,,kant',s ,,prolegomena ,,to ,,any ,,future ,,metaphysics ,,edited ,,in ,,english ,,by ,,dr4 ,,paul ,,carus ,,third ,,edition ,,chicago ,,the ,,open ,,court ,,publishing ,,company #aiab ,,translation ,,copyrighted ,,by ,the ,open ,court ,publishing ,co4 #aijb4 ,transcriber's note3 9999 ,supplemental material and table of contents are omitted from this etext4 9999 ,contents ,,publishers' ,,preface4 ,,introduction4 ,,prolegomena4 ,,preamble ,,on ,,the ,,peculiarities ,,of ,,all ,,metaphysical ,,cognition4 ,,first ,,part ,,of ,,the ,,transcendental ,,problem4 ,,how ,,is ,,pure ,,mathematics ,,possible8 ,,second ,,part ,,of ,,the ,,transcendental ,,problem4 ,,how ,,is ,,the ,,science ,,of ,,nature ,,possible8 ,,third ,,part ,,of ,,the ,,main ,,transcendental ,,problem4 ,,how ,,is ,,metaphysics ,,in ,,general ,,possible8 ,,scholia4 ,,solution ,,of ,,the ,,general ,,question ,,of ,,the ,,prolegomena1 ,,how ,,is ,,metaphysics ,,possible ,,as ,a ,,science8 ,,appendix4 ,,on ,,what ,,can ,,be ,,done ,,to ,,make ,,metaphysics ,,actual ,,as ,a ,,science4 ,,publishers' ,,preface4 ,kant's ,prolegomena1#a although a small book1 is indubitably the most important of his writings4 ,it furnishes us with a key to his main work1 ,the ,critique of ,pure ,reason2 in fact1 it is an extract containing all the salient ideas of ,kant's system4 ,it approaches the subject in the simplest and most direct way1 and is therefore best adapted as an introduction into his philosophy4 ,for this reason1 ,the ,open ,court ,publishing ,company has deemed it advisable to bring out a new edition of the work1 keeping in view its broader use as a preliminary survey and explanation of ,kant's philosophy in general4 ,in order to make the book useful for this broader purpose1 the editor has not only stated his own views concerning the problem underlying the ,prolegomena 7see page #afg et seq471 but has also collected the most important materials which have reference to ,kant's philosophy1 or to the reception which was accorded to it in various quarters 7see page #bda et seq474 ,the selections have not been made from a partisan standpoint1 but have been chosen with a view to characterising the attitude of different minds1 and to directing the student to the best literature on the subject4 #a ,prolegomena means literally prefatory or introductory remarks4 ,it is the neuter plural of the present passive participle of 1 to speak before1 i4e41 to make introductory remarks before beginning one's regular discourse4 ,it is not without good reasons that the appearance of the ,critique of ,pure ,reason is regarded as the beginning of a new era in the history of philosophy2 and so it seems that a comprehension of ,kant's position1 whether we accept or reject it1 is indispensable to the student of philosophy4 ,it is not his solution which makes the sage of ,knigsberg the initiator of modern thought1 but his formulation of the problem4 99 99 99 ,the present translation is practically new1 but it goes without saying that the editor utilised the labors of his predecessors1 among whom ,prof4 ,john ,p4 ,mahaffy and ,john ,h4 ,bernard deserve special credit4 ,richardson's translation of #ahah may be regarded as superseded and has not been consulted1 but occasional reference has been made to that of ,prof4 ,ernest ,belfort ,bax4 ,considering the difficulties under which even these translators labored we must recognise the fact that they did their work well1 with painstaking diligence1 great love of the subject1 and good judgment4 ,the editor of the present translation has the advantage of being to the manor born2 moreover1 he is pretty well versed in ,kant's style2 and wherever he differs from his predecessors in the interpretation of a construction1 he has deviated from them not without good reasons4 ,nevertheless there are some passages which will still remain doubtful1 though happily they are of little consequence4 ,as a curiosum in ,richardson's translation ,professor ,mahaffy mentions that the words widersinnig gewundene ,schnecken1 which simply means symmetric helices1#b are rendered by snails rolled up contrary to all sense--a wording that is itself contrary to all sense and makes the whole paragraph unintelligible4 ,we may add an instance of another mistake that misses the mark4 ,kant employs in the ,appendix a word that is no longer used in ,german4 ,he speaks of the ,cento der ,metaphysik as having neue ,lappen and einen vernderten ,zuschnitt4 ,mr4 ,bax translates ,cento by body1 ,lappen by outgrowths1 and ,zuschnitt by figure4 ,his mistake is perhaps not less excusable than ,richardson's2 it is certainly not less comical1 and it also destroys the sense1 which in the present case is a very striking simile4 ,cento is a ,latin word#c derived from the ,greek 1#d meaning a garment of many patches sewed together1 or1 as we might now say1 a crazy quilt4 #b ,mahaffy not incorrectly translates spirals winding opposite ways1 and ,mr4 ,bax follows him verbatim even to the repetition of the footnote4 #c ,the ,french cento is still in use4 #d 1 7#a7 one that bears the marks of the 1 goad2 a rogue1 7#b7 a patched cloth2 7#c7 any kind of patchwork1 especially verses made up of scraps from other authors4 99 99 99 ,in the hope that this book will prove useful1 ,the ,open ,court ,publishing ,company offers it as a help to the student of philosophy4 ,p4,c4 ,,introduction4 ,these ,prolegomena are destined for the use1 not of pupils1 but of future teachers1 and even the latter should not expect that they will be serviceable for the systematic exposition of a ready-made science1 but merely for the discovery of the science itself4 ,there are scholarly men1 to whom the history of philosophy 7both ancient and modern7 is philosophy itself2 for these the present ,prolegomena are not written4 ,they must wait till those who endeavor to draw from the fountain of reason itself have completed their work2 it will then be the historian's turn to inform the world of what has been done4 ,unfortunately1 nothing can be said1 which in their opinion has not been said before1 and truly the same prophecy applies to all future time2 for since the human reason has for many centuries speculated upon innumerable objects in various ways1 it is hardly to be expected that we should not be able to discover analogies for every new idea among the old sayings of past ages4 ,my object is to persuade all those who think ,metaphysics worth studying1 that it is absolutely necessary to pause a moment1 and1 neglecting all that has been done1 to propose first the preliminary question1 #8,whether such a thing as metaphysics be at all possible8' ,if it be a science1 how comes it that it cannot1 like other sciences1 obtain universal and permanent recognition8 ,if not1 how can it maintain its pretensions1 and keep the human mind in suspense with hopes1 never ceasing1 yet never fulfilled8 ,whether then we demonstrate our knowledge or our ignorance in this field1 we must come once for all to a definite conclusion respecting the nature of this so-called science1 which cannot possibly remain on its present footing4 ,it seems almost ridiculous1 while every other science is continually advancing1 that in this1 which pretends to be ,wisdom incarnate1 for whose oracle every one inquires1 we should constantly move round the same spot1 without gaining a single step4 ,and so its followers having melted away1 we do not find men confident of their ability to shine in other sciences venturing their reputation here1 where everybody1 however ignorant in other matters1 may deliver a final verdict1 as in this domain there is as yet no standard weight and measure to distinguish sound knowledge from shallow talk4 ,after all it is nothing extraordinary in the elaboration of a science1 when men begin to wonder how far it has advanced1 that the question should at last occur1 whether and how such a science is possible8 ,human reason so delights in constructions1 that it has several times built up a tower1 and then razed it to examine the nature of the foundation4 ,it is never too late to become wise2 but if the change comes late1 there is always more difficulty in starting a reform4 ,the question whether a science be possible1 presupposes a doubt as to its actuality4 ,but such a doubt offends the men whose whole possessions consist of this supposed jewel2 hence he who raises the doubt must expect opposition from all sides4 ,some1 in the proud consciousness of their possessions1 which are ancient1 and therefore considered legitimate1 will take their metaphysical compendia in their hands1 and look down on him with contempt2 others1 who never see anything except it be identical with what they have seen before1 will not understand him1 and everything will remain for a time1 as if nothing had happened to excite the concern1 or the hope1 for an impending change4 ,nevertheless1 ,i venture to predict that the independent reader of these ,prolegomena will not only doubt his previous science1 but ultimately be fully persuaded1 that it cannot exist unless the demands here stated on which its possibility depends1 be satisfied2 and1 as this has never been done1 that there is1 as yet1 no such thing as ,metaphysics4 ,but as it can never cease to be in demand1#e--since the interests of common sense are intimately interwoven with it1 he must confess that a radical reform1 or rather a new birth of the science after an original plan1 are unavoidable1 however men may struggle against it for a while4 #e ,says ,horace3 ,rusticus expectat1 dum defluat amnis1 at ille ,labitur et labetur in omne volubilis aevum2 ,a rustic fellow waiteth on the shore ,for the river to flow away1 ,but the river flows1 and flows on as before1 ,and it flows forever and aye4 ,since the ,essays of ,locke and ,leibnitz1 or rather since the origin of metaphysics so far as we know its history1 nothing has ever happened which was more decisive to its fate than the attack made upon it by ,david ,hume4 ,he threw no light on this species of knowledge1 but he certainly struck a spark from which light might have been obtained1 had it caught some inflammable substance and had its smouldering fire been carefully nursed and developed4 ,hume started from a single but important concept in ,metaphysics1 viz41 that of ,cause and ,effect 7including its derivatives force and action1 etc474 ,he challenges reason1 which pretends to have given birth to this idea from herself1 to answer him by what right she thinks anything to be so constituted1 that if that thing be posited1 something else also must necessarily be posited2 for this is the meaning of the concept of cause4 ,he demonstrated irrefutably that it was perfectly impossible for reason to think a priori and by means of concepts a combination involving necessity4 ,we cannot at all see why1 in consequence of the existence of one thing1 another must necessarily exist1 or how the concept of such a combination can arise a priori4 ,hence he inferred1 that reason was altogether deluded with reference to this concept1 which she erroneously considered as one of her children1 whereas in reality it was nothing but a bastard of imagination1 impregnated by experience1 which subsumed certain representations under the ,law of ,association1 and mistook the subjective necessity of habit for an objective necessity arising from insight4 ,hence he inferred that reason had no power to think such combinations1 even generally1 because her concepts would then be purely fictitious1 and all her pretended a priori cognitions nothing but common experiences marked with a false stamp4 ,in plain language there is not1 and cannot be1 any such thing as metaphysics at all4#f #f ,nevertheless ,hume called this very destructive science metaphysics and attached to it great value4 ,metaphysics and morals he declares in the fourth part of his ,essays are the most important branches of science2 mathematics and physics are not nearly so important4 ,but the acute man merely regarded the negative use arising from the moderation of extravagant claims of speculative reason1 and the complete settlement of the many endless and troublesome controversies that mislead mankind4 ,he overlooked the positive injury which results1 if reason be deprived of its most important prospects1 which can alone supply to the will the highest aim for all its endeavor4 ,however hasty and mistaken ,hume's conclusion may appear1 it was at least founded upon investigation1 and this investigation deserved the concentrated attention of the brighter spirits of his day as well as determined efforts on their part to discover1 if possible1 a happier solution of the problem in the sense proposed by him1 all of which would have speedily resulted in a complete reform of the science4 ,but ,hume suffered the usual misfortune of metaphysicians1 of not being understood4 ,it is positively painful to see how utterly his opponents1 ,reid1 ,oswald1 ,beattie1 and lastly ,priestley1 missed the point of the problem2 for while they were ever taking for granted that which he doubted1 and demonstrating with zeal and often with impudence that which he never thought of doubting1 they so misconstrued his valuable suggestion that everything remained in its old condition1 as if nothing had happened4 ,the question was not whether the concept of cause was right1 useful1 and even indispensable for our knowledge of nature1 for this ,hume had never doubted2 but whether that concept could be thought by reason a priori1 and consequently whether it possessed an inner truth1 independent of all experience1 implying a wider application than merely to the objects of experience4 ,this was ,hume's problem4 ,it was a question concerning the origin1 not concerning the indispensable need of the concept4 ,were the former decided1 the conditions of the use and the sphere of its valid application would have been determined as a matter of course4 ,but to satisfy the conditions of the problem1 the opponents of the great thinker should have penetrated very deeply into the nature of reason1 so far as it is concerned with pure thinking1--a task which did not suit them4 ,they found a more convenient method of being defiant without any insight1 viz41 the appeal to common sense4 ,it is indeed a great gift of ,god1 to possess right1 or 7as they now call it7 plain common sense4 ,but this common sense must be shown practically1 by well-considered and reasonable thoughts and words1 not by appealing to it as an oracle1 when no rational justification can be advanced4 ,to appeal to common sense1 when insight and science fail1 and no sooner--this is one of the subtile discoveries of modern times1 by means of which the most superficial ranter can safely enter the lists with the most thorough thinker1 and hold his own4 ,but as long as a particle of insight remains1 no one would think of having recourse to this subterfuge4 ,for what is it but an appeal to the opinion of the multitude1 of whose applause the philosopher is ashamed1 while the popular charlatan glories and confides in it8 ,i should think that ,hume might fairly have laid as much claim to common sense as ,beattie1 and in addition to a critical reason 7such as the latter did not possess71 which keeps common sense in check and prevents it from speculating1 or1 if speculations are under discussion1 restrains the desire to decide because it cannot satisfy itself concerning its own arguments4 ,by this means alone can common sense remain sound4 ,chisels and hammers may suffice to work a piece of wood1 but for steel-engraving we require an engraver's needle4 ,thus common sense and speculative understanding are each serviceable in their own way1 the former in judgments which apply immediately to experience1 the latter when we judge universally from mere concepts1 as in metaphysics1 where sound common sense1 so called in spite of the inapplicability of the word1 has no right to judge at all4 ,i openly confess1 the suggestion of ,david ,hume was the very thing1 which many years ago first interrupted my dogmatic slumber1 and gave my investigations in the field of speculative philosophy quite a new direction4 ,i was far from following him in the conclusions at which he arrived by regarding1 not the whole of his problem1 but a part1 which by itself can give us no information4 ,if we start from a well-founded1 but undeveloped1 thought1 which another has bequeathed to us1 we may well hope by continued reflection to advance farther than the acute man1 to whom we owe the first spark of light4 ,i therefore first tried whether ,hume's objection could not be put into a general form1 and soon found that the concept of the connexion of cause and effect was by no means the only idea by which the understanding thinks the connexion of things a priori1 but rather that metaphysics consists altogether of such connexions4 ,i sought to ascertain their number1 and when ,i had satisfactorily succeeded in this by starting from a single principle1 ,i proceeded to the deduction of these concepts1 which ,i was now certain were not deduced from experience1 as ,hume had apprehended1 but sprang from the pure understanding4 ,this deduction 7which seemed impossible to my acute predecessor1 which had never even occurred to any one else1 though no one had hesitated to use the concepts without investigating the basis of their objective validity7 was the most difficult task ever undertaken in the service of metaphysics2 and the worst was that metaphysics1 such as it then existed1 could not assist me in the least1 because this deduction alone can render metaphysics possible4 ,but as soon as ,i had succeeded in solving ,hume's problem not merely in a particular case1 but with respect to the whole faculty of pure reason1 ,i could proceed safely1 though slowly1 to determine the whole sphere of pure reason completely and from general principles1 in its circumference as well as in its contents4 ,this was required for metaphysics in order to construct its system according to a reliable method4 ,but ,i fear that the execution of ,hume's problem in its widest extent 7viz41 my ,critique of the ,pure ,reason7 will fare as the problem itself fared1 when first proposed4 ,it will be misjudged because it is misunderstood1 and misunderstood because men choose to skim through the book1 and not to think through it--a disagreeable task1 because the work is dry1 obscure1 opposed to all ordinary notions1 and moreover long-winded4 ,i confess1 however1 ,i did not expect to hear from philosophers complaints of want of popularity1 entertainment1 and facility1 when the existence of a highly prized and indispensable cognition is at stake1 which cannot be established otherwise than by the strictest rules of methodic precision4 ,popularity may follow1 but is inadmissible at the beginning4 ,yet as regards a certain obscurity1 arising partly from the diffuseness of the plan1 owing to which the principal points of the investigation are easily lost sight of1 the complaint is just1 and ,i intend to remove it by the present ,prolegomena4 ,the first-mentioned work1 which discusses the pure faculty of reason in its whole compass and bounds1 will remain the foundation1 to which the ,prolegomena1 as a preliminary exercise1 refer2 for our critique must first be established as a complete and perfected science1 before we can think of letting ,metaphysics appear on the scene1 or even have the most distant hope of attaining it4 ,we have been long accustomed to seeing antiquated knowledge produced as new by taking it out of its former context1 and reducing it to system in a new suit of any fancy pattern under new titles4 ,most readers will set out by expecting nothing else from the ,critique2 but these ,prolegomena may persuade him that it is a perfectly new science1 of which no one has ever even thought1 the very idea of which was unknown1 and for which nothing hitherto accomplished can be of the smallest use1 except it be the suggestion of ,hume's doubts4 ,yet ever1 he did not suspect such a formal science1 but ran his ship ashore1 for safety's sake1 landing on scepticism1 there to let it lie and rot2 whereas my object is rather to give it a pilot1 who1 by means of safe astronomical principles drawn from a knowledge of the globe1 and provided with a complete chart and compass1 may steer the ship safely1 whither he listeth4 ,if in a new science1 which is wholly isolated and unique in its kind1 we started with the prejudice that we can judge of things by means of our previously acquired knowledge1 which is precisely what has first to be called in question1 we should only fancy we saw everywhere what we had already known1 the expressions1 having a similar sound1 only that all would appear utterly metamorphosed1 senseless and unintelligible1 because we should have as a foundation our own notions1 made by long habit a second nature1 instead of the author's4 ,but the longwindedness of the work1 so far as it depends on the subject1 and not the exposition1 its consequent unavoidable dryness and its scholastic precision are qualities which can only benefit the science1 though they may discredit the book4 ,few writers are gifted with the subtilty1 and at the same time with the grace1 of ,david ,hume1 or with the depth1 as well as the elegance1 of ,moses ,mendelssohn4 ,yet ,i flatter myself ,i might have made my own exposition popular1 had my object been merely to sketch out a plan and leave its completion to others1 instead of having my heart in the welfare of the science1 to which ,i had devoted myself so long2 in truth1 it required no little constancy1 and even self-denial1 to postpone the sweets of an immediate success to the prospect of a slower1 but more lasting1 reputation4 ,making plans is often the occupation of an opulent and boastful mind1 which thus obtains the reputation of a creative genius1 by demanding what it cannot itself supply2 by censuring1 what it cannot improve2 and by proposing1 what it knows not where to find4 ,and yet something more should belong to a sound plan of a general critique of pure reason than mere conjectures1 if this plan is to be other than the usual declamations of pious aspirations4 ,but pure reason is a sphere so separate and self-contained1 that we cannot touch a part without affecting all the rest4 ,we can therefore do nothing without first determining the position of each part1 and its relation to the rest2 for1 as our judgment cannot be corrected by anything without1 the validity and use of every part depends upon the relation in which it stands to all the rest within the domain of reason4 ,so in the structure of an organized body1 the end of each member can only be deduced from the full conception of the whole4 ,it may1 then1 be said of such a critique that it is never trustworthy except it be perfectly complete1 down to the smallest elements of pure reason4 ,in the sphere of this faculty you can determine either everything or nothing4 ,but although a mere sketch1 preceding the ,critique of ,pure ,reason1 would be unintelligible1 unreliable1 and useless1 it is all the more useful as a sequel4 ,for so we are able to grasp the whole1 to examine in detail the chief points of importance in the science1 and to improve in many respects our exposition1 as compared with the first execution of the work4 ,after the completion of the work ,i offer here such a plan which is sketched out after an analytical method1 while the work itself had to be executed in the synthetical style1 in order that the science may present all its articulations1 as the structure of a peculiar cognitive faculty1 in their natural combination4 ,but should any reader find this plan1 which ,i publish as the ,prolegomena to any future ,metaphysics1 still obscure1 let him consider that not every one is bound to study ,metaphysics1 that many minds will succeed very well1 in the exact and even in deep sciences1 more closely allied to practical experience1#g while they cannot succeed in investigations dealing exclusively with abstract concepts4 ,in such cases men should apply their talents to other subjects4 ,but he who undertakes to judge1 or still more1 to construct1 a system of ,metaphysics1 must satisfy the demands here made1 either by adopting my solution1 or by thoroughly refuting it1 and substituting another4 ,to evade it is impossible4 #g ,the term ,anschauung here used means sense-perception4 ,it is that which is given to the senses and apprehended immediately1 as an object is seen by merely looking at it4 ,the translation intuition1 though etymologically correct1 is misleading4 ,in the present passage the term is not used in its technical significance but means practical experience4--,ed4 ,in conclusion1 let it be remembered that this much-abused obscurity 7frequently serving as a mere pretext under which people hide their own indolence or dullness7 has its uses1 since all who in other sciences observe a judicious silence1 speak authoritatively in metaphysics and make bold decisions1 because their ignorance is not here contrasted with the knowledge of others4 ,yet it does contrast with sound critical principles1 which we may therefore commend in the words of ,virgil3 ,ignavum1 fucos1 pecus a praesepibus arcent4 ,bees are defending their hives against drones1 those indolent creatures4 ,,prolegomena4 ,,preamble ,,on ,,the ,,peculiarities ,,of ,,all ,,metaphysical ,,cognition4 #a4 ,of the ,sources of ,metaphysics4 ,if it becomes desirable to formulate any cognition as science1 it will be necessary first to determine accurately those peculiar features which no other science has in common with it1 constituting its characteristics2 otherwise the boundaries of all sciences become confused1 and none of them can be treated thoroughly according to its nature4 ,the characteristics of a science may consist of a simple difference of object1 or of the sources of cognition1 or of the kind of cognition1 or perhaps of all three conjointly4 ,on this1 therefore1 depends the idea of a possible science and its territory4 ,first1 as concerns the sources of metaphysical cognition1 its very concept implies that they cannot be empirical4 ,its principles 7including not only its maxims but its basic notions7 must never be derived from experience4 ,it must not be physical but metaphysical knowledge1 viz41 knowledge lying beyond experience4 ,it can therefore have for its basis neither external experience1 which is the source of physics proper1 nor internal1 which is the basis of empirical psychology4 ,it is therefore a priori knowledge1 coming from pure ,understanding and pure ,reason4 ,but so far ,metaphysics would not be distinguish able from pure ,mathematics2 it must therefore be called pure philosophical cognition2 and for the meaning of this term ,i refer to the ,critique of the ,pure ,reason 7,,ii4 ,method of ,transcendentalism1 ,chap4 ,i41 ,sec4 i71 where the distinction between these two employments of the reason is sufficiently explained4 ,so far concerning the sources of metaphysical cognition4 #b4 ,concerning the ,kind of ,cognition which can alone be called ,metaphysical4 a4 ,of the ,distinction between ,analytical and ,synthetical ,judgments in general4--,the peculiarity of its sources demands that metaphysical cognition must consist of nothing but a priori judgments4 ,but whatever be their origin1 or their logical form1 there is a distinction in judgments1 as to their content1 according to which they are either merely explicative1 adding nothing to the content of the cognition1 or expansive1 increasing the given cognition3 the former may be called analytical1 the latter synthetical1 judgments4 ,analytical judgments express nothing in the predicate but what has been already actually thought in the concept of the subject1 though not so distinctly or with the same 7full7 consciousness4 ,when ,i say3 ,all bodies are extended1 ,i have not amplified in the least my concept of body1 but have only analysed it1 as extension was really thought to belong to that concept before the judgment was made1 though it was not expressed2 this judgment is therefore analytical4 ,on the contrary1 this judgment1 ,all bodies have weight1 contains in its predicate something not actually thought in the general concept of the body2 it amplifies my knowledge by adding something to my concept1 and must therefore be called synthetical4 b4 ,the ,common ,principle of all ,analytical ,judgments is the ,law of ,contradiction4--,all analytical judgments depend wholly on the law of ,contradiction1 and are in their nature a priori cognitions1 whether the concepts that supply them with matter be empirical or not4 ,for the predicate of an affirmative analytical judgment is already contained in the concept of the subject1 of which it cannot be denied without contradiction4 ,in the same way its opposite is necessarily denied of the subject in an analytical1 but negative1 judgment1 by the same law of contradiction4 ,such is the nature of the judgments3 all bodies are extended1 and no bodies are unextended 7i4e41 simple74 ,for this very reason all analytical judgments are a priori even when the concepts are empirical1 as1 for example1 ,gold is a yellow metal2 for to know this ,i require no experience beyond my concept of gold as a yellow metal3 it is1 in fact1 the very concept1 and ,i need only analyse it1 without looking beyond it elsewhere4 c4 ,synthetical ,judgments require a different ,principle from the ,law of ,contradiction4--,there are synthetical a posteriori judgments of empirical origin2 but there are also others which are proved to be certain a priori1 and which spring from pure ,understanding and ,reason4 ,yet they both agree in this1 that they cannot possibly spring from the principle of analysis1 viz41 the law of contradiction1 alone2 they require a quite different principle1 though1 from whatever they may be deduced1 they must be subject to the law of contradiction1 which must never be violated1 even though everything cannot be deduced from it4 ,i shall first classify synthetical judgments4 #a4 ,empirical ,judgments are always synthetical4 ,for it would be absurd to base an analytical judgment on experience1 as our concept suffices for the purpose without requiring any testimony from experience4 ,that body is extended1 is a judgment established a priori1 and not an empirical judgment4 ,for before appealing to experience1 we already have all the conditions of the judgment in the concept1 from which we have but to elicit the predicate according to the law of contradiction1 and thereby to become conscious of the necessity of the judgment1 which experience could not even teach us4 #b4 ,mathematical ,judgments are all synthetical4 ,this fact seems hitherto to have altogether escaped the observation of those who have analysed human reason2 it even seems directly opposed to all their conjectures1 though incontestably certain1 and most important in its consequences4 ,for as it was found that the conclusions of mathematicians all proceed according to the law of contradiction 7as is demanded by all apodeictic certainty71 men persuaded themselves that the fundamental principles were known from the same law4 ,this was a great mistake1 for a synthetical proposition can indeed be comprehended according to the law of contradiction1 but only by presupposing another synthetical proposition from which it follows1 but never in itself4 ,first of all1 we must observe that all proper mathematical judgments are a priori1 and not empirical1 because they carry with them necessity1 which cannot be obtained from experience4 ,but if this be not conceded to me1 very good2 ,i shall confine my assertion to pure ,mathematics1 the very notion of which implies that it contains pure a priori and not empirical cognitions4 ,it might at first be thought that the proposition #g #e #ab is a mere analytical judgment1 following from the concept of the sum of seven and five1 according to the law of contradiction4 ,but on closer examination it appears that the concept of the sum of #g #e contains merely their union in a single number1 without its being at all thought what the particular number is that unites them4 ,the concept of twelve is by no means thought by merely thinking of the combination of seven and five2 and analyse this possible sum as we may1 we shall not discover twelve in the concept4 ,we must go beyond these concepts1 by calling to our aid some concrete image 7,anschauung71 i4e41 either our five fingers1 or five points 7as ,segner has it in his ,arithmetic71 and we must add successively the units of the five1 given in some concrete image 7,anschauung71 to the concept of seven4 ,hence our concept is really amplified by the proposition #g #e #ab1 and we add to the first a second1 not thought in it4 ,arithmetical judgments are therefore synthetical1 and the more plainly according as we take larger numbers2 for in such cases it is clear that1 however closely we analyse our concepts without calling visual images 7,anschauung7 to our aid1 we can never find the sum by such mere dissection4 ,all principles of geometry are no less analytical4 ,that a straight line is the shortest path between two points1 is a synthetical proposition4 ,for my concept of straight contains nothing of quantity1 but only a quality4 ,the attribute of shortness is therefore altogether additional1 and cannot be obtained by any analysis of the concept4 ,here1 too1 visualisation 7,anschauung7 must come to aid us4 ,it alone makes the synthesis possible4 ,some other principles1 assumed by geometers1 are indeed actually analytical1 and depend on the law of contradiction2 but they only serve1 as identical propositions1 as a method of concatenation1 and not as principles1 e4g41 a a1 the whole is equal to itself1 or a b a1 the whole is greater than its part4 ,and yet even these1 though they are recognised as valid from mere concepts1 are only admitted in mathematics1 because they can be represented in some visual form 7,anschauung74 ,what usually makes us believe that the predicate of such apodeictic#h judgments is already contained in our concept1 and that the judgment is therefore analytical1 is the duplicity of the expression1 requesting us to think a certain predicate as of necessity implied in the thought of a given concept1 which necessity attaches to the concept4 ,but the question is not what we are requested to join in thought to the given concept1 but what we actually think together with and in it1 though obscurely2 and so it appears that the predicate belongs to these concepts necessarily indeed1 yet not directly but indirectly by an added visualisation 7,anschauung74 #h ,the term apodeictic is borrowed by ,kant from ,aristotle who uses it in the sense of certain beyond dispute4 ,the word is derived from 7 ,i show7 and is contrasted to dialectic propositions1 i4e41 such statements as admit of controversy4--,ed4 #c4 ,a ,remark on the ,general ,division of ,judgments into ,analytical and ,synthetical4 ,this division is indispensable1 as concerns the ,critique of human understanding1 and therefore deserves to be called classical1 though otherwise it is of little use1 but this is the reason why dogmatic philosophers1 who always seek the sources of metaphysical judgments in ,metaphysics itself1 and not apart from it1 in the pure laws of reason generally1 altogether neglected this apparently obvious distinction4 ,thus the celebrated ,wolf1 and his acute follower ,baumgarten1 came to seek the proof of the principle of ,sufficient ,reason1 which is clearly synthetical1 in the principle of ,contradiction4 ,in ,locke's ,essay1 however1 ,i find an indication of my division4 ,for in the fourth book 7chap4 iii4 #i1 seq471 having discussed the various connexions of representations in judgments1 and their sources1 one of which he makes identity and contradiction 7analytical judgments71 and another the coexistence of representations in a subject1 he confesses 7 #aj7 that our a priori knowledge of the latter is very narrow1 and almost