
 comment of the text1 the biography of  
the author1 the exposition of the work  
itself1 the sthetic theory  of          
literature1 and so on2 in fact1 every   
kind of conceivable work  on literature4
 ,the danger of this extension of       
meaning lies in the  facility with which
 we are led to believe that many things1
 when called  with one name1 are really 
one thing3 we think of literary         
criticism as  of the synthesis of all   
the above-mentioned operations--a       
synthesis  which1 as ,croce observes1   
when it exists cannot be due to anybody 
but  the printer4 ,or1 again1 we may    
consider that one or another of those   
operations is the true aim of literary  

criticism--and to that one we           
subordinate all the others1 as merely   
subservient to the particular  aim we   
have in sight4 ,this is the origin of   
the various schools of                  
criticism--sthetic1 historical1         
psychological--each of which believes   
itself to be in possession of the only  
legitimate method4 ,but if we           
subordinate the history of a work to its
 sthetic valuation1 we deny  the        
independence and intrinsic importance of
 history2 if we subordinate  the sthetic
 valuation to the historical            
consideration1 we make of  the former a 
useless accessory of the latter2 if we  
subordinate the  biography of the author
 to the historical explanation of the   
work1  we destroy the importance of     
biography1 which1 though useful in a    
certain sense to the explanation of the 
work1 is in itself nothing  but the     
history of the development of a moral   
personality4#a ,in  fact1 the unity of  
literary criticism lies not in its aim1 

but in  its subject-matter3 what we mean
 by literary criticism is a series  of  
particular operations having independent
 aims1 without any other  connection    
than that of the material employed in   
each of them4#b  ,croce does not deny   
the possibility of using the results of 
one of  these operations for the        
purposes of another1 but this does not  
change  the nature of either3 the spirit
 of man is not divided into small       
compartments3 all our experience helps  
us in whatever work we are  doing4 ,to  
understand ,petrarch's poetry1 it is    
useful either to be or  to have been in 
love2 but it doesn't follow that to make
 love and to  understand that poetry are
 one and the same thing4#c    ,the study
 of the principles of literature does   
not belong to literary  criticism1 but  
to sthetics2 or1 to use ,vico's         
distinction1 not to  ,philology but to  
,philosophy4 ,textual criticism1 and    
interpretative  comment1 are            
preliminaries of literary criticism1    

which begins only  with the             
contemplation or sthetic enjoyment of   
literature3 that is1  with that         
operation of reading which is made      
possible through the  establishment of a
 correct text1 and by the help1 when    
needed1 of a  convenient commentary4 ,in
 literary criticism proper ,croce       
distinguishes  three successive phases1 
or moments1 answering respectively to   
the  questions3 ,what have ,i read8     
,what is the value of that which ,i have
  read8 ,which is the genesis and       
fortune of this particular work8 ,the   
first is the exposition or              
description--which in itself is a work  
of art of which another work of art is  
the subject2 the second1 the  valuation 
or sthetic judgment2 the third1 the     
history of the work  under              
consideration4 ,outside these three     
moments or phases1 ,croce does  not     
admit of any other independent critical 
operation3 the research  of the sources 
of a work is only part of the history of

 that work2  comparative criticism is an
 instrument of historical criticism2    
philology in the strict sense of the    
word can in turn be used as a  help to  
each of the three main operations1 but  
when it is exclusively  concerned with  
the general history of a language1 it is
 no longer a  literary discipline2      
bibliography is a mere external element 
of the  history of the work2 the study  
of the content is a literary study only 
if it is pursued in relation with either
 the exposition1 valuation  or history  
of the work1 that is1 when the work     
itself is viewed as  literature1 and not
 as a document for the purposes of      
another science  or discipline2 the     
biography of the author is an element of
 the genesis  of the work1 and therefore
 of its history1 but its main interest  
is  moral and not literary4    ,it is   
easy to see that1 however fruitful as a 
reaction to the  prevailing confusion1  
this abstract partition was still very  
artificial2 but it was impossible for   

,croce to go beyond it1 with  the help  
of the mechanical and unhistoric logic  
which was his only  instrument at that  
time4 ,he still divided a fact from its 
genesis1  and the fact and genesis from 
the judgment1 and therefore it was      
impossible for him to see that the      
internal history of a work is its  true 
exposition or characterization1 and that
 such characterization  is one with the 
valuation4 ,in regard to the valuation  
itself1 he  considered it to be purely  
subjective and relative1 as he was      
unable  to accept either ,kant's theory 
of the objectivity of taste1 because of 
its intellectualism1 or the             
psychologists' childish delusion of the 
possibility of drawing a normal or      
standard taste from the average  of the 
sthetic likings and judgments of        
different communities and  different    
ages2 and on the other hand he was still
 very far from  discovering that        
identity of the sthetic judgment with   
the sthetic  activity1 which was to be  

the foundation of his later doctrine4   
,the discussion that follows1 on the    
relations between the sthetic  judgment 
and the history of a work of art1       
obviously suffers from the              
impossibility of drawing useful         
consequences from a distinction of      
purely abstract concepts2 from the fact 
that that which was ,croce's  only real 
discovery at the time1 his conception of
 art1 had not yet  been thought out by  
him in the fulness of its relations with
 the other  activities of the human     
spirit4 ,as regards history1 this little
 book is  a step forward because it is a
 valid criticism of a confused and nave 
state of mind1 in which these abstract  
concepts could help to introduce  some  
sort of order and method2 but1 on the   
whole1 though it clarifies  the terms of
 the general problem1 it does not bring 
it appreciably  nearer to a solution4   
,croce was1 however1 more or less       
consciously aware of this deficiency4   
,in a long excursus on ,de ,sanctis1    

whose work he upheld as a model  of     
perfect literary criticism1 he insisted 
on the importance of a  sound theory of 
art1 such as ,de ,sanctis undoubtedly   
possessed1 as an  essential part of the 
mental equipment of a literary critic2  
and the  chief reproach that he         
addressed to his contemporaries in the  
field of  literary studies in ,italy1   
was that of neglecting those theoretical
  problems to which very little         
attention had been paid in our country  
after the work of ,vico4 ,he pointed to 
the great development of sthetic        
studies in ,germany during the          
nineteenth century1 and affirmed the    
necessity of dismissing every spirit of 
impatience and false pride1  and of     
submitting oneself to the hard labour of
 extracting the essence  of the abundant
 literature created by the philosophic  
activity of  the ,germans around those  
problems4#d ,his final words contained  
at  the same time an appeal and a       
programme of work3 ,there is a good     

deal to be expected from a work         
especially directed towards these  two  
points3 to banish a series of concepts  
which have introduced  themselves in    
sthetics1 and which are entirely foreign
 to it1 and  with their presence        
maintain an invincible confusion2 and to
 free the  concept of art and of the    
,beautiful from the limits within which 
it has  been circumscribed by linguistic
 habits1 acknowledging the intimate     
connection between the so-called sthetic
 and artistic facts and other  facts of 
the life of the spirit4#e ,that his     
attitude towards the  later ,german     
sthetics was1 from the very beginning1 a
 critical one1 is  clearly shown by what
 immediately follows3 ,working in this  
direction1  ,i believe that we shall    
find ourselves1 with a new consciousness
 and  with a wealth of observations     
gathered in the course of a century1  to
 the point from which modern sthetics   
started1 to the school of  ,leibnitz and
 ,wolff1 and to ,baumgarten's           

conception1#f--that is1 to              
,baumgarten's ,meditations of #agce1    
which the word sthetica appears  for the
 first time as the name of an           
independent philosophical cal           
discipline1 contrasted to ,logic in the 
same sense in which the ,greeks  used to
 contrast aisthta to nota1 the facts of 
sensuous knowledge  to the facts of     
mental knowledge4 ,which means that     
,croce believed the  science of sthetics
 to be still in its infancy1 and to     
require a great  creative effort which  
was well worth making1 both for the sake
 of the  general philosophical problems 
involved1 and for the effects that a    
deeper view of those problems could not 
but have on the practical work  of the  
literary critic and of the historian4   
,through these first discussions1 which 
at the time appeared to him  more as    
acts of personal liberation than as the 
beginning of a  philosophical career1   
,croce had really discovered his        
vocation4 ,from  ,de ,sanctis he had    

learnt that art is neither the work of  
reflection  and logic1 nor the product  
of craft1 but a pure and spontaneous    
forma  fantastica3#g through his own    
experience of dry erudition1 and        
through his meditations on the relations
 between history and criticism1  he had 
verified the validity and usefulness of 
,de ,sanctis' conception1  and had been 
made aware of the necessity of doing    
what ,de ,sanctis had  not been either  
willing or capable of doing3 of creating
 a philosophy  where he had given       
nothing but critical essays and         
delineations of  literary history1 and a
 new criticism1 a new historiography1 as
 a  consequence of the philosophic      
deepening and systematization of his    
thought4#h    ,but from ,croce's        
published work at this time it would be 
easy to  gather the fallacious          
impression that his interest was an     
exclusively  literary one3 that he      
proceeded to create a philosophy of     
literature  and art1 and that only      

through the necessities of the system he
 was  led to the consideration of       
logical1 economic and ethical facts4    
,if that were true1 with the exception  
of his theory of sthetics1  practically 
the whole of his philosophy would be    
opened to the  reproach that he levelled
 against the greatest part of the       
,german  sthetic theories of the        
nineteenth century3 of not being derived
  from spontaneous and direct           
researches1 but rather from the need of 
filling a compartment in a philosophical
 system4#i ,a good many among  ,croce's 
critics have been the victims of such a 
misconception of the  actual genesis of 
his thought2 and have discounted the    
importance of  any but his sthetic      
theories1 considering all the rest as a 
kind of  philosophical by-product1 with 
the result that they have not been  able
 properly to understand even that part  
of his work in which they  were         
interested4 ,the typical example is     
given by those moralistic  critics of   

his sthetics1 who would have been spared
 many mistakes and  inanities1 if they  
had thought ,croce's ethics and logic   
worth a little  consideration4 ,they    
would then have realized that their     
criticisms had  been anticipated and    
criticized long before they had been    
uttered4 ,but  perhaps it is asking too 
much of the average student of          
literature1  once he has made the effort
 to think about the problems of art1    
that  he should also try to turn the    
light of his reason on the obscure      
promptings of his moral consciousness2 a
 suggestion which in many cases  would  
be violently rejected as the height of  
immorality4    ,we shall soon see from  
which source ,croce derived his interest
 in  economic problems and in the       
history of the practical activities of  
man4 ,of the permanence of those moral  
preoccupations which had been  his      
constant companions since his           
adolescence1 we find the traces in  his 
autobiographical notes4 ,in ,de         

,sanctis1 whose ,history of ,italian    
,literature is as much a moral as an    
sthetic history of the ,italian  people1
 he had the model of a sound and simple 
morality1 austere  without              
exaggerations1 and high without         
fanaticisms4#aj ,but the same           
difficulties which prevented him from   
fully understanding ,de ,sanctis'       
sthetic principles1 and from using them 
as a vivifying element in his  literary 
work1 made him also for a long time     
accept an inferior moral  conception1   
that of ,herbart's realism1 in which the
 moral ideal was  energetically         
asserted1 but as a thing of another     
world1 as having  man under itself as   
brute matter1 on which its stamp1 more  
or less  marked1 might or might not be  
impressed4 ,that is1 he saw the moral   
ideal in relation to the actual life of 
man1 in a position similar  to that     
which concepts and ideals had for him in
 relation to reality  as a whole3 his   
moral abstractism and rigorism was the  

counterpart of  his logic4 ,but that    
rigorism and abstractism was the way    
that ,i had  necessarily to follow in   
order to understand the moral           
concreteness1  and to lift it to the    
plane of a philosophical theory4 ,and   
that  rigorism1 which was at the same   
time a love for sharp distinctions1     
while it saved me from associationism   
and positivism and evolutionism1  put me
 on my guard against1 and hindered me   
from falling into the  errors of that   
now naturalistic1 now mystic1           
,hegelianism1 which through  a hasty and
 often mythological dialectic1          
obliterated or weakened the             
distinctions which are the life of the  
dialectic process4#aa ,what  ,croce     
lacked1 in ethics as well as in         
sthetics1 was a new logic or  theory of 
knowledge1 which would allow him to     
grasp the concept or  the ideal1 that is
 the universal1 in the concrete         
spiritual activity1  that is in the     
particular and individual4 ,meanwhile1  

his own dealing  with abstract concepts1
 with purely formal universals1 was to  
be1 in  relation to the further         
developments of his logic1 what his     
early  literary work1 of a purely       
erudite character1 had been in relation 
to his meditations on art and history3  
that personal experience1 of            
difficulties and errors1 without which  
no truth can ever be reached4    ,on the
 whole1 ,croce's position at that time  
was1 as he himself defined  it many     
years later1 a                          
,platonic-,scholastic-,herbartian one2  
one that1  in the moral held1 had at    
least the advantage of being            
invulnerable  to the subtle menace of   
sensualism and decadentism1#ab in the   
,european life and thought of the       
nineties1 the acme of spiritual         
distinction--an illusory reaction to and
 escape from the prevailing  positivism 
and determinism1 of which in reality    
they were but thinly  disguised         
variations4 ,croce never lost1 even for 

an instant1 the power  of discerning    
sensual refinement from spiritual       
finesse1 erotic flights  from moral     
elevation1 false heroism from sheer     
duty4#ac ,here lies the  fundamental    
difference1 of spiritual race1 between  
him and his most  illustrious           
contemporary1 ,gabriele d',annunzio1    
with whom he has more  than once been   
coupled by superficial critics4 ,the    
character of their  respective influence
 on the younger ,italian generations1 of
 ,d',annunzio  between #ahij and #aijj1 
and of ,croce between #aijj and #aiaj1  
is more than  sufficient evidence on    
this point4    ,it is something of a    
surprise to find that he had learnt     
practically  nothing from his uncle     
,bertrando ,spaventa1 who had been the  
most  powerful representative of the    
,hegelian tradition in ,italy4 ,the     
central  problem of ,spaventa's         
speculation had been that of the        
relations  between knowing and being1 of
 transcendence and immanence2 and       

although  it was only through a solution
 of this problem that ,croce could hope 
for progress in any of his particular   
philosophical researches1 yet  he could 
take no interest in it when its         
discussion was earned on  independently 
of those problems of art1 of moral life1
 of law and  history1 towards which his 
attention was naturally drawn4 ,croce   
himself explains this lack of interest  
as due to his unconscious  immanentism3 
as ,i met with no difficulty in         
conceiving the relation  between        
thinking and being2 if ,i had any       
difficulty1 it was rather in  conceiving
 a being severed from thought1 or a     
thought severed from  being4#ad ,but in 
this case he is probably seeing himself 
in the  light of his later experience3  
that difficulty did exist1 and is the   
fundamental difficulty of his early     
speculation4 ,only1 he could not  solve 
it by ,spaventa's methods1 which were   
those of a rigorous and  formal         
logician1 of a philosopher with a       

theological background1 but  only       
through the elaboration of the materials
 of his own particular  moral and       
intellectual experience4 ,at a later    
stage1 and when he had  already         
independently arrived at a position much
 more similar to  that of ,spaventa1    
than he would ever have thought possible
 for him1  the influence1 if not of     
,spaventa himself1 at least of that     
attitude  towards philosophy which had  
been his1 came back to him through his  
friend ,giovanni ,gentile1 whose mental 
temperament was much more akin  to that 
of the old ,neapolitan thinker1 than    
,croce's ever was4 ,croce's  idealism   
7or ,hegelianism7 was at this time      
limited to what he had  unconsciously   
absorbed through ,de ,sanctis'          
conception of art2 but his  theory of   
knowledge1 not yet logically unfolded1  
was still oscillating  between          
intellectualism and naturalism4 ,he was 
decidedly anti-,hegelian1  on the other 
hand1 in his theory of history and in   

his general  conception of the world4   
,footnote #a3 ,primi ,saggi1 pp4 #gi-hj4
    ,footnote #b3 ,primi ,saggi1 p4 #hj4
    ,footnote #c3 ,primi ,saggi1 p4 #hb4
    ,footnote #d3 ,primi ,saggi1 p4     
#afc4    ,footnote #e3 ,primi ,saggi1 p4
 #afd4    ,footnote #f3 ,primi ,saggi1  
ib4    ,footnote #g3 ,contributo1 p4    
#ed4    ,footnote #h3 ,contributo1 pp4  
#ee-ef4    ,footnote #i3 ,primi ,saggi1 
p4 #afc4    ,footnote #aj3 ,contributo1 
p4 #eh4    ,footnote #aa3 ,contributo1  
p4 #ei-fj4    ,footnote #ab3            
,contributo1 p4 #fj4    ,footnote #ac3  
,contributo1 p4 #fa4    ,footnote #ad3  
,contributo1 p4 #fc4          ,,iii4    
,,history ,,and ,,economics      ,a new 
interest3 ,marxism--,historical         
materialism--,criticism and             
interpretation3 a new historical        
canon--,marxian economics as an         
application of the hypothetic           
method--,the concepts of science and the
  economic principle--,science and      
practice--,marxism and morality4        

,in ,april1 #ahie1 his old professor at 
the ,university of ,rome1 ,antonio      
,labriola1 sent to ,croce an essay on   
the ,communist ,manifesto1 in which  he 
submitted to a critical examination the 
materialistic conception of  history    
elaborated during the fifty preceding   
years by ,karl ,marx and  ,friedrich    
,engels4 ,labriola had been probably the
 first professor in a  ,european        
,university to take ,historical         
,materialism as a subject  for his      
academic lectures1 his first course on  
,marxism having been  delivered in      
#ahhi4 ,but ,croce1 who had given all   
his thoughts first to  his literary     
work1 and then to his meditations on art
 and criticism1  had not been as yet    
able to perceive the bearing of the new 
problems  discussed by his master on    
that problem of the nature of history   
which  had been the subject of his first
 philosophical essay1 and was to be  the
 centre of his later speculations4      
,labriola's little book came to  him at 

a moment when he had reached an impasse 
in the course of his  research1 and it  
opened to him an entirely new field of  
investigations1  it afforded him an     
escape towards studies and meditations1 
at  first apparently unrelated to his   
former ones1 but the results of  which  
were destined to react vigorously on    
them4 ,he plunged with  youthful        
enthusiasm into the literature not of   
,marxism and historical  materialism    
only1 but of ,economics in general4 ,in 
the five following  years1 while he     
continued with unremitting energy his   
literary labours1  now more clearly     
directed towards an understanding of the
 historical  problems of sthetics1 and a
 clarification of the concepts of a     
philosophical science of sthetics1 he   
published a series of critical  essays  
on ,materialismo storico ed economia    
marxistica1 intended at  the same time  
as a defence and a rectification of     
,marx's doctrines4    ,we shall consider
 this phase of ,croce's work from two   

distinct points  of view--as a new      
individual experience1 and as a stage in
 the  development of his philosophy4    
,for the first of them1 we shall again  
leave the word to ,croce himself3 ,that 
intercourse with the literature  of     
,marxism1 and the eagerness with which  
for some time ,i followed the           
socialistic press of ,germany and       
,italy1 stirred my whole being1 and  for
 the first time awakened in me a feeling
 of political enthusiasm1  yielding a   
strange taste of newness to me3 ,i was  
like a man who having  fallen in love   
for the first time when no longer young1
 should observe  in himself the         
mysterious process of the new passion4  
,at that fire  ,i burnt also my abstract
 moralism1 and ,i learnt that the course
 of  history has a right to drag and to 
crush the individual4 ,as ,i had not    
been disposed in my family circle to any
 fanaticism1 and not even to a  liking  
for the current and conventional        
liberalism of ,italian politics  444 it 

seemed to me to breathe faith and hope  
in the vision of the  rebirth of mankind
 redeemed by labour and in labour4#a    
,this political  enthusiasm did not last
 very long3 it disappeared when that    
which  was ,croce's true nature1 not    
practical but essentially theoretical1  
reasserted itself1 by reducing this new 
experience into new conceptual  forms2  
but without it1 the whole of his        
philosophy of the practical  activity   
would forever have been like a theory of
 vision in the mind of  a blind man1 or 
a theory of love in that of a keeper of 
the harem4 ,art1  thought1 mortality1   
had already appeared to him as aspects  
of his own  life2 to these1 a new       
element was added now1 not as a mere    
object of  thought1 but as a passionate 
and concrete experience4    ,the        
interpretation of the doctrine of       
historical materialism presented  a     
number of difficulties deriving partly  
from the form in which the  doctrine    
itself had originally appeared--not as a

 coherent theory1  but as a series of   
pronouncements and observations         
scattered in a  variety of writings1    
composed at a distance of years1 and the
 aim of  which was rather political and 
polemical than scientific2 and partly   
from its association with remnants of   
old metaphysics1 both in its            
originators and in their followers4 ,in 
,marx and ,engels1 as well as           
practically in the whole literature of  
,marxism1 the emphasis being  laid on   
the substantive rather than on the      
adjective1 historical  materialism      
implied the adhesion to that            
metaphysical materialism which  was one 
of the children of ,hegelian            
metaphysics4 ,what had been the  ,idea  
for ,hegel1 was the ,economy of the new 
metaphysicians3 the only  reality1      
working beneath the surface of human    
consciousness1 as an  under-structure   
beneath a merely apparent and illusory  
superstructure4  ,given this conception1
 it is easy to understand why historical

  materialism appealed so strongly to   
positivists and evolutionists1  who     
concealed a similar kind of metaphysics 
under their proclaimed  contempt for    
philosophy4 ,the old philosophies of    
history had attempted  to reduce the    
sequence of history to a scheme of      
concepts1 starting  with ,god1 or       
,providence1 or the ,hegelian ,idea3 the
 new unconscious  metaphysicians        
substituted for the old concepts that of
 ,economy1  or of ,matter1 or of        
,development and ,evolution1 from which 
all the  particular historical          
determinations could be deduced with not
 less  certainty than from the old      
metaphysical entities4 ,and from their  
predecessors they also borrowed those   
teleological tendencies which  are      
implicit in all metaphysics1 attributing
 a will and an end to  their new ,god1  
be it called ,progress or ,matter1 and  
trying to deduce  the future course of  
history from the dialectic of the past4 
,hence the  growth of a vast literature 

inquiring into the development of       
abstract  sociological schemes or of    
economic forms reduced to               
characteristics  of economic epochs1    
forcing the concrete materials of       
history into  rigid conceptual frames2  
hence the nave faith in the deduction of
  social predeterminations1 of which the
 most striking was the asserted         
necessity of the advent of socialism as 
the only logical outcome of  capitalist 
society4    ,croce1 pursuing the        
analysis initiated by ,labriola1 began  
by  dissociating what seemed to him to  
be the vital element in historical      
materialism1 from any intrusion of      
either ,hegelian or positivistic        
metaphysics4 ,his criticism of          
historical materialism as a philosophy  
of history and1 generally1 of the       
possibility of constructing  any        
philosophy of history1 is the first     
resolute step towards an                
anti-metaphysical conception of         
philosophy4 ,whether by metaphysics  is 

meant the knowledge of another world of 
real essences1 of things  in themselves1
 beyond the objects of our immediate    
experience1  or the creation of abstract
 concepts duplicating and falsifying    
the complex world of life1 the whole    
trend of ,croce's thought  will         
henceforward oppose any claim on the    
part of these spurious  philosophies1   
mythological or pseudo-scientific1 to   
furnish an adequate  interpretation of  
reality4 ,vico's metaphysics of human   
ideas1 which  is no metaphysics at all1 
because it does not postulate the       
existence  of any reality beyond that of
 the spirit of man1 will more and more  
become the model of ,croce's own        
philosophy4 ,that immanentism which  he 
considers as one of the spontaneous     
attitudes of his mind slowly  extricates
 itself from the ruins of his own       
transcendental logic1  and shows itself 
impervious to the allurements of both   
,platonism and  ,positivism1 of the     
ancient and the new myth4    ,purged of 

its unessential philosophical           
associations1 historical  materialism   
7or1 more precisely1 the economic       
interpretation of  history7 appeared to 
,croce as nothing more than a new canon 
or  criterion of historical             
interpretation1 fixing the attention of 
the  historian on a mass of new data1   
the importance of which had not been    
recognized before4 ,it was neither a new
 philosophy nor a new method3  it could 
not be legitimately employed to draw    
conclusions on the  relations between   
economic facts and the other facts of   
history1 nor  to reduce history itself  
to the operation of a few abstract laws4
 ,it  was a tendency of historical      
thought1 coinciding with the            
manifestation  of certain objective     
conditions of society 7the industrial   
revolution7  and their reflexes in      
political thought1 by which the economic
 element  in social facts acquired a    
stronger relief than it had ever had in 
the  consciousness of man4 ,and it      

seemed to point1 both for the historian 
and for the philosopher1 towards the    
existence of a fundamental  principle or
 form of human activity--economic       
activity1 about the  nature of which1   
and its relation with sthetic1 logic1   
and moral  activity1 very little had    
been thought and written1 besides what  
is  contained in the introductions to   
all classical manuals of political      
economy4 ,while still insisting that    
history is art1 that is1 the            
representation of individual happenings1
 ,croce was thus implicitly  brought to 
admit of the importance of philosophy1  
that is1 of the study  of the           
fundamental forms or categories of human
 activity1 for the  historian4 ,his     
conception of history was undergoing a  
transformation in  a direction similar  
to that towards which his conception of 
philosophy  was moving4    ,when he     
passed from the consideration of the    
general theory to the  examination of   
more technical aspects of ,marx's       

doctrines1 the first  difficulty which  
presented itself to him was that of the 
relations  between ,marxian economics   
and pure economics1 or general economic 
science4 ,the society whose economic    
life ,marx had studied in ,das          
,kapital1 was neither human society in  
general1 nor any particular  historical 
society1 but a purely ideal and formal  
society deduced from  a proposition     
assumed outside the fields of pure      
economics3 that of  the equivalence of  
value and labour4 ,starting from this   
postulate1  ,marx had proceeded to      
inquire into those processes of         
differentiation  between the assumed    
standard and the actual prices of       
commodities in a  capitalist society1 by
 which labour itself acquires a price   
and becomes  a commodity4 ,it was a     
method of scientific analysis consisting
 in  regarding a phenomenon not as it   
actually exists1 but as it would be  if 
one of its factors were altered1 and in 
comparing the hypothetical  with the    

real phenomenon1 conceiving of the first
 as diverging from  the second which is 
postulated as fundamental1 or the second
 as  diverging from the first1 which is 
postulated in the same manner4  ,it is  
only when the whole of ,marxian         
economics is considered as the          
application of such a method1 that the  
concepts of labour-value and of         
surplus-value acquire a definite and    
precise meaning3 the description  of    
economic society as a pure working      
society 7producing no goods which       
cannot be increased by labour7 must then
 be interpreted as a concept  of        
difference1 or an instrument of         
elliptical comparison1 as against  the  
descriptions of actual economic society 
given by pure economics4  ,its positive 
value1 not as an abstract hypothesis1   
but as a means  of knowledge1 depends on
 the fact that such a society does      
actually  coincide with certain aspects 
of historical capitalist society2 that  
the equivalence of labour and value is  

not a purely imaginary fact1 but  a fact
 among other facts1 empirically opposed1
 limited1 and distorted  by other facts4
 ,having assumed this equivalence as a  
test for the study  of the social       
problem of labour1 ,marx's object was to
 show the special  way in which this    
problem is solved in a capitalist       
society4 ,and this  was the real        
justification for his employment of the 
hypothetical  method4    ,it is clear   
that ,croce was infinitely more         
interested in what ,marx  had actually  
accomplished1 than in what he had       
intended to do4 ,in  ,marx's own mind1  
the analysis of the conditions of       
capitalist society  led inevitably to   
the conclusion that a passage from      
capitalism to  socialism was            
predetermined by the structure of       
capitalist society  itself4 ,it is well 
known that the prevision assumed what   
claimed to be  a strictly scientific    
character in the formulation of the law 
of the  fall in the rate of profits3 the

 gradual decrease of surplus-values     
accompanying the increase in technical  
improvements1 and automatically         
re-establishing the equivalence of      
labour and value4 ,croce offered  a very
 convincing criticism of this law on    
,marx's own grounds1 by  showing that it
 rested on a confusion between technical
 and economic  facts1 thus affording a  
remarkable example of ,marx's           
uncertainty of his  own method4 ,it was 
clear that in this particular case ,marx
 had been  carried away by his desire to
 reduce the metaphysical implications of
  his economic sociology to the status  
of an historical law4 ,and ,croce's     
criticism was evidently intended both to
 deprive ,marx's historical  determinism
 of one of its most powerful            
instruments1 and to confirm  his own    
view of the method which gave validity  
and importance to such  economic        
speculations as ,marx's were4           
,marxian economics stood thus           
interpreted as comparative sociological 

economics1 and by the definition ,croce 
also defined the scope of  sociological 
science1 and the nature of the logical  
processes which  it could legitimately  
employ4 ,it was a considerable advance  
in the  study of scientific concepts1 as
 distinct from purely speculative       
concepts4 ,but he still believed at the 
time1 misled by the economists'         
discussions on the nature of the        
economic principle1 that pure  economics
 and the philosophy of economics        
practically coincided2 and  as he had   
maintained the legitimacy of ,marx's    
method against the  criticisms of the   
pure1 or scientific1 economists1 he     
defended pure  economics against ,marx  
and his school1 as the general science  
of the  economic datum4 ,but he was soon
 to understand that his own point  of   
view and that of the pure economists    
were widely divergent1 and  that the    
methods of pure economics are in fact   
scientific and not  philosophical4 ,in  
later years1 when he came to regard the 

science of  economics as an empirical   
and mathematical science1 ,marxian      
economics  appeared to him merely as a  
special branch of economic casuistry1   
employing methods fundamentally         
identical with those of pure economics3 
a relationship which could be           
illustrated by a comparison with the    
parallel of non-,euclidean and classical
 geometry4 ,although he did  not reach  
this final position at the time1 there  
is no doubt that  his experience of the 
actual scientific processes of economics
 freed  him from his allegiance to      
,herbartian logic1 in which science and 
philosophy were still formally          
undifferentiated1 and led him gradually 
to the distinction between the          
scientific and the speculative concept1 
of which the relation established       
between ,marxian and pure economics is  
a tentative prefiguration4    ,but the  
most essential gain of his economic     
studies was in the  direction of the    
affirmation of the merely practical1 or 

economic1  principle1 as one of the     
irreducible forms of human activity1    
raising  the concept of the ,useful to  
the same level 7logically speaking7 at  
which those of the ,beautiful1 the      
,true1 and the ,good had been kept by   
the whole ,european philosophical       
tradition since ,plato4 ,he was here    
actually elaborating not a scientific1  
but a speculative concept1  though his  
approach to it was always by means of   
the discussion  of particular problems1 
the solution of which implied a definite
  view of the relations between the     
economic principle on one side1  and    
respectively on the other side1 the     
intellectual and the moral  principle4  
,as regards the possibility of inferring
 practical programmes from  scientific  
principles1 he objected that neither the
 desirable nor  the practicable are     
science4 ,science may be a legitimate   
means of  simplifying problems1 making  
it possible to distinguish in them what 
can be scientifically ascertained from  

what can only be partially  known2 in   
the case of the ,marxian law of the fall
 in the rate of  profits1 for instance1 
if such a law were proved to be         
scientifically  correct1 it could be    
said1 under certain conditions that the 
end  of capitalist society was a        
scientific certainty1 though it would   
remain doubtful what would follow it4   
,but logic is not life1 and the         
appraisement of social programmes is a  
matter of empirical observations  and of
 practical convictions4 ,the            
unconquerable indetermination of  social
 facts brings forth that element of     
dating in the actions of  practical men1
 which is to will what inspiration is to
 expression1  insight to intellect1 in  
the poet and in the scientist4          
,socialism could not be called a        
scientific programme1 except in a       
limited and metaphorical sense1 which   
was not a criticism of socialism        
itself1 but of the bad logic of certain 
,socialists3 the ,marxian  programme as 

such1 ,croce recognized as one of the   
noblest and boldest1  and also one of   
those which obtain the greatest support 
from the  objective conditions of       
existing society4 ,having already denied
 the  dependence of intellectual truth  
on economic fact1 by criticising  the   
metaphysics of historical materialism1  
he thus asserted now the  autonomy of   
the economic from the logical principle4
    ,on the other hand1 he destroyed the
 legend of the intrinsic immorality  of 
,marxism1 which was due to ,marx's      
repeated assertions that the social     
question is not a moral question1 and to
 his sharp criticisms of class  ideals  
and hypocrisies4 ,he pointed to the     
moral interest which had  guided ,marx's
 political activity1 and which could    
even be said to have  prompted the      
choice of the fundamental hypotheses of 
his economics4  ,what ,marx had called  
the impotence of morality was the futile
 attempt  at apportioning praise or     
blame for the natural conditions of the 

social order4 ,it is only when such     
conditions are no longer conceived  as  
necessary for the social order in       
general1 but only for a stage  in its   
history1 and when new conditions appear 
that make it possible  to destroy them1 
that moral condemnation is justified and
 effective3  to use another of ,marx's  
phrases1 morality condemns what history 
has  already condemned4 ,this is as much
 as saying that the only real  moral    
problems1 as all other problems of human
 life1 are those that  present          
themselves under given historical       
circumstances1 at a given  time2        
concrete1 not abstract2 and that moral  
judgments apply not to  facts or        
conditions1 but to actions4 ,the passage
 from such a concrete1  or historical1  
view of morality1 to a doctrine of moral
 relativity  is a very easy one1 but    
,marx's own views on this point1 which  
he  never deliberately expounded1 are   
irrelevant to the substance of his      
doctrine4 ,for his own part1 ,croce     

reasserted the value of ,kantian        
ethics1 and the absoluteness of the     
moral ideal1 as an ideal which  is not  
above and outside the spirit of man1 but
 rather one of its  intrinsic forms or  
categories4 ,and ,marx's conclusions in 
regard to the  function of morality in  
the social movement1 and to the method  
for the  education of the proletariat1  
though clashing with current prejudices1
  contain no contradiction of general   
ethical principles4 ,but ,marx's        
interest was not essentially an ethical 
one3 the moralistic criticisms  of ,marx
 were similar to the puritanic          
criticisms of ,machiavelli1 and         
resolved themselves into a charge that  
neither the one nor the other  had      
treated problems totally different from 
those which they had  actually attempted
 to clarify4 ,while vindicating the     
importance of  ,machiavelli in the      
history of the study of the economic    
activity of  man1 ,croce called ,marx   
himself the ,machiavelli of the labour  

movement1  implicitly suggesting a      
similarity of both object and method    
between  ,il ,principe and ,das         
,kapital1 which is singularly           
illuminating4    ,the last essays of the
 book on ,materialismo ,storico are two 
letters  to ,professor ,pareto ,on the  
,economic ,principle1 written in #aijj2 
but  with these we reach a time when    
,croce's thought was already organizing 
itself in the system of the philosophy  
of mind4 ,in them we find a  sketch of  
the system in the form in which it      
appeared in the first  edition of the   
,estetica3 that is1 we already decidedly
 enter into the  maturer phase of       
,croce's thought4 ,we must here pause on
 the threshold1  and looking back on the
 years of ,croce's special interest in  
economic  problems1 sum up the new      
elements that the study of these        
problems adds  to his intellectual      
physiognomy3 a more deliberately        
anti-metaphysical  attitude1 a growing  
consciousness of the complexity of      

history and of  the concreteness of     
moral life1 a realization of the        
function of the  economic activity1 a   
progress in the analysis of scientific  
concepts1  and therefore in the         
foundations of his logic--but1 most     
important of  all1 a continued practice 
of philosophical thought under the shape
 of  historical methodology4 ,apart from
 their interest as documents of the     
growth of his philosophy1 ,croce's      
studies have also a place in the        
history of social and economic thought1 
side by side with those of  ,labriola   
and of ,georges ,sorel1 as a significant
 episode in that ,latin  crisis of      
,marxism1 the ultimate outcome of which 
are the theories of  ,french and        
,italian ,syndicalism4      ,footnote   
#a3 ,contributo1 p4 #cf-cg4             
,,part ,,second ,,the ,,philosophy ,,of 
,,mind      7#aijj-aiaj7      ,i4 ,,the 
,,growth ,,of ,,the ,,system      ,the  
unity of thought--,the writing of the   
,estetica--,the method of               

philosophy--,a philosophy of mind--,the 
,filosofia della ,spirito and the       
,critica--,other activities4      ,the  
salient feature of ,croce's mind1 fully 
displaying itself in the  maturity of   
his work1 is a power to follow different
 lines of thought  and research1 without
 either confusing the issues or losing  
sight of  the deep underlying           
connections4 ,for the average scholar1  
an incursion  into alien ground will    
generally mark the abandonment of his   
former  interests2 or1 in the best      
hypothesis1 the creation of a new mental
  personality coexisting with the       
original one1 but neither reacting on   
it nor being influenced by it4 ,the     
reason is obvious3 the substance  of    
each personality is a cross-section of  
the body of one discipline1  which in   
its actual history1 in its methods1     
associations and sphere  of interest1   
touches the other one at very few points
 only1 if at any  at all4 ,the          
establishment of new relations between  

the two requires  a new personal        
elaboration1 a complete individual      
mastery of the  materials and methods of
 each discipline4 ,we are hardly aware  
of the  independence gained by even very
 closely related fields of research     
through the specialists treatment of the
 last century3 how each of  them has    
developed1 so to speak1 a language of   
its own1 which has its  foundation in   
the peculiar1 and inevitable1           
terminology1 but extends  far beyond it 
into the logical structure of the       
specialist mind4 ,we  have more or less 
consciously built up a world 7that is1  
an implicit  conception of the world1 a 
nave philosophy7 for the economist1 one 
for the biologist1 one for the          
mathematician1 one for the student of   
literature1 and so on4 ,the scholar with
 the dual personality lives             
alternatively in separate and           
self-contained worlds2 but to melt the  
two images into a single one1 is far    
beyond his power4 ,in other cases1  he  

will relate all the experiences         
legitimately belonging to one  special  
world1 to another one1 probably to the  
one with which he was  first acquainted2
 but then we have those awkward hybrids1
 the economics  of the literary man1 or 
the literature of the biologist1 or the 
biology  of the economist2 and the      
confusion is so apparent that it        
generally  reflects itself in the very  
quality of the terminology employed4    
,it was against this kind of confusion1 
against the transference of the         
concepts of one science into another1   
which was the favourite device  of      
positivism1 that ,croce continually     
reacted in his criticism of             
contemporary thought4 ,he instinctively 
knew the value of distinctions1  and    
also the value of unity2 but he would   
never pay for unity at the  expense of  
the fine1 precise1 necessary            
distinctions4 ,this explains  why for a 
certain number of years he may have     
appeared as a man  occupied in the      

pursuit of two quite different and      
unconnected lines of  research3 his     
literary friends used to look on his    
economic studies  with wonder and       
distrust1 as on a strange whim and a    
total waste of  time1 while the         
economists more or less resented the    
intrusion of the  outsider4 ,but it     
explains also why1 when he finally      
attempted to give  shape to the         
conclusions he had reached in regard to 
one particular  group of problems1 his  
grasp of the essential unity and his    
power to  build an inclusive and        
unspecialized conception of reality1    
were made  visible at once4 ,there was  
no special problem of thought which     
could be  treated apart from an either  
implicit or explicit view of the whole  
of  reality3 there was no solution of   
any particular problem which would  not 
affect1 and in turn be affected by1 the 
solution of every other  problem4 ,or1  
to say the same thing in different      
words1 philosophy was  a system1 not in 

the sense that a rigid logical scheme   
could once  and forever fit the ever    
moving stream of reality1 but because it
 is  impossible to think the            
distinctions without the unity1 or the  
unity  without the distinctions4 ,that  
which appears to us1 psychologically1   
as the main characteristic of ,croce's  
mind1 transforms itself into the        
intrinsic logic of his system1 in which 
the principles of unity and of          
distinction are1 as we shall see1       
fundamental4    ,in the year #ahii      
,croce had been compelled to spend a    
good part of  his time in a more or less
 practical activity in connection with  
the  ,centenary of the ,neapolitan      
,republic of #agii1 and it was only     
towards  the end of that year that he   
could dedicate himself entirely to  the 
work he had constantly had in mind since
 the publication of his  essays on      
literary criticism3 the exposition of   
his concept of art  in the fulness of   
its relations and determinations4 ,it   

will be well  to let ,croce himself give
 us an account of that decisive moment1 
of  the ripening and gathering of his   
various speculations into their  first  
coherent and systematic expression4     
,when ,i started my work1  and began to 
collect my scattered thoughts1 ,i found 
myself extremely  ignorant3 the gaps    
multiplied themselves in my sight2 those
 same things  that ,i thought ,i held   
well in my grasp wavered and became     
confused2  unsuspected questions came   
forward asking for an answer2 and during
  five months ,i read almost nothing1   
walked for hours and hours1 spent  half 
days and whole days lying on a couch1   
searching assiduously within  myself1   
and putting down on paper notes and     
thoughts1 each of which  was a criticism
 of the other4 ,this torment grew much  
worse1 when in  ,november ,i tried to   
set forth in a concise memoir the       
fundamental  theses of sthetics1        
because1 ten times at least1 having     
carried my  work up to a certain point1 

