,,animal ,,behaviour ,,by ,c4 ,,lloyd ,,morgan1 ,f4,r4,s4 ,,author ,,of 8,,the ,,springs ,,of ,,conduct10 8,,habit ,,and ,,instinct10 8,,psychology ,,for ,,teachers10 ,,etc4 ,,etc4 ,,illustrated ,,second ,,edition ,,third ,,impression ,,london ,,edward ,,arnold #aibj 7,all rights reserved7 ,,preface ,,to ,,the ,,first ,,edition ,my book on 8,animal ,life and ,intelligence0 being out of print1 ,i undertook to revise it for a new ,edition4 ,as the work of revision proceeded1 however1 it appeared that the amended treatment would not fall conveniently under the previous scheme of arrangement4 ,i therefore decided to write a new book under the title of 8,animal ,behaviour40 ,a few passages from the older work have been introduced1 and some of the observations and conclusions already published in greater detail in 8,habit and ,instinct0 have been summarized4 ,but it will be found that these occupy a relatively small space in the following pages4 ,c4 ,,ll4 ,m4 ,,university ,,college1 ,,bristol1 ,,october #ast1 #aijj4 ,,contents ,,chapter ,i ,,organic ,,behaviour ,,page ,i4 ,,behaviour ,,in ,,general #a ,,ii4 ,,behaviour ,,of ,,cells #c ,,iii4 ,,corporate ,,behaviour #ad ,,iv4 ,,the ,,behaviour ,,of ,,plants #bd ,v4 ,,reflex ,,action #ca ,,vi4 ,,the ,,evolution ,,of ,,organic ,,behaviour #ce ,,chapter ,,ii ,,consciousness ,i4 ,,the ,,conscious ,,accompaniments ,,of ,,certain ,,organic ,,changes #db ,,ii4 ,,the ,,early ,,stages ,,of ,,mental ,,development #dh ,,iii4 ,,later ,,phases ,,in ,,mental ,,development #ef ,,iv4 ,,the ,,evolution ,,of ,,consciousness #fa ,,chapter ,,iii ,,instinctive ,,behaviour ,i4 ,,definition ,,of ,,instinctive ,,behaviour #fc ,,ii4 ,,instinctive ,,behaviour ,,in ,,insects #ga ,,iii4 ,,the ,,instinctive ,,behaviour ,,of ,,young ,,birds #hd ,,iv4 ,,the ,,conscious ,,aspect ,,of ,,instinctive ,,behaviour #ih ,v4 ,,the ,,evolution ,,of ,,instinctive ,,behaviour #ajf ,,chapter ,,iv ,,intelligent ,,behaviour ,i4 ,,the ,,nature ,,of ,,intelligent ,,behaviour #aag ,,ii4 ,,intelligent ,,behaviour ,,in ,,insects #abc ,,iii4 ,,some ,,results ,,of ,,experiment #acd ,,iv4 ,,the ,,evolution ,,of ,,intelligent ,,behaviour #aee ,v4 ,,the ,,influence ,,of ,,intelligence ,,on ,,instinct #afh ,,chapter ,v ,,social ,,behaviour ,i4 ,,imitation #agi ,,ii4 ,,intercommunication #aic ,,iii4 ,,social ,,communities ,,of ,,bees ,,and ,,ants #bje ,,iv4 ,,animal ,,tradition #bbj ,v4 ,,the ,,evolution ,,of ,,social ,,behaviour #bbe ,,chapter ,,vi ,,the ,,feelings ,,and ,,emotions ,i4 ,,impulse1 ,,interest1 ,,and ,,emotion #bce ,,ii4 ,,play #bdh ,,iii4 ,,courtship #beh ,,iv4 ,,animal 8,,sthetics0 ,,and 8,,ethics0 #bgj ,v4 ,,the ,,evolution ,,of ,,feeling ,,and ,,emotion #bhb ,,chapter ,,vii ,,the ,,evolution ,,of ,,animal ,,behaviour ,i4 ,,the ,,physiological ,,aspect #bie ,,ii4 ,,the ,,biological ,,aspect #cje ,,iii4 ,,the ,,psychological ,,aspect #cae ,,iv4 ,,continuity ,,in ,,evolution #cbd ,,index #cch ,,illustrations ,,fig4 ,,page #a4 ,paramecium4 7,from 8,animal ,biology40 ,longmans7 #d #b4 ,behaviour of ,paramecia4 7,after ,jennings1 ,american ,journal of ,psychology7 #h #c4 ,cell-division4 7,from 8,animal ,biology40 ,longmans7 #ac #d4 ,wapiti with antlers in velvet4 7,drawing by ,mr4 ,charles ,whymper1 after photograph by ,miss ,reynolds7 #af #e4 ,wapiti with velvet shredding off4 7,drawing by ,mr4 ,charles ,whymper1 after photograph by ,miss ,reynolds7 #ag #f4 ,sun-dew leaf and tentacles4 7,from ,darwin's 8,insectivorous ,plants40 ,murray4 ,by kind permission of ,mr4 ,francis ,darwin1 ,f4,r4,s47 #bf #g4 ,venus's ,fly-trap4 7,from ,darwin's 8,insectivorous ,plants40 ,murray4 ,by kind permission of ,mr4 ,francis ,darwin1 ,f4,r4,s47 #bg #h4 ,flower of ,valisneria #bh #i4 ,flower of ,catasetum #cj #aj4 ,flower of ,catasetum dissected4 7,from ,darwin's 8,fertilization of ,orchids40 ,murray4 ,by kind permission of ,mr4 ,francis ,darwin1 ,f4,r4,s47 #ca #aa4 ,solitary ,wasp stinging ,caterpillar4 7,after ,plate ,,iii4 in ,dr4 and ,mrs4 ,peckham's 8,solitary ,wasps07 #ge #ab4 ,solitary ,wasp dragging a ,caterpillar to its ,nest4 7,after ,plate ,,iv4 in ,dr4 ,peckham's 8,solitary ,wasps07 #gf #ac4 ,insect ,larv3 ,sitaris1 ,argyromba1 and ,leucopsis4 7,after ,fabre 8,souvenirs07 #hj #ad4 ,yucca ,flower and ,moth #hc #ae4 ,newly-hatched ,chick swimming4 7,drawn by ,mr4 ,charles ,whymper1 after instantaneous photographs and a sketch by the author7 #he #af4 ,nestling ,megapode4 7,from ,dr4 ,r4 ,bowdler ,sharpe's 8,wonders of the ,bird ,world40 ,wells ,gardner7 #hg #ag4 ,cuckoo ejecting ,meadow ,pipit4 7,from ,mrs4 ,hugh ,blackburn's sketch in 8,birds from ,moidart40 ,david ,douglas7 #ia #ah4 ,leaf-case of ,birch-weevil #aba #ai4 ,solitary ,wasp using a stone as a tool4 7,after ,plate ,v4 in ,dr4 ,peckham's 8,solitary ,wasps07 #abg #bj4 ,spiders placed by ,solitary ,wasps in crotches of branching stems4 7,after ,plate ,x4 in ,dr4 ,peckham's 8,solitary ,wasps07 #acc #ba4 ,fox-terrier lifting the latch of a gate4 7,drawn by ,mr4 ,charles ,whymper1 after a photograph by ,miss ,alice ,worsley7 #ade #bb4 ,cage used by ,dr4 ,thorndike4 7,after figure in 8,animal ,intelligence10 ,psychological ,review1 #ahih7 #adh #bc4 ,diagram illustrating ,dr4 ,thorndike's ,experiments4 7,based on data given in his monograph on 8,animal ,intelligence07 #aej #bd4 ,wood ant4 7,from ,shipley's 8,invertebrates40 ,a4 ,c4 ,black7 #bjg #be4 ,beetle soliciting food from ,ant4 7,after ,wasmann4 ,enlarged7 #bac #bf4 ,honey-pot ,ant4 7,enlarged7 #bae ,,animal ,,behaviour ,,chapter ,i ,,organic ,,behaviour ,i4--,,behaviour ,,in ,,general ,we commonly use the word 8behaviour0 with a wide range of meaning4 ,we speak of the behaviour of troops in the field1 of the prisoner at the bar1 of a dandy in the ball-room4 ,but the chemist and the physicist often speak of the behaviour of atoms and molecules1 or that of a gas under changing conditions of temperature and pressure4 ,the geologist tells us that a glacier behaves in many respects like a river1 and discusses how the crust of the earth behaves under the stresses to which it is subjected4 ,weather-wise people comment on the behaviour of the mercury in a barometer as a storm approaches4 ,instances of a similar usage need not be multiplied4 ,frequently employed with a moral significance1 the word is at least occasionally used in a wider and more comprehensive sense4 ,when ,mary1 the nurse1 returns with the little ,miss ,smiths from ,master ,brown's birthday party1 she is narrowly questioned as to their behaviour2 but meanwhile their father1 the professor1 has been discoursing to his students on the behaviour of iron filings in the magnetic field2 and his son ,jack1 of ,h4,m4,s4 ,blunderer1 entertains his elder sisters with a graphic description of the behaviour of a first-class battle-ship in a heavy sea4 ,the word will be employed in the following pages in a wide and comprehensive sense4 ,we shall have to consider1 not only the kind of animal behaviour which implies intelligence1 sometimes of a high order2 not only such behaviour as animal play and courtship1 which suggests emotional attributes2 but also forms of behaviour which1 if not unconscious1 seem to lack conscious guidance and control4 ,we shall deal mainly with the behaviour of the animal as a whole1 but also incidentally with that of its constituent particles1 or cells2 and we shall not hesitate to cite 7in a parenthetic section7 some episodes of plant life as examples of organic behaviour4 ,thus broadly used1 the term in all cases indicates and draws attention to the reaction of that which we speak of as behaving1 in response to certain surrounding conditions or circumstances which evoke the behaviour4 ,the middy would not talk of the behaviour of his ship as she lay at anchor in ,portland harbour2 the word is only applicable when there is action and reaction as the vessel ploughs through a heavy sea1 or when she answers to the helm4 ,apart from gravitation the glacier and the river would not 8behave in a similar manner40 ,only under the conditions comprised under the term 8magnetic field0 do iron filings exhibit certain peculiarities of behaviour4 ,and so1 also1 in other cases4 ,the behaviour of cells is evoked under given organic or external conditions2 instinctive1 intelligent1 and emotional behaviour are called forth in response to those circumstances which exercise a constraining influence at the moment of action4 ,it is therefore necessary1 in a discussion of animal behaviour1 that we should endeavour to realize1 as far as possible1 in every case1 first1 the nature of the animal under consideration2 secondly1 the conditions under which it is placed2 thirdly1 the manner in which the response is called forth by the circumstances1 and fourthly1 how far the behaviour adequately meets the essential conditions of the situation4 ,,ii4--,,behaviour ,,of ,,cells ,from what has already been said it may be inferred that our use of the term 8behaviour0 neither implies nor excludes the presence of consciousness4 ,few are prepared to contend that the iron filings in a magnetic field consciously group themselves in definite and symmetrical patterns1 or that sand grains on a vibrating plate assemble along certain nodal lines because they are conscious of the effects of the bow by which the plate is set in sounding vibration4 ,but where organic response falls under our observation1 no matter how simple and direct that response may be1 there is a natural tendency to suppose that the behaviour is conscious2 and where the response is less simple and more indirect1 this tendency is so strengthened as to give rise to a state of mind bordering on1 or actually reaching1 conviction4 ,nor is this surprising3 for1 in the first place1 organic responses1 even the simplest1 are less obviously and directly related to the interplay of surrounding circumstances2 and1 in the second place1 they are more obviously in relation to some purpose in the sense that they directly or indirectly contribute to the maintenance of life or the furtherance of well-being4 ,now where behaviour is complex and subserves an end which we can note and name1 there arises the supposition that it may well be of the same nature as our own complex and conscious behaviour4 ,take for example the behaviour of the ,slipper-animalcule1 ,paramecium1 one of the minute creatures known to zoologists as ,protozoa4 ,the whole animal is constituted by a single cell1 somewhat less than one-hundredth of an inch in length1 the form and behaviour of which may be readily studied under the microscope4 ,thousands may be obtained from water in which some hay has been allowed to rot4 ,the surface of the ,paramecium is covered with waving hair-like cilia1 by which it is propelled through the water1 while stiffer hairs may be shot out from the surface at any point where there is a local source of irritation1 as indicated at the top of the accompanying figure4 ,two little sacs expand and contract1 and serve to drain off water and waste products from the substance of the cell4 ,food is taken in at the end of the funnel1 shown in the lower part of the figure4 ,the cilia here work in such manner as to drive the particles into and down the tube1 and on reaching its inner end these particles burst through into the semi-fluid substance1 and circulate therein4 ,just above the funnel there are two bean-like bodies1 the larger of which is known as the macronucleus1 the smaller as the micronucleus4 ,illustration3 ,,fig4 #a4--,paramecium4 ,the process of multiplication is by 8fission10 or the division of each ,paramecium into two similar animalcules4 ,not infrequently1 however1 two ,paramecia may be seen to approach each other and come together1 funnel to funnel2 and in each the nuclei undergo curious changes4 ,the macronucleus breaks up1 and is scattered4 ,the micronucleus in each divides into four portions1 of which three break up and disappear2 while the fourth again divides into two parts1 one to be retained and the other to be exchanged for the similar micronuclear product of the other ,paramecium4 ,the retained portion and that received in exchange then unite to form a new micronucleus4 ,m4 ,maupas concludes from his careful observations that1 in the absence of such 8conjugation0 in the mid-period of life1 ,paramecia pass into a state of senility which ends in decrepitude and death4 ,if this be so1 conjugation is in them necessary for the continuance of a healthy race4 ,here we have what a zoologist would describe as a specialized mode of behaviour of the nuclei2 and we have also the behaviour of the minute creatures 7which contain the nuclei7 as they approach each other and come together in conjugation4 ,can one wonder that the latter1 at any rate1 has been regarded as an example of conscious procedure8 ,in truth we do not know in what manner and by what subtle influences the ,paramecia are drawn together in conjugation4 ,but it is scarcely logical to base on such ignorance any positive assertion as to conscious attraction4 ,it is better to confess that here is a piece of organic behaviour1 the exact conditions of which are at present unexplained4 ,we may take from the writings#a of ,dr4 ,h4 ,s4 ,jennings1 of ,harvard1 some account of other modes of behaviour among ,paramecia4 ,they largely feed upon clotted masses of bacteria4 ,if a number are placed upon a glass slip1 together with a small bacterial clot1 they will be seen to congregate around the clot and to feed upon it4 ,all apparently press in so as to reach it1 or get as near it as possible4 ,and if a number be placed on another slide without any clot1 they soon collect in groups in one or more regions1 as in ,fig4 #b1 ,,iii4 ,it appears as if they were actuated by some social impulse leading them to crowd together and shun isolated positions4 ,nay1 more2 it seems as if1 after thus collecting and crowding in to some centre of interest1 the attractive influence gradually waned2 the group spreads1 and the ,paramecia are less densely packed2 the assembly scatters more and more1 but still seems to be retained by an invisible boundary beyond which the little creatures do not pass4 ,illustration3 ,,fig4 #b4--;,behaviour of ,paramecia 7after ,jennings74 ,furthermore1 if kept in a jar1 the ,paramecia crowd up towards the surface where the bacteria clots are floating2 and if1 beneath the cover glass of a slip on which they are under microscopic examination1 a drop of liquid be introduced through a very fine tube1 they will seem either to be attracted to it1 as in ,fig4 #b1 ,i41 or repelled from it1 as in ,fig4 #b1 ,,ii41 according to its nature4 ,from alkaline liquids they are repelled2 to slightly acid drops they are attracted1 unless the acidity be too pungent4 ,heat and cold are alike repellent1 and even a drop of pure distilled water forms an area into which the ,paramecia do not enter4 ,with such facts before him1 the incautious observer may be led to the conclusion that ,paramecia are not only conscious1 but endowed with intelligence and volition4 ,even ,m4 ,binet1#b who occupies a position which should lead him to exercise more caution1 tells us that there is not a single infusorian which cannot be frightened1 and does not manifest its fear by rapid flight2 he speaks of some of these unicellular animals as 8endowed with memory and volition10 and possessed of 8instinct of great precision20 and he describes the following stages3-- 87#a7 ,the perception of an external object2 87#b7 ,the choice made between a number of objects2 87#c7 ,the perception of their position in space2 87#d7 ,movements calculated either to approach the body and seize it1 or to flee from it40 ,but when we seem to have grasped his point of view1 when we have catalogued the memory1 fear1 instinct1 perception1 choice and volition1 the whole intelligent edifice crumbles2 for we are told that 8we are not in a position to determine whether these various acts are accompanied by consciousness1 or whether they follow as simple physiological processes40 ,to most of us fear1 memory1 choice1 volition1 imply something more than simple physiological processes2 they imply not only consciousness1 but highly elaborated consciousness4 ,dr4 ,jennings's researches show that no such implication can be accepted unless we are prepared to cast aside the trammels of reasonable caution4 ,in the first place1 the whole matter of feeding appears to be referable to simple organic behaviour not necessarily involving consciousness4 ,the cilia in the mouth-groove and funnel constantly wave in such a manner as to drive a current of water1 together with any particles which float therein1 towards the interior2 and the particles are then engulphed1 no matter what their composition may be4 ,digestible or indigestible1 in they go4 ,there is no selection of the one or rejection of the other4 ,but1 as we have seen1 the ,paramecia collect around a bacterial clot and feed upon it4 ,surely here there is selection of the nutritious6 ,apparently not4 ,they collect in just the same way towards a piece of blotting-paper1 cotton-wool1 cloth1 sponge1 or other fibrous body1 and remain assembled round such an innutritious centre just as long as round a bacterial clot4 ,there seems to be no choice in the matter2 contact with any substance gives rise1 as an organic response1 to the lessening or cessation of the regular movements in all the cilia except those of the mouth-groove and funnel4 ,as the ,paramecia swim hither and thither1 first one1 then another1 then more1 chance to come in contact with the bacterial clot1 the blotting-paper1 or other substance1 and since the lashing of the cilia is then automatically lessened1 there they stay2 others find their way to the same spot in the course of their random movements1 and they1 too1 stay2 thus many soon collect4 ,but this does not account for the seemingly social assemblages of ,paramecia where there is no such substance to arrest their progress4 ,dr4 ,jennings attributes this to the fact that a dilute solution of carbon-dioxide has1 what we may call for the present1 an attractive influence4 ,if a bubble of air and a bubble of carbon dioxide be introduced into the water in which ,paramecia are swimming beneath a cover-glass1 the animalcules collect around the carbonic dioxide1 but not around the air bubble4 ,at first they press up close to the bubble of carbon dioxide1 but gradually form a ring farther and farther from its limiting boundary4 ,this is held to be due to the fact that it is only the dilute solution of carbonic acid that has the peculiar 8attraction0--a stronger solution has a different effect4 ,and1 as the gas dissolves1 the ,paramecia collect in a ring just where the solution is sufficiently dilute4 ,now carbon dioxide is a product of the organic waste of living substance2 it is given off by active ,paramecia4 ,where therefore many are collected together they form a centre of the production of this substance2 and when other ,paramecia come1 in the course of their random movements1 into such a centre they remain there and help to swell the numbers in the cluster4 ,if ,paramecia be placed in water to which a distinctly reddish tinge is given by mixing it with a small quantity of rosol--a substance which is decolourized by carbon dioxide1 and is not injurious to ,paramecia--it will be seen that1 where the groups are collected1 the reddish tinge fades and disappears4 ,as the groups expand1 and are less densely packed1 the colourless area expands too3 and the limits within which the group is circumscribed are also the limits of decolourization4 ,dr4 ,jennings considers it beyond question that the assembling of ,paramecia is due to the presence in such assemblages of carbonic acid produced by the animals themselves4 ,the first beginning of the crowd may be some small fragment of bacterial clot or other substance4 ,it would seem1 then1 that ,paramecia are attracted by faintly acid solutions2 and here at least there is1 it may be urged1 an element of choice4 ,but even here1 according to ,dr4 ,jennings1 there is not only no real choice1 but not even any real attraction4 ,what takes place1 according to his observations1 is briefly as follows4 ,suppose a faintly acid drop be inserted beneath the cover-glass4 ,paramecia may almost graze its boundary without being in any way affected by its presence4 ,but in their random movements some1 and eventually many1 perhaps most1 of the little animals chance to enter the faintly acid region2 but there is no sign of reaction or response2 they swim on across the drop until they reach its further margin4 ,here a reaction does take place4 ,instead of proceeding onwards1 slowly revolving on its long axis1 a ,paramecium thus situated jerks backwards by a reversal of all the cilia1 at the same time revolving on its axis in a direction opposite to that in which it was before turning4 ,but the cilia of the mouth-groove resume their normal mode of working sooner than the others1 and this causes the ,paramecium to turn aside4 ,it then goes ahead until it again reaches the boundary at another point1 when the same behaviour is seen4 ,the course of such a ,paramecium is shown in ,fig4 #b1 ,,iv4 ,if1 instead of a faintly acid drop1 a little alkaline liquid be introduced beneath the cover-glass1 the ,paramecium similarly jerks backward and turns aside on reaching its outer boundary4 ,the turning may carry it away from the alkali1 as shown in ,fig4 #b1 ,v42 but it just as often brings it again towards the drop1 especially a large one4 ,it seems to be a matter of chance which result follows4 ,but eventually the little creature sails off1 since each time it comes within the influence of the alkaline fluid it jerks back and turns4 ,it appears1 then1 that when it is swimming in a normal solution a faintly acid liquid does not much modify its behaviour1 but an alkaline fluid evokes a reversal of the cilia2 and that when it is a slightly acid solution1 not only does stronger acid cause reversal1 but normal fluid produces a similar result4 ,a reaction of essentially the same kind is in fact called forth by such different stimuli as chemical substances1 water heated above the normal temperature1 or cooled considerably below it1 and fluids which cause changes of internal pressure within the substance of the cell4 ,nor does it matter where the stimulus is applied4 ,if it be applied at the hinder end the infusorian still jerks backward1 though this may drive it into a destructive solution and thus cause death4 ,there is1 however1 some evidence of different behaviour in some infusorians according as the stimulus is here or there4 ,in other words1 the behaviour is to some extent related to the position of the part stimulated4 ,furthermore1 it may be gathered from ,dr4 ,jennings's account that there is nothing to lead us to suppose that such free living cells show any indication of what may be regarded as the keynote of intelligent behaviour4 ,they do not profit by experience4 ,they exhibit organic reactions which may be accompanied by some dim form of consciousness1 but which do not seem to be under the guidance of such consciousness1 if it exist4 ,one of the first lessons which the study of animal behaviour1 in its organic aspect1 should impress upon our minds is1 that living cells may react to stimuli in a manner which we perceive to be subservient to a biological end1 and yet react without conscious purpose--that is to say1 automatically4 ,the living cell assimilates food and absorbs oxygen1 it grows and subdivides1 it elaborates secretions1 produces a skeletal framework or covering1 rids itself of waste products1 responds to stimuli in a definite fashion1 moves hither and thither at random1 its functional activities being stimulated or checked by many influences2 and yet this varied life may give no evidence of a guiding consciousness3 if purpose there be1 it lies deeper than its protoplasm1 deeper than the dim sentience which may be present or may be absent--we cannot tell which4 ,and when the cells are incorporated in the body of one of the higher animals1 instead of each preserving a free and nomad existence2 when they become the multitudinous constituents of an organic republic with unity of plan and unity of biological end1 then the behaviour of each is limited in range but perfected within that range1 in subservience to the requirements of the more complex unity4 ,the muscle cell contracts1 the gland-cell secretes1 the rods and cones of the retina respond to the waves of light1 and all the normal responses of the special cells go on with such orderly regularity that the term behaviour seems scarcely applicable to reactions so stereotyped4 ,but the physiologist and the physician know well that such uniformity of response is dependent on uniformity of conditions4 ,a little dose of some drug will profoundly modify and render abnormal the procedure which was before so mechanical in its exactitude2 and we are thus led to see how dependent the orderly behaviour really is on the maintenance of certain surrounding conditions4 ,moreover1 the existence of every cell in the body corporate is the outcome of a process of division involving a special mode of behaviour in the nucleus1 of which we are only beginning to guess the meaning and significance1 and of which we seek in vain to find an explanation in mechanical terms4 ,and when we trace these divisions back to their primary source in the fertilized ovum1 we find changes and evolutions in the nuclear matter of which it can only be said that the more they are studied the more complex and varied do they appear4 ,the egg1 or ovum1 is a single cell produced by the female1 and varying much in size1 according to the amount of food-yolk with which it is supplied4 ,like other cells1 it has a nucleus1 and this undergoes changes which are definitely related to the fertilization of the ovum1 which we describe as the biological end4 ,such preparatory changes for a future contingency are especially characteristic of organic behaviour4 ,there is nothing like it in the mineral kingdom4 ,the nucleus divides into two parts1 one of which passes out of the ovum and is lost4 ,the nucleus again divides1 and again one part passes out and is lost4 ,thus only one quarter of the original amount of nuclear matter remains4 ,now1 division of the nucleus occurs whenever an animal cell divides2 but in this case 7apart from details which would here be out of place7 there is this difference4 ,during the ordinary division of cells there are found in the nucleus a definite number of curved rods1 and this number is constant for any given species2 but in the nucleus which remains in the ovum after three parts of its substance are lost1 the number of rods has been reduced to half that which is common to the species4 ,the egg is now ready for fertilization4 ,a minute active cell1 which is produced by the male1 and which also has only half the normal number of rods1 enters the ovum4 ,the two nuclei approach each other1 and give rise to the single nucleus of the fertilized ovum1 which thus has the full number of rods--half of them derived from one parent1 half from the other parent4 ,the sperm cell of the male adds little to the store of protoplasm in the ovum2 but it introduces a minute body1 which seems to initiate subsequent divisions of the cell4 ,the nature of these divisions may be seen in the accompanying diagrammatic figure4 ,in ,a the cell is just preparing to divide4 ,above the nucleus is the minute body 7centrosome7 just spoken of1 which has already divided4 ,in the nucleus the matter of which the rods will be constituted is net-like4 ,in ,b this net-work has taken on the new form of a coiled thread1 while the divided body above is associated with a spindle of delicate fibres4 ,in ,c the membrane round the nucleus has disappeared1 and the coiled thread has broken up into curved rods 7chromosomes71 four of which are shown4 ,the two halves of the minute body form the centres of radiating stars4 ,in ,d each curved rod has split along its length1 and the two parts are being drawn asunder towards the centres of the two stars2 the cell itself is beginning to divide4 ,in ,e the process is carried a step further1 while in ,f the cell has completely divided into two3 the rods have disappeared as such1 and are replaced by a net-work2 a new nuclear membrane has been formed1 and the minute body has again divided preparatory to the further division of the cell4 ,illustration3 ,,fig4 #c4--;,cell-division4 ,such1 stripped as far as possible of technicalities1 are some of the facts concerning the behaviour of cells and their nuclei during the process of cell-multiplication4 ,no good purpose would be subserved by pretending that we fully understand them4 ,the splitting of the rods does indeed seem an efficient means to the end of securing a fair division of the nuclear substance1 which1 according to many biologists1 is the organic bearer of hereditary qualities in the cells4 ,but that is nearly all that we can say4 ,is the process accompanied by some form of sentience8 ,we do not know4 ,that it is controlled and guided by any consciousness in the cell is most improbable4 ,but if it be a purely organic and unconscious process it should at least impress on our minds the fact that such organic behaviour may reach a high degree of delicacy and complexity4 ,,iii4 ,,corporate ,,behaviour ,the word 8corporate0 is here applied to the organic behaviour of cells when they are not independent and free1 but are incorporated in the animal body1 and act in relation to each other4 ,if the behaviour of the individual cell during division impresses us with the subtle intricacy of organic processes1 the behaviour of the growing cell-republic during the early stages of organic development must impress us no less forcibly4 ,we place the fertilized egg of a hen in an incubator1 and supply the requisite conditions of warmth1 moisture1 and fresh air4 ,before the egg is laid cell-division has begun4 ,a small patch of closely similar cells has formed on the surface of the yolk4 ,further subdivision is then arrested until the warmth of incubation quickens again the patch into life4 ,but when once thus quickened no subsequent temporary arrest is possible--life will not again lie dormant4 ,if arrest there be it is that of death4 ,and from that little patch of cells1 which spreads further and further over the yolk1 a chick is developed4 ,into the intricate technicalities of embryology this is not the place to enter4 ,but it is a matter of common knowledge that1 whereas we have to-day an egg such as we eat for breakfast1 three weeks hence we shall have a bright active bird1 a cunningly wrought piece of mechanism1 and1 more than that1 a going machine4 ,during this wonderful process the cellular constituents take on new forms and perform new functions1 all in relationship to each other1 all as part of one organic whole4 ,here bones are developed to form a skeletal framework1 there muscles are constituted which shall render orderly movements possible2 feathers1 beak1 and claws take shape as products of the skin2 gut and glands prepare for future modes of nutrition2 heart and blood-vessels undergo many changes1 some reminiscent of bygone and ancestral gill-respiration1 some in relation to the provisional respiration of the embryo by means of a temporary organ that spreads out beneath the shell1 some preparatory to the future use of the lungs1--some1 again1 related to the absorption of food from the yolk1 others to subsequent means of digestion2 nerve1 brain1 and sense-organs differentiate4 ,a going machine in the egg1 the chick is hatched1 and forthwith enters on a wider field of behaviour4 ,few would think of attributing to the consciousness of the embryo chick any guiding influence on the development of its bodily structure1 any control over the subtle changes and dispositions of its constituent cells4 ,but no sooner does the chick1 when it is hatched1 begin to show wider modes of instinctive behaviour1 than we invoke conscious intelligence for their explanation1 seemingly forgetful of the fact that there is no logical ground for affirming that1 while the marvellous delicacies of structure are of unconscious organic origin1 the early modes of instinctive behaviour are due to the guidance of consciousness4 ,such modes of behaviour will1 however1 be considered in another chapter4 ,here we have to notice that the unquestionably organic behaviour of the incorporated republic of cells may attain to a high degree of complexity1 and may serve a distinctly biological end4 ,illustration3 ,,fig4 #d4--,wapiti with antlers in velvet4 ,there is1 perhaps1 no more striking instance of rapid and vigorous growth than is afforded by the antlers of deer1#c which are shed and renewed every year4 ,in the early summer1 when growing1 they are covered over with a dark hairy skin1 and are said to be 8in velvet40 ,if you lay your hand on the growing antler1 you will feel that it is hot with the nutrient blood that is coursing beneath it4 ,it is1 too1 exceedingly sensitive and tender4 ,an army of tens of thousands of busy living cells is at work beneath that velvet surface1 building the bony antlers1 preparing for the battles of autumn4 ,each minute cell1 working for the general good1 takes up from the nutrient blood the special materials it requires2 elaborates the crude bone-stuff1 at first soft as wax1 but ere long to become hard as stone2 and then1 having done its work1 having added its special morsel to the fabric of the antler1 remains embedded and immured1 buried beneath the bone-products of its successors or descendants4 ,no hive of bees is busier or more replete with active life than the antler of a stag as it grows beneath the soft1 warm velvet4 ,and thus are built up in the course of a few weeks those splendid 8beams10 with their 8tynes0 and 8snags10 which1 in the case of the wapiti1 even in the confinement of our ,zoological ,gardens1 may reach a weight of thirty-two pounds1 and which1 in the freedom of the ,rocky ,mountains1 may reach such a size that a man may walk1 without stooping1 beneath the archway made by setting up upon their points the shed antlers4 ,when the antler has reached its full size1 a circular ridge makes its appearance at a short distance from the base4 ,this is the 8burr10 which divides the antler into a short 8pedicel0 next the skull1 and the 8beam0 with its branches above4 ,the circulation in the blood-vessels of the beam now begins to languish1 and the velvet dies and peels off1 leaving the hard1 bony substance exposed4 ,then is the time for fighting1 when the stags challenge each other to single combat1 while the hinds stand timidly by4 ,but when the period of battle is over1 and the wars and loves of the year are past1 the bone beneath the burr begins to be eaten away1 through the activity of certain large bone-absorbing cells1 and1 the base of attachment being thus weakened1 the antlers are shed2 the scarred surface skins over and heals1 and only the hair-covered pedicel of the antler is left4 ,illustration3 ,,fig4 #e4--,wapiti with velvet shredding off4 ,we have no reason to suppose that this corporate cellular behaviour1 involving the nicely adjusted co-operation of so vast an army of organic units1 is under the conscious guidance of the stag4 ,and yet how orderly the procedure6 how admirable the result6 ,nor is there an organ or structural part of the stag or any other animal that does not tell the same tale4 ,this is but one paragraph of the volume in which is inscribed the varied and wonderful history of organic behaviour in its corporate aspect4 ,is it a matter for wonder that the cause of such phenomena has been regarded as 8a mystery transcending naturalistic conception2 as an alien influx into nature1 baffling scientific interpretation08 ,and yet1 though not surprising1 this attitude of mind1 in face of organic phenomena1 is illogical1 and is due partly to a misconception of the function of scientific interpretation1 partly to influences arising from the course pursued by the historical development of scientific knowledge4 ,the function of biological science is to formulate and to express in generalized terms the related antecedences and sequences which are observed to occur in animals and plants4 ,this can already be done with some approach to precision4 ,but the underlying cause of the observed phenomena does not fall within the purview of natural science2 it involves metaphysical conceptions4 ,it is no more 7and no less7 a 8mystery0 than all causation in its last resort--as the raison d'tre of observed phenomena--is a mystery4 ,gravitation1 chemical affinity1 crystalline force1--these are all 8mysteries40 ,if the mystery of life1 lying beneath and behind organic behaviour1 be said to baffle scientific interpretation1 this is because it suggests ultimate problems with which science as such should not attempt to deal4 ,the final causes of vital phenomena 7as of other phenomena7 lie deeper than the probe of science can reach4 ,but why is this sense of mystery especially evoked in some minds by the contemplation of organic behaviour1 by the study of life8 ,partly1 no doubt1 because the scientific interpretation of organic processes is but recent1 and in many respects incomplete4 ,people have grown so accustomed to the metaphysical assumptions employed by physicists and chemists when they speak of the play of crystalline forces and the selective affinities of atoms1 they have been wont for so long to accept the 8mysteries0 of crystallization and of chemical union1 that these assumptions have coalesced with the descriptions and explanations of science2 and the joint products are now1 through custom1 cheerfully accepted as natural4 ,where the phenomena of organic behaviour are in question1 this coalescence has not yet taken place2 the metaphysical element is on the one hand proclaimed as inexplicable by natural science1 and on the other hand denied even by those who talk glibly of physical forces as the final cause of the phenomena of the inorganic world4 ,so much reference to the problems which underlie the problems of science seems necessary4 ,it is here assumed that the phenomena of organic behaviour are susceptible of scientific discussion and elucidation4 ,but even assuming that an adequate explanation in terms of antecedence and sequence shall be thus attained by the science of the future1 this will not then satisfy1 any more than our inadequate explanations now satisfy1 those who seek to know the ultimate meaning and reason of it all3 ,what makes organic matter behave as we see it behave8 what drives the wheels of life1 as it drives the planets in their courses8 what impels the egg to go through its series of developmental changes8 what guides the cells along the divergent course of their life-history8 ,these are questions the ultimate answers to which lie beyond the sphere of science--questions which man 7who is a metaphysical being7 always does and always will ask1 even if he rests content with the answer of agnosticism2 but questions to which natural science never will be able1 and should never so much as attempt1 to give an answer4 ,enough has now been said to show that organic behaviour is a thing sui generis1 carrying its own peculiar marks of distinction3 and further1 that1 for science1 this is just part of the constitution of nature1 neither more nor less mysterious than1 let us say1 crystallization or chemical combination4 ,but associated and closely interwoven with all that is distinctively organic there is much which can to some extent be interpreted in terms of physics and chemistry4 ,the animal#d has sometimes been likened to a steam-engine1 in which the food is the fuel which enters into combustion with the oxygen taken in through the lungs4 ,it may be worth while to modify and modernize this analogy--always remembering1 however1 that such an analogy must not be pushed too far4 ,in the ordinary steam-engine the fuel is placed in the fire-box1 to which the oxygen of the air gains access2 the heat produced by the combustion converts the water in the boiler into steam1 which is made to act upon the piston1 and thus set the machinery in motion4 ,but there is another kind of engine1 now extensively used1 which works on a different principle4 ,in the gas-engine the fuel is gaseous1 and it can thus be introduced in a state of intimate mixture with the oxygen with which it is to unite in combustion4 ,this is a great advantage4 ,the two can unite rapidly and explosively4 ,in gunpowder the same end is effected by mixing the carbon and sulphur with nitre1 which contains the oxygen necessary for their explosive combustion4 ,and this is carried still further in dynamite and gun-cotton1 where the elements necessary for explosive combustion are not merely mechanically mixed1 but are chemically combined in a highly unstable compound4 ,but in the gas-engine1 not only are the fuel and the oxygen thus intimately mixed1 but the controlled explosions are caused to act directly on the piston1 and not through the intervention of water in a boiler4 ,whereas1 therefore1 in the steam-engine the combustion is to some extent external to the working of the machine1 in the gas-engine it is to a large extent internal and direct4 ,now1 instead of likening the animal as a whole to a steam-engine1 it is more satisfactory to liken each cell to an automatic gas-engine which manufactures its own explosive4 ,during the period of repose which intervenes between periods of activity1 its protoplasm is busy in construction1 taking from the blood-discs oxygen1 and from the blood-fluid carbonaceous and nitrogenous materials1 and knitting these together into relatively unstable explosive compounds1 which play the part of the mixed air and gas of the gas-engine4 ,a resting muscle may be likened to a complex and well-organized battery of gas-engines4 ,on the stimulus supplied through a nerve-channel a series of co-ordinated explosions takes place3 the gas-engines are set to work2 the muscular fibres contract2 the products of the silent explosions are taken up and hurried away by the blood-stream2 and the protoplasm prepares a fresh supply of explosive material4 ,long before the invention of the gas-engine1 long before gun-cotton or dynamite were dreamt of1 long before some ,chinese or other inventor first mixed the ingredients of gunpowder1 organic nature had utilized the principle of controlled explosions in the protoplasmic cell1 and thus rendered animal behaviour possible4 ,certain cells are1 however1 more delicately explosive than others4 ,those1 for example1 on or near the external surface of the body--those1 that is to say1 which constitute the end-organs of the special senses--contain explosive material which may be fired by a touch1 a sound1 an odour1 the contact with a sapid fluid or a ray of light4 ,the effects of the explosions in these delicate cells1 reinforced in certain neighbouring nerve-batteries1 are transmitted down the nerves as waves of subtle chemical or electrolytic change1 and thus reach that wonderful aggregation of organized and co-ordinated explosive cells1 the brain4 ,here it is again reinforced and directed 7who1 at present1 can say how87 along fresh nerve-channels to muscles1 or glands1 or other organized groups of explosives4 ,and in the brain1 somehow associated with the explosion of its cells1 consciousness1 the mind-element1 emerges2 of which we need only notice here that it belongs to a wholly different order of being from the physical activities and products with which we are at present concerned4 ,we must not press the explosion analogy too far4 ,the essential thing seems to be that the protoplasm of the cell has the power of building up complex and unstable chemical compounds1 which are perhaps stored in its spongy substance2 and that these unstable compounds1 under the influence of a stimulus 7or1 possibly1 sometimes spontaneously71 break down into simpler and more stable compounds4 ,in the case of muscle-cells1 this latter change is accompanied by an alteration in length of the fibres1 and consequent movements in the animal1 the products of the disruptive change being useless or harmful1 and being1 therefore1 removed as soon as possible4 ,but very frequently the products of explosive activity are made use of4 ,in the case of bone-cells1 one of the products of disruption is of permanent use to the organism1 and constitutes the solid framework of the skeleton4 ,in the case of the secreting cells in the salivary and other digestive glands1 some of the disruptive products are of temporary value for the preparation of the food4 ,it is probable that these useful products of disruption1 permanent or temporary1 took their origin in waste products for which natural selection has found a use1 and which have been gradually rendered more and more efficacious in modes of organic behaviour increasingly complex4 ,in the busy hive of cells which constitutes what we call the animal body1 there is thus ceaseless activity4 ,during periods of apparent rest the protoplasm is engaged in constructive work1 building up fresh supplies of unstable materials1 which1 during periods of apparent activity1 break up into simpler and more stable substances1 some of which are useful to the organism1 while others must be got rid of as soon as possible4 ,from another point of view1 the cells during apparent rest are storing up energy to be utilized by the animal during its periods of activity4 ,the storing up of available energy may be likened to the winding up of a watch or clock2 it is when an organ is at rest that the cells are winding themselves up2 and thus we have the apparent paradox that the cell is most active and doing most work when the organ of which it forms a part is at rest4 ,during the repose of an organ1 in fact1 the cells are busily working in preparation for the manifestation of energetic action that is to follow4 ,just as the brilliant display of intellectual activity in a great orator is the result of the silent work of a lifetime1 so is the physical manifestation of muscular power the result of the silent preparatory work of the muscle-cells4 ,it may1 perhaps1 seem strange that the products of cellular life should be reached by the roundabout process of first producing unstable compounds1 from which are then formed more stable substances1 useful for permanent purposes as in bone1 or temporary purposes as in the digestive fluids4 ,it seems a waste of power to build up substances unnecessarily complex and stored with an unnecessarily abundant supply of energy4 ,but only thus could the organs be enabled to act under the influence of stimuli1 and afford examples of corporate behaviour4 ,they are like charged batteries ready to discharge under the influence of the slightest organic touch4 ,in this way1 too1 is afforded a means by which the organ is not dependent only upon the products of the immediate activity of the protoplasm at the time of action1 but can utilize the store laid up during preceding periods of rest4 ,sufficient has now been said to illustrate the nature of some of the physical processes which accompany organic behaviour in its corporate aspect4 ,the fact that should stand out clearly is that the animal body is stored with large quantities of available energy resident in highly complex and unstable chemical compounds1 elaborated by the constituent cells4 ,these unstable compounds1 eminently explosive according to our analogy1 are built up of materials derived from two different sources--from the nutritive matter 7containing carbon1 hydrogen1 and nitrogen7 absorbed during digestion1 and from oxygen taken up from the air during respiration4 ,the cells thus become charged with energy that can be set free on the application of the appropriate stimulus1 which may be likened to the spark that fires the explosive4 ,let us note1 in conclusion1 that it is through the blood-system1 ramifying to all parts of the body1 and the nerve-system1 the ramifications of which are not less perfect1 that one of the larger and higher animals is knit together into an organic whole4 ,the former carries to the cell the raw materials for the elaboration of its explosive products1 and1 after the explosions1 carries off the waste products which result therefrom4 ,the nerve-fibres carry the stimuli by which the explosive is fired1 while the central nervous system organizes1 co-ordinates1 and controls the explosions1 and initiates the elaboration of the explosive compounds4 ,blood and nerves co-operate to render corporate behaviour possible4 ,,iv4--,,the ,,behaviour ,,of ,,plants ,a short parenthetic section on the behaviour of plants may serve further to illustrate the nature of organic behaviour4 ,we have seen that ,paramecium is apparently attracted by faintly acid solutions1 and have briefly considered ,dr4 ,jennings's interpretation of the facts disclosed by careful observation4 ,in the ferns the female element1 or ovum1 is contained in a minute flask-shaped structure 7archegonium71 in the neck and mouth of which mucilaginous matter1 with a slightly acid reaction1 is developed2 and this is said to exercise an attractive influence on the freely swimming ciliated male elements1 or spermatozoids1 which are necessary for fertilization4 8,now1 it has been shown by experiment that the spermatozoids of ferns are attracted by certain chemical substances1 and especially by malic acid4 ,if artificial archegonia are prepared 7consisting of tiny capillary glass-tubes7 and filled with mucilage to which a small quantity of this acid has been added1 they are found1 when placed in water containing fern-spermatozoids1 to exercise the same attraction upon them which the real archegonia exercise in nature4 ,the malic acid gradually diffuses out into the water1 and the spermatozoids are influenced by it1 so that they move in the direction in which the substance is more concentrated1 i4e4 towards the tube4 ,although it cannot be proved that the archegonia themselves contain malic acid1 as they are too small for a recognizable quantity to be obtained from them1 yet there can be little doubt that the natural archegonia owe their attractive influence to the same chemical agent which has proved efficacious in experiment40#e ,in the light of ,dr4 ,jennings's observations1 it is perhaps not improbable that this so-called attractive influence is similar to that seen in ,paramecium2 and that the spermatozoids enter the organic acid in the course of their random movements1 and there remain4 ,be that as it may1 the male elements collect in the mucilaginous mass1 and pass down the neck of the flask until one reaches and coalesces with the female element1 or ovum1 and effects its fertilization4 ,here we have organic behaviour unmistakably directed to a biological end--behaviour which may indeed be accompanied by some dim form of consciousness1 but which is due to a purely organic reaction4 ,it is scarcely satisfactory to say that the spermatozoids 8possess a certain power of perception1 by which their movements are guided40#f ,if consciousness be present1 it is probably merely an accompaniment of the response1 and has no directive influence on its nature and character4 ,in the higher plants1 as in the higher animals1 the differentiation and the orderly marshalling of the cell-progeny arising from the coalescent male and female elements1 afford1 during development1 examples of corporate organic behaviour which can be more readily described than explained1 but which not less clearly subserve definite biological ends1 and in many cases1 such as the direction of growth in radicles and roots1 the curling of tendrils1 and the reaction to the influence of light and warmth1 are related to and evoked by the environing conditions4 ,more closely resembling familiar modes of behaviour in animals are such movements as are seen in the 8tentacles0 which project from the upper surface and margin of the ,sun-dew leaf4 ,their knobbed ends secrete a sticky matter1 which glistens in the sun1 and to which small foreign bodies readily adhere4 ,if particles of limestone1 sand1 or clay1 such as may be blown by the wind1 touch and stick to these knobs1 there follows an exudation of acid liquid1 but no marked and continuous change occurs in the position of the tentacles4 ,but should an insect alight on the leaf1 or a small piece of meat be placed upon the tentacles1 not only is there a discharge of acid juice1 but a ferment is also produced1 which has a digestive action on the nitrogenous matter4 ,slowly the tentacle curves inwards and downwards1 as one's finger may bend towards the palm of one's hand2 neighbouring tentacles also turn towards and incline on to the stimulating substance2 then others1 further off1 behave in a similar way1 until all the tentacles1 some two hundred in number1 are inflected and converge upon the nitrogenous particle4 ,nay1 more3 8,when two little bits of meat are placed simultaneously on the right and left halves of the same ,sun-dew leaf1 the two hundred tentacles divide into two groups1 and each one of the groups directs its aim to one of the bits of meat40#g ,illustration3 ,,fig4 #f4--,sun-dew 7,drosera74 ,leaf 7enlarged7 with the tentacles on one side inflected over a bit of meat placed on the disc4 7,from ,darwin's 8,insectivorous ,plants407 ,the movements1 though slow1 are orderly1 methodical1 and effective1 the secretions of many glands being brought to bear on just those substances which are capable of digestion and absorption by the plant4 ,the seemingly concerted action is moreover due to an organic transmission of impulses from cell to cell--a transmission accompanied by visible changes in a purple substance contained within the cells4 ,in the ,sun-dew any tentacle may form the starting-point of the spreading wave of impulse4 ,but in the ,venus's ,fly-trap there are six delicate spines1 the slightest touch on any one of which causes the two halves of the specially modified leaf-end to fold inwards on the midrib as a hinge4 ,the transmission of impulse is more rapid1 the trap closing in a few seconds2 and electric currents have been observed to accompany the change4 ,tooth-like spines at the edge of the trap interlock1 and serve to prevent the escape of small insects1 while short-stalked purple glands secrete an acid digestive juice4 ,division of labour has been carried further2 and organic behaviour1 not less purposive1 is carried out in a manner even more effective4 ,illustration3 ,,fig4 #g4--,venus's ,fly-trap 7,diona74 ,leaf viewed laterally in its expanded state4 7,from ,darwin's 8,insectivorous ,plants407 ,in other plants adaptive movements are well known4 8,few phenomena have such a peculiar appearance as the movements which occur in the sensitive ,oxalis when rain comes on4 ,not only do the leaflets on which the finest rain-drops fall fold together in a downward direction1 but all the neighbouring ones perform the same movement1 although they have not themselves been shaken by the impact of the falling drops4 ,the movement is continued to the common leaf-stalk bearing the numerous leaflets4 ,this also bends down towards the ground4 ,the rain-drops now slide over the bent leaf-stalk and down over the depressed leaflets1 and not a drop remains behind on their delicate surfaces40#h ,the waves of impulse are said to be transmitted along definite lines1 and to cause the expulsion of water from certain cells at the point of insertion of the leaflets or leaf-stalks1 rendering them flaccid4 ,illustration3 ,,fig4 #h4--;,flower of ,valisneria4 ,appealing even more strongly to the popular imagination1 though probably not of deeper biological significance1 is the behaviour of plants in relation to the essential process of fertilization4 ,only two examples can here be cited4 ,valisneria spiralis is an aquatic plant1 with long submerged strap-like leaves1 which grows in still water in ,southern ,europe4 ,the female flower is enclosed in two translucent bracts1 which form a protective bladder so long as the flower is beneath the surface of the water2 but the flower-stalk continues to grow until the flower reaches the surface1 when it becomes freely exposed by the splitting of the bracts4 ,there are three boat-shaped sepals1 which act as floats2 three quite minute petals2 and three large fringed stigmas1 which project over the abortive petals in the space between the boat-like sepals4 ,the flower is now ready for fertilization4 ,the male flowers1 which are developed on different individuals from those which produce the female flowers1 grow in bunches beneath an investing bladder4 ,the stalk does not elongate1 so that the bladder never rises far above the bottom1 and remains completely submerged4 ,here the bladder bursts1 and the male flowers1 with short stalks1 are detached4 ,each has three sepals1 which enclose and protect the stamens4 ,the separated flower now ascends to the surface1 the sepals open and form three hollow boats1 by means of which the flower floats freely1 while the two functional stamens project upwards and somewhat obliquely into the air1 exposing the large sticky pollen-cells4 ,blown hither and thither by the wind1 these little flower-boats 8accumulate in the neighbourhood of fixed bodies1 especially in their recesses1 where they rest like ships in harbour4 ,when the little craft happen to get stranded in the recesses of a female ,valisneria flower1 they adhere to the tri-lobed stigma1 and some of the pollen-cells are sure to be left sticking to the fringes on the margins of the stigmatic surface40#i ,this is a good example of purely organic behaviour admirably adapted to secure a definite and important biological end4 ,few will be likely to contend that it is even accompanied by1 still less under the guidance of1 any conscious foresight on the part of the plant4 ,and the lesson it should teach is that1 in the study of organic behaviour1 adaptation to the conditions of existence is not necessarily the outcome of conscious guidance4 ,it is well known that the orchids exhibit1 in their mode of fertilization1 remarkable adaptations by which the visits of insects are rendered subservient to the needs of the plant4 ,in the ,catasetums1 for example1 the male flower may be described as consisting of two parts--a lower part1 the cup-like labellum 7,fig4 #i1 l71 which constitutes a landing-stage on which insects may alight2 and an upper part1 the column 7,fig4 #i1 c71 surrounded by the upper sepal and petals4 ,in the upper part of the column the pollen-masses are borne at one end of an elastic pedicel1 at the other end of which is an adhesive disc1 and the rod is bent over a pad so as to be in a state of strain4 ,the disc is retained in position by a membrane with which two long tubular horns 7,figs4 #i1 h2 #aj1 an7 are continuous4 ,these project over the labellum1 where insects alight to gnaw its sweet fleshy walls1 and if they be touched1 even very lightly1 they convey some stimulus to the membrane which surrounds and connects the disc with the adjoining surface1 causing it instantly to rupture2 and as soon as this happens1 the disc is suddenly set free4 ,the highly elastic pedicel then flirts the disc out of its chamber with such force that the whole is ejected1 sometimes to a distance of two or three feet1 bringing away with it the two pollen-masses4 8,the utility of so forcible an ejection is to drive the soft and viscid cushion of the disc against the hairy thorax of the large hymenopterous insects which frequent the flowers4 ,when once attached to an insect1 assuredly no force which the insect could exert would remove the disc and pedicel1 but the caudicles by which the pollen-masses are attached are ruptured without much difficulty1 and thus the balls of pollen might readily be left on the adhesive stigma of the female flower40#aj ,illustration3 ,,fig4 #i4--;,flower of ,catasetum2 c1 column2 h1 horns2 l1 labellum4 ,here again we have adaptive behaviour of exquisite nicety1 and we have the transmission of an impulse very rapidly along the cells of the irritable horns1 followed by the sudden rupture of a membrane4 ,beautiful1 however1 as is the adaptation1 effective as it is to a definite biological end1 the organic behaviour does not afford any indication of the guidance of consciousness4 ,among plants we have many interesting and admirable examples of organic behaviour2 but nowhere so much as a hint of that profiting by individual experience which is the criterion of the effective presence of conscious guidance and control4 ,illustration3 ,,fig4 #aj4--;,catasetum2 ,c1 diagram of column2 a1 anther2 an1 horn2 d1 adhesive disc2 f1 filament of anther2 g1 ovarium2 ped1 pedicel2 ,d and ,e1 pollinium2 p1 pollen-mass4 7,from ,darwin's 8,orchids407 ,v4--,,reflex ,,action ,it is sometimes said that the tentacles of the ,sun-dew leaf indicate a primitive kind of reflex action in plants1 and that they afford evidence of discrimination4 8,it is10 says ,romanes1 8the stimulus supplied by continuous pressure that is so delicately perceived1 while the stimulus supplied by impact is disregarded40#aa ,and1 comparing this with what is observed in the ,venus's ,fly ,trap1 he says3 8,in these two plants the power of discriminating between these two kinds of stimuli has been developed to an equally astonishing extent1 but in opposite directions40#ab ,it is well1 however1 to avoid terms which carry with them so distinctively a conscious implication as 8discrimination0 and 8perception0 do for most of us4 ,just as the photographer's film reacts differently according to the quality of light-rays1 violet or red1 which reach it1 so do many organic substances react differently to stimuli of different quality1 irrespective of their intensity4 ,the 8discrimination0 of plants and of some of the lower animals is of this kind1 and it is better to speak of it simply as differential reaction4 ,there can then be no chance of its being confused with conscious choice4 ,nor should the movements of the ,sun-dew tentacles or of those of the ,sea-anemone be termed in strictness reflex action4 ,as originally employed by ,marshall ,hall1 and1 since that time1 by common consent1 reflex action involves a differentiated nervous system4 ,there is1 first1 an afferent impulse from the point of stimulation passing inwards to a nerve-centre2 secondly1 certain little-understood changes within this centre2 and thirdly1 an efferent impulse from the centre to some organ or group of cells which are thus affected4 ,in plants there is no indication of anything analogous to this specialized mode of response4 ,the impulse passes directly from the point of stimulation to the part affected without the intervention of anything like a nerve-centre4 ,in the sensitive ,oxalis the impulse passes directly to the point of insertion of the leaflet or leaf-stalk2 in ,catasetum1 from the horn to the retaining membrane2 in the ,sun-dew1 from the affected tentacle to those in its neighbourhood4 ,even in the ,sea-anemone1 though there is a loosely diffused nervous system1 the passage of the impulse from one part of the circlet of tentacles to other parts1 seems to follow a direct rather than a reflex course1 and there do not appear to be any specialized centres by which the impulses are received and then redistributed4 ,in all animals in which well-differentiated nervous systems are found1 in which there are distinct nerve-fibres and nerve-centres1 reflex actions1 simple or more complicated1 occur4 ,they form the initial steps leading up to the highest types of organic behaviour4 ,so long as the nervous arcs--afferent fibres1 nerve-centre1 and efferent fibres--remain intact reflex acts may be carried out with great precision and delicacy1 even when the higher centres1 which we believe to be those of conscious guidance and control1 have been destroyed4 ,when1 for example1 the whole of the brain of a frog has been extirpated and the animal is hung up by the lower jaw1 if the left side be touched with a drop of acid the left leg is drawn up and begins to scratch at the irritated spot1 and when this leg is held1 the other hind leg is1 with seemingly greater difficulty1 brought to bear on the same spot4 8,this10 says ,sir ,michael ,foster1 8at first sight looks like an intelligent choice4444 ,but a frog deprived of its brain so that the spinal cord only is left1 makes no spontaneous movements at all4 ,such an entire absence of spontaneity is wholly inconsistent with the possession of intelligence4444 ,we are therefore led to conclude that the phenomena must be explained in some other way than by being referred to the working of an intelligence40#ac ,but if we concede that intelligence is absent1 may there not at least be some consciousness8 ,sir ,michael ,foster's reply to such a question goes as far as we have any justification for going1 even when we give free rein to conjecture4 8,we may distinguish10 he says1 8between an active continuous consciousness1 such as we usually understand by the term1 and a passing or momentary condition1 which we may speak of as consciousness1 but which is wholly discontinuous from an antecedent or from a subsequent similar momentary condition2 and indeed we may suppose that the complete consciousness of ourselves1 and the similarly complete consciousness which we infer to exist in many animals1 has been evolved out of such a rudimentary consciousness4 ,we may1 on this view1 suppose that every nervous action of a certain intensity or character is accompanied by some amount of consciousness which we may1 in a way1 compare to the light emitted when a combustion previously giving rise to invisible heat waxes fiercer4 ,we may thus infer that when the brainless frog is stirred by some stimulus to a reflex act1 the spinal cord is lit up by a momentary flash of consciousness coming out of the darkness and dying away into darkness again2 and we may perhaps infer that such a passing consciousness is the better developed the larger the portion of the cord involved in the reflex act and the more complex the movement4 ,but such a momentary flash1 even if we admit its existence1 is something very different from consciousness as ordinarily understood1 is far removed from intelligence1 and cannot be appealed to as explaining the #8choice' spoken of above40#ad ,these sentences indicate with sufficient clearness the distinction1 more than once hinted at in the foregoing pages1 between consciousness as an accompaniment1 and consciousness as a guiding influence4 ,we shall have more to say in this connection in subsequent chapters4 ,the experiment with the frog shows1 at any rate1 that reflex actions1 of a distinctly purposive nature1 may be carried out when the centres1 which are believed to exercise conscious control and guidance have been destroyed4 ,it is said that in man1 when1 owing to injuries of the spine1 the connection between the brain and the lower part of the spinal cord have been severed1 tickling of the foot causes withdrawal of the limb without directly affecting the consciousness of the patient4 ,but in all such cases we are dealing with a maimed creature4 ,the living frog or man1 healthy and intact1 is1 presumably in the one case1 certainly in the other1 conscious of these reflex actions1 and can exercise some amount of guidance and control over them4 ,in man this is unquestionably the case4 ,but granting that the brain is the organ of conscious control1 granting that it can receive impulses from and transmit impulses to the reflex centres1 no more is here implied1 and no more can be legitimately inferred1 than that the kind of organic behaviour we call 8reflex action0 is in the higher animals in touch with the guiding centres4 ,we have no ground for assuming that in reflex action there is any power of intelligent guidance independent of that which is exercised by the brain or analogous organ4 ,in brief1 reflex acts1 in animals endowed with intelligence1 may be regarded as specialized modes of organic behaviour2 which are in themselves often characterized by much complexity2 which subserve definite biological ends2 which are effected by subordinate centres capable of transmitting impulses to1 and receiving impulses from1 the centres of intelligent guidance2 and which1 as responses confined to certain organs or parts of the body1 form elements in the wider behaviour of the animal as a whole4 ,,vi4--,,the ,,evolution ,,of ,,organic ,,behaviour ,the interpretation of organic behaviour in terms of evolution mainly depends on the answer we give to the question3 ,are acquired modes of behaviour inherited8 ,a negative answer to this question is here provisionally accepted4 ,but the premisses from which this conclusion is drawn are too technical for discussion in these pages4 ,it must suffice to state as briefly as possible what this conclusion amounts to1 and to indicate some of the consequences which follow from its acceptance4 ,the fertilized egg gives origin1 as we have seen1 to the multitude of cells which build up the body of one of the higher animals4 ,there are1 on the one hand1 muscle-cells1 gland-cells1 nerve-cells1 and other constituents of the various tissues2 and there are1 on the other hand1 the reproductive cells--ova or sperms1 as the case may be4 ,now1 every cell in the developed animal is a direct descendant of the fertilized egg4 ,but of all the varied host only the reproductive cells take any direct share in the continuity of the race4 ,hereditary transmission is therefore restricted to the germinal substance of these reproductive cells4 ,trace the ancestry of any cell in the adult body1 say a nerve-cell1 and you reach the fertilized ovum4 ,trace back the ancestral line yet further1 and you follow a long sequence of reproductive cells1 or1 at least1 of cells which have undergone but little differentiation2 but never again will you find1 in the course of a genealogy of bewildering length1 a nerve-cell4 ,such a tissue-element is a descendant1 but cannot become an ancestor2 it dies without direct heirs4 ,it is universally admitted that the bodily structures are subject to what is termed modification under the stress of environing circumstances4 ,the muscles may acquire unusual strength by use and exercise2 the nerve-centres may learn certain tricks of behaviour in the course of individual life2 and other structures may be similarly accommodated to the conditions which affect them4 ,to such modifications of structure or function in the organs or parts the term acquired is primarily applied4 ,the tissues have thus a certain amount of organic plasticity1 through which they are adjusted to a range of circumstances varying in extent4 ,they are able to acquire new modes of behaviour4 ,but the cells of which they are composed are off the line of racial descent4 ,they leave no direct heirs4 ,when the body dies the modifications of behaviour acquired by its parts perish with it4 ,only if in some way they exercise what we may term a homopathic influence on the germinal substance can the accommodation they have learnt be transmitted in inheritance4 ,by a homopathic influence is here meant one that is of such a nature as to communicate to the germinal substance1 the seeds of similar changes of structure or function4 ,and of the occurrence of any such homopathic influence there is no convincing evidence4 ,logically contrasted with the modifications of the tissues1 dependent on organic plasticity1 are the variations which arise from the nature and constitution of the reproductive cells4 ,how they arise cannot here be discussed4 ,but they are1 it is believed1 subject to the influence of natural selection1 which has guided them1 throughout the ages of organic evolution1 in the directions they have taken2 disadvantageous variations having been eliminated1 and favourable variations surviving in the struggle for existence4 ,such modes of behaviour as are congenital and are due to hereditary transmission are therefore the outcome of variations which have been selected generation after generation4 ,and the fit adjustment of this congenital behaviour to the needs of life is termed adaptation4 ,it is here assumed that modifications of behaviour in one generation are not inherited1 and therefore contribute nothing to the store of adaptive behaviour in the next generation4 ,it must not1 however1 be supposed that the provisional acceptance of this conclusion involves the denial of all connection of any sort between accommodation and adaptation4 ,when we remember that plastic modification and germinal variation have been working together1 in close association1 all along the line of organic evolution to reach the common goal of adjustment to the circumstances of life1 it is difficult to believe that they have been throughout the whole process altogether independent of each other4 ,granted that acquired modifications1 as such1 are not directly inherited1 they may none the less afford the conditions under which coincident variations escape elimination4 ,by coincident variations ,i mean those the direction of which coincides with that taken by modification4 ,the survival of an animal depends on its adjustment to the circumstances of its life1 no matter how this adjustment is secured4 ,and this survival would in the long run be better secured1 we may suppose1 where the two methods of adjustment were coincident and not conflicting2#ae just as a man who not only acquires by his own exertions a fortune but also inherits one1 is better off than his neighbour1 of equal business capacity1 who is entirely dependent on his own exertions4 ,the inheritance of a small capital may1 indeed1 make just the difference between success and failure4 ,even with it1 if he had no power of acquiring more1 he might remain a poor man4 ,inheritance and acquisition combined may best lead to survival in competition4 ,thus modification may supply the conditions under which coincident variations are favoured1 and1 given time1 to reach step by step1 through natural selection1 a fully adaptive level4 ,if this be so we may accept many of the facts adduced by the transmissionist in favour of the direct inheritance of acquired characters1 and at the same time interpret them on selectionist principles4 ,if1 however1 acquired characters are not hereditary the method of natural selection in racial progress is curiously indirect4 ,apart from the preservation of their fecundity1 the cells on which the continuity of life1 in all the higher animals1 depends1 have themselves taken little part in the struggle for existence4 ,just as in the forest tree1 the firmly implanted roots1 the sturdy stem1 and the strong branches have to bear the stress of the winter storm1 that the flowers of spring may ripen the seeds which contain the potentiality of all this strength2 so do muscle1 sinew1 and brain secure the survival of the animal1 that his descendants may carry on the struggle4 ,one may liken the cellular constituents of the animal to a hive of bees with fertile drones and queen1 and sterile workers4 ,it is on the exertions of the latter that1 in the struggle for existence1 the continued existence of the swarm depends1 while it is by the pairing of the fertile drone and queen that the continuity of the race is secured4 ,no worker can transmit the qualities which are so essential to the well-being of the community4 ,but in the eggs of their sister the queen-mother these qualities lie dormant4 ,and since the race is one race1 the workers by their exertions contribute indirectly to the maintenance of those hereditary aptitudes to which they are unable to contribute directly4 ,for it is essential to bear in mind that they not only work for their own generation1 but they determine the course of heredity4 ,picture two such communities set in an environment which intensifies the struggle for existence4 ,the one is strong1 healthy1 and vigorous2 the other in all respects the reverse4 ,the incidence of the battle of life falls mainly on the workers4 ,if they succumb in the one group their fertile queen either perishes1 or gives rise to a poor stock1 certain in the long run to be eliminated4 ,but the vigorous workers in the other group survive and secure1 too1 the survival of their queen1 who1 since she is also their sister1 bears1 in her ovaries1 the good seed from which a new generation of vigorous workers shall be developed4 ,thus though the sterile bees contribute nothing directly to the heredity of the race1 they indirectly determine the direction which that heredity shall take4 ,so1 too1 in the higher animals1 the reproductive cells are the fertile sisters of a host of sterile body cells1 on which the main incidence of the struggle for existence falls4 ,their sterility precludes their directly contributing to the success of future cell-generations2 but in protecting their fertile sisters1 the reproductive cells1 they are really determining the lines along which the evolution of the race shall continue4 ,acquired characters may thus be regarded as the results of those accidents1 fortunate or the reverse as the case may be1 which happen to the body1 and more or less modify its outward form or hidden structure1 and its modes of organic behaviour2 but which1 as such1 have no direct effects for better or worse on the germinal substance4 ,all that the plant or animal can be is due to heredity2 all that it is1 to heredity and circumstance4 ,even the ability to yield to circumstance is part of heredity's dower4 ,fortunate1 then1 the plant or animal that inherits such definiteness of structure and behaviour as may fit it to its station1 together with such plasticity as may enable it to accommodate itself to those changes of environing conditions which may fall to its lot4 ,one more point must be noticed in connection with this difficult and puzzling subject4 ,the acceptance of the conclusion that acquired modes of behaviour are not hereditary nowise commits us to the belief that heredity has nothing whatever to do with them4 ,though what is acquired may not be transmitted1 what one may term the acquisitiveness is unquestionably inherited4 ,though this1 that1 or the other acquired mode of behaviour may have no direct descendants1 the power of acquiring any one of them under the appropriate circumstances is handed on as an invaluable legacy4 ,just as the mirror which has reflected a fleeting scene retains no lasting image of the bygone events1 so heredity may retain no impress of acquired characters2 but just as the mirror keeps its power of reflecting such scenes1 so does heredity transmit the power of acquiring such characters4 ,as the leaves of the oak are renewed each successive spring1 so may acquired modes of behaviour be repeated in each successive generation if only the requisite conditions recur in due season4 ,from what has preceded it may1 therefore1 be inferred that organic behaviour may arise either through modifications occurring in the plastic tissues1 or through variations having their origin in the germinal substance4 ,broadly speaking1 however1 we may regard as predominantly due to adaptation those congenital modes of behaviour and those organic responses which on their first occurrence are relatively definite in character1 and which are directed to a biological end1 for whose attainment the tissues have had no preparatory training2 and we may regard as predominantly due to accommodation those responses which are1 so to speak1 learnt by the tissues in the course of individual life4 ,both are dependent on heredity1 but in different ways4 ,what the animal owes to heredity may1 indeed1 as ,i have elsewhere said1#af be classified under two heads4 ,under the first will fall those relatively definite modes of behaviour which fit the animal to deal at once1 on their first occurrence1 with certain essential or frequently recurring conditions of the environment4 ,under the second head will fall the power of dealing with special circumstances as they arise in the course of a varied life4 ,the former may be likened to the inheritance of specific drafts for definite needs which are sure to arise in the conduct of life2 the latter to the inheritance of a legacy which may be drawn upon for any purpose as occasion may demand4 ,if the need becomes habitual the animal may1 so to speak1 instruct his banker to set aside a specific sum to meet it as it arises4 ,but this arrangement is a purely individual matter1 dictated by experience1 and in no wise enjoined by the original terms of the bequest4 ,and both types are fostered by natural selection which develops 7a7 such congenital definiteness of response1 and 7b7 such innate plasticity1 as are advantageous under the conditions of existence2 uniform conditions tending to emphasize the former1 variable conditions the latter4 ,difficult as it may be to earmark the items of the organic bequest--to say that1 of the sum of energy expended in any given case of organic behaviour1 so much is due to a specific draft definitely assigned in heredity for this particular purpose1 and so much is contributed from the general legacy of innate plasticity1--it none the less conduces to clear thinking to emphasize the logical distinction between them1 so long as it is steadily borne in mind that logical distinction does not imply biological separation4 ,the animal1 with all its varied modes of behaviour1 is an organic whole1 and as an organic whole it has been developed from the fertilized egg4 ,the very same tissues which exhibit congenital modes of behaviour are capable also of acquiring new responses and playing their part in accommodation4 ,we have not one set of organs which are the products of variation and another set which result from modification4 ,our study would no doubt be simplified if this were the case2 but it is not so4 ,and we must take the animal as we find it1 presenting varied behaviour of complex origin4 ,even the reflex nervous centres1 which are concerned in responses so automatic as to suggest a stereotyped structure of distinctively germinal origin1 are also1 as we saw at the close of the last section1 in close touch with those centres of control which are associated with the supreme power of accommodation arising from the possession of consciousness4 ,,chapter ,,ii ,,consciousness ,i4--,,the ,,conscious ,,accompaniments ,,of ,,certain ,,organic ,,changes ,it is possible that all organic behaviour is accompanied by consciousness4 ,but there is no direct means of ascertaining whether it is so or not4 ,this is1 and must remain1 a matter of more or less plausible conjecture4 ,we have1 indeed1 no direct knowledge of any consciousness save our own4 ,undue stress should not1 however1 be laid on this fundamental isolation of the individual mind4 ,we confidently infer that our fellow-men are conscious1 because they are in all essential respects like us1 and because they behave just as we do when we act under its guiding influence4 ,and on similar grounds we believe not less confidently that many animals are also conscious4 ,but how far we are justified in extending this inference it is difficult to say4 ,probably our safest criterion is afforded by circumstantial evidence that the animal in question profits by experience4 ,if1 as we watch any given creature during its life-history1 we see at first a number of congenital or acquired modes of behaviour1 we may not be able to say whether they are accompanied by consciousness or not2 but if we find that some of these are subsequently carried out more vigorously while others are checked1 we seem justified in the inference that pleasurable consciousness was associated with the results of the former1 and disagreeable consciousness with those of the latter4 ,when we see that a chick1 for example1 pecks at first at any small object1 it is difficult to say1 on these grounds1 whether it is a sentient animal or only an unconscious automaton2 and if it continued to behave in a similar fashion throughout life1 our difficulty would still remain4 ,but when we see that some objects are rejected while others are selected1 we infer that consciousness in some way guides its behaviour4 ,the chick has profited by experience4 ,but even this is clearly only a criterion of what we may term effective consciousness4 ,there may be sentience which is merely an accompaniment of organic action without any guiding influence on subsequent modes of behaviour4 ,in that case it is not effective2 and whether it is present or not we have no means of ascertaining4 ,we seem also to be led to the conclusion1 both from a priori considerations and from the results of observation1 that effective consciousness is associated with a nervous system4 ,its fundamental characteristic is control over the actions1 so that some kinds of behaviour may be carried out with increased vigour1 and others checked4 ,and it is difficult to see how this can take place unless the centres of control are different from those over which they exercise this influence4 ,if we are to understand anything definite by the guidance of consciousness1 we must conceive it as standing apart from and exercising an overruling influence over that which it guides4 ,this is unquestionably an essential characteristic of consciousness1 as generally understood by those who take the trouble to consider its relation to behaviour2 and though some would seek to persuade us that a mere accompaniment of consciousness can somehow determine the continuance or discontinuance of organic behaviour1 it is difficult to see how this can be the case4 ,the accompaniment of air-tremors can no more influence the vibrations of a sounding string than an accompaniment of consciousness can affect the nature of the organic changes in the tentacles of the ,sun-dew leaf4 ,and if1 instead of trusting to such general a priori considerations1 we study with attention the conditions under which an animal so behaves as to lead us to infer that it profits by experience1 we find that it is not the consciousness that accompanies the behaviour which leads to future guidance1 but the consciousness that arises from the results of the behaviour4 ,let us willingly grant that the newly hatched1 and as yet inexperienced chick1 when it pecks at a small object is conscious of a visual impression1 and is conscious also of movements of its neck and beak4 ,these do not constitute the experience by which it profits4 ,this is provided by the results of the pecking1 according as the morsel seized is nice or nasty4 ,we may say1 in popular language1 that the little bird remembers when it sees a similar object that the former results were pleasant or distasteful1 as the case may be2 and that it is through this remembrance that future guidance is rendered possible4 ,but all the evidence that we possess goes to show that the sensory centres1 stimulated by what we will assume to be the taste of the morsel1 are different from those which are affected by sight1 and the movements concerned in pecking4 ,so that the consciousness which is effective in guiding future action is an accompaniment of the stimulation of centres that are different from those concerned in the behaviour over which guidance is exercised4 ,and if this interpretation of the observed facts be correct1 it supports the conclusions reached from a priori considerations4 ,it seems further to show that1 not only is a nervous system necessary for the occurrence of controlled behaviour1 but that no little complexity in its intercommunications is essential4 ,it may be urged that the chick's behaviour which has been selected for purposes of illustration1 and the interpretation we have put upon it1 throws too much stress on remembrance1 so called1 and further gives the false impression that all experience must be for future guidance4 ,there are surely numberless cases1 it will be said1 in which nothing of the nature of distinct memory is involved1 and in which the guidance of consciousness is exercised at once over present behaviour1 without any postponement to the future4 ,even omitting for the present the former point1 the formula implied--that present experience is for future guidance--cannot be accepted in view of the familiar fact that present experience is constantly influencing present behaviour4 ,practically speaking1 this is perfectly true3 because1 practically1 under the term present we include quite an appreciable period of time--say1 a few seconds1 or even minutes4 ,if we narrow our conception of the present1 as is commonly done in philosophical discussions1 to the boundary line between past and future1 then it will be seen that even the guidance of what in popular speech is called present behaviour is really exercised on the subsequent phases of that behaviour4 ,at the risk of some technicality our position must be explained a little more fully4 ,it is assumed that the data of consciousness are afforded by afferent impulses coursing inwards from the organs of special sense1 or those concerned in responsive movements4 ,this conclusion rests on such a wide body of psychological inference that it may be accepted without discussion1 at any rate for our immediate purpose4 ,the efferent impulses1 those which effect the orderly contraction of the muscles1 are unconscious2 but when the movement is produced afferent impulses course inwards from the parts concerned in the behaviour1 and these may then contribute data to consciousness4 ,now let us suppose that a chick1 which has been hatched in an incubator1 be removed some twelve hours after birth1 held in the hands for a few minutes until its eyes have grown accustomed to the light1 and placed on a table near some small pieces of hard-boiled egg4 ,let us watch its behaviour and endeavour to interpret it4 ,we shall have occasion to consider hereafter whether the conscious experience of parents and ancestors is inherited as such2 for the present we will assume that it is not4 ,the chick has to acquire for itself its own experience4 ,a piece of egg catches the eye of the little bird1 which then pecks at it1 and just fails to seize it4 ,here is a piece of congenital organic behaviour4 ,taken by itself one might find it difficult to say whether it is accompanied by consciousness or not1 just as one finds it difficult to say whether the closure of the ,venus's ,fly-trap is conscious4 ,but the subsequent behaviour of the chick leads us to infer that it is a sentient animal2 and we may1 therefore1 fairly assume that it is sentient from the first4 ,dividing the course of the observed behaviour into stages1 we may say that the first stage is that in which the chick receives a visual stimulus accompanied by a sensation of sight4 ,upon this there rapidly follows the second