,,theory  ,,history    ,,of             
,,historiography    by    ,,benedetto   
,,croce    authorized translation       
,,by    ,,douglas ,,ainslie             
,,london    ,,george ,g4 ,,harrap       
,,company    #aiba          ,,preface   
,,to ,,the ,,first ,,italian ,,edition  
,almost all the writings which compose  
the present treatise were printed  in   
the proceedings of ,italian academies   
and in ,italian reviews between  #aiab  
and #aiac4 ,since they formed part of a 
general scheme1 their  collection in    
book form presented no difficulties4    
,this volume has  appeared in ,german   
under the title ,zur ,theorie und       
,geschichte der  ,historiographie       
7,tbingen1 ,mohr1 #aiae74    ,on        
publishing in book form in ,italian1 ,i 
made a few slight alterations  here and 
there and added three brief essays1     
placed as an appendix to  the first     
part4    ,the description of the volume 
as forming the fourth of my ,philosophy 
of the ,spirit requires some            

explanation2 for it does not really form
  a new systematic part of the          
philosophy1 and is rather to be looked  
upon as a deepening and amplification of
 the theory of historiography1  already 
outlined in certain chapters of the     
second part1 namely the  ,logic4 ,but   
the problem of historical comprehension 
is that toward  which pointed all my    
investigations as to the modes of the   
spirit1  their distinction and unity1   
their truly concrete life1 which is     
development and history1 and as to      
historical thought1 which is the        
self-consciousness of this life4 ,in a  
certain sense1 therefore1 this          
resumption of the treatment of          
historiography on the completion of the 
wide circle1 this drawing forth of it   
from the limits of the first  treatment 
of the subject1 was the most natural    
conclusion that could  be given to the  
whole work4 ,the character of           
'conclusion' both explains  and         
justifies the literary form of this last

 volume1 which is more  compressed and  
less didactic than that of the previous 
volumes4    ,b4 ,c4    ,naples3 ,may    
#aiaf          ,,translator',s ,,note   
,the author himself explains the precise
 connexion of the present work  with the
 other three volumes of the ,philosophy 
of the ,spirit1 to  which it now forms  
the conclusion4    ,i had not           
contemplated translating this treatise1 
when engaged upon  the others1 for the  
reason that it was not in existence in  
its present  form1 and an external      
parallel to its position as the last1   
the late  comer of the four             
masterpieces1 is to be found in the fact
 of its  publication by another firm    
than that which produced the preceding  
volumes4 ,this diversity in unity will1 
,i am convinced1 by no means act  as a  
bar to the dissemination of the original
 thought contained in its  pages1 none  
of which will1 ,i trust1 escape the     
diligent reader through  the close      
meshes of the translation4    ,the      

volume is similar in format to the      
,logic1 the ,philosophy of the          
,practical1 and the sthetic4 ,the last  
is now out of print1 but will  reappear 
translated by me from the definitive    
fourth ,italian edition1  greatly       
exceeding in bulk the previous editions4
    ,the present translation is from the
 second ,italian edition1 published  in 
#aiai4 ,in this the author made some    
slight verbal corrections and  a few    
small additions4 ,i have1 as always1    
followed the text with the  closest     
respect4      ,d4 ,a4    ,the ,athenum1 
,london    ,november #aibj              
,,contents          ,,part ,i           
,,theory ,,of ,,historiography          
,i4   ,history and ,chronicle           
,,ii4   ,pseudo-,histories        ,,iii4
   ,history as ,history of the          
,universal4               ,criticism of 
',universal ,history'         ,,iv4     
,ideal ,genesis and ,dissolution of the 
',philosophy of ,history'          ,v4  
,the ,positivity of ,history            

,,vi4   ,the ,humanity of ,history      
,,vii4   ,choice and ,periodization     
,,viii4   ,distinction 7,special        
,histories7 and ,division         ,,ix4 
,the ',history of ,nature' and ,history 
,,appendices          ,i4   ,attested   
,evidence         ,,ii4   ,analogy and  
,anomaly of ,special ,histories         
,,iii4   ,philosophy and ,methodology   
,,part ,,ii        ,,concerning ,,the   
,,history ,,of ,,historiography         
,i4   ,preliminary ,questions           
,,ii4   ,grco-,roman ,historiography    
,,iii4   ,medieval ,historiography      
,,iv4   ,the ,historiography of the     
,renaissance          ,v4   ,the        
,historiography of the ,enlightenment   
,,vi4   ,the ,historiography of         
,romanticism        ,,vii4   ,the       
,historiography of ,positivism          
,,viii4   ,the ,new ,historiography4    
,conclusion        ,index of ,names     
,,part ,i      ,,theory ,,of            
,,historiography      ,i      ,,history 
,,and ,,chronicle        ,i             

',contemporary history' is wont to be   
called the history of a passage  of     
time1 looked upon as a most recent past1
 whether it be that of the  last fifty  
years1 a decade1 a year1 a month1 a day1
 or indeed of the  last hour or of the  
last minute4 ,but if we think and speak 
rigorously1  the term 'contemporaneous' 
can be applied only to that history     
which  comes into being immediately     
after the act which is being            
accomplished1  as consciousness of that 
act3 it is1 for instance1 the history   
that  ,i make of myself while ,i am in  
the act of composing these pages2 it  is
 the thought of my composition1 linked  
of necessity to the work  of            
composition4 ',contemporary' would be   
well employed in this case1  just       
because this1 like every act of the     
spirit1 is outside time 7of  the first  
and after7 and is formed 'at the same   
time' as the act to  which it is linked1
 and from which it is distinguished by  
means of a  distinction not             

chronological but ideal4                
',non-contemporary history1'  'past     
history1' would1 on the other hand1 be  
that which finds itself  in the presence
 of a history already formed1 and which 
thus comes into  being as a criticism of
 that history1 whether it be thousands  
of years  or hardly an hour old4    ,but
 if we look more closely1 we perceive   
that this history  already formed1 which
 is called or which we would like to    
call  'non-contemporary' or 'past'      
history1 if it really is history1 that  
is to say1 if it mean something and is  
not an empty echo1 is also              
contemporary1 and does not in any way   
differ from the other4 ,as in  the      
former case1 the condition of its       
existence is that the deed of  which the
 history is told must vibrate in the    
soul of the historian1  or 7to employ   
the expression of professed historians7 
that the  documents are before the      
historian and that they are             
intelligible4  ,that a narrative or a   

series of narratives of the fact is     
united  and mingled with it merely means
 that the fact has proved more  rich1   
not that it has lost its quality of     
being present3 what were  narratives or 
judgments before are now themselves     
facts1 'documents'  to be interpreted   
and judged4 ,history is never           
constructed from  narratives1 but always
 from documents1 or from narratives that
 have  been reduced to documents and    
treated as such4 ,thus if contemporary  
history springs straight from life1 so  
too does that history which  is called  
non-contemporary1 for it is evident that
 only an interest  in the life of the   
present can move one to investigate past
 fact4  ,therefore this past fact does  
not answer to a past interest1 but to a 
present interest1 in so far as it is    
unified with an interest of the  present
 life4 ,this has been said again and    
again in a hundred ways by  historians  
in their empirical formulas1 and        
constitutes the reason1 if  not the     

deeper content1 of the success of the   
very trite saying that  history is      
magister vit4    ,i have recalled these 
forms of historical technique in order  
to remove  the aspect of paradox from   
the proposition that 'every true history
 is  contemporary history4' ,but the    
justice of this proposition is easily   
confirmed and copiously and             
perspicuously exemplified in the reality
  of historiographical work1 provided   
always that we do not fall into  the    
error of taking the works of the        
historians all together1 or  certain    
groups of them confusedly1 and of       
applying them to an abstract  man or to 
ourselves considered abstractly1 and of 
then asking what  present interest leads
 to the writing or reading of such      
histories3 for  instance1 what is the   
present interest of the history which   
recounts  the ,peloponnesian or the     
,mithradatic ,war1 of the events        
connected with  ,mexican art1 or with   
,arabic philosophy4 ,for me at the      

present moment  they are without        
interest1 and therefore for me at this  
present moment  those histories are not 
histories1 but at the most simply titles
 of  historical works4 ,they have been  
or will be histories in those that  have
 thought or will think them1 and in me  
too when ,i have thought  or shall think
 them1 re-elaborating them according to 
my spiritual  needs4 ,if1 on the other  
hand1 we limit ourselves to real        
history1 to  the history that one really
 thinks in the act of thinking1 it will 
be  easily seen that this is perfectly  
identical with the most personal and    
contemporary of histories4 ,when the    
development of the culture of my        
historical moment presents to me 7it    
would be superfluous and perhaps  also  
inexact to add to myself as an          
individual7 the problem of ,greek       
civilization or of ,platonic philosophy 
or of a particular mode of  ,attic      
manners1 that problem is related to my  
being in the same way as  the history of

 a bit of business in which ,i am       
engaged1 or of a love  affair in which  
,i am indulging1 or of a danger that    
threatens me4 ,i  examine it with the   
same anxiety and am troubled with the   
same sense of  unhappiness until ,i have
 succeeded in solving it4 ,hellenic life
 is on  that occasion present in me2 it 
solicits1 it attracts and torments me1  
in the same way as the appearance of the
 adversary1 of the loved one1  or of the
 beloved son for whom one trembles4     
,thus too it happens or has  happened or
 will happen in the case of the         
,mithradatic ,war1 of ,mexican  art1 and
 of all the other things that ,i have   
mentioned above by way of  example4     
,having laid it down that               
contemporaneity is not the              
characteristic  of a class of histories 
7as is held with good reason in         
empirical  classifications71 but an     
intrinsic characteristic of every       
history1  we must conceive the relation 
of history to life as that of unity2    

certainly not in the sense of abstract  
identity1 but of synthetic  unity1 which
 implies both the distinction and the   
unity of the terms4  ,thus to talk of a 
history of which the documents are      
lacking would  appear to be as          
extravagant as to talk of the existence 
of something as  to which it is also    
affirmed that it is without one of the  
essential  conditions of existence4 ,a  
history without relation to the document
  would be an unverifiable history2 and 
since the reality of history lies  in   
this verifiability1 and the narrative in
 which it is given concrete  form is    
historical narrative only in so far as  
it is a critical  exposition of the     
document 7intuition and reflection1     
consciousness  and auto-consciousness1  
etc471 a history of that sort1 being    
without  meaning and without truth1     
would be inexistent as history4 ,how    
could  a history of painting be composed
 by one who had not seen and enjoyed    
the works of which he proposed to       

describe the genesis critically8 ,and   
how far could anyone understand the     
works in question who was without  the  
artistic experience assumed by the      
narrator8 ,how could there be a  history
 of philosophy without the works or at  
least fragments of the  works of the    
philosophers8 ,how could there be a     
history of a sentiment  or of a custom1 
for example that of ,christian humility 
or of knightly  chivalry1 without the   
capacity for living again1 or rather    
without an  actual living again of these
 particular states of the individual    
soul8    ,on the other hand1 once the   
indissoluble link between life and      
thought  in history has been effected1  
the doubts that have been expressed as  
to  the certainty and the utility of    
history disappear altogether in  a      
moment4 ,how could that which is a      
present producing of our spirit  ever be
 uncertain8 ,how could that knowledge be
 useless which solves  a problem that   
has come forth from the bosom of life8  

,,ii      ,but can the link between     
document and narrative1 between life and
  history1 ever be broken8 ,an          
affirmative answer to this has been     
given  when referring to those histories
 of which the documents have been  lost1
 or1 to put the case in a more general  
and fundamental manner1  those histories
 whose documents are no longer alive in 
the human  spirit4 ,and this has also   
been implied when saying that we all of 
us in  turn find ourselves thus placed  
with respect to this or that part of    
history4 ,the history of ,hellenic      
painting is in great part a history     
without documents for us1 as are all    
histories of peoples concerning  whom   
one does not know exactly where they    
lived1 the thoughts and  feelings chat  
they experienced1 or the individual     
appearance of the  works that they      
accomplished2 those literatures and     
philosophies1 too1  as to which we do   
not know their theses1 or even when we  
possess these  and are able to read them

 through1 yet fail to grasp their       
intimate  spirit1 either owing to the   
lack of complementary knowledge or      
because  of our obstinate temperamental 
reluctance1 or owing to our momentary   
distraction4    ,if1 in these cases1    
when that connexion is broken1 we can no
 longer  call what remains history      
7because history was nothing but that   
connexion71 and it can henceforth only  
be called history in the sense  that we 
call a man the corpse of a man1 what    
remains is not for  that reason nothing 
7not even the corpse is really nothing74
 ,were  it nothing1 it would be the same
 as saying that the connexion is        
indissoluble1 because nothingness is    
never effectual4 ,and if it be not      
nothing1 if it be something1 what is    
narrative without the document8    ,a   
history of ,hellenic painting1 according
 to the accounts that have  been handed 
down or have been constructed by the    
learned of our times1  when closely     
inspected1 resolves itself into a series

 of names of  painters 7,apollodorus1   
,polygnotus1 ,zeuxis1 ,apelles1 etc471  
surrounded  with biographical anecdotes1
 and into a series of subjects for      
painting 7the burning of ,troy1 the     
contest of the ,amazons1 the battle  of 
,marathon1 ,achilles1 ,calumny1 etc471  
of which certain particulars  are given 
in the descriptions that have reached   
us2 or a graduated  series1 going from  
praise to blame1 of these painters and  
their works1  together with names1      
anecdotes1 subjects1 judgments1 arranged
 more or  less chronologically4 ,but the
 names of painters separated from the   
direct knowledge of their works are     
empty names2 the anecdotes are  empty1  
as are the descriptions of subjects1 the
 judgment of approval  or of            
disapproval1 and the chronological      
arrangement1 because merely             
arithmetical and lacking real           
development2 and the reason why we do   
not realize it in thought is that the   
elements which should constitute  it are

 wanting4 ,if those verbal forms possess
 any significance1 we owe  it to what   
little we know of antique paintings from
 fragments1 from  secondary works that  
have come down to us in copies1 or in   
analogous  works in the other arts1 or  
in poetry4 ,with the exception1 however1
 of  that little1 the history of        
,hellenic art is1 as such1 a tissue of  
empty  words4    ,we can1 if we like1   
say that it is 'empty of determinate    
content1'  because we do not deny that  
when we pronounce the name of a painter 
we think of some painter1 and indeed of 
a painter who is an ,athenian1  and that
 when we utter the word 'battle1' or    
',helen1' we think of  a battle1 indeed 
of a battle of hoplites1 or of a        
beautiful woman1  similar to those      
familiar to us in ,hellenic sculpture4  
,but we can  think indifferently of any 
one of the numerous facts that those    
names  recall4 ,for this reason their   
content is indeterminate1 and this      
indetermination of content is their     

emptiness4      ,all histories separated
 from their living documents resemble   
these  examples and are empty           
narratives1 and since they are empty    
they are  without truth4 ,is it true or 
not that there existed a painter named  
,polygnotus and that he painted a       
portrait of ,miltiades in the ,poecile8 
,we shall be told that it is true1      
because one person or several  people1  
who knew him and saw the work in        
question1 bear witness to  its          
existence4 ,but we must reply that it   
was true for this or that  witness1 and 
that for us it is neither true nor      
false1 or 7which comes  to the same     
thing7 that it is true only on the      
evidence of those  witnesses--that is to
 say1 for an extrinsic reason1 whereas  
truth  always requires intrinsic        
reasons4 ,and since that proposition is 
not  true 7neither true nor false71 it  
is not useful either1 because where     
there is nothing the king loses his     
rights1 and where the elements of a     

problem are wanting the effective will  
and the effective need to solve  it are 
also wanting1 along with the possibility
 of its solution4 ,thus  to quote those 
empty judgments is quite useless for our
 actual lives4  ,life is a present1 and 
that history which has become an empty  
narration  is a past3 it is an          
irrevocable past1 if not absolutely so1 
' 1  then certainly for the present     
moment4    ,the empty words remain1 and 
the empty words are sounds1 or the      
graphic  signs which represent them1 and
 they hold together and maintain        
themselves1 not by an act of thought    
that thinks them 7in which case  they   
would soon be filled71 but by an act of 
will1 which thinks it  useful for       
certain ends of its own to preserve     
those words1 however  empty or half     
empty they may be4 ,mere narrative1     
then1 is nothing but a  complex of empty
 words or formulas asserted by an act of
 the will4    ,now with this definition 
we have succeeded in giving neither more

  nor less than the true distinction1   
hitherto sought in vain1 between        
history and chronicle4 ,it has been     
sought in vain1 because it has          
generally been sought in a difference in
 the quality of the facts  which each   
difference took as its object4 ,thus1   
for instance1 the  record of individual 
facts has been attributed to chronicle1 
to  history that of general facts2 to   
chronicle the record of private1  to    
history that of public facts3 as though 
the general were not  always individual 
and the individual general1 and the     
public were not  always also private and
 the private public6 ,or else the record
 of  important facts 7memorable things7 
has been attributed to history1 to      
chronicle that of the unimportant3 as   
though the importance of facts  were not
 relative to the situation in which we  
find ourselves1 and as  though for a man
 annoyed by a mosquito the evolutions of
 the minute  insect were not of greater 
importance than the expedition of       

,xerxes6  ,certainly1 we are sensible of
 a just sentiment in these fallacious   
distinctions--namely1 that of placing   
the difference between history  and     
chronicle in the conception of what     
interests and of what does  not interest
 7the general interests and not the     
particular1 the  great interests and not
 the little1 etc474 ,a just sentiment is
 also  to be noted in other             
considerations that are wont to be      
adduced1 such  as the close bond between
 events that there is in history and the
  disconnectedness that appears on the  
other hand in chronicle1 the  logical   
order of the first1 the purely          
chronological order of the  second1 the 
penetration of the first into the core  
of events and  the limitation of the    
second to the superficial or external1  
and  the like4 ,but the differential    
character is here rather metaphorized   
than thought1 and when metaphors are not
 employed as simple forms  expressive of
 thought we lose a moment after what has

 just been gained4  ,the truth is that  
chronicle and history are not           
distinguishable as  two forms of        
history1 mutually complementary1 or as  
one subordinate  to the other1 but as   
two different spiritual attitudes4      
,history is  living chronicle1 chronicle
 is dead history2 history is            
contemporary  history1 chronicle is past
 history2 history is principally an act 
of  thought1 chronicle an act of will4  
,every history becomes chronicle  when  
it is no longer thought1 but only       
recorded in abstract words1  which were 
once upon a time concrete and           
expressive4 ,the history of  philosophy 
even is chronicle1 when written or read 
by those who do not  understand         
philosophy3 history would even be what  
we are now disposed  to read as         
chronicle1 as when1 for instance1 the   
monk of ,monte ,cassino  notes3 #ajja4  
,beatus ,dominicus migravit ad          
,christum4 #ajjb4 ,hoc anno  venerunt   
,saraceni super ,capuam4 #ajjd4         

,terremotus ingens hunc montem          
exagitavit1 etc42 for those facts were  
present to him when he wept  over the   
death of the departed ,dominic1 or was  
terrified by the natural  human scourges
 that convulsed his native land1 seeing 
the hand of ,god  in that succession of 
events4 ,this does not prevent that     
history from  assuming the form of      
chronicle when that same monk of ,monte 
,cassino  wrote down cold formulas1     
without representing to himself or      
thinking  their content1 with the sole  
intention of not allowing those memories
  to be lost and of handing them down to
 those who should inhabit ,monte        
,cassino after him4    ,but the         
discovery of the real distinction       
between chronicle and  history1 which is
 a formal distinction 7that is to say1 a
 truly real  distinction71 not only     
frees us from the sterile and fatiguing 
search  after material distinctions     
7that is to say1 imaginary              
distinctions71  but it also enables us  

to reject a very common                 
presupposition--namely1  that of the    
priority of chronicle in respect to     
history4 ,primo  annales chronicles     
fuere1 post histori fact sunt1 the      
saying of  the old grammarian1 ,mario   
,vittorino1 has been repeated1          
generalized1  and universalized4 ,but   
precisely the opposite of this is the   
outcome of  the inquiry into the        
character and therefore into the genesis
 of the  two operations or attitudes3   
first comes history1 then chronicle4    
,first comes the living being1 then the 
corpse2 and to make history the  child  
of chronicle is the same thing as to    
make the living be born from  the       
corpse1 which is the residue of life1 as
 chronicle is the residue  of history4  
,,iii      ,history1 separated from the 
living document and turned into         
chronicle1  is no longer a spiritual    
act1 but a thing1 a complex of sounds   
and  of other signs4 ,but the document  
also1 when separated from life1 is      

nothing but a thing like another1 a     
complex of sounds or of other           
signs--for example1 the sounds and the  
letters in which a law was once         
communicated2 the lines cut into a block
 of marble1 which manifested a          
religious sentiment by means of the     
figure of a god2 a heap of bones1  which
 were at one time the expression of a   
man or of an animal4    ,do such things 
as empty narratives and dead documents  
exist8 ,in a  certain sense1 no1 because
 external things do not exist outside   
the  spirit2 and we already know that   
chronicle1 as empty narrative1 exists   
in so far as the spirit produces it and 
holds it firmly with an act of  will    
7and it may be opportune to observe once
 more that such an act  carries always  
with it a new act of consciousness and  
of thought73  with an act of will1 which
 abstracts the sound from the thought1  
in which dwelt the certainty and        
concreteness of the sound4 ,in the  same
 way1 these dead documents exist to the 

extent that they are the  manifestations
 of a new life1 as the lifeless corpse  
is really itself  also a process of     
vital creation1 although it appears to  
be one of  decomposition and something  
dead in respect of a particular form of 
life4 ,but in the same way as those     
empty sounds1 which once contained  the 
thought of a history1 are eventually    
called narratives1 in memory  of the    
thought they contained1 thus do those   
manifestations of a new  life continue  
to be looked upon as remnants of the    
life that preceded  them and is indeed  
extinguished4    ,now observe how1 by   
means of this string of deductions1 we  
have  put ourselves into the position of
 being able to account for the          
partition of historical sources into    
narratives and documents1  as we find it
 among some of our modern               
methodologists1 or1 as it  is also      
formulated1 into traditions and residues
 or remains  7berbleibsel1 berreste74   
,this partition is irrational from  the 

empirical point of view1 and may be of  
use as indicating the  inopportunity of 
the introduction of a speculative       
thought into  empiricism4 ,it is so     
irrational that one immediately runs    
against  the difficulty of not being    
able to distinguish what one wished to  
distinguish4 ,an empty 'narrative'      
considered as a thing is tantamount  to 
any other thing whatever which is called
 a 'document4' ,and1 on  the other hand1
 if we maintain the distinction we incur
 the further  difficulty of having to   
base our historical construction upon   
two  different orders of data 7one foot 
on the bank and the other in  the       
river7--that is to say1 we shall have to
 recur to two parallel  instances1 one  
of which is perpetually referring us    
back to the other4  ,and when we seek to
 determine the relation of the two kinds
 of sources  with a view to avoiding the
 inconvenient parallelism1 what happens 
is  this3 either the relation is stated 
to depend upon the superiority  of the  

one over the other1 and the distinction 
vanishes1 because the  superior form    
absorbs into itself and annuls the      
inferior form2 or  a third term is      
established1 in which the two forms are 
supposed to  become united with a       
distinction3 but this is another way of 
declaring  them to be inexistent in that
 abstractness4 ,for this reason it does 
not  seem to me to be without           
significance that the partition of      
accounts  and documents should not have 
been adopted by the most empirical of   
the  methodologists4 ,they do not       
involve themselves in these subtleties1 
but content themselves with grouping the
 historical sources into those  that are
 written and those that are represented1
 or in other  similar ways4 ,in         
,germany1 however1 ,droysen availed     
himself of these  distinctions between  
narratives and documents1 traditions1   
etc41 in  his valuable ,elements of     
,historicism 7he had strong leanings    
toward  philosophy71 and they have been 

employed also by other methodologists1  
who are hybrid empiricists1             
'systematists1' or 'pedants1' as they   
are looked upon in our ,latin countries4
 ,this is due to the copious            
philosophical traditions of ,germany4   
,the pedantry certainly exists1  and it 
is to be found just in that inopportune 
philosophy4 ,but what  an excellent     
thing is that pedantry and the          
contradictions which it  entails1 how it
 arouses the mind from its empirical    
slumbers and makes  it see that in place
 of supposed things there are in reality
 spiritual  acts1 where the terms of an 
irreconcilable dualism were supposed  to
 be in conflict1 relation and unity1 on 
the contrary1 prevail6  ,the partition  
of the sources into narratives and      
documents1 and the  superiority         
attributed to documents over narratives1
 and the alleged  necessity of narrative
 as a subordinate but ineradicable      
element1  almost form a mythology or    
allegory1 which represents in an        

imaginative  manner the relation between
 life and thought1 between document and 
criticism in historical thought4    ,and
 document and criticism1 life and       
thought1 are the true sources  of       
history--that is to say1 the two        
elements of historical synthesis2  and  
as such1 they do not stand face to face 
with history1 or face to  face with the 
synthesis1 in the same way as fountains 
are represented  as being face to face  
with those who go to them with a pail1  
but they  form part of history itself1  
they are within the synthesis1 they     
form a constituent part of it and are   
constituted by it4 ,hence the  idea of a
 history with its sources outside itself
 is another fancy  to be dispelled1     
together with that of history being the 
opposite of  chronicle4 ,the two        
erroneous fancies converge to form one4 
,sources1 in  the extrinsic sense of the
 empiricists1 like things1 are equally  
with  chronicle1 which is a class of    
those things1 not anterior but posterior

  to history4 ,history would indeed be  
in a fix if it expected to be  born of  
what comes after it1 to be born of      
external things6 ,thing1 not  thought1  
is born of thing3 a history derived from
 things would be a  thing--that is to   
say1 just the inexistent of which we    
were talking a  moment ago4    ,but     
there must be a reason why chronicle as 
well as documents seems  to precede     
history and to be its extrinsic source4 
,the human spirit  preserves the mortal 
remains of history1 empty narratives and
  chronicles1 and the same spirit       
collects the traces of past life1       
remains and documents1 striving as far  
as possible to preserve them  unchanged 
and to restore them as they deteriorate4
 ,what is the object  of these acts of  
will which go to the preservation of    
what is empty  and dead8 ,perhaps       
illusion or foolishness1 which preserves
 a little  while the worn-out elements  
of mortality on the confines of ,dis by 
means of the erection of mausoleums and 

sepulchres8 ,but sepulchres  are not    
foolishness and illusion2 they are1 on  
the contrary1 an act  of morality1 by   
which is affirmed the immortality of the
 work done by  individuals4 ,although   
dead1 they live in our memory and will  
live in  the memory of times to come4   
,and that collecting of dead documents  
and  writing down of empty histories is 
an act of life which serves life4  ,the 
moment will come when they will serve to
 reproduce past history1  enriched and  
made present to our spirit4    ,for dead
 history revives1 and past history again
 becomes present1 as  the development of
 life demands them4 ,the ,romans and the
 ,greeks lay  in their sepulchres1 until
 awakened at the ,renaissance by the new
  maturity of the ,european spirit4 ,the
 primitive forms of civilization1  so   
gross and so barbaric1 lay forgotten1 or
 but little regarded1 or  misunderstood1
 until that new phase of the ,european  
spirit1 which was  known as ,romanticism
 or ,restoration1 'sympathized' with    

them--that is  to say1 recognized them  
as its own proper present interest4     
,thus great  tracts of history which are
 now chronicle for us1 many documents   
now  mute1 will in their turn be        
traversed with new flashes of life and  
will  speak again4    ,these revivals   
have altogether interior motives1 and no
 wealth of  documents or of narratives  
will bring them about2 indeed1 it is    
they  themselves that copiously collect 
and place before themselves the         
documents and narratives1 which without 
them would remain scattered  and inert4 
,and it will be impossible ever to      
understand anything of  the effective   
process of historical thought unless we 
start from the  principle that the      
spirit itself is history1 maker of      
history at every  moment of its         
existence1 and also the result of all   
anterior history4  ,thus the spirit     
bears with it all its history1 which    
coincides with  itself4 ,to forget one  
aspect of history and to remember       

another one  is nothing but the rhythm  
of the life of the spirit1 which        
operates  by determining and            
individualizing itself1 and by always   
rendering  indeterminate and            
disindividualizing previous             
determinations and  individualizations1 
in order to create others more copious4 
,the spirit1  so to speak1 lives again  
its own history without those external  
things called narratives and documents2 
but those external things are           
instruments that it makes for itself1   
acts preparatory to that internal  vital
 evocation in whose process they are    
resolved4 ,the spirit asserts  and      
jealously preserves 'records of the     
past' for that purpose4    ,what we all 
of us do at every moment when we note   
dates and other  matters concerning our 
private affairs 7chronicles7 in our     
pocket-books1 or when we place in their 
little caskets ribbons and  dried       
flowers 7,i beg to be allowed to select 
these pleasant images1  when giving     

instances of the collection of          
'documents'71 is done on a  large scale 
by a certain class of workers called    
philologists1 as  though at the         
invitation of the whole of society4     
,they are specially  known as the       
erudite when they collect evidence and  
narrations1  as archologists and        
archivists when they collect documents  
and  monuments1 as the places where such
 objects are kept 7the silent white     
abodes of the dead7 are called          
libraries1 archives1 and museums4  ,can 
there be any ill-feeling against these  
men of erudition1 these  archivists and 
archologists1 who fulfil a necessary and
 therefore  a useful and important      
function8 ,the fact remains that there  
is a  tendency to mock at them and to   
regard them with compassion4 ,it is     
true enough that they sometimes afford a
 hold for derision with their  ingenuous
 belief that they have history under    
lock and key and are  able to unlock the
 'sources' at which thirsty humanity may

 quench its  desire for knowledge2 but  
we know that history is in all of us and
 that  its sources are in our own       
breasts4 ,for it is in our own breasts  
alone  that is to be found that crucible
 in which the certain is converted  into
 the true1 and philology1 joining with  
philosophy1 produces  history4          
,,ii      ,,pseudo-,,histories          
,history1 chronicle1 and philology1 of  
which we have seen the origin1  are     
series of mental forms1 which1 although 
distinct from one another1  must all of 
them be looked upon as                  
physiological--that is to say1 true  and
 rational4 ,but logical sequence now    
leads me from physiology to             
pathology--to those forms that are not  
forms but deformations1 not true  but   
erroneous1 not rational but irrational4 
,the ingenuous belief cherished by the  
philologists that they have  history    
locked up in their libraries1 museums1  
and archives 7something  in the same    
manner as the genius of the ,arabian    

,nights1 who was  shut up in a small    
vase in the form of compressed smoke7   
does not  remain inactive1 and gives    
rise to the idea of a history           
constructed  with things1 traditions1   
and documents 7empty traditions and dead
  documents71 and this affords an       
instance of what may be called          
philological history4 ,i say the idea   
and not the reality1 because  it is     
simply impossible to compose a history  
with external things1  whatever efforts 
may be made and whatever trouble be     
taken4 ,chronicles  that have been      
weeded1 chopped up into fragments1      
recombined1  rearranged1 always remain  
nevertheless chronicles--that is to say1
  empty narratives2 and documents that  
have been restored1 reproduced1         
described1 brought into line1 remain    
documents--that is to say1 silent       
things4 ,philological history consists  
of the pouring out of one or  more books
 into a new book4 ,this operation bears 
an appropriate name  in current language

 and is known as 'compilation4' ,these  
compilations  are frequently convenient1
 because they save the trouble of having
  recourse to several books at the same 
time2 but they do not contain  any      
historical thought4 ,modern             
chronological philologists regard       
medieval chroniclers and the old        
,italian historians 7from ,machiavelli  
and ,guicciardini down to ,giannone7    
with a feeling of superiority4  ,these  
writers 'transcribed1' as they called   
it1 their 'sources' in  the parts of    
their books that are devoted to         
narrative--that is  to say1 chronicle4  
,yet they themselves do not and cannot  
behave  otherwise1 because when history 
is being composed from 'sources' as     
external things there is never anything 
else to do but to transcribe  the       
sources4 ,transcription is varied by    
sometimes summarizing and  sometimes    
altering the words1 and this is         
sometimes a question of  good taste and 
sometimes a literary pretence2 it is    

also a verifying  of quotations1 which  
is sometimes a proof of loyalty and     
exactitude1  sometimes a make-believe   
and a making oneself believe that the   
feet  are planted firmly on the earth1  
on the soil of truth1 believed to  be   
narrative and quotation from the        
document4 ,how very many of such        
philological historians there are in our
 time1 especially since the  so-called  
'philological method' has been          
exaggerated--that is to say1  a         
one-sided value has been attributed to  
it6 ,these histories have  indeed a     
dignified and scientific appearance1 but
 unfortunately fehlt  leider6 das       
geistige ,band1 the spiritual tie is    
wanting4 ,they really  consist at bottom
 of nothing but learned or very learned 
'chronicles1'  sometimes of use for     
purposes of consultation1 but lacking   
words that  nourish and keep warm the   
minds and souls of men4                 
,nevertheless1 since we have            
demonstrated that philological history  

really presents chronicles and documents
 and not histories1 it might  be asked  
upon what possible ground do we accuse  
it of irrationality  and error1 seeing  
that we have regarded the formation of  
chronicles1  the collection of          
documents1 and all the care that is     
expended ,upon  them as most rational8  
,but error never lies in the fact1 but  
only in  the 'claim' or 'idea' that     
accompanies the fact4 ,and in this case 
the idea or claim is that which has been
 defined above as properly  belonging to
 philological history--namely1 that of  
composing histories  with documents and 
narratives4 ,this claim can be said to  
exercise a  rational function also1 to  
the extent that it lays down the claim1 
though without satisfying it1 that      
history should go beyond the mere       
chronicle or document4 ,but in so far as
 it makes the claim1 without  itself    
fulfilling it1 this mode of history must
 be characterized as  contradictory and 
absurd4    ,and since the claim is      

absurd1 philological history remains    
without  truth as being that which1 like
 chronicle1 has not got truth within    
it1 but derives it from the authority to
 which it appeals4 ,it will be  claimed 
for philology that it tests authorities 
and selects those most  worthy of faith4
 ,but without dwelling upon the fact    
that chronicle  also1 and chronicle of  
the crudest1 most ignorant and credulous
 sort1  proceeded in a like manner by   
testing and selecting those authorities 
which seemed to it to be the most worthy
 of faith1 it is always a  question of  
faith 7that is to say1 of the thought of
 others and of  thought belonging to the
 past7 and not of criticism 7that is to 
say1  of our own thought in the act71 of
 verisimilitude and not of that         
certainty which is truth4 ,hence        
philological history can certainly be   
correct1 but not true 7richtig and not  
wahr74 ,and as it is  without truth1 so 
is it without true historical           
interest--that is to  say1 it sheds no  

light upon an order of facts answering  
to a practical  and ethical want2 it may
 embrace any matter indifferently1      
however  remote it be from the practical
 and ethical soul of the compiler4      
,thus1 as a pure philologist1 ,i enjoy  
the free choice of indifference1  and   
the history of ,italy for the last      
half-century has the same value  for me 
as that of the ,chinese dynasty of the  
,tsin4 ,i shall turn from  one to the   
other1 moved1 no doubt1 by a certain    
interest1 but by an  extra-historical   
interest1 of the sort formed in the     
special circle of  philology4    ,this  
procedure1 which is without truth and   
without passion1 and is  proper to      
philological history1 explains the      
marked contrast so  constantly renewed  
between the philological historians and 
historians  properly so called4 ,these  
latter1 intent as they are upon the     
solution  of vital problems1 grow       
impatient to find themselves offered in 
reply  the frigid products of philology1

 or become angry at the persistent      
assertion that such is history1 and that
 it must be treated in such  a spirit   
and with such methods4 ,perhaps the     
finest explosion of such  a feeling of  
anger and annoyance is to be found in   
the ,letters on  the ,study of ,history 
7#agea7 of ,bolingbroke1 in which       
erudition is  treated as neither more   
nor less than sumptuous ignorance1 and  
learned  disquisitions upon ancient or  
primitive history are admitted at the   
most as resembling those 'eccentric     
preludes' which precede concerts  and   
aid in setting the instruments in tune  
and that can only be  mistaken for      
harmony by some one without ear1 just in
 the same way as  only he who is without
 historic sense can confuse those       
exhibitions of  erudition with true     
history4 ,as an antithesis to them he   
suggests as  an ideal a kind of         
'political maps1' for the use of the    
intellect and  not of the memory1       
indicating the ,storie fiorentine of    

,machiavelli  and the ,trattato dei     
benefici of ,fra ,paolo as writings that
 approach  that ideal4 ,finally he      
maintains that for true and living      
history we  should not go beyond the    
beginning of the sixteenth century1     
beyond  ,charles ,v and ,henry ,,viii1  
when the political and social history of
  ,europe first appeared--a system which
 still persisted at the beginning  of   
the eighteenth century4 ,he then        
proceeds to paint a picture of those    
two centuries of history1 for the use1  
not of the curious and the  erudite1 but
 of politicians1 too one1 ,i think1     
would wish to deny the  just sentiment  
for history which animates these        
demands1 set forth in  so vivacious a   
manner4 ,bolingbroke1 however1 did not  
rise1 nor was it  possible for him to   
rise1 to the conception of the death and
 rebirth of  every history 7which is the
 rigorously speculative concept of      
'actual'  and 'contemporary' history71  
owing to the conditions of culture of   

his time1 nor did he suspect that       
primitive barbaric history1 which  he   
threw into a corner as useless dead     
leaves1 would reappear quite  fresh half
 a century later1 as the result of the  
reaction against  intellectualism and   
,jacobinism1 and that this reaction     
would have as  one of its principal     
promoters a publicist of his own        
country1 ,burke1  nor indeed that it had
 already reappeared in his own time in a
 corner  of ,italy1 in the mind and soul
 of ,giambattista ,vico4 ,i shall not   
adduce  further instances of the        
conflict between effective and          
philological  historians1 after this    
conspicuous one of ,bolingbroke1 because
 it is  exceedingly well known1 and the 
strife is resumed under our very eyes   
at every moment4 ,i shall only add that 
it is certainly deplorable  7though     
altogether natural1 because blows are   
not measured in a  struggle7 that the   
polemic against the 'philologists'      
should have been  transferred so as to  

include also the philologues pure and   
simple4 ,for  these latter1 the poor    
learned ones1 archivists and            
archologists1 are  harmless1 beneficent 
little souls4 ,if they should be        
destroyed1 as is  sometimes prophesied  
in the heat of controversy1 the         
fertility of the  spiritual field would 
be not only diminished1 but ruined      
altogether1  and we should be obliged to
 promote to the utmost of our power the 
reintroduction of those coefficients of 
our culture1 very much in the  same way 
as is said to have been the case with   
,french agriculture after  the          
improvident harrying of the harmless and
 beneficent wasps which  went on for    
several years4    ,whatever of justified
 or justifiable is to be found in the   
statements  as to the uncertainty and   
uselessness of history is also due to   
the revolt of the pure historic sense   
against philological history4  ,this is 
to be assumed from observing that even  
the most radical of  those opponents    

7,fontenelle1 ,volney1 ,delfico1 etc47  
end by admitting  or demanding some form
 of history as not useless or uncertain1
 or not  altogether useless and         
uncertain1 and from the fact that all   
their  shafts are directed against      
philological history and that founded   
upon  authority1 of which the only      
appropriate definition is that of       
,rousseau  7in the mile71 as l'art de   
choisir entre plusieurs mensonges1 celui
  qui ressemble mieux  la vrit4    ,in  
all other respects--that is to say1 as  
regards the part due to  sensational and
 naturalistic assumptions--historical   
scepticism  contradicts itself here1    
like every form of scepticism1 for the  
natural  sciences themselves1 thus      
raised to the rank of model1 are founded
 upon  perceptions1 observations1 and   
experiments--that is to say1 upon facts 
historically ascertained--and the       
'sensations1' upon which the whole      
truth of knowledge is based1 are not    
themselves knowledge1 save to the       

extent that they assume the form of     
affirmations--that is to say1 in so  far
 as they are history4    ,but the truth 
is that philological history1 like every
 other sort of  error1 does not fall    
before the enemy's attack1 but rather   
solely  from internal causes1 and it is 
its own professors that destroy it1     
when they conceive of it as without     
connexion with life1 as merely  a       
learned exercise 7note the many         
histories that are treatments of        
scholastic themes1 undertaken with a    
view to training in the art of          
research1 interpretation1 and           
exposition1 and the many others that    
are continuations of this direction     
outside the school and are due to       
tendency there imparted71 and when they 
themselves evince uncertainty1          
surrounding every statement that they   
make with doubts4 ,the  distinction     
between criticism and hypercriticism has
 been drawn  with a view to arresting   
this spontaneous dissolution of         

historical  philology2 thus we find the 
former praised and allowed1 while the   
latter is blamed and forbidden4 ,but the
 distinction is one of the  customary   
sort1 by means of which lack of         
intelligence disguised as  love of      
moderation contrives to chip off the    
edges from the antitheses  that it fails
 to solve4 ,hypercriticism is the       
prosecution of criticism2  it is        
criticism itself1 and to divide         
criticism into a more and a less1  and  
to admit the less and deny the more1 is 
extravagant1 to say the  least of it4   
,no 'authorities' are certain while     
others are uncertain1  but all are      
uncertain1 varying in uncertainty in an 
extrinsic and  conjectural manner4 ,who 
can guarantee himself against the false 
statement made by the usually diligent  
and trustworthy witness in a  moment of 
distraction or of passion8 ,a           
sixteenth-century inscription1  still to
 be read in one of the old byways of    
,naples1 wisely prays  ,god 7and        

historical philologists should pray to  
,him fervently every  morning7 to       
deliver us now and for ever from the    
lies of honest  men4 ,thus historians   
who push criticism to the point of      
so-called  hypercriticism perform a most
 instructive philosophical duty when    
they  render the whole of such work     
vain1 and therefore fit to be called  by
 the title of ,sanchez's work ,quod     
nihil scitur4 ,i recollect the  remark  
made to me when ,i was occupied with    
research work in my young  days by a    
friend of but slight literary knowledge1
 to whom ,i had lent  a very critical1  
indeed hypercritical1 history of ancient
 ,rome4 ,when  he had finished reading  
it he returned the book to me1 remarking
 that  he had acquired the proud        
conviction of being the most learned of 
philologists1 because the latter arrive 
at the conclusion that they  know       
nothing as the result of exhausting     
toil1 while he knew nothing  without any
 effort at all1 simply as a generous    

gift of nature4#a        ,,ii      ,the 
consequence of this spontaneous         
dissolution of philological history     
should be the negation of history       
claimed to have been written with  the  
aid of narratives and documents         
conceived as external things1 and  the  
consignment of these to their proper    
lower place as mere aids to  historical 
knowledge1 as it determines and         
redetermines itself in the  development 
of the spirit4 ,but if such consequences
 are distasteful  and the project is    
persevered in of thus writing history in
 spite of  repeated failures1 the       
further problem then presents itself as 
to  how the cold indifference of        
philological history and its intrinsic  
uncertainty can be healed without       
changing those presumptions4 ,the       
problem1 itself fallacious1 can receive 
but a fallacious solution1  expressed by
 the substitution of the interest of    
sentiment for  the lack of interest of  
thought and of sthetic coherence of     

representation for the logical coherence
 here unobtainable4 ,the new  erroneous 
form of history thus obtained is        
poetical history4    ,numerous examples 
of this kind of history are afforded by 
the  affectionate biographies of persons
 much beloved and venerated and by  the 
satirical biographies of the detested2  
patriotic histories which  vaunt the    
glory and lament the misadventures of   
the people to which the  author belongs 
and with which he sympathizes1 and those
 that shed a  sinister light upon the   
enemy people1 adversary of his own2     
universal  history1 illuminated with the
 ideals of liberalism or                
humanitarianism1  that composed by a    
socialist1 depicting the acts1 as ,marx 
said1 of the  cavalier of the sorry     
countenance1 in other words of the      
capitalist1  that of the anti-,semite1  
who shows the ,jew to be everywhere the 
source  of human misfortune and of human
 turpitude and the persecution of the   
,jew to be the acme of human splendour  

and happiness4 ,nor is poetical  history
 exhausted with this fundamental and    
general description of  love and hate   
7love that is hate and hate that is     
love71 for it passes  through all the   
most intricate forms1 the fine          
gradations of sentiment4  ,thus we have 
poetical histories which are amorous1   
melancholy1  nostalgic1 pessimistic1    
resigned1 confident1 cheerful1 and as   
many  other sorts as one can imagine4   
,herodotus celebrates the romance of the
  jealousies of the gods1 ,livy the epos
 of ,roman virtue1 ,tacitus composes    
horrible tragedies1 ,elizabethan dramas 
in sculptural ,latin prose4 ,if  we turn
 to the most modern among the moderns1  
we find ,droysen giving  expression to  
his lyrical aspiration toward the strong
 centralized  state in his history of   
,macedonia1 that ,prussia of ,hellas2   
,grote to his  aspirations toward       
democratic institutions1 as symbolized  
in ,athens2  ,mommsen to those directed 
toward empire1 as symbolized in ,csar2  

,balbo pouring forth all his ardours for
 ,latin independence1 employing  for    
that purpose all the records of ,latin  
battles and beginning with  nothing less
 than those between the ,itali and      
,etrusci against the  ,pelasgi2 ,thierry
 celebrating the middle class in the    
history of the  ,third ,estate          
represented by ,jacques ,bonhomme2 the  
,goncourts writing  voluptuous fiction  
round the figures of ,mme de ,pompadour1
 of ,mme ,du  ,barry1 of ,marie         
,antoinette1 more careful of the        
material and cut of  garments than of   
thoughts2 and1 finally1 ,de ,barante1 in
 his history of  the ,dukes of          
,burgundy1 having his eye upon knights  
and ladies1 arms and  love4    ,it may  
seem that the indifference of           
philological history is thus  truly     
conquered and historical material       
dominated by a principle and  criterion 
of values4 ,this is the demand          
persistently addressed to  history from 
all sides in our day by methodologists  

and philosophers4  ,but ,i have avoided 
the word 'value' hitherto1 owing to its 
equivocal  meaning1 apt to deceive many4
 ,for since history is history of the   
spirit1 and since spirit is value1 and  
indeed the only value that is  possible 
to conceive1 that history is clearly    
always history of values2  and since the
 spirit becomes transparent to itself as
 thought in the  consciousness of the   
historian1 the value that rules the     
writing of  history is the value of     
thought4 ,but precisely for this reason 
its  principle of determination cannot  
be the value known as the value of      
'sentiment1' which is life and not      
thought1 and when this life finds       
expression and representation1 before it
 has been dominated by thought1  we have
 poetry1 not history4 ,in order to turn 
poetical biography into  truly          
historical biography we must repress our
 loves1 our tears1 our  scorn1 and seek 
what function the individual has        
fulfilled in social  activity or        

civilization2 and we must do the same   
for national history  as for that of    
humanity1 and for every group of facts1 
small or great1  as for every order of  
events4 ,we must supersede--that is to  
say1  transform--values of sentiment    
with values of thought4 ,if we do not   
find ourselves able to rise to this     
'subjectivity' of thought1 we shall     
produce poetry and not history3 the     
historical problem will remain  intact1 
or1 rather1 it will not yet have come   
into being1 but will do  so when the    
requisite conditions are present4 ,the  
interest that stirs  us in the former   
case is not that of life which becomes  
thought1 but of  life which becomes     
intuition and imagination4    ,and since
 we have entered the domain of poetry1  
while the historical  problem remains   
beyond1 erudition ,or philology1 from   
which we seem  to have started1 remains 
something on this side--that is to say1 
is  altogether surpassed4 ,in           
philological history1 notwithstanding   

the  claims made by it1 chronicles and  
documents persist in their crude        
natural and undigested state4 ,but these
 are profoundly changed in  poetical    
history2 or1 to speak with greater      
accuracy1 they are simply  dissolved4   
,let us ignore the case 7common enough7 
of the historian  who1 with a view to   
obtaining artistic effects1             
intentionally mingles  his inventions   
with the data provided by the chronicles
 and documents1  endeavouring to make   
them pass for history--that is to say1  
he renders  himself guilty of a lie and 
is the cause of confusion4 ,but the     
alteration that is continuous and       
inherent to historiography consists  of 
the choice and connexion of the details 
themselves1 selected from  the          
'sources1' rather owing to motives of   
sentiment than of thought4  ,this1      
closely considered1 is really an        
invention or imagining of the  facts2   
the new connexion becomes concrete in a 
newly imagined fact4 ,and  since the    

data that are taken from the 'sources'  
do not always lend  themselves with     
docility to the required connexion1 it  
is considered  permissible to solliciter
 doucement les textes 7as1 if ,i am not 
mistaken1 ,renan1 one of the            
historian-poets1 remarked7 and to add   
imaginary particulars1 though in a      
conjectural form1 to the actual  data4  
,vossius blamed those ,grecian          
historians1 and historians of other     
nations1 who1 when they invent fables1  
ad effugiendam vanitatis notam  satis   
fore putant si addant solemne suum      
'aiunt1' 'fertur1' vel aliquid  quod    
tantundem valeat4 ,but even in our own  
day it would be diverting  and          
instructive to catalogue the forms of   
insinuation employed by  historians who 
pass for being most weighty1 with a view
 to introducing  their own personal     
imaginings3 'perhaps1' 'it would seem1' 
'one would  say1' 'it is pleasant to    
think1' 'we may infer1' 'it is          
probable1' 'it  is evident1' and the    

like2 and to note how they sometimes    
come to omit  these warnings and recount
 things that they have themselves       
imagined  as though they had seen them1 
in order to complete their picture1     
regarding which they would be much      
embarrassed if some one1 indiscreet  as 
an enfant terrible1 should chance to ask
 them3 ,how do you know  it8 ,who told  
you this8 ,recourse has been had to the 
methodological  theory of imagination   
necessary for the historian who does not
 wish  to become a mere chronicler1 to  
an imagination1 that is to say1 which   
shall be reconstructive and integrating2
 or1 as is also said1 to  the necessity 
of integrating the historical datum with
 our personal  psychology or            
psychological knowledge4 ,this theory1  
similar to that  of value in history1   
also contains an equivocation4 ,for     
doubtless  imagination is indispensable 
to the historian3 empty criticism1 empty
  narrative1 the concept without        
intuition or imagination1 are altogether

  sterile2 and this has been said and   
said again in these pages1 when  we have
 demanded the vivid experience of the   
events whose history we  have undertaken
 to relate1 which also means their      
re-elaboration as  intuition and        
imagination4 ,without this imaginative  
reconstruction or  integration it is not
 possible to write history1 or to read  
it1 or to  understand it4 ,but this sort
 of imagination1 which is really quite  
indispensable to the historian1 is the  
imagination that is inseparable  from   
the historical synthesis1 the           
imagination in and for thought1 the     
concreteness of thought1 which is never 
an abstract concept1 but always  a      
relation and a judgment1 not            
indetermination but determination4 ,it  
is nevertheless to be radically         
distinguished from the free poetic      
imagination1 dear to those historians   
who see and hear the face and  the voice
 of ,jesus on the ,lake of ,tiberias1 or
 follow ,heraclitus on  his daily walks 

among the hills of ,ephesus1 or repeat  
again the secret  colloquies between    
,francis of ,assisi and the sweet       
,umbrian countryside4    ,here too we   
shall be asked of what error1 then1 we  
can accuse poetical  history1 if it be  
poetry 7a necessary form of the spirit  
and one of the  dearest to the heart of 
man7 and not history4 ,but here also we 
must  reply--in manner analogous to our 
reply in the case of philological       
history--that the error does not lie in 
what is done1 but in what is  claimed to
 be done3 not in creating poetry1 but in
 calling histories  that are poetry     
poetical histories1 which is a          
contradiction in terms4  ,so far am ,i  
from entertaining the thought of        
objecting to poetry  woven out of       
historical data that ,i wish to affirm  
that a great part  of pure poetry1      
especially in modern times1 is to be    
found in books  that are called         
histories4 ,the epic1 for instance1 did 
not1 as is  believed1 die in the        

nineteenth century1 but it is not to be 
found in  the 'epic poems' of ,botta1 of
 ,bagnoli1 of ,bellini1 or of           
,bandettini1  where it is sought by     
short-sighted classifiers of literature1
 but in  narratives of the history of   
the ,risorgimento1 where are poured     
forth  epic1 drama1 satire1 idyll1      
elegy1 and as many other 'kinds of      
poetry'  as may be desired4 ,the        
historiography of the ,risorgimento is  
in great  part a poetical               
historiography1 rich in legends which   
still await  the historian1 or have met 
with him only occasionally and by       
chance1  exactly like ancient or        
medieval epic1 which1 if it were really 
poetry1  was yet believed by its        
hearers1 and often perhaps by its       
composers  themselves1 to be history4   
,and ,i claim for others and for myself 
the right to imagine history as dictated
 by my personal feeling2 to  imagine1   
for instance1 an ,italy as fair as a    
beloved woman1 as dear as  the tenderest

 of mothers1 as austere as a venerated  
ancestress1 to seek  out her doings     
through the centuries and even to       
prophesy her future1  and to create for 
myself in history idols of hatred and of
 love1 to  embellish yet more the       
charming1 if ,i will1 and to make the   
unpleasant  yet more unpleasant4 ,i     
claim to seek out every memory and every
  particular1 the expressions of        
countenance1 the gestures1 the garments1
  the dwellings1 every kind of          
insignificant particular 7insignificant 
for others or in other respects1 but not
 for me at that moment71 almost         
physically to approach my friends and my
 mistresses1 of both of which  ,i       
possess a fine circle or harem in       
history4 ,but it remains evident  that  
when ,i or others have the intention of 
writing history1 true  history and not  
poetical history1 we shall clear away   
myths and idols1  friends and           
mistresses1 devoting our attention      
solely to the problem of  history1 which

 is spirit or value 7or if less         
philosophical and more  colloquial terms
 be preferred1 culture1 civilization1   
progress71 and we  shall look upon them 
with the two eyes and the single sight  
of thought4  ,and when some one1 in that
 sphere or at that altitude1 begins to  
talk  to us of the sentiments that but a
 short while ago were tumultuous in  our
 breasts1 we shall listen to him as to  
one who talks of things that  are       
henceforth distant and dead1 in which we
 no longer participate1  because the    
only sentiment that now fills our soul  
is the sentiment of  truth1 the search  
for historical truth4      #a ,see      
,appendix ,i4        ,,iii      ,with   
poetical history--that is to say1 with  
the falling back of history  into a form
 ideally anterior1 that of poetry--the  
cycle of erroneous  forms of history 7or
 of erroneous theoretical forms7 is     
complete4  ,but my discourse would not  
perhaps be complete were ,i to remain   
silent as to a so-called form of history

 which had great importance  in         
antiquity when it developed its own     
theory4 ,it continues to have  some     
importance in our own day1 although now 
inclined to conceal its  face1 to change
 its garments1 and to disguise itself4  
,this is the  history known in antiquity
 as oratory or rhetoric4 ,its object was
  to teach philosophy by example1 to    
incite to virtuous conduct1 to  impart  
instruction as to the best political and
 military institutions1  or simply to   
delight1 according to the various       
intentions of the  rhetoricians4 ,and   
even in our own day this type of history
 is demanded  and supplied not only in  
the elementary schools 7where it seems  
to  be understood that the bitter of    
wisdom should be imbibed by youth       
mingled with the sweet of fable71 but   
among grown men4 ,it is closely  linked 
up with politics1 where it is a question
 of politics1 or with  religion1        
philosophy1 morality1 and the like1     
where they are concerned1  or with      

diversions1 as in the case of anecdotes1
 of strange events1  of scandalous and  
terrifying histories4 ,but can this1 ,i 
ask1 be  considered1 ,i do not say      
history1 but an erroneous 7theoretical7 
form  of history8 ,the structure of     
rhetorical history presupposes a history
  that already exists1 or at least a    
poetical history1 narrated with  a      
practical end4 ,the end would be to     
induce an emotion leading to  virtue1 to
 remorse1 to shame1 or to enthusiasm2 or
 perhaps to provide  repose for the     
soul1 such as is supplied by games2 or  
to introduce into  the mind a           
historical1 philosophical1 or scientific
 truth 7movere1  delectare1 docere1 or  
in whatever way it may be decided to    
classify  these ends72 but it will      
always be an end--that is to say1 a     
practical  act1 which avails itself of  
the telling of the history as a means   
or as one of its means4 ,hence          
rhetorical history 7which would be  more
 correctly termed practicistical        

history7 is composed of two  elements1  
history and the practical end1          
converging into one1 which  is the      
practical act4 ,for this reason one     
cannot attack it1 but only  its theory1 
which is the already mentioned theory1  
so celebrated in  antiquity1 of history 
as opus oratorium1 as   1  as 1 as   7if
 warlike71 or   7if  political71 or as  
evocative of 1 and the like4 ,this      
doctrine is  altogether analogous to the
 hedonistic and pedagogic doctrine      
relating  to poetry which at that time  
dominated4 ,it was believed possible to 
assign an end to poetry1 whereas an     
extrinsic end was assigned to it1  and  
poetry was thus passed over without     
being touched4 ,practicistical  history 
7which1 however1 is not history7 is     
exempt from censure as  a practical act3
 each one of us is not content with     
inquiring into  history1 but also acts1 
and in acting can quite well avail      
himself of  the re-evocation of this or 
that image1 with a view to stimulating  

his  own work1 or 7which comes to the   
same thing7 the work of others4 ,he     
can1 indeed1 read and re-read all the   
books that have from time to time  been 
of assistance to him1 as ,cato the      
younger had recourse to reading  the    
,phdo in order to prepare himself for   
suicide1 while others have  prepared    
themselves for it by reading ,werther1  
,ortis1 or the poems of  ,leopardi4     
,from the time of the ,renaissance to   
the eighteenth century1  many others    
prepared themselves for conspiracies and
 tyrannicides by  reading ,plutarch1 and
 so much was this the case that one of  
them1 the  youthful ,boscoli1 when      
condemned to death for a conspiracy     
against the  ,medici1 remarked in his   
last hour to ,della ,robbia 7who        
recounts the  incident71 ,get ,brutus   
out of my head6--,brutus1 not1 that is  
to say1  the history of ,brutus that he 
had read and thought about1 but that by 
which he had been fascinated and urged  
on to commit the crime4 ,for the  rest1 

true and proper history is not that     
,brutus which procreated the  modern    
,bruti with their daggers1 but ,brutus  
as thought and situated in  the world of
 thought4    ,one might be induced to   
assign a special place to the history   
now known  as biased1 because1 on the   
one hand1 it seems that it is not a     
simple  history of sentiment and poetry1
 since it has an end to attain1 and  on 
the other because such end is not       
imposed upon it from without1  but      
coincides with the conception of history
 itself4 ,hence it would  seem fitting  
to look upon it as a form of history    
standing half-way  between poetry and   
practicism1 a mixture of the two4 ,but  
mixed forms  and hybrid products exist  
only in the fictitious classifications  
of empiricists1 never in the reality of 
the spirit1 and biased  history1 when   
closely examined1 is really either      
poetical history or  practicistical     
history4 ,an exception must always be   
made of the books  in which the two     

moments are sometimes to be found side  
by side1 as  indeed one usually finds   
true history and chronicle and the      
document  and philological and poetical 
history side by side4 ,what gives the   
illusion of a mingling or of a special  
form of history is the fact that  many  
take their point of departure from      
poetical inspiration 7love of  country1 
faith in their country1 enthusiasm for a
 great man1 and so on7  and end with    
practical calculations3 they begin with 
poetry and end  with the allegations of 
the special pleader1 and sometimes1     
although  more rarely1 they follow an   
opposite course4 ,this duplication is to
 be  observed in the numerous histories 
of parties that have been composed      
since the world was a world1 and it is  
not difficult to discover in  what parts
 of them we have manifestations of      
poetry and in what parts  of            
calculation4 ,good taste and criticism  
are continually effecting this          
separation for history1 as for art and  

poetry in general4    ,it is true that  
good taste loves and accepts poetry and 
discriminates  between the practical    
intentions of the poet and those of the 
historian-poet2 but those intentions are
 received and admitted by the  moral    
conscience1 provided always that they   
are good intentions and  consequently   
good actions2 and although people are   
disposed to speak  ill of advocates in  
general1 it is certain that the honest  
advocate  and the prudent orator cannot 
be dispensed with in social life4 ,nor  
has so-called practicistical history    
ever been dispensed with1 either        
according to the ,grco-,roman practice1 
which was that of proposing  portraits  
of statesmen1 of captains1 and of heroic
 women as models for  the soul1 or      
according to that of the ,middle ,ages1 
which was to repeat  the lives of saints
 and hermits of the desert1 or of       
knights strong  of arm and of unshakable
 faith1 or in our own modern world1     
which  recommends as edifying and       

stimulating reading the lives and       
'legends'  of inventors1 of business    
men1 of explorers1 and of millionaires4 
,educative histories1 composed with the 
view of promoting definite  practical or
 moral dispositions1 really exist1 and  
every ,italian knows  how great were the
 effects of ,colletta's and ,balbo's    
histories and the  like during the      
period of the ,risorgimento1 and        
everyone knows books  that have         
'inspired' him or inculcated in him the 
love of his own  country1 of his town   
and steeple4    ,this moral efficacy1   
which belongs to morality and not to    
history1 has  had so strong a hold upon 
the mind that the prejudice still       
survives  of assigning a moral function 
to history 7as also to poetry7 in the   
field of teaching4 ,this prejudice is   
still to be found inspiring even        
,labriola's pedagogic essay on ,the     
,teaching of ,history4 ,but if we  mean 
by the word 'history' both history that 
is thought as well as  that which1 on   

the contrary1 is poetry1 philology1 or  
moral will1 it  is clear that 'history' 
will enter the educational process not  
under  one form alone1 but under all    
these forms4 ,but as history proper it  
will only enter it under one of them1   
which is not that of moral  education1  
exclusively or abstractly considered1   
but of the education  or development of 
thought4        ,,iv      ,much is said1
 now even more than formerly1 of the    
necessity of a  'reform of history1' but
 to me there does not seem to be        
anything  to reform4 ,nothing to reform 
in the sense attributed to such a       
demand--namely1 that of moulding a new  
form of history or of creating  for the 
first time true history4 ,history is1   
has been1 and always  will be the same1 
what we have called living history1     
history that is  7ideally7 contemporary2
 and chronicle1 philological history1   
poetical  history1 and 7let us call it  
history nevertheless7 practicistical    
history are1 have been1 and always will 

be the same4 ,those who  undertake the  
task of creating a new history always   
succeed in setting  up philological     
history against poetical history1 or    
poetical history  against philological  
history1 or contemporary history against
 both  of them1 and so on4 ,unless1     
indeed1 as is the case with ,buckle and 
the many tiresome sociologists and      
positivists of the last ten years1  they
 lament with great pomposity and no less
 lack of intelligence as  to what       
history is that it lacks the capacity of
 observation and of  experiment 7that is
 to say1 the naturalistic abstraction of
 observation  and experiment71 boasting 
that they 'reduce history to natural    
science'--that is to say1 by the        
employment of a circle1 as vicious as   
it is grotesque1 to a mental form which 
is its pale derivative4    ,in another  
sense1 everything is certainly to be    
reformed in  history1 and history is at 
every moment labouring to render herself
  perfect--that is to say1 is enriching 

herself and probing more deeply  into   
herself4 ,there is no history that      
completely satisfies us1  because any   
construction of ours generates new facts
 and new problems  and solicits new     
solutions4 ,thus the history of ,rome1  
of ,greece1 and  of ,christianity1 of   
the ,reformation1 of the ,french        
,revolution1 of  philosophy1 of         
literature1 and of any other subject is 
always being  told afresh and always    
differently4 ,but history reforms       
herself1  remaining herself always1 and 
the strength of her development lies    
precisely in thus enduring4    ,the     
demand for radical or abstract reform   
also cannot be given that  other meaning
 of a reform of the 'idea of history1'  
of the discovery  that is to be made or 
is finally made of the true concept of  
history4 ,at all periods the distinction
 has to some extent been  made between  
histories that are histories and those  
others that  are works of imagination or
 chronicles4 ,this could be demonstrated

  from the observations met with at all 
times among historians and              
methodologists1 and from the confessions
 that even the most confused of  them   
involuntarily let fall4 ,it is also to  
be inferred with certainty  from the    
nature itself of the human spirit1      
although the words in  which those      
distinctions are expressed have not been
 written or are  not preserved4 ,and    
such a concept and distinction are      
renewed at  every moment by history     
itself1 which becomes ever more copious1
 more  profound4 ,this is to be looked  
upon as certain1 and is for that matter 
made evident by the history of          
historiography1 which has certainly     
accomplished some progress since the    
days of ,diogenes of ,halicarnassus  and
 of ,cicero to those of ,hegel and of   
,humboldt4 ,other problems have  been   
formed in our own day1 some of which ,i 
attempt to solve in this  book4 ,i am   
well aware that it affords solutions    
only to some among the  many1 and       

especially that it does not solve       
7simply because it cannot7  those that  
are not yet formed1 but which will      
inevitably be formed in  the future4    
,in any case it will be thought that the
 clearness acquired by the  historical  
consciousness as to the nature of its   
own work will at  least avail to destroy
 the erroneous forms of history1 that   
since we  have shown that philological  
history or chronicle is not history1 and
  that poetical history is poetry and   
not history1 the 'facts' that           
correspond to those beliefs must        
disappear1 or become ever more limited  
in extension1 to the point of           
disappearing altogether in a near or    
distant future1 as catapults have       
disappeared before guns and as we see   
carriages disappearing before1          
automobiles4    ,and this would be truly
 possible were these erroneous forms to 
become  concrete in 'facts1' were they  
not1 as ,i have said above1 mere        
'claims4' ,if error and evil were a     

fact1 humanity would have long ago      
abolished it--that is to say1 superseded
 it1 in the same way as it has          
superseded slavery and serfdom and the  
method of simple barter and so  many    
other things that were facts1 that is to
 say1 its own transitory  forms4 ,but   
error 7and evil1 which is one with it7  
is not a fact2 it  does not possess     
empirical existence2 it is nothing but  
the negative or  dialectical moment of  
the spirit1 necessary for the           
concreteness of the  positive moment1   
for the reality of the spirit4 ,for this
 reason it is  eternal and              
indestructible1 and to destroy it by    
abstraction 7since it  cannot be done by
 thought7 is equivalent to imagining the
 death of the  spirit1 as confirmed in  
the saying that abstraction is death4   
,and without occupying further space    
with the ex-position of a doctrine  that
 would entail too wide a digression1#a  
,i shall observe that a  glance at the  
history of history proves the salutary  

nature of error1  which is not a        
,caliban1 but rather an ,ariel1 who     
breathes everywhere1  calling forth and 
exciting1 but can never be grasped as a 
solid thing4  ,and with a view to       
seeking examples only in those general  
forms that  have been hitherto examined1
 polemical and tendencious              
historiography  is certainly to be      
termed error4 ,this prevailed during the
 period of  the enlightenment1 and      
reduced history to a pleading against   
priests  and tyrants4 ,but who would    
have wished simply to return from this  
to  the learned and apathetic history of
 the ,benedictines and of the other     
authors of folios8 ,the polemic and its 
direction expressed the need  for living
 history1 though not in an altogether   
satisfactory form1  and this need was   
followed by the creation of a new       
historiography  during the period of    
romanticism4 ,the type of merely        
philological  history1 promulgated in   
,germany after #ahbj1 and afterward     

disseminated  throughout ,europe1 was   
also certainly error2 but it was        
likewise an  instrument of liberation   
from the more or less fantastic and     
arbitrary  histories improvised by the  
philosophers4 ,but who would wish to    
turn  back from them to the             
'philosophies of history'8 ,the type of 
history1  sometimes tendencious1 but    
more often poetical1 which followed in  
the  wake of the national ,italian      
movement1 was also error--that is to    
say1  it led to the loss of historical  
calm4 ,but that poetical consciousness  
which surpassed itself when laying claim
 to historical truth was  bound sooner  
or later to generate 7as had been the   
case on a larger  scale in the          
eighteenth century7 a history linked    
with the interests  of life without     
becoming servile and allowing itself to 
be led away  by the phantoms of love and
 hate suggested by them4 ,further       
examples  could be adduced1 but the     
example of examples is that which       

happens  within each of us when we are  
dealing with historical material4 ,we   
see our sympathies and antipathies arise
 in turn as we proceed 7our  poetical   
history71 our intentions as practical   
men 7our rhetorical  history71 our      
chroniclistical memories 7our           
philological history72 we  mentally     
supersede these forms in turn1 and in   
doing so find ourselves  in possession  
of a new and more profound historical   
truth4 ,thus does  history affirm       
itself1 distinguishing itself from      
non-histories and  conquering the       
dialectical moments which arise from    
these4 ,it was  for this reason that ,i 
said that there is never anything of    
anything  to reform in the abstract1 but
 everything of everything in the        
concrete4      #a ,see ,logic as        
,science of ,pure ,concept4--,d4 ,a4    
,,iii      ,,history ,,as ,,history ,,of
 ,,the ,,universal ,,criticism ,,of     
',,universal ,,history      ,i          
,returning from this dialectical round  

to the concept of history as            
'contemporary history1' a new doubt     
assails and torments us4 ,for if  the   
proof given has freed that concept from 
one of the most insistent  forms of     
historical scepticism 7the scepticism   
that arises from the  lack of           
reliability of 'testimony'71 it does not
 seem that it has been  freed or ever   
can be freed from that other form of    
scepticism1 more  properly termed       
'agnosticism1' which does not absolutely
 deny the truth  of history1 but denies 
to it complete truth4 ,but in ultimate  
analysis  this is to deny to it real    
knowledge1 because unsound knowledge1   
half  knowledge1 also reduces the vigour
 of the part that it asserts to be      
known4 ,it is1 however1 commonly        
asserted that only a part of history1 a 
very small part1 is known to us3 a faint
 glimmer which renders yet more         
sensible the vast gloom that surrounds  
our knowledge on all sides4    ,in      
truth1 what do we know of the origins of

