,,essays3 ,,scientific1 ,,political1 ,,speculative4 ,,by ,,herbert ,,spencer4 ,,library ,,edition1 7otherwise fifth thousand17 ,containing ,seven ,essays not before ,republished1 and various other additions4 ,,vol4 ,,ii4 ,,williams ,,and ,,norgate1 #ad1 ,,henrietta ,,street1 ,,covent ,,garden1 ,,london2 ,,and #bj1 ,,south ,,frederick ,,street1 ,,edinburgh4 #ahia4 ,,london3 ,g4 ,,norman ,,and ,,son1 ,,printers1 ,,hart ,,street1 ,,covent ,,garden4 ,,contents ,,of ,,vol4 ,,ii4 ,,page ,,the ,,genesis ,,of ,,science #a ,,the ,,classification ,,of ,,the ,,sciences #gd ,,reasons ,,for ,,dissenting ,,from ,,the ,,philosophy ,,of ,m4 ,,comte #aah ,,on ,,laws ,,in ,,general1 ,,and ,,the ,,order ,,of ,,their ,,discovery #ade ,,the ,,valuation ,,of ,,evidence #afa ,,what ,,is ,,electricity8 #afh ,,mill versus ,,hamilton--,,the ,,test ,,of ,,truth #ahh ,,replies ,,to ,,criticisms #bah ,,prof4 ,,green',s ,,explanations #cba ,,the ,,philosophy ,,of ,,style #ccc ,,use ,,and ,,beauty #cgj ,,the ,,sources ,,of ,,architectural ,,types #cge ,,gracefulness #cha ,,personal ,,beauty #chg ,,the ,,origin ,,and ,,function ,,of ,,music #djj ,,the ,,physiology ,,of ,,laughter #deb 7,for ,index1 see ,volume ,,iii47 #a ,,the ,,genesis ,,of ,,science4 ,first published in ,the ,british ,quarterly ,review for ,july #ahed4 ,there still prevails among men a vague notion that scientific knowledge differs in nature from ordinary knowledge4 ,by the ,greeks1 with whom ,mathematics--literally things learnt--was alone considered as knowledge proper1 the distinction must have been strongly felt2 and it has ever since maintained itself in the general mind4 ,though1 considering the contrast between the achievements of science and those of daily unmethodic thinking1 it is not surprising that such a distinction has been assumed2 yet it needs but to rise a little above the common point of view1 to see that it is but a superficial distinction4 ,the same faculties are employed in both cases2 and in both cases their mode of operation is fundamentally the same4 ,if we say that science is organized knowledge1 we are met by the truth that all knowledge is organized in a greater or less degree--that the commonest actions of the household and the field presuppose facts colligated1 inferences drawn1 results expected2 and that the general success of these actions proves the data by which they were guided to have been correctly put together4 ,if1 again1 we say that science is prevision--is a seeing beforehand--is a knowing in what #b times1 places1 combinations1 or sequences1 specified phenomena will be found2 we are obliged to confess that the definition includes much that is foreign to science in its ordinary acceptation3 for example1 a child's knowledge of an apple4 ,this1 as far as it goes1 consists in previsions4 ,when a child sees a certain form and colours1 it knows that if it puts out its hand it will have certain impressions of resistance1 and roundness1 and smoothness2 and if it bites1 a certain taste4 ,and manifestly its general acquaintance with surrounding objects is of like nature--is made up of facts concerning them1 grouped so that any part of a group being perceived1 the existence of the other facts included in it is foreseen4 ,if1 once more1 we say that science is exact prevision1 we still fail to establish the supposed difference4 ,not only do we find that much of what we call science is not exact1 and that some of it1 as physiology1 can never become exact2 but we find further1 that many of the previsions constituting the common stock alike of wise and foolish1 are exact4 ,that an unsupported body will fall2 that a lighted candle will go out when immersed in water2 that ice will melt when thrown on the fire--these1 and many like predictions relating to the familiar properties of things1 have as high a degree of accuracy as predictions are capable of4 ,it is true that the results foreseen are of a very general character2 but it is none the less true that they are correct as far as they go3 and this is all that is requisite to fulfil the definition4 ,there is perfect accordance between the anticipated phenomena and the actual ones2 and no more than this can be said of the highest achievements of the sciences specially characterized as exact4 ,seeing thus that the assumed distinction between scientific knowledge and common knowledge cannot be sustained2 and yet feeling1 as we must1 that however impossible it may be to draw a line between them1 the two are not practically identical2 there arises the question--,what is the relationship #c between them8 ,a partial answer to this question may be drawn from the illustrations just given4 ,on reconsidering them1 it will be observed that those portions of ordinary knowledge which are identical in character with scientific knowledge1 comprehend only such combinations of phenomena as are directly cognizable by the senses1 and are of simple1 invariable nature4 ,that the smoke from a fire which she is lighting will ascend1 and that the fire will presently boil the water placed over it1 are previsions which the servant-girl makes equally well with the most learned physicist2 but they are previsions concerning phenomena in constant and direct relation--phenomena that follow visibly and immediately after their antecedents--phenomena of which the causation is neither remote nor obscure--phenomena which may be predicted by the simplest possible act of reasoning4 ,if1 now1 we pass to the previsions constituting science--that an eclipse of the moon will happen at a specified time2 that when a barometer is taken to the top of a mountain of known height1 the mercurial column will descend a stated number of inches2 that the poles of a galvanic battery immersed in water will give off1 the one an inflammable and the other an inflaming gas1 in definite ratio--we perceive that the relations involved are not of a kind habitually presented to our senses4 ,they depend1 some of them1 on special combinations of causes2 and in some of them the connexion between antecedents and consequents is established only by an elaborate series of inferences4 ,a broad distinction1 therefore1 between scientific knowledge and common knowledge is its remoteness from perception4 ,if we regard the cases in their most general aspect1 we see that the labourer who1 on hearing certain notes in the adjacent hedge1 can describe the particular form and colours of the bird making them1 and the astronomer who1 having calculated a transit of ,venus1 can delineate the black spot entering on the sun's disc1 as it will appear through the telescope1 at a specified hour1 do #d essentially the same thing4 ,each knows that on fulfilling the requisite conditions1 he shall have a preconceived impression--that after a definite series of actions will come a group of sensations of a foreknown kind4 ,the difference1 then1 is neither in the fundamental character of the mental acts2 nor in the correctness of the previsions accomplished by them2 but in the complexity of the processes required to achieve the previsions4 ,much of our common knowledge is1 as far as it goes1 precise4 ,science does not increase its precision4 ,what then does it do8 ,it reduces other knowledge to the same degree of precision4 ,that certainty which direct perception gives us respecting coexistences and sequences of the simplest and most accessible kind1 science gives us respecting coexistences and sequences1 complex in their dependencies1 or inaccessible to immediate observation4 ,in brief1 regarded from this point of view1 science may be called an extension of the perceptions by means of reasoning4 ,on further considering the matter1 however1 it will perhaps be felt that this definition does not express the whole fact--that inseparable as science may be from common knowledge1 and completely as we may fill up the gap between the simplest previsions of the child and the most recondite ones of the physicist1 by interposing a series of previsions in which the complexity of reasoning involved is greater and greater1 there is yet a difference between the two beyond that above described4 ,and this is true4 ,but the difference is still not such as enables us to draw the assumed line of demarcation4 ,it is a difference not between common knowledge and scientific knowledge2 but between the successive phases of science itself1 or knowledge itself--whichever we choose to call it4 ,in its earlier phases science attains only to certainty of foresight2 in its later phases it further attains to completeness4 ,we begin by discovering a relation2 we end by discovering the relation4 ,our first achievement is to foretell the kind #e of phenomenon which will occur under specified conditions2 our last achievement is to foretell not only the kind but the amount4 ,or1 to reduce the proposition to its most definite form--undeveloped science is qualitative prevision2 developed science is quantitative prevision4 ,this will at once be perceived to express the remaining distinction between the lower and the higher stages of positive knowledge4 ,the prediction that a piece of lead will take more force to lift it than a piece of wood of equal size1 exhibits certainty1 but not completeness1 of foresight4 ,the kind of effect in which the one body will exceed the other is foreseen2 but not the amount by which it will exceed4 ,there is qualitative prevision only4 ,on the other hand1 the predictions that at a stated time two particular planets will be in conjunction2 that by means of a lever having arms in a given ratio1 a known force will raise just so many pounds2 that to decompose a given quantity of sulphate of iron by carbonate of soda will require so many grains--these predictions show foreknowledge1 not only of the nature of the effects to be produced1 but of the magnitude1 either of the effects themselves1 of the agencies producing them1 or of the distance in time or space at which they will be produced4 ,there is both qualitative provision and quantitative prevision4 ,and this is the unexpressed difference which leads us to consider certain orders of knowledge as especially scientific when contrasted with knowledge in general4 ,are the phenomena measurable8 is the test which we unconsciously employ4 ,space is measurable3 hence ,geometry4 ,force and space are measurable3 hence ,statics4 ,time1 force1 and space are measurable3 hence ,dynamics4 ,the invention of the barometer enabled men to extend the principles of mechanics to the atmosphere2 and ,aerostatics existed4 ,when a thermometer was devised there arose a science of heat1 which was before impossible4 ,of such external agents as we have found no measures but our sensations #f we have no sciences4 ,we have no science of smells2 nor have we one of tastes4 ,we have a science of the relations of sounds differing in pitch1 because we have discovered a way to measure these relations2 but we have no science of sounds in respect to their loudness or their timbre1 because we have got no measures of loudness and timbre4 ,obviously it is this reduction of the sensible phenomena it presents1 to relations of magnitude1 which gives to any division of knowledge its specially scientific character4 ,originally men's knowledge of weights and forces was like their present knowledge of smells and tastes--a knowledge not extending beyond that given by the unaided sensations2 and it remained so until weighing instruments and dynamometers were invented4 ,before there were hour-glasses and clepsydras1 most phenomena could be estimated as to their durations and intervals1 with no greater precision than degrees of hardness can be estimated by the fingers4 ,until a thermometric scale was contrived1 men's judgments respecting relative amounts of heat stood on the same footing with their present judgments respecting relative amounts of sound4 ,and as in these initial stages1 with no aids to observation1 only the roughest comparisons of cases could be made1 and only the most marked differences perceived1 it resulted that only the most simple laws of dependence could be ascertained--only those laws which1 being uncomplicated with others1 and not disturbed in their manifestations1 required no niceties of observation to disentangle them4 ,whence it appears not only that in proportion as knowledge becomes quantitative do its previsions become complete as well as certain1 but that until its assumption of a quantitative character it is necessarily confined to the most elementary relations4 ,moreover it is to be remarked that while1 on the one hand1 we can discover the laws of the greater part of phenomena only by investigating them quantitatively2 on the other hand we can extend the range of our quantitative #g previsions only as fast as we detect the laws of the results we predict4 ,for clearly the ability to specify the magnitude of a result inaccessible to direct measurement1 implies knowledge of its mode of dependence on something which can be measured--implies that we know the particular fact dealt with to be an instance of some more general fact4 ,thus the extent to which our quantitative previsions have been carried in any direction1 indicates the depth to which our knowledge reaches in that direction4 ,and here1 as another aspect of the same fact1 it may be observed that as we pass from qualitative to quantitative prevision1 we pass from inductive science to deductive science4 ,science while purely inductive is purely qualitative2 when inaccurately quantitative it usually consists of part induction1 part deduction2 and it becomes accurately quantitative only when wholly deductive4 ,we do not mean that the deductive and the quantitative are coextensive2 for there is manifestly much deduction that is qualitative only4 ,we mean that all quantitative prevision is reached deductively2 and that induction can achieve only qualitative prevision4 ,still1 however1 it must not be supposed that these distinctions enable us to separate ordinary knowledge from science2 much as they seem to do so4 ,while they show in what consists the broad contrast between the extreme forms of the two1 they yet lead us to recognize their essential identity1 and once more prove the difference to be one of degree only4 ,for1 on the one hand1 much of our common knowledge is to some extent quantitative2 seeing that the amount of the foreseen result is known within certain wide limits4 ,and1 on the other hand1 the highest quantitative prevision does not reach the exact truth1 but only a near approach to it4 ,without clocks the savage knows that the day is longer in the summer than in the winter2 without scales he knows that stone is heavier than flesh2 that is1 he can foresee respecting certain results that their amounts will exceed these1 and be less than #h those--he knows about what they will be4 ,and1 with his most delicate instruments and most elaborate calculations1 all that the man of science can do1 is to reduce the difference between the foreseen and the actual results to an unimportant quantity4 ,moreover1 it must be borne in mind not only that all the sciences are qualitative in their first stages1--not only that some of them1 as ,chemistry1 have but lately reached the quantitative stage--but that the most advanced sciences have attained to their present power of determining quantities not present to the senses1 or not directly measurable1 by a slow process of improvement extending through thousands of years4 ,so that science and the knowledge of the uncultured are alike in the nature of their previsions1 widely as they differ in range2 they possess a common imperfection1 though this is immensely greater in the last than in the first2 and the transition from the one to the other has been through a series of steps by which the imperfection has been rendered continually less1 and the range continually wider4 ,these facts1 that science and ordinary knowledge are allied in nature1 and that the one is but a perfected and extended form of the other1 must necessarily underlie the whole theory of science1 its progress1 and the relations of its parts to each other4 ,there must be incompleteness in any history of the sciences1 which1 leaving out of view the first steps of their genesis1 commences with them only when they assume definite forms4 ,there must be grave defects1 if not a general untruth1 in a philosophy of the sciences considered in their interdependence and development1 which neglects the inquiry how they came to be distinct sciences1 and how they were severally evolved out of the chaos of primitive ideas4 ,not only a direct consideration of the matter1 but all analogy1 goes to show that in the earlier and simpler stages must be sought the key to all subsequent intricacies4 ,the time was when the anatomy and physiology of the human being were studied #i by themselves--when the adult man was analyzed and the relations of parts and of functions investigated1 without reference either to the relations exhibited in the embryo or to the homologous relations existing in other creatures4 ,now1 however1 it has become manifest that no true conceptions are possible under such conditions4 ,anatomists and physiologists find that the real natures of organs and tissues can be ascertained only by tracing their early evolution2 and that the affinities between existing genera can be satisfactorily made out only by examining the fossil genera to which they are akin4 ,well1 is it not clear that the like must be true concerning all things that undergo development8 ,is not science a growth8 ,has not science1 too1 its embryology8 ,and must not the neglect of its embryology lead to a misunderstanding of the principles of its evolution and of its existing organization8 ,there are priori reasons1 therefore1 for doubting the truth of all philosophies of the sciences which tacitly proceed upon the common notion that scientific knowledge and ordinary knowledge are separate2 instead of commencing1 as they should1 by affiliating the one upon the other1 and showing how it gradually came to be distinguishable from the other4 ,we may expect to find their generalizations essentially artificial2 and we shall not be deceived4 ,some illustrations of this may here be fitly introduced1 by way of preliminary to a brief sketch of the genesis of science from the point of view indicated4 ,and we cannot more readily find such illustrations than by glancing at a few of the various classifications of the sciences that have from time to time been proposed4 ,to consider all of them would take too much space3 we must content ourselves with some of the latest4 99 99 99 99 99 ,commencing with those which may be soonest disposed of1 let us notice1 first1 the arrangement propounded by ,oken4 ,an abstract of it runs thus3 ,part ,i4 ,,mathesis4--,pneumatogeny3 ,primary ,act1 ,primary ,consciousness1 #aj ,god1 ,primary ,rest1 ,time1 ,polarity1 ,motion1 ,man1 ,space1 ,point1 ,line1 ,surface1 ,globe1 ,rotation4--,hylogeny3 ,gravity1 ,matter1 ,ether1 ,heavenly ,bodies1 ,light1 ,heat1 ,fire4 7,he explains that ,,mathesis is the doctrine of the whole2 ,pneumatogeny being the doctrine of immaterial totalities1 and ,hylogeny that of material totalities47 ,part ,,ii4 ,,ontology4--,cosmogeny3 ,rest1 ,centre1 ,motion1 ,line1 ,planets1 ,form1 ,planetary ,system1 ,comets4--,stchiogeny3 ,condensation1 ,simple ,matter1 ,elements1 ,air1 ,water1 ,earth4--,stchiology3 ,functions of the ,elements1 c4 c4--,kingdoms of ,nature3 ,individuals4 7,he says in explanation that #8,,ontology teaches us the phenomena of matter4 ,the first of these are the heavenly bodies comprehended by ,cosmogeny4 ,these divide into elements4--,stchiogeny4 ,the earth element divides into minerals--,mineralogy4 ,these unite into one collective body--,geogeny4 ,the whole in singulars is the living1 or ,organic1 which again divides into plants and animals4 ,biology1 therefore1 divides into ,organogeny1 ,phytosophy1 ,zoosophy4'7 ,,first ,,kingdom4--,,minerals4 ,mineralogy1 ,geology4 ,part ,,iii4 ,,biology4--,organosophy1 ,phytogeny1 ,phyto-physiology1 ,phytology1 ,zoogeny1 ,physiology1 ,zoology1 ,psychology4 ,a glance over this confused scheme shows that it is an attempt to classify knowledge1 not after the order in which it has been1 or may be1 built up in the human consciousness2 but after an assumed order of creation4 ,it is a pseudo-scientific cosmogony1 akin to those which men have enunciated from the earliest times downwards2 and only a little more respectable4 ,as such it will not be thought worthy of much consideration by those who1 like ourselves1 hold that experience is the sole origin of knowledge4 ,otherwise1 it might have been needful to dwell on the incongruities of the arrangement--to ask how motion can be treated of before space8 how there can be rotation without matter to rotate8 how polarity can be dealt with without involving points and lines8 ,but it will serve our present purpose just to indicate a few of the absurdities resulting from the doctrine which ,oken seems to hold in common with ,hegel1 that 8to philosophize on ,nature is to re-think the great thought of ,creation40 ,here is a sample3 8,mathematics is the universal science2 so also is #aa ,physio-philosophy1 although it is only a part1 or rather but a condition of the universe2 both are one1 or mutually congruent4 8,mathematics is1 however1 a science of mere forms without substance4 ,physio-philosophy is1 therefore1 mathematics endowed with substance40 ,from the ,english point of view it is sufficiently amusing to find such a dogma not only gravely stated1 but stated as an unquestionable truth4 ,here we see the experiences of quantitative relations which men have gathered from surrounding bodies and generalized 7experiences which had been scarcely at all generalized at the beginning of the historic period7--we find these generalized experiences1 these intellectual abstractions1 elevated into concrete actualities1 projected back into ,nature1 and considered as the internal frame-work of things--the skeleton by which matter is sustained4 ,but this new form of the old realism1 is by no means the most startling of the physio-philosophic principles4 ,we presently read that1 8,the highest mathematical idea1 or the fundamental principle of all mathematics is the zero #j40 99 99 99 8,zero is in itself nothing4 ,mathematics is based upon nothing1 and1 consequently1 arises out of nothing4 8,out of nothing1 therefore1 it is possible for something to arise2 for mathematics1 consisting of propositions1 is a something in relation to #j40 ,by such 8consequentlys0 and 8therefores0 it is1 that men philosophize when they 8re-think the great thought of creation40 ,by dogmas that pretend to be reasons1 nothing is made to generate mathematics2 and by clothing mathematics with matter1 we have the universe6 ,if now we deny1 as we do deny1 that the highest mathematical idea is the zero--if1 on the other hand1 we assert1 as we do assert1 that the fundamental idea underlying all mathematics1 is that of equality2 the whole of ,oken's cosmogony disappears4 ,and here1 indeed1 we may see illustrated1 the distinctive peculiarity of the ,german method of procedure in these #ab matters--the bastard priori method1 as it may be termed4 ,the legitimate priori method sets out with propositions of which the negation is inconceivable2 the priori method as illegitimately applied1 sets out either with propositions of which the negation is not inconceivable1 or with propositions like ,oken's1 of which the affirmation is inconceivable4 ,it is needless to proceed further with the analysis2 else might we detail the steps by which ,oken arrives at the conclusions that 8the planets are coagulated colours1 for they are coagulated light02 that 8the sphere is the expanded nothing20 that gravity is 8a weighty nothing1 a heavy essence1 striving towards a centre20 that 8the earth is the identical1 water the indifferent1 air the different2 or the first the centre1 the second the radius1 the last the periphery of the general globe or of fire40 ,to comment on them would be nearly as absurd as are the propositions themselves4 ,let us pass on to another of the ,german systems of knowledge--that of ,hegel4 ,the simple fact that ,hegel puts ,jacob ,bhme on a par with ,bacon1 suffices alone to show that his stand-point is far remote from the one usually regarded as scientific3 so far remote1 indeed1 that it is not easy to find any common basis on which to found a criticism4 ,those who hold that the mind is moulded into conformity with surrounding things by the agency of surrounding things1 are necessarily at a loss how to deal with those who1 like ,schelling and ,hegel1 assert that surrounding things are solidified mind--that ,nature is 8petrified intelligence40 ,however1 let us briefly glance at ,hegel's classification4 ,he divides philosophy into three parts3 #a4 ,logic1 or the science of the idea in itself1 the pure idea4 #b4 ,the ,philosophy of ,nature1 or the science of the idea considered under its other form--of the idea as ,nature4 #c4 ,the ,philosophy of the ,mind1 or the science of the idea in its return to itself4 ,of these1 the second is divided into the natural sciences1 #ac commonly so-called2 so that in its more detailed form the series runs thus3--,logic1 ,mechanics1 ,physics1 ,organic ,physics1 ,psychology4 ,now1 if we believe with ,hegel1 first1 that thought is the true essence of man2 second1 that thought is the essence of the world2 and that1 therefore1 there is nothing but thought2 his classification1 beginning with the science of pure thought1 may be acceptable4 ,but otherwise1 it is an obvious objection to his arrangement1 that thought implies things thought of--that there can be no logical forms without the substance of experience--that the science of ideas and the science of things must have a simultaneous origin4 ,hegel1 however1 anticipates this objection1 and1 in his obstinate idealism1 replies1 that the contrary is true4 ,he affirms that all contained in the forms1 to become something1 requires to be thought2 and that logical forms are the foundations of all things4 ,it is not surprising that1 starting from such premises1 and reasoning after this fashion1 ,hegel finds his way to strange conclusions4 ,out of space and time he proceeds to build up motion1 matter1 repulsion1 attraction1 weight1 and inertia4 ,he then goes on to logically evolve the solar system4 ,in doing this he widely diverges from the ,newtonian theory2 reaches by syllogism the conviction that the planets are the most perfect celestial bodies2 and1 not being able to bring the stars within his theory1 says that they are mere formal existences and not living matter1 and that as compared with the solar system they are as little admirable as a cutaneous eruption or a swarm of flies4#a ,results so absurd might be left as self-disproved1 were it not that speculators of this class are not alarmed by any amount of incongruity with established beliefs4 ,the only efficient mode of treating systems like this of #ad ,hegel1 is to show that they are self-destructive--that by their first steps they ignore that authority on which all their subsequent steps depend4 ,if ,hegel professes1 as he manifestly does1 to develop his scheme by reasoning--if he presents successive inferences as necessarily following from certain premises2 he implies the postulate that a belief which necessarily follows after certain antecedents is a true belief2 and did an opponent reply to one of his inferences that1 though it was impossible to think the opposite1 yet the opposite was true1 he would consider the reply irrational4 ,the procedure1 however1 which he would thus condemn as destructive of all thinking whatever1 is just the procedure exhibited in the enunciation of his own first principles4 ,mankind find themselves unable to conceive that there can be thought without things thought of4 ,hegel1 however1 asserts that there can be thought without things thought of4 ,that ultimate test of a true proposition--the inability of the human mind to conceive the negation of it--which in all the successive steps of his arguments he considers valid1 he considers invalid where it suits his convenience to do so2 and yet at the same time denies the right of an opponent to follow his example4 ,if it is competent for him to posit dogmas which are the direct negations of what human consciousness recognizes2 then is it also competent for his antagonists to stop him at any moment by saying1 that though the particular inference he is drawing seems to his mind1 and to all minds1 necessarily to follow from the premises1 yet it is not true1 but the contrary inference is true4 ,or1 to state the dilemma in another form3--,if he sets out with inconceivable propositions1 then may he with equal propriety make all his succeeding propositions inconceivable ones--may at every step throughout his reasoning draw the opposite conclusion to that which seems involved4 ,hegel's mode of procedure being thus essentially suicidal1 the ,hegelian classification which depends upon #ae it1 falls to the ground4 ,let us consider next that of ,m4 ,comte4 ,as all his readers must admit1 ,m4 ,comte presents us with a scheme of the sciences which1 unlike the foregoing ones1 demands respectful consideration4 ,widely as we differ from him1 we cheerfully bear witness to the largeness of his views1 the clearness of his reasoning1 and the value of his speculations as contributing to intellectual progress4 ,did we believe a serial arrangement of the sciences to be possible1 that of ,m4 ,comte would certainly be the one we should adopt4 ,his fundamental propositions are thoroughly intelligible2 and1 if not true1 have a great semblance of truth4 ,his successive steps are logically co-ordinated2 and he supports his conclusions by a considerable amount of evidence--evidence which1 so long as it is not critically examined1 or not met by counter evidence1 seems to substantiate his positions4 ,but it only needs to assume that antagonistic attitude which ought to be assumed towards new doctrines1 in the belief that1 if true1 they will prosper by conquering objectors--it needs but to test his leading doctrines either by other facts than those he cites1 or by his own facts differently applied1 to show that they will not stand4 ,we will proceed thus to deal with the general principle on which he bases his hierarchy of the sciences4 ,in the condensed translation of the ,positive ,philosophy1 by ,miss ,martineau1 ,m4 ,comte says3--8,our problem is1 then1 to find the one rational order1 amongst a host of possible systems40 4 4 8,this order is determined by the degree of simplicity1 or1 what comes to the same thing1 of generality of their phenomena40 ,and the arrangement he deduces runs thus3--,mathematics1 ,astronomy1 ,physics1 ,chemistry1 ,physiology1 ,social ,physics4 ,this he asserts to be 8the true filiation of the sciences40 ,he asserts further1 that the principle of progression from a greater to a less degree of generality1 8which gives this order to the whole body of science1 arranges the parts of each science40 ,and1 #af finally1 he asserts that the gradations thus established priori among the sciences and the parts of each science1 8is in essential conformity with the order which has spontaneously taken place among the branches of natural philosophy20 or1 in other words--corresponds with the order of historic development4 ,let us compare these assertions with the facts4 ,that there may be perfect fairness1 let us make no choice1 but take as the field for our comparison1 the succeeding section treating of the first science--,mathematics2 and let us use none but ,m4 ,comte's own facts1 and his own admissions4 ,confining ourselves to this one science1 we are limited to comparisons between its several parts4 ,m4 ,comte says1 that the parts of each science must be arranged in the order of their decreasing generality2 and that this order of decreasing generality agrees with the order of historic development4 ,our inquiry will be1 then1 whether the history of mathematics confirms this statement4 ,carrying out his principle1 ,m4 ,comte divides ,mathematics into 8,abstract ,mathematics1 or the ,calculus 7taking the word in its most extended sense7 and ,concrete ,mathematics1 which is composed of ,general ,geometry and of ,rational ,mechanics40 ,the subject-matter of the first of these is number2 the subject-matter of the second includes space1 time1 motion1 force4 ,the one possesses the highest possible degree of generality2 for all things whatever admit of enumeration4 ,the others are less general2 seeing that there are endless phenomena that are not cognizable either by general geometry or rational mechanics4 ,in conformity with the alleged law1 therefore1 the evolution of the calculus must throughout have preceded the evolution of the concrete sub-sciences4 ,now somewhat awkwardly for him1 the first remark ,m4 ,comte makes bearing on this point is1 that 8from an historical point of view1 mathematical analysis appears to have arisen out of the contemplation of geometrical and mechanical facts40 ,true1 he goes #ag on to say that1 8it is not the less independent of these sciences logically speaking20 for that 8analytical ideas are1 above all others1 universal1 abstract1 and simple2 and geometrical conceptions are necessarily founded on them40 ,we will not take advantage of this last passage to charge ,m4 ,comte with teaching1 after the fashion of ,hegel1 that there can be thought without things thought of4 ,we are content simply to compare the assertion1 that analysis arose out of the contemplation of geometrical and mechanical facts1 with the assertion that geometrical conceptions are founded upon analytical ones4 ,literally interpreted they exactly cancel each other4 ,interpreted1 however1 in a liberal sense1 they imply1 what we believe to be demonstrable1 that the two had a simultaneous origin4 ,the passage is either nonsense1 or it is an admission that abstract and concrete mathematics are coeval4 ,thus1 at the very first step1 the alleged congruity between the order of generality and the order of evolution1 does not hold good4 ,but may it not be that though abstract and concrete mathematics took their rise at the same time1 the one afterwards developed more rapidly than the other2 and has ever since remained in advance of it8 ,no3 and again we call ,m4 ,comte himself as witness4 ,fortunately for his argument he has said nothing respecting the early stages of the concrete and abstract divisions after their divergence from a common root2 otherwise the advent of ,algebra long after the ,greek geometry had reached a high development1 would have been an inconvenient fact for him to deal with4 ,but passing over this1 and limiting ourselves to his own statements1 we find1 at the opening of the next chapter1 the admission1 that 8the historical development of the abstract portion of mathematical science has1 since the time of ,descartes1 been for the most part determined by that of the concrete40 ,further on we read respecting algebraic functions that 8most functions were concrete in their origin--even those which are at present the most purely #ah abstract2 and the ancients discovered only through geometrical definitions elementary algebraic properties of functions to which a numerical value was not attached till long afterwards1 rendering abstract to us what was concrete to the old geometers40 ,how do these statements tally with his doctrine8 ,again1 having divided the calculus into algebraic and arithmetical1 ,m4 ,comte admits1 as perforce he must1 that the algebraic is more general than the arithmetical2 yet he will not say that algebra preceded arithmetic in point of time4 ,and again1 having divided the calculus of functions into the calculus of direct functions 7common algebra7 and the calculus of indirect functions 7transcendental analysis71 he is obliged to speak of this last as possessing a higher generality than the first2 yet it is far more modern4 ,indeed1 by implication1 ,m4 ,comte himself confesses this incongruity2 for he says3--8,it might seem that the transcendental analysis ought to be studied before the ordinary1 as it provides the equations which the other has to resolve4 ,but though the transcendental is logically independent of the ordinary1 it is best to follow the usual method of study1 taking the ordinary first40 ,in all these cases1 then1 as well as at the close of the section where he predicts that mathematicians will in time 8create procedures of a wider generality10 ,m4 ,comte makes admissions that are diametrically opposed to the alleged law4 ,in the succeeding chapters treating of the concrete department of mathematics1 we find similar contradictions4 ,m4 ,comte himself names the geometry of the ancients special geometry and that of the moderns general geometry4 ,he admits that while 8the ancients studied geometry with reference to the bodies under notice1 or specially2 the moderns study it with reference to the phenomena to be considered1 or generally40 ,he admits that while 8the ancients extracted all they could out of one line or surface before passing to another10 8the moderns1 since ,descartes1 employ themselves on questions #ai which relate to any figure whatever40 ,these facts are the reverse of what1 according to his theory1 they should be4 ,so1 too1 in mechanics4 ,before dividing it into statics and dynamics1 ,m4 ,comte treats of the three laws of motion1 and is obliged to do so2 for statics1 the more general of the two divisions1 though it does not involve motion1 is impossible as a science until the laws of motion are ascertained4 ,yet the laws of motion pertain to dynamics1 the more special of the divisions4 ,further on he points out that after ,archimedes1 who discovered the law of equilibrium of the lever1 statics made no progress until the establishment of dynamics enabled us to seek 8the conditions of equilibrium through the laws of the composition of forces40 ,and he adds--8,at this day this is the method universally employed4 ,at the first glance it does not appear the most rational--dynamics being more complicated than statics1 and precedence being natural to the simpler4 ,it would1 in fact1 be more philosophical to refer dynamics to statics1 as has since been done40 ,sundry discoveries are afterwards detailed1 showing how completely the development of statics has been achieved by considering its problems dynamically2 and before the close of the section ,m4 ,comte remarks that 8before hydrostatics could be comprehended under statics1 it was necessary that the abstract theory of equilibrium should be made so general as to apply directly to fluids as well as solids4 ,this was accomplished when ,lagrange supplied1 as the basis of the whole of rational mechanics1 the single principle of virtual velocities40 ,in which statement we have two facts directly at variance with ,m4 ,comte's doctrine2--first1 that the simpler science1 statics1 reached its present development only by the aid of the principle of virtual velocities1 which belongs to the more complex science1 dynamics2 and that this 8single principle0 underlying all rational mechanics--this most general form which includes alike the relations of statical1 #bj hydrostatical1 and dynamical forces--was reached so late as the time of ,lagrange4 ,thus it is not true that the historical succession of the divisions of mathematics has corresponded with the order of decreasing generality4 ,it is not true that abstract mathematics was evolved antecedently to1 and independently of1 concrete mathematics4 ,it is not true that of the subdivisions of abstract mathematics1 the more general came before the more special4 ,and it is not true that concrete mathematics1 in either of its two sections1 began with the most abstract and advanced to the less abstract truths4 ,it may be well to mention1 parenthetically1 that1 in defending his alleged law of progression from the general to the special1 ,m4 ,comte somewhere comments upon the two meanings of the word general1 and the resulting liability to confusion4 ,without now discussing whether the asserted distinction exists in other cases1 it is manifest that it does not exist here4 ,in sundry of the instances above quoted1 the endeavours made by ,m4 ,comte himself to disguise1 or to explain away1 the precedence of the special over the general1 clearly indicate that the generality spoken of is of the kind meant by his formula4 ,and it needs but a brief consideration of the matter to show that1 even did he attempt it1 he could not distinguish this generality which1 as above proved1 frequently comes last1 from the generality which he says always comes first4 ,for what is the nature of that mental process by which objects1 dimensions1 weights1 times1 and the rest1 are found capable of having their relations expressed numerically8 ,it is the formation of certain abstract conceptions of unity1 duality1 and multiplicity1 which are applicable to all things alike4 ,it is the invention of general symbols serving to express the numerical relations of entities1 whatever be their special characters4 ,and what is the nature of the mental process by which numbers are found capable of having their relations expressed algebraically8 ,it is the same4 #ba ,it is the formation of certain abstract conceptions of numerical functions which are constant whatever be the magnitudes of the numbers4 ,it is the invention of general symbols serving to express the relations between numbers1 as numbers express the relations between things4 ,just as arithmetic deals with the common properties of lines1 areas1 bulks1 forces1 periods2 so does algebra deal with the common properties of the numbers which arithmetic presents4 ,having shown that ,m4 ,comte's alleged law of progression does not hold among the several parts of the same science1 let us see how it agrees with the facts when applied to the separate sciences4 8,astronomy10 says ,m4 ,comte 7,positive ,philosophy1 ,book ,,iii471 8was a positive science1 in its geometrical aspect1 from the earliest days of the school of ,alexandria2 but ,physics1 which we are now to consider1 had no positive character at all till ,galileo made his great discoveries on the fall of heavy bodies40 ,on this1 our comment is simply that it is a misrepresentation based upon an arbitrary misuse of words--a mere verbal artifice4 ,by choosing to exclude from terrestrial physics those laws of magnitude1 motion1 and position1 which he includes in celestial physics1 ,m4 ,comte makes it appear that the last owes nothing to the first4 ,not only is this unwarrantable1 but it is radically inconsistent with his own scheme of divisions4 ,at the outset he says--and as the point is important we quote from the original--8,pour la physique inorganique nous voyons d'abord1 en nous conformant toujours l'ordre de gnralit et de dpendance des phnomnes1 qu'elle doit tre partage en deux sections distinctes1 suivant qu'elle considre les phnomnes gnraux de l'univers1 ou1 en particulier1 ceux que prsentent les corps terrestres4 ,d'o la physique cleste1 ou l'astronomie1 soit gomtrique1 soit mechanique2 et la physique terrestre40 ,here then we have inorganic physics clearly divided into celestial physics and terrestrial physics--the phenomena presented by the universe1 and the #bb phenomena presented by earthly bodies4 ,if now celestial bodies and terrestrial bodies exhibit sundry leading phenomena in common1 as they do1 how can the generalization of these common phenomena be considered as pertaining to the one class rather than to the other8 ,if inorganic physics includes geometry 7which ,m4 ,comte has made it do by comprehending geometrical astronomy in its sub-section1 celestial physics72 and if its other sub-section1 terrestrial physics1 treats of things having geometrical properties2 how can the laws of geometrical relations be excluded from terrestrial physics8 ,clearly if celestial physics includes the geometry of objects in the heavens1 terrestrial physics includes the geometry of objects on the earth4 ,and if terrestrial physics includes terrestrial geometry1 while celestial physics includes celestial geometry1 then the geometrical part of terrestrial physics precedes the geometrical part of celestial physics2 seeing that geometry gained its first ideas from surrounding objects4 ,until men had learnt geometrical relations from bodies on the earth1 it was impossible for them to understand the geometrical relations of bodies in the heavens4 ,so1 too1 with celestial mechanics1 which had terrestrial mechanics for its parent4 ,the very conception of force1 which underlies the whole of mechanical astronomy1 is borrowed from our earthly experiences2 and the leading laws of mechanical action as exhibited in scales1 levers1 projectiles1 c41 had to be ascertained before the dynamics of the ,solar ,system could be entered upon4 ,what were the laws made use of by ,newton in working out his grand discovery8 ,the law of falling bodies disclosed by ,galileo2 that of the composition of forces also disclosed by ,galileo2 and that of centrifugal force found out by ,huyghens--all of them generalizations of terrestrial physics4 ,yet1 with facts like these before him1 ,m4 ,comte places astronomy before physics in order of evolution6 ,he does not compare the geometrical parts of the two together1 and the mechanical parts of the two #bc together2 for this would by no means suit his hypothesis4 ,but he compares the geometrical part of the one with the mechanical part of the other1 and so gives a semblance of truth to his position4 ,he is led away by a verbal illusion4 ,had he confined his attention to the things and disregarded the words1 he would have seen that before mankind scientifically co-ordinated any one class of phenomena displayed in the heavens1 they had previously co-ordinated a parallel class of phenomena displayed on the surface of the earth4 ,were it needful we could fill a score pages with the incongruities of ,m4 ,comte's scheme4 ,but the foregoing samples will suffice4 ,so far is his law of evolution of the sciences from being tenable1 that1 by following his example1 and arbitrarily ignoring one class of facts1 it would be possible to present1 with great plausibility1 just the opposite generalization to that which he enunciates4 ,while he asserts that the rational order of the sciences1 like the order of their historic development1 8is determined by the degree of simplicity1 or1 what comes to the same thing1 of generality of their phenomena20 it might contrariwise be asserted that1 commencing with the complex and the special1 mankind have progressed step by step to a knowledge of greater simplicity and wider generality4 ,so much evidence is there of this as to have drawn from ,whewell1 in his ,history of the ,inductive ,sciences1 the remark that 8the reader has already seen repeatedly in the course of this history1 complex and derivative principles presenting themselves to men's minds before simple and elementary ones40 ,even from ,m4 ,comte's own work1 numerous facts1 admissions1 and arguments1 might be picked out1 tending to show this4 ,we have already quoted his words in proof that both abstract and concrete mathematics have progressed towards a higher degree of generality1 and that he looks forward to a higher generality still4 ,just to strengthen this adverse hypothesis1 let us take a further instance4 #bd ,from the particular case of the scales1 the law of equilibrium of which was familiar to the earliest nations known1 ,archimedes advanced to the more general case of the lever of which the arms may or may not be equal2 the law of equilibrium of which includes that of the scales4 ,by the help of ,galileo's discovery concerning the composition of forces1 ,d',alembert 8established1 for the first time1 the equations of equilibrium of any system of forces applied to the different points of a solid body0--equations which include all cases of levers and an infinity of cases besides4 ,clearly this is progress towards a higher generality--towards a knowledge more independent of special circumstances--towards a study of phenomena 8the most disengaged from the incidents of particular cases20 which is ,m4 ,comte's definition of 8the most simple phenomena40 ,does it not indeed follow from the admitted fact1 that mental advance is from the concrete to the abstract1 from the particular to the general1 that the universal and therefore most simple truths are the last to be discovered8 ,should we ever succeed in reducing all orders of phenomena to some single law--say of atomic action1 as ,m4 ,comte suggests--must not that law answer to his test of being independent of all others1 and therefore most simple8 ,and would not such a law generalize the phenomena of gravity1 cohesion1 atomic affinity1 and electric repulsion1 just as the laws of number generalize the quantitative phenomena of space1 time and force8 ,the possibility of saying so much in support of an hypothesis the very reverse of ,m4 ,comte's1 at once proves that his generalization is only a half-truth4 ,the fact is that neither proposition is correct by itself2 and the actuality is expressed only by putting the two together4 ,the progress of science is duplex4 ,it is at once from the special to the general1 and from the general to the special4 ,it is analytical and synthetical at the same time4 ,m4 ,comte himself observes that the evolution of science #be has been accomplished by the division of labour2 but he quite misstates the mode in which this division of labour has operated4 ,as he describes it1 it has been simply an arrangement of phenomena into classes1 and the study of each class by itself4 ,he does not recognize the effect of progress in each class upon all other classes3 he recognizes only the effect on the class succeeding it in his hierarchical scale4 ,or if he occasionally admits collateral influences and intercommunications1 he does it so grudgingly1 and so quickly puts the admissions out of sight and forgets them1 as to leave the impression that1 with but trifling exceptions1 the sciences aid one another only in the order of their alleged succession4 ,the fact is1 however1 that the division of labour in science1 like the division of labour in society1 and like the 8physiological division of labour0 in individual organisms1 has been not only a specialization of functions1 but a continuous helping of each division by all the others1 and of all by each4 ,every particular class of inquirers has1 as it were1 secreted its own particular order of truths from the general mass of material which observation accumulates2 and all other classes of inquirers have made use of these truths as fast as they were elaborated1 with the effect of enabling them the better to elaborate each its own order of truths4 ,it was thus in sundry of the cases we have quoted as at variance with ,m4 ,comte's doctrine4 ,it was thus with the application of ,huyghens's optical discovery to astronomical observation by ,galileo4 ,it was thus with the application of the isochronism of the pendulum to the making of instruments for measuring intervals1 astronomical and other4 ,it was thus when the discovery that the refraction and dispersion of light did not follow the same law of variation1 affected both astronomy and physiology by giving us achromatic telescopes and microscopes4 ,it was thus when ,bradley's discovery of the aberration of light enabled him to make the first step towards ascertaining the motions of the stars4 #bf ,it was thus when ,cavendish's torsion-balance experiment determined the specific gravity of the ,earth1 and so gave a datum for calculating the specific gravities of the ,sun and ,planets4 ,it was thus when tables of atmospheric refraction enabled observers to write down the real places of the heavenly bodies instead of their apparent places4 ,it was thus when the discovery of the different expansibilities of metals by heat1 gave us the means of correcting our chronometrical measurements of astronomical periods4 ,it was thus when the lines of the prismatic spectrum were used to distinguish the heavenly bodies that are of like nature with the sun from those which are not4 ,it was thus when1 as recently1 an electro-telegraphic instrument was invented for the more accurate registration of meridional transits4 ,it was thus when the difference in the rates of a clock at the equator1 and nearer the poles1 gave data for calculating the oblateness of the earth1 and accounting for the precession of the equinoxes4 ,it was thus--but it is needless to continue4 ,here1 within our own limited knowledge of its history1 we have named ten additional cases in which the single science of astronomy has owed its advance to sciences coming after it in ,m4 ,comte's series4 ,not only its minor changes1 but its greatest revolutions have been thus determined4 ,kepler could not have discovered his celebrated laws had it not been for ,tycho ,brahe's accurate observations2 and it was only after some progress in physical and chemical science that the improved instruments with which those observations were made1 became possible4 ,the heliocentric theory of the ,solar ,system had to wait until the invention of the telescope before it could be finally established4 ,nay1 even the grand discovery of all--the law of gravitation--depended for its proof upon an operation of physical science1 the measurement of a degree on the ,earth's surface4 ,so completely1 indeed1 did it thus depend1 that ,newton had actually abandoned his hypothesis because the #bg length of a degree1 as then stated1 brought out wrong results2 and it was only after ,picart's more exact measurement was published1 that he returned to his calculations and proved his great generalization4 ,now this constant intercommunion which1 for brevity's sake1 we have illustrated in the case of one science only1 has been taking place with all the sciences4 ,throughout the whole course of their evolution there has been a continuous consensus of the sciences--a consensus exhibiting a general correspondence with the consensus of the faculties in each phase of mental development2 the one being an objective registry of the subjective state of the other4 99 99 99 99 99 ,from our present point of view1 then1 it becomes obvious that the conception of a serial arrangement of the sciences is a vicious one4 ,it is not simply that1 as ,m4 ,comte admits1 such a classification 8will always involve something1 if not arbitrary1 at least artificial20 it is not1 as he would have us believe1 that1 neglecting minor imperfections such a classification may be substantially true2 but it is that any grouping of the sciences in a succession gives a radically erroneous idea of their genesis and their dependencies4 ,there is no 8one rational order among a host of possible systems40 ,there is no 8true filiation of the sciences40 ,the whole hypothesis is fundamentally false4 ,indeed1 it needs but a glance at its origin to see at once how baseless it is4 ,why a series8 ,what reason have we to suppose that the sciences admit of a linear arrangement8 ,where is our warrant for assuming that there is some succession in which they can be placed8 ,there is no reason2 no warrant4 ,whence then has arisen the supposition8 ,to use ,m4 ,comte's own phraseology1 we should say1 it is a metaphysical conception4 ,it adds another to the cases constantly occurring1 of the human mind being made the measure of ,nature4 ,we are obliged to think in sequence2 it is a law of our minds that we must consider subjects separately1 one after another3 therefore #bh ,nature must be serial--therefore the sciences must be classifiable in a succession4 ,see here the birth of the notion1 and the sole evidence of its truth4 ,men have been obliged when arranging in books their schemes of education and systems of knowledge1 to choose some order or other4 ,and from inquiring what is the best order1 have fallen into the belief that there is an order which truly represents the facts--have persevered in seeking such an order2 quite overlooking the previous question whether it is likely that ,nature has consulted the convenience of book-making4 ,for ,german philosophers1 who hold that ,nature is 8petrified intelligence10 and that logical forms are the foundations of all things1 it is a consistent hypothesis that as thought is serial1 ,nature is serial2 but that ,m4 ,comte1 who is so bitter an opponent of all anthropomorphism1 even in its most evanescent shapes1 should have committed the mistake of imposing upon the external world an arrangement which so obviously springs from a limitation of the human consciousness1 is somewhat strange4 ,and it is the more strange when we call to mind how1 at the outset1 ,m4 ,comte remarks that in the beginning 8toutes les sciences sont cultives simultanment par les mmes esprits20 that this is 8inevitable et mme indispensable20 and how he further remarks that the different sciences are 8comme les diverses branches d'un tronc unique40 ,were it not accounted for by the distorting influence of a cherished hypothesis1 it would be scarcely possible to understand how1 after recognizing truths like these1 ,m4 ,comte should have persisted in attempting to construct 8une chelle encyclopdique40 ,the metaphor which ,m4 ,comte has here so inconsistently used to express the relations of the sciences--branches of one trunk--is an approximation to the truth1 though not the truth itself4 ,it suggests the facts that the sciences had a common origin2 that they have been developing simultaneously2 and that they have been from time to time dividing and sub-dividing4 ,but it fails to suggest the fact1 that the #bi divisions and sub-divisions thus arising do not remain separate1 but now and again re-unite in direct and indirect ways4 ,they inosculate2 they severally send off and receive connecting growths2 and the intercommunion has been ever becoming more frequent1 more intricate1 more widely ramified4 ,there has all along been higher specialization1 that there might be a larger generalization2 and a deeper analysis1 that there might be a better synthesis4 ,each larger generalization has lifted sundry specializations still higher2 and each better synthesis has prepared the way for still deeper analysis4 ,and here we may fitly enter upon the task awhile since indicated--a sketch of the ,genesis of ,science1 regarded as a gradual outgrowth from common knowledge--an extension of the perceptions by the aid of the reason4 ,we propose to treat it as a psychological process historically displayed2 tracing at the same time the advance from qualitative to quantitative prevision2 the progress from concrete facts to abstract facts1 and the application of such abstract facts to the analysis of new orders of concrete facts2 the simultaneous advance in generalization and specialization2 the continually increasing subdivision and reunion of the sciences2 and their constantly improving consensus4 99 99 99 99 99 ,to trace out scientific evolution from its deepest roots would1 of course1 involve a complete analysis of the mind4 ,for as science is a development of that common knowledge acquired by the unaided senses and uncultured reason1 so is that common knowledge itself gradually built up out of the simplest perceptions4 ,we must1 therefore1 begin somewhere abruptly2 and the most appropriate stage to take for our point of departure will be the adult mind of the savage4 ,commencing thus1 without a proper preliminary analysis1 we are naturally somewhat at a loss how to present1 in a satisfactory manner1 those fundamental processes of thought out of which science originates4 ,perhaps our argument may #cj be best initiated by the proposition1 that all intelligent action whatever depends upon the discerning of distinctions among surrounding things4 ,the condition under which only it is possible for any creature to obtain food and avoid danger1 is1 that it shall be differently affected by different objects--that it shall be led to act in one way by one object1 and in another way by another4 ,in the lower orders of creatures this condition is fulfilled by means of an apparatus which acts automatically4 ,in the higher orders the actions are partly automatic1 partly conscious4 ,and in man they are almost wholly conscious4 ,throughout1 however1 there must necessarily exist a certain classification of things according to their properties--a classification which is either organically registered in the system1 as in the inferior creation1 or is formed by conscious experience1 as in ourselves4 ,and it may be further remarked1 that the extent to which this classification is carried1 roughly indicates the height of intelligence--that1 while the lowest organisms are able to do little more than discriminate organic from inorganic matter2 while the generality of animals carry their classifications no further than to a limited number of plants or creatures serving for food1 a limited number of beasts of prey1 and a limited number of places and materials2 the most degraded of the human race possess a knowledge of the distinctive natures of a great variety of substances1 plants1 animals1 tools1 persons1 c42 not only as classes but as individuals4 ,what now is the mental process by which classification is effected8 ,manifestly it is a recognition of the likeness or unlikeness of things1 either in respect of their sizes1 colours1 forms1 weights1 textures1 tastes1 c41 or in respect of their modes of action4 ,by some special mark1 sound1 or motion1 the savage identifies a certain four-legged creature he sees1 as one that is good for food1 and to be caught in a particular way2 or as one that is dangerous2 and acts accordingly4 ,he has classed together all the creatures that are alike in #ca this particular4 ,and manifestly in choosing the wood out of which to form his bow1 the plant with which to poison his arrows1 the bone from which to make his fish-hooks1 he identifies them through their chief sensible properties as belonging to the general classes1 wood1 plant1 and bone1 but distinguishes them as belonging to sub-classes by virtue of certain properties in which they are unlike the rest of the general classes they belong to2 and so forms genera and species4 ,and here it becomes manifest that not only is classification carried on by grouping together in the mind things that are like2 but that classes and sub-classes are formed and arranged according to the degrees of unlikeness4 ,things strongly contrasted are alone distinguished in the lower stages of mental evolution2 as may be any day observed in an infant4 ,and gradually as the powers of discrimination increase1 the strongly-contrasted classes at first distinguished1 come to be each divided into sub-classes1 differing from each other less than the classes differ2 and these sub-classes are again divided after the same manner4 ,by the continuance of which process1 things are gradually arranged into groups1 the members of which are less and less unlike2 ending1 finally1 in groups whose members differ only as individuals1 and not specifically4 ,and thus there tends ultimately to arise the notion of complete likeness4 ,for manifestly1 it is impossible that groups should continue to be subdivided in virtue of smaller and smaller differences1 without there being a simultaneous approximation to the notion of no difference4 ,let us next notice that the recognition of likeness and unlikeness1 which underlies classification1 and out of which continued classification evolves the idea of complete likeness--let us next notice that it also underlies the process of naming1 and by consequence language4 ,for all language consists1 at the outset1 of symbols which are as like to the things symbolized as it is practicable to make them4 ,the #cb language of signs is a means of conveying ideas by mimicking the actions or peculiarities of the things referred to4 ,verbal language also1 in its first stage1 is a mode of suggesting objects or acts by imitating the sounds which the objects make1 or with which the acts are accompanied4 ,originally these two languages were used simultaneously4 ,it needs but to watch the gesticulations with which the savage accompanies his speech--to see a ,bushman dramatizing before an audience his mode of catching game--or to note the extreme paucity of words in primitive vocabularies2 to infer that in the beginning1 attitudes1 gestures1 and sounds1 were all combined to produce as good a likeness as possible of the things1 animals1 persons1 or events described2 and that as the sounds came to be understood by themselves the gestures fell into disuse3 leaving traces1 however1 in the manners of the more excitable civilized races4 ,but be this as it may1 it suffices simply to observe1 how many of the words current among barbarous peoples are like the sounds appertaining to the things signified2 how many of our own oldest and simplest words have the same peculiarity2 how children habitually invent imitative words2 and how the sign-language spontaneously formed by deaf mutes is based on imitative actions--to be convinced that the notion of likeness is that from which the nomenclature of objects takes its rise4 ,were there space we might go on to point out how this law of likeness is traceable1 not only in the origin but in the development of language2 how in primitive tongues the plural is made by a duplication of the singular1 which is a multiplication of the word to make it like the multiplicity of the things2 how the use of metaphor--that prolific source of new words--is a suggesting of ideas which are like the ideas to be conveyed in some respect or other2 and how1 in the copious use of simile1 fable1 and allegory among uncivilized races1 we see that complex conceptions which there is no direct language for1 are #cc rendered1 by presenting known conceptions more or less like them4 ,this view is confirmed1 and the predominance of this notion of likeness in primitive thought further illustrated1 by the fact that our system of presenting ideas to the eye originated after the same fashion4 ,writing and printing have descended from picture-language4 ,the earliest mode of permanently registering a fact was by depicting it on a skin and afterwards on a wall2 that is--by exhibiting something as like to the thing to be remembered as it could be made4 ,gradually as the practice grew habitual and extensive1 the most frequently repeated forms became fixed1 and presently abbreviated2 and1 passing through the hieroglyphic and ideographic phases1 the symbols lost all apparent relation to the things signified3 just as the majority of our spoken words have done4 ,observe1 again1 that the same thing is true respecting the genesis of reasoning4 ,the likeness which is perceived to exist between cases1 is the essence of all early reasoning and of much of our present reasoning4 ,the savage1 having by experience discovered a relation between a certain object and a certain act1 infers that the like relation will be found in future4 ,and the expressions we use in our arguments--8analogy implies10 8the cases are not parallel10 8by parity of reasoning10 8there is no similarity10--show how constantly the idea of likeness underlies our ratiocinative processes4 ,still more clearly will this be seen on recognizing the fact that there is a close connexion between reasoning and classification2 that the two have a common root2 and that neither can go on without the other4 ,for on the one hand1 it is a familiar truth that the attributing to a body in consequence of some of its properties1 all those other properties in virtue of which it is referred to a particular class1 is an act of inference4 ,and1 on the other hand1 the forming of a generalization is the putting together in one class1 all those #cd cases which present like relations2 while the drawing a deduction is essentially the perception that a particular case belongs to a certain class of cases previously generalized4 ,so that as classification is a grouping together of like things2 reasoning is a grouping together of like relations among things4 ,add to which1 that while the perfection gradually achieved in classification consists in the formation of groups of objects which are completely alike2 the perfection gradually achieved in reasoning consists in the formation of groups of cases which are completely alike4 ,once more we may contemplate this dominant idea of likeness as exhibited in art4 ,all art1 civilized as well as savage1 consists almost wholly in the making of objects like other objects2 either as found in ,nature1 or as produced by previous art4 ,if we trace back the varied art-products now existing1 we find that at each stage the divergence from previous patterns is but small when compared with the agreement2 and in the earliest art the persistency of imitation is yet more conspicuous4 ,the old forms and ornaments and symbols were held sacred1 and perpetually copied4 ,indeed1 the strong imitative tendency notoriously displayed by the lowest human races--often seeming to be half automatic1 ensures among them a constant reproducing of likenesses of things1 forms1 signs1 sounds1 actions and whatever else is imitable2 and we may even suspect that this aboriginal peculiarity is in some way connected with the culture and development of this general conception1 which we have found so deep and wide-spread in its applications4 ,and now let us go on to consider how1 by a further unfolding of this same fundamental notion1 there is a gradual formation of the first germs of science4 ,this idea of likeness which underlies classification1 nomenclature1 language spoken and written1 reasoning1 and art2 and which plays so important a part because all acts of intelligence are made #ce possible only by distinguishing among surrounding things1 or grouping them into like and unlike2--this idea we shall find to be the one of which science is the especial product4 ,already during the stage we have been describing1 there has existed qualitative prevision in respect to the commoner phenomena with which savage life is familiar2 and we have now to inquire how the elements of quantitative prevision are evolved4 ,we shall find that they originate by the perfecting of this same idea of likeness--that they have their rise in that conception of complete likeness which1 as we have seen1 necessarily results from the continued process of classification4 ,for when the process of classification has been carried as far as it is possible for the uncivilized to carry it--when the animal kingdom has been grouped not merely into quadrupeds1 birds1 fishes1 and insects1 but each of these divided into kinds--when there come to be classes1 in each of which the members differ only as individuals1 and not specifically2 it is clear that there must frequently occur an observation of objects which differ so little as to be indistinguishable4 ,among several creatures which the savage has killed and carried home1 it must often happen that some one1 which he wished to identify1 is so exactly like another that he cannot tell which is which4 ,thus1 then1 there originates the notion of equality4 ,the things which among ourselves are called equal--whether lines1 angles1 weights1 temperatures1 sounds or colours--are things which produce in us sensations which cannot be distinguished from each other4 ,it is true that we now apply the word equal chiefly to the separate traits or relations which objects exhibit1 and not to those combinations of them constituting our conceptions of the objects2 but this limitation of the idea has evidently arisen by analysis4 ,that the notion of equality originated as alleged1 will1 we think1 become obvious on remembering that as there were no artificial objects from which it could have been #cf abstracted1 it must have been abstracted from natural objects2 and that the various families of the animal kingdom chiefly furnish those natural objects which display the requisite exactitude of likeness4 ,the experiences out of which this general idea of equality is evolved1 give birth at the same time to a more complex idea of equality2 or1 rather1 the process just described generates an idea of equality which further experience separates into two ideas--equality of things and equality of relations4 ,while organic forms occasionally exhibit this perfection of likeness out of which the notion of simple equality arises1 they more frequently exhibit only that kind of likeness which we call similarity2 and which is really compound equality4 ,for the similarity of two creatures of the same species but of different sizes1 is of the same nature as the similarity of two geometrical figures4 ,in either case1 any two parts of the one bear the same ratio to one another1 as the homologous parts of the other4 ,given in a species1 the proportions found to exist among the bones1 and we may1 and zoologists do1 predict from any one1 the dimensions of the rest2 just as1 when knowing the proportions subsisting among the parts of a geometrical figure1 we may1 from the length of one1 calculate the others4 ,and if1 in the case of similar geometrical figures1 the similarity can be established only by proving exactness of proportion among the homologous parts--if we express this relation between two parts in the one1 and the corresponding parts in the other1 by the formula ,a is to ,b as a is to b2 if we otherwise write this1 ,a to ,b a to b2 if1 consequently1 the fact we prove is that the relation of ,a to ,b equals the relation of a to b2 then it is manifest that the fundamental conception of similarity is equality of relations4 ,with this explanation we shall be understood when we say that the notion of equality of relations is the basis of all exact reasoning4 ,already it has been shown that reasoning in general is a recognition #cg of likeness of relations2 and here we further find that while the notion of likeness of things ultimately evolves the idea of simple equality1 the notion of likeness of relations evolves the idea of equality of relations3 of which the one is the concrete germ of exact science1 while the other is its abstract germ4 ,those who cannot understand how the recognition of similarity in creatures of the same kind1 can have any alliance with reasoning1 will get over the difficulty on remembering that the phenomena among which equality of relations is thus perceived1 are phenomena of the same order and are present to the senses at the same time2 while those among which developed reason perceives relations1 are generally neither of the same order1 nor simultaneously present4 ,and if1 further1 they will call to mind how ,cuvier and ,owen1 from a single part of a creature1 as a tooth1 construct the rest by a process of reasoning based on this equality of relations1 they will see that the two things are intimately connected1 remote as they at first seem4 ,but we anticipate4 ,what it concerns us here to observe is1 that from familiarity with organic forms there simultaneously arose the ideas of simple equality1 and equality of relations4 ,at the same time1 too1 and out of the same mental processes1 came the first distinct ideas of number4 ,in the earliest stages1 the presentation of several like objects produced merely an indefinite conception of multiplicity2 as it still does among ,australians1 and ,bushmen1 and ,damaras1 when the number presented exceeds three or four4 ,with such a fact before us we may safely infer that the first clear numerical conception was that of duality as contrasted with unity4 ,and this notion of duality must necessarily have grown up side by side with those of likeness and equality2 seeing that it is impossible to recognize the likeness of two things without also perceiving that there are two4 ,from the very beginning the conception of number must have been1 as it is still1 associated with #ch likeness or equality of the things numbered2 and for the purposes of calculation1 an ideal equality of the things is assumed4 ,before any absolutely true numerical results can be reached1 it is requisite that the units be absolutely equal4 ,the only way in which we can establish a numerical relationship between things that do not yield us like impressions1 is to divide them into parts that do yield us like impressions4 ,two unlike magnitudes of extension1 force1 time1 weight1 or what not1 can have their relative amounts estimated1 only by means of some small unit that is contained many times in both2 and even if we finally write down the greater one as a unit and the other as a fraction of it1 we state1 in the denominator of the fraction1 the number of parts into which the unit must be divided to be comparable with the fraction4 ,it is1 indeed1 true1 that by a modern process of abstraction1 we occasionally apply numbers to unequal units1 as the furniture at a sale or the various animals on a farm1 simply as so many separate entities2 but no exact quantitative result can be brought out by calculation with units of this order4 ,and1 indeed1 it is the distinctive peculiarity of the calculus in general1 that it proceeds on the hypothesis of that absolute equality of its abstract units1 which no real units possess2 and that the exactness of its results holds only in virtue of this hypothesis4 ,the first ideas of number must necessarily then have been derived from like or equal magnitudes as seen chiefly in organic objects2 and as the like magnitudes most frequently observed were magnitudes of extension1 it follows that geometry and arithmetic had a simultaneous origin4 ,not only are the first distinct ideas of number co-ordinate with ideas of likeness and equality1 but the first efforts at numeration display the same relationship4 ,on reading accounts of savage tribes1 we find that the method of counting by the fingers1 still followed by many children1 is the aboriginal method4 ,neglecting the several cases #ci in which the ability to enumerate does not reach even to the number of fingers on one hand1 there are many cases in which it does not extend beyond ten--the limit of the simple finger notation4 ,the fact that in so many instances1 remote1 and seemingly unrelated nations1 have adopted ten as their basic number2 together with the fact that in the remaining instances the basic number is either five 7the fingers of one hand7 or twenty 7the fingers and toes72 of themselves show that the fingers were the original units of numeration4 ,the still surviving use of the word digit1 as the general name for a figure in arithmetic1 is significant2 and it is even said that our word ten 7,sax4 tyn2 ,dutch1 tien2 ,german1 zehn7 means in its primitive expanded form two hands4 ,so that1 originally1 to say there were ten things1 was to say there were two hands of them4 ,from all which evidence it is tolerably clear that the earliest mode of conveying the idea of a number of things1 was by holding up as many fingers as there were things2 that is1 by using a symbol which was equal1 in respect of multiplicity1 to the group symbolized4 ,for which inference there is1 indeed1 strong confirmation in the statement that our own soldiers spontaneously adopted this device in their dealings with the ,turks during the ,crimean war4 ,and here it should be remarked that in this re-combination of the notion of equality with that of multiplicity1 by which the first steps in numeration are effected1 we may see one of the earliest of those inosculations between the diverging branches of science1 which are afterwards of perpetual occurrence4 ,as this observation suggests1 it will be well1 before tracing the mode in which exact science emerges from the inexact judgments of the senses1 and showing the non-serial evolution of its divisions1 to note the non-serial character of those preliminary processes of which all after development is a continuation4 ,on re-considering them it will be seen that not only are they divergent branches #dj from a common root1--not only are they simultaneous in their growth2 but that they are mutual aids2 and that none can advance without the rest4 ,that progress of classification for which the unfolding of the perceptions paves the way1 is impossible without a corresponding progress in language1 by which greater varieties of objects are thinkable and expressible4 ,on the one hand classification cannot be carried far without names by which to designate the classes2 and on the other hand language cannot be made faster than things are classified4 ,again1 the multiplication of classes and the consequent narrowing of each class1 itself involves a greater likeness among the things classed together2 and the consequent approach towards the notion of complete likeness itself allows classification to be carried higher4 ,moreover1 classification necessarily advances pari passu with rationality--the classification of things with the classification of relations4 ,for things that belong to the same class are1 by implication1 things of which the properties and modes of behaviour--the co-existences and sequences--are more or less the same2 and the recognition of this sameness of co-existences and sequences is reasoning4 ,whence it follows that the advance of classification is necessarily proportionate to the advance of generalizations4 ,yet further1 the notion of likeness1 both in things and relations1 simultaneously evolves by one process of culture the ideas of equality of things and equality of relations2 which are the respective bases of exact concrete reasoning and exact abstract reasoning--,mathematics and ,logic4 ,and once more1 this idea of equality1 in the very process of being formed1 necessarily gives origin to two series of relations--those of magnitude and those of number2 from which arise geometry and the calculus4 ,thus the process throughout is one of perpetual subdivision and perpetual intercommunication of the divisions4 ,from the very first there has been that consensus of different kinds of knowledge1 #da answering to the consensus of the intellectual faculties1 which1 as already said1 must exist among the sciences4 ,let us now go on to observe how1 out of the notions of equality and number1 as arrived at in the manner described1 there gradually arose the elements of quantitative prevision4 ,equality1 once having come to be definitely conceived1 was recognizable among other phenomena than those of magnitude4 ,being predicable of all things producing indistinguishable impressions1 there naturally grew up ideas of equality in weights1 sounds1 colours1 c42 and1 indeed1 it can scarcely be doubted that the occasional experience of equal weights1 sounds1 and colours1 had a share in developing the abstract conception of equality--that the ideas of equality in sizes1 relations1 forces1 resistances1 and sensible properties in general1 were evolved during the same stage of mental development4 ,but however this may be1 it is clear that as fast as the notion of equality gained definiteness1 so fast did that lowest kind of quantitative prevision which is achieved without any instrumental aid1 become possible4 ,the ability to estimate1 however roughly1 the amount of a foreseen result1 implies the conception that it will be equal to a certain imagined quantity2 and the correctness of the estimate will manifestly depend on the precision which the perceptions of sensible equality have reached4 ,a savage with a piece of stone in his hand1 and another piece lying before him of greater bulk but of the same kind 7sameness of kind being inferred from the equality of the two in colour and texture7 knows about what effort he must put forth to raise this other piece2 and he judges accurately in proportion to the accuracy with which he perceives that the one is twice1 three times1 four times1 c4 as large as the other2 that is--in proportion to the precision of his ideas of equality and number4 ,and here let us not omit to notice that even in these vaguest of quantitative previsions1 the conception of equality of relations is also involved4 ,for it is only in #db virtue of an undefined consciousness that the relation between bulk and weight in the one stone is equal to the relation between bulk and weight in the other1 that even the roughest approximation can be made4 ,but how came the transition from those uncertain perceptions of equality which the unaided senses give1 to the certain ones with which science deals8 ,it came by placing the things compared in juxtaposition4 ,equality being asserted of things which give us indistinguishable impressions1 and no distinct comparison of impressions being possible unless they occur in immediate succession1 it results that exactness of equality is ascertainable in proportion to the closeness of the compared things4 ,hence the fact that when we wish to judge of two shades of colour whether they are alike or not1 we place them side by side2 hence the fact that we cannot1 with any precision1 say which of two allied sounds is the louder1 or the higher in pitch1 unless we hear the one immediately after the other2 hence the fact that to estimate the ratio of weights1 we take one in each hand1 that we may compare their pressures by rapidly alternating in thought from the one to the other2 hence the fact1 that in a piece of music1 we can continue to make equal beats when the first beat has been given1 but cannot ensure commencing with the same length of beat on a future occasion2 and hence1 lastly1 the fact1 that of all magnitudes1 those of linear extension are those of which the equality is most precisely ascertainable1 and those to which1 by consequence1 all others have to be reduced4 ,for it is the peculiarity of linear extension that it alone allows its magnitudes to be placed in absolute juxtaposition1 or1 rather1 in coincident position2 it alone can test the equality of two magnitudes by observing whether they will coalesce1 as two equal mathematical lines do1 when placed between the same points2 it alone can test equality by trying whether it will become identity4 ,hence1 then1 the fact1 that all exact science is reducible1 #dc by an ultimate analysis1 to results measured in equal units of linear extension4 ,still it remains to be noticed in what manner this determination of equality by comparison of linear magnitudes originated4 ,once more may we perceive that surrounding natural objects supplied the needful lessons4 ,from the beginning there must have been a constant experience of like things placed side by side--men standing and walking together2 animals from the same herd2 fish from the same shoal4 ,and the ceaseless repetition of these experiences could not fail to suggest the observation1 that the nearer together any objects were1 the more visible became any inequality between them4 ,hence the obvious device of putting in apposition1 things of which it was desired to ascertain the relative magnitudes4 ,hence the idea of measure4 ,and here we suddenly come upon a group of facts which afford a solid basis to the remainder of our argument2 while they also furnish strong evidence in support of the foregoing speculations4 ,those who look sceptically on this attempted rehabilitation of early mental development1 and who think that the derivation of so many primary notions from organic forms is somewhat strained1 will perhaps see more probability in the hypotheses which have been ventured1 on discovering that all measures of extension and force originated from the lengths and weights of organic bodies1 and all measures of time from the periodic phenomena of either organic or inorganic bodies4 ,thus1 among linear measures1 the cubit of the ,hebrews was the length of the forearm from the elbow to the end of the middle finger2 and the smaller scriptural dimensions are expressed in hand-breadths and spans4 ,the ,egyptian cubit1 which was similarly derived1 was divided into digits1 which were finger-breadths2 and each finger-breadth was more definitely expressed as being equal to four grains of barley placed breadthwise4 ,other ancient measures were #dd the orgyia or stretch of the arms1 the pace1 and the palm4 ,so persistent has been the use of these natural units of length in the ,east1 that even now some ,arabs mete out cloth by the forearm4 ,so1 too1 is it with ,european measures4 ,the foot prevails as a dimension throughout ,europe1 and has done so since the time of the ,romans1 by whom1 also1 it was used3 its lengths in different places varying not much more than men's feet vary4 ,the heights of horses are still expressed in hands4 ,the inch is the length of the terminal joint of the thumb2 as is clearly shown in ,france1 where pouce means both thumb and inch4 ,then we have the inch divided into three barley-corns4 ,so completely1 indeed1 have these organic dimensions served as the substrata of mensuration1 that it is only by means of them that we can form any estimate of some of the ancient distances4 ,for example1 the length of a degree on the ,earth's surface1 as determined by the ,arabian astronomers shortly after the death of ,haroun-al-,raschid1 was fifty-six of their miles4 ,we know nothing of their mile further than that it was #djjj cubits2 and whether these were sacred cubits or common cubits1 would remain doubtful1 but that the length of the cubit is given as twenty-seven inches1 and each inch defined as the thickness of six barley-grains4 ,thus one of the earliest measurements of a degree comes down to us in barley-grains4 ,not only did organic lengths furnish those approximate measures which satisfied men's needs in ruder ages1 but they furnished also the standard measures required in later times4 ,one instance occurs in our own history4 ,to remedy the irregularities then prevailing1 ,henry ,i4 commanded that the ulna1 or ancient ell1 which answers to the modern yard1 should be made of the exact length of his own arm4 ,measures of weight had a kindred derivation4 ,seeds seem commonly to have supplied the units4 ,the original of the carat used for weighing in ,india is a small bean4 ,our own systems1 both troy and avoirdupois1 are derived #de primarily from wheat-corns4 ,our smallest weight1 the grain is a grain of wheat4 ,this is not a speculation2 it is an historically-registered fact4 ,henry ,,iii4 enacted that an ounce should be the weight of #fdj dry grains of wheat from the middle of the ear4 ,and as all the other weights are multiples or sub-multiples of this1 it follows that the grain of wheat is the basis of our scale4 ,so natural is it to use organic bodies as weights1 before artificial weights have been established1 or where they are not to be had1 that in some of the remoter parts of ,ireland the people are said to be in the habit1 even now1 of putting a man into the scales to serve as a measure for heavy commodities4 ,similarly with time4 ,astronomical periodicity1 and the periodicity of animal and vegetable life1 are simultaneously used in the first stages of progress for estimating epochs4 ,the simplest unit of time1 the day1 nature supplies ready made4 ,the next simplest period1 the moneth or month1 is also thrust upon men's notice by the conspicuous changes constituting a lunation4 ,for larger divisions than these1 the phenomena of the seasons1 and the chief events from time to time occurring1 have been used by early and uncivilized races4 ,among the ,egyptians the rising of the ,nile served as a mark4 ,the ,new ,zealanders were found to begin their year from the reappearance of the ,pleiades above the sea4 ,one of the uses ascribed to birds1 by the ,greeks1 was to indicate the seasons by their migrations4 ,barrow describes the aboriginal ,hottentot as expressing dates by the number of moons before or after the ripening of one of his chief articles of food4 ,he further states that the ,kaffir chronology is kept by the moon1 and is registered by notches on sticks--the death of a favourite chief1 or the gaining of a victory1 serving for a new era4 ,by which last fact1 we are at once reminded that in early history1 events are commonly recorded as occurring in certain reigns1 and in certain years of certain reigns3 a proceeding which made a king's reign #df a rude measure of duration4 ,and1 as further illustrating the tendency to divide time by natural phenomena and natural events1 it may be noticed that even by our own peasantry the definite divisions of months and years are but little used2 and that they habitually refer to occurrences as 8before sheep-shearing10 or 8after harvest10 or 8about the time when the squire died40 ,it is manifest1 therefore1 that the approximately equal periods perceived in ,nature gave the first units of measure for time2 as did ,nature's approximately equal lengths and weights give the first units of measure for space and force4 ,it remains only to observe1 that measures of value were similarly derived4 ,barter1 in one form or other1 is found among all but the very lowest human races4 ,it is obviously based upon the notion of equality of worth4 ,and as it gradually merges into trade by the introduction of some kind of currency1 we find that the measures of worth1 constituting this currency1 are organic bodies2 in some cases cowries1 in others cocoa-nuts1 in others cattle1 in others pigs2 among the ,american ,indians peltry or skins1 and in ,iceland dried fish4 ,notions of exact equality and of measure having been reached1 there arose definite ideas of magnitudes as being multiples one of another2 whence the practice of measurement by direct apposition of a measure4 ,the determination of linear extensions by this process can scarcely be called science1 though it is a step towards it2 but the determination of lengths of time by an analogous process may be considered as one of the earliest samples of quantitative prevision4 ,for when it is first ascertained that the moon completes the cycle of her changes in about thirty days--a fact known to most uncivilized tribes that can count beyond the number of their fingers--it is manifest that it becomes possible to say in what number of days any specified phase of the moon will recur2 and it is also manifest that this prevision is effected by an apposition of two times1 after the same manner #dg that linear space is measured by the apposition of two lines4 ,for to express the moon's period in days1 is to say how many of these units of measure are contained in the period to be measured--is to ascertain the distance between two points in time by means of a scale of days1 just as we ascertain the distance between two points in space by a scale of feet or inches2 and in each case the scale coincides with the thing measured--mentally in the one1 visibly in the other4 ,so that in this simplest1 and perhaps earliest case of quantitative prevision1 the phenomena are not only thrust daily upon men's notice1 but ,nature is1 as it were1 perpetually repeating that process of measurement by observing which the prevision is effected4 ,this fact1 that in very early stages of social progress it is known that the moon goes through her changes in nearly thirty days1 and that in rather more than twelve moons the seasons return--this fact that chronological astronomy assumes a certain scientific character even before geometry does2 while it is partly due to the circumstance that the astronomical divisions1 day1 month1 and year1 are ready made for us1 is partly due to the further circumstances that agricultural and other operations were at first regulated astronomically1 and that from the supposed divine nature of the heavenly bodies their motions determined the periodical religious festivals4 ,as instances of the one we have the observation of the ,egyptians1 that the rising of the ,nile corresponded with the heliacal rising of ,sirius2 the directions given by ,hesiod for reaping and ploughing1 according to the positions of the ,pleiades2 and his maxim that 8fifty days after the turning of the sun is a seasonable time for beginning a voyage40 ,as instances of the other1 we have the naming of the days after the sun1 moon1 and planets2 the early attempts among ,eastern nations to regulate the calendar so that the gods might not be offended by the displacement of their sacrifices2 and the fixing of the great annual festival of the ,peruvians by the position of the sun4 #dh ,in all which facts we see that1 at first1 science was simply an appliance of religion and industry4 ,after the discoveries that a lunation occupies nearly thirty days1 and that some twelve lunations occupy a year--discoveries which we may infer were the earliest1 from the fact that existing uncivilized races have made them--we come to the first known astronomical records1 which are those of eclipses4 ,the ,chaldeans were able to predict these4 8,this they did1 probably10 says ,dr4 ,whewell in his useful history1 from which most of the materials we are about to use will be drawn1 8by means of their cycle of #bbc months1 or about eighteen years2 for1 at the end of this time1 the eclipses of the moon begin to return1 at the same intervals and in the same order as at the beginning40 ,now this method of calculating eclipses by means of a recurring cycle1--the ,saros as they called it--is a more complex case of prevision by means of coincidence of measures4 ,for by what observations must the ,chaldeans have discovered this cycle8 ,obviously1 as ,delambre infers1 by inspecting their registers2 by comparing the successive intervals2 by finding that some of the intervals were alike2 by seeing that these equal intervals were eighteen years apart2 by discovering that all the intervals that were eighteen years apart were equal2 by ascertaining that the intervals formed a series which repeated itself1 so that if one of the cycles of intervals were superposed on another the divisions would fit4 ,and this being once perceived1 it became possible to use the cycle as a scale of time by which to measure out future periods of recurrence4 ,seeing thus that the process of so predicting eclipses1 is in essence the same as that of predicting the moon's monthly changes by observing the number of days after which they repeat--seeing that the two differ only in the extent and irregularity of the intervals2 it is not difficult to understand how such an amount of knowledge should so early have been reached4 ,and we shall be the less surprised on remembering that the only things involved in these #di previsions were time and number2 and that the time was in a manner self-numbered4 ,still1 the ability to predict events recurring only after so long a period as eighteen years1 implies a considerable advance in civilization--a considerable development of general knowledge2 and we have now to inquire what progress in other sciences accompanied1 and was necessary to1 these astronomical previsions4 ,in the first place1 there must have been a tolerably efficient system of calculation4 ,mere finger-counting1 mere head-reckoning1 even with the aid of a decimal notation1 could not have sufficed for numbering the days in a year2 much less the years1 months1 and days between eclipses4 ,consequently there must have been a mode of registering numbers2 probably even a system of numerals4 ,the earliest numerical records1 if we may judge by the practices of the less civilized races now existing1 were probably kept by notches cut on sticks1 or strokes marked on walls2 much as public-house scores are kept now4 ,and there is reason to think that the first numerals used were simply groups of straight strokes1 as some of the still-extant ,roman ones are2 leading us to suspect that these groups of strokes were used to represent groups of fingers1 as the groups of fingers had been used to represent groups of objects--a supposition harmonizing with the aboriginal practice of picture writing4 ,be this so or not1 however1 it is manifest that before the ,chaldeans discovered their ,saros1 they must have had both a set of written symbols serving for an extensive numeration1 and a familiarity with the simpler rules of arithmetic4 ,not only must abstract mathematics have made some progress1 but concrete mathematics also4 ,it is scarcely possible that the buildings belonging to this era should have been laid out and erected without any knowledge of geometry4 ,at any rate1 there must have existed that elementary geometry which deals with direct #ej measurement--with the apposition of lines2 and it seems that only after the discovery of those simple proceedings1 by which right angles are drawn1 and relative positions fixed1 could so regular an architecture be executed4 ,in the case of the other division of concrete mathematics--mechanics1 we have definite evidence of progress4 ,we know that the lever and the inclined plane were employed during this period3 implying that there was a qualitative prevision of their effects1 if not a quantitative one4 ,but we know more4 ,we read of weights in the earliest records2 and we find weights in ruins of the highest antiquity4 ,weights imply scales1 of which we have also mention2 and scales involve the primary theorem of mechanics in its least complicated form--involve not a qualitative but a quantitative prevision of mechanical effects4 ,and here we may notice how mechanics1 in common with the other exact sciences1 took its rise from the simplest application of the idea of equality4 ,for the mechanical proposition which the scales involve1 is1 that if a lever with equal arms1 have equal weights suspended from them1 the weights will remain at equal altitudes4 ,and we may further notice how1 in this first step of rational mechanics1 we see illustrated the truth awhile since named1 that as magnitudes of linear extension are the only ones of which the equality is exactly ascertainable1 the equalities of other magnitudes have at the outset to be determined by means of them4 ,for the equality of the weights which balance each other in scales1 depends on the equality of the arms3 we can know that the weights are equal only by proving that the arms are equal4 ,and when by this means we have obtained a system of weights1--a set of equal units of force and definite multiples of them1 then does a science of mechanics become possible4 ,whence1 indeed1 it follows1 that rational mechanics could not possibly have any other starting-point than the scales4 ,let us further remember that during this same period #ea there was some knowledge of chemistry4 ,sundry of the arts which we know to have been carried on1 were made possible only by a generalized experience of the modes in which certain bodies affect each other under special conditions4 ,in metallurgy1 which was extensively practised1 this is abundantly illustrated4 ,and we even have evidence that in some cases the knowledge possessed was1 in a sense1 quantitative4 ,for1 as we find by analysis that the hard alloy of which the ,egyptians made their cutting tools1 was composed of copper and tin in fixed proportions1 there must have been an established prevision that such an alloy was to be obtained only by mixing them in these proportions4 ,it is true1 this was but a simple empirical generalization2 but so was the generalization respecting the recurrence of eclipses2 so are the first generalizations of every science4 ,respecting the simultaneous advance of the sciences during this early epoch1 it remains to point out that even the most complex of them must have made some progress4 ,for under what conditions only were the foregoing developments possible8 ,the conditions furnished by an established and organized social system4 ,a long continued registry of eclipses2 the building of palaces2 the use of scales2 the practice of metallurgy--alike imply a settled and populous nation4 ,the existence of such a nation not only presupposes laws and some administration of justice1 which we know existed1 but it presupposes successful laws--laws conforming in some degree to the conditions of social stability--laws enacted because it was found that the actions forbidden by them were dangerous to the ,state4 ,we do not by any means say that all1 or even the greater part1 of the laws were of this nature2 but we do say1 that the fundamental ones were4 ,it cannot be denied that the laws affecting life and property were such4 ,it cannot be denied that1 however little these were enforced between class and class1 they were to a considerable extent #eb enforced between members of the same class4 ,it can scarcely be questioned1 that the administration of them between members of the same class was seen by rulers to be necessary for keeping society together4 ,but supposition aside1 it is clear that the habitual recognition of these claims in their laws1 implied some prevision of social phenomena4 ,that same idea of equality1 which1 as we have seen1 underlies other science1 underlies also morals and sociology4 ,the conception of justice1 which is the primary one in morals2 and the administration of justice1 which is the vital condition to social existence2 are impossible without the recognition of a certain likeness in men's claims1 in virtue of their common humanity4 ,equity literally means equalness2 and if it be admitted that there were even the vaguest ideas of equity in these primitive eras1 it must be admitted that there was some appreciation of the equalness of men's liberties to pursue the objects of life--some appreciation1 therefore1 of the essential principle of national equilibrium4 ,thus in this initial stage of the positive sciences1 before geometry had yet done more than evolve a few empirical rules--before mechanics had passed beyond its first theorem--before astronomy had advanced from its merely chronological phase into the geometrical2 the most involved of the sciences had reached a certain degree of development--a development without which no progress in other sciences was possible4 ,only noting as we pass1 how1 thus early1 we may see that the progress of exact science was not only towards an increasing number of previsions1 but towards previsions more accurately quantitative--how1 in astronomy1 the recurring period of the moon's motions was by and by more correctly ascertained to be two hundred and thirty-five lunations2 how ,callipus further corrected this ,metonic cycle1 by leaving out a day at the end of every seventy-six years2 and how these successive advances implied a #ec longer continued registry of observations1 and the co-ordination of a greater number of facts2 let us go on to inquire how geometrical astronomy took its rise4 ,the first astronomical instrument was the gnomon4 ,this was not only early in use in the ,east1 but it was found among the ,mexicans2 the sole astronomical observations of the ,peruvians were made by it2 and we read that #aajj ,b4,c41 the ,chinese observed that1 at a certain place1 the length of the sun's shadow1 at the summer solstice1 was to the height of the gnomon1 as one and a half to eight4 ,here again it is observable1 both that the instrument is found ready made1 and that ,nature is perpetually performing the process of measurement4 ,any fixed1 erect object--a column1 a pole1 the angle of a building--serves for a gnomon2 and it needs but to notice the changing position of the shadow it daily throws1 to make the first step in geometrical astronomy4 ,how small this first step was1 may be seen in the fact that the only things ascertained at the outset were the periods of the summer and winter solstices1 which corresponded with the least and greatest lengths of the mid-day shadow2 and to fix which1 it was needful merely to mark the point to which each day's shadow reached4 ,and now let it not be overlooked that in the observing at what time during the next year this extreme limit of the shadow was again reached1 and in the inference that the sun had then arrived at the same turning point in his annual course1 we have one of the simplest instances of that combined use of equal magnitudes and equal relations1 by which all exact science1 all quantitative prevision1 is reached4 ,for the relation observed was between the length of the gnomon's shadow and the sun's position in the heavens2 and the inference drawn was that when1 next year1 the extremity of the shadow came to the same point1 he occupied the same place4 ,that is1 the ideas involved were1 the equality of the shadows1 and the equality of the relations between #ed shadow and sun in successive years4 ,as in the case of the scales1 the equality of relations here recognized is of the simplest order4 ,it is not as those habitually dealt with in the higher kinds of scientific reasoning1 which answer to the general type--the relation between two and three equals the relation between six and nine2 but it follows the type--the relation between two and three equals the relation between two and three3 it is a case of not simply equal relations1 but coinciding relations4 ,and here1 indeed1 we may see beautifully illustrated how the idea of equal relations takes its rise after the same manner that that of equal magnitudes does4 ,as already shown1 the idea of equal magnitudes arose from the observed coincidence of two lengths placed together2 and in this case we have not only two coincident lengths of shadows1 but two coincident relations between sun and shadows4 ,from the use of the gnomon there naturally grew up the conception of angular measurements2 and with the advance of geometrical conceptions came the hemisphere of ,berosus1 the equinoctial armil1 the solstitial armil1 and the quadrant of ,ptolemy--all of them employing shadows as indices of the sun's position1 but in combination with angular divisions4 ,it is out of the question for us here to trace these details of progress4 ,it must suffice to remark that in all of them we may see that notion of equality of relations of a more complex kind1 which is best illustrated in the astrolabe1 an instrument which consisted 8of circular rims1 moveable one within the other1 or about poles1 and contained circles which were to be brought into the position of the ecliptic1 and of a plane passing through the sun and the poles of the ecliptic0--an instrument1 therefore1 which represented1 as by a model1 the relative positions of certain imaginary lines and planes in the heavens2 which was adjusted by putting these representative lines and planes into parallelism with the celestial ones2 and which depended for its use on the perception that the relations among these #ee representative lines and planes were equal to the relations among those represented4 ,we might go on to point out how the conception of the heavens as a revolving hollow sphere1 the explanation of the moon's phases1 and indeed all the successive steps taken1 involved this same mental process4 ,but we must content ourselves with referring to the theory of eccentrics and epicycles1 as a further marked illustration of it4 ,as first suggested1 and as proved by ,hipparchus to afford an explanation of the leading irregularities in the celestial motions1 this theory involved the perception that the progressions1 retrogressions1 and variations of velocity seen in the heavenly bodies1 might be reconciled with their assumed uniform movements in circles1 by supposing that the earth was not in the centre of their orbits2 or by supposing that they revolved in circles whose centres revolved round the earth2 or by both4 ,the discovery that this would account for the appearances1 was the discovery that in certain geometrical diagrams the relations were such1 that the uniform motion of points along curves conditioned in specified ways1 would1 when looked at from a particular position1 present analogous irregularities2 and the calculations of ,hipparchus involved the belief that the relations subsisting among these geometrical curves were equal to the relations subsisting among the celestial orbits4 ,leaving here these details of astronomical progress1 and the philosophy of it1 let us observe how the relatively concrete science of geometrical astronomy1 having been thus far helped forward by the development of geometry in general1 reacted upon geometry1 caused it also to advance1 and was again assisted by it4 ,hipparchus1 before making his solar and lunar tables1 had to discover rules for calculating the relations between the sides and angles of triangles--trigonometry1 a subdivision of pure mathematics4 ,further1 the reduction of the doctrine of the sphere to a quantitative form needed for astronomical purposes1 required the formation of a spherical trigonometry1 which #ef was also achieved by ,hipparchus4 ,thus both plane and spherical trigonometry1 which are parts of the highly abstract and simple science of extension1 remained undeveloped until the less abstract and more complex science of the celestial motions had need of them4 ,the fact admitted by ,m4 ,comte1 that since ,descartes the progress of the abstract division of mathematics has been determined by that of the concrete division1 is paralleled by the still more significant fact that even thus early the progress of mathematics was determined by that of astronomy4 ,and here1 indeed1 we see exemplified the truth1 which the subsequent history of science frequently illustrates1 that before any more abstract division makes a further advance1 some more concrete division suggests the necessity for that advance--presents the new order of questions to be solved4 ,before astronomy put before ,hipparchus the problem of solar tables1 there was nothing to raise the question of the relations between lines and angles3 the subject-matter of trigonometry had not been conceived4 ,just incidentally noticing the circumstance that the epoch we are describing witnessed the evolution of algebra1 a comparatively abstract division of mathematics1 by the union of its less abstract divisions1 geometry and arithmetic 7a fact proved by the earliest extant samples of algebra1 which are half algebraic1 half geometric7 we go on to observe that during the era in which mathematics and astronomy were thus advancing1 rational mechanics made its second step2 and something was done towards giving a quantitative form to hydrostatics1 optics1 and acoustics4 ,in each case we shall see how the idea of equality underlies all quantitative prevision2 and in what simple forms this idea is first applied4 ,as already shown1 the first theorem established in mechanics was1 that equal weights suspended from a lever with equal arms would remain in equilibrium4 ,archimedes discovered that a lever with unequal arms was in #eg equilibrium when one weight was to its arm as the other arm to its weight2 that is--when the numerical relation between one weight and its arm was equal to the numerical relation between the other arm and its weight4 ,the first advance made in hydrostatics1 which we also owe to ,archimedes1 was the discovery that fluids press equally in all directions2 and from this followed the solution of the problem of floating bodies2 namely1 that they are in equilibrium when the upward and downward pressures are equal4 ,in optics1 again1 the ,greeks found that the angle of incidence is equal to the angle of reflection2 and their knowledge reached no further than to such simple deductions from this as their geometry sufficed for4 ,in acoustics they ascertained the fact that three strings of equal lengths would yield the octave1 fifth and fourth1 when strained by weights having certain definite ratios2 and they did not progress much beyond this4 ,in the one of which cases we see geometry used in elucidation of the laws of light2 and in the other1 geometry and arithmetic made to measure certain phenomena of sound4 ,while sundry sciences had thus reached the first stages of quantitative prevision1 others were progressing in qualitative prevision4 ,it must suffice just to note that some small generalizations were made respecting evaporation1 and heat1 and electricity1 and magnetism1 which1 empirical as they were1 did not in that respect differ from the first generalizations of every science2 that the ,greek physicians had made advances in physiology and pathology1 which1 considering the great imperfection of our present knowledge1 are by no means to be despised2 that zoology had been so far systematized by ,aristotle1 as1 to some extent1 enabled him from the presence of certain organs to predict the presence of others2 that in ,aristotle's ,politics1 is shown progress towards a scientific conception of social phenomena1 and sundry previsions respecting #eh them2 and that in the state of the ,greek societies1 as well as in the writings of ,greek philosophers1 we may recognize both an increasing clearness in the conception of equity and some appreciation of the fact that social stability depends on the maintenance of equitable relations4 ,space permitting1 we might dwell on the causes which retarded the development of some of the sciences1 as for example1 chemistry2 showing that relative complexity had nothing to do with it--that the oxidation of a piece of iron is a simpler phenomenon than the recurrence of eclipses1 and the discovery of carbonic acid less difficult than that of the precession of the equinoxes4 ,the relatively slow advance of chemical knowledge might be shown to be due1 partly to the fact that its phenomena were not daily thrust on men's notice as those of astronomy were2 partly to the fact that ,nature does not habitually supply the means1 and suggest the modes of investigation1 as in the sciences dealing with time1 extension1 and force2 partly to the fact that the great majority of the materials with which chemistry deals1 instead of being ready to hand1 are made known only by the arts in their slow growth2 and partly to the fact that even when known1 their chemical properties are not self-exhibited1 but have to be sought out by experiment4 ,merely indicating these considerations1 however1 let us go on to contemplate the progress and mutual influence of the sciences in modern days2 only parenthetically noticing how1 on the revival of the scientific spirit1 the successive stages achieved exhibit the dominance of the law hitherto traced--how the primary idea in dynamics1 a uniform force1 was defined by ,galileo to be a force which generates equal velocities in equal successive times--how the uniform action of gravity was first experimentally determined by showing that the time elapsing before a body thrown up1 stopped1 was equal to the time it took to fall--how the first fact in compound motion which ,galileo #ei ascertained was1 that a body projected horizontally1 will describe equal horizontal spaces in equal times1 compounded vertical spaces described which increase by equal increments in equal times--how his discovery respecting the pendulum was1 that its oscillations occupy equal intervals of time whatever their lengths--how the law which he established that in any machine the weights that balance each other1 are reciprocally as their virtual velocities implies that the relation of one set of weights to their velocities equals the relation of the other set of velocities to their weights2--and how thus his achievements consisted in showing the equalities of certain magnitudes and relations1 whose equalities had not been previously recognized4 ,and now1 but only now1 physical astronomy became possible4 ,the simple laws of force had been disentangled from those of friction and atmospheric resistance by which all their earthly manifestations are disguised4 ,progressing knowledge of terrestrial physics had given a due insight into these disturbing causes2 and1 by an effort of abstraction1 it was perceived that all motion would be uniform and rectilinear unless interfered with by external forces4 ,geometry and mechanics having diverged from a common root in men's sensible experiences1 and having1 with occasional inosculations1 been separately developed1 the one partly in connexion with astronomy1 the other solely by analyzing terrestrial movements1 now join in the investigations of ,newton to create a true theory of the celestial motions4 ,and here1 also1 we have to notice the important fact that1 in the very process of being brought jointly to bear upon astronomical problems1 they are themselves raised to a higher phase of development4 ,for it was in dealing with the questions raised by celestial dynamics that the then incipient infinitesimal calculus was unfolded by ,newton and his continental successors2 and it was from inquiries into the mechanics of the solar system that the general theorems of mechanics contained in the #fj ,principia--many of them of purely terrestrial application--took their rise4 ,thus1 as in the case of ,hipparchus1 the presentation of a new order of concrete facts to be analyzed1 led to the discovery of new abstract facts2 and these abstract facts then became instruments of access to endless groups of concrete facts previously beyond quantitative treatment4 ,meanwhile1 physics had been carrying further that progress without which1 as just shown1 rational mechanics could not be disentangled4 ,in hydrostatics1 ,stevinus had extended and applied the discovery of ,archimedes4 ,torricelli had proved atmospheric pressure1 8by showing that this pressure sustained different liquids at heights inversely proportional to their densities20 and ,pascal 8established the necessary diminution of this pressure at increasing heights in the atmosphere03 discoveries which in part reduced this branch of science to a quantitative form4 ,something had been done by ,daniel ,bernouilli towards the dynamics of fluids4 ,the thermometer had been invented2 and sundry small generalizations reached by it4 ,huyghens and ,newton had made considerable progress in optics2 ,newton had approximately calculated the rate of transmission of sound2 and the continental mathematicians had ascertained some of the laws of sonorous vibrations4 ,magnetism and electricity had been considerably advanced by ,gilbert4 ,chemistry had got as far as the mutual neutralization of acids and alkalies4 ,and ,leonardo da ,vinci had advanced in geology to the conclusion that the deposition of animal remains in marine strata is the origin of fossils4 ,our present purpose does not require that we should give particulars4 ,here it only concerns us to illustrate the consensus subsisting in this stage of growth1 and afterwards4 ,let us look at a few cases4 ,the theoretic law of the velocity of sound deduced by ,newton from purely mechanical data1 was found wrong by one-sixth4 ,the error remained unaccounted for until