stage1 when the bird pecks1 and its experience is widened by new data of consciousness derived from a group of motor sensations2 and upon this1 again1 there follows the third stage1 when sensations come in from the morsel of egg which the chick touched but just failed to seize4 ,after a pause the chick strikes again4 ,but we have not a mere repetition of the former sequence of stages4 ,the visual stimulus at first fell upon the eye of a wholly inexperienced bird2 now it falls upon the eye of one that has gained experience of pecking and tasting4 ,what we may call the conscious situation has completely changed1 at all events if we assume that the items of consciousness1 including as essential the consciousness of behaviour1 do not remain separate and isolated1 but have coalesced into a group through association4 ,and in this group the consciousness of behaving is perhaps the most important element in the situation1 making it of practical value4 ,what psychologists term the presentative visual stimulus1 now calls up re-presentative elements1 motor and gustatory2 and these place the situation in a wholly new aspect4 ,they give it what ,dr4 ,stout terms 8meaning40 ,on the second or third attempt the chick seizes and swallows the morsel of egg4 ,its experience is yet further widened2 and thereafter the situation has other new elements4 ,later it pecks at some nasty grub2 shakes its head1 and wipes its bill on the ground4 ,the conscious situation has for the future become more complex1 and the behaviour is henceforth differentiated into that of acceptance and that of rejection1 in each case determined by the acquired meaning in the coalescent conscious situation3 the sight of a nice piece of egg being one situation1 that of a nasty caterpillar another1 each associated with its specific behaviour-consciousness4 ,we need not carry the illustration further on these lines3 the essential feature is that experience grows by the coalescence of successive increments1 and that each increment modifies the situation which takes effect on the succeeding phases of behaviour1 even if they succeed within the fraction of a second4 ,that is what is meant by saying that present experience is for future guidance4 ,the future need not be remote1 but may be so immediate that in popular speech we may say that it is not future but present guidance which is rendered possible4 ,we may now turn for a moment to the criticism that there are numberless cases in which nothing of the nature of distinct memory is involved4 ,we may now substitute for the word remembrance1 which was used above1 the more technical term re-presentation4 ,profiting by experience1 regarded as a criterion of the presence of effective consciousness1 involves re-presentative elements in the conscious situation which carry with them meaning4 ,let us for the moment assume an ultra-sceptical attitude with regard to any conscious accompaniment4 ,the chick when it pecks1 let us say1 is an unconscious automaton4 ,it seizes a piece of egg2 this affords an unconscious stimulus1 which sets agoing unconscious acts of swallowing2 or it seizes a piece of meal soaked in quinine1 which sets agoing unconscious acts of rejection and touches the hidden springs which make the automaton wipe its bill4 ,so far we find no great difficulty4 ,it is when we have to consider subsequent behaviour that a severe strain is felt on this method of interpretation4 ,one can understand an automatic action repeated again and again as often as the stimulus is repeated4 ,but the chick may shake its head and wipe its bill on the mere sight of the quinine-soaked meal1 which1 on the hypothesis of conscious experience1 has already proved distasteful4 ,so that if we accept the unconscious automaton theory we must assume an organic association which closely simulates the conscious association to which our own experience testifies4 ,but the associations which take part in the guidance of behaviour in the chick are so varied and delicate1 so closely resemble those which in ourselves imply conscious guidance1 that a sceptical attitude throws more strain upon our credulity than the acceptance of the current belief in conscious control4 ,we shall therefore assume that evidence for such coalescent association is also evidence of the presence of effective consciousness4 ,it may still be said1 however1 that in selecting an example from so highly organized an animal as a bird1 we are taking for granted that a complex case of controlled behaviour may fairly be accepted as a type of more simple cases4 ,unfortunately the only being with whose power of conscious control we have any first-hand acquaintance is possessed of a nervous system even more complex than that of the chick4 ,our psychological interpretations are inevitably anthropomorphic4 ,all we can hope to do is to reduce our anthropomorphic conclusions to their simplest expression4 ,the irreducible residuum seems to be that wherever an animal1 no matter how lowly its station in the scale of life1 profits by experience1 and gives evidence of association1 it must have some dim remembrance1 or1 let us now say1 some re-presentation1 of the results of previous behaviour which enters into and remodels the conscious situation2 that through the re-presentative elements behaviour is somehow guided2 and1 further1 that the centre of conscious control is different from the centre of response over which the control is exercised4 ,,ii4--,,the ,,early ,,stages ,,of ,,mental ,,development ,we use the phrase 8mental development0 in its broadest acceptation as inclusive of1 and applicable to1 all phases of effective consciousness4 ,we shall assume that throughout this development there is a concomitant development of nerve-centres and of their organic connections4 ,and we shall further assume that experience1 as such1 is not inherited4 ,the nature of the grounds on which the latter assumption is based must first be briefly indicated4 ,it is commonly asserted that fear of man1 the inveterate hunter and sportsman1 is inherited by many animals1 as is also that of other natural enemies4 ,this is1 however1 questioned1 or even denied1 by many careful observers4 ,mr4 ,w4 ,h4 ,hudson has an excellent chapter on 8,fear in ,birds0 in his 8,naturalist in ,la ,plata10 and concludes that fear of particular enemies is1 in nearly all cases1 the result of experience individually acquired4 ,i have found that pheasants1 partridges1 plovers1 domestic chicks1 and other young birds1 hatched in an incubator1 show no signs of fear in the presence of dog or cat1 so long as the animal is not aggressive4 ,it should be mentioned1 however1 that ,miss ,m4 ,hunt#ag asserts that chicks do show inherited fear of the cat4 ,dr4 ,thorndike's#ah observations1 on the other hand1 support my own1 which ,i have since repeated with the same results4 ,neither birds nor small mammals show any signs of fear of stealthily moving snakes4 ,my fox terrier smelt1 nose to nose1 a young lamb which was lying alone in a field4 ,i was close at hand1 and could detect no indication of alarm on the part of the lamb till the mother came running up in great excitement4 ,then the lamb ran off to her dam4 ,whenever opportunity has arisen1 ,i have introduced young kittens to my fox terrier1 and have never seen any sign of inherited fear4 ,he was a great hunter of strange cats1 but was trained to behave politely to all birds and beasts within the precincts of my study4 ,it is true that he was on good terms1 or at least terms of permissive neutrality1 with the kittens' mother4 ,and it may be said that this was inherited2 but such an argument cannot apply in the case of pheasant or lamb4 ,here1 as throughout our study of animal behaviour in its conscious aspect1 we have not only to conduct observations with due care1 but to draw inferences with due caution4 ,douglas ,spalding described how newly hatched turkeys showed signs of alarm at the cry of a hawk2 and he inferred that1 since this sound was quite new to their individual experience1 the alarm was due to the inheritance of ancestral experience of hawks4 ,but since young birds show signs of alarm at any sudden and unaccustomed sound--a sneeze1 the noise of a toy horn1 a loud violin note1 and so forth--the safer inference seems to be that they may be frightened by strange sounds of many kinds4 ,but this does not imply the inheritance of experience1 which is essentially a discriminating process4 ,there is no sufficient evidence that a peculiar cry suggests the hawk1 of which the progenitors have acquired bitter experience2 nothing to justify the belief that the sound carries with it inherited meaning4 ,and as with hearing1 so with sight4 ,young birds may be frightened by many strange objects4 ,i have seen a group of several species1 filled with apparent alarm at a large white jug suddenly placed among them1 at balls of paper tossed towards them1 at a handkerchief dropped in their midst4 ,it is1 in fact1 their inexperience which is often the condition of such fear4 ,as ,mr4 ,hudson says3#ai 8,a piece of newspaper carried accidentally by the wind is as great an object of terror to an inexperienced young bird as a buzzard sweeping down with death in its talons40 ,until recently it was commonly asserted that birds avoid gaudy but nauseous or harmful insects through the inheritance of experience gained by their ancestors through many generations4 ,but here again the inference seems to have been incautiously drawn4 ,of the hundreds of young birds ,i have had under observation1 not one has avoided the peculiarly distasteful cinnabar caterpillar1 until it had gained for itself experience of its nauseous character4 ,so too of wasps and bees4 ,only through experience are these avoided4 ,it is true that chicks may shrink from them if they buzz or even walk rapidly towards them4 ,but a large harmless fly will inspire just as much timidity4 ,as the result of careful observations1 ,mr4 ,frank ,finn#bj concludes 8that each bird has to separately acquire its experience1 and well remembers what it has learnt40 ,and with this conclusion my own observations are entirely in accord4 ,such is some of the observational evidence on which is based the provisional hypothesis that experience1 as such1 is not inherited4 ,what1 then1 is inherited8 ,clearly the organic conditions under which experience can be acquired4 ,since a young bird inherits a tendency to peck at small objects1 especially1 in the case of some birds such as plovers or partridges1 at small moving objects1 opportunities are afforded for discrimination in accordance with the results of experience4 ,since its inherited timidity leads the chick to shrink from many things seen or heard1 a wide range of conscious data is supplied4 ,inheritance provides the raw material of organic behaviour for effective consciousness to deal with in accordance with the results which are its data4 ,having thus cleared the ground and laid bare some at least of the assumptions which we accept as foundations on which to build1 we may now follow up the line of treatment which was suggested in the first section of this chapter4 ,remembering that our aim is to understand the influence of consciousness on behaviour--or1 in more accurate1 if more cumbrous phraseology1 the influence of certain nerve-centres which have for their concomitant what we have termed effective consciousness--the questions which present themselves in any given case are3 ,what is the conscious situation which is effective in guidance8 what elements enter into the situation1 whence are they derived1 and how were they introduced8 how do they take effect in behaviour8 ,if it be true that1 in many of the lower forms of life1 consciousness or sentience1 though presumably present in some dim form1 is merely an accompaniment of organic behaviour without reaching the level of recognizable effectiveness2 and if1 during the development of one of the higher animals from the fertilized ovum1 the early stages of organic behaviour are in like manner merely sentient2 it follows that1 when effective consciousness enters upon the scene 7who can say at what exact stage of evolution871 it finds itself a partner in a going concern4 ,much organic business is being transacted with orderly regularity2 preparations have been made for more extensive operations2 and energies lying dormant1 or expending themselves aimlessly in starts and twitches1 await the guidance which shall direct them to higher and wider biological ends4 ,or1 to vary the analogy1 consciousness is the heir to a wide estate1 over which he has no control until he comes of age4 ,up to that time the estate is managed in strict accordance with the dictates of the hereditary bequest4 ,he may be aware of what is going on1 but merely as a spectator without power of interference4 ,and when he comes into possession his first business is to gather up the threads4 ,he must learn bit by bit how the estate is being managed1 that he may have data for the guidance of his own management within the wise limits of the hereditary entail4 ,now1 when a mammal is born1 a bird is hatched1 an insect emerges from the chrysalis1 we have1 if not the beginning1 at any rate a great and sudden extension of the range of effective consciousness4 ,in the case of the mammal and bird the experience gained in the womb or within the egg-shell is presumably of little value for the wider life upon which an entrance is made4 ,it is true that an insect has passed through a previous stage of active and no doubt consciously guided existence as a caterpillar4 ,but we do not know whether the experience thus acquired is effectual for use in the later imago stage4 ,and we may perhaps infer from the extensive remodelling of the nervous system1 which occurs during the chrysalis sleep1 that this itself serves to break the continuity of experience4 ,in any case the newly hatched chick1 if it inherit no experience1 and can have gained little of guiding value in the egg1 enters upon a situation which from the number and variety of the data supplied may well seem to us bewildering4 ,if we picture ourselves in such a position1 with sights1 sounds1 motor sensations1 touches1 and pressures raining in upon a virgin experience1 we wonder how we should make a beginning2 how we could possibly decide on the first step towards reducing this multiplicity and diversity to something like unity and order4 ,and perhaps we wonder how we ourselves made a beginning when we were pink newly born babies4 ,if it may be said without paradox1 we never did make a beginning4 ,the beginning was made for us4 ,for we habitually associate ourselves with the control centres1 and regard our bodies1 like our watches1 as ours and not us4 ,we wind the bodily watch1 and set its hands from time to time2 but we did not make it1 and it was already going when heredity handed it to us over the counter of birth4 ,the first step towards reducing the seeming chaos of sensory experience to something like order is not due to the selection by consciousness of this or that element for prominence among the rest1 but to the thrusting forward of certain modes of behaviour by the conditions of organic life4 ,the differentiation of the field of vision in the chick is not effected by any conscious determination to fix the attention on that wriggling maggot1 but through the congenital response it calls forth4 ,this serves not only to make the grub stand out clearly amid its surroundings1 but also to emphasize a motor group1 called into vigorous action in the midst of other motor sensations1 and1 in rapid sequence1 to lay stress on a sensation of taste suddenly called into prominence4 ,nor1 as we have seen1 do the organic effects cease here4 ,the functional action of three sensory centres is thus called into play4 ,but they are constituent parts of one nervous system4 ,the direct stimulation of each by nerve impulses from eye1 motor organs1 and beak1 gives temporary predominance to certain sensory data which are termed presentative4 ,but the several centres are connected with each other4 ,and thenceforward1 in subsequent stages of experience1 the direct stimulation of the visual centre indirectly calls into play the other two1 so that the presentation through sight evolves re-presentations of the motor group1 and of taste4 ,hence sentience is not sufficient for guidance2 there must be consentience involving the presence of several elements4 ,but these elements must not be regarded as separate save in our analysis2 they form constituent parts of the coalescent situation as a whole1 of which alone the chick is presumably conscious1 without analysis of detail4 ,it is just because the chick is a going concern when consciousness comes of age and begins to assume control--just because a wide range of congenital behaviour is part of the organic heritage--that the early stages of the acquisition of experience proceed so rapidly and so smoothly4 ,the animal has not to make and fashion the early conscious situations2 it has only to accept them4 ,it has not at first to enforce order on the multiplicity of sensory data raining in upon the conscious centres2 it has only to take note of the existing order among them4 ,it has not painfully to learn how to co-ordinate the efferent impulses proceeding to the many muscles concerned in some simple response2 it has only to be sensitive to the response as a whole4 ,it has not to select the association of this1 that1 and the other group of data within a coalescent situation2 organic behaviour provides it with predetermined sequences ready made--sequences which have for generations received the emphatic sanction of natural selection4 ,congenital tendencies which it has inherited but not acquired determine all its earliest behaviour1 determine what elements in the sensory complex shall be thrust into conscious prominence1 determine in what manner these data shall be associated2 determine1 in fact1 what salient points in the developing situations shall stand out clearly from the rest1 and how these salient points shall be grouped and linked by the connecting threads of association and shall coalesce into effective wholes4 ,and if in the comparatively helpless human infant the congenital modes of response seem less organized than those of the chick1 if there is a larger percentage of random and apparently aimless movements1 if the organic management of the bodily estate is less definitely ordered by the terms of the hereditary bequest1 if there is more of maternal guidance and fosterage2 still the data are provided in a substantially similar way4 ,the situations are indeed destined to become more complex1 the distinctions which arise in consciousness are more numerous1 the coalescence and association include a wider range and succession of salient points2 a longer time is required to become acquainted with the transactions of a business conducted in a far greater number of centres3 but1 at least in the early stages1 the data are of the same kind1 and are emphasized in the same way4 ,presentation and re-presentation play a similar rle2 and the chief difference lies in the fact that less stereotyped congenital behaviour is supplemented by some guidance1 probably far less than is generally supposed1 from those who lovingly minister to the course of infant development4 ,no attempt can here be made to trace even in outline 7an outline which must in any case be imaginary and conjectural7 the sequence of situations which marks the course of mental development in its earlier stages4 ,an example may1 however1 serve to show how the exercise of congenital tendencies may give rise to a new situation1 and lead to a further development of behaviour4 ,i kept some young chicks in my study in an improvised pen floored with newspaper1 the edges of which were turned up and supported1 to form frail but sufficient retaining walls4 ,one of the little birds1 a week old1 stood near the corner of the pen1 pecking vigorously and persistently at something1 which proved to be the number on the page of the turned-up newspaper4 ,he then transferred his attention and his efforts to the corner of the paper just within his reach4 ,seizing this1 he pulled at it1 bending the newspaper down1 and thus making a breach in the wall of the pen4 ,through this he stepped forth into the wider world of my study4 ,i restored the paper as before1 caught the bird1 and replaced him near the scene of his former efforts4 ,he again pecked at the corner of the paper1 pulled it down1 and escaped4 ,i then put him back as far as possible from the spot4 ,presently he came round to the same corner1 repeated his previous behaviour1 and again made his escape4 ,now1 here the inherited tendency to peck at small objects led1 through the drawing down of the paper1 to a new situation1 of which advantage was taken4 ,the little drama consisted of two scenes1 which may be sufficiently described as 8the corner of the pen10 and 8the open way10 this being the sequence in experience4 ,subsequently the first scene was again enacted in presentative terms1 and there followed first a re-presentation of scene ii41 with its associated behaviour1 and then the presentative repetition of this scene4 ,we may take this as a sample of the nature of a conscious situation which is effective in guidance4 ,we have seen the nature of the elements 7sensory data1 including as essential those supplied by the behaviour itself1 with a pleasurable or painful tone7 which enter into such a situation2 we have seen that they owe their primary origin to direct presentation1 but that they may be subsequently introduced indirectly in re-presentative form2 we have seen that the situation as a whole results from the coalescence of the data4 ,there only remains the question how the felt situation takes effect on behaviour4 ,and to this question1 unfortunately1 we can give but a meagre and incomplete reply4 ,all we can say is1 that connections seem to be in some way established between the centres of conscious control and the centres of congenital response2 and that through these channels the responsive behaviour may be either checked or augmented 7as a whole or in part71 according to the tone1 disagreeable or pleasant1 that suffuses the situation4 ,how this is effected we do not fully know4 ,,iii4--,,later ,,phases ,,in ,,mental ,,development ,some surprise may be felt that in our brief discussion of the early stages of mental development nothing has been said of percepts and concepts1 nothing of abstraction or generalization4 ,the omission is not only due to a desire to avoid the subtle technicalities of psychological nomenclature4 ,it is partly due to the wish not to forejudge a difficult question of interpretation4 ,spirited passages of arms from time to time take place between psychologists in opposing camps1 as to whether animals are or are not capable of forming abstract and general ideas2 and untrained camp followers hang on the skirts of the fray1 making a good deal of noise with blank-cartridge4 ,the question at issue turns partly on the definitions of technical terms2 partly1 when there is agreement on this point1 on the interpretation to be put on certain modes of behaviour4 ,nothing seems at first sight much easier than to say what we mean by an abstract idea or by a general idea4 ,we are thinking about colour1 which is both abstract and general--abstract1 because in itself it is a special quality of visible objects floated off1 so to speak1 from other qualities1 such as hardness and weight1 shape and size2 general1 because it includes many different colours in one group4 ,looking up at the bookshelves1 we see a volume with a red back4 ,we neglect the shape1 the contents1 the lettering2 it is the colour with which we are immediately concerned1 which forms an important feature in the present thought-situation2 and this is1 in virtue of that situation1 abstracted from the rest4 ,but a chick a few days old may have acquired experience of several kinds of caterpillars much alike in shape and size2 of which1 one kind is ringed with orange and black4 ,and while the others are eagerly seized1 caterpillars of this kind are left untouched4 ,it is not the size or the shape which is an effective element in the situation2 it is the peculiar coloration of the cinnabar caterpillars4 ,now1 does the effectiveness of this quality in the stimulus justify the inference that the chick forms an abstract idea of colour8 ,that clearly depends on our definition of abstract idea1 and on our inferences concerning the nature of the chick's mind4 ,a dog lies dozing upon the mat1 and hears a step in the porch without4 ,his behaviour at once shows that this enters into the conscious situation4 ,there is1 moreover1 a marked difference according as the step has the familiar fall of the master's tread1 the well-known shuffle of the irrepressible butcher's lad1 or an unfamiliar sound4 ,these several situations are1 without question1 nicely distinguished4 ,let us suppose the situation of the moment is introduced by a strange footfall4 ,it seems to suggest man2 but this cannot be any particular man1 since he is as yet invisible and is a stranger4 ,does the dog1 then1 frame a general idea of man8 ,does the chamois do so when1 bounding across the snow field1 he stops suddenly on scenting the distant footprints of a mountaineer8 ,do you do so when you hear the bleating of an invisible lamb in the meadow behind yonder wall8 ,here1 again1 the answers we give to these questions depend partly on the exact meaning of the term 8general idea20 partly on our interpretation of what passes through the mind of the being concerned4 ,we have sought1 so far1 rather to avoid than to answer these questions4 ,we seem to be on safe ground so long as we content ourselves with saying that the orange and black of the cinnabar caterpillar1 the strange footfall1 or the trail of the mountaineer1 enter as effective elements into the immediate conscious situation4 ,but when we pass to the higher phases of mental development we can no longer wholly ignore such questions4 ,when we are dealing with intellectual human beings1 there can be no doubt that they at least are capable of framing1 with definite intention1 and of set purpose1 both general and abstract conceptions4 ,and how do they reach these conceptions8 ,by reviewing a number of past situations1 analyzing them1 intentionally disentangling and isolating for the purposes of their thought certain elements which they contain1 and classifying these abstracts under genera and species--that is to say1 into broader and narrower groups4 ,the primary and proximate object of this process is to reach a scheme of thought by which the scheme of nature1 as given in experience1 can be explained4 ,and1 no doubt1 underlying this primary object is the purpose of guiding future behaviour in accordance with the rational scheme which is thus attained4 ,man is sometimes described as par excellence the being who looks before and after4 ,all his greatest achievements are due to his powers of reflection and foresight4 ,what share the symbolism of speech takes in the process briefly indicated in the last paragraph is the subject of much discussion4 ,without going so far as to urge that the very beginnings of reflective thought are inexplicable without its aid1 it may be accepted as obviously true that words are a great assistance4 ,they may be regarded as intellectual pegs upon which we hang the results of abstraction and generalization4 ,it may be said that we often think in pictures or images1 and not in words1 but the more abstract and general our thought1 the more it is dependent on the symbolic elements4 ,we may say1 then1 that the higher phases of mental development are characterized by the fact that the situations contain the products of reflective thought1 presumably absent in the earlier stages2 they are further characterized by a new purpose or end of consciousness1 namely1 to explain the situations hitherto merely accepted as they are given in presentation or re-presentation2 they require deliberate attention to the relationships which hold good among the several elements of successive situations2 and they involve1 so far as behaviour is concerned1 the intentional application of an ideal scheme with the object of rational guidance4 ,we shall follow ,dr4 ,stout in terming this later stage of mental development the ideational stage2 and in speaking of the simpler situations considered in the preceding section as belonging to the perceptual stage4 ,it should be observed that we are not attempting to determine just where1 in the scale of organic existence1 the line between the perceptual and the ideational stages of mental development is to be drawn4 ,we are certainly very far from asserting that the one does not give rise to the other in the course of an evolution which is orderly and progressive4 ,we are merely contrasting the rational guidance of effective consciousness at its best with the earlier embryonic condition out of which it has arisen by natural genesis4 ,in doing this we have been forced to make some reference to the difficulties of technical nomenclature4 ,and some further reference is necessary lest our point of view be misunderstood4 ,we shall regard these abstract and general ideas as the products of an intentional purpose directed to the special end of isolating the one and of classifying the other2 we shall reserve the term rational for the conduct which is guided in accordance with an ideal scheme or deliberate plan of action2 while for behaviour to the guidance of which no such reflection and deliberation seems to have contributed we shall reserve the term intelligent4 ,if1 for example1 the rejection of a cinnabar caterpillar by the chick is the direct result of experience through the re-presentation in the new situation of certain elements introduced during the development of a like situation1 we shall call it an intelligent act4 ,but if we have grounds for supposing that the situation is reflectively considered by the chick in relation to an ideal and more or less definitely conceived plan of action which is 7perhaps dimly7 taking form in its mind1 we shall regard it as so far rational4 ,and so1 too1 in other cases of animal behaviour4 ,now1 with regard to the control through which consciousness is effective in the guidance of behaviour1 it is necessary1 in view of these considerations1 to distinguish its intelligent from its rational exercise4 ,and this is of importance since we generally speak of control in the latter sense in reference to human conduct4 ,intelligent control 7on the perceptual plane7 is due to the direct operation of the results of experience without the intervention of any generalized conception or ideal4 ,in rational control 7on the ideational plane71 such conceptions and ideals exert a controlling influence4 ,if1 to prevent a boy sucking his thumb we administer bitter aloes1 we trust to intelligent control through the immediate effects of experience2 but if he be induced to give up the habit because it is babyish1 he so far exercises rational control4 ,what we call self-control is of this type4 ,only one more distinction need be drawn4 ,intelligent behaviour1 founded on direct association gained through previous experience1 we shall attribute to impulse2 but for rational conduct1 the outcome of reflection and deliberation1 we seek to ascertain the motive4 ,in human affairs our motives are referred to certain categories each of which presupposes an ideal scheme1 prudential1 sthetic1 ethical1 or other4 ,to act from motive and not from impulse is to act deliberately1 because we judge the action to be expedient1 seemly1 or right1 as the case may be4 ,if1 then1 we contrast the lower perceptual stages of mental evolution with the higher ideational phases1 the former includes behaviour due to impulse2 but from it conduct due to motive is excluded4 ,,iv4--,,the ,,evolution ,,of ,,consciousness ,the origin of consciousness1 like that of matter or energy1 appears to be beyond the pale of scientific discussion4 ,the appearance of effective consciousness on the scene of life does indeed seem to justify the belief in the prior existence of sentience as the mere accompaniment of organic behaviour4 ,ex nihilo nihil fit4 ,and since effective consciousness must1 on this principle1 be developed from something1 it is reasonable to assume that this something is pre-existing sentience4 ,again1 we may assume that this sentience is a concomitant of all life-processes1 or only of some4 ,but we have no criterion by which we can hope to determine which of these alternatives is the more probable4 ,we appear1 however1 at all events to have evidence that when effective consciousness does enter on the scene and play its part in the guidance of behaviour1 its progress is1 in technical phraseology1 marked by that differentiation of conscious elements1 and that integration of these differentiated items1 which are seemingly the correlatives of the differentiation and integration of nervous systems4 ,there is thus1 presumably1 a progressive development of orderly complexity in the conscious situations of which controlled or guided behaviour is the outcome4 ,and when this has reached a certain stage--what stage it is most difficult to determine--the relationships1 at first implicit in the conscious situations1 as they naturally arise in the course of experience1 begin to be rendered explicit with the dawn of reflection4 ,intentional abstraction and generalization to which data are afforded by the reiterated emphasis in experience of the salient features in successive situations1 supply new elements to the more highly developed situations of rational life4 ,ideal schemes and plans of action1 the products of reflection and foresight1 take form in the mind and enter into the conscious situation4 ,and the intelligent animal1 hitherto the creature of impulse1 guided only by the pleasurable or painful tone which gives colour to experience1 becomes a rational being1 capable of judging how far his own behaviour and that of others is conformable to an ideal4 ,if1 then1 we were asked to characterize in the briefest possible terms the stages of conscious evolution1 we should say that in the first stage we have consciousness as accompaniment2 in the second1 consciousness as guide2 in the third1 consciousness as judge4 ,and if we were pressed to apply distinctive terms to these three1 we should adopt ,st4 ,george ,mivart's term consentience for the mid-phase1 and speak of mere sentience in the first stage2 consentience in the second2 and consciousness1 with restricted signification1 in the third and highest stage4 ,such a distinction in terms is1 however1 a counsel of perfection1 and we shall not attempt to preserve it in the following pages1 in which the word 8consciousness0 will be used in a comprehensive sense4 ,ever since the publication of ,darwin's 8,origin of ,species10 evolutionists have been divided into two sections where consciousness in the narrower sense is under discussion4 ,the members of the one have contended that1 though the physical and perhaps the lower mental nature of man is the outcome of evolutionary process1 his higher mental attributes are of other origin4 ,the members of the second section have urged that the higher not less than the lower characteristics of the mind of man have been evolved4 ,it is somewhat strange that naturalists who accept the latter position are not infrequently impatient when any serious attempt is made to discuss it from the standpoint of psychology4 ,it is1 however1 becoming more and more clearly evident that the discussion of the relation of the animal to the human mind1 if it is to be made a subject of scientific inquiry1 must be conducted on psychological lines by those who have devoted years of study to the subject4 ,in this work such a discussion will be attempted1 and animal behaviour will be treated as the precursor of human conduct1 and as affording evidence of the germs from which the distinctively human mental attributes may have been evolved4 ,,chapter ,,iii ,,instinctive ,,behaviour ,i4--,,definition ,,of ,,instinctive ,,behaviour ,there are probably few subjects which have afforded more material for wonder and pious admiration than the instinctive endowments of animals4 8,i look upon instinct10 wrote ,addison in one of his graceful essays1 8as upon the principle of gravitation in bodies1 which is not to be explained by any known qualities inherent in the bodies themselves1 nor from any laws of mechanism1 but as an immediate impression from the first ,mover and the ,divine ,energy acting in the creatures40#ba ,in like manner ,spence said3 8,we may call the instincts of animals those faculties implanted in them by the ,creator1 by which1 independent of instruction1 observation or experience1 and without a knowledge of the end in view1 they are all alike impelled to the performance of certain actions tending to the well-being of the individual and the preservation of the species40#bb ,according to such views1 instinct is an ultimate principle the natural genesis of which is beyond the pale of explanation4 ,but similar views were1 at the time these passages were written1 held to apply1 not only to animal behaviour1 but also to animal structure4 ,the development of the stag's antler1 or of the insect's wing1 was also regarded as 8an immediate impression from the first ,mover and the ,divine ,energy acting in the creatures40 ,this view1 however1 is1 neither in the case of structure nor in the case of behaviour1 that entertained by modern science4 ,it is indeed an expression of opinion concerning the metaphysics of instinct4 ,leaving the question of ultimate origin precisely where it stood in the times of ,addison and of ,spence1 modern science seeks to trace the natural antecedents of all natural phenomena1 and regards structure and behaviour alike as the products of evolution1 endeavouring to explain the manner of their genetic origin in terms of progressive heredity4 ,omitting1 therefore1 all reference to problems which1 however important1 are beyond the limits of scientific inquiry1#bc we may take as a basis for further discussion ,spence's definition1 according to which the instincts of animals are those faculties by which1 independent of instruction1 observation1 or experience1 and without a knowledge of the end in view1 they are all alike impelled to the performance of certain actions tending to their own well-being and the preservation of the species4 ,let us first consider the reference of instinctive actions to a faculty by which animals are said to be impelled to their performance4 ,paley also defined instinct as 8a propensity prior to experience40 ,and unquestionably in the popular conception it is usual to attribute instinctive acts to some such conscious cause4 ,but it will be more convenient1 for the present1 to consider instinctive behaviour from the objective point of view1 as it is presented to our observation2 we may then proceed to the further consideration of the conscious concomitants which may be inferred4 ,from the objective point of view1 therefore1 we may agree with ,professor ,groos1 who says#bd that 8the idea of consciousness must be rigidly excluded from any definition of instinct which is to be of practical utility10 since 8it is always hazardous in scientific investigation to allow an hypothesis which cannot be tested empirically40 ,in this we have the support of ,dr4 and ,mrs4 ,peckham1 whose studies of the life-histories of spiders and wasps are models of careful and patient investigation4 8,under the term ,instinct10 they say1 8we place all complex acts which are performed previous to experience1 and in a similar manner by all members of the same sex and race1 leaving out as non-essential1 at this time1 the question of whether they are or are not accompanied by consciousness40#be ,it may be said1 however1 that some reference to the conscious aspect of instinctive behaviour is implied by saying that the acts are performed without instruction or experience4 ,but the reference at present is wholly negative4 ,we may say1 as the result of observation1 that instinctive acts are performed under such circumstances as exclude the possibility of guidance in the light of individual experience1 and render it in the highest degree improbable that there exists any idea of the end to be attained4 ,but this is a very different position from that of asserting the presence of a positive faculty or propensity which impels an animal to the performance of certain actions4 ,this it is which1 from the observational point of view1 is unnecessary4 ,for the reference of a given type of observed behaviour to a 8propensity0 so to behave or to a 8faculty0 of thus behaving1 is no more helpful than the reference of the development of any given type of structure to a 8potentiality0 so to develop4 ,we may1 therefore1 without loss of precision1 simplify ,spence's definition by stating that instinctive behaviour is independent of instruction and experience1 and tends to the well-being of the individual and the preservation of the species4 ,let us next consider the clause which affirms that instinctive behaviour is prior to experience4 ,this is well in line with the distinction now drawn by biologists between congenital and acquired characters4 ,it refers them to the former category1 and implies that the organic mechanism by which they are rendered possible is of germinal origin4 ,this is not1 however1 universally admitted4 ,professor ,wundt1 for example1 approaching the subject from the point of view afforded by the study of man and the higher animals1 gives to the term a wider meaning1 and so defines instinct as to include acquired habits4 8,movements10 he says1#bf 8which originally followed upon simple or compound voluntary acts1 but which have become wholly or partly mechanized in the course of individual life1 or of generic evolution1 we term instinctive actions40 ,in accordance with this definition1 instincts fall into two groups4 ,those 8which1 so far as we can tell1 have been developed during the life of the individual1 and in the absence of definite individual influences might have remained wholly undeveloped1 may be called acquired instincts40 ,they have become instinctive through repetition4 8,to be distinguished from these acquired human instincts are others which are connate40 ,now1 there can be no question that behaviour which has become habitual through frequent repetition is frequently1 in popular speech1 described as instinctive4 ,we hear it said that the experienced cyclist guides his machine instinctively4 ,and the word is similarly used in many like cases4 ,but we shall find it conducive to precision and clearness of thought to emphasize the distinction between what is acquired in the course of life and what is congenital in the race4 ,and to this end we shall regard behaviour which has 8become mechanized in the course of individual life0 as due to acquired habit1 reserving the term instinctive for such behaviour as is independent of individual experience4 ,we shall1 in short1 so far accept ,spence's definition4 ,in this definition1 as in those of the majority of naturalists1 it seems to be further implied that instinctive behaviour is of a relatively definite kind1 though it is no doubt subject to such variation as is found in animal structure and organization4 ,mr4 ,rutgers ,marshall1 however1 in a recent work1#bg protests against any such implication1 and urges that 8this variableness is so wide that definiteness of reaction cannot for a moment be used as a differentia in relation to instinct without narrowing our conception of the bounds of instinct in a manner to be deplored40 8,the actions10 he says1 8connected with the preparation for self-defence1 those connected with protection of the young1 with nest-building1 with migration1 etc41 these actions are surely to be classed as instinctive2 and yet they are exceedingly variable and unpredictable in detail2 all that we can predict is the general trend of the varying actions which result from varying stimuli under varying conditions1 and which function to some determinate biological end40 ,mr4 ,marshall then proceeds to argue that we are 8warranted in speaking of the ethical instincts1 of the patriotic instincts1 of the benevolent instincts1 and of the artistic instincts20 and thus leads up to the position1 to be further elaborated in his work1 that there exists in man a religious instinct which has fulfilled a function of biological value in the development of our race4 ,now1 here again there is much in popular usage of the words instinct and instinctive which lends support1 for what it is worth1 to ,mr4 ,marshall's very broad conception of the range of instinct4 ,again and again we hear1 in the pulpit and elsewhere1 of the religious instinct2 we hear1 too1 of the benevolent1 patriotic1 and artistic instincts1 and more besides4 ,but what we are endeavouring to define is a type of behaviour which1 as such1 is prior to instruction and experience4 ,can we affirm that patriotic and religious behaviour conforms to such a type8 ,is it unquestionably congenital and not acquired8 ,if we are forced to give negative answers to these questions we must regard ,mr4 ,marshall's conception of instinct 7one inclusive of multifarious tendencies which have a biological value7 as too broad and too vague to be of any service to us at this stage of our study of animal behaviour4 ,what1 then1 shall we understand by ,spence's phrase that instinct involves the performance of 8certain actions08 ,and how far shall we accept it8 ,we shall take it as implying so much definiteness of behaviour as renders instinctive acts susceptible of scientific investigation1 and in this sense shall accept it with some modification of phraseology4 ,we shall freely admit1 however1 the existence of variations of instinctive behaviour analogous to variations in animal structure4 ,it is the occurrence of such variations that renders the natural selection of instinctive modes of behaviour conceivable4 ,we shall also admit some1 nay much1 variation in detail4 ,take1 for example1 two of the cases which ,mr4 ,marshall cites--nest-building and migration4 ,both involve1 not merely a simple response to a given stimulus1 but a complex sequence of actions4 ,in detail there may be much variation even among members of the same species4 ,and yet1 can it be questioned that the behaviour as a whole is in each case relatively definite8 ,may we not even say that it is remarkably definite8 ,may we not even go further1 and assert that only on the assumption that any given instinctive act is relatively definite1 can we regard it as a subject for scientific investigation1 and can we hope to distinguish it from other modes of behaviour8 ,the next point for consideration in ,spence's definition1 which we have taken as our text1 is his characterization of instinctive acts as 8tending to the well-being of the individual and the preservation of the species40 ,here we have ,mr4 ,marshall with us1 for he too lays stress on the fact that instinctive behaviour has reference to a definite biological end4 ,but in saying that the biological end is the objective mark of an instinct1#bh he seems to be in error4 ,because1 in the first place1 there are other 8objective marks10 and because1 in the second place1 this objective mark is not restricted to instinctive behaviour4 ,according to ,spence1 a further characteristic of instinctive acts is that they are independent of instruction or experience2 and this serves to differentiate them from other modes of behaviour which are also subservient to a biological end4 ,intelligent behaviour1 not less than that which we term instinctive1 has reference to a biological end4 ,many intelligent acts1 for example1 have for their object the well-being of the individual2 many subserve race preservation2 these bear1 every whit as much as instinctive acts1 the 8objective mark0 which ,mr4 ,marshall regards as characteristic of instinct4 ,and if we turn to his subjective criterion--the absence of any conception of the biological end which the behaviour subserves--,mr4 ,marshall's position is equally untenable4 ,there are thousands of acquired modes of behaviour1 dependent on instruction or experience1 in which there is1 on the subjective side1 so far as we can judge1 no conception of the biological end to be attained4 ,what can the animal in the early stages of intelligence know of biological ends8 ,mr4 ,marshall's subjective criterion applies just as much to a wide range of intelligent behaviour as it does to instinctive actions4 ,in accepting1 therefore1 ,spence's statement that when animals behave instinctively they perform1 without a knowledge of the end in view1 certain actions tending to their own well-being and the preservation of the species1 we must take it in connection with the preceding limitation1 remembering that they are also performed without instruction and experience4 ,a further point for very brief consideration is suggested by the phrase in which ,spence says that animals are all alike impelled to the performance of certain actions4 ,as it stands it is too sweeping and general4 ,still1 we do require some explicit statement of the facts which he had in mind when he wrote the words 8all alike40 ,and we find it with sufficient exactness in ,dr4 ,peckham's definition1 where he comprises under the category of instinctive behaviour 8all complex acts which are performed previous to experience1 and in a similar manner by all members of the same sex and race40 ,this places congenital behaviour in line with morphological structure as a subject for comparative treatment4 ,one more question remains4 ,what shall we understand by 8complex acts08 ,in the first place1 it is well to restrict the term instinctive to co-ordinated actions2 and this implies the presence of nerve-centres by which the co-ordination is effected4 ,we thus exclude the organic behaviour of plants1 since there is no evidence in the vegetable kingdom of co-ordinating centres4 ,in the second place1 the co-ordination is1 as we have seen1 congenital1 and not acquired in the course of individual experience4 ,young water-birds1 and indeed young chicks1 as soon as they are born1 and have recovered from the shock of birth1 can swim with definite co-ordination of leg movements4 ,here the definiteness is not only congenital1 but connate1 if we use the latter term for an instinctive activity which is performed at or very shortly after birth4 ,on the other hand1 young swallows cannot fly at birth2 they are then too immature1 and their wings are not sufficiently developed4 ,but when they are some three weeks old1 and the wings have attained functional size and power1 little swallows can fly with considerable if not perfect skill4 ,the co-ordination is congenital1 for it is not acquired in the course of individual experience2 but it is not connate1 since it is not exhibited at or shortly after birth4 ,the term deferred may be applied to such congenital activities as are thus carried out when the animal has undergone a certain amount of further development after birth4 ,in the third place1 it is customary to distinguish between such reflex actions as have already been briefly exemplified1#bi and instinctive behaviour4 ,it is1 however1 by no means easy1 if indeed it be possible1 to draw any sharp and decisive line of demarcation4 ,instinct has indeed been well described by ,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer as compound reflex action2 hence the distinction between instinctive and reflex behaviour turns in large degree on their relative complexity4 ,it would seem1 however1 that whereas a reflex act--such as the withdrawal of the foot of a sleeping child when the sole is tickled--is a restricted and localized response1 involving a particular organ or a definite group of muscles1 and is initiated by a more or less specialized external stimulus2 instinctive behaviour is a response of the animal as a whole1 and involves the co-operation of several organs and of many groups of muscles4 ,partly initiated by an external stimulus or group of stimuli1 it is also1 seemingly1 determined in part1 in a greater degree than reflex action1 by internal factors which cause uneasiness or distress1 more or less marked1 if they do not find their normal instinctive satisfaction4 ,this point1 however1 may be more profitably discussed in connection with the conscious aspect of instinct4 ,if1 then1 we say that reflex acts are local responses of the congenital type due to specialized stimuli1 while instinctive activities are matters of more general behaviour1 usually involving a larger measure of central 7as opposed to local or ganglionic7 co-ordination1 and due to the more widely-spread effects of stimuli in which both external and internal factors co-operate1 we shall probably get as near as is possible to the distinction of which we are in search4 ,but it must be remembered that there are cases in which the distinction can hardly be maintained4 ,we are now in a position to define instinctive behaviour as comprising those complex groups of co-ordinated acts which are1 on their first occurrence1 independent of experience2 which tend to the well-being of the individual and the preservation of the race2 which are due to the co-operation of external and internal stimuli2 which are similarly performed by all the members of the same more or less restricted group of animals2 but which are subject to variation1 and to subsequent modification under the guidance of experience4 ,,ii4--,,instinctive ,,behaviour ,,in ,,insects ,since instinctive behaviour is1 by definition1 independent of experience1 and since the animals which act instinctively are also1 in many cases1 able to act intelligently1 it is clear that1 apart from hereditary variations1 we must expect to find acquired modifications of instinct4 ,as ,huber said of bees1 their instinctive procedure often indicates 8a little dose of judgment40 ,it is1 indeed1 exceedingly difficult1 as a matter of observation1 to distinguish between hereditary variation and acquired modification4 ,for the rle played by these two factors in any given behaviour can only be determined if the whole life-history of the individual be known1 and if there be opportunities for comparing it with the complete life-histories of other members of its race4 ,and this is seldom possible4 ,these considerations must be borne in mind as we proceed to a brief study of some of the instinctive modes of behaviour in insects4 ,dr4 and ,mrs4 ,peckham's investigations on the instincts and habits of the solitary wasps have been described in a volume#cj worthy to be placed by the side of ,fabre's 8,souvenirs40 ,their descriptions seem to glow with the warm sunshine1 and are redolent of the fresh air which afforded the conditions under which the observations were conducted4 ,we can but regret that1 in extracting from their bright pages some of the salient facts1 the natural delicacy and grace of their treatment must be lost4 ,for we can only give the dry skeleton which they have clothed with the flesh of lively detail4 ,they enumerate the following primary modes of instinctive behaviour3-- #a4 ,stinging4 #b4 ,taking a particular kind of food4 #c4 ,method of attacking and capturing prey4 #d4 ,method of carrying prey4 #e4 ,preparing nest1 and then capturing prey1 or the reverse4 #f4 ,the mode of taking prey into the nest4 #g4 ,the general style and locality of the nest4 #h4 ,the spinning or not spinning of a cocoon1 and its specific form when one is made4 ,when the young ,pelopus emerges from the pupa-case and gnaws its way out of the mud cell1 with limp and flaccid wings1 it responds to a touch by well-directed movements of the abdomen with thrusts of the sting1 as perfect as those of the adult4 ,there is clearly no opportunity here for either instruction or experience to afford any intelligent guidance4 ,stinging is an instinctive act4 ,and it is an act of which great use is made in the capture of prey which shall serve for food to the young--it has a biological end4 ,but the wasps of different species do not have to learn by experience what prey to attack4 ,it is by instinct1 too1 that they take their proper food-supply1 one caterpillars1 another spiders1 a third flies or beetles4 ,so deeply seated1 indeed1 is the hereditary preference1 that no fly-robber ever takes spiders1 nor will the capturer of spiders change to caterpillars or beetles4 ,some keep to a few species or genera1 while ,philanthus punctatus preys chiefly or entirely on bees of the genus ,halictus4 ,romanes#ca thought that the manner of stinging and paralyzing their prey might 8be justly deemed the most remarkable instinct in the world40 ,spiders1 insects1 and caterpillars are stung1 he says1 8in their chief nerve-centres1 in consequence of which the victims are not killed outright1 but rendered motionless2 they are then conveyed to a burrow and1 continuing to live in their paralyzed condition for several weeks1 are then available as food for the larv when these are hatched4 ,of course the extraordinary fact which stands to be explained is that of the precise anatomical1 not to say also physiological knowledge which appears to be displayed by the insect in stinging only the nerve-centres of its prey40 ,eimer#cb thought that it 8is absolutely impossible that the animal has arrived at its habit otherwise than by reflection upon the facts of experience40 8,at the beginning10 he says1 8she probably killed larv by stinging them anywhere1 and then placed them in the cell4 ,the bad results of this showed themselves2 the larv putrified before they could serve as food for the larval wasps4 ,in the mean time the mother wasp discovered that those larv which she had stung in particular parts of the body were motionless but still alive1 and then she concluded that larv stung in this particular way could be kept for a longer time unchanged as living motionless food40 ,now1 since these wasps1 when they have stored their nests and laid an egg on one of the victims1 close it up once and for all1 and take no further interest in it or its contents1 there seems no opportunity1 at any rate in the existing state of matters1 for the acquisition of that experience on which ,eimer relied4 ,but both his explanation and ,romanes's difficulty are based on the following assumptions3 first1 that the victims are instinctively or habitually stung in the chief nerve-centres2 secondly1 that when thus stung they are not killed but remain paralyzed for weeks2 and thirdly1 that the marvellously definite and delicate instinctive behaviour is in direct relation to the uniform result of prolonged paralysis and consequent preservation of the food in the fresh state4 ,but ,dr4 ,peckham's careful observations and experiments show that1 with the ,american wasps1 the victims stored in the nests are quite as often dead as alive2 that those which are only paralyzed live for a varying number of days1 some more1 some less2 that wasp larv thrive just as well on dead victims1 sometimes dried-up1 sometimes undergoing decomposition1 as on living and paralyzed prey2 that the nerve-centres are not stung with the supposed uniformity2 and that in some cases paralysis1 in others death1 follows when the victims are stung in parts far removed from any nerve-centre4 8,we believe10 he says1 8that the primary purpose of the stinging is to overcome resistance1 and to prevent the escape of the victims1 and that incidentally some of them are killed and others are paralyzed40 ,if1 therefore1 as will probably be shown to be the case1 these conclusions are found to be generally true for this interesting group of insects1 the mystery of 8the precise anatomical1 not to say also physiological knowledge which appears to be displayed0 by these wasps turns out to be one of our own fabrication4 ,it melts away in the light of fuller and more searching investigation4 ,illustration3 ,,fig4 #aa4--,solitary ,wasp stinging ,caterpillar 7after ,peckham74 ,it must not be supposed1 however1 from what has been said1 that the behaviour in the act of stinging is altogether indefinite4 ,on the contrary1 each species proceeds in a relatively definite manner with some variation or modification of method4 ,philanthus punctatus1 for example1 stings the bees1 on which she preys1 under the neck1 and the thrust is at once fatal4 ,dr4 ,peckham further notes that he was only successful in getting the wasps to sting when they were hunting2 those that had not yet begun to store the nests paid no attention to the bees4 ,this is an example of that internal factor to which reference was made in the last section4 ,marchal observed that ,cerceris ornata runs the end of her abdomen along the under surface of the thorax of the bee1 and delivers her thrust at the division of the segments--that is1 where the sting can enter4 ,the action does not imply any physiological knowledge4 ,in general she begins at the neck4 ,spiders are usually1 but not always1 stung on the ventral surface4 ,to give but one more example1 ,dr4 ,peckham observed in three cases the procedure of ,ammophila urnaria which preys on caterpillars1 and often1 after stinging1 bites the neck in several places1 this process being termed malaxation4 ,in three observed captures1 all the caterpillars being of the same species and alike in size1 the thrusts were given on the ventral surface near the middle line1 between the segments4 ,in the first1 seven stings were given at the extremities 7there being thirteen segments71 the middle segments being left untouched1 and no malaxation was practised4 ,in the second1 seven stings were again given1 but in the anterior and middle segments1 followed by slight malaxation4 ,in both these cases the first three thrusts were in definite order1 behind the third1 the second1 and the first segments successively4 ,in the case of the third caterpillar1 only one thrust was given1 between the third and fourth segments--that is to say1 in the position of the first stab in the other cases1--and after this one thrust there was prolonged malaxation4 ,of fifteen stored caterpillars examined1 some lived only three days1 others a little longer1 while a few showed signs of life at the end of a fortnight4 ,in more than one instance the second of the two caterpillars stored in each nest died and became discoloured before the first one was entirely eaten4 ,the larva under such circumstances ate it with good appetite1 and then spun its cocoon as if nothing unpleasant had occurred4 ,illustration3 ,,fig4 #ab4--,solitary ,wasp dragging a ,caterpillar to its ,nest 7after ,peckham74 ,the mode of carrying their booty is in these wasps instinctive1 and relatively uniform4 ,ammophila urnaria grasps the caterpillar1 near the anterior end1 in her mandibles1 and carries or drags it beneath her legs1 walking forwards4 ,it is generally but not always with the ventral surface uppermost4 ,pompilus takes hold of her spider anywhere1 but always drags it over the ground1 walking backwards4 ,oxybelus clasps her fly with her hind legs2 ,bembex with the second pair4 ,each works after her own fashion in a way that is relatively uniform for each species4 ,the general style of the nest1 its mode of construction1 and its method of closure1 are always performed1 says ,dr4 ,peckham1 by each species in a similar manner1 not indeed in circumstantial detail1 but quite in the same way in a broad sense4 ,variation or modification is always present1 but the tendency to depart from a nest of a given type is not excessive4 ,some dig in the ground curved tunnels1 with or without one or more chambers4 ,others bore into decaying wood2 others use straws1 or make tunnels in bramble stems2 while the mud-daubers build cells in which to store the food and lay the egg4 ,this is sometimes deposited on the first1 sometimes on the last1 sometimes on some intermediate victim1 but generally in much the same place and position4 ,ammophila1 for instance1 lays it on the side of the sixth or seventh segment--that is to say1 in about the mid position4 ,some species first capture their prey1 and then make the nest in which it is to be entombed4 ,others first prepare the nest1 and then carry or drag their prey to it--often from considerable distances--quite irrespective of what seems to us the more appropriate method of the two under the particular circumstances of the case4 ,and the way in which the victim is dragged into the nest is similarly a matter of inheritance4 ,each way is characteristic of the species concerned1 and would be an important part of any definition of the animal based upon its modes of behaviour4 ,for example1 a ,sphex places her grasshopper just at the entrance of the nest1 which she then enters herself before dragging in her prey by the antenn4 ,when the wasp was in the hole1 ,fabre moved the victim a little way off2 the wasp came out1 brought the grasshopper to the entrance as before1 and went in a second time4 ,this was repeated about forty times1 each time with the same result1 until the patience of the naturalist was exhausted1 and the persistent wasp took her booty in after her appropriate fashion4 ,she must place the grasshopper close to the opening2 she must then descend and examine the nest1 and1 after that1 must drag it down4 ,nothing less than the performance of these acts in a certain order satisfies her instinctive impulse4 ,in a private letter1 from which he kindly allows me to quote1 ,dr4 ,peckham says3 8,we have recently made some experiments on this wasp 7,sphex ichneumonea74 ,first we allow her to carry in her prey undisturbed1 to see how far she was faithful to the traditions of her ancestors1 and to observe her normal methods4 ,on the next day1 when she had placed her grasshopper just at the opening of the nest1 and while she was below1 we drew it back to a little distance4 ,she came out1 and we both repeated our operations four times--she running down into the nest1 always after getting the grasshopper into position1 and we as regularly drawing it away4 ,the fifth time she changed her plan1 seized it by the head and backed into the nest with it4 ,the next day1 at the fourth trial1 she straddled it and walked head first into the nest with it2 and on the fourth day1 at the eighth trial1 she backed in with it as on the second day40 ,these interesting observations show that the wasp has sufficient intelligence to modify her procedure in accordance with an unwonted situation4 ,the 8consecutive necessity10 as it has been termed1 has a potent influence1 but is not absolute4 ,fabre notes a case of similar consecutive necessity in the case of the mason bee1 ,chalicodoma4 ,if while a bee is provisioning its nest with honey and pollen the structure be destroyed1 she sometimes breaks open a completed cell1 and1 having done so1 goes on bringing more provision1 though the cell already contains a sufficient store of food2 and only when she has completed the superfluous storing does she deposit her egg and seal up the cell4 ,so1 too1 when the cell is removed in an early stage of construction1 and another completed cell already partially stored is substituted1 the bee1 instead of simply adopting the new cell1 goes on building until the cell is as much as one-third beyond the usual height2 then1 and not till then1 does she proceed in due course to the next stage of the instinctive procedure1 the provisioning of the cell4 ,from our general knowledge of animal nature1 we should expect to find parasitic forms ready to take advantage of the material stored by such insects as the solitary wasps and the mason bees4 ,it is said that ,chalicodoma provides nourishment to the larv of some sixteen unbidden guests4 ,a parasitic bee 7,stelis nasuta7 breaks open a closed cell1 and1 after depositing its eggs1 seals it up again with mortar4 ,since her eggs and larv develop more rapidly than those of the mason bee1 they are first served with the store of provision1 while the rightful owner is done out of its inheritance4 ,by a curious act1 of what appears to us like retributive justice1 these parasitic larv sometimes fall a prey to another parasite1 also a hymenopterous insect named ,monodontomerus1 the larv of which prey on the young of both bees4 ,another genus of the same family1 ,leucopsis 7,fig4 #ac1 ,f71 also succeeds in piercing with its ovipositor1 at a suitable spot1 the walls of the ,chalicodoma cell1 and suspends its curious hooked egg 7,fig4 #ac1 ,g7 on the delicate cocoon within which the chrysalis lies4 ,fabre found in some cases as many as five of these parasitic eggs on a single cocoon4 ,but he never found more than one larva in any cell that he examined4 ,the following is an epitome of his conclusions and inferences4 ,from the parasitic egg is hatched a minute arched grub1 with relatively large head and mandibles1 and provided with a number of bristles1 which aid it in progression 7,fig4 #ac1 ,h74 ,it does not1 however1 at once attack the bee larva1 but makes a series of excursions1 the object of which is to reach and destroy any other parasitic eggs4 ,this was not actually observed1 but the eggs were found to have been destroyed1 and there was seemingly no other means of destruction under the conditions maintained4 ,the larva1 this done1 changes its skin and takes on a new form1 destitute of bristles1 with a very small head and minute mandibles 7,fig4 #ac1 ,i74 ,in this new form it attacks the ,chalicodoma larva1 making a very small incision1 through which the juices of the host are transferred to the guest without further injury to the grub4 ,it is interesting to note that1 if the facts are accurately described and the inferences are correct1 there are associated with two types of instinctive behaviour two distinct types of structure4 ,the creature can have no conscious control over its structural development1 and there is no ground for assuming that it has any control over its instinctive behaviour4 ,illustration3 ,,fig4 #ac4--;,insect ,larv4 ,a1 ,b1 of ,sitaris2 ,c1 ,d1 ,e1 of ,argyromba2 ,g1 ,h1 ,i1 of ,leucopsis2 ,f1 imago of ,leucopsis 7after ,fabre74 ,the specialization of structure and of instinctive behaviour1 in accordance with a definite sequence of life-conditions1 is even more remarkable in another of the many parasites which ,chalicodoma unwittingly labours to nourish4 ,this time it is a fly 7,argyromba71 which lays a minute egg on the outside of the cell4 ,from this egg is hatched a slender threadlike worm1 barely one-twentieth of an inch in length 7,fig4 #ac1 ,c74 ,it has three pairs of longish bristles near the anterior end1 and a single yet longer pair at the hinder extremity4 ,these aid it in creeping over the wall of the cell4 ,its small head is armed with short1 stiff bristles4 ,for many days it wanders over the surface of the cell1 inserting its bristly head into each minute cranny and crack4 ,throughout this long period it has never a bite nor sup4 ,probably many of them never succeed in finding a crevice by which they can effect an entrance1 but those that do manage to wriggle in undergo a change1 lose their bristles1 and develop a minute suctorial mouth1 through which the contents of the larva are absorbed into their swelling bodies 7,fig4 #ac1 ,d74 ,when fully grown they are quite helpless1 and unable to get out from the cell in which they are now imprisoned4 ,for months they lie quiescent1 but in the succeeding spring they pass into a pupal condition very different from that of most flies4 ,the relatively large head is armed with strong spines2 the middle region bears bristles directed backwards2 the posterior end has short spines 7,fig4 #ac1 ,e74 ,fixing itself to the interior of the cell by the latter1 it strikes with its armoured head repeated blows on the walls of its prison until a breach is at last made1 and sufficiently enlarged to form a suitable exit4 ,then the pupa-skin bursts1 and the imago insect emerges and flies off4 ,at each stage of life there is the closest relation between structure and behaviour1 and each is equally adapted to a biological end of which the creature has never had an opportunity of gaining any experience4 ,exceedingly multifarious are the ways in which insects thus provide for the future of young they will never see4 ,antherophagus lives in flowers1 and is believed to seize with its mandibles humble bees1 which then unwittingly bear the parasitic beetle to the nests in which alone the larv have been found4 ,the larv of our common oil-beetle 7,melo7 are parasitic on the bee1 ,anthophora4 ,it deposits its ten thousand eggs without observable discrimination2 but the active young larva instinctively seizes and attaches itself to any hairy object4 ,thousands must go astray4 ,they have been found on hairy beetles1 flies1 and bees of the wrong genus4 ,some1 however1 become thus attached to the one suitable species1 and are conveyed by the ,anthophora to her nest1 where they promptly eat the egg she lays4 ,it is not difficult to picture to one's self how this incompletely evolved instinct might be further perfected by natural selection1 through the survival of those females which laid their eggs in the haunts of the bee-host4 ,and such an advance in instinctive behaviour is seen in another and rarer beetle--,sitaris4 ,her eggs are laid in ,august near the entrance to a nest of the ,anthophora4 ,in ,september they hatch to form larv1 which hibernate in groups till the following spring4 ,then they become active 7,fig4 #ac1 ,a71 and attach themselves to hairy objects4 ,being near the ,anthophora nest1 there is an increased chance of their fastening upon this bee4 ,the chance is still far from good1 for if this were so1 we should not find that the ,sitaris laid as many as two thousand eggs4 ,still1 on these grounds1 we may presume that its chance of survival is about five times as good as that of ,melo1 which lays ten thousand eggs4 ,the larva is said generally to attach itself to a male bee1 which is hatched earlier than his mate1 and to pass on to the female at the nuptial period2 but in any case it eventually slips on to the egg that she lays4 ,this forms the food of the larva during the remainder of this stage of its existence4 ,it then moults and assumes a new form1 capable of feeding on the honey 7,fig4 #ac1 ,b72 and1 after further changes1 becomes a pupa1 and then assumes the imago condition4 ,in these cases the advantage is wholly on the side of the parasite4 ,but there are cases of close relationship between insects and flowering plants where the instinctive behaviour gives rise to reciprocal benefit4 ,the ,yucca is a genus of ,american ,liliaceous plants1 with large pale sweet-smelling flowers2 and these are dependent for fertilization on the instinctive behaviour of a small straw-coloured moth of the genus ,pronuba4 ,just when the ,yucca plant blossoms in the summer1 the moths emerge from their chrysalis cases4 ,they mate2 and the female then flies to a flower1 collects a pellet of pollen from the anthers1 proceeds to another flower1 pierces the pistil with her sharp ovipositor1 lays her eggs among the ovules1 and finally darting to the stigma stuffs the pollen pellet into its funnel-shaped extremity 7,fig4 #ad74 ,if the flower be not thus fertilized the ovules do not develop2 and if the ovules do not develop the grubs which are hatched from the moth's eggs die of starvation4 ,there are enough ovules to supply food to the grubs1 and leave a balance to continue the race of ,yuccas4 ,illustration3 ,,fig4 #ad4--,yucca ,flower and ,moth4 ,whether the female moth is attracted to the flower by sight or smell1 we do not know4 ,and whether the male finds the female1 in the case of the ,yucca moth1 through scent1 we are not in a position to state with certainty4 ,it has1 however1 been shown that in certain moths#cc some odour emitted by the female is the attractive stimulus1 affecting sense-organs situated on the antenn of the male4 ,to females confined in an opaque vessel over the mouth of which gauze was tied1 the males came in numbers2 but when a clear glass vessel was inverted1 and sand was packed round the mouth1 so as to prevent the escape of air from the interior1 no males came1 though the imprisoned females were clearly visible4 ,if the antenn of the males were either removed or coated with shellac the moths failed to notice the females even when close to them4 ,in what way the intact male is made aware of the direction from which the scent comes1 we do not know--possibly by differential stimulation in the antenn1 the moth instinctively turning in the direction of greater stimulation4 ,it will be seen1 therefore1 that in the case of the behaviour of the ,yucca moth--behaviour which is essential to the biological end of reproduction--there is much detail concerning which we are ignorant4 ,but for our present purpose the important point to notice is that the procedure of the female cannot be due to imitation2 nor can it be the outcome of individually acquired experience2 for the method of procedure is not gradually learnt1 but is carried out without apparent hesitation the first and only time the appropriate occasion presents itself4 ,not only does the moth take no heed of her grubs1 but they are so placed that she could not in any case ascertain by observation that only if the ovules are fertilized do her offspring thrive4 ,she cannot possibly know what effect the stuffing of the pollen on to the stigma exercises1 or indeed whether it have any effect at all4 ,and yet generation after generation these moths collect the pollen from the anthers and bear it to the stigma4 ,spence's words 8without knowledge of the end in view0 are amply justified in this case1 as in other cases of typically instinctive behaviour4 ,,iii4--,,the ,,instinctive ,,behaviour ,,of ,,young ,,birds ,since it is easy to hatch birds of many species in an incubator1 and to rear them under conditions which not only afford facilities for observation but exclude parental influence1 their study has special advantages4 ,one can with some approach to accuracy distinguish the instinctive from the acquired factors in their behaviour4#cd ,illustration3 ,,fig4 #ae4--,newly-hatched ,chick swimming4 ,the callow young of such birds as pigeons1 jays1 and thrushes are hatched in a helpless condition1 and require constant and assiduous ministration to their elementary organic needs4 ,most of their instincts are of the deferred type4 ,but pheasants1 plovers1 moor-hens1 domestic chicks1 and ducklings1 with many others1 are active soon after birth1 and exhibit powers of complex co-ordination1 with little or no practice of the necessary limb-movements4 ,they walk and balance the body so soon and so well as to show us that this mode of procedure is congenital1 and has not to be gradually acquired through the guidance of experience4 ,young water-birds swim with neat and orderly strokes the very first time they are gently placed in water4 ,even little chicks a day or two old can swim well4 ,dr4 ,thorndike1 who draws attention to this fact1#ce appears to accept the view1 suggested by ,dr4 ,bashford ,dean1 that the movements are not those of swimming but only of running4 ,i have carefully watched the action through the glass walls of a tank and compared it with that of a young moor-hen4 ,in the two cases it is quite similar in type1 and the type appears to be different from that of running1 though it is perhaps hard to distinguish the two4 ,in any case1 the hand over hand action is well co-ordinated1 and is very different from a mere excited struggle4 ,chicks twenty-six hours old taken straight from the incubator drawer1 before they had taken food1 made directly for the side of the tank and tried to scramble out4 ,they gradually sank deeper through the wetting of the down1 but could keep afloat for from two to three minutes4 ,i have made observations on chicks of various ages from twenty-four hours to a month1 and find in all cases similar results2 but with the older birds the flapping of the wings and more vigorous action cause them to get water-logged more rapidly4 ,there is some apparent distress with cries2 but less than one might expect under the circumstances4 ,for the purposes of the above illustration ,mr4 ,charles ,whymper had before him a sketch ,i made of the leg-action1 and instantaneous photographs of the chicks swimming for which ,i am indebted to my colleague ,mr4 ,george ,brebner4 ,i have not observed the behaviour of an adult hen when placed in the water4 ,dr4 ,thorndike says1 8there is no vigorous instinct to strike out toward the shore10 she 8will float about aimlessly for awhile and only very slowly reach the shore40 ,but ,mrs4 ,foster ,wood informs me that she has seen a hen leap into a pond after her brood of ducklings and swim to the other side1 a distance of twenty feet4 ,diving1 in water-birds1 is also an instinctive mode of behaviour2 and this is obviously a more difficult procedure than swimming1 one further removed from reflex action4 ,and careful observations have placed beyond question the fact that flight is also instinctive4 ,a swallow1 for example1 taken from the nest under conditions which made it practically certain that it had never yet taken wing1 exhibited guided flight1 and attempted to alight on a suitable ledge4 ,of course flight is generally a deferred instinct1 and is not performed until the wings have reached a suitable state of development4 ,an instinctive response1 which may perhaps be regarded as one of its initial stages1 is seen in quite young chicks4 ,if placed in a basket1 and rapidly lowered therein through a foot or two1 the chick will extend its skinny and scarcely feathered wings4 ,but though1 from the usual conditions of development1 flight in birds is a deferred instinct1 yet in exceptional cases it may be connate4 ,the mound-builders 7,megapodes7 of the ,australian region are hatched from large eggs in warm earth or sand1 and are not tended by the parents4 ,so well fledged are these birds that they can fly the day they emerge from the egg4 ,dr4 ,worcester1 while digging in one of their mounds1 made an unsuccessful attempt to seize one which was newly hatched2 but it flew several rods into thick brush1 and this notwithstanding the fact that it had probably never before seen the light of day4 ,illustration3 ,,fig4 #af4--,nestling ,megapode1 to show the well-developed wings4 7,from ,dr4 ,r4 ,bowdler ,sharpe's 8,wonders of the ,bird ,world407 ,it must not be supposed that1 in adducing flight as an example of instinctive behaviour in birds1 we are contending that it is this and nothing more throughout life4 ,the inference to be drawn from the facts of observation is rather that instinct provides a general ground plan of behaviour which intelligent acquisition1 by enforcing here and checking there1 perfects and guides to finer issues4 ,few would contend that the consummate skill evinced in fully developed flight at its best1 the hurtling swoop of the falcon1 the hovering of the kestrel1 the wheeling of swifts in the summer air1 the rapid dart and sudden poise of the humming bird1 the easy sweep of the sea-gull1 the downward glide of the stork--that these are1 in all their exquisite perfection1 instinctive4 ,a rough but sufficient outline of action is hereditary2 but the manifold graces and delicacies of perfected flight are due to intelligent skill begotten of practice and experience4 ,there are many little idiosyncracies and special traits of flight which are probably instinctive--such as enable an ornithologist or a sportsman to recognize a flying bird from a distance4 ,and the same is true of other modes of behaviour4 ,the observer of young birds cannot fail to note and to be impressed by many of these4 ,the way in which a little moor-hen uses its wings in scrambling up any rough surface is very characteristic2 so1 too1 is the manner in which a guinea-chick runs backwards and then sideways at a right angle when one attempts to catch him4 ,if suddenly startled1 moor-hens and chicks scatter and hide2 plovers drop and crouch with their chins on the ground2 pheasants stand motionless and silent4 ,knowledge of the ways of birds enables one to predict with tolerable accuracy how each kind will behave under given circumstances4 ,that the actions are always precisely alike cannot be said with truth2 but that the behaviour is so relatively definite as to be readily recognizable can be confidently asserted4 ,that a moor-hen will flick its tail1 that a chick will dust itself in the sand1 that pheasants and partridges will scratch the ground1 that a jay will go through certain actions in the bath1 that the preening of the down will be carried out in particular ways--moor-hens1 for example1 wringing out the water in a peculiar manner1--and that all these1 and many other modes of behaviour1 will be presented in relatively definite ways3 all these are1 to borrow a phrase of ,dr4 ,peckham's1 so characteristic of the several groups of birds1 that they would be an important part of any definition based upon behaviour4 ,and there can be no question that they are instinctive4 ,they may indeed seem trivial and commonplace1 scarcely worthy of special note2 but they serve to show in how many details organic heredity lays the foundation for future behaviour1 and affords groups of data for effective consciousness to utilize4 ,to show the instinctive nature of such behaviour1 the following examples will suffice4 ,one of a batch of moor-hen chicks showed once1 and once only1 when a week old1 an incipient tendency to bathe in the shallow tin of water which was placed in their run1 but soon desisted2 nor was the action repeated1 though he and the others enjoyed standing in the water4 ,five weeks later one of the batch was taken to a beck4 ,he walked quietly through the comparatively still water near the edge2 but when he reached the part of the stream where it ran swiftly and broke over the pebbles1 he stopped1 ducked1 and took an elaborate bath1 dipping his head well under1 flicking the water over his back1 ruffling his feathers1 and behaving in a most characteristic manner4 ,each day thereafter he did the same1 with a vigour that increased up to the third morning1 and then remained constant4 ,the same bird some weeks later was swimming in a narrow part of the stream1 with steep banks on either side1 when he was frightened by a rough-haired pup4 ,down he dived1 for the first time in his life2 and after a few seconds his head was seen to appear1 just peeping above the water beneath the bank4 ,ten days after receiving two nestling jays ,i placed in their cage a shallow tin of water4 ,they took no notice of it1 having never seen water before2 for they were fed chiefly on sopped food4 ,presently one of them hopped into it1 whether attracted by the water or by accident it is difficult to say1 squatted in it bending his legs1 and at once fluttered his feathers1 as such birds do when they bathe1 though his breast scarcely touched the water4 ,the other seized the tin in his bill1 and then pecked at the water1 thus wetting his beak4 ,he1 too1 fluttered his feathers in a similar fashion1 though he was outside the tin and not in the water at all4 ,a little later the first again entered the tin1 and dipped his breast well into the water2 this was followed by much fluttering and splashing4 ,the bird took a good bath1 as did the other shortly afterwards1 and then spent half an hour in a thorough grooming1 with much fluttering of the wings1 the crest feathers being constantly raised and lowered1 expressive of an emotional state4 ,now1 in these cases it would be impossible to say whether the behaviour was carried out in the manner characteristic of the species1 prior to experience and independent of imitation1 on the basis of mere casual and chance observation4 ,but in these cases the whole life-history of the individuals concerned was known2 and it can be asserted with confidence that the behaviour was hereditary1 and not acquired by any gradual process of learning4 ,moreover1 in each case there seemed to be such evidence as observation can afford1 that internal emotional factors co-operated with the direct external stimuli in determining the nature of the behaviour4 ,whether such actions so far contribute to the well-being of the individual as to be of decisive advantage it is difficult to say4 ,some would contend that bathing is practised by birds merely for the pleasure it seemingly affords2 others would urge that it is a means of getting rid of troublesome and presumably hurtful parasites1 to the attacks of which birds are peculiarly subject4 ,illustration3 ,,fig4 #ag4--,young ,cuckoo ejecting nestling ,meadow ,pipit4 7,from ,mrs4 ,hugh ,blackburn's sketch in 8,birds from ,moidart407 ,one of the most remarkable instincts of young birds is that of the cuckoo1 which ejects eggs and nestlings from the home of its foster-parent4 ,mrs4 ,hugh ,blackburn found a nest which contained two meadow-pipits' eggs1 besides that of a cuckoo4 ,on a later visit 8the pipits were found to be hatched1 but not the cuckoo4 ,at the next visit1 which was after an interval of forty-eight hours1 we found the young cuckoo alone in the nest1 and both the young pipits lying down the bank1 about ten inches from the margin of the nest1 but quite lively after being warmed in the hand4 ,they were replaced in the nest beside the cuckoo1 which struggled about until it got its back under one of them1 when it climbed backwards directly up the open side of the nest1 and hitched the pipit from its back on to the edge4 ,it then stood quite upright on its legs1 which were straddled wide apart1 with the claws firmly fixed halfway down the inside of the nest1 among the interlacing fibres of which the nest was woven1 and1 stretching its wings apart and backwards1 it elbowed the pipit fairly over the margin1 so far that its struggles took it down the bank instead of back into the nest4 ,as it was getting late1 and the cuckoo did not immediately set to work on the other nestling1 ,i replaced the ejected one and went home4 ,on returning next day1 both nestlings were found dead and cold1 out of the nest40#cf ,here we have a definite account by an eye-witness1 who sketched the young cuckoo1 which was naked1 blind1 and could scarcely hold up its head4 ,and her account1 itself confirmatory of that given by ,jenner in #aggh1 is confirmed by that of ,dr4 ,john ,hancock1#cg who witnessed the ejection of a fledgling hedge-sparrow1 which 8was put over the edge of the nest exactly as illustrated by ,mrs4 ,blackburn40 ,the procedure is unquestionably