 ,rome or of the ,greek  states1 and of 
the people who preceded the ,greek and  
,roman  civilizations in those          
countries1 notwithstanding all the      
researches  of the learned8 ,and if a   
fragment of the life of these people    
does  remain to us1 how uncertain is its
 interpretation6 ,if some tradition  has
 been handed down to us1 how poor1      
confused1 and contradictory it  is6 ,and
 we know still less of the people who   
preceded those people1 of  the          
immigrations from ,asia and ,africa into
 ,europe or inversely1 and of  relations
 with other countries beyond the ocean1 
even with the ,atlantis  of the myths4  
,and the monogenesis or polygenesis of  
the human race is a  desperate          
head-splitter1 open to all conjectures4 
,the appearance upon  the earth of the  
genus homo is open to vain conjectures1 
as is his  affinity or relationship to  
the animals4 ,the history of the earth1 
of  the solar system1 of the whole      
cosmos1 is lost in the obscurity of its 

origin4 ,but obscurity does not dwell   
alone among the 'origins'2 the  whole of
 history1 even that of modern ,europe   
which is nearest to us1  is obscure4    
,who can really say what motives        
determined a ,danton or a  ,robespierre1
 a ,napoleon or an ,alexander of        
,russia8 ,and how numerous are  the     
obscurities and the lacun that relate to
 the acts themselves--that  is to say1  
to their externalization6 ,mountains of 
books have been  written upon the days  
of ,september1 upon the eighteenth of   
,brumaire1  upon the burning of ,moscow2
 but who can tell how these things      
really  happened8 ,even those who were  
direct witnesses are not able to say1   
for  they have handed down to us diverse
 and conflicting narratives4 ,but  let  
us leave great history4 ,will it not at 
least be possible for us to  know a     
little history completely1 we will not  
say that of our country1  of our town1  
or of our family1 but the least little  
history of any one  of ourselves3 what  

he really wanted when 7many years ago or
 yesterday7  he abandoned himself to    
this or that motive of passion1 and     
uttered  this or that word2 how he      
reached this or that particular         
conclusion  or decided upon some        
particular course of action2 whether the
 motives  that urged him in a particular
 direction were lofty or base1 moral or 
egoistic1 inspired by duty or by vanity1
 pure or impure8    ,it is enough to    
make one lose one's head1 as those      
scrupulous people  are aware1 who the   
more they attempt to perfect their      
examination  of conscience the more they
 are confused4 ,no other counsel can be 
offered to them than that of examining  
themselves certainly1 but not  overmuch1
 of looking rather ahead than behind1 or
 only looking behind  to the extent that
 it is necessary to look4 ,we certainly 
know our own  history and that of the   
world that surrounds us1 but how little 
and how  meagrely in comparison with our
 infinite desire for knowledge6    ,the 

best way of ending this vexation of     
spirit is that which ,i have  followed1 
that of pushing it to its extreme limit1
 and then of  imagining for a moment    
that all the interrogations mentioned1  
together  with the infinite others that 
could be mentioned1 have been satisfied2
  satisfied as interrogations that      
continued to the infinite can be        
satisfied--that is to say1 by affording 
an immediate answer to them1  one after 
the other1 and by causing the spirit to 
enter the path of a  vertiginous process
 of satisfactions1 always obtained to   
the infinite4  ,now1 were all those     
interrogations satisfactorily answered1 
were we  in possession of all the       
answers to them1 what should we do8 ,the
 road  of progress to the infinite is as
 wide as that to hell1 and if it  does  
not lead to hell it certainly leads to  
the madhouse4 ,and that  infinite1 which
 grows bigger the moment we first touch 
it1 does not  avail us2 indeed it fills 
us with fear4 ,only the poor finite     

assists  us1 the determined1 the        
concrete1 which is grasped by thought   
and which  lends itself as base for our 
existence and as point of departure for 
our action4 ,thus even were all the     
particular infinities of infinite       
history offered for the gratification of
 our desire1 there would be  nothing    
else left for us to do but to clear our 
minds of them1 to  forget them1 and to  
concentrate upon that particular point  
alone  which corresponds to a problem   
and constitutes living1 active history1 
contemporary history4    ,and this is   
what the spirit in its development      
accomplishes1 because  there is no fact 
that is not known at the moment of its  
being done1 by  means of the            
consciousness that germinates           
perpetually upon action2  and there is  
no fact that is not forgotten sooner or 
later1 but may  be recalled1 as we      
remarked when speaking of dead history  
revived at  the touch of life1 of the   
past that by means of the               

contemporaneous  becomes again          
contemporaneous4 ,tolstoi got this      
thought fixed in his  mind3 not only is 
no one1 not even a ,napoleon1 able to   
predetermine  with exactitude the       
happenings of a battle1 but no one can  
know how  it really did happen1 because 
on the very evening of its ending an    
artificial1 legendary history appears1  
which only a credulous spirit  could    
mistake for real history2 yet it is upon
 this that professional  historians     
work1 integrating or tempering          
imagination with imagination4  ,but the 
battle is known as it gradually         
develops1 and then as the  turmoil that 
it causes is dissipated1 so too is      
dissipated the turmoil  of that         
consciousness1 and the only thing of    
importance is the  actuality of the new 
situation and the 'new disposition of   
soul that  has been produced1 expressed 
in poetical legends or availing itself  
of artificial fictions4 ,and each one of
 us at every moment knows and  forgets  

the majority of his thoughts and acts   
7what a misfortune  it would be if he   
did not do so1 for his life would be a  
tiresome  computation of his smallest   
movements672 but he does not forget1 and
  preserves for a greater or less time1 
those thoughts and sentiments  which    
represent memorable crises and problems 
relating to his future4  ,sometimes we  
assist with astonishment at the         
awakening in us of  sentiments and      
thoughts that we had believed to be     
irrevocable4 ,thus  it must be said that
 we know at every moment all the history
 that we  need to know2 and since what  
remains over does not matter to us1 we  
do  not possess the means of knowing it1
 or we shall possess it when the  need  
arises4 ,that 'remaining' history is the
 eternal phantom of the  'thing in      
itself1' which is neither 'thing' nor   
'in itself1' but only  the imaginative  
projection of the infinity of our action
 and of our  knowledge4    ,the         
imaginative projection of the thing in  

itself1 with the agnosticism  that is   
its result1 is caused in philosophy by  
the natural sciences1  which posit a    
reality made extrinsic and material and 
therefore  unintelligible4 ,chroniclism 
also occasions historical agnosticism   
in an analogous manner at the           
naturalistic moment of history1 for  it 
posits a dead and unintelligible        
history4 ,allowing itself to be  seduced
 by this allurement it strays from the  
path of concrete truth1  while the soul 
feels itself suddenly filled with       
infinite questions1  most vain and      
desperate4 ,in like manner1 he who      
strays from or has  not yet entered the 
fruitful path of a diligent life1 feels 
his soul  full to overflowing of        
infinite desires1 of actions that cannot
 be  realized1 of pleasures out of      
reach1 and consequently suffers the     
pains  of a ,tantalus4 ,but the wisdom  
of life warns us not to lose ourselves  
in absurd desires1 as the wisdom of     
thought warns us not to lose  ourselves 

in problems that are vain4        ,,ii  
,but if we cannot know anything but the 
finite and the particular1  always      
indeed only this particular and this    
finite1 must we then  renounce 7a       
dolorous renunciation #a7 knowledge of  
universal history8  ,without doubt1 but 
with the double corollary that we are   
renouncing  what we have never          
possessed1 because we could not possess 
it1 and that  in consequence such       
renunciation is not at all painful4     
',universal history1' too1 is not a     
concrete act or tact1 but a 'claim1'    
and a claim due to chroniclism and to   
its 'thing in itself1' and  to the      
strange proposal of closing the infinite
 progression1 which  had been improperly
 opened1 by means of progress to the    
infinite4  ,universal history really    
tries to form a picture of all the      
things  that have happened to the human 
race1 from its origins upon the earth   
to the present moment4 ,indeed1 it      
claims to do this from the origin of    

things1 or the creation1 to the end of  
the world1 since it would not  otherwise
 be truly universal4 ,hence its tendency
 to fill the abysses  of prehistory and 
of the origins with theological or      
naturalistic  fictions and to trace     
somehow the future1 either with         
revelations  and prophecies1 as in      
,christian universal history 7which went
 as far  as ,antichrist and the ,last   
,judgment71 or with previsions1 as in   
the  universal histories of positivism1 
democratism1 and socialism4    ,such was
 its claim1 but the result turns out to 
be different from  the intention1 and it
 gets what it can--that is to say1 a    
chronicle  that is always more or less  
of a mixture1 or a poetical history     
expressing some aspiration of the heart 
of man1 or a true and proper  history1  
which is not universal1 but particular1 
although it  embraces the lives of many 
peoples and of many times4 ,most        
frequently  these different elements are
 to be discerned side by side in the    

same literary composition4 ,omitting    
chronicles more or less wide in  scope  
7though always narrow71 poetical        
histories1 and the various              
contaminations of several different     
forms1 we immediately perceive1  not as 
a result of logical deduction alone1 but
 with a simple glance  at any one of the
 'universal histories1' that 'universal 
histories1'  in so far as they are      
histories1 or in that part of them in   
which they  are histories1 resolve      
themselves into nothing else but        
particular  histories'--that is to say1 
they are due to a particular interest   
centred in a particular problem1 and    
comprehend only those facts that  form  
part of that interest and afford an     
answer to that particular  problem4 ,for
 antiquity the example of the work of   
,polybius should  suffice for all1 since
 it was he who most vigorously insisted 
upon  the need for a 'universal history'
 7 1      74 ,for the ,christian period 
we may cite the ,civitas  ,dei of       

,augustine1 and for modern times the    
,philosophy of ,history  of ,hegel 7he  
also called it universal history1 or    
philosophische  ,weltgeschichte74 ,but  
we observe here that the universal      
history which  ,polybius desired and    
created was that more vast1 more        
complex1 more  political1 and graver    
history which ,roman hegemony and the   
formation  of the ,roman world required1
 and therefore that it embraced only    
those  peoples which came into relation 
and conflict with ,rome1 and limited    
itself almost altogether to the history 
of political institutions and  of       
military dispositions1 according to the 
spiritual tendencies of  the author4    
,augustine1 in his turn1 attempted to   
render intelligible  the penetration of 
,paganism by ,christianity1 and with    
this object in  view he made use of the 
idea of two enemy cities1 the           
terrestrial  and the celestial1 of which
 the first was sometimes the adversary  
of  and sometimes preparatory to the    

second4 ,finally1 ,hegel treated the    
same problem in his universal history as
 in his particular history  of          
philosophy--that is to say1 the manner  
in which the spirit of a  philosophy of 
servitude to nature1 or to the          
transcendental ,god1 has  elevated      
itself to the consciousness of liberty4 
,he cut out prehistory  from the        
philosophy of history1 as he had cut it 
out from the history  of philosophy1 and
 considered ,oriental history very      
summarily1 since it  did not offer much 
of interest to the prosecution of his   
design4    ,naturalistic or cosmological
 romances will always be composed by    
those  who feel inspired to write them1 
and they will always find eager and     
appreciative readers1 especially among  
the lazy1 who are pleased to  possess   
the 'secret of the world' in a few      
pages4 ,and more or less  vast          
compilations will always be made of the 
histories of the ,east  and the ,west1  
of the ,americas and ,africa and        

,oceania4 ,the strength  of a single    
individual does not suffice for these1  
even as regards  their compilation1 so  
we now find groups of learned men or    
compilers  associated in that object 7as
 though to give ocular evidence of the  
absence of all intimate connexion74 ,we 
have even seen recently certain         
attempts at universal histories arranged
 on geographical principles1  like so   
many histories set side by              
side--,european1 ,asiatic1 ,african1    
and so on--which insensibly assume the  
form of a historical dictionary4  ,and  
this or that particular history can     
always usefully take the name  of a     
'universal history1' in the old sense of
 ,polybius--that is to  say1 as opposed 
to books that are less actual1 less     
serious1 and less  satisfactory1 the    
books of those 'writers of particular   
things' 7      7 who are led to make    
little things great  7   7 and to       
indulge in lengthy anecdotes unworthy   
of being recorded 7    71 and that owing

 to the  lack of a criterion 7' 74 ,in  
this sense1 those times and  peoples    
whose politico-social development had   
produced1 as it were1  a narrowing of   
the historical circle would be well     
advised to break  away from minute      
details and to envisage 'universal      
history'--that  is to say1 a vaster     
history1 which lies beyond particular   
histories4  ,this applies in particular 
to our ,italy1 which1 since it had a    
universalistic function at the time of  
the ,renaissance1 had universal  vision1
 and told the history of all the peoples
 in its own way1 and  then limited      
itself to local history1 then again     
elevated itself  to national history1   
and should now1 even more than in the   
past1  extend itself over the vast      
fields of the history of all times past 
and present4 ,but the word 'universal1' 
which has value for the ends  above     
mentioned1 will never designate the     
possession of a 'universal  history1' in
 the sense that we have refused to it4  

,such a history  disappears in the world
 of illusions1 together with similar    
,utopias1  such1 for instance1 as the   
art that should serve as model for all  
times1 or universal justice valid for   
all time4      ,,iii    ,but in the same
 way that by the dissipation of the     
illusion of  universal art and of       
universal justice the intrinsically     
universal  character of particular art  
and of particular justice is not        
cancelled  7of the ,iliad or of the     
constitution of the ,roman family71 to  
negate  universal history does not mean 
to negate the universal in history4     
,here1 too1 must be repeated what was   
said of the vain search for ,god        
throughout the infinite series of the   
finite and found at every point  of it3 
,und du bist ganz vor mir6 ,that        
particular and that finite  is          
determined1 in its particularity and    
finitude1 by thought1 and  therefore    
known together with the universal1 the  
universal in that  particular form4 ,the

 merely finite and particular does not  
exist  save as an abstraction4 ,there is
 no abstract finite in poetry and in    
art itself1 which is the reign of the   
individual2 but there is the  ingenuous 
finite1 which is the undistinguished    
unity of finite and  infinite1 which    
will be distinguished in the sphere of  
thought and  will in that way attain to 
a more lofty form of unity4 ,and history
  is thought1 and1 as such1 thought of  
the universal1 of the universal  in its 
concreteness1 and therefore always      
determined in a particular  manner4     
,there is no fact1 however small it be1 
that can be otherwise  conceived        
7realized and qualified7 than as        
universal4 ,in its most  simple         
form--that is to say1 in its essential  
form--history expresses  itself with    
judgments1 inseparable syntheses of     
individual and  universal4 ,and the     
individual is called the subject of the 
judgment1  the universal the predicate1 
by old terminological tradition1  which 

it will perhaps be convenient to        
preserve4 ,but for him who  dominates   
words with thought1 the true subject of 
history is just  the predicate1 and the 
true predicate the subject--that is to  
say1 the universal is determined in the 
judgment by individualizing  it4 ,if    
this argument seems too abstruse and    
amounts to a philosophical  subtlety1 it
 may be rendered obvious and altogether 
different from  a private possession of 
those known as philosophers by means of 
the  simple observation that everyone   
who reflects1 upon being asked what is  
the subject of the history of poetry1   
will certainly not reply ,dante  or     
,shakespeare1 or ,italian or ,english   
poetry1 or the series of poems  that are
 known to us1 but poetry--that is to    
say1 a universal2 and  again1 when asked
 what is the subject of social and      
political history1  the answer will not 
be ,greece or ,rome1 ,france or         
,germany1 or even all  these and others 
such combined1 but culture1             

civilization1 progress1  liberty1 or any
 other similar word--that is to say1 a  
universal4    ,and here we can remove a 
great stumbling-block to the recognition
  of the identity of philosophy with    
history4 ,i have attempted to  renovate1
 modify1 and establish this doctrine    
with many analyses and  with many       
arguments in another volume of my       
works4#a ,it is1 however1  frequently   
very difficult1 being rather an object  
of irresistible  argument than of       
complete persuasion and adhesion4       
,seeking for the  various causes of this
 difficulty1 ,i have come upon one which
 seems  to me to be the principal and   
fundamental4 ,this is precisely the     
conception of history not as living     
contemporary history1 but as  history   
that is dead and belongs to the past1 as
 chronicle 7or  philological history1   
which1 as we know1 can be reduced to    
chronicle74  ,it is undeniable that when
 history is taken as chronicle its      
identity  with philosophy cannot be made

 clear to the mind1 because it does not 
exist4 ,but when chronicle has been     
reduced to its proper practical and     
mnemonical function1 and history has    
been raised to the knowledge of  the    
eternal present1 it reveals itself as   
all one with philosophy1  which for its 
part is never anything but the thought  
of the eternal  present4 ,this1 be it   
well understood1 provided always that   
the dualism  of ideas and facts has been
 superseded1 of vrits de raison and     
vrits de fait1 the concept of philosophy
 as contemplation of  vrits de raison1  
and that of history as the amassing of  
brute facts1  of coarse vrits de fait4  
,we have recently found this tenacious  
dualism in the act of renewing itself1  
disguised beneath the axiom that  le    
propre de l'histoire est de savoir1 le  
propre de la philosophie  est de        
comprendre4 ,this amounts to the absurd 
distinction of knowing  without         
understanding and of understanding      
without knowing1 which would  thus be   

the doubly dis-heartening theoretical   
fate of man4 ,but such a  dualism and   
the conception of the world which       
accompanies it1 far from  being true    
philosophy1 are the perpetual source    
whence springs that  imperfect attempt  
at philosophizing which is called       
religion when  one is within its magic  
circle1 mythology when one has left it4 
,will  it be useful to attack           
transcendency1 and to claim the         
character of  immanence for reality and 
for philosophy8 ,it will certainly be of
 use2  but ,i do not feel the necessity 
of doing so1 at any rate here and now4  
,and since history1 properly understood1
 abolishes the idea of a  universal     
history1 so philosophy1 immanent and    
identical with  history1 abolishes the  
idea of a universal philosophy--that is 
to  say1 of the closed system4 ,the two 
negations correspond and are  indeed    
fundamentally one 7because closed       
systems1 like universal  histories1 are 
cosmological romances71 and both receive

 empirical  confirmation from the       
tendency of the best spirits of our day 
to  refrain from 'universal histories'  
and from 'definitive systems1'  leaving 
both to compilers1 to believers1 and to 
the credulous of  every sort4 ,this     
tendency was implicit in the last great 
philosophy1  that of ,hegel1 but it was 
opposed in its own self by old survivals
  and altogether betrayed in execution1 
so that this philosophy also  converts  
itself into a cosmological romance4     
,thus it may be said  that what at the  
beginning of the nineteenth century was 
merely a  simple presentiment becomes   
changed into firm consciousness at  the 
beginning of the twentieth4 ,this defies
 the fears of the timid  lest the       
knowledge of the universal should be    
thus compromised1  and indeed maintains 
that only in this way can such knowledge
 be  truly and perpetually acquired1    
because dynamically obtained4 ,thus     
history becoming actual history and     
philosophy becoming historical          

philosophy have freed themselves1 the   
one from the anxiety of not  being able 
to know that which is not known1 only   
because it was or will  be known1 and   
the other from the despair of never     
being able to attain  to definite       
truth--that is to say1 both are freed   
from the phantom of  the 'thing in      
itself4'      #a ,in the ,logic1        
especially in ,part ,,ii1 ,chapter ,,iv4
          ,,iv      ,,ideal ,,genesis   
,,and ,,dissolution ,,of ,,the          
',,philosophy ,,of ,,history'        ,i 
,the conception of the so-called        
'philosophy of history' is perpetually  
opposed to and resisted by the          
deterministic conception of history4    
,not  only is this clearly to be seen   
from inspection1 but it is also quite   
evident logically1 because the          
'philosophy of history' represents the  
transcendental conception of the real1  
determinism the immanent4    ,but on    
examining the facts it is not less      
certain that historical  determinism    

perpetually generates the 'philosophy of
 history'2 nor  is this fact less       
evidently logical than the preceding1   
because  determinism is naturalism1 and 
therefore immanent1 certainly1 but      
insufficiently and falsely immanent4    
,hence it should rather be  said that it
 wishes to be1 but is not1 immanent1 and
 whatever its  efforts may be in the    
contrary direction1 it becomes converted
 into  transcendency4 ,all this does not
 present any difficulty to one who  has 
clearly in mind the conceptions of the  
transcendent and of the  immanent1 of   
the philosophy of history as            
transcendency and of the  deterministic 
or naturalistic conception of history as
 a false  immanence4 ,but it will be of 
use to see in more detail how this      
process  of agreements and oppositions  
is developed and solved with reference  
to  the problem of history4    ,first   
collect the facts1 then connect them    
causally2 this is the way  that the work
 of the historian is represented in the 

deterministic  conception4 ,aprs la     
collection des faits1 la recherche des  
causes1  to repeat the very common      
formula in the very words of one of the 
most  eloquent and picturesque theorists
 of that school1 ,taine4 ,facts are     
brute1 dense1 real indeed1 but not      
illumined with the light of science1    
not intellectualized4 ,this intelligible
 character must be conferred  upon them 
by means of the search for causes4 ,but 
it is very well known  what happens when
 one fact is linked to another as its   
cause1 forming a  chain of causes and   
effects3 we thus inaugurate an infinite 
regression1  and we never succeed in    
finding the cause or causes to which we 
can  finally attach the chain that we   
have been so industriously putting      
together4    ,some1 maybe many1 of the  
theorists of history get out of the     
difficulty  in a truly simple manner3   
they break or let fall at a certain     
point  their chain1 which is already    
broken at another point at the other    

end 7the effect which they have         
undertaken to consider74 ,they operate  
with their fragment of chain as though  
it were something perfect and  closed in
 itself1 as though a straight line      
divided at two points  should include   
space and be a figure4 ,hence1 too1 the 
doctrine that we  find among the        
methodologists of history3 that it is   
only necessary  for history to seek out 
'proximate' causes4 ,this doctrine is   
intended  to supply a logical foundation
 to the above process4 ,but who can ever
  say what are the 'proximate causes'8  
,thought1 since it is admitted  that it 
is unfortunately obliged to think       
according to the chain of  causes1 will 
never wish to know anything but 'true'  
causes1 be they  near or distant in     
space and time 7space1 like time1 ne    
fait rien   l'affaire74 ,in reality1    
this theory is a fig-leaf1 placed there 
to cover a proceeding of which the      
historian1 who is a thinker and a       
critic1 is ashamed1 an act of will which

 is useful1 but which for that  very    
reason is wilful4 ,the fig-leaf1        
however1 is a sign of modesty1 and  as  
such has its value1 because1 if shame be
 lost1 there is a risk that  it will    
finally be declared that the 'causes' at
 which an arbitrary  halt has been made 
are the 'ultimate' causes1 the 'true'   
causes1 thus  raising the caprice of the
 individual to the rank of an act       
creative  of the world1 treating it as  
though it were ,god1 the ,god of certain
  theologians1 whose caprice is truth4  
,i should not wish again to quote       
,taine just after having said this1 for 
he is a most estimable author1  not on  
account of his mental constitution1 but 
of his enthusiastic  faith in science2  
yet it suits me to quote him            
nevertheless4 ,taine1  in his search for
 causes1 having reached a cause which he
 sometimes  calls the 'race' and        
sometimes the 'age1' as for instance in 
his  history of ,english literature1    
when he reaches the concept of the  'man

 of the ,north' or ',german1' with the  
character and intellect that  would be  
suitable to such a person--coldness of  
the senses1 love  of abstract ideas1    
grossness of taste1 and contempt for    
order and  regularity--gravely affirms3 
,l s'arrte la recherche3 on est tomb    
sur quelque disposition primitive1 sur  
quelque trait propre  toutes  les       
sensations1  toutes les conceptions d'un
 sicle ou d'une race1 sur  quelque      
particularit insparable de toutes les   
dmarches de son esprit  et de son cour4 
,ce sont l les grandes causes1 les      
causes universelles  et permanentes4    
,what that primitive and insurmountable 
thing contained  was known to ,taine's  
imagination1 but criticism is ignorant  
of it2 for  criticism demands that the  
genesis of the facts or groups of facts 
designated as 'age' and 'race' should be
 given1 and in demanding their  genesis 
declares that they are neither          
'universal' nor 'permanent1'  because no
 universal and permanent 'facts' are    

known1 as far as ,i  am aware1 certainly
 not le ,germain and l'homme du ,nord2  
nor are  mummies facts1 though they last
 some thousands of years1 but not for   
ever--they change gradually1 but they do
 change4    ,thus whoever adopts the    
deterministic conception of history1    
provided  that he decides to abstain    
from cutting short the inquiry that he  
has  undertaken in an arbitrary and     
fanciful manner1 is of necessity obliged
  to recognize that the method adopted  
does not attain the desired end4  ,and  
since he has begun to think history1    
although by means of an  insufficient   
method1 no course remains to him save   
that of beginning  all over again and   
following a different path1 or that of  
going  forward but changing his         
direction4 ,the naturalistic            
presupposition1  which still holds its  
ground 7first collect the facts1 then   
seek  the causes3 what is more evident  
and more unavoidable than that871       
necessarily leads to the second         

alternative4 ,but to adopt the second   
alternative is to supersede determinism1
 it is to transcend nature  and its     
causes1 it is to propose a method       
opposite to that hitherto               
followed--that is to say1 to renounce   
the category of cause for  another1     
which cannot be anything but that of    
end1 an extrinsic and  transcendental   
end1 which is the analogous opposite1   
corresponding to  the cause4 ,now the   
search for the transcendental end is the
 'philosophy  of history4'    ,the      
consequent naturalist 7,i mean by this  
he who 'continues to think1'  or1 as is 
generally said1 to draw the             
consequences7 cannot avoid this         
inquiry1 nor does he ever avoid it1 in  
whatever manner he conceive  his new    
inquiry4 ,this he cannot even do1 when  
he tries1 by declaring  that the end or 
'ultimate cause' is unknowable1 because 
7as elsewhere  remarked7 an unknowable  
affirmed is an unknowable in some way   
known4  ,naturalism is always crowned   

with a philosophy of history1 whatever  
its mode of formulation3 whether it     
explain the universe as composed  of    
atoms that strike one another and       
produce history by means of their       
various shocks and gyrations1 to which  
they can also put an end by  returning  
to their primitive state of dispersion1 
whether the hidden  ,god be termed      
,matter or the ,unconscious or something
 else1 or whether1  finally1 ,he be     
conceived as an ,intelligence which     
avails itself of  the chain of causes in
 order to actualize ,his counsels4 ,and 
every  philosopher of history is on the 
other hand a naturalist1 because he  is 
a dualist and conceives a ,god and a    
world1 an idea and a fact in  addition  
to or beneath the ,idea1 a kingdom of   
ends and a kingdom or  sub-kingdom of   
causes1 a celestial city and one that is
 more or less  diabolical or terrene4   
,take any deterministic historical work 
and you  will find or discover in it1   
explicit or understood1 transcendency   

7in  ,taine1 for example1 it goes by the
 name of 'race' or of 'sicle1'  which   
are true and proper deities72 take any  
work of 'philosophy of  history' and    
dualism and naturalism will be found    
there 7in ,hegel1 for  example1 when he 
admits rebellious and impotent facts    
which resist or  are unworthy the       
dominion of the idea74 ,and we shall see
 more and more  clearly how from the    
entrails of naturalism comes inevitably 
forth the  'philosophy of history4'     
,,ii      ,but the 'philosophy of       
history' is just as contradictory as the
  deterministic conception from which it
 arises and to which it is  opposed4    
,having both accepted and superseded the
 method of linking  brute facts         
together1 it no longer finds facts to   
link 7for these  have already been      
linked together1 as well as might be1 by
 means  of the category of cause71 but  
brute facts1 on which it must confer    
rather a 'meaning' than a linking1      
representing them as aspects of a       

transcendental process1 a theophany4    
,now those facts1 in so far as  they are
 brute facts1 are mute1 and the         
transcendency of the process  requires  
an organ1 not that of thought that      
thinks or produces facts1  but an       
extra-logical organ1 in order to be     
conceived and represented  7such1 for   
example1 as thought which proceeds      
abstractly a priori1  in the manner of  
,fichte71 and this is not to be found in
 the spirit1  save as a negative moment1
 as the void of effective logical       
thought4  ,the void of logical thought  
is immediately filled with praxis1 or   
what is called sentiment1 which then    
appears as poetry1 by theoretical       
refraction4 ,there is an evident        
poetical character running through all  
'philosophies of history4' ,those of    
antiquity represented historical  events
 as strife between the gods of certain  
peoples or of certain  races or         
protectors of certain individuals1 or   
between the god of light  and truth and 

the powers of darkness and lies4 ,they  
thus expressed the  aspirations of      
peoples1 groups1 or individuals toward  
hegemony1 or of  man toward goodness and
 truth4 ,the most modern of modern forms
 is that  inspired by various national  
and ethical feelings 7the ,italian1 the 
,germanic1 the ,slav1 etc471 or which   
represents the course of history as     
leading to the kingdom of liberty1 or as
 the passage from the ,eden of          
primitive communism1 through the ,middle
 ,ages of slavery1 servitude1 and       
wages1 toward the restoration of        
communism1 which shall no longer be     
unconscious but conscious1 no longer    
,edenic but human4 ,in poetry1 facts    
are no longer facts but words1 not      
reality but images1 and so there  would 
be no occasion to censure them1 if it   
remained pure poetry4  ,but it does not 
so remain1 because those images and     
words are placed  there as ideas and    
facts--that is to say1 as myths3        
progress1 liberty1  economy1 technique1 

science are myths1 in so far as they are
 looked  upon as agents external to the 
facts4 ,they are myths no less than ,god
  and the ,devil1 ,mars and ,venus1     
,jove and ,baal1 or any other cruder    
forms  of divinity4 ,and this is the    
reason why the deterministic conception1
  after it has produced the 'philosophy 
of history1' which opposes it1  is      
obliged to oppose its own daughter in   
its turn1 and to appeal from  the realm 
of ends to that of causal connexions1   
from imagination to  observation1 from  
myths to facts4    ,the reciprocal      
confutation of historical determinism   
and the philosophy  of history1 which   
makes of each a void or a nothing--that 
is to say1  a single void or            
nothing--seems to the eclectics as usual
 to be the  reciprocal fulfilment of two
 entities1 which effect or should effect
  an alliance for mutual support4 ,and  
since eclecticism flourishes in         
contemporary philosophy1 mutato nomine1 
it is not surprising that  besides the  

duty of investigating the causes to     
history also is  assigned that of       
ascertaining the 'meaning' or the       
'general plan' of  the course of history
 7see the works on the philosophy of    
history of  ,labriola1 ,simmel1 and     
,rickert74 ,since1 too1 writers on      
method are  wont to be empirical and    
therefore eclectic1 we find that with   
them  also history is divided into the  
history which unites and criticizes     
documents and reconstructs events1 and  
'philosophy of history' 7see            
,bernheim's manual1 typical of all of   
them74 ,finally1 since ordinary  thought
 is eclectic1 nothing is more easy than 
to find agreement as to  the thesis that
 simple history1 which presents the     
series of facts1  does not suffice1 but 
that it is necessary that thought should
 return  to the already constituted     
chain of events1 in order to discover   
there the hidden design and to answer   
the questions as to whence we  come and 
whither we go4 ,this amounts to saying  

that a 'philosophy of  history' must be 
posited side by side with history4 ,this
 eclecticism1  which gives substance to 
two opposite voids and makes them join  
hands1 sometimes attempts to surpass    
itself and to mingle those two          
fallacious sciences or parts of science4
 ,then we hear 'philosophy of  history' 
defended1 but with the caution that it  
must be conducted with  'scientific' and
 'positive' method1 by means of the     
search for the  cause1 thus revealing   
the action of divine reason or          
providence4#a  ,ordinary thought quickly
 consents to this programme1 but        
afterward  fails to carry it out4#b     
,there is nothing new here either for   
those who know3 'philosophy  of history'
 to be constructed by means of 'positive
 methods1'  transcendency to be         
demonstrated by means of the methods of 
false  immanence1 is the exact          
equivalent in the field of historical   
studies  to that metaphysic to be       
constructed by means of the experimental

  method which was recommended by the   
neocritics 7,zeller and others71  for it
 claimed1 not indeed to supersede two   
voids that reciprocally  confute one    
another1 but to make them agree         
together1 and1 after  having given      
substance to them1 to combine them in a 
single substance4  ,i should not like to
 describe the impossibilities contained 
in the  above as the prodigies of an    
alchemist 7the metaphor seems to be too 
lofty71 but rather as the medleys of bad
 cooks4      #a ,see1 for example1 the  
work of ,flint2 but since1 less radical 
than  ,flint1 ,hegel and the ,hegelians 
themselves also ended in admitting the  
concourse of the two opposed methods1   
traces of this perversion are  also to  
be found in their 'philosophies of      
history4' ,here1 too1 is to  be noted   
the false analogy by which ,hegel was   
led to discover the same  relation      
between a priori and historical facts as
 between mathematics  and natural facts3
 ,man muss mit dem ,kreise dessen1 worin

 die  ,prinzipien fallen1 wenn man es so
 nennen will1 a priori vertraut sein1   
so gut als ,kepler mit den ,ellipsen1   
mit ,kuben und ,quadraten und mit den   
,gedanken von ,verhltnissen derselben a 
priori schon vorher bekannt  sein       
musste1 ehe er aus den empirischen      
,daten seine unsterblichen  ,gesetze1   
welche aus ,bestimmungen jener ,kreise  
von ,vorstellungen  bestehen1 erfinden  
konnte4 7,cf4 ,vorles4 b4 d4 ,philos1 d4
 ,gesch41  ed4 ,brunstd1 pp4 #ajg-ajh47 
#b ,not even the above-mentioned ,flint 
carried it out1 for he lost  him-self in
 preliminaries of historical            
documentation and never  proceeded to   
the promised construction4        ,,iii 
,the true remedy for the contradictions 
of historical determinism and of  the   
'philosophy of history' is quite other  
than this4 ,to obtain it1 we  must      
accept the result of the preceding      
confutation1 which shows that  both are 
futile1 and reject1 as lacking thought1 
both the 'designs'  of the philosophy of

 history and the causal chains of       
determinism4  ,when these two shadows   
have been dispersed we shall find       
ourselves  at the starting-place3 we are
 again face to face with disconnected   
brute facts1 with facts that are        
connected1 but not understood1 for      
which determinism had tried to employ   
the cement of causality1 the            
'philosophy of history1' the magic wand 
of finality4 ,what shall we  do with    
these facts8 ,how shall we make them    
clear rather than dense  as they were1  
organic rather than inorganic1          
intelligible rather  than               
unintelligible8 ,truly1 it seems        
difficult to do anything with  them1    
especially to effect their desired      
transformation4 ,the spirit  is helpless
 before that which is1 or is supposed to
 be1 external to  it4 ,and when facts   
are understood in that way we are apt to
 assume  again that attitude of contempt
 of the philosophers for history which  
has been well-nigh constant since       

antiquity almost to the end of the      
eighteenth century 7for ,aristotle      
history was less philosophical and  less
 serious than poetry1 for ,sextus       
,empiricus it was unmethodical          
material2 ,kant did not feel or         
understand history74 ,the attitude      
amounts to this3 leave ideas to the     
philosophers and brute facts to the     
historians--let us be satisfied with    
serious things and leave their  toys to 
the children4    ,but before having     
recourse to such a temptation1 it will  
be prudent  to ask counsel of methodical
 doubt 7which is always most useful71   
and  to direct the attention precisely  
upon those brute and disconnected  facts
 from which the causal method claims to 
start and before which we1  who are now 
abandoned by it and by its complement1  
the philosophy of  history1 appear to   
find ourselves again4 ,methodical doubt 
will suggest  above all things the      
thought that those facts are a          
presupposition  that has not been       

proved1 and it will lead to the inquiry 
as to  whether the proof can be         
obtained4 ,having attempted the proof1  
we  shall finally arrive at the         
conclusion that those facts really do   
not  exist4    ,for who1 as a matter of 
fact1 affirms their existence8          
,precisely the  spirit1 at the moment   
when it is about to undertake the search
 for  causes4 ,but when accomplishing   
that act the spirit does not already    
possess the brute facts 7d'abord la     
collection des faits7 and then  seek the
 causes 7aprs1 la recherche des causes72
 but it makes  the facts brute by that  
very act--that is to say1 it posits them
  itself in that way1 because it is of  
use to it so to posit them4  ,the search
 for causes1 undertaken by history1 is  
not in any way  different from the      
procedure of naturalism1 already several
 times  illustrated1 which abstractly   
analyses and classifies reality4 ,and   
to illustrate abstractly and to classify
 implies at the same time to  judge in  

classifying--that is to say1 to treat   
facts1 not as acts of  the spirit1      
conscious in the spirit that thinks     
them1 but as external  brute facts4 ,the
 ,divine ,comedy is that poem which we  
create again  in our imagination in all 
its particulars as we read it and which 
we  understand critically as a          
particular determination of the spirit1 
and to which we therefore assign its    
place in history1 with all its          
surroundings and all its relations4 ,but
 when this actuality of our  thought and
 imagination has come to an end--that is
 to say1 when that  mental process is   
completed--we are able1 by means of a   
new act of  the spirit1 separately to   
analyse its elements4 ,thus1 for        
instance1  we shall classify the        
concepts relating to ',florentine       
civilization1'  or to 'political        
poetry1' and say that the ,divine       
,comedy was an  effect of ,florentine   
civilization1 and this in its turn an   
effect  of the strife of the communes1  

and the like4 ,we shall also thus  have 
prepared the way for those absurd       
problems which used to annoy  de        
,sanctis so much in relation to the work
 of ,dante1 and which he  admirably     
described when he said that they arise  
only when lively  sthetic expression has
 grown cold and poetical work has fallen
 into  the hands of dullards addicted to
 trifles4 ,but if we stop in time and   
do not enter the path of those          
absurdities1 if we restrict ourselves   
purely and simply to the naturalistic   
moment1 to classification1 and  to the  
classificatory judgment 7which is also  
causal connexion71 in an  altogether    
practical manner1 without drawing any   
deductions from it1 we  shall have done 
nothing that is not perfectly           
legitimate2 indeed1 we  shall be        
exercising our right and bowing to a    
rational necessity1 which  is that of   
naturalizing1 when naturalization is of 
use1 but not beyond  those limits4 ,thus
 the materialization of the facts and   

the external  or causal binding of them 
together are altogether justified as    
pure  naturalism4 ,and even the maxim   
which bids us to stop at 'proximate'    
causes--that is to say1 not to force    
classification so far that it  loses all
 practical utility--will find its       
justification4 ,to place  the concept of
 the ,divine ,comedy in relation to that
 of ',florentine  civilization' may be  
of use1 but it will be of no use        
whatever1  or infinitely less use1 to   
place it in relation to the class of    
',indo-,european civilization' or to the
 'civilization of the white man4'       
,,iv      ,let us then return with      
greater confidence to the point of      
departure1  the true point of           
departure--that is to say1 not to that  
of facts  already disorganized and      
naturalized1 but to that of the mind    
that thinks and constructs the fact4    
,let us raise up the debased            
countenances of the calumniated 'brute  
facts1' and we shall see the  light of  

thought resplendent upon their          
foreheads4 ,and that true point  of     
departure will reveal itself not merely 
as a point of departure1 but  both as a 
point of arrival and of departure1 not  
as the first step in  historical        
construction1 but the whole of history  
in its construction1  which is also its 
self-construction4 ,historical          
determinism1 and all  the more          
'philosophy of history1' leave the      
reality of history behind  them1 though 
they directed their journey thither1 a  
journey which  became so erratic and so 
full of useless repetitions4    ,we     
shall make the ingenuous ,taine confess 
that what we are saying  is the truth   
when we ask him what he means by the    
collection des  faits and learn from him
 in reply that the collection in        
question  consists of two stages or     
moments1 in the first of which documents
  are revived in order to attain1       
travers la distance des temps1  l'homme 
vivant1 agissant1 dou de passions1 muni 

d'habitudes1 avec  sa voix et sa        
physionomie1 avec ses gestes et ses     
habits1 distinct  et complet comme celui
 que tout  l'heure nous avons quitt dans
 la  rue2 and in the second is sought   
and found sous l'homme extrieur  l'homme
 intrieur1 l'homme invisible1 le centre1
 le groupe des  facults et des          
sentiments qui produit le reste1 le     
drame intrieur1  la psychologie4        
,something very different1 then1 from   
collections  de faits ,i ,if the things 
mentioned by our author really do come  
to  pass1 if we really do make live     
again in imagination individuals and    
events1 and if we think what is within  
them--that is to say1 if we  think the  
synthesis of intuition and concept1     
which is thought in its                 
concreteness--history is already        
achieved3 what more is wanted8 ,there   
is nothing more to seek4 ,taine replies3
 ,we must seek causes4 ,that is  to say1
 we must slay the living 'fact' thought 
by thought1 separate  its abstract      

elements--a useful thing1 no doubt1 but 
useful for memory  and practice4 ,or1 as
 is the custom of ,taine1 we must       
misunderstand and  exaggerate the value 
of the function of this abstract        
analysis1 to lose  ourselves in the     
mythology of races and ages1 or in other
 different but  none the less similar   
things4 ,let us beware how we slay poor 
facts1 if  we wish to think as          
historians1 and in so far as we are such
 and really  think in that way we shall 
not feel the necessity for having       
recourse  either to the extrinsic bond  
of causes1 historical determinism1 or to
  that which is equally extrinsic of    
transcendental ends1 philosophy of      
history4 ,the fact historically thought 
has no cause and no end outside  itself1
 but only in itself1 coincident with its
 real qualities and with  its           
qualitative reality4 ,because 7it is    
well to note in passing7 the            
determination of facts as real facts    
indeed1 but of unknown nature1  asserted

 but not understood1 is itself also an  
illusion of naturalism  7which thus     
heralds its other illusion1 that of the 
'philosophy of  history'74 ,in thought1 
reality and quality1 existence and      
essence1 are  all one1 and it is not    
possible to affirm a fact as real       
without at the  same time knowing what  
fact it is--that is1 without qualifying 
it4    ,returning to and remaining in or
 moving in the concrete fact1 or1       
rather1 making of oneself thought that  
thinks the fact concretely1 we          
experience the continual formation and  
the continual progress of our           
historical thought and also make clear  
to ourselves the history of             
historiography1 which proceeds in the   
same manner4 ,and we see how 7,i  limit 
myself to this1 in order not to allow   
the eye to wander too far7  from the    
days of the ,greeks to our own          
historical understanding has  always    
been enriching and deepening itself1 not
 because abstract causes  and           

transcendental ends of human things have
 ever been recovered1  but only because 
an ever increasing consciousness of them
 has been  acquired4 ,politics and      
morality1 religion and philosophy and   
art1  science and culture and economy1  
have become more complex concepts and   
at the same time better determined and  
unified both in themselves and  with    
respect to the whole4 ,correlatively    
with this1 the histories of  these forms
 of activity have become ever more      
complex and more firmly  united4 ,we    
know 'the causes' of civilization as    
little as did the  ,greeks2 and we know 
as little as they of the god or gods who
 control  the fortunes of humanity4 ,but
 we know the theory of civilization     
better  than did the ,greeks1 and1 for  
instance1 we know 7as they did not know1
  or did not know with equal clearness  
and security7 that poetry is an  eternal
 form of the theoretic spirit1 that     
regression or decadence is a  relative  
concept1 that the world is not divided  

into ideas and shadows  of ideas1 or    
into potencies and acts1 that slavery is
 not a category  of the real1 but a     
historical form of economic1 and so     
forth4 ,thus it  no longer occurs to    
anyone 7save to the survivals or        
fossils1 still to  be found among us7 to
 write the history of poetry on the     
principle of  the pedagogic ends that   
the poets are supposed to have had in   
view3  on the contrary1 we strive to    
determine the forms expressive of their 
sentiments4 ,we are not at all          
bewildered when we find ourselves before
  what are called 'decadences1' but we  
seek out what new and greater  thing was
 being developed by means of their      
dialectic4 ,we do not  consider the work
 of man to be miserable and illusory1   
and aspiration  and admiration for the  
skies and for the ascesis joined        
thereunto  and averse to earth as alone 
worthy of admiration and imitation4 ,we 
recognize the reality of power in the   
act1 and in the shadows the  solidity of

 the ideas1 and on earth heaven4        
,finally1 we do not find  that the      
possibility of social life is lost owing
 to the disappearance  of the system of 
slavery4 ,such a disappearance would    
have been the  catastrophe of reality1  
if slaves were natural to reality--and  
so forth4    ,this conception of history
 and the consideration of               
historiographical  work in itself make  
it possible for us to be just toward    
historical  determinism and to the      
'philosophy of history1' which1 by their
  continual reappearance1 have          
continually pointed to the gaps in our  
knowledge1 both historical and          
philosophical1 and with their false     
provisional solutions have heralded the 
correct solutions of the new  problems  
which we have been propounding4 ,nor has
 it been said that  they will henceforth
 cease to exercise such a function      
7which is the  beneficial function of   
,utopias of every sort74 ,and although  
historical  determinism and the         

'philosophy of history' have no history1
 because  they do not develop1 they yet 
receive a content from the relation in  
which they stand to history1 which does 
develop--that is to say1  history       
develops in them1 notwithstanding their 
covering1 extrinsic  to their content1  
which compels to think even him who     
proposes to  schematize and to imagine  
without thinking4 ,for there is a great 
difference between the determinism that 
can now appear1 after ,descartes  and   
,vico and ,kant and ,hegel1 and that    
which appeared after ,aristotle2        
between the philosophy of history of    
,hegel and ,marx and that of  gnosticism
 and ,christianity4 ,transcendency and  
false immanency are at  work in both    
these conceptions respectively2 but the 
abstract forms  and mythologies that    
have appeared in more mature epochs of  
thought  contain this new maturity in   
themselves4 ,in proof of this1 let us   
pause but a moment 7passing by the      
various forms of naturalism7 at  the    

case of the 'philosophy of history4' ,we
 observe already a great  difference    
between the philosophy of history1 as it
 appears in the  ,homeric world1 and    
that of ,herodotus1 with whom the       
conception of the  anger of the gods is 
a simulacrum of the moral law1 which    
spares the  humble and treads the proud 
underfoot2 from ,herodotus to the ,fate 
of  the ,stoics1 a law to which the gods
 themselves are subjected1 and from     
this to the conception of ,providence1  
which appears in late antiquity  as     
wisdom that rules the world2 from this  
pagan providence again to               
,christianity1 which is divine justice1 
evangelical preparation1 and  educative 
care of the human race1 and so on1 to   
the refined providence  of the          
theologians1 which as a rule excludes   
divine intervention  and operates by    
means of secondary causes1 to that of   
,vico1 which  operates as dialectic of  
the spirit1 to the ,idea of ,hegel1     
which is the  gradual conquest of the   

consciousness of self1 which liberty    
achieves  during the course of history1 
till we finally reach the mythology of  
progress and of civilization1 which     
still persists and is supposed to  tend 
toward the final abolition of prejudices
 and superstitions1 to  be carried out  
by means of the increasing power and    
divulgation of  positive science4    ,in
 this way the 'philosophy of history'   
and historical determinism  sometimes   
attain to the thinness and transparency 
of a veil1 which  covers and at the same
 time reveals the concreteness of the   
real in  thought4 ,mechanical causes    
thus appear idealized1 transcendent     
deities  humanized1 and facts are in    
great part divested of their brutal     
aspect4  ,but however thin the veil may 
be1 it remains a veil1 and however      
clear the truth may be1 it is not       
altogether clear1 for at bottom  the    
false persuasion still persists that    
history is constructed with  the        
'material' of brute facts1 with the     

'cement' of causes1 and with  the       
'magic' of ends1 as with three          
successive or concurrent methods4  ,the 
same thing occurs with religion1 which  
in lofty minds liberates  itself almost 
altogether from vulgar beliefs1 as do   
its ethics from the  heteronomy of the  
divine command and from the             
utilitarianism of rewards  and          
punishments4 ,almost altogether1 but not
 altogether1 and for this  reason       
religion will never be philosophy1 save 
by negating itself1 and  thus the       
'philosophy of history' and historical  
determinism will become  history only by
 negating themselves4 ,the reason is    
that as long as they  proceed in a      
positive manner dualism will also       
persist1 and with it the  torment of    
scepticism and agnosticism as a         
consequence4    ,the negation of the    
philosophy of history1 in history       
understood  concretely1 is its ideal    
dissolution1 and since that so-called   
philosophy is nothing but an abstract   

and negative moment1 our reason  for    
affirming that the philosophy of history
 is dead is clear4 ,it  is dead in its  
positivity1 dead as a body of doctrine1 
dead in this  way1 with all the other   
conceptions and forms of the            
transcendental4  ,i do not wish to      
attach to my brief 7but in my opinion   
sufficient7  treatment of the argument  
the addition of an explanation which to 
some  will appear to be 7as it appears  
to me7 but little philosophical and     
even somewhat trivial4 ,notwithstanding1
 since ,i prefer the accusation  of     
semi-triviality to that of equivocation1
 ,i shall add that since the  criticism 
of the 'concepts' of cause and          
transcendental finality does  not forbid
 the use of these 'words1' when they are
 simple words 7to  talk1 for example1 in
 an imaginative way of liberty as of a  
goddess1 or  to say1 when about to      
undertake a study of ,dante1 that our   
intention is  to 'seek the cause' or    
'causes' of this or that work or act of 

his71  so nothing forbids our continuing
 to talk of 'philosophy of history'  and
 of philosophizing history1 meaning the 
necessity of treating or of  a better   
treatment of this or that historical    
problem4 ,neither does  anything forbid 
our calling the researches of historical
 gnoseology  'philosophy of history1'   
although in this case we are treating   
the  history1 not properly of history1  
but of historiography1 two things  which
 are wont to be designated with the same
 word in ,italian as in  other          
languages4 ,neither do we wish to       
prevent the statement 7as did a  ,german
 professor years ago7 that the          
'philosophy of history' must be  treated
 as 'sociology'--that is to say1 the    
adornment with that ancient  title of   
so-called sociology1 the empirical      
science of the state1 of  society and of
 culture4    ,these denominations are   
all permissible in virtue of the same   
right  as that invoked by the adventurer
 ,casanova when he went before the      

magistrates in order to justify himself 
for having changed his  name--the right 
of every man to the letters of the      
alphabet4 ,but the  question treated    
above is not one of the letters of the  
alphabet4 ,the  'philosophy of history1'
 of which we have briefly shown the     
genesis and  the dissolution1 is not one
 that is used in various senses1 but a  
most  definite mode of conceiving       
history--the transcendental mode4       
,v      ,,the ,,positivity ,,of         
,,history      ,we therefore meet the   
well-known saying of ,fustel de         
,coulanges that  there are certainly    
history and philosophy1 but not the     
philosophy  of history1 with the        
following3 there is neither philosophy  
nor  history1 nor philosophy of history1
 but history which is philosophy  and   
philosophy which is history and is      
intrinsic to history4 ,for this  reason1
 all the controversies--and foremost of 
all those concerned  with               
progress--which philosophers1           

methodologists of history1 and          
sociologists believe to belong to their 
especial province1 and flaunt  at the   
beginning and the end of their          
treatises1 are reduced for us to  simple
 problems of philosophy1 with historical
 motivation1 all of them  connected with
 the problems of which philosophy       
treats4    ,in controversies relating to
 progress it is asked whether the work  
of  man be fertile or sterile1 whether  
it be lost or preserved1 whether        
history have an end1 and if so of what  
sort1 whether this end be  attainable in
 time or only in the infinite1 whether  
history be progress  or regress1 or an  
interchange between progress and        
regress1 greatness  and decadence1      
whether good or evil prevail in it1 and 
the like4 ,when  these questions have   
been considered with a little attention 
we shall  see that they resolve         
themselves substantially into three     
points3 the  conception of development1 
that of end1 and that of value4 ,that is

 to  say1 they are concerned with the   
whole of reality1 and with history  only
 when it is precisely the whole of      
reality4 ,for this reason they  do not  
belong to supposed particular sciences1 
to the philosophy of  history1 or to    
sociology1 but to philosophy and to     
history in so far  as it is philosophy4 
,when the ordinary current terminology  
has been  translated into philosophical 
terms it calls forth immediately the    
thesis1 antithesis1 and synthesis by    
means of which those problems  have been
 thought and solved during the course of
 philosophy1 to  which the reader       
desirous of instruction must be         
referred4 ,we can  only mention here    
that the conception of reality as       
development is  nothing but the         
synthesis of the two one-sided          
opposites1 consisting  of permanency    
without change and of change without    
permanency1 of  an identity without     
diversity and of a diversity without    
identity1  for development is a         

perpetual surpassing1 which is at the   
same  time a perpetual conservation4    
,from this point of view one of the     
conceptions that has had the greatest   
vogue in historical books1 that  of     
historical circles1 is revealed as an   
equivocal attempt to issue  forth from a
 double one-sidedness and a falling back
 into it1 owing to  an equivocation4    
,because either the series of circles is
 conceived as  composed of identicals   
and we have only permanency1 or it is   
conceived  as of things diverse and we  
have only change4 ,but if1 on the       
contrary1  we conceive it as circularity
 that is perpetually identical and at   
the  same time perpetually diverse1 in  
this sense it coincides with the        
conception of development itself4    ,in
 like manner1 the opposite theses1 as to
 the attainment or the  impossibility of
 attainment of the end of history1      
reveal their common  defect of positing 
the end as extrinsic to history1        
conceiving  of it either as that which  

can be reached in time 7progressus ad   
finitum71 or as that which can never be 
attained1 but only infinitely           
approximated 7progressus ad infinitum74 
,but where the end has been  correctly  
conceived as internal--that is to say1  
all one with  development itself--we    
must conclude that it is attained at    
every  instant1 and at the same time not
 attained1 because every attainment  is 
the formation of a new prospect1 whence 
we have at every moment the             
satisfaction of possession1 and arising 
from this the dissatisfaction  which    
drives us to seek a new possession4#a   
,finally1 the conceptions of history as 
a passage from evil to good  7progress71
 or from good to evil 7decadence1       
regression71 take their  origin from the
 same error of entifying and making     
extrinsic good and  evil1 joy and sorrow
 7which are the dialectical construction
 of reality  itself74 ,to unite them in 
the eclectic conception of an           
alternation of  good and evil1 of       

progress and regress1 is incorrect4 ,the
 true solution  is that of progress     
understood not as a passage from evil to
 good1 as  though from one state to     
another1 but as the passage from the    
good to  the better1 in which the evil  
is the good itself seen in the light of 
the better4    ,these are all           
philosophical solutions which are at    
variance with  the superficial theses of
 controversialists 7dictated to them by 
sentimental motives or imaginative      
combinations1 really mythological  or   
resulting in mythologies71 to the same  
extent that they are in  accordance with
 profound human convictions and with the
 tireless toil1  the trust1 the courage1
 which constitute their ethical         
manifestations4    ,by drawing the      
consequences of the dialectical         
conception of progress  something more  
immediately effective can be achieved in
 respect to the  practice and history of
 historiography4 ,for we find in that   
conception  the origin of a historical  

maxim1 in the mouth of every one1 yet   
frequently misunderstood and frequently 
violated--that is to say1 that  to      
history pertains not to judge1 but to   
explain1 and that it  should be not     
subjective but objective4               
,misunderstood1 because the judging in  
question is often taken in the  sense of
 logical judgment1 of that judgment     
which is thinking itself1  and the      
subjectivity1 which would thus be       
excluded1 would be neither  more nor    
less than the subjectivity of thought4  
,in consequence of this                 
misunderstanding we hear historians     
being advised to purge themselves  of   
theories1 to refrain from the disputes  
arising from them1 to  restrict         
themselves to facts1 collecting1        
arranging1 and squeezing out  the sap   
7even by the statistical method74 ,it is
 impossible to follow  such advice as   
this1 as may easily be seen1 for such   
'abstention from  thought' reveals      
itself as really abstention from        