the #fa time of ,laplace1 who1 suspecting that the heat disengaged by the compression of the undulating strata of the air1 gave additional elasticity1 and so produced the difference1 made the needful calculations and found he was right4 ,thus acoustics was arrested until thermology overtook and aided it4 ,when ,boyle and ,marriot had discovered the relation between the densities of gases and the pressures they are subject to2 and when it thus became possible to calculate the rate of decreasing density in the upper parts of the atmosphere2 it also became possible to make approximate tables of the atmospheric refraction of light4 ,thus optics1 and with it astronomy1 advanced with barology4 ,after the discovery of atmospheric pressure had led to the invention of the air-pump by ,otto ,guericke2 and after it had become known that evaporation increases in rapidity as atmospheric pressure decreases2 it became possible for ,leslie1 by evaporation in a vacuum1 to produce the greatest cold known2 and so to extend our knowledge of thermology by showing that there is no zero within reach of our researches4 ,when ,fourier had determined the laws of conduction of heat1 and when the ,earth's temperature had been found to increase below the surface one degree in every forty yards1 there were data for inferring the past condition of our globe2 the vast period it has taken to cool down to its present state2 and the immense age of the solar system--a purely astronomical consideration4 ,chemistry having advanced sufficiently to supply the needful materials1 and a physiological experiment having furnished the requisite hint1 there came the discovery of galvanic electricity4 ,galvanism reacting on chemistry disclosed the metallic bases of the alkalies and earths1 and inaugurated the electro-chemical theory2 in the hands of ,oersted and ,ampre it led to the laws of magnetic action2 and by its aid ,faraday has detected significant facts relative to the constitution of light4 ,brewster's discoveries respecting double refraction and #fb dipolarization proved the essential truth of the classification of crystalline forms according to the number of axes1 by showing that the molecular constitution depends on the axes4 ,now in these and in numerous other cases1 the mutual influence of the sciences has been quite independent of any supposed hierarchical order4 ,often1 too1 their inter-actions are more complex than as thus instanced--involve more sciences than two4 ,one illustration of this must suffice4 ,we quote it in full from the ,history of the ,inductive ,sciences4 ,in ,book ,,xi41 chap4 ,,ii41 on 8,the ,progress of the ,electrical ,theory10 ,dr4 ,whewell writes3 8,thus at that period1 mathematics was behind experiment1 and a problem was proposed1 in which theoretical numerical results were wanted for comparison with observation1 but could not be accurately obtained2 as was the case in astronomy also1 till the time of the approximate solution of the problem of three bodies1 and the consequent formation of the tables of the moon and planets1 on the theory of universal gravitation4 ,after some time1 electrical theory was relieved from this reproach1 mainly in consequence of the progress which astronomy had occasioned in pure mathematics4 ,about #ahja there appeared in the ,bulletin des ,sciences1 an exact solution of the problem of the distribution of electric fluid on a spheroid1 obtained by ,biot1 by the application of the peculiar methods which ,laplace had invented for the problem of the figure of the planets4 ,and1 in #ahaa1 ,m4 ,poisson applied ,laplace's artifices to the case of two spheres acting upon one another in contact1 a case to which many of ,coulomb's experiments were referrible2 and the agreement of the results of theory and observation1 thus extricated from ,coulomb's numbers obtained above forty years previously1 was very striking and convincing40 ,not only do the sciences affect each other after this direct manner1 but they affect each other indirectly4 ,where there is no dependence1 there is yet analogy--likeness of relations2 and the discovery of the relations subsisting among one set of phenomena1 constantly suggests a search for similar relations among another set4 ,thus the established fact that the force of gravitation varies inversely as the square of the distance1 being recognized as a necessary characteristic of all influences proceeding from a centre1 raised the suspicion that heat and light follow the same law2 which proved to be the case--a suspicion and a #fc confirmation which were repeated in respect to the electric and magnetic forces4 ,thus1 again1 the discovery of the polarization of light led to experiments which ended in the discovery of the polarization of heat--a discovery that could never have been made without the antecedent one4 ,thus1 too1 the known refrangibility of light and heat lately produced the inquiry whether sound also is not refrangible2 which on trial it turns out to be4 ,in some cases1 indeed1 it is only by the aid of conceptions derived from one class of phenomena that hypotheses respecting other classes can be formed4 ,the theory1 at one time favoured1 that evaporation is a solution of water in air1 assumed that the relation between water and air is like the relation between water and a dissolved solid2 and could never have been conceived if relations like that between salt and water had not been previously known4 ,similarly the received theory of evaporation--that it is a diffusion of the particles of the evaporating fluid in virtue of their atomic repulsion--could not have been entertained without a foregoing experience of magnetic and electric repulsions4 ,so complete in recent days has become this consensus among the sciences1 caused either by the natural entanglement of their phenomena1 or by analogies between the relations of their phenomena1 that scarcely any considerable discovery concerning one order of facts now takes place1 without shortly leading to discoveries concerning other orders4 ,to produce a complete conception of this process of scientific evolution it would be needful to go back to the beginning1 and trace in detail the growth of classifications and nomenclatures2 and to show how1 as subsidiary to science1 they have acted upon it while it has reacted upon them4 ,we can only now remark that1 on the one hand1 classifications and nomenclatures have aided science by subdividing the subject-matter of research1 and giving fixity and diffusion to the truths disclosed2 and that on the other hand1 they have caught from it that increasing #fd quantitativeness1 and that progress from considerations touching single phenomena to considerations touching the relations among many phenomena1 which we have been describing4 ,of this last influence a few illustrations must be given4 ,in chemistry it is seen in the facts that the dividing of matter into the four elements was ostensibly based on the single property of weight1 that the first truly chemical division into acid and alkaline bodies1 grouped together bodies which had not simply one property in common but in which one property was constantly related to many others1 and that the classification now current1 places together in the groups supporters of combustion1 metallic and non-metallic bases1 acids1 salts1 c41 bodies which are often quite unlike in sensible qualities1 but which are like in the majority of their relations to other bodies4 ,in mineralogy again1 the first classifications were based on differences in aspect1 texture1 and other physical attributes4 ,berzelius made two attempts at a classification based solely on chemical constitution4 ,that now current recognizes1 as far as possible1 the relations between physical and chemical characters4 ,in botany the earliest classes formed were trees1 shrubs1 and herbs3 magnitude being the basis of distinction4 ,dioscorides divided vegetables into aromatic1 alimentary1 medicinal1 and vinous3 a division of chemical character4 ,csalpinus classified them by the seeds and seed-vessels1 which he preferred because of the relations found to subsist between the character of the fructification and the general character of the other parts4 ,while the 8natural system0 since developed1 carrying out the doctrine of ,linnus1 that 8the natural orders must be formed by attention not to one or two1 but to all the parts of plants10 bases its divisions on like peculiarities which are found to be constantly related to the greatest number of other like peculiarities4 ,and similarly in zoology1 the successive classifications1 from having been originally determined by external and often #fe subordinate characters not indicative of the essential nature1 have been more and more determined by those internal and fundamental differences1 which have uniform relations to the greatest number of other differences4 ,nor shall we be surprised at this analogy between the modes of progress of positive science and classification1 when we bear in mind that both proceed by making generalizations2 that both enable us to make previsions1 differing only in their precision2 and that while the one deals with equal properties1 magnitudes1 and relations1 the other deals with properties and relations which approximate towards equality in various degrees4 ,without further argument it will1 we think1 be admitted that the sciences are none of them separately evolved--are none of them independent either logically or historically2 but that all of them have1 in a greater or less degree1 required aid and reciprocated it4 ,indeed1 it needs but to throw aside hypotheses1 and contemplate the mixed character of surrounding phenomena1 to see at once that these notions of division and succession in the kinds of knowledge are simply scientific fictions3 good1 if regarded merely as aids to study2 bad1 if regarded as representing realities in ,nature4 ,no facts whatever are presented to our senses uncombined with other facts--no facts whatever but are in some degree disguised by accompanying facts3 disguised in such a manner that all must be partially understood before any one can be understood4 ,if it be said1 as by ,m4 ,comte1 that gravitating force should be treated of before other forces1 seeing that all things are subject to it1 it may on like grounds be said that heat should be first dealt with2 seeing that thermal forces are everywhere in action4 ,nay more1 it may be urged that the ability of any portion of matter to manifest visible gravitative phenomena depends on its state of aggregation1 which is determined by heat2 that only by the aid of thermology can we explain those apparent exceptions to #ff the gravitating tendency which are presented by steam and smoke1 and so establish its universality2 and that1 indeed1 the very existence of the ,solar ,system in a solid form is just as much a question of heat as it is one of gravitation4 ,take other cases3--,all phenomena recognized by the eyes1 through which only are the data of exact science ascertainable1 are complicated with optical phenomena1 and cannot be exhaustively known until optical principles are known4 ,the burning of a candle cannot be explained without involving chemistry1 mechanics1 thermology4 ,every wind that blows is determined by influences partly solar1 partly lunar1 partly hygrometric2 and implies considerations of fluid equilibrium and physical geography4 ,the direction1 dip1 and variations of the magnetic needle1 are facts half terrestrial1 half celestial--are caused by earthly forces which have cycles of change corresponding with astronomical periods4 ,the flowing of the gulf-stream and the annual migration of icebergs towards the equator1 involve in their explanation the ,earth's rotation and spheroidal form1 the laws of hydrostatics1 the relative densities of cold and warm water1 and the doctrines of evaporation4 ,it is no doubt true1 as ,m4 ,comte says1 that 8our position in the ,solar ,system1 and the motions1 form1 size1 and equilibrium of the mass of our world among the planets1 must be known before we can understand the phenomena going on at its surface40 ,but1 fatally for his hypothesis1 it is also true that we must understand a great part of the phenomena going on at its surface before we can know its position1 c41 in the ,solar ,system4 ,it is not simply that1 as already shown1 those geometrical and mechanical principles by which celestial appearances are explained1 were first generalized from terrestrial experiences2 but it is that even the obtainment of correct data on which to base astronomical generalizations1 implies advanced terrestrial physics4 ,until after optics had made considerable advance1 the ,copernican #fg system remained but a speculation4 ,a single modern observation on a star has to undergo a careful analysis by the combined aid of various sciences--has to be digested by the organism of the sciences2 which have severally to assimilate their respective parts of the observation1 before the essential fact it contains is available for the further development of astronomy4 ,it has to be corrected not only for nutation of the ,earth's axis and for precession of the equinoxes1 but for aberration and for refraction2 and the formation of the tables by which refraction is calculated1 presupposes knowledge of the law of decreasing density in the upper atmospheric strata1 of the law of decreasing temperature and the influence of this on the density1 and of hygrometric laws as also affecting density4 ,so that1 to get materials for further advance1 astronomy requires not only the indirect aid of the sciences which have presided over the making of its improved instruments1 but the direct aid of an advanced optics1 of barology1 of thermology1 of hygrometry2 and if we remember that these delicate observations are in some cases registered electrically1 and that they are further corrected for the 8personal equation0--the time elapsing between seeing and registering1 which differs with different observers--we may even add electricity and psychology4 ,and here1 before leaving these illustrations1 and especially this last one1 let us not omit to notice how well they exhibit that increasingly active consensus of the sciences which characterizes their advancing development4 ,besides finding that in these later times a discovery in one science commonly causes progress in others2 besides finding that a great part of the questions with which modern science deals are so mixed as to require the co-operation of many sciences for their solution2 we find that1 to make a single good observation in the purest of the natural sciences1 requires the combined aid of half a dozen other sciences4 ,perhaps the clearest comprehension of the interconnected #fh growth of the sciences may be obtained by contemplating that of the arts1 to which it is strictly analogous1 and with which it is bound up4 ,most intelligent persons must have been occasionally struck with the numerous antecedents pre-supposed by one of our processes of manufacture4 ,let him trace the production of a printed cotton1 and consider all that is implied by it4 ,there are the many successive improvements through which the power-looms reached their present perfection2 there is the steam-engine that drives them1 having its long history from ,papin downwards2 there are the lathes in which its cylinder was bored1 and the string of ancestral lathes from which those lathes proceeded2 there is the steam-hammer under which its crank shaft was welded2 there are the puddling furnaces1 the blast-furnaces1 the coal-mines and the iron-mines needful for producing the raw material2 there are the slowly improved appliances by which the factory was built1 and lighted1 and ventilated2 there are the printing engine1 and the dye-house1 and the colour-laboratory with its stock of materials from all parts of the world1 implying cochineal-culture1 logwood-cutting1 indigo-growing2 there are the implements used by the producers of cotton1 the gins by which it is cleaned1 the elaborate machines by which it is spun2 there are the vessels in which cotton is imported1 with the building-slips1 the rope-yards1 the sail-cloth factories1 the anchor-forges1 needful for making them2 and besides all these directly necessary antecedents1 each of them involving many others1 there are the institutions which have developed the requisite intelligence1 the printing and publishing arrangements which have spread the necessary information1 the social organization which has rendered possible such a complex co-operation of agencies4 ,further analysis would show that the many arts thus concerned in the economical production of a child's frock1 have each been brought to its present efficiency by slow steps which the other arts have aided2 and that from the beginning this reciprocity has been on #fi the increase4 ,it needs but on the one hand to consider how impossible it is for the savage1 even with ore and coal ready1 to produce so simple a thing as an iron hatchet2 and then to consider1 on the other hand1 that it would have been impracticable among ourselves1 even a century ago1 to raise the tubes of the ,britannia bridge from lack of the hydraulic press2 to see how mutually dependent are the arts1 and how all must advance that each may advance4 ,well1 the sciences are involved with each other in just the same manner4 ,they are1 in fact1 inextricably woven into this same complex web of the arts2 and are only conventionally independent of it4 ,originally the two were one4 ,how to fix the religious festivals2 when to sow2 how to weigh commodities2 and in what manner to measure ground2 were the purely practical questions out of which arose astronomy1 mechanics1 geometry4 ,since then there has been a perpetual inosculation of the sciences and the arts4 ,science has been supplying art with truer generalizations and more completely quantitative previsions4 ,art has been supplying science with better materials1 and more perfect instruments4 ,and all along the interdependence has been growing closer1 not only between art and science1 but among the arts themselves1 and among the sciences themselves4 ,how completely the analogy holds throughout1 becomes yet clearer when we recognize the fact that the sciences are arts to one another4 ,if1 as occurs in almost every case1 the fact to be analyzed by any science1 has first to be prepared--to be disentangled from disturbing facts by the afore discovered methods of other sciences2 the other sciences so used1 stand in the position of arts4 ,if1 in solving a dynamical problem1 a parallelogram is drawn1 of which the sides and diagonal represent forces1 and by putting magnitudes of extension for magnitudes of force a measurable relation is established between quantities not else to be dealt with2 it may be fairly said that geometry plays towards mechanics much the same part that the fire of the founder plays towards the metal he is going to cast4 #gj ,if1 in analyzing the phenomena of the coloured rings surrounding the point of contact between two lenses1 a ,newton ascertains by calculation the amount of certain interposed spaces1 far too minute for actual measurement2 he employs the science of number for essentially the same purpose as that for which the watchmaker employs tools4 ,if1 before calculating the orbit of a comet from its observed position1 the astronomer has to separate all the errors of observation1 it is manifest that the refraction-tables1 and logarithm-books1 and formul1 which he successively uses1 serve him much as retorts1 and filters1 and cupels serve the assayer who wishes to separate the pure gold from all accompanying ingredients4 ,so close1 indeed1 is the relationship1 that it is impossible to say where science begins and art ends4 ,all the instruments of the natural philosopher are the products of art2 the adjusting one of them for use is an art2 there is art in making an observation with one of them2 it requires art properly to treat the facts ascertained2 nay1 even the employing established generalizations to open the way to new generalizations1 may be considered as art4 ,in each of these cases previously organized knowledge becomes the implement by which new knowledge is got at3 and whether that previously organized knowledge is embodied in a tangible apparatus or in a formula1 matters not in so far as its essential relation to the new knowledge is concerned4 ,if art is applied knowledge1 then such portion of a scientific investigation as consists of applied knowledge is art4 ,hence we may even say that as soon as any prevision in science passes out of its originally passive state1 and is employed for reaching other previsions1 it passes from theory into practice--becomes science in action--becomes art4 ,and after contemplating these facts1 we shall the more clearly perceive that as the connexion of the arts with each other has been becoming more intimate2 as the help given by sciences to arts and by arts to sciences1 has been age by age increasing2 so the interdependence of the sciences #ga themselves has been ever growing greater1 their relations more involved1 their consensus more active4 99 99 99 99 99 ,in here ending our sketch of the ,genesis of ,science1 we are conscious of having done the subject but scant justice4 ,two difficulties have stood in our way3 one1 the having to touch on so many points in such small space2 the other1 the necessity of treating in serial arrangement a process which is not serial4 ,nevertheless1 we believe the evidence assigned suffices to substantiate the leading propositions with which we set out4 ,inquiry into the first stages of science confirms the conclusion drawn from analysis of science as now existing1 that it is not distinct from common knowledge1 but an outgrowth from it--an extension of perception by means of reason4 ,that more specific characteristic of scientific previsions1 which was analytically shown to distinguish them from the previsions of uncultured intelligence--their quantitativeness--we also see to have been the characteristic alike of the initial steps in science1 and of all the steps succeeding them4 ,the facts and admissions cited in disproof of the assertion that the sciences follow one another1 both logically and historically1 in the order of their decreasing generality1 have been enforced by the instances we have met with1 showing that a more general science as much owes its progress to the presentation of new problems by a more special science1 as the more special science owes its progress to the solutions which the more general science is thus led to attempt--instances1 therefore1 illustrating the position that scientific advance is as much from the special to the general as from the general to the special4 ,quite in harmony with this position we find to be the admissions that the sciences are as branches of one trunk1 and that they were at first cultivated simultaneously4 ,this harmony becomes the more marked on finding1 as we have done1 not only that the sciences have a common root1 but that science in #gb general has a common root with language1 classification1 reasoning1 art2 that throughout civilization these have advanced together1 acting and reacting upon each other just as the separate sciences have done2 and that thus the development of intelligence in all its divisions and sub-divisions has conformed to this same law which we have shown that the sciences conform to4 ,from all which we may perceive that the sciences can with no greater propriety be arranged in a succession1 than language1 classification1 reasoning1 art1 and science1 can be arranged in a succession2 that1 however needful a succession may be for the convenience of books and catalogues1 it must be recognized as merely a convention2 and that so far from its being the function of a philosophy of the sciences to establish a hierarchy1 it is its function to show that the linear arrangements required for literary purposes1 have none of them any basis either in ,nature or ,history4 ,there is one further remark we must not omit--a remark touching the importance of the question that has been discussed4 ,topics of this abstract nature are commonly slighted as of no practical moment2 and1 doubtless1 many will think it of little consequence what theory respecting the genesis of science may be entertained4 ,but the value of truths is often great1 in proportion as their generality is wide4 ,and it must be so here4 ,a correct theory of the development of the sciences must have an important effect on education2 and1 through education1 on civilization4 ,much as we differ from him in other respects1 we agree with ,m4 ,comte in the belief that1 rightly conducted1 the education of the individual must have a certain correspondence with the evolution of the race4 ,no one can contemplate the facts we have cited in illustration of the early stages of science1 without recognizing the necessity of the processes through which those stages were reached--a necessity which1 in respect to the leading truths1 may likewise be traced in all after stages4 ,this necessity1 #gc originating in the very nature of the phenomena to be analyzed and the faculties to be employed1 partially applies to the mind of the child as to that of the savage4 ,we say partially1 because the correspondence is not special but general only4 ,were the environment the same in both cases1 the correspondence would be complete4 ,but though the surrounding material out of which science is to be organized1 is1 in many cases1 the same to the juvenile mind and the aboriginal mind1 it is not so throughout2 as1 for instance1 in the case of chemistry1 the phenomena of which are accessible to the one but were inaccessible to the other4 ,hence1 in proportion as the environment differs1 the course of evolution must differ4 ,after admitting exceptions1 however1 there remains a substantial parallelism2 and1 if so1 it is of moment to ascertain what really has been the process of scientific evolution4 ,the establishment of an erroneous theory must be disastrous in its educational results2 while the establishment of a true one must be fertile in school-reforms and consequent social benefits4 ,,endnote ,,to ,,the ,,genesis ,,of ,,science4 #a ,it is curious that the author of 8,the ,plurality of ,worlds10 with quite other aims1 should have persuaded himself into similar conclusions4 #gd ,,the ,,classification ,,of ,,the ,,sciences4 ,first published as a brochure in ,april #ahfd4 ,the preface to the second edition1 published in ,april #ahfi1 ,i reproduce because of certain facts contained in it which are not without interest4 ,the first edition of this ,essay is not yet out of print4 ,but a proposal to translate it into ,french having been made by ,professor ,rthor1 ,i have decided to prepare a new edition free from the imperfections which criticism and further thought have disclosed1 rather than allow these imperfections to be reproduced4 ,the occasion has almost tempted me into some amplification4 ,further arguments against the classification of ,m4 ,comte1 and further arguments in support of the classification here set forth1 have pleaded for utterance4 ,but reconsideration has convinced me that it is both needless and useless to say more--needless because those who are not committed will think the case sufficiently strong as it stands2 and useless because to those who are committed1 additional reasons will seem as inadequate as the original ones4 ,in the preface to the third edition1 however1 a reason is given for a change of decision on this point at that time made 7,february #ahga73 the reason being 8the publication of several objections by ,prof4 ,bain in his ,logic40 ,this last conclusion is thrust on me by seeing how little ,m4 ,littr1 the leading expositor of ,m4 ,comte1 is influenced by fundamental objections the force of which he admits4 ,after quoting one of these1 he says1 with a candour equally #ge rare and admirable1 that he has vainly searched ,m4 ,comte's works and his own mind for an answer4 ,nevertheless1 he adds--8j'ai russi1 je crois1 carter l'attaque de ,m4 ,herbert ,spencer1 et sauver le fond par des sacrifices indispensables mais accessoires40 ,the sacrifices are these4 ,he abandons ,m4 ,comte's division of ,inorganic ,science into ,celestial ,physics and ,terrestrial ,physics--a division which1 in ,m4 ,comte's scheme1 takes precedence of all the rest2 and he admits that neither logically nor historically does ,astronomy come before ,physics1 as ,m4 ,comte alleges4 ,after making these sacrifices1 which most will think too lightly described as 8sacrifices indispensables mais accessoires10 ,m4 ,littr proceeds to rehabilitate the ,comtean classification in a way which he considers satisfactory1 but which ,i do not understand4 ,in short1 the proof of these incongruities affects his faith in the ,positivist theory of the sciences1 no more than the faith of a ,christian is affected by proof that the ,gospels contradict one another4 ,here in ,england ,i have seen no attempt to meet the criticisms with which ,m4 ,littr thus deals4 ,there has been no reply to the allegation1 based on examples1 that the several sciences do not develop in the order of their decreasing generality2 nor to the allegation1 based on ,m4 ,comte's own admissions1 that within each science the progress is not1 as he says it is1 from the general to the special2 nor to the allegation that the seeming historical precedence of ,astronomy over ,physics in ,m4 ,comte's pages1 is based on a verbal ambiguity--a mere sleight of words2 nor to the allegation1 abundantly illustrated1 that a progression in an order the reverse of that asserted by ,m4 ,comte may be as well substantiated2 nor to various minor allegations equally irreconcileable with his scheme4 ,i have met with nothing more than iteration of the statement that the sciences do conform1 logically and historically1 to the order in which ,m4 ,comte places them2 regardless of the assigned evidence that they do not4 ,under these circumstances it is unnecessary for me to #gf say more2 and ,i think ,i am warranted in continuing to hold that the ,comtean classification of the sciences is demonstrably untenable4 99 99 99 99 99 ,in an essay on 8,the ,genesis of ,science10 originally published in #ahed1 ,i endeavoured to show that the ,sciences cannot be rationally arranged in serial order4 ,proof was given that neither the succession in which the ,sciences are placed by ,m4 ,comte 7to a criticism of whose scheme the essay was in part devoted71 nor any other succession in which the ,sciences can be placed1 represents either their logical dependence or their historical dependence4 ,to the question--,how may their relations be rightly expressed8 ,i did not then attempt any answer4 ,this question ,i propose now to consider4 ,a true classification includes in each class1 those objects which have more characteristics in common with one another1 than any of them have in common with any objects excluded from the class4 ,further1 the characteristics possessed in common by the colligated objects1 and not possessed by other objects1 involve more numerous dependent characteristics4 ,these are two sides of the same definition4 ,for things possessing the greatest number of attributes in common1 are things that possess in common those essential attributes on which the rest depend2 and1 conversely1 the possession in common of the essential attributes1 implies the possession in common of the greatest number of attributes4 ,hence1 either test may be used as convenience dictates4 ,if1 then1 the ,sciences admit of classification at all1 it must be by grouping together the like and separating the unlike1 as thus defined4 ,let us proceed to do this4 99 99 99 99 99 ,the broadest natural division among the ,sciences1 is the division between those which deal with the abstract relations #gg under which phenomena are presented to us1 and those which deal with the phenomena themselves4 ,relations of whatever orders1 are nearer akin to one another than they are to any objects4 ,objects of whatever orders1 are nearer akin to one another than they are to any relations4 ,whether1 as some hold1 ,space and ,time are nothing but forms of ,thought#b2 or whether1 as ,i hold myself1 they are forms of ,things1 that have generated forms of ,thought through organized and inherited experience of ,things2 it is equally true that ,space and ,time are contrasted absolutely with the existences disclosed to us in ,space and ,time2 and hence the ,sciences which deal exclusively with ,space and ,time1 are separated by the profoundest of all distinctions from the ,sciences which deal with the existences contained in ,space and ,time4 ,space is the abstract of all relations of co-existence4 ,time is the abstract of all relations of sequence4 ,and dealing as they do entirely with relations of co-existence and sequence1 in their general or special forms1 ,logic and ,mathematics form a class of the ,sciences more widely unlike the rest1 than any of the rest are from one another4 ,the ,sciences which deal with existences themselves1 instead of the blank forms in which existences are presented to us1 admit of a sub-division less profound than the division above made1 but more profound than any of the divisions among the ,sciences individually considered4 ,they #gh fall into two classes1 having quite different aspects1 aims1 and methods4 ,every phenomenon is more or less composite--is a manifestation of force under several distinct modes4 ,hence result two objects of inquiry4 ,we may study the component modes of force separately2 or we may study them as co-operating to generate in this composite phenomenon4 ,on the one hand1 neglecting all the incidents of particular cases1 we may aim to educe the laws of each mode of force1 when it is uninterfered with4 ,on the other hand1 the incidents of the particular case being given1 we may seek to interpret the entire phenomenon1 as a product of the several forces simultaneously in action4 ,the truths reached through the first kind of inquiry1 though concrete inasmuch as they have actual existences for their subject-matters1 are abstract inasmuch as they refer to the modes of existence apart from one another2 while the truths reached by the second kind of inquiry are properly concrete1 inasmuch as they formulate the facts in their combined order1 as they occur in ,nature4 ,the ,sciences1 then1 in their main divisions1 stand thus3 ,,science is that which treats of the forms in which phenomona are known to us2 ,,abstract ,,science 7,logic and ,mathematics7 that which treats of the phenomena themselves in their elements ,,abstract-,,concrete ,,science 7,mechanics1 ,physics1 ,chemistry1 etc47 in their totalities ,,concrete ,,science 7,astronomy1 ,geology1 ,biology1 ,psychology1 ,sociology1 etc47 ,it is needful to define the words abstract and concrete as thus used2 since they are sometimes used with other #gi meanings4 ,m4 ,comte divides ,science into abstract and concrete2 but the divisions which he distinguishes by these names are quite unlike those above made4 ,instead of regarding some ,sciences as wholly abstract1 and others as wholly concrete1 he regards each ,science as having an abstract part1 and a concrete part4 ,there is1 according to him1 an abstract mathematics and a concrete mathematics--an abstract biology and concrete biology4 ,he says3--8,il faut distinguer1 par rapport tous les ordres de phnomnes1 deux genres de sciences naturelles3 les unes abstraites1 gnrales1 ont pour objet la dcouverte des lois qui rgissent les diverses classes de phnomnes1 en considrant tous les cas qu'on peut concevoir2 les autres concrtes1 particulires1 descriptives1 et qu'on dsigne quelquefois sous le nom de sciences naturelles proprement dites1 consistent dans l'application de ces lois a l'histoire effective des diffrens tres existans40 ,and to illustrate the distinction1 he names general physiology as abstract1 and zoology and botany as concrete4 ,here it is manifest that the words abstract and general are used as synonymous4 ,they have1 however1 different meanings2 and confusion results from not distinguishing their meanings4 ,abstractness means detachment from the incidents of particular cases4 ,generality means manifestation in numerous cases4 ,on the one hand1 the essential nature of some phenomenon is considered1 apart from disguising phenomena4 ,on the other hand1 the frequency of the phenomenon1 with or without disguising phenomena1 is the thing considered4 ,among the phenomena presented by numbers1 which are purely ideal1 the two coincide2 but excluding these1 an abstract truth is not realizable to perception in any case of which it is asserted1 whereas a general truth is realizable to perception in every case of which it is asserted4 ,some illustrations will make the distinction clear4 ,thus it is an abstract truth that the angle contained in a semi-circle is a right angle--abstract in the sense that though it does not hold of #hj actually-constructed semi-circles and angles1 which are always inexact1 it holds of the ideal semi-circles and angles abstracted from real ones2 but this is not a general truth1 either in the sense that it is commonly manifested in ,nature1 or in the sense that it is a space-relation that comprehends many minor space-relations3 it is a quite special space-relation4 ,again1 that the momentum of a body causes it to move in a straight line at a uniform velocity1 is an abstract-concrete truth--a truth abstracted from certain experiences of concrete phenomena2 but it is by no means a general truth3 so little generality has it1 that no one fact in ,nature displays it4 ,conversely1 surrounding things supply us with hosts of general truths that are not in the least abstract4 ,it is a general truth that the planets go round the ,sun from ,west to ,east--a truth which holds good in several hundred cases 7including the cases of the planetoids72 but this truth is not at all abstract1 since it is perfectly realized as a concrete fact in every one of these cases4 ,every vertebrate animal whatever1 has a double nervous system2 all birds and all mammals are warm-blooded--these are general truths1 but they are concrete truths3 that is to say1 every vertebrate animal individually presents an entire and unqualified manifestation of this duality of the nervous system2 every living bird exemplifies absolutely or completely the warm-bloodedness of birds4 ,what we here call1 and rightly call1 a general truth1 is simply a proposition which sums up a number of our actual experiences2 and not the expression of a truth drawn from our actual experiences1 but never presented to us in any of them4 ,in other words1 a general truth colligates a number of particular truths2 while an abstract truth colligates no particular truths1 but formulates a truth which certain phenomena all involve1 though it is actually seen in none of them4 ,limiting the words to their proper meanings as thus defined1 it becomes manifest that the three classes of #ha ,sciences above separated1 are not distinguishable at all by differences in their degrees of generality4 ,they are all equally general2 or rather they are all1 considered as groups1 universal4 ,every object whatever presents at once the subject-matter for each of them4 ,in every fragment of substance we have simultaneously illustrated the abstract truths of relation in ,time and ,space2 the abstract-concrete truths in conformity with which the fragment manifests its several modes of force2 and the concrete truths resulting from the joint manifestation of these modes of force1 and which give to the fragment the characters by which it is known as such or such4 ,thus these three classes of ,sciences severally formulate different1 but co-extensive1 classes of facts4 ,within each group there are truths of greater and less generality3 there are general abstract truths1 and special abstract truths2 general abstract-concrete truths1 and special abstract-concrete truths2 general concrete truths1 and special concrete truths4 ,but while within each class there are groups and sub-groups and sub-sub-groups which differ in their degrees of generality1 the classes themselves differ only in their degrees of abstractness4#c 99 99 99 99 99 ,let us pass to the sub-divisions of these classes4 ,the first class is separable into two parts--the one containing universal truths1 the other non-universal truths4 ,dealing #hb wholly with relations apart from related things1 ,abstract ,science considers first1 that which is common to all relations whatever2 and1 second1 that which is common to each order of relations4 ,besides the indefinite and variable connexions which exist among phenomena1 as occurring together in ,space and ,time1 we find that there are also definite and invariable connexions--that between each kind of phenomenon and certain other kinds of phenomena1 there exist uniform relations4 ,this is a universal abstract truth--that there is an unchanging order1 or fixity of law1 in ,space and ,time4 ,we come next to the several kinds of unchanging order1 which1 taken together1 form the subjects of the #hc second division of ,abstract ,science4 ,of this second division1 the most general sub-division is that which deals with the natures of the connexions in ,space and ,time1 irrespective of the terms connected4 ,the conditions under which we may predicate a relation of coincidence or proximity in ,space and ,time 7or of non-coincidence or non-proximity7 from the subject-matter of ,logic4 ,here the natures and amounts of the terms between which the relations are #hd asserted 7or denied7 are of no moment3 the propositions of ,logic are independent of any qualitative or quantitative specification of the related things4 ,the other sub-division has for its subject-matter1 the relations between terms which are specified quantitatively but not qualitatively4 ,the amounts of the related terms1 irrespective of their natures1 are here dealt with2 and ,mathematics is a statement of the laws of quantity considered apart from reality4 ,quantity considered apart from reality1 is occupancy of ,space or ,time2 and occupancy of ,space or ,time is measured by units of one or other order1 but of which the ultimate ones are simply separate places in consciousness1 either coexistent or sequent4 ,among units that are unspecified in their natures 7extensive1 protensive1 or intensive71 but are ideally endowed with existence considered apart from attributes1 the quantitative relations that arise1 are those most general relations expressed by numbers4 ,such relations fall into either of two orders1 according as the units are considered simply as capable of filling separate places in consciousness1 or according as they are considered as filling places that are not only separate1 but equal4 ,in the one case1 we have that indefinite calculus by which numbers of abstract existences1 but not sums of abstract existence1 are predicable4 ,in the other case1 we have that definite calculus by which both numbers of abstract existences and sums of abstract existence are predicable4 ,next comes that division of ,mathematics which deals with the quantitative relations of magnitudes 7or aggregates of units7 considered as coexistent1 or as occupying ,space--the division called ,geometry4 ,and then we arrive at relations1 the terms of which include both quantities of ,time and quantities of ,space--those in which times are estimated by the units of space traversed at a uniform velocity1 and those in which equal units of time being given1 the spaces traversed with uniform or variable velocities are estimated4 #he ,these ,abstract ,sciences1 which are concerned exclusively with relations and with the relations of relations1 may be grouped as shown in ,table ,i4 99 99 99 99 99 ,,table ,i4 ,,abstract ,,science4 ,universal law of relation--an expression of the truth that uniformities of connexion obtain among modes of ,being1 irrespective of any specification of the natures of the uniformities of connexion4 ,laws of relations that are qualitative2 or that are specified in their natures as relations of coincidence or proximity in ,time and ,space1 but not necessarily in their terms the natures and amount of which are indifferent4 7,,logic47#d that are quantitative 7,,mathematics7 negatively3 the terms of the relations being definitely-related sets of positions in space2 and the facts predicated being the absences of certain quantities4 7,geometry of ,position4#e7 positively3 the terms being magnitudes composed of units that are equal only as having independent existences4 7,indefinite ,calculus4#f7 equal units the equality of which is not defined as extensive1 protensive1 or intensive 7,definite ,calculus7 when their numbers are completely specified 7,arithmetic47 when their numbers are specified only in their relations 7,algebra47 in the relations of their relations4 7,calculus of ,operations47 the equality of which is that of extension considered in their relations of coexistence4 7,geometry47 considered as traversed in ,time that is wholly indefinite4 7,kinematics47 that is divided into equal units 7,geometry of ,motion4#g7 ,passing from the ,sciences concerned with the ideal or unoccupied forms of relations1 and turning to the ,sciences concerned with real relations1 or the relations among realities1 we come first to those ,sciences which treat of realities1 not as they are habitually manifested1 but with realities as manifested in their different modes1 when these are artificially separated from one another4 ,while the ,abstract ,sciences are wholly ideal1 relatively to the ,abstract-,concrete and ,concrete ,sciences2 the ,abstract-,concrete ,sciences are partially ideal1 relatively to the ,concrete ,sciences4 ,just as ,logic and ,mathematics generalize the laws of relation1 qualitative and quantitative1 apart from related things2 so1 ,mechanics1 ,physics1 ,chemistry generalize the laws of relation which different modes of ,matter and ,motion conform to1 when severally disentangled from those actual phenomena in which they are mutually modified4 ,just as the geometrician formulates the properties of lines and surfaces1 independently of the irregularities and thicknesses of lines and surfaces as they really exist2 so the physicist and the chemist formulate the manifestations of each mode of force1 independently of the disturbances in its manifestations which other modes of force cause in every actual case4 ,in works on ,mechanics1 the laws of motion are expressed without reference to friction and resistance of the medium4 ,not what motion ever really is1 but what it would be if retarding forces were absent1 is asserted4 ,if afterwards any retarding force is taken into account1 then the effect of this retarding force is dealt with by itself3 neglecting the other retarding forces4 ,consider1 again1 the generalizations of the physicist respecting molecular motion4 ,the law that light varies inversely as the square of the distance1 is absolutely true only when the radiation #hf goes on from a point without dimensions1 which it never does2 and it also assumes that the rays are perfectly straight1 which they cannot be unless the medium differs from all actual media in being perfectly homogeneous4 ,if the disturbing effects of changes of media are investigated1 the formul expressing the refractions take for granted that the new media entered are homogeneous2 which they never really are4 ,even when a compound disturbance is allowed for1 as when the refraction undergone by light in traversing a medium of increasing density1 like the atmosphere1 is calculated1 the calculation still supposes conditions that are unnaturally simple--it supposes that the atmosphere is not pervaded by heterogeneous currents1 which it always is4 ,similarly with the inquiries of the chemist4 ,he does not take his substances as ,nature supplies them4 ,before he proceeds to specify their respective properties1 he purifies them--separates from each all trace of every other4 ,before ascertaining the specific gravity of a gas1 he has to free this gas from the vapour of water1 usually mixed with it4 ,before describing the properties of a salt1 he guards against any error that may arise from the presence of an uncombined portion of the acid or base4 ,and when he alleges of any element that it has a certain atomic weight1 and unites with such and such equivalents of other elements1 he does not mean that the results thus expressed are exactly the results of any one experiment2 but that they are the results which1 after averaging many trials1 he concludes would be realized if absolute purity could be obtained1 and if the experiments could be conducted without loss4 ,his problem is to ascertain the laws of combination of molecules1 not as they are actually displayed1 but as they would be displayed in the absence of those minute interferences which cannot be altogether avoided4 ,thus all ,abstract-,concrete ,sciences have for their object1 analytical interpretation4 ,in every case it is the aim to decompose the phenomenon1 and formulate its #hg components apart from one another2 or some two or three apart from the rest4 ,wherever1 throughout these ,sciences1 synthesis is employed1 it is for the verification of analysis4#h ,the truths elaborated are severally asserted1 not as truths exhibited by this or that particular object2 but as truths universally holding of ,matter and ,motion in their more general or more special forms1 considered apart from particular objects1 and particular places in space4 ,the sub-divisions of this group of ,sciences1 may be drawn on the same principle as that on which the sub-divisions of the preceding group were drawn4 ,phenomena1 considered as more or less involved manifestations of force1 yield on analysis1 certain laws of manifestation which are universal1 and other laws of manifestation1 which1 being dependent on conditions1 are not universal4 ,hence the ,abstract-,concrete ,sciences are primarily divisible into--the laws of force considered apart from its separate modes1 and laws of force considered under each of its separate modes4 ,and this second division of the ,abstract-,concrete group1 is sub-divisible after a manner essentially analogous4 ,it is needless to occupy space by defining these several #hh orders and genera of ,sciences4 ,table ,,ii4 will sufficiently explain their relations4 99 99 99 99 99 ,,table ,,ii4 ,,abstract-,,concrete ,,science4 ,universal laws of forces 7tensions and pressures71 as deducible from the persistence of force3 the theorems of resolution and composition of forces4 ,laws of forces as manifested by matter in masses 7,,mechanics7 that are in equilibrium relatively to other masses and are solid4 7,statics47 and are fluid4 7,hydrostatics47 that are not in equilibrium relatively to other masses and are solid4 7,dynamics47 and are fluid4 7,hydrodynamics47 in molecules 7,,molecular ,,mechanics7 when in equilibrium3 7,molecular ,statics7 giving statical properties of matter general1 as impenetrability or space-occupancy4 special1 as the forms resulting from molecular equilibrium4 giving statico-dynamical properties of matter 7cohesion1 elasticity1 etc47 when solid4 when liquid4 when gaseous4 when not in equilibrium3 7,molecular ,dynamics7 as resulting in a changed distribution of molecules which alters their relative positions homogeneously causing increase of volume 7expansion1 liquefaction1 evaporation74 causing decrease of volume 7condensation1 solidification1 contraction74 which alters their relative positions heterogeneously 7,chemistry7 producing new relations of molecules 7new compounds74 producing new relations of forces 7new affinities74 as resulting in a changed distribution of molecular motion1 which1 by integration1 generates sensible motion4 which1 by disintegration1 generates insensible motion1 under the forms of ,heat4 ,light4 ,electricity4 ,magnetism4 ,wecome now to the third great group4 ,we have done with the ,sciences which are concerned only with the blank forms of relations under which ,being is manifested to us4 ,we have left behind the ,sciences which1 dealing with ,being under its universal mode1 and its several non-universal modes regarded as independent1 treat the terms of its relations as simple and homogeneous2 which they never are in ,nature4 ,there remain the ,sciences which1 taking these modes of ,being as they are habitually connected with one another1 have for the terms of their relations1 those heterogeneous combinations of forces that constitute actual phenomena4 ,the subject-matter of these ,concrete-,sciences is the real1 as contrasted with the wholly or partially ideal4 ,it is their aim1 not to separate and generalize apart the components of all phenomena1 but to explain each phenomenon as a product of these components4 ,their relations are not1 like those of the simplest ,abstract-,concrete ,sciences1 relations between one antecedent and one consequent2 nor are they1 like those of the more involved ,abstract-,concrete ,sciences1 relations between some few antecedents cut off in imagination from all others1 and some few consequents similarly cut off2 but they are relations each of which has for its terms a complete plexus of antecedents and a complete plexus of consequents4 ,this is manifest in the least involved ,concrete ,sciences4 ,the astronomer seeks to explain the ,solar ,system4 ,he does not stop short after generalizing the laws of planetary movement1 such as planetary movement would be did only a single planet exist2 but he solves this abstract-concrete problem1 as a step towards solving the concrete problem of the planetary movements as affecting one another4 ,in astronomical language1 8the theory of the ,moon0 means an interpretation of the ,moon's motions1 not as determined simply by centripetal #hi and centrifugal forces1 but as perpetually modified by gravitation towards the ,earth's equatorial protuberance1 towards the ,sun1 and even towards ,venus3 forces daily varying in their amounts and combinations4 ,nor does the astronomer leave off when he has calculated what will be the position of a given body at a given time1 allowing for all perturbations2 but he goes on to consider the effects produced by reactions on the perturbing masses4 ,and he further goes on to consider how the mutual perturbations of the planets cause1 during a long period1 increasing deviations from a mean state2 and then how compensating perturbations cause continuous decrease of the deviations4 ,that is1 the goal towards which he ever strives1 is a complete explanation of these complex planetary motions in their totality4 ,similarly with the geologist4 ,he does not take for his problem only those irregularities of the ,earth's crust that are worked by denudation2 or only those which igneous action causes4 ,he does not seek simply to understand how sedimentary strata were formed2 or how faults were produced2 or how moraines originated2 or how the beds of ,alpine lakes were scooped out4 ,but taking into account all agencies co-operating in endless and ever-varying combinations1 he aims to interpret the entire structure of the ,earth's crust4 ,if he studies separately the actions of rain1 rivers1 glaciers1 icebergs1 tides1 waves1 volcanoes1 earthquakes1 etc42 he does so that he may be better able to comprehend their joint actions as factors in geological phenomena3 the object of his science being to generalize these phenomena in all their intricate connexions1 as parts of one whole4 ,in like manner ,biology is the elaboration of a complete theory of ,life1 in each and all of its involved manifestations4 ,if different aspects of its phenomena are investigated apart--if one observer busies himself in classing organisms1 another in dissecting them1 another in ascertaining their chemical compositions1 another in studying functions1 another in tracing laws of modification2 they are #ij all1 consciously or unconsciously1 helping to work out a solution of vital phenomena in their entirety1 both as displayed by individual organisms and by organisms at large4 ,thus1 in these ,concrete ,sciences1 the object is the converse of that which the ,abstract-,concrete ,sciences propose to themselves4 ,in the one case we have analytical interpretation2 while in the other case we have synthetical interpretation4 ,instead of synthesis being used merely to verify analysis2 analysis is here used only to aid synthesis4 ,not to formulate the factors of phenomena is now the object2 but to formulate the phenomena resulting from these factors1 under the various conditions which the ,universe presents4 ,this third class of ,sciences1 like the other classes1 is divisible into the universal and the non-universal4 ,as there are truths which hold of all phenomena in their elements2 so there are truths which hold of all phenomena in their totalities4 ,as force has certain ultimate laws common to its separate modes of manifestation1 so in those combinations of its modes which constitute actual phenomena1 we find certain ultimate laws that are conformed to in every case4 ,these are the laws of the re-distribution of force4 ,since we can become conscious of a phenomenon only by some change wrought in us1 every phenomenon necessarily implies re-distribution of force--change in the arrangements of matter and motion4 ,alike in molecular movements and the movements of masses1 one great uniformity may be traced4 ,a decreasing quantity of motion1 sensible or insensible1 always has for its concomitant an increasing aggregation of matter2 and1 conversely1 an increasing quantity of motion1 sensible or insensible1 has for its concomitant a decreasing aggregation of matter4 ,give to the molecules of any mass1 more of that insensible motion which we call heat1 and the parts of the mass become somewhat less closely aggregated4 ,add a further quantity of insensible motion1 and the mass so far disintegrates as to become #ia liquid4 ,add still more insensible motion1 and the mass disintegrates so completely as to become gas2 which occupies a greater space with every extra quantity of insensible motion given to it4 ,on the other hand1 every loss of insensible motion by a mass1 gaseous1 liquid1 or solid1 is accompanied by a progressing integration of the mass4 ,similarly with sensible motions1 be the bodies moved large or small4 ,augment the velocities of the planets1 and their orbits will enlarge--the ,solar ,system will occupy a wider space4 ,diminish their velocities1 and their orbits will lessen--the ,solar ,system will contract1 or become more integrated4 ,and in like manner we see that sensible motions given to bodies on the ,earth's surface involve partial disintegrations of the bodies from the ,earth2 while the loss of their motions are accompanied by their re-integration with the ,earth4 ,in all changes we have either an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion2 or an absorption of motion and concomitant disintegration of matter4 ,and where1 as in living bodies1 these processes go on simultaneously1 there is an integration of matter proportioned to the dissipation of motion1 and an absorption of motion proportioned to the disintegration of matter4 ,such1 then1 are the universal laws of that re-distribution of matter and motion everywhere going on--a re-distribution which results in ,evolution so long as the aggregation of matter and dispersion of motion predominate2 but which results in ,dissolution where there is a predominant aggregation of motion and dispersion of matter4 ,hence we have a division of ,concrete ,science which bears towards the other ,concrete ,sciences1 a relation like that which the ,universal ,law of ,relation bears to ,mathematics1 and like that which ,universal ,mechanics 7composition and resolution of forces7 bears to ,physics4 ,we have a division of ,concrete ,science which generalizes those concomitants of this re-distribution that hold good among all orders of concrete objects--a division which explains why1 along with a #ib predominating integration of matter and dissipation of motion1 there goes a change from an indefinite1 incoherent homogeneity1 to a definite1 coherent heterogeneity2 and why a reverse re-distribution of matter and motion1 is accompanied by a reverse structural change4 ,passing from this universal ,concrete ,science1 to the non-universal ,concrete ,sciences2 we find that these are primarily divisible into the science which deals with the re-distributions of matter and motion among masses in space1 consequent on their mutual actions as wholes2 and the science which deals with the re-distributions of matter and motion consequent on the mutual actions of the parts of each mass4 ,and of these equally general ,sciences1 this last is re-divisible into the ,science which is limited to the concomitants of re-distribution among the parts of each mass when regarded as independent1 and the ,science which takes into account the molecular motion received by radiation from other masses4 ,but these sub-divisions1 and their sub-sub-divisions1 will be best seen in the annexed ,table ,,iii4 99 99 99 99 99 ,,table ,,iii4 ,,concrete ,,science4 ,universal laws of the continuous re-distribution of ,matter and ,motion2 which results in ,evolution where there is a predominant integration of ,matter and dissipation of ,motion1 and which results in ,dissolution where there is a predominant absorption of ,motion and disintegration of ,matter4 ,laws of the redistributions of ,matter and ,motion actually going on among the celestial bodies in their relations to one another as masses3 comprehending 7,,astronomy7 the dynamics of our solar system4 7,planetary ,astronomy47 the dynamics of our stellar universe4 7,sidereal ,astronomy47 among the molecules of any celestial mass2 as caused by the actions of these molecules on one another 7,,astrogeny7 resulting in the formation of compound molecules4 7,solar ,mineralogy47 resulting in molecular motions and genesis of radiant forces4#i resulting in movements of gases and liquids4 7,solar ,meteorology4#aj7 the actions of these molecules on one another1 joined with the actions on them of forces radiated by the molecules of other masses3 7,,geogeny7 as exhibited in the planets generally4 as exhibited in the ,earth causing composition and of decomposition of inorganic matters4 7,mineralogy47 causing re-distributions of gases and liquids4 7,meteorology47 causing re-distributions of solids4 7,geology47 causing organic phenomena2 which are 7,biology7 those of structure 7,morphology7 general4 special4 those of function in their internal relations 7,physiology7 general4 special4 in their external relations 7,psychology7 general special separate4 combined4 7,sociology4#aa7 ,that these great groups of ,sciences and their respective sub-groups1 fulfil the definition of a true classification given at the outset1 is1 ,i think1 tolerably manifest4 ,the subjects of inquiry included in each primary division1 have essential attributes in common with one another1 which they have not in common with any of the subjects contained in the other primary divisions2 and they have1 by consequence1 a greater number of attributes in which they are severally like the subjects they are grouped with1 and unlike the subjects otherwise grouped4 ,between ,sciences which deal with relations apart from realities1 and ,sciences which deal with realities1 the distinction is the widest possible2 since ,being1 in some or all of its attributes1 is common to all ,sciences of the second class1 and excluded from all ,sciences of the first class4 ,and when we divide the ,sciences which treat of realities1 into those which deal #ic with their component phenomena considered in ideal separation and those which deal with their component phenomena as actually united1 we make a profounder distinction than can exist between the ,sciences which deal with one or other order of the components1 or than can exist between the ,sciences which deal with one or other order of the things composed4 ,the three groups of ,sciences may be briefly defined as--laws of the forms2 laws of the factors2 laws of the products4 ,when thus defined1 it becomes manifest that the groups are so radically unlike in their natures1 that there can be no transitions between them2 and that any ,science belonging to one of the groups must be quite incongruous with the ,sciences belonging to either of the other groups1 if transferred4 ,how fundamental are the differences between them1 will be further seen on considering their functions4 ,the first1 or abstract group1 is instrumental with respect to both the others2 and the second1 or abstract-concrete group is instrumental with respect to the third or concrete group4 ,an endeavour to invert these functions will at once show how essential is the difference of character4 ,the second and third groups supply subject-matter to the first1 and the third supplies subject-matter to the second2 but none of the truths which constitute the third group are of any use as solvents of the problems presented by the second group2 and none of the truths which the second group formulates can act as solvents of problems contained in the first group4 ,concerning the sub-divisions of these great groups1 little remains to be added4 ,that each of the groups1 being co-extensive with all phenomena1 contains truths that are universal and others that are not universal1 and that these must be classed apart1 is obvious4 ,and that the sub-divisions of the non-universal truths1 are to be made according to their decreasing generality in something like the manner shown in the ,tables1 is proved by the fact that #id when the descriptive words are read from the root to the extremity of any branch1 they form a definition of the ,science constituting that branch4 ,that the minor divisions might be otherwise arranged1 and that better definitions of them might be given1 is highly probable4 ,they are here set down merely for the purpose of showing how this method of classification works out4 ,i will only further remark that the relations of the ,sciences as thus represented1 are still but imperfectly represented3 their relations cannot be truly shown on a plane1 but only in space of three dimensions4 ,the three groups cannot rightly be put in linear order as they have here been4 ,since the first stands related to the third1 not only indirectly through the second1 but also directly--it is directly instrumental with respect to the third1 and the third supplies it directly with subject-matter4 ,their relations can thus only be truly shown by branches diverging from a common root on different sides1 in such a way that each stands in juxta-position to the other two4 ,and only by a like mode of arrangement1 can the relations among the sub-divisions of each group be correctly represented4 99 99 99 99 99 ,the foregoing exposition1 highly abstract as it is1 will by some readers be less readily followed than a more concrete one4 ,with the view of carrying conviction to such ,i will re-state the case in two ways3 the first of them adapted only to those who accept the doctrine of ,evolution in its most general form4 ,we set out with concentrating nebulous matter4 ,tracing the re-distributions of this1 as the rotating contracting spheroid leaves behind successive annuli and as these severally form secondary rotating spheroids1 we come at length to planets in their early stages4 ,thus far we consider the phenomena dealt with purely astronomical2 and so long as our ,earth1 regarded as one of these spheroids1 #ie was made up of gaseous and molten matters only1 it presented no data for any more complex ,concrete ,science4 ,in the lapse of cosmical time a solid film forms1 which1 in the course of millions of years1 thickens1 and1 in the course of further millions of years1 becomes cool enough to permit the precipitation1 first of various other gaseous compounds1 and finally of water4 ,presently1 the varying exposure of different parts of the spheroid to the ,sun's rays1 begins to produce appreciable effects2 until at length there have arisen meteorological actions1 and consequent geological actions1 such as those we now know3 determined partly by the ,sun's heat1 partly by the still-retained internal heat of the ,earth1 and partly by the action of the ,moon on the ocean8 ,how have we reached these geological phenomena8 ,when did the astronomical changes end and the geological changes begin8 ,it needs but to ask this question to see that there is no real division between the two4 ,putting pre-conceptions aside1 we find nothing more than a group of phenomena continually complicating under the influence of the same original factors2 and we see that our conventional division is defensible only on grounds of convenience4 ,let us advance a stage4 ,as the ,earth's surface continues to cool1 passing through all degrees of temperature by infinitesimal gradations1 the formation of more and more complex inorganic compounds becomes possible4 ,later1 its surface sinks to that heat at which the less complex compounds of the kinds called organic can exist2 and1 finally1 the formation of the more complex organic compounds takes place4 ,chemists now show us that these compounds may be built up synthetically in the laboratory--each stage in ascending complexity making possible the next higher stage4 ,hence it is inferable that1 in the myriads of laboratories1 endlessly diversified in their materials and conditions1 which the ,earth's surface furnished during the myriads of years occupied in passing through these stages of temperature1 such successive #if syntheses were effected2 and that the highly complex unstable substance out of which all organisms are composed1 was eventually formed in microscopic portions3 from which1 by continuous integrations and differentiations1 the evolution of all organisms has proceeded4 ,where then shall we draw the line between ,geology and ,biology8 ,the synthesis of this most complex compound1 is but a continuation of the syntheses by which all simpler compounds were formed4 ,the same primary factors have been co-operating with those secondary factors1 meteorologic and geologic1 previously derived from them4 ,nowhere do we find a break in the ever-complicating series2 for there is a manifest connexion between those movements which various complex compounds undergo during their isomeric transformations1 and those changes of form undergone by the protoplasm which we distinguish as living4 ,strongly contrasted as they eventually become1 biological phenomena are at their root inseparable from geological phenomena--inseparable from the aggregate of transformations continually wrought in the matters forming the ,earth's surface by the physical forces to which they are exposed4 ,further stages ,i need not particularize4 ,the gradual development out of the biological group of phenomena1 of the more specialized group we class as psychological1 needs no illustration4 ,and when we come to the highest psychological phenomena1 it is clear that since aggregations of human beings may be traced upwards from single wandering families to tribes and nations of all sizes and complexities1 we pass insensibly from the phenomena of individual human action to those of corporate human action4 ,to resume1 then1 is it not manifest that in the group of sciences--,astronomy1 ,geology1 ,biology1 ,psychology1 ,sociology1 we have a natural group that admits neither of disruption nor change of order8 ,here there is both a genetic dependence1 and a dependence of interpretations4 ,the phenomena have arisen in this succession in cosmical #ig time2 and complete scientific interpretation of each group depends on scientific interpretation of the preceding groups4 ,no other science can be thrust in anywhere without destroying the continuity4 ,to insert ,physics between ,astronomy and ,geology1 would be to make a break in the history of a continuous series of changes2 and a like break would be produced by inserting ,chemistry between ,geology and ,biology4 ,it is true that ,physics and ,chemistry are needful as interpreters of these successive assemblages of facts2 but it does not therefore follow that they are themselves to be placed among these assemblages4 ,concrete ,science1 made up of these five concrete sub-sciences1 being thus coherent within itself1 and separated from all other science1 there comes the question--,is all other science similarly coherent within itself8 or is it traversed by some second division that is equally decided8 ,it is thus traversed4 ,a statical or dynamical theorem1 however simple1 has always for its subject-matter something that is conceived as extended1 and as displaying force or forces--as being a seat of resistance1 or of tension1 or of both1 and as capable of possessing more or less of vis viva4 ,if we examine the simplest proposition of ,statics1 we see that the conception of ,force must be joined with the conception of ,space1 before the proposition can be framed in thought2 and if we similarly examine the simplest proposition in ,dynamics1 we see that ,force1 ,space1 and ,time1 are its essential elements4 ,the amounts of the terms are indifferent2 and1 by reduction of its terms beyond the limits of perception1 they are applied to molecules3 ,molar ,mechanics and ,molecular ,mechanics are continuous4 ,from questions concerning the relative motions of two or more molecules1 ,molecular ,mechanics passes to changes of aggregation among many molecules1 to changes in the amounts and kinds of the motions possessed by them as members of an aggregate1 and to changes of the motions transferred through aggregates of them1 as those constituting light4 #ih ,daily extending its range of interpretations1 it is coming to deal even with the components of each compound molecule on the same principles4 ,and the unions and disunions of such more or less compound molecules1 which constitute the phenomena of ,chemistry1 are also being conceived as resultant phenomena of essentially kindred natures--the affinities of molecules for one another1 and their reactions in relation to light1 heat1 and other modes of force1 being regarded as consequent on the combinations of the various mechanically-determined motions of their various components4 ,without at all out-running1 however1 this progress in the mechanical interpretation of molecular phenomena1 it suffices to point out that the indispensable elements in any chemical conception are units occupying places in space1 and exerting forces on one another4 ,this1 then1 is the common character of all these sciences which we at present group under the names of ,mechanics1 ,physics1 ,chemistry4 ,leaving undiscussed the question whether it is possible to conceive of force apart from extended somethings exerting it1 we may assert1 as beyond dispute1 that if the conception of force be expelled1 no science of ,mechanics1 ,physics1 or ,chemistry remains4 ,made coherent1 as these sciences are1 by this bond of union1 it is impossible to thrust among them any other science without breaking their continuity4 ,we cannot place ,logic between ,molar ,mechanics and ,molecular ,mechanics4 ,we cannot place ,mathematics between the group of propositions concerning the behaviour of homogeneous molecules to one another1 and the group of propositions concerning the behaviour of heterogeneous molecules to one another 7which we call ,chemistry74 ,clearly these two sciences lie outside the coherent whole we have contemplated2 separated from it in some radical way4 ,by what are they radically separated8 ,by the absence of the conception of force through which alone we know objects as existing or acting4 ,however true it may be #ii that so long as ,logic and ,mathematics have any terms at all1 these must be capable of affecting consciousness1 and1 by implication1 of exerting force2 yet it is the distinctive trait of these sciences that not only do their propositions make no reference to such force1 but1 as far as possible1 they deliberately ignore it4 ,instead of being1 as in all the other sciences1 an element that is not only recognized but vital2 in ,mathematics and ,logic1 force is an element that is not only not vital1 but is studiously not recognized4 ,the terms in which ,logic expresses its propositions1 are symbols that do not profess to represent things1 properties1 or powers1 of one kind more than another2 and may equally well stand for the attributes belonging to members of some connected series of ideal curves which have never been drawn1 as for so many real objects4 ,and the theorems of ,geometry1 so far from contemplating perceptible lines and surfaces as elements in the truths enunciated1 consider these truths as becoming absolute only when such lines and surfaces become ideal--only when the conception of something exercising force is extruded4 99 99 99 99 99 ,let me now make a second re-statement1 not implying acceptance of the doctrine of ,evolution1 but exhibiting with a clearness almost if not quite as great1 these fundamental distinctions4 ,the concrete sciences1 taken together or separately1 contemplate as their subject-matters1 aggregates--either the entire aggregate of sensible existences1 or some secondary aggregate separable from this entire aggregate1 or some tertiary aggregate separable from this1 and so on4 ,sidereal ,astronomy occupies itself with the totality of visible masses distributed through space2 which it deals with as made up of identifiable individuals occupying specified places1 and severally standing towards one another1 towards sub-groups1 and towards the entire group1 in defined ways4 ,planetary ,astronomy1 cutting out of this all-including aggregate that #ajj relatively minute part constituting the ,solar ,system1 deals with this as a whole--observes1 measures1 and calculates the sizes1 shapes1 distances1 motions1 of its primary1 secondary1 and tertiary members2 and1 taking for its larger inquiries the mutual actions of all these members as parts of a coordinated assemblage1 takes for its smaller inquiries the actions of each member considered as an individual1 having a set of intrinsic activities that are modified by a set of extrinsic activities4 ,restricting itself to one of these aggregates1 which admits of close examination1 ,geology 7using this word in its comprehensive meaning7 gives an account of terrestrial actions and terrestrial structures1 past and present2 and1 taking for its narrower problems local formations and the agencies to which they are due1 takes for its larger problems the serial transformations undergone by the entire ,earth4 ,the geologist being occupied with this cosmically small1 but otherwise vast1 aggregate1 the biologist occupies himself with small aggregates formed out of parts of the ,earth's superficial substance1 and treats each of these as a coordinated whole in its structures and functions2 or1 when he treats of any particular organ1 considers this as a whole made up of parts held in a sub-coordination that refers to the coordination of the entire organism4 ,to the psychologist he leaves those specialized aggregates of functions which adjust the actions of organisms to the complex activities surrounding them3 doing this1 not simply because they are a stage higher in speciality1 but because they are the counterparts of those aggregated states of consciousness dealt with by the science of ,subjective ,psychology1 which stands entirely apart from all other sciences4 ,finally1 the sociologist considers each tribe and nation as an aggregate presenting multitudinous phenomena1 simultaneous and successive1 that are held together as parts of one combination4 ,thus1 in every case1 a concrete science deals with a real aggregate 7or a plurality of real aggregates72 and it includes as its #aja subject-matter whatever is to be known of this aggregate in respect of its size1 shape1 motions1 density1 texture1 general arrangement of parts1 minute structure1 chemical composition1 temperature1 etc41 together with all the multitudinous changes1 material and dynamical1 gone through by it from the time it begins to exist as an aggregate to the time it ceases to exist as an aggregate4 ,no abstract-concrete science makes the remotest attempt to do anything of this sort4 ,taken together1 the abstract-concrete sciences give an account of the various kinds of properties which aggregates display2 and each abstract-concrete science concerns itself with a certain order of these properties4 ,by this1 the properties common to all aggregates are studied and formulated2 by that1 the properties of aggregates having special forms1 special states of aggregation1 etc42 and by others1 the properties of particular components of aggregates when dissociated from other components4 ,but by all these sciences the aggregate1 considered as an individual object1 is tacitly ignored2 and a property1 or a connected set of properties1 exclusively occupies attention4 ,it matters not to ,mechanics whether the moving mass it considers is a planet or a molecule1 a dead stick thrown into the river or the living dog that leaps after it3 in any case the curve described by the moving mass conforms to the same laws4 ,similarly when the physicist takes for his subject the relation between the changing bulk of matter and the changing quantity of molecular motion it contains4 ,dealing with the subject generally1 he leaves out of consideration the kind of matter2 and dealing with the subject specially in relation to this or that kind of matter1 he ignores the attributes of size and form3 save in the still more special cases where the effect on form is considered1 and even then size is ignored4 ,so1 too1 is it with the chemist4 ,a substance he is investigating1 never thought of by him as distinguished in extension or amount1 is not even required to be perceptible4 ,a portion of carbon on #ajb which he is experimenting1 may or may not have been visible under its forms of diamond or graphite or charcoal--this is indifferent4 ,he traces it through various disguises and various combinations--now as united with oxygen to form an invisible gas2 now as hidden with other elements in such more complex compounds as ether1 and sugar1 and oil4 ,by sulphuric acid or other agent he precipitates it from these as a coherent cinder1 or as a diffused impalpable powder2 and again1 by applying heat1 forces it to disclose itself as an element of animal tissue4 ,evidently1 while thus ascertaining the affinities and atomic equivalence of carbon1 the chemist has nothing to do with any aggregate4 ,he deals with carbon in the abstract1 as something considered apart from quantity1 form1 appearance1 or temporary state of combination2 and conceives it as the possessor of powers or properties1 whence the special phenomena he describes result3 the ascertaining of all these powers or properties being his sole aim4 ,finally1 the ,abstract ,sciences ignore alike aggregates and the powers which aggregates or their components possess2 and occupy themselves with relations--either with the relations among aggregates1 or among their parts1 or the relations among aggregates and properties1 or the relations among properties1 or the relations among relations4 ,the same logical formula applies equally well1 whether its terms are men and their deaths1 crystals and their planes of cleavage1 or plants and their seeds4 ,and how entirely ,mathematics concerns itself with relations1 we see on remembering that it has just the same expression for the characters of an infinitesimal triangle1 as for those of the triangle which has ,sirius for its apex and the diameter of the ,earth's orbit for its base4 ,i cannot see how these definitions of these groups of sciences can be questioned4 ,it is undeniable that every ,concrete ,science gives an account of an aggregate or of aggregates1 inorganic1 organic1 or super-organic 7a society72 #ajc and that1 not concerning itself with properties of this or that order1 it concerns itself with the co-ordination of the assembled properties of all orders4 ,it seems to me no less certain that an ,abstract-,concrete ,science gives an account of some order of properties1 general or special2 not caring about the other traits of an aggregate displaying them1 and not recognizing aggregates at all further than is implied by discussion of the particular order of properties4 ,and ,i think it is equally clear that an ,abstract ,science1 freeing its propositions1 so far as the nature of thought permits1 from aggregates and properties1 occupies itself with relations of co-existence and sequence1 as disentangled from all particular forms of being and action4 ,if then these three groups of sciences are1 respectively1 accounts of aggregates1 accounts of properties1 accounts of relations1 it is manifest that the divisions between them are not simply perfectly clear1 but that the chasms between them are absolute4 99 99 99 99 99 ,here1 perhaps more clearly than before1 will be seen the untenability of the classification made by ,m4 ,comte4 ,already1 after setting forth in a general way these fundamental distinctions1 ,i have pointed out the incongruities that arise when the sciences1 conceived as ,abstract1 ,abstract-,concrete1 and ,concrete1 are arranged in the order proposed by him4 ,such incongruities become still more conspicuous if for these general names of the groups we substitute the definitions given above4 ,the series will then stand thus3 ,,mathematics ,an account of relations 7including1 under ,mechanics1 an account of properties74 ,,astronomy ,an account of aggregates4 ,,physics ,an account of properties4 ,,chemistry ,an account of properties4 ,,biology ,an account of aggregates4 ,,sociology ,an account of aggregates4 ,that those who espouse opposite views see clearly the #ajd defects in the propositions of their opponents and not those in their own1 is a trite remark that holds in philosophical discussions as in all others3 the parable of the mote and the beam applies as well to men's appreciations of one another's opinions as to their appreciations of one another's natures4 ,possibly to my positivist friends ,i exemplify this truth1--just as they exemplify it to me4 ,those uncommitted to either view must decide where the mote exists and where the beam4 ,meanwhile it is clear that one or other of the two views is essentially erroneous2 and that no qualifications can bring them into harmony4 ,either the sciences admit of no such grouping as that which ,i have described1 or they admit of no such serial order as that given by ,m4 ,comte4 ,,postscript ,,replying ,,to ,,criticisms4 ,among objections made to any doctrine1 those which come from avowed supporters of an adverse doctrine must be considered1 other things equal1 as of less weight than those which come from men uncommitted to an adverse doctrine1 or but partially committed to it4 ,the element of prepossession1 distinctly present in the one case and in the other case mainly or quite absent1 is a well-recognized cause of difference in the values of the judgments3 supposing the judgments to be otherwise fairly comparable4 ,hence1 when it is needful to bring the replies within a restricted space1 a fit course is that of dealing rather with independent criticisms than with criticisms which are really indirect arguments for an opposite view1 previously espoused4 ,for this reason ,i propose here to confine myself substantially1 though not absolutely1 to the demurrers entered against the foregoing classification by ,prof4 ,bain1 in his recent work on ,logic4 ,before dealing with the more #aje important of these1 let me clear the ground by disposing of the less important4 99 99 99 99 99 ,incidentally1 while commenting on the view ,i take respecting the position of ,logic1 ,prof4 ,bain points out that this1 which is the most abstract of the sciences1 owes much to ,psychology1 which ,i place among the ,concrete ,sciences2 and he alleges an incongruity between this fact and my statement that the ,concrete ,sciences are not instrumental in disclosing the truths of the ,abstract ,sciences4 ,subsequently he re-raises this apparent anomaly when saying 8,nor is it possible to justify the placing of ,psychology wholly among ,concrete ,sciences4 ,it is a highly analytic science1 as ,mr4 ,spencer thoroughly knows40 ,for a full reply1 given by implication1 ,i must refer ,prof4 ,bain to #ef of ,the ,principles of ,psychology1 where ,i have contended that 8while1 under its objective aspect1 ,psychology is to be classed as one of the ,concrete ,sciences which successively decrease in scope as they increase in speciality2 under its subjective aspect1 ,psychology is a totally unique science1 independent of1 and antithetically opposed to1 all other sciences whatever40 ,a pure idealist will not1 ,i suppose1 recognize this distinction2 but to every one else it must1 ,i should think1 be obvious that the science of subjective existences is the correlative of all the sciences of objective existences2 and is as absolutely marked off from them as subject is from object4 ,objective ,psychology1 which ,i class among the ,concrete ,sciences1 is purely synthetic1 so long as it is limited1 like the other sciences1 to objective data2 though great aid in the interpretation of these data is derived from the observed correspondence between the phenomena of ,objective ,psychology as presented in other beings and the phenomena of ,subjective ,psychology as presented in one's own consciousness4 ,now it is ,subjective ,psychology only which is analytic1 and which affords aid in the #ajf development of ,logic4 ,this being explained1 the apparent incongruity disappears4 ,a difficulty raised respecting the manner in which ,i have expressed the nature of ,mathematics1 may next be dealt with4 ,prof4 ,bain writes3 8,in the first place1 objection may be taken to his language1 in discussing the extreme ,abstract ,sciences1 when he speaks of the empty forms therein considered4 ,to call ,space and ,time empty forms1 must mean that they can be thought of without any concrete embodiment whatsoever2 that one can think of ,time1 as a pure abstraction1 without having in one's mind any concrete succession4 ,now1 this doctrine is in the last degree questionable40 ,i quite agree with ,prof4 ,bain that 8this doctrine is in the last degree questionable20 but ,i do not admit that this doctrine is implied by the definition of ,abstract ,science which ,i have given4 ,i speak of ,space and ,time as they are dealt with by mathematicians1 and as it is alone possible for pure ,mathematics to deal with them4 ,while ,mathematics habitually uses in its points1 lines1 and surfaces1 certain existences1 it habitually deals with these as representing points1 lines1 and surfaces that are ideal2 and its conclusions are true only on condition that it does this4 ,points having dimensions1 lines having breadths1 planes having thicknesses1 are negatived by its definitions4 ,using1 though it does1 material representatives of extension1 linear1 superficial1 or solid1 ,geometry deliberately ignores their materiality2 and attends only to the truths of relation they present4 ,holding with ,prof4 ,bain1 as ,i do1 that our consciousness of ,space is disclosed by our experiences of ,matter--arguing1 as ,i have done in ,the ,principles of ,psychology1 that it is a consolidated aggregate of all relations of co-existence that have been severally presented by ,matter2 ,i nevertheless contend that it is possible to dissociate these relations from ,matter to the extent required for formulating them as abstract truths4 ,i contend1 too1 that this separation is of the kind habitually made in other cases2 as1 for instance1 when the general laws of motion are formulated 7as ,m4 ,comte's system1 among #ajg others1 formulates them7 in such way as to ignore all properties of the bodies dealt with save their powers of taking up1 and retaining1 and giving out1 quantities of motion2 though these powers are inconceivable apart from the attribute of extension1 which is intentionally disregarded4 ,taking other of ,prof4 ,bain's objections1 not in the order in which they stand but in the order in which they may be most conveniently dealt with1 ,i quote as follows3 8,the law of the radiation of light 7the inverse square of the distance7 is said by ,mr4 ,spencer to be ,abstract-,concrete1 while the disturbing changes in the medium are not to be mentioned except in a ,concrete ,science of ,optics4 ,we need not remark that such a separate handling is unknown to science40 ,it is perfectly true that 8such a separate handling is unknown to science40 ,but1 unfortunately for the objection1 it is also perfectly true that no such separate handling is proposed by me1 or is implied by my classification4 ,how ,prof4 ,bain can have so missed the meaning of the word 8concrete10 as ,i have used it1 ,i do not understand4 ,after pointing out that 8no one ever drew the line10 between the ,abstract-,concrete and the ,concrete ,sciences1 8as ,i have done it10 he alleges an anomaly which exists only supposing that ,i have drawn it where it is ordinarily drawn4 ,he appears inadvertently to have carried with him ,m4 ,comte's conception of ,optics as a ,concrete ,science1 and1 importing it into my classification1 debits me with the incongruity4 ,if he will re-read the definition of the ,abstract-,concrete ,sciences1 or study their sub-divisions as shown in ,table ,,ii41 he will1 ,i think1 see that the most special laws of the redistribution of light1 equally with its most general laws1 are included4 ,and if he will pass to the definition and the tabulation of the ,concrete ,sciences1 he will1 ,i think1 see no less clearly that ,optics cannot be included among them4 ,prof4 ,bain considers that ,i am not justified in classing ,chemistry as an ,abstract-,concrete ,science1 and excluding from it all consideration of the crude forms of the various #ajh substances dealt with2 and he enforces his dissent by saying that chemists habitually describe the ores and impure mixtures in which the elements1 etc41 are naturally found4 ,undoubtedly chemists do this4 ,but do they therefore intend to include an account of the ores of a substance1 as a part of the science which formulates its molecular constitution and the constitutions of all the definite compounds it enters into8 ,i shall be very much surprised if ,i find that they do4 ,chemists habitually prefix to their works a division treating of ,molecular ,physics2 but they do not therefore claim ,molecular ,physics as a part of ,chemistry4 ,if they similarly prefix to the chemistry of each substance an outline of its mineralogy1 ,i do not think they therefore mean to assert that the last belongs to the first4 ,chemistry proper1 embraces nothing beyond an account of the constitutions and modes of action and combining proportions of substances that are taken as absolutely pure2 and its truths no more recognize impure substances than the truths of ,geometry recognize crooked lines4 ,immediately after1 in criticizing the fundamental distinction ,i have made between ,chemistry and ,biology1 as ,abstract-,concrete and ,concrete respectively1 ,prof4 ,bain says3 8,but the objects of ,chemistry and the objects of ,biology are equally concrete1 so far as they go2 the simple bodies of chemistry1 and their several compounds1 are viewed by the ,chemist as concrete wholes1 and are described by him1 not with reference to one factor1 but to all their factors40 ,issue is here raised in a form convenient for elucidation of the general question4 ,it is true that1 for purposes of identification1 a chemist gives an account of all the sensible characters of a substance4 ,he sets down its crystalline form1 its specific gravity1 its power of refracting light1 its behaviour as magnetic or diamagnetic4 ,but does he thereby include these phenomena as part of the ,science of ,chemistry8 ,it seems to me that the relation between the weight #aji of any portion of matter and its bulk1 which is ascertained on measuring its specific gravity1 is a physical and not a chemical fact4 ,i think1 too1 that the physicist will claim1 as part of his science1 all investigations touching the refraction of light3 be the substance producing this refraction what it may4 ,and the circumstance that the chemist may test the magnetic or diamagnetic property of a body1 as a means of ascertaining what it is1 or as a means of helping other chemists to determine whether they have got before them the same body1 will neither be held by the chemist1 nor allowed by the physicist1 to imply a transfer of magnetic phenomena from the domain of the one to that of the other4 ,in brief1 though the chemist1 in his account of an element or a compound1 may refer to certain physical traits associated with its molecular constitution and affinities1 he does not by so doing change these into chemical traits4 ,whatever chemists may put into their books1 ,chemistry1 considered as a science1 includes only the phenomena of molecular structures and changes--of compositions and decompositions4#ab ,i contend1 then1 that ,chemistry does not give an account of anything as a concrete whole1 in the same way that ,biology gives an account of an organism as a concrete whole4 ,this will become even more manifest on observing the character of #aaj the biological account4 ,all the attributes of an organism are comprehended1 from the most general to the most special--from its conspicuous structural traits to its hidden and faint ones2 from its outer actions that thrust themselves on the attention1 to the minutest sub-divisions of its multitudinous internal functions2 from its character as a germ1 through the many changes of size1 form1 organization1 and habit1 it goes through until death2 from the physical characters of it as a whole1 to the physical characters of its microscopic cells1 and vessels1 and fibres2 from the chemical characters of its substance in general to the chemical characters of each tissue and each secretion--all these1 with many others4 ,and not only so1 but there is comprehended as the ideal goal of the science1 the consensus of all these phenomena in their co-existences and successions1 as constituting a coherent individualized group definitely combined in space and in time4 ,it is this recognition of individuality in its subject-matter1 that gives its concreteness to ,biology1 as to every other ,concrete ,science4 ,as ,astronomy deals with bodies that have their several proper names1 or 7as with the smaller stars7 are registered by their positions1 and considers each of them as a distinct individual--as ,geology1 while dimly perceiving in the ,moon and nearest planets other groups of geological phenomena 7which it would deal with as independent wholes1 did not distance forbid71 occupies itself with that individualized group presented by the ,earth2 so ,biology treats either of an individual distinguished from all others1 or of parts or products belonging to such an individual1 or of structural or functional traits common to many such individuals that have been observed1 and supposed to be common to others that are like them in most or all of their attributes4 ,every biological truth connotes a specifically individualized object1 or a number of specifically individualized objects of the same kind1 or numbers of different kinds that are severally specific4 ,see1 then1 the contrast4 #aaa ,the truths of the ,abstract-,concrete ,sciences do not imply specific individuality4 ,neither ,molar ,physics1 nor ,molecular ,physics1 nor ,chemistry1 concerns itself with this4 ,the laws of motion are expressed without any reference whatever to the sizes or shapes of the moving masses2 which may be taken indifferently to be suns or atoms4 ,the relations between contraction and the escape of molecular motion1 and between expansion and the absorption of molecular motion1 are expressed in their general forms without reference to the kind of matter2 and1 if the degree of either that occurs in a particular kind of matter is formulated1 no note is taken of the quantity of that matter1 much less of its individuality4 ,similarly with ,chemistry4 ,when it inquires into the atomic weight1 the molecular structure1 the atomicity1 the combining proportions1 etc41 of a substance1 it is indifferent whether a grain or a ton be thought of--the conception of amount is absolutely irrelevant4 ,and so with more special attributes4 ,sulphur1 considered chemically1 is not sulphur under its crystalline form1 or under its allotropic viscid form1 or as a liquid1 or as a gas2 but it is sulphur considered apart from those attributes of quantity1 and shape1 and state1 that give individuality4 ,prof4 ,bain objects to the division ,i have drawn between the ,concrete ,science of ,astronomy and that ,abstract-,concrete ,science which deals with the mutually-modified motions of hypothetical masses in space1 as 8not a little arbitrary40 ,he says3 8,we can suppose a science to confine itself solely to the #8factors1' or the separated elements1 and never1 on any occasion1 to combine two into a composite third4 ,this position is intelligible1 and possibly defensible4 ,for example1 in ,astronomy1 the ,law of ,persistence of ,motion in a straight line might be discussed in pure ideal separation2 and so1 the ,law of ,gravity might be discussed in equally pure separation--both under the ,abstract-,concrete department of ,mechanics4 ,it might then be reserved to a concrete department to unite these in the explanation of a projectile or of a planet4 ,such1 however1 is not ,mr4 ,spencer's boundary line4 ,he allows ,theoretical ,mechanics to make this particular combination1 and to arrive at the laws of #aab planetary movement1 in the case of a single planet4 ,what he does not allow is1 to proceed to the case of two planets1 mutually disturbing one another1 or a planet and a satellite1 commonly called the #8problem of the ,three ,bodies4'0 ,if ,i held what ,prof4 ,bain supposes me to hold1 my position would be an absurd one2 but he misapprehends me4 ,the misapprehension results in part from his having here1 as before1 used the word 8concrete0 with the ,comtean meaning1 as though it were my meaning2 and in part from the inadequacy of my explanation4 ,i did not in the least mean to imply that the ,abstract-,concrete ,science of ,mechanics1 when dealing with the motions of bodies in space1 is limited to the interpretation of planetary movement such as it would be did only a single planet exist4 ,it never occurred to me that my words might be so construed4 ,abstract-,concrete problems admit1 in fact1 of being complicated indefinitely1 without going in the least beyond the definition4 ,i do not draw the line1 as ,prof4 ,bain alleges1 between the combination of two factors and the combination of three1 or between the combination of any number and any greater number4 ,i draw the line between the science which deals with the theory of the factors1 taken singly and in combinations of two1 three1 four1 or more1 and the science which1 giving to these factors the values derived from observations of actual objects1 uses the theory to explain actual phenomena4 ,it is true that1 in these departments of science1 no radical distinction is consistently recognized between theory and the applications of theory4 ,as ,prof4 ,bain says3 8,newton1 in the ,first ,book of the ,principia1 took up the problem of the ,three ,bodies1 as applied to the ,moon1 and worked it to exhaustion4 ,so writers on ,theoretical ,mechanics continue to include the ,three ,bodies1 ,precession1 and the ,tides40 ,but1 supreme though the authority of ,newton may be as a mathematician and astronomer1 and weighty as are the names of ,laplace and ,herschel1 who in their works have similarly mingled theorems and the explanations yielded by them1 it does not seem to me that these facts go for much2 #aac unless it can be shown that these writers intended thus to enunciate the views at which they had arrived respecting the classification of the sciences4 ,such a union as that presented in their works1 adopted merely for the sake of convenience1 is1 in fact1 the indication of incomplete development2 and has been paralleled in simpler sciences which have afterwards outgrown it4 ,two conclusive illustrations are at hand4 ,the name ,geometry1 utterly inapplicable by its meaning to the science as it now exists1 was applicable in that first stage during which its few truths were taught in preparation for land-measuring and the setting-out of buildings2 but1 at a comparatively early date1 these comparatively simple truths became separated from their applications1 and were embodied by the ,greek geometers into systems of theory4#ac ,a like purification is now taking place in another division of the science4 ,in the ,gomtrie ,descriptive of ,monge1 theorems were mixed with their applications to projection and plan-drawing4 ,but1 since his time1 the science and the art have been segregating2 and ,descriptive ,geometry1 or1 as it may be better termed1 the ,geometry of ,position1 is now recognized by mathematicians as a far-reaching system of truths1 parts of which are already embodied in books that make no reference to derived methods available by the architect or the engineer4 ,to meet a counter-illustration that will be cited1 ,i may remark that though1 in works on ,algebra intended for beginners1 the theories of quantitative relations1 as treated algebraically1 are accompanied by groups of problems to be solved1 the subject-matters of these problems are not thereby made parts of the ,science of ,algebra4 ,to say that they are1 is to say that ,algebra includes the conceptions of distances and relative speeds and times1 or of weights and bulks and #aad specific gravities1 or of areas ploughed and days and wages2 since these1 and endless others1 may be the terms of its equations4 ,and just in the same way that these concrete problems1 solved by its aid1 cannot be incorporated with the ,abstract ,science of ,algebra2 so ,i contend that the concrete problems of ,astronomy1 cannot be incorporated with that division of ,abstract-,concrete ,science which develops the theory of the inter-actions of free bodies that attract one another4 ,on this point ,i find myself at issue1 not only with ,prof4 ,bain1 but also with ,mr4 ,mill1 who contends that3 8,there is an abstract science of astronomy1 namely1 the theory of gravitation1 which would equally agree with and explain the facts of a totally different solar system from the one of which our earth forms a part4 ,the actual facts of our own system1 the dimensions1 distances1 velocities1 temperatures1 physical constitution1 etc41 of the sun1 earth1 and planets1 are properly the subject of a concrete science1 similar to natural history2 but the concrete is more inseparably united to the abstract science than in any other case1 since the few celestial facts really accessible to us are nearly all required for discovering and proving the law of gravitation as an universal property of bodies1 and have therefore an indispensable place in the abstract science as its fundamental data40--,auguste ,comte and ,positivism1 p4 #dc4 ,in this explanation1 ,mr4 ,mill recognizes the fundamental distinction between the ,concrete ,science of ,astronomy1 dealing with the bodies actually distributed in space1 and a science dealing with hypothetical bodies hypothetically distributed in space4 ,nevertheless1 he regards these sciences as not separable2 because the second derives from the first the data whence the law of inter-action is derived4 ,but the truth of this premiss1 and the legitimacy of this inference1 may alike be questioned4 ,the discovery of the law of inter-action was not due primarily1 but only secondarily1 to observation of the heavenly bodies4 ,the conception of an inter-acting force that varies inversely as the square of the distance1 is an priori conception rationally deducible from mechanical and geometrical considerations4 ,though unlike in derivation to the many empirical hypotheses of ,kepler respecting planetary orbits and planetary motions1 yet it was #aae like the successful among these in its relation to astronomical phenomena3 it was one of many possible hypotheses1 which admitted of having their consequences worked out and tested2 and one which1 on having its implications compared with the results of observation1 was found to explain them4 ,in short1 the theory of gravitation grew out of experiences of terrestrial phenomena2 but the verification of it was reached through experiences of celestial phenomena4 ,passing now from premiss to inference1 ,i do not see that1 even were the alleged parentage substantiated1 it would necessitate the supposed inseparability2 any more than the descent of ,geometry from land-measuring necessitates a persistent union of the two4 ,in the case of ,algebra1 as above indicated1 the disclosed laws of quantitative relations hold throughout multitudinous orders of phenomena that are extremely heterogeneous2 and this makes conspicuous the distinction between the theory and its applications4 ,here the laws of quantitative relations among masses1 distances1 velocities1 and momenta1 being applied mainly 7though not exclusively7 to the concrete cases presented by ,astronomy1 the distinction between the theory and its applications is less conspicuous4 ,but1 intrinsically1 it is as great in the one case as in the other4 ,how great it is1 we shall see on taking an analogy4 ,this is a living man1 of whom we may know little more than that he is a visible1 tangible person2 or of whom we may know enough to form a voluminous biography4 ,again1 this book tells of a fictitious hero1 who1 like the heroes of old romance1 may be an impersonated virtue or vice1 or1 like a modern hero1 one of mixed nature1 whose various motives and consequent actions are elaborated into a semblance of reality4 ,but no accuracy and completeness of the picture makes this fictitious personage an actual personage1 or brings him any nearer to one4 ,nor does any meagreness in our knowledge of a real man reduce him any nearer to the imaginary being of a novel4 ,to the #aaf last1 the division between fiction and biography remains an impassable gulf4 ,so1 too1 remains the division between the ,science dealing with the inter-actions of hypothetical bodies in space1 and the ,science dealing with the inter-actions of existing bodies in space4 ,we may elaborate the first to any degree whatever by the introduction of three1 four1 or any greater number of factors under any number of assumed conditions1 until we symbolize a solar system2 but to the last an account of our symbolic solar system is as far from an account of the actual solar system as fiction is from biography4 ,even more obvious1 if it be possible1 does the radical character of this distinction become1 on observing that from the simplest proposition of ,general ,mechanics we may pass to the most complex proposition of ,celestial ,mechanics1 without a break4 ,we take a body moving at a uniform velocity1 and commence with the proposition that it will continue so to move for ever4 ,next1 we state the law of its accelerated motion in the same line1 when subject to a uniform force4 ,we further complicate the proposition by supposing the force to increase in consequence of approach towards an attracting body2 and we may formulate a series of laws of acceleration1 resulting from so many assumed laws of increasing attraction 7of which the law of gravitation is one74 ,another factor may now be added by supposing the body to have motion in a direction other than that of the attracting body2 and we may determine1 according to the ratios of the supposed forces1 whether its course will be hyperbolic1 parabolic1 elliptical1 or circular--we may begin with this hypothetical additional force as infinitesimal1 and formulate the varying results as it is little by little increased4 ,the problem is complicated a degree more by taking into account the effects of a third force1 acting in some other direction2 and beginning with an infinitesimal amount of this force we may reach any amount4 ,similarly1 by introducing factor after factor1 #aag each at first insensible in proportion to the rest1 we arrive1 through an infinity of gradations1 at a combination of any complexity4 ,thus1 then1 the ,science which deals with the inter-action of hypothetical bodies in space1 is absolutely continuous with ,general ,mechanics4 ,we have already seen that it is absolutely discontinuous with that account of the heavenly bodies which has been called ,astronomy from the beginning4 ,when these facts are recognized1 it seems to me that there cannot remain a doubt respecting its true place in a classification of the ,sciences4 ,,endnotes ,,to ,,the ,,classification ,,of ,,the ,,sciences4 #b ,i have been charged with misrepresenting ,kant and misunderstanding him1 because ,i have used the expression 8forms of ,thought0 instead of 8forms of ,intuition40 ,elsewhere ,i have shown that my argument against him remains equally valid when the phrase 8forms of ,intuition0 is used4 ,here ,i may in the first place add that ,i did but follow some ,kantists in saying 8forms of ,thought10 and ,i may add in the second place that the objection is superficial and quite irrelevant to the issue4 ,thought when broadly used as antithetical to ,things includes ,intuition3 it comprehends in this sense all that is subjective as distinguished from all that is objective1 and in so doing comprehends ,intuition4 ,nor is this all4 ,there cannot be ,intuition without ,thought3 every act of intuition implies an act of classing without which the thing intuited is not known as such or such2 and every act of classing is an act of thought4 #c ,some propositions laid down by ,m4 ,littr1 in his book--,auguste ,comte et la ,philosophie ,positive 7published in #ahfc71 may fitly be dealt with here4 ,in the candid and courteous reply he makes to my strictures on the ,comtean classification in 8,the ,genesis of ,science10 he endeavours to clear up some of the inconsistencies ,i pointed out2 and he does this by drawing a distinction between objective generality and subjective generality4 ,he says--8qu'il existe deux ordres de gnralit1 l'une objective et dans les choses1 l'autre subjective1 abstraite et dans l'esprit40 ,this sentence1 in which ,m4 ,littr makes subjective generality synonymous with abstractness1 led me at first to conclude that he had in view the same distinction as that which ,i have above explained between generality and abstractness4 ,on re-reading the paragraph1 however1 ,i found this was not the case4 ,in a previous sentence he says--8,la biologie a pass de la considration des organes celles des tissus1 plus gnraux que les organes1 et de la considration des tissus celle des lments anatomiques1 plus gnraux que les tissus4 ,mais cette gnralit croissante est subjective non objective1 abstraite non concrte40 ,here it is manifest that abstract and concrete1 are used in senses analogous to those in which they are used by ,m4 ,comte2 who1 as we have seen1 regards general physiology as abstract and zoology and botany as concrete4 ,and it is further manifest that the word abstract1 as thus used1 is not used in its proper sense4 ,for1 as above shown1 no such facts as those of anatomical structure can be abstract facts2 but can only be more or less general facts4 ,nor do ,i understand ,m4 ,littr's point of view when he regards these more general facts of anatomical structure1 as subjectively general and not objectively general4 ,the structural phenomena presented by any tissue1 such as mucous membrane1 are more general than the phenomena presented by any of the organs which mucous membrane goes to form1 simply in the sense that the phenomena peculiar to the membrane are repeated in a greater number of instances than the phenomena peculiar to any organ into the composition of which the membrane enters4 ,and1 similarly1 such facts as have been established respecting the anatomical elements of tissues1 are more general than the facts established respecting any particular tissue1 in the sense that they are facts which the various parts of organized bodies exhibit in a greater number of cases--they are objectively more general2 and they can be called subjectively more general only in the sense that the conception corresponds with the phenomena4 ,let me endeavour to clear up this point3--,there is1 as ,m4 ,littr truly says1 a decreasing generality that is objective4 ,if we omit the phenomena of ,dissolution1 which are changes from the special to the general1 all changes which matter undergoes are from the general to the special--are changes involving a decreasing generality in the united groups of attributes4 ,this is the progress of things4 ,the progress of thought1 is not only in the same direction1 but also in the opposite direction4 ,the investigation of ,nature discloses an increasing number of specialities2 but it simultaneously discloses more and more the generalities within which these specialities fall4 ,take a case4 ,zoology1 while it goes on multiplying the number of its species1 and getting a more complete knowledge of each species 7decreasing generality72 also goes on discovering the common characters by which species are united into larger groups 7increasing generality74 ,both these are subjective processes2 and in this case1 both orders of truth reached are concrete--formulate the phenomena as actually manifested4 ,the truth that mammals of all kinds have seven cervical vertebr 7,i believe there is one exception7 is a generalization--a general relation in thought answering to a general relation in things4 ,as the existence of seven cervical vertebr in each mammal is a concrete fact1 the statement of it is a concrete truth1 and the statement colligating such truths is not made other than concrete by holding of case after case4 ,m4 ,littr1 recognizing the necessity for some modification of the hierarchy of the ,sciences1 as enunciated by ,m4 ,comte1 still regards it as substantially true2 and for proof of its validity1 he appeals mainly to the essential constitutions of the ,sciences4 ,it is unnecessary for me here to meet1 in detail1 the arguments by which he supports the proposition1 that the essential constitutions of the ,sciences1 justify the order in which ,m4 ,comte places them4 ,it will suffice to refer to the foregoing pages1 and to the pages which are to follow1 as containing the definitions of those fundamental characteristics which demand the grouping of the ,sciences in the way ,i have pointed out4 ,as already shown1 and as will be shown still more clearly by and bye1 the radical differences of constitution among the ,sciences1 necessitate the colligation of them into the three classes--,abstract1 ,abstract-,concrete1 and ,concrete4 ,how irreconcilable is ,m4 ,comte's classification with these groups1 will be at once apparent on inspection4 ,it stands thus3 ,mathematics 7including rational ,mechanics71 partly ,abstract1 partly ,abstract-,concrete4 ,astronomy ,concrete4 ,physics ,abstract-,concrete4 ,chemistry ,abstract-,concrete4 ,biology ,concrete4 ,sociology ,concrete4 #d ,this definition includes the laws of relations called necessary1 but not those of relations called contingent4 ,these last1 in which the probability of an inferred connexion varies with the number of times such connexion has occurred in experience1 are rightly dealt with mathematically4 #e ,here1 by way of explanation of the term negatively-quantitative1 it will suffice to instance the proposition that certain three lines will meet in a point1 as a negatively-quantitative proposition2 since it asserts the absence of any quantity of space between their intersections4 ,similarly1 the assertion that certain three points will always fall in a straight line1 is negatively-quantitative2 since the conception of a straight line implies the negation of any lateral quantity1 or deviation4 #f ,lest the meaning of this division should not be understood1 it may be well to name1 in illustration1 the estimates of the statistician4 ,calculations respecting population1 crime1 disease1 etc41 have results which are correct only numerically1 and not in respect of the totalities of being or action represented by the numbers4 #g ,perhaps it will be asked--how can there be a ,geometry of ,motion into which the conception of ,force does not enter8 ,the reply is1 that the time-relations and space-relations of ,motion may be considered apart from those of ,force1 in the same way that the space-relations of ,matter may be considered apart from ,matter4 #h ,i am indebted to ,prof4 ,frankland for reminding me of an objection that may be made to this statement4 ,the production of new compounds by synthesis1 has of late become an important branch of chemistry4 ,according to certain known laws of composition1 complex substances1 which never before existed1 are formed1 and fulfil anticipations both as to their general properties and as to the proportions of their constituents--as proved by analysis4 ,here it may be said with truth1 that analysis is used to verify synthesis4 ,nevertheless1 the exception to the above statement is apparent only1--not real4 ,in so far as the production of new compounds is carried on merely for the obtainment of such new compounds1 it is not ,science but ,art--the application of pre-established knowledge to the achievement of ends4 ,the proceeding is a part of ,science1 only in so far as it is a means to the better interpretation of the order of ,nature4 ,and how does it aid the interpretation8 ,it does it only by verifying the pre-established conclusions respecting the laws of molecular combination2 or by serving further to explain them4 ,that is to say1 these syntheses1 considered on their scientific side1 have simply the purpose of forwarding the analysis of the laws of chemical combination4 #i ,this must not be supposed to mean chemically-produced forces4 ,the molecular motion here referred to as dissipated in radiations1 is the equivalent of that sensible motion lost during the integration of the mass of molecules1 consequent on their mutual gravitation4 #aj ,embracing the interpretation of such phenomena as the solar spots1 the facul and the coronal flames4 #aa ,want of space prevents anything beyond the briefest indication of these subdivisions4 #ab ,perhaps some will say that such