,,the ,,analogy ,,of ,,religion1 ,,to ,,the ,constitution and ,course of ,nature4 ,,to ,,which ,,are ,,added ,,two ,,brief ,,dissertations3 ,i4 ,,on ,,personal ,,identity4--,,ii4 ,,on ,,the ,,nature ,,of ,,virtue4 ,,by ,,joseph ,,butler1 ,d4,c4,l4 ,ejus ,analogi hc vis est1 ut id quod dubium est ad aliquid simile1 de quo non quritur referat ut incerta certis probet4--,,quintil4 l4 i4 c4 #f4 ,,with ,,an ,,introduction1 ,,notes1 ,,conspectus1 ,,and ,,ample ,,index1 ,,by ,,howard ,,malcom1 ,d4,d4 ,,president ,,of ,,the ,,university1 ,,lewisburg1 ,,pennsylvania4 ,,seventeenth ,,edition4 ,,philadelphia3 ,j4 ,b4 ,,lippincott ,,co4 #ahgc4 ,entered according to ,act of ,congress1 in the year #aheg1 by ,j4 ,b4 ,,lippincott ,,co4 in the ,clerk's ,office of the ,district ,court of the ,united ,states in and for the ,eastern ,district of ,pennsylvania4 ,,contents4 ,,page ,,editor',s ,,introduction #e 0 ,,preface #ai 0 ,,conspectus #ba ,,author',s ,,advertisement #ff 0 ,,introduction #fg ,,part ,i4 ,,of ,,natural ,,religion4 ,,chap4 ,i4--,a ,future ,life #gg ,,chap4 ,,ii4--,the ,government of ,god by ,rewards and ,punishments #ie ,,chap4 ,,iii4--,the ,moral ,government of ,god #aje ,,chap4 ,,iv4--,probation1 as implying ,trial1 ,difficulties1 and ,danger #abh ,,chap4 ,v4--,probation1 as intended for ,moral ,discipline and ,improvement #acf ,,chap4 ,,vi4--,the ,opinion of ,necessity1 considered as influencing ,practice #aeg ,,chap4 ,,vii4--,the ,government of ,god1 considered as a ,scheme or ,constitution1 imperfectly comprehended #aga ,,conclusion #ahj ,,part ,,ii4 ,,of ,,revealed ,,religion4 ,,chap4 ,i4--,the ,importance of ,christianity #ahf ,,chap4 ,,ii4--,the supposed ,presumption against a ,revelation1 considered as miraculous #bjb ,,chap4 ,,iii4--,our ,incapacity of judging1 what were to be expected in a ,revelation2 and the ,credibility1 from ,analogy1 that it must contain things appearing liable to ,objections #bji ,,chap4 ,,iv4--,christianity1 considered as a ,scheme or ,constitution1 imperfectly comprehended #bbc ,,chap4 ,v4--,the ,particular ,system of ,christianity2 the ,appointment of a ,mediator1 and the ,redemption of the ,world by him #bcj ,,chap4 ,,vi4--,want of ,universality in ,revelation2 and of the supposed ,deficiency in the ,proof of it #bdg ,,chap4 ,,vii4--,the ,particular ,evidence for ,christianity #bfc ,,chap4 ,,viii4--,objections against arguing from the ,analogy of ,nature to ,religion #bif ,,conclusion #cjf ,,dissertations4 ,,dissertation ,i4--,personal ,identity #cag ,,dissertation ,,ii4--,the ,nature of ,virtue #cbd ,,index ,,to ,,part ,i #ccc ,,index ,,to ,,part ,,ii #cdc ,editor's ,introduction ,,joseph ,,butler was born at ,wantage1 ,england1 ,may #ahth1 #afib1 the youngest of eight children4 ,the biographies of that day were few and meagre2 and in few cases is this so much to be regretted as in ,butler's4 ,it would have been both interesting and profitable to trace the development and occupations of one of the mightiest of human minds4 ,but no cotemporary gathered up the incidents of his life1 and now all efforts to elicit them have been without success4 ,his father was a prosperous dry-goods merchant1 who1 at the time of his son's birth1 had retired from business with a competency1 and resided in a suburban mansion called 8,the ,priory10 still in existence4 ,being a non-conformist1 he educated ,joseph at a 8dissenting0 academy at ,gloucester1 under ,,samuel ,,jones1 a gentleman of great ability1 and a skilful instructor1 who raised up some of the greatest men of their day4#a ,it was while a member of this academy1 and about the age of twenty-one1 that ,butler disclosed to the world his wonderful power of abstract reasoning1 in his famous correspondence with ,samuel ,clarke1 in relation to that eminent author's 8,demonstration of the ,being and ,attributes of ,god40 ,this correspondence is now generally inserted at the end of that work4 ,mr4 ,butler having deliberately adopted ,episcopal views1 and resolved to unite himself with the ,established ,church1 his father1 with praiseworthy liberality1 sent him to ,oxford1 where he entered ,oriel ,college1 ,march1 #agad4 ,of his college life there is no account2 nor of the time and place of his ordination4 ,he removed to ,london in #agah1 on receiving the appointment of 8,preacher at the ,rolls40 ,his famous ,fifteen ,sermons were preached in that chapel1 and published before resigning the place1 with a dedication to ,sir ,joseph ,jekyl1 8as a parting mark of gratitude for the favors received during his connection with that learned society40 ,one of ,butler's warmest college friends was ,edward ,talbot second son of a clergyman who afterwards became ,bishop of ,durham4 ,this admirable young man died of smallpox2 in his last hours recommending ,butler to his father's patronage2 and scarcely had that gentleman attained the see of ,durham1 before he gave ,mr4 ,b4 the living of ,haughton1 from whence he transferred him1 in #agbe1 to the richer benefice of ,stanhope4 ,on receiving this honorable and lucrative appointment1 he resigned the ,lectureship at the ,rolls1 and in the autumn of #agbf retired to his beautiful residence at ,stanhope4 ,here1 without a family to occupy his time1 he devoted himself to his great work1 the ,analogy3 using horseback exercise1 seeing little company1 living abstemiously and caring for his flock4 ,seven years thus rolled away2 when to draw him from what seemed to his friends too great retirement and application1 ,lord-,chancellor ,talbot made him his chaplain1 and afterwards1 in #agcf1 gave him a prebend's stall in ,rochester4 ,in #agcf1 ,butler being now forty-four1 ,caroline1 consort of ,george ,,ii41 appointed him 8,clerk of the ,closet10 an office which merely required his attendance at the ,queen's apartments every evening1 from seven to nine4 ,being now in ,london1 convenient to the press1 and enjoying both leisure and competency1 he published his immortal ,,analogy--the cherished work of his life4 ,the ,queen was delighted with the book1 and made herself master of its glorious array of reasoning4 ,but she died the same year1 and he lost not only a patroness1 but a friend4 ,he returned to his benefice at ,stanhope1 the income of which had been held during his residence in ,london4 ,on her death-bed1 the ,queen had urged her husband to promote her honored chaplain to a bishopric2 and next year1 the see of ,norwich becoming vacant1 the ,bishop of ,bristol was translated to it1 and the see of ,bristol given to ,butler4 ,bristol was the poorest bishopric in ,england1 its emoluments being but #b1jjj per annum2 less than those of the rectorship of ,stanhope4 ,butler distinctly disclosed his disappointment in his letter to the minister ,walpole1 accepting the position2 and declared that he did not think it 8very suitable to the condition of his fortune1 nor answerable to the recommendation with which he was honored40 ,the king was not displeased at this candor1 and in #agdj improved his income by giving him1 in addition to his bishopric1 the profitable and influential office of ,dean of ,st4 ,paul's4 ,butler1 who had retained the living of ,stanhope along with his bishopric1 now resigned that rectorship4 8,the rich revenues10 says ,professor ,fitzgerald1 8of the ,deanery of ,st4 ,paul1 enabled him to gratify his taste at ,bristol40 ,he expended about #be1jjj in improving and beautifying the episcopal residence and gardens4 ,he fostered useful charities1 and employed his wealth for others rather than for himself4 ,in #agej1 upon the death of ,dr4 ,edward ,chandler1 ,bishop of ,durham1 ,butler was promoted to that see1 the most honorable and lucrative in ,england4 ,he had before been offered the ,primacy1 on the death of ,archbishop ,potter1 but declined it1 with the remark that 8it was too late for him to try to support a falling church40 ,on assuming his diocese at ,durham1 ,butler delivered and published his famous ,charge to the ,clergy1 upon 8,the ,use and ,importance of ,external ,religion40 ,he was at once assailed vigorously1 in pamphlets and papers1 by ,archdeacon ,blackburn1 the ,rev4 ,t4 ,lindsay1 and others1 on the charge of ,popery2 an imputation which is still sometimes cast upon him1 and which finds some slender support in his setting up a marble cross over the communion-table at ,bristol4 ,that he never was a ,papist1 is now so evident1 that we can account for the imputation only by the strong jealousy of the ,romish ,church then prevalent4 ,butler now became still more munificent4 ,his private charities were exceedingly generous1 and his public ones seemed sometimes to border on extravagance4 ,he gave #b1jjj a year to the county hospital1 and often gave away thousands of dollars at a time4 ,but though quite lavish in buildings and ornaments1 as well as in benevolence1 he was remarkably frugal in his personal expenses4 ,it is said of him1 by ,rev4 ,john ,newton1 that on one occasion1 when a distinguished visitor dined with him by appointment1 the provision consisted of a single joint of meat1 and a pudding4 ,the bishop remarked to his guest on that occasion1 that he 8had long been disgusted with the fashionable expense of time and money in entertainments1 and was determined that it should receive no countenance from his example40 ,of his amusements we know little except that he took much horseback exercise1 and often employed his secretary1 ,mr4 ,emms1 to play for him on the organ4 ,butler held the see of ,durham less than two years4 ,symptoms of general physical decay betrayed themselves about the time of his promotion1 and in spite of all that skill and affection could prompt1 he sunk to rest ,june #afth1 #ageb1 aged sixty4 ,he was never married4 ,a considerable number of his sermons and charges have been printed1 but are too philosophical to be generally read4 ,his great work is the ,analogy1 published in #agcf1 and from that day read and admired by every highly-cultivated mind4 ,he was induced to write by a state of things very remarkable in the history of religion4 ,debauchery and infidelity were almost universal1 not in any one class of society but in all4 ,england had reached the culminating point of irreligion1 and the firm re-establishment of ,episcopacy had as yet done nothing to mend the nation's morals4 ,piety was deemed a mark of ignorance and vulgarity1 and multitudes of those who professed it were persecuted to dungeons and death4 ,infidel writers1 warmed into life by court corruption1 became more numerous and audacious than ever before4 ,their methods of attacking ,christianity were various2 but the most successful then1 as always1 was to impugn certain doctrines and declarations of the ,sacred ,scriptures1 as irrational1 and hence reject the whole4 ,they generally admitted the ,being and perfection of ,god1 and extolled the sufficiency of natural religion2 but denied any revelation1 or any necessity for one4 ,the verdict of the world was that the ,bible is not authentic1 that man is not accountable1 nor even probably immortal1 that ,god neither rewards nor punishes1 and that present indulgence1 as far as our nature admits1 is both wise and safe4 ,bishop ,downam1#b one of the most learned of the clergy1 in the early part of the seventeenth century writes thus3 8,in these times1 if a man do but labor to keep a good conscience1 though he meddle not with matters of state1 if he make conscience of swearing1 sanctify the ,sabbath1 frequent sermons1 or abstain from the common corruptions of the times1 he shall straightway be condemned for a puritan1 and be less favored than either a carnal gospeller1 or a close ,papist40 ,it was considered settled1 especially in polite circles1 that ,christianity1 after so long a prevalence1 had been found out to be an imposture4 ,the clergy1 as a body1 did nothing to dispel this moral gloom1 but rather increased it by their violent and scandalous conduct4 ,in the sad language of ,bishop ,warburton1 8,religion had lost its hold on the minds of the people40 ,he adds with great point1 8,though a rule of right may direct the philosopher to a principle of action2 and the point of honor may keep up the thing called manners1 among gentlemen3 yet nothing but religion can ever fix a sober standard of behavior among the common people40 ,even the universities were on the side of irreligion2 for professorships1 as well as pulpits1 were given to men1 not for positive worth and fitness1 but for possessing qualities then most in vogue with those who held the appointing power4 ,such were the trying times which had driven our pilgrim fathers to seek a home amid the wilds of an unexplored continent1 and to face the dangers of sea and savage4 ,it must ever be regarded as among the highest instances of ,god's bringing good out of evil1 that this outrageous rampancy of infidelity brought out a host of champions for the truth of ,his word2 who boldly met the odium of discipleship1 and waged battle in such style that the ,deistical controversy was settled forever4 ,never was a dispute more determined on both sides1 and never was victory more complete4 ,literary infidelity not only recoiled1 but was routed2 and can never again prevail4 ,henceforth1 no scholar will ever treat the evidences of ,christianity as a subject of ridicule or contempt4 ,when we contrast the stupendous learning1 and powerful logic1 of the ,christian writers of that century1 with the superficial and almost contemptible productions of the writers against whom they contended1 we are tempted to wonder why such power should be requisite to overthrow such weakness4 ,but we must remember1 that frail logic and shallow considerations1 will persuade men to indulge their vices2 while the soundest reasonings and the most impressive inducements1 with difficulty lead them to self-restraint and true holiness4 ,the infidel writers of that day have sunk into such oblivion that their works are now seldom found but in great libraries2 and even well-educated persons scarcely know more of them than their names4 ,yet so perfectly did their principles accord with the temper of the times and the universal depravity of the carnal heart1 that they enjoyed the highest popularity with all classes4 ,forever honored be the names of that noble band1 who1 in face of such odds1 established the authority of the ,bible1 and left the advocates of atheism and immorality without a lurking-place4#c ,in this noble cohort ,butler stands conspicuous3 and to him1 ,i think1 more than to all the others1 is to be attributed the sudden and total overthrow of infidelity1 when it was in its glory4 ,as a metaphysician1 few have equalled him4 ,what he added to the science1 has ever since remained a part of it1 which can be said of scarcely another4 ,he advanced more that was new1 fortified old positions more ably1 and applied speculation to religion more usefully than any before him4 ,our language furnishes no profounder thinking4 ,merely to understand him is an honorable distinction1 and requires no small previous training of the power of attention4 ,as a polemic1 he is keen1 sagacious1 candid1 patient1 persevering1 calm1 inventive1 and profound3 every page indicates that repose of mind1 which belongs only to true greatness1 combined with a full knowledge of the subject4 ,so far as ,i am able to judge1 he never presses a consideration beyond its just limits1 and seldom introduces an illustration which has not the force of an argument4 ,fallacies he seems to abolish at a touch4 ,the ,analogy employed much of his life4 ,it was begun in his twentieth year1 but was not published till he was forty-five4 ,such a mode of writing never makes large books1 for the matter1 constantly revised1 becomes constantly condensed4 ,the ,analogy is so condensed1 as that to make a satisfactory synopsis is scarcely practicable4 ,hence1 though my ,conspectus and notes have aided my pupils to understand and remember the argument1 they do not in any measure obviate the necessity of studying the book itself4 ,if they do not increase the number of those who shall studiously peruse the book itself1 my aim and expectations will be disappointed4 ,to this work no reply has ever been attempted6 ,extensive as is its diffusion1 and great as is its acknowledged influence1 infidelity has had the highest inducements to attempt to set it aside4 ,written for a present purpose1 and most signally accomplishing it1 it is yet so written as to endure1 in full value1 through all coming time4 ,it is undoubtedly 8the most original and the most profound work extant1 in any language1 on the philosophy of religion10#d 8the most argumentative and philosophical defence of ,christianity ever submitted to the world40#e ,writers in defence of ,christianity had1 before ,butler1 amply discussed the several departments of evidences2 but still there remained objections4 ,the structure of the globe1 the course of nature1 the organization of animals1 c4 were affirmed to contradict revelation4 ,its doctrines and duties1 moreover1 were pronounced inconsistent with sound reason4 ,butler repeats none of the old arguments1 but confines himself to the showing that the declarations of revelation are in perfect harmony with facts seen daily in the world1 and which all admit4 ,that the world might not have been ordered and governed otherwise1 he does not choose to dispute4 ,taking things as they are1 and closely studying the connection between one thing and another1 we ought to inquire what course of action on our part1 will conform to the needs of such a nature and such circumstances4 ,our bodies are constructed of parts1 all adapted to each other1 and also to one general end4 ,so too1 our souls4 ,and the two together have relations and adaptations1 which may1 to some extent at least1 indicate what is designed to be the general end of our existence4 ,if ,christianity befits these several parts of our mixed nature and their obvious uses1 then there is nothing incongruous between the two2 and no objections against ,christianity can be drawn from the course of nature4 ,on the contrary1 all seems to be governed as the gospel declares it is1 and shows that the ,author of man and the ,author of the ,bible is the same4 ,this is still more impressive when we consider that we have a moral faculty2 for it is the very object and business of this faculty to deal with right and wrong1 good and evil2 the facts and magnitudes of which are obvious in the course of nature4 ,if ,christianity does1 in an especial manner1 befit this faculty1 if it is adapted to promote our general rectitude and happiness1 and if it contains no principle which is not discernible in the government of the visible world1 then there is no discrepancy between ,christianity and ,providence4 ,this is ,butler's position4 ,he confines himself to proving such an analogy between revelation and the daily course of things1 as that nothing known in the universe can be offered in disproof of ,christianity4 ,the mode of warfare was new4 ,without professing to prove ,christianity to be true1 he demonstrates that it cannot be proved to be false2 and that if it be even probable1 the rejection of it is a gross folly and a tremendous hazard4 ,every objection against it he proves to be equally forcible against facts which constantly occur1 and which all admit1 though none profess to understand4 ,thus leaving the ramparts of the church to be guarded by the mighty men who had valiantly maintained its defence1 he quietly walked out into the camp of the enemy1 and spiked every gun6 ,it has been said that the whole argument of the 8,analogy0 seems to be built on ,ecclesiasticus xlii4 #bd3 8,all things are double1 one against the other1 and ,god hath made nothing imperfect40 ,if it be so1 it involves no disparagement to have received thus the seminal idea of this immortal work4 ,who else has so gloriously discerned and expanded the profound philosophy of the son of ,sirac8 ,others have uttered sentiments which seem to involve the whole exposition of ,butler4 ,origen affirms that 8he who believes the ,scripture to have proceeded from ,him who is the ,author of nature1 may well expect to find the same sort of difficulties in it1 as are found in nature40 ,shall we assign to ,origen the whole credit of the 8,analogy08 ,as well might we bestow all our admiration for the delightful papers of ,addison1 in the ,spectator1 to the classical authors from whom he selected appropriate mottoes6 ,by such a rule1 the entire merit of this most ,christian work of ,butler should be attributed to the pagan ,quintilian1 from whom he derives the motto which so appropriately graces his title-page4 ,a rapid sketch of the outline of the argument will aid the student at his outset4 ,he begins by taking for granted the existence of an intelligent ,author and ,governor of the universe4 ,then1 from the conditions and changes observed in the visible world1 he argues the folly of objecting to revelation on account of doctrines which do but declare the same general laws and the same principles of government4 ,that there is this harmony1 he proves2 and hence the probability that the same sort of government will prevail hereafter1 which prevails now4 ,he demonstrates that man is under exactly such a probation in this world1 and as to this world1 as revelation affirms him to be under1 as to the next2 and that embarrassments produced by the doctrine of necessity1 involve nature no less than religion4 ,he then evinces the need that man should be placed in a state of training and trial1 if he is ever to be qualified for better conditions2 and that this world1 as now governed1 is exactly adapted to give that training1 and to produce such a character as will insure happiness under any possible contingencies4 ,this is the argument of ,part ,i4 ,proceeding to examine ,christianity1 he discusses its importance1 its proofs1 the unavoidableness of its containing strange things1 the absurdity of expecting fully to comprehend its statements1 and the abundance of its evidence for candid minds1 though they are not1 and ought not to be1 irresistible4 ,he answers not only the objections to ,christianity1 but the objections against its proofs2 which he shows are very different things4 ,though he keeps rigidly to the refutation of objections1 and nowhere meddles with the direct evidence of ,christianity1 yet1 by removing every objection1 he does in fact confirm its claims4 ,this clearing away of objections1 after the usual proofs are presented1 crowns and completes the evidence4 ,thus the ultimate result of a study of his book is not only negative but positive2 and such has been its effect on every candid and competent student4 ,we should remember that we have no right to require the removal of objections1 and that therefore the whole of ,butler's work is in fact supererogatory2 a concession and kindness to such as have doubts1 either honest or captious4 ,our only rightful demand of ,christianity is for credentials4 ,it presents these in its nature1 its miracles1 its prophecies1 its propagation1 its influence1 and its success4 ,if these are competent1 we should bow to its teachings4 ,to suppose that we are capable of judging of the propriety of all ,god's law1 or even to understand his reasons for it1 if they were disclosed1 is absurd4 ,it is true we naturally presume that a revelation in words1 and a revelation by natural objects and the visible order of things1 would coincide2 but to find out the fact or the extent of such coincidence1 is not our first business4 ,we are to weigh the testimony in favor of religion1 embrace it1 if sufficient1 and attribute the obscurity of any part1 to our present want of capacity4 ,the solution of difficulties serves to confirm our faith in ,christianity1 but has no place in our ground of reception3 and we have no right to wait for such solution1 however painful and embarrassing may be the difficulties4 ,another1 and perhaps even more important1 use of the 8,analogy10 is to dissipate the prejudices and objections to ,christianity which prevent a candid study of its evidences4 ,these prepossess and poison the mind1 and obstruct or abate the force of the best arguments4 ,few1 if any1 after a careful examination of the positive evidences of ,christianity1 conclude them to be inadequate4 ,but many are they1 who having heard objections which their scanty learning does not enable them to answer1 and their no less scanty interest in the subject does not induce them to examine1 or which their inclinations lead them to cherish1 cast it all aside4 ,in this way they relieve themselves from the labor of investigation1 as well as their compunctions of conscience2 while they indulge both their love of sin and pride of singularity4 ,an instance of the use of this book to such a mind1 we have in the case of ,chalmers4 ,he had read1 when a young man1 several infidel productions4 ,their semblance of logic and learning1 and supercilious confidence of style1 disposed him to regard all religion as mere superstition4 ,his mind was poisoned4 ,accustomed as he had been to the positive and precise reasonings of mathematics1 he could not find similar proofs for ,christianity4 ,but he was induced1 by some friends1 to study ,butler's ,analogy4 ,this1 as he expresses it1 took ,christianity 8out of the class of unlikelihoods40 ,it brought him to the investigation1 as if the evidence was neither plus nor minus4 ,he examined the evidences as he would have done a declaration that ,cicero weighed just one hundred and fifty pounds2 open to the smallest proof or presumption on the positive side of the question4 ,delivered from prejudice1 not only against ,christianity but against its proofs1 he soon saw the madness of deism1 and immovably accepted the word of ,god1 though he did not1 at that time1 feel its transforming power on his own heart4 ,long afterwards he writes1 8,i cannot render sufficient homage to the argument1 which first1 addressing itself to the subject-matter of ,christianity1 relieves it of all disproof1 and pronounces it worthy of a trial2 and then1 addressing itself to the evidence of ,christianity1 relieves it of all objections1 and makes good1 to that evidence1 all the entireness and efficiency which natively belong to it40 ,years afterwards he said1 8,butler made me a ,christian40 ,that it did far more for him than to effect his change of sentiment1 that it continued to be a light in his firmament1 is touchingly told in the ,preface of his ,bridgewater ,treatise1 where he says1 8,i have derived greater aid from the views and reasonings of ,butler1 than ,i have been able to find1 besides1 in the whole range of our extant authorship40 ,to the sincere believer in the word of ,god the study of ,butler is of great use4 ,doubts are among ,satan's tried weapons1 and often haunt the holiest1 especially if of a contemplative turn4 ,they see goodness oppressed1 and vice rampant2 the world ruled by wicked men1 and truth making its way with difficulty4 ,their hearts are traitorous1 their surroundings full of temptation1 and the direct evidence of ,christianity they may never have studied4 ,to such the analogical argument comes with full power1 meets a candid examination1 and prevails4 ,to no ,christian is this book so useful as the minister4 ,he is constantly confronted by the difficulties which ,butler so triumphantly handles4 ,here he is furnished1 not only with a shield to protect his own mind from subtle darts1 but a sword to demolish the cavil1 and defend the system of which he is a public teacher4 ,to all persons this book is of great value4 ,we arrive at certainty in but few of our decisions1 and are often obliged1 even in matters of great moment1 to act on probability4 ,thus we employ precautions when an evil is not certain to occur4 ,if the evil would be very serious1 we adopt the precaution1 when there is but little probability1 or perhaps a bare possibility1 of its occurrence4 ,now1 ,butler has shown that if the proofs of revelation were weak1 nay1 if it had absolutely no proof1 nay further1 if on fair examination there appeared not even a probability of its truth1 still there would remain a possibility1 and this alone1 considering the tremendous issues at stake1 should make every man a ,christian4 ,this argument cannot be applied to ,mahometanism or any other religion1 because against those much may be advanced as disproof4 ,our author1 having shown the utter absence of disproof1 shuts us up to the reception of ,christianity1 were its truth barely possible4 ,there have not been wanting persons to disparage the 8,analogy10 because it affords1 as they say1 no direct proof of revelation4 ,as well might we demand a discussion of chemistry in a work on astronomy4 ,scores of writers prove ,christianity1 and here we have one to relieve us from the difficulties which beset it1 and objections which still remain4 ,there is an aspect in which the ,analogy may be said to contribute the best of proof4 ,what can go further towards establishing a point1 than to demonstrate that there is no proof of the contrary8 ,what can show the fallacy of a set of objections1 more than to prove that they might be urged with no less force against the obvious course of nature8 ,this use of analogy is conformable to the severest logic1 and though offering no pretence of positive argument1 goes far towards establishing full conviction4 8,the probabilities10 says ,,stewart1 8resulting from a concurrence of different analogies1 may rise so high as to produce an effect on the belief scarcely distinguishable from moral certainty40 ,when it is considered that ,butler's argument is wholly in addition to the cumulative mass of direct and almost irresistible evidence1 and removes even the objections which attend the subject1 we see the rejection of ,christianity to be inexpressibly rash and absurd4 ,we see the skeptic condemned at his own bar1 for acting in the most momentous of all possible concerns1 in a manner the very opposite of that which he calls sensible and prudent in his ordinary affairs4 ,the 8,analogy0 establishes1 beyond cavil1 strong presumptions that ,christianity is true1 aside from all inspection of its proofs4 ,the man1 therefore1 who really understands this book1 and refuses to be a ,christian1 is led by his lusts and not his reason4 ,some admirers of this book have lamented as a defect1 its want of evangelical tincture1 and its exclusive reference to natural things4 ,to me1 this is a prime recommendation4 ,were it otherwise1 the reasoning would be in a circle4 ,the very structure of the argument demands that it should avoid quotations from the ,bible4 ,it must be admitted1 however1 that some expressions1 taken just as they stand1 without qualification by the current of the argument1 tend to lead astray4 ,for instance1 8,there is nothing in the human mind contrary to virtue40 8,men's happiness and virtue are left to themselves40 8,religion requires nothing which we are not well able to perform40 8,our repentance is accepted1 to eternal life40 8,our relations to ,god are made known by reason40 ,such expressions are not to be taken alone1 but as explained by the general drift of sentiment and doctrine4 ,no one can be familiar with his works1 without finding the fullest evidence that ,christianity was to ,butler infinitely more than a creed or a ritual4 ,nor should we forget that such expressions are not to be interpreted by the tenor of the 8,analogy0 only1 but by that of his whole #8,works4' ,even if it be judged that he everywhere fails to express himself in such phrase as we usually call evangelical1 it should be remembered that he was a ,church-of-,england man1 at a time when there was a powerful reaction against the evangelism of the ,puritans1 and when a real lack of emotional piety was general in his church4 ,that he did not enjoy in his last illness1 which extended over a long period1 that sustaining sense of the love of ,christ which hearty ,christians generally feel1 is certain4 ,a friend1 trying to relieve his depression1 reminded him of his excellent life1 and especially his wide liberalities4 ,he immediately replied1 8l am but a steward6 ,all is ,his1 intrusted to me1 to promote his glory and the good of mankind2 how can ,i know that ,i have not abused the trust8 ,i reflect on all these things1 and they fill my soul with terror by the feeling of responsibility they awaken40 ,on another occasion1 his chaplain sought to soothe his troubled spirit by referring to the extensive influence of his ,analogy in reclaiming skeptics4 ,his reply was1 8,i began the ,analogy with a view to the glory of ,god2 but as ,i proceeded1 visions of the fame it might bring me mingled themselves with my motives1 and all was polluted and made sinful6 ,the book may be a blessing to others1 but it weighs like lead on my soul40 8,admit all this10 tenderly replied the chaplain2 8yet has not ,jesus said1 #8,whosoever cometh unto me shall in no wise be cast out'80 ,instantly the ,bishop raised himself in the bed1 exclaiming1 8,how wonderful that the force of this passage never struck me before6 #8,whosoever1'--all1 ,,all6 #8,in no wise1'--no amount of sin can prevent acceptance6 ,christ's righteousness will hide the iniquities of all who accept his offer of mercy60 ,from that time1 for weeks1 ,butler spoke to all who approached him1 of a full and free salvation4 ,he died triumphantly repeating this passage4 ,if all that is said of the lack of evangelical sentiment in ,butler or his book be conceded1 it certainly cannot impair either the value of the analogical argument1 or the force of our author's use of it4 ,various circumstances conspire to make the study of 8,the ,analogy0 difficult4 ,the nature of the reasoning--the conciseness1 and often obscurity of the style--the dislocation of parts by frequent digressions--the arrest of a close course of reasoning to answer objections--and the abstruseness of the subject itself--combine to make the full comprehension of its import difficult4 ,mackintosh says1 8,no thinker so great1 was ever so bad a writer40 ,but this1 like some other objections of ,sir ,james1 is stated too strongly4 ,the language is good1 sinewy ,saxon1 and will endure when much that is now called fine writing1 will seem grotesque4 ,still it is possible to write philosophy in better phrase1 as has been shown by at least two great men1 ,berkeley and ,stewart4 ,had ,butler but possessed the glowing style of ,berkeley1 or the smooth1 graceful1 and transparent diction of ,dugald ,stewart1 his work1 instead of serving only for close thinkers1 or a college text-book1 would have been read by all classes1 and banished that vulgar infidelity which flippant writers still disseminate4 ,that it is thus restricted in its influence is a misfortune to the world4 ,but he wrote for a class1 and did his work completely4 ,literary infidelity was conquered4 ,vulgar1 ignorant1 licentious infidelity1 will always exist1 and is even now deplorably prevalent4 ,both ,europe and ,america contain conceited and malignant ignoramuses1 who by their sneers1 their cavils1 and their audacity1 make havoc of souls4 ,of these1 ,tom ,paine is a type1 whose book1 the contempt of cultivated minds1 continues to be sold and read4 ,for this class of persons1 8,baxter's ,call10 or 8,alleine's ,alarm10 are far more suitable than treatises on the evidences of ,christianity1 or even ,butler's ,analogy4 ,editor's ,preface4 ,the text is the result of a careful collation of the various principal editions4 ,occasionally solecisms are corrected1 and a word transposed or put in italics1 when a sentence could thus be made perspicuous4 ,the author had a fashion of beginning a large proportion of his sentences with 8and10 8but10 8now10 8indeed10 8however10 c41 which often served to perplex1 and in such cases they have been omitted4 ,long paragraphs1 comprehending different topics1 have been so divided as to correspond with the true analysis2 which will greatly assist the student in detecting the successive stages of the argument4 ,special pains has been taken to correct and improve the punctuation4 ,hundreds of sentences have thus been rendered more perspicuous1 and many which were obscure1 have been made lucid4 ,in no respect was ,butler's style1 as printed1 so defective4 ,the ,conspectus is made much ampler than any other1 for this reason3 that students are apt to content themselves with such help instead of mastering the full discussion by the author4 ,in the present case they cannot so do1 for such is the fulness of the ,conspectus1 that if they master this1 they have mastered the subject itself in full4 ,notes by the present editor are distinguished from those of the author by being enclosed in brackets4 ,they are designed to open out further views1 to elucidate the text1 to facilitate extended researches1 and to suggest topics for conversation in the class-room4 ,the ,index has cost far more labor than would be supposed1 and may not be of much benefit to the undergraduate4 ,its advantages will not be small to him in after life when he desires to recur to particular topics4 ,the general scholar will find it enables him to make use of the book for occasional reference4 ,without it the work is not complete for the class-room1 still less for the library4 ,that students of the ,analogy need help1 is confessed2 and all attempts to furnish it have been kindly received4 ,as is remarked by ,bishop ,wilson1 8,his argument1 clear and convincing as it is to a prepared mind1 is not obvious to the young reader1 whose experience of life being small1 and his habits of reflection feeble1 has not the furniture necessary for comprehending1 at first1 the thoughts and conclusions of such a mind4 ,the style is too close1 too negligent1 too obscure1 to be suitable for the young40 ,if it be asked why1 with several existing helps to the study of the ,analogy1 ,i offer another1 ,i frankly reply1 because ,i have found none of them satisfactory1 either to the public or to myself4 99 99 99 99 99 ,some teachers prefer their text-books to be accompanied by a set of questions4 ,such will find in this edition all they desire4 ,they have only to enunciate each sentence of the ,conspectus in the interrogative form1 and they will have every possible question prepared to their hand4 ,conspectus of the ,author's ,introduction4 ,i4 ,what is probable evidence8 #a4 ,it differs from demonstration in that it admits of degrees2 of all degrees4 #a47 ,one probability does not beget assurance4 #b47 ,but the slightest presumption makes a probability4 #c47 ,the repetition of it may make certainty4 #b4 ,what constitutes probability is likeness2 in regard to the event itself1 or its kind of evidences1 or its circumstances4 #a47 ,this daily affords presumptions1 evidence1 or conviction3 according as it is occasional1 common1 or constant4 #b47 ,measures our hopes and fears4 #c47 ,regulates our expectations as to men's conduct4 #d47 ,enables us to judge of character from conduct4 #c4 ,it is an imperfect mode of judging1 and adapted to beings of limited capacities4 #d4 ,where better evidence cannot be had1 it constitutes moral obligation1 even though great doubts remain4 #a47 ,we are as much bound to do what1 on the whole1 appears to be best1 as if we knew it to be so4 #b47 ,in questions of great moment1 it is reasonable to act when the favorable chances are no greater than the unfavorable4 #c47 ,there are numberless cases in which a man would be thought distracted if he did not act1 and that earnestly1 where the chances of success were greatly against him4 ,,ii4 ,the use and application of probabilities4 ,shall not go further into the nature of probable evidence1 nor inquire why likeness begets presumption and conviction2 nor how far analogical reasoning can be reduced to a system2 but shall only show how just and conclusive this mode of reasoning is4 #a4 ,in determining our judgments and practice4 #a47 ,there may be cases in which its value is doubtful4 #b47 ,there may be seeming analogies1 which are not really such4 #c47 ,but as a mode of argument1 it is perfectly just and conclusive4 #b4 ,in noting correspondencies between the different parts of ,god's government4 #a47 ,we may expect to find the same sort of difficulties in the ,bible1 as we do in ,nature4 #b47 ,to deny the ,bible to be of ,god1 because of these difficulties1 requires us to deny that the world was made by him4 #c47 ,if there be a likeness between revelation and the system of nature1 it affords a presumption that both have the same author4 #d47 ,to reason on the construction and government of the world1 without settling foundation-principles1 is mere hypothesis4 #e47 ,to apply principles which are certain1 to cases which are not applicable1 is no better4 #f47 ,but to join abstract reasonings to the observation of facts1 and argue1 from known present things1 to what is likely or credible1 must be right4 #g47 ,we cannot avoid acting thus1 if we act at all4 #c4 ,in its application to religion1 revealed1 as well as natural4 ,this is the use which will be made of analogy in the following work4 ,in so using it1 #a47 ,it will be taken for proved that there is an intelligent ,creator and ,ruler4 --,there are no presumptions against this1 prior to proof4 --,there are proofs3--from analogy1 reason1 tradition1 c4 --,the fact is not denied by the generality of skeptics4 #b47 ,no regard will be paid to those who idly speculate as to how the world might have been made and governed4 --,such prating would amount to this3 ,all creatures should have been made at first as happy as they could be4 ,nothing of hazard should be put upon them4 ,should have been secured in their happiness4 ,all punishments avoided4 --,it is a sufficient reply to such talk that mankind have not faculties for such speculations4 #c47 ,we are1 to some extent1 judges as to ends2 and may conclude that ,nature and ,providence are designed to produce virtue and happiness2 but of the means of producing these in the highest degree1 we are not competent judges4 --,we know not the extent of the universe2 --,nor even how one person can best be brought to perfection4 --,we are not often competent to judge of the conduct of each other4 --,as to ,god1 we may presume that order will prevail in his universe2 but are no judges of his modes for accomplishing this end4 #d47 ,instead of vainly1 and perhaps sinfully1 imagining schemes for ,god's conduct1 we must study what is4 --,discovering general laws4 --,comparing the known course of things with what revelation teaches us to expect4 ,,iii4 ,the force of this use of ,analogy4 #a4 ,sometimes is practically equivalent to proof4 #b4 ,confirms what is otherwise proved4 #c4 ,shows that the system of revelation is no more open to ridicule1 than the system of nature4 #d4 ,answers almost all objections against religion4 #e4 ,to a great extent answers objections against the proofs of religion4 ,,iv4 ,general scope of the book4 #a4 ,the divine government is considered1 as containing in it1 ,chap4 #a4 ,man's future existence4 0 #b4 ,in a state of reward or punishment4 0 #c4 ,this according to our behavior4 0 #d4 ,our present life probationary4 0 #e4 ,and also disciplinary4 0 #f4 ,notwithstanding the doctrine of necessity4 0 #g4 ,or any apparent want of wisdom or goodness4 #b4 ,revealed religion is considered1 ,chap4 #a4 ,as important4 0 #b4 ,as proved by miracles4 0 #c4 ,as containing strange things4 0 #d4 ,as a scheme imperfectly comprehended4 0 #e4 ,as carried on by a mediator4 0 #f4 ,as having such an amount of evidence as ,god saw fit to give4 0 #g4 ,as having sufficient and full evidence4 ,conspectus of the ,analogy4 ,,part ,i4 ,,chapter ,i4 ,a ,,future ,,life4 ,will not discuss the subject of identity2 but will consider what analogy suggests from changes which do not destroy2 and thus see whether it is not probable that we shall live hereafter4 ,i4 ,the probabilities that we shall survive death4 #a4 ,it is a law of nature that creatures should exist in different stages1 and in various degrees of perfection4 --,worms turn into flies4 --,eggs are hatched into birds4 --,our own present state is as different from our state in the womb1 as two states of the same being can be4 --,that we shall hereafter exist in a state as different from the present as the present is from our state in the womb1 is according to analogy4 #b4 ,we now have capacities for happiness1 action1 misery1 c41 and there is always a probability that things will continue as they are1 except when experience gives us reason to think they will be altered4 ,this is a general law2 and is our only natural reason for expecting the continuance of any thing4 #c4 ,there is no reason to apprehend that death will destroy us4 ,if there was1 it would arise from the nature of death2 or from the analogy of nature4 #a47 ,not from the nature of death4 --,we know not what death is4 --,but only some of its effects4 --,these effects do not imply the destruction of the living agent4 --,we know little of what the exercise of our powers depends upon2 and nothing of what the powers themselves depend on4 --,we may be unable to exercise our powers1 and yet not lose them--e4g4 sleep1 swoon4 #b47 ,not from analogy4 --,reason shows no connection between death and our destruction4 --,we have no faculties by which to trace any being beyond it4 --,the possession of living powers1 up to the very moment when our faculties cease to be able to trace them1 is a probability of their continuing4 --,we have already survived wonderful changes4 --,to live after death is analogous to the course of nature4 ,,ii4 ,presumptions against a future life4 #a4 ,that death destroys us4 ,ans4 #a4 ,this is an assumption that we are compound and material beings1 and hence discerptible2 which is not true4 #a47 ,consciousness is a single1 indivisible power1 and of course the subject of it must be4 #b47 ,the material body is not ourself4 #c47 ,we can easily conceive of our having more limbs1 or of a different kind1 or of having more or fewer senses1 or of having no bodies at all1 or of hereafter animating these same bodies1 remodelled4 #d47 ,the dissolution of a succession of new and strange bodies1 would have no tendency to destroy us4 ,ans4 #b4 ,though the absolute simplicity of the living being cannot be proved by experiment1 yet facts lead us so to conclude4 ,we lose limbs1 c4 ,our bodies were once very small1 but we might1 then1 have lost part of them4 ,there is a constant destruction and renewal going on4 #a47 ,thus we see that no certain bulk is necessary to our existence1 and unless it were proved that there is1 and that it is larger than an indissoluble atom1 there is no reason to presume that death destroys us1 even if we are discerptible4 #b47 ,the living agent is not an internal material organism1 which dies with the body4 ,because --,our only ground for this presumption is our relation to other systems of matter4 ,but we see these are not necessary to us4 --,it will not do to say that lost portions of the body were not essential--who is to determine8 --,the relation between the living agent1 and the most essential parts of the body1 is only one by which they mutually affect each other4 #c47 ,if we regard our body as made up of organs of sense1 we come to the same result4 --,we see with the eyes1 just as we do with glasses4 ,the eye is not a recipient1 any more than a telescope4 --,it is not pretended that vision1 hearing1 c4 can be traced clear up to the percipient2 but so far as we can trace perceptions1 the organ does not perceive4 --,in dreams we perceive without organs4 --,when we lose a limb we do not lose the directing power2 we could move a new one1 if it could be made1 or a wooden one4 ,but the limb cut off has no power of moving4 --,thus1 our loss of the organs of perception and motion1 not being the destruction of the power1 there is no ground to think that the destruction of other organs or instruments would destroy us4 ,objection4 ,these observations apply equally to brutes4 ,ans4 #a4 ,be it so4 ,perhaps they are immortal3--may hereafter improve3 we know not what latent powers they may have4 #a47 ,the human being at one period looks as little likely to make great intellectual attainments2 for a long time he has capacities for virtue and religion1 but cannot use them4 #b47 ,many persons go out of the world who never became able to exercise these capacities2 e4g4 infants4 ,ans4 #b4 ,if brutes were immortal1 it does not prove them to be moral agents4 #a47 ,it may be necessary1 for aught we know1 that there should be living creatures not moral agents1 nor rational4 #b47 ,all difficulties as to what would become of them1 are founded in our ignorance4 #b4 ,that our souls1 though not material1 so depend upon the bodily structure1 that we cannot survive its destruction4 ,ans4 #a4 ,reason1 memory1 c4 do not depend on the body1 as perceptions by the senses do4 ,death may destroy those instruments1 and yet not destroy the powers of reflection4 ,ans4 #b4 ,human beings exist1 here1 in two very different states1 each having its own laws3 sensation and reflection4 ,by the first we feel2 by the second we reason and will4 #a47 ,nothing which we know to be destroyed at death1 is necessary to reflecting on ideas formerly received4 #b47 ,though the senses act like scaffolds1 or levers1 to bring in ideas1 yet when once in1 we can reflect1 c4 without their aid4 ,ans4 #c4 ,there are diseases which prove fatal1 c41 yet do not1 in any part of their course1 impair the intellect2 and this indicates that they do not destroy it4 #a47 ,in the diseases alluded to1 persons have their reflective power1 in full1 the very moment before death4 #b47 ,now1 why should a disease1 at a certain degree1 utterly destroy powers which were not even affected by it1 up to that point8 #c4 ,that death at least suspends our reflective powers1 or interrupts our continuing to exist in the like state of reflection which we do now4 ,ans4 ,there appears so little connection between our powers of sensation and our powers of reflection that we cannot presume that what might destroy the former1 could even suspend the latter4 #a47 ,we daily see reason1 memory1 c4 exercised without any assistance1 that we know of1 from our bodies4 #b47 ,seeing them in lively exercise to the last1 we must infer that death is not a discontinuance of their exercise1 nor of the enjoyments and sufferings of such exercise4 #c47 ,our posthumous life may be but a going on1 with additions4 ,like the change at our birth--which produced not a suspension of the faculties we had before1 nor a total change in our state of life2 but a continuance of both1 with great alterations4 #d47 ,death may but at once put us into a higher state of life1 as our birth did2 our relation to bodily organs may be the only hinderance to our entering a higher condition of the reflective powers4 #e47 ,were we even sure that death would suspend our intellectual powers1 it would not furnish even the lowest probability that it would destroy them4 ,objec4 ,from the analogy of plants4 ,ans4 ,this furnishes poets with apt illustrations of our frailty1 but affords no proper analogy4 ,plants are destitute of perception and action1 and this is the very matter in question4 ,,remarks4 #a4 ,it has been shown1 that confining ourselves to what we know1 we see no probability of ever ceasing to be3--it cannot be concluded from the reason of the thing3--nor from the analogy of nature4 #b4 ,we are therefore to go upon the belief of a future existence4 #c4 ,our going into new scenes and conditions1 is just as natural as our coming into the world4 #d4 ,our condition may naturally be a social one4 #e4 ,the advantages of it may naturally be bestowed1 according to some fixed law1 in proportion to one's degrees in virtue4 #a47 ,perhaps not so much as now by society2 but by ,god's more immediate action4 #b47 ,yet this will be no less natural1 i4e4 stated1 fixed1 or settled4 #c47 ,our notions of what is natural1 are enlarged by greater knowledge of ,god and his works4 #d47 ,there may be some beings in the world1 to whom the whole of ,christianity is as natural as the visible course of nature seems to us4 #f4 ,these probabilities of a future life1 though they do not satisfy curiosity1 answer all the purposes of religion1 as well as demonstration4 #a47 ,even a demonstration of a future state1 would not demonstrate religion1 but would be reconcilable with atheism4 #b47 ,but as religion implies a future state1 any presumption against such a state1 would be a presumption against religion4 #c47 ,the foregoing observations remove all presumptions of that sort1 and prove to a great probability1 a fundamental doctrine of religion4 ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,,the ,,government ,,of ,,god ,,by ,,rewards ,,and ,,punishments4 ,the question of a future life is rendered momentous by our capacity for happiness and misery4 ,especially if that happiness or misery depends on our present conduct4 ,we should feel the deepest solicitude on this subject4 ,and that if there were no proof of a future life and interest1 other than the probabilities just discussed4 ,i4 ,in the present world our pleasures and pains are1 to a great extent1 in our own power4 #a4 ,we see them to be consequences of our actions4 #b4 ,and we can foresee these consequences4 #c4 ,our desires are not gratified1 without the right kind of exertion4 #d4 ,by prudence we may enjoy life2 rashness1 or even neglect may make us miserable4 #e4 ,why this is so is another matter4 #a47 ,it may be impossible to be otherwise4 #b47 ,or it may be best on the whole4 #c47 ,or ,god's plan may be to make only the good happy4 #d47 ,or the whole plan may be incomprehensible to us4 ,objec4 ,it may be said 8this is only the course of nature40 ,ans4 ,it is granted3 but #a4 ,the course of nature is but the will of ,god4 ,we admit that ,god is the natural governor of the world3 and must not turn round and deny it because his government is uniform4 #b4 ,our natural foresight of the consequences of actions1 is his appointment4 #c4 ,the consequences themselves1 are his appointment4 #d4 ,our ability to foresee these consequences1 is ,god's instruction how we are to act4 ,objec4 ,by this reasoning we are instructed to gratify our appetites1 and such gratification is our reward for so doing4 ,ans4 ,certainly not4 ,foreseen pleasures and pains are proper motives to action in general2 but we may1 in particular cases1 damage ourselves by indulgence4 ,our eyes are made to see with1 but not to look at every thing3--for instance the sun4 ,it follows1 from what has been said1 that ,,ii4 ,we are1 now1 actually under ,god's government1 in the strictest sense4 #a4 ,admitting that there is a ,god1 it is not so much a matter of speculation1 as of experience1 that he governs us4 #b4 ,the annexing of pleasures and pains to certain actions1 and giving notice them1 is the very essence of government4 #c4 ,whether by direct acts upon us1 or by contriving a general plan1 does not affect the argument4 #a47 ,if magistrates could make laws which should execute themselves1 their government would be far more perfect than it is4 #b47 ,god's making fire burn us1 is as much an instance of government1 as if he directly inflicted the burn1 whenever we touched fire4 #d4 ,hence the analogy of nature shows nothing to render incredible the ,bible doctrine of ,god's rewarding or punishing according to our actions4 ,additional remarks on ,punishment4 ,as men object chiefly to future punishment1 it is proper to show further that the course of administration1 as to present punishment1 is analogous to what religion teaches as to the future4 ,indeed they add credibility to it4 ,and ought to raise the most serious apprehension4 ,i4 ,circumstances to be observed touching present punishments4 #a4 ,they often follow acts which produce present pleasure or advantage4 #b4 ,the sufferings often far exceed the pleasure or advantage4 #c4 ,they often follow remotely4 #d4 ,after long delay they often come suddenly4 #e4 ,as those remote effects are not certainly foreseen1 they may not be thought of at the time2 or if so1 there is a hope of escaping4 #f4 ,there are opportunities of advantage1 which if neglected do not recur4 #g4 ,though1 in some cases1 men who have sinned up to a certain point1 may retrieve their affairs1 yet in many cases1 reformation is of no avail4 #h4 ,inconsiderateness is often as disastrous as wilful wrong-doing4 #i4 ,as some punishments by civil government1 are capital1 so are some natural punishments4 #a47 ,seem intended to remove the offender out of the way4 #b47 ,or as an example to others4 ,,ii4 ,these things are not accidental1 but proceed from fixed laws4 #a4 ,they are matters of daily experience4 #b4 ,proceed from the general laws1 by which the world is governed4 ,,iii4 ,they so closely resemble what religion teaches1 as to future punishment1 that both might be expressed in the same words4 e4g4 ,proverbs1 ch4 i4 ,the analogy sufficiently answers all objections against the ,scripture doctrine of future punishment1 such as #a47 ,that our frailty or temptations annihilate the guilt of vice4 #b47 ,or the objection from necessity4 #c47 ,or that the ,almighty cannot be contradicted4 #d47 ,or that he cannot be offended4 ,,remarks4 #a4 ,such reflections are terrific1 but ought to be stated and considered4 #b4 ,disregard of a hereafter cannot be justified by any thing short of a demonstration of atheism4 ,even skeptical doctrines afford no justification4 #c4 ,there is no pretence of reason for presuming that the licentious will not find it better for them that they had never been born4 ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,,moral ,,government ,,of ,,god4 ,as the structure of the world shows intelligence1 so the mode of distributing pleasure and pain1 shows government4 ,that is1 ,god's natural government1 such as a king exercises over his subjects4 ,but this does not1 at first sight1 determine what is the moral character of such government4 ,i4 ,what is a moral or righteous government8 #a4 ,not mere rewarding and punishing4 #b4 ,but doing this according to character4 #c4 ,the perfection of moral government is doing this exactly4 ,objec4 ,god is simply and absolutely benevolent4 ,ans4 ,benevolence1 infinite in degree1 would dispose him to produce the greatest possible happiness1 regardless of behaviour4 ,this would rob ,god of other attributes2 and should not be asserted unless it can be proved4 ,and whether it can be proved is not the point now in hand4 ,the question is not whether there may not be1 in the universe1 beings to whom he manifests absolute benevolence1 which might not be incompatible with justice2 but whether he treats us so4 #d4 ,it must be owned to be vastly difficult1 in such a disordered world1 to estimate with exactness the overplus of happiness on the side of virtue3 and there may be exceptions to the rule4 ,but it is far from being doubtful that on the whole1 virtue is happier than vice1 in this world4 ,,ii4 ,the beginnings of a righteous administration1 are seen in nature4 #a4 ,it has been proved 7ch4 ii47 that ,god governs3 and it is reasonable to suppose that he would govern righteously4 #a47 ,any other rule of government would be harder to account for4 #b47 ,the ,bible doctrine that hereafter the good shall be happy1 and the wicked miserable1 is no more than an expectation that a method of government1 now begun1 shall be carried on4 #b4 ,the opposite consequences of prudence and rashness1 show a right constitution of nature2 and our ability to foresee and control these consequences1 shows that we are under moral law4 #c4 ,god has so constructed society that vice1 to a great degree1 is actually punished by it4 #a47 ,without this1 society could not exist4 #b47 ,this is ,god's government1 through society2 and is as natural1 as society4 #c47 ,since the course of things is ,god's appointment1 men are unavoidably accountable for their behaviour4 ,objec4 ,society often punishes good actions1 and rewards wickedness4 ,ans4 #a4 ,this is not necessary1 and consequently not natural4 #b4 ,good actions are never punished by society as good1 but because considered bad4 #d4 ,by the course of nature1 virtue is rewarded1 and vice punished1 as such1 which proves a moral government2 as will be seen if we rightly distinguish between actions and their qualities4 #a47 ,an action may produce present gratification though it be wrong3 in which case the gratification is in the act1 not the morality of it3 in other cases the enjoyment consists wholly in the quality of virtuousness4 #b47 ,vice is naturally attended with uneasiness1 apprehension1 vexation1 remorse1 c4 --,this is a very different feeling from that produced by mere misfortune4 --,men comfort themselves under misfortune1 that it was not their own fault4 #c47 ,honest and good men are befriended as such4 #d47 ,injuries are resented as implying fault2 and good offices are regarded with gratitude on account of the intention1 even when they fail to benefit us4 --,this is seen in family government1 where children are punished for falsehood1 fretfulness1 c41 though no one is hurt4 --,and also in civil government1 where the absence or presence of ill intention goes far in determining the penalty of wrong-doing4 #e47 ,the whole course of the world1 in all ages and relations1 turns much upon approbation and disapprobation4 #f47 ,the very fact of our having a moral nature1 is a proof of our being under ,god's moral government4 --,we are placed in a condition which unavoidably operates on our moral nature4 --,hence it arises that reward to virtue and reprobation of vice1 as such1 is a rule1 never inverted4 ,if it be thought that there are instances to the contrary1 7which is not so17 they are evidently monstrous4 --,the degree in which virtue and vice receive proper returns1 is not the question now1 but only the thing itself1 in some degree4 #g47 ,it is admitted that virtue sometimes suffers1 and vice prospers2 but this is disorder1 and not the order of nature4 #h47 ,it follows1 that we have in the government of the world1 a declaration from ,god1 for virtue and against vice4 ,so far as a man is true to virtue1 is he on the side of the divine administration4 ,such a man must have a sense of security1 and a hope of something better4 #e4 ,this hope is confirmed by observing that virtue has necessary tendencies beyond their present effects4 #a47 ,these are very obvious with regard to individuals4 #b47 ,are as real1 though not so patent1 in regard to society4 --,the power of a society under the direction of virtue1 tends to prevail over power not so directed1 just as power under direction of reason1 tends to prevail over brute force4 --,as this may not be conceded1 we will notice how the case stands1 as to reason3 ,length of time1 and proper opportunity1 are necessary for reason to triumph over brutes4 ,rational beings1 disunited1 envious1 unjust1 and treacherous1 may be overcome by brutes1 uniting themselves by instinct3 but this would be an inverted order of things4 --,a like tendency has virtue to produce superiority4 ,by making the good of society1 the object of every member of it4 ,by making every one industrious in his own sphere4 ,by uniting all in one bond of veracity and justice4 #c47 ,if the part of ,god's government which we see1 and the part we do not see1 make up one scheme1 then we see a tendency in virtue to superiority4 #d47 ,but to produce that superiority there must be --,a force proportioned to the obstacles4 --,sufficient lapse of time4 --,a fair field of trial2 such as extent of time1 adequate occasions1 and opportunities for the virtuous to unite4 #e47 ,these things are denied to virtue in this life1 so that its tendencies1 though real1 are hindered4 #f47 ,but it may have all requisite advantages hereafter4 --,eternity will be lasting enough4 --,good men will unite2 as they cannot do now1 scattered over the earth1 and ignorant of one another4 --,other orders of virtuous beings will join2 for the very nature of virtue is a bond of union4 #g47 ,the tendency of such an order of things1 so far as seen by vicious beings in any part of the universe1 would be to the amendment of all who were capable of it1 and their recovery to virtue4 #h47 ,all this goes to show that the hinderances to virtue are contingent1 and that its beneficial tendencies are ,god's declarations in its favor4 #i47 ,if the preceding considerations are thought to be too speculative1 we may easily come to the same result by reflecting on the supremacy which any earthly nation would attain1 by entire virtue for many ages4 ,,remarks4 ,consider now the general system of religion4 ,the government of the world is one2 it is moral2 virtue shall in the end prevail over wickedness2 and to see the importance and fitness of such an arrangement we have only to consider what would be the state of things1 if vice had these advantages1 or virtue the contrary4 ,objec4 ,why may not things be now going on in other worlds1 and continue always to go on in this world1 in the same mixed and disordered state as at present8 ,ans4 ,we are not proving that ,god's moral government is perfect1 or the truth of religion1 but only seeing what there is in the course of nature1 to confirm it1 supposing it to be known4 ,were there nothing to judge by1 but the present distribution of pleasure and pain1 we should have no ground to conclude that hereafter we should be rewarded or punished exactly according to our deserts4 ,but even then there would be no indication that vice is better than virtue4 ,still the preceding observations confirm the doctrine of future retribution2 for1 #a47 ,they show that the ,author of nature is not indifferent to virtue and vice4 #b47 ,that future distributive justice would differ not in kind1 but in degree only1 from ,god's present government4 ,it would be the effect1 towards which we see the tendency4 #c47 ,that higher rewards and punishments may be hereafter4 #d47 ,that we should expect it to be so2 because the tendencies of vice and virtue are immutable1 while the hinderances are only artificial4 ,,summary4 ,this enumerates the steps of the argument1 in the foregoing chapter1 in as condensed a form as possible4 ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,,of ,a ,,state ,,of ,,probation4 ,the doctrine of probation comprehends several particulars4 ,but the most common notion is that our future interests are depending2 and depending on ourselves4 ,and that we have opportunities for both good and bad conduct1 and temptations to each4 ,this is not exactly the same as our being under moral government2 for it implies allurement to evil1 and difficulties in being good4 ,hence needs to be considered by itself4 ,doctrine4 ,,the ,,natural ,,government ,,of ,,god1 ,,in ,,this ,,world1 ,,puts ,,us ,,on ,,trial ,,as ,,to ,,the ,,things ,,of ,,this ,,world2 ,,and ,,so ,,implies1 ,,what ,,religion ,,teaches1 ,,that ,,his ,,moral ,,government ,,puts ,,us ,,on ,,trial ,,as ,,to ,a ,,future ,,world4 ,i4 ,so far as we are tempted to do what will damage our future temporal interests1 so far we are under probation as to those interests4 #a4 ,the annexing of pleasures and pains to actions1 as good or bad1 and enabling us to foresee their effect1 implies that our interests1 in part at least1 depend on ourselves4 #b4 ,we often blame ourselves and others for evils1 as resulting from misconduct4 #c4 ,it is very certain that we often miss possible good1 and incur evils1 not for want of knowing better1 but through our fault4 #d4 ,every one speaks of the hazards of young persons1 from other causes than ignorance4 ,,ii4 ,these natural or temporal trials are analogous to our moral and religious trial4 #a4 ,in both cases1 what constitutes the trial1 is either in our circumstances or in our nature4 #a47 ,some would do right but for violent or extraordinary temptations4 #b47 ,others will seek evil1 and go out of their way after wicked indulgence1 when there are no external temptations4 #c47 ,but even those who err through temptation1 must have that within which makes them susceptible of temptation4 #d47 ,so that we are in a like state of probation with respect to both present and future interests4 #b4 ,if we proceed to observe how mankind behave in both capacities1 we see the same analogy4 #a47 ,some scarcely look beyond the present gratification4 #b47 ,some are driven by their passions against their better judgment and feeble resolutions4 #c47 ,some shamelessly go on in open vice4 #d47 ,some persist in wrong-doing1 even under strong apprehensions of future misery4 #c4 ,the analogy is no less plain in regard to the influence of others upon us4 #a47 ,bad example4 #b47 ,wrong education4 #c47 ,corruptions of religion4 #d47 ,general prevalence of mistakes as to true happiness4 #d4 ,in both cases negligence and folly bring difficulty as well as vice4 ,,iii4 ,the disadvantages we labor under from our fallen and disordered state1 are the same1 in relation to both earthly and future interests4 ,this disadvantage affords no ground of complaint2 for1 #a4 ,we may manage to pass our days in comfort and peace4 #b4 ,and so may we obtain the security and comfort of religion4 #c4 ,we might as well complain that we are not a higher order of beings4 ,,remarks4 #a4 ,it is thus proved that the state of trial1 which religion says we are in1 is credible2 for it exactly corresponds to what we see4 #a47 ,if from birth till death we were in a constant security of enjoyment1 without care or correctness1 it would be a presumption against religion4 #b47 ,it might1 if we had no experience1 be urged that an infinitely good ,being would not expose us to the hazard of misery4 ,this is indeed a difficulty1 and must remain so2 but still the course of nature is as it is4 #c47 ,the miseries which we bring on ourselves are no more unavoidable than our deportment4 #b4 ,it has been proved that we are in danger of miscarrying as to our interests1 both present and future4 #c4 ,the sum of the whole is1 that as we do not have present enjoyments and honors forced upon us1 in spite of misconduct1 so this may be the case1 as to that chief and final good which religion proposes4 ,,chapter ,v4 ,,probation ,,intended ,,for ,,moral ,,discipline ,,and ,,improvement4 ,why we should be placed in the condition spoken of in the last chapter1 is a question which cannot be answered4 ,it may be that we could not understand1 if told4 ,and if we could1 it might injure us to know1 just now4 ,it certainly is consistent with ,god's righteous government4 ,religion tells us that we are so placed in order to become qualified for a better state4 ,this1 though a very partial answer to the inquiry why we are so placed1 answers an infinitely more important question1--viz43 ,what is our business here8 ,i4 ,we are placed in this state of trial1 for our improvement in virtue1 as the requisite qualification for future security and happiness4 #a4 ,every creature is designed for a particular way of life4 #a47 ,happiness depends on the congruity between a creature's nature and its circumstances4 #b47 ,man's character might be so changed as to make him incapable of happiness on earth4 #c47 ,or he might be placed1 without changing his nature1 in a world where he must be wretched1 for want of the proper objects to answer to his desires4 #d47 ,so that without determining what is the future condition of good men1 we know there must be necessary qualifications to make us capable of enjoying it4 #b4 ,human beings are so constituted as to become fit for new and different conditions4 #a47 ,we not only acquire ideas1 but store them up4 #b47 ,we can become more expert in any kind of action4 #c47 ,and can make settled alterations in our tempers4 #d47 ,we can form habits--both bodily and mental4 ,as these operate in producing radical changes in human character1 we will look for a moment at the process4 --,neither perceptions1 nor knowledge1 are habits2 though necessary to forming them4 --,there are habits of perception1 however1 and habits of action3 the former are passive1 the latter active4 --,habits of body are produced by external acts1 and habits of mind by the exertion of principles2 i4e4 carrying them out4 --,resolutions to do well are acts1 and may help towards forming good habits4 ,but mere theorizing1 and forming pictures in the mind1 not only do not help1 but may harden the mind to a contrary course4 --,passive impressions1 by repetition grow weaker4 ,thus familiarity with danger lessens fear4 --,hence active habits may be formed and strengthened1 by acting according to certain motives or excitements1 which grow less sensibly felt and less and less felt1 as the habit strengthens4 ,thus the sight of distress excites the passive emotion of pity1 and the active principle of benevolence4 ,but inquiring out cases of distress in order to relieve them1 causes diminished sensitiveness at the sight of misery1 and stronger benevolence and aptitude in relieving it4 ,so admonition1 experience1 and example1 if acted upon1 produce good2 if not1 harden4 #e47 ,the formation of a habit may be imperceptible and even inexplicable1 but the thing itself is matter of certain experience4 #f47 ,a habit once formed1 the action becomes easy and often pleasurable3 opposite inclinations grow weaker3 difficulties less3 and occasions more frequent4 #g47 ,thus1 a new character1 in several respects1 is formed4 #c4 ,we should not have these capacities for improvement and for the reconstruction of character1 if it were not necessary4 #a47 ,they are necessary1 even as to this life4 --,we are not qualified1 at first1 for mature life3 understanding and strength come gradually4 --,if we had them in full1 at birth1 we should at first be distracted and bewildered1 and our faculties would be of no use previous to experience4 ,ignorant of any employment1 we could not provide for ourselves4 --,so that man is an unformed1 unfinished creature1 even as to this world1 till he acquire knowledge1 experience1 and habits4 #b47 ,provision is made for our acquiring1 in youth1 the requisite qualities for manhood4 --,children learn1 from their very birth1 ,the nature and use of objects4 ,the subordinations of domestic life4 ,the rules of life4 --,some of this learning is acquired so insensibly1 as to seem like instinct1 but some requires great care and labor1 and the doing of things we are averse to4 --,according as we act during this formative period1 is our character formed2 and our capacity for various stations in society determined4 --,early opportunities lost1 cannot be recovered4 #c47 ,our state of discipline throughout this life1 for another1 is exactly of the same kind3 and comprehended under one general law4 --,if we could not see how the present discipline fitted us for a higher life1 it would be no objection4 ,we do not know how food1 sleep1 c4 enlarges the child's body2 nor would we expect such a result1 prior to experience4 ,nor do children understand the need of exercise1 temperance1 restraint1 c4 --,we thus see a general analogy of ,providence indicating that the present life is preparatory4 #d4 ,if virtue is a necessary qualification for future happiness1 then we see our need of the moral culture of our present state4 #a47 ,analogy indicates that our future state will be social4 --,nature furnishes no shadow of unreasonableness in the ,scripture doctrine that this future community will be under the more immediate government of ,god4 --,nor the least proof that its members will not require the exercise of veracity1 justice1 c4 towards each other2 and that character which results from the practice of such virtues4 --,certainly the universe is under moral government2 and a virtuous character must1 in some way1 be a condition of happiness in that state4 #b47 ,we are deficient1 and in danger of deviating from what is right4 --,we have desires for outward objects4 --,the times1 degrees1 c4 of gratifying these desires1 are1 of right1 subject to the control of the moral principle4 --,but that principle neither excites them1 nor prevents their being excited4 --,they may exist1 when they cannot be lawfully gratified1 or gratified at all4 --,when the desire exists1 and the gratification is unlawful1 we are tempted4 #c47 ,the only security is the principle within4 --,the strengthening of this lessens the danger4 --,it may be strengthened1 by discipline and exercise4 ,noting examples4 ,attending to the right1 and not to preference4 ,considering our true interests4 --,when improved1 it becomes1 in proportion to its strength1 our security from the dangers of natural propensions4 --,virtue1 become habitual by discipline1 is improved virtue2 and improved virtue must produce increased happiness1 if the government of the world is moral4 #d47 ,even creatures made upright may fall4 --,the fall of an upright being1 is not accounted for by the nature of liberty2 for that would only be saying that an event happened because it might happen4 --,but from the very nature of propensions4 --,a finitely perfect being would have propensions corresponding to its surroundings2 its understanding2 and its moral sense2 and all these in due proportions4 --,such a being would have propensions1 though the object might not be present1 or the indulgence might be contrary to its moral sense2 and this would have some tendency1 however small1 to induce gratification4 --,the tendency would be increased by the frequency of occasions2 and yet more by the least indulgence1 even in thought2 till1 under peculiar conjunctures1 it would become effect4 --,the first transgression might so utterly disorder the constitution1 and change the proportions of forces1 as to lead to a repetition of irregularities2 and hence to the construction of bad habits1 and a depraved character4 #e47 ,on the contrary1 a finitely perfect being may attain higher virtue1 and more security1 by obeying the moral principle4 --,for the danger would lessen1 by the increased submissiveness of propensions4 --,the moral principle would gain force by exercise4 #f47 ,thus vice is not only criminal1 but degrading2 and virtue is not only right1 but improving4 --,the degree of improvement may be such that the danger of sinning may be almost infinitely lessened4 --,yet the security may always be the habits formed in a state of discipline2 making such a state altogether fit and necessary4 #g47 ,this course of reasoning is vastly stronger when applied to fallen and corrupt creatures4 --,the upright need improvement2 the fallen must be renewed4 --,discipline is expedient for the one2 necessary for the other2 and of a severer sort4 ,,ii4 ,the present world is peculiarly fit for such discipline as we need4 #a4 ,surrounding evils tend to produce moderation1 practical knowledge1 c4 very different from a mere speculative knowledge of our liability to vice and misery4 #b4 ,our experience in this world1 with right views and practice1 may leave eternal impressions for good4 #c4 ,every act of self-government in the exercise of virtue1 must1 from the very make of our nature1 form habits of virtue1 and a more intense virtuous principle4 #d4 ,resolute and persevering resistance to particular and violent temptations1 is a continued act of virtue1 and that in a higher degree than if the seduction were transient and weak4 #e4 ,self-denial is not essential to virtue1 but is almost essential to discipline and improvement4 #a47 ,because actions materially virtuous1 which have no difficulty1 but agree with our inclinations1 may be done merely from inclination1 and so not be really virtuous4 #b47 ,but when they are done in face of danger and difficulty1 virtuousness is increased1 and confirmed into a habit4 ,objec4 #a4 ,as our intellectual or physical powers may be overtasked1 so may our moral4 ,ans4 ,this may be so in exceptional cases1 but it does not confute the argument4 ,in general1 it holds good4 ,all that is intended to be proved is1 that this world is intended to be a state of improvement1 and is fitted for it4 #a47 ,some sciences which of themselves are highly improving1 require a trying measure of attention1 which some will not submit to4 #b47 ,it is admitted that this world disciplines many to vice3 but this viciousness of many is the very thing which makes the world a virtuous discipline to good men4 ,the whole end in placing mankind as they are we know not2 but these things are evident--the virtues of some are exercised3--and so exercised as to be improved3 and improved beyond what they would be in a perfectly virtuous community4 #c47 ,that all1 or even the generality1 do not improve1 is no proof that their improvement was not intended4 ,of seeds and animals not one in a million comes to perfection2 yet such as do1 evidently answer an end for which they were designed4 ,the appearance of waste in regard to seeds1 c4 is just as unaccountable1 as the ruin of moral agents4 ,objec4 #b4 ,rectitude arising from hope and fear1 is only the discipline of self-love4 ,ans4 ,obedience is obedience1 though prompted by hope or fear3 and a course of such obedience1 forms a habit of it3 and distinct habits of various virtues1 by repressing inclination whenever justice1 veracity1 c4 require4 ,beside1 veracity1 justice1 regard to ,god's authority1 and self-interest1 are coincident2 and each1 separately1 a just principle4 ,to begin a good life from either of them1 and persist1 produces that very character which corresponds to our relations to ,god1 and secures happiness4 ,objec4 #c4 ,the virtues requisite for a state of afflictions1 and produced by it1 are not wanted to qualify us for a state of happiness4 ,ans4 ,such is not the verdict of experience4 ,passive submission is essential to right character4 ,prosperity itself begets extravagant desires2 and imagination may produce as much discontent as actual condition4 ,hence1 though we may not need patience in heaven1 we shall need that temper which is formed by patience4 ,self-love would always coincide with ,god's commands1 when our interest was rightly understood2 but it is liable to error4 ,therefore1 ,,habits of resignation are necessary1 for all creatures2 and the proper discipline for resignation is affliction4 ,objec4 #d4 ,the trouble and danger of such discipline1 might have been avoided by making us at once1 what we are intended to become4 ,ans4 ,what we are to be1 is the effect of what we are to do4 ,god's natural government is arranged not to save us from trouble or danger1 but to enable and incline us to go through them4 ,it is as natural for us to seek means to obtain things1 as it is to seek the things2 and in worldly things we are left to our choice1 whether to improve our powers and so better our condition1 or to neglect improvement and so go without the advantage4 ,analogy1 therefore1 makes the same arrangement credible1 as to a future state4 ,,iii4 ,this state of discipline may be necessary for the display of character4 #a4 ,not to the all-knowing ,being1 but to his creation1 or part of it1 and in many ways which we know not4 #b4 ,it may be a means in disposing of men according to character4 #c4 ,and of showing creation that they are so disposed of4 #d4 ,such display of character certainly contributes1 largely1 to the general course of things considered in this chapter4 ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,,of ,,necessity ,,as ,,influencing ,,conduct4 ,fatalists have no right to object to ,christianity1 for they of course hold the doctrine to be compatible with what they see in nature4 ,the question is1 whether it be not equally compatible with what ,christianity teaches4 ,to argue on the supposition of so great an absurdity as necessity1 is puzzling2 and the obscurity and puzzle of the argument must therefore be excused4 ,i4 ,necessity does not destroy the proof of an intelligent ,author and ,governor of the world4 #a4 ,it does not exclude design and deliberation4 #a47 ,this is matter of actual experience and consciousness4 --,necessity does not account for the existence of any thing1 but is only a circumstance relating to its origin4 ,instance the case of a house3 the fatalist admits that it had a builder1 and the only question would be1 was he obliged to build it as he did8 #b47 ,it is the same as to the construction of the world4 ,to say it exists by necessity must mean it had a maker1 who acted by necessity3 for necessity is only an abstract notion1 and can do nothing4 #c47 ,we say ,god exists by necessity1 because we intuitively discern that there must be an infinite ,being1 prior to all causes2 but we cannot say that every thing so exists4 ,the fact that many changes in nature are produced by man's contrivance is a proof of this4 #d47 ,thus though the fatalist does not choose to mean by necessity an agent acting necessarily1 he is obliged to mean this4 #e47 ,and it also follows that a thing's being done by necessity does not exclude design4 #b4 ,it does not exclude a belief that we are in a state of religion4 #a47 ,suppose a fatalist to educate a child on his own principles1--viz43 that he cannot do otherwise than he does2 and is not subject to praise or blame4 7,it might be asked1 would he1 if possessed of common sense1 so educate his child87 --,the child would be delighted with his freedom2 but would soon prove a pest1 and go to destruction4 --,he would meet with checks and rebuffs1 which would teach him that he was accountable4 --,he would1 in the end1 be convinced either that his doctrine was wrong1 or that he had reasoned inconclusively upon it1 and misapplied it4 #b47 ,to apply fatalism to practice1 in any other way1 would be found equally fallacious3 e4g4 that he need not take care of his life4 #c47 ,no such absurdity follows the doctrine of freedom4 --,reasoning on this ground is justified by all experience4 --,the constitution of things is as if we were free4 #d47 ,if the doctrine of necessity be true1 and yet1 when we apply it to life1 always misleads us2 how1 then1 can we be sure it would not mislead us with respect to future interests8 #e47 ,it follows that if there are proofs of religion on the supposition of freedom1 they are just as conclusive on the supposition of necessity4 #c4 ,it does not refute the notion that ,god has a will and a character4 #a47 ,it does not hinder us from having a will and a character2 from being cruel1 or benevolent1 or just1 c4 #b47 ,if necessity be plead as the excuse for crime1 it equally excuses the punishment of crime2 for if it destroys the sin of the one1 it destroys the sin of the other4 #c47 ,the very assumption of injustice in punishing crime1 shows that we cannot rid ourselves of the notion of justice and injustice4 ,objec4 ,if necessity be reconcilable with the character of ,god1 as portrayed in ,christianity1 does it not destroy the proof that he has that character2 and so destroy the proofs of religion8 ,ans4 ,no4 ,happiness and misery are not our fate1 but the results of our conduct4 ,god's government is that of a father and a magistrate2 and his natural rule of government must be veracity and justice4 ,we shall proceed to show that1 ,,ii4 ,necessity does not destroy the proofs of religion4 #a4 ,it is a plain fact that ,god rewards and punishes4 #a47 ,he has given us a moral faculty1 by which we discern between actions1 and approve or disapprove1 c4 #b47 ,this implies a rule1 a peculiar kind of rule2 i4e4 one from which we cannot depart without being self-condemned4 #c47 ,the dictates of our moral faculty are ,god's laws1 with sanctions4 ,it not only raises a sense of duty1 but a sense of security in obeying1 and danger in disobeying2 and this is an explicit sanction4 #d47 ,god's government must conform to the nature he has given us2 and we must infer that in the upshot happiness will follow virtue1 and misery vice4 #e47 ,hence religious worship is a duty1 if only as a means of keeping up the sense of this government4 #f47 ,no objection from necessity can lie against this course of proof4 --,the conclusion is wholly and directly from facts2 not from what might appear to us to be fit1 but from what his actions tell us he wills4 #b4 ,natural religion has external evidence which necessity1 if true1 does not affect4 #a47 ,suppose a person convinced of the truths of natural religion1 but ignorant of history1 and of the present state of mankind1 he would inquire3 --,how this religion came8 --,how far the belief of it extended8 --,if he found that some one had totally propounded it1 as a deduction of reason1 then1 though its evidences from reason would not be impaired1 its history would furnish no further proof4 #b47 ,but such an one would find1 on the contrary1 --,that essentially it had been professed in all countries4 --,and can be traced up through all ages4 --,and was not reasoned out1 but revealed4 #c47 ,these things are of great weight4 --,showing natural religion to be conformed to the common sense of mankind4 --,and either that it was revealed1 or forces itself upon the mind4 --,the rude state of the early ages leads to the belief of its being revealed1 and such is the opinion of the learned4 #c4 ,early pretences to revelation indicate some original real one from which they were copied4 --,the history of revelation is as old as history itself4 --,such a fact is a proof of religion1 against which there is no presumption4 --,and indicates a revelation prior to the examination of the book said to contain it2 and independent of all considerations of its being corrupted1 or darkened by fables4 #d4 ,it is thus apparent that the external evidence of religion is considerable2 and is not affected by the doctrine of necessity4 ,,remarks4 #a4 ,the danger of taking custom1 c4 for our moral rule4 #a47 ,we are all liable to prejudice4 #b47 ,reason may be impaired1 perverted1 or disregarded4 #c47 ,the matter in hand is of infinite moment4 #b4 ,the foregoing observations amount to practical proof4 ,objec4 ,probabilities which cannot be confuted1 may be overbalanced by greater probabilities3 much more by demonstration4 ,now1 as the doctrine of necessity must be true1 it cannot be that ,god governs us as if we were free when he knows we are not4 ,ans4 ,this brings the matter to a point1 and the answer is not to be evaded1--viz43 that the whole constitution and course of things shows this reasoning to be false1 be the fallacy where it may4 ,the doctrine of freedom shows where1--viz43 in supposing ourselves necessary agents when in fact we are free4 ,admitting the doctrine of necessity1 the fallacy evidently lies in denying that necessary agents are accountable2 for that they are rewarded and punished is undeniable4 ,,conclusion4--,it follows that necessity1 if true1 neither proves that ,god will not make his creatures happy or miserable according to their conduct1 nor destroys the proofs that he will do so4 ,that is1 necessity1 practically1 is false4 ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,,divine ,,government ,a ,,scheme ,,imperfectly ,,comprehended4 ,moral government1 as a fact1 has now been considered2 it remains for us to remove objections against its wisdom and goodness4 ,a thing being true does not prove it to be good4 ,in arguing as to its truth1 analogy could only show it to be credible4 ,but1 if a moral government be admitted as a fact1 analogy makes it credible that it is a scheme or system1 and that man's comprehension of it is necessarily so limited1 as to be inadequate to determine its injustice4 ,this we shall find to be the case4 ,doctrine4 ,,on ,,the ,,supposition ,,that ,,god ,,exercises ,,moral ,,government1 ,,the ,,analogy ,,of ,,nature ,,teaches ,,that ,,it ,,must ,,be ,a ,,scheme1 ,,and ,,one ,,quite ,,beyond ,,our ,,comprehension4 ,i4 ,the ordering of nature is a scheme2 and makes it credible by analogy1 that moral government is a scheme4 #a4 ,the parts curiously correspond to each other2 individuals to individuals1 species to species1 events to events2 and all these both immediate and remote4 #b4 ,this correspondence embraces all the past1 and all the future2 including all creatures1 actions1 and events4 #a47 ,there is no event1 which does not depend for its occurrence on some further thing1 unknown to us2 we cannot give the whole account of any one thing4 #b47 ,things apparently the most insignificant1 seem to be necessary to others1 of the greatest importance4 #c4 ,if such is ,god's natural government1 it is credible that such is his moral government4 #a47 ,in fact they are so blended as to make one scheme4 --,one is subservient to the other1 just as the vegetable kingdom subserves the animal1 and our animal organization subserves our mental4 --,every act of ,god seems to look beyond the occasion1 and to have reference to a general plan4 --,there is evidently a previous adjustment4 ,the periods1 c4 for trying men4 ,the instruments of justice4 ,the kinds of retribution4 #b47 ,the whole comprises a system1 a very small part of which is known to us3 therefore no objections against any part can be insisted on4 #c47 ,this ignorance is universally acknowledged1 except in arguing against religion4 ,that it ought to be a valid answer to objections against religion1 we proceed to show4 --,suppose it to be asserted that all evils might have been prevented by repeated interpositions2 or that more good might have been so produced2 which would be the utmost that could be said3 still1 --,our ignorance would vindicate religion from any objections arising from apparent disorders in the world4 --,the government of the world might be good1 even on those suppositions2 for at most they could but suggest that it might be better4 --,at any rate1 they are mere assertions4 --,instances may be alleged1 in things much less out of reach1 of suppositions palpably impossible1 which all do not see to be so3 nor any1 at first sight4 #d47 ,it follows that our ignorance is a satisfactory answer to all objections against the divine government4 --,an objection against an act of ,providence1 no way connected with any other thing1 as being unjust1 could not be answered by our ignorance4 --,but when the objection is made against an act related to other and unknown acts1 then our ignorance is a full answer4 --,some unknown relation1 or unknown impossibility1 may render the act not only good1 but good in the highest degree4 ,,ii4 ,consider some particular things1 in the natural government of ,god1 the like of which we may infer1 by analogy1 to be contained in his moral government4 #a4 ,no ends are accomplished without means4 #a47 ,often1 means very disagreeable bring the most desirable results4 #b47 ,how means produce ends1 is not learned by reason1 but experience4 #c47 ,in many cases1 before experience1 we should have expected contrary results4 #d47 ,hence we may infer that those things which are objected against ,god's moral government1 produce good4 #e47 ,it is evident that our not seeing how the means work good1 or their seeming to have an opposite effect1 offers no presumption against their fitness to work good4 #f47 ,they may not only be fit1 but the only means of ultimate good4 ,objec4 ,though our capacity of vice and misery may promote virtue1 and our suffering for sin be better than if we were restrained by force1 yet it would have been better if evil had not entered the world4 ,ans4 ,it is granted that though sinful acts may produce benefits1 to refrain from them would produce more4 ,we have curative pains1 yet pain is not better than health4 #b4 ,natural government is carried on by general laws4 #a47 ,nature shows that this is best3 all the good we enjoy is because there are general laws4 ,they enable us to forecast for the procurement of good4 #b47 ,it may not be possible1 by general laws1 to prevent all irregularities1 or remedy them4 #c47 ,direct interpositions might perhaps remedy many disorders arising under them1 but this would have bad effects4 --,encouraging improvidence4 --,leaving us no rule of life4 --,every interposition would have distant effects3 so that we could not guess what would be the whole result4 ,if it be replied that those distant effects might also be corrected by direct interpositions--this is only talking at random4 ,objec4 ,if we are so ignorant as this whole argument supposes1 we are too ignorant to understand the proofs of religion4 ,ans4 #a4 ,total ignorance of a subject precludes argument1 but partial ignorance does not4 ,we may1 in various degrees1 know a man's character1 and the way he is likely to pursue certain ends2 and yet not know how he ought to act to gain those ends4 ,in this case objections to his mode of pursuing ends may be answered by our ignorance1 though that he does act in a certain manner is capable of proof4 ,so we may have evidence of ,god's character and aims1 and yet not be competent judges as to his measures4 ,our ignorance is a good answer to the difficulties of religion1 but no objection to religion itself4 ,ans4 #b4 ,if our ignorance did invalidate the proofs of religion1 as well as the objections1 yet is it undeniable that moral obligations remain unaffected by our ignorance of the consequences of obedience or violation4 ,the consequences of vice and virtue may not be fully known1 yet it is credible that they may be such as religion declares3 and this credibility is an obligation1 in point of prudence1 to abstain from sin4 ,ans4 #c4 ,our answers to the objections against religion1 are not equally valid against the proofs of it4 ,answers rehearsed4 ,ans4 #d4 ,our answers1 though they may be said to be based on our ignorance1 are really not so1 but on what analogy teaches concerning our ignorance1--viz43 that it renders us incompetent judges4 ,they are based on experience1 and what we do know2 so that to credit religion is to trust to experience1 and to disregard it is the contrary4 ,,conclusion4 #a4 ,the reasoning of the last chapter leads us to regard this life as part of a larger plan of things4 #a47 ,whether we are connected with the distant parts of the universe1 is uncertain2 but it is very clear we are connected1 more or less1 with present1 past1 and future4 #b47 ,we are evidently in the midst of a scheme1 not fixed but progressive2 and one equally incomprehensible1 whether we regard the present1 past1 or future4 #b4 ,this scheme contains as much that is wonderful as religion does3 for it certainly would be as wonderful that all nature came into existence without a ,creator1 as that there should be a ,creator3 and as wonderful that the ,creator should act without any rule or scheme1 as that he should act with one2 or that he should act by a bad rule1 rather than a righteous one4 #c4 ,our very nature compels us to believe that the will and character of the ,author of nature1 is just and good4 #d4 ,whatever be his character1 he formed the world as it is1 and controls it as he does1 and has assigned us our part and lot4 #e4 ,irrational creatures act their part1 and receive their lot1 without reflection1 but creatures endued with reason1 can hardly avoid reflecting whither we go1 and what is the scheme1 in the midst of which we find ourselves4 ,here follows a recapitulation of the book4 ,,part ,,ii4 ,,chapter ,i4 ,,importance ,,of ,,christianity4 ,every one must admit that we need a revelation4 ,few1 if any1 could reason out a system1 even of natural religion4 ,if they could1 there is no probability that they would4 ,such as might1 would still feel the want of revelation4 ,to say that ,christianity is superfluous1 is as wild as to say all are happy4 ,no exactness in attending to natural religion can make ,christianity of small importance4 ,if ,christianity be from ,god1 we must obey1 unless we know all his reasons for giving it3 and also that those reasons no longer exist2 at least in our case4 ,this we cannot know4 ,the importance of ,christianity appears if we regard it ,i4 ,as a republication of natural religion4 #a4 ,it gives the moral system of the universe4 #a47 ,free from corruptions2 teaching that --,jehovah created all things4 -- 0 governs all things4 --,virtue is his law4 --,mankind will be judged according to character4 #b47 ,it publishes its facts authoritatively4 #c47 ,with vastly more clearness2 e4g4 the doctrines of a future state3 danger of sin3 efficacy of repentance4 #d47 ,with the advantage of a visible church1 distinguished from the world by peculiar institutions4 ,objec4 ,the perversions of ,christianity1 and the little good it has done4 ,ans4 #a4 ,natural religion is no less perverted1 and has done less good4 #b4 ,the benefits of ,christianity are not small4 #c4 ,the evils ascribed to it1 are not its effects4 ,things are to be judged by their genuine tendencies4 #d4 ,the light of reason1 no more than revelation forces acquiescence4 #e47 ,with the additional advantage that every ,christian1 is bound to instruct and persuade others4 ,,ii4 ,as containing truths not discoverable by natural reason4 #a4 ,a mode of salvation for the ruined4 #b4 ,duties unknown before4 #c4 ,our relations to the ,son and ,holy ,ghost4 #a47 ,hence the form of baptism4 #b47 ,pious regards to ,christ1 and the ,holy ,ghost1 based on our relations to them4 #d4 ,the manner of external worship4 ,,iii4 ,the fearful hazard of neglecting ,christianity4 #a4 ,those who think natural religion sufficient1 must admit that ,christianity is highly important4 #b4 ,our relations to ,christ being made known1 our religious regard to him is an evident obligation4 #c4 ,these relations being real1 there is no reason to think that our neglect of behaving suitably to them1 will not be attended with the same kind of consequences as follow the neglect of duties made known by reason4 #d4 ,if we are corrupt and depraved1 and so unfit for heaven1 and if we need ,god's ,holy ,spirit to renew our nature1 how can it be a slight thing whether we make use of the means for obtaining such assistance8 #e4 ,thus1 if ,christianity be either true1 or merely credible1 it is most rash and presumptuous to treat it lightly4 ,,remarks4 #a4 ,the distinction between positive and moral obligations4 #a47 ,for moral precepts we can see the reason3 for positive we cannot4 #b47 ,moral duties are such prior to command2 positive duties are such because commanded4 #c47 ,the manner in which a duty is made known1 does not make it moral or positive4 #b4 ,the ground of regarding moral duties as superior to positive4 #a47 ,both have the nature of moral commands4 #b47 ,if the two conflict1 we must obey the moral4 --,positive institutions are means to moral ends4 --,ends are more excellent than means4 --,obedience to positive institutions1 has no value but as proceeding from moral principle4 #c47 ,both moral and positive duties are revealed1 and so are on a level2 but the moral law is also interwoven with our very nature1 and so its precepts must prevail when the two interfere4 #c4 ,there is less necessity for determining their relative authority1 than some suppose4 #a47 ,though man is disposed to outward and ritual religion1 nothing can give us acceptance with ,god1 without moral virtue4 #b47 ,scripture always lays stress on moral duties4 #c47 ,it is a great weakness1 though very common1 to make light of positive institutions1 because less important than moral4 --,we are bound to obey all ,god's commands4 --,a precept1 merely positive1 admitted to be from ,god1 creates moral obligation1 in the strictest sense4 ,,conclusion4 ,this account of ,christianity shows our great obligation to study the ,scriptures4 ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,,presumptions ,,against ,a ,,revelation1 ,,considered ,,as ,,miraculous4 ,having shown the need of revelation1 we now examine the presumptions against it4 ,the analogy of nature is generally supposed to afford presumptions against miracles4 ,they are deemed to require stronger evidence than other events4 ,i4 ,analogy furnishes no presumptions against the general scheme of ,christianity4 #a4 ,it is no presumption against ,christianity1 that it is not the discovery of reason1 or of experience4 #b4 ,nor is it a presumption against ,christianity1 that it contains things unlike the apparent course of nature4 #a47 ,we cannot suppose every thing1 in the vast universe1 to be just like what is the course of nature in this little world4 #b47 ,even within the present compass of our knowledge1 we see many things greatly unlike4 #c4 ,if we choose to call what is unlike our known course of things1 miraculous1 still that does not make it improbable4 ,,ii4 ,there is no presumption against such a revelation1 as we should now call miraculous1 being made1 at the beginning of the world4 #a4 ,there was then no course of nature1 as to this world4 #b4 ,whether man then received a revelation involves a question not of miracles1 but of fact4 #c4 ,creation was a very different exertion of power from that which rules the world1 now it is made4 #d4 ,whether the power of forming stopped when man was made2 or went on1 and formed a religion for him1 is merely a question as to the degree or extent1 to which a power was exerted4 #e4 ,there is then no presumption from analogy against supposing man had a revelation when created4 #f4 ,all tradition and history teaches that he had1 which amounts to a real and material proof4 ,,iii4 ,there is no presumption against miracles1 or a miraculous revelation1 after the course of nature was settled4 #a4 ,such a presumption1 requires the adduction of some parallel case4 #b4 ,this would require us to know the history of some other world4 #c4 ,even then1 if drawn from only one other world1 the presumption would be very precarious4 ,to be more particular1 #a4 ,there is a strong presumption against any truth till it is proved--which yet is overcome by almost any proof4 --,hence the question of a presumption against miracles1 involves only the degree of presumption1 7not whether the presumption is peculiar to miracles17 and whether that degree is such as to render them incredible4 #b4 ,if we leave out religion1 we are in total darkness as to the cause or circumstances on which the course of nature depends4 --,five or six thousand years may have given occasion and reasons for miraculous interpositions of ,providence4 #c4 ,taking in religion1 there are distinct reasons for miracles2 to afford additional instruction2 to attest the truth of instruction4 #d4 ,miracles must not be compared with common events1 but with uncommon2 earthquakes1 pestilence1 c4 ,,conclusion4 #a4 ,there are no analogies to render miracles incredible4 #b4 ,on the contrary1 we see good reasons for them4 #c4 ,there are no presumptions against them1 peculiar to them1 as distinguished from other unusual phenomena4 ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,,our ,,incapacity ,,of ,,judging ,,what ,,should ,,be ,,expected ,,in ,a ,,revelation ,,from ,,god4 ,beside the objectors to the evidences of ,christianity1 there are many who object to its nature4 ,they say it is not full enough3 