instinctive4 ,the sounds uttered by young birds are sufficiently definite to be readily recognized and are susceptible of classification4 ,in domestic chicks at least six notes may be distinguished4 ,first the gentle 8peeping0 note1 expressive of contentment4 ,a further low note1 a double sound1 seems to indicate extreme satisfaction and pleasure4 ,very characteristic and distinct is the danger-note--a sound difficult to describe1 but readily recognized4 ,if a humble-bee1 a black-beetle1 a big worm1 a lump of sugar--anything strange and largish--be thrown to the chicks1 this danger-note is at once heard2 and it serves to place others on the alert1 though this is perhaps the outcome of experience4 ,then there is the cheeping sound1 expressive apparently of a state of mild dissatisfaction with the present state of affairs4 ,it generally ceases when one throws some grain1 or even stands near them4 ,extreme dissatisfaction is marked by a sharper1 shriller squeak1 when one seizes them against their inclination4 ,lastly1 there is the shrill cry of greater distress1 when1 for example1 their swimming powers are subjected to critical examination4 ,with pheasants a gentle1 8peeping0 note of contentment1 a shriller cry of distress1 and a danger-note1 generically like1 but specifically distinct from1 that of the chick1 are early differentiated4 ,the complaining note of the partridge is uttered six or seven times in quick succession1 followed by a pause4 ,the note of the plover is high-pitched1 and much like the familiar cry of the adult bird1 to which it owes its popular name of 8peewit40 ,so1 too1 the guinea-fowl in down utters from the first notes quite characteristic of its kind1 while its danger-note is not unlike that of the chick or pheasant4 ,the piping of ducklings is comparatively monotonous1 and there does not seem to be a definite danger-note4 ,with moor-hen chicks1 even on the first day1 two notes are well-marked--a call-note1 lower in pitch than that of the chick1 and rather harsh and raucous1 and a 8tweet1 tweet0 of pleasure1 something like the contented note of a canary4 ,later1 five or six notes are differentiated1 the most characteristic of which is the harsh 8crek1 crek10 when the little bird is from any cause excited4 ,it is uttered in a crouching attitude1 with head thrown back and wings held outwards and forwards1 waving to and fro in a very characteristic manner4 ,that this has suggestive value for other moor-hen chicks is shown by its distinctly infectious effect2 if one bird has cause to utter the note and strike the attitude others follow suit4 ,while clearly instinctive in their mode of occurrence1 while they seem to show well the co-operation of an internal emotional factor1 their biological value seems to lie in their suggestive effect on other members of the brood4 ,they form an elementary but sufficient social bond4 ,if these notes afford evidence of an incipient social factor1 the instinct of pecking is distinctively individualistic4 ,chicks peck with considerable but not complete accuracy of aim at practically anything of suitable size at suitable distance2 but it is through experience that they learn what to select for food and what to reject or leave untouched4 ,moving objects1 however1 are more readily pecked at than those which are still2 and the instinctive response seems to be stimulated if one tap on the ground near the object1 or move it with a pencil1 thus simulating the action of the hen4 ,and this is even more marked with pheasants and partridges4 ,plovers seize small worms with an avidity which looks like an inherited response to the sight of natural food4 ,pheasants and partridges also appear to be specially affected by worms1 and when one of them seizes a worm for the first time1 he shakes it and dashes it against the ground4 ,chicks1 a week or ten days old1 also seize a largish fly or bee with a dash1 and maul it on the ground1 throwing it on one side before again approaching it4 ,and such birds seem to show an instinctive tendency to bolt with such treasures as caterpillars or small worms4 ,moor-hens cannot at first be induced to take food from the ground4 ,it has to be held above them1 whereupon they crouch down1 with head and neck held back1 opening their beaks more like the callow young of nursling birds2 but they also strike upwards at the object--these modes of behaviour being1 no doubt1 correlated with the manner in which the mother moor-hen normally feeds her young from her beak during the early days of life4 ,callow fledglings1 such as young jays1 simply open their mouths1 gaping widely to be fed4 ,and many will respond in this way to such a note as a low whistle1 as may readily be seen with swallows4 ,but at a later age such birds show instinctive modes of reaction of a more complex type4 ,a jay1 for example1 was offered a summer chafer or ,june bug1 seized it at once in his bill1 and tried to place his foot on it4 ,then he hopped down on to the floor of his cage1 dropped the beetle1 seized it again as it crawled off1 and after two or three attempts swallowed it1 tossing it back from the point of his bill into the throat4 ,this was the first time he took food from the ground or swallowed it in this manner4 ,on the whole1 there seems to be much inherited definiteness of co-ordination1 and some tendency to respond in a definite manner to specific stimuli4 ,that there should not be more differentiation in this respect than observation discloses is probably due to the fact that the parent birds afford1 under natural conditions1 much guidance in the selection of food4 ,since the solitary wasp unerringly seizes its appropriate food1 since it responds instinctively to specific stimuli1 there would seem no reason why birds should not show similar instinctive differentiation4 ,but one must remember that in the case of the wasp there is no parental guidance2 the insect is more completely dependent on instinct than is the bird to whose needs the hen assiduously ministers4 ,it is at first sight surprising that such birds as chicks and pheasants do not peck instinctively at still water4 ,when a shallow vessel containing water was placed among some little chicks1 several of them ran repeatedly through the water1 but took no heed of it4 ,then1 after about an hour1 one of them standing in the vessel pecked at his toes1 and at once lifted his head and drank freely with characteristic action4 ,another subsequently pecked at a bubble near the edge1 and then he too drank4 ,in fact1 the best way of inducing them to drink is to scatter some grains of food in the tin2 they peck at the grains1 which catch their eye1 and incidentally find the water1 and the touch of water in the bill at once leads to the characteristic response and congenitally definite behaviour4 ,that the sight of a still surface does not itself suffice to evoke this behaviour is probably again due to the fact that under nature the hen guides them and pecks at the water1 when they follow her lead4 ,one fact which must be constantly borne in mind is that what is inherited is instinctive co-ordination1 often related to a definite stimulus1 not instinctive knowledge4 ,a chick pecks at a grain when it is at a suitable distance1 not because instinct provides him with the knowledge that this is something to be seized and tested1 but because he cannot help doing so4 ,he is so organized that this stimulus produces that result through an organic co-ordination that is independent of conscious knowledge or experience4 ,how definite is the inherited co-ordination is shown by many observations4 ,a young pheasant1 only a few hours old1 was taken from the incubator drawer1 and held snugly while a piece of egg-yolk was moved before his eyes with the aid of fine forceps4 ,he did not peck at it1 but followed with movements of his head every motion of the object in a narrow circle4 ,simple as this action seems1 it presents a striking example of co-ordinated movements accurately related to movements in the visual field1 the whole performed without any opportunity for learning or practice1 and less than half an hour after the bird was taken from the drawer of the incubator and first saw daylight4 ,psychologists sometimes puzzle their heads over the question how and by what steps the field of vision and the field of movement are brought into relation with each other2 but in such a case as this1 the problem ceases to be primarily psychological4 ,the relation is purely organic2 the conscious data are grouped from the outset4 ,with young jays there was no such co-ordination at first2 and when they began after a few days 7about twelve or fourteen7 to follow an object with the head and eye1 the movements were at first jerky4 ,but a week later1 when ,i swept the food through a circle a foot in diameter in front of their cage1 it was followed smoothly and evenly4 ,here a certain amount of learning and practice1 absent in the case of the pheasant1 was required4 ,and it is difficult to say what proportion of the final result was acquired1 what proportion hereditary2 but probably the behaviour is in the main instinctive1 though somewhat deferred4 ,one more example1 perhaps even more trivial in the eyes of some people1 may be given4 ,a duckling a few hours old will scratch the side of his head4 ,it is true he may topple over in the process1 through insufficient powers of balance1 for the simultaneous performance of poising on one leg and having a good scratch with the other is no easy matter4 ,but let not either our familiarity with such behaviour1 nor some observed and laughable failure on the part of the duckling1 blind us to the fact that this is a congenital activity1 and one of no little complexity1 indicating a definite organic nexus4 ,a local irritation sets agoing movements of the hind limb of that side through which just that particular spot is scratched in the absence of any previous practice1 any learning to localize the spot4 ,there can be no question that such inherited co-ordinations1 whether perfect from the first1 or with deferred perfection and some aid from acquisition1 afford ready-made data to consciousness1 which are of the utmost service in the guidance of subsequent behaviour4 ,the two-days-old chick1 with the aid of this instinctive co-ordination1 performs well a number of actions1 which1 had she to consciously learn them all1 would probably be still but half mastered when she was a skinny old hen4 ,our whole treatment of instinctive behaviour has been based on the assumption1 already to some extent justified1 that experience is not inherited4 ,if it be hereditary1 how comes it that chicks show no recognition of still water1 which must have been familiar to the experience of generation after generation of birds8 ,how comes it that they do not even seem to recognize their natural parent and protector1 the hen8 ,two chicks ten days old were taken to the yard whence were derived the eggs from which they were hatched1 and were placed about two yards from a hen which was clucking to her brood4 ,they were not in a frightened condition1 for they stood on my hand and ate grain from it1 scratching at the palm4 ,but of the clucking of the hen they took no notice whatever4 ,the same results were obtained with other chicks thirteen days old4 ,was this due1 as ,spalding suggested1 to loss of the instinctive response which was perhaps present at an earlier age8 ,seemingly not4 ,for a chick was taken at the age of two and a half days to its own mother1 which had three chicks4 ,these followed her about1 and ran at once to her when she clucked and pecked on the ground4 ,the little stranger1 however1 took no notice1 nor did he show any tendency either to go to the hen or to follow the three chicks1 having been purposely brought up alone4 ,when the hen took her little brood under her wing1 the stranger was placed close to her4 ,she clucked1 and seemed anxious to entice and welcome the little fellow1 seizing an oat-husk and dropping it before him2 but he remained indifferent1 walking away and standing in the sunshine4 ,after about forty minutes he seemed more inclined to go with the other chicks1 but still ignored the existence of the hen4 ,the natural instinctive tendency seems to be from the first to nestle under anything2 and there is the hen provided by nature for the purpose4 ,by experience the chicks grow accustomed to her fussy ways1 as they grow accustomed to the ways of such a foster-parent as the writer of these pages4 ,still1 though there is1 apparently1 no instinctive knowledge of the hen as their natural protector1 and though ,i have seen no observable response to the clucking sound1 this must not be taken as necessarily implying that there is no instinctive response to any of her modes of behaviour4 ,there is such a response to her pecking on the ground2 there is probably such a response to her danger-note2 and there may be many other such instinctive modes of behaviour related to her actions4 ,how far they extend can only be ascertained by patient observation2 and such responsive behaviour need not imply any instinctive knowledge begotten of inherited experience4 ,we may now summarize some of the general conclusions which may be drawn from observations of instinctive behaviour in young birds4 #a4 ,that which is inherited is essentially a motor response or train of such responses4 ,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer's description of instinct as compound reflex action is thus justified4 #b4 ,these often show very accurate and nicely-adjusted hereditary co-ordinations4 #c4 ,they are evoked by stimuli1 the general type of which is fairly definite1 and may in some cases be in response to particular objects4 #d4 ,they are also generally shown under conditions which lead us to infer the presence of an internal factor1 emotional or other4 #e4 ,there does not seem to be any evidence of inherited knowledge or experience4 ,,iv4--,,the ,,conscious ,,aspect ,,of ,,instinctive ,,behaviour ,in our definition of instinctive behaviour all positive reference to the presence of conscious states was omitted4 ,by some writers1 however1 the fact that it is accompanied by consciousness is regarded as a distinguishing feature of instinct4 ,romanes introduced his definition with the words3#ch 8,instinct is reflex action into which there is imported the element of consciousness40 ,and he emphasized the conscious aspect when he said3 8,the term comprises all those faculties of mind which are concerned with conscious and adaptive action1 antecedent to individual experience40 ,professor ,wundt also lays some stress on the conscious accompaniments of instinctive activities which1 he says1#ci 8differ from the reflexes proper in this1 that they are accompanied by emotions in the mind1 and that their performance is regulated by these emotions40 ,the definitions of other writers express or imply the presence of consciousness in differing modes and degrees1 culminating in the hypothesis of inherited knowledge4 ,douglas ,spalding1 for example1 said#dj that 8animals can forget the instinctive knowledge which they never learned60 ,now1 the exclusion from our definition of direct reference to the conscious aspect must not be taken to imply that instinctive behaviour is a mere matter of unconscious automatism2 nor even that it is unprofitable to discuss how much consciousness there may be1 of what sort1 and how distributed4 ,all that it does imply is1 that the amount1 nature1 and distribution of consciousness cannot well be introduced into a definition the object of which is to help us to distinguish certain observable types of behaviour from others4 ,in a word1 the definition given is biological and objective1 and is to be accepted or rejected without prejudice to such psychological considerations as those upon which we have now briefly to enter4 ,the first thing we have to decide is how much we are to include1 from the psychological standpoint1 under instinct4 ,for we may take either a broader or a narrower view of the matter2 and which of these we adopt will make much difference in our conclusions4 ,let us first deal with the narrower4 ,we have said above that what is hereditary in instinctive behaviour is the co-ordination4 ,now1 such co-ordination of movements into a finished and appropriate act is due to a nicely graded distribution of efferent nerve-waves to the several muscles concerned1 so that these muscles may be caused to contract in due order1 and each to just the right extent4 ,but efferent nerve-waves as such1 and their mode of distribution by the nerve-centres1 are in all probability unconscious1 while the contraction of the muscles is a purely organic matter4 ,if1 therefore1 we narrow our conception of instinct so as to include only the co-ordinated act by itself1 excluding all reference both to the stimuli which are its antecedents1 and to the effects in consciousness which its performance may produce2 and if the data for consciousness are in all cases supplied through afferent channels2 then there seems to be no escape from the conclusion that instinctive behaviour as such may be1 and probably is1 altogether outside the individual consciousness4 ,it should be noted1 however1 that on this view only the instinctive co-ordination in itself can be fairly regarded as independent of the stream of experience4 ,now1 in the first place it is convenient so far to broaden our conception as to include under the head of instinctive behaviour1 in its conscious aspect1 not only the co-ordinated act but the data which its performance affords to consciousness4 ,it may indeed seem that we are here trying to draw a distinction where no real difference exists4 ,the physiological distinction is1 however1 not only clear and undeniable1 but quite easily understood4 ,for the sake of illustration let us take the case of an intentional action1 such as glancing up from the words we are reading to the clock4 ,efferent waves course along several motor nerves to the six muscles by which each eye is moved1 and to the muscles of accommodation within the eye4 ,these muscles are called into duly co-ordinated activity1 by which our vision is focussed upon the clock-face4 ,this is one part of the physiological procedure--that by which the intended result is attained4 ,but there is a second part readily distinguishable from the former4 ,as the eyes move1 afferent messages course inwards from the muscles or the eye-sockets and their neighbourhood2 and it is these incoming waves which afford data to consciousness1 telling us that the movements are in progress or have been effected4 ,the nerves involved in the latter part are quite different from those concerned in the former part1 and they proceed to areas of the brain differently situated from those whence the efferent waves issued4 ,thus it is in all cases of movement2 the efferent nerves call the muscles into play2 the afferent nerves bring information that the movements are carried out4 ,it is through the latter that data are unquestionably afforded to consciousness4 ,but in the case of any complex action--and1 as we have seen1 instinctive behaviour is often remarkably complex--the information that the action has begun comes in before the behaviour is completed4 ,practically we may say that any given stage of performance and the consciousness it evokes are simultaneous2 for though in strictness the one lags just a little behind the other1 yet they are so nearly coincident in time that we may disregard the interval between them4 ,such being the case1 therefore1 we may fairly regard the felt performance of the instinctive act as capable of introducing important elements into the conscious situation4 ,but not only does instinctive behaviour thus introduce important elements into the conscious situation1 it is also called forth by stimuli which themselves afford not less important elements4 ,to exclude these from any consideration of instinct1 in its conscious aspect1 would render the treatment of the problem so incomplete as to be wholly unsatisfactory from a psychological point of view4 ,can we believe that when the moor-hen dived1 as it never had dived before1 at the sight of the rough-haired pup1 the vivid experience of that strange and disquieting intruder did not enter into1 and form a prominent feature in1 the conscious situation8 ,if we are to consider the conscious aspect at all1 we must try and grasp the situation as a whole4 ,and on these grounds we may yet further broaden our conception so as to include1 from the psychological point of view1 not only the behaviour itself1 and its effects in consciousness1 but also the stimulating conditions under which it is called into play4 ,if1 then1 we accept this position1 and agree to use the term 8instinct0 for our present purpose in a comprehensive sense1 we may now proceed to consider very briefly the nature of the elements which enter into the instinctive situation4 ,first1 there are the external stimuli affecting one or more of the sense organs1 and thus evoking consciousness2 and secondly1 there are internal factors1 having their source in the condition of the body1 or its parts and organs4 ,it is convenient to take these two together1 so that we may see what relationship they bear to each other4 ,both seem to be present1 and to co-operate in a great number of instinctive acts4 ,in the behaviour connected with feeding1 for example1 an internal element of hunger co-operates with the external presentation of the appropriate food or prey4 ,so1 too1 with the instincts concerned in the propagation of the race4 ,looking at the matter generally1 we may regard the internal factors of the kind with which we are now dealing1 as giving rise to a want or need1 passing in some cases into a state of craving4 ,in themselves such conscious states are in their inception exceedingly indefinite2 for a want can only be rendered definite in experience by its appropriate satisfaction4 ,in many cases of instinctive behaviour the indefinite want and the particular and duly related stimulus seem to lead1 without prevision and by a blind impulse1 to the performance of those acts which will afford the unforeseen satisfaction4 ,and when once this satisfaction has been attained1 subsequent wants or needs of like character will no longer be indefinite2 nor will future behaviour of the same kind be thereafter wholly instinctive1 for it can never again be prior to1 or independent of1 experience4 ,granted1 however1 that a felt need of some kind1 indefinite at first but none the less real1 is present in many cases as a spur to instinctive behaviour2 is it in all cases a necessary factor8 ,may we say that this distinguishes instinctive from merely reflex action8 ,the question is1 from the nature of the case1 exceedingly difficult to answer4 ,but without going so far as to say that reflex action may be unerringly distinguished from instinctive behaviour by the absence of any such internal factors1 we may perhaps1 at any rate1 go so far as to give provisional acceptance to the view that in instinct these wants and felt needs enter into the conscious situation in a manner and to a degree that are so far distinctive--which seems to be the position adopted by ,professor ,wundt4 ,there is1 however1 a further relation between the external stimulus and these internal factors which is presumably of no little importance4 ,the stimulus intensifies the want1 or may in some cases call it into existence4 ,just as a whiff from the kitchen may lead us to realize that we need the satisfaction that will erelong be presented at table1 so may the sight of his mate in the spring evoke in the breast of the yearling sparrow a need1 having its source in morphological and physiological changes1 that spurs him on to the courtship that shall lead to its due satisfaction4 ,popular attention has1 indeed1 been so naturally drawn to the internal needs or wants with which we are now dealing1 as to give them an almost exclusive monopoly of the term 8instinct10 which thus often comes to be regarded as a connecting link between the stimulus and the act4 ,the sight of a mouse1 for example1 is said to call forth the instinct of the cat1 which is satisfied by her pouncing upon it4 ,and so it comes about that1 while the biologist fixes upon the instinctive act as the essential feature1 the psychologist is apt to regard the impulse#da which prompts to action as the more central and characteristic element4 ,we are here endeavouring to combine both these points of view4 ,to come to closer quarters with the relationship which holds good between the external and internal elements1 it appears that1 when the stimulus evokes or intensifies the want or need1 this is probably effected by efferent waves which call the organs or parts into tonic action1 of which the animal becomes conscious through the afferent messages which come in from them to the sensory centres2 in much the same way as the whiff from the kitchen takes effect on the salivary and other glands1 and throws the organs of digestion into a felt preparedness for the fulfilment of their functions4 ,but it may have other and more indirect consequences4 ,when the moor-hen dived to escape from the obtrusive puppy1 his heart-beat was probably affected2 he had1 perhaps1 an uncomfortable sinking in his gizzard2 his breathing was short and laboured2 and he experienced creepy sensations in the skin and around the feather-roots4 ,such we may suppose were the accompaniments or sources of the emotional state of fear or alarm4 ,and they presumably entered with no little vividness into the conscious situation at the moment of instinctive action4 ,in all those cases in which the behaviour is associated with such an emotional state as anger or fear1 the external stimulus seems to produce widely-spread effects on the glands1 respiratory organs1 heart and blood-vessels1 skin and other parts1 as well as the more direct response in productive action4 ,and all this must enter into the conscious situation1 contributing largely1 as we shall hereafter see1 to the emotions in their instinctive origin4 ,enough has now been said to indicate with sufficient clearness the kind of co-operation and mutual relationship which subsists between the external and the internal factors in the conscious situation which leads to instinctive behaviour4 ,we have seen that1 not improbably1 some organic prompting is always present in greater or less degree4 ,but the question still remains whether anything like a definite and particular external stimulus is in all cases a necessary factor4 ,when the predaceous larva of the water-beetle1 ,dytiscus1 ceases to feed1 and1 creeping into the moist earth near the pond's edge1 makes a hollow cell in which to enter upon its pupal sleep1 there does not seem to be any well-defined stimulus from the outer world which can be said to initiate the behaviour of whose purport the larva can have no idea4 ,some inner need seems to impel the creature to this necessary but as yet unknown course of action2 and this appears to constitute1 if not the sole1 at least the preponderant element in the conscious situation4 ,in healthy young birds and other animals there is after the rest of sleep a certain exhilaration and exuberance of spirits which seemingly leads to characteristic action2 dancing1 flapping of the wings1 running hither and thither in short quick spurts1 and so forth4 ,no doubt in such cases external stimuli are present1 and contribute in some degree to the effects produced2 but they do not seem to be particularized so that one can say that just this or that well-defined stimulus is necessary to give rise to the observed behaviour4 ,in the case of migration1 too1 an internal factor--the nature of which we do not know--is probably as strong as if not stronger than any influence from without4 ,while1 therefore1 we may say that some external factors are frequently1 not improbably always1 contributory1 we must add that observation does not enable us in all cases to define them with any approach to accuracy2 and1 further1 that promptings from within seem in some instinctive acts to be the most important elements in the conscious situation4 ,it now only remains to draw attention to the fact that the effects of the behaviour1 as the animal becomes conscious of the performance of the acts concerned1 serve to complete and render definite the conscious situation4 ,consciousness1 however1 probably receives information of the net results of the progress of behaviour1 and not of the minute and separate details of muscular contraction4 ,these net results1 having thus entered presentatively into the situation1 are subsequently susceptible of re-presentative recall1 when the recurrence of certain salient elements serve to reproduce the essential features of the situation of which experience has been gained on a former occasion4 ,hence1 as has already been noted1 it is only the first performance of an instinctive action which can be described as prior to experience4 ,the second time the deed is done it is done by an animal which has had opportunity of gaining experience on the foregoing occasion4 ,and then it may be done with a difference1 with some acquired modification of performance4 ,by the repetition of the slightly modified behaviour the effects of habit are introduced1 and thus acquired peculiarities of action are established as individual traits4 ,we must not forget that1 in a large number of cases1 so-called instinctive behaviour1 as presented to observation1 has lost through modified repetition its original purity of type4 ,the acts we see are often the joint products of heredity and individual acquisition1 the inherited co-ordination having been supplemented or otherwise altered through experience4 ,even in the case of the very first exhibition of such a deferred instinct as the moor-hen's dive1 although that organized sequence of acts which constituted the behaviour as a whole had never before occurred1 although there was no gradual learning how to dip beneath the surface1 and to swim under water1 still many of the constituent acts had been often repeated2 experience had already been gained of much of the detail then for the first time combined in an instinctive sequence4 ,so that if we distinguish between instinct as congenital and habit as acquired1 we must not lose sight of the fact that there is continual interaction1 in a great number of cases1 between instinct and habit1 and that the first performance of a deferred instinct may be carried out in close and inextricable association with the habits which1 at the period of life in question1 have already been acquired4 ,instinct supplies an outline sketch of behaviour1 to which experience adds colour and shading4 ,which predominates in the finished picture depends on the status of the animal4 ,in the lower and less intelligent types the outline stands out clearly1 there being but little shading to divert our attention from the clear firm lines inscribed by heredity2 but in the higher and more intelligent animals1 the deft pencil of experience has added so much detail and has interwoven with the fainter outline so many new and skilfully introduced touches1 that the original sketch is scarcely distinguishable unless we have carefully watched from the beginning the gradual development of the picture4 ,v4--,,the ,,evolution ,,of ,,instinctive ,,behaviour ,it may be assumed that the fact of evolution is generally admitted4 ,the question of its method is1 however1 still open to discussion4 ,it is possible that1 as some biologists contend1 there is an inherent tendency in organic beings to evolve in certain definite directions independently of their relation to the environment4 ,but it is scarcely probable that instinctive behaviour is mainly due to any such inherent tendency--of the nature of which in any case we know but little4 ,setting this on one side1 therefore1 we have two hypotheses3 first1 that instincts are the result of natural selection2 secondly1 that they are due to the inheritance of acquired habits4 ,these two views we will now proceed to consider4 ,we have seen that ,professor ,wundt distinguishes two classes of instinctive acts3 first1 those which are acquired or have become wholly or partly mechanized in the course of individual life2 secondly1 those which are connate or have been mechanized in the course of generic evolution4 8,the laws of practice10 he says1#db 8suffice for the explanation of the acquired instincts4 ,the occurrence of connate instincts renders a subsidiary hypothesis necessary4 ,we must suppose that the physical changes which the nervous elements undergo can be transmitted from father to son4444 ,the assumption of the inheritance of acquired dispositions or tendencies is inevitable if there is to be any continuity of evolution at all4 ,we may be in doubt as to the extent of this inheritance2 we cannot question the fact itself40 ,now1 the application of the term 8instinct10 both to acquired and to connate behaviour1 seems to prejudge the question of their genetic connection4 ,and since we have the well-recognized term habits for actions the performance of which becomes automatic through frequency of repetition1 we may substitute this term1 or the phrase habitual acts1 for the 8acquired instincts0 of ,professor ,wundt4 ,modifying1 therefore1 his statement in accordance with this usage1 the fact which1 he says1 we cannot question is that acquired habits are inherited as congenital instincts4 ,this opinion has long been held3 ,g4 ,h4 ,lewes regarded instinctive actions as transmitted habits from which the intelligence1 through which they were originally acquired1 had lapsed4 ,darwin believed that such inheritance was a factor in the evolution of instinctive behaviour4 ,romanes distinguished instincts due to this mode of origin as 8secondary20 reserving the term 8primary0 for those attributable to natural selection1 and describing those in which both factors co-operate as 8instincts of blended origin40 ,the late ,professor ,eimer1 of ,tbingen1 going further than either ,darwin or ,romanes1 reverted almost entirely to what we may term the ,lamarckian interpretation4 8,i describe as automatic actions10 he says1#dc 8those which1 originally performed consciously and voluntarily1 in consequence of frequent practice come to be performed unconsciously and involuntarily4444 ,such acquired automatic actions can be inherited4 ,instinct is inherited faculty1 especially is inherited habit40 ,in his discussion of the subject ,eimer makes no express allusion to primary instincts2 but he attributes to lapsed intelligence some of those which were classed by ,romanes as primary1 and his tendency is to refer all instincts to the same source4 8,every bird10 he says1 8must1 from the first time it hatches its eggs1 draw the conclusion that young will also be produced from the eggs which it lays afterwards1 and this experience must have been inherited as instinct40 ,why1 in the first instance1 it must draw the conclusion from observation if it inherit instinctive knowledge1 is not made clear4 ,but our present purpose is to indicate1 not to criticize1 ,eimer's position4 ,he claims that 8the original progenitors of the cuckoo1 when they began to lay their eggs in other nests1 acted by reflection and design40 ,of the behaviour of mason wasps and their allies1 which provide their young with paralyzed but living prey1 he exclaims1 8,what a wonderful contrivance6 ,what calculation on the part of the animal must have been necessary to discover it60 ,of the instincts of neuter bees he remarks1 8,selection cannot here have had much influence1 since the workers do not reproduce4 ,in order to make these favourable conditions constant1 insight and reflection on the part of the animals1 and the inheritance of these faculties were necessary40 ,and he concludes1 8,thus1 according to the preceding considerations1 automatic action may be described as habitual voluntary action2 instinct1 as inherited habitual voluntary action1 or the capacity for such action40 ,turning now to the opposite end of the scale of opinion1 we find that ,professor ,weismann1 commenting on the supposed inheritance of acquired habit1 says1#dd 8,i believe that this is an entirely erroneous view1 and ,i hold that all instinct is entirely due to the operation of natural selection1 and has its foundation1 not upon inherited experiences1 but upon variation of the germ40 ,ziegler and ,groos in ,germany1 ,whitman and ,baldwin in ,america1 ,poulton and ,wallace in ,england1 either deny the existence of secondary instincts1 due to the inheritance of acquired habits1 or question the sufficiency of the evidence adduced in support of such transmission4 ,in their explanation of the manner in which that inherited co-ordination1 which is biologically the central fact in instinctive behaviour1 has been evolved they rely mainly or entirely on the principle of natural selection4 ,what1 then1 were the facts which appeared to ,romanes sufficient to justify a belief in the existence of a class of instincts dependent on inherited habit for their origin8 ,he tells us that he only gives a few examples 8amongst almost any number0 that he could quote4 ,it is certainly unfortunate that1 out of more than one hundred and fifty pages devoted to instinct in his work on 8,mental ,evolution in ,animals10 only three#de are assigned to secondary instincts2 or six1 if we include one dealing with inherited peculiarities of hand-writing in man1 and two showing the force of heredity in the domain of instinct1 8whether of the primary or secondary class40 ,it is true that many pages are devoted to instincts of blended origin1 but the co-operation of the ,lamarckian factor is here rather assumed than proved4 ,we must1 however1 be content to take the few examples that are actually given4 ,they are four in number4 ,first1 that ponies in ,norway are used without bridles1 and are trained to obey the voice2 and that1 as a consequence1 a race-peculiarity has been established1 for ,andrew ,knight says that it is impossible to give them what is called 8a mouth40 ,no details are given1 and ,romanes does not further discuss the evidence4 ,secondly1 ,mr4 ,lawson ,tait had a cat which was taught to beg for food like a terrier4 ,all her kittens adopted the same habit under circumstances which precluded the possibility of imitation4 ,supposing the facts to be correctly reported1 and granting that the owners of the kittens1 presumably aware of the maternal propensity1 did not take some pains to teach the offspring of such a parent to beg 7and this does not present much difficulty71 one can hardly found a scientific conclusion on so slight an anecdotal basis4 ,thirdly1 instinctive fear is said to be an inherited acquisition2 which1 fourthly1 is lost by disuse4 ,but1 as we have already seen1 modern investigation has placed this matter of so-called hereditary fear of natural enemies on a different footing4 ,pheasants1 partridges1 moor-hens1 and wild duck show no fear of a quiet dog4 ,if approached gently1 in the absence of their parents1 callow wild birds in their nest exhibit little alarm at the slow and gentle approach of man4 ,mr4 ,hudson's opinion has already been quoted1 but will bear repetition2 it is1 8that fear of particular enemies is in nearly all cases the result of experience40 ,and there is no evidence to show that1 in those cases in which it is truly instinctive and not the result of experience1 the instinctive behaviour is necessarily due to inherited habit and not to natural selection4 ,it cannot be said that the evidence for the supposed mode of origin of secondary instincts is sufficiently varied and cogent to carry conviction4 ,on the other hand1 there does seem some evidence which points to a different conclusion4 ,when instinctive behaviour follows on a sensory impression1 not only is the co-ordination hereditary1 but there is an inherited linkage of stimulus and response4 ,thus in the solitary wasps the sight of the natural prey is followed by the appropriate modes of attack4 ,the ,melo larva springs upon anything hairy4 ,in chicks the sight of a small object at a certain distance initiates the act of pecking4 ,in moor-hens and ducklings the stimulus of water produces the movements concerned in swimming4 ,and so1 too1 in many other examples of instinctive behaviour1 we infer from the observed facts that stimulus and response have an organic connection founded on hereditary links in the nervous system4 ,now1 if such connection were due to inherited habit1 we should expect them to be established wherever the experience to which they are related has been constant through many generations4 ,how comes it1 then1 that the chick does not instinctively respond by appropriate behaviour to the sight of water8 ,how comes it that young birds do not instinctively avoid bees1 and wasps1 and nauseous caterpillars8 ,if the effects of ancestral experience be hereditary1 one would surely expect that in these cases the connection between stimulus and response--a connection which passes into acquired habit--would have become congenital2 that the habitual behaviour would have long ago become instinctive4 ,but this does not appear to be the case4 ,and with regard to disuse causing the loss of instinct1 how comes it that young chicks swim with well-ordered leg-movements1 though swimming is not an act that is habitually performed by the members of their race8 ,what1 then1 has the alternative hypothesis of natural selection to advance in explanation of these facts8 ,on this hypothesis instinctive acts have biological value in such degree that they have become congenital through the preservation of adaptive variations4 ,but if this be so1 why does not the chick respond instinctively to the sight of that which is so essential to its existence as water to drink8 ,in reply to this question it may be suggested that1 under natural conditions1 the hen teaches all her chickens to peck at the water1 and thus shields them from the eliminating influence which gives rise to natural selection1 in the absence of which the habit of drinking in response to the sight of water1 though acquired by each succeeding generation of birds1 has not become instinctive and congenital4 ,or1 to put the matter from a slightly different point of view1 the maternal instincts of the hen protect her chicks from any elimination in this respect2 and in the absence of such elimination the habit has not been inherited as instinct4 ,but though the hen can lead her young to peck at the water1 she cannot teach them how to perform the complex movements of the mouth1 throat1 and head in actual drinking4 ,in this matter1 therefore1 her own instinctive procedure does not shield them from the incidence of that elimination which leads to survival under natural selection4 ,those chicks would be eliminated which1 on pecking the water1 failed to respond to the stimulus by the complex behaviour involved in drinking1 leaving those to survive in which the response had been congenitally established4 ,thus it would seem that1 when natural selection is excluded1 the habit has not become congenitally linked with a visual stimulus2 but when natural selection is in operation1 the response has been thus linked with the stimulus of water in the bill4 ,whence we may infer that the co-operation of natural selection is an essential factor in the evolution of instinctive behaviour4 ,there are1 however1 cases of instinctive behaviour which may seem too trivial and unimportant to be subject to the sway of natural selection4 ,there are numberless little idiosyncracies of behaviour which seem to be truly instinctive1 which are readily recognizable as distinctive traits1 but which can hardly be regarded as of sufficient biological value to determine whether the creatures in which they are developed should survive or be eliminated in the struggle for existence4 ,in many cases1 however1 these serve rather to distinguish the detailed manner of behaviour than its biological end or purpose4 ,in different species natural selection may determine the survival of those whose instinctive behaviour meets a biological need4 ,the relatively unimportant details1 differing slightly in each species1 are mere adjuncts2 and since natural selection deals with each species or inter-generating group separately1 the essential behaviour may in each case carry with it the associated differences of manner4 ,we must remember1 too1 that1 as in the matter of structure so in that of behaviour1 it is the animal as a whole that is selected for survival2 and so long as the whole is adapted to the circumstances of life1 the associated differences of form or manner may share in1 without doing much to determine1 survival4 ,in any case these little instinctive traits1 if they are so trivial as to seem of small value from the biological point of view1 appear to be too unimportant to have been intelligently acquired as habits4 ,let us now consider one or two cases of instinctive behaviour which would fall under ,romanes's category of instincts of blended origin partly due to natural selection1 partly to the inheritance of acquired habit4 ,it is the custom of the house martin to build beneath the eaves4 ,forsaking the ancestral rocky haunts1 it has been led to utilize the houses that man has built4 ,this has all the appearance of being due to an intelligent modification of the ancestral instinct2 but how far the modification has become through heredity a congenital variation1 we do not know4 ,the intelligence which is said to have enabled the martin of the past to adopt this method of nidification is still operative4 ,the nestlings brought up under the eaves would have opportunities for acquiring experience which might lead them to build under similar circumstances4 ,nest and eaves would be associated in the conscious situation4 ,nor would the effects of natural selection be necessarily excluded4 ,one may suppose that in the open country1 far from rock-shelters1 those martins in which there was a congenital tendency to build in house-shelters would bring up their broods and transmit this tendency2 while those in which it was absent would either go elsewhere or fail to bring up broods at all4 ,in the absence of fuller knowledge as to the truly instinctive nature of the behaviour1 and as to its mode of genesis1 we are in large degree at the mercy of conjecture4 ,but in any case the incidence of elimination is not necessarily excluded1 and there are1 therefore1 no grounds for denying that natural selection has been a co-operating factor in the evolution of the instinctive behaviour1 if such it be4 ,it is well known that the lapwing will apparently simulate the actions of a wounded bird1 with the object1 as it seems1 of drawing intruders away from her nest4 ,and such tactics are not restricted to this bird1 nor even to one or two species4 ,they are common1 no doubt with diversities of detail1 to such different birds as grouse1 pigeons1 plovers1 rails1 avocets1 ducks1 pipits1 buntings1 and warblers4 ,granting that the behaviour is truly instinctive1 it forms a very pretty subject for transmissionists and their critics to quarrel over4 8,if we seek1 as an example10 the transmissionist may exclaim1 8an instinct which bears the marks of its intelligent1 and therefore acquired origin1 this of feigning wounded provides all that we can possibly demand40 8,what mode of instinctive behaviour10 the selectionist may ask1 8can be adduced which is more obviously useful to the species8 ,is not this just the kind of procedure which natural selection1 if it be a factor at all1 must fix upon and perpetuate through the elimination of failures8 ,those birds which1 through congenital variation of behaviour1 acted in this way would certainly enable their offspring to escape destruction by enemies1 and these would survive to perpetuate the instinct40 ,let us expand the transmissionist position a little further4 ,an extremist1 of the type presented by ,eimer1 would perhaps urge that the lapwing reasons thus3 8,if ,i pretend to be wounded1 trail my wing1 and flutter along the ground1 instead of flying off1 ,i shall draw upon myself the intruder's attention1 and lead him to suppose that ,i shall be easily caught2 and if ,i thus entice him away1 my little ones will be saved1 and my end gained40 ,thus1 it may be said1 might the bird argue1 and then give practical effect to its reasoning4 ,but are we not here attributing to the lapwing powers of ratiocination beyond the capacity of the most intelligent of birds8 ,are we not assuming a histrionic power1 and a realization of the effects on others of its display1 which many a human actor might well covet8 8,but may not the bird10 it may be urged in reply1 8have found by experience1 without any elaborate process of abstract reasoning1 that the trick is effectual80 ,in any case it would be experience perilously acquired4 ,granting that the bird has the wit to try the trick1 a little over-acting1 a little too much lameness of wing1 and she is herself seized and killed2 a little under-acting1 and the trick fails--her brood is found and destroyed4 ,does it not seem probable that such experience would be dearly bought1 that failure would mean either death to the parent or death to the offspring8 ,and is it not clear that natural selection is thus introduced in any case8 ,and may not the selectionist pertinently ask3 8,if natural selection is thus introduced as a factor1 why halt midway between two hypotheses8 ,why not take the further step--one by which all the difficulties attending the intelligent acquisition and the biological transmission are alike avoided--of allowing that natural selection exercises1 throughout1 its influence on congenital variations1 and not on acquired modifications of behaviour80 ,there is1 however1 a way in which1 when natural selection is operative1 intelligence may serve to foster congenital variations of the required nature and direction4 ,we must remember that acquired habits on the one hand1 and congenital variations of instinctive behaviour on the other hand1 are both working1 in their different spheres1 towards the same end1 that of adjustment to the conditions of life4 ,if1 then1 acquired accommodation and congenital adaptation reach this end by different methods1 survival may be best secured by their co-operation4 ,and the more thorough-going the co-operation the better the chance of survival4 ,there would be a distinct advantage in the struggle for existence when inherited tendencies of independent origin coincided in direction with acquired modifications of behaviour2 a distinct disadvantage when such inherited tendencies were of such a character as to thwart or divert the action of intelligence4 ,thus any hereditary variations which coincide in direction with modifications of behaviour due to acquired habit would be favoured and fostered2 while such variations as occurred on other and divergent lines would tend to be weeded out4 ,professor ,mark ,baldwin1#df who has independently suggested such relation between modification and variation1 has applied to the process the term 8,organic ,selection20 but it may also be described as the natural selection of coincident variations4 ,it may be urged1 therefore1 that if natural selection be accepted as a potent factor in organic evolution1 and unless good cases can be adduced in which natural selection can play no part and yet habit has become instinctive1 we may adopt some such view as the foregoing4 ,while still believing that there is some connection between habit and instinct1 we may regard the connection as indirect and permissive rather than direct and transmissive4 ,we may look upon some habits as the acquired modifications which foster those variations which are coincident in direction1 and which go to the making of instinct4 ,the net result of a study of instinctive behaviour is to lead us to the conclusion that its evolution runs parallel with the evolution of animal structure4 ,this is perhaps best seen in the case of those insects in which typical instinctive acts are performed by larv of wholly different form and structure1 though they are stages in the development of the same species4 ,this is exemplified in the cases of ,sitaris1 ,argyromba1 and ,leucopsis which have been briefly described4 ,it is probable that in all cases of instinctive action natural selection has been a co-operating factor4 ,without going so far as to assert with ,professor ,weismann the 8all-sufficiency of natural selection10 we may echo the words of ,professor ,groos1#dg and say3 8,nevertheless1 we know no principle except that of selection1 and we must go as far as that will take us4 ,absolute knowledge of such phenomena is unattainable40 ,and in this conclusion we have the support of ,dr4 ,peckham1 who says1#dh 8,we have found them the instinctive acts of solitary wasps in all stages of their development1 and are convinced that they have passed through many degrees from the simple to the complex1 by the action of natural selection4 ,indeed1 we find in them beautiful examples of the survival of the fittest40 ,,chapter ,,iv ,,intelligent ,,behaviour ,i4--,,the ,,nature ,,of ,,intelligent ,,behaviour ,such an animal as a newly hatched bird or an insect just set free from the chrysalis is a going concern1 a living creature4 ,it is the bearer of wonderfully complex automatic machinery1 capable1 under the initiating influence of stimuli1 of performing instinctive acts4 ,but if this were all we should have no more than a cunningly wrought and self-developing automatic machine4 ,what the creature does instinctively at first it would do always1 perhaps a little more smoothly as the organic mechanism settled down to its work--just as a steam-engine goes more smoothly when it has been running for a while2 but otherwise the action would continue unchanged4 ,instinctive behaviour would remain unmodified throughout life4 ,the chick1 however1 or the imago insect is something more than this4 ,it affords evidence of the accommodation of behaviour to varying circumstances4 ,it so acts as to lead us to infer that there are centres of intelligent control through the action of which the automatic behaviour can be modified in accordance with the results of experience4 ,when1 for example1 a young chick walks towards and pecks at a ladybird1 the like of which he has never before seen1 the behaviour may be purely instinctive2 and so1 too1 when he similarly seizes a wasp-larva4 ,even when he rejects the ladybird or swallows the larva1 this may be directly due to unpleasant stimulation in the one case1 and pleasant in the other4 ,but when1 after a few trials1 the chick leaves ladybirds unmolested while he seizes wasp-larv with increased energy1 he affords evidence of selection based on individual experience4 ,and such selection implies intelligence in almost its simplest expression4 ,we may say1 therefore1 that1 whereas instinctive behaviour is prior to individual experience1 intelligent behaviour is the outcome and product of such experience4 ,this distinction is presumably clear enough2 and it is one that is based on the facts of observation4 ,but we must not fail to notice that1 though the logical distinction is quite clear1 the acquired modifications of behaviour1 which we speak of as intelligent1 presuppose congenital modes of response which are guided to finer issues4 ,we may say1 then1 that where these congenital modes of response take the form of instinctive behaviour1 there is supplied a general plan of action which intelligence particularizes in such a manner as to produce accommodation to the conditions of existence4 ,we have already frankly admitted that1 in the present state of our knowledge1 we do not know with any definiteness how intelligent modification of behaviour is effected4 ,but it seems probable that from all parts of the automatically working organic machine messages come in to the centres of conscious control1 and that in accordance with the net result of all these messages1 and the past experience which they recall1 other messages go out to the automatic centres1 and1 by checking their action here and enforcing it there1 give new direction to the resulting behaviour4 ,if this be so1 the consciousness associated with the control-centres is like the person who sits in a central office and guides the working of some organized system in accordance with the information he is constantly receiving2 who sends messages to check activity in certain directions and to render it more efficient and vigorous in others4 ,it may be said1 however1 that intelligent guidance is1 at any rate in such simple cases as the selection of a palatable grub and the rejection of a nauseous ladybird1 itself determined by instinctive likes and dislikes4 ,all young chicks apparently find wasp-larv palatable and ladybirds the reverse2 and this is just as much the outcome of heredity as the instinctive act of pecking4 ,since1 therefore1 heredity determines what shall be selected and what rejected--since the likes and dislikes are themselves instinctive--any essential difference between congenital and acquired behaviour seems to be evanescent4 ,now1 if we apply to the affective qualities of mental states--the pleasurable tone or its opposite which characterize such states--the term 8instinctive10 we do so in reference to the broader psychological conception of instinct1 rather than in accordance with the narrower biological acceptation of the term4 ,for the likes and dislikes constitute part of the conditions under which the behaviour occurs1 and not elements in the co-ordinated response as such4 ,hence it is preferable to apply to these hereditary qualities the term innate1 rather than the term instinctive4 ,but1 waiving this distinction1 it is true that such pleasant or unpleasant qualities of the sensory results of stimuli are part of the animal's hereditary outfit1 and are not acquired in the course of individual experience4 ,what1 then1 is acquired8 ,what part does experience play in the development of intelligent behaviour8 ,let us consider the case of the chick and the ladybird1 and see whether it helps us to answer these questions4 ,the chick is stimulated to the instinctive pecking response by a small moving object4 ,that is the first scene of the little drama4 ,in the second scene the ladybird is seized1 sensory centres are unpleasantly stimulated1 and the insect is dropped or thrown on one side with signs of disgust4 ,let us grant that this aversion with its characteristic response is also instinctive4 ,there is no hereditary connection between scene #a and scene #b4 ,after an interval the curtain rises on act ii4 ,the characters are the same as in the first scene of the previous act4 ,but the action of the drama is different4 ,the chick does not seize the ladybird4 ,why8 ,because there is an acquired connection between scenes #a and #b of the previous act4 ,the chick has gained experience of the nauseous character of the insect1 and this experience influences and modifies his behaviour4 ,the essentially new feature1 therefore1 is the establishment of a connection which is not provided through inheritance4 ,to put the distinction in a brief form1 we may say that instinct depends on how the nervous system is built through heredity2 while intelligence depends upon how the nervous system is developed through use4 ,assuming that an animal is capable of gaining experience and of acquiring new nervous connections in the course of individual experience1 it follows that1 as has already been indicated1 instinctive behaviour in its logical purity is only presented in the first performance of any given co-ordinated act4 ,for after this the animal has gained experience of its performance2 and this can no longer conform to a definition of instinct1 according to which it is characterized as 8prior to experience40 ,on the other hand1 intelligent behaviour cannot be presented on the first occurrence of any action1 since there is no prior experience thereof in the light of which it may be guided4 ,this logical distinction may be expressed by saying that instinctive behaviour is always prior to experience1 while intelligent behaviour is always subsequent to experience4 ,when1 however1 instinctive procedure continues throughout life practically unmodified or but little modified1 we may still class it under instinct1 since the hereditary connections are still the predominant factors4 ,and where the latter part of an instinctive sequence is modified by the experience gained in the former part1 we may still term the modification intelligent1 however small may be the time-interval implied in the word 8subsequent40 ,sharp as the logical distinction is1 the behaviour of animals is in the main a joint-product1 and whether we term it instinctive or intelligent depends upon whether the hereditary or the acquired factor predominates4 ,passing on now to consider some further characteristics of intelligent behaviour1 we may first notice what ,dr4 ,charles ,mercier1 in his work on 8,the ,nervous ,system and the ,mind10 terms the four criteria of intelligence4 ,intelligence is manifested1 he says1 first in the novelty of the adjustments to external circumstances2 secondly1 in the complexity2 thirdly in the precision2 and fourthly1 in dealing with the circumstances in such a way as to extract from them the maximum of benefit4 ,illustration3 ,,fig4 #ah4--,leaf-case of ,birch-weevil4 ,if1 however1 we are to regard these severally as criteria of intelligence1 each should serve to differentiate intelligent from instinctive behaviour4 ,but this is not the case4 ,the precision of the adjustment cannot be regarded as a criterion of intelligence1 for many instinctive acts are remarkably precise4 ,no grocer's assistant rolls a paper funnel with more precision than is displayed by the birch-weevil 7,rhynchites betul7 in constructing the leaf-case in which her eggs are laid4 ,curved incisions of constant form are made on either side of the midrib1 and are 8of just the right shape to make the overlaps in the rolling1 and to retain them rolled up with the least tendency to spring back10#di while the tip of the leaf is rolled into a second smaller funnel1 which is tucked in to close the opening of the first1 after the eggs have been deposited4 8,the eggs hatch in their dark place1 each giving rise to an eyeless maggot1 which ultimately leaves the funnel for the earth4444 ,hence the beetle cannot be considered to have ever seen a funnel1 and certainly has never witnessed the construction of one1 though1 when disclosed1 it almost immediately sets to work to make funnels on the complex and perfect system0 characteristic of the species4 ,this is but one example of instinctive precision out of the many which could be cited4 ,we may say1 then1 that though1 when an act is otherwise shown to be intelligent1 the precision is a criterion of the level attained by the intelligence1 still it cannot be said to be a criterion which serves to distinguish intelligent from instinctive behaviour4 ,nor can we regard apparent prevision 7which is sometimes advanced as a criterion of intelligence7 as specially distinctive of intelligent acts regarded objectively in the study of animal behaviour4 ,for1 as we have had occasion to show1 there are many instincts which display an astonishing amount of what may be termed 8blind prevision0--instance the instinctive regard for the welfare of unborn offspring which the mother will never see1 and the instinctive preparation for an unknown future existence in the case of insect larv4 ,nor1 again1 is the complexity of the adjustment distinctive of intelligence as contrasted with instinct4 ,we have cited examples which afford evidence of much complexity in instinctive behaviour4 ,the construction and storage of the nest among solitary wasps1 and their methods of capturing and conveying the insects or spiders on which they prey1 are sufficiently complex4 ,so1 too1 is the behaviour of the ,sitaris larva which attaches itself to the male bee1 passes to the female1 and then slips on to the eggs she lays2 and so1 again1 is that of the ,yucca moth1 which collects pollen from the anthers1 conveys it to the stigma1 and then lays her eggs among the ovules4 ,these cases show1 too1 that the circumstances may be dealt with in such a way as to extract from them the maximum of benefit4 ,it would be difficult intelligently to improve upon the manner of dealing with the circumstances displayed in many familiar modes of instinctive procedure4 ,there remain the novelty of the adjustment and the individuality displayed4 ,and here we seem to have valid criteria of intelligent behaviour4 ,the ability to perform acts in special adaptation to new circumstances1 and the individuality manifested in dealing with the complex conditions of a variable environment1--these seem to be distinctive features of intelligence4 ,on the other hand1 in instinctive behaviour there seems to be no choice2 the animal is impelled to their stereotyped performance through impulse1 as by a stern necessity2 they are so far from novel that they are performed by every like individual of the species1 and have been so performed by their ancestors for generations2 and in performing the instinctive act1 the animal seems to have no more individuality or originality than a piece of adequately wound clockwork4 ,granting1 then1 that behaviour is shown to be intelligent by the fact that there is evidence of profiting by experience1 we may say that the level attained by the intelligence is indicated by the complexity of the adjustment1 its precision1 the individuality shown1 the amount of prevision disclosed1 and in its being such as to extract from the circumstances the maximum of benefit4 ,many of these points1 however1 serve equally well to mark the level of instinctive procedure4 ,,ii4--,,intelligent ,,behaviour ,,in ,,insects ,it is1 as we have seen1 among the higher invertebrates1 especially in insects1 that some of the most remarkable and complex instincts may be found4 ,there is1#ej however1 a tendency to ascribe the behaviour of insects entirely to instinct1 without sufficient evidence that neither imitation1 instruction1 nor intelligent learning play any part4 ,this is1 perhaps1 a survival of the old-fashioned view that all the acts of the lower animals are performed from instinct1 whereas those of human beings are to be regarded as rational or intelligent4 ,in popular writings and lectures1 for example1 we frequently find some or all of the following activities of ant-life ascribed to instinct3 recognition of members of the same nest2 powers of communication2 keeping aphides for the sake of their sweet secretion2 collection of aphid eggs in ,october1 hatching them out in the nest1 and taking them in the spring to the daisies1 on which they feed1 for pasture2 slave-making and slave-keeping1 which1 in some cases1 is so ancient a habit that the enslavers are unable even to feed themselves2 keeping insects as beasts of burden1 e4g4 a kind of plant-bug to carry leaves2 keeping beetles1 etc41 as domestic pets2 habits of personal cleanliness1 one ant giving another a brush-up1 and being brushed-up in return2 habits of play and recreation2 habits of burying the dead2 the storage of grain and nipping the budding rootlet to prevent further germination2 the habits described by ,dr4 ,lincecum1 and to a large extent confirmed by ,dr4 ,mc,cook1 that ,texan ants prepare a clearing around their nest1 and six months later harvest the ant-rice1 a kind of grass of which they are particularly fond1 even1 according to ,lincecum1 seeking and sowing the grain which shall yield this harvest2 the collection by other ants of grass to manure the soil on which there subsequently grows a species of fungus upon which they feed2 the military organization of the ecitons of ,central ,america2 and so forth4 ,now1 the description of the habits of ants forms one of the most interesting chapters in natural history4 ,but to class them all as illustrations of instinct is a survival of an old-fashioned method of treatment4 ,to put the matter in another way4 ,suppose that an intelligent ant were to make observations on human behaviour as displayed in one of our great cities or in an agricultural district4 ,seeing so great an amount of routine work going on around him1 might he not be in danger of regarding all this as evidence of hereditary instinct8 ,might he not find it difficult to obtain satisfactory evidence of the establishment of our habits1 of the fact that this routine work has to some extent to be learnt8 ,might he not say 7perhaps not wholly without truth71 8,i can see nothing whatever in the training of the children of these men to fit them for their life-work4 ,the training of their children has no more apparent bearing upon the activities of their after-life than the feeding of our grubs has on the duties of ant-life4 ,and although we must remember10 he might continue1 8that these large animals do not have the advantage which we possess of awaking suddenly1 as by a new birth1 to their full faculties1 still1 as they grow older1 now one and now another of their deferred instincts is unfolded and manifested4 ,they fall into the routine of life with little or no training as the period proper to the various instincts arrives4 ,if learning thereof there be1 it has at present escaped our observation4 ,and such intelligence as their activities evince 7and many of them do show remarkable adaptation to uniform conditions of life7 would seem to be rather ancestral than of the present time2 as is shown by the fact that many of the adaptations are directed rather to past conditions of life than to those which now hold good4 ,in the presence of new emergencies to which their instincts have not fitted them1 these poor men are often completely at a loss4 ,we cannot but conclude1 therefore1 that1 although shown under somewhat different and less favourable conditions1 instinct occupies fully as large a space in the psychology of man as it does in that of the ant1 while their intelligence is far less unerring and1 therefore1 markedly inferior to our own40 ,of course1 the views here attributed to the ant are very absurd4 ,but are they much more absurd than the views of those who1 on the evidence which we at present possess1 attribute all the varied activities of ant-life to instinct8 ,take the case of the ecitons1 or military ants1 or the harvesting ants1 or the ants that are said to keep draught-bugs as beasts of burden3 have we sufficient evidence to enable us to affirm that these modes of behaviour are purely instinctive and not intelligent2 that all the varied manuvres of the military ants1 for example1 are displayed to the full without any learning or imitation1 without teaching and without intelligence on the part of every individual in the army4 ,that in some cases there is something very like a training or education of the ant when it emerges from the pupa condition is rendered probable by the observations of ,m4 ,forel4 ,as ,romanes says1#ea 8,the young ant does not appear to come into the world with a full instinctive knowledge of all its duties as a member of a social community4 ,it is led about the nest and #8trained to a knowledge of domestic duties1 especially in the case of larv4' ,later on1 the young ants are taught to distinguish between friends and foes40 ,we have only to weigh the evidence brought forward by such observers as ,fabre and ,dr4 ,peckham to see that among the solitary wasps and mason bees the behaviour1 though founded on instinct1 is in large degree modified by intelligence4 ,the care with which a site for the tunnelled nest in the ground is selected1 betokens something more than instinct4 ,the following is a slightly condensed statement of ,dr4 and ,mrs4 ,peckham's observations on one of the solitary wasps 7,aporus fasciatus74#eb 8,we were working one day in the melon-field when we saw one of these little wasps going backwards and dragging a spider4 ,she twice left it on the ground while she circled about for a moment1 but soon carried it up on to one of the large melon leaves1 and left it there while she made a long and careful study of the locality1 skimming close to the ground in and out among the vines2 at length she went under a leaf close to the ground1 and began to dig4 ,after her head was well down in the ground we broke off the leaf that we might see her method of work4 ,she went on for ten minutes without noticing the change1 and then1 without any circling1 flew off to visit her spider4 ,when she tried to return to her hole it was evident that some landmark was missing4 ,again and again she zig-zagged from the spider to the nesting-place1 going by a sort of path among the vines from leaf to leaf1 and from blossom to blossom1 but when she reached the spot she did not recognize it4 ,at last we laid the leaf back in its place over the opening1 when she at once went in and resumed her work1 keeping at it steadily for ten minutes longer4 ,at this point she suddenly reversed her operations1 and began to fill in the hole that she had made4 ,she then glanced at the spider1 selected a new place1 and began to dig again4 ,this hole was also filled in2 she looked once more at the spider1 and started a nest in a new place4 ,this1 in turn1 was soon abandoned1 as was a fourth4 ,the fifth beginning was made under a leaf that lay close to the ground1 but after twenty minutes' work this place also was abandoned and a sixth started4 ,this1 however1 was the final choice1 and after forty-five minutes spent in digging it was completed40 ,illustration3 ,,fig4 #ai4--,solitary ,wasp using a stone to beat down the earth over its nest 7after ,peckham74 ,this description shows an amount of apparent fastidiousness which is quite irreconcilable with the hypothesis that the behaviour is merely instinctive4 ,not less fastidious are some wasps in the temporary closure of the hole with a stone or pellet of earth1 the operation being repeated several times with different covers before the insect seems to be satisfied2 while in other cases the hole is hidden by bringing earth in such quantity as to render the place indistinguishable from the rest of the field4 ,but in one case observed by ,dr4 ,peckham1 intelligent procedure was carried so far as apparently to involve the use of a tool1 the same behaviour having been independently observed in the same genus 7,ammophila7 by ,dr4 ,s4 ,w4 ,williston of ,kansas ,university4 8,just here10 writes ,dr4 ,peckham1#ec 8must be told the story of one little wasp whose individuality stands out in our minds more distinctly than that of any of the others4 ,in filling up her nest she put her head down into it and bit away the loose earth from the sides1 letting it fall to the bottom of the burrow1 and then1 after a quantity had accumulated1 jammed it down with her head4 ,earth was then brought from the outside and pressed in1 and then more was bitten from the sides4 ,when1 at last1 the filling was level with the ground1 she brought a quantity of fine grains of dirt to the spot1 and1 picking up a small pebble in her mandibles1 used it as a hammer in pounding them down with rapid strokes1 thus making this spot as hard and firm as the surrounding surface4 ,before we could recover from our astonishment at this performance she had dropped her stone and was bringing more earth1 and in a moment we saw her pick up the pebble and again pound the earth into place with it4 ,once more the whole process was repeated1 and then the little creature flew away40 ,here we have intelligent behaviour rising to a level to which some would apply the term rational4 ,for the act may be held to afford evidence of the perception of the relation of the means employed to an end to be attained1 and some general conception of purpose4 ,in this section1 which deals with description of behaviour based on observation1 the psychological explanation cannot be discussed4 ,similar indications of deliberate action may be held to be afforded by the sometimes elaborate 8locality studies0 which these insects seem to make1--by the 8care that is taken by wasps to acquaint themselves with the surroundings of their nests40 ,a ,sphex1 for example1 which had partially made and then abandoned several nests1 left them without any locality study2 but when she had completed a nest in a suitable spot she made 8a most thorough and systematic study of the surroundings4 ,she flew in and out among the plants1 first in narrow circles near the surface of the ground1 and then in wider and wider ones as she rose higher in the air1 until at last she took a straight line and disappeared in the distance40 ,another species 7,cerceris deserta7 8has the habit of making a number of half circles in front of the nest1 and then1 after rising a little higher1 of flying several times completely round it40 ,the method of procedure is1 it seems1 so normal to the species that it is probably founded on an instinctive basis4 ,dr4 and ,mrs4 ,peckham1 in commenting on their observations1 say3#ed 8,if the examination of the objects about the nest makes no impression upon the wasp1 or if it is not remembered1 she ought not to be inconvenienced nor thrown off her track when weeds and stones are removed and the surface of the ground is smoothed over2 but this is just what happens40 ,for convenience of observation they 8sometimes gently moved intercepting objects to one side1 but even such a slight change threw the wasp out of her bearings1 and made it difficult for her to recover her treasure40 ,where wasps form a number of nests in a small plot of ground1 as in the case of ,bembex1 each knows and returns to its own hole1 as was proved by ,dr4 ,peckham1 who marked the insects and their nests with paint4 ,so1 too1 with regard to prey4 ,in the course of his observations on ,pompilus1 ,fabre removed the spider which the wasp had deposited on a tuft of vegetation before she made her nest4 ,as she was at work beneath the surface she could not see what went on above ground or where the spider had been redeposited some twenty inches from its former position4 ,on emerging from the nest the wasp went straight to the original spot1 searched round it for some time1 then made further excursions1 and discovered the spider4 ,after slightly altering its position1 and placing it on another tuft of vegetation1 she returned to her subterranean labours1 giving the observer an opportunity of again moving the spider4 ,five times did ,fabre repeat the operation1 and every time the wasp returned to the spot where she had last deposited her prey4 ,the same observer records some interesting experiments with the mason bee1 ,chalicodoma4 ,the mud nests of the species investigated were affixed to stones on the banks of the ,rhone4 ,when a nest was partially constructed1 the bee having flown off for more material1 ,fabre moved the stone to a new position1 near at hand and easily visible from the original site4 ,the bee went straight to the place where the nest had been1 searched the immediate neighbourhood1 flew off1 and returned to the same spot to continue the search4 ,if she came across her own nest in its new position she did not recognize it as hers1 but left it after examination4 ,but if a stone with the nest of another bee in about the same stage of construction was placed in the position occupied by her own1 she adopted it4 ,and when two nests near together1 both half built1 were transposed1 each bee unhesitatingly adopted the nest which occupied the position where its own nest had been4 ,it may well seem strange that1 the general locality-memory being so well marked1 the recognition of the particular stone and nest should be deficient4 ,this may be due to the fact that the so-called compound eyes are the organs concerned in locality vision1 while the ocelli deal with details at very close range1 and that the former alone afford the requisite data for recognition2 by their instrumentality alone arises the conscious situation which affords guidance in behaviour4 ,and in that situation slight changes which for us make it 8still the same but with a difference0 render it no longer the same for a being of more limited intelligence--one probably incapable of analyzing the situation and seeing that the sameness preponderates over the difference4 ,be this as it may1 the failure of a bee to recognize its own nest under circumstances so foreign to its experience as removal to a new spot may be paralleled with what ,i have observed in the case of sticklebacks4 ,a nest had been built in a round glass bell jar which stood near a window4 ,some aquatic vegetation grew in the tank1 and the nest was built on the window side4 ,an experiment was made by turning the large bell jar through a right angle4 ,the male stickleback searched for its nest in the old direction on the window side--that is to say1 the same position in reference to the incidence of the light4 ,the search was1 of course1 fruitless1 and a new nest was begun in this position4 ,presently the old nest was discovered1 and was then vigorously destroyed in just the same way as the nest of a rival is pulled to pieces and scattered4 ,here a new incidence of light and new direction of shadows seemed to have completely transformed the visual situation4 ,to return to insects1 it is probable that the homing faculty is not the result of an inborn mysterious instinct dependent on some sense of direction of which we have no knowledge1 but is based upon experience gained during their flight hither and thither--that1 in a word1 it is intelligent and not instinctive4 ,experiments of ,fabre at first seemed to suggest some magnetic influence to which bees were sensitive2 for when a minute magnet was fixed to a bee as it started on its return journey1 the insect was at fault2 but as a check experiment he affixed a piece of straw instead of a magnet1 with similar results4 ,some of ,fabre's observations and those of ,dr4 ,bethe#ee are difficult to reconcile with the hypothesis that1 in the homing1 guidance is due to acquired acquaintance with the locality4 ,but1 on the other hand1 the experiments of ,lord ,avebury and of ,romanes seem to favour this view4 ,romanes found that when bees were taken inland from their hive near the seaboard1 and then liberated1 they returned from considerable distances1 the whole locality being familiar2 but taken to the seashore1 where the objects around them were unfamiliar 7since the seashore is not the place where flowers and nectar are to be found71 the bees1 though not far distant from the hive1 were nonplussed and lost their way4 ,dr4 and ,mrs4 ,peckham1 as the result of their extremely careful observations1 seem to have no doubt that the homing of solitary wasps is due to locality-experience2 and of the social wasp1 ,polistes fusca1 they say3#ef 8,we have seen the young workers make repeated locality studies when they first began to venture away from home1 but as they occupy the same nest all summer they1 of course1 grow more and more familiar with their surroundings1 until they become so thoroughly acquainted with them that they can find their way without the least difficulty4 ,we have no doubt that with them1 as with the solitary wasps1 the faculty is not instinctive1 but is the direct outcome of individual experience40 ,in the interesting pages of the works in which ,dr4 and ,mrs4 ,peckham describe their investigations1 there are many observations which show that wasps are capable of intelligently profiting by the experience which their instinctive behaviour places them in a position to acquire4 ,the inherited tendencies and aptitudes pave the way for acquired modification and accommodation of behaviour4 ,to catch and paralyze spiders1 to dig and prepare a tunnelled nest1 and to carry the prey to the nest1 all this affords the instinctive basis2 but when the observers tell us that they 8have several times seen wasps enlarge their holes when a trial had demonstrated that a spider would not go in10 and even on one occasion without trial when an unusually bulky spider was brought1 there is something beyond instinct2 there is intelligent adjustment to special circumstances given in experience4 ,presumably intelligent is the habit frequently observed in one species of ,pompilus1 and occasionally in another1 of hanging the paralyzed spider in a crotch of a branching stem1 usually of bean or sorrel1 where it will be safe from the depredation of ants4 ,on one occasion ,dr4 ,peckham1 desirous of seeing the exact manner in which the victim was stung1 substituted an unhurt spider for that which the wasp had paralyzed4#eg 8,according to the habit of its species when danger threatens1 it kept perfectly quiet1 and when the wasp returned it was hanging there as motionless as a piece of dead matter2 but she would not touch it2 she hunted all over that plant and then over several others near to it1 returning continually to look again at the right spot4 ,after five minutes she flew off in the direction of the woods to catch another spider4 ,why did she go to the woods8 ,why did she not take the one that hung there in plain view8 ,it could not have been due to the fact that we had handled the spider1 since when1 on other occasions1 we took one that had been paralyzed1 examined it1 and then returned it to the wasp1 she accepted it without hesitation4444 ,in forty minutes she came back with another spider1 but1 instead of taking it into the nest1 she hung it upon a bean plant near by1 and then proceeded to dig a new hole a few inches distant from the first4 ,foolish little wasp1 what a waste of labour6 ,truly1 if you are endowed with energy beyond your fellows1 you are but meagrely furnished with reason40 ,illustration3 ,,fig4 #bj4--,spiders placed by ,solitary ,wasps in the crotches of branching stems 7after ,peckham74 ,here we have the routine of instinct--the normal mode of hunting and capturing prey1 the normal procedure of bringing the spider1 and then making the nest1 predominating over any tendency to initiate intelligent improvements4 ,this1 however1 should not surprise us1 in whom the force of habit is often so strong4 ,nor should we feel surprise at the apparently stupid tolerance some of these wasps display in presence of parasites4 ,bembex1 which does not store and close its cell1 but brings continual supplies of food to its larv1 is not disturbed by the presence in the cell of the grubs of the parasitic fly ,miltogramma4 ,she could1 we think1 easily free her nest of these intruders1 but she continues to bring supplies1 though the parasites may absorb it all and leave her own larv to perish4 ,she adapts her procedure to the new conditions1 being incapable of knowing that she is feeding the enemies of her race4 ,enough has now been said to show the extent and the limitations of the intelligence of such insects as the solitary wasps4 ,it will be noticed that the acquired modifications of behaviour occur in close connection with the inherited ground-plan of instinctive procedure4 ,we shall have occasion to note the same connection in our discussion of social behaviour in the next chapter4 ,and we shall consider the influence of intelligence on instinct before we bring this chapter to a close4 ,,iii4--,,some ,,results ,,of ,,experiment ,it is unnecessary to give a resum of entertaining anecdotes illustrative of intelligent behaviour in the higher animals4 ,such anecdotes are too often the outcome of casual observations by untrained observers2 and the interpretation put upon the facts frequently shows a want of psychological discrimination4 ,such is not the material of which science is constituted4 ,what is needed is systematic observation conducted1 so far as possible1 under controlled conditions4 ,two things are necessary3 first1 to distinguish instinctive behaviour1 inherited as such1 from the acquired modifications or new departures due to intelligence2 and secondly1 to determine the method and range of intelligent procedure4 ,these problems can only be solved in their entirety by a complete knowledge of the life-history of the animal concerned4 ,but they may be attacked in detail by a systematic study of particular modes of behaviour1 and by an investigation into their manner of origin4 ,that this may be done with some approach to accuracy1 resort must be had to experiment1 which permits of observation under controlled conditions4 ,to ascertain1 for example1 how far nest-building is instinctive in birds1 ,mr4 ,john ,s4 ,budgett hatched a hen greenfinch under a canary4 ,in the following autumn he bought a caged bird1 a cock1 probably of the same year1 and in the succeeding spring turned the pair into a large aviary1 supplying such material as twigs1 rootlets1 dried grass1 moss1 feathers1 sheep's wool and horsehair4 ,the hen soon began to build1 the cock bird taking no share in the work1 and finished her nest in a few days4 ,on careful comparison it was found to resemble that of a wild greenfinch in every particular1 being made of wool1 roots1 and moss1 lined with horsehair4 ,a second nest the aviary greenfinch built was also quite normal4 ,in the case of a bullfinch which ,mr4 ,budgett reared1 having obtained it when a few weeks' old1 the first nest was composed of dried grass with a little wool and hair1 but without either rootlets or twigs4 ,a second which she built was1 however1 quite typical1 made of fine twigs and roots1 and lined with horsehair2 as was also a third nest4 ,it is just possible1 though most improbable1 that the bullfinch utilized its three weeks' experience gained in the nest from which it was taken4 ,but ,mr4 ,jenner ,weir describes#eh observations on canaries in which this source of experience is excluded4 8,it is usual10 he says1 8with canary fanciers to take out the nest constructed by the parent birds1 and to place a felt nest in its place1 and when her young are hatched1 and old enough to be handled1 to place a second clean nest1 also of felt1 in the box1 removing the other4 ,but ,i never knew that canaries so reared failed to make a nest when the breeding time arrived4 ,i have1 on the other hand1 marvelled to see how like a wild bird's the nests are constructed4 ,it is customary to supply them with a small set of materials1 such as moss and hair4 ,they use the moss for the foundation1 and line with the finer materials1 just as a wild goldfinch would do40 ,experiment seems1 therefore1 to show in a way1 and with a clearness impossible of attainment by observation under natural uncontrolled conditions1 that nest-building in birds is instinctive4 ,that the manner and method