incidental phenomena as those of the heat and light evolved during chemical changes1 are to be included among chemical phenomena4 ,i think1 however1 the physicist will hold that all phenomena of re-distributed molecular motion1 no matter how arising1 come within the range of ,physics4 ,but whatever difficulty there may be in drawing the line between ,physics and ,chemistry 7and1 as ,i have incidentally pointed out in ,the ,principles of ,psychology1 #ee1 the two are closely linked by the phenomena of allotropy and isomerism71 applies equally to the ,comtean classification1 or to any other4 ,and ,i may further point out that no obstacle hence arises to the classification ,i am defending4 ,physics and ,chemistry being both grouped by me as ,abstract-,concrete ,sciences1 no difficulty in satisfactorily dividing them in the least affects the satisfactoriness of the division of the great group to which they both belong1 from the other two great groups4 #ac ,it may be said that the mingling of problems and theorems in ,euclid is not quite consistent with this statement2 and it is true that we have1 in this mingling1 a trace of the earlier form of the science4 ,but it is to be remarked that these problems are all purely abstract1 and1 further1 that each of them admits of being expressed as a theorem4 #aah ,,reasons ,,for ,,dissenting ,,from ,,the ,,philosophy ,,of ,m4 ,,comte4 ,originally published in ,april #ahfd as an appendix to the foregoing essay4 ,while the preceding pages were passing through the press1 there appeared in the ,revue des ,deux ,mondes for ,february #aeth1 #ahfd1 an article on a late work of mine--,first ,principles4 ,to ,m4 ,auguste ,laugel1 the writer of the article1 ,i am much indebted for the careful exposition he has made of some of the leading views set forth in that work2 and for the catholic and sympathetic spirit in which he has dealt with them4 ,in one respect1 however1 ,m4 ,laugel conveys to his readers an erroneous impression--an impression doubtless derived from what appears to him adequate evidence1 and doubtless expressed in perfect sincerity4 ,m4 ,laugel describes me as being1 in part1 a follower of ,m4 ,comte4 ,after describing the influence of ,m4 ,comte as traceable in the works of some other ,english writers1 naming especially ,mr4 ,mill and ,mr4 ,buckle1 he goes on to say that this influence1 though not avowed1 is easily recognizable in the work he is about to make known2 and in several places throughout his review1 there are remarks having the same implication4 ,i greatly regret having to take exception to anything said by a critic so candid and so able4 ,but the ,revue des ,deux ,mondes #aai circulates widely in ,england1 as well as elsewhere2 and finding that there exists in some minds1 both here and in ,america1 an impression similar to that entertained by ,m4 ,laugel--an impression likely to be confirmed by his statement--it appears to me needful to meet it4 ,two causes of quite different kinds1 have conspired to diffuse the erroneous belief that ,m4 ,comte is an accepted exponent of scientific opinion4 ,his bitterest foes and his closest friends1 have unconsciously joined in propagating it4 ,on the one hand1 ,m4 ,comte having designated by the term 8,positive ,philosophy0 all that definitely-established knowledge which men of science have been gradually organizing into a coherent body of doctrine2 and having habitually placed this in opposition to the incoherent body of doctrine defended by theologians2 it has become the habit of the theological party to think of the antagonist scientific party1 under the title of 8positivists40 ,and thus1 from the habit of calling them 8positivists10 there has grown up the assumption that they call themselves 8positivists10 and that they are disciples of ,m4 ,comte4 ,on the other hand1 those who have accepted ,m4 ,comte's system1 and believe it to be the philosophy of the future1 have naturally been prone to see everywhere the signs of its progress2 and wherever they have found opinions in harmony with it1 have ascribed these opinions to the influence of its originator4 ,it is always the tendency of discipleship to magnify the effects of the master's teachings2 and to credit the master with all the doctrines he teaches4 ,in the minds of his followers1 ,m4 ,comte's name is associated with scientific thinking1 which1 in many cases1 they first understood from his exposition of it4 ,influenced as they inevitably are by this association of ideas1 they are reminded of ,m4 ,comte wherever they meet with thinking which corresponds1 in some marked way1 to ,m4 ,comte's description of scientific thinking2 and hence are apt to imagine him as introducing into other minds1 the #abj conceptions which he introduced into their minds4 ,such impressions are1 however1 in most cases quite unwarranted4 ,that ,m4 ,comte has given a general exposition of the doctrine and method elaborated by ,science1 is true4 ,but it is not true that the holders of this doctrine and followers of this method1 are disciples of ,m4 ,comte4 ,neither their modes of inquiry nor their views concerning human knowledge in its nature and limits1 are appreciably different from what they were before4 ,if they are 8positivists10 it is in the sense that all men of science have been more or less consistently 8positivists20 and the applicability of ,m4 ,comte's title to them1 no more makes them his disciples1 than does its applicability to men of science who lived and died before ,m4 ,comte wrote1 make these his disciples4 ,m4 ,comte himself by no means claims that which some of his adherents are apt1 by implication1 to claim for him4 ,he says3--8,il y a1 sans doute1 beaucoup d'analogie entre ma philosophie positive et ce que les savans anglais entendent1 depuis ,newton surtout1 par philosophie naturelle20 7see ,avertissement7 and further on he indicates the 8grand mouvement imprim l'esprit humain1 il y a deux sicles1 par l'action combine des prceptes de ,bacon1 des conceptions de ,descartes1 et des dcouvertes de ,galile1 comme le moment o l'esprit de la philosophie positive a commenc se prononcer dans le monde40 ,that is to say1 the general mode of thought and way of interpreting phenomena1 which ,m4 ,comte calls 8,positive ,philosophy10 he recognizes as having been growing for two centuries2 as having reached1 when he wrote1 a marked development2 and as being the heritage of all men of science4 ,that which ,m4 ,comte proposed to do1 was to give scientific thought and method a more definite embodiment and organization2 and to apply it to the interpretation of classes of phenomena not previously dealt with in a scientific manner4 ,the conception was a great one2 and the endeavour to work it out was worthy of sympathy and #aba applause4 ,some such conception was entertained by ,bacon4 ,he1 too1 aimed at the organization of the sciences2 he1 too1 held that 8,physics is the mother of all the sciences20 he1 too1 held that the sciences can be advanced only by combining them1 and saw the nature of the required combination2 he1 too1 held that moral and civil philosophy could not flourish when separated from their roots in natural philosophy2 and thus he1 too1 had some idea of a social science growing out of physical science4 ,but the state of knowledge in his day prevented any advance beyond the general conception3 indeed1 it was marvellous that he should have advanced so far4 ,instead of a vague1 undefined conception1 ,m4 ,comte has presented the world with a defined and highly-elaborated conception4 ,in working out this conception he has shown remarkable breadth of view1 great originality1 immense fertility of thought1 unusual powers of generalization4 ,considered apart from the question of its truth1 his system of ,positive ,philosophy is a vast achievement4 ,but after according to ,m4 ,comte high admiration for his conception1 for his effort to realize it1 and for the faculty he has shown in the effort to realize it1 there remains the inquiry--,has he succeeded8 ,a thinker who re-organizes the scientific method and knowledge of his age1 and whose re-organization is accepted by his successors1 may rightly be said to have such successors for his disciples4 ,but successors who accept this method and knowledge of his age1 minus his re-organization1 are certainly not his disciples4 ,how then stands the case with ,m4 ,comte8 ,there are some few who receive his doctrines with but little reservation2 and these are his disciples truly so called4 ,there are others who regard with approval certain of his leading doctrines1 but not the rest3 these we may distinguish as partial adherents4 ,there are others who reject all his distinctive doctrines2 and these must be classed as his antagonists4 ,the members of this class stand substantially in the same position as they would #abb have done had he not written4 ,declining his re-organization of scientific doctrine1 they possess this scientific doctrine in its pre-existing state1 as the common heritage bequeathed by the past to the present2 and their adhesion to this scientific doctrine in no sense implicates them with ,m4 ,comte4 ,in this class stand the great body of men of science4 ,and in this class ,i stand myself4 99 99 99 99 99 ,coming thus to the personal part of the question1 let me first specify those great general principles on which ,m4 ,comte is at one with preceding thinkers2 and on which ,i am at one with ,m4 ,comte4 ,all knowledge is from experience1 holds ,m4 ,comte2 and this ,i also hold--hold it1 indeed1 in a wider sense than ,m4 ,comte2 since1 not only do ,i believe that all the ideas acquired by individuals1 and consequently all the ideas transmitted by past generations1 are thus derived2 but ,i also contend that the very faculties by which they are acquired1 are the products of accumulated and organized experiences received by ancestral races of beings 7see ,principles of ,psychology74 ,but the doctrine that all knowledge is from experience1 is not originated by ,m4 ,comte2 nor is it claimed by him4 ,he himself says--8,tous les bons esprits rptent1 depuis ,bacon1 qu'il n'y a de connaissances relles que celles qui reposent sur des faits observs40 ,and the elaboration and definite establishment of this doctrine1 has been the special characteristic of the ,english school of ,psychology4 ,nor am ,i aware that ,m4 ,comte1 accepting this doctrine1 has done anything to make it more certain1 or give it greater definiteness4 ,indeed it was impossible for him to do so2 since he repudiates that part of mental science by which alone this doctrine can be proved4 ,it is a further belief of ,m4 ,comte1 that all knowledge is phenomenal or relative2 and in this belief ,i entirely agree4 ,but no one alleges that the relativity of all knowledge was first enunciated by ,m4 ,comte4 ,among others who have #abc more or less consistently held this truth1 ,sir ,william ,hamilton enumerates1 ,protagoras1 ,aristotle1 ,st4 ,augustin1 ,boethius1 ,averroes1 ,albertus ,magnus1 ,gerson1 ,leo ,hebrus1 ,melancthon1 ,scaliger1 ,francis ,piccolomini1 ,giordano ,bruno1 ,campanella1 ,bacon1 ,spinoza1 ,newton1 ,kant4 ,and ,sir ,william ,hamilton1 in his 8,philosophy of the ,unconditioned10 first published in #ahbi1 has given a scientific demonstration of this belief4 ,receiving it in common with other thinkers1 from preceding thinkers1 ,m4 ,comte has not1 to my knowledge1 advanced this belief4 ,nor indeed could he advance it1 for the reason already given--he denies the possibility of that analysis of thought which discloses the relativity of all cognition4 ,m4 ,comte reprobates the interpretation of different classes of phenomena by assigning metaphysical entities as their causes2 and ,i coincide in the opinion that the assumption of such separate entities1 though convenient1 if not indeed necessary1 for purposes of thought1 is1 scientifically considered1 illegitimate4 ,this opinion is1 in fact1 a corollary from the last2 and must stand or fall with it4 ,but like the last it has been held with more or less consistency for generations4 ,m4 ,comte himself quotes ,newton's favorite saying--8,o6 ,physics1 beware of ,metaphysics60 ,neither to this doctrine1 any more than to the preceding doctrines1 has ,m4 ,comte given a firmer basis4 ,he has simply reasserted it2 and it was out of the question for him to do more4 ,in this case1 as in the others1 his denial of subjective psychology debarred him from proving that these metaphysical entities are mere symbolic conceptions which do not admit of verification4 ,lastly1 ,m4 ,comte believes in invariable natural laws--absolute uniformities of relation among phenomena4 ,but very many before him have believed in them too4 ,long familiar even beyond the bounds of the scientific world1 the proposition that there is an unchanging order in things1 has1 within the scientific world1 held1 for generations1 the #abd position of an established postulate3 by some men of science recognized only as holding of inorganic phenomena2 but recognized by other men of science1 as universal4 ,and ,m4 ,comte1 accepting this doctrine from the past1 has left it substantially as it was4 ,though he has asserted new uniformities1 ,i do not think scientific men will admit that he has so demonstrated them1 as to make the induction more certain2 nor has he deductively established the doctrine1 by showing that uniformity of relation is a necessary corollary from the persistence of force1 as may readily be shown4 ,these1 then1 are the pre-established general truths with which ,m4 ,comte sets out--truths which cannot be regarded as distinctive of his philosophy4 8,but why10 it will perhaps be asked1 8is it needful to point out this2 seeing that no instructed reader supposes these truths to be peculiar to ,m4 ,comte80 ,i reply that though no disciple of ,m4 ,comte would deliberately claim them for him2 and though no theological antagonist at all familiar with science and philosophy1 supposes ,m4 ,comte to be the first propounder of them2 yet there is so strong a tendency to associate any doctrines with the name of a conspicuous recent exponent of them1 that false impressions are produced1 even in spite of better knowledge4 ,of the need for making this reclamation1 definite proof is at hand4 ,in the ,no4 of the ,revue des ,deux ,mondes named at the commencement1 may be found1 on p4 #icf1 the words--8,toute religion1 comme toute philosophie1 a la prtention de donner une explication de l'univers4 ,la philosophie qui s'appelle positive se distingue de toutes les philosophies et de toutes les religions en ce qu'elle a renonc cette ambition de l'esprit humain20 and the remainder of the paragraph is devoted to explaining the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge4 ,the next paragraph begins--8,tout imbu de ces ides1 que nous exposons sans les discuter pour le moment1 ,m4 ,spencer divise1 etc40 ,now this is one of those collocations of ideas #abe which tends to create1 or to strengthen1 the erroneous impression ,i would dissipate4 ,i do not for a moment suppose that ,m4 ,laugel intended to say that these ideas which he describes as ideas of the 8,positive ,philosophy10 are peculiarly the ideas of ,m4 ,comte4 ,but little as he probably intended it1 his expressions suggest this conception4 ,in the minds of both disciples and antagonists1 8the ,positive ,philosophy0 means the philosophy of ,m4 ,comte2 and to be imbued with the ideas of 8the ,positive ,philosophy0 means to be imbued with the ideas of ,m4 ,comte--to have received these ideas from ,m4 ,comte4 ,after what has been said above1 ,i need scarcely repeat that the conception thus inadvertently suggested1 is a wrong one4 ,m4 ,comte's brief enunciations of these general truths1 gave me no clearer apprehensions of them than ,i had before4 ,such clarifications of ideas on these ultimate questions1 as ,i can trace to any particular teacher1 ,i owe to ,sir ,william ,hamilton4 99 99 99 99 99 ,from the principles which ,m4 ,comte held in common with many preceding and contemporary thinkers1 let us pass now to the principles that are distinctive of his system4 ,just as entirely as ,i agree with ,m4 ,comte on those cardinal doctrines which we jointly inherit2 so entirely do ,i disagree with him on those cardinal doctrines which he propounds1 and which determine the organization of his philosophy4 ,the best way of showing this will be to compare1 side by side1 the ,propositions held by ,m4 ,comte4 ,propositions which ,i hold4 84 4 4 chacune de nos conceptions ,the progress of our conceptions1 principales1 chaque branche and of each branch of knowledge1 de nos connaissances1 passe is from beginning to end successivement par trois tats intrinsically alike4 ,there are not thoriques diffrens3 l'tat three methods of philosophizing thologique1 ou fictif2 l'tat radically opposed2 but one method mtaphysique1 ou abstrait2 of philosophizing which remains1 l'tat scientifique1 ou positif4 in essence1 the same4 ,at first1 ,en d'autres termes1 l'esprit and to the last1 the conceived humain1 par sa nature1 emploie causal agencies of phenomena1 successivement dans chacune de have a degree of generality ses recherches trois mthodes de corresponding #abf to the width philosopher1 dont le caractre of the generalizations which est essentiellement diffrent et experiences have determined2 and mme radicalement oppos3 d'abord they change just as gradually la mthode thologique1 ensuite as experiences accumulate4 ,the la mthode mtaphysique1 et enfin integration of causal agencies1 la mthode positive40 ,cours de originally thought of as ,philosophie ,positive1 #ahcj1 ,vol4 multitudinous and local1 but i4 p4 #c4 finally believed to be one and universal1 is a process which involves the passing through all intermediate steps between these extremes2 and any appearance of stages can be but superficial4 ,supposed concrete and individual causal agencies1 coalesce in the mind as fast as groups of phenomena are assimilated1 or seen to be similarly caused4 ,along with their coalescence1 comes a greater extension of their individualities1 and a concomitant loss of distinctness in their individualities4 ,gradually1 by continuance of such coalescences1 causal agencies become1 in thought1 diffused and indefinite4 ,and eventually1 without any change in the nature of the process1 there is reached the consciousness of a universal causal agency1 which cannot be conceived4#ad 8,le systme thologique est ,as the progress of thought is parvenu la plus haute perfection one1 so is the end one4 ,there dont il soit susceptible1 are not three possible terminal quand il a substitu l'action conceptions2 but only a single providentielle d'un tre unique au terminal conception4 ,when jeu vari des nombreuses divinits the theological idea of the indpendantes qui avaient t providential action of one being1 imagines primitivement4 ,de mme1 is developed to its ultimate le dernier terme du systme form1 by the absorption of all metaphysique consiste concevoir1 independent secondary agencies1 au lieu des diffrentes entits it becomes the conception of a particulires1 une seule grande being immanent in all phenomena2 entit gnrale1 la nature1 and the reduction of it to envisage comme la source this #abg state1 implies the unique de tous les phnomnes4 fading-away1 in thought1 of all ,pareillement1 la perfection du those anthropomorphic attributes systme positif1 vers laquelle by which the aboriginal idea il tend sans cesse1 quoiqu'il was distinguished4 ,the alleged soit trs-probable qu'il ne doive last term of the metaphysical jamais l'atteindre1 serait de system--the conception of a pouvoir se reprsenter tous les single great general entity1 divers phnomnes observables nature1 as the source of all comme des cas particuliers d'un phenomena--is a conception seul fait gnral1 tel que celui identical with the previous one3 de la gravitation1 par exemple40 the consciousness of a single p4 #e4 source which1 in coming to be regarded as universal1 ceases to be regarded as conceivable1 differs in nothing but name from the consciousness of one being1 manifested in all phenomena4 ,and similarly1 that which is described as the ideal state of science--the power to represent all observable phenomena as particular cases of a single general fact1 implies the postulating of some ultimate existence of which this single fact is alleged2 and the postulating of this ultimate existence1 involves a state of consciousness indistinguishable from the other two4 84 4 4 la perfection du systme ,though along with the extension positif1 vers laquelle il tend of generalizations1 and sans cesse1 quoiqu'il soit concomitant integration of trs-probable1 qu'il ne doive conceived causal agencies1 the jamais l'atteindre1 serait de conceptions of causal agencies pouvoir se reprsenter tous les grow more indefinite2 and though divers phnomnes observables as they gradually coalesce into comme des cas particuliers d'un a universal causal agency1 seul fait general1 p4 #e4 4 4 4 4 4 they cease to be representable considrant comme absolument in thought1 and are no longer inaccessible1 et vide de sens supposed to be comprehensible2 pour nous la recherche de ce yet the consciousness of cause qu'on appelle les causes1 soit remains as dominant to the last premires1 soit finales40 p4 #ad4 as it was at first2 and can never be got rid of4 ,the consciousness of cause can be abolished only by abolishing consciousness itself4#ae 7,first ,principles1 #bf47 #abh 8,ce n'est pas aux lecteurs de cet ,ideas do not govern and ouvrage que je croirai jamais overthrow the world3 the world devoir prouver que les ides is governed or overthrown by gouvernent et bouleversent le feelings1 to which ideas serve monde1 ou1 en d'autres termes1 que only as guides4 ,the social tout le mcanisme social repose mechanism does not rest finally finalement sur des opinions4 ,ils on opinions2 but almost wholly savent surtout que la grande on character4 ,not intellectual crise politique et morale des anarchy1 but moral antagonism1 is socits actuelles tient1 en the cause of political crises4 dernire analyse1 l'anarchie ,all social phenomena are produced intellectuelle40 p4 #dh4af by the totality of human emotions and beliefs2 of which the emotions are mainly pre-determined1 while the beliefs are mainly post-determined4 ,men's desires are chiefly inherited2 but their beliefs are chiefly acquired1 and depend on surrounding conditions2 and the most important surrounding conditions depend on the social state which the prevalent desires have produced4 ,the social state at any time existing1 is the resultant of all the ambitions1 self-interests1 fears1 reverences1 indignations1 sympathies1 etc41 of ancestral citizens and existing citizens4 ,the ideas current in this social state1 must1 on the average1 be congruous with the feelings of citizens2 and therefore1 on the average1 with the social state these feelings have produced4 ,ideas wholly foreign to this social state #abi cannot be evolved1 and if introduced from without1 cannot get accepted--or1 if accepted1 die out when the temporary phase of feeling which caused their acceptance1 ends4 ,hence1 though advanced ideas when once established1 act on society and aid its further advance2 yet the establishment of such ideas depends on the fitness of the society for receiving them4 ,practically1 the popular character and the social state1 determine what ideas shall be current2 instead of the current ideas determining the social state and the character4 ,the modification of men's moral natures1 caused by the continuous discipline of social life1 which adapts them more and more to social relations1 is therefore the chief proximate cause of social progress4 7,social ,statics1 chap4 xxx47 84 4 4 je ne dois pas ngliger ,the order in which the d'indiquer d'avance1 comme une generalizations of science are proprit essentielle de l'chelle established1 is determined by encyclopdique que je vais the frequency and impressiveness proposer1 sa conformit gnrale with which different classes avec l'ensemble de l'histoire of relations are repeated in scientifique2 en ce sens1 que1 conscious experience2 and this malgr la simultanit relle et depends1 partly on the directness continue du dveloppement des with which personal welfare diffrentes sciences1 celles qui is affected2 partly on the seront classes comme antrieures conspicuousness of one or both the seront1 en effet1 plus anciennes phenomena between which a relation et constamment plus avances is to be perceived2 partly on que celles prsentes comme the absolute frequency with which postrieures40 p4 #hd4 4 4 the relations occur2 partly on 4 4 4 4 4 4 8,cet ordre est their relative frequency of dtermin par le degr de occurrence2 partly on their simplicit1 ou1 ce qui revient au degree of simplicity2 and partly mme1 par le degr de gnralit on their degree of abstractness4 des phnomnes40 p4 #hg4 7,first ,principles1 #ast ed41 #cf2 or otherwise see 8,essay on ,laws in ,general and the ,order of their ,discovery407 8,en rsultat dfinitif1 la ,the sciences as arranged in this mathmatique1 l'astronomie1 succession specified by ,m4 ,comte1 la physique1 la chimie1 la do not logically conform to the physiologie1 et la physique natural and invariable hierarchy sociale2 telle est la formule of phenomena2 and #acj there encyclopdique qui1 parmi is no serial order whatever in le trs-grand nombre de which they can be placed1 which classifications que comportent les represents either their logical six sciences fondamentales1 est dependence or the dependence seule logiquement conforme la of phenomena4 7,see ,genesis of hirarchie naturelle et invariable ,science1 and foregoing ,essay47 des phnomnes40#ag p4 #aae4 8,on conoit1 en effet1 que l'tude ,the historical development of rationelle de chaque science the sciences has not taken fondamentale exigeant la culture place in this serial order2 nor pralable de toutes celles qui la in any other serial order4 ,there prcdent dans notre hirarchie is no 8true filiation of the encyclopdique1 n'a pu faire de sciences40 ,from the beginning1 progrs rels et prendre son the abstract sciences1 the vritable caractre1 qu' aprs un abstract-concrete sciences1 and grand dveloppement des sciences the concrete sciences1 have antrieures relatives des progressed together3 the first phnomnes plus gnraux1 plus solving problems which the second abstraits1 moins compliqus1 et and third presented1 and growing indpendans des autres4 ,c'est done only by the solution of the dans cet ordre que la progression1 problems2 and the second similarly quoique simultane1 a d avoir growing by joining the first lieu40 p4 #ajj4 in solving the problems of the third4 ,all along there has been a continuous action and reaction between the three great classes of sciences--an advance from concrete facts to abstract facts1 and then an application of such abstract facts to the analysis of new orders of concrete facts4 7,see ,genesis of ,science47 ,such then are the organizing principles of ,m4 ,comte's philosophy and my reasons for rejecting them4 ,leaving out of his 8,exposition0 those pre-established general #aca doctrines which are the common property of modern thinkers2 these are the general doctrines which remain--these are the doctrines which fundamentally distinguish his system4 ,from every one of them ,i dissent4 ,to each proposition ,i oppose either a widely-different proposition1 or a direct negation2 and ,i not only do it now1 but have done it from the time when ,i became acquainted with his writings4 ,the rejection of his cardinal principles should1 ,i think1 alone suffice2 but there are sundry other views of his1 some of them largely characterizing his system1 which ,i equally reject4 ,let us glance at them4 ,how organic beings have ,this inquiry1 ,i believe1 admits originated1 is an inquiry which of answer1 and will be answered4 ,m4 ,comte deprecates as a useless ,that division of ,biology which speculation3 asserting1 as he concerns itself with the origin of does1 that species are immutable4 species1 ,i hold to be the supreme division1 to which all others are subsidiary4 ,for on the verdict of ,biology on this matter1 must wholly depend our conception of human nature1 past1 present1 and future2 our theory of the mind2 and our theory of society4 ,m4 ,comte contends that of what is ,i have very emphatically expressed commonly known as mental science1 my belief in a subjective science all that most important part of the mind1 by writing a which consists of the subjective ,principles of ,psychology1 one analysis of our ideas1 is an half of which is subjective4 impossibility4 ,m4 ,comte's ideal of society ,that form of society towards which is one in which government we is are progressing1 ,i hold developed to the greatest to be one in which government extent--in which class-functions will be reduced to the smallest are far more under conscious amount possible1 and freedom public regulation than now--in increased to the greatest amount which hierarchical organization possible--one in which human with unquestioned authority nature will have become so moulded shall guide everything--in which by social discipline into fitness the individual life shall be for the social state1 that it will subordinated in the greatest need little external restraint1 degree to the social life4 but will be self-restrained--one in which the citizen will tolerate no interference with his freedom1 save that which maintains the equal freedom of others--one in which the spontaneous #acb co-operation which has developed our industrial system1 and is now developing it with increasing rapidity1 will produce agencies for the discharge of nearly all social functions1 and will leave to the primary governmental agency nothing beyond the function of maintaining those conditions to free action1 which make such spontaneous co-operation possible--one in which individual life will thus be pushed to the greatest extent consistent with social life2 and in which social life will have no other end than to maintain the completest sphere for individual life4 ,m4 ,comte1 not including in his ,i conceive1 on the other hand1 philosophy the consciousness of that the object of religious a cause manifested to us in all sentiment will ever continue phenomena1 and yet holding that to be1 that which it has ever there must be a religion1 which been--the unknown source of must have an object1 takes for his things4 ,while the forms under object--,humanity4 8,this ,collective which men are conscious of the ,life 7of ,society7 is in ,comte's unknown source of things1 may system the tre ,suprme2 the fade away1 the substance of only one we can know therefore the consciousness is permanent4 the only one we can worship40 ,beginning with causal agents conceived as imperfectly known2 progressing to causal agents conceived as less known and less knowable2 and coming at last to a universal causal agent posited as not to be known at all2 the religious sentiment must ever continue to occupy itself with this universal causal agent4 ,having in the course of evolution come to have for its object of contemplation the ,infinite ,unknowable1 the religious sentiment can never again 7unless by retrogression7 take a ,finite ,knowable1 like ,humanity1 for its object of contemplation4 ,here1 then1 are sundry other points1 all of them important1 and the last two supremely important1 on which ,i am diametrically opposed to ,m4 ,comte2 and did space permit1 ,i could add many others4 ,radically differing from him as ,i thus do1 in everything distinctive of his philosophy2 and having invariably expressed my dissent1 #acc publicly and privately1 from the time ,i became acquainted with his writings2 it may be imagined that ,i have been not a little startled to find myself classed as one of the same school4 ,that any who are acquainted with my writings1 should suppose ,i have any general sympathy with ,m4 ,comte1 save that implied by preferring proved facts to superstitions1 astonishes me4 ,it is true that1 disagreeing with ,m4 ,comte1 though ,i do1 in all those fundamental views that are peculiar to him1 ,i agree with him in sundry minor views4 ,the doctrine that the education of the individual should accord in mode and arrangement with the education of mankind1 considered historically1 ,i have cited from him2 and have endeavoured to enforce it4 ,i entirely concur in his opinion that there requires a new order of scientific men1 whose function shall be that of co-ordinating the results arrived at by the rest4 ,to him1 ,i believe1 ,i am indebted for the conception of a social consensus2 and when the time comes for dealing with this conception1 ,i shall state my indebtedness4 ,and ,i also adopt his word1 ,sociology4 ,there are1 ,i believe1 in the part of his writings which ,i have read1 various incidental thoughts of great depth and value2 and ,i doubt not that were ,i to read more of his writings1 ,i should find others4#ah ,it is very probable1 too1 that ,i have said 7as ,i am told ,i have7 some things which ,m4 ,comte had already said4 ,it would be difficult1 ,i believe1 to find two men who had no opinions in common4 ,and it would be extremely strange if two men1 starting from the same general doctrines established by modern science1 should traverse some of the same fields of inquiry1 without their lines of thought having any points of intersection4 ,but #acd none of these minor agreements can be of much weight in comparison with the fundamental disagreements above specified4 ,leaving out of view that general community which we both have with the scientific thought of the age1 the differences between us are essential1 while the correspondences are non-essential4 ,and ,i venture to think that kinship must be determined by essentials1 and not by non-essentials4#ai 99 99 99 99 99 ,joined with the ambiguous use of the phrase 8,positive ,philosophy10 which has led to a classing with ,m4 ,comte of many men who either ignore or reject his distinctive principles1 there has been one special circumstance that has tended to originate and maintain this classing in my own case4 ,the assumption of some relationship between ,m4 ,comte and myself1 was unavoidably raised by the title of my first book--,social ,statics4 ,when that book was published1 ,i was unaware that this title had been before used3 had ,i known the fact1 ,i should certainly have adopted an alternative title which ,i had in view4#bj ,if1 however1 instead of #ace the title1 the work itself be considered1 its irrelation to the philosophy of ,m4 ,comte becomes abundantly manifest4 ,there is decisive testimony on this point4 ,in the ,north ,british ,review for ,august1 #ahea1 a reviewer of ,social ,statics says 8,the title of this work1 however1 is a complete misnomer4 ,according to all analogy1 the phrase 8,social ,statics0 should be used only in some such sense as that in which1 as we have already explained1 it is used by ,comte1 namely as designating a branch of inquiry whose end it is to ascertain the laws of social equilibrium or order1 as distinct ideally from those of social movement or progress4 ,of this ,mr4 ,spencer does not seem to have had the slightest notion1 but to have chosen the name for his work only as a means of indicating vaguely that it proposed to treat of social concerns in a scientific manner40--p4 #cba4 ,respecting ,m4 ,comte's application of the words statics and dynamics to social phenomena1 now that ,i know what it is1 ,i will only say that while ,i perfectly understand how1 by a defensible extension of their mathematical meanings1 the one may be used to indicate social functions in balance1 and the other social functions out of balance1 ,i am quite at a loss to understand how the phenomena of structure can be included in the one any more than in the other4 ,but the two things which here concern me1 are1 first1 to point out that ,i had not 8the slightest notion0 of giving ,social ,statics the meaning which ,m4 ,comte gave it2 and1 second1 to explain the meaning which ,i did give it4 ,the units of any aggregate of matter1 are in equilibrium when they severally act and re-act on one another on all sides with equal forces4 ,a state of change among them implies that there are forces exercised by some that are not counterbalanced by like forces exercised by others2 and a state of rest implies the absence of such uncounterbalanced #acf forces--implies1 if the units are homogeneous1 equal distances among them--implies a maintenance of their respective spheres of molecular motion4 ,similarly among the units of a society1 the fundamental condition to equilibrium1 is1 that the restraining forces which the units exercise on each other1 shall be balanced4 ,if the spheres of action of some units are diminished by extension of the spheres of action of others1 there necessarily results an unbalanced force which tends to produce political change in the relations of individuals2 and the tendency to change can cease1 only when individuals cease to aggress on each other's spheres of action--only when there is maintained that law of equal freedom1 which it was the purpose of ,social ,statics to enforce in all its consequences4 ,besides this totally-unlike conception of what constitutes ,social ,statics1 the work to which ,i applied that title1 is fundamentally at variance with ,m4 ,comte's teachings in almost everything4 ,so far from alleging1 as ,m4 ,comte does1 that society is to be re-organized by philosophy2 it alleges that society is to be re-organized only by the accumulated effects of habit on character4 ,its aim is not the increase of authoritative control over citizens1 but the decrease of it4 ,a more pronounced individualism1 instead of a more pronounced nationalism1 is its ideal4 ,so profoundly is my political creed at variance with the creed of ,m4 ,comte1 that1 unless ,i am misinformed1 it has been instanced by a leading ,english disciple of ,m4 ,comte as the creed to which he has the greatest aversion4 ,one point of coincidence1 however1 is recognizable4 ,the analogy between an individual organism and a social organism1 which was held by ,plato and by ,hobbes1 is asserted in ,social ,statics1 as it is in the ,sociology of ,m4 ,comte4 ,very rightly1 ,m4 ,comte has made this analogy the cardinal idea of this division of his philosophy4 ,in ,social ,statics1 the aim of which is essentially ethical1 this analogy is pointed out incidentally1 to enforce certain ethical considerations2 and is there obviously suggested partly by the definition of life which #acg ,coleridge derived from ,schelling1 and partly by the generalizations of physiologists there referred to 7chap4 xxx4 4 #ab1 #ac1 #af74 ,excepting this incidental agreement1 however1 the contents of ,social ,statics are so entirely antagonistic to the philosophy of ,m4 ,comte1 that1 but for the title1 the work would never1 ,i think1 have raised the remembrance of him--unless1 indeed1 by the association of opposites4#ba ,and now let me point out that which really has exercised a profound influence over my course of thought4 ,the truth which ,harvey's embryological inquiries first dimly indicated1 which was afterwards more clearly perceived by ,wolff1 and which was put into a definite shape by ,von ,baer--the truth that all organic development is a change from a state of homogeneity to a state of heterogeneity--this it is from which very many of the conclusions which ,i now hold1 have indirectly resulted4 ,in ,social ,statics1 there is everywhere manifested a dominant belief in the evolution of man and of society4 ,there is also manifested the belief that this evolution is in both cases determined by the incidence of conditions--the actions of circumstances4 ,and there is further1 in the sections already referred to1 a recognition of the fact that organic and social evolutions1 conform to the same law4 ,falling amid beliefs in evolutions of various orders1 everywhere determined by natural causes 7beliefs #ach again displayed in the ,theory of ,population and in the ,principles of ,psychology72 the formula of ,von ,baer set up a process of organization4 ,the extension of it to other kinds of phenomena than those of individual and social bodies1 is traceable through successive stages4 ,it may be seen in the last paragraph of an essay on 8,the ,philosophy of ,style10 published in ,october1 #aheb2 again in an essay on 8,manners and ,fashion10 published in ,april1 #ahed2 and then1 in a comparatively advanced form1 in an essay on 8,progress3 its ,law and ,cause10 published in ,april1 #aheg4 ,afterwards1 there came the recognition of the need for modifying ,von ,baer's formula by including the trait of increasing definiteness2 next the inquiry into those general laws of force from which this universal transformation necessarily results2 next the deduction of these from the ultimate law of the persistence of force2 next the perception that there is everywhere a process of ,dissolution complementary to that of ,evolution2 and1 finally1 the determination of the conditions 7specified in the foregoing essay7 under which ,evolution and ,dissolution respectively occur4 ,the filiation of these results is1 ,i think1 tolerably manifest4 ,the process has been one of continuous development1 set up by the addition of ,von ,baer's law to a number of ideas that were in harmony with it4 ,and ,i am not conscious of any other influences by which the process has been affected4 ,it is possible1 however1 that there may have been influences of which ,i am not conscious2 and my opposition to ,m4 ,comte's system may have been one of them4 ,the presentation of antagonistic thoughts1 often produces greater definiteness and development of one's own thoughts4 ,it is probable that the doctrines set forth in the essay on 8,the ,genesis of ,science10 might never have been reached1 had not my dissent from ,m4 ,comte's conception1 led me to work them out2 and but for this1 ,i might not have arrived at the classification of the sciences exhibited in the foregoing essay4 ,possibly there are other cases in which the stimulus of #aci repugnance to ,m4 ,comte's views1 may have aided in elaborating my own views2 though ,i cannot call to mind any other cases4 ,let it by no means be supposed from all ,i have said1 that ,i do not regard ,m4 ,comte's speculations as of value4 ,true or untrue1 his system as a whole1 has doubtless produced important and salutary revolutions of thought in many minds2 and will doubtless do so in many more4 ,doubtless1 too1 not a few of those who dissent from his general views1 have been healthfully stimulated by consideration of them4 ,the presentation of scientific knowledge and method as a whole1 whether rightly or wrongly co-ordinated1 cannot have failed greatly to widen the conceptions of most of his readers4 ,and he has done especial service by familiarizing men with the idea of a social science1 based on the other sciences4 ,beyond which benefits resulting from the general character and scope of his philosophy1 ,i believe that there are scattered through his pages many large ideas that are valuable not only as stimuli1 but for their actual truth4 ,it has been by no means an agreeable task to make these personal explanations2 but it has seemed to me a task not to be avoided4 ,differing so profoundly as ,i do from ,m4 ,comte on all fundamental doctrines1 save those which we inherit in common from the past2 it has become needful to dissipate the impression that ,i agree with him--needful to show that a large part of what is currently known as 8positive philosophy10 is not 8positive philosophy0 in the sense of being peculiarly ,m4 ,comte's philosophy2 and to show that beyond that portion of the so-called 8positive philosophy0 which is not peculiar to him1 ,i dissent from it4 ,and now at the close1 as at the outset1 let me express my great regret that these explanations should have been called forth by the statements of a critic who has treated me so liberally4 ,nothing will1 ,i fear1 prevent the foregoing pages from appearing like a very ungracious response to ,m4 ,laugel's sympathetically-written review4 ,i can only hope that the gravity of the question at issue1 in so far as it #adj concerns myself1 may be taken in mitigation1 if not as a sufficient apology4 ,,note4 ,the preceding pages originally formed the second portion of a pamphlet entitled ,the ,classification of the ,sciences3 to which are added ,reasons for dissenting from the ,philosophy of ,m4 ,comte1 which was first published in #ahfd4 ,for some time past this pamphlet has been included in the third volume of my ,essays1 c41 and has been no longer accessible in a separate form4 ,there has recently been diffused afresh1 the misconception which originally led me to exhibit my entire rejection of those views of ,m4 ,comte1 which essentially distinguish his system from other systems2 and the motives which then prompted me to publish the reasons for this rejection1 now prompt me to put them within the reach of all who care to inquire about the matter4 ,the ,appendix1 presenting an outline of the leading propositions of the ,synthetic ,philosophy1 will further aid the reader in forming a correct judgment4 ,oct4 #g1 #ahhd4 ,,appendix ,a4 ,some fourteen or more years ago1 an ,american friend requested me1 with a view to a certain use which he named1 to furnish him with a succinct statement of the cardinal principles developed in the successive works ,i had published and in those ,i was intending to publish4 ,this statement ,i here reproduce4 ,having been written solely for an expository purpose1 and without thought of ,m4 ,comte and his system1 it will serve better than a statement now drawn up since it is not open to the suspicion of being adapted to the occasion4#bb 8#a4 ,throughout the universe in general and in detail1 there is an unceasing redistribution of matter and motion4 8#b4 ,this redistribution constitutes evolution where there is a #ada predominant integration of matter and dissipation of motion1 and constitutes dissolution where there is a predominant absorption of motion and disintegration of matter4 8#c4 ,evolution is simple when the process of integration1 or the formation of a coherent aggregate1 proceeds uncomplicated by other processes4 8#d4 ,evolution is compound when1 along with this primary change from an incoherent to a coherent state1 there go on secondary changes due to differences in the circumstances of the different parts of the aggregate4 8#e4 ,these secondary changes constitute a transformation of the homogeneous into the heterogeneous--a transformation which1 like the first1 is exhibited in the universe as a whole and in all 7or nearly all7 its details3 in the aggregate of stars and nebulae2 in the planetary system2 in the earth as an inorganic mass2 in each organism1 vegetal or animal 7,von ,baer's law72 in the aggregate of organisms throughout geologic time2 in the mind2 in society2 in all products of social activity4 8#f4 ,the process of integration1 acting locally as well as generally1 combines with the process of differentiation to render this change not simply from homogeneity to heterogeneity1 but from an indefinite homogeneity to a definite heterogeneity2 and this trait of increasing definiteness1 which accompanies the trait of increasing heterogeneity1 is1 like it1 exhibited in the totality of things and in all its divisions and sub-divisions down to the minutest4 8#g4 ,along with this redistribution of the matter composing any evolving aggregate1 there goes on a redistribution of the retained motion of its components in relation to one another3 this also becomes1 step by step1 more definitely heterogeneous4 8#h4 ,in the absence of a homogeneity that is infinite and absolute1 that redistribution of which evolution is one phase1 is inevitable4 ,the causes which necessitate it are these3 8#i4 ,the instability of the homogeneous1 which is consequent upon the different exposures of the different parts of any limited aggregate to incident forces4 ,the transformations hence resulting are complicated by 8#aj4 ,the multiplication of effects4 ,every mass and part of a mass on which a force falls1 sub-divides and differentiates that force1 which thereupon proceeds to work a variety of changes2 and each of these becomes the parent of similarly-multiplying changes3 the multiplication of them becoming greater in proportion as the aggregate becomes more heterogeneous4 ,and these two causes of increasing differentiations are furthered by 8#aa4 ,segregation1 which is a process tending ever to separate unlike units and to bring together like units--so serving continually to sharpen1 or make definite1 differentiations otherwise caused4 8#ab4 ,equilibration is the final result of these transformations which an evolving aggregate undergoes4 ,the changes go on until there is reached an equilibrium between the forces which all parts of the aggregate are exposed to and the forces these parts oppose to them4 ,equilibration may pass through a transition stage of balanced motions 7as in a planetary system7 or of #adb balanced functions 7as in a living body7 on the way to ultimate equilibrium2 but the state of rest in inorganic bodies1 or death in organic bodies1 is the necessary limit of the changes constituting evolution4 8#ac4 ,dissolution is the counter-change which sooner or later every evolved aggregate undergoes4 ,remaining exposed to surrounding forces that are unequilibrated1 each aggregate is ever liable to be dissipated by the increase1 gradual or sudden1 of its contained motion2 and its dissipation1 quickly undergone by bodies lately animate and slowly undergone by inanimate masses1 remains to be undergone at an indefinitely remote period by each planetary and stellar mass1 which1 since an indefinitely distant period in the past1 has been slowly evolving3 the cycle of its transformations being thus completed4 8#ad4 ,this rhythm of evolution and dissolution1 completing itself during short periods in small aggregates1 and in the vast aggregates distributed through space completing itself in periods which are immeasurable by human thought1 is1 so far as we can see1 universal and eternal--each alternating phase of the process predominating now in this region of space and now in that1 as local conditions determine4 8#ae4 ,all these phenomena1 from their great features down to their minutest details1 are necessary results of the persistence of force1 under its forms of matter and motion4 ,given these as distributed through space1 and their quantities being unchangeable1 either by increase or decrease1 there inevitably result the continuous redistributions distinguishable as evolution and dissolution1 as well as all those special traits above enumerated4 8#af4 ,that which persists unchanging in quantity but ever changing in form1 under these sensible appearances which the universe presents to us1 transcends human knowledge and conception--is an unknown and unknowable power1 which we are obliged to recognize as without limit in space and without beginning or end in time40 ,these successive paragraphs set forth in the most abstract way1 that process of transformation going on throughout the ,cosmos as a whole1 and in each larger or smaller portion of it4 ,in ,first ,principles the statements contained in these paragraphs are elaborated1 explained1 and illustrated2 and in subsequent volumes of the series1 the purpose has been to interpret the several great groups of phenomena1 ,astronomical1 ,geological 7both postponed71 ,biological1 ,psychological1 ,sociological1 and ,ethical1 in conformity with these general laws of ,evolution which ,first ,principles enunciates4 99 99 99 99 99 ,if it can be shown that any one of the above propositions has been adopted from1 or has been suggested by1 the #adc ,positive ,philosophy1 there will be evidence that the ,synthetic ,philosophy is to that extent indebted to it4 ,or if there can be quoted any expressed conviction of ,m4 ,comte1 that the factors producing changes of all kinds1 inorganic and organic1 co-operate everywhere throughout the ,cosmos in the same general way1 and everywhere work metamorphoses having the same essential traits1 a much more decided indebtedness may reasonably be supposed4 ,so far as ,i know it1 however1 the ,positive ,philosophy contains none of the special ideas above enumerated1 nor any of the more general ideas they involve4 ,,appendix ,b4 ,on pp4 #aai and #abj1 ,i have pointed out that the followers of ,m4 ,comte1 swayed by the spirit of discipleship1 habitually ascribe to him a great deal which was the common inheritance of the scientific world before he wrote1 and to which he himself laid no claim4 ,kindred remarks have since been made by others1 both in ,england and in ,france--the one by ,mr4 ,mill1 and the other by ,m4 ,fouille4 ,mr4 ,mill says3 8,the foundation of ,m4 ,comte's philosophy is thus in no way peculiar to him1 but the general property of the age1 however far as yet from being universally accepted even by thoughtful minds4 ,the philosophy called ,positive is not a recent invention of ,m4 ,comte1 but a simple adherence to the traditions of all the great scientific minds whose discoveries have made the human race what it is4 ,m4 ,comte has never presented it in any other light4 ,but he has made the doctrine his own by his manner of treating it40--,auguste ,comte and ,positivism1 pp4 #h1 #i4 ,in his ,histoire de la ,philosophie1 #ahge1 ,m4 ,alfred ,fouille writes3 8,saint-,simon voulut successivement organiser la socit l'aide de la science 7prtention d'o sortit le positivisme7 puis l'aide de l'industrie1 et enfin l'aide d'une religion nouvelle1 capable de #8forcer chacun de ses membres suivre le prcepte de l'amour du prochain4'0--p4 #dbh4 8,les doctrines sociales de ,saint-,simon1 jointes au naturalisme de ,cabanis et de ,broussais1 donnrent naissance au #8positivisme' d',auguste ,comte4 #add ,ce dernier1 comme ,saint-,simon1 voit dans la science sociale ou #8sociologie' le terme et le but de toutes les recherches scientifiques40--p4 #dbb4 8,a cette mthode ,auguste ,comte ajouta des vues historiques1 qu'il croyait entirement originales1 sur les trois tats par o passe ncessairement selon lui la connaissance humaine3 tat thologique1 tat mtaphysique1 et tat scientifique4 ,le germe de cette thorie tait dj dans ,turgot40--p4 #dbd4 8,en somme1 ,auguste ,comte a eu le mrite d'insister sur les mthodes qui conviennent aux sciences de la nature2 mais il faut avouer que ces mthodes taient connues bien avant lui40--p4 #dbe4 ,,endnotes ,,to ,,reasons ,,for ,,dissenting ,,from ,,the ,,philosophy ,,of ,m4 ,,comte4 #ad ,a clear illustration of this process1 is furnished by the recent mental integration of ,heat1 ,light1 ,electricity1 etc41 as modes of molecular motion4 ,if we go a step back1 we see that the modern conception of ,electricity1 resulted from the integration in consciousness1 of the two forms of it involved in the galvanic battery and in the electric-machine4 ,and going back to a still earlier stage1 we see how the conception of statical electricity1 arose by the coalescence in thought1 of the previously-separate forces manifested in rubbed amber1 in rubbed glass1 and in lightning4 ,with such illustrations before him1 no one can1 ,i think1 doubt that the process has been the same from the beginning4 #ae ,possibly it will be said that ,m4 ,comte himself admits that what he calls the perfection of the positive system1 will probably never be reached2 and that what he condemns is the inquiry into the natures of causes and not the general recognition of cause4 ,to the first of these allegations ,i reply that1 as ,i understand ,m4 ,comte1 the obstacle to the perfect realization of the positive philosophy is the impossibility of carrying generalization so far as to reduce all particular facts to cases of one general fact--not the impossibility of excluding the consciousness of cause4 ,and to the second allegation ,i reply that the essential principle of his philosophy is an avowed ignoring of cause altogether4 ,for if it is not1 what becomes of his alleged distinction between the perfection of the positive system and the perfection of the metaphysical system8 ,and here let me point out that1 by affirming exactly the opposite to that which ,m4 ,comte thus affirms1 ,i am excluded from the positive school4 ,if his own definition of positivism is to be taken1 then1 as ,i hold that what he defines as positivism is an absolute impossibility1 it is clear that ,i cannot be what he calls a positivist4 #af ,a friendly critic alleges that ,m4 ,comte is not fairly represented by this quotation1 and that he is blamed by his biographer1 ,m4 ,littr1 for his too-great insistance on feeling as a motor of humanity4 ,if in his 8,positive ,politics10 which ,i presume is here referred to1 ,m4 ,comte abandons his original position1 so much the better4 ,but ,i am here dealing with what is known as 8the ,positive ,philosophy20 and that the passage above quoted does not misrepresent it1 is proved by the fact that this doctrine is re-asserted at the commencement of the ,sociology4 #ag ,in #ahhe1 during a controversy with one of ,m4 ,comte's ,english disciples1 ,i was blamed for speaking 8of ,comte as making six sciences10 and was told that 8in all ,comte's works1 except the first1 he makes seven sciences40 ,as ,i was dealing with ,the ,positive ,philosophy1 ,i thought ,i could not do better than give the foregoing extract from the ,cours de ,philosophie ,positive2 and it did not occur to me that ,i was called upon to see whether1 in any of his later voluminous works1 ,m4 ,comte had made a different statement4 ,my opponent1 however1 enlarged on this 8blunder10 as he politely called it3 apparently oblivious of the fact that if it was a blunder on my part to speak of ,comte as recognizing six sciences when in his later days he recognized seven1 it was a much more serious blunder on the part of ,comte himself to have long overlooked the seventh4 #ah ,m4 ,comte's 8,exposition0 ,i read in the original in #aheb2 and in two or three other places have referred to the original to get his exact words4 ,the ,inorganic ,physics1 and the first chapter of the ,biology1 ,i read in ,miss ,martineau's condensed translation1 when it appeared4 ,the rest of ,m4 ,comte's views ,i know only through ,mr4 ,lewes's outline1 and through incidental references4 #ai ,in his work1 ,auguste ,comte et la ,philosophie ,positive 7#ahfc71 ,m4 ,littr defending the ,comtean classification of the sciences from the criticism ,i made upon it in the 8,genesis of ,science10 deals with me wholly as an antagonist4 ,the chapter he devotes to his reply1 opens by placing me in direct opposition to the ,english adherents of ,comte1 named in the preceding chapter4 #bj ,i believed at the time1 and have never doubted until now1 that the choice of this title was absolutely independent of its previous use by ,m4 ,comte4 ,while writing these pages1 ,i have found reason to think the contrary4 ,on referring to ,social ,statics1 to see what were my views of social evolution in #ahej1 when ,m4 ,comte was to me but a name1 ,i met with the following sentence3--8,social philosophy may be aptly divided 7as political economy has been7 into statics and dynamics0 7ch4 xxx4 #a74 ,this ,i remembered to be a reference to a division which ,i had seen in the ,political ,economy of ,mr4 ,mill4 ,but why had ,i not mentioned ,mr4 ,mill's name8 ,on referring to the first edition of his work1 ,i found1 at the opening of ,book iv41 this sentence3--8,the three preceding parts include as detailed a view as the limits of this treatise permit1 of what1 by a happy generalization of a mathematical phrase1 has been called the ,statics of the subject40 ,here was the solution of the question4 ,the division had not been made by ,mr4 ,mill1 but by some writer 7on ,political ,economy ,i supposed7 who was not named by him2 and whom ,i did not know4 ,it is now manifest1 however1 that while ,i supposed ,i was giving a more extended use to this division1 ,i was but returning to the original use which ,mr4 ,mill had limited to his special topic4 ,another thing is1 ,i think1 tolerably manifest4 ,as ,i evidently wished to point out my obligation to some unknown political economist1 whose division ,i thought ,i was extending1 ,i should have named him had ,i known who he was4 ,and in that case should not have put this extension of the division as though it were new4 #ba ,let me add that the conception developed in ,social ,statics1 dates back to a series of letters on the 8,proper ,sphere of ,government10 published in the ,nonconformist newspaper in the latter half of #ahdb1 and republished as a pamphlet in #ahdc4 ,in these letters will be found1 along with many crude ideas1 the same belief in the conformity of social phenomena to unvariable laws2 the same belief in human progression as determined by such laws2 the same belief in the moral modification of men as caused by social discipline2 the same belief in the tendency of social arrangements 8of themselves to assume a condition of stable equilibrium20 the same repudiation of state-control over various departments of social life2 the same limitation of state-action to the maintenance of equitable relations among citizens4 ,the writing of ,social ,statics arose from a dissatisfaction with the basis on which the doctrines set forth in those letters were placed3 the second half of that work is an elaboration of these doctrines2 and the first half a statement of the principles from which they are deducible4 #bb ,published many years since in ,america1 this statement was republished in ,england eight years since4 ,see ,athenum for ,july #bbnd1 #ahhb4 #ade ,,on ,,laws ,,in ,,general1 ,,and ,,the ,,order ,,of ,,their ,,discovery4 ,the following was contained in the first edition of ,first ,principles4 ,i omitted it from the re-organized second edition1 because it did not form an essential part of the new structure4 ,as it is referred to in the foregoing pages1 and as its general argument is germane to the contents of those pages1 ,i have thought well to insert it here4 ,moreover1 though ,i hope eventually to incorporate it in that division of the ,principles of ,sociology which treats of ,intellectual ,progress1 yet as it must be long before it can thus re-appear in its permanent place1 and as1 should ,i not get so far in the execution of my undertaking1 it may never thus re-appear at all1 it seems proper to make it more accessible than it is at present4 ,the first and last sections1 which served to link it into the argument of the work to which it originally belonged1 are omitted4 ,the rest has been carefully revised1 and in some parts considerably altered4 ,the recognition of ,law being the recognition of uniformity of relations among phenomena1 it follows that the order in which different groups of phenomena are reduced to law1 must depend on the frequency with which the uniform relations they severally display are distinctly experienced4 ,at any given stage of progress1 those #adf uniformities will be best known with which men's minds have been oftenest and most strongly impressed4 ,in proportion partly to the number of times a relation has been presented to consciousness 7not merely to the senses71 and in proportion partly to the vividness with which the terms of the relation have been cognized1 will be the degree in which the constancy of connexion is perceived4 ,the succession in which relations are generalized being thus determined1 there result certain derivative principles to which this succession must more immediately and obviously conform4 ,the first is the directness with which personal welfare is affected4 ,while1 among surrounding things1 many do not appreciably influence us in any way1 some produce pleasures and some pains1 in various degrees2 and manifestly1 those things of which the actions on the organism for good or evil are most decided1 will1 cteris paribus1 be those of which the laws of action are earliest observed4 ,second comes the conspicuousness of one or both phenomena between which a relation is to be perceived4 ,on every side are phenomena so concealed as to be detected only by close observation2 others not obtrusive enough to attract notice2 others which moderately solicit the attention2 others so imposing or vivid as to force themselves on consciousness2 and1 supposing conditions to be the same1 these last will of course be among the first to have their relations generalized4 ,in the third place1 we have the absolute frequency with which the relations occur4 ,there are coexistences and sequences of all degrees of commonness1 from those which are ever present to those which are extremely rare2 and manifestly1 the rare coexistences and sequences1 as well as the sequences which are very long in taking place1 will not be reduced to law so soon as those which are familiar and rapid4 ,fourthly has to be added the relative frequency of occurrence4 ,many events and appearances are limited to certain times or certain places1 or both2 #adg and1 as a relation which does not exist within the environment of an observer cannot be perceived by him1 however common it may be elsewhere or in another age1 we have to take account of the surrounding physical circumstances1 as well as of the state of society1 of the arts1 and of the sciences--all of which affect the frequency with which certain groups of facts are observable4 ,the fifth corollary to be noticed is1 that the succession in which different classes of relations are reduced to law1 depends in part on their simplicity4 ,phenomena presenting great composition of causes or conditions1 have their essential relations so masked1 that it requires accumulated experiences to impress upon consciousness the true connexions of antecedents and consequents they involve4 ,hence1 other things equal1 the progress of generalization will be from the simple to the complex2 and this it is which ,m4 ,comte has wrongly asserted to be the sole regulative principle of the progress4 ,sixth comes the degree of concreteness1 or absence of abstractness4 ,concrete relations are the earliest acquisitions4 ,such analyses of them as separate the essential connexions from their disguising accompaniments1 necessarily come later4 ,the analyses of the connexions1 always more or less compound1 into their elements then becomes possible4 ,and so on continually1 until the highest and most abstract truths have been reached4 ,these1 then1 are the several derivative principles4 ,the frequency and vividness with which uniform relations are repeated in conscious experience1 determining the recognition of their uniformity1 and this frequency and vividness depending on the above conditions1 it follows that the order in which different classes of facts are generalized1 must depend on the extent to which the above conditions are fulfilled in each class4 ,let us mark how the facts harmonize with this conclusion3 taking first a few that elucidate the general truth1 and afterwards some that #adh exemplify the special truths which we here see follow from it4 99 99 99 99 99 ,the relations earliest known as uniformities1 are those subsisting among the common properties of matter--tangibility1 visibility1 cohesion1 weight1 etc4 ,we have no trace of a time when the resistance offered by an object was regarded as caused by the will of the object2 or when the pressure of a body on the hand holding it1 was ascribed to the agency of a living being4 ,and accordingly1 these are the relations of which we are oftenest conscious3 being1 as they are1 objectively frequent1 conspicuous1 simple1 concrete1 and of immediate personal concern4 ,similarly with the ordinary phenomena of motion4 ,the fall of a mass on the withdrawal of its support1 is a sequence which directly affects bodily welfare1 is conspicuous1 simple1 concrete1 and very often repeated4 ,hence it is one of the uniformities recognized before the dawn of tradition4 ,we know of no era when ordinary movements due to terrestrial gravitation were attributed to volition4 ,only when the relation is obscured1 as where the withdrawal of a support is not obvious1 or1 as in the case of an arolite1 where the antecedent of the descent is unperceived1 do we find the conception of personal agency4 ,on the other hand1 motions of intrinsically the same order as that of a falling stone--those of the heavenly bodies--long remain ungeneralized2 and until their uniformity is seen1 and indeed for a long time after1 are construed as results of will4 ,this difference is clearly not dependent on comparative complexity or abstractness1 since the motion of a planet in an ellipse of slight eccentricity1 is as simple and concrete a phenomenon as the motion of a projected arrow in an ellipse of extreme eccentricity indistinguishable from a parabola4 ,but the antecedents are not conspicuous2 the sequences are of long duration2 and they are not often repeated4 ,and that these are the causes of their slow #adi reduction to law1 we see in the fact that they are severally generalized in the order of their frequency and conspicuousness--the moon's monthly cycle1 the sun's annual change1 the periods of the inferior planets1 the periods of the superior planets4 ,while astronomical sequences were still ascribed to volition1 certain terrestrial sequences of a different kind1 but some of them equally without complication1 were interpreted in like manner4 ,the solidification of water at a low temperature1 is a phenomenon that is simple1 concrete1 and of much personal concern4 ,but it is neither so frequent as those which we see are earliest generalized1 nor is the presence of the antecedent so manifest4 ,though in all but tropical climates1 mid-winter displays the relation between cold and freezing with tolerable constancy2 yet1 during the spring and autumn1 the occasional appearance of ice in the mornings has no very obvious connexion with coldness of the weather4 ,sensation being so inaccurate a measure1 it is not possible for the savage to experience the definite relation between a temperature of #cb and the congealing of water2 and hence the long continued belief in personal agency4 ,similarly1 but still more clearly1 with the winds4 ,the absence of regularity and the inconspicuousness of the antecedents1 allowed the mythological explanation to survive for a great period4 ,during the era in which the uniformity of many quite simple inorganic relations was still unrecognized1 certain organic relations1 intrinsically very complex and special1 were generalized4 ,the constant coexistence of feathers and a beak1 of four legs with an internal bony framework1 are facts which were1 and are1 familiar to every savage4 ,did a savage find a bird with teeth1 or a mammal clothed with feathers1 he would be as much surprised as an instructed naturalist4 ,now these uniformities of organic structure thus early perceived1 are of exactly the same kind as those more numerous ones later established by biology4 ,the constant #aej coexistence of mammary glands with two occipital condyles to the skull1 of vertebr with teeth lodged in sockets1 of frontal horns with the habit of rumination1 are generalizations as purely empirical as those known to the aboriginal hunter4 ,the botanist cannot in the least understand the complex relation between papilionaceous flowers and seeds borne in flattened pods3 he knows these and like connexions simply in the same way that the barbarian knows the connexions between particular leaves and particular kinds of wood4 ,but the fact that sundry of the uniform relations which chiefly make up the organic sciences1 were very early recognized1 is due to the high degrees of vividness and frequency with which they were presented to consciousness4 ,though the connexion between the sounds characteristic of a certain bird1 and the possession of edible flesh1 is extremely involved1 yet the two terms of the relation are conspicuous1 often recur in experience1 and a knowledge of their connexion has a direct bearing on personal welfare4 ,meanwhile innumerable relations of the same order1 which are displayed with even greater frequency by surrounding plants and animals1 remain for thousands of years unrecognized1 if they are unobtrusive or of no apparent moment4 ,when1 passing from this primitive stage to a more advanced stage1 we trace the discovery of those less familiar uniformities which mainly constitute what is distinguished as ,science1 we find the succession in which knowledge of them is reached1 to be still determined in the same manner4 ,this will become obvious on contemplating separately the influence of each derivative condition4 99 99 99 99 99 ,how relations that have immediate bearings on the maintenance of life1 are1 other things equal1 fixed in the mind before those which have no immediate bearings1 the history of ,science abundantly illustrates4 ,the habits of existing uncivilized races1 who fix times by moons and barter so many of one article for so many of another1 show #aea us that conceptions of equality and number1 which are the germs of mathematical science1 were developed under the immediate pressure of personal wants2 and it can scarcely be doubted that those laws of numerical relations which are embodied in the rules of arithmetic1 were first brought to light through the practice of mercantile exchange4 ,similarly with geometry4 ,the derivation of the word shows us that it originally included only certain methods of partitioning ground and laying out buildings4 ,the properties of the scales and the lever1 involving the first principle in mechanics1 were early generalized under the stimulus of commercial and architectural needs4 ,to fix the times of religious festivals and agricultural operations1 were the motives which led to the establishment of the simpler astronomic periods4 ,such small knowledge of chemical relations as was involved in ancient metallurgy1 was manifestly obtained in seeking how to improve tools and weapons4 ,in the alchemy of later times1 we see how greatly an intense hope of private benefit contributed to the disclosure of a certain class of uniformities4 ,nor is our own age barren of illustrations4 8,here10 says ,humboldt1 when in ,guiana1 8as in many parts in ,europe1 the sciences are thought worthy to occupy the mind1 only so far as they confer some immediate and practical benefit on society40 8,how is it possible to believe10 said a missionary to him1 8that you have left your country to come to be devoured by mosquitoes on this river1 and to measure lands that are not your own80 ,our coasts furnish like instances4 ,every sea-side naturalist knows how great is the contempt with which fishermen regard the collection of objects for the microscope or aquarium4 ,their incredulity as to the possible value of such things is so great1 that they can scarcely be induced even by bribes to preserve the refuse of their nets4 ,nay1 we need not go for evidence beyond daily table-talk4 ,the demand for 8practical science0--for a knowledge that can be brought to bear on the business of #aeb life--joined to the ridicule commonly vented on scientific pursuits having no obvious uses1 suffice to show that the order in which laws are discovered greatly depends on the directness with which knowledge of them affects our welfare4 ,that1 when all other conditions are the same1 obtrusive relations will be generalized before unobtrusive ones1 is so nearly a truism that examples appear almost superfluous4 ,if it be admitted that by the aboriginal man1 as by the child1 the co-existent properties of large surrounding objects are noticed before those of minute objects1 and that the external relations which bodies present are generalized before their internal relations1 it must be admitted that in subsequent stages of progress1 the comparative conspicuousness of relations has greatly affected the order in which they were recognized as uniform4 ,hence it happened that after the establishment of those very manifest sequences constituting a lunation1 and those less manifest ones marking a year1 and those still less manifest ones marking the planetary periods1 astronomy occupied itself with such inconspicuous sequences as those displayed in the repeating cycle of lunar eclipses1 and those which suggested the theory of epicycles and eccentrics2 while modern astronomy deals with still more inconspicuous sequences1 some of which1 as the planetary rotations1 are nevertheless the simplest which the heavens present4 ,in physics1 the early use of canoes implied an empirical knowledge of certain hydrostatic relations that are intrinsically more complex than sundry static relations not empirically known2 but these hydrostatic relations were thrust upon observation4 ,or1 if we compare the solution of the problem of specific gravity by ,archimedes with the discovery of atmospheric pressure by ,torricelli 7the two involving mechanical relations of the same class71 we perceive that the much earlier occurrence of the first than the last was determined1 neither by a difference in their bearings on personal welfare1 nor by a difference in the frequency with #aec which illustrations of them came under observation1 nor by relative simplicity2 but by the greater obtrusiveness of the connexion between antecedent and consequent in the one case than in the other4 ,among miscellaneous illustrations1 it may be pointed out that the connexions between lightning and thunder1 and between rain and clouds1 were recognized long before others of the same order1 simply because they thrust themselves on the attention4 ,or the long-delayed discovery of the microscopic forms of life1 with all the phenomena they present1 may be named as very clearly showing how certain groups of relations not ordinarily perceptible1 though in other respects like long-familiar relations1 have to wait until changed conditions render them perceptible4 ,but1 without further details1 it needs only to consider the inquiries which now occupy the electrician1 the chemist1 the physiologist1 to see that science has advanced1 and is advancing1 from the more conspicuous phenomena to the less conspicuous ones4 ,how the degree of absolute frequency of a relation affects the recognition of its uniformity1 we see in contrasting certain biological facts4 ,the connexion between death and bodily injury1 constantly displayed not only in men but in all inferior creatures1 came to be recognized as an instance of natural causation while yet deaths from diseases or from some of them continued to be thought supernatural4 ,among diseases themselves1 it is observable that unusual ones were regarded as of demoniacal origin during ages when the more frequent were ascribed to ordinary causes3 a truth paralleled among our own peasantry1 who by the use of charms show a lingering superstition with respect to rare disorders1 which they do not show with respect to common ones1 such as colds4 ,passing to physical illustrations1 we may note that within the historic period whirlpools were accounted for by the agency of water-spirits2 but we do not find that within the same period the disappearance of water on exposure either to the sun or to artificial heat was #aed interpreted in an analogous way3 though a more marvellous occurrence1 and a more complex one1 its great frequency led to the early recognition of it as a natural uniformity4 ,rainbows and comets do not differ much in conspicuousness1 and a rainbow is intrinsically the more involved phenomenon2 but chiefly because of their far greater commonness1 rainbows were perceived to have a direct dependence on sun and rain while yet comets were regarded as signs of divine wrath4 ,that races living inland must long have remained ignorant of the daily and monthly sequences of the tides1 and that tropical races could not early have comprehended the phenomena of northern winters1 are extreme illustrations of the influence which relative frequency has on the recognition of uniformities4 ,animals which1 where they are indigenous1 call forth no surprise by their structures or habits1 because these are so familiar1 when taken to countries where they have never been seen1 are looked at with an astonishment approaching to awe--are even thought supernatural3 a fact which will suggest numerous others that show how the localization of phenomena shares in controlling the order in which they are reduced to law4 ,not only however does their localization in space affect the progression1 but also their localization in time4 ,facts which are rarely if ever manifested in one era1 are rendered very frequent in another1 simply through the changes wrought by civilization4 ,the lever1 of which the properties are illustrated in the use of sticks and weapons1 is vaguely understood by every savage--on applying it in a certain way he rightly anticipates certain effects2 but the wheel-and-axle1 pulley1 and screw1 cannot have their powers either empirically or rationally known till the advance of the arts has more or less familiarized them4 ,through those various means of exploration which we have inherited and added to1 we have become acquainted with a vast range of chemical relations that were relatively #aee non-existent to the primitive man4 ,to highly-developed industries we owe both the substances and the appliances that have disclosed to us countless uniformities which our ancestors had no opportunity of seeing4 ,these and like instances1 show that the accumulated materials1 and processes1 and products1 which characterize the environments of complex societies1 greatly increase the accessibility of various classes of relations2 and by thus multiplying the experiences of them1 or making them relatively frequent1 facilitate the generalization of them4 ,moreover1 various classes of phenomena presented by society itself1 as for instance those which political economy formulates1 become relatively frequent1 and therefore recognizable1 in advanced social states2 while in less advanced ones they are either too rarely displayed to have their relations perceived1 or1 as in the least advanced ones1 are not displayed at all4 ,that1 where no other circumstances interfere1 the order in which different uniformities are established varies as their complexity1 is manifest4 ,the geometry of straight lines was understood before the geometry of curved lines2 the properties of the circle before the properties of the ellipse1 parabola1 and hyperbola2 and the equations of curves of single curvature were ascertained before those of curves of double curvature4 ,plane trigonometry comes in order of time and simplicity before spherical trigonometry2 and the mensuration of plane surfaces and solids before the mensuration of curved surfaces and solids4 ,similarly with mechanics3 the laws of simple motion were generalized before those of compound motion2 and those of rectilinear motion before those of curvilinear motion4 ,the properties of equal-armed levers or scales1 were understood before those of levers with unequal arms2 and the law of the inclined plane was formulated earlier than that of the screw1 which involves it4 ,in chemistry the progress has been from the simple inorganic compounds to the more involved or organic compounds4 ,and where1 as in the higher sciences1 the conditions of the exploration are #aef more complicated1 we still may trace relative complexity as determining the order of discovery where other things are equal4 ,the progression from concrete relations to abstract relations1 and from the less abstract to the more abstract1 is equally obvious4 ,numeration1 which in its primary form concerned itself only with groups of actual objects1 came earlier than simple arithmetic2 the rules of which deal with numbers apart from objects4 ,arithmetic1 limited in its sphere to concrete numerical relations1 is alike earlier and less abstract than ,algebra1 which deals with the relations of these relations4 ,and in like manner1 the ,calculus of ,operations comes after ,algebra1 both in order of evolution and in order of abstractness4 ,in ,mechanics1 the more concrete relations of forces exhibited in the lever1 inclined plane1 etc41 were understood before the more abstract relations expressed in the laws of resolution and composition of forces2 and later than the three abstract laws of motion as formulated by ,newton came the still more abstract law of inertia4 ,similarly with ,physics and ,chemistry1 there has been an advance from truths entangled in all the specialities of particular facts and particular classes of facts1 to truths disentangled from the disguising incidents under which they are manifested--to truths of a higher abstractness4 ,brief and rude as is this sketch of a mental development which has been long and complicated1 ,i venture to think it shows inductively what was deductively inferred1 that the order in which separate groups of uniformities are recognized1 depends not on one circumstance but on several circumstances4 ,the various classes of relations are generalized in a certain succession1 not solely because of one particular kind of difference in their natures2 but also because they are variously placed in time and in space1 variously open to observation1 and variously related to our own constitutions3 our perception of them being influenced by all these conditions in endless combinations4 ,the comparative degrees #aeg of importance1 of obtrusiveness1 of absolute frequency1 of relative frequency1 of simplicity1 of concreteness1 are every one of them factors2 and from their unions in proportions that are never twice alike1 there results a highly complex process of mental evolution4 ,but while it is thus manifest that the proximate causes of the succession in which relations are reduced to law1 are numerous and involved2 it is also manifest that there is one ultimate cause to which these proximate causes are subordinate4 ,as the several circumstances that determine the early or late recognition of uniformities are circumstances that determine the number and strength of the impressions which these uniformities make on the mind1 it follows that the progression conforms to a certain fundamental principle of psychology4 ,we see a posteriori1 what we concluded priori1 that the order in which relations are generalized1 depends on the frequency and impressiveness with which they are repeated in conscious experience4 99 99 99 99 99 ,having roughly analyzed the progress of the past1 let us take advantage of the light thus thrown on the present1 and consider what is implied respecting the future4 ,note1 first1 that the likelihood of the universality of ,law has been ever growing greater4 ,out of the countless coexistences and sequences with which mankind are environed1 they have been continually transferring some from the group whose order was supposed to be arbitrary1 to the group whose order is known to be uniform4 ,and manifestly1 as fast as the relations which are unreduced to law become fewer1 the probability that among them there are some which do not conform to law1 becomes less4 ,to put the argument numerically--,it is clear that when out of surrounding phenomena a hundred of several kinds have been found to occur in constant connexions1 there arises a slight presumption that all phenomena occur in constant connexions4 ,when uniformity has been established in a thousand cases1 more varied #aeh in their kinds1 the presumption gains strength4 ,and when the known cases of uniformity amount to millions1 including many of each variety1 it becomes an ordinary induction that uniformity exists everywhere4 ,silently and insensibly their experiences have been pressing men on towards the conclusion thus drawn4 ,not out of a conscious regard for these reasons1 but from a habit of thought which these reasons formulate and justify1 all minds have been advancing towards a belief in the constancy of surrounding coexistences and sequences4 ,familiarity with concrete uniformities has generated the abstract conception of uniformity--the idea of ,law2 and this idea has been in successive generations slowly gaining fixity and clearness4 ,especially has it been thus among those whose knowledge of natural phenomena is the most extensive--men of science4 ,the mathematician1 the physicist1 the astronomer1 the chemist1 severally acquainted with the vast accumulations of uniformities established by their predecessors1 and themselves daily adding new ones as well as verifying the old1 acquire a far stronger faith in law than is ordinarily possessed4 ,with them this faith1 ceasing to be merely passive1 becomes an active stimulus to inquiry4 ,wherever there exist phenomena of which the dependence is not yet ascertained1 these most cultivated intellects1 impelled by the conviction that here too there is some invariable connexion1 proceed to observe1 compare1 and experiment2 and when they discover the law to which the phenomena conform1 as they eventually do1 their general belief in the universality of law is further strengthened4 ,so overwhelming is the evidence1 and such the effect of this discipline1 that to the advanced student of ,nature1 the proposition that there are lawless phenomena has become not only incredible but almost inconceivable4 ,this habitual recognition of law which already distinguishes modern thought from ancient thought1 must spread among men at large4 ,the fulfilment of fresh predictions that are made possible by every new step1 and the further #aei command gained over ,nature's forces1 prove to the uninitiated the validity of scientific generalizations and the doctrine they illustrate4 ,widening education is daily diffusing among the mass of men that knowledge of these generalizations which has been hitherto confined to the few4 ,and as fast as this diffusion goes on1 the belief of the scientific must become the belief of the world at large4 99 99 99 99 99 ,that law is universal1 will become an irresistible conclusion when it is perceived that the progress in the discovery of laws itself conforms to law2 and when this perception makes it clear why certain groups of phenomena have been reduced to law1 while other groups are still unreduced4 ,when it is seen that the order in which uniformities are recognized1 must depend on the frequency and vividness with which they are repeated in conscious experience2 when it is seen that1 as a matter of fact1 the most common1 important1 conspicuous1 concrete1 and simple1 uniformities were the earliest recognized1 because they were experienced oftenest and most distinctly2 it will by implication be seen that long after the great mass of phenomena have been generalized1 there must remain phenomena which1 from their rareness1 or unobtrusiveness1 or seeming unimportance1 or complexity1 or abstractness1 are still ungeneralized4 ,thus will be furnished a solution to a difficulty sometimes raised4 ,when it is asked why the universality of law is not already fully established1 there will be the answer that the directions in which it is not yet established are those in which its establishment must necessarily be latest4 ,that state of things which is inferable beforehand1 is just the state which we find to exist4 ,if such coexistences and sequences as those of ,biology and ,sociology are not yet reduced to law1 the presumption is1 not that they are irreducible to law1 but that their laws elude our present means of exploration4 ,having long ago proved uniformity throughout all the lower classes of relations1 and having been step by step proving #afj uniformity throughout classes of relations successively higher and higher1 if we have not yet succeeded with the highest classes1 it may be fairly concluded that our powers are at fault1 rather than that the uniformity does not exist4 ,and unless we make the absurd assumption that the process of generalization1 now going on with unexampled rapidity1 has reached its limit1 and will suddenly cease1 we must infer that ultimately mankind will discover a constant order even among the most involved and obscure phenomena4 #afa ,,the ,,valuation ,,of ,,evidence4 ,first published in ,the ,leader for ,june #be1 #ahec4 ,with ,spirit-rappings and ,table-movings still the rage1 and with the belief in ,spontaneous ,combustion still unextinguished1 it seems desirable that something should be said in justification of that general scepticism with which the philosophical meet the alleged wonders that periodically turn the heads of the nation4 ,nothing less than a bulky octavo would be needed to contain all that might be written on the matter2 and unfortunately such an octavo1 when written1 would be little read by those most requiring it4 ,a brief hint or two1 however1 may find listeners among them4 8,i tell you ,i saw it myself10 is the so-thought conclusive assertion with which many a controversy is abruptly ended4 ,commonly those who make this assertion think that after it nothing remains to be urged2 and they are astonished at the unreasonableness of those who still withhold their belief4 ,though they reject many tales of witchcraft1 many ghost stories whose marvels were attested by eye-witnesses--though they have repeatedly seen stage-conjurors seem to do things which they do not believe were really done--though they have heard of the ,automaton ,chess-player and the ,invisible ,girl1 and have perhaps seen explanations of the modes in which the public were deluded by #afb them--though in all these cases they know that the facts were other than the spectators supposed them to be2 yet they cannot imagine that their own perceptions have been vitiated by influences like those which vitiated the perceptions of others4 ,or1 to put the thing more charitably and perhaps more truly1 they forget that such vitiations are constantly occurring4 ,to observe correctly1 though commonly thought very easy1 every man of science knows to be difficult4 ,our faculties are liable to report falsely from two opposite causes--the presence of hypothesis1 and the absence of hypothesis4 ,to the dangers arising from one or other of these1 every observation we make is exposed2 and between the two it is hard to see any fact quite truly4 ,a few illustrations of the extreme distortions arising from the one cause1 and the extreme inaccuracy consequent on the other1 will justify this seeming paradox4 ,nearly every one is familiar with the myth prevalent on our sea-coasts1 respecting the ,barnacle ,goose4 ,the popular belief was1 and indeed is still in some places1 that the fruits on branches which hang into the sea become changed into shell-covered creatures called barnacles1 found incrusting these submerged branches2 and further1 that these barnacles are in process of time transformed into the birds known as barnacle geese4 ,this belief was not confined to the vulgar2 it was received among naturalists4 ,nor was it with them simply an adopted rumour4 ,it was based on observations which were recorded and approved by the highest scientific authorities1 and published with their countenance4 ,in a paper contained in the ,philosophical ,transactions1 ,sir ,robert ,moray says3--8,in every shell that ,i opened 4 4 4 there appeared nothing wanting1 as to the external parts1 for making up a perfect sea-fowl2 the little bill like that of a goose1 the eyes marked1 the head1 neck1 breast1 wings1 tail1 and feet formed1 the feathers everywhere perfectly shaped and blackish coloured1 and the feet like those of other #afc waterfowl1 to my best remembrance40 ,now this myth respecting the barnacle goose has been exploded for some century and a half4 ,to a modern zoologist who examines one of these cirrhipeds1 as the barnacles are called1 it seems scarcely credible that it could ever have been thought a chick2 and what ,sir ,robert ,moray could have taken for 8head1 neck1 breast1 wings1 tail1 feet1 and feathers10 he cannot imagine4 ,under the influence of a pre-conception1 here is a man of education describing as 8a perfect sea-fowl0 what is now known to be a modified crustacean--a creature belonging to a remote part of the animal kingdom4 ,a still more remarkable instance of perverted observation exists in an old book entitled ,metamorphosis ,naturalis1 c41 published at ,middleburgh in #affb4 ,this work1 in which is attempted for the first time a detailed account of insect-transformations1 contains numerous illustrative plates1 in which are represented the various stages of evolution--larva1 pupa1 and imago4 ,those who have any knowledge of ,entomology will recollect that the chrysalises of all our common butterflies exhibit at the anterior end a number of pointed projections1 producing an irregular outline4 ,have they ever observed in this outline a resemblance to a man's face8 ,for myself1 ,i can say that though in early days ,i kept brood after brood of butterfly larv through all their changes1 ,i never perceived any such likeness2 nor can ,i see it now4 ,nevertheless1 in the plates of this ,metamorphosis ,naturalis1 each chrysalis has its projections so modified as to represent a burlesque human head--the respective species having different profiles given them4 ,whether the author was a believer in metempsychosis1 and thought he saw in the chrysalis a disguised humanity2 or whether1 swayed by the false analogy which ,butler makes so much of1 between the change from chrysalis to butterfly and that from mortality to immortality1 he considered the chrysalis as typical of man2 does not appear4 ,here1 however1 is the fact1 that influenced by some #afd pre-conception or other1 he has made his drawings quite different from the actual forms4 ,it is not that he simply thinks this resemblance exists--it is not that he merely says he can see it2 but his preconception so possesses him as to swerve his pencil1 and make him produce representations laughably unlike the realities4 ,these1 which are extreme cases of distorted perceptions1 differ only in degree from the distorted perceptions of daily life2 and so strong is the distorting influence that even the man of science cannot escape its effects4 ,every microscopist knows that if they have conflicting theories respecting its nature1 two observers shall look through the same instrument at the same object1 and give quite different descriptions of its appearance4 ,from the dangers of hypothesis let us now turn to the dangers of no hypothesis4 ,little recognized as is the fact1 it is nevertheless true that we cannot make the commonest observation correctly without beforehand having some notion of what we are to observe4 ,you are asked to listen to a faint sound1 and you find that without a pre-conception of the kind of sound you are to hear1 you cannot hear it4 ,provided that it is not strong1 an unusual flavour in your food may pass quite unperceived1 unless some one draws attention to it1 when you taste it distinctly4 ,after knowing him for years1 you shall suddenly discover that your friend's nose is slightly awry1 and wonder that you never remarked it before4 ,still more striking becomes this inability when the facts to be observed are complex4 ,of a hundred people who listen to the dying vibrations of a church bell1 almost all fail to perceive the harmonics1 and assert the sound to be simple4 ,scarcely any one who has not practised drawing1 sees1 when in the street1 that all the horizontal lines in the walls1 windows1 shutters1 roofs1 seem to converge to one point in the distance3 a fact which1 after a few lessons in perspective1 becomes visible enough4 ,perhaps ,i cannot more clearly illustrate this necessity for #afe hypothesis as a condition to accurate perception1 than by narrating a portion of my own experience relative to the colours of shadows4 ,indian ink was the pigment which1 during boyhood1 ,i invariably used for shading4 ,ask any one who has received no culture in art1 or who has given no thought to it1 of what colour a shadow is1 and the unhesitating reply will be--black4 ,this is uniformly the creed of the uninitiated2 and in this creed ,i undoubtingly remained till about eighteen4 ,happening1 at that age1 to come much in contact with an amateur artist1 ,i was told1 to my great surprise1 that shadows are not black but of a neutral tint4 ,this1 to me1 novel doctrine1 ,i strenuously resisted4 ,i have a pretty distinct recollection of denying it point blank1 and quoting all my experience in support of the denial4 ,i remember1 too1 that the controversy lasted over a considerable period2 and that it was only after my friend had repeatedly drawn my attention to instances in ,nature1 that ,i finally gave in4 ,though ,i must previously have seen myriads of shadows1 yet in consequence of the fact that very generally the tint approaches to black1 ,i had been unable1 in the absence of hypothesis1 to perceive that in many cases it is distinctly not black4 ,i continued to hold this amended doctrine for some years4 ,it is true that from time to time ,i observed that the tone of the neutral tint varied considerably in different shadows2 but still the divergencies were not such as to shake my faith in the dogma4 ,by-and-bye1 however1 in a popular work on ,optics1 ,i met with the statement that the colour of a shadow is always the complement of the colour of the light casting it4 ,not seeing the wherefore of this alleged law1 which seemed moreover to conflict with my established belief1 ,i was led to study the matter as a question of causation4 ,why are shadows coloured8 and what determines the colour8 were the queries that suggested themselves4 ,in seeking answers1 it soon became manifest #aff that as a space in shadow is a space from which the direct light alone is excluded1 and into which the indirect light 7namely1 that reflected by surrounding objects1 by the clouds and by the sky7 continues to fall1 the colour of a shadow must partake of the colour of everything that can either radiate or reflect light into it4 ,hence1 the colour of a shadow must be the average colour of the diffused light2 and must vary1 as that varies1 with the colours of all surrounding things4 ,thus was at once explained the inconstancy ,i had already noticed2 and ,i presently recognized in ,nature that which the theory implies--namely1 that a shadow may have any colour whatever1 according to circumstances4 ,under a clear sky1 and with no trees1 hedges1 houses1 or other objects at hand1 shadows are of a pure blue4 ,during a red sunset1 mixture of the yellow light from the upper part of the western sky with the blue light from the eastern sky1 produces green shadows4 ,go near to a gas-lamp on a moonlight night1 and a pencil-case placed at right angles to a piece of paper will be found to cast a purple-blue shadow and a yellow-grey shadow1 produced by the gas and the moon respectively4 ,and there are conditions it would take too long here to describe1 under which two parts of the same shadow are differently coloured4 ,all which facts became obvious to me as soon as ,i knew that they must exist4 ,here1 then1 respecting certain simple phenomena that are hourly visible1 are three successive convictions2 each of them based on years of observation2 each of them held with unhesitating confidence2 and yet only one--as ,i now believe--true4 ,but for the help of an hypothesis1 ,i should probably have remained in the common belief that shadows are black4 ,and but for the help of another hypothesis1 ,i should probably have remained in the half-true belief that they are neutral tint4 ,is it not clear1 therefore1 that to observe correctly is by no means easy8 ,on the one hand1 a pre-conception1 makes #afg us liable to see things not quite as they are1 but as we think them4 ,on the other hand1 in the absence of a pre-conception1 we are liable to pass over much that we ought to see4 ,yet we must have either a pre-conception or no pre-conception4 ,evidently1 then1 all our observations1 save those guided by true theories already reached1 are in danger of either distortion or incompleteness4 ,it remains but to remark1 that if our observations are imperfect in cases like the foregoing1 where the things seen are persistent1 and may be again and again looked at or continuously contemplated2 how much more imperfect must they be where the things seen are complex processes1 changes1 or actions1 each presenting successive phases1 which1 if not truly observed at the moments they severally occur1 can never be truly observed at all6 ,here the chances of error become immensely multiplied4 ,and when1 in addition1 there exists some moral excitement1--when1 as in these ,spirit-rapping and ,table-turning experiments1 the intellect is partially paralysed by fear or wonder correct observation becomes next to an impossibility4 #afh ,,what ,,is ,,electricity8 ,first published in ,the ,reader for ,november #ai1 #ahfd4 ,probably few1 if any1 competent physicists have1 of late years1 used the term 8electric fluid0 in any other than a conventional sense4 ,when distinguishing electricity into the two kinds1 8positive0 and 8negative10 or 8vitreous0 and 8resinous10 they have used the ideas suggested by these names merely as convenient symbols1 and not as representatives of different entities4 ,and1 now that heat and light are proved to be modes of motion1 it has become obvious that all the allied manifestations of force must be modes of motion4 ,what is the particular mode of motion which constitutes electricity1 thus becomes the question4 ,that it is some kind of molecular vibration1 different from the molecular vibrations which luminous bodies give off1 is1 ,i presume1 taken for granted by all who bring to the consideration of the matter a knowledge of recent discoveries4 ,beyond those simple oscillations of molecules from which light and heat result1 may we not suspect that there will1 in some cases1 arise compound oscillations8 ,let us consider whether the conditions under which electricity arises are not such as to generate compound oscillations2 and whether the phenomena of electricity are not such as must result from compound oscillations4 ,the universal antecedent to the production of electricity #afi is the immediate or mediate contact of heterogeneous substances--substances that are heterogeneous either in their molecular constitutions1 or in their molecular states4 ,if1 then1 electricity is some mode of molecular motion1 and if1 whenever it is produced1 the contact of substances having unlike molecules or molecules in unlike states1 is the antecedent1 there seems thrust upon us the conclusion that electricity results from some mutual action of molecules whose motions are unlike4 ,what must be that mutual action of molecules having unlike motions1 which1 as we see1 is the universal antecedent of electrical disturbance8 ,the answer to this question does not seem difficult to reach1 if we take the simplest case--the case of contact-electricity4 ,when two pieces of metal of the same kind1 and at the same temperature1 are applied to one another1 there is no electrical excitation2 but1 if the metals applied to one another be of different kinds1 there is a genesis of electricity4 ,this1 which has been regarded as an anomalous fact--a fact so anomalous that it has been much disputed because apparently at variance with every hypothesis--is a fact to which an interpretation is at once supplied by the hypothesis that electricity results from the mutual disturbances of unlike molecular motions4 ,for if1 on the one hand1 we have homogeneous metals in contact1 their respective molecules1 oscillating synchronously1 will give and take any forces which they impress on one another without producing oscillations of new orders4 ,but if1 on the other hand1 the molecules of the one mass have periods of oscillation different from those of the other mass1 their mutual impacts will not agree with the period of oscillation of either1 but will generate a new rhythm1 differing from1 and much slower than1 that of either4 ,the production of what are called 8beats0 in acoustics1 will best illustrate this4 ,it is a familiar fact that two strings vibrating at different rates1 from time to time concur in sending off arial waves in the #agj same direction at the same instant3 that then1 their vibrations getting more and more out of correspondence1 they send off their arial waves in the same direction at exactly intermediate instants2 and presently1 coming once more into correspondence1 they again generate coinciding waves4 ,so that when their periods of vibration differ but little1 and when consequently it takes an appreciable time to complete their alternations of agreement and disagreement1 there results an audible alternation in the sound--a succession of pulses of louder and feebler sound4 ,in other words1 besides the primary1 simple1 and rapid series of waves1 constituting the two sounds themselves1 there is a series of slow compound waves1 resulting from their repeated conflicts and concurrences4 ,now if1 instead of the two strings communicating their vibrations to the air1 each communicated its vibrations to the other1 we should have just the same alternation of concurrent and conflicting pulses4 ,and if each of the two strings was combined with an aggregate of others like itself1 in such way that it communicated to its neighbours both its normal and its abnormal vibrations1 it is clear that through each aggregate of strings there would be propagated one of these compound waves of oscillation1 in addition to their simple rapid oscillations4 ,this illustration will1 ,i think1 make it manifest that when a mass of molecules which have a certain period of vibration1 is placed in contact with a mass of molecules which have another period of vibration1 there must result an alternation of coincidences and antagonisms in the molecular motions1 such as will make the molecules alternately increase and decrease one another's motions4 ,there will be instants at which they are moving in the same direction1 and intervening instants at which they are moving in opposite directions2 whence will arise periods of greatest and least deviations from their ordinary motions4 ,and these greatest and least deviations1 being communicated to neighbouring molecules1 and passed on by them #aga to the next1 will result in waves of perturbation propagated throughout each mass4 ,let us now ask what will be the mutual relations of these waves4 ,action and reaction being equal and opposite1 it must happen that whatever effect a molecule of the mass ,a produces upon an adjacent molecule of the mass ,b1 must be accompanied by an equivalent reverse effect upon itself4 ,if a molecule of the mass ,a is at any instant moving in such way as to impress on a molecule of the mass ,b an additional momentum in any given direction1 then the momentum of the molecule of ,a1 in that direction1 will be diminished to an equal amount4 ,that is to say1 to any wave of increased motion propagated through the molecules of ,b1 there must be a reactive wave of decreased motion propagated in the opposite direction through the molecules of ,a4 ,see1 then1 the two significant facts4 ,any addition of motion1 which at one of these alternate periods is given by the molecules of ,a to the molecules of ,b1 must be propagated through the molecules of ,b in a direction away from ,a2 and simultaneously there must be a subtraction from the motion of the molecules of ,a1 which will be propagated through them in a direction away from ,b4 ,to every wave of excess sent through the one mass1 there will be a corresponding wave of defect sent through the other2 and these positive and negative waves will be exactly coincident in their times1 and exactly equal in their amounts4 ,whence it follows that if these waves1 proceeding from the surface of contact through the two masses in contrary directions1 are brought into relation1 they will neutralize each other4 ,action and reaction being equal and opposite1 these plus and minus molecular motions will cancel if they are added together2 and there will be a restoration of equilibrium4 ,these positive and negative waves of perturbation will travel through the two masses of molecules with great facility4 ,it is now an established truth that molecules #agb absorb1 in the increase of their own vibrations1 those rhythmical impulses or waves which have periodic times the same as their own2 but that they cannot thus absorb successive impulses that have periodic times different from their own4 ,hence these differential undulations1 being very long undulations in comparison with those of the molecules themselves1 will readily pass through the masses of molecules1 or be conducted by them4 ,further observe that1 if the two masses of molecules continue joined1 these positive and negative differential waves travelling away from the surface of contact in opposite directions1 and severally arriving at the outer surfaces of the two masses1 will be reflected from these2 and1 travelling back again toward the surface of contact1 will there meet and neutralize one another4 ,hence no current will be produced along a wire joining the outer surfaces of the masses2 since neutralization will be more readily effected by this return of the waves through the masses themselves4 ,but1 though no external current arises1 the masses will continue in what we call opposite electric states2 as a delicate electrometer shows that they do4 ,and further1 if they are parted1 the positive and negative waves which have the instant before been propagated through them respectively1 remaining unneutralized1 the masses will display their opposite electric states in a more conspicuous way4 ,the residual positive and negative waves will then neutralize each other along any conductor that is placed between them1 seeing that the plus waves communicated from the one mass to the conductor1 meeting with the minus waves communicated from the other1 and being mutually cancelled as they meet1 the conductor will become a line of least resistance to the waves of each mass4 ,let us pass now to the allied phenomena of thermo-electricity4 ,suppose these two masses of metal to be heated at their surfaces of contact3 the forms of the #agc masses being such that their surfaces of contact can be considerably heated without their remoter parts being much heated4 ,what will happen8 ,prof4 ,tyndall has shown1 in the cases of various gases and liquids1 that1 other things equal1 when molecules have given to them more of the insensible motion which we call heat1 there is no alteration in their periods of oscillation1 but an increase in the amplitudes of their oscillations3 the molecules make wider excursions in the same times4 ,assuming that it is the same in solids1 it will follow that1 when the two metals are heated at their surfaces of contact1 the result will be the same as before in respect of the natures and intervals of the differential waves4 ,there will be a change1 however1 in the strengths of these waves4 ,for1 if the two orders of molecules have severally given to them increased quantities of motion1 the perturbations which they impress on each other will also be increased4 ,these stronger positive and negative waves of differential motion will1 as before1 travel through either mass away from the surfaces of contact--that is1 toward the cold extremities of the masses4 ,from these cold extremities they will1 as before1 rebound toward the surfaces of contact2 and1 as before1 will tend thus to equilibriate each other4 ,but they will meet with resistance in thus travelling back4 ,it is a well-ascertained fact that raising the temperatures of metals decreases their conducting powers4 ,hence1 if the two cold ends of the masses be connected by some other mass whose molecules can take on with facility these differential undulations--that is1 if the two ends be joined by a conductor1 the positive and negative waves will meet and neutralize one another along this conductor1 instead of being reflected back to the surfaces of contact4 ,in other words1 there will be established a current along the wire joining the two cold ends of the metallic masses4 ,carried a step further1 this reasoning affords us an explanation of the thermo-electric pile4 ,if a number of #agd these bars of different metals1 as antimony and bismuth1 are soldered together1 end to end1 in alternate order1 ,,ab1 ,,ab1 ,,ab1 etc41 then1 so long as they remain cold1 there is no manifestation of an electric current2 or1 if all the joints are equally heated1 there is no manifestation of an electric current beyond that which would arise from any relative coolness of the two ends of the compound bar4 ,but if alternate joints are heated1 an electric current is produced in a wire joining the two ends of the compound bar--a current that is intense in proportion to the number of pairs4 ,what is the cause of this8 ,clearly1 so long as all the joints are of the same temperature1 the differential waves propagated from each joint toward the two adjacent joints will be equal and opposite to those from the adjacent joints1 and no disturbance will be shown4 ,but if alternate joints are heated1 the positive and negative differential waves propagated away from them will be stronger than those propagated from the other joints4 ,hence1 if the joint of bar ,a with bar ,b be heated1 the other end of the bar ,b1 which is joined to ,a#b1 not being heated1 will receive a stronger differential wave than it sends back4 ,in addition to the wave which its molecules would otherwise induce in the molecules of ,a#b1 there is an effect which it conducts from ,a#a2 and this extra impulse propagated to the other end of ,b#b is added to the impulse which its heated molecules would otherwise give to the molecules of ,a#c2 and so on throughout the series4 ,the waves being added together1 become more violent1 and the current through the wire joining the extremities of the series1 more intense4 ,this interpretation of the facts of thermo-electricity will probably be met by the objection that there are1 in some cases1 thermo-electric currents developed between masses of metal of the same kind1 and even between different parts of the same mass4 ,it may be urged that1 if unlikeness between the rates of vibration of molecules in contact #age is the cause of these electric disturbances2 then1 heat ought not to produce any electric disturbances when the molecules are of the same kind2 since heat does not change the periodic times of molecular vibrations4 ,this objection1 which seems at first sight a serious one1 introduces us to a confirmation4 ,for where the masses of molecules are homogeneous in all other respects1 difference of temperature does not generate any thermo-electric current4 ,the junction of hot with cold mercury sets up no electric excitement4 ,in all cases where thermo-electricity is generated between metals of the same kind1 there is evidence of heterogeneity in their molecular structures--either one has been hammered and the other not1 or one is annealed and the other unannealed4 ,and where the current is between different parts of the same mass1 there are differences in the crystalline states of the parts1 or differences between the ways in which the parts have cooled after being cast4 ,that is to say1 there is proof that the molecules in the two masses1 or in different parts of the same mass1 are in unlike relations to their neighbours--are in unlike states of tension4 ,now1 however true it may be that molecules of the same kind vibrate at the same rate1 whatever may be their temperature1 it is obviously true so long only as their motions are not modified by restraining forces4 ,if molecules of the same kind are in one mass arranged into that state which constitutes crystallization1 while in another mass they are not thus bound together2 or if in the one their molecular relations have been modified by hammering1 and in the other not2 the differences in the restraints under which they respectively vibrate will affect their rates of vibration4 ,and if their rates of vibration are rendered unequal1 then the alleged cause of electrical disturbance comes into existence4 ,to sum up1 may it not be said that by some such action alone can the phenomena of electricity be explained2 #agf and that some such action must inevitably arise under the conditions8 ,on the one hand electricity1 being a mode of motion1 implies the transformation of some prexisting motion--implies1 also1 a transformation such that there are two new kinds of motion simultaneously generated1 equal and opposite in their directions--implies1 further1 that these differ in being plus and minus1 and being therefore capable of neutralizing each other4 ,on the other hand1 in the above cases1 molecular motion is the only source of motion that can be assigned2 and this molecular motion seems calculated1 under the circumstances1 to produce effects like those witnessed4 ,molecules vibrating at different rates cannot be brought in juxtaposition without affecting one another's motions4 ,they must affect one another's motions by periodically adding to1 or deducting from one another's motions2 and any excess of motion which those of the one order receive1 must be accompanied by an equivalent defect of motion in those of the other order4 ,when such molecules are units of aggregates placed in contact1 they must pass on these perturbations to their neighbours4 ,and so1 from the surface of contact1 there must be waves of excessive and defective molecular motion1 equal in their amounts1 and opposite in their directions--waves which must exactly compensate one another when brought into relation4 ,i have here dealt only with electrical phenomena of the simplest kind4 ,hereafter ,i may possibly endeavour to show how this hypothesis furnishes interpretations of other forms of ,electricity4 99 99 99 99 99 ,,postscript 7#ahgc74--;,during the nine years which have elapsed since the foregoing essay was published1 ,i have found myself no nearer to such allied interpretations of other forms of ,electricity4 ,though1 from time to time1 ,i have recurred to the subject1 in the hope of fulfilling the #agg expectation raised by the closing sentence1 yet no clue has encouraged me to pursue the speculation4 ,only now1 when republication of the essay in a permanent form once more brings the question before me1 does there occur a thought which appears worth setting down4 ,the union of two different ideas1 not before placed side by side1 has generated this thought4 ,in the first number of the ,principles of ,biology1 