,i became aware of the necessity of     
taking  a step which was not justified  
logically1 and ,i started all over again
  in order to discover in the beginnings
 the obscurity or error which had       
brought me to that quandary2 and1 having
 rectified the error1 again  went my    
way1 and a little further ,i again      
stumbled into a similar  difficulty4    
,only after six or seven more months was
 ,i able to send  to the press that     
memoir in the form in which it has been 
printed  under the title ,tesi          
fondamentali di un' ,estetica come      
scienza dell'  espressione e linguistica
 generale2 arid and abstruse1 but from  
which1 once ,i had finished it1 ,i came 
out not only quite oriented in  regard  
to the problems of the mind1 but also   
with an awakened and  sure understanding
 of almost all the principal problems   
about which  classical philosophers have
 toiled3 an understanding which cannot  
be  acquired by merely reading their    
books1 but only by repeating within     

oneself1 under the stimulus of life1    
their mental drama4#a ,we are  so used  
to see the intellectual worker          
surrounded and propped up by  libraries1
 laboratories1 files1 and statistics1   
that the sight of a  man abandoning his 
books1 giving himself up to what by all 
material  standards must be classed as a
 state of idleness1 in order to withdraw
  into the intimacy of his own          
consciousness1 there to find an answer  
to the problems of reality1 cannot but  
strike us as incongruous and            
anachronistic4 ,if we were frank about  
ourselves1 we should confess that  our  
unbounded confidence in the purely      
material helps is merely a mask  for our
 deep-rooted scepticism1 for our        
absolute lack of confidence  in the     
power of reason4 ,what we cannot hope to
 attain through our  individual effort1 
we expect as the product of a great     
machine of  thought1 in which man enters
 as a little wheel1 accomplishing a     
given function1 as mechanical and       

impersonal as the rest of the  machine4 
,we strive for objectivity1 and believe 
in the automatic  fabrication of truth4 
,through a false analogy with the       
methods of the  natural sciences1       
imperfectly understood1 and assimilated 
to those of  industrial production1 we  
call this process scientific1 and we    
pretend  to despise what we fear1 the   
testimony of our consciousness and the  
hardships of personal thought4 ,reason1 
the human reason1 the ultimate  source  
of all knowledge1 we pay lip homage to1 
but really put in the  same category as 
the obscure intuition of the mystic4    
,outside our  mechanical objectivity1 we
 seem unable to see anything but an     
arbitrary  subjectivism1 a capricious   
and empirical individuality4    ,but    
however incongruous and anachronistic it
 may appear to us1 there  is little     
doubt that this method is the only      
philosophical method1 the  method of    
philosophy in all times4 ,croce's       
originality consists merely  in having  

reasserted its validity in such sharp   
contrast to all the  tendencies of the  
age1 and to have shown that true        
objectivity belongs  only to the truth  
we discover within ourselves1 when the  
eye of our  mind is not turned on the   
transient spectacle of our superficial  
life1  but is reaching under it for that
 universal consciousness which is  the  
foundation of the individual one4 ,there
 is no scholar who is as  exacting and  
punctilious as ,croce in the choice and 
elaboration of his  material--as        
conscious of the need of thoroughness   
and precision--as  impatient of any form
 of improvisation2 but he never forgets 
that  the end of all his labours is     
merely that of knowing himself1 in  the 
spirit of the ancient oracle1 by        
acquiring a direct1 intimate  experience
 of the processes through which a mind  
of to-day has come to  be what is truly 
is2 of making his own individual        
consciousness partake  more and more of 
that universality which alone is true   

consciousness1  by liberating itself    
from all casual determinations1 and     
becoming  historically acquainted with  
itself4 ,it is easy to see how in such a
  general attitude the road to          
philosophy is also the road to history2 
and how both in philosophy and in       
history the final test must be not  that
 of the dead material1 but of the living
 spirit4    ,the employment of such a   
method leads to two consequences3 the   
first1  that a philosophy thus conceived
 will be a philosophy of the human      
spirit--,filosofia dello ,spirito--or1  
as we1 following the habits of          
,english-speaking philosophers1 shall   
tentatively call it1 a philosophy  of   
mind2 the second1 that the universality 
which the individual spirit  discovers  
within itself1 not being a static1      
immovable universality1  but merely the 
form of its ever-changing1 historical   
actuality1  philosophy itself will be a 
continuous progress1 and at no          
particular  moment will it be possible  

to define the thought of the philosopher
 as  a completed system4 ,as we cannot1 
however1 in the small compass of this   
book1 minutely follow all the successive
 modifications and accretions  of       
,croce's thought1 we shall speak of the 
ten years between #aijj and  #aiaj as of
 the period in which the system of the  
philosophy of mind  was developed and   
determined1 and we shall attempt in the 
following  chapters to give a general   
view of the system itself as it might   
have  appeared in #aiaj to a            
conscientious student of all the works  
of ,croce  published during that        
interval of time4    ,the ,tesi         
contained already the substance of the  
,estetica come  scienza dell'           
espressione e linguistica generale which
 was completed  in #aija and published  
in #aijb1 and with which ,croce         
definitely took  his place in modern    
philosophy4 ,the book is divided in two 
parts1 the  exposition of the theory and
 the history of the doctrine4 ,but the  

two  parts are very closely related to  
each other1 as the exposition already   
criticises all the possible aspects of  
sthetic theory1 and the history  merely 
disposes the same criticisms in a       
chronological order1 and  labels each of
 them with a name4 ,this plan1 with     
slight alterations1 is  that of the     
successive volumes of the ,filosofia    
dello ,spirito3 to the  reader who is   
already acquainted with the history of  
philosophy1 the  historical character of
 the purely theoretical exposition is   
readily  apparent4    ,soon after the   
publication of the ,estetica1 ,croce    
began to consider  his book merely as a 
programme and a sketch which needed     
filling in  with further                
developments1--with the investigation of
 the other forms  of human activity1    
which had been merely postulated in the 
study of  the sthetic activity2 and with
 a wide cultural work1 to be carried  on
 especially by means of a review1       
through which his ideas should  be      

tested in immediate and constant        
relation with the problems of           
contemporary ,italian and ,european     
thought4 ,the enormous activity of the  
following years falls easily into this  
rough division4 ,on one hand we  have   
the completion of the ,filosofia dello  
,spirito1 with the ,logica  come scienza
 del concetto puro1 the first edition of
 which appeared  in #aije 7,lineamenti  
di una ,logica1 etc471 and the second1  
deeply  modified by his meditations on  
the practical activity1 in #aiji1 with  
the ,filosofia della ,pratica3          
,economica ed ,etica1 written in #aijh1 
but of which some parts had already been
 given in #aijg in the memoir           
,riduzione della filosofia del diritto  
alla filosofia dell' economia2  and with
 the new and fuller formulation of his  
sthetics in a paper  read to the        
,international ,congress of ,philosophy 
in ,heidelberg in #aijh1  on            
,l'intuizione pura e il carattere lirico
 dell' arte4 ,to these must  be added   

the two monographs on ,hegel 7#aijf7 and
 ,vico 7#aiaj71 which are  at the same  
time an exposition of their philosophies
 and a restatement  of ,croce's own main
 positions1 in so far as they coincided 
with those  elements of truth which he  
still recognized as living in their     
thought4    ,on the other hand we have  
the publication of a bi-monthly review1 
,la  ,critica1 the first number of which
 appeared in ,january1 #aijc1 and  which
 is still being published4 ,la ,critica 
announced itself as a  review of        
literature1 history and philosophy1 but 
it differed from  all other publications
 in the same fields in two main         
features3 the  first1 that the number of
 its contributors was practically       
limited to  two1 ,croce himself1 and his
 friend ,giovanni ,gentile1 with whom he
 had  first been brought in contact     
through their common interest in        
,marxian  studies1 and who followed for 
some years at least a line of thought   
which touched his own at many points2   

the second1 that it imposed upon  itself
 a very definite programme of work1 each
 number containing an  essay1 or part of
 an essay1 by ,croce on some ,italian   
writer of the  preceding half-century1  
and one by ,gentile on the ,italian     
philosophers  of the same period1       
besides a number of reviews of new      
,italian and  foreign books1 and notes  
and comments on contemporary questions  
of  culture and moral life4 ,in his own 
main work for the ,critica1  ,croce was 
at the same time aiming at giving       
concrete examples of the  application of
 sthetic theory in the domain of        
literary criticism1 and  at clearing the
 ground for the work of the new         
generation1 through an  appraisement of 
the literary values of the preceding    
one4 ,the general  temper of the review 
is clearly expressed in the following   
words  from the already so often quoted 
autobiographical notes3 ,the ideal      
which ,i cherished was drawn not from my
 own personality1 but from my  varied   

experience1 because1 having lived       
sufficiently in the academic  world to  
know both its virtues and its faults1   
and having at the same  time preserved a
 feeling of real life1 and of literature
 and science  as being born from it and 
renovating themselves in it1 ,i         
addressed  my censures and my polemics  
on one hand against dilettanti and      
unmethodical workers1 on the other      
against the academicians resting in     
their prejudices and idling with the    
externals of art and science4#b    ,the 
greatest part of the writings           
contributed by ,croce to the ,critica   
during these years were later collected 
in volumes1 of which however  only the  
,problemi d',estetica 7#aiaj71          
containing1 besides the  ,heidelberg    
lecture1 a large number of essays both  
on the theory and  history of sthetics1 
appeared before the end of the period we
 are now  considering4 ,to intensify the
 action of both his books and his       
review1  he initiated in #aijf1 in      

connection with the publisher ,laterza  
of ,bari1  the publication of a series  
of ,classici della filosofia moderna1 in
  which he published his own translation
 of ,hegel's ,encyclopedia2 and  in     
#aiji1 of the collection ,scrittori d'  
,italia1 which is in the way  to        
becoming the standard corpus of ,italian
 ,literature4 ,he took also  a leading  
part in the editing of the same         
publisher's ,biblioteca di  cultura     
moderna1 which was enriched through his 
care and advice with  reprints of rare  
works of southern ,italian writers of   
the ,risorgimento  and of the early     
years of the ,unity1 and with           
translations of books  representative of
 foreign contemporary thought4    ,if we
 add to all this1 a number of scattered 
essays and monographs1  editions of     
texts and documents1 and bibliographies1
 and the generous  cooperation1         
extending from the friendly discussion  
of plans and ideas  to the humble       
reading of proofs1 with a host of       

friends and disciples1  we have a fairly
 complete idea of the significance of   
,croce in the  cultural life of young   
,italy4 ,he very rapidly became         
something like an  institution2 he was  
hailed as the master and spiritual guide
 of the  new generation4 ,his work and  
his example1 the clarity of his thought 
and the rhythm of his steady1           
harmonious1 powerful activity1 were an  
element not of the limited life of the  
intellectual laboratory only1  but of   
the spiritual life of the nation4       
,footnote #a3 ,contributo1 pp4 #dj-da4  
,footnote #b3 ,contributo1 p4 #dh4      
,,ii4 ,,intuition ,,and ,,expression#a  
,the four grades of spiritual           
activity--,intuition and conceptual     
knowledge--,the intuitive               
consciousness--,the limits of intuitive 
knowledge--,identifications of intuition
 and expression--,art as  expression3   
content and form--,language as          
expression2 the reality of              
words--,croce's use of the word         

intuition--,the lyrical character of the
  pure intuition4      ,the whole cycle 
of the philosophy of mind exhausts      
itself in the  study of the four        
fundamental forms of human activity1 the
 concepts  of which we have seen slowly 
developing through the mazes of ,croce's
  early speculations3 the sthetic1 the  
logic1 the economic and the  ethic2 of  
the distinction and the unity of sthetic
 and logic in the  theoretical activity1
 or knowledge1 and of economic and ethic
 in the  practical activity1 or action2 
and finally of the relations between    
the theoretical and the practical1 or   
knowledge and action4 ,this may  be said
 to be the positive aspect of ,croce's  
philosophy3 the negative  aspect        
consists in the criticism and exclusion 
of any other form of  activity from the 
system of the human spirit1 and of that 
which is not  the spirit1 or nature1    
from the system of reality4    ,to the  
four forms or grades of spiritual       
activity1 correspond four  philosophical

 sciences3 sthetics1 ,logic1 ,economics1
 and ,ethics4  ,each of them can be said
 to be the organum of the particular    
form  of activity which it studies2 the 
affirmation of that sphere of           
consciousness which is proper to it1 and
 of its relations to the other  forms4  
,each of them is therefore related to   
the others in the same  way as the      
various forms of activity are related to
 each other4 ,they  might be defined as 
the projection on the plane of logic of 
the whole  system of human activity1    
that is1 of the whole of reality4 ,they 
derive  their intrinsic validity from   
this perfect coincidence of their       
several  objects with the only          
conceivable aspects of reality4    ,we  
shall in this and in the following      
chapters attempt to fill in with  the   
strictly necessary detail this very     
ample frame4 ,but we can already  point 
to the idealistic character of such a   
philosophy resulting from  its method1  
which is that of the testimony of       

consciousness1 as opposed  to the       
naturalistic or psychologic method of   
indirect observation2 from  its object1 
which is the human spirit or mind in the
 fulness of its  determinations2 and    
from the exclusion of any aspect of     
reality which  is not immanent in       
consciousness1 that is1 both of the     
naturally and  the supernaturally       
transcendent4 ,as against another kind  
of idealism1  of which the typical      
example is ,platonic transcendentalism1 
,croce's  idealism is realistic and     
immanentistic3 the task of the          
philosophy of  mind is to discover the  
immanent logic of reality4 ,but against 
current  realism1 which considers mind  
as the mere spectator and observer of   
external or natural reality1 it asserts 
the identity of reality and             
consciousness1 which is the basic       
position of all idealism4    ,there are 
two forms of knowledge3 intuitive 7or   
sthetic7 and  conceptual 7or logical74  
,intuition is the knowledge of the      

individual  or particular2 the concept  
is the knowledge of the universal4 ,this
  distinction1 as we have already seen1 
corresponds roughly to the old          
classical distinction of mythos and     
logos1 to ,vico's definitions  of poetry
 and metaphysics1 and to the new meaning
 given by ,baumgarten  to the old       
antithesis of aisthta and nota4 ,let us 
quote ,vico  again3 ,men first feel     
without perceiving1 then they perceive  
and are  perturbed and moved2 finally   
they reflect with pure mind4 ,here we   
have  three successive grades1 of which 
the first is mere sensation1 the  lower 
limit of mental activity2 the second is 
intuition2 the third1  concept4 ,for    
,vico1 the second grade is identical    
with ,poetry1 and the  science of this  
form of knowledge1 which we call        
sthetics1 he called  ,poetic ,logic1 the
 science of poetry as the first         
operation of the  human mind4 ,vico's   
discovery consists in this definition of
 ,poetry  7and ,art71 not as a casual1  

capricious1 lateral form of spiritual   
activity1 but as the first and necessary
 grade of knowledge1 as an  essential   
function of the mind4 ,but ,vico's      
thought was clothed in what  we might   
well call a mythological form3 the      
various grades of spiritual  activity   
were presented by him as successive     
stages or epochs in the  history of     
mankind2 and the inter-relation of the  
various grades1 as  the actual law of   
the development of human society4 ,croce
 unravelled  ,vico's philosophy1 or     
ideal history1 history of the mind1 from
 ,vico's  concrete1 sociological        
history1 and the result was this new    
sthetics  which is at the same time a   
science of the first grade of knowledge1
  and of art and language4    ,of the   
reality of intuitive1 as distinct from  
reflected knowledge1 we  have constant  
evidence in our immediate experience4   
,if ,i examine my  own consciousness1 at
 any particular moment1 ,i find it      
crowded with  things ,i know1 as1 now1  

this room in which ,i am writing1 the   
piano  that is open before me1 the      
flowers in a little basket1 blue        
fragments  of sky and green branches    
washed by the recent rain swaying in the
  clear sunlight1 the shrill voice of a 
child from the road1 the light  steps of
 a girl moving about the house4 ,i am   
not conscious of all  these intuitions  
at once3 ,i write1 and ,i distinctly    
know this white  paper only1 and the    
black signs ,i am tracing1 the pen      
guided by my  hand1 and the edges of a  
few books on my table3 all the rest has 
faded  away into a blurred1 fused       
intuition1 the intuition of an          
atmosphere1  composed of mere shreds and
 shadows of the colours and sounds of   
which  ,i was so distinctly conscious   
but one minute ago4 ,but now ,i put down
  my pen again1 and ,i look at the      
piano2 and ,i let my mind wander away1  
from what ,i see to what ,i remember or 
imagine3 the fair-headed figure  playing
 this morning ,franck's ,prelude1       

,choral and ,fugue1 the rapid and  sure 
movements of the fingers on the white   
and black keys1 a vague  image of the   
solemn and passionate music1 memories of
 distant days1  a sudden rush of obscure
 fantasies1 evoked by the actual        
playing1  and still lingering in the    
recesses of my mind1 returning now with 
a fragment of a melody1 with a          
succession of triumphant chords4 ,and   
again1 ,i look beyond the window1 and   
the little square of green and  blue    
expands itself into the vast valley     
beyond1 screened from my view  by these 
few trees clustering around the house1  
and yet mysteriously  present to my     
inner eye3 ,i see a little company of   
riders cantering  along a shaded lane1  
coming out in an open meadow surrounded 
by low1  thick-wooded hills2 the sun    
sets in a pale purple sky1 and ,i hear  
the  tramping of the slow1 heavy hoofs1 
as the horses find their way back       
through the woods1 through a darkness   
much more opaque and solid than  that of

 the remote twilight1 still visible     
above the highest branches1  animated by
 the first faint glittering of a star4  
,and the woods are  full of a myriad    
small breathing and stirring noises1 of 
the sense of  the deep surging inhuman  
life of trees and shrubs1 of the        
penetrating  scent of the rich damp     
earth1 of decaying wood1 of fallen      
leaves4    ,and now1 ,i suddenly shut   
myself out of this world of perceptions 
and  imaginations1 or rather ,i keep    
them all before me1 but not because  of 
the immediate1 individual interest ,i   
have in each of them4 ,i try  to extract
 the common1 the universal element of   
which ,i suspect the  existence not     
beyond but within them4 ,i renounce all 
particular  intuitions for the concept  
of intuition4 ,i am no longer an        
image-making  mind1 no longer engaged in
 this elementary or first operation of  
the human mind1 but ,i have passed on to
 a different1 and manifestly a          
secondary plane of mental activity1     

since it would be impossible for  me to 
root my thinking anywhere but on the    
soil of my intuitions4    ,what1 then1  
is intuition8 ,clearly it is not the    
mere sensation1 the  formless matter    
which the mind cannot grasp in itself1  
as mere matter1  but possesses only by  
imposing its form on it4 ,without matter
 no human  knowledge or activity is     
possible1 but matter is1 within         
ourselves1 the  animal element1 that    
which is brutal and impulsive1 not the  
spiritual  domain1 which is humanity4   
,matter conquered by form gives place to
  the concrete form4 ,matter1 or        
content1 is what differentiates one     
intuition from another2 the form is     
constant1 and the form is the  spiritual
 activity4 ,in this way we set the lower
 limit of intuitive  knowledge1 and we  
recognize its characters of awareness   
and activity3  an intuition is not that 
which presents itself to me1 but that   
which  ,i make my own1 by giving form to
 it4 ,it may be an actual perception1   

but the distinction between that which  
is real and that which is  imaginary is 
not an intuitive1 but a logical or      
intellectual one2  the knowledge of     
things which ,i do not perceive1 but    
only remember1  or even only create with
 my imagination belongs to the same     
class1  partakes of the same formal     
character4 ,space and time1 which have  
more  than once been considered as      
intuitions1 are in reality categories   
of an intellectual order3 they may be   
found in intuitions1 as other           
intellectual elements are found1 but as 
ingredients and not as  necessary       
elements1 materialiter and not          
formaliter4 ,in relation to  the usual  
psychological concepts of association   
and representation1 it  can be said that
 an intuition is an association1 when by
 that word we  mean an active mental    
synthesis1 and not a mechanical         
juxtaposition of  abstract sensations2  
and that it is a representation1 not as 
a complex  sensation1 but as a spiritual

 elaboration of the sensation4    ,the  
upper limit of intuitive knowledge is   
given by reflected1 or  intellectual1 or
 logical knowledge1 or whatever we may  
call that  which is no longer knowledge 
of the individual1 of things1 but of the
  universal1 of relations among things1 
of concepts4 ,intuitive knowledge  is   
independent of intellectual knowledge1  
as it is possible to form  intuitions   
without forming concepts2 in the        
examples which ,i have  given in the    
preceding paragraph1 practically all the
 intuitions are  pure intuitions1 in the
 sense that they do not contain any     
logical  ingredients4 ,but even when    
such are found1 they appear as mere     
intuitions1 and not as concepts3 as1 for
 instance1 ,hamlet's philosophy1  which 
,i do not read as a help towards the    
understanding of metaphysical  problems1
 but as a characterization of an        
imaginery individual4 ,on the  other    
hand1 logical knowledge is founded on   
intuitions1 presupposes  the world of   

intuitions as its matter or content4    
,the relation between  sthetic and      
logical knowledge is one of grade or    
development3 the  former stands by      
itself1 rests directly on that which is 
not yet spirit  or form1 is the first   
grade of spiritual or human activity2   
the latter  gives a further spiritual   
elaboration to the intuitive material4  
,this relationship1 to which we shall   
return later1 is the typical  process of
 ,croce's own logic1 the logic of       
spiritual or mental grades1  which he   
substitutes throughout his system for   
the naturalistic or  transcendental     
logic of his early masters4    ,a       
further step in the deduction of the    
concept of intuitive or sthetic         
knowledge1 is made by identifying       
intuition with expression4 ,given the   
active and conscious character of       
intuition1 we are already prepared to   
admit that every true intuition is at   
the same time an expression2 that  which
 cannot objectify itself into an        

expression is nothing but mere          
sensation4 ,the mind does not actually  
intuit except by doing1 forming1  and   
expressing4 ,we must not think only of  
verbal expressions3 there  are          
intuitions which cannot be expressed by 
words1 but only by sounds  or lines or  
colours4 ,but in any case the two words 
are interchangeable3  what really exists
 in our spirit is only what we can      
express4 ,it is  only when we can       
express ourselves1 that we are conscious
 of actually  possessing1 that is1 of   
having actually formed1 our intuitions4 
,it is  impossible to distinguish the   
expression from the intuition because   
they are not two but one4    ,this      
identification runs counter to a number 
of very common and very  dear delusions3
 we constantly imagine that the         
difference between  ourselves and a     
great painter or a great poet does not  
consist in the  power of seeing and     
feeling1 but in a supposed gift of      
merely external  expression2 and again1 

we credit ourselves with a number of    
thoughts  and images1 which we might    
express if we only wished to4 ,the      
easiest  way to free ourselves of such  
delusions is to try to express whatever 
it seems to us that we possess3 it      
becomes then apparent that our          
pictorial or poetical intuitions are    
really mere fragments1 or echoes1  of   
intuitions2 are1 in fact1 not more than 
that which we succeed in  expressing4   
,it must however be borne in mind that  
we give here to the  word expression a  
purely mental or spiritual significance3
 we mean by  it the image that we form  
in our mind1 and of which the painting  
or the  poem1 as objects1 are the       
material extrinsications4 ,it requires  
but  little reflection to realize that  
there is no painting or poem--there  is 
no word that we utter--unless it be a   
mere flatus vocis1 which  has not been  
preceded in our mind by an internal     
image1 which is the  true expression4   
,the reader will have remarked that1 in 

order to give examples of  intuitive    
knowledge1 we have now had recourse to  
poetry and to  painting4 ,the fact is   
that there is no difference between     
intuitive  knowledge1 or expression1 and
 art1 except a purely extensive and     
empirical one3 that is1 we call a poet  
or an artist a man who possesses  this  
expressive power in a higher degree than
 the rest of mankind2  we call a poem or
 a work of art an expression which is   
fuller1 more  complex1 more elaborate1  
than those which are the product of our 
common intuitive activity1 mere waves of
 the continuous stream of  spiritual    
life1 in which they are constantly      
interrupted by and mixed  with          
reflections and volitions1 with logical 
and practical facts4 ,the  difference   
between the genius and the common man1  
in the sthetic as  well as in the other 
spheres of human activity1 is a         
quantitative1  not a qualitative one4   
,art is not a peculiar spiritual        
function1 and  therefore a closed circle

 to which none but the elect are        
admitted3 the  artist appeals to the    
intuitive man in each of us1 in a       
language of  which every human mind     
finds the key within itself4    ,the    
definition of art as expression         
emphasizes the creative and formal      
character of art2 and its immediate     
consequence is the identification  of   
form and content1 that is1 the solution 
of one of the oldest and  most confused 
of sthetic problems4 ,art is form1 not  
in the technical  or formalistic sense1 
but in the meaning which we have given  
to the  word when discussing the        
relation between sensation and          
intuition2 and  the content of a        
particular work of art cannot be        
abstracted from the  work itself as     
something that existed before it1 and to
 which a form  has been added from      
outside4 ,there is no content1 in art1  
which is not  the content of a          
particular form1 that is1 that which has
 ceased to  exist as a possible content1

 and has transformed itself into a      
definite  form4 ,this conception of the 
relations of form and content implies   
also either a new interpretation1 or the
 repudiation1 of the theory  of art as  
the imitation of nature1 meaningless in 
a mechanical sense1  true1 and          
synonymous with the theory of intuition1
 in a creative and  formative sense4    
,through the same critical process1 all 
discussions of  the relations between   
art and the senses appear as being      
founded on a  confusion between that    
which is still beyond the limit of      
spiritual  activity1 the sensation or   
impression1 and the actual sthetic      
elaboration1 which begins only when the 
mind becomes aware of the  impression   
that has reached it through the channel 
of the senses4    ,we have mentioned1 in
 connection with the identification of  
intuition  and expression1 the fact that
 every word that we utter is constantly 
preceded by an internal image2 which is 
as much as saying that  language is a   

perpetual spiritual creation1 on the    
same plane as all  our other            
expressions1 and as art4 ,we are        
accustomed to seeing dead  words and    
syllables in grammars and dictionaries1 
and we consider  them as something      
external1 as a kind of instrument that  
we use and  accommodate to this and that
 purpose4 ,but words that grammarians   
study1 through a naturalistic process1  
as independent elements of  the         
linguistic organism1 are really alive   
and full of their meaning  only in the  
active context of speech4 ,the reality  
of words is only in  the individual     
spirit that speaks1 and every word is   
new every time  that it is employed     
because it expresses that particular1   
individual  moment of spiritual         
activity1 which cannot be the same as   
any other  one4 ,philologists have been 
divided on the question of the origin of
  language for centuries1 some finding  
it in the logical activity1 others  in a
 system of mechanical symbols and       

conventions1 a few admitting the        
conception of language as a pure sthetic
 creation only for a mythic1  primitive 
period1 which is succeeded in the       
history of every language  by a period  
of development by convention and        
association4 ,but1 as in  all other     
branches of spiritual activity1 it is   
here impossible to draw  a distinction  
between the problem of the origins and  
the problem of  the nature of language3 
linguistic expressions have fixed       
themselves  in the course of centuries  
and stand before us as a body of        
language1  as a reality independent of  
the individual activity that produces   
the  particular expressions2 this is    
what prevents us from recognizing in    
the actual linguistic facts the same    
creative energy that formed the  first  
words uttered by man4    ,in this       
reduction of the philosophy of language 
to sthetics1 ,croce  again follows      
,vico1 who professed to have found the  
true origins  of languages in the       

principles of poetry1 who first asserted
 the  functional identity of language   
and poetry4 ,this theory1 however1      
seems to clash with the existence of    
what we might call the implicit         
conceptuality of language1 of which we  
are constantly made aware by our        
grammatical categories4 ,the fact is    
that the relation between language  and 
concept is the same as between intuition
 and concept3 that is1 on  one side1    
language is the material of our         
reflected thought1 and it  would be     
impossible for the reflection to begin  
without or before the  language2 but1 on
 the other hand1 the concepts appear in 
language not  as forms but as matter4   
,in other words1 to speak it is not     
necessary  to think logically1 but it is
 impossible to think logically without  
speaking4 ,the grammatical categories   
are not real elements of language1  but 
products of abstraction1 of a purely    
practical character1 of the  kind that  
we shall soon have to examine in the    

rhetoric of the arts4    ,what may help 
us1 in thus conceiving of the active and
 intuitive  character of language1 is a 
comparison with other classes of        
expressive  facts4 ,when we speak of    
musical or pictorial language1 we are   
aware  that we are using mere metaphors 
for the purpose of collecting certain   
general characteristics which are common
 to some of these facts4 ,the  various  
musical grammars1 the rules of harmony  
or of orchestration1 are  nothing but   
summaries of abstractions3 in the       
presence of a certain  music1 or of a   
certain picture1 we cannot forget the   
principle that no  expression can give  
birth to a new expression without first 
undergoing  a new creative process4 ,and
 this is as true of the highest forms of
  artistic expression as of the words   
which we use in our daily life4    ,a   
number of objections to ,croce's        
sthetics have been prompted by his  use 
of the word intuition4 ,to the reader   
who has followed our argument1  it is   

not necessary to explain that ,croce's  
intuition has nothing in  common either 
with the mystic intuition of the        
,neoplatonists or of  the               
ultra-romantics1 or with the intuition  
which ,bergson substitutes  for the     
intellect as the proper organ of        
absolute knowledge4 ,it is  not a       
mysterious instrument of the mind1 by   
which man can either come  in contact   
with supernatural realities1 or1        
renouncing that which is  distinctively 
human in him1 enter into the actual     
movement and life  of nature4 ,the fact 
that ,croce has spent so much time and  
thought  in trying to understand this   
first1 nave1 elementary grade of the    
theoretical activity1 does not justify  
his critics in putting him in  the same 
class either with romantic              
metaphysicians or with romantic         
naturalists4 ,that such a confusion has 
ever been possible is only a  further   
proof of the immaturity and             
superficiality of a large part of  our  

most solemn contemporary thought4 ,it   
shows how it has been given to  grown-up
 and apparently educated men1 to read a 
book without knowing  what its subject  
was1 and without even being able to     
shield themselves  behind the saving    
grace of silence4    ,an objection of a 
quite different order was raised by     
,croce himself1  who found its solution 
in the elaboration of his philosophy of 
the practical1 or of will4 ,it can be   
said of the theory of art as  intuition1
 that it reduces art to a form of       
knowledge1 to a theoretical  function1  
while what we look for in works of art  
is life and movement1  and the feeling  
and personality of the artist1 that is1 
something  that is not theoretical but  
practical4 ,the answer might be that the
  feeling is content and the intuition  
form2 but such a dualistic point  of    
view would in reality destroy not only  
,croce's sthetics1 but the  foundations 
of his whole philosophy of mind4 ,and we
 would be back at a  position which we  

thought we had already criticised and   
surpassed4 ,the  truth is that          
intuition1 and the personality1 or      
lyrical character1  of a work of art1   
are only different aspects of the same  
spiritual  process1 that where one is1  
the other too will have to be found4    
,what  we can abstract as the psychic   
content of intuition1 since we have     
already excluded abstractions and       
concepts1 is only what we call          
appetition1 tendency1 feeling1 will--the
 various facts which constitute  the    
practical form of the human spirit4     
,pure intuition cannot  represent       
anything but the will in its            
manifestations1 that is1 nothing  but   
states of mind4 ,and the states of mind 
are that passion1 feeling1  and         
personality which we find in art1 and   
which determine its lyrical  character4 
,in order properly to understand this   
new point of view1 it must be  borne in 
mind that the lyrical character of the  
poetry does not  however coincide with  

the practical passion of the poet3 the  
relation  between the emotion and the   
intuition is not a deterministic one1 as
  of cause and effect1 but a creative   
one1 as of matter and form4 ,the        
poetical vibration is different in kind 
from the practical one4 ,if ,i  grasp   
,croce's meaning correctly1 the feeling 
and movement which we  find in art is   
something that belongs intrinsically to 
the intuitive  activity--it is the      
dynamic of the creative process itself4 
,and  in fact1 what we look for in the  
works of art is not the empirical       
personality of the artist1 but the      
tonality of his individual sthetic      
activity1 which is always new and always
 unmistakably his own1--not  the rhythm 
of his passion but that of his vision or
 contemplation1  of his intuition of the
 passion4 ,any other way of considering 
this  relation would inevitably lead us 
back to the conventional distinction  of
 form and content1 to the attribution of
 sthetic characters to  the emotions    

themselves1 and to a definition of      
intuition not as a  simple and primitive
 fact1 but as a combination of the      
practical and  the theoretical1 of will 
and knowledge4 ,i consider this         
deduction of  the lyrical character of  
intuition as one of the points of       
,croce's  sthetics which opens the way  
to new problems and stand in need of    
further elaboration2 but what is        
important in it1 and already firmly     
established1 is the recognition of this 
character1 through which the  whole     
doctrine of intuition gains a deeper and
 richer meaning1 and  becomes more apt  
to deal with the concrete facts of our  
sthetic  experience4      ,footnote #a3 
,this chapter and the following two are 
founded especially  on the ,estetica1   
pp4 #a-aga2 the essay on ,l'intuizione  
pura e  il carattere lirico dell' arte1 
in ,problemi1 pp4 #a-cj2 and the        
,breviario1 in ,nuovi ,saggi1 pp4 #a-ia4
          ,,iii4 ,,the ,,concept ,,of   
,,art      ,further determinations of   

the concept of art--,theoretical and    
practical  activity--,the progress of   
sthetic theories--,an ,american         
instance3  morality and art--,the       
typical--,the ends of art--,the process 
of sthetic  production--,relations of   
the sthetic with the practical          
activity--,the  delusion of objective   
beauty--sthetic hedonism--,the sthetic  
value4      ,the determination of the   
concept of art as pure intuition would  
be  little more than a verbal variation 
of older doctrines1 if its validity  and
 importance could not be proved in the  
actual practice of thought on  sthetic  
problems1 in the study of the relations 
of the sthetic fact  with the other     
facts of human activity1 and in the     
criticism of errors  which have invaded 
the field of sthetic thought through a  
confusion of  the sthetic with the      
intellectual or the practical4 ,we shall
 therefore  not be able to grasp the new
 concept in the fulness of its meaning  
until we have surveyed the whole ground 

of the philosophy of mind3 the  sthetic 
concept cannot be said to be fully      
determined until we have  a clear       
conception of the other fundamental     
grades or forms of the  spirit4 ,for the
 purposes of our exposition1 we may     
however anticipate a  summary or scheme 
of the essential relations1 which will  
be more fully  developed in the         
following chapters4    ,we have already 
seen how the logical activity springs   
from the soil  of the pure intuition2   
how the knowledge of the universal      
follows the  knowledge of the           
individual4 ,the sthetic and the logic  
grade1 of which  the second implies the 
first1 exhaust the whole of knowledge1  
the  whole theoretical life of man4 ,a  
third grade or form does not exist3  not
 in history1 which ,croce still         
considered1 in the first years of  this 
period1 as reducible to the concept of  
art1 and differentiated  from it only by
 its employment of the predicate of     
existence1 of the  distinction between  

reality and imagination2 and not in the 
natural and  mathematical sciences1     
which elaborate the data of intuition   
through  fictions1 hypotheses1 and      
conventions1 which are practical and not
  theoretical processes4    ,the        
relation between the theoretical and the
 practical activity is  of the same kind
 as that between the two grades of the  
theoretical  activity3 that is1 the     
first is the basis of the second4 ,we   
can think  of a knowing which is        
independent from the will1 but not of a 
will  which is independent of knowledge3
 it is impossible to will without       
historical intuitions and a knowledge of
 relations4 ,within the  practical      
activity1 we can further distinguish two
 grades corresponding  to the two grades
 of the theoretical activity3 the       
economic1 which  is the will of the     
individual1 of a particular end1 and the
 ethic1  which is the will of the       
universal1 of the rational end4 ,the    
relation  between the economic and the  

ethic activity is again the same        
grade-relation as between the sthetic   
and the logic1 the theoretical  and the 
practical4 ,the concrete life of the    
human spirit consists in  the           
perpetually recurring cycle of the four 
grades of its activity1  which is the   
law of its unity and development4 ,the  
concept rises from  the intuition1 and  
action from knowledge2 ethical activity 
is not  conceivable without a           
theoretical foundation1 and the         
concreteness of  a particular end4 ,at  
the close of the cycle1 the spiritual   
life itself  becomes the object of a new
 intuition1 from which a new concept and
 a  new action are reproduced ad        
infinitum4 ,in the history of sthetics1 
the errors deriving from the confusion  
of that which is distinctively  sthetic 
with other forms of theoretical or      
practical activity1  present themselves 
as a series of doctrines1 which can be  
considered  as gradual approximations to
 the definition of art as intuition4 ,it

  is not necessarily1 or not only1 a    
chronological series1 but rather a      
succession of actual moments in the     
deduction of the concept of art4        
,empirical sthetics recognises the      
existence of a class of sthetic  or     
artistic facts1 without attempting to   
reduce them under a single  concept2    
practical 7hedonistic or moralistic7    
sthetics makes a first  attempt at      
interpreting them by putting them in    
relation with one  of the categories of 
spiritual activity2 intellectualiste    
sthetics  denies that they belong to the
 practical sphere1 though failing to    
discover their precise theoretical      
character2 agnostic sthetics  criticises
 all the preceding moments1 and is      
satisfied with a purely  negative       
definition2 mystic sthetics1 conscious  
of the difference of  sthetic from      
logical facts1 makes a new spiritual    
category of them1  affirms their        
autonomy and independence1 but mistakes 
the nature of  their relation with      

conceptual knowledge4 ,we are all more  
or less  familiar with the various      
aspects of these doctrines1 and it can  
be  said that none of them 7with the    
exception of the first1 which is now    
represented by psychologic sthetics7 is 
now being held consistently  by any     
responsible thinker4 ,the truth of the  
intuitive theory1 which  we find        
adumbrated already in classical         
antiquity in the ,aristotelian  theory  
of mimesis1 and of which artists and    
critics have always had a  kind of      
obscure presentiment1 is now implicitly 
recognised by all who  have an intimate 
contact with and a sincere feeling for  
art and poetry4  ,the literary and      
artistic development of the end of the  
eighteenth and  of the nineteenth       
century has been accompanied by such a  
wealth of  critical thought1 that a     
conscious understanding of the nature of
 art  is now much more frequent than in 
former ages4 ,the forces that were  at  
work liberating logical and moral       

thought from the shackles of the  past1 
reacted vigorously on sthetic thought1  
and helped to make it  more and more    
independent from both intellectualistic 
and moralistic  errors4 ,it would be    
possible to extract aphorisms and       
meditations from  the writings of the   
greatest poets1 artists1 and musicians  
of the  period1 to show how common among
 them was and is the knowledge of the   
spiritual autonomy and of the intuitive 
character of art4 ,but because  the task
 of the artist is not that of           
elaborating a philosophy of art1  and a 
good many critics and stheticians1 on   
the other hand1 have very  little       
experience of the actual sthetic        
processes1 we find that though  the     
other doctrines are discredited1 yet a  
number of prejudices which  have their  
roots in them are still current1--the   
artists themselves  rejecting them1 as  
it were1 by instinct and not by         
reasoning1 and the  critics and         
stheticians clinging to them because    

they help them to  gain a fictitious    
possession of that artistic reality     
which escapes  them in its purity and   
actuality4 ,an intellectualiste or      
moralistic  critic can easily mask his  
lack of sthetic taste1 his fundamental  
ignorance of art1 by talking at length  
and with great solemnity about          
unessentials4 ,artists and poets1 on the
 other hand1 are apt to react  to these 
prejudices by falling into the errors of
 stheticism1 that  is by attributing to 
their empirical selves the freedom that 
belongs  to their function1 and by      
denying in the name of art the autonomy 
and dignity of intellectual and moral   
values4 ,in both cases1 what is         
manifestly lacking is a proper          
understanding of the meaning of logical1
  or ideal distinctions1 for which the  
artists1 ,i suppose1 ought to be  more  
readily forgiven than the critics1      
though stheticism may be as  dangerous  
to art as moralism or intellectualism   
are to thought4    ,a recent literary   

polemic in ,america offered some        
striking examples of  these prejudices4 
,a critic of the older school1 in a     
discussion of the  moral tendencies of  
the age1 introduced a criticism of the  
proposition  that art is not concerned  
either with truth or morality1 by       
affirming  that this negative           
proposition could legitimately be       
converted into  the positive one3 the   
object of art is to deny that which     
truth and  morality affirm4 ,the sophism
 of this conversion is based on a       
confusion  between the two logical      
concepts of distinction and opposition4 
,the  critic was not deducing a logical 
consequence of the first proposition1   
any more than if he were interpreting my
 saying that ,i am not  interested as a 
student of literature in the law of     
gravitation1 as  implying a disbelief in
 the law of gravitation3 he was merely  
stating  his own conception of art as a 
conceptual and moral function1 and of   
the value of art as an intellectual and 

moral value2 which is the error  of     
intellectualism and moralism4 ,in his   
reply to the older critic1 a  writer of 
the younger generation contended that   
sthetic values are  higher than either  
logical or moral values1 and in some    
mysterious way  transcend and comprehend
 them both4 ,the younger writer was     
evidently  using the same kind of logic 
as his adversary1 and affirming on his  
own  account the error of a variety of  
stheticism4    ,what the original       
proposition actually implies is that    
judgments  regarding the logical truth  
or the historical verity1 the moral     
merit  or demerit of a work of art1 do  
not treat art as art1 but dissolve the  
work itself into its abstract elements1 
and deal with these elements in  an     
entirely different context4 ,if ,i      
discuss the theology and philosophy  of 
,dante1 ,i shall find a number of       
propositions which to my mind are       
untrue2 but the beauty of ,dante's      
poetry is incommensurable with the      

truth or falsehood of his logical       
thought4 ,the beauty of ,francesca's    
episode is not impaired by the quite    
reasonable suspicion that the  poetical 
idealization of a guilty passion might  
have a dangerous  influence on weak and 
sentimental souls4    ,the imperfect    
distinction between art and logical or  
scientific truth  is responsible for the
 critical prejudice of art as expressive
 of  the typical4 ,the typical is a     
product of abstract thought1 of the     
kind that is employed in the natural    
sciences4 ,the expressions of  art are  
essentially individual and particular1  
and when we consider  them as typical1  
we merely use them as the starting point
 for our  own abstractions1 that is1 for
 the purposes of a quite different      
mental process4 ,similar to the concept 
of the typical are those of  the        
allegory and symbol1 which are          
mechanical constructions of the         
intellect1 and which art is unable to   
represent unless it reduces them  to the

 particular and concrete4    ,the       
confusion between art and morality1     
being ultimately founded on  the        
supposition that art is not a           
theoretical function1 but an act of  the
 will1 gives rise to the theories of the
 ends of art1 and of the  so-called     
choice of the subject4 ,but the end of  
art is art itself1  expression or       
beauty1 or whatever other name we shall 
give to the  sthetic value1 just as the 
end of science is truth and the end of  
morality is goodness2 that is1 the      
concept of end coincides in every  case 
with the concept of value4 ,and the     
artist cannot choose his  subject1 since
 there is no abstract subject present to
 his mind1 but  only the world of his   
own already formed intuitions and       
expressions2  which he can neither will 
nor not will4 ,this is the truth        
contained in  the old idea of poetical  
inspiration1 which was merely another   
word for  the spontaneity and           
unreflectiveness of art4 ,a choice of   

the subject  according to ends other    
than sthetic is a certain cause of      
failure4  ,the only conceivable meaning 
that advice as to the choice of a       
subject  may have1 is a kind of artistic
 know thyself1 a warning to the artist  
to be true to himself1 to follow his    
inspiration1 and that which is  deepest 
and most genuine in it4 ,it is1 however1
 a tautological meaning1  and the       
reverse of the one which is given to it 
by the moralistic  critic4    ,if it is 
impossible for us either to will or not 
will our sthetic  vision1 the internal  
image which is the true work of art1 it 
is clear  that an element of will enters
 into the production of the physical  or
 external image1 made of sounds or lines
 or colours or shapes1  which we call   
works of art in a naturalistic or       
empirical sense4 ,the  complete process 
of sthetic production is symbolized by  
,croce in  the four following stages3 a1
 the impression2 b the expression or    
sthetic spiritual synthesis2 c1 the     

feeling of pleasure or pain  which      
accompanies the sthetic as well as any  
other form of spiritual  activity2 d1   
the translation of the sthetic fact into
 physical  phenomena4 ,the only true    
sthetic moment of the whole process is  
in  b1 which alone is real expression1  
while d is expression in the            
naturalistic and abstract sense of the  
word4 ,such a conception clashes        
against a number of deep-rooted         
fallacies1 which in their turn are the  
source of innumerable sthetic           
prejudices4 ,it is clear1 however1 that 
what we call a printed poem is no poem  
at all1 but only a collection of        
conventional black signs on a white     
page1 which suggest to me a number  of  
movements of my vocal organs destined to
 the production of certain  sounds2 and 
again1 that these sounds are not the    
poem in itself1 apart  from my          
understanding of their meaning1 from my 
re-creation of the  internal image which
 prompted their original production now 

recorded in  the pages of a book4       
,physically1 a painting is constituted  
by colours  on a wall1 or board1 or     
canvas3 here1 the first stage of        
reproduction  which is required for the 
written poem is not necessary3 the      
material  7visual1 as it was auditive   
for the poem7 on which the original     
image  fixed itself is directly present 
to me2 and yet1 again1 that material    
object is not the sthetic vision1 but a 
mere stimulus for its  reproduction4    
,starting from the material object1     
,croce symbolized the  inverse process  
of sthetic reproduction in the following
 series3 e1  the physical stimulus2 d-b1
 the perception of physical facts       
7sound1  colours1 etc471 which is at the
 same time the sthetic synthesis        
previously produced2 c1 the sthetic     
pleasure or pain4 ,here1 again1  the    
only moment of true sthetic activity is 
in b where1 at least in  the hypothesis 
of a perfect understanding1 my vision   
coincides with the  orignal creation4   