has in it foolish things3 gives rise to superstition3 subserves tyranny3 is not universally known3 not well arranged3 figurative language1 c4 ,it is granted that if it contained immoralities or contradictions they would show it to be false4 ,but other objections against religion1 aside from objections against its evidences1 are frivolous3 as will now be shown4 ,let the student look to the force of the proofs1 rather than any consequences which may be drawn from them4 ,i4 ,the ,scripture informs us of a scheme of government1 in addition to the material laws of the world4 #a4 ,if both these schemes1 the physical and the moral1 coincide and form one whole1 then our inability to criticise the system of nature1 renders it credible that we are incompetent to criticise the system of grace4 #b4 ,nature shows many things we should not have expected1 prior to experience4 #c4 ,hence it is altogether likely it would be so in religion4 #d4 ,if a citizen is incompetent to judge of the propriety of the general laws of his government1 he is equally incompetent to judge when and how far those laws should be suspended1 or deviated from4 ,,ii4 ,we are no better judges of how revelation should be imparted4 ,whether to every man1 or to some for others2 or what mode or degree of proof should be given2 or whether the knowledge should be given gradually or suddenly4 #a4 ,we are not able to judge how much new knowledge ought to be given by revelation4 #b4 ,nor how far1 nor in what way1 ,god should qualify men to transmit any revelation he might make4 #c4 ,nor whether the evidence should be certain1 probable1 or doubtful4 #d4 ,nor whether all should have the same benefit from it4 #e4 ,nor whether it should be in writing1 or verbal4 ,if it be said that if not in writing it would not have answered its purpose3 ,i ask1 what purpose8 ,who knows what purposes would best suit ,god's general government8 #f4 ,all which shows it to be absurd to object to particular things in revelation as unsuitable4 ,,iii4 ,hence the only question1 concerning the truth of revelation is1 whether it is a revelation4 #a4 ,no obscurities1 c4 could overthrow the authority of a revelation4 #b4 ,it can only be overthrown by nullifying the proofs4 #c4 ,though the proofs could be shown to be less strong than is affirmed1 it still should control our conduct4 ,,iv4 ,modes of arguing1 which are perfectly just1 in relation to other books1 are not so as to the ,bible4 #a4 ,we are competent judges of common books1 but not of ,scripture4 #b4 ,our only inquiry should be to find out the sense4 #c4 ,in other books1 internal improbabilities weaken external proof2 but in regard to revelation1 we scarcely know what are improbabilities4 #a47 ,those who judge the ,scripture by preconceived expectations1 will imagine they find improbabilities4 #b47 ,and so they would by thus judging in natural things4 --,it would seem very improbable1 prior to experience1 that man should be better able to determine the magnitudes and motions of heavenly bodies1 than he is to determine the causes and cures of disease1 which much more nearly concerns him4 --,or that we should sometimes hit upon a thing in an instant1 even when thinking of something else1 which we had been vainly trying to discover for years4 --,or that language should be so liable to abuse1 that every man may be a deceiver4 --,or that brute instinct should ever be superior to reason4 ,v4 ,such observations apply to almost all objections to ,christianity1 as distinguished from objections against its evidence4 ,for instance1 the disorderly manner in which some1 in the apostolic age used their miraculous gifts4 #a4 ,this does not prove the acts not miraculous4 #b4 ,the person having any such gift1 would have the same power over it which he would have over any other ability1 and might pervert it4 #c4 ,to say why was he not also endued with prudence1 to restrain its use1 is but saying why did not ,god give a higher degree of miraculous endowment8 ,as to which we are not competent judges4 #d4 ,god does not confer his natural gifts1 7memory1 eloquence1 knowledge1 c47 only on those who are prudent and make the best use of them4 #e4 ,nor is worldly instruction1 by educators1 commonly given in the happiest manner4 ,,vi4 ,there is a resemblance between religion and nature in several other respects4 #a4 ,in both1 common and necessary things1 are plain2 but to 8go on to perfection0 in either1 requires exact and laborious study4 #b4 ,the hinderances to both religious and physical knowledge1 are the same in kind4 ,a more perfect knowledge may be brought about1 #a47 ,by the progress of learning and liberty4 #b47 ,by students attending to intimations overlooked by the generality4 #c4 ,it is not wonderful that our knowledge of ,bible truth should be small2 for the natural world has laid open to inspection1 for thousands of years1 and yet only lately are any great discoveries made4 #d4 ,perhaps these scientific discoveries1 are to be the means of opening and ascertaining ,bible truth4 ,objec4 ,the cases are not parallel2 for natural knowledge is of no consequence1 compared to spiritual4 ,ans4 #a4 ,the cases are parallel2 for natural knowledge is as important to our natural well-being1 as spiritual knowledge is to our spiritual well-being4 ,ans4 #b4 ,if the cases were not parallel1 there are plenty of other analogies1 which show that ,god does not dispense his gifts according to our notions of their value4 ,objec4 #b4 ,if ,christianity be intended for the recovery of men1 why not sooner introduced1 and more widely diffused8 ,ans4 ,the objection is just as strong against the natural sciences4 ,nay1 if the light of nature and of revelation are both from the same source1 we might expect that revelation would have been introduced and diffused just as it is4 #a47 ,remedies for disease are known but to a few1 or not known at all1 nor to any without care and study4 #b47 ,when proposed by discoverers1 they have been treated with derision1 and the use rejected by thousands whom they might have cured4 #c47 ,the best remedies have been used unskilfully1 and so made to produce more disease4 #d47 ,their benefit may come very slowly4 #e47 ,in some cases they may be wholly ineffectual4 #f47 ,they maybe so disagreeable that many will not submit to use them1 even with the prospect of a cure4 #g47 ,sometimes the remedy may be entirely out of reach if we were ready to take it4 ,all this reasoning may be applied to ,christianity4 ,,vii4 ,having obviated all objections to ,christianity1 from its containing things we should not have expected1 we will now consider the objections against its morality4 #a4 ,reason may judge1 as to whether revelation contains things contrary to justice1 and wisdom1 c4 as those attributes are taught by natural religion4 ,but no such objections are advanced1 except such as would equally condemn the constitution of nature4 #b4 ,there are indeed particular precepts1 to particular persons1 which would be immoral1 but for the precept4 ,the precept changes the nature of the action4 #c4 ,none are contrary to immutable morality4 ,we are never commanded to cultivate the principles of ingratitude1 treachery1 c4 #d4 ,god may command the taking of life or property because these are his4 #e4 ,the only real difficulty is1 that such commands are liable to be perverted by the wicked to their own horrid purposes2 and to mislead the weak4 ,but such objections do not lie against revelation1 as such1 but against the very notion of religion as a trial4 #f4 ,the sum of the whole is1 objections against the scheme of ,christianity do not affect its truth2 since there are no objections against its morality4 ,hence objections against it1 aside from its evidences1 are frivolous4 ,objections against the evidence1 will be considered in a subsequent chapter1 i4e4 ch4 vii4 ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,,christianity ,a ,,scheme ,,imperfectly ,,understood4 ,in the last chapter it was shown that we might expect1 beforehand1 that a revelation would contain strange things1 and things liable to great objections4 ,this abates the force of such objections1 or rather precludes them4 ,but it may be said this does not show such objectionable things to be good1 or credible4 ,it was a sufficient answer ch4 vii4 part i4 to objections against the course of nature1 that it was a scheme1 imperfectly comprehended4 ,if ,christianity be a scheme1 the like objections admit of a like answer4 ,in studying this chapter1 let chap4 vii4 part i4 be kept in view4 ,i4 ,christianity is a scheme1 beyond our comprehension4 #a4 ,god's general plan is to conduct things gradually1 so that1 finally1 every one shall receive what he deserves4 #b4 ,christianity is a particular arrangement1 under this general plan3 is a part of it1 and conduces to its completion4 #c4 ,it is itself a complicated and mysterious economy4 #a47 ,its arrangements began from the fall of man4 #b47 ,various dispensations1 patriarchal1 prophetic1 c4 were preparatory to it4 #c47 ,at a certain juncture in the condition of the world ,jesus ,christ came4 #d47 ,the mission of the ,holy ,ghost was part of this economy4 #e47 ,christ now presides over it1 and will establish the church1 judge the world1 give up the kingdom1 c4 c4 #d4 ,of course1 we can comprehend but little of such a scheme4 #e4 ,we plainly see1 from what is revealed1 that there is very much unrevealed4 #f4 ,thus it is evident that we are as little capable of judging as to the whole system of religion1 as we are as to the whole system of nature4 ,,ii4 ,in both material and spiritual things1 means are used to accomplish ends4 #a4 ,hence a thing may seem foolish to us1 because we do not know its object and end4 #b4 ,its seeming foolish to us1 is no proof that it is so4 ,,iii4 ,christianity is carried on by general laws1 no less than nature4 #a4 ,why do we say there are laws of nature8 #a47 ,we indeed know some such4 ,but nothing of the laws of many things1 e4g4 ,pestilence4 ,storms4 ,earthquakes4 ,diversities of human powers4 ,association of ideas4 #b47 ,hence we call many things accidental1 which we know are not matters of chance1 but are subject to general laws4 #c47 ,it is a very little way that we can trace things to their general laws4 #d47 ,we attribute many things to such laws1 only by analogy4 #b4 ,just for the same reasons1 we say that miracles comport with ,god's general laws of wisdom4 ,these laws may be unknown to us2 but no more so than those by which some die as soon as born1 or live to old age1 or have superior understandings1 c4 #c4 ,we see no more reason to regard the frame and course of nature as a scheme1 than we have to regard ,christianity as such4 #a47 ,if the first is a scheme1 then ,christianity1 if true1 would be likely to be a scheme4 #b47 ,as ,christianity is revealed but in part1 and is an arrangement to accomplish ends1 there would of course seem to us1 in it1 irregularities2 just as we see in nature4 #c47 ,therefore objections against the one1 are answered in the same manner as objections against the other4 99 99 99 99 99 ,having1 in a previous chapter1 ch4 iii41 answered objections to ,christianity as a matter of fact1 and in this1 as a general question of wisdom and goodness1 the next thing is to discuss objections in particular4 ,as one of these is directed against the scheme1 as just now described1 it will be considered here4 ,objec4 ,christianity is a roundabout1 and perplexed contrivance2 just such as men1 for want of understanding or power1 are obliged to adopt1 in their designs4 ,ans4 #a47 ,god uses just such complex arrangements in the natural world4 ,the mystery is quite as great in nature as in grace4 #b47 ,we do not know what are means1 and what are ends4 #c47 ,the natural world1 and its government1 are not fixed1 but progressive4 #d47 ,great length of time is required in some changes2 e4g4 animals1 vegetables1 geological periods1 c4 #e47 ,one state of life is a preparation and means for attaining another4 #f47 ,man is impatient1 but ,jehovah deliberate4 ,,chapter ,v4 ,,of ,a ,,mediator1 ,,and ,,redemption ,,by ,,him4 ,nothing in ,christianity is so much objected to as the position assigned to ,christ2 yet nothing is more unjust4 ,the whole world exhibits mediation4 ,i4 ,our existence1 and all its satisfactions1 are by the medium of others4 #a4 ,if so in the natural world1 why not in the spiritual8 #b4 ,the objection therefore is not only against ,christ's mediation1 but all mediation4 ,,ii4 ,we cannot know all the ends for which ,god punishes1 nor by whom he should punish4 #a4 ,future punishment may be as natural a sequence of sin1 as a broken limb is of falling from a precipice4 #b4 ,this is not taking punishment out of the hands of ,god1 and giving it to nature2 it is only distinguishing ordinary events from miraculous4 ,,iii4 ,in natural providence1 ,god has made provision that the bad consequences of actions do not always follow4 #a4 ,we may say ,god could have prevented all evil4 ,but we see he permits it1 and has provided relief1 and even sometimes perfect remedies for it4 #a47 ,thus the bad consequences of trifling on a precipice may be prevented by a friend1 if we do not reject his assistance4 #b47 ,we may ourselves do much towards preventing the bad consequences of our misdeeds4 #c47 ,still more if assisted4 #b4 ,it might have been perfectly just if it were not so2 but that it is so1 shows compassion1 as distinguished from goodness4 #c4 ,the course of nature affords many instances of such compassion4 #d4 ,thus analogy sanctions an arrangement1 by which the ruinous consequences of vice or folly may be averted1 at least in some cases4 #e4 ,if the consequences of rash and inconsiderate acts1 which we scarcely call vicious1 are often so serious1 we may apprehend that the bad consequences will be greater1 in proportion as the irregularity is greater4 #f4 ,a dissolute disregard to all religion1 if there be a religion1 is incomparably more reprehensible than the mere neglects1 imprudencies1 c4 of this life4 #g4 ,as the effects of worldly imprudence and vice are often misery1 ruin1 and even death1 no one can say what may be the consequences of blasphemy1 contempt of ,god1 and final impenitence4 #h4 ,nor can any one tell1 how far the consequences of such great wickedness can possibly be prevented1 consistently with the eternal rule of right4 #i4 ,still there would1 from analogy1 be some hope of room for pardon4 ,,iv4 ,there is no probability that any thing we could do alone1 would entirely prevent the effects of our irregularities4 #a4 ,we do not know all the reasons for punishment1 nor why it should be fit to remit punishment4 #b4 ,nor do we know all the consequences of vice1 and so should not know how to prevent them4 #c4 ,vice impairs men's abilities for helping themselves4 #d4 ,misconduct makes assistance necessary1 which otherwise would not have been4 ,why should not the same things be so1 as to our future interests8 #e4 ,in temporal things1 behaving well in time to come1 does not repair old errors1 why should it as to future things8 #f4 ,were it so in all cases it would be contrary to all our notions of government4 #g4 ,it could not be determined in what degree1 or in what cases1 it would be so1 even if we knew it might in some cases4 #h4 ,the efficacy of repentance1 as urged in opposition to atonement1 is contrary to the general sense of mankind2 as shown by the prevalence of propitiatory sacrifices4 ,v4 ,in this state of apprehension1 awakened by the light of nature1 revelation comes in1 and teaches positively1 the possibility of pardon and safety4 #a4 ,confirms our fears as to the unprevented consequences of sin4 #b4 ,declares the world to be in a state of ruin4 #c4 ,that repentance alone will not secure pardon4 #d4 ,that there is a mode of pardon1 by interposition4 #e4 ,that ,god's moral government is compassionate1 as well as his natural government4 #f4 ,that he has provided1 by the interposition of a mediator1 to save men4 #g4 ,all this seems to put man in a strange state of helpless degradation4 ,but it is not ,christianity which puts him so4 ,all philosophy and history show man to be degraded and corrupt4 ,,vi4 ,scripture1 in addition to confirming the dim testimony of the light of nature1 reveals a ,christ1 as mediator and propitiatory sacrifice4 #a4 ,he is 8that prophet40 #a47 ,declared the will of ,god4 #b47 ,published anew the law of nature4 #c47 ,taught with authority4 #d47 ,revealed the right manner of worship4 #e47 ,revealed the exact use of repentance4 #f47 ,revealed future rewards and punishments4 #g47 ,set us a perfect example4 #b4 ,he has a kingdom which is not of this world4 #a47 ,founded a church4 #b47 ,governs it4 #c47 ,of it1 all who obey him are members4 #d47 ,each of these shall live and reign with him forever4 #c4 ,he is a propitiatory sacrifice4 #a47 ,how his sacrifice becomes efficacious1 we are not exactly told4 #b47 ,conjectures may be absurd2 at least cannot be certain4 #c47 ,if any complain for want of further instruction1 let him produce his claim to it4 #d47 ,some1 because they cannot explain1 leave it out of their creed2 and regard ,christ only as a teacher4 #e47 ,we had better accept the benefit1 without disputing about how it was procured4 ,,vii4 ,we are not judges1 antecedent to revelation1 whether a mediator was necessary1 nor what should be the whole nature of his office4 #a4 ,we know not how future punishment would have been inflicted4 #b4 ,nor all the reasons why it would be necessary4 #c4 ,the satisfaction by ,christ1 does not represent ,god as indifferent whether he punishes the innocent or guilty4 #a47 ,we see1 in this world1 the innocent forced to suffer for the faults of the guilty4 #b47 ,but ,christ suffered voluntarily4 #d4 ,though1 finally1 every one shall receive according to his own deserts2 yet1 during the progress of ,god's scheme1 vicarious sufferings may be necessary4 #a47 ,god commands us to assist others1 though in many cases it costs us suffering and toil4 #b47 ,one person's sufferings often tend to relieve another4 #e4 ,vicarious atonement for sinners1 serves to vindicate the authority of ,god's laws1 and to deter men from sin4 #f4 ,objections to vicarious suffering are obviously not objections to ,christianity1 but to the whole course of nature4 #g4 ,the objection1 therefore1 amounts to nothing more than saying that a divine arrangement is not necessary1 or fit1 because the objector does not see it to be so2 though he must own he is no judge1 and could not understand why it should be necessary1 if it were so6 ,,viii4 ,we have no reason to expect the same information touching ,god's conduct1 as we have in relation to our own duty4 #a4 ,god instructs us by experience4 #b4 ,this experience1 though sufficient for our purposes1 is an infinitely small part of his providence4 #c4 ,the things not understood involve ,god's appointment1 and ,christ's execution2 but what is required of us1 we are clearly informed4 #d4 ,even the reasons for ,christian precepts are made obvious4 ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,,supposed ,,lack ,,of ,,proof ,,of ,,revelation1 ,,and ,,its ,,want ,,of ,,universality4 ,it has been thought to be a positive argument against revelation1 that its evidences are not adequate1 and that it is not universally known and believed4 ,but the argument amounts to just this1 that ,god would not bestow on us any favor1 except in such a mode and degree as we thought best1 and did exactly the same for everybody else4 ,such a notion1 all analogy contradicts4 ,i4 ,men act in their most important concerns on doubtful evidence4 #a4 ,it is often absolutely impossible to say which of two modes of acting will give most pleasure or profit4 #b4 ,if it were possible1 we cannot know what changes temper1 satiety1 ill health1 c4 might produce1 so as to destroy our pleasure4 #c4 ,we cannot foresee what accidents may cut it all off4 #d4 ,strong objections and difficulties may attach to the course of action we adopt1 which yet all would admit ought not to deter us4 #e4 ,we may1 after all1 be deceived by appearances1 or by our passions1 c4 #f4 ,men think it reasonable to engage in pursuit of advantage1 even when the probabilities of success are against them4 ,,ii4 ,as to the light of ,christianity not being universal4 #a4 ,temporal good is enjoyed in very different degrees even among creatures of the same species4 #b4 ,yet it is certain that ,god governs4 #c4 ,we may prudently or imprudently use our good things4 #d4 ,the ,jewish religion was not universal4 #e4 ,if it be intended that ,christianity should be a small light1 shining in a great and wide-spread darkness1 it would be perfectly uniform with other parts of ,god's providence4 #f4 ,if some have ,christianity so corrupted1 and interpolated1 as to cause thoughtful persons to doubt it1 as is the case in some countries2 and if1 where it is the purest1 some learn much less from it than they might1 there are manifest parallels in ,god's natural dispensations4 #g4 ,no more is expected of any one1 than is equitable under his circumstances4 #h4 ,every one is bound to get rid of his ignorance1 as far as he can1 and to instruct his neighbor4 #i4 ,if revelation were universal1 in extent and degree1 different understandings1 educations1 tempers1 length of lives1 and outward advantages1 would soon make the knowledge of it as different as it is at present4 ,,iii4 ,practical reflections4 ,first4 ,that the evidence of religion is not such as unavoidably to convince all1 may be part of our probation4 #a4 ,it gives scope for a wise or vicious use of our understanding4 ,just as is the case in common affairs4 #b4 ,intellectual inattention to so serious a matter1 is as immoral1 as disobedience after conviction of the truth4 ,secondly4 ,if the evidence is really doubtful1 it puts us on probation4 #a4 ,if a man were in doubt whether a certain person had done him the greatest favor1 or whether his whole temporal interest depended on him1 he ought not to regard that person as he would if there were no reason to think so4 #b4 ,so if there is only reason to apprehend that ,christianity may be true1 we are as much bound to examine1 c4 as we would be bound to obey1 if we knew it was true4 #c4 ,considering the infinite importance of religion1 there is not much difference as to what ought to be the mode of life of those who are convinced and those who doubt its truth4 ,their hopes and fears are the same in kind1 though not in degree2 and so their obligations are much the same4 #d4 ,doubts presuppose some evidence1 belief more1 and certainty more still4 ,each state should influence our conduct1 and does so1 in common things4 #e4 ,it shows a mental defect not to see evidence unless it is glaring2 and a corrupt heart not to be influenced by it unless overpowering4 ,thirdly4 ,difficulties as to believing religion1 are no more a ground of complaint1 than difficulties in practising it4 #a4 ,they constitute a wholesome discipline4 #a47 ,in allowing an unfair mind to deceive itself4 #b47 ,in requiring belief and the practice of virtue under some uncertainties4 #b4 ,in the case of some minds1 speculative difficulties as to the evidence of religion is the principal trial4 ,a full conviction of its truth would constrain some to obedience4 ,fourthly4 ,the difficulties may be in the objector rather than in the religion4 #a4 ,not sufficiently in earnest to be informed4 #b4 ,secretly wishes religion not to be true4 #c4 ,looks at objections rather than replies4 #d4 ,treats the subject ludicrously4 ,fifthly4 ,the proof of ,christianity is level to common men4 #a4 ,they are capable of being convinced of the existence of ,god1 and of their moral accountability4 #b4 ,and they can understand the evidence of miracles1 and the fulfilment of prophecy4 #c4 ,if they are capable of seeing the difficulty1 they are capable of understanding the proof4 #d4 ,if they pick up objections from hearsay1 and will not or cannot examine them thoroughly1 they must remain ignorant1 just as they do as to the sciences4 ,objec4 ,our directions should be too plain to admit of doubt2 like those of an earthly master4 ,ans4 ,the earthly master only wants his work done1 and is careless as to the state of the heart2 but as the whole of morality consists in the state of the heart1 the cases are not parallel4 ,finally4 ,the credibility of our being in a state of probation is just as great as the credibility of there being any religion4 ,our probation may be whether we choose to inform ourselves as to our duty1 and then whether we choose to do it4 ,such is exactly the case as to temporal matters4 ,to discern what is best often requires difficult consideration1 and yet leaves doubts3 and not reflecting carefully1 or not acting even when there may be doubt1 is often fatal4 ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,,positive ,,evidences ,,of ,,christianity4 ,having considered the objections both to the general scheme of ,christianity1 and to particular doctrines in it1 it only remains to consider the positive evidence of its truth2 i4e4 what analogy teaches with regard to that evidence4 ,there are many evidences of ,christianity1 beside those from miracles or prophecy1 which are the principal2 embracing a great variety of proofs1 direct and collateral1 and reaching through all past time4 ,we shall now consider the proofs from ,,miracles and ,,prophecy4 ,i4 ,miracles4 #a4 ,bible history gives the same evidence for the miracles described1 as for common events4 #a47 ,the miracles are evidently not put in for ornament1 as speeches are by historians and poets put into the mouths of heroes4 #b47 ,the accounts of them have been quoted as genuine1 by various writers1 from that day to this4 #c47 ,these accounts are confirmed by subsequent events2 and the miracles alone1 can account for those events4 #d47 ,the only fair way of accounting for these statements1 and their reception in the world1 is that the things really happened4 #e47 ,the statements should be admitted till disproved1 even if doubtful4 #b4 ,paul's ,epistles have evidences of genuineness1 beyond what can attach to mere history4 #a47 ,additional4 ,his evidence is quite detached4 ,he received the gospel not in common with the other apostles1 but separately1 and direct from ,christ1 after his ascension4 #b47 ,peculiar4 ,he speaks of ,christ's miracles and those of others incidentally1 as familiar facts1 fully believed by those to whom he wrote4 #c4 ,christianity demands credence on the ground of its miracles1 and was so received by great numbers1 at the time and on the spot2 which is the case with no other religion4 #a47 ,its first converts embraced it on this ground4 #b47 ,it is not conceivable that they would have done so1 at such fearful sacrifice1 unless fully satisfied of the truth of these miracles4 #c47 ,such a profession and sacrifices furnish the same kind of evidence as if they had testified to the truth of the miracles in writing4 #d47 ,it is real evidence1 for they had full opportunity to inform themselves4 #e47 ,it is a sort of evidence distinct from direct history1 though of the same nature4 #f47 ,men are suspicious as well as credulous1 and slow to believe against their interests1 as these did4 #d4 ,it lies upon unbelievers to show why all this array of proof is to be rejected2 but in such an important concern we shall proceed to notice some possible objections4 ,objec4 #a4 ,enthusiasts make similar sacrifices for idle follies4 ,ans4 #a4 ,this objection ignores the distinction between opinions and facts4 ,suffering for an opinion is no proof of its truth2 but in attestation of observed facts1 it is proof4 #b4 ,enthusiasm weakens testimony1 it is true1 even as to facts2 and so does disease1 in particular instances4 ,but when great numbers1 not weak1 nor negligent1 affirm that they saw and heard certain things1 it is the fullest evidence4 #c4 ,to reject testimony on the ground of enthusiasm1 requires that the things testified be incredible2 which has not been shown1 as to religion1 but the contrary4 #d4 ,religion is not the only thing in regard to which witnesses are liable to enthusiasm4 ,in common matters1 we get at the truth through witnesses1 though influenced by party spirit1 custom1 humor1 romance1 c4 c4 ,objec4 #b4 ,enthusiasm and knavery may have been combined in the apostles and first ,christians4 ,ans4 ,such a mixture is often seen1 and is often reproved in ,scripture2 but not more in religious than in common affairs4 ,men in all matters deceive themselves and others1 in every degree1 yet human testimony is good ground of belief4 ,objec4 #c4 ,men have been deluded by false miracles4 ,ans4 ,not oftener than by other pretences4 ,objec4 #d4 ,fabulous miracles have historical evidence4 ,ans4 #a4 ,if this were equal to that for ,scripture miracles1 the evidence for the latter would not be impaired4 ,the objection really amounts to this1 that evidence proved not to be good1 destroys evidence which is good and unconfuted6 ,or to this1 that if two men1 of equal reputation1 testify1 in cases not related to each other1 and one is proved false1 the other must not be believed6 #b4 ,nothing can rebut testimony1 but proof that the witness is incompetent1 or misled4 #c4 ,against all such objections must be set the fact that ,christianity was too serious a matter to allow the first converts to be careless as to its evidence2 and also that their religion forbid them to deceive others4 ,,ii4 ,as to the evidence from prophecy4 #a4 ,obscurity as to part of a prophecy does not invalidate it1 but is1 as to us1 as if that part were not written1 or were lost4 ,we may not see the whole prophecy fulfilled1 and yet see enough fulfilled to perceive in it more than human foresight4 #b4 ,a long series of prophecies1 all applicable to certain events1 is proof that such events were intended4 ,this answers the objection that particular prophecies were not intended to be applied as ,christians apply them4 ,mythological and satirical writings greatly resemble prophecy4 ,now we apply a parable1 or fable1 or satire1 merely from seeing it capable of such application4 ,so if a long series of prophecies be applicable to the present state of the world1 or to the coming of ,christ1 it is proof that they were so intended4 ,besides1 the ancient ,jews1 before ,christ1 applied the prophecies to him1 just as ,christians do now4 #c4 ,if it could be shown that the prophets did not understand their own predictions1 or that their prophecies are capable of being applied to other events than those to which ,christians apply them1 it would not abate the force of the argument from prophecy1 even with regard to those instances4 ,for1 #a47 ,to know the whole meaning of an author we must know the whole meaning of his book1 but knowing the meaning of a book is not knowing the whole mind of the author4 #b47 ,if the book is a compilation1 the authors may have meanings deeper than the compiler saw4 ,if the prophets spoke by inspiration1 they are not the authors1 but the writers of prophecy1 and may not have known all that the ,divine ,spirit intended4 ,but the fulfilment of the prophecy shows a foresight more than human4 ,,remark4 ,this whole argument is just and real2 but it is not expected that those will be satisfied who will not submit to the perplexity and labor of understanding it2 or who have not modesty and fairness enough to allow an argument its due weight2 or who wilfully discard the whole investigation4 ,,the ,,general ,,argument ,we now proceed to ,,the ,,general ,,argument embracing both direct and circumstantial evidence4 ,a full discussion would require a volume1 and cannot be expected here2 but something should be said1 especially as most questions of difficulty1 in practical affairs1 are settled by evidence arising from circumstances which confirm each other4 ,the thing asserted is that ,god has given us a revelation declaring himself to be a moral governor2 stating his system of government2 and disclosing a plan for the recovery of mankind out of sin1 and raising them to perfect and final happiness4 ,i4 ,consider this revelation as a history4 #a4 ,it furnishes an account of the world1 as ,god's world4 #a47 ,god's providence1 commands1 promises1 and threatenings4 #b47 ,distinguishes ,god from idols4 #c47 ,describes the condition of religion and of its professors1 in a world considered as apostate and wicked4 #d47 ,political events are related as affecting religion1 and not for their importance as mere political events4 #e47 ,the history is continued by prophecy1 to the end of the world4 #b4 ,it embraces a vast variety of other topics2 natural and moral4 #a47 ,thus furnishing the largest scope for criticism4 #b47 ,so that doubts of its truth confirm that truth1 for in this enlightened age the claims of a book of such a nature could be easily and finally shown to be false1 if they were so4 #c47 ,none who believe in natural religion1 hold that ,christianity has been thus confuted4 #c4 ,it contains a minute account of ,god's selecting one nation for his peculiar people1 and of his dealings with them4 #a47 ,interpositions in their behalf4 #b47 ,threats of dispersion1 c4 if they rebelled4 #c47 ,promises of a ,messiah as their prince2 so clearly as to raise a general expectation1 c4 #d47 ,foretelling his rejection by them1 and that he should be the ,savior of the ,gentiles4 #d4 ,describes minutely the arrival of the ,messiah1 and his life and labors2 and the result1 in the establishment of a new religion4 ,,ii4 ,as to the authenticity of this history4 ,suppose a person ignorant of all history but the ,bible1 and not knowing even that to be true1 were to inquire into its evidence of authenticity1 he would find1 #a4 ,that natural religion owes its establishment to the truths contained in this book4 ,this no more disproves natural religion1 than our learning a proposition from ,euclid1 shows that the proposition was not true before ,euclid4 #b4 ,the great antiquity of revelation4 #c4 ,that its chronology is not contradicted but confirmed by known facts4 #d4 ,that there is nothing in the history itself to awaken suspicion of its fidelity4 #a47 ,every thing said to be done in any age or country1 is conformable to the manners of that age and country4 #b47 ,the characters are all perfectly natural4 #c47 ,all the domestic and political incidents are credible4 ,some of these1 taken alone1 seem strange to some1 in this day2 but not more so than things now occurring4 #d47 ,transcribers may have made errors1 but these are not more numerous than in other ancient books2 and none of them impair the narrative4 #e4 ,that profane authors confirm ,scripture accounts4 #f4 ,that the credibility of the general history1 confirms the accounts of the miracles1 for they are all interwoven1 and make but one statement4 #g4 ,that there certainly was and is such a people as the ,jews2 whose form of government was founded on these very books of ,moses2 and whose acknowledgment of the ,god of the ,bible1 kept them a distinct race4 #h4 ,that one ,jesus1 of ,jewish extraction1 arose at the time when the ,jews expected a ,messiah1 was rejected by them1 as was prophesied1 and was received by the ,gentiles1 as was prophesied4 #i4 ,that the religion of this ,jesus spread till it became the religion of the world1 notwithstanding every sort of resistance2 and has continued till now4 #aj4 ,that the ,jewish government was destroyed1 and the people dispersed into all lands2 and still for many centuries1 continue to be a distinct race1 professing the law of ,moses4 ,if this separateness be accounted for1 in any way1 it does not destroy the fact that it was predicted4 ,,conclusion4 #a4 ,recapitulation of the preceding ten observations4 #b4 ,add the fact that there are obvious appearances in the world1 aside from the ,jews1 which correspond to prophetic history4 #c4 ,these appearances1 compared with ,bible history1 and with each other1 in a joint view1 will appear to be of great weight1 and would impress one who regarded them for the first time1 more than they do us who have been familiar with them4 #d4 ,the preceding discussion1 though not thorough1 amounts to proof of something more than human in this matter4 #a47 ,the sufficiency of these proofs may be denied1 but the existence of them cannot be4 #b47 ,the conformity of prophecies to events may be said to be accidental1 but the conformity itself cannot be denied4 #c47 ,these collateral proofs may be pronounced fanciful1 but it cannot be said they are nothing4 ,probabilities may not amount to demonstration1 but they remain probabilities4 #e4 ,those who will set down all seeming completions of prophecy1 and judge of them by the common rules of evidence1 will find that together they amount to strong proof4 ,because probable proofs1 added together1 not only increase evidence1 but multiply it4 #f4 ,it is very well to observe objections2 but it should be remembered that a mistake on one side is far more dangerous than a mistake on the other2 and the safest conclusion is the best4 #g4 ,religion1 like other things1 is to be judged by all the evidence taken together4 ,unless all its proofs be overthrown1 it remains proved4 ,if no proof singly were sufficient1 the whole taken together might be4 #h4 ,it is much easier to start an objection1 than to comprehend the united force of a whole argument4 #i4 ,thus it appears that the positive evidence of revelation cannot be destroyed1 though it should be lessened4 ,,chapter ,,viii4 ,,objections ,,against ,,the ,,analogical ,,argument4 ,if all made up their minds with proper care and candor1 there would be no need of this chapter4 ,but some do not try to understand what they condemn2 and our mode of argument is open to objections1 especially in the minds of those who judge without thinking4 ,the chief objections will therefore be considered4 ,they are these3--it does not solve difficulties in revelation to say that there are as great in natural religion3--it will not make men religious to show them that it is as important as worldly prudence1 for showing that1 does not make them prudent3--the justice of ,god in the system of religion1 is not proved by showing it is as apparent as in his natural providence3--no reasoning from analogy can carry full conviction3--mankind will not renounce present pleasures1 for a religion which is not free from doubt4 ,to each of which a reply will now be given4 ,i4 ,as to requiring a solution of all difficulties4 #a4 ,this is but resolving to comprehend the nature of ,god1 and the whole plan of his government throughout eternity4 #b4 ,it is always right to argue from what is known1 to what is disputed4 ,we are constantly so doing4 ,the most eminent physician does not understand all diseases1 yet we do not despise what he does know4 #c4 ,it is very important to find that objections against revelation are just as strong1 not only against natural religion1 but against the course of nature4 ,,ii4 ,as to men's having as little reason for worldly pursuits1 as they have for being religious4 #a4 ,if men can be convinced that they have as much reason to be religious as they have to practise worldly prudence1 then there is a reason for being religious4 #b4 ,if religion proposes greater than worldly interests1 and has the same reasons for belief1 then it has proportionally a greater claim4 #c4 ,if religion being left doubtful1 proves it to be false1 then doubts as to the success of any worldly pursuit show it to be wrong4 ,yet we constantly act1 even in the most important affairs1 without certainty of being right4 ,,iii4 ,as to the justice and goodness of ,god in religion4 #a4 ,our business is not to vindicate ,god1 but to learn our duty1 governed as we are2 which is a very different thing4 ,it has been shown that if we knew all things1 present1 past1 and future1 and the relations of each thing to all other things1 we might see to be just and good what now do not seem so3 and it is probable we should4 #b4 ,we do not say that objections against ,god's justice and goodness are removed by showing the like objections against natural providence1 but that they are not conclusive1 because they apply equally to what we know to be facts4 #c4 ,the existence of objections does not destroy the evidence of facts4 ,the fact for instance that ,god rewards and punishes1 though men may think it unjust4 ,even necessity1 plead for human acts1 does no more to abolish justice than it does injustice4 #d4 ,though the reasonableness of ,christianity cannot be shown from analogy1 the truth of it may4 ,the truth of a fact may be proved without regard to its quality4 ,the reasonableness of obeying ,christianity is proved1 if we barely prove ,christianity itself to be possible4 #e4 ,though analogy may not show ,christian precepts to be good1 it proves them to be credible4 ,,iv4 ,the analogical argument does not remove doubt4 #a4 ,what opinion does any man hold1 about which there can be no doubt8 ,even the best way of preserving and enjoying this life1 is not agreed upon4 ,whether our measures will accomplish our objects1 is always uncertain2 and still more whether the objects1 if accomplished1 will give us happiness4 ,yet men do not on this account refuse to make exertion4 #b4 ,this objection overlooks the very nature of religion4 ,the embracing of it presupposes a certain degree of candor and integrity1 to try which1 and exercise1 and improve it1 is its intention4 ,just as warning a man of danger1 presupposes a disposition to avoid danger4 #c4 ,religion is a probation1 and has evidence enough as such2 and would not be such1 if it compelled assent4 #d4 ,we never mean by sufficient evidence1 such an amount as necessarily determines a man to act1 but only such as will show an action to be prudent4 ,v4 ,as to the small influence of the analogical argument4 #a4 ,as just observed1 religion is a test1 and an exercise1 of character2 and that some reject it is nothing to our purpose4 ,we are inquiring not what sort of creature man is1 but what he should be4 ,this is each man's own concern4 #b4 ,religion1 as a probation1 accomplishes its end1 whether individuals believe or not4 #c4 ,even this objection admits that religion has some weight1 and of course it should have some influence2 and if so1 there is the same reason1 though not so strong1 for publishing it1 that there would be1 if it were likely to have greater influence4 ,,further4 ,it must be considered that the reasoning in this treatise is on the principles of other men1 and arguments of the utmost importance are omitted1 because not universally admitted4 ,thus as to ,fatalism1 and the abstract fitness or unfitness of actions4 ,the general argument is just a question of fact1 and is here so treated4 ,abstract truths are usually advanced as proof2 but in this work1 only facts are adduced4 ,that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles1 is an abstract truth3 but that they so appear to us1 is only a matter of fact4 ,that there is such a thing as abstract right and wrong1 which determines the will of ,god in rewarding and punishing1 is an assertion of an abstract truth1 as well as a fact4 ,suppose ,god in this world rewarded and punished every man exactly as he obeyed or disobeyed his conscience1 this would not be an abstract truth1 but a fact4 ,and if all acknowledged this as a fact1 all would not see it to be right4 ,if1 instead of his doing it now1 we say he will do it hereafter1 this too is not an abstract truth1 but a question of fact4 ,this fact could be fully proved on the abstract principles of moral fitness2 but without them1 there has now been given a conclusive practical proof2 which though it may be cavilled at1 and shown not to amount to demonstration1 cannot be answered4 ,hence it may be said as to the force of this treatise1 #a4 ,to such as are convinced of the truth of revelation1 as proved on the principles of liberty and moral fitness1 it will furnish a full confirmation4 ,to such as do not admit those principles it is an original proof4 #b4 ,those who believe will find objections removed1 and those who disbelieve will find they have no grounds for their scepticism2 and a good deal beside4 #c4 ,thus though some may think too much is here made of analogy1 yet there can be no denying that the argument is real4 ,it confirms all facts to which it can be applied2 and of many is the only proof4 ,it is strong on the side of religion1 and ought to be regarded by such as prefer facts to abstract reasonings4 ,,conclusion4 ,recapitulates the general structure and design of the argument1 the classes of persons for whose benefit it is particularly adopted1 and declares those who reject ,christianity to be wholly without excuse4 ,advertisement prefixed to the ,first ,edition4 ,if the reader should here meet with any thing which he had not before attended to1 it will not be in the observations upon the constitution and course of nature1 these being all obvious1 but in the application of them2 in which1 though there is nothing but what appears to me of some real weight1 and therefore of great importance1 yet he will observe several things1 which will appear to him of very little1 if he can think things to be of little importance1 which are of any real weight at all1 upon such a subject of religion4 ,however1 the proper force of the following treatise lies in the whole general analogy considered together4 ,it is come1 ,i know not how to be taken for granted1 by many persons1 that ,christianity is not so much as a subject of inquiry2 but that it is1 now at length1 discovered to be fictitious4 ,accordingly they treat it1 as if1 in the present age1 this were an agreed point among all people of discernment2 and nothing remained1 but to set it up as a principal subject of mirth and ridicule1 as it were by way of reprisals1 for its having so long interrupted the pleasures of the world4 ,on the contrary1 thus much at least1 will be here found1 not taken for granted but proved1 that any reasonable man1 who will thoroughly consider the matter1 may be as much assured1 as he is of his own being1 that it is not so clear a case1 that there is nothing in it4 ,there is1 ,i think1 strong evidence of its truth2 but it is certain no one can1 upon principles of reason1 be satisfied of the contrary4 ,the practical consequence to be drawn from this1 is not attended to by every one who is concerned in it4 ,may1 #agcf4 ,,introduction4 ,probable evidence is essentially distinguished from demonstrative by this1 that it admits of degrees2 and of all variety of them1 from the highest moral certainty1 to the very lowest presumption4 ,we cannot indeed say a thing is probably true upon one very slight presumption for it2 because1 as there may be probabilities on both sides of a question1 there may be some against it2 and though there be not1 yet a slight presumption does not beget that degree of conviction1 which is implied in saying a thing is probably true4 ,but that the slightest possible presumption is of the nature of a probability1 appears from hence2 that such low presumption1 often repeated1 will amount even to moral certainty4 ,thus a man's having observed the ebb and flow of the tide to-day1 affords some sort of presumption1 though the lowest imaginable1 that it may happen again to-morrow3 but the observation of this event for so many days1 and months1 and ages together1 as it has been observed by mankind1 gives us a full assurance that it will4 ,that which chiefly constitutes probability is expressed in the word likely1 i4e4 like some truth1#f or true event2 like it1 in itself1 in its evidence1 in some 7more or fewer7 of its circumstances4#g ,for when we determine a thing to be probably true1 suppose that an event has or will come to pass1 it is from the mind's remarking in it a likeness to some other event1 which we have observed has come to pass4 ,this observation forms1 in numberless daily instances1 a presumption1 opinion1 or full conviction1 that such event has or will come to pass2 according as the observation is1 that the like event has sometimes1 most commonly1 or always1 so far as our observation reaches1 come to pass at like distances of time1 or place1 or upon like occasions4 ,hence arises the belief1 that a child1 if it lives twenty years1 will grow up to the stature and strength of a man2 that food will contribute to the preservation of its life1 and the want of it for such a number of days1 be its certain destruction4 ,so likewise the rule and measure of our hopes and fears concerning the success of our pursuits2 our expectations that others will act so and so in such circumstances2 and our judgment that such actions proceed from such principles2 all these rely upon our having observed the like to what we hope1 fear1 expect1 judge2 ,i say1 upon our having observed the like1 either with respect to others or ourselves4 ,thus1 the prince#h who had always lived in a warm climate1 naturally concluded in the way of analogy1 that there was no such thing as water's becoming hard1 because he had always observed it to be fluid and yielding4 ,we1 on the contrary1 from analogy conclude1 that there is no presumption at all against this3 that it is supposable there may be frost in ,england any given day in ,january next2 probable that there will on some day of the month2 and that there is a moral certainty1 i4e4 ground for an expectation without any doubt of it1 in some part or other of the winter4 ,probable evidence1 in its very nature1 affords but an imperfect kind of information2 and is to be considered as relative only to beings of limited capacities4 ,for nothing which is the possible object of knowledge1 whether past1 present1 or future1 can be probable to an infinite intelligence2 since it cannot but be discerned absolutely as it is in itself1 certainly true1 or certainly false4 ,but to us1 probability is the very guide of life4 ,from these things it follows1 that in questions of difficulty1 or such as are thought so1 where more satisfactory evidence cannot be had1 or is not seen2 if the result of examination be1 that there appears upon the whole1 any even the lowest presumption on one side1 and none on the other1 or a greater presumption on one side1 though in the lowest degree greater2 this determines the question1 even in matters of speculation4 ,in matters of practice1 it will lay us under an absolute and formal obligation1 in point of prudence and of interest1 to act upon that presumption or low probability1 though it be so low as to leave the mind in very great doubt which is the truth4 ,for surely a man is as really bound in prudence to do what upon the whole1 according to the best of his judgment1 appears to be for his happiness1#i as what he certainly knows to be so4 ,further1 in questions of great consequence1 a reasonable man will think it concerns him to remark lower probabilities and presumptions than these2 such as amount to no more than showing one side of a question to be as supposable and credible as the other3 nay1 such even as but amount to much less than this4 ,for numberless instances might be mentioned respecting the common pursuits of life1 where a man would be thought1 in a literal sense1 distracted1 who would not act1 and with great application too1 not only upon an even chance1 but upon much less1 and where the probability or chance was greatly against his succeeding4#aj ,it is not my design to inquire further into the nature1 the foundation1 and measure of probability2 or whence it proceeds that likeness should beget that presumption1 opinion1 and full conviction1 which the human mind is formed to receive from it1 and which it does necessarily produce in every one2 or to guard against the errors1 to which reasoning from analogy is liable4 ,this belongs to the subject of ,logic2 and is a part of that subject which has not yet been thoroughly considered4 ,indeed ,i shall not take upon me to say1 how far the extent1 compass1 and force1 of analogical reasoning1 can be reduced to general heads and rules2 and the whole be formed into a system4 ,but though so little in this way has been attempted by those who have treated of our intellectual powers1 and the exercise of them2 this does not hinder but that we may be1 as we unquestionably are1 assured1 that analogy is of weight1 in various degrees1 towards determining our judgment and our practice4 ,nor does it in any wise cease to be of weight in those cases1 because persons1 either given to dispute1 or who require things to be stated with greater exactness than our faculties appear to admit of in practical matters1 may find other cases in which it is not easy to say1 whether it be1 or be not1 of any weight2 or instances of seeming analogies1 which are really of none4 ,it is enough to the present purpose to observe1 that this general way of arguing is evidently natural1 just1 and conclusive4 ,for there is no man can make a question but that the sun will rise to-morrow1 and be seen1 where it is seen at all1 in the figure of a circle1 and not in that of a square4 ,hence1 namely from analogical reasoning1 ,origen#aa has with singular sagacity observed1 that 8he who believes the ,scripture to have proceeded from him who is the ,author of nature1 may well expect to find the same sort of difficulties in it1 as are found in the constitution of nature40 ,and in a like way of reflection it may be added1 that he who denies the ,scripture to have been from ,god upon account of these difficulties1 may1 for the very same reason1 deny the world to have been formed by him4 ,on the other hand1 if there be an analogy or likeness between that system of things and dispensation of ,providence1 which revelation informs us of1 and that system of things and dispensation of ,providence1 which experience together with reason informs us of1 i4e4 the known course of nature2 this is a presumption1 that they have both the same author and cause2 at least so far as to answer objections against the former's being from ,god1 drawn from any thing which is analogical or similar to what is in the latter1 which is acknowledged to be from him2 for an ,author of nature is here supposed4 ,forming our notions of the constitution and government of the world upon reasoning1 without foundation for the principles which we assume1 whether from the attributes of ,god1 or any thing else1 is building a world upon hypothesis1 like ,des ,cartes4 ,forming our notions upon reasoning from principles which are certain1 but applied to cases to which we have no ground to apply them1 7like those who explain the structure of the human body1 and the nature of diseases and medicines1 from mere mathematics17 is an error much akin to the former3 since what is assumed in order to make the reasoning applicable1 is ,hypothesis4 ,but it must be allowed just1 to join abstract reasonings with the observation of facts1 and argue from such facts as are known1 to others that are like them2 from that part of the divine government over intelligent creatures which comes under our view1 to that larger and more general government over them which is beyond it2 and from what is present1 to collect what is likely1 credible1 or not incredible1 will be hereafter4 ,this method then of concluding and determining being practical1 and what1 if we will act at all1 we cannot but act upon in the common pursuits of life2 being evidently conclusive1 in various degrees1 proportionable to the degree and exactness of the whole analogy or likeness2 and having so great authority for its introduction into the subject of religion1 even revealed religion2 my design is to apply it to that subject in general1 both natural and revealed3 taking for proved1 that there is an intelligent ,author of nature1 and natural ,governor of the world4 ,for as there is no presumption against this prior to the proof of it3 so it has been often proved with accumulated evidence2 from this argument of analogy and final causes2 from abstract reasonings2 from the most ancient tradition and testimony2 and from the general consent of mankind4 ,nor does it appear1 so far as ,i can find1 to be denied by the generality of those who profess themselves dissatisfied with the evidence of religion4 ,as there are some1 who1 instead of thus attending to what is in fact the constitution of nature1 form their notions of ,god's government upon hypothesis3 so there are others1 who indulge themselves in vain and idle speculations1 how the world might possibly have been framed otherwise than it is2 and upon supposition that things might1 in imagining that they should1 have been disposed and carried on after a better model1 than what appears in the present disposition and conduct of them4#ab ,suppose now a person of such a turn of mind1 to go on with his reveries1 till he had at length fixed upon some particular plan of nature1 as appearing to him the best4--,one shall scarce be thought guilty of detraction against human understanding1 if one should say1 even beforehand1 that the plan which this speculative person would fix upon1 though he were the wisest of the sons of men1 probably would not be the very best1 even according to his own notions of best2 whether he thought that to be so1 which afforded occasions and motives for the exercise of the greatest virtue1 or which was productive of the greatest happiness1 or that these two were necessarily connected1 and run up into one and the same plan4 ,it may not be amiss1 once for all1 to see what would be the amount of these emendations and imaginary improvements upon the system of nature1 or how far they would mislead us4 ,it seems there could be no stopping1 till we came to some such conclusions as these3 that all creatures should at first be made as perfect and as happy as they were capable of ever being3 that nothing1 surely1 of hazard or danger should be put upon them to do2 some indolent persons would perhaps think nothing at all3 or certainly1 that effectual care should be taken1 that they should1 whether necessarily or not1 yet eventually and in fact1 always do what was right and most conducive to happiness2 which would be thought easy for infinite power to effect1 either by not giving them any principles which would endanger their going wrong1 or by laying the right motive of action in every instance before their minds in so strong a manner1 as would never fail of inducing them to act conformably to it3 and that the whole method of government by punishments should be rejected as absurd2 as an awkward roundabout method of carrying things on2 nay1 as contrary to a principal purpose1 for which it would be supposed creatures were made1 namely1 happiness4 ,now1 without considering what is to be said in particular to the several parts of this train of folly and extravagance1 what has been above intimated1 is a full direct general answer to it2 namely1 that we may see beforehand that we have not faculties for this kind of speculation4 ,for though it be admitted that1 from the first principles of our nature1 we unavoidably judge or determine some ends to be absolutely in themselves preferable to others1 and that the ends now mentioned1 or if they run up into one1 that this one is absolutely the best2 and consequently that we must conclude the ultimate end designed1 in the constitution of nature and conduct of ,providence1 is the most virtue and happiness possible2 yet we are far from being able to judge what particular disposition of things would be most friendly and assistant to virtue2 or what means might be absolutely necessary to produce the most happiness in a system of such extent as our own world may be1 taking in all that is past and to come1 though we should suppose it detached from the whole things4 ,indeed we are so far from being able to judge of this1 that we are not judges what may be the necessary means of raising and conducting one person to the highest perfection and happiness of his nature4 ,nay1 even in the little affairs of the present life1 we find men of different educations and ranks are not competent judges of the conduct of each other4 ,our whole nature leads us to ascribe all moral perfection to ,god1 and to deny all imperfection of him4 ,and this will forever be a practical proof of his moral character1 to such as will consider what a practical proof is2 because it is the voice of ,god speaking in us4 ,hence we conclude1 that virtue must be the happiness1 and vice the misery1 of every creature2 and that regularity and order and right cannot but prevail finally in a universe under his government4 ,but we are in no sort judges1 what are the necessary means of accomplishing this end4 ,let us then1 instead of that idle and not very innocent employment of forming imaginary models of a world1 and schemes of governing it1 turn our thoughts to what we experience to be the conduct of nature with respect to intelligent creatures2 which may be resolved into general laws or rules of administration1 in the same way as many of the laws of nature respecting inanimate matter may be collected from experiments4 ,let us compare the known constitution and course of things with what is said to be the moral system of nature2 the acknowledged dispensations of ,providence1 or that government which we find ourselves under1 with what religion teaches us to believe and expect2 and see whether they are not analogous and of a piece4 ,upon such a comparison it will1 ,i think1 be found that they are very much so3 that both may be traced up to the same general laws1 and resolved into the same principles of divine conduct4 ,the analogy here proposed to be considered is of pretty large extent1 and consists of several parts2 in some more1 in others less exact4 ,in some few instances perhaps1 it may amount to a real practical proof2 in others not so4 ,yet in these it is a confirmation of what is proved otherwise4 ,it will undeniably show1 what too many need to have shown them1 that the system of religion1 both natural and revealed1 considered only as a system1 and prior to the proof of it1 is not a subject of ridicule1 unless that of nature be so too4 ,and it will afford an answer to almost all objections against the system both of natural and revealed religion2 though not perhaps an answer in so great a degree1 yet in a very considerable degree an answer to the objections against the evidence of it3 for objections against a proof1 and objections against what is said to be proved1 the reader will observe are different things4 ,the divine government of the world1 implied in the notion of religion in general and of ,christianity1 contains in it3 that mankind is appointed to live in a future state2#ac that there every one shall be rewarded or punished2#ad rewarded or punished respectively for all that behaviour here1 which we comprehend under the words1 virtuous or vicious1 morally good or evil3#ae that our present life is a probation1 a state of trial1#af and of discipline1#ag for that future one2 notwithstanding the objections1 which men may fancy they have1 from notions of necessity1 against there being any such moral plan as this at all2#ah and whatever objections may appear to lie against the wisdom and goodness of it1 as it stands so imperfectly made known to us at present3#ai that this world being in a state of apostasy and wickedness1 and consequently of ruin1 and the sense both of their condition and duty being greatly corrupted amongst men1 this gave occasion for an additional dispensation of ,providence2 of the utmost importance2#bj proved by miracles2#ba but containing in it many things appearing to us strange1 and not to have been expected2#bb a dispensation of ,providence1 which is a scheme or system of things2#bc carried on by the mediation of a divine person1 the ,messiah1 in order to the recovery of the world2#bd yet not revealed to all men1 nor proved with the strongest possible evidence to all those to whom it is revealed2 but only to such a part of mankind1 and with such particular evidence1 as the wisdom of ,god thought fit4#be ,the design then of the following treatise will be to show1 that the several parts principally objected against in this moral and ,christian dispensation1 including its scheme1 its publication1 and the proof which ,god has afforded us of its truth2 that the particular parts principally objected against in this whole dispensation1 are analogous to what is experienced in the constitution and course of nature or ,providence2 that the chief objections themselves which are alleged against the former1 are no other than what may be alleged with like justness against the latter1 where they are found in fact to be inconclusive2 and that this argument from analogy is in general unanswerable1 and undoubtedly of weight on the side of religion1#bf notwithstanding the objections which may seem to lie against it1 and the real ground which there may be for difference of opinion1 as to the particular degree of weight which is to be laid upon it4 ,this is a general account of what may be looked for in the following treatise4 ,i shall begin it with that which is the foundation of all our hopes and of all our fears2 all our hopes and fears1 which are of any consideration2 ,i mean a future life4 ,,the ,,analogy ,,of ,,religion4 ,,part ,i4 ,natural ,religion4 ,,chapter ,i4 ,a ,,future ,,life4#bg ,strange difficulties have been raised by some concerning personal identity1 or the sameness of living agents1 implied in the notion of our existing now and hereafter1 or in any two successive moments2 which1 whoever thinks it worth while1 may see considered in the first dissertation at the end of this treatise4 ,but without regard to any of them here1 let us consider what the analogy of nature1 and the several changes which we have undergone1 and those which we know we may undergo without being destroyed1 suggest1 as to the effect which death may1 or may not1 have upon us2 and whether it be not from thence probable1 that we may survive this change1 and exist in a future state of life and perception4 ,i4 ,from our being born into the present world in the helpless imperfect state of infancy1 and having arrived from thence to mature age1 we find it to be a general law of nature in our own species1 that the same creatures1 the same individuals1 should exist in degrees of life and perception1 with capacities of action1 of enjoyment and suffering1 in one period of their being1 greatly different from those appointed them in another period of it4 ,in other creatures the same law holds4 ,for the difference of their capacities and states of life at their birth 7to go no higher7 and in maturity2 the change of worms into flies1 and the vast enlargement of their locomotive powers by such change3 and birds and insects bursting the shell of their habitation1 and by this means entering into a new world1 furnished with new accommodations for them1 and finding a new sphere of action assigned them2 these are instances of this general law of nature4 ,thus all the various and wonderful transformations of animals are to be taken into consideration here4 ,the states of life in which we ourselves existed formerly1 in the womb and in our infancy1 are almost as different from our present in mature age1 as it is possible to conceive any two states or degrees of life can be4 ,therefore that we are to exist hereafter1 in a state as different 7suppose7 from our present1 as this is from our former1 is but according to the analogy of nature2 according to a natural order or appointment of the very same kind1 with what we have already experienced4 ,,ii4 ,we know we are endued with capacities of action1 of happiness and misery3 for we are conscious of acting1 of enjoying pleasure and suffering pain4 ,now that we have these powers and capacities before death1 is a presumption that we shall retain them through and after death2 indeed a probability of it abundantly sufficient to act upon1 unless there be some positive reason to think that death is the destruction of those living powers2 because there is in every case a probability1 that all things will continue as we experience they are1 in all respects1 except those in which we have some reason to think they will be altered4 ,this is that kind#bh of presumption or probability from analogy1 expressed in the very word continuance1 which seems our only natural reason for believing the course of the world will continue to-morrow1 as it has done so far as our experience or knowledge of history can carry us back4 ,nay1 it seems our only reason for believing1 that any one substance now existing will continue to exist a moment longer2 the self-existent substance only excepted4 ,thus if men were assured that the unknown event1 death1 was not the destruction of our faculties of perception and of action1 there would be no apprehension that any other power or event1 unconnected with this of death1 would destroy these faculties just at the instant of each creature's death2 and therefore no doubt but that they would remain after it2 which shows the high probability that our living powers will continue after death1 unless there be some ground to think that death is their destruction4#bi ,for1 if it would be in a manner certain that we should survive death1#cj provided it were certain that death would not be our destruction1 it must be highly probable we shall survive it1 if there be no ground to think death will be our destruction4 ,though ,i think it must be acknowledged1 that prior to the natural and moral proofs of a future life commonly insisted upon1 there would arise a general confused suspicion1 that in the great shock and alteration which we shall undergo by death1 we1 i4e4 our living powers1 might be wholly destroyed2 yet even prior to those proofs1 there is really no particular distinct ground or reason for this apprehension at all1 so far as ,i can find4 ,if there be1 it must arise either from the reason of the thing1 or from the analogy of nature4 ,but we cannot argue from the reason of the thing1 that death is the destruction of living agents1 because we know not at all what death is in itself2 but only some of its effects1 such as the dissolution of flesh1 skin1 and bones4 ,these effects do in no wise appear to imply the destruction of a living agent4 ,besides1 as we are greatly in the dark1 upon what the exercise of our living powers depends1 so we are wholly ignorant what the powers themselves depend upon2 the powers themselves as distinguished1 not only from their actual exercise1 but also from the present capacity of exercising them2 and as opposed to their destruction3 for sleep1 or certainly a swoon1 shows us1 not only that these powers exist when they are not exercised1 as the passive power of motion does in inanimate matter2 but shows also that they exist1 when there is no present capacity of exercising them3 or that the capacities of exercising them for the present1 as well as the actual exercise of them1 may be suspended1 and yet the powers themselves remain undestroyed4 ,since then we know not at all upon what the existence of our living powers depends1 this shows further1 there can no probability be collected from the reason of the thing1 that death will be their destruction3 because their existence may depend upon somewhat in no degree affected by death2 upon somewhat quite out of the reach of this king of terrors4 ,so that there is nothing more certain1 than that the reason of the thing shows us no connection between death and the destruction of living agents4 ,nor can we find any thing throughout the whole analogy of nature to afford us even the slightest presumption1 that animals ever lose their living powers2 much less if it were possible1 that they lose them by death3 for we have no faculties wherewith to trace any beyond or through it1 so as to see what becomes of them4 ,this event removes them from our view4 ,it destroys the sensible proof1 which we had before their death1 of their being possessed of living powers1 but does not appear to afford the least reason to believe that they are1 then1 or by that event1 deprived of them4 ,our knowing that they were possessed of these powers1 up to the very period to which we have faculties capable of tracing them1 is itself a probability of their retaining them beyond it4 ,this is confirmed1 and a sensible credibility is given to it1 by observing the very great and astonishing changes which we have experienced2 so great1 that our existence in another state of life1 of perception and of action1 will be but according to a method of providential conduct1 the like to which has been already exercised even with regard to ourselves2 according to a course of nature1 the like to which we have already gone through4 ,however1 as one cannot but be greatly sensible1 how difficult it is to silence imagination enough to make the voice of reason even distinctly heard in this case2 as we are accustomed1 from our youth up1 to indulge that forward1 delusive faculty1 ever obtruding beyond its sphere2 7of some assistance indeed to apprehension1 but the author of all error17 as we plainly lose ourselves in gross and crude conceptions of things1 taking for granted that we are acquainted with what indeed we are wholly ignorant of3 it may be proper to consider the imaginary presumptions1 that death will be our destruction1 arising from these kinds of early and lasting prejudices2 and to show how little they really amount to1 even though we cannot wholly divest ourselves of them4 ,and1 ,i4 ,all presumption of death's being the destruction of living beings1 must go upon supposition that they are compounded2#ca and so1 discerptible4 ,but since consciousness is a single and indivisible power1 it should seem that the subject in which it resides must be so too4 ,for were the motion of any particle of matter absolutely one and indivisible1 so as that it should imply a contradiction to suppose part of this motion to exist1 and part not to exist1 i4e4 part of this matter to move1 and part to be at rest1 then its power of motion would be indivisible2 and so also would the subject in which the power inheres1 namely1 the particle of matter3 for if this could be divided into two1 one part might be moved and the other at rest1 which is contrary to the supposition4 ,in like manner it has been argued1#cb and1 for any thing appearing to the contrary1 justly1 that since the perception or consciousness1 which we have of our own existence1 is indivisible1 so as that it is a contradiction to suppose one part of it should be here and the other there2 the perceptive power1 or the power of consciousness1 is indivisible too3 and consequently the subject in which it resides1 i4e4 the conscious being4 ,now1 upon supposition that the living agent each man calls himself1 is thus a single being1 which there is at least no more difficulty in conceiving than in conceiving it to be a compound1 and of which there is the proof now mentioned2 it follows1 that our organized bodies are no more ourselves or part of ourselves1 than any other matter around us4 ,and it is as easy to conceive1 how matter1 which is no part of ourselves1 may be appropriated to us in the manner which our present bodies are2 as how we can receive impressions from1 and have power over1 any matter4 ,it is as easy to conceive1 that we may exist out of bodies1 as in them2 and that we might have animated bodies of any other organs and senses wholly different from these now given us2 and that we may hereafter animate these same or new bodies1 variously modified and organized2 as to conceive how we can animate such bodies as our present4 ,and lastly1 the dissolution of all these several organized bodies1 supposing ourselves to have successively animated them1 would have no more conceivable tendency to destroy the living beings ourselves1 or deprive us of living faculties1 the faculties of perception and of action1 than the dissolution of any foreign matter1 which we are capable of receiving impressions from1 and making use of1 for the common occasions of life4 ,,ii4 ,the simplicity and absolute oneness of a living agent cannot1 from the nature of the thing1 be properly proved by experimental observations4 ,but as these fall in with the supposition of its unity1 so they plainly lead us to conclude certainly1 that our gross organized bodies1 with which we perceive objects of sense1 and with which we act1 are no part of ourselves2 and therefore show us1 that we have no reason to believe their destruction to be ours3 even without determining whether our living substance be material or immaterial4 ,for we see by experience1 that men may lose their limbs1 their organs of sense1 and even the greatest part of these bodies1 and yet remain the same living agents4 ,persons can trace up the existence of themselves to a time1 when the bulk of their bodies was extremely small1 in comparison of what it is in mature age3 and we cannot but think1 that they might then have lost a considerable part of that small body1 and yet have remained the same living agents2 as they may now lose great part of their present body1 and remain so4 ,and it is certain1 that the bodies of all animals are in a constant flux2#cc from that never-ceasing attrition1 which there is in every part of them4 ,now1 things of this kind unavoidably teach us to distinguish1 between these living agents ourselves1 and large quantities of matter1 in which we are very nearly interested2 since these may be alienated1 and actually are in a daily course of succession1 and changing their owners2 whilst we are assured1 that each living agent remains one and the same permanent being4#cd ,and this general observation leads us on to the following ones4 ,first1 ,that we have no way of determining by experience1 what is the certain bulk of the living being each man calls himself3 and yet1 till it be determined that it is larger in bulk than the solid elementary particles of matter1 which there is no ground to think any natural power can dissolve1 there is no sort of reason to think death to be the dissolution of it1 of the living being1 even though it should not be absolutely indiscerptible4 ,secondly1 ,from our being so nearly related to and interested in certain systems of matter1 7suppose our flesh and bones17 and afterwards ceasing to be at all related to them1 the living agents1 ourselves1 remaining all this while undestroyed notwithstanding such alienation2 and consequently these systems of matter not being ourselves1 it follows further that we have no ground to conclude any other 7suppose internal7 systems of matter1 to be the living agents ourselves2 because we can have no ground to conclude this1 but from our relation to and interest in such other systems of matter3 and therefore we can have no reason to conclude what befalls those systems of matter at death1 to be the destruction of the living agents4 ,we have already several times over1 lost a great part or perhaps the whole of our body1 according to certain common established laws of nature1 yet we remain the same living agents4 ,when we shall lose as great a part1 or the whole1 by another common established law of nature1 death1 why may we not also remain the same8 ,that the alienation has been gradual in one case1 and in the other will be more at once1 does not prove any thing to the contrary4 ,we have passed undestroyed through those many and great revolutions of matter1 so peculiarly appropriated to us ourselves2 why should we imagine death will be so fatal to us8 ,nor can it be objected1 that what is thus alienated or lost1 is no part of our original solid body1 but only adventitious matter4 ,because we may lose entire limbs1 which must have contained many solid parts and vessels of the original body2 or if this be not admitted1 we have no proof1 that any of these solid parts are dissolved or alienated by death4 ,though we are very nearly related to that extraneous or adventitious matter1 whilst it continues united to and distending the several parts of our solid body1 yet after all1 the relation a person bears to those parts of his body1 to which he is most nearly related1 amounts but to this1 that the living agent1 and those parts of the body1 mutually affect each other4#ce ,the same thing1 the same thing in kind though not in degree1 may be said of all foreign matter1 which gives us ideas1 and over which we have any power4 ,from these observations the whole ground of the imagination is removed1 that the dissolution of any matter1 is the destruction of a living agent1 from the interest he once had in such matter4 ,thirdly1 ,if we consider our body somewhat more distinctly1 as made up of organs and instruments of perception and of motion1 it will bring us to the same conclusion4 ,thus the common optical experiments show1 and even the observation how sight is assisted by glasses shows1 that we see with our eyes in the same sense as we see with glasses4 ,nor is there any reason to believe1 that we see with them in any other sense2 any other1 ,i mean1 which would lead us to think the eye itself a percipient4 ,the like is to be said of hearing2 and our feeling distant solid matter by means of something in our hand1 seems an instance of the like kind1 as to the subject we are considering4 ,all these are instances of foreign matter1 or such as is no part of our body1 being instrumental in preparing objects for1 and conveying them to1 the perceiving power1 in a manner similar to the manner in which our organs of sense prepare and convey them4 ,both are in a like way instruments of our receiving such ideas from external objects1 as the ,author of nature appointed those external objects to be the occasions of exciting in us4 ,glasses are evident instances of this2 namely of matter which is no part of our body1 preparing objects for and conveying them towards the perceiving power1 in like manner as our bodily organs do4 ,and if we see with our eyes only in the same manner as we do with glasses1 the like may justly be concluded1 from analogy1 of all our other senses4 ,it is not intended1 by any thing here said1 to affirm1 that the whole apparatus of vision1 or of perception by any other sense1 can be traced through all its steps1 quite up to the living power of seeing1 or perceiving3 but that so far as it can be traced by experimental observations1 so far it appears1 that our organs of sense prepare and convey objects1 in order to their being perceived1 in like manner as foreign matter does1 without affording any shadow of appearance1 that they themselves perceive4 ,and that we have no reason to think our organs of sense percipients1 is confirmed by instances of persons losing some of them1 the living beings themselves1 their former occupiers1 remaining unimpaired4 ,it is confirmed also by the experience of dreams2 by which we find we are at present possessed of a latent1 and what would be otherwise an unimagined unknown power of perceiving sensible objects1 in as strong and lively a manner without our external organs of sense1 as with them4 ,so also with regard to our power of moving1 or directing motion by will and choice2 upon the destruction of a limb1 this active power evidently remains1 unlessened2 so that the living being1 who has suffered this loss1 would be capable of moving as before1 if it had another limb to move with4 ,it can walk by the help of an artificial leg4 ,it can make use of a pole or a lever1 to reach towards itself and to move things1 beyond the length and the power of its arm2 and this it does in the same manner as it reaches and moves1 with its natural arm1 things nearer and of less weight4 ,nor is there so much as any appearance of our limbs being endued with a power of moving or directing themselves2 though they are adapted1 like the several parts of a machine1 to be the instruments of motion to each other2 and some parts of the same limb1 to be instruments of motion to the other parts4 ,thus a man determines that he will look at an object through a microscope2 or being lame1 that he will walk to such a place with a staff1 a week hence4 ,his eyes and his feet no more determine in these cases1 than the microscope and the staff4 ,nor is there any ground to think they any more put the determination in practice2 or that his eyes are the seers1 or his feet the movers1 in any other sense than as the microscope and the staff are4 ,upon the whole1 then1 our organs of sense1 and our limbs1 are certainly instruments1#cf which the living persons ourselves make use of to perceive and move with3 there is not any probability1 that they are any more2 nor consequently1 that we have any other kind of relation to them1 than what we have to any other foreign matter formed into instruments of perception and motion1 suppose into a microscope or a staff2 7,i say any other kind of relation1 for ,i am not speaking of the degree of it7 nor consequently is there any probability1 that the alienation or dissolution of these instruments1 is the destruction of the perceiving and moving agent4 ,and thus our finding that the dissolution of matter1 in which living beings were most nearly interested1 is not their dissolution2 and that the destruction of several of the organs and instruments of perception and of motion belonging to them1 is not their destruction2 shows demonstratively1 that there is no ground to think that the dissolution of any other matter1 or destruction of any other organs and instruments1 will be the dissolution or destruction of living agents1 from the like kind of relation4 ,and we have no reason to think we stand in any other kind of relation to any thing which we find dissolved by death4 ,but it is said1 these observations are equally applicable to brutes3#cg and it is thought an insuperable difficulty1 that they should be immortal1 and by consequence capable of everlasting happiness4 ,now this manner of expression is both invidious and weak3 but the thing intended by it1 is really no difficulty at all1 either in the way of natural or moral consideration4 ,for #a1 ,suppose the invidious thing1 designed in such a manner of expression1 were really implied1 as it is not in the least1 in the natural immortality of brutes1 namely1 that they must arrive at great attainments1 and become rational and moral agents2 even this would be no difficulty1 since we know not what latent powers and capacities they may be endued with4 ,there was once1 prior to experience1 as great presumption against human creatures1 as there is against the brute creatures1 arriving at that degree of understanding1 which we have in mature age4 ,for we can trace up our own existence to the same original with theirs4 ,we find it to be a general law of nature1 that creatures endued with capacities of virtue and religion should be placed in a condition of being1 in which they are altogether without the use of them1 for a considerable length of their duration2 as in infancy and childhood4 ,and great part of the human species1 go out of the present world1 before they come to the exercise of these capacities in any degree4 #b4 ,the natural immortality of brutes does not in the least imply1 that they are endued with any latent capacities of a rational or moral nature4 ,the economy of the universe might require1 that there should be living creatures without any capacities of this kind4 ,and all difficulties as to the manner how they are to be disposed of1 are so apparently and wholly founded in our ignorance1 that it is wonderful they should be insisted upon by any1 but such as are weak enough to think they are acquainted with the whole system of things4 ,there is then absolutely nothing at all in this objection1 which is so rhetorically urged1 against the greatest part of the natural proofs or presumptions of the immortality of human minds2 ,i say the greatest part1 for it is less applicable to the following observation1 which is more peculiar to mankind4 ,,iii4 ,as it is evident our present powers and capacities of reason1 memory1 and affection1 do not depend upon our gross body in the manner in which perception by our organs of sense does2 so they do not appear to depend upon it at all1 in any such manner as to give ground to think1 that the dissolution of this body will be the destruction of these our present powers of reflection1 as it will of our powers of sensation2 or to give ground to conclude1 even that it will be so much as a suspension of the former4 ,human creatures exist at present in two states of life and perception1 greatly different from each other2 each of which has its own peculiar laws1 and its own peculiar enjoyments and sufferings4 ,when any of our senses are affected1 or appetites gratified with the objects of them1 we may be said to exist or live in a state of sensation4 ,when none of our senses are affected or appetites gratified1 and yet we perceive1 and reason1 and act1 we may be said to exist or live in a state of reflection4 ,now it is by no means certain1 that any thing which is dissolved by death1 is in any way necessary to the living being1 in this its state of reflection1 after ideas are gained4 ,for1 though1 from our present constitution and condition of being1 our external organs of sense are necessary for conveying in ideas to our reflecting powers1 as carriages1 and levers1 and scaffolds are in architecture3#ch yet when these ideas are brought in1 we are capable of reflecting in the most intense degree1 and of enjoying the greatest pleasure1 and feeling the greatest pain1 by means of that reflection1 without any assistance from our senses2 and without any at all1 which we know of1 from that body which will be dissolved by death4 ,it does not appear then1 that the relation of this gross body to the reflecting being is1 in any degree1 necessary to thinking2 to intellectual enjoyments or sufferings3 nor1 consequently1 that the dissolution or alienation of the former by death1 will be the destruction of those present powers1 which render us capable of this state of reflection4 ,further1 there are instances of mortal diseases1 which do not at all affect our present intellectual powers2 and this affords a presumption1 that those diseases will not destroy these present powers4 ,indeed1 from the observations made above1#ci it appears1 that there is no presumption1 from their mutually affecting each other1 that the dissolution of the body is the destruction of the living agent4 ,by the same reasoning1 it must appear too1 that there is no presumption1 from their mutually affecting each other1 that the dissolution of the body is the destruction of our present reflecting powers3 indeed instances of their not affecting each other1 afford a presumption of the contrary4 ,instances of mortal diseases not impairing our present reflecting powers1 evidently turn our thoughts even from imagining such diseases to be the destruction of them4 ,several things indeed greatly affect all our living powers1 and at length suspend the exercise of them2 as for instance drowsiness1 increasing till it ends in sound sleep3 and hence we might have imagined it would destroy them1 till we found by experience the weakness of this way of judging4 ,but in the diseases now mentioned1 there is not so much as this shadow of probability1 to lead us to any such conclusion1 as to the reflecting powers which we have at present4 ,for in those diseases1 persons the moment before death appear to be in the highest vigor of life4 ,they discover apprehension1 memory1 reason1 all entire2 the utmost force of affection2 a sense of character1 of shame and honor2 and the highest mental enjoyments and sufferings1 even to the last gasp4 ,these surely prove even greater vigor of life than bodily strength does4 ,now what pretence is there for thinking1 that a progressive disease when arrived to such a degree1 ,i mean that degree which is mortal1 will destroy those powers1 which were not impaired1 which were not affected by it1 during its whole progress quite up to that degree8 ,and if death by diseases of this kind1 is not the destruction of our present reflecting powers1 it will scarce be thought that death by any other means is4 ,it is obvious that this general observation may be carried further4 ,there appears to be so little connection between our bodily powers of sensation1 and our present powers of reflection1 that there is no reason to conclude1 that death1 which destroys the former1 does so much as suspend the exercise of the latter1 or interrupt our continuing to exist in the like state of reflection which we do now4#dj ,for suspension of reason1 memory1 and the affections which they excite1 is no part of the idea of death1 nor implied in our notion of it4 ,our daily experiencing these powers to be exercised1 without any assistance1 that we know of1 from those bodies which will be dissolved by death2 and our finding often1 that the exercise of them is so lively to the last2 afford a sensible apprehension1 that death may not perhaps be so much as a discontinuance of the exercise of these powers1 nor of the enjoyments and sufferings which it implies4#da ,so that our posthumous life1 whatever there may be in it additional to our present1 may yet not be beginning entirely anew2 but going on4 ,death may1 in some sort and in some respects1 answer to our birth2 which is not a suspension of the faculties which we had before it1 or a total change of the state of life in which we existed when in the womb2 but a continuation of both1 with such and such great alterations4 ,nay1 for aught we know of ourselves1 of our present life and of death1 death may immediately1 in the natural course of things1 put us into a higher and more enlarged state of life1 as our birth does2#db a state in which our capacities2 and sphere of perception and of action1 may be much greater than at present4 ,for as our relation to our external organs of sense1 renders us capable of existing in our present state of sensation2 so it may be the only natural hinderance to our existing1 immediately1 and of course2 in a higher state of reflection4 ,the truth is1 reason does not at all show us1 in what state death naturally leaves us4 ,but were we sure1 that it would suspend all our perceptive and active powers2 yet the suspension of a power and the destruction of it1 are effects so totally different in kind1 as we experience from sleep and a swoon1 that we cannot in any wise argue from one to the other2 or conclude even to the lowest degree of probability1 that the same kind of force which is sufficient to suspend our faculties1 though it be increased ever so much1 will be sufficient to destroy them4#dc ,these observations together may be sufficient to show1 how little presumption there is1 that death is the destruction of human creatures4 ,however1 there is the shadow of an analogy1 which may lead us to imagine it1--viz43 the supposed likeness which is observed between the decay of vegetables1 and of living creatures4 ,this likeness is indeed sufficient to afford the poets very apt allusions to the flowers of the field1 in their pictures of the frailty of our present life4 ,but in reason1 the analogy is so far from holding1 that there appears no ground for the comparison1 as to the present question2 because one of the two subjects compared is wholly void of that1 which is the principal and chief thing in the other2 the power of perception and of action2 which is the only thing we are inquiring about the continuance of4 ,so that the destruction of a vegetable1 is an event not similar or analogous to the destruction of a living agent4 ,if1 as was above intimated1 leaving off the delusive custom of substituting imagination in the room of experience1 we would confine ourselves to what we do know and understand2 if we would argue only from that1 and from that form our expectations1 it would appear at first sight1 that as no probability of living beings ever ceasing to be so1 can be concluded from the reason of the thing1 so none can be collected from the analogy of nature2 because we cannot trace any living beings beyond death4 ,but as we are conscious that we are endued with capacities of perception and of action1 and are living persons2 what we are to go upon is1 that we shall continue so1 till we foresee some accident or event1 which will endanger those capacities1 or be likely to destroy us3 which death does in no wise appear to be4 ,thus1 when we go out of this world1 we may pass into new scenes1 and a new state of life and action1 just as naturally as we came into the present4 ,and this new state may naturally be a social one4#dd ,and the advantages of it1 advantages1 of every kind1 may naturally be bestowed1 according to some fixed general laws of wisdom1 upon every one in proportion to the degrees of his virtue4 ,and though the advantages of that future natural state should not be bestowed1 as these of the present in some measure are1 by the will of the society2 but entirely by his more immediate action1 upon whom the whole frame of nature depends3 yet this distribution may be just as natural1 as their being distributed here by the instrumentality of men4 ,indeed1 though one should allow any confused undetermined sense1 which people please to put upon the word natural1 it would be a shortness of thought scarce credible1 to imagine1 that no system or course of things can be so1 but only what we see at present3#de especially whilst the probability of a future life1 or the natural immortality of the soul1 is admitted upon the evidence of reason2 because this is really both admitting and denying at once1 a state of being different from the present to be natural4 ,but the only distinct meaning of that word is1 stated1 fixed1 or settled2 since what is natural as much requires and presupposes an intelligent agent to render it so1 i4e4 to effect it continually1 or at stated times1 as what is supernatural or miraculous does to effect it for once4 ,hence it must follow1 that persons' notion of what is natural1 will be enlarged in proportion to their greater knowledge of the works of ,god1 and the dispensations of his providence4 ,nor is there any absurdity in supposing1 that there may be beings in the universe1 whose capacities1 and knowledge1 and views1 may be so extensive1 as that the whole ,christian dispensation may to them appear natural1 i4e4 analogous or conformable to ,god's dealings with other parts of his creation2 as natural as the visible known course of things appears to us4 ,for there seems scarce any other possible sense to be put upon the word1 but that only in which it is here used2 similar1 stated1 or uniform4 ,this credibility of a future life1 which has been here insisted upon1 how little soever it may satisfy our curiosity1 seems to answer all the purposes of religion1 in like manner as a demonstrative proof would4 ,indeed a proof1 even a demonstrative one1 of a future life1 would not be a proof of religion4 ,for1 that we are to live hereafter1 is just as reconcilable with the scheme of atheism1 and as well to be accounted for by it1 as that we are now alive is3 and therefore nothing can be more absurd than to argue from that scheme1 that there can be no future state4 ,but as religion implies a future state1 any presumption against such a state1 is a presumption against religion4 ,the foregoing observations remove all presumptions of that sort1 and prove1 to a very considerable degree of probability1 one fundamental doctrine of religion2 which1 if believed1 would greatly open and dispose the mind seriously to attend to the general evidence6 of the whole4 ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,,the ,,government ,,of ,,god ,,by ,,rewards ,,and ,,punishments4 ,that which makes the question concerning a future life to be of so great importance to us1 is our capacity of happiness and misery4 ,and that which makes the consideration of it to be of so great importance to us1 is the supposition of our happiness and misery hereafter depending upon our actions here4 ,indeed1 without this1 curiosity could not but sometimes bring a subject1 in which we may be so highly interested1 to our thoughts2 especially upon the mortality of others1 or the near prospect of our own4 ,but reasonable men would not take any further thought about hereafter1 than what should happen thus occasionally to rise in their minds1 if it were certain that our future interest no way depended upon our present behavior2 whereas1 on the contrary1 if there be ground1 either from analogy or any thing else1 to think it does1 then there is reason also for the most active thought and solicitude1 to secure that interest2 to behave so as that we may escape that misery1 and obtain that happiness1 in another life1 which we not only suppose ourselves capable of1 but which we apprehend also is put in our own power4 ,and whether there be ground for this last apprehension1 certainly would deserve to be most seriously considered1 were there no other proof of a future life and interest1 than that presumptive one1 which the foregoing observations amount to4 ,in the present state1 all which we enjoy1 and a great part of what we suffer1 is put in our own power4 ,pleasure and pain are the consequences of our actions2 and we are endued by the ,author of our nature with capacities of foreseeing these consequences4 ,we find by experience that he does not so much as preserve our lives1 exclusive of our own care and attention1 to provide ourselves with1 and to make use of1 that sustenance1 by which he has appointed our lives shall be preserved2 and without which1 he has appointed1 they shall not be preserved4 ,in general we foresee1 that the external things1 which are the objects of our various passions1 can neither be obtained nor enjoyed1 without exerting ourselves in such and such manners3 but by thus exerting ourselves1 we obtain and enjoy these objects1 in which our natural good consists2 or by this means ,god gives us the possession and enjoyment of them4 ,i know not1 that we have any one kind or degree of enjoyment1 but by the means of our own actions4 ,by prudence and care1 we may1 for the most part1 pass our days in tolerable ease and quiet3 on the contrary1 we may1 by rashness1 ungoverned passion1 wilfulness1 or even by negligence1 make ourselves as miserable as ever we please4 ,and many do please to make themselves extremely miserable1 i4e4 to do what they know beforehand will render them so4 ,they follow those ways1 the fruit of which they know1 by instruction1 example1 and experience1 will be disgrace1 and poverty1 and sickness1 and untimely death4 ,this every one observes to be the general course of things2 though it is to be allowed1 we cannot find by experience1 that all our sufferings are owing to our own follies4 ,why the ,author of nature does not give his creatures promiscuously such and such perceptions1 without regard to their behavior2 why he does not make them happy without the instrumentality of their own actions1 and prevent their bringing any sufferings upon themselves1 is another matter4#df ,perhaps there may be some impossibilities in the nature of things1 which we are unacquainted with4#dg ,or less happiness1 it may be1 would upon the whole be produced by such a method of conduct1 than is by the present4 ,or perhaps divine goodness1 with which1 if ,i mistake not1 we make very free in our speculations1 may not be a bare single disposition to produce happiness2 but a disposition to make the good1 the faithful1 the honest1 happy4 ,perhaps an infinitely perfect mind may be pleased with seeing his creatures behave suitably to the nature which he has given them2 to the relations which he has placed them in to each other2 and to that which they stand in to himself3 that relation to himself1 which1 during their existence1 is even necessary1#dh and which is the most important one of all3 perhaps1 ,i say1 an infinitely perfect mind may be pleased with this moral piety of moral agents1 in and for itself2 as well as upon account of its being essentially conducive to the happiness of his creation4 ,or the whole end1 for which ,god made1 and thus governs the world1 may be utterly beyond the reach of our faculties3 there may be somewhat in it as impossible for us to have any conception of1 as for a blind man to have a conception of colors4 ,however this be1 it is certain matter of universal experience1 that the general method of divine administration is1 forewarning us1 or giving us capacities to foresee1 with more or less clearness1 that if we act so and so1 we shall have such enjoyments1 if so and so1 such sufferings2 and giving us those enjoyments1 and making us feel those sufferings1 in consequence of our actions4 8,but all this is to be ascribed to the general course of nature10 ,true4 ,this is the very thing which ,i am observing4 ,it is to be ascribed to the general course of nature3 i4e4 not surely to the words or ideas1 course of nature2 but to ,him who appointed it1 and put things into it2 or to a course of operation1 from its uniformity or constancy1 called natural2#di and which necessarily implies an operating agent4 ,for when men find themselves necessitated to confess an ,author of nature1 or that ,god is the natural governor of the world1 they must not deny this again1 because his government is uniform4 ,they must not deny that he does things at all1 because he does them constantly1#ej because the effects of his acting are permanent1 whether his acting be so or not2 though there is no reason to think it is not4 ,in short1 every man1 in every thing he does1 naturally acts upon the forethought and apprehension of avoiding evil or obtaining good3 and if the natural course of things be the appointment of ,god1 and our natural faculties of knowledge and experience are given us by him1 then the good and bad consequences which follow our actions1 are his appointment1 and our foresight of those consequences1 is a warning given us by him1 how we are to act4 8,is the pleasure then1 naturally accompanying every particular gratification of passion1 intended to put us upon gratifying ourselves in every such particular instance1 and as a reward to us for so doing80 ,no1 certainly4 ,nor is it to be said1 that our eyes were naturally intended to give us the sight of each particular object1 to which they do or can extend2 objects which are destructive of them1 or which1 for any other reason1 it may become us to turn our eyes from4 ,yet there is no doubt1 but that our eyes were intended for us to see with4#ea ,so neither is there any doubt1 but that the foreseen pleasures and pains belonging to the passions1 were intended1 in general1 to induce mankind to act in such and such manners4 ,from this general observation1 obvious to every one1 7that ,god has given us to understand1 he has appointed satisfaction and delight to be the consequence of our acting in one manner1 and pain and uneasiness of our acting in another1 and of our not acting