issued in ,january #ahfc1 and dealing1 among other 8,data of ,biology10 with organic matter and the effects of forces upon it1 ,i ventured to speculate about the molecular actions concerned in organic changes1 and1 among others1 those by which light enables plants to take the carbon from carbonic acid 7 #ac74 ,pointing out that the ability of heat to decompose compound molecules1 is generally proportionate to the difference between the atomic weights of their component elements1 and assuming that components having widely-unlike atomic weights1 have widely-unlike motions1 and are therefore affected by widely-unlike undulations2 the inference drawn was1 that in proportion as the rhythms of its components differ1 a compound molecule will be unstable in presence of strong etherial undulations acting upon one component more than on the other or others3 their movements thus being rendered so incongruous that they can no longer hold together4 ,it was argued1 further1 that a tolerably-stable compound molecule may1 if exposed to strong etherial undulations especially disturbing one of its components1 be decomposed when in presence of some unlike molecule having components whose times of oscillation differ less from those of this disturbed component4 ,and a parallel was drawn between the de-oxidation of metals by carbon when exposed to the longer undulations in a furnace1 and the de-carbonization of carbonic acid by hydrogen1 c41 when exposed to the shorter undulations in a plant's leaves4 ,these ideas ,i recall chiefly for the purpose of presenting clearly the conception of a compound molecule as containing #agh diversely-moving components--components having independent and unlike oscillations1 in addition to the oscillation of the whole molecule formed by them4 ,the legitimacy of this conception may1 ,i suppose1 be assumed4 ,the beautiful experiments by which ,prof4 ,tyndall has proved that light decomposes the vapours of certain compounds1 illustrates this ability which the elements of a compound molecule have1 severally to take up etherial undulations corresponding to their own2 and thus to have their individual movements so increased as to cause disruption of the compound molecule4 ,this1 at least1 is the interpretation which ,prof4 ,tyndall puts on the facts2 and ,i presume that he puts a kindred interpretation upon the facts he has disclosed respecting the marvellous power possessed by complex-moleculed vapours to absorb heat--the interpretation1 namely1 that the thermal undulations are1 in such vapours1 taken up in augmenting the movements within each molecule1 rather than in augmenting the movements of the molecules as wholes4 ,but now1 assuming this to be a true conception of compound molecules and the effects produced on them by etherial undulations1 there presents itself the question--,what will be the effects produced by compound molecules on one another8 ,how will the elements of one compound molecule have their rhythmical motions affected by proximity to the elements of an unlike compound molecule8 ,may we not suspect that effects will be produced on one another1 not only by the unlike molecules as wholes1 but also certain other1 and partially-independent1 effects by their components on one another2 and that there will so be generated some specialized form of molecular motion8 ,throughout the speculation set forth in the foregoing essay1 the supposition is that the molecules are those of juxtaposed metals--molecules which1 whether absolutely simple or not1 are relatively simple2 and these are regarded as producing on one another's movements perturbations of a relatively-simple kind1 which admit of being transferred from molecule #agi to molecule throughout each mass4 ,in trying to carry further this interpretation1 it had not occurred to me until now1 to consider the perturbations produced on one another by compound molecules3 taking into consideration1 not merely the capacity each has for affecting the other as a whole1 but the capacity which the constituents of each individually have for affecting the individual constituents of the other4 ,if an individual constituent of a compound molecule can1 by the successive impacts of etherial undulations1 have the amplitudes of its oscillations so increased as to detach it2 we can scarcely doubt that an individual constituent of a compound molecule may affect an individual constituent of an unlike compound molecule near it3 their respective oscillations perturbing one another apart from the perturbation produced on one another by the compound molecules as wholes4 ,and it seems inferable that the secondary perturbation thus arising1 will1 like the primary perturbation1 be such that the action and reaction1 equal and opposite in their amounts1 will produce equal and opposite deviations in the molecular movements4 ,from this there appear to be several corollaries4 ,if a compound molecule1 having a slow rhythm as a whole in addition to the more rapid rhythms of its members1 has the power of taking up much of that motion we call heat in the increase of its internal movements1 and to a corresponding degree takes up less in the increase of its movements as a whole2 then may we not infer that the like will hold when other kinds of forces are brought to bear on it8 ,may we not anticipate that when a mass of compound molecules of one kind is made to act upon a mass of compound molecules of another kind 7say by friction71 the molecular effects mutually produced1 partly in agitating the molecules as wholes1 and partly in agitating their components relatively to one another1 will become less of the first and more of the last1 in proportion as the molecules progress in compositeness8 ,a further implication suggests itself4 ,while much of the #ahj force mutually exercised will thus go to increase the motion within each of the compound molecules that immediately act on one another1 it appears inferable that relatively little of this intestinal motion will be communicated to other molecules4 ,the excesses of oscillation given to individual members of a large cluster1 will not be readily passed on to homologous members of adjacent large clusters2 since they must be relatively far apart4 ,whatever motion is transferred1 must be transferred by waves of the intervening etherial medium2 and the power of these must decrease rapidly as the distance increases4 ,obviously such difficulty of transfer must1 for this reason1 become great when the molecules become highly compounded4 ,at the same time will it not follow that such augmentations of movement caused in individual members of a cluster1 not being readily transmissible to homologous members of adjacent clusters1 will accumulate8 ,the more composite molecules become1 the more possible will it be for individual components of them to be violently affected by individual components of different composite molecules near them--the more possible will it be for their mutual perturbations to progressively increase8 ,and now let us consider how these inferences bear on the interpretation of ,statical ,electricity--the form of ,electricity most unlike the form above dealt with4 ,the substances which exhibit most conspicuously the phenomena of statical electricity are distinguished either by the chemical complexity of their molecules1 or else by the compositeness of their molecules produced allotropically or isomerically1 or else by both4 ,the simple substances electrically excited by friction1 as carbon and sulphur1 are those having several allotropic states--those capable of forming multiple molecules4 ,the conchoidal fracture of the diamond and of roll-sulphur1 suggest some colloidal form of aggregation1 regarded by ,prof4 ,graham as a form in which the molecules are united into #aha relatively-large groups4#bc ,in such compound inorganic substances as glass1 we have1 besides the chemical complexity1 this same conchoidal fracture which1 along with other evidence1 shows glass to be a colloid2 and the colloidal form of molecule is to be similarly inferred as characterizing resin1 amber1 c4 ,that dry animal substances1 such as silk and hair1 are formed of extremely-large molecules1 we have clear proof2 since these1 chemically complex in a high degree1 also have their components united in high multiples4 ,it needs but to name the fact that non-electric and conducting substances1 such as the metals1 acids1 water1 c41 have relatively-simple molecules1 to make it clear that the capacity for developing statical electricity depends in some way upon the presence of molecules of highly composite kinds4 ,and there is even still more conclusive proof than that yielded by the contrast between these groups--the proof furnished by the fact that the same substance may be a conductor or a non-conductor1 according to its form of molecular aggregation4 ,thus selenium when crystalline is a conductor1 but when in that allotropic state called amorphous1 or non-crystalline1 it is a good non-conductor4 ,that is1 accepting ,prof4 ,graham's interpretation of these states1 when its molecules are arranged simply1 it is a conductor1 but when they are compounded into large groups it is a non-conductor1 and1 by implication1 an electric4 ,so far1 then1 the priori inference that a peculiar form of molecular perturbation will result when two unlike substances1 one of which or each of which consists of #ahb highly-compounded molecules1 are made to act on one another1 is justified a posteriori4 ,and now1 instead of asking generally what will happen1 let us ask what may be inferred to happen in a special case4 ,a piece of glass is rubbed by silk4 ,the large colloidal molecules forming the surface of each1 are made to disturb one another4 ,this is an inference about which there will1 ,i suppose1 be no dispute2 since it is that assumed in the now-established doctrine of the correlation of heat and motion4 ,besides the effect which1 as wholes the molecules mutually produce1 there is the effect produced on one another by certain of their components4 ,such of these as have times of oscillation which differ1 but not very widely1 generate mutual perturbations that are equal and opposite4 ,could these perturbations be readily propagated away from the surface of contact through either mass1 the effect would quickly dissipate1 as in the case of metals2 but1 for the reason given above1 these perturbations cannot be transferred with ease to the homologous members of the compound molecules behind4 ,hence the mechanical force of the friction1 transformed into the molecular movements of these superficial constituent molecules1 exists in them as intense mutual perturbations1 which1 unable to diffuse1 are limited to the surfaces1 and1 indeed1 to those parts of the surfaces that have acted on one another4 ,in other words1 the two surfaces become charged with two equal and opposite molecular perturbations--perturbations which1 cancelling one another if the surfaces are kept in contact1 cannot do this if the surfaces are parted2 but can then cancel one another only if a conductor is interposed4 ,let me briefly point out some apparent agreements between the corollaries from this hypothesis1 and the observed phenomena4 ,we have1 first1 an interpretation of the fact1 otherwise seeming so anomalous1 that this form of electrical excitement is superficial4 ,that there should be a mode of #ahc activity limited to the surface of a substance1 is difficult to understand in the absence of some conception of the kind suggested4 ,we have an explanation of the truth1 insisted on by ,faraday1 that there can be no charge of one kind of electricity obtained1 without a corresponding charge of the opposite kind4 ,for it is a necessary implication of the hypothesis above set forth1 that no molecular perturbation of the nature described1 can be produced1 without there being simultaneously produced a counter-perturbation exactly equal to it4 ,may we not also say that some insight is afforded into the phenomena of induction8 ,in the cases thus far considered1 the two surfaces electrified by the mutual perturbations of their molecules1 are supposed to be in contact4 ,since1 however1 apparent contact is not actual contact1 we must1 even in this case1 assume that the mutual perturbation is effected through an intervening stratum of ether4 ,to interpret induction1 then1 we have first to conceive this stratum of ether to be greatly increased in thickness2 and then to ask what will happen if the molecules of one surface1 in this state of extreme internal perturbation1 act on the molecules of a surface near it4 ,whether the stratum of ether is so thin as to be inappreciable to our senses1 or whether it is wide enough to be conspicuous1 it must still happen that if through it the mutual perturbations are conveyed in the one case1 they will be conveyed in the other2 and hence a surface which is already the seat of these molecular perturbations of one order1 will induce perturbations of a counter order in the molecules of an adjacent surface4 ,in additional justification of the hypothesis1 ,i will only point out that voltaic electricity seems to admit of a kindred interpretation4 ,for any molecular re-arrangement1 such as occurs in a chemical decomposition and recombination1 implies that the movements of the #ahd molecules concerned are mutually perturbed2 and their perturbations must conform to the general law already described3 the molecules must derange one another's motions in equal and opposite ways1 and so must generate plus and minus derangements that cancel when brought into relation4 ,of course ,i suggest this view simply as one occurring to an outsider4 ,unquestionably it presents difficulties2 as1 for instance1 that no manifest explanation is yielded by it of electric attractions and repulsions4 ,and there are doubtless objections not obvious to me that will at once strike those to whom the facts are more familiar4 ,the hypothesis must be regarded as speculative2 and as set down on the chance that it may be worth consideration4 99 99 99 99 99 ,since the foregoing postscript was put in type1 ,i have received criticisms upon it1 oral and written1 from several leading electricians and physicists2 and ,i have profited by them to amend parts of the exposition4 ,while ,i have remained without endorsements of the hypothesis1 the objections raised have not been such as to make clear its untenability4 ,on one point an addition seems needful to exclude a misconstruction apt to arise4 ,the description of the mutually-produced molecular perturbations1 opposite in their kinds1 as resulting in waves that are propagated away from the place of disturbance1 and that cancel when brought into relation1 is met by the criticism that waves1 proceeding in opposite directions and meeting1 do not mutually cancel1 but1 passing one another1 proceed onwards4 ,there are1 however1 two respects in which the parallelism does not hold1 between the waves referred to and the waves ,i have described1 which perhaps cannot rightly be called waves4 ,the waves referred to1 as those on the surface of a liquid1 #ahe are such that each consists of two opposite deviations from a mean state4 ,each shows excess and defect4 ,a series of them is a series of plus and minus divergences2 and if two such series meet one another1 they do not cancel4 ,but there is no analogy between this case and a case in which the whole effect propagated in one direction is a plus motion1 and the whole effect propagated in the opposite direction is a minus motion--that is1 plus and minus changes in other motions4 ,these1 if equal in amount1 will cancel when they meet4 ,if one is a continual addition to motion in a certain direction1 and the other a corresponding subtraction from motion in that direction1 the two1 when added together1 must produce zero4 ,from another point of view the absence of parallelism between the two cases may be equally well seen4 ,waves of the kinds instanced as not cancelling one another1 are waves produced by some force foreign to the medium exhibiting them--an extrinsic force4 ,hence1 proceeding from the place of initiation1 they are necessarily1 considered in their totalities1 positive in whatever directions they travel2 and hence1 too1 when conducted round so as to meet1 an exaggerated perturbation will result4 ,but in the simplest of the cases here dealt with 7that of contact-electricity7 the perturbation is not of extrinsic origin1 but of intrinsic origin4 ,there is no external activity at the expense of which the quantity of motion in the disturbed matter is positively increased4 ,the activity1 being such only as is internally possessed1 can generate no more motion than already exists2 and therefore whatever gain of motion arises anywhere in the molecules must be at the cost of an equal loss elsewhere4 ,here perturbation cannot be a plus motion in all directions from the place of initiation2 but any plus motion continually generated can result only from an equal and opposite minus motion continually generated2 and the mutual cancelling becomes a corollary from the mutual genesis4 ,in the course of the discussions which ,i have had1 the #ahf following way of presenting the argument has occurred to me4 #a4 ,two homogeneous bodies are rubbed together and there results heat3 the interpretation being that the molar motion is transformed into molecular motion4 ,here motion produces motion--the form only being changed4 #b4 ,now of the two bodies one is replaced by a body unlike in nature to the other1 and they are again rubbed4 ,again a certain amount of heat is produced3 some of the molar motion is1 as before1 transformed into molecular motion4 ,but1 at the same time1 another part of the molar motion is changed into--what8 ,surely not a fluid1 a substance1 a thing4 ,it cannot be that what in the first case produces a change of state1 in the second case produces an entity4 ,and in the second case itself1 it cannot be that while part of the original motion becomes changed into another species of motion1 part of it becomes changed into a species of matter4 #c4 ,must we not say1 then1 that if1 when the two bodies rubbed are homogeneous1 sensible motion is transformed into insensible motion1 when they are heterogeneous1 sensible motion must still be transformed into insensible motion3 such difference of nature as this insensible motion has1 being consequent on the difference of nature between the two kinds of molecules acting on one another8 #d4 ,if1 when the two masses are homogeneous1 those molecules which compose the two rubbed surfaces disturb one another1 and increase one another's oscillations2 then1 when the two masses are heterogeneous1 those molecules forming the two rubbed surfaces must also disturb one another in some way--increase one another's agitations4 #e4 ,if1 when the two sets of molecules are alike in kind1 the mutual disturbance is such that they simply increase the amplitudes of one another's oscillations1 and do this because their times correspond2 then1 must it not be #ahg that when they are unlike in kind1 the mutual disturbance will involve a differential action consequent on the unlikeness of their motions8 ,must not the discord of the oscillations produce a result which cannot be produced when the oscillations are concordant--a compound form of molecular motion8 #f4 ,if masses of relatively-simple molecules1 placed in apposition and made to act on one another1 cause such effects2 then must we not say that effects of the same class1 but of a different order1 will be caused by the mutual actions1 not of the molecules as wholes1 but of their constituents8 ,if the rubbed surfaces severally consist of highly-compounded molecules--each containing1 it may be1 several hundreds of minor molecules1 united into a definitely-arranged cluster2 then1 while the molecules as wholes affect one another's motions1 must we not infer that the constituents of the one class will affect the constituents of the other class in their motions8 ,while the molecules as wholes increase one another's oscillations1 or derange one another's oscillations1 or both1 the components of them cannot be so stably arranged that members of the one group are wholly inoperative on members of the other group4 ,and if they are operative1 then there must be a compound form of molecular motion which arises when masses of highly-compounded molecules of unlike kinds1 are made to act on one another4 ,with this series of propositions and questions1 ,i leave the suggestion to its fate2 merely remarking that1 setting out with the principles of molecular physics now accepted1 it seems difficult to avoid the implication that some actions of the kinds described take place1 and that there result from them some classes of phenomena--phenomena which1 if not those we call electrical1 remain to be identified4 ,,endnote ,,to ,,what ,,is ,,electricity84 #bc ,though conchoidal fracture may not be conclusive proof of colloidality1 yet colloidal substances hard enough for fracture always display it4 ,respecting roll-sulphur ,i may say that though in a few days after it is made1 it changes from its original state to a state in which it consists of minute crystals of another kind irregularly massed1 yet there is reason for suspecting that these have a matrix of amorphous sulphur4 ,i learn from ,dr4 ,frankland that1 when sublimed1 sulphur aggregates partly into minute crystals and partly into an amorphous powder distinguished by insolubility4 #ahh ,,mill versus ,,hamilton--,,the ,,test ,,of ,,truth4 ,first published in ,the ,fortnightly ,review for ,july #ahfe4 ,british speculation1 to which1 the chief initial ideas and established truths of ,modern ,philosophy are due1 is no longer dormant4 ,by his ,system of ,logic1 ,mr4 ,mill probably did more than any other writer to re-awaken it4 ,and to the great service he thus rendered some twenty years ago1 he now adds by his ,examination of ,sir ,william ,hamilton's ,philosophy--a work which1 taking the views of ,sir ,william ,hamilton as texts1 reconsiders sundry ultimate questions that still remain unsettled4 ,among these questions is one of much importance which has already been the subject of controversy between ,mr4 ,mill and others2 and this question ,i propose to discuss afresh4 ,before doing so1 however1 it will be desirable to glance at two cardinal doctrines of the ,hamiltonian philosophy from which ,mr4 ,mill shows reasons for dissenting--desirable1 because comment on them will elucidate what is to follow4 ,in his fifth chapter1 ,mr4 ,mill points out that 8what is rejected as knowledge by ,sir ,william ,hamilton10 is 8brought back by him under the name of belief40 ,the quotations justify this description of ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton's position1 and warrant the assertion that the relativity of #ahi knowledge was held by him but nominally4 ,his inconsistency may1 ,i think1 be traced to the use of the word 8belief0 in two quite different senses4 ,we commonly say we 8believe0 a thing for which we can assign preponderating evidence1 or concerning which we have received some indefinable impression4 ,we believe that the next ,house of ,commons will not abolish ,church-rates2 or we believe that a person on whose face we look is good-natured4 ,that is1 when we can give confessedly-inadequate proofs or no proofs at all for the things we think1 we call them 8beliefs40 ,and it is the peculiarity of these beliefs1 as contrasted with cognitions1 that their connexions with antecedent states of consciousness may be easily severed1 instead of being difficult to sever4 ,but1 unhappily1 the word 8belief0 is also applied to each of those temporarily or permanently indissoluble connexions in consciousness1 for the acceptance of which the only warrant is that it cannot be got rid of4 ,saying that ,i feel a pain1 or hear a sound1 or see one line to be longer than another1 is saying that there has occurred in me a certain change of state2 and it is impossible for me to give a stronger evidence of this fact than that it is present to my mind4 ,every argument1 too1 is resolvable into successive affections of consciousness which have no warrants beyond themselves4 ,when asked why ,i assert some mediately known truth1 as that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles1 ,i find that the proof may be decomposed into steps1 each of which is an immediate consciousness that certain two quantities or two relations are equal or unequal--a consciousness for which no further evidence is assignable than that it exists in me4 ,nor1 on finally getting down to some axiom underlying the whole fabric of demonstration1 can ,i say more than that it is a truth of which ,i am immediately conscious4 ,but now observe the confusion that has arisen4 ,the immense majority of truths which we accept as beyond doubt1 and from which our notion of unquestionable truth is abstracted1 #aij have this other trait in common--they are severally established by affiliation on deeper truths4 ,these two characters have become so associated1 that one seems to imply the other4 ,for each truth of geometry we are able to assign some wider truth in which it is involved2 for that wider truth we are able1 if required1 to assign some still wider2 and so on4 ,this being the general nature of the demonstration by which exact knowledge is established1 there has arisen the illusion that knowledge so established is knowledge of higher validity than that immediate knowledge which has nothing deeper to rest on4 ,the habit of asking for proof1 and having proof given1 in all these multitudinous cases1 has produced the implication that proof may be asked for those ultimate dicta of consciousness into which all proof is resolvable4 ,and then1 because no proof of these can be given1 there arises the vague feeling that they are akin to other things of which no proof can be given--that they are uncertain--that they have unsatisfactory bases4 ,this feeling is strengthened by the accompanying misuse of words4 8,belief0 having1 as above pointed out1 become the name of an impression for which we can give only a confessedly-inadequate reason1 or no reason at all2 it happens that when pushed hard respecting the warrant for any ultimate dictum of consciousness1 we say1 in the absence of all assignable reason1 that we believe it4 ,thus the two opposite poles of knowledge go under the same name2 and by the reverse connotations of this name1 as used for the most coherent and least coherent relations of thought1 profound misconceptions have been generated4 ,here1 it seems to me1 is the source of ,sir ,william ,hamilton's error4 ,classing as 8beliefs0 those direct1 undecomposable dicta of consciousness which transcend proof1 he asserts that these are of higher authority than knowledge 7meaning by knowledge that for which reasons can be given72 and in asserting this he is fully justified4 ,but when he claims equal authority for those affections of consciousness which #aia go under the same name of 8beliefs10 but differ in being extremely-indirect affections of consciousness1 or not definite affections of consciousness at all1 the claim cannot be admitted4 ,by his own showing1 no positive cognition answering to the word 8infinite0 exists2 while1 contrariwise1 those cognitions which he rightly holds to be above question1 are not only positive1 but have the peculiarity that they cannot be suppressed4 ,how1 then1 can the two be grouped together as of like degrees of validity8 ,nearly allied in nature to this1 is another ,hamiltonian doctrine1 which ,mr4 ,mill effectively combats4 ,i refer to the corollary respecting noumenal existence which ,sir ,william ,hamilton draws from the law of the ,excluded ,middle1 or1 as it might be more intelligibly called1 the law of the ,alternative ,necessity4 ,a thing must either exist or not exist--must have a certain attribute or not have it3 there is no third possibility4 ,this is a postulate of all thought2 and in so far as it is alleged of phenomenal existence1 no one calls it in question4 ,but ,sir ,william ,hamilton1 applying the formula beyond the limits of thought1 draws from it certain conclusions respecting things as they are1 apart from our consciousness4 ,he says1 for example1 that though we cannot conceive ,space as infinite or as finite1 yet1 8on the principle of the ,excluded ,middle1 one or other must be admitted40 ,this inference ,mr4 ,mill shows good reason for rejecting4 ,his argument may be supplemented by another1 which at once suggests itself if from the words of ,sir ,william ,hamilton's propositions we pass to the thoughts for which they are supposed to stand4 ,when remembering a certain thing as in a certain place1 the place and the thing are mentally represented together2 while to think of the non-existence of the thing in that place1 implies a consciousness in which the place is represented but not the thing4 ,similarly1 if1 instead of thinking of an object as colourless1 we think of it as having colour1 the change consists in the addition to the #aib concept of an element that was before absent from it--the object cannot be thought of first as red and then as not red1 without one component of the thought being expelled from the mind by another4 ,the doctrine of the ,excluded ,middle1 then1 is simply a generalization of the universal experience that some mental states are directly destructive of other states4 ,it formulates a certain absolutely-constant law1 that no positive mode of consciousness can occur without excluding a correlative negative mode2 and that the negative mode cannot occur without excluding the correlative positive mode3 the antithesis of positive and negative1 being1 indeed1 merely an expression of this experience4 ,hence it follows that if consciousness is not in one of the two modes1 it must be in the other4 ,but now1 under what conditions only can this law of consciousness hold8 ,it can hold only so long as there are positive states of consciousness which can exclude the negative states1 and which the negative states can in their turn exclude4 ,if we are not concerned with positive states of consciousness at all1 no such mutual exclusion takes place1 and the law of the ,alternative ,necessity does not apply4 ,here1 then1 is the flaw in ,sir ,william ,hamilton's proposition4 ,that ,space must be infinite or finite1 are alternatives of which we are not obliged to regard one as necessary2 seeing that we have no state of consciousness answering to either of these words as applied to the totality of ,space1 and therefore no exclusion of two antagonist states of consciousness by one another4 ,both alternatives being unthinkable1 the proposition should be put thus3 ,space is either or is 2 neither of which can be conceived1 but one of which must be true4 ,in this1 as in some other cases1 ,sir ,william ,hamilton continues to work out the forms of thought when they no longer contain any substance2 and1 of course1 reaches nothing more than verbal conclusions4 ,ending here these comments on doctrines of ,sir ,william #aic ,hamilton1 which ,mr4 ,mill rejects on grounds that will be generally recognized as valid1 let me now pass to a doctrine1 partly held by ,sir ,william ,hamilton1 and held by others in ways variously qualified and variously extended--a doctrine which1 ,i think1 may be successfully defended against ,mr4 ,mill's attack4 99 99 99 99 99 ,in the fourth and fifth editions of his ,logic1 ,mr4 ,mill treats1 at considerable length1 the question--,is inconceivability an evidence of untruth8--replying to criticisms previously made on his reasons for asserting that it is not4 ,the chief answers which he there makes to these criticisms1 turn upon the interpretation of the word inconceivable4 ,this word he considers is used as the equivalent of the word unbelievable2 and1 translating it thus1 readily disposes of sundry arguments brought against him4 ,whether any others who have used these words in philosophical discussion1 have made them synonymous1 ,i do not know2 but that they are so used in those reasonings of my own which ,mr4 ,mill combats1 ,i was not conscious1 and was surprised to find alleged4 ,it is now manifest that ,i had not adequately guarded myself against the misconstruction which is liable to arise from the double meaning of the word belief--a word which1 we have seen1 is used for the most coherent and the least coherent connexions in consciousness1 because they have the common character that no reason is assignable for them4 ,throughout the argument to which ,mr4 ,mill replies1 the word is used by me only in the first of these senses4 ,the 8invariably existent beliefs10 the 8indestructible beliefs10 are the indissoluble connexions in consciousness--never the dissoluble ones4 ,but unbelievable implies the dissoluble ones4 ,by association with the other and more general meaning of the word belief1 the word unbelievable suggests cases in which the proposition admits of being represented in thought1 though it may be with difficulty2 and in which1 consequently1 the counter-proposition admits of being #aid decomposed4 ,to be quite sure of our ground1 let us define and illustrate the meanings of inconceivable and unbelievable4 ,an inconceivable proposition is one of which the terms cannot1 by any effort1 be brought before consciousness in that relation which the proposition asserts between them--a proposition of which the subject and the predicate offer an insurmountable resistance to union in thought4 ,an unbelievable proposition is one which admits of being framed in thought1 but is so much at variance with experience that its terms cannot be put in the alleged relation without effort4 ,thus1 it is unbelievable that a cannon-ball fired from ,england should reach ,america2 but it is not inconceivable4 ,conversely1 it is inconceivable that one side of a triangle is equal to the sum of the other two sides--not simply unbelievable4 ,the two sides cannot be represented in consciousness as becoming equal in their joint length to the third side1 without the representation of a triangle being destroyed2 and the concept of a triangle cannot be framed without a simultaneous destruction of a concept in which these magnitudes are represented as equal4 ,that is to say1 the subject and predicate cannot be united in the same intuition--the proposition is unthinkable4 ,it is in this sense only that ,i have used the word inconceivable2 and only when rigorously restricted to this sense do ,i regard the test of inconceivableness as having any value4 ,i had concluded that when this explanation was made1 ,mr4 ,mill's reasons for dissent would be removed4 ,passages in his recently-published volume1 however1 show that1 even restricting the use of the word inconceivable to the meaning here specified1 he still denies that a proposition is proved to be true by the inconceivableness of its negation4 ,to meet1 within any moderate compass1 all the issues which have grown out of the controversy1 is difficult4 ,before passing to the essential question1 however1 ,i will endeavour to clear the ground of certain minor questions4 ,describing ,sir ,william ,hamilton's doctrine respecting #aie the ultimate facts of consciousness1 or those which are above proof1 ,mr4 ,mill writes3 8,the only condition he requires is that we be not able to #8reduce it a fact of this class to a generalization from experience4' ,this condition is realized by its possessing the #8character of necessity4' #8,it must be impossible not to think it4 ,in fact1 by its necessity alone can we recognize it as an original datum of intelligence1 and distinguish it from any mere result of generalization and custom4' ,in this ,sir ,william ,hamilton is at one with the whole of his own section of the philosophical world2 with ,reid1 with ,stewart1 with ,cousin1 with ,whewell1 we may add1 with ,kant1 and even with ,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer4 ,the test by which they all decide a belief to be a part of our primitive consciousness--an original intuition of the mind--is the necessity of thinking it4 ,their proof that we must always1 from the beginning1 have had the belief1 is the impossibility of getting rid of it now4 ,this argument1 applied to any of the disputed questions of philosophy1 is doubly illegitimate3 neither the major nor the minor premise is admissible4 ,for in the first place1 the very fact that the question is disputed1 disproves the alleged impossibility4 ,those against whom it is needful to defend the belief which is affirmed to be necessary1 are unmistakable examples that it is not necessary 4 4 4 4 ,these philosophers1 therefore1 and among them ,sir ,william ,hamilton1 mistake altogether the true conditions of psychological investigation1 when1 instead of proving a belief to be an original fact of consciousness by showing that it could not have been acquired1 they conclude that it was not acquired1 for the reason1 often false1 and never sufficiently substantiated1 that our consciousness cannot get rid of it now40 ,this representation1 in so far as it concerns my own views1 has somewhat puzzled me4 ,considering that ,i have avowed a general agreement with ,mr4 ,mill in the doctrine that all knowledge is from experience1 and have defended #aif the test of inconceivableness on the very ground that it expresses 8the net result of our experiences up to the present time0 7,principles of ,psychology1 #dcj7--;considering that1 so far from asserting the distinction quoted from ,sir ,william ,hamilton1 ,i have aimed to abolish such distinction--considering that ,i have endeavoured to show how all our conceptions1 even down to those of ,space and ,time1 are 8acquired0--considering that ,i have sought to interpret forms of thought 7and by implication all intuitions7 as products of organized and inherited experiences 7,principles of ,psychology1 #bjh72 ,i am taken aback at finding myself classed as in the above paragraph4 ,leaving the personal question1 however1 let me pass to the assertion that the difference of opinion respecting the test of necessity itself disproves the validity of the test4 ,two issues are here involved4 ,first1 if a particular proposition is by some accepted as a necessary belief1 but by one or more denied to be a necessary belief1 is the validity of the test of necessity thereby disproved in respect of that particular proposition8 ,second1 if the validity of the test is disproved in respect of that particular proposition1 does it therefore follow that the test cannot be depended on in other cases8--does it follow that there are no beliefs universally accepted as necessary1 and in respect of which the test of necessity is valid8 ,each of these questions may1 ,i think1 be rightly answered in the negative4 ,in alleging that if a belief is said by some to be necessary1 but by others to be not necessary1 the test of necessity is thereby shown to be no test1 ,mr4 ,mill tacitly assumes that all men have powers of introspection enabling them in all cases to say what consciousness testifies2 whereas a great proportion of men are incapable of correctly interpreting consciousness in any but its simplest modes1 and even the remainder are liable to mistake for dicta of consciousness what prove on closer examination not to be its dicta4 ,take the case of an arithmetical blunder4 #aig ,a boy adds up a column of figures1 and brings out a wrong total4 ,again he does it and again errs4 ,his master asks him to go through the process aloud1 and then hears him say 8#ce and #i are #df0--;an error which he had repeated on each occasion4 ,now without discussing the mental act through which we know that #ce and #i are #dd1 and through which we recognize the necessity of this relation1 it is clear that the boy's misinterpretation of consciousness1 leading him tacitly to deny this necessity by asserting that 8#ce and #i are #df10 cannot be held to prove that the relation is not necessary4 ,this1 and kindred misjudgments daily made by accountants1 merely show that there is a liability to overlook what are necessary connexions in our thoughts1 and to assume as necessary others which are not4 ,in these and hosts of cases1 men do not distinctly translate into their equivalent states of consciousness the words they use4 ,this negligence is with many so habitual1 that they are unaware that they have not clearly represented to themselves the propositions they assert2 and are then apt1 quite sincerely though erroneously1 to assert that they can think things which it is really impossible to think4 ,but supposing it to be true that whenever a particular belief is alleged to be necessary1 the existence of some who profess themselves able to believe otherwise1 proves that this belief is not necessary2 must it be therefore admitted that the test of necessity is invalid8 ,i think not4 ,men may mistake for necessary1 certain beliefs which are not necessary2 and yet it may remain true that there are necessary beliefs1 and that the necessity of such beliefs is our warrant for them4 ,were conclusions thus tested proved to be wrong in a hundred cases1 it would not follow that the test is an invalid one2 any more than it would follow from a hundred errors in the use of a logical formula1 that the logical formula is invalid4 ,if from the premise that all horned animals ruminate1 it were inferred that the rhinoceros1 being a horned animal1 ruminates2 the error would #aih furnish no argument against the worth of syllogisms in general--whatever their worth may be4 ,daily there are thousands of erroneous deductions which1 by those who draw them1 are supposed to be warranted by the data from which they draw them2 but no multiplication of such erroneous deductions is regarded as proving that there are no deductions truly drawn1 and that the drawing of deductions is illegitimate4 ,in these cases1 as in the case to which they are here paralleled1 the only thing shown is the need for verification of data and criticism of the acts of consciousness4 8,this argument10 says ,mr4 ,mill1 referring to the argument of necessity1 8applied to any of the disputed questions of philosophy1 is doubly illegitimate2 4 4 4 the very fact that the question is disputed1 disproves the alleged impossibility40 ,besides the foregoing replies to this1 there is another4 ,granting that there have been appeals illegitimately made to this test--granting that there are many questions too complex to be settled by it1 which men have nevertheless proposed to settle by it1 and have consequently got into controversy2 it may yet be truly asserted that in respect of all1 or almost all1 questions legitimately brought to judgment by this test1 there is no dispute about the answer4 ,from the earliest times on record down to our own1 men have not changed their beliefs concerning the truths of number4 ,the axiom that if equals be added to unequals the sums are unequal1 was held by the ,greeks no less than by ourselves1 as a direct verdict of consciousness1 from which there is no escape and no appeal4 ,each of the propositions of ,euclid appears to us absolutely beyond doubt as it did to them4 ,each step in each demonstration we accept1 as they accepted it1 because we immediately see that the alleged relation is as alleged1 and that it is impossible to conceive it otherwise4 ,illustration ,but how are legitimate appeals to the test to be distinguished8 ,the answer is not difficult to find4 ,mr4 ,mill #aii cites the belief in the antipodes as having been rejected by the ,greeks because inconceivable1 but as being held by ourselves to be both conceivable and true4 ,he has before given this instance1 and ,i have before objected to it 7,principles of ,psychology1 #dbh71 for the reason that the states of consciousness involved in the judgment are too complex to admit of any trustworthy verdict being given4 ,an illustration will show the difference between a legitimate appeal to the test and an illegitimate appeal to it4 ,a and ,b are two lines4 ,how is it decided that they are equal or not equal8 ,no way is open but that of comparing the two impressions they make on consciousness4 ,i know them to be unequal by an immediate act1 if the difference is great1 or if1 though only moderately different1 they are close together2 and supposing the difference is but slight1 ,i decide the question by putting the lines in apposition when they are movable1 or by carrying a movable line from one to the other if they are fixed4 ,but in any case1 ,i obtain in consciousness the testimony that the impression produced by the one line differs from that produced by the other4 ,of this difference ,i can give no further evidence than that ,i am conscious of it1 and find it impossible1 while contemplating the lines1 to get rid of the consciousness4 ,the proposition that the lines are unequal is a proposition of which the negation is inconceivable4 ,but now suppose it is asked whether ,b and ,c are equal2 or whether ,c and ,d are equal4 ,no positive answer is possible4 ,instead of its being #bjj inconceivable that ,b is longer than ,c1 or equal to it1 or shorter1 it is conceivable that it is any one of the three4 ,here an appeal to the direct verdict of consciousness is illegitimate1 because on transferring the attention from ,b to ,c1 or ,c to ,d1 the changes in the other elements of the impressions so entangle the elements to be compared1 as to prevent them from being put in apposition4 ,if the question of relative length is to be determined1 it must be by rectification of the bent line2 and this is done through a series of steps1 each one of which involves an immediate judgment akin to that by which ,a and ,b are compared4 ,now as here1 so in other cases1 it is only simple percepts or concepts respecting the relations of which immediate consciousness can satisfactorily testify2 and as here1 so in other cases1 it is by resolution into such simple percepts and concepts1 that true judgments respecting complex percepts and concepts are reached4 ,that things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one another1 is a fact which can be known by direct comparison of actual or ideal relations1 and can be known in no other way3 the proposition is one of which the negation is inconceivable1 and is rightly asserted on that warrant4 ,but that the square of the hypothenuse of a right-angled triangle equals the sum of the squares of the other two sides1 cannot be known immediately by comparison of two states of consciousness4 ,here the truth can be reached only mediately1 through a series of simple judgments respecting the likenesses or unlikenesses of certain relations3 each of which judgments is essentially of the same kind as that by which the above axiom is known1 and has the same warrant4 ,thus it becomes apparent that the fallacious result of the test of necessity which ,mr4 ,mill instances1 is due to a misapplication of the test4 ,these preliminary explanations have served to make clear the question at issue4 ,let us now pass to the essence of it4 99 99 99 99 99 ,metaphysical reasoning is usually vitiated by some covert #bja petitio principii4 ,either the thing to be proved or the thing to be disproved1 is tacitly assumed to be true in the course of the proof or disproof4 ,it is thus with the argument of ,idealism4 ,though the conclusion reached is that ,mind and ,ideas are the only existences2 yet the steps by which this conclusion is reached1 take for granted that external objects have just the kind of independent existence which is eventually denied4 ,if that extension which the ,idealist contends is merely an affection of consciousness1 has nothing out of consciousness answering to it2 then1 in each of his propositions concerning extension1 the word should always mean an affection of consciousness and nothing more4 ,but if wherever he speaks of distances and dimensions we write ideas of distances and dimensions1 his propositions are reduced to nonsense4 ,so1 too1 is it with ,scepticism4 ,the resolution of all knowledge into 8impressions0 and 8ideas10 is effected by an analysis which assumes at every step an objective reality producing the impressions and the subjective reality receiving them4 ,the reasoning becomes impossible if the existence of object and subject be not admitted at the outset4 ,agree with the ,sceptic's doubt1 and then propose to revise his argument so that it may harmonize with his doubt4 ,of the two alternatives between which he halts1 assume1 first1 the reality of object and subject4 ,his argument is practicable2 whether valid or not4 ,now assume that object and subject do not exist4 ,he cannot stir a step toward his conclusion--nay1 he cannot even state his conclusion2 for the word 8impression0 cannot be translated into thought without assuming a thing impressing and a thing impressed4 ,though ,empiricism1 as at present understood1 is not thus suicidal1 it is open to an analogous criticism on its method1 similarly telling against the validity of its inference4 ,it proposes to account for our so-called necessary beliefs1 as well as all our other beliefs2 and to do this without postulating any one belief as necessary4 ,bringing #bjb forward abundant evidence that the connexions among our states of consciousness are determined by our experiences--that two experiences frequently recurring together in consciousness1 become so coherent that one strongly suggests the other1 and that when their joint recurrence is perpetual and invariable1 the connexion between them becomes indissoluble2 it argues that the indissolubility1 so produced1 is all that we mean by necessity4 ,and then it seeks to explain each of our so-called necessary beliefs as thus originated4 ,now could pure ,empiricism reach this analysis and its subsequent synthesis without taking any thing for granted1 its arguments would be unobjectionable4 ,but it cannot do this4 ,examine its phraseology1 and there arises the question1 ,experiences of what8 ,translate the word into thought1 and it clearly involves something more than states of mind and the connexions among them4 ,for if it does not1 then the hypothesis is that states of mind are generated by the experiences of states of mind2 and if the inquiry be pursued1 this ends with initial states of mind which are not accounted for--the hypothesis fails4 ,evidently1 there is tacitly assumed something beyond the mind by which the 8experiences0 are produced--something in which exist the objective relations to which the subjective relations correspond--an external world4 ,refuse thus to explain the word 8experiences10 and the hypothesis becomes meaningless4 ,but now1 having thus postulated an external reality as the indispensable foundation of its reasonings1 pure ,empiricism can subsequently neither prove nor disprove its postulate4 ,an attempt to disprove it1 or to give it any other meaning than that originally involved1 is suicidal2 and an attempt to establish it by inference is reasoning in a circle4 ,what then are we to say of this proposition on which ,empiricism rests8 ,is it a necessary belief1 or is it not8 ,if necessary1 the hypothesis in its pure form is abandoned4 ,if not necessary--if not posited #bjc priori as absolutely certain--then the hypothesis rests on an uncertainty2 and the whole fabric of its argument is unstable4 ,more than this is true4 ,besides the insecurity implied by building on a foundation that is confessedly not beyond question1 there is the much greater insecurity implied by raising proposition upon proposition of which each is confessedly not beyond question4 ,for to say that there are no necessary truths1 is to say that each successive inference is not necessarily involved in its premises--is an empirical judgment--a judgment not certainly true4 ,hence1 applying rigorously its own doctrine1 we find that pure ,empiricism1 starting from an uncertainty and progressing through a series of uncertainties1 cannot claim much certainty for its conclusions4 ,doubtless1 it may be replied that any theory of human knowledge must set out with assumptions--either permanent or provisional2 and that the validity of these assumptions is to be determined by the results reached through them4 ,but that such assumptions may be made legitimately1 two things are required4 ,in the first place they must not be multiplied step after step as occasion requires2 otherwise the conclusion reached might as well be assumed at once4 ,and in the second place1 the fact that they are assumptions must not be lost sight of3 the conclusions drawn must not be put forward as though they have a certainty which the premises have not4 ,now pure ,empiricism1 in common with other theories of knowledge1 is open to the criticism1 that it neglects thus avowedly to recognize the nature of those primary assumptions which it lays down as provisionally valid1 if it denies that they can be necessarily valid4 ,and it is open to the further criticism1 that it goes on at every step in its argument making assumptions which it neglects to specify as provisional2 since they1 too1 cannot be known as necessary4 ,until it has assigned some warrant for its original datum and for each of its subsequent inferences1 or else has #bjd acknowledged them all to be but hypothetical1 it may be stopped either at the outset or at any stage in its argument4 ,against every 8because0 and every 8therefore10 an opponent may enter a caveat1 until he is told why it is asserted3 contending1 as he may1 that if this inference is not necessary he is not bound to accept it2 and that if it is necessary it must be openly declared to be necessary1 and some test must be assigned by which it is distinguished from propositions that are not necessary4 ,these considerations will1 ,i think1 make it obvious that the first step in a metaphysical argument1 rightly carried on1 must be an examination of propositions for the purpose of ascertaining what character is common to those which we call unquestionably true1 and is implied by asserting their unquestionable truth4 ,further1 to carry on this inquiry legitimately1 we must restrict our analysis rigorously to states of consciousness considered in their relations to one another3 wholly ignoring any thing beyond consciousness to which these states and their relations may be supposed to refer4 ,for if1 before we have ascertained by comparing propositions what is the trait that leads us to class some of them as certainly true1 we avowedly or tacitly take for granted the existence of something beyond consciousness2 then1 a particular proposition is assumed to be certainly true before we have ascertained what is the distinctive character of the propositions which we call certainly true1 and the analysis is vitiated4 ,if we cannot transcend consciousness--if1 therefore1 what we know as truth must be some mental state1 or some combination of mental states2 it must be possible for us to say in what way we distinguish this state or these states4 ,the definition of truth must be expressible in terms of consciousness2 and1 indeed1 cannot otherwise be expressed if consciousness cannot be transcended4 ,clearly1 then1 the metaphysician's first step must be to shut out from his investigation every thing but what is subjective2 not taking for granted the #bje existence of any thing objective corresponding to his ideas1 until he has ascertained what property of his ideas it is which he predicates by calling them true4 ,let us note the result if he does this4 99 99 99 99 99 ,the words of a proposition are the signs of certain states of consciousness2 and the thing alleged by a proposition is the connexion or disconnexion of the states of consciousness signified4 ,when thinking is carried on with precision--when the mental states which we call words1 are translated into the mental states they symbolize 7which they very frequently are not7--thinking a proposition consists in the occurrence together in consciousness of the subject and predicate4 8,the bird was brown10 is a proposition which implies the union in thought of a particular attribute with a group of other attributes4 ,when the inquirer compares various propositions thus rendered into states of consciousness1 he finds that they differ very greatly in respect of the facility with which the states of consciousness are connected and disconnected4 ,the mental state known as brown may be united with those mental states which make up the figure known as bird1 without appreciable effort1 or may be separated from them without appreciable effort3 the bird may easily be thought of as black1 or green1 or yellow4 ,contrariwise1 such an assertion as 8,the ice was hot10 is one to which he finds much difficulty in making his mind respond4 ,the elements of the proposition cannot be put together in thought without great resistance4 ,between those other states of consciousness which the word ice connotes1 and the state of consciousness named cold1 there is an extremely strong cohesion--a cohesion measured by the resistance to be overcome in thinking of the ice as hot4 ,further1 he finds that in many cases the states of consciousness grouped together cannot be separated at all4 ,the idea of pressure cannot be disconnected from the idea of something occupying space4 ,motion cannot be thought #bjf of without an object that moves being at the same time thought of4 ,and then1 besides these connexions in consciousness which remain absolute under all circumstances1 there are others which remain absolute under special circumstances4 ,between the elements of those more vivid states of consciousness which the inquirer distinguishes as perceptions1 he finds that there is a temporarily-indissoluble cohesion4 ,though when there arises in him that comparatively faint state of consciousness which he calls the idea of a book1 he can easily think of the book as red1 or brown1 or green2 yet when he has that much stronger consciousness which he calls seeing a book1 he finds that so long as there continue certain accompanying states of consciousness which he calls the conditions to perception1 those several states of consciousness which make up the perception cannot be disunited--he cannot think of the book as red1 or green1 or brown2 but finds that1 along with a certain figure1 there absolutely coheres a certain colour4 ,still shutting himself up within these limits1 let us suppose the inquirer to ask himself what he thinks about these various degrees of cohesion among his states of consciousness--how he names them1 and how he behaves toward them4 ,if there comes1 no matter whence1 the proposition--8,the bird was brown10 subject and predicate answering to these words spring up together in consciousness2 and if there is no opposing proposition1 he unites the specified and implied attributes without effort1 and believes the proposition4 ,if1 however1 the proposition is--8,the bird was necessarily brown10 he makes an experiment like those above described1 and finding that he can separate the attribute of brownness1 and can think of the bird as green or yellow1 he does not admit that the bird was necessarily brown4 ,when such a proposition as 8,the ice was cold0 arises in him1 the elements of the thought behave as before2 and so long as no test is applied1 the union of the consciousness of cold with the #bjg accompanying states of consciousness1 seems to be of the same nature as the union between those answering to the words brown and bird4 ,but should the proposition be changed into--8,the ice was necessarily cold10 quite a different result happens from that which happened in the previous case4 ,the ideas answering to subject and predicate are here so coherent1 that in the absence of careful examination they might pass as inseparable1 and the proposition be accepted4 ,but suppose the proposition is deliberately tested by trying whether ice can be thought of as not cold4 ,great resistance is offered in consciousness to this4 ,still1 by an effort1 he can imagine water to have its temperature of congelation higher than blood heat2 and can so think of congealed water as hot instead of cold4 ,now the extremely strong cohesion of states of consciousness1 thus experimentally proved by the difficulty of separating them1 he finds to be what he calls a strong belief4 ,once more1 in response to the words--8,along with motion there is something that moves10 he represents to himself a moving body2 and1 until he tries an experiment upon it1 he may suppose the elements of the representation to be united in the same way as those of the representations instanced above4 ,but supposing the proposition is modified into--8,along with motion there is necessarily something that moves10 the response made in thought to these words1 discloses the fact that the states of consciousness called up in this case are indissolubly connected in the way alleged4 ,he discovers this by trying to conceive the negation of the proposition--by trying to think of motion as not having along with it something that moves2 and his inability to conceive this negation is the obverse of his inability to tear asunder the states of consciousness which constitute the affirmation4 ,those propositions which survive this strain1 are the propositions he distinguishes as necessary4 ,whether or not he means any thing else by this word1 he evidently means that in his consciousness the connexions #bjh they predicate are1 so far as he can ascertain1 unalterable4 ,the bare fact is that he submits to them because he has no choice4 ,they rule his thoughts whether he will or not4 ,leaving out all questions concerning the origin of these connexions--all theories concerning their significations1 there remains in the inquirer the consciousness that certain of his states of consciousness are so welded together that all other links in the chain of consciousness yield before these give way4 ,continuing rigorously to exclude everything beyond consciousness1 let him now ask himself what he means by reasoning8 what is the essential nature of an argument8 what is the peculiarity of a conclusion8 ,analysis soon shows him that reasoning is the formation of a coherent series of states of consciousness4 ,he has found that the thoughts expressed by propositions1 vary in the cohesions of their subjects and predicates2 and he finds that at every step in an argument1 carefully carried on1 he tests the strengths of all the connexions asserted and implied4 ,he considers whether the object named really does belong to the class in which it is included--tries whether he can think of it as not like the things it is said to be like4 ,he considers whether the attribute alleged is really possessed by all members of the class--tries to think of some member of the class that has not the attribute--,and he admits the proposition only on finding1 by this criticism1 that there is a greater degree of cohesion in thought between its elements1 than between the elements of the counter-proposition4 ,thus testing the strength of each link in the argument1 he at length reaches the conclusion1 which he tests in the same way4 ,if he accepts it1 he does so because the argument has established in him an indirect cohesion between states of consciousness that were not directly coherent1 or not so coherent directly as the argument makes them indirectly4 ,but he accepts it only supposing that the connexion between the two states of consciousness #bji composing it1 is not resisted by some stronger counter-connexion4 ,if there happens to be an opposing argument1 of which the component thoughts are felt1 when tested1 to be more coherent2 or if1 in the absence of an opposing argument1 there exists an apposing conclusion1 of which the elements have some direct cohesion greater than that which the proffered argument indirectly gives2 then the conclusion reached by this argument is not admitted4 ,thus1 a discussion in consciousness proves to be simply a trial of strength between different connexions in consciousness--a systematized struggle serving to determine which are the least coherent states of consciousness4 ,and the result of the struggle is1 that the least coherent states of consciousness separate1 while the most coherent remain together--form a proposition of which the predicate persists in rising up in the mind along with its subject--constitute one of the connexions in thought which is distinguished as something known1 or as something believed1 according to its strength4 ,what corollary may the inquirer draw1 or rather what corollary must he draw1 on pushing the analysis to its limit8 ,if there are any indissoluble connexions1 he is compelled to accept them4 ,if certain states of consciousness absolutely cohere in certain ways1 he is obliged to think them in those ways4 ,the proposition is an identical one4 ,to say that they are necessities of thought is merely another way of saying that their elements cannot be torn asunder4 ,no reasoning can give to these absolute cohesions in thought any better warrant2 since all reasoning1 being a process of testing cohesions1 is itself carried on by accepting the absolute cohesions2 and can1 in the last resort1 do nothing more than present some absolute cohesions in justification of others--an act which unwarrantably assumes in the absolute cohesions it offers1 a greater value than is allowed to the absolute cohesions it would justify4 ,here1 then1 the inquirer comes down to an #baj ultimate mental uniformity--a universal law of his thinking4 ,how completely his thought is subordinated to this law1 is shown by the fact that he cannot even represent to himself the possibility of any other law4 ,to suppose the connexions among his states of consciousness to be otherwise determined1 is to suppose a smaller force overcoming a greater--a proposition which may be expressed in words but cannot be rendered into ideas4 ,no matter what he calls these indestructible relations1 no matter what he supposes to be their meanings1 he is completely fettered by them4 ,their indestructibility is the proof to him that his consciousness is imprisoned within them2 and supposing any of them to be in some way destroyed1 he perceives that indestructibility would still be the distinctive character of the bounds that remained--the test of those which he must continue to think4 ,these results the inquirer arrives at without assuming any other existence than that of his own consciousness4 ,they postulate nothing about mind or matter1 subject or object4 ,they leave wholly untouched the questions--what does consciousness imply8 and how is thought generated8 ,there is not involved in the analysis any hypothesis respecting the origin of these relations between thoughts--how there come to be feeble cohesions1 strong cohesions1 and absolute cohesions4 ,whatever some of the terms used may have seemed to connote1 it will be found1 on examining each step1 that nothing is essentially involved beyond states of mind and the connexions among them1 which are themselves other states of mind4 ,thus far1 the argument is not vitiated by any petitio principii4 ,should the inquirer enter upon the question1 ,how are these facts to be explained8 he must consider how any further investigation is to be conducted1 and what is the possible degree of validity of its conclusions4 ,remembering that he cannot transcend consciousness1 he sees that anything in the shape of an interpretation must be #baa subordinate to the laws of consciousness4 ,every hypothesis he entertains in trying to explain himself to himself1 being an hypothesis which can be dealt with by him only in terms of his mental states1 it follows that any process of explanation must itself be carried on by testing the cohesions among mental states1 and accepting the absolute cohesions4 ,his conclusions1 therefore1 reached only by repeated recognitions of this test of absolute cohesion1 can never have any higher validity than this test4 ,it matters not what name he gives to a conclusion--whether he calls it a belief1 a theory1 a fact1 or a truth4 ,these words can be themselves only names for certain relations among his states of consciousness4 ,any secondary meanings which he ascribes to them must also be meanings expressed in terms of consciousness1 and therefore subordinate to the laws of consciousness4 ,hence he has no appeal from this ultimate dictum2 and seeing this1 he sees that the only possible further achievement is the reconciliation of the dicta of consciousness with one another--the bringing all other dicta of consciousness into harmony with this ultimate dictum4 99 99 99 99 99 ,here1 then1 the inquirer discovers a warrant higher than that which any argument can give1 for asserting an objective existence4 ,mysterious as seems the consciousness of something which is yet out of consciousness1 he finds that he alleges the reality of this something in virtue of the ultimate law--he is obliged to think it4 ,there is an indissoluble cohesion between each of those vivid and definite states of consciousness which he calls a sensation1 and an indefinable consciousness which stands for a mode of being beyond sensation1 and separate from himself4 ,when grasping his fork and putting food into his mouth1 he is wholly unable to expel from his mind the notion of something which resists the force he is conscious of using2 and he cannot suppress the nascent thought of an independent existence keeping apart his tongue and palate1 and giving #bab him that sensation of taste which he is unable to generate in consciousness by his own activity4 ,though self-criticism shows him that he cannot know what this is which lies outside of him2 and though he may infer that not being able to say what it is1 it is a fiction2 he discovers that such self-criticism utterly fails to extinguish the consciousness of it as a reality4 ,any conclusion into which he argues himself1 that there is no objective existence connected with these subjective states1 proves to be a mere verbal conclusion to which his thoughts will not respond4 ,the relation survives every effort to destroy it--is proved by experiment1 repeated no matter how often1 to be one of which the negation is inconceivable2 and therefore one having supreme authority4 ,in vain he endeavours to give it any greater authority by reasoning2 for whichever of the two alternatives he sets out with1 leaves him at the end just where he started4 ,if1 knowing nothing more than his own states of consciousness1 he declines to acknowledge any thing beyond consciousness until it is proved1 he may go on reasoning for ever without getting any further2 since the perpetual elaboration of states of consciousness out of states of consciousness1 can never produce anything more than states of consciousness4 ,if1 contrariwise1 he postulates external existence1 and considers it as merely postulated1 then the whole fabric of his argument1 standing upon this postulate1 has no greater validity than the postulate gives it1 minus the possible invalidity of the argument itself4 ,the case must not be confounded with those cases in which an hypothesis1 or provisional assumption1 is eventually proved true by its agreement with facts2 for in these cases the facts with which it is found to agree1 are facts known in some other way than through the hypothesis3 a calculated eclipse of the moon serves as a verification of the hypothesis of gravitation1 because its occurrence is observable without taking for granted the hypothesis of gravitation4 ,but when the external world #bac is postulated1 and it is supposed that the validity of the postulate may be shown by the explanation of mental phenomena which it furnishes1 the vice is1 that the process of verification is itself possible only by assuming the thing to be proved4 ,but now1 recognizing the indissoluble cohesion between the consciousness of self and an unknown not-self1 as constituting a dictum of consciousness which he is both compelled to accept and is justified by analysis in accepting1 it is competent for the inquirer to consider whether1 setting out with this dictum1 he can base on it a satisfactory explanation of what he calls knowledge4 ,he finds such an explanation possible4 ,the hypothesis that the more or less coherent relations among his states of consciousness1 are generated by experience of the more or less constant relations in something beyond his consciousness1 furnishes him with solutions of numerous facts of consciousness3 not1 however1 of all1 if he assumes that this adjustment of inner to outer relations has resulted from his own experiences alone4 ,nevertheless1 if he allows himself to suppose that this moulding of thoughts into correspondence with things1 has been going on through countless preceding generations2 and that the effects of experiences have been inherited in the shape of modified organic structures2 then he is able to interpret all the phenomena4 ,it becomes possible to understand how these persistent cohesions among states of consciousness1 are themselves the products of often-repeated experiences2 and that even what are known as 8forms of thought10 are but the absolute internal uniformities generated by infinite repetitions of absolute external uniformities4 ,it becomes possible also to understand how1 in the course of organizing of these multiplying and widening experiences1 there may arise partially-wrong connexions in thought1 answering to limited converse with things2 and that these connexions in thought1 temporarily taken for indissoluble ones1 may afterwards be made dissoluble by presentation #bad of external relations at variance with them4 ,but even when this occurs1 it can afford no ground for questioning the test of indissolubility2 since the process by which some connexion previously accepted as indissoluble1 is broken1 is simply the establishment of some antagonistic connexion1 which proves1 on a trial of strength1 to be the stronger--which remains indissoluble when pitted against the other1 while the other gives way4 ,and this leaves the test just where it was2 showing only that there is a liability to error as to what are indissoluble connexions4 ,from the very beginning1 therefore1 to the very end of the explanation1 even down to the criticism of its conclusions and the discovery of its errors1 the validity of this test must be postulated4 ,whence it is manifest1 as before said1 that the whole business of explanation can be nothing more than that of bringing all other dicta of consciousness into harmony with this ultimate dictum4 99 99 99 99 99 ,to the positive justification of a proposition1 may be added that negative justification which is derived from the untenability of the counter-proposition4 ,when describing the attitude of pure ,empiricism1 some indications that its counter-proposition is untenable were given2 but it will be well here to state1 more specifically1 the fundamental objections to which it is open4 ,if the ultimate test of truth is not that here alleged1 then what is the ultimate test of truth8 ,and if there is no ultimate test of truth1 then what is the warrant for accepting certain propositions and rejecting others8 ,an opponent who denies the validity of this test1 may legitimately decline to furnish any test himself1 so long as he does not affirm any thing to be true2 but if he affirms some things to be true and others to be not true1 his warrant for doing so may fairly be demanded4 ,let us glance at the possible response to the demand4 ,if asked why he holds it to be unquestionably true that two quantities which differ #bae in unequal degrees from a third quantity are themselves unequal1 two replies seem open to him3 he may say that this is an ultimate fact of consciousness1 or that it is an induction from personal experiences4 ,the reply that it is an ultimate fact of consciousness1 raises the question1 ,how is an ultimate fact of consciousness distinguished8 ,all beliefs1 all conclusions1 all imaginations even1 are facts of consciousness2 and if some are to be accepted as beyond question because ultimate1 while others are not to be accepted as beyond question because not ultimate1 there comes the inevitable inquiry respecting the test of ultimacy4 ,on the other hand1 the reply that this truth is known only by induction from personal experiences1 suggests the query--,on what warrant are personal experiences asserted8 ,the testimony of experience is given only through memory2 and its worth depends wholly on the trustworthiness of memory4 ,is it1 then1 that the trustworthiness of memory is less open to doubt than the immediate consciousness that two quantities must be unequal if they differ from a third quantity in unequal degrees8 ,this can scarcely be alleged4 ,memory is notoriously uncertain4 ,we sometimes suppose ourselves to have said things which it turns out we did not say2 and we often forget seeing things which it is proved we did see4 ,we speak of many passages of our lives as seeming like dreams2 and can vaguely imagine the whole past to be an illusion4 ,we can go much further toward conceiving that our recollections do not answer to any actualities1 than we can go toward conceiving the non-existence of ,space4 ,but even supposing the deliverances of memory to be above criticism1 the most that can be said for the experiences to which memory testifies1 is that we are obliged to think we have had them--cannot conceive the negation of the proposition that we have had them2 and to say this is to assign the warrant which is repudiated4 ,a further counter-criticism may be made4 ,throughout the argument of pure ,empiricism1 it is tacitly assumed that #baf there may be a ,philosophy in which nothing is asserted but what is proved4 ,it proposes to admit into the coherent fabric of its conclusions1 no conclusion that is incapable of being established by evidence2 and it thus takes for granted that not only may all derivative truths be proved1 but also that proof may be given of the truths from which they are derived1 down to the very deepest4 ,the result of thus refusing to recognize some fundamental unproved truth1 is simply to leave its fabric of conclusions without a base4 ,the giving proof of any special proposition1 is the assimilation of it to some class of propositions known to be true4 ,if any doubt arises respecting the general proposition which is cited in justification of this special proposition1 the course is to show that this general proposition is deducible from a proposition or propositions of still greater generality2 and if pressed for proof of each such still more general proposition1 the only resource is to repeat the process4 ,is this process endless8 ,if so1 nothing can be proved--the whole series of propositions depends on some unassignable proposition4 ,has the process an end8 ,if so1 there must eventually be reached a widest proposition--one which cannot be justified by showing that it is included by any wider--one which cannot be proved4 ,or to put the argument otherwise3 ,every inference depends on premises2 every premise1 if it admits of proof1 depends on other premises2 and if the proof of the proof be continually demanded1 it must either end in an unproved premise1 or in the acknowledgment that there cannot be reached any premise on which the entire series of proofs depends4 ,hence ,philosophy1 if it does not avowedly stand on some datum underlying reason1 must acknowledge that it has nothing on which to stand4 99 99 99 99 99 ,the expression of divergence from ,mr4 ,mill on this fundamental question1 ,i have undertaken with reluctance1 only on finding it needful1 both on personal and on general #bag grounds1 that his statements and arguments should be met4 ,for two reasons1 especially1 ,i regret having thus to contend against the doctrine of one whose agreement ,i should value more than that of any other thinker4 ,in the first place1 the difference is1 ,i believe1 superficial rather than substantial2 for it is in the interests of the ,experience-,hypothesis that ,mr4 ,mill opposes the alleged criterion of truth2 while it is as harmonizing with the ,experience-,hypothesis1 and reconciling it with all the facts1 that ,i defend this criterion4 ,in the second place1 this lengthened exposition of a single point of difference1 unaccompanied by an exposition of the numerous points of concurrence1 unavoidably produces an appearance of dissent very far greater than that which exists4 ,mr4 ,mill1 however1 whose unswerving allegiance to truth is on all occasions so conspicuously displayed1 will fully recognize the justification for this utterance of disagreement on a matter of such profound importance1 philosophically considered2 and will not require any apology for the entire freedom with which ,i have criticised his views while seeking to substantiate my own4 #bah ,,replies ,,to ,,criticisms4 ,first published in ,the ,fortnightly ,review for ,november and ,december #ahgc4 ,when made by a competent reader1 an objection usually implies one of two things4 ,either the statement to which he demurs is wholly or partially untrue2 or1 if true1 it is presented in such a way as to permit misapprehension4 ,a need for some change or addition is in any case shown4 ,not recognizing the errors alleged1 but thinking rather that misapprehensions cause the dissent of those who have attacked the metaphysico-theological doctrines held by me1 ,i propose here to meet1 by explanations and arguments1 the chief objections urged3 partly with the view of justifying these doctrines1 and partly with the view of guarding against the wrong interpretations which it appears are apt to be made4 ,the pages of a periodical intended for general reading may be thought scarcely fitted for the treatment of these highly abstract questions4 ,there is now1 however1 so considerable a class interested in them1 and they are so deeply involved with the great changes of opinion in progress1 that ,i have ventured to hope for readers outside the circle of those who occupy themselves with philosophy4 ,of course the criticisms to be noticed ,i have selected1 #bai either because of their intrinsic force1 or because they come from men whose positions or reputations give them weight4 ,to meet more than a few of my opponents is out of the question4 99 99 99 99 99 ,let me begin with a criticism contained in the sermon preached by the ,rev4 ,principal ,caird before the ,british ,association1 on the occasion of its meeting in ,edinburgh1 in ,august1 #ahga4 ,expressed with a courtesy which1 happily1 is now less rare than of yore in theological controversy1 ,dr4 ,caird's objection might1 ,i think1 be admitted without involving essential change in the conclusion demurred to2 while it might be shown to tell with greater force against the conclusions of thinkers classed as orthodox1 ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton and ,dean ,mansel1 than against my own4 ,describing this as set forth by me1 ,dr4 ,caird says3 8,his thesis is that the provinces of science and religion are distinguished from each other as the known from the unknown and unknowable4 ,this thesis is maintained mainly on a critical examination of the nature of human intelligence1 in which the writer adopts and carries to its extreme logical results the doctrine of the relativity of human knowledge which1 propounded by ,kant1 has been reproduced with special application to theology by a famous school of philosophers in this country4 ,from the very nature of human intelligence1 it is attempted to be shown that it can only know what is finite and relative1 and that therefore the absolute and infinite the human mind is1 by an inherent and insuperable disability1 debarred from knowing4 4 4 4 4 ,may it not be asked1 for one thing1 whether in the assertion1 as the result of an examination of the human intellect1 that it is incapable of knowing what lies beyond the finite1 there is not involved an obvious self-contradiction8 ,the examination of the mind can be conducted only by the mind1 and if the instrument be1 as is alleged1 limited and defective1 the result of the inquiry must partake of that defectiveness4 ,again1 does not the knowledge of a limit imply already the power to transcend it8 ,in affirming that human science is incapable of crossing the bounds of the finite world1 is it not a necessary presupposition that you who so affirm have crossed these bounds80 ,that this objection is one ,i am not disinclined to recognize1 will be inferred when ,i state that it is one ,i have myself raised4 ,while preparing the second edition of the #bbj ,principles of ,psychology1 ,i found1 among my memoranda1 a note which still bore the wafers by which it had been attached to the original manuscript 7unless1 indeed1 it had been transferred from the ,,ms4 of ,first ,principles1 which its allusion seems to imply74 ,it was this3 8,i may here remark in passing that the several reasonings1 including the one above quoted1 by which ,sir ,william ,hamilton would demonstrate the pure relativity of our knowledge--reasonings which clearly establish many important truths1 and with which in the main ,i agree--are yet capable of being turned against himself1 when he definitely concludes that it is impossible for us to know the absolute4 ,for to positively assert that the absolute cannot be known1 is in a certain sense to assert a knowledge of it--is to know it as unknowable4 ,to affirm that human intelligence is confined to the conditioned1 is to put an absolute limit to human intelligence1 and implies absolute knowledge4 ,it seems to me that the #8learned ignorance' with which philosophy ends1 must be carried a step further2 and instead of positively saying that the absolute is unknowable1 we must say that we cannot tell whether it is knowable or not40 ,why ,i omitted this note ,i cannot now remember4 ,possibly it was because re-consideration disclosed a reply to the contained objection4 ,for while it is true that the intellect cannot prove its own competence1 since it must postulate its own competence in the course of the proof1 and so beg the question2 yet it does not follow that it cannot prove its own incompetence respecting questions of certain kinds4 ,its inability in respect of such questions has two conceivable causes4 ,it may be that the deliverances of ,reason in general are invalid1 in which case the incompetence of ,reason to solve questions of a certain class is implied by its general incompetence2 or it may be that the deliverances of ,reason1 valid within a certain range1 themselves end in the conclusion that ,reason is incapable beyond that range4 ,so that while there can be no proof of competence1 because competence is postulated in each step of the demonstration1 there may be proof of incompetence either 7#a7 if the successive deliverances forming the steps of the demonstration1 by severally evolving contradictions1 show their untrustworthiness1 or 7#b7 if1 being trustworthy1 #bba they lead to the result that on certain questions ,reason cannot give any deliverance4 ,reason leads both inductively and deductively to the conclusion that the sphere of ,reason is limited4 ,inductively1 this conclusion expresses the result of countless futile attempts to transcend this sphere--attempts to understand ,matter1 ,motion1 ,space1 ,time1 ,force1 in their ultimate natures--attempts which1 bringing us always to alternative impossibilities of thought1 warrant the inference that such attempts will continue to fail1 as they have hitherto failed4 ,deductively1 this conclusion expresses the result of mental analysis1 which shows us that the product of thought is in all cases a relation1 identified as such or such2 that the process of thought is the identification and classing of relations2 that therefore ,being in itself1 out of relation1 is unthinkable1 as not admitting of being brought within the form of thought4 ,that is to say1 deduction explains that failure of ,reason established as an induction from many experiments4 ,and to call in question the ability of ,reason to give this verdict against itself in respect of these transcendent problems1 is to call in question its ability to draw valid conclusions from premises2 which is to assert a general incompetence necessarily inclusive of the special incompetence4 99 99 99 99 99 ,closely connected with the foregoing1 is a criticism from ,dr4 ,mansel1 on which ,i may here make some comments4 ,in a note to his ,philosophy of the ,conditioned p4 #ci1 he says3 8,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer1 in his work on ,first ,principles1 endeavours to press ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton into the service of ,pantheism and ,positivism together0 a somewhat strange assertion1 by the way1 considering that ,i reject them both1 8by adopting the negative portion only of his philosophy--in which1 in common with many other writers1 he declares the absolute to be inconceivable by the mere intellect1--and rejecting the positive portions1 in which he most emphatically maintains that the belief in a personal ,god is imperatively demanded by the facts of our moral and emotional consciousness4 4 4 4 4 ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton's fundamental principle is1 that consciousness #bbb must be accepted entire1 and that the moral and religious feelings1 which are the primary source of our belief in a personal ,god1 are in no way invalidated by the merely negative inferences which have deluded men into the assumption of an impersonal absolute4 4 4 4 4 ,mr4 ,spencer1 on the other hand1 takes these negative inferences as the only basis of religion1 and abandons ,hamilton's great principle of the distinction between knowledge and belief40 ,putting these statements in the order most convenient for discussion1 ,i will deal first with the last of them4 ,instead of saying what he does1 ,dr4 ,mansel should have said that ,i decline to follow ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton in confounding two distinct1 and indeed radically-opposed1 meanings of the word belief4 ,this word 8is habitually applied to dicta of consciousness for which no proof can be assigned3 both those which are unprovable because they underlie all proof1 and those which are unprovable because of the absence of evidence40#bd ,in the pages of the ,fortnightly ,review for ,july1 #ahfe1 ,i exhibited this distinction as follows3 8,we commonly say we #8believe' a thing for which we can assign some preponderating evidence1 or concerning which we have received some indefinable impression4 ,we believe that the next ,house of ,commons will not abolish ,church-rates2 or we believe that a person on whose face we look is good-natured4 ,that is1 when we can give confessedly-inadequate proofs1 or no proofs at all1 for the things we think1 we call them #8beliefs4' ,and it is the peculiarity of these beliefs1 as contrasted with cognitions1 that their connexions with antecedent states of consciousness may be easily severed1 instead of being difficult to sever4 ,but unhappily1 the word #8belief' is also applied to each of those temporarily or permanently indissoluble connexions in consciousness1 for the acceptance of which the only warrant is that it cannot be got rid of4 ,saying that ,i feel a pain1 or hear a sound1 or see one line to be longer than another1 is saying that there has occurred in me a certain change of state2 and it is impossible for me to give a stronger evidence of this fact than that it is present to my mind4 4 4 4 4 #8,belief' having1 as above pointed out1 become the name of an impression for which we can give only a confessedly-inadequate reason1 or no reason at all2 it happens that when pushed hard respecting the warrant for any ultimate dictum of consciousness1 we say1 in the absence of all assignable reason1 that we believe it4 ,thus the two opposite poles of knowledge go under the same name2 and by the reverse connotations of this name1 as used for the most coherent and least coherent relations of thought1 profound misconceptions have been generated40 ,now that the belief which the moral and religious #bbc feelings are said to yield of a personal ,god1 is not one of the beliefs which are unprovable because they underlie all proof1 is obvious4 ,it needs but to remember that in works on ,natural ,theology1 the existence of a personal ,god is inferred from these moral and religious feelings1 to show that it is not contained in these feelings themselves1 or joined with them as an inseparable intuition4 ,it is not a belief like the beliefs which ,i now have that this is daylight1 and that there is open space before me--beliefs which cannot be proved because they are of equal simplicity with1 and of no less certainty than1 each step in a demonstration4 ,were it a belief of this most certain kind1 argument would be superfluous3 all races of men and every individual would have the belief in an inexpugnable form4 ,hence it is manifest that1 confusing the two very different states of consciousness called beliefs1 ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton ascribes to the second a certainty that belongs only to the first4 ,again1 neither ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton nor ,dr4 ,mansel has enabled us to distinguish those 8facts of our moral and emotional consciousness0 which imperatively demand the belief in a personal ,god1 from those facts of our 7or of men's7 8moral and emotional consciousness0 which1 in those having them1 imperatively demand beliefs that ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton would regard as untrue4 ,a ,new ,zealand chief1 discovering his wife in an infidelity1 killed the man2 the wife then killed herself that she might join her lover in the other world2 and the chief thereupon killed himself that he might go after them to defeat this intention4 ,these two acts of suicide furnish tolerably strong evidence that these ,new ,zealanders believed in another world to which1 they could go at will1 and fulfil their desires as they did here4 ,if they were asked the justification for this belief1 and if the arguments by which they sought to establish it were not admitted1 they might still fall back on emotional #bbd consciousness as yielding them an unshakeable foundation for it4 ,i do not see why a ,fiji ,islander1 adopting the ,hamiltonian argument1 should not justify by it his conviction that after being buried alive1 his life in the other world1 forthwith commencing at the age he has reached in this1 will similarly supply him with the joys of conquest and the gratifications of cannibalism4 ,that he has a conviction to this effect stronger than the religious convictions current among civilized people1 is proved by the fact that he goes to be buried alive quite willingly4 ,and as we may presume that his conviction is not the outcome of a demonstration1 it must be the outcome of some state of feeling--some 8emotional consciousness40 ,why1 then1 should he not assign the 8facts0 of his 8emotional consciousness0 as 8imperatively demanding0 this belief8 ,manifestly1 this principle that 8consciousness must be accepted entire10 either obliges us to accept as true the superstitions of all mankind1 or else obliges us to say that the consciousness of a certain limited class of cultivated people is alone meant4 ,if things are to be believed simply because the facts of emotional consciousness imperatively demand the beliefs1 ,i do not see why the actual existence of a ghost in a house1 is not inevitably implied by the intense fear of it that is aroused in the child or the servant4 ,lastly1 and chiefly1 ,i have to deal with ,dr4 ,mansel's statement that 8,mr4 ,spencer1 on the other hand1 takes these negative inferences as the only basis of religion40 ,this statement is exactly the reverse of the truth2 since ,i have contended1 against ,hamilton and against him1 that the consciousness of that which is manifested to us through phenomena is positive1 and not negative1 as they allege1 and that this positive consciousness supplies an indestructible basis for the religious sentiment 7,first ,principles1 #bf74 ,instead of giving here passages to show this1 ,i may fitly quote the statement and opinion of a #bbe foreign theologian4 ,m4 le pasteur ,grotz1 of the ,reformed ,church at ,nismes1 writes thus3 8,la science serait-elle done par nature ennemie de la religion8 pour tre religieux1 faut-il proscrire la science8--,c'est la science1 la science exprimentale qui va maintenant parler en faveur de la religion2 c'est elle qui1 par la bouche de l'un des penseurs 4 4 4 de notre poque1 ,m4 ,herbert ,spencer1 va rpondre la fois ,m4 ,vacherot et ,m4 ,comte40 99 99 99 99 99 8,ici1 ,m4 ,spencer discute la thorie de l'inconditionn2 entendez par ce mot3 ,dieu4 ,le philosophie cossais1 ,hamilton1 et son disciple1 ,m4 ,mansel1 disent comme nos positivistes franais3 #8,nous ne pouvons affirmer l'existence positive de quoi que ce soit au del des phnomnes4' ,seulement1 ,hamilton et son disciple se sparent de nos compatriotes en faisant intervenir une #8rvlation merveilleuse' qui nous fait croire l'existence de l'inconditionn1 et grce cette rvlation vraiment merveilleuse1 toute l'orthodoxie revient4 ,est-il vrai que nous ne puissions rien affirmer au del des phnomnes8 ,m4 ,spencer dclare qu'il y a dans cette assertion une grave erreur4 ,le ct logique1 dit-il fort justement1 n'est pas le seul2 il y a aussi le ct psychologique1 et1 selon nous1 il prouve que l'existence positive de l'absolu est une donne ncessaire de la conscience40 8,l est la base de l'accord entre la religion et la science4 ,dans un chapitre 4 4 4 4 intitul ,rconciliation1 ,m4 ,spencer etablit et dveloppe cet accord sur son vritable terrain40 99 99 99 99 99 8,m4 ,spencer1 en restant sur le terrain de la logique et de la psychologie1 et sans recourir une intervention surnaturelle1 a tabli la legitimit1 la ncessit et l'eternelle dure du sentiment religieux et de la religion40#be ,i turn next to what has been said by ,dr4 ,shadworth ,h4 ,hodgson1 in his essay on 8,the ,future of ,metaphysic10 published in the ,contemporary ,review for ,november1 #ahgb4 ,remarking only1 with respect to the agreements he expresses in certain views of mine1 that ,i value them as coming from a thinker of subtlety and independence1 ,i will confine myself here to his disagreements4 ,dr4 ,hodgson1 before giving his own view1 briefly describes and criticizes the views of ,hegel and ,comte1 with both of whom he partly agrees and partly disagrees1 and then #bbf proceeds to criticize the view set forth by me4 ,after a preliminary brief statement of my position1 to the wording of which ,i demur1 he goes on to say3 8,in his ,first ,principles1 ,part ,i1 second ed41 there is a chapter headed #8,ultimate ,scientific ,ideas1' in which he enumerates six such ideas or groups of ideas1 and attempts to show that they are entirely incomprehensible4 ,the six are3--#a4 ,space and ,time4 #b4 ,matter4 #c4 ,rest and ,motion4 #d4 ,force4 #e4 ,consciousness4 #f4 ,the ,soul1 or the ,ego4 ,now to enter at length into all of these would be an undertaking too large for the present occasion2 but ,i will take the first of the six1 and endeavour to show in its case the entire untenability of ,mr4 ,spencer's view2 and since the same arguments may be employed against the rest1 ,i shall be content that my case against them should be held to fail if my case should fail in respect to ,space and ,time40 ,i willingly join issue with ,dr4 ,hodgson on these terms2 and proceed to examine1 one by one1 the several arguments he uses to show the invalidity of my conclusions4 ,following his criticisms in the order he has chosen1 ,i begin with the sentence following that which ,i have just quoted4 ,the first part of it runs thus3--8,the metaphysical view of ,space and ,time is1 that they are elements in all phenomena1 whether the phenomena are presentations or representations40 ,whether1 by 8the metaphysical view10 is here meant the view of ,kant1 whether it means ,dr4 ,hodgson's own view1 or whether the expression has a more general meaning1 ,i have simply to reply that the metaphysical view is incorrect4 ,dealing with the ,kantian version of this doctrine1 that ,space is a form of intuition1 ,i have pointed out that only with certain classes of phenomena is ,space united indissolubly2 that ,kant habitually considers phenomena belonging to the visual and tactual groups1 with which the consciousness of space is inseparably joined1 and overlooks groups with which it is not inseparably joined4 ,though in the adult1 perception of sound has certain space-implications1 mostly1 if not wholly1 acquired by individual experience2 and though it would seem from the instructive experiments of ,mr4 ,spalding1 that in creatures born with nervous systems much more organized than our own are at birth1 #bbg there is some innate perception of the side from which a sound comes2 yet it is demonstrable that the space-implications of sound are not originally given with the sensation as its form of intuition4 ,bearing in mind the ,kantian doctrine1 that ,space is the form of sensuous intuitions not only as presented but also as represented1 let us examine critically our musical ideas4 ,as ,i have elsewhere suggested to the reader 8,let him observe what happens when some melody takes possession of his imagination4 ,its tones and cadences go on repeating themselves apart from any space-consciousness--they are not localized4 ,he may or may not be reminded of the place where he heard them--this association is incidental only4 ,having observed this1 he will see that such space-implications as sounds have1 are learnt in the course of individual experience1 and are not given with the sounds themselves4 ,indeed1 if we refer to the ,kantian definition of form1 we get a simple and conclusive proof of this4 ,kant says form is #8that which effects that the content of the phnomenon can be arranged under certain relations4' ,how then can the content of the phenomenon we call sound be arranged8 ,its parts can be arranged in order of sequence--that is1 in ,time4 ,but there is no possibility of arranging its parts in order of coexistence--that is1 in ,space4 ,and it is just the same with odour4 ,whoever thinks that sound and odour have ,space for their form of intuition1 may convince himself to the contrary by trying to find the right and left sides of a sound1 or to imagine an odour turned the other way upwards40--,principles of ,psychology1 #cii4--,note4 ,as ,i thus dissent1 not ,i think without good reason1 from 8the metaphysical view of ,space and ,time0 as 8elements in all phenomena10 it will naturally be expected that ,i dissent from the first criticism which ,dr4 ,hodgson proceeds to deduce from it4 ,dealing first with the arguments ,i have used to show the incomprehensibility of ,space and ,time1 if we consider them as objective1 and stating in other words the conclusion ,i draw1 that 8as ,space and ,time cannot be either nonentities nor the attributes of entities1 we have no choice but to consider them as entities40 ,dr4 ,hodgson continues3 8,so far good4 ,secondly1 he argues that they cannot be represented in thought as such real existences1 because #8to be conceived at all1 a thing must be conceived as having attributes4' ,now here the metaphysical doctrine enables us to conceive them as real existences1 and rebuts the argument for #bbh their inconceivability2 for the other element1 the material element1 the feeling or quality occupying ,space and ,time stands in the place and performs the function of the required attributes1 composing together with the space and time which is occupied the empirical phenomena of perception4 ,so far as this argument of ,mr4 ,spencer goes1 then1 we are entitled to say that his case for the inconceivability of ,space and ,time as real existences is not made out40 ,whether the fault is in me or not ,i cannot say1 but ,i fail to see that my argument is thus rebutted4 ,on the contrary1 it appears to me substantially conceded4 ,what kind of entity is that which can exist only when occupied by something else8 ,dr4 ,hodgson's own argument is a tacit assertion that ,space by itself cannot be conceived as an existence2 and this is all that ,i have alleged4 ,dr4 ,hodgson deals next with the further argument1 familiar to all readers1 which ,i have added as showing the insurmountable difficulty in the way of conceiving ,space and ,time as objective entities2 namely1 that 8all entities which we actually know as such are limited4 4 4 4 ,but of ,space and ,time we cannot assert either limitation1 or the absence of limitation40 ,without quoting at length the reasons ,dr4 ,hodgson gives for distinguishing between ,space as perceived and ,space as conceived1 it will suffice if ,i quote his own statement of the result to which they bring him3 8,so that ,space and ,time as perceived are not finite1 but infinite1 as conceived are not infinite1 but finite40 ,most readers will1 ,i think1 be startled by the assertion that conception is less extensive in range than perception2 but1 without dwelling on this1 ,i will content myself by asking in what case ,space is perceived as infinite8 ,surely ,dr4 ,hodgson does not mean to say that he can perceive the whole surrounding ,space at once--that the ,space behind is united in perception with the ,space in front4 ,yet this is the necessary implication of his words4 ,taking his statement less literally1 however1 and not dwelling on the fact that in perception ,space is habitually bounded by objects more or less distant1 let us test his #bbi assertion under the most favourable conditions4 ,supposing the eye directed upwards towards a clear sky2 is not the space then perceived1 laterally limited8 ,the visual area1 restricted by the visual apertures1 cannot include in perception even #ahj from side to side1 and is still more confined in a direction at right angles to this4 ,even in the third direction1 to which alone ,dr4 ,hodgson evidently refers1 it cannot properly be said that it is infinite in perception4 ,look at a position in the sky a thousand miles off4 ,now look at a position a million miles off4 ,what is the difference in perception8 ,nothing4 ,how then can an infinite distance be perceived when these immensely-unlike finite distances cannot be perceived as differing from one another1 or from an infinite distance8 ,dr4 ,hodgson has used the wrong word4 ,instead of saying that ,space as perceived is infinite1 he should have said that1 in perception1 ,space is finite in two dimensions1 and becomes indefinite in the third when this becomes great4 ,i now come to the paragraph beginning 8,mr4 ,spencer then turns to the second or subjective hypothesis1 that of ,kant40 ,this paragraph is somewhat difficult to deal with1 because in it my reasoning is criticized both from the ,kantian point of view and from ,dr4 ,hodgson's own point of view4 ,dissenting from ,kant's view1 ,dr4 ,hodgson says1 8,i hold that both ,space and ,time and ,feeling1 or the material element1 are equally and alike subjective1 equally and alike objective40 ,as ,i cannot understand this1 ,i am unable to deal with those arguments against me which ,dr4 ,hodgson bases upon it1 and must limit myself to that which he urges on behalf of ,kant4 ,he says3 8,but ,i think that ,mr4 ,spencer's representation of ,kant's view is very incorrect2 he seems to be misled by the large term non-ego4 ,kant held that ,space and ,time were in their origin subjective1 but when applied to the non-ego resulted in phenomena1 and were the formal element in those phenomena1 among which some were phenomena of the internal sense or ego1 others of the external sense or non-ego4 ,the non-ego to which the forms of ,space and ,time did not apply and did not belong1 was the ,ding-an-sich1 not the #bcj phenomenal non-ego4 ,hence the objective existence of ,space and ,time in phenomena1 but not in the ,ding-an-sich1 is a consistent and necessary consequence of ,kant's view of their subjective origin40 ,if ,i have misunderstood ,kant1 as thus alleged1 then my comment must be that ,i credited him with an hypothesis less objectionable than that which he held4 ,i supposed his view to be that ,space1 as a form of intuition belonging to the ego1 is imposed by it on the non-ego 7by which ,i understood the thing in itself7 in the act of intuition4 ,but now the ,kantian doctrine is said to be that ,space1 originating in the ego1 when applied to the non-ego1 results in phenomena 7the non-ego meant being1 in that case1 necessarily the ,ding-an-sich1 or thing in itself72 and that the phenomena so resulting become objective existences along with the ,space given to them by the subject4 ,the subject having imposed ,space as a form on the primordial object1 or thing in itself1 and so created phenomena1 this ,space thereupon becomes an objective existence1 independent of both the subject and the original thing in itself6 ,to ,dr4 ,hodgson this may seem a more tenable position than that which ,i ascribed to ,kant2 but to me it seems only a multiplication of inconceivabilities4 ,i am content to leave it as it stands3 not feeling my reasons for rejecting the ,kantian hypothesis much weakened4#bf ,the remaining reply which ,dr4 ,hodgson makes runs thus3 8,but ,mr4 ,spencer has a second argument to prove this inconceivability4 ,it is this3--#8,if ,space and ,time are forms of thought1 they can never be #bca thought of2 since it is impossible for anything to be at once the form of thought and the matter of thought4' 4 4 4 4 ,an instance will show the fallacy best4 ,syllogism is usually held to be a form of thought4 ,would it be any argument for the inconceivability of syllogisms to say1 they cannot be at once the form and the matter of thought8 ,can we not syllogize about syllogism8 ,or1 more plainly still1--no dog can bite himself1 for it is impossible to be at once the thing that bites and the thing that is bitten40 ,had ,dr4 ,hodgson quoted the whole of the passage from which he takes the above sentence2 or had he considered it in conjunction with the ,kantian doctrine to which it refers 7namely1 that ,space survives in consciousness when all contents are expelled1 which implies that then ,space is the thing with which consciousness is occupied1 or the object of consciousness71 he would have seen that his reply has none of the cogency he supposes4 ,if1 taking his first illustration1 he will ask himself whether it is possible to 8syllogize about syllogism10 when syllogism has no content whatever1 symbolic or other--has nonentity to serve for major1 nonentity for minor1 and nonentity for conclusion2 he will1 ,i think1 see that syllogism1 considered as surviving terms of every kind1 cannot be syllogized about3 the 8pure form0 of reason 7supposing it to be syllogism1 which it is not7 if absolutely discharged of all it contains1 cannot be represented in thought1 and therefore cannot be reasoned about4 ,following ,dr4 ,hodgson to his second illustration1 ,i must express my surprise that a metaphysician of his acuteness should have used it4 ,for an illustration to have any value1 the relation between the terms of the analogous case #bcb must have some parallelism to the relation between the terms of the case with which it is compared4 ,does ,dr4 ,hodgson really think that the relation between a dog and the part of himself which he bites1 is like the relation between matter and form8 ,suppose the dog bites his tail4 ,now the dog1 as biting1 stands1 according to ,dr4 ,hodgson1 for the form as the containing mental faculty2 and the tail1 as bitten1 stands for this mental faculty as contained4 ,now suppose the dog loses his tail4 ,can the faculty as containing and the faculty as contained be separated in the same way8 ,does the mental form when deprived of all content1 even itself 7granting that it can be its own content71 continue to exist in the same way that a dog continues to exist when he has lost his tail8 ,even had this illustration been applicable1 ,i should scarcely have expected ,dr4 ,hodgson to remain satisfied with it4 ,i should have thought he would prefer to meet my argument directly1 rather than indirectly4 ,why has he not shown the invalidity of the reasoning used in the ,principles of ,psychology 7 #cii1 #bnd ed478 ,having there quoted the statement of ,kant1 that 8,space and ,time are not merely forms of sensuous intuition1 but intuitions themselves20 ,i have written 8,if we inquire more closely1 this irreconcilability becomes still clearer4 ,kant says3--#8,that which in the phnomenon corresponds to the sensation1 ,i term its matter2 but that which effects that the content of the phenomenon can be arranged under certain relations1 ,i call its form4' ,carrying with us this definition of form1 as #8that which effects that the content 4 4 4 4 can be arranged under certain relations1' let us return to the case in which the intuition of ,space is the intuition which occupies consciousness4 ,can the content of this intuition #8be arranged under certain relations' or not8 ,it can be so arranged1 or rather1 it is so arranged4 ,space cannot be thought of save as having parts1 near and remote1 in this direction or the other4 ,hence1 if that is the form of a thing #8which effects that the content 4 4 4 4 can be arranged under certain relations1' it follows that when the content of consciousness is the intuition of ,space1 which has #8parts that can be arranged under certain relations1' there must be a form of that intuition4 ,what is it8 ,kant does not tell us--does not appear to perceive that there must be such a form2 and could not have perceived this without abandoning his hypothesis that the space-intuition is primordial40 ,now when ,dr4 ,hodgson has shown me how that 8which #bcc effects that the content 4 4 4 4 can be arranged under certain relations10 may also be that which effects its own arrangement under the same relations1 ,i shall be ready to surrender my position2 but until then1 no analogy drawn from the ability of a dog to bite himself will weigh much with me4 ,having1 as he considers1 disposed of the reasons given by me for concluding that1 considered in themselves1 8,space and ,time are wholly incomprehensible0 7he continually uses on my behalf the word 8inconceivable10 which1 by its unfit connotations1 gives a wrong aspect to my position71 ,dr4 ,hodgson goes on to say3- 8,yet ,mr4 ,spencer proceeds to use these inconceivable ideas as the basis of his philosophy4 ,for mark1 it is ,space and ,time as we know them1 the actual and phenomenal ,space and ,time1 to which all these inconceivabilities attach4 ,mr4 ,spencer's result1 ought1 therefore1 logically to be--,scepticism4 ,what is his actual result8 ,ontology4 ,and how so8 ,why1 instead of rejecting ,space and ,time as the inconceivable things he has tried to demonstrate them to be1 he substitutes for them an ,unknowable1 a something which they really are1 though we cannot know it1 and rejects that1 instead of them1 from knowledge40 ,this statement has caused me no little astonishment4 ,that having before him the volume from which he quotes1 so competent a reader should have so completely missed the meaning of the passages 7 #bf7 already referred to1 in which ,i have contended against ,hamilton and ,mansel1 makes me almost despair of being understood by any ordinary reader4 ,in that section ,i have1 in the first place1 contended that the consciousness of an ,ultimate ,reality1 though not capable of being made a thought1 properly so called1 because not capable of being brought within limits1 nevertheless remains as a consciousness that is positive3 is not rendered negative by the negations of limits4 ,i have pointed out that 8,the error1 7very naturally fallen into by philosophers intent on demonstrating the limits and conditions of consciousness71 consists in assuming that consciousness contains nothing but limits and conditions2 to the entire neglect of that which is limited and conditioned4 ,it is forgotten that there is something which alike forms the raw material of definite thought and remains after the definiteness which thinking gave to it has been #bcd destroyed0--something which 8ever persists in us as the body of a thought to which we can give no shape40 ,this positive element of consciousness it is which1 8at once necessarily indefinite and necessarily indestructible10 ,i regard as the consciousness of the ,unknowable ,reality4 ,yet ,dr4 ,hodgson says 8,mr4 ,spencer proceeds to use these inconceivable ideas as the basis of his philosophy30 implying that such basis consists of negations1 instead of consisting of that which persists notwithstanding the negation of limits4 ,and then1 beyond this perversion1 or almost inversion1 of meaning1 he conveys the notion that ,i take as the basis of philosophy1 the 8inconceivable ideas0 8or self-contradictory notions0 which result when we endeavour to comprehend ,space and ,time4 ,he speaks of me as proposing to evolve substance out of form1 or rather1 out of the negations of forms--gives his readers no conception that the ,power manifested to us is that which ,i regard as the ,unknowable1 while what we call ,space and ,time answer to the unknowable nexus of its manifestations4 ,and yet the chapter from which ,i quote1 and still more the chapter which follows it1 makes this clear--as clear1 at least1 as ,i can make it by carefully-worded statements and re-statements4 99 99 99 99 99 ,philosophical systems1 like theological ones1 following the law of evolution in general1 severally become in course of time more rigid1 while becoming more complex and more definite2 and they similarly become less alterable--resist all compromise1 and have to be replaced by the more plastic systems that descend from them4 ,it is thus with pure ,empiricism and pure ,transcendentalism4 ,down to the present time disciples of ,locke have continued to hold that all mental phenomena are interpretable as results of accumulated individual experiences2 and1 by criticism1 have been led simply to elaborate their interpretations--ignoring the proofs of inadequacy4 ,on the other hand1 disciples of ,kant1 #bce asserting this inadequacy1 and led by perception of it to adopt an antagonist theory1 have persisted in defending that theory under a form presenting fatal inconsistencies4 ,and then1 when there is offered a mode of reconciliation1 the spirit of no-compromise is displayed3 each side continuing to claim the whole truth4 ,after it has been pointed out that all the obstacles in the way of the experiential doctrine disappear if the effects of ancestral experiences are joined with the effects of individual experiences1 the old form of the doctrine is still adhered to4 ,and meanwhile ,kantists persist in asserting that the ego is born with intuitional forms which are wholly independent of anything in the non-ego1 after it has been shown that the innateness of these intuitional forms may be so understood as to escape the insurmountable difficulties of the hypothesis as originally expressed4 ,i am led to say this by reading the remarks concerning my own views1 made with an urbanity ,i hope to imitate1 by ,professor ,max ,mller1 in a lecture delivered at the ,royal ,institution in ,march1 #ahgc4bg ,before dealing with the criticisms contained in this lecture1 ,i must enter a demurrer against that interpretation of my views by which ,professor ,max ,mller makes it appear that they are more allied to those of ,kant than to those of ,locke4 ,he says3 8,whether the pre-historic genesis of these congenital dispositions or inherited necessities of thought1 as suggested by ,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer1 be right or wrong1 does not signify for the purpose which ,kant had in view4 ,in admitting that there is something in our mind1 which is not the result of our own posteriori experience1 ,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer is a thorough ,kantian1 and we shall see that he is a ,kantian in other respects too4 ,if it could be proved that nervous modifications1 accumulated from generation to generation1 could result in nervous structures that are fixed in proportion as the outer relations to which they answer are fixed1 we1 as followers of ,kant1 should only have to put in the place of ,kant's intuitions of ,space and ,time #8the constant space-relations expressed in definite nervous structures1 congenitally framed to act in definite ways1 and incapable of acting in any other #bcf way4' ,if ,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer had not misunderstood the exact meaning of what ,kant calls the intuitions of ,space and ,time1 he would have perceived that1 barring his theory of the pre-historic origin of these intuitions1 he was quite at one with ,kant40 ,on this passage let me remark1 first1 that the word 8pre-historic10 ordinarily employed only in respect to human history1 is misleading when applied to the history of ,life in general2 and his use of it leaves me in some doubt whether ,professor ,max ,mller has rightly conceived the hypothesis he refers to4 ,my second comment is1 that the description of me as 8quite at one with ,kant10 8barring0 the 8theory of the prehistoric origin of these intuitions10 curiously implies that it is a matter of comparative indifference whether the forms of thought are held to be naturally generated by intercourse between the organism and its environing relations1 during the evolution of the lowest into the highest types1 or whether such forms are held to be supernaturally given to the human mind1 and are independent both of environing relations and of ancestral minds4 ,but now1 addressing myself to the essential point1 ,i must meet the statement that ,i have 8misunderstood the exact meaning of what ,kant calls the intuitions of ,space and ,time10 by saying that ,i think ,professor ,max ,mller has overlooked certain passages which justify my interpretation1 and render his interpretation untenable4 ,for ,kant says 8,space is nothing else than the form of all phenomena of the external sense20 further1 he says that 8,time is nothing but the form of our internal intuition20 and1 to repeat words ,i have used elsewhere1 8,he distinctly shuts out the supposition that there are forms of the non-ego to which these forms of the ego correspond1 by saying that #8,space is not a conception which has been derived from outward experiences4'0 ,now so far from being in harmony with1 these statements are in direct contradiction to1 the view which ,i hold2 and seem to me absolutely