,it must be understood1 however1 that   
these successive stages are not  real1  
but abstract or symbolical distinctions4
 ,we cannot re-create  an sthetic vision
 except through the sounds or colours in
 which it  originally expressed itself2 
and those sounds or colours coincide    
with  the original expression4 ,the     
words and rhythm of a poem are to it    
what  the body is to the soul1 and once 
you have dissolved that form1 there  is 
nothing left4 ,hence the theoretical    
impossibility of a translation1  which  
can only exist as a new creation4 ,but  
when we consider those  words or that   
rhythm not within the expressive        
synthesis1 in which  their reality is   
spiritual and not physical1 but outside 
it1 as words1  as rhythm1 we build up by
 abstraction a category of physical     
facts1  to which we attribute a reality 
not inferior to that of the spiritual   
activity4 ,b and d1 in the preceding    
analysis1 are not different  realities1 
but different elaborations1 the first1  

ideal1 the second1  naturalistic1 of the
 same fact4    ,we have now established 
a relation between the sthetic and the  
practical activity3 the physical        
expression is an act of the will1  and  
as such it falls legitimately in the    
domain of both economic and  ethical    
judgments4 ,we may buy or sell the      
physical stimuli1 books1  statues1 and  
paintings1 though no amount of wealth   
can give the  sthetic vision3 the       
possession of the objects of art is of  
another  order than the possession of   
the spiritual creation4 ,we may consider
  that the communication of a certain   
intuition is in certain cases  morally  
undesirable1 and censure the artist for 
having willed it1  or try to prevent him
 from accomplishing it4 ,the principle  
of the  spiritual autonomy of art1      
necessary to establish the nature of    
sthetic value1 cannot be understood to  
imply the absolute practical  freedom of
 the artist from the laws that bind all 
other men4 ,but even  from this point of

 view1 there is no doubt that art is    
more likely to  suffer from excessive   
constraint than from excessive freedom2 
and that  the fanatics of morality in   
art are only too often inclined to      
mistake  a set of arbitrary rulings for 
morality1 and to overlook the intention 
of the artist4 ,it is a significant     
fact1 and one which deserves more       
attention than it seems to have ever    
received1 that the so-called moral      
condemnation of a true work of art has  
never outlasted one or two  generations1
 and their prejudices and weaknesses4   
,the existence of the physical stimuli  
or material helps for the  sthetic      
reproduction1 fosters the illusion of   
beauty as an intrinsic  attribute of    
physical objects1 first as artistic1 and
 then as natural  beauty4 ,it is hardly 
necessary to criticise this illusion at 
this  point of our discussion3 beauty is
 not an objective attribute1 but  a     
spiritual value4 ,in the same way as    
there is no intrinsic beauty1           

independent dent of our either creative 
or re-creative activity1 in  words or   
notes or lines or colours1 there is also
 no category of  natural beauty4 ,what  
we call beauty of nature is either that 
which  in nature is merely pleasureable 
from a practical and sensuous           
standpoint1 or the presence of certain  
stimuli for the reproduction of  a      
prexistent sthetic vision4 ,we recognise
 the obvious truth of this  fact1 when  
we remark that the beauty of a certain  
landscape is not  visible to everybody1 
but only to him who looks at it with an 
artist's  eye4 ,and it would be possible
 to write a history of the progressive  
development of beauty in nature1 which  
would practically coincide  with1 or    
follow at a short distance of time1 the 
various stages of the  history of poetry
 and painting4    ,closely related with 
the confusion between the physical      
attributes  of the objects of art1 and  
the true sthetic value1 are all the     
theories of sthetics which consider that

 the end of art is pleasure1  or sthetic
 hedonism in its various forms4 ,of     
these the most ancient  is the one that 
considers beautiful that which gives    
pleasure to the  higher senses1 he      
hearing and the sight2 and other forms  
of it can  still be found1 if not among 
artists and critics1 at least among     
psychologists4 ,two of the most recent  
interpretations of sthetic  facts1 the  
theory of empathy or ,einfhlung and the 
theory of tactile  values1 are merely   
modern scientific variations of the old 
prejudice4  ,but no hedonistic theory   
can ever give a consistent account of   
sthetic facts1 as it is impossible to   
draw a distinction1 on a purely         
psychological plane1 between those      
pleasures of the senses which may       
precede or accompany the sthetic fact1  
and those that are purely  sensuous2 and
 the inevitable result is a complete    
reduction of the  sthetic to the        
sensual4 ,in such theories1 the real    
sthetic problem  does not even reach the

 stage of being formulated4    ,the     
truth that the hedonist obscurely       
foresees is that every  spiritual       
activity is constantly accompanied by   
the practical reflex  of satisfaction   
and dissatisfaction1 pleasure and pain1 
value and  dis-value4 ,value is every   
activity that unfolds itself freely1    
dis-value is the contrasted1 hindered1  
impeded unfolding of the same  activity4
 ,if we call beauty the sthetic value1  
then beauty is but the  successful      
expression1 or better1 the expression1  
since an unsuccessful  expression is not
 an expression at all4 ,and it is not   
necessary to  repeat that by expression 
we distinctly mean not the physical     
stimulus1  but the spiritual synthesis4 
,with this definition of sthetic value  
we reach one of the most  important     
points of ,croce's thought3 the solution
 of what he calls  the dualism of       
values1 or ideals1 to the concrete      
realities4 ,as the  beautiful expression
 is simply expression1 the true thought 

is simply  thought1 and so on1 so the   
ugly expression or the false thought are
  non-expression and non-thought1 the   
non-being which has no reality  outside 
the moment of its opposition and        
criticism4          ,,iv4 ,,technique   
,,and ,,criticism      ,art and         
technique--,errors deriving from the    
common conception of  technique--,the   
theories of the particular arts--,the   
literary genres  --,the rhetorical      
categories--,the categories of          
language--,genius and  taste--,the      
sthetic judgment--,the idolatry of      
standards--,the sthetic  standard3 the  
true objectivity--,criticism and        
history4      ,the relation between the 
sthetic activity and the practical      
moment of  the production of the        
physical objects of art may be regarded 
under the  aspect of the relation       
between art and technique4 ,the only    
legitimate  meaning of the word         
technique is that of a body of          
naturalistic  knowledge in the service  

of the practical activity of the artist4
 ,in  this sense we can conceive of a   
great artist who is a poor technician1  
as in the case of a painter who should  
use ,colours subject to rapid  change   
and deterioration1 a musician who should
 be a bad singer or  pianist1 a poet who
 should not be able to recite his own   
poetry4 ,but  in the common language of 
critics1 we mean by technique something 
quite different--in painting what we    
call drawing or composition1 in  music1 
harmony or orchestration1 in poetry1    
metre and construction4  ,now it is     
quite clear that we cannot conceive of a
 great painter who  could not draw1 a   
great musician unable to harmonize or to
 orchestrate1  a great poet whose lines 
are defective4 ,what we here isolate as 
the technical handling of an artistic   
subject is but the process of  sthetic  
creation itself1 the succession and     
progression of intuitions  in the       
artist's mind2 using the naturalistic or
 psychological method1  we abstract     

certain moments of the creative process1
 and we attribute  a reality to such    
abstractions4 ,we talk of the technique 
of a poem  or of a painting as being    
something that has been superadded to   
the  original intuition2 we see the poet
 or the artist engaged in learning  the 
technique of his art2 we see him        
correcting or modifying his  original   
expression according to certain         
technical standards4 ,but what  we call 
the technique of a poem or of a painting
 is that particular  poem or painting in
 its concreteness2 and no poet or artist
 can learn  a technique except by       
re-creating in his own spirit the work  
of the  great masters1 his technical    
education being but one with his sthetic
  education2 and finally1 the process of
 correction or modification is  merely a
 stage of the expressive process itself3
 no poet can correct a  line in his     
poem1 no painter change a line or a     
shade in his picture1  if the internal  
image has not first spontaneously       

undergone such  corrections and changes 
in his mind4    ,the consequences of the
 common conception of technique in      
criticism  are more dangerous1 because  
more subtle and affecting a more        
intimate  knowledge of art1 than those  
of any other sthetic error4 ,the talk   
of the connoisseur and of the average   
musical or dramatic critic is  full of  
such fallacies as the technical errors  
of great painters1 the  harmonic or     
orchestral wonders of poor music1 the   
faulty construction  of a great play2   
fallacies which may sometimes have      
originated  from some real character of 
the sthetic fact1 but which are mere    
contradictions in terms4 ,and the       
literary critic will speak of the  fine 
frenzy and the quiet eye1 meaning by the
 one1 the abstract  inspiration1 and by 
the other the abstract production1 and  
so miss the  true sthetic moment which  
is neither the one nor the other1 but   
the  synthesis of the two4 ,or he will  
oppose romanticism to classicism1 in  a 

similar sense1 without realizing that   
all art is at the same time  romantic   
and classic1 truly inspired1 and because
 truly inspired1 able  to express       
itself4    ,mere variations of the      
naturalistic or psychological conception
 of  technique1 as an actual moment of  
the sthetic creation1 are a series  of  
theories which ,croce has extensively   
criticised1 and of which we can  give   
but a cursory account4    ,the theories 
of the particular arts and of their     
limits originate from  the manuals of   
practical precepts useful to architects1
 sculptors1  painters or musicians1 and 
are founded on the assumed possibility  
of  finding a field of the sthetic      
activity corresponding to the physical  
means employed by each category of      
artists4 ,but we have already seen  that
 in the sthetic fact there is no        
distinction between means and  end3 we  
can speak of the various arts in a      
purely empirical sense1 as  an external 
classification of the objects of art1   

but not as classes of  sthetic activity4
    ,a similar kind of classification is
 the one which gives rise to  the       
literary genre1 and to similar          
abstractions in the other arts3         
legitimate instruments of work as long  
as we do not forget that there  does not
 exist anything like the idea of a      
tragedy or sonata apart from  all       
concrete tragedies or sonatas1 and as   
long as we do not condemn  a new tragedy
 or a new sonata simply because it is   
not like the old  ones1 that is1 as long
 as we do not transform an abstract type
 into a  law4 ,every new sthetic        
creation1 far from being bound to obey  
external  laws1 establishes new laws1 or
 rather is its own law4 ,it must1 and   
will1 answer only for itself1 and the   
only claim that we can put upon  it is  
that of internal coherence4 ,both the   
theories of the arts and the  theories  
of the genres1 when we try to treat them
 as true and rigorous1  and not as mere 
practical expedients1 manifest the      

absurdity of their  task through their  
incapacity to give precise and absolute 
definitions4  ,every work of art        
expresses a state of mind1 and every    
state of mind  is irreducibly individual
 and new3 a complete classification     
would  therefore be only that in which  
every class has under itself a single   
intuition4    ,another form of the      
technical prejudice is the creation of  
rhetorical  categories1 which are also  
abstract classes of expressions tending 
to  transform themselves into precepts4 
,the main prejudice of rhetoric1 in     
literature as well as in all other arts1
 is that of the distinction  between the
 simple and the ornate1 which is founded
 on a conception  of beauty not as the  
value of the expression1 but as         
something that  can be added1 so to     
speak1 mechanically1 to the expression4 
,because of  its preceptive character1  
rhetoric has done more harm in the      
history  of poetry and art1 than any of 
the other classifications of the same   

order2 and though it is generally       
discredited among artists and critics   
to-day1 in its pure original form1 yet  
rhetorical prejudices1 both in  the     
creation and judgment of art1 are still 
endowed with an obstinately  vigorous   
life4    ,these naturalistic            
classifications in art have their       
counterpart in the  study of language1  
in the creation of grammatical genres or
 categories  or parts of speech1 and in 
the attempts to reduce the empirical    
grammars to preceptive or normative     
grammars3 that is1 a practical  or      
pedagogic expedient1 to a rhetoric or   
technique of language4 ,but  the        
individuality and indivisibility of     
expression is in the nature  of language
 as well as of art1 and language obeys  
not the abstract  precepts of           
grammarians1 but the law of the sthetic 
spirit which makes  us find a new       
expression for every new intuition4     
,even phonetic laws1  the modern        
scientific instruments of grammar1 are  

mere descriptive  summaries of observed 
facts1 of physical moments abstracted   
from their  spiritual reality1 and      
therefore abstract or naturalistic laws1
 and  never actually represent the      
concrete1 individually determined facts 
of language4    ,a coherent theory of   
sthetic 7literary and artistic7         
criticism can  be deduced from the      
concept of art as intuition1 and we have
 already  anticipated its main theses in
 the discussion of the concept itself4  
,we  have seen that in the process of   
reproduction of an sthetic process1  the
 actual moment in which the original    
image1 through the medium of  what we   
have abstracted as the physical         
stimulus1 reproduces itself in  a mind  
other than that of the creator 7or1 in  
what we might consider as  a particular 
case1 in the mind of the creator himself
 at a time other  than that of the      
original creation71 is a moment of      
sthetic activity  identical with that of
 creation4 ,given an identity of        

circumstances1  that which takes place  
within my mind is the same sthetic      
process  which took place originally in 
the mind of the artist4 ,if we call     
genius the creative1 and taste the      
reproductive activity1 the corollary  of
 these considerations is that of the    
identity of genius and taste3  in the   
act of contemplating and judging a work 
of art1 our spirit  becomes one with the
 spirit of the artist4 ,though in       
practice this  identity may never be    
attained 7because of variations in the  
material  conditions of the physical    
stimulus1 or in the spiritual attitude  
of  the contemplator71 yet if we deny   
it1 and establish a difference in  kind 
between these two aspects of sthetic    
activity1 we find ourselves  inevitably 
led to exclude the possibility not of   
the sthetic judgment  only1 but of all  
forms of sthetic communication4 ,there  
is a sense  in which we can speak of the
 relativity of taste1 and which accounts
  for the actual variety of judgments1  

not in relation to art only1 but  to all
 forms of human activity3 every judgment
 is relative to our  knowledge1 at a    
particular moment1 of the actual        
conditions in which  the work of art was
 originally produced4 ,but this is the  
intrinsic  relativity of all the        
particular determinations of reality1   
not a  relativity peculiar to sthetic   
values1 which are as real1 though of a  
different order1 as those of logic or   
morality4    ,but the sthetic judgment  
itself is not the mere intuitive        
reproduction  of the work of art1 made  
possible by what we call historical     
criticism  in the narrow sense of the   
word1 that is1 by interpretation and    
comment4 ,these are the antecedent of   
the sthetic judgment1 which  consists in
 a logical proposition of the form3 ,a  
is art1 or ,a is not  art1 ,a is art in 
a b c1 ,a is not art in d e f2 or again3
 ,there is a  fact1 ,a1 which is a work 
of art1 ,there is a fact1 ,a1 which is  
falsely  believed to be a work of art4  

,the sthetic judgment1 like all other   
judgments1 establishes a relation       
between a particular1 concrete fact1    
and a universal category1 which is that 
of art4 ,and1 like all other  judgments1
 it is at the same time a judgment of   
value and an historical  judgment1 which
 is the obvious consequence of ,croce's 
identification of  value and fact4      
sthetic criticism therefore coincides   
with the history  of the sthetic        
activity1 with the history of poetry or 
art4    ,a frequent reaction to ,croce's
 sthetics1 and to its implications  in  
the theory of criticism1 especially     
among literary critics1 is a  sense of  
irritation caused by the loss of the    
so-called standards of  judgment4 ,it   
would be interesting to analyze these   
supposed standards1  which generally are
 not explicitly enunciated 7probably    
because their  clear enunciation would  
manifest their true nature1 and annul   
them  as standards of sthetic judgment71
 but only more or less obscurely        

referred to with a mixture of pride and 
reverence4 ,they would then show        
themselves to be the critical duplicates
 of the various sthetic errors  which we
 have already discussed4    ,if the     
standards of which the critics speak    
are1 as is often the case1  moral or    
intellectual ideals1 it is clear that   
,croce's sthetics does  not question    
their validity1 but only their          
application4 ,there is a  large number  
of literary critics1 who are such only  
in name1 and whose  real interests are  
intellectual or moral1 critics of       
thought and of  the ethical life1 and   
not of art4 ,they use works of art as   
documents  and undoubtedly works of art 
are1 in the unity of the human spirit1  
documents of intellectual and moral     
life2 but their error begins when  they 
confuse the issues1 and censure or      
praise the art of the past1  or try to  
influence the art of the future1 with   
criteria which are no  longer           
intellectual or moral1 but1 because they

 have been transposed  outside their    
legitimate sphere1 intellectualistic and
 moralistic4    ,all other so-called    
standards are derived from the abstract 
ideas of  literary genres and of        
rhetorical categories4 ,it is easy to   
judge of  a new tragedy if you know what
 a tragedy ought to be1 if you have a   
catalogue of purely external            
characteristics which you may either    
find1  or not find1 in the new work that
 comes before you4 ,this is1 of course1 
the crudest form of rhetorical          
criticism2 there is another which is    
not less frequent1 but more subtle4 ,the
 critic builds up an ideal of  what art 
ought to be1 not with abstract          
categories1 and classifications         
transformed into arbitrary sthetic      
precepts or standards1 but through  his 
predilection for one particular author1 
or for one particular  epoch1 the       
,middle ,ages or the ,renaissance1 the  
,classics or the  ,romantics3 every work
 of art which is different either in    

spirit or in  form from those that have 
been chosen is condemned in proportion  
to its  variation from the ideal4 ,this 
form of criticism is often also vitiated
  by the intrusion of intellectualistic 
and moralistic errors1 since an  ideal  
which is a mere particular determination
 of the past assumed as a  universal    
value is likely to be mere rhetoric of  
thought and morality  as well as of art4
    ,the only legitimate standard in    
sthetic criticism is the sthetic        
standard1 that of beauty or expression1 
as against ugliness or  non-expression4 
,our critical judgment is the reaction  
of our sthetic  personality in the      
presence of a work of art1 as the moral 
judgment is  the reaction of our moral  
personality in the presence of an       
action4 ,our  knowledge of a work of    
art1 of a concrete and individual       
intuition1  as our knowledge of an      
action1 approaches more or less to the  
ideal  limit1 according to the breadth  
of our experience and the depth of our  

understanding2 but there exist no       
external criteria on which we can  rest 
our judgment1 no mechanical props which 
will support it4 ,this  theory of       
criticism1 far from justifying a        
capricious and arbitrary  subjectivism1 
requires from the critic a constant     
vigilance against  that which is        
narrowly personal1 capricious1 and      
arbitrary in himself2  a patient1       
unceasing effort in the labor of        
recapturing and recreating  the material
 and spiritual circumstances from which 
the work of art  originally sprang2 and 
the quick sensitivity of the artist     
coupled with  the wide understanding of 
the historian and the philosopher4      
,when sthetic criticism is raised to    
this plane on which it coincides  with  
the history of poetry1 or of art1 it    
transforms itself necessarily  into a   
general criticism of life4 ,what to the 
sthetic consciousness  appears as ugly  
or non-expressive1 since in the world of
 history there  are no negative facts1  

will not1 when historically considered1 
appear  as a negative value1 but as a   
value of another order1 as an intrusion 
of the logical or of the practical      
spirit in the work of the poet or  of   
the artist4 ,what in the ,divine ,comedy
 is not poetry is the outcome  of       
philosophical or moral preoccupations   
which have not become art1  have not    
fused themselves into a new1 coherent   
intuition1 and must be  apprehended not 
as art1 but as philosophy and morality4 
,the allegory  of the ,frie ,queene is  
not art1 but it is an expression of     
certain  aspects of the ,protestant     
spirit in the ,england of ,elizabeth4   
,in a poet  like ,byron1 the presence of
 practical motives is felt all through  
his  poetical production2 and the critic
 cannot limit his work to tracting  the 
gems1 and to saying of all the rest3    
this is not poetry4 ,he must  tell us   
what it is1 and only by telling what it 
is1 he criticises it  completely as     
poetry4 ,it is impossible1 in fact1 to  

give to art its  place1 without         
assigning its place to all the other    
activities of life4  ,the great sthetic 
critic will also be a critic of         
philosophy1 of  morality1 of politics2  
but1 as ,croce says of ,de ,sanctis1 the
 strength  of his purely sthetic        
consideration of art will also be the   
strength  of his purely moral           
consideration of morality1 of his purely
 logical  consideration of philosophy1  
and so on4 ,the forms or grades of the  
spirit1 which the critic employs as     
categories for his judgment1 are        
ideally distinct in the unity of the    
spirit1 but cannot materially be        
separated from each other or from that  
unity without losing all their          
vitality4 ,the distinction of sthetic   
criticism from the other forms  of      
criticism1 of the history of poetry and 
the arts from the other  kinds of       
history1 is but an empirical one1       
pointing to the fact that  the attention
 of the critic or historian is turned   

towards one aspect  rather than another 
of the same indivisible reality4        
,v4 ,,the ,,pure ,,concept#a      ,the  
function of logic in the system--,the   
concept--,logical concepts and          
conceptual fictions--,the pure concept  
as the unity of distinctions--          
,singularity1 particularity and         
universality--,the dialectic process  in
 ,hegel and in ,croce--,opposition1     
distinction and value--,the             
expressiveness of the                   
concept--,definition and individual     
judgment3  their                        
identity--,classification and           
numeration--,the a priori synthesis4    
,we have summarily examined in the three
 preceding chapters the theory  of      
sthetic1 or intuitive1 or individual1 as
 distinct from logical1 or  conceptual1 
or universal1 knowledge4 ,we must now   
leave the sthetic  activity in the      
background as the mere antecedent of the
 logical one1  and proceed to           
investigate the latter4    ,in a sense  

it may be said that the key to every    
system of philosophy  is to be found in 
the either implicit or explicit solution
 given to  certain logical problems and 
that only by understanding the logic of 
a  philosopher can we be sure to give   
its true meaning and value to his       
thought4 ,the reverse is1 as a general  
rule1 also true3 any solution of  a     
particular problem1 any particular      
elaboration of the concept1 when  fully 
understood1 will lead us back to the    
philosopher's logic1 to his  concept of 
the concept4 ,the main points of        
,croce's logic could easily  be deduced 
from his sthetics2 but an untrained mind
 might unwittingly  transpose the whole 
sthetic theory on a purely psychological
 plane1  and involve it again in the    
errors and contradictions of which it   
aims at being a conclusive refutation4  
,a study of ,croce's logic will  render 
such a shifting of the perspective      
impossible4 ,it will show  that a       
discussion of ,croce's sthetics has no  

meaning except on the  logical plane on 
which ,croce has put it1 and that       
therefore any serious  objection to it  
ought necessarily to imply either a     
revision of the  logical premises1 or a 
demonstration that the actual logical   
processes  are not rigorously in accord 
with these premises4 ,what is here said 
of ,croce's sthetics is valid also for  
,croce's economics or ethics1  and the  
reason is obvious4 ,croce's ,logica is  
not a manual of logic1  in a scholastic 
and formalistic sense3 it is the        
exposition of his  conception of the    
logical activity1 and therefore the     
philosophy of his  philosophy4    ,this 
method of approach to the logical       
problems1 although unusual in  our      
times1 and antagonistic to the general  
tendencies of our culture1  is not only1
 as its opponents assume1 that of ,kant 
and ,hegel1 but that  of the whole      
tradition of ,european philosophy1      
beginning with ,socrates1  ,plato1 and  
,aristotle4 ,it was only in epochs of   

philosophical decadence  that logic     
reduced itself to a mere formalism or   
instrumentalism1  ism1 to a doctrine of 
the means of thought1 as opposed to its 
proper  function1 which is that of      
inquiring into the nature of thought1   
and  therefore1 since there is no way by
 which we can reach reality except      
through thought1 into the nature of     
reality itself4 ,to ,croce1 as  before  
him to ,hegel1 the philosophical        
tradition is not a capricious  sequel of
 unrelated speculations1 but a series of
 connected efforts  through which the   
human mind becomes progressively        
conscious of its  own functions and     
structure4 ,nothing is more alien from  
him than that  type of philosophical    
criticism1 which exhausts itself in an  
attempt  at reducing under a common     
denominator apparently similar solutions
 of  problems1 which in fact are        
profoundly different in their historical
  determination3 but this consciousness 
of the historical factor in  philosophy1

 far from breeding in him a sense of    
scepticism and of the  relativity of    
truth1 impels him to consider every     
effective thought as  a necessary moment
 of truth1 and to represent therefore   
the succession  of effective thoughts1  
critically separated from what in the   
various  concrete philosophies is merely
 postulated or imagined1 as a perpetual 
integration of truth4 ,this attitude    
explains why the immediate  foundations 
of ,croce's logic should be ,kant's a   
priori synthesis and  ,hegel's          
dialectic1 that is1 the highest stages  
of the development of  ,european thought
 before the positivistic                
anti-metaphysical reaction  which swept 
away for a time1 not the last traces of 
transcendental  metaphysics only1 but   
philosophy and logic itself2 and why    
also1 among  all the recent critics of  
,kant and ,hegel1 ,croce should be one  
of the  keenest and sharpest4 ,his sure 
grasp of fundamentals made it easy  for 
him to demolish all that is artificial  

and unessential in their  systems2 as is
 particularly evident in the case of    
,hegel1 who emerged  from ,croce's      
criticism as the discoverer of one great
 principle and  at the same time the    
creator1 through the misapplication of  
the same  principle1 of many a false    
science4    ,this return to the         
philosophical tradition1 which between  
the end  of the last and the beginning  
of this century1 was not limited to     
,croce and to ,italy only1 was          
accompanied and indirectly favoured by  
the researches of pure scientists on the
 method of exact and natural  sciences4 
,the economic theory of the scientific  
concept1 such as it  appears especially 
in the works of ,mach and ,avenarius1   
and to an  understanding of which ,croce
 had been prepared by his own studies on
  ,marxism1 was probably the most       
efficient instrument in destroying  from
 within the pseudo-scientific           
constructions of positivism4 ,the       
scientists themselves1 by defining the  

limits of scientific thought1  proved   
the impossibility of building a         
philosophy which should be at  the same 
time a synthesis of all particular      
sciences and a system of  reality4 ,the 
conclusions of this new scientific      
methodology are on the  whole accepted  
by ,croce1 and the fact that they       
naturally fall into  their proper place 
in his logic is the most valid          
justification of his  method1 to which  
the distinction between the concept of  
philosophy and  the concepts of the     
sciences is essential4    ,we need not  
point to the object of logic1 or        
concept1 as we did in a  former chapter 
to the object of sthetics1 or intuition4
 ,the writing  of this book implies a   
belief in its existence1 and we could   
take  practically any page of it as an  
example of what we mean by concept1  or 
logical knowledge4 ,we shall not        
therefore pause to confute logical      
scepticism1 except by repeating the old 
argument that it is impossible  to deny 

the existence of the concept except     
through the formulation of  a concept4  
,such affirmations as that there is no  
other knowledge than  the sthetic one1  
or the one which is given by the        
ineffable intuition  of the mystic1 or  
by practical fictions1 are in their turn
 neither  sthetic knowledge nor mystical
 intuitions1 nor practical fictions1 but
  affirmations1 however contradictory in
 themselves1 of a universal value  and  
of an absolute character1 that is1      
concepts4 ,through them1 it is  possible
 immediately to distinguish the logical 
form of knowledge1 as  represented by   
such affirmations1 from the sthetic or  
representative  one1 from the           
sentimental or practical state of mind  
of the mystic1 and  from those concepts 
which are mere empirical fictions4 ,it  
is evident1  in this last instance1 that
 the theory of the fiction cannot be a  
new fiction1 but must belong to an      
activity of a different kind1 the       
logical activity1 whose value is truth4 

,of those three forms of logical        
scepticism1 stheticism1 mysticism1  and 
empiricism1 the third one leads us to   
the distinction between the  logical    
concept and the scientific concepts1 or 
fictions4 ,the logical  or pure concept 
is beyond all individual                
representations1 and must  therefore not
 contain any particular representative  
element2 but1 on  the other hand1 being 
the universal as opposed to the         
individuality of  representations1 it   
must refer to all and each of them4 ,if 
we think1  for instance1 of the concepts
 of beauty1 truth1 quality1 development1
  and such like1 it will be impossible  
for us to represent or imagine a        
sufficiently large fragment of reality  
that will exhaust them1 or such  an     
infinitesimal one as will not admit     
them4 ,this is what is meant by  saying 
that the concept is at the same time    
universal and concrete1  or1 in other   
words1 that it is transcendent in       
respect to every single  representation1

 and yet immanent in all of them4 ,a    
third characteristic  of the pure       
concept1 besides those of universality  
and concreteness1  is that of           
expressivity3 being a product of        
knowledge1 it must be  expressed and    
spoken1 and cannot be a dumb act of the 
mind1 such as  practical acts are4      
,the conceptual fictions1 or1 as ,croce 
called them on account of  their        
non-theoretical character1 the          
pseudo-concepts differ from the  pure   
concept in being either concrete and    
representative but not  universal1 or   
universal without any possible reference
 to individual  representations1 that   
is1 without concreteness4 ,the first    
class is  that of empirical concepts1   
which contain some objects or fragments 
of reality1 but not the whole of        
reality3 such as the concepts of  house1
 cat1 rose4 ,the second is that of      
abstract concepts1 which  contain no    
object or fragment of reality3 such as  
those of triangle  in geometry or of    

free movement in physics4 ,the first are
 real1 but  not rigorous1 the second    
rigorous1 but unreal4 ,neither the ones 
nor  the others can be considered as    
mistaken concepts or errors1 since      
after having criticised them from a     
logical point of view1 we still         
continue to use them for what they are2 
nor as imperfect concepts1 and          
preparatory to the perfect ones1 since  
their formation presupposes the         
existence of the perfect and rigorous   
ones3 it would be impossible to         
conceive the house1 the rose1 the       
triangle1 before conceiving quantity1   
quality1 existence1 and other pure      
concepts4 ,it is true that in the       
actual development of thought1          
conceptual fictions have again and      
again given birth to true concepts2 but 
in that case they have lost  their      
intrinsic nature1 and have assumed the  
characters of the genuine  logical      
activity4 ,in order to understand the   
proper function or nature  of the       

conceptual fictions1 it is necessary to 
fix our attention on the  moment of     
their formation1 which is practical and 
not logical4 ,their  justification lies 
in their practical end and in their     
usefulness3 they  are instruments by the
 help of which we can recall with a     
single word  vast groups of             
representations1 or which indicate in a 
single word what  kind of operation is  
required in order to find certain       
representations4  ,the act of forming   
intellectual fictions is neither an act 
of knowledge  nor of not-knowledge2     
logically1 it is neither rational nor   
irrational  7true or untrue72 its       
rationality is of another order1        
practical and  not logical4 ,the        
activity which produces pure concepts1  
and that which  produces empirical or   
abstract concepts1 have been called     
respectively  ,reason and ,abstract     
,intellect1 or ,intuition and           
,intellect2 to which  terminology ,croce
 objects that the word intellect is     

certainly  inappropriate to a           
non-theoretical activity4 ,croce himself
 is in no  need of a new name for it1   
since he considers it one with the      
general  practical activity1 will or    
action4    ,the definition that we have 
given of the pure concept seems to clash
  against an insuperable difficulty     
arising from the multiplicity of        
concepts4 ,if the concept is an         
elaboration of reality as a universal1  
how can we admit the existence of more  
than one concept8 ,beauty  and truth are
 both concrete universals1 and yet they 
are not the  same universal3 they have  
the same logical form1 but they denote  
different aspects of reality4 ,if this  
variety of the concepts1 that  is1 of   
the aspects of reality1 were            
insuperable1 we should fall from  the   
irreducible multiplicity of             
representations into a not less         
irreductible multiplicity of concepts1  
which would in the end justify  a new   
logical scepticism and take us back to a

 mystical solution of  the problem of   
the unity of reality4 ,the passage from 
the multiple  universals to the true    
universal would be logically impossible1
 and to  be performed only by the help  
of some sort of mystical intuition4     
,the solution of this difficulty has    
already been hinted at in the           
discussion of the relations between     
intuition and concept1 and between      
knowledge and will4 ,the theory of the  
successive grades of reality1  in their 
progressive implication1 is the true    
form of the concept4  ,croce affirms the
 unity of reality1 as a consequence of  
the unity of  the concept1 of the form  
through which only reality is known4    
,but if  we suppress the distinction1   
the unity that we reach is an empty and 
ineffable one3 a whole is a whole only  
inasmuch as it has parts1 as  it is     
parts2 a unity can be thought only      
through its distinctions4  ,therefore   
the unity and the distinctions are both 
necessary to the  concept3 the          

distinctions are not something outside  
the concept1 but  the concept itself1   
which is a unity of distinctions4 ,the  
mind or  spirit is one1 but it is       
impossible to think of it as a pure and 
simple  unity1 outside of the forms in  
which it realizes itself1 and of these  
forms in their necessary relations4     
,which is but a more comprehensive  way 
of saying what we have already said     
speaking of one of those forms  in      
particular1 the sthetic one1 that it is 
impossible to conceive any  of them     
except by determining its relations with
 the others4    ,it is necessary1       
however1 not to convert these           
distinctions of the  concept into       
abstractions3 by approximation1 and for 
a practical  purpose1 we can speak of a 
given action as a theoretical or        
practical  one1 an economic or moral    
one4 ,in fact1 in every fragment of     
reality  we find the universal1 and     
therefore all the forms of the          
universal4  ,but on the other hand it is

 impossible to think any concrete datum1
  and to recognize it as an affirmation 
of the spirit as a whole1 unless  we    
distinguish each of its aspects in the  
most rigorous fashion4 ,we  shall then  
have a criticism of art and poetry1 from
 the sthetic point  of view2 or of      
philosophy1 from the logical one2 and a 
moral judgment  which takes into account
 only the individual moral initiative4  
,the  distinctions of the concept are   
then used as directing principles of    
thought1 but not1 in the way empirical  
concepts are used1 as criteria  for a   
classification of objects2 nor1 again1  
as characteristics of  epochs of actual 
historical development1 which in the end
 reduce  themselves to types of material
 classification4    ,croce's theory of  
the unity and distinctions of the       
concept coincides  with the old division
 of concepts into universal1 particular1
 and  singular ones4 ,the true logical  
definition is reached only by           
determining the singularity of a        

distinction in relation with the other  
distinctions 7particularity71 and with  
the whole 7universality74 ,for          
instance1 the concept of beauty is      
intuition 7singularity71 knowledge      
7particularity71 and finally spirit or  
mind 7universality74 ,the  symbol       
corresponding to this peculiar relation 
is not that of a fine  or succession1   
but of a circle3 there is not a first   
and a last term  of the series1 a       
beginning and an end1 but a perpetual   
revolution1  in which every distinction 
in turn may appear as the beginning and 
the end of the series4 ,art or          
philosophy1 knowledge or action1 may be 
postulated with equal reason as the end 
of the spirit3 the true end1  however1  
is not any of the particular forms1 but 
only the spirit or  mind or reality as a
 whole4    ,readers who are familiar    
with ,hegelian logic will at once       
perceive  the difference between        
,croce's and ,hegel's treatment of      
logical  distinctions4 ,there is no     

attempt on the part of ,croce to apply  
to them  the dialectic process1 which   
pervades the whole of ,hegel's          
philosophy1  and which is retained by   
,croce only in its legitimate sphere    
which is  not that of distinctions but  
of oppositions4 ,the dialectic process1 
of  which the remote ancestor is ,plato1
 and the more immediate forbears  those 
,renaissance philosophers1 ,cusanus and 
,bruno1 who more or less  obscurely     
affirmed the principium coincidenti     
oppositorum1 only  with ,hegel reaches  
its rigorous logical expression4 ,the   
most famous  instance of its application
 is to be found in ,hegel's formula of  
the  opposition of being and non-being1 
and of their unity in the becoming3  the
 pure being is identical with the pure  
non-being1 or1 to say the  same thing in
 different words1 we cannot think the   
one without the  other1 and we do       
actually think the one and the other    
when we think the  actual reality1 which
 is neither being nor non-being1 but    

becoming4  ,being and non-being are a   
true couple of opposites1 as ideal and  
real1  positive and negative1 value and 
non-value1 activity and passivity1  and 
so on4 ,by the application of the       
dialectic process1 all these  couples   
are shown to be not couples of concepts1
 but single concepts1  each couple      
containing the affirmation and the      
negation of a single  concept4 ,croce's 
criticism of ,hegel is founded on an    
interpretation of  the dialectic process
 as logically valid for such couples    
only1 and  inapplicable to the          
distinctions of the concept1 or to      
empirical and  abstract concepts2 and   
this criticism1 while emphasizing the   
importance  of ,hegel's main            
contribution to philosophical thought1  
sweeps away at  one stroke all that in  
his philosophy has generally been       
considered as  most distinctly ,hegelian
 both by his followers and by his       
adversaries4    ,croce's interest in    
such couples of opposites as those that 

we have  mentioned is very far from     
being as keen as ,hegel's4 ,their       
dialectic  solution into single concepts
 is implicit in every phase of ,croce's 
philosophy4 ,this can best be seen in   
the constant interchange of such  words 
as spirit and reality2 each of them1    
when taken by itself1 a  pure1 formal   
spirit1 and a pure1 material reality1   
are meaningless1  while1 once they have 
been correlated1 both indicate the same 
concept1  the spirit perpetually        
realizing itself in the concreteness of 
life3  a formula which contains the     
whole of ,croce's immanentism4 ,but     
within  the distinctions of the concept1
 the dialectic process is constantly    
applied by ,croce to such oppositions as
 those of good and evil1 true  and      
false1 beautiful and ugly1 which are    
nothing but the double  aspect1         
affirmative and negative1 respectively1 
of the concepts of  goodness1 and truth1
 and beauty4 ,we need only recall what  
we have said  of ,croce's conception of 

sthetic value1 and of value in general4 
,the dialectic process is the logical   
structure of ,croce's concept of  value4
 ,the positive element of each concept  
is the only real one1 and  a negative   
judgment of value is not a purely       
logical judgment1 but  a statement to   
which is added the expression of a      
desire or of an  exigency4 ,if we say3  
,a is immoral1 we mean3 ,a follows his  
own immediate  pleasure 7a logical      
statement71 and also3 ,a ought to follow
 a higher  end 7the expression of a     
desire74 ,a positive judgment of value1 
on the  other hand1 coincides entirely  
with a logical judgment1 or a statement 
of fact4 ,the opposition of value to    
fact is of the same kind as that  of    
spirit to reality2 verbal and apparent  
and not logical and real4  ,the         
underlying reality of the opposition can
 be grasped only through  the           
distinction2 what in the opposition is a
 negative and therefore a  mere         
abstraction can never be anything but a 

positive value of another  order1 a     
distinct form of activity4 ,the action  
that we have judged  as morally evil1 if
 it is an action at all1 belongs to the 
economic  order1 is economically        
rational1 directed towards a particular 
end  which confers on it its particular 
value2 and the same applies to  all the 
other categories of reality1 in which   
error and evil cannot  be introduced    
except by the substitution of one form  
for the other4  ,it is impossible to    
distinguish a concept from its opposite 
as two  concepts2 but when a distinction
 is introduced1 the opposition loses    
its negative character1 and identifies  
itself with a distinct but  positive    
value4 ,error and evil as such are never
 present except in the  act that        
transcends them1 in the conscience that1
 realizing itself in a  higher sphere1  
turns against them and condemns them4   
,it is superfluous  to point to the     
importance that this process lends to   
the distinctions  themselves1 which are 

