,transcriber's ,notes ,the ,table of ,contents was added by the ,transcriber4 ,the maps just below most chapter headings originally were on the pages before those headings1 but were moved by the ,transcriber4 ,,contents ,letter ,i #i ,letter ,,ii #ai ,letter ,,iii #be ,letter ,,iv #ca ,letter ,v #dc ,letter ,,vi #ec ,letter ,,vii #ei ,letter ,,viii #fc ,letter ,,ix #gc ,letter ,x #gg ,letter ,,xi #ha ,letter ,,xii #hi ,a ,,general',s ,,letters ,,to ,,his ,,son ,,on ,,minor ,,tactics ,a ,,general',s ,,letters ,,to ,,his ,,son ,,on ,,minor ,,tactics ,illustration ,,new ,,york ,,george ,h4 ,,doran ,,company ,copyright1 #aiah ,by ,george ,h4 ,doran ,company ,printed in the ,united ,states of ,america ,,preface ,it has very forcibly been brought home to me that not only young officers joining their units from training establishments1 but also those who have been in ,france and have come back wounded1 are often very ignorant on those points in minor tactics which they have not learnt through actual experience on the battlefield1 and that this is especially the case with regard to the proper control of fire4 ,the battlefield is an expensive place to acquire knowledge which can be gained elsewhere1 and it behooves us to do all we possibly can to train our young commanders under peace conditions for the ordeals they will have to encounter in the presence of the enemy4 ,training which in ordinary times would form the course of study for years now has to be crammed into a few months1 and it stands to reason that much which is essential remains unlearnt4 ,i have generally found that the best way to train young officers in minor tactics is by giving them as realistically as possible little problems to solve1 and afterwards in the presence of their comrades to discuss their proposed dispositions and then to tell them clearly what they ought to have done1 giving reasons for every step taken4 ,where it is possible actually to carry out the exercise with troops1 this is still better1 so long as it is all done quickly1 as this impresses the lesson to be learnt more strongly on the minds of the students4 ,many men who are in other ways excellent instructors have not the facility for constructing problems with a point1 and this being the case1 it has occurred to me that ,i may be generally helping the training of young officers by publishing these letters which are written in continuation of those ,i addressed to my son on obtaining his commission4 ,the importance of the subject with which they deal is self-evident4 ,unless the arrow-head1 the platoon1 be sharp1 that is1 unless the leader be skilful as well as brave1 the little combat will not be won1 and it is the sum of the little combats which spells the result of the battle4 ,there is not a word in this little book which transgresses the spirit of the training manuals and official instructions now in force4 8,x4 ,y4 ,z40 ,a ,,general',s ,,letters ,,to ,,his ,,son ,,on ,,minor ,,tactics ,,letter ,i ,december #a1 #aiag4 ,,my ,,dear ,,dick1-- ,it is now nearly nine months since ,i wrote the last of my letters of advice to you1 and since then you have yourself been in ,france and have had many experiences and hairbreadth escapes4 ,i am very thankful that your wound is only a slight one1 and am glad that within a couple of months you will probably once more be able to take your place in the fighting-line1 for that is where your country demands your presence4 ,it behoves you1 in the meantime1 to seize every opportunity of studying your profession and familiarising yourself as far as possible with the different positions in which you may be placed1 so that when you meet a similar situation in the field you may recognise it for what it really is1 in spite of the surroundings in which it is dressed1 and may thus be more likely to solve it properly than would be the case if you were dealing with a problem which you had never thought over before4 ,it would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of the results which may depend on your correctly answering the questions put to you on the field of battle4 ,these questions become more complex and more varied as the responsibility of an officer's position increases1 but in the case of a junior officer they are seldom very difficult1 and all that is required to deal with them properly is a little common sense and a cool head combined with courage and determination4 ,it is on the result of the many little fights of which an action is composed that the result of a battle depends4 ,the brilliant strategy of a commander-in-chief and the fine tactics of a divisional commander cannot bear fruit unless the troop-leading of the companies is well carried out1 and in the same way good troop-leading will prevent a defeat being turned into a rout4 ,individual gallantry1 valuable as it may be1 is bound to be thrown away if unaccompanied by skill4 ,the experiences you have undergone should render you more capable of assimilating the requisite knowledge than you were nine months ago4 ,before ,i proceed further1 ,i will mention a few axioms which can seldom be neglected without bad results accruing4 ,some of these seem so self-evident that it would appear to be unnecessary to state them1 nevertheless they are all of them continually transgressed4 #a4 ,impress on your men the importance of adjusting their sights correctly4 ,on a peace field-day this axiom is sometimes neglected1 and in the excitement of action it is often entirely forgotten4 #b4 ,keep your men together unless there is some very definite object for not doing so1 and only detach them for protective services1 i4e4 advance guards1 etc4 #c4 ,infantry mounted officers are apt to forget that their horses are given to them in order to give them more mobility4 ,there are many occasions on which1 by cantering on and making arrangements previous to the arrival of the unit which they command1 they can save a great deal of valuable time and often much marching and counter-marching4 #d4 ,never allow the pace in front to be hurried on a march4 ,it is much easier to march at the head than at the rear of a column4 #e4 ,before opening fire1 carefully consider the situation4 ,if you feel certain of being able to deal with the enemy1 let him approach close before disclosing yourself1 and then destroy him4 ,if1 on the contrary1 he is