irreconcilable with it4 ,how can it be said that1 8barring0 a difference represented as trivial1 ,i am #bcg 8quite at one with ,kant10 when ,i contend that these subjective forms of intuition are moulded into correspondence with1 and therefore derived from1 some objective form or nexus1 and therefore dependent upon it2 while the ,kantian hypothesis is that these subjective forms are not derived from the object1 but pre-exist in the subject--are imposed by the ego on the non-ego4 ,it seems to me that not only do ,kant's words1 as above given1 exclude the view which ,i hold1 but also that ,kant could not consistently have held any such view4 ,rightly recognizing1 as he did1 these forms of intuition as innate1 he was1 from his stand-point1 obliged to regard them as imposed on the matter of intuition in the act of intuition4 ,in the absence of the hypothesis that intelligence has been evolved1 it was not possible for him to regard these subjective forms as having been derived from objective forms4 ,a disciple of ,locke might1 ,i think1 say that the ,evolution-view of our consciousness of ,space and ,time is essentially ,lockian1 with more truth than ,professor ,max ,mller can represent it as essentially ,kantian4 ,the ,evolution-view is completely experiential4 ,it differs from the original view of the experientialists by containing a great extension of that view4 ,with the relatively-small effects of individual experiences1 it joins the relatively-vast effects of the experiences of antecedent individuals4 ,but the view of ,kant is avowedly and absolutely unexperiential4 ,surely this makes the predominance of kinship manifest4 ,in ,professor ,max ,mller's replies to my criticisms on ,kant1 ,i cannot see greater validity than in this affiliation to which ,i have demurred4 ,one of his arguments is that which ,dr4 ,hodgson has used1 and which ,i have already answered2 and ,i think that the others1 when compared with the passages of the ,principles of ,psychology which they concern1 will not be found adequate4 ,i refer to them here #bch chiefly for the purpose of pointing out that when he speaks of me as bringing 8three arguments against ,kant's view10 he understates the number4 ,let me close what ,i have to say on this disputed question1 by quoting the summary of reasons ,i have given for rejecting the ,kantian hypothesis3 8,kant tells us that ,space is the form of all external intuition2 which is not true4 ,he tells us that the consciousness of ,space continues when the consciousness of all things contained in it is suppressed2 which is also not true4 ,from these alleged facts he infers that ,space is an priori form of intuition4 ,i say infers1 because this conclusion is not presented in necessary union with the premises1 in the same way that the consciousness of duality is necessarily presented along with the consciousness of inequality2 but it is a conclusion voluntarily drawn for the purpose of explaining the alleged facts4 ,and then that we may accept this conclusion1 which is not necessarily presented along with these alleged facts which are not true1 we are obliged to affirm several propositions which cannot be rendered into thought4 ,when ,space is itself contemplated1 we have to conceive it as at once the form of intuition and the matter of intuition2 which is impossible4 ,we have to unite that which we are conscious of as ,space with that which we are conscious of as the ego1 and contemplate the one as a property of the other2 which is impossible4 ,we have at the same time to disunite that which we are conscious of as ,space1 from that which we are conscious of as the non-ego1 and contemplate the one as separate from the other2 which is also impossible4 ,further1 this hypothesis that ,space is 8nothing else0 than a form of intuition belonging wholly to the ego1 commits us to one of the two alternatives1 that the non-ego is formless or that its form produces absolutely no effect upon the ego2 both of which alternatives involve us in impossibilities of thought40--,prin4 of ,psy41 #cii4 ,objections of another1 though allied1 class have been made in a review of the ,principles of ,psychology by ,mr4 ,h4 ,sidgwick--a critic whose remarks on questions of mental philosophy always deserve respectful consideration4 ,mr4 ,sidgwick's chief aim is to show what he calls 8the mazy inconsistency of his my metaphysical results40 ,more specifically1 he expresses thus the proposition he seeks to justify--8,his view of the subject appears to have a fundamental incoherence1 which shows itself in various ways on the surface of his exposition1 but of which the root lies #bci much deeper1 in his inability to harmonise different lines of thought40 ,before dealing with the reasons given for this judgment1 let me say that1 in addition to the value which candid criticisms have as showing where more explanation is needed1 they are almost indispensable as revealing to a writer incongruities he had not perceived4 ,especially where1 as in this case1 the subject-matter has many aspects1 and where the words supplied by our language are so inadequate in number that1 to avoid cumbrous circumlocution1 they have to be used in senses that vary according to the context1 it is extremely difficult to avoid imperfections of statement4 ,but while ,i acknowledge sundry such imperfections and the resulting incongruities1 ,i cannot see that these are1 as ,mr4 ,sidgwick says1 fundamental4 ,contrariwise1 their superficiality seems to me proved by the fact that they may be rectified without otherwise altering the expositions in which they occur4 ,here is an instance4 ,mr4 ,sidgwick points out that1 when treating of the 8,data of ,psychology10 ,i have said 7in #ef7 that1 though we reach inferentially 8the belief that mind and nervous action are the subjective and objective faces of the same thing1 we remain utterly incapable of seeing1 and even of imagining1 how the two are related0 7,i quote the passage more fully than he does74 ,he then goes on to show that in the 8,special ,synthesis10 where ,i have sketched the evolution of ,intelligence under its objective aspect1 as displayed in the processes by which beings of various grades adjust themselves to surrounding actions1 ,i 8speak as if0 we could see how consciousness 8naturally arises at a particular stage0 of nervous action4 ,the chapter he here refers to is one describing that 8differentiation of the psychical from the physical life0 which accompanies advancing organization1 and more especially advancing development of the nervous system4 ,in it ,i have shown #bdj that1 while the changes constituting physical life continue to be characterized by the simultaneity with which all kinds of them go on throughout the organism1 the changes constituting psychical life1 arising as the nervous system develops1 become gradually more distinguished by their seriality4 ,and ,i have said that as nervous integration advances1 8there must result an unbroken series of these changes--there must arise a consciousness40 ,now ,i admit that here is an apparent inconsistency4 ,i ought to have said that 8there must result an unbroken series of these changes10 which1 taking place in the nervous system of a highly-organized creature1 gives coherence to its conduct2 and along with which we assume a consciousness1 because consciousness goes along with coherent conduct in ourselves4 ,if ,mr4 ,sidgwick will substitute this statement for the statement as it stands1 he will see that the arguments and conclusions remain intact4 ,a survey of the chapter as a whole1 proves that its aim is not in the least to explain how nervous changes1 considered as waves of molecular motion1 become the feelings constituting consciousness2 but that1 contemplating the facts objectively in living creatures at large1 it points out the cardinal distinction between vital actions in general1 and those particular vital actions which1 in a creature displaying them1 lead us to speak of it as intelligent4 ,it is shown that the rise of such actions becomes marked in proportion as the changes taking place in the part called the nervous system1 are made more and more distinctly serial1 by union in a supreme centre of co-ordination4 ,the introduction of the word consciousness1 arises in the effort to show what fundamental character there is in these particular physiological changes which is parallel to a fundamental character in the psychological changes4 ,another instance of the way in which ,mr4 ,sidgwick evolves an incongruity which he considers fundamental1 out of what ,i should have thought he would see is a #bda defective expression1 ,i will give in his own words4 ,speaking of a certain view of mine1 he says3 8,he tells us that #8logic 4 4 4 contemplates in its propositions certain connexions predicated1 which are necessarily involved with certain other connexions given3 regarding all these connexions as existing in the non-ego--not1 it may be1 under the form in which we know them1 but in some form4' ,but in #dgc1 where ,mr4 ,spencer illustrates by a diagram his #8,transfigured ,realism1' the view seems to be this3 although we cannot say that the real non-ego resembles our notion of it in #8its elements1 relations1 or laws1' we can say that #8a change in the objective reality causes in the subjective state a change exactly answering to it--so answering as to constitute a cognition of it4' ,here the #8something beyond consciousness' is no longer said to be unknown1 as its effect in consciousness #8constitutes a cognition of it4'0 ,this apparent inconsistency1 marked by the italics1 would not have existed if1 instead of 8a cognition of it10 ,i had said1 as ,i ought to have said1 8what we call a cognition of it0--that is1 a relative cognition as distinguished from an absolute cognition4 ,in ordinary language we speak of as cognitions1 those connexions in thought which so guide us in our dealings with things1 that actual experience verifies ideal anticipation3 marking off1 by opposed words1 those connexions in thought which mis-guide us4 ,the difference between accepting a cognition as relatively true and accepting it as absolutely true1 will be clearly shown by an illustration4 ,there is no direct resemblance whatever between the sizes1 forms1 colours1 and arrangements1 of the figures in an account-book1 and the moneys or goods1 debts or credits1 represented by them2 and yet the forms and arrangements of the written symbols1 are such as answer in a perfectly-exact way to stocks of various commodities and to various kinds of transactions4 ,hence we say1 figuratively1 that the account-book will 8tell us0 all about these stocks and transactions4 ,similarly1 the diagram ,mr4 ,sidgwick refers to1 suggests a way in which symbols1 registered in us by objects1 may have forms and arrangements wholly unlike their objective causes and the nexus among those causes1 while yet they are so related as to guide us correctly in our transactions #bdb with those objective causes1 and1 in that sense1 constitute cognitions of them2 though they no more constitute cognitions in the absolute sense1 than do the guiding symbols in the account-book constitute cognitions of the things to which they refer4 ,so repeatedly is this view implied throughout the ,principles of ,psychology1 that ,i am surprised to find a laxity of expression raising the suspicion that ,i entertain any other4 ,to follow ,mr4 ,sidgwick through sundry criticisms of like kind1 which may be similarly met1 would take more space than ,i can here afford4 ,i must restrict myself now to the alleged 8fundamental incoherence0 of which he thinks these inconsistencies are signs4 ,i refer to that reconciliation of ,realism and ,idealism considered by him as an impossible compromise4 ,a difficulty is habitually felt in accepting a coalition after long conflict4 ,whoever has espoused one of two antagonist views1 and1 in defending it1 has gained a certain comprehension of the opposite view1 becomes accustomed to regard these as the only alternatives1 and is puzzled by an hypothesis which is at once both and neither4 ,yet1 since it turns out in nearly all cases that1 of conflicting doctrines1 each contains an element of truth1 and that controversy ends by combination of their respective half-truths1 there is a priori probability on the side of an hypothesis which qualifies ,realism by ,idealism4 ,mr4 ,sidgwick expresses his astonishment1 or rather bespeaks that of his readers1 because1 while ,i accept ,idealistic criticisms1 ,i nevertheless defend the fundamental intuition of ,common ,sense2 and1 as he puts it1 8fires his my argument full in the face of ,kant1 ,mill1 and #8metaphysicians' generally40 8,he tells us that #8metaphysicians' illegitimately assume that #8beliefs reached through complex intellectual processes1' are more valid than #8beliefs reached through simple intellectual processes2' that the common language they use refuses to express their hypotheses1 and thus their reasoning inevitably implies the common notions which they repudiate2 that the belief of ,realism has the advantage of #8priority1' #8simplicity1' #8distinctness4' #bdc ,but surely this prior1 simple1 distinctly affirmed belief is that of what ,mr4 ,spencer terms #8crude ,realism'1 the belief that the non-ego is per se extended1 solid1 even coloured 7if not resonant and odorous74 ,this is what common language implies2 and the argument by which ,mr4 ,spencer proves the relativity of feelings and relations1 still more the subtle and complicated analysis by which he resolves our notion of extension into an aggregate of feelings and transitions of feeling1 lead us away from our original simple belief--that 7e4g47 the green grass we see exists out of consciousness as we see it--just as much as the reasonings of ,idealism1 ,scepticism1 or ,kantism40 ,on the face of it the anomaly seems great2 but ,i should have thought that after reading the chapter on 8,transfigured ,realism10 a critic of ,mr4 ,sidgwick's acuteness would have seen the solution of it4 ,he has overlooked an essential distinction4 ,all which my argument implies is that the direct intuition of ,realism must be held of superior authority to the arguments of ,anti-,realism1 where their deliverances cannot be reconciled4 ,the one point on which their deliverances cannot be reconciled1 is the existence of an objective reality4 ,but while1 against this intuition of ,realism1 ,i hold the arguments of ,anti-,realism to be powerless1 because they cannot be carried on without postulating that which they end by denying2 yet1 having admitted objective existence as a necessary postulate1 it is possible to make valid criticisms upon all those judgments which ,crude ,realism joins with this primordial judgment3 it is possible to show that a transfigured interpretation of properties and relations1 is more tenable than the original interpretation4 ,to elucidate the matter1 let us take the most familiar case in which the indirect judgments of ,reason correct the direct judgments of ,common ,sense4 ,the direct judgment of ,common ,sense is that the ,sun moves round the ,earth4 ,in course of time1 ,reason1 finding some facts at variance with this1 begins to doubt2 and1 eventually1 hits upon an hypothesis which explains the anomalies1 but which denies this apparently-certain dictum of ,common ,sense4 ,what is the reconciliation8 ,it consists in showing #bdd to ,common ,sense that the new interpretation equally well corresponds with direct intuition1 while it avoids all the difficulties4 ,common ,sense is reminded that the apparent motion of an object may be due either to its actual motion or to the motion of the observer2 and that there are terrestrial experiences in which the observer thinks an object he looks at is moving1 when the motion is in himself4 ,extending the conception thus given1 ,reason shows that if the ,earth revolves on its axis1 there will result that apparent motion of the ,sun which ,common ,sense interpreted into an actual motion of the ,sun2 and the common-sense observer thereupon becomes able to think of sunrise and sunset as due to his position as spectator on a vast revolving globe4 ,now if the astronomer1 setting out by recognizing these celestial appearances1 and proceeding to evolve the various anomalies following from the common-sense interpretation of them1 had drawn the conclusion that there externally exist no ,sun and no motion at all1 he would have done what ,idealists do2 and his arguments would have been equally powerless against the intuition of ,common ,sense4 ,but he does nothing of the kind4 ,he accepts the intuition of ,common ,sense respecting the reality of the ,sun and of the motion2 but replaces the old interpretation of the motion by a new interpretation reconcilable with all the facts4 ,everyone must see that here1 acceptance of the inexpugnable element in the common-sense judgment1 by no means involves acceptance of the accompanying judgments2 and ,i contend that the like discrimination must be made in the case we are considering4 ,it does not follow that while1 against the consciousness which ,crude ,realism has of an objective reality1 the arguments of ,anti-,realism are futile1 they are therefore futile against the conceptions which ,crude ,realism forms of the objective reality4 ,if ,anti-,realism can show that1 granting an objective reality1 the interpretation of ,crude ,realism contains insuperable #bde difficulties1 the process is quite legitimate4 ,and1 its primordial intuition remaining unshaken1 ,realism may1 on reconsideration1 be enabled to frame a new conception which harmonizes all the facts4 ,to show that there is not here the 8mazy inconsistency0 alleged1 let us take the case of sound as interpreted by ,crude ,realism1 and as re-interpreted by ,transfigured ,realism4 ,crude ,realism assumes the sound present in consciousness to exist as such beyond consciousness4 ,anti-,realism proves the inadmissibility of this assumption in sundry ways 7all of which1 however1 set out by talking of sounding bodies beyond consciousness1 just as ,realism talks of them72 and then ,anti-,realism concludes that we know of no existence save the sound as a mode of consciousness3 which conclusion1 and all kindred conclusions1 ,i contend are vicious--first1 because all the words used connote an objective activity2 second1 because the arguments are impossible without postulating at the outset an objective activity2 and third1 because no one of the intuitions out of which the arguments are built1 is of equal validity with the single intuition of ,realism that an objective activity exists4 ,but now the ,transfigured ,realism which ,mr4 ,sidgwick thinks 8has all the serious incongruity of an intense metaphysical dream10 neither affirms the untenable conception of ,crude ,realism1 nor1 like ,anti-,realism1 draws unthinkable conclusions by suicidal arguments2 but1 accepting that which is essential in ,crude ,realism1 and admitting the difficulties which ,anti-,realism insists upon1 reconciles matters by a re-interpretation analogous to that which an astronomer makes of the solar motion4 ,continuing all along to recognize an objective activity which ,crude ,realism calls sound1 it shows that the answering sensation is produced by a succession of separate impacts which1 if made slowly1 may be separately identified1 and which will1 if progressively increased in rapidity1 produce tones higher and higher in pitch4 ,it #bdf shows by other experiments that sounding bodies are in states of vibration1 and that the vibrations may be made visible4 ,and it concludes that the objective activity is not what it subjectively seems1 but is proximately interpretable as a succession of arial waves4 ,thus ,crude ,realism is shown that while there unquestionably exists an objective activity corresponding to the sensation known as sound1 yet the facts are not explicable on the original supposition that this is like the sensation2 while they are explicable by conceiving it as a rhythmical mechanical action4 ,eventually this re-interpretation1 joined with kindred reinterpretations of other sensations1 comes to be itself further transfigured by analysis of its terms1 and re-expression of them in terms of molecular motion2 but1 however abstract the interpretation ultimately reached1 the objective activity continues to be postulated3 the primordial judgment of ,crude ,realism remains unchanged1 though it has to change the rest of its judgments4 ,in another part of his argument1 however1 ,mr4 ,sidgwick implies that ,i have no right to use those conceptions of objective existence by which this compromise is effected4 ,quoting sundry passages to show that while ,i hold the criticisms of the ,idealist to be impossible without 8tacitly or avowedly postulating an unknown something beyond consciousness10 ,i yet admit that 8our states of consciousness are the only things we can know20 he goes on to argue that ,i am radically inconsistent1 because1 in interpreting the phenomena of consciousness1 ,i continually postulate1 not an unknown something1 but a something of which ,i speak in ordinary terms1 as though its ascribed physical characters really exist as such1 instead of being1 as ,i admit they are1 synthetic states of my consciousness4 ,his objection1 if ,i understand it1 is that for the purposes of ,objective ,psychology ,i apparently profess to know ,matter and ,motion in the ordinary realistic way2 while1 as a result of subjective analysis1 ,i reach the conclusion that #bdg it is impossible to have that knowledge of objective existence which ,realism supposes we have4 ,doubtless there seems here to be what he calls 8a fundamental incoherence40 ,but ,i think it exists1 not between my two expositions1 but between the two consciousnesses of subjective and objective existence1 which we cannot suppress and yet cannot put into definite forms4 ,the alleged incoherence ,i take to be but another name for the inscrutability of the relation between subjective feeling and its objective correlate which is not feeling--an inscrutability which meets us at the bottom of all our analyses4 ,an exposition of this inscrutability ,i have elsewhere summed up thus3 8,see1 then1 our predicament4 ,we can think of ,matter only in terms of ,mind4 ,we can think of ,mind only in terms of ,matter4 ,when we have pushed our explorations of the first to the uttermost limit1 we are referred to the second for a final answer2 and when we have got the final answer of the second1 we are referred back to the first for an interpretation of it4 ,we find the value of x in terms of y2 then we find the value of y in terms of x2 and so on we may continue for ever without coming nearer to a solution40--,prin4 of ,psy4 #bgb4 ,carrying a little further this simile1 will1 ,i think1 show where lies the insuperable difficulty felt by ,mr4 ,sidgwick4 ,taking x and y as the subjective and objective activities1 unknown in their natures and known only as phenomenally manifested2 and recognizing the fact that every state of consciousness implies1 immediately or remotely1 the action of object on subject or subject on object1 or both2 we may say that every state of consciousness will be symbolized by some modification of xy--the phenomenally-known product of the two unknown factors4 ,in other words1 xy1 xy1 xy1 xy1 xy1 c41 c41 will represent all perceptions and thoughts4 ,suppose1 now1 that these are thoughts about the object2 composing some hypothesis respecting its characters as analyzed by physicists4 ,clearly1 all such thoughts1 be they about shapes1 resistances1 momenta1 molecules1 molecular motions1 or what not1 will contain forms of the subjective activity x4 ,now let the thoughts #bdh be concerning mental processes4 ,it must similarly happen that some mode of the unknown objective activity y1 will be in every case a component4 ,now suppose that the problem is the genesis of mental phenomena2 and that1 in the course of the inquiry1 bodily organization and the functions of the nervous system are brought into the explanation4 ,it will happen1 as before1 that these1 considered as objective1 have to be described and thought about in modes of xy4 ,and when by the actions of such a nervous system1 conceived objectively in modes of xy1 and acted upon by physical forces which are conceived in other modes of xy1 we endeavour to explain the genesis of sensations1 perceptions1 and ideas1 which we can think of only in other modes of xy1 we find that all our factors1 and therefore all our interpretations1 contain the two unknown terms1 and that no interpretation is imaginable that will not contain the two unknown terms4 ,what is the defence for this apparently-circular process8 ,simply that it is a process of establishing congruity among our symbols4 ,it is finding a mode of so symbolizing the unknown activities1 subjective and objective1 and so operating with our symbols1 that all our acts may be rightly guided--guided1 that is1 in such ways that we can anticipate1 when1 where1 and in what quantity some one of our symbols1 or some combination of our symbols1 will be found4 ,mr4 ,sidgwick's difficulty arises1 ,i think1 from having insufficiently borne in mind the statements made at the outset1 in 8,the ,data of ,philosophy10 that such conceptions as 8are vital1 or cannot be separated from the rest without mental dissolution1 must be assumed as true provisionally20 that 8there is no mode of establishing the validity of any belief except that of showing its entire congruity with all other beliefs20 and that 8,philosophy1 compelled to make those fundamental assumptions without which thought is impossible1 has to justify them by showing their congruity with all other dicta of consciousness40 ,in #bdi pursuance of this distinctly-avowed mode of procedure1 ,i assume provisionally1 an objective activity and a subjective activity1 and certain general forms and modes 7,space1 ,time1 ,matter1 ,motion1 ,force71 which the subjective activity1 operated on by the objective activity1 ascribes to it1 and which ,i suppose to correspond in some way to unknown forms and modes of the objective activity4 ,these provisional assumptions1 having been carried out to all their consequences1 and these consequences proved to be congruous with one another and with the original assumptions1 these original assumptions are justified4 ,and if1 finally1 ,i assert1 as ,i have repeatedly asserted1 that the terms in which ,i express my assumptions and carry on my operations are but symbolic1 and that all ,i have done is to show that by certain ways of symbolizing1 perfect harmony results--invariable agreement between the symbols in which ,i frame my expectations1 and the symbols which occur in experience--,i cannot be blamed for incoherence4 ,on the contrary1 it seems to me that my method is the most coherent that can be devised4 ,lastly1 should it be said that this regarding of everything constituting experience and thought as symbolic1 has a very shadowy aspect2 ,i reply that these which ,i speak of as symbols1 are real relatively to our consciousness2 and are symbolic only in their relation to the ,ultimate ,reality4 ,that these explanations will make clear the coherence of views which before seemed 8fundamentally incoherent10 ,i feel by no means certain2 since1 as ,i did not perceive the difficulties presented by the exposition as at first made1 ,i may similarly fail to perceive the difficulties in this explanation4 ,originally1 ,i had intended to complete the ,principles of ,psychology by a division showing how the results reached in the preceding divisions1 physiological and psychological1 analytic and synthetic1 subjective and objective1 harmonize with one another1 and are but different aspects of the same aggregate of phenomena4 ,but the work was already #bej bulky2 and ,i concluded that this division might be dispensed with1 because the congruities to be pointed out were sufficiently obvious4 ,so little was ,i conscious of the alleged 8inability to harmonize different lines of thought40 ,mr4 ,sidgwick's perplexities1 however1 show me that such an exposition of concords is needful4 99 99 99 99 99 ,i have reserved to the last1 one of the first objections made to the metaphysico-theological doctrine set forth in ,first ,principles1 and implied in the several volumes that have succeeded it4 ,it was urged by an able metaphysician1 the ,rev4 ,james ,martineau1 in an essay entitled 8,science1 ,nescience1 and ,faith20 and1 effective against my argument as it stands1 shows the need for some development of my argument4 ,that ,mr4 ,martineau's criticism may be understood1 ,i must quote the passages it concerns4 ,continuing the reasoning employed against ,hamilton and ,mansel1 to show that our consciousness of that which transcends knowledge is positive1 and not1 as they allege1 negative1 ,i have said3 8,still more manifest will this truth become when it is observed that our conception of the ,relative itself disappears1 if our conception of the ,absolute is a pure negation4 ,it is admitted1 or rather it is contended1 by the writers ,i have quoted above1 that contradictories can be known only in relation to each other--that ,equality1 for instance1 is unthinkable apart from its correlative ,inequality2 and that thus the ,relative can itself be conceived only by opposition to the ,non-relative4 ,it is also admitted1 or rather contended1 that the consciousness of a relation implies a consciousness of both the related members4 ,if we are required to conceive the relation between the ,relative and ,non-relative without being conscious of both1 #8we are in fact' 7to quote the words of ,mr4 ,mansel differently applied7 #8required to compare that of which we are conscious with that of which we are not conscious2 the comparison itself being an act of consciousness1 and only possible through the consciousness of both its objects4' ,what1 then1 becomes of the assertion that1 #8the ,absolute is conceived merely by a negation of conceivability1' or as #8the mere absence of the conditions under which consciousness is possible8' ,if the ,non-relative or ,absolute1 is present in thought only as a mere negation1 then the relation between it and the ,relative becomes unthinkable1 because one of the terms of the relation is absent from consciousness4 #bea ,and if this relation is unthinkable1 then is the ,relative itself unthinkable1 for want of its antithesis3 whence results the disappearance of all thought whatever40--,first ,principles1 #bf4 ,on this argument ,mr4 ,martineau comments as follows2 first re-stating it in other words3 8,take away its antithetic term1 and the relative1 thrown into isolation1 is set up as absolute1 and disappears from thought4 ,it is indispensable therefore to uphold the ,absolute in existence1 as condition of the relative sphere which constitutes our whole intellectual domain4 ,be it so3 but when saved on this plea1--to preserve the balance and interdependence of two co-relatives1--the #8,absolute' is absolute no more2 it is reduced to a term of relation3 it loses therefore its exile from thought3 its disqualification is cancelled3 and the alleged nescience is discharged4 8,so1 the same law of thought which warrants the existence1 dissolves the inscrutableness1 of the ,absolute40--,essays1 ,philosophical and ,theological pp4 #ahf-g4 ,i admit this to be a telling rejoinder2 and one which can be met only when the meanings of the words1 as ,i have used them1 are carefully discriminated1 and the implications of the doctrine fully traced out4 ,we will begin by clearing the ground of minor misconceptions4 ,first1 let it be observed that though ,i have used the word ,absolute as the equivalent of ,non-relative1 because it is used in the passages quoted from the writers ,i am contending against2 yet ,i have myself chosen for the purposes of my argument1 the name ,non-relative1 and ,i do not necessarily commit myself to any propositions respecting the ,absolute1 considered as that which includes both ,subject and ,object4 ,the ,non-relative as spoken of by me1 is to be understood rather as the totality of ,being minus that which constitutes the individual consciousness1 present to us under forms of ,relation4 ,did ,i use the word in some ,hegelian sense1 as comprehensive of that which thinks and that which is thought about1 and did ,i propose to treat of the order of things1 not as phenomenally manifested but as noumenally proceeding1 the objection would be fatal4 ,but the aim being simply to formulate the order of things as present under relative forms1 the antithetical ,non-relative here named as #beb implied by the conception of the ,relative1 is that which1 in any act of thought1 is outside of and beyond it1 rather than that which is inclusive of it4 ,further1 it should be observed that this ,non-relative1 spoken of as a necessary complement to the ,relative1 is not spoken of as a conception but as a consciousness2 and ,i have in sundry passages distinguished between those modes of consciousness which1 having limits1 and constituting thought proper1 are subject to the laws of thought1 and the mode of consciousness which persists when the removal of limits is carried to the uttermost1 and when distinct thought consequently ceases4 ,this opens the way to the reply here to be made to ,mr4 ,martineau's criticism--namely1 that while by the necessities of thought the ,relative implies a ,non-relative2 and while1 to think of this antithesis completely1 requires that the ,non-relative shall be made a conception proper2 yet1 for the vague thought which is alone in this case possible1 it suffices that the ,non-relative shall be present as a consciousness which though undefined is positive4 ,let us observe what necessarily happens when thought is employed on this ultimate question4 ,in a preceding part of the argument criticized1 ,i have1 in various ways1 aimed to show that1 alike when we analyze the product of thought and when we analyze the process of thought1 we are brought to the conclusion that invariably 8a thought involves relation1 difference1 likeness20 and that even from the very nature of ,life itself1 we may evolve the conclusion that 8thinking being relationing1 no thought can ever express more than relations40 ,what1 now1 must happen if thought1 having this law1 occupies itself with the final mystery8 ,always implying terms in relation1 thought implies that both terms shall be more or less defined2 and as fast as one of them becomes indefinite1 the relation also becomes indefinite1 and thought becomes indistinct4 ,take the #bec case of magnitudes4 ,i think of an inch2 ,i think of a foot2 and having tolerably-definite ideas of the two1 ,i have a tolerably-definite idea of the relation between them4 ,i substitute for the foot a mile2 and being able to represent a mile much less definitely1 ,i cannot so definitely think of the relation between an inch and a mile--cannot distinguish it in thought from the relation between an inch and two miles1 as clearly as ,i can distinguish in thought the relation between an inch and one foot from the relation between an inch and two feet4 ,and now if ,i endeavour to think of the relation between an inch and the #bdj1jjj miles from here to the ,moon1 or the relation between an inch and the #ic1jjj1jjj miles from here to the ,sun1 ,i find that while these distances1 practically inconceivable1 have become little more than numbers to which ,i frame no answering ideas1 so1 too1 has the relation between an inch and either of them become practically inconceivable4 ,evidently then this partial failure in the process of forming thought-relations1 which happens even with finite magnitudes when one of them is immense1 passes into complete failure when one of them cannot be brought within any limits4 ,the relation itself becomes unrepresentable at the same time that one of its terms becomes unrepresentable4 ,nevertheless1 in this case it is to be observed that the almost-blank form of relation preserves a certain qualitative character4 ,it is still distinguishable as belonging to the consciousness of extensions1 not to the consciousnesses of forces or durations2 and in so far remains a vaguely-identifiable relation4 ,but now suppose we ask what happens when one term of the relation has not simply magnitude having no known limits1 and duration of which neither beginning nor end is cognizable1 but is also an existence not to be defined8 ,in other words1 what must happen if one term of the relation is not only quantitatively but also qualitatively unrepresentable8 ,clearly in this case the #bed relation does not simply cease to be thinkable except as a relation of a certain class1 but it lapses completely4 ,when one of the terms becomes wholly unknowable1 the law of thought can no longer be conformed to2 both because one term cannot be present1 and because relation itself cannot be framed4 ,that is to say1 the law of thought that contradictories can be known only in relation to each other1 no longer holds when thought attempts to transcend the ,relative2 and yet1 when it attempts to transcend the ,relative1 it must make the attempt in conformity with its law--must in some dim mode of consciousness posit a ,non-relative1 and1 in some similarly dim mode of consciousness1 a relation between it and the ,relative4 ,in brief then1 to ,mr4 ,martineau's objection ,i reply1 that the insoluble difficulties he indicates arise here1 as elsewhere1 when thought is applied to that which transcends the sphere of thought2 and that just as when we try to pass beyond phenomenal manifestations to the ,ultimate ,reality manifested1 we have to symbolize it out of such materials as the phenomenal manifestations give us2 so we have simultaneously to symbolize the connexion between this ,ultimate ,reality and its manifestations1 as somehow allied to the connexions among the phenomenal manifestations themselves4 ,the truth ,mr4 ,martineau's criticism adumbrates1 is that the law of thought fails where the elements of thought fail2 and this is a conclusion quite conformable to the general view ,i defend4 ,still holding the validity of my argument against ,hamilton and ,mansel1 that in pursuance of their own principle the ,relative is not at all thinkable as such1 unless in contradistinction to some existence posited1 however vaguely1 as the other term of a relation1 conceived however indefinitely2 it is consistent on my part to hold that in this effort which thought inevitably makes to pass beyond its sphere1 not only does the product of thought become a dim symbol of a product1 but the process of thought becomes a dim #bee symbol of a process2 and hence any predicament inferable from the law of thought cannot be asserted4 ,i may fitly close this reply by a counter-criticism4 ,to the direct defence of a proposition1 may be added the indirect defence which results from showing the untenability of an alternative proposition4 ,this criticism on the doctrine of an ,unknowable ,existence manifested to us in phenomena1 ,mr4 ,martineau makes in the interests of the doctrine held by him1 that this existence is1 to a considerable degree1 knowable4 ,we are quite at one in holding that there is an indestructible consciousness of ,power behind ,appearance2 but whereas ,i contend that this ,power cannot be brought within the forms of thought1 ,mr4 ,martineau contends that there can be consistently ascribed certain attributes of personality--not1 indeed1 human characteristics so concrete as were ascribed in past times2 but still1 human characteristics of the more abstract and higher class4 ,his general doctrine is this3--,regarding ,matter as independently existing2 regarding as also independently existing1 those primary qualities of ,body 8which are inseparable from the very idea of ,body1 and may be evolved a priori from the consideration of it as solid extension or extended solidity20 and saying that to this class 8belong ,triple ,dimension1 ,divisibility1 ,incompressibility20 he goes on to assert that as these 8cannot absent themselves from ,body1 they have a reality coeval with it1 and belong eternally to the material datum objective to ,god3 and his mode of activity with regard to them must be similar to that which alone we can think of his directing upon the relations of ,space1 viz4 not ,volitional1 to cause them1 but ,intellectual1 to think them out4 ,the ,secondary ,qualities1 on the other hand1 having no logical tie to the ,primary1 but being appended to them as contingent facts1 cannot be referred to any deductive thought1 but remain over as products of pure ,inventive ,reason and ,determining ,will4 ,this sphere of cognition1 a posteriori to us1--where we cannot move a step alone but have submissively to wait upon experience1 is precisely the realm of ,divine originality3 and we are most sequacious where ,he is most free4 ,while on this ,secondary field ,his ,mind and ours are thus contrasted1 they meet in resemblance again upon the ,primary3 for the evolutions of deductive ,reason there is but one track possible to all intelligences2 no #bef merum arbitrium can interchange the false and true1 or make more than one geometry1 one scheme of pure ,physics1 for all worlds3 and the ,omnipotent ,architect ,himself1 in realizing the ,kosmical conception1 in shaping the orbits out of immensity and determining seasons out of eternity1 could but follow the laws of curvature1 measure1 and proportion40--,essays1 ,philosophical and ,theological1 pp4 #afc-d4 ,before the major criticism which ,i propose to make on this hypothesis1 let me make a minor one4 ,not only of space-relations1 but also of primary physical properties1 ,mr4 ,martineau asserts the necessity3 not a necessity to our minds simply1 but an ontological necessity4 ,what is true for human thought1 is1 in respect of these1 true absolutely3 8the laws of curvature1 measure1 and proportion10 as we know them1 are unchangeable even by ,divine power2 as are also the ,divisibility and ,incompressibility of ,matter4 ,but if1 in these cases1 ,mr4 ,martineau holds that a necessity in thought implies an answering necessity in things1 why does he refrain from saying the like in other cases8 ,why1 if he tacitly asserts it in respect of space-relations and the statical attributes of ,body1 does he not also assert it in respect of the dynamical attributes of ,body8 ,the laws conformed to by that mode of force now distinguished as 8energy10 are as much necessary to our thought as are the laws of space-relations4 ,the axioms of ,mechanics lie on the same plane with the axioms of pure ,mathematics4 ,now if ,mr4 ,martineau admits this--if he admits1 as he must1 the corollary that there can be no such manifestation of energy as that displayed in the motion of a planet1 save at the expense of equivalent energy which pre-existed--if he draws the further necessary corollary that the direction of a motion cannot be changed by any action1 without an equal reaction in an opposite direction on something acting--if he bears in mind that this holds not only of all visible motions1 celestial and terrestrial1 but that those activities of ,body which affect us as secondary properties1 are also known only through other forms of #beg energy1 which are equivalents of mechanical energy and conform to these same laws--and if1 lastly1 he infers that none of these derivative energies can have given to them their characters and directions1 save by pre-existing forces1 statical and dynamical1 conditioned in special ways2 what becomes of that 8realm of ,divine originality0 which ,mr4 ,martineau describes as remaining within the realm of necessity8 ,consistently carried out1 his argument implies a universally-inevitable order1 in which volition can have no such place as that he alleges4 ,not pushing ,mr4 ,martineau's reasoning to this conclusion1 so entirely at variance with the one he draws1 but accepting his statement just as it stands1 let us consider the solution it offers us4 ,we are left by it without any explanation of ,space and ,time2 we are not helped in conceiving the origin of ,matter2 and there is afforded us no idea how ,matter came to have its primary attributes4 ,all these are tacitly assumed to exist uncreated4 ,creative activity is represented as under the restrictions imposed by mathematical necessities1 and as having for datum 7mark the word7 a substance which1 in respect of certain characters1 defies modification4 ,but surely this is not an interpretation of the mystery of things4 ,the mystery is simply relegated to a remoter region1 respecting which no inquiry is to be made4 ,but the inquiry must be made4 ,after every such solution there arises afresh the question--what is the origin and nature of that which imposes these limits on creative power8 what is the primary ,god which dominates over this secondary ,god8 ,for1 clearly1 if the 8,omnipotent ,architect himself0 7to use ,mr4 ,martineau's somewhat inconsistent name7 is powerless to change the 8material datum objective0 to him1 and powerless to change the conditions under which it exists1 and under which he works1 there is obviously implied a power to which he is subject4 ,so that in ,mr4 ,martineau's doctrine also1 there is an ,ultimate #beh ,unknowable2 and it differs from the doctrine he opposes1 only by intercalating a partially ,knowable between this and the wholly ,knowable4 ,finding1 as explained above1 that this interpretation is not consistent with itself2 and finding1 as just shown1 that it leaves the essential mystery unsolved2 ,i do not see that it has an advantage over the doctrine of the ,unknowable in its unqualified shape4 ,there cannot1 ,i think1 be more than temporary rest in a proximate solution which takes for its basis the ultimately insoluble4 ,just as thought cannot be prevented from passing beyond ,appearance1 and trying to conceive the ,cause behind2 so1 following out the interpretation ,mr4 ,martineau offers1 thought cannot be prevented from asking what ,cause it is which restricts the ,cause he assigns4 ,and if we must admit that the question under this eventual form cannot be answered1 may we not as well confess that the question under its immediate form cannot be answered8 ,is it not better candidly to acknowledge the incompetence of our intelligence1 rather than to persist in calling that an explanation which does but disguise the inexplicable8 ,whatever answer each may give to this question1 he cannot rightly blame those who1 finding in themselves an indestructible consciousness of an ultimate ,cause1 whence proceed alike what we call the ,material ,universe and what we call ,mind1 refrain from affirming anything respecting it2 because they find it as inscrutable in nature as it is inconceivable in extent and duration4 ,,postscript4--,with the concluding paragraph of the foregoing article1 ,i had hoped to end1 for a long time1 all controversial writing2 and1 if the article had been published entire in the ,november number of the ,fortnightly1 as originally intended1 the need for any addition would not have been pressing4 ,but while it was in the printer's #bei hands1 two criticisms1 more elaborate than those dealt with above1 made their appearance2 and now that the postponed publication of this latter half of the article affords the opportunity1 ,i cannot1 without risking misinterpretations1 leave these criticisms unnoticed4 ,especially do ,i feel called upon by courtesy to make some response to one who1 in the ,quarterly ,review for ,october1 #ahgc1 has dealt with me in a spirit which1 though largely antagonistic1 is not wholly unsympathetic2 and who manifestly aims to estimate justly the views he opposes4 ,in the space at my disposal1 ,i cannot of course follow him through all the objections he has urged4 ,i must content myself with brief comments on the two propositions he undertakes to establish4 ,his enunciation of these runs thus3 8,we would especially direct attention to two points1 to both of which we are confident objections may be made2 and although ,mr4 ,spencer has himself doubtless considered such objections 7and they may well have struck many of his readers also71 we nevertheless do not observe that he has anywhere noticed or provided for them4 8,the two points we so select are3 87#a7 ,that his system involves the denial of all truth4 87#b7 ,that it is radically and necessarily opposed to all sound principles of morals40 ,on this passage1 ending in these two startling assertions1 let me first remark that ,i am wholly without this consciousness the reviewer ascribes to me4 ,remembering that ,i have expended some little labour in developing what ,i conceive to be a system of truths1 ,i am surprised by the supposition that 8the denial of all truth0 is an implication which ,i am 8doubtless0 aware may be alleged against this system4 ,remembering1 too1 that by its programme this system is shown to close with two volumes on ,the ,principles of ,morality1 the statement that it is 8necessarily opposed to all sound principles of morals10 naturally astonishes me2 and still more the statement that ,i am doubtless conscious it may be so regarded4 ,saying thus much by way of repudiating that latent scepticism #bfj attributed to me by the reviewer1 ,i proceed to consider what he says in proof of these propositions4 ,on those seeming incongruities of ,transfigured ,realism commented on by him1 ,i need say no more than ,i have already said in reply to ,mr4 ,sidgwick2 by whom also they have been alleged4 ,i will limit myself to the corollary he draws from the doctrine of the ,relativity of ,knowledge1 as held by me4 ,rightly pointing out that ,i hold this in common with 8,messrs4 ,mill1 ,lewes1 ,bain1 and ,huxley20 but not adding1 as he should have done1 that ,i hold it in common with ,hamilton1 ,mansel1 and the long list of predecessors through whom ,hamilton traced it2 the reviewer proceeds to infer from this doctrine of relativity that no absolute truth of any kind can be asserted--not even the absolute truth of the doctrine of relativity itself4 ,and then he leaves it to be supposed by his readers1 that this inference tells especially against the system he is criticizing4 ,if1 however1 the reviewer's inference is valid1 this 8denial of all truth0 must be charged against the doctrines of thinkers called orthodox1 as well as against the doctrines of those many philosophers1 from ,aristotle down to ,kant1 who have said the same thing4 ,but now ,i go further1 and reply that against that form of the doctrine of relativity held by me1 this allegation cannot be made with the same effect as it can against preceding forms of the doctrine4 ,for ,i diverge from other relativists in asserting that the existence of a non-relative is not only a positive deliverance of consciousness1 but a deliverance transcending in certainty all others whatever2 and is one without which the doctrine of relativity cannot be framed in thought4 ,i have urged that 8unless a real ,non-relative or ,absolute be postulated1 the ,relative itself becomes absolute2 and so brings the argument to a contradiction20#bh and elsewhere ,i have described this consciousness of a ,non-relative manifested to us through the ,relative as #bfa 8deeper than demonstration--deeper even than definite cognition--deep as the very nature of mind20#bi which seems to me to be saying as emphatically as possible that1 while all other truths may be held as relative1 this truth must be held as absolute4 ,yet1 strangely enough1 though contending thus against the pure relativists1 and holding with the reviewer1 that 8every asserter of such a purely-relative philosophy must be in the position of a man who saws across the branch of a tree on which he actually sits1 at a point between himself and the trunk10#cj ,i am singled out by him as though this were my own predicament6 ,so far1 then1 from admitting that the view ,i hold 8involves the denial of all truth10 ,i assert that1 having at the outset posited the co-existence of subject and object as a deliverance of consciousness which precedes all reasoning2#ca having subsequently shown1 analytically1 that this postulate is in every way verified1#cb and that in its absence the proof of relativity is impossible2 my view is distinguished by an exactly-opposite trait4 ,the justification of his second proposition the reviewer commences by saying that--8,in the first place the process of ,evolution1 as understood by ,mr4 ,spencer1 compels him to be at one with ,mr4 ,darwin in his denial of the existence of any fundamental and essential distinction between ,duty and ,pleasure40 ,following this by a statement respecting the genesis of moral sentiments as understood by me 7which is extremely unlike the one ,i have given in the ,principles of ,psychology1 #bae1 #ejc-eab1 and #ebd-ecb71 the reviewer goes on to say that 8,we yield with much reluctance to the necessity of affirming that ,mr4 ,spencer gives no evidence of ever having acquired a knowledge of the meaning of the term #8morality1' according to the true sense of the word40 ,just noting that1 as shown by the context1 the assertion #bfb thus made is made against all those who hold the ,doctrine of ,evolution in its unqualified form1 ,i reply that in so far as it concerns me1 it is one the reviewer would scarcely have made had he more carefully examined the evidence3 not limiting himself to those works of mine named at the head of his article4 ,and ,i cannot but think that had the spirit of fairness which he evidently strives to maintain1 been fully awake when these passages were written1 he would have seen that1 before making so serious an allegation1 wider inquiry was needful4 ,if he had simply said that1 given the doctrine of mental evolution as held by me1 he failed to see how moral principles are to be established1 ,i should not have objected2 provided he had also said that ,i believe they can be established1 and had pointed out what ,i hold to be their bases4 ,as it is1 however1 he has so presented his own inference from my premises1 as to make it seem an inference which ,i also must draw from my premises4 ,quite a different and much more secure foundation for moral principles is alleged by me1 than that afforded by moral sentiments and conceptions2 which he refers to as though they formed the sole basis of the ethical conclusions ,i hold4 ,while the reviewer contends that 8,mr4 ,spencer's moral system is even yet more profoundly defective1 as it denies any objective distinction between right and wrong in any being1 whether men are or are not responsible for their actions20 ,i contend1 contrariwise1 that it is distinguished from other moral systems by asserting the objectivity of the distinction1 and by endeavouring to show that the subjective distinction is derived from the objective distinction4 ,in my first work1 ,social ,statics1 published twenty-three years ago1 the essential thesis is that1 apart from their warrant as alleged ,divine injunctions1 and apart from their authority as moral intuitions1 the principles of justice are primarily deducible from the laws of life as carried on under social conditions4 ,i argued throughout that these principles so derived have #bfc a supreme authority1 to which considerations of immediate expediency must yield2 and ,i was for this reason classed by ,mr4 ,mill as an anti-utilitarian4 ,more recently1 in a letter drawn from me by this misapprehension of ,mr4 ,mill1 and afterwards published by ,professor ,bain in his ,mental and ,moral ,science1 ,i have re-stated this position4 ,already1 in an explanatory article entitled ,morals and ,moral ,sentiments1 published in the ,fortnightly ,review for ,april1 #ahga1 ,i have quoted passages from that letter2 and here1 considering the gravity of the assertions made by the ,quarterly reviewer1 ,i hope to be excused for re-quoting them3 8,morality1 properly so called--the science of right conduct--has for its object to determine how and why certain modes of conduct are detrimental1 and certain other modes beneficial4 ,these good and bad results cannot be accidental1 but must be necessary consequences of the constitution of things2 and ,i conceive it to be the business of ,moral ,science to deduce from the laws of life and the conditions of existence1 what kinds of action necessarily tend to produce happiness1 and what kinds to produce unhappiness4 ,having done this1 its deductions are to be recognized as laws of conduct2 and are to be conformed to irrespective of a direct estimation of happiness or misery40 99 99 99 99 99 8,if it is true that pure rectitude prescribes a system of things far too good for men as they are1 it is not less true that mere expediency does not of itself tend to establish a system of things any better than that which exists4 ,while absolute morality owes to expediency the checks which prevent it from rushing into ,utopian absurdities1 expediency is indebted to absolute morality for all stimulus to improvement4 ,granted that we are chiefly interested in ascertaining what is relatively right1 it still follows that we must first consider what is absolutely right2 since the one conception presupposes the other40 ,and the comment ,i then made on these passages ,i may make now1 that 8,i do not see how there could well be a more emphatic assertion that there exists a primary basis of morals independent of1 and in a sense antecedent to1 that which is furnished by experiences of utility2 and consequently independent of1 and in a sense antecedent to1 those moral sentiments which ,i conceive to be generated by such experiences40 ,i will only add that1 had my beliefs been directly opposite to those ,i have enunciated1 #bfd the reviewer might1 ,i think1 have found good reasons for his assertion4 ,if1 instead of demurring to the doctrine 8that greatest happiness should be the immediate aim of man10#cc ,i had endorsed that doctrine--if1 instead of explaining and justifying 8a belief in the special sacredness of these highest principles1 and a sense of the supreme authority of the altruistic sentiments answering to them10#cd ,i had denied the sacredness and the supreme authority--if1 instead of saying of the wise man that 8the highest truth he sees he will fearlessly utter2 knowing that1 let what may come of it1 he is thus playing his right part in the world10#ce ,i had said that the wise man will not do this2 the reviewer might with truth have described me as not understanding 8the term #8morality' according to the true sense of the word40 ,and he might then have inferred that the ,doctrine of ,evolution as ,i hold it1 implies denial of the 8distinction between ,duty and ,pleasure40 ,but as it is1 ,i think the evidence will not generally be held to warrant his assertion4 ,i quite agree with the reviewer that the prevalence of a philosophy 8is no mere question of speculative interest1 but is one of the highest practical importance40 ,i join him1 too1 in the belief that 8calamitous social and political changes0 may be the outcome of a mistaken philosophy4 ,moreover1 writing as he does under the conviction that there can be no standard of right and wrong save one derived from a ,revelation interpreted by an ,infallible ,authority1 ,i can conceive the alarm with which he regards so radically opposed a system4 ,though ,i could have wished that the sense of justice he generally displays had prevented him from ignoring the evidence ,i have above given1 ,i can understand how1 from his point of view1 the ,doctrine of ,evolution1 as ,i understand it1 8seems absolutely fatal #bfe to every germ of morality10 and 8entirely negatives every form of religion40 ,but ,i am unable to understand that modified ,doctrine of ,evolution which the reviewer hints at as an alternative4 ,for1 little as the reader would anticipate it after these expressions of profound dissent1 the reviewer displays such an amount of agreement as to suggest that the system he is criticizing might be converted1 8rapidly and without violence1 into an #8allotropic state1' in which its conspicuous characters would be startlingly diverse from those that it exhibits at present40 ,may ,i1 using a different figure1 suggest a different transformation1 having a subjective instead of an objective character8 ,as in a stereoscope1 the two views representing diverse aspects1 often yield at first a jumble of conflicting impressions1 but1 after a time1 suddenly combine into a single whole which stands out quite clearly2 so1 may it not be that the seemingly-inconsistent ,idealism and ,realism dwelt on by the reviewer1 as well as the other seemingly-fundamental incongruities he is struck by1 will1 under more persistent contemplation1 unite as complementary sides of the same thing8 99 99 99 99 99 ,my excuse for devoting some space to a criticism of so entirely different a kind as that contained in the ,british ,quarterly ,review for ,october1 #ahgc1 must be that1 under the circumstances1 ,i cannot let it pass unnoticed without seeming to admit its validity4 ,saying that my books should be dealt with by specialists1 and tacitly announcing himself as an expert in ,physics1 the reviewer takes me to task both for errors in the statement of physical principles and for erroneous reasoning in physics4 ,that he discovers no mistakes ,i do not say4 ,it would be marvellous if in such a multitude of propositions1 averaging a dozen per page1 ,i had made all criticism-proof4 ,some are inadvertencies which ,i should have been obliged to the reviewer for pointing out as such1 but which he prefers to #bff instance as proving my ignorance4 ,in other cases1 taking advantage of an imperfection of statement1 he proceeds to instruct me about matters which either the context1 or passages in the same volume1 show to be quite familiar to me4 ,here is a sample of his criticisms belonging to this class3 8,nor should we counsel a man to venture upon physical speculations who converts the proposition #8heat is insensible motion' into #8insensible motion is heat1' and hence concludes that when a force is applied to a mass so large that no motion is seen to result from it1 or when1 as in the case of sound1 motion gets so dispersed that it becomes insensible1 it turns to heat40 ,respecting the first of the two statements contained in this sentence1 ,i will observe that the reader1 if not misled by the quotation-marks into the supposition that ,i have made1 in so many words1 the assertion that 8insensible motion is heat10 will at any rate infer that this assertion is distinctly involved in the passage named4 ,and he will infer that the reviewer would never have charged me with such an absurd belief1 if there was before him evidence proving that ,i have no such belief4 ,what will the reader say1 then1 when he learns1 not simply that there is no such statement1 and not simply that on the page referred to1 which ,i have ascertained to be the one intended1 there is no such implication visible1 even to an expert 7and ,i have put the question to one72 but when he further learns that in other passages1 the fact that heat is one only of the modes of insensible motion is distinctly stated 7see ,first ,prin4 #ff1 #fh1 #aga72 and when he learns that elsewhere ,i have specified the several forms of insensible motion8 ,if the reviewer1 who looks so diligently for flaws as to search an essay in a volume he is not reviewing to find one term of an incongruity1 had sought with equal diligence to learn what ,i thought about insensible motion1 he would have found in the ,classification of the ,sciences1 ,table ,,ii41 that insensible motion is described by me as having the forms of ,heat1 ,light1 ,electricity1 ,magnetism4 ,even had there been in #bfg the place he names1 an unquestionable implication of the belief which he ascribes to me1 fairness might have led him to regard it as an oversight when he found it at variance with statements ,i have elsewhere made4 ,what then is to be thought of him when1 in the place named1 no such belief is manifest2 either to an ordinary reader or to a specially-instructed reader8 ,no less significant is the state of mind betrayed in the second clause of the reviewer's sentence4 ,by representing me as saying that when the motion constituting sound 8gets so dispersed that it becomes insensible1 it turns to heat10 does he intend to represent me as thinking that when sound-undulations become too weak to be audible1 they become heat-undulations8 ,if so1 ,i reply that the passage he refers to has no such meaning4 ,does he then allege that some part of the force diffused in sound-waves is expended in generating electricity1 by the friction of heterogeneous substances 7which1 however1 eventually lapses from this special form of molecular motion in that general form constituting heat72 and that ,i ought to have thus qualified my statement8 ,if so1 he would have had me commit a piece of scientific pedantry hindering the argument4 ,if he does not mean either of these things1 what does he mean8 ,does he contest the truth of the hypothesis which enabled ,laplace to correct ,newton's estimate of the velocity of sound--the hypothesis that heat is evolved by the compression each sound-wave produces in the air8 ,does he deny that the heat so generated is at the expense of so much wave-motion lost8 ,does he question the inference that some of the motion embodied in each wave is from instant to instant dissipated1 partly in this way and partly in the heat evolved by fluid friction8 ,can he show any reason for doubting that when the sound-waves have become too feeble to affect our senses1 their motion still continues to undergo this transformation and diminution until it is all lost8 ,if not1 why does he implicitly deny that #bfh the molar motion constituting sound1 eventually disappears in producing the molecular motion constituting heat8#cf ,i will dwell no longer on the exclusively-personal questions raised by the reviewer's statements2 but1 leaving the reader to judge of the rest of my 8stupendous mistakes0 by the one ,i have dealt with1 ,i will turn to a question worthy to occupy some space1 as having an impersonal interest--the question1 namely1 respecting the nature of the warrant we have for asserting ultimate physical truths4 ,the contempt which1 as a physicist1 the reviewer expresses for the metaphysical exploration of physical ideas1 ,i will pass over with the remark that every physical question1 probed to the bottom1 opens into a metaphysical one2 and that ,i should have thought the controversy now going on among chemists1 respecting the legitimacy of the atomic hypothesis1 might have shown him as much4 ,on his erroneous statement that ,i use the phrase 8,persistence of ,force0 as an equivalent for the now-generally-accepted phrase 8,conservation of ,energy10 ,i will observe only that1 had he not been in so great a hurry to find inconsistencies1 he would have seen why1 for the purposes of my argument1 #bfi ,i intentionally use the word ,force3 ,force being the generic word1 including both that species known as ,energy1 and that species by which ,matter occupies space and maintains its integrity--a species which1 whatever may be its relation to ,energy1 and however clearly recognized as a necessary datum by the theory of ,energy1 is not otherwise considered in that theory4 ,i will confine myself to the proposition1 disputed at great length by the reviewer1 that our cognition of the ,persistence of ,force is a priori4 ,he relies much on the authority of ,professor ,tait1 whom he twice quotes to the effect that 8,natural philosophy is an experimental1 and not an intuitive science4 ,no priori reasoning can conduct us demonstratively to a single physical truth40 ,were ,i to take a hypercritical attitude1 ,i might dwell on the fact that ,professor ,tait leaves the extent of his proposition somewhat doubtful1 by speaking of 8,natural philosophy0 as one science4 ,were ,i to follow further the reviewer's example1 ,i might point out that 8,natural philosophy10 in that ,newtonian acceptation adopted by ,professor ,tait1 includes ,astronomy2 and1 going on to ask what astronomical 8experiments0 those are which conduct us to astronomical truths1 ,i might then 8counsel0 the reviewer not to depend on the authority of one who 7to use the reviewer's polite language7 8blunders0 by confounding experiment and observation4 ,i will not1 however1 thus infer from ,professor ,tait's imperfection of statement that he is unaware of the difference between the two2 and shall rate his authority as of no less value than ,i should1 had he been more accurate in his expression4 ,respecting that authority ,i shall simply remark that1 if the question had to be settled by the authority of any physicist1 the authority of ,mayer1 who is diametrically opposed to ,prof4 ,tait on this point1 and who has been specially honoured1 both by the ,royal ,society and by the ,french ,institute1 might well counter-weigh his1 if not out-weigh it4 ,i am not aware1 #bgj however1 that the question is one in ,physics4 ,it seems to me a question respecting the nature of proof4 ,and1 without doubting ,professor ,tait's competence in ,logic and ,psychology1 ,i should decline to abide by his judgment on such a question1 even were there no opposite judgment given by a physicist1 certainly of not less eminence4 ,authority aside1 however1 let us discuss the matter on its merits4 ,in the ,treatise on ,natural ,philosophy1 by ,profs4 ,thomson and ,tait1 #bdc 7#ast ed471 ,i read that 8as we shall show in our chapter on #8,experience1' physical axioms are axiomatic to those only who have sufficient knowledge of the action of physical causes to enable them to see at once their necessary truth40 ,in this ,i agree entirely4 ,it is in ,physics1 as it is in ,mathematics1 that before necessary truths can be grasped1 there must be gained by individual experience1 such familiarity with the elements of the thoughts to be framed1 that propositions about those elements may be mentally represented with distinctness4 ,tell a child that things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one another1 and the child1 lacking a sufficiently-abstract notion of equality1 and lacking1 too1 the needful practice in comparing relations1 will fail to grasp the axiom4 ,similarly1 a rustic1 never having thought much about forces and their results1 cannot form a definite conception answering to the axiom that action and reaction are equal and opposite4 ,in the last case as in the first1 ideas of the terms and their relations require to be made1 by practice in thinking1 so vivid that the involved truths may be mentally seen4 ,but when the individual experiences have been multiplied enough to produce distinctness in the representations of the elements dealt with2 then1 in the one case as in the other1 those mental forms generated by ancestral experiences1 cannot be occupied by the elements of one of these ultimate truths without perception of its necessity4 ,if ,professor ,tait does not admit this1 what #bga does he mean by speaking of 8physical axioms10 and by saying that the cultured are enabled 8to see at once their necessary truth80 ,again1 if there are no physical truths which must be classed as a priori1 ,i ask why ,professor ,tait joins ,sir ,w4 ,thomson in accepting as bases for ,physics1 ,newton's ,laws of ,motion8 ,though ,newton gives illustrations of prolonged motion in bodies that are little resisted1 he gives no proof that a body in motion will continue moving1 if uninterfered with1 in the same direction at the same velocity2 nor1 on turning to the enunciation of this law quoted in the above-named work1 do ,i find that ,professor ,tait does more than exemplify it by facts which can themselves be asserted only by taking the law for granted4 ,does ,professor ,tait deny that the first law of motion is a physical truth8 ,if so1 what does he call it8 ,does he admit it to be a physical truth1 and1 denying that it is a priori1 assert that it is established a posteriori--that is1 by conscious induction from observation and experiment8 ,if so1 what is the inductive reasoning which can establish it8 ,let us glance at the several conceivable arguments which we must suppose him to rely on4 ,a body set in motion soon ceases to move if it encounters much friction1 or much resistance from the bodies struck4 ,if less of its energy is expended in moving1 or otherwise affecting1 other bodies1 or in overcoming friction1 its motion continues longer4 ,and it continues longest when1 as over smooth ice1 it meets with the smallest amount of obstruction4 ,may we then1 proceeding by the method of concomitant variations1 infer that were it wholly unobstructed its motion would continue undiminished8 ,if so1 we assume that the diminution of its motion observed in experience1 is proportionate to the amount of energy abstracted from it in producing other motion1 either molar or molecular4 ,we assume that no variation has taken place in its rate1 save that caused by deductions in moving other matter2 for if #bgb its motion be supposed to have otherwise varied1 the conclusion that the differences in the distances travelled result from differences in the obstructions met with1 is vitiated4 ,thus the truth to be established is already taken for granted in the premises4 ,nor is the question begged in this way only4 ,in every case where it is remarked that a body stops the sooner1 the more it is obstructed by other bodies or media1 the law of inertia is assumed to hold in the obstructing bodies or media4 ,the very conception of greater or less retardation so caused1 implies the belief that there can be no retardations without proportionate retarding causes2 which is itself the assumption otherwise expressed in the first law of motion4 ,again1 let us suppose that instead of inexact observations made on the movements occurring in daily experience1 we make exact experiments on movements specially arranged to yield measured results2 what is the postulate underlying every experiment8 ,uniform velocity is defined as motion through equal spaces in equal times4 ,how do we measure equal times8 ,by an instrument which can be inferred to mark equal times only if the oscillations of the pendulum are isochronous2 which they can be proved to be only if the first and second laws of motion are granted4 ,that is to say1 the proposed experimental proof of the first law1 assumes not only the truth of the first law1 but of that which ,professor ,tait agrees with ,newton in regarding as a second law4 ,is it said that the ultimate time-measure referred to is the motion of the ,earth round its axis1 through equal angles in equal times8 ,then the obvious rejoinder is that the assertion of this1 similarly involves an assertion of the truth to be proved2 since the undiminished rotatory movement of the ,earth is itself a corollary from the first law of motion4 ,is it alleged that this axial movement of the ,earth through equal angles in equal times1 is ascertainable by reference to the stars8 ,i answer that a developed system of ,astronomy1 leading through complex #bgc reasonings to the conclusion that the ,earth rotates1 is1 in that case1 supposed to be needful before there can be established a law of motion which this system of ,astronomy itself postulates4 ,for even should it be said that the ,newtonian theory of the ,solar ,system is not necessarily pre-supposed1 but only the ,copernican2 still1 the proof of this assumes that a body at rest 7a star being taken as such7 will continue at rest2 which is a part of the first law of motion1 regarded by ,newton as not more self-evident than the remaining part4 ,not a little remarkable1 indeed1 is the oversight made by ,professor ,tait1 in asserting that 8no a priori reasoning can conduct us demonstratively to a single physical truth10 when he has before him the fact that the system of physical truths constituting ,newton's ,principia1 which he has joined ,sir ,william ,thomson in editing1 is established by a priori reasoning4 ,that there can be no change without a cause1 or1 in the words of ,mayer1 that 8a force cannot become nothing1 and just as little can a force be produced from nothing10 is that ultimate dictum of consciousness on which all physical science rests4 ,it is involved alike in the assertion that a body at rest will continue at rest1 in the assertion that a body in motion must continue to move at the same velocity in the same line if no force acts on it1 and in the assertion that any divergent motion given to it must be proportionate to the deflecting force2 and it is also involved in the axiom that action and reaction are equal and opposite4 ,the reviewer's doctrine1 in support of which he cites against me the authority of ,professor ,tait1 illustrates in ,physics that same error of the inductive philosophy which1 in ,metaphysics1 ,i have pointed out elsewhere 7,principles of ,psychology1 ,part ,,vii474 ,it is a doctrine implying that we can go on for ever asking the proof of the proof1 without finally coming to any deepest cognition which is unproved and unprovable4 ,that this is an untenable doctrine1 ,i need #bgd not say more to show4 ,nor1 indeed1 would saying more to show it be likely to have any effect1 in so far at least as the reviewer is concerned2 seeing that he thinks ,i am 8ignorant of the very nature of the principles0 of which ,i am speaking1 and seeing that my notions of scientific reasoning 8remind0 him 8of the ,ptolemists10 who argued that the heavenly bodies must move in circles because the circle is the most perfect figure4#cg ,not to try the reader's patience further1 ,i will end by pointing out that1 even were the reviewer's criticisms all valid1 they would leave unshaken the theory he contends against4 ,though one of his sentences 7p4 #dhj7 raises the expectation that he is about to assault1 and greatly to damage1 the bases of the system contained in the second part of ,first ,principles1 yet all those propositions which constitute the bases1 he leaves1 not only uninjured1 but even untouched1--contenting himself with trying to show 7with what success we have seen7 that the fundamental one is an a posteriori truth and not an a priori truth4 ,against the general ,doctrine of ,evolution1 considered as an induction from all classes of concrete phenomena1 he utters not a word2 nor does he utter a word to disprove any one of those laws of the redistribution of matter and motion1 by #bge which the process of ,evolution is deductively interpreted4 ,respecting the law of the ,instability of the ,homogeneous1 he says no more than to quarrel with one of the illustrations4 ,he makes no criticism on the law of the ,multiplication of ,effects4 ,the law of ,segregation he does not even mention4 ,nor does he mention the law of ,equilibration4 ,further1 he urges nothing against the statement that these general laws are severally deducible from the ultimate law of the ,persistence of ,force4 ,lastly1 he does not deny the ,persistence of ,force2 but only differs respecting the nature of our warrant for asserting it4 ,beyond pointing out1 here a cracked brick and there a quoin set askew1 he merely makes a futile attempt to show that the foundation is not natural rock1 but concrete4 ,from his objections ,i may1 indeed1 derive much satisfaction4 ,that a competent critic1 obviously anxious to do all the mischief he can1 and not over-scrupulous about the means he uses1 has done so little1 may be taken as evidence that the fabric of conclusions attacked will not be readily overthrown4 99 99 99 99 99 ,in the ,british ,quarterly ,review for ,january1 #ahgd1 the writer of the article ,i have dealt with above1 makes a rejoinder4 ,it is of the kind which might have been anticipated4 ,there are men to whom the discovery that they have done injustice is painful4 ,after proof of having wrongly ascribed to another such a nonsensical belief as that insensible motion is heat because heat is insensible motion1 some would express regret4 ,not so my reviewer4 ,having by forced interpretations debited me with an absurdity1 he makes no apology2 but1 with an air implying that he had all along done this1 he attacks the allegation ,i had really made--an allegation which is at least so far from an absurdity1 that he describes it only as not justified by 8the present state of science40 ,and here1 having incidentally referred to this point1 ,i may as well1 before #bgf proceeding1 deal with his substituted charge at the same time that ,i further exemplify his method4 ,probably most of those who see the ,british ,quarterly1 will be favourably impressed by the confidence of his assertion2 but those who compare my statement with his travesty of it1 and who compare both with some authoritative exposition1 will be otherwise impressed4 ,to his statement that ,i conclude 8that friction must ultimately transform all the italics are his the energy of a sound into heat10 ,i reply that it is glaringly untrue3 ,i have named friction as a second cause only4 ,and when he pooh-poohs the effect of compression because it is 8merely momentary10 is he aware of the meaning of his words8 ,will he deny that1 from first to last1 during the interval of condensation1 heat is being generated8 ,will he deny to the air the power of radiating such heat8 ,he will not venture to do so4 ,take then the interval of condensation as one-thousandth of a second4 ,i ask him to inform those whom he professes to instruct1 what is the probable number of heat-waves which have escaped in this interval4 ,must they not be numbered by thousands of millions8 ,in fact1 by his 8merely momentary10 he actually assumes that what is momentary in relation to our time-measures1 is momentary in relation to the escape of ethereal undulations6 ,let me now proceed more systematically1 and examine his rejoinder point by point4 ,it sets out thus3 8,in the notice of ,mr4 ,spencer's works that appeared in the last number of this ,review1 we had occasion to point out that he held mistaken notions of the most fundamental generalizations of dynamics2 that he had shown an ignorance of the nature of proof in his treatment of the ,newtonian ,law2 that he had used phrases such as the ,persistence of ,force in various and inconsistent significations2 and more especially that he had put forth proofs logically faulty in his endeavour to demonstrate certain physical propositions by priori methods1 and to show that such proofs must exist4 ,to this article ,mr4 ,spencer has replied in the ,december number of the ,fortnightly ,review4 ,his reply leaves every one of the above positions unassailed40 ,in my 8,replies to ,criticisms10 which1 as it was1 trespassed unduly on the pages of the ,fortnightly ,review1 ,i singled #bgg out from those of his allegations which touched me personally1 one that might be briefly dealt with as an example2 and ,i stated that1 passing over other personal questions1 as not interesting to the general reader1 ,i should devote the small space available to an impersonal one4 ,notwithstanding this1 the reviewer1 in the foregoing paragraph1 enumerates his chief positions2 asserts that ,i have not assailed any of them 7which is untrue72 and then leads his readers to the belief that ,i have not assailed them because they are unassailable4 ,leaving this misbelief to be dealt with presently1 ,i continue my comments on his rejoinder4 ,after referring to the passage ,i have quoted from ,prof4 ,tait's statement about physical axioms1 and after indicating the nature of my criticism1 the reviewer says3 8,had ,mr4 ,spencer1 however1 read the sentence that follows it1 we doubt whether we should have heard aught of this quotation4 ,it is #8,without further remark we shall give ,newton's ,three ,laws2 it being remembered that as the properties of matter might have been such as to render a totally different set of laws axiomatic1 these laws must be considered as resting on convictions drawn from observation and experiment and not on intuitive perception4' ,this not only shows that the term #8axiomatic' is used in the previous sentence in a sense that does not exclude an inductive origin1 but it leaves us indebted to ,mr4 ,spencer for the discovery of the clearest and most authoritative expression of disapproval of his views respecting the nature of the ,laws of ,motion40 ,let us analyze this 8authoritative expression40 ,it contains several startling implications1 the disclosure of which the reader will find not uninteresting4 ,consider1 first1 what is implied by framing the thought that 8the properties of matter might have been such as to render a totally different set of laws axiomatic40 ,i will not stop to make the inquiry whether matter having properties fundamentally unlike its present ones1 can be conceived2 though such an inquiry1 leading to the conclusion that no conception of the kind is possible1 would show that the proposition is merely a verbal one4 ,it will suffice if ,i examine the nature of this proposition that 8the properties of matter might have been0 #bgh other than they are4 ,does it express an experimentally-ascertained truth8 ,if so1 ,i invite ,prof4 ,tait to describe the experiments4 ,is it an intuition8 ,if so1 then along with doubt of an intuitive belief concerning things as they are1 there goes confidence in an intuitive belief concerning things as they are not4 ,is it an hypothesis8 ,if so1 the implication is that a cognition of which the negation is inconceivable 7for an axiom is such7 may be discredited by inference from that which is not a cognition at all1 but simply a supposition4 ,does the reviewer admit that no conclusion can have a validity greater than is possessed by its premises8 or will he say that the trustworthiness of cognitions increases in proportion as they are the more inferential8 ,be his answer what it may1 ,i shall take it as unquestionable that nothing concluded can have a warrant higher than that from which it is concluded1 though it may have a lower4 ,now the elements of the proposition before us are these3--,as 8the properties of matter might have been such as to render a totally different set of laws axiomatic0 therefore 8these laws now in force must be considered as resting 4 4 4 not on intuitive perception30 that is1 the intuitions in which these laws are recognized1 must not be held authoritative4 ,here the cognition posited as premiss1 is that the properties of matter might have been other than they are2 and the conclusion is that our intuitions relative to existing properties are uncertain4 ,hence1 if this conclusion is valid1 it is valid because the cognition or intuition respecting what might have been1 is more trustworthy than the cognition or intuition respecting what is6 ,scepticism respecting the deliverances of consciousness about things as they are1 is based upon faith in a deliverance of consciousness about things as they are not6 ,i go on to remark that this 8authoritative expression of disapproval0 by which ,i am supposed to be silenced1 even were its allegation as valid as it is fallacious1 would leave #bgi wholly untouched the real issue4 ,i pointed out how ,prof4 ,tait's denial that any physical truths could be reached a priori1 was contradicted by his own statement respecting physical axioms4 ,the question thus raised the reviewer evades1 and substitutes another with which ,i have just dealt4 ,now ,i bring forward again the evaded question4 ,in the passage ,i quoted1 ,prof4 ,tait1 besides speaking of physical 8axioms10 says of them that due familiarity with physical phenomena gives the power of seeing 8at once0 8their necessary truth40 ,these last words1 which express his conception of an axiom1 express also the usual conception4 ,an axiom is defined as a 8self-evident truth10 or a truth that is seen at once2 and the definition otherwise worded is--a 8truth so evident at first sight1 that no process of reasoning or demonstration can make it plainer40 ,now ,i contend that ,prof4 ,tait1 by thus committing himself to a definition of physical axioms identical with that which is given of mathematical axioms1 tacitly admits that they have the same a priori character2 and ,i further contend that no such nature as that which he describes physical axioms to have1 can be acquired by experiment or observation during the life of an individual4 ,axioms1 if defined as truths of which the necessity is at once seen1 are thereby defined as truths of which the negation is inconceivable2 and the familiar contrast between them and the truths established by individual experiences1 is that these last never become such that their negations are inconceivable1 however multitudinous the experiences may be4 ,thousands of times has the sportsman heard the report that follows the flash from his gun1 but still he can imagine the flash as occurring silently2 and countless daily experiments on the burning of coal1 leave him able to conceive coal as remaining in the fire without ignition4 ,so that the 8convictions drawn from observation and experiment0 during a single life1 can never acquire that character which ,prof4 ,tait admits physical axioms to have3 in other words1 physical axioms cannot be #bhj derived from personal observation and experiment4 ,thus1 otherwise applying the reviewer's words1 ,i 8doubt whether we should have heard aught of this quotation0 to which he calls my attention1 had he studied the matter more closely2 and he 8leaves us indebted to0 him 8for the discovery of0 a passage which serves to make clearer the untenability of the doctrine he so dogmatically affirms4 ,i turn now to what the reviewer says concerning the special arguments ,i used to show that the first law of motion cannot be proved experimentally4 ,after a bare enunciation of my positions1 he says3 8,on the utterly erroneous character of these statements we do not care to dwell1 we wish simply to call our reader's attention to the conclusion arrived at4 ,is that a disproof of the possibility of an inductive proof8 ,we thought that every tolerably educated man was aware that the proof of a scientific law consisted in showing that by assuming its truth1 we could explain the observed phenomena40 ,probably the reviewer expects his readers to conclude that he could easily dispose of the statements referred to if he tried4 ,among scientific men1 however1 this cavalier passing over of my arguments will perhaps be ascribed to another cause4 ,i will give him my reason for saying this4 ,those arguments1 read in proof by one of the most eminent physicists1 and by a specially-honoured mathematician1 had their entire concurrence2 and ,i have since had from another mathematician1 standing among the very first1 such qualified agreement as is implied in saying that the first law of motion cannot be proved by terrestrial observations 7which is in large measure what ,i undertook to show in the paragraphs which the reviewer passes over so contemptuously74 ,but his last sentence1 telling us what he thought 8every tolerably educated man was aware0 of1 is the one which chiefly demands attention4 ,in it he uses the word law--a word which1 conveniently wide in meaning1 suits his purpose remarkably well4 ,but we are here speaking of physical axioms4 ,the question is whether the justification of a physical #bha axiom consists in showing that by assuming its truth1 we can explain the observed phenomena4 ,if it does1 then all distinction between hypothesis and axiom disappears4 ,mathematical axioms1 for which there is no other definition than that which ,prof4 ,tait gives of physical axioms1 must stand on the same footing4 ,henceforth we must hold that our warrant for asserting that 8things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one another10 consists in the observed truth of the geometrical and other propositions deducible from it and the associated axioms--the observed truth1 mind2 for the fabric of deductions yields none of the required warrant until these deductions have been tested by measurement4 ,when we have described squares on the three sides of a right-angled triangle1 cut them out in paper1 and1 by weighing them1 have found that the one on the hypothenuse balances the other two2 then we have got a fact which1 joined with other facts similarly ascertained1 justifies us in asserting that things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one another6 ,even as it stands1 this implication will not1 ,i think1 be readily accepted2 but we shall find that its unacceptability becomes still more conspicuous when the analysis is pursued to the end4 ,continuing his argument to show that the laws of motion have no a priori warrant1 the reviewer says3 8,mr4 ,spencer asserts that ,newton gave no proof of the ,laws of ,motion4 ,the whole of the ,principia was the proof1 and the fact that1 taken as a system1 these laws account for the lunar and planetary motions1 is the warrant on which they chiefly rest to this day40 ,i have first to point out that here1 as before1 the reviewer escapes by raising a new issue4 ,i did not ask what he thinks about the ,principia1 and the proof of the laws of motion by it2 nor did ,i ask whether others at this day1 hold the assertion of these laws to be justified mainly by the evidence the ,solar ,system affords4 ,i asked what ,newton thought4 ,the reviewer had represented the belief that the second law of motion is knowable a priori1 as too #bhb absurd even for me openly to enunciate4 ,i pointed out that since ,newton enunciates it openly under the title of an axiom1 and offers no proof whatever of it1 he did explicitly what ,i am blamed for doing implicitly4 ,and thereupon ,i invited the reviewer to say what he thought of ,newton4 ,instead of answering1 he gives me his opinion to the effect that the laws of motion are proved true by the truth of the ,principia deduced from them4 ,of this hereafter4 ,my present purpose is to show that ,newton did not say this1 and gave every indication of thinking the contrary4 ,he does not call the laws of motion 8hypotheses20 he calls them 8axioms40 ,he does not say that he assumes them to be true provisionally2 and that the warrant for accepting them as actually true1 will be found in the astronomically-proved truth of the deductions4 ,he lays them down just as mathematical axioms are laid down--posits them as truths to be accepted a priori1 from which follow consequences that must therefore be accepted4 ,and though the reviewer thinks this an untenable position1 ,i am quite content to range myself with ,newton in thinking it a tenable one--if1 indeed1 ,i may say so without undervaluing the reviewer's judgment4 ,but now1 having shown that the reviewer evaded the issue ,i raised1 which it was inconvenient for him to meet1 ,i pass to the issue he substitutes for it4 ,i will first deal with it after the methods of ordinary logic1 before dealing with it after the methods of what may be called transcendental logic4 ,to establish the truth of a proposition postulated1 by showing that the deductions from it are true1 requires that the truth of the deductions shall be shown in some way that does not directly or indirectly assume the truth of the proposition postulated4 ,if1 setting out with the axioms of ,euclid1 we deduce the truths that 8the angle in a semi-circle is a right angle10 and that 8the opposite angles of any quadrilateral figure described in a circle1 are together equal to two right angles10 and so forth2 and if1 because #bhc these propositions are true1 we say that the axioms are true1 we are guilty of a petitio principii4 ,i do not mean simply that if these various propositions are taken as true on the strength of the demonstrations given1 the reasoning is circular1 because the demonstrations assume the axioms2 but ,i mean more--,i mean that any supposed experimental proof of these propositions by measurement1 itself assumes the axioms to be justified4 ,for even when the supposed experimental proof consists in showing that some two lines demonstrated by reason to be equal1 are equal when tested in perception1 the axiom that things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one another1 is taken for granted4 ,the equality of the two lines can be ascertained only by carrying from the one to the other1 some measure 7either a moveable marked line or the space between the points of compasses71 and by assuming that the two lines are equal to one another1 because they are severally equal to this measure4 ,the ultimate truths of mathematics1 then1 cannot be established by any experimental proof that the deductions from them are true2 since the supposed experimental proof takes them for granted4 ,the same thing holds of ultimate physical truths4 ,for the alleged a posteriori proof of these truths1 has a vice exactly analogous to the vice ,i have just indicated4 ,every evidence yielded by astronomy that the axioms called 8the laws of motion0 are true1 resolves itself into a fulfilled prevision that some celestial body or bodies1 will be seen in a specified place1 or in specified places1 in the heavens1 at some assigned time4 ,now the day1 hour1 and minute of this verifying observation1 can be fixed only on the assumption that the ,earth's motion in its orbit and its motion round its axis1 continue undiminished4 ,mark1 then1 the parallelism4 ,one who chose to deny that things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one another1 could never have it proved to him by showing the truth of deduced propositions2 since the testing process would in #bhd every case assume that which he denied4 ,similarly1 one who refused to admit that motion1 uninterfered with1 continues in the same straight line at the same velocity1 could not have it proved to him by the fulfilment of an astronomical prediction2 because he would say that both the spectator's position in space1 and the position of the event in time1 were those alleged1 only if the ,earth's motions of translation and rotation were undiminished1 which was the very thing he called in question4 ,evidently such a sceptic might object that the seeming fulfilment of the prediction1 say a transit of ,venus1 may be effected by various combinations of the changing positions of ,venus1 of the ,earth1 and of the spectator on the ,earth4 ,the appearances may occur as anticipated1 though ,venus is at some other place than the calculated one2 provided the ,earth also is at some other place1 and the spectator's position on the ,earth is different4 ,and if the first law of motion is not assumed1 it must be admitted that the ,earth and the spectator may occupy these other places at the predicted time3 supposing that in the absence of the first law1 this predicted time can be ascertained1 which it cannot4 ,thus the testing process inevitably begs the question4 ,that the perfect congruity of all astronomical observations with all deductions from 8the laws of motion10 gives coherence to this group of intuitions and perceptions1 and so furnishes a warrant for the entire aggregate of them which it would not have were any of them at variance1 is unquestionable4 ,but it does not therefore follow that astronomical observations can furnish a test for each individual assumption1 out of the many which are simultaneously made4 ,i will not dwell on the fact that the process of verification assumes the validity of the assumptions on which acts of reasoning proceed2 for the reply may be that these are shown to be valid apart from astronomy4 ,nor will ,i insist that the assumptions underlying mathematical inferences1 geometrical and #bhe numerical1 are involved2 since it may be said that these are justifiable separately by our terrestrial experiences4 ,but1 passing over all else that is taken for granted1 it suffices to point out that1 in making every astronomical prediction1 the three laws of motion and the law of gravitation are all assumed2 that if the first law of motion is to be held proved by the fulfilment of the prediction1 it can be so only by taking for granted that the two other laws of motion and the law of gravitation are true2 and that non-fulfilment of the prediction would not disprove the first law of motion1 since the error might be in one or other of the three remaining assumptions4 ,similarly with the second law3 the astronomical proof of it depends on the truth of the accompanying assumptions4 ,so that the warrants for the assumptions ,a1 ,b1 ,c1 and ,d1 are respectively such that ,a1 ,b1 and ,c being taken as trustworthy1 prove the validity of ,d2 ,d being thus proved valid1 joins ,c1 and ,b1 in giving a character to ,a2 and so throughout4 ,the result is that everything comes out right if they happen to be all true2 but if one of them is false1 it may destroy the characters of the other three1 though these are in reality exact4 ,clearly1 then1 astronomical prediction and observation can never test any one of the premises by itself4 ,they can only justify the entire aggregate of premises1 mathematical and physical1 joined with the entire aggregate of reasoning processes leading from premises to conclusions4 ,i now recall the reviewer's 8thought10 uttered in his habitual manner1 8that every tolerably educated man was aware that the proof of a scientific law consisted in showing that by assuming its truth1 we could explain the observed phenomena40 ,having from the point of view of ordinary logic dealt with this theory of proof as applied by the reviewer1 ,i proceed to deal with it from the point of view of transcendental logic1 as ,i have myself applied it4 ,and here ,i have to charge the reviewer with either being ignorant of1 or else deliberately ignoring1 a cardinal #bhf doctrine of the ,system of ,philosophy he professes to review--a doctrine set forth not in those four volumes of it which he seems never to have looked into2 but in the one volume of it he has partially dealt with4 ,for this principle which1 in respect to scientific belief1 he enunciates for my instruction1 is one which1 in ,first ,principles1 ,i have enunciated in respect to all beliefs whatever4 ,in the chapter on the 8,data of ,philosophy10 where ,i have inquired into the legitimacy of our modes of procedure1 and where ,i have pointed out that there are certain ultimate conceptions without which the intellect can no more stir 8than the body can stir without help of its limbs10 ,i have inquired how their validity or invalidity is to be shown2 and ,i have gone on to reply that 8,those of them which are vital1 or cannot be severed from the rest without mental dissolution1 must be assumed as true provisionally 4 4 4 4 leaving the assumption of their unquestionableness to be justified by the results4 8 #dj4 ,how is it to be justified by the results8 ,as any other assumption is justified--by ascertaining that all the conclusions deducible from it1 correspond with the facts as directly observed--by showing the agreement between the experiences it leads us to anticipate1 and the actual experiences4 ,there is no mode of establishing the validity of any belief1 except that of showing its entire congruity with all other beliefs40 ,proceeding avowedly and rigorously on this principle1 ,i have next inquired what is the fundamental process of thought by which this congruity is to be determined1 and what is the fundamental product of thought yielded by this process4 ,this fundamental product ,i have shown to be the coexistence of subject and object2 and then1 describing this as a postulate to be justified by 8its subsequently-proved congruity with every result of experience1 direct and indirect10 ,i have gone on to say that 8the two divisions of self and not-self1 are re-divisible into certain most general forms1 the reality of which ,science1 as well as ,common ,sense1 from moment to moment assumes40 ,nor is this all4 ,having thus assumed1 only provisionally1 this deepest of all intuitions1 far transcending an axiom in self-evidence1 ,i #bhg have1 after drawing deductions occupying four volumes1 deliberately gone back to the assumption 7,prin4 of ,psy41 #chf74 ,after quoting the passage in which the principle was laid down1 and after reminding the reader that the deductions drawn had been found congruous with one another2 ,i have pointed out that it still remained to ascertain whether this primordial assumption was congruous with all the deductions2 and have thereupon proceeded1 throughout eighteen chapters1 to show the congruity4 ,and yet having before him the volumes in which this principle is set forth with a distinctness1 and acted upon with a deliberation1 which ,i believe are nowhere paralleled1 the reviewer enunciates for my benefit this principle of which he 8thought that every tolerably educated man was aware06 ,he enunciates it as applying to limited groups of beliefs1 to which it does not apply2 and shuts his eyes to the fact that ,i have avowedly and systematically acted upon it in respect to the entire aggregate of our beliefs 7axioms included7 for which it furnishes the ultimate justification6 ,here ,i must add another elucidatory statement1 which would have been needless had the reviewer read that which he criticizes4 ,his argument proceeds throughout on the assumption that ,i understand a priori truths after the ancient manner1 as truths independent of experience2 and he shows this more tacitly1 where he 8trusts0 that he is 8attacking one of the last attempts to deduce the laws of nature from our inner consciousness40 ,manifestly1 a leading thesis of one of the works he professes to review1 is entirely unknown to him--the thesis that forms of thought1 and consequently the intuitions which those forms of thought involve1 result entirely from the effects of experiences1 organized and inherited4 ,with the ,principles of ,psychology before him1 not only does he seem unaware that it contains this doctrine1 but though this doctrine1 set forth in its first edition published nearly twenty years ago1 has gained #bhh considerable currency1 he seems never to have heard of it4 ,the implication of this doctrine is1 not that the 8laws of nature0 are deducible from 8our inner consciousness10 but that our consciousness has a pre-established correspondence with such of those laws 7simple1 perpetually presented1 and never negatived7 as have1 in the course of practically-infinite ancestral experiences1 registered themselves in our nervous structure4 ,had he taken the trouble to acquaint himself with this doctrine1 he would have learned that the intuitions of axiomatic truths are regarded by me as latent in the inherited brain1 just as bodily reflex actions are latent in the inherited nervous centres of a lower order2 that such latent intuitions are made potentially more distinct by the greater definiteness of structure due to individual action and culture2 and that thus1 axiomatic truths1 having a warrant entirely a posteriori for the race1 have for the individual a warrant which1 substantially a priori1 is made complete a posteriori4 ,and he would then have learned that as1 during evolution1 ,thought has been moulded into increasing correspondence with ,things2 and as such correspondence1 tolerably complete in respect of the simple1 ever-present1 and invariable relations1 as those of space1 has made considerable advance in respect of the primary dynamical relations2 the assertion that the resulting intuitions are authoritative1 is the assertion that the simplest uniformities of nature1 as experienced throughout an immeasurable past1 are better known than they are as experienced during an individual life4 ,all which conceptions1 however1 being1 as it seems1 unheard of by the reviewer1 he regards my trust in these primordial intuitions as like that of the ,ptolemists in their fancies about perfection6 99 99 99 99 99 ,thus far my chief antagonists1 passive if not active1 have been ,prof4 ,tait and1 by implication1 ,sir ,william ,thomson1 #bhi his coadjutor in the work quoted against me--men of standing1 and the last of them of world-wide reputation as a mathematician and physicist4 ,partly because the opinions of such men demand attention1 ,i have dealt with the questions raised at some length2 and partly1 also1 because the origin and consequent warrant of physical axioms are questions of general and permanent interest4 ,the reviewer1 who by citing against me these authorities has gained for some of his criticisms consideration they would otherwise not deserve1 ,i must1 in respect of his other criticisms1 deal with very briefly4 ,because1 for reasons sufficiently indicated1 ,i did not assail sundry of his statements1 he has reiterated them as unassailable4 ,i will here add no more than is needful to show how groundless is his assumption4 ,what the reviewer says on the metaphysical aspects of the propositions we distinguish as physical1 need not detain us long4 ,his account of my exposition of 8,ultimate ,scientific ,ideas10 he closes by saying of me that 8he is not content with less than showing that all our fundamental conceptions are inconceivable40 ,whether the reviewer knows what he means by an inconceivable conception1 ,i cannot tell4 ,it will suffice to say that ,i have attempted no such remarkable feat as that described4 ,my attempt has been to show that objective activities1 together with their objective forms1 are inconceivable by us--that such symbolic conceptions of them as we frame1 and are obliged to use1 are proved1 by the alternative contradictions which a final analysis of them discloses1 to have no likeness to the realities4 ,but the proposition that objective existence cannot be rendered in terms of subjective existence1 the reviewer thinks adequately expressed by saying that 8our fundamental conceptions0 7subjective products7 8are inconceivable0 7cannot be framed by subjective processes76 ,giving this as a sample from which may be judged his fitness for discussing these ultimate questions1 ,i pass over his physico-metaphysical criticisms1 and proceed at once to #bij those which his special discipline may be assumed to render more worthy of attention4 ,quoting a passage relative to the law that 8all central forces vary inversely as the squares of the distances10 he derides the assertion that 8this law is not simply an empirical one1 but one deducible mathematically from the relations of space--one of which the negation is inconceivable40 ,now whether this statement can or cannot be fully justified1 it has at any rate none of that absurdity alleged by the reviewer4 ,when he puts the question--8,whence does he do ,i get this80 he invites the suspicion that his mind is not characterized by much excursiveness4 ,it seems never to have occurred to him that1 if rays like those of light radiate in straight lines from a centre1 the number of them falling on any given area of a sphere described from that centre1 will diminish as the square of the distance increases1 because the surfaces of spheres vary as the squares of their radii4 ,for1 if this has occurred to him1 why does he ask whence ,i get the inference8 ,the inference is so simple a one as naturally to be recognized by those whose thoughts go a little beyond their lessons in geometry4#ch ,if the reviewer means to ask1 whence ,i get the implied assumption that central forces act only in straight lines1 ,i reply that this assumption has a warrant akin to that of ,newton's first axiom1 that a moving body will continue moving in a straight line unless interfered with4 ,for that the force exerted by one centre on another should act in a curved line1 implies the conception of some second force1 complicating the direct effect of the first4 ,and1 even could a central force be truly conceived as acting in lines not straight1 the average #bia distribution of its effects upon the inner surface of the surrounding sphere1 would still follow the same law4 ,thus1 whether or not the law be accepted on a priori grounds1 the assumed absurdity of representing it to have a priori grounds1 is not very obvious4 ,respecting this statement of mine the reviewer goes on to say 8,this is a wisdom far higher than that possessed by the discoverer of the great law of attraction1 who was led to consider it from no cogitations on the relations of space1 but from observations of the movements of the planets2 and who was so far from rising to that clearness of view of the truth of his great discovery1 which is expressed by the phrase1 #8its negation is inconceivable1' that he actually abandoned it for a time1 because 7through an error in his estimate of the earth's diameter7 it did not seem fully to account for the motion of the moon40 ,to the first clause in this sentence1 ,i have simply to give a direct denial2 and to assert that neither ,newton's 8observations of the movements of the planets0 nor other such observations continued by all astronomers for all time1 would yield 8the great law of attraction40 ,contrariwise1 ,i contend that when the reviewer says1 by implication1 that ,newton had no antecedent hypothesis respecting the cause of the planetary motions1 he 7the reviewer7 is not only going beyond his possible knowledge1 but he is asserting that which even a rudimentary acquaintance with the process of discovery1 might have shown him was impossible4 ,without framing1 beforehand1 the supposition that there was at work an attractive force varying inversely as the square of the distance1 no such comparison of observations as that which led to the establishment of the theory of gravitation could have been made4 ,on the second clause of the sentence1 in which the reviewer volunteers for my benefit the information that ,newton 8actually abandoned0 his hypothesis for a while because it did not bring out right results1 ,i have first to tell him that1 in an early number of the very periodical containing his article1#ci ,i cited this fact #bib 7using these same words7 at a time when he was at school1 or before he went there4#dj ,i have next to assert that this fact is irrelevant2 and that ,newton1 while probably seeing it to be a necessary implication of geometrical laws that central forces vary inversely as the squares of the distances1 did not see it to be a necessary implication of any laws1 geometrical or dynamical1 that there exists a force by which the celestial bodies affect one another2 and therefore doubtless saw that there was no a priori warrant for the doctrine of gravitation4 ,the reviewer1 however1 aiming to substitute for my 8confused notions0 his own clear ones1 wishes me to identify the proposition--,central forces vary inversely as the squares of the distances--with the proposition--,there exists a cosmical attractive force which varies inversely as the squares of the distances4 ,but ,i decline to identify them2 and ,i suspect that a considerable distinction between them was recognized by ,newton4 ,lastly1 apart from all this1 ,i have to point out that even had ,newton thought the existence of an attractive force throughout space was an a priori truth1 as well as the law of variation of such a force if it existed2 he would still1 naturally enough1 pause before asserting gravitation and its law1 when he found his deductions did not correspond with the facts4 ,to suppose otherwise1 is to ascribe to him a rashness which no disciplined man of science could be guilty of4 ,see1 then1 the critical capacity variously exhibited in the space of a single sentence4 ,the reviewer1 quite erroneously1 thinks that observations unguided by hypotheses suffice for physical discoveries4 ,he seems unaware that1 on a priori grounds1 the law of the inverse square had been suspected as the law of some cosmical force1 before ,newton4 ,he asserts1 without warrant1 that no such a priori conception preceded1 in ,newton's mind1 his observations and #bic calculations4 ,he confounds the law of variation of a force1 with the existence of a force varying according to that law4 ,and he concludes that ,newton could have had no a priori conception of the law of variation1 because he did not assert the existence of a force varying according to this law in defiance of the evidence as then presented to him6 ,now that ,i have analyzed1 with these results1 the first of his criticisms1 the reader will neither expect me to waste time in similarly dealing with the rest seriatim1 nor will he wish to have his own time occupied in following the analysis4 ,to the evidence thus furnished of the reviewer's fitness for the task he undertakes1 it will suffice if ,i add an illustration or two of the animus which leads him to make grave imputations on trivial grounds1 and to ignore the evidence which contradicts his interpretations4 ,because ,i have spoken of a balanced system1 like that formed by the sun and planets1 as having the 8peculiarity1 that though the constituents of the system have relative movements1 the system1 as a whole1 has no movement10 he unhesitatingly assumes me to be unaware that in a system of bodies whose movements are not balanced1 it is equally true that the centre of gravity remains constant4 ,ignorance of a general principle in dynamics is alleged against me solely because of this colloquial use of the word 8peculiarity10 where ,i should have used a word 7and there is no word perfectly fit7 free from the implication of exclusiveness4 ,if the reviewer were to assert that arrogance is a 8peculiarity0 of critics2 and if ,i were thereupon to charge him with entire ignorance of mankind1 many of whom besides critics are arrogant1 he would rightly say that my conclusion was a very large one to draw from so small a premise4 ,to this example of strained inference ,i will join an example of what seems like deliberate misconstruction4 ,from one of my essays 7not among the works he professes to deal with7 the reviewer1 to strengthen his attack1 brings #bid a strange mistake2 which1 even without inquiry1 any fair-minded reader would see must be an oversight4 ,a statement true of a single body acted on by a tractive force1 ,i have inadvertently pluralized3 being so possessed by another aspect of the question1 as to overlook the obvious fact that with a plurality of bodies the statement became untrue4 ,not only1 however1 does the reviewer ignore various evidences furnished by the works before him1 that ,i could not really think what ,i had there said1 but he ignores a direct contradiction contained in the paragraph succeeding that from which he quotes4 ,so that the case stands thus3--,on two adjacent pages ,i have made two opposite statements1 both of which ,i cannot be supposed to believe4 ,one of them is right2 and this the reviewer assumes ,i do not believe4 ,one of them is glaringly wrong2 and this the reviewer assumes ,i do believe4 ,why he made this choice no one who reads his criticism will fail to see4 ,even had his judgments more authority than is given to them by his mathematical honours1 this brief characterization would1 ,i think1 suffice4 ,perhaps already1 in rebutting the assumption that ,i did not answer his allegations because they were unanswerable1 ,i have ascribed to them an unmerited importance4 ,for the rest1 suggesting that their value may be measured by the value of that above dealt with as a sample1 ,i leave them to be answered by the works they are directed against4 ,here ,i end4 ,the foregoing pages1 while serving1 ,i think1 the more important purpose of making clearer the relations of physical axioms to physical knowledge1 incidentally justify the assertion that the reviewer's charges of fallacious reasoning and ignorance of the nature of proof1 recoil on himself4 ,when1 in his confident way1 he undertakes to teach me the nature of our warrant for scientific beliefs1 ignoring absolutely the inquiry contained in ,principles of ,psychology1 concerning the relative values of direct intuitions and reasoned conclusions1 he lays himself open to #bie a sarcasm which is sufficiently obvious4 ,and when a certain ultimate principle of justification for our beliefs1 set forth and acted upon in the ,system of ,synthetic ,philosophy more distinctly than in any other work1 is enunciated by him for my instruction1 as one which he 8thought that every tolerably educated man was aware0 of1 his course is one for which ,i find no fit epithet in the vocabulary ,i permit myself to use4 ,that in some cases he has shown eagerness to found charges on misinterpretations little less than deliberate1 has been sufficiently shown2 as also that1 in other cases1 his own failure to discriminate is made the ground for ascribing to me beliefs that are manifestly untenable4 ,save in the single case of a statement respecting collisions of bodies1 made by me without the needful qualification1 ,i am not aware of any errors he detects1 except errors of oversight or those arising from imperfect expression and inadequate exposition4 ,when he unhesitatingly puts the worst constructions on these1 it cannot be because his own exactness is such that no other constructions occur to him2 for he displays an unusual capacity for inadvertencies1 and must have had many experiences showing him how much he might be wronged by illiberal interpretations of them4 ,one who in twenty-three professed extracts makes fifteen mistakes--words omitted1 or added1 or substituted--should not need reminding how largely mere oversight may raise suspicion of something worse4 ,one who shows his notions of accurate statement by asserting that as ,i substitute 8persistence0 for 8conservation10 ,i therefore identify ,persistence of ,force with ,conservation of ,energy1 and debits me with the resulting incongruities--one who1 in pursuance of this error1 confounds a special principle with the general principle it is said to imply1 and thereupon describes a wider principle as being included in a narrower 7p4 #dha7--one who speaks of our 8inner consciousness0 7p4 #dhh71 so asserting1 by implication1 that we have an outer consciousness--one who #bif talks of an inconceivable conception2 ought surely to be aware how readily lax expressions may be turned into proofs of absurd opinions4 ,and one who1 in the space of a few pages1 falls into so many solecisms1 ought to be vividly conscious that a whole volume thus written would furnish multitudinous statements from which a critic1 moved by a spirit like his own1 might evolve abundant absurdities2 supplying ample occasion for blazoning the tops of pages with insulting words4 99 99 99 99 99 ,a letter1 drawn from ,prof4 ,tait by the foregoing criticisms1 and published by him in ,nature1 initiated a controversy carried on in that periodical between ,march #bfth and ,june #ahth1 #ahgd4 ,partly in justification of my position1 and