'seriousness of  thought1' as a         
surreptitious attaching of value to the 
most vulgar and  contradictory thoughts1
 transmitted by tradition1 wandering    
about idly  in the mind1 or flashing out
 as the result of momentary caprice4    
,the  maxim is altogether false1        
understood or misunderstood in this way1
  and it must be taken by its           
opposite--namely1 that history must     
always  judge strictly1 and that it must
 always be energetically subjective     
without allowing itself to be confused  
by the conflicts in which  thought      
engages or by the risks that it runs4   
,for it is thought itself1  and thought 
alone1 which gets over its own          
difficulties and dangers1  without      
falling even here into that frivolous   
eclecticism which tries  to find a      
middle term between our judgment and    
that of others1 and  suggests various   
neutral and insipid forms of judgment4  
,but the true and legitimate meaning1   
the original motive for that  'judging1'

 that 'subjectivity1' which it condemns1
 is that history  should not apply to   
the deeds and the personages that are   
its material  the qualifications of good
 and evil1 as though there really were  
good and evil facts in the world1 people
 who are good and people  who are evil4 
,and it is certainly not to be denied   
that innumerable  historiographers1 or  
those who claim to be historiographers1 
have  really striven and still strive   
along those lines1 in the vain and      
presumptuous attempt to reward the good 
and punish the evil1 to qualify         
historical epochs as representing       
progress or decadence--in a word1  to   
settle what is good and what is evil1 as
 though it were a question  of          
separating one element from another in a
 compound1 hydrogen from1  oxygen4      
,whoever desires to observe             
intrinsically the above maxim1 and by   
doing so to set himself in accordance   
with the dialectic conception  of       
progress1 must in truth look upon every 

trace or vestige of  propositions       
affirming evil1 regression1 or decadence
 as real facts1  as a sign of           
imperfection--in a word1 he must condemn
 every trace  or vestige of negative    
judgments4 ,if the course of history is 
not  the passage from evil to good1 or  
alternative good and evil1 but the      
passage from the good to the better1 if 
history should explain and  not condemn1
 it will pronounce only positive        
judgments1 and will  forge chains of    
good1 so solid and so closely linked    
that it will  not be possible to        
introduce into them even a little link  
of evil or  to interpose empty spaces1  
which in so far as they are empty would 
not represent good but evil4 ,a fact    
that seems to be only evil1 an  epoch   
that appears to be one of complete      
decadence1 can be nothing  but a        
non-historical fact--that is to say1 one
 which has not been  historically       
treated1 not penetrated by thought1 and 
which has remained  the prey of         

sentiment and imagination4    ,whence   
comes the phenomenology of good and     
evil1 of sin and repentance1  of        
decadence and resurrection1 save from   
the consciousness of the  agent1 from   
the act which is in labour to produce a 
new form of  life8#b ,and in that act   
the adversary who opposed us is in the  
wrong2 the state from which we wish to  
escape1 and from which we  are escaping1
 is unhappy2 the new one toward which we
 are tending  becomes symbolized as a   
dreamed-of felicity to be attained1 or  
as  a past condition to restore1 which  
is therefore most beautiful in          
recollection 7which here is not         
recollection1 but imagination74 ,every  
one knows how these things present      
them-selves to us in the course  of     
history1 manifesting themselves in      
poetry1 in ,utopias1 in stories  with a 
moral1 in detractions1 in apologies1 in 
myths of love1 of  hate1 and the like4  
,to the heretics of the ,middle ,ages   
and to the  ,protestant reformers the   

condition of the primitive ,christians  
seemed  to be most lovely and most holy1
 that of papal ,christians most evil    
and debased4 ,the ,sparta of ,lycurgus  
and the ,rome of ,cincinnatus seemed  to
 the ,jacobins to be as admirable as    
,france under the ,carlovingians  and   
the ,capetians was detestable4 ,the     
humanists looked upon the lives  of the 
ancient poets and sages as luminous and 
the life of the ,middle  ,ages as dense 
darkness4 ,even in times near our own   
has been witnessed  the glorification of
 the ,lombard communes and the          
depreciation of  the ,holy ,roman       
,empire1 and the very opposite of this1 
according as  the facts relating to     
these historical events were reflected  
in the  consciousness of an ,italian    
longing for the independence of ,italy  
or  of a ,german upholding the holy     
,german empire of ,prussian hegemony4   
,and this will always happen1 because   
such is the phenomenology of the        
practical consciousness1 and these      

practical valuations will always  be    
present to some extent in the works of  
historians4 ,as works1 these  are not   
and cannot ever be pure history1        
quintessential history2 if in  no other 
way1 then in their phrasing and use of  
metaphors they will  reflect the        
repercussion of practical needs and     
efforts directed toward  the future4    
,but the historical consciousness1 as   
such1 is logical and  not practical     
consciousness1 and indeed makes the     
other its object2  history once lived   
has become in it thought1 and the       
antitheses of will  and feeling that    
formerly offered resistance have no     
longer a place in  thought4    ,for if  
there are no good and evil facts1 but   
facts that are always good  when        
understood in their intimate being and  
concreteness1 there are not  opposite   
sides1 but that wider side that embraces
 both the adversaries  and which happens
 just to be historical consideration4   
,historical  consideration1 therefore1  

recognizes as of equal right the ,church
 of  the catacombs and that of ,gregory 
,,vii1 the tribunes of the ,roman people
  and the feudal barons1 the ,lombard   
,league and the ,emperor ,barbarossa4   
,history never metes out justice1 but   
always justifies2 she could not  carry  
out the former act without making       
herself unjust--that is to say1         
confounding thought with life1 taking   
the attractions and repulsions of       
sentiment for the judgments of thought4 
,poetry is satisfied with the expression
 of sentiment1 and it is worthy  of note
 that a considerable historian1         
,schlosser1 wishing to reserve  for     
himself the right and duty of judging   
historical facts with  ,kantian         
austerity and abstraction1 kept his eyes
 fixed on the ,divine  ,comedy--that is 
to say1 a poetical work--as his model of
 treatment4  ,and since there are       
poetical elements in all myths1 we      
understand why  the conception of       
history known as dualistic--that is to  

say1 of  history as composed of two     
currents1 which mix but never resolve in
 one  another their waters of good and  
evil1 truth and error1 rationality and  
irrationality--should have formed a     
conspicuous part1 not only of the       
,christian religion1 but also of the    
mythologies 7for they really are  such7 
of humanism and of illuminism4 ,but the 
detection of this problem  of the       
duality of values and its solution in   
the superior unity of  the conception of
 development is the work of the         
nineteenth century1  which on this      
account and on account of other         
solutions of the same  kind 7certainly  
not on account of its philological and  
archological  richness1 which was       
relatively common to the four preceding 
centuries7  has been well called 'the   
century of history4'    ,not only1      
therefore1 is history unable to         
discriminate between facts  that are    
good and facts that are evil1 and       
between epochs that are  progressive and

 those that are regressive1 but it does 
not begin until  the psychological      
conditions which rendered possible such 
antitheses  have been superseded and    
substituted by an act of the spirit1    
which  seeks to ascertain what function 
the fact or the epoch previously        
condemned has fulfilled--that is to say1
 what it has produced of its  own in the
 course of development1 and therefore   
what it has produced4  ,and since all   
facts and epochs are productive in their
 own way1 not  only is not one of them  
to be condemned in the light of history1
 but  all are to be praised and         
venerated4 ,a condemned fact1 a fact    
that is  repugnant1 is not yet a        
historical proposition1 it is hardly    
even the  premiss of a historical       
problem to be formulated4 ,a negative   
history is  a non-history so long as its
 negative process substitutes itself for
  thought1 which is affirmative1 and    
does not maintain itself within its     
practical and moral bounds and limit    

itself to poetical expressions and      
empirical modes of representation1 in   
respect of all of which we can          
certainly speak 7speak and not think71  
as we do speak at every moment1  of bad 
men and periods of decadence and        
regression4    ,if the vice of negative 
history arises from the separation1 the 
solidification1 and the opposition of   
the dialectical antitheses  of good and 
evil and the transformation of the ideal
 moments of  development into entities1 
that other deviation of history which   
may be known as elegiac history arises  
from the misunderstanding of  another   
necessity of that conception--that is to
 say1 the perpetual  constancy1 the     
perpetual conservation of what has been 
acquired4 ,but  this is also false by   
definition4 ,what is preserved and      
enriched  in the course of history is   
history itself1 spirituality4 ,the past 
does not live otherwise than in the     
present1 as the force of the  present1  
resolved and transformed in the present4

 ,every particular  form1 individual1   
action1 institution1 work1 thought1 is  
destined to  perish3 even art1 which is 
called eternal 7and is so in a certain  
sense71 perishes1 for it does not live1 
save to the extent that it  is          
reproduced1 and therefore transfigured  
and surrounded with new  light1 in the  
spirit of posterity4 ,finally1 truth    
itself perishes1  particular and        
determined truth1 because it is not     
rethinkable1 save  when included in the 
system of a vaster truth1 and therefore 
at the  same time transformed4 ,but     
those who do not rise to the conception 
of  pure historical consideration1 those
 who attach themselves with their  whole
 soul to an individual1 a work1 a       
belief1 an institution1 and  attach     
themselves so strongly that they cannot 
separate themselves  from it in order to
 objectify it before themselves and     
think it1 are  prone to attribute the   
immortality which belongs to the spirit 
in  universal to the spirit in one of   

its particular and determined forms2    
and since that form1 notwithstanding    
their efforts1 dies1 and dies  in their 
arms1 the universe darkens before their 
gaze1 and the only  history that they   
can relate is the sad one of the agony  
and death of  beautiful things4 ,this   
too is poetry1 and very lofty poetry4   
,who can do  otherwise than weep at the 
loss of a beloved one1 at separation    
from  something dear to him1 cannot see 
the sun extinguished and the earth      
tremble and the birds cease their flight
 and fall to earth1 like ,dante1  on the
 loss of his beloved who was so         
beautiful8 ,but history is never        
history of death1 but history of life1  
and all know that the proper            
commemoration of the dead is the        
knowledge of what they did in life1  of 
what they produced that is working in   
us1 the history of their life  and not  
of their death1 which it behoves a      
gentle soul to veil1 a soul  barbarous  
and perverse to exhibit in its miserable

 nakedness and to  contemplate with     
unhealthy persistence4 ,for this reason 
all histories  which narrate the death  
and not the life of peoples1 of states1 
of  institutions1 of customs1 of        
literary and artistic ideals1 of        
religious  conceptions1 are to be       
considered false1 or1 we repeat1 simply 
poetry1  where they attain to the level 
of poetry4 ,people grow sad and suffer  
and lament because that which was is no 
longer4 ,this would resolve  itself into
 a mere tautology 7because if it was1 it
 is evident that it  is no longer71 were
 it not conjoined to the neglect of     
recognizing what  of that past has not  
perished--that is to say1 that past in  
so far as  it is not past but present1  
the eternal life of the past4 ,it is in 
this  neglect1 in the incorrect view    
arising out of it1 that the falsity of  
such histories resides4    ,it sometimes
 happens that historians1 intent upon   
narrating those  scenes of anguish in a 
lugubrious manner and upon celebrating  

the  funerals which it pleases them to  
call histories1 remain partly  astounded
 and partly scandalized when they hear a
 peal of laughter1 a  cry of joy1 a sigh
 of satisfaction1 or find an            
enthusiastic impulse  springing up from 
the documents that they are searching4  
,how1 they  ask1 could men live1 make   
love1 reproduce their species1 sing1    
paint1  discuss1 when the trumps were   
sounding east and west to announce the  
end of the world8 ,but they do not see  
that such an end of the world  exists   
only in their own imaginations1 rich in 
elegiac motives1 but  poor in           
understanding4 ,they do not perceive    
that such importunate  trumpet-calls    
have never in reality existed4 ,these   
are very useful1  on the other hand1 for
 reminding those who may have forgotten 
it that  history always pursues her     
indefatigable work1 and that her        
apparent  agonies are the travail of a  
new birth1 and that what are believed to
  be her expiring sighs are moans that  

announce the birth of a new world4      
,history differs from the individual who
 dies because1 in the words of  ,alcmon 
of ,crete1 he is not able     1 to join 
his beginning to his end3 history never 
dies1 because she always joins  her     
beginning to her end4      #a ,for the  
complete development of these           
conceptions1 see my study  of ,the      
,conception of ,becoming1 in the ,saggio
 sullo ,hegel seguito  da altri scritti 
di storia della filosofia1 pp4 #adi-age 
7,bari1  #aiac74 7,english translation  
of the work on ,hegel by ,douglas       
,ainslie4  ,macmillan1 ,london47    #b  
,for what relates to this section1 see  
my treatment of ,judgments of  ,value1  
in the work before cited4          ,,vi 
,,the ,,humanity ,,of ,,history         
,enfranchising itself from servitude to 
extra-mundane caprice and  to blind     
natural necessity1 freeing itself from  
transcendency and  from false immanence 
7which is in its turn transcendency71   
thought  conceives history as the work  

of man1 as the product of human will    
and intellect1 and in this manner enters
 that form of history which  we shall   
call humanistic4 ,this humanism first   
appears as in simple  contrast to nature
 or to extra-mundane powers1 and posits 
dualism4  ,on the one side is man1 with 
his strength1 his intelligence1 his     
reason1 his prudence1 his will for the  
good2 on the other there is  something  
that resists him1 strives against him1  
upsets his wisest  plans1 breaks the web
 that he has been weaving and obliges   
him to weave  it all over again4        
,history1 envisaged from the view-point 
of this  conception1 is developed       
entirely from the first of these two    
sides1  because the other does not      
afford a dialectical element which can  
be  continually met and superseded by   
the first1 giving rise to a sort of     
interior collaboration1 but represents  
the absolutely extraneous1 the          
capricious1 the accidental1 the meddler1
 the ghost at the feast4 ,only  in the  

former do we find rationality combined  
with human endeavour1  and thus the     
possibility of a rational explication of
 history4 ,what  comes from the other   
side is announced1 but not explained3 it
 is not  material for history1 but at   
the most for chronicle4 ,this first form
 of  humanistic history is known under  
the various names of rationalistic1     
intellectualistic1 abstractistic1       
individualistic1 psychological  history1
 and especially under that of pragmatic 
history4 ,it is a  form generally       
condemned by the consciousness of our   
times1 which has  employed these        
designations1 especially rationalism and
 pragmatism1  to represent a particular 
sort of historiographical insufficiency 
and  inferiority1 and has made          
proverbial the most characteristic      
pragmatic  explanations of institutions 
and events1 as types of                 
misrepresentation  into which one must  
beware of falling if one wish to think  
history  seriously4 ,but as happens in  

the progress of culture and science1    
even  if the condemnation be cordially  
accepted and no hesitation entertained  
as to drawing practical consequences    
from it in the field of actuality1      
there is not an equally clear           
consciousness of the reasons for this1  
or of the thought process by means of   
which it has been attained4 ,this       
process we may briefly describe as      
follows4    ,pragmatic finds the reasons
 for historical facts in man1 but in man
  in so far as he is an individual made 
abstract1 and thus opposed  as such not 
only to the universe1 but to other men1 
who have also  been made abstract4      
,history thus appears to consist of the 
mechanical  action and reaction of      
beings1 each one of whom is shut up in  
himself4  ,now no historical process is 
intelligible under such an arrangement1 
for the sum of the addition is always   
superior to the numbers added4  ,to such
 an extent is this true that1 not       
knowing which way to turn  in order to  

make the sum come out right1 it became  
necessary to  excogitate the doctrine of
 'little causes1' which were supposed to
  produce 'great effects4' ,this        
doctrine is absurd1 for it is clear     
that great effects can only have real   
causes 7if the illegitimate  conceptions
 of great and small1 of cause and       
effect1 be applicable  here74 ,such a   
formula1 then1 far from expressing the  
law of historical  facts1 unconsciously 
expresses the defects of the doctrine1  
which  is inadequate for its purpose4   
,and since the rational explanation     
fails1 there arise crowds of fancies to 
take its place1 which are all  conceived
 upon the fundamental motive of the     
abstract individual4 ,the  pragmatic    
explanation of religions is             
characteristic of this2 these  are      
supposed to have been produced and      
maintained in the world by the  economic
 cunning of the priests1 taking         
advantage of the ignorance  and         
credulity of the masses4 ,but historical

 pragmatic does not  always present     
itself in the guise of this egoistic and
 pessimistic  inspiration4 ,it is not   
fair to accuse it of egoism and         
utilitarianism1  when the true          
accusation should1 as we have already   
said1 be levelled  at its abstract      
individualism4 ,this abstract           
individualism could be and  sometimes   
was conceived even as highly moral1 for 
we certainly find  among the pragmatics 
sage legislators1 good kings1 and great 
men1 who  benefit humanity by means of  
science1 inventions1 and well-organized 
institutions4 ,and if the greedy priest 
arranged the deceit of  religions1 if   
the cruel despot oppressed weak and     
innocent people1 and  if error was      
prolific and engendered the strangest   
and most foolish  customs1 yet the      
goodness of the enlightened monarch and 
legislator  created the happy epochs1   
caused the arts to flourish1 encouraged 
poets1 aided discoveries1 encouraged    
industries4 ,from these pragmatic       

conceptions is derived the verbal usage 
whereby we speak of the age of          
,pericles1 of that of ,augustus1 of that
 of ,leo ,x1 or of that of ,louis       
,,xiv4 ,and since fanciful explanations 
do not limit themselves merely  to      
individuals physically existing1 but    
also employ facts and small  details1   
which are also made abstract and shut up
 in themselves1 being  thus also turned 
into what ,vico describes as            
'imaginative universals1'  in like      
manner all these modes of explanation   
known as 'catastrophic'  and making     
hinge the salvation or the ruin of a    
whole society upon the  virtue of some  
single fact are also derived from       
pragmatic4 ,examples  of this1 which    
have also become proverbial1 because    
they refer to  concepts that have been  
persistently criticized by the          
historians of  our time1 are the fall of
 the ,roman ,empire1 explained as the   
result  of barbarian invasions1         
,european civilization of the twelfth   

and  thirteenth centuries1 as the result
 of the ,crusades1 the renascence  of   
classical literatures1 as the result of 
the ,turkish conquest of                
,constantinople and of the immigration  
of the learned ,byzantines into         
,italy--and the like4 ,and in just the  
same way as when the conception  of the 
single individual did not furnish a     
sufficient explanation  recourse was for
 that reason had to a multiplicity of   
individuals1 to  their co-operation and 
conflicting action1 so here1 when the   
sole cause  adduced soon proved itself  
too narrow1 an attempt was made to make 
up  for the insufficiency of the method 
by the search for and enumeration  of   
multiple historical causes4 ,this       
enumeration threatened to proceed  to   
the infinite1 but1 finite or infinite as
 it might be1 it never  explained the   
process to be explained1 for the obvious
 reason that the  continuous is never   
made out of the discontinuous1 however  
much the  latter may be multiplied and  

solidified4 ,the so-called theory of the
  causes or factors of history1 which   
survives in modern consciousness1       
together with several other mental      
habits of pragmatic1 although  generally
 inclined to follow other paths1 is     
rather a confession of  powerlessness to
 dominate history by means of individual
 causes1  or causes individually        
conceived1 than a theory2 far from being
 a  solution1 it is but a reopening of  
the problem4    ,pragmatic therefore    
fails to remain human--that is to say1  
to develop  itself as rationality2 even 
in the human side to which it clings and
  in which it wishes to maintain and    
oppose itself to the natural or         
extra-natural2 and having already made  
individuals irrational and  unhuman by  
making them abstract1 it gradually has  
recourse to other  historical factors1  
and arrives finally at natural causes1  
which do  not differ at all in their    
abstractness from other individual      
causes4  ,this means that pragmatic1    

which had previously asserted itself as 
humanism1 falls back into naturalism1   
from which it had distinctly  separated 
itself4 ,and it falls into it all the   
more1 seeing that1 as  has been noted1  
human individuals have been made        
abstract1 not only  among themselves1   
but toward the rest of the universe1    
which remains  facing them1 as though it
 were an enemy4 ,what is it that really 
rules  history according to this        
conception8 ,is it man1 or extra-human  
powers1  natural or divine8 ,the claim  
that history exists only as an          
individual  experience is not           
maintainable2 and in the pragmatic      
conception another  agent in history is 
always presumed1 an extra-human being   
which1 at  different times and to       
different thinkers1 is known as fate1   
chance1  fortune1 nature1 ,god1 or by   
some other name4 ,during the period at  
which  pragmatic history flourished1 and
 there was much talk of reason and      
wisdom1 an expression of a monarchical  

or courtly tinge is to be found  upon   
the lips of a monarch and of a          
philosopher who was his friend3  homage 
was paid to sa ,majest le ,hasard6 ,here
 too there is an attempt  to patch up   
the difficulty and to seek eclectic     
solutions2 in order  to get out of it1  
we find pragmatic affirming that human  
affairs are  conducted half by prudence 
and half by fortune1 that intelligence  
contributes one part1 fortune another1  
and so on4 ,but who will assign  the    
just share to the two competitors8 ,will
 not he who does assign it  be the true 
and only maker of history8 ,and since he
 who does assign  it cannot be man1 we  
see once again how pragmatic leads      
directly to  transcendency and          
irrationality through its naturalism4   
,it leads to  irrationality1 accompanied
 by all its following of inconveniences 
and by all the other dualisms that it   
brings with it and which are  particular
 aspects of itself1 such as the         
impossibility of development1           

regressions1 the triumph of evil4 ,the  
individual1 engaged with external       
forces however conceived1 sometimes     
wins1 at other times loses2 his  victory
 itself is precarious1 and the enemy is 
always victorious1  inflicting losses   
upon him and making his victories       
precarious4  ,individuals are ants      
crushed by a piece of rock1 and if some 
ant  escapes from the mass that falls   
upon it and reproduces the species1     
which begins again the labour from the  
beginning1 the rock will fall1  or      
always may fall1 upon the new generation
 and may crush all of its  members1 so  
that it is the arbiter of the lives of  
the industrious  ants1 to which it does 
much injury and no good4 ,this is as    
pessimistic  a view as can be conceived4
    ,these difficulties and             
vain-tentatives of pragmatic            
historiography have  caused it to be    
looked upon with disfavour and to be    
rejected in favour  of a superior       
conception1 which preserves the initial 

humanistic motive  and1 removing from it
 the abstractness of the atomicized     
individual1  assures it against any     
falling back into agnosticism1          
transcendency1  or the despair caused by
 pessimism4 ,the conception that has    
completed  the criticism of pragmatic   
and the redemption of humanism has been 
variously and more or less well         
formulated in the course of the  history
 of thought as mind or reason that      
constructs history1 as the  'providence'
 of mind or the 'astuteness' of reason4 
,the great value of this conception is  
that it changes humanism from  abstract 
to concrete1 from monadistic or         
atomistic to idealistic1  from something
 barely human into something cosmic1    
from unhuman  humanism1 such as that of 
man shut up in himself and opposed to   
man1  into humanism that is really      
human1 the humanity common to men1      
indeed to the whole universe1 which is  
all humanity1 even in its most  hidden  
recesses--that is to say1 spirituality4 

,and history1 according  to this        
conception1 as it is no longer the work 
of nature or of an  extra-mundane ,god1 
so it is not the impotent work of the   
empirical  and unreal individual1       
interrupted at every moment1 but the    
work  of that individual which is truly 
real and is the eternal spirit          
individualizing itself4 ,for this reason
 it has no adversary at all  opposed to 
it1 but every adversary is at the same  
time its subject  --that is to say1 is  
one of the aspects of that dialecticism 
which  constitutes its inner being4     
,again1 it does not seek its principle  
of  explanation in a particular act of  
thought or will1 or in a single         
individual or in a multitude of         
individuals1 or in an event given as    
the cause of other events1 or in a      
collection of events that form the      
cause of a single event1 but seeks and  
places it in the process itself1  which 
is born of thought and returns to       
thought1 and is intelligible  through   

the auto-intelligibility of thought1    
which never has need of  appealing to   
anything external to itself in order to 
understand itself4  ,the explanation of 
history becomes so truly1 because it    
coincides with  its explication2 whereas
 explanation by means of abstract causes
 is a  breaking up of the process2 the  
living having been slain1 there is a    
forced attempt made to obtain life by   
setting the severed head again  upon the
 shoulders4    ,when the historians of  
our day1 and the many sensible folk who 
do not  make a profession of philosophy1
 repeat that the history of the world   
does not depend upon the will of        
individuals1 upon such accidents as  the
 length of ,cleopatra's nose1 or upon   
anecdotes2 that no historical  event has
 ever been the result of deception or   
misunderstanding1 but  that all have    
been due to persuasion and necessity2   
that there is some  one who has more    
intelligence than any individual        
whatever--the world2  that the          

explanation of a fact is always to be   
sought in the entire  organism and not  
in a single part torn from the other    
parts2 that  history could not have been
 developed otherwise than it has        
developed1  and that it obeys its own   
iron logic2 that every fact has its     
reason  and that no individual is       
completely wrong2 and numberless        
propositions  of the same sort1 which ,i
 have assembled promiscuously--they are 
perhaps not aware that with such        
henceforth obvious statements they  are 
repeating the criticism of pragmatic    
history 7and implicitly that  of        
theological and naturalistic history7   
and affirming the truth of  idealistic  
history4 ,were they aware of this1 they 
would not mingle  with these            
propositions others which are their     
direct contradiction1  relating to      
causes1 accidents1 decadences1 climates1
 races1 and so  on1 which represent the 
detritus of the conception that has been
  superseded4 ,for the rest1 it is      

characteristic of the consciousness     
called common or vulgar to drag along   
with it an abundant detritus of  old1   
dead concepts mingled with the new ones2
 but this does not detract  from the    
importance of its enforced recognition  
of the new concept1  which it           
substantially follows in its judgments4 
,owing to the already mentioned         
resolution of all historiographical     
questions into general philosophy1 it   
would not be possible to  give copious  
illustrations of the new concept of     
history which the  nineteenth century   
has accepted in place of the pragmatic  
conception  without giving a lengthy    
exposition of general philosophy1 which1
 in  addition to the particular         
inconvenience its presence would have   
here1  would lead to the repetition of  
things elsewhere explained4 ,taking the 
position that history is the work1 not  
of the abstract individual1 but  of     
reason or providence1 as admitted1 ,i   
intend rather to correct an  erroneous  

mode of expressing that doctrine which  
,i believe that ,i have  detected4 ,i   
mean the form given to it by ,vico and  
by ,hegel1 according  to which          
,providence or ,reason makes use of the 
particular ends and  passions of men1 in
 order to conduct them unconsciously to 
more lofty  spiritual conditions1 making
 use for this purpose of benevolent     
cunning4    ,were this form exact1 or   
were it necessary to take it literally  
7and  not simply as an imaginative and  
provisional expression of the truth71   
,i greatly fear that a shadow of dualism
 and transcendency would appear  in the 
heart of the idealistic conception4 ,for
 in this position of  theirs toward the 
,idea or ,providence1 individuals would 
have to be  considered1 if not as       
deluded 7satisfied indeed beyond their  
desires  and hopes71 then certainly as  
illuded1 even though benevolently       
illuded4 ,individuals and ,providence1  
or individuals and ,reason1 would  not  
make one1 but two2 and the individual   

would be inferior and the  ,idea        
superior--that is to say1 dualism and   
the reciprocal transcendency  of ,god   
and the world would persist4 ,this1 on  
the other hand1 would not  be at        
variance from the historical point of   
view with what has been  several times  
observed as to the theological residue  
at the bottom  of ,hegel's1 and yet more
 of ,vico's1 thought4 ,now the claim of 
the  idealistic conception is that      
individual and ,idea make one and not   
two--that is to say1 perfectly coincide 
and are identified4 ,for this  reason1  
there must be no talking 7save          
metaphorically7 of the wisdom of  the   
,idea and of the folly or illusion of   
individuals4    ,nevertheless it seems  
indubitably certain that the individual 
acts  through the medium of infinite    
illusions1 proposing to himself ends    
that he fails to attain and attaining   
ends that he has not seen4              
,schopenhauer 7imitating ,hegel7 has    
made popular the illusions of  love1 by 

means of which the will leads the       
individual to propagate  the species2   
and we all know that illusions are not  
limited to those  that men and women    
exercise toward one another 7les        
tromperies  rciproques71 but that they  
enter into our every act1 which is      
always  accompanied by hopes and mirages
 that are not followed by realization4  
,and the illusion of illusions seems to 
be this3 that the individual  believes  
himself to be toiling to live and to    
intensify his life more  and more1      
whereas he is really toiling to die4 ,he
 wishes to see his  work completed as   
the affirmation of his life1 and its    
completion is  the passing away of the  
work2 he toils to obtain peace in life1 
but  peace is on the contrary death1    
which alone is peace4 ,how then are we  
to deny this dualism between the        
illusion of the individual and the      
reality of the work1 between the        
individual and the ,idea8 ,how are we to
  refute the only explanation which     

seems to compose in some measure the    
discord--namely1 that the ,idea turns   
the illusions of the individual to  its 
own ends1 even though this doctrine lead
 inevitably to a sort of  transcendency 
of the ,idea8    ,but the real truth is 
that what results from the observations 
and  objections above exposed is not the
 illusion of the individual who  loves1 
who tries to complete his work1 who     
sighs for peace1 but rather  the        
illusion of him who believes that the   
individual is illuded3 the  illusory is 
the illusion itself4 ,and this illusion 
appears in the  phenomenology of the    
spirit as the result of the well-known  
abstractive  process1 which breaks up   
unity in an arbitrary manner and in this
 case  separates the result from the    
process or actual acting1 in which alone
  the former is real2 the accompaniment 
from the accompanied1 which is  all one 
with the accompaniment1 because there is
 not spirit and its  escort1 but only   
the one spirit in its development1 the  

single moments  of the process1 of the  
continuity1 which is their soul2 and so 
on4  ,that illusion arises in the       
individual when he begins to reflect    
upon  himself1 and at the beginning of  
that reflection1 which is at the same   
time a dialectical process4 ,but in     
concrete reflection1 or rather in       
concrete consciousness1 he discovers    
that there is no end that has not  been 
realized1 as well as it could1 in the   
process1 in which it was  never an      
absolute end--that is to say1 an        
abstract end1 but both a  means and an  
end4    ,to return to the popular theory
 of ,schopenhauer1 only he who looks    
upon men as animals1 or worse than      
animals1 can believe that love is a     
process that leads only to the          
biological propagation of the species1  
when every man knows that he fecundates 
his own soul above all prior  to the    
marriage couch1 and that images and     
thoughts and projects and  actions are  
created before children and in addition 

to them4 ,certainly1  we are conscious  
of the moments of an action as it       
develops--that is  to say1 of its       
passage and not of its totality seen in 
the light of  a new spiritual situation1
 such as we strive to obtain when1 as we
  say1 we leave the tumult behind us and
 set ourselves to write our own         
history4 ,but there is no illusion1     
either now or then2 neither now nor     
then is there the abstract individual   
face to face with a ,providence  who    
succeeds in deceiving him for beneficial
 ends1 acting rather as  a doctor than  
as a serious educator1 and treating the 
race of men as  though they were animals
 to train and make use of1 instead of   
men to  educate--that is to say1        
develop4    ,after having concentrated  
the mind upon a thought of ,vico and of 
,hegel1 can it be possible to set       
ourselves down to examine those of      
others which afford material to the     
controversies of historians and         
methodologists of history of our time8  

,these represent the usual form  in     
which appear the problems concerning the
 relation between the  individual and   
the ,idea1 between pragmatic and        
idealistic history4  ,perhaps the       
patience necessary for the descent into 
low haunts is  meritorious and our duty2
 perhaps there may be some useful       
conclusion  to be drawn from these      
common disputes2 but ,i must beg to be  
excused  for not taking part in them and
 for limiting myself to the sole remark 
that the question which has been for    
some time discussed1 whether  history be
 the history of 'masses' or of          
'individuals1' would be  laughable in   
its very enunciation1 if we were to     
understand by 'mass'  what the word     
implies1 a complex of individuals4 ,and 
since it is not  a good method to       
attribute laughable ideas to            
adversaries1 it may be  supposed that on
 this occasion what is meant by 'mass'  
is something  else1 which moves the mass
 of individuals4 ,in this case1 anyone  

can see  that the problem is the same as
 that which has just been examined4 ,the
  conflict between 'collectivistic' and 
'individualistic' historiography  will  
never be composed so long as the former 
assigns to collectivity  the power that 
is creative of ideas and institutions1  
and the latter  assigns it to the       
individual of genius1 for both          
affirmations are true  in what they     
include and false in what they          
exclude--that is to say1  not only in   
their exclusion of the opposed thesis1  
but also in the  tacit exclusion1 which 
they both make1 of totality as idea4    
,a warning as to a historiographical    
method1 so similar in appearance  to    
that which ,i have been defending as to 
be confounded with it1 may  perhaps be  
more opportune4 ,this method1 which is  
variously called  sociological1         
institutional1 and of values1 preserves 
among the  variety of its content and   
the inequality of mental level          
noticeable  in its supporters the       

general and constant characteristic of  
believing  that true history consists of
 the history of societies1 institutions1
  and human values1 not of individual   
values4 ,the history of individuals1    
according to this view1 is excluded1 as 
being a parallel or inferior  history1  
and its inferiority is held to be due   
either to the slight  degree of interest
 that it is capable of arousing or to   
its lack of  intelligibility4 ,in the   
latter case 7by an inversion on this    
occasion  of the attitude of contempt   
which was noted in pragmatic history7 it
  is handed over to chronicle or        
romance4 ,but in such dualism as this1  
and in the disagreement which persists  
owing to that dualism1 lies the         
profound difference between the         
empirical and naturalistic conceptions  
of value1 of institutions1 and of       
societies1 and the idealistic           
conception4 ,this conception does not   
contemplate the establishment of  an    
abstract history of the spirit1 of the  

abstract universal1 side by  side with  
or beyond abstract individualistic or   
pragmatic history1  but the             
understanding that individual and idea1 
taken separately1 are  two equivalent   
abstractions1 each equally unfitted for 
supplying  its subject to history1 and  
that true history is the history of the 
individual in so far as he is universal 
and of the universal in so  far as      
individual4 ,it is not a question of    
abolishing ,pericles to the  advantage  
of politics1 or ,plato to the advantage 
of philosophy1 or  ,sophocles to the    
advantage of tragedy2 but to think and  
to represent  politics1 philosophy1 and 
tragedy as ,pericles1 ,plato1 and       
,sophocles1  and these as each one of   
the others in one of their particular   
moments4 ,because if each one of these  
is the shadow of a dream outside  its   
relation with the spirit1 so likewise is
 the spirit outside its                 
individualizations1 and to attain to    
universality in the conception of       

history is to render both equally secure
 with that security which they  mutually
 confer upon one another4 ,were the     
existence of ,pericles1 of  ,sophocles1 
and of ,plato indifferent1 would not the
 existence of the  idea have for that   
very reason been pronounced indifferent8
 ,let him who  cuts individuals out of  
history but pay close attention and he  
will  perceive that either he has not   
cut them out at all1 as he imagined1 or 
he has cut out with them history itself4
          ,,vii      ,,choice ,,and     
,,periodization      ,since a fact is   
historical in so far as it is thought1  
and since  nothing exists outside       
thought1 there can be no sense whatever 
in the  question1 ,what are historical  
facts and what are non-historical       
facts8 ,a non-historical fact would be a
 fact that has not been thought  and    
would therefore be non-existent1 and so 
far no one has yet met  with a          
non-existent fact4 ,a historical thought
 links itself to and  follows another   

historical thought1 and then another1   
and yet another2  and however far we    
navigate the great sea of being1 we     
never leave the  well-defined sea of    
thought4 ,but it remains to be explained
 how the  illusion is formed that there 
are two orders of facts1 historical and 
non-historical4 ,the explanation is easy
 when we recollect what has been  said  
as to the chroniclizing of history which
 dies as history1 leaving  behind it the
 mute traces of its life1 and also as to
 the function of  erudition or          
philology1 which preserves these traces 
for the ends of  culture1 arranging     
scattered items of news1 documents1 and 
monuments  in an orderly manner4 ,news1 
documents1 and monuments are            
innumerable1  and to collect them all   
would not only be impossible1 but       
contrary to  the ends themselves of     
culture1 which1 though aided in its work
 by the  moderate and even copious      
supply of such things1 would be hindered
 and  suffocated by their exuberance1   

not to say infinity4 ,we consequently   
observe that the annotator of news      
transcribes some items and omits  the   
rest2 the collector of papers arranges  
and ties up in a bundle a  certain      
number of them1 tearing up or burning or
 sending to the dealer  in such things a
 very large quantity1 which forms the   
majority2 the  collector of antiques    
places some objects in glass cases1     
others in  temporary safe custody1      
others he resolutely destroys or allows 
to be  destroyed2 if he does otherwise1 
he is not an intelligent collector1  but
 a maniacal amasser1 well fitted to     
provide 7as he has provided7  the comic 
type of the antiquarian for fiction and 
comedy4 ,for this  reason1 not only are 
papers jealously collected and preserved
 in  public archives1 and lists made of 
them1 but efforts are also made  to     
discard those that are useless4 ,it is  
for this reason that in the  recensions 
of philologists we always hear the same 
song in praise of  the learned man who  

has made a 'sober' use of documents1 of 
blame for  him who has followed a       
different method and included what is   
vain and  superfluous in his volumes of 
annals1 of selections from archives1  or
 of collections of documents4 ,all      
learned men and philologists1 in  fact1 
select1 and all are advised to select4  
,and what is the logical  criterion of  
this selection8 ,there is none3 no      
logical criterion can  be named that    
shall determine what news or what       
documents are or are  not useful and    
important1 just because we are here     
occupied with a  practical and not with 
a scientific problem4 ,indeed1 this lack
 of a  logical criterion is the         
foundation of the sophism that          
tyrannizes  over maniacal collectors1   
who reasonably affirm that everything   
can  be of use1 and would therefore     
unreasonably preserve everything--they  
wear themselves out in accumulating old 
clothes and odds and ends  of all sorts1
 over which they mount guard with       

jealous affection4  ,the criterion is   
the choice itself1 conditioned1 like    
every economic  act1 by knowledge of the
 actual situation1 and in this case by  
the  practical and scientific needs of a
 definite moment or epoch4 ,this        
selection is certainly conducted with   
intelligence1 but not with the          
application of a philosophic criterion1 
and is justified only in and  by itself4
 ,for this reason we speak of the fine  
tact1 or scent1 or  instinct of the     
collector or learned man4 ,such a       
process of selection  may quite well    
make use of apparent logical            
distinctions1 as those  between public  
and private facts1 capital and secondary
 documents1  beautiful or ugly1         
significant or insignificant monuments2 
but in  final analysis the decision is  
always given from practical motives1    
and is summed up in the act of          
preserving or neglecting4 ,now from this
  preserving or neglecting1 in which our
 action is realized1 is afterward       

invented an objective quality1          
attributed to facts1 which leads to     
their being spoken of as 'facts that are
 worthy' and 'facts that are  not worthy
 of history1' of 'historical' and       
'non-historical' facts4 ,but  all this  
is an affair of imagination1 of         
vocabulary1 and of rhetoric1  which in  
no way changes the substance of things4 
,when history is confounded with        
erudition and the methods of the  one   
are unduly transferred to the other1 and
 when the metaphorical  distinction that
 has just been noted is taken in a      
literal sense1 we  are asked how it is  
possible to avoid going astray in the   
infinity of  facts1 and with what       
criterion it is possible to effect the  
separation  of 'historical' facts from  
'those that are not worthy of history4' 
,but there is no fear of going astray in
 history1 because1 as we have  seen1 the
 problem is in every case prepared by   
life1 and in every case  the problem is 
solved by thought1 which passes from the

 confusion of  life to the distinctness 
of consciousness2 a given problem with a
  given solution3 a problem that        
generates other problems1 but is never  
a problem of choice between two or more 
facts1 but on each occasion  a creation 
of the unique fact1 the fact thought4   
,choice does not  appear in it1 any more
 than in art1 which passes from the     
obscurity  of sentiment to the clearness
 of the representation1 and is never    
embarrassed between the images to be    
chosen1 because itself creates the      
image1 the unity of the image4    ,by   
thus confounding two things1 not only is
 an insoluble problem  created1 but the 
very distinction between facts that can 
and facts  that cannot be neglected is  
also denaturalized and rendered void4   
,this distinction is quite valid as     
regards erudition1 for facts that  can  
be neglected are always facts--that is  
to say1 they are traces of  facts1 in   
the form of news1 documents1 and        
monuments1 and for this  reason one can 

understand how they can be looked upon  
as a class to  be placed side by side   
with the other class of facts that      
cannot be  neglected4 ,but              
non-historical facts--that is to say1   
facts that have  not been thought--would
 be nothing1 and when placed beside     
historical  facts--that is to say1      
thought as a species of the same        
genus--they  would communicate their    
nullity to those also1 and would        
dissolve their  own distinctness1       
together with the concept of history4   
,after this1 it does not seem necessary 
to examine the characteristics  that    
have been proposed as the basis for this
 division of facts into  historical and 
non-historical4 ,the assumption being   
false1 the manner  in which it is       
treated in its particulars remains      
indifferent and  without importance in  
respect to the fundamental criticism of 
the  division itself4 ,it may happen    
7and this is usually the case7 that  the
 characteristics and the differences    

enunciated have some truth in           
themselves1 or at least offer some      
problem for solution3 for example1  when
 by historical facts are meant general  
facts and by non-historical  facts those
 that are individual4 ,here we find the 
problem of the  relation of the         
individual and the universal4 ,or1      
again1 by historical  facts are         
sometimes meant those that treat of     
history proper1 and by  non-historical  
the stray references of chronicles1 and 
here we find the  problem as to the     
relation between history and chronicle4 
,but regarded  as an attempt to decide  
logically of what facts history should  
treat  and what neglect1 and to assign  
to each its quality1 such divisions are 
all equally erroneous4    ,the          
periodization of history is subject to  
the same criticism4 ,to  think history  
is certainly to divide it into periods1 
because  thought is organism1 dialectic1
 drama1 and as such has its periods1 its
  beginning1 its middle1 and its end1   

and all the other ideal pauses that  a  
drama implies and demands4 ,but those   
pauses are ideal and therefore          
inseparable from thought1 with which    
they are one1 as the shadow is one  with
 the body1 silence with sound3 they are 
identical and changeable  with it4      
,christian thinkers divided history into
 that which preceded  and that which    
followed the redemption1 and this       
periodization was not  an addition to   
,christian thought1 but ,christian      
thought itself4 ,we  modern ,europeans  
divide it into antiquity1 the ,middle   
,ages1 and modern  times4 ,this         
periodization has been subject to a     
great deal of refined  criticism on the 
part of those who hold that it came to  
be introduced  anyhow1 almost           
dishonestly1 without the authority of   
great names1 and  without the advice of 
the philosophers and the methodologists 
being  asked on the matter4 ,but it has 
maintained itself and will maintain     
itself so long as our consciousness     

shall persist in its present phase4     
,the fact of its having been insensibly 
formed would appear to be  rather a     
merit than a demerit1 because this means
 that it was not due  to the caprice of 
an individual1 but has followed the     
development of  modern consciousness    
itself4 ,when antiquity has nothing more
 to tell us  who still feel the need of 
studying ,greek and ,latin1 ,greek      
philosophy  and ,roman law2 when the    
,middle ,ages have been superseded 7and 
they have  not been superseded yet72    
when a new social form1 different from  
that  which emerged from the ruins of   
the ,middle ,ages1 has supplanted our   
own2 then the problem itself and the    
historical outlook which derives  from  
it will also be changed1 and perhaps    
antiquity and the ,middle ,ages  and    
modern times will all be contained      
within a single epoch1 and the  pauses  
be otherwise distributed4 ,and what has 
been said of these great  periods is to 
be understood of all the others1 which  

vary according to  the variety of       
historical material and the various     
modes of viewing it4  ,it has sometimes 
been said that every periodization has a
 'relative'  value4 ,but we must say    
'both relative and absolute1' like all  
thought1  it being understood that the  
periodization is intrinsic to thought   
and  determined by the determination of 
thought4    ,however1 the practical     
needs of chroniclism and of learning    
make  themselves felt here also4 ,just  
as in metrical treatises the internal   
rhythm of a poem is resolved into       
external rhythm and divided into        
syllables and feet1 into long and short 
vowels1 tonic and rhythmic  accents1    
into strophes and series of strophes1   
and so on1 so the  internal time of     
historical thought 7that time which is  
thought  itself7 is derived from        
chroniclism converted into external     
time1 or  temporal series1 of which the 
elements are spatially separated from   
one  another4 ,scheme and facts are no  

longer one1 but two1 and the facts  are 
disposed according to the scheme1 and   
divided according to the  scheme into   
major and minor cycles 7for example1    
according to hours1  days1 months1      
years1 centuries1 and millenniums1 where
 the calculation  is based upon the     
rotations and revolutions of the earth  
upon itself  and round the sun74 ,such  
is chronology1 by means of which we know
  that the histories of ,sparta1        
,athens1 and ,rome filled the thousand  
years preceding ,christ1 that of the    
,lombards1 the ,visigoths1 and the      
,franks the first millennium after      
,christ1 and that we are still in the   
second millennium4 ,this mode of        
chronology can be pursued by means of   
particularizing incidents thus3 that the
 ,empire of the ,west ended in  ,a4,d4  
#dgf 7although it did not really end    
then or had already ended  previously72 
that ,charlemagne the ,frank was crowned
 ,emperor at ,rome  by ,pope ,leo ,,iii 
in the year #hjj2 that ,america was     

discovered in #adib1  and that the      
,thirty ,years ,war ended in #afdh4 ,it 
is of the greatest  use to us to know   
these things1 or 7since we really know  
nothing  in this way7 to acquire the    
capacity of so checking references to   
facts that we are able to find them     
easily and promptly when occasion       
arises4 ,certainly no one thinks of     
speaking ill of chronologies and        
chronographies and tables and synoptic  
views of history1 although in  using    
them we run the risk 7and in what thing 
done by man does he not  run a risk87 of
 seeing worthy folk impressed with the  
belief that the  number produces the    
event1 as the hand of the clock1 when it
 touches  the sign of the hour1 makes   
the clock strike2 or 7as an old         
professor  of mine used to say7 that the
 curtain fell upon the acting of ancient
  history in #dgf1 to rise again        
immediately afterward on the beginning  
of  the ,middle ,ages4    ,but such     
fancies are not limited to the minds of 

the ingenuous and  inattentive2 they    
constitute the base of that error owing 
to which a  distinction of periods1     
which shall be what is called objective 
and  natural1 is desired and sought     
after4 ,christian chronographers had    
already introduced this ontological     
meaning into chronology1 making  the    
millenniums of the world's history      
correspond with the days of  the        
creation or the ages of man's life4     
,finally1 ,ferrari in ,italy and        
,lorenz in ,germany 7the latter ignorant
 of his ,italian predecessor7  conceived
 a theory of historical periods         
according to generations1  calculated in
 periods of thirty-one years and a      
fraction1 or of  thirty-three years and 
a fraction1 and grouped as tetrads or   
triads1 in  periods of a hundred and    
twenty-five years or a century4 ,but1   
without  dwelling upon numerical and    
chronographic schemes1 all doctrines    
that  represent the history of nations  
as proceeding according to the stages   

of development of the individual1 of his
 psychological development1  of the     
categories of the spirit1 or of anything
 else1 are due to  the same error1 which
 is that of rendering periodization     
external  and natural4 ,all are         
mythological1 if taken in the           
naturalistic  sense1 save when these    
designations are employed               
empirically--that  is to say1 when      
chronology is used in chroniclism and   
erudition in a  legitimate manner4 ,we  
must also repeat a warning as to the    
care to be  employed in recognizing     
important problems1 which sometimes have
 first  appeared through the medium of  
those erroneous inquiries1 and as to    
the truths that have been seen or caught
 a glimpse of by these means4  ,this    
exempts us 7as we remarked above in     
relation to the criteria of  choice7    
from examining those doctrines in the   
particularity of their  various         
determinations1 because in this respect1
 if their assumption be  obviously      

fantastic1 their value is consequently  
nil4 ,nil1 as the  value of all those   
sthetic constructions is nil which claim
 to pass  from the abstractions1 by     
means of which they reduce the organism 
of  the work of art to fragments for    
practical ends1 to the explanation of   
the nature of art and to the judgment   
and history of the creations of  human  
imagination4          ,,viii            
,,distinction 7,,special ,,histories7   
,,and ,,division      ,the conception of
 history that we have reached--namely1  
that which has  not its documents       
outside itself1 but in itself1 which has
 not its  final and causal explanation  
outside itself1 but within itself1 which
  has not philosophy outside itself1 but
 coincides with philosophy1 which  has  
not the reason for its definite form and
 rhythm outside itself1 but  within     
itself--identifies history with the act 
of thought itself1 which  is always     
philosophy and history together4 ,and   
with this it debarrasses  it of the     

props and plasters applied to it as     
though to an invalid in  need of        
external assistance4 ,for they really   
did produce an infirmity  through their 
very insistence in first imagining and  
then treating a  non-existent infirmity4
    ,doubtless the autonomy thus        
attained is a great advantage2 but at   
first  sight it is not free from a grave
 objection4 ,when all the fallacious    
distinctions formerly believed in have  
been cancelled1 it seems that  nothing  
remains for history as an act of thought
 but the immediate  consciousness of the
 individual-universal1 in which all     
distinctions  are submerged and lost4   
,and this is mysticism1 which is        
admirably  adapted for feeling oneself  
at unity with ,god1 but is not adapted  
for  thinking the world nor for acting  
in the world4    ,nor does it seem      
useful to add that unity with ,god does 
not exclude  consciousness of diversity1
 of change1 of becoming4 ,for it can  be
 objected that consciousness of         

diversity either derives from  the      
individual and intuitive element1 and in
 this case it is  incomprehensible how  
such an element can subsist in its      
proper form of  intuition1 in thought1  
which always universalizes2 or if it is 
said  to be the result of the act of    
thought itself1 then the distinction1   
believed to have been abolished1        
reappears in a strengthened form1  and  
the asserted indistinct simplicity of   
thought remains shaken4 ,a  mysticism   
which should insist upon particularity  
and diversity1 a  historical mysticism1 
in fact1 would be a contradiction in    
terms1 for  mysticism is unhistorical   
and anti-historical by its very nature4 
,but these objections retain their      
validity precisely when the act of      
thought is conceived in the mystical    
manner--that is to say1 not as  an act  
of thought1 but as something negative1  
the simple result of  the negation by   
reason of empirical distinctions1 which 
certainly  leaves thought free of       

illusions1 but not yet truly full of    
itself4  ,to sum up1 mysticism1 which is
 a violent reaction from naturalism and 
transcendency1 yet retains traces of    
what it has denied1 because it  is      
incapable of substituting anything for  
it1 and thus maintains its  presence1 in
 however negative a manner4 ,but the    
really efficacious  negation of         
empiricism and transcendency1 their     
positive negation1 is  brought about not
 by means of mysticism1 but of idealism2
 not in  the immediate1 but in the      
mediated consciousness2 not in          
indistinct  unity1 but in the unity that
 is distinction1 and as such truly      
thought4    ,the act of thought is the  
consciousness of the spirit that is     
consciousness2 and therefore that act is
 auto-consciousness4 ,and               
auto-consciousness implies distinction  
in unity1 distinction between  subject  
and object1 theory and practice1 thought
 and will1 universal  and particular1   
imagination and intellect1 utility and  

morality1 or  however these distinctions
 of and in unity are formulated1 and    
whatever  may be the historical forms   
and denominations which the eternal     
system  of distinctions1 perennis       
philosophia1 may assume4 ,to think is to
  judge1 and to judge is to distinguish 
while unifying1 in which the            
distinguishing is not less real than the
 unifying1 and the unifying  than the   
distinguishing--that is to say1 they are
 real1 not as two  diverse realities1   
but as one reality1 which is dialectical
 unity  7whether it be called unity or  
distinction74    ,the first consequence 
to be drawn from this conception of the 
spirit  and of thought is that when     
empirical distinctions have been        
overthrown  history does not fall into  
the indistinct2 when the                
will-o'-the-wisps  have been            
extinguished1 darkness does not         
supervene1 because the light  of the    
distinction is to be found in history   
itself4 ,history is thought  by judging 

it1 with that judgment which is not1 as 
we have shown1  the evaluation of       
sentiments1 but the intrinsic knowledge 
of facts4  ,and here its unity with     
philosophy is all the more evident1     
because  the better philosophy          
penetrates and refines its distinctions1
 the  better it penetrates the          
particular2 and the closer its embrace  
of the  particular1 the closer its      
possession of its own proper            
conceptions4  ,philosophy and           
historiography progress together1       
indissolubly united4    ,another        
consequence to be deduced from the      
above1 and one which  will perhaps seem 
to be more clearly connected with the   
practice of  historiography1 is the     
refutation of the false idea of a       
general  history1 superior to special   
histories4 ,this has been called a      
history of histories1 and is supposed to
 be true and proper history1  having    
beneath it political1 economic1 and     
institutional histories1  moral history 

or the history of the sentiments and    
ethical ideals1 the  history of poetry  
and art1 the history of thought and of  
philosophy4  ,but were this so1 a       
dualism would arise1 with the usual     
result of every  dualism1 that each one 
of the two terms1 having been ill       
distinguished1  reveals itself as empty4
 ,in this case1 either general history  
shows  itself to be empty1 having       
nothing to do when the special histories
  have accomplished their work1 or      
particular histories do so1 when  they  
fail even to pick up the crumbs of the  
banquet1 all of which has  been         
voraciously devoured by the other4      
,sometimes recourse is had to  a feeble 
expedient1 and to general history is    
accorded the treatment  of one of the   
subjects of the special histories1 the  
latter being  then grouped apart from   
that4 ,of this arrangement the best that
 can  be said is that it is purely      
verbal and does not designate a logical 
distinction and opposition1 and the     

worst that can happen is that a  real   
value should be attributed to it1       
because in this case a fantastic        
hierarchy is established1 which makes it
 impossible to understand the  genuine  
development of the facts4 ,and there is 
practically no special  history that has
 not been promoted to be a general      
history1 now as  political or social    
history1 to which those of literature1  
art1  philosophy1 religion1 and the     
lesser sides of life should supply an   
appendix2 now as history of the ideas or
 progress of the mind1 where  social    
history and all the others are placed in
 the second line2 now as  economic      
history1 where all the others are looked
 upon as histories  or chronicles of    
'superstructures' derived from economic 
development in  an illusory manner1     
while the former is held to have        
developed in some  mysterious way by    
means of unknown powers1 without thought
 and will1  or producing thought and    
will1 in fancies and velleities1 like so

 many  bubbles on the surface of its    
course4 ,we must be firm in maintaining 
against the theory of general history   
that there does not exist  anything real
 but special histories1 because thought 
thinks facts to  the extent that it     
discerns a special aspect of them1 and  
only and  always constructs histories of
 ideas1 of imaginations1 of political   
actions1 of apostolates1 and the like4  
,but it is equally just and advantageous
 to maintain the opposite  thesis3 that 
nothing exists but general history4 ,in 
this way is  refuted the false notion of
 the speciality of histories1 understood
 as  a juxtaposition of specialities4   
,this fallacy is correctly noted by the 
critics in all histories which expose   
the various orders of facts one  after  
the other as so many strata and 7to     
employ the critics' word7  compartments 
or little boxes1 containing political   
history1 industrial  and commercial     
history1 history of customs1 religious  
history1 history  of literature and of  

art1 and so on1 under so many separate  
headings4  ,these divisions are merely  
literary1 they may possess some utility 
as  such1 but in the case under         
consideration they do not fulfil merely 
a literary function1 but attempt that of
 historical understanding1  and thereby 
give evidence of their defect1 in thus  
presenting these  histories as without  
relation between one another1 not       
dialecticized1  but aggregated4 ,it is  
quite clear that history remains to be  
written after the writing of those      
histories in this disjointed  manner4   
,abstract distinction and abstract unity
 are both equally  misunderstandings of 
concrete distinction and concrete unity1
 which is  relation4    ,and when the   
relation is not broken and history is   
thought in the  concrete1 it is seen    
that to think one aspect is to think all
 the  others at the same time4 ,thus it 
is impossible to understand completely  
the doctrine1 say1 of a philosopher1    
without having to some extent  recourse 

to the personality of the man himself1  
and1 by distinguishing  the philosopher 
from the man1 at the same time          
qualifying not only the  philosopher but
 the man1 and uniting these two distinct
 characteristics  as a relation of life 
and philosophy4 ,the same is to be said 
of the  distinction between the         
philosopher as philosopher and as orator
  or artist1 as subject to his private  
passions or as rising to the  execution 
of his duty1 and so on4 ,this means that
 we cannot think the  history of        
philosophy save as at the same time     
social1 political1  literary1 religious1
 and ethical history1 and so on4 ,this  
is the source  of the illusion that one 
in particular of these histories is the 
whole of them1 or that that one from    
which a start is made1 and which        
answers to the predilections and to the 
competence of the writer1 is  the       
foundation of all the others4 ,it also  
explains why it is sometimes  said that 
the 'history of philosophy' is also the 

