file which includes the original illustrations4 ,see #ebide-;h4htm or #ebide-;h4zip3 7https3_/_/www4gutenberg4org_/cache_/epu b_/#ebide_/pg#ebide-;images4html7 or 7https3_/_/www4gutenberg4org_/files_/#eb ide_/ebide-;h4zip7 ,images of the original pages are available through ,internet ,archive4 ,see https3_/_/archive4org_/details_/reformed logicsys#jjmclarich ,transcriber's note3 ,text enclosed by underscores is in italics 7italics74 ,text enclosed by equal signs is in bold face 7bold74 ,a carat character is used to denote superscription4 ,a single character following the carat is superscripted 7example3 e#b74 's represents lower case s with an acute accent4 n4 represents lower case n with dot under4 ,,reformed ,,logic ,oxford ,horace ,hart1 ,printer to the ,university ,,reformed ,,logic ,a ,system ,based on ,berkeley's ,philosophy with an ,entirely ,new ,method of ,dialectic by ,d4 ,b4 ,mc,l,a,c,h,l,a,n ',,spirits are active1 indivisible substances2 ,,ideas objects are inert1 fleeting1 dependent things1 which subsist not by themselves1 but are supported by1 or exist in minds or spiritual substances4444 ,the cause of ,ideas is an incorporeal active ,,substance or ,spirit4' --,berkeley4 ,london ,swan ,sonnenschein ,co4 ,paternoster ,square #ahib ,all rights reserved ',looking to the chaotic state of logic text-books at the present time1 one would be inclined to say that there does not exist anywhere a recognised1 currently-received body of speculation to which the title ,logic can be unambiguously assigned1 and that we must therefore resign the hope of attaining by any empirical consideration of the received doctrine1 a precise determination of the nature and limits of logical theory4' ,encyc4 ,brit41 ,art41 ,,logic4 ,,preface ,the object of the following treatise is to give an intelligible account of the principal facts of ,mind1 with a method for the right expression and criticism of ,reasoning4 ,it is based on principles not before applied to such a purpose4 ,the current systems of ,metaphysic are obscure and difficult simply because they start from false premises1 not because the nature and operations of ,mind cannot1 if properly understood1 be made as comprehensible to beginners as other branches of knowledge4 ,the rules of ,dialectic are quite within the capacity of any intelligent schoolboy1 and should be an essential part of early education1 like ,arithmetic4 ,let not the student be repelled at finding a philosophy reputed to be one of the most difficult taken as the basis of this work4 ,it is ,berkeleyism considerably modified4 ,also it is to be borne in mind that a philosophy is not to be judged by its prim facie probability1 but by its power of explaining many facts in a coherent and lucid way4 ,a theory that does this should not be rejected for a seeming paradox at the outset4 ,most of the theoretical and all the dialectical parts of this work can be adapted to ,realistic thinking1 by treating the judgments of the two ,berkeleyan categories as intuitions instead of inferences4 ,,contents ,,page ,,preface v ,,introduction ,,sect4 ,i ,division of ,philosophies into ,ideal and ,substantial--,substantial subdivided into ,mental and ,material--,berkeley's philosophy a ,mental ,substantialism #a ,,ii ,ontological principles essential to logical theory--,mind consists of 7at least7 ,self and a ,plastic ,substance--,functions of each--,perception of ,inorganic things discussed--,berkeley's view on this point rejected--,body to be considered an apparatus of ,perception #d ,,iii ,current ,metaphysic is ,ideal and therefore incoherent--,substantial alone has a connecting principle--,importance of ,categories in ,substantialism--,its doctrine of ,reason totally different from the ,academic #h ,,intellect ,,iv ,origin of ,intellect--,its use--,difference between ,sentimental and ,intellectual consciousness--,intellect not the governing intelligence of ,man--,moral education the most important #aa ,v ,truth1 its various meanings--,veracity--,correct ,ideation--,correct ,inference--,no absolute standard of ,truth--,nisi utile est1 quod novimus1 stulta est ,sapentia--,schopenhauer on the function of ,intellect #ad ,,vi ,standard of ,truth relating to ,bodily welfare different from that relating to ,mental welfare--,realism the theory of ,perception under the former standard--,its main dogmas--,cause why it is superseded--,superstition of ,one ,truth--,realism and ,substantialism both true and yet contradictory #ah ,,perception ,,vii ,defined1 according to ,substantial principles--,noumenon--,subject--,object --,sentiment not excited by ,objects1 but ,objects accompany ,sentiments--,subject not passive in ,perception--,,attention--,kant's opinion on the inconceivability of ,noumena refuted--,difficulty of overcoming ,realistic prejudices--,science of little use in ,philosophy #bc ,,ideas ,,viii ,how produced--,hume's notion untenable--,no innate ,ideas--but ,sentiment is innate--,division of ,ideas into ,particular1 ,general1 and ,imaginary #bg ,,ix ,,memory--,,oblivion--,,recollection--,i mages1 how preserved and how lost--,good ,memory not necessarily advantageous--,recovery of the apparently ,forgotten--,sudden extinction of ,ideas--',decay of the mind' in old age--,memory inexplicable on any theory but the ,substantial--,john ,stuart ,mill's confession--,memory the chief fact of ,mental ,science #bh ,x ,sentiments may be remembered--,feelings and ,emotions--,no detailed analysis of ,sentiments possible or necessary--,spinoza's list--,can sentiments be noumenally excited without objects8 #cd ,,xi ,analysis of ,comparison--,it is the principle of ,generalisation and ,imagination #cf ,,generalisation ,,xii ,purpose of ,generalisation--,objects classified must be similar and have similar utilities--,inferiority of general ideas acquired by definition--,names not essential to general thought--,generalisation resembles composite photography--,classification on mere objective resemblance--neat but superficial--,conceptualism #ch ,,xiii ,,matter the most general notion derived from ,objects--,belief in ,real ,matter a form of ,mysticism--,a material basis for phenomena unnecessary #dc ,,xiv ,,nominalism--,berkeley's ,nominalism1 and objections thereto--,concrete ,thought expressed in general terms #df ,,xv ,generalisation the bane of ,european philosophy--,plato's theories on ,general ,ideas--,aristotle's ',essence'--,classification a means1 not the end of ,reason--,the explanatory ,unity a unity of service--,evolution a concrete ,platonism #eh ,,imagination ,,xvi ,how distinguished from ,recollection and ,reverie--,imagination by ,simple ,combination--,by ,transfusion--,artistic ,imagination--,rational ,imagination--,wrong views of ,metaphysicians #fc ,,dialectic ,,xvii ,recapitulation of the genealogy of ,reason--,it is the art of conceiving the ,future and ,unknown--,dialectic the science of ,reason--,division of theorems into ,arguments and ,fallacies--,method of ,dialectic #fh ,,xviii ,the ,,rational ,,parallel--,rational ,conclusions are never certain--,essential parts of an ,argument--,rules of ,parallel--,false conclusions cannot be destroyed but may be stigmatised--,in what circumstances we may reason concerning a known fact #gd ,,xix ,hypothetical ,arguments--,current errors with respect to these--,dilemma #hj ,,xx ,,debate is extra-dialectic--,how a valid argument may be criticised #hg ,,categories ,,xxi ,natural--,realistic--,scientific--,phil osophical --,categories of ,pythagoreans--of ,aristotle--of ,kant1 etc4 #ib ,,xxii ,category of ,inherence--,it is a metaphysical analysis of objects--,examples of ,judgment and ,argument--,use of ,standards for ,mediate ,comparison #ig ,,xxiii ,category of ,association defined--,position--,examples of ,judgment and ,argument--,movement--,number--,flat ,space #ajc ,,xxiv ,perspection or ,depth in groups--,perspective degradation--,redintegration1 real and ideal--,this groupment as a fixed ,precedent--,standard of ,depth--,sky ,perspection #ajh ,,xxv ,concretion of ,cubic ideas from flat objects--,backs of things--,resistance--,dr4 ,johnson on ,idealism--,danger of trifling with ,idealists1 illustrated from the ,dabistn--,geographical ,concretion--,its superiority to mere ,recollection--,sphericity of the ,earth1 what it means #aah ,,xxvi ,material ,sequence defined1 with examples--,,time the interval between objects in ,sequence--,eternity--,scientific confusion of ,sequence with ,causation #abf ,,xxvii ,,causation--,its peculiarities--,how distinguished from ,sequence--,effects are never causes--,cause consists of ,motive1 ,plan1 and ,power--,generation not causation--,atoms not causes--,sub-categories of ,causation--',conservation' of ,energy discussed--,note on ,,dreams #acj ,,redaction ,,of ,,colloquial ,,arguments ,,xxviii ,language not naturally an instrument of ,argument--,how to adapt it to this purpose--,negative words--,partitive words--,redaction does not extend to the correction of faulty observation--,syllogistic ,conversion not necessary on the ,substantial method #aea ,,fallacies ,,xxix ,of ,equivocation--,of ,imperfect ,observation #aeg ,,xxx ,of ,parallel ,arrangement--,suppressed ,precedent--,inferring a negative from ,contrast--,false ,analogy--,doubtful ,precedent--,of ,accident--,of ,division--,of ,composition--,dialectical ,tautology--,cross ,reasoning--,fallacy of ,no ,case--,of ,inversion--,suppressed ,conclusion--,of ,no ,application--,of ,irrelevant ,conclusion #afa ,,academical ,,dialectic ,,xxxi ,various notions of ,reason entertained by ,syllogists--,one only true1 ,analogy #age ,,xxxii ',immediate ,inference' is not ,argument1 but explicitness and emphasis in language #agf ,,xxxiii ,arithmetic1 what it is--,the ,real and the ,symbolic--,reasoning enters only into the ,real--,the ,symbolic a kind of expression #agg ,,xxxiv ,geometrical ,demonstration not a form of ,reasoning--,the so-called 'deductive reasoning' of ,geometry a graduated series of lessons in perception #ahb ,,xxxv ,induction not a special kind of reasoning1 but a deduction with suppressed precedent--,other meanings of the word #ahe ,,xxxvi ,aristotle's ,dictum explained and refuted #ahg ,,xxxvii ,mediate ,comparison not ,argument #ahi ,,xxxviii ,syllogism analysed--,it is not ,argument--,doctrine of the ,predicate--,moods of the ,syllogism discussed--,all moods reducible to ,one #aia ,,studies ,,in ,,dialectic ,,xxxix ,additional examples to illustrate the ,dialectic of ,substantialism #bje ,,introduction ,i--,,relation ,,of ,,berkeley',s ,,philosophy ,,to ,,other ,,systems ,philosophies are either ,ideal or ,substantial4 ,the ideal are those which resolve all things1 actual and possible1 into thought or consciousness4 ,they seek to find in consciousness the reason and meaning of itself1 or1 if this be impossible1 to account for each item in consciousness by defining its relation to some other item1 or to some general mass of consciousness4 ,this type of philosophy includes ,german transcendentalism and idealism1 and some species of ,buddhist and ,persian metaphysic4 ,european idealists are seldom consistent1 for at the basis of their philosophies 7or at the apex7 they place ,,god1 who is not an item of human consciousness1 actual or potential1 and who therefore occupies1 whether it be admitted or not1 the relation of substance to human thought4 ,substantial philosophies affirm that thought invariably inheres in some sort of ,substance1 for whose service it exists4 ,it is incapable of independent being1 and cannot be understood abstracted from its substance4 ,it is intermittent1 called up when wanted1 and is liable to variation and aberration4 ,substantialists differ however as to what the substance of human intelligence is4 ,some hold that it is the human body4 ,consciousness exists1 they argue1 for the use of the body and varies with its condition4 ,this class of philosophers may be subdivided into ,materialists and ,metaphysicians 7including logicians74 ,materialists believe that consciousness is a product of the physical body--has therefore no existence before the body is formed or after it is dissolved4 ,it is really as physical as the teeth or hair4 ,in metaphysic the intelligence is supposed to have a principle of existence apart from the body1 and does not1 or need not1 share the fate of the body4 ,the body is nevertheless regarded as the substance or superior fact during the union of the two4 ,this is an eminently inconsistent philosophy1 for if consciousness has an existence apart from body it must be in some other substance1 and if so its relations to that substance are more important than its relations to the body1 and should be the first object of inquiry4 ,metaphysic is in its development an idealism1 since the connection admitted between body and thought is too slight to afford a sufficient explanation of intelligence1 and no other substantial relation is known4 ,the notion that an invisible immaterial substance may underlie consciousness has occurred to some philosophers1 among others to the illustrious ,,berkeley4 ,his theory of ,vision1 which has never been refuted or even weakened1 is founded on this hypothesis4 ,berkeleyan substantialism combines the characteristic features of the other theories1 and affords an easy solution of many difficult problems in philosophy4 ,it has in common with idealism--whence it is sometimes1 but erroneously1 called by that name--that it regards all material bodies and things as facts or items of consciousness4 ,it agrees with materialism that a substance is essential to consciousness1 and that the consciousness of man serves the needs of his body1 though that is not the highest use to which it can be put4 ,it confirms the metaphysical view that intelligence is not1 in its abstract or essential character1 dependent on the body1 and may therefore survive the body4 ,this is the theory on which the following logic is based3 ,i shall refer to it briefly as ,substantialism4 ,,ii--,,ontological ,,notions ,substantialism has two main divisions--,ontology1 which treats of the mental substance in itself1 and ,logic or ,metaphysic1 which deals with its consciousness4 ,the present essay is specially concerned with logic1 but certain ontological premises must be assumed to render the logic intelligible4 ,this follows from the subordinate relation of consciousness to substance4 ,the substantial mind consists of two principal parts--a ,,self and a ,,plasma--the ,atman and ,aka'sa of ,sanscrit philosophers4 ,self is the seat of ,energy and ,consciousness4 ,the plasma is inert and unconscious2 it protects the ,self and receives1 communicates1 and retains impressions of experience1 both the external and the internal#a4 ,the ,self would be conscious though isolated from other minds1 at least from those of its own grade of being4 ,it would feel the fluctuations of its energy4 ,but the experience called 'external' depends on the mutual action of minds4 ,it is the form into which their consciousness is thrown when they come in contact4 ,it lasts no longer than the contact1 and so has only a casual existence4 ,the constitution of the mind is not given by ,berkeley1 and on other points also we must supplement and correct his philosophy4 ,he was wrong as regards the mental cause of the perception of the ,inorganic or ,dead4 ,since external experience implies that another mind is operating upon ours1 what mind is operating when we perceive an object that is apparently mindless8 ,berkeley replies that it is the supreme mind that is then acting upon us4 ,many objections can be urged against this view4 ,i will mention only one1 which seems to me conclusive4 ,by every canon of judgment we possess1 the living or organised is better--more important and significant--than the lifeless and elemental2 so if ,berkeley's reasoning be valid the phenomena excited by finite and created beings are superior to those excited by their ,creator4 ,the movements of a living man are referred to a human mind--a putrescent carcase is a vision immediately induced by the ,deity4 ,the beauty of the starry sky is irrelevant to the question4 ,apart from the finite life and thought that may be associated with the stars1 they have no more philosophical importance than a spadeful of sand4 ,a more reasonable account of the inorganic is found in several ancient philosophies4 ,gnostics and ,neo-,platonists referred the elemental to a cosmic mind 7,demiurgos7 intermediate between human beings and the ,supreme4 ,the demiurgic mind is inconceivably greater and more powerful than the human1 but is not necessarily better in quality4 ,it is the origin of all natural forces1 and its organic processes are what we term 'physical laws4' ,this is the explanation of inorganic consciousness which ,i feel disposed to adopt1 but to discuss it fully would carry us too far from the subject of this work4 ,the next point relates to the body4 ,what is its function in substantialism8 ,the brain1 says ,berkeley1 is an idea in the mind1 and he ridicules the notion that one idea should generate all other ideas4 ,this is an argument against materialism4 ,no doubt he would have admitted1 though he does not say so1 that the body-idea facilitates1 or at least must precede1 the experience of other ideas4 ,he would not have denied that it is an instrumental idea4 ,since his time an important discovery has been made with reference to the constitution of the body4 ,i allude to the ,cell theory4 ,it is no longer possible to regard the body either as a self-moving machine 7if this is not a contradiction in terms71 or as a lump of 'dead matter' animated by the mind4 ,it is a society of minute animals#b1 each having a certain degree of independent energy and liberty of movement4 ,they are organised and governed by the human or animal mind with which they are associated4 ,in short1 the relation of the cell to the man is analogous to1 if not quite the same as1 the relation of the man to the cosmic being4 ,this discovery complicates the problem of 'external' consciousness1 without however affecting the principles on which a substantialist would endeavour to solve it4 ,instead of conceiving human minds as coming into immediate contact in perception1 we have to conceive the cellular systems of each as forming a medium between the two4 ,we do not perceive the other mind immediately or intuitively2 what we perceive intuitively is certain affections in our own organism1 which we must first refer to the other body1 and then to the mind behind that body4 ,our knowledge of other human beings is thus altogether inferential4 ,the cellular medium explains why we are not generally aware of the substantial constitution of other minds2 it is veiled by the intervening organisms4 ,the relation of body to mind1 the reason of embodiment1 and so forth1 are questions of prime importance in ontology1 but in logic we are concerned only with the object in consciousness1 without reference to the apparatus of perception4 ,the instrument of intellectual perception may in its proper character be ignored4 ,,iii--,,differences ,,between ,,substantial ,,and ,,metaphysical ,,logic ,all the current academic metaphysic is ideal4 ,materialists1 when they attempt to explain thought1 fail to attach it properly to the body1 or to account for that large and important division of mental activity which has no bearing1 direct or indirect1 on bodily welfare4 ,they drop their materialism at an early stage of their enquiry and continue on the metaphysical method4 ,hence in none of the current systems is there any true principle of arrangement in the treatment of logical phenomena4 ,unless we know the use of a thing we cannot describe it1 let alone explain it4 ,we know not the relative importance of its parts1 and we arrange them according to superficial resemblances1 or on some arbitrary principle which conceals instead of revealing their meaning4 ,substantial philosophy alone possesses a principle of coherence4 ,the facts of consciousness are determined by anterior facts of substance1 and there can be only one true mode in which to present them--they must follow and reflect the substantial order4 ,they will thus appear as a consecutive and coherent system of ideas1 no one of which could be otherwise placed without damage to the whole4 ,this is perhaps the most important respect in which substantial logic differs from others4 ,the doctrine of ,categories has to receive full development in order to elucidate the genesis of the 'material world4' ,except to a substantialist the categories have no particular value1 and so they are barely mentioned in the academic systems4 ,the theory of ,reasoning or ,dialectic 7logic in the narrower sense7 given in the following chapters1 will be found totally different from the academic4 ,it does not merely state in other words or metaphors the doctrines laid down in works of the ,aristotelian type1--it declares that the theory of reasoning taught in these works is altogether false4 ,our argumentation is not conducted in syllogisms1 either tacit or explicit4 ,this has been suspected by several critics of logic1 but no attempt has been made to substitute a more correct theory and method4 ,of course logicians do not always reason wrongly1 and true arguments may be stated in the syllogistic form4 ,what ,i mean is that logicians nowhere tell us in what right reasoning essentially consists1 and for want of a distinct notion on the subject they all of them occasionally admit as valid1 arguments that are not so4 ,the main dogma of substantialism should be kept in view in reading the following pages4 ,it is mind alone that is conceived as having solidity and energy3 material things are temporary forms of our consciousness2 they have length and breadth but no depth1 and they are without energy1 even passive resistance4 ,if an object cannot be removed at pleasure1 what resists us is the other mind causing that object1 not the object itself4 ,as far as possible ,i have utilised the existing logical terminology4 ,but substantialism has notions which require special technical words1 and ,i have not hesitated to invent such when necessary4 ,on the other hand1 ,i have rejected the latinisms of current logic1 which have never been assimilated by modern languages4 ,the ,english language is good enough for all the purposes of logic4 ,footnote #a3 ,the mental substance is the fifth essence of the initiate ,greeks and of ,alchemists4 ,they also called it chaos and first matter4 ',man was made of that very matter and chaos whereof all the world was made1 and all the creatures in it3 which is a most high mystery to understand1 and must1 nay is altogether necessary to be known of him that expecteth good from this art1 being the ground of the wisdom thereof4 ,foolish men1 nay they that the world holds for great doctors1 say and tell it for truth1 that ,god made man of a piece of mud1 or clay1 or dust of the earth1 which is false2 it was no such matter1 but a ,quintessential ,matter which is called earth1 but is no earth4'--,de ,manna ,benedicto4 ,footnote #b3 ,see ,stricker's ,manual of ,histology2 ,bioplasm1 and other works1 by ,dr4 ,lionel ,s4 ,beale1 ,m4,b41 ,f4,r4,s42 and an article on the ,new ,psychology1 by ,a4 ,fouill1 in the ,revue des ,deux ,mondes for ,october #aeth1 #ahia4 ,,intellect ,,iv--,,its ,,origin ,,and ,,function ,the mind has at physical birth one uniform quality of plasma and consciousness4 ,by education and experience a portion of the plasma is gradually changed1 and the consciousness excited by this portion is what we call ,,intellect4 ,the word may also stand for the plasma so differentiated4 ,the consciousness pertaining to the plasma left in its primitive state is ,,sentiment1 which generally corresponds to what is termed the moral nature of man4 ,intellect is a temporary condition arising out of the need to preserve the ,self from hostile and inharmonious surroundings4 ,the adaptation is artificial1 and may therefore be well-done1 or ill-done1 or over-done4 ,it is over-done when too much of the plasma and mental energy is devoted to intellectual purposes--when the individual has1 to use a common expression1 more head than heart4 ,in this case the end is sacrificed to the means4 ,i conceive the intellect as a hardening of the plasma in its superficies1 the formation of a sort of rind capable of receiving finer1 sharper1 and more enduring impressions than the plasma of sentiment2 and1 being harder1 it is better able than the latter to resist enfeebling influences4 ,its duty is to challenge and inspect vibrations before permitting them to pass inwards to the region of sentiment4 ,yet the intellectual consciousness is itself a degree of sentiment1 and in intellects not sufficiently trained it may be impossible to distinguish thoughts that are purely intellectual1 from thoughts that are also to some extent sentimental4 ,upon minds of this sort the best-prepared arguments have no hold2 they must be mixed with oratory and poetry to receive any attention4 ,it need not be said that a mind which responds only to 'persuasive' language is feeble of intellect4 ,it lives in the present only1 and is incapable of far-reaching designs4 ,it is to the intellect we owe the power of conceiving the past and future1 and of laying plans for the future4 ,a mind properly intellectualised is1 of its kind1 strong and self-controlled4 ,with the intellect defective the man exhibits passion1 undue excitement and demonstrativeness4 ,he responds to the least stimulus1 like an exposed nerve2 his energy is wasted in explosions4 ,sentiment is the inmost nerve of man--intellect its protecting sheath4 ,the most carefully trained intellect is liable at times to be carried by assault or stratagem2 then follows a feeling of emptiness occasioned by loss of energy4 ,on the other hand an appearance of self-command may be really due to apathy1--the mind is of a low type and callous to influences that usually affect its species4 ,if it is bad to be explosive1 it is perhaps worse to be incapable of exploding4 ,intellect is not the supreme or ruling intelligence of man4 ,it initiates nothing4 ,it is a light to direct our steps1 but we do not walk where the light happens to fall--we make it fall where we desire to walk4 ,hence the diversity of occupation and intellectual accomplishments in men4 ,each acquires the sort of intellect he thinks will be sentimentally most serviceable to him2 and on matters concerning which he has not learnt to reason he consults other men4 ,we are not born rational beings2 we are in no sense rational on all subjects2 we are rational only on those few which we have mastered4 ,men pretend to act from reason only1 and perhaps they do on matters to which they are indifferent4 ,but in general their rationality consists in finding pretexts for what on sentimental grounds they have already resolved to do1 and in finding ways and means to carry out their resolves4 ,sentiment is the moving spring of conduct3 intellect is the executive faculty4 ,those historical philosophers are mistaken who suppose the progress of mankind results from intellectual discoveries and inventions4 ,these are effects1 not causes1 of progress--effects of sentimental disagreement with previous conditions4 ,intellect is little more than an extension inwards of our senses4 ,it is an epitome and rearrangement of their observations1 and is as instrumental as they4 ,we are not necessarily improved by a development of the intellect forced upon us from without4 ,education is sometimes a dagger put into the hands of an assassin4 ,the best education is largely sentimental 7moral71 for that is not confined to preserving the mind we have--it gives us another and a better mind1 and so indirectly improves the intellect4 ,v--,,truth ,this word has several meanings which it may be well to notice4 ,as veracity it means an agreement between our thoughts and our language4 ,it supposes that we take reasonable pains to learn the conventional laws upon which language is founded1 and then endeavour as far as possible to bring our speech in conformity with these laws4 ,since language is an art 7like music7 it may be acquired well or ill1 so that a mistake in the use of a phrase or term is not regarded as untruth4 ,there must be deliberate abuse of language to constitute a lie4 ,agreement between an idea of memory and the actual experience--correct recollection--is another meaning of truth4 ,also truth may signify agreement between an inferential thought and the fact to which it refers1 although the fact has not yet been observed4 ,in this sense truth must be construed liberally4 ,we never foresee a future fact exactly as it will take place4 ,our anticipations are vague and our preparations for them general1 but that on the whole is enough for our purposes4 ,at least it is all that reason affords us4 ,if we are absolutely certain of a future fact and can figure it in the mind precisely as it will take place1 that means that it has already occurred so often that we are virtually using our memory1 not our reason4 ,an inference may be considered true if it is the best we can draw from the information at our command1 though in point of fact it may prove to be very incorrect4 ,there is no mass of speculative ,truth which everybody ought to possess on pain of being considered foolish or miscreant4 ,this notion1 formerly so prevalent1 betrays gross ignorance of the nature and function of intellect4 ,it makes intellectual speculation an end in itself4 ,our ideas must be such as serve the uses of our sentimental or inner soul1 and since the sentiments 7tastes7 of men vary widely1 so ought also their intellectual ideas4 ,though change of sentiment modifies ideas1 change of ideas does not modify sentiment4 ,there is therefore no sort of good in uniformity of belief in itself4 ,it is creditable to modern times that men have shaken off the procrustean beliefs of the ,middle ,ages1 and are free to adapt their intellects to their real sentimental needs4 ,the numerous sections into which speculative thought is now broken up1 and the frequent changes of theory1 are signs of healthy and active sentiment4 ,in matters of social policy1 where large bodies of men have to carry out a single design1 uniformity must be attained by persuasion or compromise4 ,but such matters relate only to physical well-being1 into which philosophical truth can hardly be said to enter4 ,this relative and1 in the widest sense1 utilitarian view of intellectual truth applies both to quantity and quality of ideas4 ,we should not learn what we do not sentimentally require4 ,that is waste of power4 ,useless knowledge is folly1 said both ,plato and ,aristotle4 ,to mistake knowledge to be the pursuit of man is to confuse the means with the end1 says the author of the ,bhagavad ,gita4 ,the quality of our ideas must not be good beyond our necessities4 ,if they are1 we shall suffer by acting on them4 ,they will land us in circumstances for which our nature is not fully prepared4 ,if there were an abstract or standard truth1 it would be good for every species of being1 and no doubt the thoughts of a man are nearer to it than the thoughts of a horse4 ,therefore a horse ought to be improved by receiving a human intellect4 ,but if we could insinuate into a horse's mind the knowledge possessed by an educated man1 we should spoil what may have been a good horse and produce a monstrous and horrible man4 ,so is it with ourselves4 ,if we could receive knowledge far in advance of our requirements or out of relation to them1 it would drive us mad or be itself madness4 ,our constitution and necessities determine what we can know and what we ought to know4 ,not all possible knowledge is good1 and what is good for some may be useless or bad for others4 ,schopenhauer says well#c3 ',the faculty of ,knowing 444 has only arisen for the purpose of self-preservation1 and therefore stands in a precise relation1 admitting of countless gradations1 to the requirements of each animal species4' ,,vi--,,realism ,if our interests were single and uniform1 one consistent scheme of intellectual knowledge would suffice4 ,we need never be in fundamental contradiction with ourselves4 ,every advance in knowledge would illustrate and confirm what we had already learned4 ,but we are not of this simple constitution4 ,we are first and essentially minds1 we are next and temporarily embodied minds1 and in each of these characters we have distinct and1 to a great extent1 conflicting interests4 ,hence we have to acquire different species of knowledge and admit different standards of truth4 ,the ideas that serve the interests of the embodied man are false to the same man considered apart from his embodiment1 and contrariwise--false1 in the sense of being useless and perhaps misleading4 ,hence the existence of ,common-sense for the embodied interests1 and ,philosophy for the purely mental interests4 ,science is common knowledge carried to its utmost perfection1 but not partaking in the least of the philosophical character4 ,realism is the notion of perception that is acquired with our common knowledge4 ,it is seldom explicitly defined or defended1 for in order to this a comparison with philosophic theories would have to be made1 and the defects of realism would be apparent4 ,the realistic view is so named by philosophers to distinguish it from their own views4 ,for corporeal purposes it is useful to believe1 and it is therefore relatively true1 that there is a real space which would exist although all objects were removed from it4 ,objects are real solid things stored in space like casks in a cellar4 ,they have fixed dimensions notwithstanding that they appear to contract and dilate as we leave or approach them4 ,it is quite 'natural' they should appear smaller at a distance4 ,distant perception is conceivable1 therefore it is possible1 and since calculations based on this assumption are verified by experience1 it must and does take place4 ,time also is as real as space1 and would exist by itself though space and its contents were annihilated4 ,it is a sort of stream4 ,all these propositions are true for certain necessary purposes4 ,we begin to form such ideas from the moment we are born1 and during the years of infancy we are doing nothing else intellectually but working out the notions of space1 time1 magnitude1 distance4 ,most of our school education is of the same kind4 ,by the time we reach maturity realism has become so rooted in our intellect that--as regards the majority of men--no sceptical considerations are strong enough to unsettle them4 ,for why8 ,they enable the natural man to provide sufficiently well for his bodily needs and other needs depending therefrom1 and he has therefore no motive for doubting his realism or for acquiring any other sort of ideas4 ,he is quite right to abide by those which have answered his purposes4 ,it is not from without but from within that doubts arise as to realistic truth4 ,they arise when the mind has acquired power over and above what is needed for bodily uses1 and begins to think on its own account4 ,sentiments are felt which do not depend on or refer to bodily life1 and a new intellect has to be formed to explain and protect these sentiments4 ,this new intellect is ,philosophy4 ,it is the science and practical conduct of mind considered as abstracted from body4 ,much of the obscurity of philosophy is traceable to the superstition of a fixed standard of truth which must be recognised universally4 ,we are reluctant to accept philosophical hints and inferences because they conflict with truths that have been physically verified4 ,or--which is more common--we take up a few philosophical propositions and tack on to them all the science we know1 believing they make a homogeneous whole1 because truth must be self-consistent4 ,time and labour would be spared if we could be told at the right moment that truth is expedience#d1 and that there is no need to harmonise philosophy and science4 ,we are each of us two men in one1 and each of these men must be allowed to think for himself4 ,there is no reason why they should quarrel2 there is no reason why they should even argue4 ,the science in our mind should not be ousted to make room for the philosophy2 let them exist together and work alternately4 ,when the mariner is at sea he must mind his ship and study the weather2 when he is on shore he may neglect both4 ,so when we are navigating the body we have to think in categories proper to its safety2 as philosophers we dismiss the realistic categories and think in other forms1 but we need not then call the realism false or foolish4 ,in its proper place it is right and true#e4 ,between realism and substantialism there is therefore no necessary conflict or competition4 ,they are each indispensable4 ,it is absurd to carry realism into philosophy1 and no less absurd to carry substantialism into common affairs1 or to reproach a substantialist because he acts and speaks occasionally like other people4 ,it is probable however that in a community largely composed of substantialists the realism of common action would be less stringent than is now found necessary4 ,footnote #c3 ,will in ,nature1 ',physiology of ,plants4' ,footnote #d3 ,this does not apply to truth in the sense of veracity4 ,footnote #e3 ,greek philosophers never understood the dual standard of ,truth1 and insisted that philosophy was the best preparation for every sort of employment4 ,the people1 though generally unwise in political matters1 had sense enough not to entrust the care of their temporal interests to philosophers1 and so the universal utility of philosophy had few opportunities of being tested4 ,a ,macedonian king committed the custody of ,corinth and its citadel to a philosopher1 ,persaeus1 who was promptly expelled by ,aratus--a mere soldier4 ,persaeus frequented the schools again1 and on the well-worn theme that 'none but a wise man is fit to be a general' being brought up for discussion1 he said1 ',it is true1 and the gods know it1 that this maxim of ,zeno once pleased me more than all the rest2 but ,i have changed my opinion since ,i was taught better by the young ,sicyonian4'--,plutarch's ,life of ,aratus4 ,,perception ,,vii ,perception has already been partially defined4 ,so-called 'external objects' are forms excited in our consciousness by pressure of other minds4 ,the great permanent 'world' is due