at all2 and that we find these consequences1 which we were beforehand informed of1 uniformly to follow27 we may learn1 that we are at present actually under his government in the strictest and most proper sense2 in such a sense1 as that he rewards and punishes us for our actions4 ,an ,author of nature being supposed1 it is not so much a deduction of reason1 as a matter of experience1 that we are thus under his government2 under his government1 in the same sense1 as we are under the government of civil magistrates4 ,because the annexing of pleasure to some actions1 and pain to others1 in our power to do or forbear1 and giving notice of this appointment beforehand to those whom it concerns1 is the proper formal notion of government4 ,whether the pleasure or pain which thus follows upon our behavior1 be owing to the ,author of nature's acting upon us every moment which we feel it2 or to his having at once contrived and executed his own part in the plan of the world2 makes no alteration as to the matter before us4 ,for if civil magistrates could make the sanctions of their laws take place1 without interposing at all1 after they had passed them2 without a trial1 and the formalities of an execution3 if they were able to make their laws execute themselves1 or every offender to execute them upon himself2 we should be just in the same sense under their government then1 as we are now2 but in a much higher degree1 and more perfect manner4 ,vain is the ridicule1 with which one foresees some persons will divert themselves1 upon finding lesser pains considered as instances of divine punishment4 ,there is no possibility of answering or evading the general thing here intended1 without denying all final causes4 ,for final causes being admitted1 the pleasures and pains now mentioned must be admitted too as instances of them4 ,and if they are2 if ,god annexes delight to some actions1 and uneasiness to others1 with an apparent design to induce us to act so and so2 then he not only dispenses happiness and misery1 but also rewards and punishes actions4 ,if1 for example1 the pain which we feel1 upon doing what tends to the destruction of our bodies1 suppose upon too near approaches to fire1 or upon wounding ourselves1 be appointed by the ,author of nature to prevent our doing what thus tends to our destruction2 this is altogether as much an instance of his punishing our actions1 and consequently of our being under his government1#eb as declaring by a voice from heaven1 that if we acted so1 he would inflict such pain upon us2 and inflicting it1 whether it be greater or less4 ,thus we find1 that the true notion or conception of the ,author of nature1 is that of a master or governor1 prior to the consideration of his moral attributes4 ,the fact of our case1 which we find by experience1 is1 that he actually exercises dominion or government over us at present1 by rewarding and punishing us for our actions1 in as strict and proper a sense of these words1 and even in the same sense1 as children1 servants1 subjects1 are rewarded and punished by those who govern them4 ,thus the whole analogy of nature1 the whole present course of things1 most fully shows1 that there is nothing incredible in the general doctrine of religion1 that ,god will reward and punish men for their actions hereafter3 nothing incredible1 ,i mean1 arising out of the notion of rewarding and punishing4 ,for the whole course of nature is a present instance of his exercising that government over us1 which implies in it rewarding and punishing4 99 99 99 99 99 ,as divine punishment is what men chiefly object against1 and are most unwilling to allow2 it may be proper to mention some circumstances in the natural course of punishments at present1 which are analogous to what religion teaches us concerning a future state of punishment2 indeed so analogous1 that as they add a further credibility to it1 so they cannot but raise a most serious apprehension of it in those who will attend to them4 ,it has been now observed1 that such and such miseries naturally follow such and such actions of imprudence and wilfulness1 as well as actions more commonly and more distinctly considered as vicious2 and that these consequences1 when they may be foreseen1 are properly natural punishments annexed to such actions4 ,the general thing here insisted upon1 is1 not that we see a great deal of misery in the world1 but a great deal which men bring upon themselves by their own behavior1 which they might have foreseen and avoided4 ,now the circumstances of these natural punishments1 particularly deserving our attention1 are such as these4 ,oftentimes they follow1 or are inflicted in consequence of1 actions which procure many present advantages1 and are accompanied with much present pleasure2 for instance1 sickness and untimely death are the consequence of intemperance1 though accompanied with the highest mirth1 and jollity4 ,these punishments are often much greater1 than the advantages or pleasures obtained by the actions1 of which they are the punishments or consequences4 ,though we may imagine a constitution of nature1 in which these natural punishments1 which are in fact to follow1 would follow1 immediately upon such actions being done1 or very soon after2 we find on the contrary in our world1 that they are often delayed a great while1 sometimes even till long after the actions occasioning them are forgot2 so that the constitution of nature is such1 that delay of punishment is no sort nor degree of presumption of final impunity4 ,after such delay1 these natural punishments or miseries often come1 not by degrees1 but suddenly1 with violence1 and at once2 however1 the chief misery often does4 ,as certainty of such distant misery following such actions1 is never afforded persons1 so perhaps during the actions1 they have seldom a distinct1 full expectation of its following3#ec and many times the case is only thus1 that they see in general1 or may see1 the credibility1 that intemperance1 suppose1 will bring after it diseases2 civil crimes1 civil punishments2 when yet the real probability often is1 that they shall escape2 but things notwithstanding take their destined course1 and the misery inevitably follows at its appointed time1 in very many of these cases4 ,thus also though youth may be alleged as an excuse for rashness and folly1 as being naturally thoughtless1 and not clearly foreseeing all the consequences of being untractable and profligate1 this does not hinder1 but that these consequences follow2 and are grievously felt1 throughout the whole course of mature life4 ,habits contracted even in that age1 are often utter ruin3 and men's success in the world1 not only in the common sense of worldly success1 but their real happiness and misery1 depends1 in a great degree1 and in various ways1 upon the manner in which they pass their youth2 which consequences they for the most part neglect to consider1 and perhaps seldom can properly be said to believe1 beforehand4 ,in numberless cases1 the natural course of things affords us opportunities for procuring advantages to ourselves at certain times1 which we cannot procure when we will2 nor ever recall the opportunities1 if we have neglected them4 ,indeed the general course of nature is an example of this4 ,if1 during the opportunity of youth1 persons are indocile and self-willed1 they inevitably suffer in their future life1 for want of those acquirements1 which they neglected the natural season of attaining4 ,if the husbandman lets seedtime pass without sowing1 the whole year is lost to him beyond recovery4 ,though after men have been guilty of folly and extravagance up to a certain degree1 it is often in their power1 to retrieve their affairs1 to recover their health and character1 at least in good measure2 yet real reformation is in many cases1 of no avail at all towards preventing the miseries1 poverty1 sickness1 infamy1 naturally annexed to folly and extravagance exceeding that degree4 ,there is a certain bound to imprudence and misbehavior1 which being transgressed1 there remains no place for repentance in the natural course of things4 ,it is further very much to be remarked1 that neglects from inconsiderateness1 want of attention1#ed not looking about us to see what we have to do1 are often attended with consequences altogether as dreadful1 as any active misbehavior1 from the most extravagant passion4 ,and lastly1 civil government being natural1 the punishments of it are so too3 and some of these punishments are capital2 as the effects of a dissolute course of pleasure are often mortal4 ,so that many natural punishments are final#ee to him who incurs them1 if considered only in his temporal capacity2 and seem inflicted by natural appointment1 either to remove the offender out of the way of being further mischievous1 or as an example1 though frequently a disregarded one1 to those who are left behind4 ,these things are not what we call accidental1 or to be met with only now and then2 but they are things of every day's experience4 ,they proceed from general laws1 very general ones1 by which ,god governs the world in the natural course of his providence4#ef ,and they are so analogous1 to what religion teaches us concerning the future punishment of the wicked1 so much of a piece with it1 that both would naturally be expressed in the very same words1 and manner of description4 ,in the book of ,proverbs1#eg for instance1 wisdom is introduced1 as frequenting the most public places of resort1 and as rejected when she offers herself as the natural appointed guide of human life4 ,how long1 speaking to those who are passing through it1 how long1 ye simple ones1 will ye love folly1 and the scorners delight in their scorning1 and fools hate knowledge8 ,turn ye at my reproof4 ,behold1 ,i will pour out my spirit upon you1 ,i will make known my words unto you4 ,but upon being neglected1 ,because ,i have called1 and ye refused1 ,i have stretched out my hand1 and no man regarded2 but ye have set at nought all my counsel1 and would none of my reproof3 ,i also will laugh at your calamity1 ,i will mock when your fear cometh2 when your fear cometh as desolation1 and your destruction cometh as a whirlwind2 when distress and anguish come upon you4 ,then shall they call upon me1 but ,i will not answer2 they shall seek me early1 but they shall not find me4 ,this passage1 every one sees1 is poetical1 and some parts of it are highly figurative2 but the meaning is obvious4 ,and the thing intended is expressed more literally in the following words2 ,for that they hated knowledge1 and did not choose the fear of the ,lord----therefore shall they eat of the fruit of their own way1 and be filled with their own devices4 ,for the security of the simple shall slay them1 and the prosperity of fools shall destroy them4 ,the whole passage is so equally applicable to what we experience in the present world1 concerning the consequences of men's actions1 and to what religion teaches us is to be expected in another1 that it may be questioned which of the two was principally intended4 ,indeed when one has been recollecting the proper proofs of a future state of rewards and punishments1 nothing methinks can give one so sensible an apprehension of the latter1 or representation of it to the mind1 as observing1 that after the many disregarded checks1 admonitions1 and warnings1 which people meet with in the ways of vice and folly and extravagance1 warnings from their very nature1 from the examples of others1 from the lesser inconveniences which they bring upon themselves1 from the instructions of wise and virtuous men3 after these have been long despised1 scorned1 ridiculed3 after the chief bad consequences1 temporal consequences1 of their follies1 have been delayed for a great while1 at length they break in irresistibly1 like an armed force3 repentance is too late to relieve1 and can serve only to aggravate their distress1 the case is become desperate3 and poverty and sickness1 remorse and anguish1 infamy and death1 the effects of their own doings1 overwhelm them beyond possibility of remedy or escape4 ,this is an account of what is2 in fact1 the general constitution of nature4 ,it is not in any sort meant1 that1 according to what appears at present of the natural course of things1 men are always uniformly punished in proportion to their misbehavior4 ,but that there are very many instances of misbehavior punished in the several ways now mentioned1 and very dreadful instances too2 sufficient to show what the laws of the universe may admit1 and1 if thoroughly considered1 sufficient fully to answer all objections against the credibility of a future state of punishments1 from any imaginations1 that the frailty of our nature and external temptations1 almost annihilate the guilt of human vices3 as well as objections of another sort2 from necessity1 from suppositions1 that the will of an infinite ,being cannot be contradicted1 or that he must be incapable of offence and provocation4#eh ,reflections of this kind are not without their terrors to serious persons1 even the most free from enthusiasm1 and of the greatest strength of mind2 but it is fit that things be stated and considered as they really are4 ,there is1 in the present age1 a certain fearlessness with regard to what may be hereafter under the government of ,god1 which nothing but a universally acknowledged demonstration on the side of atheism can justify2 and which makes it quite necessary1 that men be reminded1 and if possible made to feel1 that there is no sort of ground for being thus presumptuous1 even upon the most sceptical principles4 ,for1 may it not be said of any person upon his being born into the world1 he may behave so as to be of no service to it1 but by being made an example of the woeful effects of vice and folly8 ,that he may1 as any one may1 if he will1 incur an infamous execution from the hands of civil justice1 or in some other course of extravagance shorten his days2 or bring upon himself infamy and diseases worse than death8 ,so that it had been better for him1 even with regard to the present world1 that he had never been born4 ,and is there any pretence of reason for people to think themselves secure1 and talk as if they had certain proof1 that1 let them act as licentiously as they will1 there can be nothing analogous to this1 with regard to a future and more general interest1 under the providence and government of the same ,god8 ,,chapter ,,iii4#ei ,,the ,,moral ,,government ,,of ,,god4 ,as the manifold appearances of design1 and of final causes1 in the constitution of the world1 prove it to be the work of an intelligent mind1 so the particular final causes of pleasure and pain distributed amongst his creatures1 prove that they are under his government2 what may be called his natural government of creatures endued with sense and reason4 ,this implies somewhat more than seems usually attended to1 when we speak of ,god's natural government of the world4 ,it implies government of the very same kind with that which a master exercises over his servants1 or a civil magistrate over his subjects4 ,these latter instances of final causes1 as really prove an intelligent ,governor of the world1 in the sense now mentioned1 and before#fj distinctly treated of2 as any other instances of final causes prove an intelligent ,maker of it4 ,but this alone does not appear at first sight to determine any thing certainly1 concerning the moral character of the ,author of nature1 considered in this relation of governor2 does not ascertain his government to be moral1 or prove that he is the righteous ,judge of the world4 ,moral government consists1 not in barely rewarding and punishing men for their actions1 which the most tyrannical may do1 but in rewarding the righteous1 and punishing the wicked3 in rendering to men according to their actions1 considered as good or evil4 ,and the perfection of moral government consists in doing this1 with regard to all intelligent creatures1 in an exact proportion to their personal merits or demerits4 ,some men seem to think the only character of the ,author of nature to be that of simple absolute benevolence4 ,this1 considered as a principle of action and infinite in degree1 is a disposition to produce the greatest possible happiness1 without regard to persons' behavior1 otherwise than as such regard would produce higher degrees of it4 ,and supposing this to be the only character of ,god1 veracity and justice in him would be nothing but benevolence conducted by wisdom4 ,surely this ought not to be asserted1 unless it can be proved2 for we should speak with cautious reverence upon such a subject4 ,whether it can be proved or no1 is not the thing here to be inquired into2 but whether in the constitution and conduct of the world1 a righteous government be not discernibly planned out3 which necessarily implies a righteous governor4 ,there may possibly be in the creation beings1 to whom the ,author of nature manifests himself under this most amiable of all characters1 this of infinite absolute benevolence2 for it is the most amiable1 supposing it not1 as perhaps it is not1 incompatible with justice2 but he manifests himself to us under the character of a righteous governor4 ,he may1 consistently with this1 be simply and absolutely benevolent1 in the sense now explained3 but he is 7for he has given us a proof in the constitution and conduct of the world that he is7 a governor over servants1 as he rewards and punishes us for our actions4 ,and in the constitution and conduct of it1 he may also have given1 besides the reason of the thing1 and the natural presages of conscience1 clear and distinct intimations1 that his government is righteous or moral3 clear to such as think the nature of it deserving their attention1 and yet not to every careless person1 who casts a transient reflection upon the subject4#fa ,it is particularly to be observed1 that the divine government1 which we experience ourselves under in the present state1 taken alone1 is allowed not to be the perfection of moral government4 ,yet this by no means hinders1 but that there may be somewhat1 be it more or less1 truly moral in it4 ,a righteous government may plainly appear to be carried on to some degree1 enough to give us the apprehension that it shall be completed1 or carried on to that degree of perfection which religion teaches us it shall2 but which cannot appear1 till much more of the divine administration be seen1 than can be seen in the present life4 ,the design of this chapter is to inquire how far this is the case3 how far1 over and above the moral nature#fb which ,god has given us1 and our natural notion of him as righteous governor of those his creatures1 to whom he has given this nature2#fc ,i say how far besides this1 the principles and beginnings of a moral government over the world may be discerned1 notwithstanding and amidst all the confusion and disorder of it4 ,one might mention here1 what has been often urged with great force1 that1 in general1 less uneasiness and more satisfaction1 are the natural consequences#fd of a virtuous than of a vicious course of life1 in the present state1 as an instance of a moral government established in nature2 an instance of it collected from experience and present matter of fact4#fe ,but it must be owned a thing of difficulty to weigh and balance pleasures and uneasinesses1 each amongst themselves1 and also against each other1 so as to make an estimate with any exactness1 of the overplus of happiness on the side of virtue4 ,and it is not impossible1 that1 amidst the infinite disorders of the world1 there may be exceptions to the happiness of virtue2 even with regard to persons1 whose course of life from their youth up has been blameless3 and more with regard to those who have gone on for some time in the ways of vice1 and have afterwards reformed4 ,for suppose an instance of the latter case2 a person with his passions inflamed1 his natural faculty of self-government impaired by habits of indulgence1 and with all his vices about him1 like so many harpies1 craving their accustomed gratification2 who can say how long it might be1 before such a person would find more satisfaction in the reasonableness and present good consequences of virtue1 than difficulties and self-denial in the restraints of it8 ,experience also shows1 that men can to a great degree1 get over their sense of shame1 so as that by professing themselves to be without principle1 and avowing even direct villany1 they can support themselves against the infamy of it4 ,but as the ill actions of any one will probably be more talked of1 and oftener thrown in his way1 upon his reformation2 so the infamy of them will be much more felt1 after the natural sense of virtue and of honor is recovered4 ,uneasiness of this kind ought indeed to be put to the account of former vices3 yet it will be said they are in part the consequences of reformation4 ,still ,i am far from allowing it doubtful1 whether virtue1 upon the whole1 be happier than vice in the present world4 ,if it were1 yet the beginnings of a righteous administration may1 beyond all question1 be found in nature1 if we will attentively inquire after them4#ff ,i4 ,in whatever manner the notion of ,god's moral government over the world might be treated1 if it did not appear1 whether he were in a proper sense our governor at all2 yet when it is certain matter of experience1 that he does manifest himself to us under the character of a governor in the sense explained1#fg it must deserve to be considered1 whether there be not reason to apprehend1 that he may be a righteous or moral governor4 ,since it appears to be fact1 that ,god does govern mankind by the method of rewards and punishments1 according to some settled rules of distribution2 it is surely a question to be asked1 what presumption is there against his finally rewarding and punishing them according to this particular rule1 namely1 as they act reasonably1 or unreasonably1 virtuously or viciously8 ,rendering men happy or miserable by this rule1 certainly falls in1 much more falls in1 with our natural apprehensions and sense of things1 than doing so by any other rule whatever2 since rewarding and punishing actions by any other rule1 would appear much harder to be accounted for1 by minds formed as he has formed ours4 ,be the evidence of religion then more or less clear1 the expectation which it raises in us1 that the righteous shall1 upon the whole1 be happy1 and the wicked miserable1 cannot possibly be considered as absurd or chimerical2 because it is no more than an expectation1 that a method of government already begun1 shall be carried on1 the method of rewarding and punishing actions2 and shall be carried on by a particular rule1 which unavoidably appears to us at first sight more natural than any other1 the rule which we call distributive justice4 ,nor1 ,,ii4 ,ought it to be entirely passed over1 that tranquillity1 satisfaction1 and external advantages1 being the natural consequences of prudent management of ourselves1 and our affairs2 and rashness1 profligate negligence1 and wilful folly1 bringing after them many inconveniences and sufferings2 these afford instances of a right constitution of nature1 as the correction of children1 for their own sakes1 and by way of example1 when they run into danger or hurt themselves1 is a part of right education4#fh ,thus1 that ,god governs the world by general fixed laws1 that he has endued us with capacities of reflecting upon this constitution of things1 and foreseeing the good and bad consequences of behavior1 plainly implies some sort of moral government2 since from such a constitution of things it cannot but follow1 that prudence and imprudence1 which are of the nature of virtue and vice1#fi must be1 as they are1 respectively rewarded and punished4 ,,iii4 ,from the natural course of things1 vicious actions are1 to a great degree1 actually punished as mischievous to society2 and besides punishment actually inflicted upon this account1 there is also the fear and apprehension of it in those persons1 whose crimes have rendered them obnoxious to it1 in case of a discovery2 this state of fear being often itself a very considerable punishment4 ,the natural fear and apprehension of it too1 which restrains from such crimes1 is a declaration of nature against them4 ,it is necessary to the very being of society1 that vices1 destructive of it1 should be punished as being so2 the vices of falsehood1 injustice1 cruelty3 which punishment therefore is as natural as society1 and so is an instance of a kind of moral government1 naturally established1 and actually taking place4 ,and1 since the certain natural course of things is the conduct of providence or the government of ,god1 though carried on by the instrumentality of men1 the observation here made amounts to this1 that mankind find themselves placed by him in such circumstances1 as that they are unavoidably accountable for their behavior2 and are often punished1 and sometimes rewarded1 under his government1 in the view of their being mischievous1 or eminently beneficial to society4 ,if it be objected that good actions and such as are beneficial to society1 are often punished1 as in the case of persecution and in other cases2 and that ill and mischievous actions are often rewarded3#gj it may be answered distinctly1 first1 that this is in no sort necessary1 and consequently not natural in the sense in which it is necessary1 and therefore natural1 that ill or mischievous actions should be punished3 and in the next place1 that good actions are never punished1 considered as beneficial to society1 nor ill actions rewarded1 under the view of their being hurtful to it4 ,so that it stands good1 without any thing on the side of vice to be set over against it1 that the ,author of nature has as truly directed1 that vicious actions1 considered as mischievous to society1 should be punished1 and put mankind under a necessity of thus punishing them1 as he has directed and necessitated us to preserve our lives by food4 ,,iv4 ,in the natural course of things1 virtue as such is actually rewarded1 and vice as such punished3 which seems to afford an instance or example1 not only of government1 but of moral government1 begun and established2 moral in the strictest sense1 though not in that perfection of degree1 which religion teaches us to expect4 ,in order to see this more clearly1 we must distinguish between actions themselves1 and that quality ascribed to them1 which we call virtuous or vicious4#ga ,the gratification itself of every natural passion1 must be attended with delight2 and acquisitions of fortune1 however made1 are acquisitions of the means or materials of enjoyment4 ,an action then1 by which any natural passion is gratified1 or fortune acquired1 procures delight or advantage2 abstracted from all consideration of the morality of such action4 ,consequently1 the pleasure or advantage in this case1 is gained by the action itself1 not by the morality1 the virtuousness or viciousness of it2 though it be perhaps virtuous or vicious4 ,to say that such an action or course of behavior1 procured such pleasure or advantage1 or brought on such inconvenience and pain1 is quite a different thing from saying1 that such good or bad effect was owing to the virtue or vice of such action or behavior4 ,in one case1 an action abstracted from all moral consideration1 produced its effect3 in the other case1 for it will appear that there are such cases1 the morality of the action under a moral consideration1 i4e4 the virtuousness or viciousness of it1 produced the effect4 ,now ,i say virtue as such1 naturally procures considerable advantages to the virtuous1 and vice as such1 naturally occasions great inconvenience and even misery to the vicious1 in very many instances4 ,the immediate effects of virtue and vice upon the mind and temper1 are to be mentioned as instances of it4 ,vice as such is naturally attended with some sort of uneasiness1 and not uncommonly1 with great disturbance and apprehension4 ,that inward feeling1 which1 respecting lesser matters and in familiar speech we call being vexed with oneself1 and in matters of importance and in more serious language1 remorse2 is an uneasiness naturally arising from an action of a man's own1 reflected upon by himself as wrong1 unreasonable1 faulty1 i4e4 vicious in greater or less degrees3 and this manifestly is a different feeling from that uneasiness1 which arises from a sense of mere loss or harm4 ,what is more common1 than to hear a man lamenting an accident or event1 and adding--but however he has the satisfaction that he cannot blame himself for it2 or on the contrary1 that he has the uneasiness of being sensible it was his own doing8 ,thus also the disturbance and fear1 which often follow upon a man's having done an injury1 arise from a sense of his being blameworthy2 otherwise there would1 in many cases1 be no ground of disturbance1 nor any reason to fear resentment or shame4 ,on the other hand1 inward security and peace1 and a mind open to the several gratifications of life1 are the natural attendants of innocence and virtue4 ,to which must be added the complacency1 satisfaction1 and even joy of heart1 which accompany the exercise1 the real exercise of gratitude1 friendship1 benevolence4 ,and here1 ,i think1 ought to be mentioned the fears of future punishment1 and peaceful hopes of a better life1 in those who fully believe1 or have any serious apprehension of religion3 because these hopes and fears are present uneasiness and satisfaction to the mind1 and cannot be got rid of by great part of the world1 even by men who have thought most thoroughly upon the subject of religion4 ,and no one can say1 how considerable this uneasiness or satisfaction may be1 or what upon the whole it may amount to4#gb ,in the next place comes in the consideration1 that all honest and good men are disposed to befriend honest good men as such1 and to discountenance the vicious as such1 and do so in some degree2 indeed in a considerable degree3 from which favor and discouragement cannot but arise considerable advantage and inconvenience4 ,though the generality of the world have little regard to the morality of their own actions1 and may be supposed to have less to that of others1 when they themselves are not concerned2 yet let any one be known to be a man of virtue1 somehow or other he will be favored and good offices will be done him1 from regard to his character1 without remote views1 occasionally1 and in some low degree1 ,i think1 by the generality of the world1 as it happens to come in their way4 ,public honors too and advantages are the natural consequences1 and sometimes at least1 the consequences in fact1 of virtuous actions2 of eminent justice1 fidelity1 charity1 love to our country1 considered in the view of being virtuous4 ,and sometimes even death itself1 often infamy and external inconveniences1 are the public consequences of vice as vice4 ,for instance1 the sense which mankind have of tyranny1 injustice1 oppression1 additional to the mere feeling or fear of misery1 has doubtless been instrumental in bringing about revolutions1 which make a figure even in the history of the world4 ,for it is plain1 that men resent injuries as implying faultiness1 and retaliate1 not merely under the notion of having received harm1 but of having received wrong2 and they have this resentment in behalf of others1 as well as of themselves4 ,so likewise even the generality are1 in some degree1 grateful and disposed to return good offices1 not merely because such a one has been the occasion of good to them1 but under the view1 that such good offices implied kind intention and good desert in the doer4 ,to all this may be added two or three particular things1 which many persons will think frivolous2 but to me nothing appears so1 which at all comes in towards determining a question of such importance1 as1 whether there be or be not1 a moral institution of government1 in the strictest sense moral1 visibly established and begun in nature4 ,the particular things are these3 ,that in domestic government1 which is doubtless natural1 children and others also are very generally punished for falsehood1 injustice1 and ill-behavior1 as such1 and rewarded for the contrary3 which are instances of veracity and justice and right behavior1 as such1 naturally enforced by rewards and punishments1 more or less considerable4 ,that1 though civil government be supposed to take cognizance of actions in no other view than as prejudicial to society1 without respect to the immorality of them1 yet as such actions are immoral1 so the sense which men have of the immorality of them1 very greatly contributes1 in different ways1 to bring offenders to justice4 ,and that entire absence of all crime and guilt in the moral sense1 when plainly appearing1 will almost of course procure1 and circumstances of aggravated guilt prevent1 a remission of the penalties annexed to civil crimes1 in many cases1 though by no means in all4 ,upon the whole then1 besides the good and bad effects of virtue and vice upon men's own minds1 the course of the world does1 in some measure1 turn upon the approbation and disapprobation of them as such1 in others4 ,the sense of well and ill doing1 the presages of conscience1 the love of good characters and dislike of bad ones1 honor1 shame1 resentment1 gratitude1 all these1 considered in themselves1 and in their effects1 do afford manifest real instances1 of virtue as such naturally favored1 and of vice as such discountenanced1 more or less1 in the daily course of human life2 in every age1 in every relation1 in every general circumstance of it4 ,that ,god has given us a moral nature1#gc may most justly be urged as a proof of our being under his moral government3 but that he has placed us in a condition1 which gives this nature1 as one may speak1 scope to operate1 and in which it does unavoidably operate2 i4e4 influence mankind to act1 so as thus to favor and reward virtue1 and discountenance and punish vice1 this is not the same1 but a further additional proof of his moral government2 for it is an instance of it4 ,the first is a proof1 that he will finally favor and support virtue effectually3 the second is an example of his favoring and supporting it at present1 in some degree4 ,if a more distinct inquiry be made1 whence it arises1 that virtue as such is often rewarded1 and vice as such is punished1 and this rule never inverted1 it will be found to proceed1 in part1 immediately from the moral nature itself1 which ,god has given us2#gd and also in part1 from his having given us1 together with this nature1 so great a power over each other's happiness and misery4 ,for1 first1 it is certain1 that peace and delight1 in some degree and upon some occasions1 is the necessary and present effect of virtuous practice2 an effect arising immediately from that constitution of our nature4 ,we are so made1 that well-doing as such1 gives us satisfaction1 at least in some instances2 ill-doing as such1 in none4 ,and1 secondly1 from our moral nature1 joined with ,god's having put our happiness and misery in many respects in each other's power1 it cannot but be1 that vice as such1 some kinds and instances of it at least1 will be infamous1 and men will be disposed to punish it as in itself detestable2 and the villain will by no means be able always to avoid feeling that infamy1 any more than he will be able to escape this further punishment1 which mankind will be disposed to inflict upon him1 under the notion of his deserving it4 ,but there can be nothing on the side of vice1 to answer this2 because there is nothing in the human mind contradictory1 as the logicians speak1 to virtue4 ,for virtue consists in a regard to what is right and reasonable1 as being so2 in a regard to veracity1 justice1 charity1 in themselves3 and there is surely no such thing1 as a like natural regard to falsehood1 injustice1 cruelty4 ,if it be thought1 that there are instances of an approbation of vice1 as such1 in itself1 and for its own sake1 7though it does not appear to me1 that there is any such thing at all27 it is evidently monstrous3 as much so1 as the most acknowledged perversion of any passion whatever4 ,such instances of perversion then being left out1 as merely imaginary1 or at least unnatural2 it must follow1 from the frame of our nature1 and from our condition1 in the respects now described1 that vice cannot at all be1 and virtue cannot but be1 favored as such by others1 upon some occasions1 and happy in itself1 in some degree4 ,for what is here insisted upon1 is not the degree in which virtue and vice are thus distinguished1 but only the thing itself1 that they are so in some degree2 though the whole good and bad effect of virtue and vice as such1 is not inconsiderable in degree4 ,but that they must be thus distinguished in some degree1 is in a manner necessary3 it is matter of fact of daily experience1 even in the greatest confusion of human affairs4 ,it is not pretended but that1 in the natural course of things1 happiness and misery appear to be distributed by other rules1 than only the personal merit and demerit of characters4 ,they may sometimes be distributed by way of mere discipline4 ,there may be the wisest and best reasons1 why the world should be governed by general laws1 from whence such promiscuous distribution perhaps must follow2 and also why our happiness and misery should be put in each other's power1 in the degree which they are4 ,and these things1 as1 in general1 they contribute to the rewarding virtue and punishing vice1 as such1 so they often contribute also1 not to the inversion of this1 which is impossible1 but to the rendering persons prosperous1 though wicked2 afflicted1 though righteous2 and1 which is worse1 to the rewarding some actions1 though vicious1 and punishing other actions1 though virtuous4#ge ,but all this cannot drown the voice of nature in the conduct of ,providence1 plainly declaring itself for virtue1 by way of distinction from vice1 and preference to it4 ,for our being so constituted as that virtue and vice are thus naturally favored and discountenanced1 rewarded and punished1 respectively as such1 is an intuitive proof of the intent of nature1 that it should be so2 otherwise the constitution of our mind1 from which it thus immediately and directly proceeds1 would be absurd4 ,but it cannot be said1 because virtuous actions are sometimes punished1 and vicious actions rewarded1 that nature intended it4 ,for1 though this great disorder is brought about1 as all actions are1 by means of some natural passion2 yet this may be1 as it undoubtedly is1 brought about by the perversion of such passion1 implanted in us for other1 and those very good purposes4 ,and indeed these other and good purposes1 even of every passion1 may be clearly seen4 ,we have then a declaration1 in some degree of present effect1 from ,him who is supreme in nature1 which side he is of1 or what part he takes2 a declaration for virtue1 and against vice4 ,so far therefore as a man is true to virtue1 to veracity and justice1 to equity and charity1 and the right of the case1 in whatever he is concerned2 so far he is on the side of the divine administration1 and co-operates with it3 and from hence1 to such a man1 arises naturally a secret satisfaction and sense of security1 and implicit hope of somewhat further4 ,v4 ,this hope is confirmed by the necessary tendencies of virtue1 which1 though not of present effect1 yet are at present discernible in nature2 and so afford an instance of somewhat moral in the essential constitution of it4 ,there is1 in the nature of things1 a tendency in virtue and vice to produce the good and bad effects now mentioned1 in a greater degree than they do in fact produce them4 ,for instance2 good and bad men would be much more rewarded and punished as such1 were it not1 that justice is often artificially eluded1#gf that characters are not known1 and many1 who would thus favor virtue and discourage vice1 are hindered from doing so1 by accidental causes4 ,these tendencies of virtue and vice are obvious with regard to individuals4 ,but it may require more particularly to be considered1 that power in a society1 by being under the direction of virtue1 naturally increases1 and has a necessary tendency to prevail over opposite power1 not under the direction of it2 in like manner1 as power1 by being under the direction of reason1 increases1 and has a tendency to prevail over brute force4 ,there are several brute creatures of equal1 and several of superior strength1 to that of men2 and possibly the sum of the whole strength of brutes may be greater than that of mankind2 but reason gives us the advantage and superiority over them2 and thus man is the acknowledged governing animal upon the earth4 ,nor is this superiority considered by any as accidental2 but as what reason has a tendency1 in the nature of the thing1 to obtain4 ,and yet perhaps difficulties may be raised about the meaning1 as well as the truth1 of the assertion1 that virtue has the like tendency4 ,to obviate these difficulties1 let us see more distinctly1 how the case stands with regard to reason2 which is so readily acknowledged to have this advantageous tendency4 ,suppose then two or three men1 of the best and most improved understanding1 in a desolate open plain1 attacked by ten times the number of beasts of prey3 would their reason secure them the victory in this unequal combat8 ,power then1 though joined with reason1 and under its direction1 cannot be expected to prevail over opposite power1 though merely brutal1 unless the one bears some proportion to the other4 ,again3 put the imaginary case1 that rational and irrational creatures were of like external shape and manner3 it is certain1 before there were opportunities for the first to distinguish each other1 to separate from their adversaries1 and to form a union among themselves1 they might be upon a level1 or in several respects upon great disadvantage2 though united they might be vastly superior3 since union is of such efficacy1 that ten men united1 might be able to accomplish1 what ten thousand of the same natural strength and understanding wholly ununited1 could not4 ,in this case1 brute force might more than maintain its ground against reason1 for want of union among the rational creatures4 ,or suppose a number of men to land upon an island inhabited only by wild beasts2 men who1 by the regulations of civil government1 the inventions of art1 and the experience of some years1 could they be preserved so long1 would be really sufficient to subdue the wild beasts1 and to preserve themselves in security from them3 yet a conjuncture of accidents might give such advantage to the irrational animals as they might at once overpower1 and even extirpate1 the rational ones4 ,length of time then1 proper scope1 and opportunities for reason to exert itself1 may be absolutely necessary to its prevailing over brute force4 ,further3 there are many instances of brutes succeeding in attempts1 which they could not have undertaken1 had not their irrational nature rendered them incapable of foreseeing the danger of such attempt1 or the fury of passion hindered their attending to it3 and there are instances of reason and real prudence preventing men's undertaking what1 it has appeared afterwards1 they might have succeeded in by a lucky rashness4 ,in certain conjunctures1 ignorance and folly1 weakness and discord1 may have their advantages4 ,so that rational animals have not necessarily the superiority over irrational ones2 but1 how improbable soever it may be1 it is evidently possible1 that in some globes the latter may be superior4 ,and were the former wholly at variance and disunited1 by false self-interest and envy1 by treachery and injustice1 and consequent rage and malice against each other1 whilst the latter were firmly united among themselves by instinct1 this might greatly contribute to the introducing such an inverted order of things4 ,for every one would consider it as inverted3 since reason has1 in the nature of it1 a tendency to prevail over brute force2 notwithstanding the possibility it may not prevail1 and the necessity1 which there is1 of many concurring circumstances to render it prevalent4 ,now ,i say1 virtue in a society has a like tendency to procure superiority and additional power3 whether this power be considered as the means of security from opposite power1 or of obtaining other advantages4 ,it has this tendency1 by rendering public good1 an object and end1 to every member of the society2 by putting every one upon consideration and diligence1 recollection and self-government1 both in order to see what is the most effectual method1 and also in order to perform their proper part1 for obtaining and preserving it2 by uniting a society within itself1 and so increasing its strength2 and1 which is particularly to be mentioned1 uniting it by means of veracity and justice4 ,for as these last are principal bonds of union1 so benevolence or public spirit1 undirected1 unrestrained by them1 is1 nobody knows what4 ,and suppose the invisible world1 and the invisible dispensations of ,providence1 to be1 in any sort1 analogous to what appears3 or that both together make up one uniform scheme1 the two parts of which1 the part which we see1 and that which is beyond our observation1 are analogous to each other3 then1 there must be a like natural tendency in the derived power1 throughout the universe1 under the direction of virtue1 to prevail in general over that which is not under its direction2 as there is in reason1 derived reason in the universe1 to prevail over brute force4 ,but then1 in order to the prevalence of virtue1 or that it may actually produce1 what it has a tendency to produce2 the like concurrences are necessary1 as are1 to the prevalence of reason4 ,there must be some proportion1 between the natural power or force which is1 and that which is not1 under the direction of virtue3 there must be sufficient length of time2 for the complete success of virtue1 as of reason1 cannot1 from the nature of the thing1 be otherwise than gradual3 there must be1 as one may speak1 a fair field of trial1 a stage large and extensive enough1 proper occasions and opportunities1 for the virtuous to join together1 to exert themselves against lawless force1 and to reap the fruit of their united labors4 ,now indeed it is to be hoped1 that the disproportion between the good and bad1 even here on earth1 is not so great1 but that the former have natural power sufficient to their prevailing to a considerable degree1 if circumstances would permit this power to be united4 ,for1 much less1 very much less1 power under the direction of virtue1 would prevail over much greater not under the direction of it4#gg ,however1 good men over the face of the earth cannot unite2 because1 7among other reasons17 they cannot be sufficiently ascertained of each other's characters4 ,and the known course of human things1 the scene we are now passing through1 particularly the shortness of life1 denies to virtue its full scope in several other respects4 ,the natural tendency which we have been considering1 though real1 is hindered from being carried into effect in the present state3 but these hinderances may be removed in a future one4 ,virtue1 to borrow the ,christian allusion1 is militant here2 and various untoward accidents contribute to its being often overborne3 but it may combat with greater advantage hereafter1 and prevail completely1 and enjoy its consequent rewards1 in some future states4 ,neglected as it is1 perhaps unknown1 perhaps despised and oppressed here2 there maybe scenes in eternity1 lasting enough1 and in every other way adapted1 to afford it a sufficient sphere of action2 and a sufficient sphere for the natural consequences of it to follow in fact4 ,if the soul be naturally immortal1 and this state be a progress towards a future one1 as childhood is towards mature age1 good men may naturally unite1 not only among themselves1 but also with other orders of virtuous creatures1 in that future state4 ,for virtue1 from the very nature of it1 is a principle and bond of union1 in some degree1 among all who are endued with it1 and known to each other2 so as that by it1 a good man cannot but recommend himself to the favor and protection of all virtuous beings1 throughout the whole universe1 who can be acquainted with his character1 and can any way interpose in his behalf in any part of his duration4 ,one might add1 that suppose all this advantageous tendency of virtue to become effect1 among one or more orders of creatures1 in any distant scenes and periods1 and to be seen by any orders of vicious creatures1 throughout the universal kingdom of ,god2 this happy effect of virtue would have a tendency1 by way of example1 and possibly in other ways1 to amend those of them who are capable of amendment1 and of being recovered to a just sense of virtue4 ,if our notions of the plan of ,providence were enlarged in any sort proportionable to what late discoveries have enlarged our views with respect to the material world1 representations of this kind would not appear absurd or extravagant4 ,they are not to be taken as intended for a literal delineation of what is in fact the particular scheme of the universe1 which cannot be known without revelation3 for suppositions are not to be looked on as true1 because not incredible3 but they are mentioned to show1 that our finding virtue to be hindered from procuring to itself such superiority and advantages1 is no objection against its having1 in the essential nature of the thing1 a tendency to procure them4 ,and the suppositions now mentioned do plainly show this3 for they show1 that these hinderances are so far from being necessary1 that we ourselves can easily conceive1 how they may be removed in future states1 and full scope be granted to virtue4 ,and all these advantageous tendencies of it are to be considered as declarations of ,god in its favor4 ,this however is taking a pretty large compass3 though it is certain1 that1 as the material world appears to be1 in a manner1 boundless and immense1 there must be some scheme of ,providence vast in proportion to it4 ,but let us return to the earth our habitation2 and we shall see this happy tendency of virtue1 by imagining an instance not so vast and remote3 by supposing a kingdom or society of men upon it1 perfectly virtuous1 for a succession of many ages2 to which1 if you please1 may be given a situation advantageous for universal monarchy4 ,in such a state1 there would be no such thing as faction3 but men of the greatest capacity would of course1 all along1 have the chief direction of affairs willingly yielded to them2 and they would share it among themselves without envy4 ,each of these would have the part assigned him1 to which his genius was peculiarly adapted2 and others1 who had not any distinguished genius1 would be safe1 and think themselves very happy1 by being under the protection and guidance of those who had4 ,public determinations would really be the result of the united wisdom of the community3 and they would faithfully be executed1 by the united strength of it4 ,some would contribute in a higher way1 but all in some way1 to the public prosperity3 and in it1 each would enjoy the fruits of his own virtue4 ,and as injustice1 whether by fraud or force1 would be unknown among themselves1 so they would be sufficiently secured from it in their neighbors4 ,for cunning and false self-interest1 confederacies in injustice1 ever slight1 and accompanied with faction and intestine treachery2 these on one hand would be found mere childish folly and weakness1 when set in opposition against wisdom1 public spirit1 union inviolable1 and fidelity on the other3 allowing both a sufficient length of years to try their force4 ,add the general influence1 which such a kingdom would have over the face of the earth1 by way of example particularly1 and the reverence which would be paid it4 ,it would plainly be superior to all others1 and the world must gradually come under its empire2 not by means of lawless violence2 but partly by what must be allowed to be just conquest2 and partly by other kingdoms submitting themselves voluntarily to it1 throughout a course of ages1 and claiming its protection1 one after another1 in successive exigencies4 ,the head of it would be a universal monarch1 in another sense than any mortal has yet been2 and the ,eastern style would be literally applicable to him1 that all people1 nations1 and languages should serve him4 ,and though indeed our knowledge of human nature1 and the whole history of mankind1 show the impossibility1 without some miraculous interposition1 that a number of men1 here on earth1 should unite in one society or government1 in the fear of ,god and universal practice of virtue2 and that such a government should continue so united for a succession of ages3 yet admitting or supposing this1 the effect would be as now drawn out4 ,thus for instance1 the wonderful power and prosperity promised to the ,jewish nation in the ,scripture1 would be1 in a great measure1 the consequence of what is predicted of them2 that the people should be all righteous1 and inherit the land forever2#gh were we to understand the latter phrase of a long continuance only1 sufficient to give things time to work4 ,the predictions of this kind1 for there are many of them1 cannot come to pass1 in the present known course of nature2 but suppose them come to pass1 and then1 the dominion and preminence promised must naturally follow1 to a very considerable degree4 ,consider now the general system of religion2 that the government of the world is uniform1 and one1 and moral2 that virtue and right shall finally have the advantage1 and prevail over fraud and lawless force1 over the deceits as well as the violence of wickedness1 under the conduct of one supreme governor3 and from the observations above made1 it will appear that ,god has1 by our reason1 given us to see a peculiar connection in the several parts of this scheme1 and a tendency towards the completion of it1 arising out of the very nature of virtue3 which tendency is to be considered as something moral in the essential constitution of things4 ,if any one should think all this to be of little importance1 ,i desire him to consider1 what he would think1 if vice had1 essentially and in its nature1 these advantageous tendencies2 or if virtue had essentially the contrary ones4 ,it may be objected1 that notwithstanding all these natural effects and natural tendencies of virtue1 yet things may be now going on throughout the universe1 and may go on hereafter1 in the same mixed way as here at present upon earth3 virtue sometimes prosperous1 sometimes depressed2 vice sometimes punished1 sometimes successful4 ,the answer to which is1 that it is not the purpose of this chapter1 nor of this treatise1 properly to prove ,god's perfect moral government over the world1 or the truth of religion2 but to observe what there is in the constitution and course of nature1 to confirm the proper proof of it1 supposed to be known3 and that the weight of the foregoing observations to this purpose may be thus distinctly proved4 ,pleasure and pain are1 to a certain degree1 say to a very high degree1 distributed among us without any apparent regard to the merit or demerit of characters4 ,and were there nothing else concerning this matter discernible in the constitution and course of nature1 there would be no ground from the constitution and course of nature1 to hope or to fear that men would be rewarded or punished hereafter according to their deserts3 which1 however1 it is to be remarked1 implies1 that even then there would be no ground from appearances to think1 that vice upon the whole would have the advantage1 rather than that virtue would4 ,thus the proof of a future state of retribution would rest upon the usual known arguments for it2 which are ,i think plainly unanswerable2 and would be so1 though there were no additional confirmation of them from the things above insisted on4 ,but these things are a very strong confirmation of them4 ,for1 ,first1 ,they show that the ,author of nature is not indifferent to virtue and vice4 ,they amount to a declaration1 from him1 determinate and not to be evaded1 in favor of one1 and against the other2 such a declaration1 as there is nothing to be set over against or answer1 on the part of vice4 ,so that were a man1 laying aside the proper proof of religion1 to determine from the course of nature only1 whether it were most probable1 that the righteous or the wicked would have the advantage in a future life2 there can be no doubt1 but that he would determine the probability to be1 that the former would4 ,the course of nature then1 in the view of it now given1 furnishes us with a real practical proof of the obligations of religion4 ,secondly1 ,when1 conformably to what religion teaches us1 ,god shall reward and punish virtue and vice as such1 so as that every one shall1 upon the whole1 have his deserts2 this distributive justice will not be a thing different in kind1 but only in degree1 from what we experience in his present government4 ,it will be that in effect1 towards which we now see a tendency4 ,it will be no more than the completion of that moral government1 the principles and beginning of which have been shown1 beyond all dispute1 discernible in the present constitution and course of nature4 ,thirdly1 ,as under the natural government of ,god1 our experience of those kinds and degrees of happiness and misery1 which we do experience at present1 gives just ground to hope for1 and to fear1 higher degrees and other kinds of both in a future state1 supposing a future state admitted3 so under his moral government our experience1 that virtue and vice are1 in the manners above mentioned1 actually rewarded and punished at present1 in a certain degree1 gives just ground to hope and to fear1 that they may be rewarded and punished in a higher degree hereafter4 ,it is acknowledged indeed that this alone is not sufficient ground to think1 that they actually will be rewarded and punished in a higher degree1 rather than in a lower3 but then1 ,lastly1 ,there is sufficient ground to think so1 from the good and bad tendencies of virtue and vice4 ,for these tendencies are essential1 and founded in the nature of things3 whereas the hinderances to their becoming effect are1 in numberless cases1 not necessary1 but artificial only4 ,now it may be much more strongly argued1 that these tendencies1 as well as the actual rewards and punishments1 of virtue and vice1 which arise directly out of the nature of things1 will remain hereafter1 than that the accidental hinderances of them will4 ,and if these hinderances do not remain2 those rewards and punishments cannot but be carried on much farther towards the perfection of moral government3 i4e4 the tendencies of virtue and vice will become effect2 but when1 or where1 or in what particular way1 cannot be known at all1 but by revelation4 ,upon the whole3 there is a kind of moral government implied in ,god's natural government3#gi virtue and vice are naturally rewarded and punished as beneficial and mischievous to society2#hj and rewarded and punished directly as virtue and vice4#ha ,the notion of a moral scheme of government is not fictitious1 but natural2 for it is suggested to our thoughts by the constitution and course of nature3 and the execution of this scheme is actually begun1 in the instances here mentioned4 ,and these things are to be considered as a declaration of the ,author of nature1 for virtue1 and against vice3 they give a credibility to the supposition of their being rewarded and punished hereafter2 and also ground to hope and to fear1 that they may be rewarded and punished in higher degrees than they are here4 ,all this is confirmed1 and the argument for religion1 from the constitution and course of nature1 is carried on farther1 by observing1 that there are natural tendencies1 and1 in innumerable cases1 only artificial hinderances1 to this moral scheme's being carried on much farther towards perfection1 than it is at present4#hb ,the notion then of a moral scheme of government1 much more perfect than what is seen1 is not a fictitious1 but a natural notion2 for it is suggested to our thoughts1 by the essential tendencies of virtue and vice4 ,these tendencies are to be considered as intimations1 as implicit promises and threatenings1 from the ,author of nature1 of much greater rewards and punishments to follow virtue and vice1 than do at present4 ,indeed1 every natural tendency1 which is to continue1 but which is hindered from becoming effect by only accidental causes1 affords a presumption1 that such tendency will1 some time or other1 become effect3 a presumption proportionable in degree to the length of the duration1 through which such tendency will continue4 ,from these things together1 arises a real presumption1 that the moral scheme of government established in nature1 shall be carried on much farther towards perfection hereafter2 and1 ,i think1 a presumption that it will be absolutely completed4 ,from these things1 joined with the moral nature which ,god has given us1 considered as given us by him1 arises a practical proof#hc that it will be completed3 a proof from fact2 and therefore a distinct one from that which is deduced from the eternal and unalterable relations1 the fitness and unfitness of actions4 ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,,probation1 ,,as ,,implying ,,trial1 ,,difficulties1 ,,and ,,danger4#hd ,the general doctrine of religion1 that our present life is a state of probation for a future one1 comprehends under it several particular things1 distinct from each other4 ,the first and most common meaning of it seems to be1 that our future interest is now depending1 and depending upon ourselves2 that we have scope and opportunities here1 for that good and bad behavior1 which ,god will reward and punish hereafter2 together with temptations to one1 as well as inducements of reason to the other4 ,and this1 in a great measure1 is the same as saying1 that we are under the moral government of ,god1 and to give an account of our actions to him4 ,for the notion of a future account and general righteous judgment1 implies some sort of temptations to what is wrong3 otherwise there would be no moral possibility of doing wrong1 nor ground for judgment1 or discrimination4 ,but there is this difference1 that the word probation is more distinctly and particularly expressive of allurements to wrong1 or difficulties in adhering uniformly to what is right1 and of the danger of miscarrying by such temptations1 than the words moral government4 ,a state of probation then1 as thus particularly implying in it trial1 difficulties1 and danger1 may require to be considered distinctly by itself4#he ,as the moral government of ,god1 which religion teaches us1 implies that we are in a state of trial with regard to a future world1 so also his natural government over us implies that we are in a state of trial1 in the like sense1 with regard to the present world4 ,natural government by rewards and punishments1 as much implies natural trial1 as moral government does moral trial4 ,the natural government of ,god here meant1#hf consists in his annexing pleasure to some actions1 and pain to others1 which are in our power to do or forbear1 and giving us notice of such appointment1 beforehand4 ,this necessarily implies1 that he has made our happiness and misery1 or our interest1 to depend in part upon ourselves4 ,so far as men have temptations to any course of action1 which will probably occasion them greater temporal inconvenience and uneasiness1 than satisfaction1 so far their temporal interest is in danger from themselves2 or they are in a state of trial with respect to it4 ,now people often blame others1 and even themselves1 for their misconduct in their temporal concerns4 ,and we find many are greatly wanting to themselves1 and miss that natural happiness1 which they might have obtained in the present life3 perhaps every one does in some degree4 ,but many run themselves into great inconvenience1 and into extreme distress and misery1 not through incapacity of knowing better1 and doing better1 for themselves1 which would be nothing to the present purpose1 but through their own fault4 ,these things necessarily imply temptation1 and danger of miscarrying1 in a greater or less degree1 with respect to our worldly interest or happiness4 ,every one too1 without having religion in his thoughts1 speaks of the hazards which young people run1 upon their setting out in the world3 hazards from other causes1 than merely their ignorance1 and unavoidable accidents4 ,and some courses of vice1 at least1 being contrary to men's worldly interest or good2 temptations to these must at the same time be temptations to forego our present and our future interest4 ,thus in our natural or temporal capacity1 we are in a state of trial1 i4e4 of difficulty and danger1 analogous1 or like to our moral and religious trial4 ,this will more distinctly appear to any one1 who thinks it worth while1 more distinctly1 to consider1 what it is which constitutes our trial in both capacities1 and to observe1 how mankind behave under it4 ,that which constitutes this trial1 in both these capacities1 must be something either in our external circumstances1 or in our nature4 ,for1 on the one hand1 persons may be betrayed into wrong behavior upon surprise1 or overcome upon any other very singular and extraordinary external occasions1 who would1 otherwise1 have preserved their character of prudence and of virtue3 in which cases1 every one1 in speaking of the wrong behavior of these persons1 would impute it to such particular external circumstances4 ,on the other hand1 men who have contracted habits of vice and folly of any kind1 or have some particular passions in excess1 will seek opportunities1 and1 as it were1 go out of their way1 to gratify themselves in these respects1 at the expense of their wisdom and their virtue2 led to it1 as every one would say1 not by external temptations1 but by such habits and passions4 ,and the account of this last case is1 that particular passions are no more coincident with prudence1 or that reasonable self-love1 the end of which is our worldly interest1 than they are with the principle of virtue and religion2 but often draw contrary ways to one1 as well as to the other3 and so such particular passions are as much temptations1 to act imprudently with regard to our worldly interest1 as to act viciously4#hg ,when we say1 men are misled by external circumstances of temptation2 it cannot but be understood1 that there is somewhat within themselves1 to render those circumstances temptations1 or to render them susceptible of impressions from them4 ,so when we say1 they are misled by passions2 it is always supposed1 that there are occasions1 circumstances1 and objects1 exciting these passions1 and affording means for gratifying them4 ,therefore1 temptations from within1 and from without1 coincide1 and mutually imply each other4 ,the several external objects of the appetites1 passions1 and affections1 being present to the senses1 or offering themselves to the mind1 and so exciting emotions suitable to their nature2 not only in cases where they can be gratified consistently with innocence and prudence1 but also in cases where they cannot1 and yet can be gratified imprudently and viciously3 this as really puts them in danger of voluntarily foregoing their present interest or good1 as their future2 and as really renders self-denial necessary to secure one1 as the other3 i4e4 we are in a like state of trial with respect to both1 by the very same passions1 excited by the very same means4 ,thus mankind having a temporal interest depending upon themselves1 and a prudent course of behavior being necessary to secure it1 passions inordinately excited1 whether by means of example1 or by any other external circumstance1 towards such objects1 at such times1 or in such degrees1 as that they cannot be gratified consistently with worldly prudence1 are temptations2 dangerous1 and too often successful temptations1 to forego a greater temporal good for a less2 i4e4 to forego what is1 upon the whole1 our temporal interest1 for the sake of a present gratification4 ,this is a description of our state of trial in our temporal capacity4 ,substitute now the word future for temporal1 and virtue for prudence2 and it will be just as proper a description of our state of trial in our religious capacity2 so analogous are they to each other4#hh ,if1 from consideration of this our like state of trial in both capacities1 we go on to observe farther1 how mankind behave under it2 we shall find there are some1 who have so little sense of it1 that they scarce look beyond the passing day3 they are so taken up with present gratifications1 as to have1 in a manner1 no feeling of consequences1 no regard to their future ease or fortune in this life3 any more than to their happiness in another4 ,some appear to be blinded and deceived by inordinate passion1 in their worldly concerns1 as much as in religion4 ,others are not deceived1 but as it were forcibly carried away by the like passions1 against their better judgment1 and feeble resolutions too of acting better4#hi ,and there are men1 and truly not a few1 who shamelessly avow1 not their interest1 but their mere will and pleasure1 to be their law of life3 and who1 in open defiance of every thing reasonable1 will go on in a course of vicious extravagance1 foreseeing1 with no remorse and little fear1 that it will be their temporal ruin2 and some of them1 under the apprehension of the consequences of wickedness in another state4 ,to speak in the most moderate way1 human creatures are not only continually liable to go wrong voluntarily1 but we see likewise that they often actually do so1 with respect to their temporal interests1 as well as with respect to religion4 ,thus our difficulties and dangers1 or our trials in our temporal and our religious capacity1 as they proceed from the same causes1 and have the same effect upon men's behavior1 are evidently analogous1 and of the same kind4 ,it may be added1 that the difficulties and dangers of miscarrying in our religious state of trial1 are greatly increased1 and one is ready to think1 are in a manner wholly made1 by the ill behavior of others2 by a wrong education1 wrong in a moral sense1 sometimes positively vicious2 by general bad example2 by the dishonest artifices which are got into business of all kinds2 and1 in very many parts of the world1 by religion's being corrupted into superstitions1 which indulge men in their vices4 ,in like manner1 the difficulties of conducting ourselves prudently in respect to our present interest1 and our danger of being led aside from pursuing it1 are greatly increased1 by a foolish education2 and1 after we come to mature age1 by the extravagance and carelessness of others1 with whom we have intercourse3 and by mistaken notions1 very generally prevalent1 and taken up from common opinion1 concerning temporal happiness1 and wherein it consists4 ,persons1 by their own negligence and folly in temporal affairs1 no less than by a course of vice1 bring themselves into new difficulties1 and1 by habits of indulgence1 become less qualified to go through them3 and one irregularity after another1 embarrasses things to such a degree1 that they know not whereabout they are2 and often makes the path of conduct so intricate and perplexed1 that it is difficult to trace it out2 difficult even to determine what is the prudent or the moral part4 ,thus1 for instance1 wrong behavior in one stage of life1 youth2 wrong1 ,i mean considering ourselves only in our temporal capacity1 without taking in religion2 this1 in several ways1 increases the difficulties of right behavior in mature age2 i4e4 puts us into a more disadvantageous state of trial in our temporal capacity4 ,we are an inferior part of the creation of ,god4 ,there are natural appearances of our being in a state of degradation4#ij ,we certainly are in a condition1 which does not seem1 by any means1 the most advantageous we could imagine or desire1 either in our natural or moral capacity1 for securing either our present or future interest4 ,however1 this condition1 low1 and careful1 and uncertain as it is1 does not afford any just ground of complaint4 ,for1 as men may manage their temporal affairs with prudence1 and so pass their days here on earth in tolerable ease and satisfaction1 by a moderate degree of care3 so likewise with regard to religion1 there is no more required than what they are well able to do1#ia and what they must be greatly wanting to themselves1 if they neglect4 ,and for persons to have that put upon them1 which they are well able to go through1 and no more1 we naturally consider as an equitable thing2 supposing it done by proper authority4 ,nor have we any more reason to complain of it1 with regard to the ,author of nature1 than of his not having given us advantages belonging to other orders of creatures4 ,,remarks4 ,the thing here insisted upon is1 that the state of trial1 which religion teaches us we are in1 is rendered credible1 by its being throughout uniform and of a piece with the general conduct of ,providence towards us1 in all other respects within the compass of our knowledge4 ,indeed if mankind1 considered in their natural capacity1 as inhabitants of this world only1 found themselves1 from their birth to their death1 in a settled state of security and happiness1 without any solicitude or thought of their own3 or if they were in no danger of being brought into inconveniences and distress1 by carelessness1 or the folly of passion1 through bad example1 the treachery of others1 or the deceitful appearances of things3 were this our natural condition1 then it might seem strange1 and be some presumption against the truth of religion1 that it represents our future and more general interest1 as not secure of course1 but as depending upon our behavior1 and requiring recollection and self-government to obtain it4 ,it then might be alleged1 8,what you say is our condition1 in one respect1 is not in any wise of a sort with what we find1 by experience1 is our condition in another4 ,our whole present interest is secured to our hands1 without any solicitude of ours2 and why should not our future interest1 if we have any such1 be so too80 ,but since1 on the contrary1 thought and consideration1 the voluntary denying ourselves many things which we desire1 and a course of behavior1 far from being always agreeable to us1 are absolutely necessary to our acting even a common decent1 and common prudent part1 so as to pass with any satisfaction through the present world1 and be received upon any tolerable good terms in it3 since this is the case1 all presumption against self-denial and attention being necessary to secure our higher interest1#ib is removed4 ,had we not experience1 it might1 perhaps speciously1 be urged1 that it is improbable any thing of hazard and danger should be put upon us by an infinite being2 when every thing which has hazard and danger in our manner of conception1 and will end in error1 confusion1 and misery1 is already certain in his foreknowledge4 ,indeed1 why any thing of hazard and danger should be put upon such frail creatures as we are1 may well be thought a difficulty in speculation2 and cannot but be so1 till we know the whole1 or at least much more of the case4 ,but still the constitution of nature is as it is4 ,our happiness and misery are trusted to our conduct1 and made to depend upon it4 ,somewhat1 and1 in many circumstances1 a great deal too1 is put upon us1 either to do1 or to suffer1 as we choose4 ,all the various miseries of life1 which people bring upon themselves by negligence and folly1 and might have avoided by proper care1 are instances of this3 which miseries are1 beforehand1 just as contingent and undetermined as conduct1 and left to be determined by it4 ,these observations are an answer#ic to the objections against the credibility of a state of trial1 as implying temptations1 and real danger of miscarrying with regard to our general interest1 under the moral government of ,god4 ,and they show1 that1 if we are at all to be considered in such a capacity1 and as having such an interest1 the general analogy of ,providence must lead us to apprehend ourselves in danger of miscarrying1 in different degrees1 as to this interest1 by our neglecting to act the proper part belonging to us in that capacity4 ,for we have a present interest under the government of ,god1 which we experience here upon earth4 ,this interest1 as it is not forced upon us1 so neither is it offered to our acceptance1 but to our acquisition2 and in such manner1 as that we are in danger of missing it1 by means of temptations to neglect1 or act contrary to it2 and without attention and self-denial1 we must and do miss it4 ,it is then perfectly credible1 that this may be our case1 with respect to that chief and final good1 which religion proposes to us4 ,,chapter ,v4 ,,probation1 ,,as ,,intended ,,for ,,moral ,,discipline ,,and ,,improvement4 ,from the consideration of our being in a probation-state1 of so much difficulty and hazard1 naturally arises the question1 how we came to be placed in it8 ,but such a general inquiry as this would be found involved in insuperable difficulties4 ,for1 though some of these difficulties would be lessened1 by observing that all wickedness is voluntary1 as is implied in its very notion2 and that many of the miseries of life have apparent good effects3 yet1 when we consider other circumstances belonging to both1 and what must be the consequence of the former in a life to come1 it cannot but be acknowledged plain folly and presumption1 to pretend to give an account of the whole reasons of this matter2 the whole reasons of our being allotted a condition1 out of which so much wickedness and misery1 so circumstanced1 would in fact arise4 ,whether it be not beyond our faculties1 not only to find out1 but even to understand2 or1 though we should be supposed capable of understanding it1 yet1 whether it would be of service or prejudice to us to be informed of it1 is impossible to say4 ,but as our present condition can in no wise be shown to be inconsistent with the perfect moral government of ,god3 so religion teaches us we were placed in it1 that we might qualify ourselves1 by the practice of virtue1 for another state which is to follow it4 ,this1 though but a partial answer1 a very partial one indeed1 to the inquiry now mentioned2 is yet a more satisfactory answer to another1 which is of real1 and of the utmost importance to us to have answered1--viz43 ,what is our business here8 ,the known end then1 why we are placed in a state of so much affliction1 hazard1 and difficulty1 is1 our improvement in virtue and piety1 as the requisite qualification for a future state of security and happiness4 ,the beginning of life1 considered as an education for mature age in the present world1 appears plainly1 at first sight1 analogous to this our trial for a future one3 the former being in our temporal capacity1 what the latter is in our religious capacity4 ,some observations common to both1 and a more distinct consideration of each1 will more distinctly show the extent and force of the analogy between them2 and the credibility1 which arises from hence1 as well as from the nature of the thing1 that the present life was intended to be a state of discipline for a future one4 ,i4 ,every species of creatures is1 we see1 designed for a particular way of life2 to which1 the nature1 the capacities1 temper1 and qualifications1 of each species1 are as necessary as their external circumstances4 ,both come into the notion of such state1 or particular way of life1 and are constituent parts of it4 ,change a man's capacities or character1 to the degree in which it is conceivable they may be changed1 and he would be altogether incapable of a human course of life1 and human happiness2 as incapable1 as if1 his nature continuing unchanged1 he were placed in a world1 where he had no sphere of action1 nor any objects to answer his appetites1 passions1 and affections of any sort4 ,one thing is set over against another1 as an ancient writer expresses it4#id ,our nature corresponds to our external condition4 ,without this correspondence1 there would be no possibility of any such thing as human life and happiness3 which life and happiness are1 therefore1 a result from our nature and condition jointly3 meaning by human life1 not living in the literal sense1 but the whole complex notion commonly understood by those words4 ,so that without determining what will be the employment and happiness1 the particular life1 of good men hereafter2 there must be some determinate capacities1 some necessary character and qualifications1 without which persons cannot but be utterly incapable of it3 in like manner1 as there must be some1 without which men would be incapable of their present state of life4 ,,ii4 ,the constitution of human creatures1 and indeed of all creatures which come under our notice1 is such1 as that they are capable of naturally becoming qualified for states of life1 for which they were once wholly unqualified4 ,in imagination we may indeed conceive of creatures1 incapable of having any of their faculties naturally enlarged1 or as being unable naturally to acquire any new qualifications4 ,but the faculties of every species known to us1 are made for enlargement2 for acquirements of experience and habits4 ,we find ourselves1 in particular1 endued with capacities1 not only of perceiving ideas1 and of knowledge or perceiving truth1 but also of storing up ideas and knowledge by memory4 ,we are capable1 not only of acting1 and of having different momentary impressions made upon us2 but of getting a new facility in any kind of action1 and of settled alterations in our temper or character4 ,the power of the two last is the power of habits4 ,but neither the perception of ideas1 nor knowledge of any sort1 are habits2 though absolutely necessary to the forming of them4 ,however1 apprehension1 reason1 memory1 which are the capacities of acquiring knowledge1 are greatly improved by exercise4 ,whether the word habit is applicable to all these improvements1 and in particular how far the powers of memory and of habits may be powers of the same nature1 ,i shall not inquire4 ,but that perceptions come into our minds readily and of course1 by means of their having been there before1 seems a thing of the same sort1 as readiness in any particular kind of action1 proceeding from being accustomed to it4 ,aptness to recollect practical observations1 of service in our conduct1 is plainly habit in many cases4 ,there are habits of perception1 and habits of action4 ,an instance of the former1 is our constant and even involuntary readiness1 in correcting the impressions of our sight concerning magnitudes and distances1 so as to substitute judgment in the room of sensation1 imperceptibly to ourselves4 ,it seems as if all other associations of ideas not naturally connected1 might be called passive habits2 as properly as our readiness in understanding languages upon sight1 or hearing of words4 ,our readiness in speaking and writing them1 are instances of active habits4 ,for distinctness1 we may consider habits1 as belonging to the body1 or to the mind3 and the latter will be explained by the former4 ,under the former are comprehended all bodily activities or motions1 whether graceful or unbecoming1 which are owing to use3 under the latter1 general habits of life and conduct2 such as those of obedience and submission to authority1 or to any particular person2 those of veracity1 justice1 and charity2 those of attention1 industry1 self-government1 envy1 revenge4 ,habits of this latter kind seem produced by repeated acts1 as well as the former4 ,and as habits belonging to the body are produced by external acts1 so habits of the mind are produced by the exertion of inward practical principles2 i4e4 by carrying them into act1 or acting upon them2 the principles of obedience1 of veracity1 justice1 and charity4 ,nor can those habits be formed by any external course of action1 otherwise than as it proceeds from these principles3 because it is only these inward principles exerted1 which are strictly acts of obedience1 of veracity1 of justice1 and of charity4 ,so likewise habits of attention1 industry1 self-government1 are in the same manner acquired by exercise2 and habits of envy and revenge by indulgence1 whether in outward act1 or in thought and intention2 i4e4 inward act3 for such intention is an act4 ,resolutions to do well1 are also properly acts4 ,and endeavoring to enforce upon our own minds a practical sense of virtue1 or to beget in others that practical sense of it1 which a man really has himself1 is a virtuous act4 ,all these1 therefore1 may and will contribute towards forming good habits4 ,but going over the theory of virtue in one's thoughts1 talking well1 and drawing fine pictures1 of it2 this is so far from necessarily or certainly conducing to form a habit of it1 in him who thus employs himself1 that it may harden the mind in a contrary course1 and render it gradually more insensible2 i4e4 form a habit of insensibility to all moral considerations4 ,for1 from our very faculty of habits1 passive impressions1 by being repeated1 grow weaker4 ,thoughts1 by often passing through the mind1 are felt less sensibly3 being accustomed to danger1 begets intrepidity1 i4e4 lessens fear2 to distress1 lessens the passion of pity2 to instances of others' mortality1 lessens the sensible apprehension of our own4 ,from these two observations together1 that practical habits are formed and strengthened by repeated acts1 and that passive impressions grow weaker by being repeated upon us1 it must follow1 that active habits may be gradually forming and strengthening1 by a course of acting upon such and such motives and excitements1 while these motives and excitements themselves are1 by proportionable degrees1 growing less sensible2 i4e4 are continually less and less sensibly felt1 even as the active habits strengthen4 ,and experience confirms this3 for active principles1 at the very time that they are less lively in perception than they were1 are found to be1 somehow1 wrought more thoroughly into the temper and character1 and become more effectual in influencing our practice4 ,the three things just mentioned may afford instances of it4 ,perception of danger is a natural excitement of passive fear1 and active caution3 and by being inured to danger1 habits of the latter are gradually wrought1 at the same time that the former gradually lessens4 ,perception of distress in others is a natural excitement1 passively to pity1 and actively to relieve it3 but let a man set himself to attend to1 inquire out1 and relieve distressed persons1 and he cannot but grow less and less sensibly affected with the various miseries of life1 with which he must become acquainted2 when yet1 at the same time1 benevolence1 considered not as a passion1 but as a practical principle of action1 will strengthen3 and while he passively compassionates the distressed less1 he will acquire a greater aptitude actively to assist and befriend them4 ,so also at the same time that the daily instances of men's dying around us give us daily a less sensible passive feeling or apprehension of our own mortality1 such instances greatly contribute to the strengthening a practical regard to it in serious men2 i4e4 to forming a habit of acting with a constant view to it4 ,this seems further to show1 that passive impressions made upon our minds by admonition1 experience1 or example1 though they may have a remote efficacy1 and a very great one1 towards forming active habits1 yet can have this efficacy no otherwise than by inducing us to such a course of action3 and that it is not being affected so and so1 but acting1 which forms those habits3 only it must be always remembered1 that real endeavors to enforce good impressions upon ourselves are a species of virtuous action4 ,nor do we know how far it is possible1 in the nature of things1 that effects should be wrought in us at once1 equivalent to habits2 i4e4 what is wrought by use and exercise4 ,the thing insisted on is1 not what may be possible1 but what is in fact the appointment of nature3 which is1 that active habits are to be formed by exercise4 ,their progress may be so gradual1 as to be imperceptible in its steps3 it may be hard to explain the faculty1 by which we are capable of habits1 throughout its several parts2 and to trace it up to its original1 so as to distinguish it from all others in our mind3 and it seems as if contrary effects were to be ascribed to it4 ,but the thing in general1 that our nature is formed to yield to use and exercise1 in some such manner as this1 is matter of certain experience4 ,thus1 by accustoming ourselves to any course of action1 we get an aptness to go on1 a facility1 readiness1 and often pleasure1 in it4 ,the inclinations which rendered us averse to it1 grow weaker2 the difficulties in it1 not only the imaginary but the real ones1 lessen2 the reasons for it offer themselves of course to our thoughts upon all occasions2 and the least glimpse of them is sufficient to make us go on1 in a course of action1 to which we have been accustomed4 ,practical principles appear to grow stronger1 absolutely in themselves1 by exercise2 as well as relatively1 with regard to contrary principles2 which1 by being accustomed to submit1 do so habitually1 and of course4 ,thus a new character1 in several respects1 may be formed2 and many habitudes of life1 not given by nature1 but which nature directs us to acquire4 ,,iii4 ,indeed we may be assured1 that we should never have had these capacities of improving by experience1 acquired knowledge1 and habits1 had they not been necessary1 and intended to be made use of4 ,and accordingly we find them so necessary1 and so much intended1 that without them we should be utterly incapable of that which was the end for which we were made1 considered in our temporal capacity only3 the employments and satisfactions of our mature state of life4 ,nature does in no wise qualify us wholly1 much less at once1 for this mature state of life4 ,even maturity of understanding1 and bodily strength1 not only are arrived at gradually1 but are also very much owing to the continued exercise of our powers of body and mind from infancy4 ,if we suppose a person brought into the world with both these in maturity1 as far as this is conceivable1 he would plainly at first be as unqualified for the human life of mature age1 as an idiot4 ,he would be in a manner distracted1 with astonishment1 and apprehension1 and curiosity1 and suspense3 nor can one guess1 how long it would be1 before he would be familiarized to himself and the objects about him1 enough even to set himself to any thing4 ,it may be questioned too1 whether the natural information of his sight and hearing would be of any manner of use to him in acting1 before experience4 ,and it seems1 that men would be strangely headstrong and self-willed1 and disposed to exert themselves with an impetuosity1 which would render society insupportable1 and the living in it impracticable1 were it not for some acquired moderation and self-government1 some aptitude and readiness in restraining themselves1 and concealing their sense of things4 ,want of every thing of this kind which is learnt would render a man as incapable of society1 as want of language would2 or as his natural ignorance of any of the particular employments of life would render him incapable of providing himself with the common conveniences1 or supplying the necessary wants of it4 ,in these respects1 and probably in many more of which we have no particular notion1 mankind is left by nature1 an unformed1 unfinished creature2 utterly deficient and unqualified1 before the acquirement of knowledge1 experience1 and habits1 for that mature state of life1 which was the end of his creation1 considering him as related only to this world4 ,but1 as nature has endued us with a power of supplying those deficiencies1 by acquired knowledge1 experience1 and habits2 so likewise we are placed in a condition1 in infancy1 childhood1 and youth1 fitted for it2 fitted for our acquiring those qualifications of all sorts1 which we stand in need of in mature age4 ,hence children1 from their very birth1 are daily growing acquainted with the objects about them1 with the scene in which they are placed1 and to have a future part2 and learning something or other1 necessary to the performance of it4 ,the subordinations1 to which they are accustomed in domestic life1 teach them self-government in common behavior abroad1 and prepare them for subjection and obedience to civil authority4#ie ,what passes before their eyes1 and daily happens to them1 gives them experience1 caution against treachery and deceit1 together with numberless little rules of action and conduct1 which we could not live without2 and which are learnt so insensibly and so perfectly1 as to be mistaken perhaps for instinct1 though they are the effect of long experience and exercise2 as much so as language1 or knowledge in particular business1 or the qualifications and behavior belonging to the several ranks and professions4 ,thus the beginning of our days is adapted to be1 and is1 a state of education in the theory and practice of mature life4 ,we are much assisted in it by example1 instruction1 and the care of others2 but a great deal is left to ourselves to do4 ,and of this1 as part is done easily and of course2 so part requires diligence and care1 the voluntary foregoing many things which we desire1 and setting ourselves to what we should have no inclination to1 but for the necessity or expedience of it4 ,for that labor and industry1 which the station of so many absolutely requires1 they would be greatly unqualified for1 in maturity1 as those in other stations would be for any other sorts of application2 if both were not accustomed to them in their youth4 ,and1 according as persons behave themselves1 in the general education which all go through1 and in the particular ones adapted to particular employments1 their character is formed1#if and made to appear2 they recommend themselves more or less2 and are capable of1 and placed in1 different stations in society4 ,the former part of life1 then1 is to be considered as an important opportunity1 which nature puts into our hands2 and which1 when lost is not to be recovered4 ,and our being placed in a state of discipline throughout this life1 for another world1 is a providential disposition of things1 exactly of the same kind1 as our being placed in a state of discipline during childhood1 for mature age4 ,our condition in both respects is uniform and of a piece1 and comprehended under one and the same general law of nature4 ,if we were not able at all to discern1 how or in what way the present life could be our preparation for another2 this would be no objection against the credibility of its being so4 ,we do not discern1 how food and sleep contribute to the growth of the body2 nor could have any thought that they would1 before we had experience4 ,nor do children at all think1 on the one hand1 that the sports and exercises1 to which they are so much addicted1 contribute to their health and growth2 nor1 on the other1 of the necessity which there is for their being restrained in them4 ,nor are they capable of understanding the use of many parts of discipline1 which nevertheless they must be made to go through1 in order to qualify them for the business of mature age4 ,were we not able then to discover1 in what respects the present life could form us for a future one2 yet nothing would be more supposable than that it might1 in some respects or other1 from the general analogy of ,providence4 ,and this1 for aught ,i see1 might reasonably be said1 even though we should not take in the consideration of ,god's moral government over the world4 ,but1 ,,iv4 ,take in this consideration1 and consequently1 that the character of virtue and piety is a necessary qualification for the future state1 and then we may distinctly see1 how1 and in what respects1 the present life may be a preparation for it2 since we want1 and are capable of1 improvement in that character1 by moral and religious habits2 and the present life is fit to be a state of discipline for such improvement3 in like manner as we have already observed1 how1 and in what respects1 infancy1 childhood1 and youth1 are a necessary preparation1 and a natural state of discipline1 for mature age4 ,nothing which we at present see1 would lead us to the thought of a solitary inactive state hereafter4 ,if we judge at all from the analogy of nature1 we must suppose1 according to the ,scripture account of it1 that it will be a community4 ,and there is no shadow of any thing unreasonable in conceiving1 though there be no analogy for it1 that this community will be1 as the ,scripture represents it1 under the more immediate1 or1 if such an expression may be used1 the more sensible government of ,god4 ,nor is our ignorance1 what will be the employments of this happy community1 nor our consequent ignorance1 what particular scope or occasion there will be for the exercise of veracity1 justice1 and charity1 among the members of it with regard to each other1 any proof1 that there will be no sphere of exercise for those virtues4 ,much less1 if that were possible1 is our ignorance any proof1 that there will be no occasion for that frame of mind1 or character1 which is formed by the daily practice of those particular virtues here1 and which is a result from it4#ig ,this at least must be owned in general1 that1 as the government established in the universe is moral1 the character of virtue and piety must1 in some way or other1 be the condition of our happiness or the qualification for it4 ,from what is above observed1 concerning our natural power of habits1 it is easy to see1 that we are capable of moral improvement by discipline4 ,and how greatly we want it1 need not be proved to any one who is acquainted with the great wickedness of mankind2 or even with those imperfections1 which the best are conscious of4 ,but it is not perhaps distinctly attended to by every one1 that the occasion which human creatures have for discipline1 to improve in them this character of virtue and piety1 is to be traced up higher than to excess in the passions1 by indulgence and habits of vice4 ,mankind1 and perhaps all finite creatures1 from the very constitution of their nature1 before habits of virtue1 are deficient1 and in danger of deviating from what is right2 and therefore stand in need of virtuous habits1 for a security against this danger4 ,for1 together with the general principle of moral understanding1 we have in our inward frame various affections towards particular external objects4 ,these affections are naturally1 and of right1 subject to the government of the moral principle1 as to the occasions upon which they may be gratified2 as to the times1 degrees1 and manner1 in which the objects of them may be pursued4 ,but the principle of virtue can neither excite them1 nor prevent their being excited4 ,on the contrary1 they are naturally felt1 when the objects of them are present to the mind1 not only before all consideration whether they can be obtained by lawful means1 but after it is found they cannot4 ,the natural objects of affection continue so2 the necessaries1 conveniences1 and pleasures of life1 remain naturally desirable1 though they cannot be obtained innocently3 nay1 though they cannot possibly be obtained at all4 ,and when the objects of any affection whatever cannot be obtained without unlawful means2 but may be obtained by them3 such affection1 though its being excited1 and its continuing some time in the mind1 be as innocent as it is natural and necessary1 yet cannot but be conceived to have a tendency to incline persons to venture upon such unlawful means3 and therefore must be conceived as putting them in some danger of it4 ,now what is the general security against this danger1 against their actually deviating from right8 ,as the danger is1 so also must the security be1 from within3 from the practical principle of virtue4#ih ,the strengthening or improving this principle1 considered as practical1 or as a principle of action1 will lessen the danger1 or increase the security against it4 ,and this moral principle is capable of improvement1 by proper discipline and exercise3 by recollecting the practical impressions which example and experience have made upon us3 and1 instead of following humor and mere inclination1 by continually attending to the equity and right of the case1 in whatever we are engaged1 be it in greater or less matters2 and accustoming ourselves always to act upon it1 as being itself the just and natural motive of action2 and as this moral course of behavior must necessarily1 under the divine government1 be our final interest4 ,thus the principle of virtue1 improved into a habit1 of which improvement we are thus capable1 will plainly be1 in proportion to the strength of it1 a security against the danger which finite creatures are in1 from the very nature of propension1 or particular affections4 ,this way of putting the matter1 supposes particular affections to remain in a future state2 which it is scarce possible to avoid supposing4 ,and if they do2 we clearly see1 that acquired habits of virtue and self-government may be necessary for the regulation of them4 ,however1 though we were not distinctly to take in this supposition1 but to speak only in general2 the thing really comes to the same4 ,for habits of virtue1 thus acquired by discipline1 are improvement in virtue3 and improvement in virtue must be advancement in happiness1 if the government of the universe be moral4 ,from these things we may observe1 7and it will further show this our natural and original need of being improved by discipline17 how it comes to pass1 that creatures made upright1 fall2 and how those who preserve their uprightness1 raise themselves by so doing1 to a more secure state of virtue4 ,to say that the former is accounted for by the nature of liberty1 is to say no more1 than that an event's actually happening is accounted for by a mere possibility of its happening4 ,but it seems distinctly conceivable from the very nature of particular affections or propensions4 ,for1 suppose creatures intended for such a particular state of life1 for which such propensions were necessary3 suppose them endued with such propensions1 together with moral understanding1 as well including a practical sense of virtue as a speculative perception of it2 and that all these several principles1 both natural and moral1 forming an inward constitution of mind1 were in the most exact proportion possible2 i4e4 in a proportion the most exactly adapted to their intended state of life2 such creatures would be made upright1 or finitely perfect4 ,now particular propensions1 from their very nature1 must be felt1 the objects of them being present2 though they cannot be gratified at all1 or not with the allowance of the moral principle4 ,if they can be gratified without its allowance1 or by contradicting it1 then they must be conceived to have some tendency1 in how low a degree soever1 yet some tendency1 to induce persons to such forbidden gratification4 ,this tendency1 in some one particular propension1 may be increased1 by the greater frequency of occasions naturally exciting it1 than of occasions exciting others4 ,the least voluntary indulgence in forbidden circumstances1#ii though but in thought1 will increase this wrong tendency2 and may increase it further1 till1 peculiar conjunctures perhaps conspiring1 it becomes effect2 and danger of deviating from right1 ends in actual deviation from it2 a danger necessarily arising from the very nature of propension1 and which therefore could not have been prevented1 though it might have been escaped1 or got innocently through4 ,the case would be1 as if we were to suppose a straight path marked out for a person1 in which a certain degree of attention would keep him steady3 but if he would not attend1 in this degree1 any one of a thousand objects1 catching his eye1 might lead him out of it4 ,now it is impossible to say1 how much even the first full overt act of irregularity might disorder the inward constitution2 unsettle the adjustments1 and alter the proportions1 which formed it1 and in which the uprightness of its make consisted3 but repetition of irregularities would produce habits4 ,thus the constitution would be spoiled2 and creatures made upright1 become corrupt and depraved in their settled character1 proportionably to their repeated irregularities in occasional acts1#ajj ,on the contrary1 these creatures might have improved and raised themselves1 to a higher and more secure state of virtue1 by the contrary behavior3 by steadily following the moral principle1 supposed to be one part of their nature3 and thus withstanding that unavoidable danger of defection1 which necessarily arose from propension1 the other part of it4 ,for1 by thus preserving their integrity for some time1 their danger would lessen2 since propensions1 by being inured to submit1 would do it more easily and of course3 and their security against this lessening danger would increase2 since the moral principle would gain additional strength by exercise3 both which things are implied in the notion of virtuous habits4 ,thus vicious indulgence is not only criminal in itself1 but also depraves the inward constitution and character4 ,and virtuous self-government is not only right in itself1 but also improves the inward constitution or character3 and may improve it to such a degree1 that though we should suppose it impossible for particular affections to be absolutely coincident with the moral principle2 and consequently should allow1 that such creatures as have been above supposed1 would forever remain defectible1 yet their danger of actually deviating from right may be almost infinitely lessened1 and they fully fortified against what remains of it2 if that may be called danger1 against which there is an adequate1 effectual security4 ,still1 this their higher perfection may continue to consist in habits of virtue formed in a state of discipline1 and this their more complete security remain to proceed from them4 ,thus it is plainly conceivable1 that creatures without blemish1 as they came out of the hands of ,god1 may be