'philosophy of  history1' or that       
'social history' is the true 'history of
 philosophy1'  and so on4 ,a history of 
philosophy thoroughly thought out is    
truly the  whole of history 7and in like
 manner a history of literature or of   
any  other form of the spirit71 not     
because it annuls the other in itself1  
but because all the others are present  
in it4 ,hence the demand that           
historians shall acquire universal minds
 and a doctrine that shall  also be in a
 way universal1 and the hatred of       
specialist historians1  pure            
philosophers1 pure men of letters1 pure 
politicians1 or pure  economists1 who1  
owing precisely to their one-sidedness1 
fail even to  understand the speciality 
that they claim to know in its purity1  
but  possess only in skeleton form that 
is to say1 in its abstractness4    ,and 
here a distinction becomes clear to us1 
with which it is impossible  to dispense
 in thinking history3 the distinction   
between form and  matter1 owing to      

which1 for example1 we understand art by
 referring  it to matter 7emotions1     
sentiments1 passions1 etc47 to which the
 artist  has given form2 or philosophy  
by referring it to the facts which  gave
 rise to the problems that the thinker  
formulated and solved1 or  the action of
 the politician by referring it to the  
aspirations and  ideas with which he was
 faced1 and which supplied the material 
he has  shaped with genius1 as an artist
 of practical life--that is to say1 we  
understand these things by always       
distinguishing an external from  an     
internal history1 or an external history
 that is made into an  internal history4
 ,this distinction of matter and form1  
of external and  internal1 would give   
rise again to the worst sort of dualism1
 would  lead us to think of the         
pragmatical imagination of man who      
strives  against his enemy nature1 if it
 did not assume an altogether internal  
and dialectical meaning in its true     
conception4 ,because from what has  been

 said it is easy to see that external   
and internal are not two  realities or  
two forms of reality1 but that external 
and internal1  matter and form1 both    
appear in turn as form in respect to one
 another1  and this materialization of  
each to idealize itself in the other  is
 the perpetual movement of the spirit as
 relation and circle3 a  circle that is 
progress just because neither of these  
forms has the  privilege of functioning 
solely as form1 and neither has the     
misfortune  of functioning solely as    
matter4 ,what is the matter of artistic 
and  philosophical history8 ,what is    
called social and moral history8 ,and   
what is the matter of this history8     
,artistic and philosophical history4    
,from this clearing up of the relation  
between matter and form1 that  false    
mode of history is refuted which sets   
facts on one side and ideas  on the     
other1 as two rival elements1 and is    
therefore never able to  pay its debt   
and show how ideas are generated from   

facts and facts  from ideas1 because    
that generation must be conceived in its
 truth as a  perpetually rendering vain 
of one of the elements in the unity of  
the  other4    ,if history is based upon
 distinction 7unity7 and coincides with 
philosophy1 the high importance that    
research into the autonomy of one  or   
the other special history attains in    
historiographical development  is       
perfectly comprehensible1 but this is   
merely the reflection of  philosophical 
research1 and is often troubled and     
lacking in precision4  ,all know what a 
powerful stimulus the new conception of 
imagination  and art gave to the        
conception of history1 and therefore    
also to  mythology and religion1 which  
were being developed with slowness and  
difficulty during the eighteenth to     
triumph at the beginning of the         
nineteenth century4 ,this is set down to
 the creation of the history  of poetry 
and myth in the works of ,vico in the   
first place and then  of ,herder and    

others1 and of the history of the       
figurative arts in  the works of        
,winckelmann and others4 ,and to the    
clearer conception of  philosophy1 law1 
customs1 and language is due their      
renewal in the  respective              
historiographical fields1 at the hands  
of ,hegel1 ,savigny1  and ,humboldt1 and
 other creators and improvers of        
history1 celebrated  on this account4   
,this also explains why there has been  
so much dispute  as to whether history  
should be described as history of the   
state or as  history of culture1 and as 
to whether the history of culture       
represents  an original aspect beyond   
that of the state or greater than it1 as
 to  whether the progress narrated in   
history is only intellectual or also    
practical and moral1 and so on4 ,these  
discussions must be referred to  the    
fundamental philosophical inquiry into  
the forms of the spirit1  their         
distinction and relation1 and to the    
precise mode of relation of  each one to

 the other4#a    ,but although history  
distinguishes and unifies1 it never     
divides--that is to say1 separates2 and 
the divisions of history  which have    
been and are made do not originate      
otherwise than as the  result of the    
same practical and abstractive process  
that we have  seen break up the         
actuality of living history to collect  
and arrange  the inert materials in the 
temporal scheme1 rendered extrinsic4    
,histories already produced1 and as such
 past1 receive in this way  titles      
7every thought is 'without title' in its
 actuality--that is to  say1 it has only
 itself for title71 and each one is     
separated from  the other1 and all of   
them1 thus separated1 are classified    
under more  or less general empirical   
conceptions1 by means of classifications
  that more or less cross one another4  
,we may admire copious lists of  this   
sort in the books of methodologists1 all
 of them proceeding1  as is inevitable1 
according to one or the other of these  

general  criteria3 the criterion of the 
quality of the objects 7histories  of   
religions1 customs1 ideas1 institutions1
 etc41 etc471 and that of               
temporal-spatial arrangement 7,european1
 ,asiatic1 ,american1 ancient1          
medieval1 of modern times1 of ancient   
,greece1 of ancient ,rome1 of  modern   
,greece1 of the ,rome of the ,middle    
,ages1 etc472 in conformity  with the   
abstract procedure which1 when dividing 
the concept1 is led  to posit on the one
 hand abstract forms of the spirit      
7objects7 and  on the other abstract    
intuitions 7space and time74 ,i shall   
not say  that those titles and divisions
 are useless1 nor even those tables1    
but shall limit myself to the' remark   
that the history of philosophy1  of art1
 or of any other ideally distinct       
history1 when understood as a  definite 
book or discourse1 becomes empirical for
 the reason already  given1 that true   
distinction is ideal1 and a discourse or
 a book in  its concreteness contains   

not only distinction but unity and      
totality1  and to look upon either as   
incorporating only one side of the real 
is  arbitrary4 ,and ,i shall also       
observe that as there are histories of  
philosophy and of art in the empirical  
sense1 so also nothing forbids  our     
talking in the same sense of a general  
history1 separate from  special         
histories1 indeed even of a history of  
progress and one of  decadence1 of good 
and evil1 of truth and error4    ,the   
confusion between division and          
distinction--that is to say1 between    
the empirical consideration that breaks 
up history into special  histories and  
the philosophical consideration which   
always unifies  and distinguishes as it 
unifies--is the cause of errors         
analogous to  those that we have seen to
 result from such a process4 ,to this   
are due  above all the many             
disquisitions on the 'problem' and on   
the 'limits'  of this or that history or
 group of special histories empirically 

constituted4 ,the problem does not      
exist1 and the limits are impossible  to
 assign because they are conventional1  
as is finally recognized with  much     
trouble1 and as could be recognized with
 much less trouble if a  start were     
made1 not from the periphery1 but from  
the centre--that is  to say1 from       
gnoseological analysis4 ,a graver error 
is the creation of  an infinity of entia
 imaginationis1 taken for metaphysical  
entities  and forms of the spirit1 and  
the pretension that arises from this of 
developing the history of abstractions  
as though they were so many  forms of   
the spirit with independent lives of    
their own1 whereas the  spirit is one4  
,hence the innumerable otiose problems  
with fantastic  solutions met with in   
historical books1 which it is here      
unnecessary  to record4 ,every one is   
now able to draw these obvious          
consequences  for himself and to make   
appropriate reflections concerning them4
 ,it  is further obvious that the entia 

imaginations1 in the same way as  the   
'choice' of facts1 and the chronological
 schematization or dating  of them1     
enter as a subsidiary element into any  
concrete exposition of  historical      
thought1 because the distinction of     
thinking and abstraction  is an ideal   
distinction1 which operates only in the 
unity of the spirit4      #a ,see       
,appendix ,,ii4          ,,ix      ,,the
 ',,history ,,of ,,nature' ,,and        
,,history      ,we must cease the       
process of classifying referred to just 
now1 and  also that of the illusion of  
naturalism connected with it1 by means  
of which imaginary entities created by  
abstraction are changed into  historical
 facts and classificatory schemes into  
history1 if we wish  to understand the  
difference between history that is      
history and that  due to what are called
 the natural sciences4 ,this is also    
called  history--'history of            
nature'--but is so only in name4 ,some  
few years  ago a lively protest was     

made#a against the confusion of these   
two  forms of mental labour1 one of     
which offers us genuine history1 such as
  might1 for instance1 be that of the   
,peloponnesian ,war or of ,hannibal's   
wars or of ancient ,egyptian            
civilization1 and the other a spurious  
history1 such as that known as the      
history of animal organisms1 of the     
earth's structure or geology1 of the    
formation of the solar system  or       
cosmogony4 ,it was observed with reason 
that in many treatises  the one has been
 wrongly connected with the other--that 
is to say1  history of civilization with
 history of nature1 as though the former
  follows the latter historically4 ,the 
bottomless abyss between the two  was   
pointed out4 ,this has been observed1   
however1 in a confused way  by all1 and 
better by historians of purely          
historical temperament1  who have an    
instinctive repugnance for natural      
history and hold  themselves carefully  
aloof from it4 ,it was remembered with  

reason that  the history of historians  
has always the individually determinate 
as  its object1 and proceeds by internal
 reconstruction1 whereas that of  the   
naturalists depends upon types and      
abstractions and proceeds by  analogies4
 ,finally1 this so-called history or    
quasi-history was very  accurately      
defined as an apparently chronological  
arrangement of things  spatially        
distinct1 and it was proposed to        
describe it with a new and  proper name1
 that of ,metastoria4    ,indeed1       
constructions of this sort are really   
nothing but  classificatory schemes1    
from the more simple to the more        
complex4  ,their terms are obtained by  
abstract analyses and generalization1   
and  their series appears to the        
imagination as a history of the         
successive  development of the more     
complex from the more simple4 ,their    
right to  exist as classificatory       
schemes is incontestable1 and their     
utility is  also incontestable1 for they

 avail themselves of imagination to     
assist  learning and to aid the memory4 
,this only becomes contestable when they
 are estranged from themselves1  lose   
their real nature1 lay claim to         
illegitimate functions1 and  take their 
imaginary historicity too seriously4 ,we
 find this in the  metaphysic of        
naturalism1 especially in evolutionism1 
which has  been its most recent form4   
,this is due1 not so much to the men of 
science 7who are as a rule cautious and 
possess a more or less clear            
consciousness of the limits of those    
schemes and series7 as to the           
dilettante scientists and dilettante    
philosophers to whom we owe the  many   
books that undertake to narrate the     
origin of the world1 and  which1 aided  
by the acrisia of their authors1 run on 
without meeting  any obstacle1 from the 
cell1 indeed from the nebula1 to the    
,french  ,revolution1 and even to the   
socialist movements of the nineteenth   
century4 ',universal histories1' and    

therefore cosmological romances  7as we 
have already remarked in relation to    
universal histories71 are  composed1 not
 of pure thought1 which is criticism1   
but of thought  mingled with            
imagination1 which finds its outlet in  
myths4 ,it is  useless to prove in      
detail that the evolutionists of to-day 
are  creators of myths1 and that they   
weary themselves with attempts to  write
 the first chapters of ,genesis in      
modern style 7their description  is more
 elaborate1 but they confuse such       
description with history in  a manner by
 no means inferior to that of           
,babylonian or ,israelitish  priests71  
because this becomes evident as soon as 
such works are placed  in their proper  
position4 ,their logical origin will at 
once make clear  their true character4  
,but setting aside these scientific     
monstrosities1 already condemned  by the
 constant attitude of restraint and     
scepsis toward them on the  part of all 
scientifically trained minds--condemned1

 too1 by the  very fact that they have  
had to seek and have found their fortune
  at the hands of the crowd or 'great   
public1' and have fallen to the  rank of
 popular propaganda--we must here       
determine more precisely  how these     
classificatory schemes of               
historiographical appearance are  formed
 and how they operate4 ,with this       
object1 it is well to observe  that     
classificatory schemes and apparent     
histories do not appear to  be confined 
to the field of what are called the     
natural sciences or  sub-human world1   
but appear also in that of the moral    
sciences or  sciences of the human      
world4 ,and to adduce simple and        
perspicuous  examples1 it often happens 
that in the abstract analysis of        
language  and the positing of the types 
of the parts of speech1 noun1 verb1     
adjective1 pronoun1 and so on1 or in the
 analysis of the word into  syllables   
and sounds1 or of style into proper or  
metaphorical words  and into various    

classes of metaphors1 we construct      
classes that go  from the more simple to
 the more complex4 ,this gives rise to  
the  illusion of history of language1   
exposed as the successive acquisition   
of the various parts of speech or as the
 passage from the single  sound to the  
syllable 7monosyllabic languages71 from 
the syllable to  the aggregate of       
syllables 7plurisyllabic languages71    
from words to  propositions1 metres1    
rhymes1 and so on4 ,these are imaginary 
histories  that have never been         
developed elsewhere than in the studies 
of  scientists4 ,in like manner1        
literary styles that have been          
abstractly  distinguished and arranged  
in series of increasing complexity 7for 
example1 lyric1 epic1 drama7 have given 
rise and continue to give  rise to the  
thought of a schematic arrangement of   
poetry1 which1 for  example1 should     
appear during a first period as lyric1 a
 second as  epic1 a third as drama4     
,the same has happened with regard to   

the classifications of abstract         
political1 economic1 philosophical      
forms1 and so on1 all of which have     
been followed by their shadows in the   
shape of imaginative history4 ,the      
repugnance that historians experience in
 attaching their narratives  to         
naturalistic-mythological               
prologues--that is to say1 in linking   
together in matrimony a living being and
 a corpse--is also proved by  their     
reluctance to admit scraps of abstract  
history into concrete  history1 for they
 at once reveal their heterogeneity in  
regard to one  another by their mere    
appearance4 ,de ,sanctis has often been 
reproached  for not having begun his    
,history of ,italian ,literature with an
  account of the origins of the ,italian
 language and of its relations  with    
,latin1 and even with the linguistic    
family of ,indo-,european  languages1   
and of the races that inhabit the       
various parts of ,italy4  ,an attempt   
has even been made to correct the design

 of that classic  work by supplying1    
with a complete lack of historical      
sense1 the  introductions and additions 
that are not needed4 ,but de ,sanctis1  
who took great pains to select the best 
point of departure for the  narrative of
 the history of ,italian literature1 and
 finally decided  to begin with a brief 
sketch of the state of culture at the   
,suabian  court and of the ,sicilian    
poetical school1 did not hesitate a     
moment  in rejecting all abstractions of
 languages and races which to his true  
historical sense did not appear to be   
reconcilable with the tenzone  of       
,ciullo1 with the rhythms of ,friar     
,jacob1 or with the ballades of  ,guido 
,cavalcanti1 which are quite concrete   
things4    ,we must also remember that  
plans for classification and            
pseudo-historical arrangements of their 
analogies are created not only  upon the
 bodies of histories that are living and
 really reproducible  and rethinkable1  
but also upon those that are dead--that 

is to say1  upon news items1 documents1 
and monuments4 ,this observation makes  
more complete the identification of     
imaginary histories arising from  the   
natural sciences with those which have  
their source in the moral  sciences4    
,the foundation of both is therefore    
very often not historical  intelligence1
 but1 on the contrary1 the lack of it1  
and their end not  only that of aiding  
living history and keeping it alive1 but
 also the  mediate end of assisting in  
the prompt handling of the remains and  
the  cinders of the vanished world1 the 
inert residues of history4    ,the      
efficacy of this enlargement of the     
concept of abstract history1  which is  
analogical or naturalizing in respect to
 the field known  as 'spiritual' 7and   
thus separated from that empirically    
known as  'natural'71 cannot be doubted 
by one who knows and remembers the great
  consequences that philosophy draws    
from the resolution of the realistic    
concept of 'nature' in the idealistic   

conception of 'construction1'  which the
 human spirit makes of reality1 looking 
upon it as nature4  ,kant worked upon   
the solution of this problem            
indefatigably and with  subtlety2 he    
gave to it the direction that it has    
followed down to  our own days4 ,and the
 consequence that we draw from it1 in   
respect  to the problem that now        
occupies us1 is that an error was       
committed  when1 moved by the legitimate
 desire of distinguishing abstract from 
concrete history1 naturalizing history  
from thinking history1 genuine  from    
fictitious history1 a sort of           
agnosticism was reached1 as a final     
result1 by means of limiting history to 
the field of humanity1 which  was said  
to be cognoscible1 and declaring all the
 rest to be the object  of metastoria   
and the limit of human knowledge4 ,this 
conclusion would  lead again to a sort  
of dualism1 though in a lofty sphere4   
,but if  metastoria also appears1 as we 
have seen1 in the human field1 it is    

clear that the distinction as formulated
 stands in need of correction2  and the 
agnosticism founded upon it vacillates  
and falls4 ,there is not  a double      
object before thought1 man and nature1  
the one capable of  treatment in one    
way1 the other in another way1 the first
 cognizable1  and the second            
uncognizable and capable only of being  
constructed  abstractly2 but thought    
always thinks history1 the history of   
reality  that is one1 and beyond thought
 there is nothing1 for the natural      
object becomes a myth when it is        
affirmed as object1 and shows itself  in
 its true reality as nothing else but   
the human spirit itself1 which          
schematized history that has been lived 
and thought1 or the materials  of the   
history that has already been lived and 
thought4 ,the saying that  nature has no
 history is to be understood in the     
sense that nature as  a rational being  
capable of thought has not history1     
because it is  not--or1 let us say1 it  

is nothing that is real4 ,the opposite  
saying1  that nature is also formative  
and possesses historical life1 is to be 
taken in the other sense that reality1  
the sole reality 7comprehending  man and
 nature in itself1 which are only       
empirically and abstractly  separate71  
is all development and life4    ,what   
substantial difference can ever be      
discovered on the one hand  between     
geological stratifications and the      
remains of vegetables  and animals1 of  
which it is possible to construct a     
prospective and  indeed a serial        
arrangement1 but which it is never      
possible to rethink  in the living      
dialectic of their genesis1 and on the  
other hand the  relics of what is called
 human history1 and not only that called
  prehistorical1 but even the historical
 documents of our history of  yesterday1
 which we have forgotten and no longer  
understand1 and which  we can certainly 
classify and arrange in a series1 and   
build castles  in the air about or allow

 our fancies to wander among1 but which 
it is  no longer possible really to     
think again8 ,both cases1 which have    
been  arbitrarily distinguished1 are    
reducible to one single case4 ,even in  
what is called 'human history' there    
exists a 'natural history1' and  what is
 called 'natural history' also was once 
'human' history--that  is to say1       
spiritual1 although to us who have left 
it so far behind  it seems to be almost 
foreign1 so mummified and mechanicized  
has it  become1 if we glance at it but  
summarily and from the outside4 ,do you 
wish to understand the true history of a
 ,ligurian or ,sicilian neolithic  man8 
,first of all1 try if it be possible to 
make yourself mentally  into a ,ligurian
 or ,sicilian neolithic man2 and if it  
be not possible1  or you do not care to 
do this1 content yourself with          
describing and  classifying and         
arranging in a series the skulls1 the   
utensils1 and  the inscriptions         
belonging to those neolithic peoples4   

,do you wish to  understand the history 
of a blade of grass8 ,first and         
foremost1 try  to make yourself into a  
blade of grass1 and if you do not       
succeed1  content yourself with         
analysing the parts and even with       
disposing them  in a kind of imaginative
 history4 ,this leads to the idea from  
which  ,i started in making these       
observations about historiography1 as to
  history being contemporary history and
 chronicle being past history4  ,we take
 advantage of the idea and at the same  
time confirm that truth  by solving with
 its aid the antithesis between a       
history that is  'history' and a        
'history of nature1' which1 although it 
is history1  was supposed to obey laws  
strangely at variance with those of the 
only  history4 ,it solves this          
antithesis by placing the second in the 
lower  rank of pseudo-history4      #a  
,by the economist ,professor ,gotti1 at 
the seventh congress of  ,german        
historians1 held at ,heidelberg4 ,the   

lecture can be read in  print under the 
anything but clear or exact title of    
,die ,grenzen der  ,geschichte          
7,leipzig1 ,duncker u4 ,humblot1 #aijd74
          ,,appendix ,i      ,,attested 
,,evidence      ,if true history is that
 of which an interior verification is   
possible1  and is therefore history     
ideally contemporary and present1 and if
  history by witnesses is lacking in    
truth and is not even false1 but  just  
neither false nor true 7not a hoc est   
but a fertur71 a  legitimate question   
arises as to the origin and function of 
those  innumerable propositions resumed 
from evidence critically thrashed out   
and 'held to be true1' although not     
verified1 and perhaps never to be       
verified1 but nevertheless employed even
 in most serious historical  treatment4 
,when we are writing the history of the 
doctrine known as  the coincidentia     
oppositorum1 or of the poem called ,i   
sepolcri1  the ,latin of the ,cardinal  
di ,cusa and the verse of ,foscolo      

obviously  belong to us1 both as to the 
thoughts and the actual words1          
pronounced  by ourselves to ourselves1  
and the certainty of those historical   
facts  is at the same time logical      
truth4 ,but that the ,de docta          
ignorantia  was written between the end 
of #adci and the early part of #addj1   
and  ,foscolo's poem on the return of   
the poet to ,italy after his long       
military service in ,france1 is evidence
 founded upon proofs1 as to  which we   
can only say that they are to be        
considered valid1 because  they have    
been to some extent attested1 but we    
cannot claim them to  be true4 ,no      
amount of acute mental labour upon them 
can prevent another  document or the    
better reading of an old document       
destroying them4  ,nevertheless1 no one 
will treat of the works of the ,cusan or
 of ,foscolo  without availing himself  
of the biographical details as to their 
authors which have been preserved4      
,an esteemed methodologist of our day   

has been tempted to found the  faith    
placed in this order of evidence upon a 
sort of telepathy of  the past1 an      
almost spiritualistic revival4 ,but     
there is nothing  so mysterious in the  
genesis of that belief as to need a     
risky and  fantastic explanation1 to    
which even ,horace's ,jew would not give
  credence4 ,on the contrary1 it is a   
question of something that we can       
observe in process of formation in our  
private life of every day4 ,we  are     
noting down in our diary1 for instance1 
certain of our acts1 or  striking the   
balance of our account4 ,after a certain
 interval has  elapsed those facts fade 
from memory and the only way of         
affirming to  ourselves that they have  
happened and must be considered true is 
the  evidence of our notes3 the document
 bears witness2 trust the book4 ,we     
behave in a similar way in respect to   
the statements of others on the         
authority of their diaries or           
account-books4 ,we presume that if the  

thing has been written down it answers  
to the truth4 ,doubtless this           
assumption1 like every assumption1 may  
turn out to be false in fact1  owing to 
the note having been made in a moment of
 distraction or of  hallucination1 or   
too late1 when the memory of the fact   
was already  imprecise and lacking in   
certainty1 or because it was            
capriciously  made or made with the     
object of deceiving others4 ,but just   
for this  reason1 written evidence is   
not usually accepted with closed eyes2  
its verisimilitude is examined and we   
confront it with other written          
evidence1 we investigate the probity and
 accuracy of the writer or  witness4 ,it
 is just for this reason that the penal 
code threatens with  pains and penalties
 those who alter or falsify documents4  
,and although  these and other subtle   
and severe precautions do not in certain
 cases  prevent fraud1 deception1 and   
error 7in the same way that the         
tribunals  established for the purpose  

of condemning the guilty often send away
  the guilty unpunished and sometimes   
condemn the innocent71 yet the use  of  
documents and evidence works out on the 
whole in accordance with the  truth2 it 
is held to be useful and worthy of      
support and encouragement1  because the 
injuries that it is liable to cause are 
greatly inferior to  those that it      
prevents4    ,now what men do with      
regard to their private affairs in daily
 life may  be said to be done on a large
 scale by the human race when it        
delivers  itself of the load of         
innumerable facts and fixes them        
externally where  they are recoverable  
in a weakened form as unverifiable      
documentary  evidence1 yet are          
nevertheless such that as a whole we are
 justified  in looking upon them end    
treating them as true4 ,historical faith
  then is not the result of telepathy or
 spiritualism1 but of a wise  economic  
provision1 which the spirit continues to
 realize4 ,in this  way we understand   

historical work directed toward the     
prevention of  alterations and          
deformations1 and its acceptation of    
certain testimony1  as 'what must be    
held to be true in the present state of 
science1' and  its graduation of the    
rest as uncertain1 probable1 and most   
probable  to be sometimes accepted in   
the expectation of ulterior inquiries4  
,finally1 it explains the dislike of    
'hypercriticism' when1 not content  with
 a constant refinement of criticism1    
hypercriticism contests the  value of   
the most ingenuous and authoritative    
testimony4 ,the reason is  that it thus 
breaks the rules of the game that is    
being played sub  regula1 and only      
serves at the most to remind those apt  
to forget it  that history by evidence  
is at bottom an altogether external     
history1  never fundamental1 true       
history1 which is contemporary and      
present4    ,this genesis or nature of  
'attested' evidence already contains the
  answer to the other question as to its

 function4 ,it is clear that this       
cannot be to posit true history or to   
take its place1 but to supply it  with  
those secondary particulars which it    
would not be worth while to  make the   
effort of keeping alive and complete in 
the mind1 for this  effort would result 
in damaging what is most important to   
us4 ,finally1  whether the ,de docta    
ignorantia were written some time       
earlier or  later is something that may 
quite well be determined by a different 
interpretation of this or that thought  
of ,cusanus1 but it does not  affect the
 function that the doctrine of the      
coincidence of opposites  exercises in  
the formation of logical science4       
,again1 whether the  ,sepolcri was      
composed or planned prior to ,foscolo's 
visit to ,france  would without doubt   
change to some extent our representation
 of the  gradual development of the soul
 and genius of the poet1 but it would   
hardly at all change our mode of        
interpreting his great ode4 ,those  who 

despair of historical truth1 owing to   
the lack of a verifiable  certainty of  
some particulars1 or to the uncertainty 
and dubiety that  surrounds it1 resemble
 him who1 having forgotten the chronicle
 of his  life in this or that year1     
should think that he did not know       
himself  in his present condition1 which
 is both the recapitulation of his past 
and carries with it his past in all that
 it really concerns him to  know4 ,but1 
on the other hand1 attested evidence    
that has been field  to be true is a    
stimulus to us to search ourselves more 
closely1 an  enrichment of what we have 
found by means of analysis and          
meditation  and a confirmation or proof 
of our thoughts1 which are not to be    
neglected1 especially when true evidence
 and attested evidence agree  with one  
another4 ,to refuse the assistance and  
the facilities afforded  by attested    
evidence1 owing to the fear that some of
 it may prove  false1 or because all of 
it possesses an external and somewhat   

general  and vague character1 would be  
to refuse the authority of the human    
race1 and so to commit the sin of       
,descartes and of ,malebranche4 ,this   
great refusal does not concern or assist
 the understanding of history4  ,all    
that does matter and does assist is that
 authority--including the  authority of 
the human race--should never be allowed 
to take the place  of the thought of    
humanity1 to which1 in any case1 belongs
 the first  place4          ,,appendix  
,,ii      ,,analogy ,,and ,,anomaly ,,of
 ,,special ,,histories      ,in the     
course of the preceding theoretical     
explanations we have denied  both the   
idea of a universal history 7in time and
 space7#a and that  of a general history
 7of the spirit in its indiscriminate   
generality  or unity71#b and have       
insisted instead upon the opposite view 
with its  two clauses3 that history is  
always particular and always special1   
and that these two determinations       
constitute precisely concrete and       

effective universality and concrete and 
effective unity4 ,what has  been        
declared impossible1 then1 does not     
represent in any way a loss1  for it is 
on the one hand fictitious universality 
or the universality  of fancy1 and on   
the other abstract universality1 or1 if 
it be  preferred1 confused universality4
 ,so-called universal histories  have   
therefore shown themselves to be        
particular histories1 which  have       
assumed that title for purposes of      
literary notoriety1 or as  collections1 
views1 and chroniclistical compilations 
of particular  histories1 or1 finally1  
as romances4 ,in like manner1 general   
inclusive  histories are either so only 
in name1 or set different histories side
  by side1 or they are metaphysical and 
metaphorical playthings4    ,as a result
 of this double but converging negation1
 it is also  advisable to refute a      
common and deeply rooted belief 7which  
we  ourselves at one time shared to some
 extent7#c that we should arrive  at the

 re-establishment of the universality of
 the fancy3 or that  there are some     
among the special histories1 constituted
 according  to the various forms of the 
spirit 7general and individual only  in 
so far as every form of the spirit is   
the whole spirit in that  form71 which  
require universal treatment and others  
only treatment  as monographs4 ,the     
typical instance generally adduced is   
that of  the difference between the     
history of philosophy and the history of
  poetry or of art4 ,the subject of the 
former is supposed to be the one  great 
philosophical problem that interests all
 men1 of the latter  the sentimental or 
imaginative problems of particular      
moments1 or at  the most of particular  
artists4 ,thus the former is supposed to
 be  continuous1 the latter             
discontinuous1 the former capable of    
complete  universal vision1 the second  
only of a sequence of particular        
visions4  ,but a more 'realistic'       
conception of philosophy deprives it of 

this  privilege as compared with the    
history of art and poetry or of any     
other special history2 for1 appearances 
notwithstanding1 it is not  true that   
men have concentrated upon one          
philosophical problem only1  whose      
successive solutions1 less and less     
inadequate1 compose a single  line of   
progress1 the universal history of the  
human spirit1 affording  support and    
unification to all other histories4 ,the
 opposite is the  truth3 the            
philosophical problems that men have    
treated of and will  treat of are       
infinite1 and each one of them is always
 particularly  and individually         
determined4 ,the illusion as to the     
uniqueness of the  problem is due to    
logical misapprehension1 increased by   
historical  contingencies1 whence a     
problem which owing to religious motives
 seemed  supreme has been looked upon as
 unique or fundamental1 and groupings   
and generalizations made for practical  
ends have been held to be real  identity

 and unity4#d ',universal' histories of 
philosophy1 too1 like  the others1 when 
we examine them with a good magnifying  
glass1 are  revealed as either          
particular histories of the problem that
 engages the  philosopher-historian1 or 
arbitrary artificial constructions1 or  
tables  and collections of many         
different historical sequences1 in the  
manner  of a manual or encyclopdia of   
philosophical history4 ,certainly       
nothing  forbids the composition of     
abridgments of philosophical histories1 
containing classifications of particular
 problems and representing the          
principal thinkers of all peoples and of
 all times as occupied with one  or     
another class of problem4 ,this1        
however1 is always a chroniclistical    
and naturalistic method of treating the 
history of philosophy1 which  only      
really lives when a new thinker connects
 the problems already set  in the past  
and its intrinsic antecedents with the  
definite problem  that occupies his     

attention4 ,he provisionally sets aside 
others with  a different connexion1     
though without for that reason          
suppressing  them1 intending rather to  
recall them when another problem makes  
their presence necessary4 ,it is for    
this reason that even in those          
abridgments that seem to be the most    
complete and 'objective' 7that  is to   
say1 'material'7 a certain selection    
does appear1 due to the  theoretical    
interest of the writer1 who never       
altogether ceases to be a               
historiographer-philosopher4 ,the       
procedure is in fact just that of the   
history of art and poetry1 where what is
 really historical treatment1  living   
and complete1 is the thought or         
criticism of individual poetical        
personalities1 and the rest a table of  
criticisms1 an abridgment due  to       
contiguity of time or place1 affinity of
 matter or similarity of  temperament1  
or to degrees of artistic excellence4   
,nor must we say that  every philosophic

 problem is linked to all the others and
 is always a  problem of the whole of   
philosophy1 thus differing from the     
cases of  poetry and art1 for there is  
no diversity here either1 and the whole 
of  history and the entire universe are 
immanent in every single work of  art4  
,now that we have likewise reduced      
philosophies of history to the rank  of 
particular histories1 it is scarcely    
necessary to demonstrate  that the      
demand being made in several quarters   
for a 'universal'  or 'general' history 
of science is without foundation4 ,for  
such  a history would be impossible to  
write1 even if we were able to  identify
 or compare the history of science with 
chat of philosophy4  ,but it is doubly  
impossible both because there are       
comprised under  the name of 'science'  
such diverse forms as sciences of       
observation  and mathematical sciences1 
and also because in each of these       
classes  themselves the several         
disciplines remain separate1 owing to   

the  irreducible variety of data and    
postulates from which they spring4  ,if1
 as we have pointed out1 every          
particular philosophical problem  links 
and places itself in harmony with all   
other philosophical  problems1 every    
scientific problem tends1 on the        
contrary1 to shut  itself up in itself1 
and there is no more destructive        
tendency in  science than that of       
'explaining' all the facts by means of a
 'single  principle1' substituting1 that
 is to say1 an unfruitful metaphysic    
for fruitful science1 allowing an empty 
word to act as a magic wand1  and by    
'explaining everything' to 'explain'    
nothing at all4 ,the unity  admitted by 
the history of the sciences is not that 
which connects  one theory with another 
and one science with another in an      
imaginary  general history of science1  
but that which connects each science and
  each theory with the intellectual and 
social complex of the moment in  which  
it appeared4 ,but even here too we must 

utter the warning that in  thus         
explaining their true nature we do not  
wish to contest the right  to existence 
of tables and encyclopdias of the       
history of science1  far less to throw  
discredit upon the present direction of 
studies1 by  means of which1 at the call
 of the history of the sciences1 useful 
,research is stimulated in directions   
that have been long neglected4  ,nor do 
we intend to move any objection to      
histories of science in the  form of    
tables and encyclopdias on the ground   
that it is impossible  for the same     
student to be equally competent as to   
problems of quite  different nature1    
such as are those of the various        
sciences2 for it  is inconceivable that 
a philosopher exists with a capacity    
equal to  the understanding of each and 
every philosophical problem 7indeed1 the
  mind of the best solver of certain    
problems is usually the more closed  to 
others72 or that a critic and historian 
of poetry and art exists  who tastes and

 enjoys equally all forms of poetry and 
art1 however  versatile he be4 ,each one
 has his sphere marked out more or less 
narrowly1 and each is universal only by 
means of his particularity4    ,finally1
 we shall not repeat the same           
demonstration for political  history and
 ethics1 where the claim to represent   
the whole of history  in a single line  
of development has had less occasion to 
manifest  itself4 ,it is usually more   
readily admitted there that every       
history  is particular--that is to say1 
determined by the political and ethical 
problem or problems with which history  
is concerned in time and place1  and    
which every history therefore           
occasionally rethinks from the          
beginning4 ,the analogy1 then1 between  
different kinds of special  history is  
to be considered perfect1 and the       
anomaly between them  excluded1 for they
 all obey the principle of              
particularity1 that is1  particular     
universality 7whatever be the appearance

 to the contrary74  ,but if1 as         
histories1 they all proceed according to
 the nature of what  we have explained  
as historiography1 in so far as they are
 special  each one conforms to the      
concept of its speciality4 ,it is in    
this sense  alone that each one is      
anomalous in respect to the others1     
preserving1  that is to say1 its own    
peculiar nature4 ,we have explained that
 the  claim to treat the history of     
poetry and of art in the same way as    
philosophy is erroneous1 not only       
because it misconceives the true        
concept of history1 but also because it 
misrepresents the nature of  art1       
conceiving it as philosophy and         
dissipating it in a dialectic  of       
concepts1 or because it leaves out1 in  
the history of art1 just  that by reason
 of which art is art1 looking upon it as
 something  secondary1 or at best giving
 it a place beside the social or        
conceptual  activities4 ,this error is  
precisely analogous to that of those who

  from time to time suggest what they   
term the 'psychological' reform of      
philosophy--that is to say1 they would  
like to treat it as dependent  upon the 
psychology of philosophers and of the   
social environment1 thus  placing it on 
a level1 sometimes with the history of  
the sentiments1  at others with that of 
fancies and ,utopias1 or with what is   
not  the history of philosophizing4     
,such persons lack the knowledge of     
what philosophy is1 as the others lack  
the knowledge of poetry  and art4       
,anyone desirous of arriving at a rapid 
knowledge of the  difference between the
 history of philosophy and the history  
of poetry  should observe how the one1  
owing to the nature of its object1 is   
led  to examine theories in so far as   
they are the work of pure mind1  and    
therefore to develop a history in which 
thoughts represent the  dramatis person1
 while the other is led by the nature of
 its object  to examine works of art in 
so far as they are works of imagination1

  which gives expression to movements of
 feeling1 and therefore to  develop a   
history of imaginative and sensitive    
points of view4 ,the  former1 therefore1
 though it does not neglect actions1    
events1 and  imagination1 regards them  
as the humus of pure thought and takes  
the form of a history of concepts       
without persons1 either real or         
imaginary1 while the latter1 which also 
does not neglect actions1  events1 and  
thoughts in its turn regards them as the
 humus of imaginary  creations and takes
 the form of a history of ideal or      
imaginary  personalities1 which have    
divested themselves of the ballast of   
practical interests and of the curb of  
concepts4 ,the plans1 too1 which  they  
draw up and with which they cannot      
dispense1 any more than can any  human  
dialectic1 answer to these different    
tendencies--that is to say1  with the   
one they are schemes or general types of
 modes of thinking1  with the other     
schemes containing ideal personalities4 

,if the history of philosophy has       
several times tried to devour the       
history of poetry and art1 it may also  
be said to have several times  tried to 
devour the history of practice1 that of 
politics and ethics1  or 'social        
history1' as people prefer to call it in
 our day4 ,it has  also been asserted   
that such history should be set free    
from the  chroniclism in which it had   
become involved and assume a scientific 
and  rigorous form4 ,to do this1 it was 
heedful to reduce it to a history  of   
'ideas1' which are the true and         
essential practical acts1 because  they 
generate them--that is to say1 the error
 which we noted above in  respect to    
poetry and art has here been repeated4  
,what is peculiar to  practical acts has
 been neglected1 and only the 'ideas1'  
which are  their antecedents and        
consequents1 have been retained4 ,but on
 other  occasions the 'ideas' to which  
it was claimed to reduce practical  acts
 were not really ideas or intellectual  

formations1 but truly  practical acts1  
sentiments1 dispositions1 customs1      
institutions4 ,the  originality of      
political and ethical history was thus  
unconsciously  confirmed4 ,its object is
 just what can be designated with the   
single  word institutions1 taking the   
word in its widest signification--that  
is to say1 understanding by it all      
practical arrangements of human         
individuals and societies1 from the most
 recondite sentiments to the  most      
obvious modes of life 7which1 too1 are  
always will in action74  ,all are       
equally historical productions1 the sole
 effective historical  productions      
perceivable according to the practical  
form of the  spirit4 ,if the patrimony  
of judgments1 as the capital with and   
upon  which our modern thought works1 is
 the result of a long history1 of  which
 we become conscious from time to time1 
illustrating now one  and now another of
 its particular aspects at the          
solicitation of new  needs1 so also what

 we can now practically do1 all our     
sentiments  as so-called civilized      
men--courage1 honour1 dignity1 love1    
modesty1  and the like--all our         
institutions in the strict sense of the 
term  7which are themselves due to      
attitudes of the spirit1 utilitarian or 
moral7--the family1 the state1 commerce1
 industry1 military affairs1  and so    
on--have a long history2 and according  
as one or other of those  sentiments or 
institutions enters upon a crisis1 as   
the result of new  wants1 we attempt to 
ascertain its true 'nature'--that is to 
say1 its  historical genesis4 ,anyone   
who has followed the developments of    
modern  social historiography with care 
and attention has been able to see      
clearly that its aim is precisely to    
arrange the chroniclistic chaos  of     
disaggregated notes of events in ordered
 series of histories of  social values1 
and that its field of research is the   
history of the  human soul in its       
practical aspect2 either when it        

produces general  histories of          
civilization 7always due to particular  
motives and  limited by them71 or when  
it presents histories of classes1       
peoples1  social currents1 sentiments1  
institutions1 and so forth4             
,biography1 too 7only when not limited  
to a mere chroniclistic  collection of  
the experiences of an individual or to a
 poetical  portrait1 improperly regarded
 as a historical work71 is the history  
of  an 'institution' in the             
philosophical acceptation of the word   
and forms  part of the history of       
practice3 because the individual1 in the
 same  way as a people or a social      
class1 is the formation of a character1 
or  complex of specific attitudes and   
actions consequent upon them2 and it  is
 of this that historical biography      
consists1 not of the individual  looked 
upon as external or private or physical1
 or whatever it be  called4    ,we might
 be expected to indicate the place or   
function of the history  of science and 

of religion1 in order to render to a    
certain extent  complete this rapid     
review of special histories1 in which   
general  history realizes itself in     
turn--it never exists outside of them4  
,but  if science differs from philosophy
 in being partly theoretical and  partly
 practical1 and religion is an attempt  
to explain reality by  means of myth and
 to direct the work of man according to 
an ideal1 it  is evident that the       
history of science enters to some extent
 into the  history of philosophical     
thought and to some extent forms part of
 that  of needs and institutions2       
indeed1 since the moment which sets     
science  to work and endows it with its 
peculiar character is the practical or  
suitable moment1 it really belongs to   
the history of institutions in  the very
 wide sense described2 and the history  
of religion forms to  some extent part  
of the history of institutions and to   
some extent  part of the history of     
philosophy2 indeed1 since the dominating

 moment  is here mythical conception or 
philosophical effort1 the history of    
religion is substantially that of       
philosophy4 ,other more particular      
disquisitions in connexion with this    
argument would be out of place  in the  
present treatise1 which is not          
especially concerned with the  theory   
and methodology of particular special   
histories 7coincident with  the         
treatment of the various spheres of     
philosophy1 sthetics1 logic1  etc471 and
 aims only at indicating the directions 
in which they must  necessarily         
develop4#e      #a ,supra1 pp4 #ee-ei4  
#b ,supra1 pp4 #aai-abb4    #c ,in the  
sthetic1 ,i1 ch4 xvii4    #d ,see       
,appendix ,,iii4    #e ,it will be of   
further use to draw attention here1 in a
 note1 to  the already mentioned        
distinction between the history of      
practice in  politics and in ethics1    
because thus alone can be set at rest   
the  variance which runs through        
historiography1 between political       

history  or history of states and       
history of humanity or of civilization1 
especially from the eighteenth century  
onward4 ,in ,germany it is  one of the  
elements in the intricate debate between
 ,geschichte  and ,kulturgeschichte1 and
 it has sometimes been described as a   
conflict between ,french historiography 
7,voltaire and his followers71  or      
histoire de la civilisation1 and the    
,germanic 7,mser and his  followers71 or
 history of the state4 ,one side would  
absorb and  subject the history of      
culture or social history to that of the
  state1 the other would do the         
opposite2 and the eclectics1 as usual1  
without knowing much about it1 place the
 one beside the other1 inert1  history  
of politics and history of civilization1
 thus destroying the  unity of history4 
,the truth is that political history and
 history  of civilization have the same 
relations between one another in the    
practical field as those between the    
history of poetry or of art and  the    

history of philosophy or thought in the 
theoretical field4 ,they  correspond to 
two eternal moments of the spirit--that 
of the pure will1  or economic moment1  
and that of the ethical will4 ,hence we 
also see why  some will always be       
attracted rather by the one than the    
other form of  history3 according as to 
whether they are moved chiefly by       
political or  chiefly by moral          
interests4          ,,appendix ,,iii    
,,philosophy ,,and ,,methodology        
,having established the unity of        
philosophy and historiography1 and      
shown that the division between the two 
has but a literary and didactic  value1 
because it is founded upon the          
possibility of placing in the           
foreground of verbal exposition now one 
and now the other of the two            
dialectical elements of that unity1 it  
is well to make quite clear what  is the
 true object of the treatises bearing   
the traditional title of  philosophic   
'theory' or 'system'3 to what 7in a     

word7 philosophy can  be reduced4       
,philosophy1 in consequence of the new  
relation in which it has been  placed1  
cannot of necessity be anything but the 
methodological moment  of               
historiography3 a dilucidation of the   
categories constitutive  of historical  
judgments1 or of the concepts that      
direct historical  interpretation4 ,and 
since historiography has for content the
 concrete  life of the spirit1 and this 
life is life of imagination and of      
thought1 of action and of morality 7or  
of something else1 if anything  else can
 be thought of71 and in this variety of 
its forms remains  always one1 the      
dilucidation moves in distinguishing    
between sthetic  and logic1 between     
economic and ethic1 uniting and         
dissolving them  all in the philosophy  
of the spirit4 ,if a philosophical      
problem shows  itself to be altogether  
sterile for the historical judgment1 we 
have  there the proof that such problem 
is otiose1 badly stated1 and in  reality

 does not exist4 ,if the solution of a  
problem--that is to  say1 of a          
philosophical proposition--instead of   
making history more  intelligible1      
leaves it obscure or confounds it with  
others1 or leaps  over it and lightly   
condemns or negates it1 we have there   
the proof  that such proposition and the
 philosophy with which it is connected  
are arbitrary1 though it may preserve   
interest in other respects1 as a        
manifestation of sentiment or of        
imagination4    ,the definition of      
philosophy as 'methodology' is not at   
first exempt  from doubts1 even on the  
part of one ready to accept in general  
the  tendency that it represents2       
because philosophy and methodology are  
terms often contrasted1 and a philosophy
 that leads to a methodology  is apt to 
be tainted with empiricism4 ,but        
certainly the methodology  of which we  
are here speaking is not at all         
empirical2 indeed1 it  appears just for 
the purpose of correcting and taking the

 place of the  empirical methodology of 
professional historians and of other    
such  specialists in all that greater   
part of it where it is a true and       
proper1 though defective1 attempt toward
 the philosophical solution  of the     
theoretical problems raised by the study
 of history1 or toward  philosophical   
methodology and philosophy as           
methodology4    ,if1 however1 the       
above-mentioned dispute is settled as   
soon as stated1  this cannot be said of 
another1 where our position finds itself
 opposed  to a widely diffused and      
ancient conception of philosophy as the 
solver of the mystery of the universe1  
knowledge of ultimate reality1          
revelation of the world of noumena1     
which is held to be beyond the  world of
 phenomena1 in which we move in ordinary
 life and in which  history also moves4 
,this is not the place to give the      
history of that  idea2 but we must at   
least say this1 that its origin is      
religious or  mythological1 and that it 

persisted even among those philosophers 
who were most successful in directing   
thought toward our earth as the  sole   
reality1 and initiated the new          
philosophy as methodology of the        
judgment or of historical knowledge4 ,it
 persisted in ,kant1 who admitted  it as
 the limit of his criticism2 it         
persisted in ,hegel1 who framed his     
subtle researches in logic and          
philosophy of the spirit in a sort of   
mythology of the ,idea4                 
,nevertheless1 the diversity of the two 
conceptions manifested itself  in an    
ever-increasing ratio1 finding          
expression in various formulas  of the  
nineteenth century1 such as psychology  
against metaphysic1  a philosophy of    
experience and immanence1 aprioristic   
against  transcendental philosophy1     
positivism against idealism2 and        
although the polemic was as a rule ill  
conducted1 going beyond the  mark and   
ending by unconsciously embracing that  
very metaphysic1  transcendency1 and    

apriority1 that very abstract idealism1 
which it  had set out to combat1 the    
sentiment that inspired it was          
legitimate4  ,and the philosophy of     
methodology has made it its own1 has    
combated  the same adversary with better
 arms1 has certainly insisted upon a    
psychological view1 but a speculative   
psychological view1 immanent  in        
history1 but dialectically immanent1    
differing in this from  positivism1 that
 while the latter made necessary the    
contingent1 it  made the contingent     
necessary1 thus affirming the right of  
thought to  the hegemony4 ,such a       
philosophy is just philosophy as history
 7and so  history as philosophy71 and   
the determination of the philosophical  
moment in the purely categorical and    
methodological moment4    ,the greater  
vigour of this conception in respect to 
the opposite1  the superiority of       
philosophy as methodology over          
philosophy as  metaphysic1 is shown by  
the capacity of the former to solve the 

problems of the latter by criticizing   
them and pointing out their  origin4    
,metaphysic1 on the other hand1 is      
incapable of solving not only  the      
problems of methodology1 but even its   
own problems1 without having  recourse  
to the fantastic and arbitrary4 ,thus   
questions as to the  reality of the     
external world1 of soul-substance1 of   
the unknowable1  of dualisms and of     
antitheses1 and so forth1 have          
disappeared in  gnoseological doctrines1
 which have substituted better          
conceptions for  those which we formerly
 possessed concerning the logic of the  
sciences1  explaining those questions as
 eternally renascent aspects of the     
dialectic or phenomenology of knowledge4
    ,the view of philosophy as          
metaphysic is1 however1 so inveterate   
and so  tenacious that it is not        
surprising that it should still give    
some sign  of life in the minds of those
 who have set themselves free of it in  
general1 but have not applied themselves

 to eradicating it in all its           
particulars1 nor closed all the doors by
 which it may return in a more  or less 
unexpected manner4 ,and if we rarely    
find it openly and directly  displayed  
now1 we may yet discern or suspect it in
 one or other of its  aspects or        
attitudes1 persisting like kinks of the 
mind1 or unconscious  preconceptions1   
which threaten to drive philosophy as   
methodology back  into the wrong path1  
and to prepare the return1 though but   
for a brief  period1 of the metaphysic  
that has been superseded4    ,it seems  
to me opportune to provide here a clear 
statement of some of  these             
preconceptions1 tendencies1 and habits1 
pointing out the errors  which they     
contain and entail4    ,first of all the
 survivals of the past that are still   
common comes the  view of philosophy as 
having a fundamental problem to solve4  
,now the  conception of a fundamental   
problem is intrinsically at variance    
with  that of philosophy as history1 and

 with the treatment of philosophy  as   
methodology of history1 which posits1   
and cannot do otherwise  than posit1 the
 infinity of philosophical problems1 all
 certainly  connected with one another1 
but not one of which can be considered  
fundamental1 for just the same reason   
that no single part of an  organism is  
the foundation of all the others1 but   
each one is in its  turn foundation and 
founded4 ,if1 indeed1 methodology take  
the substance  of its problems from     
history1 history in its most modest but 
concrete  form of history of ourselves1 
of each one of us as an individual1 this
  shows us that we pass on from one to  
another particular philosophical        
problem at the promptings of our life as
 it is lived1 and that one or  the other
 group or class of problems holds the   
field or has especial  interest for us1 
according to the epochs of our life4    
,and we find the  same to be the case if
 we look at the wider but less definite 
spectacle  afforded by the already      

mentioned general history of            
philosophy--that  is to say1 that       
according to times and peoples1         
philosophical problems  relating        
sometimes to morality1 sometimes to     
politics1 to religion1  or to the       
natural sciences and mathematics1 have  
in turn the upper  hand4 ,every         
particular philosophical problem has    
been a problem of the  whole of         
philosophy1 either openly or by         
inference1 but we never meet  with a    
general problem of philosophy1 owing to 
the contradiction  thereby implied4 ,and
 if there does seem to be one 7and it   
certainly  does seem so71 it is really a
 question of appearances1 due to the    
fact that modern philosophy1 which comes
 to us from the ,middle ,ages  and was  
elaborated during the religious         
struggles of the ,renaissance1  has     
preserved a strong imprint of theology  
in its didactic form1  not less than in 
the psychological disposition of the    
greater part of  those addicted to it4  

,hence arises the fundamental and almost
 unique  importance usurped by the      
problem of thought and being1 which     
after  all was nothing more than the old
 problem of this world and the next1  of
 earth and heaven1 in a critical and    
gnoseological form4 ,but those  who     
destroyed or who initiated the          
destruction of heaven and of the  other 
world and of transcendental philosophy  
by immanent philosophy  began at the    
same moment to corrode the conception of
 a fundamental  problem1 although they  
were not fully aware of this 7for we    
have said  above that they remained     
trammelled in the philosophy of the     
,thing  in ,itself or in the ,mythology 
of the ,idea74 ,that problem was rightly
  fundamental for religious spirits1 who
 held that the whole intellectual  and  
practical dominion of the world was     
nothing1 unless they had saved  their   
own souls or their own thought in       
another world1 in the knowledge  of a   
world of noumena and reality4 ,but such 

it was not destined to  remain for the  
philosophers1 henceforth restricted to  
the world alone  or to nature1 which has
 no skin and no kernel and is all of a  
piece4  ,what would happen were we to   
resume belief in a fundamental problem1 
dominating all others8 ,the other       
problems would either have to be        
considered as all dependent upon it and 
therefore solved with it1 or  as        
problems no longer philosophical but    
empirical4 ,that is to say1 all  the    
problems appearing every day anew in    
science and life would lose  their      
value1 either becoming a tautology of   
the fundamental solution or  being      
committed to empirical treatment4 ,thus 
the distinction between  philosophy and 
methodology1 between metaphysic and     
philosophy of the  spirit1 would        
reappear1 the first transcendental as   
regards the second1  the second         
aphilosophical as regards the first4    
,another view1 arising from the old     
metaphysical conception of the  function

 of philosophy1 leads to the rejection  
of distinction in favour  of unity1 thus
 conforming to the theological          
conception that all  distinctions are   
unified by absorption in ,god1 and to   
the religious  point of view1 which     
forgets the world and its necessities in
 the  vision of ,god4 ,from this ensues 
a disposition which may be described  as
 something between indifferent1         
accommodating1 or weak1 in respect  of  
particular problems1 and the pernicious 
doctrine of the double  faculty is      
almost tacitly renewed1 that is1 of     
intellectual intuition  or other        
superior cognoscitive faculty1 peculiar 
to the philosopher  and leading to the  
vision of true reality1 and of criticism
 or thought  prone to interest itself in
 the contingent and thus greatly        
inferior  in degree and free to proceed 
with a lack of speculative rigour not   
permissible in the other4 ,such a       
disposition led to the worst possible   
consequences in the philosophical       

treatises of the ,hegelian school1      
where the disciples 7differing from the 
master7 generally gave evidence  of     
having meditated but little or not at   
all upon the problems of the  various   
spiritual forms1 freely accepting vulgar
 opinions concerning  them1 or engaging 
in them with the indifference of men    
sure of the  essential1 and therefore   
cutting and mutilating them without     
pity1 in  order to force them into their
 pre-established schemes with all haste1
  thus getting rid of difficulties by   
means of this illusory arrangement4     
,hence the emptiness and tiresomeness of
 their philosophies1 from  which the    
historian1 or the man whose attention is
 directed to the  understanding of the  
particular and the concrete1 failed to  
learn  anything that could be of use to 
him in the direction of his own  studies
 and in the clearer formulation of his  
own judgments4 ,and since  the mythology
 of the idea reappeared in positivism as
 mythology of  evolution1 here too      

particular problems 7which are indeed   
the only  philosophical problems7       
received merely schematic and empty     
treatment  and did not progress at all4 
,philosophy as history and methodology  
of  history restores honour to the      
virtue of acuteness or discernment1     
which the theological unitarianism of   
metaphysic tended to depreciate3        
discernment1 which is prosaic but       
severe1 hard and laborious but          
prolific1 which sometimes assumes the   
unsympathetic aspect of  scholasticism  
and pedantry1 but is also of use in this
 aspect1 like  every discipline1 and    
holds that the neglect of distinction   
for unity  is also intimately opposed to
 the conception of philosophy as        
history4    ,a third tendency 7,i beg to
 be allowed to proceed by enumeration of
 the  various sides of the same mental  
attitude for reasons of convenience71  a
 third tendency also seeks the          
definitive philosophy1 untaught by  the 
historical fact that no philosophy has  

ever been definitive or has  set a limit
 to thought1 or has ever been thoroughly
 convinced that  the perpetual changing 
of philosophy with the world which      
perpetually  changes is not by any means
 a defect1 but is the nature itself of  
thought and reality4 ,or1 rather1 such  
teaching1 and the proposition  that     
follows it1 do not fail altogether of   
acceptance1 and they are  led to believe
 that the spirit1 ever growing upon     
itself1 produces  thoughts and systems  
that are ever new4 ,but since they have 
retained  the presupposition of a       
fundamental problem which 7as we have   
said7  substantially consists of the    
ancient problem of religion alone1  and 
each problem well determined implies a  
single solution1 the  solution given of 
the 'fundamental problem' naturally     
claims to be  the definitive solution of
 the problem of philosophy itself4 ,a   
new  solution could not appear without a
 new problem 7owing to the logical      
unity of problem and solution72 but that

 problem1 which is superior  to all the 
others1 is on the contrary the only one4
 ,thus a definitive  philosophy1 assumed
 in the conception of the fundamental   
problem1 is at  variance with historical
 experience1 and more irreconcilably1   
because  in a more evidently logical    
manner1 with philosophy as history1     
which1  admitting infinite problems1    
denies the claim for and the expectation
  of a definitive philosophy4 ,every    
philosophy is definitive for the        
problem which it solves1 but not for the
 one that appears immediately           
afterward1 at the foot of the first1 nor
 for the other problems which  will     
arise from the solution of this4 ,to    
close the series would be to  turn from 
philosophy to religion and to rest in   
,god4    ,indeed1 the fourth            
preconception1 which we now proceed to  
state1 and  which links itself with the 
preceding1 and1 together with all the   
preceding1 to the theological nature of 
the old metaphysic1 concerns  the figure

 of the philosopher1 as ,buddha or the  
,awakened ,one1 who  posits himself as  
superior to others 7and to himself in   
the moments  when he is not a           
philosopher71 because he holds himself  
to be free from  human passions1        
illusions1 and agitations by means of   
philosophy4 ,this  is the case with the 
believer1 who fixes his mind upon ,god  
and shakes  off earthly cares1 like the 
lover1 who feels himself blessed in the 
possession of the beloved and defies the
 whole world4 ,but the world  soon takes
 its revenge both upon the believer and 
the lover1 and does  not fail to insist 
upon its rights4 ,such an illusion is   
impossible for  the philosophical       
historian1 who differs from the other in
 feeling  himself irresistibly involved 
in the course of history1 as at once    
both  subject and object1 and who is    
therefore led to negate felicity or     
beatitude1 as he negates every other    
abstraction 7because1 as has been  well 
said1 le bonheur est le contraire de la 

sensation de vivre71 and  to accept life
 as it is1 as joy that overcomes sorrow 
and perpetually  produces new sorrows   
and new unstable joys4 ,and history1    
which he  thinks as the only truth1 is  
the work of tireless thought1 which     
conditions practical work1 as practical 
work conditions the new work of         
thought4 ,thus the primacy formerly     
attributed to the contemplative life  is
 now transferred not to active life1 but
 to life in its integrity1  which is at 
once thought and action4 ,and every man 
is a philosopher  7in his circle1       
however wide or narrow it may appear71  
and every  philosopher is a man1        
indissolubly linked to the conditions of
 human  life1 which it is not given to  
anyone to transcend4 ,the mystical or   
apocalyptic philosopher of the          
,grco-,roman decadence was well able to 
separate himself from the world3 the    
great thinkers1 like ,hegel1 who        
inaugurated the epoch of modern         
philosophy1 although they denied the    

primacy of the abstract contemplative   
life1 were liable to fall back  into the
 error of belief in this supremacy and  
to conceive a sphere of  absolute       
spirit1 a process of liberation through 
art1 religion1 and  philosophy1 as a    
means of reaching it2 but the once      
sublime figure of  the philosopher      
blessed in the absolute1 when we try to 
revive it in  this modern world of ours1
 becomes tinged with the comic4 ,it is  
true  that satire has now but little    
material upon which to exercise itself1 
and is reduced to aiming its shafts at  
the 'professors of philosophy'          
7according to the type of philosopher   
that has been created by modern         
universities1 which is partly the heir  
of the 'master of theology'  of the     
,middle ,ages73 against the professors1 
that is to say1 to the  extent that they
 continue to repeat mechanically        
abstract general  propositions1 and seem
 to be unmoved by the passions and the  
problems  that press upon them from all 

sides and vainly ask for more concrete  
and actual treatment4 ,but the function 
and the social figure of the            
philosopher have profoundly changed1 and
 we have not said that the  manner of   
being of the 'professors of philosophy' 
will not also change  in its turn--that 
is to say1 that the way of teaching     
philosophy in  the universities and     
schools is not on the verge of          
experiencing a  crisis1 which will      
eliminate the last remains of the       
medieval fashion  of formalistic        
philosophizing4 ,a strong advance in    
philosophical  culture should lead to   
this result3 that all students of human 
affairs1  jurists1 economists1          
moralists1 men of letters--in other     
words1 all  students of historical      
matters--should become conscious and    
disciplined  philosophers1 and that thus
 the philosopher in general1 the purus  
philosophus1 should find no place left  
for him among the professional          
specifications of knowledge4 ,with the  

disappearance of the philosopher  'in   
general' would also disappear the last  
social vestige of the  teleologist or   
metaphysician1 and of the ,buddha or    
,awakened ,one4    ,there is also a     
prejudice which to some extent          
inquinates the manner  of culture of    
students of philosophy4 ,they are       
accustomed to have  recourse almost     
exclusively to the books of             
philosophers1 indeed of  philosophers   
'in general1' of the metaphysical       
system-makers1 in the  same way as the  
student of theology formed himself upon 
the sacred  texts4 ,this method of      
culture1 which is perfectly consequent  
when  a start is made from the          
presupposition of a fundamental or      
single  problem1 of which it is         
necessary to know the different         
diverging  and progressive solutions    
which have been attempted1 is altogether
  inconsequent and inadequate in the    
case of a historical and immanent       
philosophy1 which draws its material    

from all the most varied  impressions of
 life and from all intuitions and       
reflections upon life4  ,that form of   
culture is the reason for the aridity of
 the treatment of  certain particular   
problems1 for which is necessary a      
continued contact  with daily experience
 7art and art criticism for sthetic1    
politics1  economy1 judicial trials for 
the philosophy of rights1 positive and  
mathematical sciences for the gnoseology
 of the sciences1 and so on74  ,to it is
 also due the aridity of treatment of   
those parts of philosophy  themselves   
which are traditionally considered to   
constitute 'general  philosophy1' for   
they too had their origin in life1 and  
we must refer  them back to life if we  
are to give a satisfactory              
interpretation of  their propositions2  
we must plunge them into life again to  
develop  them and to find in them new   
aspects4 ,the whole of history is the   
foundation of philosophy as history1 and
 to limit its foundation to  the history

 of philosophy alone1 and of 'general'  
or 'metaphysical'  philosophy1 is       
impossible1 save by unconsciously       
adhering to the old  idea of philosophy1
 not as methodology but as metaphysic1  
which is the  fifth of the prejudices   
that we are enumerating4    ,this       
enumeration can be both lengthened and  
ended with the mention of a  sixth      
preconception1 relating to philosophical
 exposition4 ,owing to  this1 philosophy
 is expected to have either an          
architectural form1 as  though it were a
 temple consecrated to the ,eternal1 or 
a warm poetical  form1 as though it were
 a hymn to the ,eternal4 ,but these     
forms were  part of the old content1 and
 that form is now changed4 ,philosophy  
shows itself to be a dilucidation of the
 categories of historical               
interpretation rather than the grandiose
 architecture of a temple or a  sacred  
hymn running on conventional lines4     
,philosophy is discussion1  polemic1    
rigorous didactic exposition1 which is  

certainly coloured  with the sentiments 
of the writer1 like every other literary
 form1  able also at times to raise its 
voice 7or on the other hand to become   
slight and playful1 according to        
circumstances71 but not constrained to  
observe rules which appear to be proper 
to a theological or religious  content4 
,philosophy treated as methodology has1 
so to speak1 caused  philosophical      
exposition to descend from poetry to    
prose4    ,all the preconceptions1      
habits1 and tendencies which ,i have    
briefly  described should in my opinion 
be carefully sought out and eliminated1 
for it is they that impede philosophy   
from taking the form and  proceeding in 
the mode suitable and adequate to the   
consciousness of  the unity with history
 which it has reached4 ,if we look      
merely at  the enormous amount of       
psychological observations and moral    
doubts  accumulated in the course of the
 nineteenth century by poetry1 fiction1 
and drama1 those voices of our society1 

and consider that in great part  it     
remains without critical treatment1 some
 idea can be formed of the  immense     
amount of work that falls to philosophy 
to accomplish4 ,and if  on the other    
hand we observe the multitude of anxious
 questions that  the great ,european    
,war has everywhere raised--as to the   
state1 as to  history1 as to rights1 as 
to the functions of the different       
peoples1 as  to civilization1 culture1  
and barbarism1 as to science1 art1      
religion1  as to the end and ideal of   
life1 and so on--we realize the duty of 
philosophers to issue forth from the    
theologico-metaphysical circle in  which
 they remain confined even when they    
refuse to hear of theology  and         
metaphysic4 ,for notwithstanding their  
protests1 and notwithstanding  the new  
conception accepted and professed by    
them1 they really remain  intellectually
 and spiritually attached to the old    
ideas4    ,even the history itself of   
philosophy has hitherto been renewed    

only  to a small extent1 in conformity  
with the new conception of philosophy4  
,this new conception invites us to      
direct our attention to thoughts  and   
thinkers1 long neglected or placed in   
the second rank and not  considered to  
be truly philosophers because they did  
not treat directly  the 'fundamental    
problem' of philosophy or the great     
peut-tre1 but  were occupied with       
'particular problems4' ,these particular
 problems1  how-ever1 were destined to  
produce eventually a change of view as  
regards the 'general problem1' which    
emerged itself reduced to the  rank of a
 'particular' problem4 ,it is simply the
 result of prejudice  to look upon a    
,machiavelli1 who posited the conception
 of the modern  state1 a ,baltasar      
,gracian1 who examined the question of  
acuteness in  practical matters1 a      
,pascal1 who criticized the spirit of   
,jesuitry1 a  ,vico1 who renewed all the
 sciences of the spirit1 or a ,hamann1  
with  his keen sense of the value of    

tradition1 as minor philosophers1 ,i do 
not say in comparison with some         
metaphysician of little originality1    
but even when compared with a ,descartes
 or a ,spinoza1 who dealt with  other   
but not superior problems4 ,a schematic 
and bloodless history  of philosophy    
corresponded1 in fact1 with the         
philosophy of the  'fundamental         
problem4' ,a far richer1 more varied and
 pliant philosophy  should correspond   
with philosophy as methodology1 which   
holds to be  philosophy not only what   
appertains to the problems of immanency1
 of  transcendency1 of this world and   
the next1 but everything that has  been 
of avail in increasing the patrimony of 
guiding conceptions1 the  understanding 
of actual history1 and the formation of 
the reality of  thought in which we     
live4          ,,part ,,ii              
,,concerning ,,the ,,history ,,of       
,,historiography          ,i            
,,preliminary ,,questions      ,we      
possess many works relating to the      

history of historiography1 both         
special1 dealing with individual        
authors1 and more or less general1      
dealing with groups of authors          
7histories of historiography confined   
to one people and to a definite period1 
or altogether 'universal'  histories74  
,not only have we bibliographical works 
and works of  erudition1 but criticism1 
some of it excellent1 especially in the 
case  of ,german scientific literature1 
ever the most vigilant of all in not    
leaving unexplored any nook or cranny of
 the dominion of knowledge4  ,it cannot1
 therefore1 form part of my design to   
treat the theme from  its foundations3  
but ,i propose to make a sort of        
appendix or critical  annotation to the 
collection of books and essays that ,i  
have read upon  the argument4 ,i will   
not say that these are all1 or even that
 they are  all those of any importance1 
but they ire certainly a considerable   
number4 ,by means of this annotation ,i 
shall try to establish1 on the  one     

hand1 in an exact manner and in         
conformity with the principles          
explained1 the method of such a history1
 regarding which ,i observe  that there 
still exist confusion and perplexity1   
even among the best1  which lead to     
errors of judgment or at least of plan1 
and on the  other hand ,i shall try to  
outline the principal periods in a      
summary  manner1 both with the view of  
exemplifying the method established1    
and1 as it were1 of illustrating        
historically the concepts exposed in    
the preceding theoretical pages1 which  
might otherwise retain here and  there  
something of an abstract appearance4    
,beginning with methodical              
delimitations1 ,i shall note in the     
first  place that in a history of       
historiography as such1 historical      
writings  cannot be looked upon from the
 point of view proper to a history of   
literature--that is to say1 as          
expressions of individual sentiments1   
as forms of art4 ,doubtless they are    

this also1 and have a perfect right  to 
form part of histories of literature1 as
 the treatises and systems  of the      
philosophers1 the writings of ,plato and
 ,aristotle1 of ,bruno1  of ,leibnitz1  
and of ,hegel2 but in this case both are
 regarded not as  works of history and  
of philosophy1 but of literature and    
poetry2 and  the empirical scale of     
values which constitute the different   
modes  of history in the cases of the   
same authors is different1 because  in a
 history of literature the place of a   
,plato will always be more  considerable
 than that of an ,aristotle1 that of a  
,bruno than that of  a ,leibnitz1 owing 
to the greater amount of passion and the
 greater  richness of artistic problems 
contained in the former of each pair4   
,the fact that in many volumes of       
literary history such diversity of      
treatment is not observed1 and          
historians are talked of historically   
and not in a literary manner and        
philosophers philosophically rather     

than in a literary manner1 is due to the
 substitution in such  works of         
incoherent compilation for work that is 
properly critical  and scientific4 ,but 
the distinction between the two aspects 
is  important for this reason also1 that
 erroneous judgments1 praise1 and       
censure1 alike unjustified1 are apt to  
appear1 owing to the careless           
transference of the scale of values from
 one history to another4 ,the  slight   
esteem in which ,polybius was held in   
antiquity and for some  time after1     
because 'he did not write well' in      
comparison with the  splendour of ,livy 
or with the emotional intensity of      
,tacitus1 is an  instance of this1 as is
 likewise in ,italy the excessive praise
 lavished  upon certain historians who  
were little more than correct and       
elegant  writers of prose in comparison 
with others who were negligent and crude
  in their form1 but serious students4  
,ulrici1#a in his youthful book  on     
ancient historiography1 which despite   

its heaviness and verbosity  of         
exposition has great merits1 after      
having discussed the 'scientific  value'
 of that historiography1 also speaks at 
great length of 'artistic  value'2 but  
setting aside what of arbitrary is to be
 found in some of  the laws that he     
applies to historiography as art1 in    
conformity with  the sthetic ideas of   
his time1 it is evident that the second 
subject  of which he treats does not    
coalesce with the first and is only     
placed  side by side with it in the same
 way as those sections of works dealing 
with historical method are not connected
 but simply juxtaposed1 and  after      
having studied in their own way the     
formation of historical  thought1 the   
collection of materials or 'heuristic1' 
up to final  'comprehension1' begin to  
discuss the form of the 'exposition1'   
and in  so doing continue without being 
aware of it the method of rhetorical    
treatises on the art of history composed
 during the ,renaissance4 ,these  have  

their chief exponent in ,vossius        
7#afbc74 ,we cannot abstain from        
sometimes mentioning the literary form  
of the works of historians1  nor from   
according their laurels to works of     
remarkable literary  value1 while noting
 their unsatisfactory historiographical 
methods2  but to touch here and there   
upon1 to discuss1 to characterize1 to   
eliminate1 is of secondary importance   
and does not form part of the  proper   
function of historiography1 whose object
 is the development of                  
historiographical thought4    ,the      
distinction between this history and    
that of philology or  erudition is less 
apparent but not less indubitable1      
always1 be it  well understood1 in the  
sense explained1 of a distinction that  
is not  a separation4 ,this warning     
should be understood in respect of other
  exclusions that we are about to       
effect1 without our being obliged  to   
repeat it at every step2 for the        
connexion between history and  philology

 is undeniable1 not less than that      
between history and art1  or history and
 practical life4 ,but that does not     
prevent philology  in itself being the  
collection1 the rearrangement1 the      
purification  of material1 and not      
history4 ,owing to this quality it forms
 a part  rather of the history of       
culture than of that of thought4 ,it    
would be  impossible to disassociate it 
from the history of libraries1 archives1
  museums1 universities1 seminaries1    
coles des chartes1 academical  and      
editorial enterprises1 and from other   
institutions and proceedings  of an     
entirely practical nature4 ,fueter has  
therefore been right in  excluding from 
his theme in his recent work on the     
history of modern  historiography#b the 
history of merely philological research 
and  criticism4 ,this has not prevented 
him from taking store where apposite  of
 the school of ,biondo or of that of    
,maurini1 or of the perfecting of  the  
method of seeking for the sources       

attained by the ,german school  in the  
nineteenth century4 ,the confusion and  
lack of development  observable in the  
old and solid work of ,wachler#c is     
perhaps due to  his having failed to    
make this distinction1 to which recourse
 can also  be had with advantage        
elsewhere4 ,wachler's work1 entitled and
 conceived  as history of research and  
of the historical art from the          
,renaissance  of letters in ,europe     
onward1 ended by assuming the appearance
 of a  repertory or bibliographical     
catalogue4    ,the obstacles to be      
encountered by the distinction between  
the history  of historiography and that 
of the practical tendencies1 or         
tendencies  of the social and political 
spirit1 are more intricate4 ,these      
indeed  become incorporated with or at  
least leave their mark upon the works   
of historians2 but it is just because we
 can only with difficulty  perceive the 
line of demarcation that it is          
indispensable to make it  quite clear4  