now seen at last not as mere logical    
instruments1  but as the actual         
differentiations of reality1 the        
necessary conditions  of all life and   
progress4    ,the concept does not exist
 outside its verbal expression1 but the 
relation between logical thought and    
language1 because of the purely  sthetic
 or intuitive nature of language1 is not
 of the rigorous  character which is    
postulated by the ,aristotelian         
logician1 and1 in  more recent times1 by
 the student of symbolic logic1 who both
 assume  language to be an essentially  
logical function4 ,it would be          
impossible  for ,croce to fall into that
 extreme of idealism which is the common
  vice of the verbal realist1 for whom  
propositions1 judgments1 or  syllogisms 
have a kind of absolute reality of their
 own1 independent  of the mind that     
thinks them4 ,it may seem paradoxical to
 assert that  nowhere is ,croce's       
realism more apparent than in his       
treatment of the  verbal forms of the   

concept2 and yet his criticism of the   
old logical  principles and forms1      
running parallel to that of the         
rhetorical  categories and genres in the
 field of sthetics1 allows him to reach 
the actual workings of the logical      
activity with much greater intimacy     
than is possible through any kind of    
formalistic logic4    ,the logical      
judgment1 or concept1 appears in two    
main forms3 the  definition1 and the    
individual judgment4 ,in the definition1
 the  subject is one with the predicate1
 both being universal2 in the           
individual judgment1 the subject is an  
individual1 the predicate a  universal4 
,the intuition is the sthetic form of   
the spirit1 is a  definition2 ,the      
,divine ,comedy is poetry1 is an        
individual judgment4  ,the individual   
judgment is one with the perception1 or 
perceptive  judgment1 with the          
historical judgment1 and1 for the reason
 given  before1 with the positive       
judgment of value2 it is the last and   

most  perfect form of knowledge4 ,but   
the distinction between the definition  
and the individual judgment is not an   
ultimate and irreducible one4  ,the     
concrete logical act is always an       
individual judgment1 that is1  the      
affirmation of the unity of the         
individual and the universal in         
relation to a particular subject2 and   
every definition is an individual       
judgment inasmuch as it cannot be but   
the solution of a particular  problem1  
individually and historically           
determined4 ,the particular  problem1   
the group of facts1 from which a        
particular definition  arises1 is the   
individual subject of which the         
definition predicates  the concept4     
,this identification of the definition  
and the individual  judgment disposes of
 the familiar distinctions of formal and
 material  truths1 of truths of reason  
and of fact1 and of analytical and      
synthetical judgments2 which all are    
reduced to mere abstractions1  partial  

aspects of the only logical act1        
consisting in the thinking of  the pure 
concept1 as a concrete universal4       
,the practical imitations of the        
concept1 or pseudo-concepts1 also may   
appear in the double form of definitions
 and individual judgments4  ,from the   
empirical concepts we can form empirical
 judgments1 which  consist in the       
inclusion of an individual subject      
within a class or  type1 and therefore  
can also be called classificatory       
judgments4 ,from  the abstract concepts1
 the passage to the individual subject  
cannot be  effected without the         
intervention of an empirical concept1   
that is1  without a previous reduction  
of the individual subjects to classes   
and  types3 this reduction enables us to
 form empirico-abstract judgments1  or  
judgments of numeration and mensuration4
 ,the function of these  judgments is1  
as that of the concepts with which they 
are related1 not  theoretical1 but      
practical3 to classify or to enumerate  

is not the same  as to understand1      
though they are both essential          
operations of the  human mind4 ,the     
corresponding judgments are therefore   
called by ,croce  pseudo-judgments1 or  
practical imitations of the individual  
judgment4    ,the reduction of the pure 
concept to the individual judgment is   
the  fundamental innovation of ,croce's 
logic4 ,it entirely disposes of any     
form of transcendental thought1 of an   
,absolute or a ,universal as  some      
beyond and above reality1 and therefore 
of the last remnants  of metaphysics in 
philosophy4 ,it means1 translated into  
terms of  common language1 that there is
 no thought outside the thinking of     
individual minds1 individually1 that is1
 historically determined2 and1          
conversely1 that there is no reality    
outside the reality of thought1  since  
the postulation of an external reality  
is nothing but one more  act of thought4
 ,in the light of this doctrine1 the    
relation between  the intuition and the 

concept1 between sthetic and logical    
knowledge1  can be restated by saying   
that while the intuition is the         
autonomous1  creative mental act1 by    
which the individual is known as        
individual1  the concept is the         
autonomous1 creative mental act1 by     
which the  individual is known as       
universal1 that is1 not simply known1   
but  understood4 ,since ,kant1 an       
autonomous creative act of the human    
mind  has received in modern philosophy 
the name of a priori synthesis1 a       
synthesis which cannot be resolved into 
its components1 or material  elements1  
because its form1 and therefore its true
 being1 cannot be  traced in them1 but  
is imposed on them by the mind4 ,croce's
 intuition  is an sthetic a priori      
synthesis1 through which the obscure    
psychic  material rises to the light of 
consciousness2 his concept1 a logical  a
 priori synthesis1 in which the         
intuition is no longer form1 but        
matter1 subject to a new form which is  

judgment and reason4 ,the a  priori     
synthesis is thus employed by ,croce as 
the peculiar dialectic  process of the  
distinctions of the concept1 the        
rigorous logical form  of the           
double-grade relation between the       
individual and the universal1  between  
intuition and concept1 between knowledge
 and action1 and1 as we  shall see in   
his philosophy of the practical1 between
 the economic and  the ethical will4 ,it
 is1 however1 not a mere logical form1  
or rather1  it is a logical form1       
because it is the actual process of the 
spirit1  which cannot either know or act
 except by forming a priori syntheses   
7sthetic or logical1 economic or        
ethical71 that is1 by constantly        
re-creating itself and its own reality  
and values4      ,footnote #a3 ,see     
,logica1 part i1 ,il concetto puro1     
etc41 pp4  #a-agj4          ,,vi4 ,,the 
,,forms ,,of ,,knowledge#a      ,the    
elementary forms of                     
knowledge--,philosophy as the pure      

concept--  ,development of ,croce's     
theory of history--,the identity of     
history and  philosophy--,subjectivity  
and objectivity--,distinctions and      
divisions  of history--,the historical  
determination of philosophy--,the       
economic  theory of science--,the       
natural sciences--,history and          
science--,the  naturalistic method and  
the concept of nature--,mathematical    
processes4      ,the result of ,croce's 
inquiry into the forms of man's         
theoretical  activity can be summed up  
by saying that there are two pure       
theoretical  forms1 the intuition and   
the concept1 of which the second can be 
subdivided for convenience' sake into   
the definition and the individual       
judgment2 and two modes of the practical
 elaboration of knowledge1 the          
empirical concept and the abstract      
concept1 from which are derived  the    
classificatory judgment and the judgment
 of numeration4 ,already  in sthetics we
 have found no rigorous criterion of    

distinction  between the general        
intuitive activity of man1 as it        
manifests itself  in language1 and those
 empirically constituted bodies of      
particular  intuitions1 which we call   
,poetry and the ,arts3 every man is a   
poet  and an artist1 though we reserve  
these names only for those among        
ourselves in whom the sthetic activity  
manifests itself in a  higher degree1   
dominates the whole life of the         
individual spirit4  ,the concept and the
 pseudo-concepts are also elementary1   
fundamental  forms of knowledge1 of     
which all men partake3 every man1 as he 
is  a poet1 is also a philosopher and an
 historian1 a scientist and a           
mathematician3 but1 again1 we reserve   
these names only for the most           
conspicuous manifestations of those     
common spiritual activities1 and  form  
the empirical concepts of ,philosophy   
and ,history1 of ,science and           
,mathematics4 ,we may speak of vulgar   
knowledge and of pure or scientific     

knowledge1 but only by approximation and
 without forgetting that the  only claim
 to rationality and intelligibility on  
the part of pure  knowledge lies in its 
relationship with the elementary forms1 
in the  same way as ,poetry owes its    
power and beauty to the language in     
which  it spreads its roots4 ,a         
particular treatment of these higher    
degrees  of knowledge is not1 therefore1
 logically justified2 the problems  that
 they present are the same that have    
been met with in the general  discussion
 of the theoretical activity1 and all   
they will have to offer  will be but a  
confirmation1 and in some points a      
clarification1 of what  has already been
 said4    ,as ,art is intuition1 so     
,philosophy is the pure concept3 it is  
easy to  see that all the formal        
definitions of ,philosophy that have    
ever been  given1 as science of the     
first principles1 of the ultimate       
causes1 of  the origins of things1 of   
norms1 of values1 of categories1 are    

mere  verbal variants of the pure       
concept4 ,even the most materialistic   
and  realistic philosophies1 since      
matter itself or nature or reality are  
assumed by them as principles of        
universal validity1 as concepts or      
ideas1 fall within the limits of this   
definition4 ,in this sense there  is no 
philosophy which is not idealistic3 the 
differences between one  philosophy and 
another are nothing but differences in  
the elaboration  of the pure concept4   
,what follows from this identification  
cation of  philosophy with the pure     
concept is that all philosophies are1 of
  necessity1 systematic1 inasmuch as it 
is impossible to think the pure  concept
 as a singular or particular one1       
outside its relations with  the whole4  
,this systematic character belongs to   
every philosophical  proposition1 and   
not only to the actual systems of       
philosophy3 the  solution of every      
particular philosophical problem implies
 a vision  of that problem in its       

universality1 that is1 in the system4   
,we are  constantly reminded of this    
exigency by the fact that a new and     
original elaboration of particular      
problems does actually react on the     
whole of our thought2 and that we are   
often compelled to revise our           
fundamental opinions by the discovery of
 a difficulty which at first  presents  
itself in one sphere of thought only4   
,of such a process1 the whole of        
,croce's philosophy is a continuous     
exemplification1 but nowhere so clearly 
apparent as in the progress  of his     
conception of history4 ,his first step  
had been that of  reducing history to   
the general concept of art1 thereby     
emphasizing  the concreteness and       
individuality of history1 as opposed to 
the  abstractness of the natural        
sciences1 the concepts of which1 in that
  early stage1 he could not yet         
distinguish from those of philosophy4   
,in  the ,estetica the conception is    
still practically the same1 history     

resulting from the intersection of art  
and philosophy through the  application 
of the predicate of existence to the    
intuitive material4  ,in his first      
,lineamenti di ,logica1 history appears 
as the ultimate  product of the         
theoretical spirit1 the sea to which the
 river of art  flowed1 swollen by the   
waters of the river of philosophy4 ,but 
in the  same ,lineamenti he had not yet 
arrived at the identification of the    
definition and the individual judgment1 
which in his second ,logica  constitutes
 the final form of the pure concept1    
,croce's original  interpretation of    
,kant's a priori synthesis4 ,between the
 first  and the second ,logica1 ,croce  
wrote his ,filosofia della pratica1  in 
which he denied the duality of intention
 and action1 as in the  ,estetica he had
 denied the duality of intuition and    
expression3 an  intention which was not 
also an action appeared to him1 as we   
shall  see1 inconceivable4 ,it was by   
analogy with his treatment of this      

duality1 that he solved the duality     
between the concept 7in the sense  of   
definition7 and the individual judgment1
 which was also a duality  of philosophy
 as antecedent and history as           
consequent1 as he perceived  that a     
concept which is not at the same time a 
judgment of the  particular is as unreal
 as an intention which is not at the    
same time  an action4    ,these are the 
successive steps by which ,croce reached
 his doctrine of  the identity of       
history and philosophy1 one of the most 
discussed and  of the least understood  
among his theories4 ,we shall come back 
to it  later4 ,but a few more hints on  
its meaning can already be given here4  
,it is clear that by introducing the    
predicate of existence as essential  to 
history ,croce had already abandoned the
 conception of history as  pure1 that   
is1 non-logical1 non-intellectualized   
intuition3 but the  predicate of        
existence is insufficient to form a     
judgment1 without  the addition of the  

other predicates1 that is1 of the whole 
concept4  ,the predicate of existence   
can only tell us that something exists1 
but not what it is1 that exists3 the    
determination of the singular1  in its  
relations with the particular and the   
universal1 is implicit  in the          
historical judgment1 even when it is not
 openly enunciated4  ,such judgments as3
 ,this thing is1 or has been1 seem to   
present the  proper form of the         
historical judgment2 no other predicates
 than that  of existence are here       
visible1 but my talking of this thing   
implies  that ,i know what this thing   
is2 the other predicates are concealed  
in the subject4 ,every historical       
statement is1 therefore1 a perfect      
individual judgment4 ,its concrete and  
individual character1 which ,croce  had 
asserted in his early theory1 is here   
maintained by the presence of  the      
subject1 though the subject itself1 in  
history1 is seen not in its  intuitive  
purity1 as in poetry1 but as a concrete 

determination of the  concept4 ,the     
identification of philosophy and history
 is not so much  the effect of a more   
intellectualized view of the historical 
processes1  as of the progressive       
consciousness acquired by ,croce of the 
inherent  concreteness and individuality
 of the universal--of that realistic    
view of the concept as expressed by his 
elaboration of the logical a  priori    
synthesis4    ,the old distinction      
between a subjective and an objective   
treatment of  history receives a new    
light from the foregoing considerations4
 ,it is  impossible to make history     
without judgment1 and1 therefore1       
history  is in a sense irreducibly      
subjective4 ,but the subjectivity of    
history  is not the arbitrary and       
capricious subjectivity of the          
individual  historian1 who introduces   
his own passions and tendencies into the
  historical narrative3 it is the       
subjectivity of thought1 of the earnest 
and dispassionate research of truth1    

which coincides with the only           
conceivable objectivity4 ,what we call  
objective truth is not reached by       
renouncing thought1 but only by making  
our thought deeper and truer4  ,the     
historian who permeates with his thought
 his recreation of the  past 7and if he 
did not1 he would be recreating the past
 as poetry1  and imagination1 not as    
history7 needs not add a judgment of    
value to  his statements of fact3 the   
identity of value and fact presents     
itself  once more to us in the intrinsic
 structure of the historical judgment4  
,whatever the aspect of reality to which
 we turn our attention1 true  history   
and true criticism coincide4    ,a      
consequence of this identification of   
history and philosophy is that  the only
 legitimate divisions of history are    
those that correspond to  the           
distinctions of the concept1--history of
 knowledge and of action1  of art1 of   
thought1 of the practical activity of   
man2 and that the  relation among the   

different branches of history is similar
 to that of  the distinctions of the    
concept within the concept itself3 that 
is1  the history of one particular form 
of human activity is nothing but  the   
history of the whole spirit of man as it
 realizes itself under  one of its      
aspects1 a statement that we have       
already illustrated when  speaking of   
the history of art and poetry4 ,other   
divisions of history  are possible and  
useful1 deduced from empirical concepts 
7such as the  state1 the church1 the    
drama1 the novel1 society1 religion1    
etc471 but  they are divisions of       
practical convenience1 mnemonic and     
didascalie  expedients1 and not rigorous
 distinctions4 ,empirical concepts are1 
in fact1 in constant use in history1 but
 as instruments1 not as  constituents of
 historical thought4 ,history is of the 
individual  sub specie universalis1 and 
not of the practical generalizations4   
,this peculiar function of the empirical
 concept in history marks  the          

distinction between history and the     
natural sciences1 the final             
irreducibility of history to sociology4 
,as history is reduced to philosophy    
through the identification  of the      
historical with the individual judgment1
 so philosophy is  reduced to history   
through the identification of the       
definition with  the individual         
judgment4 ,since every philosophical    
proposition is  an answer to a given    
question1 and every question or problem 
is  individually and historically       
determined1 the whole course of the     
history of philosophy is in constant    
function of the general course of       
history4 ,this is the truth contained in
 ,hegel's formula of the identity  of   
philosophy and history of philosophy1   
which had been revived in  ,italy1 when 
,croce was meditating on these problems1
 by his friend  ,gentile3 a formula     
which he finally accepted and           
transformed into that  of the identity  
of history and philosophy1 in accordance

 with his view  of philosophy as a      
moment or grade of the spirit of man4   
,the a priori  synthesis which          
constitutes the reality both of the     
definition and  of the individual       
judgment is1 at the same time1 the      
reality of both  philosophy and history4
 ,the distinction between the two is a  
purely  didactic one3 in the first the  
emphasis is laid on the definition and  
the system1 in the second on the        
individual judgment and the narrative4  
,but because the narrative includes the 
concept1 every narrative  clarifies and 
solves philosophical problems1 and1 on  
the other hand1  every system of        
concepts throws light on the facts which
 are present  to the mind4 ,the         
confirmation of the soundness of the    
system is in the  power it displays to  
interpret and narrate history2 the      
touchstone of  philosophy is history4   
,the concept1 in affirming itself1      
conquers the  whole of reality1 which   
becomes one with it4    ,we shall deal  

more briefly with ,croce's treatment of 
the organization  of the empirical and  
abstract concepts in the natural and    
mathematical  sciences because his views
 coincide in their general lines with   
the  economic theory of science1 which  
is the view of scientific method        
elaborated by the scientists themselves 
in the last decades1 and differ  from it
 only in so far as they are comprehended
 in a vaster system of  thought4        
,croce's polemic against                
pseudo-scientific philosophy1 which  was
 amply justified at the beginning of his
 career1 has now lost a  good deal of   
its actuality1 since the ambitious      
attempts to organize  the concepts of   
science into a system of ultimate truth 
have finally  collapsed under the blows 
inflicted on their authors by science   
itself1  and are now relegated into a   
few academic and journalistic           
backwaters4  ,on the other hand1 there  
is no doubt that his discussion of      
scientific  methods1 though sufficient  

for his purposes1 is far from being as  
exhaustive as his discussion of either  
art or philosophy4    ,the natural      
sciences are systems of empirical       
concepts1 that is1 of  practical        
elaborations of knowledge1 and1         
therefore1 they do not belong  to the   
sphere of theoretical1 but to that of   
practical activity4 ,this  proposition  
must not be understood as referring to  
the practical  ends1 or applications1 of
 science3 action requires a knowledge of
 the  individual fact with which we are 
to deal1 and1 therefore1 the true       
antecedent of action is not science1 but
 an individual 7or historical7          
judgment4 ,the natural sciences are not 
subservient to action1 but  they are    
actions in the service of knowledge4    
,because of the empirical  and pragmatic
 character of their concepts1 it is     
impossible either  to unify them in a   
single concept1 or to divide them       
according to  rigorous distinctions4    
,the natural laws which they evolve are 

the same  empirical concepts1 which give
 rise to the creation of classes and    
types1 expressed in a different form2   
their empirical character is  confirmed 
by what ,boutroux called their          
contingency1 which is nothing  but the  
reflex of their arbitrary formation4    
,even the most general of  those laws1  
that of the constancy and uniformity of 
nature1 assumed as  the foundation of so
 much pseudo-scientific thought in the  
nineteenth  century1 is a mere postulate
 of practical opportunity1 without which
  it would be hardly possible to        
construct any science3 it is the first  
economic principle of scientific method1
 not an attribute of objective  reality4
    ,the truth of the natural sciences1 
that truth of which they and their      
empirical concepts are an abbreviated   
transcription1 is the historical  datum1
 the knowledge of actual individual     
happenings4 ,history is the  hot and    
fluid mass which the naturalist         
solidifies in the schematic  moulds of  

classes and types4 ,the naturalistic    
discoverer is1 therefore1  an historical
 discoverer and the revolutions of the  
natural sciences  are steps in the      
progress of historical knowledge4 ,the  
difference in  method between history   
and the natural sciences is not due to  
the  supposed difference between a      
higher and a lower reality 7spirit and  
nature71 or to the fact that nature has 
no history2 nature is perpetual         
activity and change1 that is1 history1  
as much as the spirit1 but the  progress
 of nature is less clearly perceptible  
and less interesting  to us than that of
 the human reality1 and1 therefore1 an  
abbreviated  transcription is more apt  
to satisfy our needs in relation to the 
knowledge of what we call nature than to
 that of the spirit4 ,the  nature that  
has no history1 and which is opposed in 
dualistic systems  of philosophy to the 
spirit of man1 is not the actual1       
historical  reality of nature1 but the  
empirical concepts of the natural       

sciences1  their classes1 types and     
laws1 conceived as an objective reality 
and  substituted for that reality4 ,in  
this sense1 nature is not a special     
object1 but only a method of treatment1 
as is proved by the fact  that that same
 method1 applied to the so-called higher
 and spiritual  reality1 by such        
sciences as psychology1 sociology1 or   
comparative  philology1 creates the same
 kind of naturalistic categories in the 
domain of the spirit4 ,it is of nature  
in this sense that the idealist  denies 
the real existence1 since the time when 
,bishop ,berkeley  repudiated matter as 
a mere abstraction4 ,and here again1 the
 scientist  comes to the support of the 
idealist with his keen awareness of  the
 pragmatic character of his hypotheses  
on the ultimate physical  constituents  
of reality4    ,it is through this      
theory of the natural sciences that     
,croce succeeded  in eliminating        
naturalistic transcendence from his     
thought1 and1  singularly enough1 his   

first impulse in this direction came to 
him  from his sthetic studies1 through  
his criticism of literary genres1  of   
grammars1 of the particular arts and of 
rhetorical forms4 ,he saw  how through  
them nature introduces itself1 as a     
construction of the  human spirit1 in   
the pure spiritual world of art2 and    
having denied  its reality in art1 he   
proceeded to discover it everywhere not 
as  reality1 but as an product of       
abstracting processes4 ,this must not be
  interpreted as meaning that the       
naturalistic method is an illegitimate  
hybrid3 it has its uses in its proper   
place1 and not less in the  study of    
mind than in the study of nature4 ,it is
 only by mistaking  its constructions or
 fictions for realities1 that we can be 
tempted  to deduce from the natural     
sciences a philosophy of nature1 or from
  the applications of the naturalistic  
method to art and to the history  of    
man1 an sthetics or a philosophy of     
history4 ,but the natural  sciences     

themselves are not responsible for the  
errors of philosophical  naturalism4    
,that such errors should not be limited 
exclusively to  philosophers1 but very  
often appear within the body of sciences
 like  biology or psychology or         
sociology1 is easily explained by the   
fact  that no scientist is a pure       
scientist3 but poor philosophy does not 
become science simply because it finds  
place in scientific books4  ,the quarrel
 between vitalists and mechanicists1 for
 one instance1  is a philosophical 7or  
historical71 not a scientific dispute3  
and  it reveals itself1 ultimately1 as  
the opposition not of conceivable       
realities1 but merely of different      
methods in the elaboration of the       
historical datum4 ,the coherent and     
clear-minded biologist is to-day  a     
mechanicist1 not because mechanism is   
the essence of reality1 but  because it 
is the postulate of his research4 ,the  
vitalist1 on the other  hand1 is        
inevitably brought by the trend of his  

thought to abandon  science and to      
become more or less deliberately a      
philosopher4 ,it is  enough to mention  
in this connection such names as        
,driesch or ,bergson4    ,the fictitious
 or conventional character of           
mathematics is still  more apparent than
 that of the natural sciences2 and we   
shall not  add anything to what we have 
said in the preceding chapter about the 
abstract concept1 the non-concrete      
universal1 which is the distinctive     
process of mathematical thought4 ,the   
application of the mathematical         
processes1 through the empirical        
concepts1 to the historical datum1      
gives origin to what we have called the 
judgment of numeration 7and             
mensuration71 and to the mathematical   
sciences of nature4 ,all that has  been 
observed of the natural sciences in     
general is valid for these  also4 ,their
 truth is still only the truth of the   
intuitive1 historical  datum of which   
the empirical concepts are practical    

elaborations2 the  addition of a further
 practical elaboration1 the abstract    
concept1  can add to their mnemonic or1 
as it is more often called1 technical   
efficiency1 but not to the value of     
their original content4 ,this  process1 
as the purely naturalistic one1 can be  
applied to the human as  well as to the 
natural reality1 but it is evident that 
its usefulness  decreases in the passage
 from the one to the other1 following   
the same  standards that apply to the   
natural sciences in general1 those of   
the  relative perceptibility and        
importance of the individual happening4 
,it is at its highest in physics or     
astronomy1 less notable in biology  or  
economics2 practically inexistent in    
psychology or sociology1 the  two       
sciences that suffer not less from the  
delusions of misapplied  statistics than
 from the invasions of cheap philosophy4
 ,croce's theory  of science1 as we have
 already remarked1 differs from the     
generally  accepted methodology of      

modern science only in its context1     
which  is usually agnostic in1 the pure 
scientist1 while1 in ,croce1 it         
consists in the affirmation of the pure 
concept1 or of the autonomy of          
philosophy3 a proposition with which the
 scientist qua scientist has no  reason 
to quarrel4 ,in both cases1 the autonomy
 of scientific thought  is only         
relative1 and the difference of context 
is a difference in  the determination of
 its limits4 ,in both cases1 scientific 
thought is  recognised as thoroughly    
legitimate only within limits4 ,the cry 
of the  bankruptcy of science1 of which 
we heard so much a few years ago1 is as 
meaningless for ,croce as for the pure  
scientist2 science cannot become        
bankrupt except by over-stepping its    
logical limits1 that is1 by first       
ceasing to be science and becoming the  
ape of philosophy4      ,footnote #a3   
,see ,logica1 part ii1 ,la filosofia1 la
 storia1 etc41 pp4  #aga-bfi4           
,,vii4 ,,the ,,theory ,,of ,,error#a    

,the practical origin of theoretical    
error--,confirmations of  this          
doctrine--,the forms of                 
error--stheticism and empiricism2       
mathematicism--,philosophism3 the       
philosophy of history and the           
philosophy of nature--,mythologism3     
philosophy and religion--,dualism1      
scepticism1 mysticism--,the conversion  
to truth--,the function of error4       
,one of the most original developments  
of ,croce's thought--a doctrine  that   
does not owe its validity only to its   
connection with the system1  since we   
can find it adumbrated already in such  
widely divergent  philosophies as those 
of ,socrates and ,thomas ,aquinas1 of   
,descartes  and ,rosmini1 but which in  
,croce's system acquires a new and wider
  meaning--is the theory of the         
practical origin of theoretical error1  
which we shall briefly discuss in this  
chapter4    ,from a strictly logical    
standpoint1 every error is mere         
privation or  negativity1 the opposite  

of the logical value which is truth1 and
  therefore inexistent outside the      
moment of opposition4 ,as there are  not
 two values in sthetics1 the beautiful  
and the ugly1 but one only1  beauty or  
expression1 of which ugliness or        
non-expression is merely the  negative  
aspect1 so in logic also there is but   
one value1 thought or  truth1 and error 
is non-thought1 that which logically has
 no being or  reality4 ,there is no     
thought which is not a thinking of      
truth4    ,let us pause for one instant 
to consider this last proposition1 which
  at first sight undoubtedly has a      
somewhat paradoxical air4 ,and yet it   
is impossible not to accept it1 unless  
we are willing to fall into the  most   
radical scepticism1 which would imply a 
renunciation not only of  every form of 
thought1 but even1 since there is no    
action which is not  founded on         
knowledge1 of every kind of action4 ,if 
we believed that  it were possible for  
our thought to think that which is not  

true1 no  external criterion or standard
 of truth could even be substituted for 
that which thought intrinsically would  
lack1 since the apprehension  of such   
external standards would in itself be an
 act of thought1 and  therefore suffer  
from the indetermination and uncertainty
 of thought  itself4 ,this belief in the
 validity of human thought is in fact1  
however disguised or even openly denied1
 present in every thinking  and acting  
being3 every thought1 every action of   
man is an implicit  declaration of this 
faith4 ,and once we have consciously    
acquired it1  as an inalienable1        
intrinsic characteristic of our whole   
spiritual  activity1 it is evident that 
it leaves no place for faith as such1   
for  an obscure1 independent faculty1 a 
mystical intuition1 different from  and 
superior to our human thought1 and which
 could mysteriously endow  thought      
itself with the gratuitous gift of      
truth4    ,and yet1 after we have denied
 the logical existence of error1 we are 

still confronted with the mass of       
positive errors which we can more  or   
less easily identify in the course of   
history and in our daily  experience4   
,positive errors1 that is1 affirmations 
of knowing that  which we do not know1  
are real products of our activity3 but  
since the  theoretical value1 truth1 is 
absent from them1 they cannot be        
products  of the theoretical activity4  
,they must therefore be products of the 
only other form of spiritual activity1  
the practical4 ,ignorance or  obscurity 
or doubt are not errors2 they are the   
inexhaustible matter to  which the      
spirit of man is perpetually giving form
 and reality4 ,to be  aware of one's    
ignorance is in fact the first stage in 
the research of  truth1 the initum      
sapient4 ,thought and truth are         
affirmation2 the  positive error is an  
affirmation also1 which simulates truth4
 ,we cannot  think an error1 but we can 
pass from thought to action1 by making a
  false affirmation1 a purely practical 

affirmation1 which consists in  the act 
of producing sounds to which no thought 
corresponds1 or1 which  amounts to the  
same1 only a thought without value1     
without coherence1  without truth4 ,what
 we have qualified in its negative      
aspect as a  theoretical error manifests
 itself in its positive aspect as an act
 of  will1 directed to a certain end1 a 
practical act1 and1 as such1 having  its
 own rationality1 which is neither      
logical1 nor moral1 but purely          
economic1 consisting in the adequacy of 
that particular affirmation  to the     
individual purpose by which it has been 
prompted4 ,morality  requires that the  
thinking spirit should realize itself as
 truth2 and  therefore the economic act 
which is error1 though logically unreal1
  though economically useful1 finds     
inevitably its ultimate sanction in a   
moral condemnation4    ,though this     
doctrine may appear unfamiliar to the   
logician1 yet we all  constantly depend 
on it in our analysis of error4 ,we know

 that error is  due to the passions or  
interests of men1 which cloud the       
intellect1 and  the more an error is    
foreign to our own ways of thinking1 the
 easier it  is for us to discover the   
practical motives which help us to      
explain  it away4 ,that category of     
errors which goes under the name of     
national  prejudices1 for instance1 is  
transparent in its origins to every man 
belonging to a nation other than the one
 in which a particular set  of such     
prejudices is commonly accepted4 ,and   
other categories of  errors1 social1    
professional1 religious1 and so on1 are 
of the same  kind1 affecting only       
certain classes of men1 because of the  
passions  or interests or traditions    
which belong to them by reason of their 
peculiar practical associations4 ,in the
 field of politics1 or in any  kind of  
heated discussion1 this research of the 
practical motive is  even pushed to the 
extreme1 and the bad faith of the       
adversary becomes  an obvious axiom4 ,in

 such cases1 the same passions being    
active on  both sides1 the research of  
the practical motive is evidently not   
pure  and disinterested1 but is itself  
moved by a practical motive1 and        
therefore likely to produce a new error1
 rather than a clear judgment4          
,therefore1 though rigorously speaking  
there is no difference between  the     
error which is a deliberate lie and that
 which is due to a more  or less        
justifiable weakness1 and there is no   
error which is not in  bad faith1 which 
is not due to a deliberate act of will1 
yet1 from  an empirical standpoint we   
may distinguish between errors in bad   
and  in good faith1 and recommend       
tolerance and indulgence for the latter 
kind4 ,but tolerance is not             
indifference4 ,croce went so far1 in    
drawing  the consequences of his        
doctrine1 as to justify the ,holy       
,inquisition2  and in fact all our      
modern advocates of religious and       
political  tolerance have really shaken 

our faith in its methods1 but not in its
  principle1 which is that of the moral 
responsibility of error4 ,the ,holy     
,inquisition moreover was bound to clash
 with the freedom1 which is not  the    
freedom of error but the freedom of     
truth1 because it placed its  faith in a
 static1 extrahuman truth1 as against   
the veritas filia  temporis1 the truth  
which is engendered and conditioned by  
history1 by  the peculiar problems and  
intellectual climate of the age1 and    
which is  the object of our modern      
faith2 and therefore defeated its own   
end by  striking at the roots of the    
value for the upholding of which it had 
been established4    ,passing from the  
problem of the nature of error to that  
of the forms  actually assumed by       
philosophic error1 ,croce accepts       
,vico's definition  of error1 as an     
improper combination of ideas1 and      
therefore defines  such forms1 by       
deducing the number of possible improper
 combinations  from his own conception  

of the legitimate forms of theoretical  
activity4 ,this phenomenology of error  
is one of the main tasks of  logic1     
while the refutation of particular      
philosophical errors is the  task of    
philosophy as a whole4 ,we shall rapidly
 survey these general  forms1 in which  
it will be easy for the reader to       
recognize the logical  7or illogical7   
structure of many particular errors     
criticised in the  preceding chapters4  
,the pure concept can be improperly     
combined with1 or exchanged for1  the   
pure intuition 7art71 or the empirical  
and abstract concept 7the  natural and  
mathematical sciences72 or it can be    
improperly split  in its unity of       
intuition and concept 7a priori         
synthesis71 and  arbitrarily put        
together again1 either as a concept     
which simulates an  intuition or as an  
intuition which simulates a concept4    
,hence the five  fundamental forms of   
error3 stheticism1 empiricism1          
mathematicism1  philosophism1 and       

historicism or mythologism4 ,to these   
must be added  other forms originated   
from combinations of the preceding ones3
  dualism1 scepticism1 and mysticism4   
,we have dealt elsewhere with both      
stheticism and empiricism4 ,of  the     
first1 the most recent form is that     
which pretends to build a  philosophy of
 pure intuition or of pure experience1  
that is1 of an  experience which1 not   
being touched by any intellectual       
category1  is also pure intuition4      
,empiricism is practically all the      
current  philosophy of our times1 from  
the positivism of ,comte and ,spencer   
to the more modern types of the         
so-called philosophic elaboration of    
scientific knowledge4 ,mathematicism is 
a rarer and more aristocratic  form of  
error3 it does not consist in the       
application of the  mathematical method 
to the exposition of philosophical      
concepts1  which is a mere didactic     
expedient1 more or less convenient1 but 
insufficient to characterize the quality

 of the concepts themselves2  its true  
exponents are those philosophers or     
mathematicians who  take mathematical   
fictions1 such as the dimensions of     
space1 for  realities1 and proceed to   
speculate on such a foundation4 ,the    
near  future seems to promise a great   
extension of this kind of philosophy1   
through the prevailing interest in the  
theory of relativity1 which  is fondly  
supposed to contain the germs of a      
revolution in thought4  ,both empiricism
 and mathematicism lead to a dualistic  
conception of  reality1 by opposing     
either the facts of scientific and      
historical  knowledge1 that is1 a       
collection of facts limited in space and
 time1  to an infinite reality beyond   
that knowledge1 or our actual world of  
space and time1 to worlds1 spaces and   
times mathematically conceivable1  but  
of which we have no experience4 ,the    
passage from this dualism to            
spiritualism and other kinds of         
superstition1 which in our times seem   

to be so closely associated with certain
 forms of pseudo-scientific  thought1 is
 of the easiest4 ,the naturalistic      
experiments by which  we attempt to peer
 into the mystery of the so-called      
unknown or  unknowable1 hoping to detect
 the spirit itself as matter1 however   
subtle or light1 and such theories as   
that of the identity of the  spiritual  
world with the four-dimensional space1  
are evidences of this  immediate        
connection between superstition and     
science1 for which1  obviously1 not     
science is responsible1 and not         
ignorance even1 but  a chain of more or 
less deliberate errors in each case     
reducible to  definite practical        
motives4 ,from the point of view of the 
ethics of  intellect1 there is no       
difference between the frank impostor   
who is  moved to speculate on other     
people's feelings only by greed1 and the
  scientist who makes his science       
minister to his own private feelings1   
and is hardly1 if at all1 conscious of  

his fraud4    ,of the other two forms of
 philosophic error1 philosophism1       
consisting  in the abuse of the purely  
logical element1 and therefore in an    
usurpation on the part of philosophy    
against either history or science1      
tending to the formation of a philosophy
 of history and of a philosophy  of     
nature1 is less common now than in times
 of more active and original            
speculation4 ,the most conspicuous      
examples are to be met with among       
,germany's classical thinkers2 and we   
have already hinted at the  connection  
between one particular logical error1   
the undue extension  of the dialectic   
process to the distinctions of the      
concept1 and to  the empirical concept1 
which is the basis of ,hegel's          
philosophies of  history and nature4    
,both these sciences attempt an a priori
 deduction  of the individual and of the
 empirical1 a process which is in itself
  absurd and contradictory4 ,they       
duplicate history and science with a    

series of concepts1 which1 unless they  
are the same which constitute  history  
and science 7in which case we have      
history and we have science1  and not a 
philosophy of history or of nature71 are
 necessarily empty  of any concrete     
determinations4 ,but though ,croce      
points to philosophy  of history and    
philosophy of nature as to the two      
typical instances  of philosophism1 yet 
he is ready to acknowledge that a good  
deal  of thought that has gone under    
those names in the past has had a  large
 influence in moulding many of our      
historical and philosophical            
conceptions1 and1 in the case of the    
second one1 in helping us to  realize   
the unity and spirituality of nature1   
and to recognize in the  history of     
nature the same principles operating in 
the history of man4  ,croce's idealism1 
in fact1 does not divide nature from the
 spirit  except in the logical sense    
which has been made clear in the        
preceding  chapter2 it does not relegate

 nature in an unknowable sphere beyond  
the reach of human minds4 ,it unifies   
spirit and nature1 but a parte          
subjecti1 and not a parte objecti1 and  
reduces nature to the spirit1  rather   
than the spirit to nature2 which is the 
only process that makes  such a         
unification intelligible and            
significant4    ,the last of the five   
fundamental forms of philosophic error  
consists  in the arbitrary separation of
 the subject from its predicate1 of     
history from philosophy1 and in the     
consequent position of the subject  as  
predicate1 that is1 of a mere           
representation as a concept4 ,this  may 
sound rather abstruse1 but can          
immediately be made clear by adding     
that what ,croce has in mind in this    
definition is the production of  myths4 
,this error he therefore calls either   
historicism 7from the  logical process  
by which it is produced71 or mythologism
 7from the  form which it commonly      
assumes74 ,a myth is to him not a mere  

poetic  or sthetic imagination1 but     
necessarily includes an affirmation or  
logical judgment4 ,it differs also from 
allegory1 in which the relation         
established between a poetic fiction and
 a concept is always more  or less      
openly declared to be arbitrary1 and the
 two terms are not  confused with each  
other4 ,in a myth1 on the contrary1 the 
poetic  fiction assumes the actual      
function of the concept1 transforming   
both  philosophy and history into a     
fable or legend4 ,errors of this class  
are frequent in every system of         
philosophy1 when the thinker1 either    
consciously and deliberately1 as in the 
case of ,plato1 or unwittingly1  as in  
,kant's ,ding an sich or in             
,schopenhauer's ,will1 fills the  gaps  
of his real speculation with a mere     
image4 ,but mythologism is  more        
generally the form of religious error1  
since there is no religion  without a   
logical affirmation embodied in a myth4 
,if myth and religion  coincide1 as the 

distinction between myth and philosophy 
is that of  error and truth1 of a false 
and a true philosophy1 we must conclude 
that religion as truth is one with      
philosophy1 or1 as ,croce expresses  it1
 that the true religion is philosophy2  
and this appears to ,croce to  be the   
conclusion of all ancient and modern    
thought in regard to the  history of    
religions4 ,philosophies have sprung up 
in all times from  the soil of religious
 thought1 and more or less completely   
resolved in  themselves1 and logically  
clarified1 the obscure substance of     
myth4  ,this is ,croce's clear-cut1     
unequivocal solution of the problem of  
the  relations between philosophy and   
religion3 there is no place reserved    
anywhere in his system for an either    
internal or external revelation  other  
than that perpetual revelation of truth1
 which is at the same  time history and 
philosophy4    ,from the possible       
combinations of these five fundamental  
forms  of error1 three more complex ones

 are derived3 dualism1 when two         
contradictory methods1 one logically    
legitimate and the other  illegitimate1 
or both equally false1 are brought      
together1 and  considered to be both    
philosophically valid2 scepticism1 when 
the  mind1 in the presence of confusion 
and error1 asserts the mystery of       
reality1 which is the problem itself1   
but denies its own power to  deal with  
it2 and finally1 mysticism1 when even   
that last semblance  of thought1 by     
which the sceptic affirms that there is 
a mystery1 is  abandoned1 and the       
immediate actuality of life is regarded 
to be the  only truth4 ,dualism leads   
inevitably to the conception of a double
  reality1 and we have already seen how 
the whole of ,croce's speculation       
continually tends towards the logical   
unification of dualities1 as with       
spirit and nature1 value and fact4      
,every philosophical problem seems  to  
present itself to his mind as involved  
in a dualistic difficulty2  every       

solution becomes satisfactory to him    
only when the last shreds  of dualism   
are eliminated from it4 ,while          
scepticism is a logical error  7the     
affirmation of a purely negative        
position71 it contains within  itself   
one of the essential moments of every   
progress in thought1 the  scepsis1 or   
philosophical doubt1 which is the       
negation of an error1  and therefore the
 germ of every true affirmation4 ,as for
 mysticism1  we have dealt with it      
elsewhere as being one of the untenable 
aspects  of logical scepticism2 we may  
add that1 if it ever obeyed the laws of 
internal coherence1 we should not even  
be able to discuss it1 since its  only  
conceivable expression would be an      
ecstatic silence4    ,the same character
 of necessity that invests these forms  
of the logical  error is present also in
 the false solutions of other           
philosophical  problems1 and we need    
only refer the reader to our discussion 
of  sthetic theories4 ,in both cases1   

not only the number1 but also the       
logical succession1 of the necessary    
forms of error1 depends on the  number  
of possible arbitrary combinations of   
the spiritual forms1  or concepts of    
reality4 ,but infinite1 on the other    
hand1 are the  individual forms of      
error1 as infinite are the individual   
forms of  truth3 the problems are always
 historically conditioned and variable1 
and so are also the solutions and the   
false solutions1 determined by          
feelings1 passions1 and interests4      
,from error to truth1 there is no       
gradual ascent4 ,the passage is         
described by ,croce as a kind of        
spiritual conversion3 the erring        
spirit1 fleeing from the light1 must    
convert itself in a researching  spirit1
 eager for light2 pride must yield to   
humility2 the narrow love  for one's    
abstract individuality1 widen and lift  
itself to an austere  love1 to an utter 
devotion to that which is above the     
individual1  becoming ,bruno's eroico   