to the action of a cosmic mind with which we are intimately associated throughout our physical life4 ,objects have a totally different sort of existence from minds1 for whereas the latter are--at least relative to objects--self-existent1 the former have no existence except during the act of perception4 ,if minds could be all moved asunder from each other the whole objective world would disappear1 yet the universe would be as full as before1 for sensation occupies no room4 ,the appearances we interpret as distance are due to variations in the pressure or stimulus producing the object4 ,it will be convenient to call the more active mind ,noumenon1 the perceiving mind ,subject4 ,the mind that is subject on one occasion may be noumenon at another1 and conversely4 ,the true antithesis to subject is not object1 but noumenon4 ,object has no antithesis1 unless it be nonentity4 ,it is specially to be noticed that an object is not the cause of a sentiment4 ,the knife we see or handle is not the cause of the pain it may inflict if driven into our flesh4 ,pains and pleasures signify that the noumenal action is powerful enough not only to excite objects in the intellect1 but to penetrate inwards and excite sentiments also4 ,it is the noumenon that causes both object and sentiment1 as far as the energy exerted is concerned1 but the variation of plasma in the subject is also essential to the distinction of object and sentiment4 ,the subject is not quite passive in perception4 ,no consciousness takes place unless the subject is charged with energy4 ,further1 since consciousness is confined to the ,self and not inherent in the plasma1 we perceive only such vibrations as reach the ,self4 ,if the ,self is absorbed in one part of the mind1 vibrations may take place in other parts without being noticed4 ,the more energy we concentrate at the point or surface of contact 7,attention71 or otherwise bring to bear on the plasmic vibration1 the more vivid is the object4 ,the fixing or circumscribing of attention so as to break up our experience into distinct things or objects is an acquired art1 whence we may infer that the intellectual experience of infancy is a vague whitish surface1 not clearly distinguished by colour or movement4 ,kant and other philosophers admit that objects are caused by noumena1 but insist that we can never know or conceive what a noumenon is4 ,why not8 ,each of us knows himself to be the noumenon of many phenomena2 he has no doubt that many other phenomena are caused by minds like himself1 and it is easy to extend this principle to all phenomena whatever4 ,they are all caused by minds more or less like human minds4 ,this is a useful conclusion1 although we are not able to imagine very accurately the mind of an insect or of a being of cosmic dimensions4 ,it is not necessary we should1 but the most general inference of this sort is better than none at all1 and better than the notion that phenomena are self-existent and self-moving4 ,although simple and intelligible when stated in the abstract1 perception is difficult to work out in detail4 ,objections start up on every side1 and it requires the utmost patience to reduce them to what they are--inferences from the realism we are supposed to have discarded4 ,it is only when we try to dislodge realism wholly and consistently that we find how fast its hold upon our intellect is4 ,critics who profess to treat ,berkeley's substantialism seriously and sympathetically1 constantly bring up against it arguments of the most naively realistic kind4 ,they have no adequate conception how enormous is the revolution in thought involved in substituting substantialism for realism4 ,it is a complete dissolution of the natural thought and belief2 it means the construction of a new heaven and a new earth with laws to which we have been hitherto unaccustomed4 ,the old science is of little or no use to us as substantialists4 ,philosophy is not an advance or correction of science4 ,in so far as the latter claims to be absolutely or philosophically true1 substantialism abolishes it in dispensing with the notions of real matter and real space4 ,hence it is quite irrelevant to point out that substantialism is inconsistent with 7say7 the doctrine of physical evolution4 ,this theory1 though so new1 is now often referred to as axiomatically true1 whereas it is an inference1 the evidence for which1 even to many realists1 is far from conclusive4 ,whether it be considered true or not in science1 physical evolution is quite untrue in philosophy4 ,,ideas ,,viii--,,how ,,produced ,an imprint or mould of the object is generally left in the plasma of the subject4 ,the imprint is deep1 clear and lasting in proportion to the strength of the exciting cause and the degree of energy assigned to the perception4 ,when the noumenon withdraws the object does not at once disappear1 for if the energy of attention remain the mould left by the noumenon serves to excite a consciousness similar to the object1 and this is what we call an ,,idea4 ,what ,hume says as to an object differing from an idea in nothing but vividness is evidently incorrect4 ,objects are generally1 but not always1 more vivid than ideas1 and when an object is present we have an indefeasible conviction of being acted on by something not ourselves1 which conviction is not present in recollection4 ,we may not be able to give a satisfactory reason for the conviction--if we are arguing idealistically we certainly shall not--but the fact that it is there serves to mark off objects as a class of consciousness distinct from ideas1 irrespective of their vividness4 ,if an object were once seen clearly and so remembered1 and were afterwards seen indistinctly through a mist1 the latter consciousness would 7according to ,hume7 be the idea and the former the object4 ,such an application of words would be an abuse of language4 ,there are of course no innate ideas of objects4 ,there is innate consciousness--the sentimental4 ,ideas are of three kinds--,particular ,ideas1 ,general ,ideas1 ,imaginary ,ideas--corresponding to the so-called faculties of ,memory1 ,generalisation or ,classification1 and ,imagination4 ,,ix--,,memory ,,of ,,objects ,when the energy of attention is exhausted or withdrawn the idea also disappears1 but it may be revived by bringing the energised ,self in contact with the imprint again1 and this operation can be repeated indefinitely4 ,the power of exciting ideas of past experience is ,memory2 any particular exercise of memory is ,recollection4 ,the imprint of an object is not absolutely permanent and is probably never quite true4 ,it begins to lose sharpness at once1 but if the object be frequently observed and much remembered1 it will retain its general character for years4 ,the exercise of memory1 instead of wearing out the imprint as would be the case with a material negative or engraved plate1 keeps the channels open#f4 ,persons of little experience remember well1 for their energy of attention is not distributed over many different ideas2 it travels continuously round a small circuit4 ,one hears ignorant persons recounting events that happened years ago1 with as much detail and with almost as much sentiment as if they had taken place the day before4 ,a 'good memory' is no proof that the quality of mind or thought is good4 ,all experience is not worth remembering4 ,one of the most difficult things in moral culture is to get rid of the imprints of ideas that are out of harmony with our improved sentiment4 ,although the imprints in our mind may close up and leave scarce a cicatrice1 the part that has been once disturbed is never the same as the virgin plasm4 ,it remains a little more tender4 ,it may not reopen to ordinary stimuli1 but an extra agitation of the plasm will rip up the closed furrows1 and give us back scenes in our life that had long ceased to be recollected4 ,a great agitation in all parts of the mind may revive what appears to be the whole of our past experience in a simultaneous recollection4 ,so ,i explain the extraordinary lucidity that sometimes occurs in fevers and in moments of extreme terror4 ,it is also conceivable that the egoistic energy may be so strong as to destroy outright the moulds of thought1 as a flood sweeps away the banks of a river4 ',we sometimes find a disease quite strip the mind of all its ideas1 and the flames of a fever in a few days calcine all those images to dust and confusion which seemed to be as lasting as if graved in marble'#g4 ,what is called 'decay of the mind' in old age is merely the loss of the plasmic images4 ,since intellect would not have been formed in the first instance if it had not been wanted1 it is to be expected that it will fade out of the mind when it is no longer wanted4 ,so far as the realistic intellect is concerned1 we return to 'second childhood' and the uniform sensibility we had at birth4 ,no philosophy but the substantial explains memory4 ,idealists and metaphysicians1 who recognise only consciousness1 are utterly unable to account for the revival of a shadowy sort of objects in the absence of their original causes4 ,here is the melancholy confession of ,john ,stuart ,mill on the subject3-- ',if we speak of the ,mind as a series of feelings1 we are obliged to complete the statement by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future3 and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the ,mind1 or ,ego1 is something different from any series of feelings1 or possibilities of them1 or of accepting the paradox that something which ex hypothesi is but a series of feelings1 can be aware of itself as a series4 ',the truth is that we are here face to face with that final inexplicability at which1 as ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton observes1 we inevitably arrive when we reach ultimate facts2 and in general one mode of stating it only appears more incomprehensible than another1 because the whole of human language is accommodated to the one1 and is so incongruous with the other1 that it cannot be expressed in any terms which do not deny its truth4 ,the real stumbling-block is perhaps not in any theory of the fact1 but in the fact itself4 ,the true incomprehensibility perhaps is1 that something which has ceased1 or is not yet in existence1 can still be1 in a manner1 present3 that a series of feelings1 the infinitely greater part of which is past or future1 can be gathered up as it were into a single present conception1 accompanied by a belief of reality4 ,i think1 by far the wisest thing we can do is to accept the inexplicable fact1 without any theory of how it takes place2 and when we are obliged to speak of it in terms which assume a theory1 to use them with a reservation as to their meaning#h4' ,memory an ultimate fact6 ,it is the first that stares us in the face on beginning to philosophise1 and it haunts us through all our subsequent speculations4 ,it is the 'dweller on the threshold' of philosophy1 which unless we overcome will overcome us1 and frustrate our magic4 ,the passage quoted does not show ,mill's usual candour and consistency4 ,his philosophy has broken down on an essential point1 and he is reluctant to admit it4 ,he tries to throw the blame on other things1 and recommends that those who think with him should maintain a discreet silence on the subject of memory1 or if obliged to speak of it do so in ambiguous language4 ,that is hardly honest1 and is bad philosophical practice4 ,what we know or think we know we may leave alone--it will not run away2 it is what we are conscious of not knowing that should receive our persistent attention4 ,materialism presents at first sight the data out of which to construct a theory of memory1 for it recognises the dependent character of consciousness and takes body to be its substance4 ,does the body show any marks or traces of thought that may serve to revive ideas in the absence of objects8 ,none have yet been discovered4 ,nerves are used in objective observation1 but they do not appear to be essential either to recollection in general or to any of the more elaborate forms of internal thought4 ,the brain is used only when giving expression to thought4 ,memory is noticed by everyone1 even the least metaphysical4 ,persons who are incapable of understanding the difference between object and subject or general and particular1 are yet perfectly well aware of the difference between remembering and forgetting4 ,the phrases relating to this distinction are the commonest in every language4 ,memory is conspicuous--notorious--palpable4 ,it is the pivot on which the whole mental system revolves4 ,it cannot be gainsaid or ignored4 ,there is no profit in boycotting it in the manner recommended by ,mill--it must be faced and explained4 ',how do you account for memory8' should be the first question addressed to one who pretends to have a science of mind4 ,if he has no plausible answer to give1 his system is not worth discussion4 ,a philosophy without a theory of memory is like an astronomy without gravitation4 ,x--,,memory ,,of ,,sentiments ,sentiments are remembered and recollected like objects4 ,for instance1 a boy is punished for doing wrong and has pain2 he does wrong again and is haunted with the fear of being punished again1 which is the recollected and anticipated pain4 ,we have thus two species of sentiment corresponding exactly to object and idea4 ,the word 'feeling' is appropriate to the first1 'emotion' to the second4 ',passion' is a strong degree of either4 ,objects that are associated with feelings are better remembered than those that merely affect the intellect1 for there is a double memory at work--one in the core and one on the surface of our mind4 ,sentiments are not susceptible of the same degree of analysis as objects4 ,the inner matrix is more fluid and does not keep details4 ,apart from the objects associated with feelings1 there is not much opportunity or need for classifying them4 ,we are happy1 wretched1 or indifferent--that sums up the sentimental experience4 ,no two moral philosophers give the same list of sentiments4 ,some are satisfied with two--pain and pleasure4 ,spinoza gives a list of forty-seven#i sentiments1 which includes luxury and drunkenness4 ,it is evident that luxury is a general term which covers many different forms of feeling1 and if the feeling of intoxication by alcohol is worth mentioning1 so also must be the intoxications by opium and tobacco2 and if these are included we must admit the feeling of nausea1 which brings us to the sentiments associated with all diseased conditions of body or mind4 ,such distinctions are superfluous1 for if the sentiment is purely personal and not associated with an external object1 it is not of any general interest2 if associated with an object and common to many persons it is best defined by reference to the object--as the pleasure of smelling a rose4 ,we have sometimes feelings of elation and depression for which we cannot find an internal reason nor yet an objective sign4 ,many of the so-called religious experiences are of this sort4 ,so also are the sudden sympathies and aversions we feel towards certain people and places4 ,here there is an object1 but we cannot find anything in the object that can be taken as specially significant of the feeling4 ,we are said not to be able to 'analyse' our feeling1 that is1 assign it an object as cause4 ,these abnormal feelings may be explained by supposing that some external influences succeed in reaching our sentiment without exciting our intellect4 ,considering that intellect is artificial and may be very imperfect1 and also that its efficiency depends to some extent on its being less sensitive than the original mental nature1 it is reasonable to conclude that subtle emanations from our surroundings may occasionally affect us without exciting the intellectual consciousness4 ,panic1 inspiration1 mesmerism1 and other 'occult' influences are probably due to this cause4 ,if we further assume that sentiments so excited may then1 by association1 excite appropriate ideas in the intellect of the recipient1 we have a likely explanation of what is called 'thought-transference4' ,since ideas excite emotions1 it is reasonable to suppose that feelings may excite ideas1 or even the illusion that objects are being perceived4 ,,xi--,,comparison ,most ideas1 except the particular 7which are copies of single objects71 are associated with a consciousness of resemblance and difference which arises in the following manner4 ,when new experience simply revives the imprint of a former experience we call it the same object or objects1 though it is not numerically the same1 being different at least in time4 ,if a totally new imprint is made in the mind the experience is quite novel or strange1 but we do not call it different4 ,experience is usually neither quite the same as before nor quite strange1 which means that the present noumenon has partially revived an old imprint and made a partially new one4 ,in this case we have a quadruple consciousness4 ,there is first the present object2 next the recollection of the object originally associated with the same imprint2 thirdly1 a consciousness of resemblance between the new and the old 7the present object and the recollected idea7 in so far as the imprints coincide1 and 7fourthly7 a sense of difference in so far as they disagree4 ,the limitation of resemblance gives rise to the sense of difference--a negative consciousness--and the shock of difference emphasises the resemblance4 ,this is ,comparison1 the common basis of ,generalisation and ,imagination4 ,footnote #f3 ,as if the image had the form of a stencil4 ,footnote #g3 ,locke1 ,essay on the ,understanding1 ii4 x4 #e4 ,footnote #h3 ,exam4 of ,hamilton's ,philosophy1 p4 #bab-c4 ,footnote #i3 ,i append ,spinoza's list1 and print in italics the sentiments that appear to me to be emotions as distinguished from feelings4 ,desire--,pleasure--,pain--,wonder--,con tempt--,love--,hate-- ,inclination--,aversion--,devotion--,der ision--,hope--,fear-- ,confidence--,despair--,joy--,grief--,pi ty--,approval--,indignation-- ,overesteem--,disparagement--,envy--,mer cy 7or goodwill7--,self-contentment--,humility- -,repentance--,pride-- ,dejection--,honour--,shame--,regret--,e mulation--,thankfulness-- ,benevolence--,anger--,revenge--,cruelty --,daring--,cowardice-- ,consternation--,civility 7or deference7--,ambition--,luxury--,drunken ness--,avarice--,lust4 ,pollock's ,spinoza1 ch4 vii4 ,,generalisation ,,xii--,,nature ,,and ,,function ,general ,ideas are formed by the coincident imprint of several objects in some respects different1 but which have all a resemblance as objects1 and are besides the signs of the same sentimental effect4 ,if the effects are different the confusion of the objects occasions practical error1 as when we mistake one man for another whom he closely resembles4 ,though the sentimental utilities should be the same1 the object cannot be reduced to a common idea if they are quite dissimilar3 for example1 a sand-glass and a watch have similar uses1 but they cannot be generalized4 ,the value of generalisation to a thinker is that it economises memory and recollection by making one common or average idea do duty for many particular ideas4 ,let us follow the process in detail4 ,the first perception of an object leaves an imprint in the substance of the intellect4 ,a second perception partially resembling the first revives the first to the extent at least of the resemblance4 ,supposing this is done by a hundred similar objects it is plain that the resembling properties will have been experienced a hundred times1 whereas the distinguishing attributes may have been felt a few times only1 in some cases only once4 ,unless we have special reasons for observing the differences and so deepening the impressions of them1 they will fade from our memory at a rate corresponding to the paucity of experiences4 ,the most general idea will last longest because there the impression has been very deep4 ,our idea of ,man or ,animal will on this principle1 as it is found to do in fact1 outlast our memory of many concrete men and animals4 ,the objects that contribute to form a general idea or ,class are commonly said to 'belong to1' or to 'inhere in1' or to be 'brought under' the idea or class4 ,all these metaphors are wrong and occasion mistakes4 ,generalisation is nothing but condensed or epitomised recollection2 it is practised by ourselves for our own convenience1 and does not imply any essential or extra-personal relation between the objects4 ,we are free to classify things in any order we find useful4 ,a farmer's classification of some animals into cattle1 game1 fowls1 birds1 and vermin1 is perfectly legitimate1 for each species is based on a different utility for him4 ,we should distinguish general ideas which we ourselves have drawn from our primary experience1 from the ideas suggested by verbal definitions of general ideas formed by other minds4 ,supposing the objects in question to be quite unknown to us1 the definitional idea is more like a particular or imaginary idea than a general idea4 ,it is a single thin rigid idea1 utterly unlike the flexible suggestive thought evolved from a large mass of personal experience4 ,definitional general ideas are as unsatisfactory as described objects1 but we are sometimes compelled to use both when personal experience is totally wanting4 ,it is a common error to suppose that general ideas cannot exist in the intellect without words by which to name them4 ,words and other modes of marking ideas are useful in all departments of thought1 but not more necessary in general thought than in any other4 ,an active intellect makes thousands of observations and scores of general ideas which it may have no means or wish to express in language4 ,generalisation is very like the operation called composite photography4 ,a number of persons are posed in the same attitude and partially photographed on the same plate4 ,the result is an average or mean likeness of the whole group1 but not an exact portrait of any individual4 ,so general ideas are 'means' or 'averages' of many resembling but slightly differing objects4 ,there are other things in the photographic art remarkably similar to intellectual thinking4 ,the gelatine film behaves very like the mental plasma3 only one other physical object 7so far as ,i am aware7 is a better image of the plasm4 ,in theory the object or phenomenon has no importance4 ,even when it has the quality we call 'beauty1' that is not a property of the bare object1 for it is not seen by every person or animal with good eyesight2 it is a sentimental effect associated with the object4 ,hence we might1 if it were possible1 ignore all objects except those which have value to us as signs of sentimental effects4 ,but in practice we cannot do this4 ,objects are thrust upon our notice which we cannot avoid1 and which have no sentimental interest for us4 ,these objects are necessarily classified according to their phenomenal appearance only1 and such ideas lack an essential characteristic of true general ideas4 ,but we cannot prevent their formation in the mind1 for generalisation is merely a kind of abbreviated memory1 and1 objects being once perceived1 their recollection is to a great extent beyond our control4 ,artificial and adventitious utilities produce the same kind of one-sided generalisation4 ,if society pays a man in fame or money to observe and describe certain things1 his classification of them will be purely phenomenal4 ,he will classify dogs with wolves and nightshade with potato1 and will lump together the whole population of a country in one class1 although it consists of the most divers elements--fools and philosophers1 rogues and righteous1 saints and sinners1 patricians and plebeians4 ,these are differences much more important than sameness of nationality1 colour1 race1 or language4 ,this practice1 no doubt1 gives symmetrical classifications4 ,the greater classes are subdivided into subordinate classes1 and these again into lower classes in a many-stepped series4 ,gradation occurs also in true generalisation1 but not to the same extent4 ,if we confine our observation to things that are much like each other1 the average idea will not be greatly different from a particular idea3 this is called lowness in generality4 ,if we run together quadrupeds1 bipeds and fishes1 we shall have a much higher general idea3 the average will be very unlike any concrete animal4 ,the higher we generalise the smaller becomes the content of the idea1 but the wider its extension1 that is1 the realm of objects from which it has been drawn1 or which it is considered to represent4 ,the usual practice is to generalise by fine gradations4 ,get the general idea of sheep1 then of cow1 then of horse2 then average the averages4 ,the result is much the same if we run all the objects together and average them in one operation1 but the slower process gives the neater results4 ,the gradations of generality are distinguished by names such as 7beginning from below7 variety1 species1 genus1 class1 family1 kingdom4 ',conceptualism' is the metaphysical doctrine now prevalent with respect to general ideas4 ,they are regarded not as objects nor as essences1 but as forms of consciousness depending more or less on our own mental activity4 ,this is true enough so far as it goes1 but without a substantial plasm to hold the 'concept' its formation and endurance are quite inexplicable4 ,,xiii--,,matter ,matter is the name given to the most general idea we can form of objects4 ,it is supposed to cover all of them4 ,in other words1 the content or 'essence' of the idea is the attribute or attributes common to all objects without exception4 ,it is the universal objective minimum--the least objective experience consistent with the experience being objective4 ,some have attempted to define this general idea more precisely by identifying it with some abstract property such as extension1 resistance1 etc4 ,an object may be material without offering any resistance to human energy1 as a beam of light4 ,a material object may also be without extension1 as a sound or smell4 ,the only quality left to matter is bare objectivity1 namely1 that it is a form of consciousness excited in a mind by some other mind1 not occurring spontaneously4 ,this seems to me the only true connotation of matter4 ,matter is not the antithesis of mind2 it is a mere affection of mind4 ,the two are not in any proper sense co-ordinate or equipollent4 ,they are to each other somewhat in the relation of a mirror to an image reflected from it4 ,mind is to each of us a concrete primary experience--the feeling of personal power and identity4 ,matter is a general idea arising from the comparison of objects in consciousness4 ,no two things could well be more diverse4 ,since general ideas are products of our own mental energy1 and matter the most general of all1 it is the farthest removed from the concrete objective condition1 and so it is literally true that we never objectively perceive matter though we constantly perceive material objects4 ,it is as impossible to see1 touch1 or taste matter as it is to ride the general idea ,equus or dine off the general idea nourishment4 ,in denying the objectivity of matter we do not deny the objective reality of things3 we merely decline to confound a general idea with the objects that have contributed to form it4 ,we decline to be mystics1 in the sense defined by ,j4 ,s4 ,mill#aj4 ,the belief in the external existence of matter is a form of mysticism2 the ,hindus call it maya1 meaning illusion4 ,some metaphysicians argue that since phenomena appear only in conjunction1 we are compelled by the constitution of our nature to think of them conjoined in and by something1 and this imaginary foundation and cement is another meaning of the word 'matter4' ,for myself ,i feel no such compulsion4 ,when things are complex ,i recollect the several properties as cohering together1 and when ,i abstract one or some for special consideration1 ,i sometimes think of the others as forming a 'substance' in which the abstracted properties inhere4 ,but ,i cannot discover any inherence or coherence except the mutual1 and the notion of an invisible material setting which holds all the parts of a thing together seems to me superfluous and unwarranted4 ,if it existed it would not be1 as logicians argue1 something superior and antithetical to phenomena2 it would be simply an inferred or latent phenomenon like the luminiferous ether of science4 ,the material substance is evidently a groping of the mind after the noumenal 7mental7 substance which causes the appearance of objects4 ,,xiv--,,nominalism ,nominalists deny the existence of general ideas as distinct from particular ideas4 ,most of them affirm that we employ general or common words to signify the common properties of similar things1 but that we are incapable of thinking of these common properties apart from the other properties that accompany them4 ,why we should wish to use signs of things we cannot think about1 or how a word can be a 'sign' when we are incapable of attaching a definite meaning to it1 are points not satisfactorily cleared up by nominalists4 ,considering how well ,berkeley's principle1 combined with the plasmic theory1 accounts for generalisation1 and how inevitable it is that there should be general ideas distinguishable from particular ideas by superior brilliancy and endurance1 it is surprising to find in ,berkeley one of the most convinced and eloquent of nominalists4 ,his views on the subject have so much weight with philosophers that ,i must examine them at length4 ',it is agreed on all hands1' he writes in the ,introduction to his ,principles1 'that the qualities or modes of things do never really exist each of them apart by itself1 and separated from all others1 but are mixed1 as it were1 and blended together1 several in the same object4 ,but1 we are told1 the mind being able to consider each quality singly1 or abstracted from those other qualities with which it is united1 does by that means frame to itself abstract ideas4 ,for example1 there is perceived by sight an object extended1 coloured1 and moved3 this mixed or compound idea the mind resolving into its simple constituent parts1 and viewing each by itself1 exclusive of the rest1 does frame the abstract ideas of extension1 colour1 and motion4 ,not that it is possible for colour or motion to exist without extension2 but only that the mind can frame to itself by abstraction the idea of colour exclusive of extension1 and of motion exclusive of both colour and extension4' ,abstract ideas do not form a fourth class of ideas but are fractions of particular1 general1 or imaginary ideas1 and may 7as ,berkeley1 reporting the metaphysical doctrine1 says7 be single or partial properties mentally detached from the collective properties forming an object4 ,in this case they are abstracted properties1 not ideas4 ,since general ideas are less complete than the particular ideas from which they were drawn1 they are abstract ideas in so far as they are partial ideas2 but all abstract ideas are not general ideas4 ,berkeley's nominalism is based on the supposed impossibility of forming any sort of partial idea1 and he now proceeds to reproduce the metaphysical account of the general abstract idea4 ',and as the mind frames to itself abstract ideas of qualities or modes1 so does it1 by the same precision or mental separation1 attain abstract ideas general ideas of the more compounded beings which include several co-existent qualities4 ,for example1 the mind having observed that ,peter1 ,james1 and ,john resemble each other in certain common agreements of shape and other qualities1 leaves out of the complex or compounded idea it has of ,peter1 ,james1 and any other particular man1 that which is peculiar to each1 retaining only what is common to all1 and so makes an abstract general idea wherein all the particulars equally partake--abstracting entirely from and cutting off those circumstances and differences which might determine it to any particular existence4 ,and after this manner it is said we come by the abstract general idea of man1 or1 if you please1 humanity or human nature2 wherein it is true there is included colour1 because there is no man but has some colour1 but then it can be neither white1 nor black1 nor any particular colour1 because there is no one particular colour wherein all men partake4 ,so likewise there is included stature1 but then it is neither tall stature1 nor low stature1 nor yet middle stature1 but something abstracted from all these4 ,and so of the rest4 ,moreover1 there being a great variety of other creatures that partake of some parts1 but not all1 of the complex idea of man1 the mind1 leaving out those parts which are peculiar to men1 and retaining those only which are common to all the living creatures1 frames the idea of animal1 which abstracts not only from all particular men1 but also all birds1 beasts1 fishes and insects4 ,the constituent parts of the abstract idea of animal are body1 life1 sense1 and spontaneous motion4 ,by body is meant body without any particular shape or figure1 there being no one shape or figure common to all animals1 without covering either of hair1 or feathers1 or scales1 c41 nor yet naked3 hair1 feathers1 scales1 and nakedness being the distinguishing properties of particular animals1 and for that reason left out of the abstract general idea4 ,upon the same account the spontaneous motion must be neither walking1 nor flying1 nor creeping2 it is nevertheless a motion1 but what that motion is it is not easy to conceive4' ,this is a fair paraphrase of the accounts given by metaphysicians of the manner of forming general ideas4 ,it is also in itself a perfectly correct account of the process1 considered simply as a manifestation of consciousness or a succession of states of consciousness1 that is1 apart from the substantial plasmic operation of which it is merely the symptom4 ,berkeley however denies that it is a true statement of what takes place in the mind of consciousness4 ',whether others have this wonderful faculty of abstracting their ideas1 they best can tell2 for myself1 ,i find indeed ,i have a faculty of imagining or representing to myself1 the ideas of those particular things ,i have perceived1 and of variously compounding and dividing them4 ,i can imagine a man with two heads1 or the upper parts of a man joined to the body of a horse4 ,i can consider the hand1 the eye1 the nose each by itself abstracted or separated from the rest of the body4 ,but then1 whatever hand or eye ,i imagine1 it must have some particular shape or colour4 ,likewise the idea of man that ,i frame to myself must be either of a white1 or a black1 or a tawny1 a straight1 or a crooked1 a tall1 or a low1 or a middle-sized man4 ,i cannot by any effort of thought conceive the abstract idea above described4 ,and it is equally impossible for me to form the abstract idea of motion distinct from the body moving1 and which is neither swift nor slow1 curvilinear nor rectilinear2 and the like may be said of all other abstract general ideas whatsoever4 ,to be plain1 ,i own myself able to abstract in one sense1 as when ,i consider some particular parts or qualities separated from others1 and which1 though they are united in some object1 yet it is possible they may really exist without them4 ,but ,i deny that ,i can abstract from one another1 or conceive separately1 those qualities which it is impossible should exist so separated2 or that ,i can form a general notion1 by abstracting from particulars in the manner aforesaid--which last are the two proper acceptations of abstraction4 ,and there is ground to think most men will acknowledge themselves to be in my case4 ,the generality of men which are simple and illiterate never pretend to abstract notions general ideas4 ,it is said they are difficult and not to be attained without pains and study2 we may therefore reasonably conclude that1 if such there be1 they are confined only to the learned4' ,it is quite true that 'the simple and illiterate never pretend to abstract notions1' for the sufficient reason that they do not know the names of their mental operations1 even if they are capable of discriminating them4 ,for the same reason they do not pretend to talk prose or to be realists4 ,the practice of every profession and craft1 even the humblest1 involves abstraction and generalisation4 ,the objective properties associated with a given utility have to be abstracted from those which are indifferent1 and this is what enables men of experience in any branch of industry or art to form a speedy judgment on matters touching their special affairs4 ,it is in part what distinguishes the 'professional' from the 'amateur4' ,berkeley's disclaimer of any power in himself to form general ideas is no doubt sincere1 and he is justified in reasoning from himself to others4 ,but the point at issue is1 whether ,berkeley in this instance correctly analysed his own mental processes4 ,the fact that he was correct in some points of great importance does not preclude us from surmising that he may have been wrong in others of less importance4 ,in comparison with his discovery of the substantiality of mind1 his oversight on the subject of abstraction is a bagatelle4 ,he explains the existence of general words on the theory that they are names of particular ideas which we use to represent all similar ideas4 '444 an idea which1 considered in itself1 is particular1 becomes general by being made to represent or stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort4 ,to make this plain by an example1 suppose a geometrician is demonstrating the method of cutting a line in two equal parts4 ,he draws1 for instance1 a black line of one inch in length3 this1 which in itself is a particular line1 is nevertheless with regard to its signification general1 since1 as it is there used1 it represents all particular lines whatsoever2 so that what is demonstrated of it is demonstrated of all lines1 or1 in other words1 of a line in general4 ,and1 as that particular line becomes general by being made a sign1 so the name line1 which taken absolutely is particular1 by being a sign is made general4 ,and as the former owes its generality not to its being the sign of an abstract or general line1 but of all