of procedure is often modified in accordance with special conditions--that the instinctive outline of nidification receives its final touches through individual experience--is sometimes seen under nature1 and more often under the semi-experimental conditions of domestication4 ,thus three pairs of pigeons in the ,wilson ,tower of ,clifton ,college made their nests in #ahih1 as ,i am informed by ,mr4 ,h4 ,c4 ,playne1 of galvanized iron wire1 pieces of which were left in a corner at the top of the tower1 thus affording a parallel to the behaviour of the unconventional crow of ,calcutta1 mentioned by ,mr4 ,f4 ,w4 ,headley1#ei which made its nest of soda-water bottle wires1 which it picked up in a back yard4 ,but even in this matter experiment serves to bring out clearly the selective influence which is exercised by intelligence4 ,bolton1#fj in #agib1 observed a pair of goldfinches beginning to build their nest in his garden4 ,they formed the ground-work of moss1 grass1 etc41 as usual2 but on his scattering small parcels of wool in different parts of the garden they1 in great measure1 left off the use of their own stuff and used the wool4 ,afterwards he gave them cotton1 and they then used this instead of the wool2 then he supplied fine down1 and they finished their work with this1 leaving the wool and cotton4 ,in studying the behaviour of wild animals under natural conditions1 it must always be difficult to distinguish the congenital basis from the acquired elements2 for both tend to bring about a working adjustment to the conditions of life1 and we can seldom have opportunities of tracing the interplay of the factors which produce the instinct-habits of adult life4 ,but under domestication we seek to bring about a new working adjustment to conditions imposed by man4 ,the skilful trainer utilizes the natural instinctive tendencies as a basis2 and1 by a system of rewards and punishments1 leads the intelligent modifications of behaviour along lines directed by his deliberate purpose4 ,the conditions are largely those of experiment1 and they bring out the play and range of intelligence in a way which would otherwise elude our observation4 ,the training of falcons for the chase affords a good illustration1 since they cannot be bred in confinement1 and the effects of training cannot therefore be hereditary4 ,the falconer's object is to modify the congenital instinctive behaviour of a bird of prey for the purposes of sport4 ,she is trained to the lure at first at short distances1 and step by step through longer flights2 she is taught by snatching away the lure to stoop at it repeatedly as often as it is jerked aside2 and then she is trained on living quarry1 at first under easy conditions1 till eventually she can be flown at a wild bird4 ,and as a result a well-trained falcon will follow her master from field to field1 regulating her flight by his movements1 always ready for a stoop when the quarry is sprung4 ,the fact that she can be thus educated for her work shows that her behaviour is plastic1 and can be moulded by intelligence4 ,experimental conditions reveal the fact2 but under nature the moulding influence of intelligence is presumably not less important1 though it is more directly in line with the congenital instinctive tendencies4 ,that much of the behaviour of the higher animals is guided by experience similar to that which plays so large a part in their training under the experimental conditions of domestication is generally admitted4 ,but what are the range and limits of animal intelligence1 and whether it attains the level of rational conduct1 in the restricted sense of the term 8rational10 are questions open to discussion1 to which answers are more likely to be obtained through experiment than by chance observations4 ,before giving some of the results of such experiment it will be well to revert to the distinction1 which was drawn in the second chapter1 between the lower or intelligent stage of mental development and the higher or rational stage4 ,it will be remembered that rational processes were characterized by the fact that the situations contain the products of reflective thought1 presumably absent in the earlier stages of development2 that they were further characterized by a new purpose or end of consciousness1 namely1 to explain the situations which at an earlier stage are merely accepted as they are given in presentation or re-presentation2 they require deliberate attention to the relationships which hold good among the several elements of successive situations2 and they involve1 so far as behaviour is concerned1 the intentional application of an ideal scheme with the object of rational guidance4 ,on the other hand1 the animal at the stage of intelligent behaviour deals with the circumstances of his comparatively simple life by making use of the particular situations which have been presented to consciousness in the course of his practical experience4 ,if such an animal be placed in the midst of new circumstances he has to find out by a process of trial and error how they are to be met4 ,after a longer or shorter period of trial1 guided only by particular experiences1 he chances to hit upon a mode of procedure which is successful4 ,the successful act is then incorporated in a new situation2 at first1 perhaps1 only incompletely4 ,the association is eventually established by repetition1 through which is acquired the habit of doing the right thing in the appropriate manner4 ,why he does this and not something else1 in so far as he is intelligent and not rational1 he probably neither knows nor has the wit to consider4 ,the satisfaction of success suffices for intelligence as such4 ,if the circumstances be so modified as to render the particular mode of meeting them ineffectual1 after trying again and again in the old way1 he will sometimes stumble upon the proper mode of overcoming the difficulty1 and after doing so two or three times a new conscious situation involving the requisite associations will be established1 and the appropriate behaviour will become habitual4 ,but why this new mode of procedure rather than any other is adopted1 intelligence as such does not know1 because it does not analyze the situation and disentangle the essential relationships4 ,the satisfaction of success again suffices4 ,in a word1 such an animal in the perceptual stage of mental development seems wanting in the power of reflection4 ,he does not appear to show evidence of framing anything like a general scheme of knowledge which he can apply to the solution of particular problems1 of a practical nature1 involving difficulties and obstacles4 ,the method of intelligence--in the sense in which we are using this term--the method of varied trial and error with the utilization of chance success1 is a lengthy and somewhat clumsy process2 but it suffices4 ,now contrast it with the procedure of a rational animal1 such as man is or may be4 ,when he is confronted by a difficulty he is not content to meet it by trying this way1 and that way1 and another way1 anyhow1 and trusting to chance to bring success1 but he considers the problem in all its relations with a view to ascertaining the essential nature of the difficulty4 ,for each attempted mode of meeting the case he has a definite reason4 ,he knows why he does this and not that4 ,he has a plan or scheme which he puts into execution4 ,and if it fail1 he is not content till he finds out wherein the failure lay4 ,this enables him to plan a better scheme4 ,he sees why it is better2 and if at last he be successful by a happy hit1 as in the chance procedure of intelligence1 he looks for the reason of it4 ,and seeing why this fortunate attempt1 unlike his previous efforts1 just meets the case1 he repeats it because he perceives that herein lies the essential solution of the difficulty4 ,both in the case of intelligence and in that of reason1 as here distinguished1 present procedure is based upon past experience2 but reason has built upon the foundations thus laid an orderly scheme1 and knows its whys and wherefores1 while intelligence is at the mercy of chance associations4 ,the reason for success it has not the wit to assign4 ,the essential difference between the two cases may be put in another way by saying that the intelligent being forms sensory impressions and sensory images linked together by bonds of association1 combining and coalescing to constitute a conscious situation effective in behaviour under the guiding influence of pleasure and pain2 while the rational being not only does all this1 but goes further4 ,he fixes his attention on the way in which the elements in the situation are connected and related2 he builds an ideal framework on which the sensory impressions are set or move in an orderly manner4 ,and it is this scheme1 fashioned by reason and transforming the situation1 which he utilizes in dealing with difficulties4 ,yet another way of putting the same essential distinction is to say that intelligence deals with pictures1 either directly presented to the senses or called up in re-presentation4 ,if we state the matter thus1 however1 we must remember that the 8pictures0 may be painted in colours supplied by any of the senses2 and that smells1 tastes1 sounds1 touches1 pressures1 limb-movements1 and so forth1 are elements in the pictured product4 ,bearing this in mind1 we may say that intelligence deals with sensory impressions and their revived images in concrete and particular situations2 while reason analyzes the pictures1 and extracts from them general notions in terms of which the pictures may be explained4 ,for example1 we picture a stone falling to the earth2 but we explain it by the general notion of gravitative attraction4 ,the conception forms part of our ideal scheme of knowledge1 which is not itself picturable1 though this or that example of its action may be presented or re-presented in sensory imagery4 ,once more we may say--and this way of looking at the question arises naturally out of what has gone before--that intelligence deals with concrete examples1 and does not rise to the abstract and general rule4 ,the ideal scheme of reason is the result of abstraction and generalization4 ,it is a framework of conceptions which can be applied to the particular facts which fall under observation to see whether it fits and meets the case4 ,intelligence has to deal with the facts as they present themselves1 without the aid of an organized system of knowledge built up into an ideal scheme4 ,enough has now been said to indicate the distinction between the method of intelligence and that of reason4 ,it may1 no doubt1 be said that the terminology used is open to criticism2 for1 on the one hand1 the words 8intelligence0 and 8intelligent0 are frequently used as synonymous with 8reason0 and 8rational20 and1 on the other hand1 acts requiring neither abstraction1 generalization1 nor the application of any scheme of knowledge are frequently spoken of as 8rational40 ,hence there is1 it may be urged1 some danger of misunderstanding4 ,this may be granted4 ,and unless some such restriction of meaning under suitable terms be accepted by psychologists1 misunderstanding will continue4 ,more essential1 however1 than the distinctive terms we are to use is the distinction of method which underlies them4 ,that1 ,i trust1 is sound4 ,dr4 ,lindley1 in an interesting paper on 8,a ,study of ,puzzles10#fa has utilized the distinction in his investigation of the mental development of children1 and has found that the procedure of young children is predominantly of the 8sense-trial and error0 order which has above been termed intelligent2 and he expresses the opinion that 8most of the adaptations of animals are on this sense-trial and error level40 ,such certainly seems to be the conclusion to be drawn from my own experimental observations on dogs4 ,it has frequently been asserted that the behaviour of a dog with a stick in his mouth1 when he comes to a narrow gap1 shows that he at once perceives the nature of the difficulty1 and meets it in a rational manner by adopting the appropriate plan of action4 ,he pulls the stick through by one end4 ,but experiments1 which ,i have elsewhere described1#fb showed that a fox terrier1 fourteen months old1 seemed to be incapable of perceiving the nature of the difficulty which vertical iron railings presented to his passage with a stick in his mouth1 and only imperfectly learnt to overcome it after many ineffectual trials and many failures4 ,the results obtained on the first afternoon may be quoted to indicate the nature of the evidence4 ,the dog was sent after a short stick into a field1 and had to pass through vertical rails about six inches apart4 ,on his return the stick caught at the ends4 ,i whistled and turned as if to leave2 and the dog pushed and struggled vigorously4 ,he then retired into the field1 lay down1 and began gnawing the stick1 but1 when called1 came slowly up to the railings and stuck again4 ,after some efforts he put his head on one side1 and brought the stick1 a short one1 through4 ,after patting and encouraging him1 ,i sent him after it again4 ,on his return he came up to the railings with more confidence1 but1 holding the stick by the middle1 found his passage barred4 ,after some struggles he dropped it and came through without it4 ,sent after it again1 he put his head through the railings1 seized the stick by the middle1 and then pulled with all his might1 dancing up and down in his endeavours to effect a passage4 ,turning his head in his efforts1 he at last brought the stick through4 ,a third time he was again foiled2 again dropped the stick2 and again seizing it by the middle tried to pull it through4 ,i then placed the stick so that he could easily seize it by one end and draw it through the opening between the rails4 ,but when ,i sent him after it1 he went through into the field1 picked up the stick by the middle1 and tried to push his way between the railings1 succeeding1 after many abortive attempts1 by holding his head on one side4 ,subsequent trials on many occasions yielded similar results4 ,but the following summer1 when ,i resumed the experiments1 ,i was able with some guidance to teach him to bring a long stick to the railings1 drop it1 and then draw the stick through by one end2 though even then1 if he had dropped it so that one end just caught a rail1 he often failed1 shaking his head vigorously1 dropping the stick and seizing it again1 and repeating this behaviour until it chanced to fall in a more favourable position4 ,he did not apparently perceive that by gently moving the stick a little one way or other the difficulty could be simply overcome with little effort4 ,nor when given a crooked stick1 which caught in a rail1 did he show any sign of perceiving that by pushing the stick and freeing the crook he could pull the stick through4 ,each time the crook caught he pulled with all his strength1 seizing the stick now at the end1 now in the middle1 and now near the crook4 ,at length he seized the crook itself1 and with a wrench broke it off4 ,a man who was passing1 and who had paused for a couple of minutes to watch the proceedings1 said1 8,clever dog that1 sir2 he knows where the hitch do lie40 ,the remark was the characteristic outcome of two minutes' chance observation4 ,during the half hour or more during which ,i had watched the dog he had tried nearly every possible way of holding and tugging at the stick4 ,such is the mode of behaviour based on intelligence--continued trial and failure1 until a happy effect is reached1 not by methodically planning1 but by chance4 ,two of my friends criticized these results1 and said that they only showed how stupid my dog was4 ,their dogs would have acted very differently4 ,i suggested that the question could easily be put to the test of experiment4 ,the behaviour of the dog was in each case--the one a very intelligent ,yorkshire terrier1 the other an ,english terrier--similar to that above described4 ,the owner of the latter was somewhat annoyed1 used forcible language1 and told the dog that he could do it perfectly well if he tried4 ,in experimenting with my fox terrier on the method adopted in seizing and carrying differently balanced objects1 ,i used 7#a7 a straight stick1 the centre of gravity of which was at the middle2 7#b7 a ,kaffir knob-kerrie1 the centre of gravity of which was about six inches from the knob2 7#c7 a light geological hammer2 and 7#d7 a heavier hammer4 ,in the last1 the centre of balance was close to the hammer head4 ,the net result of the observations was that the best place for seizing and holding the object was hit upon in each case after indefinite trials2 that after three or four days' continuous experience with one 7say the knob-kerrie71 another 7say the stick7 was at first seized nearer one end1 showing the influence of the more recent association2 and that there was little indication of the dog's seizing any one of the four at once in the right place1 that is to say1 the point of seizure was not clearly differentiated in accordance with the look of the object4 ,i tied a piece of string1 in later trials1 round the centre of balance1 but this1 at the time of the dog's death1 had not served as a sure guide to his experience4 ,the way in which my dog learnt to lift the latch of the garden gate1 and thus let himself out1 affords a good example of intelligent behaviour4 ,the iron gate outside my house is held to by a latch1 but swings open by its own weight if the latch be lifted4 ,whenever he wanted to go out the fox terrier raised the latch with the back of his head1 and thus released the gate1 which swung open4 ,now the question in any such case is3 ,how did he learn the trick8 ,in this particular case the question can be answered1 because he was carefully watched4 ,when he was put outside the door1 he naturally wanted to get out into the road1 where there was much to tempt him--the chance of a run1 other dogs to sniff at1 possibly cats to be worried4 ,he gazed eagerly out through the railings on the low parapet wall shown in the illustration2 and in due time chanced to gaze out under the latch1 lifting it with his head4 ,he withdrew his head and looked out elsewhere2 but the gate had swung open4 ,here was the fortunate occurrence arising out of natural tendencies in a dog4 ,but the association between looking out just there and the open gate with a free passage into the road is somewhat indirect4 ,the coalescence of the presentative and re-presentative elements into a conscious situation effective for the guidance of behaviour was not effected at once4 ,after some ten or twelve experiences1 in each of which the exit was more rapidly effected with less gazing out at wrong places1 the fox terrier had learnt to go straight and without hesitation to the right spot4 ,in this case the lifting of the latch was unquestionably hit on by accident1 and the trick was only rendered habitual by repeated association in the same situation of the chance act and the happy escape4 ,once firmly established1 however1 the behaviour remained constant throughout the remainder of the dog's life1 some five or six years4 ,illustration3 ,,fig4 #ba4--;,fox-terrier lifting the latch of a gate4 ,mr4 ,e4 ,j4 ,shellard observed#fc an act of similar import in a ,scotch staghound1 which 8appeared at first to be the result of thought10 but which1 on closer observation1 was clearly seen to be the result of intelligence in the restricted sense of the term4 ,the dog released the lever-latch of a yard door4 8,at first he raised his paws to the door and scratched violently1 manifesting various signs of impatience4 ,his scratches1 which extended from the top of the door downwards1 and over the whole area1 would thus inevitably at some time or other reach the handle of the latch1 which was thus struck forcibly downwards1 the latch itself rising upwards4 ,the door would then open from the weight of the dog pushing against it4 ,the dog always opened the door in this manner from the time when the incident was first noticed until he left1 a period of about three years4 ,the door was opened with no greater ease at the expiration of that period than at the commencement4 ,his paws would strike various parts of the door1 and he never appeared to exercise any degree of judgment in the localization of his strokes1 the fact of his paws striking the handle of the latch being a necessary result1 providing the dog had sufficient patience and strength to continue40 ,one or two more experiments with my fox terrier may be briefly described4 ,i watched his behaviour when a solid indiarubber ball was thrown towards a wall standing at right angles to its course4 ,at first he followed it right up to the wall and then back as it rebounded4 ,so long as it travelled with such velocity as to be only just ahead of him he pursued the same course4 ,but when it was thrown more violently1 so as to meet him on the rebound as he ran towards the wall1 he learnt that he was thus able to seize it as it came towards him4 ,and1 profiting by the incidental experience thus gained1 he acquired the habit--though for long with some uncertainty of reaction--of slowing off when the object of his pursuit reached the wall so as to await its rebound4 ,again1 when the ball was thrown so as to glance at a wide angle from a surface1 at first--when the velocity was such as to keep it just ahead of him--he followed its course4 ,but when the velocity was increased he learnt to take a short cut along the third side of a triangle1 so as to catch the object at some distance from the wall4 ,a third series of experiments were made where a right angle was formed by the meeting of two surfaces4 ,one side of the angle1 the left1 was dealt with for a day or two4 ,at first the ball was directly followed4 ,then a short cut was taken to meet its deflected course4 ,on the fourth day this method was well established4 ,on the fifth1 the ball was thrown so as to strike the other or right side of the angle1 and thus be deflected in the opposite direction4 ,the dog followed the old course 7the short cut to the left7 and was completely non-plussed1 searching that side1 then more widely1 and not finding the ball for eleven minutes4 ,on repeating the experiment thrice1 similar results were that day obtained4 ,on the following day the ball was thrown just ahead of him1 so as to strike to the right of the angle1 and was followed and caught4 ,this course was pursued for three days1 and he then learnt to take a short cut to the right4 ,on the next day the ball was sent1 as at first1 to the left1 and the dog was again non-plussed4 ,i did not succeed in getting him to associate a given difference of initial direction with a resultant difference of deflection4 ,i may here mention that1 whenever searching for a ball of which he had lost sight in the road1 he would run along the gutter first on one side and then on the other4 ,a friend who was walking with me one day regarded this as a clear case of rational inference4 8,the dog knows10 he said1 8the effects of the convex curvature of the road as well as we do40 ,i am convinced1 however 7having watched his ways from a puppy71 that this method of search was gradually established on a basis of practical experience4 ,no logical inference on his part is necessary for the interpretation of the facts2 and we should not assume its presence unless the evidence compels us to do so4 ,dr4 ,e4 ,l4 ,thorndike1 in a monograph on 8,animal ,intelligence0 published as a supplement to the ,psychological ,review 7,june1 #ahih71 has fully described and carefully discussed a number of interesting experiments4 ,the subjects 7one might1 alas6 almost say victims7 of some of these were thirteen kittens or cats from three to eighteen months old4 ,his method of investigation shall be stated in his own words4 8,after considerable preliminary observation of animals' behaviour under various conditions1 ,i chose for my general method one which1 simple as it is1 possesses several other marked advantages besides those which accompany experiment of any sort4 ,it was merely to put animals when hungry in enclosures from which they could escape by some simple act1 such as pulling at a loop of cord1 pressing a lever1 or stepping on a platform4 ,the animal was put in the enclosure1 food was left outside in sight1 and his actions observed4 ,besides recording his general behaviour1 special notice was taken of how he succeeded in doing the necessary act 7in case he did succeed71 and a record was kept of the time that he was in the box before performing the successful pull1 or clawing1 or bite4 ,this was repeated until the animal had formed a perfect association between the sense-impression of the interior of that box and the impulse leading to the successful movement4 ,when the association was thus perfect1 the time taken to escape was1 of course1 practically constant and very short4 8,if1 on the other hand1 after a certain time the animal did not succeed1 he was taken out1 but not fed4 ,if1 after a sufficient number of trials1 he failed to get out1 the case was recorded as one of complete failure4 ,enough different sorts of methods of escape were tried to make it fairly sure that association in general1 not association of a particular sort of impulse1 was being studied4 ,enough animals were taken with each box or pen to make it sure that the results were not due to individual peculiarities4 ,none of the animals used had any previous acquaintance with any of the mechanical contrivances by which the doors were opened4 ,so far as possible the animals were kept in a uniform state of hunger1 which was practically utter hunger40 ,illustration3 ,,fig #bb4--;,cage used in ,professor ,thorndike's experiments4 ,to ,dr4 ,thorndike's monograph we must refer those who desire detailed information as to apparatus and procedure4 ,it must here suffice to state that the box-cages employed were rudely constructed of wooden laths1 and formed cramped prisons about twenty inches long by fifteen broad and twelve high4 ,nine contained such simple mechanisms as ,dr4 ,thorndike describes in the passage above quoted4 ,when a loop or cord was pulled1 a button turned1 or a lever depressed1 the door fell open4 ,in another1 pressure on the door as well as depression of a thumb-latch was required4 ,in one cage two simple acts on the part of the kitten were necessary1 pulling a cord and pushing aside a piece of board2 and in yet others three acts were requisite4 ,in those boxes from which escape was more difficult a few of the cats failed to get out4 ,the times occupied in thoroughly learning the trick of the box by those who were successful are plotted in a series of curves1 the essential feature of which is the graphic expression of a gradual diminution in the time interval between imprisonment and escape in successive trials4 ,this is shown in ,fig4 #bc1 which is constructed from some of ,dr4 ,thorndike's data4 ,in some cases the cats were set free from a box when they 7#a7 licked themselves or 7#b7 scratched themselves4 ,illustration3 ,,fig4 #bc4--;,diagram showing times taken by a kitten to escape from the cage in twenty-four successive experiments4 ,dr4 ,thorndike comments on the results of his experiments as follows3-- 8,when put into the box the cat would show evident signs of discomfort and of an impulse to escape from confinement4 ,it tries to squeeze through any opening2 it claws and bites at the bars or wire2 it thrusts its paws out through any opening1 and claws at everything it reaches2 it continues its efforts when it strikes anything loose and shaky3 it may claw at things within the box4 ,it does not pay very much attention to the food outside1 but seems simply to strive instinctively to escape from confinement4 ,the vigour with which it struggles is extraordinary4 ,for eight or ten minutes it will claw1 and bite1 and squeeze incessantly4444 ,the cat that is clawing all over the box in her impulsive struggle will probably claw the string1 or loop1 or button so as to open the door4 ,and gradually all the other non-successful impulses will be stamped out1 and the particular impulse leading to the successful act will be stamped in by the resulting pleasure1 until1 after many trials1 the cat will1 when put in the box1 immediately claw the button or loop in a definite way4444 ,starting1 then1 with its store of instinctive impulses1 the cat hits upon the successful movement1 and gradually associates it with the sense-impression of the interior of the box until the connection is perfect1 so that it performs the act as soon as confronted with the sense-impression4444 ,previous experience makes a difference in the quickness with which the cat forms the associations4 ,after getting out of six or eight boxes by different sorts of acts1 the cat's general tendency to claw at loose objects within the box is strengthened and its tendency to squeeze through holes and bite bars is weakened2 accordingly it will learn associations along the general line of the old more quickly4 ,associations between licking or scratching and escape are similarly established1 and there was a noticeable tendency to diminish the act until it becomes a mere vestige of a lick or scratch4 ,after the cat gets so that it performs the act soon after being put in1 it begins to do it less and less vigorously4 ,the licking degenerates into a mere quick turn of the head with one or two motions up and down with tongue extended4 ,instead of a hearty scratch1 the cat waves its paw up and down rapidly for an instant40 ,such experiments carried out on a different method give results in line with my own4 ,the conditions are1 however1 somewhat unnatural1 which ,i regard as in some respects a disadvantage4 ,but we need experiments on different methods--the more the better1--and if the results they furnish are in accord1 their correctness will be rendered the more probable4 ,it is to be hoped that ,dr4 ,thorndike will devise further experiments in which 7#a7 the conditions shall be somewhat less strained and straitened1 while the subjects are in a more normal state of equanimity 7cannot 8utter hunger0 be avoided871 and 7#b7 there shall be more opportunity for the exercise of rational judgment1 supposing the faculty to exist4 ,to establish the absence of foresight in the procedure of the cats1 it is surely necessary so to arrange matters that the connections are clearly open--nay1 even obvious--to the eye of reason4 ,it appears that this consideration has not weighed sufficiently with ,dr4 ,thorndike4 ,a series of experiments were made to ascertain whether instruction 7in the form of putting the animal through the procedure requisite for a given act7 was in any degree helpful4 ,the conclusion is that such instruction has no influence4 ,those who have had experience in teaching animals to perform tricks will probably agree here--though some trainers give expression to a different opinion4 ,it is1 however1 essential to distinguish carefully between showing an animal how a trick is done1 and either stimulating its attention or furnishing accessory guidance 7such as the occasional taps of the trainer's whip when he wants a performing horse to kneel71 or affording suitable conditions the results of which temporarily enter into the association complex4 ,if the latter be eliminated the practice of trainers1 ,i believe1 bears out the general result of the experiments4 ,dr4 ,thorndike never succeeded in getting an animal to change its way of doing a thing for his4 ,nor was ,i1 after repeated trials1 able to modify the way in which my dog lifted the latch of the gate4 ,he did it with the back of his head4 ,i could not get him to do it 7more gracefully7 with his muzzle4 ,it may be said that the remarkable feats of performing animals imply the existence of faculties of a higher order than ,dr4 ,thorndike and ,i are prepared to admit on the basis of our experiments4 ,mr4 ,p4 ,g4 ,hamerton many years ago described#fd how1 in his own house1 a cleverly trained dog would fetch in their right order the letters which spelt the ,english or ,german equivalents of common ,french words1 and do other wonderful things4 ,but the owner of the dog 7,m4 du ,rouil7 admitted that there was a means of rapport between them which he was not prepared to divulge4 ,it is just because the trainer has to lead up to and utilize chance experiences that such prolonged patience and care are required4 ,the animal is but the instrument on which his clever trainer plays2 an instrument of wonderful intelligence1 but lacking in the higher rational faculty4 ,the organized scheme is the master's1 not that of his willing slave4 ,a rational being might not do more wonderful things2 but he would learn them more rapidly and by a less wearisome method4 ,as it is1 the clever performing dog originates little or nothing1 and repeats again and again the same stereotyped behaviour1 which--if one witnesses the performance often--touches one with a profound sense of its lack of rational spontaneity4 ,as at present advised1 therefore1 ,i see no reason for withdrawing from the position provisionally taken up4 ,the utilization of chance experience1 without the framing and application of an organized scheme of knowledge1 appears to be the predominant method of animal intelligence4 ,on this view1 then1 we may see in instinctive behaviour1 and the multifarious automatic acts of animals1 a means of providing experience of the right kind and on profitable lines4 ,we may see in the play-instincts of the young a training ground for the more serious business of animal life--a theme developed by ,professor ,groos4 ,we may see in the imitative tendency--the innate proclivity to follow a lead blindly and at first unintelligently--a further means of providing those useful items of experience which intelligence finds so serviceable4 ,and we may see in the intelligence which can profit by chance occurrences that arise in these several ways all that suffices for the simple needs of animal existence4 ,with some differences of opinion ,dr4 ,thorndike and ,i have much in common in the conclusions to which we have been independently led as to the method and limits of animal intelligence4 ,we seem to be in essential agreement in the belief that the method of animal intelligence is to profit by chance experience without rational foresight1 and that unless such experience be individually acquired1 the data essential for intelligent progress are absent4 ,while in our attempts to realize the general nature of animal consciousness there is a close similarity of treatment4 ,in my 8,introduction to ,comparative ,psychology0 a good deal of space is devoted to an analysis of the psychology of skill 8in order that we may infer what takes place in the minds of animals20 and ,i said3--8,when ,i am playing a hard game of tennis1 or when ,i am sailing a yacht close to the wind in a choppy sea1 self does not at all tend to become focal4 ,hence1 though ,i am a self-conscious being ,i am not always self-conscious4 ,and presumably when ,i am least self-conscious1 ,i am nearest the condition of the animal at the stage of mere sense experience4 ,i am exhilarated with the sense of pleasurable existence1 my whole being tingles with sentient life4 ,i sense1 or am aware of1 my own life and consciousness1 in an unusually subtle manner4 ,experience is vivid and continuous4 ,such ,i take it to be the condition of the conscious but not yet self-conscious animal40 ,i can therefore cordially endorse ,dr4 ,thorndike's conclusions as expressed in the following passages3-- 8,one who has watched the life of a cat or dog for a month or more under test conditions1 gets1 or fancies he gets1 a fairly definite idea of what the intellectual intelligent life of a cat or dog feels like4 ,it is most like what we feel when consciousness contains little thought about anything1 when we feel the sense-impressions in their first intention1 so to speak1 when we feel our own body1 and the impulses we give to it4 ,sometimes one gets this animal consciousness while in swimming1 for example4 ,one feels the water1 the sky1 the birds above1 but with no thoughts about them or memories of how they looked at other times1 or sthetic judgments about their beauty2 one feels no ideas about what movements he will make1 but feels himself make them1 feels his body throughout4 ,self-consciousness dies away4 ,social consciousness dies away4 ,the meanings1 and values1 and connections of things die away4 ,one feels sense-impressions1 has impulses1 feels the movements he makes2 that is all40 ,and after an illustration from such a game as tennis1 ,dr4 ,thorndike adds3 8,finally the elements of the associations are not isolated4 ,no tennis-player's stream of thought is filled with free-floating representations of any of the tens of thousands of sense-impressions or movements he has seen and made on the tennis-court4 ,yet there is consciousness enough at the time1 keen consciousness of the sense-impressions1 impulses1 feelings of one's bodily acts4 ,so with the animals4 ,there is consciousness enough1 but of this kind40 ,it may be said that between the method of intelligence and that of fully developed rational procedure there is a wide gap which must have been bridged in the course of mental evolution4 ,unquestionably4 ,and in contending that the methods of the animal are predominantly intelligent1 ,i am far from wishing to assert dogmatically that in no animals are there even the beginnings of a rational scheme4 ,indications thereof do not indeed at present appear to have been clearly disclosed by experiment4 ,but the experimental development of the subject is still in its infancy4 ,we shall probably have to await the further results which must be the outcome of patient and well-directed child-study4 ,the human child does pass in the course of his individual development from intelligent to rational procedure4 ,here there is a bridge which is crossed by every child4 ,when we know more about the stadia of this development we shall be in a position to apply the results obtained in child-study in the analogous field of animal-study4 ,till then we must possess our souls in patience1 and base our provisional conclusions on the results of systematic investigation1 rather than on those of casual observation and anecdote4 ,,iv4--,,the ,,evolution ,,of ,,intelligent ,,behaviour ,no attempt can be made in this section to trace the successive stages of the evolutionary progress of intelligence from its lower to its higher developments4 ,it is indeed questionable whether comparative psychology has1 as yet1 accumulated a sufficient body of data to render such a task profitable or even possible4 ,and the lower the level of intelligence with which we have to deal1 the less reliable are the scanty psychological data which we can obtain4 ,to interpret the mental processes which accompany the acts of even the higher animals is a hard task1 requiring careful psychological analysis4 ,still harder is the task to infer the psychological basis of the actions of the lower animals4 ,it is difficult to say where1 in the hierarchy of animal progress1 the beginnings of intelligence can first be traced4 ,in the articulated animals1 such as the insects1 spiders1 and crustacea1 there is abundant evidence of intelligence of a relatively high grade4 ,but even in their case1 how hard it is to realize the nature of their experience--to get any adequate notion of their mental processes6 ,we are inevitably forced to describe their psychology in the most general terms4 ,so1 too1 with forms still lower in the scale of intelligence4 ,many molluscs unquestionably profit by experience4 ,but can we clearly picture to ourselves the nature and manner of acquisition of this experience8 ,the way in which limpets return to the scars on the rock which form their homes seems to show that they have acquired a practically adequate experience of their near surroundings4 ,romanes cites#fe some of the earlier observations which have been extended by ,professor ,ainsworth ,davis4#ff ,i looked into the matter myself some years ago1 at ,mewps ,bay near ,lulworth in ,dorsetshire4 ,the method adopted#fg was to remove the limpets from the rock1 and affix them at various distances from their scars4 ,this can be done without difficulty or injury to the mollusc if one catches them as they are moving4 ,but one must make sure that they are just leaving or returning to their proper homes1 and are not taken in the midst of a more extended peregrination1 as in that case their special scars cannot be noted4 ,failure to be careful in this matter vitiated my earlier observations1 which are therefore excluded in the following table3-- ---------------------------------------- ----------------- ,number ,distance ,number returned4 removed4 in inches4 ---------------------------------- ,in #b tides4 ,in #d tides4 ,later4 ---------------------------------------- --------------- #be #f #ba -- -- #ba #ab #ac #e -- #ba #ah #aj #f #b #cf #bd #a #a #c ---------------------------------------- --------------- ,from the nature of the rock surfaces the removal of a limpet to a distance of two feet almost invariably involved placing them on the further side of an angle4 ,and though some returned over such an angle1 the majority did not4 ,in most cases the individuals which failed to return to their respective scars took up new positions2 and in several instances1 when they were subsequently removed to a distance of a few inches from this new position1 they returned to it4 ,their return to the scar was watched in many cases1 and the course was fairly1 but not quite direct4 ,one limpet covered a distance of ten inches1 over a somewhat curved course1 in a little under twenty minutes4 ,in another case the limpet on its return journey had to pass between two others1 which necessitated the lifting of the shell to some height so as to clear one of them4 ,on reaching the scar they twist and turn about so as to fit down in the normal position which is constant4 ,when they come up the wrong way round they rotate pretty rapidly through the #ahj degrees to get into position4 ,one was observed to make a short excursion from and return to its scar under stillish water4 ,but as a rule they seem to remain fixed when they are submerged1 moving for the most part when the tide has just receded4 ,the greatest distance ,i have watched a limpet reach from its home was twenty-two inches4 ,but ,i have found them at a distance of three feet from their scars--that is to say1 from those to which they fitted perfectly4 ,this was on a large flat surface4 ,when they move1 the tentacles are projected out beyond the shell1 and keep on touching and slightly adhering to the rock4 ,on reaching the scar they carefully feel round it with the tentacles4 ,by excision of these feelers ,professor ,davis was led to conclude that it is not through their instrumentality that the limpet finds its way back to its particular scar4 ,but ,i am inclined to question these results4 ,at any rate1 further observations and experiments are needed to settle the point4 ,snails will also return to special dark hollows or crannies in the wall after their foraging excursions4 ,such behaviour in molluscs affords evidence of something more than instinct4 ,in popular speech1 we should say that there is memory of the locality4 ,and in any case it is difficult to interpret the facts without the assumption that the animals are conscious1 and that re-presentative states are evoked through the mediation of presentative sense-impressions4 ,but how difficult1 if not impossible1 it is to form anything like a satisfactory conception of the rudimentary mental processes of a limpet6 ,the most highly developed molluscs are the cephalopods4 ,they have long sensitive mobile arms with which they feel for and capture their prey4 8,now ,schneider observed10 writes ,dr4 ,stout1#fh 8a very young octopus seize a hermit-crab4 ,the hermit-crab covers the shell in which it takes up its abode with stinging zoophytes4 ,stung by these1 the octopus immediately recoiled and let its prey escape4 ,subsequently it was observed to avoid hermit-crabs4 ,older animals of the same species managed cleverly to pull the crab out of its house without being stung40 ,such cases afford evidence of profiting by experience through the exercise of intelligence4 ,darwin's careful observations on the manner in which earthworms drag leaves into their burrows seem to show that these annelids act intelligently1 and deal with leaves of different shapes in different ways4 ,the leaves of ,pine trees1 consisting of two needles arising from a common base1 were almost invariably drawn down by seizing this basal point of junction2 while the leaves of the ,lime were1 in #gi per cent4 of the cases examined1 drawn down by the apex2 in only #d per cent4 by the base2 and in the remaining #ag per cent4 by seizing some intermediate portion4 ,on the other hand1 the leaves of the ,rhododendron1 in which the basal part of the blade is often narrower than the apical part1 were in #ff per cent4 of the observations drawn down by the narrower base4 ,triangles of paper were in the majority of cases seized by the apex4 ,commenting upon his observations1 carried out with great care under experimental conditions1 ,darwin says1#fi 8,as worms are not guided by special instincts in each particular case1 though possessing a general instinct to plug up their burrows1 and as chance is excluded1 the next most probable conclusion seems to be that they try in different ways to draw in objects1 and at last succeed in some one way20 that is to say1 they profit by experience based on the method of trial and failure4 ,but ,darwin adds that the evidence he obtained shows 8that worms do not habitually try to draw objects into their burrows in many different ways40 ,and he seems to attribute to them an almost rational power of dealing with the circumstances in the light of general conceptions4 8,if worms10 he says1 8are able to judge1 either before drawing or after having drawn an object close to the mouths of their burrows1 how best to drag it in1 they must acquire some notion of its general shape4 ,this they probably acquire by touching it in many places with the anterior extremity of their bodies1 which acts as a tactual organ4 ,it may be well to remember how perfect the sense of touch becomes in a man when born blind and deaf1 as are worms4 ,if worms have the power of acquiring some notion1 however rude1 of the shape of an object and of their burrows1 as seems to be the case1 they deserve to be called intelligent2 for they then act in nearly the same manner as would a man under similar circumstances40 ,such power of perceiving the relation of the shape of a leaf or other object to the form of the burrow is presumably beyond the reach of an earthworm4 ,it may be regarded as more probable that the earthworm inherits an instinctive tendency to draw down objects in special ways1 and that this is subject to some modification under the play of experience1 without the formation of anything so psychologically complex as a general notion1 however rude4 ,in any case the behaviour of earthworms in closing their burrows seems to afford indications of something more than instinct--of that profiting by the results of experience which characterizes intelligent procedure4 ,more than this we cannot say4 ,professor ,whitman#gj has made some interesting observations on the leech ,clepsine4 8,place the animal10 he says1 8in a shallow1 flat-bottomed dish1 and leave it for a few hours or a day1 in order to give it time to get accustomed to the place1 and come to rest on the bottom4 ,then1 taking the utmost care not to jar the dish or breathe upon the surface of the water1 look at the ,clepsine through a low magnifying lens1 and see what happens when the surface of the water is touched with the point of a needle held vertically above the animal's back4 ,if the experiment is properly carried out1 it will be seen that the respiratory undulations 7if such movements happen to be going on7 suddenly cease1 and that the animal slightly expands its body and hugs the glass4 ,wait a few moments until the animal1 recovering its normal composure1 again resumes its respiratory movements4 ,then let the needle descend through the water until the point rests on the bottom of the dish at a little distance from the edge of the body4 ,again the movements will cease1 and the animal will hug the glass with its body somewhat expanded4 ,now push the needle slowly along towards the leech1 and notice as the needle comes almost in contact with the thin margin of the body1 that the part nearest the needle begins to retreat slowly before it4 ,this behaviour shows a surprising keenness of tactile sensibility1 the least touch of the water with a needle-point being felt at once4444 ,if its back were rubbed with a brush or the handle of a dissecting needle1 in order to test its sensitiveness to touch1 the appearance would probably be that of insensibility and indifference to the treatment4 ,closer examination1 however1 would show that the flesh of the animal was more rigid than usual1 and that the surface was covered with numerous stiff1 conical elevations1 the dermal papill or warts1 which are so low and blunt in the normal state of rest as to be scarcely visible4 ,it would be seen that the animal1 although motionless1 was in a state of active resistance to attack4444 ,clepsine has another and entirely different method of keeping quiet4 ,the animal rolls itself up 7head first and ventral side innermost7 into a hard ball1 outwardly passive1 free to roll or fall whithersoever gravity or currents of water may direct it4444 ,if by chance the animal has eggs1 it will not desert them to escape in this way4444 ,this species1 then1 has two quite distinct and peculiar ways of keeping quiet1 and thus avoiding its enemies4 ,if the animal has no eggs1 or if it has young1 it may adopt either mode of escape1 while if it has eggs it has no choice but to remain quiet over them4444 ,the act of rolling up into a passive ball may be performed 7a7 under compulsion1 as when it is her last resort in self-defence2 7b7 under a milder provocation1 as one of three courses of behaviour1 as when the resting-place is turned up to light1 and the choice is offered between remaining quiet in place1 creeping away at leisure1 or rolling into a ball and dropping to the bottom2 7c7 or finally1 under no special external stimulus1 but rather from internal motive1 the normal demand for rest and shady seclusion1 presumably very strong in ,clepsine after gorging itself with the blood of its turtle host40 ,professor ,whitman rightly regards the act of rolling into a ball as instinctive1 and due to natural selection4 ,but he does not undertake to discuss the question as to how much intelligence1 if any1 ,clepsine may have4 ,nor1 indeed1 is it an easy matter to determine4 ,the differential reaction according as the animal has eggs or not suggests intelligence2 but it may be instinct varying according to the conditions of stimulation external and internal4 ,the different behaviour which may be seen in different cases when a stone is turned to the light again suggests intelligence1 but again may be determined directly by the conditions of stimulation4 ,prompted by ,dr4 ,whitman's observations1 ,i endeavoured to determine whether a leech would grow accustomed to frequent gentle stimulation with a camel's-hair brush1 and cease to react under circumstances which were followed by no ill effects4 ,but though ,i incline to think that this is the case1 the observations were not such as to be satisfying and convincing4 ,if intelligence be present we seem to find it in an early and rudimentary state4 ,observation1 we must confess1 seems to afford little indication of the conditions under which intelligence first makes its appearance in the animal kingdom4 ,and if we turn to general considerations1 which at the best afford uncertain guidance1 little light is thrown on the subject4 ,if we accept the view already indicated1#ga that the nerve-centres which are concerned in the conscious control begotten of experience are independent of those primarily concerned in normal reflex action1 we may perhaps believe that the simplest nervous system1 worthy of the name1 contains both these elements1 and that in the course of the evolution of nervous systems in higher and higher grades1 there go on pari passu the further differentiation of these elements1 and the progressive integration of reflex and control centres into a closely connected and effective whole4 ,not that any expression of the facts1 if such they be1 in terms of an evolution formula1 adds anything to our knowledge of the organic modus operandi4 ,we know but little of the intimate nerve physiology of even the highest invertebrates4 ,we see ample evidence of the control of behaviour in the light of individual experience4 ,of any detailed knowledge concerning the manner in which this control is effected we do not seem to possess more than the rude initial phases4 ,when we compare1 however1 the several grades of intelligence which observation suggests1 and when we watch the conscious development of the more intelligent animals1 we seem to find evidence of the growth of a system of experience1 at first in very close touch with inherited modes of procedure1 but gradually acquiring more of independence and freedom4 ,increase of the range and complexity of behaviour brings with it1 not only increase in the range and complexity of experience1 but also--what is1 perhaps1 even more essential to effective progress--greater unity and closer connection into a well-knit whole4 ,and with this greater unity and closer connection there goes what one may term a condensation of experience by an elimination of detail and the survival of essential features repeatedly emphasized4 ,this is analogous in the development of intelligence to the generalization and abstraction which play so important a part in the development of reason4 ,it affords1 in fact1 the data which reflection utilizes in the purposive and intentional condensation and concentration of knowledge at a higher stage of mental development4 ,the omission of detail and the survival of the salient features is well known to us in the familiar facts of memory4 ,we have seen thousands of sheep and oxen1 no two of which are probably alike in all their external details as presented to vision4 ,but we remember what a sheep or an ox looks like1 and many of us can form a visualized image of either of these animals4 ,this1 however1 is not the re-presentative image of any particular sheep or ox4 ,it is what psychologists term a generic image4 ,it is like a composite photograph made by superimposing on the same plate a number of individual images so that the salient features which all possess in common stand out clearly by their coincidence on the plate1 while the distinctive details are but dimly presented4 ,thus does memory preserve the essentials common to many impressions while the distinguishing details are lost and fade1 eliminated by forgetfulness4 ,and thus in the experience which intelligence practically utilizes are the net results of a thousand particular impressions condensed in one effective image4 ,condensation of experience is also effected by the elimination1 under the guidance of consciousness1 of those modes of behaviour which are not efficacious--a process to which ,professor ,mark ,baldwin applies the phrase ,functional ,selection4 ,there is a tendency at first to the overproduction of relatively useless actions4 ,the multifarious random movements of the human infant1 though their inexactness renders the child terribly helpless1 afford a wide store of plastic material which intelligence can guide to its appropriate use4 ,and the prolonged period of pupilage in the child is correlated with an unsurpassed range of combination and recombination of the abundant plastic material4 ,the hereditary legacy1 though it contains fewer drafts for definite and specific purposes than are placed to the credit of an animal rich in instinctive endowment1 affords a far larger general fund on which intelligence may draw for the varied purposes of the freer financial existence of a rational being4 ,the relatively helpless young of many of the higher mammalia exhibit also much overproduction of seemingly aimless movements4 ,but from these intelligence selects those which are of value for the purposes of life--those which experience proves to be effective4 ,these--the relatively few--afford the motor impressions which by repetition stand out in experience1 while the rest lapse from memory and are eliminated from experience as they are eliminated from practical performance4 ,this is a great gain4 ,motor experience is rendered generic2 the composite image that is retained is the net result of effective behaviour2 and all that is valuable in the acquisitions of early life is condensed within manageable limits4 ,this process of rendering generic the particular items of a widening experience has a marked effect in the development of the conscious situations in the light of which behaviour is intelligently guided4 ,it is not the master holding this whip or that ball which suggests to the dog a hiding or a scamper2 it is a generic situation with interchangeable details4 ,it is not this1 that1 or the other previously unseen cat that at once determines the situation for the fox terrier2 the particular animal has never entered into his past experience3 it is the fulfilment of the essential conditions of the generic image that is operative in behaviour4 ,the experience of animals must inevitably become in large degree generic by the elimination of the unessential and survival in re-presentative consciousness of the salient elements in many slightly diverse situations4 ,stated in terms of this conception1 the familiar phenomena of mimicry are due to the fact that the mimicking form accords sufficiently well with the generic image to carry the same suggested meaning4 ,as is well known1 the model has been proved in many cases to be unpalatable or hurtful1 while the mimic is in itself neither the one nor the other4 ,the drone-fly1 ,eristalis1 mimics the drone4 ,and it has been urged that this cannot be a true case of mimicry1 since the drone is harmless1 though the female and 8neuter0 bees are possessed of stings4 ,but ,i have satisfied myself by experiments with young birds1 that 7#a7 after experience with bees drones are avoided1 and 7#b7 that after similar experience drone-flies are also left untouched4 ,hence it seems that all three fall within the same generic image1 the points of resemblance outweighing the differences in detail--as they do1 indeed1 with many men and women4 ,such examples of mimicry belong to what is known as the 8,batesian type0--so called after ,h4 ,w4 ,bates1 who1 in #ahfa1 discussed its occurrence among ,amazonian insects in the light of the theory of natural selection4 ,there are1 however1 certain groups of insects which1 although themselves 8protected10 possess common warning colours1 causing them to resemble each other4 ,these are sometimes classed under the head of 8,mllerian mimicry0--so called after ,fritz ,mller1 who1 in #ahgi1 first offered an explanation of the facts based on the theory of natural selection4 ,he suggested that such mutual resemblance is advantageous to both protected forms1 since it lessens the number of those which are killed by young birds and other animals while they are learning by experience what to eat and what to leave4 ,for1 as the result of careful observation1 ,mr4 ,frank ,finn concludes 8that each bird has to separately acquire its experience1 and well remembers what it has learnt10--a conclusion with which1 as already stated1 my own observations are entirely in accord4 ,there is therefore a certain amount of destruction of even well-protected forms by young and inexperienced birds4 ,if1 then1 two such forms resemble each other1 the acquisition of experience is thereby facilitated and the amount of destruction reduced1 on the assumption that the two fall within the same generic image4 ,upholders of natural selection are not1 indeed1 at one in accepting this explanation1 and further observation is unquestionably needed4 ,it is not improbable1 however1 that common protective coloration1 such as the banding of yellow and black1 seen in such different forms as the caterpillar of the cinnabar moth and the imago of the wasp1 is of mutual utility4 ,the following experiment was made with young chicks4 ,strips of orange and black paper were pasted beneath glass slips1 and on them meal moistened with quinine was placed4 ,on other plain slips meal moistened with water was provided4 ,the young birds soon learnt to avoid the bitter meal1 and then would not touch plain meal if it were offered on the banded slip4 ,and these birds1 save in two instances1 refused to touch cinnabar caterpillars1 which were new to their experience4 ,they did not1 like other birds1 have to learn by particular trials that these caterpillars are unpleasant4 ,their experience had already been gained through the banded glass slips2 or so it seemed4 ,i have also found that young birds who had learnt to avoid cinnabar caterpillars left wasps untouched4 ,such observations must be repeated and extended4 ,but they seem to show that one aspect of the ,mllerian theory is not without some facts in support of it2 and1 so far as they go1 they afford evidence that black and orange banding1 irrespective of particular form1 may constitute a guiding generic feature in the conscious situation4 ,it may be said that the generic condensation of experience here indicated implies the formation of general and abstract ideas1 and that we cannot in face of the evidence accept ,locke's dictum that abstraction is 8an excellency which the faculties of brutes do by no means attain to40 ,romanes contended#gb that 8all the higher animals have general ideas of #8good-for-eating' and #8not-good-for-eating' quite apart from any particular objects of which either of these qualities happens to be characteristic10 and he quoted with approval ,leroy's statement1#gc that a fox 8will see snares when there are none2 his imagination1 distorted by fear1 will produce deceptive shapes1 to which he will attach an abstract notion of danger40 ,according to such views animals form concepts2 and concepts belong to the sphere of rational thought4 ,it is not my intention to enter at length into the refinements of psychological distinction4 ,many psychologists1 however1 seek to distinguish between1 on the one hand1 the predominance by natural emphasis1 of certain qualities1 such as that of being suitable for food1 and1 on the other hand1 the intentional isolation of these qualities for the purposes of thought and rational explanation4 ,abstraction they regard as a deliberate process applied with rational intent to the material afforded by experience and reflection4 ,generalization1 too1 they regard as deliberate1 and carried out with like intent4 ,the result is not merely a composite or generic product1 but something more subtle and less dependent on sense4 8,all trees hitherto seen by me10 said ,noir1 8leave in my imagination a mixed image1 a kind of ideal presentation of a tree4 ,quite different is my concept1 which is never an image40 ,the concept 8tree0 is a deliberate synthesis of abstract qualities intentionally isolated1 and recombined in accordance with the general relationships which subsist between them4 ,if we accept this distinction1 if we regard abstraction and generalization as intentional mental processes carried out with the rational intent of discovering the relationships of phenomena with the object of explaining them and recombining their essential features in an ideal scheme of thought1 we shall probably admit1 with ,john ,locke1 that these are excellencies which the faculties of brutes do by no means attain to4 ,but we shall none the less see that the predominance of certain salient features in experience by reiterated emphasis in association with natural needs1 and the development of generic in place of merely particular re-presentations will afford the appropriate material for abstraction on the one hand1 and generalization on the other4 ,intelligence supplies the embryonic mental structures from which1 under the quickening influence of a rational purpose1 abstract and general ideas may be evolved4 ,the essential features of the evolution of intelligence seem1 then1 to be1 first1 the development of controlling nerve-centres1 by which the responsive action of reflex automatic or instinctive centres may be checked1 augmented1 or modified2 secondly1 the increased differentiation and integration of these control centres with extension of the range and complexity of experience in close touch with practical needs2 thirdly1 the condensation and concentration of experience by the formation of generic products through the reiterated emphasis begotten of recurrent situations having certain salient features in common1 though differing in details2 and fourthly1 an increased plasticity of behaviour1 especially in early life1 enabling an animal to deal effectually with an environment far less simple than that to which the more stereotyped instinctive behaviour is fitted by inheritance to respond4 ,and this evolution of intelligent behaviour is working its way up to1 though as such it cannot reach1 the succeeding phase of mental evolution in which the data1 supplied by intelligence1 are treated with a new purpose for higher ends in the rational thought which seeks to explain the phenomena1 and frame an ideal scheme of their relations and interconnections4 ,two further points may be noticed4 ,first1 that it is during the early and plastic days or months of life that intelligence is setting its seal on animal behaviour1 and stamping it with its distinctive character4 ,adult life is very much what youth has made it2 and old age is stereotyped through habit4 ,in times of progress1 the character of the race is determined by plastic possibilities of the young4 ,among them it is that the incidence of elimination makes itself felt1 resulting in the survival of those whose intelligence can mould behaviour in accordance with the new circumstances of a wider life4 ,secondly1 this selection of the intelligent involves the survival of those in whose higher brain-centres there is room for a greater range and variety of interconnection by means of associating fibres4 ,it involves a selective survival of the larger and more finely organized brains4 ,it is probable1 as ,professor ,ray ,lankester has recently indicated1 that the ridiculously small-brained mammals and reptiles of the past were creatures of instinct with little capacity for intelligent control4 ,their lives were simple1 and their enemies and competitors no better provided with higher brain-centres than themselves4 ,stereotyped instinctive behaviour sufficed to enable them to hold their own1 and meet the requirements of a life of dull and unprogressive monotony4 ,strength without cunning made these big-framed animals for a while masters of the situation4 ,but among those existing animals whose skeletons indicate an analogous zoological position1 there is none which exhibits a cerebral development so poor4 ,and we may fairly conclude that the fact that these huge creatures have left no lineal descendants may be taken as evidence of the importance and value1 in evolution1 of that cerebral tissue which is the organic basis of intelligence4 ,the higher brain contains the potentiality of that experience without which the evolution of intelligent behaviour in any race of vertebrate animals is impossible4 ,v4--,,the ,,influence ,,of ,,intelligence ,,on ,,instinct ,we have seen that the relation of instinct to intelligence is essentially that of congenital to acquired behaviour4 ,we have seen1 too1 that in the ,lamarckian interpretation what is acquired in the course of life may be transmitted through inheritance1 and thus the intelligent behaviour of one generation may become instinctive and congenital in the next4 ,but serious biological difficulties stand in the way of the acceptance of this interpretation2 there is1 moreover1 little or no evidence of the assumed transmission to offspring of any acquired modifications of structure or behaviour4 ,we have1 therefore1 been led to infer that instinctive behaviour has been evolved through the selection of adaptive variations of germinal origin1 the influence of intelligence being restricted to the fosterage of co-incident variations1 that is to say1 of those congenital variations which coincide in direction with the acquired modifications of behaviour due to intelligence4 ,it is clear that on this interpretation the influence of intelligence on instinct is more indirect and less simple than that implied by the ,lamarckian hypothesis4 ,intelligence and instinct are in large degree independent1 though there is continual interaction between them4 ,we have now to consider the nature of this interaction1 and to this end we must indicate the relation of acquired modifications to the hereditary groundwork of the animal constitution4 ,the basal fact is1 that the bodily tissues are subject to a certain amount of structural change during the course of individual life in accordance with the amount of functional strain put upon them4 ,the labourer's thickened skin1 the enlarged and strengthened muscles of the athlete1 the juggler's acquired suppleness are familiar cases4 ,less familiar instances are afforded under abnormal conditions4 ,should one kidney from any cause be slowly destroyed1 the other will slowly enlarge to carry on the increased work of elimination of waste products2 when the larger shin bone of a dog has been removed after injury1 the smaller bone becomes thickened to bear the added strain2 new joint surfaces are sometimes formed where bones have been broken and the natural joints injured4 ,one may say that the normal development of any structure depends upon a due amount of use4 ,but1 since in the course of strenuous life any organ is from time to time subject to an abnormal amount of strain1 it must be fitted to respond to a super-normal call on its strength and functional activity4 ,were the heart and the lungs1 for example1 unable to meet the greatly added drain on their energies1 due to unwonted and severe exertion1 collapse1 perhaps death1 would ensue if such exertion were imperatively demanded under special circumstances4 ,and it is clear that many wild animals must be not infrequently placed in such circumstances as will subject their muscular structures and the functional activity of their organs of circulation and respiration to a strain nearly up to their extreme limits of endurance4 ,the carnivorous hunter would often fail to secure his prey if his organization were unequal to a hard and prolonged chase2 the hunted prey would not survive to procreate his kind if he fell a victim to the first pursuer through inability to stand the exertion necessary to enable him to make good his escape4 ,it is thus1 we may believe1 through natural selection that a sufficiently high standard of strength and functional endurance is maintained4 ,the failures in these respects are steadily eliminated4 ,it is difficult to realize the great strain put upon a bird's organization by the migration flight4 ,some ten times as many birds leave our shores in the autumn as return to them in the following spring4 ,what proportion of these is weeded out in the act of migration we do not know2 but we may be sure that only those fitted to stand a severe test of physical endurance return to rear broods which shall inherit in large degree similar vigour of constitution4 ,two factors1 then1 determine the limits of efficiency in the bodily organs--heredity and use4 ,and these two co-operate in such a way that we may say1 either that due use is the essential condition of the effective development of the hereditary powers1 or that heredity serves to condition their effective development through use4 ,but though closely related1 so that each may be regarded as conditional on the other1 they are1 if we accept the view that acquired characters are not transmitted as such1 so far independent in that use adds nothing to1 disuse subtracts nothing from1 the hereditary store4 ,it is1 indeed1 difficult to conceive how1 on any view1 the absence of the conditioning factor of normal use can be the efficient cause of a positive diminution of the balance at the bank of heredity4 ,and ,lamarckian thinkers have not succeeded in placing their conception of the matter in the clear light of a working hypothesis4 ,the amount of what we may term 8modifiability0 by use differs a good deal in the several organs and tissues4 ,the teeth of carnivora and the antlers of deer may be cited as structures in which the conditioning effects of use form a relatively unimportant factor4 ,on the other hand1 the nervous system1 with which we are here primarily concerned1 is of all animal structures that in which what is acquired may attain the greatest importance in the successful conduct of life2 the nature and the range of behaviour affording an index of the amount of modifiability in this respect4 ,we have already seen that instinctive behaviour is primarily a matter of the first occasion on which any given action is performed1 and that many instinctive acts are subject to subsequent modification in the light of the experience gained during the early performances4 ,the range of such modification varies both in different animals and also with respect to different modes of behaviour in the same animal4 ,the more fixed and deeply rooted an instinct the less readily does intelligence obtain a hold on it1 so as to direct the behaviour into new channels of better accommodation to the circumstances4 ,m4 ,fabre describes how a ,sphex1 one of the solitary wasps1 instinctively draws its prey1 a grasshopper1 into the burrow by its antenn4 ,when these were cut off the wasp pulled the grasshopper in by the jaw appendages2 but when these were removed she seemed incapable of further accommodation to the unusual circumstances4 ,it would seem an easy and obvious application of intelligence to seize the prey by one of the forelegs4 ,but this was not done2 and the grasshopper was then left4 ,intelligence did not seem equal to meeting the altered conditions presented by the maimed grasshopper4 ,still1 there was some modification of the normal instinctive behaviour2 and1 as ,dr4 ,peckham has shown1 there may be more than ,fabre noted4 ,let us assume the existence of an animal whose every act is instinctive1 whose whole behaviour is marked out in strictly hereditary lines1 no new departures being acquired in the course of individual life4 ,this extreme case would afford an example of what we may term completely stereotyped behaviour4 ,on the other hand1 let us assume the existence of an animal with no hereditary definiteness of reaction1 whose every act is intelligent1 whose whole behaviour is the result of individual acquisition4 ,this antithetical extreme case would afford an example of what we may term completely plastic behaviour4 ,it is questionable1 however1 whether either of these extreme types occur in nature4 ,what we find in our study of animal behaviour is some intermediate condition in which both factors co-operate1 with a predominance either of stereotyped instinctive response on the one hand1 or of plastic intelligent acquisition on the other hand4 ,and in the latter case1 as such behaviour approaches its ideal limits1 we have modifiability under the circumstances of individual life at its maximum4 ,the evolution of intelligence as such runs parallel with the evolution of plastic behaviour2 and this plasticity is necessitated by the variety and the complexity of the conditions of life--a variety and a complexity requiring many subtle modifications of response to enable the behaviour to reach accommodation to the changeful exigencies of diverse circumstances4 ,to meet constant and relatively fixed conditions stereotyped instinctive responses suffice2 and the elimination under natural selection of those individuals which fail to respond in fixed ways by specially adaptive behaviour tends to render definite the hereditary channels of nervous intercommunication4 ,an inherited system of no little complexity may thus be evolved2 of which we have seen examples in our study of instinctive behaviour4 ,but the essential condition of the successful working of such a system is constancy in the environment to which the instinctive behaviour is adapted4 ,completely stereotyped behaviour1 in its theoretical perfection1 is in exact adaptation to the circumstances4 ,where instincts are only relatively perfect1 further adaptation is secured through congenital variation and the survival of the individuals in which the behaviour is better adapted to the comparatively invariable circumstances4 ,this is one line of evolution4 ,but the evolution of intelligence is along independent lines of progress4 ,both1 however1 result from the functional activity of the same nervous system1 they jointly determine the behaviour1 they interact not only in the course of individual life but in the process of evolution1 and they are both subject to the incidence of natural selection1 which can determine whether the one line or the other shall preponderate--whether instinct or intelligence shall dominate behaviour4 ,if an answer must be given to the question whether instinct or intelligence has priority in the course of the evolution of behaviour1 it may be urged that1 on theoretical grounds1 the claims of instinct are the stronger4 ,taking animals as we actually find them1 however1 they afford numberless examples of behaviour at first instinctive but subsequently modified1 in greater or less degree1 in accordance with the teachings of experience4 ,let us1 first1 assume that the environment is slowly changing1 or has changed1 in some definite manner4 ,such change would1 of course1 be relative1 and might be due1 either to new conditions brought to bear on the animal1 or to the animal being itself brought1 in the expansion of its life1 within their influence4 ,the old instinct is no longer quite adapted to the changed circumstances4 ,if the change were sufficient in amount1 and occurred somewhat suddenly1 variations of instinct might not occur soon enough to enable the animal to reach adaptation by the gradual process of natural selection4 ,if dependent on instinct alone the animal would1 under these circumstances1 be eliminated4 ,but if intelligence were able to modify the behaviour to meet the new conditions this elimination would be prevented4 ,in successive generations intelligence would constantly modify behaviour in the same manner and in a definite direction4 ,meanwhile congenital variations in different directions would occur4 ,those which were in directions antagonistic to that dictated by intelligence would tend to thwart accommodation and render it less effectual2 but those which were coincident in direction would conspire with accommodation and render it more effectual4 ,the individuals in which variations of instinct tended to thwart intelligence would be eliminated2 while those in which coincident variations assisted and aided intelligent modification would survive4 ,thus intelligence would lead the way along lines which congenital variations would follow4 ,and in the course of a number of generations the new instinct would reach the fully adaptive level1 and further modification by intelligence would become unnecessary unless the environment continued to change yet more4 ,individual accommodation of behaviour would in this way determine the direction of instinctive variation2 and yet throughout the process there would be1 strictly speaking1 no transmission of the intelligently acquired characters of the behaviour4 ,but though under constant and uniform changes in the environment the net result would be only a guided variation of the original instinct1 under more variable and indefinitely changing circumstances the result would be different4 ,the higher animals exhibit an intelligent plasticity which enables them to meet the requirements of the more complex environment into which their wider life has risen2 for evolution lifts the animal from narrower into progressively wider spheres of activity and behaviour1 so that its environment becomes relatively more complex4 ,here stereotyped behaviour would be rather a hindrance than an advantage4 ,the winning animal in life's struggle would be the one in which behaviour was most rapidly and most surely modified to meet particular needs--the one in which the teachings of experience were most promptly utilized in effective action4 ,the inevitable tendency of the evolution of intelligence must be disintegration of the stereotyped modes of behaviour and the dissolution of instinct4 ,natural selection1 which under a uniform and constant environment leads to the survival of relatively fixed and definite modes of response1 under an environment presenting a wide range of possibilities leads to the survival of plastic accommodation through intelligence4 ,it is not that intelligence has any direct influence tending to undermine the hereditary foundations of instinct1 for acquired plasticity is not inherited as such2 it is rather that when the stereotyped and the plastic are pitted against each other in the struggle for existence in the wider1 freer1 and more varied life of the higher animals the plastic survives and the stereotyped succumbs4 ,imperfect as is our present knowledge of the manner in which the nervous connections implied in psychological associations are established1 there can be no question that they are acquired in the course of individual life2 they are modifications of nervous structure due to a special mode of use under the conditions of experience4 ,here1 then1 in the case of the nervous system1 as in that of the bodily organs before mentioned1 two co-operating factors determine the limits of efficiency--heredity and use4 ,just as the heart and lungs must inherit the power of standing abnormal strain if the animal is to avoid elimination in times of unwonted exertion1 so must the nervous system inherit some reserve power of dealing effectively with unwonted circumstances by intelligent accommodation1 if the animal is not to fall a victim to such circumstances4 ,in other words1 at times of heightened competition those animals which can draw on a reserve fund of intelligent accommodation will survive1 while the stupid blunderers will be eliminated4 ,we may term this reserve fund of intelligent accommodation1 this inherited ability to meet specially difficult circumstances as they arise1 innate capacity4 ,from the nature of the case it must be indefinite1 for it must carry with it the ability to meet unforeseen combinations of the environing forces by new combinations of the results of experience4 ,its distinguishing mark is plasticity1 in contradistinction to the stereotyped fixity of typical instinct4 ,and accompanying its evolution there is probably1 as we have seen1 a dissolution of its antithesis1 instinct4 ,thus may we account for the fact that man1 with his great store of innate capacity1 has so small a number of stereotyped instincts4 ,but the dissolution of instincts is not complete4 ,residua are left in the inherited mental constitution4 ,and these we term congenital tendencies and propensities4 ,they differ from the typical instincts in the fact that the definiteness of response has been lost4 ,they dictate a general trend of action1 but the particular application in behaviour is due to intelligent accommodation4 ,they are commonly spoken of as instinctive2 and their mode of origin justifies the use of the adjective in association with the term 8propensities40 ,but it must be remembered that the behaviour to which they lead is not1 as such1 wholly instinctive2 it is a joint product of instinct and intelligence1 the general trend being due to the instinctive propensity1 while the mode of application is guided by intelligence4 ,there is1 however1 another way in which analogous propensities may be ingrained in the mental constitution1 not as residual vestiges of old instincts1 but as congenital rudiments fostered by new habits4 ,it is a well-known and familiar fact that the frequent repetition of intelligent accommodation in certain definite lines begets habits1 which so far simulate instincts as to be commonly described in popular speech as instinctive4 ,professor ,wundt indeed places them in the category of 8acquired instincts0--a usage which we regard as unsatisfactory1 seeing that it tends to mask the distinction between the congenital and acquired factors in behaviour1 and seeing that we have the well-defined term 8habits0 for acts rendered to a large extent automatic through repetition4 ,lamarckian thinkers regard habit as the mother of instinct1 assuming that the acquired automatism of one generation may be transmitted to become congenital in the succeeding generation4 ,this conclusion we provisionally reject1 regarding the basal assumption as at present unproven4 ,but though we cannot accept the view that habit is the mother of instinct1 we regard it as not improbable that habit may be the nurse of congenital propensities4 ,remembering that similar habits are acquired by animals of the same species throughout a series of succeeding generations1 and assuming that congenital variations are constantly occurring in many directions1 it seems probable that some of these variations will be coincident in direction with the acquired habits4 ,thus would arise a congenital propensity to perform the habitual acts2 and should they be of sufficient importance in the conduct of life to be subject to the action of natural selection1 those animals in which such propensities were congenital would survive1 whereas those in which no such propensities existed would be eliminated4 ,it is unnecessary1 however1 to elaborate this conception further1 since it is in line with that already discussed in considering the influence of intelligence in fostering a diversion of instinct under changing circumstances4 ,then we were considering how habit may lead to a congenital change in an old instinct2 here we are dealing with the development of a new propensity4 ,sufficient has now been said to illustrate some of the ways in which instinct and intelligence interact in the evolution of behaviour4 ,such interaction is further exemplified in the social life of animals1 which will be dealt with in the next chapter4 ,,chapter ,v ,,social ,,behaviour ,i4--,,imitation ,the characteristic feature of social behaviour is that it is in large degree determined by the behaviour of other members of the social community4 ,in all animals which mate there is a temporary or more lasting influence on each other of the individuals which unite to procreate their kind2 and in those which foster their young there is a social relation of parents and offspring4 ,some of these mutual relationships will be discussed1 in their emotional aspects1 in the next chapter4 ,here we will consider the more general factors which serve to determine the course of social evolution4 ,among these is commonly reckoned imitation4 ,m4 ,tarde says1 8,la socit c'est l'imitation40 ,but this word1 like so many others which are employed alike in popular speech and in more or less technical discussions1 carries a somewhat wide range of meaning1 and is by some writers used in a broader1 by others in a narrower sense4 ,thus ,professor ,mark ,baldwin#gd says1 8that all organic adaptation in a changing environment is a phenomenon of biological or organic imitation10 under which category will fall1 therefore1 the organic behaviour of the protozoa and of plants4 ,on the other hand1 ,professor ,e4 ,l4 ,thorndike1 though he admits in the lower animals 8certain pseudo-imitative or semi-imitative phenomena10 has been led by experiments1 to be presently noticed1 to the conclusion that animals as high in the scale of life as cats and dogs cannot form new associations under the influence of imitation4 8,it seems sure10 he says1#ge 8from these experiments1 that the animals were unable to form an association leading to an act from having seen another animal1 or animals1 perform the act in a certain situation40 ,in face of such apparently diverse usage it is necessary to show within what limits and with what qualifications the word may profitably here be used to indicate a factor in social evolution4 ,professor ,mark ,baldwin's use of the term 8imitation0 can only be understood in its relation to an hypothesis of organic and mental evolution1 which he develops with no little skill and brilliancy4#gf ,he regards the processes of life as issuing in a great twofold adaptation1 due to expansions and contractions1--the former representing waxing1 the latter waning vitality2 and he holds that all special adaptations are secured by the new hold upon beneficial stimulations reached by the expansive out-reaching movements4 8,among the variations in organic forms10 he says1 8it is easy to see that some of them might react in such a way as to keep in contact with the stimulus1 to lay hold of it1 and so keep on reacting to it again and again--just as our rhythmic action in breathing keeps the organism in vital contact with the oxygen of the air4 ,these organisms will get all the benefit or damage of the repetition or persistence of the stimulus1 or of their own reactions1 again and again2 and it is self-evident that the beneficial stimulations are the ones which should be maintained in this way1 and that the organisms which did this would live4 ,the organisms which reacted in such a way as to retain the damaging stimulations1 on the other hand1 by this same process1 would aid nature in killing themselves4 ,if this be true1 only those organisms would survive which had the variation of retaining useful stimulations in what ,i have called1 in speaking of imitation elsewhere1 a #8circular way' of reacting4444 ,so1 when we come to consider phylogeny and ontogeny together1 we find that if by an organism we mean a thing of contractility or irritability1 whose round of movements is kept up by some kind of nutritive process supplied by the environment--absorption1 chemical action of atmospheric oxygen1 etc4--and whose existence is threatened by dangers of contact and what not1 the first thing to do is to secure a