furore1 ,spinoza's amor ,dei            
intellectualis4  ,in this act of love   
and enthusiasm1 the spirit becomes pure 
thought and  attains the truth1 or1     
rather1 transforms itself into truth4   
,and the  possession of truth is at the 
same time possession of its contrary1 of
  error transformed into truth2 to      
possess a concept is to possess it in   
the fulness of its relations1 and       
therefore to possess1 in the same  act1 
all the ways in which that concept1 for 
instance1 of the sthetic  activity1 is  
at the same time the concept of         
hedonism1 intellectualism1  empiricism1 
and so on4 ,the two kinds of knowledge1 
that of truth and  of its contrary1 are 
inseparable3 the concept is at the same 
time  affirmation and negation4    ,from
 this absolute possession of truth1 we  
may distinguish a stage  of research1   
which is not yet thought1 but only the  
operation of the  practical will        
creating certain conditions for thought4
 ,seen in the  light of this process1   

the series of errors through which a    
mind goes1  when guided by a will to    
gather its materials and prepare itself 
to  think1 transforms itself into a     
series of attempts or hypotheses4 ,an   
error is an error when there is a will  
to err2 the hypothesis1 however1  into  
which the error is transmuted by the new
 will is not yet truth1  and becomes    
truth only in the act of its            
verification2 but it is no  longer an   
error1 because it does not affirm itself
 as truth1 but only  as a means or help 
for the conquest of truth4    ,from this
 double consideration of the nature of  
error1 first1 as error  which is        
conquered and comprehended by truth1 and
 then as attempt or  hypotheses in the  
service of truth1 ,croce derives the    
identification of  the history of error 
with the history of truth1 or           
philosophy4 ,but not  in the sense in   
which ,hegel had considered the         
successive apparition of  the various   
philosophical categories and of the     

various forms of error1  seeing in them 
a kind of gradual revelation of his own 
philosophy4 ,to  ,croce such a          
conception of the progress of philosophy
 is unacceptable4  ,philosophy as an    
abstract category1 as one of the forms  
of the  spiritual activity1 has no      
origin in time1 is not limited to the   
men we  call philosophers1 but acts in  
every moment of the life of the spirit  
on the material offered by history1     
which it contributes to create1 and     
does not1 therefore1 progress any more  
than the categories of art or of        
morality4 ,but it progresses in its     
concreteness1 as art and the whole  of  
life do2 because life is development1   
and development is progress4  ,every    
affirmation of reality is conditioned by
 reality and conditions  a new reality1 
which in its turn is1 in its progress1  
the condition of  a new thought and a   
new philosophy4 ,in this perpetual      
cycle1 though  individual errors are    
conquered1 no form of error can be      

definitely  abolished2 but they         
constantly reappear1 because of the     
intrinsic  necessity of their structure1
 and when they reappear not as wilful   
errors1 but as attempts and hypotheses1 
they have their appointed  function in  
the progress of truth and reality4 ,to  
this constancy of  error corresponds a  
constancy of truth3 truth is not        
attained once and  for ever1 but is true
 in the act of its affirmation1 and in  
proportion  to its adequacy to the      
particular problem1 to the individual   
conditions  of fact1 which necessarily  
include1 at every given moment1 the     
whole  history of the past4 ,thus1 from 
a different angle1 ,croce's theory of   
error reaches the same conclusion as his
 general theory of logic1  the identity 
of philosophy and history2 and          
philosophy appears as a  perpetual      
development1 a history that never can   
repeat itself1 since  every affirmation 
of the truth transforms itself into a   
new element of  reality1 into one of the

 conditions determining every new       
problem and  every new solution4        
,footnote #a3 ,see ,logica1 part iii1   
,le forme degli errori1 etc41 pp4       
#bga-dba4          ,,viii4 ,,the        
,,practical ,,activity#a                
,philosophical                          
introspection--,affirmation of the      
practical activity--,the  category of   
feeling--,the theoretical activity as   
the antecedent of the                   
practical--,identity of intention and   
volition--,identity of volition and     
action--,the practical judgment3        
philosophy and psychology --,the problem
  of free will3 liberty and             
necessity--,croce's solution in the     
context of  his philosophy--,the        
practical value3 good and evil--,the    
unreality of  evil1 and the function of 
ideals--,the sanction of evil--,the     
volition  and the passions--,the        
empirical individuality--,development   
and progress4      ,the reality of the  
practical activity as distinct from the 

theoretical  activity1 of will as       
distinct from knowledge1 can never be   
proved  through the naturalistic method 
of psychology1 by merely pointing  to a 
class of facts--actions--different from 
another class of  facts--thoughts4 ,the 
so-called action manifests itself1 at a 
closer  analysis1 as infinitely complex 
and rich in purely theoretical          
elements2 the so-called thought1 as     
partly at least a work of the  human    
will4 ,the concrete life of the spirit  
is always both practical  and           
theoretical1 and the distinction we are 
looking for is an ideal  distinction1 to
 be ascertained by the method of        
philosophical1 not  psychological1      
introspection2 by the direct witness of 
consciousness1  and by the deduction of 
its function in the concept of the      
spirit1  or of reality1 as a whole4 ,the
 complete affirmation of a form1 or     
grade1 of spiritual activity is the     
philosophy of that form1 and of  its    
relations with the others2 in this case1

 the philosophy of the  practical1 or of
 will4 ,it is hardly necessary1 at this 
stage of our  exposition1 to observe    
that the philosophy of the practical    
will not  be practical philosophy1 a    
collection of rules for the attainment  
of  the useful and the good1 any more   
than the philosophy of art is a         
collection of sthetic precepts3 it will 
be a purely formal science1 a  universal
 concept1 the content of which is the   
infinite wealth of the  individual      
determinations of the will1 the history 
of the practical  activity4    ,in the  
following chapter we shall deal more    
particularly with the two  forms of the 
practical activity1 economic and ethic1 
corresponding  to the two forms of the  
theoretical1 sthetic and logic4 ,here we
  shall consider the undifferentiated   
practical activity1 first1 in its       
relations1 and then1 in its internal    
dialectic4 ,the contents of this        
chapter are1 therefore1 intended as     
applying both to economics and  ethics1 

to the useful and to the good4    ,there
 are two typical forms of scepticism    
regarding the practical  activity4 ,the 
first denies that it is a spiritual     
activity1 by  denying that man is       
conscious of his will1 in the process of
 willing2  consciousness comes only     
after1 and is not consciousness of the  
will1  but of our representation of the 
will4 ,therefore1 the will is nature1   
and consciousness1 or spiritual         
activity1 is only our thought4 ,the     
second does not exclude the will from   
consciousness1 but affirms that  there  
is no real distinction between will and 
thought4 ,the first  doctrine is        
evidently founded on a confusion between
 reflected and  intrinsic consciousness2
 and maintains something that is always 
true  of reflected consciousness1 not in
 relation to the will only1 but to      
every form of spiritual activity2       
carried to its extreme consequences1  it
 would banish consciousness from the    
whole life of human mind1 since  every  

act of consciousness would always be    
consciousness of something  else1 and   
never of itself4 ,against this view1    
,croce insists on the  concept of an    
intrinsic consciousness1 which          
accompanies every act of  the spirit3   
the consciousness of the creative       
artist1 for instance1  which is         
certainly other than that of the critic1
 but not less real4  ,the will may be   
regarded as nature1 only when           
apprehended by the  theoretical         
activity2 as every other act of the     
spirit becomes nature1  outside its     
immediate actuality1 when consciously   
reflected upon4 ,the  second form of    
sceptism1 identifying thought and will1 
cannot maintain  itself in its purity1  
because of the difficulties involved by 
the  denial of what seems to be the     
immediate evidence of consciousness2 it1
  therefore1 qualifies itself by        
recognizing that the will is thought1   
but of a particular kind1 thought       
impressing itself on nature1 or         

realizing itself in action3 which is but
 an indirect way of admitting  the      
autonomy of the practical activity4     
,but do the theoretical and the         
practical activity exhaust the whole of 
the spirit of man8 ,there is at least   
one more psychological category  which  
clamours for admission within the       
precincts of philosophy1 that  of       
feeling or sentiment4 ,for ,croce1      
feeling as a form of spiritual  activity
 does not exist3 the corresponding      
psychological class covers  a number of 
heterogeneous facts1 which cannot be    
reduced to a single  concept4 ,its      
function in philosophy has always been  
that of serving  as a temporary term for
 that which philosophy had not yet hilly
  determined and understood2 in         
sthetics1 for the intuitive character   
of art1 against the fallacies of        
hedonism and intellectualism2 in the    
theory of history for the individual and
 concrete element of history1  or even  
for the subjective historical judgment1 

against positivism  and sociologism2 in 
logic1 for the pure concept against the 
empirical  and abstract4 ,its function  
in the philosophy of the practical is of
  the same order3 feeling or sentiment  
are among the names by which the        
peculiarity of the practical activity   
first began to be recognized1  being    
labels for classes of psychological     
facts in which the moment of  will is   
more important than that of reason1     
practice more essential  than theory4   
,but the psychological facts thus       
classified resolve  themselves          
ultimately either into acts of knowledge
 or of will2 and  the witness of direct 
consciousness does not find feeling or  
sentiment  within itself as a distinct  
form of spiritual activity4 ,obviously1 
this exclusion does not imply that      
,croce denies the existence of the      
empirical groups of facts gathered in   
those classes2 it means only  that he   
has reduced those facts to the immediate
 data of consciousness  of which they   

consist1 and divested them of that      
mysterious halo1 the  halo of ignorance 
or of deliberate error1 with which an   
appeal to  sentimental reasons is sure  
to be accompanied when introduced into a
  philosophical discussion4 ,when we    
hear1 for instance1 that philosophy  and
 science belong to the sphere of reason1
 and religion to that of  sentiment1    
since there is no sentiment which is not
 either reason or  will1 we at once     
understand that what is meant is that   
the speaker is  willing to believe1 for 
practical motives1 what his reason tells
 him  to be untrue2 and we know also    
that this error contains1 sometimes at  
least1 an element of truth1 which is the
 affirmation of a truer reason  than the
 one employed by a certain type of      
philosophy1 by a rationalism  which     
treats the human spirit as a thing of   
abstract logic4 ,the error  consists in 
the putting of one's will in the place  
of one's reason2  the germinal truth1 in
 the attempt to make one's reason wider1

 more  comprehensive4 ,it is1 therefore1
 one of those positions in which it is  
a sin against the spirit to acquiesce1  
but which are the beginning of  wisdom  
in the man of good faith4    ,the       
practical activity presupposes the      
theoretical activity3 no  will is       
conceivable without knowledge1 and our  
will is such as our  knowledge is4 ,but 
this presupposition is of an ideal and  
not of a  temporal order3 the mind in   
its concreteness1 at every moment of its
  life1 is both practical and           
theoretical4 ,the a particular kind of  
knowledge which conditions our will is  
neither the purely intuitive  nor the   
abstractly logical one1 but the         
historical or perceptive1 or  concretely
 logical knowledge1 which is at the same
 time a knowledge  of things and of the 
relations of things1 constantly changing
 with  the perpetual development of the 
world around us1 and1 therefore1        
constantly re-creating and renovating   
itself as the antecedent of  every      

particular volition4 ,no other          
theoretical fact precedes the act  of   
will3 the so-called practical judgments 
or practical concepts1  which some      
thinkers consider as a necessary        
intermediate step between  the          
historical judgment and the volition1   
are nothing but classes  of historical  
judgments relating to volitions in the  
past1 mental  formations similar to the 
rhetorical categories in the domain of  
art1  and1 therefore1 do not really     
precede but follow the actual volitions4
  ,in the process of willing1 the       
recognition of a certain action as good 
or useful1 that is1 as belonging to one 
of the practical categories1  and1      
therefore1 desirable1 is not an act that
 precedes the volition1  but is the     
volition itself4 ,the qualification of  
an action as useful  or good is not     
distinguishable from the volition except
 when it comes  after the action1 and is
 then a reflection on the act itself1   
not  different in kind from any other   

historical judgment4    ,the conclusion 
to be drawn from these premises is that1
 in relation to  every particular       
situation1 intention and volition       
coincide2 or1 that  what we call        
intention1 the abstract volition1 the   
imaginary volition1  opposed to the     
concrete and real one1 is not a moment  
of the will  at all1 and the only       
volition is the one that is determined  
by the  concrete situation1 the real and
 concrete volition4 ,the distinction    
between intention and volition has in   
all times been the fertile  ground for  
the growth of all kinds of hypocrisy1 as
 it is easy to  connect in one's mind a 
certain concrete volition1 which is     
evil1 with  an imaginary intention of   
good2 and the doctrine that justifies   
the  means for the sake of the end is   
but a variety of this process4 ,the     
identification of intention and volition
 is1 therefore1 not merely a  matter of 
good logic2 it is the necessary         
foundation of a realistic  doctrine of  

the will1 which cannot will anything but
 itself1 and can  never be abstracted   
from its real basis1 from the actual    
determinations  of the moment of reality
 by which it is conditioned4    ,once   
the concrete character of volition has  
been recognized1 there  remains no      
difficulty in the way of further        
identifying volition and  action4 ,the  
relation between the two is analogous to
 the relation  between intuition and    
expression in sthetics3 there is no     
volition  which is not also an action1  
and vice versa4 ,volition and action are
  not two distinct phases of one        
process1 but two different ways of      
looking at the same reality3 the same   
fact which is1 from the point  of view  
of the spirit1 a volition1 is1          
naturalistically speaking1 an  action3  
we are in the presence of one more      
aspect of the old dualism  of spirit and
 nature4 ,and here again the duality    
vanishes when we  observe that there is 
not a single act of will which does not 

manifest  itself in a physical movement1
 however imperceptible1 and that on  the
 other hand there is no physical action1
 not even the so-called  instinctive or 
habitual ones1 which are not either     
direct or indirect  products of the     
will4 ,a ,that which is independent of  
the will is not  the action itself1 but 
the success of the action1--what ,croce 
calls a  happening4 ,the volition       
coincides with the action1 which is the 
work of  the individual1 and not with   
the happening1 which is collaboration or
  contrast of wills1 the work not of the
 individual1 but of the whole4 ,no      
action ever realizes itself entirely in 
the happening1 and no action1  however  
hindered in its realization1 is ever    
entirely without influence  on the      
happening4 ,the measure of the adequacy 
of the historical  judgment preceding   
the action to the particular situation  
is given in  some degree by the relation
 between the action and the happening2  
but  it is impossible1 and it is in fact

 never done1 though we may affirm  our  
inclination to do it1 to derive the     
value of an action1 of the  actual1     
concrete volition1 from its success4    
,when we praise a practical  hero for   
his success1 we imply that his success  
was not accidental1  not a mere         
happening1 but entirely due to acts of  
his will2 if the  praise is misplaced1  
the error is not in the theory1 on which
 we all  implicitly agree1 but in our   
knowledge and judgment of the facts of  
his  life4 ,and when we rise from the   
consideration of purely economical to   
that of ethical values1 the importance  
of success gradually diminishes1        
because we fix our attention more to the
 spiritual reality1 to the  quality of  
the individual soul1 and less to the    
material concomitants4  ,the great      
majority of mankind's moral heroes would
 be utter failures  from the standpoint 
of success1 granted that it should be   
possible to  speak of such a            
contradiction in terms as moral success1

 a phrase in  which a true spiritual    
value1 morality1 is applied to a mere   
material  abstraction4    ,the practical
 judgment1 which is1 as we have already 
seen1 nothing  but a particular kind of 
historical judgment1 is a reflection on 
the  action and not on the happening2   
and we shall not repeat here what  has  
been said elsewhere of the relation     
between fact and value3 the  practical  
value is the action itself1 and cannot  
be deduced or derived  from standards1  
principles1 ideals1 which are but       
combinations of  prexistent judgments4  
,the practical judgment1 economic or    
moral1 is  a philosophical judgment in  
the sense in which every other judgment 
is also philosophical4 ,a philosophy of 
the practical activity1 not  in the     
technical sense in which we speak of    
treatises and schools  of philosophy1   
but in that universal sense in which    
every man is a  philosopher1 as he is a 
poet1 is therefore the necessary        
condition of  the practical judgment4   

,but this philosophy is fundamentally   
distinct  from the psychological or     
naturalistic elaboration of the facts of
  the will1 though at times it may have 
been materially connected with  it4 ,a  
psychologically descriptive science of  
the practical activity  is1 however1 as 
legitimate in its own field as all other
 natural  sciences2 it constitutes a    
practical rhetoric which has as glorious
 a  tradition as the rhetoric of        
literature1 from ,theophrastus to       
,spinoza  and ,descartes4 ,it creates   
its classes or types of actions1 the    
value  of which is similar to that of   
all other empirical concepts1 and by    
giving them a categorical form1 it      
transforms them into maxims1 rules1  and
 precepts4 ,as long as these types and  
precepts are taken for what  they are1  
no harm can come from them2 we all make 
similar formations  as helps to our     
individual conduct1 and find them more  
than helpful1  necessary4 ,but when they
 are taken as philosophy1 then we have  

the  usual results of this kind of      
logical confusion3 either the empirical 
concepts1 under a rigorous analysis1    
lose their consistency1 and types  or   
rules which were useful instruments for 
the treatment of particular  problems   
are discarded for philosophical         
concepts1 which are immaterial  to the  
discussion1 or they are treated as      
philosophical concepts1 and  invested   
with the character of universality and  
necessity which belongs  to the latter4 
,of the first process1 we shall give as 
an example the  man who maintains that  
war is necessary and eternal2 which is  
true1 if  by war we mean the perpetual  
conflict and struggle which is the life 
of  reality 7a philosophical concept71  
but which is at least a gratuitous      
assertion1 when it is said of that      
particular kind of war which is  waged  
between state and state1 with arms and  
armies4 ,of the second1 the  moralist   
who identifies morality with a          
particular system or set of  precepts1  

or the philosopher who turns his        
philosophy into a special  pleading for 
his cause or party4 ,turning now from   
the discussion of  the relations between
 the practical and the theoretical      
activity1 to  consider the intrinsic    
problems of the will1 and the most      
complex and  difficult of all1 that of  
the freedom of the will1 we shall find  
that  ,croce's solution1 though reached 
by a totally different method1 is  very 
similar to the one offered by ,bergson4 
,both ,croce and ,bergson  refuse to    
take sides in the quarrel between       
free-will and determinism1  but transfer
 it to a higher or deeper ground where  
the contrasting  terms acquire more     
significant1 and no longer opposite1    
meanings4  ,bergson accomplishes his    
abolition of the dilemma through a      
masterful  psychological analysis of the
 immediate data of consciousness1 ,croce
  comes to the same result by applying  
to this problem his logic of the        
distinctions of the concept1 which we   

have already seen so often at  work4    
,every act of the will is determined1 in
 the sense that it is  conditioned by a 
given situation1 and varies with the    
varying of the  situation2 it is free1  
inasmuch as it is something new and     
different1  which was not given in the  
situation1 and without which there would
  be no change1 no growth1 no           
development4 ,necessity and freedom1    
which  so often appear as antagonistic  
views of the same fact1 are both        
present1 though distinct1 in the        
volition1 which is the unity of the     
two1 being at once determined and free4 
,the volition is thus regarded  as a    
practical a priori synthesis1 the       
autonomous creative act of  the         
practical mind1 as the intuition is the 
sthetic1 and the concept  the logical a 
priori synthesis2 the spirit never      
realizes itself  except by acting1 and  
it never acts except under given        
conditions of  place and time4 ,but as  
these conditions are nothing but what we

 have  called happenings1 which in their
 turn are complex results of single     
volitions1 the concept of the freedom of
 the spirit coincides with that  of its 
activity4    ,this solution is the one  
that we were obviously led to expect    
from  the whole context of ,croce's     
philosophy1 a solution in keeping  with 
his logic and with his general theory of
 knowledge4 ,a similar  parallelism we  
can observe in respect to the other     
solutions of the  problem of the will3  
determinism is connected with a         
mechanistic  materialism1 as            
indeterminism with one form or other of 
mythicism4  ,the doctrine of the double 
causality1 which admits of a double     
series  of facts1 some subject to a     
mechanical necessity1 others free and   
creative--a solution which is probably  
the most commonly accepted              
to-day--corresponds to the logical      
dualism of nature and spirit4 ,this     
last one can be considered as an        
approximation to the abolition of the   

dilemma1 as proposed by both ,croce and 
,bergson1 when we contrast it  with the 
strictly deterministic position1 though 
it still preserves  the opposition of   
fact and value1 of experience and       
philosophy1 of  reality and spirit4 ,in 
the new conception of the will1         
necessity and  freedom stand in the same
 relation as all these other dualities  
in  ,croce's system2 and the emphasis is
 laid1 as usual1 on the second term1    
through which only we can understand the
 first4 ,the agreement between  ,croce  
and ,bergson in this particular instance
 points to a closer  similarity between 
their respective philosophies than is   
apparent to  a casual observer4 ,that   
external reality which seems to confront
 the  spirit as a separate existence1   
and which ,bergson considers as the     
product of a purely mechanical1         
practical intellect1 corresponds to     
what ,croce defines as the naturalistic1
 not theoretical1 but practical1        
elaboration of reality2 and in          

,bergson's intuition and lan vital1     
,croce's concept of reality as spiritual
 activity is mythically  adumbrated4    
,if activity is freedom1 then freedom   
coincides with the value of  activity4  
,if we use the words good and evil1 not 
with any special  ethical connotation1  
but as the general terms of practical   
value and  non-value1 good and evil are 
activity and non-activity1 freedom and  
absence of freedom4 ,evil1 like all     
other purely negative values1 is        
unreal4 ,this does not mean that the    
actions that we call evil have no  real 
existence1 any more than the unreality  
of ugliness or falsehood  imply the     
non-existence of bad poetry or of       
logical errors2 bad poetry  and logical 
errors have no sthetic or logical       
reality1 but they are  products of the  
practical spirit1 directed towards the  
satisfaction of  practical ends2 and    
every real action1 inasmuch as it is an 
action1  considered in itself as        
adequate to its particular end1 is good4

 ,it  is only by substituting to that   
end another end1 that the first end  may
 appear as evil1 and the second as good2
 but if this substitution  takes place  
before the action1 then the action is   
inevitably directed  towards the second 
end1 and therefore again1 it is not     
evil1 but good4  ,it is through a       
psychological delusion that we imagine  
ourselves in  a position in which we see
 the good1 and yet do the evil3 what we 
do  is that which appears to us as the  
most desirable end1 and therefore  as   
good4 ,the intention1 outside the actual
 volition1 is1 as we have  seen1 unreal2
 if it were real1 it would realize      
itself as an action1  and be one with   
it4 ,the negative practical judgments1  
whether economic  or ethic1 are         
judgments which affirm the reality of a 
certain action1  and therefore its      
value1 at the same time comparing that  
value with a  different one1 which has  
not been realized in that particular    
instance4  ,the negative moral judgment 

usually consists in the affirmation of a
  purely economic value contrasted with 
an ethical value which is absent  from  
the action which is the subject of the  
judgment4    ,the doctrine of the       
unreality of evil has always been       
regarded with  deep mistrust by the     
practical moralist2 but that mistrust is
 utterly  unjustified by the doctrine   
itself4 ,for practical purposes it may  
be  convenient to consider life as      
intrinsically evil1 and to oppose to  it
 a set of ideals1 or abstract moral     
values to which we must strive  to      
conform our actions2 in fact1 every one 
of us is constantly doing  something of 
the kind1 and finding in those ideals a 
help and an  inspiration4 ,but shall our
 ideals lose their value when we        
understand  that they have no separate1 
transcendent reality8 ,that every action
  carries its own value within itself1  
and that therefore unless we  constantly
 realize those ideals in our concrete   
and individual  actions1 in every one of

 our actions1 the ideals themselves will
 be  but empty shadows8 ,every ideal1   
however high and comprehensive1 is  but 
an empirical concept derived from a     
class of actions in which we  have      
recognised a moral value2 moral         
standards have the same character  as   
sthetic standards1 and are useful and   
active only as long as  we understand   
their nature4 ,but the creation of moral
 values is a  constantly renovated1     
spontaneous1 original activity1 in the  
same sense  in which art and poetry are4
 ,we can be directed1 both in our       
activity  and in our judgment1 by       
standards and ideals2 that is1 standards
  and ideals may help us to put         
ourselves in a position practically     
favourable to the creation or judgment  
of sthetic or moral values4  ,but the   
actual creation1 as the actual judgment1
 takes place1 both  in art and morality1
 so to speak1 at the risk of our whole  
life3 it  is a new activity1 in a       
situation which cannot be identical with

 any  previous situation1 and to which  
no rule will ever give us the key4      
,while on one hand our sense of         
responsibility is rather heightened     
than diminished by ,croce's conception  
of value1 if we look at the  same       
doctrine from another angle1 it tells us
 that there is no evil  where there is  
no consciousness of evil2 that evil     
becomes something  positive1 acquires an
 independent existence1 only when it is 
reflected  in a higher plane of         
consciousness4 ,the only conceivable    
sanction of  the evil that we have      
willed is in the will that1 tending     
towards a  better end1 apprehends its   
former volition as inadequate and       
therefore  evil2 but until that light   
has shown itself to the spirit1 all     
other  sanctions are meaningless4 ,this 
is the foundation of the ,christian     
doctrine of repentance1 of the uses of  
remorse1 or grace2 and the  individual  
intimate quality of moral values was    
first proclaimed by the  voice that     

said3 nolite iudicare4 ,if the ,kingdom 
of ,heaven is not  within you1 it is not
 to be found anywhere else4    ,we can  
consider the actual volition as         
intrinsically good1 if we also  approach
 it from the point of view of the       
multiplicity of possible                
volitions--impulses1 passions1          
desires--striving to realize themselves 
at every moment of our life4 ,every     
single volition is the result of  a     
struggle from which it emerges after    
having conquered all the other  possible
 volitions4 ,when1 in this struggle1 the
 single volition does  not assert itself
 fully1 we become the prey of that      
multiplicity1  willing a volition which 
is not the one that we ought to will1   
and that  in a way we feel we will2     
hence a will that is divided against    
itself1  an action which is not positive
 but negative1 not a true action1 but  a
 kind of passivity4 ,when the single    
volition conquers the passions1  when   
one impulse or desire becomes the will1 

all the other possible  volitions lose  
their actual value1 multiplicity gives  
way to unity1  passivity to action1 evil
 to good1 death to life4    ,the        
passions can be empirically regarded as 
habits of the will1 as  inclinations    
towards one or another category of      
actions2 by a further  empirical        
elaboration1 we can divide them into the
 various classes of  virtues and vices1 
virtues being the passions or habits of 
rational  actions1 and vices the        
contrary ones4 ,individuality or        
personality1  as an empirical concept1  
is nothing but a complex of more or less
  lasting habits1 some natural and some 
acquired1 or1 more rigorously1  the     
historical situation of the universal   
spirit in every instant of  time1 and   
therefore that complex of habits which  
historical conditions  have produced4   
,these habits are the material out of   
which we mould our  life1 and the first 
duty of every individual consists in    
exploring  his own dispositions1 in     

establishing what attitudes the progress
 of  reality has deposited in him1 at   
the moment of his birth and in the      
course of his individual life--to       
acquire a consciousness of what in      
religious terms we might call his       
vocation or mission2 it is impossible   
for anyone to act except on the basis of
 his prexisting personal  habits of     
will4 ,but temperament1 or the empirical
 individuality1 is  not yet character1  
or virtue2 and the respect that we owe  
to it1 as  the necessary condition of   
our action1 must not be confused with   
the  ultra-modern tendency which        
expresses itself in the cry for the     
rights  of the individual temperament   
and for the free development of the     
passions4 ,the individual has the duty  
of seeking his own self1 but  also that 
of cultivating himself in the light of  
reason2 his empirical  individuality is 
a mere datum1 and his life is his own   
work4 ,an  education aiming only at the 
expression of individual idiosyncrasies 

7as so much of our modern education1 at 
least in theory1 is7 is no  education at
 all4 ,the ideal is rather to be sought 
in such a perfect  fulfilment of one's  
individual mission1 however humble1 that
 it should  at the same time fulfil the 
universal mission of man4    ,the law of
 life is in the unity that conquers the 
multiplicity1 in the  will asserting    
itself above the passions4 ,the reality 
is perpetual  development1 an infinite  
possibility transforming itself into an 
infinite actuality1 gathering itself at 
every instant from the multiple  into   
the one1 only to disrupt itself again   
and produce a new unity4  ,multiplicity1
 contradiction1 evil1 non-being1 on one 
side1 and unity1  coherence1 good1      
being1 on the other1 are unthinkable    
outside the  synthesis of life1 which is
 activity1 becoming1 evolution4 ,this   
concept  of becoming or evolution is the
 one that modern thought has substituted
  for that of an immobile reality and of
 a transcendent divinity4 ,and in       

,croce it becomes wide enough to embrace
 ,hegel's speculative dialectic  on one 
side1 and the naturalistic evolutionism 
of the scientist on  the other4 ,the    
dialectic of will is the dialectic of   
reality1 both  spiritual and natural--or
 rather only and always spiritual1 since
  nature cannot be distinguished from   
the spirit as a concrete reality of     
another order1 but only as an           
abstraction of the practical intellect4 
,what we call life in nature is         
consciousness in the spirit1 and the    
history of nature is not qualitatively  
different from the history of  man4 ,the
 whole course of history cannot be      
regarded otherwise than as  a continuous
 progress1 a perpetual triumph of life  
over death2 and its  rationality1 which 
we call ,fate or ,providence1 is not the
 work of a  transcendent ,intelligence1 
but is a ,providence realizing itself in
 die  individual1 working not outside or
 above1 but within history itself4  ,the
 mystery of which we are all conscious  

is not a part of reality1 but  only the 
presentment of future realizations1 the 
infinity of evolution4  ,the ,god       
transcendent1 the empirical immortality1
 are mere figures and  myths for the    
,god living in nature and in the spirit 
of man1 for the  spirit of man1 for the 
spiritual activity1 which is life and   
death in  one4      ,footnote #a3 ,see  
,filosofia della ,pratica1 part i1      
,l'attivit pratica  in generale1 pp4    
#a-bji4          ,,ix4 ,,economics ,,and
 ,,ethics#a      ,the distinctions of   
the practical activity--,the autonomy of
 ethics3  utilitarianism--,the autonomy 
of the economic form3 abstract          
moralism--,relations of the ethical to  
the economic form--,pleasure  and duty1 
happiness and virtue--,importance of the
 economic  principle--,philosophy and   
the science of economics--,the ethical  
principle2 material ethics--,ethical    
formalism2 the universality of the      
principle--,the object of the ethical   
will--,croce as a moralist4      ,the   

preceding chapter deals with the        
practical activity in general1  with the
 general concept of will or action4 ,we 
must now introduce in  that concept a   
distinction analogous to that by which  
the theoretical  activity has appeared  
to us first as the knowledge of die     
individual or  intuition1 then as the   
knowledge of the universal or concept4  
,but here1  again1 we shall not employ  
the merely descriptive and psychological
  method1 nor yet attempt to deduce this
 distinction from the analogy  between  
the theoretical and the practical       
activity2 we shall appeal  once more to 
the immediate test of consciousness1    
which in fact reveals  two distinct     
forms of the will1 the economic and the 
ethic4 ,economic  activity is the one   
that wills and realizes only that which 
relates to  the conditions of fact in   
which the individual finds himself2     
ethical  activity1 the one that wills   
and realizes that which1 though related 
to  those conditions1 at the same time  

in some way transcends them4 ,to one    
correspond individual1 to the other1    
universal ends2 on one is based  the    
judgment on the coherence of the action 
in itself1 on its adequacy  to its      
individual end2 on the other1 the       
judgment on its adequacy to  universal  
ends1 which transcend the individual4   
,if we recognise only  the ethical form1
 we perceive very soon that it implies  
the other  one1 which we intended to    
exclude1 since our action1 though       
universal  in its meaning1 must always  
be something concrete and individually  
determined4 ,we do not realize morality 
in the universal1 but always a  given   
moral volition1 not the abstract        
virtues1 but the concrete works4        
,although a moral action is not only our
 individual pleasure1 yet it  must be   
that1 too1 or we should never be able to
 realize it4 ,on the  other hand1 the   
mere economic action1 the satisfaction  
of our immediate  pleasure1 though it   
satisfies us in relation to our         

individual end1 yet  it leaves          
constantly unsatisfied that which we are
 beside and beyond  our individual      
determinations1 our deepest and truest  
being4 ,and this  dissatisfaction will  
last until we succeed in lifting        
ourselves above  the infinite succession
 of individual ends1 and in inserting in
 them a  universal value4 ,this passage 
or conversion from the purely economic  
to  the ethic1 from pleasure to duty1 is
 designed by ,croce as the conquest  of 
that peace which is not of a fabulous   
future1 but of the present  and real2 in
 every instant is eternity1 to him who  
knows how to reach  it4 ,our actions    
will be always new1 because always new  
problems are put  before us by the      
course of reality2 but in them1 if we   
accomplish them  with a pure heart1     
seeking in them what lifts them above   
themselves1  we shall each time possess 
the ,whole4 ,such is the character of   
the  moral action2 which satisfies us   
not as individuals but as men1 and  as  

individuals only because the individual 
is a man1 and as men only  through the  
medium of individual satisfaction4      
,the denial of the autonomy of the      
ethical form1 the attempt to reduce  the
 ethic to the economic1 the morally good
 to the individually  useful1 is the    
substance of the many theories that go  
under the name  of utilitarianism4 ,but 
this reduction of the practical activity
 to  a single principle clashes in every
 instant of our life against the        
distinction between mere pleasure and   
duty1 between the useful and the  honest
 action1 between the things that have a 
price and those that  have none1 between
 actions which have a moral motive and  
those that  have only a utilitarian one4
 ,the utilitarians themselves1 unable to
  pass over the distinction1 have tried 
to explain it away as a purely          
quantitative one1 defining morality as  
the utility of the greater  number or as
 the interest or egotism of the race2   
but it is clear that  these so-called   

quantitative distinctions are really    
qualitative ones3  the utility of the   
greater number is no longer individual  
utility or  immediate pleasure1 the     
egotism of the race is no longer        
egotism1 but  a value which transcends  
the individual4 ,a further attempt in   
the same  direction consists in         
considering morality as born from the   
association  between certain acts which 
are means to a pleasure1 and that       
pleasure  itself3 a savage fights to    
defend his personal liberty or his life1
 a  civilized man1 forgetting that the  
tribe1 or the city1 or the state1  are  
but means to preserve his life and his  
property1 defends them for  themselves1 
and allows himself to be deprived of    
both his property and  his life for love
 of his country4 ,but only through      
stupidity is it  possible to mistake the
 means for the end1 and1 therefore1 this
 theory  actually reduces morality to   
what is practically irrational1 a       
product  of confusion and illusion2 that

 is1 to the contrary of the practical   
activity1 which is1 in its own sphere1  
rationality and wisdom4 ,the mere       
enunciation of this theory1 if true1    
ought to produce the dissolution  of    
those false associations1 and1          
therefore1 the destruction of  morality2
 if morality subsists1 this is due to   
its rational character1  which          
associationism has not succeeded in     
disproving4 ,the last refuge  of        
utilitarianism is in theology and       
mystery3 the utility of moral  actions  
is not of this world1 but derived from  
the conception of  another world in     
which ,god punishes or rewards us for   
our conduct on  earth4 ,but this kind of
 utilitarianism puts itself outside the 
field  of philosophy1 by emptying the   
symbols of religion of their moral      
content1 which is their only logical    
justification4    ,the converse form of 
error1 which consists in eliminating the
 economic  moment from the concept of   
practical activity1 is criticised by    

,croce  as abstract moralism4 ,the      
economic moment has been regarded as    
purely  technical1 that is1 as the      
theoretical moment that precedes action1
  action itself being always and only   
ethical2 but some sort of knowledge     
precedes every action1 and the          
distinction between the useful and  the 
good cannot be reduced to that between  
knowledge and will2 we  can consider the
 useful as the means and the good as the
 end1 only  by forgetting that there is 
as much difference between knowing the  
useful and willing the useful1 as       
between knowing the good and willing    
the good4 ,the useful has also been     
identified with the egotistic and       
immoral2 but the merely useful is       
amoral1 and not immoral1 in the same    
sense in which the pure intuition is    
alogical1 and not either logical  or    
illogical4 ,the imagination of the poet 
cannot be submitted to the  logical     
judgment1 any more than the immediate   
pleasure of the child1  or any action   

which precedes the awakening of the     
moral consciousness4  ,and besides1 the 
useful is so far from being immoral1    
that there is no  moral action which is 
not also useful1 as there is no logical 
truth  which can express itself except  
through language4 ,finally1 the useful  
has been defined as an inferior form of 
practical consciousness2 but  what this 
definition actually accomplishes is to  
recognise1 though  imperfectly1 the true
 distinction1 which is a relation of    
higher and  lower only in the           
metaphorical sense in which these       
adjectives can be  employed for the     
relation between the intuition and the  
concept4    ,economics and ethics are   
the double grade of the practical       
activity3  it is possible to conceive of
 actions having no moral value1 and yet 
economically effective1 but not of moral
 actions which should not  at the same  
time be useful1 or economic4 ,morality  
lives concretely  in utility1 as the    
universal in the individual1 the eternal

 in the  contingent4 ,but we can never  
sufficiently emphasize the true         
character  of the distinction1 which1   
taken as a purely abstract and          
psychological  one1 might justify the   
persistence of morally indifferent      
actions  within the moral consciousness4
 ,the moral consciousness1 once it  is  
awakened1 invests the whole life of the 
practical mind1 as the  logical         
consciousness does for the theoretical  
mind1 and it abolishes  that condition  
of innocence1 in which the purely       
economic is not  yet subject to the     
moral judgment1 in the same way as      
perception  and reflection destroy our  
nave belief in the reality of purely    
poetical imaginations4 ,on the other    
hand1 there are no actions which  are   
economically ally indifferent1 or1 as   
they are generally called1              
disinterested2 morality requires that   
the individual should transform  a      
universal interest into his individual  
one1 make of morality itself  his       

personal utility1 but it cannot ask for 
the abolition of all  interests1 which  
would mean the abolition of morality as 
well4 ,the  value of a moral action is  
in direct proportion with the passion   
and fervour with which we identify our  
individual ends with ends  transcending 
our empirical individuality4    ,in the 
light of this distinction1 the old      
oppositions of pleasure and  duty1 of   
happiness and virtue1 lose a good deal  
of their rigour and  sharpness4         
,pleasure as the positive economic      
activity or feeling can  never be in    
real contrast with duty as the positive 
moral activity3  a moral action brings  
with itself its own satisfaction or     
pleasure1  and if it brings pain also1  
either the good action was not entirely 
good1 not willed with all our heart1 or 
it was accompanied by a new  practical  
problem1 which has yet to be solved4    
,similarly1 happiness is  not           
necessarily virtue1 but there is no     
virtue which is not happiness2  the     

sorrows of the virtuous are not         
intrinsic to morality1 being but  the   
limits of human activity1 which the good
 share with the wicked4  ,we all can    
transform our limits into sorrows1 by   
our restlessness  and unreasonableness2 
or1 through resignation1 our sorrows in 
limits  and conditions of activity4     
,asceticism1 which regards pleasure and 
happiness as essentially immoral1 is the
 extreme form of moral  abstractism2 by 
destroying the economic category1 it    
deprives morality  of its reality and   
concreteness4 ,it is1 in fact1 in the   
practical  sphere1 the counterpart of   
mysticism in the theoretical1 which     
makes  thought impossible by            
dissociating it from expression4    ,the
 recognition of the autonomy of the     
economic moment as one of the           
fundamental forms of spiritual activity1
 and the study of its relations  with   
morality1 appears to me as ,croce's most
 important contribution to  modern      
thought4 ,we have seen what light the   

problems of the ethical  will receive1  
when they are seen in their unity and   
distinction with  the facts of the      
economic1 or individual1 will4 ,we shall
 see in the  next chapter what a vast   
field of human activity1 comprising the 
whole political life of mankind1 reveals
 a new rationality1 once it  is regarded
 as a legitimate product of the human   
mind1 to be judged  according to its own
 standards and values1 and not to       
standards and  values belonging to a    
different order of facts4 ,croce's      
discovery of  the will of the individual
 as the first grade1 the elementary form
 of  the practical spirit1 is analogous 
to ,vico's discovery of the purely      
intuitive activity as the first grade of
 knowledge2 and it establishes  between 
economics and ethics1 between politics  
and morality1 the same  relation as     
between sthetic and logical values4 ,the
 sthetically true  is the adequately    
expressive1 as the economically good is 
the useful2  but in both cases1 we can  

never repeat it sufficiently1 once the  
logical and the moral consciousness are 
awakened1 neither the sthetic  can be   
apprehended otherwise than as logically 
true or untrue1 nor the  economic       
otherwise than as morally good or bad4  
,the standards which  are illegitimate  
when applied to art as art1 to politics 
as politics1  become rational again in  
the all pervading light of truth and    
morality4  ,the predecessors of ,croce  
in this line of his speculation are1 on 
one side1 the political writers who1    
from ,aristotle to ,machiavelli1        
attempted to define the relations       
between politics and morality2 on the   
other side1 the economists1 who1 by     
isolating a type of value1 which  was   
not an sthetic1 intellectual1 or ethical
 value1 and which could  not be         
identified with the reverse of the      
ethical value1 or egotism1  had prepared
 the ground for the establishment of a  
philosophy of  economics4 ,as a matter  
of actual1 historical derivation1 it was

 from  his study of ,marxism1 from his  
meditations on contemporary economic    
science1 that ,croce drew1 as we saw in 
one of the first chapters of  this book1
 his conception of economic value as one
 of the universal  values4    ,after    
what has been said of the general       
relationship between philosophy  and    
science1 it will not be difficult to    
determine the place that  economic      
science occupies in ,croce's thought1 in
 relation to his  philosophy of         
economics4 ,economics as a philosophical
 science  is that branch of philosophy1 
the object of which is the economic     
activity in its universality1 the       
determination of the concept of         
volition or action as the volition or   
action of the individual1 that  is1 as  
the predicate of the economic judgment  
or judgment of utility4  ,the economic  
judgment1 in its turn1 is but a form of 
historical  judgment1 and1 therefore1   
the concrete form of the philosophy of  
economics is economic history1 the      