particular right lines that may possibly exist1 so the latter must be thought to derive its generality from the same cause1 namely1 the various particular lines which it indifferently denotes4' ,these extracts will suffice to show what was ,berkeley's doctrine on the subject of general ideas4 ,with respect to the analogy supposed to exist between the generality of a name and the generality of a general idea1 it has to be observed that a name owes its generality solely to its being the sign of a general idea4 ,it is an imputed or conventional generality1--in its proper character a general name is concrete and individual4 ,also it does not resemble the thing it signifies 7the general idea71 nor the concrete things from which that has been derived4 ,the generality of a general idea1 on the other hand1 depends altogether on its resemblance to many particular things4 ,it is independent of convention4 ,hence there is no real analogy between the two generalities4 ,considering that ,berkeley professes himself unable to imagine abstract properties1 it is surprising how easily and naturally he writes about geometrical lines--which are abstract properties4 ,probably he means concrete strokes4 ,what sort of representation can subsist between one concrete stroke and every other concrete stroke8 ,if it is straight it will not correctly represent a curve2 if it is curved it will not represent a straight stroke4 ,a stroke an inch long cannot stand for a stroke a hundred miles long2 a black stroke does not properly represent a red stroke4 ,so it is incorrect to say that 'what is demonstrated of it is demonstrated of all strokes1 or1 in other words1 of a stroke in general4' ,a particular object can stand only for itself1 and if general words stand for many things it is not by direct representation1 but because they first suggest general ideas1 which are the true substitutes of many particular things4 ,a reference to geometrical objects1 themselves so abstract1 is a doubtful mode of showing how well one concrete thing can represent others4 ,had ,berkeley taken a more complex object as his general representative he would have seen the weakness of his argument4 ,suppose a biologist has to discourse on a province of animal life comprising many species1 and takes an individual of one species as a representative of the whole4 ,his sample is perhaps a hare1 but he has to treat of birds and fishes4 ,what is to prevent his hearers from concluding that birds are furred animals and fishes quadrupeds8 ,are they to be expected to see in the hare only the properties common to all the animals reviewed8 ,if so they have the power denied them by nominalists of forming a pure general idea1 and the hare is superfluous4 ,the common properties could have been defined and imagined without a concrete specimen1 with irrelevant attributes1 being brought into the discourse4 ,all nominalists insist that if we think long on a general idea it becomes particular1 and from this they argue that it is not1 and never has been1 a general idea#aa4 ,the experiments of this sort proposed by logicians are misleading1 because we are without the ordinary motives for thinking generally4 ,in practical thought we have some sufficient reason for attending to a fraction of consciousness and excluding the rest1 and the irrelevant qualities are distinctly less charged with attention than the principal quality4 ,the power of abstracting thought is a matter of education4 ,it is that ruling of the spirit which is more difficult than the capture of a city4 ,we have to master the restless energic ,self and fix it down on a particular plasmic figure1 or a mere point or edge of one1 preventing the energy from spreading to adjacent images4 ,that is irksome and fatiguing1 but it is only a high degree of the faculty everyone possesses of distinguishing particular objects from each other4 ,some minds are so flaccid that you cannot hold them to one subject1 even the most particular and obvious1 for five minutes at a time4 ,training enables us to bring into the focus of attention just what we wish to observe or think about1 and leave the rest in the background1 however closely it may be connected with the matter that immediately interests us4 ,but for this power much of our energy would be expended to no purpose4 ,abstraction is simply attention of a minute and concentrated kind--a bringing of our energy of observation or recollection to a fine point4 ,when abstraction need not be prolonged--when we are free to pass rapidly from one general or abstract idea to another--there is no difficulty in partial thinking4 ,we skim over the plasmic imprints1 lightly brushing the surface of each where it is most prominent and therefore most general1 but not pausing to recollect particulars4 ,it is this rapid delicate touch we oftenest use in actual thought2 but when for purposes of experiment we come down heavily on an imprint1 then the ,self overflows to adjacent channels and particular memories are stirred up1 in spite of every effort to limit our attention4 ,so common and easy is rapid general thought that it is constantly used as a substitute for concrete thought1 when a sketchy treatment of things is all that is wanted4 ',a bird has alighted on the fence4' ,the speaker saw a particular concrete bird1 and might have tried to describe it in the concrete4 ,but the attributes that rendered it concrete are supposed not to be of present importance1 and the hearer is consequently invited to think only of bird in general4 ,would a nominalist affirm that in such a case the words are meaningless unless the idea is concreted--unless the general sketch is filled out in detail8 ,take another example4 ',the man sat by the window overlooking the river that flowed towards the city4' ,here all the nouns are general1 but the picture is individual and concrete4 ,it is also quite intelligible1 as a sketch4 ,we can think of a man without assigning to him any particular type of face1 or colour of hair1 or stature1 or age1 or clothing4 ,our idea is the general idea man used as a sketch of a particular man4 ,he is in a house because he is looking through a window1 but we do not stay to imagine the house as cottage1 inn1 or mansion4 ,we call up the general idea house1 which is definite enough for our purpose1 and we cannot doubt for a moment that we have such a general idea4 ,the river may be wide or narrow1 straight or crooked1 navigable or not1 but we think only of the general idea river1 which is water flowing between banks4 ,and surely we can imagine a general city without giving it any definite size1 or form1 or nationality1 or number of inhabitants6 ,these considerations clearly demonstrate that we have general ideas1 which are not merely concrete ideas used as examples1 and if we can employ them in the manner just indicated1 where a light superficial recollection is all that is necessary1 we can equally well use them in their more legitimate character1 as signs of certain general utilities4 ,,xv--,,errors ,,with ,,respect ,,to ,,generalisation ,generalisation has been the bane of ,european philosophy4 ,it has monopolised well-nigh the whole metaphysical attention4 ,it has been considered the radical fact of mind from which all others have grown1 whereas it is no more than a method for abbreviating recollection4 ,it neither reveals to us new things1 nor reduces the multiplicity of things actually existing4 ,plato insisted on the importance of general thought as against the fluctional idealism of ,heraclitus1 but he was wholly mistaken as to the nature of general ideas4 ,he thought they were external objects--also types and causes of primary objects4 ,but patterns are not causes1 and general ideas are quite obviously suggested by things1 not things derived from general ideas4 ,the notion that the general idea is either the cause1 or an image and revelation of the cause1 of things is an error of perennial recurrence4 ,in some form or other it is always with us4 ,plato also taught that general ideas are recollections of knowledge acquired in the condition prior to embodiment1 which the objective experience of this life serves to revive4 ,these several doctrines are somewhat inconsistent with each other4 ,the last is interesting but lacks confirmation4 ,aristotle admitted the superiority of general over particular ideas1 and thought that the former corresponded to some specially important part of objects called the 'essence4' ,this is nearer the truth4 ,the essence of an object is that part of it1 which being present1 a given sentimental result follows1 or may be expected to follow1 or may be made to follow4 ,a certain experience of things is necessary before we can know what is the objective minimum consistent with some sentimental utility4 ,if things are classified with due regard to their utilities1 the essence will be the same as the general idea4 ,it is however not true that the essence or any other part of the object causes the sentimental effect 7,,vii74 ,a common form of the generalistic superstition is to suppose that a thing is explained or sufficiently accounted for by classifying it4 ,in all philosophies of ,greek derivation--the ,asiatic seem to be free from this defect--reason is considered to be 'the bringing of a thing under a class-notion1' and when this is done we are supposed to know the thing completely4 ,an elaborate and utterly false dialectic has been erected on this foundation4 ,no doubt our first attempt at explaining a thing is to refer it to a general idea--to classify it4 ,this usually suggests something to add to the bare phenomenon by way of explanation or hypothesis4 ,but only if we have a prior knowledge of the general idea1 derived from things better known than the present phenomenon4 ,the general idea is simply a short formula of that prior knowledge4 ,suppose we thoroughly know a body of similar things a1 b1 c1 and also reduce them to the general image ,x2 then on seeing d and noticing that it is like a1 b1 c1 we briefly think1 ',oh1 it is ,x1' which excuses us from studying it further4 ,we at once transfer to d our whole knowledge of a1 b1 c1 and in this ideal transfer the explanation consists--not in the classification4 ,the transfer is often tacit--if explicit it is an 'argument4' ,if there has been no better known a1 b1 c1 it is evident that the mere generalisation of new facts d1 e1 f1 will not add anything to our knowledge of them4 ,in deduction we should only return to them the knowledge just extracted from them4 ,we should be explaining things by themselves--reasoning in a circle#ab4 ,the unity1 which explains is not the general idea4 ,it is a unity of function or service1 and may include things utterly heterogeneous1 and therefore incapable of being reduced to a common idea4 ,the pen in my hand consists of wood and metal2 if ,i generalise them into ,matter--the nearest class that includes both--,i do not thereby explain the pen4 ,but it is explained by the unity of service3 the wood and metal contribute to form one instrument for writing4 ,the best results of modern science are discoveries of utilities 7inventions72 discoveries of the relations of sequence among objects1 which enable us to predict their arrival years in advance2 of coexistences on the great cosmic scale 7geographical and stellar exploration72 of co-inherence of properties in individual objects 7chemistry74 ,yet science is still too generalistic4 ,it runs too much to classification and nomenclature1 which is nothing but memoria technica4 ,modern biology presents a curious return of ,platonism4 ,the general idea is not indeed put forward as the cause of individuals1 but a particular concrete animal is found who closely resembles the general idea1 and it is imagined that an animal like him was the original cause of all animals of his species4 ,when it happens--as it occasionally must in a thorough-going system of phenomenal classification--that the average or general idea falls between two species1 no individual can be found to represent it with the desired exactness4 ,in this case it is supposed by evolutionists that the intermediate animal has existed but is now extinct4 ,these are the 'missing links' so badly wanted to complete the evolutionary scheme4 ,footnote #aj3 ',mysticism is neither more nor less than ascribing objective existence to the subjective creations of our own faculties1 to ideas or feelings of the mind4'--,logic1 chapter on ',fallacies4' ,footnote #aa3 ,with equal plausibility it might be argued that we have no particular ideas1 because it is difficult if not impossible to observe and remember all the details of any object4 ,our most particular ideas are slightly abstract1 and in the process of forgetting they become more and more abstract1 until they disappear altogether4 ,footnote #ab3 ,mill's nominalistic tendencies led him to the same conclusion3 ',our general ideas contain nothing but what has been put into them1 either by our passive experience1 or by our active habits of thought2 and the metaphysicians in all ages1 who have attempted to construct the laws of the universe by reasoning from our supposed necessities of thought1 have always proceeded1 and only could proceed1 by laboriously finding in their own minds what they themselves had formerly put there1 and evolving from their ideas of things what they had first involved in those ideas4'--,logic1 ,bk4 ,v4 c4 #c4 #c4 ,,imagination ,,xvi ,this faculty or habit consists essentially in combining ideas 7particular or general71 or objects and ideas1 so as to form systems different from those occurring in actual experience4 ,the whole has never been perceived1 though all its elements have been perceived4 ,any association of ideas may be called imaginary if it occurs in an order different from the order of experience4 ,but the term ,imagination is properly confined to novel combinations deliberately and consciously formed to serve some utility4 ,it is thus distinguished from ,reverie1 in which no choice or control enters into the recollection4 ,we control our ideal associations by means of comparison1 which is therefore what distinguishes imagination from reverie4 ,for instance1 if ,i see a vase from which the handle has been broken off1 ,i can imagine the handle restored1 but to do this ,i must be able to compare the broken vase with a similar whole vase1 or with the general idea 'whole vase4' ,the combination ,i form is novel1 for ,i have never seen this particular vase in a whole state2 if ,i had ,i should not be imagining it but recollecting it4 ,there are two principal distinctions to be noticed in imagination2 one relates to the mode of forming the imaginary idea1 the other to its use4 ,in the above case we form the whole by mechanical extension or addition4 ,the process is as simple as nailing one piece of wood to another4 ,but suppose the broken vase is of porcelain and the whole one of bronze1 the restoration can still be made1 but it is no mechanical junction of two previous ideas4 ,it is a fusion of the material supplied by one idea with a form supplied by another4 ,on the same principle a vase may be wholly designed from hints supplied by a score or more of vases1 differing in material1 in size1 colour1 decoration1 and so forth4 ,in these cases the new idea may be said to be totally different throughout its length from any other and from any object4 ,yet it is a combination of previous ideas4 ,we do not create any absolutely new idea4 ,this may be called imagination by transfusion4 ,the elements may be so well mixed that it is impossible to trace each back to its origin4 ,transfusion may be further complicated by recompounding ideas already compound4 ,this occurs1 as we shall see1 in forming the 'external world' of materialists and realists4 ,the two uses to which imaginary ideas are put are the ,artistic and the ,rational4 ,we have seen 7,x7 that emotions may be excited by objects or ideas4 ,hence1 agreeable emotions may be excited by suggesting the objects associated with the original agreeable feelings2 and novel emotions may be excited by novel combinations of the ideas of experienced objects that have been signs of feelings4 ,from this possibility has arisen that extensive province of activity called ,,art1 which consists in imagining novel combinations of things capable of exciting novel and pleasurable emotions 7not feelings71 and in finding means of suggesting such ideas to others4 ,some of these combinations are so subtle1 and the emotions they excite so exquisite1 that we value the artistic work at a great price1 and rank the man who imagined it among the benefactors of his species4 ,,reason1 or the ,rational ,imagination1 does not appeal directly to the emotions4 ,it serves the uses of life by enabling us to imagine what we have not yet experienced but may have to experience1 and the quality aimed at is accuracy of intellectual ideation1 not emotional pleasure4 ,it is found by experience that an intellect well furnished with ideas may learn to combine them into pictures or preconceptions of the future1 and the indirect utility of this accomplishment is very great4 ,if it does not1 like art1 give immediate sentimental pleasure1 it often enables us so to control events that we are brought into conditions affording more lasting satisfaction than many expensive works of art4 ,reason1 then1 is the imaginative faculty applied to the purpose of acquiring ideas of experience that has not yet taken place1 and it is good in proportion to the similarity of the idea to the anticipated or unknown experience4 ,although imagination is more important than generalisation1 it has received little attention from metaphysicians4 ,their treatment of it is not uniform1 but it generally exhibits two fundamental defects4 ,they consider it an independent or ultimate faculty1 that is1 one incapable of resolution into anything more simple4 ,we have seen that it is an application of comparison1 and comparison depends on the coincidence of particular ideas4 ,then they regard imagination only in its artistic uses1 not perceiving that it is also the basis of reason4 ,reason they treat as generalisation--a vice that pervades all their systems4 ,they put reason and art in essential opposition1 whereas the difference between them is only specific--a difference of use4 ,some metaphysicians confound imagination with mere recollection4 ',it is1' says one of them1 'the faculty representative of the phenomena both of the external and internal worlds4' ,but there is a great difference between the representation of what we have experienced actually1 and the representation of a future and perhaps impossible event3 the latter only is imaginative4 ',there is no train of ideas1' says another1 'to which the term imagination may not be applied4' ,if a man at the end of the day calls to mind all the events of the day in a train of ideas1 that is recollection1 and would be very inappropriately termed imagination4 ,according to a third1 imagination has for its object the concrete as opposed to abstractions and generalities4 ,this also is inexact4 ,a traveller may describe in general the qualities of a foreign country or tribe of men1 and we shall imagine that generality without a concrete picture4 ,the power of imagining generalities and abstractions necessarily follows from the power of forming them in the first instance4 ,,dialectic ,,xvii--,,its ,,scope ,the derivation of ,reason as given in the preceding sections may be summed up thus3--the meeting of ,minds gives ,perception or primary experience2 ,attention selects therefrom objects of special interest to the observer2 ,memory retains impressions of these in the mental plasma1 by which ideas of them are recollected though the originating mind be not present2 community with divergence of imprint gives rise to ,comparison2 from this are derived ,imagination and ,generalisation2 from imagination emerge ,reason and ,art4 ,generalisation is thus only a collateral relation of reason1 not its immediate parent nor in the direct line of descent4 ,it is not essential to reason1 but may enter as a subsidiary process into an argument4 ,if the things we argue about are numerous it will be more correct to generalise them and then argue from the general idea1 than to argue from one concrete object to another4 ,but innumerable inferences are drawn from one particular thing to another1 and these involve no generalisation4 ,reason is chiefly the art of predicting by means of the intellect what will occur to us in the future4 ,its use is to enable us to prepare for future events in so far as our resources permit4 ,we never predict quite accurately1 but general preconceptions are better than none at all4 ,the same process by which we preconceive the future can be applied to the conception of what is actually taking place but not within our ken--as at the antipodes--and can be applied also to events that took place in the past and will never be experienced by us4 ,it might be objected that as regards the past we can have no motive in imagining it1 seeing we can never experience it4 ,but a conception of the past is often a necessary condition of our conceiving the future1 and is artistically interesting4 ,it awakens pleasing emotions to be able to picture to ourselves1 even imperfectly1 states of the world and of society that have long been obsolete4 ,an investigation of the manner in which reason supplies us with ideas of the unknown1 involves the consideration and arrangement of so many details that it may be regarded as a small science in itself--,,dialectic4 ,a dialectician 7logician in the narrower sense7 is neither a grammarian nor an encyclopedia of the best information on every subject4 ,his office consists in deciding whether certain theorems are arguments or not4 ,an ,,argument is an act or product of rational imagination4 ,theorems which purport to be arguments1 but are not1 are ,,fallacies4 ,a fallacy is not merely a bad argument--it is no argument at all4 ,quite apart from fallacy there is a goodness and badness in arguments1 but with this discrimination the dialectician 7as such7 has nothing to do4 ,only persons experienced in the matter are competent to decide between good and bad arguments4 ,hence when the quality of an argument is in question the dialectician takes no part in the debate3 he is neither combatant nor umpire4 ,he is at most an impartial president whose chief duty is to see that people do not debate about mere words and foregone conclusions4 ,granting that a theorem has the qualities of an argument1 the dialectician is not competent to say that it is improper or too trivial to be discussed4 ,he is not a judge of what people ought to be interested in4 ,from his better knowledge of what constitutes rational prediction1 a dialectician may offer his services to disentangle and render explicit involved and partial arguments4 ,many people reason well who are yet unable to express themselves coherently4 ,a dialectician should be able to reconstruct an argument from the slightest hint1 as a naturalist imagines an animal from a single bone4 ,in ordinary reasoning the arguments are seldom fully expressed1 and the reasoners themselves are not always quite conscious of the premises from which they argue4 ,all such suppressed and overlooked assumptions should be brought to light by dialectic1 the aim of which is to render reason as self-conscious as possible4 ,though a dialectician need not be an expert in any department of knowledge1 he must know the facts on which an argument is built1 otherwise he may be deceived by equivocal language4 ,reverting to the instance of the vase--the dialectician must have seen both the whole vase and the broken vase1 but he need not have any opinion as to whether the proposed handle is the most suitable1 or not4 ,that must be left to those who are familiar with vases and who are interested in the restoration of the one in question4 ,the definition here given of the scope and office of dialectic may appear to some too modest4 ,but in reality there is a great deal involved in it4 ,philosophers have been discussing ,reason for twenty centuries or more1 and have not produced a satisfactory definition of it4 ,consequently they cannot decide with any confidence whether a theorem is an argument or a fallacy4 ,the cleverest of them give their sanction to theorems that are demonstrably fallacies4 ,they are evidently judging more by ear than by rule4 ,all this causes confusion of mind and waste of energy4 ,dialectic takes its general idea of reason from the higher analysis of logic1 and brings the general idea to bear on concrete arguments4 ,a dialectician makes a collection of theorems for study just as a botanist makes a collection of plants4 ,he sorts them out into convenient classes1 separates the valid or useful from the erroneous and misleading1 studies the relation of language to argument and the influence for good or ill that words have upon rational thought4 ,from the example of the vase cited above it will be seen that in every act of reason two principal things are requisite4 ,there must be something wholly known 7or comparatively well known7 and something less well known1 and the reasoning or argument consists in ideally completing the latter on the model of the former4 ,if we would predict the coming of a future season of the year we must have a picture in the mind of all the seasons in the order in which they occur4 ,if we would go straight to a place on the surface of the earth we must have a plan of the way in our imagination4 ,if we would predict the effect of a drug on an animal body we must have previously noticed the effect it has produced--and so on4 ,neither the mind nor intellect supplies spontaneously any of these models2 they are all formed out of actual experience remembered and recollected4 ,when they have been refined into extremely general ideas they are apt to be taken for innate tendencies of the intellect1 as ,kant erroneously thought4 ,they are not so2 all we know of the intellect is consistent with the belief that it begins with pure plasm without a trace of idea1 and is absolutely indifferent to the imprints it may receive4 ,doctrines of innate ideas--innate forms of thought or categories--innate 'principles' of various kinds--are devices of metaphysicians to cover the weakness of their theories4 ,the two main parts of an argument divide naturally into four subdivisions4 ,there is the thing argued about 7corresponding to the broken vase72 there is the ideal extension or restoration2 in the model we reason from there are the parts corresponding to each of these4 ,i propose to take terms for these four parts from one of the most important1 formal and correct modes of reasoning--the application of a precedent or statute to a case in ,law4 ,,xviii--,,the ,,rational ,,parallel ,every argument1 whatever be the matter of it1 consists in bringing a ,case under a ,precedent1 and applying to the case ideally the better knowledge possessed of the precedent4 ,the ,conclusion 7also called ,inference or ,deduction7 is the result of this application1 and is always an addition to our stock of ideas4 ,a conclusion has never the same reality as actual experience4 ,it is not 'true' in that sense1 though it may be 'morally' true1 that is1 we are ready to act upon it without hesitation--to stake our life or fortune on it4 ,as regards actual or experienced fact there can be no argument1 since it is useless to 'predict' what we already know4 ,academical logicians have a doctrine the reverse of this4 ,they assert that their syllogisms yield conclusions that are always as certain as the premises4 ,grant their premises and you are obliged to accept their conclusions4 ,this is so1 because a regular syllogistic conclusion is simply a restating in other words of the information1 or part of the information1 already contained in the premises4 ,if the syllogism has any use at all1 it is merely as an aid to recollection2 no new idea is generated by it4 ,it is needless to insist on a fact so notorious as that ordinary rational conclusions--those that form the staple of our daily thought--are not by any means so certain as the data from which they are drawn4 ,for example1 the sky is red and lowering this evening1 and we conclude therefrom that the weather will be bad to-morrow4 ,there is no doubt about the present aspect of the sky1 but much doubt about the inference4 ,the form of an act of reasoning or argumentation may be rendered plainer by a diagram4 ,s ,a --- --- ,c ,i --- --- ,s ,a represents the precedent4 ,s is the ,subject or body of the precedent2 ,a 7the ,applicate7 is one property1 or a part1 or a relation of ,s abstracted from the rest to illustrate a case4 ,c is the case2 ,i is the conclusion 7or inference74 ,i results from imagining ,c to be associated with a property or relation similar to ,a4 ,the sum of our ,i's constitutes what we know of the world and man before we were born1 of what is taking place in other parts of the world or universe1 of what may take place in the future1 and of the concealed and inaccessible parts of present objects4 ,this is true not only of the results of our own reasoning but of what we have learned as verified knowledge from others1 for the interpretation of language is1 in the last analysis1 a rational conclusion4 ,all the parts of an argument exist in the mind1 but they are not always expressed in language4 ,when treated dialectically the implicit members are expressed1 and the terms arranged so as to show as clearly as possible the nature of the argument4 ,the following are the points most necessary to be observed in constructing or analysing an argument4 7#a7 ,c must resemble ,s1 for that is the basis of the argument4 ,if ,c is not felt to be like ,s1 or 7as sometimes happens7 is explicitly declared to be unlike ,s1 there can be no conclusion4 ,the precedent is not applicable to the case4 ,a may1 or may not1 be associated with ,s2 that is to say1 a verbal negation may appear in the statement of the relation of ,s to ,a1 but there must be no negation with respect to the relation of ,c to ,s4 ,the resemblance of ,c to ,s may1 however1 vary in degree from the faintest analogy to community of species4 ,the difference between them may far outweigh their resemblance4 ,there may even be no material likeness1 but only a similarity of function1 or position1 or of any the most trivial attribute4 ,only it is to be observed that the kind and degree of resemblance between ,s and ,c determine the kind and degree of resemblance between ,a and ,i4 ,we must not infer specifically unless the case is specifically like the precedent4 ,in all other instances we can only infer proportionally or by transfusion4 7#b7 ,none of the antecedents must be a verbal or identical proposition1 that is1 a proposition which merely substitutes one name or nominal phrase for another2 nor must the case be merely the precedent expressed in other words1 or the precedent a paraphrase of the case4 ,in any of these circumstances one of the elements of the argument is wanting2 we have two names for one thing or two propositions giving the same information4 7#c7 ,the precedent may 7as has been already remarked7 be a general idea1 or may be an individual idea or object4 ,if ,s ,a has occurred frequently it is certain to be generalised1 and so may form a maxim1 a law1 a rule1 an induction1 c4 ,but one well-observed precedent is enough to suggest a conclusion1 if there has been no experience to the contrary4 ,there is therefore no dialectical difference between arguing from a general idea 7class notion7 to an individual or subordinate idea1 and arguing from one individual to another4 ,comparison and inference occur in both4 7#d7 ,after separating ,a from ,s care should be taken that it is ,a and not ,s that is used to generate ,i4 ,examples are plentiful of theorems in which ,s and ,a change parts1 which invalidates the conclusion4 ,other errors in stating theorems intended to be arguments will be noticed under the head of ',fallacies4' ,the following is an argument conformable to the above rules4 ,tyrants deserve death ---------------------------------------- --------- ,caesar was a tyrant no doubt he deserved death ,this square mode of stating the argument is adapted from the general type1 and brings out the mutual relations of the compared parts better than the three-lined arrangement4 ,the word 'therefore1' which usually introduces a logical conclusion1 is ambiguous4 ,it may mean that the antecedents are the causes of the fact mentioned in the conclusion1 or merely that the antecedents are the reasons why we believe the conclusion4 ,the former is the scientific 'therefore1' the latter is the purely dialectical4 ,i shall generally omit the illative word1 and print conclusions in italics1 besides entering them invariably in the fourth compartment of the parallel when this arrangement is adopted4 ,an idea once generated in the intellect is not to be erased at pleasure4 ,it can be obliterated only by the process of forgetting4 ,if after we have formed a dialectical conclusion we meet with evidence that contradicts it1 the only result of that evidence is to affix a mark of falsity to the conclusion1 so that as often as it is recollected the stigma is recollected too1 and neutralises the effect of the idea4 ,a negative or destructive argument is thus1 plasmically speaking1 a positive addition to the idea it seeks to efface4 ,for the time being it renders the idea more conspicuous1 as the word ,,cancelled stamped in large letters across a document makes it more evident than it was before2 but no doubt the stigmatising of an idea hastens the process of oblivion1 for we thenceforth bestow less attention upon it4 ,stigmatic arguments are not another species1 but merely the ordinary constructive arguments used for a particular purpose4 ,suppose we have inferred from the general resemblance of the earth to the moon that the latter is inhabited1 we stigmatise this belief by such an argument as-- ,without air animals cannot live ---------------------------------------- ----------------------- ,there is no air in the moon there can be no life in the moon ,there is an exception to the rule that argument is superfluous when the speaker has already verified the conclusion4 ,it is when he is addressing a person who has not had the same experience as himself and who doubts his word4 ,the speaker may then resort to arguments drawn from antecedents recognised by the hearer1 if any such are applicable to the subject4 ,but a fact may be truly reported though neither the witness nor a sceptical hearer can find dialectical antecedents to prove it1 for there may be no relation between the fact in question and any prior knowledge they possess1 or they may not be able to find the relation4 ,this brings us again to that view of the intellect which represents it as artificial and limited by experience4 ,man is rational only on matters familiar to him2 in utterly novel circumstances he is irrational1 and must fall back for guidance on his general mental sentiment1 or the advice of persons more experienced than himself4 ,,xix--,,hypothetical ,,arguments ,it is allowable to imagine ourselves placed in circumstances not yet realised1 or in possession of information not yet acquired1 and to anticipate or rehearse the reasoning we should employ under the supposed conditions4 ,such arguments take in language a conditional or hypothetical phraseology4 ,the case may be entirely fictitious1 but ,i cannot find a valid instance of a whole precedent being fictitious4 ,its dubiety turns on our knowledge or ignorance of the applicate4 ,has a subject such or such an attribute8 ,then it may be applied to illustrate a certain case4 ',if it is true that ,damon and ,pythias are inseparable1 then ,pythias must be in town1 for ,i have just seen ,damon4' ,it is more often the case that is dubious4 ',if ,caius is a ,european he is white1 for all ,europeans are white4' ',if ,damon is in town ,pythias is in town1 for they are inseparable4' ',if ,i were you ,i should defer the voyage to the summer season1 as ,i have always found winter travelling disagreeable4' ,but the word 'if' does not always mark a hypothetical thought4 ,in the proposition1 'if children are neglected they will grow up ignorant1' we have a dogmatic or assertorial judgment--'neglected children grow up ignorant4' 7,bain47 ,the precedent may be suppressed in hypothetical as in dogmatic argument4 ',if the crops are good1 corn will be cheap' implies the unspoken precedent1 'good crops have been invariably followed by cheap corn4' ',if logic is useless it deserves to be neglected1' carries the mind to the more general thesis1 'all useless studies deserve to be neglected4' ',if ,great ,britain should be invaded the volunteers will be called out1' rests on the precedent judgment1 'it is the duty of the volunteer army to repel invaders4' ,arguments in which both applicate and case are hypothetical are so very dubious that they cannot be considered of any practical use4 ',if opium is poisonous1 and if this substance is opium1 you will be poisoned by taking this substance4' ,the ,aristotelian hypothetical is almost invariably a fallacy1 sometimes on more than one account4 ,it usually consists of--first1 a conditional or doubtful statement2 next1 a solution of the doubt by means of positive information2 finally and by way of inference the first statement is given without the doubt4 ,here is an example from ,jevons3 ',if the barometer is falling1 bad weather is coming2 but the barometer is falling2 therefore bad weather is coming4' ,where did the information that the barometer is falling come from8 ,if we knew it before uttering the first proposition1 we were affecting an ignorance that did not exist4 ,the second proposition takes away all occasion for argument2 it is an amendment of the first proposition1 and what we get from the theorem as a whole is a case1 followed by a prediction for which there is no precedent justification4 ,we are arguing in a circle4 ',if ,aristotle is right1 slavery is a proper form of society2 but slavery is not a proper form of society2 therefore ,aristotle is not right4' ,if we knew for certain 7as the second proposition indicates7 that slavery is not a proper form of society1 what is the use or meaning of treating the question as hypothetical 7as is done in the