,such tendencies1 such social and       
political spirit1 belong  rather to the 
matter than to the theoretical form of  
history2 they are  not so much          
historiography as history in the act and
 in its fieri4  ,machiavelli is a       
historian in so far as he tries to      
understand the  course of events2 he is 
a politician1 or at least a publicist1  
when  he posits and desires a prince1   
founder of a strong national state1  as 
his ideal1 reflecting this in his       
history4 ,this history1 in so  far as it
 portrays that ideal and the inspiration
 and teaching that  accompany it1 here  
and there becomes fable 7fabula docet74 
,thus  ,machiavelli belongs partly to   
the history of thought in the           
,renaissance  and partly to the history 
of the practice of the ,renaissance4    
,nor does  this happen solely in        
political and social historiography1 but
 also  in literary and artistic1 because
 there is not perhaps a critic in  the  
world1 however unprejudiced and broad in

 his ideas1 who does not  manifest      
tendencies in the direction of a        
literary renovation of his  epoch       
together with his actual judgments and  
reconstructions4 ,now to  the extent    
that he does this1 even if it be in the 
same book and on  the same page or in   
the same period1 he is no longer a      
critic1 but  a practical reformer of    
art4 ,in one domain of history alone is 
this  pacific accompaniment of          
interpretations and aspirations         
impossible--in  the history of          
philosophy1 because when1 as here1 there
 is a difference  between historical    
interpretation and the tendency of the  
philosopher1  the difference reveals the
 insufficiency of the interpretation    
itself3  in other words1 if the theory  
of the historian of philosophy is at war
  with the theories of which he claims  
to expound the history1 his theory  must
 be false1 just because it does not     
avail to justify the history  of the    
theories4 ,but this exception does not  

annul the distinction  in other fields2 
indeed1 it confirms it1 and is not an   
exception in  the empirical sense1 as it
 appears to be3 thought distinguishes   
and  is distinguished from sentiment and
 will1 but it is not distinguished  from
 itself1 precisely because it is the    
principle of distinction4  ,a           
methodological corollary of this        
distinction between history of          
historiography and history of practical 
tendencies is that the  introduction    
into the first of considerations        
belonging to the second  is to be held  
erroneous4 ,here ,i think ,fueter has   
sinned to some extent  in the book to   
which ,i have already referred1 where he
 divides his  material into humanistic1 
political1 party1 imperial1             
particularist1  ,protestant1 ,catholic1 
,jesuitic1 illuministic1 romanticist1   
erudite1  lirico-subjective1 national1  
statolatral1 historiographical1 and the 
like4 ,only some of the above divisions 
belong to1 or can properly be  reduced  

to1 historiographical concepts1 while   
the majority refer to  social and       
political life4 ,hence the lack of sound
 organization that  we observe in this  
book1 which is yet so lively and        
ingenious3 its  divisions follow one    
another without sufficient logicality1  
continuity1  and necessity1 and are not 
the result of a single thought which    
posits  them and develops itself through
 them4 ,if1 on the other hand1 the      
genuinely historiographical portions1   
which have become mingled with  it1     
should be eliminated1 what remained     
could certainly be organized1  but as   
social and political history1 no longer 
as historiography1  because the works of
 historians would be consulted only as  
documents  showing the tendencies of the
 times in which they were written4      
,machiavelli1 for instance1 7to use the 
same example7 would there figure  as an 
,italian patriot and defender of        
absolute power1 while ,vico 7a  much    
greater historian than ,machiavelli7    

would not be able to appear at  all1 or 
hardly at all1 because his relation with
 the political life of  his time was    
remote and general4    ,what ,i have    
been expounding may be resumed by saying
 that the history  of historiography is 
neither literary history nor the history
 of  cultural1 social1 political1 moral 
doings1 which are of a practical        
nature1 but that it is certainly all    
these things1 by reason of the          
unbreakable unity of history1 though    
with it the accent does not fall  upon  
practical facts1 but rather upon        
historiographical thought1  which is its
 proper subject4    ,having pointed out 
or recalled these distinctions1 which1  
as we have  seen1 are sometimes         
neglected with evil results1 we must now
 utter a  warning against other         
distinctions1 employed without rational 
basis1  which rather overcloud and      
trouble the history of historiography   
than  shed light upon it4    ,fueter 7,i
 cite him again1 although the error is  

not peculiar to  him7 declares that he  
has dealt in his book with              
historiographical  theories and with    
historical method only in so far as they
 seem  to have had influence upon actual
 historiography4 ,the history of        
historicity 7here is the reason he gives
 for the method he has  followed7 is as 
little the history of historiography as 
is the history  of dramatic theories the
 history of the drama4 ,this he         
considers to  be proved by the fact that
 theory and practice often follow       
different  paths1 as1 for instance1 in  
,lope de ,vega1 whose theory of the     
drama  and actual dramatic work were two
 different things1 to such an extent    
that it was said of the ,spanish        
dramatist that although he reverenced   
the poetical art1 when he sat down to   
compose he locked up the correct  rules 
under seven keys4 ,this argument is     
without doubt specious1 and ,i  was     
myself formerly seduced by it2 but it is
 fallacious1 as ,i realized  when ,i    

thought it over again1 and ,i now affirm
 it to be an error with  all the        
conviction and authority of one who     
criticizes an error at one  time his    
own4 ,the argument is founded upon a    
false analogy between the  production of
 art and that of history4 ,art1 which is
 the work of the  imagination1 can be   
well distinguished from the theory of   
art1 which  is the work of reflection2  
artistic genius produces the former1 the
  speculative intellect the latter1 and 
it often happens with artists  that the 
speculative intellect is inferior to    
their genius1 so that  they do one thing
 and say another1 or say one thing and  
do another1  without its being possible 
to accuse them of logical incoherence1  
because the incoherence is between two  
discordant thoughts1 never  between a   
thought and an act of the imagination4  
,but history and theory  of history are 
both of them works of thought1 bound to 
one another in  the same way as thought 
is bound to itself1 since it is one4    

,thus no  historian but possesses in a  
more or less reflective way his theory  
of  history1 because1 not to put too    
fine a point upon it1 every historian   
implicitly or explicitly conducts a     
polemic against other historians        
7against other 'versions' and           
'judgments' of a fact71 and how could   
he ever conduct a polemic or criticize  
others if he did not himself  possess a 
conception of what history is and ought 
to be1 to which to  refer1 a theory of  
history8 ,the artist1 on the other hand1
 in so far  as he is an artist1 does not
 polemize or criticize1 but forms4 ,it  
may quite well happen that an erroneous 
theory of historiography is  expounded1 
while on the contrary the history as    
narrated may turn out  to be well       
constructed4 ,this is1 of course1 to be 
incoherent1 but is  so neither more nor 
less than when progress is effected in  
one branch  of historiography1 while    
there is backwardness in another4 ,there
 may  obtain1 on the contrary1 an       

excellent theory of history1 where      
history  itself is bad2 but in the same 
way that in one field of historiography 
there is the sense of and striving for a
 better method1 while there  is         
adherence to old methods in all the     
other fields4 ,the history of           
historiography is the history of        
historical thought2 and here it is      
impossible to distinguish theory of     
history from history4    ,another       
exclusion which ,fueter declares that he
 has made is that of  the philosophy of 
history4 ,he does not give the reason   
for this1 but  allows it to be          
understood1 for he evidently holds that 
philosophies of  history do not possess 
a purely scientific character and are   
lacking  in truth4 ,but not only are    
what are called 'philosophies of        
history'  erroneous conceptions of      
history1 but so also are the            
naturalistic or  deterministic          
conceptions opposed to them1 and all the
 various forms of  pseudo-history which 

have been described above1 philological 
history1  poetical history1 rhetorical  
history4 ,i do not find that he has     
excluded these from his history1 any    
more than he has really excluded  the   
theological and transcendental          
conception of history 7philosophy  of   
history72 indeed1 he constantly refers  
to it4 ,justice and logic  would insist 
upon all or none being excluded--all    
really excluded1  and not merely in     
words4 ,but to exclude all of them1 it  
may be said1  would be anything but     
intelligent1 because how could the      
history of  history ever be told in such
 a void8 ,what is this history but the  
struggle of scientific historiography   
against inadequate scientific  formulas8
 ,certainly the former is the           
protagonist1 but how could a  drama be  
presented with a protagonist lacking    
antagonists8 ,and even  if historical   
philology be not considered directly1   
but referred back  to philology1 if     
poetical history be referred back to    

literature1  rhetorical or practical to 
social and political history1 it would  
nevertheless be necessary always to take
 account of the conversion that  often  
occurs of those various mental          
constructions into assertions  of       
reality1 taken in exchange for and given
 the value of true and  proper          
histories4 ,in this sense they become in
 turn deterministic  or transcendental  
conceptions of history1 and both of them
 logical  or illogical representations  
of all the others1 and end by becoming  
equivalent to one another dialectically1
 and are always before the  eyes of the 
historian1 because the perpetual        
condition and the  perpetual sign of the
 progress of historical thought reside  
in their  movement1 which passes from   
transcendency or false immanence to pure
  immanence1 to return to them and enter
 into a more profound conception  of    
immanency4 ,to exclude philosophies of  
history from the history of             
historiography does not1 therefore1 seem

 to me to be justifiable1  for the same 
reason as it seems to be unjustifiable  
to exclude from  it historiographical   
theories1 which are the consciousness   
that  historiography acquires of itself3
 owing to their homogeneity1 ,i say1    
owing indeed to their identity with     
history1 of which they do not form      
accidental ingredients or material      
elements1 but constitute the very       
essence4 ,a proof of this is to be found
 in the ,historical ,philosophy  of     
,france of ,flint4 ,he proceeds from a  
presumption that is perhaps the         
opposite of that of ,fueter--that is to 
say1 he treats of the philosophy  of    
history1 and not of history1 but finds  
it impossible to maintain  the dykes    
between the two4 ,his treatise1         
therefore1 when artificial  obstacles   
have been overcome1 runs like a single  
river and reveals  to our view the whole
 history of historical ,french thought1 
to which  ,bossuet and ,rollin1         
,condorcet and ,voltaire1 ,auguste      

,comte and ,michelet  or ,tocqueville   
equally belong4    ,at this point it    
will probably be objected 7although     
,fueter does not  propound this         
objection1 it is probable that it is at 
the back of  his mind7 that what is     
desired in a history of historiography  
is not  so much a history of historical 
thought as a history of history  in the 
concrete3 of the ,storie fiorentine of  
,machiavelli1 of the  ,sicle de ,louis  
,,xiv of ,voltaire1 or of the ,rmische  
,geschichte of  ,niebuhr3 that would be 
a general history1 while what is desired
 is a  specific history4 ,but it is well
 to pay close attention to the meaning  
of such a request and to the possibility
 of what is asked4 ,if ,i set  out to   
write the history of the ,storie        
fiorentine of ,machiavelli1 in  respect 
to the particular material with which it
 deals1 ,i shall rewrite  the history of
 ,florence1 criticizing and completing  
,machiavelli1 and  shall thus be1 for   
instance1 a ,villari1 a ,davidsohn1 or a

 ,salvemini4  ,if ,i set out to write   
the history of the material of          
,voltaire's work1  ,i shall criticize   
,voltaire and outline a new ,sicle de   
,louis ,,xiv1  as has been done1 for    
example1 by ,philippson4 ,and if ,i set 
to work to  examine and rethink the work
 of ,niebuhr in respect to its          
particular  material1 ,i shall be a new 
historian of ,rome1 a ,mommsen or 7to   
quote  the most recent writers7 a       
,hector ,pais or a ,gaetano de ,sanctis4
 ,but is  this what is desired8         
,certainly not4 ,but if this be not     
desired1 if the  particular materials of
 those histories are not to be taken    
account of1  what else remains save the 
'way' in which they have been conceived1
 the  'mental form' by means of which   
they construct their narratives1 and    
therefore their theory and their        
historical 'thought'8    ,now1 if this  
truth be admitted 7and ,i do not see how
 it can be  contested7 it is not        
possible to reject an ulterior          

consequence which1  although it is wont 
to arouse in some the sensation of a    
paradox1  does not do so in us1 for we  
find it altogether in accordance with   
the conception of the identity of       
history with1 philosophy that we  have  
defended4 ,is a thought that is not     
thought conceivable8 ,is it  permissible
 to distinguish between the thought of  
the historian and  the thought of the   
philosopher8 ,are there perhaps two     
different  thoughts in the world8 ,to   
persist in maintaining that the thought 
of  the historian thinks the fact and   
not the theory is prevented by the      
preceding admission1 if by nothing else3
 that the historian always  thinks at   
least both the theory of history and the
 historical fact4 ,but  this admission  
entails his thinking the theory of all  
the things that  he narrates1 together  
with the theory of history4 ,and indeed 
he could  not narrate without           
understanding them4 ,fueter extols the  
merit of  ,winckelmann1 who was the     

first to conceive a history1 not of     
artists1  but of art1 of a pure         
spiritual activity1 and that of         
,giannone1 who  was the first to attempt
 a history of the life of jurisprudence4
 ,but  these writers made the progress  
they did because they had a new  and    
more accurate conception of art and of  
rights1 and if they went  wrong as to   
certain points1 that is because they did
 not always think  those conceptions    
with equal exactitude4 ,winckelmann1 for
 instance1  materialized the spiritual  
activity of the artist when he posited  
an  abstract1 fixed material ideal of   
beauty1 and gave an abstract history  of
 artistic styles without regard to the  
temperaments1 historical  circumstances1
 and individualities of the artists     
themselves4 ,giannone  failed to        
supersede the dualism of ,church and    
,state4 ,without indulging  in other too
 particular examples1 it is evident at  
the first glance  that ancient          
historiography concords with the ancient

 conception of  religion of the state1  
of ethic1 and of the whole of reality2  
the  medieval with ,christian theology  
and ethic2 that of the first half of    
the nineteenth century with the         
idealistic and romantic philosophy1     
that of the second half with            
naturalistic and positivistic           
philosophy4  ,thus1 ex parte            
historicorum1 there is no way of        
distinguishing  historical and          
philosophical thought1 which are        
perfectly commingled in  the narratives4
 ,but there is also no possibility of   
maintaining such  a distinction ex parte
 philosophorum either1 because1 as all  
know1  or at least say1 each period has 
the philosophy proper to it1 which  is  
the consciousness of that period1 and as
 such is its history1 at  least in germ2
 or1 as we have put it1 philosophy and  
history coincide4  ,and if they         
coincide1 the history of philosophy and 
the history of  historiography also     
coincide3 the one is not only not       

distinguishable  from the other1 but is 
not even subordinate to the other1 for  
it is all  one with it4    ,the         
historiography of philosophy has already
 begun to open its arms1  inviting and  
receiving the works of the historians4  
,every day it  understands better that a
 history of ,greek thought is not       
complete  without taking count of       
,herodotus1 ,thucydides1 and ,polybius1 
nor of  ,roman thought without ,livy and
 ,tacitus1 nor of the thought of the    
,renaissance without ,machiavelli and   
,guicciardini4 ,it must open them yet   
wider and clasp to its bosom even the   
humble medieval historiographers  who   
noted the ,gesta episcoporum or         
,historiol translationum or ,vit        
sanctorum1 or who bear witness to the   
,christian faith1 according to  their   
powers and in their own way1 it is true1
 but not less than the  great ,augustine
 according to his powers4 ,it must      
receive not only the  hagiographical    
writers1 but even obtuse philologists or

 sociologists  who have amused us during
 the last decades and bear witness to   
the  creed of positivism not other-wise 
than as ,spencer or ,haeckel in their   
systems4 ,by means of this amplification
 of concepts and enrichment of          
material1 the historiography of         
philosophy will place itself in the     
position of being able to show that     
philosophy is a force diffused          
throughout life1 and not the particular 
invention and cult of certain  men who  
are philosophers1 and will obtain the   
means that have hitherto  been lacking  
to effect a close conjunction with the  
whole historical  movement4    ,in its  
turn the history of historiography will 
gain by the fusion1  because it will    
find its own directive principles in    
philosophy1 and by  its means will be   
rendered capable of understanding both  
the problems  of history in general and 
those of its various aspects as history 
of  art and of philosophy1 of economic  
and moral life4 ,to seek elsewhere  the 

criterion of explanation is vain4       
,fueter1 who takes a glance at  the most
 recent historiography1 that posterior  
to #ahgj1 at the end of  his book1      
discerns in it the new consciousness    
that gives the highest  place to        
political and military power and marks  
the end of the old  liberalism1 the     
strengthening of such consciousness by  
means of the  ,darwinian theories       
concerning the struggle for life1 the   
influence of  a more intense economical 
and industrial life and a greater       
intensity  of world politics1 the       
repercussion of ,egyptian and           
,orientalistic  discoveries1 which have 
aided in disproving the illusion of     
,europe as  the centre of the world1 the
 attraction exercised by the theory of  
races1 and so on4 ,these observations   
are just1 but they do not reach  the    
heart and brain of the most recent      
historiography2 they merely  revolve    
round its body4 ,the heart or brain is1 
as ,i have observed1  naturalism1 the   

ideal of historical culture inspired and
 to be inspired  by the natural         
sciences4 ,so true is this that ,fueter 
himself burns a  few grains of incense  
before this idol1 sighing for a form of 
history  that shall be beautiful with   
the beauty of a well-made machine1      
rivalling a book on physics such as the 
,theory of ,tones of ,helmholtz4  ,the  
truth is that the ideal of the natural  
sciences1 instead of being  the         
perfection1 is one of the many crises   
that historical thought has  passed     
through and will pass through4          
,historical thought is dialectic  of    
development1 and not by any means a     
deterministic explanation by  means of  
causes which does not explain anything  
because it does not  develop anything4  
,but whatever we may think of this1 it  
is certain that  naturalism--that is1   
the criticism of naturalism--can alone  
supply the  clue for unravelling the web
 of the historiography of the last ten  
years2 the same events and historical   

movements enumerated above have  acted  
in the particular way in which they have
 acted owing to being  constantly framed
 in naturalistic thought4    ,for the   
rest1 nothing forbids1 and it may even  
serve a useful purpose1  that the       
history of philosophy and the history of
 historiography  should receive literary
 treatment in different books1 for      
altogether  practical reasons1 such1 for
 instance1 as the abundance of material 
and  the different training and         
acquirements needed for the treatment of
 the  different classes of material4    
,but what is apparently disunited by    
practice thought really unifies2 and    
this real unification is what  ,i have  
wished to inculcate1 without the        
pedantic idea ever passing  through my  
mind of dictating rules for composing   
books1 as to which  it is desirable to  
leave all liberty of inclusion and      
exclusion to  writers1 in conformity    
with their various intentions4      #a  
,charakteristik der antiken             

,historiographie 7,berlin1 #ahcc74    #b
 ,geschichte der neueren                
,historiographie 7,mnchen u4 ,berlin1   
,oldenburg1 #aiaa74    #c ,geschichte   
der historischen ,forschung und ,kunst  
seit der  ,wiederherstellung der        
literarischen ,cultur in ,europa        
7,gttingen1  #ahab-bj74          ,,ii   
,,gr,,co-,,roman ,,historiography       
,after what we have said as to the      
nature of periodization1#a the  usual   
custom1 to which ,i too bow here1 of    
beginning the history of  historiography
 with that of the ,greeks1 and with the 
,greeks of the  fifth or sixth century  
before ,christ1 will be taken for what  
it is  really worth1 but it must not be 
thought that we thus intend to  announce
 the beginning of historiography1 its   
first appearance in the  world1 when1 on
 the contrary1 all we wish to say is    
that our interest  in the investigation 
of its course becomes more vivid at that
 point4  ,history1 like philosophy1 has 
no historical beginning1 but only an    

ideal or metaphysical beginning1 in so  
far as it is an activity of  thought1   
which is outside time4 ,historically    
speaking1 it is quite  clear that prior 
to ,herodotus1 prior to the logographs1 
prior indeed  to ,hesiod and to ,homer1 
history was already1 because it is      
impossible  to conceive of men who do   
not think and do not narrate their deeds
 in  some way or other4 ,this           
explanation might seem to be superfluous
 if the  confusion between historical   
beginning and ideal beginning had not   
led  to the fancy of a 'first           
philosophical step1' made by ,thales or 
,zeno1  or by somebody else1 by means of
 which thinking the first stone is      
supposed to have been laid1 as it was   
believed that by thinking another  last 
step the pinnacle of the edifice of     
philosophy was or would be  attained4   
,but ,thales and ,herodotus should      
really be called rather the  'sons' of  
our interest in the development of those
 disciplines than  the 'fathers' of     

philosophy and history1 and it is we    
whom those sons  salute as their        
'fathers4' ,we have not usually much    
interest in what  occurred prior to them
 or among people more distant than they 
from  our point of view1 not only       
because there is a scarcity of surviving
  documents concerning them1 but above  
all because they are forms of  thought  
which have but little connexion with our
 own actual problems4    ,from its point
 of view1 too1 the distinction that we  
laid down between  history and philology
 suggests refraining from the search    
hitherto  made for the beginnings of    
,grco-,roman historiography by means of 
composing lists of magistrates and of   
adding to these brief mention  of wars1 
treatises1 embassies from colonies1     
religious festivities1  earthquakes1    
inundations1 and the like1 in the  and  
in the annales  pontificum1 in archives 
and museums made in temples1 or indeed  
in the  chronological nails fixed to the
 walls1 spoken of by ,perizonius4 ,such 

things are extrinsic to historiography  
and form the precedent1 not of  it1 but 
of chronicle and philology1 which were  
not born for the first  time in the     
nineteenth or seventeenth century1 or at
 any rate during  the ,alexandrine      
period1 but belong to all times1 for in 
all times men  take note of what they   
remember and attempt to preserve such   
memorials  intact1 to restore and to    
increase them4 ,the precedent of history
  cannot be something different from    
history1 but is history itself1 as      
philosophy is the precedent of          
philosophy and the living of the living4
  ,nevertheless the thought of          
,herodotus and of the logographs really 
does unite itself with religions1 myths1
 theogonies1 cosmogonies1  genealogies1 
and with legendary and epical tales1    
which were not  indeed poetry1 or were  
not only poetry but also thoughts--that 
is to  say1 metaphysics and histories4  
,the whole of later historiography      
developed from them by a dialectical    

process1 for which they supplied  the   
presuppositions--that is to say1        
concepts1 propositions of fact and      
fancy mingled1 and with that the        
stimulus better to seek out the truth   
and to dissipate fancies4 ,this         
dissipation took place more rapidly at  
the time which it is usual to fix by    
convention as the beginning of  ,greek  
historiography4    ,at that time thought
 deserts mythological history and its   
ruder  form1 prodigious or miraculous   
history1 and enters earthly or human    
history--that is to say1 the general    
conception that is still ours1 so  much 
so that it has been possible for an     
illustrious living historian  to propose
 the works of ,thucydides as an example 
and model to the  historians of our     
times4 ,certainly that exit and that    
entrance did  not represent for the     
,greeks a complete breaking with the    
past2 and  since earthly history could  
not have been altogether wanting in the 
past1 so it is not to be believed that  

the ,greeks from the sixth and  seventh 
centuries onward should have abandoned  
all faith in mythology  and prodigies4  
,these things persisted not only with   
the people and  among lesser or vulgar  
historiographers1 but also left their   
traces  among some of the greatest4     
,nevertheless1 looking at the whole from
  above1 as one should look at it1 it is
 evident that the environment  is       
altogether changed from what it was4    
,even the many fables that we  read in  
,herodotus1 and which were to be read in
 the logographs1 are  rarely 7as has    
been justly observed7 put forward       
ingenuously1 but are  usually given as  
by one who collects what others believe1
 and does  not for that reason accept   
those beliefs1 even if he does not      
openly  evince his disbelief2 or he     
collects them because he does not know  
what to substitute for them1 and rather 
as matter for reflection  and inquiry3  
qu nec confirmare argumentis neque      
refellere in animo  est1 as ,tacitus    

says1 when he recounts the fables of the
 ,germans3  plura transcribo quam credo1
 declared ,quintus ,curtius4 ,herodotus 
is  certainly not ,voltaire1 nor is he  
indeed ,thucydides 7,thucydides1 'the   
atheist'72 but certainly he is no longer
 ,homer or ,hesiod4    ,the following   
are a few examples of leading problems  
which ancient  historians had before    
them1 dictated by the conditions and    
events  of ,greek and ,roman life2 they 
were treated from a mental point of     
view1 which no longer found in those    
facts episodes of the rivalry of        
,aphrodite and ,hera 7as formerly in the
 ,trojan ,war71 but varying complex     
human struggles1 due to human interests1
 expressing themselves in human         
actions4 ,how did the wars between the  
,greeks and the ,persians originate  and
 develop8 ,what were the origins of the 
,peloponnesian ,war8 of the  expedition 
of ,cyrus against ,artaxerxes8 ,how was 
the ,roman power formed  in ,latium1 and
 how did it afterward extend in ,italy  

and in the whole  world8 ,how did the   
,romans succeed in depriving the        
,carthaginians of the  hegemony of the  
,mediterranean8 ,what were the political
 institutions  developed in ,athens1    
,rome1 and ,sparta1 and what form did   
the social  struggle take in those      
cities8 ,what did the ,athenian demos1  
the ,roman  plebs1 the eupatrides1 and  
the patres desire8 ,what were the       
virtues1 the dispositions1 the points of
 view1 of the various peoples  which    
entered into conflict among themselves1 
,athenians1 ,lacedemonians1  ,persians1 
,macedonians1 ,romans1 ,gauls1 and      
,germans8 ,what were the  characters of 
the great men who guided the destinies  
of the peoples1  ,themistocles1         
,pericles1 ,alexander1 ,hannibal1 and   
,scipio8 ,these problems  were solved in
 a series of classical works by         
,thucydides1 ,xenophon1  ,polybius1     
,livy1 ,tacitus1 etc41 and they will    
certainly not be blamed  for failing to 
exhaust their themes--that is1 for      

failing to sound the  bottom of the     
universe1 because there is no sounding  
the bottom of the  universe--nor because
 they solve those problems only in the  
terms in  which they had proposed them1 
neither more nor less than as we solve  
the problems of our day in our own      
terms4 ,nor must we forget that since   
modern historiography is still much as  
it was left by the ,greeks1 the  greater
 part of those events are still thought 
as they were by the  ancients1 and      
although something has been added and a 
different light  illumines the whole1   
the work of the ancient historians is   
preserved in  our own3 a true eternal   
possession1 as ,thucydides intended that
 his  history should be4    ,and just as
 historical thought had become          
invigorated in its passage  from the    
mythological to the human stage1 so did 
research and philology  grow4 ,herodotus
 was already travelling1 asking         
questions1 and listening  to answers1   
distinguishing between the things that  

he had seen  with his own eyes and those
 which depended upon hearsay1 opinion1  
and conjecture2 ,thucydides was         
submitting to criticism different       
traditions relating to the same fact1   
and even inserting documents in  his    
narrative4 ,later appeared legions of   
learned men and critics1 who  compiled  
'antiquities' and 'libraries1' and      
busied themselves also with  the reading
 of texts1 with chronology and          
geography1 thus affording  great        
assistance to historical studies4 ,such 
a fervour of philological  studies was  
eventually attained that it was         
recognized as necessary to  draw a clear
 distinction between the 'histories of  
antiquaries' 7of  which a considerable  
number survive either entire or in      
fragments7  and 'histories of           
historians1' and ,polybius several times
 said that it  is easy to compose       
history from books1 because it suffices 
to take up  one's residence in a city   
where there exist rich libraries1 but   

that  true history requires acquaintance
 with political and military affairs    
and direct knowledge of places and of   
people2 and ,lucian repeated  that it is
 indispensable for the historian to have
 political sense1    1 a gift of nature 
not to be learned 7the maxims  and      
practices praised as quite novel by     
,mser and ,niebuhr are therefore  by no 
means new74 ,the fact is that a more    
profound theoretical  consciousness     
corresponded with a more vigorous       
historiography1 so  inseparable is the  
theory of history from history1         
advancing with it4  ,it was also known  
that history should not be made a simple
 instrument  of practice1 of political  
intrigue1 or of amusement1 and that its 
function is above all to aim at truth3  
ne quid falsi dicere audeat1  ne quid   
veri non audeat4 ,in consequence of     
this1 partisanship1 even  for one's own 
country1 was condemned 7although it was 
recognized  chat solicitude and sympathy
 were permissible72 and quidquid ,grcia 

mendax audet in historia was blamed4 ,it
 was known that history is not          
chronicle 7annales71 which is limited to
 external things1 recording 7in  the    
words of ,asellio1 the ancient ,roman   
historian7 quod factum1 quoque  anno    
gestum sit1 whereas history tries to    
understand quo ,consilio1  quaque       
ratione gesta sint4 ,and it was also    
known that history cannot  set herself  
the same task as poetry4 ,we find       
,thucydides referring with  disdain to  
histories written with the object of    
gaining the prize in  oratorical        
competitions1 and to those which indulge
 in fables to please  the vulgar4       
,polybius too inveighed against those   
who seek to emphasize  moving details1  
and depict women dishevelled and in     
tears1 and  dreadful scenes1 as though  
composing tragedies and as though it    
were  their business to create the      
marvellous and pleasing and not impart  
truth and instruction4 ,if it be a fact 
that rhetorical historiography  7a      

worsening of the imaginative and poetic7
 abounded in antiquity and  introduced  
its false gold even into some           
masterpieces1 the general  tendency of  
the better historians was to set        
themselves free of ornate  rhetoricians 
and of cheap eloquence4 ,but the ancient
 historians will  never fail of lofty   
poetical power and elevation for this   
reason 7not  even the 'prosaic'         
,polybius1 who sometimes paints most    
effective  pictures71 but will ever     
retain what is proper to lofty          
historical  narrative4 ,cicero and      
,quintilian1 ,diogenes and ,lucian1 all 
recognize  that history must adopt verba
 ferme poetarum1 that it is proxima     
poetis et quodammodo carmen solutum1    
that scribitur ad narrandum1  non ad    
demonstrandum1 that   1 and the like4   
,what the  best historians and theorists
 sought at that time was not the aridity
  and dryness of mathematical or        
physical treatment 7such as we often    
hear desired in our day71 but gravity1  

abstention from fabulous and  pleasing  
tales1 or if not from fabulous then from
 frivolous tales1 in  fact from         
competition with the rhetoricians and   
composers of histories  that were       
romances or gross caricatures of such4  
,above all they desired  that history   
should remain faithful to real life1    
since it is the  instrument of life1 and
 a form of knowledge useful to the      
statesman and  to the lover of his      
country1 and by no means docile to the  
capricious  requirements of the         
unoccupied seeking amusement4    ,this  
theory of historiography1 which may be  
found here and there in  a good many    
special treatises and in general        
treatises on the art of  speech1 finds  
nowhere such complete and conscious     
expression as in the  frequent polemical
 interludes of ,polybius in his         
,histories1 where  the polemic itself   
endows it with precision1 concreteness1 
and savour4  ,polybius is the ,aristotle
 of ancient historiography3 an          

,aristotle who  is both historical and  
theoretical1 completing the ,stagirite1 
who in  the vast expanse of his work had
 taken but little interest in history   
properly so called4 ,and since so great 
a part of the ancient narratives  lives 
in our own1 so there is not one of the  
propositions recorded  that has not been
 included and has not been worthy of    
being included  in our treatises4 ,and  
if1 for example1 the maxim that history 
should  be narrated by men of the world 
and not by the simply erudite or by     
philologists1 that it is born of        
practice and assists in practice1  has  
been often neglected1 the blame falls on
 those who neglect it4 ,a  further      
blunder committed by such writers has   
been to forget completely  the   and to 
pay court to an ideal of history        
something like  an anatomical map or a  
treatise of mechanics4    ,but the      
defect that ancient historiography      
exposes to our gaze is of  another sort4
 ,the ancients did not observe it as a  

defect1 or only  sometimes1 in a vague  
and fugitive manner1 without attaching  
weight to  it1 for otherwise they would 
have remedied it when it occurred4 ,the 
modern spirit inquires how the          
sentiments and conceptions which are now
  our ideal patrimony1 and the          
institutions in which they are realized1
  have been gradually formed4 ,it wishes
 to understand the revolutionary        
passages from primitive and ,oriental to
 ,grco-,roman culture1 how  modern ethic
 was attained through ancient ethic1 the
 modern through  the ancient state1 the 
vast industry and international commerce
 of  the modern world through the       
ancient mode of economic production1    
the passage from the myths of the       
,aryans to our philosophies1 from       
,mycenean to ,french or ,swedish or     
,italian art of the twentieth century4  
,hence there are special histories of   
culture1 of philosophy1 of poetry1  of  
the sciences1 of technique1 of economy1 
of morality1 of religions1  and so on1  

which are preferred to histories of     
individuals or of  states themselves1 in
 so far as they are abstract            
individuals4 ,they  are illuminated and 
inspired throughout with the ideas of   
liberty1 of  civilization1 of humanity1 
and of progress4 ,all this is not to be 
found  in ancient historiography1       
although it cannot be said to be        
altogether  absent1 for with what could 
the mind of man have ever been occupied1
  save by human ideals or 'values'8 ,nor
 should the error be made of            
considering 'epochs' as something       
compact and static1 whereas they are    
various and in motion1 or of rendering  
those divisions natural and  external   
which1 as has been demonstrated1 are    
nothing but the movement  of our thought
 as we think history1 a fallacy linked  
with the other one  concerning the      
absolute beginning of history and the   
rendering temporal  of the forms of the 
spirit4 ,whoever is gifted with the     
patience of  the collector will meet    

here and there with suggestions and     
buddings  of those historiographical    
conceptions of which1 generally         
speaking1  we have denied the existence 
in the writings of the ancients4 ,he who
  finds diversion in modernizing the old
 may travesty the thoughts of  the      
ancients1 as they have been travestied1 
so as to render them  almost altogether 
similar to those of the moderns4 ,in the
 first book  of ,aristotle's            
,metaphysics1 for instance1 is to be    
admired a sketch  of the development of 
,greek philosophy1 of the various       
naturalistic  interpretations which have
 been in turn proposed for the          
explanation  of the cosmos1 and so on1  
up to the new orientation of the mind1  
when1  compelled by truth itself1 it    
turned toward a different order of      
principles--that is to say1 till the    
time of ,anaxagoras1 who seems  to be a 
sober man among the intoxicated1 thus   
continuing up to the  time of ,socrates1
 who founded ethic and discovered the   

universal and  the definition4 ,a sketch
 of the history of civilization is to be
 found  at the beginning of the ,history
 of ,thucydides1 and ,polybius will be  
found discoursing of the progress that  
had been made in all the arts1  while   
,cicero1 ,quintilian1 and several others
 trace the progress of  rights and of   
literature4 ,there are also touches of  
human value in  conflict with one       
another in the narratives of the        
struggles between  ,greeks and          
barbarians1 between the truly civil and 
active life of  the former and the      
proud1 lazy habits of the latter4 ,other
 similar  conceptions of human values   
will be found in many comparisons of    
peoples1 and above all in the way that  
,tacitus describes the ,germans  as a   
new moral power rising up against that  
of ancient ,rome1 and  perhaps also in  
the repugnance which the same historian 
experiences  at seeing before him the   
,jews1 who follow rites contrarius      
ceteris  mortalibus4 ,finally1 ,rome1   

mistress of the world1 will sometimes   
assume in our eyes the aspect of a      
transparent symbol of the human  ideal1 
analogous to ,roman law1 gradually      
idealized in the form of  natural law4  
,but here it is rather a question of    
symbols than of  conceptions1 of our own
 conclusions than of the thoughts proper
 to the  ancients4 ,when1 for instance1 
we examine the history of philosophy  of
 ,aristotle as outlined by him1 we find 
that it consists above all  in a rapid  
critical account to serve as propdeutic 
to his system2  and literary and        
artistic histories and histories of     
civilization  seem often to be weakened 
by the prejudice that these are not     
really  necessary mental forms1 but     
luxuries and refinements4 ,at the utmost
  we can speak of exceptions1 incidents1
 tentatives2 which does not in  any way 
alter the comprehensive impression and  
general conclusion to  the effect that  
the ancients never possessed explicit   
histories of  civilization1 philosophy1 

religions1 literature1 art1 or rights3  
none1  in fact1 of the many possessed by
 ourselves4 ,nor did they possess       
'biography' in the sense that we do1 as 
the history of the ideal  function of an
 individual in his own time and in the  
life of humanity1  nor the sense of     
development1 and when they speak of     
primitive times  they rarely feel that  
they are primitive1 but are rather      
disposed to  transfigure them           
poetically1 in the same way that ,dante 
did by the  mouth of ,cacciaguida that  
,fiorenza which stood soberly and       
modestly at  peace within the circle of 
the ancient days4 ,it was one of the    
severe  labours of our ,vico to recover 
the crude reality of history beneath    
these poetic idylls4 ,in this work he   
was assisted1 not by the ancient        
historiographers1 but by documents and  
mostly by languages4    ,the physiognomy
 of the histories of the ancients as    
described very  accurately reflects the 
character of their philosophy1 which    

never  attained to the conception of the
 spirit1 and therefore also failed  to  
attain to that of humanity1 liberty1 and
 progress1 which are  aspects or        
synonyms of the former4 ,it certainly   
passed from physiology  or cosmology to 
ethic1 logic1 and rhetoric2 but it      
schematized and  materialized these     
spiritual disciplines because it treated
 them  empirically4 ,thus their ethic   
did not rise above the custom of        
,greece and ,rome1 nor their logic above
 abstract forms of reasoning  and       
discussing1 nor their poetic above      
classes of literature4 ,for  this reason
 all assume the form of precepts4       
',anti-historical  philosophy' has been 
universally recognized and described1   
but it  is anti-historical because      
anti-spiritual1 anti-historical because 
naturalistic4 ,the ancients also failed 
to notice the deficiency  observed by   
us1 for they were entirely occupied with
 the joy of the  effort of passing from 
myth to science and thus to the         

collection and  classification of the   
facts of reality4 ,that is to say1 they 
were  engrossed upon the sole problem   
which they set themselves to solve1  and
 solved so successfully that they       
supplied naturalism with the            
instruments which it still employs3     
formal logic1 grammar1 the doctrine  of 
the virtues1 the doctrine of literary   
classes1 categories of civil  rights1   
and so forth4 ,these were all           
,grco-,roman creations4    ,but that    
ancient historians and philosophers were
 not explicitly aware  of the above     
defect in its proper terms1 or rather in
 our modern terms1  does not mean that  
they were not to some extent exercised  
by it4 ,in  every historical period     
exist problems theoretically formulated 
and for  that very reason solved1 while 
others have not yet arrived at complete 
theoretical maturity1 but are seen1     
intuited1 though not yet adequately     
thought4 ,if the former are the positive
 contribution of that time to  the chain

 whose links form the human spirit1 the 
latter represent an  unsatisfied demand1
 which binds that time in another way to
 the coming  time4 ,the great attention 
paid to the negative aspect of every    
epoch  sometimes leads to the forgetting
 of the other aspect1 and to the        
consequent imagining of a humanity that 
passes not from satisfaction  to        
satisfaction through dissatisfaction1   
but from dissatisfaction  to            
dissatisfaction and from error to error4
 ,but obscurities and  discordances are 
possible in so far as light and concord 
have been  previously attained4 ,thus   
they represent in their way progress1 as
 is  to be seen from the history that we
 are recounting1 where we find them     
very numerous for the very reason that  
the age of mythologies and of  prodigies
 has been left behind4 ,if ,greece and  
,rome had not been both  more than      
,greece and more than ,rome1 if they had
 not been the human  spirit1 which is   
infinitely greater than any ,greece and 

any ,rome--its  transitory              
individuations--they would have been    
satisfied with the  human portraits of  
their historians and would not have     
sought beyond4  ,but they did seek      
beyond--that is to say1 those very      
historians and  philosophers sought2 and
 since they had before them so many     
episodes  and dramas of human life1     
reconstructed by their thought1 they    
asked  themselves what was the cause of 
those events1 reasonably concluding     
that such a cause might be one fact or  
another1 a particular fact2 and  for    
this reason they began to distinguish   
between facts and causes1  and1 in the  
order of causes themselves1 between     
cause and occasion1  as does            
,thucydides1 or between beginning1      
cause1 and occasion 1  1 1 like         
,polybius4 ,they thus became involved in
 disputes  as to the true cause of this 
or that event1 and ever since antiquity 
attempts have been made to solve the    
enigma of the 'greatness' of  ,rome1    

assuming in modern times the guise of a 
solemn experimentum of  historical      
thought and thus forming the diversion  
of those historians  who linger behind4 
,the question was often generalized in  
the other  question as to the motive    
power behind all history2 and here too  
appear  doctrines1 afterward drawn out  
to great length1 such as that the form  
of the political constitution was the   
cause of all the rest1 and that  other  
doctrine relating to climate and to the 
temperaments of peoples4  ,the doctrine 
principally proposed and accepted was   
that of the natural  law of the circle  
in human affairs1 the perpetual         
alternation of  good and evil1 or the   
passage through political forms1 which  
always  returns to the form from which  
it has taken its start1 or as growth    
from infancy to manhood1 declining into 
old age and decrepitude and  ending in  
death4 ,but a law of this sort1 which   
satisfied and still  satisfies the      
,oriental mind1 did not satisfy the     

classical mind1  which had a lively     
sense of human effort and of the        
stimulus received  from obstacles       
encountered and conflicts endured4      
,hence therefore the  further questions3
 ,does fate or immutable necessity      
oppress man1 or is  he not rather the   
plaything of capricious fortune1 or is  
he ruled by a  wise and sagacious       
providence8 ,it was also asked whether  
the gods are  interested in human       
affairs or not4 ,these questions met    
with answers  that are sometimes pious1 
advocating submission to the divine will
 and  wisdom1 sometimes1 again1 inspired
 with the notion that the gods are  not 
concerned with human affairs themselves1
 but solely with vengeance  and         
punishment4 ,all these conceptions lack 
firmness1 and are for the  most part    
confused1 since a general uncertainty   
and confession of  ignorance prevails in
 them3 in incerto judicium est1 said    
,tacitus1  almost summing up the ancient
 argument on the subject in this        

epigram1  or rather finding non-thought1
 failure to understand1 to be the result
  of the argument4    ,what we do not   
understand we do not dominate2 on the   
contrary1 it  dominates us1 or at least 
menaces us1 taking the form of evil2    
hence  the psychological attitude of the
 ancients toward history must be        
described as pessimistic4 ,they saw much
 greatness fall1 but they never         
discovered the greatness that does not  
fall and that rises up greater  after   
every fall4 ,for this reason a flood of 
bitterness inundates  their histories4  
,happiness1 beauty of human life1 always
 seemed to be  something that had been  
and was no longer1 and were it present  
would  have soon been lost4 ,for the    
,romans and those professing the cult of
  ,rome1 it was primitive1 austere1     
victorious ,rome2 and all the ,roman    
historians1 big and little1 ,livy1      
,sallust1 and ,tacitus1 ,paterculus and 
,florus1 fix their gaze upon that image1
 as they lament the corruption  of later

 days4 ,once it was ,rome that trampled 
the world underfoot2  but they knew that
 the triumphant queen must some day     
become slave  from queen that once she  
was4 ,this thought manifests itself in  
the  most various forms1 from the       
melancholy meditations of ,scipio upon  
the  ruins of ,carthage to the fearful  
expectation of the lordship which--as   
,persia to ,babylonia and ,macedonia to 
,persia--must succeed to that of  the   
,romans 7the theory of the 'four        
monarchies' has its origin in the       
,grco-,roman world1 whence it filtered  
into ,palestine and into the  ,book of  
,daniel74 ,sometimes repressed1         
sometimes outspoken1 we hear  the       
anxious question3 ,who will be the      
successor and the gravedigger8  ,will it
 be the menacing ,parthian8 ,will it be 
the ,germans1 so rich in  new and       
mysterious energy8--all this1 despite   
the proud consciousness  of ancient     
times that had uttered the words ,rome1 
the eternal city4  ,certainly1 that     

general pessimism is not altogether     
coherent1 for no  pessimism can be so   
altogether1 and here and there appear   
fugitive  hints of a perception of human
 progress in this or that part of life4 
,we find1 for instance1 ,tacitus1       
bitterest of men1 remarking that nec    
omnia apud priores meliora1 sed nostra  
quoque tas multa laudis et  artium      
imitanda tulit1 and one of the speakers 
in the ,de oratoribus  observes that    
literary forms change with the times and
 that it is  owing to the vitio         
malignitatis humana that we hear the    
perpetual  praise of ancient things and 
the perpetual abuse of things modern4   
,another interlocutor in the same       
dialogue draws attention to the         
dialectic connexion between the         
turbulence of life and the greatness of 
art1 whence ,rome donec erravit1 donec  
se partibus et dissensionibus  confecit1
 precisely at that time tulit           
valentiorem eloquentiam4  ,this linking 
together of good and evil is not        

altogether absent in  ancient           
philosophy1 and is also to be found here
 and there in ancient  historiography4  
,sallust1 for example1 is of opinion    
that ,rome remained  in good health so  
long as she had ,carthage opposed to her
 and giving  her trouble4 ,readers of   
,cicero and of ,seneca will be aware    
that the  idea of humanity also made    
considerable progress during the last   
days of the ,republic and the first days
 of the ,empire1 owing to the  influence
 of ,stoicism4 ,divine providence too is
 courted1 as was not  formerly the case1
 and we also find ,diodorus ,siculus    
undertaking to  treat the affairs of all
 nations as those of a single city 7    
74 ,but these promises remain still     
weak1 vague1 and inert  7the promissor  
,diodorus1 for example1 carried out none
 of his  grandiose prologue71 and in any
 case they foretell the dissolution  of 
the classical world4 ,during this epoch 
the problem as to the  signification of 
history remains unsolved1 because the   

contradictory  conceptions above        
mentioned of fortune or of the gods1 the
 belief in  a universal worsening of    
things1 in a fall or a regression1 which
 had  already been expressed in many    
ancient myths1 were not by any means    
solutions4    ,owing to their failure to
 realize spiritual value as the immanent
  progressive force in history1 even the
 loftiest of the ancient  historians    
were not able to maintain the unity and 
autonomy of  historiographical work1    
which in other respects they had        
discovered  and asserted4 ,although they
 had penetrated the deception exercised 
by  those histories that are really     
poetry1 or lies and partisanship1 or    
collections of material and             
unintelligent piling up of erudition1 or
  instruments of pleasure1 affording    
marvel for simple folk1 yet they  were  
on the other hand incapable of ever     
setting themselves free of  the         
preconception of history as directed to 
an end of edification  and chiefly of   

instruction4 ,this real heteronomy then 
appeared to  be autonomy4 ,they are all 
agreed as to this3 ,thucydides proposed 
to  narrate past events in order to     
predict from them future events1        
identical or similar1 the perpetual     
return of human fortunes2 ,polybius     
sought out the causes of facts in order 
that he might apply them to  analogous  
cases1 and held those unexpected events 
to be of inferior  importance whose     
irregularities place them outside rules2
 ,tacitus1 in  conformity with his chief
 interest1 which was rather moralistic  
than  social or political1 held his     
chief end to be the collection of facts 
notable for the vice or virtue which    
they contained1 ne virtutes  sileantur  
utque pravis dictis factsque ex         
posteritate et infamia metus  sit4      
,behind them came all the minor         
historians1 all the hypocrites1  who    
repeated by imitation or involuntary    
echo or false unction and in a          
superficial way what in the greater     

writers was the result of profound      
thought1 as1 for instance1 the          
,sallusts1 the ,diogenes1 the ,diodori1 
the ,plutarchs1 and those that resemble 
them4 ,then there were all the          
extractors of historical quintessences1 
of memorable deeds and words of         
statesmen1 captains1 and philosophers1  
and even of women 7the   74 ,ancient    
historiography has been called          
'pragmatical1' and  such it is1 in the  
double sense of the word1 ancient and   
modern3 in so  far as it limits itself  
to the earthly side of things and       
especially  to the political 7the       
'pragmatic' of ,polybius71 and in so far
 as it  adorns them with reflections and
 advice 7the 'apodictic' of the same    
historian-theorist74    ,this           
heteronomous theory of history does not 
always remain merely  theory1 prologue1 
or frame1 but sometimes operates so as  
to lead to  the mingling of elements    
that are not historiographical with     
history1  such as1 for instance1 is the 

case with the 'speeches' or 'orations'  
of  historical personages1 not delivered
 or not in agreement with what was      
really said1 but invented or arranged by
 the historian and put into the  mouths 
of the personages4 ,this1 in my opinion1
 has been wrongly looked  upon as a     
survival of the 'epic spirit' in ancient
 historiography1 or  as a simple proof  
of the rhetorical ability of the        
narrators1 because1  if the first       
explanation hold as to some of the      
popular writers and the  second as to   
certain rhetoricians1 the origin of     
those falsifications  was with the      
greater historians nothing but the      
fulfilment of the  obligation of        
teaching and counselling accepted by    
them4 ,but when such  ends had been     
assigned to history1 its intrinsic      
quality of truth  and the line of       
demarcation which it drew between real  
and imaginary  could not but vacillate  
to some extent1 since the imaginary     
sometimes  served excellently well and  

even better than the real for those     
ends4  ,and setting aside ,plato1 who   
despised all knowledge save that of the 
transcendental ideas1 did not ,aristotle
 himself ask whether the greater  truth 
belonged to history or to poetry8 ,had  
he not indeed said that  history is     
'less philosophical' than poetry8 ,and  
if so why should not  history have      
availed itself of the aid of poetry and 
of imagination8  ,in any case1          
resistance could be opposed to this     
ulterior perversion  by seeking the     
truth with vigilant eye1 and also by    
reducing the  share of the imaginary    
speeches and other parerga co the       
smallest  dimensions4 ,but it was       
impossible to dispense with belief in   
the end  of instruction1 because it was 
in any case necessary that history      
should have some end1 and a true end had
 not been discovered1 and  the end of   
instruction performed almost the        
function of a metaphor of  the truth1   
since it was to some extent the nearest 

to the truth4 ,in  ,polybius critical   
vigilance1 scientific austerity1 a keen 
desire for  ample and severe history1   
attain to so high a level that one would
 feel  disposed to treat the historian  
of ,megalopolis like one of those great 
pagans that medieval imagination        
admitted to ,paradise1 or at least to   
,purgatory1 as worthy of having known   
the true ,god by extraordinary  means   
and as a reward for their intense moral 
conscience4 ,but if we  envisage the    
matter with greater calmness we shall   
have to consign  ,polybius also to the  
,limbo where those who were before      
,christianity  and did not duly adore   
,god are received4 ,they were men of    
great value  and reached the boundary1  
even touching it1 but they never passed 
beyond4      #a ,see pp4 #aab-aaf4      
,,iii      ,,medieval ,,historiography  
,for the same reason that we must not   
look upon the beginning of  any history 
as an absolute beginning1 or conceive of
 epochs in a  simplicistic manner1 as   

though they were strictly limited to the
  determinations represented by their   
general character1 we must  be careful  
not to identify the humanistic          
conception of history  with the ancient 
epoch of historiography which it        
characterizes or  symbolizes--in fact1  
we must not make historical the ideal   
categories1  which are eternal4         
,grco-,roman historiography was without 
doubt  humanistic1 but it was a         
,grco-,roman humanism--that is to say1  
it not  only had all the limitations    
that we have been pointing out1 but also
  the special physiognomy which such    
humanism assumes in the ancient         
historians and thinkers1 varying more or
 less in each one of them4  ,not only   
was it thus humanistic1 but other       
formations of the same  sort probably   
preceded1 as they certainly followed1 it
 in the course  of the centuries4 ,it is
 perhaps attractive1 but it is also     
artificial  7and contrary to the true   
concept of progress71 to conceive of the

  history of philosophy and of          
historiography as of a series of ideal  
phases1 which are traversed once only1  
and to transform philosophers  into     
categories and categories into          
philosophers1 making synonymous         
,democritus and the atom1 ,plato and the
 transcendental idea1 ,descartes  and   
dualism1 ,spinoza and pantheism1        
,leibnitz and monadism1 whittling  down 
history to the dimensions of a          
,dynastengeschichte1 as a ,german       
critic has satirically described it1 or 
treating it according to a  sort of     
'line of buckets' theory1 as an         
,englishman has humorously  described   
it4 ,hence1 too1 the view that history  
has not yet appeared in  the world1 or  
that it has appeared for the first time 
and by flashes1  in response to the     
invocations made by the historian and   
the critic of  the present day4 ,but    
every thinking of history is always     
adequate to  the moment at which it     
appears and always inadequate to the    

moment that  follows4    ,the           
opportuneness of this warning is        
confirmed by the astonishment of  those 
who consider the passage from ancient to
 ,christian or medieval  historiography2
 for what can be the meaning of this    
passage1 in which  we find ourselves    
faced with a miraculous and mythological
 world all  over again1 identical as it 
seems1 in its general characteristics1  
with that of the ancient historians1    
which has disappeared8 ,it is  certainly
 not progress1 but rather falling into a
 ditch1 into which  also fall all the   
dearest illusions relating to the       
perpetual advance  of humanity4 ,and the
 ,middle ,ages did seem to be a ditch or
 a declivity1  sometimes during the     
period itself and most clearly at the   
,renaissance1  and this image is still  
represented in common belief4           
,restricting  ourselves solely to the   
domain of historiography1 and following 
up  the impression of astonishment at   
first caused by it1 we end by           

representing events at the beginning of 
the ,middle ,ages somewhat in the  way  
they appeared to our writer ,adolfo     
,bartoli1 in his introductory  volume to
 the ,history of ,italian ,literature1  
which is all broken up  with cries of   
horror and with the gesture of covering 
the face lest  he should see so much    
ugliness4 ,we are in a world1 writes    
,bartoli1  when speaking of ,gregory of 
,tours1 where thought has descended so  
low  as to cause pity1 in a world where 
a conception of history no longer       
exists1 and history also becomes a      
humble handmaid to theology--that  is to
 say1 an aberration of the spirit4 ,and 
after ,gregory of ,tours  7continues    
,bartoli7 there is a further fall3      
,behold ,fredigarius1 in  whom          
credulity1 ignorance1 and confusion     
surpass every limit444 there  survives  
in him nothing of a previous            
civilization4 ,after ,fredigarius1  with
 the monastic chronicle1 we take another
 step down-ward toward  nothingness1    

though this would seem to be impossible4
 ,here we seem to  see the lean monk    
putting his trembling head out of the   
narrow window  of his cell every five or
 eleven years1 to make sure that men are
 not  all dead1 and then shutting       
himself up again in the prison1 where he
  lives only in the expectation of      
death4 ,we must protest against such    
shrinking back 7which makes the critic  
of to-day look like the lean  monk whose
 appearance he has so vividly           
portrayed72 we must assert  that        
mythology and miracle and transcendency 
certainly returned in  the ,middle      
,ages--that is to say1 that these ideal 
categories again  acted with almost     
equal force and that they almost        
reassumed their  ancient bulk1 but they 
did not return historically identical   
with  those of the pre-,hellenic world4 
,we must seek in the heart of their  new
 manifestations for the effective       
progress which is certainly             
accomplished by ,gregory of ,tours and  