history of the spirit of man as it      
realizes itself in the individual action
 or volition4 ,between that  philosophy 
and that history1 there is no place1 as 
we know1 for any  intermediate form of  
knowledge1 but only for the practical   
7empirical  or abstract7 elaboration1 of
 the economic datum4 ,this is what the  
science of economics actually is3 an    
applied mathematical science1  founded  
on empirical concepts4 ,the postulates  
and types of economic  science are among
 the most perfect examples of conscious 
fictions1  beginning with the           
fundamental one of the homo conomicus3  
they  are empirical concepts by which   
the economic reality is simplified to   
such an extent that it becomes possible 
to submit it to mathematical            
calculation1 and thereby to recognise   
promptly its necessary aspects  and     
consequences4 ,economic science         
partakes1 therefore1 of the rigour  and 
absoluteness of mathematics1 which is   
obtained1 as we know1  only by          

sacrificing the concreteness of its     
object4 ,its laws are  arbitrary and    
tautological1 consisting1 like all      
scientific laws1 in  the definition of  
those characteristics of reality which  
have been  abstracted to form its       
postulates or empirical concepts2 but it
 is  only through the acceptance of such
 definitions that it succeeds  in       
dominating1 ordering1 describing1 and   
classifying the mass and  variety of    
economic facts and1 most important of   
all1 in treating them  quantitively4 ,it
 has1 in fact1 the same structure as    
another science  with which it has been 
frequently compared1 and which is here  
assumed  as typical of the proceedings  
of applied mathematics--mechanics4 ,i   
believe that very few economists would  
quarrel to-day with ,croce's            
characterization of economic science1   
since its mathematical character  is now
 universally recognised2 but ,croce     
proves conclusively that even  in its   
non-mathematical phases1 economics has  

always been a purely  quantitative      
science4 ,volition and action are       
assumed in it in their  indistinction2  
and moral facts being volitions and     
actions as well as  the economic facts1 
they can also be included in the        
economic calculus1  because from a      
merely abstract point of view there is  
no way of  differentiating them from the
 latter4    ,between the philosophy and 
the science of economics there is       
neither agreement nor disagreement1 but 
a total heterogeneity1 and1  therefore1 
a reciprocal tolerance4 ,it is only when
 one invades the  field1 or adopts the  
methods1 of the other1 that conflict and
 error  arise4 ,economics as a science  
may then deny the legitimacy of the     
philosophical study of the economic     
moment2 or it may attribute a  universal
 value to its empirical concepts 7as it 
has happened again  and again in the    
disputes between free-traders and       
protectionists1 or  as it constantly    
happens when economic laws are referred 

to as endowed  with a character of      
absolute necessity72 or1 finally it may 
transform  its fictions into realities1 
attributing for instance to the concrete
  human being1 and to the exclusion of  
any other quality1 the qualities  it has
 abstracted for the creation of its homo
 conomicus4 ,but1 in  all such cases1   
though we may meet these errors among   
the economists1  they are not scientific
 errors but logical errors2 or rather1  
they are  poor science only because they
 are bad philosophy4 ,the true function 
of  the abstract economic schemes is    
that of an instrument in the hands of   
the historical and sociological         
observer1 who needs many other similar  
instruments1 if he wants to gain a      
concrete and direct knowledge of  actual
 historical and social conditions4      
,it is now time for us to return1 from  
this discussion of the two  different   
elaborations of the economic datum1 to a
 closer consideration  of the second    
form of the practical activity1 or of   

the ethical  principle4 ,in the same way
 as the empirical concepts of economic  
science are insufficient to exhaust the 
infinite wealth of the economic         
principle1 no single action or group of 
single actions can define the  ethical  
principle1 which is universal1 and      
therefore merely formal4 ,by            
identifying the principle with a series1
 however vast1 of particular            
determinations1 that is1 by substituting
 a material ethics for a formal  one1 we
 fall back inevitably into              
utilitarianism1 since the volition of  a
 single object or class of objects is   
not a volition of the universal  but of 
the particular1 not an ethical but an   
economic act4 ,even the  highest forms  
of moral ideals1 such as benevolence1   
love1 altruism1  humanitarianism1 etc41 
once they are apprehended materially1   
and not  as mere verbal approximations  
to the formal ethical principle1 acquire
  a contingent and utilitarian          
character1 and are apt to come in actual

  conflict with the truly moral will4   
,the same criticism applies1 and  with  
greater force1 to institutionalized     
ideals1 such as the family1  the state1 
the social organism1 the interest of the
 race1 etc42  none of them can be the   
object of the moral will without        
exceptions  and restrictions1 that is1  
without losing in the act of the will   
its institutional character1 and        
appearing as one of the particular      
conditions under which the particular   
moral volition takes place4  ,the       
religious principles themselves are     
subject to this reduction  from the     
ethical to the economic1 when1 as in the
 case of theological  utilitarianism1   
they are taken as empirical limitations1
 as particular  objects1 of the ethical 
will4 ,the material ethical principles  
are in  fact analogous to those material
 sthetic principles which we have       
criticised as rhetorical2 they          
constitute a rhetoric of the virtues not
  less deadly to the creative moral will

 than the rhetoric of the arts is  to   
the creative intuition4    ,the ethical 
principle must be formal1 but not       
formalistic1 and  therefore ,croce is   
not satisfied with any of the so-called 
universal  laws or categorical          
imperatives1 or with any of the many    
formulas  which attempt to define the   
moral actions through one constant      
determination which ought to be present 
in each of them4 ,such formulas  are    
mere symbols or metaphors1 and can be   
used as the equivalents of  the ethical 
principle1 as some of the categories of 
material ethics  can be used2 but their 
danger consists in giving the illusion  
of  possessing the true principle1 while
 what we are given is an empty  and     
tautological one1 which will again give 
way to purely empirical  determinations 
and therefore to utilitarianism4 ,this  
empty formalism1  or absolute           
indetermination1 of the ethical         
principle1 corresponds to  two          
conceptions of philosophy1 which ,croce 

respectively calls partial  and         
discontinuous4 ,according to the first1 
man may know a portion of  reality1 but 
never reality as a whole2 as regards    
morality1 he may hear  the voice of his 
own conscience1 but never grasp with his
 intellect  the content of the moral    
law4 ,according to the second1 he may   
know the  reason of morality1 but not   
within the sphere of ethics1 whose task 
consists only in establishing the moral 
law and deducing the moral  precepts2   
the problem of the essence of morality  
belongs to another  science1            
metaphysics4 ,the reader who has        
followed us to this point  knows that   
,croce's philosophy is neither partial  
nor discontinuous2  that he does not    
admit of any limits to human thought1   
nor of any  division in the body of     
philosophy4 ,the whole of philosophy is 
already  included for him in the first  
philosophical proposition1 and though it
  may didactically be useful to divide  
the problems of philosophy in  groups1  

or even to deal separately with the     
particular philosophical  science on one
 hand1 and with general philosophy or   
metaphysics on the  other1 yet truth    
does not belong to the distinctions     
outside their  unity1 to the parts      
outside the whole1 to the segments      
outside the  circle4 ,it is this        
totality and continuity of ,croce's     
philosophy that  makes ,croce's ethical 
principle a form1 but not an empty one2 
a form  which is full in a philosophical
 and universal sense1 which is at the   
same time content1 and universal as     
content not less than as form4 ,he  has 
defined the ethical principle1 not1     
tautologically1 as a universal  form1   
but as the volition of the universal3 a 
definition which is  at the same time   
the distinction of the ethical from the 
economical  form1 or volition of the    
individual4 ,we may here recall1 to test
 once  more the coherence of ,croce's   
thought1 and to make this definition    
clearer1 his definition of the concept  

as knowledge of the universal2  by it   
the concept is distinguished from the   
intuition1 or knowledge of  the         
individual1 and the logical principle is
 seen as unidentifiable  either with an 
abstract logical form or with any       
particular system  of philosophy4 ,the  
concept is real only in the infinite    
individual  determinations of actual    
thought1 as the ethical principle in the
  infinite concrete volitions of the    
human spirit sub specie universalis4    
,the universal which is the object of   
the ethical volition is not  something  
that we shall need to define at this    
point of our exposition1  since the     
whole of ,croce's philosophy is nothing 
but a definition of  the universal4 ,the
 universal is mind or the spirit2 it is 
reality1 as  unity of will and thought2 
it is life grasped in its depth as that 
same unity2 it is freedom1 since a      
reality thus conceived is perpetual     
development1 creation1 progress4 ,man1  
in willing the universal1 turns  from   

his individuality to that which         
transcends it1 to the spirit1  or       
reality1 or life1 or freedom1 not as    
abstract ideals1 but as they  realize   
themselves in his individual action4    
,the volition of the  individual1 of    
one's individual existence1 is          
necessarily the first  step2 there is no
 man1 however deeply moral1 who does not
 begin by  affirming his own individual 
life2 without this affirmation1 he would
  never be able to transcend it and to  
deny it4 ,but he who should limit       
himself to this affirmation1 and accept 
as a place of rest what is only  the    
beginning of his development1 would find
 himself in contradiction  with his     
real1 intimate self4 ,he must will not  
only his individual  self1 but that self
 also1 which being the same in all      
selves is their  common ,father4 ,it is 
thus that he promotes the realization of
 reality1  lives the full life1 and     
makes his heart beat with the heart of  
the  universe3 ,cor cordium4 ,the moral 

individual is conscious that he  is     
working for the ,whole4 ,every action   
which is in accord with the  ethical    
duty is in accord with ,life1 and would 
be contrary to duty and  immoral1 if    
instead of promoting life1 it should    
depress and mortify  it4 ,the most      
humble moral action resolves itself into
 this volition  of the spirit in its    
universality4 ,the soul of a simple and 
ignorant  man wholly devoted to his     
modest duty is in perfect unison with   
that of  the philosopher whose mind     
receives within itself the universal    
spirit4  ,what one does1 the other      
thinks2 and both reach by different     
roads  their full satisfaction in an act
 of life1 in a fecund embrace with      
reality4    ,it is in pages like the    
ones from which we have extracted this  
enthusiastic definition of morality1    
that the true quality of ,croce's       
philosophy is best perceived4 ,but what 
is here affirmed as a principle  lives  
as an ever present spirit in innumerable

 able discussions of  particular moral  
problems in his ,filosofia della        
,pratica1 in his  moral essays1 in his  
literary criticism 7there is no living  
literary  critic who has a keener       
perception of moral values than this    
implacable  enemy of moralism71 in the  
whole of his work4 ,it is this moral    
enthusiasm1 together with his capacity  
to see clear and deep1 his  catholic    
tolerance for all forms of beauty and   
truth and goodness1  however distant    
from his tastes and inclinations1 and   
his courageous1  outspoken intolerance  
for all hypocrisies1 compromises1       
half-truths1  wilful errors1 that has   
given ,croce1 in the last twenty years1 
in  ,italy1 a right to moral as well as 
intellectual leadership4 ,he is the     
true heir of an infinitely complex moral
 tradition1 and placed high  enough to  
do justice to all its elements1 though  
apparently contrasting  with each other4
 ,but when recognizing the symbolical   
and practical  value of the various     

positive ethical systems that appear to 
him as  gradual approximations to the   
full concreteness and universality of   
the  ethical principle1 he emphasizes   
the connection of his own ethics with   
one of those elements in preference to  
every other1 with the religious  and    
,christian element1 for which morality  
is already what it is for  the          
philosopher1 the love and will of the   
universal spirit4 ,there is  no truth of
 ethics which for him cannot be         
expressed in the words that  we have    
learned as children from our traditional
 religion4 ,between the  religious man  
and the philosopher1 between religion   
and philosophy1  there is no enmity1 but
 continuity and development2 in the     
affirmation  of the ethical principle1  
which is the crucial test of every      
philosophy  as of every religion1 the   
substantial identity of religion and    
philosophy is finally established4      
,footnote #a3 ,see ,filosofia della     
,pratica1 part ii1 ,l'attivit  pratica  

nelle tue forme speciali1 pp4 #baa-cai4 
,x4 ,,the ,,laws#a      ,economic       
society as an empirical concept--,the   
philosophical concept  of               
society--,sociology1 philosophy of law  
and political science--,the  definition 
of law--,laws and customs--,the laws1   
the natural laws and the  practical     
principles--,mutability of the laws3 the
 jus naturale--,the  function of the    
laws--,legalism3 the ,jesuit and the    
,puritan--,the  legislative activity as 
a generically economic activity--,the   
juridical  activity--,law and language4 
,one of the fundamental empirical       
concepts of the science of economics  is
 that of economic society1 which is     
formed by abstracting certain  classes  
of economic relationships from the mass 
of relationships of  all kinds among    
which the life of the individual        
realizes itself4 ,any  treatise of      
economics can be considered as a        
definition of economic  society2 and we 
know how those definitions are apt to   

vary according  to the choice of the    
groups of facts studied1 and the method 
employed1  by different schools of      
economists4 ,the economic society of the
  ,marxian is not the economic society  
of the classical economist2 the         
,catholic economist1 differing from     
both1 will include in his treatment  the
 consideration of certain ethical       
relations which give a greater          
complexity to his scheme4 ,it would be  
possible to study the economics  of the 
individual in perfect isolation from all
 other human beings1  limiting the      
elements of this particular form of     
society to one man1  and that portion of
 nature from which he draws his food1   
his clothing1  his shelter2 on the other
 hand1 the whole of mankind and the     
whole of  nature may enter into a       
single1 all-including1 economic body4   
,we may  even study animal species1 in  
their relations within themselves1 or   
with man1 or with other animal species1 
or with nature at large1 from  an       

economic standpoint 7symbiosis and      
parasitism are facts bearing a  close   
resemblance with human economy7--and    
thus form an infinite number  of new    
economic societies4 ,each of these      
empirical concepts can be  varied ad    
infinitum1 by the mere inclusion or     
exclusion of certain  classes of        
relationships4    ,the empirical1       
non-rigorous character of the concept of
 economic  society is self-evident2 and 
it can therefore be usefully employed to
  prove by analogy the similar character
 of the concept of society as           
manufactured by jurists1 sociologists1  
and political scientists4 ,it  is       
against such fictions that philosophy   
reacts by building a concept  of the    
isolated individual1 that is1 of the    
individual isolated from  the particular
 classes of relationships which enter   
into the formation  of particular       
empirical concepts of society2 but it   
does this only to  plunge the individual
 again in the midst of that infinite    

multiplicity1  which is one aspect1 and 
an essential one1 of reality1 ,society  
as a  philosophical concept cannot be   
identified with any form of economic  or
 political society2 of such1 as mere    
abstractions1 no philosophical          
treatment is possible4 ,society is that 
real multiplicity1 without which  we    
should have neither knowledge nor       
action1 neither art nor thought1        
neither utility nor morality2 and from  
society in this sense1 the  individual  
cannot be isolated1 without reducing    
him1 in his turn1 to a  merely abstract 
concept4    ,the sociologist1 the       
jurist1 the political scientist use     
their  concepts of society for their    
purposes1 which are1 in the sense which 
is now familiar to our reader1          
scientific purposes4 ,but very often    
they lose sight of the character of     
these concepts1 and treat these         
instruments of classification and       
description as substitutes for  the     
actual reality which they are1 by reason

 of their abstractness1  utterly unable 
to reproduce4 ,the sociologist talks of 
the collective  mind1 and of collective 
representations1 as if they had a       
reality  outside the thought and action 
of the individual2 the jurist builds a  
philosophy of law1 in which society is  
opposed to the individual as  a being to
 another being1 and law1 as a product of
 society1 at every  point transcends the
 individual will4 ,the political        
scientist deals  with the community1 or 
the association1 or the ,state1 as with 
concepts  of which it were possible to  
give a philosophical definition1 valid  
for all times1 and from which the rules 
of perfect government could be          
rigorously deduced4 ,of these types of  
philosophical degenerations of          
legitimate scientific thought1 it can be
 roughly said that1 because of  the     
peculiar cultural development of the    
various nations of ,europe1 the  first  
belongs more particularly to ,england   
and ,france1 the second to  ,italy and  

,germany2 though they are all more or   
less common in ,european  culture as a  
whole4 ,as an ,italian1 ,croce was      
particularly interested in  the second1 
the philosophical degeneration of       
juridical thought1 and  therefore his   
particular treatment of the economic    
facts underlying  the problems of       
political society naturally took the    
shape of an  inquiry into the nature of 
law4 ,but it ought not to be difficult  
for  the ,english or ,american reader1  
for whom these problems are not part  of
 a practically inexistent philosophy of 
law1 but of a long tradition  of        
political science and theory of         
government1 to translate ,croce's       
thought into terms of his own cultural  
experience4    ,a law is an act of will1
 whose content is a series or class of  
actions4  ,this definition excludes from
 the concept of law any empirical       
social determination2 it includes within
 it all laws which are  merely          
individual1 the laws that the individual

 lays down to and for  himself1 the     
rules of conduct and programs of life   
and action1 which  the individual       
follows of his own accord4 ,it may be   
objected that  individual laws differ   
from social and political laws1 because 
the  latter are coercive and            
constrictive1 while the former are not4 
,there  is no law1 however1 that is     
truly coercive2 the individual is always
  free either to observe or not to      
observe the law4 ,what a law does is to 
offer a choice or alternative1 and this 
is as true of individual as of  social  
laws4 ,we may disregard our own rules of
 conduct or programs of  action1 and    
suffer from doing so1 and inflict a     
punishment on ourselves  for having done
 so2 or we may alter our individual laws
 as social laws  are altered when they  
no longer respond to the need of a      
community1  and are either violently    
overthrown by rebellion or quietly      
allowed to  fall into desuetude through 
non-observance1 or modified by the      

proper  organs of legislation4 ,but the 
importance of the concept of individual 
laws lies in the fact that the so-called
 social laws have no reality  outside   
the individual3 in order to observe a   
law it is necessary to  make it one's   
own1 and to rebel against a law is to   
expel it from one's  personality1 of    
which it was1 or tried to become1 a     
part4 ,the only real  laws are1         
therefore1 individual laws4    ,if the  
criterion of sanction or coercion is    
insufficient to draw a  distinction     
between individual and social laws1 we  
can still less  use it to divide the    
social laws into customs or unwritten   
laws1 and  political and juridical laws4
 ,both customs and laws carry with them 
sanctions1 though of a different order1 
or1 to put it in more precise  terms1   
both offer a choice between probable    
consequences to the free  individual    
will4 ,this distinction1 like every     
other subdivision of the  laws 7civil1  
penal1 national1 international1 laws and

 by-laws1 etc471  is a purely empirical 
one4 ,but the concept of law comprehends
 these and  many more in which the      
jurists have no interest1 such as the   
literary  or artistic laws 7that a      
tragedy should have five acts1 or1 as at
 one  time in ,england1 that a novel    
should fill three volumes71 or the rules
  of religious life1 or the precepts of 
chivalry1 down to the statutes  of a    
criminal gang and to ,balzac's droit    
parisien4 ,in fact1 the  empirical      
distinctions of the laws are coextensive
 with the empirical  concepts of        
society1 and partake of the same        
characteristics3 to the  preceding      
examples of laws correspond respectively
 the republic of  letters1 a monastery1 
the order of knighthood1 a band of      
robbers1 and  le beau monde4 ,but the   
only reality1 both of the society and of
 the  law1 is the individual assent4    
,the laws have one point in common with 
the so-called natural laws2  both are   
concerned with empirical concepts1 or   

classes4 ,but while the  natural laws   
are mere indicative statements of fact1 
the laws can  always be translated from 
the indicative to the imperative2 that  
is1  they contain a volitive element    
which is absent from the natural laws4  
,the volitive element is present1 on the
 other hand1 in the practical           
principles which have some time received
 the names of moral or economic  laws1  
and which can be converted into such    
imperatives as ,will the  universal1 or1
 in particular1 ,will the good1 the     
useful1 the true1 the  beautiful4 ,but  
these principles are concerned with the 
universal1 that  is1 with the spirit of 
man in the necessary forms of its       
activity1 not  with a particular product
 of the spirit1 a class or type of      
actions1 as  do laws in the strict      
meaning of the word4 ,this distinction  
between the  practical principles and   
the laws opens the way to the           
recognition of a  very important        
character of the laws3 while the        

practical principles1  because of their 
universality1 have no limits and no     
exceptions  7and we have already seen   
that a morally indifferent action is a  
contradiction in terms71 the laws can   
never exhaust the universal1 and        
therefore will always leave outside     
themselves a margin of actions1  not    
included in any of the classes to which 
they refer1 and therefore  legally      
indifferent4 ,in more technical         
language1 we may express the  same idea 
by saying that all laws1 whether        
imperative or prohibitive  or permissive
 7a law1 according to the ancient       
formula1 aut iubet aut  vetat aut       
permittit71 can be reduced to permissive
 laws3 an order is  always at the same  
time a prohibition1 and both orders and 
prohibitions  implicitly permit all     
actions which are not contemplated by   
the law4    ,moreover1 while the        
practical principles are immutable1     
always capable  of giving form to the   
most varied historical material1 the    

laws are in  perpetual flux and change4 
,the particular modes of change1 whether
 by  evolution or revolution1 do not    
concern the philosopher1 for whom all   
can be reduced to a angle one3 the free 
will producing a new law under  new     
conditions4 ,against the perpetual      
mutability of the laws1 due to  the     
contingent and historical character of  
their content1 clashes the  concept of  
an ,eternal ,code1 or ,law of ,nature   
7jus naturale71 which  presumes to      
determine the content and form of the   
laws1 according to  abstract reason1    
once and forever4 ,this conception is   
due to an error  with which we are now  
familiar1 consisting in the             
transformation of  empirical concepts   
into principals of universal validity4  
,but from  this particular error1 as    
from all errors1 we must distinguish    
certain  elements of actual and concrete
 thought which have been historically   
associated with it4 ,in the attempts to 
establish a ,law of ,nature1 we  shall  

then recognise either new concrete      
legislative programs1 the  new laws     
appearing as natural and rational by    
contrast with the old  ones1 or an      
attempt to deduce from1 and through1    
juridical concepts1  the principles of a
 philosophy of the practical4 ,the      
principle of  nationality1 fighting for 
realization against the old dynastic    
law1  appears to its defenders as a     
typical natural right2 and ,rousseau1   
when deducing the principles of the jus 
naturale1 warns us that  he is not      
dealing with historical truths1 but with
 hypothetical and  conventional         
reasonings1 that is1 with principles    
which transcend every  particular       
determination and have not a positive1  
but an ideal value4  ,we no longer speak
 of a ,law of ,nature1 but the error    
which gave rise  to that conception is  
still vigorous in current social and    
political  discussions2 every attempt to
 change legal conditions is always      
advocated or resisted by an appeal      

either to natural rights1 which are  but
 arbitrary rationalizations of          
historical contingencies1 or to         
abstract reasons1 principles1 or ideas1 
of which the particular laws  or        
institutions are assumed to be the final
 and necessary expression4  ,but        
rationality1 morality1 and naturality1  
in the sense in which  these qualities  
are predicated of one or another type of
 laws and  institutions1 do not belong  
to any particular historical            
determination  more than to another2    
they belong only to the spirit of man   
and to the  concrete values that it     
realizes among the ever-changing        
conditions of  history4    ,a law1 being
 a volition of a class of actions1 and  
therefore of an  abstraction1 is in     
itself an abstract or unreal volition4  
,what we  actually will is not the law1 
but the single1 individual action  under
 the law3 the reality of the law is only
 in its execution4 ,in  the individual  
execution1 however1 what realizes itself

 is not the  law1 but the practical     
principle1 economic or ethic1 of which  
both  the observance and the            
non-observance of the law are particular
  determinations2 the individual        
practical problems can never be foreseen
  seen by the law1 which is by its      
nature general and abstract4 ,what is   
then1 it may be asked1 the use of the   
laws8 ,croce's answer is that the  laws 
are helps to the real volition1 in the  
same way as the empirical  and abstract 
concepts1 though not real knowledge     
themselves1 are helps  to knowledge4 ,in
 order to determine ourselves to the    
single action1  it is useful to begin by
 fixing our attention to the class of   
which  that single is an element2 in    
order to know either the individual1  or
 the universal1 it is useful to create1 
between the universal and  the          
individual1 classes and types1 general  
concepts1 or1 as ,croce  calls them1    
relatively constant variables1 through  
which the process  of actual knowledge  

is made easier and quicker4 ,we cannot  
think the  pseudo-concepts1 but they    
help us to think2 we cannot will the    
laws1  but they help us to will4 ,the   
concept of law is akin to that of plan  
or design2 in practice1 a plan or       
design1 and its execution1 are one  and 
the same thing1 as we act by constantly 
changing our design1  because reality1  
which is the foundation of our action1  
is in perpetual  change4 ,but this      
unreality of the plan1 as distinct from 
the concrete  individual action1 does   
not deprive the plan itself of its      
practical  uses1 which are universally  
recognized1 and which are identical with
  the uses of law4    ,when we identify 
the empirical laws with the universal   
practical  principles1 economic or      
ethic1 we fall into legalism1 which can 
be  defined as the belief that universal
 principles can be definitely  embodied 
in a limited number of laws1 and that1  
on the other hand1  these laws partake  
of the character of absoluteness which  

belongs to  those principles4 ,it is    
especially in the treatment of ethics   
that  this confusion has caused its     
worst effects4 ,the two outstanding     
types  of legalists are the ,jesuit1 who
 admits of the morally indifferent1  the
 justification through the intention1   
the pious fraud1 and other  practical   
means for the purely literal observance 
of the law1 supposed  to be a sufficient
 satisfaction of the moral obligation1  
and the  ,puritan1 who maintains that   
the unchangeable letter of the law is   
the  only1 and always certain1 guide of 
the moral consciousness4 ,both ,jesuit  
and ,puritan1 or to give them the names 
they assumed in a historical            
controversy1 both ,molinist and         
,jansenist1 have often been in practice 
much better than their theories2 but we 
are here interested only in  their      
theoretical pronouncements1 which1      
though apparently contrasting1  yet     
combine in substituting the letter for  
the spirit1 and in drying  up1 in the   

name of morality1 the living springs of 
moral activity4  ,and in both cases1    
moral legalism is associated with       
theological  utilitarianism2 it is1 in  
fact1 but another aspect of the same    
error4    ,the will that wills classes  
of actions1 the legislative activity1 is
  either moral or merely economic1 and  
can therefore be judged as either  moral
 or immoral1 economic or anti-economic4 
,but as the laws are will  in the       
abstract1 our judgment of the laws will 
also be an abstract  judgment4 ,to      
pronounce a concrete judgment1 we must  
turn to the moment  of the execution of 
the law1 to the individual practical    
action1 in  which the law realizes      
itself4 ,in this sphere1 it is vain to  
dispute  whether a law is essentially   
economic or moral3 the economic or moral
  character of the law is not determined
 by the abstract intention of the       
legislator1 but by the manner of its    
execution1 by the quality of the        
individual executor4 ,the punishment    

which a law assigns for a category  of  
crimes may be intended by the legislator
 either to deter or to  emend the       
criminal2 but in the man who abstains   
from that particular  kind of crime1 the
 law is an economic one if the          
abstention is entirely  due to the fear 
of the punishment1 it is a moral one if 
it coincides  with a sincere abhorrence 
of the crime4 ,no law1 therefore1 can be
 said  to be intrinsically moral1 and if
 we want to define the legislative      
activity in its full extension1 we must 
define it as generically  practical or  
merely economic4    ,the same definition
 obviously applies to the will that     
executes the  law1 as distinct from the 
will that formulates it3 the juridical  
activity1 as ,croce names it1 is also   
generically practical or  merely        
economic1 and as such united to and     
distinct from the moral  activity4 ,as  
the juridical activity1 however1 does   
not partake  of the abstractness of the 
legislative1 but is as concrete and     

determined as the economic activity1    
there is actually no possibility  of    
distinguishing the one from the other2  
the juridical activity  is therefore    
identical with the economic activity4   
,this is ,croce's  original solution of 
the fundamental problem of the          
philosophy of  law2 a solution which is 
closely connected with his recognition  
of a  utilitarian practical category1   
distinct from but not opposed to the    
moral category1 and with his reduction  
of all laws to individual laws4  ,the   
reader must recall what has been said   
elsewhere of the relations  between     
economic and moral values2 and he will  
then understand in what  sense it can be
 said that ,croce's theory of law is an 
answer to the  secular disputes on the  
relations between law and morality1     
between  positive and ideal law1        
historical law and the ,law of ,nature4 
,and he  will also be able to perceive  
the difference between the reduction of 
the juridical to the mere economic      

activity1 which1 as we know1 is  also   
the form through which only morality    
realizes itself1 and the  theories of   
law as the pure embodiment of force and 
of the positive1  established right as  
the only conceivable right1 which are   
nothing but  the counterpart of moral   
utilitarianism in the field of law4     
,croce's  theory of law is1 as all the  
rest of his philosophy is1 a purely     
formal  doctrine2 not intended to defend
 one type of laws and institutions      
against any other1 but attempting to    
furnish a conception of law1 as an      
individual1 perpetually new activity of 
the spirit of man1 of which all  laws   
and institutions1 all phases and        
tendencies of political history1  appear
 as concrete historical manifestations4 
,the philosophy of law has often had    
recourse to the philosophy of  language 
for analogies by which its own problems 
could be clarified4 ,a  doctrinaire view
 of the juridical and political problem1
 for which the  origin of law and       

society is to be found in an abstract   
convention1  and which therefore tends  
to build up1 by new conventions1 a model
  legislation1 or an ,eternal ,code1    
shows its real nature when related to   
the corresponding conception of language
 as a collection of signs1 a  purely    
symbolical organism1 which can be so    
perfected by reason as to  become an    
absolute1 universal language1 embodying 
in its signs every  conceivable type of 
logical operations3 a universal         
language1 which  should also be a       
universal symbolic logic4 ,sharply      
opposed to the  doctrinaire1 the        
traditionalist views certain types of   
positive laws  and institutions as      
endowed with a character of necessity   
which puts  them above the reach of the 
individual judgment of man2 and as he   
fails  to discover the ever present     
creative activity1 by which man         
constructs  his juridical and political 
world1 he also withdraws from the human 
spirit the power to create its own      

language1 and makes of words a  divine  
institution4 ,equally remote from the   
sociological as from the  theological   
concept1 which are the extreme          
theoretical forms of popular  errors1   
,croce establishes between law and      
language an analogy by which  both      
manifest their intrinsic creative and   
human character4 ,the reality  of law is
 the individual juridical or economic   
activity1 as the reality  of language is
 the concrete intuitive activity4 ,law  
is the will of the  individual1 as      
language is the knowledge of the        
individual4 ,grammars  and dictionaries 
are the codes of language1 mere         
abstractions from the  actual living    
flux of the creative expression1 as the 
written laws and  codes are but the     
grammars of law1 mere abstractions from 
the actual  living flux of political    
history4 ,language is not logic1 and yet
 the  logical thought cannot realize    
itself except through language2 law  is 
not morality1 and yet the ethical       

activity cannot live except by          
incorporating itself in laws and        
institutions1 and in the execution of   
laws1 the concrete1 individual life of  
institutions1 that is1 in the  juridical
 and economic activity4    ,thus1 the   
end of this exposition of ,croce's      
system1 the doctrine of  language with  
which the system opens links itself     
intimately with this  doctrine of law1  
with which it closes4 ,and both as      
regards language  and as regards law1   
the last word is1 of necessity1 a new   
implicit  affirmation of the identity of
 the philosophical with the historical  
method4 ,the true history of a language 
is not a history of abstract            
grammatical schemes1 but the history of 
the poetry and literature  in which that
 language has realized itself1 a history
 of individual  expressions2 the true   
history of law is one with the social   
and  political history of a people1     
which is1 and cannot be but the history 
of its practical activity in its        

effective1 individual realization1  that
 is1 juridical and economic history4    
,footnote #a3 ,see ,filosofia della     
,pratica1 part iii1 ,le ,leggi1 pp4     
#cba-djg4          ,,part ,,third       
,,philosophy ,,as ,,history 7#aiaa-aiba7
          ,i4 ,,works ,,and ,,days      
,a retrospective view of the            
system--,germs of development--,the     
return to  history--,croce's attitude   
during the war--,essays on the great    
poets4      ,to the reader of the three 
volumes of the ,filosofia dello         
,spirito1  which were published before  
#aiaj1 the whole of ,croce's thought    
appeared  as a solidly constructed      
system1 in which the four grades or     
forms  of spiritual activity were       
studied in their intrinsic essence1 and 
presented in their relations as         
completing the cycle of living reality1 
in contrast with that reality which the 
mind postulates outside its  living     
self1 and which the system reduces to a 
complex practical  product of the mind1 

a collection of material helps          
subservient to the  essential forms of  
its activity4 ,knowledge and action1    
reciprocally  implicated1 are the       
substance of reality2 and both knowledge
 and  action1 rising1 the first1 from   
the intuition to the concept1 the       
second1 from the economic to the ethical
 will1 attain the universal1            
all-including values which we express by
 the words ,beautiful1 ,true1  ,useful  
and ,good1 but only and in so far as    
they realize themselves  in the concrete
 and individual4 ,a universal more      
universal than that  which is present in
 the individual act is inexistent1 or   
exists only  as an impotent abstraction 
renouncing the concreteness and reality 
of  the individual1 and therefore also  
that true universality which has  no    
being outside this action1 this thought1
 this life4 ,the soul of  the system1   
slowly extricating itself from the      
traces of naturalism  or                
intellectualism1 which are still visible

 in the ,estetica1 is the  logic of the 
pure concept1 which resolves in the     
concrete universal the  dualisms of     
nature and spirit1 of fact and value1 of
 life and thought1  and1 finally1 of    
history and philosophy4 ,but while this 
logic can be  seen at work in all the   
parts of the system1 and is1 in fact1   
the form  towards which all ,croce's    
thoughts seem to have constantly tended 
from  the time of his earliest          
philosophical essays1 yet1 to an        
attentive  eye1 it is possible to       
discover the successive stages by which 
it  actually incorporated itself in the 
system4 ,in particular1 we have been    
able to point to the effects of the     
later meditations on the philosophy  of 
will1 on one side1 on a more intimate   
understanding of the pure  intuition as 
the lyrical intuition1 on the other1 on 
the identification  of the definition   
with the individual judgment1 and       
thereby on the  relations between       
history and philosophy4 ,on the whole it

 can be said  that two apparently       
contrasting directions were at work     
within the  system itself3 one          
reflecting ,croce's mental need for     
clear and fine  distinctions1 the other1
 that deep consciousness of the unity of
 the  real1 without which all           
distinctions tend to solidify themselves
 into  dead abstractions4    ,if we     
imagine two students of ,croce's        
philosophy1 endowed with  antagonistic  
philosophical temperaments1 the one a   
dialectician1  the other a mystic1 we   
can easily conceive them as the founders
 of  two diametrically opposed schools  
of thought4 ,the first would have       
emphasized the rigorous distinctions1   
the formal character1 the  intellectual 
precision of the system2 he might have  
retained the  identification of         
philosophy and history1 but to him these
 words would  have stood only for the   
names of two formal disciplines1 and not
 for  the concrete life of the human    
spirit which is present in them4 ,the   

second would have passed lightly over   
the distinctions1 and probably          
considered them as partaking of the same
 unreality which belongs to  scientific 
or legal abstractions2 and by           
obliterating the logical  processes     
without which the mind of man is unable 
to grasp and to  express itself1 he     
would have taken refuge in an ineffable1
 though  not necessarily silent1        
contemplation of the underlying unity4  
,this  hypothesis is not a criticism of 
,croce's philosophy2 it is merely the   
indication of the fact that1 when the   
system appeared as completed1  new      
problems1 and therefore new errors or   
new truths1 were bound to  grow out of  
the elements of the system itself4 ,and 
nobody was more  conscious of this fact 
than ,croce himself1 who concluded his  
volume on  the ,filosofia della ,pratica
 by expressly warning his readers of the
  inexhaustibility of thought1 which is 
one with the infinity of reality  and of
 life4 ,no philosophical system is      

final1 because life itself  has no end4 
,every system of philosophy1 being      
conditioned by life1  can do no more    
than solve a group of problems          
historically given1 and  prepare the    
conditions for new problems and new     
systems4 ,of his own  work in relation  
to his readers1 he conceived as of      
nothing more than  an instrument of     
work4    ,in these last few chapters we 
shall see ,croce himself at work on  the
 new problems generated by his own      
system1 trying more rigidly  to         
eliminate the last remnants of          
naturalism1 and to put a stronger       
accent on the spiritual unity1#a yet    
constantly defending his  conception of 
the spirit as the unity of distinctions1
 especially  against the mystical       
tendencies of the new actual idealism4  
,while  never1 in the course of his     
whole life1 has he limited his activity 
to  mere systematic thinking1 during the
 last eleven years he has shown  a more 
marked tendency to return from a        

philosophy1 which is all a  meditation  
of the formal problems of history1 to   
those concrete works  of history1 by    
which he was started on his             
philosophical career2 to  return to     
them1 however1 with a mind in which the 
original uncertainty  and obscurity has 
given place to a definite consciousness 
of the nature  and purpose of history4  
,the passage from the more philosophical
 to the  more historical stage is marked
 by the publication of a fourth volume  
of the ,filosofia dello ,spirito1 in    
which1 under the title of ,teoria  e    
,storia della ,storiografia1 he         
collected a number of essays written    
between #aiab and #aiac1 containing an  
elaboration of the theory of  history   
already expounded in the ,logica4 ,this 
volume does not form  a new part of the 
system1 but rather the natural          
conclusion of the  whole work1 since the
 problem which it discusses is the one  
towards  which tended all his former    
inquiries into the forms of the spirit1 

into their concrete life which is       
development and history1 and the        
consciousness of which is historical    
thought4 ,but before proceeding to      
analyze this final form of ,croce's     
theory of history1 we shall give a      
rapid account of the rest of his        
intellectual activity from #aiaj onward4
    ,as during the preceding eight      
years1 the ,critica continues to this   
day to be the main organ of ,croce's    
work and influence1 and in the  ,critica
 the greatest part of his writings are  
still published for  the first time4    
,the general features of the ,critica   
have remained  practically unchanged1   
except that his series of essays on the 
,italian  literature of the last fifty  
years 7which he collected in #aiad-ae in
  the four volumes of ,la ,letteratura  
della ,nuova ,italia7 has been  followed
 by studies on ,italian historiography  
from the beginning of the  nineteenth   
century to our day 7since #aiad71 by    
essays on some of the  greatest         