in danger of going wrong2 and so may stand in need of the security of virtuous habits1 additional to the moral principle wrought into their natures by him4 ,that which is the ground of their danger1 or their want of security1 maybe considered as a deficiency in themselves1 to which virtuous habits are the natural supply4 ,and as they are naturally capable of being raised and improved by discipline1 it may be a thing fit and requisite1 that they should be placed in circumstances with an eye to it3 in circumstances peculiarly fitted to be to them a state of discipline for their improvement in virtue4 ,but how much more strongly must this hold with respect to those who have corrupted their natures1 are fallen from their original rectitude1 and whose passions are become excessive by repeated violations of their inward constitution6 ,upright creatures may want to be improved3 depraved creatures want to be renewed4 ,education and discipline1 which may be in all degrees and sorts of gentleness and of severity1 are expedient for those3 but must be absolutely necessary for these4 ,for these1 discipline of the severer sort too1 and in the higher degrees of it1 must be necessary1 in order to wear out vicious habits2 to recover their primitive strength of self-government1 which indulgence must have weakened2 to repair1 as well as raise into a habit1 the moral principle1 in order to their arriving at a secure state of virtuous happiness4 ,whoever will consider the thing1 may clearly see that the present world is peculiarly fit to be a state of discipline for this purpose1 to such as will set themselves to mend and improve4 ,for1 the various temptations with which we are surrounded2 our experience of the deceits of wickedness2 having been in many instances led wrong ourselves2 the great viciousness of the world2 the infinite disorders consequent upon it2 our being made acquainted with pain and sorrow1 either from our own feeling of it1 or from the sight of it in others2 these things1 though some of them may indeed produce wrong effects upon our minds1 yet when duly reflected upon1 have1 all of them1 a direct tendency to bring us to a settled moderation and reasonableness of temper3 the contrary both to thoughtless levity1 and also to that unrestrained self-will1 and violent bent to follow present inclination1 which may be observed in undisciplined minds4 ,such experience1 as the present state affords1 of the frailty of our nature2 of the boundless extravagance of ungoverned passion2 of the power which an infinite being has over us1 by the various capacities of misery which he has given us2 in short1 that kind and degree of experience1 which the present state affords us1 that the constitution of nature is such as to admit the possibility1 the danger1 and the actual event1 or creatures losing their innocence and happiness1 and becoming vicious and wretched2 has a tendency to give us a practical sense of things very different from a mere speculative knowledge1 that we are liable to vice1 and capable of misery4 ,and who knows1 whether the security of creatures in the highest and most settled state of perfection1 may not in part arise1 from their having had such a sense of things as this1 formed1 and habitually fixed within them1 in some state of probation4 ,and passing through the present world with that moral attention1 which is necessary to the acting a right part in it1 may leave everlasting impressions of this sort upon our minds4 ,to be a little more distinct3 allurements to what is wrong1 difficulties in the discharge of our duty1 our not being able to act a uniform right part without some thought and care1 and the opportunities which we have1 or imagine we have1 of avoiding what we dislike or obtaining what we desire1 by unlawful means1 when we either cannot do it at all1 or at least not so easily1 by lawful ones1 these things1 i4e4 the snares and temptations of vice1 are what render the present world peculiarly fit to be a state of discipline1 to those who will preserve their integrity3 because they render being upon our guard1 resolution1 and the denial of our passions1 necessary in order to that end4 ,the exercise of such particular recollection1 intention of mind1 and self-government1 in the practice of virtue1 has1 from the make of our nature1 a peculiar tendency to form habits of virtue2 as implying1 not only a real1 but also a more continued1 and a more intense exercise of the virtuous principle1 or a more constant and a stronger effort of virtue exerted into act4 ,thus suppose a person to know himself to be in particular danger1 for some time1 of doing any thing wrong1 which yet he fully resolves not to do2 continued recollection and keeping upon his guard1 in order to make good his resolution1 is a continued exerting of that act of virtue in a high degree1 which need have been1 and perhaps would have been1 only instantaneous and weak1 had the temptation been so4 ,it is indeed ridiculous to assert1 that self-denial is essential to virtue and piety3#aja but it would have been nearer the truth1 though not strictly the truth itself1 to have said1 that it is essential to discipline and improvement4 ,for though actions materially virtuous1 which have no sort of difficulty1 but are perfectly agreeable to our particular inclinations1 may possibly be done only from these particular inclinations1 and so may not be any exercise of the principle of virtue1 i4e4 not be virtuous actions at all2 yet1 on the contrary1 they may be an exercise of that principle3 and when they are1 they have a tendency to form and fix the habit of virtue4 ,but when the exercise of the virtuous principle is more continued1 oftener repeated1 and more intense2 as it must be in circumstances of danger1 temptation1 and difficulty1 of any kind and in any degree2 this tendency is increased proportionably1 and a more confirmed habit is the consequence4 ,this undoubtedly holds to a certain length3 but how far it may hold1 ,i know not4 ,neither our intellectual powers1 nor our bodily strength can be improved beyond a certain degree3 and both may be overwrought4 ,possibly there may be something analogous to this1 with respect to the moral character2 which is scarce worth considering4 ,i mention it only1 lest it should come into some persons' thoughts1 not as an exception to the foregoing observations1 which perhaps it is2 but as a confutation of them1 which it is not4 ,and there may be several other exceptions4 ,observations of this kind cannot be supposed to hold minutely1 and in every case4 ,it is enough that they hold in general4 ,and these plainly hold so far1 as that from them may be seen distinctly1 7which is all that is intended by them17 that the present world is peculiarly fit to be a state of discipline1 for our improvement in virtue and piety3 in the same sense as some sciences1 by requiring and engaging the attention1 not to be sure of such persons as will not1 but of such as will1 set themselves to them1 are fit to form the mind to habits of attention4 ,indeed the present state is so far from proving1 in event1 a discipline of virtue to the generality of men1 that on the contrary they seem to make it a discipline of vice4 ,and the viciousness of the world is1 in different ways1 the great temptation which renders it a state of virtuous discipline1 in the degree it is1 to good men4 ,the whole end1 and the whole occasion1 of mankind's being placed in such a state as the present1 is not pretended to be accounted for4 ,that which appears amidst the general corruption1 is1 that there are some persons1 who1 having within them the principle of amendment and recovery1 attend to and follow the notices of virtue and religion1 be they more clear or more obscure1 which are afforded them2 and that the present world is not only an exercise of virtue in these persons1 but an exercise of it in ways and degrees1 peculiarly apt to improve it3 apt to improve it1 in some respects1 even beyond what would be1 by the exercise of it1 required in a perfectly virtuous society1 or in a society of equally imperfect virtue with themselves4 ,but that the present world does not actually become a state of moral discipline to many1 even to the generality1 i4e4 that they do not improve or grow better in it1 cannot be urged as a proof1 that it was not intended for moral discipline1 by any who at all observe the analogy of nature4 ,for1 of the numerous seeds of vegetables and bodies of animals1 which are adapted and put in the way to improve to such a point or state of natural maturity and perfection1 we do not see perhaps that one in a million actually does4 ,far the greatest part of them decay before they are improved to it2 and appear to be absolutely destroyed4 ,yet no one1 who does not deny all final causes1 will deny1 that those seeds and bodies1 which do attain to that point of maturity and perfection1 answer the end for which they were really designed by nature2 and therefore that nature designed them for such perfection4 ,i cannot forbear adding1 though it is not to the present purpose1 that the appearance of such an amazing waste in nature1 with respect to these seeds and bodies1 by foreign causes1 is to us as unaccountable1 as1 what is much more terrible1 the present and future ruin of so many moral agents by themselves1 i4e4 by vice4 ,against this whole notion of moral discipline1 it may be objected1 in another way2 that so far as a course of behavior1 materially virtuous1 proceeds from hope and fear1 so far it is only a discipline and strengthening of self-love4 ,but doing what ,god commands1 because he commands it1 is obedience1 though it proceeds from hope or fear4 ,a course of such obedience will form habits of it4 ,and a constant regard to veracity1 justice1 and charity1 may form distinct habits of these particular virtues2 and will certainly form habits of self-government1 and of denying our inclinations1 whenever veracity1 justice1 or charity requires it4 ,nor is there any foundation for this great nicety1 with which some affect to distinguish in this case1 in order to depreciate all religion proceeding from hope or fear4 ,for1 veracity1 justice1 and charity1 regard to ,god's authority1 and to our own chief interest1 are not only all three coincident2 but each of them is1 in itself1 a just and natural motive or principle of action4 ,he who begins a good life from any one of them1 and perseveres in it1 as he is already in some degree1 so he cannot fail of becoming more and more1 of that character which is correspondent to the constitution of nature as moral2 and to the relation which ,god stands in to us as moral governor of it3 nor consequently can he fail of obtaining that happiness1 which this constitution and relation necessarily suppose connected with that character4 ,these several observations1 concerning the active principle of virtue and obedience to ,god's commands1 are applicable to passive submission or resignation to his will3 which is another essential part of a right character1 connected with the former1 and very much in our power to form ourselves to4 ,it may be imagined1 that nothing but afflictions can give occasion for or require this virtue2 that it can have no respect to1 nor be any way necessary to qualify for1 a state of perfect happiness3 but it is not experience which can make us think thus4 ,prosperity itself1 while any thing supposed desirable is not ours1 begets extravagant and unbounded thoughts4 ,imagination is altogether as much a source of discontent1 as any thing in our external condition4 ,it is indeed true1 that there can be no scope for patience1 when sorrow shall be no more2 but there may be need of a temper of mind1 which shall have been formed by patience4 ,for1 though self-love1 considered merely as an active principle leading us to pursue our chief interest1 cannot but be uniformly coincident with the principle of obedience to ,god's commands1 our interest being rightly understood2 because this obedience1 and the pursuit of our own chief interest1 must be in every ease one and the thing3 yet it may be questioned1 whether self-love1 considered merely as the desire of our own interest or happiness1 can1 from its nature1 be thus absolutely and uniformly coincident with the will of ,god2 any more than particular affections can3#ajb coincident in such sort1 as not to be liable to be excited upon occasions and in degrees1 impossible to be gratified consistently with the constitution of things1 or the divine appointments4 ,so that habits of resignation may1 upon this account1 be requisite for all creatures3 habits1 ,i say2 which signify what is formed by use4 ,however1 in general it is obvious that both self-love and particular affection in human creatures considered only as passive feelings1 distort and rend the mind2 and therefore stand in need of discipline4 ,now denial of those particular affections1 in a course of active virtue and obedience to ,god's will1 has a tendency to moderate them2 and seems also to have a tendency to habituate the mind1 to be easy and satisfied with that degree of happiness which is allotted us1 i4e4 to moderate self-love4 ,but the proper discipline for resignation is affliction4 ,a right behavior under that trial2 recollecting ourselves so as to consider it in the view1 in which religion teaches us to consider it1 as from the hand of ,god1 receiving it as what he appoints1 or thinks proper to permit1 in his world and under his government2 this will habituate the mind to a dutiful submission4 ,such submission1 together with the active principle of obedience1 make up the temper and character in us1 which answers to his sovereignty2 and which absolutely belongs to the condition of our being1 as dependent creatures4 ,nor can it be said1 that this is only breaking the mind to a submission to mere power2 for mere power may be accidental1 and precarious1 and usurped3 but it is forming within ourselves the temper of resignation to ,his rightful authority1 who is1 by nature1 supreme over all4 ,upon the whole3 such a character1 and such qualifications1 are necessary for a mature state of life in the present world1 as nature alone does in no wise bestow2 but has put it upon us1 in great part1 to acquire1 in our progress from one stage of life to another1 from childhood to mature age2 put it upon us to acquire them1 by giving us capacities of doing it1 and by placing us1 in the beginning of life1 in a condition fit for it4 ,and this is a general analogy to our condition in the present world1 as in a state of moral discipline for another4 ,it is in vain to object against the credibility of the present life's being intended for this purpose1 that all the trouble and the danger unavoidably accompanying such discipline1 might have been saved us1 by our being made at once the creatures and the characters1 which we were to be4 ,for we experience1 that what we were to be1 was to be the effect of what we would do3 and that the general conduct of nature is1 not to save us trouble or danger1 but to make us capable of going through them1 and to put it upon us to do so4 ,acquirements of our own1 experience and habits1 are the natural supply to our deficiencies1 and security against our dangers3 since it is as plainly natural to set ourselves to acquire the qualifications1 as the external things1 which we stand in need of4 ,in particular1 it is as plainly a general law of nature1 that we should with regard to our temporal interest1 form and cultivate practical principles within us1 by attention1 use1 and discipline1 as any thing whatever is a natural law2 chiefly in the beginning of life1 but also throughout the whole course of it4 ,the alternative is left to our choice3 either to improve ourselves1 and better our condition2 or1 in default of such improvement1 to remain deficient and wretched4 ,it is therefore perfectly credible1 from the analogy of nature1 that the same may be our case1 with respect to the happiness of a future state1 and the qualifications necessary for it4 ,there is a third thing1 which may seem implied in the present world's being a state of probation2 that it is a theatre of action1 for the manifestation of persons' characters1 with respect to a future one3 not1 to be sure1 to an all-knowing ,being1 but to his creation or part of it4 ,this may1 perhaps1 be only a consequence of our being in a state of probation in the other senses4 ,however1 it is not impossible1 that men's showing and making manifest1 what is in their heart1 what their real character is1 may have respect to a future life1 in ways and manners with which we are not acquainted3 particularly it may be a means1 7for the ,author of nature does not appear to do any thing without means17 of their being disposed of suitably to their characters2 and of its being known to the creation1 by way of example1 that they are thus disposed of4 ,but not to enter upon any conjectural account of this2 one may just mention1 that the manifestation of persons' characters contributes very much1 in various ways1 to the carrying on a great part of that general course of nature1 respecting mankind1 which comes under our observation at present4 ,i shall only add1 that probation1 in both these senses1 as well as in that treated of in the foregoing chapter1 is implied in moral government2 since by persons' behavior under it1 their characters cannot but be manifested1 and if they behave well1 improved4 ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,,the ,,opinion ,,of ,,necessity1 ,,considered ,,as ,,influencing ,,practice4 ,throughout the foregoing treatise it appears1 that the condition of mankind1 considered as inhabitants of this world only1 and under the government of ,god which we experience1 is greatly analogous to our condition1 as designed for another world1 or as under that farther government1 which religion teaches us4 ,if therefore any assert1 as a fatalist must1 that the opinion of universal necessity is reconcilable with the former2 there immediately arises a question in the way of analogy1 whether he must not also own it to be reconcilable with the latter1 i4e4 with the system of religion itself1 and the proof of it4 ,the reader then will observe1 that the question now before us is not absolute1 i4e4 whether the opinion of fate be reconcilable with religion2 but hypothetical1 whether1 upon supposition of its being reconcilable with the constitution of nature1 it be not reconcilable with religion also4 ,or1 what pretence a fatalist1 not other persons1 but a fatalist1 has to conclude from his opinion1 that there can be no such thing as religion4 ,and as the puzzle and obscurity1 which must unavoidably arise from arguing upon so absurd a supposition as that of universal necessity1 will1 ,i fear1 easily be seen2 it will1 ,i hope1 as easily be excused4#ajc ,since it has been all along taken for granted1 as a thing proved1 that there is an intelligent ,author of nature1 or natural ,governor of the world2 and since an objection may be made against the proof of this1 from the opinion of universal necessity1 as it may be supposed1 that such necessity will itself account for the origin and preservation of all things2 it is requisite1 that this objection be distinctly answered2 or that it be shown1 that a fatality supposed consistent with what we certainly experience1 does not destroy the proof of an intelligent ,author and ,governor of nature2 before we proceed to consider1 whether it destroys the proof of a moral ,governor of it1 or of our being in a state of religion4 ,when it is said by a fatalist1 that the whole constitution of nature1 the actions of men1 every thing1 and every mode and circumstance of every thing1 is necessary1 and could not possibly have been otherwise2 it is to be observed1 that this necessity does not exclude deliberation1 choice1 preference1 and acting from certain principles1 and to certain ends3 because all this is matter of undoubted experience1 acknowledged by all1 and what every man may1 every moment1 be conscious of4 ,hence it follows1 that necessity1 alone and of itself1 is in no sort an account of the constitution of nature1 and how things came to be and to continue as they are2 but only an account of this circumstance relating to their origin and continuance1 that they could not have been otherwise1 than they are and have been4 ,the assertion1 that every thing is by necessity of nature1 is not an answer to the question2 ,whether the world came into being as it is1 by an intelligent ,agent forming it thus1 or not3 but to quite another question2 ,whether it came into being as it is1 in that way and manner which we call necessarily1 or in that way and manner which we call freely8 ,for suppose farther1 that one who was a fatalist1 and one who kept to his natural sense of things1 and believed himself a free agent1 were disputing together1 and vindicating their respective opinions2 and they should happen to instance a house2 they would agree that it was built by an architect4 ,their difference concerning necessity and freedom would occasion no difference of judgment concerning this2 but only concerning another matter2 whether the architect built it necessarily or freely4 ,suppose they should proceed to inquire concerning the constitution of nature4 ,in a lax way of speaking1 one of them might say1 it was by necessity2 and the other1 by freedom3 but if they had any meaning to their words1 as the latter must mean a free agent1 so the former must at length be reduced to mean an agent1 whether he would say one or more1 acting by necessity3 for abstract notions can do nothing4 ,we indeed ascribe to ,god a necessary existence1 uncaused by any agent4 ,for we find within ourselves the idea of infinity1 i4e4 immensity and eternity1 impossible1 even in imagination1 to be removed out of being4 ,we seem to discern intuitively1 that there must1 and cannot but be1 something1 external to ourselves1 answering this idea1 or the archetype of it4 ,hence1 7for this abstract1 as much as any other1 implies a concrete7 we conclude1 that there is1 and cannot but be1 an infinite and immense eternal being1 existing prior to all design contributing to his existence1 and exclusive of it4 ,from the scantiness of language1 a manner of speaking has been introduced2 that necessity is the foundation1 the reason1 the account of the existence of ,god4 ,but it is not alleged1 nor can it be at all intended1 that every thing exists as it does1 by this kind of necessity3 a necessity antecedent in nature to design3 it cannot1 ,i say1 be meant that every thing exists as it does1 by this kind of necessity1 upon several accounts2 and particularly because it is admitted1 that design1 in the actions of men1 contributes to many alterations in nature4 ,if any deny this1 ,i shall not pretend to reason with them4 ,from these things it follows2 ,first1 ,that when a fatalist asserts1 that every thing is by necessity1 he must mean1 by an agent acting necessarily2 he must1 ,i say1 mean this1 for ,i am very sensible he would not choose to mean it4 ,secondly1 ,that the necessity1 by which such an agent is supposed to act1 does not exclude intelligence and design4 ,so that1 were the system of fatality admitted1 it would just as much account for the formation of the world1 as for the structure of a house1 and no more4 ,necessity as much requires and supposes a necessary agent1 as freedom requires and supposes a free agent1 to be the former of the world4 ,and the appearances of design and of final causes in the constitution of nature as really prove this acting agent to be an intelligent designer1 or to act from choice2 upon the scheme of necessity1 supposed possible1 as upon that of freedom4 ,it appearing thus1 that the notion of necessity does not destroy the proof that there is an intelligent ,author of nature and natural ,governor of the world2 the present question1 which the analogy before mentioned suggests1#ajd and which1 ,i think1 it will answer1 is this3 ,whether the opinion of necessity1 supposed consistent with possibility1 with the constitution of the world1 and the natural government which we experience exercised over it1 destroys all reasonable ground of belief1 that we are in a state of religion3 or whether that opinion be reconcilable with religion2 with the system1 and the proof of it4 ,suppose then a fatalist to educate any one1 from his youth up1 in his own principles2 that the child should reason upon them1 and conclude1 that since he cannot possibly behave otherwise than he does1 he is not a subject of blame or commendation1 nor can deserve to be rewarded or punished4 ,imagine him to eradicate the very perceptions of blame and commendation out of his mind1 by means of this system2 to form his temper1 and character1 and behavior to it2 and from it to judge of the treatment he was to expect1 say1 from reasonable men1 upon his coming abroad into the world3 as the fatalist judges from this system1 what he is to expect from the ,author of nature1 and with regard to a future state4 ,i cannot forbear stopping here to ask1 whether any one of common sense would think fit1 that a child should be put upon these speculations1 and be left to apply them to practice4 ,and a man has little pretence to reason1 who is not sensible1 that we are all children in speculations of this kind4 ,however1 the child would doubtless be highly delighted to find himself freed from the restraints of fear and shame1 with which his play-fellows were fettered and embarrassed2 and highly conceited in his superior knowledge1 so far beyond his years4 ,but conceit and vanity would be the least bad part of the influence1 which these principles must have1 when thus reasoned and acted upon1 during the course of his education4 ,he must either be allowed to go on and be the plague of all about him1 and himself too1 even to his own destruction1 or else correction must be continually made use of1 to supply the want of those natural perceptions of blame and commendation1 which we have supposed to be removed2 and to give him a practical impression1 of what he had reasoned himself out of the belief of1 that he was in fact an accountable child1 and to be punished for doing what he was forbid4 ,it is therefore in reality impossible1 but that the correction which he must meet with1 in the course of his education1 must convince him1 that if the scheme he was instructed in were not false1 yet that he reasoned inconclusively upon it1 and somehow or other misapplied it to practice and common life2 as what the fatalist experiences of the conduct of ,providence at present1 ought in all reason to convince him1 that this scheme is misapplied1 when applied to the subject of religion4#aje ,but supposing the child's temper could remain still formed to the system1 and his expectation of the treatment he was to have in the world1 be regulated by it2 so as to expect that no reasonable man would blame or punish him1 for any thing which he should do1 because he could not help doing it3 upon this supposition it is manifest he would1 upon his coming abroad into the world1 be insupportable to society1 and the treatment which he would receive from it would render it so to him2 and he could not fail of doing something very soon1 for which he would be delivered over into the hands of civil justice4 ,and thus1 in the end1 he would be convinced of the obligations he was under to his wise instructor4 ,suppose this scheme of fatality1 in any other way1 applied to practice1 such practical application of it will be found equally absurd2 equally fallacious in a practical sense4 ,for instance1 that if a man be destined to live such a time1 he shall live to it1 though he take no care of his own preservation2 or if he be destined to die before that time1 no care can prevent it1 therefore all care about preserving one's life is to be neglected3 which is the fallacy instanced in by the ancients4 ,on the contrary1 none of these practical absurdities can be drawn from reasoning1 upon the supposition that we are free2 but all such reasoning with regard to the common affairs of life is justified by experience4 ,therefore1 though it were admitted that this opinion of necessity were speculatively true2 yet1 with regard to practice1 it is as if it were false1 so far as our experience reaches3 that is1 to the whole of our present life4 ,for1 the constitution of the present world1 and the condition in which we are actually placed1 is1 as if we were free4 ,and it may perhaps justly be concluded1 that since the whole process of action1 through every step of it1 suspense1 deliberation1 inclining one way1 determining1 and at last doing as we determine1 is as if we were free1 therefore we are so4#ajf ,the thing here insisted upon is1 that under the present natural government of the world1 we find we are treated and dealt with1 as if we were free1 prior to all consideration whether we are so or not4 ,were this opinion therefore of necessity admitted to be ever so true2 yet such is in fact our condition and the natural course of things1 that whenever we apply it to life and practice1 this application of it always misleads us1 and cannot but mislead us1 in a most dreadful manner1 with regard to our present interest4 ,how then can people think themselves so very secure1 that the same application of the same opinion may not mislead them also1 in some analogous manner1 with respect to a future1 a more general1 and more important interest8 ,for1 religion being a practical subject2 and the analogy of nature showing us1 that we have not faculties to apply this opinion1 were it a true one1 to practical subjects2 whenever we do apply it to the subject of religion1 and thence conclude1 that we are free from its obligations1 it is plain this conclusion cannot be depended upon4 ,there will still remain just reason to think1 whatever appearances are1 that we deceive ourselves2 in somewhat of a like manner1 as when people fancy they can draw contradictory conclusions from the idea of infinity4 ,from these things together1 the attentive reader will see it follows1 that if upon supposition of freedom the evidence of religion be conclusive1 it remains so1 upon supposition of necessity1 because the notion of necessity is not applicable to practical subjects3 i4e4 with respect to them1 is as if it were not true4 ,nor does this contain any reflection upon reason1 but only upon what is unreasonable4 ,for to pretend to act upon reason1 in opposition to practical principles1 which the ,author of our nature gave us to act upon2 and to pretend to apply our reason to subjects1 with regard to which1 our own short views1 and even our experience1 will show us1 it cannot be depended upon2 and such1 at best1 the subject of necessity must be2 this is vanity1 conceit1 and unreasonableness4 ,but this is not all4 ,we find within ourselves a will1 and are conscious of a character4 ,now if this1 in us1 be reconcilable with fate1 it is reconcilable with it in the ,author of nature4 ,besides1 natural government and final causes imply a character and a will in the ,governor and ,designer2#ajg a will concerning the creatures whom he governs4 ,the ,author of nature then being certainly of some character or other1 notwithstanding necessity2 it is evident this necessity is as reconcilable with the particular character of benevolence1 veracity1 and justice1 in him1 which attributes are the foundation of religion1 as with any other character3 since we find this necessity no more hinders men from being benevolent1 than cruel2 true1 than faithless2 just1 than unjust2 or1 if the fatalist pleases1 what we call unjust4 ,it is said indeed1 that what1 upon supposition of freedom1 would be just punishment1 upon supposition of necessity1 becomes manifestly unjust3 because it is punishment inflicted for doing that which persons could not avoid doing4 ,as if the necessity1 which is supposed to destroy the injustice of murder1 for instance1 would not also destroy the injustice of punishing it6 ,however1 as little to the purpose as this objection is in itself1 it is very much to the purpose to observe from it1 how the notions of justice and injustice remain1 even while we endeavor to suppose them removed2 how they force themselves upon the mind1 even while we are making suppositions destructive of them3 for there is not1 perhaps1 a man in the world1 but would be ready to make this objection at first thought4 ,but though it is most evident1 that universal necessity1 if it be reconcilable with any thing1 is reconcilable with that character in the ,author of nature1 which is the foundation of religion2 8,yet1 does it not plainly destroy the proof that he is of that character1 and consequently the proof of religion80 ,by no means4 ,for we find1 that happiness and misery are not our fate1 in any such sense as not to be the consequences of our behavior2 but that they are the consequences of it4#ajh ,we find ,god exercises the same kind of government over us1 which a father exercises over his children1 and a civil magistrate over his subjects4 ,now1 whatever becomes of abstract questions concerning liberty and necessity1 it evidently appears to us1 that veracity and justice must be the natural rule and measure of exercising this authority or government1 to a ,being who can have no competitions1 or interfering of interests1 with his creatures and his subjects4 ,but as the doctrine of liberty1 though we experience its truth1 may be perplexed with difficulties1 which run up into the most abstruse of all speculations2 and as the opinion of necessity seems to be the very basis upon which infidelity grounds itself2 it may be of some use to offer a more particular proof of the obligations of religion1 which may distinctly be shown not to be destroyed by this opinion4 ,the proof from final causes of an intelligent ,author of nature is not affected by the opinion of necessity2 supposing necessity a thing possible in itself1 and reconcilable with the constitution of things4#aji ,it is a matter of fact1 independent on this or any other speculation1 that he governs the world by the method of rewards and punishments3#aaj and also that he hath given us a moral faculty1 by which we distinguish between actions1 and approve some as virtuous and of good desert1 and disapprove others as vicious and of ill desert4#aaa ,this moral discernment implies1 in the notion of it1 a rule of action1 and a rule of a very peculiar kind3 for it carries in it authority and a right of direction2 authority in such a sense1 as that we cannot depart from it without being self-condemned4#aab ,and that the dictates of this moral faculty1 which are by nature a rule to us1 are moreover the laws of ,god1 laws in a sense including sanctions2 may be thus proved4 ,consciousness of a rule or guide of action1 in creatures who are capable of considering it as given them by their ,maker1 not only raises immediately a sense of duty1 but also a sense of security in following it1 and of danger in deviating from it4 ,a direction of the ,author of nature1 given to creatures capable of looking upon it as such1 is plainly a command from him3 and a command from him necessarily includes in it1 at least1 an implicit promise in case of obedience1 or threatening in case of disobedience4 ,but then the sense or perception of good and ill desert1#aac which is contained in the moral discernment1 renders the sanction explicit1 and makes it appear1 as one may say1 expressed4 ,for since his method of government is to reward and punish actions1 his having annexed to some actions an inseparable sense of good desert1 and to others of ill1 this surely amounts to declaring1 upon whom his punishments shall be inflicted1 and his rewards be bestowed4 ,he must have given us this discernment and sense of things1 as a presentiment of what is to be hereafter3 that is1 by way of information beforehand1 what we are finally to expect in this world4 ,there is then most evident ground to think1 that the government of ,god1 upon the whole1 will be found to correspond to the nature which he has given us3 and that1 in the upshot and issue of things1 happiness and misery shall1 in fact and event1 be made to follow virtue and vice respectively2 as he has already1 in so peculiar a manner1 associated the ideas of them in our minds4 ,and hence might easily be deduced the obligations of religious worship1 were it only to be considered as a means of preserving upon our minds a sense of this moral government of ,god1 and securing our obedience to it3 which yet is an extremely imperfect view of that most important duty4 ,no objection from necessity can lie against this general proof of religion4 ,none against the proposition reasoned upon1 that we have such a moral faculty and discernment2 because this is a mere matter of fact1 a thing of experience1 that human kind is thus constituted3 none against the conclusion2 because it is immediate and wholly from this fact4 ,for the conclusion1 that ,god will finally reward the righteous and punish the wicked1 is not here drawn1 from its appearing to us fit#aad that he should2 but from its appearing1 that he has told us1 he will4 ,and this he hath certainly told us1 in the promise and threatening1 which it hath been observed the notion of a command implies1 and the sense of good and ill desert which he has given us1 more distinctly expresses4 ,this reasoning from fact is confirmed1 and in some degree even verified1 by other facts2 by the natural tendencies of virtue and of vice2#aae and by this1 that ,god1 in the natural course of his providence1 punishes vicious actions as mischievous to society2 and also vicious actions as such in the strictest sense4#aaf ,so that the general proof of religion is unanswerably real1 even upon the wild supposition which we are arguing upon4 ,it must be observed further1 that natural religion has1 besides this1 an external evidence2 which the doctrine of necessity1 if it could be true1 would not affect4 ,for suppose a person1 by the observations and reasoning above1 or by any other1 convinced of the truth of religion2 that there is a ,god1 who made the world1 who is the moral governor and judge of mankind1 and will upon the whole deal with every one according to his works3 ,i say1 suppose a person convinced of this by reason1 but to know nothing at all of antiquity1 or the present state of mankind3 it would be natural for such a one to be inquisitive1 what was the history of this system of doctrine2 at what time1 and in what manner1 it came first into the world2 and whether it were believed by any considerable part of it4 ,were he upon inquiry to find1 that a particular person1 in a late age1 first of all proposed it1 as a deduction of reason1 and that mankind were before wholly ignorant of it2 then1 though its evidence from reason would remain1 there would be no additional probability of its truth1 from the account of its discovery4 ,but instead of this being the fact1 he would find1 on the contrary1 what could not but afford him a very strong confirmation of its truth3 ,first1 ,that somewhat of this system1 with more or fewer additions and alterations1 hath been professed in all ages and countries1 of which we have any certain information relating to this matter4 ,secondly1 ,that it is certain historical fact1 so far as we can trace things up1 that this whole system of belief1 that there is one ,god1 the creator and moral governor of the world1 and that mankind is in a state of religion1 was received in the first ages4 ,and ,thirdly1 ,that as there is no hint or intimation in history1 that this system was first reasoned out2 so there is express historical or traditional evidence1 as ancient as history1 that it was taught first by revelation4 ,now these things must be allowed to be of great weight4 ,the first of them1 general consent1 shows this system to be conformable to the common sense of mankind4 ,the second1 namely1 that religion was believed in the first ages of the world1 especially as it does not appear that there were then any superstitious or false additions to it1 cannot but be a further confirmation of its truth4 ,for it is a proof of this alternative3 either that it came into the world by revelation2 or that it is natural1 obvious1 and forces itself upon the mind4 ,the former of these is the conclusion of learned men4 ,and whoever will consider1 how unapt for speculation rude and uncultivated minds are1 will1 perhaps from hence alone1 be strongly inclined to believe it the truth4 ,and as it is shown in the second part#aag of this treatise1 that there is nothing of such peculiar presumption against a revelation in the beginning of the world1 as there is supposed to be against subsequent ones2 a sceptic could not1 ,i think1 give any account1 which would appear more probable even to himself1 of the early pretences to revelation2 than by supposing some real original one1 from whence they were copied4 ,and the third thing above mentioned1 that there is express historical or traditional evidence1 as ancient as history1 of the system of religion being taught mankind by revelation1 this must be admitted as some degree of real proof1 that it was so taught4 ,for why should not the most ancient tradition be admitted as some additional proof of a fact1 against which there is no presumption8 ,this proof is mentioned here1 because it has its weight to show1 that religion came into the world by revelation1 prior to all consideration of the proper authority of any book supposed to contain it2 and even prior to all consideration1 whether the revelation itself be uncorruptly handed down1 or mixed and darkened with fables4 ,thus the historical account1 which we have of the origin of religion1 taking in all circumstances1 is a real confirmation of its truth1 no way affected by the opinion of necessity4 ,and the external evidence1 even of natural religion1 is by no means inconsiderable4 ,it is carefully to be observed1 and ought to be recollected after all proofs of virtue and religion1 which are only general1 that as speculative reason may be neglected1 prejudiced1 and deceived1 so also may our moral understanding be impaired and perverted1 and the dictates of it not impartially attended to4 ,this indeed proves nothing against the reality of our speculative or practical faculties of perception8 against their being intended by nature1 to inform us in the theory of things1 and instruct us how we are to behave1 and what we are to expect in consequence of our behavior4 ,yet our liableness1 in the degree we are liable1 to prejudice and perversion1 is a most serious admonition to us to be upon our guard1 with respect to what is of such consequence1 as our determinations concerning virtue and religion2 and particularly not to take custom1 and fashion1 and slight notions of honor1 or imaginations of present ease1 use1 and convenience to mankind1 for the only moral rule4#aah ,the foregoing observations1 drawn from the nature of the thing1 and the history of religion1 amount1 when taken together1 to a real practical proof of it1 not to be confuted3 such a proof as1 considering the infinite importance of the thing1 ,i apprehend1 would be admitted fully sufficient1 in reason1 to influence the actions of men1 who act upon thought and reflection1 if it were admitted that there is no proof of the contrary4 ,but it may be said2 8,there are many probabilities1 which cannot indeed be confuted2 i4e4 shown to be no probabilities1 and yet may be overbalanced by greater probabilities1 on the other side2 much more by demonstration4 ,and there is no occasion to object against particular arguments alleged for an opinion1 when the opinion itself may be clearly shown to be false1 without meddling with such arguments at all1 but leaving them just as they are4#aai ,now the method of government by rewards and punishments1 and especially rewarding and punishing good and ill desert as such respectively1 must go upon supposition1 that we are free and not necessary agents4 ,and it is incredible1 that the ,author of nature should govern us upon a supposition as true1 which he knows to be false2 and therefore absurd to think1 he will reward or punish us for our actions hereafter2 especially that he will do it under the notion1 that they are of good or ill desert40 ,here then the matter is brought to a point4 ,and the answer is full1 and not to be evaded1--viz43 that the whole constitution and course of things1 the whole analogy of ,providence1 shows beyond possibility of doubt1 that the conclusion from this reasoning is false2 wherever the fallacy lies4 ,the doctrine of freedom indeed clearly shows where3 in supposing ourselves necessary1 when in truth we are free agents4 ,but1 upon the supposition of necessity1 the fallacy lies in taking for granted1 that it is incredible necessary agents should be rewarded and punished4 ,that1 somehow or other1 the conclusion now mentioned is false1 is most certain4 ,for it is fact1 that ,god does govern even brute creatures by the method of rewards and punishments1 in the natural course of things4 ,men are rewarded and punished for their actions1 punished for actions mischievous to society as being so1 punished for vicious actions as such2 by the natural instrumentality of each other1 under the present conduct of ,providence4 ,nay1 even the affection of gratitude1 and the passion of resentment1 and the rewards and punishments following from them1 which in general are to be considered as natural1 i4e4 from the ,author of nature2 these rewards and punishments1 being naturally#abj annexed to actions considered as implying good intention and good desert1 ill intention and ill desert2 these natural rewards and punishments1 ,i say1 are as much a contradiction to the conclusion above1 and show its falsehood1 as a more exact and complete rewarding and punishing of good and ill desert as such4 ,so that if it be incredible1 that necessary agents should be thus rewarded and punished2 then1 men are not necessary but free2 since it is matter of fact1 that they are thus rewarded and punished4 ,if1 on the contrary1 which is the supposition we have been arguing upon1 it be insisted that men are necessary agents2 then1 there is nothing incredible in the further supposition of necessary agents being thus rewarded and punished3 since we ourselves are thus dealt with4 ,from the whole therefore it must follow1 that a necessity supposed possible1 and reconcilable with the constitution of things1 does in no sort prove that the ,author of ,nature will not1 nor destroy the proof that he will1 finally and upon the whole1 in his eternal government1 render his creatures happy or miserable1 by some means or other1 as they behave well or ill4 ,or1 to express this conclusion in words conformable to the title of the chapter1 the analogy of nature shows us1 that the opinion of necessity1 considered as practical1 is false4 ,and if necessity1 upon the supposition above mentioned1 doth not destroy the proof of natural religion1 it evidently makes no alteration in the proof of revealed4 ,from these things likewise we may learn1 in what sense to understand that general assertion1 that the opinion of necessity is essentially destructive of all religion4 ,first1 in a practical sense2 that by this notion1 atheistical men pretend to satisfy and encourage themselves in vice1 and justify to others their disregard to all religion4 ,and secondly1 in the strictest sense2 that it is a contradiction to the whole constitution of nature1 and to what we may every moment experience in ourselves1 and so overturns every thing4 ,but by no means is this assertion to be understood1 as if necessity1 supposing it could possibly be reconciled with the constitution of things1 and with what we experience1 were not also reconcilable with religion3 for upon this supposition1 it demonstrably is so4#aba ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,,the ,,government ,,of ,,god1 ,,considered ,,as ,a ,,scheme ,,or ,,constitution1 ,,imperfectly ,,comprehended4 ,though it be acknowledged1 as it cannot but be1 that the analogy of nature gives a strong credibility to the general doctrine of religion1 and to the several particular things contained in it1 considered as so many matters of fact2 and likewise that it shows this credibility not to be destroyed by any notions of necessity3 still1 objections may be insisted upon1 against the wisdom1 equity1 and goodness of the divine government implied in the notion of religion1 and against the method by which this government is conducted2 to which objections analogy can be no direct answer4 ,for the credibility1 or the certain truth1 of a matter of fact1 does not immediately prove any thing concerning the wisdom or goodness of it2 and analogy can do no more1 immediately or directly1 than show such and such things to be true or credible1 considered only as matters of fact4 ,but if1 upon supposition of a moral constitution of nature and a moral government over it1 analogy suggests and makes it credible1 that this government must be a scheme1 system1 or constitution of government1 as distinguished from a number of single unconnected acts of distributive justice and goodness2 and likewise1 that it must be a scheme1 so imperfectly comprehended1 and of such a sort in other respects1 as to afford a direct general answer to all objections against the justice and goodness of it3 then analogy is1 remotely1 of great service in answering those objections2 both by suggesting the answer1 and showing it to be a credible one4 ,now this1 upon inquiry1 will be found to be the case4 ,for1 ,first1 ,upon supposition that ,god exercises a moral government over the world1 the analogy of his natural government suggests and makes it credible1 that his moral government must be a scheme1 quite beyond our comprehension3 and this affords a general answer to all objections against the justice and goodness of it4 ,secondly1 ,a more distinct observation of some particular things contained in ,god's scheme of natural government1 the like things being supposed1 by analogy1 to be contained in his moral government1 will further show1 how little weight is to be laid upon these objections4 ,i4 ,upon supposition that ,god exercises a moral government over the world1 the analogy of his natural government suggests and makes it credible1 that his moral government must be a scheme1 quite beyond our comprehension2 and this affords a general answer to all objections against the justice and goodness of it4 ,it is most obvious1 analogy renders it highly credible1 that1 upon supposition of a moral government1 it must be a scheme4 ,for the world1 and the whole natural government of it1 appears to be so3 to be a scheme1 system1 or constitution1 whose parts correspond to each other1 and to a whole1 as really as any work of art1 or as any particular model of a civil constitution and government4 ,in this great scheme of the natural world1 individuals have various peculiar relations to other individuals of their own species4 ,whole species are1 we find1 variously related to other species1 upon this earth4 ,nor do we know1 how much further these kinds of relations may extend4 ,and1 as there is not any action or natural event1 which we are acquainted with1 so single and unconnected1 as not to have a respect to some other actions and events2 so possibly each of them1 when it has not an immediate1 may yet have a remote1 natural relation to other actions and events1 much beyond the compass of this present world4 ,there seems indeed nothing1 from whence we can so much as make a conjecture1 whether all creatures1 actions1 and events1 throughout the whole of nature1 have relations to each other ,but1 as it is obvious1 that all events have future unknown consequences2 so if we trace any event1 as far as we can1 into what is connected with it1 we shall find1 that if it were not connected with something further in nature1 unknown to us1 something both past and present1 such event could not possibly have been at all4 ,nor can we give the whole account of any one thing whatever2 of all its causes1 ends1 and necessary adjuncts2 those adjuncts1 ,i mean1 without which it could not have been4 ,by this most astonishing connection1 these reciprocal correspondences and mutual relations1 every thing which we see in the course of nature is actually brought about4 ,things seemingly the most insignificant imaginable1 are perpetually observed to be necessary conditions to other things of the greatest importance2 so that any one thing whatever1 may for aught we know to the contrary1 be a necessary condition to any other4 ,the natural world then1 and natural government of it1 being such an incomprehensible scheme2 so incomprehensible1 that a man must1 really in the literal sense1 know nothing at all1 who is not sensible of his ignorance in it2 this immediately suggests1 and strongly shows the credibility1 that the moral world and government of it may be so too4#abb ,indeed the natural and moral constitution and government of the world are so connected1 as to make up together but one scheme3 and it is highly probable1 that the first is formed and carried on merely in subserviency to the latter2 as the vegetable world is for the animal1 and organized bodies for minds4 ,but the thing intended here is1 without inquiring how far the administration of the natural world is subordinate to that of the moral1 only to observe the credibility1 that one should be analogous or similar to the other3 that therefore every act of divine justice and goodness may be supposed to look much beyond itself1 and its immediate object2 may have some reference to other parts of ,god's moral administration1 and to a general moral plan2 and that every circumstance of this his moral government may be adjusted beforehand with a view to the whole of it4 ,for example3 the determined length of time1 and the degrees and ways1 in which virtue is to remain in a state of warfare and discipline1 and in which wickedness is permitted to have its progress2 the times appointed for the execution of justice2 the appointed instruments of it2 the kinds of rewards and punishments1 and the manners of their distribution2 all particular instances of divine justice and goodness1 and every circumstance of them1 may have such respects to each other1 as to make up altogether a whole1 connected and related in all its parts2 a scheme or system1 which is as properly such1 as the natural world is1 and of the like kind4 ,supposing this to be the case1 it is most evident1 that we are not competent judges of this scheme1 from the small parts of it which come within our view in the present life3 therefore no objections against any of these parts can be insisted upon by reasonable men4#abc ,this our ignorance1 and the consequence here drawn from it1 are universally acknowledged upon other occasions2 and though scarce denied1 yet are universally forgot1 when persons come to argue against religion4 ,and it is not perhaps easy1 even for the most reasonable men1 always to bear in mind the degree of our ignorance1 and make due allowances for it4 ,upon these accounts1 it may not be useless to go a little further1 in order to show more distinctly1 how just an answer our ignorance is1 to objections against the scheme of ,providence4 ,suppose then a person boldly to assert1#abd that the things complained of1 the origin and continuance of evil1 might easily have been prevented by repeated interpositions2#abe interpositions so guarded and circumstanced1 as would preclude all mischief arising from them4 ,or1 if this were impracticable1 that a scheme of government is itself an imperfection1 since more good might have been produced1 without any scheme1 system1 or constitution at all1 by continued single unrelated acts of distributive justice and goodness2 because these would have occasioned no irregularities4 ,farther than this1 it is presumed1 the objections will not be carried4 ,yet the answer is obvious3 that were these assertions true1 still the observations above1 concerning our ignorance in the scheme of divine government and the consequence drawn from it1 would hold1 in great measure2 enough to vindicate religion1 against all objections from the disorders of the present state4 ,were these assertions true1 yet the government of the world might be just and good notwithstanding2 for1 at the most1 they would infer nothing more than that it might have been better4 ,but they are mere arbitrary assertions2 no man being sufficiently acquainted with the possibilities of things1 to bring any proof of them to the lowest degree of probability4 ,for however possible what is asserted may seem1 yet many instances may be alleged1 in things much less out of our reach1 of suppositions absolutely impossible1 and reducible to the most palpable self contradictions1 which1 not every one would perceive to be such2 nor perhaps any one1 at first sight suspect4 ,from these things1 it is easy to see distinctly1 how our ignorance1 as it is the common1 so it is really a satisfactory answer1 to all objections against the justice and goodness of ,providence4 ,if a man1 contemplating any one providential dispensation1 which had no relation to any others1 should object1 that he discerned in it a disregard to justice1 or a deficiency of goodness2 nothing would be less an answer to such objection1 than our ignorance in other parts of providence1 or in the possibilities of things1 no way related to what he was contemplating4 ,but when we know not but the part objected against may be relative to other parts unknown to us2 and when we are unacquainted with what is1 in the nature of the thing1 practicable in the case before us2 then our ignorance is a satisfactory answer2 because1 some unknown relation1 or some unknown impossibility1 may render what is objected against1 just and good2 nay good in the highest practicable degree4 ,,ii4 ,how little weight is to be laid upon such objections1 will further appear1 by a more distinct observation of some particular things contained in the natural government of ,god1 the like to which may be supposed1 from analogy1 to be contained in his moral government4 ,first1 ,as in the scheme of the natural world1 no ends appear to be accomplished without means3 so we find that means very undesirable1 often conduce to bring about ends in such a measure desirable1 as greatly to overbalance the disagreeableness of the means4 ,and in cases where such means are conducive to such ends1 it is not reason1 but experience1 which shows us1 that they are thus conducive4 ,experience also shows many means to be conducive and necessary to accomplish ends1 which means1 before experience1 we should have thought1 would have had even a contrary tendency4 ,from these observations relating to the natural scheme of the world1 the moral being supposed analogous to it1 arises a great credibility1 that the putting our misery in each other's power to the degree it is1 and making men liable to vice to the degree we are2 and in general1 that those things which are objected against the moral scheme of ,providence1 may be1 upon the whole1 friendly and assistant to virtue1 and productive of an overbalance of happiness3 i4e4 the things objected against may be means1 by which an overbalance of good1 will in the end1 be found produced4 ,and from the same observations1 it appears to be no presumption against this1 that we do not1 if indeed we do not1 see those means to have any such tendency1 or that they seem to us to have a contrary one4 ,thus those things1 which we call irregularities1 may not be so at all2 because they may be means of accomplishing wise and good ends more considerable4 ,it may be added1 as above1 that they may also be the only means1 by which these wise and good ends are capable of being accomplished4 ,it may be proper to add1 in order to obviate an absurd and wicked conclusion from any of these observations1 that though the constitution of our nature1 from whence we are capable of vice and misery1 may1 as it undoubtedly does1 contribute to the perfection and happiness of the world2 and though the actual permission of evil may be beneficial to it3 7i4e4 it would have been more mischievous1 not that a wicked person had himself abstained from his own wickedness1 but that any one had forcibly prevented it1 than that it was permitted37 yet notwithstanding1 it might have been much better for the world1 if this very evil had never been done4 ,nay it is most clearly conceivable1 that the very commission of wickedness may be beneficial to the world1 and yet1 that it would be infinitely more beneficial for men to refrain from it4 ,for thus1 in the wise and good constitution of the natural world1 there are disorders which bring their own cures2 diseases1 which are themselves remedies4 ,many a man would have died1 had it not been for the gout or a fever2 yet it would be thought madness to assert1 that sickness is a better or more perfect state than health2 though the like1 with regard to the moral world1 has been asserted4 ,secondly1 ,the natural government of the world is carried on by general laws4 ,for this there may be wise and good reasons3 the wisest and best1 for aught we know to the contrary4 ,and that there are such reasons1 is suggested to our thoughts by the analogy of nature2 by our being made to experience good ends to be accomplished1 as indeed all the good which we enjoy is accomplished1 by this means1--viz43 that the laws1 by which the world is governed1 are general4 ,we have scarce any kind of enjoyments1 but what we are1 in some way or other1 instrumental in procuring ourselves1 by acting in a manner which we foresee likely to procure them3 now this foresight could not be at all1 were not the government of the world carried on by general laws4 ,and though1 for aught we know to the contrary1 every single case may be1 at length1 found to have been provided for even by these3 yet to prevent all irregularities1 or remedy them as they arise1 by the wisest and best general laws1 may be impossible in the nature of things2 as we see it is absolutely impossible in civil government4 ,but then we are ready to think1 that1 the constitution of nature remaining as it is1 and the course of things being permitted to go on1 in other respects1 as it does1 there might be interpositions to prevent irregularities2 though they could not have been prevented1 or remedied by any general laws4 ,there would indeed be reason to wish1 which1 by-the-way1 is very different from a right to claim1 that all irregularities were prevented or remedied by present interpositions1 if these interpositions would have no other effect than this4 ,but it is plain they would have some visible and immediate bad effects3 for instance1 they would encourage idleness and negligence2 and they would render doubtful the natural rule of life1 which is ascertained by this very thing1 that the course of the world is carried on by general laws4 ,and further1 it is certain they would have distant effects1 and very great ones too2 by means of the wonderful connections before mentioned4#abf ,so that we cannot so much as guess1 what would be the whole result of the interpositions desired4 ,it may be said1 any bad result might be prevented by further interpositions1 whenever there was occasion for them3 but this again is talking quite at random1 and in the dark4#abg ,upon the whole then1 we see wise reasons1 why the course of the world should be carried on by general laws1 and good ends accomplished by this means3 and for aught we know1 there may be the wisest reasons for it1 and the best ends accomplished by it4 ,we have no ground to believe1 that all irregularities could be remedied as they arise1 or could have been precluded1 by general laws4 ,we find that interpositions would produce evil1 and prevent good3 and1 for aught we know1 they would produce greater evil than they would prevent2 and prevent greater good than they would produce4 ,and if this be the case1 then the not interposing is so far from being a ground of complaint1 that it is an instance of goodness4 ,this is intelligible and sufficient3 and going further1 seems beyond the utmost reach of our faculties4 ,it may be said1 that 8after all1 these supposed impossibilities and relations are what we are unacquainted with2 and we must judge of religion1 as of other things1 by what we do know1 and look upon the rest as nothing3 or however1 that the answers here given to what is objected against religion1 may equally be made use of to invalidate the proof of it2 since their stress lies so very much upon our ignorance40 ,but1 ,first1 ,though total ignorance in any matter does indeed equally destroy1 or rather preclude1 all proof concerning it1 and objections against it2 yet partial ignorance does not4 ,for we may in any degree be convinced1 that a person is of such a character1 and consequently will pursue such ends2 though we are greatly ignorant1 what is the proper way of acting1 in order the most effectually to obtain those ends3 and in this case1 objections against his manner of acting1 as seemingly not conducive to obtain them1 might be answered by our ignorance2 though the proof that such ends were intended1 might not at all be invalidated by it4 ,thus1 the proof of religion is a proof of the moral character of ,god1 and consequently that his government is moral1 and that every one upon the whole shall receive according to his deserts2 a proof that this is the designed end of his government4 ,but we are not competent judges1 what is the proper way of acting1 in order the most effectually to accomplish this end4#abh ,therefore our ignorance is an answer to objections against the conduct of ,providence1 in permitting irregularities1 as seeming contradictory to this end4 ,now1 since it is so obvious1 that our ignorance may be a satisfactory answer to objections against a thing1 and yet not affect the proof of it2 till it can be shown1 it is frivolous to assert1 that our ignorance invalidates the proof of religion1 as it does the objections against it4 ,secondly1 ,suppose unknown impossibilities1 and unknown relations1 might justly be urged to invalidate the proof of religion1 as well as to answer objections against it2 and that1 in consequence of this1 the proof of it were doubtful4 ,still1 let the assertion be despised1 or let it be ridiculed1 it is undeniably true1 that moral obligations would remain certain1 though it were not certain what would1 upon the whole1 be the consequences of observing or violating them4 ,for1 these obligations arise1 immediately and necessarily1 from the judgment of our own mind1 unless perverted1 which we cannot violate without being self-condemned4 ,and they would be certain too1 from considerations of interest4 ,for though it were doubtful1 what will be the future consequences of virtue and vice2 yet it is1 however1 credible1 that they may have those consequences1 which religion teaches us they will3 and this credibility is a certain#abi obligation in point of prudence1 to abstain from all wickedness1 and to live in the conscientious practice of all that is good4 ,thirdly1 ,the answers above given to the objections against religion cannot be made use of to invalidate the proof of it4 ,for1 upon suspicion that ,god exercises a moral government over the world1 analogy does most strongly lead us to conclude1 that this moral government must be a scheme1 or constitution1 beyond our comprehension4 ,a thousand particular analogies show us1 that parts of such a scheme1 from their relation to other parts1 may conduce to accomplish ends1 which we should have thought they had no tendency to accomplish3 nay ends1 which before experience1 we should have thought such parts were contradictory to1 and had a tendency to prevent4 ,therefore all these analogies show1 that the way of arguing made use of in objecting against religion is delusive3 because they show it is not at all incredible1 that1 could we comprehend the whole1 we should find the permission of the disorders objected against to be consistent with justice and goodness2 and even to be instances of them4 ,now this is not applicable to the proof of religion1 as it is to the objections against it2#acj and therefore cannot invalidate that proof1 as it does these objections4 ,lastly1 ,from the observation now made1 it is easy to see1 that the answers above given to the objections against ,providence1 though1 in a general way of speaking1 they may be said to be taken from our ignorance2 yet are by no means taken merely from that1 but from something which analogy shows us concerning it4 ,for analogy shows us positively1 that our ignorance in the possibilities of things1 and the various relations in nature1 renders us incompetent judges1 and leads us to false conclusions1 in cases similar to this1 in which we pretend to judge and to object4 ,so that the things above insisted upon are not mere suppositions of unknown impossibilities and relations3 but they are suggested to our thoughts1 and even forced upon the observation of serious men1 and rendered credible too1 by the analogy of nature4 ,therefore to take these things into the account1 is to judge by experience and what we do know3 and it is not judging so1 to take no notice of them4 ,,conclusion4 ,the observations of the last chapter lead us to consider this little scene of human life1 in which we are so busily engaged1 as having a reference1 of some sort or other1 to a much larger plan of things4 ,whether we are1 any way1 related to the more distant parts of the boundless universe1 into which we are brought1 is altogether uncertain4 ,but it is evident1 that the course of things1 which comes within our view1 is connected with some things1 past1 present1 and future1 beyond it4#aca ,so that we are placed1 as one may speak1 in the middle of a scheme1 not fixed but progressive1 every way incomprehensible3 incomprehensible1 in a manner equally1 with respect to what has been1 what now is1 and what shall be4 ,this scheme cannot but contain in it some things as wonderful1 and as much beyond our thought and conception1#acb as any thing in that of religion4 ,for1 will any man in his senses say1 that it is less difficult to conceive1 how the world came to be and to continue as it is1 without1 than with1 an intelligent ,author and ,governor of it8 ,or1 admitting an intelligent ,governor of it1 that there is some other rule of government more natural1 and of easier conception1 than that which we call moral8 ,indeed1 without an intelligent ,author and ,governor of nature1 no account at all can be given1 how this universe1 or the part of it particularly in which we are concerned1 came to be1 and the course of it to be carried on1 as it is3 nor any1 of its general end and design1 without a moral governor of it4 ,that there is an intelligent ,author of nature1 and natural ,governor of the world1 is a principle gone upon in the foregoing treatise2 as proved1 and generally known1 and confessed to be proved4 ,and the very notion of an intelligent ,author of nature1 proved by particular final causes1 implies a will and a character4#acc ,now1 as our whole nature1 the nature which he has given us1 leads us to conclude his will and character to be moral1 just1 and good3 so we can scarce in imagination conceive1 what it can be otherwise4 ,however1 in consequence of this his will and character1 whatever it be1 he formed the universe as it is1 and carries on the course of it as he does1 rather than in any other manner2 and has assigned to us1 and to all living creatures1 a part and a lot in it4 ,irrational creatures act this their part1 and enjoy and undergo the pleasures and the pains allotted them1 without any reflection4 ,but one would think it impossible1 that creatures endued with reason could avoid reflecting sometimes upon all this2 reflecting1 if not from whence we came1 yet1 at least1 whither we are going2 and what the mysterious scheme1 in the midst of which we find ourselves1 will1 at length1 come out and produce3 a scheme in which it is certain we are highly interested1 and in which we may be interested even beyond conception4#acd ,for many things prove it palpably absurd to conclude1 that we shall cease to be1 at death4 ,particular analogies do most sensibly show us1 that there is nothing to be thought strange1 in our being to exist in another state of life4 ,and that we are now living beings1 affords a strong probability that we shall continue so2 unless there be some positive ground1 and there is none from reason or analogy1 to think death will destroy us4 ,were a persuasion of this kind ever so well grounded1 there would1 surely1 be little reason to take pleasure in it4 ,indeed it can have no other ground1 than some such imagination1 as that of our gross bodies being ourselves2 which is contrary to experience4 ,experience too most clearly shows us the folly of concluding1 from the body and the living agent affecting each other mutually1 that the dissolution of the former is the destruction of the latter4 ,and there are remarkable instances of their not affecting each other1 which lead us to a contrary conclusion4 ,the supposition1 then1 which in all reason we are to go upon1 is1 that our living nature will continue after death4 ,and it is infinitely unreasonable to form an institution of life1 or to act1 upon any other supposition4 ,all expectation of immortality1 whether more or less certain1 opens an unbounded prospect to our hopes and our fears3 since we see the constitution of nature is such1 as to admit of misery1 as well as to be productive of happiness1 and experience ourselves to partake of both in some degree2 and since we cannot but know1 what higher degrees of both we are capable of4 ,and there is no presumption against believing further1 that our future interest depends upon our present behavior3 for we see our present interest doth2 and that the happiness and misery1 which are naturally annexed to our actions1 very frequently do not follow1 till long after the actions are done1 to which they are respectively annexed4 ,so that were speculation to leave us uncertain1 whether it were likely1 that the ,author of nature1 in giving happiness and misery to his creatures1 hath regard to their actions or not1 yet1 since we find by experience that he hath such regard1 the whole sense of things which he has given us1 plainly leads us1 at once and without any elaborate inquiries1 to think that it may1 indeed must1 be to good actions chiefly that he hath annexed happiness1 and to bad actions misery2 or that he will1 upon the whole1 reward those who do well1 and punish those who do evil4 ,to confirm this from the constitution of the world1 it has been observed1 that some sort of moral government is necessarily implied in that natural government of ,god1 which we experience ourselves under2 that good and bad actions1 at present1 are naturally rewarded and punished1 not only as beneficial and mischievous to society1 but also as virtuous and vicious3 and that there is1 in the very nature of the thing1 a tendency to their being rewarded and punished in a much higher degree than they are at present4 ,and though this higher degree of distributive justice1 which nature thus points out and leads towards1 is prevented for a time from taking place2 it is by obstacles1 which the state of this world unhappily throws in its way1 and which therefore are in their nature temporary4 ,now1 as these things in the natural conduct of ,providence are observable on the side of virtue2 so there is nothing to be set against them on the side of vice4 ,a moral scheme of government then is visibly established1 and1 in some degree1 carried into execution3 and this1 together with the essential tendencies of virtue and vice duly considered1 naturally raise in us an apprehension1 that it will be carried on further towards perfection in a future state1 and that every one shall there receive according to his deserts4 ,and if this be so1 then our future and general interest1 under the moral government of ,god1 is appointed to depend upon our behavior2 notwithstanding the difficulty1 which this may occasion1 of securing it1 and the danger of losing it3 just in the same manner as our temporal interest1 under his natural government1 is appointed to depend upon our behavior2 notwithstanding the like difficulty and danger4 ,for1 from our original constitution1 and that of the world which we inhabit1 we are naturally trusted with ourselves2 with our own conduct and our own interest4 ,and from the same constitution of nature1 especially joined with that course of things which is owing to men1 we have temptations to be unfaithful in this trust2 to forfeit this interest1 to neglect it1 and run ourselves into misery and ruin4 ,from these temptations arise the difficulties of behaving so as to secure our temporal interest1 and the hazard of behaving so as to miscarry in it4 ,there is therefore nothing incredible in supposing there may be the like difficulty and hazard with regard to that chief and final good1 which religion lays before us4 ,the whole account1 how it came to pass that we were placed in such a condition as this1 must indeed be beyond our comprehension4 ,but it is in part accounted for by what religion teaches us1 that the character of virtue and piety must be a necessary qualification for a future state of security and happiness1 under the moral government of ,god2 in like manner1 as some certain qualifications or other are necessary for every particular condition of life1 under his natural government3 and that the present state was intended to be a school of discipline1 for improving in ourselves that character4 ,now this intention of nature is rendered highly credible by observing2 that we are plainly made for improvement of all kinds2 that it is a general appointment of ,providence1 that we cultivate practical principles1 and form within ourselves habits of action1 in order to become fit for what we were wholly unfit for before2 that in particular1 childhood and youth is naturally appointed to be a state of discipline for mature age2 and that the present world is peculiarly fitted for a state of moral discipline4 ,and1 whereas objections are urged against the whole notion of moral government and a probationary state1 from the opinion of necessity2 it has been shown1 that ,god has given us the evidence1 as it were1 of experience1 that all objections against religion1 on this head1 are vain and delusive4 ,he has also1 in his natural government1 suggested an answer to all our short-sighted objections1 against the equity and goodness of his moral government2 and in general he has exemplified to us the latter by the former4 ,these things1 which it is to be remembered1 are matters of fact1 ought1 in all common sense1 to awaken mankind2 to induce them to consider in earnest their condition1 and what they have to do4 ,it is absurd1 absurd to the degree of being ridiculous1 if the subject were not of so serious a kind1 for men to think themselves secure in a vicious life2 or even in that immoral thoughtlessness1 into which far the greatest part of them are fallen4 ,the credibility of religion1 arising from experience and facts here considered1 is fully sufficient1 in reason1 to engage them to live in the general practice of all virtue and piety2 under the serious apprehension1 though it should be mixed with some doubt1#ace of a righteous administration established in nature1 and a future judgment in consequence of it3 especially when we consider1 how very questionable it is1 whether any thing at all can be gained by vice1#acf how unquestionably little as well as precarious1 the pleasures and profits of it are at the best1 and how soon they must be parted with at the longest4 ,for1 in the deliberations of reason1 concerning what we are to pursue and what to avoid1 as temptations to any thing from mere passion are supposed out of the case1 so inducements to vice1 from cool expectations of pleasure and interest so small and uncertain and short1 are really so insignificant1 as1 in the view of reason to be almost nothing in themselves2 and in comparison with the importance of religion they quite disappear and are lost4 ,mere passion may indeed be alleged1 though not as a reason1 yet as an excuse1 for a vicious course of life4 ,and how sorry an excuse it is1 will be manifest by observing1 that we are placed in a condition in which we are unavoidably inured to govern our passions1 by being necessitated to govern them3 and to lay ourselves under the same kind of restraints1 and as great ones too1 from temporal regards1 as virtue and piety1 in the ordinary course of things1 require4 ,the plea of ungovernable passion then1 on the side of vice1 is the poorest of all things2 for it is no reason1 and a poor excuse4 ,the proper motives to religion are the proper proofs of it1 from our moral nature1 from the presages of conscience1 and our natural apprehension of ,god under the character of a righteous ,governor and ,judge3 a nature1 and conscience1 and apprehension1 given us by him2 and from the confirmation of the dictates of reason1 by life and immortality brought to light by the ,gospel2 and the wrath of ,god revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men4 ,,end ,,of ,,the ,,first ,,part4 ,,part ,,ii4 ,revealed ,religion4 ,,chapter ,i4 ,,the ,,importance ,,of ,,christianity4#acg ,some persons1 upon pretence of the sufficiency of the light of nature1 avowedly reject all revelation1 as in its very notion incredible1 and what must be fictitious4 ,and indeed it is certain1 no revelation would have been given1 had the light of nature been sufficient in such a sense1 as to render one not wanted and useless4 ,but no man1 in seriousness and simplicity of mind1 can possibly think it so1 who considers the state of religion in the heathen world before revelation1 and its present state in those places which have borrowed no light from it3 particularly the doubtfulness of some of the greatest men1 concerning things of the utmost importance1 as well as the natural inattention and ignorance of mankind in general4 ,it is impossible to say1 who would have been able to have reasoned out that whole system1 which we call ,natural ,religion1 in its genuine simplicity1 clear of superstition3 but there is certainly no ground to affirm that the generality could4 ,if they could1 there is no sort of probability that they would4 ,admitting there were1 they would highly want a standing admonition to remind them of it1 and inculcate it upon them4 ,and further1 were they as much disposed to attend to religion1 as the better sort of men are2 yet even upon this supposition1 there would be various occasions for supernatural instruction and assistance1 and the greatest advantages might be afforded by them4#ach ,so that to say revelation is a thing superfluous1 what there was no need of1 and what can be of no service1 is1 ,i think1 to talk quite wildly and at random4 ,nor would it be more extravagant to affirm1 that mankind is so entirely at ease in the present state1 and life so completely happy1 that it is a contradiction to suppose our condition capable of being1 in any respect1 better4 ,there are other persons1 not to be ranked with these1 who seem to be getting into a way of neglecting1 and as it were1 overlooking revelation1 as of small importance provided natural religion be kept to4 ,with little regard either to the evidence of the former1 or to the objections against it1 and even upon supposition of its truth2 8the only design of it10 say they1 8must be1 to establish a belief of the moral system of nature1 and to enforce the practice of natural piety and virtue4 ,the belief and practice of these were1 perhaps1 much promoted by the first publication of ,christianity3 but whether they are believed and practised1 upon the evidence and motives of nature or of revelation1 is no great matter10#aci ,this way of considering revelation1 though it is not the same with the former1 yet borders nearly upon it1 and very much1 at length runs up into it3 and requires to be particularly considered1 with regard to the persons who seem to be getting into this way4 ,the consideration of it will likewise further show the extravagance of the former opinion1 and the truth of the observations in answer to it1 just mentioned4 ,and an inquiry into the importance of ,christianity1 cannot be an improper introduction to a treatise concerning the credibility of it4 ,now1 if ,god has given a revelation to mankind1 and commanded those things which are commanded in ,christianity2 it is evident1 at first sight1 that it cannot in any wise be an indifferent matter1 whether we obey or disobey those commands3 unless we are certainly assured1 that we know all the reasons for them1 and that all those reasons are now ceased1 with regard to mankind in general1 or to ourselves in particular4 ,it is absolutely impossible we can be assured of this4#adj ,for our ignorance of these reasons proves nothing in the case3 since the whole analogy of nature shows1 what is indeed in itself evident1 that there may be infinite reasons for things1 with which we are not acquainted4 ,but the importance of ,christianity will more distinctly appear1 by considering it more distinctly3 ,first1 as a republication1 and external institution1 of natural or essential religion1 adapted to the present circumstances of mankind1 and intended to promote natural piety and virtue3 ,secondly1 as containing an account of a dispensation of things1 not discoverable by reason1 in consequence of which several distinct precepts are enjoined us4 ,for though natural religion is the foundation and principal part of ,christianity1 it is not in any sense the whole of it4 ,i4 ,christianity is a republication of ,natural religion4 ,it instructs mankind in the moral system of the world3 that it is the work of an infinitely perfect ,being1 and under his government1 that virtue is his law1 and that he will finally judge mankind in righteousness1 and render to all according to their works1 in a future state4 ,and1 which is very material1 it teaches natural religion in its genuine simplicity2 free from those superstitions1 with which it was totally corrupted1 and under which it was in a manner lost4 ,revelation is1 further1 an authoritative publication of natural religion1 and so affords the evidence of testimony for the truth of it4 ,indeed the miracles and prophecies recorded in ,scripture1 were intended to prove a particular dispensation of ,providence1 i4e4 the redemption of the world by the ,messiah3 but this does not hinder1 but that they may also prove ,god's general providence over the world1 as our moral governor and judge4 ,and they evidently do prove it2 because this character of the ,author of nature1 is necessarily connected with and implied in that particular revealed dispensation of things3 it is likewise continually taught expressly1 and insisted upon1 by those persons who wrought the miracles and delivered the prophecies4 ,so that indeed natural religion seems as much proved by the ,scripture revelation1 as it would have been1 had the design of revelation been nothing else than to prove it4 ,but it may possibly be disputed1 how far miracles can prove natural religion2 and notable objections may be urged against this proof of it1 considered as a matter of speculation3 but considered as a practical thing1 there can be none4 ,for suppose a person to teach natural religion to a nation1 who bid lived in total ignorance or forgetfulness of it2 and to declare that he was commissioned by ,god so to do2 suppose him1 in proof of his commission1 to foretell things future1 which no human foresight could have guessed at2 to divide the sea with a word2 feed great multitudes with bread from heaven2 cure all manner of diseases2 and raise the dead1 even himself1 to life2 would not this give additional credibility to his teaching1 a credibility beyond what that of a common man would have2 and be an authoritative publication of the law of nature1 i4e4 a new proof of it8 ,it would be a practical one1 of the strongest kind1 perhaps1 which human creatures are capable of having given them4 ,the ,law of ,moses then1 and the ,gospel of ,christ1 are authoritative publications of the religion of nature2 they afford a proof of ,god's general providence1 as moral ,governor of the world1 as well as of his particular dispensations of providence towards sinful creatures1 revealed in the ,law and the ,gospel4 ,as they are the only evidence of the latter1 so they are an additional evidence of the former4 ,to show this further1 let us suppose a man of the greatest and most improved capacity1 who had never heard of revelation1 convinced upon the whole1 notwithstanding the disorders of the world1 that it was under the direction and moral government of an infinitely perfect ,being2 but ready to question1 whether he were not got beyond the reach of his faculties3 suppose him brought1 by this suspicion1 into great danger of being carried away by the universal bad example of almost every one around him1 who appeared to have no sense1 no practical sense at least1 of these things3 and this1 perhaps1 would be as advantageous a situation with regard to religion1 as nature alone ever placed any man in4 ,what a confirmation now must it be to such a person1 all at once1 to find1 that this moral system of things was revealed to mankind1 in the name of that infinite ,being1 whom he had from principles of reason believed in3 and that the publishers of the revelation proved their commission from him1 by making it appear1 that he had intrusted them with a power of suspending and changing the general laws of nature4 ,nor must it by any means be omitted1 for it is a thing of the utmost importance1 that life and immortality are eminently brought to light by the ,gospel4 ,the great doctrines of a future state1 the danger of a course of wickedness#ada and the efficacy of repentance1 are not only confirmed in the ,gospel1 but are taught1 especially the last is1 with a degree of light1 to which that of nature is but darkness4 ,further4 ,as ,christianity served these ends and purposes1 when it was first published1 by the miraculous publication itself1 so it was intended to serve the same purposes in future ages1 by means of the settlement of a visible church3#adb of a society1 distinguished from common ones1 and from the rest of the world1 by peculiar religious institutions2 by an instituted method of instruction1 and an instituted form of external religion4 ,miraculous powers were given to the first preachers of ,christianity1 in order to their introducing it into the world3 a visible church was established1 in order to continue it1 and carry it on successively throughout all ages4 ,had only ,moses and the prophets1 ,christ and his apostles1 taught1 and by miracles proved1 religion to their contemporaries2 the benefits of their instructions would have reached but a small part of mankind4 ,christianity must have been1 in a great degree1 sunk and forgot in a very few ages4 ,to prevent this1 appears to have been one reason why a visible church was instituted2 to be like a city upon a hill1 a standing memorial to the world of the duty which we owe our ,maker3 to call men continually1 both by example and instruction1 to attend to it1 and1 by the form of religion1 ever before their eyes1 remind them of the reality2 to be the repository of the oracles of ,god2 to hold up the light of revelation in aid to that of nature1 and to propagate it1 throughout all generations1 to the end of the world--the light of revelation1 considered here in no other view1 than as designed to enforce natural religion4 ,and in proportion as ,christianity is professed and taught in the world1 religion1 natural or essential religion1 is thus distinctly and advantageously laid before mankind1 and brought again and again to their thoughts1 as a matter of infinite importance4 ,a visible church has also a further tendency to promote natural religion1 as being an instituted method of education1 originally intended to be of peculiar advantage to those who conform to it4 ,for one end of the institution was1 that1 by admonition and reproof1 as well as instruction1 by a general regular discipline1 and public exercises of religion1 the body of ,christ1 as the ,scripture speaks1 should be edified2 i4e4 trained up in piety and virtue for a higher and better state4 ,this settlement1 then1 appearing thus beneficial1 tending in the nature of the thing to answer1 and1 in some degree1 actually answering1 those ends1 it is to be remembered1 that the very notion of it implies positive institutions2 for the visibility of the church consists in them4 ,take away every thing of this kind1 and you lose the very notion itself4 ,so that if the things now mentioned are advantages1 the reason and importance of positive institutions in general is most obvious2 since without them these advantages could not be secured to the world4 ,and it is mere idle wantonness1 to insist upon knowing the reasons1 why such particular ones were fixed upon rather than others4 ,the benefit arising from this supernatural assistance1 which ,christianity affords to natural religion1 is what some persons are very slow in apprehending4 ,and yet it is a thing distinct in itself1 and a very plain obvious one4 ,for will any in good earnest really say1 that the bulk of mankind in the heathen world were in as advantageous a situation1 with regard to natural religion1 as they are now among us3 that it was laid before them1 and enforced upon them1 in a manner as distinct1 and as much tending to influence their practice8 ,the objections against all this1 from the perversion of ,christianity1 and from the supposition of its having had but little good influence1 however innocently they may be proposed1 cannot be insisted upon as conclusive1 upon any principles1 but such as lead to downright ,atheism2 because the manifestation of the law of nature by reason1 which1 upon all principles of ,theism1 must have been from ,god1 has been perverted and rendered ineffectual in the same manner4 ,it may indeed1 ,i think1 truly be said1 that the good effects of ,christianity have not been small2 nor its supposed ill effects1 any effects at all of it1 properly speaking4 ,perhaps1 too1 the things done have been aggravated2 and if not1 ,christianity hath been often only a pretence1 and the same evils in the main would have been done upon some other pretence4 ,however1 great and shocking as the corruptions and abuses of it have really been1 they cannot be insisted upon as arguments against it1 upon principles of ,theism4 ,for one cannot proceed one step in reasoning upon natural religion1 any more than upon ,christianity1 without laying it down as a first principle1 that the dispensations of ,providence are not to be judged of by their perversions1 but by their genuine tendencies3 not by what they do actually seem to effect1 but by what they would effect if mankind did their part2 that part which is justly put and left upon them4 ,it is altogether as much the language of one as of the other3 ,he that is unjust1 let him be unjust still3 and he that is holy1 let him be holy still4#adc ,the light of reason does not1 any more than that of revelation1 force men to submit to its authority2 both admonish them of what they ought to do and avoid1 together with the consequences of each2 and after this1 leave them at full liberty to act just as they please1 till the appointed time of judgment4 ,every moment's experience shows1 that this is ,god's general rule of government4#add ,to return then3 ,christianity being a promulgation of the law of nature2 being moreover an authoritative promulgation of it2 with new light1 and other circumstances of peculiar advantage1 adapted to the wants of mankind2 these things fully show its importance4 ,it is to be observed further1 that as the nature of the case requires1 so all ,christians are commanded to contribute1 by their profession of ,christianity1 to preserve it in the world1 and render it such a promulgation and enforcement of religion4 ,for it is the very scheme of the ,gospel1 that each ,christian should1 in his degree1 contribute towards continuing and carrying it on3 all by uniting in the public profession and external practice of ,christianity2 some by instructing1 by having the oversight and taking care of this religious community1 the church of ,god4 ,now this further shows the importance of ,christianity2 and1 which is what ,i chiefly intend1 its importance in a practical sense3 or the high obligations we are under1 to take it into our most serious consideration2 and the danger there must necessarily be1 not only in treating it despitefully1 which ,i am not now speaking of1 but in disregarding and neglecting it4 ,for this is neglecting to do what is expressly enjoined us1 for continuing those benefits to the world1 and transmitting them down to future times4 ,and all this holds1 even though the only thing to be considered in ,christianity were its subserviency to natural religion4 ,,ii4 ,christianity is to be considered in a further view2 as containing an account of a dispensation of things1 not at all discoverable by reason1 in consequence of which several distinct precepts are enjoined us4 ,christianity is not only an external institution of natural religion1 and a new promulgation of ,god's general providence1 as righteous governor and judge of the world2 but it contains also a revelation of a particular dispensation of ,providence1 carrying on by his ,son and ,spirit1 for the recovery and salvation of mankind1 who are represented in ,scripture to be in a state of ruin4 ,and in consequence of this revelation being made1 we are commanded to be baptized1 not only in the name of the ,father1 but also1 of the ,son1 and of the ,holy ,ghost3 and other obligations of duty1 unknown before1 to the ,son and the ,holy ,ghost1 are revealed4 ,now the importance of these duties may be judged of1 by observing that they arise1 not from positive command merely1 but also from the offices which appear1 from ,scripture1 to belong to those divine persons in the ,gospel dispensation2 or from the relations1 which we are there informed1 they stand in to us4 ,by reason is revealed the relation1 which ,god the ,father stands in to us4 ,hence arises the obligation of duty which we are under to him4 ,in ,scripture are revealed the relations1 which the ,son and ,holy ,spirit stand in to us4 ,hence arise the obligations of duty2#ade which we are under to them4 ,the truth of the case1 as one may speak1 in each of these three respects being admitted3 that ,god is the governor of the world1 upon the evidence of reason2 that ,christ is the mediator between ,god and man1 and the ,holy ,ghost our guide and sanctifier1 upon the evidence of revelation3 the truth of the case1 ,i say1 in each of these respects being admitted1 it is no more a question1 why it should be commanded1 that we be baptized in the name of the ,son and of the ,holy ,ghost1 than that we be baptized in the name of the ,father4 ,this matter seems to require to be more fully stated4#adf ,let it be remembered then1 that religion comes under the twofold consideration of internal and external3 for the latter is as real a part of religion1 of true religion1 as the former4 ,now1 when religion is considered under the first notion1 as an inward principle1 to be exerted in such and such inward acts of the mind and heart1 the essence of natural religion may be said to consist in religious regards to ,god the ,father ,almighty3 and the essence of revealed religion1 as distinguished from natural1 to consist in religious regards to the ,son1 and to the ,holy ,ghost4 ,the obligation we are under1 of paying these religious regards to each of these divine persons respectively1 arises from the respective relations which they each stand in to us4 ,how these relations are made known1 whether by reason or revelation1 makes no alteration in the case3 because the duties arise out of the relations themselves1 not out of the manner in which we are informed of them4 ,the ,son and ,spirit have each his proper office in that great dispensation of ,providence1 the redemption of the world2 the one our ,mediator1 the other our ,sanctifier4 ,does not then the duty of religious regards to both these divine persons1 as immediately arise to the view of reason1 out of the very nature of these offices and relations2 as the good-will and kind intention1 which we owe to our fellow-creatures1 arise out of the common relations between us and them8 ,but it will be asked1 8,what are the inward religious regards1 appearing thus obviously due to the ,son and ,holy ,spirit2 as arising1 not merely from command in ,scripture1 but from the very nature of the revealed relations1 which they stand in to us80 ,i answer1 the religious regards of reverence1 honor1 love1 trust1 gratitude1 fear1 hope4 ,in what external manner this inward worship is to be expressed1 is a matter of pure revealed command1 as perhaps the external manner1 in which ,god the ,father is to be worshipped1 may be more so than we are ready to think4 ,but the worship1 the internal worship itself1 to the ,son and ,holy ,ghost1 is no further matter of pure revealed command1 than as the relations they stand in to us are matter of pure revelation3 for the relations being known1 the obligations to such internal worship are obligations of reason1 arising out of those relations themselves4 ,in short1 the history of the gospel as immediately shows us the reason of these obligations1 as it shows us the meaning of the words1 ,son and ,holy ,ghost4 ,if this account of the ,christian religion be just1 those persons who can speak lightly of it1 as of little consequence1 provided natural religion be kept to1 plainly forget1 that ,christianity1 even what is peculiarly so called1 as distinguished from natural religion1 has yet somewhat very important1 even of a moral nature4 ,for the office of our ,lord being made known1 and the relation he stands in to us1 the obligation of religious regards to him is plainly moral1 as much as charity to mankind is2 since this obligation arises1 before external command1 immediately out of that his office and relation itself4 ,those persons appear to forget1 that revelation is to be considered1 as informing us of somewhat new1 in the state of mankind1#adg and in the government of the world3 as acquainting us with some relations we stand in1 which could not otherwise have been known4 ,these relations being real 7though before revelation we could be under no obligations from them1 yet upon their being revealed71 there is no reason to think1 but that neglect of behaving suitably to them will be attended with the same kind of consequences under ,god's government1 as neglecting to behave suitably to any other relations1 made known to us by reason4 ,ignorance1 whether unavoidable or voluntary1 so far as we can possibly see1 will just as much1 and just as little1 excuse in one case as in the other3 the ignorance being supposed equally unavoidable1 or equally voluntary1 in both cases4 ,if therefore ,christ be indeed the mediator between ,god and man1 i4e4 if ,christianity be true2 if he be indeed our ,lord1 our ,savior1 and our ,god1 no one can say1 what may follow1 not only the obstinate1 but the careless disregard to him1 in those high relations4 ,nay1 no one can say1 what may follow such disregard1 even in the way of natural consequence4#adh ,for1 as the natural consequences of vice in this life are doubtless to be considered as judicial punishments inflicted by ,god1 so for aught we know1 the judicial punishments of the future life may be1 in a like way or a like sense1 the natural consequence of vice3#adi of men's violating or disregarding the relations which ,god has placed them in here1 and made known to them4 ,if mankind are corrupted and depraved in their moral character1 and so are unfit for that state1 which ,christ is gone to prepare for his disciples2 and if the assistance of ,god's ,spirit be necessary to renew their nature1 in the degree requisite to their being qualified for that state2 7all which is implied in the express1 though figurative declaration1 ,except a man be born of the ,spirit1 he cannot enter into the kingdom of ,god3#aej7 supposing this1 is it possible any serious person can think it a slight matter1 whether or no he makes use of the means1 expressly commanded by ,god1 for obtaining this divine assistance8 ,especially since the whole analogy of nature shows1 that we are not to expect any benefits1 without making use of the appointed means for obtaining or enjoying them4 ,now reason shows us nothing1 of the particular immediate means of obtaining either temporal or spiritual benefits4 ,this therefore we must learn1 either from experience or revelation4 ,and experience1 the present case does not admit of4 ,the conclusion from all this evidently is1 that ,christianity being supposed either true or credible1 it is unspeakable irreverence1 and really the most presumptuous rashness1 to treat it as a light matter4 ,it can never justly be esteemed of little consequence1 till it be positively supposed false4 ,nor do ,i know a higher and more important obligation which we are under1 than that of examining most seriously into its evidence1 supposing its credibility2 and of embracing it1 upon supposition of its truth4 ,the two following deductions may be proper to be added1 in order to illustrate the foregoing observations1 and to prevent their being mistaken4 ,first1 ,hence we may clearly see1 where lies the distinction between what is positive and what is moral in religion4 ,moral precepts1 are precepts the reasons of which we see3 positive precepts1 are precepts the reasons of which we do not see4#aea ,moral duties arise out of the nature of the case itself1 prior to external command4 ,positive duties do not arise out of the nature of the case1 but from external command2 nor would they be duties at all1 were it not for such command1 received from ,him whose creatures and subjects we are4 ,but the manner in which the nature of the case or the fact of the relation1 is made known1 this doth not denominate any duty either positive or moral4 ,that we be baptized in the name of the ,father is as much a positive duty1 as that we be baptized in the name of the ,son1 because both arise equally from revealed command3 though the relation which we stand in to ,god the ,father is made known to us by reason1 and the relation we stand in to ,christ1 by revelation only4 ,on the other hand1 the dispensation of the ,gospel being admitted1 gratitude as immediately becomes due to ,christ1 from his being the voluntary minister of this dispensation1 as