,fredigarius1 and even by the  monkish  
chroniclers4    ,the divinity descends  
again to mingle anthropomorphically with
 the  affairs of men1 as a most powerful
 or ultra-powerful personage among  the 
less powerful2 the gods are now the     
saints1 and ,peter and ,paul  intervene 
in favour of this or that people2 ,st   
,mark1 ,st ,gregory1  ,st ,andrew1 or   
,st ,january lead the array of the      
combatants1 the one  vying with the     
other1 and sometimes against the other1 
playing  malicious tricks upon one      
another2 and in the performance or the  
non-performance of an act of worship is 
again placed the loss or gain  of a     
battle3 medieval poems and chronicles   
are full of such stories4  ,these       
conceptions are analogous to the        
antique1 and indeed they are  their     
historical continuation4 ,this is not   
only so 7as has so often  been pointed  
out7 owing to the attachment of this or 
that particular  of ancient faith to    
popular religion and to the             

transformation of  gods into saints and 
demons1 but also1 and above all1 to a   
more  substantial reason4 ,ancient      
thought had left fortune1 the divinity1 
the inscrutable1 at the edge of its     
humanism1 with the result that  the     
prodigious was never completely         
eliminated even from the most  severe   
historians--the door at any rate was    
left open by which it  could return4    
,all are aware with how many            
'superstitions' philosophy1  science1   
history1 and customs were impregnated   
during late antiquity1  which in this   
respect was not intellectually superior1
 but indeed  inferior1 to the new       
,christian religion4 ,in the latter the 
fables  gradually formed and miracles   
which were believed became spiritualized
  and ceased to be 'superstitions'--that
 is to say1 something extraneous  or    
discordant to the general humanistic    
conception--and set themselves  in      
harmony with the new supernaturalistic  
and transcendental  conception1 of which

 they were the accompaniment4 ,thus myth
 and  miracle1 becoming intensified in  
,christianity1 became at the same time  
different from ancient myths and        
miracles4    ,they were different and   
more lofty1 because they contained a    
more lofty  thought3 the thought of     
spiritual worth1 which was not peculiar 
to this  or to that people1 but common  
to the whole of humanity4 ,the ancients 
had indeed touched upon this thought in 
speculation1 but they had never         
possessed it1 and their philosophers had
 sought it in vain or attained  to it   
only in abstract speculation not capable
 of investing the whole  soul1 as is the
 case with thoughts that are profoundly 
thought1 and  as was the case with      
,christianity4 ,paulus ,orosius         
expresses this in  his ,histor adversus 
paganos1 in such accents as no          
,grco-,roman  historian had been able to
 utter3 ,ubique patria1 ubique lex et   
religio mea est4444 ,latitudo orientis1 
septentrionis copiositas1  meridiana    

diffusio1 magnarum insularum largissim  
tutissimque sedes  mei juris et nominis 
sunt1 quia ad ,christianos et ,romanos  
,romanus et  ,christianus accedo4 ,to   
the virtue of the citizen is added that 
of man1  of spiritual man1 who puts     
himself on a level with the truth by    
means  of his religious faith and by his
 work1 which is humanly good4 ,to the   
illustrious men among the pagans are    
opposed illustrious men among the       
,christians who are better than         
illustrious1 being saints2 and the new  
,plutarch is found in the ,vit patrum or
 eremitarum1 in the lives  of the       
confessors of ,christ1 of the martyrs1  
of the propagators of  the true faith2  
the new epics describe the conflicts of 
the faithful  against unbelievers1 of   
,christians against heretics and        
,islamites4  ,there is here a greater   
consciousness of conflict than the      
,greeks had  of the conflict between    
,greeks and barbarians1 or freedmen and 
slaves1  which were usually looked upon 

rather as representing differences of   
nature than of spiritual values4        
,ecclesiastical history now appears1  no
 longer that of ,athens or of ,rome1 but
 of religion and of the ,church  which  
represented it in its strifes and in its
 triumphs--that is to  say1 the strifes 
and triumphs of the truth4 ,this was a  
thing without  precedent in the ancient 
world1 whose histories of culture1 of   
art  or philosophy1 did not go beyond   
the empirical stage1 as we have  seen1  
whereas ecclesiastical history has a    
spiritual value as its  subject1 by     
means of which it illuminates and judges
 facts4 ,to censure  ecclesiastical     
history because it overrules and        
oppresses profane  history will perhaps 
be justified1 as we shall see1 from     
certain  points of view and in a certain
 sense2 but it is not justifiable as a  
general criticism of the idea of that   
history1 and1 indeed1 when we  formulate
 the censure in these terms we are      
unconsciously pronouncing  a warm eulogy

 of it4 ,the historia spiritalis 7as we 
may also call  it1 employing the title  
of ,avito's poem7 could not and in truth
 would  not consent to be a mere part1  
or to suffer rivals at its side3 it     
must dominate and affirm itself as the  
whole4 ,and since history  becomes      
history of the truth with ,christianity1
 it abandons at the  same time the      
fortuitous and chance1 to which the     
ancients had often  abandoned it1 and   
recognizes its own proper law1 which is 
no longer  a natural law1 blind fate1 or
 even the influence of the stars 7,st   
,augustine confutes this doctrine of the
 pagans71 but rationality1              
intelligence1 providence4 ,this         
conception was not unknown to ancient   
philosophy1 but is now set free from the
 frost of intellectualism and           
abstractionism and becomes warm and     
fruitful4 ,providence guides and        
disposes the course of events1 directing
 them to an end1 permitting  evils as   
punishments and as instruments of       

education1 determining the  greatness   
and the catastrophes of empires1 in     
order to prepare the  kingdom of ,god4  
,this means that for the first time is  
really broken the  idea of the circle1  
of the perpetual return of human affairs
 to their  starting-point1 of the vain  
labour of the ,danads 7,st ,augustine   
also  combats the circuitus72 history   
for the first time is here understood   
as progress3 a progress that the ancient
 historians did not succeed  in         
discovering1 save in rare glimpses1 thus
 falling into unconsolable  pessimism1  
whereas ,christian pessimism is         
irradiated with hope4 ,hence  the       
importance to be attributed to the      
succession of empires and to  the       
function fulfilled by each of them1 and 
especially with regard  to the ,roman   
,empire1 which politically unified the  
world that ,christ  came to unify       
spiritually1 to the position of ,judaism
 as opposed to  ,christianity1 and the  
like4 ,these questions have been        

answered in  various ways1 but on the   
common assumption that divine           
intelligence  had willed those events1  
that greatness and that decadence1 those
 joys  and afflictions1 and therefore   
that all had been necessary means of    
the divine work1 and that all had       
competed in and were competing in  the  
final end of history1 linked one with   
the other1 not as effects  following    
from a blind cause1 but as stages of a  
process4 ,hence1 too1  history          
understood as universal history1 no     
longer in the sense of  ,polybius1 who  
narrates the transactions of those      
states which enter  into relations with 
one another1 but in the profounder sense
 of a  history of the universal1 of the 
universal by excellence1 which is       
history in labour with ,god and toward  
,god4 ,by means of this spirit  which   
invests them1 even the most neglected of
 the chronicles become  surrounded with 
a halo1 which is wanting to the         
classical histories of  ,greece and     

,rome1 and which1 however distant they  
be from our particular  view-points1 yet
 in their general aspect makes them very
 near to our  heart and mind4    ,such  
are the new problems and the new        
solutions which ,christianity  brought  
to historical thought1 and it may be    
said of them1 as of the  political and  
humanistic thought of the ancients1 that
 they constitute  a solid possession of 
perpetual efficacy for the human spirit4
 ,eusebius  of ,csarea is to be placed  
beside ,herodotus as 'father' of modern 
historiography1 however little disposed 
it may be to recognize its  parents in  
that barbaric author and in the others  
who were called  'fathers of the        
,church1' to whom1 and particularly to  
,st ,augustine1 it  yet owes so great a 
part of itself4 ,what are our histories 
of culture1  of civilization1 of        
progress1 of humanity1 of truth1 save   
the form of  ecclesiastical history in  
harmony with our times--that is to say1 
of  the triumph and propagation of the  

faith1 of the strife against the  powers
 of darkness1 of the successive         
treatments of the new evangel1 or  good 
news1 made afresh with each succeeding  
epoch8 ,do not the modern  histories1   
which narrate the function performed or 
the pre-eminence  assumed by this or    
that nation in the work of civilization1
 correspond  to the ,gesta ,dei per     
,francos and to other like formulas of  
medieval  historiography8 ,and our      
universal histories are such not only in
 the  sense of ,polybius1 but also of   
the universal as ideal1 purified and    
elevated in the ,christian sense2 hence 
the religious sentiment which we        
experience on approaching the solemnity 
of history4    ,it will be observed that
 in presenting it in this way we to some
 extent  idealize the ,christian        
conception2 and this is true1 but in the
 same  way and in the same measure as we
 have idealized ancient humanism1  which
 was not only humanism1 but also        
transcendency and mystery4  ,christian  

historiography1 like ancient            
historiography1 solved the  problems    
that were set to it1 but it did not     
solve other problems that  were only    
formed afterward1 because they were not 
set to it4 ,a proof  of this is to be   
found in the caprices and the myths that
 accompanied  its fundamental           
conception4 ,the prodigious and the     
miraculous1 which1  as already observed1
 surrounded ,christian historiography1  
bore witness  precisely to the          
incomplete ideality of the new and      
loftier ,god1  the thought of whom      
became converted into a myth1 his action
 into  fabulous anecdotes4 ,yet when it 
was not a question of miracles1 or when 
these were reduced to small compass1    
attenuated and held back1 if not        
refuted1 there nevertheless remained the
 miracle of the divinity and  of the    
truth1 conceived as transcendent1       
separated from and opposed to  human    
affairs4 ,this too was an attestation of
 the ,christian spirit1 in  so far as it

 surpassed the ancient spirit1 not with 
the calmness and  security of thought1  
but with the violence of sentiment and  
with the  enthusiasm of the imagination4
 ,transcendency led to a consideration  
of  worldly things as external and      
rebellious to divine things3 hence the  
dualism of ,god and the world1 of a     
civitas colestis and of another  that   
was terrena1 of a civitas ,dei and of a 
civitas diaboli which  revived most     
ancient ,oriental conceptions1 such as  
,parseeism1 and was  tempered1 if not   
internally corrected1 by means of the   
providential  course of history1        
internally compromised by that          
unconquered dualism4  ,the city of ,god 
destroyed the earthly city and took its 
place1 but  did not justify it1 although
 it tried to do so here and there1  in  
accordance with the logic of its        
providential and progressive  principle4
 ,st ,augustine1 obliged to explain the 
reasons of the fortune  of ,rome1       
escaped from the difficulty with the    

sophism that ,god conceded  that        
greatness to the ,romans as a reward for
 their virtues1 earthly  though they    
were and not such as to lead to the     
attainment of heavenly  glories1 but yet
 worthy the fleeting reward of earthly  
glory4 ,thus the  ,romans remained      
always reprobate1 but less reprehensible
 than other  reprobates2 there could not
 have been true virtue where there had  
not  been true religion4 ,the contests  
of ideas did not appear as conflicting  
forms of the true in its becoming1 but  
simply diabolical suggestions1  which   
disturbed the truth1 which was complete 
and possessed by the  ,church4 ,eusebius
 of ,csarea treated heresies as the work
 of the  devil1 because it was the devil
 who prompted ,simon ,magus1 and then   
,menander1 and the two currents of      
gnosis represented by ,saturninus and   
,basil4 ,otto of ,frisia contemplated   
the ,roman ,empire succeeding to the    
,babylonian as son to father1 and the   
kings of the ,persians and the  ,greeks 

almost as its tutors and pedagogues4 ,in
 the political unity of  ,rome he       
discovers a prelude to ,christian unity1
 in order that the minds  of men should 
form themselves ad majora intelligenda  
promptiores et  capaciores1 be          
disciplined to the cult of a single man1
 the emperor1  and to the fear of a     
single dominant city1 that they should  
learn unam  quoque fidem tenendam4 ,but 
the same ,otto imagines the whole world 
a  primo homine ad ,christum 444        
exceptis de ,israelitico populo paucis1 
errore deceptus1 vanis superstitionibus 
deditus1 dmonum ludicris  captus1 mundi 
illecebris irretitus1 fighting sub      
principe mundi  diabolo1 until venit    
plenitudo temporis and ,god sent ,his   
son to earth4  ,the doctrine of         
salvation as a grace due to the good    
pleasure of ,god1  indebita ,dei gratia1
 is not at all an accidental excrescence
 upon this  conception1 but is its      
foundation or logical complement4       
,christian  humanity was destined to    

make itself unhuman1 and ,st ,augustine1
 however  much reverence he excites by  
the energy of his temperament1 by his   
gaze ever fixed above1 offends us to an 
equal degree by his lack of  human      
sympathy1 his harshness and cruelty2 and
 the 'grace' of which he  speaks assumes
 in our eyes the aspect of odious       
favouritism and undue  exercise of      
power4 ,it is nevertheless well to      
remember that by means  of these        
oscillations and deviations of sentiment
 and imagination  ,christian            
historiography prepared the problem of  
the surpassing of  dualism4 ,for if the 
search for the ,christianity of the     
non-,christians1  for grace due to all  
men from their very character of men1   
the truth  of heresies1 the goodness of 
pagan virtue1 was a historical task that
  has matured slowly in modern times1   
the division and opposition of  the two 
histories and the two cities1 introduced
 by ,christianity1 was  a fundamental   
necessity1 as their unity thought in the

 providential  divine ,unity was a good 
preparation for it4    ,another         
well-known aspect of this dualism is    
dogmatism1 the  incapacity to understand
 the concrete particularization of      
itself by  the spirit in its various    
activities and forms4 ,this explains the
  accusation levelled against           
ecclesiastical history of overriding and
  tyrannically oppressing the whole of  
the rest of history4 ,this did in  fact 
take place1 because ecclesiastical      
history1 instead of developing  itself  
in the concrete universal of the spirit1
 remained rooted in a  particular       
determination of it4 ,all human values  
were reduced to a  single value--that is
 to say1 to firmness of ,christian faith
 and to  service of the ,church4 ,this  
value1 thus abstractly conceived1 became
  deprived of its natural virtue and    
declined to the level of a material  and
 immobile fact1 and indeed the vivid1   
fluid ,christian consciousness  after   
some centuries of development became    

solidified in dogmas4 ,that             
materialized and motionless dogma       
necessarily prevailed as a universal    
measure1 and men of all times were      
judged according to whether they had  or
 had not been touched with the divine   
grace1 were pious or impious1  and the  
lives of the holy fathers and of        
believers were a ,plutarch1  who        
excluded every other profane ,plutarch4 
,this was the dogmatism of              
transcendency1 which therefore resolved 
itself into asceticism1 in  the name of 
which the whole actual history of       
mankind is covered with  contempt1 with 
horror1 and with lamentation4 ,this is  
particularly  noticeable in ,augustine1 
in ,orosius1 and in ,otto of ,frisia1   
but is to  be perceived at least in germ
 as a tendency among all the historians 
or  chroniclers of the early ,middle    
,ages4 ,what thoughts are suggested by  
the battle of ,thermopyl to ,otto of    
,frisia8 ,tdet hic inextricabilem       
malorum texere cratem2 tamen ad         

ostendendam mortalium miseriam1         
summatim ea attingere volo4 ,and what by
 the deeds of ,alexander8  ,regni       
,macedonum monarchia1 qu al ipso cpit1  
ipso mortuo cum ipso  finitur4444       
,civitas autem ,christi firmata supra   
firmam petram4444 ,with  asceticism is  
linked the often noted and often        
ridiculed credulity  of the medieval    
historians 7not to be confounded with   
the belief in  miracles1 originating    
from religion73 this credulity is       
generally  attributed to the prevalence 
of imagination1 or to social conditions1
  which rendered books rare and critical
 capacity difficult to find--that  is to
 say1 to things which required to be    
explained in their turn4                
,indifference is1 indeed1 one of the    
principal sources of credulity1  because
 no one is ever credulous in the things 
that touch him closely  and of which he 
treats1 while on the other hand all 7as 
is proved  in daily life7 are ready to  
lend an ear to more or less indifferent 

talk4 ,asceticism1 diminishing the      
interest for things of the world  and   
for history1 assisted in the neglect and
 dispersion of books  and documents1    
promoted credulity toward everything    
heard or read1  unbridling the          
imagination1 ever desirous of the       
wonderful and  curious1 to the          
disadvantage of discernment4 ,it did    
this not only  in history properly so   
called1 but also in the science of      
nature or  natural history1 which was   
also indifferent to one1 who possessed  
the  ultimate truth of religion4 ,the   
weak capacity for individualization     
noticeable in medieval historiography   
must be attributed to ascetism1  which  
is usually satisfied with the general   
character of goodness  or badness 7the  
'portrait' is very rare in it1 as in the
 figurative  arts of the same age71 and 
it has even less consciousness of the   
historical differences of place and     
time1 travestying persons and  events in
 contemporary costume4 ,it even goes so 

far as to compose  imaginary histories  
and false documents1 which portray the  
supposed  type4 ,this extends from      
,agnello of ,ravenna1 who declared that 
he wrote  also the lives of those       
bishops of ,ravenna about whom he       
possessed no  information1 et credo 7he 
said7 non mentitum esse1 because1 if    
they filled so high a past1 they must of
 necessity have been good1  charitable1 
zealous1 and so forth1 down to the false
 decretals of the  pseudo-,isidore4 ,we 
also owe to asceticism the form of      
chronicle as  its intimate cause1       
because1 when the meaning of particular 
facts  was neglected1 it only remained  
to note them as they were observed  or  
related1 without any ideological        
connexion and with only the             
chronological connexion4 ,thus we       
frequently find among the historians  of
 the ,middle ,ages the union 7at first  
sight strange1 yet not without  logical 
coherence7 of a grandiose history1      
beginning with the creation  of the     

world and the dispersion of the races1  
and an arid chronicle1  following the   
other principle and becoming ever more  
particular and  more contingent as      
approach is gradually made to the times 
of the  authors4    ,when on the one    
hand the two cities1 the heavenly and   
the earthly1 and  on the other the      
transcendency of the principle of       
explanation had  been conceived1 the    
composition of dualism could not be     
sought for in  intelligence1 but in     
myth1 which put an end to the strife    
with the  triumph of one of the two     
adversaries3 the myth of the fall1 of   
the  redemption1 of the expected reign  
of ,christ1 of the ,last ,judgment1 and 
of the final separation of the two      
cities1 one ascending to ,paradise  with
 the elect1 the other driven back into  
hell with the wicked4 ,this  mythology  
had its precedent in the ,judaic        
expectations of a ,messiah1  and also1  
from some points of view1 in ,orphism1  
and continued to  develop through       

gnosis1 millenarism1 and other heretical
 tentatives  and heresies1 until it took
 a definite or almost a definite form in
  ,st ,augustine4 ,it has been remarked 
that in this conception metaphysic      
became identified with history1 as an   
entirely new thought1 altogether        
opposed to ,greek thought1 and that it  
is a philosophical contribution         
altogether novel and proper to          
,christianity4 ,but we must add here    
that1  as mythology1 it did not unite1  
but indeed confounded1 metaphysic and   
history1 making the finite infinite1    
avoiding the fallacy of the circle  as  
perpetual return of things1 but falling 
into the other fallacy of a  progress   
beginning and ending in time4 ,history  
was therefore arranged  in spiritual    
epochs or phases1 through which humanity
 was born1 grew  up1 and attained       
completion3 there were six1 seven1 or   
eight epochs1  according to the various 
ways of dividing and calculating1 which 
sometimes corresponded to the ages of   

human life1 sometimes to the days  of   
the creation1 sometimes to both these   
schemes combined2 or where  the         
hermeneutic of ,st ,jerome upon the     
,book of ,daniel was accepted1  the     
succession of events was distributed    
among the four monarchies1  of which the
 last was the ,roman1 not only in order 
of time1 but also  in that of the idea1 
because after the ,roman ,empire 7the   
,middle ,ages1  as we know1 long        
nourished the illusion that that empire 
persisted in  the form of the ,holy     
,roman ,empire7 there would be nothing  
else1 and  the reign of ,christ or of   
the ,church and then of ,antichrist and 
the  universal judgment were expected to
 follow without any intermission4  ,the 
end which history had not yet reached   
chronologically1 being also  intrinsic  
to the system1 was ideally              
constructible1 as the ,apocalypses  had 
already ideally constructed it1         
pervading theological works and  even   
histories1 which in their last section  

7see the works of ,otto of  ,frisia for 
all of them7 described the coming of    
,antichrist and the end  of the world3  
hence the idea of a history of things   
future1 continued  by the paradoxical   
,francesco ,patrizzi1 who gave utterance
 to his theory  in the sixteenth century
 in his dialogues ,upon ,history        
7#aefj74 ,this  general historical      
picture might be here and there varied  
in its  particulars1 but never shattered
 and confuted2 it varied in orthodoxy   
up to the time of ,augustine1 and       
afterward among the dissentients and    
the heretics3 most noteworthy of these  
variations was the ,eternal  ,evangel of
 the followers of ,gioacchino di ,flora1
 who divided history  into three epochs1
 corresponding to the three persons of  
the ,trinity3  the first that of the    
,old ,testament or of the ,father1 the  
second  that of the ,new ,testament or  
of the ,son1 the third and last1 that of
  the ,spirit4 ,these are but artificial
 combinations and transactions1  by     

means of which life always seeks to find
 a passage between the  preconceived    
schemes which compress and threaten to  
suffocate it4    ,but such transactions 
did not avail to get the better of the  
discord  between reality and plan which 
everywhere revealed itself4 ,hence the  
necessity of the allegorical            
interpretation1 so dear to the ,middle  
,ages4 ,this consisted substantially in 
placing an imaginary figure  between the
 plan and the historical reality1 a     
mixture of both1 like a  bridge1 but a  
bridge which could be crossed only in   
imagination4 ,thus  personages and      
events of sacred and profane history    
were allegorized1  and subtle numerical 
calculations made and continually       
reinforced with  new imaginary          
contributions1 in order to discover     
correspondences  and parallelisms2 and  
not only were the ages of life and the  
days of  creation placed on a parallel  
line with historical epochs1 but so     
also were the virtues and other         

conceptions4 ,such notions are still  to
 be found in books of devotion and in   
the preaching of the less  acute and    
less modernized of sacred orators4 ,the 
'reign of nature'  was also included in 
allegorical interpretation2 and since   
history  and metaphysic had been set at 
variance with one another1 so in like   
manner was natural science set at       
variance with both of them1 and all     
appeared together in allegorical forms  
in the medieval encyclopdias1  the      
,pantheons and ,mirrors of the ,world4  
,notwithstanding these inevitable       
strayings1 the new idea of history  as  
the spiritual drama of humanity1        
although it inclined toward myth1  yet  
acted with such energy as to weaken the 
ancient heteronomous  conception of     
history as directed toward the          
administration of abstract  instruction1
 useful in actual practice4 ,history    
itself was now the  teaching1 the       
knowledge of the life of the human race 
from its creation  upon the earth1      

through its struggles1 up to its final  
state1 which  was indicated in the near 
or remote horizon4 ,history thus became 
the  work of ,god1 teaching by ,his     
direct word and presence1 which is to be
  seen and heard in every part of it4   
,declarations are certainly not         
wanting1 indeed they abound1 that the   
reading of histories is useful  as      
counselling1 and particularly as        
inculcating1 good behaviour and         
abstention from evil4 ,sometimes it is a
 question of traditional and            
conventional declarations1 at others of 
particular designs3 but  medieval       
historiography was not conceived1       
because it could not be  conceived1     
heteronomously4    ,if asceticism       
mortified minds1 and if the miraculous  
clouded them1 it  is not necessary to   
believe1 on the other hand1 that either 
had the  power to depress reality       
altogether and for a long period4       
,indeed1  precisely because asceticism  
was arbitrary1 and mythology imaginary1 

they remained more or less abstract1 in 
the same way as allegorical             
interpretation1 which was impotent to   
suppress the real determinations  of    
fact4 ,it was all very well to despise  
and condemn the earthly city  in words1 
but it forced itself upon the attention1
 and if it did not  speak to the        
intellect it spoke to the souls and to  
the passions of  men4 ,in its period of 
youthful vigour1 also1 ,christianity was
 obliged  to tolerate profane history1  
dictated by economic1 political1 and    
military interests1 side by side with   
sacred history4 ,and as in the  course  
of the ,middle ,ages1 in addition to the
 religious poetry of the  sacred hymns  
and poems1 there also existed an epic of
 territorial  conquests1 of the shock of
 peoples and of feudal strife1 so there 
continued to exist a worldly history1   
more or less mingled and tempered  with 
religious history4 ,we find even fervent
 ,christians and the most  pious of     
priests yielding to the desire of       

collecting and handing down  the memory 
of their race3 thus ,gregory of ,tours  
told of the ,franks1  ,paulus ,diaconus 
of the ,lombards1 ,bede of the ,angles1 
,widekind of the  ,saxons4 ,their gentle
 hearts of political partisans do not   
cease to  beat4 ,not only do they lament
 the misery and wickedness of humanity  
in general1 but also give vent to their 
particular feelings1 as we  observe1 for
 instance1 in the monk ,erchempertus1   
who1 ex intimo corde  ducens alta       
suspiria1 resumes the thread of ,paul's 
history to narrate  the deeds of his    
glorious ,lombards 7now hunted back into
 the southern  part of ,italy alone and 
assaulted and imbushed on every side71  
non  regnum sed excidium1 non           
felicitatem sed miseriam1 non triumphum 
sed  perniciem4 ,and ,liutprand of      
,cremona1 although he makes the deity   
intervene as ruler and punisher on every
 occasion1 and even the saints  in      
person do battle1 does not fail1 for    
instance1 to note that when             

,berengarius proceeded to take          
possession of the kingdom after the     
death of ,guido1 the followers of the   
latter called for ,king ,lambert1  quia 
semper ,itali geminis uti dominis       
volunt1 quatinus alterum  alterius      
terrore coherceant3 which is also the   
definition of feudal  society4 ,they    
were most credulous in many things1 far 
from profound  and abandoned to their   
imagination1 but they were not          
credulous1  indeed they were            
clear-sighted1 shrewd and diffident in  
what concerned  the possessions and     
privileges of the churches and          
monasteries1 of  families1 and of the   
feudal group and the order of           
citizenship to which  each belonged4 ,it
 is to these interests that we owe the  
formation of  archives1 registers1      
chronologies1 and the exercise of       
criticism as to  the authenticity and   
genuineness of documents4 ,the          
conception of the  new ,christian virtue
 oppressed1 but did not quench1         

admiration 7though  held sinful by the  
most severe7 for the great name of      
ancient ,rome1 and  the many works of   
pagan civilization1 its eloquence1 its  
poetry1 its  civil wisdom4 ,nor did it  
forbid admiration for ,arabic or        
,judaic-,arabic  wisdom1 of which the   
works were well received1               
notwithstanding  religious strife4      
,hence we may say that in the same way  
as ,grco-,roman  humanism did not       
altogether exclude the supernatural1 so 
the ,christian  supernatural did not    
prevent human consideration of worldly  
passions  and earthly transactions4     
,this becomes more and more evident as  
we pass from the early to the  late     
,middle ,ages1 when profane             
historiography progresses1 as the result
  of the struggles between ,church and  
,state1 of the communal movement1  of   
the more frequent commercial            
communications between ,europe and the  
,east1 and the like4 ,these are         
themselves the result of the            

development1  the maturing1 and the     
modernization of thought1 which grows   
with life  and makes life grow4 ,neither
 life nor thought remained attached to  
the  conceptions of the fathers of the  
,church1 of ,augustine1 of ,orosius1  to
 whom history offered nothing but the   
proof of the infinite evils  that       
afflict humanity1 of the unceasing      
punishments of ,god1 and of  the deaths 
of the persecutors4 ,in ,otto of ,frisia
 himself1 who holds  more firmly than   
the others to the doctrines of          
,augustine1 we find the  asperity of    
doctrine tempered by grace2 and when he 
afterward proceeds  to narrate the      
struggle between the ,church and the    
,empire1 if it cannot  be said that he  
takes the side of the ,empire1 it also  
cannot be said  that he resolutely      
defends that of the ,church1 for the    
eschatological  visions that form so    
great a part of his work do not blind   
his  practical sense and political      
judgment4 ,the party of the faith       

against  the faithless remained1        
however1 always the 'great party1' the  
great  'struggle of classes' 7elect and 
reprobate7 and of 'states' 7celestial   
and earthly cities74 ,but within this   
large framework we perceive other       
figures more closely particularized1    
other parties and interests1  which     
gradually come to occupy the first1     
second1 and third planes1  so that the  
struggle between ,god and the devil is  
forced ever more  and more into the     
background and becomes somewhat vague1  
something  always assumed to be present1
 but not felt to be active and urgent in
  the soul1 as something which is still 
talked of1 but is not deeply  felt1 or  
at least felt with the energy that the  
words would wish us  to believe1 the    
words themselves often sounding like a  
refrain1 as  pious as it is             
conventional4 ,the miraculous gradually 
fills less and  less space and appears  
more rarely3 ,god acts more willingly by
 means  of secondary causes1 and        

respects natural laws2 ,he rarely       
intervenes  directly in a revolutionary 
manner4 ,the form of the chronicles1    
too1  becomes also less accidental and  
arid1 the better among the chroniclers  
here and there seeking a different      
'order'--that is to say1 really1 a      
better understanding--and we find       
7particularly from the thirteenth       
century onward7 the ordo artificialis or
 internal opposed to the  ordo naturalis
 or external chronological order4 ,there
 are also  to be found those who        
distinguish between the sub singulis    
annis  describere and the sub stilo     
historico conglutinare--that is to  say1
 the grouping together according to     
things described4 ,the general  aspect  
of historiography changes not a little4 
,limiting ourselves  to ,italian        
historiography alone1 there are no      
longer little books  upon the miracles  
and the translations of the bodies of   
saints and  bishops1 but chronicles of  
communes1 all of them full of affection 

for  the feudal superiors or for the    
archbishop1 for the imperial or the     
anti-imperial side1 for ,milan or for   
,bergamo1 or for ,lodi4 ,the sense  of  
tragedy1 which weighed so heavily upon  
,erchempertus1 returns with  new and    
stronger accents in the narrative of the
 deeds of ,barbarossa  at ,milan1       
entitled ,libellus tristititi et        
doloris1 angusti et  tribulationis1     
passionum et tormentorum4 ,love for     
one's city usurps  much of the space    
previously devoted to things celestial1 
and praises  of ,milan1 of ,bergamo1 of 
,venice1 of ,amalfi1 of ,naples1 resound
 in the  pages of their chroniclers4    
,thus those vast chronicles are reached 
which1 although they begin with the     
,tower of ,babel1 yet lead to the       
history of that city or of that event   
which makes the strongest appeal  to the
 feelings and best stimulates the       
industry of the writer1 and  become     
mingled with the persons and things of  
the present or future  life4 ,giovanni  

,villani1 a pilgrim to ,rome to         
celebrate the papal  jubilee1 is not    
inspired with the ascetic spirit or     
raised to heaven by  that solemn        
spectacle2 but1 on the contrary1 since  
he finds himself  in the holy city of   
,rome on that blessed pilgrimage1       
inspecting its  great and ancient       
possessions1 and reading the histories  
and the  great deeds of the ,romans1 he 
is inspired to compose the history of   
his native ,fiorenza1 daughter and      
creation of ,rome 7of ancient ,rome     
prior to ,christianity74 ,his ,fiorenza 
resembled ,rome in its rise to          
greatness and its following after great 
things1 and was like ,rome in  its fall4
 ,thus the 'holy' and the 'blessed' do  
not lead him to holy  and blessed       
thoughts1 but to thoughts of worldly    
greatness4 ,to the  historiography of   
the communes answers the more seriously 
worldly1 the  more formally and         
historically elaborated historiography  
of the ,norman  and ,suabian kingdom of 

,sicily4 ,in the proem to its           
,constitutiones  sovereigns are declared
 to be instituted ipsa rerum necessitate
  cogente1 nec minus divin provisionis  
instinctu2 with its ,romualdo  ,guarna1 
its ,abbot ,telesino1 its ,malaterra1   
its ,hugo ,falcando and ,pietro  da     
,eboli1 its ,riccardo da ,san ,germano1 
with the pseudo-,jamsilla1 and  ,saba   
,malaspina4 ,all of these have their    
heroes1 ,roger and ,william the         
,normans1 ,frederick and ,manfred the   
,suabians1 and what they praise in  them
 is the sound political basis which they
 knew how to establish  and to maintain 
with a firm hand4 ,eo tempore1 says     
,falcando of  ,roger1 ,regnum ,sicilia1 
strenuis et prclaris viris abundans1 cum
  terra marique plurimum posset1 vicinis
 circumquoque gentibus terrorem         
incusserat1 summaque pace ac            
tranquillitate maxima fruebatur4 ,and   
the so-called ,jamsilla1 of ,frederick  
,,ii3 ,vir fuit magni cordis1  sed      
magnanitatem suam multa1 qua in eo fuit1

 sapientia superavit1  ut nequaquam     
impetus eum ad aliquid faciendum        
impelleret1 sed ad  omnia cum rationis  
maturitate procederet2444 utpote qui    
philosophis  studiosus erat quam et ipse
 in se coluit1 et in regno suo propagare
  ordinavit4 ,tunc quidem ipsius felici 
tempore in regno ,sicili erant          
litterati pauci vel nulli2 ipse vero    
imperator liberalium artium et  omnis   
approbat scientia scholas in regno ipso 
constituit 444 ut  omnis conditionis et 
fortuna homines nullius occasione       
indigenti  a philosophi studio          
retraherentur4 ,the state1 profane      
culture1  'philosophy1' impersonated in 
the heresiarch ,frederick1 are thus set 
in  clear relief4 ,and while on the one 
hand more and more laical theories  of  
the state become joined to these        
political and cultural currents  7from  
,dante1 indeed from ,thomas ,aquinas1 to
 ,marsilio of ,padua71 and  the first   
outlines of literary history 7lives of  
the poets and of men  famous for their  

knowledge1 and the rise of vernacular   
literatures7 and  histories of manners  
7as in certain passages in ,ricobaldo of
 ,ferrara71  on the other hand          
scholasticism found its way to such     
problems and  conceptions by means of   
the works of ,aristotle1 which          
represented as  it were a first brief   
summary of ancient knowledge4 ,it is    
unnecessary  to say that ,dante's poem  
is the chief monument of this condition 
of  spirit1 where the ideas of the      
,middle ,ages are maintained1 but the   
political1 poetical1 and philosophical  
affections1 the love of fame and  of    
glory1 prove their vigour1 although     
subordinated to those ideas and         
restrained1 as far as possible1 by them4
    ,but those ideas are nevertheless   
maintained1 even among the  imperialists
 and adversaries of the ,church1 and it 
is only in rare  spirits that we find a 
partly sceptical and partly mocking     
negation  of them4 ,transcendency1 the  
prescience of ,god1 ,who ordains1       

directs1  and disposes of everything    
according to ,his will1 bestows rewards 
and punishments1 and intervenes         
mysteriously1 always maintains its      
place in the distant background1 in     
,dante as in ,giovanni ,villani1  as in 
all the historians and chroniclers4     
,toward the close of the  fifteenth     
century the theological conception makes
 a curious appearance  in the ,french   
historian ,comines1 arm in arm with the 
most alert and  unprejudiced policy of  
success at all costs4 ,worldliness1 so  
rich1  so various1 and so complex1 was  
yet without an ideal standard of        
comparison1 and for this reason it was  
rather lived than thought1  showing     
itself rather in richness of detail than
 systematically4 ,the  ancient elements 
of culture1 which had passed from       
,aristotelianism  into scholasticism1   
failed to act powerfully1 because that  
part of  ,aristotelianism was           
particularly selected which was in      
harmony with  ,christian thought already

 translated into ,platonic terms and    
dogmatized  in a transcendental form by 
the fathers of the ,church4 ,hence it   
has  even been possible to note a pause 
in historiographical interest1  where   
scholasticism has prevailed1 a          
compendium of the type of that of       
,martin ,polonus being held sufficient  
to serve the end of quotations for      
demonstration or for legal purposes4    
,what was required upon entering  a new 
period of progress 7there is always     
progress1 but 'periods of  progress' are
 those in which the motion of the spirit
 seems to become  accelerated and the   
fruit that has been growing ripe for    
centuries is  rapidly plucked7 was a    
direct conscious negation of            
transcendency and  of ,christian        
miracle1 of ascesis and of eschatology1 
both in life  and in thought a negation 
whose terms 7heavenly and earthly life7 
had  certainly been noted by medieval   
historiography1 but had been allowed  to
 endure and to progress1 the one beside 

the other1 without true and  proper     
contact and conflict arising between    
them4          ,,iv      ,,the          
,,historiography ,,of ,,the             
,,renaissance      ,the negation of     
,christian transcendency was the work of
 the age of  the ,renaissance1 when1 to 
employ the expression used by ,fueter1  
historiography became 'secularized4' ,in
 the histories of ,leonardo ,bruni  and 
of ,bracciolini1 who gave the first     
conspicuous examples of the  new        
attitude of historiographical thought1  
and in all others of the  same sort     
which followed them--among them those of
 ,machiavelli and of  ,guicciardini     
shine forth conspicuously--we find      
hardly any trace of  'miracles4' ,these 
are recorded solely with the intention  
of mocking at  them and of explaining   
them in an altogether human manner4 ,an 
acute  analysis of individual characters
 and interests is substituted for the   
intervention of divine providence and   
the actions of the popes1 and  religious

 strifes themselves are apt to be       
interpreted according to  utilitarian   
passions and solely with an eye to their
 political bearing4  ,the scheme of the 
four monarchies with the advent of      
,antichrist  connected with it is       
allowed to disappear2 histories are now 
narrated  ab inclinatione imperii1 and  
even universal histories1 like the      
,enneads of ,sabellicus1 do not adhere  
to traditional ecclesiastical           
tradition4 ,chronicles of the world1    
universal miraculous histories1  both   
theological and apocalyptic1 become the 
literature of the people  and of those  
with little culture1 or persist in      
countries of backward  culture1 such as 
,germany at that time1 or finally are   
limited to the  circle of ,catholic or  
,protestant confessional historiography1
 both  of which retain so much of the   
,middle ,ages1 the ,protestant perhaps  
more than the ,catholic 7at least at a  
first glance71 for the latter  contrived
 at least here and there to temporize   

and to accommodate  itself to the times4
 ,all this is shown very clearly and    
minutely by  ,fueter1 and ,i shall now  
proceed to take certain observations and
 some  information from his book1 which 
,i shall rearrange and complete with    
some more of my own4 ,in the political  
historiography of the late ,middle      
,ages1 the theological conception had   
been1 as we have said1 thrown into  the 
background2 but henceforward it is not  
to be found even there1  and if at times
 we hear its formulas1 they are just    
like those of the  ,crusade against the 
,turks1 preaching the liberation of the 
tomb of  ,christ4 ,these were still     
repeated by preachers1 writers of verse1
 and  rhetoricians 7and continued to be 
repeated for three centuries71 but  they
 found no response in political reality 
and in the conscience of  the people1   
because they were but empty sound4 ,nor 
was the negation  of theologism and the 
secularization of history accomplished  
only in  practice1 unaccompanied with   

complete consciousness2 for1 although   
many minds really did turn in the       
direction indicated by fate1 or in      
other words by the new mental necessity1
 and although the polemic  was not      
always open1 but on the contrary often  
surrounded with many  precautions1      
evidence abounds of the agreement of the
 practice with  the theory of           
historiography4 ,the criticism of so    
grave a theorist of  history as ,bodin  
is opposed to the scheme of the four    
monarchies4 ,he  makes it his object to 
combat the inveteratum errorem de       
quattuor  imperiis1 proving that the    
notion was capriciously taken from the  
dream of ,daniel1 and that it in no way 
corresponded with the real  course of   
events4 ,it would be superfluous to     
record here the celebrated  epigrams of 
,machiavelli and of ,guicciardini1 who  
satirized theology  and miracles4       
,guicciardini noted that all religions  
have boasted of  miracles1 and therefore
 they are not proofs of any one of them1

 and  are perhaps nothing but secrets of
 nature4 ,he advised his readers  never 
to say that ,god had aided so-and-so    
because he was good and  had made       
so-and-so suffer because he was wicked1 
for we often see  the opposite1 and the 
counsels of divine providence are in    
fact  an abyss4 ,paolo ,sarpi1 although 
he admits that it is a pious and        
religious thought to attribute the      
disposition of every event to divine    
providence1 yet holds it presumption to 
determine to what end  events are       
directed by that highest wisdom2 for    
men1 being emotionally  attached to     
their opinions1 are persuaded that they 
are as much loved  and favoured by ,god 
as by themselves4 ,hence1 for example1  
they argued  that ,god had caused       
,zwingli and ,hecolampadius to die      
almost at the  same time1 in order that 
he might punish and remove the ministers
 of  discord1 whereas it is certain that
 after the death of these two1 the      
evangelical cantons have made greater   

progress in the doctrine that  they     
received from both of them4 ,such a     
disposition of religious and  cautious  
spirits is yet more significant than    
that of the radical and  impetuous1     
openly irreverent1 in the same way as   
the new importance  attributed to       
history is notable in the increase of   
historiographical  labour that is then  
everywhere noticeable1 and in the       
formation of a  true and proper         
philological school1 not only for       
antiquity1 but for  the ,middle ,ages   
7,valla1 ,flavio ,biondo1 ,calchi1      
,sigonio1 ,beato ,renano1  etc471 which 
publishes and restores texts1 criticizes
 the authenticity  and the value of     
sources1 is occupied with the           
establishment of a  technical method of 
examining witnesses1 and composes       
learned histories4    ,nothing is more  
natural than that the new form of       
historiography  should seem to be a     
return to ,grco-,roman antiquity1 as    
,christianity  had seemed to be a return

 to the story of ,eden 7the interlude of
  paganism having been brought to an end
 by the redemption71 or that the        
,middle ,ages should still seem to some 
to-day to be a falling back into        
barbarous pre-,hellenic times4 ,the     
illusion of the return was expressed  in
 the cult of classical antiquity1 and in
 all those manifestations1  literary1   
artistic1 moral1 and customary1 familiar
 to those who know  the ,renaissance4   
,in the special field with which we are 
at present  occupied1 we find a curious 
document in support of the difficulty   
that  philologists and critics          
experienced in persuading themselves    
that the  ,greek and ,roman writers had 
perhaps been able to deceive themselves1
 to  lie1 to falsify1 to be led astray  
by passions and blinded by ignorance1   
in the same way as those of the ,middle 
,ages4 ,thus the latter were  severely  
criticized while the former were        
reverenced and accepted1 for  it needed 
much time and labour to attain to an    

equal mental freedom  regarding the     
ancients1 and the criticism of texts and
 of sources was  developed in respect to
 medieval history long before it        
attained to  a like freedom in respect  
to ancient history4 ,but the greatest   
proof  and monument of the illusion of  
the return was the formation of the     
humanistic type of historiography1      
opposed to the medieval4 ,this  had been
 chiefly confined to the form of        
chronicle and humanistic                
historiography1 although it accepted the
 arrangement by years and  seasons      
according to the examples set by the    
,greeks and ,romans1  cancelled as far  
as possible numerical indications1 and  
exerted itself  to run on unbrokenly1   
without chronological cuts and          
cross-cuts4  ,latin had become barbarous
 in the ,middle ,ages and had accepted  
the  vocabularies of vulgar tongues1 or 
those which designated new things  in a 
new way1 whereas the humanistic         
historiographers translated and         

disguised every thought and every       
narrative in ,ciceronian ,latin1 or  at 
least ,latin of the ,golden ,age4 ,we   
frequently find picturesque  anecdotes  
in the medieval chronicles1 and         
humanism1 while it restored  its dignity
 to history1 deprived it of that        
picturesque element1 or  attenuated and 
polished it as it had done the things   
and customs of the  barbaric centuries4 
,this humanistic type of historiography1
 like the  new philological erudition   
and criticism and the whole movement of 
the  ,renaissance1 was ,italian work1   
and in ,italy histories in the vulgar   
tongue were soon modelled upon it1 which
 found in the latinized prose  of       
,boccaccio an instrument well suited to 
their ends4 ,from ,italy it was         
diffused among other countries1 and as  
always happens when an industry  is     
transplanted into virgin soil1 and      
workmen and technical experts are       
invited to come from the country of its 
origin1 so the first humanistic         

historians of the other parts of ,europe
 were ,italians4 ,paolo ,emilio  the    
,veronese1 who ,gallis condidit         
historias1 gave the ,french the         
humanistic history of ,france in his ,de
 rebus gestis ,francorum1 and  ,polydore
 ,virgil did the like for ,england1     
,lucio ,marineo for ,spain1 and  many   
others for other countries1 until       
indigenous experts appeared and  the aid
 of ,italians became unnecessary4 ,later
 on it became necessary to  throw off   
this cloak1 which was too loose or too  
tight--indeed1 was not  cut to the model
 of modern thought4 ,what there was in  
it of artificial1  of swollen1 of false1
 was blamed--these defects being indeed 
clearly  indicated in the constructive  
principle of this literary form1 which  
was that of imitation4 ,but anyone with 
a feeling for the past will  enjoy that 
historical humanistic prose as the      
expression of love for  antiquity and of
 the desire to rise to its level4 ,this 
love and this  desire were so keen that 

they had no hesitation in reproducing   
things  external and indifferent in     
addition to what was better and         
sometimes  in default of it4            
,giambattista ,vico1 sometimes so       
sublimely puerile1 is  still found      
lamenting1 three centuries after the    
creation of humanistic  historiography1 
that no sovereign has been found into   
whose mind has  entered the thought of  
preserving for ever in the best ,latin  
style  a record of the famous ,war of   
the ,spanish ,succession1 than which a  
greater has never happened in the world 
since the ,second ,carthaginian  ,war1  
that of ,csar with ,pompey1 and of      
,alexander with ,darius4 ,but what  of  
this8 ,quite recently1 during the war in
 ,tripoli1 came the proposal  from the  
depths of one of the meridional         
provinces of ,italy1 one of  those      
little countrysides where the shadow of 
a humanist still exists1  that a ,latin 
commentary should be composed upon that 
war entitled  ,de bello libico4 ,this   

proposal was received with much laughter
 and  made even me smile1 yet the smile 
was accompanied with a sort of  tender  
emotion1 when ,i recalled how long and  
devotedly our fathers and  forefathers  
had pursued the ideal of a beautiful    
antiquity and of a  decorous            
historiography4    ,nevertheless1 the   
belief in the effectivity or possibility
 of such a  return was1 as we have said1
 an illusion2 nothing of what has been  
returns1 nothing of what has been can be
 abolished2 even when we  return to an  
old thought the new adversary makes the 
defence new and  the thought itself new4
 ,i read some time ago the work of a    
learned  ,french ,catholic4 ,while      
clearing the ,middle ,ages of certain   
absurd  accusations and confuting errors
 commonly circulated about them1 he     
maintained that the ,middle ,ages are   
the truly modern time1 modern with  the 
eternal modernity of the true1 and that 
therefore they should  not be called the
 ,middle ,ages1 which term should be    

applied to the  period that has elapsed 
between the fifteenth century and our   
own  day1 between the ,reformation and  
positivism4 ,as ,i read1 ,i reflected   
that such a theory is the worthy pendant
 to that other theory1 which  places the
 ,middle ,ages beneath antiquity1 and   
that both had some time  ago shown      
themselves false to historical thought1 
which knows nothing  of returns1 but    
knows that the ,middle ,ages preserved  
antiquity deep  in its heart as the     
,renaissance preserved the ,middle      
,ages4 ,and what  is 'humanism' but a   
renewed formula of that 'humanity' of   
which the  ancient world knew little or 
nothing1 and which ,christianity and the
  ,middle ,ages had so profoundly felt8 
,what is the word 'renaissance'  or     
'renewal' but a metaphor taken from the 
language of religion8 ,and  setting     
aside the word1 is not the conception of
 humanism perhaps the  affirmation of a 
spiritual and universal value1 and in so
 far as it is  that1 altogether foreign1

 as we know1 to the mind of antiquity1  
and an  intrinsic continuation of the   
'ecclesiastical' and 'spiritual' history
  which appeared with ,christianity8    
,the conception of spiritual value  had 
without doubt become changed or         
enriched1 for it contained within       
itself more than a thousand years of    
mental experiences1 thoughts1 and       
actions4 ,but while it thus grew more   
rich1 it preserved its original         
character1 and constituted the religion 
of the new times1 with its  priests and 
martyrs1 its polemic and its apologetic1
 its intolerance  7it destroyed or      
allowed to perish the monuments of the  
,middle ,ages  and condemned its writers
 to oblivion71 and sometimes even       
imitated the  forms of its worship      
7,navagaro used to burn a copy of       
,martial every  year as a holocaust to  
pure ,latinity74 ,and since humanity1   
philosophy1  science1 literature1 and   
especially art1 politics1 activity in   
all its  forms1 now fill that conception

 of value which the ,middle ,ages had   
placed in ,christian religious faith    
alone1 histories or outlines of         
histories continue to appear as the     
outcome of these determinations1  which 
were certainly new in respect to        
medieval literature1 but were  not less 
new in respect to ,grco-,roman          
literature1 where there was  nothing to 
compare to them1 or only treatises      
composed in an empirical  and extrinsic 
manner4 ,the new histories of values    
presented them selves  timidly1         
imitating in certain respects the few   
indent examples1 but  they gave evidence
 of a fervour1 an intelligence1 an      
afflatus1 which  led to a hope for that 
increase and development wanting to     
their  predecessors1 which1 instead of  
developing1 had gradually become more   
superficial and finally disappeared     
again into vagueness4 ,suffice it to    
mention as representative of them all   
,vasari's ,lives of the ,painters1      
which are connected with the meditations

 and the researches upon art  contained 
in so many treatises1 dialogues1 and    
letters of ,italians1 and  are here and 
there shot through with flashes such as 
never shone in  antiquity4 ,the same may
 be said of treatises on poetry and     
rhetoric1  and of the judgments which   
they contain as to poetry and of the new
  history of poetry1 then being         
attempted with more or less successful  
results4 ,the 'state' too1 which forms  
the object of the meditations  of       
,machiavelli1 is not the simple state of
 antiquity1 city or empire1  but is     
almost the national state felt as       
something divine1 to which  even the    
salvation of the soul must be           
sacrificed--that is to say1  as the     
institution in which the true salvation 
of the soul is to be  found4 ,even the  
pagan virtue which he and others opposed
 to ,christian  virtue is very different
 from the pure ,grco-,roman disposition 
of mind4  ,at that time a start was also
 made in the direction of investigating 

the theory of rights1 of political      
forms1 of myths and beliefs1 of         
philosophical systems1 to-day in full   
flower4 ,and since that same            
consciousness which had produced        
humanism had also widened the           
boundaries of the known world1 and had  
sought for and found people of  whom the
 ,bible preserved no record and of whom 
the ,grco-,roman writers  knew nothing1 
there appeared at that time a literature
 relating to  savages and to the        
indigenous civilizations of ,america    
7and also of  distant ,asia1 which had  
been better explored71 from which arose 
the  first notions as to the primitive  
forms of human life4 ,thus were  widened
 the spiritual boundaries of humanity at
 the same time as the  material4    ,we 
are not alone in perceiving the illusion
 of the 'return to  antiquity1' for the 
men of the ,renaissance were not slow in
 doing this4  ,not every one was content
 to suit himself to the humanistic      
literary  type4 ,some1 like             

,machiavelli1 threw away that cloak1 too
 ample in its  folds and in its train1  
preferring to it the shorter modern     
dress4  ,protests against pedantry and  
imitation are indeed frequently to be   
heard during the course of the century4 
,philosophers rebelled against          
,aristotle 7first against the medieval  
and then against the ancient            
,aristotle71 and appeals were made to   
truth1 which is superior both to  ,plato
 and to ,aristotle2 men of letters      
advocated the new 'classes1'  and       
artists repeated that the great masters 
were 'nature' and the  'idea4' ,one     
feels in the air that the time is not   
far distant when the  question1 ,who are
 the true ancients8--that is to say1    
,who are the  intellectually expert and 
mature8--will be answered with1 ,we are2
  the symbol of antiquity will be broken
 and there will be found within  it the 
reality which is human thought1 ever new
 in its manifestations4  ,such an answer
 may possibly be slow in becoming clear 

and certain as an  object of common     
conviction1 though it will eventually   
become so1 and  now suffices to explain 
the true quality of that return         
antiquity1 by  preventing the taking of 
the symbol for the thing symbolized4    
,this symbolical covering1 cause of     
prejudices and misunderstandings1  which
 enfolded the whole of humanism1 was not
 the sole vice from  which the          
historiography of the ,renaissance      
suffered4 ,we do not1  of course1 speak 
here of the bias with which all         
histories were  variously affected1     
according as they were written by men of
 letters  who were also courtiers and   
supported the interests of their        
masters1  or official historians of     
aristocratic and conservative states    
like  ,venice1 or men taking one or the 
other side in the conflicts within the  
same state1 such as the ottimani 7or    
aristocratic7 and the popular  party of 
,florence1 or upholders of opposed      
religious beliefs1 such as  the group of

 reformed divines of ,magdeburg and     
,baronio4 ,we do not speak  here of the 
historians who became story-writers     
7they sometimes take to  history1 like  
,bandello71 or of those who collected   
information with a  view to exciting    
curiosity and creating scandal4 ,these  
are things that  belong to all periods1 
and are not sufficient to qualify a     
particular  historiographical age4 ,but 
if we examine only that which is or     
wished  to be historical thought1 the   
historiography of the ,renaissance      
suffered from two other defects1 each of
 which it had inherited from  one of its
 progenitors1 antiquity and the ,middle 
,ages4 ,and above all  there came to it 
from antiquity the humanistic-abstract  
or pragmatical  conception1 as it is    
called1 which inclines to explain facts 
by the  individual in his singularity   
and in his atomism1 or by means of      
abstract political forms1 and the like4 
,for ,machiavelli1 the prince is  not   
only the ideal but the criterion that he

 adopts for the explanation  of events4 
,he does not only appear in his         
treatises and political  opuscules1 but 
in the ,florentine ,histories1 where we 
meet with him at  the very              
beginning--after the terrible           
imaginative description of  the         
condition of ,italy in the fifth        
century--in the great figure of         
,theodoric1 by whose 'virtue' and       
'goodness' not only ,rome and ,italy1   
but all the other parts of the ,western 
empire1 arose free from the  continual  
scourgings which they had supported for 
so many years from so  many invasions1  
and became again happy and well-ordered 
communities4  ,the same figure reappears
 in many different forms in the course  
of  the centuries described in those    
histories4 ,finally1 at the end of  the 
description of the social struggles of  
,florence1 we read that  this city had  
reached such a point that it could be   
easily adapted to  any form of          
government by a wise law-giver4 ,in like

 manner1 the  ,history of ,italy by     
,guicciardini begins with the           
description of the  happiness of ,italy 
at the end of the fifteenth century1    
acquired at  various times and preserved
 for many reasons1 not the least of     
which  was the industry and genius of   
,lorenzo de' ,medici1 who strove in     
every way so to balance ,italian affairs
 that they should not incline  more in  
one direction than another4 ,he had     
allies in ,ferdinand of  ,aragon and    
,ludovic the ,moor1 partly for the same 
and partly for other  reasons1 and the  
,venetians were held in check by all    
three of them4  ,this perfect system of 
equilibrium was broken by the deaths of 
,lorenzo1  of ,ferdinand1 and of the    
,pope4 ,all historians of this period   
express  themselves in the same way1 and
 although a lively consciousness of the 
spiritual values of humanity was in     
process of formation1 as has been  seen1
 yet these were spoken of as though they
 depended upon the will  and the        

intelligence of individuals who were    
their masters1 not the  contrary4 ,in   
the history of painting1 for example1   
the 'prince' for  ,vasari is ,giotto1   
who1 although born among inexpert       
artisans1 alone  revived painting and   
reduced it to such a form as might be   
described as  good4 ,biographies are    
also constantly individualistic1 for    
they never  succeed in perfectly uniting
 the individual with the work which he  
creates and which in turn creates him4  
,the idea of chance or fortune persisted
 alongside the pragmatic  conception1   
its ancient companion4 ,machiavelli     
assigns the course of  events half to   
fortune and half to human prudence1 and 
although the  accent falls here upon    
prudence1 the acknowledgment of the one 
does  not abolish the force of the      
other1 so mysterious and transcendent4  
,guicciardini attacks those who1 while  
attributing everything to  prudence and 
virtue1 exclude the power of fortune1   
because we  see that human affairs      

receive at all times great impulsions   
from  fortuitous events1 which it is not
 within the power of man either to      
foresee or to escape1 and although the  
care and understanding of man  may      
moderate many things1 nevertheless that 
alone does not suffice1  but good       
fortune is also necessary4 ,it is true  
that here and there  there seems to     
appear another conception in            
,machiavelli1 that of the  strength and 
logic of things1 but it is only a       
fleeting shadow4 ,it is  also a shadow  
for ,guicciardini1 when he adds that    
even if we wish to  attribute everything
 to prudence and virtue1 must at least  
admit that  it is necessary to fall upon
 or be born in times when the virtues or
  qualities for which you value yourself
 are esteemed4 ,guicciardini  remains   
perplexed as to one point only1 as      
though he had caught a  glimpse of      
something that is neither caprice of the
 individual nor  contingency of fortune3
 ,when ,i consider to what accidents and

 dangers  of illness1 of chance1 of     
violence1 of infinite sorts1 is exposed 
the  life of man1 the concurrence of how
 many things is needful that the        
harvest of the year should be good1     
nothing surprises me more than to  see  
an old man or a good harvest4 ,but even 
here we do not get beyond  uncertainty1 
which in this case manifests itself as  
astonishment4 ,with  the renewal of the 
idea of fortune1 even to a partial      
extent1 with  the restitution of the    
cult of this pagan divinity1 not only   
does  the ,god of ,christianity         
disappear1 but also the idea of         
rationality1  of finality1 of           
development1 affirmed during the        
medieval period4  ,the ancient ,oriental
 idea of the circle in human affairs    
returns2  it dominated all the          
historians of the ,renaissance1 and     
above all  ,machiavelli4 ,history is an 
alternation of lives and deaths1 of     
goods  and ills1 of happiness and       
misery1 of splendour and decadence4     

,vasari  understands the history of     
painting in the same way as that of all 
the arts1 which1 like human bodies1 have
 their birth1 their growth1  their old  
age1 and their death4 ,he is solicitous 
of preserving in his  book the memory of
 the artistic capacity of his time1 lest
 the art  of painting1 either owing to  
the neglect of men or to the malignity  
of the ages or to decree of heaven      
7which does not appear to wish  to      
maintain things here below for long in  
the same state71 should  encounter the  
same disorder and ruin as befell it in  
the ,middle  ,ages4 ,bodin1 while       
criticizing and rejecting the scheme of 
the four  monarchies1 and demonstrating 
the fallaciousness of the assertion that
  gold deteriorates into copper1 or even
 into clay1 and celebrating the         
splendour of letters1 of commerce1 of   
the geographical discoveries of  his    
age1 does not1 however1 conclude in     
favour of progress1 but of  the circle1 
blaming those who find everything       

inferior in antiquity1  cum1 terna      
quadam lege natur1 conversiti omnium    
rerum velut in orbem  redire videatur1  
ut aqua vitia virtutibus1 ignoratio     
scienti1 turpe  honesto consequens sit1 
ac tenebr luci4 ,the sad1 bitter1       
pessimistic  tone which we observe among
 ancient historians1 which sometimes    
bursts forth into the tragic1 is also   
often to be met with among the          
historians of the ,renaissance1 for they
 saw perish many things that  were very 
dear to them1 and were constrained to   
tremble for those which  they still     
enjoyed1 or at least to fear for them by
 anticipation1  certain that sooner or  
later they would yield their place to   
their  contraries4    ,and since history
 thus conceived does not represent      
progress but a  circle1 and is not      
directed by the historical law of       
development1  but by the natural law of 
the circle1 which gives it regularity   
and  uniformity1 it follows that the    
historiography of the ,renaissance1     

like the ,grco-,roman1 has its end      
outside itself1 and affords nothing  but
 material suitable for exhortations     
toward the useful and the good1  for    
various forms of pleasure or as ornament
 for abstract truths4  ,historians and  
theorists of history are all in         
agreement as to this1  with the         
exception of such eccentrics as         
,patrizzi1 who expressed  doubts as to  
the utility of knowing what had happened
 and as to  the truth itself of         
narratives1 but ended by contradicting  
himself  and also laying down an        
extrinsic end4 ,each one of us can find1
  both on his own account and on that of
 the public weal1 many useful  documents
 in the knowledge of these so different 
and so important  examples1 writes      
,guicciardini in the proem to his       
,history of ,italy4  ,hence will clearly
 appear1 as the result of innumerable   
examples1  the instability of things    
human1 how harmful they are often wont  
to  be to themselves1 but ever to the   

people1 the ill-conceived counsels  of  
those who rule1 when1 having only before
 their eyes either vain  errors or      
present cupidities1 they are not mindful
 of the frequent  variations of fortune1
 and converting the power that has been 
granted  them for the common weal into  
an injury to others1 they become the    
authors of new perturbations1 either as 
the result of lack of prudence  or of   
too much ambition4 ,and ,bodin holds    
that non solum prsentia  commode        
explicantur1 sed etiam futura           
colliguntur1 certissimaque rerum        
expetendarum ac fugiendarum prcepta     
constantur1 from historical  narratives4
 ,campanella thinks that history should 
be composed ut sit  scientiarum         
fundamentum sufficiens2 ,vossius        
formulates the definition  that was     
destined to appear for centuries in     
treatises3 cognitio  singularium1 quorum
 memoriam conservari utile sit ad bene  
beateque  vivendum4 ,historical         
knowledge therefore seemed at that time 

to be  the lowest and easiest form of   
knowledge 7and this view has been held  
down to our own days72 to such an extent
 that ,bodin1 in addition  to the       
utilitas and the oblectatio1 also       
recognized to history  facilitas1 so    
great a facility ut1 sine ullius artis  
adjumento1 ipsa  per sese ab omnibus    
intelligatur4 ,when truth had been      
placed outside  historical narrative1   
all the historians of the ,renaissance1 
like  their ,greek and ,roman           
predecessors1 practised1 and all the    
theorists  7from ,pontanus in the       
,actius to ,vossius in the ,ars         
historica7  defended1 the use of more or
 less imaginary orations and            
exhortations1  not only as the result of
 bowing to ancient example1 but through 
their  own convictions4 ,eventually ,m4 
de la ,popelinire1 in his ,histoire  des
 histoires1 avec l'ide de l'histoire    
accomplie 7#aeii71 where  he inculcates 
in turn historical exactitude and       
sincerity with such  warm eloquence1    

suddenly turns round to defend imaginary
 harangues  et concions1 for this fine  
reason1 that what is necessary is       
'truth'  and not 'the words' in which it
 is expressed6 ,the truth of history    
was thus not history1 but oratory and   
political science2 and if the           
historians of the ,renaissance were     
hardly ever able to exercise oratory    
7for which the political constitution of
 the time allowed little  scope71 all or
 nearly all were authors of treatises   
upon political  science1 differently    
inspired as compared with those of the  
,middle  ,ages1 which had ethical and   
religious thought behind them1 resuming 
and advancing the speculations of       
,aristotle and of ancient political     
writers4 ,in like manner1 treatises on  
historical art1 unknown to the  ,middle 
,ages1 but which rapidly multiplied in  
the ,renaissance 7see a  great number of
 them in the ,penus artis historic of   
#aegi71 resumed  and fertilized the     
researches of ,grco-,roman theorists4   