,european poets 7since #aiag71 by notes 
on modern ,italian and  foreign         
literature 7since #aiag71 and by the    
,frammenti di ,etica 7since  #aiac71    
containing discussions of particular    
problems of contemporary  morality4 ,but
 practically all the reviews and essays 
published in  the ,critica and elsewhere
 are now being collected in the edition 
of  his complete works1 of which a full 
list will be found at the end of  this  
volume4 ,in #aiab1 for the inauguration 
of the ,rice ,institute in  ,houston1   
,texas1 he wrote his ,breviario di      
,estetica1 which we have  partly        
utilized in our exposition of his       
sthetic doctrine1 and which  he         
reprinted in #aibj in his ,nuovi ,saggi 
di ,estetica1 which also  contains his  
most significant philosophical essays of
 the last four or  five years4 ,his     
,contributo alla critica di me stesso   
7,contribution  to the ,criticism of    
,myself7 was written in ,april1 #aiae1  
on the eve of  ,italy's entrance into   

the war1 and is the best essay in       
existence on  the development of his    
thought4    ,of ,croce's attitude during
 the war we shall say but a few words4  
,he  was one of the very few ,european  
philosophers or scholars who did not    
transform themselves into improvised    
statesmen1 or into passionate  defenders
 of national prejudices and proclaimers 
of national hatreds4  ,differing from   
the ,germanized philologist1 who was the
 type prevailing  in most universities  
before the war1 in that he had not      
waited for  the war to become aware of  
the many weaknesses and imperfections   
of modern ,german culture1 while on the 
other hand he had lived for  years in   
true and intimate contact with the great
 spirits of ,german  ,romanticism1 he   
resisted with all his power the         
universal tendency of  the time to make 
of the contingent issues of the war a   
criterion of  intellectual truth and of 
scientific conduct4 ,at the same time1  
his  temper and education reacted       

violently against the false ideologies  
of  the war1 the superstructure of      
verbal ideals with which on all sides   
cunning statesmen and nave philosophers 
attempted to veil the true  nature of   
the conflict4 ,against these1 he        
reasserted his conception  of the       
political life and struggles of states  
as manifestations of  the economic1     
amoral or pre-moral1 activity1 and of   
life itself as a  perpetual struggle1   
finding its reason and its rest in the  
struggle  itself4 ,the theory of the    
state as justice appeared to him merely 
as  a theoretical error1 the fortune of 
which lay in the opportunity it         
afforded to give a convenient mask of   
morality to particular interests1       
either of individuals or of states4 ,the
 intrinsic morality of the  war he      
conceived as resting on its tragic      
reality1 as reflected in  a severely    
historical thought1 to which it appears 
as a moment of  that historical fate    
which crushes and destroys states as    

well as  individuals1 to create from    
their ruins always new forms of life4   
,it is needless to say that for a time  
at least ,croce shared with  ,bertrand  
,russell and with ,romain ,rolland1 two 
thinkers in many respects  very distant 
from him1 and yet as impervious as he   
was to the rhetoric  of the war1 the    
privilege of a vast unpopularity4       
,looking back now on  his writings which
 were later collected in the volume     
,pagine sulla  guerra1 it is possible to
 discover among them many attitudes     
which  were justified and useful only as
 a reaction against the current         
fallacies of the time2 and also to      
realize that the man who speaks to  us  
through them is not always and only a   
pure philosopher1 but a man  with a     
given complex of moral and political    
tastes and passions4 ,but  this is1 in a
 way1 as it should be2 in the same way1 
between ,croce the  philosopher of      
sthetics and ,croce the critic of       
poetry1 there is a  difference which is 

inherent in the nature of the two       
different forms  of intellectual        
activity2 the philosopher is a man of   
understanding1  the critic a man of     
tastes and passions4 ,in both cases1 his
 ideal  has always been to make the     
critic or the moralist worthy of the    
philosopher1 his particular             
comprehension of history adequate to his
  concept of the universal4 ,to say that
 the equation is never perfect1  is only
 another way of saying that every       
particular historical problem           
continually raises new problems of      
thought1 and that ,croce's thought      
finds therefore in itself the motives of
 its own development1 the  springs of   
its own life4 ,where passion and reason 
ultimately coincide1  the roots of the  
development are taken away1 and death   
takes the place  of life4    ,yet1      
notwithstanding these limitations1 ,i   
know of no man whose thought  on the war
 is on the whole more acceptable to     
those among us who lived  through the   

war not as spectators1 looking on it as 
on a vast moral  abstraction1 but as    
humble actors1 in the midst of its human
 reality4 ,a  sense of collaboration    
between one side and the other1 of      
being1 here  as there1 employed in a    
common task1 whose meaning was much     
deeper  than any that had been offered  
to us by the national rhetoricians1--a  
collaboration which happened to take the
 aspect of a struggle1 and  imposed     
duties antagonistic1 but of the same    
nature--was probably the  most usual    
frame of mind among the soldiers who    
could think2 and it  existed1           
subconsciously1 even among the          
unthinking ones1 provided that  their   
duties were of a definite1 concrete     
kind1 touched them in the  deepest      
chords of their beings1 involved the    
fundamental issues of life  and death4  
,to the man who consciously faces death1
 there is no comfort  in wilful error2  
only this realization of an end that    
transcends all  particular ideals1      

because it is the end of life itself1   
can be worthy  of that price4 ,you      
cannot willingly die for fourteen points
 any more  than for one point1 but death
 which is loathsome in the drama of mere
  circumstance1 however adorned with    
brilliant rhetoric1 is no longer  death 
but an act of life in the tragedy in    
which the hero is conscious  of his     
fate4 ,there was no war1 probably1 that 
was ever more full than  the last one of
 what might be called the material of   
tragedy2 but what  have the official    
celebrators done with it1 they who have 
not feared  to desecrate1 in all our    
countries1 one at least of the concrete1
  individual tragedies1 in order to make
 of it an empty symbol1 to  transform an
 unknown hero into abstract heroism8 ,in
 some of ,croce's  pages1 there is a    
more concrete realization of the ideal  
tragedy of  the war than in any poem or 
oration that ,i have seen to this day4  
,the last years of the war found ,croce 
at work on some of the greatest         

poetical spirits of modern ,europe1     
,ariosto1 ,goethe1 ,corneille1          
,shakespeare1 bringing to the           
understanding of their work1 to this    
task  of concrete history1 the deep     
consciousness of the nature of poetry1  
and of the relations of poetry with     
life1 acquired in twenty years of       
philosophical meditations4 ,even his    
functions as ,minister of ,public       
,education during the last two years did
 not distract him entirely from  his    
studies1 and this year of the sixth     
centenary of ,dante's death  was        
celebrated by him with the publication  
of ,la ,poesia di ,dante1  which will   
certainly remain as the most lasting    
monument raised to the  memory of the   
poet on this occasion4 ,this troubled   
peace cannot make  him deviate from the 
path of his appointed labour any more   
than the war  could2 in peace as in war1
 his duty is his daily task1 here and   
to-day1  and his confidence in the      
morality and usefulness of that work    

which is  his work is as little shaken  
by the prophets of despair in peace1 as 
it was by the messiahs of the promised  
land who were so loud above the  turmoil
 of war4 ,he is probably now noting with
 a smile that the same  men who talked  
of the war to end all wars1 are now very
 busy preventing  our civilization from 
dying away2 that is1 building a peace in
 the  abstract1 with programs and words1
 as they fought a war which was not  the
 war1 but a phantasm of their           
imagination4      ,footnote #a3         
,contributo1 p4 #gd4          ,,ii4     
,,the ,,theory ,,of ,,history      ,two 
meanings of the word history--,history  
as contemporary history--  ,history and 
chronicle--,the spirit as               
history--,philology1 and  philological  
history--,poetical and rhetorical       
history--,universal  history--,the      
universality of history3 history and    
philosophy--,the  unity of              
thought--,philosophy as                 
methodology--,the positivity of         

history--,the humanity of               
history--,distinctions and              
divisions--,the  history of nature4     
,there are two meanings to the word     
history1 in ,english as well as in      
other ,european languages2 on one hand  
it denotes the actual doing1 the        
immediacy of life1 on the other1 the    
thinking that seems to follow  the      
doing1 the consciousness of life4 ,in a 
rough1 approximate way1 we  speak of men
 who make history1 and of other men who 
think or write  history--though we are  
all perfectly aware of the fact that we 
cannot  make history without first      
thinking history1 that the action1 in   
other  words1 follows a judgment of the 
situation1 which is an elementary form  
of historical thought1 and is           
accompanied by its own consciousness1   
which is its immediate history4 ,in this
 sense1 the action cannot be  materially
 severed from its history3 the          
distinction between the two  is a purely
 formal and ideal one4 ,and again1 the  

thinking of history1  in the second     
meaning of the word1 consists in making 
present to our  spirit1 in re-living1 an
 action or group of actions1 which thus 
become as actual an experience as any   
practical doing1 a fragment  of our own 
life1 and1 ultimately1 the consciousness
 of our own  individual experience4     
,thus the two meanings which stand out  
as sharply  contrasting when we         
objectify and solidify them1 as an      
external1  chronological series of      
happenings1 and as a formal discipline  
attempting to give1 in innumerable      
books1 a description and as it were  a  
verbal duplicate of that series1 once we
 examine them in the light  of our      
consciousness1 reveal themselves merely 
as different aspects or  moments of the 
same spiritual process4    ,croce's     
latest writings on history may be       
puzzling to the average  reader because 
this ambiguity cannot be overcome by him
 unless he is  willing to penetrate to  
the heart of ,croce's doctrine1 in which

 the  word history acquires a more      
pregnant and fundamental meaning4 ,in   
many of us there is a tendency to balk  
at any attempt at filling old  words    
with deeper and more precise            
connotations2 but philosophy is  not a  
matter of words4 ,a new thought will in 
any case alter the whole  physiognomy of
 our vocabulary1 and to stand up for the
 old meanings  is as much as to refuse  
to think1 or rather1 to refuse to live4 
,for  history as a formal discipline1   
for the actual writing of history1      
,croce uses the word ,historiography2   
but in his ,teoria e ,storia  della     
,storiografia 7,theory and ,history of  
the writing of ,history71  history still
 means both the doing and the thinking1 
life and the  consciousness of life1    
though not in the abstract distinction  
in which  these meanings are generally  
apprehended4 ,in ,croce the distinction 
is  also unity1 and there is no doing   
which is not also a thinking1 no life   
which is not also the consciousness of  

life1 no consciousness which is  not    
also the consciousness of itself4 ,the  
ambiguity1 some traces of  which could  
still be seen in the ,logica1 entirely  
disappears in this  fourth volume of the
 system1 at least for the reader who has
 followed  the whole development of     
,croce's thought4    ,we call           
contemporary history the history that is
 being made1 rather  loosely including  
in it a more or less extended stretch of
 time up  to the actual present4 ,but   
contemporary history rigorously ought   
to be only history in the actual making1
 the immediate present and  the         
consciousness of the immediate present4 
,all history1 however1  is contemporary 
history in this rigorous and precise    
sense2 it is a  condition of all history
 that it should live1 be present in the 
mind  of the historian2 all history     
springs directly from present life1     
since only an interest of our present   
life can induce us to inquire  into the 
past1 which1 by being made history1 is  

no longer a past but  a present4 ,if1   
,croce says1 contemporaneity is not the 
characteristic  of one class of         
histories 7as it is held to be1 and with
 good reasons1  in an empirical         
classification71 but the intrinsic      
character of all  history1 the relation 
between history and life must be        
conceived of  as a relation of unity3   
not certainly in the sense of an        
abstract  identity1 but in that of a    
synthetic unity1 which implies both the 
unity and the distinction of the terms4 
,to speak of a history1 of  which we do 
not possess the documents1 will then    
seem as absurd as  to speak of the      
existence of a certain thing1 of which  
we should at  the same time affirm that 
one of the essential conditions for its 
existence is lacking4 ,a history without
 relation with the document  would be an
 inverifiable history2 and since the    
reality of history  lies in this        
verifiability1 and the historical       
narrative in which it  realizes itself  

is an historical narrative only in so   
far as it is the  critical exposition of
 the document1 a history of that kind1  
without  meaning and without truth1     
would be inexistent as history4 ,how    
could  ever a history of painting be    
composed by a man who should not see and
  enjoy the works of which he intends to
 describe critically the origin  and    
development8 ,how1 a history of         
philosophy1 without the works1 or  at   
least the fragments of the works of the 
philosophers8 ,how1 the  history of a   
feeling or a custom1 for instance1 of   
,christian humility  or of chivalresque 
honour1 without the capacity to re-live1
 or rather1  without actually re-living 
those particular states of mind8 ,on the
  other hand1 having established the    
indissoluble connection of life  and    
thought in history1 the doubts that have
 been advanced about the  certainty and 
utility of history suddenly and totally 
disappear1 and  it becomes almost       
impossible to understand them4 ,how     

could that ever  be uncertain1 which is 
a present product of our spirit8 ,how   
could a  knowledge be useless1 which    
solves a problem rising from the womb of
  life8#a    ,if history is thus        
regarded not as an object but as an     
activity1 not as  the irrevocable past  
but as the living present1 the          
difference between  history and         
chronicle1 which is one of the puzzles  
of historical  thought1 becomes an      
important and significant distinction4  
,we are used  to think that the original
 form of historical writing is the      
chronicle1  and history a later and     
maturer development4 ,now if history is 
the  consciousness of a present1 it     
follows that history is contemporary    
with the event2 that1 therefore1 the    
most meagre chronicle1 in the mind  of  
its writer1 moved by the actuality of   
the facts which he records1  is already 
a history in the full sense of the word4
 ,and the records of  the past1 whether 
appearing to us1 from a literary point  

of view1 as  mere chronicles or as true 
histories1 become history again whenever
  they are apprehended by a new mind as 
an answer to a present problem1         
partaking of the activity of the mind   
that thinks them anew4 ,the same        
records1 on the other hand1 are a mere  
chronicle1 an empty narrative1  a truly 
irrevocable past1 whenever they are not 
re-lived by a living  mind1 either      
because they do not correspond to any   
interest of present  life1 or because   
the essential conditions for the        
recreation of that  past1 the documents 
which enable us to revive within        
ourselves the  original experience1 are 
irrevocably lost4 ,the true distinction 
between  history and chronicle is not1  
therefore1 a literary or material one1  
but a distinction between forms of      
spiritual activity3 history is the      
living consciousness1 and1 therefore1 an
 act of thought or knowledge2  chronicle
 is the dead record1 which we preserve  
by a mere act of will1  because we know 

that some day the dead record itself may
 come back to  life1 transform itself   
again1 under an impulse rooted not in   
the past  but in the present1 into a    
living thought4    ,these revivals have 
purely inward motives2 and no amount of 
narratives  or documents can produce    
them2 on the contrary1 it is the inner  
motive  that gathers and brings before  
itself documents and narratives1  which1
 without it1 would remain dispersed and 
inert4 ,and it will be  for ever        
impossible to understand the effectual  
process of historical  thought1 unless  
one starts from the principle that the  
spirit itself  is history1 and1 in every
 one of its moments1 the maker of       
history  and at the same time the result
 of all foregoing history2 so that the  
spirit carries within itself the whole  
of its history1 which in fact  coincides
 with the spirit itself4 ,to forget one 
aspect of history  and to remember      
another is nothing but the rhythm of the
 life of the  spirit1 which works by    

determining and individualizing itself1 
and by  in-determining and              
dis-individualizing the preceding       
determinations  and individualizations1 
in order to create new and richer ones4 
,the  spirit would live over again1 so  
to speak1 its history1 even without     
those external objects which we call    
narratives and documents2 but  those    
external objects are instruments that it
 fashions for itself1 and  preparatory  
acts that it accomplishes1 in order to  
effect that vital  interior evocation1  
in whose process they resolve           
themselves4 ,and for  this purpose the  
spirit asserts and jealously preserves  
the 'memories  of the past4'#b    ,this 
practical function of the preservation  
of the dead documents  and records is   
the work of the pure scholar1 of the    
erudite1 the  archivist1 the            
archologist1 or what might be termed    
philology in the  strict sense of the   
word4 ,and it is a legitimate and useful
 function1  provided that it does not   

pretend to be other than it actually is1
 and  to substitute itself for the true 
process of history1 by attempting to    
make history with the external objects  
that have been confided to its  care4   
,philological histories are never       
anything but mere compilations1  learned
 chronicles1 useful repertories2 and as 
such1 blameless2 but  as histories they 
lack the living spirit1 the creative    
impulse1 which  alone can transform the 
document into history4 ,we have only to 
turn our  attention to the greatest part
 of our modern histories of literature1 
whether written by a single philologist 
or by a learned society1 to  realize    
that that which is philology in them is 
not history1 but  repertory2 and the    
rest1 which is history1 is not          
philology1 but a  vivid reaction1 an act
 of present life1 by which some at least
 of the  documents of the past 7since   
some philologists are men7 have suddenly
  become part of the actual experience  
of the writer1 answered his  spiritual  

need1 stirred that which is still human 
in his soul4 ,and if  a further         
confirmation of the philological error  
is needed1 and of the  further errors in
 which it involves the philological     
historian1 it is  sufficient to open    
those same literary histories at the    
pages in which  they attempt to explain 
the origins of the ,renaissance4        
,because as  those writers make history 
from the sources1 so they imagine that  
life  itself springs from material      
sources2 and the ,renaissance finds its 
causes in the discovery of monuments and
 documents of the classical  world1 in  
the lives and travels of humanists1 in  
the munificence of  popes and princes4  
,it does not seem to occur to them that 
monuments  and manuscripts1 which       
materially had existed in ,europe during
 all the  so-called ,dark and ,middle   
,ages1 could not have been discovered   
unless1  at a certain moment in the     
development of ,european civilization1  
the  spirit of the ,western nations had 

not craved those particular helps  to   
its own life1 because of motives and    
impulses generated by its own  actual   
experience2 and that the medival        
clericus was not less of a  traveller   
than the humanist1 and that the economic
 aspect of life can  never be           
intelligibly conceived as a cause of    
that life of which it is  but a moment4 
,for the philological historian1 the    
,renaissance begins  between the end of 
the fourteenth and the beginning of the 
fifteenth  century2 but the historian   
tout court knows that the fundamental   
impulses and motives by which we        
empirically ally characterize that      
period in the history of the human      
spirit were already present in the      
,italy of the thirteenth century1 and   
slowly maturing in the other  ,european 
countries long before any of the        
,italian humanists had come to  them as 
the apostles of a new creed4    ,if     
philological history is not history but 
pseudo-history1 so are also  two other  

forms of so-called historical thought1  
poetical history and  rhetorical        
history4 ,the first substitutes for the 
value of history1  which is thought1 a  
purely immediate and sentimental1 or    
sthetic  value2 it presents itself very 
often as a reaction to philological     
history1 but it falls into the opposite 
error1 which is that of putting  the    
imagination in the place of the         
document4 ,rhetorical history is  that  
which is animated by practical ends     
7moralistic1 nationalistic1  or other71 
and it really consists of two distinct  
elements1 history  itself1 and the      
particular end towards which the        
recitation of history  is directed1     
converging into a single practical act4 
,both partake of  life much more        
intensely than philological history2 but
 the life of  the one is poetry1 that of
 the other is economic or moral action4 
,they  are1 therefore1 legitimate as    
poetry and as action1 and become errors 
only in so far as they are presented as 

history4 ,it is important to  make this 
distinction as clear as possible3 the   
actual interest which  makes history is 
not for ,croce a sentimental or         
practical interest1  but an interest of 
thought4 ,in the distinction of the     
various forms of  spiritual activity1   
history is not the sentimental or       
practical moment1  but the moment of    
ultimate consciousness1 the reflection  
and not either  the intuition or the    
action1 the thought which is            
consciousness of  life and not life     
immediate2 neither art nor morality1 in 
a word1 but  philosophy1 if by          
philosophy1 we mean not a formal        
discipline1 but  all knowledge sub      
specie universalis4 ,the defenders of   
rhetorical  history have become more    
frequent during and after the war than  
they  were before it1 it being only too 
natural that in times of exceptional    
stress truth should be made subservient 
to practical ends1 and the man  of      
knowledge should be unwittingly         

transmogrified into a man of action2    
and they insist more than ever on the   
moral efficacy of history as its  proper
 educational value4 ,but if by history  
we mean both that history  which is     
thought1 and those that are poetry1     
philology or moral will1  it is clear   
that 'history' will enter into the      
educational process not  under one only1
 but under all these forms2 though as   
history proper1  under one only1 which  
is not that of moral education1         
exclusively  and abstractly considered1 
but of the education or development of  
thought4#c    ,the conception of history
 as contemporary history1 or present    
thought1  helps us to discard that form 
of historical scepticism1 or            
agnosticism1  which affirms that all we 
can know of history is but one part1 and
  a very small part1 of the whole4 ,if  
we should imagine that infinite  whole1 
in its infinite detail1 as present for  
one moment to our mind1  all we could   
do1 would be instantly to proceed to    

forget it1 in order  to concentrate our 
attention on that detail only which     
answers to  a problem and1 therefore1   
constitutes a living and active history4
  ,that whole is not something of which 
we can affirm the existence at  any     
given moment1 but the eternal phantasm  
of the thing in itself1  the limiting   
concept of the infinity of our doing and
 knowing3 a  naturalistic construction  
similar to the external and material    
reality  of physical science4 ,it is    
this naturalistic process that gives    
birth  to agnosticism1 in history as in 
science2 that is1 to the affirmation  of
 the impossibility of knowing that which
 has no reality outside our  own        
thought1 which has created1 or rather   
posited it1 for its own  purposes4 ,a   
further consequence is that we must     
renounce the knowledge  of universal    
history1 not as a fact1 because as such 
it has never  existed1 but as a pretence
 under which1 in fact1 we are given     
something  quite different4 ,the        

pretence consists 7and it will be well  
to recall  ,croce's own words1 written  
long before some recent attempts1 which 
in  those words find their precise      
valuation7 in reducing within a single  
frame all the facts of mankind1 from its
 origins on earth to the  present day2  
or rather1 since in this way history    
would not be truly  universal1 from the 
origins of things or from the ,creation 
to the end  of the world2 hence a       
tendency to fill the abysm of prehistory
 or of  the origins with theological or 
naturalistic novels1 and somehow to     
outline the future1 either with         
revelations or with prophecies1 as in   
the ,christian universal history 7which 
extended to the ,anti-,christ and  to   
the universal judgment71 or with        
forecasts1 as in the universal          
histories of positivism1 democraticism1 
and socialism4 ,such is the  pretence2  
but the fact turns out to be different  
from the intention1  and what we get is 
either a more or less heterogeneous     

chronicle1 or  a poetical history       
expressing some aspiration of the heart1
 or even a  true history1 which is not  
universal but particular1 though        
embracing  the life of many nations and 
of many epochs2 and1 more often1 in the 
same literary body we discern these     
divers elements1 one by the side of  the
 other4#d    ,universal history is a    
utopian ideal similar to those of a     
universal  language1 or of universal    
art1 or of a law that should be valid   
for  all times2 the only useful meaning 
of the word universal when applied  to  
history is that of a recommendation to  
enlarge the sphere of our  historical   
interests1 and to turn from the         
knowledge of one time and  one people to
 that of the great facts and currents of
 history4 ,but a  denial of the validity
 of universal history must not be       
understood as  withdrawing from history 
the knowledge of the universal4 ,the    
reader who  has followed us through the 
preceding chapters1 and especially      

through  our analysis of the historical 
judgment1 knows how the concreteness    
and individuality of history is         
determined by thought1 and therefore    
known as a universal4 ,history is       
thought1 and1 as such1 the thought  of  
the universal in its concrete and       
particular determinations4 ,the  object 
of history is never this or that poet1  
but poetry2 not this or  that nation or 
epoch1 but culture1 civilization1       
progress1 freedom1 or  a similar word   
which denotes the development of the    
human spirit as a  whole1 and is        
therefore a universal4 ,it is of        
history1 thus conceived1  of            
contemporary history1 as opposed to the 
naturalistic moment  7chronicle1 or     
philological history71 that ,croce      
asserts the identity  with philosophy3  
history as1 the knowledge of the eternal
 present being  one with the thought of 
the eternal present1 which is           
philosophy4  ,history renounces the     
pretence of an objective universality in

 the same  way as philosophy1 immanent  
in and identical with history1 abolishes
  the idea of a universal philosophy3   
the two negations are but one1  since   
the closed system1 the final truth1 is  
as much a cosmological  novel as        
universal history is4 ,this tendency was
 implicit in ,hegel's  philosophy1 but  
contrasted within it by old prejudices1 
and wholly  betrayed in the execution1  
so that even that philosophy converted  
itself into a cosmological novel2 we can
 therefore say that that which  at the  
beginning of the nineteenth century was 
a mere presentiment1  only at the       
beginning of the twentieth is           
transforming itself into a  firm        
consciousness1 which defies the fears of
 the timid1 that in this  way we        
endanger the knowledge of the universal2
 maintaining that1 on  the contrary1 in 
this way only this knowledge is obtained
 truly and  for ever1 because in a      
dynamic mode4 ,history becoming actual  
history1  and philosophy becoming       

historical philosophy1 have freed       
themselves1  one from the dread of not  
being able to know that which is not    
known  only because either it was or it 
will be known1 and the other1 from the  
despair of never attaining the final    
truth3 that is1 both have freed         
themselves from the phantasm of the     
'thing in itself4'#e    ,this final     
affirmation of the unity of human       
thought1 this  qualification of all     
thought as at the same time historical  
and  philosophical1 is the last answer  
given by ,croce to the problem  which   
had occupied him for the last twenty    
years1 ever since his  first            
speculations on history as art4 ,from   
the consideration of the  individual    
moment which is essential to history1 he
 had slowly raised  himself to the      
contemplation of the pure universal1    
only to return  finally to the          
individual moment in which only the     
universal realizes  itself4 ,and while  
this answer can be regarded1 on the     

whole1 as the  natural conclusion of the
 idealistic movement in philosophy1 yet 
it  differs from ,kant in its ultimate  
repudiation of the noumenon1 from       
,hegel1 in that it makes it impossible  
to build1 side by side with a  dynamic  
logic1 a mythology of the ,idea1 a      
philosophy of history and of  nature1 in
 which the transcendental element1      
eliminated already from  the logic1     
should find its ultimate refuge4 ,it is 
to be hoped that  ,croce's critics will 
not level against him those same        
criticisms that  are generally employed 
against ,kant or ,hegel1 because they   
would be for  the most part ineffectual 
against a ,kantian and ,hegelian        
philosopher  who has discarded the whole
 of ,kantian and ,hegelian metaphysics4 
,from this standpoint1 ,croce is not    
only the heir of the idealistic1  but   
also of the positivistic or realistic   
tradition1 which he has  constantly     
opposed1 not because of its             
anti-metaphysical character1  but       

because in the external reality of the  
realist1 in the natural or  historical  
philosophy of the positivist1 he is     
unable to see anything  but naturalistic
 disguises of the old metaphysical      
entities4 ,a realist  who should not in 
principle refuse to become acquainted   
with ,croce's  thought1 but honestly    
attempt to understand it1 would probably
 find his  own realism purified and made
 more truly realistic by the experience4
    ,a material distinction1 as of      
formal disciplines1 between history and 
philosophy still survives in ,croce's   
theory1 philosophy proper being         
considered as the categoric or          
methodological moment of history--a     
distinction roughly corresponding to the
 one he made in his logic  between the  
individual judgment and the definition4 
,but philosophy  itself is profoundly   
modified once we fully realize that its 
historical  character implies the       
abandonment of certain features which   
are  constantly associated in our minds 

with the idea of philosophy1 because  of
 its early associations with mythology  
and the positive religions  ions4 ,to   
these belong the belief in the existence
 of a fundamental  problem of           
philosophy1 which remains the same      
throughout the history of  human        
thought1 and of which the various       
philosophies are but successive         
approximations to an answer2 the        
consequent stress laid on the unity  of 
the system rather than on the fine and  
clear distinctions2 the  research of an 
ultimate truth2 and finally1 the        
prejudice by which  the philosopher is  
regarded as a ,buddha or priest1 freed  
from human  passions and human          
illusions1 resting in the pure          
contemplation of  a truth1 which1 by    
being tom from the soil of active life  
that has  borne it1 cannot but wither   
away and become as empty and unreal as  
the  ,buddha's own ,nirvana frankly     
professes to be4 ,metaphysics to ,croce 
is  the last incarnation of theology2   

and the professor of philosophy in  our 
universities1 with a culture formed     
exclusively on the books of the  great  
philosophers of the past1 unmoved by the
 passions and problems  of life1 is but 
the heir of the medival master of       
theology4 ,a strong  advancement of     
philosophical culture ought to tend     
towards this result3  that all the      
students of human things1 jurists1      
economists1 moralists1  men of letters1 
that is1 all the students of historical 
matters1  should become conscious and   
well-disciplined philosophers2 and the  
philosopher in general1 the purus       
philosophus1 should no longer find      
place among the professional            
specifications of knowledge4#f    ,we   
shall not follow our author in all his  
developments of the theory  of history4 
,it suffices to say that these          
developments are obviously  but new     
presentations1 made here and there more 
precise and more  coherent1 of the      
various problems already discussed in   

the preceding  volumes of the ,filosofia
 dello ,spirito4 ,we shall thus         
recognise in  ,croce's criticism of the 
philosophy of history as a special      
discipline1  distinct both from history 
as such and from a so-called general    
philosophy1 his polemic against         
transcendence1 either metaphysical  or  
naturalistic2 and in his claim for the  
positivity of history1 his  theory of   
value1 by which the only real values are
 the positive ones1  coinciding with the
 fact1 while negative values are but    
expressions  of feelings and desires4   
,in the light of this theory1 since     
history  is obviously concerned with    
that which is1 and not with that which  
is  not1 the limits of historical       
judgment are clearly established1 in the
  way in which we saw them established  
for literary criticism4 ,as the         
literary critic is never concerned with 
anything but with expression1  or art1  
or beauty1 non-expression1 non-art1     
non-beauty being as such  inexistent1   

and truly existent only as              
manifestations of the logical  or       
practical activity of man2 so the       
historian at large will never  meet     
negative values1 but positive facts     
only1 which assume the aspect  of       
ugliness1 or error1 or immorality1 only 
in the dialectic process of  reality1 in
 the creation of a higher form of life4 
,his affirmation of  the positive fact  
is sufficient judgment1 and it becomes  
an implicit  moral judgment whenever the
 consciousness of the historian is a    
moral  consciousness1 without any need  
for him to usurp the function of the    
moralist or of the judge in apportioning
 praise or blame on the objects  of his 
history4    ,against the humanistic or  
pragmatic conception of history1 which  
finds  the reasons and motives of       
history in the abstract individual1 as  
against the opposite view1 for which the
 true history is only that  of the      
collectivity1 of the institutions1 of   
the human values1 ,croce  reasserts his 

concept of the actuality of the spirit1 
in regard to  which the individual is as
 much of an abstraction as the society  
or  the value which does not entirely   
realize itself in the fact4 ,the  object
 of history is neither ,pericles nor    
,politics1 neither ,sophocles  nor      
,tragedy1 neither ,plato nor            
,philosophy2 but the universal in the   
individual1 that is1 ,politics1         
,tragedy1 ,philosophy1 as ,pericles1    
,sophocles1 and ,plato1 or ,pericles1   
,sophocles1 and ,plato as particular    
moments of ,politics1 of ,tragedy1 and  
of ,philosophy4    ,as there are no     
special philosophical sciences1 and then
 a general  philosophy1 which should be 
outside or above them1 but whenever we  
think of reality under one of its       
aspects or distinctions1 we think  of   
the whole of reality in one of its      
determinations1 so there are no  special
 histories1 the limits of which can be  
definitely stated1 and  above them a    
general history1 which would in a new   

form revive the myth  of universal      
history4 ,we have seen how literary     
history1 for instance1  tends inevitably
 to become the whole spiritual history  
of a nation2  and the same applies to   
all special histories1 whether political
 or  moral1 or philosophical4 ,there are
 divisions of history1 according  to the
 quality of the objects1 to time and    
space1 but such divisions  are mere     
empirical classifications1 practical    
instruments or literary  expedients2 and
 we can use as the foundation of such   
divisions even the  ideal distinctions  
of the fundamental forms of spiritual   
activity4 ,but  when these distinctions 
are understood as actual distinctions of
 the  aspects of the spiritual life1 of 
which we make history1 then all the     
other aspects will inevitably be present
 in the particular distinction1  once we
 truly apprehend it in the fulness of   
its relations4 ,in this  sense1 history 
is always special or particular1 because
 it is only in  the special and         

particular that we can grasp the        
effectual and concrete  universality1   
the effectual and concrete unity4       
,finally1 the difference between the    
history of man and the history of       
nature is not a difference in the object
 but in the method of history4  ,the    
whole of reality is spiritual reality1  
and nature apprehended  in its          
concreteness and actuality1 if we are   
able to recreate it  within ourselves1  
becomes actual1 concrete1 contemporary  
history as  much as any part of human   
history4 ,on the other hand1 the        
application  of empirical and abstract  
concepts1 the practical manipulation of 
the data of human history1 transforms   
the history of man into mere  natural   
history4 ,this difference in method we  
have already analyzed in  studying      
,croce's logic1 and we shall only add   
here that the reader of  ,croce may     
often be tempted to regard ,croce's     
conception of reality as  limited to the
 human spirit only1 and therefore to    

give a metaphysical  interpretation to  
his exclusion of nature4 ,the correct   
interpretation  is a purely             
epistemological one1 and again and again
 ,croce insists that  in the whole of   
reality1 which is development or life1  
man and nature  are but empirical and   
abstract distinctions4 ,on the other    
hand1 ,croce's  interests are certainly 
more human than natural1 and not only in
 the  sense in which this is true of    
every man2 in the more precise sense    
also that the effort to recreate within 
himself the consciousness of a  blade of
 grass1 which he advises the historian  
of nature to perform1  clearly appeals  
to him so little1 that he may even seem 
doubtful of its  success4 ,the accent is
 continually laid1 in ,croce's thought1 
on the  history of man1 and on the      
thought of man2 to many of us1 our      
dealings  with nature 7not the dead     
nature of ,linnus1 but the living nature
 of  ,virgil and ,shelley7 would        
probably suggest a shifting of the      

accent  by which the spirituality of    
nature1 the continuity of the dynamic   
process from nature to man would become 
more emphatically affirmed  than it is  
in any of ,croce's writings4 ,we are    
probably touching here  on one of the   
possible1 and probable1 lines of        
development of ,croce's  philosophy2    
which1 however1 will not become actual  
until the historical  problems of the   
living nature shall not urge ,croce     
himself1 or one of  his successors1 as  
powerfully as the problems of human     
history have  moved him4 ,at present1   
with very rare exceptions1 the students 
of  the history of nature are occupied  
in transforming their historical        
experience into classes and types and   
laws2 but a time may come when  from the
 naturalistic constructions we shall be 
able more frequently  to recreate the   
life of which these are but the dead    
spoils1 the  accumulated vestiges1 by   
the same process by which history       
re-kindles  the old chronicles into new1

 contemporary life4 ,that such a        
development  is implied in ,croce's own 
theory of history can hardly be         
questioned1  though1 when realized1 it  
will undoubtedly react on more than one 
point  of ,croce's logic4      ,footnote
 #a3 ,teoria e ,storia1 pp4 #e-f4       
,footnote #b3 ,teoria e ,storia1 pp4    
#ae-af4    ,footnote #c3 ,teoria e      
,storia1 pp4 #ce-f4    ,footnote #d3    
,teoria e ,storia1 p4 #df4    ,footnote 
#e3 ,teoria e ,storia1 pp4 #ea-b4       
,footnote #f3 ,teoria e ,storia1 p4     
#ade4          ,,iii4 ,,criticism ,,and 
,,history      ,beyond the system--,the 
universality of art--,the discipline of 
art--,poetry1 prose and                 
oratory--,classicism and impressionism--
  ,practical personality and poetical   
personality--,the monographic  method in
 criticism--,the reform of sthetic      
history--,criticism as                  
philosophy--,sensibility and            
intelligence4      ,the identification  
of history and philosophy1 in the form  

in which  we have expounded it in the   
preceding chapter1 is the turning point 
of ,croce's thought2 the system which in
 the first three volumes of  the        
,filosofia dello ,spirito had still a   
somewhat static and rigid  appearance1  
is really set to movement1 animated as  
if by a new and  intenser life1 since   
its implicit dynamism is made explicit  
in the  fourth and concluding volume4   
,to ,croce himself1 the whole of his    
work  appears no longer as a system1 but
 as a series of systematizations1  and  
his ,filosofia dello ,spirito1 as a     
series of volumes on the  problems      
slowly gathering in his mind since the  
years of his youth4  ,no wonder1        
therefore1 that his later work should   
contain thoughts  that break the bars of
 the so-called system1 and give1 to a   
close  scrutiny1 new systems or new     
'systematizations1' since always the    
whole  moves with every one of our      
steps4 ,no wonder that he should feel   
that  he will continue to philosophize  

even if one day he shall abandon        
philosophy1 as this is what the unity of
 philosophy and history  implies3 that  
we philosophize whenever we think1 and  
of whatever object  and in whatever form
 we may think4#a ,and in fact1 in these 
last few  years1 ,croce has given many a
 severe shock to the faithful           
worshippers  of his system1 sometimes by
 extending his tolerance1 or even his   
approval1 to types of speculation       
apparently remote from his own1 but  in 
which he recognises1 under a radically  
different aspect1 some of  the living   
impulses1 and spiritual interests by    
which his own thought  is moved2 and    
sometimes by developing new theories1   
through which  intellectual positions   
criticised by him at an earlier stage of
 his  work were restablished as having a
 new meaning and value1 once they  were 
approached from a new and higher        
standpoint1 partly reached by  means of 
that same critical process which had    
previously revealed them  as errors4    

,croce's conception of the function of  
error in the history  of human thought1 
while making him violently intolerant of
 actual  negative error1 leads him to   
search painstakingly for that element of
  truth which is the reality of every   
error2 and in this respect too1 his     
philosophical career is as it were      
roughly divided into two periods1  one  
of critical dissolution1 and the other  
of critical reconstruction1             
respectively corresponding to the       
building up of the system1 and to the   
successive liberation from the shackles 
of the system itself4 ,croce's  name    
will certainly be remembered in the     
future1 if on no other  account1 as that
 of the only philosopher who never      
became the slave  of his dead thought4  
,his coherence is never of the letter1  
but of the  spirit4    ,this last phase 
of ,croce's thought offers greater      
difficulties to the  expositor than the 
preceding ones1 partly because it is    
still in the  making1 and therefore     

lacks the necessary perspective1 and    
partly  because it is embodied not only 
in purely philosophical essays1 but in  
every page of ,croce's historical and   
critical writings2 so that very  often  
it would be impossible to give a clear  
account of it without  ample and minute 
reference to the underlying historical  
material4  ,the whole of ,croce's       
thought could indeed be restated through
 an  exposition of ,croce's historical  
views1 and it would be an alluring  task
 to extract from his writings a kind of 
outline of the history  of mankind1     
considered especially in its sthetic and
 philosophical  cal manifestations1 and 
indirectly also in its moral and        
economic  activities2 but it would take 
us much beyond the limits which we have 
set to our labour4 ,we shall therefore  
confine ourselves to examining1  in this
 chapter1 the latest developments of    
,croce's sthetics1  especially in       
relation with the history of art and    
poetry2 and1 in the  following and      

concluding one1 to considering his      
theory of truth or of  the function of  
thought1 in relation to other types of  
contemporary  thought4    ,we have      
followed the evolution1 or rather the   
deepening1 of ,croce's  concept of art  
as pure intuition1 into lyrical         
intuition1 through  which the movement  
and life which might seem to have been  
denied to  the products of the sthetic  
activity considered as a mere form of   
knowledge1 were recognised as           
intrinsically belonging to them by      
reason  of the very nature of that      
cognitive activity1 and of its relations
  with the practical sphere of the      
spirit1 the states of mind1 which can   
be abstracted as the matter or content  
of the sthetic form4 ,another           
difficulty1 however1 still persisted in 
,croce's theory1 due to the  sharp      
distinction between the sthetic and the 
logical activity1 which  reserved to the
 first the field of individual1 to the  
second that of  universal               

knowledge--constituting a double-grade  
relation1 in which the  sthetic was     
implied by the logic activity1 but not  
vice-versa4 ,the  corresponding         
distinction of the two forms of the     
practical spirit1  the economic and the 
ethic1 evolved by ,croce at a maturer   
stage of his  speculation1 establishes  
not only a double-grade relation1 but   
also  a reciprocal implication4 ,croce's
 essay on ,il carattere di totalit      
della espressione artistica 7#aiag7 is  
an attempt at interpreting his  first   
distinction in the light of the second1 
thereby recognising the  universal or   
cosmic character of art4 ,that          
universality which becomes  explicit in 
the logical judgment is implicit in the 
intuition1 already  identified with the 
category of feeling1 with the concrete  
states of  mind1 on which it imposes its
 form3 ,since1 what is a feeling or a   
state of mind8 is it something that can 
be detached from the universe  and      
developed by itself8 have the part and  

the whole1 the individual  and the      
cosmos1 the finite and the infinite1 any
 reality1 one outside  the other8 ,one  
may be inclined to grant that every     
severance and  isolation of the two     
terms of the relation could not be      
anything  but the work of abstraction1  
for which only there is an abstract     
individuality and an abstract finite1 an
 abstract unity and an abstract         
infinite4 ,but the pure intuition1 or   
artistic representation1 abhors         
abstraction2 or rather it does not even 
abhor it1 since it knows it  not1       
because of its nave or auroral cognitive
 character4 ,in it1 the  individual     
lives by the life of the whole1 and the 
whole is in the life  of the individual2
 and every true artistic representation 
is itself and  the universe1 the        
universe in that individual form1 and   
that individual  form as the universe4  
,in every accent of a poet1 in every    
creature of  his phantasy1 there is the 
whole of human destiny1 all the hopes1  

the  illusions1 the sorrows and the     
joys1 all human greatness and all human 
misery1 the entire drama of reality1    
which perpetually becomes and  grows    
upon itself1 suffering and rejoicing4#b 
,this recognition of the implicit       
universality of the sthetic  expression 
does not abolish1 as it might seem to a 
superficial  observer1 the distinction  
between sthetic and logical knowledge2  
it  rather makes it clearer and truer4  
,an imperfect recognition may lead  to  
an intellectualistic or mystic theory of
 art2 and intellectualism  and mysticism
 in sthetics remain for ,croce as       
typical forms of error1  whether they   
are directed towards a confusion between
 intuition and  judgment1 or towards a  
symbolical or allegorical interpretation
 of  art1 or towards a semi-religious   
theory of art as the revelation of  the 
,deus absconditus4 ,but the truth that  
those errors tried to  express in their 
imperfect formulas1 is finally          
understood by him to  be that character 

of universality which belongs to every  
aspect and  to every fragment of the    
living reality4 ,feeling itself1 or a   
state  of mind1 partakes in its         
actuality of that universal character1  
but  when expressed in art1 it retains  
its universality only by losing its     
practical nature1 and subjecting itself 
entirely to the form which  expresses   
it4 ,thus the sthetic activity1 because 
bent on realizing  its own universality1
 which is the perfection of its form1   
imposes on  the artist a morality and a 
discipline which cannot be identified   
with  practical morality1 with the      
discipline of life4 ,the sincerity of   
the'  artist is of another order than   
that of the practical man1 though 7we   
can never repeat it too often7 sthetic  
virtues being incommensurable  with     
moral values1 his work as an artist does
 not exempt him from his  duties as a   
man4    ,this further determination of  
the concept of expression is used by    
,croce to clarify a distinction which   

had already been adumbrated  in the     
,estetica2 the distinction between      
poetic1 intellectual1 and  practical    
expression1 between the word in which   
the pure intuition  embodies itself1 the
 word which is a sign or symbol of      
thought1 and  the word which is an      
instrument for the awakening of the     
emotions1 a  preparation for action4    
,thus the old categories of poetry1     
prose1 and  oratory reappear1 but no    
longer as criteria of material          
classification1  no longer to be        
identified with classes or genres of    
expression4 ,they  become synonyms1     
respectively1 of the sthetic1 the       
logical1 and the  practical activity2 to
 be used as instruments of literary and 
artistic  criticism1 if the critic is   
willing to renounce all external helps  
and  material standards1 and to         
penetrate into the individuality of the 
act1 where only it is given to him to   
discern the different spiritual         
dispositions1 and what is poetry from   

what is not poetry4 ,under the          
semblance of prose1 in a comedy or in a 
novel1 we may find a true and  deeply   
felt lyric2 as under that of verse1 in a
 tragedy or in a poem1  nothing but     
reflection and oratory4#c ,it is easy to
 perceive how this  distinction will    
also react on ,croce's theory of        
language as intuition  and expression1  
not by altering its initial position1   
but by offering  new means for the      
empirical analysis of the facts of      
language1 the  nature of which is       
obviously determined by the kind of     
impulse which  man obeys in the         
individual act of expression4 ,by the   
employment of  such a method1 the       
history of language as sthetic          
expression can be  qualified and        
illumined through the consideration of  
the moments in  which language ceases to
 be a pure act of sthetic creation1 and 
is  subordinated1 as a symbol or        
instrument1 to the purposes of the      
logical  and practical mind4            