partly as tending to make clearer the nature and origin of physical axioms1 ,i append certain portions of the correspondence1 with some additional explanations and comments4 ,for the purpose of elucidation ,i prefix the theses ,i have maintained4 #big ,,theses4 #a4 ,if ,a produces ,b1 then #b ,a will produce #b ,b4 ,this is the blank form of causal relation quantitatively considered1 when the causes and effects are simple--that is1 are unimpeded by other causes and uncomplicated by other effects2 and whenever two or more causes co-operate1 there is no possibility of determining the relation between the compound cause and the compound effect except by assuming that between each co-operating cause and its separate effect there exists this same quantitative relation4 #b4 ,this truth holds whatever the natures of the simple causes and simple effects2 and is an a priori assumption made in conducting every experiment and in reasoning from it4 ,every process of weighing1 every chemical analysis1 every physical investigation1 proceeds on this truth without assigning warrant for it2 and in allowing for the effect of any minor cause that interferes with the major cause1 this same truth is assumed4 #c4 ,when ,a is an impressed force and ,b the produced motion1 then the general truth that if ,a produces ,b1 #b ,a will produce #b ,b1 becomes the more special truth called the ,second ,law of ,motion4 ,newton's amplified statement of this ,law is3--8,if any force generates a motion1 a double force will generate double the motion1 a triple force triple the motion1 whether that force be impressed altogether and at once1 or gradually and successively40 ,and his further clause1 asserting that this law holds whether the directions of the forces are or are not the same1 asserts a proportionality between each force and its produced motion1 such as we have seen to be invariably assumed between each cause and its separate effect1 when there are co-operating causes4 #d4 ,this ,law may be affirmed1 without specification of the modes in which the impressed force and the resulting motion are to be estimated4 ,newton's statement is abstract4 ,taking for granted right modes of measurement1 it asserts that the alteration of motion 7rightly measured7 is proportional to the impressed force 7rightly measured74 #e4 ,no a posteriori proof of the general ultimate physical truth 7or of this more special truth it includes7 is possible2 because every supposed process of verification assumes it4 ,these1 cleared from entanglements1 are the theses held by me1 and defended in the following pages4 #bih ,,appendix ,a4 7,from ,nature1 ,april #af1 #ahgd47 ,absence from town has delayed what further remarks ,i have to make respecting the disputed origin of physical axioms4 ,the particular physical axiom in connection with which the general question was raised1 was the ,second ,law of ,motion4 ,it stands in the ,principia as follows3 8,the alteration of motion is ever proportional to the motive force impressed2 and is made in the direction of the right line in which that force is impressed4 8,if any force generates a motion1 a double force will generate double the motion1 a triple force triple the motion1 whether that force be impressed altogether and at once1 or gradually and successively4 ,and this motion 7being always directed the same way with the generating force71 if the body moved before1 is added to or subducted from the former motion1 according as they directly conspire with or are directly contrary to each other2 or obliquely joined1 when they are oblique1 so as to produce a new motion compounded from the determination of both40 ,as this1 like each of the other ,laws of ,motion1 is called an axiom2#da as the paragraph appended to it is simply an amplification1 or re-statement in a more concrete form2 as there are no facts named as bases of induction1 nor any justifying experiment2 and as ,newton proceeds forthwith to draw deductions2 it was a legitimate inference that he regarded this truth as a priori4 ,my statement to this effect was based on the contents of the ,principia itself2 and ,i think ,i was warranted in assuming that the nature of the ,laws of ,motion1 as conceived by ,newton1 was to be thence inferred4 ,the passages quoted by the ,british ,quarterly ,reviewer from ,newton's correspondence1 which were unknown to me1 show that this was not ,newton's conception of them4 ,thus far1 then1 my opponent has the best of the #bii argument4 ,several qualifying considerations have to be set down1 however4 7#a7 ,clearly1 the statements contained in the ,principia do not convey ,newton's conception2 otherwise there would have been no need for his explanations4 ,the passages quoted prove that he wished to exclude these cardinal truths from the class of hypotheses1 which he said he did not make2 and to do this he had to define them4 7#b7 ,by calling them 8axioms10 and by yet describing them as principles 8deduced from phenomena10 he makes it manifest that he gives the word 8axiom0 a sense widely unlike the sense in which it is usually accepted4 7#c7 ,further1 the quotations fail to warrant the statement that the ,laws of ,motion are proved true by the truth of the ,principia4 ,for if the fulfilment of astronomical predictions made in pursuance of the ,principia1 is held to be the evidence 8on which they chiefly rest to this day10 then1 until thus justified1 they are unquestionably hypotheses4 ,yet ,newton says they are not hypotheses4 ,newton's view may be found without seeking for it in his letters3 it is contained in the ,principia itself4 ,the scholium to ,corollary ,,vi4 begins thus3 8,hitherto ,i have laid down such principles as have been received by mathematicians1 and are confirmed by abundance of experiments4 ,by the two first ,laws and the two first ,corollaries1 ,galileo discovered that the descent of bodies observed the duplicate ratio of the time1 and that the motion of projectiles was in the curve of a parabola2 experience agreeing with both10 c4 ,now as this passage precedes the deductions constituting the ,principia1 it shows conclusively1 in the first place1 that ,newton did not think 8the whole of the ,principia was the proof0 of the ,laws of ,motion1 though the ,reviewer asserts that it is4 ,further1 by the words ,i have italicised1 ,newton implicitly describes ,galileo as having asserted these ,laws of ,motion1 if not as gratuitous hypotheses 7which he says they are not71 then as a priori intuitions4 ,for a proposition which is confirmed by #cjj experiment1 and which is said to agree with experience1 must have been entertained before the alleged verifications could be reached4 ,and as before he made his experiments on falling bodies and projectiles1 ,galileo had no facts serving as an inductive basis for the ,second ,law of ,motion1 the law could not have been arrived at by induction4 ,let me end what ,i have to say on this vexed question by adding a further reason to those ,i have already given1 for saying that physical axioms cannot be established experimentally4 ,the belief in their experimental establishment rests on the tacit assumption that experiments can be made1 and conclusions drawn from them1 without any truths being postulated4 ,it is forgotten that there is a foundation of pre-conceptions without which the perceptions and inferences of the physicist cannot stand--pre-conceptions which are the products of simpler experiences than those yielded by consciously-made experiments4 ,passing over the many which do not immediately concern us1 ,i will name only that which does1--the exact quantitative relation of proportionality between cause and effect4 ,it is taken by the chemist as a truth needing no proof1 that if two volumes of hydrogen unite with one volume of oxygen to form a certain quantity of water1 four volumes of hydrogen uniting with two volumes of oxygen will form double the quantity of water4 ,if a cubic foot of ice at #cb is liquefied by a specified quantity of heat1 it is taken to be unquestionable that three times the quantity of heat will liquefy three cubic feet4 ,and similarly with mechanical forces1 the unhesitating assumption is that if one unit of force acting in a given direction produces a certain result1 two units will produce twice the result4 ,every process of measurement in a physical experiment takes this for granted2 as we see in one of the simplest of them--the process of weighing4 ,if a measured quantity of metal1 gravitating towards the ,earth1 counterbalances a quantity of some other substance1 the truth postulated in every act #cja of weighing is1 that any multiple of such weight will counterbalance an equi-multiple of such substance4 ,that is to say1 each unit of force is assumed to work its equivalent of effect in the direction in which it acts4 ,now this is nothing else than the assumption which the ,second ,law of ,motion expresses in respect to effects of another kind4 8,if any force generates a motion1 a double force will generate a double motion10 c41 c42 and when carried on to the composition of motions1 the law is1 similarly1 the assertion that any other force1 acting in any other direction1 will similarly produce in that direction a proportionate motion4 ,so that the law simply asserts the exact equivalence or proportionality of causes and effects of this particular class1 while all physical experiments assume this exact equivalence or proportionality among causes and effects of all classes4 ,hence1 the proposal to prove the ,laws of ,motion experimentally1 is the proposal to make a wider assumption for the purpose of justifying one of the narrower assumptions included in it4 ,reduced to its briefest form1 the argument is this3--,if definite quantitative relations of proportionality between causes and effects be assumed a priori1 then1 the ,second ,law of ,motion is an immediate corollary4 ,if there are not definite quantitative relations of proportionality between causes and effects1 all the conclusions drawn from physical experiments are invalid4 ,and further1 in the absence of this a priori assumption of equivalence1 the quantified conclusion from any experiment may be denied1 and any other quantification of the conclusion asserted4#db ,,herbert ,,spencer4 99 99 99 99 99 ,entire misconstruction of the view expressed above1 #cjb having been shown by a new assailant1 who announced himself as also 8,a ,senior ,wrangler10 ,mr4 ,james ,collier my secretary at that time wrote on my behalf an explanatory letter1 published in ,nature for ,may #ba1 #ahgd1 from which the following passages are extracts3 8,the cue may be taken from an experience described in ,mr4 ,spencer's ,principles of ,psychology 7 #dfh1 note71 where it is shown that when with one hand we pull the other1 we have in the feeling of tension produced in the limb pulled1 a measure of the reaction that is equivalent to the action of the other limb4 ,both terms of the relation of cause and effect are in this case present to consciousness as muscular tensions1 which are our symbols of forces in general4 ,while no motion is produced they are felt to be equal1 so far as the sensations can serve to measure equality2 and when excess of tension is felt in the one arm1 motion is experienced in the other4 ,here1 as in the examples about to be given1 the relation between cause and effect1 though numerically indefinite1 is definite in the respect that every additional increment of cause produces an additional increment of effect2 and it is out of this and similar experiences that the idea of the relation of proportionality grows and becomes organic4 8,a child1 when biting his food1 discovers that the harder he bites the deeper is the indentation2 in other words1 that the more force applied1 the greater the effect4 ,if he tears an object with his teeth1 he finds that the more he pulls the more the thing yields4 ,let him press against something soft1 as his own person1 or his clothes1 or a lump of clay1 and he sees that the part or object pressed yields little or much1 according to the amount of the muscular strain4 ,he can bend a stick the more completely the more force he applies4 ,any elastic object1 as a piece of india-rubber or a catapult1 can be stretched the farther the harder he pulls4 ,if he tries to push a small body1 there is little resistance and it is easy to move2 but he finds that a #cjc big body presents greater resistance and is harder to move4 ,the experience is precisely similar if he attempts to lift a big body and a little one2 or if he raises a limb1 with or without any object attached to it4 ,he throws a stone3 if it is light1 little exertion propels it a considerable distance2 if very heavy1 great exertion only a short distance4 ,so1 also1 if he jumps1 a slight effort raises him to a short height1 a greater effort to a greater height4 ,by blowing with his mouth he sees that he can move small objects1 or the surface of his morning's milk1 gently or violently according as the blast is weak or strong4 ,and it is the same with sounds3 with a slight strain on the vocal organs he produces a murmur2 with great strain he can raise a shout4 8,the experiences these propositions record all implicate the same consciousness--the notion of proportionality between force applied and result produced2 and it is out of this latent consciousness that the axiom of the perfect quantitative equivalence of the relations between cause and effect is evolved4 ,to show how rigorous1 how irreversible1 this consciousness becomes1 take a boy and suggest to him the following statements3--,can he not break a string he has1 by pulling8 tell him to double it1 and then he will break it4 ,he cannot bend or break a particular stick3 let him make less effort and he will succeed4 ,he is unable to raise a heavy weight3 tell him he errs by using too much force4 ,he can't push over a small chest3 he will find it easier to upset a larger one4 ,by blowing hard he cannot move a given object3 if he blows lightly1 he will move it4 ,by great exertion he cannot make himself audible at a distance3 but he will make himself heard with less exertion at a greater distance4 ,tell him to do all or any of these1 and of course he fails4 ,the propositions are unthinkable1 and their unthinkableness shows that the consciousness which yields them is irreversible4 ,these1 then1 are preconceptions1 properly so called1 which have #cjd grown unconsciously out of the earliest experiences1 beginning with those of the sucking infant1 which are perpetually confirmed by fresh experiences1 and which have at last become organized in the mental structure4 99 99 99 99 99 8,mr4 ,spencer's argument appears to be briefly this3--#a4 ,there are numberless experiences unconsciously acquired and unconsciously accumulated during the early life of the individual 7in harmony with the acquisitions of all ancestral individuals7 which yield the preconception1 long anteceding anything like conscious physical experiments1 that physical causes and effects vary together quantitatively4 ,this is gained from all orders of physical experiences1 and forms a universal preconception respecting them1 which the physicist or other man of ,science brings with him to his experiments4 8#b4 ,mr4 ,spencer showed in three cases--chemical1 physical1 and mechanical--that this preconception1 so brought1 was tacitly involved in the conception which the experimenter drew from the results of his experiments4 8#c4 ,having indicated this universal preconception1 and illustrated its presence in these special conceptions1 ,mr4 ,spencer goes on to say that it is involved also in the special conception of the relation between force and motion1 as formulated in the #8,second ,law of ,motion4' ,he asserts that this is simply one case out of the numberless cases in which all these consciously-reasoned conclusions rest upon the unconsciously-formed conclusions that precede reasoning4 ,mr4 ,spencer alleges that as it has become impossible for a boy to think that by a smaller effort he can jump higher1 and for a shopman to think that smaller weights will outbalance greater quantities1 and for the physicist to think that he will get increased effects from diminished causes1 so it is impossible to think that #8alteration of motion' is not #8proportional to the motive force impressed4' ,and he maintains that this is1 in fact1 a #cje latent implication of unconsciously-organized experiences1 just as much as those which the experimenter necessarily postulates40 99 99 99 99 99 ,to meet further misinterpretations1 a second letter was written by ,mr4 ,collier and published in ,nature for ,june #d1 #ahgd4 ,the following are passages from it3 8,having but limited space1 and assuming that the requisite qualifications would be made by unbiased readers1 ,i passed over all those details of the child's experiences which would have been required in a full exposition4 ,of course ,i was aware that in the bending of a stick the visible effect does not increase in the same ratio as the force applied2 and hardly needed the #8,senior ,wrangler' to tell me that the resistance to a body moving through a fluid increases in a higher ratio than the velocity4 ,it was taken for granted that he1 and those who think with him1 would see that out of all these experiences1 in some of which the causes and effects are simple1 and in others of which they are complex1 there grows the consciousness that the proportionality is the more distinct the simpler the antecedents and consequents4 ,this is part of the preconception which the physicist brings with him and acts upon4 ,perhaps it is within the #8,senior ,wrangler's' knowledge of physical exploration1 that when the physicist finds a result not bearing that ratio to its assigned cause which the two were ascertained in other cases to have1 he immediately assumes the presence of some perturbing cause or causes1 which modify the ratio4 ,there is1 in fact1 no physical determination made by any experimenter which does not assume1 as an a priori necessity1 that there cannot be a deviation from proportion without the presence of such additional cause4 8,returning to the general issue1 perhaps the #8,senior ,wrangler' will pay some respect to the judgment of one #cjf who was a ,senior ,wrangler too1 and a great deal more--who was distinguished not only as a mathematician but as an astronomer1 a physicist1 and also as an inquirer into the methods of science3 ,i mean ,sir ,john ,herschel4 ,in his ,discourse on the ,study of ,natural ,philosophy1 he says3 8#8,when we would lay down general rules for guiding and facilitating our search1 among a great mass of assembled facts1 for their common cause1 we must have regard to the characters of that relation which we intend by cause and effect4' 8,of these #8characters' he sets down the third and fourth in the following terms3 8#8,increase or diminution of the effect1 with the increased or diminished intensity of the cause1 in cases which admit of increase and diminution4' 8#8,proportionality of the effect to its cause in all cases of direct unimpeded action4' 8,observe that1 in ,sir ,j4 ,herschel's view1 these are #8characters' of the relation of cause and effect to be accepted as #8general rules for guiding and facilitating our search' among physical phenomena--truths that must be taken for granted before the search1 not truths derived from the search4 ,clearly1 the #8proportionality of the effect to its cause in all cases of direct and unimpeded action' is here taken as a priori4 ,sir ,j4 ,herschel would1 therefore1 have asserted1 with ,mr4 ,spencer1 that the ,second ,law of ,motion is a priori2 since this is one of the cases of the #8proportionality of the effect to its cause4' 8,and now let the #8,senior ,wrangler' do what ,sir ,j4 ,herschel has not done or thought of doing--prove the proportionality of cause and effect4 ,neither he1 nor any other of ,mr4 ,spencer's opponents1 has made the smallest attempt to deal with this main issue4 ,mr4 ,spencer alleges that this cognition of proportionality is a priori3 not in the old sense1 but in the sense that it grows out of experiences that precede reasoning4 ,his opponents1 following ,prof4 ,tait in the assertion that ,physics is a purely experimental science1 containing1 therefore1 no a priori truths1 affirm that this #cjg cognition is a posteriori--a product of conscious induction4 ,let us hear what are the experiments4 ,it is required to establish the truth that there is proportionality between causes and effects1 by a process which nowhere assumes that if one unit of force produces a certain unit of effect1 two units of such force will produce two units of such effect4 ,until the #8,senior ,wrangler' has done this he has left ,mr4 ,spencer's position untouched40 ,,appendix ,b4 ,after publication of the letters from which the foregoing are reproduced1 there appeared in ,nature certain rejoinders containing misrepresentations even more extreme than those preceding them4 ,there resulted a direct correspondence with two of the writers--,mr4 ,robert ,b4 ,hayward1 of ,harrow1 and ,mr4 ,j4 ,f4 ,moulton1 my original assailant1 the author of the article in the ,british ,quarterly ,review4 ,this correspondence1 in which ,i demanded from these gentlemen the justifications for their statements1 formed part of this ,appendix in its pamphlet form1 as distributed among those who are competent to judge of the questions at issue4 ,it is needless to give permanence to the replies and rejoinders4 ,the character of ,mr4 ,moulton's allegations1 quite congruous with those ,i have exposed in the 8,replies to ,criticisms10 may be inferred from one of the sentences closing my reply--8,wonderful to relate1 my inductive proof that proportionality of cause and effect is taken for granted1 he cites as my inductive proof of proportionality itself60 ,the result of the interchange of letters with ,mr4 ,hayward1 was to make it clear that 8the thing ,i assert is not really disputed2 and the thing disputed1 ,i have nowhere asserted40 ,while1 however1 the controversial part of the correspondence may fitly disappear1 #cjh ,i retain an expository part embodied in the following letter to ,mr4 ,hayward4 #ch1 ,queen's ,gardens1 ,bayswater1 ,june #bast1 #ahgd4 ,,sir1--,herewith ,i send you a copy of your letter with my interposed comments4 ,i think those comments will make it clear to you that ,i have not committed myself to three different definitions of our consciousness of the ,second ,law of ,motion4 ,as others may still feel a difficulty such as you seem to have felt1 in understanding that which familiarity has made me regard as simple1 ,i will endeavour1 by a synthetic exposition1 to make clear the way in which these later and more complex products of organized experiences stand related to earlier and simpler products4 ,to make this exposition easier to follow1 ,i will take first our ,space-consciousness and the derived conceptions4 ,on the hypothesis of ,evolution1 the ,space-consciousness results from organized motor1 tactual1 and visual experiences4 ,in the ,principles of ,psychology1 #cbf-cdf1 ,i have described in detail what ,i conceive to have been its genesis4 ,such ,space-consciousness so generated1 is one possessed in greater or less degree by all creatures of any intelligence2 becoming wider1 and more definite1 according to the degree of mental evolution which converse with the environment has produced4 ,how deeply registered the external relations have become in the internal structure1 is shown by the facts that the decapitated frog pushes away with one or both legs the scalpel applied to the hind part of its body1 and that the chick1 as soon as it has recovered from the exhaustion of escaping from the egg1 performs correctly-guided actions 7accompanied by consciousness of distance and direction7 in picking up grains4 ,ascending at once to such organized and inherited ,space-consciousness as exists in the child1 and which from moment to moment #cji it is making more complete by its own experiences 7aiding the development of its nervous system into the finished type of the adult1 by the same exercises which similarly aid the development of its muscular system71 we have to observe that1 along with increasingly-definite ideas of distance and direction1 it gains unawares certain more special ideas of geometrical relations4 ,take one group of these4 ,every time it spreads open its fingers it sees increase of the angles between them1 going along with increase of the distances between the finger-tips4 ,in opening wide apart its own legs1 and in seeing others walk1 it has continually before it the relation between increase or decrease of base in a triangle having equal sides1 and increase or decrease of the angle included by those sides4 ,the relation impressed on it being simply that of concomitant variation3 ,i do not speak of any more definite relation1 which1 indeed1 is unthinkable by the young4 ,it does not observe these facts in such way as to be conscious that it has observed them2 but they are so impressed upon it as to establish a rigid association between certain mental states4 ,various of its activities disclose space-relations of this class more definitely4 ,the drawing of a bow exhibits them in another way and with somewhat greater precision2 and when1 instead of the ends of a bow1 capable of approaching one another1 the points of attachment are fixed and the string elastic1 the connexion between increasing length in the sides of an isosceles triangle and increasing acuteness of the included angle1 is still more forced upon the attention2 though it still does not rise into a conscious cognition4 ,this is what ,i mean by an 8unconsciously-formed preconception40 ,when1 in course of time1 the child1 growing into the boy1 draws diagrams on paper1 and1 among other things1 draws isosceles triangles1 the truth that1 the base being the same1 the angle at the apex becomes more acute as the sides lengthen1 is still more definitely displayed to him2 and when his attention is drawn to this relation he finds that he #caj cannot think of it as being otherwise4 ,if he imagines the lengths of the sides to change1 he cannot exclude the consciousness of the correlative change in the angle2 and presently1 when his mental power is sufficiently developed1 he perceives that if he continues to lengthen the sides in imagination1 the lines approach parallelism as the angle approaches zero3 yielding a conception of the relations of parallel lines4 ,here the consciousness has risen into the stage of definite conception4 ,but1 manifestly1 the definite conception so reached is but a finishing of the preconceptions previously reached1 and would have been impossible in their absence2 and these unconsciously-formed preconceptions would similarly have been impossible in the absence of the still earlier consciousnesses of distance1 direction1 relative position1 embodied in the consciousness of ,space4 ,the whole evolution is one2 the arrival at the distinct conception is the growing up to an ultimate definiteness and complexity2 and it can no more be reached without passing through the earlier stages of indefinite consciousness1 than the adult bodily structure can be reached without passing through the structures of the embryo1 the infant1 and the child4#dc ,through a parallel evolution arises1 first the vague #caa consciousness of forces as exerted by self and surrounding things2 presently1 some discrimination in respect of their amounts as related to their effects2 later1 an association formed unawares between greatness of quantity in the two1 and between smallness of quantity in the two2 later still1 a tacit assumption of proportionality1 though without a distinct consciousness that the assumption has been made2 and1 finally1 a rising of this assumption into definite recognition1 as a truth necessarily holding where the forces are simple4 ,throughout its life every creature has1 within the actions of its moving parts1 forces and motions conforming to the ,laws of ,motion4 #cab ,if it has a nervous system1 the differences among the muscular tensions and the movements initiated1 register themselves in a vague way in that nervous system4 ,as the nervous system develops1 along with more developed limbs1 there are at once more numerous different experiences 4 4 4 of momentum generated1 of connected actions and reactions 7as when an animal tears the food which it holds with its paws72 and1 at the same time1 there are1 in its more developed nervous system1 increased powers of appreciating and registering these differences4 ,all the resulting connexions in consciousness1 though unknowingly formed and unknowingly entertained1 are ever present as guides to action3 witness the proportion between the effort an animal makes and the distance it means to spring2 or witness the delicate adjustments of muscular strains to changes of motion1 made by a swallow catching flies or a hawk swooping on its quarry4 ,manifestly1 then1 these experiences1 organized during the earlier stages of mental evolution1 form a body of consciousnesses1 not formulated into cognitions1 nor present even as preconceptions1 but nevertheless present as a mass of associations in which the truths of relation between force and motion are potentially present4 ,on ascending to human beings of the uncultured sort1 we reach a stage at which some nascent generalization of these experiences occur4 ,the savage has not expressed to himself the truth that if he wants to propel his spear further he must use more force2 nor does the rustic put into a distinct thought the truth that to raise double the weight he must put forth twice the effort2 but in each there is a tacit assumption to this effect1 as becomes manifest on calling it in question4 ,so that1 in respect of these and other simple mechanical actions1 there exist unconsciously-formed preconceptions4 ,and just as the geometrical truths presented in a rude way by the relations among surrounding objects1 are not overtly recognized until there is some familiarity with straight lines1 and diagrams made of them2 #cac so1 until linear measures1 long used1 have led to the equal-armed lever1 or scales1 and thus to the notion of equal units of force1 this mechanical preconception cannot rise into definiteness4 ,nor after it has risen into definiteness does it for a long time reach the form of a consciously-held cognition2 for neither the village huxter nor the more cultivated druggist in the town1 recognizes the general abstract truth that1 when uninterfered with1 equi-multiples of causes and their effects are necessarily connected4 ,but now observe that this truth1 acted upon with more or less distinct consciousness of it by the man of science1 and perfected by him through analysis and abstraction1 is thus perfected only as the last step in its evolution4 ,this definite cognition is but the finished form of a consciousness long in preparation--a consciousness the body of which is present in the brute1 takes some shape in the primitive man1 reaches greater definiteness in the semi-civilized1 becomes afterwards an assumption distinct though not formulated1 and takes its final development only as it rises into a consciously-accepted axiom4 ,just as there is a continuous evolution of the nervous system1 so is there a continuous evolution of the consciousness accompanying its action4 ,just as the one grows in volume1 complexity1 and definiteness1 so does the other4 ,and just as necessary as the earlier stages are to the later in the one case1 are they in the other4 ,to suppose that the finished conceptions of science can exist without the unfinished common knowledge which precedes them1 or this without still earlier mental acquisitions1 is the same thing as to suppose that we can have the correct judgments of the adult without passing through the crude judgments of the youth1 the narrow1 incoherent ones of the child1 and the vague1 feeble ones of the infant4 ,so far is it from being true that the view of physical axioms held by me1 is one which bases cognitions on some other source than experience1 it asserts experience to be the only possible source of these1 as of other cognitions2 but it asserts1 further1 that #cad not simply is the consciously-acquired experience of present actions needful1 but that for the very possibility of gaining this we are indebted to the accumulated experiences of all past actions4 ,not ,i1 but my antagonists1 are really chargeable with accepting the ancient a priori view2 since1 without any explanation of them or justification of them1 they posit as unquestionable the assumptions underlying every experiment and the conclusion drawn from it4 ,the belief in physical causation1 assumed from moment to moment as necessary in every experiment and in all reasoning from it1 is a belief which1 if not justified by the hypothesis above set forth1 is tacitly asserted as an a priori belief4 ,contrariwise1 my own position is one which affiliates all such beliefs upon experiences acquired during the whole past2 which alleges those experiences as the only warrant for them2 which asserts that during the converse between the mind and its environment1 necessary connexions in ,thought1 such as those concerning ,space1 have resulted from infinite experiences of corresponding necessary connexions in ,things2 and that1 similarly1 out of perpetual converse with the ,forces manifested to us in ,space1 there has been a progressive establishment of internal relations answering to external relations1 in such wise that there finally emerge as physical axioms1 certain necessities of ,thought which answer to necessities in ,things4 ,i need scarcely say that ,i have taken the trouble of making my comments on your letter1 and of writing this further exposition1 with a view to their ulterior use4 ,i am1 c41 ,,herbert ,,spencer4 ,,appendix ,c4 ,,summary ,,of ,,results4 ,those who deny a general doctrine enunciated by ,mayer as the basis of his reasonings1 habitually assumed by ,faraday #cae as a guiding principle in drawing his conclusions1 distinctly held by ,helmholtz1 and tacitly implied by ,sir ,john ,herschel--those1 ,i say1 who deny this general doctrine and even deride it1 should be prepared with clear and strong reasons for doing this4 ,having been attacked1 not in the most temperate manner1 for enunciating this doctrine and its necessary implications in a specific form1 ,i have demanded such reasons4 ,observe the responses to the demand4 #a4 ,the ,british ,quarterly ,reviewer quoted for my instruction the dictum of ,professor ,tait1 that 8,natural ,philosophy is an experimental1 and not an intuitive science4 ,no priori reasoning can conduct us demonstratively to a single physical truth40 ,thereupon ,i inquired what ,professor ,tait meant 8by speaking of #8physical axioms1' and by saying that the cultured are enabled #8to see at once their necessary truth8'0 4 4 4 ,no reply4 #b4 ,instead of an answer to the question1 how this intuition of necessity can be alleged by ,professor ,tait consistently with his other doctrine1 the ,reviewer quotes1 as though it disposed of my question1 ,professor ,tait's statement that 8as the properties of matter might have been such as to render a totally different set of laws axiomatic1 these laws of motion must be considered as resting on convictions drawn from observation and experiment1 and not on intuitive perception40 ,whereupon ,i inquired how ,professor ,tait knows that 8the properties of matter might have been0 other #caf than they are4 ,i asked how it happened that his intuition concerning things as they are not1 is so certain that1 by inference from it1 he discredits our intuitions concerning things as they are 4 4 4 ,no reply3 ,professor ,tait told1 propos of my question1 a story of which no one could discover the application2 but1 otherwise1 declined to answer4 ,nor was any answer given by his disciple4 #c4 ,further1 ,i asked how it happened that ,professor ,tait accepted as bases for ,physics1 ,newton's ,laws of ,motion2 which were illustrated but not proved by ,newton1 and of which no proofs are supplied by ,professor ,tait1 in the ,treatise on ,natural ,philosophy4 ,i went on to examine what conceivable a posteriori warrant there can be if there is no warrant a priori2 and ,i pointed out that neither from terrestrial nor from celestial phenomena can the ,first ,law of ,motion be deduced without a petitio principii 4 4 4 ,no reply3 the ,reviewer characterized my reasoning as 8utterly erroneous0 7therein differing entirely from two #cag eminent authorities who read it in proof72 but beyond so characterizing it he said nothing4 #d4 ,to my assertion that ,newton gave no proof of the ,laws of ,motion1 the ,reviewer rejoined that 8the whole of the ,principia was the proof40 ,on which my comment was that ,newton called them 8axioms10 and that axioms are not commonly supposed to be proved by deductions from them 4 4 4 ,the ,reviewer quotes from one of ,newton's letters a passage showing that though he called the ,laws of ,motion 8axioms10 he regarded them as principles 8made general by induction20 and that therefore he could not have regarded them as a priori4 #e4 ,in rejoinder1 ,i pointed out that whatever conception ,newton may have had of these 8axioms10 he explicitly and distinctly excluded them from the class of 8hypotheses40 ,hence ,i inferred that he did not regard the whole of the #cah ,principia as the proof1 which the ,reviewer says it is2 since an assumption made at the outset1 to be afterwards justified by the results of assuming it1 is an 8hypothesis0 4 4 4 ,no reply4 #f4 ,authority aside1 ,i examined on its merits the assertion that the ,laws of ,motion are1 or can be1 proved true by the ascertained truth of astronomical predictions2 and showed that the process of verification itself assumed those ,laws4 ,no reply4 #g4 ,to make still clearer the fact that ultimate physical truths are1 and must be1 accepted as a priori1 ,i pointed out that in every experiment the physicist tacitly assumes a relation between cause and effect1 such that1 if one unit of cause produces its unit of effect1 two units of the cause will produce two units of the effect2 and ,i argued that this general assumption included the special assumption asserted in the ,second ,law of ,motion4 4 4 4 ,no reply3 that is to say1 no endeavour to show the untruth of this statement1 but a quibble based on my omission of the word 8proportionality0 in places where it was implied1 though not stated4 #h4 ,attention was drawn to a passage #cai from ,sir ,john ,herschel's ,discourse on the ,study of ,natural ,philosophy1 in which the 8proportionality of the effect to its cause in all cases of direct unimpeded action0 is included by him among 8the characters of that relation which we intend by cause and effect20 and in which this assumption of proportionality is set down as one preceding physical exploration1 and not as one to be established by it 4 4 4 ,no reply4 #i4 ,lastly1 a challenge to prove this proportionality4 8,it is required to establish the truth that there is proportionality between causes and effects1 by a process which nowhere assumes that if one unit of force produces a certain unit of effect1 two units of such force will produce two units of such effect40 4 4 4 ,no reply4 ,thus on all these essential points my three mathematical opponents allow judgment to go against them by default4 ,the attention of readers has been drawn off from the main issues by the discussion of side issues4 ,fundamental questions have been evaded1 and new questions of subordinate kinds raised4 ,what is the implication8 ,one who is able to reach and to carry the central position of his antagonist1 does not spend his strength on small outposts4 ,if he declines to assault the stronghold1 it must be because he sees it to be impregnable4 99 99 99 99 99 ,the trouble ,i have thus taken to meet criticisms and dissipate misapprehensions1 ,i have taken because the attack #cbj made on the special doctrine defended1 is part of an attack on the ultimate doctrine underlying the deductive part of ,first ,principles--the doctrine that the quantity of existence is unchangeable4 ,i agree with ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton that our consciousness of the necessity of causation1 results from the impossibility of conceiving the totality of ,being to increase or decrease4 ,the proportionality of cause and effect is an implication3 denial of it involves the assertion that some quantity of cause has disappeared without effect1 or some quantity of effect has arisen without cause4 ,i have asserted the a priori character of the ,second ,law of ,motion1 under the abstract form in which it is expressed1 simply because this1 too1 is an implication1 somewhat more remote1 of the same ultimate truth4 ,and my sole reason for insisting on the validity of these intuitions1 is that1 on the hypothesis of ,evolution1 absolute uniformities in things have produced absolute uniformities in thoughts2 and that necessary thoughts represent infinitely-larger accumulations of experiences than are formed by the observations1 experiments1 and reasonings of any single life4 ,,endnotes ,,to ,,replies ,,to ,,criticisms4 #bd ,principles of ,psychology1 ,second ,edition1 #dbe1 note4 #be ,le ,sentiment ,religieux1 par ,a4 ,grotz4 ,paris1 ,j4 ,cherbuliez1 #ahgj4 #bf ,instead of describing me as misunderstanding ,kant on this point1 ,dr4 ,hodgson should have described ,kant as having1 in successive sentences1 so changed the meanings of the words he uses1 as to make either interpretation possible4 ,at the outset of his ,critique of ,pure ,reason1 he says3--8,the effect of an object upon the faculty of representation1 so far as we are affected by the said object1 is sensation4 ,that sort of intuition which relates to an object by means of sensation1 is called an empirical intuition4 ,the undetermined object of an empirical intuition1 is called phnomenon4 ,that which in the phnomenon corresponds to the sensation1 ,i term its matter20 here1 remembering the definition just given of phenomenon1 objective existence is manifestly referred to 8but that which effects that the content of the phnomenon can be arranged under certain relations1 ,i call its form0 so that form1 as here applied1 refers to objective existence4 8,but that in which our sensations are merely arranged1 and by which they are susceptible of assuming a certain form1 cannot be itself sensation40 ,in which sentence the word form obviously refers to subjective existence4 ,at the outset1 the #8phenomenon' and the #8sensation' are distinguished as objective and subjective respectively2 and then1 in the closing sentences1 the form is spoken of in connexion first with the one and then with the other1 as though they were the same4 #bg ,see ,fraser's ,magazine for ,may1 #ahgc4 #bh ,first ,principles1 #bf4 #bi ,ibid4 #gf 7#ast ed47 #cj ,compare ,principles of ,psychology1 #hh1 #ie1 #cia1 #dja1 #djf4 #ca ,first ,principles1 #ci-de4 #cb ,principles of ,psychology1 part vii4 #cc ,social ,statics1 chap4 iii4 #cd ,principles of ,psychology1 #eca4 #ce ,first ,principles1 #cd4 #cf ,only after the foregoing paragraphs were written1 did the remark of a distinguished friend show me how certain words were misconstrued by the reviewer in a way that had never occurred to me as possible4 ,in the passage referred to1 ,i have said that sound-waves 8finally die away in generating thermal undulations that radiate into space20 meaning1 of course1 that the force embodied in the sound-waves is finally exhausted in generating thermal undulations4 ,in common speech1 the dying-away of a prolonged sound1 as that of a church-bell1 includes its gradual diminution as well as its final cessation4 ,but rather than suppose ,i gave to the words this ordinary meaning1 the reviewer supposes me to believe1 not simply that the longitudinal waves of air can pass1 without discontinuity1 into the transverse waves of ether1 but he also debits me with the belief that the one order of waves1 having lengths measurable in feet1 and rates expressed in hundreds per second1 can1 by mere enfeeblement1 pass into the other order of waves1 having lengths of some fifty thousand to the inch1 and rates expressed in many billions per second6 ,why he preferred so to interpret my words1 and that1 too1 in the face of contrary implications elsewhere 7instance #ajj71 will1 however1 be manifest to every one who reads his criticisms4 #cg ,other examples of these amenities of controversy1 in which ,i decline to imitate my reviewer1 have already been given4 ,what occasions he supplies me for imitation1 were ,i minded to take advantage of them1 an instance will show4 ,pointing out an implication of certain reasonings of mine1 he suggests that it is too absurd even for me to avow explicitly2 saying3--8,we scarcely think that even ,mr4 ,spencer will venture to claim as a datum of consciousness the ,second ,law of ,motion1 with its attendant complexities of component velocities1 c40 ,now any one who turns to ,newton's ,principia1 will find that to the enunciation of the ,second ,law of ,motion1 nothing whatever is appended but an amplified re-statement--there is not even an illustration1 much less a proof4 ,and from this law1 this axiom1 this immediate intuition or 8datum of consciousness10 ,newton proceeds forthwith to draw those corollaries respecting the composition of forces which underlie all dynamics4 ,what1 then1 must be thought of ,newton1 who explicitly assumes that which the reviewer thinks it absurd to assume implicitly8 #ch ,that ,i am certainly not singular in this view1 is shown to me1 even while ,i write1 by the just-issued work of ,prof4 ,jevons on the ,principles of ,science3 a ,treatise on ,logic and ,scientific ,method4 ,in vol4 ii41 p4 #ada1 ,prof4 ,jevons remarks respecting the law of variation of the attractive force1 that it 8is doubtless connected at this point with the primary properties of space itself1 and is so far conformable to our necessary ideas40 #ci ,see ,essay on 8,the ,genesis of ,science10 in the ,british ,quarterly ,review for ,july1 #ahed1 p4 #abg4 #dj ,i do not say this at random4 ,the reviewer1 who has sought rather to make known than to conceal his identity1 took his degree in #ahfh4 #da ,it is true that in ,newton's time1 8axiom0 had not the same rigorously defined meaning as now2 but it suffices for my argument that1 standing unproved as a basis for physical deductions1 it bears just the same relation to them that a mathematical axiom does to mathematical deductions4 #db ,the above letter1 written after absence at ,easter had involved a week's delay1 and written somewhat hurriedly to prevent the delay of a second week1 was less carefully revised than it should have been4 ,the words in square brackets1 obviously implied by the reasoning1 and specifically implied by the illustrations1 were not in the letter as originally published4 #dc ,here1 in explaining the genesis of special space-intuitions1 ,i have singled out a group of experiences which1 in ,nature1 ,may #bh1 ,mr4 ,hayward had chosen as illustrating the absurdity of supposing that the scientific conception of proportionality could be reached as alleged4 ,he said3 8,it is hardly a parody of ,mr4 ,collier's remarks to say3--#8,a child discovers that the greater the angle between his legs the greater the distance between his feet1 an experience which implicates the notion of proportionality between the angle of a triangle and its opposite side2' a preconception1 as it appears to me1 with just as good a basis as that whose formation ,mr4 ,collier illustrates1 but one which1 as ,i need hardly add1 is soon corrected by a conscious study of geometry or by actual measurement40 ,i am indebted to ,mr4 ,hayward for giving this instance4 ,it conveniently serves two purposes4 ,it serves to exemplify the connexion between the crude preconceptions unconsciously formed by earlier experiences1 and the conceptions consciously evolved out of them by the help of later experiences1 when the requisite powers of analysis and abstraction have been reached4 ,and at the same time it serves to show the failure of my opponents to understand how1 in the genesis of intelligence1 the scientific conception of exact proportionality develops from the crude1 vague1 and inaccurate preconception4 ,for while the notion of proportionality acquired by the child in ,mr4 ,hayward's example1 is not true1 it is an approximation towards one which is true1 and one which is reached when its more developed intelligence is brought critically to bear on the facts4 ,eventually it is discovered that the angle is not proportional to the subtending side1 but to the subtending arc2 and this is discovered in the process of disentangling a simple relation from other relations which complicate and disguise it4 ,between the angle and the arc there is exact proportionality1 for the reason that only one set of directly-connected space-relations are concerned3 the distance of the subtending arc from the subtended angle1 remains constant--there is no change in the relation between the increasing angle and the increasing arc2 and therefore the two vary together in direct proportion4 ,but it is otherwise with the subtending side4 ,the parts of this stand in different relations of distance from the subtended angle2 and as the line is lengthened1 each added part differs from the preceding parts in its distance from the angle4 ,that is to say1 one set of simple directly-connected geometrical relations1 is here involved with another set2 and the relation between the side and the angle is such that the law of relative increase involves the co-operation of two sets of factors4 ,now the distinguishing the true proportionality 7between the angle and the arc7 from the relation which simulates proportionality 7between the angle and the side7 is just that process of final development of exact conceptions1 which ,i assert to be the finishing step of all the preceding development2 and to be impossible in its absence4 ,and the truth to which my assailants shut their eyes1 is that1 just as among these conceptions of space-relations1 the conception of exact proportionality can be reached only by evolution from the crude notion of proportionality1 formed before reasoning begins2 so1 among the force-relations1 the conception of proportionality finally reached1 when simple causes and their effects are disentangled by analytical intelligence1 can be reached only by evolution of the crude notion of proportionality1 established as a preconception by early experiences which reinforce ancestral experiences4 #cba ,,prof4 ,,green',s ,,explanations4 ,from the ,contemporary ,review for ,feb4 #ahha4 ,it would not have occurred to me to reproduce this essay1 had it not been that there has lately been a reproduction of the essay to which it replies4 ,but as ,mr4 ,nettleship1 in his editorial capacity1 has given a permanent shape to ,professor ,green's unscrupulous criticism1 ,i am obliged to give a permanent shape to the pages which show its unscrupulousness4 ,dreary at best1 metaphysical controversy becomes especially dreary when it runs into rejoinders and re-rejoinders2 and hence ,i feel some hesitation in inflicting1 even upon those readers of the ,contemporary who are interested in metaphysical questions1 anything further concerning ,prof4 ,green's criticism1 ,mr4 ,hodgson's reply to it1 and ,prof4 ,green's explanations4 ,still1 it appears to me that ,i can now hardly let the matter pass without saying something in justification of the views attacked by ,prof4 ,green2 or1 rather1 in disproof of the allegations he makes against them4 ,i did not1 when ,prof4 ,green's two articles appeared1 think it needful to notice them3 my wish to avoid hindrance to my work1 being supported partly by the thought that very few would read a discussion so difficult to follow1 and partly by the thought that1 of the few who did read it1 most would be those whose knowledge of ,the ,principles of ,psychology enabled them to see how unlike the argument #cbb ,i have used is the representation of it given by ,prof4 ,green1 and how inapplicable his animadversions therefore are4 ,this last belief was1 ,i find1 quite erroneous2 and ,i ought to have known better than to form it4 ,experience might have shown me that readers habitually assume a critic's version of an author's statement to be the true version1 and that they rarely take the trouble to see whether the meaning ascribed to a detached passage is the meaning which it bears when taken with the context4 ,moreover1 ,i should have remembered that in the absence of disproofs it is habitually assumed that criticisms are valid2 and that inability rather than pre-occupation prevents the author from replying4 ,i ought not1 therefore1 to have been surprised to learn1 as ,i did from the first paragraph of ,mr4 ,hodgson's article1 that ,prof4 ,green's criticisms had met with considerable acceptance4 ,i am much indebted to ,mr4 ,hodgson for undertaking the defence of my views2 and after reading ,prof4 ,green's rejoinder1 it seems to me that ,mr4 ,hodgson's chief allegations remain outstanding4 ,i cannot here1 of course1 follow the controversy point by point4 ,i propose to deal simply with the main issues4 99 99 99 99 99 ,at the close of his answer1 ,prof4 ,green refers to 8two other misapprehensions of a more general nature1 which he ,mr4 ,hodgson alleges against me at the outset of his article40 ,not admitting these1 ,prof4 ,green postpones replies for the present2 though by what replies he can show his apprehensions to be true ones1 ,i do not see4 ,further misapprehensions of a general nature1 which stand as preliminaries to his criticisms1 may here be instanced1 as serving1 ,i think1 to show that those criticisms are misdirected4 ,from ,the ,principles of ,psychology ,prof4 ,green quotes the following sentences3 8,the relation between these1 as antithetically opposed divisions of the #cbc entire assemblage of manifestations of the ,unknowable1 was our datum4 ,the fabric of conclusions built upon it must be unstable if this datum can be proved either untrue or doubtful4 ,should the idealist be right1 the doctrine of evolution is a dream40 ,and on these sentences he comments thus3 8,to those who have humbly accepted the doctrine of evolution as a valuable formulation of our knowledge of animal life1 but at the same time think of themselves as #8idealists1' this statement may at first cause some uneasiness4 ,on examination1 however1 they will find in the first place that when ,mr4 ,spencer in such a connection speaks of the doctrine of evolution1 he is thinking chiefly of its application to the explanation of knowledge--an application at least not necessarily admitted in the acceptance of it as a theory of animal life40#dd ,from which it appears that ,prof4 ,green's conception of ,evolution is that popular conception in which it is identified with that set forth in ,the ,origin of ,species4 ,that my conception of ,evolution1 referred to in the passage he quotes1 is a widely different one1 would have been perceived by him had he referred to the exposition of it contained in ,first ,principles4 ,my meaning in the passage he quotes is1 that since ,evolution1 as ,i conceive it1 is1 under certain conditions1 the result of that universal redistribution of matter and motion which is1 and ever has been1 going on2 and since1 during those phases of it which are distinguishable as astronomic and geologic1 the implication is that no life1 still less consciousness 7under any such form as is known to us71 existed2 there is necessarily implied by the theory of ,evolution1 a mode of ,being independent of1 and antecedent to1 the mode of ,being we now call consciousness4 ,and ,i implied that1 consequently1 this theory must be a dream1 if either ideas are the only existences1 or if1 as ,prof4 ,green appears to think1 the object exists only by correlation with the subject4 ,how necessary is this more general view as a basis for my psychological view1 and how erroneous is a criticism which ignores it1 will be seen on observing that by ignoring it1 ,i am made to appear profoundly inconsistent where #cbd otherwise there is no inconsistency4 ,prof4 ,green says that my doctrine 8ascribes to the object1 which in truth is nothing without the subject1 an independent reality1 and then supposes it gradually to produce certain qualities in the subject1 of which the existence is in truth necessary to the possibility of those qualities in the object which are supposed to produce them40#de ,on which my comment is that1 ascribing1 as ,i do1 8an independent reality0 to the object1 and denying that the object is 8nothing without the subject10 my doctrine1 though wholly inconsistent with that of ,professor ,green1 is wholly consistent with itself4 ,had he rightly conceived the doctrine of ,transfigured ,realism 7,prin4 of ,psy4 #dgc71 ,prof4 ,green would have seen that while ,i hold that the qualities of object and subject1 as present to consciousness1 being resultants of the co-operation of object and subject1 exist only through their co-operation1 and1 in common with all resultants1 must be unlike their factors2 yet that there pre-exist those factors1 and that without them no resultants can exist4 ,equally fundamental is another preliminary misconception which ,prof4 ,green exhibits4 ,he says 8,we should be sorry to believe that ,mr4 ,spencer and ,mr4 ,lewes regard the relation between consciousness and the world as corresponding to that between two bodies1 of which one is inside the other2 but apart from some such crude imagination it does not appear1 c40 ,now since ,i deliberately accept1 and have expounded at great length1 this view which ,professor ,green does not ascribe to me1 because he would be 8sorry to believe0 ,i entertain such a 8crude imagination0--since this view is everywhere posited by the doctrine of ,psychological ,evolution as ,i have set it forth2 ,i am astonished at finding it supposed that ,i hold some other view4 ,considering that ,parts ,,ii4 ,,iii4 and ,,iv4 of the ,principles of ,psychology are occupied with tracing out mental ,evolution as a result of converse between organism and environment2 and #cbe considering that throughout ,part ,v4 the interpretations1 analytical instead of synthetical1 pre-suppose from moment to moment a surrounding world and an included organism2 ,i cannot imagine a stranger assumption than that ,i do not believe the relationship between consciousness and the world to be that of inclusion of the one by the other4 ,i am aware that ,prof4 ,green does not regard me as a coherent thinker2 but ,i scarcely expected he would ascribe to me an incoherence so extreme that in ,part ,,vi4 ,i abandon the fundamental assumption on which all the preceding parts stand1 and adopt some other4 ,and ,i should the less have expected so extreme an incoherence to be ascribed to me1 considering that throughout ,part ,,vi4 this same belief is tacitly implied as part of that realistic belief which it is the aim of its argument to explain and justify4 ,here1 however1 the fact of chief significance is1 that as ,professor ,green would be 8sorry to believe0 ,i hold the view named1 and refrains from ascribing to me so 8crude an imagination10 it is to be concluded that his arguments are directed against some other view which he supposes me to hold4 ,if so1 one of two conclusions is inevitable4 ,either his criticisms are valid against this other view which he tacitly ascribes to me1 or they are not4 ,if he admits them to be invalid on the assumption that ,i hold this other view1 the matter ends4 ,if he holds them to be valid on the assumption that ,i hold this other view1 then they must be invalid against the absolutely-different view which ,i actually hold2 and again the matter ends4 ,even were ,i to leave off here1 ,i might1 ,i think1 say that the inapplicability of ,prof4 ,green's arguments is sufficiently shown2 but it may be desirable to point out that beyond these general misapprehensions1 by which they are vitiated1 there are special misapprehensions4 ,much to my surprise1 considering the careful preliminary explanation ,i have given1 he has failed to understand the mental attitude assumed by me when describing the synthesis of experiences #cbf against which he more especially urges his objections4 ,in chapters entitled 8,partial ,differentiation of ,subject and ,object10 8,completed ,differentiation of ,subject and ,object10 and 8,developed ,conception of the ,object10 ,i have endeavoured1 as these titles imply1 to trace up the gradual establishment of this fundamental antithesis in a developing intelligence4 ,it appeared to me1 and still appears1 that for coherent thinking there must be excluded at the outset1 not only whatever implies acquired knowledge of objective existence1 but also whatever implies acquired knowledge of subjective existence4 ,at the close of the chapter preceding those just named1 as well as in ,first ,principles1 where this process of differentiation was more briefly indicated1 ,i recognized1 and emphatically enlarged upon1 the difficulty of carrying out such an inquiry3 pointing out that in any attempts we make to observe the way in which subject and object become distinguished1 we inevitably use those faculties and conceptions which have grown up while the differentiation of the two has been going on4 ,in trying to discern the initial stages of the process1 we carry with us all the products which belong to the final stage1 and cannot free ourselves from them4 ,in ,first ,principles 7 #dc7 ,i have pointed out that the words impressions and ideas1 the term sensation1 the phrase state of consciousness1 severally involve large systems of beliefs2 and that if we allow ourselves to recognize their connotations we inevitably reason circularly4 ,and in the closing sentence of the chapter preceding those above named1 ,i have said 8,though in every illustration taken we shall have tacitly to posit an external existence1 and in every reference to states of consciousness we shall have to posit an internal existence which has these states2 yet1 as before1 we must ignore these implications40 ,i should have thought that1 with all these cautions before him1 ,prof4 ,green would not have fallen into the error of supposing that in the argument thereupon commenced1 the phrase 8states of consciousness0 is used with all its ordinary implications4 ,i should have thought that1 as in #cbg a note appended to the outset of the argument ,i have referred to the parallel argument in ,first ,principles1 where ,i have used the phrase 8manifestations of existence0 instead of 8states of consciousness10 as the least objectionable2 and as the argument in the ,psychology is definitely described in this note as a re-statement in a different form of the argument in ,first ,principles2 he would have seen that in the phrase 8states of consciousness10 as used throughout this chapter1 was to be included no more meaning than was included in the phrase 8manifestations of existence40#df ,i should have thought he would have seen that the purpose of the chapter was passively to watch1 with no greater intelligence than is implied in watching1 how the manifestations or states1 vivid and faint1 comport themselves3 excluding all thought of their meanings--all interpretations of them4 ,nevertheless1 ,prof4 ,green charges me with having1 at the outset of the examination1 invalidated my argument by implying1 in the terms ,i use1 certain products of developed consciousness4#dg ,he contends that my division of the 8states of consciousness10 or1 as ,i elsewhere term them1 8manifestations of existence10 into vivid and faint1 is vitiated from the first by including along with the vivid ones those faint ones needful to constitute them perceptions1 in the ordinary sense of the word4 ,because1 describing all ,i passively watch1 ,i speak of a distant #cbh head-land1 of waves1 of boats1 c1 he actually supposes me to be speaking of those developed cognitions under which these are classed as such and such objects4 ,what would he have me do8 ,it is impossible to give any such account of the process as ,i have attempted1 without using names for things and actions4 ,the various manifestations1 vivid and faint1 which in the case described impose themselves on my receptivity1 must be indicated in some way2 and the words indicating them inevitably carry with them their respective connotations4 ,what more can ,i do than warn the reader that all these connotations must be ignored1 and that attention must be paid exclusively to the manifestations themselves1 and the modes in which they comport themselves4 ,at the stage described in this 8partial differentiation10 while ,i suppose myself as yet unconscious of my own individuality and of a world as separate from it1 the obvious implication is1 that what ,i name 8states of consciousness10 because this is the current term for them1 are to have no interpretations whatever put upon them2 but that their characters and modes of behaviour are to be observed1 as they might be while yet there had been none of that organization of experiences which makes things known in the ordinary sense4 ,it is true that1 thus misinterpreting me in ,december1 ,prof4 ,green1 writing again in ,march1 puts into the mouth of an imagined advocate the true statement of my view2#dh though he 7,prof4 ,green7 then proceeds to deny that ,i can mean what this imagined advocate rightly says ,i mean3 taking occasion to allege that ,i use the phrase 8states of consciousness0 8to give a philosophical character0 to what would else seem 8written too much after the fashion of a newspaper correspondent40#di ,even1 however1 had he admitted that intended meaning which he sees1 but denies1 the rectification would have been somewhat unsatisfactory1 coming three months after various #cbi absurdities1 based on his misinterpretation1 had been ascribed to me4 ,but the most serious allegation made by ,mr4 ,hodgson against ,prof4 ,green1 and which ,i here repeat1 is that he habitually says ,i regard the object as constituted by 8the aggregate of vivid states of consciousness10 in face of the conspicuous fact that ,i identify the object with the nexus of this aggregate4 ,in his defence ,prof4 ,green says 8,if ,i had made any attempt to show that ,mr4 ,spencer believes the object to be no more than an aggregate of vivid states of consciousness1 ,mr4 ,hodgson's complaint1 that ,i ignore certain passages in which a contrary persuasion is stated1 would have been to the purpose40 ,let us look at the facts4 ,treating of the relation between my view and the idealistic and sceptical views1 he imagines addresses made to me by ,berkeley and ,hume4 8#8,you agree with me1' ,berkeley might say1 #8that when we speak of the external world we are speaking of certain lively ideas connected in a certain manner2'0#ej and this identification of the world with ideas1 ,i am tacitly represented as accepting4 ,again1 ,hume is supposed to say to me--8,you agree with me that what we call the world is a series of impressions20#ea and here1 as before1 ,i am supposed silently to acquiesce in this as a true statement of my view4 ,similarly throughout his argument1 ,prof4 ,green continually states or implies that the object is1 in my belief1 constituted by the vivid aggregate of states of consciousness4 ,at the outset of his second article1#eb he says of me3--8,he there0 in the ,principles of ,psychology 8identifies the object with a certain aggregate of vivid states of consciousness1 which he makes out to be independent of another aggregate1 consisting of faint states1 and identified with the subject40 ,and admitting that he thus describes my view1 he nevertheless alleges that he does not misrepresent me1 because1 as he says1#ec 8there is scarcely a page of my article in #ccj which ,mr4 ,spencer's conviction of the externality and independence of the object1 in the various forms in which it is stated by him1 is not referred to40 ,but what if it is referred to in the process of showing that the externality and independence of the object is utterly inconsistent with the conception of it as an aggregate of vivid states of consciousness8 ,what if ,i am continually made to seem thus absolutely inconsistent1 by omitting the fact that not the aggregate of vivid states itself is conceived by me as the object1 but the nexus binding it together8 ,a single brief example will typify ,prof4 ,green's general method of procedure4 ,on page #dj of his first article he says--8,and in the sequel the #8separation of themselves' on the part of states of consciousness #8into two great aggregates1 vivid and faint1' is spoken of as a #8differentiation between the antithetical existences we call object and subject4' ,if words mean anything1 then1 ,mr4 ,spencer plainly makes the #8object' an aggregate of conscious states40 ,but in the entire passage from which these words of mine are quoted1 which he gives at the bottom of the page1 a careful reader will observe a word 7omitted from ,prof4 ,green's quotation in the text71 which quite changes the meaning4 ,i have described the result1 not as 8a differentiation10 but as 8a partial differentiation40 ,now1 to use ,prof4 ,green's expression1 8if words mean anything10 a partial differentiation cannot have the same sense as a complete differentiation4 ,if the #8'object' has been already constituted by this partial differentiation1 what does the #8object' become when the differentiation is completed8 ,clearly1 8if words mean anything10 then1 had ,prof4 ,green not omitted the word 8partial10 it would have been manifest that the aggregate of vivid states was not alleged to be the object4 ,the mode of treatment which we here see in little1 exemplifies ,prof4 ,green's mode of treatment at large4 ,throughout his two articles he criticizes detached portions1 and ascribes to them meanings #cca quite different from those which they have when joined with the rest4 ,with the simplicity of 8a raw undergraduate0 7to some of whose views ,prof4 ,green compares some of mine7 ,i had assumed that an argument running through three chapters would not be supposed to have its conclusion expressed in the first2 but now1 after the professorial lesson ,i have received1 my simplicity will be decreased1 and ,i shall be aware that a critic may deal with that which is avowedly partial1 as though it were entire1 and may treat as though it were already developed1 a conception which the titles of the chapters before him show is yet but incipient4 ,here ,i leave the matter1 and if anything more is said1 shall let it pass4 ,controversy must be cut short1 or work must be left undone4 ,i can but suggest that metaphysical readers will do well to make their own interpretations of my views1 rather than to accept without inquiry all the interpretations offered them4 ,,postscript4--,from a note appended by ,mr4 ,nettleship to his republished versions of ,prof4 ,green's articles1 it appears that1 after the foregoing pages were published by me1 ,prof4 ,green wrote to the editor of the ,contemporary ,review1 saying3 8,while ,i cannot honestly retract anything in the substance of what ,i then wrote1 there are expressions in the article which ,i very much regret1 so far as they might be taken to imply want of personal respect for ,mr4 ,spencer4 ,for reasons sufficiently given in my reply to ,mr4 ,hodgson1 ,i cannot plead guilty to the charge of misrepresentation which ,mr4 ,spencer repeats2 but on reading my first article again in cold blood ,i found that ,i had allowed controversial heat to betray me into the use of language which was unbecoming--especially on the part of an unknown writer 7not even then a #8professor'7 assailing a veteran philosopher4 ,i make this acknowledgment merely for my own satisfaction1 not under the impression that it can at all concern ,mr4 ,spencer0 7vol4 i41 p4 #eda74 ,possibly some of ,prof4 ,green's adherents will ask how1 after he has stated that he cannot honestly retract1 and that #ccb he is not guilty of misrepresentation1 ,i can describe his criticism as unscrupulous4 ,my reply is that a critic who persists in saying that which1 on the face of it1 is dishonest1 and then avers that he cannot honestly do otherwise1 does not thereby prove his honesty1 but contrariwise4 ,one who deliberately omits from his quotation the word 8partial10 and then treats1 as though it were complete1 that which is avowedly incomplete--one who1 in dealing with an argument which runs through three chapters1 recognizes only the first of them--one who persists in thinking it proper to do this after the consequent distortions of statement have been pointed out to him2 is one who1 if not knowingly dishonest1 is lacking in due perception of right and wrong in controversy4 ,the only other possible supposition which occurs to me1 is that such a proceeding is a natural sequence of the philosophy to which he adheres4 ,of course1 if ,being and non-,being are the same1 then representation and misrepresentation are the same4 ,i may add that there is a curious kinship between the ideas implied by the letter above quoted and its implied sentiments4 ,prof4 ,green says that his apology for unbecoming language he makes merely for his 8own satisfaction40 ,he does not calm his qualms of conscience by indicating his regret to those who read this unbecoming language2 nor does he express his regret to me1 against whom it was vented2 but he expresses his regret to the editor of the ,contemporary ,review6 ,so that a public insult to ,a is supposed to be cancelled by a private apology to ,b6 ,here is more ,hegelian thinking2 or rather1 here is ,hegelian feeling congruous with ,hegelian thinking4 ,,endnotes ,,to ,,prof4 ,,green',s ,,explanations4 #dd ,contemporary ,review1 ,december1 #ahgg1 p4 #ce4 #de ,contemporary ,review1 ,december1 #ahgg1 p4 #cg #df ,if ,i am asked why here ,i used the phrase 8states of consciousness0 rather than 8manifestations of existence10 though ,i had previously preferred the last to the first1 ,i give as my reason the desire to maintain continuity of language with the preceding chapter1 8,the ,dynamics of ,consciousness40 ,in that chapter an examination of consciousness had been made with the view of ascertaining what principle of cohesion determines our beliefs1 as preliminary to observing how this principle operates in establishing the beliefs in subject and object4 ,but on proceeding to do this1 the phrase 8state of consciousness0 was supposed1 like the phrase 8manifestation of existence10 not to be used as anything more than a name by which to distinguish this or that form of being1 as an undeveloped receptivity would become aware of it1 while yet self and not-self were undistinguished4 #dg ,contemporary ,review1 ,december1 #ahgg1 pp4 #di1 #ej4 #dh ,contemporary ,review1 ,march1 #ahgh1 p4 #gec4 #di ,ibid41 ,march1 #ahgh1 p4 #gee4 #ej ,contemporary ,review1 ,december1 #ahgg1 p4 #dd4 #ea ,ibid41 ,december1 #ahgg1 p4 #dd4 #eb ,ibid41 ,march1 #ahgh1 p4 #gde4 #ec ,ibid41 ,january1 #ahha1 p4 #aae4 #ccc ,,the ,,philosophy ,,of ,,style4 ,first published in ,the ,westminster ,review for ,october #aheb4 ,commenting on the seeming incongruity between his father's argumentative powers and his ignorance of formal logic1 ,tristram ,shandy says3--8,it was a matter of just wonder with my worthy tutor1 and two or three fellows of that learned society1 that a man who knew not so much as the names of his tools1 should be able to work after that fashion with them40 ,sterne's implied conclusion that a knowledge of the principles of reasoning neither makes1 nor is essential to1 a good reasoner1 is doubtless true4 ,thus1 too1 is it with grammar4 ,as ,dr4 ,latham1 condemning the usual school-drill in ,lindley ,murray1 rightly remarks3--8,gross vulgarity is a fault to be prevented2 but the proper prevention is to be got from habit--not rules40 ,similarly1 good composition is far less dependent on acquaintance with its laws1 than on practice and natural aptitude4 ,a clear head1 a quick imagination1 and a sensitive ear1 will go far towards making all rhetorical precepts needless4 ,and where there exists any mental flaw--where there is a deficient verbal memory1 or an inadequate sense of logical dependence1 or but little perception of order1 or a lack of constructive ingenuity2 no amount of instruction will insure good writing4 ,nevertheless1 some result may be expected from a familiarity #ccd with the principles of style4 ,the endeavour to conform to laws may tell1 though slowly4 ,and if in no other way1 yet1 as facilitating revision1 a knowledge of the thing to be achieved--a clear idea of what constitutes a beauty1 and what a blemish--cannot fail to be of service4 99 99 99 99 99 ,no general theory of expression seems yet to have been enunciated4 ,the maxims contained in works on composition and rhetoric1 are presented in an unorganized form4 ,standing as isolated dogmas--as empirical generalizations1 they are neither so clearly apprehended1 nor so much respected1 as they would be were they deduced from some simple first principle4 ,we are told that 8brevity is the soul of wit40 ,we hear styles condemned as verbose or involved4 ,blair says that every needless part of a sentence 8interrupts the description and clogs the image20 and again1 that 8long sentences fatigue the reader's attention40 ,it is remarked by ,lord ,kaimes that1 8to give the utmost force to a period1 it ought1 if possible1 to be closed with the word that makes the greatest figure40 ,avoidance of parentheses1 and the use of ,saxon words in preference to those of ,latin origin1 are often insisted upon4 ,but1 however influential the precepts thus dogmatically expressed1 they would be much more influential if reduced to something like scientific ordination4 ,in this as in other cases1 conviction is strengthened when we understand the why4 ,and we may be sure that recognition of the general principle from which the rules of composition result1 will not only bring them home to us with greater force1 but will disclose other rules of like origin4 ,on seeking for some clue to the law underlying these current maxims1 we may see implied in many of them1 the importance of economizing the reader's or hearer's attention4 ,to so present ideas that they may be apprehended with the least possible mental effort1 is the desideratum towards which most of the rules above quoted point4 ,when we #cce condemn writing that is wordy1 or confused1 or intricate--when we praise this style as easy1 and blame that as fatiguing1 we consciously or unconsciously assume this desideratum as our standard of judgment4 ,regarding language as an apparatus of symbols for conveying thought1 we may say that1 as in a mechanical apparatus1 the more simple and the better arranged its parts1 the greater will be the effect produced4 ,in either case1 whatever force is absorbed by the machine is deducted from the result4 ,a reader or listener has at each moment but a limited amount of mental power available4 ,to recognize and interpret the symbols presented to him1 requires part of this power2 to arrange and combine the images suggested by them requires a further part2 and only that part which remains can be used for framing the thought expressed4 ,hence1 the more time and attention it takes to receive and understand each sentence1 the less time and attention can be given to the contained idea2 and the less vividly will that idea be conceived4 ,how truly language must be regarded as a hindrance to thought1 though the necessary instrument of it1 we shall clearly perceive on remembering the comparative force with which simple ideas are communicated by signs4 ,to say1 8,leave the room10 is less expressive than to point to the door4 ,placing a finger on the lips is more forcible than whispering1 8,do not speak40 ,a beck of the hand is better than1 8,come here40 ,no phrase can convey the idea of surprise so vividly as opening the eyes and raising the eyebrows4 ,a shrug of the shoulders would lose much by translation into words4 ,again1 it may be remarked that when oral language is employed1 the strongest effects are produced by interjections1 which condense entire sentences into syllables4 ,and in other cases1 where custom allows us to express thoughts by single words1 as in ,beware1 ,heigho1 ,fudge1 much force would be lost by expanding them into specific propositions4 ,hence1 carrying out the metaphor that #ccf language is the vehicle of thought1 we may say that in all cases the friction and inertia of the vehicle deduct from its efficiency2 and that in composition1 the chief thing to be done1 is1 to reduce the friction and inertia to the smallest amounts4 ,let us then inquire whether economy of the recipient's attention is not the secret of effect1 alike in the right choice and collocation of words1 in the best arrangement of clauses in a sentence1 in the proper order of its principal and subordinate propositions1 in the judicious use of simile1 metaphor1 and other figures of speech1 and even in the rhythmical sequence of syllables4 ,the greater forcibleness of ,saxon ,english1 or rather non-,latin ,english1 first claims our attention4 ,the several special reasons assignable for this may all be reduced to the general reason--economy4 ,the most important of them is early association4 ,a child's vocabulary is almost wholly ,saxon4 ,he says1 ,i have1 not ,i possess--,i wish1 not ,i desire2 he does not reflect1 he thinks2 he does not beg for amusement1 but for play2 he calls things nice or nasty1 not pleasant or disagreeable4 ,the synonyms learned in after years1 never become so closely1 so organically1 connected with the ideas signified1 as do these original words used in childhood2 the association remains less strong4 ,but in what does a strong association between a word and an idea differ from a weak one8 ,essentially in the greater ease and rapidity of the suggestive action4 ,both of two words1 if they be strictly synonymous1 eventually call up the same image4 ,the expression--,it is acid1 must in the end give rise to the same thought as--,it is sour2 but because the term acid was learnt later in life1 and has not been so often followed by the ideal sensation symbolized1 it does not so readily arouse that ideal sensation as the term sour4 ,if we remember how slowly the meanings follow unfamiliar words in another language1 and how increasing familiarity with them brings greater rapidity and ease of comprehension2 and if we consider that the #ccg like effect must have resulted from using the words of our mother tongue from childhood upwards2 we shall clearly see that the earliest learnt and oftenest used words1 will1 other things equal1 call up images with less loss of time and energy than their later learnt equivalents4 ,the further superiority possessed by ,saxon ,english in its comparative brevity1 obviously comes under the same generalization4 ,if it be an advantage to express an idea in the smallest number of words1 then it must be an advantage to express it in the smallest number of syllables4 ,if circuitous phrases and needless expletives distract the attention and diminish the strength of the impression produced1 then so1 too1 must surplus articulations4 ,a certain effort1 though commonly an inappreciable one1 is required to recognize every vowel and consonant4 ,if1 as all know1 it is tiresome to listen to an indistinct speaker1 or to read an ill-written manuscript2 and if1 as we cannot doubt1 the fatigue is a cumulative result of the attention needed to catch successive syllables2 it follows that attention is in such cases absorbed by each syllable4 ,and this being so when the syllables are difficult of recognition1 it will be so too1 though in a less degree1 when the recognition of them is easy4 ,hence1 the shortness of ,saxon words becomes a reason for their greater force4 ,one qualification1 however1 must not be overlooked4 ,a word which embodies the most important part of the idea to be conveyed1 especially when emotion is to be produced1 may often with advantage be a polysyllabic word4 ,thus it seems more forcible to say--8,it is magnificent10 than--8,it is grand40 ,the word vast is not so powerful a one as stupendous4 ,calling a thing nasty is not so effective as calling it disgusting4 ,there seem to be several causes for this exceptional superiority of certain long words4 ,we may ascribe it partly to the fact that a voluminous1 mouth-filling epithet is1 by its very size1 suggestive of largeness or strength1 as is shown by the pomposity of sesquipedalian verbiage2 and when great power or #cch intensity has to be suggested1 this association of ideas aids the effect4 ,a further cause may be that a word of several syllables admits of more emphatic articulation2 and as emphatic articulation is a sign of emotion1 the unusual impressiveness of the thing named is implied by it4 ,yet another cause is that a long word 7of which the latter syllables are generally inferred as soon as the first are spoken7 allows the hearer's consciousness more time to dwell on the quality predicated2 and where1 as in the above cases1 it is to this predicated quality that the entire attention is called1 an advantage results from keeping it before the mind for an appreciable interval4 ,to make our generalization quite correct we must therefore say1 that while in certain sentences expressing feeling1 the word which more especially implies that feeling may often with advantage be a many-syllabled one2 in the immense majority of cases1 each word1 serving but as a step to the idea embodied by the whole sentence1 should1 if possible1 be a single syllable4 ,once more1 that frequent cause of strength in ,saxon and other primitive words--their onomatopia1 may be similarly resolved into the more general cause4 ,both those directly imitative1 as splash1bang1 whiz1 roar1 c41 and those analogically imitative1 as rough1 smooth1 keen1 blunt1 thin1 hard1 crag1 c41 have a greater or less likeness to the things symbolized2 and by making on the ears impressions allied to the ideas to be called up1 they save part of the effort needed to call up such ideas1 and leave more attention for the ideas themselves4 ,economy of the recipient's mental energy may be assigned1 too1 as a manifest cause for the superiority of specific over generic words4 ,that concrete terms produce more vivid impressions than abstract ones1 and should1 when possible1 be used instead1 is a current maxim of composition4 ,as ,dr4 ,campbell says1 8,the more general the terms are1 the picture is the fainter2 the more special #cci they are1 the brighter40 ,when aiming at effect we should avoid such a sentence as3 ,when the manners1 customs1 and amusements of a nation are cruel and barbarous1 the regulations of their penal code will be severe4 ,and in place of it we should write3 ,when men delight in battles1 bull-fights1 and combats of gladiators1 will they punish by hanging1 burning1 and the rack4 ,this superiority of specific expressions is clearly due to a saving of the effort required to translate words into thoughts4 ,as we do not think in generals but in particulars--as1 whenever any class of things is named1 we represent it to ourselves by calling to mind individual members of the class2 it follows that when a general word is used1 the hearer or reader has to choose from his stock of images1 one or more1 by which he may figure to himself the whole group4 ,in doing this1 some delay must arise--some force be expended2 and if1 by employing a specific term1 an appropriate image can be at once suggested1 an economy is achieved1 and a more vivid impression produced4 ,turning now from the choice of words to their sequence1 we find the same principle hold good4 ,we have a priori reasons for believing that there is some one order of words by which every proposition may be more effectively expressed than by any other2 and that this order is the one which presents the elements of the proposition in the succession in which they may be most readily put together4 ,as in a narrative1 the events should be stated in such sequence that the mind may not have to go backwards and forwards in order to rightly connect them2 as in a group of sentences1 the arrangement should be such that each of them may be understood as it comes1 without waiting for subsequent ones2 so in every sentence1 the sequence of words should be that which suggests the constituents of the thought in the order most convenient for building it #cdj up4 ,duly to enforce this truth1 and to prepare the way for applications of it1 we must analyze the mental act by which the meaning of a series of words is apprehended4 ,we cannot more simply do this than by considering the proper collocation of substantive and adjective4 ,is it better to place the adjective before the substantive1 or the substantive before the adjective8 ,ought we to say with the ,french--un cheval noir2 or to say as we do--a black horse8 ,probably1 most persons of culture will say that one order is as good as the other4 ,alive to the bias produced by habit1 they will ascribe to that the preference they feel for our own form of expression4 ,they will expect those educated in the use of the opposite form to have an equal preference for that4 ,and thus they will conclude that neither of these instinctive judgments is of any worth4 ,there is1 however1 a psychological ground for deciding in favour of the ,english custom4 ,if 8a horse black0 be the arrangement1 then immediately on the utterance of the word 8horse10 there arises1 or tends to arise1 in the mind1 an idea answering to that word2 and as there has been nothing to indicate what kind of horse1 any image of a horse suggests itself4 ,very likely1 however1 the image will be that of a brown horse3 brown horses being the most familiar4 ,the result is that when the word 8black0 is added1 a check is given to the process of thought4 ,either the picture of a brown horse already present to the imagination has to be suppressed1 and the picture of a black one summoned in its place2 or else1 if the picture of a brown horse be yet unformed1 the tendency to form it has to be stopped4 ,whichever is the case1 some hindrance results4 ,but if1 on the other hand1 8a black horse0 be the expression used1 no mistake can be made4 ,the word 8black10 indicating an abstract quality1 arouses no definite idea4 ,it simply prepares the mind for conceiving some object of that colour2 and the attention is kept suspended until that object is known4 ,if1 then1 by #cda precedence of the adjective1 the idea is always conveyed rightly1 whereas precedence of the substantive is apt to produce a misconception2 it follows that the one gives the mind less trouble than the other1 and is therefore more forcible4 ,possibly it will be objected that the adjective and substantive come so close together1 that practically they may be considered as uttered at the same moment2 and that on hearing the phrase1 8a horse black10 there is not time to imagine a wrongly coloured horse before the word 8black0 follows to prevent it4 ,it must be owned that it is not easy to decide by introspection whether this is so or not4 ,but there are facts collaterally implying that it is not4 ,our ability to anticipate the words yet unspoken is one of them4 ,if the ideas of the hearer lingered behind the expressions of the speaker1 as the objection assumes1 he could hardly foresee the end of a sentence by the time it was half delivered2 yet this constantly happens4 ,were the supposition true1 the mind1 instead of anticipating1 would fall more and more in arrear4 ,if the meanings of words are not realized as fast as the words are uttered1 then the loss of time over each word must entail an accumulation of delays and leave a hearer entirely behind4 ,but whether the force of these replies be or be not admitted1 it will scarcely be denied that the right formation of a picture must be facilitated by presenting its elements in the order in which they are wanted2 even though the mind should do nothing until it has received them all4 ,what is here said respecting the succession of the adjective and substantive is applicable1 by change of terms1 to the adverb and verb4 ,and without further explanation1 it will be manifest1 that in the use of prepositions and other particles1 most languages spontaneously conform with more or less completeness to this law4 ,on similarly analyzing sentence considered as vehicles for entire propositions1 we find not only that the same principle holds good1 but that the advantage of respecting #cdb it becomes marked4 ,in the arrangement of predicate and subject1 for example1 we are at once shown that as the predicate determines the aspect under which the subject is to be conceived1 it should be placed first2 and the striking effect produced by so placing it becomes comprehensible4 ,take the often-quoted contrast between--8,great is ,diana of the ,ephesians10 and--8,diana of the ,ephesians is great40 ,when the first arrangement is used1 the utterance of the word 8great10 arousing vague associations of an imposing nature prepares the imagination to clothe with high attributes whatever follows2 and when the words1 8,diana of the ,ephesians0 are heard1 appropriate imagery already nascent in thought1 is used in the formation of the picture3 the mind being thus led directly1 and without error1 to the intended impression4 ,but when the reverse order is followed1 the idea1 8,diana of the ,ephesians10 is formed with no special reference to greatness2 and when the words1 8is great10 are added1 it has to be formed afresh2 whence arises a loss of mental energy1 and a corresponding diminution of effect4 ,the following verse from ,coleridge's 8,ancient ,mariner10 though incomplete as a sentence1 well illustrates the same truth4 8,alone1 alone1 all1 all alone1 ,alone on a wide wide sea6 ,and never a saint took pity on ,my soul in agony40 ,of course the principle equally applies when the predicate is a verb or a participle4 ,and as effect is gained by placing first all words indicating the quality1 conduct1 or condition of the subject1 it follows that the copula also should have precedence4 ,it is true1 that the general habit of our language resists this arrangement of predicate1 copula1 and subject2 but we may readily find instances of the additional force gained by conforming to it4 ,thus in the line from 8,julius ,csar0 8,then burst his mighty heart10 priority is given to a word embodying both predicate and #cdc copula4 ,in a passage contained in ,sir ,w4 ,scott's 8,marmion10 the like order is systematically employed with great effect3 8,the ,border slogan rent the sky6 ,a ,home6 a ,gordon6 was the cry2 ,loud were the clanging blows2 ,advanced1--forced back1--now low1 now high1 ,the pennon sunk and rose2 ,as bends the bark's mast in the gale ,when rent are rigging1 shrouds1 and sail1 ,it waver'd 'mid the foes40 ,pursuing the principle further1 it is obvious that for producing the greatest effect1 not only should the main divisions of a sentence observe this sequence1 but the sub-divisions of these should have their parts similarly arranged4 ,in nearly all cases1 the predicate is accompanied by some limit or qualification called its complement4 ,commonly1 also1 the circumstances of the subject1 which form its complement1 have to be specified4 ,and as these qualifications and circumstances must determine the mode in which the acts and things they belong to are conceived1 precedence should be given to them4 ,lord ,kaimes notices the fact that this order is preferable2 though without giving the reason4 ,he says3--8,when a circumstance is placed at the beginning of the period1 or near the beginning1 the transition from it to the principal subject is agreeable3 is like ascending or going upward40 ,a sentence arranged in illustration of this will be desirable4 ,here is one3 ,whatever it may be in theory1 it is clear that in practice the ,french idea of liberty is--the right of every man to be master of the rest4 ,in this case1 were the first two clauses1 up to the word 8practice0 inclusive1 which qualify the subject1 to be placed at the end instead of the beginning1 much of the force would be lost2 as thus3 ,the ,french idea of liberty is--the right of every man to be master of the rest2 in practice at least1 if not in theory4 ,similarly with respect to the conditions under which any #cdd fact is predicated4 ,observe in the following example the effect of putting them last3 ,how immense would be the stimulus to progress1 were the honour now given to wealth and title given exclusively to high achievements and intrinsic worth6 ,and then observe the superior effect of putting them first3 ,were the honour now given to wealth and title given exclusively to high achievements and intrinsic worth1 how immense would be the stimulus to progress6 ,the effect of giving priority to the complement of the predicate1 as well as the predicate itself1 is finely displayed in the opening of 8,hyperion30 8,deep in the shady sadness of a vale ,far sunken from the healthy breath of morn1 ,far from the fiery noon1 and eve's one star1 ,sat grey-haired ,saturn1 quiet as a stone40 ,here we see1 not only that the predicate 8sat0 precedes the subject 8,saturn10 and that the three lines in italics1 constituting the complement of the predicate1 come before it2 but that in the structure of this complement also1 the same order is followed3 each line being so composed that the qualifying words are placed before the words suggesting concrete images4 ,the right succession of the principal and subordinate propositions in a sentence depends on the same law4 ,regard for economy of the recipient's attention1 which1 as we find1 determines the best order for the subject1 copula1 predicate1 and their complements1 dictates that the subordinate proposition shall precede the principal one1 when the sentence includes two4 ,containing1 as the subordinate proposition does1 some qualifying or explanatory idea1 its priority prevents misconception of the principal one2 and therefore saves the mental effort needed to correct such misconception4 ,this will be seen in the annexed example4 ,the secrecy once maintained in respect to the parliamentary debates1 is still thought needful in diplomacy2 and diplomacy being secret1 ,england may any day be #cde unawares betrayed by its ministers into a war costing a hundred thousand lives1 and hundreds of millions of treasure3 yet the ,english pique themselves on being a self-governed people4 ,the two subordinate propositions1 ending with the semicolon and colon respectively1 almost wholly determine the meaning of the principal proposition with which the sentence concludes2 and the effect would be lost were they placed last instead of first4 ,from this general principle of right arrangement may also be inferred the proper order of those minor divisions into which the major divisions of sentences may be decomposed4 ,in every sentence of any complexity the complement to the subject contains several clauses1 and that to the predicate several others2 and these may be arranged in greater or less conformity to the law of easy apprehension4 ,of course with these1 as with the larger members1 the succession should be from the less specific to the more specific--from the abstract to the concrete4 ,now however we must notice a further condition to be fulfilled in the proper construction of a sentence2 but still a condition dictated by the same general principle with the other3 the condition1 namely1 that the words or the expressions which refer to the most nearly connected thoughts shall be brought the closest together4 ,evidently the single words1 the minor clauses1 and the leading divisions of every proposition1 severally qualify each other4 ,the longer the time that elapses between the mention of any qualifying member and the member qualified1 the longer must the mind be exerted in carrying forward the qualifying member ready for use4 ,and the more numerous the qualifications to be simultaneously remembered and rightly applied1 the greater will be the mental power expended1 and the smaller the effect produced4 ,hence1 other things equal1 force will be gained by so arranging the members of a sentence that these suspensions shall at any moment be the fewest in #cdf number2 and shall also be of the shortest duration4 ,the following is an instance of defective combination4 ,a modern newspaper-statement1 though probably true1 would be laughed at1 if quoted in a book as testimony2 but the letter of a court gossip is thought good historical evidence1 if written some centuries ago4 ,a re-arrangement of this1 in accordance with the principle indicated above1 will be found to increase the effect4 ,thus3 ,though probably true1 a modern newspaper-statement quoted in a book as testimony1 would be laughed at2 but the letter of a court gossip1 if written some centuries ago1 is thought good historical evidence4 ,by making this change1 some of the suspensions are avoided and others shortened2 while there is less liability to produce premature conceptions4 ,the passage quoted below from 8,paradise ,lost0 affords a fine instance of a sentence well arranged2 alike in the priority of the subordinate members1 in the avoidance of long and numerous suspensions1 and in the correspondence between the sequence of the clauses and the sequence of the phenomena described1 which1 by the way1 is a further prerequisite to easy apprehension1 and therefore to effect4 8,as when a prowling wolf1 ,whom hunger drives to seek new haunt for prey1 ,watching where shepherds pen their flocks at eve1 ,in hurdled cotes amid the field secure1 ,leaps o'er the fence with ease into the fold3 ,or as a thief1 bent to unhoard the cash ,of some rich burgher1 whose substantial doors1 ,cross-barr'd and bolted fast1 fear no assault1 ,in at the window climbs1 or o'er the tiles3 ,so clomb the first grand ,thief into ,god's fold2 ,so since into his ,church lewd hirelings climb40 ,the habitual use of sentences in which all or most of the descriptive and limiting elements precede those described and limited1 gives rise to what is called the inverted style3 a title which is1 however1 by no means confined to this #cdg structure1 but is often used where the order of the words is simply unusual4 ,a more appropriate title would be the direct style1 as contrasted with the other1 or indirect style3 the peculiarity of the one being1 that it conveys each thought step by step with little liability to error2 and of the other1 that it conveys each thought by a series of approximations1 which successively correct the erroneous preconceptions that have been raised4 ,the superiority of the direct over the indirect form of sentence1 implied by the several conclusions above drawn1 must not1 however1 be affirmed without reservation4 ,though1 up to a certain point1 it is well for the qualifying clauses of a proposition to precede those qualified2 yet1 as carrying forward each qualifying clause costs some mental effort1 it follows that when the number of them and the time they are carried become great1 we reach a limit beyond which more is lost than is gained4 ,other things equal1 the arrangement should be such that no concrete image shall be suggested until the materials out of which it is to be framed have been presented4 ,and yet1 as lately pointed out1 other things equal1 the fewer the materials to be held at once1 and the shorter the distance they have to be borne1 the better4 ,hence in some cases it becomes a question whether most mental effort will be entailed by the many and long suspensions1 or by the correction of successive misconceptions4 ,this question may sometimes be decided by considering the capacity of the persons addressed4 ,a greater grasp of mind is required for the ready apprehension of thoughts expressed in the direct manner1 where the sentences are anywise intricate4 ,to recollect a number of preliminaries stated in elucidation of a coming idea1 and to apply them all to the formation of it when suggested1 demands a good memory and considerable power of concentration4 ,to one possessing these1 the direct method will mostly seem the best2 while to one deficient in them it will seem the worst4 #cdh ,just as it may cost a strong man less effort to carry a hundred-weight from place to place at once1 than by a stone at a time2 so1 to an active mind it may be easier to bear along all the qualifications of an idea and at once rightly form it when named1 than to first imperfectly conceive such idea1 and then carry back to it1 one by one1 the details and limitations afterwards mentioned4 ,while conversely1 as for a boy the only possible mode of transferring a hundred-weight1 is that of taking it in portions2 so1 for a weak mind1 the only possible mode of forming a compound conception may be that of building it up by carrying separately its several parts4 ,that the indirect method--the method of conveying the meaning by a series of approximations--is best fitted for the uncultivated1 may indeed be inferred from their habitual use of it4 ,the form of expression adopted by the savage1 as in--8,water1 give me10 is the simplest type of this arrangement4 ,in pleonasms1 which are comparatively prevalent among the uneducated1 the same essential structure is seen2 as1 for instance in--8,the men1 they were there40 ,again1 the old possessive case--8,the king1 his crown10 conforms to the like order of thought4 ,moreover1 the fact that the indirect mode is called the natural one1 implies that it is the one spontaneously employed by the common people2 that is--the one easiest for undisciplined minds4 ,there are many cases1 however1 in which neither the direct nor the indirect mode is the best2 but in which an intermediate mode is preferable to both4 ,when the number of circumstances and qualifications to be included in the sentence is great1 the judicious course is neither to enumerate them all before introducing the idea to which they belong1 nor to put this idea first and let it be remodelled to agree with the particulars afterwards mentioned2 but to do a little of each4 ,it is desirable to avoid so extremely indirect an arrangement as the following3 8,we came to our journey's end1 at last1 with no #cdi small difficulty1 after much fatigue1 through deep roads1 and bad weather40 ,yet to transform this into an entirely direct sentence would be unadvisable2 as witness3 ,at last1 with no small difficulty1 after much fatigue1 through deep roads1 and bad weather1 we came to our journey's end4 ,dr4 ,whately1 from whom we quote the first of these two arrangements1 proposes this construction3 8,at last1 after much fatigue1 through deep roads and bad weather1 we came1 with no small difficulty1 to our journey's end40 ,here by introducing the words 8we came0 a little earlier in the sentence1 the labour of carrying forward so many particulars is diminished1 and the subsequent qualification 8with no small difficulty0 entails an addition to the thought that is easily made4 ,but a further improvement may be effected by putting the words 8we came0 still earlier2 especially if at the same time the qualifications be rearranged in conformity with the principle already explained1 that the more abstract elements of the thought should come before the more concrete4 ,observe the result of making these two changes3 ,at last1 with no small difficulty1 and after much fatigue1 we came1 through deep roads and bad weather1 to our journey's end4 ,this reads with comparative smoothness2 that is--with less hindrance from suspensions and reconstructions of thought4 ,it should be further remarked1 that even when addressing vigorous intellects1 the direct mode is unfit for communicating ideas of a complex or abstract character4 ,so long as the mind has not much to do1 it may be well able to grasp all the preparatory clauses of a sentence1 and to use them effectively2 but if some subtlety in the argument absorb the attention it may happen that the mind1 doubly #cej strained1 will break down1 and allow the elements of the thought to lapse into confusion4 99 99 99 99 99 ,let us pass now to figures of speech4 ,in them we may equally discern the same general law of effect4 ,implied in rules given for the choice and right use of them1 we shall find the same fundamental requirement--economy of attention4 ,it is indeed chiefly because they so well subserve this requirement1 that figures of speech are employed4 ,let us begin with the figure called ,synecdoche4 ,the advantage sometimes gained by putting a part for the whole1 is due to the more convenient1 or more vivid1 presentation of the idea4 ,if1 instead of writing 8a fleet of ten ships10 we write 8a fleet of ten sail10 the picture of a group of vessels at sea is more readily suggested2 and is so because the sails constitute the most conspicuous parts of vessels so circumstanced4 ,to say1 8,all hands to the pumps10 is better than to say1 8,all men to the pumps20 as it calls up a picture of the men in the special attitude intended1 and so saves effort4 ,bringing 8grey hairs with sorrow to the grave10 is another expression1 the effect of which has the same cause4 ,the effectiveness of ,metonymy may be similarly accounted for4 8,the low morality of the bar10 is a phrase both more brief and significant than the literal one it stands for4 ,a belief in the ultimate supremacy of intelligence over brute force1 is conveyed in a more concrete form1 and therefore more representable form1 if we substitute the pen and the sword for the two abstract terms4 ,to say1 8,beware of drinking60 is less effective than to say1 8,beware of the bottle60 and is so1 clearly because it calls up a less specific image4 ,the ,simile is in many cases used chiefly with a view to ornament2 but whenever it increases the force of a passage1 it does so by being an economy4 ,here is an instance4 ,the illusion that great men and great events came #cea oftener in early times than they come now1 is due partly to historical perspective4 ,as in a range of equidistant columns1 the furthest off seem the closest2 so1 the conspicuous objects of the past seem more thickly clustered the more remote they are4 ,to express literally the thought thus conveyed1 would take many sentences2 and the first elements of the picture would become faint while the imagination was busy in adding the others4 ,but by the help of a comparison much of the effort otherwise required is saved4 ,concerning the position of the ,simile1#ed it needs only to remark1 that what has been said about the order of the adjective and substantive1 predicate and subject1 principal and subordinate propositions1 c41 is applicable here4 ,as whatever qualifies should precede whatever is qualified1 force will generally be gained by placing the simile before the object or act to which it is applied4 ,that this arrangement is the best1 may be seen in the following passage from the 8,lady of the ,lake30 8,as wreath of snow1 on mountain breast1 ,slides from the rock that gave it rest1 ,poor ,ellen glided from her stay1 ,and at the monarch's feet she lay40 ,inverting these couplets will be found to diminish the effect considerably4 ,there are cases1 however1 even where the simile is a simple one1 in which it may with advantage be placed last2 as in these lines from ,alexander ,smith's 8,life ,drama30 8,i see the future stretch ,all dark and barren as a rainy sea40 ,the reason for this seems to be1 that so abstract an idea as that attaching to the word 8future10 does not present #ceb itself to the mind in any definite form2 and hence the subsequent arrival at the simile entails no reconstruction of the thought4 ,such however are not the only cases in which this order is the more forcible4 ,as putting the simile first is advantageous only when it is carried forward in the mind to assist in forming an image of the object or act2 it must happen that if1 from length or complexity1 it cannot be so carried forward1 the advantage is not gained4 ,the annexed sonnet1 by ,coleridge1 is defective from this cause4 8,as when a child1 on some long winter's night1 ,affrighted1 clinging to its grandam's knees1 ,with eager wond'ring and perturb'd delight ,listens strange tales of fearful dark decrees1 ,mutter'd to wretch by necromantic spell2 ,or of those hags who at the witching time ,of murky midnight1 ride the air sublime1 ,and mingle foul embrace with fiends of hell2 ,cold horror drinks its blood6 ,anon the tear ,more gentle starts1 to hear the beldame tell ,of pretty babes1 that lov'd each other dear1 ,murder'd by cruel uncle's mandate fell3 ,ev'n such the shiv'ring joys thy tones impart1 ,ev'n so1 thou1 ,siddons1 meltest my sad heart40 ,here1 from the lapse of time and accumulation of circumstances1 the first member of the comparison is forgotten before the second is reached2 and requires re-reading4 ,had the main idea been first mentioned1 less effort would have been required to retain it1 and to modify the conception of it into harmony with the illustrative ideas1 than to remember the illustrative ideas1 and refer back to them for help in forming the final image4 ,the superiority of the ,metaphor to the ,simile is ascribed by ,dr4 ,whately to the fact that 8all men are more gratified at catching the resemblance for themselves1 than in having it pointed out to them40 ,but after what has been said1 the great economy it achieves will seem the more probable cause4 ,lear's exclamation 8,ingratitude6 thou marble-hearted fiend10 #cec would lose part of its effect were it changed into 8,ingratitude6 thou fiend with heart like marble20 and the loss would result partly from the position of the simile and partly from the extra number of words required4 ,when the comparison is an involved one1 the greater force of the metaphor1 due to its relative brevity1 becomes much more conspicuous4 ,if1 drawing an analogy between mental and physical phenomena1 we say1 ,as1 in passing through a crystal1 beams of white light are decomposed into the colours of the rainbow2 so1 in traversing the soul of the poet1 the colourless rays of truth are transformed into brightly-tinted poetry2 it is clear that in receiving the two sets of words expressing the two halves of the comparison1 and in carrying the meaning of the one to help in interpreting the other1 considerable attention is absorbed4 ,most of this is saved by putting the comparison in a metaphorical form1 thus3 ,the white light of truth1 in traversing the many-sided transparent soul of the poet1 is refracted into iris-hued poetry4 ,how much is conveyed in a few words by using ,metaphor1 and how vivid the effect consequently produced1 is everywhere shown4 ,from 8,a ,life ,drama0 may be quoted the phrase1 8,i spear'd him with a jest10 as a fine instance among the many which that poem contains4 ,a passage in the 8,prometheus ,unbound10 of ,shelley1 displays the power of the metaphor to great advantage4 8,methought among the lawns together ,we wandered1 underneath the young gray dawn1 ,and multitudes of dense white fleecy clouds ,were wandering in thick flocks along the mountains ,shepherded by the slow unwilling wind40 ,this last expression is remarkable for the distinctness with which it calls up the features of the scene2 bringing the mind by a bound to the desired conception4 ,but a limit is put to the advantageous use of ,metaphor1 #ced by the condition that it must be simple enough to be understood from a hint4 ,evidently1 if there be any obscurity in the meaning or application of it1 no economy of attention will be achieved2 but rather the reverse4 ,hence1 when the comparison is complex1 it is better to put it in the form of a ,simile4 ,there is1 however1 a species of figure1 sometimes classed under ,allegory1 but which might well be called ,compound ,metaphor1 that enables us to retain the brevity of the metaphorical form even where the analogy is intricate4 ,this is done by indicating the application of the figure at the outset1 and then leaving the reader or hearer to continue the parallel4 ,emerson has employed it with great effect in the first of his ,lectures on the ,times4 8,the main interest which any aspects of the ,times can have for us1 is the great spirit which gazes through them1 the light which they can shed on the wonderful questions1 ,what are we8 and ,whither do we tend8 ,we do not wish to be deceived4 ,here we drift1 like white sail across the wild ocean1 now bright on the wave1 now darkling in the trough of the sea2 but from what port did we sail8 ,who knows8 ,or to what port are we bound8 ,who knows8 ,there is no one to tell us but such poor weather-tossed mariners as ourselves1 whom we speak as we pass1 or who have hoisted some signal1 or floated to us some letter in a bottle from afar4 ,but what know they more than we8 ,they also found themselves on this wondrous sea4 ,no2 from the older sailors nothing4 ,over all their speaking-trumpets the gray sea and the loud winds answer--,not in us2 not in ,time40 ,the division of ,simile from ,metaphor is by no means definite4 ,between the one extreme in which the two elements of the comparison are detailed at full length and the analogy pointed out1 and the other extreme in which the comparison is implied instead of stated1 come intermediate forms1 in which the comparison is partly stated and partly implied4 ,for instance3 ,astonished at the performances of the ,english plough1 the ,hindoos paint it1 set it up1 and worship it2 thus turning a tool into an idol4 ,linguists do the same with language4--,here there is an evident advantage in leaving the reader or hearer to complete the figure4 ,and generally these #cee intermediate forms are good in proportion as they do this2 provided the mode of completion be obvious4 ,passing over much that may be said of like purport on ,hyperbole1 ,personification1 ,apostrophe1 c41 let us close our remarks on construction by a typical example of effective expression4 ,the general principle which has been enunciated is that1 other things equal1 the force of a verbal form or arrangement is great1 in proportion as the mental effort demanded from the recipient is small4 ,the corollaries from this general principle have been severally illustrated4 ,but though conformity now to this and now to that requirement has been exemplified1 no case of entire conformity has yet been quoted4 ,it is indeed difficult to find one2 for the ,english idiom does not commonly permit the order which theory dictates4 ,a few1 however1 occur in ,ossian4 ,here is one3 8,like autumn's dark storms pouring from two echoing hills1 towards each other approached the heroes4 ,like two deep streams from high rocks meeting1 mixing1 roaring on the plain3 loud1 rough1 and dark in battle meet ,lochlin and ,inisfail4 99 99 99 ,as the noise of the troubled ocean when roll the waves on high2 as the last peal of the thunder of heaven2 such is the din of war40 ,except in the position of the verb in the first two similes1 the theoretically best arrangement is fully carried out in each of these sentences4 ,the simile comes before the qualified image1 the adjectives before the substantives1 the predicate and copula before the subject1 and their respective complements before them4 ,that the passage is bombastic proves nothing2 or rather1 proves our case4 ,for what is bombast but a force of expression too great for the magnitude of the ideas embodied8 ,all that may rightly be inferred is1 that only in rare cases should all the conditions to effective expression be fulfilled4 99 99 99 99 99 ,a more complex application of the theory may now be #cef made4 ,not only in the structures of sentences1 and the uses of figures of speech1 may we trace economy of the recipient's mental energy as the cause of force2 but we may trace this same cause in the successful choice and arrangement of the minor images out of which some large thought is to be built4 ,to select from a scene or event described1 those elements which carry many others with them2 and so1 by saying a few things but suggesting many1 to abridge the description2 is the secret of producing a vivid impression4 ,an extract from ,tennyson's 8,mariana0 will well illustrate this4 8,all day within the dreamy house1 ,the doors upon their hinges creaked1 ,the blue fly sung in the pane2 the mouse ,behind the mouldering wainscot shriek'd1 ,or from the crevice peer'd about40 ,the several circumstances here specified bring with them many appropriate associations4 ,when alone the creaking of a distant door is much more obtrusive than when talking to friends4 ,our attention is rarely drawn by the buzzing of a fly in the window1 save when everything is still4 ,while the inmates are moving about the house1 mice usually keep silence2 and it is only when extreme quietness reigns that they peep from their retreats4 ,hence each of the facts mentioned1 presupposing various others1 calls up these with more or less distinctness2 and revives the feeling of dull solitude with which they are connected in our experience4 ,were all of them detailed instead of suggested1 the mental energies would be so frittered away in attending that little impression of dreariness would be produced4 ,similarly in other cases4 ,in the choice of component ideas1 as in the choice of expressions1 the aim must be to convey the greatest quantity of thoughts with the smallest quantity of words4 ,the same principle may sometimes be advantageously carried yet further1 by indirectly suggesting some entirely #ceg distinct thought in addition to the one expressed4 ,thus if we say1 ,the head of a good classic is as full of ancient myths1 as that of a servant-girl of ghost stories2 it is manifest that besides the fact asserted1 there is an implied opinion respecting the small value of much that passes as classical learning2 and as this implied opinion is recognized much sooner than it can be put into words1 there is gain in omitting it4 ,in other cases1 again1 great effect is produced by an overt omission2 provided the nature of the idea left out is obvious4 ,a good instance occurs in ,heroes and ,hero-worship4 ,after describing the way in which ,burns was sacrificed to the idle curiosity of lion-hunters--people who sought to amuse themselves1 and who got their amusement while 8the ,hero's life went for it60 ,carlyle suggests a parallel thus3 8,richter says1 in the ,island of ,sumatra there is a kind