regular supply to the nutritive processes1 and to avoid these contacts4 ,but the organism can do nothing but move1 as a whole or in some of its parts4 ,so1 then1 if one of such creatures is to be fitter than another to survive1 it must be the creature which1 by its movements1 secures more nutritive processes and avoids more dangerous contacts4 ,but movements toward the source of stimulation keep hold on the stimulation1 and movements away from the contacts break the contacts2 that is all4 ,nature selects these organisms2 how could she do otherwise80 8,thus a #8circular' activity is found in operation2 life-processes issuing in increased movements1 by which in turn the stimulations to the life-processes are kept in action40 ,but when a child imitates1 himself reproducing the 8copy0 set for imitation1 the reaction at which imitative suggestion aims is one which will reproduce the stimulating impression1 and so tend to perpetuate itself4 ,the stimulus starts a motor process1 which tends to reproduce the stimulus1 and1 through it1 the motor process again4 ,it is a 8circular activity40 ,thus 8we are able to reconstruct the theory of adaptation in such a way as to show that this kind of organic selection by movement1 and this kind of imitative selection by consciousness1 are the same thing4 ,organic imitation and conscious imitation--each a circular process tending to maintain certain stimulations and to avoid others--here is one thing20 and to this one thing the common term 8imitation0 is applied by ,mr4 ,baldwin4 ,this extended usage is admitted by the author to be somewhat of an innovation4 ,but if his hypothesis be sound this need be no bar to its acceptance4 ,two salient questions must1 however1 receive satisfactory answers4 ,first1 is all organic adaptation in a changing environment a circular process--a phenomenon of organic imitation8 ,secondly1 does all conscious imitation tend to reproduce the imitating stimulus8 ,professor ,baldwin speaks of organic imitation and conscious imitation as 8each a circular process tending to maintain certain stimulations and to avoid others40 ,now1 it may be granted that the tendency to maintain or repeat certain stimulations may be regarded as a 8circular process40 ,but can the avoidance or non-repetition of others be so regarded8 ,a large proportion alike of the hereditary adaptations and the acquired accommodations of behaviour are directed to this avoidance or non-repetition of hurtful stimulations4 ,the instinctive shrinking of a chick from an aggressive animal is just as much adaptive as the repeated cuddling beneath the warm wing of the mother4 ,the avoidance of nauseous cinnabar caterpillars is just as much an accommodation to the constitution of the environment as the reiterated seizing of palatable grubs4 ,even low down in the scale of animal life1 ,dr4 ,jennings's observations on ,paramecia seem to show that the retention of favourable stimulation is not due to its direct influence1 but is the indirect result of a reaction to the relatively unfavourable stimulation which occurs when the ,paramecium passes away from more satisfactory surroundings4 ,a favourable environment is secured through the avoidance of the unfavourable4 ,unless1 therefore1 we exclude adaptive avoidance from the category of adaptations1 we cannot regard all organic adaptation in a changing environment as a phenomenon of organic imitation due to a circular process tending to the reinstatement of stimulation4 ,passing to the second question--,does all conscious imitation tend to reproduce the initiating stimulus8--we cannot unreservedly give an affirmative answer4 ,it is true that when a child more or less successfully reproduces a sound which falls upon its ear1 a like sound stimulus is afforded which may by a circular process incite to renewed effort1 and lead to yet more successful reproduction4 ,but when ,professor ,baldwin's child1 between nine and ten months old1 imitated certain movements of the lips1 there was no reproduction of the initiating visual stimulus4 ,a chick seeing its companions run away or crouch will follow suit2 and this would commonly be termed an imitative action2 but there is here no reproduction of the initiating stimulus4 ,very much of the behaviour which is usually ascribed to imitation produces effects in consciousness quite different from that of the original stimulation4 ,it is only by selecting one's examples that one finds in them evidence in favour of ,professor ,baldwin's 8circular process40 ,since1 therefore1 this circular mode of activity is neither a characteristic of all conscious imitation1 nor a distinguishing mark of all adaptive organic action1 the grounds on which ,professor ,baldwin bases his extended usage of the term appear to be fallacious4 ,and in this usage we cannot follow him4 ,turning now to ,professor ,thorndike's very different contention--that animals even so high as the cat and dog do not imitate in the sense of forming an association leading to an act from having seen another animal perform the act in a certain way--we may first describe some of his ingenious experiments designed to submit the matter to the test of observation under controlled conditions4#gg ,experiments were made with chicks in several ways4 ,they were1 for example1 placed in pens1 from which1 in each case1 8there was only one possible way of escape1 to see if they would learn it more quickly when another chick did the thing several times before their eyes4 ,the method was to give some chicks their first trial with an imitation possibility1 and their second without1 while others were given their first trial without and their second with4 ,if the ratio of the average time of the first trial to the average time of the second is smaller in the first class than it is in the second class1 we may find evidence of this sort of influence by imitation4 ,though imitation may not be able to make an animal do what he would otherwise not do1 it may make him do quicker a thing he would have done sooner or later anyway4 ,as a fact1 the ratio is much longer4 ,this is due to the fact that a chick1 when in a pen with another chick1 is not afflicted by the discomfort of loneliness1 and so does not try to get out4 ,so the other chick1 who is continually being put in with him to teach him the way out1 really prolongs his stay in4 ,this factor destroys the value of these quantitative experiments1 and ,i do not10 says ,mr4 ,thorndike1 8insist upon them as evidence against imitation1 though they certainly offer none for it40 ,chicks1 from sixteen to thirty days old1 were also placed in boxes from which escape was open to them by such acts as pecking at the door1 stepping on a platform1 or pecking at a tack4 ,the method of experiment was to put a chick in1 leave him from sixty to eighty seconds1 then put in another who knew the act1 and on his performing it to let both escape4 ,no cases were counted unless the imitator apparently saw the other do the thing4 ,after about every ten such chances to learn the act1 the imitator was left in alone for ten minutes4 ,out of thirteen cases tabulated only once was the act performed1 in spite of the ample chance for imitation4 8,i have no hesitation10 adds ,mr4 ,thorndike1 8in declaring this one's act in stepping on the platform the result of mere accident1 and am sure that any one who had watched the experiments would agree40 ,to test the influence1 if any1 of imitation in cats1 the following method was adopted4 ,a box was arranged with two compartments separated by a wire screen4 8,the larger of these had a front of wooden bars with a door which fell open when a string stretched across the top was bitten or clawed down4 ,the smaller was closed by boards on three sides and by the wire screen on the fourth4 ,through the screen a cat within could see the one to be imitated pull the string1 go out through the door thus opened1 and eat the fish outside4 ,when put in this compartment1 the top being covered by a large box1 a cat soon gave up efforts to claw through the screen1 quieted down1 and watched more or less the proceedings going on in the other compartment4 ,thus this apparatus could be used to test the power of imitation4 ,a cat who had no experience with the means of escape from the large compartment was put in the closed one2 another cat1 who would do it readily1 was allowed to go through the performance of pulling the string1 going out1 and eating the fish4 ,record was made of the number of times he did so1 and of the number of times the imitator had his eyes clearly fixed on him4444 ,after the imitatee had done the thing a number of times1 the other was put in the big compartment alone1 and the time it took him before pulling the string was noted and his general behaviour closely observed4 ,if he failed in five or ten or fifteen minutes to do so1 he was released and not fed4 ,this entire experiment was repeated a number of times4 ,from the times taken by the imitator to escape and from observation of the way that he did it1 we can decide whether imitation played any part4444 ,no one1 ,i am sure1 who had seen the behaviour of the cats would have claimed that their conduct was at all influenced by what they had seen4 ,when they did hit the string the act looked just like the accidental success of the ordinary association experiment4 ,but1 besides these personal observations1 we have in the impersonal time-records sufficient proofs of the absence of imitation40 ,some observations on dogs are also described4 ,from these it appears that the three individuals on which experiments were made failed to learn the way of getting out of a cage from seeing another dog escape4 ,one of them was also allowed to see another dog beg for meat #aaj times4 ,but he never tried to imitate him and thus secure a piece of meat as a reward4 ,it therefore 8seems sure10 says ,mr4 ,thorndike1 8that we should give up imitation as an a priori explanation of any novel intelligent performance4 ,to say that a dog who opens a gate1 for instance1 need not have reasoned it out if he had seen another dog do the same thing1 is to offer instead of one false explanation another equally false4 ,imitation in any form is too doubtful a factor to be presupposed without evidence40 ,professor ,thorndike is of opinion that monkeys are probably imitative in ways beyond the capacity of dogs and cats2 but1 at the time of writing1 he had not substantiated his opinion1 by analogous experiments4 ,if so1 it will perhaps prove that they are rational beings in the narrower sense defined in a previous chapter of this work4 ,for it appears that the kind of imitation which ,mr4 ,thorndike's experiments go far to disprove1 is what we may term reflective imitation4 ,a cat with no experience of the means of escape1 one that has tried to get out of the box by chance efforts in many directions and has failed1 sees another cat perform an act acquired in this way1 and learns nothing from the sight4 ,this1 no doubt1 proves that the cat had not in any sense grasped the nature of the problem before it1 had no notion of just where the difficulty lay1 had not the wit to see that the performance of the other cat supplied the missing links in its own previous behaviour4 ,it is questionable whether such missing links could be supplied in this way in the absence of some powers of reflection4 ,the cat is unable to form an association1 leading to an appropriate act1 from having seen another animal perform the act in a certain way1 partly because it cannot perceive the reason of its previous failure1 and see that the other's performance affords the requisite clue4 ,the whole gist of the chance experience interpretation of animal behaviour is that there must be chance experience to build on4 ,the cat cannot gain this by looking on never so intently1 unless it be provided with a rational as well as a sensory eye4 ,the act of pulling the string has been reached by the successful cat through the gradual elimination of many failures2 it is a differentiated act1 having no place in the previous experience of the kitten4 ,it has never entered into the conscious situation1 and cannot be supplied at will by a non-rational being4 ,as ,mr4 ,thorndike himself says1 8no cat can form an association leading to an act unless there is included in the association an impulse of its own which leads to the act40#gh ,by 8impulse10 ,mr4 ,thorndike 8means the consciousness accompanying a muscular innervation apart from that feeling of the act which comes from seeing one's self move1 from feeling one's body in a different position1 etc4 ,it is the direct feeling of doing as distinguished from the idea of the act done gained through eye1 etc4444 ,the act in this respect of being felt as to be done or as doing is in animals the important thing1 is the thing which gets associated1 while the act as done1 as viewed from outside1 is a secondary affair40 ,i take it that by 8impulse0 is here meant what ,dr4 ,stout would term the direct experience involved in conation4#gi ,if it have a place in experience distinguishable from that of stimulation and response it is included in what ,i have on a former page spoken of as the consciousness of behaviour as such1 which was said to be essential4 ,and ,i am surprised that ,mr4 ,thorndike should have supposed that ,i believe that this could by any animal be 8supplied at will40 ,in any case it seems probable1 as the result of observation1 that unless the consciousness of behaving in a specific manner has entered into the situation as developed in experience it cannot in animals enter into any subsequent representative complex4 ,and it is the absence of such consciousness of behaving in a specific manner which the sight of the escaping cat fails to supply in ,mr4 ,thorndike's experiments4 ,interesting and valuable as these experiments are1 they are open to the criticism to which1 as we have seen1 his other experiments are also open--that the conditions are abnormal and cramped4 ,apart from reflective imitation1 which they tend to disprove1 they do not conduce to the kind of conscious situation which appears to be most favourable for the development of intelligent imitation founded on hereditary tendencies and propensities4 ,it is through such imitation that1 as ,herr ,groos says1#hj 8animals learn perfectly those things for which they have imperfect hereditary dispositions40 ,the kind of situation which conduces to such intelligent imitation is that which involves the attitude of attention and interest rising1 when these are sufficiently varied in their direction1 into what is spoken of as curiosity4 ,these1 in their natural occurrence in animals1 are parts of1 or in any case accompaniments of the conative attitude--they are connected with activities and impulsive tendencies to behaviour4 ,if attention and interest are directed to the behaviour of another animal1 the conative attitude is that of imitation4 ,miss ,romanes has described how skilfully a capuchin imitated the actions necessary to unlock a trunk4 ,it does not seem necessary to assume that reflective imitation is here exemplified4 ,the monkey need not regard the key and lock as the related parts of a puzzle to be practically solved1 need not have any free idea of the difficulty it presents1 need not in unlocking the trunk grasp the true nature of the difficulty or have any conception of its solution4 ,every several act of the capuchin1 the seizing the key1 the directing it here or there1 and so on1 is already supplied with the impulse of which ,dr4 ,thorndike speaks4 ,attention1 itself charged with impulse1 directs and combines these pre-existing impulses to a new end4 ,and since that which directs the attention is the act of another1 we call the procedure imitative4 ,but the varied and persistent effort differs in no essential respect from that of a two days' chick1 which pecks again and again at some speck which catches its eye1 or that of a nestling jay1 which will peck for long at some nail or piece of wire in its cage1 twisting and turning its bill in many and varied ways4 ,and success in opening the trunk is reached by the capuchin1 not1 it would seem1 through any real appreciation of the essential kernel of the practical problem1 but through the chance results of many varied efforts4 ,although in no other animals is it developed to so high a degree as in the monkeys1 interest in the doings of others is an attitude by no means rare1 and affords the basis of intelligent imitation4 ,perhaps the conditions in ,dr4 ,thorndike's experiments were not the best for the development of such interest in the procedure of another4 ,and in any case the imitation of a particular mode of procedure1 reached by the gradual defining of the impulse1 could hardly be expected in the absence of the series of experiences by which that definition had been reached1 unless the cat were capable of what has been above spoken of as reflective imitation4 ,if1 then1 we agree to exclude from the category of imitative behaviour in animals1 on the one hand1 any 8circular process0 which may occur in the same individual1 and on the other hand any reflective imitation1 such as is so important a factor in human education1 it remains to be seen what may be fairly included in this category4 ,it is probable that in animals imitation has its foundations in instinctive behaviour1 of which it may be regarded as the characteristically social type4 ,if one of a group of chicks learn by casual experience to drink from a tin of water1 others will run up and peck at the water1 and thus learn to drink4 ,a hen teaches her little ones to pick up grain or other food by pecking on the ground and dropping suitable materials before them1 while they seemingly imitate her action in seizing the grain4 ,one may make chicks and pheasants peck by simulating the action of a hen with a pencil point or pair of fine forceps4 ,according to ,mr4 ,peal1 the ,assamese find that young jungle pheasants will perish if their pecking responses are not thus stimulated2 and ,professor ,claypole tells me that this is also the case with young ostriches hatched in an incubator4 ,a little pheasant and guinea-fowl followed two older ducklings1 one wild1 the other tame1 and seemed to wait upon their bills1 to peck when they pecked1 and to be guided by their actions4 ,it is certainly much easier to bring up young birds if older birds are setting an example of eating and drinking2 and instinctive acts1 such as scratching the ground1 are performed earlier if imitation be not excluded4 ,if a group of chicks have learnt to avoid cinnabar caterpillars1 and if then two or three from another group are introduced and begin to pick up the caterpillars1 the others will sometimes again seize them1 though they would otherwise have left them untouched4 ,one of my chicks1 coming upon a dead bee1 gave the danger or alarm note2 another at some little distance at once made the same sound4 ,a number of similar cases might be given2 but what impresses the observer as he watches the early development of a brood of young birds1 is the presence of an imitative tendency which is exemplified in many little ways not easy to describe in detail4 ,it is probable1 however1 that these imitative tendencies or propensities are not wholly indefinite4 ,the young birds do not imitate any actions1 but behaviour of certain specific types1 the imitation of which has been engrained through the action of natural selection4 ,what generalization1 then1 can be drawn from this somewhat indefinite group of facts1 to which many others of like import could be added from observations on the young of mammals8 ,what is their relation to instinctive procedure in general8 ,it would seem that they are characterized by a special relation of the external stimulus to the response4 ,when this stimulus is afforded by the behaviour of another animal1 and the responsive behaviour it initiates is similar to that which affords the stimulus1 such behaviour may be termed imitative4 ,a chick sounds the danger note2 this is the stimulus under which another chick sounds a similar note1 and we say that the one imitates the other4 ,such an action may be described as imitative in its effects1 but not imitative in its purpose4 ,only from the observer's standpoint does such instinctive behaviour differ from other modes of congenital procedure4 ,it may be termed biological1 but not psychological1 imitation4 ,and if it be held that the essence of imitation lies in the purpose so to imitate1 we must find some other term under which to describe the facts4 ,this does not seem necessary1 however1 if we are careful to qualify the term 8imitation0 by the adjective 8instinctive0 or 8biological40 ,and the retention of the term serves to indicate that this is the stock on which deliberate imitation is eventually grafted4 ,the fact that instinctive imitation leads1 under natural conditions1 to behaviour which is already familiar to us in the species concerned1 prevents us from recognizing the influence of this social factor so easily as might otherwise be the case4 ,the abnormal arrests our attention more readily than the normal1 and hence the cases commonly cited are generally those which strike us as unusual1 such as the imitation of human sounds by the parrot4 ,but if the young inherit a tendency to imitate certain actions of their parents1 and if there is among the members of a gregarious species such instinctive imitation as shall tend to keep them gregarious1 we have here a social factor in animal life of no slight importance4 ,just as the higher type of reflective imitation is of great value in bringing the human child to the level of the adults who form the family and social environment1 so1 too1 does the sub-conscious instinctive imitation of the lower animals bring the young bird or other creature into line with the members of its own species4 ,in broods of chicks brought up under experimental conditions1 there are often one or two more active1 vigorous1 intelligent1 and mischievous birds4 ,these are the leaders of the brood2 the others are their imitators4 ,their presence raises the general level of intelligent activity4 ,remove them1 and the others show a less active1 less inquisitive1 less adventurous life4 ,they seem to lack initiative4 ,from which one may infer that imitation affords to some extent a means of levelling up the less intelligent to the standard of the more intelligent2 and of supplying a stimulus to the development of habits which would otherwise be lacking4 ,when a mongrel pup1 whose development ,dr4 ,wesley ,mills watched and has described1 was introduced to the society of other dogs1 its progress was1 he tells us1 8extraordinarily rapid40 ,instinctive imitation thus introduces into the conscious situation certain modes of behaviour1 and if the development of the situation as a whole is pleasurable1 there will be a tendency to its redevelopment1 under the guidance of intelligence1 on subsequent occasions4 ,as in the case of other instincts and propensities1 there is given through inheritance a more or less definite outline sketch of social procedure1 which intelligence further defines1 and refines1 and shapes to more delicate issues4 ,as a rule1 however1 intelligence does not tend to make the imitation as such more perfect4 ,it may perfect the behaviour1 but not necessarily on imitative lines4 ,in the case1 however1 of the song and call-notes of birds1 and not improbably the sounds of other animals1 there does seem a predisposition to render the imitation as such more perfect4 ,the facts1 as afforded by such birds as the magpie1 jay1 starling1 marsh-warbler1 and mocking-bird1 are familiar2 and ,i have elsewhere#ha given some account of them4 ,it may be specially noted that we have in this case that circular mode of activity on which1 as we have seen1 ,professor ,mark ,baldwin lays so much stress4 ,professor ,thorndike seems to regard the phenomena presented by imitative birds as somewhat of a mystery1 and as the result of a specialization removed from the general course of mental development4 ,and he says that1 until we know whether there is in birds which repeat sounds any tendency to imitate in other lines1 we cannot connect these phenomena with anything found in the mammals1 or use them to advantage in a discussion of animal imitation as the forerunner of human4 ,upon the view1 however1 that such imitation is primarily instinctive and only secondarily intelligent1 there seems no reason why we should expect to find imitation in birds running along any other lines than those which the hereditary instinct has marked out4 ,and so far from being unable to use the phenomena to advantage in a discussion of animal imitation as a forerunner of human1 we may perhaps see in them the best examples1 other than those afforded by apes1 of that intelligent imitation which is the precursor of the rational and reflective imitation of the boy or girl4 ,in the case of the human child we may see the three stages in the development of vocal imitation4 ,first1 the instinctive stage1 where the sound which falls upon the ear is a stimulus to the motor-mechanism of sound production4 ,secondly1 the intelligent stage of the profiting by experience4 ,intelligence1 as we have seen1 aims at the reinstatement of pleasurable situations1 and the suppression of those which are the reverse4 ,the sound-stimulus1 the motor effects in behaviour1 and the resulting sound-production coalesce into a conscious situation1 which appears to be pleasurable or the reverse1 according as the sound produced resembles or not the initiating sound-stimulus4 ,if we assume that the resemblance of the sounds he utters to the sounds he hears is itself a source of pleasurable satisfaction 7and this certainly seems to be the case71 intelligence1 without the aid of any higher faculty1 will secure accommodation and render imitation more and more perfect4 ,and this appears to be the stage reached by the mocking-bird or the parrot4 ,but the child soon goes further4 ,he reflects upon the results he has reached2 he at first dimly1 and then more clearly realizes that they are imitative2 and his later efforts at imitation are no longer subject to the chance occurrence of happy results1 but are based on a scheme of behaviour which is taking form in his mind1 are deliberate and intentional1 and are directed to a special end more or less clearly perceived as such4 ,he no longer imitates like a parrot2 he begins to imitate like a man1 and may1 by the study of good models and the maintenance of a high ideal1 acquire the moving cadences of an orator4 ,according to our interpretation1 instinctive imitation is a factor of wide importance in animal behaviour1 intelligent imitation1 arising in close connection with interest in the doings of others1 is a co-operating factor1 but of intentional and reflective imitation there is at present no satisfactory evidence in any animal below man4 ,,ii4--,,intercommunication ,the foundations of intercommunication1 like those of imitation1 are laid in certain instinctive modes of response1 which are stimulated by the acts of other animals of the same social group4 ,these have been fostered by natural selection as a means of social linkage furthering the preservation1 both of the individual and of the group4 ,some account has already been given of the sounds made by young birds1 which seem to be instinctive and to afford an index of the emotional state at the time of utterance4 ,that in many cases they serve to evoke a like emotional state and correlated expressive behaviour in other birds of the same brood cannot be questioned4 ,the alarm note of a chick will place its companions on the alert2 and the harsh 8krek0 of a young moor-hen1 uttered in a peculiar crouching attitude1 will often throw others into this attitude1 though the maker of the warning sound may be invisible4 ,that the cries of her brood influence the conduct of the hen is a matter of familiar observation2 and that her danger signal causes them at once to crouch or run to her for protection is not less familiar4 ,no one who has watched a cat with her kittens1 or a sheep with her lambs1 can doubt that such 8dumb animals0 are influenced in their behaviour by suggestive sounds4 ,the important questions are1 how they originate1 what is their value1 and how far such intercommunication--if such we may call it--extends4 ,there can be but little question that in all cases of animals under natural conditions such behaviour has an instinctive basis4 ,though the effect may be to establish a means of communication1 such is not their conscious purpose at the outset4 ,they are presumably congenital and hereditary modes of emotional expression which serve to evoke responsive behaviour in another animal--the reciprocal action being generally in its primary origin between mate and mate1 between parent and offspring1 or between members of the same family group4 ,and it is this reciprocal action which constitutes it a factor in social evolution4 ,its chief interest in connection with the subject of behaviour lies in the fact that it shows the instinctive foundations on which intelligent and eventually rational modes of intercommunication are built up4 ,for instinctive as the sounds are at the outset1 by entering into the conscious situation and taking their part in the association-complex of experience1 they become factors in the social life as modified and directed by intelligence4 ,to their original instinctive value as the outcome of stimuli1 and as themselves affording stimuli to responsive behaviour1 is added a value for consciousness in so far as they enter into those guiding situations by which intelligent behaviour is determined4 ,and if they also serve to evoke1 in the reciprocating members of the social group1 similar or allied emotional states1 there is thus added a further social bond1 inasmuch as there are thus laid the foundations of sympathy4 8,what makes the old sow grunt and the piggies sing and whine80 said a little girl to a portly substantial farmer4 8,i suppose they does it for company1 my dear10 was the simple and cautious reply4 ,so far as appearances went1 that farmer looked as guiltless of theories as man could be4 ,and yet he gave terse expression to what may perhaps be regarded as the most satisfactory hypothesis as to the primary purpose of animal sounds4 ,they are a means by which each indicates to others the fact of his comforting presence2 and they still1 to a large extent1 retain their primary function4 ,the chirping of grasshoppers1 the song of the cicada1 the piping of frogs in the pool1 the bleating of lambs at the hour of dusk1 the lowing of contented cattle1 the call-notes of the migrating host of birds--all these1 whatever else they may be1 are the reassuring social links of sound1 the grateful signs of kindred presence4 ,arising thus in close relation to the primitive feelings of social sympathy1 they would naturally be called into play with special force and suggestiveness at times of strong emotional excitement1 and the earliest differentiations would1 we may well believe1 be determined along lines of emotional expression4 ,thus would originate mating cries1 male and female after their kind2 and parental cries more or less differentiated into those of mother and offspring1 the deeper note of the ewe differing little save in pitch and timbre from the bleating of her lamb1 while the cluck of the hen differs widely from the peeping note of the chick in down4 ,thus1 too1 would arise the notes of anger and combat1 of fear and distress1 of alarm and warning4 ,if we call these the instinctive language of emotional expression1 we must remember that such 8language0 differs markedly from the 8language0 of which the sentence is the recognized unit4 ,it is1 however1 not improbable that1 through association in the conscious situation1 sounds1 having their origin in emotional expression and evoking in others like emotional states1 may acquire a new value in suggesting1 for example1 the presence of particular enemies4 ,an example will best serve to indicate my meaning4 8,in the early dawn of a grey morning10 says ,mr4 ,h4 ,b4 ,medlicott1#hb 8,i was geologizing along the base of the ,muhair ,hills in ,south ,behar1 when all of a sudden there was a stampede of many pigs from the fringe of the jungle1 with porcine shrieks of sauve-qui-peut significance4 ,after a short run in the open they took to the jungle again1 and in a few minutes there was another uproar1 but different in sound and in action2 there was a rush1 presumably of the fighting members1 to the spot where the row began1 and after some seconds a large leopard sprang from the midst of the scuffle4 ,in a few bounds he was in the open1 and stood looking back1 licking his chaps4 ,the pigs did not break cover1 but continued on their way4 ,they were returning to their lair after a night's feeding on the plain1 several families having combined for mutual protection2 while the beasts of prey were evidently waiting for the occasion4 ,i was alone1 and1 though armed1 ,i did not care to beat up the ground to see if in either case a kill had been effected4 ,the numerous herd covered a considerable space1 and the scrub was thick4 ,the prompt concerted action must in each case have been started by the special cry4 ,i imagine that the first assailant was a tiger1 and the case was at once known to be hopeless1 the cry prompting instant flight1 while in the second case the cry was for defence4 ,it can scarcely be doubted that in the first case each adult pig had a vision of a tiger1 and in the second of a leopard or some minor foe40 ,if we accept ,mr4 ,medlicott's interpretation as in the main correct1 we have in this case3 7#a7 common action in social behaviour1 7#b7 community of emotional state1 and 7#c7 the suggestion of natural enemies not unfamiliar in the experience of the herd4 ,under uniform conditions of experience the alarm-notes of some birds may well call up1 re-presentatively1 salient features in previous situations4 ,unquestionably1 in the parrot1 the word-sounds they imitate become associated with definite objects of sense-experience4 ,in the following case1 a particular sound appeared to be suggestive of a particular sense-idea in the dog4 ,the parent blackbirds1 which built near a house in ,clifton1 were wont to give the alarm-note when marauding cats appeared in sight4 ,this sound1 it would seem1 became definitely associated1 in the experience of a terrier1 with the animals the presence of which called it forth2 and on hearing the alarm note the dog would rush out into the garden1 apparently1 as ,i am informed by his mistress1 in fullest expectation of a pleasant worry4 ,it is a not improbable hypothesis1 therefore1 that in the course of evolution the initial value of uttered sounds is emotional2 but that on this may be grafted in further development the indication of particular enemies4 ,if1 for example1 the cry which prompts instant flight among the pigs is called forth by a tiger1 it is reasonable to suppose that this cry would give rise to a representative generic image of that animal having its influence on the conscious situation4 ,but if the second cry1 for defence1 was prompted sometimes by a leopard and sometimes by some other minor foe1 then this cry would not give rise to a re-presentative image of the same definiteness4 ,whether animals have the power of intentionally differentiating the sounds they make to indicate different objects1 is extremely doubtful4 ,can a dog bark in different tones to indicate 8cat0 or 8rat10 as the case may be8 ,probably not4 ,it may1 however1 be asked why1 if a pig may squeak differently1 and thus1 perhaps1 incidently indicate on the one hand 8tiger0 and on the other hand 8leopard10 should not a dog bark differently1 and thus indicate appropriately 8cat0 or 8rat08 ,because it is assumed that the two different cries in the pig are the instinctive expression of two different emotional states1 and ,mr4 ,medlicott could distinguish them2 whereas1 in the case of the dog1 we can distinguish no difference between his barking in the one case and the other1 nor do the emotional states appear to be differentiated4 ,of course1 there may be differences which we have failed to detect4 ,what may be regarded1 however1 as improbable1 is the intentional differentiation of sounds by barking in different tones with the purpose of indicating 8cat0 or 8rat40 ,mr4 ,r4 ,l4 ,garner1 in a work#hc which unfortunately contains much hasty and immature generalization1 distinguished nine sounds made by capuchins4 ,but none of these1 so far as can be gathered from the data given1 is necessarily indicative of a particular object4 ,all of them may be emotional expressions of satisfaction1 discontent1 alarm1 apprehension1 and so forth4 ,in any case1 there is no evidence for that intentional employment of sounds1 to the realized end of intercommunication1 which would involve the exercise of an incipient rational faculty4 ,such powers of intercommunication as animals possess are based on direct association1 and refer to the here and the now4 ,a dog may be able to suggest to his companion the fact that he has descried a worriable cat2 but can a dog tell his neighbour of the delightful worry he enjoyed the day before yesterday in the garden where the man with the biscuit-tin lives8 ,probably not1 bark he never so expressively4 ,although some anecdotes are commonly interpreted as affording evidence of descriptive intercommunication among animals1 we need the decisive results of experiment before this view can be unreservedly accepted4 ,sir ,john ,lubbock1 now ,lord ,avebury1 made careful experiments with ants1 and discusses the question with his customary lucidity and impartiality4 8,much of what has been said10 he writes1#hd 8as to the powers of communication possessed by bees and ants depends on the fact that if one of them in the course of her rambles has discovered a supply of food1 a number of others soon find their way to the store4 ,this1 however1 does not necessarily imply any power of describing localities4 ,if the ants merely follow a more fortunate companion1 or if they hunt her by scent1 the matter is comparatively simple2 if1 on the contrary1 the others have the route described to them1 the case becomes very different40 ,experiments were therefore made to decide the question4 ,for example1 when an ant returned from the discovered store of food to the nest1 and then emerged with a following of other ants1 she was taken up on a slip of paper and transferred to the food4 ,the followers1 thus deprived of their leader1 in nearly all cases failed to find the store4 8,i conclude1 then10 says ,lord ,avebury1 8that when large numbers of ants come to food they follow one another1 being also1 to a large extent1 guided by scent4 ,the fact1 therefore1 does not imply any considerable power of intercommunication40 ,there are1 moreover1 some circumstances which seem to strengthen this conclusion4 ,for instance1 8if a number of slave-ants are put in a box1 and if in one corner a dark place of retreat be provided for them1 with some earth1 one soon finds her way to it4 ,she then comes out again1 and going up to one of the others1 takes her by the jaws and carries her to the place of shelter4 ,they then both repeat the same manuvre with other ants1 and so on until all their companions are collected together4 ,now1 it seems difficult to imagine that so slow a course would be adopted1 if they possessed any power of communicating description40 ,lord ,avebury is1 however1 of opinion that such insects can transmit simpler ideas4 ,he found1 for example1 that where ants were put to a large and a small store of larv under similar circumstances1 a greater number of insects followed the ant that had discovered the larger store4 ,this may1 indeed1 have been due rather to a difference in manner than to any intentional communication2 but the fact remains that through some difference of behaviour there resulted suggestive effects on other members of the community4 ,but although there can be little doubt that the behaviour of social insects has suggestive value for others1 it may still be regarded as very doubtful whether they are able to communicate information to one another by any system of language or signs1 purposively employed as a system to this end4 ,the distinguished geologist1 ,hague1 communicated to ,darwin#he the effects on ants of crushing some of their number as they proceeded along a definite trail4 8,as soon as those ants which were approaching arrived near to where their fellows lay dead and suffering1 they turned and fled with all possible haste40 8,when such an ant1 returning in fright1 met another approaching1 the two would always communicate1 but each would pursue its own way1 the second ant continuing its journey to the spot where the first had turned about1 and then following that example40 ,there seems nothing to show that the 8communication0 here was effective4 ,from the many anecdotes of dogs calling others to their assistance1 or bringing others to those who feed them or treat them kindly1 we may indeed infer the existence of a social tendency and of the suggestive effects of behaviour1 but we cannot derive conclusive evidence of anything like descriptive communication4 ,and although domestic animals may learn or be taught to associate the words we utter with certain acts or things1 or may even1 in a sense1 communicate their wishes to us by special modes of behaviour--as in the case of ,lord ,avebury's poodle1 ,van1#hf who was taught to bring cards on which such words as 8,food0 or 8,out0 were printed1 and in that of a cat which touches the handle of the door when she wants it opened for her1--still1 all these are founded on direct association1 and are in a line with the act of ,mr4 ,thorndike's cat1 which licked herself or scratched herself when imprisoned in a cage1 such act having entered into the association-complex4 ,such intentional communication as is to be found in animals1 if indeed we may properly so call it1 seems to arise by an association of the performance of some act in a conscious situation involving further behaviour for its complete development4 ,thus the cat which touches the handle of the door when it wishes to leave the room has had experience in which the performance of this act has coalesced with a specific development of the conscious situation4 ,the case is similar when your dog drops a ball or stick at your feet1 wishing you to throw it for him to fetch4 ,and on these lines may probably be interpreted such behaviour as ,romanes#hg thus described3--8,terrier ,a being asleep in my house1 and terrier ,b lying on a wall outside1 a strange dog1 ,c1 ran along below the wall on the public road1 following a dog-cart4 ,immediately on seeing ,c1 ,b jumped off the wall1 ran upstairs to where ,a was asleep1 woke him up by poking him with his nose in a determined and suggestive manner1 which ,a at once understood as a sign3 he jumped over the wall and pursued the dog ,c1 although ,c was by that time far out of sight round a bend in the road40 ,romanes did not probably intend to imply that ,a by poking ,b1 conveyed specific information that there was another dog1 ,c1 which had proceeded in a particular direction4 ,that would be descriptive communication4 ,the meaning attaching to ,a's action was presumably similar to that which characterizes other 8meaning0 for intelligent animals--the development of the situation on lines marked out by previous experience4 ,still1 it is clear that such an act would be the perceptual precursor of the deliberate conduct of the rational being by whom the sign is definitely realized as a sign1 the intentional meaning of which is distinctly present to thought4 ,this involves a judgment concerning the sign as an object of thought2 and this is probably beyond the capacity of the dog4 ,for1 as ,romanes himself says1#hh 8it is because the human mind is able1 so to speak1 to stand outside of itself1 and thus to constitute its own ideas the subject-matter of its own thought1 that it is capable of judgment1 whether in the act of conception or in that of predication4 ,we have no evidence to show that any animal is capable of objectifying its own ideas2 and1 therefore1 we have no evidence that any animal is capable of judgment40 ,it seems1 therefore1 that the sounds made by animals1 and certain other modes of behaviour1 may be regarded as primarily instinctive acts which have been evolved with the biological end of affording suggestive stimuli furthering intercommunication between the members of the social group4 ,their performance1 however1 affords data to consciousness1 which intelligence makes use of in the guidance of behaviour in accordance with the results of experience4 ,and since the similar acts performed by the socially linked members are in many cases closely connected with emotional states1 there arises the further social link of community of feeling--that which1 perhaps1 more than anything else conduces to community of action and similarity of social behaviour4 ,occasionally particular sounds or special acts may1 through constant and uniform association1 indicate particular objects1 such as natural enemies4 ,but there does not appear to be convincing evidence of any intentional differentiation of the means of communication1 or of any use of sounds for descriptive ends4 ,still1 just as the instinctive imitation we considered in the last section may be regarded as the precursor1 in the animal world1 of the reflective and rational imitation of which we may watch the development in children1 so may instinctive modes of intercommunication be regarded as supplying the foundations on which deliberate and intentional communication may be based4 ,and here imitation will be a co-operating factor4 ,we see in the early stages of the development of children's language how large a share simple and direct association takes in the process4 ,for a while1 indeed1 there seems to be this and nothing more4 ,but gradually there arises a realization of a further import and purpose in the hitherto isolated associations4 ,it is seen that they symbolize elements in that incipiently rational scheme of thought and things which is beginning to take form in the child's mind4 ,the relationships which hold good within the conscious situations of daily life begin to occupy the focus of attention1 and hitherto unappreciated word-sounds are perceived to stand out as signs for these relationships4 ,of course the relationships#hi are implicit in the conscious situations of the higher animals and of infants4 ,only by reflection can they become explicit1 and rivet the attention4 ,something is needed to bring them into prominence and focus the mental eye upon them4 ,and descriptive intercommunication supplies this need4 ,if a description1 even the simplest1 is to be apprehended or presented to the apprehension of others1 then the relationships must be rendered explicit4 ,try to describe an ordinary visual scene1 or the most commonplace sequence of events1 and see if you can do so without making clear to the mind the relationships involved4 ,the thing is impossible4 ,an infant or a dog cannot understand the simplest possible description1 because the words and suffixes which indicate the relationships have no meaning4 ,the words which stand for substantive impressions may have suggestive value through direct association4 ,the word 8cat0 or 8rats0 may have for the dog a very definite suggestive value2 and hence some people fancy that when they say to their dog1 8,there is a cat in the garden10 the animal understands what they say4 ,but it is quite sufficient to suppose that the word 8cat0 has suggestive force1 all the rest being for the dog mere surplusage of sound4 ,when we talk to our four-footed companions1 how much can they be said to understand of what we say8 ,perhaps a score of words have for a dog a definitely suggestive value1 each associated with some simple object or action4 8,out10 8down10 8up10 8walk10 8biscuit10 8cat10 8fetch10 and so forth elicit appropriate responses4 ,even with these1 tone is more suggestive than articulation1 and in each word the salient feature is the chief guide4 ,when ,i said 8,whisky10 for example1 to my fox-terrier1 he would at once sit up and beg2 not because his tastes were as depraved as those of his master1 but because the isk sound1 common both to 8,whisky0 and 8biscuit10 was what had for his ears the suggestive value4 ,in a paper on the 8,speech of ,children10#ij ,mr4 ,s4 ,s4 ,buckman exhibits the animal stage in the incipient speech of the human infant4 ,we cannot here discuss1 still less criticize1 his paper4 ,one or two examples will serve to illustrate how instinctive sounds may serve as the basis for subsequent speech4 ,he regards ma as primarily a forcible expression of an emotional state4 8,if the child require attention it makes the loudest noise which it can produce2 the parting of the lips and opening of the mouth to the widest extent while the full volume of breath is emitted produces the sound ma40 ,at first the sound seems to have the value of a simple expression of an emotional state4 8,but if the infant require attention it is its mother whom it wants1 and from whom it receives this attention2 therefore ma very soon comes to be recognized as the call for mother1 and1 by a further step in development1 as the name for mother40 ,here1 if we accept the interpretation1 we have the passage from the emission of a sound as the expression of emotion to the use of the sound from its association with a particular object of sense-experience to indicate that object4 ,similarly1 according to ,mr4 ,buckman1 with kah4 ,at first 8a strong sign of displeasure at anything nasty to the taste10 it passes1 we are told1 into a symbol for the bad2 hence 2 and is perhaps narrowed down to the particularly offensive 4 ,da and ta are regarded as recognition sounds1 the former being associated eventually with the father1 the latter with strangers4 ,this appears somewhat hypothetical1 but1 granting the accuracy of ,mr4 ,buckman's interpretation1 these sounds also illustrate again the transition from the expression of an emotion to sounds indicative of particular objects of experience4 ,interesting1 however1 as are such observations on the animal stage of sound-production in the human infant1 they do not touch the crucial period in the development of language4 ,mr4 ,buckman1 indeed1 regards as a remarkably dogmatic assertion ,professor ,max ,mller's dictum that 8the one great barrier between the brute and man is language20 and he tells us that 8there are more than twelve different words in the language of fowls10 on which assertion1 in turn1 the distinguished linguist whom he criticizes might have something piquant to say4 ,no doubt the difference of opinion turns on the definition of the word 8language40 ,but if1 as is now generally accepted1 the sentence and not the word is the distinguishing unit in language1 and the copula in some form1 explicit or implicit1 is the pivot of the sentence1 the wisest hen is probably incapable of language4 ,the word becomes an element in language--a word proper--only when it assumes the office of a part of speech1 that is to say1 a constituent element in an interrelated whole4 ,the animal 8word10 if we like so to term it1 is an isolated brick2 a dozen1 or even a couple of hundred such bricks do not constitute a building4 ,language1 properly so called1 is the builded structure1 be it a palace or only a cottage2 hen language1 or monkey language1 is1 at best1 so far as we at present have evidence1 an unfashioned heap of bricks4 ,it is just because language is the expression of a portion of a scheme of thought that it indicates in the speaker the possession of a rational soul1 capable of perceiving and symbolizing the relationships of things as reflected in thought4 ,herein lies the practical value1 for human advance in mental development1 of language as a means of descriptive intercommunication4 ,it renders explicit relationships otherwise merely implicit1 and forces them to the front2 and since these relationships are the stuff of which knowledge is built--without the realization of which any complex ideal scheme is impossible of attainment--the importance of descriptive intercommunication can scarcely be overestimated4 ,and though there is no conclusive evidence of its occurrence among animals1 yet we have in them the instinctive and intelligent basis on which in due course of evolution it may be securely based4 ,,iii4--,,social ,,communities ,,of ,,bees ,,and ,,ants ,apart from human societies the most noteworthy social communities of animals are found among insects1 especially in ants1 bees1 wasps1 and termites4 ,it is true that in the mammalia we find such communities as the troop of apes1 the herd of cattle1 the pack of wolves1 the school of porpoises1 the so-called 8rookeries0 of seals1 and the colonies of 8prairie dogs0 and of beavers2 and that among birds there are analogous communities4 ,undoubtedly the temporary or permanent association of many individuals is in such cases an advantage to the race1 and confers mutual benefits on the associates4 ,but in none of these cases is division of labour carried to such a high degree as among the social insects4 ,and it is through such division of labour that the social community reaches its highest expression4 ,it is a somewhat remarkable fact that in man1 where we find the social division of labour brought to a high pitch of perfection1 and carried out with great nicety of accommodation to those circumstances which civilization has rendered extremely complicated1 there is no organic differentiation of structure among the co-operating individuals2 whereas1 so low down in the scale of life as the colonial polype1 ,hydractinia1 which is often found growing on the shells occupied by hermit crabs1 there are at least three kinds of differentiated individuals3 nutritive polypes with mouth and tentacles2 mouthless sensitive members2 and others whose sole office is reproduction4 ,but these differentiated individuals in the colonial zoophytes are connected at their bases by a common flesh2 and the division of labour is a product of organic evolution1 and is probably not in any degree determined or guided by consciousness4 ,we may say1 then1 that the division of labour in the zoophyte is wholly physical1 whereas in man it is chiefly conscious or psychical2 as is also the bond of union between the several members of the colony4 ,intermediate between these extremes stand the social insects4 ,in them there is no physical bond of union1 for each individual is distinct and separate2 the social linkage is in some degree conscious under the conditions of their nurture2 and the division of labour is partly conscious1 though probably in large degree based on instinctive foundations1 and partly the outcome of an organic differentiation of structure seen in the reproductive members and in the sterile workers1 as exemplified in the common wood ant 7,fig4 #bd74 ,in some cases the workers themselves may be divided into different castes4 ,illustration3 ,,fig4 #bd4--,wood ant4 #a1 ,queen2 #b1 male2 #c1 worker 7from ,shipley74 ,so much has been written--and well written--on the social life of insect communities1 that it will here suffice to indicate some of the problems which arise when we endeavour to interpret the modes of behaviour which have been carefully observed4 ,in the honey-bee we have the well-known differentiation of structure into drones or effective males1 queens or egg-laying females1 and workers or ineffective females1 in which the development of the reproductive organs is arrested or modified4 ,distinct modes of behaviour are correlated with these structural differences4 ,when a swarm of bees leaves a hive it generally consists of the old queen-mother and a certain number of the workers which are her offspring4 ,when they have found new quarters1 or have been safely housed under domestication1 the workers busy themselves in making the cells in which the queen may lay her eggs1 and in which food may be stored4 ,in doing this the bees act in concert1 and though the mathematical accuracy of the form and size of the cells has been much exaggerated1 the comb which results is a very beautiful and well-adapted product of mutual co-operation in joint labour4 ,and though intelligence may1 under special circumstances1 modify the method of procedure there can be little doubt that comb-building is primarily due to inherited instinct4 ,the cells are not1 however1 all of the same size1 those for the drones being somewhat larger than the cells in which the workers are reared1 while much larger and differently shaped cells are prepared for the future queens4 ,if instinctive therefore--as it seems to be in the main--the behaviour runs into different lines1 the immediate causes of which1 internal or external1 we are not able accurately to assign4 ,the reproductive behaviour of egg-laying in the queen-mother is also instinctive4 ,it is believed that the drones are developed from eggs from which the queen bee withholds the fertilizing fluid1 which she retains for months or years after the nuptial flight1 stored in a special receptacle4 ,and the size and shape of the drone-cell may supply the stimulus through which her behaviour in this respect is determined4 ,but she lays similarly fertilized eggs in both the worker-cells and the queen-cells2 and in these two cases the stimulating conditions must be different4 ,when the eggs have been laid1 and the grubs hatched1 the worker bees assume new duties--the feeding and tending of the young4 ,they eat honey and pollen1 which is partially digested1 and supplied as pap to the grubs in such quantities that they seem bathed in it2 but after a short time a mixture of honey pollen and water is substituted for this pap4 ,it is said that the drone larv are fed with pap for a longer period than the workers2 and the queen larva undoubtedly receives far more of this pap--or1 perhaps1 of a still richer nutritive product1 sometimes spoken of as royal jelly--and1 indeed1 is supplied therewith throughout larval life4 ,it is generally believed that this high feeding is the cause of queen-development1 and that should the queen larv die ordinary worker larv are fed up1 and produce queens nowise dissimilar to those developed in the royal cells4 ,it is clear1 if this be so1 that the behaviour of the nurses decides the difference between the future queens and working bees--that is to say1 the fertile and the sterile females4 ,in any case1 the feeding of the young by members of the same community is a fact to be specially noted4 ,it is commonly said that the family is the germ from which the social community springs2 and it may be added that food-collection or food-administration in some form makes the difference between the family that coheres and the family that scatters4 ,when the larv have been fed1 each after its kind1 the workers seal up the cells with lids of pollen and wax2 the larv spin cocoons1 pass into the pupa stage1 and then change to perfect bees1 which bite a way through the lid and take their place in the hive4 ,these young bees now become the nurses1 while the older bees go abroad to fetch honey and pollen to be stored away in some of the cells4 ,but when a queen emerges1 her first act is to go round to the other royal cells1 tear them open1 and sting to death the helpless occupants4 ,meanwhile the old queen may have led off the surplus population in a swarm1 and the new queen reigns in her stead4 ,idle drones have also been emerging from their cells2 and when the young queen starts forth on her nuptial flight she is followed by the drones1 mates with one of them1 and returns a potential mother of thousands4 ,so long as there is abundance of food the useless drones are tolerated2 but when there is scarcity they are ejected1 and drone eggs1 larv1 and pup are said to be destroyed4 ,in the works of ,huber and others1 further marvels of hive-life1 some well-authenticated1 others more or less doubtful1 are duly set forth4 ,but enough has here been said to show that a social community of bees presents problems of animal behaviour which are sufficiently difficult of explanation4 ,how far is the behaviour instinctive8 ,how far is it due to experience individually acquired8 ,are we constrained to admit a rational factor8 ,if so1 is it1 like human reason1 the result of generalization from experience of the relationships of phenomena8 ,or are there features of insect psychology which differ from any of which we have firsthand knowledge8 ,these questions are more easily put than answered4 ,as in the case of bird-migration1 so too in that of the social life of bees1 there is much that honesty forces us to confess our inability satisfactorily to explain4 ,so1 too1 is it in the social life of ants4 ,among these insects the males and perfect females bear wings1 though these appendages may be subsequently shed4 ,in some kinds1 however1 there are also wingless males or females capable of exercising the reproductive function4 ,the workers are wingless1 and are often of two or three kinds1 differing in form and appearance1 and in some cases playing different parts in the social economy4 ,there is also1 in some cases1 a separate class of large-headed soldier ants2 so that differentiation of structure among the sterile females is carried further in ants than in bees4 ,their nests generally consist of an elaborate system of chambers and passages1 either built with pine-needles1 as in our common wood ant1 or hollowed out in the earth or in wood1 or sometimes built with a paper-like material1 or formed of rolled leaves4 ,it is said that a common ant in ,eastern ,asia 7cophylla smaragdina7 8forms shelters on the leaves of trees1 by curling the edges of leaves and joining them together4444 ,the perfect ant has no material with which to fasten together the edges it curls2 its larva1 however1 possesses glands that secrete a supply of material for it to form a cocoon with1 and the ants utilize the larv to effect their purpose40#ia ,this has recently been confirmed by ,mr4 ,e4 ,g4 ,green1 ,government entomologist1 at the ,botanic ,gardens at ,peradeniya1 ,ceylon4 8,he has seen ants actually holding larv in their mouths and utilizing them as spinning machines4 ,to find out what would be done1 some leaves were purposely separated by ,mr4 ,green4 ,the edges of the leaves were quickly drawn together by the ants1 and1 about an hour later1 small white grubs were seen being passed backwards and forwards across the gaps made in the walls of the shelter4 ,a continuous thread of silk proceeded from the mouth of the larva1 and was used to repair the damage40#ib ,this is a remarkable act of apparently intelligent behaviour4 ,but when we remember how much of the time of ants is occupied in carrying about their larv1 it is hardly an act of which it can be affirmed that it could not arise as the result of chance experience4 ,in some cases two different genera are found in the same nest1 with separate chambers and passages1 as in the case of the robber-ant 7,solenopsis7 and the slave-ant 7,formica fusca74 ,the orifices by which the former enter are too small to allow of the entrance of the latter1 8hence the robber obtains an easy living at the expense of the larger species10 for 8they make incursions into the nurseries1 and carry off the larv as food40 ,in a few cases the foundation of a new colony has been carefully watched4 ,blockmann was successful in observing the formation of new nests by ,componotus ligniperdus at ,heidelberg4 8,he found under stones1 in the spring1 many examples of females1 either solitary or accompanied only by a few eggs1 larv1 or pup4 ,further1 he was successful in getting isolated females to commence nesting in confinement1 and observed that the ant that afterwards becomes the queen1 at first carries out by herself all the duties of the nest4 ,beginning by making a small burrow1 she lays some eggs1 and when these hatch1 feeds and tends the larv and pup3 the first specimens of these latter that become perfect insects are workers of all sizes1 and at once undertake the duties of tending the young and feeding the mother1 who1 being thus freed from the duties of nursing and of providing food while she is herself tended and fed1 becomes a true queen-ant4 ,thus it seems established that1 in the case of this species1 the division of labour found in the complex community does not at first exist1 but is correlative with increasing numbers of the society4 ,further observations as to the growth of one of these nascent communities1 and the times and conditions under which the various forms of individuals composing a complete society first appear1 would be of considerable interest40#ic ,the queen does not1 as in the case of the bee1 deposit her eggs in separate cells where they are tended by nurses4 ,the eggs1 which are laid in the chambers of the nest1 are subjected to much licking by the nurses2 the larv are1 moreover1 moved about from place to place1 so as to be subjected to the requisite conditions of moisture and temperature4 ,they are carefully cleaned1 and after they have passed into the pupa stage the emerging insects are stripped of a delicate investing skin4 ,and not only do the ants assiduously feed their young2 those who have gone forth and drunk their fill of sweet juices feed those who have remained behind4 ,forel took some specimens of ,componotus ligniperdus1 8and shut them up without food for several days1 and thereafter supplied some of them with honey1 stained with ,prussian blue2 being very hungry1 they fed so greedily on this that in a few hours their hind bodies were distended to three times their previous size4 ,he then took one of these gorged individuals1 and placed it among those that had not been fed4 ,the replete ant was at once explored by touches of the other ants and surrounded1 and food was begged from it4 ,it responded to the demands by feeding a small specimen from its mouth1 and when this little one had received a good supply1 it in turn communicated some thereof to other specimens2 while the original well-fed one also supplied others1 and thus the food was speedily distributed4 ,this habit of receiving and giving food is of the greatest importance in the life-history of ants40#id ,it affords the basis or starting-point of the keeping of aphides1 the making of slaves1 the curious development of honey-pot ants1 and in some cases the association with ants of other insects4 ,illustration3 ,,fig4 #be4--;,beetle soliciting food from ,ant 7after ,wasmann74 ,some of these insects1 of which there are many species belonging to several orders1 are parasitic2 others appear to be hostile1 and yet are able to maintain themselves in the nest2 others simply live side by side with the ants1 which seem to be neither hostile nor friendly to them4 ,in some of these cases the biological purpose of the association is unknown1 while in others the ant serves as a model which the associated insect mimics4 ,thus in the nest of an ,indian ant 7,sima rufa-nigra7 occur a small wasp and a spider which1 to some extent in form and more markedly in coloration1 mimic their hosts4 8,wherever you find this species in any numbers10 says ,mr4 ,rothney1#ie 8if you watch a few moments1 you will see a mimicking spider1 ,salticus1 running about among the ants1 which it very closely resembles in appearance1 much more so in life than in set specimens placed side by side2 ,i have seen numbers on the most friendly footing with the ants1 though ,i have never seen them enter their burrows4444 ,they are1 ,i should say1 the only friends the ant has1 with the exception of a sand-wasp1 a new species of ,rhinopsis since described by ,mr4 ,cameron1 which also very closely mimics the ant1 and which1 on first observing among the workers1 ,i took to be the male40 ,but there are some beetles which are not only tolerated1 but fed by the ants with which they live4 ,in the case of the genera ,atemeles and ,lomechusa1 which are always found in or near ants' nests1 the good offices are reciprocal1 for the beetles 8have patches of yellow hairs1 and these secrete some substance with a flavour agreeable to the ants1 which lick the beetles from time to time4 ,on the other hand1 the ants feed the beetles2 this they do by regurgitating food1 at the request of the beetle1 on to their lower lip1 from which it is then taken by the beetle4 ,the beetles in many of their movements exactly resemble the ants1 and their mode of requesting food1 by stroking the ants in certain ways1 is quite ant-like4 ,so reciprocal is the friendship1 that if an ant is in want of food the beetle will in its turn disgorge for the benefit of its host4 ,the young of the beetles are reared in the nests by the ants1 who attend to them as carefully as they do to their own young4 ,the beetles are1 however1 fond of the ants' larv as food1 and1 indeed1 eat them to a very large extent1 even when their own young are receiving food from the ants4 ,wasmann 7to whom we are indebted for most of our knowledge on this subject7 seems to be of opinion that the ants scarcely distinguish between the beetle larv and their own young2 one unfortunate result for the beetle follows from this1 viz4 that in the pupal state the treatment that is suitable for the ant larv does not agree with the beetle larv4 ,the ants are in the habit of digging up their own kind1 and lifting them out and cleaning them during their metamorphosis3 they do this also with the beetle larv1 with fatal results2 so that only those that have the good fortune to be forgotten by the ants complete their development40#if ,aphides1 or plant-lice1 yield to the solicitations of ants1 which stroke them with their antenn1 by emitting a drop of sweet and viscid secretion1 and it appears that the caress of the ant is the natural stimulus for the emission of the drop4 ,not only1 however1 do the ants go forth in search of aphides in their natural haunts1 they bring them to the neighbourhood of the nest1 and may even impound them by building a wall of earth round and over them4 ,huber stated that ants collected the eggs of the aphides and tended them in their nests1 and the accuracy of the observation has been shown by ,lord ,avebury and others4 8,the aphid eggs are laid early in ,october1 on the food plant of the insect4 ,they are of no direct use to the ants1 yet they are not left where they are laid1 where they would be exposed to the severity of the weather and to innumerable dangers1 but brought into the nests by the ants1 and tended by them with the utmost care through the long winter months until the following ,march1 when the young ones are brought out and again placed on the young shoots of the daisy40#ig ,dr4 ,mc,cook noticed that ants1 returning from the trees on which aphides abounded1 fed others near the nests1 and he regarded this as a case of division of labour1 the foragers obtaining food for the nurses which remained in or near the nest4 ,a further division of labour1 carried to lengths which seem almost absurd1 is found in the honey-pot ant of the ,united ,states and ,mexico4 ,the juice on which these ants feed is obtained from an oak-gall4 ,foragers go forth at night and return distended with the sweet fluid1 and1 having fed the ordinary workers in the nest1 apparently discharge the balance of their store into living honey-pots1 which remain in the nest and preserve the food till it may be required by the members of the community4 ,their abdomens are enormously distended1 they never leave the nest1 and they seem to form a distinct caste1 whose function it is to passively accumulate stores of reserve food for the community4 ,curiously enough the same peculiar social arrangement is found in different genera living as far apart as ,mexico1 ,australia1 and ,south ,africa4 ,illustration3 ,,fig4 #bf4---;,honey-pot ,ant4 ,there is no doubt that in some cases the division of labour is not restricted to the individuals of the same species1 but that other species are introduced into the nest to perform certain functions--thus giving rise to the so-called slavery among ants4 ,this is carried to an extreme in the ,european species ,formica rufescens1 the males and queens of which do no work1 while the sole function of the workers is to capture slaves of the smaller species ,formica fusca4 ,in association with this specialized mode of instinctive behaviour1 8even their bodily structure has undergone a change2 their mandibles have lost their teeth1 and have become mere nippers1 deadly weapons indeed1 but useless except in war4 ,they have lost the greater part of their instincts3 their art--that is1 the power of building2 their domestic habits--for they take no care of their own young1 all this being done by the slaves2 their industry--they take no part in providing the daily supplies2 if the colony changes the situation of its nest1 the masters are all carried by the slaves to the new one2 nay1 they have even lost the habit of feeding4444 ,i have had a nest of this species under observation for a long time1 but never saw one of the masters feeding4 ,i have kept isolated specimens for weeks1 by giving them a slave for an hour or two a day to clean and feed them1 and under these circumstances they remained in perfect health1 while1 but for the slaves1 they would have perished in two or three days40#ih ,in this matter1 we have in different species successive stages in the development of the instinctive behaviour which is thus carried so far in ,formica rufescens4 ,our ,english ants1 of the species ,formica sanguinea1 have fewer slaves and are less dependent on them2 they can feed and forage for themselves1 and during migration carry their slaves--which are of the same species as in the other case--instead of being carried by them4 ,in the nests of the common wood ant or horse ant 7,formica rufa7 there are occasionally a few slaves4 ,lord ,avebury thinks it likely that they are developed from larv or pup1 originally taken for food1 which have by chance come to maturity in the nest of their captors4 ,but one more incident in the social life of ants can here be noticed--though many others could be given did space permit4 ,the leaf-cutting ants of ,america form paths from their nests to suitable trees1 from which to obtain the small coin-like leaf fragments1 which they carry in the mandibles1 and hence have gained the name of umbrella or parasol ants4 ,these paths are sometimes underground2 and ,mr4 ,mc,cook measured one which ran at a depth of some #ah inches beneath the surface for #ddh feet1 and was then continued for another #ahe feet to the tree which the ants were stripping4 ,the whole path was in an almost perfect straight line from nest to tree4 ,the leaf fragments are stored in large quantities in the nest1 and it was long a matter of uncertainty for what purpose they were collected4 ,the problem was solved by ,alfred ,mller1 who found that the leaves1 which are subdivided and masticated by a special set of workers within the nest1 form the appropriate material in which the threads of a fungus ramify and flourish4 ,this fungus is tended by the ants with great care1 and is made to produce a specially modified form of growth1 not found under other circumstances1 in the form of white aggregations1 termed by ,mller 8,kohlrabi clumps40 ,these form the principal food of the ants2 and the spongy mass of earth and leaves is called the fungus garden4 8,if a nest be broken into and the fungus garden scattered1 the ants collect it as quickly as possible1 especially the younger parts1 taking as much trouble over it as over the larv4 ,they also cover it up again as soon as possible to protect it from the light40#ii ,again1 it may be asked with regard to the social life of ants as with respect to that of bees--,how far is their complex behaviour instinctive8 ,how far is it due to imitation8 ,what part does intelligence play1 and under what conditions of acquisition8 ,is reason1 in the restricted sense of the word1 a factor in the development of the behaviour8 ,i cannot answer these questions1 and am of opinion that much detailed observation is yet needed before we can do much more than speculate in the matter4 ,much indeed has been done1 but yet more remains for future investigation4 ,the conditions under which much of the behaviour is carried out seem to indicate strong instinctive tendencies which give an hereditary trend to the direction which the social behaviour takes4 ,dr4 ,bethe1#ajj indeed1 goes so far as to regard the behaviour as almost entirely instinctive1 affording little evidence of that modifiability of reactions which indicates intelligent guidance4 ,he shows as the result of careful experiment that the behaviour of ants to friends and enemies are direct reactions to smell4 ,enemies washed with the excretions of members of the nest are treated as friends1 notwithstanding their different colour1 size1 and general appearance4 ,by scent1 too1 they follow the lead of others and retrace their way to the nest2 this1 he says1 is not the result of a mental process1 but is the reaction of a complicated reflex mechanism4 ,as the outcome of careful observation1 ,dr4 ,bethe's conclusions are of great value and interest4 ,but he seems to go too far in denying to ants any power of intelligent accommodation to circumstances4 ,if we admit intelligence1 then the fact that the insects come forth in the midst of a community in full social activity would tend to the imitative or intelligent acquisition of like modes of procedure4 ,it is difficult to distinguish the share taken by these two factors which may well co-operate4 ,and if natural selection is exercising its influence through the elimination of those which do not fall into line in social behaviour1 there would be ample opportunity for the survival of coincident variations4#aja ,if one may be allowed to speculate1 it seems probable that the interaction of instinct and intelligence will be found with fuller knowledge to suffice for the explanation of the facts1 without calling in the known but here improbable factor of rationality or any factors unknown elsewhere in psychology4 ,some interesting observations of ,lord ,avebury's are sometimes quoted as evidence that ants are lacking in intelligence1 but 7if we accept the distinction already drawn#ajb7 they seem rather to show the lack of reason4 8,i placed food10 he says1#ajc 8in a porcelain cup1 on a slip of glass surrounded by water1 but accessible to the ants by a bridge1 consisting of a strip of paper two-thirds of an inch long and one-third wide4 ,having then put an ant 7,formica nigra7 from one of my nests to this food1 she began carrying it off1 and by degrees a number of friends came to help her4 ,when about twenty-five ants were so engaged1 ,i moved the little paper bridge slightly1 so as to leave a chasm just so wide that the ants could not reach across4 ,they came to the edge and tried hard to get over1 but it did not occur to them to push the paper bridge1 though the distance was only about one-third of an inch1 and they might easily have done so4 ,after trying for about a quarter of an hour they gave up the attempt and returned home4 ,this ,i repeated several times4 ,then1 thinking that paper was a substance to which they were not accustomed1 ,i tried the same with a bit of straw one inch long and one-eighth of an inch wide4 ,the result was the same4 ,again1 ,i placed particles of food close to and directly over the nest1 but connected with it only by a passage several feet in length4 ,under these circumstances it would be obviously a saving of time and labour to drop the food on to the nest1 or at any rate to spring down with it1 so as to save one journey4 ,but though ,i have frequently tried the experiment1 my ants never adopted either of these courses4 ,i arranged matters so that the glass on which the food was placed was only raised one-third of an inch above the nest4 ,the ants tried to reach down1 and the distance was so small that occasionally1 if another ant passed underneath just as one was reaching down1 the upper one could step on to its back1 and so descend2 but this only happened accidentally1 and they did not think of throwing the particles down1 nor1 which surprised me very much1 would they jump down themselves4 ,i then placed a heap of mould close to the glass1 but just so far that they could not reach across4 ,it would have been quite easy for any ant1 by moving a particle of earth for a quarter of an inch1 to have made a bridge by which the food might have been reached1 but this simple expedient did not occur to them40 ,now1 when we remember that the method of intelligence is to profit by chance experience1 while the method of reason is1 with foresight and intention1 to adapt means to ends1 we shall see that to move a straw even a quarter of an inch1 or to make a bridge with particles of mould1 would require rational and not merely intelligent powers4 ,chance experience would not supply the necessary data to be utilized by intelligence when repetition had established an association in the conscious situation4 ,granting that the ants were intelligent but not rational1 they could not be expected to overcome the difficulties1 simple as they seem to us1 which ,lord ,avebury placed in their path4 ,had they been overcome the fact would be more difficult to explain than the use of a stone tool by the sand wasp1 since this could more readily be hit upon by chance experience4 ,and what these valuable experiments1 of which kind more are needed1 seem to show is1 that the ant1 probably the most intelligent of all insects1 has no claim to be regarded as a rational being4 ,,iv4--,,animal ,,tradition ,in that interaction between instinct and intelligence which1 when further detailed work has sifted and purified our knowledge of the psychology of animal communities1 may prove sufficient to account for the well-established facts1 animal tradition will probably have to be recognized as of no little importance4 ,when a newly emerging ant or bee1 or a young bird or mammal is born into a community where certain modes of behaviour are already in full swing1 an imitative tendency of the follow-my-leader type may lead it to fall in line with the traditional habits4 ,it is said that young ants follow the older workers about the nest1 and are 8trained to a knowledge of domestic duties1 especially in the case of larv40 ,on the other hand1 we have seen that1 in certain observed cases1 the queen ant is the solitary starting-point of a new community1 and that the division of labour follows with the increasing numbers of the newly formed social group2 so that1 in such cases1 whatever part tradition may play in the later phases of social life1 it cannot afford a sufficient account of the division of labour in the earlier history of the community4 ,we need1 however1 fuller information concerning the continued life-history of such communities under natural conditions1 and as to how far they remain self-contained without any incorporation of older members from adjoining nests4 ,in the case of bees1 where the old queen departs with a swarm1 there may be greater continuity of tradition4 ,but how far this is a necessary factor in social development is at present a matter of conjecture4 ,in the herd of mammals and the flock of birds1 and in all the family and social life in these classes of animals1 the example of elders1 without any imitation of the higher reflective type1 can scarcely be without its influence on the behaviour of the young which1 one would suppose1 would tend to fall in with the ways which had become traditional in the species4 ,professor ,wesley ,mills tells us that a mongrel pup1 whose psychical development he carefully watched1 showed 8extraordinarily rapid0 progress when he was introduced to the society of other dogs1 and was thus subjected to the influence of canine tradition4 ,how far this influence extends in animal communities--how far it is either a necessary or even an important contributory factor in the development of certain modes of behaviour--is at present in large degree a matter of speculation4 ,and the only justification for speculation in science is that it may open our eyes to modes of influence the range and limits of whose effects may be submitted to the touchstone of careful observation1 and1 if possible1 experiment4 ,in this instance it is rather the indefiniteness of the evidence before us than its absence that stands in the way of any profitable discussion of the problem from the evidential point of view4 ,and this indefiniteness is partly due to the fact that the need of observation is not realized1 because this factor in animal behaviour has not been distinguished with sufficient clearness4 ,it is worth while1 therefore1 to devote a short space to a consideration of the relation of this tradition to instinct and intelligence with a view to the focussing of observation on the facts by which it may be further elucidated4 ,in the first place1 it is probable that1 as in other modes of animal behaviour1 traditional procedure is founded on an instinctive basis4 ,this must be an imitative tendency of the broad follow-my-leader type indicated in the first section of this chapter4 ,and this would afford wide instinctive foundations1 which would owe their hereditary character to the fact that1 under natural selection1 those individuals in the community would survive which fell into line with the adaptive behaviour of their companions1 while those which failed in this respect would be eliminated as more or less isolated outsiders1 standing apart from the social life4 ,in illustration we may take a hypothetical case1 founded1 however1 upon observation4 ,the ,rev4 ,s4 ,j4 ,whitmee1 a missionary in ,samoa1 believes that the tooth-billed pigeon of these islands 7,didunculus strigirostris7 8has probably been frightened when roosting1 or during incubation1 by attacks of cats1 and has sought safety in the trees4 ,learning1 from frequent repetition of the fright1 that the ground is a dangerous place1 it has acquired the habit of building1 roosting1 and feeding on the high trees2 and this habit is now operating for the preservation of this interesting bird1 which a few years ago was almost extinct40#ajd ,now1 in this case1 the young birds which followed the lead of those who1 under experience1 had acquired the habit1 would stand a better chance of survival than those who1 failing to do so1 were caught napping on the ground4 ,in further illustration1 we may take the case of two species of rats found by ,mr4 ,c4 ,m4 ,woodford on one of the ,solomon ,islands4 ,these two species are regarded by ,mr4 ,oldfield ,thomas as slightly altered descendants of one parent species1 with adaptations due to the fact that1 of this original species1 some have adopted a terrestrial1 others an arboreal life4 ,thus ,mus rex lives in trees1 has broad footpads1 and a long rasp-like1 probably semi-prehensile tail2 while ,mus imperator lives on the ground1 has smaller pads1 and a short smooth tail4 ,how far the different modes of behaviour in the two species may have been fostered by the influence of tradition we do not know2 but it is not improbable that such an influence would be a co-operating factor in the process of segregation1 and that in the course of time each form has been adapted to its special environment through the elimination of those individuals which were not in harmony with the conditions of their life4 ,such a case--admittedly hypothetical in the interpretation put upon the facts--may help us to see how the general instinctive follow-my-leader tendency might become specialized in certain essential lines of racial behaviour1 and how1 under natural selection1 coincident variations in the line of traditional acts might become more and more definitely inherited as1 at first1 strong instinctive tendencies1 and eventually more stereotyped modes of instinctive behaviour4 ,this1 indeed1 may have been the mode of origin of some of the social instincts4 ,reverting1 however1 to the stage where the general instinctive follow-my-leader tendency is only partly or incompletely specialized along particular lines of behaviour1 we should have at this stage certain hereditary trends of action1 dependent on stimuli afforded by the behaviour of others1 but needing1 for their guidance to finer issues and more adequate and highly perfected performance1 the play of intelligence and the satisfaction of nascent social impulses4 ,in the economy of the hive or the nest there are1 no doubt1 instinctive tendencies and predispositions2 but there is also something more than organic heredity with its transmitted modes of behaviour analogous to the inherited form and structure of the body or its parts4 ,consciousness exerts a guiding influence4 ,the insect is not independent of experience1 but is capable of profiting by the teachings of that fertile mother of all intelligent behaviour4 ,it is unnecessary1 however1 to insist on the fact that such insects are something more than instinctive automata1 but are guided in their behaviour by the results of experience4 ,many careful observers lay stress upon this2 if1 indeed1 they do not go further and claim for the social insect the higher rational faculty4 8,when we see10 says ,lord ,avebury1#aje 8an ant-hill tenanted by thousands of industrious inhabitants1 excavating chambers1 forming tunnels1 making roads1 guarding their home1 gathering food1 feeding the young1 tending their domestic animals--each one fulfilling its duties industriously1 and without confusion--it is difficult altogether to deny to them the gift of reason2 and the preceding observations tend to confirm the opinion that their mental powers differ from those of man1 not so much in kind as in degree40 ,if the term 8reason0 be here accepted in the broad sense1 and not in the narrower sense before indicated1 this passage will probably be endorsed by the majority of those who have paid any attention to the subject4 ,even those who regard 8reason10 in the more restricted acceptation of the term1 as outside any scheme of evolution1 since it differs in kind and not merely in degree1 would probably deny this faculty to ants4 ,in any case the passage expresses the conviction of a close and singularly unprejudiced observer1 that the doings of ants involve conscious guidance in the light of experience individually acquired4 ,and yet the behaviour of different species of ants1 each after its kind1 is remarkably