first78 ,if we acquired the information after uttering the first proposition1 there was no occasion to go on with the argument2 we should have said simply1 ',slavery is not a proper form of society1 though ,aristotle said it was4' ,it is needless1 except for verbal completeness1 to say 'he was not right'--we have logically said so4 ,when two or more alternative data are presented1 of which only one is valid or relevant to a proposed argument1 but we know not at first which the valid datum is1 we have the dilemma 7trilemma1 tetralemma1 c47 of logicians4 ,in such conditions we have a double process to go through2 we must first settle by observation or by an auxiliary argument which of the alternative data to select1 and then work out the principal argument in the regular dogmatic form4 ,suppose we have to determine dialectically the specific gravity of a piece of metal1 but do not know whether it is gold or gun-metal4 ,it is evident we must first somehow make up our mind as to its identity1 and then proceed on the usual method of argumentation4 ,the 'making up our mind' is probably itself an argument1 and might be of this character--',a piece of yellow metal stamped with what appears to be a hall-mark1 is more likely to be gold than gun-metal2 this piece of metal has traces of such a stamp2 so ,i conclude it is gold4' ,then we proceed to the principal question--',the specific gravity of gold is #aibf2 ,i have concluded that this object is gold2 ,i conclude further that it has a specific gravity of #aibf4' ,we may work out all the alternative conclusions first and fix on a datum afterwards1 as in deciding how we shall invest our money4 ',if ,i put my money in ,consols ,i shall have a small return with good security2 if ,i buy ,patagonian bonds ,i may have a large interest for a time1 but the security is bad4' ,the next thing to settle is whether in our experience or on accepted principles small profit with good security is1 or is not1 to be preferred to large profit and bad security3 having decided in favour of the former alternative1 we now choose our investment dogmatically--',a good security with small profit is to be preferred2 ,consols are of this character2 they are a suitable investment for me4' ,we may be unable to decide for any of the alternative data1 but we work out all the possible arguments as hypotheses1 and so are prepared in a degree for all the possible events4 ,a person is seen approaching our residence1 but we cannot discern whether it is ,a4 ,b41 who is a bore1 or ,c4 ,d41 who is an entertaining companion4 ,we argue rapidly--',if it is ,a4 ,b4 ,i shall have a bad half-hour1 for he always wearies me2 if it is ,c4 ,d4 ,i shall have an agreeable distraction1 for he is very amusing4' ,according to the syllogists1 the dilemmatic premises are a statement of alternative data and the choice of one of them1 and the inference is the rejection of the remainder3 or the rejection may be given as matter of fact and the selection as conclusion4 ,in neither case have we argument4 ,from the moment we select a datum the remaining data are of no import to us1 and they need not be mentioned4 ,the selection of one datum is logically identical with the rejection of the rest1 and this is therefore not a conclusion from that4--',do you take tea or coffee8'--',tea1 please4'--',then ,i conclude you do not take coffee4'--,a person who would 'conclude' in this fashion would be justly deemed irrational4 ,the choice of the tea is a fact1 and the rejection of the coffee is the same fact otherwise expressed1 so that the rejection cannot be a rational conclusion4--',my doctor sends me off every winter to ,nice1 ,algiers1 or ,egypt2 but ,i never go to ,algiers or ,egypt4'--,there is no occasion to say1 'therefore you go to ,nice'2 that has been already announced as a matter of fact and is not susceptible of inference4 ,for the sake of verbal emphasis we might remark1 ',so it is to ,nice you go'1 but this is not logically requisite4 ,whately's examples of this kind of theorem are exactly of the model just given4--',either the earth is eternal1 or the work of chance1 or the work of an intelligent ,being2 it is not eternal1 nor the work of chance1 therefore it is the work of an intelligent ,being4' ,this is put forward in all gravity as a specimen of reasoning4 ,it is plain that if we know the premises as matters of fact1 we also know the proposed conclusion as a matter of fact4 ,there is no occasion to reason about it4 ,the ,aristotelian hypothetical can be reduced to arithmetical subtraction4 ,suppose we put five balls into a bag and afterwards take out three without seeing the remainder3 is the judgment that two balls remain in the bag a logical inference8 ,no--it is matter of fact4 ,since we last perceived the objects they have undergone diminution1 but that does not confer on what is left of them the imaginary character proper to a rational conclusion4 ,what remains is as much fact--recollected but not imaginary fact--as before the subtraction4 ,whately's next example is--',it is either spring1 summer1 autumn1 or winter2 but it is neither spring nor summer2 therefore it is either autumn or winter4' ,this is aggravated fallacy4 ,not only is it mere subtraction1 but the remainder is perceived--not recollected1 as in the preceding case4 ,the actual season of the year is a known fact1 and is not rendered more certain by an inference drawn from the absence of some other season4 ,arguments have no validity as against matters of fact1 and add nothing to their authority4 ,fact is above1 and independent of1 argument4 ,the example just cited may be paralleled thus--',the cards in my hand are either spades1 hearts1 clubs1 or diamonds2 but they are neither spades nor hearts2 therefore they are either clubs or diamonds'4--,i see that they are either clubs or diamonds3 the perceptual judgment renders the rational--imaginary--judgment superfluous4 ,reason is intended to supplement experience--not to supersede it4 ,,xx--,,debate ,the purpose of debate is to determine the goodness or badness of an argument by general logical criticism and knowledge of the matter4 ,this is not dialectic1 but takes place after the dialectician has declared that a given theorem is valid argument4 ,if then its conclusion is repugnant to us we may seek to stigmatise it--or remove a stigma as the case may be--by going behind the argument to the composition of the judgments that enter into it4 ,let us take the case of ,caesar being proved to be a tyrant in a society that punishes tyranny with death4 ,there are two ways in which he may be saved or his punishment mitigated4 ,we are not bound to take the first precedent that is offered from which to generate a conclusion4 ,we grant that ,caesar resembles the general notion 'tyrant1' but we ask if he does not resemble in an equal or greater degree some other person or class in regard to whom capital punishment is no just treatment4 ,does he resemble a 'successful and patriotic general'--a 'benevolent monarch'--a 'wise legislator'--a 'virtuous man'8 ,all these resemblances are compatible with his being a tyrant in some senses of the word4 ,let us not condemn ,caesar for what may be a merely technical offence--the usurpation of authority--if in other respects he is an admirable man4 ,so an opportunity must be given to ,caesar or his advocate to suggest other precedents1 yielding a different conclusion1 by which to complete our imperfect knowledge of the case4 ,socrates1 when he was brought under the class 'perverters of youth'--which also yielded the conclusion 'death'--suggested as an amendment that he should be classed under 'national benefactors1' with the conclusion 'maintenance for life at the public expense4' ,it is not enough that we can say of a case that it 'is' this or that1 and so proceed to draw the conclusion bound up in that classification4 ',is' in the case means likeness to the precedent1 and one 'is' is good only when no better can be found4 ,if after having weighed the alternative precedents it appears clear that ,caesar resembles tyrants more than any other class of persons1 the prospect looks bad for him4 ,but there is still a chance of escaping the worst penalty4 ,it turns on the meaning of the word 'all1' which in logic generally introduces a proposition to which no exception has been found--the misnamed and misleading 'universal4' ,logicians do not hesitate to say that in this connection it means 'all possible1 known or unknown1 past or future individuals of the class4' ,they suppose1 or talk as if they supposed1 that at some fixed date in our life we enter into possession of our general ideas1 and that no subsequent experience can modify them4 ,hence the moment it is admitted that ,caesar is a tyrant1 he is supposed to come under the rule of a stereotyped general idea with inflexible consequences4 ,this is not quite so4 ',all' does not mean 'all possible' but 'all known up to the present time1 exclusive of the case under discussion4' ,our general or average ideas are the plasmic product of the individuals we have actually known--not a unit more4 ,and as that idea is liable to be modified by every new individual examined1 it is possible that on examining ,caesar we may find reason to change our general idea1 to the extent at least of dividing it into two species1 the tyrants who deserve death and the tyrants who deserve some milder punishment1 and that we shall resolve to bring ,caesar under the latter species4 ,thus if the idea threatens to hang ,caesar1 on the other hand ,caesar may burst the idea1 and his case establish itself as a new precedent4 ,that is how general ideas multiply--by a sort of fission4 ,in the proposition 'tyrants deserve death' as first proposed1 we are dealing with the old general idea1 and--as regards all individuals except those from which it was drawn--the proposition is little more than a hypothesis4 ,the idea is itself on trial4 ,until ,caesar is examined we do not fully know how the general tyrant is in future to be defined4 ,our examination of ,caesar is a part of our education on the subject of tyrants4 ,in judging we learn1 and the general idea which remains after ,caesar is examined is that by which he is to be judged4 ,if our idea of tyrant remains unshaken after the trial of ,caesar1 and if he is found to resemble that class more than any other1 then--and not till then--are we compelled to pass on him the judgment associated with the definition of tyrant4 ,an argument based on a particular or solitary precedent is criticised on the same principles4 ,we seek to prove either that the case is not sufficiently like the precedent to justify the application1 or that the applicate is not a property of the precedent4 ,if we make good either of these propositions1 we prevent the suggested conclusion from being fastened on the case4 ,the syllogistic dialecticians do not admit alternative precedents or reconstruction of general ideas3 their terms and figures are not adapted to express such notions4 ,hence they cannot evade a conclusion whose premises are correctly given4 ,they have an axiom to the effect that a judgment must be absolutely true or absolutely false--a door must be open or shut1 it cannot be ajar2 every colour is white or black1 it cannot be green or grey1 and so on4 ,now in practical reasoning we may and constantly do admit premises and reject the conclusions they dialectically involve4 ,we look at the question 'from another point of view4' ,this means that while admitting there is some ground for bringing a case under a certain precedent1 we contend that on the whole it is preferable to bring it under another precedent with a different conclusion4 ,the proposed handle may fit the vase somehow1 but we think another sort of handle will suit it better4 ,or--rather than accept an objectionable conclusion--we will divide our idea4 ,this is degree in truth4 ,and that is the elastic method on which we reason in actual affairs4 ,logicians give a false account of reason1 and so their systems are neglected and their authority is never recognised in real debates4 ,,categories ,,xxi--,,categories ,,of ,,substantialism1 ,,and ,,others ,a ,category is primarily a class of ,judgments4 ,since arguments are composed of judgments1 a category is also a class of arguments2 that is to say1 the argument follows the classification of the judgment4 ,this is not the practice of syllogists1 who have categories for judgments only1 the arguments being classified according to verbal expression4 ,i distinguish six categories--two ,natural and four ,artificial4 ,the judgments of a natural category concern experience presented in a synthesis whose composition is due to the noumenal mind2 the categories corresponding to this definition are-- ,inherence-- ,association4 ,an artificial category is so called because the synthesis is formed by the subjective mind4 ,the first category of this kind is ,perspection-- which is an artificial arrangement of objects according to a figurative interpretation of certain appearances they present4 ,the second artificial category ,i will call ,concretion-- as it is an ideal cohesion of experiences never wholly perceived at once4 ,these two categories are those chiefly responsible for the realistic mode of thought4 ,the third artificial category is that which is called in science causation1 but it is only ,sequence1-- that is1 a series of phenomena sufficiently coherent to afford a basis for inference1 but not necessarily or energically connected4 ,hume and others have conclusively proved that such phenomena are not causally related4 ,finally there is ,causation-- in the proper sense of the word1 that is1 the relation between energic mind and its effects4 ,this is the category of human affairs generally1 and of all the ,cosmic that we explain by analogy with the ,human4 ,it is the only exhaustive explanation of phenomena1 and so is the category which philosophy would substitute for the rest4 ,when we can truly resolve things into effects analogous to human actions1 we have reached the highest standpoint from which they can be viewed4 ,realistic anthropomorphism is the first and rudest explanation of things3 idealistic anthropomorphism is the last and most refined4 ,the artificial categories are all formed on analogies supplied by the natural1 since the intellect is incapable of imagining anything absolutely original4 ,each category may include judgments of other categories in a subordinate relation4 ,inherence and concretion enter to some extent as auxiliaries into all the others4 ,a group category may be treated as an individual object for certain purposes1 and an individual as a group of properties4 ,in the one case a fictitious unity is created1 in the other a real unity is imaginatively dissolved4 ,but in general the categories are sufficiently distinct and may be considered as mutually exclusive4 ,they will be separately analysed and exemplified4 ,the term category is used in common logic to signify the final classes into which judgments can be arranged4 ,to this minor use only is the category applied4 ,it does not either denote a classification of arguments or a distinct province of ideas whose origin and validity should be a matter of investigation4 ,in ,greek and modern logic arguments are distinguished solely by their verbal expression--never by the character of the judgment that enters into them4 ,treated in this superficial and haphazard way1 the categories necessarily play a quite insignificant part in philosophy4 ,the oldest known set of categories is that quoted by ,aristotle in his ,metaphysic as being held by a sect of ,pythagoreans4 ,it consists of the following series of contraries-- ,bound4 ,infinity4 ,odd4 ,even4 ,unity4 ,plurality4 ,right4 ,left4 ,male4 ,female4 ,rest4 ,motion4 ,straight4 ,crooked4 ,light4 ,darkness4 ,good4 ,bad4 ,square4 ,oblong4 ,aristotle's own categories are the following3-- 7#a7 ,essence or ,substance1 as man1 horse3 7#b7 ,quantity1 as two cubits long3 7#c7 ,quality1 as white1 erudite3 7#d7 ,relation1 as double1 half1 greater3 7#e7 ,place1 as in the ,agora3 7#f7 ,time1 as yesterday3 7#g7 ,posture1 as standing1 sitting3 7#h7 ,having 7,condition871 as to be shod1 armed3 7#i7 ,action1 as he is cutting1 burning3 7#aj7 ,passion1 as he is being cut4 ,this list can be reduced to one half the number4 ,quantity1 ,quality1 ,posture1 ,condition are kinds of ,attribute or ,property of the ,substance4 ,place and ,time are valid4 ,action and ,passion are both referable to causation4 ,non-causal sequence or consecution 7as day following night7--one of the commonest judgments--is not mentioned4 ,the ,stoics reduced ,aristotle's ten categories to four--,substratum or ,substance1 the ,essential ,quality1 ,manner of being1 and ,relation4 ,kan4da1 a ,hindu philosopher1 has six categories--,substance1 ,quality1 ,action1 ,genus1 ,individuality1 and ,concretion or ,co-inherence4 ,plotinus was acquainted with the ,aristotelian and ,stoic lists and offers as his own3--7#a7 ,fundamental forms of the ,ideal--,being1 ,rest1 ,motion1 ,identity1 ,difference2 7#b7 ,categories of the ,sensible--,substance1 ,relation1 ,quality1 ,quantity1 ,motion4 ,descartes recognised but two final categories1 the ,absolute and the ,relative4 ,kant has an elaborate scheme of categories1 which he considered to be1 not merely classes of judgments1 but innate power of the mind by which we are moved to form the judgments4 ,they are the following3-- ,i4 ,of ,quantity4 ,unity1 ,plurality1 ,totality4 ,,ii4 ,of ,quality4 ,reality1 ,negation1 ,limitation4 ,,iii4 ,of ,relation4 ,of ,inherence and ,subsistence 7substantia et accidens74 ,of ,causality and ,dependence 7cause and effect74 ,of ,community 7reciprocity between the active and the passive74 ,,iv4 ,of ,modality4 ,possibility1 ,impossibility1 ,existence1 ,non-existence1 ,necessity1 ,contingency4 ,sir ,william ,hamilton's categories were ,being1 ,being by itself1 and ,being by accident4 ,categories have also been proposed by ,spinoza1 ,locke1 ,wolff1 ,leibnitz1 ,herbart1 ,mill1 and others4 ,no two of them are alike4 ,they are not formed on any definite principle1 but are individual opinions as to the most convenient way to classify judgments#ac4 ,,xxii--,,inherence ,an object being given by perception we develop our knowledge of it1 first by narrowing our focus of attention so as to perceive parts and single attributes of the object2 next by widening our attention so as to include several objects in one view4 ,the first process is ,analysis or ,abstraction2 it informs us what attributes co-inhere to constitute the object4 ,the second is ,synthesis or ,grouping1 by which we learn the relations of one thing to others4 ,these operations comprise all we know about a thing1 for it can have no attributes which are not either internal or external4 ,practical analysis means cutting a thing to pieces or dissolving it1 and this has a certain value because it multiplies objects4 ,but it does not increase our knowledge of the first thing4 ,on the contrary1 by destroying a thing we render a knowledge of it impossible4 ,the analysis which gives knowledge is ,metaphysical ,abstraction--an attention concentrated on the parts of a thing without destroying their connection with the other inherent parts4 ,the metaphysical elements may be quite different from the mechanically divisible parts4 ,they are generally a species of things which could not exist alone1 such as red1 blue1 straight1 curved1 square1 round1 acid1 sweet1 insipid1 fragrant1 sharp1 hot1 heavy1 dull1 loud1 bright1 and a multitude of properties of that abstract kind4 ,for many of these--at least for the description of them--a comparison of two or more things is essential4 ,a sound is heard to be loud by comparison with another which is low or soft2 a knife is known to be blunt by experience of another more sharp1 or the same knife in a sharper condition4 ,but comparison does not alter the essential character of abstract attention--it serves merely as an incitement to it4 ,difference between qualities otherwise alike whets our attention to a finer discrimination4 ,the properties recognised by each sense are easily distinguished in the bulk from those of another sense4 ,colour is distinct from ,figure in a more marked degree than red from blue or square from circular4 ,fine degrees of ,sound may be difficult to discriminate1 but not the difference between a sound and a smell or a taste4 ,still broader contrasts give rise to an artificial but sometimes useful kind of attribution--the negative4 ,when we do not know much concerning the positive characteristics of a thing1 it is something to know that it has not this or that property4 ,what ,thought is1 positively1 few people know1 but they are able to say 7with a little prompting7 that it is un-extended1 im-material1 im-ponderable1 and so forth4 ,this comparison re-acts on the thing better known1 and so we call visual objects 'extended' from their dissimilarity to thoughts4 ,but for that there would have been no occasion to notice the abstract extension of visual objects4 ,the term 'visual object' would have tacitly included extension4 ,there must be great and general ignorance of a thing to excuse the negative attribution3 it is not allowable to speak of plants as non-metals1 or sheep as non-horses1 but a large class of animals is called in-vertebrate4 ,in this case the negative property serves to bar a possible inference that all animals are vertebrate1 since those we know best are so4 ,the judgment in this category is a consciousness of the attributes making up a thing1 or so much of it as interests us4 ',cleopatra's ,needle is an obelisk of granite1 about sixty-eight feet high1 and is carved with hieroglyphics4' ,if we go on to say that it stands on the ,thames ,embankment1 we shift into the category of association4 ,the relation of an object to its place is different from that of one inherent attribute of the object to another1 or to the whole4 ,the properties of a general idea are defined in this category4 ,the synthesis is natural or noumenal1 the artificiality of the idea consisting merely in the omission of some of the concrete properties4 ',garden rhubarb in general has broadly cordate leaves1 strongly veined beneath2 the footstalks are long1 thick1 and fleshy1 with a channel above2 its growth is exceedingly rapid4' ,these are properties inherent in a unity not of our making4 ,the botanist changes into the category of sequence when he says1 'the stalks are used for tarts and made into jam4' ,in a complicated object or general idea some of the judgments we treat as inherent may be inferences in other categories used subordinately4 ',the ancient ,persians had remarkably thin and weak skulls4 ,they were good horsemen and archers1 courageous and spirited in battle4 ,they wore a tunic and trousers of leather4444 ,they were quick and lively1 keen-witted1 capable of repartee1 ingenious1 and--for ,orientals--far-sighted4 ,they had fancy and imagination1 a relish for poetry and art1 and they were not without a certain power of political combination4' ,some of these properties might have been perceived objectively1 but not the possession of fancy and imagination1 which could only be known by inference in causation--here used to complete a coherent unity4 ,the historian employs causation as a principal category when he tells us that 'their bards did not touch the chords which rouse what is noblest and highest in our nature4' ,the thought implied in touching chords--the notion of will directing action--is a different judgment from the perception of an inherent permanent attribute4 ,the argument in this category consists in ideally completing an imperfect object by comparison with a similar object1 or the idea of a similar object4 ,suppose we have studied thoroughly one or more rhubarb plants1 and then see a plant with broadly cordate leaves1 footstalks long1 thick1 and fleshy1 and having a channel above4 ,in the time at our disposal we cannot ascertain if its growth is exceedingly rapid1 but we are justified in inferring that it is1 and that the plant we are examining is in all other respects rhubarb4 ,if the ,egyptian obelisks we have seen were sculptured with hieroglyphics throughout their length1 and we see an obelisk part of which is underground1 it is a rational inference that that part also is sculptured4 ,we have proved that certain samples of aluminium have a specific gravity of #bf1 and then see a metal--of specific gravity unknown--which has all the other properties of aluminium3 we may confidently infer that this metal also would1 if tested1 show a specific gravity of #bf4 ,for purposes of reason it may be necessary to compare things that cannot be brought physically together4 ,when this happens we generally compare them in idea1 or the idea of one with the other as object4 ,when great accuracy is required and the idea--which is always rather vague--cannot be relied on1 we have recourse to mediate comparison4 ,standards are employed4 ,these are manageable or portable objects with which principal things are separately compared by way of effecting indirectly a comparison between them4 ,standards can only mediate comparisons between abstract properties1 for if they contained all the concrete properties of the compared objects they would1 by supposition1 be as unmanageable as the latter4 ,we have standards for length in rules1 scales1 tapes1 chains2 the balance is a standard for weight4 ,there are also scales for pitch of sound1 varieties of colour1 degree of light1 heat1 atmospheric pressure1 and probably some others for special purposes4 ,indirect comparison is not in itself inference2 or if inference it is subordinate and preparatory to some more important conclusion4 ,a coin is weighed and concluded to be light1 but this is only a datum in determining the more important question whether it is a forged coin or not4 ,,xxiii--,,association ,in this category we widen the attention so as to include several objects in one act of perception4 ,the first result of this diffusion of attention is to lessen the brilliancy of objects4 ,our attention is a light which is intensified when narrowed and concentrated--enfeebled when dispersed over several objects4 ,the observation of a group amounts practically to observing the objects in rapid succession4 ,at a given moment we perceive only one thing well1 or it may be only a small part of a thing1 but we have a dull sense of other things adjacent1 which we have just seen and may immediately see again in any order we please4 ,that is all that is meant by perception of a group4 ,to distinguish this category properly from the next we must consider the group of objects as divested of depth or distance outwards4 ,it is to be regarded as a flat surface standing a few feet from us1 the objects in it having absolutely the dimensions they appear to have4 ,this is in fact their real magnitude1 for the supposed real magnitude is a matter of theory1 and means the perceptual magnitude taken under certain conditions of observation4 ,the real magnitude is constantly changing1 so for practical convenience in determining size1 etc41 we refer all objects to one condition of observation--that in which they can be touched as well as seen4 ,in metaphysic we are not obliged to recognise this convention4 ,if an object a mile off appears to be an inch high1 it is an inch high as really as if it were in a photograph or picture and materially represented of that height4 ,the mystery of the change of size in objects is not explained or reasoned away by any device for overcoming some of its practical inconveniences4 ,it depends on the degree of energy with which minds affect each other4 ,a group has properties which an object has not2 or1 if this be not strictly the case1 we may say that the properties we look for in a group are not those we distinguish in a single object4 ,the special properties of a group are positions4 ,it is unnecessary to say 'relative' positions1 for position cannot be otherwise than relative4 ,position cannot be defined by reference to anything more simple4 ,what is meant is intuitively known to everybody4 ,but let us take a concrete example--a man with a horse and cart standing on a bridge4 ,each object in this group has a position towards the other objects4 ,the bridge is over the river and under the cart2 the cart is upon the bridge and behind the horse2 the man is in the cart2 the horse is before and outside of the cart1 it is near one end of the bridge1 far from the other1 and between the two extremities4 ,these are the principal positions in a natural group or association1 by which is meant the objects we can see 7or are supposed to see7 simultaneously1 and whose mutual positions we are considering4 ,the use of observing positions is the same as that which moves us to all rational study1 namely1 its value in prediction4 ,we can reason from one object to another in a group just as we reason from one property to another in an object4 ,suppose our perception of a landscape is interrupted for a moment1 and when we next endeavour to perceive it we find we only perceive a portion of it1 the rest being 'hidden' by an intervening object4 ,as far as we are concerned the hidden part has been annihilated4 ,we only remember what was there4 ,but this recollection is also a preconception of what we may be able to cause to appear again1 either by removing the obstructing object1 by waiting till it has been removed1 or by walking round and standing between it and the landscape4 ,if this be too close to mere recollection1 we have pure reasoning when from the general appearance of a group we imagine generally some concealed part of it not before seen4 ,a procession of people dressed in mourning is usually accompanied by a hearse3 from perceiving the people only on a certain occasion we predict the hearse4 ,the sound of a steam-whistle enables us to imagine a train in a certain locality1 though fog or other obstruction may prevent our seeing it4 ,the scent of flowers prepares us for finding them somewhere near us4 ,from smoke we predict the nearness of a chimney4 ,the trail of an animal is a clue to his position4 ,the judgment in this category is therefore a consciousness of position1 such as those mentioned above4 ,the argument is a completion of one association by comparison with another--the expectation of similarity in groups4 ,movement4 ,all judgments as to change of position in objects come under this category4 ,it takes at least two things arranged in a group to produce the perception of movement4 ,if there were but one thing in our field of observation we could not say whether it moved or not1 for there would be nothing which it would pass1 or leave1 or approach4 ,it would appear to stand still4 ,there is1 however1 more in movement than depends on mere perception4 ,all movement is due to energy either in the observer or in the other mind acting upon his4 ,energy is not a generalisation of moving things1 nor a property1 nor a relation1 though all these may be signs of energy4 ,the most abstract idea of movement is ,motion4 ,it may be defined as a series of positions4 ,number4 ,if we treat a group as a large loose object we shall perceive in it certain properties not strictly positional4 ,number is one of these4 ,a group of three coins has not the same practical value as a group of six or sixty1 and we are thus obliged to notice the difference and distinguish degrees of this property by names--hence ,arithmetic4 ,flat ,space or space of two dimensions is another property of a group4 ,grouped objects have frequently intervals between them4 ,such intervals are negations of perception--interruptions or discontinuities of experience4 ,but by abstraction we can reduce the objects bounding an interval to a geometrical line1 and so give a sort of positive existence to the interval4 ,thus we talk of a hole or of darkness as if they were true objects1 and measure them by standards of length4 ,if we abstract the boundary lines from a space we get the idea 'intervalness1' which is the right name for two-dimensioned space4 ,this abstract idea is nearly the same as abstract size4 ,space is interval without bounds--size is object without contents4 ,space and size are equally nothing intrinsically or in their own right1 but they have been reached by different modes of refining away the positive qualities associated with them1 and this difference of origin is slightly suggested by their names4 ,spaces have a use in perception similar to rests in music--they relieve the attention and give contrast and vigour to the next positive object4 ,,xxiv--,,perspection ,this is the first of the artificial categories4 ,it is an ideal treatment of an associated group to facilitate a certain kind of reasoning4 ,reason--let me repeat--is the imaginary extension of experience by comparison with more complete experience of a similar kind4 ,by reasoning in inherence we complete single objects2 by inference in association we complete groups4 ,these two categories demonstrate that a natural group consists of fragments of objects1 and fragments of other natural groups which are possible but not yet developed4 ,a hill is partly concealed by a house1 the house partly concealed by a tree1 the tree by a stone fence1 the fence by a growth of ivy4 ,a river disappears at a curve and is lost to view2 we know from experience of other rivers that under certain conditions we might perceive the river further on as a feature in several more landscapes4 ,as we gaze at an association of objects these possible completions occur to us--not fully or definitely but sufficiently to convince us that the group might be developed into many other groups1 and into a multitude of objects of forms different from those we actually perceive4 ,by our hypothesis the observer has always been stationary1 the objects have moved to and fro but not from near to far4 ,their real dimensions have remained unaltered1 and nothing has occurred to suggest that they ever appear of other dimensions4 ,in short we are gazing on a piece of stage-scenery4 ,but there is another element in perception4 ,we and all other real 7mental7 beings are part of the cosmic force4 ,we are co-creators of what we perceive--limited gods1 not machine-men as the scientific people would have us believe4 ,but for our power of affecting each other and our readiness to receive impressions from other minds1 there would be no perception--no material objects4 ,we 7that is1 all sentient beings7 could1 by unanimous resolution1 annul the material creation--blot out the universe of objective things in a moment4 ,united to and implied in this general power is the particular power of modifying our world without destroying it4 ,we can redistribute the active and passive forces so as to produce other perceptual effects than those present at a given moment4 ,and we habitually do this to some extent4 ,within a limited scope our world is plastic as dough1 and we knead it to any form we please4 ,for example1 we exert energy to change our place1 and immediately the group before us breaks up and undergoes metamorphosis4 ,some objects disappear altogether1 and entirely new objects present themselves4 ,some become smaller1 others larger2 some fractional forms fill out to completion1 some integers undergo curtailment1 others separate into several distinct objects4 ,in a few minutes the first group has dissolved into a second1 which may merge into a third1 and so on indefinitely4 ,in contemplating these phenomena we discern a third form of completeness and incompleteness1 distinct from those that enter into inherence and association4 ,hence a new type of reasoning--another category3 the ,perspective4 ,it will be convenient to suppose that the modifications to which it refers are solely due to the observing mind1 as the most conspicuous and comprehensive really are1 but some of the minor perspective changes are due to the noumenon of the object4 ,we have first to get a criterion of perspective perfection4 ,what this shall be is to some extent a matter of convention4 ,the standard ,i shall adopt is1 that an object of a nature to be perceptible to all the senses would be most perfect if within reach of touch4 ,if it can be heard it is then heard at its loudest--this is correct enough for our purpose1--if it can be seen it is then seen at its largest and brightest4 ,this is ,perspective ,completeness at the ,tactual ,range4 ,it means the closest contact of noumenon and subject1 compatible with clear definition in perception4 ,now let us exert energy and disarrange a group4 ,those things that were or might have been tangible in the former position1 are no longer so1 but they may still be seen1 heard1 or even smelt4 ,the bright colours have however somewhat faded1 the size has shrunk1 some of the details are lost4 ,here is a lapse from perspective completeness4 ,it is indicated1 not as in the first two categories by mechanical cutting away of mass and circumstance1 but by deterioration all over the object4 ,we seem to be thrown out of focus in relation to it1 and the perspective degradation may increase until the object has dwindled to a speck and finally disappears altogether4 ,the judgment in this category consists in observing the kind and degree of degradation to which things are liable in perspection4 ,in addition to change in size1 brightness1 detail and loudness1 which have been already mentioned1 occultation as in the second category can be used as an indirect datum4 ,an object which eclipses another is invariably more perfect perspectively than the object eclipsed4 ,the motion of objects has also to be taken into account4 ,as objects degrade their movements slacken1 and recover power as the objects are restored4 ,by attending to all these indications and checking each by the rest1 we have the elements of a fairly accurate inference as to comparative perspective condition4 ,we have constant practice in this sort of thought with frequent opportunities of verifying our conclusions2 penalties are annexed to failure and rewards to success4 ,it is no wonder then that in the course of years we become expert in judging of perspective condition1 so that when confronted with a natural group we can estimate almost instantly the degree in which each object falls short of perspective integrity4 ,the result of this practice is that on perceiving