,it is to be  expected that the         
historiography of this period should    
represent some  of the defects of       
medieval historiography in another form1
 owing to  its character of reaction    
already mentioned and to the new        
divinity  that it had raised up upon the
 altars in place of the ancient         
divinity1  humanity4 ,the ,renaissance  
everywhere reveals its effort to oppose 
the  one term to the other1 and since   
scholasticism had sought the things  of 
,god and of the soul1 it wished to      
restrict itself to the things  of       
nature4 ,we find ,guicciardini and a    
chorus of others describing the         
investigations of philosophers and      
theologians and of all those who  write 
things above nature or such as are not  
seen as 'madnesses'2  and because       
scholasticism had defined science in the
 ,aristotelian  manner as de            
universalibus1 ,campanella opposed to   
this definition  his ,scientia est de   
singularibus4 ,in like manner its men of

 letters1  prejudiced in favour of      
,latin1 at first refused to recognize   
the new  languages that had been formed 
during the ,middle ,ages1 as well as    
medieval literature and poetry2 its     
jurists rejected the feudal in  favour  
of the ,roman legal code1 its           
politicians representative forms  in    
favour of absolute lordship and         
monarchy4 ,it was then that first       
appeared the conception of the ,middle  
,ages as a whole1 opposed to  another   
whole1 formed of the ancient and the    
ancient-modern1 into  which the ,middle 
,ages were inserted like an irksome and 
painful wedge4  ,the word 'medieval' was
 certainly late in appearing as an      
official  designation1 employed in the  
divisions and titles of histories       
7toward  the end of the seventeenth     
century1 as it would seem1 in the       
manuals  of ,cellario72 previously it   
had only just occurred here and there2  
but  the thought contained in it had    
been in the air for some time--that is  

to say1 in the soul of everybody--eked  
out with other words1 such as           
'barbarous' or ',gothic' ages1 and      
,vasari expresses it by means of the    
distinction between ancient and 'old1'  
calling those things ancient  which     
occurred before the existence of        
,constantine1 of ,corinth1 of  ,athens1 
of ,rome1 and of other very famous      
cities built up to the time  of ,nero1  
of the ,vespasians1 of ,trajan1         
,hadrian1 and ,antoninus1 and  'old'    
those which had their origin from ,st   
,silvester onward4 ,in  any case1 the   
distinction was clear3 on the one hand  
most brilliant  light1 on the other     
dense darkness4 ,after ,constantine1    
writes the  same ,vasari1 every sort of 
virtue was lost1 beautiful souls and    
lofty intellects became corrupted into  
most ugly and basest1  and the fervent  
zeal of the new religion did infinite   
damage to the  arts4 ,this means neither
 more nor less than that dualism1 one of
 the  capital traits of the ,middle     

,ages1 was retained1 although           
differently  determined1 for now the god
 was 7although not openly acknowledged7 
antiquity1 art1 science1 ,greek and     
,roman life1 and its adversary1 the     
reprobate and rebel1 was the ,middle    
,age1 ',gothic' temples1 theology and   
philosophy bristling with difficulties1 
the clumsy and cruel customs of  that   
age4 ,but just because the respective   
functions of the two terms  were merely 
inverted1 their opposition remained1 and
 if ,christianity  did not succeed in   
understanding ,paganism and in          
recognizing its  father1 so the         
,renaissance failed to recognize itself 
as the son of  the ,middle ,ages1 and   
did not understand the positive and     
durable value  of the period that was   
closing4 ,for this reason1 both ages    
destroyed  or allowed to disappear the  
monuments of the previous age4 ,this was
  certainly far less the case with the  
,renaissance1 which expressed  itself   
less violently and was deeply imbued    

with the thought of the  ,middle ,ages1 
and1 owing to the idea of humanity1 had 
an obscure feeling  of the importance of
 its predecessor4 ,so much was this the 
case that  the school of learned men and
 philologists already mentioned was     
formed  at that time1 with the new of   
investigating medieval antiquities4 ,but
  the learned are the learned--that is  
to say1 they do not take an active  part
 in the struggles of their time1 though 
busied with the collection  and         
arrangement of its chronicles and       
remains1 which they often judge  in     
accordance with the vulgar opinion of   
their own time1 so that it is  quite    
customary to find them despising the    
subject of their labours1  declaring    
that the poet whom they are studying has
 no value1 or that  the period to which 
they are consecrating their entire life 
is ugly  and displeasing4 ,it needed    
much to free the flame of intelligence  
from  the heaps of medieval antiquities 
accumulated for centuries by the        

learned1 and the ,middle ,ages were     
abhorred during the ,renaissance1  even 
when they were investigated4 ,the drama 
of love and hatred was not  dissimilar  
in its forms1 nor less bitterly         
dualistic1 although vastly  more        
interesting1 than that which was then   
being played out between  ,catholics and
 ,protestants4 ,the latter called the   
,pope ,antichrist1 and  the primacy of  
the ,roman ,church mysterium            
iniquitatis1 and compiled  a catalogue  
testium veritatis of those who had      
opposed that iniquity  even while it    
prevailed4 ,the ,catholics returned the 
compliment with  remarks about ,luther  
and the ,reformation1 and composed      
catalogues  of heretics1 ,satan's       
witnesses4 ,but this strife was a relic 
of the  past1 and would have ended by   
becoming gradually attenuated and       
dispersed2 whereas the other was an     
element of the future1 and could  only  
be conquered by long effort and a new   
conception of the loftiest  character4  

,v      ,,the ,,historiography ,,of     
,,the ,,enlightenment      ,meanwhile   
the historiography which immediately    
followed pushed the  double aporia of   
antiquity and of the ,middle ,ages to   
the extreme2 and  it was owing to this  
radical unprejudiced procedure that it  
acquired  its definite physiognomy and  
the right of being considered a         
particular  historiographical period4   
,the symbolical vesture1 woven of       
memories of  the ,grco-,roman world1    
with which the modern spirit had first  
clothed  itself1 is now torn and thrown 
away4 ,the thought that the ancients had
  not been the oldest and wisest among  
the peoples1 but the youngest  and the  
least expert1 and that the true         
ancients1 that is to say1 the  most     
expert and mature in mind1 are co be    
found in the men of the  modern world1  
had little by little made its way and   
become universally  accepted4 ,reason in
 its nudity1 henceforth saluted by its  
proper  name1 succeeds the example and  

the authority of the ,grco-,romans1     
which represented reason opposed to     
barbaric culture and customs4           
,humanitarianism1 the cult of humanity1 
also idolized by the name of  'nature1' 
that is to say1 ingenuous general human 
nature1 succeeds to  humanism1 with its 
one-sided admirations for certain       
peoples and for  certain forms of life4 
,histories written in ,latin become     
scarce or  are confined to the learned1 
and those written in national languages 
are multiplied2 criticism is exercised  
not only upon medieval  falsifications  
and fables1 upon the writings of        
credulous and ignorant  monks in        
monasteries1 but upon the pages of      
ancient historians1 and the  first      
doubts appear as to the truth of the    
historical ,roman tradition4  ,a feeling
 of sympathy1 however1 toward the       
ancients still persists1  whereas       
repugnance and abhorrence for the       
,middle ,ages continue to  increase4    
,all feel and say that they have        

emerged1 not only from  darkness1 but   
from the twilight before dawn1 that the 
sun of reason  is high on the horizon1  
illuminating the intellect and          
irradiating  it with most vivid light4  
',light1' 'illumination1' and the like  
are  words pronounced on every occasion 
and with ever increasing conviction  and
 energy2 hence the title 'age of light1'
 of 'enlightenment' or  of              
'illumination1' given to the period     
extending from ,descartes to  ,kant4    
,another term began to circulate1 at    
first used rarely and in  a restricted  
sense--'progress4' ,it gradually becomes
 more insistent  and familiar1 and      
finally succeeds in supplying a         
criterion for the  judgment of facts1   
for the conduct of life1 for the        
construction of  history1 becomes the   
subject of special investigations1 and  
of a new  kind of history1 the history  
of the progresses of the human spirit4  
,but here we observe the persistence and
 the potency of ,christian and          

theological thought4 ,the progress so   
much discussed was1 so to speak1  a     
progress without development1           
manifesting itself chiefly in a sigh  of
 satisfaction and security1 as of one1  
favoured by fortune1 who has            
successfully encountered many obstacles 
and now looks serenely upon  the        
present1 secure as to the future1 with  
mind averted from the past1  or         
returning to it now and then for a brief
 moment only1 in order to  lament its   
ugliness1 to despise and to smile at it4
 ,take as an example  of all the most   
intelligent and at the same time the    
best of the  historical representatives 
of enlightenment ,m4 de ,voltaire1 who  
wrote  his ,essai sur les murs in order 
to aid his friend the ,marquise du      
,chtelet to surmonter le dgot caused her
 by l'histoire moderne  depuis la       
dcadence de l',empire romain1 treating  
the subject in a  satirical vein4 ,or   
take ,condorcet's work1 l',esquisse d'un
 tableau  historique des progrs de      

l'esprit humain1 which appears at its   
end  like a last will and testament 7and
 also as the testament of the man  who  
wrote it71 and where we find the whole  
century in compendium4  ,it is as happy 
in the present1 even in the midst of the
 slaughters  of the ,revolution1 as rosy
 in its views as to the future1 as it is
  full of contempt and sarcasm for the  
past1 which had generated that  present4
 ,the felicity of the period upon which 
they were entering  was clearly stated4 
,voltaire says that at this time les    
hommes ont  acquis plus de lumires d'un 
bout de l',europe  l'autre que dans     
tous les ges prcdents4 ,man now         
brandishes the arm which none can       
resist3 la seule arme contre le monstre1
 c'est la ,raison3 la seule  manire     
d'empcher les hommes d'tre absurdes et  
mchants1 c'est de  les clairer2 pour    
rendre le fanatisme excrable1 il ne faut
 que le  peindre4 ,certainly it was not 
denied that there had been something  of
 good and beautiful in the past4 ,they  

must have existed1 if they  suffered    
from superstition and oppression4 ,on   
voit dans l'histoire  les erreurs et les
 prjugs se succder tour  tour1 et       
chasser la  vrit et la raison3 on voit  
les habiles et les heureux enchaner  les
 imbciles et craser les infortuns2 et   
encore ces habiles et  ces heureux sont 
eux-mmes les jouets de la fortune1 ainsi
 quelles  esclaves qu'ils gouvernent4   
,and not only had the good existed1     
though  oppressed1 but it had also been 
efficient in a certain measure3 au      
milieu de ces saccagements et de ces    
destructions nous voyons un amour  de   
l'ordre qui anime en secret le genre    
humain et qui a prvenu sa  ruine totale3
 c'est un des ressorts de la nature1 qui
 reprend toujours  sa force4444 ,and    
then the 'great epochs' must not be     
forgotten1 the  'centuries' in which the
 arts nourished as the result of the    
work  of wise men and monarchs1 les     
quatre ges heureux of history4 ,but     
between this sporadic good1 weak or     

acting covertly1 or appearing  only for 
a time and then disappearing1 and that  
of the new era1 the  quantitative and   
energetic difference is such that it is 
turned into  a qualitative difference3 a
 moment comes when men learn to think1  
to  rectify their ideas1 and past       
history seems like a tempestuous sea  to
 one who has landed upon solid earth4   
,certainly everything is not  to be     
praised in the new times2 indeed1 there 
is much to blame3 les  abus servent de  
lois dans presque toute la terre2 et si 
les plus sages  des hommes              
s'assemblaient pour faire des lois1 o   
est l'tat dont  la forme subsistt       
entire8 ,the distance from the ideal of 
reason  was still great and the new     
century had still to consider itself as 
a simple step toward complete           
rationality and felicity4 ,we find the  
fancy of a social form limit even in    
,kant1 who dragged after him  so much   
old intellectualistic and scholastic    
philosophy4 ,sometimes  indeed its final

 form was not discovered1 and its place 
was taken by a  vertiginous succession  
of more and more radiant social forms4  
,but the  series of these radiant forms1
 the progress toward the final form and 
the destruction of abuses1 really began 
in the age of enlightenment1  after some
 episodic attempts in that direction    
during previous ages1  for this age     
alone had entered upon the just1 the    
wide1 the sure  path1 the path illumined
 with the light of reason4 ,it sometimes
 even  happened in the course of that   
period that a doctrine leading to       
,rousseau's inverted the usual view and 
placed reason1 not in modern  times or  
in the near or distant future1 but in   
the past1 and not in  the medieval1     
,grco-,roman1 or ,oriental past1 but in 
the prehistoric  past1 in the 'state of 
nature1' from which history represented 
the  deviation4 ,but this theory1 though
 differing in its mode of expression1   
was altogether identical in substance   
with that generally accepted1  because a

 prehistoric 'state of nature' never had
 any existence in the  reality1 which is
 history1 but expressed an ideal to be  
attained in a  near or distant future1  
which had first been perceived in modern
 times  and was therefore really capable
 of moving in that direction1 whether   
in the sense of realization or return4  
,the religious character of all  this   
new conception of the world cannot be   
obscure to anyone1 for it  repeats the  
,christian conceptions of ,god as truth 
and justice 7the lay  ,god71 of the     
earthly paradise1 the redemption1 the   
millennium1 and so  on1 in laical terms1
 and in like manner with6 ,christianity 
sets the  whole of previous history in  
opposition to itself1 to condemn it1    
while  hardly admiring here and there   
some consoling ray of itself4 ,what does
  it matter that religion1 and          
especially ,christianity1 was then the  
target for fiercest blows and shame and 
mockery1 that all reticence was         
abandoned1 and people were no longer    

satisfied with the discreet smile  that 
had once blossomed on the lips of the   
,italian humanists1 but broke  out into 
open and fanatical warfare8 ,even lay   
fanaticism is the result  of dogmatism4 
,what does it matter that pious folk    
were shocked and saw  the ancient ,satan
 in the lay ,god1 as the enlightened    
discovered the  capricious1 domineering1
 cruel tribal deity in the old ,god     
represented  by the priest8 ,the        
possibility of reciprocal accusations   
confirms the  dualism1 active in the new
 as in the old conception1 and rendering
  it unsuitable for the understanding of
 development and of history4    ,the    
historiographical aporia of antiquity   
was also being increased  by abstract   
individualism or the 'pragmatic'        
conception4 ,so true was  this that it  
was precisely at that time that the     
formula was resumed1  and pragmatism1 as
 history of human ideas1 sentiments1    
calculations1  and actions1 as a        
narrative embellished with reflections1 

was opposed  to theological or medieval 
history and to the old ingenuous        
chronicles  or erudite collections of   
information and documents4 ,voltaire1   
who  combats and mocks at belief in     
divine designs and punishments and in   
the leadership of a small barbarous     
population called upon to act as an     
elect people and to be the axle of      
universal history 7so that he may       
substitute for it the lay theology which
 has been described71 is the  same      
,voltaire who praises in ,guicciardini  
and in ,machiavelli the first           
appearance of an histoire bien faite4   
,the pragmatic mode of treatment  was   
extended even to the narrative of events
 relating to religion and  the ,church  
and was applied by ,mosheim and others  
in ,germany4 ,owing to  this penetration
 of rationalism into ecclesiastical     
historiography and  into ,protestant    
philosophy1 it afterward seemed that the
 ,reformation  had caused thought to    
progress1 whereas1 as regards this      

matter1  the ,reformation simply        
received humanistic thought in the new  
form1  to which it had previously been  
opposed4 ,if1 in other respects1 it     
aided the advance of the historical     
conception in an original manner1  this 
was brought about1 as we shall see1 by  
means of another element  seething      
within it1 mysticism4 ,but meanwhile not
 even ,catholicism  remained immune from
 the pragmatic1 of which we find traces 
in the  ,discours of ,bossuet1 who      
represents the ,augustinian conception1 
shorn  of its accessories1 reduced and  
modernized1 lacking the irreconcilable  
dualism of the two cities and the ,roman
 ,empire as the ultimate and            
everlasting empire1 allowing natural    
causes preordained by ,god and          
regulated by the laws to operate side by
 side with divine intervention1  and    
conceding a large share to the social   
and political conditions of  the various
 peoples4 ,we do not speak of the last  
step taken by the same  author in his   

,histoire des variations des glises1    
when he conceived  the history of the   
,reformation objectively and in its     
internal motives1  presenting it as a   
rebellious movement directed against    
authority4  ,even his adversary         
,voltaire recognized that ,bossuet had  
not omitted  d'autres causes in addition
 to the divine will favouring the elect 
people1 because he had several times    
taken count de l'esprit des  nations4   
,such was the strength of l'esprit du   
sicle4 ,the pragmatic  conceptions of   
that time are still so well known and so
 near to us1  so persistent in so many  
of our narratives and historical        
manuals1  that it would be useless to   
describe them4 ,when we direct our      
thoughts  to the historical works of the
 eighteenth century1 there immediately  
rises to the memory the general outline 
of a history in which priests  deceive1 
courtiers intrigue1 wise monarchs       
conceive and realize good  institutions1
 combated and rendered almost vain      

through the malignity  of others and the
 ignorance of the people1 though they   
remain  nevertheless a perpetual object 
of admiration for enlightened spirits4  
,the image of chance or caprice appears 
with the evocation of that  image1 and  
mingling with the histories of these    
conflicts makes them  yet more          
complicated1 their results yet stranger 
and more astonishing4  ,and what was the
 use1 that is to say1 the end1 of       
historical narrative  in the view of    
those historians8 ,here also the reading
 of a few lines  of ,voltaire affords   
the explanation3 ,cet avantage consiste 
surtout  dans la comparaison qu'un homme
 d'tat1 un citoyen1 peut faire des lois 
et des mours trangres avec celles de son
 pays3 c'est ce qui excite  l'mulation  
des nations modernes dans les arts1 dans
 l''agriculture1  dans le commerce4 ,les
 grandes fautes passes servent beaucoup 
tout  genre4 ,on ne saurait trop        
remettre devant les yeux les crimes et  
les malheurs3 on peut1 quoi qu'on en    

dise1 prvenir les uns et les  autres4   
,this thought is repeated with many     
verbal variations and is  to be found in
 nearly all the books of historiographie
 theory of the  time1 continuing the    
,italian mode of the ,renaissance in an 
easier  and more popular style4 ,the    
words 'philosophy of history1' which had
  later so much success1 at first served
 to describe the assistance  obtainable 
from history in the shape of advice and 
useful precepts1  when investigated     
without prejudice--that is to say1 with 
the one  'assumption' of reason4    ,the
 external end assigned to history led to
 the same results as in  antiquity1 when
 history became oratorical and even     
historico-pedagogic  romances were      
composed1 and as in the ,renaissance1   
when 'declamatory  orations' were       
preserved1 and history was treated as   
material more  or less well adapted to  
certain ends1 whence arose a certain    
amount  of indifference toward its      
truth1 so that ,machiavelli1 for        

instance1  deduced laws and precepts    
from the decades of ,livy1 not only     
assuming  them to be true1 but accepting
 them in those parts which he must have 
recognized to be demonstrably fabulous4 
,orations began to disappear1  but their
 disappearance was due to good literary 
taste rather than  to anything else1    
which recognized how out of harmony were
 those  expedients with the new popular1
 prosaic1 polemical tone that narrative 
assumed in the eighteenth century4 ,in  
exchange they got something  worse3 lack
 of esteem for history1 which was       
considered to be an  inferior reality1  
unworthy of the philosopher1 who seeks  
for laws1 for  what is constant1 for the
 uniform1 the general1 and can find it  
in  himself and in the direct           
observation of external and internal    
nature1  natural and human1 without     
making that long1 useless1 and dangerous
  tour of facts narrated in the         
histories4 ,descartes1 ,malebranche1 and
  the long list of their successors do  

not need especial mention here1  for it 
is well known how mathematics and       
naturalism dominated and  depressed     
history at this period4 ,but was        
historical truth at least an  inferior  
truth8 ,after fuller reflection1 it did 
not seem possible to  grant even this4  
,in history1 said ,voltaire1 the word   
'certain1' which  is used to designate  
such knowledge as that two and two make 
four1 ,i  think1 ,i suffer1 ,i exist1   
should be used very rarely1 and in the  
sole sense of very probable4 ,others    
held that even this was saying  too     
much1 for they altogether denied the    
truth of history and declared  that it  
was a collection of fables1 of          
inventions and equivocations1 or  of    
undemonstrable affirmations4 ,hence the 
scepticism or ,pyrrhonism of  the       
eighteenth century1 which showed itself 
on several occasions and  has left us a 
series of curious little books as a     
document of itself4  ,such is1 indeed1  
the inevitable result when historical   

knowledge is  looked upon as a mass of  
individual testimonies1 dictated or     
altered by  the passions1 or            
misunderstood through ignorance1 good at
 the best for  supplying edifying and   
terrible examples in confirmation of the
 eternal  truths of reason1 which1 for  
the rest1 shine with their own light4   
,it would nevertheless be altogether    
erroneous to found upon the             
exaggeration to which the theological   
and pragmatical views attained  in the  
historiography of the enlightenment1 and
 see in it a decadence  or regression   
similar to that of the ,renaissance and 
of other  predecessors4 ,not only were  
germs of error evolved at that time1 not
  only did the difficulties that had    
appeared in the previous period  become 
more acute1 but there was also          
developed1 and elevated to a  high      
degree of efficiency1 that              
historiography of spiritual values      
which ,christian historiography had     
intensified and almost created1 and     

which the ,renaissance had begun to     
transfer to the earth4 ,voltaire  as    
historiographer deserves to be defended 
7and this has recently  been done by    
several writers1 admirably by ,fueter71 
because he has  a lively perception of  
the need of bringing history back from  
the  treatment of the external to that  
of the internal and strives to  satisfy 
this need4 ,for this reason1 books that 
gave accounts of wars1  treaties1       
ceremonies1 and solemnities seemed to   
him to be nothing but  'archives' or    
'historical dictionaries1' useful for   
consultation on  certain occasions1 but 
history1 true history1 he held to be    
something  altogether different4 ,the   
duty of true history could not be to    
weight  the memory with external or     
material facts1 or as he called them    
events 7vnements71 but to discover what 
was the society of men in  the past1 la 
socit des hommes1 comment on vivait dans
 l'intrieur  des familles1 quels arts   
taient cultivs1 and to paint 'manners'  

7les mours72 not to lose itself in the  
multitude of insignificant  particulars 
7petits faits71 but to collect only     
those that were of  importance          
7considrables7 and to explain the spirit
 7l'esprit7  that had produced them4    
,owing to this preference that ,voltaire
 accords  to manners over battles we    
find in him the conception 7although it 
remains without adequate treatment and  
gets lost in the ardour of  polemic7    
that it is not for history to trace the 
portrait of human  splendours and       
miseries 7les dtails de la splendeur et 
de la misre  humaine7 but only of       
manners and of the arts1 that is1 of the
  positive work2 in his ,sicle de ,louis
 ,,xiv he says that he wishes to        
illustrate the government of that       
monarch1 not in so far as il a fait  du 
bien aux franais1 but in so far as il a 
fait du lien aux hommes4  ,what         
,voltaire undertook1 and to no small    
extent achieved1 forms the  principal   
object of all historians' labours at    

this period4 ,whoever  wishes to do so  
can see in ,fueter's book how the great 
pictures  to be found in ,voltaire's    
,essai sur les mours and ,sicle were    
imitated in the pages both of ,french   
writers and in those of other  ,european
 countries--for instance1 in the        
celebrated introduction by  ,robertson  
to his history of ,charles ,v4 ,it will 
also be noticed how the  special        
histories of this or that aspect of     
culture are multiplied  and perfected1  
as though several of the desiderata     
mentioned by  ,bacon in his             
classification of history had been thus 
supplied4 ,the  history of philosophy   
abandons more and more the type of      
collections  of anecdotes and utterances
 of philosophers1 to become the history 
of systems1 from ,brucker to ,buhle and 
to ,tiedemann4 ,the history of  art     
takes the shape of a special problem in 
,winckelmann's work and in  the works of
 his successors4 ,in ,voltaire's own    
books and in those of  his school it    

assumes that of literature2 in those of 
,dubos and of  ,montesquieu that of     
rights and of institutions2 in ,germany 
it leads to  the production of a work as
 original and realistic as the history  
of  ,osnabrck by ,mser4 ,in the         
specialist work of ,heeren1 the history 
of  industry and commerce separates     
itself from the historical divisions  or
 digressions of economic treatises and  
takes a form of its own4 ,the  history  
of social customs investigates 7as in   
,sainte-,palaye's book  on ,ancienne    
chevalerie7 even the minutest aspects of
 social and  moral life4 ,had not       
,voltaire remarked about tournaments    
that il se  fait des rvolutions dans les
 plaisirs comme dans tout le reste8 ,and
  to limit ourselves to ,italy1 which at
 that time was also acting on  the      
initiative1 though she soon afterward   
withdrew and received her  impulse from 
the other countries of ,europe1 it is   
well to remember  that in the eighteenth
 century ,pietro ,giannone1 expressing  

the desires  and the attempts at their  
realization of a multitude of           
,neapolitan  compatriots and            
contemporaries1 traced the civil history
 of the ,kingdom  of ,naples1 giving    
much space to the relations between     
,church and ,state  and to the incidents
 of legislation4 ,many followed this    
example in  ,italy and outside it 7among
 the many were ,montesquieu and         
,gibbon74 ,in  ,italy1 too1 ,ludovico   
,antonio ,muratori illustrated medieval 
life in  his ,antiquitates ,itali1 and  
,tiraboschi composed a great history of 
,italian literature 7understood as that 
of the whole culture of ,italy71        
notable not less for its erudition than 
for its clearness of design1  while     
other lesser writers1 like ,napoli      
,signorelli1 in his ,vicende  della     
cultura delle due ,sicilie1             
particularized in certain regions1      
sprinkling their history with the       
philosophy current at the time4 ,the    
,jesuit ,bettinelli1 too1 imitated the  

historical books of ,voltaire  for the  
history of letters1 arts1 and customs in
 ,italy1 ,bonafede the  work of ,brucker
 for the history of philosophy1 and     
,lanzi1 in a manner  far superior to    
those just mentioned1 continued the path
 followed by  ,winckelmann in his       
,history of ,painting4    ,not only did 
the historiography of the enlightenment 
render history  more 'interior' and     
develop it in its interiority1 but it   
also  broadened it in space and time4   
,here too ,voltaire represents in an    
eminent degree the needs of his age1    
with his continual accusations of       
narrowness and meanness levelled at the 
traditional image of universal  history1
 as composed of ,hebrew or sacred       
history and ,grco-,roman or  profane    
history1 or1 as he says1 histoires      
prtendues universelles1  fabriques dans 
notre ,occident4 ,a beginning was made  
with the use of  the material           
discovered1 transported1 and accumulated
 by explorers and  travellers from the  

,renaissance onward1 of which a         
considerable part  had been contributed 
by the ,jesuits and by missionaries4    
,india and  ,china attracted attention1 
both on account of their antiquity and  
of  the high grade of civilization to   
which they had attained4 ,translations  
of religious and literary ,oriental     
texts were soon added to this1  and it  
became possible to discuss that         
civilization1 not merely at  second-hand
 and according to the narratives of     
travellers4 ,this  increase of knowledge
 relating to the ,east is paralleled by 
increase  of knowledge not only in      
relation to antiquity 7these studies    
were  never dropped1 but changed their  
centre1 first from ,italy to ,france    
and ,holland1 then to ,england1 and then
 to ,germany71 but also in regard  to   
the ,middle ,ages1 in the works of the  
,benedictines1 of ,leibnitz1  ,muratori1
 and very many others1 who here also    
specialized both as  regards the objects
 of their researches and as to the      

regions or cities  in which they        
conducted them1 as for instance ,de ,meo
 in his ,annali  critici del ,regno di  
,napoli4    ,with the increase of       
erudition1 of the variety of documents  
and  information available1 went hand in
 hand a more refined criticism as  to   
the authenticity of the one and of the  
value as evidence of the  other4 ,fueter
 does well to note the progress in      
method accomplished by  the             
,benedictines and by ,leibnitz 7who did 
not surpass those excellent  and learned
 monks in this respect1 although he was 
a philosopher7 up  to ,muratori1 who did
 not restrict himself to testing the    
genuineness  of tradition1 but initiated
 criticism of the tendencies of         
individual  witnesses1 of the interests 
and passions which colour and give      
their shape to narratives4 ,the         
en-lightened1 with ,voltaire at their   
head1 initiated another kind of         
criticism of a more intrinsic sort1     
directed to things and to the knowledge 

of things 7to literary1 moral1          
political1 and military experience71    
recognizing the impossibility  that     
things should have happened in the way  
that they are said to have  happened by 
superficial1 credulous1 or prejudiced   
historians1 and  attempting to          
reconstruct them in the only way that   
they could have  happened4 ,we shall    
admire in ,voltaire 7especially in the  
,sicle7 his  lack of confidence in the  
reports of courtiers and servants1      
accustomed  to forge calumnies and to   
interpret maliciously and anecdotically 
the  external actions of sovereigns and 
statesmen4    ,this happened because the
 historiography of the enlightenment1   
while  it preserved and even exaggerated
 pragmatism1 yet on the other  hand     
refined and spiritualized it1 as will   
have been observed in  the expressions  
preferred by ,voltaire and even in the  
theologizing  ,bossuet3 l'esprit des    
nations1 l'esprit du temps4 ,what that  
esprit  was naturally remained vague1   

because the support of philosophy1  in  
which at that time those newly imported 
concepts introduced an  unexpected      
element of conflict1 was lacking to     
refer it to the ideal  determinations of
 the spirit in its development and to   
conceive the  various epochs and the    
various nations as each playing its own 
part in  the spiritual drama4 ,thus it  
often happened that esprit was perverted
  into a fixed quality1 such as race1 if
 it were a question of nations1  and    
into a current or mode1 if periods were 
spoken of1 and was thus  naturalized and
 pragmatized4 ,trois choses1 wrote      
,voltaire1 influent  sans cesse sur     
l'esprit des hommes1 le climat1 le      
gouvernement1 et  la religion3 c'est la 
seule manire d'expliquer l'nigme du     
monde3  where the 'spirit' is lowered to
 the position of a product of natural1  
and social circumstances4 ,the          
suggestive word had1 however1 been      
pronounced1 and a clear consciousness of
 the terms themselves of the  social1   

political1 and cultural struggle that   
was being carried on  would have little 
by little emerged4 ,for the time being1 
climate1  government1 religion1 genius  
of the peoples1 genius of the time1 were
  all more or less happy attempts to go 
beyond pragmatism and to place          
causality in a universal order4 ,this   
effort1 and at the same time its        
limit--that is to say1 the falling back 
into the abstract and pragmatic  form of
 explanation--is also shown in the      
doctrine of the 'single  event1' which  
was believed to determine at a stroke   
the new epoch of  barbarism or of       
civilization4 ,thus at this time it was 
customary to  assign enormous importance
 to the ,crusades or to the ,turkish    
occupation  of ,constantinople1 as      
,fueter records1 with special reference 
to  ,richardson's history4 ,another     
consequence of the same embarrassment   
was the slight degree of fusion attained
 in the various histories of  culture1  
of customs1 and of the arts that were   

composed it this time4  ,the various    
manifestations of life were set down one
 after the other  without any success1  
or even any attempt at developing them  
organically4    ,doubtless the new and  
vigorous historiographical tendencies of
 the  enlightenment were then attacking 
other barriers opposed to them by  the  
already mentioned lay-theological       
dualism1 in addition to those of        
pragmatism and of naturalism4 ,this     
lay-theology ended by negating the      
principle of development itself1 because
 the judgment of the past as  consisting
 of darkness and errors precluded any   
serious conception of  religion1 poetry1
 philosophy1 or of primitive and bygone 
institutions4  ,what did an institution 
of the great importance of 'divination' 
in  primitive civilizations amount to   
for ,voltaire in the formative process  
of observation and scientific deduction8
 ,the invention du premier  fripon qui  
rencontra un imbcile4 ,or oracles1 also 
of such importance  in the life of      

antiquity8 ,des fourberies4 ,to what    
amounted the  theological struggles     
between ,catholics1 ,lutherans1 and     
,calvinists  in connexion with the      
,eucharist8 ,to the ridiculous spectacle
 of the  ,papists who mangeaient ,dieu  
pour pain1 les luthriens du pain et     
,dieu1  les calvinistes mangrent le pain
 et ne mangrent point ,dieu4 ,what  was 
the only end that could be attained by  
the ,jansenists8 ,boredom3 a  sequence  
of tiresome querelles thologiques and of
 petty querelles  de plume1 so that     
nothing remains of the writers of that  
time who took  part in them but         
geometry1 reasoned grammar1 logic--that 
is to say1  only what appartient  la    
raison2 the querelles thologiques were  
une maladie de plus dans l'esprit       
humain4 ,nor does the philosophy  of    
earlier times receive better treatment4 
,that of ,plato was nothing  but une    
mauvaise mtaphysique1 a tissue of       
arguments so bad that  it seems         
impossible they could have been admired 

and added to by  others yet more        
extravagant from century to century1    
until ,locke was  reached3 ,locke1 qui  
seul a dvelopp l'entendement humain dans
 un  livre o il n'y a que des vrits1 et1
 ce qui rend l'ouvrage parfait1  toutes 
les vrits sont claires4 ,in poetry1     
modern work was placed  above ancient1  
the ,gerusalemme above the ,iliad1 the  
,orlando above the  ,odyssey1 ,dante    
seems obscure and awkward1 ,shakespeare 
a barbarian not  without talent4        
,medieval literature was beneath        
consideration3 ,on a  recueilli quelques
 malheureuses compositions de ce temps3 
c'est faire  un amas de cailloux tirs   
dantiques masures quand on est entour de
  palais4 ,frederick of ,prussia1 who   
here showed himself a consistent        
,voltairean1 did not receive the new    
edition of the ,nibelungenlied and  the 
other epic monuments of ,germany        
graciously4 ,in a word1 the whole  of   
the past lost its value1 or preserved   
only the negative value  of evil3 ,que  

les citoyens d'une ville immense1 o les 
arts1 les  plaisirs1 et la paix rgnent  
aujourd'hui1 o la raison mme commence   
s'introduire1 comparent les temps1 et   
qu'ils se plaignent1 s'ils osent4       
,c'est une rflexion qu'il faut faire    
presque  chaque page de cette  histoire4
 ,the lack of the conception of         
development rendered sterile  the very  
acquisition of knowledge of distant     
things and people2 and  although there  
was in certain respects merit in        
introducing ,india and  ,china into     
universal history1 and although the     
criticism and satire  of the 'four      
monarchies' and of 'sacred' history was 
to a certain  extent justified1 it is   
well to remember that in the notion     
mocked at  was satisfied the legitimate 
need for understanding history in its   
relations with ,christian and ,european 
civilized life2 and that if it  had not 
been found possible 7and it never was at
 that time7 to form a  more complete    
chain1 in which were ,arabia1 ,india and

 ,china1 and the  ,american             
civilizations1 and all the other newly  
discovered things1  these additional    
contributions to knowledge would have   
remained a mere  object for curiosity or
 imagination4 ,india1 ,china1 and the   
,east in  general were therefore of     
little more use in the eighteenth       
century  than to manifest an affection  
for tolerance1 indeed for religious     
indifferentism4 ,those distant          
countries1 in which there was no        
proselytizing frenzy1 and which did not 
send missionaries to weary              
,europe--though ,europe did not spare   
them such visitations--were not  treated
 as historical realities1 nor did they  
obtain their place in  the reality of   
spiritual development1 but became       
longed-for ideals1  countries of dream4 
,those who in our day renew praises of  
,asiatic  toleration1 contrasting it    
with ,european intolerance1 and wax     
tender  over such wisdom and meekness1  
are not aware that in so doing they  are

 repeating uselessly and inopportunely  
what ,voltaire has already  done2 and if
 in this matter he did not aid the      
better understanding  of history1 he at 
any rate fulfilled a practical and moral
 function  which was necessary for the  
conditions of his own time4 ,the        
defective  conception of development1   
and not accidental circumstances1 such  
as  the publicistic1 journalistic1 and  
literary tendencies of the original     
among those historians1 is also the     
profound reason for the failure of      
contact and of union between the immense
 mass of erudition accumulated  by the  
sixteenth century philologists1 and the 
historiography of the  enlightenment4   
,how were those documents and           
collections to be employed  in the slow 
and laborious development of the spirit1
 if1 according to  the new conception1  
instead of developing1 the spirit was to
 leap1 and  had indeed already made a   
great leap and left the past far behind8
 ,it  was sufficient to rummage from    

time to time among them and extract some
  curious detail1 which should fit in   
with the polemic of the moment4  ,c'est 
un vaste magasin1 o vous prendrez ce qui
 est  votre usage1  said ,voltaire4     
,thus the learned and the enlightened1  
both of them  children of their time1   
remained divided among themselves1 the  
former  incapable of rising to the level
 of history owing to their slight       
vivacity of spirit1 the latter          
overrunning it owing to their too great 
vivacity1 and reducing it to a form of  
journalism4    ,all these limits1 just  
because they are limits1 assign its     
proper  sphere to the historiography of 
the enlightenment1 but they must  not be
 taken as meaning that it had not made  
any progress4 ,that  historiography1    
plunged in the work at the moment most  
urgent1  surrounded with the splendour  
of the truths that it was in the act  of
 revealing around it1 failed to see     
those limits and its own  deficiencies1 
or saw them rarely and with difficulty4 

,it was aware only  that it progressed  
and progressed rapidly1 nor was it wrong
 in this  belief4 ,nor are those critics
 7among whom is ,fueter7 wrong who now  
defend it from the bad reputation that  
has befallen it and celebrate  its many 
virtues1 which we also have set in a    
clear light and have  added to1 and     
whose connexion and unity we have       
proved4 ,yet we must  not leave that bad
 reputation unexplained1 for it sounds  
far more  serious than the usual        
depreciation by every historical period 
of the  one that has preceded it1 with  
the view of showing its inferiority  to 
the present4 ,here1 on the contrary1 we 
find a particular judgment  of          
depreciation1 pronounced even by        
comparison with the periods  that       
preceded the enlightenment1 so that this
 period1 and not1 for  example1 the     
,renaissance1 has especially received   
the epithet of  'anti-historical' 7the  
anti-historical eighteenth century74 ,we
 find  the explanation of this when we  

think of the dissipation then taking    
place of all symbolical veils1 received 
from venerable antiquity1 and  of the   
crude dualism and conflict which were   
being instigated at that  time between  
history and religion4 ,the ,renaissance 
was also itself an  affirmation of human
 reason1 but at the moment of its       
breaking with  medieval tradition it was
 felt to be all the same tied to        
classical  tradition1 which gave it an  
appearance of historical consciousness  
7an  appearance and not the reality74   
,the philosophers of the ,renaissance   
often invoked and placed themselves     
under the protection of the  ancient    
philosophers1 ,plato against ,aristotle1
 or the ,greek ,aristotle  against the  
,aristotle of the commentators4 ,the    
lettered men of the  period sought to   
justify the new works of art and the new
 judgments  upon them by appealing to   
the precepts of antiquity1 although they
  sophisticated and subtilized what they
 found there4 ,philosophers1  artists1  

and critics turned their shoulders upon 
antiquity only when  and where no sort  
of conciliation was possible1 and it was
 only the  boldest among them who       
ventured to do even this4 ,the ancient  
republics  were taken as an example by  
the politicians1 with ,livy as their    
text1  as the ,bible was by the         
,christians4 ,religion1 which was       
exhausted or  had been extinguished in  
the souls of the cultured1 was of       
necessity  preserved for the people as  
an instrument of government1 a vulgar   
form  of philosophy3 almost all are     
agreed as to this1 from ,machiavelli to 
,bruno4 ,the sage legislator or the     
'prince' of ,machiavelli and the        
enlightened despot of ,voltaire1 who    
were both of them idealizations  of the 
absolute monarchies that had moulded    
,europe politically to  their will1 have
 substantial affinities2 but the        
sixteenth-century  politician1 expert in
 human weaknesses and charged with all  
the  experience of the rich history of  

,greece and of ,rome1 studied finesse   
and transactions1 where the enlightened 
man of the eighteenth century1          
encouraged by the ever renewed victories
 of the ,reason1 raised  ,reason's      
banner1 and for her took his sword from 
the scabbard1 without  feeling the      
smallest necessity for covering his face
 with a mask4 ,king  ,numa created a    
religion in order to deceive the people1
 and was praised  for it by             
,machiavelli2 but ,voltaire would have  
abused him for doing  so1 as he abused  
all inventors of dogmas and promoters of
 fanaticism4  ,what more is to be said8 
,the rationalism of the ,renaissance was
  especially the work of the ,italian   
genius1 so well balanced1 so careful  to
 avoid excesses1 so accommodating1 so   
artistic2 enlightenment1 which  was     
especially the work of the ,french      
genius1 was radical1 consequent1  apt to
 run into extremes1 logistical4    ,when
 the genius of the two countries and the
 two epochs is compared1  the           

enlightenment is bound to appear        
anti-historical with respect  to the    
,renaissance1 which1 owing to the       
comparison thus drawn and  instituted   
with such an object1 becomes endowed    
with a historical  sense and with a     
sense of development which it did not   
possess1 having  also been essentially  
rationalistic and anti-historical1 and1 
in a  certain sense1 more so than the   
enlightenment4 ,i say more than the     
enlightenment1 not only because the     
latter1 as ,i have shown1 greatly1      
increased historical knowledge and      
ideas1 but also precisely because it    
caused all the contradictions latent in 
the ,renaissance to break out4  ,this   
was an apparent regression in historical
 knowledge1 but in reality  it was an   
addition to life1 and therefore to      
historical consciousness  itself1 as we 
clearly see immediately afterward4 ,the 
triumph and  the catastrophe of the     
enlightenment was the ,french           
,revolution2 and  this was at the same  

time the triumph and the catastrophe of 
its  historiography4          ,,vi      
,,the ,,historiography ,,of             
,,romanticism      ,the reaction        
manifested itself with the sentimental  
return to the past1  and with the       
defence undertaken by the politicians of
 old institutions  worthy of being      
preserved or accorded new life4 ,hence  
arose two forms  of historical          
representation1 which certainly belong  
in a measure to  all periods1 but which 
were very vigorous at the romantic      
period3  nostalgic historiography and   
historiography which restored4 ,and     
since the past of their desires1 which  
supplied the material for  practical    
recommendations1 was just that which the
 enlightenment  and the ,revolution had 
combated and overthrown--the ,middle    
,ages and  everything that resembled or 
seemed to resemble the ,middle          
,ages--both  kinds of history were1 so  
to say1 medievalized4 ,just as a        
watercourse  which has been forcibly    

diverted from its natural bed noisily   
returns  to it as soon as obstructions  
are removed1 so a great sigh of joy and 
satisfaction1 a warm emotion of         
tenderness1 welled up in and reanimated 
all breasts as1 after so long a         
rationalistic ascesis1 they again took  
to themselves the old religion1 the old 
national customs1 regional and  local1  
again entered the old houses and castles
 and cathedrals1 sang  again the old    
songs1 dreamed again the old legends4   
,in this tumult of  sentiment we do not 
at first observe the profound and       
irremediable  change that has taken     
place in the souls of all1 borne witness
 to  by the anxiety1 the emotion1 the   
pathos of that apparent return4 ,it     
would be to belittle the nostalgic      
historiography of the romantic  movement
 to make it consist of certain special  
literary works1 for in  reality it      
penetrated all or almost all the        
writings of that time1 like  an         
irresistible current1 to be found not   

only in lesser and poorer  spirits1 such
 as ,de ,barante1 nor only in the more  
poetically disposed1  such as           
,chateaubriand1 but in historians who   
present some of the most  important or  
purely scientific thoughts1 for example 
,niebuhr4 ,the life  of chivalry1 the   
life of the cloister1 the ,crusades1 the
 ,hohenstaufen1  the ,lombard and       
,flemish communes1 the ,christian kings 
of ,spain at  strife with the ,arabs1   
the ,arabs themselves1 ,england divided 
between  ,saxons and ,normans1 the      
,switzerland of ,william ,tell1 the     
chansons  de geste1 the songs of the    
troubadours1 ,gothic architecture       
7characteristic vicissitude of a name1  
applied in contempt and then  turned    
into a symbol of affection71 became at  
this time the object of  universal and  
national sympathy1 as did the rough1    
ingenuous popular  literature1 poetry1  
and art3 translations or abbreviations  
of the  medieval chronicles were even   
reprinted for the enjoyment of a large  

and eager circle of readers2 the first  
medieval museums were formed2  an       
attempt was made to restore and complete
 ancient churches1 castles1  and city   
palaces4 ,historiography entered into   
close relations and  exchange of ideas  
with the new literary form of historical
 romance1  which expressed the same     
nostalgia1 first with ,walter ,scott and
 then  with his innumerable followers in
 all countries4 7,this literary form    
was therefore quite different from the  
historical fiction of ,manzoni1  which  
is free from such sentiment and whose   
historical element has a  moral         
foundation47 ,i have already remarked   
that this nostalgia was  far more modern
 of content than at first supposed2 so  
much so that  every one was attracted to
 it by the motive that most appealed to 
himself1 whether religious or political1
 ,old ,catholic1 mystical1  monarchical1
 constitutional1 communal-republican1   
national-independent1                   
liberal-democratic1 or aristocratic4    

,nevertheless1 when the past was  taken 
as a poetic theme1 there was a risk that
 the idealizing tendency  of the images 
would be at strife with critical        
reflection3 hence the  cult of the      
,middle ,ages1 which had become a       
superstition1 came to a  ridiculous end4
 ,fueter quotes an acute remark of      
,ranke1 relating to one  of the last    
worthy representatives of the romantic  
school1 ,giesebrecht1  author of the    
,history of the ,german ,empire1 admirer
 and extoller of  the                   
',christian-,germanic virtues1' of the  
power and excellence of the  medieval   
heroes4 ,ranke described all this as at 
once too virile and  too puerile4 ,but  
the puerility discernible at the sources
 of this  ideal current1 before it falls
 into the comic1 is rather the sublime  
puerility of the poet's dream4    ,the  
actual modern motives1 which present    
themselves as sentiments in  nostalgic  
historiography1 acquired a reflex form  
with the same or  other writers1 as     

tendencies to the service of which their
 narratives  were bent4 ,here1 too1 it  
would be superfluous to give an account 
of  all the various forms and           
specifications of these tendencies      
7which  ,fueter has already done        
admirably71 from the persistent         
,rousseauism  of ,giovanni ,mller to    
,sismondi1 or from the ideal of a free  
peasantry  of ,niebuhr1 the ultramontane
 ideal of ,leo1 the                     
imperialistic-medieval  ideal of the    
already mentioned ,giesebrecht and      
,ficker1 the old liberal  of ,raumer1   
the neo-liberal of ,rotteck and         
,gervinus1 the anglicizing  of ,guizot  
and ,dahlmann1 or the democratic ideal  
of ,michelet1 to  the neo-,guelfish     
ideal of ,troya and ,balbo and ,father  
,tosti1 to the  ,prussian hegemony of   
,droysen and of ,treitschke1 and so on4 
,but all of  these1 and other historians
 with a particular bias1 lean1 with rare
  exceptions1 on the past1 and find the 
justification of their bias in  the     

dialectic of tradition or in tradition  
itself4 ,nobody any longer  cared to    
compose by the light of abstract reason 
alone4 ,the extreme  typical instance is
 afforded by the socialistic school1    
which took the  romantic form in the    
person of its chief representative1     
,marx1 who  endowed it with             
historiographical and scientific value4 
,his work was  in complete opposition to
 the socialistic ideals that had        
appeared in  the eighteenth century1 and
 he therefore boasted that they had     
passed  from the state of being a       
,utopia to that of a science4 ,his      
science  was nothing less than          
historical necessity attributed to the  
new era  that he prophesied1 and        
materialism itself no longer wished to  
be the  naturalistic materialism of a   
d',holbach or a ,helvtius1 but presented
  itself as 'historical materialism4'   
,if nostalgic historiography is poetry  
and that with a purpose is  practical   
and political1 the historiography1 the  

true historiography1  of romanticism is 
not to be placed in either of the two1  
in so far as  it is considered an epoch 
in the history of thought4 ,certainly1  
poetry  and practice arose from a       
thought and led to a thought as its     
material  or problem3 the ,french       
,revolution was certainly not the cause 
or the  effect of a philosophy1 but both
 the cause and the effect1 a philosophy 
in the act1 born from and generating the
 life that was then developed4  ,but    
thought in the form of thought1 and not 
in the form of sentimental  love of the 
past or effort to revive a false past1  
is what determines  the scientific      
character of that historiography1 which 
we desire to set  in a clear light4 ,and
 it reacted in the form of thought      
against the  thought of the             
enlightenment1 so crudely dualistic1 by 
opposing to it  the conception of       
development4    ,not indeed that this   
concept was something entirely new1     
which had then  burst forth in bud for  

the first time3 no speculative          
conception that  is really such can be  
absent at one time and appear at        
another4 ,the  difference lies in this1 
that at a given period scientific       
problems  seem to apply to one rather   
than to another aspect of thought1 which
  is always present in its totality4 ,so
 that when we say that the  conception  
of development was absent from antiquity
 and from the  eighteenth century1 we   
utter a hyperbole4 ,there are good      
reasons for  this hyperbole1 but it     
remains a hyperbole and should not be   
taken  literally and understood         
materially4 ,nor are we to believe that 
there  was no suspicion or anticipation 
of the important scientific conception  
of development prior to the romantic    
period4 ,traces of it may be found  in  
the pantheism of the great philosophers 
of the ,renaissance1 and  especially in 
,bruno1 and in mysticism itself1 in so  
far as it included  pantheism1 and yet  
more distinctly in the reconstruction of

 the bare  bones of the theological     
conception with the conception of the   
course  of historical events as a       
gradual education of the human race1 in 
which the successive revelations should 
be the communication of books  of a     
gradually less and less elementary      
nature1 from the first ,hebrew          
scriptures to the ,gospels and to the   
revisions of the ,gospels4 ,lessing     
offers an example of this4 ,nor were the
 theorists of the enlightenment  always 
so terribly dualistic as those that ,i  
have mentioned1 but here  and there one 
of them1 such as ,turgot1 although he   
did not altogether  abandon the         
presupposition as to epochs of          
decadence1 yet recognized  the progress 
of ,christianity over antiquity and of  
modern times over  ,christianity1 and   
attempted even to trace the line of     
development  passing through the three  
ages1 the mythological1 the             
metaphysical1  and the scientific4      
,other thinkers1 like ,montesquieu1     

noticed the  relativity of institutions 
to customs and to periods2 others1 like 
,rousseau1 attached great importance to 
the strength of sentiment4              
,enlightenment had also its adversaries 
during its own period1 not  only as     
represented by political abstraction and
 fatuous optimism  7such as that of     
,galiani1 for instance71 but also in    
more important  respects1 destined later
 to form the special subject of         
criticism1  such as contempt for        
tradition1 for religion1 and for poetry 
and arid  naturalism4 ,hence the smile  
of ,hamann at the blind faith of        
,voltaire  and of ,hume in the          
,newtonian astronomical doctrines and at
 their lack  of sense for moral         
doctrines4 ,he held that a revival of   
poetry and  a linking of it with history
 were necessary1 and considered history 
to be 7here he was just the opposite of 
,bodin7 not the easiest but  the most   
difficult of all mental labours4 ,but in
 the ,scienza nuova  of ,vico 7#agbe7   

was to be found a very rich and organic 
anticipation  of romantic thought 7as   
should now be universally recognized and
  known74 ,vico criticized the          
enlightenment only in its beginnings    
7when  it was still only natural        
jurisprudence and ,cartesianism71 yet he
  nevertheless penetrated more deeply   
than others who came after him  into its
 hidden motives and measured more       
accurately its logical and  practical   
consequences4 ,thus he opposed to the   
superficial contempt  for the past in   
the name of abstract reason the         
unfolding of the human  mind in history1
 as sense1 imagination1 and intellect1  
as the divine  or animal age1 the heroic
 age1 and the human age4 ,he held       
further  that no human age was in the   
wrong1 for each had its own strength and
  beauty1 and each was the effect of its
 predecessor and the necessary          
preparation for the one to follow1      
aristocracy for democracy1 democracy    
for monarchy1 each one appearing at the 

right moment1 or as the justice  of that
 moment4    ,the conception of          
development did not1 however1 in the    
romantic  period1 remain the thought of 
a solitary thinker without an audience1 
but broadened until it became a general 
conviction2 it did not  appear timidly  
shadowed forth1 or contradictorily      
affirmed1 but took  on body1 coherence1 
and vigour1 and dominated spirits4 ,it  
is the  formative principle of the      
idealist philosophy1 which culminated in
  the system of ,hegel4 ,few there were 
who resisted its strength1 and  these1  
like ,herbart1 were still shut up in    
pre-,kantian dogmatism1  or tried to    
resist it and are more or less tinged   
with it1 as is  the case with           
,schopenhauer and yet more with ,comte  
and later with  positivistic            
evolutionism4 ,it gives its intellectual
 backbone to the  whole of              
historiography 7with the exception here 
too of lingerers and  reactionaries71   
and that historiography corrects for it1

 in greater or  less measure1 the same  
one-sided tendencies which came to it   
from the  sentimental and political     
causes already described1 from          
tenderness for  the near past or for the
 good old times1 and for the ,middle    
,ages4  ,the whole of history is now    
understood as necessary development1 and
  is therefore implicitly1 and more or  
less explicitly1 all redeemed2 it  is   
all learned with the feeling that it is 
sacred1 a feeling reserved  in the      
,middle ,ages for those parts of it only
 which represented the  opposition of   
,god to the power of the devil4 ,thus   
the conception of  development was      
extended to classical antiquity1 and    
then1 with the  increase of knowledge   
and of attention1 to ,oriental          
civilizations4  ,thus the ,romans1 the  
,ionians1 the ,dorians1 the ,egyptians1 
and the  ,indians got back their life   
and were justified and loved in their   
turn almost as much as the world of     
chivalry and the ,christian world  had  

been loved4 ,but the logical extension  
of the conception did not  find any     
obstacle among the philosophers and     
historians1 even in the  repugnance that
 was felt for the times to which modern 
times were  opposed1 such as the        
eighteenth century4 ,the spectacle was  
witnessed  of the consecration of       
,jacobinism and of the ,french          
,revolution in  the very books of their 
adversaries1 ,hegel1 for instance1      
finding in  those events both the       
triumph and the death1 the one not less 
than the  other1 the 'triumphant death' 
of the modern abstract subjectivity1    
inaugurated by ,descartes4 ,not only did
 the adversaries1 but also the          
executioners and their victims1 make    
peace1 and ,socrates1 the martyr of     
free thought and the victim of          
intolerance1 such as he was understood  
to be by the intellectualists of the    
eighteenth century and those who        
superstitiously repeat them in our own  
day1 was condemned to the death  that he

 had well deserved1 in the name of      
,history1 which does not admit  of      
spiritual revolutions without tragedies4
 ,the drafter1 too1 of the  ,manifesto  
of the ,communists1 as he was hastening 
on the business of  putting an end to   
the burgess class1 both with his prayers
 and with  his works1 gave vent to a    
warm and grandiose eulogium of the work 
achieved by the burgess class1 and in so
 doing showed himself to be the         
faithful child of romantic thought2     
because1 for anyone who held to the     
ideology of the eighteenth century1     
capitalism and the burgess class  should
 have appeared to be nothing but        
distortions due to ignorance1           
stupidity1 and egoism1 unworthy of any  
praise beyond a funeral  oration4 ,the  
passions of the greater part of those   
historians were  most inflammable1 not  
less than those of the enlightened1 yet 
satire1  sarcasm1 invective1 at least   
among the superior intellects1 vividly  
encircled the historical understanding  

of the time1 but did not oppress  or    
negate it4 ,the general impression      
experienced from those narratives  is   
that of a serious effort to render      
justice to all1 and we owe it to  the   
discipline thus imparted to the minds   
and souls of the thinkers  and          
historians of romanticism that it is    
only the least cultivated or  most      
fanatical among the priests and         
,catholics in general who continue  to  
curse ,voltaire and the eighteenth      
century as the work of the devil4  ,in  
the same way1 it is only vulgar         
democrats and anti-clericals1  akin to  
the former in their anachronism and the 
rest1 who treat the  reaction1 the      
restoration1 and the ,middle ,ages with 
equal grossness4  ,enlightenment and the
 ,jacobinism connected with it was a    
religion1  as we have shown1 and when it
 died it left behind it survivals or    
superstitions4    ,to conceive history  
as development is to conceive it as     
history of  ideal values1 the only ones 

that have value1 and it was for this    
reason that in the romantic period there
 was an ever increasing  multiplication 
of those histories which had already    
increased to so  considerable an extent 
in the preceding period4 ,but their     
novelty did  not consist in their       
external multiplication1 but in their   
internal  maturation1 which corrected   
those previously composed1 consisting   
either of learned collections of        
disconnected items of information1 or   
judgments indeed1 but judgments based   
upon an external model1 which  claimed  
to be constructed by pure reason and was
 in reality constructed  by arbitrary   
and capricious abstraction and          
imagination4 ,and now the  history of   
poetry and of literature is no longer   
measured according  to the standard of  
the ,roman-humanistic ideal1 or         
according to the  classical ideal of the
 age of ,louis ,,xiv1 or of the         
ratiocinative and  prosaic ideal of the 
eighteenth century1 but discovers by    

degrees  its own measure in itself1 and 
beginning with the first attempts of    
,herder1 of the ,schlegels1 and then of 
,villemain1 of ,sainte-,beuve1 and  of  
,gervinus1 and for antiquity of ,wolf   
and ,mller1 finally reaches  the high   
standard represented by the ,history of 
,italian ,literature  of de ,sanctis4   
,suddenly the history of art feels      
itself embarrassed  by the too narrow   
ideal of ,lessing and of ,winckelmann1  
and there is  a movement toward colour1 
toward landscape1 toward pre-,hellenic  
and  post-,hellenic art1 toward the     
romantic1 the ,gothic1 the ,renaissance1
  and the baroque1 a movement that      
extends from ,meyer and ,hirth to       
,rumohr1 ,kluger1 ,schnaase1 till it    
reaches ,burckhardt and ,ruskin4 ,it    
also tries here and there to break down 
the barriers of the schools and  to     
attain the really artistic personality  
of the artists4 ,the history  of        
philosophy has its great crisis with    
,hegel1 who leads it from the  abstract 

subjectivism of the followers of ,kant  
to objectivity1 and  recognizes the only
 true existence of philosophy to consist
 of the  history of thought1 considered 
in its entirety1 without neglecting any 
one of its forms4 ,zeller1 ,fischer1 and
 ,erdmann in ,germany1 ,cousin and  his 
school in ,france1 ,spaventa in ,italy1 
follow ,hegel in such objective         
research4 ,the like takes place in the  
history of religion1 which tries  to    
adopt intrinsic criteria of judgment1   
after ,spittler and ,planck1 the  last  
representatives of the rationalistic    
school1 with ,marheinecke1  ,neander1   
,hase1 and finds a peculiarly scientific
 form with ,strauss1  ,baur1 and the    
,tbingen school2 and from ,eichhorn to  
,savigny1 ,gans1 and  ,lassalle in the  
history of rights4 ,the conception of   
the ,state always  yields the leadership
 more and more to that of the nation in 
the  history called political1 and      
'nationality' substitutes the names of  
'humanity1' 'liberty1' and 'equality1'  

and all the other ideas of the          
preceding age that once were full of    
radiance1 but are now dimmed4 ,this     
nationalism has wrongly been looked upon
 as a regression1 in respect  of that   
universalism and cosmopolitanism1       
because 7notwithstanding  its well-known
 sentimental exaggerations7 it notably  
assists the  concrete conception of the 
universal living only in its historical 
creations1 such as nations1 which are   
both products and factors of its        
development4 ,and the value of          
,europeanism is revived as the result   
of this acquisition of consciousness of 
the value of nations4 ,it had  been too 
much trampled upon during the period of 
the enlightenment1  owing to the        
naturalistic spirit which dominated at  
that time1 and to  the reaction taking  
place against the historical schemes of 
antiquity  and ,christianity1 although  
it was surely evident that history      
written  by ,europeans could not but be 
',europocentric1' and that it is only in

  relation to the course of ,grco-,roman
 civilization1 which was ,christian  and
 ,occidental1 that the civilizations    
developed along other lines  become     
actual and comprehensible to us1        
provided always that we do  not wish to 
change history into an exhibition of the
 different types  of civilization1 with 
a prize for the best of them ,the       
difference is  also made clear for the  
same reason between history and         
pre-history1  between the history of man
 and the history of nature1 which had   
been  illegitimately linked by the      
materialists and the naturalists4 ,this 
is  to be found even in the works of    
,herder1 who retains a good many of  the
 elements of the century of his birth   
mingled with those of the new  period4  
,but it is above all in romantic        
historiography that we observe  the     
search for and very often the happy     
realization of an organic  linking      
together of all particular histories of 
spiritual values1 by  relating          

religious1 philosophical1 poetical1     
artistic1 juridical1 and  moral facts as
 a function of a single motive of       
development4 ,it then  becomes a        
commonplace that a literature cannot be 
understood without  understanding ideas 
and customs1 or politics without        
philosophy1 or  7as was realized rather 
later7 rights and customs and ideas     
without  economy4 ,and it is worth while
 recording as we pass by that there is  
hardly one of these histories of values 
which has not been previously  presented
 or sketched by ,vico1 together with the
 indication of their  intrinsic unity4  
,histories of poetry1 histories of myth1
 of rights1 of  languages1 of           
constitutions1 of explicative or        
philosophical reason1  all are in ,vico1
 although sometimes wrapped up in the   
historical  or sociological epoch with  
which each one of them was particularly 
connected4 ,even modern biography 7which
 illustrates what the individual  does  
and suffers in relation to the mission  

which he fulfils and to the  aspect of  
the ,idea which becomes actual in him7  
has its first or one of  its first      
notable monuments in the autobiography  
of ,vico--that is to  say1 in the       
history of the works which ,providence  
commanded and guided  him to accomplish 
in diverse ways that seemed to be       
obstacles1 but  were opportunities4     
,this transformation of biography does  
not imply failure to recognize          
individuality1 but is1 on the contrary1 
its elevation1 for it finds  its true   
meaning in its relation with the        
universal1 as the universal  its        
concreteness in the individual4 ,and    
indeed individualizing power1           
perception of physiognomies1 of states  
of the soul1 of the various  forms of   
the ideas1 sense of the differences of  
times and places1  may be said to show  
themselves for the first time in        
romantic  historiography4 ,that is to   
say1 they do not show themselves rarely 
or  as by accident1 nor any longer in   