so much superior to you that you cannot hope to be able to do this1 you should open at a long range1 but in these circumstances do not hurry the rate of fire to begin with4 ,it takes an exceptional man to fire more than #bjj rounds in a short space of time without being shaken4 #f4 ,it is a sound rule always to pursue the line of action which your opponent does not wish you to pursue4 ,if1 for instance1 in the circumstances mentioned in the above paragraph the enemy open fire on you at a long range1 you may presume that he does so in order to keep you at arm's length1 and if you halt you are probably doing what he wishes you to do4 #g4 ,however small your party may be when acting independently1 it is responsible for its own protection1 and it should always have an advance guard or its equivalent4 #h4 ,whenever you have an opportunity of doing so1 and the tactical situation allows of it1 check your ranges by firing at an auxiliary mark where you can see the splash of your bullet1 such as a dusty road or water4 #i4 ,when you have ascertained the correct distances of the object1 make a range-card and pass on your information to neighbouring troops4 #aj4 ,if you see a good opportunity of inflicting loss on the enemy1 but it is impracticable to check the range1 use combined sights4 #aa4 ,remember that if the target you are shooting at is large enough and you know the range1 you can inflict heavy losses with rifle and machine-gun fire at ranges well over #b1jjj yards4 #ab4 ,do not forget to make use of the map when estimating a range4 #ac4 ,although the secret of success in an engagement is the proper co-operation of the different arms of the service1 the platoon commander must not cry out for artillery assistance when he has the means of carrying out his task in his own platoon1 which1 with its riflemen1 its ,lewis gunners1 its bombers1 and its rifle bombers1 is1 in itself1 a miniature division4 ,in an action where telephonic communication has broken down this rule applies with special force4 #ad4 ,above all things1 impress on your men the enormous power of their rifle4 ,i have heard many stories of men not firing at all because they hoped the enemy would come within bombing range4 ,i have also heard of bodies of ,german troops streaming across the open unfired at because no order was given4 ,i have also heard of machine guns stopping a ,german advance1 whilst infantry who were lying down beside them did not fire a shot4 #ae4 ,rifle grenades and bombs both have their proper uses1 and in trench fighting it would be difficult to get on without them4 ,the former are also excellent for giving covering fire whilst a post is being rushed2 but if the infantryman's worth be #ajj1 of this #ajj1 #he per cent4 belongs to his rifle and bayonet1 #aj per cent4 to his rifle grenade1 and #e per cent4 at the outside to his bomb4 #af4 ,never miss an opportunity to reorganise your company or platoon1 as the case may be1 ready for the next emergency4 #ag4 ,after capturing a trench or work1 get your ,lewis guns into position without any delay4 ,from a small front they can bring a great fire to bear1 and they must be given the best position4 ,under the protection given by them1 the remainder of your command must consolidate4 7,for consolidation1 see note to ,scheme #g47 #ah4 ,your duty towards the enemy is your duty towards your neighbour reversed4 ,think how he could make himself most objectionable to you and act in this manner towards him4 #ai4 ,always be certain that you understand your orders1 and if you are in doubt never hesitate to ask and make certain1 even should your commanding officer have a short temper4 #bj4 ,if you are detached for any specific purpose you should always rejoin your unit when you have accomplished what you were told to do4 #ba4 ,do not fail to give negative information4 ,young officers are very apt to neglect this4 ,it may be of great importance to a commanding officer to know that a certain place is not held by the enemy1 and this is just the kind of information that his patrol leaders are apt to forget to send him4 #bb4 ,always insist on any verbal order you may give being repeated to you by the recipient before he leaves your presence4 #bc4 ,in a retirement you send men to the rear with orders to take up another position to protect your retirement2 always see that they are accompanied by a competent leader1 or when the last party falls back they will very likely find that their retirement is unsupported4 ,try to remember these axioms4 ,my subsequent letters will be founded on their application4 ,your affectionate father1 8,x4 ,y4 ,z40 ,,letter ,,ii ,illustration3 ,w ,x ,y are ,pill ,boxes ,w ,y have been captured by us ,x still holds out ,december #g1 #aiag4 ,,my ,,dear ,,dick1-- ,i will now proceed to set you a few problems in illustration of the axioms which ,i gave you at the end of my last letter4 ,the first will be on the subject of taking a ,german pill-box1 for ,i have heard of many instances of a pill-box holding up the advance of a whole brigade for a very considerable period4 ,i have also heard how many gallant but badly devised attempts to carry it have failed1 and the lives of officers and men have been sacrificed in vain1 and how eventually a better commanded platoon has succeeded in taking it with very little loss4 ,,problem #a ,w1 ,x1 and ,y are three pill-boxes about #aej yards apart4 ,we are attacking in the direction of the arrows1 that is1 in a northerly direction4 ,our men following close behind the barrage took pill-boxes ,w and ,y2 but1 partly owing to the conformation of the ground and partly for other reasons1 we failed to take ,x1 and this pill-box is now holding up the whole of our advance between ,w1 wood1 and ,y1 knoll1 with a machine gun1 which is being fired from the inside of the pill-box1 and which sweeps the whole ground between these points so effectively that directly we attempt to advance our men are mown down4 ,it is apparent that ,x has only one machine gun in action1 though this is a very efficient one4 ,from the contours on the sketch1 it is evident that the ground is convex in formation1 that is1 that it is nearly flat between ,x and ,h1 but that it slopes rapidly between ,h and ,h1 between ,b and ,b1 and between ,c and ,c4 ,the slopes are covered with brushwood4 ,the ground between contour #abj