constant--so constant that1 to use the words of ,dr4 ,peckham in another connection1 it is characteristic of the species1 and would be an important part of any definition of the insect based upon its habits4 ,and some part of this constancy may be due to tradition1 though much of it may result from strong instinctive tendencies which intelligence guides to similar ends1 because the conditions are similar in successive generations of social insects4 ,from the point of view of observation1 however1 it is particularly difficult to distinguish the part played by tradition as a psychological influence from that played by what we have above described as instinctive imitation4 ,in our study of other modes of instinctive behaviour we can isolate an individual1 or group of young individuals1 and observe how far certain acts are performed prior to any experience4 ,thus chicks behave in certain instinctive ways under conditions which preclude their learning from the hen or other older birds--so that tradition cannot be operative4 ,but where social behaviour is concerned1 such methods of observation are necessarily excluded1 since isolation involves the absence of the social factor4 ,and if certain instinctive acts require for their due performance the stimulus of the like performance in others1 what is this but a form of instinctive tradition2 and how are we to distinguish it from intelligent tradition1 where a psychological factor has freer play and exercises guidance over the performance8 ,in the present state of our knowledge we can do no more than suggest1 as not improbable1 that tradition passes through three phases3 the first in which it is instinctive2 the second in which it becomes intelligent through the satisfaction which the due performance of traditional acts arouses in consciousness2 and the third in which1 at any rate in man1 it takes on a rational form1 and is made to accord with an ideal scheme1 the product of conceptual thought and of reflection on data which have been generalized and considered in their due relationships to the scheme which takes definite form in the mind4 ,whether in the social communities of insects or those of beavers1 among mammals1 or rooks among birds1 tradition has begun to pass into the third or rational stage1 we do not know4 ,it may be so1 but probably the development along these lines has not been carried far4 ,presumably in the ant1 rook1 and beaver anything like an ideal scheme of thought based on reflection1 if it exist1 is as yet exceedingly indefinite4 ,but even supposing that no animal has yet risen beyond the second or intelligent stage1 it is none the less important to realize that we have here1 in animal life1 the foundations on which may be raised what may1 perhaps1 be regarded as one of the characteristic features of human progress4 ,this characteristic is the transference of evolution from the organism to the environment handed on from generation to generation4 ,thus man1 8availing himself of tradition1 is able to seize upon the acquirements of his ancestors at the point where they left them40#ajf ,thus 8he has slowly accumulated and organized the experience which is almost wholly lost with the cessation of individual life in other animals40#ajg ,but he is able to do so through the extension1 refining1 and fixing of that instinctive and intelligent tradition which begins to take form in animal communities4 ,v4--,,the ,,evolution ,,of ,,social ,,behaviour 8,animals of many kinds10 said ,darwin1#ajh 8are social2 every one must have noticed how miserable horses1 dogs1 sheep1 etc41 are when separated from their companions4 ,the most common mutual service in the higher animals is to warn one another of danger4 ,every sportsman knows how difficult it is to approach animals in a herd or troop4 ,wild horses and cattle do not1 ,i believe1 make any danger-signal2 but the attitude of any one of them who first discovers an enemy warns the others4 ,rabbits stamp loudly on the ground with their hind feet as a signal2 sheep and chamois do the same with their fore feet1 uttering likewise a whistle4 ,many birds and some mammals post sentinels4 ,the leader of a troop of monkeys acts as such1 and utters cries expressive both of danger and of safety4 ,social animals perform many little services for each other3 horses nibble1 and cows lick each other2 monkeys search each other for external parasites1 and are said to remove thorns and burrs4 ,social animals mutually defend each other4 ,bull bisons in ,north ,america1 when there is danger drive the cows and calves into the middle of the herd1 whilst they defend the outside4 ,among baboons the old males come forward to the attack4 ,wolves hunt in packs2 and pelicans fish in concert4 8,it has often been assumed10 continues ,darwin1 8that animals were in the first place rendered social1 and that they feel as a consequence uncomfortable when separated from each other1 and comfortable whilst together2 but it is a more probable view that these sensations were first developed1 in order that those animals which would profit by living in society should be induced to live together1 in the same manner as the sense of hunger and the pleasure of eating were1 no doubt1 first acquired in order to induce animals to eat4 ,the feeling of pleasure from society is probably an extension of the parental and filial affections1 since the social instinct seems to be developed by the young remaining long with their parents2 and this extension may be attributed in part to habit1 but chiefly to natural selection4 ,with those animals which were benefited by living in close association1 the individuals which took the greatest pleasure in society would best escape various dangers2 while those which cared least for their comrades1 and lived solitary1 would perish in greater numbers4 ,in however complex a manner the feeling of sympathy may have originated1 as it is one of high importance to all those animals which aid and defend one another1 it will have been increased through natural selection2 for those communities which included the greatest number of the most sympathetic members would flourish best1 and rear the greatest number of offspring40 ,it is impossible to improve upon this pithy description of the salient facts1 and terse explanation in terms of the hypothesis of natural selection4 ,it may1 perhaps1 be urged that1 on this hypothesis1 the origin of the social state1 through a biological association of individuals1 probably neither preceded nor followed the development of a psychical bond arising from the sense of satisfaction and comfort afforded by social life1 but that both originated pari passu4 ,if the linkage was primarily instinctive1 its intelligent continuance could only be effected through the pleasure social behaviour carried with it1 and the discomfort of separation from the community4 ,no instinctive acts would be persistently repeated1 under the guidance of individual experience1 if that experience proved bitter and not sweet4 ,an animal with thwarted instincts is one with unsatisfied impulses2 its biological and its psychological tendencies are alike unfulfilled4 ,what ,darwin saw and wished to enforce1 however1 was that the psychical link of conscious satisfaction was a necessary prerequisite of the continuance and further evolution of sociability2 and that without the integrating bonds of sympathy any advance of social development was impossible4 ,in two able and interesting articles in the ,nineteenth ,century review1#aji on 8,mutual ,aid among ,animals10 ,prince ,kropotkine gives a useful and sufficiently detailed summary of the chief facts concerning the social relationships which have been observed in the animal kingdom--including1 perhaps1 some rather apocryphal instances1--and combats ,huxley's statement#aaj that1 8beyond the limited and temporary relations of the family1 the ,hobbesian war of each against all is the normal state of existence0 among animals and primitive men4 8,life in societies10 says ,prince ,kropotkine1 8is no exception in the animal world4 ,it is the rule1 the law of nature1 and it reaches its fullest development with the higher vertebrates4 ,those species which live solitary1 or in small families only1 are relatively few1 and their numbers are limited40#aaa 8,life in societies enables the feeblest insects1 the feeblest birds1 and the feeblest mammals to resist1 or to protect themselves from1 the most terrible birds and beasts of prey2 it permits longevity2 it enables the species to rear its progeny with the least waste of energy1 and to maintain its numbers1 albeit with a very slow birth-rate2 it enables the gregarious animals to migrate in search of new abodes4 ,therefore1 while fully admitting that force1 swiftness1 protective colours1 cunningness1 and endurance to hunger and cold1 which are mentioned by ,darwin and ,wallace1 are so many qualities making the individual or the species the fittest under certain circumstances1 we maintain that under any circumstances sociability is the greatest advantage in the struggle for life4444 ,the fittest are thus the most sociable animals1 and sociability appears as the chief factor in evolution1 both directly1 by securing the well-being of the species while diminishing the waste of energy1 and indirectly by favouring the growth of intelligence40#aab ,and summarizing his argument1 ,prince ,kropotkine says1#aac 8,we have seen how few are the animal species which live an isolated life1 and how numberless are those which live in societies1 either for mutual defence1 or for hunting and storing up food1 or for rearing their offspring1 or simply for enjoying life in common4 ,we have also seen that1 though a good deal of warfare goes on between different species1 or even different tribes of the same species1 peace and mutual support are the rule within the tribe1 or the species2 and that those species which best know how to combine1 and to avoid competition1 have the best chances of survival and of further progressive development4 ,they prosper1 while unsociable species decay40 ,prince ,kropotkine seems1 however1 to push his argument too far4 ,the assertion that the fittest are the most sociable animals1 that sociability appears as the chief factor in evolution1 and that unsociable species decay1 is not likely to be accepted without qualification by zoologists4 ,what grounds have we for saying that the solitary wasps are less fit than the social wasps8 ,each has a fitness according to its kind4 ,can it be maintained that the unsocial tiger is less fit than the social jackal8 ,and can it be said that tigers1 which are reported absolutely to swarm in ,java and ,sumatra1 exemplify the decay of an unsociable species8 ,is it seriously contended that the hawk1 which may be successfully mobbed by a number of wagtails1 is less fit than his more social assailants8 ,and are the unsocial raptorial birds decaying species8 ,such questions might be asked by the score4 ,and the answer in every case is that the social and unsocial alike are fitted to their several states of life4 ,in fact1 it might be contended1 with every whit as much if not more cogency1 that sociability is nature's device for enabling the weaker1 and hence in themselves the less fit1 to resist the attacks and encroachments of the stronger and individually fitter4 ,discussing the possibilities of human ancestry1 ,darwin said3#aad 8,in regard to bodily size or strength1 we do not know whether man is descended from some comparatively small species like the chimpanzee1 or from one as powerful as the gorilla4 ,we should1 however1 bear in mind that an animal possessing great size1 strength1 and ferocity1 which1 like the gorilla1 could defend itself from all enemies1 would not perhaps have become social2 and this would most effectually have checked the acquirement of the higher mental qualities1 such as sympathy and the love of his fellows4 ,hence it might have been an immense advantage to man to have sprung from some comparatively weak creature40 ,zoologists1 again1 will hardly accept without question ,prince ,kropotkine's assertion that 8life in societies is no exception in the animal world1 but is the rule1 the law of nature40 ,many will contend1 on the other hand1 that life in societies with anything like division of labour1 or with mutual aid 7and this seldom carried far71 is1 taking the animal kingdom as a whole1 of comparatively rare occurrence1 though none the less noteworthy where it exists4 ,and1 in any case1 it seems somewhat extravagant to say that sociability is the chief factor in evolution4 ,no doubt it might be plausibly urged that human society is1 from man's point of view1 the highest product of evolution2 that in attaining to this end sociability has been the leading factor2 and that obviously the leading factor in the evolution of the highest product may properly be called the chief factor in evolution4 ,but ,prince ,kropotkine apparently means that sociability is the chief factor1 not only in this evolution1 but in all organic1 or1 at least1 all animal evolution4 ,in this he will receive the support of but few zoologists4 ,by some extravagance of statement he has weakened his own case1 which is otherwise not lacking in points of weakness4 ,the legitimate inferences from animal behaviour are1 that co-operation is in some cases a factor in the evolution of a successful species1 that in human progress it has been an important factor giving strength to a creature weak in tooth and claw1 and that this factor has co-existed1 and still coexists1 with that of competition1 in the absence of which the race would be dragged down to lower levels of efficiency by the incubus of weaklings4 ,to ,professor ,alfred ,espinas#aae we owe the best and fullest discussion of the social life of animals1 and to his work the reader may be referred for a careful and1 for the most part1 unstrained and unbiassed consideration of the phenomena4 ,in common with others who have devoted serious attention to the subject1 he sees in the family the starting-point of the higher and more comprehensive social group1 or 8peuplade40 ,prince ,kropotkine seems1 indeed1 to combat this view2 but the divergence of opinion is more apparent than real4 ,he tells us#aaf that anthropology 8has established beyond any doubt that mankind did not begin its life in the shape of small isolated families4 ,far from being a primitive form of organization1 the family is a very late product of human evolution4444 ,societies1 bands1 or tribes--not families--were thus the primitive form of organization of mankind and its earliest ancestors40 ,and in support of his views he adduces the sexual communism which is said to be found in the lowest savages1 and briefly traces the development of monogamy and the genesis of the family ideal as we conceive it4 ,it may at once be admitted that in all probability mankind did not have its origin in small isolated families4 ,if we do not admit this we must accept the alternative hypothesis1 that man was developed from an unsocial ancestor4 ,for though the biological family is the starting-point of the community1 it does not of course follow that wherever there is so much coherence between parents and offspring as to form a temporary family group1 a social community must in due course arise4 ,in such unsocial carnivora as the tiger1 the temporary linkage of family life is strong while it lasts4 ,but though mankind presumably originated in a prehuman race that had already reached some degree of social coherence1 there remains behind the question--what was the origin of this social group8 ,and to this question1 ,prince ,kropotkine1 in common with ,darwin and ,espinas1 would probably answer without hesitation1 that the primeval germ of the social community lay in the prolonged coherence of the group of parents and offspring4 ,in the unsocial animals the family separates and disintegrates before the offspring mate4 ,but if the family continue to cohere1 the mating of offspring will give rise to the continuity of coherence found in the herd1 or troop1 or tribe4 ,for new family groups will be constantly arising before the old family groups have ceased to be associated4 ,thus would be afforded more opportunity for tradition than among the unsocial animals4 ,how1 then1 can it be said that1 8far from being a primitive form of organization1 the family is a very late product of human evolution08 ,by using the word 8family0 in a sense somewhat different--nay1 widely different--from that in which it is employed in a biological discussion4 ,in the latter usage sexual communism is not excluded2 ,a41 ,b41 and ,c41 ,d4 may have offspring this season2 ,a41 ,d41 and ,c41 ,b4 next season4 ,in each season there are family groups with interchange of partners4 ,this does not1 however1 conform with our conception of the family as realized under civilization4 ,herein1 in fact1 lies the essential difference between the human and the animal family4 ,the one is a realized ideal2 the other is merely a natural occurrence4 ,even in the case of monogamous animals1 mating for life is probably not conduct in conformity with an ideal1 but is due to the fact that instinctive tendencies have taken this line of direction4 ,on the other hand1 in monogamous communities of mankind1 there is1 unfortunately1 evidence that in some cases the ideal is not strong enough to prevent presumably ancestral tendencies in the direction of communism4 ,the basis of human social conduct is unquestionably to be traced in the social behaviour of animals1 in inherited tendencies to co-operation and mutual help1 in the bonds of sympathy arising through the satisfaction of impulses towards such behaviour1 and perhaps1 to some extent1 in the influence of tradition4 ,it is not1 however1 until this tradition is rendered1 through descriptive communication1 more continuous and more effective2 it is not until an ideal of mutual aid1 and social conduct generally1 takes form and is rendered common to the tribe2 it is not until the more or less realized conceptions of one generation are handed on to become the environment under which the succeeding generations are nurtured2 it is not indeed until man consciously and reflectively aims at the bettering of his environment in accordance with standards rationally conceived and deliberately carried into execution2 that a new rgime of civilized progress1 elsewhere unknown in nature1 takes definite form4 ,under this rgime1 the elimination of failures through natural selection1 though it may not be entirely superseded1 plays a subordinate part2 alongside the organic continuity which is due to physical heredity1 there runs a continuity of tradition through social inheritance4 ,human civilization is an embodiment of reason1 a product of reflection1 a realization of ideals conceived by the leaders of mankind4 ,all this forms the environment of each one of us4 ,and it is this environment which is undergoing progressive evolution and playing on the rational faculties of those which are submitted to its moulding influence4 ,there is no sufficient evidence of anything of the kind in the social communities of animals4 ,this1 of course1 must be accepted merely as an expression of opinion4 ,but on the hypothesis that animals are rational beings1 capable of reflection1 it is difficult to understand why they should remain at so low a level of social achievement4 ,the absence of powers of descriptive intercommunication is often assigned as the cause of their comparatively unprogressive condition2 but it may be regarded as the sign1 rather than the cause1 of their lack of reason in the more restricted sense of the term4 ,we cannot1 however1 enter into the much-disputed question whether reason is the product of language1 or language the outcome of reason4 ,perhaps the safest position is to assume that rationality and true speech are in large measure different aspects of one evolutionary movement--speech arising out of such preceding modes of communication as were considered in the second section of this chapter2 reason developing out of intelligence which supplies its necessary data4 ,it is sometimes said that1 notwithstanding their powers of speech1 savages in their social relations show little advance on animal communities4 ,but surely such statements must be made in forgetfulness of the fact that savage customs almost invariably indicate the presence and sway of ideals which puzzle us from their quaintness1 and from the fact that they seem contrary to the dictates of intelligence and due to motives and conceptions the nature and force of which we find it difficult to estimate4 ,the passage from intelligent social behaviour to the rationality which has assumed such strange aspects among existing savages took place somewhere at some time in the past2 and the stages of its evolution are hidden from our view4 ,all we can say is1 that it is possible to trace in animal behaviour some of the instinctive tendencies and intelligent modes of accommodation to social circumstances1 together with the germs of imitation1 intercommunication1 and tradition1 and the establishment of bonds of sympathy1 without which the subsequent stages of evolution would be inconceivable4 ,,chapter ,,vi ,,the ,,feelings ,,and ,,emotions ,i4--,,impulse1 ,,interest1 ,,and ,,emotion ,any discussion of animal behaviour must deal largely with what is termed the conative aspect of consciousness4 8,the states designated by such words as craving1 longing1 yearning1 endeavour1 effort1 desire1 wish1 and will10 says ,dr4 ,stout1 in his admirable 8,manual of ,psychology10#aag 8have one characteristic in common4 ,in all of these there is an inherent tendency to pass beyond themselves and become something different4 ,this tendency is not only a fact1 but an experience2 and the peculiar mode of being conscious1 which constitutes the experience1 is called conation40 ,closely associated with this conation is impulse1 which ,dr4 ,stout defines as 8any conative tendency1 so far as it operates by its own isolated intensity1 apart from its relation to a general system of motives4 ,action on impulse is thus contrasted with action which results from reflection and deliberation40#aah ,in the interpretation we have advocated1 animals are essentially creatures of impulse1 and not to any large extent1 if at all1 reflective agents4 ,and their impulses may be associated either with their inherited and congenital behaviour1 or with that which is due to acquired experience4 ,in other words1 their impulses may be divided broadly into two classes1 the one instinctive1 the other acquired4 ,dr4 ,stout says that conation is not only a fact1 but an experience4 ,now1 first as to the fact4 ,it seems to be the correlative in consciousness of the behaviour of the nervous system under stimulation4 ,let us take some simple case such as that1 for example1 of a hungry chick pecking at a grain of corn4 ,this is explained from the physiological point of view by saying that internal and external stimulation--internal from the digestive organs and system in need of food1 external through the eye--gives rise to a state of unstable equilibrium in the nerve-centres2 and that1 when the instability reaches a certain value1 the nervous system discharges into the motor organs1 the chick pecks1 and stable equilibrium is restored4 ,the tendency to discharge in some way under stimulation is an essential characteristic of a nervous system4 ,it is one of the facts of physiological science4 ,so1 too1 the conative tendency is one of the facts of psychological science2 it is a change in the situation introduced by the effects of the physiological discharge4 ,let us here parenthetically notice that the physiological tendency in the nervous system is an evolved complication and a specialized development of one of the fundamental properties of protoplasm--that which is often spoken of as irritability4 ,one of the characteristics of all living matter is its 8explosive0 instability4 ,so that at the very threshold of organic behaviour we have the analogue of that which1 in its developed form1 becomes the tendency of the nervous system to discharge as the result of stimulation4 ,the conative tendency of the psychologist1 therefore1 has its roots deep down in the elemental germs of all organic life4 ,and this conative tendency is1 says ,dr4 ,stout1 not only a fact but an experience4 ,let us return to our hungry chick that pecks at a grain of corn4 ,and let us grant that as the result of stimulation there arise states of consciousness which we describe as a feeling of hunger and the sight of the grain of corn4 ,the nervous system now discharges2 and there are introduced into the situation a further group of data1 the motor consciousness of the actual behaviour1 sensory data from the results of the act1 the seizing of the grain and so forth4 ,the situation has unquestionably changed4 ,but is there any specific consciousness of the conative tendency as such8 ,is there any 8peculiar mode of being conscious which constitutes the experience which is called conation08 ,it is difficult to say4 ,hence we find differences of opinion among psychologists as to what1 from the psychological point of view1 the impulse actually is4 ,is it simply the conscious situation prior to the response8 ,is it a feeling of the change from the initial to the succeeding phase8 ,or are new data introduced apart from those afforded by stimulation on the one hand and response on the other8 ,we will not attempt to decide4 ,without determining its exact nature we may rest content with the very general statement that impulse is a concomitant of a change in the conscious situation4 ,there is1 however1 a use of the term concerning which it seems necessarily to enter a word of protest4 ,impulse is by some regarded as the underlying cause of the conative tendency4 ,now science1 as such1 has nothing whatever to do with underlying causes4 ,if1 as a matter of observation and inference1 we have reason to believe that there is such a tendency1 science simply accepts the fact1 and endeavours to formulate the conditions under which it arises1 and to trace its observed or inferred antecedents4 ,no doubt many of us find it difficult or impossible to rest content with the strictly scientific position1 that of unquestioning acceptance of the facts of nature as we find them given in experience4 ,we say3 ,here is an observed tendency the conditions and antecedents of which are described by science4 ,but what causes the tendency2 what is the impelling force8 ,now to such questions science can give no answer4 ,science deals with phenomena1 and tries to tell us all about their conditions and their antecedents4 ,but whenever ,science is asked3 8,what is the underlying cause of the phenomena1--that which calls them into being80 ,science should always give one answer and one only3 8,frankly1 ,i do not know2 that lies outside my province2 ask my sister ,metaphysics40 ,science ought to have nothing whatever to do with force as the underlying cause of anything in this universe of phenomena4 ,and impulse1 as the impelling force which calls a conative tendency into being1 is a metaphysical1 not a scientific conception4 ,we need not further discuss the psychological nature of impulse4 ,indeed1 the little that has been said would not have been necessary to our inquiry were it not that we frequently have occasion to speak of animals as 8creatures of impulse10 and to refer to their behaviour as due to impulse4 ,what do we mean by such expressions8 ,if we regard conative tendency as a fact 7whatever may be said for or against its being also a specific experience71 and if this fact is the tendency of the conscious situation to develope in certain definite ways1 then we may define impulse with sufficient clearness by saying1 with ,dr4 ,stout1 that it is characterized by being unreflective4 ,conative tendency thus comprises two categories--impulse and volition2 the one unreflective1 the other involving deliberation4 ,before passing on to consider how impulse is partly determined by the feeling-tone and the emotional attributes of the conscious situation1 we may first draw attention to the important way in which the results of conative tendency afford the data through which consciousness attains its unity in the midst of diversity of experience4 ,we said that the impulses might be divided broadly into two classes--the one instinctive1 the other acquired4 ,now1 from the point of view suggested by a study of behaviour1 if not also1 as ,i am disposed to think1 from the more general standpoint of a genetic study of mental development1 it is convenient to start with the instinctive act and the conscious situation it implies4 ,we have here a piece of experience which1 if we may so phrase it1 hangs together2 in which experience of things in the environment is included in the same elemental synthesis with that of bodily acts in organic relation to these things4 ,it is closely linked1 on the one hand1 with a foregoing act of attention1 itself of the instinctive type2 closely linked1 on the other hand1 with the results of behaviour through which the environing things call forth a new conscious situation and evoke a further response4 ,thus not only does the experience of an instinctive act hang together1 but a series of such acts do so likewise4 ,and coalescent association not only links and groups the elements within the situation called forth by the single act1 but comprises also the elements of the developing situation afforded by the whole series4 ,we see this in the young chick1 where1 as the result of experience1 attention is emphasized where the material is palatable1 and lapses where it is nauseous--such nauseous substances being soon ignored4 ,furthermore many environing things appeal in different ways to the same limited number of sense organs1 while the same motor organs respond in different ways in successive modes of instinctive behaviour4 ,the same brain forms the physical basis of varied situations overlapping in many ways1 and receives afferent messages from the same body4 ,hence1 in its organic unity it affords the conditions for an underlying stratum of mental unity1 amid all the diversities of experience2 while the multiplicity of messages on the one hand from external things1 and on the other hand from internal happenings1 lays the foundations of a differentiation between the external world and the self--a differentiation long to remain implicit1 and only to be rendered explicit on a far higher level of mental development4 ,for at this early stage1 and perhaps throughout animal life1 8there is no single continuous self contrasted with a single continuous world4 ,self1 as a whole1 uniting present1 past1 and future phases1 and the world as a single coherent system of things and processes1 are ideal constructions1 built up gradually in the course of human development4 ,the ideal construction of self and the world is comparatively rudimentary in the lower races of mankind1 and it never can be complete4 ,on the purely perceptual plane with which we are now dealing it has not even begun40#aai ,but though the ideal constructions of self and the world have not1 as ,dr4 ,stout says1 at this stage1 even begun1 yet1 as the same author observes1#abj 8animals distinguish in the environment1 and treat as a separate thing1 whatever portion of matter appeals to their peculiar instincts1 and affords occasion for their characteristic modes of activity40 ,and this differentiation of specially interesting things from each other1 and from their relatively uninteresting surroundings1 must be accompanied by some differentiation of these things from themselves as affected by them and reacting to them4 ,so that here1 as we have seen to be the case in other matters1 what is commonly called the perceptual life of animals affords the rough-hewn materials from which ideal constructions may be elaborated by rational beings4 ,we cannot here attempt to do more than barely indicate the manner in which the perceptual process in animals may acquire unity and diversity--unity through the functioning of the same brain and body1 diversity from the different modes of functioning and the differential effects of diverse modes of stimulation4 ,the interesting point for us in our special inquiry is that it is through behaviour that all this is brought about4 ,as we interpret the facts1 the restless activity of the young is primarily a biological fact1 and is to be dealt with as an organic problem--a complication of the fundamental irritability of protoplasm4 ,but it is also an essential condition to the acquisition of conscious experience2 and the more there is of it in varied modes the wider is the range of the data afforded to consciousness4 ,congenital behaviour is thus the goal of organic heredity1 and the starting-point of conscious accommodation and adjustment2 it is the biological end of variation1 and affords the means to intelligent modification4 ,so much for some of the results of conative tendency4 ,not only does it secure adaptation or adjustment to the environment1 but it affords the conditions of mental development by which further accommodation is rendered possible4 ,but1 in addition to the attainment of biological ends1 in addition to the furtherance of survival in the struggle for existence1 mental development has another aspect4 ,all sensory data1 whether from the special senses1 from the motor processes concerned in responsive behaviour1 or from other sources1 may1 and perhaps always do1 carry with them some amount of what is termed feeling-tone1 giving rise to a net result in consciousness which we call pleasure or the reverse4 ,pleasure or satisfaction--however we name that which1 though vague and indeterminate in outline1 is a very real attribute of the conscious situation--affords its sanction to certain modes of conation1 and may thus be regarded as the psychological end of their continuance or their repetition4 ,it is partly1 no doubt1 a direct adjunct of sight1 hearing1 taste1 and so forth1 and of smooth and easy movements of the body and limbs2 but it is partly due to a great body of stimulation coming from many parts of the organic system4 ,the blood-vessels are dilated or contracted1 the heart's action increased or diminished2 respiration is deepened or the reverse1 and its rhythm may be altered2 glands are thrown into a state of activity2 the tone of the muscles is affected1 and there may be either incipient contraction or relaxation4 ,these are primarily organic effects2 but they influence the conscious situation1 and are themselves suffused with feeling-tone4 ,for1 from all the parts so affected1 messages are carried in to the brain1 and such afferent messages afford data to consciousness4 ,it may be that the experience of the conative tendency1 for which ,dr4 ,stout and others claim a distinctive place in consciousness1 is largely due to afferent messages from the motor organs incipiently innervated in preparation for the behaviour which follows4 ,in any case these probably form very important elements in the conscious situation antecedent to the actual response4 ,in what we may term motor attention--the state well exemplified by a cat in the strained pause which precedes the spring on to the prey1 or in ourselves when we poise before a dive or hold the billiard cue in preparation for a delicate stroke--this incipient innervation1 felt through afferent messages from the parts thus braced for action1 enters with much distinctness into the conscious situation4 ,in sensory attention1 on the other hand1 reflex acts have actually taken place1 having for their end and purpose the focussing of the sense organs on the object which stimulates them1 so that in this way further and more effective stimulation may be received4 ,but1 as the sense organ is steadily held to the focus1 and made effectually to cover the stimulating thing1 the motor apparatus concerned is kept on the strain1 and is all the while contributing data to the conscious situation4 ,in primary genesis attention1 both motor and sensory1 is unquestionably organic and reflex in its nature4 ,it is a product1 and an invaluable product1 of biological evolution4 ,without this as a basis1 the higher forms of attention under conscious guidance would be impossible4 ,for all these higher forms are modifications and complications of what is given in organic heritage4 ,here1 as elsewhere throughout the whole range of behaviour1 consciousness only guides to finer issues what is presented to it in rough outline1 or in isolated fragments1 as the outcome of biological evolution4 ,but the organic responses afford the data which consciousness uses that it may mould and fashion the behaviour so as to reach higher and more complex modes of adjustment4 ,lest a familiar form of words should give rise to misapprehension1 it may here be stated that1 when we say that consciousness moulds and fashions behaviour1 we do not intend to imply that consciousness is an underlying cause4 ,we are not using the term consciousness in a metaphysical sense4 ,we mean that consciousness is the expression of certain conditions under which behaviour is guided4 ,instead of saying1 therefore1 that consciousness utilizes certain sensory data1 it would be more correct to say that it is the sum-total of these data which are the psychical expression of certain brain conditions under which behaviour1 as a matter of fact1 takes a given set or direction4 ,we use the word consciousness1 then1 not in its metaphysical sense of an underlying cause or force1 but in its scientific sense1 as the concomitant of certain antecedent conditions4 ,our common modes of speech lend themselves with misleading facility to metaphysical assumptions1 all the more insidious since they are not consciously acknowledged as such4 ,and not only what we comprise under the broader group-name 8consciousness10 but what we include under narrower group-names1 such as 8impulse10 8volition10 8instinct10 8intelligence10 8reason10 and the like1 often do duty as underlying causes of the phenomena1 which1 from the scientific point of view1 they do no more than name4 ,we often say1 for example1 that interest guides behaviour in this direction or in that4 ,but such interest must not be regarded as an impelling force2 it is an attribute of the conscious situation1 more or less suffused with feeling-tone4 ,it is not easy to define2 but it seems to take on its distinctive character when re-presentative elements contribute what ,dr4 ,stout#aba terms 8meaning0 to the conscious situation4 ,the meaning in the early stages of mental development is1 however1 merely perceptual1 and not that which comes much later--that which is implied in the phrase 8rational significance40 ,in the chick which has tasted a cinnabar caterpillar the situation evoked by the sight of this larva has meaning in virtue of the actual experience4 ,but1 in this case1 the meaning is not conducive to continued interest1 since it checks1 rather than stimulates1 behaviour4 ,at first1 indeed1 there may be the repellent interest of aversion4 ,but this passes by1 and the larv are soon ignored4 ,small worms also acquire meaning1 and here the interest is attractive1 and is stimulated afresh each time the meaning is reinforced by repetition of the act of seizing and swallowing4 ,we have seen that it is through behaviour that things become differentiated from their surroundings1 and acquire relative independence in experience4 ,it is through behaviour that what we have termed conscious situations develop4 ,the thing is the centre or nucleus of a developing situation--that which starts the behaviour1 and towards which the behaviour is directed2 or1 since the behaviour may be that of avoidance or escape1 we should1 perhaps1 rather say1 it is that to which the behaviour has reference4 ,now1 if interest is the feeling-tone attaching to the whole attentive situation1 and if the nucleus of the situation is the thing1 it naturally follows that the thing becomes the centre of interest4 ,the mouse is a centre of absorbing interest to the cat1 her eggs to the mother-bird1 his mate to the sparrow in the spring4 ,companions are centres of abiding interest to social animals1 because they are also the centres of social behaviour and the conscious situations arising thereout2 because they evoke in special ways the attentive situation4 ,the differentiated thing being thus a centre of interest1 a relatively fixed nucleus in a changing conscious situation1 the development of which is due to behaviour1 there can be no question that1 among social animals1 the companion becomes a peculiar and specialized centre4 ,around him develops a particular type of behaviour4 ,towards him the reactions are of a quite distinctive kind4 ,mother and offspring1 mate and mate1 are reciprocal centres of interest4 ,to the offspring the parent is a common centre of interest4 ,as they grow up together1 what is of interest to one is likewise of interest at the same time to others4 ,imitation begets similarity of conscious situations4 ,in many ways such community of interest is fostered2 and through this community of interest the conscious situations acquire their distinctively social character4 ,not only is the companion1 as the nucleus of a situation1 a thing which reacts in altogether special ways1 so that it becomes differentiated from other things as something the meaning of which1 and the interest in which1 are sui generis and unique in type2 but it enters into other situations in ways that are also peculiar and characteristic4 ,a worm is thrown to a couple of chicks1 and is to each a centre of interest--the nucleus of a situation involving appropriate modes of behaviour4 ,but into this situation there enters for each of them1 in a quite peculiar and distinctive way1 the action and behaviour of the other chick4 ,the situation is complicated by the introduction of a second centre of interest1 and the behaviour has reference to both centres4 ,instead of quietly and leisurely dealing with the worm in accordance with its special meaning1 as it does when there is no rival in the field1 the chick darts at it1 and bolts with it in accordance with the special meaning which its neighbour's presence1 under such circumstances1 has acquired4 ,and this different behaviour carries with it a felt difference in the conscious situation--the interest of which is centred in the companion4 ,or take the case of a herd of cattle1 which attacks a common enemy4 ,the enemy is the primary nucleus of the situation1 but it is profoundly modified by the presence of companions by which the behaviour of attack is determined4 ,the situation is social1 and not merely individual1 and a social interest suffuses it1 and gives it a distinctive character4 ,in this social interest probably arise the germs--but only the germs--of the sense of personality4 ,some1 indeed1 go so far as to urge that we learn to know ourselves only through knowing others4 ,the genetic order1 so far as there is an order1 is1 they say1 not first the ego and then the alter1 but first the mother and companions and then through them the self4 ,or1 to put this point of view in a less questionable form1 it is only through the reaction of one on the other that the two are differentiated4 ,be this as it may1 it is only through the action of environment on the organism1 and the reaction of the organism on the environment in behaviour1 that experience becomes polarized into subject and object4 ,let it be clearly understood that for the animal1 in all probability1 subject and object are not clearly distinguished1 and set over against each other in the antithesis of thought4 ,only late in mental development are the self and the world distinguished in subtle analysis as different aspects of the common experience in which both have their inseparable being4 ,animals1 and perhaps the majority of mankind1 never trouble themselves about object and subject as clearly realized products of conception and reflective thought4 ,for these concepts are exceedingly subtle4 ,and here1 too1 the external aspect of experience has the precedence1 so far as there is precedence4 ,a healthy lad from the moment he gets up in the morning till the moment he goes to bed1 lives chiefly in the objective aspect of experience1 an aspect which is in us chiefly associated with the products in consciousness of the leading senses of sight and hearing4 ,but the subjective aspect creeps in when he is hurt1 when he is hungry1 when he is fatigued4 ,he does not argue about the matter1 or formulate it in definite terms4 ,he just dimly feels that the interest has somehow shifted4 ,still more dimly does the animal feel that1 apart from external interests which prompt nine-tenths of its behaviour1 chiefly through the senses of sight1 hearing1 and smell1 there are also matters in which the interest has somehow shifted to his own body4 ,for the germ of self is essentially an embodied self4 ,and perhaps the emotions1 which ring through the system for some time after the external cause has been removed1 serve in some degree to aid in this dimly felt shifting of interest4 ,whatever may be the exact psychological nature of the emotions--and there has been much discussion of the question--it may be regarded as certain that they introduce into the conscious situation elements which contribute not a little to the energy of behaviour4 ,they are important conditions to vigorous and sustained conation4 ,and so closely interwoven are these elements with the whole situation in its impulsive aspect1 that their disentanglement1 in psychological analysis1 is a matter of extreme difficulty4 ,i have elsewhere#abb devoted some space to the consideration of the matter4 ,i there follow ,professor ,william ,james in regarding organic effects1 other than motor sensations1 as specially characteristic of the emotions in their primary genesis4 ,the cold sweat1 the dry mouth1 the catch of the breath1 the grip of the heart1 the abdominal sinking1 the blood-tingle or blood-stagnation--these and their like1 in varied modes and degrees1 characterize the emotions of fear1 dread1 anger1 and so forth1 when they rise to any pitch of intensity1 and contribute largely to their sharpness and piquancy4 ,these organic effects may be regarded as part of the private and individual business of the body2 but in experience they closely coalesce with the motor effects through which the animal has to deal in practical behaviour with that which evokes the emotion4 ,on this view these organic states which contribute characteristic elements in the emotional consciousness are due to afferent data from the vascular system and visceral organs1 just as motor consciousness is due to afferent data from the parts concerned in overt behaviour4 ,but1 associated with emotional states1 there are also certain motor reactions1 which we speak of as their 8expression0--so carefully discussed and elucidated by ,darwin1--and these unquestionably contribute data to consciousness which coalesce with those afforded by the visceral and vascular elements4 ,the whole is commonly suffused with feeling-tone1 and the object which excites the emotion is a centre of pleasurable or painful interest4 ,representative elements1 as experience develops1 crowd into the conscious situation and render it more complex4 ,and in addition to all this1 there is1 apart from the motor expression1 the strenuous behaviour of flight or attack1 or other mode of vigorous procedure which we commonly speak of as the outcome of the emotional state4 ,the conscious situation1 in the case of an enraged or scared animal actually behaving as such1 is thus exceedingly complex4 ,and it should be understood that in urging the importance of vascular and visceral elements1 this complexity is nowise denied4 ,what is suggested is that these elements are essential1 and that they serve to characterize the distinctively emotional factor in the situation1 that in any case they heighten the conative tendency4 ,sufficient has now been said to indicate--but scarcely more than indicate--the importance of feeling-tone1 interest1 and emotion in determining the nature1 character1 and effective energy of the conscious situations which arise in the course of animal behaviour4 ,they largely influence1 and in part direct1 the course of the conative tendency4 ,but they also occur as its sequel4 ,in animal1 as in human life1 the successful attainment of the end towards which conation sets is highly pleasurable4 ,the equilibrium that is reached after instability1 though it marks the close of present endeavour1 leaves after-effects in consciousness in a sense of satisfaction which enters re-presentatively into later situations and helps to further more strenuous endeavour4 ,,ii4--,,play 8,there are two quite different popular ideas of play10 says ,professor ,groos1 in his admirable work on 8,the ,play of ,animals40 8,the first is that the animal 7or man7 begins to play when he feels particularly cheerful1 healthy1 and strong2 the second that the play of young animals serves to fit them for the tasks of later life40 ,the former view1 in which the latter may be included incidentally as a result1 is closely associated with the names of ,schiller1#abc who suggested it1 and of ,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer1#abd who developed it4 ,mr4 ,wallaschek#abe expresses the conception briefly and clearly when he says1 8,it is the surplus vigour in more highly developed organisms1 exceeding what is required for immediate needs1 in which play of all kinds takes its rise1 manifesting itself by way of imitation or repetition of all those efforts and exertions which are essential to the maintenance of life40 ,that surplus vigour is often a condition favouring the manifestation of play is probable enough1 and seems to be supported by observation and experience2 but that it is likewise a condition favouring the chase1 combat1 mating1 and much of the serious business of animal life seems equally unquestionable4 ,success in all these matters is largely determined by overflowing energy4 ,in play1 however1 this surplus vigour finds vent when there is no serious occasion for its exercise4 ,but1 as ,professor ,groos says1#abf 8while simple overflow of energy explains quite well that the individual who finds himself in a condition of overflowing energy is ready to do something1 it does not explain how it happens that all the individuals of a species manifest exactly the specific kind of play expression which prevails with their own species1 but differs from every other40 ,and if to this it be replied1 that the specific kind is determined by repetition or imitation of what we have called the serious business of animal life1 ,professor ,groos's rejoinder is1#abg that 8the conception of imitation here set forth--namely1 as the repetition of serious activities to which the individual has himself become accustomed--cannot be applied directly to the primary phenomena of play--that is1 to its first elementary manifestations0 prior to any experience of these serious activities4 ,the repetition 7with a difference67 is in such cases not the re-enactment of what has been previously performed in full earnest by the individual1 but rather the reappearance in the young of ancestral modes of procedure--in other words1 its specific character is such because it is a piece of instinctive behaviour or arises from instinctive proclivities4 ,and this is the central point of the interpretation elaborated with great skill and candour by ,professor ,groos4 ,play is instinctive2 and its biological value lies in the training it affords for the subsequent earnest of life4 ,before leaving the surplus energy theory of play one more point made by ,professor ,groos may be mentioned4 ,he contends that1 though superabundant energy is a favouring condition of animal play 7as it is1 indeed1 of all animal behaviour71 still it is not a necessary condition4 ,animals often play when they are tired out4 8,notice a kitten when a piece of paper blows past4 ,will not any observer confirm the statement that1 just as an old cat must be tired to death or else already filled to satiety if it does not try to seize a mouse running near it1 so will the kitten1 too1 spring after the moving object1 even if it has been exercising for hours and its superfluous energies are entirely disposed of8 ,or observe the play of young dogs when two of them have raced about the garden until they are forced to stop from sheer fatigue1 and they lie on the ground panting1 with tongues hanging out4 ,now one of them gets up1 glances at his companion1 and the irresistible power of his innate longing for the fray seizes him again4 ,he approaches the other1 sniffs lazily about him1 and1 though he is evidently only half inclined to obey the powerful impulse1 attempts to seize his leg4 ,the one provoked yawns1 and in a slow1 tired kind of way puts himself on the defensive2 but gradually instinct conquers fatigue on him too1 and in a few minutes both are tearing madly about in furious rivalry until want of breath puts an end to the game4 ,and so it goes on with endless repetition1 until we get the impression that the dog waits only long enough to collect the needed strength1 not till superfluous energy urges him to activity40#abh ,coming now to ,professor ,groos's interpretation of play1 we find in it1 perhaps for the first time in the literature of the subject1 adequate stress laid on its biological value4 8,the play of young animals10 he says1#abi 8has its origin in the fact that certain very important instincts appear at a time when the animal does not seriously need them4444 ,its utility consists in the practice and exercise it affords for some of the more important duties of life1 inasmuch as selection in the higher animals tends to weaken the blind force of instinct1 and aids more and more the development of independent intelligence as a substitute for it4 ,at the moment when intelligence is sufficiently evolved to be more useful in the struggle for existence than the most perfect instinct1 then will selection favour those individuals in whom the instincts in question appear earlier and in less elaborated forms--in forms that are merely for practice and exercise1--that is to say1 it will favour those animals which play4444 ,animals cannot be said to play because they are young and frolicsome1 but rather they have a period of youth in order to play2 for only by so doing can they supplement the insufficient hereditary endowment with individual experience1 in view of the coming tasks of life40 ,some stress is here laid on the fact that important instincts appear at a time when the animal does not seriously need them4 ,it seems to imply the doctrine of what biologists term 8acceleration0--which means the development of an organ or mode of behaviour at an earlier period in the descendants than that at which it appeared in the ancestors4 ,thus the adult fighting or hunting instinct of past generations appears in the young to-day as a fighting-play or a hunting-play4 ,it is open to question1 however1 whether either the instinctive behaviour or the conscious situation in the one case and the other is so nearly identical that the playful fight or hunt can fairly be called the same instinctive procedure as the serious combat or chase4 ,we may hold1 with ,professor ,groos1 that the one is an invaluable preparation for the other without identifying them as the same behaviour under different conditions4 ,indeed the conditions are so different that the identification seems strained4 ,the question may be left open1 however1 without impairing the value of ,professor ,groos's suggestion4 ,and we may divide the preparatory behaviour in what is commonly called play under two heads3 first1 general preparation for varied modes of serious effort in after-life2 and secondly1 special preparation for particular forms of this after-effort4 ,under the first will fall what ,professor ,groos terms experimentation and movement play1 including what ,dr4 ,stout1 who fully realizes its importance1 calls 8manipulation02#acj under the second1 such forms as hunting-play and fighting-play4 ,nothing is more characteristic of the young of intelligent animals than the variety and persistency of their behaviour1 their sensitiveness to stimuli of many different kinds1 their restlessness of swiftly changing attention and response1 with occasional pauses of continued effort in some special direction4 ,constantly on the alert1 they exhibit in all its shifting phases behaviour which we interpret as indicating curiosity1 inquisitiveness1 love of mischief1 destructiveness1 and so forth4 ,the facts are so familiar to every observer of young animals that it is unnecessary to give any detailed illustration4 ,watch a kitten in this stage of its development and carefully note its behaviour during half an hour2 the variety of effort1 the rles played by trial1 failure1 and success1 the gain of skill and control over behaviour1 will at once be evident4 ,or devote an equal space of time to observing young jays1 magpies1 or jackdaws4 ,every projecting piece of wire or bit of wood in their cage is pulled at this way and that way1 from above1 from below1 from the side4 ,now one1 then another1 loose object is picked up and dropped1 turned over1 carried about1 pulled at1 hammered at1 stuffed into this corner and into that1 and experimented with in all possible ways4 ,then the wise bird goes to sleep1 and wakes up again only to resume with new zest its persistent and varied efforts1 by which it becomes acquainted with all the details of its environment4 ,watch young birds on the wing gaining their mastery of the air in flight1 young seals tumbling in the water1 young foals scampering and kicking up their heels in the meadows4 ,a little observation1 as occasion serves1 a little attention to the progress towards an adequate experience of the meaning of things1 towards more complete control1 and increased nicety of behaviour1 whether in reference to their surroundings1 or in powers of finished locomotion1 will serve to bring home what ,professor ,groos includes under experimentation and movement plays4 ,he regards it all as play1 since it seems to have no serious end1 and is just a preparation for the sterner realities of adult life4 ,and for human beings1 whose work is so largely enforced1 the freedom and evident joy of it all suggests the play which has acquired for us the meaning of relaxation from irksome effort1 and glad abandonment to less constrained modes of behaviour4 ,but in young animals such play is1 after all1 the serious business of their time of life4 ,its import for their future welfare can scarcely be overestimated4 ,and its import is in large degree psychological4 ,if we watch a young puppy or kitten learning gradually to deal effectively with some difficulty in its extending environment1 we see that it puts forth its efforts at first in a somewhat random and indefinite fashion4 ,it is one of those animals in which intelligence has been evolved to supersede and become the more plastic substitute for instinct4 ,the random and indefinite movements1 are in detail reflex responses to stimuli4 ,but whereas1 in a piece of highly elaborated instinctive behaviour1 such reflexes are grouped into a whole which is co-ordinated through inherited nervous mechanism2 in the case of the acts of the puppy or kitten they have to be further co-ordinated1 or more elaborately grouped1 through experience4 ,to act in one way some of the reflexes have to be checked as redundant and not to the point3 to act in another way other reflexes have to be similarly checked2 and in a third way1 yet others4 ,but in all three some of the reflexes are utilized to different ends4 ,many conscious situations contain common elements2 and this tends to give unity to the developing experience4 ,but they contain also elements and groupings which afford that diversity without which conscious behaviour could not be accommodated to them4 ,so that we have here the conditions under which what is technically termed 8the concomitant differentiation and integration of experience0 can proceed4 ,and if we speak of the instinct of experimentation we must remember that what we are dealing with is rather an innate tendency or instinctive propensity than a definite and relatively clean-cut piece of instinctive behaviour4 ,it comprises a great number of inherited reflex acts1 and may perhaps be fairly called instinctive in detail4 ,but experimentation must be regarded rather as the proximate end of a conative tendency1 or group of conative tendencies1 whose ultimate biological end is success in dealing with the environment in the sterner struggle for existence during adult life4 ,the tendency is inherited1 and therefore falls under the head of instinctive propensity4 ,but 8experimentation0 is a group-term under which we comprise the general drift of varied modes of behaviour1 founded indeed on a congenital basis1 but receiving its stamp and character from what is acquired in the course of the experience it provides4 ,it is essentially a process whereby the conscious situations acquire what ,dr4 ,stout terms meaning2 and is specially interesting as affording an example of the way in which intelligence moulds and refashions a number of disconnected reflex responses4 ,and if1 following ,professor ,groos1 we call it play1 it is a little difficult to see how it can be brought in line with his statement#aca that 8the play of youth depends on the fact that certain instincts1 especially useful in preserving the species1 appear before the animal seriously needs them40 ,does experimentation occur before it is needed in the economy of animal behaviour8 ,and might we not with equal truth say that the play of youth depends on the fact that certain acquired habits1 especially useful in preserving the species1 are gained before the animal seriously needs them8 ,passing now to those forms of play which afford more special preparation for particular forms of after-effort1 under which fall such types as hunting-play and fighting-play1 we may refer the reader to the copious examples so carefully collected by ,professor ,groos4 ,the way in which a kitten pats a cork or a ball1 making it roll and then pouncing upon it1 is a characteristic example of animal play4 ,valuable as a preparation for dealing successfully with a mouse when occasion shall arise1 this is a specialized form of experimentation2 and it is more obviously in line with the hunting-behaviour of later life than is general experimentation with any particular modes of future behaviour4 ,still it is essentially experimentation1 with the instinctive propensity setting in more definite channels4 ,its value lies in the acquisition of skill under circumstances easier than those presented in the serious chase4 ,so1 too1 in the case of the playful tussles of puppies or in that of the kitten1 which not only shows playful fight to its brothers and sisters1 but also to its mother1 who responds by holding down the struggling and scratching little creature4 ,unquestionably1 there is an instinctive propensity2 much of the detail1 and some of the grouping1 exhibit inherited reflexes due to special modes of stimulation4 ,no doubt many of these responses occur in a similar but more emphatic way in a serious fight1 and yet we may hesitate before committing ourselves to the theory of acceleration4 ,it is at least equally probable that play as preparatory behaviour differs in biological detail 7as it almost certainly does in emotional attributes7 from the earnest of after-life1 and that it was evolved directly as a preparation1 as a means of experimentation through which certain essential modes of skill were acquired1--those animals in which the preparatory play propensity was not inherited in due force and requisite amount being worsted in the combats of later life1 and eliminated in the struggle for existence4 ,for1 in the preparatory tussles and squabbles and playful fights of young animals1 experience is gained without serious risk to life and limb4 ,the modifications of ,professor ,groos's biological interpretation of play which we would suggest are so slight that we may be said to accept it almost unreservedly4 ,the play of youth1 we may urge1 depends on instinctive propensities to experimentation in varied ways1 some of more general and others of more special import2 and the value of such experimentation lies in the fact that it is a means of acquiring1 under circumstances more easy and less dangerous than those of sterner life1 experience and skill for future use4 ,in a word1 play depends on instinctive propensities of value in education4 ,passing now to a brief consideration of the feelings and emotions which we may suppose to accompany play1 we may place first those which characterize1 from this point of view1 general experimentation4 ,we have here rapidly varying situations charged with conative impulse1 the satisfaction of which must bring pleasure--the occasional thwarting of which is probably toned with the opposite--the latter serving1 through contrast1 to enhance the satisfaction of ultimate success4 ,both pleasure and its antithetical state of feeling are primarily matters of the conscious situation as a whole1 and even in ourselves are difficult to distribute in analysis4 ,but assuredly no small share of the total product must be assigned to the successful behaviour which consummates the conative tendency4 ,indeed1 it is the thwarting of free action which is the source of much of the discomfort of the young4 ,unimpeded and vigorous behaviour also brings with it secondary effects in organic processes--fuller heart-beat1 freer circulation1 deeper respiration1 better digestion1 firmer muscular tone1 and so forth--which have a marked effect on the conscious situation1 and aid in producing that emotional tone which cannot1 perhaps1 be named in better terms than 8good spirits0 and the joy of existence1 so forcibly suggested during the free play of youth4 ,on the other hand1 there is no more piteous sight than that afforded by the young animal1 8cabined1 cribbed1 confined10 suffering from ennui and depression--all its organic processes sluggish and craving to be quickened into the natural vigour of life1 not creeping slowly through the veins1 but coursing at full flood4 ,in the psychological aspect of play ,dr4 ,groos assigns perhaps the first place to pleasure in the possession of power1 or1 as ,preyer phrases it1 pleasure in being a cause4 ,we must be careful1 however1 lest in using such expressions we seem to imply that animals--even quite young animals--are capable of entertaining ideas which belong to a much later stage of mental development4 ,speaking of 8joy in ability or power10 ,professor ,groos says1#acb 8,this feeling is first a conscious presentation to ourselves of our personality as it is emphasized by play4444 ,but it is more than this2 it is also delight in the control we have over our bodies and over external objects4 ,experimentation in its simple as well as its more complicated forms is1 apart from its effect on physical development1 educative in that it helps in the formation of causal associations4444 ,the young bear that plays in the water1 the dog that tears a paper into scraps1 the ape that delights in producing new and uncouth sounds1 the sparrow that exercises its voice1 the parrot that smashes his feeding trough--all experience the pleasure in energetic activity1 which is1 at the same time1 joy in being able to accomplish something40 ,but those who agree with ,dr4 ,stout1 as ,i do without hesitation1 in denying personality 7save in a very embryonic condition7 and the conception of causation to animals in the perceptual stage of mental evolution1 though they may find in ,dr4 ,groos's contention a central core of truth1 will be unable fully to accept his manner of presenting it4 8,any single train of perceptual activity10#acc says ,dr4 ,stout1 8has internal unity and continuity4 ,but where conscious life is mainly perceptual1 the several trains of activity are relatively isolated and disconnected with each other4 ,they do not unite to form a continuous system1 such as is implied in the conception of a person4 ,we must deny personality to animals40 ,to this ,i would merely add that1 even where perceptual continuity in animals reaches its maximum1 it is not reflectively grasped as a whole1 and the ideal construction of the personal ego is not conceived as antithetical to the impersonal world of objects4 ,with what ,dr4 ,stout says about causality ,i am in complete agreement4 8,we must notice10#acd he urges1 8the essential difference which separates the merely perceptual category from that of ideational and conceptual thought4 ,the perceptual category is always purely and immediately practical in its operation4 ,it is a constitutive form of thought only because it is a constitutive form of action4 ,the question #8,why8' has no existence for the merely perceptual consciousness4 ,it does not and cannot inquire how it is that a certain cause produces a certain effect4 ,it does not and cannot endeavour to explain1 to analyze conditions so as to present a cause as a reason4 ,it does not compare different modes of procedure or different groups of circumstances1 so as to contradistinguish the precise points in which they agree from those in which they disagree1 and in this way to explain why a certain result should follow in one case and a different result in another case4 ,causality in this sense can only exist for the ideational consciousness1 and the development of the ideational consciousness in this direction is a development of conceptual thinking--of generalization40 ,wherein1 then1 lies the central core of truth in ,professor ,groos's contention8 ,in the satisfaction that arises from the success of any conative activity4 ,we see that the animal striving and doing falls within our conception of a cause1 in the scientific sense of the word1--a relatively constant and continuous antecedent of diverse sequent effects4 ,we infer that pleasure accompanies the satisfaction of the multifarious conative impulses4 ,the pleasure is the animal's2 the conception of causality and of self as a continuous person1 still the same amid diversity of conscious situations1 is ours4 ,if we bear this in mind there can be no objection to our attributing to animals joy in ability or power4 ,it is the pleasure derived from that successful conation whereby animals fall into the category of causes within the scheme of our rational thought4 ,in fighting-play and hunting-play1 too1 there arise in more specific forms the pleasures of successful conation with the antithetical feelings accompanying thwarted conation4 ,and these are distinguished from earnest1 partly because the companion or the inanimate substitute for prey is the centre of a different situation from that afforded by an enemy or the natural object of the chase2 partly by the absence of certain insistent emotional states which characterize earnest and the serious business of life4 ,in fighting1 this is anger4 ,and we often see the tendency of this to arise in the midst of fighting-plays1 and at once say that it becomes serious and passes into fighting in earnest4 ,indeed1 some tinge of earnest1 with its fuller emotional tone1 forms part of the preparation for future life1 and so far falls within the definition ,professor ,groos gives of play4 ,from which we may see that play is not easily marked off from other forms of conation4 ,brief reference to the element of 8make-believe10 which ,dr4 ,groos assigns to the higher forms of play1 may be reserved for our fourth section2 and some further discussion of its psychological aspect to the concluding chapter4 ,,iii4--,,courtship ,we have seen that ,professor ,groos regards play as the practice and preparation for the serious business of animal life4 ,founded on instinctive tendencies1 it has its biological value in the acquisition of practical acquaintance with the environment1 and of skill in dealing with it effectually4 ,it is an education in behaviour of the utmost service in view of the struggle for existence4 ,it is full of the pleasure derived from the satisfaction of innate impulse1 the success of conative effort1 and the diffused sense of well-being which accompanies a life of action1 free and unrestrained4 ,this freedom and gladness lead us to call it play2 but we must not draw the inference that the playful animal knows that it is playing1 or forms any conception of the antithesis between work and play1 which is a product of late development4 ,in laying stress on the biological value of certain modes of behaviour which we thus call play1 a value which lies in the practice and preparation they afford for life's more earnest work1 ,professor ,groos deserves our hearty thanks4 ,nor need our thanks be less hearty if we find that he has in some degree been anticipated by ,darwin2 for he has elaborated with systematic care what ,darwin suggested incidentally4 8,nothing is more common10 said ,darwin1#ace 8than for animals to take pleasure in practising whatever instinct they follow at other times for some real good4 ,how often do we see birds which fly easily1 gliding and sailing through the air1 obviously for pleasure6 ,the cat plays with the captured mouse1 and the cormorant with the captured fish4 ,the weaver bird1 when confined in a cage1 amuses itself by neatly weaving blades of grass between the wires of its cage4 ,birds which habitually fight during the breeding season are generally ready to fight at all times2 and the males of the capercailzie sometimes hold their ,balzen1 or leks1 at the usual place of assemblage during the autumn4 ,hence it is not at all surprising that male birds should continue singing for their own amusement after the season of courtship is over40 ,in the behaviour of courtship we have what is essentially part of the serious business of animal life4 ,and in including it under the heading of 8,love ,plays10 ,professor ,groos may seem to be forgetful of his own definition of play4 ,he is1 however1 too clear a thinker not to see1 and too honest an exponent not to say1 that much of the emotional behaviour commonly regarded as courtship falls outside his main thesis 8in being1 strictly speaking1 not mere practice preparatory to the exercise of an instinct1 but rather its actual working40#acf ,but behaviour of a somewhat similar kind is seen in young animals before the time of mating has arrived1 and is exemplified both in young and adults under circumstances different from those which distinguish what we may term the pairing situation4 ,this1 at any rate1 may be regarded as a form of experimentation and practice in the arts of courtship4 ,on different grounds does ,professor ,groos attempt to justify the inclusion of actual courtship under the head of play4 ,for it may also1 he thinks1 even at the time of its serious exercise1 be to some extent artful1 involving 8make believe10 and therefore playful in a somewhat different and more subtle sense2 but a brief reference to 8make believe0 we may reserve for our next section4 ,there can be no question that special modes of behaviour often characterize the pairing situation1 and that these not only exemplify an instinctive tendency1 but from their constancy and relative definiteness constitute types of instinctive behaviour4 ,they would form parts of any definition of a species founded not on structure but on behaviour4 ,and if animals have feelings and emotions at all--if they are not ,cartesian automata1 which merely seem to be guided in their actions by consciousness--there can be but little question that the behaviour which characterizes the sexual situation is unusually charged with feeling-tone1 and accompanied by all those adjuncts which distinguish an emotional state1 broadly considered4 ,this matter is of no little importance in our interpretation of the phenomena described as courtship4 ,do the accompanying feeling-tone and the state of emotional exaltation influence the behaviour1 or would it run a similar course in the absence of any such accompaniments8 ,if1 as we can scarcely doubt1 the consciousness attending the situation does profoundly influence the behaviour1 the further question arises--,is this influence mainly the result of the presence and behaviour of an individual of the opposite sex8 ,to this1 again1 we must answer that1 so far as we can learn by observation1 behaviour unquestionably is determined by such influence in the serious business of courtship4 ,and then the further question arises--,is it a matter of indifference what the appearance and behaviour of the individual of the opposite sex may be8 ,are ,a41 ,b41 ,c41 and the rest of the male alphabet1 precisely alike in stimulating in a similar manner1 and to a similar degree1 the sexual impulse of the female8 ,if we admit any differential influence1 and if this influence takes effect in the sexual union to which courtship is preparatory1 we so far admit the efficacy of that which ,darwin termed sexual selection4 ,let us1 however1 before proceeding with general considerations1 present one or two examples of the facts which observation has furnished with regard to specialized modes of behaviour at the time of pairing4 ,speaking of ,american night-hawks1 ,audubon says1 8,their manner of flying is a good deal modified at the love season4 ,the male employs the most wonderful evolutions to give expression to his feelings1 conducting them with the greatest rapidity and agility in sight of his chosen mate1 or to put to rout a rival4 ,he often rises to a height of a hundred metres and more1 and his cries become louder and louder as he mounts2 then he plunges downward with a slanting direction1 with wings half open1 and so rapidly that it seems inevitable that he should be dashed to pieces on the ground4 ,but at the right moment1 sometimes when only a few inches from it1 he spreads his wings and tail1 and1 turning1 soars upward once more40#acg ,mr4 ,strange1 quoted by ,darwin#ach says of the satin bower-bird1 8at times the male will chase the female all over the aviary1 then go to the bower1 pick up a gay feather or a large leaf1 utter a curious kind of note1 set all his feathers erect1 run round the bower and become so excited that his eyes appear ready to start from his head2 he continues opening first one wing1 and then the other1 uttering a low1 whistling note1 and1 like the domestic cock1 seems to be picking up something from the ground1 until at last the female goes quietly towards him40 ,darwin describes how1 in the ,argus pheasant1#aci 8the immensely developed secondary wing-feathers are confined to the male1 and each is ornamented with a row of from twenty to twenty-three ocelli1 each above an inch in diameter4 ,these beautiful ornaments are hidden until the male shows himself before the female4 ,he then erects his tail1 and expands his wing-feathers into a great1 almost upright1 circular fan or shield1 which is carried in front of the body4 ,the ocelli are so shaded that1 as the ,duke of ,argyll remarks1 they stand out like balls lying loosely within sockets4 ,but when ,i looked at a specimen in the ,british ,museum1 which is mounted with the wings expanded and trailing downward1 ,i was10 adds ,darwin1 8greatly disappointed1 for the ocelli appeared flat or even concave4 ,mr4 ,gould1 however1 soon made the case clear to me1 for he held the feathers erect1 in the position in which they would naturally be displayed1 and now1 from the light shining on them from above1 each ocellus at once resembled the ornament called a ball and socket40 ,the primary wing-feathers are scarcely1 if at all1 inferior in beauty to the secondaries1 though the markings are quite different1 the chief ornament being a space parallel to the dark-blue shaft1 which in outline forms a perfect second feather lying within the true feather4 8,now the secondary and primary wing-feathers are not at all displayed1 and the ball and socket ornaments are not exhibited in full perfection1 until the male assumes the attitude of courtship40 ,it is unnecessary to describe the song of birds which is generally1 but not always1 at its best during the period of pairing4 ,bechstein1 who kept birds during his whole life1 and studied them with care1 asserts that 8the female canary always chooses the best singer1 and that in a state of nature the female finch selects that male out of a hundred whose notes please her most40#adj ,thus we are led back to sexual selection4 ,if we are satisfied that the males of certain species do as a matter of fact behave in specific and distinguishable ways at the breeding season1 and in presence of their would-be mates1 the question is1 ,what1 if any1 is the biological value of such behaviour8 ,what has fostered and guided it in the course of its evolution8 ,from the case of the ,argus pheasant1 which is only a sample of the large class of cases in which the male has special adornments1 we see that the behaviour has often direct relation to the display of such plumage1 or1 in some apes1 of coloured surfaces1 so that behaviour and ornamentation must be taken together4 ,the essence of ,darwin's contention is1 that the adornments and behaviour give rise to a situation through which the female is stimulated or excited to accept the male2 that the male in which they are best developed gives rise to the most effective situation1 produces most excitement1 and therefore has the best chance of acceptance1 being 8unconsciously preferred20#ada and that he thus begets offspring which inherit his adornments and modes of behaviour1 such inheritance being1 however1 confined to the males4 ,thus sexual selection takes effect through preferential mating1 whereby certain hereditary traits are transmitted and become racial characteristics4 ,and this is brought about through an appeal to consciousness1 and seems to involve choice--generally that of the female4 ,now1 as ,i have elsewhere urged1#adb the hypothesis of sexual selection has often been placed in a false light by the introduction of the unnecessary supposition that the hen bird1 for example1 must possess a standard or ideal of sthetic value1 and that she selects that singer which comes nearest to her conception of what a songster should be4 ,darwin occasionally expressed himself unguardedly in the matter2 he says1 for example1 that the female appreciates the display of the male1 and places to her credit a taste for the beautiful4#adc ,but he also distinctly states that 8it is not probable that she consciously deliberates2 she is most excited or attracted by the most beautiful1 or melodious1 or gallant males40#add ,this is all that is really necessary for the theory of sexual selection4 ,the hen accepts that mate which by his song or otherwise excites in sufficient degree the pairing impulse2 if others fail to excite this impulse1 they are not accepted4 ,even ,mr4 ,a4 ,r4 ,wallace1 who rejects the theory save in a very subordinate form1 says#ade that 8it may be admitted1 as highly probable1 that the female is pleased or excited by the display10 and speaks#adf of a possible choice of 8the most vigorous1 defiant1 and mettlesome male10 giving1 moreover1#adg several telling examples of preferential mating4 ,stripped of all its unnecessary sthetic surplusage1 at any rate so far as this implies an sthetic ideal1 or sthetic motive1 the hypothesis of sexual selection suggests that the accepted mate is the one which adequately evokes the pairing impulse4 ,here ,dr4 ,groos makes an interesting and important contribution to the subject4 ,he lays stress on the coyness and reluctance of the female1 and illustrates it by examples derived from observation4 8,thus the female cuckoo answers the call of her mate with an alluring laugh that excites him to the utmost1 but it is long before she gives herself up to him4 ,a mad chase through tree-tops ensues1 during which she constantly incites him with that mocking call1 till the poor fellow is fairly driven crazy4 ,the female kingfisher often torments her devoted lover for half a day1 coming and calling him1 and then taking to flight4 ,but she never lets him out of her sight the while1 looking back as she flies and measuring her speed1 and wheeling back when he suddenly gives up the pursuit4 ,the bower-bird leads her mate a chase up and down their skilfully built pleasure-house1 and many other birds behave in a similar way4 ,the male must exercise all his arts before her reluctance is overcome4 ,she leads him on from limb to limb1 from tree to tree1 until it seems that the tantalizing change from allurement to resistance must include an element of mischievous playfulness40#adh ,professor ,groos regards the instinctive coyness of the female as the most efficient means of preventing the too early and too frequent yielding to sexual impulse4#adi ,he thinks it probable that 8in order to preserve the species the discharge of the sexual function must be rendered difficult1 since the impulse to it is so powerful that1 without some such arrest1 it might easily become prejudicial to that end4 ,this same strength of impulse is10 he adds1#aej 8itself necessary to the preservation of the species2 but1 on the other hand1 dams must be opposed to the impetuous stream1 lest the impulse expend itself before it is made effectual1 or the mothers of the race be robbed of their strength1 to the detriment of their offspring40 ,it has its origin in the general fact that1 before any important motor discharge takes place1 there is apt to be a preparatory and gradually increasing excitement4 ,but this is specially emphasized in association with the sexual impulse4 ,as ,professor ,zeigler wrote1 in a private communication to ,dr4 ,groos1#aea 8,among all animals a highly excited condition of the nervous system is necessary for the act of pairing1 and consequently we find an exciting playful prelude very generally indulged in40 ,courtship may thus be regarded from the physiological point of view as a means of producing the requisite amount of pairing-hunger2 of stimulating the whole system and facilitating general and special vascular changes2 of creating that state of profound and explosive instability which has for its psychological concomitant or antecedent an imperious and irresistible craving4 ,this not only overcomes the coyness of the female1 but generates and strengthens the ardour of the male--a point on which1 perhaps1 ,professor ,groos does not lay sufficient stress4 ,for the process is reciprocal2 and though the male leads in the ardour of courtship1 yet this ardour constantly grows till at last it overcomes the barriers of reluctance4 ,courtship is thus the strong and steady bending of the bow that the arrow may find its mark in a biological end of the utmost importance in the survival of a healthy and vigorous race4 ,the coyness and reluctance of the female afford the conditions under which the bow is bent to the full4 ,but they also afford the conditions of the apparent act of choice4 ,this takes the place1 on the perceptual plane of mental development1 of that deliberation which precedes the higher act of choice on the ideational plane4 ,for psychology1 as well as for biology1 then1 ,dr4 ,groos's suggestion is a welcome and helpful one4 ,both upholders of sexual selection and critics of that hypothesis1 have been apt to regard the choice of a mate in animals from too anthropomorphic a point of view--to look upon it as the outcome of rational deliberation1 of weighing in the sthetic balance the relative attractiveness of this suitor and of that1 and of reaching a definite conclusion that the one is to be accepted because he behaves or is adorned in such and such a way1 while the other is to be rejected because he falls below all reasonable standards of requirement4 ,the choice exercised by the female1 if so we term it1 is far simpler and more nave4 ,indeed1 ,professor ,groos goes so far as to say that on his hypothesis the element of choice is altogether abolished4 8,it is the instinctive coyness of the female10 he says1#aeb 8that necessitates all the arts of courtship1 and the probability is that seldom or never does the female exert any choice4 ,she is not awarder of the prize1 but rather a hunted creature4 ,so1 just as the beast of prey has special instincts for finding his prey1 the ardent male must have special instincts for subduing female reluctance4 ,according to this theory1 there is choice only in the sense that the hare finally succumbs to the best hound1 which is as much as to say that the phenomena of courtship are referred at once to natural selection40 ,he reaches this conclusion1 however1 by gradual stages4 ,he first urges#aec that 8it would be absurd to affirm that all bird songs originate in a conscious sthetic and critical act of judgment on the part of the female4 ,a conscious choice either of the most beautiful or the loudest singer is certainly not the rule1 and probably never occurs at all4 ,but10 he adds1 8is it not still a choice1 though unconscious1 when the female turns to the singer whose voice1 whether from strength or modulation1 proves most attractive8 ,even if the song is primarily a means of recognition or an invitation from the male1 still the psychological effect must be that the female follows the songster that excites her most1 and so exerts a kind of unconscious selection40 ,the phrase 8unconscious choice0 is1 however1 somewhat unsatisfactory1 especially when we remember that it is used to indicate the result of a direct appeal to the conscious situation4 ,if1 however1 we say that it is perceptual choice arising from impulse as distinguished from ideational choice due to motive and volition1 we see that the distinction is in line with that which we have drawn again and again1 and which ,dr4 ,stout so well emphasizes in his 8,manual of ,psychology40 ,but we have also drawn the distinction between instinctive behaviour prior to individual experience1 and intelligent behaviour the result of such experience4 ,under which of these classes does the behaviour of the female during courtship fall8 ,professor ,groos1 in the further development of his hypothesis1 seems to place it in the instinctive category4 8,instead of a conscious or unconscious choice1 of which we know nothing certain10 he says1#aed 8we have the need of overcoming instinctive coyness in the female1 a fact familiar enough1 but hitherto not sufficiently accounted for4 ,then the question no longer is1 which among many males will be chosen by the female1 