nothing4 ,but in his remarks on this species of cognition1 there is so little of what is definite1 and reduced to rules1 that we cannot wonder if no one1 not even ,hume1 was led to make investigations concerning this sort of judgments4 ,for such general and yet definite principles are not easily learned from other men1 who have had them obscurely in their minds4 ,we must hit on them first by our own reflexion1 then we find them elsewhere1 where we could not possibly have found them at first1 because the authors themselves did not know that such an idea lay at the basis of their observations4 ,men who never think independently have nevertheless the acuteness to discover everything1 after it has been once shown them1 in what was said long since1 though no one ever saw it there before4 #d4 ,the ,general ,question of the ,prolegomena4--,is ,metaphysics at all ,possible8 ,were a metaphysics1 which could maintain its place as a science1 really in existence2 could we say1 here is metaphysics1 learn it1 and it will convince you irresistibly and irrevocably of its truth3 this question would be useless1 and there would only remain that other question 7which would rather be a test of our acuteness1 than a proof of the existence of the thing itself71 ,how is the science possible1 and how does reason come to attain it8 ,but human reason has not been so fortunate in this case4 ,there is no single book to which you can point as you do to ,euclid1 and say3 ,this is ,metaphysics2 here you may find the noblest objects of this science1 the knowledge of a highest ,being1 and of a future existence1 proved from principles of pure reason4 ,we can be shown indeed many judgments1 demonstrably certain1 and never questioned2 but these are all analytical1 and rather concern the materials and the scaffolding for ,metaphysics1 than the extension of knowledge1 which is our proper object in studying it 7 #b74 ,even supposing you produce synthetical judgments 7such as the law of ,sufficient ,reason1 which you have never proved1 as you ought to1 from pure reason a priori1 though we gladly concede its truth71 you lapse when they come to be employed for your principal object1 into such doubtful assertions1 that in all ages one ,metaphysics has contradicted another1 either in its assertions1 or their proofs1 and thus has itself destroyed its own claim to lasting assent4 ,nay1 the very attempts to set up such a science are the main cause of the early appearance of scepticism1 a mental attitude in which reason treats itself with such violence that it could never have arisen save from complete despair of ever satisfying our most important aspirations4 ,for long before men began to inquire into nature methodically1 they consulted abstract reason1 which had to some extent been exercised by means of ordinary experience2 for reason is ever present1 while laws of nature must usually be discovered with labor4 ,so ,metaphysics floated to the surface1 like foam1 which dissolved the moment it was scooped off4 ,but immediately there appeared a new supply on the surface1 to be ever eagerly gathered up by some1 while others1 instead of seeking in the depths the cause of the phenomenon1 thought they showed their wisdom by ridiculing the idle labor of their neighbors4 ,the essential and distinguishing feature of pure mathematical cognition among all other a priori cognitions is1 that it cannot at all proceed from concepts1 but only by means of the construction of concepts 7see ,critique ,,ii41 ,method of ,transcendentalism1 chap4 ,i41 sect4 #a74 ,as therefore in its judgments it must proceed beyond the concept to that which its corresponding visualisation 7,anschauung7 contains1 these judgments neither can1 nor ought to1 arise analytically1 by dissecting the concept1 but are all synthetical4 ,i cannot refrain from pointing out the disadvantage resulting to philosophy from the neglect of this easy and apparently insignificant observation4 ,hume being prompted 7a task worthy of a philosopher7 to cast his eye over the whole field of a priori cognitions in which human understanding claims such mighty possessions1 heedlessly severed from it a whole1 and indeed its most valuable1 province1 viz41 pure mathematics2 for he thought its nature1 or1 so to speak1 the state-constitution of this empire1 depended on totally different principles1 namely1 on the law of contradiction alone2 and although he did not divide ,judgments in this manner formally and universally as ,i have done here1 what he said was equivalent to this3 that mathematics contains only analytical1 but metaphysics synthetical1 a priori judgments4 ,in this1 however1 he was greatly mistaken1 and the mistake had a decidedly injurious effect upon his whole conception4 ,but for this1 he would have extended his question concerning the origin of our synthetical judgments far beyond the metaphysical concept of ,causality1 and included in it the possibility of mathematics a priori also1 for this latter he must have assumed to be equally synthetical4 ,and then he could not have based his metaphysical judgments on mere experience without subjecting the axioms of mathematics equally to experience1 a thing which he was far too acute to do4 ,the good company into which metaphysics would thus have been brought1 would have saved it from the danger of a contemptuous ill-treatment1 for the thrust intended for it must have reached mathematics1 which was not and could not have been ,hume's intention4 ,thus that acute man would have been led into considerations which must needs be similar to those that now occupy us1 but which would have gained inestimably by his inimitably elegant style4 ,metaphysical judgments1 properly so called1 are all synthetical4 ,we must distinguish judgments pertaining to metaphysics from metaphysical judgments properly so called4 ,many of the former are analytical1 but they only afford the means for metaphysical judgments1 which are the whole end of the science1 and which are always synthetical4 ,for if there be concepts pertaining to metaphysics 7as1 for example1 that of substance71 the judgments springing from simple analysis of them also pertain to metaphysics1 as1 for example1 substance is that which only exists as subject2 and by means of several such analytical judgments1 we seek to approach the definition of the concept4 ,but as the analysis of a pure concept of the understanding pertaining to metaphysics1 does not proceed in any different manner from the dissection of any other1 even empirical1 concepts1 not pertaining to metaphysics 7such as3 air is an elastic fluid1 the elasticity of which is not destroyed by any known degree of cold71 it follows that the concept indeed1 but not the analytical judgment1 is properly metaphysical4 ,this science has something peculiar in the production of its a priori cognitions1 which must therefore be distinguished from the features it has in common with other rational knowledge4 ,thus the judgment1 that all the substance in things is permanent1 is a synthetical and properly metaphysical judgment4 ,if the a priori principles1 which constitute the materials of metaphysics1 have first been collected according to fixed principles1 then their analysis will be of great value2 it might be taught as a particular part 7as a philosophia definitiva71 containing nothing but analytical judgments pertaining to metaphysics1 and could be treated separately from the synthetical which constitute metaphysics proper4 ,for indeed these analyses are not elsewhere of much value1 except in metaphysics1 i4e41 as regards the synthetical judgments1 which are to be generated by these previously analysed concepts4 ,the conclusion drawn in this section then is1 that metaphysics is properly concerned with synethetical propositions a priori1 and these alone constitute its end1 for which it indeed requires various dissections of its concepts1 viz41 of its analytical judgments1 but wherein the procedure is not different from that in every other kind of knowledge1 in which we merely seek to render our concepts distinct by analysis4 ,but the generation of a priori cognition by concrete images as well as by concepts1 in fine of synthetical propositions a priori in philosophical cognition1 constitutes the essential subject of ,metaphysics4 ,weary therefore as well of dogmatism1 which teaches us nothing1 as of scepticism1 which does not even promise us anything1 not even the quiet state of a contented ignorance2 disquieted by the importance of knowledge so much needed2 and lastly1 rendered suspicious by long experience of all knowledge which we believe we possess1 or which offers itself1 under the title of pure reason3 there remains but one critical question on the answer to which our future procedure depends1 viz41 ,is ,metaphysics at all possible8 ,but this question must be answered not by sceptical objections to the asseverations of some actual system of metaphysics 7for we do not as yet admit such a thing to exist71 but from the conception1 as yet only problematical1 of a science of this sort4 ,in the ,critique of ,pure ,reason ,i have treated this question synthetically1 by making inquiries into pure reason itself1 and endeavoring in this source to determine the elements as well as the laws of its pure use according to principles4 ,the task is difficult1 and requires a resolute reader to penetrate by degrees into a system1 based on no data except reason itself1 and which therefore seeks1 without resting upon any fact1 to unfold knowledge from its original germs4 ,prolegomena1 however1 are designed for preparatory exercises2 they are intended rather to point out what we have to do in order if possible to actualise a science1 than to propound it4 ,they must therefore rest upon something already known as trustworthy1 from which we can set out with confidence1 and ascend to sources as yet unknown1 the discovery of which will not only explain to us what we knew1 but exhibit a sphere of many cognitions which all spring from the same sources4 ,the method of ,prolegomena1 especially of those designed as a preparation for future metaphysics1 is consequently analytical4 ,but it happens fortunately1 that though we cannot assume metaphysics to be an actual science1 we can say with confidence that certain pure a priori synthetical cognitions1 pure ,mathematics and pure ,physics are actual and given2 for both contain propositions1 which are thoroughly recognised as apodeictically certain1 partly by mere reason1 partly by general consent arising from experience1 and yet as independent of experience4 ,we have therefore some at least uncontested synthetical knowledge a priori1 and need not ask whether it be possible1 for it is actual1 but how it is possible1 in order that we may deduce from the principle which makes the given cognitions possible the possibility of all the rest4 ,the ,general ,problem3 ,how is ,cognition from ,pure ,reason ,possible8 #e4 ,we have above learned the significant distinction between analytical and synthetical judgments4 ,the possibility of analytical propositions was easily comprehended1 being entirely founded on the law of ,contradiction4 ,the possibility of synthetical a posteriori judgments1 of those which are gathered from experience1 also requires no particular explanation2 for experience is nothing but a continual synthesis of perceptions4 ,there remain therefore only synthetical propositions a priori1 of which the possibility must be sought or investigated1 because they must depend upon other principles than the law of contradiction4 ,but here we need not first establish the possibility of such propositions so as to ask whether they are possible4 ,for there are enough of them which indeed are of undoubted certainty1 and as our present method is analytical1 we shall start from the fact1 that such synthetical but purely rational cognition actually exists2 but we must now inquire into the reason of this possibility1 and ask1 how such cognition is possible1 in order that we may from the principles of its possibility be enabled to determine the conditions of its use1 its sphere and its limits4 ,the proper problem upon which all depends1 when expressed with scholastic precision1 is therefore3 ,how are ,synthetic ,propositions a priori possible8 ,for the sake of popularity ,i have above expressed this problem somewhat differently1 as an inquiry into purely rational cognition1 which ,i could do for once without detriment to the desired comprehension1 because1 as we have only to do here with metaphysics and its sources1 the reader will1 ,i hope1 after the fore going remarks1 keep in mind that when we speak of purely rational cognition1 we do not mean analytical1 but synthetical cognition4#i #i ,it is unavoidable that as knowledge advances1 certain expressions which have become classical1 after having been used since the infancy of science1 will be found inadequate and unsuitable1 and a newer and more appropriate application of the terms will give rise to confusion4 ,this is the case with the term analytical4 ,the analytical method1 so far as it is opposed to the synthetical1 is very different from that which constitutes the essence of analytical propositions3 it signifies only that we start from what is sought1 as if it were given1 and ascend to the only conditions under which it is possible4 ,in this method we often use nothing but synthetical propositions1 as in mathematical analysis1 and it were better to term it the regressive method1 in contradistinction to the synthetic or progressive4 ,a principal part of ,logic too is distinguished by the name of ,analytics1 which here signifies the logic of truth in contrast to ,dialectics1 without considering whether the cognitions belonging to it are analytical or synthetical4 ,metaphysics stands or falls with the solution of this problem3 its very existence depends upon it4 ,let any one make metaphysical assertions with ever so much plausibility1 let him overwhelm us with conclusions1 if he has not previously proved able to answer this question satisfactorily1 ,i have a right to say3 this is all vain baseless philosophy and false wisdom4 ,you speak through pure reason1 and claim1 as it were to create cognitions a priori by not only dissecting given concepts1 but also by asserting connexions which do not rest upon the law of contradiction1 and which you believe you conceive quite independently of all experience2 how do you arrive at this1 and how will you justify your pretensions8 ,an appeal to the consent of the common sense of mankind cannot be allowed2 for that is a witness whose authority depends merely upon rumor4 ,says ,horace3 ,quodcunque ostendis mihi sic1 incredulus odi4 ,to all that which thou provest me thus1 ,i refuse to give credence4 ,the answer to this question1 though indispensable1 is difficult2 and though the principal reason that it was not made long ago is1 that the possibility of the question never occurred to anybody1 there is yet another reason1 which is this that a satisfactory answer to this one question requires a much more persistent1 profound1 and painstaking reflexion1 than the most diffuse work on ,metaphysics1 which on its first appearance promised immortality to its author4 ,and every intelligent reader1 when he carefully reflects what this problem requires1 must at first be struck with its difficulty1 and would regard it as insoluble and even impossible1 did there not actually exist pure synthetical cognitions a priori4 ,this actually happened to ,david ,hume1 though he did not conceive the question in its entire universality as is done here1 and as must be done1 should the answer be decisive for all ,metaphysics4 ,for how is it possible1 says that acute man1 that when a concept is given me1 ,i can go beyond it and connect with it another1 which is not contained in it1 in such a manner as if the latter necessarily belonged to the former8 ,nothing but experience can furnish us with such connexions 7thus he concluded from the difficulty which he took to be an impossibility71 and all that vaunted necessity1 or1 what is the same thing1 all cognition assumed to be a priori1 is nothing but a long habit of accepting something as true1 and hence of mistaking subjective necessity for objective4 ,should my reader complain of the difficulty and the trouble which ,i occasion him in the solution of this problem1 he is at liberty to solve it himself in an easier way4 ,perhaps he will then feel under obligation to the person who has undertaken for him a labor of so profound research1 and will rather be surprised at the facility with which1 considering the nature of the subject1 the solution has been attained4 ,yet it has cost years of work to solve the problem in its whole universality 7using the term in the mathematical sense1 viz41 for that which is sufficient for all cases71 and finally to exhibit it in the analytical form1 as the reader finds it here4 ,all metaphysicians are therefore solemnly and legally suspended from their occupations till they shall have answered in a satisfactory manner the question1 ,how are synthetic cognitions a priori possible8 ,for the answer contains which they must show when they have anything to offer in the name of pure reason4 ,but if they do not possess these credentials1 they can expect nothing else of reasonable people1 who have been deceived so often1 than to be dismissed without further ado4 ,if they on the other hand desire to carry on their business1 not as a science1 but as an art of wholesome oratory suited to the common sense of man1 they cannot in justice be prevented4 ,they will then speak the modest language of a rational belief1 they will grant that they are not allowed even to conjecture1 far less to know1 anything which lies beyond the bounds of all possible experience1 but only to assume 7not for speculative use1 which they must abandon1 but for practical purposes only7 the existence of something that is possible and even indispensable for the guidance of the understanding and of the will in life4 ,in this manner alone can they be called useful and wise men1 and the more so as they renounce the title of metaphysicians2 for the latter profess to be speculative philosophers1 and since1 when judgments a priori are under discussion1 poor probabilities cannot be admitted 7for what is declared to be known a priori is thereby announced as necessary71 such men cannot be permitted to play with conjectures1 but their assertions must be either science1 or are worth nothing at all4 ,it may be said1 that the entire transcendental philosophy1 which necessarily precedes all metaphysics1 is nothing but the complete solution of the problem here propounded1 in systematical order and completeness1 and hitherto we have never had any transcendental philosophy2 for what goes by its name is properly a part of metaphysics1 whereas the former science is intended first to constitute the possibility of the latter1 and must therefore precede all metaphysics4 ,and it is not surprising that when a whole science1 deprived of all help from other sciences1 and consequently in itself quite new1 is required to answer a single question satisfactorily1 we should find the answer troublesome and difficult1 nay even shrouded in obscurity4 ,as we now proceed to this solution according to the analytical method1 in which we assume that such cognitions from pure reasons actually exist1 we can only appeal to two sciences of theoretical cognition 7which alone is under consideration here71 pure mathematics and pure natural science 7physics74 ,for these alone can exhibit to us objects in a definite and actualisable form 7in der ,anschauung71 and consequently 7if there should occur in them a cognition a priori7 can show the truth or conformity of the cognition to the object in concreto1 that is1 its actuality1 from which we could proceed to the reason of its possibility by the analytic method4 ,this facilitates our work greatly for here universal considerations are not only applied to facts1 but even start from them1 while in a synthetic procedure they must strictly be derived in abstracto from concepts4 ,but1 in order to rise from these actual and at the same time well-grounded pure cognitions a priori to such a possible cognition of the same as we are seeking1 viz41 to metaphysics as a science1 we must comprehend that which occasions it1 ,i mean the mere natural1 though in spite of its truth not unsuspected1 cognition a priori which lies at the bottom of that science1 the elaboration of which without any critical investigation of its possibility is commonly called metaphysics4 ,in a word1 we must comprehend the natural conditions of such a science as a part of our inquiry1 and thus the transcendental problem will be gradually answered by a division into four questions3 #a4 ,how is pure mathematics possible8 #b4 ,how is pure natural science possible8 #c4 ,how is metaphysics in general possible8 #d4 ,how is metaphysics as a science possible8 ,it may be seen that the solution of these problems1 though chiefly designed to exhibit the essential matter of the ,critique1 has yet something peculiar1 which for itself alone deserves attention4 ,this is the search for the sources of given sciences in reason itself1 so that its faculty of knowing something a priori may by its own deeds be investigated and measured4 ,by this procedure these sciences gain1 if not with regard to their contents1 yet as to their proper use1 and while they throw light on the higher question concerning their common origin1 they give1 at the same time1 an occasion better to explain their own nature4 ,,first ,,part ,,of ,,the ,,transcendental ,,problem4 ,,how ,,is ,,pure ,,mathematics ,,possible8 #f4 ,here is a great and established branch of knowledge1 encompassing even now a wonderfully large domain and promising an unlimited extension in the future4 ,yet it carries with it thoroughly apodeictical certainty1 i4e41 absolute necessity1 which therefore rests upon no empirical grounds4 ,consequently it is a pure product of reason1 and moreover is thoroughly synthetical4 ,here the question arises3 ,how then is it possible for human reason to produce a cognition of this nature entirely a priori8 ,does not this faculty which produces mathematics1 as it neither is nor can be based upon experience1 presuppose some ground of cognition a priori1 which lies deeply hidden1 but which might reveal itself by these its effects1 if their first beginnings were but diligently ferreted out8 #g4 ,but we find that all mathematical cognition has this peculiarity3 it must first exhibit its concept in a visual form 7,anschauung7 and indeed a priori1 therefore in a visual form which is not empirical1 but pure4 ,without this mathematics cannot take a single step2 hence its judgments are always visual1 viz41 intuitive2 whereas philosophy must be satisfied with discursive judgments from mere concepts1 and though it may illustrate its doctrines through a visual figure1 can never derive them from it4 ,this observation on the nature of mathematics gives us a clue to the first and highest condition of its possibility1 which is1 that some non-sensuous visualisation 7called pure intuition1 or reine ,anschauung7 must form its basis1 in which all its concepts can be exhibited or constructed1 in concreto and yet a priori4 ,if we can find out this pure intuition and its possibility1 we may thence easily explain how synthetical propositions a priori are possible in pure mathematics1 and consequently how this science itself is possible4 ,empirical intuition viz41 sense-perception enables us without difficulty to enlarge the concept which we frame of an object of intuition or sense-perception1 by new predicates1 which intuition i4e41 sense-perception itself presents synthetically in experience4 ,pure intuition viz41 the visualisation of forms in our imagination1 from which every thing sensual1 i4e41 every thought of material qualities1 is excluded does so likewise1 only with this difference1 that in the latter case the synthetical judgment is a priori certain and apodeictical1 in the former1 only a posteriori and empirically certain2 because this latter contains only that which occurs in contingent empirical intuition1 but the former1 that which must necessarily be discovered in pure intuition4 ,here intuition1 being an intuition a priori1 is before all experience1 viz41 before any perception of particular objects1 inseparably conjoined with its concept4 #h4 ,but with this step our perplexity seems rather to increase than to lessen4 ,for the question now is1 ,how is it possible to intuite in a visual form anything a priori8 ,an intuition viz41 a visual sense-perception is such a representation as immediately depends upon the presence of the object4 ,hence it seems impossible to intuite from the outset a priori1 because intuition would in that event take place without either a former or a present object to refer to1 and by consequence could not be intuition4 ,concepts indeed are such1 that we can easily form some of them a priori1 viz41 such as contain nothing but the thought of an object in general2 and we need not find ourselves in an immediate relation to the object4 ,take1 for instance1 the concepts of ,quantity1 of ,cause1 etc4 ,but even these require1 in order to make them under stood1 a certain concrete use--that is1 an application to some sense-experience 7,anschauung71 by which an object of them is given us4 ,but how can the intuition of the object its visualisation precede the object itself8 #i4 ,if our intuition i4e41 our sense-experience were perforce of such a nature as to represent things as they are in themselves1 there would not be any intuition a priori1 but intuition would be always empirical4 ,for ,i can only know what is contained in the object in itself when it is present and given to me4 ,it is indeed even then incomprehensible how the visualising 7,anschauung7 of a present thing should make me know this thing as it is in itself1 as its properties cannot migrate into my faculty of representation4 ,but even granting this possibility1 a visualising of that sort would not take place a priori1 that is1 before the object were presented to me2 for without this latter fact no reason of a relation between my representation and the object can be imagined1 unless it depend upon a direct inspiration4 ,therefore in one way only can my intuition 7,anschauung7 anticipate the actuality of the object1 and be a cognition a priori1 viz43 if my intuition contains nothing but the form of sensibility1 antedating in my subjectivity all the actual impressions through which ,i am affected by objects4 ,for that objects of sense can only be intuited according to this form of sensibility ,i can know a priori4 ,hence it follows3 that propositions1 which concern this form of sensuous intuition only1 are possible and valid for objects of the senses2 as also1 conversely1 that intuitions which are possible a priori can never concern any other things than objects of our senses4#aj #aj ,this whole paragraph 7 #i7 will be better understood when compared with ,remark ,i41 following this section1 appearing in the present edition on page #dj4--;,ed4 #aj4 ,accordingly1 it is only the form of the sensuous intuition by which we can intuite things a priori1 but by which we can know objects only as they appear to us 7to our senses71 not as they are in themselves2 and this assumption is absolutely necessary if synthetical propositions a priori be granted as possible1 or if1 in case they actually occur1 their possibility is to be comprehended and determined beforehand4 ,now1 the intuitions which pure mathematics lays at the foundation of all its cognitions and judgments which appear at once apodeictic and necessary are ,space and ,time4 ,for mathematics must first have all its concepts in intuition1 and pure mathematics in pure intuition1 that is1 it must construct them4 ,if it proceeded in any other way1 it would be impossible to make any headway1 for mathematics proceeds1 not analytically by dissection of concepts1 but synthetically1 and if pure intuition be wanting1 there is nothing in which the matter for synthetical judgments a priori can be given4 ,geometry is based upon the pure intuition of space4 ,arithmetic accomplishes its concept of number by the successive addition of units in time2 and pure mechanics especially cannot attain its concepts of motion without employing the representation of time4 ,both representations1 however1 are only intuitions2 for if we omit from the empirical intuitions of bodies and their alterations 7motion7 everything empirical1 or belonging to sensation1 space and time still remain1 which are therefore pure intuitions that lie a priori at the basis of the empirical4 ,hence they can never be omitted1 but at the same time1 by their being pure intuitions a priori1 they prove that they are mere forms of our sensibility1 which must precede all empirical intuition1 or perception of actual objects1 and conformably to which objects can be known a priori1 but only as they appear to us4 #aa4 ,the problem of the present section is therefore solved4 ,pure mathematics1 as synthetical cognition a priori1 is only possible by referring to no other objects than those of the senses4 ,at the basis of their empirical intuition lies a pure intuition 7of space and of time7 which is a priori4 ,this is possible1 because the latter intuition is nothing but the mere form of sensibility1 which precedes the actual appearance of the objects1 in that it1 in fact1 makes them possible4 ,yet this faculty of intuiting a priori affects not the matter of the phenomenon 7that is1 the sense-element in it1 for this constitutes that which is empirical71 but its form1 viz41 space and time4 ,should any man venture to doubt that these are determinations adhering not to things in themselves1 but to their relation to our sensibility1 ,i should be glad to know how it can be possible to know the constitution of things a priori1 viz41 before we have any acquaintance with them and before they are presented to us4 ,such1 however1 is the case with space and time4 ,but this is quite comprehensible as soon as both count for nothing more than formal conditions of our sensibility1 while the objects count merely as phenomena2 for then the form of the phenomenon1 i4e41 pure intuition1 can by all means be represented as proceeding from ourselves1 that is1 a priori4 #ab4 ,in order to add something by way of illustration and confirmation1 we need only watch the ordinary and necessary procedure of geometers4 ,all proofs of the complete congruence of two given figures 7where the one can in every respect be substituted for the other7 come ultimately to this that they may be made to coincide2 which is evidently nothing else than a synthetical proposition resting upon immediate intuition1 and this intuition must be pure1 or given a priori1 otherwise the proposition could not rank as apodeictically certain1 but would have empirical certainty only4 ,in that case1 it could only be said that it is always found to be so1 and holds good only as far as our perception reaches4 ,that everywhere space 7which in its entirety is itself no longer the boundary of another space7 has three dimensions1 and that space cannot in any way have more1 is based on the proposition that not more than three lines can intersect at right angles in one point2 but this proposition cannot by any means be shown from concepts1 but rests immediately on intuition1 and indeed on pure and a priori intuition1 because it is apodeictically certain4 ,that we can require a line to be drawn to infinity 7in indefinitum71 or that a series of changes 7for example1 spaces traversed by motion7 shall be infinitely continued1 presupposes a representation of space and time1 which can only attach to intuition1 namely1 so far as it in itself is bounded by nothing1 for from concepts it could never be inferred4 ,consequently1 the basis of mathematics actually are pure intuitions1 which make its synthetical and apodeictically valid propositions possible4 ,hence our transcendental deduction of the notions of space and of time explains at the same time the possibility of pure mathematics4 ,without some such deduction its truth may be granted1 but its existence could by no means be understood1 and we must assume that everything which can be given to our senses 7to the external senses in space1 to the internal one in time7 is intuited by us as it appears to us1 not as it is in itself4 #ac4 ,those who cannot yet rid themselves of the notion that space and time are actual qualities inhering in things in themselves1 may exercise their acumen on the following paradox4 ,when they have in vain attempted its solution1 and are free from prejudices at least for a few moments1 they will suspect that the degradation of space and of time to mere forms of our sensuous intuition may perhaps be well founded4 ,if two things are quite equal in all respects as much as can be ascertained by all means possible1 quantitatively and qualitatively1 it must follow1 that the one can in all cases and under all circumstances replace the other1 and this substitution would not occasion the least perceptible difference4 ,this in fact is true of plane figures in geometry2 but some spherical figures exhibit1 notwithstanding a complete internal agreement1 such a contrast in their external relation1 that the one figure cannot possibly be put in the place of the other4 ,for instance1 two spherical triangles on opposite hemispheres1 which have an arc of the equator as their common base1 may be quite equal1 both as regards sides and angles1 so that nothing is to be found in either1 if it be described for itself alone and completed1 that would not equally be applicable to both2 and yet the one cannot be put in the place of the other 7being situated upon the opposite hemisphere74 ,here then is an internal difference between the two triangles1 which difference our understanding cannot describe as internal1 and which only manifests itself by external relations in space4 ,but ,i shall adduce examples1 taken from common life1 that are more obvious still4 ,what can be more similar in every respect and in every part more alike to my hand and to my ear1 than their images in a mirror8 ,and yet ,i cannot put such a hand as is seen in the glass in the place of its archetype2 for if this is a right hand1 that in the glass is a left one1 and the image or reflexion of the right ear is a left one which never can serve as a substitute for the other4 ,there are in this case no internal differences which our understanding could determine by thinking alone4 ,yet the differences are internal as the senses teach1 for1 notwithstanding their complete equality and similarity1 the left hand cannot be enclosed in the same bounds as the right one 7they are not congruent72 the glove of one hand cannot be used for the other4 ,what is the solution8 ,these objects are not representations of things as they are in themselves1 and as the pure understanding would cognise them1 but sensuous intuitions1 that is1 appearances1 the possibility of which rests upon the relation of certain things unknown in themselves to something else1 viz41 to our sensibility4 ,space is the form of the external intuition of this sensibility1 and the internal determination of every space is only possible by the determination of its external relation to the whole space1 of which it is a part 7in other words1 by its relation to the external sense74 ,that is to say1 the part is only possible through the whole1 which is never the case with things in themselves1 as objects of the mere understanding1 but with appearances only4 ,hence the difference between similar and equal things1 which are yet not congruent 7for instance1 two symmetric helices71 cannot be made intelligible by any concept1 but only by the relation to the right and the left hands which immediately refers to intuition4 ,remark ,i4 ,pure ,mathematics1 and especially pure geometry1 can only have objective reality on condition that they refer to objects of sense4 ,but in regard to the latter the principle holds good1 that our sense representation is not a representation of things in themselves1 but of the way in which they appear to us4 ,hence it follows1 that the propositions of geometry are not the results of a mere creation of our poetic imagination1 and that therefore they cannot be referred with assurance to actual objects2 but rather that they are necessarily valid of space1 and consequently of all that may be found in space1 because space is nothing else than the form of all external appearances1 and it is this form alone in which objects of sense can be given4 ,sensibility1 the form of which is the basis of geometry1 is that upon which the possibility of external appearance depends4 ,therefore these appearances can never contain anything but what geometry prescribes to them4 ,it would be quite otherwise if the senses were so constituted as to represent objects as they are in themselves4 ,for then it would not by any means follow from the conception of space1 which with all its properties serves to the geometer as an a priori foundation1 together with what is thence inferred1 must be so in nature4 ,the space of the geometer would be considered a mere fiction1 and it would not be credited with objective validity1 because we cannot see how things must of necessity agree with an image of them1 which we make spontaneously and previous to our acquaintance with them4 ,but if this image1 or rather this formal intuition1 is the essential property of our sensibility1 by means of which alone objects are given to us1 and if this sensibility represents not things in themselves1 but their appearances3 we shall easily comprehend1 and at the same time indisputably prove1 that all external objects of our world of sense must necessarily coincide in the most rigorous way with the propositions of geometry2 because sensibility by means of its form of external intuition1 viz41 by space1 the same with which the geometer is occupied1 makes those objects at all possible as mere appearances4 ,it will always remain a remarkable phenomenon in the history of philosophy1 that there was a time1 when even mathematicians1 who at the same time were philosophers1 began to doubt1 not of the accuracy of their geometrical propositions so far as they concerned space1 but of their objective validity and the applicability of this concept itself1 and of all its corollaries1 to nature4 ,they showed much concern whether a line in nature might not consist of physical points1 and consequently that true space in the object might consist of simple discrete parts1 while the space which the geometer has in his mind being continuous cannot be such4 ,they did not recognise that this mental space renders possible the physical space1 i4e41 the extension of matter2 that this pure space is not at all a quality of things in themselves1 but a form of our sensuous faculty of representation2 and that all objects in space are mere appearances1 i4e41 not things in themselves but representations of our sensuous intuition4 ,but such is the case1 for the space of the geometer is exactly the form of sensuous intuition which we find a priori in us1 and contains the ground of the possibility of all external appearances 7according to their form71 and the latter must necessarily and most rigidly agree with the propositions of the geometer1 which he draws not from any fictitious concept1 but from the subjective basis of all external phenomena1 which is sensibility itself4 ,in this and no other way can geometry be made secure as to the undoubted objective reality of its propositions against all the intrigues of a shallow ,metaphysics1 which is surprised at them the geometrical propositions1 because it has not traced them to the sources of their concepts4 ,remark ,,ii4 ,whatever is given us as object1 must be given us in intuition4 ,all our intuition however takes place by means of the senses only2 the understanding intuites nothing1 but only reflects4 ,and as we have just shown that the senses never and in no manner enable us to know things in themselves1 but only their appearances1 which are mere representations of the sensibility1 we conclude that 'all bodies1 together with the space in which they are1 must be considered nothing but mere representations in us1 and exist nowhere but in our thoughts4' ,you will say3 ,is not this manifest idealism8 ,idealism consists in the assertion1 that there are none but thinking beings1 all other things1 which we think are perceived in intuition1 being nothing but representations in the thinking beings1 to which no object external to them corresponds in fact4 ,whereas ,i say1 that things as objects of our senses existing outside us are given1 but we know nothing of what they may be in themselves1 knowing only their appearances1 i4e41 the representations which they cause in us by affecting our senses4 ,consequently ,i grant by all means that there are bodies without us1 that is1 things which1 though quite unknown to us as to what they are in themselves1 we yet know by the representations which their influence on our sensibility procures us1 and which we call bodies1 a term signifying merely the appearance of the thing which is unknown to us1 but not therefore less actual4 ,can this be termed idealism8 ,it is the very contrary4 ,long before ,locke's time1 but assuredly since him1 it has been generally assumed and granted without detriment to the actual existence of external things1 that many of their predicates may be said to belong not to the things in themselves1 but to their appearances1 and to have no proper existence outside our representation4 ,heat1 color1 and taste1 for instance1 are of this kind4 ,now1 if ,i go farther1 and for weighty reasons rank as mere appearances the remaining qualities of bodies also1 which are called primary1 such as extension1 place1 and in general space1 with all that which belongs to it 7impenetrability or materiality1 space1 etc47--no one in the least can adduce the reason of its being inadmissible4 ,as little as the man who admits colors not to be properties of the object in itself1 but only as modifications of the sense of sight1 should on that account be called an idealist1 so little can my system be named idealistic1 merely because ,i find that more1 nay1 ,all the properties which constitute the intuition of a body belong merely to its appearance4 ,the existence of the thing that appears is thereby not destroyed1 as in genuine idealism1 but it is only shown1 that we cannot possibly know it by the senses as it is in itself4 ,i should be glad to know what my assertions must be in order to avoid all idealism4 ,undoubtedly1 ,i should say1 that the representation of space is not only perfectly conformable to the relation which our sensibility has to objects--that ,i have said--but that it is quite similar to the object1--an assertion in which ,i can find as little meaning as if ,i said that the sensation of red has a similarity to the property of vermilion1 which in me excites this sensation4 ,remark ,,iii4 ,hence we may at once dismiss an easily foreseen but futile objection1 that by admitting the ideality of space and of time the whole sensible world would be turned into mere sham4 ,at first all philosophical insight into the nature of sensuous cognition was spoiled1 by making the sensibility merely a confused mode of representation1 according to which we still know things as they are1 but without being able to reduce everything in this our representation to a clear consciousness2 whereas proof is offered by us that sensibility consists1 not in this logical distinction of clearness and obscurity1 but in the genetical one of the origin of cognition itself4 ,for sensuous perception represents things not at all as they are1 but only the mode in which they affect our senses1 and consequently by sensuous perception appearances only and not things themselves are given to the understanding for reflexion4 ,after this necessary corrective1 an objection rises from an unpardonable and almost intentional misconception1 as if my doctrine turned all the things of the world of sense into mere illusion4 ,when an appearance is given us1 we are still quite free as to how we should judge the matter4 ,the appearance depends upon the senses1 but the judgment upon the understanding1 and the only question is1 whether in the determination of the object there is truth or not4 ,but the difference between truth and dreaming is not ascertained by the nature of the representations1 which are referred to objects 7for they are the same in both cases71 but by their connexion according to those rules1 which determine the coherence of the representations in the concept of an object1 and by ascertaining whether they can subsist together in experience or not4 ,and it is not the fault of the appearances if our cognition takes illusion for truth1 i4e41 if the intuition1 by which an object is given us1 is considered a concept of the thing or of its existence also1 which the understanding can only think4 ,the senses represent to us the paths of the planets as now progressive1 now retrogressive1 and herein is neither falsehood nor truth1 because as long as we hold this path to be nothing but appearance1 we do not judge of the objective nature of their motion4 ,but as a false judgment may easily arise when the understanding is not on its guard against this subjective mode of representation being considered objective1 we say they appear to move backward2 it is not the senses however which must be charged with the illusion1 but the understanding1 whose province alone it is to give an objective judgment on appearances4 ,thus1 even if we did not at all reflect on the origin of our representations1 whenever we connect our intuitions of sense 7whatever they may contain71 in space and in time1 according to the rules of the coherence of all cognition in experience1 illusion or truth will arise according as we are negligent or careful4 ,it is merely a question of the use of sensuous representations in the understanding1 and not of their origin4 ,in the same way1 if ,i consider all the representations of the senses1 together with their form1 space and time1 to be nothing but appearances1 and space and time to be a mere form of the sensibility1 which is not to be met with in objects out of it1 and if ,i make use of these representations in reference to possible experience only1 there is nothing in my regarding them as appearances that can lead astray or cause illusion4 ,for all that they can correctly cohere according to rules of truth in experience4 ,thus all the propositions of geometry hold good of space as well as of all the objects of the senses1 consequently of all possible experience1 whether ,i consider space as a mere form of the sensibility1 or as something cleaving to the things themselves4 ,in the former case however ,i comprehend how ,i can know a priori these propositions concerning all the objects of external intuition4 ,otherwise1 everything else as regards all possible experience remains just as if ,i had not departed from the vulgar view4 ,but if ,i venture to go beyond all possible experience with my notions of space and time1 which ,i cannot refrain from doing if ,i proclaim them qualities inherent in things in themselves 7for what should prevent me from letting them hold good of the same things1 even though my senses might be different1 and unsuited to them871 then a grave error may arise due to illusion1 for thus ,i would proclaim to be universally valid what is merely a subjective condition of the intuition of things and sure only for all objects of sense1 viz41 for all possible experience2 ,i would refer this condition to things in themselves1 and do not limit it to the conditions of experience4 ,my doctrine of the ideality of space and of time1 therefore1 far from reducing the whole sensible world to mere illusion1 is the only means of securing the application of one of the most important cognitions 7that which mathematics propounds a priori7 to actual objects1 and of preventing its being regarded as mere illusion4 ,for without this observation it would be quite impossible to make out whether the intuitions of space and time1 which we borrow from no experience1 and which yet lie in our representation a priori1 are not mere phantasms of our brain1 to which objects do not correspond1 at least not adequately1 and consequently1 whether we have been able to show its unquestionable validity with regard to all the objects of the sensible world just because they are mere appearances4 ,secondly1 though these my principles make appearances of the representations of the senses1 they are so far from turning the truth of experience into mere illusion1 that they are rather the only means of preventing the transcendental illusion1 by which metaphysics has hitherto been deceived1 leading to the childish endeavor of catching at bubbles1 because appearances1 which are mere representations1 were taken for things in themselves4 ,here originated the remarkable event of the antimony of ,reason which ,i shall mention by and by1 and which is destroyed by the single observation1 that appearance1 as long as it is employed in experience1 produces truth1 but the moment it transgresses the bounds of experience1 and consequently becomes transcendent1 produces nothing but illusion4 ,inasmuch1 therefore1 as ,i leave to things as we obtain them by the senses their actuality1 and only limit our sensuous intuition of these things to this1 that they represent in no respect1 not even in the pure intuitions of space and of time1 anything more than mere appearance of those things1 but never their constitution in themselves1 this is not a sweeping illusion invented for nature by me4 ,my protestation too against all charges of idealism is so valid and clear as even to seem superfluous1 were there not incompetent judges1 who1 while they would have an old name for every deviation from their perverse though common opinion1 and never judge of the spirit of philosophic nomenclature1 but cling to the letter only1 are ready to put their own conceits in the place of well-defined notions1 and thereby deform and distort them4 ,i have myself given this my theory the name of transcendental idealism1 but that cannot authorise any one to confound it either with the empirical idealism of ,descartes1 7indeed1 his was only an insoluble problem1 owing to which he thought every one at liberty to deny the existence of the corporeal world1 because it could never be proved satisfactorily71 or with the mystical and visionary idealism of ,berkeley1 against which and other similar phantasms our ,critique contains the proper antidote4 ,my idealism concerns not the existence of things 7the doubting of which1 however1 constitutes idealism in the ordinary sense71 since it never came into my head to doubt it1 but it concerns the sensuous representation of things1 to which space and time especially belong4 ,of these viz41 space and time1 consequently of all appearances in general1 ,i have only shown1 that they are neither things 7but mere modes of representation71 nor determinations belonging to things in themselves4 ,but the word transcendental1 which with me means a reference of our cognition1 i4e41 not to things1 but only to the cognitive faculty1 was meant to obviate this misconception4 ,yet rather than give further occasion to it by this word1 ,i now retract it1 and desire this idealism of mine to be called critical4 ,but if it be really an objectionable idealism to convert actual things 7not appearances7 into mere representations1 by what name shall we call him who conversely changes mere representations to things8 ,it may1 ,i think1 be called dreaming idealism1 in contradistinction to the former1 which may be called visionary1 both of which are to be refuted by my transcendental1 or1 better1 critical idealism4 ,,second ,,part ,,of ,,the ,,transcendental ,,problem4 ,,how ,,is ,,the ,,science ,,of ,,nature ,,possible8 #ad4 ,nature is the existence of things1 so far as it is determined according to universal laws4 ,should nature signify the existence of things in themselves1 we could never cognise it either a priori or a posteriori4 ,not a priori1 for how can we know what belongs to things in themselves1 since this never can be done by the dissection of our concepts 7in analytical judgments78 ,we do not want to know what is contained in our concept of a thing 7for the concept describes what belongs to its logical being71 but what is in the actuality of the thing superadded to our concept1 and by what the thing itself is determined in its existence outside the concept4 ,our understanding1 and the conditions on which alone it can connect the determinations of things in their existence1 do not prescribe any rule to things themselves2 these do not conform to our understanding1 but it must conform itself to them2 they must therefore be first given us in order to gather these determinations from them1 wherefore they would not be cognised a priori4 ,a cognition of the nature of things in themselves a posteriori would be equally impossible4 ,for1 if experience is to teach us laws1 to which the existence of things is subject1 these laws1 if they regard things in themselves1 must belong to them of necessity even outside our experience4 ,but experience teaches us what exists and how it exists1 but never that it must necessarily exist so and not otherwise4 ,experience therefore can never teach us the nature of things in themselves4 #ae4 ,we nevertheless actually possess a pure science of nature in which are propounded1 a priori and with all the necessity requisite to apodeictical propositions1 laws to which nature is subject4 ,i need only call to witness that propaedeutic of natural science which1 under the title of the universal ,science of ,nature1 precedes all ,physics 7which is founded upon empirical principles74 ,in it we have ,mathematics applied to appearance1 and also merely discursive principles 7or those derived from concepts71 which constitute the philosophical part of the pure cognition of nature4 ,but there are several things in it1 which are not quite pure and independent of empirical sources3 such as the concept of motion1 that of impenetrability 7upon which the empirical concept of matter rests71 that of inertia1 and many others1 which prevent its being called a perfectly pure science of nature4 ,besides1 it only refers to objects of the external sense1 and therefore does not give an example of a universal science of nature1 in the strict sense1 for such a science must reduce nature in general1 whether it regards the object of the external or that of the internal sense 7the object of ,physics as well as ,psychology71 to universal laws4 ,but among the principles of this universal physics there are a few which actually have the required universality2 for instance1 the propositions that substance is permanent1 and that every event is determined by a cause according to constant laws1 etc4 ,these are actually universal laws of nature1 which subsist completely a priori4 ,there is then in fact a pure science of nature1 and the question arises1 ,how is it possible8 #af4 ,the word nature assumes yet another meaning1 which determines the object1 whereas in the former sense it only denotes the conformity to law ,gesetzmssigkeit of the determinations of the existence of things generally4 ,if we consider it materialiter 7i4e41 in the matter that forms its objects7 nature is the complex of all the objects of experience4 ,and with this only are we now concerned1 for besides1 things which can never be objects of experience1 if they must be cognised as to their nature1 would oblige us to have recourse to concepts whose meaning could never be given in concreto 7by any example of possible experience74 ,consequently we must form for ourselves a list of concepts of their nature1 the reality whereof 7i4e41 whether they actually refer to objects1 or are mere creations of thought7 could never be determined4 ,the cognition of what cannot be an object of experience would be hyperphysical1 and with things hyperphysical we are here not concerned1 but only with the cognition of nature1 the actuality of which can be confirmed by experience1 though it the cognition of nature is possible a priori and precedes all experience4 #ag4 ,the formal aspect of nature in this narrower sense is therefore the conformity to law of all the objects of experience1 and so far as it is cognised a priori1 their necessary conformity4 ,but it has just been shown that the laws of nature can never be cognised a priori in objects so far as they are considered not in reference to possible experience1 but as things in themselves4 ,and our inquiry here extends not to things in themselves 7the properties of which we pass by71 but to things as objects of possible experience1 and the complex of these is what we properly designate as nature4 ,and now ,i ask1 when the possibility of a cognition of nature a priori is in question1 whether it is better to arrange the problem thus3 ,how can we cognise a priori that things as objects of experience necessarily conform to law8 or thus3 ,how is it possible to cognise a priori the necessary conformity to law of experience itself as regards all its objects generally8 ,closely considered1 the solution of the problem1 represented in either way1 amounts1 with regard to the pure cognition of nature 7which is the point of the question at issue71 entirely to the same thing4 ,for the subjective laws1 under which alone an empirical cognition of things is possible1 hold good of these things1 as ,objects of possible experience 7not as things in themselves1 which are not considered here74 ,either of the following statements means quite the same3 ,a judgment of observation can never rank as experience1 without the law1 that whenever an event is observed1 it is always referred to some antecedent1 which it follows according to a universal rule4 ,everything1 of which experience teaches that it happens1 must have a cause4 ,it is1 however1 more commendable to choose the first formula4 ,for we can a priori and previous to all given objects have a cognition of those conditions1 on which alone experience is possible1 but never of the laws to which things may in themselves be subject1 without reference to possible experience4 ,we cannot therefore study the nature of things a priori otherwise than by investigating the conditions and the universal 7though subjective7 laws1 under which alone such a cognition as experience 7as to mere form7 is possible1 and we determine accordingly the possibility of things1 as objects of experience4 ,for if ,i should choose the second formula1 and seek the conditions a priori1 on which nature as an object of experience is possible1 ,i might easily fall into error1 and fancy that ,i was speaking of nature as a thing in itself1 and then move round in endless circles1 in a vain search for laws concerning things of which nothing is given me4 ,accordingly we shall here be concerned with experience only1 and the universal conditions of its possibility which are given a priori4 ,thence we shall determine nature as the whole object of all possible experience4 ,i think it will be understood that ,i here do not mean the rules of the observation of a nature that is already given1 for these already presuppose experience4 ,i do not mean how 7through experience7 we can study the laws of nature2 for these would not then be laws a priori1 and would yield us no pure science of nature2 but ,i mean to ask how the conditions a priori of the possibility of experience are at the same time the sources from which all the universal laws of nature must be derived4 #ah4 ,in the first place we must state that1 while all judgments of experience 7,erfahrungsurtheile7 are empirical 7i4e41 have their ground in immediate sense perception71 vice versa1 all empirical judgments 7empirische ,urtheile7 are not judgments of experience1 but1 besides the empirical1 and in general besides what is given to the sensuous intuition1 particular concepts must yet be superadded--concepts which have their origin quite a priori in the pure understanding1 and under which every perception must be first of all subsumed and then by their means changed into experience4#aa #aa ,empirical judgments 7empirische ,urtheile7 are either mere statements of fact1 viz41 records of a perception1 or statements of a natural law1 implying a causal connexion between two facts4 ,the former ,kant calls judgments of perception 7,wahrnehmungsurtheile7 the latter judgments of experience 7,erhfahrungsurtheile74--,ed4 ,empirical judgments1 so far as they have objective validity1 are judgments of experience2 but those which are only subjectively valid1 ,i name mere judgments of perception4 ,the latter require no pure concept of the understanding1 but only the logical connexion of perception in a thinking subject4 ,but the former always require1 besides the representation of the sensuous intuition1 particular concepts originally begotten in the understanding1 which produce the objective validity of the judgment of experience4 ,all our judgments are at first merely judgments of perception2 they hold good only for us 7i4e41 for our subject71 and we do not till afterwards give them a new reference 7to an object71 and desire that they shall always hold good for us and in the same way for everybody else2 for when a judgment agrees with an object1 all judgments concerning the same object must likewise agree among themselves1 and thus the objective validity of the judgment of experience signifies nothing else than its necessary universality of application4 ,and conversely when we have reason to consider a judgment necessarily universal 7which never depends upon perception1 but upon the pure concept of the understanding1 under which the perception is subsumed71 we must consider it objective also1 that is1 that it expresses not merely a reference of our perception to a subject1 but a quality of the object4 ,for there would be no reason for the judgments of other men necessarily agreeing with mine1 if it were not the unity of the object to which they all refer1 and with which they accord2 hence they must all agree with one another4 #ai4 ,therefore objective validity and necessary universality 7for everybody7 are equivalent terms1 and though we do not know the object in itself1 yet when we consider a judgment as universal1 and also necessary1 we understand it to have objective validity4 ,by this judgment we cognise the object 7though it remains unknown as it is in itself7 by the universal and necessary connexion of the given perceptions4 ,as this is the case with all objects of sense1 judgments of experience take their objective validity not from the immediate cognition of the object 7which is impossible71 but from the condition of universal validity in empirical judgments1 which1 as already said1 never rests upon empirical1 or1 in short1 sensuous conditions1 but upon a pure concept of the understanding4 ,the object always remains unknown in itself2 but when by the concept of the understanding the connexion of the representations of the object1 which are given to our sensibility1 is determined as universally valid1 the object is determined by this relation1 and it is the judgment that is objective4 ,to illustrate the matter3 ,when we say1 the room is warm1 sugar sweet1 and wormwood bitter#ab--we have only subjectively valid judgments4 ,i do not at all expect that ,i or any other person shall always find it as ,i now do2 each of these sentences only expresses a relation of two sensations to the same subject1 to myself1 and that only in my present state of perception2 consequently they are not valid of the object4 ,such are judgments of perception4 ,judgments of experience are of quite a different nature4 ,what experience teaches me under certain circumstances1 it must always teach me and everybody2 and its validity is not limited to the subject nor to its state at a particular time4 ,hence ,i pronounce all such judgments as being objectively valid4 ,for instance1 when ,i say the air is elastic1 this judgment is as yet a judgment of perception only--,i do nothing but refer two of my sensations to one another4 ,but1 if ,i would have it called a judgment of experience1 ,i require this connexion to stand under a condition1 which makes it universally valid4 ,i desire therefore that ,i and everybody else should always connect necessarily the same perceptions under the same circumstances4 #ab ,i freely grant that these examples do not represent such judgments of perception as ever could become judgments of experience1 even though a concept of the understanding were superadded1 because they refer merely to feeling1 which everybody knows to be merely subjective1 and which of course can never be attributed to the object1 and consequently never become objective4 ,i only wished to give here an example of a judgment that is merely subjectively valid1 containing no ground for universal validity1 and thereby for a relation to the object4 ,an example of the judgments of perception1 which become judgments of experience by superadded concepts of the understanding1 will be given in the next note4 #bj4 ,we must consequently analyse experience in order to see what is contained in this product of the senses and of the understanding1 and how the judgment of experience itself is possible4 ,the foundation is the intuition of which ,i become conscious1 i4e41 perception 7perceptio71 which pertains merely to the senses4 ,but in the next place1 there are acts of judging 7which belong only to the understanding74 ,but this judging may be twofold--first1 ,i may merely compare perceptions and connect them in a particular state of my consciousness2 or1 secondly1 ,i may connect them in consciousness generally4 ,the former judgment is merely a judgment of perception1 and of subjective validity only3 it is merely a connexion of perceptions in my mental state1 without reference to the object4 ,hence it is not1 as is commonly imagined1 enough for experience to compare perceptions and to connect them in consciousness through judgment2 there arises no universality and necessity1 for which alone judgments can become objectively valid and be called experience4 ,quite another judgment therefore is required before perception can become experience4 ,the given intuition must be subsumed under a concept1 which determines the form of judging in general relatively to the intuition1 connects its empirical consciousness in consciousness generally1 and thereby procures universal validity for empirical judgments4 ,a concept of this nature is a pure a priori concept of the ,understanding1 which does nothing but determine for an intuition the general way in which it can be used for judgments4 ,let the concept be that of cause1 then it determines the intuition which is subsumed under it1 e4g41 that of air1 relative to judgments in general1 viz41 the concept of air serves with regard to its expansion in the relation of antecedent to consequent in a hypothetical judgment4 ,the concept of cause accordingly is a pure concept of the understanding1 which is totally disparate from all possible perception1 and only serves to determine the representation subsumed under it1 relatively to judgments in general1 and so to make a universally valid judgment possible4 ,before1 therefore1 a judgment of perception can become a judgment of experience1 it is requisite that the perception should be subsumed under some such a concept of the understanding2 for instance1 air ranks under the concept of causes1 which determines our judgment about it in regard to its expansion as hypothetical4#ac ,thereby the expansion of the air is represented not as merely belonging to the perception of the air in my present state or in several states of mine1 or in the state of perception of others1 but as belonging to it necessarily4 ,the judgment1 the air is elastic1 becomes universally valid1 and a judgment of experience1 only by certain judgments preceding it1 which subsume the intuition of air under the concept of cause and effect3 and they thereby determine the perceptions not merely as regards one another in me1 but relatively to the form of judging in general1 which is here hypothetical1 and in this way they render the empirical judgment universally valid4 #ac ,as an easier example1 we may take the following3 ,when the sun shines on the stone1 it grows warm4 ,this judgment1 however often ,i and others may have perceived it1 is a mere judgment of perception1 and contains no necessity2 perceptions are only usually conjoined in this manner4 ,but if ,i say1 ,the sun warms the stone1 ,i add to the perception a concept of the understanding1 viz41 that of cause1 which connects with the concept of sunshine that of heat as a necessary consequence1 and the synthetical judgment becomes of necessity universally valid1 viz41 objective1 and is converted from a perception into experience4 ,if all our synthetical judgments are analysed so far as they are objectively valid1 it will be found that they never consist of mere intuitions connected only 7as is commonly believed7 by comparison into a judgment2 but that they would be impossible were not a pure concept of the understanding superadded to the concepts abstracted from intuition1 under which concept these latter are subsumed1 and in this manner only combined into an objectively valid judgment4 ,even the judgments of pure mathematics in their simplest axioms are not exempt from this condition4 ,the principle1 a straight line is the shortest between two points1 presupposes that the line is subsumed under the concept of quantity1 which certainly is no mere intuition1 but has its seat in the understanding alone1 and serves to determine the intuition 7of the line7 with regard to the judgments which may be made about it1 relatively to their quantity1 that is1 to plurality 7as judicia plurativa74#ad ,for under them it is understood that in a given intuition there is contained a plurality of homogenous parts4 #ad ,this name seems preferable to the term particularia1 which is used for these judgments in logic4 ,for the latter implies the idea that they are not universal4 ,but when ,i start from unity 7in single judgments7 and so proceed to universality1 ,i must not even indirectly and negatively imply any reference to universality4 ,i think plurality merely without universality1 and not the exception from universality4 ,this is necessary1 if logical considerations shall form the basis of the pure concepts of the understanding4 ,however1 there is no need of making changes in logic4 #ba4 ,to prove1 then1 the possibility of experience so far as it rests upon pure concepts of the understanding a priori1 we must first represent what belongs to judgments in general and the various functions of the understanding1 in a complete table4 ,for the pure concepts of the understanding must run parallel to these functions1 as such concepts are nothing more than concepts of intuitions in general1 so far as these are determined by one or other of these functions of judging1 in themselves1 that is1 necessarily and universally4 ,hereby also the a priori principles of the possibility of all experience1 as of an objectively valid empirical cognition1 will be precisely determined4 ,for they are nothing but propositions by which all perception is 7under certain universal conditions of intuition7 subsumed under those pure concepts of the understanding4 ,logical ,table of ,judgments4 #a4 #b4 ,as to ,quantity4 ,as to ,quality4 ,universal4 ,affirmative4 ,particular4 ,negative4 ,singular4 ,infinite4 #c4 #d4 ,as to ,relation4 ,as to ,modality4 ,categorical4 ,problematical4 ,hypothetical4 ,assertorial4 ,disjunctive4 ,apodeictical4 ,transcendental ,table of the ,pure ,concepts of the ,understanding4 #a4 #b4 ,as to ,quantity4 ,as to ,quality4 ,unity 7the ,measure74 ,reality4 ,plurality 7the ,quantity74 ,negation4 ,totality 7the ,whole74 ,limitation4 #c4 #d4 ,as to ,relation4 ,as to ,modality4 ,substance4 ,possibility4 ,cause4 ,existence4 ,community4 ,necessity4 ,pure ,physiological ,table of the ,universal ,principles of the ,science of ,nature4 #a4 #b4 ,axioms of ,intuition4 ,anticipations of ,perception4 #c4 #d4 ,analogies of ,experience4 ,postulates of ,empirical ,thinking generally4 #ba;a4 ,in order to comprise the whole matter in one idea1 it is first necessary to remind the reader that we are discussing not the origin of experience1 but of that which lies in experience4 ,the former pertains to empirical psychology1 and would even then never be adequately explained without the latter1 which belongs to the ,critique of cognition1 and particularly of the understanding4 ,experience consists of intuitions1 which belong to the sensibility1 and of judgments1 which are entirely a work of the understanding4 ,but the judgments1 which the understanding forms alone from sensuous intuitions1 are far from being judgments of experience4 ,for in the one case the judgment connects only the perceptions as they are given in the sensuous intuition1 while in the other the judgments must express what experience in general1 and not what the mere perception 7which possesses only subjective validity7 contains4 ,the judgment of experience must therefore add to the sensuous intuition and its logical connexion in a judgment 7after it has been rendered universal by comparison7 something that determines the synthetical judgment as necessary and therefore as universally valid4 ,this can be nothing else than that concept which represents the intuition as determined in itself with regard to one form of judgment rather than another1 viz41 a concept of that synthetical unity of intuitions which can only be represented by a given logical function of judgments4 #bb4 ,the sum of the matter is this3 the business of the senses is to intuite--that of the understanding is to think4 ,but thinking is uniting representations in one consciousness4 ,this union originates either merely relative to the subject1 and is accidental and subjective1 or is absolute1 and is necessary or objective4 ,the union of representations in one consciousness is judgment4 ,thinking therefore is the same as judging1 or referring representations to judgments in general4 ,hence judgments are either merely subjective1 when representations are referred to a consciousness in one subject only1 and united in it1 or objective1 when they are united in a consciousness generally1 that is1 necessarily4 ,the logical functions of all judgments are but various modes of uniting representations in consciousness4 ,but if they serve for concepts1 they are concepts of their necessary union in a consciousness1 and so principles of objectively valid judgments4 ,this union in a consciousness is either analytical1 by identity1 or synthetical1 by the combination and addition of various representations one to another4 ,experience consists in the synthetical connexion of phenomena 7perceptions7 in consciousness1 so far as this connexion is necessary4 ,hence the pure concepts of the understanding are those under which all perceptions must be subsumed ere they can serve for judgments of experience1 in which the synthetical unity of the perceptions is represented as necessary and universally valid4#ae #ae ,but how does this proposition1 that judgments of experience contain necessity in the synthesis of perceptions1 agree with my statement so often before inculcated1 that experience as cognition a posteriori can afford contingent judgments only8 ,when ,i say that experience teaches me something1 ,i mean only the perception that lies in experience1--for example1 that heat always follows the shining of the sun on a stone2 consequently the proposition of experience is always so far accidental4 ,that this heat necessarily follows the shining of the sun is contained indeed in the judgment of experience 7by means of the concept of cause71 yet is a fact not learned by experience2 for conversely1 experience is first of all generated by this addition of the concept of the understanding 7of cause7 to perception4 ,how perception attains this addition may be seen by referring in the ,critique itself to the section on the ,transcendental faculty of ,judgment viz41 in the first edition1 ,von dem ,schematismus der reinen ,verstandsbegriffe4 #bc4 ,judgments1 when considered merely as the condition of the union of given representations in a consciousness1 are rules4 ,these rules1 so far as they represent the union as necessary1 are rules a priori1 and so far as they cannot be deduced from higher rules1 are fundamental principles4 ,but in regard to the possibility of all experience1 merely in relation to the form of thinking in it1 no conditions of judgments of experience are higher than those which bring the phenomena1 according to the various form of their intuition1 under pure concepts of the understanding1 and render the empirical judgment objectively valid4 ,these concepts are therefore the a priori principles of possible experience4 ,the principles of possible experience are then at the same time universal laws of nature1 which can be cognised a priori4 ,and thus the problem in our second question1 ,how is the pure ,science of ,nature possible8 is solved4 ,for the system which is required for the form of a science is to be met with in perfection here1 because1 beyond the above-mentioned formal conditions of all judgments in general offered in logic1 no others are possible1 and these constitute a logical system4 ,the concepts grounded thereupon1 which contain the a priori conditions of all synthetical and necessary judgments1 accordingly constitute a transcendental system4 ,finally the principles1 by means of which all phenomena are subsumed under these concepts1 constitute a physical#af system1 that is1 a system of nature1 which precedes all empirical cognition of nature1 makes it even possible1 and hence may in strictness be denominated the universal and pure science of nature4 #af ,kant uses the term physiological in its etymological meaning as pertaining to the science of physics1 i4e41 nature in general1 not as we use the term now as pertaining to the functions of the living body4 ,accordingly it has been translated physical4--,ed4 #bd4 ,the first one#ag of the physiological principles subsumes all phenomena1 as intuitions in space and time1 under the concept of ,quantity1 and is so far a principle of the application of ,mathematics to experience4 ,the second one subsumes the empirical element1 viz41 sensation which denotes the real in intuitions1 not indeed directly under the concept of quantity1 because sensation is not an intuition that contains either space or time1 though it places the respective object into both4 ,but still there is between reality 7sense-representation7 and the zero1 or total void of intuition in time1 a difference which has a quantity4 ,for between every given degree of light and of darkness1 between every degree of heat and of absolute cold1 between every degree of weight and of absolute lightness1 between every degree of occupied space and of totally void space1 diminishing degrees can be conceived1 in the same manner as between consciousness and total unconsciousness 7the darkness of a psychological blank7 ever diminishing degrees obtain4 ,hence there is no perception that can prove an absolute absence of it2 for instance1 no psychological darkness that cannot be considered as a kind of consciousness4 ,this occurs in all cases of sensation1 and so the understanding can anticipate even sensations1 which constitute the peculiar quality of empirical representations 7appearances71 by means of the principle3 that they all have 7consequently that what is real in all phenomena has7 a degree4 ,here is the second application of mathematics 7mathesis intensorum7 to the science of nature4 #ag ,the three following paragraphs will hardly be understood unless reference be made to what the ,critique itself says on the subject of the ,principles2 they will1 however1 be of service in giving a general view of the ,principles1 and in fixing the attention on the main points4 #be4 ,anent the relation of appearances merely with a view to their existence1 the determination is not mathematical but dynamical1 and can never be objectively valid1 consequently never fit for experience1 if it does not come under a priori principles by which the cognition of experience relative to appearances becomes even possible4 ,hence appearances must be subsumed under the concept of ,substance1 which is the foundation of all determination of existence1 as a concept of the thing itself2 or secondly--so far as1 a succession is found among phenomena1 that is1 an event--under the concept of an ,effect with reference to ,cause2 or lastly--so far as coexistence is to be known objectively1 that is1 by a judgment of experience--under the concept of ,community 7action and reaction74#ah ,thus a priori principles form the basis of objectively valid1 though empirical judgments1 that is1 of the possibility of experience so far as it must connect objects as existing in nature4 ,these principles are the proper laws of nature1 which may be termed dynamical4 #ah ,kant uses here the equivocal term ,wechselwirkung4--,ed4 ,finally the cognition of the agreement and connexion not only of appearances among themselves in experience1 but of their relation to experience in general1 belongs to the judgments of experience4 ,this relation contains either their agreement with the formal conditions1 which the understanding cognises1 or their coherence with the materials of the senses and of perception1 or combines both into one concept4 ,consequently it contains ,possibility1 ,actuality1 and ,necessity according to universal laws of nature2 and this constitutes the physical doctrine of method1 or the distinction of truth and of hypotheses1 and the bounds of the certainty of the latter4 #bf4 ,the third table of ,principles drawn from the nature of the understanding itself after the critical method1 shows an inherent perfection1 which raises it far above every other table which has hitherto though in vain been tried or may yet be tried by analysing the objects themselves dogmatically4 ,it exhibits all synthetical a priori principles completely and according to one principle1 viz41 the faculty of judging in general1 constituting the essence of experience as regards the understanding1 so that we can be certain that there are no more such principles1 a satisfaction such as can never be attained by the dogmatical method4 ,yet is this not all3 there is a still greater merit in it4 ,we must carefully bear in mind the proof which shows the possibility of this cognition a priori1 and at the same time limits all such principles to a condition which must never be lost sight of1 if we desire it not to be misunderstood1 and extended in use beyond the original sense which the understanding attaches to it4 ,this limit is that they contain nothing but the conditions of possible experience in general so far as it is subjected to laws a priori4 ,consequently ,i do not say1 that things in themselves possess a quantity1 that their actuality possesses a degree1 their existence a connexion of accidents in a substance1 etc4 ,this nobody can prove1 because such a synthetical connexion from mere concepts1 without any reference to sensuous intuition on the one side1 or connexion of it in a possible experience on the other1 is absolutely impossible4 ,the essential limitation of the concepts in these principles then is3 ,that all things stand necessarily a priori under the afore-mentioned conditions1 as objects of experience only4 ,hence there follows secondly a specifically peculiar mode of proof of these principles3 they are not directly referred to appearances and to their relations1 but to the possibility of experience1 of which appearances constitute the matter only1 not the form4 ,thus they are referred to objectively and universally valid synthetical propositions1 in which we distinguish judgments of experience from those of perception4 ,this takes place because appearances1 as mere intuitions1 occupying a part of space and time1 come under the concept of ,quantity1 which unites their multiplicity a priori according to rules synthetically4 ,again1 so far as the perception contains1 besides intuition1 sensibility1 and between the latter and nothing 7i4e41 the total disappearance of sensibility71 there is an ever decreasing transition1 it is apparent that that which is in appearances must have a degree1 so far as it 7viz41 the perception7 does not itself occupy any part of space or of time4#ai ,still the transition to actuality from empty time or empty space is only possible in time2 consequently though sensibility1 as the quality of empirical intuition1 can never be cognised a priori1 by its specific difference from other sensibilities1 yet it can1 in a possible experience in general1 as a quantity of perception be intensely distinguished from every other similar perception4 ,hence the application of mathematics to nature1 as regards the sensuous intuition by which nature is given to us1 becomes possible and is thus determined4 #ai ,heat and light are in a small space just as large as to degree as in a large one2 in like manner the internal representations1 pain1 consciousness in general1 whether they last a short or a long time1 need not vary as to the degree4 ,hence the quantity is here in a point and in a moment just as great as in any space or time however great4 ,degrees are therefore capable of increase1 but not in intuition1 rather in mere sensation 7or the quantity of the degree of an intuition74 ,hence they can only be estimated quantitatively by the relation of #a to #j1 viz41 by their capability of decreasing by infinite intermediate degrees to disappearance1 or of increasing from naught through infinite gradations to a determinate sensation in a certain time4 ,quantitas qualitatis est gradus i4e41 the degrees of quality must be measured by equality4 ,above all1 the reader must pay attention to the mode of proof of the principles which occur under the title of ,analogies of experience4 ,for these do not refer to the genesis of intuitions1 as do the principles of applied mathematics1 but to the connexion of their existence in experience2 and this can be nothing but the determination of their existence in time according to necessary laws1 under which alone the connexion is objectively valid1 and thus becomes experience4 ,the proof therefore does not turn on the synthetical unity in the connexion of things in themselves1 but merely of perceptions1 and of these not in regard to their matter1 but to the determination of time and of the relation of their existence in it1 according to universal laws4 ,if the empirical determination in relative time is indeed objectively valid 7i4e41 experience71 these universal laws contain the necessary determination of existence in time generally 7viz41 according to a rule of the understanding a priori74 ,in these ,prolegomena ,i cannot further descant on the subject1 but my reader 7who has probably been long accustomed to consider experience a mere empirical synthesis of perceptions1 and hence not considered that it goes much beyond them1 as it imparts to empirical judgments universal validity1 and for that purpose requires a pure and a priori unity of the understanding7 is recommended to pay special attention to this distinction of experience from a mere aggregate of perceptions1 and to judge the mode of proof from this point of view4 #bg4 ,now we are prepared to remove ,hume's doubt4 ,he justly maintains1 that we cannot comprehend by reason the possibility of ,causality1 that is1 of the reference of the existence of one thing to the existence of another1 which is necessitated by the former4 ,i add1 that we comprehend just as little the concept of ,subsistence1 that is1 the necessity that at the foundation of the existence of things there lies a subject which cannot itself be a predicate of any other thing2 nay1 we cannot even form a notion of the possibility of such a thing 7though we can point out examples of its use in experience74 ,the very same in comprehensibility affects the ,community of things1 as we cannot comprehend how from the state of one thing an inference to the state of quite another thing beyond it1 and vice versa1 can be drawn1 and how substances which have each their own separate existence should depend upon one another necessarily4 ,but ,i am very far from holding these concepts to be derived merely from experience1 and the necessity represented in them1 to be imaginary and a mere illusion produced in us by long habit4 ,on the contrary1 ,i have amply shown1 that they and the theorems derived from them are firmly established a priori1 or before all experience1 and have their undoubted objective value1 though only with regard to experience4 #bh4 ,though ,i have no notion of such a connexion of things in themselves1 that they can either exist as substances1 or act as causes1 or stand in community with others 7as parts of a real whole71 and ,i can just as little conceive such properties in appearances as such 7because those concepts contain nothing that lies in the appearances1 but only what the understanding alone must think73 we have yet a notion of such a connexion of representations in our understanding1 and in judgments generally2 consisting in this that representations appear in one sort of judgments as subject in relation to predicates1 in another as reason in relation to consequences1 and in a third as parts1 which constitute together a total possible cognition4 ,besides we cognise a priori that without considering the representation of an object as determined in some of these respects1 we can have no valid cognition of the object1 and1 if we should occupy ourselves about the object in itself1 there is no possible attribute1 by which ,i could know that it is determined under any of these aspects1 that is1 under the concept either of substance1 or of cause1 or 7in relation to other substances7 of community1 for ,i have no notion of the possibility of such a connexion of existence4 ,but the question is not how things in themselves1 but how the empirical cognition of things is determined1 as regards the above aspects of judgments in general1 that is1 how things1 as objects of experience1 can and shall be subsumed under these concepts of the understanding4 ,and then it is clear1 that ,i completely comprehend not only the possibility1 but also the necessity of subsuming all phenomena under these concepts1 that is1 of using them for principles of the possibility of experience4 #bi4 ,when making an experiment with ,hume's problematical concept 7his crux metaphysicorum71 the concept of cause1 we have1 in the first place1 given a priori1 by means of logic1 the form of a conditional judgment in general1 i4e41 we have one given cognition as antecedent and another as consequence4 ,but it is possible1 that in perception we may meet with a rule of relation1 which runs thus3 that a certain phenomenon is constantly followed by another 7though not conversely71 and this is a case for me to use the hypothetical judgment1 and1 for instance1 to say1 it the sun shines long enough upon a body1 it grows warm4 ,here there is indeed as yet no necessity of connexion1 or concept of cause4 ,but ,i proceed and say1 that if this proposition1 which is merely a subjective connexion of perceptions1 is to be a judgment of experience1 it must be considered as necessary and universally valid4 ,such a proposition would be1 the sun is by its light the cause of heat4 ,the empirical rule is now considered as a law1 and as valid not merely of appearances but valid of them for the purposes of a possible experience which requires universal and therefore necessarily valid rules4 ,i therefore easily comprehend the concept of cause1 as a concept necessarily belonging to the mere form of experience1 and its possibility as a synthetical union of perceptions in consciousness generally2 but ,i do not at all comprehend the possibility of a thing generally as a cause1 because the concept of cause denotes a condition not at all belonging to things1 but to experience4 ,it is nothing in fact but an objectively valid cognition of appearances and of their succession1 so far as the antecedent can be conjoined with the consequent according to the rule of hypothetical judgments4 #cj4 ,hence if the pure concepts of the understanding do not refer to objects of experience but to things in themselves 7noumena71 they have no signification whatever4 ,they serve1 as it were1 only to decipher appearances1 that we may be able to read them as experience4 ,the principles which arise from their reference to the sensible world1 only serve our understanding for empirical use4 ,beyond this they are arbitrary combinations1 without objective reality1 and we can neither cognise their possibility a priori1 nor verify their reference to objects1 let alone make it intelligible by any example2 because examples can only be borrowed from some possible experience1 consequently the objects of these concepts can be found nowhere but in a possible experience4 ,this complete 7though to its originator unexpected7 solution of ,hume's problem rescues for the pure concepts of the understanding their a priori origin1 and for the universal laws of nature their validity1 as laws of the understanding1 yet in such a way as to limit their use to experience1 because their possibility depends solely on the reference of the understanding to experience1 but with a completely reversed mode of connexion which never occurred to ,hume1 not by deriving them from experience1 but by deriving experience from them4 ,this is therefore the result of all our foregoing inquiries3 ,all synthetical principles a priori are nothing more than principles of possible experience1 and can never be referred to things in themselves1 but to appearances as objects of experience4 ,and hence pure mathematics as well as a pure science of nature can never be referred to anything more than mere appearances1 and can only represent either that which makes experience generally possible1 or else that which1 as it is derived from these principles1 must always be capable of being represented in some possible experience4 #ca4 ,and thus we have at last something definite1 upon which to depend in all metaphysical enterprises1 which have hitherto1 boldly enough but always at random1 attempted everything without discrimination4 ,that the aim of their exertions should be so near1 struck neither the dogmatical thinkers nor those who1 confident in their supposed sound common sense1 started with concepts and principles of pure reason 7which were legitimate and natural1 but destined for mere empirical use7 in quest of fields of knowledge1 to which they neither knew nor could know any determinate bounds1 because they had never reflected nor were able to reflect on the nature or even on the possibility of such a pure understanding4 ,many a naturalist of pure reason 7by which ,i mean the man who believes he can decide in matters of metaphysics without any science7 may pretend1 that he long ago by the prophetic spirit of his sound sense1 not only suspected1 but knew and comprehended1 what is here propounded with so much ado1 or1 if he likes1 with prolix and pedantic pomp3 that with all our reason we can never reach beyond the field of experience4 ,but when he is questioned about his rational principles individually1 he must grant1 that there are many of them which he has not taken from experience1 and which are therefore independent of it and valid a priori4 ,how then and on what grounds will he restrain both himself and the dogmatist1 who makes use of these concepts and principles beyond all possible experience1 because they are recognised to be independent of it8 ,and even he1 this adept in sound sense1 in spite of all his assumed and cheaply acquired wisdom1 is not exempt from wandering inadvertently beyond objects of experience into the field of chimeras4 ,he is often deeply enough involved in them1 though in announcing everything as mere probability1 rational conjecture1 or analogy1 he gives by his popular language a color to his groundless pretensions4 #cb4 ,since the oldest days of philosophy inquirers into pure reason have conceived1 besides the things of sense1 or appearances 7phenomena71 which make up the sensible world1 certain creations of the understanding 7,verstandeswesen71 called noumena1 which should constitute an intelligible world4 ,and as appearance and illusion were by those men identified 7a thing which we may well excuse in an undeveloped epoch71 actuality was only conceded to the creations of thought4 ,and we indeed1 rightly considering objects of sense as mere appearances1 confess thereby that they are based upon a thing in itself1 though we know not this thing in its internal constitution1 but only know its appearances1 viz41 the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something4 ,the understanding therefore1 by assuming appearances1 grants the existence of things in themselves also1 and so far we may say1 that the representation of such things as form the basis of phenomena1 consequently of mere creations of the understanding1 is not only admissible1 but unavoidable4 ,our critical deduction by no means excludes things of that sort 7noumena71 but rather limits the principles of the ,aesthetic 7the science of the sensibility7 to this1 that they shall not extend to all things1 as everything would then be turned into mere appearance1 but that they shall only hold good of objects of possible experience4 ,hereby then objects of the understanding are granted1 but with the inculcation of this rule which admits of no exception3 that we neither know nor can know anything at all definite of these pure objects of the understanding1 because our pure concepts of the understanding as well as our pure intuitions extend to nothing but objects of possible experience1 consequently to mere things of sense1 and as soon as we leave this sphere these concepts retain no meaning whatever4 #cc4 ,there is indeed something seductive in our pure concepts of the understanding1 which tempts us to a transcendent use1 --a use which transcends all possible experience4 ,not only are our concepts of substance1 of power1 of action1 of reality1 and others1 quite independent of experience1 containing nothing of sense appearance1 and so apparently applicable to things in themselves 7noumena71 but1 what strengthens this conjecture1 they contain a necessity of determination in themselves1 which experience never attains4 ,the concept of cause implies a rule1 according to which one state follows another necessarily2 but experience can only show us1 that one state of things often1 or at most1 commonly1 follows another1 and therefore affords neither strict universality1 nor necessity4 ,hence the ,categories seem to have a deeper meaning and import than can be exhausted by their empirical use1 and so the understanding inadvertently adds for itself to the house of experience a much more extensive wing1 which it fills with nothing but creatures of thought1 without ever observing that it has transgressed with its otherwise lawful concepts the bounds of their use4 #cd4 ,two important1 and even indispensable1 though very dry1 investigations had therefore become indispensable in the ,critique of ,pure ,reason1--viz41 the two chapters ,vom ,schematismus der reinen ,verstandsbegriffe1 and ,vom ,grunde der ,unterscheidung aller ,verstandesbegriffe berhaupt in ,phnomena und ,noumena4 ,in the former it is shown1 that the senses furnish not the pure concepts of the understanding in concreto1 but only the schedule for their use1 and that the object conformable to it occurs only in experience 7as the product of the understanding from materials of the sensibility74 ,in the latter it is shown1 that1 although our pure concepts of the understanding and our principles are independent of experience1 and despite of the apparently greater sphere of their use1 still nothing whatever can be thought by them beyond the field of experience1 because they can do nothing but merely determine the logical form of the judgment relatively to given intuitions4 ,but as there is no intuition at all beyond the field of the sensibility1 these pure concepts1 as they cannot possibly be exhibited in concreto1 are void of all meaning2 consequently all these noumena1 together with their complex1 the intelligible world1#bj are nothing but representation of a problem1 of which the object in itself is possible1 but the solution1 from the nature of our understanding1 totally impossible4 ,for our understanding is not a faculty of intuition1 but of the connexion of given intuitions in experience4 ,experience must therefore contain all the objects for our concepts2 but beyond it no concepts have any significance1 as there is no intuition that might offer them a foundation4 #bj ,we speak of the intelligible world1 not 7as the usual expression is7 intellectual world4 ,for cognitions are intellectual through the understanding1 and refer to our world of sense also2 but objects1 so far as they can be represented merely by the understanding1 and to which none of our sensible intuitions can refer1 are termed intelligible4 ,but as some possible intuition must correspond to every object1 we would have to assume an understanding that intuites things immediately2 but of such we have not the least notion1 nor have we of the things of the understanding ,verstandeswesen1 to which it should be applied4 #ce4 ,the imagination may perhaps be forgiven for occasional vagaries1 and for not keeping carefully within the limits of experience1 since it gains life and vigor by such flights1 and since it is always easier to moderate its boldness1 than to stimulate its languor4 ,but the understanding which ought to think can never be forgiven for indulging in vagaries2 for we depend upon it alone for assistance to set bounds1 when necessary1 to the vagaries of the imagination4 ,but the understanding begins its aberrations very innocently and modestly4 ,it first elucidates the elementary cognitions1 which inhere in it prior to all experience1 but yet must always have their application in experience4 ,it gradually drops these limits1 and what is there to prevent it1 as it has quite freely derived its principles from itself8 ,and then it proceeds first to newly-imagined powers in nature1 then to beings1 outside nature2 in short to a world1 for whose construction the materials cannot be wanting1 because fertile fiction furnishes them abundantly1 and though not confirmed1 is never refuted1 by experience4 ,this is the reason that young thinkers are so partial to metaphysics of the truly dogmatical kind1 and often sacrifice to it their time and their talents1 which might be otherwise better employed4 ,but there is no use in trying to moderate these fruitless endeavors of pure reason by all manner of cautions as to the difficulties of solving questions so occult1 by complaints of the limits of our reason1 and by degrading our assertions into mere conjectures4 ,for if their impossibility is not distinctly shown1 and reason's cognition of its own essence does not become a true science1 in which the field of its right use is distinguished1 so to say1 with mathematical certainty from that of its worthless and idle use1 these fruitless efforts will never be abandoned for good4 #cf4 ,how is ,nature itself possible8 ,this question--the highest point that transcendental philosophy can ever reach1 and to which1 as its boundary and completion1 it must proceed--properly contains two questions4 ,first3 ,how is nature at all possible in the material sense1 by intuition1 considered as the totality of appearances2 how are space1 time1 and that which fills both--the object of sensation1 in general possible8 ,the answer is3 ,by means of the constitution of our ,sensibility1 according to which it is specifically affected by objects1 which are in themselves unknown to it1 and totally distinct from those phenomena4 ,this answer is given in the ,critique itself in the transcendental ,aesthetic1 and in these ,prolegomena by the solution of the first general problem4 ,secondly3 ,how is nature possible in the formal sense1 as the totality of the rules1 under which all phenomena must come1 in order to be thought as connected in experience8 ,the answer must be this3 ,it is only possible by means of the constitution of our ,understanding1 according to which all the above representations of the sensibility are necessarily referred to a consciousness1 and by which the peculiar way in which we think 7viz41 by rules71 and hence experience also1 are possible1 but must be clearly distinguished from an insight into the objects in themselves4 ,this answer is given in the ,critique itself in the transcendental ,logic1 and in these ,prolegomena1 in the course of the solution of the second main problem4 ,but how this peculiar property of our sensibility itself is possible1 or that of our understanding and of the apperception which is necessarily its basis and that of all thinking1 cannot be further analysed or answered1 because it is of them that we are in need for all our answers and for all our thinking about objects4 ,there are many laws of nature1 which we can only know by means of experience2 but conformity to law in the connexion of appearances1 i4e41 in nature in general1 we cannot discover by any experience1 because experience itself requires laws which are a priori at the basis of its possibility4 ,the possibility of experience in general is therefore at the same time the universal law of nature1 and the principles of the experience are the very laws of nature4 ,for we do not know nature but as the totality of appearances1 i4e41 of representations in us1 and hence we can only derive the laws of its connexion from the principles of their connexion in us1 that is1 from the conditions of their necessary union in consciousness1 which constitutes the possibility of experience4 ,even the main proposition expounded throughout this section--that universal laws of nature can be distinctly cognised a priori--leads naturally to the proposition3 that the highest legislation of nature must lie in ourselves1 i4e41 in our understanding1 and that we must not seek the universal laws of nature in nature by means of experience1 but conversely must seek nature1 as to its universal conformity to law1 in the conditions of the possibility of experience1 which lie in our sensibility and in our understanding4 ,for how were it otherwise possible to know a priori these laws1 as they are not rules of analytical cognition1 but truly synthetical extensions of it8 ,such a necessary agreement of the principles of possible experience with the laws of the possibility of nature1 can only proceed from one of two reasons3 either these laws are drawn from nature by means of experience1 or conversely nature is derived from the laws of the possibility of experience in general1 and is quite the same as the mere universal conformity to law of the latter4 ,the former is self-contradictory1 for the universal laws of nature can and must be cognised a priori 7that is1 independent of all experience71 and be the foundation of all empirical use of the understanding2 the latter alternative therefore alone remains4#ba #ba ,crusius alone thought of a compromise3 that a ,spirit1 who can neither err nor deceive1 implanted these laws in us originally4 ,but since false principles often intrude themselves1 as indeed the very system of this