a natural group of many objects1 we graduate them according to the perspective deterioration which each exhibits1 and for greater precision we figure the perspective difference as an interval between the objects--an imaginary interval modelled on the true interval of association4 ,the object on a distant horizon is visually as near as the ground we can touch by stooping1 but in this imaginary group the former is placed at the far end of the line and the latter at the near end1 and between them are ranged the other objects each at a point corresponding to what we suppose to be its perspective distance4 ,that is how a landscape acquires depth4 ,space outwards is an ideal imitation of real lateral interval4 ,it is the measure and expression of perspective defacement4 ,from what has been said it follows that the near objects will be relatively large1 clear1 and lively in motion1 while the far will be small1 dull1 and slow1 but this rule is liable to many exceptions which can only be learnt by experience4 ,on the analogy of the other forms of inference--which consist in completing imperfect things by reference to others more perfect--the essence of an argument in perspection is the power to imagine an object which is perspectively defective1 brought up to the tactual range and displaying all the qualities it would possess in that position4 ,this is done by comparing it with the idea of the same or a similar object experienced at the tactual range2 and is done for an ulterior purpose1 like all other intellectual operations4 ,a great part of our material happiness consists in the exercise of the short senses 7taste1 touch and smell71 and the chief use of perspective reasoning is to enable us to judge of the energy required to bring a distant object near for close perception4 ,we have therefore to observe our energic fluctuations in conjunction with perspective change1 if we would extract the utmost practical benefit from this category4 ,the perspective inferences are none the less useful after we discover that they are not intuitions1 and that the completeness we imaginatively assign to distant objects has no existence until we exert the corresponding energy4 ,a landscape being rendered perspective we can determine the perspective state of any new object that may enter it1 by reference to the objects adjoining it1 and this though the object be of a species quite unknown to us and which therefore1 by itself1 would afford no clue to its perspective distance4 ,the imaginary interval we place between objects of different perspective effacement1 can be expressed in terms of exact lateral measurement4 ,this is done by developing and measuring the associative groups represented in the perspective group4 ,supposing we wish to get an exact definition of the perspective condition of a mountain relative to a certain station1 we can1 from that station1 develop all the natural groups up to the mountain 7walk over the ground7 and measure the lateral intervals and masses disclosed4 ,the total measurements will be a definition of the mountain's perspective distance in terms of true associative distance4 ,that is what we mean by saying a mountain is ten miles off4 ,it is not really ten miles off--it is not an inch off4 ,but to render it tactually perfect we should have to expend an amount of energy equal to #ag1fjj times the energy required to move from one associative object to another a yard apart from it laterally4 ,if we practise the mileage scale in conjunction with the perspective indications1 we may acquire the art of expressing in miles1 though not measured1 the distance of objects estimated from purely perspective data1 but few can do this with any near approach to exactness#ad4 ,the realistic three-dimensioned space is a combination of the true interval of association and the false interval of perspection4 ,this generates an idea resembling the capacity or vacancy in a room or vessel1 and thus it is supposed that objects occupy a sort of universal room without walls1 floor1 or ceiling4 ,it is however the enclosing objects which make a room1 and when they are abstracted there remains nothing4 ,the universal room is therefore nothing--a myth4 ,it is a useful working theory for common purposes1 but in philosophy it is superfluous and obstructive4 ,in the definitions of geometry no difference is made between the depth of a landscape and the 'third dimension' of any small cubic object4 ,they are both called 'third dimension' or 'cubic dimension4' ,yet they are inferences of different categories1 and neither is real4 ,the former1 as we have just seen1 is the imagined redintegration of objects perspectively shrunk and defaced4 ,the latter is the imaginary completion of a thing having many surfaces or facets1 only one of which can be shown at a time4 ,sky ,perspection4 ,the effect produced on our mind by the observation of celestial objects1 reveals at once the artificiality of cubic space4 ,clouds in their form and movements are somewhat like earthly things--vapour or mountains1--and so we conceive them partially graduated in distance and floating in a concavity4 ,but whether they are a mile off1 or twenty miles off1 few of us can tell4 ,when we contemplate the sun1 moon and stars1 our realism is completely at fault4 ,these we cannot modify at will1 and they move too slowly and present too uniform an aspect to cause the perspective effect4 ,since we have never seen them at the tactual range we know not to what degree they are perspectively incomplete2 hence they appear without relative distance--distance being simply a metaphor of perspective effacement4 ,if 'cubic space' is real1 let the realists tell us why we do not see it in the sky--why we do not arrange the stars behind each other according to their calculated distances4 ,this question is unanswerable realistically1 but idealistically it presents no difficulty4 ,the sky is not spaced1 because the conditions are wanting under which the illusion of terrestrial space is formed in the intellect4 ,by close instrumental attention to the moon and planets a slight parallax is observable1 and on the analogy of terrestrial parallax astronomers are able to calculate what they call the distance of these bodies4 ,perhaps their calculations are right1 but the magnitudes are not conceivable as associative distance1 being so much greater than we have any experience of4 ,we take them to mean that the heavenly bodies are extremely degraded1 perspectively speaking4 ,their noumena are in contact with our minds1 for this is essential to perception1 but if astronomical calculations are correct the contact is infinitely slight1 compared with what it would be1 supposing--to speak realistically--we could go to the stars or they could be brought to us4 ,berkeley's ,theory of ,vision and ,dialogues are occupied with the analysis of perspection4 ,the arguments he uses to show that distance outwards is not real are in the main those given in this section4 ,,xxv--,,concretion ,if we take a cricket-ball in the hand and turn it round we shall perceive a series of discs4 ,only one of these can be seen at a time1 but if we perceive and remember the whole series we shall be able to infer all from the perception of one in a similar object4 ,the same occurs with other cubical or solid objects4 ,this is a form of ideal construction different from any we have yet considered4 ,it differs from inherence in that the object which we conceptually put together is never objectively perceived as a whole4 ,it is an imaginary whole constructed in the intellect out of fragmentary experience4 ,it differs from association on the same grounds2 the latter can be all perceived at once in forming the judgment4 ,it differs from perspection in that the imperfection of experience is due to curtailment1 not to general deterioration4 ,what we actually see may be perspectively perfect4 ,it differs also from the next category in that the series of perceptions can occur in various orders of succession4 ,the 'backs' of ,things4 ,we talk of the back of a thing1 but nobody has ever seen a back4 ,things have no backs in the popular sense of the word4 ,when we turn round a back to perceive it1 it is then a front4 ,everything is a flat upright surface1 and its appearance of solidity can be imitated on a surface known to be flat1 and with nearly the same illusive completeness as in the original object4 ,in turning things round we merely change the surface2 we are exercising our power to alter primary consciousness4 ,when two persons perceive the 'same' object from contrary directions1 the sameness means that the two objects proceed from the same cause1 or can be reduced to the same general idea4 ,but the objects are numerically distinct4 ,by a similar turn of speech we say that ,a and a are the same letter1 but they are evidently distinct and dissimilar objects4 ,if we hold a thing before a mirror and see what is termed its back1 we produce a new object resembling the first in some respects but without its resistance4 ,resistance is a negative term signifying the limit of our power to alter primary experience4 ,where our power ceases resistance is said to begin1 and we meet with resistance when we apply a power inadequate to the desired effect4 ,dr4 ,johnson's solitary experiment in idealistic philosophy has been often related4 ,he struck a post1 and because it did not disappear he thought he had disproved ,berkeley's statement that material objects exist only in the perceiving mind4 ,the experiment merely showed that all means are not adequate to change all primary experience4 ,had he shut his eyes1 or turned a corner1 or occupied his attention with other matters1 the post would have vanished4 ,he chose improper means and therefore met with 'resistance4' ,no idealist believes we can change our primary experience by any capricious and frivolous means#ae4 ,geographical ,concretion4 ,the knowledge of large geographical areas is an artificial construction without objective reality4 ,our experience is1 literally and exactly1 a series or sequence--a flux or stream4 ,it is composed of objects or of groups1 according to the width of our attention4 ,if we travel over a large tract of country the experience is a train of objects or views1 which follow each other continuously but for interruptions in attention4 ,if we were bound to think of things in the order in which they were experienced1 we should have to imagine our topographical consciousness as a long ribbon of views1 like the pictures of a panorama4 ,supposing we travelled hither and thither over one county1 it would appear to us as a straight strip of land which might be several hundred miles long4 ,if we again traversed the ground1 but in another order1 we should have another strip resembling the first1 but also differing from it1 and it would be necessary to keep the two from being confused in our mind4 ,if several persons traversed the same ground but in divers directions1 they would each retain a different recollection of it1 and it would be extremely hard for any two of them to agree as to the order in succession of any portion of the ground traversed4 ,our experience of the natural group suggests a mode of treating our geographical experience which overcomes many of these inconveniences4 ,we find that we can traverse 7either bodily or by the eye7 a single landscape in a thousand directions1 and retain a memory of it without any reference to these directions4 ,what we remember is the mutual positions of the objects1 not the order in which they were observed4 ,as this greatly facilitates the memory of one group1 we apply the same principle of synthesis to the succession of groups composing our geographical experience4 ,we dismiss from our minds the order of observation1 and construct instead an imaginary group of associated objects or places having mutual positions4 ,it is imaginary1 for no one has ever seen as a co-existent synthesis the objects of a county1 not to speak of a country or continent4 ,substituting for memory of succession1 a memory of position1 there grows up in our mind a large co-existent image of a country on the model of a single group1 which affords all the advantages as regards economy of energy which we enjoy by virtue of comprehending a natural group in one act of consciousness4 ,take an instance of this economy4 ,suppose a man travelled from ,london to ,oxford1 then to ,exeter1 then to ,portsmouth1 then to ,brighton1 and afterwards desired to return to ,london4 ,if he1 acting on a mistaken conception of truth and disdaining instruction from others1 persisted in remembering the objects perceived on his journey as--what they no doubt literally were--a continuous series1 he would be unable to imagine any way of returning to ,london except by reversing the order of his journey4 ,if on the other hand he carried in his mind an image of the ground in question1 with the mutual position of the places1 it would enable him to foresee that ,london was to be reached by journeying northward from ,brighton1 in far less time and at far less cost than by returning the way he came4 ,thus does conceptual position1 when it is correctly imagined1 prove its superiority to the order of experience4 ,and we say that the ideal picture is truer than the crude memory1--not that it is really so if natural order is a test of truth1 but because it is the least onerous1 which is our practical standard of truth4 ,the only object of knowledge being the wise management of energy1 that sort of knowledge must be considered truest that enables us to have the feelings we desire at the least cost4 ,in one sense truth means the quickest and easiest way of passing from one state of consciousness to another preconceived state4 ,it may be objected to the above example as a valid deduction from an imaginary synthesis1 that the relation of ,london to ,brighton is now a certainty1 whereas an inference can be no more than a probability4 ,the reply is1 that if a man has already traversed the route in question1 it is to him an actual experience and his idea of it is ever afterwards a memory1 not an inference4 ,but until it is actually perceived it must be imaginary1 and therefore slightly problematical4 ,although a man is convinced that others are not deceiving him in saying a place is to be reached in a certain way1 he cannot be absolutely sure that he fully understands the directions given1 in other words1 that his image of the route corresponds to their perception of it4 ,there probably never is exact similarity between one man's primary experience and another man's idea of it4 ,it may even be doubted whether there is ever exact similarity between a man's own primary experience and his subsequent idea of it4 ,the geographical synthesis is founded on actual exploration supplemented by inference4 ,the mutual position of some important places are determined and serve as precedents for a multitude of minor positional deductions4 ,a is twenty miles north of ,london1 ,b is ten miles south of ,london1 hence ,a is thirty miles north of ,b4 ,the mileage is determined by imagining the synthesis developed into natural groups and measured laterally4 ,other scales are the time spent in travelling between the places1 or the money it costs1 or the distance delineated on a map4 ,though the geographical concretion may be modelled on the association1 we cannot treat it perspectively1 for the places being purely ideal 7except the one we are at71 the ideal image is not liable to deterioration by weakened perception4 ,it may suffer degradation by forgetfulness1 but that has nothing to do with perspection4 ,sphericity of the ,earth4 ,the geographical synthesis is not always formed on the pattern of a natural association4 ,that is the first and most obvious shape to give it1 and for thousands of years it appears to have answered the topographical needs of mankind4 ,but as exploration extended it was found that the associative theory did not in some cases afford true preconception4 ,if we travel far enough in any fixed direction we shall return to the point from which we started4 ,this could not have been predicted from a synthesis formed on the model of a landscape4 ,such a return however takes place in the objects denominated spheres1 and so the spherical instead of the flat form has been conceptually given to the geographical concretion4 ,that is all that is meant by saying that the world is round4 ,there is no world1 as the mystical realist--projecting outwards his mental synthesis--imagines4 ,there is only a scheme of spherical positions in the intellect1 which facilitates the recollection of places and enables us to foresee the shortest and easiest way of reaching--i4e4 experiencing places4 ,the concretion is true inasmuch as the prediction is found to coincide with real experience4 ,but that by no means implies that the places exist except when perceived in minds4 ,,xxvi--,,sequence ,sequence is a series most resembling a procession of objects in a natural group 7second category74 ,it differs therefrom in that the objects cannot be seen together4 ,it differs from concretion in that the order in which the objects appear cannot be altered1 or if they are human and alterable we cease to treat them as a sequence4 ,they no longer have the predictive value which moves us to form artificial groups of objects4 ,satisfactory examples of reasoning in sequence are less numerous than might be supposed4 ,it is a poor category for argument4 ,series either occur with perfect regularity1 like the seasons of the year1 phases of the moon1 c41 and then they rapidly become mere recollections and lose the problematical character essential to a true inference1 or the connection between the objects is too casual for argumentative purposes4 ,darwin's theory of the formation of coral atolls is a fine argument in sequence1 but the application of this theory to reefs not examined by him is hardly uncertain enough to be an argument4 ,it is the first sequential inference that is valid--the rest are foregone conclusions4 ,geology supplies some good sequences4 ,it has been noticed1 for instance1 that the sea leaves ripple-marks on sandy beaches1 and stones with similar marks have been found at a distance from the sea2 it is a valid sequential inference that the marks in the latter case have also been formed by the action of the waves4 ,here the difference in locality between the two compared series--the modern complete and the ancient incomplete--supplies that slight element of doubt essential to an argument4 ,so as regards the mode of making ancient flint tools3 it has been found that tools exactly similar to the ancient can now be made with the simplest possible means1 and it is a true argument to infer that the ancient implements were made by these means4 ,the conclusion is highly probable without being infallibly certain1 and that is what a dialectical conclusion ought to be4 ,we may admit that some of the astronomical sequences are forms of reasoning1 for they were such to their first discoverers1 and to minds not thoroughly conversant with them they are still in the nature of predictions that might fail of accomplishment4 ,political1 financial1 and sporting forecasts are sequential arguments1 and we may also include speculations on the future states of all growing organisms and developing institutions4 ,time4 ,the intervals between the objects of a sequence are imagined after the model of lateral intervals in association4 ,this is ,time4 ,like space it is mere blanks in experience1 though treated by realists as external and self-subsisting4 ,it can be measured by reference to objects on whose sequential recurrence we have the most reliance1 such as the phases of the moon1 the positions of the sun in the ecliptic1 the movements of the hands of a clock or the chiming of its bells4 ,abstract or unbounded time is called 'eternity'2 like abstract space it is a refined form of nothing4 ,time and space are usually coupled together as if co-ordinate1 but eternity is the co-ordinate of space4 ,time is divided sequence and would correspond to materially divided space1 that is1 space with objects in it at regular intervals4 ,matter1 space1 and time are the three pillars of the realistic world4 ,we have now seen what they are made of4 ,matter is a general idea compiled by ourselves from phenomenal consciousness4 ,it is no substance--only an average4 ,space has even less reality4 ,it is first the interval between two objects in association2 then this interval is used metaphorically as an expression and measure of perspective decadence4 ,time is an application of the same associative interval to express the blanks between objects in sequence4 ,space and time are thus pure nullities--negatives with positive names4 ,these three notions being exploded as entities1 there remain as a residuum of true fact and the starting-point of philosophy--minds1 their energies1 and their consciousness4 ,this is a very ancient triad4 ,science constantly confounds sequence and causation4 ,we are told that the moon causes eclipses of the sun1 that heat causes objects to expand1 that a seal causes an imprint4 ,this is a metaphor from human causation1 and the expression is now so rooted in language that it would hardly be possible to introduce a more correct phraseology4 ,yet it is as incorrect as to say that one o'clock causes two o'clock1 or that daylight causes darkness4 ,the confusion has arisen from the fact that both sequence and causation deal with fixed inconvertible series1 but only in the latter is there real power exerted to produce the effect4 ,material things and their apparent effects are due to a cause lying behind both4 ,,xxvii--,,causation ,causation differs from all other categories in that one of its elements is mental4 ,it is a series beginning in the mind--in this relation denominated cause--and developing into objective phenomena called effects or an effect4 ,the series being known by judgment we can infer similar causes from perception of similar effects4 ,the commonest causation is the use and interpretation of language4 ,because we utter words from a certain motive we infer that all who utter the same words do so from the same motive4 ,that is the reason of the intelligibility of words4 ,this category is peculiar from the extremely narrow range of the experience which supplies the judgments4 ,we never perceive any mind but one--our own--and this has to supply all the judgments by which we reason concerning other minds4 ,there is therefore no category in which correct reasoning is so difficult and so rare4 ,no amount of experience entirely overcomes this defect1 for if we are ignorant we cannot understand the wise1 and if we are wise we cannot conceive the motives of the ignorant and vicious4 ,only those persons who are mentally very like each other are mutually comprehensible4 ,this category has a further peculiarity4 ,in all the rest the inference relates to objective experience1 and this being due to interaction of minds we are justified in saying that until it is perceived it has no existence4 ,but in causation we are inferring something with reference to a mind1 and this exists though we never can perceive it4 ,we know that minds exist without perception because we know that our own exists though no one perceives us--though we are in total darkness and silence and cannot ourselves perceive our bodies4 ,as already stated1 ,existence has not the same meaning when applied to objects and to minds1 objects being merely temporary conditions of minds4 ,the non-existence of inferred but unperceived objects does not follow from any defect in the faculty of inference1 but depends on the essential character of objects4 ,they are created by mutual contact of minds and cannot exist without that condition1 however clearly they may be inferred and however correctly their appearance may be predicted4 ,causation is confounded with sequence because both are series4 ,let me illustrate the difference between them by an example4 ,i turn the stop-cock of a pipe1 and water flows from the open end of the pipe4 ,in popular and even scientific language it would be said that ,i caused the water to flow4 ,but this is incorrect4 ,all ,i caused was the turning of the tap2 that alone was wholly due to my energy and intelligence4 ,there followed as a sequence the outflow of water1 but that was due partly to cosmic force and partly to the previous human causation 7not mine7 implied in making and laying down the pipe so as to utilise the cosmic force4 ,i merely removed an obstacle that prevented the further development of the force in a particular direction4 ,my relation to the outflow was sequence1 not causation4 ,in observation sequence registers fixed or probable series of objects without regard to their causes4 ,it is sufficient if they occur regularly enough to justify prediction4 ,causation1 on the other hand1 pays no regard to physical connection of any sort1 but seeks out the being or beings who supplied the energy producing an effect or series of effects4 ,the speculations in causation pass quite beyond the domain of objectivity1 over into the realm of true creation4 ,when we read that 'the succession of events is an endless chain of effects which are in their turn causes of new effects1' what is meant is sequence1 and for 'cause' and 'effect' the terms 'antecedent' and 'consequent' should have been employed4 ,sequences may be 'chains' and may be long1 but if so their links have been forged by independent causes acting across the chain2 as when a line of soldiers fire in succession at regular intervals1 or as in the case of the moon's quarters4 ,in these instances the objects1 although forming a series1 has each a cause of its own4 ,certainly a causation is a series1 for the cause precedes the effect4 ,but an effect is never the cause of a succeeding effect4 ,when this appears to be the case the explanation is that the energy was not exhausted in producing the immediate simple effect1 but has produced a complicated effect in which a series may be discovered4 ,an objective effect1 being a mere flash of consciousness--a shadow on a window-blind--is incapable of causing anything4 ,analysis of ,cause4 ,cause is mind in action4 ,it consists of at least energy and a sentimental motive--energy exerted to gratify sentiment4 ,if the mind is intellectualised there will probably be an ideal element in the cause--in this connection called plan or design--for the better direction of the energy4 ,normal human causation consists of an effort of mind directed towards the objective realisation of a plan1 for the gratification of a sentiment4 ,this is the same as ,,will4 ,all three elements of cause may be furnished by the same individual--or any two of them--or only one4 ,for instance1 the man who wants a house supplies the motive1 the architect provides the design1 the builder finds the energy4 ,one plan may use up an indefinite number of separate stores of energy4 ,even in an individual the realisation of a plan exhausts the powers of millions of organic cells4 ,a military campaign illustrates the relation of plan to power4 ,the design may have been formed by one man1 and then communicated wholly or partially to a hundred thousand1 and the energies of these may be devoted to its realisation4 ,the soldier fights with his own energy1 but he is directed by his commander's idea1 or so much of it as has been confided to him4 ,the design may stretch from the commander to the soldier1 but not the energy4 ,in order that the commander should be termed the 'cause' of his private's activity1 it would be necessary to eliminate the notion of exerted energy from causation1 and reduce it to bare communication of design1 which would be absurd4 ,the stretching of one design over many relays of energy has no doubt helped to confirm the notion that causation is a long chain of alternate causes and effects4 ,the truth is that energy can act only at short range1 and has to be incessantly renewed4 ,the world is in a constant state of creation and dissolution1 say the ,kabbalists4 ,it is absurd to speak of anything that existed a thousand or even a hundred years ago as the cause of anything existing to-day4 ,the design may intellectually survive1 but the energy is long since dissipated4 ,we have never more than about a day's supply of energy in store at once4 ,if sentiment1 power1 and design are supplied by different individuals1 no single one of them can be called the cause of the effect4 ,the relation of each to the result is sequence4 ,when we have traced an effect to the mind or minds that supplied the three or the two necessary elements--supposing the design is sometimes omitted and the act what we call instinctive--we have obtained a complete explanation of the effect4 ,our curiosity is then absolutely satisfied4 ,we have reached a true beginning4 ,it is the want of this thorough explanation that renders material science so disappointing4 ,we are put off with a mere physical antecedent1 which itself needs explanation as much as its consequent4 ,it does not make the antecedent more significant to place it far back in time1 for time by itself is not a cause--it is merely a name given to intervals of experience4 ,a thing is never truly explained until we see that its production either caused pleasure to something else1 or was expected to cause pleasure4 ,behind everything must be ,sentiment4 ,one generation of beings is not the cause of the following generation1 else the former would have perished in begetting the latter4 ,more particularly1 a man is not the effect of his parents or remoter ancestors1 though they stood to him in an antecedent relation4 ,the seed of his body was taken from theirs1 but his energy is his own1 drawn direct from the universal source4 ,if he resembles them corporeally it is because he previously resembled them mentally1 not because the cells of his body have hereditary tendencies to take particular forms4 ,hence the ,darwinian genealogy of men and animals--supposing it were correct--does not explain them4 ,it is a phenomenal schematism based on or implying an erroneous assumption--that generation is causation4 ,atomism--the theory of ,democritus--is founded on another false view of causation4 ,the physical parts of a thing are conceived to be the causes of the thing1 and so the least conceivable particles of 'matter' are considered the first causes and true explanation of all things4 ,this notion appears to be useful in chemistry1 but it cannot be accepted as philosophy4 ,if our senses were sharpened to perceive atoms these would simply be small phenomena1 and it would still be necessary to inquire what motive and power produced them4 ,it has been suggested that atoms may be inherently sentient and dynamic3 if so they are minute animals or cells1 and we are still without an explanation of their occurrence in organised masses4 ,it is inconceivable that they should spontaneously enter into intricate combinations1 whose evident purpose has only an indirect and partial bearing on their welfare4 ,though advocated by men of undoubted ability1 ,atomism and ,evolution are nothing more than forms of the ordinary realistic belief1 that things are caused by their physical antecedents4 ,the two theories are supposed to be complementary1 but in reality they are contradictory4 ,if an animal body is caused by its parents it cannot be caused by its own atoms1 and vice vers4 ,varieties of ,causation4 ,abstract causation--the category--consists of a cause and an effect4 ,the former1 as we have seen1 is complicated1 the latter may comprise several objects4 ,ignoring the complications involved in the use of an organism--which comes between the mind and the final effect--we distinguish four or five varieties of causation4 ,c--e#a--;e#b--;e#c--;e#d ,the cause ,c produces from its own energy the series of effects e#a--;e#d1 like the rebounding of a missile from the surface of ground or water4 ,this may be called 'ricochet4' ,effects1 each having an independent cause1 sometimes form a series like a ladder3 e#a e#b e#c e#d e#e ,c ,c ,c ,c ,c ,this is the species illustrated by a successive discharge of musketry4 ,the causation of science consists of the effects in this species considered apart from the causes4 ,in the 'gamut' the effects are in sequence1 but they have all the same physical antecedent4 e#a e#b e#c e#d e#e ------------------------ ,c ,the successive acts of the same man or animal are of this kind4 ,in each of these species the effects are in series and may be treated as a sequence1 but the cause or causes lie outside the sequence4 ,far from mere regularity of succession being a proof of causation between the objects1 it may very easily be itself a part of the causal design4 ,in the 'capstan' several partial causes contribute to produce one effect1 as when a gang of men manipulate one engine4 ,c ,c _/ ,c--e--,c _/ ,c ,c ,the 'star' or 'fountain' is the converse of the last4 ,a single cause produces several simultaneous partial e e _/ e--,c--e _/ e e effects1 as when we strike our open hand smartly on the surface of water4 ,these sub-categories enable us1 if we so wish1 to define an energic series somewhat more precisely than by calling it a causation in the most abstract sense4 ,possibly also the figures delineated represent the primitive forms which energy takes when emerging into the phenomenal4 ,the 'star' is a most characteristic form4 ,the dendritic shape so frequently met with in objects is a star springing from a ray of a preceding star4 ,perhaps each vegetable bud has an independent cause2 if not they are 'ricochets' from the general plant life4 ,in the combinations of these elementary effects we have a likely explanation of plant and crystal formation4 ',conservation' of ,energy4 ,energy is annihilated in the using4 ,it emanates from a great universal centre1 and at a short distance from that centre is completely and irrecoverably dissipated4 ,the apparent fixity of things is purely formal--like the fixity of a water-fall1 which renews its substance every few seconds4 ,that is the meaning of saying that the world is in a constant state of formation and dissolution4 ,physical theorists represent energy under the figure of substance1 but they suppose it is fixed in quantity though constantly undergoing change of form--the scientific view1 here as elsewhere1 being just the opposite of the philosophical4 ,observe--say the conservationists--the case of a man raising a heavy stone from the earth4 ,he fatigues himself but he does not destroy energy2 he acquires command over the energy-in-position of the stone1 and in using it to crack a cocoa-nut or drive a post he receives back his own energy undiminished in quantity4 ,that seems reasonable at first sight4 ,a quantity of energy is taken from the man and put into the stone2 it is taken from the stone and put into the driven post4 ,to be sure1 if the man undrives the post he does not thereby disfatigue himself1 as the theory would lead us to expect--he fatigues himself the more4 ,the same 'law1' we are told1 holds good in building a dam across a stream and utilising the force of water to drive a mill4 ,the energy apparently lost in the construction is recovered in the superior ease with which we grind our corn or saw our timber4 ,there is a confusion in the terminology here3 to save energy that would otherwise be lost is not identical with recovering energy that has once been used4 ,we make a gun1 load it1 and discharge a bullet against a target4 ,what has become of the force expended8 ,it has been transformed into heat1 say the conservationists4 ,and when the target and flattened bullet have cooled down8 ,the energy has gone to raise the general temperature of the universe6 ,that is a conclusion hard to believe and impossible to verify4 ,but--granting that the individual explosions of a gun may be the 'conservation' of some antecedent power--how do we recover the initial expense of the instrument8 ,and if not recoverable1 where at least and in what form does it exist8 ,prior to the explosions that are represented by heated targets and the like1 energy was spent in inventing and making the gun1 making the ammunition1 loading and aiming the piece4 ,all these were essential to the effect--and what has become of them8 ,have they also gone to warm the universe8 ,instead of raising a stone to a height1 let us carry it along horizontally till we feel the same degree of fatigue4 ,if energy in the using is merely transformed but not lost1 we should now be in possession of some power equivalent to the energy expended4 ,but we are not--we have nothing to show for our trouble4 ,if we construct a water-mill and fix it high and dry in the middle of a plain1 instead of under a fall of water1 we get no return for the energy expended4 ,by such a law as the conservation of energy1 and with the usefulness of a properly placed mill as the measure of compensation1 we should receive an equivalent return no matter where the mill is placed4 ,what has place to do with the action of a universal law8 ,instead of raising the stone or carrying it horizontally1 let us find it near the edge of a precipice and roll it over4 ,there is no proportion between the push that launched the stone1 and the force it exhibits on reaching the foot of the precipice4 ,how is the equivalence of energy maintained in this case8 ,it will be replied that the force now at work is gravitation4 ,if so1 it was gravitation that brought down the first stone on the post--not any energy transferred from us to the stone4 ,the raising of the stone put us in a position to use the force of gravity1 just as climbing the precipice put us in a position to roll the stone over the edge of it4 ,such considerations as these make this 'law' incredible to me4 ,but when ,i pass from the explanation to the concrete facts1 ,i have no difficulty in understanding them4 ,it is the law that is obscure--not the facts4 ,there exists nothing but living minds of different degrees of energy4 ,we men are small beings associated with a cosmical creature whose force is immeasurably greater than ours1 and we have intelligence enough to utilise part of this force to supplement our own4 ,that is the meaning of mechanism4 ,some efforts to control the cosmic forces are profitable1 but there is no transmutation of our energy into the result1 nor