but which one has the qualities that can overcome the reluctance of the female whom he woos4 ,sexual selection would then become a special case of natural selection40 ,i am unable to follow ,professor ,groos in this view1 which ,i find it rather difficult to reconcile with such statements as that already quoted1 in which he says that the female's 8tantalizing change from allurement to resistance seems to include an element of a mischievous playfulness40 ,it is more probable that instinctive coyness and reluctance afford the conditions under which experience of the pleasures of courtship may be gained4 ,it is said that a flirt1 when taken to task for her conduct at ball and picnic1 justified it by asking demurely how else she was to gain that wide experience of men which was absolutely necessary to guide her in exercising a wise and becoming choice4 ,let us hope that when the fateful time arrived she acted with due deliberation4 ,now the coquetry of birds affords the opportunity of gaining just such experience in the light of which a perceptual choice may be made4 ,let us remember that courtship is1 as ,darwin said1 8a prolonged affair10 and that coyness is a means to its prolongation4 ,and let us remember that in simple cases1 as also in more complex matters1 the intelligent exercise of choice depends upon what ,dr4 ,stout terms the acquisition of meaning4 8,the chicken does not1 at first10 he says1#aee 8distinguish between what is edible and what is not4 ,this it has to learn by experience4 ,it will at the outset peck at and seize all worms and caterpillars indiscriminately4 ,there is a particular caterpillar called the cinnabar caterpillar4 ,when this is first presented to the chicken it is pecked at and seized1 like other similar objects4 ,but as soon as it is fairly seized it is dropped in disgust4 ,when next the chicken sees the caterpillar1 it looks at it suspiciously1 and refrains from pecking4 ,now1 what has happened in this case8 ,the sight of the cinnabar caterpillar re-excites the total disposition left behind by the previous experience of pecking at it1 seizing it1 and ejecting it in disgust4 ,thus the effect of these experiences what ,i have termed the conscious situation is revived4 ,the sight of the cinnabar caterpillar has acquired a meaning40 ,take now the case of a coy hen bird1 to whom several males pay court4 ,the sight of this one1 behaving after his kind1 excites in small degree the sexual impulse and emotions4 ,her heart beats but little the faster for all his antics1 her respiratory rhythm is scarcely affected1 her feathers1 like her feelings1 remain comparatively unruffled4 ,he has acquired meaning from the reaction to his presence2 it is not1 however1 a very attractive meaning4 ,but that other1 perhaps from mere persistency1 perhaps because he is more 8vigorous1 defiant1 and mettlesome0 7she1 at any rate1 certainly knows not why71 deeply stirs her organic being1 sets her all aglow1 and breaks down the barriers of her coyness4 ,and this he does because he is the centre of a conscious situation which has acquired1 through her experience of his presence1 a meaning and an interest that are at last irresistibly attractive4 ,it is a choice from impulse1 not the result of deliberation2 but it is a choice which is determined by the emotional meaning of the conscious situation4 ,and it is the reiterated revival of the associated emotional elements which generates an impulse sufficiently strong to overcome her instinctive coyness and reluctance4 ,and this coyness is the natural correlative of the ardour of the male1 an ardour increased by his courtship antics4 ,if the female yielded readily and at once1 the behaviour of courtship would never have been evolved4 ,superabundant vigour in the male is1 no doubt1 a favourable condition of courtship1 as it is of play2 but neither is it a sine qu non1 nor in any case does it1 or can it1 afford any guidance of behaviour into just those specific channels in which we find it setting during the breeding season4 ,if sexual selection be not a vera causa of the specific direction1 we have at present no other hypothesis which in any degree fits the facts4 ,and to the criticism of those who1 like ,mr4 ,w4 ,h4 ,hudson1 urge that dance and song1 and arial evolutions in birds1 are seen at times when the immediate business of courtship forms no part of the situation1 ,professor ,groos's theory of play affords a sufficient answer4 ,if courtship1 whose biological end is of such supreme importance1 forms a central feature in the serious business of animal life2 and if play is the preparation and practice for behaviour of biological importance2 we should expect to find manifestations 7with an emotional difference1 and no doubt many differences in detail7 of all those actions1 the due performance of which1 in the supreme hour of courtship1 will alone enable the adequately prepared and well-practised male to overcome the reluctance of the female1 and beget offspring to transmit his instinctive and emotional tendencies4 ,,iv4--,,animal 8,,sthetics0 ,,and 8,,ethics0 ,in this section we shall consider some types of behaviour which suggest situations that contain the germs of sthetics and ethics1 with a view to determining1 so far as possible1 the principles on which they should be interpreted4 ,this is a peculiarly difficult subject2 for we are endeavouring to get behind the behaviour1 and to infer the mental conditions which accompany it1 and through which it assumes its distinctive character4 ,the difficulty is twofold3 first1 because1 as ,dr4 ,stout puts it1#aef 8human language is especially constructed to describe the mental states of human beings1 and this means that it is especially constructed so as to mislead us when we attempt to describe the workings of minds that differ in any great degree from the human20 and secondly1 because1 to quote the same careful thinker1#aeg 8the besetting snare of the psychologist is the tendency to assume that an act or attitude which in himself would be the natural manifestation of a certain mental process must1 therefore1 have the same meaning in the case of another4 ,the fallacy lies in taking this or that isolated action apart from the totality of conditions under which it appears4 ,it is particularly seductive when the animal mind is the subject of inquiry40 ,we must1 therefore1 base our method of procedure on some definite principle4 ,the canon of interpretation which ,i have elsewhere suggested#aeh is1 that we should not interpret animal behaviour as the outcome of higher mental processes1 if it can be fairly explained as due to the operation of those which stand lower in the psychological scale of development4 ,to this it may be added--lest the range of the principle be misunderstood--that the canon by no means excludes the interpretation of a particular act as the outcome of the higher mental processes1 if we already have independent evidence of their occurrence in the agent4 ,now1 the conclusion to which we are led by direct experiment and a critical study of the actions of animals whose life-history is known to us is1 that most of their behaviour--perhaps all--is due to what ,dr4 ,stout terms the perceptual1 as opposed to the ideational1 exercise of cognition4 ,their behaviour can be explained without having recourse to the hypothesis that they reflect1 and attain to ideal schemes as the result of abstraction and generalization consciously directed to this end4 ,rather than repeat what ,i have already said1 ,i will quote ,dr4 ,stout's summary of the position to which he1 too1 has been led4 8,the vast interval10 he says1#aei 8which separates human achievements1 so far as they depend on human intelligence1 from animal achievements1 so far as they depend on animal intelligence1 is connected with the distinction between perceptual and ideational process4 ,animal activities are either purely perceptual1 or1 in so far as they involve ideas1 these ideas serve only to prompt and guide an action in its actual execution4 ,on the other hand1 man constructs #8in his head1' by means of trains of ideas1 schemes of action before he begins to carry them out4 ,he is thus capable of overcoming difficulties in advance4 ,he can cross a bridge before he comes to it40 ,it has already been stated that in the intelligent behaviour of animals under man's teaching he is the rational agent1 they his willing slaves4 ,this may be here again illustrated to enforce the distinction drawn by ,dr4 ,stout in the above passage4 ,those who have seen a shepherd's dog working sheep on a moorland fell1 and have taken the trouble to ascertain how the results he sees have been attained1 will appreciate1 on the one hand1 how well the dog knows and responds to the signals of his master1 and1 on the other hand1 how completely all initiation is in the master's mind1 not that of the keenly intelligent dog4 ,those who merely witness such a performance without inquiry or investigation will probably misunderstand the whole matter4 ,in the north of ,england competitions are not uncommon where1 say1 three sheep have to be driven over a definite course1 between certain posts and round others1 through narrow passages and into a fold--all within a certain time limit4 ,at such a competition success depends on two things3 first1 the training of the dog to respond at once to some six or eight whistle-signals1 often accompanied by gestures and movements of a stick2 and secondly1 the judgment of the shepherd4 ,the signals1 given in different whistle-tones and inflections1 have for the dog meaning1 such as drive straight on1 from this side1 from that1 stop1 lie down1 creep1 and so forth4 ,the dog's whole business is to obey these signals4 ,and the instant response of a well-trained dog is admirable4 ,but in the whole proceeding he is merely the executant of his master's orders4 ,he originates no important step4 ,and if you listen to the criticisms by other shepherds during a competition you will find that they are mainly passed on the judgment shown by the master1 and only in palpable failures in obedience on the behaviour of the dog4 ,the intelligent animal is what he is trained to be--one whose natural powers are under the complete control of his master with whom the whole plan of action lies4 ,since1 then1 in the cognitional field we find no independent evidence of the higher processes1 we are bound1 in accordance with our canon1 to interpret emotional situations on similar principles1 unless we find in them outstanding facts which cannot be explained in this way4 ,in considering the pairing situation we urged that the framing of an ideal of beauty to which a given suitor approaches1 or from which he falls short1 is unnecessary for the interpretation of the facts4 ,we should not in strictness1 therefore1 speak of 8an appreciation of beauty0 or 8a taste for the beautiful0 in birds1 since such expressions almost inevitably imply that these creatures have reached some conception of beauty as distinguished from and contrasted with ugliness4 ,at the same time the hen certainly appears to enjoy the situation of which the plumed cock1 attitudinizing thus1 forms the centre of interest--through which he acquires meaning4 ,although1 therefore1 there is probably no ideal or standard of beauty1 there are afforded the data in experience from which1 were the bird capable of reflection1 such an ideal might1 in ideational sublimation1 be derived4 ,before comparison1 abstraction1 and generalization can be applied1 in the reflective laboratory of thought1 there must be suitable experiences to form the raw material on which these rational processes can be exercised4 ,long ere1 in the course of mental evolution1 the correlative conceptions implied in the phrase 8beautiful or ugly0 had taken definite form1 perceptual situations must have arisen1 where1 by direct appeal to the senses1 by the diffused effects of stimulation and their accompanying feeling-tone1 and by the natural satisfaction of mere impulse1 the foundations were laid of that appreciation of the beautiful which forms the reflective superstructure we build upon them4 ,indeed1 the pleasure and satisfaction attending particular situations1 as they severally arise1 appear to contain the perceptual germs of what in later development becomes sthetic appreciation4 ,the bird which1 having completed its nest1 eyes it with apparent satisfaction1 may well have the germs of that which1 when rendered schematic in our thought1 we call taste4 ,dr4 ,gould1 indeed1 states that certain humming-birds decorate their nests 8with the utmost taste10 weaving into their structure beautiful pieces of lichen4 ,and the gardener bower-bird collects in front of its bower flowers and fruits of bright and varied colours4 ,what meaning these carry in the conscious situation we do not know2 we can only suppose that they incidentally contribute to the heightening of the sexual impulse1 and have been evolved as a means of stimulation to the biological end towards which sexual selection is unconsciously directed4 ,for it is probable that all the situations with which pleasure and satisfaction are in high degree associated are1 in primary origin1 closely connected with behaviour directed1 through natural or sexual selection1 to some definite biological end1 or1 in brief1 with behaviour of biological value4 ,and it is1 perhaps1 not improbable that the states of consciousness most highly toned with strong emotion have their origin in those situations which arise amid the pairing1 parental1 and companiable relations of animal life4 ,we have already said that the companion1 as the nucleus of a situation1 is a thing which reacts in altogether special ways1 so that it becomes differentiated from other things as something the meaning of which1 and the interest in which1 are sui generis and unique in type4 ,it becomes the centre of emotional situations1 which we ascribe to rivalry1 emulation1 jealousy1 and so forth4 ,and we have also drawn attention to the view that the genetic order1 so far as there is an order1 is not first the ego and then the alter1 but first the mother and companions and then through them the self4 ,we learn to know ourselves only through knowing others4 ,we must now ask the question--a question which must be answered before we can touch on the possible ethics of animals--how far1 and in what sense1 the social animal regards others as of like nature to itself1 and capable also of like feelings and emotions4 ,stated in this form we must1 ,i think1 answer the question in the negative4 ,the expression1 8of like nature to itself10 implies that the self has already taken more or less definite form1 and that the animal infers that1 since the alter behaves and reacts in like manner to the ego1 it also is an ego4 ,this is distinctly an act of reasoning4 ,as ,clifford phrased it1 the companion becomes an eject4 ,we can never by direct experience become acquainted with the feelings of others1 but we can endow them ejectively with personality analogous to our own4 ,but1 though it is exceedingly doubtful whether any animal can regard its companion as an 8eject10 may there not be a perceptual anticipation of the ideational process that comes with later-developed reflection8 ,a decade ago ,i gave the following answer to this question3 8,for myself1 ,i cannot doubt that animals project into each other the shadows of the feelings of which they are themselves conscious40#afj ,professor ,mark ,baldwin speaks of the stage at which this takes place1 as the 8projective stage0 of development4 8,now1 in the fact10 he says1#afa 8of herding1 common life and arrangements for the protection of the herd1 animal societies of various kinds1 animal division of labour1 etc41--whatever be the origin of it1--we have what seems to be such an epoch in animal life4 ,these creatures show a real recognition of one individual by another1 and a real community of life and reaction1 which is quite different from the individualism of purely sensational and unsocial consciousness4 ,and yet it is just as different from the reflective organization of human society1 in which the self-consciousness and personal volition of the individual play the most important rle4 ,i see no way of accounting for the gregarious instinct anywhere1 except on the assumption of such a projective epoch of animal consciousness40 ,now1 in endeavouring to realize how the situation feels to an animal in this projective stage1 the first difficulty we encounter is that of divesting ourselves of those products of reflection which characterize our own mental situation2 and to avoid what ,dr4 ,stout1 in the passage above quoted1#afb terms the psychologist's besetting snare4 ,the second difficulty is to grasp that1 in experience1 subject and object are inseparable1 however clearly we may learn to perceive that they are distinguishable aspects of that experience4 ,if the subject is eventually regarded as that which experiences1 and the object as that which is experienced1 it is surely obvious that each is necessary to the other4 ,but1 before these different aspects are clearly distinguished1 there is1 in the perceptual stage of mental development1 what we may term a distribution of the items of experience among the centres of interest4 ,in illustration of the kind of distribution which we may suppose to come naturally to an animal1 in what ,professor ,baldwin terms the projective epoch1 let us take three animal situations3 first1 a chick pecks at a soldier-beetle1 and finds it nauseous2 secondly1 a hen-bird hears the joyous song of her mate2 thirdly1 a puppy in play bites its companion1 and receives a painful nip in return4 ,each of these constitutes an experience-situation2 assuming that the results of the experience are distributed1 how may we suppose them to be allocated8 ,in the first case1 the soldier-beetle is the centre of interest in the situation4 ,as the situation develops1 the element of nauseousness is introduced4 ,as ,dr4 ,stout puts it1 this is what gives the soldier-beetle meaning4 ,can it be doubted that1 if there be any distribution1 the nauseousness1 though it is altogether what we have learnt to call a subjective affection1 attaches itself to the soldier-beetle8 ,the plain man1 unsophisticated by ,berkeleyan discussion1 says simply1 in such cases1 8,the thing is nauseous40 ,and this probably indicates the nave and primitive distribution4 ,turning now to our second example1 when the hen hears the courtship song the mate is the centre of a situation suffused with pleasurable feeling4 ,how is the joyousness1 again essentially subjective for our later thought1 distributed8 ,surely1 if at all1 on the mate who forms the centre of interest4 ,this it is which gives him meaning4 ,the joy of the bearer is projected on to the singer4 ,not entirely1 perhaps2 the hen literally1 on ,professor ,james's theory of the emotions1 feels her heart-beat quickened by his presence1 and the delightful ruffling of her feathers4 ,but our aim is not to deny that the germs of the subjective arise in the midst of such situations1 but to contend that some at least of the joyous character of the situation attaches to the song of the singer1 that some of the feeling is projected1 and that this is what gives the mate meaning4 ,in our third case1 the playful puppy bites his companion1 and is sharply bitten in return4 ,pain enters into the coalescent situation as a whole4 ,how is it distributed8 ,in the phraseology of association1 the nip he gives is closely linked with the pain he receives4 ,by coalescence the pain and the nip form parts of the developed situation4 ,but the companion is the centre of interest4 ,and part of the pain is probably projected on this centre4 ,that such projection actually occurs is rendered probable by such cases as the following1 which was told me some years ago4 ,a child1 whose exact age ,i have forgotten if ,i then ascertained1 was pricked by a pin1 and he said1 8,pin 'urted2 poor pin40 ,it is1 indeed1 not unlikely that with animals the outward projection of feeling is widely distributed over inanimate1 as well as animate1 objects1 and that its due restriction comes far later in development1 of which the so-called personification of lifeless things by savages may be a relic4 ,in any case1 the give-and-take of play in young animals1 and the after-earnest of courtship and fighting1 would seem to afford ample opportunity for the external and internal distribution of feeling which sows the seed in perceptual life of that which blossoms into self and alter in the reflective life of ideational thought4 ,although1 therefore1 an animal cannot conceive its companion as another self of similar nature1 and with like passions to his own1 yet a considerable share of the feeling-element of the conscious situation is projected on to that companion as the chief centre of interest4 ,and if it be said that this is his feeling and not his neighbour's1 the objection will be seen to lose its force1 so soon as it is realized that even man has no experience of any feelings save his own4 ,the only way we can reach fellow-feeling is through sympathy2 and sympathy has its roots in the projective process we have endeavoured to describe4 ,we endow our neighbours with natures as sensitive to pain and pleasure as our own4 ,this is a pre-requisite to the social relationships termed ethical4 ,but when we hear people say1 and find even ,mr4 ,romanes putting on deliberate record1#afc that 8the feelings which prompt a cat to torture a captured mouse can only be assigned to the category to which1 by common consent1 they are ascribed--delight in torturing for torture's sake10 ,i venture to think that common consent1 if such it be1 is wrong4 ,as ,i said a dozen years ago1#afd before ,professor ,groos had so carefully elaborated his theory of play1 8the cat or kitten plays with the mouse not from innate cruelty1 but for the sake of getting some little practice in the most important business of cat life4 ,only man1 who has the capacity for nobler things1 can be cruel for cruelty's sake20 and this is the direction in which ,dr4 ,groos's opinion#afe tends to set4 ,mr4 ,romanes might have learnt a lesson in caution from his sister1 who at first attributed a sense of shame to the capuchin she so carefully studied1 but subsequently was led to adopt a simpler interpretation4 8,he bit me in several places to-day10 she says1 in her admirable diary1#aff 8but he seemed ashamed of himself afterwards1 hiding his face in his arms1 and sitting quiet for a time40 ,she adds1 however1 in a footnote3 8,on subsequent observation1 ,i find this quietness was not due to shame at having bit me2 for whether he succeeds in biting any person or not1 he always sits quiet and dull-looking after a fit of passion1 being1 ,i think1 fatigued40 ,shame is an ethical feeling4 ,and as we have briefly discussed the germs of sthetics in animals1 so we may now as briefly consider the germs of ethics4 ,in its developed form ethics is one of the 8normative sciences0 involving standards of right and wrong4 ,it is1 as ,professor ,mackenzie says1#afg 8the science of the ideal in conduct40 ,it involves a standard of 8ought10 the product of reflection and generalization4 ,conduct is compared with the ideal1 and perceived to be either below1 up to1 or perhaps beyond1 the normal standard accepted by civilized mankind4 ,this involves a judgment2 and so far as conduct is shaped in accordance with the ideal we attribute the guidance to ethical motives4 ,such ideals1 such judgments1 and the control of conduct through the play of such motives1 are probably beyond the mental capacities of animals4 ,they belong to the ideational stage of mental development1 when the conative tendency becomes volitional2 not to the perceptual stage1 when it is impulsive4 ,they do not enter into the conscious situation as it takes form in the animal mind4 ,behaviour has not in them acquired ethical meaning1 since in developed ethics1 as normative1 such meaning always has reference to the norm1 or standard4 ,a real sense of shame implies that our acts have fallen below our ideal4 ,it may be said that we cannot prove that animals do not frame such ideals4 ,but1 if we accept the canon of interpretation above laid down1 what has to be proved is that they do frame them4 ,is there any case among the hundreds that are popularly adduced to show that dogs are ashamed of themselves1 that they possess a sense of justice1 that they feel the prick of conscience1 that on the one hand they know when they have done wrong1 or on the other hand enjoy a sense of conscious rectitude--is there any particular case so described in the popular phraseology of anecdote1 which could not be more simply described as the direct outcome of the coalescent situation1 without the introduction of any implied reference to a standard of behaviour reached by reflective thought8 ,the pug that has taken a nap on the drawing-room sofa1 leaps down and slinks off with a 8guilty0 look on his master's approach4 ,one can surely picture the previous situations1 and be tolerably certain that they contained an element of reproof or something more energetic4 ,the poodle that has successfully performed his tricks bounds to his mistress with an air of duty well performed4 ,has he never been petted and patted under such circumstance8 ,routine in many animals--so often creatures of habit--begets a customary sequence1 the breach of which is at once felt4 ,to this ,i ventured#afh to ascribe the conduct of the turnspit dog reported by ,arago4 ,he refused with bared teeth to enter out of his turn the drum by which the spit was rotated4 ,the companion dog was put in for a few moments and then released2 whereupon the dog which before had been so refractory seemed satisfied that his turn for drudgery had come1 and1 entering the wheel of his own accord1 began turning the spit as usual4 ,the bared teeth may be here perhaps ascribed to an outraged sense of justice4 ,but is it not a more simple1 and just as probable1 supposition that the behaviour was due to breach of customary routine4 ,a trainer with whom ,i had some conversation on this matter pointed out a collie bitch1 and said1 8,if ,i put her through her tricks in the usual order she does them like an angel2 but if ,i try and make her alter the order she snaps and sulks like the devil40 ,i have elsewhere#afi expressed my opinion that1 though animals may behave in ways which may tend to mislead us1 they do not act with intent to deceive4 ,a dog is described#agj as 8showing a deliberate design of deceiving0 because he hobbled about the room as if lame and suffering from pain in his foot4 ,but may not this be simply due to the fact that chance experience had led to a situation through which a hobbling gait had acquired the meaning of more petting and attention than usual8 ,to behave with deceit as a deliberate motive implies the idea that the action will be interpreted as having a significance different from that which it really has4 ,it is only possible on the ideational plane of mental development4 ,it implies1 too1 from the ethical standpoint1 a conscious departure from the standard of truth4 ,the black that is acted has conscious reference and relation to the white that is not black4 ,few1 however1 will credit animals with deceit of this fully conscious and deliberate kind4 ,like the fibs of little children1 the apparent deceit of animals is probably merely behaviour which has been associated in experience with pleasant results4 ,the case of shamming sickness1 quoted from ,k4 ,russ1 is thus interpreted by ,professor ,groos4#aga ,and yet he adds1 8,when we see deception used so effectively to serve practical ends1 examples of which are very common1 it can hardly be doubted that there is in all probability more consciousness of shamming in play than we have any means of demonstrating40 ,and elsewhere in the same work he observes1#agb 8,many a grown animal still takes pleasure in the mock combats that he learned in youth4 ,from a psychological point of view this phenomenon is especially noteworthy1 from the fact that the adult animal1 though already well acquainted with real fighting1 still knows how to keep within the bounds of play1 and must therefore be consciously playing a rle1 making believe40 ,i fail1 however1 to see the justification for the 8therefore40 ,surely the difference of behaviour in this example1 and in other such examples1 is sufficiently explained as the outcome of diverse situations1 without having recourse to anything so psychologically complex as the conscious self-illusion of make-believe--interesting and important as this is in the psychology of children4 ,to suppose that a monkey who nurses a bit of blanket has any ideas about its being a make-believe baby is not to interpret the behaviour of animals in accordance with the canon we have adopted for our guidance4 ,to return to the 8ethics0 of animals4 ,i have urged that ethical ideas1 properly so called1 have no place in their psychology4 ,but just as the pleasure and satisfaction attending particular situations1 as they severally arise1 appear to contain the perceptual germs of what in later development becomes sthetic appreciation2 so1 too1 do they also contain the perceptual germs of what becomes1 through reflection in man1 ethical approbation4 ,and the situations in which these ethical germs must be sought are those which entail behaviour for the good of the social community4 ,indeed1 we may go so far as to say that the perceptual foundations of ethics are laid in the social instincts4 ,the satisfaction or dissatisfaction arising from the performance or non-performance of instinctive behaviour1 evolved for the biological end of the preservation of the social community1 is the perceptual embryo from which conscience is developed4 ,professor ,mackenzie has indicated the ambiguities in the use of the term 8conscience40 8,it is10 he says1#agc 8sometimes used to express the fundamental principles on which the moral judgment rests2 at other times it expresses the principles adopted by a particular individual2 at other times it means #8a particular kind of pleasure or pain felt in perceiving our own conformity or nonconformity to principle4'#agd ,this last seems to me10 adds ,mr4 ,mackenzie1 8the most convenient acceptation of the term1 except that ,i should prefer to say simply that it is a feeling of pain accompanying and resulting from our nonconformity to principle40 ,according to this definition the existence of a principle or ideal is presupposed2 and the fact that ,professor ,mackenzie lays stress upon the pain of nonconformity1 shows that the ideal is a high one4 ,in the case of the animal1 however1 such an ideal of right conduct has probably not taken form4 ,but ,mr4 ,mackenzie also speaks of the 8quasi-conscience0 begotten of custom4 ,this comes nearer to the feeling which animals may be supposed to have when their behaviour does not accord with that which through instinct or habit is the usage of the community4 ,and if1 as seems to be shown by observation1 animals sometimes punish the breaches of such usage--when1 for example1 cats punish their kittens for uncleanliness--the quasi-conscience will assume a more developed form4 ,we may say1 then1 that the perceptual data are given in animal experience from which1 in ideational sublimation1 ethical ideals may be derived by a process of reflection and generalization4 ,as in the case of sthetics1 so in that of ethics2 long ere1 in the course of mental evolution1 the correlative conceptions implied in the phrase 8right or wrong0 had taken definite form1 perceptual situations must have arisen in which behaviour carried with it the feelings of satisfaction or the reverse which laid the foundations of that approbation of the right which forms the superstructure we build upon them by the exercise of reflective thought4 ,v4--,,the ,,evolution ,,of ,,feeling ,,and ,,emotion 8,whatever conditions10 says ,dr4 ,stout1#age 8further and favour conation in the attainment of its end1 yield pleasure4 ,whatever conditions obstruct conation in the attainment of its end1 are sources of displeasure4 ,this is the widest generalization which we can frame1 from a purely psychological point of view1 as regards the conditions of pleasure and displeasure respectively40 ,here ,dr4 ,stout seems carefully to avoid the commonly accepted and much advertised conclusion1 that pleasure and pain 7to use this more familiar word as the antithesis of pleasure7 are themselves the end of conative endeavour4 ,and he is so far right that they by no means constitute the sole or indeed the primary end of all conative process4 ,attention is a conative act2 but its primary end is not pleasure1 but rather1 as ,dr4 ,stout says1#agf the fuller presentation of the object4 ,no doubt this brings pleasure2 but the fuller presentation comes first1 and carries the pleasure with it4 ,instinctive response to felt stimulus falls within the conative attitude4 ,in it there is that 8inherent tendency to pass beyond itself and become something different10 which ,dr4 ,stout assigns to conation as its chief characteristic4 ,but the end is not pleasure1 but simply the instinctive behaviour4 ,and if we say that the attainment of this end does bring satisfaction1 which is a form of pleasure1 ,dr4 ,stout would probably reply that this is rather a result of the process than its true end4 ,now1 in such cases1 what we are really dealing with is a class of organic processes having conscious accompaniments4 ,no doubt the conscious accompaniments are of importance2 they certainly cannot be neglected by the psychologist3 but their feeling-tone does not constitute that which makes instinct run its course4 ,and ,i have introduced the subject for present discussion in this way to reinforce what has already been repeatedly urged in the foregoing pages1 that individual behaviour1 in its first intent1 is a biological legacy with ends predetermined through heredity4 ,the inherent tendency to pass beyond itself and become something different1 which for the old psychology was a heaven-sent impulse1 or1 as ,addison said1 8an immediate impression from the first ,mover and the ,divine energy acting in the creatures10 becomes for the new psychology an organic bequest4 ,but the attainment of ends thus already predetermined has feeling-tone1 both as process and in its resulting consciousness1 and this feeling-tone serves to modify1 through the situation it introduces1 future behaviour1 and thus1 in a sense1 affords a new end to subsequent conation4 8,life10 wrote ,james ,martineau1#agg 8is a cluster of wants physical1 intellectual1 affectional1 moral1 each of which may have1 and all of which may miss1 the fitting object4 ,is the object withheld or lost8 there is pain3 is it restored or gained8 there is pleasure3 does it abide or remain constant8 there is content4 ,the two first are cases of disturbed equilibrium1 and are so far dynamic that they will not rest till they reach the third1 which is their posture of stability and their true end40 ,this is an adequate description of the essential features in conative process4 ,but in genetic precedence1 as in individual development1 the physical wants come first1 and1 at the outset of behaviour1 the satisfaction or content is not and cannot be foreseen1 since it has never yet entered into experience4 ,to adopt a distinction suggested by ,professor ,mackenzie1#agh the conation is purposive1 since we see that an end is involved1 but not purposeful1 since there is no definite consciousness of the end aimed at4 ,but when experience has introduced feeling-tone into the situation1 we may say that this1 in a sense1 introduces a new end to subsequent behaviour4 ,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer has said#agi that pleasure is that which we seek to bring into consciousness and retain there2 pain1 that which we seek to get out of consciousness and keep out4 ,may we assert1 then1 that1 in the modification of behaviour due to experience1 the pleasure to be gained or the pain to be avoided is the psychological end8 ,certainly not without qualification1 unless we be among those who are content to accept any form of words which gives a general sort of notion of the kind of thing which we suppose is meant1 and which is probably more or less correct4 ,we want here and now to get clear ideas1 and to express them with some approach to accuracy4 ,to say that pleasure is the psychological end of intelligent behaviour is to put the matter too subjectively and in too abstract a form4 ,professor ,mackenzie has clearly indicated the ambiguity in the word 8pleasure40 8,pleasure10 he says1#ahj 8is sometimes understood to mean agreeable feeling1 or the feeling of satisfaction1 and sometimes it is understood to mean an object which gives satisfaction4 ,the hearing of music is sometimes said to be a pleasure1 but of course the hearing of music is not a feeling of satisfaction2 it is an object that gives satisfaction4 ,generally1 it may be observed that when we speak of #8pleasures' in the plural1 or rather in the concrete1 we mean objects that give satisfaction2 whereas when we speak of #8pleasure' in the abstract1 we more often mean the feeling of satisfaction which such objects bring with them40 ,may we not go a step further1 but entirely in the same direction1 and say that pleasure is a constituent part of the concept self as an object of thought or desire2 that its proper sphere is in the ideational consciousness2 and that1 as we interpret the animal mind1 it has no place as such therein8 ,the hedonist regards pleasure as the most excellent and distinctive characteristic of his ideal self and his ideal community4 ,but animals have not risen or fallen to the level of hedonism4 ,pleasure is not for them a motive of conduct1 though nice objects1 as such1 are attractive1 and through them impulse acquires direction and force4 ,if1 in animal psychology1 we are to use the words pleasure and pain 7as the antithesis of pleasure7--and they seem more properly to belong to a plane of mental development to which animals probably have not attained--we may say that the pleasure or the pain which attaches to any centre of interest in the situation is that which gives it attractive or repellent meaning2 it furthers conation either towards or1 as ,hobbes would say1 fromwards4 ,but if we put the matter in this somewhat abstract form1 let us keep in view1 if it be only in the background of our thought1 the kind of concrete example which may be adduced in its illustration--the dog with his attractive bone1 the kitten that has raced off at sight of him1 the cock-sparrow with trailing wings hopping after his mate1 the falcon stooping on her quarry1 the rabbit diving into his burrow at sight of the fox1 and so forth4 ,if we have such cases in view1 where the centre of the situation has acquired or is acquiring meaning1 a meaning which in large degree attaches to the external nucleus of the situation with only the germs of subjective reference1 we may1 perhaps1 summarize the position by saying that in each case some pleasure to be gained or some pain to be avoided is the psychological end of conation4 ,but in each case the conation has also a biological end--the preservation and conservation of the race4 8,an animal10 said ,darwin1#aha 8may be led to pursue that course which is most beneficial to the species by suffering1 such as pain1 hunger1 thirst1 or fear2 or by pleasure1 as in eating and drinking1 and in the propagation of the species2 or by both combined1 as in the search for food40 ,the important point here to notice is that the two ends agree--the psychological end of the attainment of pleasure and the avoidance of pain1 and the biological end of race preservation4 ,under the joint influence of pleasure and pain1 the needle of animal life sets towards the pole of beneficial action4 ,this consonance of end was in old days ascribed to the beneficent foresight of the ,creator4 ,the modern view1 that it is a product of evolution1 does not necessarily ascribe it to any other ultimate cause4 ,for many still piously hold that evolution is only a name which we give to the method of creation4 ,and there is not a fact or generalization in science by which such a conclusion can be disproved1 for the premises lie outside the field of scientific inquiry4 ,but the consonance of end is1 for science1 a remarkable fact1 and one worthy of attentive consideration4 ,we have already seen that1 if the claim for the inheritance of acquired characters be1 on the evidence1 judged unproven1 and if instinct cannot be ascribed to transmitted habit1 or regarded as a legacy of that which has been ancestrally acquired1 the only scientific explanation of instinctive behaviour is one which involves the principle of natural selection4 ,but no one doubts that1 in the course of experience1 animals acquire modes of procedure which are beneficial to the race4 ,this is well seen in the play of animals as interpreted by ,professor ,groos4 ,now1 why do animals play8 ,from the psychological point of view1 because they like it2 from the biological point of view1 because they thus gain practice and preparation for the serious business of their after-life4 ,but why do they like it8 because1 under natural selection1 those who did not like it1 and therefore did not play1 proved unfit for life's struggle1 and were eliminated4 ,suppose that an animal were born with a rooted hereditary aversion to everything nutritious and an inherited hunger for anything harmful and unfit for food4 ,what chance would it stand of survival8 ,hereditary likes and dislikes determine the general course of acquired behaviour1 just as hereditary nerve-connections determine the course of instinctive behaviour4 ,wherein1 then1 lies the difference between the two8 ,in the fact that in the one case the nerve-connections are transmitted ready-made1 while in the other they result from association or coalescence in the course of individual life4 ,but in both cases the pursuit and attainment of the beneficial brings satisfaction4 ,now1 the consonance of end has long been regarded as an inevitable deduction from the hypothesis of evolution4 8,that pains are correlatives of actions injurious to the organism10 wrote ,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer in his 8,principles of ,psychology10#ahb 8while pleasures are the correlatives of actions conducive to its welfare1 is an induction not based on the vital functions only4 ,it is an inevitable deduction from the hypothesis of evolution1 that races of sentient creatures could have come into existence under no other conditions4 ,those races of beings only can have survived in which1 on the average1 agreeable or desired feelings went along with activities conducive to the maintenance of life1 while disagreeable and habitually avoided feelings went along with activities directly or indirectly destructive of life1 and there must ever have been1 other things being equal1 the most numerous and long-continued survivals among races in which these adjustments of feelings to actions were the best1 tending ever to perfect adjustment40 ,and he safeguards the position by adding3 8,it is frequently taken for granted that the beneficial actions secured must be actions beneficial to the individual2 whereas the only necessity is that they shall be beneficial to the race40 ,this aspect of the consonance is now quite familiar2 but let us carefully note how completely dependent it is on natural selection4 ,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer's testimony is especially valuable1 since he has always laid much stress on the hereditary transmission of acquired characters and still holds#ahc 8that the inheritance of functionally-caused alterations has played a larger part than ,darwin admitted even at the close of his life2 and that1 coming more to the front as evolution has advanced1 it has played the chief part in producing the highest types40 ,now1 in these types we certainly find a wide range of consonance between the psychological and the biological ends of behaviour2 of which the phenomena of play may again be adduced as an example4 ,hence the special value of ,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer's testimony to the part played by natural selection in establishing the consonance4 8,only those races of beings10 he says1 8can have survived in which1 on the average1 agreeable feelings went along with activities conducive to life20 and again1 8,the most numerous survivals must ever have been among races in which these adjustments of feelings to actions were the best40 ,the stress is here laid on the survival of those in which the consonance has obtained2 the elimination of those in which it was absent3 that is to say1 on natural selection4 ,and where else can it be laid8 ,it is not the sort of thing which could be acquired4 ,suppose that1 as we suggested above1 an animal were born with a rooted hereditary aversion to everything nutritious and an inherited hunger for anything harmful and unfit for food4 ,under what conceivable conditions could such an animal acquire a complete change of its affective nature8 ,animals like things or they do not like them2 only to a very limited extent1 if at all1 under natural conditions1 can they learn to like them4 ,we1 indeed1 can in some degree learn to take pleasure in that which at first1 and by nature1 is distasteful2 but we do so by some external constraint1 or from some motive of ideational origin4 ,we put pressure upon ourselves1 or have pressure put upon us1 repeatedly to perform some irksome task2 we fall into routine and custom2 and the performance becomes so far second nature that its discontinuance produces an uncomfortable sense of something lacking in the daily round4 ,perhaps domestic animals learn to like the good offices we force them to perform for us4 ,but here we have the element of external constraint1 which is wholly1 or almost wholly1 absent under natural conditions4 ,and there is no evidence that such acquired likings are inherited4 ,that1 however1 is another question4 ,our present point is that1 under nature1 the conditions of such acquisition are lacking2 so that1 there being no acquisition1 there is1 in this case1 nothing acquired to be transmitted4 ,but1 so far as behaviour is concerned1 8functionally caused alterations0 are those due to the exercise of intelligence1 by which the behaviour acquires direction and character in reference to the meaning introduced into the situations4 ,see1 then1 the position to which we are logically driven4 ,the acquisition of that which has beneficial value in behaviour depends on a consonance between psychological and biological end4 ,but this consonance is dependent on survival1 and1 apart from special creation1 or some kindred hypothesis such as ,leibnitzian harmony1 can be due to nothing else4 ,even if we grant1 therefore1 that the effects of acquisition are inherited1 the conditions of beneficial acquisition are dependent on natural selection4 ,and thus the inheritance of acquired characters1 which is so often urged as a principle of evolution independent of natural selection1 is1 so far as intelligent behaviour is concerned1 indirectly1 if not directly1 due to this very natural selection of which it is said to be independent4 ,surely1 under these circumstances1 the hypothesis in question may be said to be not only unproven1 but altogether unnecessary4 ,and what is true of those diverse feelings which we group under the concepts pleasure and pain respectively1 is true also of those more complex dispositions which we call emotional--using this term in a broad and comprehensive sense4 ,we say that in their primary manifestations they are instinctive2 and they certainly seem to accompany organic behaviour due to co-ordinated reflex actions4 ,but the emotion1 as instinctive1 is a matter only of its first occurrence4 ,in the course of experience it enters into conscious situations1 the centres of interest in which have acquired meaning4 ,take a particular case4#ahd ,your dog is dozing on the lawn in the sunshine4 ,suddenly he raises his head1 pricks his ears1 scents the air1 looks fixedly at a gap in the hedge1 and utters a low growl4 ,place your hand on his shoulder1 and you will find that his muscles are all a-tremble2 on his ribs1 and you will feel how strongly his heart is beating4 ,soon the growing excitement leads to vigorous action1 and he darts through the gap4 ,you follow him across the lawn1 look over the hedge1 and see him facing his old enemy1 the butcher's cur4 ,they are moving slowly past each other1 head down1 teeth bared1 back roughened4 ,you whistle softly4 ,such a call would generally bring him bounding to your feet2 but now it is apparently unheard1 at any rate unheeded4 ,the two dogs have a short scuffle1 and the cur slinks off4 ,your dog races after him2 and he flees1 yelping4 ,the situation is over4 ,spot returns1 wagging his short tail1 jumps up at you playfully1 and then lies down again on the grass4 ,but now and then1 for ten minutes or so1 he raises his head and growls softly4 ,let us briefly analyze the dog's condition and actions1 reading into them1 conjecturally1 the accompaniments in consciousness4 ,as he lies on the lawn1 he receives a sense-stimulus1 auditory or olfactory4 ,it has already acquired meaning1 from many a tussle with the butcher's cur4 ,it has organic effects1 and it generates a conscious situation which has acquired complexity through coalescence4 ,as the result of this situation the head is raised1 the ears pricked1 and so on4 ,the dog is on the alert4 ,his attention is aroused4 ,the muscles of neck1 eyes1 ears1 are brought into play in such a way as to bring the senses to bear on the exciting object4 ,he probably sees the cur through the gap in the hedge4 ,the muscles of the frame are innervated so as to be in a state of preparation to act rapidly and forcibly4 ,at the same time the vaso-motor system is disturbed1 the heart-beat is quickened1 respiration is altered2 there is probably hardly an organ in the body which remains unaffected4 ,then the dog rushes through the hedge1 and stands with bared teeth before his antagonist4 ,a whole set of appropriate muscles are now strongly innervated4 ,there is1 perhaps1 a double innervation1 stimulating to activity and yet restraining from action4 ,he bares his teeth and growls deeply4 ,attention is so concentrated that he heeds not1 perhaps does not hear1 his master's whistle4 ,he is keenly on the alert4 ,the blood-system1 respiratory organs1 and all his inner machinery are still pulsating with nervous thrills2 his back is up4 ,then he sees his chance1 and flies at his opponent4 ,much that he has learnt in play1 and all that he has learnt in earnest1 comes to his aid in the short angry scuffle4 ,and what we call his emotion of anger spurs him on to the fight2 the cowardly dog in which this is lacking or is replaced by fear is spurred to flight4 ,each may contribute to self-preservation1 but in different ways4 ,now1 we shall not attempt to determine how the distinctively emotional elements arise4 ,some think they arise by a sort of irradiating nervous diffusion in the nerve-centres as a direct result of the originating stimulus4 ,mr4 ,rutgers ,marshall regards them as due to the motor activities in fight or flight2 ,professor ,william ,james contends that they have their source in the visceral affections of heart1 lungs1 glands1 and so forth2 ,professor ,lange attributes them to vaso-motor effects4 ,the problem is a difficult one1 and hard to determine by experiment2 for we have to deal with a matter of primary genesis1 of how they are at the outset introduced into the conscious situation4 ,experiments on animals which have already gained emotional experience cannot decide the question of genesis4 ,professor ,sherrington1 for example1 has shown#ahe that1 after severance of the spinal cord in the lower region of the neck1 and of the vagus nerves1 by which 8a huge field of vascular1 visceral1 cutaneous1 and motor reaction0 were 8deprived of all connection with the nervous centre necessary to conscious response10 8the emotional states of anger1 delight at being caressed1 fear and disgust were developed with1 as far as could be seen1 unlessened strength40 ,but the avenues of connection were closed after the motor and visceral effects had played their parts in the genesis of the emotion on the hypothesis that the emotion is thus generated4 ,although new presentative data of this type were thus excluded1 their re-presentative after-effects in the situation were not excluded4 ,it is1 moreover1 an essential part of ,professor ,james's doctrine1 as ,i provisionally accept it1 that the 8expression0 and the visceral and vascular efforts are independent results of stimulation in certain ways1 and that these independent results are conjoined through natural selection4 ,suppose we sever the connection through which the one takes effect1 there is no reason to expect that the manifestation of the other would cease4 ,professor ,sherrington cut off the channels of communication with the visceral and vascular apparatus3 if the channels of expression remained open there is no reason why such expression should cease4 ,we need not1 however1 for our present purpose1 attempt to ascertain how the distinctively emotional characteristics arise4 ,it is sufficient that they are presumably present in the situation4 ,now1 as ,dr4 ,stout well points out1#ahf the emotions generally presuppose the existence of certain specific tendencies4 8,the anger produced in a dog by taking away its bone presupposes the specific appetite for food4 ,the anger produced in it by interfering with its young presupposes the specific tendency to guard and tend its offspring4 ,so the presence of a rival who interferes with its wooing causes anger because of the pre-existence of the sexual impulse40 ,in general1 we may say that emotional states are1 under natural conditions1 closely associated with behaviour of biological value--with tendencies which are beneficial in self-preservation or race-preservation--with actions that promote survival1 and especially with the behaviour which clusters round the pairing and parental instincts4 ,the value of the emotions in animals is that they are an indirect means of furthering survival4 ,but how has the close association between emotional condition and the biological end it furthers been established8 ,again1 we must say that under natural conditions it is not the sort of thing which could be acquired4 ,and again we must urge that natural selection through survival is1 apart from some theory of pre-established harmony1 the only hypothesis in the field on which the close association can be explained4 ,there is one more point to which attention may be drawn4 ,if there be one thing1 and there certainly are not many1 on which all writers on the emotions are agreed1 it is as to their vagueness4 ,they do not readily submit to definition1 and cannot be described in a sentence4 ,this is not due to any indefiniteness of biological end1 nor to much indefiniteness in the mode of 8expression20 it is due1 rather1 to an inherent dimness and haziness of psychological outline4 ,we seem unable to focus them and get a clear-cut result4 ,this is1 no doubt1 in part due to the complexity of emotional states4 ,but1 may it not be largely due to the fact that there is no necessity for definiteness8 ,they fulfil their purpose just as well if they are vague4 ,it is quite necessary for the dog to have a clear-cut impression of his antagonist2 and1 on the cognitive side of consciousness1 meaning must be in some degree definite to be of real value4 ,but1 so long as the emotion raises the temperature1 so to speak1 to the boiling-point of vigorous action1 it matters little what the psychological source of heat may be4 ,if this be so1 we should expect an emotional vagueness1 since natural selection puts no premium upon emotional definiteness4 ,and from this it follows1 as a corollary1 that1 whereas we may infer that an animal's perceptual products are probably closely similar to our own1 since sight1 touch1 hearing1 smell1 and taste are of value in so far as they convey definite meaning1 in interpreting their feelings and emotions we have less secure grounds of inference1 since all that is requisite is that there should be a sufficiently high emotional temperature to afford the conditions for definite and vigorous action4 ,in conclusion1 then1 we may say that the primary purpose of the evolution of feeling and emotion is to promote beneficial behaviour1 and that the observed consonance of the psychological end of attaining satisfaction1 and the biological end of securing survival1 seems to be due to natural selection--is1 indeed1 scarcely explicable on any other naturalistic hypothesis4 ,a word of warning may be added4 ,we have repeatedly spoken of biological and psychological ends4 ,by this we mean what seems to the observer1 as an interpreter of natural processes1 the purpose and object of their existence4 ,but the word 8end0 is often used in such a way as to imply foresight and contrivance on the part of a rational being4 ,we have not used it in this sense4 ,whether the whole of nature1 including animal behaviour1 is driven onwards to definite ends by an underlying ,cause1 is a metaphysical question4 ,it is not one on which science has any right to express an opinion one way or the other4 ,science deals with the phenomena2 the causes of their being lie outside her province4 ,,chapter ,,vii ,,the ,,evolution ,,of ,,animal ,,behaviour ,i4--,,the ,,physiological ,,aspect ,at the outset of our inquiry1 we used the word 8behaviour0 in a wide and comprehensive sense4 ,thus broadly used1 ,i said1 the term in all cases indicates and draws attention to the reaction of that which we speak of as behaving in response to certain surrounding forces or circumstances which evoke the behaviour4 ,the behaviour of living cells is dependent on changes in their environment2 that of deciduous trees1 as they put forth their leaves in the spring or shed them in the autumn1 is related to the change of the season2 instinctive1 intelligent1 and emotional behaviour are called forth in response to those circumstances which exercise a constraining influence at the moment of action4 ,used in this comprehensive sense1 the term 8behaviour0 neither implies nor excludes the presence of consciousness4 ,we know from our own experience1 however1 that consciousness does in some cases accompany behaviour1 and we infer that in many other cases it may be present4 ,but we need a criterion of its presence to guide our inferences1 and this criterion we found in the ability of living beings to profit by experience4 ,in ,dr4 ,stout's phraseology1 if a thing seems to acquire meaning for such a being1 and the behaviour is guided in accordance with such acquired meaning1 we infer the presence of consciousness as supplying conditions effective in determining its course4 ,still this does not exclude1 nay1 rather it presupposes the presence of sentience at a lower stage of evolution1 a sentience which is as yet ineffective since the process of conscious coalescence has not begun1 or has not been carried far enough4 ,in foregoing chapters we have constantly held the problems of evolution in view1 and in special sections directed attention to them4 ,but the subject is so central to modern thought and discussion1 that some further consideration of certain aspects of the evolutionary process and products will fitly serve to bring our inquiry to a conclusion4 ,we must accept1 as a datum from the physiological point of view1 the fact that protoplasm does respond to stimuli1--that it possesses the fundamental property of irritability4 ,it is a substance that is in a state of unstable equilibrium4 ,its tendency to pass to a condition of more stable equilibrium is that in and through which organic behaviour in its very simplest expression is possible4 ,and this1 with progressive complication1 runs through the whole gamut of animal behaviour1 and eventually passes over into the sphere of consciousness4 8,the tendency to equilibrium10 writes ,dr4 ,stout1#ahg 8is the physiological correlate of what on the psychical side we call conation1--the striving aspect of consciousness40 ,but1 protoplasm at the outset--or as near the outset as we can get--is1 in technical phrase1 differentially responsive4 ,the nature of the stimulus and the nature of the conditions decide what the nature of the response shall be4 ,and even in that jelly-like speck of living matter1 the ,amba1 the responses conspire to a biological end4 ,if they did not so conspire1 we should not have the phenomena of life4 ,the mere act of living1 building up from food-stuff and oxygen an unstable substance which 8explodes0 and contracts under stimulation1 implies that the processes which thus conspire are related in such a manner as to fulfil and secure their end4 ,in higher unicellular animals1 such as the ,paramecium1 the relations are less simple2 but in them the continuance of that sum of organic behaviour which we call life1 is secured only on the condition that these less simple relations are duly preserved1 and that the vital processes conspire with sufficient unity of biological purpose4 ,and when we pass to the higher creatures in which many cells unite to form one animal1 the very word 8unite0 indicates that the vital processes of all must conspire with sufficient unity of biological purpose to insure the continued life of the whole4 ,now1 in all the higher and more active animals a nervous system is developed1 which has for its purpose and end the preservation and furtherance of unity amid circumstances of progressively increasing diversity4 ,and in the course of its evolution an added means of preserving and furthering the essential unity is provided in consciousness1 which1 through the coalescence of scattered units of sentience1 leads behaviour to acquire a new and higher unanimity of purpose4 ,thus a mental evolution is engrafted on the organic evolution which precedes it4 ,but every step in this mental evolution presupposes a step in organic evolution4 ,and such is the complexity of structure and process in all the higher animals that much of the business of behaviour is relegated to quasi-independent nervous centres1 which perform this business automatically1 and will continue to perform it1 with much subsidiary unity of end1 when they are left to themselves and all connection with the supremely unifying sensorium has been severed4 ,before proceeding to give some examples of this fact1 and to indicate its bearing on our interpretation of behaviour1 it may be well to state distinctly that no attempt is or will be here made to trace in detail the course of the evolution of animal behaviour through the ascending grades of life1 nor1 indeed1 to prove that there has been any such evolution4 ,evolution by natural genesis is here assumed as the only hypothesis with which science has any concern4 ,if it be false1 then have the labours of workers and thinkers1 since ,darwin and ,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer worked and thought1 been vain4 ,special creation is not a scientific hypothesis1 but a reference of biological and mental phenomena to an ultimate cause1 which lies beyond and altogether apart from the scope of scientific inquiry4 ,the fundamental assumption of the man of science is1 that any natural event he may select for detailed study has natural conditions and antecedents4 ,and it is only in such detailed study--taking this or that particular occurrence and endeavouring to ascertain what were its related antecedents--that advance in the evolutionary interpretation of nature can be secured4 ,such advance has been secured by the labours of those physiologists who have established by careful experiment the quasi-independent action of subsidiary nerve-centres as constituents of the nervous system as a whole4 ,in such animals as the crayfish and the lobster the central nervous system consists of a chain of 8ganglia10 or nerve-knots1 which are connected together by nerve-strands4 ,if these strands be cut between the thorax1 which carries the walking limbs1 and the abdomen or hinder portion of the body1 the nerve-connection between these parts is severed4 ,if the forepart be irritated through its sense-organs1 the limbs of that part will respond2 but1 whereas an unmutilated crayfish1 subjected to such irritation1 would give a vigorous flap of the tail1 this does not take place in the crippled animal4#ahh ,still1 if the abdomen be irritated1 it will respond by a strong and swift contraction4 ,the two portions of the body are each capable of acting independently with well co-ordinated movements1 but no longer of working together with unity of purpose4 ,in the hinder portion the abdominal limbs1 or swimmerets1 all swing backwards and forwards simultaneously with rhythmic strokes2 they act in concert4 ,sever now the connections between their ganglia1 and each pair of limbs will continue to swing rhythmically but not with concerted rhythm4 ,we have isolated a number of quasi-independent centres1 and rendered them really independent4 ,each is concerned with its own proper co-ordination1 but can no longer combine with others in a wider co-ordination4 ,mr4 ,hyde#ahi has shown that in the king-crab1 ,limulus1 when the nerve-chain is severed just in front of the abdominal region1 the rhythmic respiratory movements of the abdominal segments still proceed regularly and co-ordinately4 ,even when only a fraction of the nerve-cord1 separated by severances in front and behind1 is left1 corresponding with a single abdominal segment1 the rhythmic action of that segment continues2 but it is no longer synchronous with that of adjacent segments similarly isolated4 ,it will probably not be contended that the co-ordinated rhythm of the isolated segment in crayfish or king-crab is anything but a bit of organic and physiological behaviour4 ,whether it be accompanied by consciousness--a bit of consciousness isolated from other bits--we do not know2 but we have no grounds for supposing that the rhythmic behaviour is guided by consciousness4 ,and when1 as ,dr4 ,carpenter pointed out half a century ago1 a water-beetle1 from which the 8brain0 has been removed1 swims forwards if placed in water1 we must surely regard the co-ordinated progression as organic behaviour1 whatever view we may hold with regard to a consciousness which in such a case is in a very literal sense a divided consciousness4 ,in these invertebrates the central nervous system is obviously segmented--one can distinguish the ganglia and their connecting nerve-strands4 ,in the vertebrate the brain and spinal cord form a continuous mass of nerve-tissue without obvious segmentation4 ,but the pairs of spinal nerves1 each nerve with its afferent and efferent 8root10 indicate a really segmented condition1 though in the cord itself the segments so run together and overlap that they cease to be externally obvious4 ,and there is a certain1 though limited1 amount of overlap in the distribution of these segmental nerves4 ,still1 well co-ordinated responses occur when comparatively short portions of the spinal cord are isolated by severance from the rest4 ,in the male frog1 especially during the breeding season1 a clasping reflex is produced by stimulating the dark swollen pads on the inner side of the hand1 and this1 as ,goltz has shown1 is exhibited when all the central nervous system has been destroyed save the segments to which the nerves for the arms proceed4 8,similarly10 writes ,dr4 ,sherrington1#aij 8in the cat and monkey1 the reflex wagging of the tail persists when behind the spinal transection only the sacral region of the cord is left intact40 ,when the spinal cord of the dog is severed1 so as to isolate that portion which is concerned with movements of the hinder part of the body1 pressure on the pad of one hind-foot usually produces1 not only a lifting of that leg1 but also an extension of its fellow--that is to say1 a co-ordinated response of the two limbs4 ,but in the case of the vertebrates1 more than in that of the invertebrates1 the co-ordinated response of an isolated part of the central nervous system seems to lack the furtherance of its action1 which normally comes from the higher centres from which it has been severed4 8,the spinal reflexes significant of progression seem10 says ,dr4 ,sherrington1#aia 8to contribute chiefly towards preparatory posture in readiness for the onset of action executed by the musculature under the driving of higher centres4 ,thus the well-known reflex spinal posture of the frog is flexion of the hind limbs1 the extensors of the joints being taut and ready for the jump4 ,the spinal reflexes1 which in their results approximate most closely to the normal reactions of the unmutilated individual1 are those connected with the pelvic and abdominal viscera10 many of which 8are executed as spinal reflexes in a manner presenting little or no physiological defect from the normal4 ,and if the bulb0--the continuation of the spinal cord within the skull to form the basal portion of the brain--8be included with the spinal cord1 and these together1 including their nerves1 be isolated from the rest of the nervous system1 the animal as regards its visceral life1 including that of the heart and lungs1 is practically intact40 ,huxley graphically describes the actions of a frog from which the cerebral hemispheres have been removed4 8,if that operation10 he says1#aib 8is performed quickly and skilfully1 the frog may be kept in a state of full bodily vigour for months1 or it may be for years2 but it will sit unmoved4 ,it sees nothing2 it hears nothing4 ,it will starve sooner than feed itself1 although food put into its mouth is swallowed4 ,on irritation1 it jumps or walks2 if thrown into water it swims4 ,if it be put on the hand it sits there1 crouched1 perfectly quiet1 and would sit there for ever4 ,if the hand be inclined very gently and slowly1 so that the frog would naturally tend to slip off1 the creature's fore paws are shifted on to the edge of the hand1 until he can just prevent himself from falling4 ,if the turning of the hand be slowly continued1 he mounts up with great care and deliberation1 putting first one leg forward and then another1 until he balances himself with perfect precision on the edge2 and if the turning of the hand is continued1 he goes through the needful set of muscular operations1 until he comes to be seated in security on the back of the hand4 ,the doing of all this requires a delicacy of co-ordination and a precision of adjustment of the muscular apparatus of the body which are only comparable to those of a rope-dancer40 ,now1 why have we entered into these details8 ,to reinforce1 from a somewhat different point of view1 that which has again and again been urged in the preceding sections of this inquiry1 that much of animal behaviour is an organic legacy4 ,a going mechanism of great delicacy1 with ready-made co-ordinations1 the products of biological evolution1 affords to consciousness a vast body of its primary data4 ,as ,dr4 ,sherrington himself says1#aic 8co-ordination is abundantly shown to result from the independent power of the spinal arcs1 altogether apart from the influence of the great cranial sense-organs1 and of the cerebral arcs superposed upon them4 ,these senses and the brain find the elementary co-ordination of the skeletal musculature an achievement already provided and to hand in the spinal cord4 ,and no doubt the product of the instrument is1 with the instrument itself1 given over to their use in the reactions they elicit from the spinal musculature40 ,we have seen how instinctive behaviour1 in those animals in which it is best studied1 affords in hereditary biological outline1 a sketch which subsequent acquisition1 under experience1 serves only to elaborate by the filling in of details and of the more delicate shading in behaviour4 ,but in the higher animals1 in which a period of youth is a time for the acquisition of experience--for experimentation and practice1--it might seem that the inherited biological legacy was of less importance4 ,the 8spinal animal10 as ,dr4 ,sherrington calls it1--that is1 the animal in which the spinal centres are isolated from the cerebral centres--goes far to disprove any such view4 ,in them the cerebral senses and the brain find elementary co-ordination of the bodily movements an achievement already provided and to hand in the spinal cord4 ,but when different animals are compared--frog1 bird1 rabbit1 dog1 and monkey--the permanent effects of severance of brain connection1 the effects which remain when the temporary period of disturbing 8shock0 is over1 are more marked in the higher than the lower types4 ,and concerning this1 ,dr4 ,sherrington says1#aid 8,the deeper depression of reaction into which the higher animal1 as contrasted with the lower1 sinks when made spinal1 appears to me significant of this1 that in the higher types1 more than in the lower1 the great cerebral senses actuate the motor organs1 and impel the motions of the individual40 ,whether in the animal in which all direct connection between the anterior and posterior portions of the central nervous system has been severed there is a double consciousness--a cerebral consciousness and a spinal consciousness--we are not in a position accurately to determine4 ,if the generally accepted opinion1 that the higher brain-centres constitute the sensorium or seat of consciousness1 be correct1 we must suppose that a maimed consciousness1 with many avenues of experience closed1 is retained in the anterior moiety1 while the posterior is relegated to a condition of mere sentience at best4 ,in any case all relation between the two is prevented4 ,the two--if two there be--are rendered quite independent through severance of the cord in the region of the neck4 ,but there is a point of view indicated by ,dr4 ,sherrington which is full of suggestion and interest4 8,it is significant in the evolution of animal form10 he says1#aie 8that the organ that exhibits most uninterrupted and harmonious increase in development1 as studied successively in passing from lowest to highest1 is the brain4 ,and it is significant that in the nervous system--segmental system as it is--the brain is developed1 not in those segments whose sense organs are ordinary cutaneous 7tactual1 etc471 muscular and visceral1 but in the segments connected with the visual1 olfactory1 and auditory sense-organs2 in other words1 the brain is developed in the head4 ,the head is1 so to say1 the individual2 it has the mouth1 it takes the food1 including air and water1 and it has the main sense organs providing data for both space and time4 ,to this the body1 an elongated motor organ with a share of the viscera and the skin1 is appended primarily as a machine for locomotion4 ,this latter must of necessity lie at the behest of the great sense organs of the head40 ,now let us try and picture to ourselves a spinal animal1 or one which retains only the lowest portion of the brain1 the part known as the bulb or medulla oblongata2 let us assume that it is conscious and capable of acquiring experience through the association and coalescence of the data afforded by the senses that remain to it2 and let us try to imagine the conscious situations which would arise1 and their value in the guidance of behaviour4 ,the senses that remain are touch and the temperature sense1 the motor sense affording data from the muscles1 joints1 and tendons1 and those which supply certain visceral sensations4 ,there is not one of much1 if any1 guiding value left4 ,there is not one of what we may term anticipatory use4 ,there is not one which could serve to infuse anything like definite meaning into the situation4 ,for1 after all1 meaning is expectation4 ,there is an element of anticipation in all those senses which are of any real guiding value in the conscious situation4 ,sight1 hearing1 and1 especially for some animals1 smell1--these are the senses which forewarn of something which may follow2 of other sensations with which in the course of experience they have coalesced4 ,and they are all cut off from the supposed spinal animal4 ,a light touch might in some cases forewarn of the shock or severe pressure1 which would perhaps follow4 ,but the shocks would so often come suddenly that it is questionable whether the warning would be of much avail4 ,still1 touch is a warning and cognitive sense1 and through it the environment would acquire a limited amount of meaning4 ,now1 the biological value of coalescent association lies in this very element of warning4 ,the anticipatory senses1 sight1 hearing1 smell1 are in their several degrees the 8projective0 senses1 the senses which carry with them the quantity of 8outness40 ,and their 8projective0 character is the necessary psychological expression of their distinctive biological end4 ,they must be projective1 must carry with them 8outness10 if they are to convey what we1 following ,dr4 ,stout1 have so often spoken of as meaning4 ,but if the biological value of coalescent association lies in the expectation it renders possible2 and if1 in the spinal animal1 there are no senses left save touch1 which could receive from the environment preparatory warning of what is coming2 it would seem exceedingly improbable that it should develop quasi-independent conscious situations of its own4 ,in the unmutilated animal1 at any rate1 tactual experience would most probably coalesce with that derived from the senses which more distinctively take the lead in the acquisition of meaning4 ,and we may therefore1 on these grounds1 as well as on others1 acquiesce in the current view that the quasi-independent functioning of the spinal cord and its constituent segments is1 at best1 lit up with those flashes of mere sentience of which ,sir ,michael ,foster speaks in the passage we quoted in an earlier section4#aif ,if from the consideration of the isolated spinal animal we turn for a moment to that of the isolated cerebral animal1 we find it in a very different position4 ,it is possessed of the warning senses--those which from several points of view are the leading senses--but they are leaders without a following2 they have only a very limited company to conduct into action4 ,the company is there1 on the further side of the severance1 but they have lost touch with it4 ,they know not what it is doing1 and have therefore neither the data nor the executive power to guide its manuvres in the field of behaviour4 ,they can form maimed coalescent situations1 but they are as impotent as a mere theorist devoid of all power of practical application4 ,we need not1 however1 follow the theme further4 ,we need only add that1 could we isolate tracts of nervous tissue in the lower brain-centres of such a cerebral animal1 we should find that subsidiary co-ordinations would belong1 as a physiological heritage1 to these isolated fragments4 ,the conclusions we may draw1 then1 with regard to the evolution of behaviour1 as viewed in its physiological aspect1 are that it is1 in its simplest expression and in its most complex1 conditioned by sufficient unity of purpose to meet the biological end of survival2 that the complex unity of purpose may be analyzed into a multiplicity of subsidiary processes each with its subsidiary unity of purpose2 and that the psychological coalescence which gives unity to experience under the guidance of the leading senses1 is paralleled in a physiological coalescence within the nexus of the nervous system4 ,,ii4--,,the ,,biological ,,aspect ,the biological aspect of behaviour--its relation to biological ends--has so often come under our consideration in the foregoing chapters that little need be added in this section3 and that little may be most appropriately devoted1 first to the question whether consciousness does influence behaviour2 and secondly1 this being accepted1 to the importance of the rle that is played by the development of conscious situations in securing1 in the higher animals1 the biological end of racial preservation4 ,that this end is secured without the aid of consciousness in the case of many organic species1 in all those1 for example1 which we classify as plants1 must not be taken as presumptive evidence that in other species1 for instance in the multitudinous host of insects1 the development of conscious situations is of no biological value4 ,the fact that chlorophyll is not developed in any mammal does not show that the possession of this substance is of no service to the higher plants4 ,it would not be worth while to give expression to this very obvious truth1 were it not that critics of natural selection persistently argue that because one species gets on perfectly well without this or that particular character it can have played no part in securing the survival of another species4 ,when ,i described1 at a meeting of naturalists1 how well young chicks could swim1 such a critic drew me aside after the meeting1 and expressed his surprise that this did not convince me that the webbed foot of the duck could not logically be attributed to natural selection4 ,this is an extreme case1 and one obviously taken on peculiarly weak grounds4 ,but even ,huxley urged that1 because a frog1 from which the cerebral hemispheres have been removed1 performs many co-ordinated actions without conscious guidance1 consciousness is1 throughout nature1 merely an accompaniment of certain molecular changes in the brain4 8,such a frog10 he says1#aig 8walks1 hops1 swims1 and goes through his gymnastic performances quite as well without consciousness1 and consequently without volition1 as with it2 and if a frog1 in his natural state1 possesses anything corresponding with what we call volition1 there is no reason to think that it is anything but a concomitant of the molecular changes in the brain which form part of the series involved in the production of motion4 8,the consciousness of brutes10 he continues1 8would appear to be related to the mechanism of their body simply as a collateral product of its working1 and to be as completely without any power of modifying that working as the steam-whistle which accompanies the work of a locomotive engine is without influence on its machinery4 ,their volition1 if they have any1 is an emotion indicative of physical changes1 not a cause of such changes4 ,it does not enter into the chain of causation of their actions at all40 ,if the literal truth of this contention--the logical soundness of this conclusion--be admitted1 it seems absurd to speak of the biological value of consciousness in behaviour or to discuss the importance of the rle that is played by the development of conscious situations in securing the biological end of racial preservation4 ,now1 consciousness is regarded by an influential school of thinkers as a sort of deus ex machina1 which1 sitting enthroned1 and crowned with a capital letter as ,will1 directs1 like a being from another sphere1 the doings of the body4 ,it was against the doctrines of this school that ,huxley took up arms4 ,they do not concern us here4 ,the will1 or volition1 as an underlying cause1 stands outside the pale of scientific inquiry4 ,it belongs to the wide realm of metaphysics2 its plea must be heard in another court4 ,in this part of his contention ,huxley was1 we believe1 unquestionably right from the scientific standpoint4 ,neither will1 nor impulse1 nor instinct1 nor consciousness itself1 should be introduced into any scientific description or explanation of phenomena as a cause of their existence or being1 for as such it does not enter into the sequence of events2 it is that which metaphysics claims as their raison d'tre--that which gives them being4 ,science in this matter should be frankly agnostic--neither affirming nor denying aught4 ,this1 of course1 is not equivalent to saying that the agnostic position is the true end of human reason4 ,that would only be so on the assumption that the problems of science are the only problems with which that reason can deal4 ,to exclude metaphysics from science is not to exclude it from human thought4 ,as a matter of fact such exclusion is neither possible nor reasonable4 ,but to clearly distinguish the problems of science from those of metaphysics is absolutely necessary1 if we are to prevent hopeless confusion of issues4 ,in contending1 however1 against the introduction of metaphysical doctrines into the region of scientific explanation1 ,huxley seems to have been carried too far by the force of his own attack4 ,so long as he held to the position that every conscious state has1 as its concomitant1 a molecular change in the brain1 he had all the forces of evolution on his side4 ,but when he said that consciousness is merely the steam-whistle of life's locomotive1 or merely answers to the sound which the animal-bell gives out when it is struck1 he takes up another position of far less strategical strength4 ,for whereas the frog from which the physical centres of consciousness have been removed sits crouched and motionless1 and 8will starve sooner than feed itself1 although food put into its mouth is swallowed20 the frog in which conscious situations can take form in unmutilated cerebral hemispheres behaves in a very different manner4 ,it is nothing less than pure assumption to say that the consciousness1 which is admitted to be present1 has practically no effect whatever upon the behaviour4 ,and we must ask any evolutionist who accepts this conclusion1 how he accounts on evolutionary grounds for the existence of a useless adjunct to neural processes4 8,it is10 says ,huxley1#aih 8experimentally demonstrable--any one who cares to run a pin into himself may perform a sufficient demonstration of the fact--that a mode of motion of the nervous system is the immediate antecedent of a state of consciousness4 ,we have as much reason for regarding the mode of motion as the cause of the state of consciousness1 as we have for regarding any event as the cause of another4 ,how the one phenomenon causes the other we know as much1 or as little1 as in any other case of causation2 but we have as much right to believe that the sensation is an effect of the molecular change1 as we have to believe that motion is an effect of impact2 and there is as much propriety in saying that the brain evolves sensation1 as there is in saying that an iron rod1 when hammered1 evolves heat40 ,but if we speak of the related antecedent as the cause1 it is not obvious why we should not describe the desire to demonstrate the supposed fact as the cause of running in the pin4 ,we seem to have just as much reason for calling this antecedent state of consciousness the cause of certain movements and behaviour1 as of calling a mode of motion in the brain the cause of a further state of consciousness4 ,it is true that we have not the least idea how the desire can cause the act2 but ,huxley practically admits that we have no idea how molecular change can be the cause of consciousness4 ,in the one case we are no worse off than we are in the other4 ,neither position is logically defensible2 since each assumes that physical events and states of consciousness can constitute links in the same causal chain4 ,the philosophical hypothesis known as monism regards the molecular change1 not as the antecedent of a conscious state1 but as its concomitant4 ,that which from a physical and physiological point of view is a complex molecular disturbance is1 at the same time1 from a psychological point of view1 a state of consciousness4 ,the two are different aspects of one natural occurrence4 ,why such an occurrence should have two so different aspects we have not the faintest idea2 but here we are not one whit worse off than we were before4 ,the hypothesis does1 however1 help us to get over our difficulty4 ,an essential feature of ,huxley's contention is that the physical and physiological chain of causation is complete in itself1 which may be granted2 and further1 that if consciousness does arise it is merely an adjunct without influence on the sequence of events--what is influential is the molecular disturbance1 not the consciousness which accompanies it4 ,but according to monism the state of consciousness actually is that very same something which the physiologist calls1 in the language of physics1 a molecular disturbance4 ,and in saying that consciousness influences behaviour one who accepts this hypothesis is merely avoiding a cumbrous form of circumlocution4 ,he puts it in this way instead of saying that the nerve-changes in the cerebral hemispheres1 or elsewhere1 which from a psychological point of view are a conscious situation1 influence and determine the course of behaviour4 ,but from this point of view it is absurd to say that the consciousness is merely an adjunct--absurd to say that were there no conscious situation the neural situation would remain unchanged4 ,they are the very same thing from different points of view2 and to say there is no influential conscious situation is simply equivalent to saying that there is not this determining neural situation4 ,however we explain the fact1 there are few who hesitate to accept it for the purposes of scientific explanation4 ,the conscious situation1 having no doubt for the physiologist a neural aspect if he could only get at it as a whole1 does practically determine the behaviour of the animal which has gained the requisite experience4 ,if we accept the fact1 we may pass on to its importance in securing the biological end of race preservation4 ,it is a commonplace of evolutionary doctrine that1 other things being equal1 those races will survive1 in the constituent members of which intelligent behaviour enables them to deal most effectually with an environment of increasing complexity4 ,and it is a matter of familiar observation that such behaviour is closely connected with delicacy and refinement of development in those senses which take the lead in cognitional process1 and with rapidity and precision in the motor co-ordination through which prompt and skilful advantage is taken of the situation which has1 through experience1 acquired meaning4 ,but though the importance of intelligent adjustment to the circumstances of life is widely admitted as a general principle1 it is perhaps through a study of animal behaviour that we are best able to realize its full range and extent4 ,biologists are so largely1 and quite wisely1 occupied in the study of