man shows in not a few examples1 we are involved in difficulties as to the use of such a principle in the absence of sure criteria to distinguish the genuine origin from the spurious1 as we never can know certainly what the ,spirit of truth or the father of lies may have instilled into us4 ,but we must distinguish the empirical laws of nature1 which always presuppose particular perceptions1 from the pure or universal laws of nature1 which1 without being based on particular perceptions1 contain merely the conditions of their necessary union in experience4 ,in relation to the latter1 nature and possible experience are quite the same1 and as the conformity to law here depends upon the necessary connexion of appearances in experience 7without which we cannot cognise any object whatever in the sensible world71 consequently upon the original laws of the understanding1 it seems at first strange1 but is not the less certain1 to say3 ,the understanding does not derive its laws 7a priori7 from1 but prescribes them to1 nature4 #cg4 ,we shall illustrate this seemingly bold proposition by an example1 which will show1 that laws1 which we discover in objects of sensuous intuition 7especially when these laws are cognised as necessary71 are commonly held by us to be such as have been placed there by the understanding1 in spite of their being similar in all points to the laws of nature1 which we ascribe to experience4 #ch4 ,if we consider the properties of the circle1 by which this figure combines so many arbitrary determinations of space in itself1 at once in a universal rule1 we cannot avoid attributing a constitution 7eine ,natur7 to this geometrical thing4 ,two right lines1 for example1 which intersect one another and the circle1 howsoever they may be drawn1 are always divided so that the rectangle constructed with the segments of the one is equal to that constructed with the segments of the other4 ,the question now is3 ,does this law lie in the circle or in the understanding1 that is1 ,does this figure1 independently of the understanding1 contain in itself the ground of the law1 or does the understanding1 having constructed according to its concepts 7according to the quality of the radii7 the figure itself1 introduce into it this law of the chords cutting one another in geometrical proportion8 ,when we follow the proofs of this law1 we soon perceive1 that it can only be derived from the condition on which the understanding founds the construction of this figure1 and which is that of the equality of the radii4 ,but1 if we enlarge this concept1 to pursue further the unity of various properties of geometrical figures under common laws1 and consider the circle as a conic section1 which of course is subject to the same fundamental conditions of construction as other conic sections1 we shall find that all the chords which intersect within the ellipse1 parabola1 and hyperbola1 always intersect so that the rectangles of their segments are not indeed equal1 but always bear a constant ratio to one another4 ,if we proceed still farther1 to the fundamental laws of physical astronomy1 we find a physical law of reciprocal attraction diffused over all material nature1 the rule of which is3 that it decreases inversely as the square of the distance from each attracting point1 i4e41 as the spherical surfaces increase1 over which this force spreads1 which law seems to be necessarily inherent in the very nature of things1 and hence is usually propounded as cognisable a priori4 ,simple as the sources of this law are1 merely resting upon the relation of spherical surfaces of different radii1 its consequences are so valuable with regard to the variety of their agreement and its regularity1 that not only are all possible orbits of the celestial bodies conic sections1 but such a relation of these orbits to each other results1 that no other law of attraction1 than that of the inverse square of the distance1 can be imagined as fit for a cosmical system4 ,here accordingly is a nature that rests upon laws which the understanding cognises a priori1 and chiefly from the universal principles of the determination of space4 ,now ,i ask3 ,do the laws of nature lie in space1 and does the understanding learn them by merely endeavoring to find out the enormous wealth of meaning that lies in space2 or do they inhere in the understanding and in the way in which it determines space according to the conditions of the synthetical unity in which its concepts are all centred8 ,space is something so uniform and as to all particular properties so indeterminate1 that we should certainly not seek a store of laws of nature in it4 ,whereas that which determines space to assume the form of a circle or the figures of a cone and a sphere1 is the understanding1 so far as it contains the ground of the unity of their constructions4 ,the mere universal form of intuition1 called space1 must therefore be the substratum of all intuitions determinable to particular objects1 and in it of course the condition of the possibility and of the variety of these intuitions lies4 ,but the unity of the objects is entirely determined by the understanding1 and on conditions which lie in its own nature2 and thus the understanding is the origin of the universal order of nature1 in that it comprehends all appearances under its own laws1 and thereby first constructs1 a priori1 experience 7as to its form71 by means of which whatever is to be cognised only by experience1 is necessarily subjected to its laws4 ,for we are not now concerned with the nature of things in themselves1 which is independent of the conditions both of our sensibility and our understanding1 but with nature1 as an object of possible experience1 and in this case the understanding1 whilst it makes experience possible1 thereby insists that the sensuous world is either not an object of experience at all1 or must be nature viz41 an existence of things1 determined according to universal laws#bb4 #bb ,the definition of nature is given in the beginning of the ,second ,part of the ,transcendental ,problem1 in #ad4 ,,appendix ,,to ,,the ,,pure ,,science ,,of ,,nature4 #ci4 ,of the ,system of the ,categories4 ,there can be nothing more desirable to a philosopher1 than to be able to derive the scattered multiplicity of the concepts or the principles1 which had occurred to him in concrete use1 from a principle a priori1 and to unite everything in this way in one cognition4 ,he formerly only believed that those things1 which remained after a certain abstraction1 and seemed by comparison among one another to constitute a particular kind of cognitions1 were completely collected2 but this was only an ,aggregate4 ,now he knows1 that just so many1 neither more nor less1 can constitute the mode of cognition1 and perceives the necessity of his division1 which constitutes comprehension2 and now only he has attained a ,system4 ,to search in our daily cognition for the concepts1 which do not rest upon particular experience1 and yet occur in all cognition of experience1 where they as it were constitute the mere form of connexion1 presupposes neither greater reflexion nor deeper insight1 than to detect in a language the rules of the actual use of words generally1 and thus to collect elements for a grammar4 ,in fact both researches are very nearly related1 even though we are not able to give a reason why each language has just this and no other formal constitution1 and still less why an exact number of such formal determinations in general are found in it4 ,aristotle collected ten pure elementary concepts under the name of ,categories4#bc ,to these1 which are also called predicaments1 he found himself obliged afterwards to add five post-predicaments1#bd some of which however 7prius1 simul1 and motus7 are contained in the former2 but this random collection must be considered 7and commended7 as a mere hint for future inquirers1 not as a regularly developed idea1 and hence it has1 in the present more advanced state of philosophy1 been rejected as quite useless4 #bc #a4 ,substantia4 #b4 ,qualitas4 #c4 ,quantitas4 #d4 ,relatio1 #e4 ,actio4 #f4 ,passio4 #g4 ,quando1 #h4 ,ubi4 #i4 ,situs4 #aj4 ,habitus4 #bd ,oppositum4 ,prius4 ,simul4 ,motus4 ,habere4 ,after long reflexion on the pure elements of human knowledge 7those which contain nothing empirical71 ,i at last succeeded in distinguishing with certainty and in separating the pure elementary notions of the ,sensibility 7space and time7 from those of the ,understanding4 ,thus the #gth1 #hth1 and #ith ,categories had to be excluded from the old list4 ,and the others were of no service to me2 because there was no principle in them1 on which the understanding could be investigated1 measured in its completion1 and all the functions1 whence its pure concepts arise1 determined exhaustively and with precision4 ,but in order to discover such a principle1 ,i looked about for an act of the understanding which comprises all the rest1 and is distinguished only by various modifications or phases1 in reducing the multiplicity of representation to the unity of thinking in general3 ,i found this act of the understanding to consist in judging4 ,here then the labors of the logicians were ready at hand1 though not yet quite free from defects1 and with this help ,i was enabled to exhibit a complete table of the pure functions of the understanding1 which are however undetermined in regard to any object4 ,i finally referred these functions of judging to objects in general1 or rather to the condition of determining judgments as objectively valid1 and so there arose the pure concepts of the understanding1 concerning which ,i could make certain1 that these1 and this exact number only1 constitute our whole cognition of things from pure understanding4 ,i was justified in calling them by their old name1 ,categories1 while ,i reserved for myself the liberty of adding1 under the title of ,predicables1 a complete list of all the concepts deducible from them1 by combinations whether among themselves1 or with the pure form of the appearance1 i4e41 space or time1 or with its matter1 so far as it is not yet empirically determined 7viz41 the object of sensation in general71 as soon as a system of transcendental philosophy should be completed with the construction of which ,i am engaged in the ,critique of ,pure ,reason itself4 ,now the essential point in this system of ,categories1 which distinguishes it from the old rhapsodical collection without any principle1 and for which alone it deserves to be considered as philosophy1 consists in this3 that by means of it the true significance of the pure concepts of the understanding and the condition of their use could be precisely determined4 ,for here it became obvious that they are themselves nothing but logical functions1 and as such do not produce the least concept of an object1 but require some sensuous intuition as a basis4 ,they therefore only serve to determine empirical judgments1 which are otherwise undetermined and indifferent as regards all functions of judging1 relatively to these functions1 thereby procuring them universal validity1 and by means of them making judgments of experience in general possible4 ,such an insight into the nature of the categories1 which limits them at the same time to the mere use of experience1 never occurred either to their first author1 or to any of his successors2 but without this insight 7which immediately depends upon their derivation or deduction71 they are quite useless and only a miserable list of names1 without explanation or rule for their use4 ,had the ancients ever conceived such a notion1 doubtless the whole study of the pure rational knowledge1 which under the name of metaphysics has for centuries spoiled many a sound mind1 would have reached us in quite another shape1 and would have enlightened the human understanding1 instead of actually exhausting it in obscure and vain speculations1 thereby rendering it unfit for true science4 ,this system of categories makes all treatment of every object of pure reason itself systematic1 and affords a direction or clue how and through what points of inquiry every metaphysical consideration must proceed1 in order to be complete2 for it exhausts all the possible movements 7momenta7 of the understanding1 among which every concept must be classed4 ,in like manner the table of ,principles has been formulated1 the completeness of which we can only vouch for by the system of the categories4 ,even in the division of the concepts1#be which must go beyond the physical application of the understanding1 it is always the very same clue1 which1 as it must always be determined a priori by the same fixed points of the human understanding1 always forms a closed circle4 ,there is no doubt that the object of a pure conception either of the understanding or of reason1 so far as it is to be estimated philosophically and on a priori principles1 can in this way be completely cognised4 ,i could not therefore omit to make use of this clue with regard to one of the most abstract ontological divisions1 viz41 the various distinctions of the notions of something and of nothing1 and to construct accordingly 7,critique1 p4 #bjg7 a regular and necessary table of their divisions4#bf #be ,see the two tables in the chapters ,von den ,paralogismen der reinen ,vernuuft and the first division of the ,antinomy of ,pure ,reason1 ,system der kosmologischen ,ideen4 #bf ,on the table of the categories many neat observations may be made1 for instance3 7#a7 that the third arises from the first and the second joined in one concept2 7#b7 that in those of ,quantity and of ,quality there is merely a progress from unity to totality or from something to nothing 7for this purpose the categories of ,quality must stand thus3 reality1 limitation1 total negation71 without correlata or opposita1 whereas those of ,relation and of ,modality have them2 7#c7 that1 as in ,logic categorical judgments are the basis of all others1 so the category of ,substance is the basis of all concepts of actual things2 7#d7 that as ,modality in the judgment is not a particular predicate1 so by the modal concepts a determination is not superadded to things1 etc41 etc4 ,such observations are of great use4 ,if we besides enumerate all the predicables1 which we can find pretty completely in any good ontology 7for example1 ,baumgarten's71 and arrange them in classes under the categories1 in which operation we must not neglect to add as complete a dissection of all these concepts as possible1 there will then arise a merely analytical part of metaphysics1 which does not contain a single synthetical proposition1 which might precede the second 7the synthetical71 and would by its precision and completeness be not only useful1 but1 in virtue of its system1 be even to some extent elegant4 ,and this system1 like every other true one founded on a universal principle1 shows its inestimable value in this1 that it excludes all foreign concepts1 which might otherwise intrude among the pure concepts of the understanding1 and determines the place of every cognition4 ,those concepts1 which under the name of concepts of reflexion have been likewise arranged in a table according to the clue of the categories1 intrude1 without having any privilege or title to be among the pure concepts of the understanding in ,ontology4 ,they are concepts of connexion1 and thereby of the objects themselves1 whereas the former are only concepts of a mere comparison of concepts already given1 hence of quite another nature and use4 ,by my systematic division#bg they are saved from this confusion4 ,but the value of my special table of the categories will be still more obvious1 when we separate the table of the transcendental concepts of ,reason from the concepts of the understanding4 ,the latter being of quite another nature and origin1 they must have quite another form than the former4 ,this so necessary separation has never yet been made in any system of metaphysics for1 as a rule1 these rational concepts all mixed up with the categories1 like children of one family1 which confusion was unavoidable in the absence of a definite system of categories4 #bg ,see ,critique of ,pure ,reason1 ,von der ,amphibolie der ,reflexbegriffe4 ,,third ,,part ,,of ,,the ,,main ,,transcendental ,,problem4 ,,how ,,is ,,metaphysics ,,in ,,general ,,possible8 #dj4 ,pure mathematics and pure science of nature had no occasion for such a deduction1 as we have made of both1 for their own safety and certainty4 ,for the former rests upon its own evidence2 and the latter 7though sprung from pure sources of the understanding7 upon experience and its thorough confirmation4 ,physics cannot altogether refuse and dispense with the testimony of the latter2 because with all its certainty1 it can never1 as philosophy1 rival mathematics4 ,both sciences therefore stood in need of this inquiry1 not for themselves1 but for the sake of another science1 metaphysics4 ,metaphysics has to do not only with concepts of nature1 which always find their application in experience1 but also with pure rational concepts1 which never can be given in any possible experience4 ,consequently the objective reality of these concepts 7viz41 that they are not mere chimeras71 and the truth or falsity of metaphysical assertions1 cannot be discovered or confirmed by any experience4 ,this part of metaphysics however is precisely what constitutes its essential end1 to which the rest is only a means1 and thus this science is in need of such a deduction for its own sake4 ,the third question now proposed relates therefore as it were to the root and essential difference of metaphysics1 i4e41 the occupation of ,reason with itself1 and the supposed knowledge of objects arising immediately from this incubation of its own concepts1 without requiring1 or indeed being able to reach that knowledge through1 experience4#bh #bh ,if we can say1 that a science is actual at least in the ideas of all men1 as soon as it appears that the problems which lead to it are proposed to everybody by the nature of human reason1 and that therefore many 7though faulty7 endeavors are unavoidably made in its behalf1 then we are bound to say that metaphysics is subjectively 7and indeed necessarily7 actual1 and therefore we justly ask1 how is it 7objectively7 possible4 ,without solving this problem reason never is justified4 ,the empirical use to which reason limits the pure understanding1 does not fully satisfy the proper destination of the latter4 ,every single experience is only a part of the whole sphere of its domain1 but the absolute totality of all possible experience is itself not experience4 ,yet it is a necessary concrete problem for reason1 the mere representation of which requires concepts quite different from the categories1 whose use is only immanent1 or refers to experience1 so far as it can be given4 ,whereas the concepts of reason aim at the completeness1 i4e41 the collective unity of all possible experience1 and thereby transcend every given experience4 ,thus they become transcendent4 ,as the understanding stands in need of categories for experience1 reason contains in itself the source of ideas1 by which ,i mean necessary concepts1 whose object cannot be given in any experience4 ,the latter are inherent in the nature of reason1 as the former are in that of the understanding4 ,while the former carry with them an illusion likely to mislead1 the illusion of the latter is inevitable1 though it certainly can be kept from misleading us4 ,since all illusion consists in holding the subjective ground of our judgments to be objective1 a self-knowledge of pure reason in its transcendent 7exaggerated7 use is the sole preservative from the aberrations into which reason falls when it mistakes its destination1 and refers that to the object transcendently1 which only regards its own subject and its guidance in all immanent use4 #da4 ,the distinction of ideas1 that is1 of pure concepts of reason1 from categories1 or pure concepts of the understanding1 as cognitions of a quite distinct species1 origin and use1 is so important a point in founding a science which is to contain the system of all these a priori cognitions1 that without this distinction metaphysics is absolutely impossible1 or is at best a random1 bungling attempt to build a castle in the air without a knowledge of the materials or of their fitness for any purpose4 ,had the ,critique of ,pure ,reason done nothing but first point out this distinction1 it had thereby contributed more to clear up our conception of1 and to guide our inquiry in1 the field of metaphysics1 than all the vain efforts which have hitherto been made to satisfy the transcendent problems of pure reason1 without ever surmising that we were in quite another field than that of the understanding1 and hence classing concepts of the understanding and those of reason together1 as if they were of the same kind4 #db4 ,all pure cognitions of the understanding have this feature1 that their concepts present themselves in experience1 and their principles can be confirmed by it2 whereas the transcendent cognitions of reason cannot1 either as ideas1 appear in experience1 or as propositions ever be confirmed or refuted by it4 ,hence whatever errors may slip in unawares1 can only be discovered by pure reason itself--a discovery of much difficulty1 because this very reason naturally becomes dialectical by means of its ideas1 and this unavoidable illusion cannot be limited by any objective and dogmatical researches into things1 but by a subjective investigation of reason itself as a source of ideas4 #dc4 ,in the ,critique of ,pure ,reason it was always my greatest care to endeavor not only carefully to distinguish the several species of cognition1 but to derive concepts belonging to each one of them from their common source4 ,i did this in order that by knowing whence they originated1 ,i might determine their use with safety1 and also have the unanticipated but invaluable advantage of knowing the completeness of my enumeration1 classification and specification of concepts a priori1 and therefore according to principles4 ,without this1 metaphysics is mere rhapsody1 in which no one knows whether he has enough1 or whether and where something is still wanting4 ,we can indeed have this advantage only in pure philosophy1 but of this philosophy it constitutes the very essence4 ,as ,i had found the origin of the categories in the four logical functions of all the judgments of the understanding1 it was quite natural to seek the origin of the ideas in the three functions of the syllogisms of reason4 ,for as soon as these pure concepts of reason 7the transcendental ideas7 are given1 they could hardly1 except they be held innate1 be found anywhere else1 than in the same activity of reason1 which1 so far as it regards mere form1 constitutes the logical element of the syllogisms of reason2 but1 so far as it represents judgments of the understanding with respect to the one or to the other form a priori1 constitutes transcendental concepts of pure reason4 ,the formal distinction of syllogisms renders their division into categorical1 hypothetical1 and disjunctive necessary4 ,the concepts of reason founded on them contained therefore1 first1 the idea of the complete subject 7the substantial72 secondly1 the idea of the complete series of conditions2 thirdly1 the determination of all concepts in the idea of a complete complex of that which is possible4#bi ,the first idea is psychological1 the second cosmological1 the third theological1 and1 as all three give occasion to ,dialectics1 yet each in its own way1 the division of the whole ,dialects of pure reason into its ,paralogism1 its ,antinomy1 and its ,ideal1 was arranged accordingly4 ,through this deduction we may feel assured that all the claims of pure reason are completely represented1 and that none can be wanting2 because the faculty of reason itself1 whence they all take their origin1 is thereby completely surveyed4 #bi ,in disjunctive judgments we consider all possibility as divided in respect to a particular concept4 ,by the ontological principle of the universal determination of a thing in general1 ,i understand the principle that either the one or the other of all possible contradictory predicates must be assigned to any object4 ,this is at the same time the principle of all disjunctive judgments1 constituting the foundation of our conception of possibility1 and in it the possibility of every object in general is considered as determined4 ,this may serve as a slight explanation of the above proposition3 that the activity of reason in disjunctive syllogisms is formally the same as that by which it fashions the idea of a universal conception of all reality1 containing in itself that which is positive in all contradictory predicates4 #dd4 ,in these general considerations it is also remarkable that the ideas of reason are unlike the categories1 of no service to the use of our understanding in experience1 but quite dispensable1 and become even an impediment to the maxims of a rational cognition of nature4 ,yet in another aspect still to be determined they are necessary4 ,whether the soul is or is not a simple substance1 is of no consequence to us in the explanation of its phenomena4 ,for we cannot render the notion of a simple being intelligible by any possible experience that is sensuous or concrete4 ,the notion is therefore quite void as regards all hoped-for insight into the cause of phenomena1 and cannot at all serve as a principle of the explanation of that which internal or external experience supplies4 ,so the cosmological ideas of the beginning of the world or of its eternity 7a parte ante7 cannot be of any greater service to us for the explanation of any event in the world itself4 ,and finally we must1 according to a right maxim of the philosophy of nature1 refrain from all explanations of the design of nature1 drawn from the will of a ,supreme ,being2 because this would not be natural philosophy1 but an acknowledgment that we have come to the end of it4 ,the use of these ideas1 therefore1 is quite different from that of those categories by which 7and by the principles built upon which7 experience itself first becomes possible4 ,but our laborious analytics of the understanding would be superfluous if we had nothing else in view than the mere cognition of nature as it can be given in experience2 for reason does its work1 both in mathematics and in the science of nature1 quite safely and well without any of this subtle deduction4 ,therefore our ,critique of the ,understanding combines with the ideas of pure reason for a purpose which lies beyond the empirical use of the understanding2 but this we have above declared to be in this aspect totally inadmissible1 and without any object or meaning4 ,yet there must be a harmony between that of the nature of reason and that of the understanding1 and the former must contribute to the perfection of the latter1 and cannot possibly upset it4 ,the solution of this question is as follows3 ,pure reason does not in its ideas point to particular objects1 which lie beyond the field of experience1 but only requires completeness of the use of the understanding in the system of experience4 ,but this completeness can be a completeness of principles only1 not of intuitions 7i4e41 concrete atsights or ,anschauungen7 and of objects4 ,in order however to represent the ideas definitely1 reason conceives them after the fashion of the cognition of an object4 ,the cognition is as far as these rules are concerned completely determined1 but the object is only an idea invented for the purpose of bringing the cognition of the understanding as near as possible to the completeness represented by that idea4 ,prefatory ,remark to the ,dialectics of ,pure ,reason4 #de4 ,we have above shown in #cc and #cd that the purity of the categories from all admixture of sensuous determinations may mislead reason into extending their use1 quite beyond all experience1 to things in themselves2 though as these categories themselves find no intuition which can give them meaning or sense in concreto1 they1 as mere logical functions1 can represent a thing in general1 but not give by themselves alone a determinate concept of anything4 ,such hyperbolical objects are distinguised by the appellation of ,nomena1 or pure beings of the understanding 7or better1 beings of thought71 such as1 for example1 substance1 but conceived without permanence in time1 or cause1 but not acting in time1 etc4 ,here predicates1 that only serve to make the conformity-to-law of experience possible1 are applied to these concepts1 and yet they are deprived of all the conditions of intuition1 on which alone experience is possible1 and so these concepts lose all significance4 ,there is no danger1 however1 of the understanding spontaneously making an excursion so very wantonly beyond its own bounds into the field of the mere creatures of thought1 without being impelled by foreign laws4 ,but when reason1 which cannot be fully satisfied with any empirical use of the rules of the understanding1 as being always conditioned1 requires a completion of this chain of conditions1 then the understanding is forced out of its sphere4 ,and then it partly represents objects of experience in a series so extended that no experience can grasp1 partly even 7with a view to complete the series7 it seeks entirely beyond it noumena1 to which it can attach that chain1 and so1 having at last escaped from the conditions of experience1 make its attitude as it were final4 ,these are then the transcendental ideas1 which1 though according to the true but hidden ends of the natural determination of our reason1 they may aim not at extravagant concepts1 but at an unbounded extension of their empirical use1 yet seduce the understanding by an unavoidable illusion to a transcendent use1 which1 though deceitful1 cannot be restrained within the bounds of experience by any resolution1 but only by scientific instruction and with much difficulty4 ,i4 ,the ,psychological ,idea4#cj #cj ,see ,critique of ,pure ,reason1 ,von den ,paralogismen der reinen ,vernunft4 #df4 ,people have long since observed1 that in all substances the proper subject1 that which remains after all the accidents 7as predicates7 are abstracted1 consequently that which forms the substance of things remains unknown1 and various complaints have been made concerning these limits to our knowledge4 ,but it will be well to consider that the human understanding is not to be blamed for its inability to know the substance of things1 that is1 to determine it by itself1 but rather for requiring to cognise it which is a mere idea definitely as though it were a given object4 ,pure reason requires us to seek for every predicate of a thing its proper subject1 and for this subject1 which is itself necessarily nothing but a predicate1 its subject1 and so on indefinitely 7or as far as we can reach74 ,but hence it follows1 that we must not hold anything1 at which we can arrive1 to be an ultimate subject1 and that substance itself never can be thought by our understanding1 however deep we may penetrate1 even if all nature were unveiled to us4 ,for the specific nature of our understanding consists in thinking everything discursively1 that is1 representing it by concepts1 and so by mere predicates1 to which therefore the absolute subject must always be wanting4 ,hence all the real properties1 by which we cognise bodies1 are mere accidents1 not excepting impenetrability1 which we can only represent to ourselves as the effect of a power of which the subject is unknown to us4 ,now we appear to have this substance in the consciousness of ourselves 7in the thinking subject71 and indeed in an immediate intuition2 for all the predicates of an internal sense refer to the ego1 as a subject1 and ,i cannot conceive myself as the predicate of any other subject4 ,hence completeness in the reference of the given concepts as predicates to a subject--not merely an idea1 but an object--that is1 the absolute subject itself1 seems to be given in experience4 ,but this expectation is disappointed4 ,for the ego is not a concept1#ca but only the indication of the object of the internal sense1 so far as we cognise it by no further predicate4 ,consequently it cannot be in itself a predicate of any other thing2 but just as little can it be a determinate concept of an absolute subject1 but is1 as in all other cases1 only the reference of the internal phenomena to their unknown subject4 ,yet this idea 7which serves very well1 as a regulative principle1 totally to destroy all materialistic explanations of the internal phenomena of the soul7 occasions by a very natural misunderstanding a very specious argument1 which1 from this supposed cognition of the substance of our thinking being1 infers its nature1 so far as the knowledge of it falls quite without the complex of experience4 #ca ,were the representation of the apperception 7the ,ego7 a concept1 by which anything could be thought1 it could be used as a predicate of other things or contain predicates in itself4 ,but it is nothing more than the feeling of an existence without the least definite conception and is only the representation of that to which all thinking stands in relation 7relatione accidentis74 #dg4 ,but though we may call this thinking self 7the soul7 substance1 as being the ultimate subject of thinking which cannot be further represented as the predicate of another thing2 it remains quite empty and without significance1 if permanence--the quality which renders the concept of substances in experience fruitful--cannot be proved of it4 ,but permanence can never be proved of the concept of a substance1 as a thing in itself1 but for the purposes of experience only4 ,this is sufficiently shown by the first ,analogy of ,experience1#cb and who ever will not yield to this proof may try for himself whether he can succeed in proving1 from the concept of a subject which does not exist itself as the predicate of another thing1 that its existence is thoroughly permanent1 and that it cannot either in itself or by any natural cause originate or be annihilated4 ,these synthetical a priori propositions can never be proved in themselves1 but only in reference to things as objects of possible experience4 #cb ,cf4 ,critique1 ,von den ,analogien der ,erfahrung4 #dh4 ,if therefore from the concept of the soul as a substance1 we would infer its permanence1 this can hold good as regards possible experience only1 not of the soul as a thing in itself and beyond all possible experience4 ,but life is the subjective condition of all our possible experience1 consequently we can only infer the permanence of the soul in life2 for the death of man is the end of all experience which concerns the soul as an object of experience1 except the contrary be proved1 which is the very question in hand4 ,the permanence of the soul can therefore only be proved 7and no one cares for that7 during the life of man1 but not1 as we desire to do1 after death2 and for this general reason1 that the concept of substance1 so far as it is to be considered necessarily combined with the concept of permanence1 can be so combined only according to the principles of possible experience1 and therefore for the purposes of experience only4#cc #cc ,it is indeed very remarkable how carelessly metaphysicians have always passed over the principle of the permanence of substances without ever attempting a proof of it2 doubtless because they found themselves abandoned by all proofs as soon as they began to deal with the concept of substance4 ,common sense1 which felt distinctly that without this presupposition do union of perceptions in experience is possible1 supplied the want by a postulate4 ,from experience itself it never could derive such a principle1 partly because substances cannot be so traced in all their alterations and dissolutions1 