any necessary equivalence between the labour and the result4 ,we may stumble upon an available cosmic force almost by accident--we may waste a life-time over a mechanical problem and fail to solve it4 ,the utilisation of cosmic force by man is best explained by comparing it with animal slavery4 ,trap a wild elephant and train him to draw and carry--you have constructed an engine4 ,there are of course important differences between the two kinds of instrument1 due to the enormous disproportion between the magnitude and power of the respective entities4 ,in the case of the animal the whole life comes under our control3 in the case of the cosmos we can utilise only a minute fraction of it1 and that rather by putting ourselves in its way than by making it obey us4 ,the animal we have to feed3 the cosmic being does not draw upon us for its nourishment4 ,we can direct the animal through his sensibility3 the cosmic sensibility appears to be beyond our power of irritation4 ,apart from these differences the general laws of the one kind of tool are those of the other also4 ,we have not transferred power to the raised stone1 or the coiled spring1 or the loaded gun1 or the embanked river--any more than to the tamed and harnessed horse4 ,there is no fixed ratio between the fatigue of catching and training an animal1 and the energy saved by making him work for us4 ,the animal's work is not our own energy given back to us--neither is the machine's4 ,a plough is useless without cattle to draw it--so is a turbine without water to drive it4 ,when coal is burned to 'generate' electricity1 that is the cosmic equivalent of exhausting or killing one animal to overpower or to feed another3 the energy of combustion is utterly destroyed--not transformed into the electricity4 ,the question can be more accurately stated and brought to a plain issue if we use the terms and forms of dialectic4 ,a theory is an argument--when it is not a fallacy--and an argument1 we have seen1 consists of two parts4 ,there is the matter of fact requiring explanation1 and the antecedent knowledge which is used to illustrate it4 ,of these the precedent is the more important1 and it is no valid objection to a criticism that the person who offers it knows less about the case than the theorist4 ,the critic may be in possession of a better precedent1 which the theorist has failed to notice1 perhaps from a too exclusive attention to the case4 ,in the question before us the case is ,mechanical or ,inorganic ,energy4 ,it is not an object1 but an inference from the knowledge of our personal mental energy4 ,this latter is the only energy we really perceive4 ,but we find in objects1 or associated with the perception of them1 a power capable of assisting or of opposing our efforts--hence we conclude it is something of the same nature as our own power4 ,we cannot well avoid that inference1 and there is no apparent reason why we should try to avoid it4 ,so far science and philosophy are at one1 but here they part company4 ,philosophy consistently endows ,nature with sentiency also1 for we never--to our certain knowledge--meet with energy without sentiency1 and we have no right to transfer one attribute without the other4 ,although science is indebted to the assimilation of organic and inorganic--,nature explained by ,man--for the first notion of external energy1 no sooner is the notion formed than the argument is discarded1 and external energy is declared to be entirely destitute of an organic and mental character4 ,how then is it to be further explained8 ,to what shall it now be likened8 ,in the materialistic scheme all things are supposed to be resolved into matter and force4 ,matter is conceived as a self-existent substance1 indestructible1 c4 ,it is better known than force1 for material things can be directly perceived whereas force is imaginary all the time4 ,under these circumstances it is natural though illogical to treat force as a species of matter4 ,with only two things left in the universe1 the better known of the two will be used to explain the less known1 if an explanation is considered indispensable4 ,force is accordingly brought as a 'case' under matter as a 'precedent1' and is concluded to be indestructible because matter is believed to be indestructible2 and when energy appears to be wasted the inference is that it has simply withdrawn from view1 like an object that has ceased to be perceived and may be perceived again4 ,that seems to be the evolution of the scientific notion of inorganic energy4 ,this theorem is fallacious in two respects4 ,there is no such matter as science imagines4 ,matter is a general idea formed by the study of material objects1 which are states of consciousness excited by noumenal contact4 ,it is the average object--a mere affection or formation of the observing mind4 ,we are the makers of matter4 ,such an idea cannot be said to be indestructible3 in a sense it is destroyed in an individual when it is forgotten or inactive2 it would certainly be destroyed if all minds ceased to form it4 ,thus the precedent in the scientific theory of force is itself false4 ,then energy is not in the least like matter--either the matter of science or that of philosophy4 ,the energy we really know is a unique experience--not a general idea1 nor anything analogous to a phenomenal object2 so that even if the proposed precedent were true in itself1 it is not applicable to the case4 ,to complete our knowledge of external energy we must go back to that comparison which first suggested to us that there is external energy1 namely1 the comparison of living man with living nature4 ,if this is not a correct account of the derivation of the notion that cosmic energy is indestructible1 let conservationists tell us what is the parallel on which they are arguing4 ,here is a blank theorem for completion-- x is indestructible ---------------------------------------- --------- ,cosmic energy is a it must therefore be considered sort of x indestructible ,matter1 as we have seen1 is not x4 ,human energy is not x4 ,our individual power--so far as experience informs us--is destroyed in the using4 ,a day's work exhausts us1 and we have to pass into the condition called sleep to be refilled4 ,it is sleep1 not food1 that refreshes the mind4 ,food restores the bodily tool we have been working with--puts a fresh edge on the chisel1--but it does not recuperate the power that wields the tool4 ,what then is x8 ,,note ,,on ,,dreams ,if dreams could be studied with our waking consciousness they would throw much light on our mental nature4 ,being a poor dreamer myself ,i am not competent to discuss this phase of psychology as it deserves4 ,i think however the bulk of our dreams can be reduced to two principles4 ,there is first the simple lowering of the mental energy1 which weakens the attention and dissolves the artificial categories1 thus making ordinary reason impossible4 ,there is just enough energy left to revive a few scattered ideas1 which blend together without control or regard to precedent4 ,hence the singular combinations they sometimes form4 ,in the waking state the objective and intellectual experience are generally more vivid and engrossing than the sentimental--at least in masculine persons4 7,i deliberately avoid the phrase 'masculine mind1' because there is manifestly no sex in mind47 ,in dreams the converse of this is the case4 ,the objects we appear to see are dull and indistinct1 being ideas mistaken for objects1 whilst the feelings are evidently genuine and sometimes of great intensity4 ,this may be explained on the occult principle alluded to in section ,x4 ,what ,i understand by occult influence is this4 ,in ordinary experience the object is first perceived1 then a sentiment may be excited either by the same noumenon or by recollection4 ,in the occult procedure this order is reversed4 ,the sentiment is first secretly reached through the chinks of our intellectual armour1 and the intellect is not excited at all or only by association4 ,during sleep1 when the ,self is nearly exhausted of power1 it is likely we are more exposed than usual to such influences4 ,they invade our mind and excite our sentiment without awaking the intellect4 ,whatever ideas accompany the sentiments are generally inadequate to explain them1 the stock of available ideas being now reduced4 ,the conversations we hold in dreams1 and the apparent communication of knowledge that takes place1 are referred by ,du ,prel to a division of the ego into two or more individuals who talk together4 ,this notion appears to me forced and unthinkable4 ,under what image is the ego figured that it should be capable of division8 ,in the waking state we sometimes ask ourselves questions1 and on consideration find answers to them4 ,we cannot recall a name1 a word1 or date1 though we know it is somewhere in our memory1 and we pause and search till we succeed in exciting the latent image4 ,when this takes place in a dream the information is assumed to come from another individual by an easy dramatisation4 ,a disturbance in the body during sleep may constitute--like all bodily suffering--a drain upon our mental energy1 which will be felt as a sentiment and may excite ideas by sympathy4 ,no doubt many dreams are caused in this manner4 ,since our waking consciousness is highly artificial and imaginary1 we may infer that whilst dreaming we are nearer to the natural1 primitive state of the mind1 but in a weakened condition4 ,footnote #ac3 ,ueberweg's ,logic1 ,fleming's ,vocabulary1 and ,dickenson's ,dict4 of ,philosophy4 ,footnote #ad3 ,when the perspective object is accurately measured by instrument at a known distance from the eye1 and the tactual size of the object is also known1 the associative distance can be calculated by simple proportion4 ,multiply the measuring distance by the tactual size and divide the product by the perspective size--the quotient is the distance4 ,the perspective size of objects is greatly exaggerated in realism4 ,most people think they see a man at his full stature for a distance of fifty yards or so4 ,at that distance the tallest man does not measure half an inch in height4 ,at twenty feet a six-foot man measures #cf inches--at ten feet #gb inches4 ,the people assembled in a room forty feet long range in real--perspective--height from seven inches to two inches4 ,when a man is nearer than ten feet we do not perceive him in one operation--we observe him in parts which we put together in the mind4 ,footnote #ae3 ,probably ,dr4 ,johnson meant to be humorous in his way4 ,the principles of ,idealism are apt to excite mirth in the unphilosophical1 but the laugh is not always on the side of the scoffer4 ,a member of the ,persian philosophical sect called ,samradians once said to his steward3 ',the world and its inhabitants have no actual existence2 they have merely an ideal being4' ,the servant on hearing this took the first favourable opportunity to conceal his master's horse1 and when he was about to ride brought him an ass with the horse's saddle4 ,when the ,samradian asked1 ',where is the horse8'--the servant replied1 ',thou hast been thinking of an idea2 there was no horse in being4' ,the master answered1 ',it is true'2 he then mounted the ass1 and after riding for some time he suddenly dismounted and taking the saddle off the ass's back placed it on the servant's1 drawing the girths tightly2 and having forced the bridle into his mouth1 he mounted him and flogged him along vigorously4 ,the servant in piteous accents exclaimed1 ',what is the meaning of this treatment8'--to which the ,samradian replied1 ',there is no such thing as a whip2 it is merely ideal2 thou art only thinking of some illusion4' ,after which the steward repented and restored the horse4 ,another ,samradian--or perhaps the same individual--having married the daughter of a rich man1 she1 on finding out her husband's creed1 proposed to have some amusement at his expense4 ,one day the ,samradian brought in a bottle of pure wine1 which during his absence she emptied of its contents and filled with water4 ,when the time for taking wine arrived she poured out water instead of wine1 into a gold cup which was her own property4 ,the ,samradian having observed1 ',thou hast given me water instead of wine1'--she answered1 ',it is only ideal2 there was no wine in existence4' ,the husband then said1 ',thou hast spoken well2 hand me the cup that ,i may go to a neighbour's house and bring it back full of wine4' ,he thereupon took out the gold cup1 which he sold1 and instead of it brought back an earthen vessel full of wine4 ,the wife on seeing this said1 ',what hast thou done with the golden cup8' ,he replied1 ',thou art surely thinking of some ideal golden cup'--on which the woman greatly regretted her witticism4--,dabistn1 v4 i4 p4 #aii-bjj4 ,,redaction ,,of ,,colloquial ,,arguments ,,xxviii ,a clever man has said that the use of language is to conceal thought4 ,its primary use is certainly not to reveal thought1 but to enable one person to produce an effect on the mind of another or of others1 either for their or his own advantage4 ,in the course of using speech as an instrument of command1 entreaty1 persuasion1 menace1 or fustigation1 it may happen that the movements of the speaker's mind are revealed to some extent1 but this is a mere incident1 not the main purpose of the speech4 ,grammar is the system of rules which govern the use of language in its primary and ordinary capacity4 ,it follows from this that language is in no sense a revelation of the reasoning processes1 nor do the rules of grammar coincide with the laws of intellect4 ,it is just as reasonable to expect to find the metaphysic of thought revealed in any of the industrial and fine arts1 as to look for it in the structure of speech4 ,aristotle drew his logic from the composition of the ,greek sentence--he might as well have sought for logic in the constitution of the ,greek buskin4#af ,even when men begin to reason aloud and seek to render their logical movements as evident as possible1 they are so hampered by the ordinary habits and rules of speech that their meaning is often difficult or impossible of comprehension4 ,whence arises the necessity1 if we would reason aloud to any purpose1 of redacting or translating language from the vernacular into a dialect more indicative of the logical processes that take place when we reason4 ,this redaction consists mainly in distinguishing clearly the four parts composing an argument1 namely1 the ,subject of the ,precedent2 the ,case which is brought under it for judgment2 the ,applicate or part of the precedent bearing on the case2 the ,conclusion1 which is the ideal judgment concerning the case4 ,when these four parts are expressed and clearly understood we have a perfect argument1 so far as argumentation depends on language4 ,but probably we have spoiled the language from the grammatical and rhetorical point of view4 ,we may have had to supply much that would be redundant and unsightly in ordinary conversation or writing1 and to take away much that is appropriate to colloquial discourse4 ,we are diverting language to a use for which it was not designed1 and we need not be surprised if the result is ungraceful4 ,this cannot be helped since there exists no other means than language by which to express our concrete reasoning4 ,i have already shown practically how an argument can be arranged so as to indicate the logical relations subsisting between its parts4 ,a ,greek cross is drawn1 and in the four angles thus made the four parts of the argument are written1 or the principal words of each4 ,begin with the conclusion1 for that is generally the most explicitly given2 then find or supply the part of the precedent that agrees or logically rhymes with it2 next place the subject in the first compartment1 and the case under it4 ,these relative positions should not be varied4 ,when this has been practiced for a while it enables one to dismember the most intricate argument with ease and exactness4 ,the redaction or re-writing of the language can be abbreviated by regarding the horizontal line as equivalent to a declaration of resemblance between case and precedent-subject1 and 7by application7 between the illustrative abstraction and conclusion4 ,if there is an argument at all there must be this resemblance1 and the right-hand parts must have one of the six categorical relations to the left-hand parts4 ,the contents of the angles may be cut down to a word or two1 as-- ,i4 ,tyrants death ---------------- ,caesar death ,if the category be further indicated by a numeral over the upright line1 we have the essential parts of the argument in a very compact form4 ,the cross and categorical numeral may be regarded as a sufficient substitute for grammatical syntax and punctuation4 ,the negative word that generally occurs in stigmatic arguments requires special attention4 ,it should always be put in the second angle1 and when it may read so as to negative the subject it should be hyphened to the predicate1 thus giving it the value of non1 un1 im1 or other negative prefix4 ,to say colloquially that 'all ,russians are not angels' leaves room to believe that some ,russians are angels1 the 'not' applying to 'all' instead of to 'angels4' ,by linking 'not' to 'angels' we get a term equivalent to non-angelic1 which expresses the meaning intended--that no ,russians are angels4 ,caution should be observed with partitive words like 'some1' 'many1' 'a few1' c4 ,there is little danger of ambiguity when they occur in the case1 for that means that we bring only a portion of a group of things to judgment1 which we are manifestly entitled to do4 ,the conclusion however applies only to the portion in question1 not to the rest of the group4 ',honest men deserve respect2 some ,negroes are honest men2 these particular ,negroes deserve respect4' ,in the precedent1 partitive words imply that only some of the subject have the applicate4 ,if that portion is a dialectical 'all'--that is1 if there has been no exception in the course of our experience--we may1 though that experience has been limited1 venture to treat the applicate as universal and ground a conclusion upon it4 ,if the subject is really partitive--if we know for certain that some subjects have the applicate and others have it not--the conclusion must follow the greater probability4 ,if the number and character of the observed cases is known we can express the probability arithmetically2 it is the number of occurrences of a given character divided by the total number4 ,redaction must not be used to correct original errors of observation2 its purpose is to render explicit in language what is implicit in thought1 not what might have been thought supposing the thinker had been more intelligent or industrious than he was4 ',conversion' is a process admitted or required in the artificial methods of syllogistic dialectic4 ,it consists mainly in transposing the subject and predicate of a proposition1 as 'some ,europeans are ,mohammedans'--'some ,mohammedans are ,europeans1' ,this operation never takes place in real argument1 or is merely the emendation of a proposition at first awkwardly expressed4 ,conversion can take place only when the predicate is a class1 hence the categorical propositions cannot be converted4 ,footnote #af3 ,though evidently suggested by language1 the form which the syllogistic logic finally assumed is so unlike anything grammatical1 that it is easily convertible into symbols having no resemblance to language4 ,it has been put into literal symbols with algebraic values1 and into geometrical diagrams4 ,a logical machine has even been invented by ,professor ,jevons1 'worked by keys like a pianoforte1' which returns 'infallible answers'--of the ,aristotelian sort--to every kind of question4 ,that is sufficiently unlike both reason and language4 ,,fallacies ,,xxix--,,of ,,equivocation ,,and ,,mal-,,observation ,fallacies are counterfeit or sham arguments4 ,they may fail to be arguments--7#a7 because their antecedents are false2 7#b7 because the antecedents though true are not arranged dialectically1 and do not suggest the right conclusion2 7#c7 because the language is equivocal4 ,to take the last first4 ,so many things are called by the same name1 and so many different names may be applied to the same thing1 that if we attempt to argue from words alone1 without any personal knowledge of the things or judgments that are in question1 we shall certainly make mistakes4 ,the only security against this sort of fallacy is much experience1 and the self-denial necessary to relinquish argument and the criticism of arguments1 when we have no sufficient knowledge of the data4 ,the degree of imperfection in observation which should be considered to render the theorem fallacious1 is no easy matter to determine4 ,one class of logicians 7the ,formal7 get over the difficulty by declaring that dialectic is not concerned with concrete knowledge at all1#ag but only with its general properties 7as conceived by ,aristotle71 and they have set up as a standard of logical truth the capability of being imagined4 ,a centaur is to them as true a fact as a horse1 and they would accept as valid such a theorem as this3 ',all centaurs object to be shod with iron2 ,gryneus is a centaur2 therefore we may conclude that he would resist being shod with iron4' ,no amount of conceivability or formal coherence can make this other than nonsense4 ,j4 ,s4 ,mill and his followers go to the opposite extreme4 ,they study all the sciences and endeavour to master their methods of reasoning--which is well2 but they do so with the prepossession that there exists some absolute standard of knowledge to fail in attaining which involves fallacy4 ,they thus condemn as false all theorems based on superseded notions of nature and man4 ,only modern thinkers can argue rationally--the ancients were all and habitually victims of fallacy1--and of the moderns only the few are rational who have mastered the latest theories on every subject4 ,this is the principle of ,mill's doctrine on the fallacies of observation2 we can see that he regarded all beliefs as fallacious which he had himself outgrown or did not feel a need of4 ',truth' was simply the facts and judgments that happened to suit ,mill's mental constitution4 ,from the ,substantial point of view this is an untenable position4 ,no degree of observation is intrinsically defective if it serve the purpose of intellect1 which is to protect the mind4 ,there is no intellectual truth as a thing in itself4 ,the thoughts of a sparrow or a child are as perfect as those of a man1 if they afford the necessary defence to the individual's sentiment4 ,as we change our inner mental character1 new intellectual ideas have to be acquired and the old are discarded1 perhaps completely forgotten4 ,they appear now to be ignorances and fallacies--mal-observation and bad reasoning4 ,the new seem to be so much truer--perhaps infallibly true4 ,all that is illusion4 ,we make another advance1 and the thoughts that a week before were as stable as rocks are now cast aside as absurd4 ,perhaps the belief in the certainty of present judgments is a condition of our making the best use of them2 if so they should not be shaken until we are ready to enter on the next stage of knowledge4 ,it is quite true that one man may know more than another1 but the ground on which the more intellectual is generally considered to be superior to the latter is not the right one4 ,he is not better for his intellectual acquirements1 but he is better if his mind1 being of a finer sort1 required a superior intellect to defend it4 ,at bottom1 then1 the general cause of mal-observation--there are particular causes which interfere with the general rule--is inferiority of sentimental character4 ,we do not see what we do not need to see1 and we see imperfectly what is not essential to our well-being4 ,that we should be ignorant or reason badly about what does not concern us is not in itself a defect4 ,it is inconsistent with these views on the function of intellect to admit that any sort of non-observation or mal-observation can be always and for all alike fallacious4 ,if there are things which we habitually ignore1 the presumption is that they do not concern us--that the knowledge they would confer is not essential to our welfare and would be intellectual lumber4 ,i should therefore abstain from condemning as fallacies theorems drawn in good faith from facts believed to be true1 and which serve as motives of conduct4 ,they are sophisms only when the reasoners have not taken ordinary pains to verify their data1 or1 knowing the antecedents to be false1 pretend to believe them for some immoral purpose4 ,,xxx--,,of ,,parallel ,,arrangement ,there is no fault of perversion1 mutilation1 or entanglement in the statement of an argument that we do not meet with in actual reasoning4 ,even in the writings of educated and honest thinkers it is rare to meet with an argument the parts of which are clearly distinguished by the author himself1 and expressed so as to show the precise degree of force they ought to carry4 ,reasoning is still only a semi-conscious process directed by rule-of-thumb4 ,we make certain statements and find they have a power of moving others1 so we continue to make them4 ,but whether the result is due to the rationality of the discourse or merely to the docility of the hearers1 we do not know1 and--so long as the desired result follows--we do not care to inquire4 ,for this state of things logicians are to a great extent responsible4 ,they are uncritical imitators of the ,greek philosophers1 whose notions on dialectic were quite wrong4 ,the ,greeks and their medieval and modern followers have squandered attention on a mental process which is not reason1 mistaking it for reason1 so that practically there has never been a science of dialectic4 ,however much reasoners may have wished to present their thoughts coherently1 they have not been provided with a method or notation adapted to the purpose4 ,with an instinctive sense of the futility of the ,syllogism1 they have ignored it completely4 ,i cannot call to mind a single controversial work that has been presented in syllogistic form1 nor do even trained logicians use it overtly in argument4#ah ,yet if it were what it professes to be1 it would be as natural and convenient to express our arguments in syllogism as it is to put down on paper a sum in arithmetic4 ,we are1 as regards the expression of reasoning1 in the position of numerical thinkers before the invention of figures and the elaboration of arithmetical rules4 ,we have to do all our arguments 'in our head1' and so we do them badly4 ,we can seldom be sure of the correctness of our own reasonings1 and we are constantly being misled by sophistry4 ,nothing indeed will enable us to reason well or to detect false reasoning on a subject of which we are entirely ignorant1 but a large measure of protection would be afforded by the adoption of a uniform system of presenting arguments1 by which all the assumptions they involve are rendered explicit4 ,one of the commonest omissions in argumentation is to take the precedent for granted4 ,this is allowable when it is a fact universally known or believed4 ',if you let the glass fall it will be broken1'--the omitted precedent is the known consequences of letting brittle things fall to the ground4 ',caius is a liar1 therefore he is a coward'--presupposes that every liar is a coward4 ,this liberty of suppression is sometimes used sophistically4 ,the tacit precedent is not universally known or accepted1 but if it is questioned the sophist is ready with an exclamation of surprise or contempt at our supposed ignorance4 ,persons who are afraid of appearing singular in their beliefs are liable to be deceived by this trick4 ',it frequently happens1' says ,whately1 'in the case of a fallacy of omitted precedent that the hearers are left to the alternative of supplying either a premiss which is not true1 or else one which does not prove the conclusion3 e4g4 if a man expatiates on the distress of the country1 and thence argues that the government is tyrannical1 we must suppose him to assume either that every distressed country is under a tyranny1 which is a manifest falsehood1 or merely that every country under a tyranny is distressed1 which1 however true1 proves nothing1 the ,middle ,term being undistributed4444 ,which are we to suppose the speaker meant us to understand8 ,surely just whichever each of his hearers might happen to prefer3 some might assent to the false premiss2 others allow the unsound syllogism2 to the sophist himself it is indifferent1 as long as they can be brought to admit the conclusion4' ,we sometimes attempt to reason from ,contrast instead of resemblance1 with a confused notion that things which differ in some respects must differ also in others4 ',who spareth the rod hateth the child2 the parent who loveth his child must therefore spare not the rod4' ,the fallacy of this becomes apparent when we complete the theorem in the parallel form4 ,,vi4 ,the hating parent spares the rod ---------------------------------------- ------ ,the loving parent differs from ,no ,conclusion the hating parent ,the following has often been presented as a valid argument--',what is universally believed must be true2 the belief in ,god's existence is not universal2 it is therefore not true4' ,i4 ,what is universally believed is true ------------------------------------ ,the existence of ,god is not ,n4 ,c4 universally believed ,to establish the conclusion aimed at1 it would be necessary to lay down as precedent--',what is not universally believed is not true4' ,these theorems from contrast are on a par with the following-- ,i4 ,cows are four-footed ---------------------------------------- ----- ,sheep are not cows sheep are not four-footed ,this is the fallacy called in the quaint language of the syllogists ',illicit ,process of the ,major ,term4' ,in ,false ,analogy the resemblance is so slight that the application is untrustworthy1 or a conclusion is drawn in excess of the resemblance4 ,if from the habit of calling a deep bay or salt-water loch an 'arm' of the sea from its analogy to a human arm1 we conclude that the sea has elbows and wrists1 we commit this fallacy4 ,the earth is like an orange1 but we must not think that it is pulpy inside4 ,akin to this is the fallacy of ,false ,generality or ,doubtful ,precedent4 ,it consists in carelessly or perversely using bad antecedents when better are available4 ,this applies to such current prejudices as that all ,frenchmen are frivolous1 all ,germans mystical1 all ,jews dishonest1 all ,carthaginians faithless1 all rich people purseproud1 all nobles haughty1 and so on4 ,even if all the ,carthaginians we personally knew had proved faithless1 our general knowledge of mankind should keep us from inferring that a whole nation should be faithless4 ,the most we should conclude is that some ,carthaginians are faithless1 but we are free to exercise caution in future dealings with members of that race4 ,all these generalities are grounded on this prior argument3 'when a known portion of a class exhibits certain qualities1 we are justified in inferring that the whole class possess these qualities'--which is only occasionally true4 ,the fallacy of ,accident occurs when the precedent is so defined as not to exclude exceptions1 and the case happens to be one of the exceptions4 ',what gives pain should be abstained from2 surgical operations give pain2 they should therefore be abstained from4' ,the painful things that should be universally abstained from are those which give needless or useless pain1 not the sort that give less pain than they remove4 ,falstaff committed this fallacy when he supposed that the ,king would be a boon companion like the ,prince4 ,so did the colonists who introduced rabbits and water-cress into ,australia1 on the supposition that they would there have the same function or value as in ,great ,britain4 ,in consequence of the ,accidental change the rabbits have developed into a pest1 and the water-cress obstructs navigation4 ,if the applicate is a property of the subject only when the latter is taken collectively1 it will not yield a true conclusion when the parts or individuals of the subject are taken separately4 ,all the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles1 but it does not follow that one of them--though it resembles the triangle to some extent--is equal to two right angles4 ,in this instance we should render the meaning clear by saying 'collectively equal1' when no argument follows and no mistake is made4 ,this is called the fallacy of ,division4 ,the fallacy of ,composition is the converse of this4 ,what is true of several singulars may not be true of all of them taken together4 ,because each of the witnesses in a law case is liable to error1 it does not follow that the concurrent testimony of many is not to be credited4 7,jevons47 ,circular or ,tautological theorems 7,petitio ,principii ,begging the ,question7 are a breach of rule #b1 section ,,xviii4 ,this fallacy often consists in proposing as a precedent the case1 or information drawn from the case and stated in other words4 ',to allow every man an unbounded freedom of speech must always be1 on the whole1 advantageous to the ,state2 for it is highly conducive to the interests of the ,community that each individual should enjoy a liberty perfectly unlimited of expressing his sentiments4' 7,whately47 ,it is conducive that each individual should enjoy ---------------------------------------- --------- ,it is advantageous to allow ,there may be tautology in a single word--the 'question-begging epithet4' ,we undertake to prove something1 but get no further than the use of metaphors implying the point in dispute4 ,for example1 some scientific writers are anxious to promote the belief that animal life is a combination of natural forces--that there is no individual life distinct from cosmic life1--but all their proof consists in calling a man or beast a 'machine1' and calling machines 'creatures4' ,this might be mistaken for the ,substantialist doctrine on the same subject1 but the two are radically different4 ,substantialism asserts that man and nature have similar lives--materialism teaches that they have only one life in common1 and that the coarse1 mindless life of the cosmos as conceived realistically4 ,conclusions may be used as precedents before verification1 but it is not lawful to assume a hypothetical precedent on the understanding that it is to be proved in the course of the argument1 and then use the conclusion so obtained to prove its own precedent4 ,this is also dialectical tautology1 but the circle includes two or more theorems4 ,when naturalists tell us that in the struggle for life the fittest only survive1 and when asked how we know which are the fittest they reply that the fittest are known by the fact of their surviving1 we have a tautological argument4 ,animals that survive are the fittest ,fittest animals survive ---------------------------------------- ------------------------------ ,a particular animal hence it is the ,this animal is which is the has survived fittest of its the fittest of reason it has species its species4 survived ,survival under competitive conditions is first assumed1 and from it is deduced the superiority of the existing type of animal2 then this inferential superiority is offered to justify the previously imagined competitive survival4 ,the two hypotheses waltz round each other without making any rational advance4 ,when a book is quoted to prove its own authenticity we have this fallacy2 or when the precedent is as unknown as the conclusion1--',paradise was in ,armenia1 therefore ,gihon is an ,asiatic river4' ,the academical syllogism as defined--not always as presented--contains two fallacies1 one of which is tautology4 ',,all ,europeans are white2 ,caius is a ,european2 therefore he is white4' ,if1 as logicians say1 the 'all' is absolute and includes ,caius even before he is mentioned1 then it is clear that the theorem amounts to saying1 ',all ,europeans are white1 and one of them is ,caius4' ',both the twins are fair-haired2 ,caius is one of the twins2 therefore he is fair-haired'3--the pretended conclusion is merely a naming of a part of the precedent4 ,the first of these theorems may be interpreted so as to give a valid conclusion4 ,we are informed that an unknown person called ,caius is a ,european2 we are not told1 and we do not know1 what is the colour of his skin2 but because all the ,europeans we have known have been white1 we infer--pending actual knowledge--that ,caius is white4 ,logicians interpret the syllogism otherwise1 for they have a notion that reason should give infallible certainty4 ,after the precedent has been divided into subject and applicate1 the former is sometimes used as applicate and so generates a wrong conclusion4 ,this may be called ,cross ,reasoning or ,diagonal ,reasoning--the fallacy termed by logicians ',undistributed ,middle4' ,manx cats have no tails ---------------------------------------- --- ,this cat has no tail it must be a ,manx cat ,de ,morgan has this example--',his imbecility of character might have been inferred from his proneness to favourites2 for all weak princes have this failing4' ,all weak princes are prone ---------------------------------------- - ,he was prone he must have been weak ,statements are sometimes put forward as reasoning which contain no case1 either expressed or understood4 ,this will seem hardly credible seeing that the illustration of a case is the purpose of argumentation4 ,not only does it occur1 but a certain form of it is regarded by some logicians as valid reasoning4 ,it is the 'particular' syllogism of the ,third ,figure4 ,socrates was poor2 ,socrates was wise4 ,from these premises no conclusion can be extracted1 unless it be the verbal summary--',socrates was both poor and wise4' ,but logicians draw from it the dialectic conclusion-- ,therefore some men have been poor and wise1 or ,therefore one man has been poor and wise4 ,both these conclusions are inadmissible4 ,it is because they are empirically true that we are apt to think their truth depends on the antecedent information4 ,if we wish to extend the qualities of ,socrates to 'some men' we must make them a case with ',socrates