of #8,light-chafers1' large ,fire-flies1 which people stick upon spits1 and illuminate the ways with at night4 ,persons of condition can thus travel with a pleasant radiance1 which they much admire4 ,great honour to the ,fire-flies6 ,but--6--0 99 99 99 99 99 ,before inquiring whether the law of effect thus far traced1 explains the impressiveness of poetry as compared with prose1 it will be needful to notice some causes of force in expression which had not yet been mentioned4 ,these are not1 properly speaking1 additional causes2 but rather secondary ones1 originating from those already specified4 ,one is that mental excitement spontaneously prompts those forms of speech which have been pointed out as the most effective4 8,out with him60 8,away with him60 are the cries of angry citizens at a disturbed meeting4 ,a voyager1 describing a terrible storm he had witnessed1 would rise to some such climax as--8,crack went the ropes1 and down came the mast40 ,astonishment #ceh may be heard expressed in the phrase--8,never was there such a sight60 ,all of which sentences are constructed after the direct type4 ,again1 there is the fact that excited persons are given to figures of speech4 ,the vituperation of the vulgar abounds with them4 8,beast10 8brute10 8gallows rogue10 8cut-throat villain10 these1 and like metaphors or metaphorical epithets1 call to mind a street quarrel4 ,further1 it may be noticed that extreme brevity is a trait of passionate language4 ,the sentences are generally incomplete2 and frequently important words are left to be gathered from the context4 ,great admiration does not vent itself in a precise proposition1 as--8,it is beautiful20 but in the simple exclamation1--8,beautiful60 ,he who1 when reading a lawyer's letter1 should say1 8,vile rascal60 would be thought angry2 while1 8,he is a vile rascal10 would imply comparative coolness4 ,thus alike in the order of the words1 in the frequent use of figures1 and in extreme conciseness1 the natural utterances of excitement conform to the theoretical conditions to forcible expression4 ,hence such forms of speech acquire a secondary strength from association4 ,having1 in daily intercourse1 heard them in connection with vivid mental impressions2 and having been accustomed to meet with them in writing of unusual power2 they come to have in themselves a species of force4 ,the emotions that have from time to time been produced by the strong thoughts wrapped up in these forms1 are partially aroused by the forms themselves4 ,these create a preparatory sympathy2 and when the striking ideas looked for are reached1 they are the more vividly pictured4 ,the continuous use of words and forms that are alike forcible in themselves and forcible from their associations1 produces the impressive species of composition which we call poetry4 ,the poet habitually adopts those symbols of thought1 and those methods of using them1 which instinct #cei and analysis agree in choosing as most effective4 ,on turning back to the various specimens which have been quoted1 it will be seen that the direct or inverted form of sentence predominates in them2 and that to a degree inadmissible in prose4 ,not only in the frequency1 but in what is termed the violence of the inversions1 may this distinction be remarked4 ,the abundant use of figures1 again1 exhibits the same truth4 ,metaphors1 similes1 hyperboles1 and personifications1 are the poet's colours1 which he has liberty to employ almost without limit4 ,we characterize as 8poetical0 the prose which uses these appliances of language with frequency2 and condemn it as 8over florid0 or 8affected0 long before they occur with the profusion allowed in verse4 ,once more1 in brevity--the other requisite of forcible expression which theory points out and emotion spontaneously fulfils--poetical phraseology differs from ordinary phraseology4 ,imperfect periods are frequent2 elisions are perpetual2 and many minor words which would be deemed essential in prose1 are dispensed with4 ,thus poetry is especially impressive partly because it conforms to all the laws of effective speech1 and partly because in so doing it imitates the natural utterances of excitement4 ,while the matter embodied is idealized emotion1 the vehicle is the idealized language of emotion4 ,as the musical composer catches the cadences in which our feelings of joy and sympathy1 grief and despair1 vent themselves1 and out of these germs evolves melodies suggesting higher phases of these feelings2 so1 the poet develops from the typical expressions in which men utter passion and sentiment1 those choice forms of verbal combination in which concentrated passion and sentiment may be fitly presented4 ,there is one peculiarity of poetry conducing much to its effect--the peculiarity which is indeed usually thought its characteristic one--still remaining to be considered3 we #cfj mean its rhythmical structure4 ,this1 improbable though it seems1 will be found to come under the same generalization with the others4 ,like each of them1 it is an idealization of the natural language of emotion1 which is not uncommonly more or less metrical if the emotion be not too violent2 and like each of them it economizes the reader's or hearer's attention4 ,in the peculiar tone and manner we adopt in uttering versified language1 may be discerned its relationship to the feelings2 and the pleasure which its measured movement gives1 is ascribable to the comparative ease with which words metrically arranged can be recognized4 ,this last position will not be at once admitted2 but explanation will justify it4 ,if1 as we have seen1 there is an expenditure of mental energy in so listening to verbal articulations as to identify the words1 or in that silent repetition of them which goes on in reading1 then1 any mode of so combining words as to present a regular recurrence of certain traits which can be anticipated1 will diminish that strain on the attention entailed by the total irregularity of prose4 ,just as the body1 when receiving a series of varying concussions1 must keep its muscles ready to meet the most violent of them1 as not knowing when such may come2 so1 the mind when receiving unarranged articulations1 must keep its perceptive faculties active enough to recognize the least easily caught sounds4 ,and as1 if the concussions recur in a definite order1 the body may husband its forces by adjusting the resistance needful for each concussion2 so1 if the syllables be rhythmically arranged1 the mind may economize its energies by anticipating the attention required for each syllable4 ,far-fetched though this idea will be thought1 introspection countenances it4 ,that we do take advantage of metrical language to adjust our perceptive faculties to the expected articulations1 is clear from the fact that we are balked by halting versification4 ,much as at the bottom of a flight of stairs1 a step more or less than we counted upon gives us a #cfa shock2 so1 too1 does a misplaced accent or a supernumerary syllable4 ,in the one case1 we know that there is an erroneous pre-adjustment2 and we can scarcely doubt that there is one in the other4 ,but if we habitually pre-adjust our perceptions to the measured movement of verse1 the physical analogy above given renders it probable that by so doing we economize attention2 and hence that metrical language is more effective than prose1 because it enables us to do this4 ,were there space1 it might be worth while to inquire whether the pleasure we take in rhyme1 and also that which we take in euphony1 are not partly ascribable to the same general cause4 99 99 99 99 99 ,a few paragraphs only1 can be devoted to a second division of our subject4 ,to pursue in detail the laws of effect1 as applying to the larger features of composition1 would carry us beyond our limits4 ,but we may briefly indicate a further aspect of the general principle hitherto traced1 and hint a few of its wider applications4 ,thus far1 we have considered only those causes of force in language which depend on economy of the mental energies4 ,we have now to glance at those which depend on economy of the mental sensibilities4 ,questionable though this division may be as a psychological one1 it will serve roughly to indicate the remaining field of investigation4 ,it will suggest that besides considering the extent to which any faculty or group of faculties is tasked in receiving a form of words and constructing its contained idea1 we have to consider the state in which this faculty or group of faculties is left2 and how the reception of subsequent sentences and images will be influenced by that state4 ,without going fully into so wide a topic as the action of faculties and its reactive effects1 it will suffice to recall the fact that every faculty is exhausted by exercise4 #cfb ,this generalization1 which our bodily experiences force upon us1 and which in daily speech is recognized as true of the mind as a whole1 is true of each mental power1 from the simplest of the senses to the most complex of the sentiments4 ,if we hold a flower to the nose for long1 we become insensible to its scent4 ,we say of a brilliant flash of lightning that it blinds us2 which means that our eyes have for a time lost their ability to appreciate light4 ,after eating honey1 we are apt to think our tea is without sugar4 ,the phrase 8a deafening roar10 implies that men find a very loud sound temporarily incapacitates them for hearing faint sounds4 ,to a hand which has for some time carried a heavy body1 small bodies afterwards lifted seem to have lost their weight4 ,now1 the truth thus exemplified1 may be traced throughout4 ,alike of the reflective faculties1 the imagination1 the perceptions of the beautiful1 the ludicrous1 the sublime1 it may be shown that action exhausts2 and that in proportion as the action is violent the subsequent prostration is great4 ,equally throughout the whole nature1 may be traced the law that exercised faculties are ever tending to resume their original states4 ,not only after continued rest1 do they regain their full powers--not only are brief cessations in the demands on them followed by partial re-invigoration2 but even while they are in action1 the resulting exhaustion is ever being neutralized4 ,the processes of waste and repair go on together4 ,hence with faculties habitually exercised--as the senses of all persons1 or the muscles of any one who is strong--it happens that1 during moderate activity1 the repair is so nearly equal to the waste1 that the diminution of power is scarcely appreciable4 ,it is only when effort has been long continued1 or has been violent1 that repair becomes so far in arrear of waste as to cause a perceptible enfeeblement4 ,in all cases1 however1 when1 by the action of a faculty1 waste has been incurred1 some lapse #cfc of time must take place before full efficiency can be reacquired2 and this time must be long in proportion as the waste has been great4 ,keeping in mind these general truths1 we shall be in a condition to understand certain causes of effect in composition now to be considered4 ,every perception received1 and every conception framed1 entailing some amount of waste in the nervous system1 and the efficiency of the faculties employed being for a time1 though often but momentarily1 diminished2 the resulting partial inability affects the acts of perception and conception that immediately succeed4 ,hence the vividness with which images are pictured must1 in many cases1 depend on the order of their presentation2 even when one order is as convenient to the understanding as the other4 ,sundry facts illustrate this truth1 and are explained by it3 instance climax and anti-climax4 ,the marked effect obtained by placing last the most striking of any series of ideas1 and the weakness--often the ludicrous weakness--produced by reversing this arrangement1 depends on the general law indicated4 ,as immediately after looking at the sun we cannot perceive the light of a fire1 while by looking at the fire first and the sun afterwards we can perceive both2 so1 after receiving a brilliant1 or weighty1 or terrible thought1 we cannot properly appreciate a less brilliant1 less weighty1 or less terrible one1 though by reversing the order1 we can appreciate each4 ,in ,antithesis1 again1 the like truth is exemplified4 ,the opposition of two thoughts which are the reverse of each other in some prominent trait1 insures an impressive effect2 and does this by giving a momentary relaxation to the faculties addressed4 ,if1 after a series of ordinary images exciting in a moderate degree to the emotion of reverence1 or approbation1 or beauty1 the mind has presented to it an insignificant1 or unworthy1 or ugly image2 the structure which yields the emotion of reverence1 or approbation1 or beauty1 having for the time nothing to do1 tends to resume #cfd its full power2 and will immediately afterwards appreciate anything vast1 admirable1 or beautiful better than it would otherwise do4 ,conversely1 where the idea of absurdity due to extreme insignificance is to be produced1 it may be intensified by placing it after something impressive2 especially if the form of phrase implies that something still more impressive is coming4 ,a good illustration of the effect gained by thus presenting a petty idea to a consciousness which has not yet recovered from the shock of an exciting one1 occurs in a sketch by ,balzac4 ,his hero writes to a mistress who has cooled towards him1 the following letter3 8,madame1--,votre conduite m'tonne autant qu'elle m'afflige4 ,non contente de me dchirer le cur par vos ddains1 vous avez l'indlicatesse de me retenir une brosse dents1 que mes moyens ne me permettent pas de remplacer1 mes proprits tant greves d'hypothques au del de leur valeur4 8,adieu1 trop belle et trop ingrate amie6 ,puissions-nous nous revoir dans un monde meilleur6 8,,charles-,,edouard40 ,thus the phenomena of ,climax1 ,antithesis1 and ,anticlimax1 alike result from this general principle4 ,improbable as these momentary variations in susceptibility may seem1 we cannot doubt their occurrence when we contemplate the analogous variations in the susceptibility of the senses4 ,every one knows that a patch of black on a white ground looks blacker1 and a patch of white on a black ground looks whiter1 than elsewhere4 ,as the blackness and the whiteness are really the same1 the only assignable cause1 is a difference in their actions upon us1 dependent on the different states of our faculties4 ,the effect is due to a visual antithesis4 ,but this extension of the general principle of economy--this further condition to effective composition1 that the sensitiveness of the faculties must be husbanded--includes much more than has been yet hinted4 ,not only does it follow that certain arrangements and certain juxtapositions of connected ideas are best2 but also that some modes of dividing and presenting a subject will be more striking #cfe than others1 irrespective of logical cohesion4 ,we are shown why we must progress from the less interesting to the more interesting2 alike in the composition as a whole1 and in each successive portion4 ,at the same time1 the indicated requirement negatives long continuity of the same kind of thought1 or repeated production of like effects4 ,it warns us against the error committed by ,pope in his poems and by ,bacon in his essays--the error of constantly employing forcible forms of expression4 ,as the easiest posture by and by becomes fatiguing1 and is with pleasure exchanged for one less easy2 so1 the most perfectly-constructed sentences unceasingly used must cause weariness1 and relief will be given by using those of inferior kinds4 ,further1 we may infer not only that we ought to avoid generally combining our words in one manner1 however good1 or working out our figures and illustrations in one way1 however telling2 but that we ought to avoid anything like uniform adherence to the wider conditions of effect4 ,we should not make every division of our subject progress in interest2 we should not always rise to a climax4 ,as we saw that in single sentences it is but rarely allowable to fulfil all the conditions to strength2 so1 in the larger sections of a composition we must not often conform entirely to the principles indicated4 ,we must subordinate the component effects to the total effect4 ,the species of composition which the law we have traced out indicates as the perfect one1 is the one which genius tends naturally to produce4 ,as we found that the kinds of sentence which are theoretically best1 are those commonly employed by superior minds1 and by inferior minds when temporarily exalted2 so1 we shall find that the ideal form for a poem1 essay1 or fiction1 is that which the ideal writer would evolve spontaneously4 ,one in whom the powers of expression fully responded to the state of feeling1 would unconsciously use that variety in the mode #cff of presenting his thoughts1 which ,art demands4 ,constant employment of one species of phraseology implies an undeveloped linguistic faculty4 ,to have a specific style is to be poor in speech4 ,if we remember that in the far past1 men had only nouns and verbs to convey their ideas with1 and that from then to now the progress has been towards more numerous implements of thought1 and towards greater complexity and variety in their combinations2 we may infer that1 in the use of sentences1 we are at present much what the primitive man was in the use of words2 and that a continuance of the process which has hitherto gone on1 must produce increasing heterogeneity in our modes of expression4 ,as now1 in a fine nature1 the play of the features1 the tones of the voice and its cadences1 vary in harmony with every thought uttered2 so1 in one possessed of fully-developed powers of language1 the mould in which each combination of words is cast will vary with1 and be appropriate to1 the mental state4 ,that a perfectly-endowed man must unconsciously write in all styles1 we may infer from considering how styles originate4 ,why is ,johnson pompous1 ,goldsmith simple8 ,why is one author abrupt1 another involved1 another concise8 ,evidently in each case the habitual mode of utterance depends on the habitual balance of the nature4 ,the dominant feelings have by use trained the intellect to represent them4 ,but while long habit has made it do this efficiently1 it remains1 from lack of practice1 unable to do the like for the less active feelings2 and when these are excited1 the usual verbal forms undergo but slight modifications4 ,but let the ability of the intellect to represent the mental state be complete1 and this fixity of style will disappear4 ,the perfect writer will be now rhythmical and now irregular2 here his language will be plain and there ornate2 sometimes his sentences will be balanced and at other times unsymmetrical2 for a while there will be considerable sameness1 and then again great variety4 ,his mode of #cfg expression naturally responding to his thought and emotion1 there will flow from his pen a composition changing as the aspects of his subject change4 ,he will thus without effort conform to what we have seen to be the laws of effect4 ,and while his work presents to the reader that variety needful to prevent continuous exertion of the same faculties1 it will also answer to the description of all highly-organized products both of man and nature4 ,it will be1 not a series of like parts simply placed in juxtaposition1 but one whole made up of unlike parts that are mutually dependent4 ,,postscript4--,the conclusion that because of their comparative brevity and because of those stronger associations formed by more frequent use1 words of ,old-,english origin are preferable to words derived from ,latin or ,greek1 should be taken with two qualifications1 which it seems needful to add here4 ,in some cases the word furnished by our original tongue1 and the corresponding word directly or indirectly derived from ,latin1 though nominally equivalents1 are not actually such2 and the word of ,latin origin1 by certain extra connotations it has acquired1 may be the more expressive4 ,for instance1 we have no word of native origin which can be advantageously substituted for the word 8grand40 ,no such words as 8big0 or 8great10 which connote little more than superiority in size or quantity1 can be used instead3 they do not imply that qualitative superiority which is associated with the idea of grandeur4 ,as adopted into our own language1 the word 8grand0 has been differentiated from 8great0 by habitual use in those cases where the greatness has an sthetic superiority4 ,in this case1 then1 a word of ,latin origin is better than its nearest equivalent of native origin1 because by use it has acquired an additional meaning4 ,and here1 too1 we may conveniently #cfh note the fact that the greater brevity of a word does not invariably conduce to greater force4 ,where the word1 instead of being one conveying a subordinate component of the idea the sentence expresses1 is one conveying the central element of the idea1 on which the attention may with advantage rest a moment1 a longer word is sometimes better than a shorter word4 ,thus it may be held that the sentence--8,it is grand0 is not so effective as the sentence--8,it is magnificent40 ,besides the fact that here greater length of the word favours a longer dwelling on the essential part of the thought1 there is the fact that its greater length1 aided by its division into syllables1 gives opportunity for a cadence appropriate to the feeling produced by the thing characterized4 ,by an ascent of the voice on the syllable 8nif10 and an utterance of this syllable1 not only in a higher note1 but with greater emphasis than the preceding or succeeding syllables1 there is implied that emotion which contemplation of the object produces2 and the emotion thus implied is1 by sympathy1 communicated4 ,one may say that in the case of these two words1 if the imposingness is alone to be considered1 the word 8magnificent0 may with advantage be employed2 but if the sentence expresses a proposition in which1 not the imposingness itself1 but something about the imposingness1 is to be expressed1 then the word 8grand0 is preferable4 ,the second qualification above referred to1 concerns the superiority of words derived from ,latin or ,greek1 in cases where more or less abstract ideas have to be expressed4 ,in such cases it is undesirable to use words having concrete associations2 for such words1 by the very vividness with which they call up thoughts of particular objects or particular actions1 impede the formation of conceptions which refer1 not to particular objects and actions1 but to general truths concerning objects or actions of kinds that are more or less various4 ,thus1 such an expression as 8the colligation of facts0 is better for philosophical purposes than such #cfi an expression as 8the tying together of facts40 ,this last expression cannot be used without suggesting the thought of a bundle of material things bound up by a string or cord--a thought which1 in so far as the materiality of its components is concerned1 conflicts with the conception to be suggested4 ,though it is true that when its derivation is remembered1 8colligation0 raises the same thought1 yet1 as the thought is not so promptly or irresistibly raised1 it stands less in the way of the abstract conception with which attention should be exclusively occupied4 ,,endnote ,,to ,,the ,,philosophy ,,of ,,style4 #ed ,properly the term 8simile0 is applicable only to the entire figure1 including the two things compared and the comparison drawn between them4 ,but as there exists no name for the illustrative member of the figure1 there seems no alternative but to employ 8simile0 to express this also4 ,the context will in each case show in which sense the word is used4 #cgj ,,use ,,and ,,beauty4 ,first published in ,the ,leader for ,january #c1 #aheb4 ,in one of his essays1 ,emerson remarks1 that what ,nature at one time provides for use1 she afterwards turns to ornament2 and he cites in illustration the structure of a sea-shell1 in which the parts that have for a while formed the mouth are at the next season of growth left behind1 and become decorative nodes and spines4 ,ignoring the implied teleology1 which does not here concern us1 it has often occurred to me that this same remark might be extended to the progress of ,humanity4 ,here1 too1 the appliances of one era serve as embellishments to the next4 ,equally in institutions1 creeds1 customs1 and superstitions1 we may trace this evolution of beauty out of what was once purely utilitarian4 ,the contrast between the feeling with which we regard portions of the ,earth's surface still left in their original state1 and the feeling with which the savage regarded them1 is an instance that comes first in order of time4 ,if any one walking over ,hampstead ,heath1 will note how strongly its picturesqueness is brought out by contrast with the surrounding cultivated fields and the masses of houses lying in the distance2 and will further reflect that1 had this irregular gorse-covered surface extended on all sides to the horizon1 it #cga would have looked dreary and prosaic rather than pleasing2 he will see that to the primitive man a country so clothed presented no beauty at all4 ,to him it was merely a haunt of wild animals1 and a ground out of which roots might be dug4 ,what have become for us places of relaxation and enjoyment--places for afternoon strolls and for gathering flowers--were his places for labour and food1 probably arousing in his mind none but utilitarian associations4 ,ruined castles afford obvious instances of this metamorphosis of the useful into the beautiful4 ,to feudal barons and their retainers1 security was the chief1 if not the only end1 sought in choosing the sites and styles of their strongholds4 ,probably they aimed as little at the picturesque as do the builders of cheap brick houses in our modern towns4 ,yet what were erected for shelter and safety1 and what in those early days fulfilled an important function in the social economy1 have now assumed a purely ornamental character4 ,they serve as scenes for picnics2 pictures of them decorate our drawing-rooms2 and each supplies its surrounding districts with legends for ,christmas ,eve4 ,on following out the train of thought suggested by this last illustration1 we may see that not only do the material exuvi of past social states become the ornaments of our landscapes2 but that past habits1 manners1 and arrangements1 serve as ornamental elements in our literature4 ,the tyrannies which1 to the serfs who bore them1 were harsh and dreary facts2 the feuds which1 to those who took part in them1 were very practical life-and-death affairs2 the mailed1 moated1 sentinelled security which was irksome to the nobles who needed it2 the imprisonments1 and tortures1 and escapes1 which were stern and quite prosaic realities to all concerned in them2 have become to us material for romantic tales--material which1 when woven into ,ivanhoes and ,marmions1 serves for amusement in leisure hours1 and becomes poetical by contrast with our daily lives4 ,thus1 also1 is it with extinct creeds4 ,stonehenge1 which #cgb in the hands of the ,druids had a governmental influence over men1 is in our day a place for antiquarian excursions2 and its attendant priests are worked up into an opera4 ,greek sculptures1 preserved for their beauty in our galleries of art1 and copied for the decoration of pleasure grounds and entrance halls1 once lived in men's minds as gods demanding obedience2 as did also the grotesque idols that now amuse the visitors to our museums4 ,equally marked is this change of function in the case of minor superstitions4 ,the fairy lore1 which in past times was matter of grave belief1 and held sway over people's conduct1 have since been transformed into ornament for ,a ,midsummer ,night's ,dream1 ,the ,tempest1 ,the ,fairy ,queen1 and endless small tales and poems2 and still affords subjects for children's story-books1 themes for ballets1 and plots for ,planch's burlesques4 ,gnomes1 and genii1 and afrits1 losing their terrors1 give piquancy to the woodcuts in our illustrated edition of the ,arabian ,nights4 ,while ghost-stories1 and tales of magic and witchcraft1 after serving to amuse boys and girls in their leisure hours1 become matter for jocose allusions that enliven tea-table conversation4 ,even our serious literature and our speeches are relieved by ornaments drawn from such sources4 ,a ,greek myth is often used as a parallel by which to vary the monotony of some grave argument4 ,the lecturer breaks the dead level of his practical discourse by illustrations drawn from bygone customs1 events1 or beliefs4 ,and metaphors1 similarly derived1 give brilliancy to political orations1 and to ,times leading articles4 ,indeed1 on careful inquiry1 ,i think it will be found that we turn to purposes of beauty most byegone phenomena which are at all conspicuous4 ,the busts of great men in our libraries1 and their tombs in our churches2 the once useful but now purely ornamental heraldic symbols2 the monks1 nuns1 and convents1 which give interest to a certain class of novels2 the bronze medival soldiers used for #cgc embellishing drawing-rooms2 the gilt ,apollos which recline on time-pieces2 the narratives that serve as plots for our great dramas2 and the events that afford subjects for historical pictures2--these and such like illustrations of the metamorphosis of the useful into the beautiful1 are so numerous as to suggest that1 did we search diligently enough1 we should find that in some place1 or under some circumstance1 nearly every notable product of the past has assumed a decorative character4 ,and here the mention of historical pictures reminds me that an inference may be drawn from all this1 bearing directly on the practice of art4 ,it has of late years been a frequent criticism upon our historical painters1 that they err in choosing their subjects from the past2 and that1 would they found a genuine and vital school1 they must render on canvas the life and deeds and aims of our own time4 ,if1 however1 there be any significance in the foregoing facts1 it seems doubtful whether this criticism is a just one4 ,for if it be the course of things that what has performed some active function in society during one era1 becomes available for ornament in a subsequent one2 it almost follows that1 conversely1 whatever is performing some active function now1 or has very recently performed one1 does not possess the ornamental character2 and is1 consequently1 inapplicable to any purpose of which beauty is the aim1 or of which it is a needful ingredient4 ,still more reasonable will this conclusion appear1 when we consider the nature of this process by which the useful is changed into the ornamental4 ,an essential pre-requisite to all beauty is contrast4 ,to obtain artistic effect1 light must be put in juxtaposition with shade1 bright colours with dull colours1 a fretted surface with a plain one4 ,forte passages in music must have piano passages to relieve them2 concerted pieces need interspersing with solos2 and rich chords must not be continuously repeated4 ,in the drama we demand contrast of characters1 of scenes1 of sentiment1 of #cgd style4 ,in prose composition an eloquent passage should have a comparatively plain setting2 and in poems great effect is obtained by occasional change of versification4 ,this general principle will1 ,i think1 explain the transformation of the bygone useful into the present beautiful4 ,it is by virtue of their contrast with our present modes of life1 that past modes of life look interesting and romantic4 ,just as a picnic1 which is a temporary return to an aboriginal condition1 derives1 from its unfamiliarity1 a certain poetry which it would not have were it habitual2 so1 everything ancient gains1 from its relative novelty to us1 an element of interest4 ,gradually as1 by the growth of society1 we leave behind the customs1 manners1 arrangements1 and all the products1 material and mental1 of a bygone age--gradually as we recede from these so far that there arises a conspicuous difference between them and those we are familiar with2 so gradually do they begin to assume to us a poetical aspect1 and become applicable for ornament4 ,and hence it follows that things and events which are close to us1 and which are accompanied by associations of ideas not markedly contrasted with our ordinary associations1 are relatively inappropriate for purposes of art4 ,i say relatively because an incident of modern life or even of daily life may acquire adequate fitness for art purposes by an unusualness of some other kind than that due to unlikeness between past and present4 #cge ,,the ,,sources ,,of ,,architectural ,,types4 ,first published in ,the ,leader for ,october #bc1 #aheb4 ,when lately looking through the gallery of the ,old ,water-,colour ,society1 ,i was struck with the incongruity produced by putting regular architecture into irregular scenery4 ,in one case1 where the artist had introduced a symmetrical ,grecian edifice into a mountainous and wild landscape1 the discordant effect was particularly marked4 8,how very unpicturesque10 said a lady to her friend1 as they passed2 showing that ,i was not alone in my opinion4 ,her phrase1 however1 set me speculating4 ,why unpicturesque8 ,picturesque means1 like a picture--like what men choose for pictures4 ,why then should this be not fit for a picture8 ,thinking the matter over1 it seemed to me that the artist had sinned against that harmony of sentiment which is essential to a good picture4 ,when the other constituents of a landscape have irregular forms1 any artificial structure introduced should have an irregular form1 that it may seem part of the landscape4 ,the same general character must pervade it and the surrounding objects2 otherwise it1 and the scene amid which it stands1 become not one thing but two things2 and we say that it looks out of place4 ,or1 speaking psychologically1 the associated ideas called #cgf up by a building with its wings1 windows1 columns1 and all its parts symmetrically disposed1 differ widely from the ideas associated with an unsymmetrical landscape2 and the one set of ideas tends to banish the other4 ,pursuing the train of thought1 sundry illustrative facts came to mind4 ,i remembered that a castle1 which is usually more irregular in outline than any other kind of building1 pleases us most when seated amid crags and precipices2 while a castle on a plain seems incongruous4 ,the partly-regular and partly-irregular forms of our old farm-houses1 and our gabled gothic manors and abbeys1 appear quite in harmony with an undulating1 wooded country4 ,in towns we prefer symmetrical architecture2 and in towns it produces in us no feeling of incongruity1 because all surrounding things--men1 horses1 vehicles--are symmetrical also4 ,and here ,i was reminded of a notion that has frequently recurred to me2 namely1 that there is some relationship between the several kinds of architecture and the several classes of natural objects4 ,buildings in the ,greek and ,roman styles seem1 in virtue of their symmetry1 to take their type from animal life4 ,in the partially-irregular ,gothic1 ideas derived from the vegetable world appear to predominate4 ,and wholly irregular buildings1 such as castles1 may be considered as having inorganic forms for their basis4 ,whimsical as this speculation looks at first sight1 it is countenanced by numerous facts4 ,the connexion between symmetrical architecture and animal forms1 may be inferred from the kind of symmetry we expect1 and are satisfied with1 in regular buildings4 ,in a ,greek temple we require that the front shall be symmetrical in itself1 and that the two flanks shall be alike2 but we do not look for uniformity between the flanks and the front1 nor between the front and the back4 ,the identity of this symmetry with that found in animals is obvious4 ,again1 why is it that a #cgg building making any pretensions to symmetry displeases us if not quite symmetrical8 ,probably the reply will be--,because we see that the designer's idea is not fully carried out2 and that hence our love of completeness is offended4 ,but then there come the further questions--,how do we know that the architect's conception was symmetrical8 ,whence comes this notion of symmetry which we have1 and which we attribute to him8 ,unless we fall back upon the old doctrine of innate ideas1 we must admit that the idea of bi-lateral symmetry is derived from without2 and to admit this is to admit that it is derived from the higher animals4 ,that there is some relationship between ,gothic architecture and vegetal forms is generally admitted4 ,the often-remarked similarity between a groined nave and an avenue of trees with interlacing branches1 shows that the fact has forced itself on observation4 ,it is not only in this1 however1 that the kinship is seen4 ,it is seen still better in the essential characteristic of ,gothic2 namely1 what is termed its aspiring tendency4 ,that predominance of vertical lines which so strongly distinguishes ,gothic from other styles1 is the most marked peculiarity of trees1 when compared with animals or rocks4 ,a tall ,gothic tower1 with its elongated apertures and clusters of thin projections running from bottom to top1 suggests a vague idea of growth4 ,of the alleged connexion between inorganic forms and the wholly irregular and the castellated styles of building1 we have1 ,i think1 some proof in the fact that when an edifice is irregular1 the more irregular it is the more it pleases us4 ,i see no way of accounting for this fact1 save by supposing that the greater the irregularity the more strongly are we reminded of the inorganic forms typified1 and the more vividly are aroused the agreeable ideas of rugged and romantic scenery associated with those forms4 ,further evidence of these relationships of styles of #cgh architecture to classes of natural objects1 is supplied by the kinds of decoration they respectively present4 ,the public buildings of ,greece1 while characterized in their outlines by the bi-lateral symmetry seen in the higher animals1 have their pediments and entablatures covered with sculptured men and beasts4 ,egyptian temples and ,assyrian palaces1 similarly symmetrical in their general plan1 are similarly ornamented on their walls and at their doors4 ,in ,gothic1 again1 with its grove-like ranges of clustered columns1 we find rich foliated ornaments abundantly employed4 ,and accompanying the totally irregular1 inorganic outlines of old castles1 we see neither vegetal nor animal decorations4 ,the bare1 rock-like walls are surmounted by battlements1 consisting of almost plain blocks1 which remind us of the projections on the edge of a rugged cliff4 ,but perhaps the most significant fact is the harmony observable between each type of architecture and the scenes in which it is indigenous4 ,for what is the explanation of this harmony1 unless it be that the predominant character of surrounding things has1 in some way1 determined the mode of building adopted8 ,that the harmony exists is clear4 ,equally in the cases of ,egypt1 ,assyria1 ,greece1 and ,rome1 town life preceded the construction of the symmetrical buildings that have come down to us4 ,and town life is one in which1 as already observed1 the majority of familiar objects are symmetrical4 ,we habitually feel the naturalness of this association4 ,amid the fields1 a formal house1 with a central door flanked by equal numbers of windows to right and left1 strikes us as unrural--looks as though transplanted from a street2 and we cannot look at one of those stuccoed villas1 with mock-windows arranged to balance the real ones1 without being reminded of the suburban residence of a retired tradesman4 ,in styles indigenous in the country1 we not only find #cgi the general irregularity characteristic of surrounding things1 but we may trace some kinship between each kind of irregularity and the local circumstances4 ,we see the broken rocky masses amid which castles are often placed1 mirrored in their stern1 inorganic forms4 ,in abbeys1 and such-like buildings1 which are commonly found in sheltered districts1 we find no such violent dislocations of masses and outlines2 and the nakedness appropriate to the fortress is replaced by decorations reflecting the neighbouring woods4 ,between a ,swiss cottage and a ,swiss view there is an evident relationship4 ,the angular roof1 so bold and so disproportionately large when compared to other roofs1 reminds one of the adjacent mountain peaks2 and the broad overhanging eaves have a sweep and inclination like those of the lower branches of a pine tree4 ,consider1 too1 the apparent kinship between the flat roofs that prevail in ,eastern cities1 interspersed with occasional minarets1 and the plains that commonly surround them1 dotted here and there by palm trees4 ,contemplate a picture of one of these places1 and you are struck by the predominance of horizontal lines1 and their harmony with the wide stretch of the landscape4 ,that the congruity here pointed out should hold in every case must not be expected4 ,the ,pyramids1 for example1 do not seem to come under this generalization4 ,their repeated horizontal lines do indeed conform to the flatness of the neighbouring desert2 but their general contour seems to have no adjacent analogue4 ,considering1 however1 that migrating races1 carrying their architectural systems with them1 would naturally produce buildings having no relationship to their new localities2 and that it is not always possible to distinguish styles which are indigenous1 from those which are naturalized2 numerous anomalies must be looked for4 ,the general idea above illustrated will perhaps be somewhat misinterpreted4 ,possibly some will take the #chj proposition to be that men intentionally gave to their buildings the leading characteristics of neighbouring objects4 ,but this is not what is meant4 ,i do not suppose that they did so in times past1 any more than they do so now4 ,the hypothesis is1 that in their choice of forms men are unconsciously influenced by the forms encircling them4 ,that flat-roofed1 symmetrical architecture should have originated in the ,east1 among pastoral tribes surrounded by their herds and by wide plains1 seems to imply that the builders were swayed by the horizontality and symmetry to which they were habituated4 ,and the harmony which we have found to exist in other cases between indigenous styles and their localities1 implies the general action of like influences4 ,indeed1 on considering the matter psychologically1 ,i do not see how it could well be otherwise4 ,for as all conceptions must be made up of images1 and parts of images1 received through the senses2 and as imagination will most readily run in the direction of habitual perceptions2 it follows that the characteristic which predominates in habitual perceptions must impress itself on designs4 #cha ,,gracefulness4 ,first published in ,the ,leader for ,december #be1 #aheb4 ,we do not ascribe gracefulness to cart-horses1 tortoises1 and hippopotami1 in all of which the powers of movement are relatively inferior2 but we ascribe it to greyhounds1 antelopes1 race-horses1 all of which have highly efficient locomotive organs4 ,what1 then1 is this distinctive peculiarity of structure and action which we call ,grace8 ,one night while watching a dancer1 and inwardly condemning her tours de force as barbarisms which would be hissed1 were not people such cowards as always to applaud what they think it the fashion to applaud1 ,i remarked that the truly graceful motions occasionally introduced1 were those performed with comparatively little effort4 ,after calling to mind sundry confirmatory facts1 ,i presently concluded that grace1 as applied to motion1 describes motion that is effected with economy of force2 grace1 as applied to animal forms1 describes forms capable of this economy2 grace1 as applied to postures1 describes postures which may be maintained with this economy2 and grace1 as applied to inanimate objects1 describes such as exhibit certain analogies to these attitudes and forms4 ,that this generalization1 if not the whole truth1 contains at least a large part of it1 will1 ,i think1 become obvious1 on #chb considering how habitually we couple the words easy and graceful2 and still more1 on calling to mind some of the facts on which this association is based4 ,the attitude of a soldier1 drawing himself bolt upright when his serjeant shouts 8attention10 is more remote from gracefulness than when he relaxes at the words 8stand at ease40 ,the gauche visitor sitting stiffly on the edge of his chair1 and his self-possessed host1 whose limbs and body dispose themselves as convenience dictates1 are contrasts as much in effort as in elegance4 ,when standing1 we commonly economise power by throwing the weight chiefly on one leg1 which we straighten to make it serve as a column1 while we relax the other2 and to the same end1 we allow the head to lean somewhat on one side4 ,both these attitudes are imitated in sculpture as elements of grace4 ,turning from attitudes to movements1 current remarks will be found to imply the same relationship4 ,no one praises as graceful1 a walk that is irregular or jerking1 and so displays waste of power2 no one sees any beauty in the waddle of a fat man1 or the trembling steps of an invalid1 in both of which effort is visible4 ,but the style of walking we admire is moderate in velocity1 perfectly rhythmical1 unaccompanied by violent swinging of the arms1 and giving us the impression that there is no conscious exertion1 while there is no force thrown away4 ,in dancing1 again1 the prevailing difficulty--the proper disposal of the arms--well illustrates the same truth4 ,those who fail in overcoming this difficulty give the spectator the impression that their arms are a trouble to them2 they are held stiffly in some meaningless attitude1 at an obvious expense of power2 they are checked from swinging in the directions in which they would naturally swing2 or they are so moved that1 instead of helping to maintain the equilibrium1 they endanger it4 ,a good dancer1 on the contrary1 makes us feel that1 so far from the arms being in the way1 they are of great use4 ,each #chc motion of them1 while it seems naturally to result from a previous motion of the body1 is turned to some advantage4 ,we perceive that it has facilitated instead of hindered the general action2 or1 in other words--that an economy of effort has been achieved4 ,any one wishing to distinctly realize this fact1 may readily do so by studying the action of the arms in walking4 ,let him place his arms close to his sides1 and there keep them1 while walking with some rapidity4 ,he will unavoidably fall into a backward and forward motion of the shoulders1 of a wriggling1 ungraceful character4 ,after persevering in this for a space1 until he finds that the action is not only ungraceful but fatiguing1 let him allow his arms to swing as usual4 ,the wriggling of the shoulders will cease2 the body will move equably forward2 and comparative ease will be felt4 ,on analyzing this fact1 he may perceive that the backward motion of each arm is simultaneous with the forward motion of the corresponding leg4 ,if he will attend to his muscular sensations1 he will find that this backward swing of the arm is a counterbalance to the forward swing of the leg2 and that it is easier to produce this counterbalance by moving the arm than by contorting the body1 as he otherwise must do4#ee ,the action of the arms in walking being thus understood1 it will be manifest that the graceful employment of them in dancing is simply a complication of the same thing2 and that a good dancer is one having so acute a muscular perception as at once to feel in what direction the arms #chd should be moved to counterbalance any motion of the body or legs4 ,this connexion between gracefulness and economy of force1 will be most clearly recognized by those who skate4 ,they will remember that all early attempts1 and especially the first timid experiments in figure-skating1 are alike awkward and fatiguing2 and that the acquirement of skill is also the acquirement of ease4 ,the requisite confidence1 and a due command of the feet having been obtained1 those twistings of the trunk and gyrations of the arms1 previously used to maintain the balance1 are found needless4 ,the body is allowed to follow without control the impulse given to it2 the arms to swing where they will2 and it is clearly felt that the graceful way of performing any evolution is the way that costs least effort4 ,spectators can scarcely fail to see the same fact1 if they look for it4 ,the reference to skating suggests that graceful motion might be defined as motion in curved lines4 ,certainly1 straight and zig-zag movements are excluded from the conception4 ,the sudden stoppages which angular movements imply1 are its antithesis2 for a leading trait of grace is continuity1 flowingness4 ,it will be found1 however1 that this is merely another aspect of the same truth2 and that motion in curved lines is economical motion4 ,given certain successive positions to be assumed by a limb1 then if it be moved in a straight line to the first of these positions1 suddenly arrested1 and then moved in another direction straight to the second position1 and so on1 it is clear that at each arrest1 the momentum previously given to the limb must be destroyed at a certain cost of force1 #che and a new momentum given to it at a further cost of force2 whereas1 if1 instead of arresting the limb at its first position1 its motion be allowed to continue1 and a lateral force be impressed to make it diverge towards the second position1 a curvilinear motion is the necessary result2 and by making use of the original momentum1 force is economized4 ,if the truth of these conclusions respecting graceful movements be admitted1 it cannot1 ,i think1 be doubted1 that graceful form is that kind of form which implies relatively small effort required for self-support1 and relatively small effort required for movement4 ,were it otherwise1 there would arise the incongruity that graceful form would either not be associated at all with graceful movement1 or that the one would habitually occur in the absence of the other2 both which alternatives being at variance with our experience1 we must conclude that there exists the relationship indicated4 ,any one hesitating to admit this1 will1 ,i think1 do so no longer on remembering that the animals which we consider graceful1 are those so slight in build as not to be burdened by their own weight1 and those noted for fleetness and agility2 while those we class as ungraceful1 are those which are alike cumbrous and have the faculty of locomotion but little developed4 ,in the case of the greyhound1 especially1 we see that the particular modification of the canine type in which economy of weight is the most conspicuous1 and in which the facility of muscular motion has been brought to the greatest perfection1 is the one which we call most graceful4 ,how trees and inanimate objects should come to have this epithet applied to them1 seems less obvious4 ,but remembrance of the fact that we commonly1 and perhaps unavoidably1 regard all objects under a certain anthropomorphic aspect1 will help us to understand it4 ,the stiff branch of an oak tree standing out at right angles to the trunk1 gives us a vague notion of great force expended to #chf keep it in that position2 and we call it ungraceful1 under the same feeling that we call the holding out an arm at right angles to the body ungraceful4 ,conversely1 the lax drooping boughs of a weeping-willow are vaguely associated with limbs in attitudes requiring little effort to maintain them2 and the term graceful1 by which we describe these1 we apply by metaphor to the boughs of the willow4 ,i may as well here venture the hypothesis1 that the idea of ,grace as displayed by other beings1 has its subjective basis in ,sympathy4 ,the same faculty which makes us shudder on seeing another in danger--which sometimes causes motions of our own limbs on seeing another struggle or fall1 gives us a vague participation in all the muscular sensations which those around us are experiencing4 ,when their motions are violent or awkward1 we feel in a slight degree the disagreeable sensations which we should have were they our own4 ,when they are easy1 we sympathize with the pleasant sensations they imply in those exhibiting them4 ,,endnote ,,to ,,gracefulness4 #ee ,a parallel fact1 further elucidating this1 is supplied by a locomotive engine4 ,on looking at the driving wheel1 there will be found1 besides the boss to which the connecting rod is attached1 a corresponding mass of metal on the opposite side of the wheel1 and equidistant from the centre2 or1 if the engine be one having inside cylinders1 then1 on looking between the spokes of the driving-wheel1 it will be seen that against each crank is a block of iron1 similar to it in size1 but projecting from the axle in the reverse direction4 ,evidently1 being placed on opposite sides of the centre of motion1 each crank and its counterbalance move in opposite directions relatively to the axle2 and by so doing1 neutralize each other's perturbing effects1 and permit a smooth rotation4 ,this relationship which exists between the motions of the counterbalance and the crank1 is analogous to that which exists between the motions of the arms and legs in walking2 and in the early days of railway-locomotion1 before these counterbalance weights were used1 locomotive driving-wheels were subject to violent oscillations1 analogous to those jerkings of the shoulders which arise when we walk fast without moving our arms4 #chg ,,personal ,,beauty4 ,first published in ,the ,leader for ,april #ae1 and ,may #ac1 #ahed4 ,it is a common opinion that beauty of character and beauty of aspect are unrelated4 ,i have never been able to reconcile myself to this opinion4 ,indeed1 even those who hold it do so in an incomplete sense2 for notwithstanding their theory they continue to manifest surprise when they find a mean deed committed by one of noble countenance--a fact implying that underneath their professed induction lies a still living conviction at variance with it4 ,whence this conviction8 ,how is it that a belief in the connexion between worth and beauty primarily exists in all8 ,it cannot be innate4 ,must it not1 then1 be from early experiences8 ,and must it not be that in those who continue to believe in this connexion1 spite of their reasonings1 the early and wide experiences outweigh the later and exceptional ones8 ,those who do not admit the relationship between mental and facial beauty1 usually remark that the true connexion is between character and expression4 ,while they doubt1 or rather deny1 that the permanent forms of the features are #chh in any way indices of the forms of the mind1 they assert that the transitory forms of the features are such indices4 ,these positions seem scarcely consistent4 ,for may we not say that the transitory forms1 by perpetual repetition1 register themselves on the face1 and produce permanent forms8 ,does not an habitual frown by-and-by leave ineffaceable marks on the brow8 ,is not a chronic scornfulness presently followed by a modified set in the angles of the mouth8 ,does not that compression of the lips significant of great determination1 often stereotype itself2 and so give a changed form to the lower part of the face8 ,and if there be any truth in the doctrine of hereditary transmission1 must there not be a tendency to the re-appearance of these modifications as new types of feature in the offspring8 ,in brief1 may we not say that expression is feature in the making2 and that if expression means something1 the form of feature produced by it means something8 ,possibly it will be urged1 in reply1 that changes of expression affect only the muscles and skin of the face2 that the permanent marks they produce can extend but to these2 that1 nevertheless1 the beauty of a face is mainly dependent upon the form of its bony framework2 that hence1 in this chief respect1 there cannot take place such modifications as those described2 and that1 therefore1 the relationship of aspect to character1 while it may hold in the details1 does not hold in the generals4 ,the rejoinder is1 that the framework of the face is modified by modifications in the tissues which cover it4 ,it is an established doctrine in physiology1 that throughout the skeleton the greater or less development of bones is dependent on the greater or less development of the attached muscles2 that is1 on the exercise of them4 ,hence1 permanent changes in the muscular adjustments of the face will be followed by permanent changes in its osseous structure4 ,not to dwell in general statements1 however1 let me cite cases in which the connexion between organic ugliness and #chi mental inferiority1 and the converse connexion between organic beauty and comparative perfection of mind1 are distinctly traceable4 ,it will be admitted that the projecting jaw1 characteristic of the lower human races1 is a facial defect--is a trait which no sculptor would give to an ideal bust4 ,at the same time1 it is a fact that prominence of jaw is associated in the mammalia generally with comparative lack of intelligence4 ,this relationship1 it is true1 does not hold uniformly4 ,it is not a direct but an indirect one2 and is thus liable to be disturbed4 ,nevertheless1 it holds among the higher tribes2 and on inquiry we shall see why it holds4 ,in conformity with the law that organs develop in proportion as they are exercised1 the jaws are relatively large where the demands made on them are great2 and diminish in size as their functions become less numerous and less onerous4 ,now1 in the lower mammals the jaws are the sole organs of manipulation--are used not only for mastication1 but for seizing1 carrying1 gnawing1 and1 indeed1 for everything save locomotion1 which is the solitary office performed by the limbs4 ,advancing upwards1 we find that the fore-limbs begin to aid the jaws1 and gradually to relieve them of part of their duties4 ,some creatures use them for burrowing2 some1 as the felines1 for striking2 many1 to keep steady the prey they are tearing2 and when we arrive at the monkeys1 whose fore-limbs possess such power of prehension that objects can not only be seized1 but carried and pulled to pieces by them1 we see that the jaws have fewer functions4 ,accompanying this series of changes1 we see a double change in the form of the head4 ,the increased complexity of the limbs1 the greater variety of actions they perform1 and the more numerous perceptions they give1 imply a greater development of the brain and of its bony envelope4 ,at the same time1 the size of the jaws has diminished in correspondence with the diminution of their functions4 ,and by this simultaneous protrusion of the upper part of the cranium #cij and recession of its lower part1 what is called the facial angle has increased4 ,well1 these co-ordinate changes in functions and forms have continued during the civilization of the human race4 ,on contrasting the ,european and the ,papuan1 we see that what the one cuts in two with knife and fork1 the other tears with his jaws2 what the one softens by cooking1 the other eats in its hard1 raw state2 the bones which the one utilises by stewing1 the other gnaws2 and for sundry of the mechanical manipulations which the one has tools for1 the other uses his teeth4 ,from the ,bushman state upwards1 there has been a gradual increase in the complexity of our appliances4 ,we not only use our hands to save our jaws1 but we make implements to save our hands2 and in our engine-factories may be found implements for the making of implements4 ,this progression in the arts of life has had intellectual progression for its necessary correlative4 ,each new complication requires a new increment of intelligence for its production2 and the daily use of it develops the intelligence still further4 ,thus that simultaneous protrusion of the brain and recession of the jaws1 which among lower animals has accompanied increase of skill and sagacity1 has continued during the advance of ,humanity from barbarism to civilization2 and has been1 throughout1 the result of a discipline involving increase of mental power4 ,and so it becomes manifest that there exists an organic relationship between that protuberance of the jaws which we consider ugly1 and a certain inferiority of nature4 ,again1 that lateral jutting-out of the cheek-bones1 which similarly characterizes the lower races of men1 and which is similarly thought by us a detraction from beauty1 is similarly related to lower habits and lower intelligence4 ,the chief agents in closing the jaws are the temporal muscles2 and these are consequently the chief active agents in biting and mastication4 ,in proportion as the jaws have much work1 and correspondingly large size1 must the temporal muscles #cia be massive4 ,but the temporal muscles pass between the skull and the zygomatic arches1 or lateral parts of the cheek-bones4 ,consequently1 where the temporal muscles are massive1 the spaces between the zygomatic arches and the skull must be great2 and the lateral projection of the zygomatic arches great also1 as we see it in the uncivilized and partially civilized races4 ,like large jaws1 therefore1 of which it is an accompaniment1 excessive size of the cheek-bones is both an ugliness and an index of imperfection4 ,certain other defects of feature1 between which and mental defects it is not thus easy to trace the connexion1 may yet be fairly presumed to have such connexion in virtue of their constant co-existence with the foregoing ones3 alike in the uncivilized races and in the young of the civilized races4 ,peculiarities of face which we find regularly associated with those just shown to be significant of intellectual inferiority1 and which like them disappear as barbarism grows into civilization1 may reasonably be concluded to have like them a psychological meaning4 ,thus is it with depression of the bridge of the nose2 which is a characteristic both of barbarians and of our babes1 possessed by them in common with the higher quadrumana4 ,thus1 also1 is it with that forward opening of the nostrils1 which renders them conspicuous in a front view of the face--a trait alike of infants1 savages1 and apes4 ,and the same may be said of wide-spread al to the nose1 of great width between the eyes1 of long mouth1 of large mouth1--indeed of all those leading peculiarities of feature which are by general consent called ugly4 ,and then mark how1 conversely1 the type of face usually admitted to be the most beautiful1 is one that possesses opposite peculiarities4 ,in the ideal ,greek head1 the forehead projects so much1 and the jaws recede so much1 as to render the facial angle larger than we ever find it in fact4 ,the cheek-bones are so small as scarcely to be traceable4 ,the bridge of the nose is so high as to be almost or quite in #cib a line with the forehead4 ,the al of the nose join the face with but little obliquity4 ,in the front view the nostrils are almost invisible4 ,the mouth is small1 and the upper lip short and deeply concave4 ,the outer angles of the eyes1 instead of keeping the horizontal line1 as is usual1 or being directed upwards1 as in the ,mongolian type1 are directed slightly downwards4 ,and the form of the brow indicates an unusually large frontal sinus--a characteristic entirely absent in children1 in the lowest of the human races1 and in the allied genera of the primates4 ,if1 then1 recession of the forehead1 protuberance of the jaws1 and largeness of the cheek-bones1 three leading elements of ugliness1 are demonstrably indicative of mental inferiority--if such other facial defects as great width between the eyes1 flatness of the nose1 spreading of its al1 frontward opening of the nostrils1 length of the mouth1 and largeness of the lips1 are habitually associated with these1 and disappear along with them as intelligence increases1 both in the race and in the individual2 is it not a fair inference that all such faulty traits of feature signify deficiencies of mind8 ,if1 further1 our ideal of human beauty is characterized not simply by the absence of these traits1 but by the presence of opposite ones--if this ideal1 as found in sculptures of the ,greek gods1 has been used to represent superhuman power and intelligence--and if the race so using it were themselves distinguished by a mental superiority1 which1 if we consider their disadvantages1 produced results unparalleled2 have we not yet stronger reasons for concluding that the chief components of beauty and ugliness are severally connected with perfection and imperfection of mental nature8 ,and when1 lastly1 we remember that the variations of feature constituting expression are confessedly significant of character--when we remember that these tend by repetition to organize themselves1 to affect not only the skin and muscles but the bones of the face1 and to be transmitted to offspring--when we thus find that there is a #cic psychological meaning alike in each passing adjustment of the features1 in the marks that habitual adjustments leave1 in the marks inherited from ancestors1 and in those main outlines of the facial bones and integuments indicating the type or race2 are we not almost forced to the conclusion that all forms of feature are related to forms of mind1 and that we consider them admirable or otherwise according as the traits of nature they imply are admirable or otherwise8 ,in the extremes the relationship is demonstrable4 ,that transitory aspects of face accompany transitory mental states1 and that we consider these aspects ugly or beautiful according as the mental states they accompany are ugly or beautiful1 no one doubts4 ,that those permanent and most marked aspects of face dependent on the bony framework1 accompany those permanent and most marked mental states which express themselves in barbarism and civilization2 and that we consider as beautiful those which accompany mental superiority1 and as ugly those which accompany mental inferiority1 is equally certain4 ,and if this connexion unquestionably holds in the extremes--if1 as judged by average facts1 and by our half-instinctive convictions1 it also holds more or less visibly in intermediate cases1 it becomes an almost irresistible induction1 that the aspects which please us are the outward correlatives of inward perfections1 while the aspects which displease us are the outward correlatives of inward imperfections4 ,i am quite aware that when tested in detail this induction seems not to be borne out4 ,i know that there are often grand natures behind plain faces2 and that fine countenances frequently hide small souls4 ,but these anomalies do not destroy the general truth of the law1 any more than the perturbations of planets destroy the general ellipticity of their orbits4 ,some of them1 indeed1 may be readily accounted for4 ,there are many faces spoiled by the misproportion of features that are in themselves good2 others1 by defects of skin1 which1 though they indicate defects of #cid visceral constitution1 have no relationship to the higher parts of the nature4 ,moreover the facts that have been assigned afford reason for thinking that the leading elements of facial beauty are not directly associated with moral characteristics1 but with intellectual ones--are the results of long-continued civilized habits1 long cessation of domestic barbarism1 long culture of the manipulative powers2 and so may co-exist with emotional traits not at all admirable4 ,it is true that the highest intellectual manifestations imply a good balance of the higher feelings2 but it is also true that great quickness1 great sagacity in ordinary affairs1 great practical skill1 can be possessed without these1 and very frequently are so4 ,the prevalent beauty of the ,italians1 co-existing though it does with a low moral state1 becomes1 on this hypothesis1 reconcileable with the general induction2 as do also many of the anomalies we see around us4 ,there is1 however1 a more satisfactory explanation to be offered than any of these--an explanation which ,i think renders it possible to admit the seeming contradictions which the detailed facts present1 and yet to hold by the theory4 ,but as more space will be required for showing this than can here be spared1 ,i must defer going further until next week4 ,in the meantime1 my own conviction may be expressed in a formula in which ,i have often before uttered it3--,the saying that beauty is but skin-deep1 is but a skin-deep saying4 ,,ii4 ,all the civilized races1 and probably also the uncivilized ones1 are of mixed origin2 and1 as a consequence1 have physical and mental constitutions in which are mingled several aboriginal constitutions more or less differing from each other4 ,this heterogeneity of constitution seems to me the chief cause of the incongruities between aspect and nature which we daily meet with4 ,given a pure race1 subject to constant conditions of climate1 food1 and habits #cie of life1 and there is reason to believe that between external appearance and internal structure there will be a constant connexion4 ,unite this race with another equally pure1 but adapted to different conditions and having a correspondingly different physique1 face1 and mind1 and there will occur in the descendants1 not a homogeneous mean between the two constitutions1 but a seemingly irregular combination of characteristics of the one with characteristics of the other--one feature traceable to this race1 a second to that1 and a third uniting the attributes of both2 while in disposition and intellect there will be found a like medley of the two originals4 ,the fact that the forms and qualities of any offspring are not a mean between the forms and qualities of its parents1 but a mixture of them1 is illustrated in every family4 ,the features and peculiarities of a child are separately referred by observers to father and mother respectively--nose and mouth to this side2 colour of the hair and eyes to that--this moral peculiarity to the first2 this intellectual one to the second--and so with contour and idiosyncrasies of body4 ,manifestly if each organ or faculty in a child was an average of the two developments of such organ or faculty in the parents1 it would follow that all brothers and sisters should be alike2 or should1 at any rate1 differ no more than their parents differed from year to year4 ,so far however1 from finding this to be the case1 we find not only that great irregularities are produced by mixture of traits1 but that there is no constancy in the mode of mixture1 or the extent of variation produced by it4 ,this imperfect union of parental constitutions in the constitutions of offspring1 is still more clearly illustrated by the re-appearance of peculiarities traceable to bygone generations4 ,forms1 dispositions1 and diseases1 possessed by distant progenitors1 habitually come out from time to time in descendants4 ,some single feature1 or some solitary tendency1 will again and again show itself1 after being apparently lost4 ,it is notoriously thus with gout1 scrofula1 #cif and insanity4 ,on some of the monumental brasses in our old churches are engraved heads having traits still persistent in the same families4 ,wherever1 as in portrait galleries1 a register of ancestral faces has been kept1 the same fact is more or less apparent4 ,the pertinacity with which particular characteristics re-produce themselves is well exemplified in ,america1 where traces of negro blood can be detected in the finger nails1 when no longer visible in the complexion4 ,among breeders of animals it is well known that1 after several generations in which no visible modifications were traceable1 the effects of a cross will suddenly make their appearance4 ,in all which facts we see the general truth that an organism produced from two organisms constitutionally different1 is not a homogeneous mean2 but is made up of components1 taken in variable ways and proportions from the originals4 ,in a recent number of the ,quarterly ,journal of the ,agricultural ,society were published some facts respecting the mixture of ,french and ,english races of sheep1 bearing collaterally on this point4 ,sundry attempts had been made to improve the poor ,french breeds by our fine ,english ones4 ,for a long time these attempts failed4 ,the hybrids bore no trace of their ,english male ancestry2 but were as dwarfed and poverty-stricken as their ,french dams4 ,eventually the cause of failure was found to lie in the relative heterogeneity and homogeneity of the two constitutions4 ,the superior ,english sheep were of mixed race2 the ,french sheep1 though inferior1 were of pure race2 and the compound1 imperfectly co-ordinated constitution of the one could not maintain itself against the simple and completely balanced constitution of the other4 ,this1 at first an hypothesis1 was presently demonstrated4 ,french sheep of mixed constitution having been obtained by uniting two of the pure ,french breeds1 it was found that these hybrid ,french sheep1 when united with the ,english ones1 produced a cross in which the ,english characteristics were duly #cig displayed4 ,now1 this inability of a mixed constitution to stand its ground against an unmixed one1 quite accords with the above induction4 ,an unmixed constitution is one in which all the organs are exactly fitted to each other--are perfectly balanced3 the system as a whole1 is in stable equilibrium4 ,a mixed constitution1 on the contrary1 being made up of organs belonging to two separate sets1 cannot have them in exact fitness--cannot have them perfectly balanced2 and a system in comparatively unstable equilibrium results4 ,but in proportion to the stability of the equilibrium will be the power to resist disturbing forces4 ,hence1 when two constitutions1 in stable and unstable equilibrium respectively1 become disturbing forces to each other1 the unstable one will be overthrown1 and the stable one will assert itself unchanged4 ,the imperfect co-ordination of parts in a mixed constitution1 and this consequent instability of its equilibrium1 are intimately connected with the vexed question of genera1 species1 and varieties2 and1 with a view partly to the intrinsic interest of this question1 and partly to the further elucidation of the topic in hand1 ,i must again digress4 ,the current physiological test of distinct species is the production of a non-prolific hybrid4 ,the ability of the offspring to reproduce itself is held to indicate that its parents are of the same species1 however widely they may differ in appearance2 and its inability to do this is taken as proof that1 nearly allied as its parents may seem1 they are distinct in kind4 ,of late1 however1 facts have been accumulating that tend more and more to throw doubt on this generalization4 ,cattle-breeders have established it as a general fact1 that the offspring of two different breeds of sheep or oxen dwindle away in a few generations if allied with themselves2 and that a good result can be obtained only by mixing them with one or other of the original breeds--a fact implying that what is true of so-called species1 is1 under a modified form1 true of varieties also4 #cih ,the same phenomena are observable in the mixtures of different races of men4 ,they1 too1 it is alleged1 cannot maintain themselves as separate varieties2 but die out unless there is intermarriage with the originals4 ,in brief1 it seems that the hybrids produced from two distinct races of organisms may die out in the first1 second1 third1 fourth1 fifth1 c41 generation1 according as the constitutional difference of the races is greater or less4 ,now1 the experience of the ,french sheep-breeders1 above-quoted1 suggests a rationale of these various results4 ,for if it be true that an organism produced by two unlike organisms is not a mean between them1 but a mixture of parts of the one with parts of the other--if it be true that these parts belonging to two different sets are of necessity imperfectly co-ordinated2 then it becomes manifest that in proportion as the difference between the parent organisms is greater or less1 the defects of co-ordination in the offspring will be greater or less4 ,whence it follows that1 according to the degree of organic incongruity between the parents1 we may have every gradation in the offspring1 from a combination of parts so incongruous that it will not work at all1 up to a combination complete enough to subsist permanently as a race4 ,and this is just what we find in fact4 ,between organisms widely differing in character1 no intermediate organism is possible4 ,when the difference is less1 a non-prolific hybrid is produced--an organism so ill co-ordinated as to be capable only of incomplete life4 ,when the difference is still less1 there results an organism capable of reproducing itself2 but not of bequeathing to its offspring complete constitutions4 ,and as the degrees of difference are further diminished1 the incompleteness of constitution is longer and longer in making its appearance2 until we come to those varieties of the same species which differ so slightly that their offspring are as permanent as themselves4 ,even in these1 however1 the organic equilibrium seems less perfect2 as is illustrated #cii in the case ,i have quoted4 ,and in connexion with this inference1 it would be interesting to inquire whether pure constitutions are not superior to mixed ones1 in their power of maintaining the balance of vital functions under disturbing conditions4 ,is it not a fact1 that the pure breeds are hardier than the mixed ones8 ,are not the mixed ones1 though superior in size1 less capable of resisting unfavourable influences--extremes of temperature1 bad food1 c48 ,and is not the like true of mankind8 ,returning to the topic in hand1 it is manifest that these facts and reasonings serve further to enforce the general truth1 that the offspring of two organisms not identical in constitution is a heterogeneous mixture of the two1 and not a homogeneous mean between them4 ,if1 then1 bearing in mind this truth1 we remember the composite character of the civilized races--the mingling in ourselves1 for example1 of ,celt1 ,saxon1 ,norman1 ,dane1 with sprinklings of other tribes2 if we consider the complications of constitution that have arisen from the unions of these1 not in any uniform manner1 but with utter irregularity2 and if we recollect that the incongruities thus produced pervade the whole nature1 mental and bodily--nervous tissue and other tissues2 we shall see that there must exist in all of us an imperfect correspondence between parts of the organism that are really related2 and that as one manifestation of this1 there must be more or less of discrepancy between the features and those parts of the nervous system with which they have a physiological connexion4 ,if this be so1 then the difficulties which stand in the way of the belief that beauty of character is related to beauty of face are considerably diminished4 ,it becomes possible to admit that plainness may co-exist with nobility of nature1 and fine features with baseness2 and yet to hold that mental and facial perfection are fundamentally connected1 and will1 when the present causes of incongruity have worked themselves out1 be ever found united4 #djj ,,the ,,origin ,,and ,,function ,,of ,,music4 ,first published in ,fraser's ,magazine for ,october #aheg4 ,when ,carlo1 standing1 chained to his kennel1 sees his master in the distance1 a slight motion of the tail indicates his but faint hope that he is about to be let out4 ,a much more decided wagging of the tail1 passing by-and-by into lateral undulations of the body1 follows his master's nearer approach4 ,when hands are laid on his collar1 and he knows that he is really to have an outing1 his jumping and wriggling are such that it is by no means easy to loose his fastenings4 ,and when he finds himself actually free1 his joy expends itself in bounds1 in pirouettes1 and in scourings hither and thither at the top of his speed4 ,puss1 too1 by erecting her tail1 and by every time raising her back to meet the caressing hand of her mistress1 similarly expresses her gratification by certain muscular actions2 as likewise do the parrot by awkward dancings on his perch1 and the canary by hopping and fluttering about his cage with unwonted rapidity4 ,under emotions of an opposite kind1 animals equally display muscular excitement4 ,the enraged lion lashes his sides with his tail1 knits his brows1 protrudes his claws4 ,the cat sets up her back2 the dog retracts his upper lip2 the horse throws back his ears4 ,and in the struggles of creatures in pain1 we see that a like relation #dja holds between excitement of the muscles and excitement of the nerves of sensation4 ,in ourselves1 distinguished from lower creatures by feelings alike more powerful and more varied1 parallel facts are at once more conspicuous and more numerous4 ,let us look at them in groups4 ,we shall find that pleasurable sensations and painful sensations1 pleasurable emotions and painful emotions1 all tend to produce active demonstrations in proportion to their intensity4 ,in children1 and even in adults who are not restrained by regard for appearances1 a highly agreeable taste is followed by a smacking of the lips4 ,an infant will laugh and bound in its nurse's arms at the sight of a brilliant colour or the hearing of a new sound4 ,people are apt to beat time with head or feet to music which particularly pleases them4 ,in a sensitive person an agreeable perfume will produce a smile2 and smiles will be seen on the faces of a crowd gazing at some splendid burst of fireworks4 ,even the pleasant sensation of warmth felt on getting to the fireside out of a winter's storm1 will similarly express itself in the face4 ,painful sensations1 being mostly far more intense than pleasurable ones1 cause muscular actions of much more decided kinds4 ,a sudden twinge produces a convulsive start of the whole body4 ,a pain less violent1 but continuous1 is accompanied by a knitting of the brows1 a setting of the teeth or biting of the lip1 and a contraction of the features generally4 ,under a persistent pain of a severer kind1 other muscular actions are added3 the body is swayed to and fro2 the hands clench anything they can lay hold of2 and should the agony rise still higher1 the sufferer rolls about on the floor almost convulsed4 ,though more varied1 the natural language of the pleasurable emotions comes within the same generalization4 ,a smile1 which is the commonest expression of gratified feeling1 is a contraction of certain facial muscles2 and when the smile broadens into a laugh1 we see a more violent and #djb more general muscular excitement produced by an intenser gratification4 ,rubbing together of the hands1 and that other motion which ,hood describes as the washing of 8hands with invisible soap in imperceptible water10 have like implications4 ,children may often be seen to 8jump for joy10 ,even in adults of excitable temperament1 an action approaching to it is sometimes witnessed4 ,and dancing has all the world through been regarded as natural to an elevated state of minds4 ,many of the special emotions show themselves in special muscular actions4 ,the gratification resulting from success1 raises the head and gives firmness to the gait4 ,a hearty grasp of the hand is currently taken as indicative of friendship4 ,under a gush of affection the mother clasps her child to her breast1 feeling as though she could squeeze it to death4 ,and so in sundry other cases4 ,even in that brightening of the eye with which good news is received we may trace the same truth2 for this sparkling appearance is due to an extra contraction of the muscle which raises the eyelid1 and so allows more light to fall upon1 and be reflected from1 the wet surface of the eyeball4 ,the bodily indications of painful emotion are equally numerous1 and still more vehement4 ,discontent is shown by raised eyebrows and wrinkled forehead2 disgust by a curl of the lip1 offence by a pout4 ,the impatient man beats a tattoo with his fingers on the table1 swings his pendant leg with increasing rapidity1 gives needless pokings to the fire1 and presently paces with hasty strides about the room4 ,in great grief there is wringing of the hands1 and even tearing of the hair4 ,an angry child stamps1 or rolls on its back and kicks its heels in the air2 and in manhood1 anger1 first showing itself in frowns1 in distended nostrils1 in compressed lips1 goes on to produce grinding of the teeth1 clenching of the fingers1 blows of the fist on the table1 and perhaps ends in a violent attack on the offending person1 or in throwing about and breaking the furniture4 ,from #djc that pursing of the mouth indicative of slight displeasure1 up to the frantic struggles of the maniac1 we find that mental irritation tends to vent itself in bodily activity4 ,all feelings1 then--sensations or emotions1 pleasurable or painful--have this common characteristic1 that they are muscular stimuli4 ,not forgetting the few apparently exceptional cases in which emotions exceeding a certain intensity produce prostration1 we may set it down as a general law1 that alike in man and animals1 there is a direct connexion between feeling and movement2 the last growing more vehement as the first grows more intense4 ,were it allowable here to treat the matter scientifically1 we might trace this general law down to the principle known among physiologists as that of reflex action4#ef ,without doing this1 however1 the above numerous instances justify the generalization that every kind of mental excitement ends in excitement of the muscles2 and that the two preserve a more or less constant ratio to each other4 99 99 99 99 99 8,but what has all this to do with ,the ,origin and ,function of ,music80 asks the reader4 ,very much1 as we shall presently see4 ,all music is originally vocal4 ,all vocal sounds are produced by the agency of certain muscles4 ,these muscles1 in common with those of the body at large1 are excited to contraction by pleasurable and painful feelings4 ,and therefore it is that feelings demonstrate themselves in sounds as well as in movements4 ,therefore it is that ,carlo barks as well as leaps when he is let out--that puss purrs as well as erects her tail--that the canary chirps as well as flutters4 ,therefore it is that the angry lion roars while he lashes his sides1 and the dog growls while he retracts his lip4 ,therefore it is that the maimed animal not only struggles1 but howls4 ,and it is from this cause that in human beings bodily suffering expresses itself not only in #djd contortions1 but in shrieks and groans--that in anger1 and fear1 and grief1 the gesticulations are accompanied by shouts and screams--that delightful sensations are followed by exclamations--and that we hear screams of joy and shouts of exultation4 ,we have here1 then1 a principle underlying all vocal phenomena2 including those of vocal music1 and by consequence those of music in general4 ,the muscles that move the chest1 larynx1 and vocal chords1 contracting like other muscles in proportion to the intensity of the feelings2 every different contraction of these muscles involving1 as it does1 a different adjustment of the vocal organs2 every different adjustment of the vocal organs causing a change in the sound emitted2--it follows that variations of voice are the physiological results of variations of feeling4 ,it follows that each inflection or modulation is the natural outcome of some passing emotion or sensation2 and it follows that the explanation of all kinds of vocal expression1 must be sought in this general relation between mental and muscular excitements4 ,let us1 then1 see whether we cannot thus account for the chief peculiarities in the utterance of the feelings3 grouping these peculiarities under the heads of loudness1 quality or timbre1 pitch1 intervals1 and rate of variation4 99 99 99 99 99 ,between the lungs and the organs of voice1 there is much the same relation as between the bellows of an organ and its pipes4 ,and as the loudness of the sound given out by an organ-pipe increases with the strength of the blast from the bellows2 so1 other things equal1 the loudness of a vocal sound increases with the strength of the blast from the lungs4 ,but the expulsion of air from the lungs is effected by certain muscles of the chest and abdomen4 ,the force with which these muscles contract1 is proportionate to the intensity of the feeling experienced4 ,hence1 a priori1 loud sounds will be the habitual results of strong feelings4 ,that they are so we have daily proof4 ,the pain which #dje if moderate1 can be borne silently1 causes outcries if it becomes extreme4 ,while a slight vexation makes a child whimper1 a fit of passion calls forth a howl that disturbs the neighbourhood4 ,when the voices in an adjacent room become unusually audible1 we infer anger1 or surprise1 or joy4 ,loudness of applause is significant of great approbation2 and with uproarious mirth we associate the idea of high enjoyment4 ,commencing with the silence of apathy1 we find that the utterances grow louder as the sensations or emotions1 whether pleasurable or painful1 grow stronger4 ,that different qualities of voice accompany different mental states1 and that under states of excitement the tones are more sonorous than usual1 is another general fact admitting of a parallel explanation4 ,the sounds of common conversation have but little resonance2 those of strong feeling have much more4 ,under rising ill temper the voice acquires a metallic ring4 ,in accordance with her constant mood1 the ordinary speech of a virago has a piercing quality quite opposite to that softness indicative of placidity4 ,a ringing laugh marks joyous temperament4 ,grief1 unburdening itself1 uses tones approaching in timbre to those of chanting2 and in his most pathetic passages an eloquent speaker similarly falls into tones more vibratory than those common to him4 ,now any one may readily convince himself that resonant vocal sounds can be produced only by a certain muscular effort additional to that ordinarily needed4 ,if after uttering a word in his speaking voice1 the reader1 without changing the pitch or the loudness1 will sing this word1 he will perceive that before he can sing it1 he has to alter the adjustment of the vocal organs2 to do which a certain force must be used2 and by putting his fingers on that external prominence marking the top of the larynx1 he will have further evidence that to produce a sonorous tone the organs must be drawn out of their usual position4 ,thus1 then1 the fact that the tones of excited feeling are more vibratory than those of common #djf conversation1 is another instance of the connexion between mental excitement and muscular excitement4 ,the speaking voice1 the recitative voice1 and the singing voice1 severally exemplify one general principle4 ,that the pitch of the voice varies according to the action of the vocal muscles1 scarcely needs saying4 ,all know that the middle notes1 in which they converse1 are made without appreciable effort2 and all know that to make either very high notes or very low notes requires considerable effort4 ,in either ascending or descending from the pitch of ordinary speech1 we are conscious of increasing muscular strain1 which1 at each extreme of the register1 becomes painful4 ,hence it follows from our general principle1 that while indifference or calmness will use the medium tones1 the tones used during excitement will be either above or below them2 and will rise higher and higher1 or fall lower and lower1 as the feelings grow stronger4 ,this physiological deduction we also find to be in harmony with familiar facts4 ,the habitual sufferer utters his complaints in a voice raised considerably above the natural key2 and agonizing pain vents itself in either shrieks or groans--in very high or very low notes4 ,beginning at his talking pitch1 the cry of the disappointed urchin grows more shrill as it grows louder4 ,the 8,oh60 of astonishment or delight1 begins several notes below the middle voice1 and descends still lower4 ,anger expresses itself in high tones1 or else in 8curses not loud but deep40 ,deep tones1 too1 are always used in uttering strong reproaches4 ,such an exclamation as 8,beware60 if made dramatically--that is1 if made with a show of feeling--must be many notes lower than ordinary4 ,further1 we have groans of disapprobation1 groans of horror1 groans of remorse4 ,and extreme joy and fear are alike accompanied by shrill outcries4 ,nearly allied to the subject of pitch1 is that of intervals2 and the explanation of them carries our argument a step #djg further4 ,while calm speech is comparatively monotonous1 emotion makes use of fifths1 octaves1 and even wider intervals4 ,listen to any one narrating or repeating something in which he has no interest1 and his voice will not wander more than two or three notes above or below his medium note1 and that by small steps2 but when he comes to some exciting event he will be heard not only to use the higher and lower notes of his register1 but to go from one to the other by larger leaps4 ,being unable in print to imitate these traits of feeling1 we feel some difficulty in fully conveying them to the reader4 ,but we may suggest a few remembrances which will perhaps call to mind a sufficiency of others4 ,if two men living in the same place1 and frequently seeing one another1 meet1 say at a public assembly1 any phrase with which one accosts the other--as 8,hallo1 are you here80--will have an ordinary intonation4 ,but if one of them1 after a long absence1 has unexpectedly returned1 the expression of surprise with which his friend greets him--8,hallo6 how came you here80--will be uttered in much more strongly contrasted tones4 ,the two syllables of the word 8,hallo0 will be1 the one much higher and the other much lower than before2 and the rest of the sentence will similarly ascend and descend by longer steps4 ,again1 if1 supposing her maid to be in an adjoining room1 the mistress of the house calls 8,mary10 the two syllables of the name will be spoken in an ascending interval of a third4 ,if ,mary does not reply1 the call will be repeated probably in a descending fifth2 implying the slightest shade of annoyance at ,mary's inattention4 ,should ,mary still make no answer1 the increasing annoyance will show itself by the use of a descending octave on the next repetition of the call4 ,and supposing the silence to continue1 the lady1 if not of a very even temper1 will show her irritation at ,mary's seemingly intentional negligence by finally calling her in tones still more widely contrasted--the first syllable #djh being higher and the last lower than before4 ,now1 these and analogous facts1 which the reader will readily accumulate1 clearly conform to the law laid down4 ,for to make large intervals requires more muscular action than to make small ones4 ,but not only is the extent of vocal intervals thus explicable as due to the relation between nervous and muscular excitement1 but also1 in some degree1 their direction1 as ascending or descending4 ,the middle notes being those which demand no appreciable effort of muscular adjustment2 and the effort becoming greater as we either ascend or descend2 it follows that a departure from the middle notes in either direction will mark increasing emotion2 while a return towards the middle notes will mark decreasing emotion4 ,hence it happens that an enthusiastic person1 uttering such a sentence as--8,it was the most splendid sight ,i ever saw60 will ascend to the first syllable of the word 8splendid10 and thence will descend3 the word 8splendid0 marking the climax of the feeling produced by the recollection4 ,hence1 again1 it happens that1 under some extreme vexation produced by another's stupidity1 an irascible man1 exclaiming--8,what a confounded fool the fellow is60 will begin somewhat below his middle voice1 and descending to the word 8fool10 which he will utter in one of his deepest notes1 will then ascend4 ,and it may be remarked1 that the word 8fool0 will not only be deeper and louder than the rest1 but will also have more emphasis of articulation--another mode in which muscular excitement is shown4 ,there is some danger1 however1 in giving instances like this2 seeing that as the mode of rendering will vary according to the intensity of the feeling which the reader feigns to himself1 the right cadence may not be hit upon4 ,with single words there is less difficulty4 ,thus the 8,indeed60 with which a surprising fact is received1 mostly begins on the middle note of the voice1 and rises with the second syllable2 or1 if disapprobation as well as astonishment is felt1 the #dji first syllable will be below the middle note1 and the second lower still4 ,conversely1 the word 8,alas60 which marks not the rise of a paroxysm of grief1 but its decline1 is uttered in a cadence descending towards the middle note2 or1 if the first syllable is in the lower part of the register1 the second ascends towards the middle note4 ,in the 8,heigh-ho60 expressive of mental or muscular prostration1 we may see the same truth2 and if the cadence appropriate to it be inverted1 the absurdity of the effect clearly shows how the meaning of intervals is dependent on the principle we have been illustrating4 ,the remaining characteristic of emotional speech which we have to notice1 is that of variability of pitch4 ,it is scarcely possible here to convey adequate ideas of this more complex manifestation4 ,we must be content with simply indicating some occasions on which it may be observed4 ,on a meeting of friends1 for instance--as when there arrives a party of much-wished-for visitors--the voices of all will be heard to undergo changes of pitch not only greater but much more numerous than usual4 ,if a speaker at a public meeting is interrupted by some squabble among those he is addressing1 his comparatively level tones will be in marked contrast with the rapidly changing ones of the disputants4 ,and among children1 whose feelings are less under control than those of adults1 this peculiarity is still more decided4 ,during a scene of complaint and recrimination between two excitable little girls1 the voices may be heard to run up and down the gamut several times in each sentence4 ,in such cases we once more recognize the same law3 for muscular excitement is shown not only in strength of contraction1 but also in the rapidity with which different muscular adjustments succeed one another4 ,thus we find all the leading vocal phenomena to have a physiological basis4 ,they are so many manifestations of the general law that feeling is a stimulus to muscular #daj action--a law conformed to throughout the whole economy1 not of man only1 but of every sensitive creature--a law1 therefore1 which lies deep in the nature of animal organization4 ,the expressiveness of these various modifications of voice is therefore innate4 ,each of us1 from babyhood upwards1 has been spontaneously making them1 when under the various sensations and emotions by which they are produced4 ,having been conscious of each feeling at the same time that we heard ourselves make the consequent sound1 we have acquired an established association of ideas between such sound and the feeling which caused it4 ,when the like sound is made by another1 we ascribe the like feeling to him2 and by a further consequence we not only ascribe to him that feeling1 but have a certain degree of it aroused in ourselves3 for to become conscious of the feeling which another is experiencing1 is to have that feeling awakened in our own consciousness1 which is the same thing as experiencing the feeling4 ,thus these various modifications of voice become not only a language through which we understand the emotions of others1 but also the means of exciting our sympathy with such emotions4 99 99 99 99 99 ,have we not here1 then1 adequate data for a theory of music8 ,these vocal peculiarities which indicate excited feeling1 are those which especially distinguish song from ordinary speech4 ,every one of the alterations of voice which we have found to be a physiological result of pain or pleasure1 is carried to an extreme in vocal music4 ,for instance1 we saw that1 in virtue of the general relation between mental and muscular excitement1 one characteristic of passionate utterance is loudness4 ,well1 its comparative loudness is one of the distinctive marks of song as contrasted with the speech of daily life4 ,though there are piano passages in contrast with the forte passages1 yet the average loudness of the singing voice is much greater than #daa that of the speaking voice2 and further1 the forte passages of an air are those intended to represent the climax of its emotion4 ,we next saw that the tones in which emotion expresses itself1 are1 in conformity with this same law1 of a more sonorous timbre than those of calm conversation4 ,here1 too1 song displays a still higher degree of the peculiarity2 for the singing tone is the most resonant we can make4 ,again1 it was shown that1 from a like cause1 mental excitement vents itself in the higher and lower notes of the register2 using the middle notes but seldom4 ,and it scarcely needs saying that vocal music is still more distinguished by its comparative neglect of the notes in which we talk1 and its habitual use of those above or below them2 and1 moreover1 that its most passionate effects are commonly produced at the two extremities of its scale1 but especially at the upper one4 ,a yet further trait of strong feeling1 similarly accounted for1 was the habitual employment of larger intervals than are employed in common converse4 ,this trait1 also1 every ballad and aria systematically elaborates3 add to which1 that the direction of these intervals1 which1 as diverging from or converging towards the medium tones1 we found to be physiologically expressive of increasing or decreasing emotion1 may be observed to have in music like meanings4 ,once more1 it was pointed out that not only extreme but also rapid variations of pitch1 are characteristic of mental excitement2 and once more we see in the quick changes of every melody1 that song carries the characteristic as far1 if not farther4 ,thus1 in respect alike of loudness1 timbre1 pitch1 intervals1 and rate of variation1 song employs and exaggerates the natural language of the emotions2--it arises from a systematic combination of those vocal peculiarities which are the physiological effects of acute pleasure and pain4 ,besides these chief characteristics of song as distinguished from common speech1 there are sundry minor ones #dab similarly explicable as due to the relation between mental and muscular excitement2 and before proceeding further1 these should be briefly noticed4 ,thus1 certain passions1 and perhaps all passions when pushed to an extreme1 produce 7probably through their influence over the action of the heart7 an effect the reverse of that which has been described3 they cause a physical prostration1 one symptom of which is a general relaxation of the muscles1 and a consequent trembling4 ,we have the trembling of anger1 of fear1 of hope1 of joy2 and the vocal muscles being implicated with the rest1 the voice too becomes tremulous4 ,now1 in singing1 this tremulousness of voice is effectively used by some vocalists in pathetic passages2 sometimes1 indeed1 because of its effectiveness1 too much used by them--as by ,tamberlik1 for instance4 ,again1 there is a mode of musical execution known as the staccato1 appropriate to energetic passages--to passages expressive of exhilaration1 of resolution1 of confidence4 ,the action of the vocal muscles which produces this staccato style1 is analogous to the muscular action which produces the sharp1 decisive1 energetic movements of body indicating these states of mind2 and therefore it is that the staccato style has the meaning we ascribe to it4 ,conversely1 slurred intervals are expressive of gentler and less active feelings2 and are so because they imply the smaller muscular vivacity due to a lower mental energy4 ,the difference of effect resulting from difference of time in music1 is also attributable to this same law4 ,already it has been pointed out that the more frequent changes of pitch which ordinarily result from passion1 are imitated and developed in song2 and here we have to add1 that the various rates of such changes1 appropriate to the different styles of music1 are further traits having the same derivation4 ,the slowest movements1 largo and adagio1 are used where such depressing emotions as grief1 or such unexciting emotions as reverence1 are to be portrayed2 while the more rapid movements1 andante1 #dac allegro1 presto1 represent successively increasing degrees of mental vivacity2 and do this because they imply that muscular activity which flows from this mental vivacity4 ,even the rhythm1 which forms a remaining distinction between song and speech1 may not improbably have a kindred cause4 ,why the actions excited by strong feeling should tend to become rhythmical1 is not obvious2 but that they do so there are divers evidences4 ,there is the swaying of the body to and fro under pain or grief1 of the leg under impatience or agitation4 ,dancing1 too1 is a rhythmical action natural to elevated emotion4 ,that under excitement speech acquires a certain rhythm1 we may occasionally perceive in the highest efforts of an orator4 ,in poetry1 which is a form of speech used for the better expression of emotional ideas1 we have this rhythmical tendency developed4 ,and when we bear in mind that dancing1 poetry1 and music are connate--are originally constituent parts of the same thing1 it becomes clear that the measured movement common to them all implies a rhythmical action of the whole system1 the vocal apparatus included2 and that so the rhythm of music is a more subtle and complex result of this relation between mental and muscular excitement4 ,but it is time to end this analysis1 which possibly we have already carried too far4 ,it is not to be supposed that the more special peculiarities of musical expression are to be definitely explained4 ,though probably they may all in some way conform to the principle that has been worked out1 it is impracticable to trace that principle in its more ramified applications4 ,nor is it needful to our argument that it should be so traced4 ,the foregoing facts sufficiently prove that what we regard as the distinctive traits of song1 are simply the traits of emotional speech intensified and systematized4 ,in respect of its general characteristics1 we think it has been made clear that vocal music1 and by #dad consequence all music1 is an idealization of the natural language of passion4 99 99 99 99 99 ,as far as it goes1 the scanty evidence furnished by history confirms this conclusion4 ,note first the fact 7not properly an historical one1 but fitly grouped with such7 that the dance-chants of savage tribes are very monotonous2 and in virtue of their monotony are more nearly allied to ordinary speech than are the songs of civilized races4 ,joining with this the fact that there are still extant among boatmen and others in the ,east1 ancient chants of a like monotonous character1 we may infer that vocal music originally diverged from emotional speech in a gradual1 unobtrusive manner2 and this is the inference to which our argument points4 ,from the characters of the intervals the same conclusion may be drawn4 8,the songs of savages in the lowest scale of civilization are generally confined to the compass of few notes1 seldom extending beyond the interval of the fifth4 ,sometimes1 however1 a sudden transition into the octave occurs1 especially in sudden exclamations1 or where a word naturally dictates an emphatic raising of the voice4 ,the fifth especially plays a prominent part in primitive vocal music4 4 4 4 ,but it must not be supposed that each interval is distinctly intoned3 on the contrary1 in the transition from one interval to another1 all the intermediate intervals are slightly touched in a way somewhat similar to a violinist drawing his finger rapidly over the string from one note to another to connect them2 and as the intervals themselves are seldom clearly defined1 it will easily be understood how nearly impossible it is to write down such songs in our notation so as to convey a correct idea of their natural effect40#eg ,further evidence to the same effect is supplied by ,greek history4 ,the early poems of the ,greeks--which1 be it remembered1 were sacred legends embodied in that rhythmical1 metaphorical language which strong feeling excites--were not recited1 but chanted3 the tones and cadences #dae were made musical by the same influences which made the speech poetical4 ,by those who have investigated the matter1 this chanting is believed to have been not what we call singing1 but nearly allied to our recitative--nearly allied but simpler4 ,several facts conspire to show this4 ,the earliest stringed instruments had sometimes four1 sometimes five strings3 ,egyptian frescoes delineate some of the simpler harps as thus constituted1 and there are kindred representations of the lyres and allied instruments of the ,assyrians1 ,hebrews1 ,greeks and ,romans4 ,that the earliest ,greek lyre had but four strings1 and that the recitative of the poet was uttered in unison with its sounds1 ,neumann finds definite proof in a verse ascribed to ,terpander1 celebrating his introduction of the seven-stringed lyre3 8,the four-tond hymns now rejecting1 ,and yearning for songs new and sweet1 ,with seven strings softly vibrating1 ,the lyre anon shall we greet40 ,hence it follows that the primitive recitative was simpler than our modern recitative1 and1 as such1 much less remote from common speech than our own singing is4 ,for recitative1 or musical recitation1 is in all respects intermediate between speech and song4 ,its average effects are not so loud as those of song4 ,its tones are less sonorous in timbre than those of song4 ,commonly it diverges to a smaller extent from the middle notes--uses notes neither so high nor so low in pitch4 ,the intervals habitual to it are neither so wide nor so varied4 ,its rate of variation is not so rapid4 ,and at the same time that its primary rhythm is less decided1 it has none of that secondary rhythm produced by recurrence of the same or parallel musical phrases1 which is one of the marked characteristics of song4 ,thus1 then1 we may not only infer1 from the evidence furnished by existing barbarous tribes1 that the vocal music of pre-historic times was emotional speech very slightly exalted2 but we see that the earliest vocal music of which we have #daf any account1 differed much less from emotional speech than does the vocal music of our days4 ,that recitative--beyond which1 by the way1 the ,chinese and ,hindoos seem never to have advanced--grew naturally out of the modulations and cadences of strong feeling1 we have indeed current evidence4 ,there are even now to be met with occasions on which strong feeling vents itself in this form4 ,whoever has been present when a meeting of ,quakers was addressed by one of their number 7whose practice it is to speak only under the influence of religious emotion71 must have been struck by the quite unusual tones1 like those of a subdued chant1 in which the address was made4 ,on passing a chapel in ,wales during service1 the raised and sing-song voice of the preacher draws the attention4 ,it is clear1 too1 that the intoning used in churches is representative of this mental state2 and has been adopted on account of the congruity between it and the contrition1 supplication1 or reverence1 verbally expressed4 ,and if1 as we have good reason to believe1 recitative arose by degrees out of emotional speech1 it becomes manifest that by a continuance of the same process song has arisen out of recitative4 ,just as1 from the orations and legends of savages1 expressed in the metaphorical1 allegorical style natural to them1 there sprung epic poetry1 out of which lyric poetry was afterwards developed2 so1 from the exalted tones and cadences in which such orations and legends were delivered1 came the chant or recitative music1 from which lyrical music has since grown up4 ,and there has not only thus been a simultaneous and parallel genesis1 but there has been reached a parallelism of results4 ,for lyrical poetry differs from epic poetry1 just as lyrical music differs from recitative3 each still further intensifies the natural language of the emotions4 ,lyrical poetry is more metaphorical1 more hyperbolic1 more elliptical1 and adds the rhythm of lines to the rhythm of feet2 just as lyrical music is louder1 more sonorous1 more extreme in its #dag intervals1 and adds the rhythm of phrases to the rhythm of bars4 ,and the known fact that out of epic poetry the stronger passions developed lyrical poetry as their appropriate vehicle1 strengthens the inference that they similarly developed lyrical music out of recitative4 ,nor indeed are we without evidences of the transition4 ,it needs but to listen to an opera to hear the leading gradations4 ,between the comparatively level recitative of ordinary dialogue1 the more varied recitative with wider intervals and higher tones used in exciting scenes1 the still more musical recitative which preludes an air1 and the air itself1 the successive steps are but small2 and the fact that among airs themselves gradations of like nature may be traced1 further confirms the conclusion that the highest form of vocal music was arrived at by degrees4 ,we have some clue to the influences which have induced this development2 and may roughly conceive the process of it4 ,as the tones1 intervals1 and cadences of strong emotion were the elements out of which song was elaborated2 so1 we may expect to find that still stronger emotion produced the elaboration2 and we have evidence implying this4 ,musical composers are men of acute sensibilities4 ,the ,life of ,mozart depicts him as one of intensely active affections and highly impressionable temperament4 ,various anecdotes represent ,beethoven as very susceptible and very passionate4 ,mendelssohn is described by those who knew him as having been full of fine feeling4 ,and the almost incredible sensitiveness of ,chopin has been illustrated in the memoirs of ,george ,sand4 ,an unusually emotional nature being thus the general characteristic of musical composers1 we have in it just the agency required for the development of recitative and song4 ,any cause of excitement will generate just those exaggerations which we have found to distinguish the lower vocal music from emotional speech1 and the higher vocal music from the lower4 ,thus it becomes credible that the four-toned recitative of the #dah early ,greek poets 7like all poets1 nearly allied to composers in the comparative intensity of their feelings71 was really nothing more than the slightly exaggerated emotional speech natural to them1 which grew by frequent use into an organized form4 ,and we may infer that the accumulated agency of subsequent poet-musicians1 inheriting and adding to the products of those who went before them1 sufficed1 in the course of many centuries1 to develope this simple four-toned recitative into a vocal music having great complexity and range4 ,not only may we so understand how more sonorous tones1 greater extremes of pitch1 and wider intervals1 were gradually introduced2 but also how there arose a greater variety and complexity of musical expression4 ,for this same passionate1 enthusiastic temperament1 which leads the musical composer to express the feelings possessed by others as well as himself1 in more marked cadences than they would use1 also leads him to give musical utterance to feelings which they either do not experience1 or experience in but slight degrees4 ,and thus we may in some measure understand how it happens that music not only so strongly excites our more familiar feelings1 but also produces feelings we never had before--arouses dormant sentiments of which we do not know the meaning2 or1 as ,richter says--tells us of things we have not seen and shall not see4 99 99 99 99 99 ,indirect evidences of several kinds remain to be briefly pointed out4 ,one of them is the difficulty1 not to say impossibility1 of otherwise accounting for the expressiveness of music4 ,whence comes it that special combinations of notes should have special effects upon our emotions8--that one should give us a feeling of exhilaration1 another of melancholy1 another of affection1 another of reverence8 ,is it that these special combinations have intrinsic meanings apart from the human constitution8--that a certain number of arial waves per second1 followed by a certain other #dai number1 in the nature of things signify grief1 while in the reverse order they signify joy2 and similarly with all other intervals1 phrases1 and cadences8 ,few will be so irrational as to think this4 ,is it1 then1 that the meanings of these special combinations are conventional only8--that we learn their implications1 as we do those of words1 by observing how others understand them8 ,this is an hypothesis not only devoid of evidence1 but directly opposed to the experience of every one2 and it is excluded by the fact that children1 unconventionalised though they are1 show great susceptibility to music4 ,how1 then1 are musical effects to be explained8 ,if the theory above set forth be accepted1 the difficulty disappears4 ,if music1 taking for its raw material the various modifications of voice which are the physiological results of excited feeling1 intensifies1 combines1 and complicates them--if it exaggerates the loudness1 the resonance1 the pitch1 the intervals1 and the variability1 which1 in virtue of an organic law1 are the characteristics of passionate speech--if1 by carrying out these further1 more consistently1 more unitedly1 and more sustainedly1it produces an idealized language of emotion2 then its power over us becomes comprehensible4 ,but in the absence of this theory the expressiveness of music appears inexplicable4 ,again1 the preference we feel for certain qualities of sound presents a like difficulty1 admitting only of a like solution4 ,it is generally agreed that the tones of the human voice are more pleasing than any others4 ,if music takes its rise from the modulations of the human voice under emotion1 it is a natural consequence that the tones of that voice appeal to our feelings more than any others1 and are considered more beautiful than any others4 ,but deny that music has this origin1 and the only alternative is the untenable one that the vibrations proceeding from a vocalist's throat are1 objectively considered1 of a higher order than those from a horn or a violin4 ,once more1 the question--,how is the expressiveness of #dbj music to be otherwise accounted for8 may be supplemented by the question--,how is the genesis of music to be otherwise accounted for8 ,that music is a product of civilization1 is manifest2 for though some of the lowest savages have their dance-chants1 these are of a kind scarcely to be dignified by the title musical3 at most1 they supply but the vaguest rudiment of music1 properly so called4 ,and if music has been by slow steps developed in the course of civilization1 it must have been developed out of something4 ,if1 then1 its origin is not that above alleged1 what is its origin8 ,thus we find that the negative evidence confirms the positive1 and that1 taken together1 they furnish strong proof4 ,we have seen that there is a physiological relation1 common to man and all animals1 between feeling and muscular action2 that as vocal sounds are produced by muscular action1 there is a consequent physiological relation between feeling and vocal sounds2 that all the modifications of voice expressive of feeling are the direct results of this physiological relation2 that music1 adopting all these modifications1 intensifies them more and more as it ascends to its higher and higher forms2 that1 from the ancient epic poet chanting his verses1 down to the modern musical composer1 men of unusually strong feelings prone to express them in extreme forms1 have been naturally the agents of these successive intensifications2 and that so there has little by little arisen a wide divergence between this idealized language of emotion and its natural language3 to which direct evidence we have just added the indirect--that on no other tenable hypothesis can either the expressiveness of music or the genesis of music be explained4 99 99 99 99 99 ,and now1 what is the function of music8 ,has music any effect beyond the immediate pleasure it produces8 ,analogy suggests that it has4 ,the enjoyments of a good dinner do not end with themselves1 but minister to bodily well-being4 ,though people do not marry with a view to maintain the race1 yet the passions which impel them to marry secure its #dba maintenance4 ,parental affection is a feeling which1 while it conduces to parental happiness1 ensures the nurture of offspring4 ,men love to accumulate property1 often without thought of the benefits it produces2 but in pursuing the pleasure of acquisition they indirectly open the way to other pleasures4 ,the wish for public approval impels all of us to do many things which we should otherwise not do1--to undertake great labours1 face great dangers1 and habitually rule ourselves in ways that smooth social intercourse2 so that1 in gratifying our love of approbation we subserve divers ulterior purposes4 ,and1 generally1 our nature is such that in fulfilling each desire1 we in some way facilitate fulfilment of the rest4 ,but the love of music seems to exist for its own sake4 ,the delights of melody and harmony do not obviously minister to the welfare either of the individual or of society4 ,may we not suspect1 however1 that this exception is apparent only8 ,is it not a rational inquiry--,what are the indirect benefits which accrue from music1 in addition to the direct pleasure it gives8 ,but that it would take us too far out of our track1 