it is due to ,god the ,father1 from his being the fountain of all good2 though the first is made known to us by revelation only1 the second by reason4 ,hence also we may see1 and1 for distinctness' sake1 it may be worth mentioning1 that positive institutions come under a twofold consideration4 ,they are either institutions founded on natural religion1 as baptism in the name of the ,father2 7though this has also a particular reference to the gospel dispensation1 for it is in the name of ,god1 as the ,father of our ,lord ,jesus ,christ37 or they are external institutions founded on revealed religion2 as baptism in the name of the ,son2 and of the ,holy ,ghost4 ,secondly1 ,from the distinction between what is moral and what is positive in religion1 appears the ground of that peculiar preference1 which the ,scripture teaches us to be due to the former4 ,the reason of positive institutions in general1 is very obvious2 though we should not see the reason1 why particular ones are pitched upon rather than others4 ,whoever1 therefore1 instead of cavilling at words1 will attend to the thing itself1 may clearly see1 that positive institutions in general1 as distinguished from this or that particular one1 have the nature of moral commands2 since the reasons of them appear4 ,thus1 for instance1 the external worship of ,god is a moral duty1 though no particular mode of it be so4 ,care then is to be taken1 when a comparison is made between positive and moral duties1 that they be compared no further than as they are different2 no further than as the former are positive1 or arise out of mere external command1 the reasons of which we are not acquainted with2 and as the latter are moral1 or arise out of the apparent reason of the case1 without such external command4 ,unless this caution be observed1 we shall run into endless confusion4 ,now this being premised1 suppose two standing precepts enjoined by the same authority2 that1 in certain conjunctures1 it is impossible to obey both2 that the former is moral1 i4e4 a precept of which we see the reasons1 and that they hold in the particular case before us2 but that the latter is positive1 i4e4 a precept of which we do not see the reasons3 it is indisputable that our obligations are to obey the former2 because there is an apparent reason for this preference1 and none against it4 ,further1 positive institutions1 all those ,i suppose which ,christianity enjoins1 are means to a moral end3 and the end must be acknowledged more excellent than the means4#aeb ,nor is observance of these institutions any religious obedience at all1 or of any value1 otherwise than as it proceeds from a moral principle4 ,this seems to be the strict logical way of stating and determining this matter2 but will1 perhaps1 be found less applicable to practice1 than may be thought at first sight4 ,therefore1 in a more practical1 though more lax way of consideration1 and taking the words1 moral law and positive institutions1 in the popular sense1 ,i add1 that the whole moral law is as much matter of revealed command1 as positive institutions are3 for the ,scripture enjoins every moral virtue4 ,in this respect then they are both upon a level4 ,but the moral law is1 moreover1 written upon our hearts2 interwoven into our very nature4 ,and this is a plain intimation of the ,author of it1 which is to be preferred1 when they interfere4 ,but there is not altogether so much necessity for the determination of this question1 as some persons seem to think4 ,nor are we left to reason alone to determine it4 ,for1 ,first1 ,though mankind have1 in all ages1 been greatly prone to place their religion in peculiar positive rites1 by way of equivalent for obedience to moral precepts2 yet1 without making any comparison at all between them1 and consequently without determining which is to have the preference1 the nature of the thing abundantly shows all notions of that kind to be utterly subversive of true religion1 as they are1 moreover1 contrary to the whole general tenor of ,scripture2 and likewise to the most express particular declarations of it1 that nothing can render us accepted of ,god1 without moral virtue4 ,secondly1 ,upon the occasion of mentioning together positive and moral duties1 the ,scripture always puts the stress of religion upon the latter1 and never upon the former4 ,this1 though no sort of allowance to neglect the former1 when they do not interfere with the latter1 is yet a plain intimation1 that when they do1 the latter are to be preferred4 ,and as mankind are for placing the stress of their religion anywhere1 rather than upon virtue2 lest both the reason of the thing1 and the general spirit of ,christianity1 appearing in the intimation now mentioned1 should be ineffectual against this prevalent folly1 our ,lord himself1 from whose command alone the obligation of positive institutions arises1 has taken occasion to make the comparison between them and moral precepts2 when the ,pharisees censured him1 for eating with publicans and sinners2 and also when they censured his disciples1 for plucking the ears of corn on the ,sabbath day4 ,upon this comparison1 he has determined expressly1 and in form1 which shall have the preference when they interfere4 ,and by delivering his authoritative determination in a proverbial manner of expression1 he has made it general3 ,i will have mercy1 and not sacrifice4#aec ,the propriety of the word proverbial1 is not the thing insisted upon3 though ,i think the manner of speaking is to be called so4 ,but that the manner of speaking very remarkably renders the determination general1 is surely indisputable4 ,for1 had it been said only1 that ,god preferred mercy to the rigid observance of the ,sabbath1 even then1 by parity of reason1 most justly might we have argued1 that he preferred mercy likewise1 to the observance of other ritual institutions2 and in general1 moral duties1 to positive ones4 ,and thus the determination would have been general2 though its being so were inferred and not expressed4 ,but as the passage really stands in the ,gospel1 it is much stronger4 ,for the sense and the very literal words of our ,lord's answer1 are as applicable to any other instance of a comparison1 between positive and moral duties1 as to that upon which they were spoken4 ,and if1 in case of competition1 mercy is to be preferred to positive institutions1 it will scarce be thought1 that justice is to give place to them4 ,it is remarkable too1 that1 as the words are a quotation from the ,old ,testament1 they are introduced1 on both the forementioned occasions1 with a declaration1 that the ,pharisees did not understand the meaning of them4 ,this1 ,i say1 is very remarkable4 ,for1 since it is scarce possible1 for the most ignorant person1 not to understand the literal sense of the passage in the prophet2#aed and since understanding the literal sense would not have prevented their condemning the guiltless1#aee it can hardly be doubted1 that the thing which our ,lord really intended in that declaration was1 that the ,pharisees had not learned from it1 as they might1 wherein the general spirit of religion consists3 that it consists in moral piety and virtue1 as distinguished from ritual observances4 ,however1 it is certain we may learn this from his divine application of the passage1 in the ,gospel4 ,but1 as it is one of the peculiar weaknesses of human nature1 when1 upon a comparison of two things1 one is found to be of greater importance than the other1 to consider this other as of scarce any importance at all3 it is highly necessary that we remind ourselves1 how great presumption it is1 to make light of any institutions of divine appointment2 that our obligations to obey all ,god's commands whatever are absolute and indispensable2 and that commands merely positive1 admitted to be from him1 lay us under a moral obligation to obey them3 an obligation moral in the strictest and most proper sense4 ,to these things ,i cannot forbear adding1 that the account now given of ,christianity most strongly shows and enforces upon us the obligation of searching the ,scriptures1 in order to see1 what the scheme of revelation really is2 instead of determining beforehand1 from reason1 what the scheme of it must be4#aef ,indeed if in revelation there be found any passages1 the seeming meaning of which is contrary to natural religion2 we may most certainly conclude1 such seeming meaning not to be the real one4#aeg ,but it is not any degree of a presumption against an interpretation of ,scripture1 that such interpretation contains a doctrine1 which the light of nature cannot discover2#aeh or a precept1 which the law of nature does not oblige to4 ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,,supposed ,,presumption ,,against ,a ,,revelation ,,considered ,,as ,,miraculous4 ,having shown the importance of the ,christian revelation1 and the obligations which we are under seriously to attend to it1 upon supposition of its truth1 or its credibility1 the next thing in order1 is to consider the supposed presumptions against revelation in general2 which shall be the subject of this chapter3 and the objections against the ,christian in particular1 which shall be the subject of some following ones4#aei ,for it seems the most natural method1 to remove the prejudices against ,christianity1 before we proceed to the consideration of the positive evidence for it1 and the objections against that evidence4#afj ,it is1 ,i think1 commonly supposed1 that there is some peculiar presumption1 from the analogy of nature1 against the ,christian scheme of things1 at least against miracles2 so as that stronger evidence is necessary to prove the truth and reality of them1 than would be sufficient to convince us of other events1 or matters of fact4 ,indeed the consideration of this supposed presumption cannot but be thought very insignificant1 by many persons4 ,yet1 as it belongs to the subject of this treatise2 so it may tend to open the mind1 and remove some prejudices1 however needless the consideration of it be1 upon its own account4 ,i4 ,i find no appearance of a presumption1 from the analogy of nature1 against the general scheme of ,christianity1 that ,god created and invisibly governs the world by ,jesus ,christ2 and by him also will hereafter judge it in righteousness1 i4e4 render to every one according to his works2 and that good men are under the secret influence of his ,spirit4 ,whether these things are1 or are not1 to be called miraculous1 is perhaps only a question about words2 or however1 is of no moment in the case4 ,if the analogy of nature raises any presumption against this general scheme of ,christianity1 it must be1 either because it is not discoverable by reason or experience2 or else1 because it is unlike that course of nature1 which is4 ,but analogy raises no presumption against the truth of this scheme1 upon either of these accounts4 ,first1 ,there is no presumption1 from analogy1 against the truth of it1 upon account of its not being discoverable by reason or experience4 ,suppose one who never heard of revelation1 of the most improved understanding1 and acquainted with our whole system of natural philosophy and natural religion2 such a one could not but be sensible1 that it was but a very small part of the natural and moral system of the universe1 which he was acquainted with4 ,he could not but be sensible1 that there must be innumerable things1 in the dispensations of ,providence past1 in the invisible government over the world at present carrying on1 and in what is to come2 of which he was wholly ignorant1#afa and which could not be discovered without revelation4 ,whether the scheme of nature be1 in the strictest sense1 infinite or not2 it is evidently vast1 even beyond all possible imagination4 ,and doubtless that part of it1 which is open to our view1 is but as a point in comparison of the whole plan of ,providence1 reaching throughout eternity past and future2 in comparison of what is even now going on1 in the remote parts of the boundless universe1 nay1 in comparison of the whole scheme of this world4 ,and therefore1 that things lie beyond the natural reach of our faculties1 is no sort of presumption against the truth and reality of them2 because it is certain1 there are innumerable things1 in the constitution and government of the universe1 which are thus beyond the natural reach of our faculties4 ,secondly1 ,analogy raises no presumption against any of the things contained in this general doctrine of ,scripture now mentioned1 upon account of their being unlike the known course of nature4 ,for there is no presumption at all from analogy1 that the whole course of things1 or divine government naturally unknown to us1 and every thing in it1 is like to any thing in that which is known2 and therefore no peculiar presumption against any thing in the former1 upon account of its being unlike to any thing in the latter4 ,and in the constitution and natural government of the world1 as well as in the moral government of it1 we see things1 in a great degree1 unlike one another3 and therefore ought not to wonder at such unlikeness between things visible and invisible4 ,however1 the scheme of ,christianity is by no means entirely unlike the scheme of nature2 as will appear in the following part of this treatise4 ,the notion of a miracle1 considered as a proof of a divine mission1 has been stated with great exactness by divines2 and is1 ,i think1 sufficiently understood by every one4 ,there are also invisible miracles1#afb the ,incarnation of ,christ1 for instance1 which1 being secret1 cannot be alleged as a proof of such a mission2 but require themselves to be proved by visible miracles4 ,revelation itself too is miraculous2 and miracles are the proof of it2 and the supposed presumption against these shall presently be considered4 ,all which ,i have been observing here is1 that1 whether we choose to call every thing in the dispensations of ,providence1 not discoverable without revelation1 nor like the known course of things1 miraculous2 and whether the general ,christian dispensation now mentioned is to be called so1 or not2 the foregoing observations seem certainly to show1 that there is no presumption against it from the analogy of nature4 ,,ii4 ,there is no presumption1 from analogy1 against some operations1 which we should now call miraculous2 particularly none against a revelation at the beginning of the world3 nothing of such presumption against it1 as is supposed to be implied or expressed in the word1 miraculous4#afc ,a miracle1 in its very notion1 is relative to a course of nature2 and implies something different from it1 considered as being so4 ,now1 either there was no course of nature at the time which we are speaking of2 or if there were1 we are not acquainted what the course of nature is1 upon the first peopling of worlds4 ,therefore the question1 whether mankind had a revelation made to them at that time1 is to be considered1 not as a question concerning a miracle1 but as a common question of fact4 ,and we have the like reason1 be it more or less1 to admit the report of tradition1 concerning this question1 and concerning common matters of fact of the same antiquity2 for instance1 what part of the earth was first peopled4 ,or thus3 ,when mankind was first placed in this state1 there was a power exerted1 totally different from the present course of nature4 ,now1 whether this power1 thus wholly different from the present course of nature1 7for we cannot properly apply to it the word miraculous27 whether this power stopped immediately after it had made man1 or went on1 and exerted itself further in giving him a revelation1 is a question of the same kind1 as whether an ordinary power exerted itself in such a particular degree and manner1 or not4 ,or suppose the power exerted in the formation of the world be considered as miraculous1 or rather1 be called by that name2 the case will not be different3 since it must be acknowledged1 that such a power was exerted4 ,for supposing it acknowledged1 that our ,savior spent some years in a course of working miracles3#afd there is no more presumption1 worth mentioning1 against his having exerted this miraculous power1 in a certain degree greater1 than in a certain degree less2 in one or two more instances1 than in one or two fewer2 in this1 than in another manner4 ,it is evident then1 that there can be no peculiar presumption1 from the analogy of nature1 against supposing a revelation1 when man was first placed upon earth4#afe ,add1 that there does not appear the least intimation in history or tradition1 that religion was first reasoned out3 but the whole of history and tradition makes for the other side1 that it came into the world by revelation4 ,indeed the state of religion1 in the first ages of which we have any account1 seems to suppose and imply1 that this was the original of it among mankind4#aff ,and these reflections together1 without taking in the peculiar authority of ,scripture1 amount to real and a very material degree of evidence1 that there was a revelation at the beginning of the world4 ,now this1 as it is a confirmation of natural religion1 and therefore mentioned in the former part of this treatise2#afg so likewise it has a tendency to remove any prejudices against a subsequent revelation4 ,,iii4 ,but still it may be objected1 that there is some peculiar presumption1 from analogy1 against miracles2 particularly against revelation1 after the settlement and during the continuance of a course of nature4 ,now with regard to this supposed presumption1 it is to be observed in general1 that before we can have ground for raising what can1 with any propriety1 be called an argument from analogy1 for or against revelation considered as something miraculous1 we must be acquainted with a similar or parallel case4 ,but the history of some other world1 seemingly in like circumstances with our own1 is no more than a parallel case3 and therefore nothing short of this can be so4 ,yet1 could we come at a presumptive proof1 for or against a revelation1 from being informed1 whether such world had one1 or not2 such a proof1 being drawn from one single instance only1 must be infinitely precarious4 ,more particularly3 ,first1 ,there is a very strong presumption against common speculative truths1 and against the most ordinary facts1 before the proof#afh of them2 which yet is overcome by almost any proof4 ,there is a presumption of millions to one1 against the story of ,csar1 or of any other man4 ,for suppose a number of common facts so and so circumstanced1 of which we had no kind of proof1 should happen to come into one's thoughts2 every one would1 without any possible doubt1 conclude them to be false4 ,and the like may be said of a single common fact4 ,hence it appears1 that the question of importance1 as to the matter before us1 is1 concerning the degree of the peculiar presumption supposed against miracles2 not whether there be any peculiar presumption at all against them4 ,for1 if there be the presumption of millions to one1 against the most common facts2 what can a small presumption1 additional to this1 amount to1 though it be peculiar8 ,it cannot be estimated1 and is as nothing4 ,the only material question is1 whether there be any such presumptions against miracles1 as to render them in any sort incredible4 ,secondly1 ,if we leave out the consideration of religion1 we are in such total darkness1 upon what causes1 occasions1 reasons1 or circumstances1 the present course of nature depends2 that there does not appear any improbability for or against supposing1 that five or six thousand years may have given scope#afi for causes1 occasions1 reasons1 or circumstances1 from whence miraculous interpositions may have arisen4 ,and from this1 joined with the foregoing observation1 it will follow1 that there must be a presumption1 beyond all comparison greater1 against the particular common facts just now instanced in1 than against miracles in general2 before any evidence of either4 ,thirdly1 ,take in the consideration of religion1 or the moral system of the world1 and then we see distinct particular reasons for miracles3 to afford mankind instruction additional to that of nature1 and to attest the truth of it4 ,this gives a real credibility to the supposition1 that it might be part of the original plan of things1 that there should be miraculous interpositions4 ,lastly1 ,miracles must not be compared to common natural events1 or to events which1 though uncommon1 are similar to what we daily experience3 but to the extraordinary phenomena of nature4 ,and then the comparison will be between the presumption against miracles1 and the presumption against such uncommon appearances1 suppose1 as comets1 and against there being any such powers in nature as magnetism and electricity1 so contrary to the properties of other bodies not endued with these powers4 ,and before any one can determine1 whether there be any peculiar presumption against miracles1 more than against other extraordinary things2 he must consider1 what1 upon first hearing1 would be the presumption against the last mentioned appearances and powers1 to a person acquainted only with the daily1 monthly1 and annual course of nature respecting this earth1 and with those common powers of matter which we every day see4 ,upon all this ,i conclude2 that there certainly is no such presumption against miracles1 as to render them in any wise incredible3 that1 on the contrary1 our being able to discern reasons for them1 gives a positive credibility to the history of them1 in cases where those reasons hold3 and that it is by no means certain1 that there is any peculiar presumption at all1 from analogy1 even in the lowest degree1 against miracles1 as distinguished from other extraordinary phenomena3 though it is not worth while to perplex the reader with inquiries into the abstract nature of evidence1 in order to determine a question1 which1 without such inquiries1 we see#agj is of no importance4 ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,,our ,,incapacity ,,of ,,judging1 ,,what ,,were ,,to ,,be ,,expected ,,in ,a ,,revelation2 ,,and ,,the ,,credibility1 ,,from ,,analogy1 ,,that ,,it ,,must ,,contain ,,things ,,liable ,,to ,,objections4 ,besides the objections against the evidence for ,christianity1 many are alleged against the scheme of it2 against the whole manner in which it is put and left with the world2 as well as against several particular relations in ,scripture3 objections drawn from the deficiencies of revelation3 from things in it appearing to men foolishness2#aga from its containing matters of offence1 which have led1 and it must have been foreseen would lead1 into strange enthusiasm and superstition1 and be made to serve the purposes of tyranny and wickedness2 from its not being universal2 and1 which is a thing of the same kind1 from its evidence not being so convincing and satisfactory as it might have been3 for this last is sometimes turned into a positive argument against its truth4#agb ,it would be tedious1 indeed impossible1 to enumerate the several particulars comprehended under the objections here referred to2 they being so various1 according to the different fancies of men4 ,there are persons who think it a strong objection against the authority of ,scripture1 that it is not composed by rules of art1 agreed upon by critics1 for polite and correct writing4 ,and the scorn is inexpressible1 with which some of the prophetic parts of ,scripture are treated3 partly through the rashness of interpreters2 but very much also1 on account of the hieroglyphical and figurative language1 in which they are left us4 ,some of the principal things of this sort shall be particularly considered in the following chapters4 ,but my design at present is to observe in general1 with respect to this whole way of arguing1 that1 upon supposition of a revelation1 it is highly credible beforehand1 that we should be incompetent judges of it to a great degree3 and that it would contain many things appearing to us liable to great objections2 in case we judge of it otherwise1 than by the analogy of nature4 ,therefore1 though objections against the evidence of ,christianity are most seriously to be considered1 yet objections against ,christianity itself are1 in a great measure1 frivolous3 almost all objections against it1 excepting those which are alleged against the particular proofs of its coming from ,god4 ,i express myself with caution1 lest ,i should be mistaken to vilify reason2 which is indeed the only faculty we have wherewith to judge concerning any thing1 even revelation itself3 or be misunderstood to assert1 that a supposed revelation cannot be proved false1 from internal characters4 ,for1 it may contain clear immoralities or contradictions2 and either of these would prove it false4 ,nor will ,i take upon me to affirm1 that nothing else can possibly render any supposed revelation incredible4 ,yet still the observation above1 is1 ,i think1 true beyond doubt2 that objections against ,christianity1 as distinguished from objections against its evidence1 are frivolous4 ,to make out this1 is the general design of the present chapter4 ,with regard to the whole of it1 ,i cannot but particularly wish1 that the proofs might be attended to2 rather than the assertions cavilled at1 upon account of any unacceptable consequences1 real or supposed1 which may be drawn from them4 ,for1 after all1 that which is true1 must be admitted1 though it should show us the shortness of our faculties3 and that we are in no wise judges of many things1 of which we are apt to think ourselves very competent ones4 ,nor will this be any objection with reasonable men2 at least upon second thought it will not be any objection with such1 against the justness of the following observations4 ,as ,god governs the world and instructs his creatures1 according to certain laws or rules1 in the known course of nature2 known by reason together with experience3 so the ,scripture informs us of a scheme of divine ,providence1 additional to this4 ,it relates1 that ,god has1 by revelation1 instructed men in things concerning his government1 which they could not otherwise have known2 and reminded them of things1 which they might otherwise know2 and attested the truth of the whole by miracles4 ,now if the natural and the revealed dispensation of things are both from ,god1 if they coincide with each other1 and together make up one scheme of ,providence2 our being incompetent judges of one1 must render it credible1 that we may be incompetent judges also of the other4 ,upon experience1 the acknowledged constitution and course of nature is found to be greatly different from what1 before experience1 would have been expected2 and such as1 men fancy1 there lie great objections against4 ,this renders it beforehand highly credible1 that they may find the revealed dispensation likewise1 if they judge of it as they do of the constitution of nature1 very different from expectations formed beforehand2 and liable1 in appearance1 to great objections3 objections against the scheme itself1 and against the degrees and manners of the miraculous interpositions by which it was attested and carried on4 ,thus1 suppose a prince to govern his dominions in the wisest manner possible1 by common known laws2 and that upon some exigencies he should suspend these laws2 and govern1 in several instances1 in a different manner4 ,if one of his subjects were not a competent judge beforehand1 by what common rules the government should or would be carried on2 it could not be expected1 that the same person would be a competent judge1 in what exigencies1 or in what manner1 or to what degree1 those laws commonly observed would be suspended or deviated from4 ,if he were not a judge of the wisdom of the ordinary administration1 there is no reason to think he would be a judge of the wisdom of the extraordinary4 ,if he thought he had objections against the former2 doubtless1 it is highly supposable1 he might think also1 that he had objections against the latter4 ,and thus1 as we fall into infinite follies and mistakes1 whenever we pretend1 otherwise than from experience and analogy1 to judge of the constitution and course of nature2 it is evidently supposable beforehand1 that we should fall into as great1 in pretending to judge in like manner concerning revelation4 ,nor is there any more ground to expect that this latter should appear to us clear of objections1 than that the former should4 ,these observations1 relating to the whole of ,christianity1 are applicable to inspiration in particular4 ,as we are in no sort judges beforehand1 by what laws or rules1 in what degree1 or by what means1 it were to have been expected1 that ,god would naturally instruct us2 so upon supposition of his affording us light and instruction by revelation1 additional to what he has afforded us by reason and experience1 we are in no sort judges1 by what methods1 and in what proportion1 it were to be expected that this supernatural light and instruction would be afforded us4 ,we know not beforehand1 what degree or kind of natural information it were to be expected ,god would afford men1 each by his own reason and experience3 nor how far he would enable and effectually dispose them to communicate it1 whatever it should be1 to each other2 nor whether the evidence of it would be certain1 highly probable1 or doubtful2 nor whether it would be given with equal clearness and conviction to all4 ,nor could we guess1 upon any good ground ,i mean1 whether natural knowledge1 or even the faculty itself1 by which we are capable of attaining it1 reason1 would be given us at once1 or gradually4 ,in like manner1 we are wholly ignorant1 what degree of new knowledge1 it were to be expected1 ,god would give mankind by revelation1 upon supposition of his affording one3 or how far1 or in what way1 he would interpose miraculously1 to qualify them1 to whom he should originally make the revelation1 for communicating the knowledge given by it2 and to secure their doing it to the age in which they should live2 and to secure its being transmitted to posterity4 ,we are equally ignorant1 whether the evidence of it would be certain or highly probable1 or doubtful3#agc or whether all who should have any degree of instruction from it1 and any degree of evidence of its truth1 would have the same3 or whether the scheme would be revealed at once1 or unfolded gradually4#agd ,nay we are not in any sort able to judge1 whether it were to have been expected1 that the revelation should have been committed to writing2 or left to be handed down1 and consequently corrupted1 by verbal tradition1 and at length sunk under it1 if mankind so pleased1 and during such time as they are permitted1 in the degree they evidently are1 to act as they will4 ,but it may be said1 8that a revelation in some of the above-mentioned circumstances1 one1 for instance1 which was not committed to writing1 and thus secured against danger of corruption1 would not have answered its purpose40 ,i ask1 what purpose8 ,it would not have answered all the purposes1 which it has now answered1 and in the same degree3 but it would have answered others1 or the same in different degrees4 ,and which of these were the purposes of ,god1 and best fell in with his general government1 we could not at all have determined beforehand4 ,now since we have no principles of reason1 upon which to judge beforehand1 how it were to be expected that revelation should have been left1 or what was most suitable to the divine plan of government1 in any of the forementioned respects2 it must be quite frivolous to object afterwards as to any of them1 against its being left in one way1 rather than another3 for this would be to object against things1 upon account of their being different from expectations1 which has been shown to be without reason4 ,thus we see1 that the only question concerning the truth of ,christianity is1 whether it be a real revelation2 not whether it be attended with every circumstance which we should have looked for3 and concerning the authority of ,scripture1 whether it be what it claims to be2 not whether it be a book of such sort1 and so promulged1 as weak men are apt to fancy a book containing a divine revelation should be4 ,therefore1 neither obscurity1 nor seeming inaccuracy of style1 nor various readings1 nor early disputes about the authors of particular parts1 nor any other things of the like kind1 though they had been much more considerable in degree than they are1 could overthrow the authority of the ,scripture3 unless the prophets1 apostles1 or our ,lord1 had promised1 that the book containing the divine revelation should be exempt from those things4 ,nor indeed can any objections overthrow such a kind of revelation as the ,christian claims to be1 7since there are no objections against the morality of it1#age7 but such as can show1 that there is no proof of miracles wrought originally in attestation of it2 no appearance of any thing miraculous in its obtaining in the world2 nor any of prophecy1 that is1 of events foretold1 which human sagacity could not foresee4 ,if it can be shown1 that the proof alleged for all these is absolutely none at all1 then is revelation overturned4 ,but were it allowed1 that the proof of any one or all of them is lower than is allowed2 yet1 whilst any proof of them remains1 revelation will stand upon much the same foot it does at present1 as to all the purposes of life and practice1 and ought to have the like influence upon our behavior4 ,from the foregoing observations too1 it will follow1 and those who will thoroughly examine into revelation will find it worth remarking1 that there are several ways of arguing1 which though just with regard to other writings1 are not applicable to ,scripture3 at least not to its prophetic parts4 ,we cannot argue1 for instance1 that such and such cannot be the sense or intent of a passage of ,scripture1 for1 if it had1 it would have been expressed more plainly1 or represented under a more apt figure or hieroglyphic4 ,yet we may justly argue thus1 with respect to common books4 ,and the reason of this difference is very evident4 ,in ,scripture we are not competent judges1 as we are in common books1 how plainly it were to have been expected1 that the sense should have been expressed1 or under how apt an image figured4 ,the only question is1 what appearance there is1 that this is the sense2 and scarce at all1 how much more determinately or accurately it might have been expressed or figured4#agf 8,but is it not self-evident1 that internal improbabilities of all kinds weaken external probable proof80 ,doubtless4 ,but to what practical purpose can this be alleged here1 when it has been proved before1#agg that real internal improbabilities1 which rise even to moral certainty1 are overcome by the most ordinary testimony2 and when it now has been made to appear1 that we scarce know what are improbabilities1 as to the matter we are here considering3 as it will further appear from what follows4 ,from the observations made above it is manifest1 that we are not in any sort competent judges1 what supernatural instruction were to have been expected2 and it is self-evident1 that the objections of an incompetent judgment must be frivolous4 ,yet it may be proper to go one step further1 and observe1 that if men will be regardless of these things1 and pretend to judge of the ,scripture by preconceived expectations2 the analogy of nature shows beforehand1 not only that it is highly credible they may1 but also probable that they will1 imagine they have strong objections against it1 however really unexceptionable4 ,for so1 prior to experience1 they would think they had1 against the circumstances1 and degrees1 and the whole manner of that instruction1 which is afforded by the ordinary course of nature4 ,were the instruction which ,god affords to brute creatures by instincts and mere propensions1 and to mankind by these together with reason1 matter of probable proof1 and not of certain observation3 it would be rejected as incredible1 in many instances of it1 only upon account of the means by which this instruction is given1 the seeming disproportions1 the limitations1 necessary conditions1 and circumstances of it4 ,for instance3 would it not have been thought highly improbable1 that men should have been so much more capable of discovering1 even to certainty1 the general laws of matter1 and the magnitudes1 paths1 and revolutions1 of heavenly bodies2 than the occasions and cures of distempers1 and many other things in which human life seems so much more nearly concerned1 than in astronomy8 ,how capricious and irregular a way of information would it be said2 is that of invention1 by means of which nature instructs us in matters of science1 and in many things1 upon which the affairs of the world greatly depend3 that a man should1 by this faculty1 be made acquainted with a thing in an instant1 7when perhaps he is thinking of something else17 which he has in vain been searching after1 it may be1 for years4 ,so likewise the imperfections attending the only method1 by which nature enables and directs us to communicate our thoughts to each other1 are innumerable4 ,language is1 in its very nature1 inadequate1 ambiguous1 liable to infinite abuse1 even from negligence2 and so liable to it from design1 that every man can deceive and betray by it4 ,and1 to mention but one instance more2 that brutes1 without reason1 should act1 in many respects1 with a sagacity and foresight vastly greater than what men have in those respects1 would be thought impossible4 ,yet it is certain they do act with such superior foresight3 whether it be their own1 indeed1 is another question4 ,from these things1 it is highly credible beforehand1 that upon supposition that ,god should afford men some additional instruction by revelation1 it would be with circumstances1 in manners1 degrees1 and respects1 against the credibility of which we should be apt to fancy we had great objections4 ,nor are the objections against the ,scripture1 nor against ,christianity in general1 at all more or greater1 than the analogy of nature would beforehand--not perhaps give ground to expect2 7for the analogy may not be sufficient1 in some cases1 to ground an expectation upon27 but no more nor greater1 than analogy would show it1 beforehand1 to be supposable and credible1 that there might seem to lie against revelation4 ,by applying these general observations to a particular objection1 it will be more distinctly seen1 how they are applicable to others of the like kind2 and indeed to almost all objections against ,christianity1 as distinguished from objections against its evidence4 ,it appears from ,scripture1 that1 as it was not unusual in the apostolic age1 for persons1 upon their conversion to ,christianity1 to be endued with miraculous gifts2 so1 some of those persons exercised these gifts in a strangely irregular and disorderly manner2#agh and this is made an objection against their being really miraculous4 ,now the foregoing observations quite remove this objection1 how considerable soever it may appear at first sight4 ,for1 consider a person endued with any of these gifts1 for instance that of tongues3 it is to be supposed1 that he had the same power over this miraculous gift1 as he would have had over it1 had it been the effect of habit1 of study and use1 as it ordinarily is2 or the same power over it1 as he had over any other natural endowment4 ,consequently1 he would use it in the same manner as he did any other2 either regularly1 and upon proper occasions only1 or irregularly1 and upon improper ones3 according to his sense of decency1 and his character of prudence4#agi ,where then is the objection8 ,why1 if this miraculous power was indeed given to the world to propagate ,christianity1 and attest the truth of it1 we might1 it seems1 have expected1 that other sort of persons should have been chosen to be invested with it2 or that these should1 at the same time1 have been endued with prudence2 or that they should have been continually restrained and directed in the exercise of it3 i4e4 that ,god should have miraculously interposed1 if at all1 in a different manner1 or higher degree4 ,but1 from the observations made above1 it is undeniably evident1 that we are not judges in what degrees and manners it were to have been expected he should miraculously interpose2 upon supposition of his doing it in some degree and manner4 ,nor1 in the natural course of ,providence1 are superior gifts of memory1 eloquence1 knowledge1 and other talents of great influence1 conferred only on persons of prudence and decency1 or such as are disposed to make the properest use of them4 ,nor is the instruction and admonition naturally afforded us for the conduct of life1 particularly in our education1 commonly given in a manner the most suited to recommend it2 but often with circumstances apt to prejudice us against such instruction4 ,one might go on to add1 there is a great resemblance between the light of nature and of revelation1 in several other respects4 ,practical ,christianity1 or that faith and behavior which renders a man a ,christian1 is a plain and obvious thing3 like the common rules of conduct1 with respect to ordinary temporal affairs4 ,the more distinct and particular knowledge of those things1 the study of which the apostle calls going on unto perfection1#ahj and of the prophetic parts of revelation1 like many parts of natural and even civil knowledge1 may require very exact thought1 and careful consideration4 ,the hinderances too1 of natural1 and of supernatural light and knowledge1 have been of the same kind4 ,and as it is owned the whole scheme of ,scripture is not yet understood2 so1 if it ever comes to be understood1 before the restitution of all things1#aha and without miraculous interpositions1 it must be in the same way as natural knowledge is come at3 by the continuance and progress of learning and of liberty2#ahb and by particular persons attending to1 comparing1 and pursuing1 intimations scattered up and down it1 which are overlooked and disregarded by the generality of the world4 ,for this is the way in which all improvements are made2 by thoughtful men's tracing on obscure hints1 dropped us by nature as it were1 accidentally1 or which seem to come into our minds by chance4 ,nor is it at all incredible1 that a book which has been so long in the possession of mankind1 should contain many truths as yet undiscovered4 ,for1 all the same phenomena1 and the same faculties of investigation1 from which such great discoveries in natural knowledge have been made in the present and last age1 were equally in the possession of mankind1 several thousand years before4 ,and possibly it might be intended1 that events1 as they come to pass1 should open and ascertain the meaning of several parts of ,scripture4 ,it may be objected1 that this analogy fails in a material respect3 for that natural knowledge is of little or no consequence4 ,but ,i have been speaking of the general instruction which nature does or does not afford us4 ,and besides1 some parts of natural knowledge1 in the more common restrained sense of the words1 are of the greatest consequence to the ease and convenience of life4 ,but suppose the analogy did1 as it does not1 fail in this respect2 yet it might be abundantly supplied1 from the whole constitution and course of nature3 which shows1 that ,god does not dispense his gifts according to our notions of the advantage and consequence they would be of to us4 ,and this in general1 with his method of dispensing knowledge in particular1 would together make out an analogy full to the point before us4 ,but it may be objected still further and more generally2 8,the ,scripture represents the world as in a state of ruin1 and ,christianity as an expedient to recover it1 to help in these respects where nature fails3 in particular1 to supply the deficiencies of natural light4 ,is it credible then1 that so many ages should have been let pass1 before a matter of such a sort1 of so great and so general importance1 was made known to mankind2 and then that it should be made known to so small a part of them8 ,is it conceivable1 that this supply should be so very deficient1 should have the like obscurity and doubtfulness1 be liable to the like perversions1 in short1 lie open to all the like objections1 as the light of nature itself80#ahc ,without determining how far this1 in fact1 is so1 ,i answer2 it is by no means incredible1 that it might be so1 if the light of nature and of revelation be from the same hand4 ,men are naturally liable to diseases3 for which ,god1 in his good providence1 has provided natural remedies4#ahd ,but remedies existing in nature have been unknown to mankind for many ages2 are known but to few now2 probably many valuable ones are not known yet4 ,great has been and is the obscurity and difficulty1 in the nature and application of them4 ,circumstances seem often to make them very improper1 where they are absolutely necessary4 ,it is after long labor and study1 and many unsuccessful endeavors1 that they are brought to be as useful as they are2 after high contempt and absolute rejection of the most useful we have2 and after disputes and doubts1 which have seemed to be endless4 ,the best remedies too1 when unskilfully1 much more when dishonestly applied1 may produce new diseases2 and with the rightest application the success of them is often doubtful4 ,in many cases they are not effectual3 where they are1 it is often very slowly3 and the application of them1 and the necessary regimen accompanying it1 is not uncommonly so disagreeable1 that some will not submit to them2 and satisfy themselves with the excuse1 that if they would1 it is not certain whether it would be successful4 ,and many persons1 who labor under diseases1 for which there are known natural remedies1 are not so happy as to be always1 if ever1 in the way of them4 ,in a word1 the remedies which nature has provided for diseases are neither certain1 perfect1 nor universal4 ,and indeed the same principles of arguing1 which would lead us to conclude1 that they must be so1 would lead us likewise to conclude1 that there could be no occasion for them2 i4e4 that there could be no diseases at all4 ,and therefore our experience that there are diseases1 shows that it is credible beforehand1 upon supposition nature has provided remedies for them1 that these remedies may be1 as by experience we find they are1 neither certain1 nor perfect1 nor universal2 because it shows1 that the principles upon which we should expect the contrary are fallacious4 ,and now1 what is the just consequence from all these things8 ,not that reason is no judge of what is offered to us as being of divine revelation4 ,for this would be to infer that we are unable to judge of any thing1 because we are unable to judge of all things4 ,reason can1 and it ought to judge1 not only of the meaning1 but also of the morality and the evidence of revelation4 ,first1 ,it is the province of reason to judge of the morality of the ,scripture2 i4e4 not whether it contains things different from what we should have expected from a wise1 just1 and good ,being2 7for objections from hence have been now obviated37 but whether it contains things plainly contradictory to wisdom1 justice1 or goodness2 to what the light of nature teaches us of ,god4 ,and ,i know nothing of this sort objected against ,scripture1 excepting such objections as are formed upon suppositions1 which would equally conclude1 that the constitution of nature is contradictory to wisdom1 justice1 or goodness2 which most certainly it is not4 ,there are1 indeed1 some particular precepts in ,scripture1 given to particular persons1 requiring actions1 which would be immoral and vicious1 were it not for such precepts4 ,but it is easy to see1 that all these are of such a kind1 as that the precept changes the whole nature of the case and of the action2 and both constitutes and shows that not to be unjust or immoral1 which1 prior to the precept1 must have appeared and really been so3 which may well be1 since none of these precepts are contrary to immutable morality4 ,if it were commanded1 to cultivate the principles1 and act from the spirit of treachery1 ingratitude1 cruelty2 the command would not alter the nature of the case or of the action1 in any of these instances4 ,but it is quite otherwise in precepts1 which require only the doing an external action3 for instance1 taking away the property1 or life of any4 ,for men have no right1 either to life or property1 but what arises solely from the grant of ,god4 ,when this grant is revoked1 they cease to have any right at all in either3 and when this revocation is made known1 as surely it is possible it may be1 it must cease to be unjust to deprive them of either4 ,and though a course of external acts1 which without command would be immoral1 must make an immoral habit2 yet a few detached commands have no such natural tendency4 ,i thought proper to say thus much of the few ,scripture precepts1 which require1 not vicious actions1 but actions which would have been vicious1 but for such precepts2 because they are sometimes weakly urged as immoral1 and great weight is laid upon objections drawn from them4 ,to me there seems no difficulty at all in these precepts1 but what arises from their being offences3 i4e4 from their being liable to be perverted1 as indeed they are1 by wicked designing men1 to serve the most horrid purposes2 and perhaps to mislead the weak and enthusiastic4 ,and objections from this head are not objections against revelation2 but against the whole notion of religion1 as a trial3 and against the general constitution of nature4 ,secondly1 ,reason is able to judge1 and must1 of the evidence of revelation1 and of the objections urged against that evidence3 which shall be the subject of a following chapter4#ahe ,the consequence of the foregoing observations is1 that the question upon which the truth of ,christianity depends1 is scarcely at all what objections there are against its scheme1 since there are none against the morality of it1 but what objections there are against its evidence2 or1 what proof there remains of it1 after due allowances are made for the objections against that proof3 because it has been shown1 that the objections against ,christianity1 as distinguished from objections against its evidence1 are frivolous4 ,for surely very little weight1 if any at all1 is to be laid upon a way of arguing and objecting1 which1 when applied to the general constitution of nature1 experience shows not to be conclusive3 and such1 ,i think1 is the whole way of objecting treated of throughout this chapter4 ,it is resolvable into principles1 and goes upon suppositions1 which mislead us to think1 that the ,author of nature would not act1 as we experience he does2 or would act1 in such and such cases1 as we experience he does not in like cases4 ,but the unreasonableness of this way of objecting will appear yet more evidently from hence1 that the chief things thus objected against are justified1 as shall be further shown1#ahf by distinct1 particular1 and full analogies1 in the constitution and course of nature4 ,it is to be remembered1 that1 as frivolous as objections of the foregoing sort against revelation are1 yet1 when a supposed revelation is more consistent with itself1 and has a more general and uniform tendency to promote virtue1 than1 all circumstances considered1 could have been expected from enthusiasm and political views1 this is a presumptive proof of its not proceeding from them1 and so of its truth3 because we are competent judges1 what might have been expected from enthusiasm and political views4#ahg ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,,christianity1 ,,considered ,,as ,a ,,scheme ,,or ,,constitution1 ,,imperfectly ,,comprehended4 ,as hath been now shown1#ahh the analogy of nature renders it highly credible beforehand1 that1 supposing a revelation to be made1 it must contain many things very different from what we should have expected1 and such as appear open to great objections3 and that this observation1 in good measure1 takes off the force of those objections1 or rather precludes them4 ,it may be alleged1 that this is a very partial answer to such objections1 or a very unsatisfactory way of obviating them3 because it does not show at all1 that the things objected against can be wise1 just1 and good2 much less1 that it is credible they are so4 ,it will therefore be proper to show this distinctly2 by applying to these objections against the wisdom1 justice1 and goodness of ,christianity1 the answer above#ahi given to the like objections against the constitution of nature3 before we consider the particular analogies in the latter1 to the particular things objected against in the former4 ,now that which affords a sufficient answer to objections against the wisdom1 justice1 and goodness of the constitution of nature1 is its being a constitution1 a system1 or scheme1 imperfectly comprehended2#aij a scheme in which means are made use of to accomplish ends2 and which is carried on by general laws4 ,for from these things it has been proved1 not only to be possible1 but also to be credible1 that those things which are objected against may be consistent with wisdom1 justice1 and goodness2 nay1 may be instances of them3 and even that the constitution and government of nature may be perfect in the highest possible degree4 ,if ,christianity then be a scheme1 and of the like kind2 it is evident1 the like objections against it must admit of the like answer4 ,and1 ,i4 ,christianity is a scheme1 quite beyond our comprehension4 ,the moral government of ,god is exercised1 by gradually conducting things so in the course of his providence1 that every one1 at length and upon the whole1 shall receive according to his deserts2 and neither fraud nor violence1 but truth and right1 shall finally prevail4 ,christianity is a particular scheme under this general plan of ,providence1 and a part of it1 conducive to its completion1 with regard to mankind3 consisting itself also of various parts1 and a mysterious economy1 which has been carrying on from the time the world came into its present wretched state1 and is still carrying on1 for its recovery1 by a divine person1 the ,messiah2 who is to gather together in one the children of ,god1 that are scattered abroad1#aia and establish an everlasting kingdom1 wherein dwelleth righteousness4#aib ,in order to it2 after various manifestations of things1 relating to this great and general scheme of ,providence1 through a succession of many ages3 7,for the ,spirit of ,christ which was in the prophets1 testified beforehand his sufferings1 and the glory that should follow3 unto whom it was revealed1 that not unto themselves1 but unto us they did minister the things which are now reported unto us by them that have preached the ,gospel2 which things the angels desire to look into3#aic7--;after various dispensations looking forward and preparatory to1 this final salvation3 in the fulness of time1 when infinite wisdom thought fit2 ,he1 being in the form of ,god1--made himself of no reputation1 and took upon him the form of a servant1 and was made in the likeness of men3 and being found in fashion as a man1 he humbled himself1 and became obedient to death1 even the death of the cross4 ,wherefore ,god also hath highly exalted him1 and given him a name1 which is above every name3 that at the name of ,jesus every knee should bow1 of things in heaven1 and things in the earth1 and things under the earth3 and that every tongue should confess1 that ,jesus ,christ is ,lord1 to the glory of ,god the ,father4#aid ,parts likewise of this economy are the miraculous mission of the ,holy ,ghost1 and his ordinary assistances given to good men3#aie the invisible government1 which ,christ at present exercises over his church3 that which he himself refers to in these words3 ,in my ,father's house are many mansions--,i go to prepare a place for you3#aif and his future return to judge the world in righteousness1 and completely re-establish the kingdom of ,god4 ,for the ,father judgeth no man2 but hath committed all judgment unto the ,son3 that all men should honor the ,son1 even as they honor the ,father4#aig ,all power is given unto him in heaven and in earth4#aih ,and he must reign1 till he hath put all enemies under his feet4 ,then cometh the end1 when he shall have delivered up the kingdom to ,god1 even the ,father2 when he shall have put down all rule1 and all authority and power4 ,and when all things shall be subdued unto him1 then shall the ,son also himself be subject unto him that put all things under him1 that ,god may be all in all4#aii ,surely little need be said to show1 that this system1 or scheme of things1 is but imperfectly comprehended by us4 ,the ,scripture expressly asserts it to be so4 ,and indeed one cannot read a passage relating to this great mystery of godliness1#bjj but what immediately runs up into something which shows us our ignorance in it2 as every thing in nature shows us our ignorance in the constitution of nature4 ,and whoever will seriously consider that part of the ,christian scheme1 which is revealed in ,scripture1 will find so much more unrevealed1 as will convince him1 that1 to all the purposes of judging and objecting1 we know as little of it1 as of the constitution of nature4 ,our ignorance1 therefore1 is as much an answer to our objections against the perfection of one1 as against the perfection of the other4#bja ,,ii4 ,it is obvious too1 that in the ,christian dispensation1 as much as in the natural scheme of things1 means are made use of to accomplish ends4 ,the observation of this furnishes us with the same answer1 to objections against the perfection of ,christianity1 as to objections of the like kind1 against the constitution of nature4 ,it shows the credibility1 that the things objected against1 how foolish#bjb soever they appear to men1 may be the very best means of accomplishing the very best ends4 ,and their appearing foolishness is no presumption against this1 in a scheme so greatly beyond our comprehension4#bjc ,,iii4 ,the credibility1 that the ,christian dispensation may have been1 all along1 carried on by general laws1#bjd no less than the course of nature1 may require to be more distinctly made out4 ,consider then1 upon what ground it is we say1 that the whole common course of nature is carried on according to general fore-ordained laws4 ,we know indeed several of the general laws of matter2 and a great part of the natural behavior of living agents is reducible to general laws4 ,but we know in a manner nothing1 by what laws1 storms1 tempests1 earthquakes1 famine1 pestilence1 become the instruments of destruction to mankind4 ,and the laws by which persons born into the world at such a time and place are of such capacities1 geniuses1 tempers2 the laws by which thoughts come into our mind1 in a multitude of cases2 and by which innumerable things happen1 of the greatest influence upon the affairs and state of the world4 ,these laws are so wholly unknown to us1 that we call the events which come to pass by them1 accidental2 though all reasonable men know certainly1 that there cannot1 in reality1 be any such thing as chance2 and conclude that the things which have this appearance are the result of general laws1 and may be reduced to them4 ,it is but an exceeding little way1 and in but a very few respects1 that we can trace up the natural course of things before us1 to general laws4 ,it is only from analogy1 that we conclude the whole of it to be capable of being reduced to them3 only from our seeing that part is so4 ,it is from our finding1 that the course of nature1 in some respects and so far1 goes on by general laws1 that we conclude this of the rest4 ,if that be a just ground for such a conclusion1 it is a just ground also1 if not to conclude1 yet to apprehend1 to render it supposable and credible1 which is sufficient for answering objections1 that ,god's miraculous interpositions may have been1 all along in like manner1 by general laws of wisdom4 ,thus1 that miraculous powers should be exerted1 at such times1 upon such occasions1 in such degrees and manners1 and with regard to such persons1 rather than others2 that the affairs of the world1 being permitted to go on in their natural course so far1 should1 just at such a point1 have a new direction given them by miraculous interpositions2 that these interpositions should be exactly in such degrees and respects only2 all this may have been by general laws4 ,these laws are indeed unknown to us3 but no more unknown than the laws from whence it is1 that some die as soon as they are born1 and others live to extreme old age2 that one man is so superior to another in understanding2 with innumerable more things1 which1 as was before observed1 we cannot reduce to any laws or rules1 though it is taken for granted1 they are as much reducible to general ones1 as gravitation4 ,if the revealed dispensations of ,providence1 and miraculous interpositions1 be by general laws1 as well as ,god's ordinary government in the course of nature1 made known by reason and experience2 there is no more reason to expect that every exigence1 as it arises1 should be provided for by these general laws or miraculous interpositions1 than that every exigence in nature should be1 by the general laws of nature4 ,yet there might be wise and good reasons1 why miraculous interpositions should be by general laws2 and why these laws should not be broken in upon1 or deviated from1 by other miracles4 ,upon the whole then1 the appearance of deficiencies and irregularities in nature is owing to its being a scheme but in part made known1 and of such a certain particular kind in other respects4 ,we see no more reason why the frame and course of nature should be such a scheme1 than why ,christianity should4 ,and that the former is such a scheme1 renders it credible1 that the latter1 upon supposition of its truth1 may be so too4 ,and as it is manifest1 that ,christianity is a scheme revealed but in part1 and a scheme in which means are made use of to accomplish ends1 like to that of nature3 so the credibility1 that it may have been all along carried on by general laws1 no less than the course of nature1 has been distinctly proved4 ,from all this it is beforehand credible that there might1 ,i think probable that there would1 be the like appearance of deficiencies and irregularities in ,christianity1 as in nature3 i4e4 that ,christianity would be liable to the like objections1 as the frame of nature4 ,and these objections are answered by these observations concerning ,christianity2 as the like objections against the frame of nature are answered by the like observations concerning the frame of nature4 99 99 99 99 99 ,the objections against ,christianity1 considered as a matter of fact1#bje having1 in general1 been obviated in the preceding chapter2 and the same1 considered as made against the wisdom and goodness of it1 having been obviated in this3 the next thing1 according to the method proposed1 is to show1 that the principal objections1 in particular1 against ,christianity1 may be answered1 by particular and full analogies in nature4 ,and as one of them is made against the whole scheme of it together1 as just now described1 ,i choose to consider it here1 rather than in a distinct chapter by itself4 ,the thing objected against this scheme of the gospel is1 8that it seems to suppose ,god was reduced to the necessity of a long series of intricate means1 in order to accomplish his ends1 the recovery and salvation of the world3 in like sort as men1 for want of understanding or power1 not being able to come at their ends directly1 are forced to go roundabout ways1 and make use of many perplexed contrivances to arrive at them10 ,now every thing which we see shows the folly of this1 considered as an objection against the truth of ,christianity4 ,for1 according to our manner of conception1 ,god makes use of variety of means1 what we often think tedious ones1 in the natural course of providence1 for the accomplishment of all his ends4 ,indeed it is certain there is somewhat in this matter quite beyond our comprehension3 but the mystery is as great in nature as in ,christianity4 ,we know what we ourselves aim at1 as final ends3 and what courses we take1 merely as means conducing to those ends4 ,but we are greatly ignorant how far things are considered by the ,author of nature1 under the single notion of means and ends2 so as that it may be said1 this is merely an end1 and that merely a means1 in his regard4 ,and whether there be not some peculiar absurdity in our very manner of conception1 concerning this matter1 something contradictory arising from our extremely imperfect views of things1 it is impossible to say4 ,however1 this much is manifest1 that the whole natural world and government of it1 is a scheme or system2 not a fixed1 but a progressive one3 a scheme in which the operation of various means takes up a great length of time1 before the ends they tend to can be attained4 ,the change of seasons1 the ripening of fruits1 the very history of a flower1 are instances of this3 and so is human life4 ,thus vegetable bodies1 and those of animals1 though possibly formed at once1 yet grow up by degrees to a mature state4 ,and thus rational agents1 who animate these latter bodies1 are naturally directed to form each his own manners and character1 by the gradual gaining of knowledge and experience1 and by a long course of action4 ,our existence is not only successive1 as it must be of necessity2 but one state of our life and being is appointed by ,god1 to be a preparation for another2 and that to be the means of attaining to another succeeding one3 infancy to childhood2 childhood to youth2 youth to mature age4 ,men are impatient1 and for precipitating things3 but the ,author of nature appears deliberate throughout his operations2 accomplishing his natural ends by slow successive steps4#bjf ,and there is a plan of things beforehand laid out1 which1 from the nature of it1 requires various systems of means1 as well as length of time1 in order to the carrying on its several parts into execution4 ,thus1 in the daily course of natural providence1 ,god operates in the very same manner1 as in the dispensation of ,christianity2 making one thing subservient to another2 this1 to something further2 and so on1 through a progressive series of means1 which extend1 both backward and forward1 beyond our utmost view4 ,of this manner of operation1 every thing we see in the course of nature is as much an instance1 as any part of the ,christian dispensation4 ,,chapter ,v4 ,,the ,,particular ,,system ,,of ,,christianity2 ,,the ,,appointment ,,of ,a ,,mediator1 ,,and ,,the ,,redemption ,,of ,,the ,,world ,,by ,,him4 ,there is not1 ,i think1 any thing relating to ,christianity1 which has been more objected against1 than the mediation of ,christ1 in some or other of its parts4 ,yet upon thorough consideration1 there seems nothing less justly liable to it4#bjg ,for1 ,i4 ,the whole analogy of nature removes all imagined presumption against the general notion of a ,mediator between ,god and man4#bjh ,for we find all living creatures are brought into the world1 and their life in infancy is preserved1 by the instrumentality of others3 and every satisfaction of it1 some way or other1 is bestowed by the like means4 ,so that the visible government1 which ,god exercises over the world1 is by the instrumentality and mediation of others4 ,how far his invisible government be or be not so1 it is impossible to determine at all by reason4 ,the supposition1 that part of it is so1 appears1 to say the least1 altogether as credible1 as the contrary4 ,there is then no sort of objection1 from the light of nature1 against the general notion of a mediator between ,god and man1 considered as a doctrine of ,christianity1 or as an appointment in this dispensation3 since we find by experience1 that ,god does appoint mediators1 to be the instruments of good and evil to us3 the instruments of his justice and his mercy4 ,and the objection here referred to is urged1 not against mediation in that high1 eminent1 and peculiar sense1 in which ,christ is our mediator2 but absolutely against the whole notion itself of a mediator at all4 ,,ii4 ,as we must suppose1 that the world is under the proper moral government of ,god1 or in a state of religion1 before we can enter into consideration of the revealed doctrine1 concerning the redemption of it by ,christ3 so that supposition is here to be distinctly noticed4 ,now the divine moral government which religion teaches us1 implies that the consequence of vice shall be misery1 in some future state1 by the righteous judgment of ,god4 ,that such consequent punishment shall take effect by his appointment1 is necessarily implied4 ,but1 as it is not in any sort to be supposed1 that we are made acquainted with all the ends or reasons1 for which it is fit that future punishments should be inflicted1 or why ,god has appointed such and such consequent misery to follow vice2 and as we are altogether in the dark1 how or in what manner it shall follow1 by what immediate occasions1 or by the instrumentality of what means2 so there is no absurdity in supposing it may follow in a way analogous to that in which many miseries follow such and such courses of action at present2 poverty1 sickness1 infamy1 untimely death by diseases1 death from the hands of civil justice4 ,there is no absurdity in supposing future punishment may follow wickedness of course1 as we speak1 or in the way of natural consequence from ,god's original constitution of the world2 from the nature he has given us1 and from the condition in which he places us2 or in a like manner1 as a person rashly trifling upon a precipice1 in the way of natural consequence1 falls down2 in the way of natural consequence of this1 breaks his limbs1 and in the way of natural consequence1 without help1 perishes4 ,some good men may perhaps be offended with hearing it spoken of as a supposable thing that future punishments of wickedness may be in the way of natural consequence3 as if this were taking the execution of justice out of the hands of ,god1 and giving it to nature4 ,but they should remember1 that when things come to pass according to the course of nature1 this does not hinder them from being his doing1 who is the ,god of nature3 and that the ,scripture ascribes those punishments to divine justice1 which are known to be natural2 and which must be called so1 when distinguished from such as are miraculous4 ,after all1 this supposition1 or rather this way of speaking1 is here made use of only by way of illustration of the subject before us4 ,for since it must be admitted1 that the future punishment of wickedness is not a matter of arbitrary appointment1 but of reason1 equity1 and justice2 it comes for aught ,i see1 to the same thing1 whether it is supposed to be inflicted in a way analogous to that in which the temporal punishments of vice and folly are inflicted1 or in any other way4 ,and though there were a difference1 it is allowable1 in the present case1 to make this supposition1 plainly not an incredible one1 that future punishment may follow wickedness in the way of natural consequence1 or according to some general laws of government already established in the universe4 ,,iii4 ,upon this supposition1 or even without it1 we may observe somewhat1 much to the present purpose1 in the constitution of nature or appointments of ,providence3 the provision which is made1 that all the bad natural consequences of men's actions should not always actually follow2 or that such bad consequences1 as1 according to the settled course of things1 would inevitably have followed if not prevented1 should1 in certain degrees1 be prevented4 ,we are apt presumptuously to imagine1 that the world might have been so constituted1 as that there would not have been any such thing as misery or evil4 ,on the contrary we find the ,author of nature permits it3 but then he has provided reliefs1 and in many cases perfect remedies for it1 after some pains and difficulties2 reliefs and remedies even for that evil1 which is the fruit of our own misconduct2 and which1 in the course of nature1 would have continued1 and ended in our destruction1 but for such remedies4 ,and this is an instance both of severity and of indulgence1 in the constitution of nature4 ,thus all the bad consequences1 now mentioned1 of a man's trifling upon a precipice1 might be prevented4 ,and though all were not1 yet some of them might1 by proper interposition1 if not rejected3#bji by another's coming to the rash man's relief1 with his own laying hold on that relief1 in such sort as the case required4 ,persons may do a great deal themselves towards preventing the bad consequences of their follies3 and more may be done by themselves1 together with the assistance of others their fellow-creatures2 which assistance nature requires and prompts us to4 ,this is the general constitution of the world4 ,now suppose it had been so constituted1 that after such actions were done1 as were foreseen naturally to draw after them misery to the doer1 it should have been no more in human power to have prevented that naturally consequent misery1 in any instance1 than it is in all3 no one can say1 whether such a more severe constitution of things might not yet have been really good4 ,but1 on the contrary1 provision being made by nature1 that we may and do1 to so great degree1 prevent the bad natural effects of our follies2 this may be called mercy or compassion in the original constitution of the world3 compassion1 as distinguished from goodness in general4 ,and1 the whole known constitution and course of things affording us instances of such compassion1 it would be according to the analogy of nature1 to hope1 that however ruinous the natural consequences of vice might be1 from the general laws of ,god's government over the universe2 yet provision might be made1 possibly might have been originally made1 for preventing those ruinous consequences from inevitably following3 at least from following universally1 and in all cases4 ,many1 ,i am sensible1 will wonder at finding this made a question1 or spoken of as in any degree doubtful4 ,the generality of mankind are so far from having that awful sense of things1 which the present state of vice and misery and darkness seems to make but reasonable1 that they have scarce any apprehension or thought at all about this matter1 any way3 and some serious persons may have spoken unadvisedly concerning it4 ,but let us observe1 what we experience to be1 and what1 from the very constitution of nature cannot but be1 the consequences of irregular and disorderly behavior3 even of such rashness1 wilfulness1 neglects1 as we scarce call vicious4 ,now it is natural to apprehend1 that the bad consequences of irregularity will be greater1 in proportion as the irregularity is so4 ,and there is no comparison between these irregularities1 and the greater instances of vice1 or a dissolute profligate disregard to all religion2 if there be any thing at all in religion4 ,for consider what it is for creatures1 moral agents1 presumptuously to introduce that confusion and misery into the kingdom of ,god1 which mankind have in fact introduced3 to blaspheme the ,sovereign ,lord of all2 to contemn his authority2 to be injurious1 to the degree they are1 to their fellow-creatures1 the creatures of ,god4 ,add that the effects of vice in the present world are often extreme misery1 irretrievable ruin1 and even death3 and upon putting all this together1 it will appear1 that as no one can say1 in what degree fatal the unprevented consequences of vice may be1 according to the general rule of divine government2 so it is by no means intuitively certain1 how far these consequences could possibly1 in the nature of the thing1 be prevented1 consistently with the eternal rule of right1 or with what is1 in fact1 the moral constitution of nature4 ,however1 there would be large ground to hope1 that the universal government was not so severely strict1 but that there was room for pardon1 or for having those penal consequences prevented4 ,yet1 ,,iv4 ,there seems no probability1 that any thing we could do would alone and of itself prevent them3 prevent their following1 or being inflicted4 ,but one would think at least1 it were impossible that the contrary should be thought certain4 ,for we are not acquainted with the whole of the case4 ,we are not informed of all the reasons1 which render it fit that future punishments should be inflicted3 and therefore cannot know1 whether any thing we could do would make such an alteration1 as to render it fit that they should be remitted4 ,we do not know what the whole natural or appointed consequences of vice are2 nor in what way they would follow1 if not prevented3 and therefore can in no sort say1 whether we could do any thing which would be sufficient to prevent them4 ,our ignorance being thus manifest1 let us recollect the analogy of nature or ,providence4 ,for1 though this may be but a slight ground to raise a positive opinion upon1 in this matter2 yet it is sufficient to answer a mere arbitrary assertion1 without any kind of evidence1 urged by way of objection against a doctrine1 the proof of which is not reason1 but revelation4 ,consider then3 people ruin their fortunes by extravagance2 they bring diseases upon themselves by excess2 they incur the penalties of civil laws2 and surely civil government is natural2 will sorrow for these follies past1 and behaving well for the future1 alone and of itself prevent the natural consequences of them8 ,on the contrary1 men's natural abilities of helping themselves are often impaired2 or if not1 yet they are forced to be beholden to the assistance of others1 upon several accounts1 and in different ways2 assistance which they would have had no occasion for1 had it not been for their misconduct2 but which1 in the disadvantageous condition they have reduced themselves to1 is absolutely necessary to their recovery1 and retrieving their affairs4 ,since this is our case1 considering ourselves merely as inhabitants of this world1 and as having a temporal interest here1 under the natural government of ,god1 which however has a great deal moral in it2 why is it not supposable that this may be our case also1 in our more important capacity1 as under his perfect moral government1 and having a more general and future interest depending8#baj ,if we have misbehaved in this higher capacity1 and rendered ourselves obnoxious to the future punishment1 which ,god has annexed to vice3 it is plainly credible1 that behaving well for the time to come may be--not useless1 ,god forbid--but wholly insufficient1 alone and of itself1 to prevent that punishment3 or to put us in the condition which we should have been in1 had we preserved our innocence4 ,though we ought to reason with all reverence1 whenever we reason concerning the divine conduct3 yet it may be added1 that it is clearly contrary to all our notions of government1 as well as to what is1 in fact1 the general constitution of nature1 to suppose1 that doing well for the future should1 in all cases1 prevent all the judicial bad consequences of having done evil1 or all the punishment annexed to disobedience4 ,we have manifestly nothing from whence to determine1 in what degree1 and in what cases1 reformation would prevent this punishment1 even supposing that it would in some4 ,and though the efficacy of repentance itself alone1 to prevent what mankind had rendered themselves obnoxious to1 and recover what they had forfeited1 is now insisted upon1 in opposition to ,christianity2 yet1 by the general prevalence of propitiatory sacrifices over the heathen world1 this notion of repentance alone being sufficient to expiate guilt1 appears to be contrary to the general sense of mankind4#baa ,upon the whole then2 had the laws1 the general laws of ,god's government been permitted to operate1 without any interposition in our behalf1 the future punishment1 for aught we know to the contrary1 or have any reason to think1 must inevitably have followed1 notwithstanding any thing we could have done to prevent it4 ,v4 ,in this darkness1 or this light of nature1 call it which you please1 revelation comes in2 and confirms every doubting fear1 which could enter into the heart of man1 concerning the future unprevented consequence of wickedness4 ,it supposes the world to be in a state of ruin 7a supposition which seems the very ground of the ,christian dispensation2 and which1 if not provable by reason1 yet is in no wise contrary to it27 and teaches us too1 that the rules of divine government are such1 as not to admit of pardon immediately and directly upon repentance1 or by the sole efficacy of it4 ,but teaches at the same time1 what nature might justly have hoped1 that the moral government of the universe was not so rigid1 but that there was room for an interposition1 to avert the fatal consequences of vice2 which therefore1 by this means1 does admit of pardon4 ,revelation teaches us1 that the unknown laws of ,god's more general government1 no less than the particular laws by which we experience he governs us at present1 are compassionate1#bab as well as good in the more general notion of goodness3 and that he hath mercifully provided1 that there should be an interposition to prevent the destruction of human kind2 whatever that destruction unprevented would have been4 ,god so loved the world1 that he gave his only begotten ,son1 that whosoever believeth1 not1 to be sure1 in a speculative1 but in a practical sense1 that whosoever believeth in him1 should not perish3#bac gave his ,son in the same way of goodness to the world1 as he affords particular persons the friendly assistance of their fellow-creatures1 when1 without it1 their temporal ruin would be the certain consequence of their follies3 in the same way of goodness1 ,i say1 though in a transcendent and infinitely higher degree4 ,and the ,son of ,god loved us1 and gave himself for us1 with a love1 which he himself compares to that of human friendship3 though1 in this case1 all comparisons must fall infinitely short of the thing intended to be illustrated by them4 ,he interposed in such a manner as was necessary and effectual to prevent that execution of justice upon sinners1 which ,god had appointed should otherwise have been executed upon them2 or in such a manner1 as to prevent that punishment from actually following1 which1 according to the general laws of divine government1 must have followed the sins of the world1 had it not been for such interposition4#bad ,if any thing here said should appear1 upon first thought1 inconsistent with divine goodness2 a second1 ,i am persuaded1 will entirely remove that appearance4 ,for were we to suppose the constitution of things to be such1 as that the whole creation must have perished1 had it not been for something1 which ,god had appointed should be1 in order to prevent that ruin3 even this supposition would not be inconsistent1 in any degree1 with the most absolutely perfect goodness4 ,still it may be thought1 that this whole manner of treating the subject before us supposes mankind to be naturally in a very strange state4 ,and truly so it does4 ,but it is not ,christianity which has put us into this state4 ,whoever will consider the manifold miseries1 and the extreme wickedness of the world2 that the best have great wrongnesses within themselves1 which they complain of1 and endeavor to amend2 but that the generality grow more profligate and corrupt with age2 that even moralists thought the present state to be a state of punishment3 and1 that the earth our habitation has the appearances of being a ruin3 whoever1 ,i say1 will consider all these1 and some other obvious things1 will think he has little reason to object against the ,scripture account1 that mankind is in a state of degradation2 against this being the fact3 how difficult soever he may think it to account for1 or even to form a distinct conception of the occasions and circumstances of it4 ,but that the crime of our first parents was the occasion of our being placed in a more disadvantageous condition1 is a thing throughout and particularly analogous to what we see in the daily course of natural providence2 as the recovery of the world by the interposition of ,christ has been shown to be so in general4 ,,vi4 ,the particular manner in which ,christ interposed in the redemption of the world1 or his office as ,mediator1 in the largest sense1 between ,god and man1 is thus represented to us in the ,scripture4 ,he is the light of the world2#bae the revealer of the will of ,god in the most eminent sense4 ,he is a propitiatory sacrifice2#baf the ,lamb of ,god3#bag and1 as he voluntarily offered himself up1 he is styled our ,high ,priest4#bah ,and1 which seems of peculiar weight1 he is described beforehand in the ,old ,testament1 under the same characters of a priest1 and an expiatory victim4#bai ,and whereas it is objected1 that all this is merely by way of allusion to the sacrifices of the ,mosaic law1 the ,apostle on the contrary affirms1 that the law was a shadow of good things to come1 and not the very image of the things3#bbj and that the priests that offer gifts according to the law--serve unto the example and shadow of heavenly things1 as ,moses was admonished of ,god1 when he was about to make the tabernacle4 ,for see1 saith he1 that thou make all things according to the pattern showed to thee in the mount2#bba i4e4 the ,levitical priesthood was a shadow of the priesthood of ,christ2 in like manner as the tabernacle made by ,moses was according to that showed him in the mount4 ,the priesthood of ,christ1 and the tabernacle in the mount1 were the originals2 of the former of which the ,levitical priesthood was a type2 and of the latter the tabernacle made by ,moses was a copy4 ,the doctrine of this epistle then plainly is1 that the legal sacrifices were allusions to the great and final atonement to be made by the blood of ,christ2 and not that this was an allusion to those4 ,nor can any thing be more express and determinate than the following passage4 ,it is not possible that the blood of bulls and of goats should take away sin4 ,wherefore when he cometh into the world1 he saith1 ,sacrifice and offering1 i4e4 of bulls and of goats1 thou wouldest not1 but a body hast thou prepared me4 ,lo6 ,i come to do thy will1 ,o ,god4 ,by which will we are sanctified41 through the offering of the body of ,jesus ,christ once for all4#bbb ,and to add one passage more of the like kind3 ,christ was once offered to bear the sins of many3 and unto them that look for him shall he appear the second time1 without sin2 i4e4 without bearing sin1 as he did at his first coming1 by being an offering for it2 without having our iniquities again laid upon him1 without being any more a sin-offering3--unto them1 that look for him shall he appear the second time1 without sin1 unto salvation4#bbc ,nor do the inspired writers at all confine themselves to this manner of speaking concerning the satisfaction of ,christ2 but declare an efficacy in what he did and suffered for us1 additional to and beyond mere instruction1 example1 and government1 in great variety of expression3 ,that ,jesus should die for that nation1 the ,jews3 and not for that nation only1 but that also1 plainly by the efficacy of his death1 he should gather together in one the children of ,god that were scattered abroad3#bbd that he suffered for sins1 the just for the unjust3#bbe that he gave his life1 himself1 a ransom3#bbf that we are bought1 bought with a price3#bbg that he redeemed us with his blood3 redeemed us from the curse of the law1 being made a curse for us3#bbh that he is our advocate1 intercessor1 and propitiation3#bbi that he was made perfect1 or consummate1 through sufferings2 and being thus made perfect1 he became the author of salvation3#bcj that ,god was in ,christ reconciling the world to himself2 by the death of his ,son1 by the cross2 not imputing their trespasses unto them3#bca and lastly1 that through death he destroyed him that had the power of death4#bcb ,christ having thus humbled himself1 and become obedient to death1 even the death of the cross2 ,god also hath highly exalted him1 and given him a name1 which is above every name3 hath given all things into his hands3 hath committed all judgment unto him2 that all men should honor the ,son1 even as they honor the ,father4#bcc ,for1 worthy is the ,lamb that was slain1 to receive power1 and riches1 and wisdom1 and strength1 and honor1 and glory1 and blessing4 ,and every creature which is in heaven1 and on the earth1 heard ,i1 saying1 ,blessing1 and honor1 and glory1 and power1 be unto him that sitteth upon the throne1 and unto the ,lamb forever and ever4#bcd ,these passages of ,scripture seem to comprehend and express the chief parts of ,christ's office1 as ,mediator between ,god and man1 so far1 ,i mean1 as the nature of this his office is revealed2 and it is usually treated of by divines under three heads4 ,first1 ,he was1 by way of eminence1 the ,prophet3 that ,prophet that should come into the world1#bce to declare the divine will4 ,he published anew the law of nature1 which men had corrupted2 and the very knowledge of which1 to some degree1 was lost among them4 ,he taught mankind1 taught us authoritatively1 to live soberly1 righteously1 and godly in this present world1 in expectation of the future judgment of ,god4 ,he confirmed the truth of this moral system of nature1 and gave us additional evidence of it2 the evidence of testimony4#bcf ,he distinctly revealed the manner1 in which ,god would be worshipped1 the efficacy of repentance1 and the rewards and punishments of a future life4 ,thus he was a prophet in a sense in which no other ever was4 ,to which is to be added1 that he set us a perfect example1 that we should follow his steps4 ,secondly1 ,he has a kingdom which is not of this world4 ,he founded a ,church1 to be to mankind a standing memorial of religion1 and invitation to it2 which he promised to be with always even to the end4 ,he exercises an invisible government over it1 himself1 and by his ,spirit3 over that part of it which is militant here on earth1 a government of discipline1 for the perfecting of the saints1 for the edifying his body3 till we all come in the unity of the faith1 and of the knowledge of the ,son of ,god1 unto a perfect man1 unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of ,christ4#bcg ,of this ,church1 all persons scattered over the world1 who live in obedience to his laws1 are members4 ,for these he is gone to prepare a place1 and will come again to receive them unto himself1 that where he is1 there they may be also2 and reign with him forever and ever3#bch and likewise to take vengeance on them that know not ,god1 and obey not his ,gospel4#bci ,against these parts of ,christ's office ,i find no objections1 but what are fully obviated in the beginning of this chapter4 ,lastly1 ,christ offered himself a propitiatory sacrifice1 and made atonement for the sins of the world2 which is mentioned last1 in regard to what is objected against it4 ,sacrifices of expiation were commanded the ,jews1 and obtained among most other nations1 from tradition1 whose original probably was revelation4 ,and they were continually repeated1 both occasionally1 and at the returns of stated times3 and made up great part of the external religion of mankind4 ,but now once in the end of the world ,christ appeared to put away sin by the sacrifice of himself4#bdj ,this sacrifice was1 in the highest degree and with the most extensive influence1 of that efficacy for obtaining pardon of sin1 which the heathens may be supposed to have thought their sacrifices to have been1 and which the ,jewish sacrifices really were in some degree1 and with regard to some persons4#bda ,how and in what particular way it had this efficacy1 there are not wanting persons who have endeavored to explain3 but ,i do not find that the ,scripture has explained it4 ,we seem to be very much in the dark concerning the manner in which the ancients understood atonement to be made1 i4e4 pardon to be obtained by sacrifices4 ,and if the ,scripture has1 as surely it has1 left this matter of the satisfaction of ,christ mysterious1 left somewhat in it unrevealed1 all conjectures about it must be1 if not evidently absurd1 yet at least uncertain4 ,nor has any one reason to complain for want of further information1 unless he can show his claim to it4 ,some have endeavored to explain the efficacy of what ,christ has done and suffered for us1 beyond what the ,scripture has authorized3 others1 probably because they could not explain it1 have been for taking it away1 and confining his office as ,redeemer of the world1 to his instruction1 example1 and government of the church4 ,whereas the doctrine of the ,gospel appears to be1 not only that he taught the efficacy of repentance1 but rendered it of the efficacy of which it is1 by what he did and suffered for us3 that he obtained for us the benefit of having our repentance accepted unto eternal life3 not only that he revealed to sinners1 that they were in a capacity of salvation1 and how they might obtain it2 but moreover that he put them into this capacity of salvation1 by what he did and suffered for them2 put us into a capacity of escaping future punishment1 and obtaining future happiness4 ,and it is our wisdom thankfully to accept the benefit1 by performing the conditions1 upon which it is offered1 on our part1 without disputing how it was procured on his4 ,for1 ,,vii4 ,since we neither know by what means punishment in a future state would have followed wickedness in this3 nor in what manner it would have been inflicted1 had it not been prevented2 nor all the reasons why its infliction would have been needful1 nor the particular nature of that state of happiness1 which ,christ is gone to prepare for his disciples3 and since we are ignorant how far any thing which we could do1 would1 alone and of itself1 have been effectual to prevent that punishment to which we were obnoxious1 and recover that happiness which we had forfeited2 it is most evident we are not judges1 antecedently to revelation1 whether a mediator was or was not necessary1 to obtain those ends3 to prevent that future punishment1 and bring mankind to the final happiness of their nature4 ,for the very same reasons1 upon supposition of the necessity of a mediator1 we are no more judges1 antecedently to revelation1 of the whole nature of his office1 or of the several parts of which it consists2 or of what was fit and requisite to be assigned him1 in order to accomplish the ends of divine ,providence in the appointment4 ,hence it follows1 that to object against the expediency or usefulness of particular things1 revealed to have been done or suffered by him1 because we do not see how they were conducive to those ends1 is highly absurd4 ,yet nothing is more common to be met with1 than this absurdity4 ,if it be acknowledged beforehand1 that we are not judges in the case1 it is evident that no objection can1 with any shadow of reason1 be urged against any particular part of ,christ's mediatorial office revealed in ,scripture1 till it can be shown positively not to be requisite or conducive to the ends proposed to be accomplished2 or that it is in itself unreasonable4 ,there is one objection made against the satisfaction of ,christ1 which looks to be of this positive kind3 that the doctrine of his being appointed to suffer for the sins of the world1 represents ,god as being indifferent whether he punished the innocent or the guilty4 ,now from the foregoing observations we may see the extreme slightness of all such objections2 and 7though it is most certain all who make them do not see the consequence7 that they conclude altogether as much against ,god's whole original constitution of nature1 and the whole daily course of divine ,providence in the government of the world1 7i4e4 against the whole scheme of ,theism and the whole notion of religion17 as against ,christianity4 ,for the world is a constitution or system1 whose parts have a mutual reference to each other3 and there is a scheme of things gradually carrying on1 called the course of nature1 to the carrying on of which ,god has appointed us1 in various ways1 to contribute4 ,and when1 in the daily course of natural providence1 it is appointed that innocent people should suffer for the faults of the guilty1 this is liable to the very same objection1 as the instance we are now considering4 ,the infinitely greater importance of that appointment of ,christianity1 which is objected against1 does not hinder but it may be1 as it plainly is1 an appointment of the very same kind1 with what the world affords us daily examples of4 ,nay1 if there were any force at all in the objection1 it would be stronger1 in one respect1 against natural providence1 than against ,christianity3 because under the former we are in many cases commanded1 and even necessitated whether we will or no1 to suffer for the faults of others2 whereas the sufferings of ,christ were voluntary4 ,the world's being under the righteous government of ,god does indeed imply1 that finally1 and upon the whole1 every one shall receive according to his personal deserts3 and the general doctrine of the whole ,scripture is1 that this shall be the completion of the divine government4 ,but during the progress1 and1 for aught we know1 even in order to the completion of this moral scheme1 vicarious punishments may be fit1 and absolutely necessary4 ,men by their follies run themselves into extreme distress2 into difficulties which would be absolutely fatal to them1 were it not for the interposition and assistance of others4 ,god commands by the law of nature1 that we afford them this assistance1 in many cases where we cannot do it without very great pains1 and labor1 and sufferings to ourselves4 ,we see in what variety of ways one person's sufferings contribute to the relief of another3 and how1 or by what particular means1 this comes to pass1 or follows1 from the constitution and laws of nature1 which came under our notice3 and1 being familiarized to it1 men are not shocked with it4 ,so that the reason of their insisting upon objections of the foregoing kind against the satisfaction of ,christ is1 either that they do not consider ,god's settled and uniform appointments as his appointments at all2 or else they forget that vicarious punishment is a providential appointment of every day's experience4 ,and then1 from their being unacquainted with the more general laws of nature or divine government over the world1 and not seeing how the sufferings of ,christ could contribute to the redemption of it1 unless by arbitrary and tyrannical will1 they conclude his sufferings could not contribute to it any other way4 ,and yet1 what has been often alleged in justification of this doctrine1 even from the apparent natural tendency of this method of our redemption2 its tendency to vindicate the authority of ,god's laws1 and deter his creatures from sin2 this has never yet been answered1 and is ,i think plainly unanswerable3 though ,i am far from thinking it an account of the whole of the case4 ,but1 without taking this into consideration1 it abundantly appears1 from the observations above made1 that this objection is not an objection against ,christianity1 but against the whole general constitution of nature4 ,and if it were to be considered as an objection against ,christianity1 or considering it as it is1 an objection against the constitution of nature2 it amounts to no more in conclusion than this1 that a divine appointment cannot be necessary or expedient1 because the objector does not discern it to be so3 though he must own that the nature of the case is such1 as renders him incapable of judging1 whether it be so or not2 or of seeing it to be necessary1 though it were so6 ,it is indeed a matter of great patience to reasonable men1 to find people arguing in this manner3 objecting against the credibility of such particular things revealed in ,scripture1 that they do not see the necessity or expediency of them4 ,for though it is highly right1 and the most pious exercise of our understanding1 to inquire with due reverence into the ends and reasons of ,god's dispensations3 yet when those reasons are concealed1 to argue from our ignorance1 that such dispensations cannot be from ,god1 is infinitely absurd4 ,the presumption of this kind of objections seems almost lost in the folly of them4 ,and the folly of them is yet greater1 when they are urged1 as usually they are1 against things in ,christianity analogous or like to those natural dispensations of ,providence1 which are matter of experience4 ,let reason be kept to3 and if any part of the ,scripture account of the redemption of the world by ,christ can be shown to be really contrary to it1 let the ,scripture1 in the name of ,god1 be given up4 ,but let not such poor creatures as we are1 go on objecting against an infinite scheme1 that we do not see the necessity or usefulness of all its parts1 and call this reasoning2 and1 which still further heightens the absurdity in the present case1 parts which we are not actively concerned in4 ,for it may be worth mentioning1 ,lastly1 ,that not only the reason of the thing1 but the whole analogy of nature1 should teach us1 not to expect to have the like information concerning the divine conduct1 as concerning our own duty4 ,god instructs us by experience1 7for it is not reason1 but experience which instructs us17 what good or bad consequences will follow from our acting in such and such manners3 and by this he directs us how we are to behave ourselves4 ,but1 though we are sufficiently instructed for the common purposes of life3 yet it is but an almost infinitely small part of natural providence1 which we are at all let into4 ,the case is the same with regard to revelation4 ,the doctrine of a mediator between ,god and man1 against which it is objected1 that the expediency of some things in it is not understood1 relates only to what was done on ,god's part in the appointment1 and on the ,mediator's in the execution of it4 ,for what is required of us1 in consequence of this gracious dispensation1 is another subject1 in which none can complain for want of information4 ,the constitution of the world1 and ,god's natural government over it1 is all mystery1 as much as the ,christian dispensation4 ,yet under the first he has given men all things pertaining to life2 and under the other all things pertaining unto godliness4 ,and it may be added1 that there is nothing hard to be accounted for in any of the common precepts of ,christianity3 though if there were1 surely a divine command is abundantly sufficient to lay us under the strongest obligations to obedience4 ,but the fact is1 that the reasons of all the ,christian precepts are evident4 ,positive institutions are manifestly necessary to keep up and propagate religion among mankind4 ,and our duty to ,christ1 the internal and external worship of him2 this part of the religion of the ,gospel manifestly arises out of what he has done and suffered1 his authority and dominion1 and the relation which he is revealed to stand in to us4#bdb ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,,the ,,want ,,of ,,universality ,,in ,,revelation2 ,,and ,,the ,,supposed ,,deficiency ,,in ,,the ,,proof ,,of ,,it4 ,it has been thought by some persons1 that if the evidence of revelation appears doubtful1 this itself turns into a positive argument against it3 because it cannot be supposed1 that1 if it were true1 it would be left to subsist upon doubtful evidence4 ,and the objection against revelation from its not being universal is often insisted upon as of great weight4 ,the weakness of these opinions may be shown1 by observing the suppositions on which they are founded3 which are really such as these2 that it cannot be thought ,god would have bestowed any favor at all upon us1 unless in the degree which we think he might1 and which1 we imagine1 would be most to our particular advantage2 and also that it cannot be thought he would bestow a favor upon any1 unless he bestowed the same upon all2 suppositions1 which we find contradicted1 not by a few instances in ,god's natural government of the world1 but by the general analogy of nature together4 ,persons who speak of the evidence of religion as doubtful1 and of this supposed doubtfulness as a positive argument against it1 should be put upon considering1 what that evidence is1 which they act upon with regard to their temporal interests4 ,it is not only extremely difficult1 but in many cases absolutely impossible1 to balance pleasure and pain1 satisfaction and uneasiness1 so as to be able to say on which side is the overplus4 ,there are the like difficulties and impossibilities in making the due allowances for a change of temper and taste1 for satiety1 disgusts1 ill health3 any of which render men incapable of enjoying1 after they have obtained what they most eagerly desired4 ,numberless too are the accidents1 besides that one of untimely death1 which may even probably disappoint the best-concerted schemes3 and strong objections are often seen to lie against them1 not to be removed or answered1 but which seem overbalanced by reasons on the other side2 so as that the certain difficulties and dangers of the pursuit are1 by every one2 thought justly disregarded1 upon account of the appearing greater advantages in case of success1 though there be but little probability of it4 ,lastly1 every one observes our liableness1 if we be not upon our guard1 to be deceived by the falsehood of men1 and the false appearances of things3 and this danger must be greatly increased1 if there be a strong bias within1 suppose from indulged passion1 to favor the deceit4 ,hence arises that great uncertainty and doubtfulness of proof1 wherein our temporal interest really consists2 what are the most probable means of attaining it2 and whether those means will eventually be successful4 ,and numberless instances there are1 in the daily course of life1 in which all men think it reasonable to engage in pursuits1 though the probability is greatly against succeeding2 and to make such provision for themselves1 as it is supposable they may have occasion for1 though the plain acknowledged probability is1 that they never shall4 ,those who think the objection against revelation1 from its light not being universal1 to be of weight1#bdc should observe1 that the ,author