that the matter can always be found undiminished1 partly because the principle contains necessity1 which is always the sign of an a priori principle4 ,people then boldly applied this postulate to the concept of soul as a substance1 and concluded a necessary continuance of the soul after the death of man 7especially as the simplicity of this substance1 which is inferred from the indivisibility of consciousness1 secured it from destruction by dissolution74 ,had they found the genuine source of this principle--a discovery which requires deeper researches than they were ever inclined to make--they would have seen1 that the law of the permanence of substances has place for the purposes of experience only1 and hence can hold good of things so far as they are to be cognised and conjoined with others in experience1 but never independently of all possible experience1 and consequently cannot hold good of the soul after death4 #di4 ,that there is something real without us which not only corresponds1 but must correspond1 to our external perceptions1 can likewise be proved to be not a connexion of things in themselves1 but for the sake of experience4 ,this means that there is something empirical1 i4e41 some phenomenon in space without us1 that admits of a satisfactory proof1 for we have nothing to do with other objects than those which belong to possible experience2 because objects which cannot be given us in any experience1 do not exist for us4 ,empirically without me is that which appears in space1 and space1 together with all the phenomena which it contains1 belongs to the representations1 whose connexion according to laws of experience proves their objective truth1 just as the connexion of the phenomena of the internal sense proves the actuality of my soul 7as an object of the internal sense74 ,by means of external experience ,i am conscious of the actuality of bodies1 as external phenomena in space1 in the same manner as by means of the internal experience ,i am conscious of the existence of my soul in time1 but this soul is only cognised as an object of the internal sense by phenomena that constitute an internal state1 and of which the essence in itself1 which forms the basis of these phenomena1 is unknown4 ,cartesian idealism therefore does nothing but distinguish external experience from dreaming2 and the conformity to law 7as a criterion of its truth7 of the former1 from the irregularity and the false illusion of the latter4 ,in both it presupposes space and time as conditions of the existence of objects1 and it only inquires whether the objects of the external senses1 which we when awake put in space1 are as actually to be found in it1 as the object of the internal sense1 the soul1 is in time2 that is1 whether experience carries with it sure criteria to distinguish it from imagination4 ,this doubt1 however1 may be easily disposed of1 and we always do so in common life by investigating the connexion of phenomena in both space and time according to universal laws of experience1 and we cannot doubt1 when the representation of external things throughout agrees therewith1 that they constitute truthful experience4 ,material idealism1 in which phenomena are considered as such only according to their connexion in experience1 may accordingly be very easily refuted2 and it is just as sure an experience1 that bodies exist without us 7in space71 as that ,i myself exist according to the representation of the internal sense 7in time73 for the notion without us1 only signifies existence in space4 ,however as the ,ego in the proposition1 ,i am1 means not only the object of internal intuition 7in time71 but the subject of consciousness1 just as body means not only external intuition 7in space71 but the thing-in-itself1 which is the basis of this phenomenon2 as this is the case the question1 whether bodies 7as phenomena of the external sense7 exist as bodies apart from my thoughts1 may without any hesitation be denied in nature4 ,but the question1 whether ,i myself as a phenomenon of the internal sense 7the soul according to empirical psychology7 exist apart from my faculty of representation in time1 is an exactly similar inquiry1 and must likewise be answered in the negative4 ,and in this manner everything1 when it is reduced to its true meaning1 is decided and certain4 ,the formal 7which ,i have also called transcendental7 actually abolishes the material1 or ,cartesian1 idealism4 ,for if space be nothing but a form of my sensibility1 it is as a representation in me just as actual as ,i myself am1 and nothing but the empirical truth of the representations in it remains for consideration4 ,but1 if this is not the case1 if space and the phenomena in it are something existing without us1 then all the criteria of experience beyond our perception can never prove the actuality of these objects without us4 ,,ii4 ,the ,cosmological ,idea4#cd #cd ,cf4 ,critique1 ,die ,antinomie der reinen ,vernunft4 #ej4 ,this product of pure reason in its transcendent use is its most remarkable curiosity4 ,it serves as a very powerful agent to rouse philosophy from its dogmatic slumber1 and to stimulate it to the arduous task of undertaking a ,critique of ,reason itself4 ,i term this idea cosmological1 because it always takes its object only from the sensible world1 and does not use any other than those whose object is given to sense1 consequently it remains in this respect in its native home1 it does not become transcendent1 and is therefore so far not mere idea2 whereas1 to conceive the soul as a simple substance1 already means to conceive such an object 7the simple7 as cannot be presented to the senses4 ,yet the cosmological idea extends the connexion of the conditioned with its condition 7whether the connexion is mathematical or dynamical7 so far1 that experience never can keep up with it4 ,it is therefore with regard to this point always an idea1 whose object never can be adequately given in any experience4 #ea4 ,in the first place1 the use of a system of categories becomes here so obvious and unmistakable1 that even if there were not several other proofs of it1 this alone would sufficiently prove it indispensable in the system of pure reason4 ,there are only four such transcendent ideas1 as there are so many classes of categories2 in each of which1 however1 they refer only to the absolute completeness of the series of the conditions for a given conditioned4 ,in analogy to these cosmological ideas there are only four kinds of dialectical assertions of pure reason1 which1 as they are dialectical1 thereby prove1 that to each of them1 on equally specious principles of pure reason1 a contradictory assertion stands opposed4 ,as all the metaphysical art of the most subtile distinction cannot prevent this opposition1 it compels the philosopher to recur to the first sources of pure reason itself4 ,this ,antinomy1 not arbitrarily invented1 but founded in the nature of human reason1 and hence unavoidable and never ceasing1 contains the following four theses together with their antitheses3 #a4 ,thesis4 ,the ,world has1 as to ,time and ,space1 a ,beginning 7limit74 ,antithesis4 ,the ,world is1 as to ,time and ,space1 infinite4 #b4 ,thesis4 ,everything in the ,world consists of elements that are simple4 ,antithesis4 ,there is nothing simple1 but everything is composite4 #c4 ,thesis4 ,there are in the ,world ,causes through ,freedom4 ,antithesis4 ,there is no ,liberty1 but all is ,nature4 #d4 ,thesis4 ,in the ,series of the ,world-,causes there is some necessary ,being4 ,antithesis4 ,there is ,nothing necessary in the ,world1 but in this ,series ,all is incidental4 #eb4;a4 ,here is the most singular phenomenon of human reason1 no other instance of which can be shown in any other use4 ,if we1 as is commonly done1 represent to ourselves the appearances of the sensible world as things in themselves1 if we assume the principles of their combination as principles universally valid of things in themselves and not merely of experience1 as is usually1 nay without our ,critique1 unavoidably done1 there arises an unexpected conflict1 which never can be removed in the common dogmatical way2 because the thesis1 as well as the antithesis1 can be shown by equally clear1 evident1 and irresistible proofs--for ,i pledge myself as to the correctness of all these proofs--and reason therefore perceives that it is divided with itself1 a state at which the sceptic rejoices1 but which must make the critical philosopher pause and feel ill at ease4 #eb4;b4 ,we may blunder in various ways in metaphysics without any fear of being detected in falsehood4 ,for we never can be refuted by experience if we but avoid self-contradiction1 which in synthetical1 though purely fictitious propositions1 may be done whenever the concepts1 which we connect1 are mere ideas1 that cannot be given 7in their whole content7 in experience4 ,for how can we make out by experience1 whether the world is from eternity or had a beginning1 whether matter is infinitely divisible or consists of simple parts8 ,such concept cannot be given in any experience1 be it ever so extensive1 and consequently the falsehood either of the positive or the negative proposition cannot be discovered by this touch-stone4 ,the only possible way in which reason could have revealed unintentionally its secret ,dialectics1 falsely announced as ,dogmatics1 would be when it were made to ground an assertion upon a universally admitted principle1 and to deduce the exact contrary with the greatest accuracy of inference from another which is equally granted4 ,this is actually here the case with regard to four natural ideas of reason1 whence four assertions on the one side1 and as many counter-assertions on the other arise1 each consistently following from universally-acknowledged principles4 ,thus they reveal by the use of these principles the dialectical illusion of pure reason which would otherwise forever remain concealed4 ,this is therefore a decisive experiment1 which must necessarily expose any error lying hidden in the assumptions of reason4#ce ,contradictory propositions cannot both be false1 except the concept1 which is the subject of both1 is self-contradictory2 for example1 the propositions1 a square circle is round1 and a square circle is not round1 are both false4 ,for1 as to the former it is false1 that the circle is round1 because it is quadrangular2 and it is likewise false1 that it is not round1 that is1 angular1 because it is a circle4 ,for the logical criterion of the impossibility of a concept consists in this1 that if we presuppose it1 two contradictory propositions both become false2 consequently1 as no middle between them is conceivable1 nothing at all is thought by that concept4 #ce ,i therefore would be pleased to have the critical reader to devote to this antinomy of pure reason his chief attention1 because nature itself seems to have established it with a view to stagger reason in its daring pretentions1 and to force it to self-examination4 ,for every proof1 which ,i have given1 as well of the thesis as of the antithesis1 ,i undertake to be responsible1 and thereby to show the certainty of the inevitable antinomy of reason4 ,when the reader is brought by this curious phenomenon to fall back upon the proof of the presumption upon which it rests1 he will feel himself obliged to investigate the ultimate foundation of all the cognition of pure reason with me more thoroughly4 #eb4;c4 ,the first two antinomies1 which ,i call mathematical1 because they are concerned with the addition or division of the homogeneous1 are founded on such a self-contradictory concept2 and hence ,i explain how it happens1 that both the ,thesis and ,antithesis of the two are false4 ,when ,i speak of objects in time and in space1 it is not of things in themselves1 of which ,i know nothing1 but of things in appearance1 that is1 of experience1 as the particular way of cognising objects which is afforded to man4 ,i must not say of what ,i think in time or in space1 that in itself1 and independent of these my thoughts1 it exists in space and in time2 for in that case ,i should contradict myself2 because space and time1 together with the appearances in them1 are nothing existing in themselves and outside of my representations1 but are themselves only modes of representation1 and it is palpably contradictory to say1 that a mere mode of representation exists without our representation4 ,objects of the senses therefore exist only in experience2 whereas to give them a self-subsisting existence apart from experience or before it1 is merely to represent to ourselves that experience actually exists apart from experience or before it4 ,now if ,i inquire after the quantity of the world1 as to space and time1 it is equally impossible1 as regards all my notions1 to declare it infinite or to declare it finite4 ,for neither assertion can be contained in experience1 because experience either of an infinite space1 or of an infinite time elapsed1 or again1 of the boundary of the world by a void space1 or by an antecedent void time1 is impossible2 these are mere ideas4 ,this quantity of the world1 which is determined in either way1 should therefore exist in the world itself apart from all experience4 ,this contradicts the notion of a world of sense1 which is merely a complex of the appearances whose existence and connexion occur only in our representations1 that is1 in experience1 since this latter is not an object in itself1 but a mere mode of representation4 ,hence it follows1 that as the concept of an absolutely existing world of sense is self-contradictory1 the solution of the problem concerning its quantity1 whether attempted affirmatively or negatively1 is always false4 ,the same holds good of the second antinomy1 which relates to the division of phenomena4 ,for these are mere representations1 and the parts exist merely in their representation1 consequently in the division1 or in a possible experience where they are given1 and the division reaches only as far as this latter reaches4 ,to assume that an appearance1 e4g41 that of body1 contains in itself before all experience all the parts1 which any possible experience can ever reach1 is to impute to a mere appearance1 which can exist only in experience1 an existence previous to experience4 ,in other words1 it would mean that mere representations exist before they can be found in our faculty of representation4 ,such an assertion is self-contradictory1 as also every solution of our misunderstood problem1 whether we maintain1 that bodies in themselves consist of an infinite number of parts1 or of a finite number of simple parts4 #ec4 ,in the first 7the mathematical7 class of antinomies the falsehood of the assumption consists in representing in one concept something self-contradictory as if it were compatible 7i4e41 an appearance as an object in itself74 ,but1 as to the second 7the dynamical7 class of antinomies1 the falsehood of the representation consists in representing as contradictory what is compatible2 so that1 as in the former case1 the opposed assertions are both false1 in this case1 on the other hand1 where they are opposed to one another by mere misunderstanding1 they may both be true4 ,any mathematical connexion necessarily presupposes homogeneity of what is connected 7in the concept of magnitude71 while the dynamical one by no means requires the same4 ,when we have to deal with extended magnitudes1 all the parts must be homogeneous with one another and with the whole2 whereas1 in the connexion of cause and effect1 homogeneity may indeed likewise be found1 but is not necessary2 for the concept of causality 7by means of which something is posited through something else quite different from it71 at all events1 does not require it4 ,if the objects of the world of sense are taken for things in themselves1 and the above laws of nature for the laws of things in themselves1 the contradiction would be unavoidable4 ,so also1 if the subject of freedom were1 like other objects1 represented as mere appearance1 the contradiction would be just as unavoidable1 for the same predicate would at once be affirmed and denied of the same kind of object in the same sense4 ,but if natural necessity is referred merely to appearances1 and freedom merely to things in themselves1 no contradiction arises1 if we at once assume1 or admit both kinds of causality1 however difficult or impossible it may be to make the latter kind conceivable4 ,as appearance every effect is an event1 or something that happens in time2 it must1 according to the universal law of nature1 be preceded by a determination of the causality of its cause 7a state71 which follows according to a constant law4 ,but this determination of the cause as causality must likewise be something that takes place or happens2 the cause must have begun to act1 otherwise no succession between it and the effect could be conceived4 ,otherwise the effect1 as well as the causality of the cause1 would have always existed4 ,therefore the determination of the cause to act must also have originated among appearances1 and must consequently1 as well as its effect1 be an event1 which must again have its cause1 and so on2 hence natural necessity must be the condition1 on which effective causes are determined4 ,whereas if freedom is to be a property of certain causes of appearances1 it must1 as regards these1 which are events1 be a faculty of starting them spontaneously1 that is1 without the causality of the cause itself1 and hence without requiring any other ground to determine its start4 ,but then the cause1 as to its causality1 must not rank under time-determinations of its state1 that is1 it cannot be an appearance1 and must be considered a thing in itself1 while its effects would be only appearances4#cf ,if without contradiction we can think of the beings of understanding ,verstandeswesen as exercising such an influence on appearances1 then natural necessity will attach to all connexions of cause and effect in the sensuous world1 though on the other hand1 freedom can be granted to such cause1 as is itself not an appearance 7but the foundation of appearance74 ,nature therefore and freedom can without contradiction be attributed to the very same thing1 but in different relations--on one side as a phenomenon1 on the other as a thing in itself4 #cf ,the idea of freedom occurs only in the relation of the intellectual1 as cause1 to the appearance1 as effect4 ,hence we cannot attribute freedom to matter in regard to the incessant action by which it fills its space1 though this action takes place from an internal principle4 ,we can likewise find no notion of freedom suitable to purely rational beings1 for instance1 to ,god1 so far as his action is immanent4 ,for his action1 though independent of external determining causes1 is determined in his eternal reason1 that is1 in the divine nature4 ,it is only1 if something is to start by an action1 and so the effect occurs in the sequence of time1 or in the world of sense 7e4g41 the beginning of the world71 that we can put the question1 whether the causality of the cause must in its turn have been started1 or whether the cause can originate an effect without its causality itself beginning4 ,in the former case the concept of this causality is a concept of natural necessity1 in the latter1 that of freedom4 ,from this the reader will see1 that1 as ,i explained freedom to be the faculty of starting an event spontaneously1 ,i have exactly hit the notion which is the problem of metaphysics4 ,we have in us a faculty1 which not only stands in connexion with its subjective determining grounds that are the natural causes of its actions1 and is so far the faculty of a being that itself belongs to appearances1 but is also referred to objective grounds1 that are only ideas1 so far as they can determine this faculty1 a connexion which is expressed by the word ought4 ,this faculty is called reason1 and1 so far as we consider a being 7man7 entirely according to this objectively determinable reason1 he cannot be considered as a being of sense1 but this property is that of a thing in itself1 of which we cannot comprehend the possibility--,i mean how the ought 7which however has never yet taken place7 should determine its activity1 and can become the cause of actions1 whose effect is an appearance in the sensible world4 ,yet the causality of reason would be freedom with regard to the effects in the sensuous world1 so far as we can consider objective grounds1 which are themselves ideas1 as their determinants4 ,for its action in that case would not depend upon subjective conditions1 consequently not upon those of time1 and of course not upon the law of nature1 which serves to determine them1 because grounds of reason give to actions the rule universally1 according to principles1 without the influence of the circumstances of either time or place4 ,what ,i adduce here is merely meant as an example to make the thing intelligible1 and does not necessarily belong to our problem1 which must be decided from mere concepts1 independently of the properties which we meet in the actual world4 ,now ,i may say without contradiction3 that all the actions of rational beings1 so far as they are appearances 7occurring in any experience71 are subject to the necessity of nature2 but the same actions1 as regards merely the rational subject and its faculty of acting according to mere reason1 are free4 ,for what is required for the necessity of nature8 ,nothing more than the determinability of every event in the world of sense according to constant laws1 that is1 a reference to cause in the appearance2 in this process the thing in itself at its foundation and its causality remain unknown4 ,but ,i say1 that the law of nature remains1 whether the rational being is the cause of the effects in the sensuous world from reason1 that is1 through freedom1 or whether it does not determine them on grounds of reason4 ,for1 if the former is the case1 the action is performed according to maxims1 the effect of which as appearance is always conform able to constant laws2 if the latter is the case1 and the action not performed on principles of reason1 it is subjected to the empirical laws of the sensibility1 and in both cases the effects are connected according to constant laws2 more than this we do not require or know concerning natural necessity4 ,but in the former case reason is the cause of these laws of nature1 and therefore free2 in the latter the effects follow according to mere natural laws of sensibility1 because reason does not influence it2 but reason itself is not determined on that account by the sensibility1 and is therefore free in this case too4 ,freedom is therefore no hindrance to natural law in appearance1 neither does this law abrogate the freedom of the practical use of reason1 which is connected with things in themselves1 as determining grounds4 ,thus practical freedom1 viz41 the freedom in which reason possesses causality according to objectively determining grounds1 is rescued and yet natural necessity is not in the least curtailed with regard to the very same effects1 as appearances4 ,the same remarks will serve to explain what we had to say concerning transcendental freedom and its compatibility with natural necessity 7in the same subject1 but not taken in the same reference74 ,for1 as to this1 every beginning of the action of a being from objective causes regarded as determining grounds1 is always a first start1 though the same action is in the series of appearances only a subordinate start1 which must be preceded by a state of the cause1 which determines it1 and is itself determined in the same manner by another immediately preceding4 ,thus we are able1 in rational beings1 or in beings generally1 so far as their causality is determined in them as things in themselves1 to imagine a faculty of beginning from itself a series of states1 without falling into contradiction with the laws of nature4 ,for the relation of the action to objective grounds of reason is not a time-relation2 in this case that which determines the causality does not precede in time the action1 because such determining grounds represent not a reference to objects of sense1 e4g41 to causes in the appearances1 but to determining causes1 as things in themselves1 which do not rank under conditions of time4 ,and in this way the action1 with regard to the causality of reason1 can be considered as a first start in respect to the series of appearances1 and yet also as a merely subordinate beginning4 ,we may therefore without contradiction consider it in the former aspect as free1 but in the latter 7in so far as it is merely appearance7 as subject to natural necessity4 ,as to the fourth ,antinomy1 it is solved in the same way as the conflict of reason with itself in the third4 ,for1 provided the cause in the appearance is distinguished from the cause of the appearance 7so far as it can be thought as a thing in itself71 both propositions are perfectly reconcilable3 the one1 that there is nowhere in the sensuous world a cause 7according to similar laws of causality71 whose existence is absolutely necessary2 the other1 that this world is nevertheless connected with a ,necessary ,being as its cause 7but of another kind and according to another law74 ,the incompatibility of these propositions entirely rests upon the mistake of extending what is valid merely of appearances to things in themselves1 and in general confusing both in one concept4 #ed4 ,this then is the proposition and this the solution of the whole antinomy1 in which reason finds itself involved in the application of its principles to the sensible world4 ,the former alone 7the mere proposition7 would be a considerable service in the cause of our knowledge of human reason1 even though the solution might fail to fully satisfy the reader1 who has here to combat a natural illusion1 which has been but recently exposed to him1 and which he had hitherto always regarded as genuine4 ,for one result at least is unavoidable4 ,as it is quite impossible to prevent this conflict of reason with itself--so long as the objects of the sensible world are taken for things in themselves1 and not for mere appearances1 which they are in fact--the reader is thereby compelled to examine over again the deduction of all our a priori cognition and the proof which ,i have given of my deduction in order to come to a decision on the question4 ,this is all ,i require at present2 for when in this occupation he shall have thought himself deep enough into the nature of pure reason1 those concepts by which alone the solution of the conflict of reason is possible1 will become sufficiently familiar to him4 ,without this preparation ,i cannot expect an unreserved assent even from the most attentive reader4 ,,iii4 ,the ,theological ,idea4#cg #cg ,cf4 ,critique1 the chapter on ,transcendental ,ideals4 #ee4 ,the third transcendental ,idea1 which affords matter for the most important1 but1 if pursued only speculatively1 transcendent and thereby dialectical use of reason1 is the ideal of pure reason4 ,reason in this case does not1 as with the psychological and the cosmological ,ideas1 begin from experience1 and err by exaggerating its grounds1 in striving to attain1 if possible1 the absolute completeness of their series4 ,it rather totally breaks with experience1 and from mere concepts of what constitutes the absolute completeness of a thing in general1 consequently by means of the idea of a most perfect primal ,being1 it proceeds to determine the possibility and therefore the actuality of all other things4 ,and so the mere presupposition of a ,being1 who is conceived not in the series of experience1 yet for the purposes of experience--for the sake of comprehending its connexion1 order1 and unity--i4e41 the idea the notion of it1 is more easily distinguished from the concept of the understanding here1 than in the former cases4 ,hence we can easily expose the dialectical illusion which arises from our making the subjective conditions of our thinking objective conditions of objects themselves1 and an hypothesis necessary for the satisfaction of our reason1 a dogma4 ,as the observations of the ,critique on the pretensions of transcendental theology are intelligible1 clear1 and decisive1 ,i have nothing more to add on the subject4 ,general ,remark on the ,transcendental ,ideas4 #ef4 ,the objects1 which are given us by experience1 are in many respects incomprehensible1 and many questions1 to which the law of nature leads us1 when carried beyond a certain point 7though quite conformably to the laws of nature71 admit of no answer2 as for example the question3 why substances attract one another8 ,but if we entirely quit nature1 or in pursuing its combinations1 exceed all possible experience1 and so enter the realm of mere ideas1 we cannot then say that the object is incomprehensible1 and that the nature of things proposes to us insoluble problems4 ,for we are not then concerned with nature or in general with given objects1 but with concepts1 which have their origin merely in our reason1 and with mere creations of thought2 and all the problems that arise from our notions of them must be solved1 because of course reason can and must give a full account of its own procedure4#ch ,as the psychological1 cosmological1 and theological ,ideas are nothing but pure concepts of reason1 which cannot be given in any experience1 the questions which reason asks us about them are put to us not by the objects1 but by mere maxims of our reason for the sake of its own satisfaction4 ,they must all be capable of satisfactory answers1 which is done by showing that they are principles which bring our use of the understanding into thorough agreement1 completeness1 and synthetical unity1 and that they so far hold good of experience only1 but of experience as a whole4 #ch ,herr ,platner in his ,aphorisms acutely says 7 #gbh1 #gbi71 ,if reason be a criterion1 no concept1 which is incomprehensible to human reason1 can be possible4 ,incomprehensibility has place in what is actual only4 ,here in comprehensibility arises from the insufficiency of the acquired ideas4 ,it sounds paradoxical1 but is otherwise not strange to say1 that in nature there is much incomprehensible 7e4g41 the faculty of generation7 but if we mount still higher1 and even go beyond nature1 everything again becomes comprehensible2 for we then quit entirely the objects1 which can be given us1 and occupy ourselves merely about ideas1 in which occupation we can easily comprehend the law that reason prescribes by them to the understanding for its use in experience1 because the law is the reason's own production4 ,although an absolute whole of experience is impossible1 the idea of a whole of cognition according to principles must impart to our knowledge a peculiar kind of unity1 that of a system1 without which it is nothing but piecework1 and cannot be used for proving the existence of a highest purpose 7which can only be the general system of all purposes71 ,i do not here refer only to the practical1 but also to the highest purpose of the speculative use of reason4 ,the transcendental ,ideas therefore express the peculiar application of reason as a principle of systematic unity in the use of the understanding4 ,yet if we assume this unity of the mode of cognition to be attached to the object of cognition1 if we regard that which is merely regulative to be constitutive1 and if we persuade ourselves that we can by means of these ,ideas enlarge our cognition transcendently1 or far beyond all possible experience1 while it only serves to render experience within itself as nearly complete as possible1 i4e41 to limit its progress by nothing that cannot belong to experience3 we suffer from a mere misunderstanding in our estimate of the proper application of our reason and of its principles1 and from a ,dialectic1 which both confuses the empirical use of reason1 and also sets reason at variance with itself4 ,conclusion4 ,on the ,determination of the ,bounds of ,pure ,reason4 #eg4 ,having adduced the clearest arguments1 it would be absurd for us to hope that we can know more of any object1 than belongs to the possible experience of it1 or lay claim to the least atom of knowledge about anything not assumed to be an object of possible experience1 which would determine it according to the constitution it has in itself4 ,for how could we determine anything in this way1 since time1 space1 and the categories1 and still more all the concepts formed by empirical experience or perception in the sensible world 7,anschauung71 have and can have no other use1 than to make experience possible4 ,and if this condition is omitted from the pure concepts of the understanding1 they do not determine any object1 and have no meaning whatever4 ,but it would be on the other hand a still greater absurdity if we conceded no things in themselves1 or set up our experience for the only possible mode of knowing things1 our way of beholding 7,anschauung7 them in space and in time for the only possible way1 and our discursive understanding for the archetype of every possible understanding2 in fact if we wished to have the principles of the possibility of experience considered universal conditions of things in themselves4 ,our principles1 which limit the use of reason to possible experience1 might in this way become transcendent1 and the limits of our reason be set up as limits of the possibility of things in themselves 7as ,hume's dialogues may illustrate71 if a careful critique did not guard the bounds of our reason with respect to its empirical use1 and set a limit to its pretensions4 ,scepticism originally arose from metaphysics and its licentious dialectics4 ,at first it might1 merely to favor the empirical use of reason1 announce everything that transcends this use as worthless and deceitful2 but by and by1 when it was perceived that the very same principles that are used in experience1 insensibly1 and apparently with the same right1 led still further than experience extends1 then men began to doubt even the propositions of experience4 ,but here there is no danger2 for common sense will doubtless always assert its rights4 ,a certain confusion1 however1 arose in science which cannot determine how far reason is to be trusted1 and why only so far and no further1 and this confusion can only be cleared up and all future relapses obviated by a formal determination1 on principle1 of the boundary of the use of our reason4 ,we cannot indeed1 beyond all possible experience1 form a definite notion of what things in themselves may be4 ,yet we are not at liberty to abstain entirely from inquiring into them2 for experience never satisfies reason fully1 but in answering questions1 refers us further and further back1 and leaves us dissatisfied with regard to their complete solution4 ,this any one may gather from the ,dialectics of pure reason1 which therefore has its good subjective grounds4 ,having acquired1 as regards the nature of our soul1 a clear conception of the subject1 and having come to the conviction1 that its manifestations cannot be explained materialistically1 who can refrain from asking what the soul really is1 and1 if no concept of experience suffices for the purpose1 from accounting for it by a concept of reason 7that of a simple immaterial being71 though we cannot by any means prove its objective reality8 ,who can satisfy himself with mere empirical knowledge in all the cosmological questions of the duration and of the quantity of the world1 of freedom or of natural necessity1 since every answer given on principles of experience begets a fresh question1 which likewise requires its answer and thereby clearly shows the insufficiency of all physical modes of explanation to satisfy reason8 ,finally1 who does not see in the thorough-going contingency and dependence of all his thoughts and assumptions on mere principles of