is poor and wise' for a precedent1 but ,i fail to see how it is to be done4 ,if we add to the premises1 ',one man was ,socrates1 therefore one man was poor and wise1' we have a tautological fallacy4 ,j4 ,s4 ,mill notices a fallacy which amounts to an ,inversion of the ,parallel3 the conclusion is known or believed and the truth of the antecedents is inferred backwards4 ',people continually think and express themselves as if they believed that the premises cannot be false if the conclusion is true4 ,the truth1 or supposed truth1 of the inferences which follow from a doctrine1 often enables it to find acceptance in spite of gross absurdities in it4 ,how many philosophical systems which had scarcely any intrinsic recommendation have been received by thoughtful men because they were supposed to lend additional support to religion1 morality1 some favourite view of politics1 or some other cherished persuasion2 not merely because their wishes were thereby enlisted on its side1 but because its leading to what they deemed sound conclusions appeared to them a strong presumption in favour of its truth1 though the presumption1 when viewed in its true light1 amounted only to the absence of that particular evidence of falsehood which would have resulted from its leading by correct inference to something already known to be false4'#ai ,the conclusion of an argument may sometimes be left unexpressed4 ,if the antecedents are strong and the conclusion obvious it weakens the argument to state the conclusion in full1 besides reflecting on the capacity of the reader or hearer to draw the conclusion for himself4 ,hence we find at the end of controversial and indignant writings such expressions as--',comment is superfluous'--',we leave the reader to draw his own conclusions1'--or simply a point of exclamation is appended4 ,sophistical insinuations are suggested in this manner4 ,a train of ideas is laid that generates a conclusion which the speaker is afraid or ashamed to put into words4 ,the second fault of the syllogism as defined may be called the fallacy of ,no ,application4 ,it consists in arranging propositions so as to end in a classification1 but no applicate is detached and no rational conclusion is drawn4 ',jones is a ,welshman2 all ,welshmen are ,britons2 therefore ,jones is a ,briton4' ,if in actual thinking it were ever desired to establish by argument that ,jones is a ,briton1 it would be with the object of applying to him some quality connoted by ,briton1 but the presence of which in ,jones is a matter of doubt4 ,this would be a conclusion--but not the mere classification4 ,irrelevant ,conclusion--the fallacy called by ,aristotelians ,ignoratio elenchi--is an attempt to substitute a better argument for the one proposed1 but which proves something which has not been denied1 or stigmatises something that has not been asserted4 ,it frequently arises from honest ignorance of the question at issue1 as in the objections usually made to the ,berkeleyan ,substantialism4 ,it can also be used as a weapon of sophistry1 by confusing the matter in dispute or diverting attention to side issues4 ,it is irrelevant to the truth of a conclusion to point out that he who now supports it formerly opposed it1 or that his conduct is inconsistent with a belief in it4 ,appeals to passion--to reverence for authority--to popular belief--are instances of this fallacy4 ,the best protection against ,fallacy--next to a thorough knowledge of the matter--is a clear notion of the properties of a valid argument2 it is useful however to be able to distinguish and name the faulty theorems one constantly meets in controversial speeches and writings4 ,footnote #ag3 ,one fault of observation is noticed by formal logicians2 it is that of assigning an improper cause1 ,non causa pro caus or ,post hoc ergo propter hoc4 ,it is evident that defects in every other category have an equal light to be noticed4 ,footnote #ah3 ,whately complains of the disinclination shown by logicians to put their rules into practice4 ',whenever they have to treat of anything that is beyond the mere elements of ,logic1 they totally lay aside all reference to the principles they have been occupied in establishing and explaining1 and have recourse to a loose1 vague1 and popular kind of language2 such as would be best suited indeed to an exoterical discourse but seems strangely incongruous in a professed logical treatise4444 ,surely it affords but too much plausibility to the cavils of those who scoff at ,logic altogether1 that the very writers who profess to teach it should never themselves make any application of1 or reference to1 its principles1 when1 and when only1 such application and reference are to be expected4' ,logic1 ,book ,,iii4 ,introd4 ,the fact here admitted proves that even logicians do not find their method of any practical use4 ,but what is the meaning of the emphatic 'when only'8 ,why should a logical method be unsuitable for every sort of subject except those matters of logic that are beyond the mere elements8 ,footnote #ai3 ,logic1 ',fallacies1' c4 #f4 ,,academical ,,dialectic ,,xxxi--,,analogy ,logicians of ,greek inspiration apply the term reasoning or argument to at least eight different intellectual operations1 some of them important indeed but only one of them argument4 ,this is ,analogy--which receives but little notice from logicians because it does not give certain conclusions4 ,the operations mistaken for argument are3 ,immediate ,inference-- ,arithmetical ,calculation-- ,geometrical ,demonstration-- ,induction-- ,aristotle's ,dictum-- ,mediate ,comparison-- ,syllogism4 ,,xxxii--,,immediate ,,inference ,some logicians maintain that it is possible to draw a kind of conclusions from one judgment alone4 ,these pretended conclusions are of two species4 ,the first is a restatement in different words of the whole or part of the single idea1 and it is preceded by 'therefore' to give it the appearance of an argument4 ',all men suffer1 therefore some men suffer4' ',john is a man1 therefore he is a living creature4' ',this weighs that down1 therefore it is heavier4' ,these are all obvious tautologisms4 ,it is not an inference to deny the opposite of what we have asserted1 as ',the weather is warm1 therefore it is not cold4' ,the conditional and dilemmatic examples of logicians abound in such 'inferences4' ,we cannot entirely avoid these locutions1 as they give point and clearness to speech1 but they are not argument1 even when introduced by 'therefore4' ,the other species of spurious conclusions arises out of what is technically called ,conversion4 ,this is a process permitted in ,syllogistic in order to render propositions more explicit4 ,the subject may change places with the predicate1 a 'some' may be inserted1 an 'all' suppressed1 or a 'not' may be made to qualify one word instead of another4 ,in all this there must be no change in the meaning of the proposition1 and therefore there can be no inference4 ,if the second proposition means something more or different from the first1 another premise is unconsciously taken for granted1 or the supposed interpretation amounts to interpolation4 ,the reasoner may have inadvertently or sophistically added something to the original datum4 ,here is an example of inference by conversion--',all cabbages are plants1 therefore some plants are cabbages4' ,if it is not understood from the terms of the first proposition that plants are limited to such as are cabbages1 the 'some' of the converted proposition is an interpolation supplied from the reasoner's knowledge of the matter4 ,in this case the 'quantification' of plants is not a valid inference from the original information4 ,,xxxiii--,,arithmetical ,,calculation ,arithmetic is first a manipulation of symbols called 'figures4' ,there are ten of these1 and they are capable of many species of combination1 and an indefinite number of individual operations under each species4 ,certain rules govern each sort of operation1 and when the rules are properly understood and recollected the operations can be performed with absolute certainty4 ,although the figures have names relating to number1 and the problems given for exercise make mention of acres1 pounds1 tons1 miles1 and all sorts of concrete objects1 the symbolic calculations of books have no necessary relation to real things1 numbers1 or quantities4 ,they are a purely conventional treatment of arbitrary marks that may mean anything or nothing4 ,that is the arithmetic of the 'schools4' ,there is no trace of reasoning or argument in it--it is mere rule and recollection4 ,there is however real ,number and there is real ,quantity4 ,number is that quality in which a group of three things 7for instance7 is seen to differ from a group of four or seven1 even when the things are otherwise quite similar4 ,we begin by distinguishing ten primary degrees of this difference1 and then consider other degrees as multiples or parts of these primary degrees4 ,quantity is degree in size1 and is a property quite different from number4 ,but1 for convenience1 we assume that quantities are all units or fractions of certain standard quantities1 and we are thus enabled to use the same terms for both number and quantity4 ,the names which written language provides for the numerical degrees and their combinations are inconvenient to use1 and so a set of symbols was devised exclusively for numerical designation4 ,these are the figures of arithmetic4 ,they are the technical vocabulary of number1 and of quantity considered as number4 ,number and quantity admit of but two kinds of variation--increase and diminution4 ,these variations can be denoted so correctly by figures1 that any combination we first make in figures according to rule can be reproduced in real objects1 provided the objects are in other respects possible4 ,the result of this perfection of technical nomenclature is that our study of number and quantity has been transferred from real objects to figures4 ,it has become symbolic and indirect1 and most of us never go beyond the symbols2 that is1 what we call arithmetic is an affair of figures1 not of true quantities and numbers4 ,we talk of miles1 tons1 and pounds sterling1 but we do not think of miles1 tons1 and pounds sterling--we think of figures4 ,a thousand shillings is to us1 when arithmetically stated1 '#ajjjs41' just as it is here represented on paper2 we do not think of silver coins1 and we could not if we tried imagine a thousand things of any sort4 ,there is in reality an enormous difference between '#jjjas4' and '#ajjjs41' but to the arithmetician the only objective difference is one of arrangement in figures4 ,from these considerations it follows that there are two sciences of number4 ,there is the true science which deals with quantities really seen in objects and imagined in the mind1 and an artificial science dealing with figures which have only a historical connection with real quantity4 ,of the latter1 unfortunately1 our arithmetical education chiefly consists4 ,we are never taught to distinguish number and size in things by the 'eye1' that is1 by reason4 ,the symbolism that was originally intended to assist real arithmetical thought has ended by supplanting it4 ,an ignorant shepherd1 bricklayer1 or carpenter1 who is accustomed to make a rapid estimate of the number of things in a mass1 or the area of planking in a log1 has a better training in real arithmetical science than some mathematicians4 ,if we are obliged to practise genuine arithmetical thought in engineering1 astronomy1 and other professions1 our scholastic symbolism gets realised to some extent1 and is a great assistance in arithmetical estimation4 ,but without this it has no more reference to number and quantity than a musical education1 based entirely on the printed or written notation1 has to the appreciation of musical sounds4 ,a book arithmetician is in the position of a person thoroughly acquainted with theoretical music1 and who can even compose music according to rule1 but who is unable to distinguish a high note from a low one or harmony from discord in actual sound4 ,it will thus be seen that it is only in the real arithmetic that reasoning can enter4 ,the judgment in free arithmetical observation is the counting of actual groups and the measurement of actual surfaces1 and the argument consists in estimating the number of individuals in other groups1 and the size of other surfaces1 without counting or measurement4 ,but this exercise never enters into symbolic arithmetic4 ,all the apparent conclusions of book arithmetic are tautological2 they consist in repeating in one combination of symbols the whole or part of what has been already given in another combination4 ,it is an exercise in expression--nothing more4 ,arithmetical ratio has a resemblance to the rational parallel4 #c3e33i3ae might be arranged thus-- #e #ae ----- #c #i ,this is not argument1 for two reasons4 7#a7 ,the apparent conclusion is not an effort of rational imagination2 it is a figure that can be obtained with infallible certainty by treating the other figures according to a rule1 which has only to be recollected and applied4 7#b7 ,the relation between the left-hand figures and the right-hand figures is not a categorical judgment2 it is a form of resemblance1 and so it cannot yield a valid conclusion4 ,,xxxiv--,,geometrical ,,demonstration ,this exercise is regarded by logicians as one of the purest forms of argument4 ,it is nothing more than an aid to a certain kind of perception4 ,take1 for instance1 the fifth proposition of the first book of ,euclid--',the angles at the base of an isosceles triangle are equal1 and if the equal sides be produced the angles on the other side shall also be equal4' ,the proposition is accompanied by a diagram of an isosceles triangle with the equal sides already produced1 so that the conditional phrasing of the proposition does not mean that the production of the sides1 and what results therefrom1 are future or possible events which neither ,euclid nor anybody else has yet experienced1 and the probability of which is an argumentative conclusion4 ,what the proposition means is this3 an isosceles triangle of which the equal sides have been produced1 has equal angles on the same side of the base both within and without the triangle4 ,it is an affirmation of what is1 not of what we must believe to be for reasons to be given4 ,the truth of the proposition is seen at once from simple inspection of the diagram4 ,it is an association of properties related in a certain manner4 ,it has many relations which the geometer does not mention in this proposition1 but those which he mentions are seen to be correctly described as soon as we direct attention to them4 ,if we have any doubt on the subject we remove it by measuring the angles4 ,euclid however does not appeal to the powers of inspection we can exercise in this case1 and he ignores our facilities for measurement4 ,he appeals to simpler and easier kinds of perception expressed in his axioms1 which he began by assuming we were capable of exercising without demonstration4 ,they constitute what he considers the minimum power of relational perception1 which if a man have not he cannot be taught geometry4 ,euclid also in this proposition refers to the result of a prior demonstration1 the relation in which he supposes we have seized4 ,by means of these antecedents he prompts our perceptive faculty up to the point of seeing the relations expressed in this proposition4 ,if we saw them without the prompting1 the latter is superfluous2 if the relations do not stand the test of measurement1 the prompting goes for nothing4 ,all ,euclid's demonstrations are of this sort4 ,they are pointings-out of what can be seen by inspection and sufficient attention4 ,he is not bringing a case under a precedent--he is describing relations in things1 that may serve as precedents in concrete or applied geometry4 ,the service he performs is that of a connoisseur who points out the beauties of a picture or landscape to a careless or uninterested spectator4 ,relations are sometimes difficult to see--much more difficult than colours or masses--and there is a legitimate sphere of usefulness for people who point out what others are apt to overlook4 ,there is no prediction in this4 ,we are not asked to conceive anything that is not before us4 ,geometrical demonstration thus assists perception1 but does not imply reasoning4 ,euclid does not argue--he prompts4 ,those who maintain that ,euclid is syllogistic do so on the ground that the axioms are generalisations1 and that as often as one is cited there occurs the subsumption of an object under a class-notion4 ,that would not be argument2 but let us suppose it means bringing a case under a precedent4 ,then if the axioms be precedents and the demonstration an application of them to new cases1 the theorem is a fallacy--a useless argument written to prove a foregone certainty1 for the conclusion can be and generally is perfectly known without reference to the demonstration4 ,it appears to me more true to regard the axioms as the simplest relations1 which everybody may be supposed capable of perceiving1 and that geometrical demonstration consists in showing that other relations not so apparent are really varieties or combinations of the simpler relations4 ,by using in concert with the axioms the relations already demonstrated1 we are enabled to grasp relations that would not have been at all obvious on first beginning the geometrical praxis4 ,euclid's geometry is thus a series of graduated lessons in a special sort of observation1 not a system of deductive arguments4 ,the educational theory that geometry is exceptionally good training for the reason--apart from its practical utility in mechanics--is thus evidently a mistake4 ,abstract geometry may induce habits of minute observation and exact definition1 but reason nowhere enters into the study4 ,as a rational gymnastic there is nothing better than the game of chess4 ,,xxxv--,,induction ,those who contend that there is a kind of argument called ,inductive different from the ,deductive1 illustrate their view by some such example as the following3--',this1 that1 and the other magnet' that is1 all the magnets we know 'attract iron2 therefore all possible magnets attract iron4' ,they say there is an irresistible compulsion in the mind to draw such a conclusion from information of the kind exemplified1 and they contrast that type of thought with a deductive argument like--',all magnets attract iron2 this object is a magnet2 therefore it attracts iron4' ,they figure the former as a progress upwards1 the latter as a regress downwards4 ,that is ,induction as understood by ,j4 ,s4 ,mill and ,sir ,william ,hamilton2 on this point these philosophers happen to agree4 ,the first of those arguments is a deduction with the precedent omitted4 ,expressed in full it amounts to this--',any relation observed several times to subsist between two classes of objects1 and concerning which no exception has ever been observed1 may be taken as universal2 there is such a relation between known magnets and known iron2 therefore it may be regarded as universal4' ,the precedent is not a mental compulsion1 but a result of experience4 ,induction as above defined is therefore only a species of deductive conclusions4 ,most logicians take the word ,induction in its etymological sense1 as meaning systematic observation carried on with a view to obtaining a general idea of some class of objects2 or of establishing a categorical relation between one object or class and another1 by eliminating all the alternative correlatives4 ,in neither operation would ,induction be argument4 ,in science a 'perfect induction' is one in which all existing objects of a class1 or all objects related in a certain manner1 have been perceived1 so that there is no other object concerning which a conclusion can be drawn4 ,in such cases1 says ,mill1 there is no induction--only a summary of experience4 ,he evidently regarded the conclusion with respect to unknown cases as the essence of induction1 whereas in the scientific sense the induction is the positive content of the idea1 or the abstract relation--the unknown cases are ignored1 or there may be none4 ,in scientific writings induction sometimes means the method of observation rather than the result--the method of correcting inferences by perception1 wherever possible4 ,,xxxvi--,,aristotle',s ,,dictum ,this is usually put into ,english thus--',whatever is affirmed or denied of a class1 may be affirmed or denied of any part of that class1' and such an affirmation or denial is supposed to be an act of reason4 ,archbishop ,whately expounds the ,dictum in analysing the following theorem--,whatever exhibits marks of design had an intelligent author2 the world exhibits marks of design2 therefore the world had an intelligent author4 ',in the first of these premises1' he says1 'we find it assumed universally of the class of things which exhibit marks of design1 that they had an intelligent author2 and in the other premise1 the world is referred to that class as comprehended in it3 now it is evident that whatever is said of the whole of a class1 may be said of anything comprehended in that class3 so that we are thus authorised to say of the world1 that it had an intelligent author4 ,again1 if we examine a syllogism with a negative conclusion1 as1 e4g4 nothing which exhibits marks of design could have been produced by chance2 the world exhibits1 c42 therefore the world could not have been produced by chance3 the process of ,reasoning will be found to be the same2 since it is evident1 that whatever is denied universally of any class may be denied of anything that is comprehended in that class4 ,on further examination it will be found1 that all valid arguments whatever may be easily reduced to such a form as that of the foregoing syllogisms2 and that consequently the principle on which they are constructed is the ,,universal ,,principle of ,reasoning4'#bj ,the examples given by ,whately are perfectly valid2 the first is a constructive argument in the ,sixth ,category1 the second a stigmatic in the ,fifth4 ,i have in several places admitted that the arguments adduced by syllogists are sometimes correct1 the fault complained of being in the mode in which such correct arguments are interpreted4 ,they are interpreted wrongly1 and then other theorems are found or made agreeing with the interpretation1 and the admitted soundness of the first theorems is used to procure acceptance for the second4 ,things brought under the same definition ought to be essentially alike1 but they are not so when the utmost latitude is taken to 'assume' that predicates have properties which they obviously have not4 ,the objections we make to the ,dictum as above interpreted are--7#a7 that in reasoning the precedent 7major premise7 need not be a class2 7#b7 if it is a class1 it consists of all known things of a similar kind1 not of all possible things of a similar kind4 ,when interpreted in the latter sense the ,dictum becomes dialectically tautological1 as has been often observed4 ,,xxxvii--,,mediate ,,comparison ,a few pages further on ,whately gives a totally different account of reasoning1 without being aware of his inconsistency4 ',every syllogism has three1 and only three terms3 viz4 the middle term and the two terms 7or extremes1 as they are commonly called7 of the ,conclusion or ,question4 ,of these1 first1 the subject of the conclusion is called the minor term2 second1 its predicate1 the major term2 and third1 the middle term1 7called by the older logicians ,argumentum7 is that with which each of them is separately compared1 in order to judge of their agreement or disagreement with each other4 ,if therefore there were two middle terms1 the extremes or terms of conclusion not being both compared to the same1 could not be conclusively compared to each other4'#ba ,here reasoning is made to consist in comparing two things by reference to a third which both resemble4 ,there is not a word about classification1 which is declared just before--in loud capitals--to be the universal principle of reasoning6 ,on this definition we remark-- 7#a7 ,comparison by mediation is untrustworthy1 unless the qualities compared be rigidly defined or restricted1 as in geometry and the use of standards 7,,xxii74 ,in geometry the only two qualities recognised are figure and magnitude4 ,the axiom of mediate comparison means that things having the same magnitude as a third thing are to be considered equal1 though they may have different outlines4 ,but the axiom is liable to be untrue in things of three or more qualities4 ,add colour4 ,then a white sphere may resemble a white cube on the one side1 and a black sphere on the other1 but the white cube does not at all resemble the black sphere4 ,this axiom is therefore inadmissible or at least extremely risky in logic1 which treats of things having many qualities4 7#b7 ,comparison1 however correctly performed1 is never the end1 but only a means1 of reasoning4 ,,xxxviii--,,syllogism ,we have already had two distinct definitions of syllogism4 ,according to the first it is the application of class-attributes to individuals known to belong to the class2 according to the second it is the comparison of two things or terms by reference to a third which both resemble4 ,when we arrive at the chapters in logic books devoted to the exposition of the syllogism in detail1 we find that the theorems there discussed do not conform to either of those definitions4 ,the only sort of syllogism that can be 'converted' is one consisting of two classifications1 and a conclusion which predicates a classification1 as thus-- ,all ,englishmen are ,europeans2 ,john ,smith is an ,englishman2 therefore ,john ,smith is a ,european4 ,observe the difference between this theorem and that adduced in illustration of the ,dictum 7,,xxxvi74 ,in the latter the first premise is a categorical judgment and so therefore is the conclusion2 in the theorem just given the first premise is a classification1 and the conclusion is necessarily a classification4 ,we first remark that such an 'argument' is never met with in real spontaneous thinking--it occurs only in logic books4 ,it is manufactured exclusively for ,peripatetic consumption4 ,the reason it is not to be found is simple--the conclusion it yields is a classification1 and that is not enough for valid argument4 ,in reasoning we may introduce a classification as the minor premise--that is1 the proposition which brings the case under the precedent--but the applicate is never a general or class idea4 ,it is one or more properties abstracted from the subject 7whether the latter be a single object or general idea71 and applied to the case4 ,merely to classify a case and so leave it would answer no rational purpose4 ,logicians urge in recommendation of this syllogism that it gives a certain conclusion4 ,the premises being correct1 the conclusion is infallibly true4 ,no doubt it is1 for in contemplating a thing we can mentally enter it into all the classes to which it appears to belong1 whatever be their generality4 ,knowing the class ,european and the individual ,john ,smith1 we see at once that the latter is contained in the former1 and we can do this without putting him first in the minor class ,english4 ,it is like saying1 ',the pavilion is in the garden1 ,john ,smith is in the pavilion1 therefore he is in the garden4' ,of course he is6 ,the minor premise of a double classification is superfluous4 ,the fact that such conclusions are certain1 shows how nugatory they are4 ,we are not certain of anything till it has been experienced4 ,in legitimate reasoning the conclusion is never more than probable4 ,the certainty of these double classifications shows that we are stating what we already know--not imagining an ideal addition to our positive knowledge4 ,doctrine of the ,predicate4 ,so long as logicians are permitted to fabricate their own examples1 all is plain sailing with the syllogism4 ,but they are sometimes obliged to deal with genuine arguments4 ,in this case what they do is to assume that for logical purposes every predicate of the precedent--that is1 the applicate--is a general or class term4 ,even when an argument is good they spoil it with a bad theory4 ,sir ,william ,hamilton states that up to his time logicians recognised but one type of proposition--that called by him the proposition 'in extension1' which means the classifying of the subject4 ,he announced that he intended to introduce a proposition 'in comprehension1' meaning a judgment in the category of inherence--as for instance1 'man is responsible4' ,he further said that he recognised a third type of proposition1 that concerning 'cause and effect4' ,but in the course of working out these logical novelties he seems to have discovered that they were irreconcilable with conversion1 and so he dropped them4 ,the judgment in comprehension1 he then declared1 was to all intents and purposes the same as one in extension1 and as to causation--why1 a cause is a class1 and an effect is an individual belonging to that class6#bb ,let us see what is the result of treating applicates as general ideas4 ,take an example in each of the categories4 ',the paper is white4' ,this means that the paper has the property or attribute of whiteness4 ,in logic it is interpreted to mean that paper is an individual of the class white4 ,this is wrong1 for there is no such class4 ,no sane person would form a class out of salt1 snow1 milk1 china1 silver1 the moon1 and other white things2 for though they have a common property it is not the sign of a common human utility4 ,the confusing a single property with a class is not always owing to exigencies of syllogism4 ,it pervades the writings of most ,western metaphysicians1 and may be accounted for in this manner4 ,general ideas and abstract properties or ideas have in common that they are partial recognitions of what we perceive 7,,xiv74 ,the partition in each is however made in a different way1 and for a different purpose4 ,in generalisation the selection is done almost mechanically4 ,we see many things that have some common relation1 function1 or utility for us1 and we remember only so much of them as appears to be necessary for the recognition of that relation or utility--just so much of the ,intellectual experience as has always accompanied the ,sentimental experience4 ,the process is very like that of putting a piece of wood or ivory in a turning-lathe1 and whittling off all that we do not want4 ,a general idea is the useful core of a multitude of superposed observations1 each of which had something irrelevant--something which it is better to forget4 ,we whittle this off and remember only the core4 ,abstraction1 on the other hand1 is a conscious and deliberate operation from beginning to end4 ,it consists in distinguishing one by one the properties of a thing1 and even treating each property as if it had an independent existence4 ,for this exercise it is not necessary to observe many things3 we can analyse one alone1 though an acquaintance with other cognate objects is sometimes necessary to call our attention to single properties4 ,we need the shock of difference to be able to distinguish well a fine abstraction--the difference between shades of colours1 for example4 ,abstraction is thus a minute attention to individuals1 and need not for a moment be confounded with generalisation4 ,another cause of the confusion in question can be traced to the use of the verb 'is' to represent both the relation of a thing to the general idea it has contributed to form1 and the relation of a single property to the thing in which it inheres4 ,we say ',the man is a ,british subject'--classifying him2 we say also ',the man is cold'--mentioning one of his attributes4 ,there is no class of cold men1 and the two relations have nothing in common4 ,a class does not inhere in a man as cold inheres in him4 ,there is no object corresponding to class--it is a conceptual creation4 ,the ambiguity of 'is' favours the syllogistic doctrine of predication1 and there is a rule to the effect that in syllogising propositions1 all verbs are to be converted into 'is' 7or its conjugates7 with a participle or noun1 so that if they were not before statements of classification they now become such4 ',he walks' is clearly no classification2 but 'he is walking' is assimilated by false analogy to such a classification as 'he is human1' and so is treated as a classification by those who reason according to the ,letter4 ,the substantive verb has no positive and uniform meaning4 ,as an auxiliary it is a mere sign of tense1 and in other positions it is an indefinite mark of relationship1 the precise meaning of which must be determined by the subject and the context4 ,it may sometimes be dispensed with in classification1 as ',victoria ,regina'--',phillips1 ,dentist4' ,in the second category we have such propositions as 'the book lies on the table4' ,in syllogistic this is first altered to 'the book is lying on the table1' and it is feigned that 'lying on the table' is a class or general idea1 and 'book' an individual of that class4 ,to interpret 'the groom stands by the horse' a class has to be created1 composed of the persons who happen to be standing by horses4 ',the mountain is ten miles off' is a judgment in perspection4 ,syllogistically we are asked to believe that a class of things exists having the common property of being ten miles off1 and that the mountain is entered in that class4 ,the absurdity of this doctrine is self-evident4 ,in the remaining categories the reduction to 'is' has1 if possible1 a worse effect4 ,in changing ',canada lies west of ,ireland' into ',canada is a country lying west of ,ireland1' we lose the relation in concretion1 and express instead a verbal definition4 ,instead of affirming a position we explain a name4 ,in such a proposition as 'the town of ,a lies #ajj miles due north of ,b1' it is plain the predicate cannot be a class1 for only one place has the quality expressed4 ,in the fifth category we have such a proposition as 'water freezes when the temperature falls to zero ,centigrade4' ,this is turned into a substantive sentence by saying 'water is that liquid which freezes1' c41 which is a verbal or identical proposition4 ',cecrops founded ,athens' is a judgment in causation4 ,in turning it into ',cecrops was 7or is7 the founder of ,athens1' we emphasise the man's name1 but the relation signified by 'founded' is slurred over or lost sight of4 ,boole converts ',caesar conquered the ,gauls' into ',caesar is he who conquered the ,gauls1'#bc and this he interpreted as classification4 ,we need not be surprised that he should suppose a class could be formed by one individual1 for he elsewhere tells us that ,nothing is a class4#bd ,classification is not judgment of any sort--it is a variety of recollection4 ,logicians imagine it is the only judgment1 and so far as they can they degrade true judgments to that spurious form4 ,moods of the ,syllogism4 ,having persuaded themselves that classification is the beginning1 middle1 and end of reasoning1 logicians next proceed to divide the matter of their science4 ,modern logicians who have some acquaintance with real thinking as exemplified in works of physical science1 can1 if acting according to their natural intelligence1 lay down correct rules for dividing a subject4 ,these are simple and obvious3 divide according to fundamental resemblance--let each division correspond to some definite human utility--let the more important properties take precedence of the less important1 and so forth3 the merest common sense4 ,but in the division of their own subject they follow ,aristotle1 and so lose their way4 ,it is plain that an act of reasoning is a mental thing in the first place1 and only when uttered1 and thus in a secondary sense1 is it a material object4 ,the classification of arguments should therefore follow mental characteristics4 ,logicians make it follow the material characteristics of the terms in which the arguments are uttered4 ,their moods of the syllogism are mere varieties of expression1 not varieties of reason4 ,the number of these moods is accidental1 depending on flexibility of language and ingenuity in inventing varieties of syntax4 ,mere transposition of premises constitutes a difference of mood4 ,logicians however pretend to base their numeration on a more general necessity4 ,they calculate from the distinctive parts of the three propositions forming a syllogism1 varied by negation1 c41 that there ought to be sixty-four moods4 ,experience proves that in spite of their free and easy method of multiplying syllogistic varieties they cannot produce anything like that number4 ,one logician has thirty-six moods1 another thirty-two1 a third eleven2 the more orthodox fix the number at nineteen4 ,but they all admit that every argument can be reduced to one of four fundamental types--the moods of the ,first ,figure4 ,why then have more classes than these four8 ,because1 says ,whately1 it would be 'occasionally tedious' to reduce every argument to the first figure4 ,if the #aa1 #ai1 #cb1 or #cf classes were natural arguments taken down untouched from men's lips1 and it was found to be useless and troublesome to reduce them to four artificial forms1 the plea might be admitted4 ,but the so-called valid syllogisms are themselves artificial1 and just as tedious to make as the moods of the first figure4 ,not only so1 but an elaborate system of mnemonic rules is provided for reducing the valid moods to the fundamental moods1 thus admitting that the former are only intermediate halting places between the natural speech and the fundamental moods4 ,it is expected that the intermediates should be reduced to the first figure4 ,is there anything analogous to this sort of division in any science or branch of practical thought8 ,would logicians themselves sanction such a classification in a natural science8 ,if a zoologist1 for example1 were to determine beforehand how many classes of animals there ought to be1 would they not say he was acting improperly8 ,if1 after discovering that he had five times as many classes as he could find animals to put into them1 he still retained his classification and required his pupils to write out the names or symbols of all the useless classes--would not