and the pill-box is meadow land4 ,the platoon originally told off to attack ,x was wiped out4 ,problem4 ,you have been ordered to take ,x with your platoon and to do so as quickly as possible4 ,when you receive these orders you are yourself at ,h1 and1 as you will see from the sketch1 are not under fire from ,x4 ,what steps will you take to carry out your orders8 ,do not enter into an elaborate dissertation1 but give short1 concise orders1 and if you desire to do so1 append a short statement saying why you gave these orders4 ,action considered ,correct4 ,as there is only one machine gun in action1 if ,x be attacked simultaneously from ,b and ,c1 either one party or the other should succeed in getting to the rear of the pill-box and blowing in the door4 ,orders4 ,no4 #d ,section with the ,lewis gun will choose a position somewhere to the north of ,h1 and on my signal will open a rapid fire on the loopholes of the pill-box at ,x4 ,no4 #c ,section will choose a position near ,b1 and when the ,lewis gun opens fire1 they will open a rapid rifle-grenade fire on ,x4 ,one minute after the ,lewis gun has opened1 ,no4 #a ,section will rush in from ,c and ,no4 #b ,section from ,b4 99 99 99 99 99 ,i am aware that in the foregoing problem ,i have made the task of the platoon commander a very simple one4 ,i wished1 however1 to avoid any points of controversy4 ,if the ground should not be so advantageous for your attack as that above depicted1 the principle1 viz4 movement combined with fire1 still remains the same4 ,you should bring a converging attack to bear and advance your men under cover of the fire of your rifle grenades and ,lewis guns1 and by pushing men forward from one shell-crater to another1 you should generally be able to achieve your object if your plan be evolved on sound principles4 ,it is also possible that smoke bombs could be used with advantage if the wind be favourable4 ,the above problem is one which has often been put to young officers on the battlefield1 and they have not by any means always given a satisfactory answer to it1 simple as it is4 ,your affectionate father1 8,x4 ,y4 ,z40 ,,letter ,,iii ,illustration ,december #ae1 #aiag4 ,,my ,,dear ,,dick1-- ,since the early days of the campaign there has been but little fighting in towns or villages which have not previously been so knocked about that they could better be designated ruins than habitable places1 but in the event of an advance on a large scale towns and villages are certain to be the scenes of severe combats4 ,i will therefore give you three little problems in street-fighting4 ,when you have read them1 the points ,i call attention to will probably seem to you so self-evident that you will wonder that ,i have considered it worth while to comment on them4 ,nevertheless1 ,i am not quite sure that you will give what ,i consider to be the correct answers to all of them1 if you do not turn over the page and look at the solutions ,i have given1 before stating your own4 ,,problem #b ,the brigade to which you belong has entered a town from a southerly direction1 and you are opposed by an enemy who has entered it from a northerly direction4 ,the company of which you are in command has been allotted the ground between the roads ,b ,f1 ,c ,g1 both inclusive1 your flanks are protected1 the streets are about thirty feet broad with pavements five feet broad1 houses run all along the streets4 ,answer the following ,questions4 7a7 ,if you were to tell off a section to prevent the enemy advancing along the street ,b ,f from a northerly direction1 which side of the street would it be best for them to occupy1 and why8 7b7 ,your men occupy the streets ,b ,d and ,d ,c1 but no man can show his face in the street ,a ,h1 which is covered by machine guns and snipers firing from near ,a1 and all men attempting to cross the road at ,d have been shot4 ,several houses in the street ,b ,d have been knocked down by shell fire4 ,in this street there are six empty wagons and in the houses in the street there is to be found furniture of all descriptions1 as well as ropes1 harness1 and stables1 with some horses in them4 ,you are anxious to place a barricade across the street ,a ,h at ,d1 so as to enable you to use the crossing at ,d4 ,how should you set about making this barricade8 7c7 ,there is a house at ,h looking right down the street ,a ,h4 ,whereabouts in this house should you put your ,lewis gun1 and why8 ,solutions4 7a7 ,on the western side1 because your men1 shooting out of the windows in a northerly direction1 would then fire from their right shoulders without exposing their bodies4 7b7 ,fill the wagons with rubble from the houses which have been knocked down4 ,fasten sacking or sheets on to the wagon1 so as to give cover from view between the body of the wagon and the ground4 ,throw a string attached to a brick across the street4 ,by means of this1 pull over a rope and attach the wagons to this rope1 and thus pull them into the position you require4 7c7 ,at the back of a room in the house1 where you can see but cannot be seen1 firing through the window4 ,if you choose a window near the top of the house and put the ,lewis gun on a table some distance back in the room1 you will probably be able to fire over the barricade which you are thinking of constructing at ,d4 ,i have put you three definite and very simple questions with regard to street-fighting1 for it may often happen that correct action on the spur of the moment when a village is first entered may result in ground being easily gained which would otherwise entail heavy fighting and serious loss to capture4 ,street-fighting is a very big subject1 and as a rule it gradually develops into underground warfare4 ,villages entered during a battle often have snipers in the top stories or on the roofs of the houses1 and these are places in which you may also place a few good shots with great advantage4 ,this is an illustration of the advisability of doing to the enemy what you do not like his doing to you4 ,i will send you another problem next week4 ,your affectionate father1 8,x4 ,y4 ,z40 ,,letter ,,iv ,illustration ,december #bb1 #aiag4 ,,my ,,dear ,,dick1-- ,you have told me that you have once or twice temporarily commanded a company and have asked me whether ,i think there is any advantage in a young and active company commander being mounted4 ,in another part of your letter you ask whether ,i think a defensive position should be taken up on a forward or on a reverse slope4 ,this latter is a very big question and one on which many pages could be written1 but ,i shall confine myself here to saying that it is imperative to hold the crest line in order to get observation1 but that1 owing to the crest line and forward slope being so much more vulnerable by artillery fire than is the reverse slope1 there are many advantages in constructing the main line of defence well behind the crest4 ,i find now that ,i have tried in a few words to answer your second question before dealing with the first one4 ,the object of giving you a horse is1 firstly1 to enable you to move about more rapidly1 and consequently to do your duty better2 and secondly1 because a company commander's work really begins when the march is over4 ,it is infinitely more important that he should be fresh than that any other man in the company should be so4 ,again1 by riding on in front and making proper arrangements for bivouacs or billets1 he may save weary men much marching and counter-marching1 and1 what is even more important1 he will on other occasions1 by being able to push on in front1 save half an hour by thinking out proper tactical dispositions before his men arrive4 ,i will now give you a little problem which will1 ,i think1 illustrate the two questions which you have asked me4 ,you must1 nevertheless1 remember that there can be no hard-and-fast rule as to where a position should be taken up4 ,we cannot alter the ground to suit our formation1 and therefore our formations must be made to suit the ground4 ,the proper way to hold ground when the object is to fight a rearguard action is quite different from the way it should be held to fight a battle l'outrance1 and all ,i will commit myself to doing is to give my advice as to how a certain piece of ground should be held in certain given circumstances4 ,i hope that the following problem will1 to a certain extent1 answer both your questions4 ,,problem #c ,an advance guard1 of which the company you command forms part1 has been pushed forward to seize a position of which the ridge ,b-,i forms a part4 ,the main body should reach the position some eight hours after your arrival there4 ,you have been told that your first object is to prevent the enemy's cavalry seizing the position4 ,the enemy's cavalry1 accompanied by horse artillery1 may be expected in the proximity of the position within an hour or so after your arrival1 but it is unlikely that his infantry and field artillery will arrive much before your own main body4 ,the time of the year is ,july1 the hour is #d p4m4 ,the soil is sandy1 but covered with grass4 ,you are riding at the head of your company1 and are about two miles from the crest when a staff officer accompanied by the adjutant rides up to you and you receive the following instructions3 8,our cavalry have reached the crest of the ridge ,b ,c ,d ,e ,f ,g ,h ,i without encountering opposition4 ,you will be responsible for the front from ,e to ,i1 both inclusive1 until the main body arrives1 and must make immediate arrangements for securing it against attack by hostile cavalry and horse artillery4 ,not a minute is to be lost4 ,you will also do your best to prepare the front allotted to you for defence against a strong infantry attack which the enemy will probably deliver1 though it is unlikely that be will be in a position to do so before dawn to-morrow40 ,question #a4 ,what would you do on receipt of these orders8 ,action considered ,correct4 ,you should save time by handing over command of your company and yourself cantering on so as to examine the ground and carefully consider your plans before your company arrives4 ,the line of argument you should adopt on arrival on the ridge should be3 8,my first object is to prevent cavalry1 assisted by horse artillery1 reaching the ridge1 and not a single moment is to be lost in doing this4 8,my second object is to consider carefully how the ground can best be prepared to resist a determined infantry attack early to-morrow morning4 ,it is possible that the ridge may be subjected to shell fire soon after the arrival of my company1 and ,i must make hay whilst the sun shines40 ,the conclusions you would come to as a result of this reasoning would probably be3 8,it is improbable that ,i shall be able to entrench the whole of my company before the enemy opens fire1 but at all events ,i will try to make emplacements for my four ,lewis guns on the ridge between ,e and ,i4 ,they will thus be about eighty yards apart4 8,i will use intensive labour to get these emplacements completed quickly40 ,by intensive labour is meant telling off three men to each tool used and ordering the man to dig with all his might and main for a couple of minutes or until he is tired1 and then to hand his tool over to another man who is ready to receive it4 ,by this means more work can be done in half an hour than is usually done in an hour4 ,for periods of under an hour1 when men are working against time to achieve some important object1 intensive labour is an excellent method to adopt1 but it is not suited for long tasks where its use would wear men out4 ,it is especially applicable where the task worked at is so small that only a very limited number of men can work simultaneously4 8,i will1 at the same time1 construct trenches connecting these ,lewis gun posts4 ,it is possible that the arrival of the enemy's guns will oblige me to relinquish work until the night1 but the fact that the trenches have been commenced in the daytime will very much assist the men in their night work4 ,i will afterwards construct supporting points at the farm ,l and between ,m and ,n on the reverse slope40 ,question #b4 ,if you concur with these conclusions1 what principle will govern your action in putting the farm into a state of defence8 ,you will notice that the farm shows a bigger front to the east and the west than it does to the north and the south4 ,it is constructed of strong masonry and has two stories4 ,action which is considered ,correct4 ,you should use the southern rooms in the farm for your machine guns rather than the northern ones1 as you will there be more protected from shell fire4 ,you must keep your defence as much below ground as possible1 using