the negative and summary form of        
opposition between new and old1 civil   
and barbarous1 patriotic and            
extraneous4 ,it does not mean anything  
that some of those historians  lost     
themselves 7though this happened rarely7
 in an abstract dialectic  of ideas1 and
 that others more frequently allowed    
ideas to be submerged  in the external  
picturesqueness of customs and          
anecdotes1 because we  find             
exaggerations1 one-sidedness1 lack of   
balance1 at all periods and  in all     
progress of thought4 ,nor is the        
accusation of great importance  that the
 colouring of times and places preferred
 by the romantics  was false1 because   
the important thing was precisely this  
attempt to  colour1 whether the result  
were happy or the reverse 7if the       
latter1  the picture had to be coloured 
again1 but always coloured74 ,a further 
reason for this is that1 as has been    
already admitted1 there were  fancies   
and tendencies at work in romanticism   

beyond true and proper  historiography1 
which bestowed upon the times and places
 illustrated  that imaginary and        
exaggerated colouring suggested by the  
various  sentiments and interests4      
,history1 which is thought1 was         
sometimes  idealized at this period as  
an imaginary living again in the past1  
and  people asked of history to be      
carried back into the old castles and   
market-places of the ,middle ,ages2 for 
their enjoyment they asked to  see the  
personages of the time in their own     
proper clothes and as they  moved about1
 to hear them speak the language1 with  
the accent of the  time1 to be made     
contemporary with the facts and to      
acquire them with  the ingenuous spirit 
of a contemporary4 ,but to do this is   
not only  impossible for thought1 but   
also for art1 because art too surpasses 
life1 and it would be something useless1
 because it is not desired1  for what   
man really desires is to reproduce in   
imagination and to  rethink the past    

from the present1 not to tear himself   
away from the  present and fall back    
into the dead past4 ,certainly this last
 was an  illusion1 proper to several    
romantics 7who for that matter have     
their  successors in our own day71 and  
in so far as it was an illusion either  
remained a sterile effort or diffused   
itself in a lyrical sigh2 but  an       
illusion of that kind was one of many   
aspects and did not form an  essential  
part of romantic historiography4    ,we 
also owe it to romanticism that a       
relation was established for  the first 
time and a fusion effected between the  
learned and the  historians1 between    
those who sought out material and       
thinkers4 ,this1  as we have said1 had  
not happened in the eighteenth century1 
nor1  to tell the truth1 before it1 in  
the great epochs of erudition of        
,italian or ,alexandrian humanism1 for  
then antiquaries and politicians  each  
followed their own path1 indifferent to 
one another1 and the  only political    

ideal that sometimes gleamed from the   
bookshelves of  the antiquary 7as       
,fueter acutely observes of ,flavius    
,blondus7 was  that of a government     
which by ensuring calm should permit the
 learned  to follow their peaceful      
avocations6 ,but the watchword of       
romantic  historiography was anticipated
 in respect to this matter also by      
,vico1  in his formula of the union of  
philosophy with philology1 and of  the  
reciprocal conversion of the true with  
the certain1 of the  idea with the fact4
 ,this formula proves 7we give it       
passing mention7  that the historical   
saying of ,manzoni1 to the effect that  
,vico should  be united with ,muratori1 
was not altogether historically         
exact--that  is to say1 philosophy with 
erudition1 for ,vico had already united 
these two things1 and their union       
constitutes the chief value of his      
work4 ,nevertheless1 notwithstanding its
 inaccuracy1 the saying of  ,manzoni    
also proves how romantic historiography 

had noted the intimate  connexion that  
prevails between erudition and thought  
in history1  which is the living and    
thinking again of the document that has 
been  preserved or restored by          
erudition1 and indeed demands erudition 
that  it may be sought out and prepared4
 ,neither did romanticism limit  itself 
to stating this claim in the abstract1  
but really created the  type of the     
philologist-thinker 7who was sometimes  
also a poet71 from  ,niebuhr to         
,mommsen1 from ,thierry to ,fustel de   
,coulanges1 from ,troya  to ,balbo or   
,tosti4 ,then for the first time were   
the great collections  and repertories  
of the erudition of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth  centuries valued at their   
true worth2 then were new collections   
promoted1 supplementary to or correcting
 them according to criteria  that were  
ever more rigorous in relation to the   
subject and to the  greater knowledge   
and means at disposal4 ,thus arose the  
work known  as the ,monumenta ,germania 

historica and the ,german philological  
school 7which was once the last and     
became the first71 the one a model  of  
undertakings of this sort1 the other of 
the disciplines relating  to them1 for  
the rest of ,europe4 ,the philological  
claim of the new  historiography1 aided 
by the sentiment of nationality1 also   
gave life  in our ,italy to those       
historical societies1 to those          
collections of  chronicles1 of laws1 of 
charters1 of 'historical archives' or   
reviews1  institutions with which       
historiographical work is concerned in  
our day4  ,a notable example of the     
power to promote the most patient       
philology  inspired with purely         
historical needs is to be found1 among  
others1 in  the ,corpus inscriptionum   
latinarum1 conceived and carried out by 
a  historian endowed with the passionate
 energy and the synthetic mind of  a    
,mommsen4 ,in the eighteenth century    
7with one or two very rare and  partial 
exceptions7 historians disdained        

parchment and in-folios1 or  opened them
 impatiently1 bibentes et fugientes but 
in the nineteenth  century no serious   
spirit dared to affirm any longer that  
it was  possible to compose history     
without accurate1 scrupulous1 meticulous
  study of the documents upon which it  
is to be founded4    ,the pragmatic     
histories of the last centuries1        
therefore1 melted  away at the simple   
touch of these new historiographical    
convictions1  rather than owing to      
direct and open criticism or polemic4   
,the  word 'pragmatic1' which used to be
 a title of honour1 began to be         
pronounced with a tinge of contempt1 to 
designate an inadequate form  of        
historical thought1 and the historians  
of the enlightenment fell  into         
discredit1 not only ,voltaire and the   
,french1 but the ,humes1 the            
,robertsons1 and other ,english         
historians4 ,they appeared now to be    
quite  without colour1 lacking in       
historical sense1 their minds fixed only

  on the political aspect of things1    
superficial1 vainly attempting to       
explain great events by the intentions  
of individuals and by means of  little  
things or single details4 ,the theory1  
too1 of history as the  orator and      
teacher of virtue and prudential maxims 
also disappeared4  ,this theory had     
enjoyed a long and vigorous life during 
,grco-,roman  antiquity and again from  
the ,renaissance onward 7when ,i say    
that all  these things disappeared1 the 
exception of the fossils is always to   
be understood1 for these persisted at   
that time and persist in our  own day1  
with the air of being alive74 ,the      
attitude of the ,christian  spirit      
toward history was resumed4 ,this spirit
 contemplates it as  a single process1  
which does not repeat itself1 as the    
work of  ,god1 which teaches directly by
 means of ,his presence1 not as matter  
that exemplifies abstract teaching1     
extraneous to itself4 ,the word         
'pragmatic' was indeed pronounced with a

 smile from that time onward1  as were  
the formulas of historia magister vit or
 that directed ad  bene beateque        
vivendum3 let him who will believe these
 formulas--that  is to say1 he who      
echoes traditional thoughts without     
rethinking them  and is satisfied with  
traditional and vulgar conceptions4     
,what is the  use of history8 ,history  
itself1 was the answer1 and truly that  
is not  a little thing4    ,the new     
century glorified itself with the title 
of 'the century of  history1' owing to  
its new departures1 which were born or  
converged  in one4 ,it had deified and  
at the same time humanized history1 as  
had  never been done before1 and had    
made of it a centre of reality and of   
thought4 ,that title of honour should be
 confirmed1 if not to the whole  of the 
nineteenth century1 then to its romantic
 or idealistic period4  ,but this       
confirmation should not prevent our     
observing1 with equal  clearness1 the   
limit of that historicity1 without which

 it would not  be possible to understand
 its later and further advance4 ,history
 was  then at once deified and          
humanized2 but did the divinity and     
humanity  truly flow together in one1 or
 was there not at bottom some separation
  between the two of them8 ,was the     
disagreement between ancient worldly    
thought and ultramundane ,christian     
thought really healed1 or did it not    
present itself again in a new form1     
though this form was attenuated and     
more critical intellectually8 ,and which
 of the two elements prevailed  in this 
disagreement in its abstractness1 the   
human or rather the  divine8    ,these  
questions suggest the answer1 which is  
further suggested by  a memory familiar 
to all1 namely1 that the romantic period
 was not  only the splendid age of the  
great evolutionary histories1 but also  
the fatal age of the philosophies of    
history1 the transcendental  histories4 
,and indeed1 although the thought of    
immanence had grown  gradually more and 

more rich and profound during the       
,renaissance and  the enlightenment1 and
 that of transcendency ever more        
evanescent1  the first had not for that 
reason absorbed the second in itself1   
but had merely purified and rationalized
 it1 as ,hellenic philosophy  and       
,christian theology had tried to do in  
their own ways in their  own times4 ,in 
the romantic period1 purification and   
rationalization  continue1 and here was 
the mistake as well as the merit of     
romanticism1  for it was no longer a    
question of setting right that ancient  
opinion1  but of radically inverting and
 remaking it4 ,the transcendental       
conception of history was no longer at  
that time called revelation  and        
apocalypse1 but philosophy of history1 a
 title taken from the  enlightenment    
7principally from ,voltaire71 although  
it no longer had  the meaning formerly  
attributed to it of history examined    
with an  unprejudiced or philosophical  
spirit adorned with moral and political 

reflections1 but the meaning1 altogether
 different1 of a philosophical  search  
of the sphere above or below that of    
history--in fact1 of  a theological     
search1 which remained theological1     
however lay or  speculative it may have 
been4 ,and since a search of this sort  
always  leads to a rationalized         
mythology1 there is no reason why the   
name of  'mythology' should not be      
extended to the philosophy of history1  
or  the name of 'philosophy of history1'
 to mythology1 as ,i have extended  it1 
calling all transcendental conceptions  
of history 'philosophy of  history1' for
 they all separate the fact and the     
idea1 the event and  its explication1   
action and end1 the world and ,god4 ,and
 since the  philosophy of history is    
transcendental in its internal          
structure1  it is not surprising that it
 showed itself to be such in all the    
very varied forms that it assumed in the
 romantic period1 even among            
philosophers as avid of immanence as    

,hegel1 a great destroyer of            
,platonism1 who yet remained to a       
considerable extent engaged in it1  so  
tenacious is that enemy which every     
thinker carries in himself and  which he
 should tear from his heart1 yet cannot 
resist4    ,but without entering into a 
particular account of the assumptions   
made by the romantics and idealists in  
the construction of their  'philosophies
 of history1' it will be sufficient to  
observe the  consequences1 in order to  
point out the transcendental tendency   
of their constructions4 ,these were such
 as to compromise romantic  histories in
 the method and to damage them in the   
execution1 though  they were at first so
 vigorously conceived as a unity of     
philosophy  and philology4 ,one of the  
consequences was precisely the falling  
again  into contempt of erudition among 
those very people who adopted and       
promoted it1 and on other occasions a   
recommendation of it in words and  a    
contempt of it in deeds4 ,this          

contradictory attitude was troubled     
with an evil conscience1 so much so that
 its recommendations sound but  little  
sincere1 the contempt timid1 when it    
shows itself1 though it  is more often  
concealed4 ,nevertheless one discovers  
fleeting words of  revelation among     
these tortuosities and pretences1 such  
as that of an  a priori history         
7,fichte1 ,schelling1 ,krause1 and1 to a
 certain extent  at least1 ,hegel71     
which should be true history1 deduced   
from the pure  concepts1 or rendered    
divine in some vision of the seer of    
,patmos1 a  history which should be more
 or less different from the confusion   
of human events and facts1 as           
philosophical history1 leaving outside  
it as refuse a merely narrative history1
 which should serve as raw  material or 
as text for the sermons and precepts of 
the moralists and  politicians4 ,and we 
see rising from the bosom of a          
philosophy1 which  had tried to make    
history of itself1 by making philosophy 

also history  7proof that the design had
 not been really translated into act71  
the  distinction between philosophy and 
history1 between the historical and  the
 philosophical way of thinking1 and the 
mutual antipathy and mutual             
unfriendliness of the two orders of     
researchers4 ,the 'professional'        
historians were obliged to defend       
themselves against their progenitors    
7the philosophers71 and they ended by   
losing all pity for them1 by  denying   
that they were philosophers and treating
 them as intruders and  charlatans4     
,unpleasantness and ill-will were all   
the more inevitable in that the         
'philosophers of history'--that is to   
say1 the historians obsessed  with      
transcendency--did not always remain    
content 7nor could they do  so1 speaking
 strictly7 with the distinction between 
philosophical and  narrative history1   
and1 as was natural1 attempted to       
harmonize the  two histories1 to make   
the facts harmonize with the schemes    

which  they had imagined or deduced4    
,with this purpose in view1 they found  
themselves led to use violence toward   
facts1 in favour of their system1  and  
this resulted in certain most important 
parts being cut out1 in a  ,procrustean 
manner1 and in others that were accepted
 being perverted  to suit a meaning that
 was not genuine but imposed upon them4 
,even  the chronological divisions1     
which formed a merely practical aid to  
narratives1 were tortured 7as was the   
custom in the ,middle ,ages7 that  they 
might be elevated to the rank of ideal  
divisions4 ,and not only  was the light 
of truth extinguished in the pursuit of 
these caprices1  not only were          
individual sympathies and antipathies   
introduced 7take  as an instance typical
 of all of them the idealization of     
,hellas and  of this or that one of the 
,hellenic races71 but there appeared a  
thing yet more personally offensive to  
the victims--that is to say1  there     
penetrated into history1 under the guise

 of lofty philosophy1  the personal     
loves and hates of the historian1 in so 
far as he was a  party man1 a churchman1
 or belonged to this or that people1    
state1  or race4 ,this ended in the     
invention of ,germanism1 the crown and  
perfection of the human race1 a         
,germanism which1 claiming to be the    
purest expression of ,arianism1 would   
have restored the idea of the  elect    
people1 and have one day undertaken the 
journey to the ,east4  ,thus were in    
turn celebrated semi-absolute monarchy  
as the absolute  form of states1        
speculative ,lutheranism as the absolute
 form of  religion1 and other suchlike  
vainglorious vaunts1 with which the     
pride  of ,germany oppressed the        
,european peoples and indeed the whole  
world1  and thus exacted payment in a   
certain way for the new philosophy with 
which ,germany had endowed the world4   
,but it must not be imagined that  the  
pride of ,germany was not combated with 
its own arms1 for if the  ,english      

speculated but little and the ,french   
were too firm in their  belief in the   
,gesta ,dei per ,francos 7become the    
gestes of reason  and civilization71 yet
 the peoples who found themselves in    
less happy  conditions1 and felt more   
keenly the censure of inferiority or of 
senility thus inflicted upon them1      
reacted3 ,gioberti wrote a ,primato     
d',italia1 and ,ciezkowski a            
,paternostro1 which foretold the future 
primacy of the ,slavonic people and more
 especially of the ,poles4    ,yet      
another consequence of the 'philosophies
 of history' was the  reflourishing of  
'universal histories1' in the fallacious
 signification  of complete histories of
 humanity1 indeed of the cosmos1 which  
the  ,middle ,ages had narrated in the  
chronicles ab origine mundi and de      
duabus civitatibus and de quattuor      
imperiis1 and the ,renaissance and      
enlightenment had reduced to mere vulgar
 compilations1 finding the  centre for  
its own interest elsewhere4 ,the        

imagines mundi returned  with the       
philosophies of history1 and such they  
were themselves1  transcendental        
universal histories1 with the           
'philosophy of nature'  belonging to    
them4 ,the succession of the nations    
there took the place  of the series of  
empires3 to each nation1 as formerly to 
each empire1  was assigned a special    
function1 which once fulfilled1 it      
disappeared  or fell to pieces1 having  
passed on the lamp of life1 which must  
not  pass through the hands of any      
nation more than once4 ,the ,german     
nation  was to play there the part of   
the ,roman ,empire1 which should never  
die1 but exist perpetually1 or until the
 consummation of the ages and  the      
,kingdom of ,god4 ,to develop the       
various forms of the philosophy of      
history would aid in making clear the   
internal contradictions of the  doctrine
 and in ascribing the reasons for the   
introduction of certain  corrections for
 the purpose of doing away with the     

contradictions  in question1 but which  
in so doing introduced others4 ,and in  
making  an examination of this kind a   
special place should be reserved for    
,vico1 who offers a 'philosophy of      
history' of a very complex sort1  which 
on the one side does not negate1 but    
passes by in silence the  ,christian and
 medieval conception 7as it does not    
deny ,st ,augustine's  conception of the
 two cities or of the elect and ,gentile
 people1 but  only seriously examines   
the history of the latter71 while on the
 other  side it resumes the ancient     
,oriental motive of the circles 7courses
  and recourses71 but understands the   
course as growth and development1  and  
the recourse as a dialectical return1   
which on the other hand  does not seem  
to give rise to progress1 although it   
does not seem to  exclude it1 and also  
does not exclude the autonomy of the    
free will or  the exception of          
contingency4 ,in this conception the    
,middle ,ages and  antiquity ferment1   

producing romantic and modern thought4#a
 ,but in the  romantic period the idea  
of the circle 7which yet contained a    
great  mental claim that demanded       
satisfaction7 gave place to the idea of 
a  linear course1 taken from            
,christianity and from progress to an   
end1  which concludes with a certain    
state as limit or with entrance into a  
paradise of indefinite progress1 of     
incessant joy without sorrow4 ,in  a    
conception of this kind there is at one 
time a mixture of theology  and of      
illuminism1 as in ,herder1 at another an
 attempt at a history  according to the 
ages of life and the forms of the       
spirit1 as with  ,fichte and his school2
 then again the idea realizes its       
logical ideal  in time1 as in ,hegel1 or
 the shadow of a ,god reappears1 as in  
the  deism of ,laurent and of several   
others1 or the ,god is that of the old  
religion1 but modernized1 noble1        
judicious1 liberal1 as in moderate      
,catholicism and ,protestantism4 ,and   

since the course has necessarily an  end
 in all these schemes1 announced and    
described and therefore already  lived  
and passed by1 attempts to prolong1 to  
prorogue1 or to vary that  end have not 
been wanting1 such personages as the    
,abbots ,gioacchini  arising and calling
 themselves the ',slav apocalyptics' or 
by some other  name1 and adding new eras
 to those described4 ,but this did not  
change  anything in the general         
conception4 ,and there was no change    
effected in  it by the philosophies of  
history of the second ,schelling1 for   
example1  which are usually called      
irrationalistic1 or of the pessimists1  
because  it is clear that the decadence 
which they describe is a progress in the
  opposite sense1 a progress in evil and
 in suffering1 having its end in  the   
acme of evil and pain1 or leading indeed
 to a redemption and then  becoming a   
progress toward the good4 ,but if the   
idea of circles1 which  repeat          
themselves identically1 oppresses       

historical consciousness1  which is the 
consciousness of perennial individuality
 and diversity1  this idea of progress  
to an end oppresses it in another way1  
because  it declares that all the       
creations of history are imperfect1 save
  the last1 in which history comes to a 
standstill and which therefore  alone   
has absolute value1 and which thus takes
 away from the value of  reality in     
favour of an abstraction1 from existence
 in favour of the  inexistent4 ,and both
 of these--that is to say1 all the      
philosophies of  history1 in whatever   
way determined--lay in ambush to        
overwhelm the  conceptions of           
development and the increase in         
historiographical value  obtained       
through it by romanticism2 and when this
 injury did not occur  7as in several   
notable historians1 who narrated history
 admirably1  although they professed to 
obey the rules of the abstract          
philosophy  of history1 which they      
saluted from near or far1 but took care 

not to  introduce into their            
narratives71 it was a proof that the    
contradiction  had not been perceived1  
or at least perceived as we now perceive
 it1  in its profound dissonance4 ,it   
was a sign that romanticism too had     
problems upon which it laboured long and
 probed deeply1 and others upon  which  
it did not work at all or only worked a 
little and kept waiting1  satisfying    
them more or less4 ,history too1 like   
the individual who  works1 does 'one    
thing at a time1' neglecting or allowing
 to run on  with the help of slight     
provisional improvements the problems to
 which  it cannot for the time being    
attend1 but ready to direct full        
attention  to them when its hands are   
free4      #a ,the exposition and       
criticism of ,vico's thought are        
copiously dealt  with in the second     
volume of my ,saggi filosofici i ,la    
filosofia di  ,giambattista ,vico       
7,bari1 #aiaa74          ,,vii          
,,the ,,historiography ,,of ,,positivism

      ,the philosophies of history      
offended the historical consciousness   
in three points1 as to which it has     
every right to be jealous3 the          
integrity of historical events1 the     
unity of the narration with the         
document1 and the immanence of          
development4 ,and the opposition to the 
'philosophy of history1' and to the     
historiography of romanticism in        
general1 broke out precisely at these   
three points1 and was often  violent4   
,this opposition had at bottom a common 
motive1 as has been  shown clearly by   
the frequent sympathy and fraternizing  
among those  who represent it1 though   
dissensions as to details are common    
among  them4 ,it is1 however1 best to   
consider it in its triplicity for       
reasons  of clearness1 and to describe  
it as that of the historians1 the       
philologists1 and the philosophers4     
,to the historians1 by whom we mean     
those who had a special disposition  for
 the investigation of particular facts  

rather than theories1 and a  greater    
acquaintance with and practice of       
historical than speculative  literature1
 is due the saying that history should  
be history and  not philosophy4 ,not    
that they ventured to deny philosophy1  
for on  the contrary they protested     
their reverence for it and even for     
religion and theology1 and condescended 
to make an occasional rapid  and        
cautious excursion into those waters2   
but they generally desired  to steer    
their way through the placid gulfs of   
historical truth1  avoiding the         
tempestuous oceans of the other         
discipline3 philosophy was  relegated to
 the horizon of their works4 ,nor did   
they even contest1  at least in         
principle1 the right of existence of    
those grandiose  constructions of       
'universal history1' but they           
recommended and  preferred national or  
otherwise monographical histories1 which
 can be  sufficiently studied in their  
particulars1 substituting for universal 

histories collections of histories of   
states and of peoples4 ,and since       
romanticism had introduced into those   
universal histories and into  the       
national histories themselves its       
various practical tendencies  7which the
 philosophy of history had then turned  
into dogmas71 the  historians placed    
abstention from national and party      
tendencies upon  their programme1       
although they reserved the right of     
making felt their  patriotic and        
political aspirations1 but1 as they     
said1 without for  that reason altering 
the narrative of the facts1 which were  
supposed  to move along independently of
 their opinions1 or chime in with them  
spontaneously in the course of their    
natural development4 ,and since  passion
 and the philosophic judgment had been  
confused and mutually  contaminated in  
romanticism1 the abstention was extended
 also to  the judgment as to the quality
 of the facts narrated2 the reality  and
 not the value of the fact being held to

 be the province of the  historian1     
appeal being made to what theorists and 
philosophers had  thought about it1     
where a more profound consideration of  
the problem  was demanded4 ,history     
should not be either ,german or ,french1
 ,catholic  or ,protestant1 but it      
should also not pretend to apply a more 
ample  conception to the solution of    
these or similar antitheses1 as the     
philosophers of history had tried to do1
 but rather should neutralize  them all 
in a wise scepticism or agnosticism1 and
 attenuate them in a  form of exposition
 conducted in the tone of a presidential
 summing-up1  where careful attention is
 paid to the opinions of opposed parties
 and  courtesy is observed toward all4  
,there was diplomacy in this1 and it  is
 not astonishing that many diplomatists 
or disciples of diplomacy  should       
collaborate in this form of history1 and
 that the greatest of  all the          
historians of this school1 ,leopold     
,ranke1 in whom are to be  found all the

 traits that we have described1 should  
have had a special  predilection for    
diplomatic sources4 ,he always1 indeed1 
combated  philosophy1 especially the    
,hegelian philosophy1 and greatly       
contributed  to discredit it with the   
historians1 but he did this decorously1 
carefully avoiding the use of any word  
that might sound too rough or  too      
strong1 professing the firm conviction  
that the hand of ,god shows  itself in  
history1 a hand that we cannot grasp    
with ours1 but which  touches our face  
and informs us of its action4 ,he       
completed his long  and very fruitful   
labours in the form of monographs1      
avoiding universal  constructions4      
,when1 at the end of his life1 he set to
 work to compose  a ,weltgeschichte1 he 
carefully separated it from the         
universe1  declaring that it would have 
been lost in phantasms and philosophemes
  had he abandoned the safe ground of   
national histories and sought for  any  
other sort of universality than that of 

nations1 which acting upon  one another1
 appear one after the other and         
constitute a living whole4  ,in his     
first book he protested with fine irony 
that he was not able  to accept the     
grave charge of judging the past or of  
instructing the  present as to the      
future1 which had been assigned to      
history1 but he  felt himself capable   
only of showing how things really had   
happened  7wie es eigentlich gewesen7   
this was his object in all his work1 and
 he  held fast to it1 thus culling      
laurels unobtainable by others1         
attaining  even to the writing of the   
history of the popes of the period of   
the  ,counter-,reformation1 although he 
was a ,lutheran and remained so all his 
life4 ,this history was received with   
favour in all ,catholic countries4  ,his
 greatest achievement was to write of   
,french history in a manner  that did   
not displease the ,french4 ,a writer of 
the greatest elegance1  he was able to  
steer between the rocks1 without even   

letting appear his  own religious or    
philosophical convictions1 and without  
ever finding  himself under the         
obligation of forming a definite        
resolution1 and  in any case never      
pressing too hard upon the conceptions  
themselves  to which he had recourse1   
such as 'historical ideas1' the         
perpetual  struggle between ,church and 
,state1 and the conception of the       
,state4  ,ranke was the ideal and the   
master to many historians within1 and to
  some without1 his own country4 ,but   
even without his direct influence1  the 
type of history that he represented     
germinated everywhere1 a little  earlier
 or later according to position and to  
the calming down of the  great political
 passions and philosophical fervour in  
the different  countries4 ,this took    
place1 for instance1 in ,france earlier 
than in  ,italy1 where the idealistic   
philosophy and the national movement    
made  their strength felt in            
historiography after #ahdh1 and even up 

to #ahfj4  ,but the type of history     
which ,i should almost be disposed to   
baptize  with the name of 'diplomatic1' 
taking seriously the designation that   
,i had at first employed jocosely1 still
 meets with success among  the          
moderately disposed1 who are lovers of  
culture1 but do not wish  to become     
infected with party passions or to rack 
their brains with  philosophical        
speculations3 but1 as may be imagined1  
it is not always  treated with the      
intelligence1 the balance1 and the      
finesse of a  ,leopold ,ranke4    ,the  
ambition of altogether rejecting the    
admission of thought into  history1     
which has been lacking to the diplomatic
 historians 7because  they were without 
the necessary innocence for such an     
ambition71 was1  on the other hand1     
possessed by the philologists1 a most   
innocent  group4 ,they were all the more
 disposed to abound in this sense1 since
  their opinion of themselves1 which had
 formerly been most modest1 had  been so

 notably increased1 owing to the high   
degree of perfection  attained by       
research into chronicles and documents  
and by the recent  foundation 7which    
indeed had not been a creation ex       
nihilo7 of the  critical or historical  
method1 which was employed in a fine and
 close  examination into the origin of  
sources and the reduction of these1 and 
in the internal criticism of texts4     
,this pride of the philologists         
prevailed1 the method reaching its      
highest development in a country  like  
,germany1 where haughty pedantry        
flourishes better than elsewhere1  and  
where1 as a result of that most         
admirable thing1 scientific             
seriousness1 'scientificism' is much    
idolized4 ,this word was also           
ambitiously adopted for everything that 
concerns the surroundings and  the      
instruments of true and proper science1 
such as is the case with  the collection
 and criticism of narratives and        
documents4 ,the old  school of learned  

men1 ,french and ,italian1 who did not  
effect less  progress in 'method' than  
was attained during the nineteenth      
century in  ,germany1 did not dream that
 they were thus producing 'science1'    
much  less did they dream of vying with 
philosophy and theology1 or that  they  
could drive them from their positions   
and take their places with  the         
documentary method4 ,but in ,germany    
every mean little copier of a  text1 or 
collector of variants1 or examiner of   
the relations of texts  and conjecturer 
as to the genuine text1 raised himself  
to the level of  a scientific man and   
critic1 and not only dared to look upon 
himself  as the equal of such men as    
,schelling1 ,hegel1 ,herder1 or         
,schlegel1  but did so with disdain and 
contempt1 calling them                  
'anti-methodical4'  ,this               
pseudo-scientific haughtiness diffused  
itself from ,germany over  the other    
,european countries1 and has now reached
 ,america1 though in  other countries   

than ,germany it met more frequently    
with irreverent  spirits1 who laughed at
 it4 ,then for the first time there     
manifested  itself that mode of         
historiography which ,i have termed     
'philological'  or 'erudite' history4   
,that is to say1 the more or less       
judicious  compilations of sources which
 used to be called ,antiquitates1       
,annales1  ,penus1 ,thesauri1 presented 
themselves disguised as histories1 which
  alone were dignified and scientific4  
,the faith of these historians  was     
reposed in a narrative of which every   
word could be supported by  a text1 and 
there was nothing else whatever in their
 work1 save what  was contained in the  
texts1 torn from their contexts and     
repeated  without being thought by the  
philologist narrator4 ,their object  was
 that their histories should reach the  
rank of comprehensive  compilations1    
starting from those relating to         
particular times1  regions1 and events1 
and finally attaining to the arrangement

 of the  whole of historical knowledge  
in great encyclopdias1 out of which     
articles are to be supplied1 systematic 
or definitional1 put together  by groups
 of specialists1 directed by a          
specialist1 for classical1  romantic1   
,germanic1 ,indo-,european1 and ,semitic
 philology4 ,with a view  to alleviating
 the aridity of their labours1 the      
philologists sometimes  allowed         
themselves a little ornament in the     
shape of emotional  affections and ideal
 view-points4 ,with this purpose1 they  
had recourse  to memories of their      
student days1 to the philosophical      
catchwords  which had been the fashion  
at the time1 and to the ordinary        
sentiments  of the day toward politics1 
art1 and morality4 ,but they did all    
this  with great moderation1 that they  
might not lose their reputation for     
scientific gravity1 and that they might 
not fail in respect toward  scientific  
philological history1 which disdains the
 vain ornaments in  which philosophers1 

dilettantes1 and charlatans delight4    
,they ended  by tolerating historians of
 the type above described1 but as a     
lesser  evil1 and as a general rule     
inclined to pardon the sins arising out 
of their commerce with 'ideas' in favour
 of the 'new documents' which  they had 
discovered or employed1 and which they  
could always dig out of  their books as 
a useful residue1 while purifying them  
from 'subjective'  admixtures--that is  
to say1 from the elaboration of them    
which had  been attempted4 ,philosophy  
was known to them only as 'philosophy of
  history1' but even thus rather by     
reason of its terrible ill-fame than    
from direct acquaintance4 ,they         
remembered and were ever ready to repeat
  five or six anecdotes concerning      
errors in names and dates into which    
celebrated philosophers had actually    
fallen1 easily forgetful of the         
innumerable errors into which they fell 
themselves 7being more liable  as more  
exposed to danger72 they almost         

persuaded themselves that  philosophy   
had been invented to alter the names and
 confuse the dates  which1 had been     
confided to their amorous care1 that it 
was the abyss  opened by the fiend to   
lead to the perdition of serious        
'documentary  history4'    ,the third   
band of those opposed to the philosophy 
of history was  composed of philosophers
 or of historian--philosophers1 but of  
those  who rejected the name and        
selected another less open to suspicion1
  or tempered it with some adjective1 or
 accepted it indeed1 but  with opportune
 explanations3 they styled themselves   
positivists1  naturalists1 sociologists1
 empiricists1 criticists1 or something  
of  that sort4 ,their purpose was to do 
something different from what the       
philosophers of history had done1 and   
since these had worked with the         
conception of the end1 they all of them 
swore that they would work  with the    
conception of the cause2 they would     
search out the cause  of every fact1    

thus generalizing more and more widely  
the causes or  the cause of the entire  
course of history3 those others had     
attempted  a dynamic of history2 they   
would work at a mechanic of history1 a  
social physics4 ,a special science      
arose1 opposed to the philosophy of     
history1 in which that naturalistic and 
positivistic tendency became  exalted in
 its own eyes3 sociology4 ,sociology    
classified facts of human  origin and   
determined the laws of mutual dependence
 which regulated  them1 furnishing the  
narratives of historians with the       
principles of  explanation1 by means of 
these laws4 ,historians1 on the other   
hand1  diligently collected facts and   
offered them to sociology1 that it might
  press the juice out of them--that is  
to say1 that it might classify  and     
deduce the laws that governed them4     
,history and sociology1 then1  stood to 
one another in the same relation as     
physiology and zoology1  physics and    
mineralogy1 or in another relation of   

the same sort2 they  differed from the  
physical and natural sciences only by   
their greater  complexity4 ,the         
introduction of mathematical calculation
 seemed to  be the condition of progress
 for history as for all the sciences1   
physical and natural4 ,a new 'science'  
came forward to support this  notion1 in
 the shape of that humble servant of    
practical administration  and inspired  
creation of bureaucracy known as        
statistics4 ,and since  the whole of    
science was being modelled upon the idea
 of a factory  of condensation1 so were 
'syntheses' invoked and outlined for    
history--that is to say1 historical     
frameworks1 in which the laws and  facts
 chat dominate single histories should  
be resumed1 as though in a  sort of     
table or atlas1 which should show at a  
glance causes and the  facts which arose
 from them4 ,need we recall the names   
and supporters  of this school--,comte1 
,buckle1 ,taine1 and so on1 until we    
come to those  recent historians who    

follow them1 such as ,lamprecht and     
,breysig8 ,need  we recall the most     
consequent and the most paradoxical     
programmes or  the school1 as1 for      
instance1 ,buckle's introduction to his 
history of  civilization or ,bourdeau's 
book on the ,histoire des historiens8   
,these  and similar positivistic        
doctrines are present to the memory1    
either  because they are nearest to us  
chronologically1 or because the echo  of
 the noise they made in the world has   
not yet ceased1 and we see  everywhere  
traces of their influence4 ,everywhere  
we see it1 and above  all in the        
prejudice which they have solidly       
established 7and which we  must         
patiently corrode and dissolve71 that   
history1 true history1 is to  be        
constructed by means of the naturalistic
 method1 and that causal  induction     
should be employed4 ,then there are the 
manifold naturalistic  conceptions with 
which they have imbued modern thought3  
race1 heredity1  degeneration1          

imitation1 influence1 climate1          
historical factors1 and so  forth4 ,and 
here1 too1 as in the case of the        
philosophies of history1  since it      
suffices us to select only the essential
 in each fact1 we  shall not dwell upon 
the various particular forms of it--that
 is to  say1 upon the various modes in  
which historical causes were enunciated 
and enumerated1 and upon the various    
claims that one or other of them  was   
supreme3 now the race1 now the climate1 
now economy1 now technique1  and so     
forth4 ,here1 too1 the study of the     
particular forms would be of  use to    
anyone who wished to develop in         
particular the dialectic and to  trace  
the internal dissolution of that school1
 to demonstrate in its  particular modes
 its intrinsic tendency to surpass      
itself1 though it  failed to do so by   
that path4    ,we have already mentioned
 that the three classes of opponents of 
the 'philosophies of history' and the   
three methods by which they  proposed to

 supplant it--diplomatic1 philological1 
and positivistic  history--showed that  
they disagreed among themselves4        
,confirmation of  this may now be found 
in the contempt of the diplomatic       
historians  for mere erudition and in   
their diffidence for the constructions  
of  positivism1 the erudite1 for their  
part1 being fearful of perversions  of  
names and dates and shaking their heads 
at diplomatic histories  and the        
careless style of the men of the world  
who composed them4  ,finally1 the       
positivists looked upon the latter as   
people who did not  go to the bottom of 
things1 to their general or natural     
causes1 and  reproved the erudite with  
their incapacity for rising to the level
  of laws and to the establishment of   
facts in accordance with these  laws1   
sociological1 physiological1 or         
pathological4 ,but there is  further    
confirmation of what has been noted in  
respect to the common  conception that  
animated them all and of their          

substantial affinity1  because when the 
erudite wished to cloak themselves in a 
philosophy  of some sort1 they very     
readily strutted about draped in some   
shreds  of positivistic thought or      
phraseology4 ,they also participated in 
the  reserve and in the agnosticism of  
the positivists and the diplomatic      
historians toward speculative problems1 
and in like manner it was  impossible   
not to recognize the justice of their   
claim that evidence  should be reliable 
and documents authentic4 ,the diplomatic
 historians  agreed with them in the    
formula that history should not be      
philosophy  and that research should    
dispense with finality and follow the   
line  of causality4 ,in fact1 all three 
sorts of opponents1 at one with the     
transcendency of the philosophy of      
history1 negated the unity of  history  
with philosophy1 but in various degrees 
and with various  particular meanings1  
with various preliminary studies and in 
various  ways4 ,and although these      

schools were in agreement as to what    
they  negated1 all three of them become 
for us exposed to a criticism which     
unites them beneath a single negation4  
,for not even do the ability and  the   
intelligence of a ,ranke avail to give  
vigour to the moderatism  and to        
maintain firmly the eclecticism of      
diplomatic history1 and  the transaction
 breaks down before the failure on the  
part of those  who attempted it1 owing  
to its being contrary to their own      
powers  and intrinsically impossible4   
,the idea of an agnostic history turns  
out to be fallacious--that is to say1 of
 a history that is not  philosophical   
but does not deny philosophy1 that is   
not theological  but is not             
anti-theological1 limiting itself to    
nations and to their  reciprocal        
influence upon one another1 because     
,ranke himself was  obliged to recognize
 powers or ideals that are superior to  
nations and  that as such require to be 
speculatively justified in a philosophy 

or  in a theology4 ,in this way he laid 
himself open to the accusations  of the 
positivists1 who discredited his ideas  
as 'mystical4' ,for the  same reason    
others were proceeding to reduce them   
little by little  from the position of  
ideals or movements of the spirit to    
natural and  physiological products1 as 
was attempted by ,lorenz1 an ardent     
follower  of ,ranke1 who1 with his      
doctrine of generation and of heredity1 
fell  into that physiologism and        
naturalism from which the master had    
preserved himself4 ,and when this       
passage from spirituality to nature  was
 accomplished1 the dividing line between
 history and pre-history1  between      
history of civilization and history of  
nature1 was also not  respected4 ,on the
 other hand1 a return was made to the   
'philosophies  of history1' when ideas  
were interpreted as transcendental and  
as  answering to the designs of the     
divine will1 which governs the world    
according to a law and conducts it      

according to a plan of travel4 ,the     
boasted impartiality and objectivity1   
which was based upon a literary  device 
of half-words1 of innuendoes1 of prudent
 silences1 was also  equally illusory1  
and the ,jesuit who objected to ,ranke  
and his history  of the popes will      
always prevail from the point of view of
 rigorous  criticism--either the ,papacy
 is always and everywhere what it       
affirms  itself to be1 an institution of
 the ,son of ,god made man1 or it is a  
lie4 ,respect and caution are out of    
place here4 ,tertium non datur4         
,indeed1 it was not possible to escape  
from taking sides by adopting  that     
point of view2 at the most a third party
 was thus formed1  consisting of the    
tolerant1 the tepid1 and the            
indifferent4 ,the slight  coherence of  
,ranke's principles can be observed in  
that part of his  ,universal ,history   
where1 when speaking of ,tacitus he     
touches upon  his own experience as a   
teacher of history1 he declares that it 

is  impossible to speak of a tranquil   
and uniform progressive development  of 
historiography either among the ancients
 or the moderns1 because the  object    
itself is formed in the course of time  
and is always different1  and           
conceptions depend upon the             
circumstances among which the author    
lives and writes4 ,he thus comes to     
perform an act of resignation  before   
blind contingentism1 and the present    
historical sketch shows  how unjust this
 is1 for it has traced the organic and  
progressive  development of historical  
thought from the ,greeks to modern      
times4 ,and  the whole of the ,universal
 ,history is there to prove1 on the     
other  hand1 that his slight coherence  
of ideas1 or web of ideas that he left  
intentionally vague1 made it difficult  
for him to give life to a vast          
historical narrative1 so lacking in     
connexion1 so heavy1 and sometimes  even
 issuing in extraneous reflections1     
such1 for example1 as those  in the     

first pages of the first volume1 where  
there is a comparison  of ,saul and     
,samuel with the emperors at strife with
 the popes1 and of  the policy of       
,rehoboam and ,jeroboam with the        
political strife between  the           
centralizing states and the centrifugal 
regions of modern times4  ,we find in   
general in ,ranke an inevitable tendency
 to subside into the  pragmatic method4 
,and what has been said of ,ranke is to 
be repeated  of his disciples and of    
those who cultivated the same           
conciliatory  type of history4 ,as for  
philological history1 the description   
that  has been given of the programme   
makes clear its nullity1 for it leads   
by a most direct route to a double      
absurdity4 ,when the most rigorous      
methods of examining witnesses is really
 applied1 there is no witness  that     
cannot be suspected and questioned1 and 
philological history  leads to the      
negation of the truth of that history   
which it wishes to  construct4 ,and if  

value be attributed to certain evidence 
arbitrarily  and for external reasons1  
there is no extravagance that may not be
  accepted1 because there is no         
extravagance that may not have honest1  
candid1 and intelligent men on its side4
 ,it is not possible to reject  even    
miracles by the philological method1    
since these repose upon the  same       
attestations which make certain a war or
 a peace treaty1 as ,lorenz  has shown  
by examining the miracles of ,st        
,bernard in the light of the  severest  
philological criticism4 ,in order to    
save himself from the  admission of the 
inconceivable and of the nullification  
of history1  which follows the          
nullification of witnesses1 there       
remains nothing  but appeal to thought1 
which reconstitutes history from the    
inside1  and is evidence to itself1 and 
denies what is unthinkable for the very 
reason that it is not to be thought4    
,this appeal is the declaration of      
bankruptcy for philological history4 ,we

 may certainly say that this  form of   
history more or less sustains itself as 
history1 to the extent  that it has     
recourse to all the aids furnished by   
history proper1 and  contradicts itself2
 or it contradicts itself and yet does  
not sustain  itself1 or only for a      
little while and in appearance1 by again
 adopting  the methods of pragmaticism1 
of transcendency1 and of positivism4    
,and  the last of these in its turn     
encounters the same experiences in a    
different order1 because its principle  
of history that explains facts  causally
 presupposes the facts1 which as such   
are thought and therefore  are in a way 
already explained4 ,hence a vicious     
circle1 evident in the  connexion       
between history and sociology1 each one 
of which is to be  based upon and at the
 same time to afford a base for the     
other1 much  in the same way as a column
 which should support a capital and at  
the  same time spring from it4 ,but if1 
with a view to breaking the circle1     

history be taken as the base and        
sociology as its fulfilment1 then the   
latter will no longer be the explanation
 of the former1 which will find  its    
explanation elsewhere4 ,and this will   
be1 according to taste1 either  an      
unknown principle or some form of       
thought that acts in the same way  as   
,god1 and in both cases a transcendental
 principle4 ,hence we have the  fact of 
positivism leading to philosophies of   
history1 as exemplified  in the         
,apocalypses and the ,gospels of ,comte1
 of ,buckle1 and of others  of like     
sort3 they are all most reverent        
theologians1 but chaotic1  falling back 
into those fallacious conceptions which 
had been refuted  by romantic           
historiography4    ,truly1 when faced   
with such histories as these1           
superficial or  unintelligent or rude   
and fantastic1 romanticism1 conscious of
 the  altitude to which it had elevated 
the study of the development of human   
affairs1 might have exclaimed 7and      

indeed it did exclaim by the mouth  of  
its epigoni7 to its adversaries and     
successors1 in imitation of the  tone of
 ,bonaparte on the #ahth of ,brumaire3  
,what have you done with the  history   
which ,i left to you so brilliant8 ,were
 these the new methods1  by means of    
which you promised to solve the problems
 which ,i had not  been able to solve8  
,i see nothing in them but revers et    
misre6 ,but  we who have never met with 
absolute regressions during the secular 
development of historiography shall not 
allow ourselves to be carried  away upon
 the polemical waves now beating against
 the positivistic and  naturalistic     
school which is our present or recent   
adversary1 to the  point of losing sight
 of what it possessed that was          
substantially its  own1 and owing to    
which it really did represent progress4 
,we shall also  refrain from drawing    
comparisons between romanticism and     
positivism1  by measuring the merits of 
both1 and concluding with the assertion 

of the superiority of the former2       
because it is well known that such      
examinations of degrees of merit1 the   
field of professors1 are not            
permissible in history1 where what      
follows ideally after is virtually      
superior to that from which it is       
derived1 notwithstanding appearances  to
 the contrary4 ,and in the first place1 
it would be erroneous1  strictly        
speaking1 to believe that what had been 
won by romanticism had  been lost in    
positivism1 because when the histories  
of this period are  looked upon from    
other points of view and with greater   
attention1 we  see how they were all    
preserved4 ,romanticism had abolished   
historical  dualism1 for which there    
existed in reality positive and         
negative1  elect and outcast1 facts4    
,positivism repeated that all facts are 
facts and all have an equal right to    
enter history4 ,romanticism had         
substituted the conception of           
development for the abysses and the     

chasms that previous historiography had 
introduced into the course  of events1  
and positivism repeated that conception1
 calling it  evolution4 ,romanticism had
 established periods in development1    
either  in the form of a cycle of       
phases1 like ,vico1 or as phases without
  a circle and in linear order1 like the
 ,german romantics1 and had  exemplified
 the various phases as a series of the  
forms of the spirit  or of psychological
 forms1 and positivism renewed these    
conceptions  7although owing to the lack
 of culture usual with its adherents it 
often believed that it had made         
discoveries never made before71 as can  
be proved by a long series of examples4 
,these range from the three  ages of    
mental development of ,comte to the     
eight phases of social  development or  
four political periods which are        
respectively the  'novelties' of the    
contemporaries ,lamprecht and ,breysig4 
,romanticism1  judging that the         
explanation of events by means of the   

caprices1 the  calculations1 and the    
designs of individuals taken            
atomistically was  frivolous1 took as   
the subject of history the universals1  
the ,idea1  ideas1 the spirit1 nations  
and liberty and positivism2 it also     
rejected  individualistic atomicism1    
talking of masses1 races1 societies1    
technique1 economy1 science1 social     
tendencies2 of everything1 in  fact1    
with the exception that the caprice of  
,tizius and ,caius was  now no longer   
admitted4 ,romanticism had now not only 
reinforced the  histories of ideal      
values1 but had conceived them as in    
organic  connexion2 positivism in its   
turn insisted upon the interdependence  
of social factors and upon the unity of 
the real1 and attempted to  fill up the 
interstices of the various special      
histories by means of  the history of   
civilization and of culture1 and        
so-called social  history1 containing in
 itself politics1 literature1           
philosophy1  religion1 and every other  

class of facts4 ,romanticism had        
overthrown  heteronomous1 instructive1  
moralizing1 serviceable history1 and    
positivism in its turn boasted that its 
history was a science1 an  end in       
itself1 like every other science1       
although like every science  it afforded
 the basis for practice1 and was        
therefore capable of  application4      
,romanticism had enhanced the esteem for
 erudition1 and  had given an impetus to
 intercourse between it and history4    
,but whence  did the erudition and      
philology of the positivistic period    
derive  that pride which made them      
believe that they were themselves       
history1  save from the consciousness   
that they had inherited from            
romanticism1  which they had preserved  
and exaggerated8 ,whence did they       
inherit the  substance of their method  
save 7as ,fueter well notes7 from the   
romantic  search for the primitive1 the 
genuine1 the ingenuous1 which manifested
  itself in ,wolf1 who inaugurated the  

method8 ,it is well to remember that    
,wolf was a pre-romantic1 an admirer of 
,ossian and of popular poetry4  ,and1   
finally1 what is the meaning of the     
efforts of positivism to  seek out the  
causes of history1 the series of        
historical facts1 the  unity of the     
factors and their dependence upon a     
supreme cause1  save the speculations of
 the romantics themselves upon the      
manner1  the end1 and the value of      
development8 ,whoever pays attention to 
all  these and other resemblances which 
we could enumerate must conclude  that  
positivism is to romanticism as was the 
enlightenment to the  ,renaissance--that
 is to say1 it is not so much its       
antithesis as it is  the logical        
prosecution and the exaggeration of its 
presuppositions4  ,even its final       
conversion into theology corresponds to 
that of  romanticism4 ,this is for the  
rest an obvious matter1 for             
transcendency  is always transcendency1 
whether it be thought of as that of a   

,god  or of reason1 of nature or of     
matter4 ,but thinking of it as ,matter  
or ,nature1 this naturalistic and       
materialistic travesty1 which at  first 
seems odious or ridiculous1 of the      
problems and conceptions of             
romanticism1 of the idea into cause1 of 
development into evolution1  of the     
spirit into mass and the like1 to which 
one would at first be  inclined to      
attribute the inferiority of            
positivistic historiography1  is1 on the
 contrary1 for the close observer the   
progress made by it  upon romanticism4  
,that travesty contains the energetic   
negation of  history as moved by        
extramundane forces1 by external        
finalities1  by transcendental laws1    
just both in its motive and in its      
general  tendency1 and the correlative  
affirmation that its law must be sought 
in reality1 which is one and is called  
'nature4' ,the positivism1  which on no 
account wished to hear anything of      
'metaphysic1' had in  mind the dogmatic 

and transcendental metaphysic1 which had
 filtered  into the thought of ,kant and
 of his successors2 and the target of   
its  contempt was a good one1 although  
it ended by confusing metaphysic  with  
philosophy in general1 or dogmatic with 
critical metaphysic1  the metaphysic of 
being with that of the mind1 and was not
 itself  altogether free from that which
 it undertook to combat4 ,but this does 
not prevent its repugnance to           
'metaphysic' and1 restricting ourselves 
to what is our more immediate interest1 
to the 'philosophy of history'  from    
having produced durable results4 ,thanks
 to positivism historical  works became 
less nave and richer in facts1          
especially in that class  of facts which
 romanticism had neglected1 such as the 
dispositions  that are called natural1  
the processes that are called           
degenerative or  pathological1 the      
spiritual complications that are called 
psychological  illusions1 the interests 
that are called material1 the production

 and  the distribution of wealth1 or    
economic activity1 the facts of force   
and violence1 or of political and       
revolutionary power4 ,positivism1       
intent upon the negation of             
transcendency and upon the observation  
of  what appertained to it1 felt itself 
to be1 and was in that respect1 in  the 
right4 ,and each one of us who pays due 
attention to that order of  things and  
renews that negation is gathering the   
fruit of positivism1  and in that       
respect is a positivist4 ,its very      
contradictions had the  merit of making 
more evident the contradictions latent  
in romantic  historiography4 ,this merit
 must be admitted to the most           
extravagant  doctrines of the           
positivists1 such as that of ,taine1    
that knowledge  is a true hallucination 
and that human wisdom is an accident    
7une  rencontre71 which presumed        
irrationality to be the normal          
condition1  much as ,lombroso believed  
that genius is madness4 ,another        

instance  of this is the attempt to     
discover in what way heterogeneity and  
historical diversity come into          
existence1 if homogeneity is posited2   
and again the methodical canon that the 
explanation of history is to  be found  
in causality1 but is to stop at genius  
and virtue1 which are  without it1      
because they refuse to accept of causal 
explanation1 or  the frightful          
,unknowable1 which was placed at the    
head of histories  of the real1 after so
 great a fuss being made about that     
,titan  science which was ready to scale
 the skies4 ,but since romanticism  had 
left spirit and nature without fusion1  
the one facing the other1  it was just  
that if in the first place spirit       
swallowed up nature  without being able 
to digest it 7because1 as had been laid 
down1 it  was indigestible71 now nature 
was engaged in doing the same thing to  
spirit1 and with the same result4 ,so   
just and logical was this that  not a   
few of the old idealists went over to   

the crassest materialism  and           
positivism1 and that confession of not  
being able to see their way  in the     
confusion was at once instructive and   
suggestive1 as was also  the perplexity 
decorated with the name of              
'agnosticism4' ,and as the  precise     
affirmation of the positivity of history
 represented an advance  in thought1 so 
the antithesis of materialism1 pushed to
 an extreme1 was  an advance in the     
preparation of the new problem and in   
the new way of  solving the relation    
between spirit and nature4 ,oportet ut  
scandala1  eveniant1 and this means that
 even scandal1 the scandal of the       
absurd1  and of offensive false         
criticisms of human conscience1 is an   
advance4          ,,viii      ,,the     
,,new ,,historiography ,,conclusion     
,the romantic current not only          
maintained itself in its excesses during
  the dominion of positivism1 and1 as we
 have shown1 insinuated itself  even    
into its naturalistic antithesis1 but it

 also persisted in its  genuine form4   
,and although we have not spoken of     
pedantic imitators  and                 
conservatives--whose significance is    
slight in the history of  thought1 that 
is to say1 confined to the narrow sphere
 in which they  were compelled to think 
for themselves--we have nevertheless    
recorded  the preservation of           
romanticism in the eclecticism of       
,ranke1 who  adhered to the theories of 
,humboldt 7another 'diplomatist'74      
,idealistic  and romantic motives       
continued to illuminate the intellect   
and soul  among the philosophers1 from  
,humboldt to ,lotze and from ,hartmann  
to  ,wundt and those who corresponded to
 them in other countries4 ,the like     
occurred in historiography properly so  
called1 and could not but  happen1      
because1 if the formulas of agnosticism 
and of positivism had  been followed to 
the letter1 all light of thought would  
have been  extinguished in blind        
mechanicism--that is to say1 in         

nothing--and no  historical             
representation would have been possible4
 ,thus political1  social1              
philosophical1 literary1 and artistic   
history continued to  make acquisitions1
 if not equally important with those of 
the romantic  period 7the surroundings  
were far more favourable to the natural 
sciences and to mathematics than to     
history71 yet noteworthy4 ,this is  set 
forth in a copious volume upon          
historiography 7,i refer to the work  of
 ,fueter already several times mentioned
 in this connexion74 ,there  due honour 
will be found accorded to the great work
 accomplished by  ,ranke1 which the     
rapidity of my course of exposition has 
induced me to  illustrate rather in its 
negative aspects1 causing me1 for       
instance1  to allude solely to the      
contradictions in the ,history of the   
,popes1  which is notwithstanding a     
masterpiece4 ,the cogent quality of the 
romantic spirit at its best is revealed 
in the typical instance of  ,taine1 who 

is so ingenuously naturalistic in his   
propositions and in  the directive      
principles of his work1 yet so          
unrestrainedly romantic  in particular  
instances1 as1 for example1 in his      
characterization of  the ,french poets  
or of the ,dutch and ,italian painters4 
,all this led to  his ending in the     
exaggerated anti-,jacobin romanticism of
 his ,origines  de la ,france           
contemporaine1 in the same way that     
,zola and the other  verists1 those     
verbal enemies of romanticism1 were     
lyrical in all  their fiction1 and the  
leader of the school was induced to     
conclude  his works with the abstract   
lyricism of the ,quatre vangiles4 ,what 
has been observed of ,taine is to be    
applied to ,buckle and to the  other    
naturalists and positivists1 obliged to 
be historical against  their will1 and  
to the positivists who became followers 
of historical  materialism1 and found   
the dialectic established in their house
 without  being able to explain what it 

was or whence it came4 ,not all         
theorists  of historiography showed     
themselves to be so resolutely and madly
  naturalistic as ,bourdeau and one or  
two others2 indeed these were few  in   
number and of inferior reputation4      
,eclecticism prevailed among  the       
majority of them1 a combination of      
necessity and of liberty1 of  masses and
 individuals1 of cause and end1 of      
nature and spirit3 even  the philosophy 
of history was admitted1 if in no other 
form1 then as a  desideratum or a       
problem to be discussed at a convenient 
time 7even  though that were the ,greek 
,kalends74 ,eclecticism1 too1 presented 
the  greatest variety1 from the low     
level of a trivial arranging of concepts
  in an artificial manner to the lofty  
heights of interior labour1 from  which 
it seemed at every moment that a new    
gospel1 no longer eclectic1  must issue4
    ,this last form of eclecticism and  
the open attempts to renew romantic     
idealism more or less completely1 as    

well as romantic methods of             
historiography1 have become more        
frequent since modern consciousness  has
 withdrawn itself from positivism and   
has declared its bankruptcy4  ,but all  
this is of importance rather as a       
symptom of a real advance in  thought4  
,and the new modern philosophies of     
intuition and philosophy  of values must
 be looked upon rather as symptoms than 
as representing  progress in thought 7,i
 mean in general1 and not in the        
particular  thoughts and theories which 
often form a real contribution74 ,the   
former  of these1 however1 while it     
correctly criticizes science as an      
economic  construction useless for true 
knowledge1 then proceeds to shut itself 
up in immediate consciousness1 a sort of
 mysticism1 where historical  dialectic 
finds itself submerged and suffocated2  
and the latter1  placing the conception 
of value as guardian of the spirit in   
opposition  to the conceptions of       
science like a philosophical cave canem 

7as  our imaginative ,tari would have   
said71 leaves open a dualism1 which     
stands in the way of the unity of       
history and of thought as history4      
,when we look around us1 therefore1 we  
do not discover that new  philosophy    
which shall lay the foundations and at  
the same time afford  justification for 
the new historiography by solving the   
antithesis  between imaginative         
romanticism and materialistic           
positivism4 ,and it  is clear that we   
are not even able to discuss such a     
philosophy as a  demand1 because the    
demand for a particular philosophy is   
itself the  thinking of that particular 
philosophy1 and therefore is not a      
demand  but an actuality4 ,hence the    
dilemma either of saying nothing about  
it1  and in this case of not speaking   
even of positivism as a period that  has
 been closed and superseded1 or of      
speaking of the new philosophy as  of   
something that lives and exists1        
precisely because it does live and      

exist4 ,and since to renounce talking of
 it has been rendered impossible  by the
 very criticism chat we have devoted to 
it1 nothing remains save  to recognize  
that philosophy as something that       
exists1 not as something  to be invoked4
 ,only we must not look around us in    
order to see where  it is1 but return to
 ourselves and have recourse to the     
thought  that has animated this         
historical sketch of historiography and 
to all  the historical explanations that
 have preceded it4 ,in the philosophy   
that we have delineated1 reality is     
affirmed to be spirit1 not such  that it
 is above the world or wanders about the
 world1 but such as  coincides with the 
world2 and nature has been shown as a   
moment and a  product of this spirit    
itself1 and therefore the dualism 7at   
least that  which has troubled thought  
from ,thales to ,spencer7 is superseded1
 and  transcendency of all sorts1       
whether materialistic or theological in 
its  origin1 has also been superseded   

with it4 ,spirit1 which is the world1   
is the spirit which develops1 and is    
therefore both one and diverse1 an      
eternal solution and an eternal problem1
 and its self-consciousness is          
philosophy1 which is its history1 or    
history1 which is its philosophy1  each 
substantially identical with the other2 
and consciousness is  identical with    
self-consciousness--that is to say1     
distinct and one  with it at the same   
time1 as life and thought4 ,this        
philosophy1 which  is in us and is ours1
 enables us to recognize it--that is to 
say1 to  recognize ourselves outside of 
us--in the thought of other men which is
  also our thought1 and to discover it  
more or less clearly and perfectly  in  
the other forms of contemporary         
philosophy1 and more or less clearly  in
 contemporary historiography4 ,we have  
frequent opportunities of  effecting    
this recognition1 which is productive of
 much spiritual  comfort4 ,quite lately1
 for instance1 while ,i was writing     

these pages1  the historical work of a  
historian1 a pure historian1 came into  
my  hands 7,i select this instance among
 many7 where ,i read words at the  very 
beginning which seemed to be my very    
own3 ,my book is based upon  the        
conviction that ,german historical      
inquiry must elevate itself to  freer   
movement and contact with the great     
forces of political life and  culture1  
without renouncing the precious         
tradition of its method1 and  that it   
must plunge into philosophy and         
politics1 without experiencing  injury  
in its end or essence1 for thus alone   
can it develop its  intimate essence and
 be both universal and national4#a ,this
 is the  philosophy of our time1 which  
is the initiator of a new philosophical 
and historiographical period4 ,but it is
 not possible to write the  history of  
this philosophy and of this             
historiography1 which is subject  and   
not object1 not for the reason generally
 adopted1 which we  have found to be    

false1 since it separates the fact of   
consciousness  from the fact1 but for   
the other reason that the history which 
we  are constructing is a history of    
'epochs' or of 'great periods1' and  the
 new period is new1 just because it is  
not a period--that is  to say1 something
 closed4 ,not only are we not able to   
describe its  chronological and         
geographical outline1 because we are    
ignorant as to  what measure of time it 
will fill 7will it develop rapidly in   
thirty  or forty years1 or will it      
encounter obstacles1 yet nevertheless   
continue its course for centuries871    
what extent of countries it  will       
include 7will it remain for long        
,italian or ,german1 confined to        
certain ,italian or ,german circles1 or 
will it diffuse itself rapidly  in all  
countries1 both in general culture and  
in public instruction871  but we are    
unable to limit logically what may be   
its value outside  these considerations4
 ,the reason for this is that in order  

to be able  to describe its limitations1
 it must necessarily have developed its 
antitheses--that is to say1 the new     
problems that will infallibly arise     
from its solutions1 and this has not    
happened3 we are ourselves on  the waves
 and we have not furled our sails in    
port preparatory to a  new voyage4 ,bis 
hierher ist das ,bewusstsein gekommen   
7,knowledge has  reached this point in  
its development71 said ,hegel1 at the   
end of his  lectures upon the philosophy
 of history2 and yet he had not the     
right  to say so1 because his           
development1 which went from the        
unconsciousness  of liberty to the full 
consciousness of it in the ,german world
 and in  the system of absolute         
idealism1 did not admit of prosecution4 
,but  we are well able to say so1 for we
 have overcome the abstractness of      
,hegelianism4      #a ,friedrich        
,meinecke1 ,weltbrgerthum und           
,nationalstaat3 ,studien zur  ,genesis  
des deutschen ,nationalstaates1 second  

edition1 preface1 p4  vii4 7,mnchen u4  
,berlin1 ,oldenburg1 #aiaa47