logicians be apt to call him a pedant8 ,yet in a modern work on logic such a task is prescribed for students3-- ',write out the sixty-four moods of the syllogism1 and strike out the fifty-three invalid ones4' ,we might have excused the existence of a merely verbal classification in logic1 if it were accompanied by and subordinated to a classification of theorems considered as mental facts4 ,but in syllogistic the verbal is the dominant classification1 and we have seen from the procedure of ,sir ,william ,hamilton--in dropping his categorical judgments--that when the two principles of division conflict1 it is the mental which has to give way4 ,the ,letter is allowed to kill the ,spirit4 ,all the ,moods reducible to ,one4 ,syllogists appear not to know their own schematism very well4 ,they say there are four ultimate moods1 which it is impossible to reduce to any lower number4 ,but since each of the four is1 mentally1 a double classification1 it must be possible to reflect this common property in the mode of expression4 ,the difference between them can only be verbal4 ,let us adopt another than the ordinary symbolism4 ,cut a card into three triangular pieces of unequal size1 and call them by the letters ,a1 ,b1 ,c1 beginning with the largest4 ,these are the terms of the syllogism4 ,a ,a _/,b _/ ,b _/ _/,c _/ _/,c _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ ------------ ------------ ---------- ,barbara4 ,celarent4 ,a ,a _/,b _/ ,b _/ _/ ,c _/ _/ ,c _/ _/ 3 _/ _/ 3 _/ _/ 3 3 _/ _/ 3 3 _/ _/ _/ 3 _/ _/ _/ 3 _/ _/ _/ 3 _/ _/ _/ 3 ------------444 ------------ ----------444 ,darii4 ,ferio4 ,the first mood ,barbara is formed by placing the cards on top of each other1 so that ,b is within the margin of ,a1 and ,c within the margin of ,b4 ,this is the syllogism1 ',all ,b is ,a1 all ,c is ,b1 therefore all ,c is ,a4' ,next let ,b and ,c be as above1 but let ,a be wholly apart from both4 ,this is ,celarent3 ',no ,b is ,a1 all ,c is ,b1 therefore no ,c is ,a4' ,in ,darii the whole of ,b is in ,a1 but only a part of ,c coincides with ,b4 ,the syllogism is3 ',all ,b is ,a1 some ,c is ,b1 therefore some ,c is ,a4' ,in ,ferio ,a is again wholly separated from the others1 and ,c is only partially in ,b4 ,argument3 ',no ,b is ,a1 some ,c is ,b1 therefore some ,c is not ,a4' ,it is to be remembered that all the other figures and moods are reducible to the above figure of four moods1 so that the reduction applicable to the latter is equally applicable to the former4 ,to reduce ,darii to ,barbara all that is necessary is to ignore the dotted part of ,c4 ,that is suggested by the use of the word 'some1' which has a correlative 'all' or 'others4' ,but the correlative quantity does not enter into the syllogism1 and we know nothing about it4 ,it may not even exist4 ,we are therefore at liberty to substitute for 'some ,c' the name ,d1 and consider it an integer instead of a fraction4 ,then we have the ,barbara syllogism3 ',all ,b is ,a1 all ,d 7 some ,c7 is ,b1 therefore all ,d is ,a4' ,the phrase 'all of some' is quite allowable3 ',i met some firemen1 all of whom wore brass helmets4' ,ferio in the same manner is reduced to ,celarent4 ,the dotted part of ,c is cut away1 and the part really significant in the syllogism is called ,e4 ,then ',no ,b is ,a1 all ,e is ,b1 no ,e is ,a4' ,finally ,celarent can be reduced to ,barbara4 ,b cannot indeed be enclosed in ,a1 but we assume the existence of a whole having all the characters which ,a has not1 or having none of the characters which ,a has4 ,this is the whole ,f ,not-,a4 ,then ,celarent becomes ,barbara thus3 ',all ,b is ,f1 all ,c is ,b1 therefore all ,c is ,f4' ,this demonstrates that there is only one fundamental operation where syllogists suppose there are at least four4 ,the difference is wholly a matter of language1 and disappears on changing the names of the terms and ignoring irrelevant suggestions4 ,but the syllogism1 ,i repeat1 does not represent the act of reasoning1 and its moods and figures are fit only to be a game for children4 ,footnote #bj3 ,logic1 ,book ,i4 #c4 ,footnote #ba3 ,logic1 ,book ,,ii4 c4 #c4 #b4 ,footnote #bb3 ,lectures1 iii4 pp4 #bhg and #cef4 ,the impossibility of reconciling their definitions and rules to real thinking and argument is the despair of logicians4 ,most of them take to symbols1 which are more accommodating than real experience1 having just such properties as their makers choose to put in them4 ,sir ,william ,hamilton had the courage to declare that a logician might use arguments of a concrete or real form1 but that it is not necessary they should agree with real fact4 ',the logician has a right to suppose any material impossibility1 any material falsity2 he takes no account of what is objectively impossible or false1 he has a right to assume what premises he please1 provided that they do not involve a contradiction in terms4'--,id4 #cbb4 ,that means in plain ,english that a logician may misrepresent matters of fact1 if he cannot otherwise establish his theory6 ,footnote #bc3 ,laws of ,thought1 p4 #ce4 ,footnote #bd3 ,ibid4 p4 #dg4 ,,studies ,,in ,,dialectic ,,xxxix ,the theorems given for practice in logic books are useful dialectic material1 but they do not fully illustrate all the categories4 ,logicians have no definite categories1 and in selecting examples they are unconsciously biassed in favour of those that can be most easily interpreted to signify classification4 ,the really generalistic examples are rare2 the most are judgments of inherence1 admitted in virtue of the assumption that inherent properties can--when it is needful to preserve the traditional notion of predication--be considered class-ideas4 ,theorems in perspection and concretion we do not expect to find in logic books1 for these1 in so far as they are distinct from association1 are categories peculiar to the ,berkeleyan philosophy4 ,whately has the following example in association--',lias lies above red sandstone2 red sandstone lies above coal2 therefore lias lies above coal4' ,no doubt ,whately would1 in syllogising this1 have changed the propositions to ',red sandstone is lying1' c41 and have assumed that 'lying above coal' is a class to which red sandstone belongs4 999999 ,here are examples of arguments in inherence-- ,a hot skin1 quick pulse1 intense thirst have invariably in my experience coexisted with fever2 the person now examined exhibits these symptoms1 so ,i infer that he has a fever4 ,great width of skull between the ears is invariably found united with a destructive temperament2 this animal's skull is very wide between the ears2 hence it may be concluded that he has a destructive temperament4 ,cloven feet belong universally--i4e4 as far as our experience goes--to horned animals2 we may conclude that this fossil animal1 since it appears to have had cloven feet1 was horned4 ,i4 ,cloven feet inhere with horns ---------------------------------------- ---- ,fossil animal appears to it is probable he have had cloven feet had horns ,when an architect1 contemplating the fragments of a building1 restores it in imagination after the analogy of similar buildings1 we have an argument in inherence4 ,such speculations are generally too long and complex for analysis1 but an instructive example occurs in ,canon ,rawlinson's ,seventh ,oriental ,monarchy1 which ,i will venture to quote1 marking the phrases that introduce or express the rational idea4 ,observe the difference of style between this1 which is real practical reasoning1 and the trivial certainties of ,syllogistic4 ',what remains of this massive erection the ,takht-i-,khosru1 or palace of ,chosros ,anushirwan1 at ,ctesiphon is a mere fragment1 which1 to judge from the other extant ,sassanian ruins1 cannot have formed so much as one fourth part of the original edifice4 ,nothing has come down to our day but a single vaulted hall on the grandest scale1 together with the mere outer wall of what no doubt constituted the main facade of the building4 ,the apartments1 which1 according to all analogy1 must have existed at the two sides1 and in the rear1 of the great hall1 some of which should have been vaulted1 have wholly perished4 ,imagination may supply them from the ,firuzabad1 or the ,mashita palace2 but not a trace1 even of their foundations1 is extant2 and the details consequently are uncertain1 though the general plan can scarcely be doubted4 ,at each side of the great hall were probably two lateral ones1 communicating with each other1 and capable of being entered either from the hall or from the outer air4 ,beyond the great hall was probably a domed chamber equalling it in width1 and opening upon a court1 round which were a number of moderate-sized apartments4 ,the entire building was no doubt an oblong square1 of which the shorter sides seem to have measured #cgj feet4 ,it had at least three1 and may not improbably have had a larger number of entrances1 since it belongs to tranquil times and a secure locality4' 999999 ,the most notable argument in the category of concretion is undoubtedly the inference as to the sphericity of the earth4 ,next is the sub-inference by ,columbus that ,china could be reached by sailing westward from ,portugal4 ,if the syllogistic opinion were valid--that a conclusion must be absolutely true or absolutely false--the expedition of ,columbus was based on a fallacy4 ,most people think it was eminently rational4 ,no one has seen the north or the south poles1 and the conviction that they could be realised1 if certain difficulties of transport were overcome1 is a sub-inference of the same character4 ,here is a common type of inference in perspection-- ,,iii4 ,that church is #ajj yards off ---------------------------------------- -- ,a man appears on he is #ajj ys4 off the roof of the ch4 ,and this-- ,,iii4 ,that distant house is #fj ft4 high ---------------------------------------- ------------ ,it appears to be scaffolded the scaffold is about to a third of its height #bj feet high ,in these cases we have not seen the man or the scaffolding before1 and have not measured the latter or the distance to the former3 the conclusions are imaginary judgments fairly drawn from known premises4 999999 ,the deciphering of hieroglyphics1 cuneiform inscriptions1 and remains of other dead and forgotten languages1 is argument in causation4 ,examples cannot conveniently be quoted even in a condensed form1 but this kind of reasoning is most interesting dialectically from the slightness of the analogies that are nevertheless found to give valid conclusions4 999999 ,this is considered argument by ,whately-- ,i4 ,louis is a good king ---------------------------------------- ---------- ,the governor of ,france therefore the g4 of ,f4 is is ,louis a good king ,the supposed case is a verbal proposition1 serving to rename the subject of precedent4 ,there is no reasoning4 ,if we already know that ,louis is a good king and is also the governor of ,france 7the given matters of fact71 there is no rational imagination involved in rearranging these data as in the proposed conclusion4 999999 ',he who calls you a man speaks truly2 he who calls you a fool calls you a man2 therefore he who calls you a fool speaks truly4'--,a fallacy of cross reasoning1 and the predicate is a class4 ,all fools are men ---------------------- ,you are a man ,n4 ,c4 999999 ',nothing is heavier than platina2 feathers are heavier than nothing2 therefore feathers are heavier than platina4'--,a trivial equivoque4 ,the following is more subtle4 ',theft is a crime2 theft was encouraged by the laws of ,sparta2 therefore the laws of ,sparta encouraged crime4'--,at most the laws of ,sparta encouraged one crime2 but there is a fallacy of equivocation4 ,taking things surreptitiously from the person in whose possession they may be1 is not a crime--is not theft--in a society so communistic as the ,spartan4 ,there it was encouraged as an exercise in adroitness4 ,this example shows the necessity of knowing the matter of the argument4 999999 ',warm countries alone produce wine2 ,spain is a warm country2 therefore ,spain produces wine4' ,v4 ,wine is p4 in w4 countries ---------------------------------------- - ,spain is a warm c4 ,n4 ,c4 999999 ',meat and drink are necessaries of life2 the revenues of ,vitellius were spent in meat and drink2 therefore the revenues of ,vitellius were spent on the necessaries of life4'--,fallacy of composition3 meat and drink in moderate quantities are necessaries of one life1 but not food of every kind and in excessive quantities4 999999 ',he who is most hungry eats most2 he who eats least is most hungry2 therefore he who eats least eats most4'--,a fallacy of accident3 he who eats least does not at the same time eat most4 999999 ',whatever body is in motion must move either in the place where it is1 or in the place where it is not2 neither of these is possible2 therefore there is no such thing as motion4'--,it is an abuse of reason to attempt to disprove matters of fact4 ,the conclusion of an argument being always problematical1 it can have no force against actual experience4 ,we experience motion1 therefore it cannot be disproved4 999999 ',a wise lawgiver must either recognise the rewards and punishments of a future state1 or he must be able to appeal to an extraordinary ,providence1 dispensing them regularly in this life2 ,moses did not do the former1 therefore he must have done the latter'--7,warburton1 from ,whately74--,the reasoner omitted to establish that ,moses was a wise lawgiver1 so that the precedent does not apply to his case1 except by courtesy4 999999 ',that man is independent of the caprices of fortune who places his chief happiness in moral and intellectual excellence2 a true philosopher is independent of the caprices of fortune2 therefore a true philosopher is one who places his chief happiness in moral and intellectual excellence4' ,an instance of cross reasoning4 ,i4 ,he who places is independent ---------------------------------------- -- ,philosopher is independent ,n4 ,c4 999999 ',for those who are bent on cultivating their minds by diligent study1 the incitement of academical honours is unnecessary2 and for the idle it is ineffectual1 for such are indifferent to mental improvement2 therefore the incitement of academical honours is either unnecessary or ineffectual4' ,a fallacy of doubtful precedent3 because two kinds of students are not benefited by the hope of honours it is prematurely concluded that no others exist who may be so benefited4 999999 ',he who bears arms at the command of the magistrate does what is lawful for a ,christian2 the ,swiss in the ,french service1 and the ,british in the ,american service1 bore arms at the command of the magistrate2 therefore they did what is lawful for a ,christian4' ,the conclusion is valid so far as the information given enables us to judge4 ,if we know from other sources that the ,swiss and ,british who are referred to1 committed atrocities at the command of the magistrate1 the conclusion is a fallacy of accident4 ,in general it is lawful to obey a magistrate1 but there may be particular cases when it is not4 999999 ',anyone who is candid will refrain from condemning a book without reading it2 some reviewers do not refrain from this2 therefore some reviewers are not candid4'--,this is cross reasoning and invalid4 ,it is one thing to say that the uncandid do not refrain1 and another that all who do not refrain are uncandid4 ,the conclusion is taken from the latter proposition1 which is not asserted4 999999 ',everyone desires happiness2 virtue is happiness2 therefore everyone desires virtue4' ,i4 ,whoever desires an effect desires the cause of that effect ---------------------------------------- ------------------------ ,everyone desires the happiness everyone desires virtue which is caused by virtue ,the case is manifestly untrue4 999999 ',he who has a confirmed habit of any kind of action exercises no self-denial in the practice of that action2 a good man has a confirmed habit of virtue2 therefore he who exercises self-denial in the practice of virtue is not a good man4'--7,arist4 ,eth4 ,bk4 ,,ii41 from ,whately47 ,,vi4 ,i4 ,he who has a exercises no ,he who exercises no is good habit1 c4 self-denial self-denial in the practice of virtue ---------------------------------------- --------------------------- ,a good man has ,he exercises no ,he who does ,n4 ,c4 this habit with self-denial with exercise c4 respect to virtue respect to virtue ,the conclusion drawn is fallacious1 the second theorem being based on contrast4 999999 ',according to theologians1 a man must possess faith to be acceptable to the ,deity2 now he who believes all the fables of heathen mythology must possess faith2 therefore such a one must1 according to theologians1 be acceptable to the ,deity4' ',faith' is ambiguous1 meaning in the precedent1 spiritual aspiration1 and in the case ignorant credulity4 999999 ',no evil should be allowed that good may come of it2 all punishment is an evil2 therefore no punishment should be allowed that good may come of it4'--',evil' is ambiguous1 meaning wrong-doing in the precedent and pain in the case2 the conclusion is therefore fallacious4 999999 ',the principles of justice are variable2 the appointments of nature are invariable2 therefore the principles of justice are no appointments of nature4'--7,arist4 ,eth4 ,bk4 ,v41 from ,whately47 ,the terms 'principles of justice' and 'nature' require to be defined4 ,it might be said that justice is one principle1 everywhere and always the same1 and that only its embodiments in law and custom are variable4 999999 ',what happens every day is not improbable2 some things1 against which the chances are many thousands to one1 happen every day2 therefore some things against which the chances are many thousands to one1 are not improbable4'--,a fallacy of division3 that improbable things in general happen every day does not render the occurrence of any one a probable event4 999999 ',protection from punishment is plainly due to the innocent2 therefore1 as you maintain that this person ought not to be punished1 it appears that you are convinced of his innocence4'--,a fallacy of cross reasoning4 ,i4 ,innocent persons deserve protection ---------------------------------------- ------------ ,this person deserves protection ,n4 ,c4 999999 ',he who cannot possibly act otherwise than he does1 has neither merit nor demerit in his action2 a liberal and benevolent man cannot possibly act otherwise than he does in relieving the poor2 therefore such a man has neither merit nor demerit in his action4'--,to 'have merit in an action' is scarcely intelligible4 ,a man's merit is in his character1 and his actions are effects and signs of character4 999999 ',all the fish that the net inclosed were an indiscriminate mixture of various kinds2 those that were set aside and saved as valuable were fish that the net inclosed2 therefore those that were set aside and saved as valuable were an indiscriminate mixture of various kinds4' ,an instance of the fallacy of division3 what is true of the whole contents of the net is not necessarily true of a portion of the contents4 999999 ',a desire to gain by another's loss is a violation of the tenth commandment2 all gaming1 therefore1 since it implies a desire to profit at the expense of another1 involves a breach of the tenth commandment4'--,a valid argument in inherence4 ,all desire to gain by1 c4 violates ---------------------------------------- ---------- ,gaming involves this kind of desire it violates 999999 ',he that destroys a man who usurps despotic power in a free country1 deserves well of his countrymen2 ,brutus destroyed ,caesar1 who usurped despotic power in ,rome2 therefore he deserved well of the ,romans4'--,if ,rome was 'a free country' the conclusion is valid4 999999 ',no fish suckles its young2 the whale suckles its young2 the whale is therefore no fish4' ,i4 ,what suckles is no-fish ------------------------------ ,whale suckles it is no-fish 999999 ',this explosion must have been occasioned by gunpowder1 for nothing else would have possessed sufficient force4' ,v4 ,explosions of a certain can only be occasioned by destructiveness gunpowder ---------------------------------------- ---------- ,this explosion has that it must have been destructiveness occasioned by gunpowder 999999 ',every man should be moderate1 for excess will cause disease4' ,v4 ,to avoid disease moderation is requisite ---------------------------------------- ------- ,every man should avoid every man should disease be moderate 999999 ',blessed are the merciful1 for they shall obtain mercy4' ,i4 ,to obtain mercy is blessed ---------------------------------------- -- ,those who show mercy they must be obtain mercy considered blessed 999999 ',some speculative men are unworthy of trust2 for they are unwise1 and no unwise man can be trusted4' ,i4 ,unwise men are not to be trusted ---------------------------------------- ---------- ,some speculative men they are not to be trusted are unwise 999999 ',no idle person can be a successful writer of history2 therefore ,hume1 ,macaulay1 ,hallam and ,grote must have been industrious4' ,i4 ,successful historians are not idle persons ---------------------------------------- ---- ,hume and the rest were they cannot have successful historians been idle persons 999999 ',lithium is an element2 for it is an alkali-producing substance1 which is a metal1 which is an element4'--,fallacy of no-application4 ,every alk4 is a metal ,every metal is an element prod4 subst4 ---------------------------------------- ------------------------ ,l4 is alk4 it is a metal ,l4 is a metal it is an element p4 subst4 999999 ',rational beings are accountable for their actions2 brutes not being rational1 are therefore exempt from responsibility4' ,i4 ,rational beings are accountable ------------------------------------ ,brutes not rational ,n4 ,c4 999999 ',whatever tends to withdraw the mind from pursuits of a low nature deserves to be promoted2 classical learning does this1 since it gives us a taste for intellectual enjoyments2 therefore it deserves to be promoted4' ,v4 ,i4 ,whatever gives tends ,whatever tends deserves ---------------------------------------- ----------------- ,learning gives it tends ,learning tends it deserves 999999 ',bacon was a great lawyer and statesman2 and as he was also a philosopher1 we may infer that any philosopher may be a great lawyer and statesman4'--,the theorem infers the general inherence of philosophy with eminence in law and politics1 from the single instance of ,bacon3 it is evidently a fallacy of doubtful precedent4 999999 ',snowdon is the highest mountain in ,england and ,wales4 ,snowdon is not so high as ,ben ,nevis4 ,therefore the highest mountain in ,england and ,wales is not so high as ,ben ,nevis4' ,this means3 'the highest mountain in ,england and ,wales is called ,snowdon1 and it is not so high as ,ben ,nevis4' ,the apparent conclusion merely repeats a part of the information given already4 ,there is no case4 ,the following is a theorem of the same kind-- ',lithium is the lightest metal known4 ,lithium is the metal indicated by one bright line in the spectrum4 ,therefore the lightest metal known is the metal indicated by a spectrum of one bright line4' 999999 ',if ye were ,abraham's children1 ye would do the works of ,abraham4' ,,vi4 ,abraham's children do his works ---------------------------------------- -------- ,if ye were his children ye would do his works 999999 ',since all metals are elements1 the most rare of all the metals must be the most rare of all the elements4'--,there is a suppressed precedent to the effect that the most rare individual of a species must be the most rare of its genus1 which may or may not be true4 999999 ',all vice is odious2 but avarice is a vice2 for it makes men slaves2 therefore avarice is odious4' ,v4 ,i4 ,whatever enslaves is a vice ,all vice is odious ---------------------------------------- ---------------------------- ,avarice enslaves it is a vice ,avarice is a vice it is odious 999999 ',bucephalus is a horse2 a horse is a quadruped2 a quadruped is an animal2 an animal is a substance2 therefore ,bucephalus is a substance4' ,all horses are quads4 ,quads4 animals ,animal substance ---------------------------------------- ----------------------- ,bu4 is a h4he is q4,b4 is quad4he is an4,bu4 is an4he is subst4 ,this is what logicians call a ,sorites4 ,there may be a chain of valid arguments1 in which the conclusion of one is precedent or case of the next2 but the propositions just quoted do not make an argument1 being merely a string of classifications4 ,if we know what ,bucephalus and substance mean1 we know by perception that ,bucephalus is a substance4 999999 ',every being is then happy when it acquires the proper perfection of its nature2 and consequently all vital beings are capable of receiving felicity that are capable of arriving at the perfection of their nature4' ,i4 ,every being that acquires is happy ---------------------------------------- ---------------- ,all vital beings capable must be capable of receiving of acquiring felicity ,this is perilously near tautology2 it can be saved only by assuming that 'every being capable of happiness' is a more extensive class than 'all vital beings capable of arriving at the perfection of their nature4' 999999 ',the soul's debility is not owing to her lapse into matter2 for as this lapse is voluntary1 the soul must have sinned prior to her descent4' ,,vi4 ,voluntary lapse proves prior sin ---------------------------------------- -------- ,soul's lapse is v4 her debility must have been antecedent to lapse 999999 ,cogito ergo sum4-- ,i4 ,whatever thinks is ---------------------------------------- --- ,i think ,i must believe that ,i am ,that we exist is the most certain fact we know3 it cannot be strengthened by any argumentation4 ,if we can doubt that we are1 we can with better reason doubt that we think4 999999 ,here is ,hamilton's example of a disjunctive syllogism1 which he considered a valid argument--',the hope of immortality is either a rational expectation or an illusion2 but the hope of immortality is a rational expectation2 therefore the hope of immortality is not an illusion4' ,it is a flagrant tautologism4 999999 ',if man be not a morally responsible being1 he must want either the power of recognising moral good 7as an intelligent agent71 or the power of willing it 7as a free agent72 but man wants neither of these powers2 therefore man is a morally responsible being4' ,adopted by ,hamilton from ,krug and given as valid4 ,it is first a fallacy of contrast1 and if amended in this respect it would still be a fallacy of tautology4 ,i4 ,if m4 lacked certain pp4 he would be irresp4 ---------------------------------------- --------- ,he does not lack these pp4 ,n4 ,c4 999999 ',if ,aeschines joined in the public rejoicings1 he is inconsistent2 if he did not1 he is unpatriotic2 but he either joined1 or not1 therefore he is either inconsistent or unpatriotic4'--,an excellent specimen of logicians' logic3 on a par with this--,if it is fine weather1 ,i go2 if it rains1 ,i stay2 it must either rain or be fine1 therefore ,i must either go or stay4 999999 ',if the world were eternal1 the most useful arts1 such as painting1 c4 would be of unknown antiquity3 and on the same supposition there would be records long prior to the ,mosaic2 and likewise the sea and land in all parts of the globe might be expected to maintain the same relative situations now as formerly3 but none of these is the fact3 therefore the world is not eternal4' ,if some things were different the w4 would be eternal from what they are ---------------------------------------- -------------- ,they are not different ,n4 ,c4 999999 ',if the world existed from eternity1 there would be records prior to the ,mosaic2 and if it were produced by chance1 it would not bear marks of design3 there are no records prior to the ,mosaic1 and the world does bear marks of design3 therefore it neither existed from eternity1 nor is it the work of chance4' ,two theorems are here mixed together1 both fallacies of contrast-- ,existence of records would prove the w4 etern4 ---------------------------------------- ------- ,records do not exist the w4 is non-eternal ,non-existence of marks wd4 pr4 w4 made by chance ---------------------------------------- --------- ,the marks exist w4 was not made by chance 999999 ',if this man were wise1 he would not speak irreverently of ,scripture in jest2 and if he were good he would not do so in earnest2 but he does it1 either in jest or earnest2 therefore he is either not wise or not good4' ,as it stands this is quite circular1 but it might be rendered valid by generalisation3-- ,,vi4 ,to speak irrev4 of ,scr4 in indicates that a man is not jest or earnest wise or not good ---------------------------------------- ----------------- ,this man does it we must infer that he is not w4 or not g4 999999 ',if virtue were a habit worth acquiring1 it must ensure either power1 or wealth1 or honour1 or pleasure2 but virtue ensures none of these2 therefore virtue is not a habit worth attaining4' ,fallacy of contrast-- ,i4 ,what ensures is worth ---------------------------- ,v4 does not ensure ,n4 ,c4 999999 ',if men are not likely to be influenced in the performance of a known duty by taking an oath to perform it1 the oaths commonly administered are superfluous2 if they are likely to be so influenced1 everyone should be made to take an oath to behave rightly throughout his life2 but one or other must be the case2 therefore either the oaths commonly administered are superfluous1 or everyone should be made to take an oath to behave rightly throughout his life4'--,this will be more intelligible if contracted thus3 ,if oaths fail to influence they are superfluous2 if they influence they should be obligatory2 but they either influence or do not2 therefore they are either superfluous or should be obligatory4 ,there is no argument2 the alternative conclusions merely repeat the alternative precedents4 999999 ',if virtue is voluntary1 vice is voluntary2 but virtue is voluntary2 therefore so is vice4' 7,arist4 ,eth4 ,bk4 ,,iii4 quoted by ,whately47 ,this is a circular way of saying that we believe it to be a fact that vice is voluntary4 ,the argumentative form is probably supposed to give the assertion greater weight than it would have if expressed as a perceptual judgment4 999999 ,this is valid argument1 according to ,hamilton--',if man were suited to live out of society1 he would either be a god or a beast2 but man is neither a god nor a beast2 therefore he is not suited to live out of society4'--,it has faults of contrast and tautology4 ,i4 ,only gods and beasts are suited ------------------------------------ ,man is neither g4 nor b4 ,n4 ,c4 999999 ',if iron is impure1 it is brittle2 but this iron is impure2 therefore it is brittle4'--,a valid dogmatic argument4 ,i4 ,impure iron is brittle ----------------------------------- ,this iron is imp4 it must be br4 999999 ',if the weather is fine1 we shall go into the country2 now the weather is fine1 therefore we shall go into the country4'--,we never get beyond the simple judgment that our going into the country is associated with fine weather4 999999 ,the following is valid3--',as often as the weather is fine1 my brother has a habit of going into the country2 if the weather be fine to-morrow ,i infer that he will go into the country4' ,here a particular hypothetical case is illustrated by reference to a general habit4 999999 ',as often as the weather is fine my brother goes into the country2 if it be not fine to-morrow ,i conclude that he will not go into the country4'--,a fallacy of contrast3 we are not informed in the antecedents what the brother does on wet days4 999999 ',if there are sharpers in the company we ought not to gamble2 but there are no sharpers in the company2 therefore we ought to gamble4' ,i4 ,presence of sh4 forbids to gamble ---------------------------------- ,absence of sh4 ,n4 ,c4 999999 ',logic as it was cultivated by the schoolmen proved a fruitless study2 therefore logic as it is cultivated at the present day must be a fruitless study likewise4'--,we must take the conclusion as valid1 until we know in what respects modern logic is superior to scholastic logic4 999999 ',few treatises of science convey important truths1 without any admixture of error1 in a perspicuous and interesting form3 therefore though a treatise would deserve much attention which should possess such excellence1 it is plain that few treatises of science do deserve much attention4' ,this means no more than that treatises of a certain excellence would deserve attention1 and that there are few of them4 ,there is no argument4 999999 ',some objects of great beauty answer no other purpose but to gratify the sight3 many flowers have great beauty2 and many of them accordingly answer no other purpose than to gratify the sight4' ,i4 ,some obj4 which answer are beautiful -------------------------------------- ,many flowers are beaut4 ,n4 ,c4 999999 ',none but ,whites are civilised2 the ancient ,germans were ,whites2 therefore they were civilised4' ,i4 ,all civilised nations are ,whites --------------------------------- ,anc4 ,ger4 were ,wh4 ,n4 ,c4 999999 ',wilkes was a favourite with the populace2 he who is a favourite with the populace must understand how to manage them2 he who understands how to manage them must be well acquainted with their character2 he who is well acquainted with their character must hold them in contempt2 therefore ,wilkes must have held the populace in contempt4' ,favourites must kn4 how to ,he who kn4 how must be manage to manage acquainted ---------------------------------------- --------------------------- ,w4 was a fav4 he knew how to man4 ,w4 knew he was acq4 ,he who is acq4 must despise ------------------------------------ ,w4 was acq4 he must have desp4 999999 ',something has existed from eternity4 ,for since something now is1 it is manifest that something always was4 ,otherwise the things that now are must have risen out of nothing1 absolutely and without cause4 ,which is a plain contradiction in terms4 ,for to say a thing is produced1 and yet that there is no cause at all of that production1 is to say that something is effected when it is effected by nothing1 that is1 at the same time when it is not effected at all4 ,whatever exists has a cause of its existence1 either in the necessity of its own nature1 and then it must have been of itself eternal3 or in the will of some other being1 and then that other being must1 at least in the order of nature and causality1 have existed before it4' ,in this theorem we have a case--',something is'2 and a conclusion--',something has existed from eternity4' ,the reasoner seeks a credible or conceivable precedent by which to connect that conclusion with the case4 ,we are offered a choice of two theorems4 ,the first is untenable1 for we have never had the experience that is given as precedent2 it is also tautological1 as the 'something' of the case is the 'whatever' of the precedent4 ,v4 ,whatever exists in the necessity has existed from eternity of its own nature ---------------------------------------- --------------------------- ',something' exists in the necessity it has existed from eternity of its own nature ,it is not inconceivable that something should be self-existent1 but we know nothing as to its being eternal4 ,we are not familiar enough with self-existent things and eternal things to warrant us in asserting dogmatically that where the first quality is1 there also must be the second4 ,the next theorem is that everything must be caused1 and that causation involves a regressum ad infinitum4 ,on this principle there must have been things for an eternity backwards4 ,according to the theory of causation given in section ,,xxvii1 a true beginning is reached when we discover the motive1 design and power that produced an effect4 ,it is not necessary to ask next what caused that motive1 design and power4 ,the infinite regress is applicable only to material sequence1 in which there is no proper beginning or end4 ,the author of the above argument seems to be trying to combine the notion of causation by will with that of infinite regress4 ,but his language is too obscure to make it certain what he means exactly4 999999 ,the three following theorems--in a diluted form--occur in an otherwise excellent work on the politics and social life of the ancient ,greeks4 ',the ,athenians who opposed the union of ,greece and ,macedonia were old men1 and the result was mischievous2 other similar instances are found in history2 therefore the government of old men is always mischievous4'--,a fallacy of false generality4 ,everybody knows that some old men have been wise governors4 ,cicero1 from his experience1 drew the opposite conclusion--that the only safe rulers were old men4 ',all old political leaders are mischievous2 ,gladstone is old2 therefore he is to be considered politically mischievous4'--,even were the precedent not false the argument is superfluous1 for the effect of ,gladstone's politics is now matter of fact or history4 ',gladstone is politically mischievous2 he advocates ,home ,rule for ,ireland2 therefore ,irish ,home ,rule must be mischievous4'--,a fallacy of division3 a political leader might on the whole be mischievous1 but his measures need not on that account be each and every one mischievous4 ,if dialectic were taught generally and on a rational method1 a responsible author would avoid bad reasoning of this sort as carefully as he avoids bad grammar1 vulgar imagery1 or faulty arithmetic4 99 99 99 99 99 99 ,transcriber's note3 ,punctuation has been corrected without comment4 ,the spelling in this book is that found in the ,oxford ,english ,dictionary 7,,oed74 ,page #gh3 'comformable' corrected to 'conformable' ,the following is an argument conformable to the above rules4 ,page #ii3 un-extended1 im-material1 im-ponderable ,the author used hyphens in the above words for emphasis4 ,other instances of hyphens used for emphasis occur in the book4 ,other instances of hyphenated and unhyphenated words occur in the book4 ,page #afd3 'premiss' is a variant of 'premise' 7,,oed71 which occurs more frequently in the book4 ,page #baf3 'inclose is a variant of 'enclose' 7,,oed74 ,all the fish that the net inclosed were an indiscriminate4444