cellars if they are available1 and otherwise digging trenches inside the walls so as to have your loopholes a few inches above the ground level4 ,construct head cover with strong baulks close over your heads1 so that in the event of the whole building being brought down1 it will not affect you1 but only give you more cover from high-angle fire4 ,if possible put wire round the northern end of the building4 ,arrange to flank the work between ,m ,n1 which should in turn protect your front4 ,illustration3 ,work for #dj men #b m4 gs4 or ,lewis guns4 ,it only requires #dj to hold it1 but would give cover to twice as many ,angles at ,b ,c arbitrary to suit ground4 ,question #c4 ,what description of work will you make between ,m and ,n8 ,action considered ,correct4 ,the best form of work to construct will be one made on the principle of that shown in the annexed diagram4 ,as will be seen1 this consists of a series of island traverses strung together more or less in the shape of an 8,s40 ,the advantage of this is not only that it is suitable for all-round defence1 but that the whole of the garrison can fire simultaneously in almost any direction1 the weakest points being ,a and ,d4 ,the work shown in the diagram would require a garrison of about forty men1 but it could give cover to eighty4 ,it is less vulnerable by artillery fire than almost any other form of work4 ,it is an easy work to construct in so far that a large number of men can work at it at the same time without interfering with each other4 ,the acuteness or obtuseness of the angles at ,b and ,c must depend entirely upon the ground1 but it stands to reason that the more the angles approach right angles1 the more is the work suitable for all-round defence4 ,the 8crucifix0 strong point is also a good pattern1 but ,i think that the one that ,i have given you is better1 as it is in every way a less satisfactory mark for the enemy artillery1 and also gives you quite as good1 if not better1 opportunity of using all your rifles in every direction4 ,my next letter will contain a problem for a rearguard commander4 ,your affectionate father1 8,x4 ,y4 ,z40 ,,letter ,v ,illustration ,january #a1 #aiah4 ,,my ,,dear ,,dick1-- ,the last scheme ,i gave you dealt with the taking up of a position when an attack by a weak force was probable within an hour or so of your occupying it1 and also with the strengthening of the same position for an expected attack by a stronger force twelve hours later4 ,this one deals with a rearguard action4 ,it is straightforward and plain4 ,the object that troops fighting a rearguard action should have in mind is to keep the enemy at arm's length1 to punish him severely if he is too bold1 and at the same time not to compromise their own retreat1 unless duty requires them to sacrifice themselves in order to save the main body4 ,i will now set you the problem before ,i make my own solution too evident by my remarks4 ,it is my intention to add a few more words at the end of this letter1 but ,i do not wish you to look at them until you have written your own solution4 ,,problem #d ,the banks of the ,river ,lea are steep1 the river is about four feet six inches deep1 except near the ford4 ,the bottom is muddy4 ,at the ford it is forty yards broad1 in most other places about twenty yards4 ,the fields on either side are firm4 ,the roads shown on the sketch are dry and dusty4 ,the soil is chalky4 ,the depth of the river at the ford is two feet six inches4 ,the date is ,june #bj4 ,one of the orderlies attached to you reports that at ,slag ,farm there is a large quantity of wire1 some of it barbed4 ,the brigade to which you belong is retiring in a southerly direction4 ,the baggage moved in front of the brigade4 ,the time is #e4cj p4m4 ,you with your company1 to which six mounted orderlies have been attached1 are near ,home ,farm1 the remainder of your battalion1 which is in rear of the brigade1 is passing through ,silverton1 when the adjutant rides up to you and gives you the following order3 8,information has been received that a hostile cavalry brigade is pursuing4 ,you will take such steps as you may consider necessary to prevent the enemy crossing the ,river ,lea between ,stone ,bridge and ,slag ,farm1 both inclusive1 until #g p4m41 at which hour you will be relieved by cavalry4 ,you will be careful not to compromise your own retreat4 ,having accomplished your task1 you will rejoin your unit40 ,problem4 ,how do you appreciate the situation1 and what steps will you take to carry out your instructions8 ,solution considered ,correct4 ,the ,river ,lea is in all places within #hjj yards of the ridge1 and as the conditions are particularly favourable for fire action from the ridge1 there is no necessity for you to place your men down the forward slope4 ,the circumstances which render the situation so favourable for fire action are that it is practically impossible for the enemy's cavalry to cross the ,river ,lea1 except at the bridge or at the ford4 ,the bridge and the road1 with ponds on either side of it1 just to the north of the bridge1 form a defile #aej yards long1 through which the enemy must pass4 ,the ponds and the river also afford you an excellent opportunity to check the range by the splash of your bullets4 ,by filling the ford with wire you should also succeed in making that very difficult to cross4 ,the great objection to putting men on the forward slope is that they will come under severe fire from the horse artillery which will accompany the cavalry1 and that under cover of this fire the cavalry are much more likely to be able to cross than they would be if fired at from a concealed position on the ridge4 ,besides which all movement by men on the forward slope would be seen and the men themselves would not be able to retire until dark4 ,orders4 #a4 ,nos4 #c and #d ,platoons will proceed under ,lieutenant ,smith to the neighbourhood of ,cross ,farm1 where they will take up the best positions they can find with the object of protecting the crossing of the ,river ,lea4 ,it has been reported that a large quantity of wire1 some of it barbed1 is to be found at ,slag ,farm4 ,lieutenant ,smith will take steps to obstruct the ford with this with the object of denying its use to the enemy4 #b4 ,no4 #a ,platoon will take up a position near ,home ,farm and ,no4 #b ,platoon near ,hope ,farm1 