of nature1 in numberless instances1 bestows that upon some1 which he does not upon others1 who seem equally to stand in need of it4 ,indeed he appears to bestow all his gifts with the most promiscuous variety among creatures of the same species3 health and strength1 capacities of prudence and of knowledge1 means of improvement1 riches1 and all external advantages4 ,as there are not any two men found1 of exactly like shape and features2 so it is probable there are not any two1 of an exactly like constitution1 temper1 and situation1 with regard to the goods and evils of life4 ,yet1 notwithstanding these uncertainties and varieties1 ,god does exercise a natural government over the world2 and there is such a thing as a prudent and imprudent institution of life1 with regard to our health and our affairs1 under that his natural government4 ,as neither the ,jewish nor ,christian revelation have been universal2 and as they have been afforded to a greater or less part of the world1 at different times2 so likewise at different times1 both revelations have had different degrees of evidence4 ,the ,jews who lived during the succession of prophets1 that is1 from ,moses till after the ,captivity1 had higher evidence of the truth of their religion1 than those had1 who lived in the interval between the last-mentioned period1 and the coming of ,christ4 ,and the first ,christians had higher evidence of the miracles wrought in attestation of ,christianity1 than what we have now4 ,they had also a strong presumptive proof of the truth of it1 perhaps of much greater force1 in way of argument1 than many think1 of which we have very little remaining2 ,i mean the presumptive proof of its truth1 from the influence which it had upon the lives of the generality of its professors4 ,and we1 or future ages1 may possibly have a proof of it1 which they could not have1 from the conformity between the prophetic history1 and the state of the world#bdd and of ,christianity4 ,and further3 if we were to suppose the evidence1 which some have of religion1 to amount to little more than seeing that it may be true2 but that they remain in great doubts and uncertainties about both its evidence and its nature1 and great perplexities concerning the rule of life3 others to have a full conviction of the truth of religion1 with a distinct knowledge of their duty2 and others severally to have all the intermediate degrees of religious light and evidence1 which lie between these two--if we put the case1 that for the present1 it was intended that revelation should be no more than a small light1 in the midst of a world greatly overspread1 notwithstanding it1 with ignorance and darkness3 that certain glimmerings of this light should extend1 and be directed1 to remote distances1 in such a manner as that those who really partook of it should not discern whence it originally came3 that some in a nearer situation to it should have its light obscured1 and1 in different ways and degrees1 intercepted3 and that others should be placed within its clearer influence1 and be much more enlivened1 cheered1 and directed by it2 but yet that even to these it should be no more than a light shining in a dark place3 all this would be perfectly uniform1 and of a piece with the conduct of ,providence1 in the distribution of its other blessings4 ,if the fact of the case really were1 that some have received no light at all from the ,scripture2 as many ages and countries in the heathen world3 that others1 though they have1 by means of it1 had essential or natural religion enforced upon their consciences1 yet have never had the genuine ,scripture revelation1 with its real evidence1 proposed to their consideration2 and the ancient ,persians and modern ,mahometans may possibly be instances of people in a situation somewhat like to this2 that others1 though they have had the ,scripture laid before them as of divine revelation1 yet have had it with the system and evidence of ,christianity so interpolated1 the system so corrupted1 the evidence so blended with false miracles1 as to leave the mind in the utmost doubtfulness and uncertainty about the whole2 which may be the state of some thoughtful men1 in most of those nations who call themselves ,christian3 and lastly1 that others have had ,christianity offered to them in its genuine simplicity1 and with its proper evidence1 as persons in countries and churches of civil and of ,christian liberty2 but that even these persons are left in great ignorance in many respects1 and have by no means light afforded them enough to satisfy their curiosity1 but only to regulate their life1 to teach them their duty1 and encourage them in the careful discharge of it4 ,i say1 if we were to suppose this somewhat of a general true account of the degrees of moral and religious light and evidence1 which were intended to be afforded mankind1 and of what has actually been and is their situation1 in their moral and religious capacity2 there would be nothing in all this ignorance1 doubtfulness1 and uncertainty1 in all these varieties1 and supposed disadvantages of some in comparison of others1 respecting religion1 but may be paralleled by manifest analogies in the natural dispensations of ,providence at present1 considering ourselves merely in our temporal capacity4 ,nor is there any thing shocking in all this1 or which would seem to bear hard upon the moral administration in nature1 if we would really keep in mind1 that every one shall be dealt equitably with3 instead of forgetting this1 or explaining it away1 after it is acknowledged in words4 ,all shadow of injustice1 and indeed all harsh appearances1 in this various economy of ,providence1 would be lost1 if we would keep in mind1 that every merciful allowance shall be made1 and no more be required of any one1 than what might have been equitably expected of him1 from the circumstances in which he was placed2 and not what might have been expected1 had he been placed in other circumstances3 i4e4 in ,scripture language1 that every man shall be accepted according to what he had1 not according to what he had not4#bde ,this however does not by any means imply1 that all persons' condition here is equally advantageous with respect to futurity4 ,and ,providence's designing to place some in greater darkness with respect to religious knowledge1 is no more a reason why they should not endeavor to get out of that darkness1 and others to bring them out of it1 than why ignorant and slow people in matters of other knowledge should not endeavor to learn1 or should not be instructed4 ,it is not unreasonable to suppose1 that the same wise and good principle1 whatever it was1 which disposed the ,author of nature to make different kinds and orders of creatures1 disposed him also to place creatures of like kinds in different situations4 ,and that the same principle which disposed him to make creatures of different moral capacities1 disposed him also to place creatures of like moral capacities in different religious situations2 and even the same creatures1 in different periods of their being4 ,the account or reason of this is also most probably the account why the constitution of things is such1 as that creatures of moral natures or capacities1 for a considerable part of that duration in which they are living agents1 are not at all subjects of morality and religion2 but grow up to be so1 and grow up to be so more and more1 gradually from childhood to mature age4 ,what1 in particular1 is the account or reason of these things1 we must be greatly in the dark1 were it only that we know so very little even of our own case4 ,our present state may possibly be the consequence of something past1 of which we are wholly ignorant3 as it has a reference to somewhat to come1 of which we know scarce any more than is necessary for practice4 ,a system or constitution1 in its notion1 implies variety2 and so complicated a one as this world1 very great variety4 ,so that were revelation universal1 yet1 from men's different capacities of understanding1 from the different lengths of their lives1 their different educations and other external circumstances1 and from their difference of temper and bodily constitution1 their religious situations would be widely different1 and the disadvantage of some in comparison of others1 perhaps1 altogether as much as at present4 ,the true account1 whatever it be1 why mankind1 or such a part of mankind1 are placed in this condition of ignorance1 must be supposed also the true account of our further ignorance1 in not knowing the reasons why1 or whence it is1 that they are placed in this condition4 ,the following practical reflections may deserve the serious consideration of those persons1 who think the circumstances of mankind or their own1 in the forementioned respects1 a ground of complaint4 ,first1 ,the evidence of religion not appearing obvious1 may constitute one particular part of some men's trial in the religious sense3 as it gives scope1 for a virtuous exercise1 or vicious neglect of their understanding1 in examining or not examining into that evidence4 ,there seems no possible reason to be given1 why we may not be in a state of moral probation1 with regard to the exercise of our understanding upon the subject of religion1 as we are with regard to our behavior in common affairs4 ,the former is as much a thing within our power and choice as the latter4 ,and ,i suppose it is to be laid down for certain1 that the same character1 the same inward principle1 which1 after a man is convinced of the truth of religion1 renders him obedient to the precepts of it1 would1 were he not thus convinced1 set him about an examination of it1 upon its system and evidence being offered to his thoughts3 and that in the latter state his examination would be with an impartiality1 seriousness1 and solicitude1 proportionable to what his obedience is in the former4 ,and as inattention1 negligence1 want of all serious concern1 about a matter of such a nature and such importance1 when offered to men's consideration1 is1 before a distinct conviction of its truth1 as real depravity and dissoluteness1 as neglect of religious practice after such conviction3 so active solicitude about it1 and fair impartial consideration of its evidence before such conviction1 is as really an exercise of a morally right temper2 as is religious practice after4 ,thus1 that religion is not intuitively true1 but a matter of deduction and inference2 that a conviction of its truth is not forced upon every one1 but left to be1 by some1 collected with heedful attention to premises2 this as much constitutes religious probation1 as much affords sphere1 scope1 opportunity1 for right and wrong behavior1 as any thing whatever does4 ,and their manner of treating this subject1 when laid before them1 shows what is in their heart1 and is an exertion of it4 ,secondly1 ,it appears to be a thing as evident1 though it is not so much attended to1 that if1 upon consideration of religion1 the evidence of it should seem to any persons doubtful1 in the highest supposable degree2 even this doubtful evidence will1 however1 put them into a general state of probation in the moral and religious sense4 ,for1 suppose a man to be really in doubt1 whether such a person had not done him the greatest favor2 or1 whether his whole temporal interest did not depend upon that person2 no one1 who had any sense of gratitude and of prudence1 could possibly consider himself in the same situation1 with regard to such person1 as if he had no such doubt4 ,in truth1 it is as just to say1 that certainty and doubt are the same1 as to say the situations now mentioned would leave a man as entirely at liberty in point of gratitude or prudence1 as he would be1 were he certain he had received no favor from such person2 or that he no way depended upon him4 ,thus1 though the evidence of religion which is afforded to some men should be little more than they are given to see1 the system of ,christianity1 or religion in general1 to be supposable and credible2 this ought in all reason to beget a serious practical apprehension1 that it may be true4 ,and even this will afford matter of exercise for religious suspense and deliberation1 for moral resolution and self-government2 because the apprehension that religion may be true does as really lay men under obligations1 as a full conviction that it is true4 ,it gives occasion and motives to consider further the important subject2 to preserve attentively upon their minds a general implicit sense that they may be under divine moral government1 an awful solicitude about religion1 whether natural or revealed4 ,such apprehension ought to turn men's eyes to every degree of new light which may be had1 from whatever side it comes2 and induce them to refrain1 in the mean time1 from all immoralities1 and live in the conscientious practice of every common virtue4 ,especially are they bound to keep at the greatest distance from all dissolute profaneness1 for this the very nature of the case forbids2 and to treat with highest reverence a matter1 upon which their own whole interest and being1 and the fate of nature1 depend4 ,this behavior1 and an active endeavor to maintain within themselves this temper1 is the business1 the duty1 and the wisdom of those persons1 who complain of the doubtfulness of religion3 is what they are under the most proper obligations to4 ,and such behavior is an exertion of1 and has a tendency to improve in them1 that character1 which the practice of all the several duties of religion1 from a full conviction of its truth1 is an exertion of1 and has a tendency to improve in others3 others1 ,i say1 to whom ,god has afforded such conviction4 ,nay1 considering the infinite importance of religion1 revealed as well as natural1 ,i think it may be said in general1 that whoever will weigh the matter thoroughly may see1 there is not near so much difference1 as is commonly imagined1 between what ought in reason to be the rule of life1 to those persons who are fully convinced of its truth1 and to those who have only a serious doubting apprehension1 that it may be true4 ,their hopes1 and fears1 and obligations1 will be in various degrees3 but1 as the subject-matter of their hopes and fears is the same1 so the subject-matter of their obligations1 what they are bound to do and to refrain from1 is not so very unlike4 ,it is to be observed further1 that1 from a character of understanding1 or a situation of influence in the world1 some persons have it in their power to do infinitely more harm or good1 by setting an example of profaneness and avowed disregard to all religion1 or1 on the contrary1 of a serious1 though perhaps doubting1 apprehension of its truth1 and of a reverent regard to it under this doubtfulness2 than they can do1 by acting well or ill in all the common intercourses among mankind4 ,consequently they are most highly accountable for a behavior1 which1 they may easily foresee1 is of such importance1 and in which there is most plainly a right and a wrong2 even admitting the evidence of religion to be as doubtful as is pretended4 ,the ground of these observations1 and that which renders them just and true1 is1 that doubting necessarily implies some degree of evidence for that1 of which we doubt4 ,for no person would be in doubt concerning the truth of a number of facts so and so circumstanced1 which should accidentally come into his thoughts1 and of which he had no evidence at all4 ,and though in the case of an even chance1 and where consequently we were in doubt1 we should in common language say1 that we had no evidence at all for either side2 yet that situation of things1 which renders it an even chance and no more1 that such an event will happen1 renders this case equivalent to all others1 where there is such evidence on both sides of a question1#bdf as leaves the mind in doubt concerning the truth4 ,indeed in all these cases1 there is no more evidence on one side than on the other2 but there is 7what is equivalent to7 much more for either1 than for the truth of a number of facts1 which come into one's thoughts at random4 ,thus1 in all these cases1 doubt as much presupposes evidence1 in lower degrees1 as belief presupposes higher1 and certainty higher still4 ,any one1 who will a little attend to the nature of evidence1 will easily carry this observation on1 and see1 that between no evidence at all1 and that degree of it which affords ground of doubt1 there are as many intermediate degrees1 as there are1 between that degree which is the ground of doubt1 and demonstration4 ,and though we have not faculties to distinguish these degrees of evidence with any sort of exactness2 yet1 in proportion as they are discerned1 they ought to influence our practice4 ,it is as real an imperfection in the moral character1 not to be influenced in practice by a lower degree of evidence when discerned1 as it is in the understanding1 not to discern it4 ,and as1 in all subjects which men consider1 they discern the lower as well as higher degrees of evidence1 proportionably to their capacity of understanding2 so1 in practical subjects1 they are influenced in practice1 by the lower as well as higher degrees of it1 proportionably to their fairness and honesty4 ,and as1 in proportion to defects in the understanding1 men are unapt to see lower degrees of evidence1 are in danger of overlooking evidence when it is not glaring1 and are easily imposed upon in such cases2 so1 in proportion to the corruption of the heart1 they seem capable of satisfying themselves with having no regard in practice to evidence acknowledged to be real1 if it be not overbearing4 ,from these things it must follow1 that doubting concerning religion implies such a degree of evidence for it1 as1 joined with the consideration of its importance1 unquestionably lays men under the obligations before mentioned1 to have a dutiful regard to it in all their behavior4 ,thirdly1 ,the difficulties in which the evidence of religion is involved1 which some complain of1 is no more a just ground of complaint1 than the external circumstances of temptation1 which others are placed in2 or than difficulties in the practice of it1 after a full conviction of its truth4 ,temptations render our state a more improving state of discipline1#bdg than it would be otherwise3 as they give occasion for a more attentive exercise of the virtuous principle1 which confirms and strengthens it more1 than an easier or less attentive exercise of it could4 ,speculative difficulties are1 in this respect1 of the very same nature with these external temptations4 ,for the evidence of religion not appearing obvious1 is to some persons a temptation to reject it1 without any consideration at all2 and therefore requires such an attentive exercise of the virtuous principle1 seriously to consider that evidence1 as there would be no occasion for1 but for such temptation4 ,and the supposed doubtfulness of its evidence1 after it has been in some sort considered1 affords opportunity to an unfair mind of explaining away1 and deceitfully hiding from itself1 that evidence which it might see2 and also for men's encouraging themselves in vice1 from hopes of impunity1 though they do clearly see thus much at least1 that these hopes are uncertain4 ,in like manner the common temptation to many instances of folly1 which end in temporal infamy and ruin1 is the ground for hope of not being detected1 and of escaping with impunity2 i4e4 the doubtfulness of the proof beforehand1 that such foolish behavior will thus end in infamy and ruin4 ,on the contrary1 supposed doubtfulness in the evidence of religion calls for a more careful and attentive exercise of the virtuous principle1 in fairly yielding themselves up to the proper influence of any real evidence1 though doubtful2 and in practising conscientiously all virtue1 though under some uncertainty1 whether the government in the universe may not possibly be such1 as that vice may escape with impunity4 ,and in general1 temptation1 meaning by this word the lesser allurements to wrong and difficulties in the discharge of our duty1 as well as the greater ones2 temptation1 ,i say1 as such and of every kind and degree1 as it calls forth some virtuous efforts1 additional to what would otherwise have been wanting1 cannot but be an additional discipline and improvement of virtue1 as well as probation of it in the other senses of that word4#bdh ,so that the very same account is to be given1 why the evidence of religion should be left in such a manner1 as to require1 in some1 an attentive1 solicitous1 perhaps painful exercise of their understanding about it2 as why others should be placed in such circumstances1 as that the practice of its common duties1 after a full conviction of the truth of it1 should require attention1 solicitude1 and pains3 or1 why appearing doubtfulness should be permitted to afford matter of temptation to some2 as why external difficulties and allurements should be permitted to afford matter of temptation to others4 ,the same account also is to be given1 why some should be exercised with temptations of both these kinds2 as why others should be exercised with the latter in such very high degrees1 as some have been1 particularly as the primitive ,christians were4 ,nor does there appear any absurdity in supposing1 that the speculative difficulties1 in which the evidence of religion is involved1 may make even the principal part of some persons' trial4 ,for as the chief temptations of the generality of the world are the ordinary motives to injustice1 or unrestrained pleasure1 or to live in the neglect of religion1 from that frame of mind which renders many persons almost without feeling as to any thing distant1 or which is not the object of their senses2 so there are other persons without this shallowness of temper1 persons of a deeper sense as to what is invisible and future2 who not only see1 but have a general practical feeling1 that what is to come will be present1 and that things are not less real for their not being the objects of sense2 and who1 from their natural constitution of body and of temper1 and from their external condition1 may have small temptations to behave ill1 small difficulty in behaving well1 in the common course of life4 ,now when these latter persons have a distinct full conviction of me truth of religion1 without any possible doubts or difficulties1 the practice of it is to them unavoidable1 unless they do a constant violence to their own minds2 and religion is scarce any more a discipline to them1 than it is to creatures in a state of perfection4 ,yet these persons may possibly stand in need of moral discipline and exercise1 in a higher degree than they would have by such an easy practice of religion4 ,or it may be requisite1 for reasons unknown to us1 that they should give some further manifestation#bdi what is their moral character1 to the creation of ,god1 than such a practice of it would be4 ,thus in the great variety of religious situations in which men are placed1 what constitutes1 what chiefly and peculiarly constitutes1 the probation1 in all senses1 of some persons1 may be the difficulties in which the evidence of religion is involved3 and their principal and distinguished trial may be1 how they will behave under and with respect to these difficulties4 ,circumstances in men's situation in their temporal capacity1 analogous in good measure to this respecting religion1 are to be observed4 ,we find some persons are placed in such a situation in the world1 as that their chief difficulty with regard to conduct1 is not the doing what is prudent when it is known2 for this1 in numberless cases1 is as easy as the contrary3 but to some the principal exercise is1 recollection and being upon their guard against deceits1 the deceits suppose of those about them2 against false appearances of reason and prudence4 ,to persons in some situations1 the principal exercise with respect to conduct is1 attention in order to inform themselves what is proper1 what is really the reasonable and prudent part to act4 ,fourthly4 ,as ,i have hitherto gone upon supposition1 that men's dissatisfaction with the evidence of religion is not owing to their neglects or prejudices2 it must be added1 on the other hand1 in all common reason1 and as what the truth of the case plainly requires should be added1 that such dissatisfaction possibly may be owing to those1 possibly may be men's own fault4 ,for1 ,if there are any persons1 who never set themselves heartily and in earnest to be informed in religion3 if there are any1 who secretly wish it may not prove true2 and are less attentive to evidence than to difficulties1 and more to objections than to what is said in answer to them3 these persons will scarce be thought in a likely way of seeing the evidence of religion1 though it were most certainly true1 and capable of being ever so fully proved4 ,if any accustom themselves to consider this subject in the way of mirth and sport3 if they attend to forms and representations1 and inadequate manners of expression1 instead of the real things intended by them3 7for signs often can be no more than inadequately expressive of the things signified37 or if they substitute human errors in the room of divine truth2 why may not all1 or any of these things1 hinder some men from seeing that evidence1 which really is seen by others2 as a like turn of mind1 with respect to matters of common speculation and practice1 does1 we find by experience1 hinder them from attaining that knowledge and right understanding1 in matters of common speculation and practice1 which more fair and attentive minds attain to8 ,and the effect will be the same1 whether their neglect of seriously considering the evidence of religion1 and their indirect behavior with regard to it1 proceed from mere carelessness1 or from the grosser vices2 or whether it be owing to this1 that forms and figurative manners of expression1 as well as errors1 administer occasions of ridicule1 when the things intended1 and the truth itself1 would not4 ,men may indulge a ludicrous turn so far as to lose all sense of conduct and prudence in worldly affairs1 and even1 as it seems1 to impair their faculty of reason4 ,and in general1 levity1 carelessness1 passion1 and prejudice do hinder us from being rightly informed1 with respect to common things3 and they may1 in like manner1 and perhaps1 in some further providential manner1 with respect to moral and religious subjects3 may hinder evidence from being laid before us1 and from being seen when it is4 ,the ,scripture#bej does declare1 that every one shall not understand4 ,and it makes no difference1 by what providential conduct this comes to pass3 whether the evidence of ,christianity was1 originally and with design1 put and left so1 as that those who are desirous of evading moral obligations should not see it2 and that honest-minded persons should3 or1 whether it comes to pass by any other means4 ,further3 ,fifthly4 ,the general proof of natural religion and of ,christianity does1 ,i think1 lie level to common men3 even those1 the greatest part of whose time1 from childhood to old age1 is taken up with providing for themselves and their families the common conveniences1 perhaps necessaries1 of life3 those ,i mean1 of this rank1 who ever think at all of asking after proof1 or attending to it4 ,common men1 were they as much in earnest about religion1 as about their temporal affairs1 are capable of being convinced upon real evidence1 that there is a ,god who governs the world3 and they feel themselves to be of a moral nature1 and accountable creatures4 ,and as ,christianity entirely falls in with this their natural sense of things1 so they are capable1 not only of being persuaded1 but of being made to see1 that there is evidence of miracles wrought in attestation of it1 and many appearing completions of prophecy4 ,this proof1 though real and conclusive1 is liable to objections1 and may be run up into difficulties2 which however persons who are capable not only of talking of1 but of really seeing1 are capable also of seeing through3 i4e4 not of clearing up and answering them1 so as to satisfy their curiosity1 for of such knowledge we are not capable with respect to any one thing in nature2 but capable of seeing that the proof is not lost in these difficulties1 or destroyed by these objections4 ,but then a thorough examination into religion with regard to these objections1 which cannot be the business of every man1 is a matter of pretty large compass1 and1 from the nature of it1 requires some knowledge1 as well as time and attention2 to see1 how the evidence comes out1 upon balancing one thing with another1 and what1 upon the whole1 is the amount of it4 ,if persons who pick up these objections from others1 and take for granted they are of weight1 upon the word of those from whom they received them1 or1 by often retailing of them1 come to see or fancy they see them to be of weight2 will not prepare themselves for such an examination1 with a competent degree of knowledge2 or will not give that time and attention to the subject1 which1 from the nature of it1 is necessary for attaining such information3 in this case1 they must remain in doubtfulness1 ignorance1 or error3 in the same way as they must1 with regard to common sciences1 and matters of common life1 if they neglect the necessary means of being informed in them4 ,perhaps it will still be objected1 that if a prince or common master were to send directions to a servant1 he would take care1 that they should always bear the certain marks1 who they came from1 and that their sense should be always plain3 so as that there should be no possible doubt if he could help it1 concerning the authority or meaning of them4 ,the proper answer to all this kind of objections is1 that1 wherever the fallacy lies1 it is even certain we cannot argue thus with respect to ,him who is the ,governor of the world3 and that he does not afford us such information1 with respect to our temporal affairs and interests1 experience abundantly shows4 ,however1 there is a full answer to this objection1 from the very nature of religion4 ,the reason why a prince would give his directions in this plain manner is1 that he absolutely desires an external action done1 without concerning himself with the motive or principle upon which it is done3 i4e4 he regards only the external event1 or the thing's being done2 and not at all1 properly speaking1 the doing of it1 or the action4 ,whereas the whole of morality and religion consisting merely in action itself1 there is no sort of parallel between the cases4 ,but if the prince be supposed to regard only the action2 i4e4 only to desire to exercise1 or in any sense prove1 the understanding or loyalty of a servant2 he would not always give his orders in such a plain manner4 ,it may be proper to add1 that the will of ,god1 respecting morality and religion1 may be considered either as absolute1 or as only conditional4 ,if it be absolute1 it can only be thus1 that we should act virtuously in such given circumstances2 not that we should be brought to act so1 by this changing of our circumstances4 ,and if ,god's will be thus absolute1 then it is in our power1 in the highest and strictest sense1 to do or to contradict his will2 which is a most weighty consideration4 ,or his will may be considered only as conditional1 that if we act so and so1 we shall be rewarded3 if otherwise1 punished3 of which conditional will of the ,author of nature1 the whole constitution of it affords most certain instances4 ,upon the whole3 that we are in a state of religion necessarily implies1 that we are in a state of probation3 and the credibility of our being at all in such a state being admitted1 there seems no peculiar difficulty in supposing our probation to be1 just as it is1 in those respects which are above objected against4 ,there seems no pretence1 from the reason of the thing1 to say1 that the trial cannot equitably be any thing1 but whether persons will act suitably to certain information1 or such as admits no room for doubt2 so as that there can be no danger of miscarriage1 but either from their not attending to what they certainly know1 or from overbearing passion hurrying them on to act contrary to it4 ,for1 since ignorance and doubt1 afford scope for probation in all senses1 as really as intuitive conviction or certainty2 and since the two former are to be put to the same account as difficulties in practice2 men's moral probation may also be1 whether they will take due care to inform themselves by impartial consideration1 and afterwards whether they will act as the case requires1 upon the evidence which they have1 however doubtful4 ,and this1 we find by experience1 is frequently our probation1#bea in our temporal capacity4 ,for1 the information which we want with regard to our worldly interests is by no means always given us of course1 without any care of our own4 ,and we are greatly liable to self-deceit from inward secret prejudices1 and also to the deceits of others4 ,so that to be able to judge what is the prudent part1 often requires much and difficult consideration4 ,then after we have judged the very best we can1 the evidence upon which we must act1 if we will live and act at all1 is perpetually doubtful to a very high degree4 ,and the constitution and course of the world in fact is such1 as that want of impartial consideration what we have to do1 and venturing upon extravagant courses because it is doubtful what will be the consequence1 are often naturally1 i4e4 providentially1 altogether as fatal1 as misconduct occasioned by heedless inattention to what we certainly know1 or disregarding it from overbearing passion4 ,several of the observations here made may well seem strange1 perhaps unintelligible1 to many good men4 ,but if the persons for whose sake they are made think so1 7persons who object as above1 and throw off all regard to religion under pretence of want of evidence27 ,i desire them to consider again1 whether their thinking so be owing to any thing unintelligible in these observations1 or to their own not having such a sense of religion and serious solicitude about it1 as even their state of scepticism does in all reason require8 ,it ought to be forced upon the reflection of these persons1 that our nature and condition necessarily require us1 in the daily course of life1 to act upon evidence much lower than what is commonly called probable3 to guard1 not only against what we fully believe will1 but also against what we think it supposable may1 happen2 and to engage in pursuits when the probability is greatly against success1 if it even be credible1 that possibly we may succeed in them4 ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,,the ,,particular ,,evidence ,,for ,,christianity4 ,the presumptions against revelation1 and objections against the general scheme of ,christianity1 and particular things relating to it1 being removed1 there remains to be considered1 what positive evidence we have for the truth of it2 chiefly in order to see1 what the analogy of nature suggests with regard to that evidence1 and the objections against it3 or to see what is1 and is allowed to be1 the plain natural rule of judgment and of action1 in our temporal concerns1 in cases where we have the same kind of evidence1 and the same kind of objections against it1 that we have in the case before us4 ,in the evidence of ,christianity there seem to be several things of great weight1 not reducible to the head1 either of miracles1 or the completion of prophecy1 in the common acceptation of the words4 ,but these two are its direct and fundamental proofs3 and those other things1 however considerable they are1 yet ought never to be urged apart from its direct proofs1 but always to be joined with them4 ,thus the evidence of ,christianity will be a long series of things1 reaching1 as it seems1 from the beginning of the world to the present time1 of great variety and compass1 taking in both the direct and also the collateral1 proofs1 and making up1 all of them together1 one argument4 ,the conviction arising from this kind of proof may be compared to what they call the effect1 in architecture or other works of art2 a result from a great number of things1 so and so disposed1 and taken into one view4 ,i shall therefore1 first1 make some observations relating to miracles1 and the appearing completions of prophecy2 and consider what analogy suggests1 in answer to the objections brought against this evidence4 ,and1 secondly1 ,i shall endeavor to give some account of the general argument now mentioned1 consisting both of the direct and collateral evidence1 considered as making up one argument3 this being the kind of proof1 upon which we determine most questions of difficulty1 concerning common facts1 alleged to have happened1 or seeming likely to happen2 especially questions relating to conduct4 ,first1 ,i shall make some observations upon the direct proof of ,christianity from miracles and prophecy1 and upon the objections alleged against it4#beb ,i4 ,now the following observations relating to the historical evidence of miracles wrought in attestation of ,christianity appear to be of great weight4 #a4 ,the ,old ,testament affords us the same historical evidence of the miracles of ,moses and of the prophets1 as of the common civil history of ,moses and the kings of ,israel2 or1 as of the affairs of the ,jewish nation4 ,and the ,gospels and the ,acts afford us the same historical evidence of the miracles of ,christ and the apostles1 as of the common matters related in them4 ,this indeed could not have been affirmed by any reasonable man1 if the authors of these books1 like many other historians1 had appeared to aim at an entertaining manner of writing1 and hence interspersed miracles in their works1 at proper distances and upon proper occasions4 ,these might have animated a dull relation1 amused the reader1 and engaged his attention4 ,and the same account would naturally have been given of them1 as of the speeches and descriptions given by such authors3 the same account1 in a manner1 as is to be given1 why the poets make use of wonders and prodigies4 ,but the facts1 both miraculous and natural1 in ,scripture1 are related in plain unadorned narratives1 and both of them appear1 in all respects1 to stand upon the same foot of historical evidence4#bec ,further3 some parts of ,scripture1 containing an account of miracles fully sufficient to prove the truth of ,christianity1 are quoted as genuine1 from the age in which they are said to be written1 down to the present3 and no other parts of them1 material in the present question1 are omitted to be quoted in such manner1 as to afford any sort of proof of their not being genuine4 ,and1 as common history1 when called in question in any instance1 may often be greatly confirmed by contemporary or subsequent events more known and acknowledged2 and as the common ,scripture history1 like many others1 is thus confirmed2 so likewise is the miraculous history of it1 not only in particular instances1 but in general4 ,for1 the establishment of the ,jewish and ,christian religions1 which were events contemporary with the miracles related to be wrought in attestation of both1 or subsequent to them1 these events are just what we should have expected1 upon supposition such miracles were really wrought to attest the truth of those religions4 ,these miracles are a satisfactory account of those events3 of which no other satisfactory account can be given2 nor any account at all1 but what is merely imaginary and invented4 ,it is to be added1 that the most obvious1 the most easy and direct account of this history1 how it came to be written1 and to be received in the world as a true history1 is that it really is so2 nor can any other account of it be easy and direct4 ,now1 though an account1 not at all obvious1 but very far-fetched and indirect1 may be and often is1 the true account of a matter1 yet it cannot be admitted on the authority of its being asserted4 ,mere guess1 supposition1 and possibility1 when opposed to historical evidence1 prove nothing1 but that historical evidence is not demonstrative4 ,the just consequence from all this1 ,i think is1 that the ,scripture history in general is to be admitted as an authentic genuine history1 till something positive be alleged sufficient to invalidate it4 ,no man will deny the consequence to be1 that it cannot be rejected1 or thrown by as of no authority1 till it can be proved to be of none2 even though the evidence now mentioned for its authority were doubtful4 ,this evidence may be confronted by historical evidence on the other side1 if there be any3 or general incredibility in the things related1 or inconsistence in the general turn of the history1 would prove it to be of no authority4 ,but since1 upon the face of the matter1 upon a first and general view1 the appearance is1 that it is an authentic history1 it cannot be determined to be fictitious1 without some proof that it is so4 ,the following observations in support of these1 and coincident with them1 will greatly confirm the historical evidence for the truth of ,christianity4 #b4 ,the ,epistles of ,paul1 from the nature of epistolary writing1 and moreover from several of them being written1 not to particular persons but to churches1 carry in them evidences of their being genuine1 beyond what can be in a mere historical narrative1 left to the world at large4 ,this evidence1#bed joined with that which they have in common with the rest of the ,new ,testament1 seems not to leave so much as any particular pretence for denying their genuineness1 considered as an ordinary matter of fact1 or of criticism3 ,i say particular pretence1 for denying it2 because any single fact1 of such a kind and such antiquity1 may have general doubts raised concerning it1 from the very nature of human affairs and human testimony4 ,there is also to be mentioned a distinct and particular evidence of the genuineness of the epistle chiefly referred to here1 the first to the ,corinthians2 from the manner in which it is quoted by ,clemens ,romanus1 in an epistle of his own to that church4#bee ,now these epistles afford a proof of ,christianity1 detached from all others1 which is1 ,i think1 a thing of weight2 and also a proof of a nature and kind peculiar to itself4 ,for1 ,in them the author declares1 that he received the ,gospel in general1 and the institution of the ,communion in particular1 not from the rest of the apostles1 or jointly together with them1 but alone1 from ,christ himself2 whom he declares likewise1 conformably to the history in the ,acts1 that he saw after his ascension4#bef ,so that the testimony of ,paul is to be considered1 as detached from that of the rest of the apostles4 ,he declares further1 that he was endued with a power of working miracles1 as what was publicly known to those very people1 speaks of frequent and great variety of miraculous gifts as then subsisting in those very churches1 to which he was writing2 which he was reproving for several irregularities1 and where he had personal opposers4 ,he mentions these gifts incidentally1 in the most easy manner1 and without effort2 by way of reproof to those who had them1 for their indecent use of them2 and by way of depreciating them1 in comparison of moral virtues4 ,in short he speaks to these churches1 of these miraculous powers1 in the manner any one would speak to another of a thing1 which was as familiar1 and as much known in common to them both1 as any thing in the world4#beg ,and this1 as hath been observed by several persons1 is surely a very considerable thing4 #c4 ,it is an acknowledged historical fact1 that ,christianity offered itself to the world1 and demanded to be received1 upon the allegation1 7i4e4 as unbelievers would speak1 upon the pretence17 of miracles1 publicly wrought to attest the truth of it1 in such an age2 and that it was actually received by great numbers in that very age1 and upon the professed belief of the reality of these miracles4 ,and ,christianity1 including the dispensation of the ,old ,testament1 seems distinguished by this from all other religions4 ,i mean1 that this does not appear to be the case with regard to any other2 for surely it will not be supposed to lie upon any person1 to prove by positive historical evidence1 that it was not4 ,it does in no sort appear that ,mahometanism was first received in the world upon the foot of supposed miracles1#beh i4e4 public ones3#bei for1 as revelation is itself miraculous1 all pretence to it must necessarily imply some pretence of miracles4 ,and it is a known fact1 that it was immediately1 at the very first1 propagated by other means4 ,and as particular institutions1 whether in ,paganism or ,popery1 said to be confirmed by miracles after those institutions had obtained1 are not to the purpose3 so1 were there what might be called historical proof1 that any of them were introduced by a supposed divine command1 believed to be attested by miracles2 these would not be in any wise parallel4 ,for single things of this sort are easy to be accounted for1 after parties are formed1 and have power in their hands2 and the leaders of them are in veneration with the multitude2 and political interests are blended with religious claims1 and religious distinctions4 ,but before any thing of this kind1 for a few persons1 and those of the lowest rank1 all at once1 to bring over such great numbers to a new religion1 and get it to be received upon the particular evidence of miracles2 this is quite another thing4 ,i think it will be allowed by any fair adversary1 that the fact now mentioned1 taking in all the circumstances1 is peculiar to the ,christian religion4 ,however1 the fact itself is allowed1 that ,christianity obtained1 i4e4 was professed to be received in the world1 upon the belief of miracles1 immediately in the age in which it is said those miracles were wrought3 or that this is what its first converts would have alleged1 as the reason for their embracing it4 ,it is not to be supposed that such numbers of men1 in the most distant parts of the world1 should forsake the religion of their country1 in which they had been educated2 separate themselves from their friends1 particularly in their festival shows and solemnities1 to which the common people are so greatly addicted1 and which were of a nature to engage them much more1 than any thing of that sort among us3 and embrace a religion1 which could not but expose them to many inconveniences1 and indeed must have been a giving up the world in a great degree1 even from the very first1 and before the empire engaged in form against them3 it cannot be supposed1 that such numbers should make so great1 and to say the least1 so inconvenient a change in their whole institution of life1 unless they were really convinced of the truth of those miracles1 upon the knowledge or belief of which they professed to make it4 ,and it will1 ,i suppose1 readily be acknowledged1 that the generality of the first converts to ,christianity must have believed them3 that as by becoming ,christians they declared to the world1 they were satisfied of the truth of those miracles2 so this declaration was to be credited4 ,and this their testimony is the same kind of evidence for those miracles1 as if they had put it in writing1 and these writings had come down to us4 ,and it is real evidence1 because it is of facts1 which they had capacity and full opportunity to inform themselves of4 ,it is also distinct from the direct or express historical evidence1 though it is of the same kind3 and would be allowed to be distinct in all cases4 ,for were a fact expressly related by one or more ancient historians1 and disputed in after ages2 that this fact is acknowledged to have been believed by great numbers of the age in which the historian says it was done1 would be allowed an additional proof of such fact1 quite distinct from the express testimony of the historian4 ,the credulity of mankind is acknowledged3 and the suspicions of mankind ought to be acknowledged too2 and their backwardness even to believe1 and greater still to practise1 what makes against their interest4 ,and it must particularly be remembered1 that education1 and prejudice1 and authority1 were against ,christianity1 in the age ,i am speaking of4 ,so that the immediate conversion of such numbers is a real presumption of somewhat more than human in this matter4#bfj ,i say presumption1 for it is not alleged as a proof alone and by itself4 ,nor need any one of the things mentioned in this chapter be considered as a proof by itself3 and yet all of them together may be one of the strongest4#bfa ,upon the whole3 as there is large historical evidence1 both direct and circumstantial1 of miracles wrought in attestation of ,christianity1 collected by those who have writ upon the subject2 it lies upon unbelievers to show why this evidence is not to be credited4 ,this way of speaking is1 ,i think1 just2 and what persons who write in defence of religion naturally fall into4 ,yet1 in a matter of such unspeakable importance1 the proper question is1 not whom it lies upon1 according to the rules of argument1 to maintain or confute objections3 but whether there really are any1 against this evidence1 sufficient1 in reason1 to destroy the credit of it4 ,however1 unbelievers seem to take upon them the part of showing that there are4 ,they allege1 that numberless enthusiastic people1 in different ages and countries1 expose themselves to the same difficulties which the primitive ,christians did2 and are ready to give up their lives for the most idle follies imaginable4 ,it is not very clear1 to what purpose this objection is brought4 ,for surely1 every one1 in every case1 must distinguish between opinions and facts4 ,and though testimony is no proof of enthusiastic opinions1 or of any opinion at all2 yet it is allowed1 in all other cases1 to be a proof of facts4 ,a person's laying down his life in attestation of facts or of opinions1 is the strongest proof of his believing them4 ,and if the apostles and their contemporaries did believe the facts1 in attestation of which they exposed themselves to sufferings and death2 this their belief1 or rather knowledge1 must be a proof of those facts3 for they were such as came under the observation of their senses4 ,and though it is not of equal weight1 yet it is of weight1 that the martyrs of the next age1 notwithstanding they were not eye-witnesses of those facts1 as were the apostles and their contemporaries1 had1 however1 full opportunity to inform themselves whether they were true or not1 and gave equal proof of their believing them to be true4 ,but enthusiasm1 it is said1 greatly weakens the evidence of testimony even for facts1 in matters relating to religion3 some seem to think it totally and absolutely destroys the evidence of testimony upon this subject4 ,the powers of enthusiasm1 and of diseases too1 which operate in a like manner1 are indeed very wonderful1 in particular instances4 ,but if great numbers of men1 not appearing in any peculiar degree weak1 nor under any peculiar suspicion of negligence1 affirm that they saw and heard such things plainly1 with their eyes and their ears1 and are admitted to be in earnest2 such testimony is evidence of the strongest kind we can have1 for any matter of fact4 ,possibly it may be overcome1 strong as it is1 by incredibility in the things thus attested1 or by contrary testimony4 ,and in an instance where one thought it was so overcome1 it might be just to consider1 how far such evidence could be accounted for by enthusiasm2 for it seems as if no other imaginable account were to be given of it4 ,but till such incredibility be shown1 or contrary testimony produced1 it cannot surely be expected1 that so far-fetched1 so indirect and wonderful an account of such testimony1 as that of enthusiasm must be2 an account so strange1 that the generality of mankind can scarce be made to understand what is meant by it2 it cannot1 ,i say1 be expected that such an account will be admitted of such evidence2 when there is this direct1 easy1 and obvious account of it1 that people really saw and heard a thing not incredible1 which they affirm1 sincerely and with full assurance1 they did see and hear4 ,granting then that enthusiasm is not 7strictly speaking7 an absurd1 but a possible account of such testimony1 it is manifest1 that the very mention of it goes upon the previous supposition1 that the things so attested are incredible3 and therefore need not be considered1 till they are shown to be so4 ,much less need it be considered1 after the contrary has been proved4 ,and ,i think it has been proved1 to full satisfaction1 that there is no incredibility in a revelation1 in general2 or in such a one as the ,christian1 in particular4 ,however1 as religion is supposed peculiarly liable to enthusiasm1 it may just be observed1 that prejudices almost without number1 and without name1 such as romance1 affection1 humor1 a desire to engage attention1 or to surprise1 party spirit1 custom1 little competitions1 unaccountable likings and dislikings2 these influence men strongly in common matters4 ,and as these prejudices are often scarce know a or reflected upon by the persons themselves who are influenced by them1 they are to be considered as influences of a like kind to enthusiasm4 ,yet human testimony1 in common matters1 is naturally and justly believed1 notwithstanding4 ,it is intimated further1 in a more refined way of observation1 that though it should be proved1 that the apostles and first ,christians could not1 in some respects1 be deceived themselves1 and in other respects1 cannot be thought to have intended to impose upon the world1 yet it will not follow that their general testimony is to be believed1 though truly handed down to us3 because they might still in part1 i4e4 in other respects1 be deceived themselves1 and in part also designedly impose upon others2 which1 it is added1 is a thing very credible1 from that mixture of real enthusiasm1 and real knavery1 to be met with in the same characters4#bfb ,i must confess1 ,i think the matter of fact contained in this observation upon mankind is not to be denied2 and that something very much akin to it is often supposed in ,scripture as a very common case1 and most severely reproved4 ,but it were to have been expected1 that persons capable of applying this observation as applied in the objection1 might also frequently have met with the like mixed character1 in instances where religion was quite out of the case4 ,the thing plainly is1 that mankind are naturally endued with reason1 or a capacity of distinguishing between truth and falsehood2 and as naturally they are endued with veracity1 or a regard to truth in what they say3 but from many occasions they are liable to be prejudiced and biassed and deceived themselves1 and capable of intending to deceive others1 in every degree3 insomuch that1 as we are all liable to be deceived by prejudice1 so likewise it seems to be not an uncommon thing1 for persons who1 from their regard to truth1 would not invent a lie entirely without any foundation at all1 to propagate it with heightening circumstances1 after it is once invented and set a-going4 ,and others1 though they would not propagate a lie1 yet1 which is a lower degree of falsehood1 will let it pass without contradiction4 ,but notwithstanding all this1 human testimony remains still a natural ground of assent2 and this assent a natural principle of action4 ,it is objected further1 that however it has happened1 the fact is1 that mankind have1 in different ages1 been strangely deluded with pretences to miracles and wonders4 ,but it is by no means to be admitted1 that they have been oftener1 or are at all more liable to be deceived by these than by other pretences4 ,it is added1 that there is a very considerable degree of historical evidence for miracles1 which are1 on all hands1 acknowledged to be fabulous4 ,but suppose there were even the like historical evidence for these1 to what there is for those alleged in proof of ,christianity1 which yet is in no wise allowed1 but suppose this2 the consequence would not be1 that the evidence of the latter is not to be admitted4 ,nor is there a man in the world1 who in common cases1 would conclude thus4 ,for what would such a conclusion really amount to but this1 that evidence1 confuted by contrary evidence1 or any way overbalanced1 destroys the credibility of other evidence1 neither confuted nor overbalanced8 ,to argue that because there is1 if there were1 like evidence from testimony1 for miracles acknowledged false1 as for those in attestation of ,christianity1 therefore the evidence in the latter case is not to be credited2 this is the same as to argue1 that if two men of equally good reputation had given evidence in different cases no way connected1 and one of them had been convicted of perjury1 this confuted the testimony of the other6 ,upon the whole then1 the general observation1 that human creatures are so liable to be deceived1 from enthusiasm in religion1 and principles equivalent to enthusiasm in common matters1 and in both from negligence2 and that they are so capable of dishonestly endeavoring to deceive others2 this does indeed weaken the evidence of testimony in all cases1 but does not destroy it in any4 ,and these things will appear1 to different men1 to weaken the evidence of testimony1 in different degrees3 in degrees proportionable to the observations they have made1 or the notions they have any way taken up1 concerning the weakness and negligence and dishonesty of mankind2 or concerning the powers of enthusiasm1 and prejudices equivalent to it4 ,but it seems to me1 that people do not know what they say1 who affirm these things to destroy the evidence from testimony which we have1 of the truth of ,christianity4 ,nothing can destroy the evidence of testimony in any case1 but a proof or probability1 that persons are not competent judges of the facts to which they give testimony2 or that they are actually under some indirect influence in giving it1 in such particular case4 ,till this be made out1 the natural laws of human actions require1 that testimony be admitted4 ,it can never be sufficient to overthrow direct historical evidence1 indolently to say1 that there are so many principles1 from whence men are liable to be deceived themselves1 and disposed to deceive others1 especially in matters of religion1 that one knows not what to believe4 ,and it is surprising persons can help reflecting1 that this very manner of speaking supposes they are not satisfied that there is nothing in the evidence1 of which they speak thus2 or that they can avoid observing1 if they do make this reflection1 that it is on such a subject1 a very material one4#bfc ,over against all these objections is to be set the importance of ,christianity1 as what must have engaged the attention of its first converts1 so as to have rendered them less liable to be deceived from carelessness1 than they would in common matters2 and likewise the strong obligations to veracity1 which their religion laid them under3 so that the first and most obvious presumption is1 that they could not be deceived themselves nor deceive others4 ,and this presumption1 in this degree1 is peculiar to the testimony we have been considering4 ,in argument1 assertions are nothing in themselves1 and have an air of positiveness which sometimes is not very easy3 yet they are necessary1 and necessary to be repeated2 in order to connect a discourse1 and distinctly to lay before the view of the reader1 what is proposed to be proved1 and what is left as proved4 ,now the conclusion from the foregoing observations is1 ,i think1 beyond all doubt1 this3 that unbelievers must be forced to admit the external evidence for ,christianity1 i4e4 the proof of miracles wrought to attest it1 to be of real weight and very considerable2 though they cannot allow it to be sufficient1 to convince them of the reality of those miracles4 ,and as they must1 in all reason1 admit this2 so it seems to me1 that upon consideration they would1 in fact1 admit it2 those of them1 ,i mean1 who know any thing at all of the matter2 in like manner as persons1 in many cases1 own they see strong evidence from testimony1 for the truth of things1 which yet they cannot be convinced are true3 cases1 suppose1 where there is contrary testimony2 or things which they think1 whether with or without reason1 to be incredible4 ,but there is no testimony contrary to that which we have been considering3 and it has been fully proved1 that there is no incredibility in ,christianity in general1 or in any part of it4 ,,ii4 ,as to the evidence for ,christianity from prophecy1 ,i shall only make some few general observations1 which are suggested by the analogy of nature2 i4e4 by the acknowledged natural rules of judging in common matters1 concerning evidence of a like kind to this from prophecy4 #a4 ,the obscurity or unintelligibleness of one part of a prophecy does not1 in any degree1 invalidate the proof of foresight1 arising from the appearing completion of those other parts1 which are understood4 ,for the case is evidently the same1 as if those parts which are not understood were lost1 or not written at all1 or written in an unknown tongue4 ,whether this observation be commonly attended to or not1 it is so evident1 that one can scarce bring oneself to set down an instance in common matters1 to exemplify it4 ,however1 suppose a writing1 partly in cipher1 and partly in plain words at length2 and that in the part one understood1 there appeared mention of several known facts2 it would never come into any man's thoughts to imagine1 that if he understood the whole1 perhaps he might find1 that those facts were not in reality known by the writer4 ,indeed1 both in this example and in the thing intended to be exemplified by it1 our not understanding the whole 7the whole1 suppose1 of a sentence or a paragraph7 might sometimes occasion a doubt1 whether one understood the literal meaning of such a part3 but this comes under another consideration4 ,for the same reason1 though a man should be incapable1 for want of learning1 or opportunities of inquiry1 or from not having turned his studies this way1 even so much as to judge whether particular prophecies have been throughout completely fulfilled2 yet he may see1 in general1 that they have been fulfilled to such a degree1 as1 upon very good ground1 to be convinced of foresight more than human in such prophecies1 and of such events being intended by them4 ,for the same reason also1 though1 by means of the deficiencies in civil history1 and the different accounts of historians1 the most learned should not be able to make out to satisfaction1 that such parts of the prophetic history have been minutely and throughout fulfilled2 yet a very strong proof of foresight may arise1 from that general completion of them1 which is made out4 ,as much perhaps1 as the giver of prophecy intended should ever be afforded by such parts of prophecy4 #b4 ,a long series of prophecy being applicable to such and such events1 is itself a proof that it was intended of them3 as the rules by which we naturally judge and determine1 in common cases parallel to this1 will show4#bfd ,this observation ,i make in answer to the common objection against the application of the prophecies1 that1 considering each of them distinctly by itself1 it does not at all appear1 that they were intended of those particular events to which they are applied by ,christians2 and therefore it is to be supposed1 that if they meant any thing1 they were intended of other events unknown to us1 and not of these at all4 ,now there are two kinds of writing1 which bear a great resemblance to prophecy1 with respect to the matter before us3 the mythological1 and the satirical1 where the satire is to a certain degree concealed4 ,and a man might be assured1 that he understood what an author intended by a fable or parable related without any application or moral1 merely from seeing it to be easily capable of such application1 and that such a moral might naturally be deduced from it4 ,and he might be fully assured1 that such persons and events were intended in a satirical writing1 merely from its being applicable to them4 ,and1 agreeable to the last observation1 he might be in a good measure satisfied of it1 though he were not enough informed in affairs1 or in the story of such persons to understand half the satire4 ,for1 his satisfaction that he understood the meaning1 the intended meaning1 of these writings1 would be greater or less in proportion as he saw the general turn of them to be capable of such application2 and in proportion to the number of particular things capable of it4 ,and thus1 if a long series of prophecy is applicable to the present state of the church1 and to the political situations of the kingdoms of the world1 some thousand years after these prophecies were delivered2 and a long series of prophecy delivered before the coming of ,christ is applicable to him2 these things are in themselves a proof1 that the prophetic history was intended of him1 and of those events3 in proportion as the general turn of it is capable of such application1 and to the number and variety of particular prophecies capable of it4 ,and though1 in all just way of consideration1 the obvious completion of prophecies is to be allowed to be thus explanatory of1 and to determine1 their meaning2 yet it is to be remembered further1 that the ancient ,jews applied the prophecies to a ,messiah before his coming1#bfe in much the same manner as ,christians do now3 and that the primitive ,christians interpreted the prophecies respecting the state of the church and of the world in the last ages1 in the sense which the event seems to confirm and verify4 ,from these things it may be made appear3 #c4 ,that the showing even to a high probability1 if that could be1 that the prophets thought of some other events1 in such and such predictions1 and not those which ,christians allege to be completions of those predictions2 or that such and such prophecies are capable of being applied to other events than those1 to which ,christians apply them--that this would not confute or destroy the force of the argument from prophecy1 even with regard to those very instances4 ,for1 observe how this matter really is4 ,if one knew such a person to be the sole author of such a book1 and was certainly assured1 or satisfied to any degree1 that one knew the whole of what he intended in it2 one should be assured or satisfied to such degree1 that one knew the whole meaning of that book3 for the meaning of a book is nothing but the meaning of the author4 ,but if one knew a person to have compiled a book out of memoirs1 which he received from another1 of vastly superior knowledge in the subject of it1 especially if it were a book full of great intricacies and difficulties2 it would in no wise follow1 that one knew the whole meaning of the book1 from knowing the whole meaning of the compiler3 for the original author of them1 might have1 and there would be no presumption1 in many cases1 against supposing him to have1 some further meaning than the compiler saw4 ,to say then that the ,scriptures1 and the things contained in them1 can have no other or further meaning than those persons had1 who first recited or wrote them1 is evidently saying1 that those persons were the original1 proper1 and sole authors of those books1 i4e4 that they are not inspired3 which is absurd1 while the authority of these books is under examination2 i4e4 till you have determined they are of no divine authority at all4 ,till this be determined1 it must in all reason be supposed1 not indeed that they have1 7for this is taking for granted that they are inspired27 but that they may have1 some further meaning than what the compilers saw or understood4 ,and1 upon this supposition1 it is supposable also1 that this further meaning may be fulfilled4 ,events corresponding to prophecies1 interpreted in a different meaning from that1 in which the prophets are supposed to have understood them2 affords in a manner1 the same proof1 that this different sense was originally intended1 as it would have afforded1 if the prophets had not understood their predictions in the sense it is supposed they did3 because there is no presumption of their sense of them being the whole sense of them4 ,and it has been already shown1 that the apparent completions of prophecy must be allowed to be explanatory of its meaning4 ,so that the question is1 whether a series of prophecy has been fulfilled1 in a natural or proper1 i4e4 in any real sense of the words of it4 ,for such completion is equally a proof of foresight more than human1 whether the prophets are1 or are not1 supposed to have understood it in a different sense4 ,i say1 supposed3 for1 though ,i think it clear1 that the prophets did not understand the full meaning of their predictions1 it is another question1 how far they thought they did2 and in what sense they understood them4 ,hence may be seen1 to how little purpose those persons busy themselves1 who endeavor to prove1 that the prophetic history is applicable to events of the age in which it was written1 or of ages before it4 ,to have proved this1 before there was any appearance of a further completion of it1 might have answered some purpose2 for it might have prevented the expectation of any such further completion4 ,thus could ,porphyry have shown1 that some principal parts of the book of ,daniel1 for instance the seventh verse of the seventh chapter1 which the ,christians interpreted of the latter ages1 was applicable to events1 which happened before or about the age of ,antiochus ,epiphanes2 this might have prevented them from expecting any further completion of it4 ,and1 unless there was then1 as ,i think there must have been1 external evidence concerning that book1 more than is come down to us2 such a discovery might have been a stumbling-block in the way of ,christianity itself3 considering the authority which our ,savior has given to the book of ,daniel1 and how much the general scheme of ,christianity presupposes the truth of it4 ,but even this discovery1 had there been any such1#bff would be of very little weight with reasonable men now2 if this passage1 thus applicable to events before the age of ,porphyry1 appears to be applicable also to events1 which succeeded the dissolution of the ,roman empire4 ,i mention this1 not at all as intending to insinuate1 that the division of this empire into ten parts1 for it plainly was divided into about that number1 were1 alone and by itself1 of any moment in verifying the prophetic history3 but only as an example of the thing ,i am speaking of4 ,thus upon the whole1 the matter of inquiry evidently must be1 as above put1 ,whether the prophecies are applicable to ,christ1 and to the present state of the world1 and of the church2 applicable in such a degree1 as to imply foresight3 not whether they are capable of any other application4 ,though ,i know no pretence for saying the general turn of them is capable of any other4 ,these observations are1 ,i think1 just1 and the evidence referred to in them real3 though there may be people who will not accept of such imperfect information from ,scripture4 ,some too have not integrity and regard enough to truth1 to attend to evidence1 which keeps the mind in doubt1 perhaps perplexity1 and which is much of a different sort from what they expected4 ,it plainly requires a degree of modesty and fairness1 beyond what every one has1 for a man to say1 not to the world but to himself1 that there is a real appearance of great weight in this matter1 though he is not able thoroughly to satisfy himself about it2 but that it shall have its influence upon him1 in proportion to its apparent reality and weight4 ,it is much more easy1 and more falls in with the negligence1 presumption1 and wilfulness of the generality1 to determine at once1 with a decisive air1 ,there is nothing in it4 ,the prejudices arising from that absolute contempt and scorn1 with which this evidence is treated in the world1 ,i do not mention4 ,for what can be said to persons1 who are weak enough in their understandings to think this any presumption against it2 or1 if they do not1 are yet weak enough in their temper to be influenced by such prejudices1 upon such a subject8 ,secondly1 ,i shall endeavor to give some account of the general argument for the truth of ,christianity1 consisting both of the direct and circumstantial evidence considered as making up one argument4 ,to state and examine this argument fully1 would be a work much beyond the compass of this whole treatise2 nor is so much as a proper abridgment of it to be expected here4 ,yet the present subject requires to have some brief account of it given4 ,for it is the kind of evidence1 upon which most questions of difficulty1 in common practice1 are determined3 evidence arising from various coincidences1 which support and confirm each other1 and in this manner prove1 with more or less certainty1 the point under consideration4 ,i choose to do it also3 ,first1 because it seems to be of the greatest importance1 and not duly attended to by every one1 that the proof of revelation is not some direct and express things only1 but a great variety of circumstantial things also2 and that though each of these direct and circumstantial things is indeed to be considered separately1 yet they are afterwards to be joined together2 for that the proper force of the evidence consists in the result of those several things1 considered in their respects to each other1 and united into one view4 ,in the next place1 because it seems to me1 that the matters of fact here set down1 which are acknowledged by unbelievers1 must be acknowledged by them also to contain together a degree of evidence of great weight1 if they could be brought to lay these several things before themselves distinctly1 and then with attention consider them together2 instead of that cursory thought of them1 to which we are familiarized4 ,for being familiarized to the cursory thought of things as really hinders the weight of them from being seen1 as from having its due influence upon practice4 ,the thing asserted1 and the truth of which is to be inquired into1 is this3 ,that over and above our reason and affections1 which ,god has given us for the information of our judgment and the conduct of our lives1 he has also1 by external revelation1 given us an account of himself and his moral government over the world1 implying a future state of rewards and punishments2 i4e4 hath revealed the system of natural religion3 7for natural religion may be externally#bfg revealed by ,god1 as the ignorant may be taught it by their fellow-creatures7--that ,god1 ,i say1 has given us the evidence of revelation1 as well as the evidence of reason1 to ascertain this moral system2 together with an account of a particular dispensation of ,providence1 which reason could no way have discovered1 and a particular institution of religion founded on it1 for the recovery of mankind out of their present wretched condition1 and raising them to the perfection and final happiness of their nature4 ,this revelation1 whether real or supposed1 may be considered as wholly historical4 ,for prophecy is nothing but the history of events before they come to pass2 doctrines also are matters of fact2 and precepts come under the same notion4 ,the general design of ,scripture1 which contains in it this revelation1 thus considered as historical1 may be said to be1 to give us an account of the world in this one single view1 as ,god's world3 by which it appears essentially distinguished from all other books1 so far as ,i have found1 except such as are copied from it4 ,it begins with an account of ,god's creation of the world1 in order to ascertain1 and distinguish from all others1 who is the object of our worship1 by what he has done3 in order to ascertain1 who he is1 concerning whose providence1 commands1 promises1 and threatenings1 this sacred book1 all along1 treats2 viz4 the ,maker and ,proprietor of the world1 he whose creatures we are1 the ,god of nature3 in order likewise to distinguish him from the idols of the nations1 which are either imaginary beings1 i4e4 no beings at all2 or else part of that creation1 the historical relation of which is here given4 ,and ,john1 not improbably with an eye to this ,mosaic account of the creation1 begins his ,gospel with an account of our ,savior's pre-existence1 and that all things were made by him2 and without him1 was not any thing made that was made3#bfh agreeably to the doctrine of ,paul1 that ,god created all things by ,jesus ,christ4#bfi ,this being premised1 the ,scripture1 taken together1 seems to profess to contain a kind of an abridgment of the history of the world1 in the view just now mentioned3 that is1 a general account of the condition of religion and its professors1 during the continuance of that apostasy from ,god1 and state of wickedness1 which it everywhere supposes the world to lie in4 ,and this account of the state of religion carries with it some brief account of the political state of things1 as religion is affected by it4 ,revelation indeed considers the common affairs of this world1 and what is going on in it1 as a mere scene of distraction2 and cannot be supposed to concern itself with foretelling at what time ,rome1 or ,babylon1 or ,greece1 or any particular place1 should be the most conspicuous seat of that tyranny and dissoluteness1 which all places equally aspire to be2 cannot1 ,i say1 be supposed to give any account of this wild scene for its own sake4 ,but it seems to contain some very general account of the chief governments of the world1 as the general state of religion has been1 is1 or shall be1 affected by them1 from the first transgression1 and during the whole interval of the world's continuing in its present state1 to a certain future period1 spoken of both in the ,old and ,new ,testament1 very distinctly1 and in great variety of expression3 ,the times of the restitution of all things3#bgj when the mystery of ,god shall be finished1 as he hath declared to his servants the prophets3#bga when the ,god of heaven shall set up a kingdom1 which shall never be destroyed3 and the kingdom shall not be left to other people1#bgb as it is represented to be during this apostasy1 but judgment shall be given to the saints1#bgc and they shall reign3#bgd and the kingdom and dominion1 and the greatness of the kingdom under the whole heaven1 shall be given to the people of the saints of the ,most ,high4#bge ,upon this general view of the ,scripture1 ,i would remark1 how great a length of time the whole relation takes up1 near six thousand years of which are past2 and how great a variety of things it treats of2 the natural and moral system or history of the world1 including the time when it was formed1 all contained in the very first book1 and evidently written in a rude and unlearned age2 and in subsequent books1 the various common and prophetic history1 and the particular dispensation of ,christianity4 ,now all this together gives the largest scope for criticism2 and for the confutation of what is capable of being confuted1 either from reason1 or from common history1 or from any inconsistence in its several parts4 ,and it deserves1 ,i think1 to be mentioned1 that whereas some imagine the supposed doubtfulness of the evidence for revelation implies a positive argument that it is not true2 it appears1 on the contrary1 to imply a positive argument that it is true4 ,for1 could any common relation of such antiquity1 extent1 and variety 7for in these things the stress of what ,i am now observing lies7 be proposed to the examination of the world3 that it could not1 in an age of knowledge and liberty1 be confuted1 or shown to have nothing in it1 to the satisfaction of reasonable men2 would be thought a strong presumptive proof of its truth4 ,indeed it must be a proof of it1 just in proportion to the probability1 that if it were false1 it might be shown to be so3 which1 ,i think1 is scarce pretended to be shown1 but upon principles and in ways of arguing1 which have been clearly obviated4#bgf ,nor does it at all appear1 that any set of men1 who believe natural religion1 are of the opinion1 that ,christianity has been thus confuted4 ,but to proceed3 ,together with the moral system of the world1 the ,old ,testament contains a chronological account of the beginning of it1 and from thence1 an unbroken genealogy of mankind for many ages before common history begins2 and carried on as much farther as to make up a continued thread of history1 of the length of between three and four thousand years4 ,it contains an account of ,god's making a covenant with a particular nation1 that they should be his people1 and he would be their ,god1 in a peculiar sense2 of his often interposing miraculously in their affairs2 giving them the promise1 and long after1 the possession1 of a particular country2 assuring them of the greatest national prosperity in it1 if they would worship him1 in opposition to the idols which the rest of the world worshipped1 and obey his commands2 and threatening them with unexampled punishments if they disobeyed him1 and fell into the general idolatry3 insomuch that this one nation should continue to be the observation and the wonder of all the world4 ,it declares particularly1 that ,god would scatter them among all people1 from one end of the earth unto the other2 but that when they should return unto the ,lord their ,god1 he would have compassion upon them1 and gather them from all the nations1 whither he had scattered them3 that ,israel should be saved in the ,lord1 with an everlasting salvation2 and not be ashamed or confounded world without end4#bgg ,and as some of these promises are conditional1 others are as absolute as any thing can be expressed3 that the time should come1 when the people should be all righteous1 and inherit the land forever3 that though ,god would make a full end of all nations whither he had scattered them1 yet would he not make a full end of them3 that he would bring again the captivity of his people ,israel1 and plant them upon their land1 and they should be no more pulled up out of their land3 that the seed of ,israel should not cease from being a nation forever4#bgh ,it foretells1 that ,god would raise them up a particular person1 in whom all his promises should finally be fulfilled2 the ,messiah1 who should be1 in a high and eminent sense1 their anointed ,prince and ,savior4 ,this was foretold in such a manner1 as raised a general expectation of such a person in the nation1 as appears from the ,new ,testament1 and is an acknowledged fact2 an expectation of his coming at such a particular time1 before any one appeared claiming to be that person1 and when there was no ground for such an expectation1 but from the prophecies3 which expectation1 therefore1 must in all reason be presumed to be explanatory of those prophecies1 if there were any doubt about their meaning4 ,it seems moreover to foretell1 that this person should be rejected by the nation to whom he had been so long promised1 though he was so much desired by them4#bgi ,and it expressly foretells1 that he should be the ,savior of the ,gentiles2 and that the completion of the scheme contained in this book1 and then begun1 and in its progress1 should be something so great1 that in comparison with it1 the restoration of the ,jews alone would be but of small account4 ,it is a light thing that thou shouldest be my servant to raise up the tribes of ,jacob1 and to restore the preserved of ,israel3 ,i will also give thee for a light to the ,gentiles1 that thou mayest be for salvation unto the end of the earth4 ,and1 ,in the last days1 the mountain of the ,lord's house shall be established in the top of the mountains1 and shall be exalted above the hills2 and all nations shall flow into it--for out of ,zion shall go forth the law1 and the word of the ,lord from ,jerusalem4 ,and he shall judge among the nations--and the ,lord alone shall be exalted in that day1 and the idols he shall utterly abolish4#bhj ,the ,scripture further contains an account1 that at the time the ,messiah was expected1 a person rose up in this nation1 claiming to be that ,messiah1 to be the person to whom all the prophecies referred1 and in whom they should center3 that he spent some years in a continued course of miraculous works2 and endued his immediate disciples and followers with a power of doing the same1 as a proof of the truth of that religion1 which he commissioned them to publish3 that invested with this authority and power1 they made numerous converts in the remotest countries1 and settled and established his religion in the world2 to the end of which the ,scripture professes to give a prophetic account of the state of this religion among mankind4#bha ,let us now suppose a person utterly ignorant of history1 to have all this related to him out of the ,scripture4 ,or suppose such an one1 having the ,scripture put into his hands1 to remark these things in it1 not knowing but that the whole1 even its civil history1 as well as the other parts of it1 might be1 from beginning to end1 an entire invention2 and to ask1 ,what truth was in it1 and whether the revelation here related was real1 or a fiction8 ,and1 instead of a direct answer1 suppose him1 all at once1 to be told the following confessed facts2 and then to unite them into one view4 ,let him first be told1 in how great a degree the profession and establishment of natural religion1 the belief that there is one ,god to be worshipped1 that virtue is his law1 and that mankind shall be rewarded and punished hereafter1 as they obey and disobey it here2 in how very great a degree1 ,i say1 the profession and establishment of this moral system in the world is owing to the revelation1 whether real or supposed1 contained in this book3 the establishment of this moral system1 even in those countries which do not acknowledge the proper authority of the ,scripture4#bhb ,let him be told also1 what number of nations do acknowledge its proper authority4 ,let him then take in the consideration1 of what importance religion is to mankind4 ,and upon these things he might1 ,i think1 truly observe1 that this supposed revelation's obtaining and being received in the world1 with all the circumstances and effects of it1 considered together as one event1 is the most conspicuous and important event in the history of mankind3 that a book of this nature1 and thus promulged and recommended to our consideration1 demands1 as if by a voice from heaven1 to have its claims most seriously examined2 and that1 before such examination1 to treat it with any kind of scoffing and ridicule1 is an offence against natural piety4 ,it is to be remembered1 that how much soever the establishment of natural religion in the world is owing to the ,scripture revelation1 this does not destroy the proof of religion from reason1 any more than the proof of ,euclid's ,elements is destroyed1 by a man's knowing or thinking1 that he should never have seen the truth of the several propositions contained in it1 nor had those propositions come into his thoughts1 but for that mathematician4 ,let such a person as we are speaking of be1 in the next place1 informed of the acknowledged antiquity of the first parts of this book2 and that its chronology1 its account of the time when the earth1 and the several parts of it1 were first peopled with human creatures1 is no way contradicted1 but is really confirmed1 by the natural and civil history of the world1 collected from common historians1 from the state of the earth1 and from the late invention of arts and sciences4 ,and as the ,scripture contains an unbroken thread of common and civil history1 from the creation to the captivity1 for between three and four thousand years2 let the person we are speaking of be told1 in the next place1 that this general history1 as it is not contradicted1 but confirmed by profane history#bhc as much as there would be reason to expect1 upon supposition of its truth2 so there is nothing in the whole history itself1 to give any reasonable ground of suspicion of its not being1 in the general1 a faithful and literally true genealogy of men1 and series of things4 ,i speak here only of the common ,scripture history1 or of the course of ordinary events related in it1 as distinguished from miracles1 and from the prophetic history4 ,in all the ,scripture narrations of this kind1 following events arise out of foregoing ones1 as in all other histories4 ,there appears nothing related as done in any age1 not conformable to the manners of that age3 nothing in the account of a succeeding age1 which one would say could not be true1 or was improbable1 from the account of things in the preceding one4 ,there is nothing in the characters1 which would raise a thought of their being feigned2 but all the internal marks imaginable of their being real4 ,it is to be added also1 that mere genealogies1 bare narratives of the number of years1 which persons called by such and such names lived1 do not carry the face of fiction2 perhaps do carry some presumption of veracity3 and all unadorned narratives1 which have nothing to surprise1 may be thought to carry somewhat of the like presumption too4 ,and the domestic and the political history is plainly credible4 ,there may be incidents in ,scripture1 which1 taken alone in the naked way they are told1 may appear strange2 especially to persons of other manners1 temper1 education3 but there are also incidents of undoubted truth1 in many or most persons' lives1 which1 in the same circumstances1 would appear to the full as strange4#bhd ,there may be mistakes of transcribers1 there may be other real or seeming mistakes1 not easy to be particularly accounted for3 but there are certainly no more things of this kind in the ,scripture1 than what were to have been expected in books of such antiquity2 and nothing1 in any wise1 sufficient to discredit the general narrative4 ,now1 that a history1 claiming to commence from the creation1 and extending in one continued series1 through so great a length of time1 and variety of events1 should have such appearances of reality and truth in its whole contexture1 is surely a very remarkable circumstance in its favor4 ,and as all this is applicable to the common history of the ,new ,testament1 so there is a further credibility1 and a very high one1 given to it by profane authors3 many of these writing of the same times1 and confirming the truth of customs and events1 which are incidentally as well as more purposely mentioned in it4 ,and this credibility of the common ,scripture-history1 gives some credibility to its miraculous history3 especially as this is interwoven with the common1 so as that they imply each other1 and both together make up one relation4 ,let it then be more particularly observed to this person1 that it is an acknowledged matter of fact1 which is indeed implied in the foregoing observation1 that there was such a nation as the ,jews1 of the greatest antiquity1 whose government and general polity was founded on the law1 here related to be given them by ,moses as from heaven3 that natural religion1 with rites additional yet no way contrary to it1 was their established religion1 which cannot be said of the ,gentile world3 and that their very being as a nation1 depended upon their acknowledgment of one ,god1 the ,god of the universe4 ,for1 suppose in their captivity in ,babylon1 they had gone over to the religion of their conquerors1 there would have remained no bond of union1 to keep them a distinct people4 ,and while they were under their own kings1 in their own country1 a total apostasy from ,god would have been the dissolution of their whole government4 ,they in such a sense nationally acknowledged and worshipped the ,maker of heaven and earth1 when the rest of the world were sunk in idolatry1 as rendered them1 in fact1 the peculiar people of ,god4 ,this remarkable establishment and preservation of natural religion among them1 seems to add peculiar credibility to the historical evidence for the miracles of ,moses and the prophets4 ,because these miracles are a full satisfactory account of this event1 which plainly needs to be accounted for1 and cannot be otherwise4 ,let this person1 supposed wholly ignorant of history1 be acquainted further1 that one claiming to be the ,messiah1 of ,jewish extraction1 rose up at the time when this nation1 from the prophecies above mentioned1 expected the ,messiah3 that he was rejected1 as it seemed to have been foretold he should1 by the body of the people1 under the direction of their rulers3 that in the course of a very few years1 he was believed on and acknowledged as the promised ,messiah1 by great numbers among the ,gentiles1 agreeably to the prophecies of ,scripture1 yet not upon the evidence of prophecy1 but of miracles1#bhe of which miracles we have also strong historical evidence2 7by which ,i mean here no more than must be acknowledged by unbelievers2 for let pious frauds and follies be admitted to weaken1 it is absurd to say they destroy our evidence of miracles wrought in proof of ,christianity37#bhf that this religion approving itself to the reason of mankind1 and carrying its own evidence with it1 so far as reason is a judge of its system1 and being no way contrary to reason in those parts of it which require to be believed upon the mere authority of its ,author2 that this religion1 ,i say1 gradually spread and supported itself for some hundred years1 not only without any assistance from temporal power1 but under constant discouragements1 and often the bitterest persecutions from it2 and then became the religion of the world3 that in the mean time the ,jewish nation and government were destroyed in a very remarkable manner1 and the people carried away captive and dispersed through the most distant countries2 in which state of dispersion they have remained fifteen hundred years3 and that they remain a numerous people1 united among themselves1 and distinguished from the rest of the world1 as they were in the days of ,moses1 by the profession of his law2 and everywhere looked upon in a manner1 which one scarce knows how distinctly to express1 but in the words of the prophetic account of it1 given so many ages before it came to pass3 ,thou shalt become an astonishment1 a proverb1 and a byword1 among all nations whither the ,lord shall lead thee4#bhg ,the appearance of a standing miracle1 in the ,jews remaining a distinct people in their dispersion1 and the confirmation which this event appears to give to the truth of revelation1 may be thought to be answered1 by their religion's forbidding them intermarriages with those of other nations1 and prescribing them many peculiarities in their food1 by which they are debarred from incorporating with the people in whose countries they live4 ,this is not1 ,i think1 a satisfactory account of that which it pretends to account for4 ,but what does it pretend to account for8 ,the correspondence between this event and the prophecies2 or the coincidence of both1 with a long dispensation of ,providence1 of a peculiar nature1 towards that people8 ,no4 ,it is only the event itself1 which is offered to be thus accounted for3 which single event1 taken alone1 abstracted from all such correspondence and coincidence1 perhaps would not have appeared miraculous3 but that correspondence and coincidence may be so1 though the event itself be supposed not4 ,thus the concurrence of our ,saviour's being born at ,bethlehem1 with a long foregoing series of prophecy and other coincidences1 is doubtless miraculous2 the series of prophecy1 and other coincidences1 and the event1 being admitted3 though the event itself appears to have been brought about in a natural way2 of which1 however1 no one can be certain4 ,as several of these events seem1 in some degree expressly1 to have verified the prophetic history already1 so likewise they may be considered further1 as having a peculiar aspect towards the full completion of it2 as affording some presumption that the whole of it shall1 one time or other1 be fulfilled4 ,thus1 that the ,jews have been so wonderfully preserved in their long and wide dispersion2 which is indeed the direct fulfilling of some prophecies1 but is now mentioned only as looking forward to somewhat yet to come3 that natural religion came forth from ,judea1 and spread1 in the degree it has done over the world1 before lost in idolatry2 which1 together with some other things1 have distinguished that very place1 in like manner as the people of it are distinguished3 that this great change of religion over the earth was brought about under the profession and acknowledgment1 that ,jesus was the promised ,messiah3 things of this kind naturally turn the thoughts of serious men towards the full completion of the prophetic history1 concerning the final restoration of that people2 concerning the establishment of the everlasting kingdom among them1 the kingdom of the ,messiah2 and the future state of the world1 under this sacred government4 ,such circumstances and events1 compared with these prophecies1 though no completions of them1 yet would not1 ,i think1 be spoken of as nothing in the argument1 by a person upon his first being informed of them4 ,they fall in with the prophetic history of things still future1 give it some additional credibility1 and have the appearance of being somewhat in order to the full completion of it4 ,indeed it requires a good degree of knowledge1 and great calmness and consideration1 to be able to judge thoroughly of the evidence for the truth of ,christianity1 from that part of the prophetic history which relates to the situation of the kingdoms of the world1 and to the state of the church1 from the establishment of ,christianity to the present time4 ,but it appears from a general view of it1 to be very material4 ,and those persons who have thoroughly examined it1 and some of them were men of the coolest tempers1 greatest capacities1 and least liable to imputations of prejudice1 insist upon it as determinately conclusive4 ,,conclusion4 ,suppose now a person quite ignorant of history1 first to recollect the passages above mentioned out of ,scripture1 without knowing but that the whole was a late fiction1 then to be informed of the correspondent facts now mentioned1 and to unite them all into one view3 that the profession and establishment of natural religion in the world is greatly owing1 in different ways1 to this book1 and the supposed revelation which it contains2 that it is acknowledged to be of the earliest antiquity2 that its chronology and common history are entirely credible2 that this ancient nation1 the ,jews1 of whom it chiefly treats1 appear to have been1 in fact1 the people of ,god1 in a distinguished sense2 that1 as there was a national expectation among them1 raised from the prophecies1 of a ,messiah to appear at such a time1 so one at this time appeared claiming to be that ,messiah2 that he was rejected by this nation1 but received by the ,gentiles1 not upon the evidence of prophecy1 but of miracles2 that the religion he taught supported itself under the greatest difficulties1 gained ground1 and at length became the religion of the world2 that in the mean time the ,jewish polity was utterly destroyed1 and the nation dispersed over the face of the earth2 that notwithstanding this1 they have remained a distinct numerous people for so many centuries1 even to this day2 which not only appears to be the express completion of several prophecies concerning them1 but also renders it1 as one may speak1 a visible and easy possibility that the promises made to them as a nation1 may yet be fulfilled4 ,to these acknowledged truths1 let the person we have been supposing add1 as ,i think he ought1 whether every one will allow it or no1 the obvious appearances which there are1 of the state of the world1 in other respects besides what relates to the ,jews1 and of the ,christian church1 having so long answered1 and still answering to the prophetic history4 ,suppose1 ,i say1 these facts set over against the things before mentioned out of the ,scripture1 and seriously compared with them2 the joint view of both together must1 ,i think1 appear of very great weight to a considerate reasonable person3 of much greater indeed1 upon having them first laid before him1 than is easy for us1 who are so familiarized to them1 to conceive1 without some particular attention for that purpose4 ,all these things1 and the several particulars contained under them1 require to be distinctly and most thoroughly examined into2 that the weight of each may be judged of1 upon such examination1 and such conclusion drawn1 as results from their united force4 ,but this has not been attempted here4 ,i have gone no further than to show1 that the general imperfect view of them now given1 the confessed historical evidence for miracles1 and the many obvious appearing completions of prophecy1 together with the collateral things#bhh here mentioned1 and there are several others of the like sort2 that all this together1 which1 being fact1 must be acknowledged by unbelievers1 amounts to real evidence of somewhat more than human in this matter3 evidence much more important1 than careless men1 who have been accustomed only to transient and partial views of it1 can imagine2 and indeed abundantly sufficient to act upon4 ,and these things1 ,i apprehend1 must be acknowledged by unbelievers4 ,for though they may say1 that the historical evidence of miracles wrought in attestation of ,christianity1 is not sufficient to convince them1 that such miracles were really wrought3 they cannot deny1 that there is such historical evidence1 it being a known matter of fact that there is4 ,they may say1 the conformity between the prophecies and events is by accident3 but there are many instances in which such conformity itself cannot be denied4 ,they may say1 with regard to such kind of collateral things as those above mentioned1 that any odd accidental events1 without meaning1 will have a meaning found in them by fanciful people3 and that such as are fanciful in any one certain way1 will make out a thousand coincidences1 which seem to favor their peculiar follies4 ,men1 ,i say1 may talk thus3 but no one who is serious1 can possibly think these things to be nothing1 if he considers the importance of collateral things1 and even of lesser circumstances1 in the evidence of probability1 as distinguished in nature1 from the evidence of demonstration4 ,in many cases indeed it seems to require the truest judgment1 to determine with exactness the weight of circumstantial evidence3 but it is very often altogether as convincing1 as that which is the most express and direct4 ,this general view of the evidence for ,christianity1 considered as making one argument1 may also serve to recommend to serious persons1 to set down every thing which they think may be of any real weight at all in proof of it1 and particularly the many seeming completions of prophecy3 and they will find1 that1 judging by the natural rules1 by which we judge of probable evidence in common matters1 they amount to a much higher degree of proof1 upon such a joint review1 than could be supposed upon considering them separately1 at different times2 how strong soever the proof might before appear to them1 upon such separate views of it4 ,for probable proofs1 by being added1 not only increase the evidence1 but multiply it4#bhi ,nor should ,i dissuade any one from setting down1 what he thought made for the contrary side4 ,but then it is to be remembered1 not in order to influence his judgment1 but his practice1 that a mistake on one side may be1 in its consequences1 much more dangerous1 than a mistake on the other4 ,and what course is most safe1 and what most dangerous1 will be thought a very material consideration1 when we deliberate1 not concerning events1 but concerning conduct in our temporal affairs4 ,to be influenced by this consideration in our judgment1 to believe or disbelieve upon it1 is indeed as much prejudice1 as any thing whatever4 ,and1 like other prejudices1 it operates contrary ways1 in different men2 for some are inclined to believe what they hope1 and others what they fear4 ,and it is manifest unreasonableness to apply to men's passions in order to gain their assent4 ,but in deliberations concerning conduct1 there is nothing which reason more requires to be taken into the account1 than the importance of it4 ,for1 suppose it doubtful1 what would be the consequence of acting in this1 or in the contrary manner3 still1 that taking one side could be attended with little or no bad consequence1 and taking the other might be attended with the greatest1 must appear1 to unprejudiced reason1 of the highest moment towards determining how we are to act4 ,the truth of our religion1 like the truth of common matters1 is to be judged of by all the evidence taken together4 ,and unless the whole series of things which may be alleged in this argument1 and every particular thing in it1 can reasonably be supposed to have been by accident 7for here the stress of the argument for ,christianity lies72 then is the truth of it proved3 in like manner1 as if in any common case1 numerous events acknowledged1 were to be alleged in proof of any other event disputed2 the truth of the disputed event would be proved1 not only if any one of the acknowledged ones did of itself clearly imply it1 but1 though no one of them singly did so1 if the whole of the acknowledged events taken together could not in reason be supposed to have happened1 unless the disputed one were true4 ,it is obvious1 how much advantage the nature of this evidence gives to those persons who attack ,christianity1 especially in conversation4 ,for it is easy to show1 in a short and lively manner1 that such and such things are liable to objection1 that this and another thing is of little weight in itself2 but impossible to show1 in like manner1 the united force of the whole argument in one view4 ,lastly1 as it has been made appear1 that there is no presumption against a revelation as miraculous2 that the general scheme of ,christianity1 and the principal parts of it1 are conformable to the experienced constitution of things1 and the whole perfectly credible3 so the account now given of the positive evidence for it1 shows1 that this evidence is such1 as1 from the nature of it1 cannot be destroyed1 though it should be lessened4 ,,chapter ,,viii4 ,,objections ,,against ,,arguing ,,from ,,the ,,analogy ,,of ,,nature1 ,,to ,,religion4 ,if every one