morphological and physiological problems1 which admit of a treatment more exact than the most ardent advocate of the investigation of behaviour1 under natural or even under experimental conditions1 can claim2 they devote1 again quite rightly1 so large a share of attention to the variation and natural selection of adaptive structure in its adult condition and embryonic stages2 the pendulum of opinion has1 under the teaching of ,professor ,weismann1 swung so far in the direction of the non-acceptance of the hereditary transmission of characters individually acquired through intelligent adjustment or otherwise2 that the part played by consciousness in the evolution of the higher and more active animals is apt to pass unnoticed or unrecorded4 ,it is well1 therefore1 to put in a reminder that a great number of animals would never reach the adult state in which they pass into the hands of the comparative anatomist save for the acquisition of experience1 and the effective use of the consciousness to which they are heirs2 that their survival is due1 not only to their possession of certain structures and organs1 but1 every whit as much1 to the practical use to which these possessions are put in the give and take of active life2 and that many interesting problems which are keenly discussed by evolutionists in the light of natural selection presuppose conscious situations which are more or less tacitly taken for granted4 ,let us cast a rapid glance over some of these topics of biological discussion4 ,the fascinating subject of mimicry1 involving as it necessarily does the discussion of the value of warning colours and behaviour1 a subject opening up an extensive group of problems so brilliantly studied by ,professor ,poulton1 is meaningless save in so far as there is implied a conscious reaction to colour and form on the part of animals which can learn from experience4 ,the warning colours reinstate a conscious situation1 so that1 misled by appearances1 a bird mistakes the mimicking insect for its nauseous 8model40 ,the whole range of behaviour1 included under play1 experimentation1 and practice1 on the importance of which1 following the lead so ably given by ,professor ,groos1 we have insisted1 is equally meaningless1 save as a means to the acquisition of serviceable experience for use in the more serious business of after-life2 and experience is the establishment1 through association and coalescence1 of conscious situations which possess guiding value4 ,and if1 as we shall hereafter see1 they may also be regarded as a means of securing pleasure1 as a psychological end of behaviour1 it is not less obvious that it is only through the development of consciousness that such a psychological end can have any existence4 ,it matters not if the particular form assumed by play and experimentation be largely dependent on instinctive tendencies4 ,for all the phenomena of instinct1 profoundly organic as are the modes of behaviour comprised under this head1 definite as are the inherited co-ordinations in the most typical examples of its occurrence1 have also1 except in some doubtful cases1 a conscious aspect4 ,at any rate this is the case in so far as instinctive response forms the hereditary basis on which is reared a more nicely adjusted intelligent edifice1 in so far as instinctive procedure is subsequently modified and guided by acquired experience1 in so far as there creeps in that 8little dose of judgment0 which ,huber found in bees1 ,lord ,avebury attributes to ants1 ,dr4 ,peckham sees in spiders and solitary wasps1 and all observers find in birds and mammals4 ,for if in these cases instinctive behaviour were unconscious1 it would1 as such1 remain outside experience2 and if outside experience1 there could be no data on which consciousness could base any modification of inherited behaviour1 no opportunity of taking up the ready-formed responses into the mental synthesis and utilizing them for the wider ends of intelligent purpose4 ,in social behaviour there is a reciprocity of suggestion between the members of the community4 ,and such suggestion is operative through an appeal to consciousness4 ,however instinctive the forms of procedure may be in social insects1 there remains much beyond which is hard to explain on the hypothesis that there is1 in them1 nothing analogous to a conscious situation2 while in such vertebrates as birds and mammals we cannot but believe that consciousness is the main determinant of much behaviour which seems to imply the germs1 or more than the germs1 of sympathy4 ,the little monkey ,i saw in ,hamburg cuddling up caressingly to a wounded companion1 must surely have experienced a conscious situation analogous to that which prompts a child to nestle alongside her companion in distress4 ,and he who has seen no signs of sympathy in dogs1 has either watched their behaviour in vain1 or is himself lacking in sympathy4 ,in sexual selection by preferential mating1 even if we follow ,professor ,groos in believing that it is a special mode of natural selection1 the conscious situation is essential4 ,if we accept the theory in any form1 we must regard the adornments1 antics1 and display of the male as an appeal in some way to the consciousness of the female1 whatever particular form the effects in that consciousness may take1 whether the appeal evoke a sense of beauty1 or simply be a means of exciting to the consummation of the natural end of courtship4 ,even if we follow ,mr4 ,wallace in regarding plume and song as 8recognition marks10 it is only by their appeal to consciousness in this way1 if in no other1 that they are of any biological value4 ,and this1 of course1 applies equally to the whole range of his theory of recognition marks--their sole utility lies in their being a stimulus to consciousness through which the end of recognition is secured4 ,so1 too1 not only the specialized behaviour which we dignify by the name of 8courtship10 but every case in which mate is drawn to mate through sight1 smell1 hearing--any of the leading senses--testifies to the importance of consciousness in furthering an end of supreme biological importance4 ,and if1 as ,darwin urged1 the 8law of battle0 among the males co-operates with preferential mating1 as we can hardly deny1 in securing strong1 vigorous1 and healthy fathers of the generation they beget1 here1 too1 consciousness is an important factor4 ,can we conceive a 8law of battle0 among unconscious beings8 ,if success in the combat were a mere matter of brute strength1 it would imply some consciousness in its dull exercise4 ,but it is more4 ,it is also a trial of skill4 ,were it not so our forefathers would not have spent hours in watching a cock-fight1 or laid heavy odds on their particular 8fancy40 ,we need not labour the theme4 ,in the search for food or a nesting site1 in the capture of prey and escape from enemies1 in all that demands attention1 and in all that necessitates practice1 in what ,m4 ,houssay calls 8the industries of animals10 and in that which ,mr4 ,hudson calls 8tradition10 consciousness has a part to play4 ,even plants unconsciously appeal to the consciousness of insects1 birds1 and mammals4 ,their bright1 scented1 nectar-bearing flowers1 and their sweet1 coloured fruits are means of effecting the biological ends of fertilization and the dissemination of seeds1 but only on condition that their colours stimulate the sense of sight1 and their scent and sweetness the senses of smell and taste4 ,it is1 perhaps1 going too far to claim that1 wherever sense-organs exist they imply at least some dim and rudimentary form of conscious situation of guiding value so far as it goes2 for it is possible that in some cases the coalescence of elementary items of sentience has not been carried far enough to justify us in speaking of experience by which the animal can profit4 ,but it is surely not going too far to claim that1 wherever two or three such sense-organs are gathered together in any living being1 there is consciousness in the midst of them1 beginning to exercise that guidance which serves so markedly to differentiate the typical animal from the typical plant4 ,but throughout the animal kingdom1 until we reach its highest development in man1 the guidance of consciousness1 important as it is1 seems to be almost wholly subservient to a biological end1 that of the preservation of the race1 and for the race of the individual4 ,practical utility is the touchstone of animal intelligence1 and of the whole range of feeling and emotion in beings still under examination in the stern school of natural selection4 ,by this we mean that practical utility has determined what degree and complexity of intelligence1 feeling1 and emotion shall be attained4 ,if the requisite level be not attained--elimination4 ,higher levels no doubt bring advantage--so long as they are practically useful4 ,but in the school of natural selection useless accomplishments are not much taught4 ,although its examinations are in a sense competitive1 all are allowed to pass who qualify for survival4 ,but the competitors become more numerous and the standard for a pass rises4 ,as the school increases in size higher classes with harder problems to solve are established4 ,progress is an incident of the constant survival of the fittest when there are variations in fitness4 ,,iii4--,,the ,,psychological ,,aspect ,on the hypothesis of monism1 the nature of which1 so far as it bears on our inquiry1 was briefly indicated in the foregoing section1 the conscious situation is the psychical or mental expression of that which for the physiologist is what we may term a neural situation4 ,as such it does not enter into the chain of physical causation2 nor do physical events as such--that is to say1 save as experienced--enter into the chain of mental causation4 ,for mental development they have no independent existence1 and are negligible except in so far as they enter as items of experience into the conscious situation4 ,but altogether apart from the way or ways in which we may attempt to explain the fact1 most of us believe1 with unquestioning confidence1 that the growth of practical experience1 somehow associated with nervous changes in the brain or sensorium1 is of real value in the guidance of behaviour in such manner as to secure biological ends4 ,conscious experience must therefore1 in the animal world1 serve its biological purpose1 or it will be of no avail4 ,if there be not a pre-established harmony1 there must be an evolved harmony2 and how such a harmony could be evolved if consciousness be not by some means in vital touch with behaviour1 influenced by and in turn influencing it1 we cannot conceive4 ,the steam-whistle theory of consciousness leaves the matter1 for the evolutionist1 in this inconceivable position4 ,we need not1 however1 flog a dead horse4 ,we need not ask how1 on the steam-whistle theory1 those states of feeling which we broadly classify as pleasurable could become associated with behaviour conducing to welfare1 and those which we group as hurtful with behaviour which is biologically harmful4 ,it is more important1 again1 to notice that1 associated and consonant with the biological end1 there arises a psychological end of behaviour--what we may term1 with the qualifications before considered1#aii the getting of pleasure and the avoidance of pain4 ,this is the purpose of behaviour as viewed from the psychological aspect4 ,the biological end of animal conation is racial survival2 its psychological end is individual satisfaction4 ,and the two ends are1 in the main and broadly speaking1 consonant--a result which would unquestionably be secured by natural selection1 but is on any other naturalistic hypothesis difficult of explanation4 ,but the two ends are not only consonant2 they are supplementary one to the other4 ,during much of the life of the higher animals there is no need1 immediately present and pressing1 for the output of action to meet biological ends4 ,there are periods of life and intervals of time when the sharp incidence of the struggle for existence does not call for the serious business of behaviour4 ,but at these periods and in these intervals the animal is not inactive2 indeed1 it is restless in its activity4 ,unless it be weary with unwonted exertion1 or basking in the psychical sunshine of content1 due to the unsought advent of pleasant stimulation or the after-effects of previous behaviour 7for example1 when hunger has been relieved71 the healthy animal must be up and doing4 ,this familiar fact no doubt affords the basis in observation of the surplus-energy theory of play4 ,but is it necessarily surplus energy8 ,is it not rather normal energy which expends itself in this way when there is no immediate and serious biological business on hand8 ,and1 as ,professor ,groos has pointed out1 play is seen when we have every reason to suppose there is no surplus energy1 nay1 even when the normal energy is at a low ebb4 ,there is no more pathetic sight than a sick kitten1 with energy obviously much below par1 utilizing its little remaining strength in feeble attempts to play4 ,it is unnecessary to do more than remind the reader of the theory elaborated with so much skill and care by ,professor ,groos1 that the forms assumed by play--in which1 it will be remembered1 he includes a very wide range of behaviour--have a very important indirect biological end in practice and experimentation4 ,our present point is1 that its direct psychological end is the satisfaction it affords4 ,without this the individual would not be impelled to the continuance of performances which occupy a wide space in the field of animal behaviour in which the biological end has reference1 not to present requirements1 but to future needs4 ,no one has given better expression to the sway of this psychological end than ,mr4 ,w4 ,h4 ,hudson4 8,we see10 he says1#bjj 8that the inferior animals1 when the conditions of life are favourable1 are subject to periodical fits of gladness1 affecting them powerfully and standing out in vivid contrast to their ordinary temper4 ,and we know what this feeling is--this periodic intense elation which even civilized man occasionally experiences when in perfect health1 more especially when young4 ,there are moments when he is mad with joy1 when he cannot keep still1 when his impulse is to sing and shout aloud and laugh at nothing1 to run and leap and exert himself in some extravagant way4 ,among the heavier mammalians the feeling is manifested in loud noises1 bellowings1 and screamings1 and in lumbering1 uncouth motions--throwing up the heels1 pretended panics1 and ponderous mock battles4 8,in smaller and livelier animals1 with greater celerity and certitude in their motions1 the feeling shows itself in more regular and often in more complex ways4 ,thus ,felid1 when young1 and in very agile sprightly species1 like the puma1 throughout life1 simulate all the actions of an animal hunting its prey--sudden1 intense excitement of discovery1 concealment1 gradual advance1 masked by intervening objects1 with intervals of watching1 when they crouch motionless1 the eyes flashing and tail waved from side to side2 finally1 the rush and spring1 when the playfellow is captured1 rolled over on his back1 and worried to imaginary death4 ,other species of the most diverse kinds1 in which voice is greatly developed1 join in noisy concerts and choruses2 many of the cats may be mentioned1 also dogs and foxes1 capybaras and other loquacious rodents2 and in the howling monkeys this kind of performance rises to the sublime uproar of the tropical forest at eventide4 8,birds are more subject to this universal joyous instinct than mammals1 and there are times when some species are constantly overflowing with it2 and as they are so much freer than mammals1 more buoyant and graceful in action1 more loquacious1 and have voices so much finer1 their gladness shows itself in a greater variety of ways1 with more regular and beautiful motions1 and with melody4 ,but every species or group of species has its own inherited form or style of performance2 and however rude and irregular this may be1 as in the case of the pretended stampedes and fights of wild cattle1 that is the form in which the feeling will always be expressed40 ,that all this1 which ,mr4 ,hudson so graphically describes1 belongs to the psychological aspect of animal behaviour and is directly prompted by conative tendencies whose immediate end is conscious satisfaction1 the mere joy of unrestrained and healthy activity1 may be freely admitted1 without denying that all this exuberant psychical life owes its evolution to the fact that it is in consonance with and supplemental to biological ends which secure survival4 ,it is with animals as it is with man2 play is the preparation for earnest4 ,as ,i have elsewhere said1#bja what our national games have done for the ,english race it is difficult to overestimate4 ,they train us to use our bodies and expend our energies to the best advantage4 ,an old soldier1 watching a football match1 said1 8,that's the training for our future soldiers and sailors40 ,the playing fields are the finest school of organized co-operation in the world4 ,but1 apart from compulsion1 a boy will not enter into the game with that zest through which alone it acquires real value for training1 unless there be an immediate psychological end in the satisfaction he derives4 ,and with animals practice and preparation for the business of life could not occur if the ultimate biological purpose of it all were not supplemented by the enjoyment it brings for its own sake4 ,but in animal play1 as indeed in that of human youth1 we are perhaps a little apt1 in laying stress on the bodily skill and readiness of response to which it so effectually ministers1 to forget that it is also a psychological training4 ,in technical phraseology1 we are disposed to fix our attention on the acquired co-ordination of act and movement rather than on the correlation of conscious data1 which renders possible the skilful performance4 ,and yet1 rightly considered1 the behaviour itself is simply the outcome of a conscious situation1 duly elaborated1 and knit together through the association and coalescence of its constituent data4 ,it is a means to the unification of consciousness by bringing into relation scattered and1 at first1 quasi-independent sensory and emotional elements4 ,success is only attained through the concentration of attention and effort on that which is the centre of interest and also the focus of endeavour4 ,and this close attention and well-directed effort1 which are trained in the playful output of energy1 are just the mental qualities which will stand the animal in good stead when the real incidence of life's struggle comes upon it1 when the reward of success is survival and the penalty of failure elimination4 ,for they are not merely physical qualities1 though their effects are bodily movements of attack and defence1 of active escape1 or merely 8lying low40 ,they are essential psychological features of a unified and well-directed conative process4 ,in the fairly abundant play-time of animal life1 this unification and direction of conative process can take form under conditions wherein the preliminary failures which accompany all forms of learning do not entail the severe penalty of elimination4 ,if we may so put it1 and so apply a deeply instructive parable1 ,natural ,selection says to her more favoured children1 in which conscious situations can be developed1 8,here are the talents with which ,i have endowed you2 make use of them till ,i come1 as come ,i shall in due time40 ,this animal puts them out to usury in play2 that animal keeps them laid up in the napkin of inactivity4 ,then ,natural ,selection1 the austere one1 comes2 gives the commendation of survival to the animal that had learnt to put its talents to use in the period of preparation1 and condemns to elimination that which had not traded with his talents at the bank of play4 ,in animal life1 on the perceptual plane1 we have the same need for training in little things and seemingly unimportant matters in preparation for the stress and storm which may1 nay must1 come upon them1 that we find in men and women on the higher ethical plane4 ,to those who think that the play of animals is too trifling a thing to affect the question of survival1 we would suggest the application1 with a necessary difference1 of the thought which ,miss ,edith ,simcox puts into the following words3 8,does it10 she says1 8seem a trifling thing to say that in the hours of passionate trial and temptation a man can have no better help than his own past8 ,every generous feeling that has not been crushed1 every wholesome impulse that has been followed1 every just perception1 every habit of unselfish action1 will be present in the background to guide or to sustain4 ,it is too late1 when the storm has burst1 to provide our craft with rigging fit to weather it2 but we may find a purpose for the years that oppress us by their dull calm1 if we elect to spend them in laying up stores of strength and wisdom and emotional prejudices of a goodly human kind1 whereby1 if need arises1 we may be able to resist hereafter the gusts of passion that might else bear us out of the straightforward course40 ,to apply the thought1 the trifles of play supply the psychological rigging which alone can save the animal craft in the coming storm of the struggle for existence4 ,and the point on which we have to lay special stress in this section is1 that it is psychological rigging--or1 if this seems to lay too much emphasis on the genesis of conscious situations1 we may at least urge that the psychological ropes are of co-ordinate importance with the biological spars4 ,so far1 then1 we reach the following conclusion3 that if we classify the behaviour of the higher and more intelligent animals under two heads1 the one comprising all those acts which are of direct biological value in enabling the animal to escape elimination under the immediate stress of the struggle for existence1 and the other including all those acts which are of indirect preparatory or educative value1 the latter1 which are under their biological aspect not less important than the former1 are under their psychological aspect of perhaps even greater importance4 ,for the conditions of actual struggle are not those under which mental development could most easily be furthered1 though they are those in which it is most effectually tested4 ,hence1 the more intelligent animals pass through a period during which they are more or less shielded from the incidence of natural selection by their parents1 and this is the period of play and of psychological education4 ,and the tendency to play is so far organic1 in that it is dependent on inherited instinctive propensities1 and so far psychological in that it is accompanied by a felt want1 which constitutes a conative impulse finding its appropriate end in the consciousness of satisfaction4 ,but play--if we accept the term as the group-name for all these modes of behaviour which fall under our second class1 those of indirect biological value--does not cease with the period of youth2 it occupies all the intervals in the more serious business of animal life4 ,and no discussion of animal behaviour can be adequate which does not assign to this class its due place1 alike in biological and in psychological evolution4 ,the whole value of experience lies in the linkage and coalescence of the data afforded to consciousness4 ,it is true that an inherited nervous system supplies the organic conditions of that physiological linkage and functional coalescence of which experience is the psychological expression4 ,it is true that this physical integration secures a ready-made grouping of the conscious data which are the concomitants of orderly molecular changes in the brain or analogous sensorium4 ,still1 it also remains true that the value of experience lies in the further linkage and coalescence that is acquired by the individual in the course of what we may fitly call its education4 ,every step in this education gets its psychological sanction through the satisfaction it affords in consciousness2 and the time of acquisition is not during the stress of examination in the actual struggle for existence1 but rather in the youthful period and in the subsequent intervals of preparation and practice during the play-time of animal life4 ,the examination analogy--if1 indeed1 it may not be rightly regarded as something more than an analogy--may be pressed a little further as a means of fixing our attention on two points which are worthy of consideration4 ,the first is that1 in the preparation for the examination1 specific practice as much of it is1 cramming is not the system exemplified by the higher animals4 ,a good all-round education in the acquisition of conscious situations more or less coalescent into a unified system of experience1 and in their effective utilization without unnecessary delay and bungling along more or less converging lines of practical behaviour2 this is what secures a 8pass0 in survival1 especially where the circumstances of life have reached a considerable degree of complexity4 ,the instinctive act1 with its relatively definite response to a question which is almost certain to be set to every candidate for survival1 is that1 which is the analogue in behaviour to the result of a system of cram4 ,organic nature does employ this system in the lower classes of her school2 definite responses are ground into merely instinctive types generation after generation1 and the right answers are given1 automatically and unintelligently1 whenever the oft-recurrent questions are set4 ,but this will not do when the questions require the exercise of intelligence1 when they are of the nature of problems1 with just those delicate but not unimportant shades of difference which baffle the candidate who has been drilled in a merely mechanical fashion4 ,hence the cramming of instinct does not suffice for animals whose environment presents problems of greater variety and greater complexity4 ,intelligence is required to meet the particular combinations as they arise4 ,the greyhound1 which is loosed on a hare1 has never seen that hare run in exactly that way over that special tract of country4 ,but he has been trained in such situations1 and is thus prepared to meet the special problem in its details as they present themselves in the light of the experience he has gained of other like problems4 ,and his skill in pursuit has not only been gained through education in coursing4 ,in a thousand ways1 as puppy and dog1 he has learnt how to use well those sinewy limbs4 ,the training of his whole life is brought to bear on the question immediately before him4 ,the general bearing of these facts is obvious4 ,play1 as a means of animal education1 is varied1 and has for its end all-round training of the animal mind in its sphere of operation4 ,although there are some specific propensities1 certain observable trends of behaviour1 as in hunting-play1 courtship-play1 and the like1 we must not expect1 nor do we find1 anything like stereotyped definiteness of conative activity4 ,we find that freedom and elasticity in animal education which is1 perhaps1 more often advocated than carried into practice in human education4 ,the second point arising out of the examination analogy is1 that its range determines the level of preparation therefor4 ,it is1 for animals1 a practical examination1 not a theoretical4 ,not a single question is set demanding an explanation4 ,the problems are such as can be solved by intelligence1 not such as require the exercise of reason1 as we have used the term in foregoing pages4 ,these higher problems are only set when the sixth form is reached1 and there is no conclusive evidence that any animals get into the sixth4 ,this1 however1 is entirely a question of evidence1 and many of us will be glad to welcome them there1 if proved ability to deal reflectively with ideational questions justifies their promotion4 ,if any of them do belong to this form1 they have probably got there through play4 ,for in the stress of the actual examination there is not much time for reflection4 ,or perhaps we may rather say that1 not in actual struggle1 and not in active preparation for it in play-time1 but in intervals of leisure between both1 when the animal lies quietly turning over in his mind we know not what1 will experience be reviewed1 and generalizations drawn as to the why of events in this strange world4 ,probably the animal accepts things as they are1 and does not trouble about their explanation4 ,but it may not be so4 ,at any rate1 if animals lack the means of descriptive inter-communication1 and have no words as concrete pegs on which to hang abstract ideas1 their explanations cannot be carried far4 ,theories without the power of disputation would be a poor solace in leisure moments4 ,one more point may be noticed with regard to the psychological aspect of the evolution of behaviour--the reciprocal action of intelligence4 ,it is the intelligence of others that introduces so much variety and complexity into the environment4 ,hunters and hunted1 combatants1 rivals1 mate and mate1 enemies or companions in their varied aspects1 introduce through their intelligence complications which only intelligence can meet4 ,and1 as intelligence begets intelligence1 so do emotional attitudes beget answering emotional states4 ,psychological evolution translated into practical behaviour gives rise to situations of reciprocal complexity4 ,this point of view is1 however1 so familiar1 that nothing need be said in its further elucidation4 ,the behaviour of any given animal does not stand alone1 but is closely related with the behaviour of others4 ,among social animals the relationships are peculiarly close1 and it is among them that the psychological aspect of behaviour reaches its highest expression4 ,,iv4--,,continuity ,,in ,,evolution ,under the head of organic behaviour1 in the widest acceptation of the term1 fall the whole of physiology1 the whole of embryological development1 nay1 more1 the whole of organic evolution2 while mental evolution1 in all its stages1 may be regarded as the psychological aspect of that which1 from the physiological aspect1 is the evolution of nervous systems4 ,life itself is the behaviour of a particular kind of substance which is found more or less abundantly under natural conditions4 ,no other known substance behaves in this way1 and so ignorant are we as to the conditions of its natural origin1 that it is useless to guess at a scientific explanation4 ,and even if we knew all the antecedents and conditions of its origin we should be no nearer a comprehension of why protoplasm has the peculiar properties which we find it to possess4 ,that is a question to which science can give no answer4 ,who knows why a certain compound of oxygen and hydrogen in certain proportions has the properties of that which we call water8 ,let us note the distinction between saying1 as we said above1 that life is the behaviour of protoplasm1 and asserting that life is the cause of this behaviour4 ,the one is a scientific statement of observed fact1 the other an explanation of the fact in metaphysical terms1 a reference of the fact to its underlying cause4 ,so long as we quite clearly understand that we are talking the language of metaphysics1 we may speak of life as a cause of organic behaviour2 but let us be careful to remember that the statement has no more value for science than the assertion that aqueosity is the cause of the behaviour of water4 ,leaving on one side1 then1 the natural origin of protoplasm1 the conditions of which are unknown1 we find that1 as a matter of observation1 every bit of living substance1 the history of which has been traced1 is a fragment detached from some other bit which behaved in the same way4 ,this is the basal fact of the continuity of organic evolution4 ,but such a detached fragment has the property of increasing by taking up from the environment more of those elementary materials from which it is itself compounded in subtle synthesis4 ,nay1 further1 every fragment of which we know the history is found to increase in such a way as to reach1 in form1 structure1 and idiosyncracies of behaviour1 the likeness of the organism--plant or animal--from which it was derived4 ,in the higher plants and animals the separated fragments or cells are the ova and sperms1 or their equivalents1 which unite1 with fusion or coalescence of their nuclear matter1 and thus give rise to a new individual in the course of embryological development4 ,now1 as we have already seen1 much modern biological discussion centres round the question whether the detached reproductive fragment1 ovum or sperm as the case may be1 is derived from the whole body of the parent1 by what ,darwin termed pangenesis or in some other way1 or only from germinal substance set apart in development for this end4 ,and we have provisionally accepted the hypothesis that it is the direct descendant of other reproductive cells2 and that1 throughout a long ancestry1 stretching back into the far past1 there never occurs in the direct line of genealogical sequence1 any highly differentiated cell1 such as a gland-cell1 muscle-cell1 nerve-cell2 never1 with certain reservations into which we need not enter1 is found the representative of any tissue save that to which the reproductive function is restricted4 ,in technical phraseology1 the continuity of organic evolution is due to the continuity of the germinal substance4 ,during embryological development the fertilized ovum--consisting of two fused fragments of this germinal substance--gives rise to a host of ordered and marshalled cells1 which are divisible into two groups3 the one forms the body with its muscles1 bones1 glands1 digestive system1 skin1 sense-organs1 nerve-centres1 and so forth2 the other forms a reserve store of germinal substance1 from which are derived the ova and sperms4 ,the former take no direct share in reproduction2 they are off the line of continuous descent2 they die without issue4 ,but they protect and minister to the reproductive function of the second group--the potential ancestors of the races to follow4 ,but all instinctive and intelligent behaviour is the outcome of the orderly working of the nervous system1 is initiated through sensory stimulation1 and is executed by the motor organs2 and all the structural parts1 through which such behaviour is possible1 belong to the body--that which dies without issue4 ,how1 then1 can instinct and intelligence be inherited8 ,in a sense they are not inherited4 ,the nervous system which is their organic basis begets no heirs4 ,but it is begotten of germinal substance1 which not only produced the body of which the nervous system is a part1 but also handed on1 with that body1 samples of the same germinal substance capable of reproducing a similar body and a like nervous system4 ,herein lies the basis of heredity4 ,the stress of the struggle for existence falls upon the body2 and instinctive or intelligent behaviour is a means to its preservation in the struggle for existence4 ,according as it survives or not1 will the samples of germinal substance it contains fulfil their biological end or perish with it4 ,natural selection secures the survival of those animals which bear the seed from which their like will be developed4 ,on this view all variation arises within the germinal substance1 but it is manifested in the body which is its product4 ,how variations arise we do not know with any exactness of detail4 ,that the germinal substance is influenced in its nutrition and in other ways by the surrounding tissues is highly probable2 and this influence may lead to changes which are the source of variations2 but it is very doubtful whether such influence can be what we before termed 8homopathic40#bjb ,it is improbable that the formation of the nerve-connections involved in intelligent behaviour which has grown habitual through repetition1 can so influence the germinal cells as to give rise to variations of like nature4 ,in other words1 acquired habit is probably not a direct determinant of an inherited variation of like nature in instinctive behaviour4 ,apart from such influence the only source of variations which can be assigned is either the differential division of nuclei in preparation for the process of fertilization1#bjc or the process of fertilization itself4 ,the union of perhaps differentiated germinal substance from two distinct parents affords the opportunities for the admixture and compounding of hereditary qualities in the two samples1 from which variations favourable or the reverse may arise4 ,it is now generally recognized1 however1 that the origin of variations is a problem quite distinct from that of the survival of those whose direction is favourable to that end4 ,the theory of natural selection1 as such1 does not pretend to offer any explanation of the manner in which variations arise2 though of course a complete theory of organic evolution must assign the antecedents and conditions of organic progress in all its varied phases4 ,we know that variations do occur2 we know1 too1 that more individuals are born than survive to procreate their kind2 and1 on the theory of natural selection1 we draw from these data the conclusion that1 on the average1 the animals that escape elimination are those in which the variations are of such a nature as to conduce to this end4 ,it will be seen that1 on the hypothesis of organic heredity1 thus briefly sketched1 continuity can1 in strictness and1 as we may phrase it1 in its first intent1 only be predicated of the germinal substance2 but that this substance gives rise to products--active vigorous animals behaving in certain ways1 each after his kind--which hold similar germinal substance in trust for future use4 ,natural selection deals with the trustees2 and if they succumb1 that which they hold in trust is lost4 ,to put the matter in another way3 ,nature says to the germinal substance1 8,by your products you must be judged in accordance with the criterion of utility and efficiency40 ,practical use in the give and take of active life is the touchstone of all behaviour which makes for survival4 ,this being secured1 there may be a balance of behaviour for other purposes4 ,but in animals the balance is not of large amount1 and other purposes have not taken form and direction4 ,it should be clearly noticed that1 on the hypothesis we are considering1 use is the test of survival1 and though it is not the direct cause of variations1 it affords their sanction in survival4 ,that animal escapes elimination whose behaviour is of practical use2 and it holds in trust for the future a store of germinal substance from which is produced a successor capable of behaving in like manner4 ,the whole drama of organic evolution may be regarded as the realization in a succession of individuals of the evolving potentiality of continuous lines of germinal substance4 ,the successive individuals die--but the germinal substance lives on in their heirs1 if they have any4 ,in virtue of what intimate and hidden structure or disposition of parts the germ possesses this potentiality we do not know4 ,the ovum of a dog is a microscopic speck less than one-hundredth of an inch in diameter2 the sperm is far more minute4 ,they unite1 and their nuclei coalesce4 ,the cellular product divides and subdivides4 ,the cell colony absorbs nutriment from the maternal tissues4 ,division proceeds apace1 and the cells are marshalled and ordered in embryological development2 definite tissues are formed2 the stages of their genesis can be predicted with accuracy2 and in due time a puppy is born which shall grow to the likeness of its parents and behave as they behaved4 ,we can trace the succession of events2 we see that they form a related series2 we have good reason for believing that the state of matters at any one moment is the antecedent condition of the state of matters at the succeeding moment4 ,more than this science cannot say4 ,the underlying cause is1 for science1 hidden in the mists of the unknown4 ,even for metaphysics it is but part of the force that beats through the universe and makes it not a chaos but a cosmos--a force known to us only in its effects4 ,it will thus be seen that the conception of continuity in organic evolution has1 broadly considered1 a threefold aspect4 ,first1 there is the continuity of the germinal substance through whose reproductive behaviour under the appropriate conditions embryological development occurs2 secondly1 there is continuity in this embryological development1 stage by stage1 from the fertilized ovum to the adult which is its final product and expression2 thirdly1 there is continuity in these final products1 in the animals whose organic1 instinctive1 and intelligent behaviour lie open to our study and investigation4 ,the first is germinal1 the second developmental1 the third evolutional continuity4 ,before attempting to summarize some of the contributions afforded by our inquiry towards the doctrine of continuity in the last of these three aspects1 we must pause for a moment to consider how far and in what sense continuity can be predicated of mental development4 ,we have regarded the conscious situation as the psychical aspect of a nerve-situation in the sensorium2 and the nervous system1 capable of behaving in this way1 is in developmental continuity with the germinal substance of the fertilized ovum4 ,but what shall we say with regard to the psychical aspect8 ,two hypotheses seem open to us1 each of which presents difficulties1 but of different kinds4 ,the first is1 that when the organic development of the nervous system reaches a certain level and order of complexity consciousness emerges1 how and whence we know not4 ,the second is1 that consciousness is developed from sentience1 which is the concomitant of all organic behaviour2 which accompanies life wherever it occurs and therefore shares the continuity of the germinal substance4 ,the difficulty inseparable from the first hypothesis1 is that it is contrary to the analogy of all that we know or infer elsewhere throughout the realm of nature4 ,huxley#bjd likened its emergence to the production of heat when an iron bar is struck by repeated blows of the hammer4 ,but this analogy will not hold2 for heat is a mode of energy1 and only emerges through the transformation of other and pre-existing modes of energy4 ,a certain amount of the energy of motion in the massive hammer-head is transferred to the iron rod1 and assumes the form of that molecular vibration which we call heat4 ,and by what amount the one is the gainer1 by that amount is the other the loser4 ,but we have no reason to suppose that the like takes place in the origin of the mental concomitants of neural changes4 ,no portion of the brain's store of physical energy is drained off to form the rivulet of consciousness4 ,now1 whenever we speak of a product elsewhere in nature1 we mean a specialized bit of something pre-existent4 ,water is the product of pre-existing oxygen and hydrogen4 ,heat is the product of other forms of energy4 ,but this is not so on the first hypothesis1 according to which consciousness emerges when the functional activity of the nervous system reaches a certain level and order of complexity4 ,the mental concomitants are not 8products10 in the recognized sense of the term4 ,furthermore1 although on this hypothesis we may still speak of what was termed above evolutional continuity in the mental concomitants1 there is nothing analogous to either developmental or germinal continuity4 ,on the second hypothesis1 according to which sentience is the concomitant of all organic behaviour1 such developmental and germinal continuity1 or their analogues in the psychical order of being1 are rendered conceivable4 ,consciousness is regarded as a developed form of sentience4 ,but the sentience is wholly hypothetical4 ,it is at best a 8may be10 and its existence is incapable of proof4 ,and science is rightly impatient of hypotheses the validity of which cannot in any way be verified4 ,our safest course1 therefore1 is to accept that which is common to both hypotheses1 evolutional continuity1 and for the rest to be content with a confession of ignorance4 ,we have already drawn attention to the fact that mere sentience1 if it exists1 has no power of guidance over organic behaviour2 but consciousness1 when it emerges1 is a concomitant of nervous processes which determine the nature and direction of such nerve-changes as are the antecedents of intelligent behaviour4 ,the steps by which this control is established are unknown4 ,it is1 indeed1 probable that conscious guidance arises as an accompaniment of the differentiation of controlling centres from the automatic centres of the nervous system2 but of how this takes place we are as ignorant as we are of many other differentiations in the course of embryological development and evolutional progress4 ,of those nervous arrangements within the brain which are the physiological concomitants of the far later mental processes of reflection1 abstraction1 generalization1 and the formation of ideals1 we are1 if it be possible1 even yet more profoundly ignorant4 ,nor would it serve any good purpose to indulge in speculation where there are not even the data to enable us so much as to hazard a probable guess4 ,the utmost we are justified in attempting is to show how organic behaviour leads up to and affords the requisite data for the exercise of intelligence1 and how both supply the necessary preliminary stages in the development and evolution of what1 following ,dr4 ,stout1 we have termed ideational process4 ,this we have endeavoured to do in preceding pages2 and all that is now required is to conclude our inquiry with a brief summary by which the results1 as affording some basis for evolutional continuity1 may be focussed4 ,we regard reflex action and instinctive behaviour1 broadly considered1 as genetically prior to that which is intelligent4 ,their development in the individual and their evolution in the race are reached by the differentiation and integration of nerve-centres4 ,in the abdominal region of the crayfish1 for example1 special centres are differentiated for the behaviour of each pair of swimmerets2 but these are so integrated that the whole series of like abdominal appendages swing rhythmically with co-ordinated movements4 ,now1 when a sensorium is developed1 it does not have to group by an act of conscious selection and deliberate arrangement the multiplicity of scattered sensory data which it receives2 it does not have to organize from diverse and hitherto unrelated elements some sort of system in experience3 it receives them as a physiological heritage already grouped1 and to some extent organized4 ,stimulus and response are organically linked2 and within the response inherited co-ordinations1 often exceedingly complex1 afford a correlated group of sensory data4 ,just in so far as organic heredity has provided a working system of bodily parts1 does consciousness receive systematic information of their orderly working4 ,no doubt it is true that the development and evolution of the sensorium proceeds pari passu with the development and evolution of reflex actions compounded and co-ordinated to give rise to instinctive behaviour4 ,no doubt the progress of the one is in close touch and relation with the progress of the other2 for such relation receives the emphatic sanction of utility4 ,still it is none the less true that in individual development1 as in racial evolution1 the organic takes the lead4 ,what is intelligently acquired is something added to that which has been engrained1 through natural selection or otherwise1 as a potentiality of the germinal substance4 ,what we have first to note1 then1 is that organic evolution provides ready-grouped data to consciousness4 ,the second point is1 that the germs of abstraction and generalization1 or rather processes which are the precursors of abstraction and generalization1 arise1 and cannot fail to arise1 in the genesis of experience from the performance of inherited responses1 and from the coalescence of their results into a conscious situation4 ,to a quite young chick ,i gave pieces of yellow orange peel1 which were found to be distasteful and rejected4 ,in ,dr4 ,stout's phraseology1 they acquired meaning in experience4 ,can one doubt that the colour and taste were thus rendered predominant1 and that the shape1 size1 and other qualities of the bits of orange peel remained practically unnoticed8 ,shortly afterwards the chick was given chopped and crumbled egg2 the fragments of 8white0 were eaten1 but the bits of hard-boiled yolk were untouched4 ,they possessed a sufficient general resemblance to the orange peel to carry the same meaning4 ,in many ways particular qualities of objects are emphasized in so far as they incite to behaviour2 they form centres of biological interest1 just as the abstract quality of ideational thought is the centre of rational interest on a higher plane of mental development4 ,and in many ways objects presenting certain salient features in common1 amid differences which remain unnoticed1 are unconsciously grouped as the starting-points of similar perceptual situations1 just as in the generalization of ideational thought similar relationships are deliberately grouped as the starting-points of like conceptual situations4 ,both are purposive and have an end1 which we as investigators are able to assign2 but only for reflection and conceptual thought are they also purposeful--the end being foreseen and realized1 not only by the investigators1 but by the agent concerned4 ,and the purpose or end itself is in the two cases different4 ,in the one case it is the biological end of practical behaviour2 in the other case it is the rational end of explanation--abstraction and generalization being deliberately used as a means to this latter end4 ,the question has again and again been asked3 ,do animals reason8 ,and different answers are given by those who are substantially in agreement as to the facts and their interpretation1 but are not in agreement as to their use of the word 8reason40 ,perhaps1 if the question assume the form--,are animals capable of explaining their own acts and the causes of phenomena8--the position of those who find the evidence of their doing so insufficient may be placed in a clearer light4 ,this is what is generally meant by the statement that animals have probably not reached the level of rational beings4 ,but even if they have not reached this level1 their perceptual processes supply the antecedent conditions which are necessary if this level is to be attained in the course of further evolution4 ,we have seen that1 even in relatively simple cases1 where conscious situations mark only the beginnings of intelligence1 there is a biological emphasis of some1 rather than others1 among what we call the qualities of objects1 and there is a grouping1 on biological grounds1 of certain things which have some quality in common--such1 for example1 as being fit for food4 ,here we have at the outset of perceptual development the germs of processes which are the precursors of the abstraction and generalization of ideational thought4 ,and in the more complex conscious situations of the higher animals these processes attain to such degree of development as is necessary to secure more difficult and more remote biological ends1 until all that is necessary1 for their rational use1 is the quickening touch of a new purpose1 that of explanation4 ,we have seen that1 through what ,dr4 ,stout terms 8manipulation10 and ,professor ,groos 8experimentation0--names applied to a type of behaviour widely exemplified among the higher animals1--things1 as the nuclei of conscious situations1 become differentiated from the environment4 ,one can hardly question that a fly to the trout1 a ball to the kitten1 a bone to the puppy are things distinguished from their surroundings1 and that they become marked off as special centres of interest4 ,here on the perceptual plane is a process which is the antecedent of the conception of quasi-independent objects on the ideational plane4 ,for rational thought the thing1 as object1 is not only the centre of a practical situation leading to behaviour of direct or indirect biological value1 but is the nucleus around which we build all the qualities which are ascertained by more elaborate manipulation and experimentation carried out deliberately and of set purpose for rational ends4 ,it becomes capable of definition with the aim of explaining what are its characteristics as an object4 ,there can be little doubt that the higher animals become intimately and practically acquainted with their environment4 ,the dog who accompanies his master in many a ramble1 the horse who carries him again and again over all the surrounding country1 has a good perceptual knowledge of a somewhat extended environment4 ,and this1 again1 is the precursor of the far more extended conceptual knowledge which leads up at last to a rational conception of the universe of objects in their varied relationships4 ,but only through the concentration of thought rendered possible by much true abstraction and generalization1--only through disentangling the relationships and regrouping them for the purpose of framing an ideal scheme1--only1 in short1 by explanation and for the sake of explanation is this difficult process brought to a more or less successful issue4 ,again1 there can be little doubt that the higher animals1 in the course of experience begotten of behaviour1 reach a perceptual sensing of the bodily self1 through experience derived from the non-projecting senses1 in pain and sickness1 and often1 we may hope1 in the sense of well-being1 and the joy of existence4 ,they do not probably set this self in antithesis to the not-self4 ,that comes with reflection1 and is the result of ideal construction based on the analysis of experience1 with a view to reaching some explanation of the genesis of experience4 ,but in their perceptual awareness of the embodied self1 they have that kind of consciousness which affords the necessary data1 for the later conception of the self--when experience is polarized into its subjective and objective aspects and thus is explained1 so far as science can explain it2 suggesting1 indeed1 long ere science has attained this end1 metaphysical explanations by reference to underlying causes--too often accepted as an easy substitute for the difficult tracing out of the antecedent conditions which science endeavours painfully and by slow steps to formulate4 ,it is unnecessary to do more than remind the reader that we have found that such processes as attention and imitation pass through instinctive and intelligent stages which are the precursors of the ideational stage1 where they reach a higher expression as deliberately conscious acts4 ,in the young bird that instinctively pecks at some small1 perhaps moving1 thing1 which forms the starting point of a piece of responsive behaviour1 we have attention in the germ4 ,when experience has caused the thing to acquire meaning1 attention passes into a succeeding intelligent phase2 but only when we desire to explain this meaning1 and attention thus has a deliberate purpose1 do we find it entering upon its higher ideational career4 ,so1 too1 as we have seen1 imitation is at first a specialized form of instinctive behaviour1 where the response is seen to resemble that which stimulates it4 ,later it becomes intelligent when the repetition of the imitative behaviour is due to the satisfaction it introduces into the conscious situation4 ,then1 at last1 it reaches the ideational stage1 where reflection gives rise to an ideal1 which is to be realized in conduct4 ,the imitation by the child of its older companions is at first probably intelligent2 but when the child begins to consider why it imitates these and not those among its companions1 he is passing to the ideal stage1 and imitation becomes the sincerest form of hero-worship4 ,the boy who merely imitates his elder brothers playing at soldiers because he gets satisfaction from so doing1 becomes the subaltern who has his ideal soldier1 and will face death firmly rather than fall below his conception of how such a soldier should behave4 ,we need not again attempt to indicate how among animals we have the perceptual precursors of the sthetic and ethical concepts4 ,but we may remind the reader that we endeavoured to show that intercommunication had its foundation in instinctive sounds2 and that it passed into the intelligent stage in the perceptual life1 when these sounds acquired meaning1 and hence became guides to behaviour4 ,this is especially instructive from our present standpoint1 since it is probable that the passage of communication from the indicating to the descriptive stage afforded the conditions under which rational thought was evolved4 ,for such thought it is essential that attention should be focussed on the relationships of things4 ,and no description is possible without making distinctly present to consciousness these relationships1 in time and space1 the data for which are abundantly present in the perceptual life1 though lurking in the background1 and needing something to fix them and to aid consciousness in distinguishing them clearly4 ,in descriptive communication parts of speech1 or their initial equivalents1 afford fixation points for these relationships1 and serve to render them distinct4 ,if the reader will try to describe even the simplest occurrence without introducing the symbols for the relations which the events bear to each other1 his failure will serve to bring home how essential a feature this is4 ,in social communication1 then1 we probably have the key to the passage from perceptual to ideational process2 and in this passage description is the antecedent of1 and affords the conditions to1 explanation4 ,words1 moreover1 as we have already said1 form the pegs upon which we can hang up1 for ready reference1 the products of abstraction and generalization1 or1 to modify the analogy1 they form the bodies of which these products are the rational soul4 ,if we are ever to trace the passage from the instinctive through the indicating stage of communication1 and so onwards through the beginnings of description to its higher levels1 and thus to the use of language as a medium of explanation1 it must be through child-study4 ,in every normal human child the passage does actually take place1 though1 no doubt1 in a condensed and abbreviated form as an epitomized recapitulation in individual development1 of the steps of evolutional progress4 ,thus we may obtain a key to the solution of one of the most difficult problems in evolution by continuous process--that of the transition from animal behaviour to human conduct4 ,,index ,a ,abstract and general ideas1 #eg ,abstraction1 #aff2 germs of1 #ccb ff4 ,acceleration1 #bej ,accommodation defined1 #cf ,acquired characters1 inheritance of1 #ce1 #aaj ,acquired instincts 7,wundt71 #ff1 #ajf ,acquisition defined1 #cf2 ultimately dependent on natural selection1 #bhi ,adaptation defined1 #cg ,,addison on instinct1 #fc sthetics1 animal1 #bgj ,afferent and efferent impulses1 #cb1 #aja ,aid1 mutual1 among animals1 #bbg ,ammophila mode of stinging prey1 #ge2 of carrying prey1 #gf2 deposition of egg1 #gg2 intelligent behaviour of1 #abg ,amba1 #bif ,antlers of deer1 #ae ,ants1 behaviour of1 #abc2 intercommunication of1 #aih2 social communities of1 #bje ,aporus1 intelligent behaviour of1 #abf ,appreciation1 germs of1 #bgc ,ardour of male in courtship1 #bfi ,argyromba1 instincts of1 #gi ,arrest of development in egg1 #ad ,association in coalescent situation1 #df ,attention1 #bdb ,,audubon on ,american night-hawks1 #bfa ,,avebury1 ,lord1 on ants1 #aih2 on ,van1 #bjj2 on aphides and ants1 #bad2 on slave ants1 #bae2 on intelligence of ants1 #bah ,b ,,baldwin1 ,prof4 ,mark1 on organic selection1 #cg 7note71 #aae2 on functional selection1 #afc2 on imitation1 #agi ff42 on projective stage of development1 #bge ,batesian mimicry1 #afe ,,bechstein on canaries1 #bfb ,bees1 homing of1 #aca2 social communities of1 #bje ,beetle soliciting food from ant1 #bac ,bembex mode of carrying prey1 #gf ,,bethe1 ,dr41 on instinctive behaviour of ants1 #bag ,,binet1 ,m41 on infusoria1 #f ,biological value of play1 #bej2 purpose1 #bid2 aspect of animal behaviour1 #cje ,birch-weevil1 leaf-case of1 #aba ,birds1 instinct of1 #hd ,bison1 behaviour of the1 #bbf ,,blackburn1 ,mrs4 ,hugh1 on instinct of cuckoo1 #ij ,,blockmann1 ,dr41 on componotus1 #baj ,,bolton on goldfinches' nests1 #acf ,bower-bird1 observations on1 #bfa1 #bgc ,,buckman1 ,mr4 ,s4 ,s41 on speech of children1 #bjc ,,budgett1 ,mr4 ,john ,s41 on nest-building1 #ace ,bullfinch1 nest of1 #ace ,c ,,cameron1 ,mr41 on mimetic insects in ants' nest1 #bab ,canaries' nest1 building of1 #ace ,canon of interpretation1 #bgj ,capacity1 innate1 #agf ,capuchin monkey1 imitation in1 #ahh1 #bgh ,,carpenter1 ,w4 ,b41 on water-beetle1 #bii ,catasetum1 fertilization of1 #bi ,cats1 ,prof4 ,thorndike's experiments on1 #adg1 #ahd ,causation1 idea of1 #beg ,cell-division in egg1 #ad ,cerceris1 instincts of1 #gd2 locality studies of1 #abi ,chalicodoma1 parasites of1 #gh2 ,fabre's observations on1 #acj ,chick swimming1 #he2 instincts of1 #he ff42 imitation in1 #ahc ,child-study1 desirability of1 #aee1 #ccg ,choice1 apparent in ,paramecia1 #i2 in the pairing situation1 #bff ,ciliary action in ,paramecium1 #d-aj ,circular process 7,baldwin71 #aha ,clepsine1 behaviour of1 #aei ,coalescence in conscious situation1 #df ,coincident variations defined1 #cg2 survival of1 #aae1 #agd ,communities1 social1 of bees and ants1 #bje ,companion as centre of special interest1 #bdd ,componotus1 communities of1 #baj ,conation and impulse1 #ahg1 #bce ,concept1 nature of1 #afg ,condensation of experience1 #afc ,conduct implies motive1 #fj2 and ideal1 #bgh ,congenital responses1 #da ,conjugation in ,paramecium1 #d ,connate instincts1 #ff1 #fi ,conscience1 ambiguity of word1 #bha ,conscious accompaniments of certain organic changes1 #db2 aspect of instructive behaviour1 #ii ,consciousness1 as accompaniment and as guide1 #cd2 effective1 defined1 #dc2 as heir to organic estate1 #eb2 as epiphenomenon1 #cjf ,consentience1 #ec1 #fb ,consonance of biological and psychological end1 #bhf1 #caf ,constancy of environment leads to stereotyped behaviour1 #agc ,continuity in evolution1 #cbd2 threefold aspect of1 #cbi ,control1 the sign of effective consciousness1 #dc ,co-ordinated acts1 #fi1 #ajj2 inherited1 #id1 #ie ,corporate behaviour1 #ad ,courtship in animals1 #bei ,coyness of female birds1 #bfd ff4 ,cranial sense-organs1 #cja ,crayfish1 reflex action in1 #bih ,creation1 special1 #big ,criteria of effective consciousness1 #dc2 of intelligence1 #abj ,cruelty in cat1 #bgg ,cuckoo1 instinct of nestling1 #ij ,d ,,darwin1 ,charles1 fig4 of sun-dew leaf1 #bf2 of ,venus's fly-trap1 #bg2 of catasetum1 #ca2 on earthworms1 #aeh2 on social life of animals1 #bbe2 on human ancestry1 #bbi2 on play and practise1 #bei2 on sexual selection1 #bfb ff42 on law of battle1 #cac ,,davis1 ,prof4 ,ainsworth1 on limpets1 #aef ,,dean1 ,dr4 ,bashford1 on chick swimming1 #he ,deceit in animals1 #bhj ,deferred instincts1 #gj ,definiteness of instinctive behaviour1 #ff ,description1 involves relational terms1 #bjb ,didunculus1 changed habits in1 #bba ,differentiation and integration of nerve-centres1 #afg ,disintegration of instincts1 #agf ,diving1 instinctive1 #hf ,dog1 observations on1 intelligence of1 #ada ff41 #aeb1 #bjj1 #bga1 #cbb ,duckling1 inherited co-ordination in1 #if ,dytiscus1 instinct of1 #ajd ,e ,earthworms1 ,darwin's observations on1 #aeh ff4 ,education in play1 #bee1 #cbj ff4 ,effective consciousness defined1 #dc ,efferent and afferent impulses1 #cb1 #aja ,egg1 cell-division in1 #ad ,,eimer1 ,th41 on instincts of solitary wasps1 #gc2 on origin of instincts1 #ajh ,emotions1 and feelings1 #bce ff42 psychological nature of1 #bdf2 evolution of1 #bhb ,energy stored in cell1 #bc ,equilibrium1 tendency to1 #bif ,eristalis1 mimicry of1 #afd ,,espinas1 ,prof41 on social life of animals1 #bcj ,ethics1 animal1 #bgj ,evolution of organic behaviour1 #ce2 of consciousness1 #fa2 of instinctive behaviour1 #ajf2 of intelligent behaviour1 #aee2 of social behaviour1 #bbe2 of feeling and emotion1 #bhb2 of animal behaviour1 #bie2 as continuous1 #cbd ff4 ,experience1 of value for future guidance1 #dd2 is it inherited8 #dh1 #ig2 condensation of1 #afc ,experimentation1 #bea1 #bec ,explanation1 characteristic of later phases of mental development1 #eh1 #beg ,explosive nature of cell1 #ba ,expression of emotions1 #bdg ,external stimuli to instinctive behaviour1 #ajb ,f ,,fabre on behaviour of ,sphex1 #gg1 #agb2 of ,chalicodoma1 #gh1 #abi2 of ,leucopsis1 #gi2 of ,pompilus1 #abi ,faculty1 instinctive1 #fd ,falcons1 training of1 #acg ,fear in birds not inherited in specific direction1 #di1 #aaj ,feelings and emotion1 #bce ff42 evolution of1 #bhb2 feeling-tone1 #bdj ,ferns1 fertilization of1 #bd ,fertilization of ferns1 #bd2 of ,valisneria1 #bh2 of orchids1 #bi ,,finn1 ,mr4 ,frank1 on the acquisition of experience by young birds1 #ej ,fission1 reproduction of ,paramecium by1 #d ,flight1 instinctive1 #hf ,,forel on ,componotus1 #baa ,,foster1 ,sir ,michael1 on consciousness accompanying reflex action in pithed frog1 #cc ,frog1 reflex action in1 #cc1 #bii1 #cjj ,functional selection1 #afc ,fungus garden of ants1 #baf ,g ,,garner1 ,mr4 ,r4 ,l41 8,the ,speech of ,monkeys10 #aih ,gas-engine1 analogy of1 #bj ,general and abstract ideas1 #eg2 generalization1 #afg2 germs of1 #ccb ff4 ,generic image1 #afb2 situations1 #afc ,germinal substance1 continuity of1 #cbh ,,gould1 ,dr41 on humming-birds1 #bgc ,,green1 ,mr4 ,e4 ,g41 on ants1 #baj ,greenfinch1 nest of1 #ace ,,groos1 ,prof41 on instinct1 #fd2 origin of1 #aaf2 on imitation1 #ahg2 on animal play1 #bdh ff42 on 8,love ,play10 #bei2 on coyness of female birds1 #bfd2 on choice in mating1 #bfg2 on make-believe1 #bhj ,h ,habits and habitual acts1 #ajg1 #agg ,,hague on ants1 #aii ,,hamerton1 ,p4 ,g41 on trained dog1 #aeb ,,hancock1 ,dr4 ,john1 on cuckoo1 #ib ,heredity and circumstance1 #ci2 twofold aspect of1 #dj2 relation of to use1 #agj1 #agg2 in evolution as continuous1 #cbf ,homing of bees1 #aca ,homopathic influence defined1 #cf ,honey-pot ant1 #bae ,house-martin1 nest-building of1 #aac ,,hudson1 ,mr4 ,w4 ,h41 on fear in birds1 #di1 #ej1 #aaj2 on animal gladness1 #cag ,hunting play1 #bed ,,huxley1 ,t4 ,h41 on reflex action in frog1 #cjj2 on consciousness as epiphenomenon1 #cjf ff42 on consciousness as product of nervous changes1 #ccj ,,hyde1 ,mr41 on king-crab1 #bih ,hydractinia1 colonial polype1 #bjf ,i ,ideals1 distinguish ethics1 #bgh ,ideational stage of mental development1 #ei ,imitation1 #agi ff42 three stages of in child1 #aib ,impulse in intelligent behaviour1 #fj2 ,prof4 ,thorndike's use of the term1 #ahf2 connection of with conative process1 #bce ,independence of automatic and controlling centres1 #dc ,infant1 congenital responses in1 #ed ,influence of intelligence on instinct1 #afi ,inheritance of acquisitiveness1 #dj ,innate capacity1 #agf2 likes and dislikes1 #aai ,insects1 instinctive behaviour in1 #ga2 intelligent behaviour in1 #abc ,instinct1 broader and narrower view of1 #ii2 primary and secondary1 #ajh1 #aji2 influence of intelligence on1 #afi2 priority of1 to intelligence1 #agc2 disintegration of1 #age ,instinctive behaviour defined1 #fc2 in insects1 #ga2 in birds1 #hd2 conscious aspect of1 #ih ,integration and differentiation of nerve-centres1 #afg ,intelligence lapsed1 #ajg2 influence of1 on instinct1 #afi2 of ants1 ,lord ,avebury on1 #bah2 biological importance of1 #caj ,intelligent behaviour1 #aag2 evolution of1 #aee ,intelligent process distinguished from rational1 #ei1 #ach ,intercommunication1 #aic1 #ccf ,interest1 #bdc ,internal factors in instinctive behaviour1 #ajb ,irritability1 fundamental1 property of protoplasm1 #bdj1 #bif ,j ,,james1 ,prof4 ,wm41 theory of emotions1 #bdf1 #bib ,jays1 bathing of1 #hi2 mode of taking food1 #id ,,jenner on cuckoo1 #ib ,,jennings1 ,dr4 ,h4 ,s41 on behaviour of ,paramecia1 #e ,k ,,kerner1 ,dr41 on sun-dew1 #bf2 on sensitive ,oxalis1 #bg2 on ,valisneria1 #bi ,king-crab1 reflex action in1 #bih ,,knight1 ,andrew1 on ,norwegian ponies1 #aaj ,,kropotkine1 ,prince1 on mutual aid among animals1 #bbg ,l ,lamarckian hypothesis1 #afi1 #aga1 #agg ,language1 nature of1 #aie ,,lankester1 ,prof4 ,e4 ,ray1 on small-brained mammal1 #afh ,lapwing1 instinctive behaviour of1 #aac ,law of battle1 #cac ,leech1 observation on1 #aei ,leucopsis1 instincts of1 #gi ,,lewes1 ,g4 ,h41 on lapsed intelligence1 #ajg ,limpets1 observations on1 #aef ,,lindley1 ,dr41 on children1 #ada ,locality1 studies by wasps1 #abh ,,locke1 ,john1 limitations of animals1 #afg ,m ,,mackenzie1 ,prof4 ,j4 ,s41 on ethics1 #bgh2 on conscience1 #bha2 on ambiguity of word 8pleasure10 #bhe ,make-believe1 #bhj ,mammals1 early small-brained1 #afh ,manipulation 7,stout71 #bea ,,marchal1 ,prof41 on instincts of ,cerceris1 #gd ,,marshall1 ,mr4 ,h4 ,r41 on instinct1 #ff ,martin1 nest-building of1 #aac ,,martineau1 ,james1 on pleasure and pain1 #bhd ,,maupas1 ,m41 observations on infusoria1 #d ,,mayer1 ,dr4 ,a4 ,g41 on mating instinct of moths1 #hc ,,mccook1 ,dr41 on ants1 #bad ,meaning1 ,dr4 ,stout's use of term1 #df1 #bdc1 #bfh ,,medlicott1 ,mr4 ,h4 ,b41 on behaviour of wild pigs1 #aif ,megapodes1 instinctive flight of1 #hg ,melo1 instincts of1 #ha ,mental development1 stages of1 #dh1 #ef ,,mercier1 ,dr4 ,charles1 on criteria of intelligence1 #abj ,metaphysical explanations1 #ai2 aspect of instinct1 #fd2 of impulse1 #bcg2 of purpose1 #bid2 of will1 #cjg2 of life1 #cbe ,,mills1 ,prof4 ,wesley1 on social influence on puppy1 #bbj ,miltogramma1 parasitic fly1 #acd ,mimicry1 ,batesian and ,mllerian1 #afe2 intelligent aspect of1 #caa ,modifiability1 #aga ,modification1 defined1 #cf2 relation of1 to hereditary characters1 #agj ,m,,ller1 ,herr1 on fungus garden of ants1 #baf ,monistic hypothesis1 #cji1 #cae ,monkey1 capuchin1 imitation in1 #ahh ,monodontomerus1 instincts of1 #gi ,moor-hen1 diving of1 #hi ,moths mating1 instinct of1 #hc ,motive in rational conduct1 #fj ,movement plays1 #bea ,m,,ller1 ,prof4 ,max1 on barrier between brute and man1 #bjd ,mllerian mimicry1 #afe1 #aff ,mystery of life1 #ah ,n ,natural selection1 shielding of chicks from1 #aaa2 under uniform and variable circumstances1 #age2 in playtime of life1 #cai ,nervous arc1 #cc2 system of higher animals1 #big ,nest-building1 observations on1 #ace ,,noir on concept1 #afg ,norwegian ponies1 #aji ,nucleus division1 #ab ,o ,object and subject1 #bde1 #bgf ,octopus1 intelligence of1 #aeh cophylla1 behaviour of1 #baj ,orchids1 fertilization of1 #bi ,organic basis of differentiation of consciousness1 #ec ,organic behaviour in development1 #ae ,organic selection1 #cg 7note71 #aae ,overproduction of movements1 #afd ,oxalis1 sensitive1 behaviour of1 #bg ,oxybelus1 mode of carrying prey1 #gf ,p ,,paley1 definition of instinct1 #fd ,paramecium1 behaviour of1 #c1 #bif ,partridge1 note of young1 #ic ,,peckham1 ,dr4 ,g4 ,w41 on instinct1 #fe2 on solitary wasps1 #gb ff41 #abf ff4 ,pecking instinct of chicks1 #ic ,peewit1 note of young1 #ic ,pelopus1 instincts of1 #gb ,perceptual stage of mental development1 #ei ,personality1 #bde1 #beg ,pheasants1 note of young1 #ib2 inherited co-ordination in1 #ie2 plumage of ,argus1 #bfb ,philanthus1 prey of1 #gc2 mode of stinging prey1 #gd ,physiological aspect of animal behaviour1 #bie ,pigeons1 nests of1 #acf ,pigs1 wild1 behaviour of1 #aif ,plants1 behaviour of1 #bd ,plastic period of life1 #afh ,plasticity of tissues1 #dj2 of behaviour1 #agb ,play of animals1 #bdh ff42 biological value of1 #bej2 psychological aspect of1 #bef1 #caa1 #caf ,,playne1 ,mr4 ,h4 ,c41 on pigeons' nests1 #acf ,pleasure1 #bda2 ambiguity in word1 #bhe ,polistes1 locality studies of1 #aca ,pompilus1 mode of carrying prey1 #gf2 ,fabre's observation on1 #abi ,presentative elements distinguished from re-presentative1 #df ,primary instincts 7,romanes71 #ajh ,projective stage of mental development1 #bge2 senses1 #cjd ,pronuba1 instinct of1 #hb ,propensity1 instincts as1 #fd2 congenital1 #agf ,protoplasm1 fundamental properties of1 #bif ,psychological aspect of play1 #bef2 purpose1 #bid2 aspect of animal behaviour1 #cae ,r ,rational process distinguished from intelligent1 #ei1 #ach ,reflex action1 #ca1 #ce1 #bih ff42 relation of instinct to1 #gj ,relationships1 importance of1 #bjb ,re-presentative elements distinguished from presentative1 #df ,rhynchites1 instinct of1 #aba ,,romanes1 ,g4 ,j41 on 8discrimination0 and 8perception0 in plants1 #cb2 on instincts of solitary wasps1 #gc2 definition of instinct1 #ii2 on primary and secondary instincts1 #ajh1 #aji2 on ants1 #abf2 on general ideas1 #aff2 on animal communication1 #bja2 on cruelty in cat1 #bgg ,,romanes1 ,miss1 observations on capuchin monkey1 #ahh1 #bgh ,roots of spinal nerves1 #bii ,,rothney1 ,mr4 ,g4 ,a4 ,g41 on ,indian ants1 #bab ,s ,,schneider1 on octopus1 #aeh ,,scott1 ,dr4 ,d4 ,h41 on fern fertilization1 #be ,scratching in duckling1 #if ,sea anemone1 diffused nervous system of1 #cb ,secondary instincts 7,romanes71 #ajh1 #aji ,segmental nature of central nervous system1 #bii ,selection1 functional1 #afc2 natural1 shielding of chicks from1 #aaa2 under uniform and variable circumstances1 #age2 in playtime of life1 #cai2 sexual1 #bfa ff41 #cac ,self1 as ideal construction1 #bci ,sentience1 #fb2 origin of1 #ccj ,sexual selection1 #bfa ff41 #cac ,,sharp1 ,dr4 ,d41 on birch-weevil1 #aba2 on cophylla1 #baj ,,shellard1 ,mr4 ,e4 ,j41 observations on staghound1 #add ,,sherrington1 ,prof41 on emotion1 #bib2 on spinal animal1 #bih ff4 ,shock1 effects of physiological1 #cjb ,,simcox1 ,miss ,edith1 quoted1 #cbj ,sitaris1 instincts of1 #hb ,slave ants1 #bae ,snails1 observations on1 #aeg ,social behaviour1 #agi2 evolution of1 #bbe ,solitary wasps1 instincts of1 #gb ff42 intelligence of1 #abf ff4 ,solomon ,islands1 rats of1 #bbb ,sounds emitted by young birds1 #ib ,,spalding1 ,douglas1 on newly hatched turkeys1 #di2 on instinct1 #ii ,special creation1 #big ,speech1 connection of1 with rational process1 #eh1 #bcc2 so-called1 of monkeys1 #aih2 of children1 #bjc2 aids passage from perceptual to ideational process1 #ccg ,,spence1 on instinct1 #fc ,,spencer1 ,mr4 ,herbert1 on instinct and reflex action1 #gj2 on play due to surplus vigour1 #bdh2 on pleasure and pain1 #bhd1 #bhg2 on survival1 #bhh ,sphex1 mode of carrying prey to nest1 #gg1 #agb ,spiders placed in crotch by wasps1 #acc ,stereotyped behaviour1 #agb ,sticklebacks1 observations on1 #acj ,,stout1 ,dr4 ,g4 ,f41 on 8meaning0 for consciousness1 #df1 #bdc1 #bfh2 on ideational and perceptual stages of mental development1 #ei1 #bga2 on octopus1 #aeh2 on conative process1 #bce2 on the self1 #bci2 on manipulation1 #bea2 on emotion1 #bic ,,strange1 ,mr41 on bower-bird1 #bfa ,subject and object1 #bde1 #bgf ,sun-dew leaf1 behaviour of1 #be ,swimming1 instinctive1 #he ,t ,,tait1 ,lawson1 on begging-cat1 #aaj ,,tarde1 ,m41 on imitation as a social factor1 #agi ,tendencies1 congenital1 #agf ,,thomas1 ,mr4 ,oldfield1 on rats of ,solomon ,islands1 #bbb ,,thorndike1 ,dr41 on swimming of chick1 #he2 experiments on intelligence1 #adg ff42 experiments on imitation1 #agi1 #ahc ff4 ,tradition1 animal1 #bbj ,trial and error1 method of1 #aci ,u ,unity of perceptual process1 #bdj2 of biological purpose1 #big ,use1 super-normal1 #agj2 relation of1 to heredity1 #aga1 #agg ,v ,,valisneria1 fertilization of1 #bh ,variation defined1 #cf2 origin of1 #cbg ,venus's fly-trap1 behaviour of1 #bf ,vigour1 play due to surplus1 #bdh ,volition as conative1 #bch ,w ,,wallace1 ,dr4 ,a4 ,r41 on sexual selection1 #bfd ,,wallaschek1 ,mr41 on play as surplus vigour1 #bdh ,wapiti1 antlers of1 #af ,,wasmann1 ,dr41 on insects associated with ants1 #bac ,wasps1 solitary1 instincts of1 #gb ff42 intelligence of1 #abf ff4 ,,weir1 ,mr4 ,jenner1 on canaries1 #ace ,,weismann1 ,prof41 on origin of instinct1 #aji ,,whitman1 ,prof41 on ,clepsine1 #aei ,,whitmee1 ,rev4 ,s4 ,j41 on tooth-billed pigeon1 #bba ,will1 metaphysics of1 #cjg ,,williston1 ,dr4 ,s4 ,w41 observation on ,ammophila1 #abg ,,wood1 ,mr4 ,foster1 on hen-swimming1 #hf ,,worcester1 ,dr41 on megapode1 #hg ,,wundt1 ,prof41 on instinct1 #fe1 #ii1 #ajf ,y ,youth1 plasticity of1 #afh ,yucca moth1 instincts of1 #hb ,,the ,,end ,,printed ,,by ,,william ,,clowes ,,and ,,sons1 ,,limited1 ,,london ,,and ,,beccles ,,footnotes #a ,see 8,the ,psychology of a ,protozoon10 in the ,amer4 ,jour4 of ,psychology1 vol4 ,x41 ,no4 #d1 ,july1 #ahii1 and the fuller papers there quoted4 #b 8,the ,psychic ,life of ,micro-,organisms10 #ahhi1 p4 #fa4 #c ,this paragraph is taken from 8,animal ,life and ,intelligence10 p4 #bh4 #d ,the following paragraphs are taken with some slight changes from 8,animal ,life and ,intelligence10 pp4 #cj-ce4 #e ,d4 ,h4 ,scott1 8,an ,introduction to ,structural ,botany10 part ii41 8,flowerless ,plants10 pp4 #gj1 #ga4 #f ,ibid41 p4 #ga4 #g ,kerner1 8,natural ,history of ,plants10 translated by ,f4 ,w4 ,oliver1 vol4 i41 p4 #ade4 #h ,kerner1 8,natural ,history of ,plants10 vol4 i41 p4 #ecf4 #i ,kerner1 8,natural ,history of ,plants10 vol4 ii41 p4 #acb4 #aj ,darwin1 8,fertilization of ,orchids10 #bnd edit41 pp4 #aia1 #aib4 #aa 8,mental ,evolution in ,animals10 p4 #ej4 #ab ,ibid41 p4 #ea4 #ac 8,a ,text-book of ,physiology10 #eth edit41 part iii41 p4 #iji4 #ad 8,a ,text-book of ,physiology10 #eth edit41 part iii41 pp4 #iaa1 #iab4 #ae ,professor ,mark ,baldwin has applied the term 8organic selection0 to the result of this interaction 7,american ,naturalist for ,june and ,july1 #ahif74 ,cf4 also ,h4 ,f4 ,osborn 7,science1 ,nov4 #bg1 #ahif72 ,august ,weismann 7,romanes ,lecture on 8,the ,effects of ,external ,influences on ,development10 #ahid71 and 8,germinal ,selection10 ,monist1 ,jan41 #ahif2 and the author's 8,habit and ,instinct10 ch4 xiv41 #ahif4 #af 8,habit and ,instinct10 p4 #bf4 #ag ,american ,journal of ,psychology1 vol4 ix41 ,no4 #a4 #ah ,psychological ,review1 vol4 vi41 ,no4 #c4 #ai 8,naturalist in ,la ,plata10 p4 #hh4 #bj ,journal ,asiatic ,society of ,bengal1 lxvii41 part ii41 #ahig1 p4 #fad4 #ba ,spectator1 ,no4 #abj4 #bb ,kirby and ,spence1 8,introduction to ,entomology10 ,letter xxvii4 p4 #ecg 7#gth ,edit41 #aheh74 #bc ,cf4 supra1 p4 #ah4 #bd 8,the ,play of ,animals10 translated by ,elizabeth ,l4 ,baldwin1 p4 #fb4 #be ,george ,w4 and ,elizabeth ,g4 ,peckham1 8,on the ,instincts and ,habits of the ,solitary ,wasps10 p4 #bca4 #bf 8,lectures on ,human and ,animal ,psychology10 pp4 #chh1 #cig1 #cii4 #bg 8,instinct and ,reason10 pp4 #ij1 #ib4 #bh 8,instinct and ,reason10 p4 #ia4 #bi ,chapter ,i41 ,section ,v4 #cj 8,on the ,habits and ,instincts of the ,solitary ,wasps10 by ,george ,w4 and ,elizabeth ,g4 ,peckham 7#ahih74 #ca 8,mental ,evolution in ,animals10 p4 #bii4 #cb 8,organic ,evolution10 translated by ,j4 ,t4 ,cunningham1 p4 #bhj4 #cc ,see ,a4 ,g4 ,mayer 8,on the ,mating ,instinct of ,moths40 ,ann4 and ,mag4 of ,nat4 ,hist41 ser4 #g1 vol4 v41 ,feb41 #aijj1 p4 #ahc4 #cd ,some of the observations on which the summary of results given in this section are founded are presented in some detail in 8,habit and ,instinct10 pp4 #bi-ajj4 #ce ,psychological ,review1 ,may1 #ahii1 p4 #bhf4 #cf 8,birds from ,moidart and ,elsewhere10 p4 #ajg4 ,edinburgh3 ,douglas4 #cg ,transactions of ,northumberland and ,durham ,natural ,history ,society1 vol4 viii41 p4 #bac4 #ch 8,mental ,evolution in ,animals10 p4 #aei4 #ci 8,lectures on ,human and ,animal ,psychology10 p4 #dja4 #dj 8,instinct and ,acquisition10 ,nature1 vol4 xii41 p4 #ejg4 #da ,on the nature of impulse1 see infra1 p4 #bce4 #db 8,lectures on ,human and ,animal ,psychology10 p4 #dje4 #dc 8,organic ,evolution10 pp4 #bbc1 #bfc1 #beh1 #bgi1 #bgf1 #bih4 #dd 8,essays on ,heredity0 7#ahhi71 p4 #ia4 #de ,op4 cit41 pp4 #aif-aih4 #df ,professor ,henry ,osborn has also indicated the relationship referred to4 #dg 8,the ,play of ,animals10 p4 #fd4 #dh 8,solitary ,wasps10 p4 #bcf4 #di ,see ,d4 ,sharp1 8,cambridge ,natural ,history10 8,insects10 part ii41 p4 #bic1 and the original authorities cited on p4 #bid4 #ej ,this and the three succeeding paragraphs are taken from 8,animal ,life and ,intelligence10 p4 #dbe4 #ea 8,animal ,intelligence10 p4 #ei4 #eb 8,instincts and ,habits of the ,solitary ,wasps10 p4 #ee4 #ec ,op4 cit41 p4 #bb4 #ed ,op4 cit41 p4 #bae4 #ee 8,drfen wir den ,ameisen und ,bienen psychische ,qualitten ,zuschreiben40 ,pflger's ,archiv41 lxx41 #ahih4 #ef 8,solitary ,wasps10 p4 #bai4 #eg ,op4 cit41 pp4 #aca1 #acb4 #eh ,in a letter to ,darwin1 quoted by ,romanes1 8,mental ,evolution in ,animals10 p4 #bbf4 #ei 8,the ,structure and ,life of ,birds10 p4 #cce4 #fj ,preface to 8,harmonia ,ruralis10 quoted by ,yarrell1 8,british ,birds10 vol4 i41 p4 #eda4 #fa ,american ,journal of ,psychology1 vol4 viii41 no4 #d1 pp4 #dca-dic4 #fb 8,introduction to ,comparative ,psychology10 p4 #bee4 #fc 8,introduction to ,comparative ,psychology10 p4 #bij4 #fd ,the ,portfolio 7#ahgc71 p4 #bg1 8,canine ,guests40 #fe 8,animal ,intelligence10 pp4 #bh1 #bi4 #ff ,nature1 vol4 xxxi41 p4 #bjj4 #fg ,ibid41 vol4 li41 p4 #abg4 #fh 8,manual of ,psychology10 p4 #beg4 #fi 8,vegetable ,mould and ,earthworms10 p4 #ie4 #gj ,wood's ,holl ,biological ,lectures 7#ahih71 p4 #bhg4 #ga ,supra1 p4 #dd4 #gb 8,mental ,evolution in ,man10 p4 #bg4 #gc 8,intelligence of ,animals10 p4 #aba4 #gd 8,mental ,development in the ,child and the ,race--,methods and ,processes10 p4 #bgh4 #ge 8,animal ,intelligence30 monograph supplement to ,psychological ,review1 #ahih1 p4 #fa4 #gf ,op4 cit41 pp4 #bfc1 #agb1 #bja1 #acb1 and #bdh 7note74 #gg 8,animal ,intelligence10 pp4 #dg-fd4 #gh ,op4 cit41 pp4 #ff1 #ad1 #ae4 #gi ,cf4 infra1 p4 #bce4 #hj 8,the ,play of ,animals10 ,eng4 trans41 p4 #gi4 #ha 8,habit and ,instinct10 pp4 #agd-ahj4 #hb 8,the ,evolution of ,mind in ,man10 footnote1 pp4 #be1 #bf4 ,quoted in 8,introduction to ,comparative ,psychology10 from which the comments on it are extracted4 #hc 8,the ,speech of ,monkeys40 #hd 8,scientific ,lectures10 pp4 #aab1 #aah4 #he ,nature1 vol4 vii41 p4 #ddc4 #hf 8,the ,senses of ,animals10 p4 #bgg4 #hg 8,mental ,evolution in ,man10 p4 #ajj4 #hh ,op4 cit41 p4 #age4 #hi ,compare chap4 xiii41 on 8,the ,perception of ,relations10 in my 8,introduction to ,comparative ,psychology40 #ij ,nineteenth ,century1 ,may1 #ahig1 pp4 #gic-hjg4 #ia ,sharp1 8,insects10 part ii41 p4 #adg4 #ib ,nature1 vol4 lxii41 p4 #bec 7,july #ab1 #aijj74 #ic ,the quotation is from 8,the ,cambridge ,natural ,history10 vol4 vi41 8,insects10 part ii41 by ,david ,sharp1 ,f4,r4,s42 see pp4 #ade1 #adf4 #id ,sharp1 op4 cit41 p4 #adg4 #ie ,g4 ,a4 ,j4 ,rothney1 8,notes on ,indian ,ants10 ,trans4 ,ent4 ,soc41 #ahhi1 p4 #ced4 #if ,sharp1 op4 cit41 p4 #bbf4 #ig ,lord ,avebury 7,sir ,john ,lubbock71 quoted in ,romanes' 8,animal ,intelligence10 pp4 #fb1 #fc4 #ih ,lord ,avebury 7,sir ,john ,lubbock71 8,scientific ,lectures10 pp4 #gh1 #gi4 #ii ,nature1 vol4 xlvii41 p4 #cic 7,aug41 #ahic71 where ,a4 ,mller's investigations are described by ,j4 ,c4 ,willis4 #ajj ,a4 ,bethe1 8,drfen wir den ,ameisen und ,bienen psychische ,qualitten ,zuschreiben10 ,pflger's ,archiv41 lxx41 #ahih4 #aja ,see p4 #cg4 #ajb ,supra1 p4 #ach4 #ajc 8,scientific ,lectures10 pp4 #hj-hb4 #ajd ,proceedings of the ,zoological ,society1 #ahgd1 p4 #ahd4 #aje 8,scientific ,lectures10 #bnd edit41 p4 #adj4 #ajf ,weismann1 8,essays10 vol4 ii41 p4 #ej4 #ajg ,huxley1 8,collected ,essays10 vol4 vii41 p4 #aee4 #ajh 8,the ,descent of ,man10 vol4 i4 p4 #hec1 #bnd ,ed41 #ahhh4 ,the quotations from ,darwin in this paragraph and that which follows are somewhat condensed by a few omissions4 #aji ,vol4 xxviii41 ,sept4 and ,nov41 #ahij1 pp4 #ccg-ced1 #fii-gai4 #aaj ,nineteenth ,century1 ,feb41 #ahhh1 p4 #afe4 8,collected ,essays10 vol4 ix41 p4 #bjd4 #aaa ,op4 cit41 pp4 #gji1 #gaj4 #aab ,page #gaa4 #aac 8,mutual ,aid among ,savages40 ,nineteenth ,century1 vol4 xxix4 ,april1 #ahia1 p4 #ech4 #aad 8,descent of ,man10 vol4 i41 p4 #if4 #aae 8,des ,socits ,animales3 tude de ,psychologie ,compare0 7,paris1 #ahgg74 #aaf 8,mutual ,aid among ,savages10 ,nineteenth ,century1 ,april1 #ahia1 pp4 #eci1 #edj4 #aag ,page #fc4 #aah ,op4 cit41 p4 #bfg2 cf4 supra1 p4 #ach4 #aai ,g4 ,f4 ,stout1 8,manual of ,psychology10 p4 #bfh4 #abj ,ibid41 p4 #cah4 #aba 8,manual of ,psychology10 p4 #hd4 #abb 8,habit and ,instinct10 ch4 ix41 p4 #ahf4 #abc 8,letters on the sthetic ,education of ,mankind10 xxvii4 #abd 8,principles of ,psychology10 #ecc4 #abe 8,on the ,origin of ,music10 pp4 #bca1 #bcb4 #abf 8,the ,play of ,animals10 ,eng4 trans41 p4 #ab4 #abg ,op4 cit41 p4 #g4 #abh ,op4 cit41 p4 #ai4 #abi ,op4 cit41 pp4 #ge1 #gf4 #acj 8,manual of ,psychology10 p4 #cbg4 #aca ,op4 cit41 pref41 p4 xx4 #acb ,op4 cit41 p4 #bij4 #acc 8,manual of ,psychology10 p4 #bff4 #acd ,op4 cit41 p4 #cad4 #ace 8,descent of ,man10 vol4 ii41 p4 #fj1 #bnd edit4 #ahhh4 #acf 8,the ,play of ,animals10 ,eng4 trans41 p4 #bbi4 #acg ,quoted by ,groos1 op4 cit41 p4 #bei4 #ach 8,descent of ,man10 vol4 ii41 p4 #gg4 #aci ,darwin1 op4 cit41 p4 #ii4 #adj ,quoted by ,darwin1 8,descent of ,man10 vol4 ii41 p4 #eh4 #ada 8,descent of ,man10 vol4 ii41 p4 #ef4 #adb 8,habit and ,instinct10 p4 #bag4 #adc 8,descent of ,man10 vol4 ii41 p4 #bea4 #add ,op4 cit41 p4 #acg4 #ade 8,darwinism10 p4 #bhe4 #adf ,op4 cit41 p4 #bic4 #adg ,op4 cit41 p4 #agb4 #adh ,op4 cit41 pp4 #bhe1 #bhf4 #adi ,op4 cit41 p4 #bhc4 #aej ,op4 cit41 p4 #bdc4 #aea ,op4 cit41 p4 #bdb4 #aeb ,op4 cit41 pref41 p4 xxii4 #aec ,op4 cit41 p4 #bdj4 #aed ,op4 cit41 p4 #bdd4 #aee 8,manual of ,psychology10 p4 #he4 #aef 8,manual of ,psychology10 p4 #bc4 #aeg ,op4 cit41 p4 #bb4 #aeh 8,introduction to ,comparative ,psychology10 p4 #ec4 #aei 8,manual of ,psychology10 p4 #bff4 #afj 8,animal ,life and ,intelligence10 p4 #cdj4 #afa 8,mutual ,development in the ,child and the ,race10 p4 #ai4 #afb ,supra1 p4 #bgj4 #afc 8,animal ,intelligence10 p4 #dac4 #afd ,atalanta1 ,jan41 #ahhi4 ,reprinted in 8,animal ,sketches10 p4 #ag4 #afe 8,the ,play of ,animals10 p4 #abb4 #aff ,appendix to 8,animal ,intelligence10 p4 #dhf4 #afg 8,manual of ,ethics10 p4 #a4 #afh 8,animal ,life and ,intelligence10 p4 #djd4 #afi 8,animal ,life and ,intelligence10 p4 #djj4 8,introduction to ,comparative ,psychology10 p4 #cfi4 #agj 8,animal ,intelligence10 p4 #ddd4 #aga 8,the ,play of ,animals10 p4 #bii4 #agb ,op4 cit41 p4 #ade4 #agc 8,manual of ,ethics10 pp4 #bhe1 #bhf4 #agd ,starcke1 ,international ,journal of ,ethics1 vol4 ii41 no4 #c 7,april1 #ahib71 p4 #cdh4 #age 8,manual of ,psychology10 p4 #bcd4 8,displeasure0 here means the feeling attitude antithetical to 8pleasure40 #agf ,op4 cit41 p4 #fe4 #agg 8,types of ,ethical ,theory10 vol4 ii41 f4 #cej4 #agh 8,manual of ,ethics10 p4 #he4 #agi 8,principles of ,psychology10 vol4 i41 pt4 ii41 ch4 ix4 #abe4 #ahj 8,manual of ,ethics10 p4 #gb4 #aha 8,life and ,letters10 vol4 i41 p4 #caj4 #ahb ,vol4 i41 pt4 ii41 ch4 ix41 #abd4 ,i quote from the valuable 8,epitome0 prepared by ,mr4 ,howard ,collins1 p4 #bad4 #ahc 8,principles of ,biology10 revised and enlarged edit4 7#ahih71 p4 #efj4 #ahd ,from 8,animal ,life and ,intelligence10 p4 #chb4 #ahe 8,experiments on the ,value of ,vascular and ,visceral ,factors for the ,genesis of ,emotion10 ,proc4 ,roy4 ,soc41 vol4 lxvi41 pp4 #cij-djc 7#aijj74 #ahf 8,manual of ,psychology10 p4 #bhh4 #ahg 8,manual of ,psychology10 p4 #acb4 #ahh ,see ,huxley's book on 8,the ,crayfish10 in the ,international ,science ,series1 p4 #ajh4 #ahi ,journal of ,morphology1 vol4 ix4 ,quoted by ,professor ,c4 ,s4 ,sherrington in ,the ,marshall ,hall ,address1 8,on the ,spinal ,animal0 7reprinted from ,medico-,chirurgical ,transactions1 vol4 #hb71 p4 #d4 #aij 8,the ,spinal ,animal10 p4 #e4 #aia ,op4 cit41 p4 #bc4 #aib 8,collected ,essays10 vol4 i41 essay on 8,animal ,automatism10 p4 #bbd4 #aic ,op4 cit41 pp4 #bj1 #ba4 #aid ,op4 cit41 p4 #bi4 #aie ,op4 cit41 p4 #ah4 #aif ,vide supra1 p4 #cc4 #aig 8,collected ,essays10 vol4 i41 p4 #bdj4 #aih ,op4 cit41 pp4 #bch1 #bci4 #aii ,vide supra1 p4 #bhe4 #bjj 8,naturalist in ,la ,plata10 pp4 #bhj1 #bha4 #bja 8,psychology for ,teachers10 p4 #gj4 #bjb ,supra1 p4 #cf4 #bjc ,supra1 p4 #ac4 #bjd 8,collected ,essays10 vol4 i41 p4 #bci4 ,transcriber's ,note ,illustrations have been moved alongside the text which they illustrate1 and may no longer match the locations given in the ,list of ,illustrations4 ,the following apparent errors have been corrected3 p4 vii ,,fig changed to ,,fig4 p4 viii ,mr changed to ,mr4 p4 #bi ,figs4 #i changed to ,fig4 #i p4 #cd 7note7 on changed to of p4 #ej 7footnote7 p #hh changed to p4 #hh p4 #gb 7note7 7#ahih7 changed to 7#ahih74 p4 #ajg 7note7 #dje changed to #dje4 p4 #aca #bai changed to #bai4 p4 #aca 7note7 ,pfluger's changed to ,pflger's p4 #afb 7note7 p #dd changed to p4 #dd p4 #afe ,mullerian changed to ,mllerian p4 #bab ,where-ever changed to ,wherever p4 #baf #gi changed to #gi4 p4 #bbf drives changed to drive p4 #bci 7note7 ,g4 ,f changed to ,g4 ,f4 p4 #bef objects changed to objects4 p4 #bfg woes changed to woos p4 #ccj 7note7 #bci changed to #bci4 p4 #ccb co ordinated changed to co-ordinated p4 #cch #ajf4 changed to #ajf p4 #cch ,,beckstein changed to ,,bechstein p4 #cch leafcase changed to leaf-case p4 #cci nerve centres changed to nerve-centres p4 #cda nerve centres changed to nerve-centres p4 #cda king crab changed to king-crab p4 #cda of1 intelligence changed to of intelligence p4 #cdb on1 infusoria changed to on infusoria p4 #cdb mating1 instinct changed to mating instinct p4 #cdc ,,schneider on changed to ,,schneider1 on p4 #cdc ,shock effects changed to ,shock1 effects p4 #cdc ,,spence on changed to ,,spence1 on p4 #cdd #ajf4 changed to #ajf p4 #cdd of #cbg changed to of1 #cbg p4 #cdd #gb ff41 changed to #gb ff42 ,punctuation and spelling have otherwise been kept as printed4 ,the following are used inconsistently in the text3 alarm-note and alarm note co-existed and coexists co-incident and coincident danger-note and danger note first-hand and firsthand fox-terrier and fox terrier ground-work and groundwork inter-communication and intercommunication newly-hatched and newly hatched non-plussed and nonplussed play-time and playtime pre-requisite and prerequisite re-presentations and representations re-presentative and representative ,romanes's and ,romanes' supra and supra ,venus's ,fly-trap1 ,venus's ,fly ,trap and ,venus's fly-trap