also with the object of preventing the crossing of the ,river ,lea4 #c4 ,no4 #b ,platoon from ,hope ,farm will fire ranging shots on to the ford at ,slag ,farm1 ,chalk ,pit1 and the two road junctions to the north of the ford1 and when the officer commanding the platoon is certain by the observation of his fire that he has obtained the correct ranges1 he will pass this information to the officer commanding ,no4 #a ,platoon4 ,the officer commanding ,no4 #a ,platoon will range on the ponds near the bridge and on the road junction to the north of them1 and will similarly pass the range chart to the officer commanding ,no4 #b ,platoon4 ,this ranging will be carried out at once in order that the ranging by ,nos4 #a and #b ,platoons may be finished before the ranging is commenced by the officers commanding ,nos4 #c and #d ,platoons1 which will be carried out under the orders of ,lieutenant ,smith4 ,n4,b4--,i am quite aware that a company is supposed to carry a ,barr ,stroud range-finder4 ,although this is an excellent instrument when it is in thorough order1 there is really no such reliable range-finder as a rifle fired at a mark which will show the impact of the bullet4 99 99 99 99 99 ,in the proper solution of the foregoing scheme1 everything really depends upon your fire orders4 ,i am presuming that your men are fairly well trained with the rifle4 ,i wish1 of course1 that all our men were trained up to the standard of the ,old ,contemptibles1 but 8,rome was not built in a day10 nor can discipline and good marksmanship become part of a man's second nature as a result of only a few months' training4 ,if1 however1 your men are reasonably good shots and can fire at least fifteen rounds a minute 7they ought to fire twenty under peace conditions71 in such cases as the above much more will depend upon whether you give correct fire orders than upon whether the men are first-class marksmen or only moderately good shots4 ,you can compare a company of first-class marksmen to a ,choke-bore gun which shoots farther and harder but requires a skilled game shot to use with advantage1 whereas a company of moderately-trained shots would resemble an ordinary scatter gun1 with which the ordinary shot would probably do more execution4 ,if you give a range as #a1bjj yards when it is only #a1jjj yards and you have marksmen1 no shots will fall on the object2 whereas if your company were composed of third-class shots1 the chances are that it would be well sprinkled with bullets4 ,do not think from this that ,i prefer the third-class shots1 for that is very decidedly not the case2 but if you have a highly finished weapon1 you want a good man behind it1 although in the hands of such a one it will do brilliant execution4 ,if you have a company of good shots and are not certain of a range1 your best plan is to fire with combined sights and thus to increase the depth of the fire-swept ground4 ,this method1 although in many cases the best to adopt1 is bound to diminish the efficacy of your fire1 for if the correct range be #a1bjj yards and you fire one platoon at #a1jjj yards1 one at #a1ajj1 one at #a1bjj1 and one at #a1cjj1 it stands to reason that you can only hope to get a quarter as many hits as you would do if you gave the whole four platoons the correct range2 but even that is better than giving the range at #a1jjj and missing the mark altogether4 ,it is a bad plan to go 8,nap0 before you have looked at your hand4 ,i shall later on give you certain little problems for solution in which ,i am of opinion that combined sights should be used4 ,in the problem under consideration1 however1 their use would be absolutely wrong4 ,you can check all the ranges by seeing the splash of the bullets either in the ponds1 in the river1 or on the ,chalk ,pit1 and you should be content with nothing except the correct range4 ,young officers are always apt to consider that so long as they have taught their company to shoot fairly well1 they have done their duty with regard to musketry4 ,this is1 in reality1 by no means the case4 ,the company is simply the sportsman's gun2 the commander has to learn how to use it4 ,there are many circumstances under which a man has to pick out his own target1 as1 for instance1 when the enemy is attacking1 and here everything depends upon his individual marksmanship4 ,there are1 however1 many other occasions in which if #aj per cent4 of the effect depends upon whether the men are first-class marksmen or only ordinary decent shots1 #ij per cent4 will depend upon whether the officer gives fire orders properly adapted to the situation4 ,the above problem is an illustration of this principle4 ,you should notice that in my solution ,i carefully arranged that the party comprised of ,nos4 #b and #c ,platoons should not commence ranging until ,nos4 #a and #b ,platoons had finished4 ,were they to fire simultaneously1 confusion in the splashes made by the bullets would be the result4 ,don't forget to hand over your range card to your relief4 ,your affectionate father1 8,x4 ,y4 ,z40 ,,letter ,,vi ,illustration ,january #g1 #aiah4 ,,problem #e;a ,,my ,,dear ,,dick1-- ,i will set you another problem4 ,the force to which you belong has made a night march4 ,your platoon now forms part of a new outpost line4 ,you halted in a ditch at line marked ,d1 with a thin hedge on the enemy's side of it1 which gives you good cover from view4 ,your idea was to use this place as the headquarters of your picket1 and as soon as it was thoroughly light to throw groups out in front4 ,your platoon consists of forty men and a ,lewis gun4 ,soon after dawn and when your men are still in the trench at ,d1 you see what you take to be a strong platoon of the enemy advancing straight towards you from the north2 a couple of groups of men are fifty yards in front1 and the remainder of the platoon is advancing in fours along a country road1 which passes close to your position4 ,you see the platoon when it is at ,a about #a1jjj yards off4 ,what action will you take8 ,action considered ,correct4 ,there seems to be every chance of your being able to ambuscade this party1 and you should let it advance until the groups which the main body has in front of it are within fifty yards of your picquet4 ,you should tell off a few men on the flanks to deal with these groups1 and turn the fire of the whole of the rest