would consider1 with such attention as they are bound1 even in point of morality1 to consider1 what they judge and give characters of2 the occasion of this chapter would be1 in some good measure at least1 superseded4 ,but since this is not to be expected2 for some we find do not concern themselves to understand even what they write against3 since this treatise1 in common with most others1 lies open to objections1 which may appear very material to thoughtful men at first sight2 and1 besides that1 seems peculiarly liable to the objections of such as can judge without thinking1 and of such as can censure without judging2 it may not be amiss to set down the chief of these objections which occur to me1 and consider them to their hands4 ,they are such as these3 8,that it is a poor thing to solve difficulties in revelation1 by saying1 that there are the same in natural religion2 when what is wanting is to clear both of them of these their common1 as well as other their respective1 difficulties2 that it is a strange way indeed of convincing men of the obligations of religion1 to show them1 that they have as little reason for their worldly pursuits3 and a strange way of vindicating the justice and goodness of the ,author of nature1 and of removing the objections against both1 to which the system of religion lies open1 to show1 that the like objections lie against natural providence2 a way of answering objections against religion1 without so much as pretending to make out1 that the system of it1 or the particular things in it objected against1 are reasonable--especially1 perhaps some may be inattentive enough to add1 must this be thought strange1 when it is confessed that analogy is no answer to such objections3 that when this sort of reasoning is carried to the utmost length it can be imagined capable of1 it will yet leave the mind in a very unsatisfied state2 and that it must be unaccountable ignorance of mankind1 to imagine they will be prevailed with to forego their present interests and pleasures1 from regard to religion1 upon doubtful evidence40 ,now1 as plausible as this way of talking may appear1 that appearance will be found in a great measure owing to half views1 which show but part of an object1 yet show that indistinctly1 and to undeterminate language4 ,by these means weak men are often deceived by others1 and ludicrous men1 by themselves4 ,and even those1 who are serious and considerate1 cannot always readily disentangle1 and at once clearly see through the perplexities1 in which subjects themselves are involved2 and which are heightened by the deficiencies and the abuse of words4 ,to this latter sort of persons1 the following reply to each part of this objection severally1 may be of some assistance2 as it may also tend a little to stop and silence others4 ,first1 ,the thing wanted1 i4e4 what men require1 is to have all difficulties cleared4 ,and this is1 or at least for any thing we know to the contrary1 it may be1 the same as requiring to comprehend the divine nature1 and the whole plan of ,providence from everlasting to everlasting6 ,but it hath always been allowed to argue from what is acknowledged1 to what is disputed4 ,and it is in no other sense a poor thing1 to argue from natural religion to revealed1 in the manner found fault with1 than it is to argue in numberless other ways of probable deduction and inference1 in matters of conduct1 which we are continually reduced to the necessity of doing4 ,indeed the epithet poor may be applied1 ,i fear as properly1 to great part or the whole of human life1 as it is to the things mentioned in the objection4 ,is it not a poor thing1 for a physician to have so little knowledge in the cure of diseases1 as even the most eminent have8 ,to act upon conjecture and guess1 where the life of man is concerned8 ,undoubtedly it is3 but not in comparison of having no skill at all in that useful art1 and being obliged to act wholly in the dark4 ,further3 since it is as unreasonable1 as it is common1 to urge objections against revelation1 which are of equal weight against natural religion2 and those who do this1 if they are not confused themselves1 deal unfairly with others1 in making it seem that they are arguing only against revelation1 or particular doctrines of it1 when in reality they are arguing against moral providence2 it is a thing of consequence to show1 that such objections are as much levelled against natural religion1 as against revealed4 ,objections1 which are equally applicable to both1 are properly speaking answered1 by its being shown that they are so1 provided the former be admitted to be true4 ,and without taking in the consideration how distinctly this is admitted1 it is plainly very material to observe1 that as the things objected against in natural religion are of the same kind with what is certain matter of experience in the course of providence1 and in the information which ,god affords us concerning our temporal interest under his government2 so the objections against the system of ,christianity1 and the evidence of it1 are of the very same kind with those which are made against the system and evidence of natural religion4 ,however1 the reader upon review may see1 that most of the analogies insisted upon1 even in the latter part of this treatise1 do not necessarily require to have more taken for granted than is in the former2 viz4 that there is an ,author of nature1 or natural ,governor of the world3 and ,christianity is vindicated1 not from its analogy to natural religion1 but chiefly from its analogy to the experienced constitution of nature4 ,secondly1 ,religion is a practical thing1 and consists in such a determinate course of life1 as what1 there is reason to think1 is commanded by the ,author of nature1 and will1 upon the whole1 be our happiness under his government4 ,if men can be convinced1 that they have the like reason to believe this1 as to believe that taking care of their temporal affairs will be to their advantage2 such conviction cannot but be an argument to them for the practice of religion4 ,and if there be really any reason for believing one of these1 and endeavoring to preserve life1 and secure ourselves the necessaries and conveniences of it2 then there is reason also for believing the other1 and endeavoring to secure the interest it proposes to us4 ,and if the interest1 which religion proposes to us1 be infinitely greater than our whole temporal interest2 then there must be proportionably greater reason for endeavoring to secure one1 than the other2 since1 by the supposition1 the probability of our securing one is equal to the probability of our securing the other4 ,this seems plainly unanswerable1 and has a tendency to influence fair minds1 who consider what our condition really is1 or upon what evidence we are naturally appointed to act2 and who are disposed to acquiesce in the terms upon which we live1 and attend to and follow that practical instruction1 whatever it be1 which is afforded us4 ,but the chief and proper force of the argument referred to in the objection1 lies in another place4 ,the proof of religion1 it is said1 is involved in such inextricable difficulties1 as to render it doubtful2 and that it cannot be supposed that if it were true1 it would be left upon doubtful evidence4 ,here then1 over and above the force of each particular difficulty or objection1 these difficulties and objections taken together are turned into a positive argument against the truth of religion2 which argument would stand thus4 ,if religion were true1 it would not be left doubtful1 and open to objections to the degree in which it is3 therefore that it is thus left1 not only renders the evidence of it weak1 and lessens its force1 in proportion to the weight of such objections1 but also shows it to be false1 or is a general presumption of its being so4 ,now the observation1 that from the natural constitution and course of things1 we must in our temporal concerns1 almost continually1 and even in matters of great consequence1 act upon evidence of a like kind and degree to the evidence of religion1 is an answer to this argument4 ,because it shows1 that it is according to the conduct and character of the ,author of nature to appoint we should act upon evidence like to that1 which this argument presumes he cannot be supposed to appoint we should act upon3 it is an instance1 a general one1 made up of numerous particular ones1 of somewhat in his dealing with us1 similar to what is said to be incredible4 ,as the force of this answer lies merely in the parallel1 which there is between the evidence for religion and for our temporal conduct2 the answer is equally just and conclusive1 whether the parallel be made out1 by showing the evidence of the former to be higher1 or the evidence of the latter to be lower4 ,thirdly1 ,the design of this treatise is not to vindicate the character of ,god1 but to show the obligations of men3 it is not to justify his providence1 but to show what belongs to us to do4 ,these are two subjects1 and ought not to be confounded4 ,though they may at length run up into each other1 yet observations may immediately tend to make out the latter1 which do not appear1 by any immediate connection1 to the purpose of the former2 which is less our concern1 than many seem to think4 ,for1 first1 ,it is not necessary we should justify the dispensations of ,providence against objections1 any farther than to show1 that the things objected against may1 for aught we know1 be consistent with justice and goodness4 ,suppose then1 that there are things in the system of this world1 and plan of ,providence relating to it1 which taken alone would be unjust3 yet it has been shown unanswerably1 that if we could take in the reference1 which these things may have to other things1 present past and to come2 to the whole scheme1 which the things objected against are parts of2 these very things might1 for aught we know1 be found to be1 not only consistent with justice1 but instances of it4 ,indeed it has been shown1 by the analogy of what we see1 not only possible that this may be the case1 but credible that it is4 ,and thus objections1 drawn from such things1 are answered1 and ,providence is vindicated1 as far as religion makes its vindication necessary4 ,hence it appears1 ,secondly1 that objections against the ,divine justice and goodness are not endeavored to be removed1 by showing that the like objections1 allowed to be really conclusive1 lie against natural providence3 but those objections being supposed and shown not to be conclusive1 the things objected against1 considered as matters of fact1 are farther shown to be credible1 from their conformity to the constitution of nature2 for instance1 that ,god will reward and punish men for their actions hereafter1 from the observation1 that he does reward and punish them for their actions here4 ,and this1 ,i apprehend1 is of weight4 ,thirdly1 it would be of weight1 even though those objections were not answered4 ,for1 there being the proof of religion above set down2 and religion implying several facts2 for instance again1 the fact last mentioned1 that ,god will reward and punish men for their actions hereafter2 the observation1 that his present method of government is by rewards and punishments1 shows that future fact not to be incredible3 whatever objections men may think they have against it1 as unjust or unmerciful1 according to their notions of justice and mercy2 or as improbable from their belief of necessity4 ,i say1 as improbable3 for it is evident no objection against it1 as unjust1 can be urged from necessity2 since this notion as much destroys injustice1 as it does justice4 ,fourthly1 ,though objections against the reasonableness of the system of religion cannot indeed be answered without entering into consideration of its reasonableness2 yet objections against the credibility or truth of it may4 ,because the system of it is reducible into what is properly matter of fact3 and the truth1 the probable truth of facts1 may be shown without consideration of their reasonableness4 ,nor is it necessary1 though1 in some cases and respects1 it is highly useful and proper1 yet it is not necessary1 to give a proof of the reasonableness of every precept enjoined us1 and of every particular dispensation of ,providence1 which comes into the system of religion4 ,indeed the more thoroughly a person of a right disposition is convinced of the perfection of the ,divine nature and conduct1 the farther he will advance towards that perfection of religion1 which ,john#bij speaks of4#bia ,but the general obligations of religion are fully made out1 by proving the reasonableness of the practice of it4 ,and that the practice of religion is reasonable1 may be shown1 though no more could be proved1 than that the system of it may be so1 for aught we know to the contrary3 and even without entering into the distinct consideration of this4 ,fifthly1 ,it is easy to see1 that though the analogy of nature is not an immediate answer to objections against the wisdom1 the justice1 or goodness1 of any doctrine or precept of religion2 yet it may be1 as it is1 an immediate and direct answer to what is really intended by such objections2 which is1 to show that the things objected against are incredible4 ,fourthly1 ,it is most readily acknowledged1 that the foregoing treatise is by no means satisfactory2 very far indeed from it3 but so would any natural institution of life appear1 if reduced into a system1 together with its evidence4 ,leaving religion out of the case1 men are divided in their opinions1 whether our pleasures overbalance our pains3 and whether it be1 or be not1 eligible to live in this world4#bib ,and were all such controversies settled1 which perhaps1 in speculation1 would be found involved in great difficulties2 and were it determined upon the evidence of reason1 as nature has determined it to our hands1 that life is to be preserved3 still1 the rules which ,god has been pleased to afford us1 for escaping the miseries of it1 and obtaining its satisfactions1 the rules1 for instance1 of preserving health1 and recovering it when lost1 are not only fallible and precarious1 but very far from being exact4 ,nor are we informed by nature1 as to future contingencies and accidents1 so as to render it at all certain1 what is the best method of managing our affairs4 ,what will be the success of our temporal pursuits1 in the common sense of the word success1 is highly doubtful4 ,and what will be the success of them in the proper sense of the word2 i4e4 what happiness or enjoyment we shall obtain by them1 is doubtful in a much higher degree4 ,indeed the unsatisfactory nature of the evidence1 with which we are obliged to take up1 in the daily course of life1 is scarce to be expressed4 ,yet men do not throw away life1 or disregard the interests of it1 upon account of this doubtfulness4 ,the evidence of religion then being admitted real1 those who object against it1 as not satisfactory1 i4e4 as not being what they wish it1 plainly forget the very condition of our being3 for satisfaction1 in this sense1 does not belong to such a creature as man4 ,and1 what is more material1 they forget also the very nature of religion4 ,for1 religion presupposes1 in all those who will embrace it1 a certain degree of integrity and honesty2 which it was intended to try whether men have or not1 and to exercise in such as have it1 in order to its improvement4 ,religion presupposes this as much1 and in the same sense1 as speaking to a man presupposes he understands the language in which you speak2 or as warning a man of any danger presupposes that he hath such a regard to himself1 as that he will endeavor to avoid it4 ,therefore the question is not at all1 ,whether the evidence of religion be satisfactory2 but ,whether it be1 in reason1 sufficient to prove and discipline that virtue1 which it presupposes4 ,now the evidence of it is fully sufficient for all those purposes of probation2 how far soever it is from being satisfactory1 as to the purposes of curiosity1 or any other3 and indeed it answers the purposes of the former in several respects1 which it would not do1 if it were as overpowering as is required4 ,besides1 whether the motives or the evidence for any course of action be satisfactory1 meaning here1 by that word1 what satisfies a man that such a course of action will in event be for his good2 this need never be1 and ,i think1 strictly speaking1 never is1 the practical question in common matters4 ,the practical question in all cases is1 ,whether the evidence for a course of action be such as1 taking in all circumstances1 makes the faculty within us1 which is the guide and judge of conduct1#bic determine that course of action to be prudent4 ,indeed1 satisfaction that it will be for our interest or happiness1 abundantly determines an action to be prudent3 but evidence almost infinitely lower than this1 determines actions to be so too2 even in the conduct of every day4 ,fifthly1 ,as to the objection concerning the influence which this argument1 or any part of it1 may1 or may not be expected to have upon men2 ,i observe1 as above1 that religion being intended for a trial#bid and exercise of the morality of every person's character1 who is a subject of it2 and there being1 as ,i have shown1 such evidence for it1 as is sufficient1 in reason1 to influence men to embrace it3 to object1 that it is not to be imagined mankind will be influenced by such evidence1 is nothing to the purpose of the foregoing treatise4 ,for the purpose of it is not to inquire1 what sort of creatures mankind are2 but what the light and knowledge1 which is afforded them1 requires they should be3 to show how1 in reason1 they ought to behave2 not how1 in fact1 they will behave4 ,this depends upon themselves1 and is their own concern2 the personal concern of each man in particular4 ,how little regard the generality have to it1 experience indeed does too fully show4 ,but religion1 considered as a probation1 has had its end upon all persons1 to whom it has been proposed with evidence sufficient in reason to influence their practice3 for by this means they have been put into a state of probation2 let them behave as they will in it4 ,thus1 not only revelation1 but reason also1 teaches us1 that by the evidence of religion being laid before men1 the designs of ,providence are carrying on1 not only with regard to those who will be influenced by it1 but likewise with regard to those who will not4 ,lastly1 the objection here referred to1 allows the thing insisted upon in this treatise to be of some weight2 and if so1 it may be hoped it will have some influence4 ,and if there be a probability that it will have any at all1 there is the same reason in kind1 though not in degree1 to lay it before men1 as there would be1 if it were likely to have a greater influence4 ,further1 ,i desire it may be considered1 with respect to the whole of the foregoing objections1 that in this treatise ,i have argued upon the principles of others1#bie not my own3 and have omitted what ,i think true1 and of the utmost importance1 because by others thought unintelligible1 or not true4 ,thus ,i have argued upon the principles of the fatalists1 which ,i do not believe3 and have omitted a thing of the utmost importance which ,i do believe1--viz4 the moral fitness and unfitness of actions1 prior to all will whatever2 which as certainly determine the divine conduct1 as speculative truth and falsehood necessarily determine the divine judgment4 ,indeed the principle of liberty1 and that of moral fitness1 so force themselves upon the mind1 that moralists1 ancient as well as modern1 have formed their language upon it4 ,and probably it may appear in mine1 though ,i have endeavored to avoid it2 and1 in order to avoid it1 have sometimes been obliged to express myself in a manner1 which will appear strange to such as do not observe the reason for it4 ,but the general argument here pursued1 does not at all suppose1 or proceed upon these principles4 ,now1 these two abstract principles of liberty and moral fitness being omitted1 religion can be considered in no other view1 than merely as a question of fact3 and in this view it is here considered4 ,it is obvious1 that ,christianity1 and the proof of it1 are both historical4 ,even natural religion is1 properly1 a matter of fact4 ,for1 that there is a righteous ,governor of the world1 is so3 and this proposition contains the general system of natural religion4 ,but then1 several abstract truths1 and in particular those two principles1 are usually taken into consideration in the proof of it3 whereas it is here treated of only as a matter of fact4 ,to explain this2 ,that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones1 is an abstract truth2 but that they appear so to our mind1 is only a matter of fact4 ,this last must have been admitted1 if any thing was1 by those ancient sceptics1 who would not admit the former3 but pretended to doubt1 whether there were any such thing as truth1 or whether we could certainly depend upon our faculties of understanding for the knowledge of it in any case4 ,the assertion that there is1 in the nature of things1 an original standard of right and wrong in actions1 independent upon all will1 but which unalterably determines the will of ,god1 to exercise that moral government over the world1 which religion teaches1 7i4e4 finally and upon the whole to reward and punish men respectively as they act right or wrong27 contains an abstract truth1 as well as matter of fact4 ,but suppose that in the present state1 every man without exception1 was rewarded and punished1 in exact proportion as he followed or transgressed that sense of right and wrong1 which ,god has implanted in his nature3 this would not be at all an abstract truth1 but only a matter of fact4 ,and though this fact were acknowledged by every one1 yet the same difficulties might be raised as now are1 concerning the abstract questions of liberty and moral fitness4 ,and we should have a proof1 even the certain one of experience1 that the government of the world was perfectly moral1 without taking in the consideration of those questions3 and this proof would remain1 in what way soever they were determined4 ,thus1 ,god having given mankind a moral faculty1 the object of which is actions1 and which naturally approves some actions as right1 and of good desert1 and condemns others as wrong1 and of ill desert2 that he will1 finally and upon the whole1 reward the former and punish the latter1 is not an assertion of an abstract truth1 but of what is as mere a fact1 as his doing so at present would be4 ,this future fact ,i have not1 indeed1 proved with the force with which it might be proved1 from the principles of liberty and moral fitness2 but without them have given a really conclusive practical proof of it1 which is greatly strengthened by the general analogy of nature2 a proof easily cavilled at1 easily shown not to be demonstrative1 7and it is not offered as such27 but impossible1 ,i think1 to be evaded1 or answered4 ,thus the obligations of religion are made out1 exclusive of the questions concerning liberty and moral fitness2 which have been perplexed with difficulties and abstruse reasonings1 as every thing may4 ,hence therefore may be observed distinctly1 what is the force of this treatise4 ,it will be1 to such as are convinced of religion upon the proof arising out of the two last mentioned principles1 an additional proof and confirmation of it3 to such as do not admit those principles1 an original proof of it1#bif and a confirmation of that proof4 ,those who believe1 will here find the scheme of ,christianity cleared of objections1 and the evidence of it in a peculiar manner strengthened4 ,those who do not believe will at least be shown the absurdity of all attempts to prove ,christianity false1 the plain undoubted credibility of it2 and1 ,i hope1 a good deal more4 ,thus1 though some perhaps may seriously think1 that analogy1 as here urged1 has too great stress laid upon it2 and ridicule1 unanswerable ridicule1 may be applied1 to show the argument from it in a disadvantageous light2 yet there can be no question1 but that it is a real one4 ,for religion1 both natural and revealed1 implying in it numerous facts2 analogy1 being a confirmation of all facts to which it can be applied1 and the only proof of most1 cannot but be admitted by every one to be a material thing1 and truly of weight on the side of religion1 both natural and revealed4 ,and it ought to be particularly regarded by such as profess to follow nature1 and to be less satisfied with abstract reasonings4 ,,conclusion4 ,whatever account may be given of the strange inattention and disregard1 in some ages and countries1 to a matter of such importance as religion2 it would1 before experience1 be incredible1 that there should be the like disregard in those1 who have had the moral system of the world laid before them1 as it is by ,christianity1 and often inculcated upon them3 because this moral system carries in it a good degree of evidence for its truth1 upon its being barely proposed to our thoughts4 ,there is no need of abstruse reasonings and distinctions1 to convince an unprejudiced understanding1 that there is a ,god who made and governs the world1 and will judge it in righteousness2 though they may be necessary to answer abstruse difficulties1 when once such are raised3 when the very meaning of those words1 which express most intelligibly the general doctrine of religion1 is pretended to be uncertain2 and the clear truth of the thing itself is obscured by the intricacies of speculation4 ,to an unprejudiced mind1 ten thousand thousand instances of design cannot but prove a designer4 ,and it is intuitively manifest1 that creatures ought to live under a dutiful sense of their ,maker2 and that justice and charity must be his laws1 to creatures whom he has made social1 and placed in society4 ,the truth of revealed religion1 peculiarly so called1 is not indeed self-evident1 but requires external proof1 in order to its being received4 ,yet inattention1 among us1 to revealed religion1 will be found to imply the same dissolute immoral temper of mind1 as inattention to natural religion3 because1 when both are laid before us1 in the manner they are in ,christian countries of liberty1 our obligations to inquire into both1 and to embrace both upon supposition of their truth1 are obligations of the same nature4 ,revelation claims to be the voice of ,god3 and our obligation to attend to his voice is surely moral1 in all cases4 ,and as it is insisted1 that its evidence is conclusive1 upon thorough consideration of it2 so it offers itself with obvious appearances of having something more than human in it1 and therefore in all reason requires to have its claims most seriously examined into4 ,it is to be added1 that though light and knowledge1 in what manner soever afforded1 is equally from ,god2 yet a miraculous revelation has a peculiar tendency1 from the first principles of our nature1 to awaken mankind1 and inspire them with reverence and awe4 ,and this is a peculiar obligation1 to attend to what claims to be so1 with such appearances of truth4 ,it is therefore most certain1 that our obligations to inquire seriously into the evidence of ,christianity1 and1 upon supposition of its truth1 to embrace it1 are of the utmost importance1 and moral in the highest and most proper sense4 ,let us then suppose1 that the evidence of religion in general1 and of ,christianity1 has been seriously inquired into1 by all reasonable men among us4 ,yet we find many professedly to reject both1 upon speculative principles of infidelity4 ,all of them do not content themselves with a bare neglect of religion1 and enjoying their imaginary freedom from its restraints4 ,some go much beyond this4 ,they deride ,god's moral government over the world4 ,they renounce his protection1 and defy his justice4 ,they ridicule and vilify ,christianity1 and blaspheme the author of it2 and take all occasions to manifest scorn and contempt of revelation4 ,this amounts to an active setting themselves against religion2 to what may be considered as a positive principle of irreligion1 which they cultivate within themselves2 and1 whether they intend this effect or not1 render habitual1 as a good man does the contrary principle4 ,others1 who are not chargeable with all this profligateness1 yet are in avowed opposition to religion1 as if discovered to be groundless4 ,now admitting1 which is the supposition we go upon1 that these persons act upon what they think principles of reason1 7and otherwise they are not to be argued with17 it is really inconceivable1 that they should imagine they clearly see the whole evidence of it1 considered in itself1 to be nothing at all3 nor do they pretend this4 ,they are far indeed from having a just notion of its evidence3 but they would not say its evidence was nothing1 if they thought the system of it1 with all its circumstances1 were credible1 like other matters of science or history4 ,their manner of treating it must proceed1 either from such kind of objections against all religion1 as have been answered or obviated in the former part of this treatise2 or else from objections1 and difficulties1 supposed more peculiar to ,christianity4 ,thus1 they entertain prejudices against the whole notion of a revelation1 and miraculous interpositions4 ,they find things in ,scripture1 whether in incidental passages1 or in the general scheme of it1 which appear to them unreasonable4 ,they take for granted1 that if ,christianity were true1 the light of it must have been more general1 and the evidence of it more satisfactory1 or rather overpowering3 that it must and would have been1 in some way1 otherwise put and left1 than it is4 ,now this is not imagining they see the evidence itself to be nothing1 or inconsiderable2 but quite another thing4 ,it is being fortified against the evidence1 in some degree acknowledged1 by thinking they see the system of ,christianity1 or something which appears to them necessarily connected with it1 to be incredible or false2 fortified against that evidence1 which might otherwise make great impression upon them4 ,or1 lastly1 if any of these persons are1 upon the whole1 in doubt concerning the truth of ,christianity2 their behavior seems owing to their taking for granted1 through strange inattention1 that such doubting is1 in a manner1 the same thing as being certain against it4 ,to these persons1 and to this state of opinion concerning religion1 the foregoing treatise is adapted4 ,for1 all the general objections against the moral system of nature having been obviated1 it is shown1 that there is not any peculiar presumption at all against ,christianity1 considered either as not discoverable by reason1 or as unlike to what is so discovered2 nor any1 worth mentioning1 against it as miraculous1 if any at all2 none1 certainly1 which can render it in the least incredible4 ,it is shown1 that1 upon supposition of a divine revelation1 the analogy of nature renders it beforehand highly credible1 ,i think probable1 that many things in it must appear liable to great objections2 and that we must be incompetent judges of it1 to a great degree4 ,this observation is1 ,i think1 unquestionably true1 and of the very utmost importance4 ,but it is urged1 as ,i hope it will be understood1 with great caution not to vilify the faculty of reason1 which is the candle of the ,lord within us2#big though it can afford no light1 where it does not shine2 nor judge1 where it has no principles to judge upon4 ,the objections here spoken of1 being first answered in the view of objections against ,christianity as a matter of fact1 are in the next place considered as urged more immediately against the wisdom1 justice1 and goodness of the ,christian dispensation4 ,and it is fully made out1 that they admit of exactly the like answer1 in every respect1 to what the like objections against the constitution of nature admit of3 that1 as partial views give the appearance of wrong to things1 which1 upon further consideration and knowledge of their relations to other things1 are found just and good2 so it is perfectly credible1 that the things objected against the wisdom and goodness of the ,christian dispensation1 may be rendered instances of wisdom and goodness1 by their reference to other things beyond our view4 ,because ,christianity is a scheme as much above our comprehension1 as that of nature2 and like that1 a scheme in which means are made use of to accomplish ends1 and which1 as is most credible1 may be carried on by general laws4 ,and it ought to be attended to1 that this is not an answer taken merely or chiefly from our ignorance3 but from something positive1 which our observation shows us4 ,for1 to like objections1 the like answer is experienced to be just1 in numberless parallel cases4 ,the objections against the ,christian dispensation1 and the method by which it is carried on1 having been thus obviated1 in general1 and together2 the chief of them are considered distinctly1 and the particular things objected to are shown credible1 by their perfect analogy1 each apart1 to the constitution of nature4 ,thus1 if man be fallen from his primitive state1 and to be restored1 and infinite wisdom and power engages in accomplishing our recovery3 it were to have been expected1 it is said1 that this should have been effected at once2 and not by such a long series of means1 and such a various economy of persons and things2 one dispensation preparatory to another1 this to a further one1 and so on through an indefinite number of ages1 before the end of the scheme proposed can be completely accomplished2 a scheme conducted by infinite wisdom1 and executed by almighty power4 ,but now1 on the contrary1 our finding that every thing in the constitution and course of nature is thus carried on1 shows such expectations concerning revelation to be highly unreasonable2 and is a satisfactory answer to them1 when urged as objections against the credibility1 that the great scheme of ,providence in the redemption of the world may be of this kind1 and to be accomplished in this manner4 ,as to the particular method of our redemption1 the appointment of a ,mediator between ,god and man3 this has been shown to be most obviously analogous to the general conduct of nature1 i4e4 the ,god of nature1 in appointing others to be the instruments of his mercy1 as we experience in the daily course of ,providence4 ,the condition of this world1 which the doctrine of our redemption by ,christ presupposes1 so much falls in with natural appearances1 that heathen moralists inferred it from those appearances3 inferred that human nature was fallen from its original rectitude1 and in consequence of this1 degraded from its primitive happiness4 ,however this opinion came into the world1 these appearances kept up the tradition1 and confirmed the belief of it4 ,and as it was the general opinion under the light of nature1 that repentance and reformation1 alone and by itself1 was not sufficient to do away sin1 and procure a full remission of the penalties annexed to it2 and as the reason of the thing does not at all lead to any such conclusion2 so every day's experience shows us1 that reformation is not1 in any sort1 sufficient to prevent the present disadvantages and miseries1 which1 in the natural course of things1 ,god has annexed to folly and extravagance4 ,yet there may be ground to think1 that the punishments1 which1 by the general laws of divine government1 are annexed to vice1 may be prevented3 that provision may have been1 even originally1 made1 that they should be prevented by some means or other1 though they could not by reformation alone4 ,for we have daily instances of such mercy1 in the general conduct of nature3 compassion provided for misery1#bih medicines for diseases1 friends against enemies4 ,there is provision made1 in the original constitution of the world1 that much of the natural bad consequences of our follies1 which persons themselves alone cannot prevent1 may be prevented by the assistance of others2 assistance which nature enables1 and disposes1 and appoints them to afford4 ,by a method of goodness analogous to this1 when the world lay in wickedness1 and consequently in ruin1 ,god so loved the world1 that he gave his only-begotten ,son to save it3 and he being made perfect by suffering1 became the author of eternal salvation to all them that obey him4#bii ,indeed neither reason nor analogy would lead us to think1 in particular1 that the interposition of ,christ1 in the manner in which he did interpose1 would be of that efficacy for recovery of the world1 which the ,scripture teaches us it was4 ,but neither would reason nor analogy lead us to think1 that other particular means would be of the efficacy1 which experience shows they are1 in numberless instances4 ,therefore1 as the case before us does not admit of experience2 so1 that neither reason nor analogy can show how1 or in what particular way1 the interposition of ,christ1 as revealed in ,scripture1 is of that efficacy1 which it is there represented to be2 this is no kind nor degree of presumption against its being really of that efficacy4 ,further3 the objections against ,christianity1 from the light of it not being universal1 nor its evidence so strong as might possibly be given1 have been answered by the general analogy of nature4 ,that ,god has made such variety of creatures1 is indeed an answer to the former3 but that he dispenses his gifts in such variety1 both of degrees and kinds1 among creatures of the same species1 and even to the same individuals at different times2 is a more obvious and full answer to it4 ,and it is so far from being the method of ,providence in other cases1 to afford us such overbearing evidence1 as some require in proof of ,christianity2 that on the contrary1 the evidence upon which we are naturally appointed to act in common matters1 throughout a very great part of life1 is doubtful in a high degree4 ,and admitting the fact1 that ,god has afforded to some no more than doubtful evidence of religion2 the same account may be given of it1 as of difficulties and temptations with regard to practice4 ,but as it is not impossible1#cjj surely1 that this alleged doubtfulness may be men's own fault2 it deserves their most serious consideration1 whether it be not so4 ,however1 it is certain1 that doubting implies a degree of evidence for that of which we doubt3 and that this degree of evidence as really lays us under obligations as demonstrative evidence4 ,the whole of religion then is throughout credible3 nor is there1 ,i think1 any thing1 relating to the revealed dispensation of things1 more different from the experienced constitution and course of nature1 than some parts of the constitution of nature are from other parts of it4 ,if so1 the only question which remains is1 ,what positive evidence can be alleged for the truth of ,christianity8 ,this too in general has been considered1 and the objections against it estimated4 ,deduct1 therefore1 what is to be deducted from that evidence1 upon account of any weight which may be thought to remain in these objections1 after what the analogy of nature has suggested in answer to them3 and then consider1 what are the practical consequences from all this upon the most sceptical principles one can argue upon 7for ,i am writing to persons who entertain these principles73 and upon such consideration it will be obvious1 that immorality1 as little excuse as it admits of in itself1 is greatly aggravated1 in persons who have been made acquainted with ,christianity1 whether they believe it or not3 because the moral system of nature1 or natural religion1 which ,christianity lays before us1 approves itself1 almost intuitively1 to a reasonable mind1 upon seeing it proposed4 ,in the next place1 with regard to ,christianity1 it will be observed that there is a middle between a full satisfaction of the truth of it1 and a satisfaction of the contrary4 ,the middle state of mind between these two consists in a serious apprehension1 that it may be true1 joined with doubt whether it is so4 ,and this1 upon the best judgment ,i am able to make1 is as far towards speculative infidelity1 as any sceptic can at all be supposed to go1 who has had true ,christianity1 with the proper evidences of it1 laid before him1 and has in any tolerable measure considered them4 ,for ,i would not be mistaken to comprehend all who have ever heard of it2 because it seems evident1 that in many countries called ,christian1 neither ,christianity nor its evidence1 is fairly laid before men4 ,and in places where both are1 there appear to be some who have very little attended to either1 and who reject ,christianity with a scorn proportionate to their inattention2 and yet are by no means without understanding in other matters4 ,now it has been shown1 that a serious apprehension that ,christianity may be true1 lays persons under the strictest obligations of a serious regard to it1 throughout the whole of their life2 a regard not the same exactly1 but in many respects nearly the same with what a full conviction of its truth would lay them under4 ,lastly1 it will appear1 that blasphemy and profaneness1 with regard to ,christianity1 are absolutely without excuse4 ,there is no temptation to it1 but from the wantonness of vanity or mirth2 and those1 considering the infinite importance of the subject1 are no such temptations as to afford any excuse for it4 ,if this be a just account of things1 and yet men can go on to vilify or disregard ,christianity1 which is to talk and act as if they had a demonstration of its falsehood1 there is no reason to think they would alter their behavior to any purpose1 though there were a demonstration of its truth4 ,,dissertations4 ,,of ,,personal ,,identity4 ,,of ,,the ,,nature ,,of ,,virtue4 ,advertisement4 ,in the first copy of these papers1 ,i had inserted the two following dissertations into the chapters1 on a ,future ,life1 and on the ,moral ,government of ,god2 with which they are closely connected4 ,but as these do not directly fall under the title of the foregoing treatise1 and would have kept the subject of it too long out of sight1 it seems more proper to place them by themselves4 ,,dissertation ,i4 ,personal ,identity4 ,whether we are to live in a future state1 as it is the most important question which can possibly be asked1 so it is the most intelligible one which can be expressed in language4 ,yet strange perplexities have been raised about the meaning of that identity or sameness of person1 which is implied in the notion of our living now and hereafter1 or in any two successive moments4 ,and the solution of these difficulties hath been stranger than the difficulties themselves4 ,for1 personal identity has been explained so by some1 as to render the inquiry concerning a future life of no consequence at all to us the persons who are making it4 ,and though few men can be misled by such subtleties2 yet it may be proper to consider them a little4 ,when it is asked wherein personal identity consists1 the answer should be the same1 as if it were asked wherein consists similitude1 or equality2 that all attempts to define would but perplex it4 ,yet there is no difficulty at all in ascertaining the idea4 ,for as1 upon two triangles being compared or viewed together1 there arises to the mind the idea of similitude2 or upon twice two and four1 the idea of equality3 so likewise1 upon comparing the consciousness of one's self1 or one's own existence1 in any two moments1 there as immediately arises to the mind the idea of personal identity4 ,and as the two former comparisons not only give us the ideas of similitude and equality2 but also show us that two triangles are alike1 and twice two and four are equal3 so the latter comparison not only gives us the idea of personal identity1 but also shows us the identity of ourselves in those two moments2 the present1 suppose1 and that immediately past2 or the present1 and that a month1 a year1 or twenty years past4 ,in other words1 by reflecting upon that which is myself now1 and that which was myself twenty years ago1 ,i discern they are not two1 but one and the same self4 ,but though consciousness of what is past does thus ascertain our personal identity to ourselves1 yet to say1 that it makes personal identity1 or is necessary to our being the same persons1 is to say1 that a person has not existed a single moment1 nor done one action1 but what he can remember2 indeed none but what he reflects upon4 ,and one should really think it self-evident1 that consciousness of personal identity presupposes1 and therefore cannot constitute1 personal identity2 any more than knowledge1 in any other case1 can constitute truth1 which it presupposes4 ,this wonderful mistake may possibly have arisen from hence2 that to be endued with consciousness is inseparable from the idea of a person1 or intelligent being4 ,for1 this might be expressed inaccurately thus1 that consciousness makes personality3 and from hence it might be concluded to make personal identity4 ,but though present consciousness of what we at present do and feel is necessary to our being the persons we now are2 yet present consciousness of past actions or feelings is not necessary to our being the same persons who performed those actions1 or once had those feelings4 ,the inquiry1 what makes vegetables the same1 in the common acceptation of the word1 does not appear to have any relation to this of personal identity3 because1 the word same1 when applied to them and to a person1 is not only applied to different subjects1 but it is also used in different senses4 ,for when a man swears to the same tree1 as having stood fifty years in the same place1 he means only the same as to all the purposes of property1 and uses of common life2 and not that the tree has been all that time the same1 in the strict philosophical sense of the word4 ,for he does not know1 whether any one particle of the present tree be the same with any one particle of the tree which stood in the same place fifty years ago4 ,and if they have not one common particle of matter1 they cannot be the same tree in the proper philosophic sense of the word same3 it being evidently a contradiction in terms1 to say they are1 when no part of their substance1 and no one of their properties is the same3 no part of their substance1 by the supposition2 no one of their properties1 because it is allowed1 that the same property cannot be transferred from one substance to another4 ,therefore when we say the identity of sameness of a plant consists in a continuation of the same life1 communicated under the same organization1 to a number of particles of matter1 whether the same or not2 the word same1 when applied to life and to organization1 cannot possibly be understood to signify1 what it signifies in this very sentence1 when applied to matter4 ,in a loose and popular sense then1 the life and the organization and the plant are justly said to be the same1 notwithstanding the perpetual change of the parts4 ,but in strict and philosophical language1 no man1 no being1 no mode of being1 no any thing1 can be the same with that1 with which it has indeed nothing the same4 ,now sameness is used in this latter sense1 when applied to persons4 ,the identity of these1 therefore1 cannot subsist with diversity of substance4 ,the thing here considered1 and as ,i think1 demonstratively determined1 is proposed by ,mr4 ,locke in these words1 ,whether it2 i4e4 the same self or person1 be the same identical substance8 ,and he has suggested what is a much better answer to the question1 than that which he gives it in form4 ,for he defines person1 a thinking intelligent being1 c41 and personal identity1 the sameness of a rational being4#cja ,the question then is1 whether the same rational being is the same substance3 which needs no answer1 because being and substance1 in this place1 stand for the same idea4 ,the ground of the doubt1 whether the same person be the same substance1 is said to be this2 that the consciousness of our own existence1 in youth and in old age1 or in any two joint successive moments1 is not the same individual action1#cjb i4e4 not the same consciousness1 but different successive consciousnesses4 ,now it is strange that this should have occasioned such perplexities4 ,for it is surely conceivable1 that a person may have a capacity of knowing some object or other to be the same now1 which it was when he contemplated it formerly3 yet in this case1 where1 by the supposition1 the object is perceived to be the same1 the perception of it in any two moments cannot be one and the same perception4 ,and thus1 though the successive consciousnesses1 which we have of our own existence1 are not the same1 yet are they consciousnesses of one and the same thing or object2 of the same person1 self1 or living agent4 ,the person1 of whose existence the consciousness is felt now1 and was felt an hour or a year ago1 is discerned to be2 not two persons1 but one and the same person2 and therefore is one and the same4 ,mr4 ,locke's observations upon this subject appear hasty3 and he seems to profess himself dissatisfied with suppositions1 which he has made relating to it4#cjc ,but some of those hasty observations have been carried to a strange length by others2 whose notion1 when traced and examined to the bottom1 amounts1 ,i think1 to this3#cjd 8,that personality is not a permanent1 but a transient thing3 that it lives and dies1 begins and ends continually3 that no one can any more remain one and the same person two moments together1 than two successive moments can be one and the same moment3 that our substance is indeed continually changing2 but whether this be so or not1 is1 it seems1 nothing to the purpose2 since it is not substance1 but consciousness alone1 which constitutes personality3 which consciousness1 being successive1 cannot be the same in any two moments1 nor consequently the personality constituted by it40 ,hence it must follow1 that it is a fallacy upon ourselves1 to charge our present selves with any thing we did1 or to imagine our present selves interested in any thing which befell us yesterday2 or that our present self will be interested in what will befall us to-morrow3 since our present self is not1 in reality1 the same with the self of yesterday1 but another like self or person coming in its room1 and mistaken for it2 to which another self will succeed to-morrow4 ,this1 ,i say1 must follow4 ,for if the self or person of to-day1 and that of to-morrow1 are not the same1 but only like persons2 the person of to-day is really no more interested in what will befall the person of to-morrow1 than in what will befall any other person4 ,it may be thought1 perhaps1 that this is not a just representation of the opinion we are speaking of3 because those who maintain it allow1 that a person is the same as far back as his remembrance reaches4 ,indeed they use the words1 identity1 and same person4 ,nor will language permit these words to be laid aside2 since if they were1 there must be ,i know not what ridiculous periphrasis substituted in the room of them4 ,but they cannot1 consistently with themselves1 mean1 that the person is really the same4 ,for it is self-evident1 that the personality cannot be really the same1 if1 as they expressly assert1 that in which it consists is not the same4 ,and as1 consistently with themselves1 they cannot1 so1 ,i think it appears1 they do not mean1 that the person is really the same1 but only that he is so in a fictitious sense3 in such a sense only as they assert1 for this they do assert1 that any number of persons whatever may be the same person4 ,the bare unfolding this notion1 and laying it thus naked and open1 seems the best confutation of it4 ,however1 since great stress is said to be put upon it1 ,i add the following things4 ,first1 ,this notion is absolutely contradictory to that certain conviction1 which necessarily and every moment rises within us1 when we turn our thoughts upon ourselves1 when we reflect upon what is past1 and look forward upon what is to come4 ,all imagination of a daily change of that living agent which each man calls himself1 for another1 or of any such change throughout our whole present life1 is entirely borne down by our natural sense of things4 ,nor is it possible for a person in his wits to alter his conduct1 with regard to his health or affairs1 from a suspicion1 that1 though he should live to-morrow1 he should not1 however1 be the same person he is to-day4 ,yet1 if it be reasonable to act1 with respect to a future life1 upon the notion that personality is transient1 it is reasonable to act upon it1 with respect to the present4 ,here then is a notion equally applicable to religion and to temporal concerns4 ,every one sees and feels the inexpressible absurdity of it in the latter case2 therefore1 if any can take up with it in the former1 this cannot proceed from the reason of the thing1 but must be owing to inward unfairness1 and secret corruption of heart4 ,secondly1 ,it is not an idea1 or abstract notion1 or quality1 but a being only1 which is capable of life and action1 of happiness and misery4 ,now all beings confessedly continue the same1 during the whole time of their existence4 ,consider then a living being now existing1 and which has existed for any time alive4 ,this living being must have done and suffered and enjoyed1 what it has done and suffered and enjoyed formerly1 7this living being1 ,i say1 and not another7 as really as it does and suffers and enjoys1 what it does and suffers and enjoys this instant4 ,all these successive actions1 enjoyments1 and sufferings1 are actions1 enjoyments1 and sufferings1 of the same living being4 ,and they are so1 prior to all consideration of its remembering or forgetting3 since remembering or forgetting can make no alteration in the truth of past matter of fact4 ,and suppose this being endued with limited powers of knowledge and memory1 there is no more difficulty in conceiving it to have a power of knowing itself to be the same living being which it was some time ago1 of remembering some of its actions1 sufferings1 and enjoyments1 and forgetting others1 than in conceiving it to know or remember or forget any thing else4 ,thirdly1 ,every person is conscious1 that he is now the same person or self he was as far back as his remembrance reaches3 since when any one reflects upon a past action of his own1 he is just as certain of the person who did that action1 namely1 himself who now reflects upon it1 as he is certain that the action was done at all4 ,nay1 very often a person's assurance of an action having been done1 of which he is absolutely assured1 arises wholly from the consciousness that he himself did it4 ,this he1 person1 or self1 must either be a substance1 or the property of some substance4 ,if he1 a person1 be a substance2 then consciousness that he is the same person is consciousness that he is the same substance4 ,if the person1 or he1 be the property of a substance1 still consciousness that he is the same property is as certain a proof that his substance remains the same1 as consciousness that he remains the same substance would be2 since the same property cannot be transferred from one substance to another4 ,but though we are thus certain1 that we are the same agents1 living beings1 or substances1 now1 which we were as far back as our remembrance reaches2 yet it is asked1 whether we may not possibly be deceived in it8 ,and this question may be asked at the end of any demonstration whatever3 because it is a question concerning the truth of perception by memory4 ,he who can doubt1 whether perception by memory can in this case be depended upon1 may doubt also1 whether perception by deduction and reasoning1 which also include memory1 or indeed whether intuitive perception can4 ,here then we can go no further4 ,for it is ridiculous to attempt to prove the truth of those perceptions1 whose truth we can no otherwise prove1 than by other perceptions of exactly the same kind with them1 and which there is just the same ground to suspect2 or to attempt to prove the truth of our faculties1 which can no otherwise be proved1 than by the use or means of those very suspected faculties themselves4#cje ,,dissertation ,,ii4 ,the ,nature of ,virtue4 ,that which renders beings capable of moral government1 is their having a moral nature1 and moral faculties of perception and of action4 ,brute creatures are impressed and actuated by various instincts and propensions3 so also are we4 ,but additional to this1 we have a capacity of reflecting upon actions and characters1 and making them an object to our thought3 and on doing this1 we naturally and unavoidably approve some actions1 under the peculiar view of their being virtuous and of good desert2 and disapprove others1 as vicious and of ill desert4 ,that we have this moral approving and disapproving#cjf faculty1 is certain from our experiencing it in ourselves1 and recognising it in each other4 ,it appears from our exercising it unavoidably1 in the approbation and disapprobation even of feigned characters2 from the words right and wrong1 odious and amiable1 base and worthy1 with many others of like signification in all languages applied to actions and characters3 from the many written systems of morals which suppose it1 since it cannot be imagined1 that all these authors1 throughout all these treatises1 had absolutely no meaning at all to their words1 or a meaning merely chimerical3 from our natural sense of gratitude1 which1 implies a distinction between merely being the instrument of good1 and intending it3 from the distinction every one makes between injury and mere harm1 which1 ,hobbes says1 is peculiar to mankind2 and between injury and just punishment1 a distinction plainly natural1 prior to the consideration of human laws4 ,it is manifest that great part of common language1 and of common behavior over the world1 is formed upon supposition of such a moral faculty2 whether called conscience1 moral reason1 moral sense1 or divine reason2 whether considered as a sentiment of the understanding1 or as a perception of the heart2 or1 which seems the truth1 as including both4 ,nor is it at all doubtful in the general1 what course of action this faculty1 or practical discerning power within us1 approves and what it disapproves4 ,for1 as much as it has been disputed wherein virtue consists1 or whatever ground for doubt there may be about particulars2 yet1 in general1 there is in reality a universally acknowledged standard of it4 ,it is that1 which all ages and all countries have made profession of in public3 it is that1 which every man you meet puts on the show of3 it is that1 which the primary and fundamental laws of all civil constitutions over the face of the earth make it their business and endeavor to enforce the practice of upon mankind3 namely1 justice1 veracity1 and regard to common good4 ,it being manifest then1 in general1 that we have such a faculty or discernment as this1 it may be of use to remark some things more distinctly concerning it4 ,first1 ,it ought to be observed1 that the object of this faculty is actions1#cjg comprehending under that name active or practical principles3 those principles from which men would act1 if occasions and circumstances gave them power2 and which1 when fixed and habitual in any person1 we call his character4 ,it does not appear1 that brutes have the least reflex sense of actions1 as distinguished from events3 or that will and design1 which constitute the very nature of actions as such1 are at all an object to their perception4 ,but to ours they are3 and they are the object1 and the only one1 of the approving and disapproving faculty4 ,acting1 conduct1 behavior1 abstracted from all regard to what is in fact and event the consequence of it1 is itself the natural object of the moral discernment2 as speculative truth and falsehood is of speculative reason4 ,intention of such and such consequences1 is indeed1 always included2 for it is part of the action itself3 but though the intended good or bad consequences do not follow1 we have exactly the same sense of the action1 as if they did4 ,in like manner we think well or ill of characters1 abstracted from all consideration of the good or the evil1 which persons of such characters have it actually in their power to do4 ,we never1 in the moral way1 applaud or blame either ourselves or others1 for what we enjoy or what we suffer1 or for having impressions made upon us1 which we consider as altogether out of our power3 but only for what we do or would have done1 had it been in our power3 or for what we leave undone1 which we might have done1 or would have left undone1 though we could have done4 ,secondly1 ,our sense or discernment of actions as morally good or evil1 implies in it a sense or discernment of them as of good or ill desert4 ,it may be difficult to explain this perception1 so as to answer all the questions which may be asked concerning it3 but every one speaks of such and such actions as deserving punishment2 and it is not1 ,i suppose1 pretended1 that they have absolutely no meaning at all to the expression4 ,now the meaning plainly is not1 that we conceive it for the good of society1 that the doer of such actions should be made to suffer4 ,for if1 unhappily1 it were resolved1 that a man1 who by some innocent action1 was infected with the plague1 should be left to perish1 lest1 by other people's coming near him1 the infection should spread2 no one would say he deserved this treatment4 ,innocence and ill desert are inconsistent ideas4 ,ill desert always supposes guilt3 and if one be no part of the other1 yet they are evidently and naturally connected in our mind4 ,the sight of a man in misery raises our compassion towards him2 and if this misery be inflicted on him by another1 our indignation against the author of it4 ,but when we are informed1 that the sufferer is a villain1 and is punished only for his treachery or cruelty2 our compassion exceedingly lessens1 and in many instances our indignation wholly subsides4 ,now what produces this effect is the conception of that in the sufferer1 which we call ill desert4 ,upon considering then1 or viewing together1 our notion of vice and that of misery1 there results a third1 that of ill desert4 ,and thus there is in human creatures an association of the two ideas1 natural and moral evil1 wickedness and punishment4 ,if this association were merely artificial or accidental1 it were nothing3 but being most unquestionably natural1 it greatly concerns us to attend to it1 instead of endeavoring to explain it away4 ,it may be observed further1 concerning our perception of good and of ill desert1 that the former is very weak with respect to common instances of virtue4 ,one reason of which may be1 that it does not appear to a spectator1 how far such instances of virtue proceed from a virtuous principle1 or in what degree this principle is prevalent3 since a very weak regard to virtue may be sufficient to make men act well in many common instances4 ,on the other hand1 our perception of ill desert in vicious actions lessens1 in proportion to the temptations men are thought to have had to such vices4 ,for1 vice in human creatures consisting chiefly in the absence or want of the virtuous principle2 though a man be overcome1 suppose by tortures1 it does not from thence appear to what degree the virtuous principle was wanting4 ,all that appears is1 that he had it not in such a degree1 as to prevail over the temptation2 but possibly he had it in a degree1 which would have rendered him proof against common temptations4 ,thirdly1 ,our perception of vice and ill desert arises from1 and is the result of1 a comparison of actions with the nature and capacities of the agent4 ,for the mere neglect of doing what we ought to do1 would1 in many cases1 be determined by all men to be in the highest degree vicious4 ,this determination must arise from such comparison1 and be the result of it2 because such neglect would not be vicious in creatures of other natures and capacities1 as brutes4 ,it is the same also with respect to positive vices1 or such as consist in doing what we ought not4 ,for every one has a different sense of harm done by an idiot1 madman1 or child1 and by one of mature and common understanding2 though the action of both1 including the intention1 which is part of the action1 be the same3 as it may be1 since idiots and madmen1 as well as children1 are capable not only of doing mischief but also of intending it4 ,now this difference must arise from somewhat discerned in the nature or capacities of one1 which renders the action vicious2 and the want of which1 in the other1 renders the same action innocent or less vicious3 and this plainly supposes a comparison1 whether reflected upon or not1 between the action and capacities of the agent1 previous to our determining an action to be vicious4 ,hence arises a proper application of the epithets1 incongruous1 unsuitable1 disproportionate1 unfit1 to actions which our moral faculty determines to be vicious4 ,fourthly1 ,it deserves to be considered1 whether men are more at liberty1 in point of morals1 to make themselves miserable without reason1 than to make other people so3 or dissolutely to neglect their own greater good1 for the sake of a present lesser gratification1 than they are to neglect the good of others1 whom nature has committed to their care4 ,it would seem1 that a due concern about our own interest or happiness1 and a reasonable endeavor to secure and promote it1 7which is1 ,i think1 very much the meaning of the word prudence1 in our language27 it would seem1 that this is virtue1 and the contrary behavior faulty and blamable2 since1 in the calmest way of reflection1 we approve of the first1 and condemn the other conduct1 both in ourselves and others4 ,this approbation and disapprobation are altogether different from mere desire of our own1 or of their happiness1 and from sorrow upon missing it4 ,for the object or occasion of this last kind of perception is satisfaction or uneasiness3 whereas the object of the first is active behavior4 ,in one case1 what our thoughts fix upon is our condition3 in the other1 our conduct4 ,it is true indeed1 that nature has not given us so sensible a disapprobation of imprudence and folly1 either in ourselves or others1 as of falsehood1 injustice1 and cruelty3 ,i suppose1 because that constant habitual sense of private interest and good1 which we always carry about with us1 renders such sensible disapprobation less necessary1 less wanting1 to keep us from imprudently neglecting our own happiness1 and foolishly injuring ourselves1 than it is necessary and wanting to keep us from injuring others2 to whose good we cannot have so strong and constant a regard3 and also because imprudence and folly1 appearing to bring its own punishment more immediately and constantly than injurious behavior1 it less needs the additional punishment1 which would be inflicted upon it by others1 had they the same sensible indignation against it1 as against injustice1 and fraud1 and cruelty4 ,besides1 unhappiness being in itself the natural object of compassion1 the unhappiness which people bring upon themselves1 though it be wilfully1 excites in us some pity for them2 and this of course lessens our displeasure against them4 ,still it is matter of experience1 that we are formed so as to reflect very severely upon the greater instances of imprudent neglect and foolish rashness1 both in ourselves and others4 ,in instances of this kind1 men often say of themselves with remorse1 and of others with some indignation1 that they deserved to suffer such calamities1 because they brought them upon themselves1 and would not take warning4 ,particularly when persons come to poverty and distress by a long course of extravagance1 and after frequent admonitions1 though without falsehood or injustice2 we plainly1 do not regard such people as alike objects of compassion with those1 who are brought into the same condition by unavoidable accidents4 ,from these things it appears1 that prudence is a species of virtue1 and folly of vice3 meaning by folly1 something quite different from mere incapacity2 a thoughtless want of that regard and attention to our own happiness1 which we had capacity for4 ,and this the word properly includes2 and1 as it seems1 in its usual acceptation3 for we scarcely apply it to brute creatures4 ,however1 if any person be disposed to dispute the matter1 ,i shall very willingly give him up the words virtue and vice1 as not applicable to prudence and folly3 but must insist1 that the faculty within us1 which is the judge of actions1 approves of prudent actions1 and disapproves imprudent ones3 ,i say prudent and imprudent actions as such1 and considered distinctly from the happiness or misery which they occasion4 ,and by the way1 this observation may help to determine what justness there is in the objection against religion1 that it teaches us to be interested and selfish4 ,fifthly1 ,without inquiring how far1 and in what sense1 virtue is resolvable into benevolence1 and vice into the want of it2 it may be proper to observe1 that benevolence1 and the want of it1 singly considered1 are in no sort the whole1 of virtue and vice4 ,for if this were the case1 in the review of one's own character1 or that of others1 our moral understanding and moral sense would be indifferent to every thing1 but the degrees in which benevolence prevailed1 and the degrees in which it was wanting4 ,that is1 we should neither approve of benevolence to some persons rather than to others1 nor disapprove injustice and falsehood upon any other account1 than merely as an overbalance of happiness was foreseen likely to be produced by the first1 and of misery by the second4 ,on the contrary1 suppose two men competitors for any thing whatever1 which would be of equal advantage to each of them2 though nothing indeed would be more impertinent1 than for a stranger to busy himself to get one of them preferred to the other2 yet such endeavor would be virtue1 in behalf of a friend or benefactor1 abstracted from all consideration of distant consequences3 as that examples of gratitude1 and the cultivation of friendship1 would be of general good to the world4 ,again1 suppose one man should1 by fraud or violence1 take from another the fruit of his labor1 with intent to give it to a third1 who he thought would have as much pleasure from it as would balance the pleasure which the first possessor would have had in the enjoyment1 and his vexation in the loss of it2 suppose also that no bad consequences would follow3 yet such an action would surely be vicious4 ,nay further1 were treachery1 violence1 and injustice1 no otherwise vicious1 than as foreseen likely to produce an overbalance of misery to society2 then1 if in any case a man could procure to himself as great advantage by an act of injustice1 as the whole foreseen inconvenience1 likely to be brought upon others by it1 would amount to2 such a piece of injustice would not be faulty or vicious at all3 because it would be no more than1 in any other case1 for a man to prefer his own satisfaction to another's1 in equal degrees4 ,the fact1 then1 appears to be1 that we are constituted so as to condemn falsehood1 unprovoked violence1 injustice1 and to approve of benevolence to some preferably to others1 abstracted from all consideration1 which conduct is likeliest to produce an overbalance of happiness or misery4 ,therefore1 were the ,author of nature to propose nothing to himself as an end but the production of happiness1 were his moral character merely that of benevolence2 yet ours is not so4 ,upon that supposition indeed1 the only reason of his giving us the above mentioned approbation of benevolence to some persons rather than others1 and disapprobation of falsehood1 unprovoked violence1 and injustice1 must be1 that he foresaw this constitution of our nature would produce more happiness1 than forming us with a temper of mere general benevolence4 ,but still1 since this is our constitution1 falsehood1 violence1 injustice1 must be vice in us2 and benevolence to some1 preferably to others1 virtue2 abstracted from all consideration of the overbalance of evil or good1 which they may appear likely to produce4 ,now if human creatures are endued with such a moral nature as we have been explaining1 or with a moral faculty1 the natural object of which is actions3 moral government must consist in rendering them happy and unhappy1 in rewarding and punishing them1 as they follow1 neglect1 or depart from1 the moral rule of action interwoven in their nature1 or suggested and enforced by this moral faculty2#cjh in rewarding and punishing them upon account of their so doing4 ,i am not sensible that ,i have1 in this fifth observation1 contradicted what any author designed to assert4 ,but some of great and distinguished merit1 have1 ,i think1 expressed themselves in a manner1 which may occasion some danger1 to careless readers1 of imagining the whole of virtue to consist in singly aiming1 according to the best of their judgment1 at promoting the happiness of mankind in the present state2 and the whole of vice1 in doing what they foresee1 or might foresee1 is likely to produce an overbalance of unhappiness in it3 than which mistakes1 none can be conceived more terrible4 ,for it is certain1 that some of the most shocking instances of injustice1 adultery1 murder1 perjury1 and even of persecution1 may1 in many supposable cases1 not have the appearance of being likely to produce an overbalance of misery in the present state2 perhaps sometimes may have the contrary appearance4 ,this reflection might easily be carried on1 but ,i forbear4 ,the happiness of the world is the concern of ,him who is the lord and the proprietor of it3 nor do we know what we are about1 when we endeavor to promote the good of mankind in any ways1 but those which he has directed2 that is indeed in all ways not contrary to veracity and justice4 ,i speak thus upon supposition of persons really endeavoring1 in some sort1 to do good without regard to these4 ,but the truth seems to be2 that such supposed endeavors proceed1 almost always1 from ambition1 the spirit of party1 or some indirect principle1 concealed perhaps in great measure from persons themselves4 ,and though it is our business and our duty to endeavor1 within the bounds of veracity and justice1 to contribute to the ease1 convenience1 and even cheerfulness and diversion of our fellow-creatures3 yet1 from our short views1 it is greatly uncertain1 whether this endeavor will1 in particular instances1 produce an overbalance of happiness upon the whole2 since so many and distant things must come into the account4 ,and that which makes it our duty is1 that there is some appearance that it will1 and no positive appearance sufficient to balance this1 on the contrary side2 and also1 that such benevolent endeavor is a cultivation of that most excellent of all virtuous principles1 the active principle of benevolence4 ,however1 though veracity1 as well as justice1 is to be our rule of life2 it must be added1 otherwise a snare will be laid in the way of some plain men1 that the use of common forms of speech1 generally understood1 cannot be falsehood2 and in general1 that there can be no designed falsehood1 without designing to deceive4 ,it must likewise be observed1 that in numberless cases1 a man may be under the strictest obligations to what he foresees will deceive1 without his intending it4 ,for it is impossible not to foresee1 that the words and actions of men1 in different ranks and employments1 and of different educations1 will perpetually be mistaken by each other4 ,and it cannot but be so1 while they will judge with the utmost carelessness1 as they daily do1 of what they are not1 perhaps1 enough informed to be competent judges of1 even though they considered it with great attention4 ,,footnotes #a ,among these were ,jones1 author of the admirable ,treatise on the ,canon of the ,new ,testament3 ,lardner1 ,maddox1 ,chandler1 ,archbishop ,secker1 c4 #b ,sermon at ,spittle1 on ,abraham's trial4 #c ,among them were ,,cudworth1 born #afag2 8,intel4 ,syst4 of the ,universe30 ,,boyle1 #afbf2 8,things above ,reason30 ,,stillingfleet1 #afce2 8,letters to a ,deist30 ,sir ,i4 ,,newton1 #afdb2 8,observations on ,prophecy30 ,,leslie1 #afej2 8,short ,method with ,deists30 ,,lowth1 #affa1 ,vindic4 of the ,divine ,author of the ,bible3 ,,king1 #affi2 8,origin of ,evil30 ,,sam4 ,,clark1 #afge2 8,evidences of ,nat4 and ,rev4 ,religion30 ,,waterland1 #afhc2 8,scripture ,vindicated30 ,,lardner1 #afhd2 8,credibility of ,gospel ,history30 ,,leland1 #afia2 8,view of ,deistical ,writers10 and 8,advantage and ,necessity of ,rev430 ,,chandler1 #afic2 8,definition of ,christianity10 on 8,prophecy10 c43 ,,warburton1 #afih2 8,divine ,leg4 of ,moses20 ,bishop ,,newton1 #agjd2 8,on the ,prophecies30 ,,watson1 #agcg2 8,apology for ,christianity10 7against ,gibbon17 and also 8,apology for the ,bible10 7against ,paine47 #d ,,mcintosh3 8,progress of ,ethical ,philosophy40 #e ,,brougham3 8,disc4 on ,nat4 ,theology40 #f ,verisimile4 #g ,these three ways of being 8like10 are very distinct from each other4 ,the first is equivalent to a logical induction4 ,the second produces belief1 because the same evidence made us believe in a similar case4 ,the third is just an analogy1 in the popular sense of the term4 #h ,the story is told by ,mr4 ,locke in the ,chapter of ,probability4 #i ,this is good common sense1 and men always act thus if prudent4 ,but it is not enough thus to act in the matter of salvation4 8,he that believeth not shall be damned30 ,mark xvi4 #af4 8,he that believeth hath everlasting life30 ,john iii4 #cf4 8,with the heart man believeth unto righteousness30 ,rom4 x4 #aj4 ,belief is part of the sinner's duty in submitting himself to ,god2 and not merely a question of prudence4 #aj ,see ,part ,,ii4 chap4 vi4 #aa ,philocal4 p4 #bc1 ,ed4 ,cant4 #ab ,some of these speculations1 carried to the full measure of absurdity and impiety1 may be found in ,bayle's great 8,historical and ,critical ,dictionary40 ,see as instances1 the articles ,,origen1 ,,manich,,us1 ,,paulicians4 #ac ,ch4 i4 #ad ,ch4 ii4 #ae ,ch4 iii4 #af ,ch4 iv4 #ag ,ch4 v4 #ah ,ch4 vi4 #ai ,ch4 vii4 #bj ,part ,,ii4 ,ch4 i4 #ba ,ch4 ii4 #bb ,ch4 iii4 #bc ,ch4 iv4 #bd ,ch4 v4 #be ,ch4 vi4 vii4 #bf ,ch4 viii4 #bg ,this chapter ,dr4 ,chalmers regards as the least satisfactory in the book3 not because lacking in just analogies1 but because infected with the obscure metaphysics of that age4 ,his reasoning1 however1 only serves to show that ,b4 has perhaps made too much of the argument from the indivisibility of consciousness2 and by no means that he does not fairly use it4 ,we certainly cannot object that the subject of identity is not made plain4 ,who has explained identity1 or motion1 or cohesion1 or crystallization1 or any thing8 ,locke goes squarely at the subject of personal identity1 7see ,essay1 ch4 #bg17 but has rendered us small aid4 ,his definition is1 8,existence itself1 which determines a being of any sort1 to a particular time and place1 incommunicable to two beings of the same kind40 ,i had rather define it 8the uninterrupted continuance of being40 ,what ceases to exist1 cannot again exist3 for then it would exist after it had ceased to exist1 and would have existed before it existed4 ,locke makes consciousness to constitute identity1 and argues that a man and a person are not the same2 and that hence if ,i kill a man1 but was not conscious of what ,i did1 or have utterly forgotten1 ,i am not the same person4 ,watts shows up this notion of ,locke very ludicrously4 ,butler1 in his 8,dissertation10 urges that consciousness presupposes identity1 as knowledge presupposes truth4 ,on ,locke's theory1 no person would have existed any earlier than the period to which his memory extends4 ,we cannot suppose the soul made up of many consciousnesses1 nor could memory1 if material1 spread itself over successive years of life4 #bh ,i say kind of presumption or probability2 for ,i do not mean to affirm that there is the same degree of conviction1 that our living powers will continue after death1 as there is1 that our substances will4 #bi ,destruction of living powers1 is a manner of expression unavoidably ambiguous2 and may signify either the destruction of a living being1 so as that the same living being shall be incapable of ever perceiving or acting again at all2 or the destruction of those means and instruments by which it is capable of its present life1 of its present state of perception and of action4 ,it is here used in the former sense4 ,when it is used in the latter1 the epithet present is added4 ,the loss of a man's eye is a destruction of living powers in the latter sense4 ,but we have no reason to think the destruction of living powers1 in the former sense1 to be possible4 ,we have no more reason to think a being endued with living powers1 ever loses them during its whole existence1 than to believe that a stone ever acquires them4 #cj ,the next paragraph indicates that ,butler does not1 as ,chalmers thinks1 consider this argument as 8handing us over to an absolute demonstration40 ,it just places all arguments for and against the soul's future life1 in that balanced condition1 which leaves us to learn the fact from revelation1 free from presumptions against its truth4 ,this view of the case entirely relieves the objection as to the future life of brutes2 and shows how entirely we must rely on revelation1 as to the future1 both of man and beast4 #ca ,dodwell had published a book1 in which he argues that human souls are not naturally immortal1 but become so1 by the power of the ,holy ,ghost1 in regeneration4 ,dr4 ,clarke replied4 ,the controversy was continued by ,collins4 ,dr4 ,c4 wrote four tracts on the subject4 ,these 8presumptions0 form the base of materialism1 and hence the denial of a future state4 ,surely1 thoughts and feelings1 if material1 have extension4 ,but can any one conceive of love a foot long1 or anger an inch thick8 ,how superior to the gloomy mists of modern infidels have even pagans been6 ,cicero makes ,cato say1 8,the soul is a simple1 uncompounded substance1 without parts or mixture3 it cannot be divided1 and so cannot perish40 ,and in another place1 8,i never could believe that the soul lost its senses by escaping from senseless matter2 or that such a release will not enlarge and improve its powers20 and again1 8,i am persuaded that ,i shall only begin truly to live1 when ,i cease to live in this world10 ,xenophon reports ,cyrus as saying1 in his last moments1 8,o my sons6 do not imagine that when death has taken me from you1 ,i shall cease to exist40 #cb ,see ,dr4 ,clarke's ,letter to ,mr4 ,dodwell1 and the defences of it4 #cc ,as every particle of our bodies is changed within seven years1 an average life would take us through many such changes4 ,if the mind changes with the body1 it would be unjust for an old man to be made to suffer for the sins of his youth4 ,to escape this1 the materialist is driven to affirm that the whole is not altered1 though every particle be changed4 ,this argument from the constant flux is irresistible4 ,it proves our identity1 and that matter and mind are not the same4 ,does it not also destroy all presumption that the ,ego cannot exist without this particular body8 #cd ,see ,dissertation ,i4 #ce ,the mind affects the body1 as much as the body does the mind4 ,love1 anger1 c4 quicken the circulation2 fear checks it2 terror may stop it altogether4 ,mania is as often produced by moral1 as by physical causes1 and hence of late moral means are resorted to for cure4 ,the brain of a maniac1 seldom shows1 on dissection1 any derangement4 ,but this does not prove that there was no functional derangement4 #cf 8,s4 ,what shall we say1 then1 of the shoemaker8 ,that he cuts with his instrument only1 or with his hands also8 ,a4 ,with his hands also4 ,s4 ,does he use his eyes also1 in making shoes8 ,a4 ,yes4 ,s4 ,but are we agreed that he who uses1 and what he uses1 are different8 ,a4 ,yes4 ,s4 ,the shoemaker1 then1 and harper1 are different from the hands and eyes they use8 ,a4 ,it appears so4 ,s4 ,does a man then use his whole body8 ,a4 ,certainly4 ,s4 ,but he who uses1 and that which he uses are different4 ,a4 ,yes4 ,s4 ,a man then is something different from his own body40 ,,plat4 ,,alcibi4 ,,prim4 p4 #abi1 ,d4 ,stallb4 ,ed4 8,it may easily be perceived that the mind both sees and hears1 and not those parts which are1 so to speak1 windows of the mind40 8,neither are we bodies2 nor do ,i1 while speaking this to thee1 speak to thy body40 8,whatever is done by thy mind1 is done by thee40 ,,cicero1 ,tusc4 ,disput4 ,i4 #bj1 #df and #bb1 #eb4 8,the mind of each man is the man2 not that figure which may be pointed out with the finger40 ,,cic41 de ,rep4 b4 #f1 s4 #bd4 #cg ,butler's argument1 if advanced for proof would prove too much1 not only as to brutes but as to man2 for it would prove pre-existence4 ,and this is really the tenet1 7i4e4 transmigration17 of those who arrive at the doctrine of immortality only by philosophy4 ,philosophy cannot establish the doctrine of a future state1 nor can it afford any presumptions against either a future or a pre-existent state4 ,nothing is gained by insisting that reason teaches the true doctrine of the soul2 any more than there would be by insisting that by it we learned the doctrine of a trinity1 or atonement4 ,philosophy does teach that ,he who can create1 under infinite diversity of forms1 can sustain existence1 in any mode he pleases4 ,the reader who chooses to look further into the discussion as to the immortality of brutes1 will find it spread out in ,,polignac',s ,anti-,lucretius1 and still more in ,,bayle',s ,dictionary1 under the articles ,,pereira1 and ,,rorarius4 ,the topic is also discussed in ,,des ,,cartes on the ,passions3 ,,baxter on ,the ,nature of the ,soul3 ,,hume',s ,essays1 ,essay #i3 ,,search',s ,light of ,nature3 ,,cheyne',s ,philosophical ,principles3 ,,wagstaff on the ,immortality of ,brutes3 ,,edwards' ,critical and ,philosophical ,exercitations3 ,,watt',s ,essays1 ,essay #i3 ,,colliber',s ,enquiry3 ,,locke on the ,understanding1 b4 #b1 ch4 ix43 ,,ditton on the ,resurrection3 ,,willis ,de ,anima ,brut4 #ch ,it is as absurd to suppose that a brain thinks1 as that an eye sees1 or a finger feels4 ,the eye no more sees1 than the telescope or spectacles4 ,if the nerve be paralyzed1 there is no vision1 though the eye be perfect4 ,a few words spoken or read1 may at once deprive of sight1 or knock a person down4 ,the mind sometimes survives the body4 ,swift1 utterly helpless from palsy1 retained his faculties4 ,in some1 the body survives the mind4 ,,morgagni1 ,,haller1 ,,bonnet1 and others1 have proved that there is no part of the brain1 not even the pineal gland1 which has not been found destroyed by disease1 where there had been no hallucination of mind1 nor any suspicion of such disease1 during life4 #ci ,pp4 #hd1 #he4 #dj ,we are told by sceptics that 8mind is the result of a curious and complicated organization40 ,a mere jumble of words6 ,but were the mind material1 there is no evidence that death would destroy it3 for we do not see that death has any power over matter4 ,the body remains the very same as it does in a swoon1 till chemical changes begin4 #da ,there are three distinct questions1 relating to a future life1 here considered3 ,whether death be the destruction of living agents2 if not1 ,whether it be the destruction of their present powers of reflection1 as it certainly is the destruction of their present powers of sensation2 and if not1 ,whether it be the suspension1 or discontinuance of the exercise of these present reflecting powers4 ,now1 if there be no reason to believe the last1 there will be1 if that were possible1 less for the next1 and less still for the first4 #db ,this1 according to ,strabo1 was the opinion of the ,brachmans1 1 1 1 ,lib4 xv4 p4 #ajci1 ,ed4 ,amst4 #agjg4 8,for they think that the present life is like that of those who are just ready to be born2 and that death is a birth into the real life1 and a happy one to those who have practised philosophy40 ,to which opinion perhaps ,antoninus may allude in these words1 1 1 1 4 ,lib4 ix4 c4 #c4 ,as this last passage may1 by some1 be thought indelicate1 it is left untranslated4 #dc ,the increase of a force in any direction1 cannot of itself change that direction4 ,an arrow shot from a bow1 towards an object1 does not aim at some other object1 by being shot with more force4 #dd ,our nature will always be ours1 or we should cease to be ourselves1 and become something else4 ,and this nature is social4 ,every one feels1 at least sometimes1 that he is not complete in himself for the production of happiness2 and so looks round for that which may fit his wants1 and supply what he cannot produce from within4 ,hence amusements1 of a thousand kinds1 are resorted to1 and still more1 society4 ,society is a want of the mind2 as food is of the body4 ,society1 such as perfectly suits our real nature1 and calls out1 in a right manner1 its every attribute1 would secure our perfect happiness4 ,but ,such society must include ,god4 #de ,see ,part ,,ii4 chap4 ii4 and ,part ,,ii4 chap4 iv4 #df ,objections and difficulties belong to all subjects1 in some of their bearings4 ,ingenious and uncandid men may start others1 which care and candor may remove4 ,it is therefore no proof of weakness in a doctrine1 that it is attacked with objections1 both real and merely plausible4 ,error has been spread by two opposite means3--a dogmatic insisting on doubtful points1 and an unteachable cavilling at certain truth4 #dg ,part ,i4 chap4 vii4 #dh ,our relation to ,god is 8even necessary10 because we are his creatures3 so that the relation must endure so long as we endure4 ,but our relations to other creatures are contingent1 and may be changed or abrogated4 #di ,pp4 #ic1 #id4 #ej 8,the terms nature1 and power of nature1 and course of nature1 are but empty words1 and merely mean that a thing occurs usually or frequently4 ,the raising of a human body out of the earth we call a miracle1 the generation of one in the ordinary way we call natural1 for no other reason than because one is usual the other unusual4 ,did men usually rise out of the earth like corn we should call that natural40 ,dr4 ,,clarke1 ,controv4 with ,leibnitz4 #ea ,that man consists of parts1 is evident2 and the use of each part1 and of the whole man1 is open to investigation4 ,in examining any part we learn what it is1 and what it is to do3 e4g4 the eye1 the hand1 the heart4 ,so of mental faculties2 memory is to preserve ideas1 shame to deter us from things shameful1 compassion to induce us to relieve distress4 ,in observing our whole make1 we may see an ultimate design1--viz43 not particular animal gratifications1 but intellectual and moral improvement1 and happiness by that means4 ,if this be our end1 it is our duty4 ,to disregard it1 must bring punishment2 for shame1 anguish1 remorse1 are by the laws of mind1 the sequences of sin4 ,see ,,law',s ,notes on ,king's ,origin of ,evil4 #eb ,it is almost amazing that philosophy1 because it discovers the laws of matter1 should be placed in antagonism with the ,bible which reveals a superintending ,providence4 ,the ,bible itself teaches this very result of philosophy1--viz43 that the world is governed by general laws4 ,see ,prov4 viii4 #bi3 ,job4 xxxviii4 #ab1 #bd1 #ca1 #cc3 ,ps4 cxix4 #ij1 #ia3 ,jer4 xxxi4 #ce1 and xxxiii4 #be4 #ec ,see ,part ,,ii4 chap4 vi4 #ed ,part ,,ii4 chap4 vi4 #ee ,the general consideration of a future state of punishment1 most evidently belongs to the subject of natural religion4 ,but if any of these reflections should be thought to relate more peculiarly to this doctrine1 as taught in ,scripture1 the reader is desired to observe1 that ,gentile writers1 both moralists and poets1 speak of the future punishment of the wicked1 both as to the duration and degree of it1 in a like manner of expression and of description1 as the ,scripture does4 ,so that all which can positively be asserted to be matter of mere revelation1 with regard to this doctrine1 seems to be1 that the great distinction between the righteous and the wicked1 shall be made at the end of this world2 that each shall then receive according to his deserts4 ,reason did1 as it well might1 conclude that it should1 finally and upon the whole1 be well with the righteous1 and ill with the wicked3 but it could not be determined upon any principles of reason1 whether human creatures might not have been appointed to pass through other states of life and being1 before that distributive justice should finally and effectually take place4 ,revelation teaches us1 that the next state of things after the present is appointed for the execution of this justice2 that it shall be no longer delayed2 but the mystery of ,god1 the great mystery of his suffering vice and confusion to prevail1 shall then be finished2 and he will take to him his great power and will reign1 by rendering to every one according to his works4 #ef ,our language furnishes no finer specimens of the argument analogical4 ,butler here seizes the very points1 which are most plausible and most insisted on1 as showing the harshness and unreasonableness of ,christianity2 and overthrows them at a stroke by simply directing attention to the same things1 in the universally observed course of nature4 #eg ,chap4 i4 #eh ,see chaps4 iv4 and vi4 #ei ,this chapter1 more than any other1 carries the force of positive argument4 ,if in this world1 we have proofs that ,god is a moral governor1 then in order to evince that we shall be under moral government hereafter1 we have only to supply an intermediate consideration1--viz43 that ,god1 as such1 must be unchangeable4 ,the argument1 as just remarked1 assumes a substantive form1 because admitted facts1 as to this world1 exhibiting the very principles on which ,god's government goes at present1 compel us not only to suppose that the principles of ,god will remain1 but to believe so4 #fj ,chap4 ii4 #fa ,the objections against religion1 from the evidence of it not being universal1 nor so strong as might possibly have been1 may be urged against natural religion1 as well as against revealed4 ,and therefore the consideration of them belongs to the first part of this treatise1 as well as the second4 ,but as these objections are chiefly urged against revealed religion1 ,i choose to consider them in the second part4 ,and the answer to them there1 ch4 vi41 as urged against ,christianity1 being almost equally applicable to them as urged against the religion of nature2 to avoid repetition1 the reader is referred to that chapter4 #fb ,dissertation ,,ii4 #fc ,chap4 vi4 #fd ,see ,lord ,shaftesbury's ,inquiry concerning ,virtue1 ,part ,,ii4 #fe ,at the foundation of moral improvement1 lies the conviction that what is right1 is our happiness1 no less than our duty4 ,this again is based upon a conviction that ,god governs justly2 and has all power over us for good or evil4 ,as creation is full of the evidences of design1 so is ,providence4 ,and as the human mind shows1 in its structure1 the most exquisite marks of design1 so the government of mind shows a final object for all our faculties4 ,among the attributes of mind we observe1 conspicuous1 a disposition to seek ends1 lay plans1 and sacrifice present indulgence to future and greater good3 and a facility in learning how to subordinate one thing to another1 so as to secure success in our plans4 ,this1 with conscience to approve or disapprove our modes1 constitutes an evident adaptedness to a moral government on the part of ,god2 and would be worse than superfluous1 if there be no such government4 ,every rule of action1 deduced by reason from the light of nature1 may fairly be regarded as ,god's law2 and the inconveniences resulting from wrong actions1 are ,god's retributions4 ,these retributions1 felt or observed1 are divine teachings1 saying1 emphatically1 if you act thus you shall receive thus4 ,we do actually so judge1 in relation to physics4 ,every rule of motion1 distance1 gravitation1 heat1 electricity1 c4 c41 is received as ,god's law2 and we would deem it insane to act in opposition4 #ff ,consult ,,capp on the ,gov4 of ,god3 ,,twisse ,vindici ,prov4 ,dei3 ,,wittichii ,excre4 ,theol43 ,,dwight',s ,theol43 ,,martinius de ,gubernatione ,mundi3 ,,liefchild on ,providence3 ,,morton on do43 ,,sherlock on do43 ,,rutherford on do43 and the ,sermons of ,thos4 ,leland1 ,porteus1 ,topping1 ,hunt1 ,davies1 ,horseley1 ,south1 ,wisheart1 ,seed1 ,collings1 and ,doddridge4 #fg ,chap4 ii4 #fh ,in the structure of man1 physical and mental1 we find no contrivances for disease or pain1 so that in general those who conform to the laws of their being1 enjoy happiness2 and suffering is chiefly the result of our own conduct4 ,but1 as without revelation we could only learn the evil of vice1 by its effects1 and would often learn it too late to retrieve our affairs1 or our souls' peace1 ,god has in mercy given forth his teachings1 by which1 beforehand1 we may know the effects of actions4 #fi ,see ,dissertation ,,ii4 #gj ,it was contended by ,,mandeville in his 8,fable of the ,bees10 that private vices1 as luxury for instance1 are often conducive to the well-being of society4 ,this idea is fully refuted by ,,warburton1 ,divine ,legation of ,moses1 b4 #a3 ,,berkeley1 ,minute ,philosopher1 ,dial4 #b3 and by ,,brown1 ,characteristics1 ,ess4 #b4 #ga ,a strong illustration of this distinction is seen in the 8delivering up0 of our ,savior to be crucified4 ,as to the mere act of delivering up1 we find it referred1 #a4 ,to ,god the ,father1 ,john iii4 #af3 ,acts ii4 #bc3 ,rom4 viii4 #cb4 #b4 ,to ,christ himself1 ,eph4 v4 #b1 and v4 #be1 c4 ,in this last passage it is literally delivered himself4 #c4 ,to the ,jewish rulers1 ,luke xx4 #bj3 ,mark xii4 #ab4 #d4 ,to ,pontius ,pilate1 ,matt4 xxvii4 #bf3 ,mark xv4 #ae3 ,john xix4 #f4 #e4 ,to ,judas1 ,matt4 xxvi4 #ae3 ,zec4 xi4 #ab4 ,as to the mere act1 ,judas and ,pilate did just what ,god the ,father1 and our ,lord ,jesus did4 ,but how infinitely unlike the qualities of the act6 #gb 8,when one supposes he is about to die1 there comes over him a fear and anxiety about things in regard to which he felt none before4 ,for the stories which are told about ,hades1 that such1 as have practised wrong1 must there suffer punishment1 although made light of for a while1 these torment the soul lest they should be true4 ,but he who is conscious of innocence1 has a pleasant and good hope1 which will support old age40 ,,plato1 ,respub4 i4 s4 #e4 #gc ,see ,dissertation ,,ii4 #gd ,aside from revelation1 our ideas of the divine attributes must be derived from a knowledge of our own4 ,among these is our moral sense1 which constrains us to consider right and wrong as an immutable distinction1 and moral worth as our highest excellence4 ,hence we ascribe perfect virtue to ,god4 ,it does not follow from such reasoning1 that we form a ,deity after our own conceptions1 for it is but the argument a fortiori1 8,he that formed the eye1 shall he not see8 ,he that teacheth man knowledge1 shall he not know80 ,ps4 xciv4 #i4 ,we do not conceive of a ,deity who sees just as we do2 but that he sees1 for he makes sight4 ,so we infer that he has moral attributes1 because we have them1 from him4 ,this point is not sufficiently pressed upon infidels4 ,they readily acknowledge ,god's physical attributes1 because the argument is addressed to their understanding1 but deny his moral ones1 because their hearts are hardened through the deceitfulness of sin4 #ge ,it is easy to see that the occasional disadvantages of virtue1 are no less conducive to moral excellence1 than its being generally advantageous4 ,in view of its general advantages1 we are virtuous with a proper and commanded view to our instinctive desire for happiness4 ,in face of its disadvantages1 we cultivate virtue for its own sake4 #gf ,the common remark1 8virtue brings its own reward10 is true only with qualifications4 ,the apostles1 as to this life1 were the most miserable of men3 7#a ,cor4 xv4 #i47 ,virtue does not always bring earthly rewards4 ,the grand support of the good is drawn from considerations of that future state which the infidel denies4 ,observe1 #a4 ,we cannot suppose that ,god would so construct man1 as that his principal comfort and reward for virtue1 is a delusion4 #b4 ,very good persons are often beset with painful doubts and fears1 as to their future safety4 ,would ,god allow such doubts1 if the expectation of future happiness were the only reward of virtue8 #c4 ,this reward1 at best1 is private2 but for the encouragement of virtue1 it must have obvious triumphs4 ,on the other hand1 bad men grow callous to the rebukes of conscience1 so that great sinners suffer less from remorse than small ones1 and what is worse1 owe their tranquillity to their guilt4 ,again1 he who kills a good man1 wholly deprives him of his only reward1 if this life alone gives it4 ,and the villain who kills himself1 escapes his only punishment4 ,virtuous persons1 in the strong language of ,,robert ,,hall1,a would be 8the only persons who are wholly disappointed of their object2 the only persons who 7by a fatal and irreparable mistake71 expecting an imaginary happiness in an imaginary world1 lose their only opportunity of enjoying those present pleasures1 of which others avail themselves2 dooming themselves to grasp at shadows1 while they neglect the substance1 and harassed with a perpetual struggle against their natural propensities and passions1 and all in vain60 ,a ,sermon on the ,vanity of ,man4 #gg ,because1 so soon as any community1 or collection of persons1 conclude a man to be wholly vicious in his course1 and without any restraint of conscience1 he is at once shorn of his influence1 and will soon be stripped of all power of mischief4 ,on the other hand1 we see the might of virtue unarmed with power1 in ,luther1 in ,roger ,williams1 in ,wm4 ,penn1 and innumerable other instances4 #gh ,isa4 lx4 #ba4 #gi ,p4 #aji4 #hj ,p4 #aaj1 c4 #ha ,p4 #aaa1 c4 #hb ,p4 #aah1 c4 #hc ,see this proof drawn out briefly1 ch4 vi4 #hd ,this chapter is one of many attempts to account for the mixture of suffering and enjoyment in this world2 and demands close examination both of its theory and its arguments4 ,the student may consult1 as he has opportunity1 ,,mus,i ,disput43 ,,holtzsfusii ,disp4 de ,lapsu ,prim4 ,hominum3 ,,selden de ,laps4 ,angelorum3 ,,stapferi ,inst43 ,,witsii ,econom4 ,fd43 ,,bate',s ,harmony of the ,divine ,attrib43 ,,calcott on the ,fall3 ,,shuckford on the ,creation of ,man3 ,,manton',s ,sermons3 ,,south',s do43 ,,toplady',s do43 ,,pearson on the ,creed3 ,,le ,,clerc',s ,diss43 ,,henly',s ,dissert43 ,,kennicott on the ,tree of ,life3 and ,,fabricius de ,primo ,peccato ,angelorum ,lapsorum4 #he ,the evils of life1 are not to be regarded as entering1 necessarily1 into ,god's plan of probation2 and they are not here so presented4 ,the ,scriptures show that all suffering is either punitive1 or castigatory4 ,man at first was to be tried by temptations1 not by sufferings4 #hf ,chap4 ii4 #hg ,see ,sermons preached at the ,rolle1 #agbf1 #b;d ed4 p4 #bje1 c4 ,pref4 p4 #be1 c4 ,serm4 p4 #ba1 c4 #hh 8,if we persist in our objection1 notwithstanding these analogies1 then should we conclude1 either that we are under the regimen of an unrighteous ,deity1 or that there is no ,deity at all40--,dr4 ,,chalmers4 #hi ,shall we be of such8 ,shall we forget or disregard the great fact that when death has transferred us to other conditions1 we1 our proper selves1 will remain8 ,no longer1 indeed1 united with flesh and blood1 surrounded with houses1 lands1 business1 or enjoyments1 such as the present1 but still ourselves4 ,still with wants to be supplied1 desires to be gratified1 and capacities to be employed and developed6 #ij ,part ,,ii4 chap4 v4 #ia ,this is one of those passages1 remarked on in our introduction1 as a statement not properly explained or guarded4 ,we cannot suppose the author1 to have overlooked the great fact of man's fall and corruption4 ,that the argument properly considered1 stands good1 is the verdict of such a man as ,,chalmers4 ,after speaking of human helplessness in matters of religion1 he says1 8,there is nothing in this helplessness to break the analogies on which to found the negative vindication that forms the great and undoubted achievement of this volume4 ,the analogy lies here3--that if a man wills to obtain prosperity in this life1 he may1 if observant of the rules which experience and wisdom prescribe1 in general1 make it good4 ,and if he wills to attain blessedness in the next life1 he shall1 if observant of what religion prescribes1 most certainly make it good2 in conformity with the declaration1 #8he that seeketh findeth4'0 #ib ,it comes to this3--good things1 in this life1 are not forced upon us2 for we may refuse them1 or turn any of them into evils4 ,nor are they offered for our mere acceptance3 but only as the results of self-control and pains-taking4 ,so is it1 as to heaven4 #ic ,they are an answer1 but a cavil remains1--viz43 8the difference between temporal and eternal things1 is so vast that the cases are not analogous40 ,fairly considered1 the cases are analogous1 differing only in degree1 and not at all in principle4 ,what would be wrong on a great scale1 is wrong on a small one4 ,perhaps the analogy may be pressed further4 ,as the happiness and life of some animals1 may be sacrificed for the benefit of man1 why may not the happiness and life of some men1 be sacrificed for the good of innumerable beings of a higher order1 who witness the affairs of this earth8 ,it would but be securing 8the greatest good of the greatest number40 ,no analogies could teach this1 for analogies of course teach nothing4 ,but if the ,scriptures contained this doctrine1 immensely more repugnant than that which our author is here defending1 would analogy offer repellant presumptions8 #id ,that is1 the son of ,sirac1 who says1 8,all things are double1 one against another2 and ,he hath made nothing imperfect3 one thing established the good of another30 ,ecclesiasticus xlii4 #bd4 #ie ,consult ,,millman',s ,hist4 of ,christ1 vol4 i43 ,,priestley',s ,institutes of ,nat4 and ,rev4 ,rel41 vol4 i4 ch4 i43 and ,,whately',s ,pol4 ,econ41 sec4 #e4 #if ,we are too apt to overlook the effect of actions on the actor2 7which is often the chief effect7 in improving or impairing his own powers4 ,a razor used to cut wood or