we should prelude this inquiry by illustrating at some length a certain general law of progress2--the law that alike in occupations1 sciences1 arts1 the divisions which had a common root1 but by gradual divergence have become distinct1 and are now being separately developed1 are not truly independent1 but severally act and react on one another to their mutual advancement4 ,merely hinting thus much1 however1 by way of showing that there are many analogies to justify us1 we go on to express the opinion that there exists a relationship of this kind between music and speech4 ,all speech is compounded of two elements1 the words and the tones in which they are uttered--the signs of ideas and the signs of feelings4 ,while certain articulations express the thought1 certain modulations express the more or less of pain or pleasure which the thought gives4 ,using the word cadence in an unusually extended sense1 as #dbb comprehending all variations of voice1 we may say that cadence is the commentary of the emotions upon the propositions of the intellect4 ,this duality of spoken language1 though not formally recognized1 is recognized in practice by every one2 and every one knows that very often more weight attaches to the tones than to the words4 ,daily experience supplies cases in which the same sentence of disapproval will be understood as meaning little or meaning much1 according to the vocal inflections which accompany it2 and daily experience supplies still more striking cases in which words and tones are in direct contradiction--the first expressing consent1 while the last express reluctance2 and the last being believed rather than the first4 ,these two distinct but interwoven elements of speech have been undergoing a simultaneous development4 ,we know that in the course of civilization words have been multiplied1 new parts of speech have been introduced1 sentences have grown more varied and complex2 and we may fairly infer that during the same time new modifications of voice have come into use1 fresh intervals have been adopted1 and cadences have become more elaborate4 ,for while1 on the one hand1 it is absurd to suppose that1 along with the undeveloped verbal forms of barbarism1 there existed developed vocal inflections2 it is1 on the other hand1 necessary to suppose that1 along with the higher and more numerous verbal forms needed to convey the multiplied and complicated ideas of civilized life1 there have grown up those more involved changes of voice which express the feelings proper to such ideas4 ,if intellectual language is a growth1 so also1 without doubt1 is emotional language a growth4 ,now1 the hypothesis which we have hinted above1 is that1 beyond the direct pleasure which it gives1 music has the indirect effect of developing this language of the emotions4 ,having its root1 as we have endeavoured to show1 in those tones1 intervals1 and cadences of speech which express #dbc feeling--arising by the combination and intensifying of these1 and coming finally to have an embodiment of its own2 music has all along been reacting upon speech1 and increasing its power of rendering emotion4 ,the use in recitative and song of inflections more expressive than ordinary ones1 must from the beginning have tended to develope the ordinary ones4 ,the complex musical phrases by which composers have conveyed complex emotions1 may rationally be supposed to influence us in making those involved cadences of conversation by which we convey our subtler thoughts and feelings4 ,if the cultivation of music has any effect on the mind1 what more natural effect is there than this of developing our perception of the meanings of qualities1 and modulations of voice2 and giving us a correspondingly increased power of using them8 ,just as chemistry1 arising out of the processes of metallurgy and the industrial arts1 and gradually growing into an independent study1 has now become an aid to all kinds of production--just as physiology1 originating from medicine and once subordinate to it1 but latterly pursued for its own sake1 is in our day coming to be the science on which the progress of medicine depends2--so1 music1 having its root in emotional language1 and gradually evolved from it1 has ever been reacting upon and further advancing it4 ,it will scarcely be expected that much direct evidence in support of this conclusion can be given4 ,the facts are of a kind which it is difficult to measure1 and of which we have no records4 ,some suggestive traits1 however1 are to be noted4 ,may we not say1 for instance1 that the ,italians1 among whom modern music was earliest cultivated1 and who have more especially excelled in melody 7the division of music with which our argument is chiefly concerned7--may we not say that these ,italians speak in more varied and expressive inflections and cadences than any other people8 ,on the other hand1 may we not say that1 confined almost exclusively as they have hitherto been to their national #dbd airs1 and therefore accustomed to but a limited range of musical expression1 the ,scotch are unusually monotonous in the intervals and modulations of their speech8 ,and again1 do we not find among different classes of the same nation1 differences that have like implications8 ,the gentleman and the clown stand in decided contrast with respect to variety of intonation4 ,listen to the conversation of a servant-girl1 and then to that of a refined lady1 and the more delicate and complex changes of voice used by the latter will be conspicuous4 ,now1 without going so far as to say that out of all the differences of culture to which the upper and lower classes are subjected1 difference of musical culture is that to which alone this difference of speech is ascribable2 yet we may fairly say that there seems a much more obvious connexion of cause and effect between these than between any others4 ,thus1 while the inductive evidence to which we can appeal is but scanty and vague1 yet what there is favours our position4 99 99 99 99 99 ,probably most will think that the function here assigned to music is one of very little moment4 ,but reflection may lead them to a contrary conviction4 ,in its bearings upon human happiness1 this emotional language which musical culture develops and refines1 is only second in importance to the language of the intellect2 perhaps not even second to it4 ,for these modifications of voice produced by feelings1 are the means of exciting like feelings in others4 ,joined with gestures and expressions of face1 they give life to the otherwise dead words in which the intellect utters its ideas2 and so enable the hearer not only to understand the state of mind they accompany1 but to partake of that state4 ,in short1 they are the chief media of sympathy4 ,and if we consider how much both our general welfare and our immediate pleasures depend on sympathy1 we shall recognize the importance of whatever makes this sympathy greater4 ,if we bear in mind that by their fellow-feeling men are led #dbe to behave justly and kindly to one another--that the difference between the cruelty of the barbarous and the humanity of the civilized1 results from the increase of fellow-feeling2 if we bear in mind that this faculty which makes us sharers in the joys and sorrows of others1 is the basis of all the higher affections2 if we bear in mind how much our direct gratifications are intensified by sympathy1--how1 at the theatre1 the concert1 the picture gallery1 we lose half our enjoyment if we have no one to enjoy with us2--we shall see that the agencies which communicate it can scarcely be overrated in value4 ,the tendency of civilization is to repress the antagonistic elements of our characters and to develope the social ones--to curb our purely selfish desires and exercise our unselfish ones--to replace private gratifications by gratifications resulting from1 or involving1 the pleasures of others4 ,and while1 by this adaptation to the social state1 the sympathetic side of our nature is being unfolded1 there is simultaneously growing up a language of sympathetic intercourse--a language through which we communicate to others the happiness we feel1 and are made sharers in their happiness4 ,this double process1 of which the effects are already appreciable1 must go on to an extent of which we can as yet have no adequate conception4 ,the habitual concealment of our feelings diminishing1 as it must1 in proportion as our feelings become such as do not demand concealment1 the exhibition of them will become more vivid than we now dare allow it to be2 and this implies a more expressive emotional language4 ,at the same time1 feelings of higher and more complex kinds1 as yet experienced only by the cultivated few1 will become general2 and there will be a corresponding development of the emotional language into more involved forms4 ,just as there has silently grown up a language of ideas1 which1 rude as it at first was1 now enables us to convey with precision the most subtle and complicated thoughts2 so1 there is still silently growing up a language of feelings1 which1 notwithstanding its present #dbf imperfection1 we may expect will ultimately enable men vividly and completely to impress on each other the emotions which they experience from moment to moment4 ,thus if1 as we have endeavoured to show1 it is the function of music to facilitate the development of this emotional language1 we may regard music as an aid to the achievement of that higher happiness which it indistinctly shadows forth4 ,those vague feelings of unexperienced felicity which music arouses--those indefinite impressions of an unknown ideal life which it calls up1 may be considered as a prophecy1 the fulfilment of which music itself aids4 ,the strange capacity which we have for being affected by melody and harmony1 may be taken to imply both that it is within the possibilities of our nature to realize those intenser delights they dimly suggest1 and that they are in some way concerned in the realization of them4 ,if so the power and the meaning of music become comprehensible2 but otherwise they are a mystery4 ,we will only add that1 if the probability of these corollaries be admitted1 then music must take rank as the highest of the fine arts--as the one which1 more than any other1 ministers to human welfare4 ,and thus1 even leaving out of view the immediate gratifications it is hourly giving1 we cannot too much applaud that musical culture which is becoming one of the characteristics of our age4 ,,postscript4 ,an opponent1 or partial opponent1 of high authority1 whose views were published some fourteen years after the above essay1 must here be answered3 ,i mean ,mr4 ,darwin4 ,diligent and careful as an observer beyond naturalists in general1 and still more beyond those who are untrained in research1 his judgment on a question which must be #dbg decided by induction is one to be received with great respect4 ,i think1 however1 examination will show that in this instance ,mr4 ,darwin's observations are inadequate1 and his reasonings upon them inconclusive4 ,swayed by his doctrine of sexual selection1 he has leaned towards the view that music had its origin in the expression of amatory feeling1 and has been led to over-estimate such evidence as he thinks favours that view1 while ignoring the difficulties in its way1 and the large amount of evidence supporting another view4 ,before considering the special reasons for dissenting from his hypothesis1 let us look at the most general reasons4 ,the interpretation of music which ,mr4 ,darwin gives1 agrees with my own in supposing music to be developed from vocal noises2 but differs in supposing a particular class of vocal noises to have originated it--the amatory class4 ,i have aimed to show that music has its germs in the sounds which the voice emits under excitement1 and eventually gains this or that character according to the kind of excitement2 whereas ,mr4 ,darwin argues that music arises from those sounds which the male makes during the excitements of courtship1 that they are consciously made to charm the female1 and that from the resulting combinations of sounds arise not love-music only but music in general4 ,that certain tones of voice and cadences having some likeness of nature are spontaneously used to express grief1 others to express joy1 others to express affection1 and others to express triumph or martial ardour1 is undeniable4 ,according to the view ,i have set forth1 the whole body of these vocal manifestations of emotion form the root of music4 ,according to ,mr4 ,darwin's view1 the sounds which are prompted by the amatory feeling only1 having originated musical utterance1 there are derived from these all the other varieties of musical utterance which aim to express other kinds of feeling4 ,this roundabout derivation has1 ,i think1 less probability than the direct derivation4 #dbh ,this antithesis and its implications will perhaps be more clearly understood on looking at the facts under their nervo-muscular aspect4 ,mr4 ,darwin recognizes the truth of the doctrine with which the foregoing essay sets out1 that feeling discharges itself in action3 saying of the air-breathing vertebrata that 8,when the primeval members of this class were strongly excited and their muscles violently contracted1 purposeless sounds would almost certainly have been produced2 and these1 if they proved in any way serviceable1 might readily have been modified or intensified by the preservation of properly adapted variations40 7,the ,descent of ,man1 vol4 ii41 p4 #cca47 ,but though this passage recognizes the general relation between feelings and those muscular contractions which cause sounds1 it does so inadequately2 since it ignores1 on the one hand1 those loudest sounds which accompany intense sensations--the shrieks and groans of bodily agony2 while1 on the other hand1 it ignores those multitudinous sounds not produced 8under the excitement of love1 rage1 and jealousy10 but which accompany ordinary amounts of feelings1 various in their kinds4 ,and it is because he does not bear in mind how large a proportion of vocal noises are caused by other excitements1 that ,mr4 ,darwin thinks 8a strong case can be made out1 that the vocal organs were primarily used and perfected in relation to the propagation of the species0 7p4 #ccj74 ,certainly the animals around us yield but few facts countenancing his view4 ,the cooing of pigeons may1 indeed1 be named in its support2 and it may be contended that caterwauling furnishes evidence2 though ,i doubt whether the sounds are made by the male to charm the female4 ,but the howling of dogs has no relation to sexual excitements2 nor has their barking1 which is used to express emotion of almost any kind4 ,pigs grunt sometimes through pleasurable expectation1 sometimes during the gratifications of eating1 sometimes from a general content while seeking about for food4 ,the bleatings of sheep1 again1 occur under the promptings of various feelings1 usually of no great #dbi intensity3 social and maternal rather than sexual4 ,the like holds with the lowing of cattle4 ,nor is it otherwise with poultry4 ,the quacking of ducks indicates general satisfaction1 and the screams occasionally vented by a flock of geese seem rather to express a wave of social excitement than anything else4 ,save after laying an egg1 when the sounds have the character of triumph1 the cluckings of a hen show content2 and on various occasions cock-crowing apparently implies good spirits only4 ,in all cases an overflow of nervous energy has to find vent2 and while in some cases it leads to wagging of the tail1 in others it leads to contraction of the vocal muscles4 ,that this relation holds1 not of one kind of feeling1 but of many kinds1 is a truth which seems to me at variance with the view 8that the vocal organs were primarily used and perfected in relation to the propagation of the species40 ,the hypothesis that music had its origin in the amatory sounds made by the male to charm the female1 has the support of the popular idea that the singing of birds constitutes a kind of courtship--an idea adopted by ,mr4 ,darwin when he says that 8the male pours forth his full volume of song1 in rivalry with other males1 for the sake of captivating the female40 ,usually1 ,mr4 ,darwin does not accept without criticism and verification1 the beliefs he finds current2 but in this case he seems to have done so4 ,even cursory observation suffices to dissipate this belief1 initiated1 ,i suppose1 by poets4 ,in preparation for dealing with the matter ,i have made memoranda concerning various songbirds1 dating back to #ahhc4 ,on the #gth of ,february of that year ,i heard a lark singing several times2 and1 still more remarkably1 during the mild winter of #ahhd ,i saw one soar1 and heard it sing1 on the #ajth ,january4 ,yet the lark does not pair till ,march4 ,having heard the redbreast near the close of ,august1 #ahhh1 ,i noted the continuance of its song all through the autumn and winter1 up to ,christmas #dcj eve1 ,christmas day1 the #bith of ,december1 and again on the #ahth ,january1 #ahhi4 ,how common is the singing of the thrush during mild weather in winter1 everyone must have observed4 ,the presence of thrushes behind my house has led to the making of notes on this point4 ,the male sang in ,november1 #ahhi2 ,i noted the song again on ,christmas eve1 again on the #acth ,january1 #ahij1 and from time to time all through the rest of that month4 ,i heard little of his song in ,february1 which is the pairing season2 and none at all1 save a few notes early in the morning1 during the period of rearing the young4 ,but now that1 in the middle of ,may1 the young1 reared in a nest in my garden1 have sometime since flown1 he has recommenced singing vociferously at intervals throughout the day2 and doubtless1 in conformity with what ,i have observed elsewhere1 will go on singing till ,july4 ,how marked is the direct relation between singing and the conditions which cause high spirits1 is perhaps best shown by a fact ,i noted on the #dth ,december1 #ahhh1 when1 the day being not only mild but bright1 the copses on ,holmwood ,common1 ,dorking1 were vocal just as on a spring day1 with a chorus of birds of various kinds--robins1 thrushes1 chaffinches1 linnets1 and sundry others of which ,i did not know the names4 ,ornithological works furnish verifying statements4 ,wood states that the hedge-sparrow continues 8to sing throughout a large portion of the year1 and only ceasing during the time of the ordinary moult40 ,the song of the blackcap1 he says1 8is hardly suspended throughout the year20 and of caged birds which sing continuously1 save when moulting1 he names the grosbeak1 the linnet1 the goldfinch1 and the siskin4 ,i think these facts show that the popular idea adopted by ,mr4 ,darwin is untenable4 ,what then is the true interpretation8 ,simply that like the whistling and humming of tunes by boys and men1 the singing of birds results from overflow of energy--an overflow which in both cases #dca ceases under depressing conditions4 ,the relation between courtship and singing1 so far as it can be shown to hold1 is not a relation of cause and effect1 but a relation of concomitance3 the two are simultaneous results of the same cause4 ,throughout the animal kingdom at large1 the commencement of reproduction is associated with an excess of those absorbed materials needful for self-maintenance2 and with a consequent ability to devote a part to the maintenance of the species4 ,this constitutional state is one with which there goes a tendency to superfluous expenditure in various forms of action--unusual vivacity of every kind1 including vocal vivacity4 ,while we thus see why pairing and singing come to be associated1 we also see why there is singing at other times when the feeding and weather are favourable2 and why1 in some cases1 as in those of the thrush and the robin1 there is more singing after the breeding season than before or during the breeding season4 ,we are shown1 too1 why these birds1 and especially the thrush1 so often sing in the winter3 the supply of worms on lawns and in gardens being habitually utilized by both1 and thrushes having the further advantage that they are strong enough to break the shells of the hybernating snails3 this last ability being connected with the fact that thrushes and blackbirds are the first among the singing birds to build4 ,it remains only to add that the alleged singing of males against one another with the view of charming the females is open to parallel criticisms4 ,how far this competition happens during the pairing season ,i have not observed1 but it certainly happens out of the pairing season4 ,i have several times heard blackbirds singing alternately in ,june4 ,but the most conspicuous instance is supplied by the redbreasts4 ,these habitually sing against one another during the autumn months3 reply and rejoinder being commonly continued for five minutes at a time4 ,even did the evidence support the popular view1 adopted #dcb by ,mr4 ,darwin1 that the singing of birds is a kind of courtship--even were there good proof1 instead of much disproof1 that a bird's song is a developed form of the sexual sounds made by the male to charm the female2 the conclusion would1 ,i think1 do little towards justifying the belief that human music has had a kindred origin4 ,for1 in the first place1 the bird-type in general1 developed as it is out of the reptilian type1 is very remotely related to that type of the ,vertebrata which ascends to ,man as its highest exemplar2 and1 in the second place1 song-birds belong1 with but few exceptions1 to the single order of ,insessores--one order only1 of the many orders constituting the class4 ,so that1 if the ,vertebrata at large be represented by a tree1 of which ,man is the topmost twig1 then it is at a considerable distance down the trunk that there diverges the branch from which the bird-type is derived2 and the group of singing-birds forms but a terminal sub-division of this branch--lies far out of the ascending line which ends in ,man4 ,to give appreciable support to ,mr4 ,darwin's view1 we ought to find vocal manifestations of the amatory feeling becoming more pronounced as we ascend along that particular line of inferior ,vertebrata out of which ,man has arisen4 ,just as we find other traits which pre-figure human traits 7instance arms and hands adapted for grasping7 becoming more marked as we approach ,man2 so should we find1 becoming more marked1 this sexual use of the voice1 which is supposed to end in human song4 ,but we do not find this4 ,the ,south-,american monkeys 78the ,howlers10 as they are sometimes called71 which1 in chorus1 make the woods resound for hours together with their 8dreadful concert10 appear1 according to ,rengger1 to be prompted by no other desire than that of making a noise4 ,mr4 ,darwin admits1 too1 that this is generally the case with the gibbons3 the only exception he is inclined to make being in the case of ,hylobates agilis1 which1 on the testimony of ,mr4 ,waterhouse1 he says ascends and descends the scale by #dcc half-tones4#eh ,this comparatively musical set of sounds1 he thinks1 may be used to charm the female2 though there is no evidence forthcoming that this is the case4 ,when we remember that in the forms nearest to the human--the chimpanzees and the gorilla--there is nothing which approaches even thus far towards musical utterance1 we see that the hypothesis has next to none of that support which ought to be forthcoming4 ,indeed in his ,descent of ,man1 vol4 ii41 p4 #ccb1 ,mr4 ,darwin himself says3--8,it is a surprising fact that we have not as yet any good evidence that these organs are used by male mammals to charm the females30 an admission which amounts to something like a surrender4 ,even more marked is the absence of proof when we come to the human race itself--or rather1 not absence of proof but presence of disproof4 ,here1 from the ,descriptive ,sociology1 where the authorities will be found under the respective heads1 ,i quote a number of testimonies of travellers concerning primitive music3 commencing with those referring to the lowest races4 8,the songs of the natives of ,australia 4 4 4 are chiefly made on the spur of the moment1 and refer to something that has struck the attention at the time40 8,the ,watchandies seeing me much interested in the genus ,eucalyptus soon composed a song on this subject40 ,the ,fuegians are fond of music and generally sing in their boats1 doubtless keeping time1 as many primitive peoples do4 8,the principal subject of the songs of the ,araucanians is the exploits of their heroes30 when at work their 8song was simple1 referring mostly to their labour10 and was the same 8for every #dcd occasion1 whether the burden of the song be joy or sorrow40 ,the ,greenlanders sing of 8their exploits in the chase0 and 8chant the deeds of their ancestors40 8,the ,indians of the ,upper ,mississippi vocalize an incident1 as--#8,they have brought us a fat dog1'30 then the chorus goes on for a minute4 ,of other ,north-,american ,indians we read--8the air which the women sang was pleasing 4 4 4 the men first gave out the words1 which formed a consummate glorification of themselves40 ,among the ,carriers 7of ,north ,america7 there are professed composers1 who 8turn their talent to good account on the occasion of a feast1 when new airs are in great request40 ,of the ,new ,zealanders we read3--8,the singing of such compositions laments resembles cathedral chanting40 8,passing events are described by extemporaneous songs1 which are preserved when good40 8,when men worked together appropriate airs were sung40 ,when presenting a meal to travellers1 women would chant--8,what shall be our food8 shell fish and fern-root1 that is the root of the earth40 ,among the ,sandwich ,islanders 8most of the traditions of remarkable events in their history are preserved in songs40 ,when taught reading they could not 8recite a lesson without chanting or singing it40 ,cook found the ,tahitians had itinerant musicians who gave narrative chants quite unpremeditated4 8,a ,samoan can hardly put his paddle in the water without striking up some chant40 ,a chief of the ,kyans1 8,tamawan1 jumped up and while standing burst out into an extempore song1 in which ,sir ,james ,brooke and myself1 and last not least the wonderful steamer1 was mentioned with warm eulogies40 ,in ,east ,africa 8the fisherman will accompany his paddle1 the porter his trudge1 and the housewife her task of rubbing down grain1 with song40 ,in singing1 the ,east ,african 8contents himself with improvising a few words without sense or rhyme and repeats them till they nauseate10 ,among the ,dahomans any incident 8from the arrival of a stranger to an #dce earthquake0 is turned into a song4 ,when rowing1 the ,coast-negroes sing 8either a description of some love intrigue or the praise of some woman celebrated for her beauty40 ,in ,loango 8the women as they till the field make it echo with their rustic songs40 ,park says of the ,bambarran--8they lightened their labours by songs1 one of which was composed extempore2 for ,i was myself the subject of it40 8,in some parts of ,africa nothing is done except to the sound of music40 8,they are very expert in adapting the subjects of these songs to current events40 ,the ,malays 8amuse all their leisure hours 4 4 4 with the repetition of songs1 which are for the most part proverbs illustrated4 4 4 4 ,some that they rehearse in a kind of recitative at their bimbangs or feasts are historical love-tales40 ,a ,sumatran maiden will sometimes begin a tender song and be answered by one of the young men4 ,the ballads of the ,kamtschadales are 8inspired apparently by grief1 love1 or domestic feeling20 and their music conveys 8a sensation of sorrow and vague1 unavailing regret40 ,of their love-songs it is said 8the women generally compose them40 ,a ,kirghiz 8singer sits on one knee and sings in an unnatural tone of voice1 his lay being usually of an amorous character40 ,of the ,yakuts we are told 8their style of singing is monotonous 4 4 4 their songs described the beauty of the landscape in terms which appeared to me exaggerated40 ,in these statements1 which1 omitting repetitions1 are all which the ,descriptive ,sociology contains relevant to the issue1 several striking facts are manifest4 ,among the lowest races the only musical utterances named are those which refer to the incidents of the moment1 and seem prompted by feelings which those incidents produce4 ,the derivation of song or chant from emotional speech in general1 thus suggested1 is similarly suggested by the habits of many higher races2 for they1 too1 show us that the musically-expressed feelings relevant to the immediate occasion1 or to past occasions1 are feelings of various kinds3 now of simple good #dcf spirits and now of joy or triumph--now of surprise1 praise1 admiration1 and now of sorrow1 melancholy1 regret4 ,only among certain of the more advanced races1 as the semi-civilized ,malays and peoples of ,northern ,asia1 do we read of love-songs2 and then1 strange to say1 these are mentioned as mostly coming1 not from men1 but from women4 ,out of all the testimonies there is not one which tells of a love-song spontaneously commenced by a man to charm a woman4 ,entirely absent among the rudest types and many of the more developed types1 amatory musical utterance1 where first found1 is found under a form opposite to that which ,mr4 ,darwin's hypothesis implies2 and we have to seek among civilized peoples before we meet1 in serenades and the like1 music of the kind which1 according to his view1 should be the earliest4#ei ,even were his view countenanced by the facts1 there would remain unexplained the process by which sexually-excited sounds have been evolved into music4 ,in the foregoing essay ,i have indicated the various qualities1 relations1 and combinations of tones1 spontaneously prompted by emotions of all kinds1 which exhibit1 in undeveloped forms1 the traits of recitative and melody4 ,to have reduced his hypothesis to a shape admitting of comparison1 ,mr4 ,darwin should have shown that the sounds excited by sexual emotions possess these same traits2 and1 to have proved that his hypothesis is the more tenable1 should have shown that they possess these same traits in a greater degree4 ,but he has not attempted to do this4 ,he has simply suggested that instead of having its roots in the vocal sounds caused by feelings of all kinds1 music has its roots in the vocal #dcg sounds caused by the amatory feeling only3 giving no reason why the effects of the feelings at large should be ignored1 and the effects of one particular feeling alone recognized4 99 99 99 99 99 ,nineteen years after my essay on 8,the ,origin and ,function of ,music0 was published1 ,mr4 ,edmund ,gurney criticized it in an article which made its appearance in the ,fortnightly ,review for ,july #ahgf4 ,absorption in more important work prevented me from replying4 ,though1 some ten years ago1 ,i thought of defending my views against those of ,mr4 ,darwin and ,mr4 ,gurney1 the occurrence of ,mr4 ,darwin's death obliged me to postpone for a time any discussion of his views2 and then1 the more recent unfortunate death of ,mr4 ,gurney caused a further postponement4 ,i must now1 however1 say that which seems needful1 though there is no longer any possibility of a rejoinder from him4 ,some parts of ,mr4 ,gurney's criticism ,i have already answered by implication2 for he adopts the hypothesis that music originated in the vocal utterances prompted by sexual feeling4 ,to the reasons above given for rejecting this hypothesis1 ,i will add here1 what ,i might have added above1 that it is at variance with one of the fundamental laws of evolution4 ,all development proceeds from the general to the special4 ,first there appear those traits which a thing has in common with many other things2 then those traits which it has in common with a smaller class of things2 and so on until there eventually arise those traits which distinguish it from everything else4 ,the genesis which ,i have described conforms to this fundamental law4 ,it posits the antecedent fact that feeling in general produces muscular contraction in general2 and the less general fact that feeling in general produces1 among other muscular contractions1 those which move the respiratory and vocal apparatus4 ,with these it joins the still less general fact that sounds indicative of feelings vary in sundry #dch respects according to the intensity of the feelings2 and then enumerates the still less general facts which show us the kinship between the vocal manifestations of feeling and the characters of vocal music3 the implication being that there has gone on a progressive specialization4 ,but the view which ,mr4 ,gurney adopts from ,mr4 ,darwin is that from the special actions producing the special sounds accompanying sexual excitement1 were evolved those various actions producing the various sounds which accompany all other feelings4 ,vocal expression of a particular emotion came first1 and from this proceeded vocal expressions of emotions in general3 the order of evolution was reversed4 ,to deficient knowledge of the laws of evolution are due sundry of ,mr4 ,gurney's objections4 ,he makes a cardinal error in assuming that a more evolved thing is distinguished from less evolved things in respect of all the various traits of evolution2 whereas1 very generally1 a higher degree of evolution in some or most respects1 is accompanied by an equal or lower degree of evolution in other respects4 ,on the average1 increase of locomotive power goes along with advance of evolution2 and yet numerous mammals are more fleet than man4 ,the stage of development is largely indicated by degree of intelligence2 and yet the more intelligent parrot is inferior in vision1 in speed1 and in destructive appliances1 to the less-intelligent hawk4 ,the contrast between birds and mammals well illustrates the general truth4 ,a bird's skeleton diverges more widely from the skeleton of the lower vertebrates in respect of heterogeneity than does the skeleton of a mammal2 and the bird has a more developed respiratory system1 as well as a higher temperature of blood1 and a superior power of locomotion4 ,nevertheless1 many mammals in respect of bulk1 in respect of various appliances 7especially for prehension71 and in respect of intelligence1 are more evolved than birds4 ,thus it is obviously a mistake to assume that whatever is more #dci highly evolved in general character is more highly evolved in every trait4 ,of ,mr4 ,gurney's several objections which are based on this mistake here is an example4 ,he says--8,loudness though a frequent is by no means a universal or essential element1 either of song or of emotional speech0 7p4 #ajg74 ,under one of its aspects this criticism is self-destructive2 for if1 though both relatively loud in most cases1 song and emotional speech are both characterized by the occasional use of subdued tones1 then this is a further point of kinship between them--a kinship which ,mr4 ,gurney seeks to disprove4 ,under its other aspect this criticism implies the above-described misconception4 ,if in a song1 or rather in some part or parts of a song1 the trait of loudness is absent1 while the other traits of developed emotional utterance are present1 it simply illustrates the truth that the traits of a highly-evolved product are frequently not all present together4 ,a like answer is at hand to the next objection he makes4 ,it runs thus3 8,in the recitative which he ,mr4 ,spencer himself considers naturally and historically a step between speech and song1 the rapid variation of pitch is impossible1 and such recitative is distinguished from the tones even of common speech precisely by being more monotonous0 7p4 #ajh74 ,but ,mr4 ,gurney overlooks the fact that while1 in recitative1 some traits of developed emotional utterance are not present1 two of its traits are present4 ,one is that greater resonance of tone1 caused by greater contraction of the vocal chords1 which distinguishes it from ordinary speech4 ,the other is the relative elevation of pitch1 or divergence from the medium tones of voice3 a trait similarly implying greater strain of certain vocal muscles1 resulting from stronger feeling4 ,another difficulty raised by ,mr4 ,gurney he would probably not have set down had he been aware that one character of musical utterance which he thinks #ddj distinctive1 is a character of all phenomena into which motion enters as a factor4 ,he says3--8,now no one can suppose that the sense of rhythm can be derived from emotional speech0 7p4 #aaj74 ,had he referred to the chapter on 8,the ,rhythm of ,motion0 in ,first ,principles1 he would have seen that1 in common with inorganic actions1 all organic actions are completely or partially rhythmical--from appetite and sleep to inspirations and heart-beats2 from the winking of the eyes to the contractions of the intestines2 from the motions of the legs to discharges through the nerves4 ,having contemplated such facts he would have seen that the rhythmical tendency which is perfectly displayed in musical utterance1 is imperfectly displayed in emotional speech4 ,just as under emotion we see swayings of the body and wringings of the hands1 so do we see contractions of the vocal organs which are now stronger and now weaker4 ,surely it is manifest that the utterances of passion1 far from being monotonous1 are characterized by rapidly-recurring ascents and descents of tone and by rapidly-recurring emphases3 there is rhythm1 though it is an irregular rhythm4 ,want of knowledge of the principles of evolution has1 in another place1 led ,mr4 ,gurney to represent as an objection what is in reality a verification4 ,he says3 8,music is distinguished from emotional speech in that it proceeds not only by fixed degrees in time1 but by fixed degrees in the scale4 ,this is a constant quality through all the immense quantity of embryo and developed scale-systems that have been used2 whereas the transitions of pitch which mark emotional affections of voice are1 as ,helmholtz has pointed out1 of a gliding character0 7p4 #aac74 ,had ,mr4 ,gurney known that evolution in all cases is from the indefinite to the definite1 he would have seen that as a matter of course the gradations of emotional speech must be indefinite in comparison with the gradations of developed music4 ,progress from the one to the other is in part constituted by increasing definiteness in the time-intervals and increasing definiteness in the tone-intervals4 ,were it #dda otherwise1 the hypothesis ,i have set forth would lack one of its evidences4 ,to his allegation that not only the 8developed scale-systems0 but also the 8embryo0 scale-systems are definite1 it may obviously be replied that the mere existence of any scale-system capable of being written down1 implies that the earlier stage of the progress has already been passed through4 ,to have risen to a scale-system is to have become definite2 and until a scale-system has been reached vocal phrases cannot have been recorded4 ,moreover had ,mr4 ,gurney remembered that there are many people with musical perceptions so imperfect that when making their merely recognizable1 and sometimes hardly recognizable1 attempts to whistle or hum melodies1 they show how vague are their appreciations of musical intervals1 he would have seen reason for doubting his assumption that definite scales were reached all at once4 ,the fact that in what we call bad ears there are all degrees of imperfection1 joined with the fact that where the imperfection is not great practice may remedy it1 suffice of themselves to show that definite perceptions of musical intervals were reached by degrees4 ,some of ,mr4 ,gurney's objections are strangely insubstantial4 ,here is an example3 8,the fact is that song1 which moreover in our time is but a limited branch of music1 is perpetually making conscious efforts2 for instance1 the most peaceful melody may be a considerable strain to a soprano voice1 if sung in a very high register3 while speech continues to obey in a natural way the physiological laws of emotion0 7p4 #aag74 ,that in exaggerating and emphasizing the traits of emotional speech1 the singer should be led to make 8conscious efforts0 is surely natural enough4 ,what would ,mr4 ,gurney have said of dancing8 ,he would scarcely have denied that saltatory movements often result spontaneously from excited feeling2 and he could hardly have doubted that primitive dancing arose as a systematized form of such movements4 ,would he have considered the belief that stage-dancing is evolved from these spontaneous movements #ddb to be negatived by the fact that a stage-dancer's bounds and gyrations are made with 8conscious efforts08 ,in his elaborate work on ,the ,power of ,sound1 ,mr4 ,gurney1 repeating in other forms the objections ,i have above dealt with1 adds to them some others4 ,one of these1 which appears at first sight to have much weight1 ,i must not pass by4 ,he thus expresses it4 8,any one may convince himself that not only are the intervals used in emotional speech very large1 twelve diatonic notes being quite an ordinary skip1 but that he uses extremes of both high and low pitch with his speaking voice1 which1 if he tries to dwell on them and make them resonant1 will be found to lie beyond the compass of his singing voice0 7p4 #dgi74 ,now the part of my hypothesis which ,mr4 ,gurney here combats is that1 as in emotional speech so in song1 feeling1 by causing muscular contractions1 causes divergencies from the middle tones of the voice1 which become wider as it increases2 and that this fact supports the belief that song is developed from emotional speech4 ,to this ,mr4 ,gurney thinks it a conclusive answer that higher notes are used by the speaking voice than by the singing voice4 ,but if1 as his words imply1 there is a physical impediment to the production of notes in the one voice as high as those in the other1 then my argument is justified if1 in either voice1 extremes of feeling are shown by extremes of pitch4 ,if1 for example1 the celebrated ut de poitrine with which ,tamberlik brought down the house in one of the scenes of ,william ,tell1 was recognized as expressing the greatest intensity of martial patriotism1 my position is warranted1 even though in his speaking voice he could have produced a still higher note4 ,of answers to ,mr4 ,gurney's objections the two most effective are suggested by the passage in which he sums up his conclusions4 ,here are his words4 8,it is enough to recall how every consideration tended to the same result2 that the oak grew from the acorn2 that the musical faculty and pleasure1 which have to do with music and nothing else1 are the representatives and #ddc linear descendants of a faculty and pleasure which were musical and nothing else2 and that1 however rudely and tentatively applied to speech1 ,music was a separate order0 7p4 #dib74 ,thus1 then1 it is implied that the true germs of music stand towards developed music as the acorn to the oak4 ,now suppose we ask--,how many traits of the oak are to be found in the acorn8 ,next to none4 ,and then suppose we ask--,how many traits of music are to be found in the tones of emotional speech8 ,very many4 ,yet while ,mr4 ,gurney thinks that music had its origin in something which might have been as unlike it as the acorn is unlike the oak1 he rejects the theory that it had its origin in something as much like it as the cadences of emotional speech2 and he does this because there are sundry differences between the characters of speech-cadences and the characters of music4 ,in the one case he tacitly assumes a great unlikeness between germ and product2 while in the other case he objects because germ and product are not in all respects similar6 ,i may end by pointing out how extremely improbable1 a priori1 is ,mr4 ,gurney's conception4 ,he admits1 as perforce he must1 that emotional speech has various traits in common with recitative and song--relatively greater resonance1 relatively greater loudness1 more marked divergences from medium tones1 the use of the extremes of pitch in signifying the extremes of feeling1 and so on4 ,but1 denying that the one is derived from the others1 he implies that these kindred groups of traits have had independent origins4 ,two sets of peculiarities in the use of the voice which show various kinships1 have nothing to do with one another6 ,i think it merely requires to put the proposition in this shape to see how incredible it is4 99 99 99 99 99 ,sundry objections to the views contained in the essay on 8,the ,origin and ,function of ,music10 have arisen from misconception of its scope4 ,an endeavour to explain the origin of music1 has been dealt with as though it were a theory of music in its entirety4 ,an hypothesis #ddd concerning the rudiments has been rejected because it did not account for everything contained in the developed product4 ,to preclude this misapprehension for the future1 and to show how much more is comprehended in a theory of music than ,i professed to deal with1 let me enumerate the several components of musical effect4 ,they may properly be divided into sensational1 perceptional1 and emotional4 ,that the sensational pleasure is distinguishable from the other pleasures which music yields1 will not be questioned4 ,a sweet sound is agreeable in itself1 when heard out of relation to other sounds4 ,tones of various timbres1 too1 are severally appreciated as having their special beauties4 ,of further elements in the sensational pleasure have to be named those which result from certain congruities between notes and immediately succeeding notes4 ,this pleasure1 like the primary pleasure which fine quality yields1 appears to have a purely physical basis4 ,we know that the agreeableness of simultaneous tones depends partly on the relative frequency of recurring correspondences of the vibrations producing them1 and partly on the relative infrequency of beats1 and we may suspect that there is a kindred cause for the agreeableness of successive tones2 since the auditory apparatus which has been at one instant vibrating in a particular manner1 will take up certain succeeding vibrations more readily than others4 ,evidently it is a question of the degree of congruity2 for the most congruous vibrations1 those of the octaves1 yield less pleasure when heard in succession than those of which the congruity is not so great4 ,to obtain the greatest pleasure in this and other things1 there requires both likeness and difference4 ,recognition of this fact introduces us to the next element of sensational pleasure--that due to contrast2 including contrast of pitch1 of loudness1 and of timbre4 ,in this case1 as in other cases1 the disagreeableness caused by frequent repetition of the same sensation 7here literally called 8monotony07 results from the exhaustion which any single #dde nervous agent undergoes from perpetual stimulation2 and contrast gives pleasure because it implies action of an agent which has had rest4 ,it follows that much of the sensational pleasure to be obtained from music depends on such adjustments of sounds as bring into play1 without conflict1 many nervous elements3 exercising all and not overexerting any4 ,we must not overlook a concomitant effect4 ,with the agreeable sensation is joined a faint emotion of an agreeable kind4 ,beyond the simple definite pleasure yielded by a sweet tone1 there is a vague1 diffused pleasure4 ,as indicated in the ,principles of ,psychology 7 #ecg71 each nervous excitation produces reverberation throughout the nervous system at large2 and probably this indefinite emotional pleasure is a consequence4 ,doubtless some shape is given to it by association4 ,but after observing how much there is in common between the diffused feeling aroused by smelling at a deliciously scented flower and that aroused by listening to a sweet tone1 it will1 ,i think1 be perceived that the more general cause predominates4 ,the division between the sensational effects and the perceptional effects is of course indefinite4 ,as above implied1 part of the sensational pleasure depends on the relation between each tone and the succeeding tone2 and hence this pleasure gradually merges into that which arises from perceiving the structural connexions between the phrases and between the larger parts of musical compositions4 ,much of the gratification given by a melody consists in the consciousness of the relations between each group of sounds heard and the groups of sounds held in memory as having just passed1 as well as those represented as about to come4 ,in many cases the passage listened to would not be regarded as having any beauty were it not for its remembered connexions with passages in the immediate past and the immediate future4 ,if1 for example1 from the first movement of ,beethoven's ,funeral-,march sonata the first five notes are detached1 they appear to be meaningless2 #ddf but if1 the movement being known1 they are joined with imaginations of the anticipated phrases1 they immediately acquire meaning and beauty4 ,indefinable as are the causes of this perceptional pleasure in many cases1 some causes of it are definable4 ,symmetry is one4 ,a chief element in melodic effect results from repetitions of phrases which are either identical1 or differ only in pitch1 or differ only in minor variations3 there being in the first case the pleasure derived from perception of complete likeness1 and in the other cases the greater pleasure derived from perception of likeness with difference--a perception which is more involved1 and therefore exercises a greater number of nervous agents4 ,next comes1 as a source of gratification1 the consciousness of pronounced unlikeness or contrast2 such as that between passages above the middle tones and passages below1 or as that between ascending phrases and descending phrases4 ,and then we rise to larger contrasts2 as when1 the first theme in a melody having been elaborated1 there is introduced another having a certain kinship though in many respects different1 after which there is a return to the first theme3 a structure which yields more extensive and more complex perceptions of both differences and likenesses4 ,but while perceptional pleasures include much that is of the highest1 they also include much that is of the lowest4 ,a certain kind of interest1 if not of beauty1 is producible by the likenesses and contrasts of musical phrases which are intrinsically meaningless or even ugly4 ,a familiar experience exemplifies this4 ,if a piece of paper is folded and on one side of the crease there is drawn an irregular line in ink1 which1 by closing the paper1 is blotted on the opposite side of the crease1 there results a figure which1 in virtue of its symmetry1 has some beauty2 no matter how entirely without beauty the two lines themselves may be4 ,similarly1 some interest results from the parallelism of musical phrases1 notwithstanding utter lack of interest in the phrases themselves4 ,the kind of interest #ddg resulting from such parallelisms1 and from many contrasts1 irrespective of any intrinsic worth in their components1 is that which is most appreciated by the musically-uncultured1 and gives popularity to miserable drawing-room ballads and vulgar music-hall songs4 ,the remaining element of musical effect consists in the idealized rendering of emotion4 ,this1 as ,i have sought to show1 is the primitive element1 and will ever continue to be the vital element2 for if 8melody is the soul of music10 then expression is the soul of melody--the soul without which it is mechanical and meaningless1 whatever may be the merit of its form4 ,this primitive element may with tolerable clearness be distinguished from the other elements1 and may coexist with them in various degrees3 in some cases being the predominant element4 ,anyone who1 in analytical mood1 listens to such a song as ,robert1 toi que j'aime1 cannot1 ,i think1 fail to perceive that its effectiveness depends on the way in which it exalts and intensifies the traits of passionate utterance4 ,no doubt as music develops1 the emotional element 7which affects structure chiefly through the forms of phrases7 is increasingly complicated with1 and obscured by1 the perceptional element2 which both modifies these phrases and unites them into symmetrical and contrasted combinations4 ,but though the groups of notes which emotion prompts admit of elaboration into structures that have additional charms due to artfully-arranged contrasts and repetitions1 the essential element is liable to be thus submerged in the non-essential4 ,only in melodies of high types1 such as the ,addio of ,mozart and ,adelaide of ,beethoven1 do we see the two requirements simultaneously fulfilled4 ,musical genius is shown in achieving the decorative beauty without losing the beauty of emotional meaning4 ,it goes without saying that there must be otherwise accounted for that relatively modern element in musical effect which has now almost outgrown in importance the #ddh other elements--,i mean harmony4 ,this cannot be affiliated on the natural language of emotion2 since1 in such language1 limited to successive tones1 there cannot originate the effects wrought by simultaneous tones4 ,dependent as harmony is on relations among rates of aerial pulses1 its primary basis is purely mechanical2 and its secondary basis lies in the compound vibrations which certain combinations of mechanical rhythms cause in the auditory apparatus4 ,the resulting pleasure must1 therefore1 be due to nervous excitations of kinds which1 by their congruity1 exalt one another2 and thus generate a larger volume of agreeable sensation4 ,a further pleasure of sensational origin which harmony yields is due to contrapuntal effects4 ,skilful counterpoint has the general character that it does not repeat in immediate succession similar combinations of tones and similar directions of change2 and by thus avoiding temporary over-tax of the nervous structures brought into action1 keeps them in better condition for subsequent action4 ,absence of regard for this requirement characterizes the music of ,gluck1 of whom ,handel said--8,he knows no more counterpoint than my cook20 and it is this disregard which produces its cloying character4 ,respecting the effects of harmony ,i will add only that the vague emotional accompaniment to the sensation produced by a single sweet tone1 is paralleled by the stronger emotional accompaniment to the more voluminous and complex sensation produced by a fine chord4 ,clearly this vague emotion forms a large component in the pleasure which harmony gives4 ,while thus recognizing1 and indeed emphasizing1 the fact that of many traits of developed music my hypothesis respecting the origin of music yields no explanation1 let me point out that this hypothesis gains a further general support from its conformity to the law of evolution4 ,progressive integration is seen in the immense contrast between the small combinations of tones constituting a cadence of grief1 or anger1 or triumph1 and the vast combinations of #ddi tones1 simultaneous and successive1 constituting an oratorio4 ,great advance in coherence becomes manifest when1 from the lax unions among the sounds in which feeling spontaneously expresses itself1 or even from those few musical phrases which constitute a simple air1 we pass to those elaborate compositions in which portions small and large are tied together into extended organic wholes4 ,on comparing the unpremeditated inflexions of the voice in emotional speech1 vague in tones and times1 with those premeditated ones which the musician arranges for stage or concert room1 in which the divisions of time are exactly measured1 the successive intervals precise1 and the harmonies adjusted to a nicety1 we observe in the last a far higher definiteness4 ,and immense progress in heterogeneity is seen on putting side by side the monotonous chants of savages with the musical compositions familiar to us2 each of which is relatively heterogeneous within itself1 and the assemblage of which forms an immeasurably heterogeneous aggregate4 99 99 99 99 99 ,strong support for the theory enunciated in this essay1 and defended in the foregoing paragraphs1 is furnished by the testimonies of two travellers in ,hungary1 given in works published in #ahgh and #ahhh respectively4 ,here is an extract from the first of the two4 8,music is an instinct with these ,hungarian gipsies4 ,they play by ear1 and with a marvellous precision1 not surpassed by musicians who have been subject to the most careful training4 4 4 4 ,the airs they play are most frequently compositions of their own1 and are in character quite peculiar4 4 4 ,i heard on this occasion one of the gipsy airs which made an indelible impression on my mind2 it seemed to me the thrilling utterance of a people's history4 ,there was the low wail of sorrow1 of troubled passionate grief1 stirring the heart to restlessness1 then the sense of turmoil and defeat2 but upon this breaks suddenly a wild burst of exultation1 of rapturous joy--a triumph achieved1 which hurries you along with it in resistless sympathy4 ,the excitable ,hungarians can literally become intoxicated with this music--and no wonder4 ,you cannot reason upon it1 or explain it1 but its strains compel you to sensations of despair and joy1 of exultation and excitement1 as though under the influence of some potent charm40--,round about the ,carpathians1 by ,andrew ,f4 ,crosse1 pp4 #aa1 #ab4 #dej ,still more graphic and startling is the description given by a more recent traveller1 ,e4 ,gerard4 8,devoid of printed notes1 the ,tzigane is not forced to divide his attention between a sheet of paper and his instrument1 and there is consequently nothing to detract from the utter abandonment with which he absorbs himself in his playing4 ,he seems to be sunk in an inner world of his own2 the instrument sobs and moans in his hands1 and is pressed tight against his heart as though it had grown and taken root there4 ,this is the true moment of inspiration1 to which he rarely gives way1 and then only in the privacy of an intimate circle1 never before a numerous and unsympathetic audience4 ,himself spell-bound by the power of the tones he evokes1 his head gradually sinking lower and lower over the instrument1 the body bent forward in an attitude of rapt attention1 and his ear seeming to hearken to far-off ghostly strains audible to himself alone1 the untaught ,tzigane achieves a perfection of expression unattainable by mere professional training4 ,this power of identification with his music is the real secret of the ,tzigane's influence over his audience4 ,inspired and carried away by his own strains1 he must perforce carry his hearers with him as well2 and the ,hungarian listener throws himself heart and soul into this species of musical intoxication1 which to him is the greatest delight on earth4 ,there is a proverb which says1 #8,the ,hungarian only requires a gipsy fiddler and a glass of water in order to make him quite drunk2' and1 indeed1 intoxication is the only word fittingly to describe the state of exaltation into which ,i have seen a ,hungarian audience thrown by a gipsy band4 ,sometimes1 under the combined influence of music and wine1 the ,tziganes become like creatures possessed2 the wild cries and stamps of an equally excited audience only stimulate them to greater exertions4 ,the whole atmosphere seems tossed by billows of passionate harmony2 we seem to catch sight of the electric sparks of inspiration flying through the air4 ,it is then that the ,tzigane player gives forth everything that is secretly lurking within him--fierce anger1 childish wailings1 presumptuous exaltation1 brooding melancholy1 and passionate despair2 and at such moments1 as a ,hungarian writer has said1 one could readily believe in his power of drawing down the angels from heaven into hell6 ,listen how another ,hungarian has here described the effect of their music3--#8,how it rushes through the veins like electric fire6 ,how it penetrates straight to the soul6 ,in soft plaintive minor tones the adagio opens with a slow rhythmical movement3 it is a sighing and longing of unsatisfied aspirations2 a craving for undiscovered happiness2 the lover's yearning for the object of his affection2 the expression of mourning for lost joys1 for happy days gone for ever2 then abruptly changing to a major key1 the tones get faster and more agitated2 and from the whirlpool of harmony the melody gradually detaches itself1 alternately drowned in the foam of overbreaking waves1 to reappear floating on the surface with undulating motion--collecting as it were fresh power for a renewed burst of fury4 ,but #dea quickly as the storm came it is gone again1 and the music relapses into the melancholy yearnings of heretofore4'0 ,the ,land beyond the ,forest1 vol4 ,,ii1 pp4 #abb-d4 ,lond4 #ahhh4 ,after the evidence thus furnished1 argument is almost superfluous4 ,the origin of music as the developed language of emotion seems to be no longer an inference but simply a description of the fact4 ,,endnotes ,,to ,,the ,,origin ,,and ,,function ,,of ,,music4 #ef ,those who seek information on this point may find it in an interesting tract by ,mr4 ,alexander ,bain1 on ,animal ,instinct and ,intelligence4 #eg ,the ,music of the ,most ,ancient ,nations1 c41 by ,carl ,engel4 ,this quotation is not contained in my essay as originally published1 nor in the version of it first reproduced in #aheh4 ,herr ,engel's work was issued in #ahfd1 seven years after the date of the essay4 #eh ,it is far more probable that the ascents and descents made by this gibbon consisted of indefinitely-slurred tones4 ,to suppose that each was a series of definite semi-tones strains belief to breaking point2 considering that among human beings the great majority1 even of those who have good ears1 are unable to go up or down the chromatic scale without being taught to do so4 ,the achievement is one requiring considerable practice2 and that such an achievement should be spontaneous on the part of a monkey is incredible4 #ei ,after the above paragraphs had been sent to the printers ,i received from an ,american anthropologist1 the ,rev4 ,owen ,dorsey1 some essays containing kindred evidence4 ,of over three dozen songs and chants of the ,omaha1 ,ponka1 and other ,indians1 in some cases given with music and in other cases without1 there are but five which have any reference to amatory feeling2 and while in these the expression of amatory feeling comes from women1 nothing more than derision of them comes from men4 #deb ,,the ,,physiology ,,of ,,laughter4 ,first published in ,macmillan's ,magazine for ,march #ahfj4 ,why do we smile when a child puts on a man's hat8 or what induces us to laugh on reading that the corpulent ,gibbon was unable to rise from his knees after making a tender declaration8 ,the usual reply to such questions is1 that laughter results from a perception of incongruity4 ,even were there not1 on this reply1 the obvious criticism that laughter often occurs from extreme pleasure or from mere vivacity1 there would still remain the real problem--,how comes a sense of the incongruous to be followed by these peculiar bodily actions8 ,some have alleged that laughter is due to the pleasure of a relative self-elevation1 which we feel on seeing the humiliation of others4 ,but this theory1 whatever portion of truth it may contain1 is1 in the first place1 open to the fatal objection that there are various humiliations to others which produce in us anything but laughter2 and1 in the second place1 it does not apply to the many instances in which no one's dignity is implicated3 as when we laugh at a good pun4 ,moreover1 like the other1 it is merely a generalization of certain conditions to laughter2 and not an explanation of the odd movements which occur under these conditions4 ,why1 when greatly delighted1 or impressed with certain unexpected contrasts #dec of ideas1 should there be a contraction of particular facial muscles and particular muscles of the chest and abdomen8 ,such answer to this question as may be possible1 can be rendered only by physiology4 99 99 99 99 99 ,every child has made the attempt to hold the foot still while it is tickled1 and has failed2 and there is scarcely any one who has not vainly tried to avoid winking when a hand has been suddenly passed before the eyes4 ,these examples of muscular movements which occur independently of the will1 or in spite of it1 illustrate what physiologists call reflex-action2 as likewise do sneezing and coughing4 ,to this class of cases1 in which involuntary motions are accompanied by sensations1 has to be added another class of cases1 in which involuntary motions are unaccompanied by sensations3--instance the pulsations of the heart2 the contractions of the stomach during digestion4 ,further1 the majority of seemingly-voluntary acts in such creatures as insects1 worms1 molluscs1 are considered by physiologists to be as purely automatic as is the dilatation or closure of the iris under variations in the quantity of light2 and similarly exemplify the law1 that an impression on the end of an afferent nerve is conveyed to some ganglionic centre1 and is thence usually reflected along an efferent nerve to one or more muscles which it causes to contract4 ,in a modified form this principle holds with voluntary acts4 ,nervous excitation always tends to beget muscular motion2 and when it rises to a certain intensity always does beget it4 ,not only in reflex actions1 whether with or without sensation1 do we see that special nerves1 when raised to states of tension1 discharge themselves on special muscles with which they are indirectly connected2 but those external actions through which we read the feelings of others1 show us that1 under any considerable tension1 the nervous system in general discharges itself on the muscular system in general3 either with or without the #ded guidance of the will4 ,the shivering produced by cold implies irregular muscular contractions1 which1 though at first only partly involuntary1 become1 when the cold is extreme1 almost wholly involuntary4 ,when you have severely burnt your finger it is very difficult to preserve a dignified composure3 contortion of face1 or movement of limb1 is pretty sure to follow4 ,if a man receives good news with neither facial change nor bodily motion1 it is inferred that he is not much pleased1 or that he has extraordinary self-control3 either inference implying that joy almost universally produces contraction of the muscles1 and so1 alters the expression1 or attitude1 or both4 ,and when we hear of the feats of strength which men have performed when their lives were at stake--when we read how1 in the energy of despair1 even paralyzed patients have regained for a time the use of their limbs2 we see still more clearly the relation between nervous and muscular excitements4 ,it becomes manifest both that emotions and sensations tend to generate bodily movements1 and that the movements are violent in proportion as the emotions or sensations are intense4#fj ,this1 however1 is not the sole direction in which nervous excitement expends itself4 ,viscera as well as muscles may receive the discharge4 ,that the heart and blood-vessels 7which1 indeed1 being all contractile1 may in a restricted sense be classed with the muscular system7 are quickly affected by pleasures and pains1 we have daily proved to us4 ,every sensation of any acuteness accelerates the pulse2 and how sensitive the heart is to emotions1 is testified by the familiar expressions which use heart and feeling as convertible terms4 ,similarly with the digestive organs4 ,without detailing the various ways in which these may be influenced by our mental states1 it suffices to mention the marked benefits derived by dyspeptics1 as well as other invalids1 from cheerful society1 welcome news1 #dee change of scene1 to show how pleasurable feeling stimulates the viscera in general into greater activity4 ,there is still another direction in which any excited portion of the nervous system may discharge itself2 and a direction in which it usually does discharge itself when the excitement is not strong4 ,it may pass on the stimulus to some other portion of the nervous system4 ,this is what occurs in quiet thinking and feeling4 ,the successive states which constitute consciousness1 result from this4 ,sensations excite ideas and emotions2 these in their turns arouse other ideas and emotions2 and so on continuously4 ,that is to say1 the tension existing in particular nerve-centres1 or groups of nerve-centres1 when they yield us certain sensations1 ideas1 or emotions1 generates an equivalent tension in some other nervous structures1 with which there is a connexion3 the flow of energy passing on1 the one idea or feeling dies in producing the next4 ,thus1 then1 while we are totally unable to comprehend how the excitement of certain nerve-centres should generate feeling--while1 in the production of consciousness by physical agents acting on physical structures1 we come to a mystery never to be solved2 it is yet quite possible for us to know by observation what are the successive forms which this mystery may take4 ,we see that there are three channels along which nerve-centres in a state of tension may discharge themselves2 or rather1 ,i should say1 three classes of channels4 ,they may pass on the excitement to other nerve-centres that have no direct connexions with the bodily members1 and may so cause other feelings and ideas2 or they may pass on the excitement to one or more motor nerves1 and so cause muscular contractions2 or they may pass on the excitement to nerves which supply the viscera1 and may so stimulate one or more of these4 ,for simplicity's sake ,i have described these as alternative routes1 one or other of which any current of nerve-force must take2 thereby1 as it may be thought1 implying that #def such current will be exclusively confined to some one of them4 ,but this is by no means the case4 ,rarely1 if ever1 does it happen that a state of nervous tension1 present to consciousness as a feeling1 expends itself in one direction only4 ,very generally it may be observed to expend itself in two2 and it is probable that the discharge is never absolutely absent from any one of the three4 ,there is1 however1 variety in the proportions in which the discharge is divided among these different channels under different circumstances4 ,in a man whose fear impels him to run1 the mental tension generated is only in part transformed into a muscular stimulus3 there is a surplus which causes a rapid current of ideas4 ,an agreeable state of feeling produced1 say by praise1 is not wholly used up in arousing the succeeding phase of the feeling and the new ideas appropriate to it2 but a certain portion overflows into the visceral nervous system1 increasing the action of the heart and facilitating digestion4 ,and here we come upon a class of considerations and facts which open the way to a solution of our special problem4 ,for1 starting with the truth that at any moment the existing quantity of liberated nerve-force which in an inscrutable way produces in us the state we call feeling1 must expend itself in some direction1 it follows that1 if of the several channels it may take1 one is wholly or partially closed1 more must be taken by the others2 or that if two are closed1 the discharge along the remaining one must be more intense2 and that1 conversely1 should anything determine an unusual efflux in one direction1 there will be a diminished efflux in other directions4 ,daily experience illustrates these conclusions4 ,it is commonly remarked that the suppression of external signs of feeling1 makes feeling more intense4 ,the deepest grief is silent grief4 ,why8 ,because the nervous excitement not discharged in muscular action1 discharges itself in other nervous excitements--arouses more numerous and more #deg remote associations of melancholy ideas1 and so increases the mass of feelings4 ,people who conceal their anger are habitually found to be more revengeful than those who explode in loud speech and vehement action4 ,why8 ,because1 as before1 the emotion is reflected back1 accumulates1 and intensifies4 ,similarly1 men who1 as proved by their powers of representation1 have the keenest appreciation of the comic1 are usually able to do and say the most ludicrous things with perfect gravity4 ,on the other hand1 all are familiar with the truth that bodily activity deadens emotion4 ,under great irritation we get relief by walking about rapidly4 ,extreme effort in the bootless attempt to achieve a desired end1 greatly diminishes the intensity of the desire4 ,those who are forced to exert themselves after misfortunes1 do not suffer nearly so much as those who remain quiescent4 ,if any one wishes to check intellectual excitement1 he cannot choose a more efficient method than running till he is exhausted4 ,moreover1 these cases1 in which the production of feeling and thought is hindered by determining the nervous energy towards bodily movements1 have their counterparts in the cases in which bodily movements are hindered by extra absorption of nervous energy in sudden thoughts and feelings4 ,if1 when walking1 there flashes on you an idea that creates great surprise1 hope1 or alarm1 you stop2 or if sitting cross-legged1 swinging your pendent foot1 the movement is at once arrested4 ,from the viscera1 too1 intense mental action abstracts energy4 ,joy1 disappointment1 anxiety1 or any moral perturbation rising to a great height1 destroys appetite2 or1 if food has been taken1 arrests digestion2 and even a purely intellectual activity1 when extreme1 does the like4 ,facts1 then1 bear out these a priori inferences1 that the nervous excitement at any moment present to consciousness as feeling1 must expend itself in some way or other2 that of the three classes of channels open to it1 it must #deh take one1 two1 or more1 according to circumstances2 that the closure or obstruction of one1 must increase the discharge through the others2 and1 conversely1 that if1 to answer some demand1 the efflux of nervous energy in one direction is unusually great1 there must be a corresponding decrease of the efflux in other directions4 ,setting out from these premises1 let us now see what interpretation is to be put on the phenomena of laughter4 99 99 99 99 99 ,that laughter is a form of muscular excitement1 and so illustrates the general law that feeling passing a certain pitch habitually vents itself in bodily action1 scarcely needs pointing out4 ,it perhaps needs pointing out1 however1 that strong feeling of almost any kind produces this result4 ,it is not a sense of the ludicrous1 only1 which does it2 nor are the various forms of joyous emotion the sole additional causes4 ,we have1 besides1 the sardonic laughter and the hysterical laughter which result from mental distress2 to which must be added certain sensations1 as tickling1 and1 according to ,mr4 ,bain1 cold1 and some kinds of acute pain4 ,strong feeling1 mental or physical1 being1 then1 the general cause of laughter1 we have to note that the muscular actions constituting it are distinguished from most others by this1 that they are purposeless4 ,in general1 bodily motions that are prompted by feelings are directed to special ends2 as when we try to escape a danger1 or struggle to secure a gratification4 ,but the movements of chest and limbs which we make when laughing have no object4 ,and now remark that these quasi-convulsive contractions of the muscles1 having no object1 but being results of an uncontrolled discharge of energy1 we may see whence arise their special characters--how it happens that certain classes of muscles are affected first1 and then certain other classes4 ,for an overflow of nerve-force undirected by any motive1 will manifestly take first the #dei most habitual routes2 and if these do not suffice1 will next overflow into the less habitual ones4 ,well1 it is through the organs of speech that feeling passes into movement with the greatest frequency4 ,the jaws1 tongue1 and lips are used not only to express strong irritation or gratification1 but that very moderate flow of mental energy which accompanies ordinary conversation1 finds its chief vent through this channel4 ,hence it happens that certain muscles round the mouth1 small and easy to move1 are the first to contract under pleasurable emotion4 ,the class of muscles which1 next after those of articulation1 are most constantly set in action 7or extra action1 let us say7 by feelings of all kinds1 are those of respiration4 ,under pleasurable or painful sensations we breathe more rapidly3 possibly as a consequence of the increased demand for oxygenated blood4 ,the sensations that accompany exertion also bring on hard breathing2 which here more evidently responds to the physiological needs4 ,and emotions1 too1 agreeable and disagreeable1 both1 at first1 excite respiration2 though the last subsequently depress it4 ,that is to say1 of the bodily muscles1 the respiratory are more constantly implicated than any others in those various acts which our feelings impel us to2 and1 hence1 when there occurs an undirected discharge of nervous energy into the muscular system1 it happens that1 if the quantity be considerable1 it convulses not only certain of the articulatory and vocal muscles1 but also those which expel air from the lungs4 ,should the feeling to be expended be still greater in amount--too great to find vent in these classes of muscles--another class comes into play4 ,the upper limbs are set in motion4 ,children frequently clap their hands in glee2 by some adults the hands are rubbed together2 and others1 under still greater intensity of delight1 slap their knees and sway their bodies backwards and forwards4 ,last of all1 when the other channels for the escape of the surplus nerve-force have been filled to #dfj overflowing1 a yet further and less-used group of muscles is spasmodically affected3 the head is thrown back and the spine bent inwards--there is a slight degree of what medical men call opisthotonos4 ,thus1 then1 without contending that the phenomena of laughter in all their details are to be so accounted for1 we see that in their ensemble they conform to these general principles3--that feeling excites to muscular action2 that when the muscular action is unguided by a purpose the muscles first affected are those which feeling most habitually stimulates2 and that as the feeling to be expended increases in quantity it excites an increasing number of muscles1 in a succession determined by the relative frequency with which they respond to the regulated dictates of feeling4 ,to which as a qualifying and complicating factor must be added the relative sizes of the muscles2 since1 other things equal1 the smaller muscles will be moved more readily than the larger4 ,there still1 however1 remains the question with which we set out4 ,the explanation here given applies only to the laughter produced by acute pleasure or pain3 it does not apply to the laughter which follows certain perceptions of incongruity4 ,it is an insufficient explanation that in these cases1 laughter is a result of the pleasure we take in escaping from the restraint of grave feelings4 ,that this is a part-cause is true4 ,doubtless very often1 as ,mr4 ,bain says1 8it is the coerced form of seriousness and solemnity without the reality that gives us that stiff position from which a contact with triviality or vulgarity relieves us1 to our uproarious delight10 ,and in so far as mirth is caused by the gush of agreeable feeling which follows the cessation of unpleasant mental strain1 it further illustrates the general principle above set forth4 ,but no explanation is thus afforded of the mirth which ensues when the short silence between the andante and allegro in one of ,beethoven's symphonies1 is broken by a loud sneeze4 ,in this1 and hosts of like cases1 the mental tension is not coerced but #dfa spontaneous--not disagreeable but agreeable2 and the coming impressions to which attention is directed1 promise a gratification which few1 if any1 desire to escape4 ,hence1 when the unlucky sneeze occurs1 it cannot be that the laughter of the audience is due simply to the release from an irksome attitude of mind3 some other cause must be sought4 ,this cause we shall arrive at by carrying our analysis a step further4 ,we have but to consider the quantity of feeling which exists under such circumstances1 and then to ask what are the conditions determining the direction of its discharge1 to reach a solution4 ,take a case4 ,you are sitting in a theatre1 absorbed in the progress of an interesting drama4 ,some climax has been reached which has aroused your sympathies--say1 a reconciliation between the hero and heroine1 after long and painful misunderstanding4 ,the feelings excited by this scene are not of a kind from which you seek relief2 but are1 on the contrary1 a grateful relief from the painful feelings with which you have witnessed the previous estrangement4 ,moreover1 the sentiments these fictitious personages have for the moment inspired you with1 are not such as would lead you to rejoice in any indignity offered to them2 but rather1 such as would make you resent the indignity4 ,and now1 while you are contemplating the reconciliation with a pleasurable sympathy1 there appears from behind the scenes a tame kid1 which1 having stared round at the audience1 walks up to the lovers and sniffs at them4 ,you cannot help joining in the roar which greets this contretemps4 ,inexplicable as is this irresistible burst on the hypothesis of a pleasure in escaping from mental restraint2 or on the hypothesis of a pleasure from relative increase of self-importance1 when witnessing the humiliation of others2 it is readily explicable if we consider what1 in such a case1 must become of the feeling that existed at the moment the incongruity arose4 ,a large mass of emotion had been produced2 or1 to speak in physiological language1 a large portion of the nervous #dfb system was in a state of tension4 ,there was also great expectation with respect to the further evolution of the scene--a quantity of vague1 nascent thought and emotion1 into which the existing quantity of thought and emotion was about to pass4 ,had there been no interruption1 the body of new ideas and feelings next excited1 would have sufficed to absorb the whole of the liberated nervous energy4 ,but now1 this large amount of nervous energy1 instead of being allowed to expend itself in producing an equivalent amount of the new thoughts and emotions which were nascent1 is suddenly checked in its flow4 ,the channels along which the discharge was about to take place1 are closed4 ,the new channel opened--that afforded by the appearance and proceedings of the kid--is a small one2 the ideas and feelings suggested are not numerous and massive enough to carry off the nervous energy to be expended4 ,the excess must therefore discharge itself in some other direction2 and in the way already explained1 there results an efflux through the motor nerves to various classes of the muscles1 producing the half-convulsive actions we term laughter4 ,this explanation is in harmony with the fact that when1 among several persons who witness the same ludicrous occurrence1 there are some who do not laugh1 it is because there has arisen in them an emotion not participated in by the rest1 and which is sufficiently massive to absorb all the nascent excitement4 ,among the spectators of an awkward tumble1 those who preserve their gravity are those in whom there is excited a degree of sympathy with the sufferer1 sufficiently great to serve as an outlet for the feeling which the occurrence had turned out of its previous course4 ,sometimes anger carries off the arrested current2 and so prevents laughter4 ,an instance of this was lately furnished me by a friend who had been witnessing the feats at ,franconi's4 ,a tremendous leap had just been made by an acrobat over a number of horses4 ,the clown1 seemingly envious of this success1 made ostentatious preparation for doing the like2 #dfc and then1 taking the preliminary run with immense energy1 stopped short on reaching the first horse1 and pretended to wipe some dust from its haunches4 ,in most of the spectators1 merriment was excited2 but in my friend1 wound up by the expectation of the coming leap to a state of great nervous tension1 the effect of the baulk was to produce indignation4 ,experience thus proves what the theory implies2 namely1 that the discharge of arrested feelings into the muscular system1 takes place only in the absence of other adequate channels--does not take place if there arise other feelings equal in amount to those arrested4 ,evidence still more conclusive is at hand4 ,if we contrast the incongruities which produce laughter with those which do not1 we see that in the non-ludicrous ones the unexpected feeling aroused1 though wholly different in kind1 is not less in quantity or intensity4 ,among incongruities which may excite anything but a laugh1 ,mr4 ,bain instances--8,a decrepit man under a heavy burden1 five loaves and two fishes among a multitude1 and all unfitness and gross disproportion2 an instrument out of tune1 a fly in ointment1 snow in ,may1 ,archimedes studying geometry in a siege1 and all discordant things2 a wolf in sheep's clothing1 a breach of bargain1 and falsehood in general2 the multitude taking the law in their own hands1 and everything of the nature of disorder2 a corpse at a feast1 parental cruelty1 filial ingratitude1 and whatever is unnatural2 the entire catalogue of the vanities given by ,solomon1 are all incongruous1 but they cause feelings of pain1 anger1 sadness1 loathing1 rather than mirth40 ,now in these cases1 where the totally unlike state of consciousness suddenly produced1 is not inferior in mass to the preceding one1 the conditions to laughter are not fulfilled4 ,as above shown1 laughter naturally results only when consciousness is unawares transferred from great things to small--only when there is what we may call a descending incongruity4 ,and now observe1 finally1 the fact1 alike inferable a priori #dfd and illustrated in experience1 that an ascending incongruity not only fails to cause laughter1 but works on the muscular system an effect of the reverse kind4 ,when after something very insignificant there arises without anticipation something very great1 the emotion we call wonder results2 and this emotion is accompanied not by contraction of the muscles1 but by relaxation of them4 ,in children and country people1 that falling of the jaw which occurs on witnessing an imposing and unexpected change1 exemplifies this effect4 ,persons wonder-struck at the production of a striking result by a seemingly-inadequate cause1 are frequently described as unconsciously dropping the things they held in their hands4 ,such are just the effects to be anticipated4 ,after an average state of consciousness1 absorbing but a small quantity of nervous energy1 is aroused without notice1 a strong emotion of awe1 terror1 or admiration2 joined with the astonishment due to an apparent want of adequate causation4 ,this new state of consciousness demands far more nervous energy than that which it has suddenly replaced2 and this increased absorption of nervous energy in mental changes1 involves a temporary diminution of the outflow in other directions3 whence the pendent jaw and the relaxing grasp4 ,one further observation is worth making4 ,among the several sets of channels into which surplus feeling might be discharged1 was named the nervous system of the viscera4 ,the sudden overflow of an arrested mental excitement1 which1 as we have seen1 results from a descending incongruity1 must doubtless stimulate not only the muscular system1 as we see it does1 but also the internal organs3 the heart and stomach must come in for a share of the discharge4 ,and thus there seems to be a good physiological basis for the popular notion that mirth-creating excitement facilitates digestion4 99 99 99 99 99 ,though1 in doing so1 ,i go beyond the boundaries of the #dfe immediate topic1 ,i may fitly point out that the method of inquiry here followed1 opens the way to interpretation of various phenomena besides those of laughter4 ,to show the importance of pursuing it1 ,i will indicate the explanation it furnishes of another familiar class of facts4 ,all know how generally a large amount of emotion disturbs the action of the intellect1 and interferes with the power of expression4 ,a speech delivered with great facility to tables and chairs1 is by no means so easily delivered to an audience4 ,every schoolboy can testify that his trepidation1 when standing before a master1 has often disabled him from repeating a lesson which he had duly learnt4 ,in explanation of this we commonly say that the attention is distracted--that the proper train of ideas is broken by the intrusion of ideas that are irrelevant4 ,but the question is1 in what manner does unusual emotion produce this effect2 and we are here supplied with a tolerably obvious answer4 ,the repetition of a lesson1 or set speech previously thought out1 implies the flow of a very moderate amount of nervous excitement through a comparatively narrow channel4 ,the thing to be done is simply to call up in succession certain previously-arranged ideas--a process in which no great amount of mental energy is expended4 ,hence1 when there is a large quantity of emotion1 which must be discharged in some direction or other2 and when1 as usually happens1 the restricted series of intellectual actions to be gone through1 does not suffice to carry it off2 there result discharges along other channels besides the one prescribed3 there are aroused various ideas foreign to the train of thought to be pursued2 and these tend to exclude from consciousness those which should occupy it4 ,and now observe the meaning of those bodily actions spontaneously set up under these circumstances4 ,the schoolboy saying his lesson1 commonly has his fingers actively engaged--perhaps in twisting about a broken pen1 or perhaps in squeezing the angle of his jacket2 and if told to keep his #dff hands still1 he soon again falls into the same or a similar trick4 ,many anecdotes are current of public speakers having incurable automatic actions of this class3 barristers who perpetually wound and unwound pieces of tape2 members of parliament ever putting on and taking off their spectacles4 ,so long as such movements are unconscious1 they facilitate the mental actions4 ,at least this seems a fair inference from the fact that confusion frequently results from putting a stop to them3 witness the case narrated by ,sir ,walter ,scott of his school-fellow1 who became unable to say his lesson after the removal of the waistcoat button which he habitually fingered while in class4 ,but why do they facilitate the mental actions8 ,clearly because they draw off a portion of the surplus nervous excitement4 ,if1 as above explained1 the quantity of mental energy generated is greater than can find vent along the narrow channel of thought that is open to it2 and if1 in consequence1 it is apt to produce confusion by rushing into other channels of thought2 then1 by allowing it an exit through the motor nerves into the muscular system1 the pressure is diminished1 and irrelevant ideas are less likely to intrude on consciousness4 ,this further illustration will1 ,i think1 justify the position that something may be achieved by pursuing in other cases this kind of psychological inquiry4 ,a complete explanation of the phenomena1 requires us to trace out all the consequences of any given state of consciousness2 and we cannot do this without studying the effects1 bodily and mental1 as varying in quantity at one another's expense4 ,we should probably learn much if in every case we asked--,where is all the nervous energy gone8 ,,endnote ,,to ,,the ,,physiology ,,of ,,laughter4 #fj ,for numerous illustrations see essay on 8,the ,origin and ,function of ,music40 ,,end ,,of ,,vol4 ,,ii4 ,,mr4 ,,herbert ,,spencer',s ,,works4 ,a ,,system ,,of ,,synthetic ,,philosophy4 #hth ,thousand4 7,,with ,,an ,,appendix ,,dealing ,,with ,,criticisms47 ,in one vol4 #hvo1 cloth1 price #afs41 ,,first ,,principles4 ,,contents4 ,,part ,i4--,,the ,,unknowable4 #a4 ,religion and ,science4 #b4 ,ultimate ,religious ,ideas4 #c4 ,ultimate ,scientific ,ideas4 #d4 ,the ,relativity of ,all ,knowledge4 #e4 ,the ,reconciliation4 ,,part ,,ii4--,,the ,,knowable4 #a4 ,philosophy ,defined #b4 ,the ,data of ,philosophy4 #c4 ,space1 ,time1 ,matter1 ,motion1 and ,force4 #d4 ,the ,indestructibility of ,matter4 #e4 ,the ,continuity of ,motion4 #f4 ,the ,persistence of ,force4 #g4 ,the ,persistence of ,relations among ,forces4 #h4 ,the ,transformation and ,equivalence of ,forces4 #i4 ,the ,direction of ,motion4 #aj4 ,the ,rhythm of ,motion4 #aa4 ,recapitulation1 ,criticism1 and ,recommencement4 #ab4 ,evolution and ,dissolution4 #ac4 ,simple and ,compound ,evolution4 #ad4 ,the ,law of ,evolution4 #ae4 ,the ,law of ,evolution1 continued4 #af4 ,the ,law of ,evolution1 continued4 #ag4 ,the ,law of ,evolution1 concluded4 #ah4 ,the ,interpretation of ,evolution4 #ai4 ,the ,instability of the ,homogeneous4 #bj4 ,the ,multiplication of ,effects4 #ba4 ,segregation4 #bb4 ,equilibration4 #bc4 ,dissolution4 #bd4 ,summary and ,conclusion4 #dth ,thousand4 ,in two vols4 #hvo1 cloth1 price #cds4 ,,the ,,principles ,,of ,,biology4 ,,contents ,,of ,,vol4 ,i4 ,,part ,i4--,,the ,,data ,,of ,,biology4 #a4 ,organic ,matter4 #b4 ,the ,actions of ,forces on ,organic ,matter4 #c4 ,the ,re-actions of ,organic ,matter on ,forces4 #d4 ,proximate ,definition of ,life4 #e4 ,the ,correspondence between ,life and its ,circumstances4 #f4 ,the ,degree of ,life varies as the ,degree of ,correspondence4 #g4 ,the ,scope of ,biology4 ,,part ,,ii4--,,the ,,inductions ,,of ,,biology4 #a4 ,growth4 #b4 ,development4 #c4 ,function4 #d4 ,waste and ,repair4 #e4 ,adaptation4 #f4 ,individuality4 #g4 ,genesis4 #h4 ,heredity4 #i4 ,variation4 #aj4 ,genesis1 ,heredity1 and ,variation4 #aa4 ,classification4 #ab4 ,distribution4 ,,part ,,iii4--,,the ,,evolution ,,of ,,life4 #a4 ,preliminary4 #b4 ,general ,aspects of the ,special-,creation-,hypothesis4 #c4 ,general ,aspects of the ,evolution-,hypothesis4 #d4 ,the ,arguments from ,classification4 #e4 ,the ,arguments from ,embryology4 #f4 ,the ,arguments from ,morphology4 #g4 ,the ,arguments from ,distribution4 #h4 ,how is ,organic ,evolution caused8 #i4 ,external ,factors4 #aj4 ,internal ,factors4 #aa4 ,direct ,equilibration4 #ab4 ,indirect ,equilibration4 #ac4 ,the ,co-operation of the ,factors4 #ad4 ,the ,convergence of the ,evidences4 ,,appendix4 ,the ,spontaneous-,generation ,question4 ,,contents ,,of ,,vol4 ,,ii4 ,,part ,,iv4--,,morphological ,,development4 #a4 ,the ,problems of ,morphology4 #b4 ,the ,morphological ,composition of ,plants4 #c4 ,the ,morphological ,composition of ,plants1 continued4 #d4 ,the ,morphological ,composition of ,animals4 #e4 ,the ,morphological ,composition of ,animals1 continued4 #f4 ,morphological ,differentiation in ,plants4 #g4 ,the ,general ,shapes of ,plants4 #h4 ,the ,shapes of ,branches4 #i4 ,the ,shapes of ,leaves4 #aj4 ,the ,shapes of ,flowers4 #aa4 ,the ,shapes of ,vegetal ,cells4 #ab4 ,changes of ,shape otherwise caused4 #ac4 ,morphological ,differentiation in ,animals4 #ad4 ,the ,general ,shapes of ,animals4 #ae4 ,the ,shapes of ,vertebrate ,skeletons4 #af4 ,the ,shapes of ,animal ,cells4 #ag4 ,summary of ,morphological ,development4 ,,part ,v4--,,physiological ,,development4 #a4 ,the ,problems of ,physiology4 #b4 ,differentiations between the ,outer and ,inner ,tissues of ,plants4 #c4 ,differentiations among the ,outer ,tissues of ,plants4 #d4 ,differentiations among the ,inner ,tissues of ,plants4 #e4 ,physiological ,integration in ,plants4 #f4 ,differentiations between the ,outer and ,inner ,tissues of ,animals4 #g4 ,differentiations among the ,outer ,tissues of ,animals4 #h4 ,differentiations among the ,inner ,tissues of ,animals4 #i4 ,physiological ,integration in ,animals4 #aj4 ,summary of ,physiological ,development4 ,,part ,,vi4--,,laws ,,of ,,multiplication4 #a4 ,the ,factors4 #b4 ,priori ,principle4 #c4 ,obverse priori ,principle4 #d4 ,difficulties of ,inductive ,verification4 #e4 ,antagonism between ,growth and ,asexual ,genesis4 #f4 ,antagonism between ,growth and ,sexual ,genesis4 #g4 ,antagonism between ,development and ,genesis1 ,asexual and ,sexual4 #h4 ,antagonism between ,expenditure and ,genesis4 #i4 ,coincidence between high ,nutrition and ,genesis4 #aj4 ,specialities of these ,relations4 #aa4 ,interpretation and ,qualification4 #ab4 ,multiplication of the ,human ,race4 #ac4 ,human ,evolution in the ,future4 ,,appendix4 ,a ,criticism on ,professor ,owen's ,theory of the ,vertebrate ,skeleton4 ,on ,circulation and the ,formation of ,wood in ,plants4 #eth ,thousand4 7,,with ,,an ,,additional ,,part47 ,in two vols4 #hvo1 cloth1 price #cfs41 ,,the ,,principles ,,of ,,psychology4 ,,contents ,,of ,,vol4 ,i4 ,,part ,i4--,,the ,,data ,,of ,,psychology4 #a4 ,the ,nervous ,system4 #b4 ,the ,structure of the ,nervous ,system4 #c4 ,the ,functions of the ,nervous ,system4 #d4 ,the ,conditions essential to ,nervous ,action4 #e4 ,nervous ,stimulation and ,nervous ,discharge4 #f4 stho-,physiology4 ,,part ,,ii4--,,the ,,inductions ,,of ,,psychology4 #a4 ,the ,substance of ,mind4 #b4 ,the ,composition of ,mind4 #c4 ,the ,relativity of ,feelings4 #d4 ,the ,relativity of ,relations between ,feelings4 #e4 ,the ,revivability of ,feelings4 #f4 ,the ,revivability of ,relations between ,feelings4 #g4 ,the ,associability of ,feelings4 #h4 ,the ,associability of ,relations between ,feelings4 #i4 ,pleasures and ,pains4 ,,part ,,iii4--,,general ,,synthesis4 #a4 ,life and ,mind as ,correspondence4 #b4 ,the ,correspondence as ,direct and ,homogeneous4 #c4 ,the ,correspondence as ,direct but ,heterogeneous4 #d4 ,the ,correspondence as extending in ,space4 #e4 ,the ,correspondence as extending in ,time4 #f4 ,the ,correspondence as increasing in ,speciality4 #g4 ,the ,correspondence as increasing in ,generality4 #h4 ,the ,correspondence as increasing in ,complexity4 #i4 ,the ,co-ordination of ,correspondences4 #aj4 ,the ,integration of ,correspondences4 #aa4 ,the ,correspondences in their ,totality4 ,,part ,,iv4--,,special ,,synthesis4 #a4 ,the ,nature of ,intelligence4 #b4 ,the ,law of ,intelligence4 #c4 ,the ,growth of ,intelligence4 #d4 ,reflex ,action4 #e4 ,instinct4 #f4 ,memory4 #g4 ,reason4 #h4 ,the ,feelings4 #i4 ,the ,will4 ,,part ,v4--,,physical ,,synthesis4 #a4 ,a ,further ,interpretation ,needed4 #b4 ,the ,genesis of ,nerves4 #c4 ,the ,genesis of ,simple ,nervous ,systems4 #d4 ,the ,genesis of ,compound ,nervous ,systems4 #e4 ,the ,genesis of ,doubly-,compound ,nervous ,systems4 #f4 ,functions as ,related to these ,structures4 #g4 ,psychical ,laws as thus ,interpreted4 #h4 ,evidence from ,normal ,variations4 #i4 ,evidence from ,abnormal ,variations4 #aj4 ,results4 ,,appendix4 ,on the ,action of ,ansthetics and ,narcotics4 ,,contents ,,of ,,vol4 ,,ii4 ,,part ,,vi4--,,special ,,analysis4 #a4 ,limitation of the ,subject4 #b4 ,compound ,quantitative ,reasoning4 #c4 ,compound ,quantitative ,reasoning1 continued4 #d4 ,imperfect and ,simple ,quantitative ,reasoning4 #e4 ,quantitative ,reasoning in ,general4 #f4 ,perfect ,qualitative ,reasoning4 #g4 ,imperfect ,qualitative ,reasoning4 #h4 ,reasoning in ,general4 #i4 ,classification1 ,naming1 and ,recognition4 #aj4 ,the ,perception of ,special ,objects4 #aa4 ,the ,perception of ,body as presenting ,dynamical1 ,statico-,dynamical1 and ,statical ,attributes4 #ab4 ,the ,perception of ,body as presenting ,statico-,dynamical and ,statical ,attributes4 #ac4 ,the ,perception of ,body as presenting ,statical ,attributes4 #ad4 ,the ,perception of ,space4 #ae4 ,the ,perception of ,time4 #af4 ,the ,perception of ,motion4 #ag4 ,the ,perception of ,resistance4 #ah4 ,perception in ,general4 #ai4 ,the ,relations of ,similarity and ,dissimilarity4 #bj4 ,the ,relations of ,cointension and ,non-,cointension4 #ba4 ,the ,relations of ,coextension and ,non-,coextension4 #bb4 ,the ,relations of ,coexistence and ,non-,coexistence4 #bc4 ,the ,relations of ,connature and ,non-,connature4 #bd4 ,the ,relations of ,likeness and ,unlikeness4 #be4 ,the ,relation of ,sequence4 #bf4 ,consciousness in ,general4 #bg4 ,results4 ,,part ,,vii4--,,general ,,analysis4 #a4 ,the ,final ,question4 #b4 ,the ,assumption of ,metaphysicians4 #c4 ,the ,words of ,metaphysicians4 #d4 ,the ,reasonings of ,metaphysicians4 #e4 ,negative ,justification of ,realism4 #f4 ,argument from ,priority4 #g4 ,the ,argument from ,simplicity4 #h4 ,the ,argument from ,distinctness4 #i4 ,a ,criterion ,wanted4 #aj4 ,propositions qualitatively distinguished4 #aa4 ,the ,universal ,postulate4 #ab4 ,the test of ,relative ,validity4 #ac4 ,its ,corollaries4 #ad4 ,positive ,justification of ,realism4 #ae4 ,the ,dynamics of ,consciousness4 #af4 ,partial ,differentiation of ,subject and ,object4 #ag4 ,completed ,differentiation of ,subject and ,object4 #ah4 ,developed ,conception of the ,object4 #ai4 ,transfigured ,realism4 ,,part ,,viii4--,,congruities4 #a4 ,preliminary4 #b4 ,co-ordination of ,data and ,inductions4 #c4 ,co-ordination of ,syntheses4 #d4 ,co-ordination of ,special ,analyses4 #e4 ,co-ordination of ,general ,analyses4 #f4 ,final ,comparison4 ,,part ,,ix4--,,corollaries4 #a4 ,special ,psychology4 #b4 ,classification4 #c4 ,development of ,conceptions4 #d4 ,language of the ,emotions4 #e4 ,sociality and ,sympathy4 #f4 ,egoistic ,sentiments4 #g4 ,ego-,altruistic ,sentiments4 #h4 ,altruistic ,sentiments4 #i4 sthetic ,sentiments4 #crd ,edition1 revised and enlarged4 ,in #hvo41 cloth1 price #bas41 ,vol4 ,i4 of ,,the ,,principles ,,of ,,sociology4 ,,contents4 ,,part ,i4--,,the ,,data ,,of ,,sociology4 #a4 ,super-,organic ,evolution4 #b4 ,the ,factors of ,social ,phenomena4 #c4 ,original ,external ,factors4 #d4 ,original ,internal ,factors4 #e4 ,the ,primitive ,man--,physical4 #f4 ,the ,primitive ,man--,emotional4 #g4 ,the ,primitive ,man--,intellectual4 #h4 ,primitive ,ideas4 #i4 ,the ,ideas of the ,animate and the ,inanimate4 #aj4 ,the ,ideas of ,sleep and ,dreams4 #aa4 ,the ,ideas of ,swoon1 ,apoplexy1 ,catelepsy1 ,ecstacy1 and other forms of ,insensibility4 #ab4 ,the ,ideas of ,death and ,resurrection4 #ac4 ,the ,ideas of ,souls1 ,ghosts1 ,spirits1 ,demons4 #ad4 ,the ,ideas of ,another ,life4 #ae4 ,the ,ideas of ,another ,world4 #af4 ,the ,ideas of ,supernatural ,agents4 #ag4 ,supernatural ,agents as causing ,epilepsy and ,convulsive ,actions1 ,delirium and ,insanity1 ,disease and ,death4 #ah4 ,inspiration1 ,divination1 ,exorcism1 and ,sorcery4 #ai4 ,sacred ,places1 ,temples1 and ,altars2 ,sacrifice1 ,fasting1 and ,propitiation2 ,praise and ,prayer4 #bj4 ,ancestor-,worship in ,general4 #ba4 ,idol-,worship and ,fetich-,worship4 #bb4 ,animal-,worship4 #bc4 ,plant-,worship4 #bd4 ,nature-,worship4 #be4 ,deities4 #bf4 ,the ,primitive ,theory of ,things4 #bg4 ,the ,scope of ,sociology4 ,,part ,,ii4--,,the ,,inductions ,,of ,,sociology4 #a4 ,what is a ,society8 #b4 ,a ,society is an ,organism4 #c4 ,social ,growth4 #d4 ,social ,structures4 #e4 ,social ,functions4 #f4 ,systems of ,organs4 #g4 ,the ,sustaining ,system4 #h4 ,the ,distributing ,system4 #i4 ,the ,regulating ,system4 #aj4 ,social ,types and ,constitutions4 #aa4 ,social ,metamorphoses4 #ab4 ,qualifications and ,summary4 ,,part ,,iii4--,,the ,,domestic ,,relations4 #a4 ,the ,maintenance of ,species4 #b4 ,the ,diverse ,interests of the ,species1 of the ,parents1 and of the ,offspring4 #c4 ,primitive ,relations of the ,sexes4 #d4 ,exogamy and ,endogamy4 #e4 ,promiscuity4 #f4 ,polyandry4 #g4 ,polygyny4 #h4 ,monogamy4 #i4 ,the ,family4 #aj4 ,the ,status of ,women4 #aa4 ,the ,status of ,children4 #ab4 ,domestic ,retrospect and ,prospect4 #bnd ,thousand4 ,in #hvo1 cloth1 price #ahs4 ,vol4 ,,ii of ,,the ,,principles ,,of ,,sociology4 7,containing the two following divisions1 which may still be had separately47 ,in one vol4 #hvo1 cloth1 price #gs41 ,,ceremonial ,,institutions4 ,,contents4 #a4 ,ceremony in ,general4 #b4 ,trophies4 #c4 ,mutilations4 #d4 ,presents4 #e4 ,visits4 #f4 ,obeisances4 #g4 ,forms of ,address4 #h4 ,titles4 #i4 ,badges and ,costumes4 #aj4 ,further ,class-,distinctions4 #aa4 ,fashion4 #ab4 ,ceremonial ,retrospect and ,prospect4 ,in one vol4 #hvo1 cloth1 price #abs4 ,,political ,,institutions4 ,,contents4 #a4 ,preliminary4 #b4 ,political ,organization in ,general4 #c4 ,political ,integration4 #d4 ,political ,differentiation4 #e4 ,political ,forms and ,forces4 #f4 ,political ,heads--,chiefs1 ,kings1 etc4 #g4 ,compound ,political ,heads4 #h4 ,consultative ,bodies4 #i4 ,representative ,bodies4 #aj4 ,ministries4 #aa4 ,local ,governing ,agencies4 #ab4 ,military ,systems4 #ac4 ,judicial ,systems4 #ad4 ,laws4 #ae4 ,property4 #af4 ,revenue4 #ag4 ,the ,militant ,type of ,society4 #ah4 ,the ,industrial ,type of ,society4 #ai4 ,political ,retrospect and ,prospect4 #bnd ,thousand4 ,in one vol4 #hvo41 cloth1 price #es4 ,,ecclesiastical ,,institutions4 7,being ,part ,,vi4 of the ,,principles ,,of ,,sociology47 ,,contents4 #a4 ,the ,religious ,idea4 #b4 ,medicine-men and ,priests4 #c4 ,priestly ,duties of ,descendants4 #d4 ,eldest ,male ,descendants as ,quasi-,priests4 #e4 ,the ,ruler as ,priest4 #f4 ,the ,rise of a ,priesthood4 #g4 ,polytheistic and ,monotheistic ,priesthoods4 #h4 ,ecclesiastical ,hierarchies4 #i4 ,an ,ecclesiastical ,system as a ,social ,bond4 #aj4 ,the ,military ,functions of ,priests4 #aa4 ,the ,civil ,functions of ,priests4 #ab4 ,church and ,state4 #ac4 ,nonconformity4 #ad4 ,the ,moral ,influences of ,priesthoods4 #ae4 ,ecclesiastical ,retrospect and ,prospect4 #af4 ,religious ,retrospect and ,prospect4 #eth ,thousand4 ,,with ,,an ,,appendix1 ,,containing ,,an ,,additional ,,chapter1 ,,and ,,replies ,,to ,,criticisms4 ,in one vol4 #hvo1 cloth1 price #hs41 ,,the ,,data ,,of ,,ethics4 7,being ,part ,i4 of the ,,principles ,,of ,,ethics47 ,,contents4 #a4 ,conduct in ,general4 #b4 ,the ,evolution of ,conduct4 #c4 ,good and ,bad ,conduct4 #d4 ,ways of ,judging ,conduct4 #e4 ,the ,physical ,view4 #f4 ,the ,biological ,view4 #g4 ,the ,psychological ,view4 #h4 ,the ,sociological ,view4 #i4 ,criticisms and ,explanations4 #aj4 ,the ,relativity of ,pains and ,pleasures4 #aa4 ,egoism versus ,altruism4 #ab4 ,altruism versus ,egoism4 #ac4 ,trial and ,compromise4 #ad4 ,conciliation4 #ae4 ,absolute ,ethics and ,relative ,ethics4 #af4 ,the ,scope of ,ethics4 ,,other ,,works4 #eth ,thousand4 ,in one vol4 #hvo1 cloth1 price #fs41 ,,education3 ,,intellectual1 ,,moral1 ,,and ,,physical4 ,,contents4 #a4 ,what ,knowledge is of most ,worth8 #b4 ,intellectual ,education4 #c4 ,moral ,education4 #d4 ,physical ,education4 ,also1 #bjth and #bast ,thousand1 ,a ,,cheap ,,edition ,,of ,,the ,,foregoing ,,work4 ,in one vol4 crown #hvo1 price #bs4 #f;d4 ,library ,edition 7the #ith71 with a ,postscript4 ,in one vol41 price #ajs4 #f;d41 ,,the ,,study ,,of ,,sociology4 ,,contents4 #a4 ,our ,need of it4 #b4 ,is there a ,social ,science8 #c4 ,nature of the ,social ,science4 #d4 ,difficulties of the ,social ,science4 #e4 ,objective ,difficulties4 #f4 ,subjective ,difficulties--,intellectual4 #g4 ,subjective ,difficulties--,emotional4 #h4 ,the ,educational ,bias4 #i4 ,the ,bias of ,patriotism4 #aj4 ,the ,class-,bias4 #aa4 ,the ,political ,bias4 #ab4 ,the ,theological ,bias4 #ac4 ,discipline4 #ad4 ,preparation in ,biology4 #ae4 ,preparation in ,psychology4 #af4 ,conclusion4 ,postscript4 #ajth ,thousand4 ,in wrapper1 #as41 in cloth1 better paper1 #bs4 #f;d4 ,,the ,,man ,,versus ,,the ,,state4 ,,contents4 #a4 ,the ,new ,toryism4 #b4 ,the ,coming ,slavery4 #c4 ,the ,sins of ,legislators4 #d4 ,the ,great ,political ,superstition4 ,postscript4 #dth ,thousand4 ,in two vols4 #hvo1 cloth1 price #afs41 ,,essays3 ,,scientific1 ,,political1 ,,and ,,speculative4 ,,contents ,,of ,,vol4 ,i4 #a4 ,progress3 its ,law and ,cause4 #b4 ,manners and ,fashion4 #c4 ,the ,genesis of ,science4 #d4 ,the ,physiology of ,laughter4 #e4 ,the ,origin and ,function of ,music4 #f4 ,the ,nebular ,hypothesis4 #g4 ,bain on the ,emotions and the ,will4 #h4 ,illogical ,geology4 #i4 ,the ,development ,hypothesis4 #aj4 ,the ,social ,organism4 #aa4 ,use and ,beauty4 #ab4 ,the ,sources of ,architectural ,types4 #ac4 ,the ,use of ,anthropomorphism4 ,,contents ,,of ,,vol4 ,,ii4 #a4 ,the ,philosophy of ,style4 #b4 ,over-,legislation4 #c4 ,the ,morals of ,trade4 #d4 ,personal ,beauty4 #e4 ,representative ,government4 #f4 ,prison ,ethics4 #g4 ,railway ,morals and ,railway ,policy4 #h4 ,gracefulness4 #i4 ,state-,tamperings with ,money and ,banks4 #aj4 ,parliamentary ,reform3 the ,dangers and the ,safeguards4 #aa4 ,mill versus ,hamilton--the ,test of ,truth4 #crd ,edition4 ,in one vol4 #hvo41 price #hs41 ,,third ,,series ,,of ,,essays3 ,,contents4 #a4 ,the ,classification of the ,sciences 7with a ,postscript1 replying to ,criticisms74 #b4 ,reasons for ,dissenting from the ,philosophy of ,m4 ,comte4 #c4 ,laws in ,general4 #d4 ,the ,origin of ,animal-,worship4 #e4 ,specialized ,administration4 #f4 8,the ,collective ,wisdom40 #g4 ,political ,fetichism4 #h4 ,what is ,electricity8 #i4 ,the ,constitution of the ,sun4 #aj4 ,mr4 ,martineau on ,evolution4 #aa4 ,replies to ,criticisms4 #ab4 ,transcendental ,physiology4 #ac4 ,the ,comparative ,psychology of ,man4 ,price #bs4 #f;d41 ,,the ,,factors ,,of ,,organic ,,evolution4 ,,descriptive ,,sociology2 ,,or ,,groups ,,of ,,sociological ,,facts1 ,,classified ,,and ,,arranged ,,by ,,herbert ,,spencer1 ,,compiled ,,and ,,abstracted ,,by ,,david ,,duncan1 ,m4,a41 ,professor of ,logic1 c41 in the ,presidency ,college1 ,madras2 ,,richard ,,scheppig1 ,ph4,d42 and ,,james ,,collier4 ,,extract ,,from ,,the ,,provisional ,,preface4 ,something to introduce the work of which an instalment is annexed1 seems needful1 in anticipation of the time when completion of a volume will give occasion for a ,permanent ,preface4 ,in preparation for ,the ,principles of ,sociology1 requiring as bases of induction large accumulations of data1 fitly arranged for comparison1 ,i1 some twelve years ago1 commenced1 by proxy1 the collection and organization of facts presented by societies of different types1 past and present2 being fortunate enough to secure the services of gentlemen competent to carry on the process in the way ,i wished4 ,though this classified compilation of materials was entered upon solely to facilitate my own work2 yet1 after having brought the mode of classification to a satisfactory form1 and after having had some of the ,tables filled up1 ,i decided to have the undertaking executed with a view to publication2 the facts collected and arranged for easy reference and convenient study of their relations1 being so presented1 apart from hypothesis1 as to aid all students of ,social ,science in testing such conclusions as they have drawn and in drawing others4 ,the ,work consists of three large ,divisions4 ,each comprises a set of ,tables exhibiting the facts as abstracted and classified1 and a mass of quotations and abridged abstracts otherwise classified1 on which the statements contained in the ,tables are based4 ,the condensed statements1 arranged after a uniform manner1 give1 in each ,table or succession of ,tables1 the phenomena of all orders which each society presents--constitute an account of its morphology1 its physiology1 and 7if a society having a known history7 its development4 ,on the other hand1 the collected ,extracts1 serving as authorities for the statements in the ,tables1 are 7or1 rather will be1 when the ,work is complete7 classified primarily according to the kinds of phenomena to which they refer1 and secondarily according to the societies exhibiting these phenomena2 so that each kind of phenomenon as it is displayed in all societies1 may be separately studied with convenience4 ,in further explanation ,i may say that the classified compilations and digests of materials to be thus brought together under the title of ,descriptive ,sociology1 are intended to supply the student of ,social ,science with data1 standing towards his conclusions in a relation like that in which accounts of the structures and functions of different types of animals stand to the conclusions of the biologist4 ,until there had been such systematic descriptions of different kinds of organisms1 as made it possible to compare the connexions1 and forms1 and actions1 and modes of origin1 of their parts1 the ,science of ,life could make no progress4 ,and in like manner1 before there can be reached in ,sociology1 generalizations having a certainty making them worthy to be called scientific1 there must be definite accounts of the institutions and actions of societies of various types1 and in various stages of evolution1 so arranged as to furnish the means of readily ascertaining what social phenomena are habitually associated4 ,respecting the tabulation1 devised for the purpose of exhibiting social phenomena in a convenient way1 ,i may explain that the primary aim has been so to present them that their relations of simultaneity and succession may be seen at one view4 ,as used for delineating uncivilized societies1 concerning which we have no records1 the tabular form serves only to display the various social traits as they are found to co-exist4 ,but as used for delineating societies having known histories1 the tabular form is so employed as to exhibit not only the connexions of phenomena existing at the same time1 but also the connexions of phenomena that succeed one another4 ,by reading horizontally across a ,table at any period1 there may be gained a knowledge of the traits of all orders displayed by the society at that period2 while by reading down each column1 there may be gained a knowledge of the modifications which each trait1 structural or functional1 underwent during successive periods4 ,of course1 the tabular form fulfils these purposes but approximately4 ,to preserve complete simultaneity in the statements of facts1 as read from side to side of the ,tables1 has proved impracticable2 here much had to be inserted1 and there little2 so that complete correspondence in time could not be maintained4 ,moreover1 it has not been possible to carry out the mode of classification in a theoretically-complete manner1 by increasing the number of columns as the classes of facts multiply in the course of ,civilization4 ,to represent truly the progress of things1 each column should divide and sub-divide in successive ages1 so as to indicate the successive differentiations of the phenomena4 ,but typographical difficulties have negatived this3 a great deal has had to be left in a form which must be accepted simply as the least unsatisfactory4 ,the three ,divisions constituting the entire work1 comprehend three groups of societies3--7#a7 ,uncivilized ,societies2 7#b7 ,civilized ,societies--,extinct or ,decayed2 7#c7 ,civilized ,societies--,recent or ,still ,flourishing4 ,these divisions have at present reached the following stages3 ,,division ,i4--,uncivilized ,societies4 ,commenced in #ahfg by the gentleman ,i first engaged1 ,mr4 ,,david ,,duncan1 ,m4,a4 7now ,professor of ,logic1 c41 in the ,presidency ,college1 ,madras71 and continued by him since he left ,england1 this part of the work is complete4 ,it contains four parts1 including 8,types of ,lowest ,races10 the 8,negrito ,races10 the 8,malayo-,polynesian ,races10 the 8,african ,races10 the 8,asiatic ,races10 and the 8,american ,races40 ,,division ,,ii4--,civilized ,societies--,extinct or ,decayed4 ,on this part of the work ,dr4 ,,richard ,,scheppig has been engaged since ,january1 #ahgb4 ,the first instalment1 including the four ,ancient ,american ,civilizations1 was issued in ,march1 #ahgd4 ,a second instalment1 containing 8,hebrews and ,phnicians10 will shortly be issued4 ,,division ,,iii4--,civilized ,societies--,recent or ,still ,flourishing4 ,of this ,division the first instalment1 prepared by ,mr4 ,,james ,,collier1 of ,st4 ,andrew's and ,edinburgh ,universities1 was issued in ,august1 #ahgc4 ,this presents the ,english ,civilization4 ,it covers seven consecutive ,tables2 and the ,extracts occupy seventy pages folio4 ,the next part1 presenting in a still more extensive form the ,french ,civilization1 is now in the press4 ,the successive parts belonging to these several ,divisions1 issued at intervals1 are composed of different numbers of ,tables and different numbers of ,pages4 ,the ,uncivilized ,societies occupy four parts1 each containing a dozen or more ,tables1 with their accompanying ,extracts4 ,of the ,division comprising ,extinct ,civilized ,societies1 the first part contains four1 and the second contains two4 ,while of ,existing ,civilized ,societies1 the records of which are so much more extensive1 each occupies a single part4 ,h4 ,s4 ,march1 #ahhj4 ,in ,royal ,folio1 ,price #ahs41 ,no4 ,i4 ,english4 ,,compiled ,,and ,,abstracted ,,by ,,james ,,collier4 ,in ,royal ,folio1 ,price #afs41 ,no4 ,,ii4 ,mexicans1 ,central ,americans1 ,chibchas1 and ,peruvians4 ,,compiled ,,and ,,abstracted ,,by ,,richard ,,scheppig1 ,,ph4,d4 ,in ,royal ,folio1 ,price #ahs41 ,no4 ,,iii4 ,lowest ,races1 ,negrito ,races1 and ,malayo-,polynesian ,races4 ,,compiled ,,and ,,abstracted ,,by ,,prof4 ,,duncan1 ,m4,a4 ,,types ,,of ,,lowest ,,races4 ,fuegians4 ,andamanese4 ,veddahs4 ,australians4 ,,negrito ,,races4 ,tasmanians4 ,new ,caledonians1 etc4 ,new ,guinea ,people4 ,fijians4 ,,malayo-,,polynesian ,,races4 ,sandwich ,islanders4 ,tahitians4 ,tongans4 ,samoans4 ,new ,zealanders4 ,dyaks4 ,javans4 ,sumatrans4 ,malagasy4 ,in ,royal ,folio1 ,price #afs41 ,no4 ,,iv4 ,african ,races4 ,,compiled ,,and ,,abstracted ,,by ,,prof4 ,,duncan1 ,m4,a4 ,bushmen4 ,hottentots4 ,damaras4 ,bechuanas4 ,kaffirs4 ,east ,africans4 ,congo ,people4 ,coast ,negroes4 ,inland ,negroes4 ,dahomans4 ,ashantis4 ,fulahs4 ,abyssinians4 ,in ,royal ,folio1 ,price #ahs41 ,no4 ,v4 ,asiatic ,races4 ,,compiled ,,and ,,abstracted ,,by ,,prof4 ,,duncan1 ,m4,a4 ,arabs4 ,todas4 ,khonds4 ,gonds4 ,bhils4 ,santals4 ,karens4 ,kukis4 ,nagas4 ,bodo and ,dhimals4 ,mishmis4 ,kirghiz4 ,kalmucks4 ,ostyaks4 ,kamtschadales4 ,in ,royal ,folio1 ,price #ahs41 ,no4 ,,vi4 ,american ,races4 ,,compiled ,,and ,,abstracted ,,by ,,prof4 ,,duncan1 ,m4,a4 ,esquimaux4 ,chinooks4 ,snakes4 ,comanches4 ,iroquois4 ,chippewayans4 ,chippewas4 ,dakotas4 ,mandans4 ,creeks4 ,guiana ,tribes4 ,caribs4 ,brazilians4 ,uaups4 ,abipones4 ,patagonians4 ,araucanians4 ,in ,royal ,folio1 ,price #bas41 ,no4 ,,vii4 ,hebrews and ,phnicians4 ,,compiled ,,and ,,abstracted ,,by ,,richard ,,scheppig1 ,,ph4,d4 ,in ,royal ,folio1 ,price #cjs41 ,no4 ,,viii4 ,french4 ,,compiled ,,and ,,abstracted ,,by ,,james ,,collier4 ,,mr4 ,,herbert ,,spencer',s ,,works4 ,a ,,system ,,of ,,synthetic ,,philosophy4 ,,first ,,principles #afs4 ,,principles ,,of ,,biology4 #b vols4 #cds4 ,,principles ,,of ,,psychology4 #b vols4 #cfs4 ,,principles ,,of ,,sociology1 ,vol4 ,i4 #bas4 ,,ditto ,vol4 ,,ii4 #ahs4 7,this ,volume includes the two following ,works1 which are at present published separately47 ,,ceremonial ,,institutions #gs4 ,,political ,,institutions #abs4 ,,ecclesiastical ,,institutions #es4 ,,the ,,data ,,of ,,ethics #hs4 ,,other ,,works4 ,,the ,,study ,,of ,,sociology #ajs4 #f;d4 ,,education #fs4 ,,ditto ,cheap ,edition #bs4 #f;d4 ,,essays4 #b vols4 #afs4 ,,essays 7,third ,series7 #hs4 ,,the ,,man versus ,,the ,,state #bs4 #f;d4 ,,ditto ,cheap ,edition #as4 ,,reasons ,,for ,,dissenting ,,from ,,the ,,philosophy ,,of ,m4 ,,comte #f;d4 ,,the ,,factors ,,of ,,organic ,,evolution #bs4 #f;d4 ,for particulars see end of the volume4 ,,williams ,,and ,,norgate1 #ad1 ,,henrietta ,,street1 ,,covent ,,garden1 ,,london4 ,,also ,,mr4 ,,spencer',s ,,descriptive ,,sociology1 ,,compiled ,,and ,,abstracted ,,by ,,prof4 ,,duncan1 ,,dr4 ,,scheppig1 ,,mr4 ,,collier4 ,,folio1 ,,boards4 #a4 ,,english #ahs4 #b4 ,,ancient ,,american ,,races #afs4 #c4 ,,lowest ,,races1 ,,negritos1 ,,polynesians #ahs4 #d4 ,,african ,,races #afs4 #e4 ,,asiatic ,,races #ahs4 #f4 ,,american ,,races #ahs4 #g4 ,,hebrews ,,and ,,ph,,nicians #bas4 #h4 ,,french #cjs4 ,for particulars see end of the volume4 ,,williams ,,and ,,norgate1 #ad1 ,,henrietta ,,street1 ,,covent ,,garden1 ,,london4 ,harrison ,sons1 ,printers1 ,st4 ,martin's ,lane4 ,,transcriber',s ,,note ,this is ,volume ,,ii 7#ahia7 of ,spencer's three volume series of ,essays4 ,volume ,i 7#ahia7 has been published by ,project ,gutenberg as ebook #bihfi4 ,volume ,,iii 7#aijd7 is 7ca #bjaf ,october7 in preparation at ,project ,gutenberg ,distributed ,proofreaders4 ,volume ,,iii contains an index for all three volumes4 ,original page scans are available from archive4org4 ,original spelling and grammar are generally retained1 with a few exceptions noted below4 ,original italics look like this4 ,footnotes were renumbered #a-fj1 changed to endnotes1 and moved to the ends of the appropriate essays4 ,original printed page numbers look like this3 #ce4 ,page #hd4 ,table ,i1 originally printed on an unnumbered page between pages #hd and #he1 has been moved to page #he1 and recast as a nested list so as to function well in ebook format4 ,in particular1 large curly brackets 80 intended to combine information on more than one line have been eliminated4 ,table ,,ii1 printed between pages #hh and #hi has been treated similarly1 and moved to page #hh4 ,table ,,iii1 printed between pages #ib and #ic has been moved to page #ib and treated similarly4 ,page #abe-acj4 ,in the comparison of ,compte's and ,spencer's propositions1 the two columns of the table were rewrapped into equal widths1 to fit a #gb character limit per line4 ,this removes the original printed line per line correspondence1 if any such was implied1 but the original arrangement of the paragraphs is retained4 ,the table of paragraphs on pp4 #aca-acb was treated in the same way4 ,on page #abf1 the phrase 8est essentiellement diffrent mme radicalement oppos01 clearly missing something in the original printed book1 was changed to 8est essentiellement diffrent et mme radicalement oppos04 ,page #aib4 ,the large white spaces in the clause 8,space is either or is 20 are retained from the printed book4