experience1 the impossibility of stopping there8 ,and who does not feel himself compelled1 notwithstanding all interdictions against losing himself in transcendent ideas1 to seek rest and contentment beyond all the concepts which he can vindicate by experience1 in the concept of a ,being1 the possibility of which we cannot conceive1 but at the same time cannot be refuted1 because it relates to a mere being of the understanding1 and without it reason must needs remain forever dissatisfied8 ,bounds 7in extended beings7 always presuppose a space existing outside a certain definite place1 and in closing it2 limits do not require this1 but are mere negations1 which affect a quantity1 so far as it is not absolutely complete4 ,but our reason1 as it were1 sees in its surroundings a space for the cognition of things in themselves1 though we can never have definite notions of them1 and are limited to appearances only4 ,as long as the cognition of reason is homogeneous1 definite bounds to it are inconceivable4 ,in mathematics and in natural philosophy human reason admits of limits1 but not of bounds1 viz41 that something indeed lies without it1 at which it can never arrive1 but not that it will at any point find completion in its internal progress4 ,the enlarging of our views in mathematics1 and the possibility of new discoveries1 are infinite2 and the same is the case with the discovery of new properties of nature1 of new powers and laws1 by continued experience and its rational combination4 ,but limits cannot be mistaken here1 for mathematics refers to appearances only1 and what cannot be an object of sensuous contemplation1 such as the concepts of metaphysics and of morals1 lies entirely without its sphere1 and it can never lead to them2 neither does it require them4 ,it is therefore not a continual progress and an approximation towards these sciences1 and there is not1 as it were1 any point or line of contact4 ,natural science will never reveal to us the internal constitution of things1 which though not appearance1 yet can serve as the ultimate ground of explaining appearance4 ,nor does that science require this for its physical explanations4 ,nay even if such grounds should be offered from other sources 7for instance1 the influence of immaterial beings71 they must be rejected and not used in the progress of its explanations4 ,for these explanations must only be grounded upon that which as an object of sense can belong to experience1 and be brought into connexion with our actual perceptions and empirical laws4 ,but metaphysics leads us towards bounds in the dialectical attempts of pure reason 7not undertaken arbitrarily or wantonly1 but stimulated thereto by the nature of reason itself74 ,and the transcendental ,ideas1 as they do not admit of evasion1 and are never capable of realisation1 serve to point out to us actually not only the bounds of the pure use of reason1 but also the way to determine them4 ,such is the end and the use of this natural predisposition of our reason1 which has brought forth metaphysics as its favorite child1 whose generation1 like every other in the world1 is not to be ascribed to blind chance1 but to an original germ1 wisely organised for great ends4 ,for metaphysics1 in its fundamental features1 perhaps more than any other science1 is placed in us by nature itself1 and cannot be considered the production of an arbitrary choice or a casual enlargement in the progress of experience from which it is quite disparate4 ,reason with all its concepts and laws of the understanding1 which suffice for empirical use1 i4e41 within the sensible world1 finds in itself no satisfaction because ever-recurring questions deprive us of all hope of their complete solution4 ,the transcendental ideas1 which have that completion in view1 are such problems of reason4 ,but it sees clearly1 that the sensuous world cannot contain this completion1 neither consequently can all the concepts1 which serve merely for understanding the world of sense1 such as space and time1 and whatever we have adduced under the name of pure concepts of the understanding4 ,the sensuous world is nothing but a chain of appearances connected according to universal laws2 it has therefore no subsistence by itself2 it is not the thing in itself1 and consequently must point to that which contains the basis of this experience1 to beings which cannot be cognised merely as phenomena1 but as things in themselves4 ,in the cognition of them alone reason can hope to satisfy its desire of completeness in proceeding from the conditioned to its conditions4 ,we have above 7 #cc1 #cd7 indicated the limits of reason with regard to all cognition of mere creations of thought4 ,now1 since the transcendental ideas have urged us to approach them1 and thus have led us1 as it were1 to the spot where the occupied space 7viz41 experience7 touches the void 7that of which we can know nothing1 viz41 noumena71 we can determine the bounds of pure reason4 ,for in all bounds there is something positive 7e4g41 a surface is the boundary of corporeal space1 and is therefore itself a space1 a line is a space1 which is the boundary of the surface1 a point the boundary of the line1 but yet always a place in space71 whereas limits contain mere negations4 ,the limits pointed out in those paragraphs are not enough after we have discovered that beyond them there still lies something 7though we can never cognise what it is in itself74 ,for the question now is1 ,what is the attitude of our reason in this connexion of what we know with what we do not1 and never shall1 know8 ,this is an actual connexion of a known thing with one quite unknown 7and which will always remain so71 and though what is unknown should not become the least more known--which we cannot even hope--yet the notion of this connexion must be definite1 and capable of being rendered distinct4 ,we must therefore accept an immaterial being1 a world of understanding1 and a ,supreme ,being 7all mere noumena71 because in them only1 as things in themselves1 reason finds that completion and satisfaction1 which it can never hope for in the derivation of appearances from their homogeneous grounds1 and because these actually have reference to something distinct from them 7and totally heterogeneous71 as appearances always presuppose an object in itself1 and therefore suggest its existence whether we can know more of it or not4 ,but as we can never cognise these beings of understanding as they are in themselves1 that is1 definitely1 yet must assume them as regards the sensible world1 and connect them with it by reason1 we are at least able to think this connexion by means of such concepts as express their relation to the world of sense4 ,yet if we represent to ourselves a being of the understanding by nothing but pure concepts of the understanding1 we then indeed represent nothing definite to ourselves1 consequently our concept has no significance2 but if we think it by properties borrowed from the sensuous world1 it is no longer a being of understanding1 but is conceived as an appearance1 and belongs to the sensible world4 ,let us take an instance from the notion of the ,supreme ,being4 ,our deistic conception is quite a pure concept of reason1 but represents only a thing containing all realities1 without being able to determine any one of them2 because for that purpose an example must be taken from the world of sense1 in which case we should have an object of sense only1 not something quite heterogeneous1 which can never be an object of sense4 ,suppose ,i attribute to the ,supreme ,being understanding1 for instance2 ,i have no concept of an understanding other than my own1 one that must receive its perceptions 7,anschauung7 by the senses1 and which is occupied in bringing them under rules of the unity of consciousness4 ,then the elements of my concept would always lie in the appearance2 ,i should however by the insufficiency of the appearance be necessitated to go beyond them to the concept of a being which neither depends upon appearance1 nor is bound up with them as conditions of its determination4 ,but if ,i separate understanding from sensibility to obtain a pure understanding1 then nothing remains but the mere form of thinking without perception 7,anschauung71 by which form alone ,i can cognise nothing definite1 and consequently no object4 ,for that purpose ,i should conceive another understanding1 such as would directly perceive its objects1#ci but of which ,i have not the least notion2 because the human understanding is discursive1 and can not directly perceive1 it can only cognise by means of general concepts4 ,and the very same difficulties arise if we attribute a will to the ,supreme ,being2 for we have this concept only by drawing it from our internal experience1 and therefore from our dependence for satisfaction upon objects whose existence we require2 and so the notion rests upon sensibility1 which is absolutely incompatible with the pure concept of the ,supreme ,being4 #ci ,der die ,gegenstnde anschaute4 ,hume's objections to deism are weak1 and affect only the proofs1 and not the deistic assertion itself4 ,but as regards theism1 which depends on a stricter determination of the concept of the ,supreme ,being which in deism is merely transcendent1 they are very strong1 and as this concept is formed1 in certain 7in fact in all common7 cases irrefutable4 ,hume always insists1 that by the mere concept of an original being1 to which we apply only ontological predicates 7eternity1 omnipresence1 omnipotence71 we think nothing definite1 and that properties which can yield a concept in concreto must be superadded2 that it is not enough to say1 it is ,cause1 but we must explain the nature of its causality1 for example1 that of an understanding and of a will4 ,he then begins his attacks on the essential point itself1 i4e41 theism1 as he had previously directed his battery only against the proofs of deism1 an attack which is not very dangerous to it in its consequences4 ,all his dangerous arguments refer to anthropomorphism1 which he holds to be inseparable from theism1 and to make it absurd in itself2 but if the former be abandoned1 the latter must vanish with it1 and nothing remain but deism1 of which nothing can come1 which is of no value1 and which cannot serve as any foundation to religion or morals4 ,if this anthropomorphism were really unavoidable1 no proofs whatever of the existence of a ,supreme ,being1 even were they all granted1 could determine for us the concept of this ,being without involving us in contradictions4 ,if we connect with the command to avoid all transcendent judgments of pure reason1 the command 7which apparently conflicts with it7 to proceed to concepts that lie beyond the field of its immanent 7empirical7 use1 we discover that both can subsist together1 but only at the boundary of all lawful use of reason4 ,for this boundary belongs as well to the field of experience1 as to that of the creations of thought1 and we are thereby taught1 as well1 how these so remarkable ideas serve merely for marking the bounds of human reason4 ,on the one hand they give warning not boundlessly to extend cognition of experience1 as if nothing but world#dj remained for us to cognise1 and yet1 on the other hand1 not to transgress the bounds of experience1 and to think of judging about things beyond them1 as things in themselves4 #dj ,the use of the word world without article1 though odd1 seems to be the correct reading1 but it may be a mere misprint4-- ,ed4 ,but we stop at this boundary if we limit our judgment merely to the relation which the world may have to a ,being whose very concept lies beyond all the knowledge which we can attain within the world4 ,for we then do not attribute to the ,supreme ,being any of the properties in themselves1 by which we represent objects of experience1 and thereby avoid dogmatic anthropomorphism2 but we attribute them to his relation to the world1 and allow ourselves a symbolical anthropomorphism1 which in fact concerns language only1 and not the object itself4 ,if ,i say that we are compelled to consider the world1 as if it were the work of a ,supreme ,understanding and ,will1 ,i really say nothing more1 than that a watch1 a ship1 a regiment1 bears the same relation to the watchmaker1 the shipbuilder1 the commanding officer1 as the world of sense 7or whatever constitutes the substratum of this complex of appearances7 does to the ,unknown1 which ,i do not hereby cognise as it is in itself1 but as it is for me or in relation to the world1 of which ,i am a part4 #eh4 ,such a cognition is one of analogy1 and does not signify 7as is commonly understood7 an imperfect similarity of two things1 but a perfect similarity of relations between two quite dissimilar things4#da ,by means of this analogy1 however1 there remains a concept of the ,supreme ,being sufficiently determined for us1 though we have left out everything that could deter mine it absolutely or in itself2 for we determine it as regards the world and as regards ourselves1 and more do we not require4 ,the attacks which ,hume makes upon those who would determine this concept absolutely1 by taking the materials for so doing from themselves and the world1 do not affect us2 and he cannot object to us1 that we have nothing left if we give up the objective anthropomorphism of the concept of the ,supreme ,being4 #da ,there is1 e4g41 an analogy between the juridical relation of human actions and the mechanical relation of motive powers4 ,i never can do anything to another man without giving him a right to do the same to me on the same conditions2 just as no mass can act with its motive power on another mass without thereby occasioning the other to react equally against it4 ,here right and motive power are quite dissimilar things1 but in their relation there is complete similarity4 ,by means of such an analogy ,i can obtain a notion of the relation of things which absolutely are unknown to me4 ,for instance1 as the promotion of the welfare of children 7 a7 is to the love of parents 7 b71 so the welfare of the human species 7 c7 is to that unknown quantity which is in ,god 7 x71 which we call love2 not as if it had the least similarity to any human inclination1 but because we can suppose its relation to the world to be similar to that which things of the world bear one another4 ,but the concept of relation in this case is a mere category1 viz41 the concept of cause1 which has nothing to do with sensibility4 ,for let us assume at the outset 7as ,hume in his dialogues makes ,philo grant ,cleanthes71 as a necessary hypothesis1 the deistical concept of the ,first ,being1 in which this ,being is thought by the mere ontological predicates of substance1 of cause1 etc4 ,this must be done1 because reason1 actuated in the sensible world by mere conditions1 which are themselves always conditional1 cannot otherwise have any satisfaction1 and it therefore can be done without falling into anthropomorphism 7which transfers predicates from the world of sense to a ,being quite distinct from the world71 because those predicates are mere categories1 which1 though they do not give a determinate concept of ,god1 yet give a concept not limited to any conditions of sensibility4 ,thus nothing can prevent our predicating of this ,being a causality through reason with regard to the world1 and thus passing to theism1 without being obliged to attribute to ,god in himself this kind of reason1 as a property inhering in him4 ,for as to the former1 the only possible way of prosecuting the use of reason 7as regards all possible experience1 in complete harmony with itself7 in the world of sense to the highest point1 is to assume a supreme reason as a cause of all the connexions in the world4 ,such a principle must be quite advantageous to reason and can hurt it nowhere in its application to nature4 ,as to the latter1 reason is thereby not transferred as a property to the ,first ,being in himself1 but only to his relation to the world of sense1 and so anthropomorphism is entirely avoided4 ,for nothing is considered here but the cause of the form of reason which is perceived everywhere in the world1 and reason is attributed to the ,supreme ,being1 so far as it contains the ground of this form of reason in the world1 but according to analogy only1 that is1 so far as this expression shows merely the relation1 which the ,supreme ,cause unknown to us has to the world1 in order to determine everything in it conformably to reason in the highest degree4 ,we are thereby kept from using reason as an attribute for the purpose of conceiving ,god1 but instead of conceiving the world in such a manner as is necessary to have the greatest possible use of reason according to principle4 ,we thereby acknowledge that the ,supreme ,being is quite inscrutable and even unthinkable in any definite way as to what he is in himself4 ,we are thereby kept1 on the one hand1 from making a transcendent use of the concepts which we have of reason as an efficient cause 7by means of the will71 in order to determine the ,divine ,nature by properties1 which are only borrowed from human nature1 and from losing ourselves in gross and extravagant notions1 and on the other hand from deluging the contemplation of the world with hyperphysical modes of explanation according to our notions of human reason1 which we transfer to ,god1 and so losing for this contemplation its proper application1 according to which it should be a rational study of mere nature1 and not a presumptuous derivation of its appearances from a ,supreme ,reason4 ,the expression suited to our feeble notions is1 that we conceive the world as if it came1 as to its existence and internal plan1 from a ,supreme ,reason1 by which notion we both cognise the constitution1 which belongs to the world itself1 yet without pretending to determine the nature of its cause in itself1 and on the other hand1 we transfer the ground of this constitution 7of the form of reason in the world7 upon the relation of the ,supreme ,cause to the world1 without finding the world sufficient by itself for that purpose4#db #db ,i may say1 that the causality of the ,supreme ,cause holds the same place with regard to the world that human reason does with regard to its works of art4 ,here the nature of the ,supreme ,cause itself remains unknown to me3 ,i only compare its effects 7the order of the world7 which ,i know1 and their conformity to reason1 to the effects of human reason which ,i also know2 and hence ,i term the former reason1 without attributing to it on that account what ,i understand in man by this term1 or attaching to it anything else known to me1 as its property4 ,thus the difficulties which seem to oppose theism disappear by combining with ,hume's principle--not to carry the use of reason dogmatically beyond the field of all possible experience--this other principle1 which he quite overlooked3 not to consider the field of experience as one which bounds itself in the eye of our reason4 ,the ,critique of ,pure ,reason here points out the true mean between dogmatism1 which ,hume combats1 and skepticism1 which he would substitute for it--a mean which is not like other means that we find advisable to determine for ourselves as it were mechanically 7by adopting something from one side and something from the other71 and by which nobody is taught a better way1 but such a one as can be accurately determined on principles4 #ei4 ,at the beginning of this annotation ,i made use of the metaphor of a boundary1 in order to establish the limits of reason in regard to its suitable use4 ,the world of sense contains merely appearances1 which are not things in themselves1 but the understanding must assume these latter ones1 viz41 noumena4 ,in our reason both are comprised1 and the question is1 ,how does reason proceed to set boundaries to the understanding as regards both these fields8 ,experience1 which contains all that belongs to the sensuous world1 does not bound itself2 it only proceeds in every case from the conditioned to some other equally conditioned object4 ,its boundary must lie quite without it1 and this field is that of the pure beings of the understanding4 ,but this field1 so far as the determination of the nature of these beings is concerned1 is an empty space for us1 and if dogmatically-determined concepts alone are in question1 we cannot pass out of the field of possible experience4 ,but as a boundary itself is something positive1 which belongs as well to that which lies within1 as to the space that lies without the given complex1 it is still an actual positive cognition1 which reason only acquires by enlarging itself to this boundary1 yet without attempting to pass it2 because it there finds itself in the presence of an empty space1 in which it can conceive forms of things1 but not things themselves4 ,but the setting of a boundary to the field of the understanding by something1 which is otherwise unknown to it1 is still a cognition which belongs to reason even at this standpoint1 and by which it is neither confined within the sensible1 nor straying without it1 but only refers1 as befits the knowledge of a boundary1 to the relation between that which lies without it1 and that which is contained within it4 ,natural theology is such a concept at the boundary of human reason1 being constrained to look beyond this boundary to the ,idea of a ,supreme ,being 7and1 for practical purposes to that of an intelligible world also71 not in order to determine anything relatively to this pure creation of the understanding1 which lies beyond the world of sense1 but in order to guide the use of reason within it according to principles of the greatest possible 7theoretical as well as practical7 unity4 ,for this purpose we make use of the reference of the world of sense to an independent reason1 as the cause of all its connexions4 ,thereby we do not purely invent a being1 but1 as beyond the sensible world there must be something that can only be thought by the pure understanding1 we determine that something in this particular way1 though only of course according to analogy4 ,and thus there remains our original proposition1 which is the rsum of the whole ,critique3 that reason by all its a priori principles never teaches us anything more than objects of possible experience1 and even of these nothing more than can be cognised in experience4 ,but this limitation does not prevent reason leading us to the objective boundary of experience1 viz41 to the reference to something which is not itself an object of experience1 but is the ground of all experience4 ,reason does not however teach us anything concerning the thing in itself3 it only instructs us as regards its own complete and highest use in the field of possible experience4 ,but this is all that can be reasonably desired in the present case1 and with which we have cause to be satisfied4 #fj4 ,thus we have fully exhibited metaphysics as it is actually given in the natural predisposition of human reason1 and in that which constitutes the essential end of its pursuit1 according to its subjective possibility4 ,though we have found1 that this merely natural use of such a predisposition of our reason1 if no discipline arising only from a scientific critique bridles and sets limits to it1 involves us in transcendent1 either apparently or really conflicting1 dialectical syllogisms2 and this fallacious metaphysics is not only unnecessary as regards the promotion of our knowledge of nature1 but even disadvantageous to it3 there yet remains a problem worthy of solution1 which is to find out the natural ends intended by this disposition to transcendent concepts in our reason1 because everything that lies in nature must be originally intended for some useful purpose4 ,such an inquiry is of a doubtful nature2 and ,i acknowledge1 that what ,i can say about it is conjecture only1 like every speculation about the first ends of nature4 ,the question does not concern the objective validity of metaphysical judgments1 but our natural predisposition to them1 and therefore does not belong to the system of metaphysics but to anthropology4 ,when ,i compare all the transcendental ,ideas1 the totality of which constitutes the particular problem of natural pure reason1 compelling it to quit the mere contemplation of nature1 to transcend all possible experience1 and in this endeavor to produce the thing 7be it knowledge or fiction7 called metaphysics1 ,i think ,i perceive that the aim of this natural tendency is1 to free our notions from the fetters of experience and from the limits of the mere contemplation of nature so far as at least to open to us a field containing mere objects for the pure understanding1 which no sensibility can reach1 not indeed for the purpose of speculatively occupying ourselves with them 7for there we can find no ground to stand on71 but because practical principles1 which1 without finding some such scope for their necessary expectation and hope1 could not expand to the universality which reason unavoidably requires from a moral point of view4 ,so ,i find that the ,psychological ,idea 7however little it may reveal to me the nature of the human soul1 which is higher than all concepts of experience71 shows the insufficiency of these concepts plainly enough1 and thereby deters me from materialism1 the psychological notion of which is unfit for any explanation of nature1 and besides confines reason in practical respects4 ,the ,cosmological ,ideas1 by the obvious insufficiency of all possible cognition of nature to satisfy reason in its lawful inquiry1 serve in the same manner to keep us from naturalism1 which asserts nature to be sufficient for itself4 ,finally1 all natural necessity in the sensible world is conditional1 as it always presupposes the dependence of things upon others1 and unconditional necessity must be sought only in the unity of a cause different from the world of sense4 ,but as the causality of this cause1 in its turn1 were it merely nature1 could never render the existence of the contingent 7as its consequent7 comprehensible1 reason frees itself by means of the ,theological ,idea from fatalism1 7both as a blind natural necessity in the coherence of nature itself1 without a first principle1 and as a blind causality of this principle itself71 and leads to the concept of a cause possessing freedom1 or of a ,supreme ,intelligence4 ,thus the transcendental ,ideas serve1 if not to instruct us positively1 at least to destroy the rash assertions of ,materialism1 of ,naturalism1 and of ,fatalism1 and thus to afford scope for the moral ,ideas beyond the field of speculation4 ,these considerations1 ,i should think1 explain in some measure the natural predisposition of which ,i spoke4 ,the practical value1 which a merely speculative science may have1 lies without the bounds of this science1 and can therefore be considered as a scholion merely1 and like all scholia does not form part of the science itself4 ,this application however surely lies within the bounds of philosophy1 especially of philosophy drawn from the pure sources of reason1 where its speculative use in metaphysics must necessarily be at unity with its practical use in morals4 ,hence the unavoidable dialectics of pure reason1 considered in metaphysics1 as a natural tendency1 deserves to be explained not as an illusion merely1 which is to be removed1 but also1 if possible1 as a natural provision as regards its end1 though this duty1 a work of supererogation1 cannot justly be assigned to metaphysics proper4 ,the solutions of these questions which are treated in the chapter on the ,regulative ,use of the ,ideas of ,pure ,reason#dc should be considered a second scholion which however has a greater affinity with the subject of metaphysics4 ,for there certain rational principles are expounded which determine a priori the order of nature or rather of the understanding1 which seeks nature's laws through experience4 ,they seem to be constitutive and legislative with regard to experience1 though they spring from pure reason1 which cannot be considered1 like the understanding1 as a principle of possible experience4 ,now whether or not this harmony rests upon the fact1 that just as nature does not inhere in appearances or in their source 7the sensibility7 itself1 but only in so far as the latter is in relation to the understanding1 as also a systematic unity in applying the understanding to bring about an entirety of all possible experience can only belong to the understanding when in relation to reason2 and whether or not experience is in this way mediately subordinate to the legislation of reason3 may be discussed by those who desire to trace the nature of reason even beyond its use in metaphysics1 into the general principles of a history of nature2 ,i have represented this task as important1 but not attempted its solution1 in the book itself4#dd #dc ,critique of ,pure ,reason1 ,,ii41 chap4 ,,iii41 section #g4 #dd ,throughout in the ,critique ,i never lost sight of the plan not to neglect anything1 were it ever so recondite1 that could render the inquiry into the nature of pure reason complete4 ,everybody may afterwards carry his researches as far as he pleases1 when he has been merely shown what yet remains to be done4 ,it is this a duty which must reasonably be expected of him who has made it his business to survey the whole field1 in order to consign it to others for future cultivation and allotment4 ,and to this branch both the scholia belong1 which will hardly recommend themselves by their dryness to amateurs1 and hence are added here for connoisseurs only4 ,and thus ,i conclude the analytical solution of the main question which ,i had proposed3 ,how is metaphysics in general possible8 by ascending from the data of its actual use in its consequences1 to the grounds of its possibility4 ,,scholia4 ,,solution ,,of ,,the ,,general ,,question ,,of ,,the ,,prolegomena1 ,,how ,,is ,,metaphysics ,,possible ,,as ,a ,,science8 ,metaphysics1 as a natural disposition of reason1 is actual1 but if considered by itself alone 7as the analytical solution of the third principal question showed71 dialectical and illusory4 ,if we think of taking principles from it1 and in using them follow the natural1 but on that account not less false1 illusion1 we can never produce science1 but only a vain dialectical art1 in which one school may outdo another1 but none can ever acquire a just and lasting approbation4 ,in order that as a science metaphysics may be entitled to claim not mere fallacious plausibility1 but in sight and conviction1 a ,critique of ,reason must itself exhibit the whole stock of a priori concepts1 their division according to their various sources 7,sensibility1 ,understanding1 and ,reason71 together with a complete table of them1 the analysis of all these concepts1 with all their consequences1 especially by means of the deduction of these concepts1 the possibility of synthetical cognition a priori1 the principles of its application and finally its bounds1 all in a complete system4 ,critique1 therefore1 and critique alone1 contains in itself the whole well-proved and well-tested plan1 and even all the means required to accomplish metaphysics1 as a science2 by other ways and means it is impossible4 ,the question here therefore is not so much how this performance is possible1 as how to set it going1 and induce men of clear heads to quit their hitherto perverted and fruitless cultivation for one that will not deceive1 and how such a union for the common end may best be directed4 ,this much is certain1 that whoever has once tasted ,critique will be ever after disgusted with all dogmatical twaddle which he formerly put up with1 because his reason must have something1 and could find nothing better for its support4 ,critique stands in the same relation to the common metaphysics of the schools1 as chemistry does to alchemy1 or as astronomy to the astrology of the fortune-teller4 ,i pledge myself that nobody who has read through and through1 and grasped the principles of1 the ,critique even in these ,prolegomena only1 will ever return to that old and sophistical pseudo-science2 but will rather with a certain delight look forward to metaphysics which is now indeed in his power1 requiring no more preparatory discoveries1 and now at last affording permanent satisfaction to reason4 ,for here is an advantage upon which1 of all possible sciences1 metaphysics alone can with certainty reckon3 that it can be brought to such completion and fixity as to be incapable of further change1 or of any augmentation by new discoveries2 because here reason has the sources of its knowledge in itself1 not in objects and their observation 7,anschauung71 by which latter its stock of knowledge cannot be further increased4 ,when therefore it has exhibited the fundamental laws of its faculty completely and so definitely as to avoid all misunderstanding1 there remains nothing for pure reason to cognise a priori1 nay1 there is even no ground to raise further questions4 ,the sure prospect of knowledge so definite and so compact has a peculiar charm1 even though we should set aside all its advantages1 of which ,i shall hereafter speak4 ,all false art1 all vain wisdom1 lasts its time1 but finally destroys itself1 and its highest culture is also the epoch of its decay4 ,that this time is come for metaphysics appears from the state into which it has fallen among all learned nations1 despite of all the zeal with which other sciences of every kind are prosecuted4 ,the old arrangement of our university studies still preserves its shadow2 now and then an ,academy of ,science tempts men by offering prizes to write essays on it1 but it is no longer numbered among thorough sciences2 and let any one judge for himself how a man of genius1 if he were called a great metaphysician1 would receive the compliment1 which may be well-meant1 but is scarce envied by anybody4 ,yet1 though the period of the downfall of all dogmatical metaphysics has undoubtedly arrived1 we are yet far from being able to say that the period of its regeneration is come by means of a thorough and complete ,critique of ,reason4 ,all transitions from a tendency to its contrary pass through the stage of indifference1 and this moment is the most dangerous for an author1 but1 in my opinion1 the most favorable for the science4 ,for1 when party spirit has died out by a total dissolution of former connexions1 minds are in the best state to listen to several proposals for an organisation according to a new plan4 ,when ,i say1 that ,i hope these ,prolegomena will excite investigation in the field of critique and afford a new and promising object to sustain the general spirit of philosophy1 which seems on its speculative side to want sustenance1 ,i can imagine beforehand1 that every one1 whom the thorny paths of my ,critique have tired and put out of humor1 will ask me1 upon what ,i found this hope4 ,my answer is1 upon the irresistible law of necessity4 ,that the human mind will ever give up metaphysical researches is as little to be expected as that we should prefer to give up breathing altogether1 to avoid inhaling impure air4 ,there will therefore always be metaphysics in the world2 nay1 every one1 especially every man of reflexion1 will have it1 and for want of a recognised standard1 will shape it for himself after his own pattern4 ,what has hitherto been called metaphysics1 cannot satisfy any critical mind1 but to forego it entirely is impossible2 therefore a ,critique of ,pure ,reason itself must now be attempted or1 if one exists1 investigated1 and brought to the full test1 because there is no other means of supplying this pressing want1 which is something more than mere thirst for knowledge4 ,ever since ,i have come to know critique1 whenever ,i finish reading a book of metaphysical contents1 which1 by the preciseness of its notions1 by variety1 order1 and an easy style1 was not only