stone1 is not only put to an improper use1 but spoiled for the use which is proper4 ,but this is a faint illustration4 ,the razor may be sharpened again2 but how shall we restore a blunted sensibility1 an enfeebled judgment1 or a vitiated appetite8 ,our wrong-doing inflicts worse results on ourselves than on our victims2 and the evil may spread disaster over our whole future4 ,hence the young make a fatal blunder when they suppose that an occasional indulgence in impropriety may be compatible with general welfare1 and improvement4 ,instead of balancing the pros and cons of a particular act1 in the scale of utility or pleasure1 they should mark well its effects on themselves4 ,see the description of how an upright being may fall2 in a subsequent part of this chapter4 #ig 8,it might seem1 at first sight1 that if our state hereafter presented no temptations to falsehood1 injustice1 c41 our habit of indulging these vices here would be no disqualification for such a state2 and our forming the contrary habits no qualification4 ,but habits of veracity1 justice1 c4 are not merely securities against temptations to the contrary1 but needful for conserving the principles of love of truth1 justice1 c4 ,as our happiness depends upon the ratio between our circumstances and our dispositions1 our happiness1 in a state where things are ordered so as to give no scope for the practice of falsehood1 injustice1 c41 must depend on our having formed a love for their opposites4 ,besides1 the circumstances of the future life may be such as only to remove temptations from characters formed by such moral discipline as we undergo in this life1 and not all things that could be temptations to any one40--,,prof4 ,,fitzgerald4 #ih ,it may be thought1 that a sense of interest would as effectually restrain creatures from doing wrong4 ,but if by a sense of interest is meant a speculative conviction or belief1 that such and such indulgence would occasion them greater uneasiness1 upon the whole1 than satisfaction2 it is contrary to present experience to say1 that this sense of interest is sufficient to restrain them from thus indulging themselves4 ,and if by a sense of interest is meant a practical regard to what is upon the whole our happiness2 this is not only coincident with the principle of virtue or moral rectitude1 but is a part of the idea itself4 ,and it is evident this reasonable self-love wants to be improved1 as really as any principle in our nature4 ,for we daily see it overmatched1 not only by the more boisterous passions1 but by curiosity1 shame1 love of imitation1 by any thing1 even indolence3 especially if the interest1 the temporal interest1 suppose1 which is the end of such self-love1 be at a distance4 ,so greatly are profligate men mistaken1 when they affirm they are wholly governed by interestedness and self-love2 and so little cause is there for moralists to disclaim this principle4--,see p4 #aca4 #ii ,discipline is mainly promoted by a careful regard to acts of small individual moment4 ,the subjecting of trivial acts to moral considerations1 is the sure1 and the only mode of self-culture4 ,these acts are embryo habits1 and we may often see clearly the moral character of a habit1 when the single act seems indifferent4 ,thus viewed1 the importance of single acts will seldom seem small4 ,a single cigar1 one glass of wine for convivial purposes1 one story told with exaggerations1 may change the complexion of our character1 and of our whole destiny6 ,it is doing or refusing to do1 from a law-abiding regard to consequences1 that constitutes self-discipline4 ,papists wholly err in teaching the repression of bodily desires as in itself virtuous4 ,indulgence may be either an obstacle or an aid to moral progress1 according to our reason for indulgence4 ,when we can repress an appetite or passion whenever indulgence would be wrong1 its mastery over us is broken2 and when the passions and appetites act rightly1 from force of virtuous habit1 without direct volition1 discipline is complete4 ,ascetic acts are only useful as means1 and so long as they are ascetic 7askesis7 are proofs of imperfect obedience4 ,discipline is good only as discipline2 and when complete1 changes from a struggle between principle and inclination1 to a spontaneous habit1 and permanent mental peace4 #ajj ,chalmers objects to this hypothetical fall of man1 that it wants harmony with the ,scripture account4 ,but ,i do not see the force of the objection4 ,butler of course does not copy the ,scripture account1 for he would then depart from the aim and nature of his book4 ,the ,bible says man fell suddenly1 no less in his state than in his character4 ,butler says that we could not reason out how much disorder and damage would ensue from the first sin3 and in saying this1 avoids any incongruity with the ,mosaic account1 which tells us how much4 ,what ,b4 says of the formation of habit1 by repeated transgressions1 certainly cannot be gainsayed4 ,adam 8died10 the very day he ate the forbidden fruit4 ,the sinner 8lives0 the very day he believes on the only-begotten ,son of ,god4 ,increase of guilt1 or growth in grace are predicable in both instances4 ,in both also there is an instant transition into a new relationship with ,god4 #aja ,a forced or reluctant obedience is wholly incompatible with earthly happiness2 but may1 in the highest degree promote our future happiness4 ,it will not long mar our happiness1 even here2 because being based on principle1 and established by habit1 it will1 in process of time1 be superseded by prompt and pleasurable submission4 ,thus a person habitually virtuous1 is hardly conscious of self-denial2 a fact noticed by ,aristotle4 8,he who abstains from bodily pleasures and delights1 is virtuous in this very abstinence2 but he who is troubled by it is undisciplined40 ,ethic4 ,nic4 ii4 #c4 #ajb ,p4 #ade4 #ajc ,the student should learn to distinguish between the kinds of necessity4 ,there is--#a4 8,logical necessity10 which requires the admission of a consequent to a premise #b4 8,moral necessity10 which requires means in order to ends4 8,physical necessity10 which is the compulsory connection of sequences to antecedents1 in the material world4 #d4 8,metaphysical necessity10 which belongs to ,god only1 as existing eternally and immutably4 ,all these exist and operate1 and by them we govern ourselves4 ,but there are various other kinds of necessity1 erroneous and pernicious1 which may be grouped under two heads3--#a4 8,atheistic10 sometimes called the ,democritic1 which ascribes all things to the mechanical laws of matter4 #b4 8,theistic10 which admits the existence of ,god1 but denies to him moral character1 and makes him the arbitrary and only agent in the universe1 and creatures not responsible4 ,see ,,collings on ,providence1 ,,price',s ,dissertations1 ,,rutherford on ,providence1 ,,charnock',s ,sermons1 and ,,whately',s ,logic4 #ajd ,p4 #aeg4 #aje ,p4 #aeh4 #ajf ,,hume says1 8though man1 in truth1 is a necessary agent1 having all his actions determined by fixed and immutable laws1 yet1 this being concealed from him1 he acts with the conviction of being a free agent40 ,which is the same as to say that ,god intended to conceal from men an important fact1 involving the whole subject of right and wrong1 but ,mr4 ,hume found him out6 #ajg ,by will and character is meant that which1 in speaking of men1 we should express1 not only by these words1 but also by the words temper1 taste1 dispositions1 practical principles3 that whole frame of mind1 from whence we act in one manner rather than another4 #ajh ,chap4 ii4 #aji ,p4 #aeg1 c4 #aaj ,chap4 ii4 #aaa ,dissert4 ,,ii4 #aab ,serm4 #b1 at the ,rolls4 #aac ,dissert4 ,,ii4 #aad ,however1 ,i am far from intending to deny1 that the will of ,god is determined1 by what is fit1 by the right and reason of the case2 though one chooses to decline matters of such abstract speculation1 and to speak with caution when one does speak of them4 ,but if it be intelligible to say1 that it is fit and reasonable for every one to consult his own happiness1 then fitness of action1 or the right and reason of the case1 is an intelligible manner of speaking4 ,and it seems as inconceivable1 to suppose ,god to approve one course of action1 or one end1 preferably to another1 which yet his acting at all from design implies that he does1 without supposing somewhat prior in that end1 to be the ground of the preference2 as to suppose him to discern an abstract proposition to be true1 without supposing somewhat prior in it1 to be the ground of the discernment4 ,it doth not therefore appear1 that moral right is any more relative to perception1 than abstract truth is2 or that it is any more improper to speak of the fitness and lightness of actions and ends1 as founded in the nature of things1 than to speak of abstract truth1 as thus founded4 #aae ,p4 #aah4 #aaf ,p4 #aaj1 c4 #aag ,chap4 ii4 #aah ,dissertation ,,ii4 #aai ,pp4 #fh1 #ga4 #abj ,serm4 #hth1 at the ,rolls4 #aba ,consult1 in favor of the doctrine of necessity1 atheistical writers generally2 such as ,fichte1 ,hegel1 ,d',holback1 ,comte1 ,crousse1 ,martineau1 ,leroux1 and ,holyoake--also1 ,,belsham',s ,essays1 ,,collins on ,liberty1 ,,crombie on ,phil4 ,necessity1 ,,hobbes' ,liberty and ,necessity1 and ,leviathan1 ,,priestley on ,liberty1 ,,hartley on ,man1 and ,,edwards on the ,will4 ,against the doctrine1 see ,,beattie',s ,works1 ,part #b2 ,replies to ,hobbes by ,,bramhall and ,,lawson2 ,replies to ,priestley by ,,palmer and ,,bryant2 ,,grove on ,liberty2 ,,clarke',s ,sermons at the ,boyle ,lectures2 ,,gibb',s ,contemplations2 ,,king',s ,origin of ,evil2 ,,reid on the ,mind2 ,,watts on ,liberty2 ,,harris' ,boyle ,lectures2 ,,jackson',s ,defence2 ,,butterworth on ,moral ,government4 #abb ,,maimonides makes use of the following similitude4 8,suppose one of good understanding1 whose mother had died soon after he was born to be brought up on an island1 where he saw no human being but his father nor the female of any beast4 ,this person when grown up inquires how men are produced4 ,he is told that they are bred in the womb of one of the same species and that while in the womb we are very small and there move and are nourished4 ,the young man inquires whether when thus in the womb we did not eat1 and drink1 and breathe1 as we do now1 and is answered1 ,no4 ,then he denies it1 and offers demonstration that it could not be so4 ,for says he1 if either of us cease to breathe our life is gone2 and how could we have lived close shut up in a womb for months8 ,so if we cease to eat and drink1 we die1 and how could the child live so for months8 and thus he satisfies himself that it is impossible man should come into existence in such a manner40 #abc ,let us imagine a person to be taken to view some great historical painting1 before which hangs a thick curtain4 ,the attendant raises the curtain a few inches4 ,can the spectator1 from the unmeaning strip of foreground1 derive any conception of the figures yet concealed8 ,much less is he able to criticize their proportions1 or beauty1 or perspective1 or even the design of the artist8 ,the small fragment of a tree1 or flower1 or animal1 or building1 may seem quite unmeaning and even ugly1 though the whole would present beauty1 fitness1 or grandeur4 ,now the portion of ,god's dominions within our survey1 is as utterly insignificant1 compared to the universe1 and its interminable duration1 as1 an atom compared to a planet or a man's age to eternity4 ,the concluding observations of this chapter1 abundantly remove every difficulty as to such ignorance being as valid against the proofs of religion1 as it is against objections to it4 #abd ,no truly philosophical mind can be arrogant2 because the wider the range of thought1 the greater are the discoveries of our ignorance4 ,the young student may well hesitate to decide points1 on which the profoundest thinkers take opposite sides1 and when conscious of inability intrust himself to the guidance of those whose lives are best4 #abe ,pp4 #agg1 #agh4 #abf ,p4 #agc1 c4 #abg ,p4 #age4 #abh ,pp4 #gb1 #gc4 #abi ,p4 #fh1 and ,part ,,ii4 chap4 vi4 #acj ,serm4 at the ,rolls1 p4 #cab1 #b;d ed4 #aca ,p4 #agb1 c4 #acb ,see ,part ,,ii4 ch4 ii4 #acc ,p4 #agc4 #acd ,the remainder of this chapter is a recapitulation of the whole argument from the beginning2 and should be carefully conned4 #ace ,part ,,ii4 ch4 vi4 #acf ,p4 #ajh4 #acg ,there is a slight indication in this chapter that ,butler falls into the old plan of settling the necessity of ,christianity1 before determining its truth4 ,paley discards this order of arrangement1 in his very first sentence2 and with good reason4 ,the necessity of revelation is an abstraction2 the proofs of it are patent facts4 ,to hold in abeyance the credentials presented by ,christianity1 till we first satisfy ourselves that ,god could or would make any such announcements1 is unphilosophical and irreverent4 ,this chapter discusses the importance rather than the necessity of revelation2 and so is a fitting commencement of the discussion4 ,every truth disclosed in revelation1 over and above the truths which natural religion furnishes1 proves the necessity of revelation1 if we would know any thing of such truths4 ,and it is such truths which constitute the very peculiarities of revelation1 and teach the way of salvation1 for the sinful and helpless4 #ach ,no one can read the writings of the great sages of antiquity without a full and sad conviction that in relation to the character of ,god1 the sinfulness of man1 the future state1 and the rules of living1 those prime points on which we need knowledge1 they were almost profoundly ignorant4 ,see on this point1 ,,leland',s ,adv4 and ,necess43 ,,chalmers' ,nat4 ,theol43 ,,mccosh',s ,div4 ,gov43 ,,pascal',s ,thoughts3 ,,warburton',s ,div4 ,legation4 #aci ,invenis multos----propterea nolle fieri ,christianos1 quia quasi sufficiunt sibi de bona vita sua4 ,bene vivere opus est1 ait4 ,quid mihi prcepturus est ,christus8 ,ut bene vivam8 ,jam bene vivo4 ,quid mihi necessarius est ,christus2 nullum homicidium1 nullum furtum1 nullam rapinam facio1 res alienas non concupisco1 nullo adulterio contaminor8 ,nam inveniatur in vita mea aliquid quod reprehendatur1 et qui reprehenderit faciat ,christianum4 ,aug4 in ,psal4 xxxi4 ,you find many who refuse to become ,christians1 because they feel sufficient of themselves to lead a good life4 8,we ought to live well40 says one4 8,what will ,christ teach me8 ,to live well8 ,i do live well1 what need then have ,i of ,christ8 ,i commit no murder1 no theft1 no robbery4 ,i covet no man's goods1 and am polluted by no adultery4 ,let some one find in me any thing to censure1 and he who can do so1 may make me a ,christian40 #adj ,the true mode of distinguishing a temporary1 local1 or individual command from such as are of universal and perpetual obligation1 is well laid down by ,,wayland1 ,mor4 ,sci4 ch4 ix4 sec4 #b4 #ada ,natural religion shows us the danger of sin2 but not the infinite danger of eternal retribution1 and the hopelessness of restoration after death4 ,and as to the efficacy of repentance1 it rather opposes that doctrine than teaches it4 ,at least it does not teach that repentance may be accepted1 so as not only to cancel guilt1 but restore to the favor of ,god4 #adb 8,christianity was left with ,christians1 to be transmitted1 in like manner as the religion of nature had been left1 with mankind in general4 ,there was however this difference that by an institution of external religion with a standing ministry for instruction and discipline1 it pleased ,god to unite ,christiana into visible churches1 and all along to preserve them over a great part of the world1 and thus perpetuate a general publication of the ,gospel40 ,,butler',s sermon before the ,soc4 for ,prop4 the ,gospel4 ,he goes on to show1 in that discourse1 that these churches1 however corrupt any may become1 are repositories for the written oracles of ,god1 and so carry the antidote to their heresies4 #adc ,rev4 xxii4 #aa4 #add 8,it is no real objection to this1 though it may seem so at first sight1 to say that since ,christianity is a remedial system1 designed to obviate those very evils which have been produced by the neglect and abuse of the light of nature1 it ought not to be liable to the same perversions4 ,because--#a4 ,christianity is not designed primarily to remedy the defects of nature1 but of an unnatural state of ruin into which men were brought by the ,fall4 ,and #b4 ,it is remedial of the defects of nature in a great degree1 by its giving additional advantages4 #c4 ,it might be impossible that it should be remedial in a greater degree than it is1 without destroying man's free agency2 which would be to destroy its own end1 the practice of virtue40--,,fitzgerald',s ,notes4 #ade ,,chalmers 7,nat4 ,theol41 b4 v4 ch4 iv47 makes this very plain4 ,he shows the ethics of natural religion to be one thing and its objects another4 ,natural religion discloses no ,redeemer or ,sanctifier2 but it teaches how we should regard such a person1 if there be one4 ,it teaches love and conformity to such a being by the relation in which we of course stand to him4 ,how we are to express that love and obedience it cannot teach4 #adf ,see ,the ,nature1 ,obligation1 and ,efficacy1 of the ,christian ,sacraments1 c41 by ,,waterland1 and ,,colliber of ,revealed ,religion1 as there quoted4 #adg ,if ,christianity were but 8a republication of natural religion10 or as ,tindall says1 8as old as creation10 why do deists oppose it8 ,it does indeed republish natural religion1 but it adds stupendous truths beside4 ,if it gave us no new light1 no new motives1 it would be but a tremendous curse1 making us all the more responsible1 and none the more instructed or secure4 #adh ,p4 #id4 #adi ,ch4 v4 #aej ,john iii4 #e4 #aea ,this is the distinction between moral and positive precepts considered respectively as such4 ,but yet1 since the latter have somewhat of a moral nature1 we may see the reason of them1 considered in this view4 ,moral and positive precepts are in some respects alike1 in other respects different4 ,so far as they are alike1 we discern the reasons of both2 so far as they are different1 we discern the reasons of the former1 but not of the latter4 ,see p4 #ahi1 c4 #aeb ,without offering the least objection to what is here said of the comparative value of moral and positive institutions1 it should not be overlooked that sometimes1 obedience to a positive rite is more indicative of an obedient spirit1 than obedience to a moral rule4 ,the latter is urged by its intrinsic propriety1 over and above the command1 and appeals to several of our finer impulses4 ,the former rests singly on our reverence for the will of ,god4 ,there are many who would repel a temptation to steal1 or to lie1 who yet are insensible to the duty of baptism or the ,lord's supper4 #aec ,matt4 ix4 #ac1 and xii4 #g4 #aed ,hosea vi4 #f4 #aee ,see ,matt4 xii4 #g4 #aef ,see ch4 iii4 #aeg ,dr4 ,,angus judiciously remarks on this sentence1 8,this sentiment1 as understood by ,butler1 is just1 but very liable to abuse4 ,clearly1 the ,bible must be so interpreted as to agree with all known truth1 whether of natural religion or natural science4 ,at the same time1 to correct the theology of the ,bible by the theology of nature1 as finite and guilty men understand it1 may involve the rejection of ,bible theology entirely2 and of the very light and teaching it was intended to supply4 ,the converse of ,butler's statement is equally true1 and even more important4 ,if in natural theology there be found any facts1 the seeming lesson of which is contrary to revealed religion1 such seeming lesson is not the real one40 ,practically1 it will be found that seeming meanings of ,scripture1 really erroneous1 are corrected by other parts of ,scripture itself4 ,i understand ,butler as only affirming that we must interpret ,scripture according to immutable principles1 and known truth4 ,the infidel rejects it for not conforming to his assumed hypothesis4 #aeh ,p4 #bjc4 #aei ,chaps4 iii41 iv41 v41 vi4 #afj ,chap4 vii4 #afa ,p4 #agb4 #afb ,papists urge that the actual conversion of the bread and wine in the ,eucharist is an invisible miracle4 ,but an invisible miracle is such because wrought under circumstances which exclude examination3 while transubstantiation invites and facilitates examination4 ,it is wrought publicly1 and constantly1 and yet cannot be discovered to be a miracle4 ,indeed it supposes the working of a second miracle1 to make the first invisible4 #afc ,paley shows conclusively that a denial of miracles leads not only to a denial of revelation1 but a denial of the existence of ,god1 all of whose extraordinary acts are necessarily miraculous4 #afd ,,whately1 in his ,logic1 b4 iii41 has shown the folly of the ,deistical attempts to explain our ,savior's miracles as mere natural events4 ,having labored to show this of some one of the miracles1 they then do so as to another1 and thence infer that all were accidental conjunctures of natural circumstances4 ,he says1 they might as well argue 8that because it is not improbable one may throw sixes once in a hundred throws1 therefore it is no more improbable that one may throw sixes a hundred times running40 ,,fitzgerald says1 8the improbability of a whole series of strange natural events1 taking place unaccountably1 one after another1 amounts to a far greater improbability than is involved in the admission of miracles40 #afe ,that man1 at first1 must have had supernatural instructions1 or in other words some revelations1 is shown by ,archbishop ,,whately in his 8,origin of ,civilization40 ,rev4 ,,samuel ,,stanhope ,,smith expresses his conviction1 both from reason and history1 that man in his savage state could not even have preserved life without instruction from his ,creator4 #aff ,the maintenance by the ,jews1 of a system of pure ,theism1 through so many and so rude ages1 without being superior1 or even equal to their neighbors1 in science and civilization1 can only be accounted for on the presumption of a revelation4 #afg ,p4 #aff1 c4 #afh ,,mills 7,logic1 chap4 #bd1 #e17 points out what he deems a mistake of 8some of the writers against ,hume on ,miracles10 in confounding the improbability of an event1 before its occurrence1 with the improbability afterwards2 that is1 considering them equal in degree4 ,he fully proves that the great ,laplace fell into this error1 and the student should consult the passage4 ,prof4 ,,fitzgerald holds ,butler to have fallen into the mistake adverted to by ,mills2 and quotes the latter author in a way which seems to make him say that such is his opinion also4 ,i do not so understand ,mills1 nor do ,i see that ,butler has confounded these meanings2 but the very contrary4 ,he expressly affirms1 and most truly1 that the strongest presumption may lie against 8the most ordinary facts before the proof which yet is overcome by almost any proof40 ,butler's position here1 may be thus illustrated4 ,suppose a hundred numbers to be put in a box1 and it is proposed to draw out the number #db4 ,now there are #ii chances to #a against drawing that1 or any other given number4 ,but suppose a child tells you he put the hundred numbers into a box1 and drew out one1 and it proved to be #db2 you at once believe1 for that was as likely to come as any other4 ,the proof of ,christianity from prophecy becomes amazingly strong1 thus viewed4 ,there are many predictions1 for instance that ,christ should be born at a certain time1 and place1 and under certain very particular circumstances4 ,the probabilities against such a conjuncture of events are almost infinite2 yet they happened exactly as foretold4 #afi ,for instance1 a mass of ice or snow1 may imperceptibly accumulate for an age1 and then suddenly fall and overwhelm a village4 ,or a planet1 or comet1 may have been gradually nearing our earth for a million of years1 without producing1 as yet1 any effect on our orbit2 but in process of time1 its proximity may work great changes in our condition4 #agj ,p4 #bjh4 #aga #a ,cor4 i4 #bh4 #agb ,see ,chap4 vi4 #agc ,see ,chap4 vi4 #agd ,see note1 page #bah4 #age ,p4 #bbj4 #agf ,it is not to be understood that ,butler would not have the ordinary rules of interpretation applied to the ,holy ,scriptures4 ,because the interpretation1 8if not gathered out of the words1 must be brought into them40 ,we cannot interpret them as if we knew beforehand1 what the ,holy ,ghost meant to say2 as ,,spinoza proposes to do1 in his ,philosophia ,scriptur ,interpretes4 ,the student will do well to consult ,,benson',s ,hulsean ,lectures on ,scripture ,difficulties3 ,,king',s ,morsels of ,criticism3 ,,storr1 ,exertationes ,exeget43 ,,michaelis1 ,introd4 ad4 ,nov4 ,test43 and ,,featley',s ,key4 #agg ,pp4 #bjg1 #bjh4 #agh ,see #a ,cor4 xii4 #a-aj3 xiii4 #a3 and xiv4 #a-ai4 #agi 8,the power of healing1 or working miracles1 is1 during the whole course of its operation1 one continued arrest or diversion of the general laws of matter and motion4 ,it was therefore fit that this power should be given occasionally4 ,but the speaking with tongues1 when once the gift was conferred1 became thenceforth a natural power2 just as the free use of members of the body1 after being restored1 by miracle1 to the exercise of their natural functions4 ,in healing1 the apostles are to be considered as the workers of a miracle2 in speaking strange tongues1 as persons on whom a miracle is performed40--,,warburton1 ,doct4 of ,grace1 b4 i4 ch4 iii4 #ahj ,heb4 vi4 #a4 #aha ,acts iii4 #ba4 #ahb ,the doctrine of 8development0 has of late been popular in some quarters4 ,butler here shows the only safe notion we may entertain on that subject4 8,exact thought1 and careful consideration0 may show us how to confute specious heresies1 expound embarrassing passages1 dissipate painful doubts1 and remove many prejudices or misapprehensions4 ,but revelation is complete as it stands4 ,we may hope for progress in theology as in other sciences2 not in the development of new facts or faith1 as ,papists and ,socinians pretend1 but in the increase of sound wisdom1 aided by a more perfect interpretation of ,god's word4 #ahc ,chap4 vi4 #ahd ,chap4 v4 #ahe ,chap4 vii4 #ahf ,chap4 iv4 latter part1 and v4 vi4 #ahg ,this pregnant paragraph should receive very full attention4 ,we know much of men1 little of ,god4 ,what men are likely to do1 or say1 in certain circumstances1 is often very clear2 and generally may be guessed at4 ,but what ,god would do or say in new contingencies1 who shall attempt to prescribe or predict8 ,we are poorly qualified to assert that such and such declarations could not have come from infinite wisdom2 but we are quite competent to affirm that such and such things could not have come from human contrivance or enthusiasm4 #ahh ,in the foregoing chapter4 #ahi ,part ,i1 ch4 vii41 to which this all along refers4 #aij 8,it is the last step of reason to know there is an infinity of things which surpass it40--,,pascal4 8,the wall of adamant which bounds human inquiry1 has scarcely ever been discovered by any adventurer1 till he was aroused by the shock that drove him back40--,sir ,,jas4 ,,mackintosh4 8,of the dark parts of revelation there are two sorts3 one which may be cleared up by the studious2 the other which will always reside within the shadow of ,god's throne where it would be impiety to intrude40--,,warburton4 8,a ,christianity without mystery is as unphilosophical as it is unscriptural40--,,angus4 #aia ,john xi4 #eb4 #aib #b ,peter iii4 #ac4 #aic #a ,peter i4 #aa1 #ab4 #aid ,phil4 ii4 #f-aa4 #aie ,the influences of the ,holy ,spirit are not only 8given to good men10 but are sent upon many who live unmindful of eternity1 quickening their consciences1 enlightening their understandings and arresting their passions1 and thus it is they are converted unto the truth in ,christ4 #aif ,john xiv4 #b4 #aig ,john v4 #bb1 #bc4 #aih ,matt4 xxviii4 #ah4 #aii #a ,cor4 xv4 #bh4 #bjj #a ,tim4 iii4 #af4 #bja ,p4 #agd1 c4 #bjb #a ,cor4 i4 #ah-be4 #bjc ,pp4 #agh1 #agi4 #bjd ,pp4 #ahj1 #aha4 #bje ,p4 #agb1 c4 #bjf 8,providence hurries not himself to display to-day the consequence of the principle he yesterday announced4 ,he will draw it out in the lapse of ages ,even according to our reasoning logic is none the less sure1 because it is slow40--,,guizot on ,civilization1 ,lect4 ,i4 ,how impressively is this sentiment sustained by modern geology1 and astronomy6 #bjg 8,philosophers make shameful and dangerous mistakes1 when they judge of the ,divine economy4 ,he cannot1 they tell us1 act thus1 it would be contrary to his wisdom1 or his justice1 c4 ,but while they make these peremptory assertions they show themselves to be unacquainted with the fundamental rules of their own science1 and with the origin of all late improvements4 ,true philosophy would begin the other way1 with observing the constitution of the world1 how ,god has made us1 and in what circumstances he has placed us1 and then from what he has done1 form a sure judgment what he would do4 ,thus might they learn #8the invisible things of ,god from those which are clearly seen' the things which are not accomplished from those which are40--,,powell',s ,use and ,abuse of ,philosophy4 #bjh #a ,tim4 ii4 #e4 #bji ,the interposition of a man of known probity and worth often saves the thoughtless or the guilty from punishment4 ,mediation is seen in a thousand forms in the arrangements of social life2 and the common sense of all mankind approves of it4 ,the release of the offending1 by the intercession of the good1 and all the benefits of advice1 caution1 example1 instruction1 persuasion1 and authority1 are instances of mediation4 #baj ,,mr4 ,,newman notices a distinction between the facts of revelation1 and its principles2 and considers the argument from analogy more concerned with its principles than with its facts4 8,the revealed facts are special and singular1 from the nature of the case1 but the revealed principles are common to all the works of ,god2 and if the ,author of nature be the author of grace1 it may be expected that the principles displayed in them will be the same1 and form a connecting link between them4 ,in this identity of principle1 lies the analogy of natural and revealed religion1 in ,butler's sense of the word4 ,the ,incarnation is a fact1 and cannot be paralleled by any thing in nature3 the doctrine of mediation is a principle1 and is abundantly exemplified in nature40--,essay on ,developments4 #baa ,the student will find the inadequacy of repentance to cancel guilt1 beautifully exhibited by ,,wayland1 ,mor4 ,science3 ,,magee1 ,atonement3 ,,howe1 ,living ,temple4 #bab ,p4 #bcb1 c4 #bac ,john iii4 #af4 #bad ,it cannot1 ,i suppose1 be imagined1 even by the most cursory reader1 that it is1 in any sort1 affirmed or implied in any thing said in this chapter1 that none can have the benefit of the general redemption1 but such as have the advantage of being made acquainted with it in the present life4 ,but it may be needful to mention1 that several questions1 which have been brought into the subject before us1 and determined1 are not in the least entered into here1 questions which have been1 ,i fear1 rashly determined1 and perhaps with equal rashness contrary ways4 ,for instance1 whether ,god could have saved the world by other means than the death of ,christ1 consistently with the general laws of his government4 ,and had not ,christ come into the world1 what would have been the future condition of the better sort of men2 those just persons over the face of the earth1 for whom ,manasses in his prayer,a asserts1 repentance was not appointed4 ,the meaning of the first of these questions is greatly ambiguous3 and neither of them can properly be answered1 without going upon that infinitely absurd supposition1 that we know the whole of the case4 ,and perhaps the very inquiry1 ,what would have followed1 if ,god had not done as he has1 may have in it some very great impropriety3 and ought not to be carried on any further than is necessary to help our partial and inadequate conceptions of things4 ,a ,the 8prayer of ,manasses0 is one of the apocryphal books of the ,old ,testament1 which next precedes 8,maccabees40 #bae ,john i41 and viii4 #ab4 #baf ,rom4 iii4 #be1 v4 #aa3 #a ,cor4 v4 #g3 ,eph4 v4 #b3 #a ,john ii4 #b3 ,matt xxvi4 #bh4 #bag ,john i4 #bi1 #cf1 and throughout the book of ,revelation4 #bah ,throughout the epistle to the ,hebrews4 #bai ,isa4 liii43 ,dan4 ix4 #bd3 ,ps4 cx4 #d4 #bbj ,heb4 x4 #a4 #bba ,heb4 viii4 #d1 #e4 #bbb ,heb4 x4 #d1 #e1 #g1 #i1 #aj4 #bbc ,heb4 ix4 #bh4 #bbd ,john xi4 #ea1 #eb4 #bbe #a ,pet4 iii4 #ah4 #bbf ,matt4 xx4 #bh3 ,mark x4 #de3 #a ,tim4 ii4 #f4 #bbg #b ,pet4 ii4 #a3 ,rev4 xiv4 #d3 #a ,cor4 vi4 #bj4 #bbh #a ,pet4 i4 #ai3 ,rev4 v4 #i3 ,gal4 iii4 #ac4 #bbi ,heb4 vii4 #be3 #a ,john ii4 #a1 #b4 #bcj ,heb4 ii4 #aj43 v4 #i4 #bca #b ,cor4 v4 #ai3 ,rom4 v4 #aj3 ,eph4 ii4 #af4 #bcb ,heb4 ii4 #ad4 ,see also a remarkable passage in the book of ,job1 xxxiii4 #bd4 #bcc ,phil4 ii4 #h1 #i3 ,john iii4 #ce1 and v4 #bb1 #bc4 #bcd ,rev4 v4 #ab1 #ac4 #bce ,john vi4 #ad4 #bcf ,p4 #ahh1 c4 #bcg ,eph4 iv4 #ab1 #ac4 #bch ,john xiv4 #b1 #c3 ,rev4 iii4 #ba1 and xi4 #ae4 #bci #b ,thess4 i4 #h4 #bdj ,heb4 ix4 #bf4 #bda ,consult ,,magee1 on ,atonement3 ,,stapferi ,institutiones3 ,,turretin1 ,de ,satisfactione3 ,,chalmers1 ,discourses3 ,,owen1 ,satis4 of ,christ4 #bdb ,p4 #aid1 c4 #bdc ,this objection is ably urged by ,,tindall4 ,the answer of our author is complete4 ,we should remember1 that twice in the history of mankind1 revelation has been universal4 ,the first pair1 and the occupants of the ark1 comprised the whole population4 ,but how soon was light rejected6 ,christianity is universal1 in nature and intention2 is to become so in fact2 and according to a very probable construction of prophecy1 will continue to be universal1 for three hundred and sixty thousand years4 #bdd ,may not this be a principal object of the ,apocalypse8 ,as the book of ,daniel furnished a constant and powerful support to the faith of the ,jew1 by the constant development of prophecy1 so the ,apocalypse1 rightly studied must powerfully1 and through all time1 support the faith of the ,christian by the continual unfolding and verification of its predictions4 #bde #b ,cor4 viii4 #ab4 #bdf ,introduction4 #bdg ,part ,i4 chap4 v4 #bdh ,part ,i4 chap4 iv4 and pp4 #aef1 #aeg4 #bdi ,pp4 #aef1 #aeg4 #bej ,dan4 xii4 #aj4 ,see also ,isa4 xxix4 #ac1 #ad3 ,matt4 vi4 #bc1 and xi4 #be1 and xiii4 #aa1 #ab3 ,john iii4 #ai1 and v4 #dd3 #a ,cor4 ii4 #ad1 and #b ,cor4 iv4 #d3 #b ,tim4 iii4 #ac2 and that affectionate as well as authoritative admonition1 so very many times inculcated1 ,he that hath ears to hear1 let him hear4 ,grotius saw so strongly the thing intended in these and other passages of ,scripture of the like sense1 as to say1 that the proof given us of ,christianity was less than it might have been1 for this very purpose3 ,ut ita sermo ,evangelii tanquam lapis esset ,lydius ad quem ingenia sanabilia explorarentur4 ,de ,ver4 ,r4 ,c4 lib4 ii4 ,so that the ,gospel should be a touchstone1 to test the honesty of men's dispositions4 #bea ,pp4 #ajj1 #beg1 c4 #beb ,see ,,witsii ,meletemeta1 ,diss4 ,,iv43 ,,pfafii ,disput43 ,,campbell on ,miracles3 ,,douglass' ,criterion3 ,,farmer',s ,dissertations3 ,,paley',s ,evid43 ,,taylor',s ,apol4 of ,ben ,mordecai3 ,,tucker',s ,light of ,nat43 ,,watson',s ,tracts1 vol4 iv43 ,,jortin',s ,sermons3 ,bp4 ,,fleetwood',s ,essays3 ,,boyle ,lectures3 ,,lardner',s ,credibility4 #bec 8,the miracles of the ,jewish historian1 are intimately connected with all the civil affairs1 and make a necessary and inseparable part4 ,the whole history is founded in them2 it consists of little else2 and if it were not a history of them1 it would be a history of nothing40--,,bolingbroke1 ,posthumous ,works1 vol4 iii4 p4 #bgi4 #bed ,an admirable work on this recondite mode of proving the truth of the ,new ,testament narrative1 is ,,paley',s ,hor ,paulin4 ,the same department of evidence is ably handled by ,,birk1 in his ,hor ,evangelic1 and ,hor ,apostolic3 ,,graves on the ,pentateuch3 and ,,blunt in his 8,undesigned ,coincidences both of the ,old and ,new ,testament40 ,,grotius1 ,de ,veritate1 has some excellent passages on the same subject4 #bee ,clem4 ,rom4 ,ep4 #a4 c4 #dg4 ,,clement1 who is here quoted1 lived in the first century1 and is mentioned ,phil4 iv4 #c4 ,his epistle to the ,corinthians1 written in ,greek1 contains the passage here referred to1 which may be thus translated3 8,take the letter of the blessed ,paul the ,apostle4 ,what did he write to you1 in the first beginning of the ,gospel8 ,truly he sent you a divinely inspired letter about himself1 and ,cephas1 and ,apollos40 #bef ,gal4 i43 #a ,cor4 xi4 #bc1 c43 #a ,cor4 xv4 #h4 #beg ,rom4 xv4 #ai3 #a ,cor4 xii4 #h1 #i1 #aj-bh1 c41 and xiii4 #a1 #b1 #h1 and the whole #adth chapter3 #b ,cor4 xii4 #ab1 #ac3 ,gal4 iii4 #b1 #e4 #beh ,see the ,koran1 chap4 xiii4 and chap4 xvii4 #bei ,,mahomet expressly declares that he worked no public miracles in confirmation of his mission1 8because the former nations have charged them with imposture40 ,he claims1 however1 to have had private miraculous assurances of his mission1 and most preposterous they were4 ,,whately1 in his ,christian ,evidences1 has handled this aspect of miracles with great ability4 ,see also ,,paley',s ,evidences1 sec4 #c3 and ,,gibbon',s ,decline and ,fall1 chap4 #a4 #bfj ,,alexander1 in his ,evidences1 and several other writers have placed this argument in a very convincing light4 ,,arnobius1 one of the earliest ,christian writers1 asks1 8,shall we say that the men of those times were inconsiderate1 deceitful1 stupid1 and brutish enough to feign having seen what they never saw8 and that when they might have lived in peace and comfort1 they chose gratuitous hatred and obloquy80 ,the rejection of ,christianity by so many in the first age was the result of the continued action of personal and hereditary prejudice and depravity1 capable of resisting any supposable evidence4 ,the reception of ,christianity by multitudes1 under the same evidences1 and to their immediate personal damage1 shows strongly that there was enough evidence to produce those effects4 ,thus the rejection by some does not countervail the acceptance by others4 #bfa ,p4 #bid1 c4 #bfb ,compare ,,butler',s ,sermons2 on ,balaam1 and on ,self-deceit4 #bfc ,see the foregoing chapter4 #bfd 8,whenever a general scheme is known to be pursued by a writer1 that scheme becomes the true key in the hands of his reader1 for unlocking the meaning of particular parts1 which would otherwise not be seen clearly to refer to such scheme4 ,the inspired writers had one common and predominant scheme in view1 which was to bear testimony to ,jesus4 ,whatever passages occur in their writings1 which bear an apt and easy resemblance to the history of ,jesus1 may1 or rather must in all reasonable construction1 be applied to him40--,,hurd on the ,proph41 p4 #aag4 #bfe ,consult on this point1 ,,gulick1 ,theologia ,prophetica3 ,,vitringa1 ,observationes3 ,,hengstenburg1 ,christologia3 ,,horsley',s ,tracts and ,sermons3 ,,king',s ,morsels of ,criticism3 ,,waugh',s ,dissertations3 ,,lyall',s ,propdia ,prophetica4 #bff ,it appears that ,porphyry did nothing worth mentioning in this way4 ,for ,jerome on the place says3 ,duas posteriores bestias--in uno ,macedonum regno ponit4 ,and as to the ten kings2 ,decem reges enumerat1 qui fuerunt svissimi3 ipsosque reges non unius ponit regni1 verbi gratia1 ,macedoni1 ,syri1 ,asi1 et gypti2 sed de diversis regnis unum efficit regum ordinem4 8,the two latter beasts he places in one of the ,macedonian kingdoms40 8,he reckons up ten kings who had been excessively cruel and these not kings of one country1 as ,macedonia1 for instance1 or ,syria1 or ,asia1 or ,egypt2 but makes up his set of kings out of different kingdoms40 ,in this way of interpretation1 any thing may be made of any thing4 #bfg ,p4 #ahi1 c4 #bfh ,john i4 #c4 #bfi ,eph4 iii4 #i4 #bgj ,acts iii4 #ba4 #bga ,rev4 x4 #g4 #bgb ,dan4 ii4 #dd4 #bgc ,dan4 vii4 #bb4 #bgd ,rev4 xi4 #ag1 #ah2 xx4 #f4 #bge ,dan4 vii4 #bg4 #bgf ,chap4 ii4 iii4 c4 #bgg ,deut4 xxviii4 #fd2 xxx4 #b1 #c3 ,isa4 xlv4 #ag4 #bgh ,isa4 lx4 #ba3 ,jer4 xxx4 #aa2 xlvi4 #bh3 ,amos ix4 #ad1 #ae3 ,jer4 xxxi4 #cf4 #bgi ,isa4 viii4 #ad1 #ae2 xlix4 #e2 chap4 liii43 ,mal4 i4 #aj1 #aa1 and chap4 iii4 #bhj ,isa4 xlix4 #f1 chap4 ii41 chap1 xi41 chap4 lvi4 #g3 ,mal4 i4 #aa4 ,to which must be added1 the other prophecies of the like kind1 several in the ,new ,testament1 and very many in the ,old2 which describe what shall be the completion of the revealed plan of ,providence4 #bha ,see ,,davidson',s ,disc4 on ,proph43 ,,blaney on ,daniel's ,,lxx4 ,weeks3 ,,hurd',s ,introd4 to the ,study of ,proph43 ,,jortin',s ,ser4 at ,boyle ,lect43 ,,fuller',s ,gosp4 its own ,witness1 part ii43 ,,waugh',s ,diss43 ,,apthorpe',s ,discourses4 #bhb ,p4 #bej4 #bhc ,hundreds of instances might be adduced1 in which profane historians corroborate the statements of the ,scriptures4 ,the following are merely specimens3 ,,diodorus ,,siculus1 ,,strabo1 ,,tacitus1 ,,pliny1 and ,,solinus1 speak of the destruction of ,sodom and ,gomorrah4 ,the lives of ,david and ,solomon are given in the remains of the ,,ph,,nician ,,annals1 in ,,damascenus1 and ,,eupolemus4 ,,menander describes the carrying away of the ,ten ,tribes by ,salmanasor4 ,,suetonius1 ,,tacitus1 ,,pliny the younger1 and ,,numenius1 speak of ,jesus ,christ4 ,his miracles are owned by ,,celsus1 ,,porphyry1 ,,julian1 and ,jewish writers opposed to ,christianity4 ,,suetonius1 ,,tacitus1 ,,pliny1 ,,julian1 and others describe his being put to death2 and ,,tacitus says that many were put to death for adhering to his religion4 ,,phlegon mentions the miracles of ,peter2 and ,paul is enumerated among eminent authors1 in a fragment of ,,longinus4 #bhd ,this thought is elaborated with skill by ,,whately in his 8,historic ,doubts40 ,he takes up all the popular infidel objections as to the life of ,christ1 and applies them with undiminished or even increased force against the evidences that such a man as ,buonaparte ever existed4 ,,johnson in a lively sally once said--8#8,it is easy to be on the negative side4 ,i deny that ,canada is taken4 ,the ,french are a much more numerous people than we2 and it is not likely they would allow us to take it4' #8,but the ,government have announced the fact4' #8,very true4 ,but the ministry have put us to an enormous expense by the war in ,america1 and it is their interest to persuade us that we have got something for our money4' #8,but the fact is confirmed by thousands who were at the taking of it4' #8,aye1 but these men have an interest in deceiving us3 they don't want you should think the ,french have beat them4 ,now suppose you go over and find it so1 that would only satisfy yourself2 for when you come back we will not believe you4 ,we will say you have been bribed4'0--,,boswell4 #bhe ,p4 #bfg1 c4 #bhf ,p4 #bgj1 c4 #bhg ,deut4 xxviii4 #cg4 #bhh ,all the particular things mentioned in this chapter1 not reducible to the head of certain miracles1 or determinate completions of prophecy4 ,see p4 #bfc4 #bhi ,butler states this argument with more than his usual brevity1 and its force is not seen without reflection4 8,if contrivance or accident could have given to ,christianity any of its apparent testimonies1 its miracles1 its prophecies1 its morals1 its propagation1 or the character of its founder1 there could be no room to believe1 or even imagine1 that all these appearances of great credibility1 could be united together1 by any such means4 ,if successful craft could have contrived its public miracles1 or the pretence of them1 it requires another reach of craft1 to adopt its prophecies to the same object4 ,further1 it required not only a different1 but a totally opposite art to conceive and promulgate its admirable morals4 ,again1 its propagation1 in defiance of the powers and terrors of the world1 implied still other qualities of action4 ,lastly1 the model of the life of its founder1 is a work of such originality and wisdom1 as could be the offspring only of consummate powers of invention1 or rather never could have been devised1 but must have come from real life4 ,the hypothesis sinks under its incredibility4 ,each of these suppositions of contrivance1 being arbitrary and unsupported1 the climax of them is an extravagance40--,,davison1 on ,prophecy4 #bij #a ,john iv4 #ah4--8,there is no fear in love10 c4 #bia ,obedience from dread1 if it continue to be the only motive1 precludes advance toward perfection2 for 8,he that feareth is not made perfect in love40 ,but obedience from a discernment of the reasonableness and beneficence of religion1 and of the perfections of its ,author1 increases love till it 8casteth out fear40 #bib ,see a discussion of this subject1 in ,,bayle',s ,historical and ,biographical ,dictionary3 art4 ,,xenophanes3 notes ,d1 ,e1 ,f1 ,g4 #bic ,see ,dissertation ,,ii4 #bid ,it is remarked by ,,dean ,,fitzgerald1 that 8,it is not inconceivable that the ,almighty should apply such a test of men's candor and fidelity1 as should require them first to act upon a thing as true1 before they were so fully satisfied of its truth as to leave no doubt remaining4 ,such a course of action might be the appointed1 and for all we know1 the only possible way of overcoming habits of thought and feeling1 repugnant to the belief demanded1 so that a fixed religious faith might be the reward1 as it were1 of a sincere course of prudent behavior40 #bie ,by arguing upon the principles of others1 the reader will observe is meant1 not proving any thing from those principles1 but notwithstanding them4 ,thus religion is proved1 not from the opinion of necessity2 which is absurd3 but1 notwithstanding or even though that opinion were admitted to be true4 #bif ,p4 #ada1 c4 #big ,prov4 xx4 #bg4 #bih ,serm4 at the ,rolls1 p4 #ajf4 #bii ,john iii4 #af3 ,heb4 v4 #i4 #cjj ,p4 #beh1 c4 #cja ,locke's ,works1 vol4 i4 p4 #adf4 #cjb ,locke1 pp4 #adf1 #adg4 #cjc ,locke1 p4 #aeb4 #cjd ,see an answer to ,dr4 ,clarke's ,third ,defence of his ,letter to ,mr4 ,podwell1 #b;d edit4 p4 #dd1 #ef1 c4 #cje 8,one is continually reminded throughout this dissertation1 of what is called ,the common-sense school of ,scotch metaphysicians4 ,nor can there be any doubt that ,,reid1 in particular1 was largely indebted to ,butler1 of whose writings he was a diligent student1 for forming that sober and manly character of understanding which is1 ,i think1 his great merit40--,,fitzgerald4 #cjf ,this way of speaking is taken from ,epictetus1,a and is made use of as seeming the most full1 and least liable to cavil4 ,and the moral faculty may be understood to have these two epithets1 and applauding and condemning upon a double account2 because1 upon a survey of actions1 whether before or after they are done1 it determines them to be good or evil2 and also because it determines itself to be the guide of action and of life1 in contradistinction from all other faculties1 or natural principles of action2 in the very same manner as speculative reason directly and naturally judges of speculative truth and falsehood3 and at the same time is attended with a consciousness upon reflection1 that the natural right to judge of them belongs to it4 ,a ,arr4 ,epict4 lib4 i4 cap4 i4 #cjg -- 1 ,virtue and vice are not in feeling1 but in action1 ,m4 ,anton1 lib4 ix4 #af4 ,virtutis laus omnis in actione consistit4 ,the whole praise of virtue1 depends on action4 ,cic4 ,off4 lib4 i4 cap4 #f4 #cjh ,p4 #ade4 ,,index ,,to ,,part ,i4 ,,references ,,to ,,the ,,editor',s ,,notes ,,are ,,in ,,brackets4 ,abstract reasonings may mislead1 #afb fitness of things1 note #aff ,actions distinguished from their qualities1 #aaa manifest character1 #aef rewarded and punished1 #ih this world a theater of1 #aef what sort exercise virtue1 #aeb ,active and passive impressions1 #adj ,advantages of virtue1 #aac may never recur1 #aja ,affections1 excited by objects1 #ade need control1 #aff part of our constitution1 #adg ,affliction1 a discipline1 #aej chiefly of our own making1 #ajj ,agent1 the living1 not compounded1 #ha ,alienation of parts of our body1 #hd ,all things made double1 #acg ,allurements1 use of1 #aea ,analogy answers objections as to a present state of trial1 #ace as to modes of existence1 #gh carrying the force of positive argument1 #aje deals only with facts1 #aga indicates future punishment1 #aja may amount to proof1 #afh objections which it cannot answer1 #aga the only proof of some things1 #gi ,antiquity of religion1 #afg ,atheists not argued with1 in this treatise1 #aha ,beginnings of a righteous government seen on earth1 #ajg ,bible1 teaches the existence of general laws1 #ii ,bodies not necessary to us1 #hb not ourselves1 #hc only instruments1 #he1 #hf their solid elements1 #hh ,bodily and mental habits1 #acd ,brain1 does not think1 #hi ,brahminical notion of death1 #ib ,brutes1 are they immortal81 #hh may have greater strength than man1 #aai under man's control1 #aai ,capacities1 state of in infancy1 #hh not destroyed by death1 #hi not dependent on the body1 #gi ,causes and ends incomprehensible1 #agb ,changes compatible with identity1 #gh1 #hc ,character manifested by probation1 #aef not given but acquired1 #aee what it means1 note #afc ,conscience1 how it acts1 #afd implies government1 #aae a rule1 #afd authority1 #afd future retribution1 #afe may be impaired1 #afh perverted1 #afh ,consciousness an indiscerptible entity1 #hb presupposes identity1 #gg ,consequences may sometimes be avoided1 #ajb may be foreseen1 #ih show a moral government1 #ih ,course of nature constant1 #ig ,creatures finitely perfect1 #adg may fall1 #adh have each a way of life1 #acg ,danger of wrong doing1 how increased1 #acb ,death and birth similar1 #ia enlarges our sphere1 #ib has no power over matter1 #ia is not a suspension of our powers1 #ia is not our destruction1 #hj what it is1 #hj ,decay of vegetables1 inference from1 #ib ,definitions of identity1 #gg ,delivering up of the ,lord ,jesus ,christ1 #aaa ,destruction of seeds1 #aec ,different states of human existence1 #hi ,difficulties belong to all subjects1 #if exercise the virtuous principle1 #aeb ,disadvantages of virtue temporary1 #abf ,discipline1 its true nature and use1 #adh ,disease not destructive to the soul1 #ij sometimes remedial1 #agg ,disorder produced by sin1 #adh ,distress excites passive pity and active relief1 #adj ,distributive justice a natural rule1 #aaj ,divine government a scheme1 ,,chap4 ,,vii4 ,domestic government1 #aad ,dreams1 what they prove1 #hf ,earthly satisfactions attainable1 #ahc ,effects of actions on the actor1 #adc ,ends often produced by unlikely means1 #ahj ,enjoyments in our own power to a great degree1 #ie ,error1 how spread1 #if ,evidence of natural religion1 #aff ,evil1 may possibly be useful1 #agg its possible origin1 #adg not a necessary part of probation1 #abh ,exceptions to the happiness of virtue1 #ajh ,experience indispensable1 #ada ,faculties1 human1 not perfect at first1 #ada ,fall of man1 #acc1 #adh ,fallacy in fatalism1 #afi ,fallen creatures require discipline1 #aej ,fatalism1--see ,necessity4 ,fear a proper motive to obedience1 #aed ,folly1 destructive1 as well as crime1 #acb ,formal notion of government1 #ii ,foundation of moral improvement1 #ajh ,future advantages1 how proportioned1 #ic ,future existence probable1 ,,chap4 ,i4 of brutes1 #gi ,future interest dependent on conduct1 #ie ,future life1 a solemn subject1 #ie not an inactive condition1 #add reconcilable with atheism1 #id this life preparatory to it1 ,,chap4 ,v4 ,future punishment credible1 #ajc ,future retribution1 how proved1 #abe ,future state different from the present1 #gh brings us into new scenes1 #ic may have temptations1 #ade social1 #add will not require such virtues as does the present life1 #aed ,general laws govern the world1 #agg1 #ii produce punishment1 #ajc wisdom of them1 #agh ,general method of ,god's government1 #ig ,general system of religion1 #abd ,gradual improvement1 a wise arrangement1 #ada1 #adb ,,god an intelligent governor1 #ajf determined by what is fit1 #aff governs by human instruments1 #aaa governs justly1 #ajh has a will and a character1 #afc his aims incomprehensible1 #ig his attributes inferred from our own1 #aae his general government1 #ig his government just and good1 #agf his indirect commands1 #afe moral government of1 ,,chap4 ,,iii4 natural 0 1 0 ,,ii4 necessarily existent1 #aei not indifferent to human actions1 #abe not simply benevolent1 #ajf rewards and punishes1 #afi the only necessary being1 #aei ,good actions1 how punished1 #aaa ,good habits necessary even to the virtuous1 #adi ,good men befriended as such1 #aab cannot now all unite1 #aba ,good not forced upon us1 #acd ,government1 civil1 an ordinance of ,god1 #aaa considered as a scheme1 ,,chap4 ,,vii4 of ,god1 ,,chap4 ,,ii4 not perfected in this world1 #ajg the formal notion of it1 #ih the perfection of1 #ajf ,habits1 how formed1 c41 #aci necessary to us hereafter1 #ade of resignation1 #aee often ruinous1 #aja of virtue an improvement in virtue1 #adg passive1 #ach shape the character1 #ada ,happiness not always the immediate reward of virtue1 #ajh not given promiscuously1 #ach requisites for1 #acg the result of virtue1 #aah ,helplessness of man1 #ach ,higher degrees of retribution probable1 #abg ,hinderances to virtue1 #aba ,history of religion1 #afi ,honest men befriend the honest1 #aab ,hope and fear appeal to self-love1 #aec are just principles of action1 #aed ,human life preparatory1 #add ,hume's wonderful discovery1 #afb ,human powers may be overtasked1 #aeb ,identity does not depend on the sameness of the body1 #hc of living agents1 #gg1 #gh not explicable1 #gg ,ignorance acknowledged on all subjects but religion1 #agd answers objections1 #age the argument from1 #ahj total1 destroys proof1 #agh ,illustration of the modification of an action by its intention1 #aaa ,imagination a source of discontent1 #aed produces much error1 #ha ,immortality of brutes1 #hh ,improvement by discipline1 #add by habit1 #adg of our faculties gradual1 #ada wisdom of this1 #adb ,incomprehensibility of ,god's plans1 #ig ,inconsiderateness destructive1 #ajb ,inferiority of brute force1 #aai ,infidelity unjustifiable1 #aje ,insignificance of our knowledge1 #agd ,interest coincident with virtue1 #aed not a sufficient restraint1 note #adf ,interpositions to prevent irregularities1 #agg would produce evil1 #agh ,intentional good rewarded1 #aad ,irregularities perhaps unavoidable1 #agg seeming may not be such1 #agf ,inward peace attends virtue1 #aab ,kingdom1 idea of a perfect1 #abc ,knowledge of man insignificant1 #agd ,liberty does not account for the fall1 #adg implied in our present condition1 #afb ,life a probation1 #abh one part of it preparatory to another1 #adb what is it intended for1 #acg ,living agent not subject to death1 #gi ,living powers1 see ,death4 ,locke on human identity1 #gg ,maimonides1 his similitude1 #agc ,man an inferior part of creation1 #acc a system of parts1 #ih by nature social1 #ic capable of improvement1 #ade connected with present1 past1 and future1 #aha dealt with as if free1 #afb has a moral nature1 #aae his fall not accounted for by his free agency1 #adg his helplessness1 #ach knows nothing fully1 #agc may become qualified for new states1 #acg not a competent judge of ,god's schemes1 #agd requires moral culture1 #ade ,mania often produced by moral causes1 #he ,materialism1 its philosophical absurdity1 #ha ,matter and mind not the same1 #hc affect each other1 #he ,means learned by experience1 #agf man not a competent judge of the fitness of them1 #agh not always agreeable1 #agf ,men often miss possible temporal good1 #abi ,men's temporal interests greatly depend on themselves1 #aca ,might of unarmed virtue1 #aba ,mind influenced by the passions1 #aca is the man1 #hg its effects on the body1 #he may survive the body1 #hi the only real percipient1 #he uses the body as an instrument1 #hg ,miracles1 properly speaking1 not unnatural1 #id ,miseries as contingent as conduct1 #ace generally are avoidable1 #ajj ,mixture of suffering and enjoyment in this world1 #abh ,moral and natural government of ,god similar to each other1 #ahd ,moral attributes of ,god may be inferred from our own1 #aae ,moral discipline1 ,,chap4 ,v4 ,moral government of ,god1 ,,chap4 ,,iii4 ,moral improvement1 basis of1 #ajh ,moral world1 its apparent irregularities1 #agf ,mystery of ,god1 finished1 note #ajb ,natural1 the true meaning of the word1 #id ,natural government of ,god1 ,,chap4 ,,ii4 ,natural religion1 its evidences not affected by the doctrine of necessity1 #aff proof of1 #aff teaches the doctrine of punishment1 #ajb ,necessary agents may be punished1 #afi ,necessary bulk of one's self1 #hd ,necessary existence of ,god1 #aei ,necessary tendencies of virtue1 #aah ,negligence and folly disastrous1 #acb ,necessity consigns us to a fallacy1 #afi contradicts the constitution of nature1 #agj destroys no proof of religion1 #agj different kinds of1 #aeg does not exclude design1 #afj doctrine of1 ,,chap4 ,,vi4 not an agent1 #aei not applicable to practice1 #afc not in conflict with religion1 #afj our condition indicates freedom1 #afb reconcilable with religion1 #afh the doctrine absurd1 #aeg what it means1 #aeh writers for and against1 #agj ,new scenes in the next world1 #ic ,obedience1 reluctant1 useful1 #aeb ,objections1 against a proof and against a thing to be proved1 #agi against the scheme of ,providence1 #agd analogy of plants1 #ib ,christianity not universal1 #afi course of nature1 #ig destruction of seeds1 #aec difference between temporal and eternal things1 #ace discipline might have been avoided1 #aef ,god simply benevolent1 #ajf good and evil may be mixed in the next world1 #abd gratification of appetites natural and proper1 #ih ignorance1 the argument from invalidates the proof of religion1 #agh immortality of brutes1 #hg incredible that necessary agents should be punished1 #afi irregularities of the moral world1 #agf necessity destroys the proof of religion1 #afe our powers may be overtasked1 #aeb probabilities may be overbalanced by probabilities1 #afi punishments are only natural events1 #ii rectitude arising from hope and fear1 sordid1 #aec rewards and punishments1 #ie sin need not have entered the world1 #agg society punishes good actions1 #aaa special interpositions might prevent evil1 #agg1 #agh to the doctrine of necessity1 ,,chap4 ,,vi4 to the doctrine of future punishments1 #ajj-ajc virtue sometimes punished1 #aaa virtues of the present life not wanted hereafter1 #aed world disciplines some to vice1 #aec ,obligation certain1 when proofs are not1 #agi ,occasional disadvantages of virtue1 #aag ,occasional indulgences in wrong-doing awfully dangerous1 #adc ,one period of life preparatory to another1 #adb ,opportunities once lost irrecoverable1 #adc ,organs of sense mere instruments1 #hi ,our moral nature proves a moral government1 #aae ,pain1 no contrivance for it in man1 #aaj ,partial ignorance does not destroy proof1 #agh ,passions carry away the judgment1 #aca make our condition one of trial1 #acj may account for the fall of man1 #adg may be excited where gratification is impossible or unlawful1 #adf may remain in a future state1 #adg should be subject to the moral principle1 #ade the bare excitement of1 not criminal1 #ade but dangerous1 #adf ,passive habits1 #ach ,passive impressions weakened by repetition1 #aci ,passive submission essential1 #aee ,peace of the virtuous1 #aab ,perception1 instruments of1 #he possible without instruments1 #hf ,perfection of moral government1 #ajf1 #ajg of an earthly kingdom1 #abc ,persecution unnatural1 #aaa ,philosophy never arrogant1 #agd what it cannot teach1 #hg ,pleasure not a sufficient reason for action1 #ih and pain mostly depend on ourselves1 #ie the distribution indicates moral government1 #aje ,powers may be improved by exercise1 #ach may be overtasked1 #aeb may exist and not be exercised1 #hj no reason for supposing that death will destroy them1 #ha ,practical proof1 what1 #afh ,present existence unaccounted for by atheism1 #id ,presumptions that death will destroy us1 #ha that it will suspend our existence1 #ia ,presumptuousness unjustifiable1 #aje ,private vices not public benefits1 #aaa ,probabilities in favor of religion may be overbalanced by probabilities against it1 #afi ,probation1 ,,chap4 ,,iv4 applies to the present life as well as the future1 #acj does not necessarily imply suffering1 #abh implies allurements1 #abi is more than moral government1 #abh requires severe discipline1 #aej ,proofs of natural religion1 #aff of religion not affected by the doctrine of necessity1 #afj ,propensions necessarily create temptations1 #adf are excited by their appropriate objects1 #adg ,proper gratification of the appetites1 #ih ,prosperity of a virtuous community1 #abc may beget discontent1 #aed ,providence1 objections to ,god's1 #adj1 #agd ,public spirit a fruit of virtue1 #abj ,punishment an alarming subject1 #aje especially considered1 #ajj greater hereafter than now1 #abg in a future state credible1 #ajc1 #abe is ,god's voice of instruction1 #ajh is sometimes capital1 #ajb not unjust1 #afc often long delayed1 #aja often overtakes suddenly1 #aja of virtuous actions1 #aaa religious and natural similar1 #ajj results from folly as well as crime1 #acb the result of general laws1 #ajc ,quotations4 ,aristotle1 #aeb ,chalmers1 #aca1 #ach1 #adh ,cicero1 #hb1 #hf ,clarke1 #ig ,fitzgerald1 #ade ,robert ,hall1 #aah ,hume1 #afb ,maimonides1 #agc ,mandeville1 #aaa ,plato1 #hg1 #aac ,son of ,sirac1 #acg ,strabo1 #ib ,rashness1 consequences of1 #if ,reason an incompetent judge of means1 #agh gives power over brute force1 #aai needs experience1 #ada not dependent on bodily powers1 #hi requires a fair opportunity1 #aai-aba ,recapitulation of the whole argument1 #ahj ,rectitude1 is self-interest a proper motive to it81 #aec ,references to other authors4 ,bates1 #abh ,baxter1 #hh ,bayle1 #hh ,beattie1 #agj ,belsham1 #agj ,berkeley1 #aaa ,bonnett1 #hi ,bramhall1 #aga ,brown1 #aaa ,bryant1 #aga ,butterworth1 #ajg ,calcott1 #abh ,capp1 #aji ,chalmers1 #gg1 #gi1 #adh ,charnock1 #aeh ,cheyne1 #hh ,clarke1 #hb1 #ha1 #ig1 #aga ,colliber1 #hh ,collings1 #aeh1 #agj ,compte1 #agj ,crombie1 #agj ,crouse1 #agj ,davies1 #aji ,d',holbach1 #agj ,descartes1 #hh ,ditton1 #hh ,doddridge1 #aji ,dodwell1 #ha ,dwight1 #aji ,edwards1 #hh1 #agj ,fabricius1 #abh ,fichte1 #agj ,gibbs1 #aga ,grove1 #aga ,haller1 #hi ,harris1 #aga ,hartley1 #agj ,hegel1 #agj ,henly1 #abh ,hobbes1 #agj ,holtzfusius1 #abh ,holyoake1 #agj ,horseley1 #aji ,hume1 #hh ,hunt1 #aji ,jackson1 #aga ,konnicott1 #abh ,king1 #ih1 #aga ,law1 #ih ,lawson1 #aga ,le ,clerc1 #abh ,leland1 #aji ,leroux1 #agj ,liefchild1 #aji ,locke1 #hh ,manton1 #abh ,martineau1 #agj ,martinius1 #aai ,milman1 #adb ,morgagni1 #hi ,morton1 #aji ,musus1 #abh ,palmer1 #aga ,pearson1 #abh ,polignac1 #hh ,porteus1 #aji ,price1 #aeh ,priestley1 #adb1 #agj ,reid1 #agj ,rutherford1 #aji1 #aeh ,search1 #hh ,seed1 #aji ,selden1 #abh ,shaftesbury1 #ajh ,sherlock1 #aji ,shuckford1 #abh ,son of ,sirac1 #acg ,south1 #aji1 #abh ,stapfer1 #abh ,strabo1 #ib ,toplady1 #abh ,topping1 #aji ,twisse1 #aji ,wagstaff1 #hh ,warburton1 #aaa ,watts1 #gg1 #hh1 #aga ,whately1 #adb1 #aeh ,willis1 #hh ,wisheart1 #aji ,witsius1 #abh ,wittichius1 #aji ,reflection not dependent on sensation1 #ia ,reformation is attended with discomfort1 #ajh may not prevent penalties1 #ajb ,relation between us and our bodies1 #he ,relations of things1 limitless1 #agc ,religion a question of fact1 #afe historical evidence of1 #afh professed in all ages1 #afg its proofs not affected by the doctrine of necessity1 #agj nor by our ignorance1 #agh ,reluctant obedience profitable1 #aeb ,remedies often very disagreeable1 #agf ,repentance may be too late1 #ajd ,requisites to the superiority of reason1 #aai of virtue1 #abj1 #aba ,resentment of injuries1 #aad ,resignation a temper consonant with ,god's sovereignty1 #aee essential to virtue1 #aed the fruit of affliction1 #aee the habit necessary hereafter1 #aee ,retributions are divine teachings1 #ajh ,revelation1 antiquity of1 #afg not improbable1 #afg not universal1 note #ajg ,rewards and punishments1 how distributed1 #abf ,satisfactions of virtue1 #ajh ,scheme of ,god incomprehensible1 #agb ,self-denial1 its relations to present happiness1 #acd not essential to piety1 #aeb ,self-discipline1 what1 #adh ,self-love a just principle of action1 #aed appealed to1 #aec how moderated and disciplined1 #aee not a sufficient restraint1 note #adf reasonable and safe1 #acj ,sensation not necessary to reflection1 #ia ,senses not percipients1 #he ,severe discipline necessary1 #aej ,similitude of a historical painting1 #agd ,simplicity of the living agent1 #hc ,sin1 why not kept out of the world1 #agg ,skepticism does not justify irreligion1 #aje ,social1 our nature essentially such1 #ic ,society must punish vice1 #aaj natural and necessary1 #ic sometimes punishes the good1 #aaa ,soul a simple substance1 #hb not destroyed with the body1 #gi not naturally immortal1 #ha ,souls of brutes1 #hh ,special interpositions of ,providence1 #agg1 #agh ,stages of existence1 #gh ,state of probation1 ,,chap4 ,,iv4 ,state of discipline and improvement1 ,,chap4 ,v4 ,submissive temper necessary1 #aee ,subordinations exceedingly beneficial1 #adb ,subserviencies in nature1 #agc ,sufferings may be avoided1 #ie not necessary to the cultivation of virtue1 #abh ,temporal and religious probation similar1 #acb ,temptations increased by bad examples1 #acb and by former errors1 #acb intended for our improvement1 #acf involve probation1 #abi may improve or injure us1 #aec security against their evils1 #adf sources of1 to upright beings1 #adg the necessary result of propensions1 #adf ,tendencies of virtue1 #aah hindered1 #aba essential1 not accidental1 #abf ,terms 8nature0 and 8course of nature01 #ig ,theorizing no aid to virtue1 #aci ,thoughtlessness often fatal1 #aja ,transmigration of souls1 #hg ,trials manifest character1 #aef may exist in a future state1 #adg produced by our propensions1 #aca qualify for a better state1 #add unreasonable ones are not inflicted1 #acc why we are subjected to them1 #acf ,ultimate design of man1 #ih ,understanding may be perverted1 #afh ,uneasiness produced by former sins1 #aji ,union of good beings1 #abb ,unjustifiableness of religious indifference1 #aje ,upright creatures may fall1 #adg need good habits1 #adi ,universe and its government immense1 #abc ,vice actually punished by society #aaj1 #aaa must produce uneasiness1 #aab never rewarded as such1 #aaf not only criminal but depraving1 #adi often increased by trials1 #aec punished as such1 #aad ,vicious men lose their influence1 #aba ,virtue a bond of union1 #abb as such1 rewarded on earth1 #aaa 8brings its own reward01 #aah has occasional disadvantages1 #aag hinderances accidental1 #aba how and why rewarded1 #aaa improved by trials1 #aea its benefits to a community1 #abc natural1 not vice1 #aaf not always rewarded in this life1 #ajh on the whole happier than vice1 #aac secures peace1 #aab tendencies essential1 #abf tends to give power1 #aah1 #aba ,virtuous beings need virtuous habits1 #adi ,virtuous habits a security1 #adg how formed1 #aci improve virtue1 #adg necessary in a future state1 #ade ,voice of nature is for virtue1 #aag ,waste of seeds1 #aec ,wickedness may produce some benefits1 #agg voluntary1 #acf ,will and character of ,god1 how determined1 note #aff what they mean1 note #afc ,wonderful discovery of ,hume1 #afb ,world a system of subordinations1 #agc a theater for the manifestation of character1 #aef disciplines some to vice1 #aec fitted for man's discipline1 #aej governed by fixed laws1 #aaj ,youth a determining period1 #aja if lost1 not to be recovered1 #adc its beneficial subordinations1 #adb ,,index ,,to ,,part ,,ii4 ,,references ,,to ,,the ,,editor',s ,,notes ,,are ,,in ,,brackets ,a common absurdity1 #bdc ,abstract truth distinguished from facts1 #cje1 #ahf ,absurdity of some objections to ,christianity1 #bde ,abuse of our natural endowments1 #bag ,accidental1 what events are so called1 #bbf ,accountability gradually increases1 #bea ,actions1 definition of1 in morals1 #bfa distinguished from things done1 #bfa their bad consequences sometimes escaped1 #bcb virtue and vice consist in them1 #bfa ,advantage1 as proper a consideration in religion as in temporal affairs1 #bih variously bestowed1 #bdi1 #cab ,analogy a confirmation of all facts to which it can be applied1 #cjf affords no argument against the scheme of ,christianity1 #bjc nor against miracles1 #bjc answers presumptions against miracles1 #bjg does not prove the wisdom of ,god1 #cja does not teach that the whole of ,god's government is like that on earth1 #bjd easily cavilled at1 but unanswerable1 #cjf between natural information and that derived from inspiration1 #bab between the remedies of nature and those of grace1 #bai between the gospel and human discoveries1 #bai between the light of nature and of revelation1 #bah between the use of natural gifts1 and miraculous1 #bag between the government of ,god and that of a human master1 #bfa its small influence on men1 #cjc how used in this treatise1 #cjf may show our duty1 but not the design of the requirement1 #bdf objections to this mode of arguing1 ,,chap4 ,,viii4 shows that there may be infinite reasons for things1 with which we are not acquainted1 #ahh the only ground for some of our knowledge1 #cjf ,antidote to heresies1 #aia ,apocalypse1 its principal object1 #bdi ,appearances of men and things deceptive1 #bdh ,arguments proper as to human writings1 are not so as to ,scripture1 #bad ,atonement1 how held by the ancients1 #bda makes the innocent suffer for the guilty1 #bdc ,author of nature taken for granted1 #bih ,authoritativeness of revelation1 #ahi ,baptism a test of obedience1 #aii commanded and important1 #aid why the form of words1 #aid ,bible1 how to be interpreted1 #bjb1 #bae ,brutes1 their great sagacity1 #baf ,boundary of human inquiry1 #bbc ,candor necessary in judging of ,christianity1 #cjb ,chance1 really no such thing1 #bbf ,characters drawn in ,scripture evidently unfeigned1 #bhg ,christ a mediator1 ,,chap4 ,v4 a prophet1 #bdj a priest and king1 #bda his history1 as given in ,scripture1 #bhe his pre-existence taught1 #bhb his satisfaction1 #bci his sufferings voluntary1 #bdc manner of his interposition1 #bch not merely a teacher and example1 #bdb offered himself a propitiatory sacrifice1 #bda ,christianity a fearful curse1 if it give no more light than natural religion1 #aif a question of fact1 #cja a remedial system1 #aic an authoritative republication of the religion of nature1 #ahh1 #ahi a particular scheme under a general plan1 #aid1 #bbd a scheme imperfectly comprehended1 ,,chap4 ,,iv4 a scheme revealed but in part1 #bbf brings life and immortality to light1 #aij could not possibly be a contrivance1 #bbb1 #bid demands attention1 if barely probable1 #bec has evidences besides miracles and prophecy1 #bfc in what degree remedial1 #aic is a real revelation1 #bac is conformable to the constitution of things1 #bie its benefits require the use of means1 #aig its establishment and prevalence1 the most conspicuous and important event in history1 #bhf its evidences1 ,,chap4 ,,vii4 its good effects not small1 #aib its precepts plain and obvious1 #bah its proof historical1 #cjd its proofs liable to objection1 #bfj men bound to examine its evidence1 #aig miracles and prophecy its direct and fundamental proofs1 #bfc must have mysteries1 #bbc no objection to the morality of it1 #bad1 #bbj1 #bbb not merely a republication of natural religion1 #aif not primarily designed to remedy the defects of nature1 #aic not the discovery of reason1 #ahh objections to its evidence1 #baj objections to its nature1 #baj offered to some in a corrupt state1 #bej prescribes new duties1 #aid preserves natural religion in the world1 #aia propagated against all obstructions1 #bid rashness of treating it lightly1 #aid1 #aif1 #aig requires means to accomplish ends1 #bbe reveals a particular dispensation of ,providence1 #aid reveals important facts1 #aif some of its dark parts may be cleared up1 others cannot1 #bbc teaches more than natural religion1 #aid the evils ascribed to it1 are not its evils1 #aib the one great question concerning it1 #bac1 #bad the only religion professedly confirmed by miracles1 #bfh to be transmitted by ,christians1 #aij universal1 in nature and intention1 #bdh what alone could disprove it1 #bie why not remedial to a greater degree1 #aic why not sooner promulgated1 #bai ,christians bound to spread ,christianity1 #aij primitive1 their testimony1 #bfg ,church men bound to support it1 #aic preserves a knowledge of religion1 #aia visible1 its design1 #aij1 #aia ,circumstantial evidences of ,christianity1 #bfc1 #bha often as convincing as direct testimony1 #bid ,clemens ,romanus1 testimony of1 #bff his letter to the ,corinthians1 #bff ,climax of infidel extravagance1 #bid ,coincidence of natural and revealed religion1 #baa1 #bah ,coincidences of ,scripture1 #bff ,comparison1 how it may mislead us1 #bja ,compassion distinct from goodness1 #bcc visible in the constitution of the world1 #bcc ,consequences of infidelity2 more dangerous than those of faith1 #bid of sin1 often averted1 #bcc ,conversational objections to revelation1 #bie ,conversion1 how produced1 #bbe ,course of nature different from what we might have supposed1 previous to experience1 #baa none at the beginning1 #bje our total darkness as to its causes1 #bjh ,creation ,mosaic account of1 referred to by ,john1 #bhb a different exertion of power from government1 #bje why ,scripture describes it1 #bha ,creatures of like moral qualities placed in different religious situations1 #bea ,credulity of mankind acknowledged1 #bfi ,cumulative proof of ,christianity1 #bjg ,daniel his book had more evidence of authenticity than has come to us1 #bgi his predictions a support of ,jewish faith1 #bdi quoted by ,christ1 #bgi ,dark parts of revelation1 #bbc ,degrees of evidence have degrees of weight1 #bee require nice examination1 #beh ,deistical explanation of ,christ's miracles1 #bjf ,deists1 why do they oppose ,christianity1 #aif ,depravity of man obvious1 #bch doctrine of1 #bah ,desert of good and ill1 the notion of1 #cje ,development1 of truth1 #bah modern1 doctrine of1 #bah ,differences of religious advantages may have like reasons as those for different temporal advantages1 #bea would remain if revelation were universal1 #beb ,difficulties absurdity of requiring them to be all removed1 #big as to the evidence of religion1 analogous to those attending the practice of it1 #bef cannot be solved by analogy1 #bif speculative1 may be the chief trials of some1 #beg the discernment which can see them1 might suffice to see through them1 #bfj ,direct and circumstantial evidence must be taken together1 #bhj ,diseases of body and mind1 analogous as to their remedies1 #bbj ,disobedience1 without possible excuse1 #bec ,dispensations1 preparatory one to another1 #caj ,disregard of religion a great profligacy1 #bcc ,distinction between moral and positive obligation1 #aih1 #aih between acts and principles1 #bce between temporary1 individual1 and universal commands1 #ahh ,doubt affords scope for probation1 #bfb exercises our virtuous principles1 #bef implies some evidence1 #beb1 #bed1 #bhc involves some obligation1 #bfc puts us upon probation1 #bec ,doubtful evidence should have some influence1 #bee ,duties arising from revealed relations1 #aie moral and positive1 #aid ,earth1 its appearances confirm ,scripture1 #bch ,effect of ,adam's transgression1 #bch of combined probabilities1 #bid1 #bid ,efficacy of repentance1 #aij not taught by the light of nature1 #aij ,end1 ,god's not known1 #bdf ,enthusiasm is not peculiar to religion1 #bgb impairs no testimony for ,christianity1 #bga may often weaken testimony1 #bga sometimes mixed with knavery1 #bgb the absence of all sign of it in ,christianity1 a presumptive proof in its favor1 #bbb will not account for the spread of ,christianity1 #bgj ,enthusiasts make as great sacrifices as ,christians1 #bgj ,epistles of ,paul1 proof from1 #bff ,eternal retribution not taught by natural religion1 #aij ,ethics of natural religion distinguished from its objects1 #aid ,events expound ,scripture1 #bai ,evidence of ,christianity impregnable1 #bie collateral and direct to be viewed together1 #bid from miracles and prophecy1 #bfg imperfect1 should yet influence practice in proportion to its degree1 #bee of circumstances may be most direct1 #bid of religion1 open to all1 #bfj of religion1 the same in kind as that which controls us in temporal things1 #beh much lower than satisfactory often determines us1 #cjc not only increased but multiplied by a combination of probabilities1 #bid1 #bid reason the proper judge of1 #bba requires careful sifting1 #bef candor in judging1 #cjb1 #cjc safety always in admitting it1 #bid why liable to objection1 #beg ,evil1 remedies provided for it1 #bai1 #bcb ,exaggeration practised by many who will not lie1 #bgb ,external manner of heart worship1 #aie ,experience affords no presumption against ,christianity1 #bjc corroborates ,christian doctrines1 #bde teaches the effects of actions1 #bdf ,extravagance of some objections1 #ahg1 #ahh ,facts analogy the only proof of some1 #cjf distinguished from abstract truths1 #cje of revelation distinguished from its principles1 #bce ,fall of man1 assumed as a fact1 #bcf confirmed by appearances1 #bch ,falsehood1 its degrees and inducements1 #bgb ,false miracles have deceived many1 #bgc have some historic evidence1 #bgc ,fatalists1 their principles argued upon1 #cjd ,fear cast out by love1 #cja ,fitness1 moral1 #cjd1 #cje ,flippant objections to ,christianity1 #bie ,folly1 a real vice1 #bhj ,foresight of brutes1 #baf ,future punishments1 all the reasons for them not known1 #bcd not arbitrarily appointed1 #bcb natural sequences1 #bca1 #bcb rendered credible by temporal punishments1 #cjj ,genealogy of mankind given in ,scripture1 #bhc ,general laws a wise arrangement1 #bbg do not render miracles incredible1 #bbg control the ,christian dispensation1 #bbf few events can be traced up to them1 #bbf miracles may be their results1 #bbf1 #bbg the ground of believing there are such1 #bbf things called accidental governed by them1 #bbf ,geology1 its impressive lessons1 #bbi ,,god a master giving laws1 #bfa all his reasons for giving a command must be certainly known1 and known to have passed away1 before we can safely disregard it1 #ahh duties towards him as the ,father1 #aid1 #aie governs by mediation1 #bcj his government shows compassion1 #bcc progressive1 #bbi his means and ends we cannot distinguish1 #bbh his providence1 objections to it idle1 #cjj1 #cja his reasons not assigned1 #bdf his will1 as absolute or conditional1 #bfa how he would act in contingencies1 unknown1 #bbb how to be worshipped1 a pure matter of revelation1 #aie instructs us by experience1 #baa1 #bdf little known1 #bbb not indifferent as to who suffer1 #bdc reveals our duties1 not his plans1 #bdf the real author of the prophecies1 #bgf ,good and evil unequally distributed1 #bdh ,government of ,god sometimes1 apparently1 tardy in its results1 #bbd1 #bbe ,gradual growth of causes1 #bjh ,happiness not always secured by well-laid schemes1 #bdg ,hazard of neglecting ,christianity1 #bfb ,heathen world1 condition of1 #ahf1 #bej ,hieroglyphic and figurative language of ,scripture1 #baj ,hinderances to natural and spiritual knowledge similar1 #bah ,history of miracles1 #bfd of the ,jews confirmed by their condition1 #bhi1 #bij of the origin of religion1 #bjf furnishes no parallel to revelation1 #bjg prophecy is history anticipated1 #bha ,scripture1 has not been invalidated1 #bhc ,holy ,spirit1 its operations on the heart1 #bbe ,human contrivance unequal to some things1 #bbb ,human life1 in what sense it may be called poor1 #big ,human testimony1 reliable notwithstanding the prevalence of falsehood1 #bgc ,identity of principle between natural and revealed religion1 #bce ,ignorance of heathen writers1 #ahg of other worlds1 forbids objections to ,christianity on the ground of miracles1 #bjg of the laws of miracles1 not greater than of natural laws1 #bef of the reason of our present condition1 #bea much of it our own fault1 #bei ,imagination may fancy unreal coincidences1 #bic ,immorality not authorized in ,scripture1 #bba1 #bbb ,impassable limit to human knowledge1 #bbc ,imperceptible accumulation of forces1 #bjh ,imperfect knowledge1 better than acting in the dark1 #big ,imperfection of language1 #baf ,importance of revelation1 ,,chap4 ,i4 an abstraction1 #ahf precludes the idea that the first witnesses were careless1 #bgd ,improbability before and after an event1 #bjg of the ,deistical theory greater than that of miracles1 #bjf ,inadequacy of repentance1 #bcf ,inattention to religion1 real depravity1 #beb1 #cjg prevents convincement1 #beh ,incarnation an invisible miracle1 #bjd cannot be paralleled1 #bce ,influence of the ,holy ,ghost1 #bbe of the analogical argument1 #cjc ,innocent sometimes suffer for the guilty1 #bdc ,inspiration1 the proper kind and extent of it not discoverable by reason1 #bab not to be interpreted like other writings1 #bab ,inspired writers1 key to their meaning1 #bgf their one great scheme1 #bgf show a foresight more than human1 #bgh1 #bgi ,instruction from ,god to savages1 #bjf ,intercession by the good for the bad1 #bcb ,interest1 temporal1 not always apparent1 #cjb ,interpositions of men for each other1 #bcb ,internal improbabilities weaken external proof1 #bae ,interpretation of ,scripture1 #bae ,irregularity1 really no such thing1 #bbf whence the appearance of1 #bbg ,irregularities of men1 consequences proportioned to magnitude1 #bcc ,irreligion an aggravated sin1 #bcc especially in persons in high standing1 #bed not justifiable on any pretence1 #bef1 #cab ,invention an irregular way of information1 #baf ,invisible miracles1 #bjd things of ,god1 how learned1 #bcj ,jews ,god's dealing with them1 #bij their continuance1 a standing miracle1 #bij their history confirmed by facts1 #bia their system of ,theism1 #bjf ,jewish miracles1 a part of civil history1 #bfe ,john1 his allusion to ,christ1 in the beginning of his gospel1 #bhb his doctrine agrees with that of ,paul1 #bhb ,kingdom of ,christ on earth1 #bda ,knowledge profound1 not necessary to piety1 #bah scientific and religious1 have the same difficulties1 #bah ,knowledge of ,scripture1 improved in the same way as knowledge of the sciences1 #bah unequally distributed1 #bdi ,language necessarily ambiguous1 #baf of the prophecies1 often figurative1 #baj ,laplace1 error of1 #bjg ,levity destructive to religious influence1 #bei ,liberty belief of our1 unavoidable1 #cjd of the will1 not discussed1 note #cjd necessary to the progress of knowledge1 #bah the principle so natural that language is formed on it1 #cjd ,life future1 brought to light by the gospel1 #aij may be taken away by command1 #bba not thrown away because success is uncertain1 #cjb whether desirable or not1 #cja ,light of nature displayed in the ,scriptures1 #ahh does not teach our future condition1 #aij favors the doctrine of a ,mediator1 #bcj has left the greatest heathen in doubt1 #ahf ,ludicrous turn1 danger of1 #bei ,mahometanism not received on the footing of miracles1 #bfh ,mahometans and ancient ,persians1 how situated as to revelation1 #bej ,man accepted according to what he hath1 #bea his circumstances no ground of complaint1 #beb his obligation to study the ,scriptures1 #bjb1 #bfb must be renewed1 #aig ,manasses1 prayer of1 #bcg ,manner of worship a matter of pure revelation1 #aie ,martyrs could not have been impostors1 #bgb had full knowledge of facts1 #bfi1 #bga the full force of their testimony1 #bfi their obligations to veracity1 #bgd were not enthusiasts1 #bga ,means as related to ends1 #bbe ,mediation seen everywhere1 #bcj exemplified in social life1 #bcb ,mediator1 appointment of1 ,,chap4 ,v4 the notion of1 natural1 #bcj the ,scripture doctrine of1 #bch-bdj whether one was necessary1 #bdc why most objected to1 #bdc ,medium between full satisfaction of a truth and full satisfaction to the contrary1 #cac ,memory1 eloquence1 c4 imprudently used1 #bag ,men apt to be deluded by pretences1 #bgc their conduct may be guessed at1 #bbb ,mercy seen in the constitution of the world1 #bcc ,messiah came at the expected time1 #bhe his mission1 #bbd ,minuteness of predictions touching ,christ1 #bjg ,miracles admitted evidence for such as are false does not impair the evidence of ,christian1 #bgc contrary to the course of nature81 #bjf denying them leads to ,atheism1 #bje disorderly use of1 #bag distinct reasons for them1 #bjh large historical evidence for their truth1 #bgj manner in which related1 #bfd no argument of analogy against them1 #bje-bjg none parallel to those of ,scripture1 #bjg not mere embellishments1 #bfd not to be compared to common events1 #bji nowise incredible1 #bji occasions for them likely to arise in the course of ages1 #bjh of the ,old ,testament1 inseparable from history1 #bfe operate by general laws1 #bbf ,pagan and ,popish1 were wrought after those systems had obtained1 #bfh peculiar to the ,jewish and ,christian religions1 #bfh received as genuine from the first1 #bfh1 #bfi regulated by general laws1 #bbg satisfactorily account for the existence of ,christianity1 #bfe should be compared to uncommon events1 #bji the credentials of ,christianity1 #bfg the evidence of their truth at first1 #bdi the question of their truth only one of degree in point of evidence1 #bjh the only satisfactory account of some events1 #bfe the real nature of presumptions against them1 #bjh the term a relative one1 #bje their direct proof of ,christianity1 #bfd their evidence the same as that for common facts1 #bfd their force as proofs1 #ahi visible and invisible1 #bjd1 #bjd what evidence arises from their having been accepted as true by the first ,christians1 #bfh writers upon1 #bfd1 #bfh ,miraculous power creation not properly an act of1 #bje misused by some1 #bag1 #bfg pretences of1 have deluded some1 #bgc why bestowed1 #aij ,misconduct creates need of assistance1 #bce ,mistake of some of ,hume's opponents1 #bjg ,mistakes of philosophers dangerous1 #bcj of transcribers1 c41 #bbh ,modern geology1 lesson from1 #bbi ,moral action1 the nature of1 #bfa an action becomes such by command1 #bba ,moral duties4 ,see ,positive4 ,moral faculty1 its object1 #cje ,moral government4 ,see ,government4 ,moral precepts4 ,see ,positive4 ,moral system revealed to mankind1 #aij ,morality of ,scripture1 reason a judge of1 #bbj ,mysteries to be expected in revelation1 #bbc1 #bbd as many in nature as in ,scripture1 #bdf ,mystery of godliness1 #bbe ,mythological writings resemble prophecy1 #bgf ,narratives of ,scripture unadorned1 #bbh ,natural consequences of vice are judicial punishments1 #aig and spiritual things analogous in importance1 #bai endowments often abused1 #bag ,natural light compared to revelation1 #bah ,natural religion and revealed1 coincide1 #baa as much perverted as ,christianity1 #aib could not have been reasoned out1 #aib discloses no ,redeemer1 #aid its ethics and objects distinguished1 #aid its light wholly insufficient1 #ahg might be authenticated by miracles1 #aij moral system of1 #ahg taught and confirmed by ,christianity1 #ahh1 #bhf1 #bib what it does not teach1 #aij1 #aid ,nature carried on by uniform laws1 #bbf implies the agency of ,god1 #bca its light insufficient1 #ahf ,nature and obligation of sacraments1 note #aie ,necessity of revelation1 #ahf ,negligence prevents the recognition of truth1 #beh wholly inexcusable1 #aig ,obedience from dread1 #cja or disobedience1 an important matter1 #ahh to a positive rite1 especially indicative of piety1 #aii ,objections to certain precepts of ,scripture1 as immoral1 #bba to prophecy1 from its obscurity1 #bge to revelation1 are of equal weight against natural religion1 #ig to the analogical argument1 as such1 ,,chap4 ,,viii4 to the distribution of good and evil1 #bdh-bej to the doctrine of mediation1 ,,chap4 ,v4 to the evidence for miracles1 ,,chap4 ,,ii4 to the unequal distribution of religious knowledge1 #bdi ,objections to ,christianity as a matter of fact1 #cja as a remedial system1 #aic1 #bai as a roundabout1 perplexed contrivance1 #bbh as deficient in point of truth1 #bdg as a scheme1 #bji as mysterious1 #bbc as to its wisdom and goodness1 ,,chap4 ,,iv4 as unimportant1 ,,chap4 ,i4 atonement makes the innocent suffer for the guilty1 #bbg1 #bdc contains things unlike the course of nature1 #bjd does not remove difficulties1 #bbc has been perverted1 #aib has been productive of evils1 #aib has internal improbabilities1 #bbe-bbg disclosed to the world so recently1 #bai disorderly use of miraculous gifts1 #bbg has small influence1 #aib1 #cjc if true would not be left doubtful1 #bii is not satisfactory1 #bfj1 #bfa its doctrine of mediation1 ,,chap4 ,v4 its external proof weakened by internal improbabilities1 #bae its lack of evidence1 ,,chap4 ,,vi4 its late introduction1 #bai may be advanced flippantly1 but cannot be so answered1 #bie natural things too unimportant to furnish analogies in its favor1 #bai not just and good1 ,,chap4 ,,iv4 not necessary1 #adg not universal1 ,,chap4 ,,vi41 #bdh slowly developed1 #bai some of its precepts immoral1 #bba sufficiency of natural religion1 #ahg vicarious sufferings1 #bde ,obligation arises from the bare supposableness of ,christianity1 #bec1 #bfb ,obligations to ,god arising out of relationship1 #aif ,obscurity in part of a prophecy1 does not impair the evidence of foresight1 #bge ,offenders often shielded by friends1 #bcb ,offices of ,christ as a mediator1 #bch-bdj ,opinions must be distinguished from facts1 #bgj ,ordinary rules of interpretation1 #bae ,pagan and ,popish miracles easily accounted for1 #bfh ,parables show what the author intended1 #bgf ,partial views give an appearance of wrong1 #cji ,passion hinders correct judgment1 #bei ,paul1 his separate testimony1 #bff how he received the gospel1 #bfg summary of his testimony1 #bfg ,perfection of religion1 what8 ,,chap4 ,,viii4 ,persons for whom this treatise is written1 #cji ,philosophy1 its true mode of proceeding1 #bcj ,piety superior to ritual observances1 #bja ,pleasures and pains1 which overbalance8 #cja ,political events1 how mentioned in ,scripture1 #bhb ,popish doctrine of a miracle at the ,eucharist1 #bjd ,popular conversational objections1 #bie ,porphyry's mode of interpretation frivolous1 note #bgi objections to the book of ,daniel1 #bgi ,positive evidence of ,christianity1 ,,chap4 ,,vii4 ,positive institutions belong to the notion of a church1 #aib lay us under the strictest obligation1 #bjb means to moral ends1 #aii men disposed to depend on them1 #bjj necessary to keep up and propagate religion1 #bdf not to be made light of1 #bja not to supersede moral obedience1 #bjj the reason of them often obvious1 #aih two modes of viewing them1 #aih ,positive precepts compared with moral1 #aih1 #bja create moral obligations1 #bba ,power of healing1 #bag ,practice should be influenced by probability1 #bed ,predictions of ,christ very numerous and minute1 #bjg1 #bjh ,prejudice a hinderance to knowledge1 #beh a mark of weakness1 #bhj as hostile to truth as enthusiasm1 #bgb operates contrary ways1 #bid ,preservation of the ,jews as a distinct race1 #bia ,presumptions against miracles1 #bje against revelation as miraculous1 ,,chap4 ,,ii4 none against the general scheme of ,christianity1 #bjc none peculiar to miracles1 #bjg strong1 overcome by weak proof1 #bjg1 #bjg ,priesthood of ,christ1 #bch ,jewish1 typical of ,christ1 #bci ,principles argued upon in this treatise1 #cjd ,progressions in our existence1 #bbi ,progress in theology probable1 #bah ,probable proofs1 by being added1 not only increase evidence1 but multiply it1 #bid ,probability should influence practice1 #bed ,profane history corroborates ,scripture statements1 #bhg ,proofs of ,christianity a touchstone of honesty1 #bei level to common men1 #bfj some important ones omitted in this treatise1 and why1 #cjd why not more plain1 #bfa ,prophecy a joint review of prophecies furnishes a far stronger proof than examination in detail1 #bid a series of1 being applicable to certain events1 is proof that it was intended of them1 #bgf compared to compiled memoirs1 #bgh created the expectation of a ,messiah1 #bhd confirmed by appearances1 #bib evidence from1 #bge expressed in figurative language1 #bge how understood by ancient ,jews1 #bgg in relation to the ,jews1 #bhd is history anticipated1 #bha its obscurity1 #bge its proofs amazingly strong1 #bjg may not always have been understood by the writer1 #bgh proves foresight1 #bgf1 #bgi sometimes obscured by interpreters1 #baj summary of1 concerning ,christ1 #bhd use of1 to future ages1 #bdi writers upon1 #bgg1 #bhe ,prophet1 ,christ a1 #bdj ,prophets not the authors of what they wrote1 #bgh their sense of their predictions not necessarily the whole sense1 #bgh whether they had in view the events which ,christians consider fulfilments1 #bgg ,proverbial1 use of the word1 #bja ,providence1 never hasty1 #bbi objections to it useless1 #cjj1 #cja the course of1 progressive1 #bbi ,province of reason1 #bbj ,prudence1 its best plans often frustrated1 #bdg often requires us to act with uncertain prospect of success1 #bdg1 #bdh ,punishment follows wickedness1 of course1 #bca instances of vicarious1 #bdd not always avoided by reformation1 #bce not promiscuously inflicted1 #bdc provision made for escaping it1 #bcb1 #caa we cannot of ourselves escape it1 #bcd we cannot know why such and such are inflicted1 #bca ,quotations ,angus1 #bjb1 #bbc ,augustine1 note #ahg ,arnobius1 #bfi ,clemens ,romanus1 #bff ,davidson1 #bid ,fitzgerald1 #cjc ,grotius1 #bei ,guizot1 #bbi ,hurd1 #bgf ,dr4 ,johnson1 #bhh ,mahomet1 #bfh ,powell1 #bcj ,warburton1 #bag1 #bbc ,whately1 #bjf ,rashness of interpreters1 #baj of treating religion lightly1 #aig ,reason could not have invented ,christianity1 #bjf could not ascertain the power of penitence1 #aid discovers our relation to ,god the ,father1 #aid but not our relation to the ,son and ,holy ,ghost1 #aid1 #aif its limits very narrow1 #bbc its proper province1 #bbj must have right principles1 #bbj needs the aid of experience in judging of the consequences of actions1 #bdf not sufficient to construct a system of natural religion free from superstition1 #ahf our only faculty for judging even revelation1 #baj requires the importance of a question to be taken into account1 #bie teaches nothing of the certain means of either temporal or spiritual good1 #aig very incompetent to judge what a revelation ought to be1 #baj-bab ,reasoning by analogy to any extent1 leaves the mind unsatisfied1 #bif ,redemption agreeable to our natural notions1 #bce analogous to natural remedies1 #bcb conjectures about it must be uncertain1 #bdb mode of1 not discoverable by reason1 #bdc men not competent judges of its plan1 #bdc on whom are its benefits1 note #bcg ,scripture account of1 #bci1 #bdj we should be thankful for it1 without disputing how it was procured1 #bdb ,references to other authors ,alexander1 #bfi ,apthorpe1 #bhe ,bayle1 #cja ,benson1 #bae ,birk1 #bff ,blaney1 #bhe ,blunt1 #bff ,bolingbroke1 #bfe ,boswell1 #bhh ,boyle1 #bfd ,butler1 #aij1 #bgb ,campbell1 #bfd ,celsus1 #bhg ,chalmers1 #ahg1 #aid1 #bdb ,colliber1 #aie ,damascenus1 #bhg ,davidson1 #bhe ,diodorus ,siculus1 #bhg ,eupolemus1 #bhg ,featley1 #bae ,fitzgerald1 #aic1 #bjf1 #bjg ,fleetwood1 #bfd ,fuller1 #bhe ,gibbon1 #bfh ,graves1 #bff ,grotius1 #bff ,gulick1 #bgg ,hengstenburg1 #bgg ,horseley1 #bgg ,howe1 #bcf ,hurd1 #bhe ,jortin1 #bfd1 #bhe ,julian1 #beg ,king1 #bae1 #bgg ,lardner1 #bfd ,leland1 #ahg ,longinus1 #bhg ,lyall1 #bgg ,mc,cosh1 #ahg ,mackintosh1 #bbc ,magee1 #bcf1 #bdb ,manasses1 #bcg ,menander1 #bhg ,michaelis1 #bae ,mills1 #bjg ,newman1 #bce ,numenius1 #bhg ,owen1 #bdb ,paley1 #bje1 #bff1 #bfh ,pascal1 #ahg1 #bbc ,pfaffius1 #bfd ,phlegon1 #bhg ,phnician ,annals1 #bhg ,pliny1 #bhg ,porphyry1 #bgi1 #bhg ,samuel ,stanhope ,smith1 #bjf ,solinus1 #bhg ,spinoza1 #bae ,stapfer1 #bdb ,storr1 #bae ,strabo1 #bhg ,suetonius1 #bhg ,tacitus1 #bhg ,taylor1 #bfd ,tindall1 #aif1 #bdh ,tucker1 #bfd ,turretin1 #bdb ,vitringa1 #bgf ,warburton1 #ahg ,waterland1 #aie ,watson1 #bfd ,waugh1 #bgg1 #bhe ,wayland1 #ahh1 #bcf ,whately1 #bjf1 #bfh1 #bhh ,witsius1 #bfd ,reformation does not always preclude punishment1 #bce ,regard due to the ,son and ,holy ,spirit1 #aie ,regard to ,god as ,creator1 the essence of natural religion1 #aie ,rejection of ,christ by many1 at first1 the argument from it1 #bfi foretold1 #bhe ,relations1 being learned1 duties are perceived1 #aid ,relations of man to ,deity1 #aid to the ,son and ,holy ,ghost1 #aie ,religion a practical thing1 #bih a question of fact1 #cja1 #cjd affords particular reasons for miracles1 #bjh confirmed by the establishment of a church1 #aia considered as external and internal1 #aie doubt of its evidence does not release from moral obligation1 #bed has its end on all persons to whom proposed1 #cjc1 #cjc if true1 why susceptible of any possible doubt8 #bii its acceptance safe1 #bie its general spirit intimated1 #bjj1 #bja its great importance1 #bed its introduction into the world1 #bjf its reasonableness fully shown1 if it can only be proved that it may be reasonable1 #cja its very nature overlooked by those who insist that it should have overwhelming evidence1 #cjb may be true1 though doubtful1 #bii must be judged by its evidences taken together1 #bid not a thing reasoned out1 #bjf not equally taught to all men1 #bjf objections to it removed by analogy1 #cjj presupposes candor in those who examine it1 #bef1 #cjb1 #cjc reason may judge of its morality1 #bbj reasonable1 for aught which can be shown to the contrary1 #cja the perception of1 #cjb the view of it taken in this treatise1 #bii the evidence for it may be lessened1 but cannot be destroyed1 #bie why its evidences are allowed to admit of doubt1 #bdi1 #bec1 #bii ,relief for evils provided1 #bcb ,remedial nature of ,christianity1 #aic ,remedies provided in nature1 #bai1 #bcb may be unskilfully used1 #bbj show the compassion of ,god1 #bcc and also his strictness1 #bcd ,repentance cannot cancel guilt1 #bcf1 #bcf general sense of mankind on the subject1 #bcf its efficacy not taught by natural religion1 #aij its efficacy taught in the ,scriptures1 #aij not sufficient to preclude disaster1 #bcd1 #bce ,revelation a particular part of a great plan1 #bbd accounts for the ,theism of the ,jews1 #bjf at the beginning of the world1 would not be miraculous1 #bje cannot be neglected with impunity1 #bfj-bfb considered as miraculous1 ,,chap4 ,,ii4 considered historically1 #bha difference between its facts and its principles1 #bce discovers new relations1 and so new duties1 #aid distinguished from natural religion1 #aie does not compel assent1 #bec has twice been universal1 #bdh how it could be overturned1 #bad its disclosures1 of course1 could not have been anticipated1 #baa1 #bab its measure of evidence puts us on probation1 #bec its facts necessarily singular1 #bce no more different from the course of nature than some parts of the course of nature are different from other parts1 #cab necessary1 ,,chap4 ,i4 republishes and confirms natural religion1 #ahh1 #ahi nothing incredible in it1 #bga teaches that ,god's laws are compassionate1 #bcf the use of unwritten revelation1 #bac what is to be expected in revelation1 #baj1 #bab ,reverence for the will of ,god1 #aii ,ridicule of ,scripture an offence against natural piety1 #bhf easier than examination1 #bei the great weakness of being influenced by it1 #bhj ,roman ,empire mentioned1 #bgi ,rules for health very fallible and inexact1 #cjb of ,biblical interpretation1 #bae ,sacrifices commanded1 #bda expiatory1 #bci how the ancients regarded them1 #bdb learned by the heathen from tradition1 #bda really efficacious1 #bdb the prevalence of1 #bcf ,sacrifice of ,christ an objection to it1 #bdc how efficacious1 not taught1 #bdb proper and real1 #bci-bda puts us into a capacity for salvation1 #bdb voluntary1 #bdd ,safety an important consideration in judging1 #bid ,satirical writings1 how understood1 #bgf1 #bgg ,scheme of nature1 vast1 #bjd progressive1 #bbi ,scheme of providence1 if understood1 would justify facts which are objected to1 #cjj ,schemes1 the best may be disconcerted1 #bdg ,science confirms ,scripture history1 #bhg ,scorn of prophetic diction1 #baj ,scripture announces a general restoration of things1 #bhb antiquity of1 #bhg characters evidently not feigned1 #bhg confirmed by profane authors1 #bhh confirmed by the state of the earth1 #bhg considered historically1 #bha contains an abridged history of the world1 #bhb exposed to criticism1 #bhc expounded by itself1 #bjb gives a history of this world as ,god's world1 #bha gives an account of civil governments only as they affected religion1 #bhb has internal evidence of truth1 #bhg history genuine1 #bfe how distinguished from other books1 #bha-bhc how to be interpreted1 #bjb if false could be shown to be so1 #bhc includes a history of thousands of years1 #bhc includes the chronology of nearly four thousand years1 #bhd its authority the great question1 not its contents1 #bad its chronicles confirmed by history1 #bhg its evidences comprise a series of things of great variety and reaching to the beginning of time1 #bfc its evidences not intended to be overpowering1 #bec its great proofs are miracles and prophecy1 #bfd its relation to miracles only to be accounted for on the supposition of their truth1 #bfe its strangeness not surprising1 #bhh its style objected to1 #baj its truth must be judged of by the evidence taken together1 #bie may contain things not yet discovered1 #bah miracles1 their first reception1 #bfe naturalness of its statements1 #bhg not composed by rules of art1 #baj nothing improbable related in any part1 #bhg not to be judged by preconceived expectation1 #bae not to be judged exactly as other books1 #bad ordinary rules of interpretation1 #bae our duty to search it1 #bjb1 #bfb precepts1 some give offence1 #baj reveals our relation to the ,son and ,holy ,spirit1 #aid the possibility of its truth demands investigation1 #beh truths not discoverable by reason1 #bjc variety of topics introduced1 #bhc written in a rude age1 #bhc why it describes creation1 #bhb ,searching the ,scriptures a great duty1 #bjb ,self-deceit1 our liability to it1 #bfb ,serious apprehension may comport with doubt1 #cac ,shameful mistakes of philosophers1 #bcj ,similarity of objections to religion and nature1 #bih ,sincerity of belief proved by dying for it1 #bgj ,skepticism no justification of irreligion1 #bec ,sorrow cannot of itself restore abused benefits1 #bcd ,speaking with tongues1 #bag ,speculative difficulties similar to external temptations1 #bef the chief trial of some1 #beg1 #bei ,spread of ,christianity unaccountable if it were an imposture1 #bij ,standing ministry1 what for1 #aia ,strangeness of some ,scripture events1 #bhh ,stupidity of the martyrs1 if insincere1 #bfi ,subserviences1 the world a system of1 #bbi ,success1 temporal1 always uncertain1 #cjb ,suffering1 ignorance does not prevent it either in temporal or spiritual things1 #aif ,sufferings of ,christ vindicate ,god's law1 #bdd of the early ,christians1 #bfi ,sufficiency of light of nature pretended1 #ahf ,summary of ,jewish history1 #bhd of the historical evidence of ,scripture1 #bib ,supernatural instructions necessary from the first1 #bjf ,temporal interests not always discerned1 #bdg1 #bdh managed by prudent persons on the very principles proposed by religion as to spiritual interests1 #bih1 #bii ,temporal interests often decided by considerations which fall short of demonstration1 #bii ,temporary commands1 distinguished from perpetual1 #ahh ,temptation a wholesome discipline1 #bef earthly and spiritual similar1 #bef calls forth virtuous effort1 #beg ,testimony can be destroyed only by counter-testimony1 or by the incompetency of the witness1 #bgd for miracles not mentioned in ,scripture1 does not impair the testimony for those there recorded1 #bgc of ,paul1 separate and independent1 #bff of profane authors to the truth of ,scripture history1 #bhg of the first ,christians1 #bfi1 #bga must be judged candidly1 #bei none counter to ,christianity1 #bge slight1 overcomes strong presumptions1 #bjh unconfuted1 must be admitted1 #bgc value of1 lessened by enthusiasm1 #bga ,theism of the ,jews accounted for1 #bjf ,theology of the ,bible1 not to be corrected1 #bjb ,things which it is unreasonable to dispute1 #cjg ,thoughtlessness of men1 #bcc ,tradition teaches that there was a revelation at the beginning1 #bje of the fall of man1 #caa ,transubstantiation1 #bje ,trial by speculative difficulties1 analogous to other trials1 #bef ,true philosophy inductive1 #bcj ,truth of ,christianity proved1 unless the whole of its history and influence can be accounted for by accident1 #bie ,truth1 how developed1 #bah the1 of an event may be fully proved1 though no one of sundry proofs may be complete1 #bie whether there is any such thing1 denied by skeptics1 #cje ,twofold effect of the analogical argument1 #cje ,unbelievers1 acknowledgment of1 #bhi cannot deny a conformity between prophecy and events1 #bic ,understanding1 its right use1 #bde ,undesigned coincidences in ,bible history1 #bff ,undeterminate language deceives many1 #big ,unequal distribution of religious knowledge1 #bdi ,unfair dealing of objectors1 #big ,unreasonableness of applying to passion for guidance1 #bie ,unsatisfactory evidence1 men often obliged to act upon it1 #cjb ,variety in the distribution of ,god's gifts1 #bdi1 #cab ,vastness of the scheme of nature1 #bjd ,veracity of the first ,christians1 #bgd ,vicarious punishments witnessed every day1 #bdd deter from sin1 #bde ,vice appointed to be punished1 #bca blinds men to just evidence1 #bee its effects in the present world1 #bcd its natural consequences are ,god's judicial inflictions1 #aig its real enormity1 #bcd not palliated by any supposed lack of evidence for religion1 #bee ,vindication of religion by analogy impossible1 #bif of the character of ,god1 not attempted in this treatise1 #bii1 #cjj ,way of salvation for the helpless1 #ahf ,will of ,,god1 as absolute or conditional1 #bfa ,world1 wickedness of1 #bch ,worship1 mode of1 a matter of pure revelation1 #aie ,writers on the atonement1 #bdb ,christian sacraments1 #aie miracles1 #bfd1 #bfh necessity of revelation1 #ahg prophecy1 #bgg-bhe ,scripture difficulties1 #bae undesigned coincidences1 #bff ,,the ,,end4