of your platoon on to the main body4 ,you must be careful to see that all your men lie down1 that no one but yourself has his head above ground level1 and you must camouflage yourself4 ,the suspense in such a situation as this makes great demands on the men's discipline1 and they are apt to look up and be seen by the enemy1 thus destroying all hope of surprise4 ,,problem #e;b ,the situation is exactly the same as in ,problem #e;a1 except that instead of a platoon advancing towards you1 there is a whole company marching in fours1 with four groups #ajj yards in front of it4 ,what action would you take8 ,action considered ,correct4 ,exactly the same as in ,problem #e;a4 ,the enemy is in this case four times as strong as you are1 but the effect of surprise should more than make up for this1 and the first minute after you open fire should decide the action in your favour4 ,,problem #e;c ,the situation is again exactly the same as in #e;a and #e;b1 except that a whole battalion with eight groups #bjj yards in front of it is advancing4 ,what action would you take8 ,action considered ,correct4 ,in this case the situation is changed4 ,you are an outpost1 and your first duty is to warn your main body in case of an attack and to give it time to prepare itself4 ,it is just possible that if you allow the battalion to approach to within #cjj yards you might deal it such a blow as to almost destroy it2 but if1 on the contrary1 the covering groups were composed of really good soldiers and the companies were well commanded1 there would be a great chance of your being rushed1 and this is a risk which you ought not to take1 for it would compromise the whole situation4 ,in these circumstances you should therefore take steps to open a rapid fire on the enemy immediately with your men and your ,lewis gun4 ,your object in doing this would be to keep him at arm's length and delay his advance as much as possible so as to give your supports and reserves time to prepare themselves4 ,your affectionate father1 8,x4 ,y4 ,z40 ,,letter ,,vii ,illustration ,january #ae1 #aiah4 ,,problem #f ,,my ,,dear ,,dick1-- ,in this letter ,i am going to set you another fire problem4 ,it is one in which1 presuming that the men are fairly well trained in musketry1 everything depends on the orders given by the company commander4 ,you are in command of a company and are marching in a northerly direction along the road ,w ,b ,e1 with scouts in front of you4 ,on reaching the top of the ridge at ,b your scouts halt and beckon to you4 ,you go forward and see what appears to be an enemy's battalion at ,x1 by the bank of the ,river ,spate4 ,the battalion is in close column and the men are lying down resting4 ,the country all round the battalion is open4 ,there is a thin hedge on the top of the ridge ,a ,b ,c through which you can see and through which you could fire1 but which gives you cover from view4 ,state how the situation presents itself to you and also give your exact orders4 ,solution considered ,correct4 ,you should reason with yourself as follows3 8,if ,i advance beyond the hedge ,i shall be seen and my company will be opposed by a battalion4 ,there seems to be an excellent opportunity of surprising the enemy1 who shows no sign of moving1 with my concentrated fire1 and ,i shall consequently make my plans deliberately4 ,from my map ,i judge the distance from the top of the ridge to the bridge over the ,river ,spate to be #a1cjj yards1 and the centre of the battalion about #a1djj yards1 but as ,i want to be quite sure of getting the battalion into my bracket1 ,i shall use combined sights4 ,i shall first line up the whole company #cj yards behind the hedge1 and then order ,no4 #a ,platoon to fix their sights at #a1cjj1 ,no4 #b at #a1djj1 ,no4 #c at #a1ejj1 and ,no4 #d at #a1fjj yards1 with the ,lewis gun of ,no4 #a ,platoon at #a1cej1 that of ,no4 #b at #a1djj1 that of ,no4 #c at #a1dej1 and that of ,no4 #d at #a1ejj yards4 ,i shall then order the whole company to creep up into position1 and when the target has been properly pointed out ,i shall blow my whistle1 on which every man will fire twenty rounds rapid and each ,lewis gun six drums4 ,at the end of the twenty rounds ,i can1 if necessary1 correct my ranges4 ,men are1 as a rule1 more apt to fire high than low1 and ,i should have given the ranges #a1bjj1 #a1cjj1 #a1djj1 #a1ejj1 instead of #a1cjj1 #a1djj1 #a1ejj1 #a1fjj1 had it not been that the river will prevent the enemy rushing straight towards me if he finds the fire is high1 whereas if my ranges are short he could get out of range by retiring40 ,your affectionate father1 8,x4 ,y4 ,z40 ,,letter ,,viii ,illustration ,january #bb1 #aiah4 ,,problem #g ,,my ,,dear ,,dick1-- ,the following is a problem in trench warfare such as you may be called upon to solve any day in the trenches4 ,the company of which you are in command has succeeded in getting into a trench a section of which is given in the diagram4 ,it has only incurred about #aj per cent4 of casualties4 ,the trench is the last of the ,german system1 and there is a clear field of fire for about #ajj yards in the direction in which the enemy has retired2 after that there is a thick wood4 ,your telephone communication has broken down and it is evident that you will for some time have to rely on your own resources4 ,your flanks are secured by troops on your right and left4 ,your company now numbers #abj rank and file4 ,the front allotted to you measures about #aej yards4 ,the trench which you are now occupying was considerably shelled by us previous to its capture1 and what was the rear of the trench when the ,germans held it1 namely ,h ,g ,f1 has been considerably broken down in half a dozen places4 ,it is quite possible that the ,germans will counter-attack from the wood without delay4 ,it is evident from the section of the trench depicted on the diagram that you cannot fire out of it as it is at present4 ,problem4 ,what action will you take to prepare for the enemy's counter-attack8 ,solution considered ,correct4 ,your position is a difficult one1 for there is no place from which your men can fire4 ,you cannot even use the step ,c1 nor the parapet ,a ,k1 for the parados ,h ,g is1 as is usually the case1 eighteen inches higher than is the old crest line at ,a4 ,in the short time at your disposal it will be next to impossible to