,similarly1 in the history of poetry or 
of art1 the consideration of  the       
logical and practical moments in the    
expression will help to  define and     
isolate that which is purely sthetic    
expression1 that is1  poetry and art4   
,croce's expressionistic theory1 when   
thus understood1  differs both from     
other expressionistic theories and from 
the narrow  interpretations of ,croce's 
own theory that have been given by some 
of  his followers and by all his        
adversaries4 ,it does not1 in fact1     
attempt  to give an sthetic             
justification of art as the mere passive
 reception  of the transient mood2 it   
has no sympathy for that impressionism  
which  transforms the artist into a reed
 shaken by all winds of circumstance1   
legitimizing every intrusion of the     
practical personality in the  sthetic   
production4 ,it reduces this modern     
sthetics of the immediate  feeling to an
 expression1 not of the true spirit of  
what art and poetry  is being produced  

to-day1 but of that disease1 or         
passivity1 of the  times1 the first     
solemn document of which can be traced  
in ,rousseau's  ,confessions4 ,against  
it1 ,croce appeals to the example and   
the word  of a ,goethe or a ,leopardi1  
who diagnosed the disease in its        
inception1  and contrasted the classical
 naturalness and simplicity of the      
ancients  with the affectation and      
tumidity of the moderns4 ,but the       
classicism  which ,croce invokes is not 
a formal and literal ideal1 limited to  
certain models or standards3 it is that 
complete idealization1 which  the       
immediate practical data1 in all times  
and climates1 will undergo  at the hands
 of the true poet and artist1 whether he
 calls himself a  romanticist or a      
classicist1 an idealist or a realist4   
,closely related with this line of      
thought is ,croce's distinction of  the 
practical from the poetical personality 
of the artist1 and of  biography from   
sthetic criticism1 as we find it in the 

essay of  ,alcune massime critiche1 and 
in the first chapter of his study on    
,shakespeare 7#aiai74 ,the knowledge of 
the facts of an artist's life is        
undoubtedly required for the purposes of
 biographical or practical  history2 but
 their relation with the sthetic        
personality of the artist  is not1 as it
 is generally assumed1 a relation of    
cause and effect4  ,they may have an    
indirect utility for the definition of  
the sthetic  personality1 and especially
 for the recognition of that which in   
the  works of art themselves is still   
purely practical1 not yet stamped  with 
the seal of the sthetic activity4 ,but  
in the apprehension of  art1 the critic 
must prescind from the biographical     
elements1 because  the artist himself   
has prescinded from them in the act of  
creation of  his work of art1 which is a
 work of art inasmuch as it is the      
opposite  of the practical life1 and is 
accomplished by the artist raising      
himself above the practical plane1      

abandoning the greatest part of  his    
practical feelings1 and transfiguring   
those even that he seems  to preserve1  
because putting them into new relations4
 ,the artist1 as  we say1 'transcends   
time1' that is1 the 'practical time1'   
and enters  the 'ideal time1' where     
actions do not follow actions1 but the  
eternal  lives in the present4 ,and he  
who pretends to explain the ideal time  
by  the practical time1 the imaginative 
creation by the practical action1  art  
by biography1 unwittingly denies art    
itself1 and reduces it to  a practical  
business1 of the same kind as eating and
 making love1  producing goods or       
fighting for a political cause4#d       
,this concept of the sthetic            
personality1 which we find clearly      
defined in ,croce's most recent essays1 
was the guiding principle  of all his   
literary criticism1 since the time when 
he started his  series of studies on    
modern ,italian literature4 ,he had     
inherited  it from ,de ,sanctis1 whose  

work1 in so far as it is sthetic and    
not moral or political history1 can be  
regarded as a collection of  powerful   
characterizations of sthetic            
personalities4 ,but1 in his  first      
attempts in literary criticism1 ,croce  
employed it tentatively  in what then   
appeared to him only as the preparatory 
stage of his  work2 beyond the          
individual characterizations1 and once  
these had  been sufficiently determined1
 he still thought of the possibility of 
a general literary history1 in which    
these should find their place as  parts 
of a more complex organism of critical  
thought4 ,but when he had  completed his
 task1 in a series of remarkable essays1
 some of which  will have fixed for a   
long time to come the physiognomy of the
 most  notable ,italian writers of the  
last half-century1 he perceived that  he
 had practically exhausted the sthetic  
problems which the work of  those       
writers presented to his mind3 a general
 literary history of  the period could  

have been nothing but a new arrangement 
of the same  ideas and valuations       
contained in the individual essays4     
,thus the  monographic method 4which he 
had originally adopted for convenience' 
sake1 justified itself in the practice  
of his work1 or rather proved  to be the
 only legitimate method of literary and 
general artistic  history4 ,all the     
vague abstractions with which modern    
nationalistic or  sociological histories
 of art and poetry are crammed1 reveal  
themselves  ultimately as either        
generalizations of individual           
characteristics1 or  concepts borrowed  
from the economic and moral history of a
 nation or  people1 more or less        
irrelevant to the purposes of sthetic   
criticism4  ,the true unity in the      
consideration of the history of art     
cannot be  reached by the establishment 
of purely external and material         
relations  between work and work1       
between artist and artist1 but only by  
making  one's critical estimate of the  

individual work or artist sufficiently  
vast and sufficiently deep4             
,contemporaries1 related or opposed to  
the  individual poet1 his more or less  
partial and remote forerunners1 the     
moral and intellectual life of his time1
 and that of the times which  preceded  
and prepared it1 these and other things 
are all present 7now  expressed1 now    
unexpressed7 in our spirit1 when we     
reconstruct the  dialectic of a given   
artistic personality4 ,undoubtedly1 in  
considering  a given personality we     
cannot1 in the same act1 consider       
another or  many others or all others1  
each for itself2 and psychologists call 
this  lack of ubiquity the 'narrowness  
of the threshold of consciousness1'     
while they ought to call it the highest 
energy of the human spirit1  which sinks
 itself in the object that in a given   
moment interests it1  and does not allow
 itself under any condition to be       
diverted from it1  because in the       
individual it finds all that interests  

it1 and1 in a  word1 the ,whole4#e      
,this is the purport of the essay on ,la
 ,riforma della ,storia artistica  e    
letteraria 7#aiag71 and this is the     
method deliberately followed by  ,croce 
in his recent essays on ,ariosto1       
,goethe1 ,shakespeare1 ,corneille  and  
,dante1 which ought to be studied not   
only as characterizations of  the       
various poets1 of the feeling or        
tonality which is peculiar to each  of  
them and constitutes their sthetic      
personality1 but also as sources  for   
the methodology of literary criticism4  
,to his theory ,croce brings  a two-fold
 corroboration1 first1 from the         
observation of the fact that  it        
coincides with a more and more          
widespread tendency in both literary    
and artistic history towards the        
monographic form1 the individual  essay1
 as the most effectual type of          
criticism2 and second1 from the  analogy
 with other forms of history4 ,all      
history1 and not sthetic  history only1 

is essentially monographic2 all history 
is the history  of a given event or of a
 given custom or of a given doctrine1   
and all  history reaches the universal  
only in and through the individual4 ,the
  only obstacles to a general           
acceptation of this view are1 on one    
side1  a persistent inability to        
distinguish art from the practical and  
moral  life and from philosophy1 and on 
the other1 a lack of scientific sense1  
through which science is regarded not as
 critical research1 but as a  material  
gathering of facts4 ,prospectuses1      
handbooks1 dictionaries  and            
encyclopedias are not the ideal of      
history3 they are instruments  of which 
we shall always make use as practical   
helps for the critical  research2 but   
what is living and real thought in them 
is but an echo of  the actual thinking  
of individual problems4    ,all sthetic 
criticism1 and therefore all sthetic    
history1 is this  thinking of logical   
problems1 rooted in the concrete ground 

of the  works of art1 which are in their
 turn solutions of sthetic problems4    
,for this the dynamic conception of the 
human spirit imports that every  one of 
its acts is a creation1 or a doing1 in  
the particular form  in which the spirit
 realizes itself2 art1 a creation1 in   
respect to  which all spiritual         
antecedents assume the aspect of a given
 sthetic  problem2 history or           
philosophy1 a creation on the substance 
of reality  presenting itself as a      
logical problem2 and the whole sphere of
 the  theoretical spirit1 a theoretical 
doings which is the perpetual           
antecedent and the perpetual consequent 
of the practical doing4#f  ,the mere    
recreation of the sthetic impression    
given by a work of art  is not yet      
criticism2 the critic as a mere artifex 
additus artifici  is not yet a critic1  
but still an artist4 ,criticism1 like   
all other  history1 is not feeling or   
intuition1 but intelligence and thought4
  ,every history of criticism will      

therefore ultimately coincide with the  
history of sthetic theories1 with the   
philosophy of art4 ,we thus reach       
again1 by a new path1 the identification
 of history with philosophy2 to  which1 
in this particular case1 the most common
 objection is that what  is required in 
a critic is much more an exquisite      
sthetic sensibility  than an elaborate  
concept of what art is as a category of 
the human  mind4 ,but the objection     
rests on a misunderstanding of the      
proper  function of criticism4 ,what    
sensibility can give is but the         
immediate  apprehension or taste of the 
work of art1 critically dumb in itself2 
on the other hand1 it is impossible to  
conceive of a true intelligence  of art1
 without the conjoined capacity to      
understand the individual  works of art1
 because philosophy does not develop in 
the abstract1  but is stimulated by the 
acts of life and imagination1 rises for 
the  purpose of comprehending them1 and 
understands them by understanding       

itself4#g ,the mere sthetic sensibility 
makes but a new artist2 what  makes the 
critic is his philosophy4 ,here also1   
however1 as during the  whole course of 
our inquiry1 we must not identify       
philosophy with the  official history of
 philosophical disciplines1 which offers
 a large  number of theories of sthetics
 only remotely related to the concrete  
works of art1 to the concrete processes 
of sthetic creation1 but with  the whole
 history of human thought1 with the     
working out of particular  problems     
successively presented to the           
intelligence of man by the  actual      
developments of poetry and art4 ,the    
sthetic judgment1 like  every other     
judgment1 is a synthesis of the         
individual intuition1 or  subject1 and  
of the universal category1 or predicate2
 and this is but  another way of stating
 the identity of sthetic criticism1 as  
of all  forms of history1 with          
philosophy4 ,the critic must be endowed 
with a  power to give new life1 within  

his own mind1 to the intuitions of the  
artist1 but this is for him but the soil
 in which his thought must  spread its  
roots2 it is true that without that     
power1 no criticism  is possible1 but it
 is equally true that no philosophy of  
art can  grow on any but that same soil4
 ,the ultimate test of the validity of  
sthetic thought is in its capacity to   
expand our sphere of sthetic            
apprehension2 and pure sthetics is but  
the methodological moment of  sthetic   
history or criticism4      ,footnote #a3
 ,contributo1 pp4 #gi-ha4    ,footnote  
#b3 ,nuovi ,saggi1 di ,estetica1 p4     
#abf4    ,footnote #c3 ,nuovi ,saggi1 p4
 #adb4 ,also ,conversazioni ,critiche1  
,i1  pp4 #eh-fc4    ,footnote #d3 ,nuovi
 ,saggi1 p4 #bca4    ,footnote #e3      
,nuovi ,saggi1 p4 #aha4    ,footnote #f3
 ,l'arte come ,creazione 7#aiah71 in    
,nuovi ,saggi1 p4 #afj4    ,footnote #g3
 ,la ,critica ,letteraria come          
,filosofia 7#aiah71 in ,nuovi  ,saggi1  
p4 #bag4          ,,iv4 ,,veritas       

,,filia ,,temporis      ,quid est       
veritas8--,platonism1 or transcendental 
idealism--,naturalism1  or              
transcendental realism--,the idea of    
progress--,progress and truth3          
evolutionism--,pragmatism--,croce's new 
pragmatism--,the immanence of           
value--,the actuality of ,truth--,truth 
as history3 the function of error  and  
of evil--,the foundations of ,croce's   
thought4      ,there is one problem in  
the history of human thought1 which1    
however  conscious we might be of the   
multiplicity and historical contingency 
of philosophical problems1 yet can      
appear to us as the ultimate or  central
 one1 if only because it is an abstract 
interrogation describing  the attitude  
of the philosopher1 and to which every  
concrete logical  research1 every act of
 thought1 can be reduced4 ,it is        
,pilate's  question3 ,quid est veritas8 
,what is truth8    ,the question itself 
has no definite meaning1 until it       
receives from the  individual thinker a 

definite content1 which is history or   
experience1  and the infinite variety of
 the answers it has received is due to  
the  infinite variability of that       
content4 ,but at all times man has been 
urged by a passionate desire to lift his
 own individual answer from the  flux of
 life1 to put it as it were over and    
against that experience  from which it  
had emerged1 not as the truth of his    
particular problem1  but as an          
abstractly universal truth4 ,it is by   
violently breaking the  process of      
thought1 and hypostatizing in essence   
the subject of his  thought1 abstracted 
from its object1 or the object from its 
subject1  and both from the creative    
activity which produces truth1 that man 
has  created1 both in philosophy proper 
and in the minds of the multitude1  a   
double transcendence1 of pure ideas1 on 
one side1 of brute matter on  the other1
 from which the two most common meanings
 of the word truth  are derived4    ,the
 ,platonic idealist1 for whom the actual

 processes of life and  thought are but 
shadows and remembrances of the ,eternal
 ,ideas in  the hyper-uranian space1 can
 be assumed here as the symbol of the   
transcendental idealist1 for whom truth 
is adequation to an ideal model         
existing outside the mind4 ,the most    
disparate types of philosophers  belong 
to this herd1 and among them many that  
commonly go under the  name of realists1
 since the idealist who has fixed and   
objectified  his ideas cannot help      
considering them as real essences1 and  
dealing  with them accordingly4 ,the    
,aristotelian realist1 the theologian1  
,hegel himself when postulating an      
original ,logos1 of which ,spirit and   
,nature are the temporal explication1   
all can be gathered together  in the    
goodly company of ,platonists2 and      
,platonists are to-day both  the literal
 followers of ,german idealism1 and the 
less barbarous  among contemporary      
realists1 who are in the habit of       
attributing  an independent1 absolute   

existence to logical or mathematical    
abstractions4 ,but neither the ones nor 
the others seem to be in very  close    
contact with the spirit of the age3 what
 they mean by truth is  not what is     
generally meant by truth to-day1 except 
among those who  still cling to the     
myths in which that form of             
transcendence expressed  itself in past 
ages4 ,the sturdiest1 though hardly     
recognizable1  survivals of ,platonism  
are relics of formalistic logic1 still  
very  frequent in contemporary culture1 
and a belief in what might be called    
average truth1 mechanically extracted   
from an external and material  consensus
 of opinions4 ,but with this conception 
of truth1 we touch the  border line     
between idealistic and naturalistic     
transcendentalism4    ,the most common  
attitude of contemporary thought 7and   
the one that is  therefore usually      
designated as common sense1 and as such 
opposed to  philosophy7 is a naively    
naturalistic one4 ,but it would be a    

mistake  to regard it as a simple and   
spontaneous attitude1 and to identify   
it1  for instance1 with the nave        
intuition of the artist1 with a first   
grade of knowledge as yet untroubled by 
logical problems4 ,the artist's  vision 
is more distant from naturalism than the
 philosopher's concept1  since common   
sense1 however unreflected and          
illogical1 is in itself  a philosophy1  
and1 though it may sound paradoxical1 a 
transcendental  one4 ,the artist        
constantly identifies himself with his  
object2 in his  consciousness1 the      
distinction between subject and object  
has not  yet arisen4 ,but the nave      
naturalism of which we are now speaking 
is posterior to the logical judgment1 in
 which that distinction  first appears2 
and is obtained by keeping separate the 
two terms of  the judgment1 each of     
which exists only in relation to the    
other1  and by transforming that        
relation into a quality of the object4  
,the  unity thus disrupted is           

artificially reconstituted by abolishing
 the  subject1 that is1 by treating the 
subject itself as merely an object      
among many objects1 or as a mere        
abstract intersection of objects4 ,it   
is with this form of naturalism that    
realism generally coincides1 and  its   
abstracting process is the one that has 
been recently systematized  by the ,new 
,realists4 ,the justification of the    
naturalistic conception  of truth1 as   
truth of description1 and the motive of 
its present  popularity1 is that it     
rests on a method of knowledge which is 
indispensable to the natural and        
mathematical sciences1 and that the     
sciences have come to usurp1 in modern  
times1 for reasons which are  obvious to
 every one1 the place of science4 ,it is
 not the less true1  however1 that      
wherever that method is applied1 it     
reduces the living  reality of life and 
thought to a heap of dead1 immovable    
abstractions4  ,there is no real danger 
in this as long as the abstractions are 

taken  for what they are1 and used as   
instruments for the purposes of our     
doing and understanding2 but when they  
are considered as a complete  equivalent
 of the living reality1 then we become  
their prisoners1 and  are shut out by   
them from all possibility of true       
understanding4  ,it is especially from  
the misuses of this method in the       
historical  and moral sciences1 from the
 degenerations of sociology1 psychology1
  and philology1 that we must be        
constantly on guard2 lest in the very   
sciences of the human spirit we should  
miss that which is their true  object1  
the human activity which creates the    
world of history and the  values of     
life4    ,modern thought1 at the end of 
the ,renaissance1 begins with an attempt
  at eliminating that static conception 
of truth1 in which both ,platonism  and 
naturalism find the roots of their      
transcendence4 ,this is the  origin of  
the idea of ,progress1 first established
 by ,bruno1 by ,bacon1  by ,pascal1 by  

,vico1 in the form of a correlation     
between truth and  time4 ,medival       
thought had been shackled for centuries 
by the authority  of the ancients2 the  
new thinkers invoked the authority of   
antiquity1  of old age1 and1 therefore1 
of wisdom1 not for the distant ages1 in 
which the world could be said to be     
still young and inexperienced1 but  for 
their own times1 in which it was        
possible to add a perpetually  new      
experience and thought to that which had
 been bequeathed by the  thinkers of    
,greece and ,rome4 ,the consequence of  
this attitude was the  discovery of the 
immanence of truth in life1 the         
liberation from the  principle of       
authority 7which had been the           
characteristic medival  form of         
transcendence71 and a vigorous impulse  
towards the recognition  of the dynamic 
nature of reality1 of what an ,american 
philosopher  called the continuity of   
the ideal with the real4 ,the thought   
that  was contained in germ in those    

early polemics1 vaguely and mythically  
in ,bruno1 and much more consciously in 
,vico1 is substantially that of         
,croce's identification of philosophy   
with history4    ,we do not expect of a 
new philosophy that it should suddenly1 
as a  revelation or illumination1 give  
us a key to all the problems of         
reality1 and resolve1 once and forever1 
the so-called mystery of the  universe4 
,if such a thing should ever happen1 it 
would mean the end of  life1 which      
cannot be conceived1 in its ultimate    
essence1 otherwise  than as a perpetual 
positing and solution of problems4 ,it  
must not be  forgotten that a philosophy
 is the work of one man1 and1 therefore1
  contains only the answers to the      
problems that are real to him4  ,but if 
we stop to consider the whole course of 
thought in the last  two centuries1 we  
shall realize that the idea of          
,progress1 in many  different and even  
in contrasting forms1 is the one around 
which all  our life1 theoretical and    

practical1 has centred in modern times4 
,and  of that idea1 ,croce's philosophy 
is the most powerful and coherent       
expression that has ever appeared4 ,it  
is only by considering the  whole of    
reality as activity1 and the values of  
reality as coinciding  with the forms of
 that activity1 that ,progress acquires 
a definite  meaning3 a progress which   
should be a constant approximation      
towards  a prexistent ideal1 or a       
material process external to ourselves1 
would be a purely illusory one4 ,in one 
case1 our whole life would tend  towards
 making a duplicate of that which       
already is--a work1 therefore1  without 
intrinsic worth1 and without a real end2
 in the other1 there  would be no work  
at all1 no activity1 no life4    ,but   
nothing seems more difficult to our mind
 than to keep together  the two ideas of
 progress and of truth4 ,the natural    
sciences have  made a gallant attempt at
 assimilating the idea of progress1 and 
at  transforming themselves1 ultimately1

 into history4 ,but the static  concepts
 of naturalism resist that assimilation1
 and scientific  evolutionism offers but
 the mechanical outline1 the external   
processes  of progress1 the evolved and 
not the evolving reality2 that is1 it   
keeps its truth at the expense of its   
progress4 ,this same evolutionism1  when
 applied to the human sciences1 is      
obviously unable to grasp the  actuality
 of spiritual growth and life1 and it   
only reproduces1 in  aggravated form1   
the evils inherent in all naturalistic  
interpretations  of the spirit4         
,bergson's philosophy is a new          
evolutionism1 which  succeeds much      
better than the old one in retaining the
 idea of  progress1 and is1 therefore1 a
 further step towards the transformation
  of science into history2 but what it  
gains in this respect1 it loses  in     
relation to its principle of truth1     
which is mythically represented  as the 
lowest form of consciousness1 or rather 
as that which is below  consciousness   

itself4    ,what is vital in ,bergson is
 his criticism of the scientific1 or    
naturalistic1 intellect2 but the        
intellect of man has other functions    
besides those of dissecting and         
classifying4 ,from a similar beginning1 
that is1 from the economic theory of    
science1 derives another attempt  at    
conciliating progress and truth1        
pragmatism4 ,in pragmatism also1 the    
critical element is more or less sound1 
but the constructive one is  weak and   
arbitrary4 ,pragmatism does not reject  
the truth of science1  because of its   
practical character2 on the contrary1   
having recognized  that the foundation  
of scientific truth is economic1 it     
proceeds  to deduce all truth from the  
will1 and to verify it in action4 ,the  
result of this deduction is a closer    
connection between truth and life  than 
has been ever reached by any system of  
philosophy2 but a merely  apparent one1 
since truth itself is thus submerged and
 annulled in the  immediacy of practical

 and passional life4 ,the solution of   
the problem  of truth is obtained only  
by putting truth out of the question at 
the  beginning of the inquiry2 as it is 
dear that for a rigid pragmatist1  there
 is but one truth left1 and that is the 
truth of his theory1  which1 however1   
cannot be verified by the theory itself1
 since its  usefulness is1 to say the   
least1 very doubtful4    ,by some of his
 adversaries ,croce himself has been    
classed as a  pragmatist4 ,it is no     
wonder that certain distinctions should 
escape  the attention of men who live   
to-day as exiles from distant centuries1
  and whose critical sight is1          
therefore1 not clearer then that of an  
owl fluttering in the noonday sun4 ,but 
the only relation that ,i  can think of 
between ,croce and the pragmatists is   
that he advocates  an economic theory   
not of truth1 but of error2 that he     
finds in the  passions and practical    
interests of men the root of            
intellectual  error4 ,the problem of the

 positive relations between life and    
thought  has been treated by him1 as we 
know1 in a very different spirit from   
that of the pragmatists2 and in the     
circle of the human spirit1 the  ideal  
precedence is given by him1 not to the  
practical but to the  theoretical4 ,on  
the other hand1 in the actual process of
 time1 all  forms of human activity are 
reciprocally conditioned1 and under     
this respect ,croce's thought can be    
called1 and has been called by  himself1
 a new pragmatism1 but of a kind of     
which pragmatists have  never thought1  
or at least which they have never been  
able to discern  from the others1 and to
 bring out in full relief4 ,if life     
conditions  thought1 we have in this    
fact the clearly established            
demonstration of  the always            
historically conditioned form of every  
thought3 and not of  art only1 which is 
always the art of a time1 of a soul1 of 
a moment1  but of philosophy also1 which
 can solve but the problems that life   

proposes4 ,every philosophy reflects1   
and cannot help reflecting1 the         
preoccupations1 as they are called1 of a
 determined historical moment2  not1    
however1 in the quality of its solutions
 7because in this case it  would be a   
bad philosophy1 a partisan or passional 
philosophy71 but in  the quality of its 
problems4 ,and because the problem is   
historical1  and the solution eternal1  
philosophy is at the same time          
contingent and  eternal1 mortal and     
immortal1 temporary and                 
extratemporary4#a ,croce's  conception  
of truth is his philosophy1 and it is   
not my intention to  summarize here what
 this book presents in what is already  
so rapid a  survey4 ,i wish only to     
point again at those doctrines of his1  
through  which progress and truth are   
reconciled1 without any sacrifice of the
  one to the other4 ,truth is for ,croce
 a universal value or category of       
consciousness3 its absoluteness rests on
 its character of universality1  but1 as

 a universal has no real being outside  
its concrete actuality1  truth is       
nowhere if not in the individual        
judgment1 that is1 in the  mind that    
creates it4 ,it is strange that this    
mode of its manifestation  should be    
considered to impair the quality of     
truth1 while a similar  objection would 
hardly be raised to-day in regard to    
other forms of  spiritual activity4     
,that the ,beautiful is the value of the
 concrete1  historical productions of   
the sthetic spirit1 or the ,good that of
 the  concrete1 historically determined 
moral activity1 these are concepts      
common to all contemporary thought1     
though no one1 perhaps1 has as  yet     
expressed them as clearly as ,croce4 ,to
 the artist or to the  saint1 reality   
appears at a given moment as an sthetic 
or an ethical  problem2 the terms of the
 problem are always particular1         
contingent1  historical2 yet when the   
artist or the saint impresses on that   
reality  the seal of his own deepest    

personality1 when he creatively reacts  
to  it1 then the ,beautiful and the     
,good realize themselves1 as universal  
values1 in the individual work of art or
 of mercy4 ,our belief in the           
absoluteness of the sthetic or of the   
moral value is not weakened  but        
strengthened by our inability to fix    
them in formulas or codes or  standards2
 we see them perpetually transcending   
the reality in which  they express      
themselves1 by the same process by which
 that reality1  which is all growth and 
life1 transcends itself in the infinite 
course of its realization4 ,we cannot   
think of any number of works  of art or 
of mercy as exhausting the categories of
 the ,beautiful or  of the ,good4 ,the  
identification of these values with the 
infinite  series of their individual    
expressions fills the soul with a sense 
of  reverence and responsibility towards
 life1 that cannot be equalled  by any  
faith in static1 immovable ideals1 by   
which a term1 however  high and remote1 

is set to the living spirit1 no longer  
recognised  as the creator of its own   
sthetic and moral world4 ,to the mind   
that  has grasped this relation of the  
universal to the individual1 of the     
eternal to the present 7and the artist  
or the saint grasps it in his  own      
unphilosophical way1 to which his work  
or his action is witness71  the whole of
 reality1 human and natural1 appears as 
linked by a bond of  spiritual          
solidarity1 moving towards the same end1
 engaged in the same  sacred task4      
,truth is the value of the logical      
activity1 and therefore it coincides    
with the positive history of human      
thought4 ,its actuality is an  infinite 
progress or development1 but not in the 
sense that the value  itself may be     
subject to increase or change from      
century to century4  ,at no particular  
point in that history is it possible to 
point to a  conversion from error to    
truth1 to a total illumination or       
revelation4  ,every single affirmation  

of truth1 from the simplest and humblest
  to the most elaborate and complex1    
takes possession of the whole of        
reality1 in the fulness of its          
relations2 since it is manifestly       
impossible to affirm the truth of one   
individual subject1 without  implicitly 
determining its position in the         
universe4 ,truth1 as all  other values1 
has no extension2 it is incommensurable 
either with space  or with time1 it is  
not augmented by accumulation4 ,degrees 
in truth1  and a more and a less1 are   
inconceivable2 but each act that affirms
  it contains its whole1 since truth    
itself does not live except in the      
spirit that perpetually creates and     
recreates it4 ,truth belongs to the     
thinking mind1 that is1 to reality as a 
logical consciousness1 as life  belongs 
to the living body4 ,it belongs to us1  
individually1 in relation  to that      
universal consciousness1 in the mode and
 measure of our  partaking of it3 which 
means that however much of it we may    

conquer1  however constant1 laborious1  
honest1 intense our efforts towards     
truth may be1 yet our duty towards it   
will always remain infinite1            
inexhaustible4 ,the conquered truth is  
dead in the mind that rests in  it1 that
 ceases its effort1 as life gives place 
to death in the body  that no longer    
functions4    ,in a wider sense1 truth  
belongs to every form of spiritual      
activity4  ,beauty1 utility1 goodness   
are the truths of the artistic1 the     
practical1 the moral mind4 ,and in the  
actual life of the spirit1 each  of     
these values represents all the others  
in the particular act in  which it      
realizes itself4 ,this is what ,croce   
means by his circular  conception of the
 spirit4 ,and this is why what is said  
of one value  seems to apply without any
 change to the others2 why1 as we said  
elsewhere1 all universals are but one   
universal4 ,whether we call this  one   
,progress or ,development1 ,spirit or   
,reality1 ,mind or ,nature1 we  know    

that our thought is grasping ,life      
itself1 not in its abstract  identity1  
but in its infinite actuality1 that is1 
each time1 this  life1 this beauty1 this
 action1 this truth4 ,what we aim at is 
not an  ecstatic absorption into the    
undifferentiated unity1 but the finding 
within ourselves of a centre of         
consciousness1 capable of introducing   
order and reason into the variegated    
spectacle of the natural and human      
world1 not from outside and from above1 
but from its very heart4 ,the  truth    
that we seek is therefore never external
 to ourselves1 but our  own activity1   
our own life1 our own history4    ,this 
concept of truth as activity and as     
history1 this activistic and  energetic 
philosophy1 truly positive in that the  
course of history  appears to it as a   
succession of only positive acts and    
positive  values1 is not however a blind
 and fatuous optimism4 ,if it is true   
that nowhere positive error or positive 
evil can interrupt the process  of life1

 that death itself does not end but     
fulfil it1 yet from the  relations and  
implications of the various forms of    
activity arises  a real dialectic of    
good and evil1 of truth and error1 which
 is the  spring and motive of life4     
,what to the purely utilitarian         
conscience  is the good of now and of   
to-day1 the same conscience1 awakened to
 a  greater light1 repudiates as evil4  
,the imaginative vision of the poet1  in
 which truth expresses itself1 sensuous 
and finite1 and yet pregnant  of its    
infinity1 dissolves like mist in the sun
 in the clearness  of the logical       
concept1 and is then restored in its    
right by the  historical and critical   
consciousness to which that truth is    
poetry4  ,the myths and superstitions of
 the old religions1 dead in the letter1 
are revived in the thought itself that  
seems to destroy them4 ,history  is but 
this perpetual cycle of death and       
resurrection1 in which what  is concrete
 distinction in the act transforms      

itself into opposition  in the process1 
producing the terms of a new problem and
 becoming the  source of the new        
creation4 ,thus the whole method of     
,croce's philosophy  reveals itself as  
directed towards a realistic conception 
of life1 and  the distinctions within   
the concept are not abstract forms1 but 
the  very structure of reality4    ,the 
professional philosopher moves always   
and only in the rarefied  atmosphere of 
the pure concept4 ,croce came to        
philosophy from art and  from economics1
 and he never lost contact with the     
elementary forms  of knowledge and of   
action4 ,what might be termed as his    
fundamental  discoveries are his        
definitions of the sthetic and of the   
economic  principle4 ,on this basis the 
whole of his thought rests4 ,without a  
conception of a truth which is          
sufficient unto itself1 and yet is not  
logical truth1 and of a good which has  
its own justification1 and yet  is not  
moral good1 he would have been compelled

 to maintain by the side  of the        
concepts of truth and of goodness1 error
 and evil as positive  realities1 or to 
include the whole of reality within what
 would have  been truth and goodness in 
a purely verbal sense4 ,in both cases1  
he  would have been unable to make his  
philosophy immediately adherent to  all 
grades of active consciousness1 from the
 lowest to the highest1  and thereby to 
history4 ,of these discoveries the one  
that until now  has attracted the       
greatest attention is that of the pure  
intuition1  and of art and language as  
expression4 ,but the establishment of   
the  economic principle1 that is of the 
world of nature1 of feeling1 of         
passion1 as a positive grade of the     
spiritual process1 will probably  be    
counted as ,croce's greatest            
achievement1 by those who shall be able 
to look back on his work with an ampler 
perspective4 ,it is through  it that his
 philosophy of the spirit1 and in this  
philosophy1 the  consciousness of our   

day1 has taken possession of that other 
world1 of  that persistent              
transcendance1 which we call nature4 ,in
 this direction  lies1 undoubtedly1 the 
future course of the thought of an age1 
to  which1 in this afterglow of a great 
conflagration1 all problems seem to     
gather into the one of the subjection to
 its better and higher self1  the       
utilization for its purer purposes1 of  
its own cumbersome economic  body1 of   
its nature and of its passions4         
,footnote #a3 ,filosofia della ,pratica1
 p4 #bjh4          ,,bibliographical    
,,note      ,croce's ,complete ,works   
form a collection of twenty-eight       
volumes1 in  four distinct series1      
published by ,laterza e ,figli1 of      
,bari1 who are  also the publishers of  
,la ,critica1 and of the following      
collections  initiated or directed by   
,croce3 ,scrittori d',italia1 ,scrittori
  ,stranieri1 ,classici della ,filosofia
 ,moderna4    ,we give here a full list 
of the ,opere di ,benedetto ,croce1     

adding to  the title of each volume the 
year of the last available edition1 the 
years of their composition having       
already been indicated in the text3     
,filosofia dello ,spirito 7,philosophy  
of the ,spirit73    ,vol4 ,i1 ,estetica1
 #aiab4 7,translated under the tide of  
sthetic47    ,vol4 ,,ii1 ,logica1 #aiag4
 7,translated under the tide of ,logic47
    ,vol4 ,,iii1 ,filosofia della       
,pratica1 #aiae4 7,translated under the 
tide  of ,the ,philosophy of the        
,practical3 ,economics and ,ethics47    
,vol4 ,,iv1 ,teoria e ,storia della     
,storiografia1 #aibj4 7,translated under
  the tide of ,theory and ,history of   
,historiography in ,england1 and  under 
the ride of ,history3 ,its ,theory and  
,practice in the ,united  ,states47     
,saggi filosofici 7,philosophical       
,essays73    ,vol4 ,i1 ,problemi di     
,estetica1 #aiaj 7,problems of          
sthetics47    ,vol4 ,,ii1 ,la ,filosofia
 di ,giambattista ,fico1 #aiaa4         
7,translated under  the title of ,the   

,philosophy of ,vico47    ,vol4 ,,iii1  
,saggio sullo ,hegel1 #aiac4 7,essay on 
,hegel1 followed  by essays on the      
history of philosophy2 the essay on     
,hegel translated  under the tide of    
,what ,is ,living and ,what ,is ,dead in
 the ,philosophy of  ,hegel47    ,vol4  
,,iv1 ,materialismo ,storico ed economia
 marxistica1 #aiah4  7,translated under 
the title of ,historical ,materialism   
and ,marxian  ,economics47    ,vol4 ,v1 
,nuovi ,saggi di ,estetica1 #aibj4 7,new
 ,essays on sthetics2  contains the     
,breviario di ,estetica1 translated     
under the title of  ,the ,essence of    
sthetics47    ,vol4 ,,vi1 ,frammenti di 
,etica1 #aibb4 7,fragments of ,ethics47 
,scritti di ,storia letteraria e        
politica4 7,writings on ,literary and   
,political ,history73    ,vol4 ,i1      
,saggi sulla ,letteratura italiana del  
,seicento1 #aiaa4 7,essays  on ,italian 
,literature in the ,seventeenth         
,century47    ,vol4 ,,ii1 ,la           
,rivoluzione napoletana del #agii1      

#aiab4 7,the ,neapolitan  ,revolution of
 #agii47    ,vols4 ,,iii-,,vi1 ,la      
,letteratura della nuova ,italia1       
#aiad-ae4 7,the  ,literature of the ,new
 ,italy47    ,vol4 ,,vii1 ,i ,teatri di 
,napoli1 #aiaf4 7,the ,theatres of      
,naples47    ,vol4 ,,viii1 ,la ,spagna  
nella ,vita italiana durante la         
,rinascenza1 #aiag4  7,spain in ,italian
 ,life during the ,renaissance47        
,vols4 ,,ix-,x1 ,conversazioni critiche1
 #aiah4 7,critical ,conversations47     
,vol4 ,,xi1 ,storie e leggende          
napoletane1 #aiai4 7,historical ,tales  
and  ,legends of ,naples47    ,vol4     
,,xii1 ,goethe1 #aiai4    ,vol4 ,,xiii1 
,una ,famiglia di ,patrioti1 #aiai4 7,a 
,family of ,patriots2  includes essays  
on ,francesco de ,sanctis47    ,vol4    
,,xiv1 ,ariosto1 ,shakespeare e         
,corneille1 #aibj4 7,translated under   
the title of ,ariosto1 ,shakespeare1 and
 ,corneille47    ,vols4 ,,xv-,,xvi1     
,storia della ,storiografia italiana1   
#aibj4 7,the ,history  of ,italian      

,historiography47    ,vol4 ,,xvii1 ,la  
,poesia di ,dante1 #aiba4 7,the ,poetry 
of ,dante47      ,scritti varii4        
7,miscellaneous ,writings73    ,vol4 ,i1
 ,primi ,saggi1 #aiai4 7,early ,essays47
    ,the following volumes are not      
included in the ,laterza edition of     
,croce's works3    ,cultura e vita      
morale1 ,bari1 #aiad4 7,culture and     
,moral ,life47  ,aneddoti e profili     
settecenteschi1 ,palermo1 #aiad4        
7,anecdotes and  ,profiles of the       
,eighteenth ,century47    ,contributo   
alla critica di me stesso1 ,naples1     
#aiah4 7,contribution  to a ,criticism  
of ,myself2 one hundred copies printed  
for private  distribution47    ,curiosit
 storiche1 ,naples1 #aibj4 7,historical 
,curiosities47    ,pagine ,sparse1      
edited by ,g4 ,castellano1 ,naples1     
#aiai-aibj4  7,scattered ,pages1        
consisting of ,pagine di letteratura e  
di cultura1  #b vols42 ,pagine sulla    
guerra2 and ,memorie1 scritti biografici
 e  appunti storici47      ,a complete  

bibliography1 cataloguing the whole of  
,croce's multifarious  activity1 is     
outside the scope of this note4 ,the    
nearest approach to it  can be found in 
,g4 ,castellano's ,introduzione alle    
opere di ,b4 ,croce1  ,bari1 #aibj1     
which contains1 besides1 a full list of 
translations in  eight languages1 a     
bibliography of the ,italian and foreign
 critical  literature on ,croce1 and a  
very useful series of abstracts of      
discussions and judgments on ,croce's   
work4    ,besides articles and essays in
 ,american and ,english magazines and   
reviews1 the following works of ,croce  
have been translated into  ,english3 the
 four volumes of the ,filosofia dello   
,spirito1 the essay  on ,hegel1 the     
,essence of sthetics1 and the essays on 
,ariosto1  ,shakespeare1 and ,corneille1
 by ,douglas ,ainslie2 the essay on     
,vico1 by  ,r4 ,g4 ,collingwood1 and the
 essays on ,historical ,materialism1 by 
,c4 ,m4  ,meredith4 ,but the ,english or
 ,american student of ,croce ought to   

rely  as little as possible on          
translations2 the reading of the        
,italian text  will be found            
comparatively easy1 on the basis of a   
good acquaintance  with ,latin or with  
,french4 ,the labour entailed by the    
surmounting  of the first difficulties  
will be largely repaid by the advantages
  gained in coming into direct contact  
with ,croce's thought1 and by the       
acquisition of at least a reading       
knowledge of ,italian4    ,for the vast 
critical literature on ,croce1 scattered
 through the  literary and philosophical
 reviews of ,europe and of ,america     
during  the last twenty years1 we are   
compelled again to refer the reader to  
,castellano's book4 ,we shall only mark 
out ,croce's own autobiographical       
notes1 the ,contributo listed above1    
which1 however1 having been printed  for
 private circulation only1 is not       
generally accessible except in  the     
,french translation printed in the      
,revue de ,mtaphysique et de  ,morale1  

,,xxvi1 pp4 #a-dj4 ,the following are   
the only books which give  a general    
view of ,croce's thought3 ,g4           
,prezzolini1 ,benedetto ,croce1         
,naples1 #aiji2 ,e4 ,chiocchetti1 ,la   
filosofia di ,b4 ,croce1 ,florence1     
#aiae2 ,h4 ,wildon ,carr1 ,the          
,philosophy of ,b4 ,croce1 ,london1     
#aiag4 ,the  first is an able1 but very 
cursory sketch2 the second examines     
,croce's  philosophy from the standpoint
 of neoscholasticism2 the third is an   
ample summary written by a distinguished
 writer well acquainted with  the       
various currents of modern thought4     
,each of them ought to be read  with a  
critical and discriminating eye4    ,in 
the ,english-speaking world1 ,croce's   
fame rests emphatically on his          
sthetics1 and its applications to       
literary criticism4 ,his influence  on  
,english and ,american critical thought 
has already gone much deeper  than a    
mere list of writings on his theories   
would show2 especially in  ,england1 his

 ideas are1 so to speak1 in the air1 and
 appear in many  writers who have no    
direct knowledge of his work4 ,the best 
exposition  of this phase of his        
philosophy is to be found in ,e4 ,f4    
,carritt's  book1 ,the ,theory of       
,beauty1 #aiad1 chap4 ,,xiv4 ,the       
writings of ,a4 ,b4  ,walkley1 and of   
,j4 ,e4 ,spingam1 contain the most      
vigorous prosecution  of his thought as 
applied1 respectively1 to ,english and  
to ,american  scholarship and criticism4
    ,for the general history of ,italian
 thought1 to which many a reference  is 
made in the course of this book1 the    
best helps1 besides ,croce's  essay on  
,vico1 and ,b4 ,spaventa1 ,la filosofia 
italiana1 recently  reprinted1 ,bari1   
#aiji1 are the historical works of      
,giovanni ,gentile1  and especially his 
,storia della filosofia italiana1       
,milano1 n4  d4 ,gentile is one of the  
most profound and earnest modern        
,european  thinkers1 and it is desirable
 that his theoretical works1 similar in 

tendency to1 but widely divergent in    
temper from those of ,croce1 should     
become better known to the ,anglo-,saxon
 world4 ,two of his books1 ,la  ,riforma
 dell' ,educazione and ,teoria generale 
dello ,spirito1 are soon  to appear in  
,english4 ,croce's judgment on          
,gentile's ,actual ,idealism is         
expressed in ,una discussione tra       
filosofi amici1 in ,conversazioni       
,critiche1 ,,ii1 pp4 #fg-ie4 ,but a     
complete understanding of the vital     
relations between the two thinkers can  
be gathered only through an  adequate   
knowledge of both ,croce's and          
,gentile's work4