entertaining but also helpful1 ,i cannot help asking1 ,has this author indeed advanced metaphysics a single step8 ,the learned men1 whose works have been useful to me in other respects and always contributed to the culture of my mental powers1 will1 ,i hope1 forgive me for saying1 that ,i have never been able to find either their essays or my own less important ones 7though self-love may recommend them to me7 to have advanced the science of metaphysics in the least1 and why8 ,here is the very obvious reason3 metaphysics did not then exist as a science1 nor can it be gathered piecemeal1 but its germ must be fully preformed in the ,critique4 ,but in order to prevent all misconception1 we must remember what has been already said1 that by the analytical treatment of our concepts the understanding gains indeed a great deal1 but the science 7of metaphysics7 is thereby not in the least advanced1 because these dissections of concepts are nothing but the materials from which the intention is to carpenter our science4 ,let the concepts of substance and of accident be ever so well dissected and determined1 all this is very well as a preparation for some future use4 ,but if we cannot prove1 that in all which exists the substance endures1 and only the accidents vary1 our science is not the least advanced by all our analyses4 ,metaphysics has hitherto never been able to prove a priori either this proposition1 or that of sufficient reason1 still1 less any more complex theorem1 such as belongs to psychology or cosmology1 or indeed any synthetical proposition4 ,by all its analysing therefore nothing is affected1 nothing obtained or forwarded1 and the science1 after all this bustle and noise1 still remains as it was in the days of ,aristotle1 though far better preparations were made for it than of old1 if the clue to synthetical cognitions had only been discovered4 ,if any one thinks himself offended1 he is at liberty to refute my charge by producing a single synthetical proposition belonging to metaphysics1 which he would prove dogmatically a priori1 for until he has actually performed this feat1 ,i shall not grant that he has truly advanced the science2 even should this proposition be sufficiently confirmed by common experience4 ,no demand can be more moderate or more equitable1 and in the 7inevitably certain7 event of its non-performance1 no assertion more just1 than that hitherto metaphysics has never existed as a science4 ,but there are two things which1 in case the challenge be accepted1 ,i must deprecate3 first1 trifling about probability and conjecture1 which are suited as little to metaphysics1 as to geometry2 and secondly1 a decision by means of the magic wand of common sense1 which does not convince every one1 but which accommodates itself to personal peculiarities4 ,for as to the former1 nothing can be more absurd1 than in metaphysics1 a philosophy from pure reason to think of grounding our judgments upon probability and conjecture4 ,everything that is to be cognised a priori1 is thereby announced as apodeictically certain1 and must therefore be proved in this way4 ,we might as well think of grounding geometry or arithmetic upon conjectures4 ,as to the doctrine of chances in the latter1 it does not contain probable1 but perfectly certain1 judgments concerning the degree of the probability of certain cases1 under given uniform conditions1 which1 in the sum of all possible cases1 infallibly happen according to the rule1 though it is not sufficiently determined in respect to every single chance4 ,conjectures 7by means of induction and of analogy7 can be suffered in an empirical science of nature only1 yet even there the possibility at least of what we assume must be quite certain4 ,the appeal to common sense is even more absurd1 when concept and principles are announced as valid1 not in so far as they hold with regard to experience1 but even beyond the conditions of experience4 ,for what is common sense8 ,it is normal good sense1 so far it judges right4 ,but what is normal good sense8 ,it is the faculty of the knowledge and use of rules in concreto1 as distinguished from the speculative understanding1 which is a faculty of knowing rules in abstracto4 ,common sense can hardly understand the rule1 that every event is determined by means of its cause1 and can never comprehend it thus generally4 ,it therefore demands an example from experience1 and when it hears that this rule means nothing but what it always thought when a pane was broken or a kitchen-utensil missing1 it then understands the principle and grants it4 ,common sense therefore is only of use so far as it can see its rules 7though they actually are a priori7 confirmed by experience2 consequently to comprehend them a priori1 or independently of experience1 belongs to the speculative understanding1 and lies quite beyond the horizon of common sense4 ,but the province of metaphysics is entirely confined to the latter kind of knowledge1 and it is certainly a bad index of common sense to appeal to it as a witness1 for it cannot here form any opinion whatever1 and men look down upon it with contempt until they are in difficulties1 and can find in their speculation neither in nor out4 ,it is a common subterfuge of those false friends of common sense 7who occasionally prize it highly1 but usually despise it7 to say1 that there must surely be at all events some propositions which are immediately certain1 and of which there is no occasion to give any proof1 or even any account at all1 because we otherwise could never stop inquiring into the grounds of our judgments4 ,but if we except the principle of contradiction1 which is not sufficient to show the truth of synthetical judgments1 they can never adduce1 in proof of this privilege1 anything else indubitable1 which they can immediately ascribe to common sense1 except mathematical propositions1 such as twice two make four1 between two points there is but one straight line1 etc4 ,but these judgments are radically different from those of metaphysics4 ,for in mathematics ,i myself can by thinking construct whatever ,i represent to myself as possible by a concept3 ,i add to the first two the other two1 one by one1 and myself make the number four1 or ,i draw in thought from one point to another all manner of lines1 equal as well as unequal2 yet ,i can draw one only1 which is like itself in all its parts4 ,but ,i cannot1 by all my power of thinking1 extract from the concept of a thing the concept of something else1 whose existence is necessarily connected with the former1 but ,i must call in experience4 ,and though my understanding furnishes me a priori 7yet only in reference to possible experience7 with the concept of such a connexion 7i4e41 causation71 ,i cannot exhibit it1 like the concepts of mathematics1 by 7,anschauung7 visualising them1 a priori1 and so show its possibility a priori4 ,this concept1 together with the principles of its application1 always requires1 if it shall hold a priori--as is requisite in metaphysics--a justification and deduction of its possibility1 because we cannot otherwise know how far it holds good1 and whether it can be used in experience only or beyond it also4 ,therefore in metaphysics1 as a speculative science of pure reason1 we can never appeal to common sense1 but may do so only when we are forced to surrender it1 and to renounce all purely speculative cognition1 which must always be knowledge1 and consequently when we forego metaphysics itself and its instruction1 for the sake of adopting a rational faith which alone may be possible for us1 and sufficient to our wants1 perhaps even more salutary than knowledge itself4 ,for in this case the attitude of the question is quite altered4 ,metaphysics must be science1 not only as a whole1 but in all its parts1 otherwise it is nothing2 because1 as a speculation of pure reason1 it finds a hold only on general opinions4 ,beyond its field1 however1 probability and common sense may be used with advantage and justly1 but on quite special principles1 of which the importance always depends on the reference to practical life4 ,this is what ,i hold myself justified in requiring for the possibility of metaphysics as a science4 ,,appendix4 ,,on ,,what ,,can ,,be ,,done ,,to ,,make ,,metaphysics ,,actual ,,as ,a ,,science4 ,since all the ways heretofore taken have failed to attain the goal1 and since without a preceding critique of pure reason it is not likely ever to be attained1 the present essay now before the public has a fair title to an accurate and careful investigation1 except it be thought more advisable to give up all pretensions to metaphysics1 to which1 if men but would consistently adhere to their purpose1 no objection can be made4 ,if we take the course of things as it is1 not as it ought to be1 there are two sorts of judgments3 7#a7 one a judgment which precedes investigation 7in our case one in which the reader from his own metaphysics pronounces judgment on the ,critique of ,pure ,reason which was intended to discuss the very possibility of metaphysics72 7#b7 the other a judgment subsequent to investigation4 ,in the latter the reader is enabled to waive for awhile the consequences of the critical researches that may be repugnant to his formerly adopted metaphysics1 and first examines the grounds whence those consequences are derived4 ,if what common metaphysics propounds were demonstrably certain1 as for instance the theorems of geometry1 the former way of judging would hold good4 ,for if the consequences of certain principles are repugnant to established truths1 these principles are false and without further inquiry to be repudiated4 ,but if metaphysics does not possess a stock of indisputably certain 7synthetical7 propositions1 and should it even be the case that there are a number of them1 which1 though among the most specious1 are by their consequences in mutual collision1 and if no sure criterion of the truth of peculiarly metaphysical 7synthetical7 propositions is to be met with in it1 then the former way of judging is not admissible1 but the investigation of the principles of the critique must precede all judgments as to its value4 ,,on ,a ,,specimen ,,of ,a ,,judgment ,,of ,,the ,,critique ,,prior ,,to ,,its ,,examination4 ,this judgment is to be found in the ,gttingischen gelehrten ,anzeigen1 in the supplement to the third division1 of ,january #ai1 #aghb1 pages #dj et seq4 ,when an author who is familiar with the subject of his work and endeavors to present his independent reflexions in its elaboration1 falls into the hands of a reviewer who1 in his turn1 is keen enough to discern the points on which the worth or worthlessness of the book rests1 who does not cling to words1 but goes to the heart of the subject1 sifting and testing more than the mere principles which the author takes as his point of departure1 the severity of the judgment may indeed displease the latter1 but the public does not care1 as it gains thereby2 and the author himself may be contented1 as an opportunity of correcting or explaining his positions is afforded to him at an early date by the examination of a competent judge1 in such a manner1 that if he believes himself fundamentally right1 he can remove in time any stone of offence that might hurt the success of his work4 ,i find myself1 with my reviewer1 in quite another position4 ,he seems not to see at all the real matter of the investigation with which 7successfully or unsuccessfully7 ,i have been occupied4 ,it is either impatience at thinking out a lengthy work1 or vexation at a threatened reform of a science in which he believed he had brought everything to perfection long ago1 or1 what ,i am unwilling to imagine1 real narrowmindedness1 that prevents him from ever carrying his thoughts beyond his school-metaphysics4 ,in short1 he passes impatiently in review a long series of propositions1 by which1 without knowing their premises1 we can think nothing1 intersperses here and there his censure1 the reason of which the reader understands just as little as the propositions against which it is directed2 and hence his report can neither serve the public nor damage me1 in the judgment of experts4 ,i should1 for these reasons1 have passed over this judgment altogether1 were it not that it may afford me occasion for some explanations which may in some cases save the readers of these ,prolegomena from a misconception4 ,in order to take a position from which my reviewer could most easily set the whole work in a most unfavorable light1 without venturing to trouble himself with any special investigation1 he begins and ends by saying3 ,this work is a system of transcendent 7or1 as he translates it1 of higher7 ,idealism4#de #de ,by no means higher4 ,high towers1 and metaphysically-great men resembling them1 round both of which there is commonly much wind1 are not for me4 ,my place is the fruitful bathos1 the bottom-land1 of experience2 and the word transcendental1 the meaning of which is so often explained by me1 but not once grasped by my reviewer 7so carelessly has he regarded everything71 does not signify something passing beyond all experience1 but something that indeed precedes it a priori1 but that is intended simply to make cognition of experience possible4 ,if these conceptions overstep experience1 their employment is termed transcendent1 a word which must be distinguished from transcendental1 the latter being limited to the immanent use1 that is1 to experience4 ,all misunderstandings of this kind have been sufficiently guarded against in the work itself1 but my reviewer found his advantage in misunderstanding me4 ,a glance at this line soon showed me the sort of criticism that ,i had to expect1 much as though the reviewer were one who had never seen or heard of geometry1 having found a ,euclid1 and coming upon various figures in turning over its leaves1 were to say1 on being asked his opinion of it3 ,the work is a text-book of drawing2 the author introduces a peculiar terminology1 in order to give dark1 incomprehensible directions1 which in the end teach nothing more than what every one can effect by a fair natural accuracy of eye1 etc4 ,let us see1 in the meantime1 what sort of an idealism it is that goes through my whole work1 although it does not by a long way constitute the soul of the system4 ,the dictum of all genuine idealists from the ,eleatic school to ,bishop ,berkeley1 is contained in this formula3 ,all cognition through the senses and experience is nothing but sheer illusion1 and only1 in the ideas of the pure understanding and reason there is truth4 ,the principle that throughout dominates and determines my ,idealism1 is on the contrary3 ,all cognition of things merely from pure understanding or pure reason is nothing but sheer illusion1 and only in experience is there truth4 ,but this is directly contrary to idealism proper4 ,how came ,i then to use this expression for quite an opposite purpose1 and how came my reviewer to see it everywhere8 ,the solution of this difficulty rests on something that could have been very easily understood from the general bearing of the work1 if the reader had only desired to do so4 ,space and time1 together with all that they contain1 are not things nor qualities in themselves1 but belong merely to the appearances of the latter3 up to this point ,i am one in confession with the above idealists4 ,but these1 and amongst them more particularly ,berkeley1 regarded space as a mere empirical presentation that1 like the phenomenon it contains1 is only known to us by means of experience or perception1 together with its determinations4 ,i1 on the contrary1 prove in the first place1 that space 7and also time1 which ,berkeley did not consider7 and all its determinations a priori1 can be cognised by us1 because1 no less than time1 it inheres in our sensibility as a pure form before all perception or experience and makes all intuition of the same1 and therefore all its phenomena1 possible4 ,it follows from this1 that as truth rests on universal and necessary laws as its criteria1 experience1 according to ,berkeley1 can have no criteria of truth1 because its phenomena 7according to him7 have nothing a priori at their foundation2 whence it follows1 that they are nothing but sheer illusion2 whereas with us1 space and time 7in conjunction with the pure conceptions of the understanding7 prescribe their law to all possible experience a priori1 and at the same time afford the certain criterion for distinguishing truth from illusion therein4#df #df ,idealism proper always has a mystical tendency1 and can have no other1 but mine is solely designed for the purpose of comprehending the possibility of our cognition a priori as to objects of experience1 which is a problem never hitherto solved or even suggested4 ,in this way all mystical idealism falls to the ground1 for 7as may be seen already in ,plato7 it inferred from our cognitions a priori 7even from those of geometry7 another intuition different from that of the senses 7namely1 an intellectual intuition71 because it never occurred to any one that the senses themselves might intuite a priori4 ,my so-called 7properly critical7 ,idealism is of quite a special character1 in that it subverts the ordinary idealism1 and that through it all cognition a priori1 even that of geometry1 first receives objective reality1 which1 without my demonstrated ideality of space and time1 could not be maintained by the most zealous realists4 ,this being the state of the case1 ,i could have wished1 in order to avoid all misunderstanding1 to have named this conception of mine otherwise1 but to alter it altogether was impossible4 ,it may be permitted me however1 in future1 as has been above intimated1 to term it the formal1 or better still1 the critical ,idealism1 to distinguish it from the dogmatic ,idealism of ,berkeley1 and from the sceptical ,idealism of ,descartes4 ,beyond this1 ,i find nothing further remarkable in the judgment of my book4 ,the reviewer criticises here and there1 makes sweeping criticisms1 a mode prudently chosen1 since it does not betray one's own knowledge or ignorance2 a single thorough criticism in detail1 had it touched the main question1 as is only fair1 would have exposed1 it may be my error1 or it may be my reviewer's measure of insight into this species of research4 ,it was1 moreover1 not a badly conceived plan1 in order at once to take from readers 7who are accustomed to form their conceptions of books from newspaper reports7 the desire to read the book itself1 to pour out in one breath a number of passages in succession1 torn from their connexion1 and their grounds of proof and explanations1 and which must necessarily sound senseless1 especially considering how antipathetic they are to all school-metaphysics2 to exhaust the reader's patience ad nauseam1 and then1 after having made me acquainted with the sensible proposition that persistent illusion is truth1 to conclude with the crude paternal moralisation3 to what end1 then1 the quarrel with accepted language1 to what end1 and whence1 the idealistic distinction8 ,a judgment which seeks all that is characteristic of my book1 first supposed to be metaphysically heterodox1 in a mere innovation of the nomenclature1 proves clearly that my would-be judge has understood nothing of the subject1 and in addition1 has not understood himself4#dg #dg ,the reviewer often fights with his own shadow4 ,when ,i oppose the truth of experience to dream1 he never thinks that ,i am here speaking simply of the well-known somnio objective sumto of the ,wolffian philosophy1 which is merely formal1 and with which the distinction between sleeping and waking is in no way concerned1 and in a transcendental philosophy indeed can have no place4 ,for the rest1 he calls my deduction of the categories and table of the principles of the understanding1 common well-known axioms of logic and ontology1 expressed in an idealistic manner4 ,the reader need only consult these ,prolegomena upon this point1 to convince himself that a more miserable and historically incorrect1 judgment1 could hardly be made4 ,my reviewer speaks like a man who is conscious of important and superior insight which he keeps hidden2 for ,i am aware of nothing recent with respect to metaphysics that could justify his tone4 ,but he should not withhold his discoveries from the world1 for there are doubtless many who1 like myself1 have not been able to find in all the fine things that have for long past been written in this department1 anything that has advanced the science by so much as a fingerbreadth2 we find indeed the giving a new point to definitions1 the supplying of lame proofs with new crutches1 the adding to the crazy-quilt of metaphysics fresh patches or changing its pattern2 but all this is not what the world requires4 ,the world is tired of metaphysical assertions2 it wants the possibility of the science1 the sources from which certainty therein can be derived1 and certain criteria by which it may distinguish the dialectical illusion of pure reason from truth4 ,to this the critic seems to possess a key1 otherwise he would never have spoken out in such a high tone4 ,but ,i am inclined to suspect that no such requirement of the science has ever entered his thoughts1 for in that case he would have directed his judgment to this point1 and even a mistaken attempt in such an important matter1 would have won his respect4 ,if that be the case1 we are once more good friends4 ,he may penetrate as deeply as he likes into metaphysics1 without any one hindering him2 only as concerns that which lies outside metaphysics1 its sources1 which are to be found in reason1 he cannot form a judgment4 ,that my suspicion is not without foundation1 is proved by the fact that he does not mention a word about the possibility of synthetic knowledge a priori1 the special problem upon the solution of which the fate of metaphysics wholly rests1 and upon which my ,critique 7as well as the present ,prolegomena7 entirely hinges4 ,the ,idealism he encountered1 and which he hung upon1 was only taken up in the doctrine as the sole means of solving the above problem 7although it received its confirmation on other grounds71 and hence he must have shown either that the above problem does not possess the importance ,i attribute to it 7even in these ,prolegomena71 or that by my conception of appearances1 it is either not solved at all1 or can be better solved in another way2 but ,i do not find a word of this in the criticism4 ,the reviewer1 then1 understands nothing of my work1 and possibly also nothing of the spirit and essential nature of metaphysics itself2 and it is not1 what ,i would rather assume1 the hurry of a man incensed at the labor of plodding through so many obstacles1 that threw an unfavorable shadow over the work lying before him1 and made its fundamental features unrecognisable4 ,there is a good deal to be done before a learned journal1 it matters not with what care its writers may be selected1 can maintain its otherwise well-merited reputation1 in the field of metaphysics as elsewhere4 ,other sciences and branches of knowledge have their standard4 ,mathematics has it1 in itself2 history and theology1 in profane or sacred books2 natural science and the art of medicine1 in mathematics and experience2 jurisprudence1 in law books2 and even matters of taste in the examples of the ancients4 ,but for the judgment of the thing called metaphysics1 the standard has yet to be found4 ,i have made an attempt to determine it1 as well as its use4 ,what is to be done1 then1 until it be found1 when works of this kind have to be judged of8 ,if they are of a dogmatic character1 one may do what one likes2 no one will play the master over others here for long1 before someone else appears to deal with him in the same manner4 ,if1 however1 they are critical in their character1 not indeed with reference to other works1 but to reason itself1 so that the standard of judgment cannot be assumed but has first of all to be sought for1 then1 though objection and blame may indeed be permitted1 yet a certain degree of leniency is indispensable1 since the need is common to us all1 and the lack of the necessary insight makes the high-handed attitude of judge unwarranted4 ,in order1 however1 to connect my defence with the interest of the philosophical commonwealth1 ,i propose a test1 which must be decisive as to the mode1 whereby all metaphysical investigations may be directed to their common purpose4 ,this is nothing more than what formerly mathematicians have done1 in establishing the advantage of their methods by competition4 ,i challenge my critic to demonstrate1 as is only just1 on a priori grounds1 in his way1 a single really metaphysical principle asserted by him4 ,being metaphysical it must be synthetic and cognised a priori from conceptions1 but it may also be any one of the most indispensable principles1 as for instance1 the principle of the persistence of substance1 or of the necessary determination of events in the world by their causes4 ,if he cannot do this 7silence however is confession71 he must admit1 that as metaphysics without apodeictic certainty of propositions of this kind is nothing at all1 its possibility or impossibility must before all things be established in a critique of the pure reason4 ,thus he is bound either to confess that my principles in the ,critique are correct1 or he must prove their invalidity4 ,but as ,i can already foresee1 that1 confidently as he has hitherto relied on the certainty of his principles1 when it comes to a strict test he will not find a single one in the whole range of metaphysics he can bring forward1 ,i will concede to him an advantageous condition1 which can only be expected in such a competition1 and will relieve him of the onus probandi by laying it on myself4 ,he finds in these ,prolegomena and in my ,critique 7chapter on the ,theses and ,antitheses of the ,four ,antinomies7 eight propositions1 of which two and two contradict one another1 but each of which necessarily belongs to metaphysics1 by which it must either be accepted or rejected 7although there is not one that has not in this time been held by some philosopher74 ,now he has the liberty of selecting any one of these eight propositions at his pleasure1 and accepting it without any proof1 of which ,i shall make him a present1 but only one 7for waste of time will be just as little serviceable to him as to me71 and then of attacking my proof of the opposite proposition4 ,if ,i can save this one1 and at the same time show1 that according to principles which every dogmatic metaphysics must necessarily recognise1 the opposite of the proposition adopted by him can be just as clearly proved1 it is thereby established that metaphysics has an hereditary failing1 not to be explained1 much less set aside1 until we ascend to its birth-place1 pure reason itself1 and thus my ,critique must either be accepted or a better one take its place2 it must at least be studied1 which is the only thing ,i now require4 ,if1 on the other hand1 ,i cannot save my demonstration1 then a synthetic proposition a priori from dogmatic principles is to be reckoned to the score of my opponent1 then also ,i will deem my impeachment of ordinary metaphysics as unjust1 and pledge myself to recognise his stricture on my ,critique as justified 7although this would not be the consequence by a long way74 ,to this end it would be necessary1 it seems to me1 that he should step out of his incognito4 ,otherwise ,i do not see how it could be avoided1 that instead of dealing with one1 ,i should be honored by several problems coming from anonymous and unqualified opponents4 ,,proposals ,,as ,,to ,,an ,,investigation ,,of ,,the ,,critique ,,upon ,,which ,a ,,judgment ,,may ,,follow4 ,i feel obliged to the honored public even for the silence with which it for a long time favored my ,critique1 for this proves at least a postponement of judgment1 and some supposition that in a work1 leaving all beaten tracks and striking out on a new path1 in which one cannot at once perhaps so easily find one's way1 something may perchance lie1 from which an important but at present dead branch of human knowledge may derive new life and productiveness4 ,hence may have originated a solicitude for the as yet tender shoot1 lest it be destroyed by a hasty judgment4 ,a test of a judgment1 delayed for the above reasons1 is now before my eye in the ,gothaischen gelehrten ,zeitung1 the thoroughness of which every reader will himself perceive1 from the clear and unperverted presentation of a fragment of one of the first principles of my work1 without taking into consideration my own suspicious praise4 ,and now ,i propose1 since an extensive structure cannot be judged of as a whole from a hurried glance1 to test it piece by piece from its foundations1 so thereby the present ,prolegomena may fitly be used as a general outline with which the work itself may occasionally be compared4 ,this notion1 if it were founded on nothing more than my conceit of importance1 such as vanity commonly attributes to one's own productions1 would be immodest and would deserve to be repudiated with disgust4 ,but now1 the interests of speculative philosophy have arrived at the point of total extinction1 while human reason hangs upon them with inextinguishable affection1 and only after having been ceaselessly deceived does it vainly attempt to change this into indifference4 ,in our thinking age it is not to be supposed but that many deserving men would use any good opportunity of working for the common interest of the more and more enlightened reason1 if there were only some hope of attaining the goal4 ,mathematics1 natural science1 laws1 arts1 even morality1 etc41 do not completely fill the soul2 there is always a space left over1 reserved for pure and speculative reason1 the vacuity of which prompts us to seek in vagaries1 buffooneries1 and myticism for what seems to be employment and entertainment1 but what actually is mere pastime2 in order to deaden the troublesome voice of reason1 which in accordance with its nature requires something that can satisfy it1 and not merely subserve other ends or the interests of our inclinations4 ,a consideration1 therefore1 which is concerned only with reason as it exists for it itself1 has as ,i may reasonably suppose a great fascination for every one who has attempted thus to extend his conceptions1 and ,i may even say a greater than any other theoretical branch of knowledge1 for which he would not willingly exchange it1 because here all other cognitions1 and even purposes1 must meet and unite themselves in a whole4 ,i offer1 therefore1 these ,prolegomena as a sketch and text-book for this investigation1 and not the work itself4 ,although ,i am even now perfectly satisfied with the latter as far as contents1 order1 and mode of presentation1 and the care that ,i have expended in weighing and testing every sentence before writing it down1 are concerned 7for it has taken me years to satisfy myself fully1 not only as regards the whole1 but in some cases even as to the sources of one particular proposition72 yet ,i am not quite satisfied with my exposition in some sections of the doctrine of elements1 as for instance in the deduction of the conceptions of the ,understanding1 or in that on the paralogisms of pure reason1 because a certain diffuseness takes away from their clearness1 and in place of them1 what is here said in the ,prolegomena respecting these sections1 may be made the basis of the test4 ,it is the boast of the ,germans that where steady and continuous industry are requisite1 they can carry things farther than other nations4 ,if this opinion be well founded1 an opportunity1 a business1 presents itself1 the successful issue of which we can scarcely doubt1 and in which all thinking men can equally take part1 though they have hitherto been unsuccessful in accomplishing it and in thus confirming the above good opinion4 ,but this is chiefly because the science in question is of so peculiar a kind1 that it can be at once brought to completion and to that enduring state that it will never be able to be brought in the least degree farther or increased by later discoveries1 or even changed 7leaving here out of account adornment by greater clearness in some places1 or additional uses71 and this is an advantage no other science has or can have1 because there is none so fully isolated and independent of others1 and which is concerned with the faculty of cognition pure and simple4 ,and the present moment seems1 moreover1 not to be unfavorable to my expectation1 for just now1 in ,germany1 no one seems to know wherewith to occupy himself1 apart from the so-called useful sciences1 so as to pursue not mere play1 but a business possessing an enduring purpose4 ,to discover the means how the endeavors of the learned may be united in such a purpose1 ,i must leave to others4 ,in the meantime1 it is my intention to persuade any one merely to follow my propositions1 or even to flatter me with the hope that he will do so2 but attacks1 repetitions1 limitations1 or confirmation1 completion1 and extension1 as the case may be1 should be appended4 ,if the matter be but investigated from its foundation1 it cannot fail that a system1 albeit not my own1 shall be erected1 that shall be a possession for future generations for which they may have reason to be grateful4 ,it would lead us too far here to show what kind of metaphysics may be expected1 when only the principles of criticism have been perfected1 and how1 because the old false feathers have been pulled out1 she need by no means appear poor and reduced to an insignificant figure1 but may be in other respects richly and respectably adorned4 ,but other and great uses which would result from such a reform1 strike one immediately4 ,the ordinary metaphysics had its uses1 in that it sought out the elementary conceptions of the pure understanding in order to make them clear through analysis1 and definite by explanation4 ,in this way it was a training for reason1 in whatever direction it might be turned2 but this was all the good it did2 service was subsequently effaced when it favored conceit by venturesome assertions1 sophistry by subtle distinctions and adornment1 and shallowness by the ease with which it decided the most difficult problems by means of a little school-wisdom1 which is only the more seductive the more it has the choice1 on the one hand1 of taking something from the language of science1 and on the other from that of popular discourse1 thus being everything to everybody1 but in reality nothing at all4 ,by criticism1 however1 a standard is given to our judgment1 whereby knowledge may be with certainty distinguished from pseudo-science1 and firmly founded1 being brought into full operation in metaphysics2 a mode of thought extending by degrees its beneficial influence over every other use of reason1 at once infusing into it the true philosophical spirit4 ,but the service also that metaphysics performs for theology1 by making it independent of the judgment of dogmatic speculation1 thereby assuring it completely against the attacks of all such opponents1 is certainly not to be valued lightly4 ,for ordinary metaphysics1 although it promised the latter much advantage1 could not keep this promise1 and moreover1 by summoning speculative dogmatics to its assistance1 did nothing but arm enemies against itself4 ,mysticism1 which can prosper in a rationalistic age only when it hides itself behind a system of school-metaphysics1 under the protection of which it may venture to rave with a semblance of rationality1 is driven from this1 its last hiding-place1 by critical philosophy4 ,last1 but not least1 it cannot be otherwise than important to a teacher of metaphysics1 to be able to say with universal assent1 that what he expounds is ,science1 and that thereby genuine services will be rendered to the commonweal4