make a continuous step so as to enable you to fire over ,h1 and in the circumstances the best thing for you to do is to concentrate the whole of your energies on getting your ,lewis guns into position and to use intensive labour for the purpose4#a ,it is possible that you may be able to get one or two of the ,lewis guns satisfactorily into position at some of the places in which the revetment in ,f ,g ,h has been knocked down4 ,if1 in your company1 you have half a dozen iron or wire grips which you can utilise to pull down the sandbag revetment1 you will find them of the greatest assistance1 for men who only have their hands to work with find it very difficult to get a grip on a sandbag which is in a revetment4 #a ,see ,problem #c1 p4 #ce4 ,you must at once place look-out men to give you warning of any sign of the enemy assembling in the edge of the wood to your front and be prepared to open on them with rifle grenades4 ,the real advantage that a machine gun or ,lewis gun has over a rifle is that from a small point of vantage one of these weapons can pour a tremendous hail of fire1 and in such circumstances as those depicted above there is no doubt but that the first consideration should be to get your ,lewis guns into position4 ,if possible1 it is best to place these in pairs1 shooting obliquely and crossing their fire in front of you4 ,as soon as this is done you should thin out and organise your defence in depth4 ,this being carried out1 you must determine what localities you will hold and where you will have your gaps4 ,you should generally have a locality in front of any communication trench leading up from the rear4 ,as soon as you have determined on your localities1 you must set-to and build a fire step4 ,the next measure to take in order of importance is to collect ammunition and place it at convenient points4 ,after you have done this1 try to put wire or some other obstacle in front4 ,in advising this1 ,i am presuming that you have reached your final objective4 ,be careful to remove any old ,german wire behind you which will prevent your own supports coming up over the open to reinforce you4 ,try to get your localities marked by lamps at night1 that your own friends in rear can see where they are4 ,,problem #h ,after hard fighting you have driven the enemy out of the trench ,a ,b ,c1 and he has retired up the communication trench ,d ,e ,f in the direction of his supports4 ,you are in command of a platoon and have been ordered to take steps to prevent the enemy again advancing along the communication trench ,e ,d ,b4 ,it is not the intention of your commanding officer to advance at present any farther than the points he has already reached4 ,the time is an hour before dark4 ,what steps will you take to carry out the instructions you have received8 ,solution considered ,correct4 ,pull knife-rests#b down into the trench ,d ,e ,f1 also throw wire into it if available4 ,at once put a couple of men at the point ,d to cover the trench ,d ,e with their rifles4 ,as soon as you are able to do so1 dig a short trench from ,g to ,d and place a ,lewis gun at ,g to enfilade ,d ,e4 ,you may have to wait until after dark before you actually carry this out1 but you should make arrangements for doing it by daylight4 ,it would not be a bad plan to tie a few tins on to the knife-rests which you have thrown into the trench1 so that the rattle1 if they are moved1 will give you warning of any one's approach4 ,the ,lewis gun at ,g will be practically out of bombing range from ,e ,f4 #b ,a knife-rest is a portable wire entanglement about #aj feet long1 made upon a wooden frame-work4 ,illustration 99 99 99 99 99 ,there are as many different types of stops as there are different sorts of trenches4 ,some of these types are better than others1 but there is no type which is suitable under all circumstances4 ,everything must depend on the exact local conditions and on the means at your disposal4 ,it does not require much ingenuity to devise a good stop for a trench if you have leisure to think the matter out1 but just as a remark which would be commonplace if given as the result of matured deliberation is regarded as brilliant if made as a quick repartee1 so in tactics to do what is right under fire is quite a different thing to answering a question on an examination paper4 ,nevertheless1 to have answered a similar question on an examination paper1 or1 still better1 to have done it as a tactical exercise1 renders it very much more likely that you will do the right thing when you are faced by a similar problem in earnest4 ,i1 therefore1 counsel you to carefully consider the different sorts of trenches which you come across and to think out carefully how you would put a stop in them1 or how you turn them to shoot in the opposite direction4 ,in the diagram ,i have given you it is just possible that by cutting down the elbow at ,e1 you may be able to enfilade the section of trench ,e ,f from ,a4 ,this would1 however1 depend on the ground and on the actual construction of the trenches concerned4 ,your affectionate father1 8,x4 ,y4 ,z40 ,,letter ,,ix ,illustration ,february #a1 #aiah4 ,,problem #i ,,my ,,dear ,,dick1-- ,this week my letter will be a short one1 as it only contains one very simple problem4 ,you are on outpost duty and have been told that the ,general is very anxious to get one or two live prisoners4 ,your picquet is at some cross-roads a quarter of a mile south of the road ,a ,b marked on the map4 ,you have reason to believe that it is probable that the enemy will patrol down the road ,a ,b4 ,a ,b is a good road with strong fences on either side of it1 and with ditches on the road side of the fence4 ,does any special way of taking prisoners alive in this road suggest itself to you8 ,solution4 ,a very good plan to adopt in these circumstances would be what the ,japanese used to call the trap-door4 ,if your post consists of six men1 leave four under the leader at ,a and tell them to conceal themselves in the ditch1 and place two1 also concealed in the ditch1 forty yards in front of the mat ,b4 ,if the enemy's patrol comes along1 the men at ,b should allow it to pass them and then give a signal and at the same time themselves take steps to cut off the patrol's retreat1 whilst the four men at ,a prevent it advancing farther4 99 99 99 99 99 ,the above little scheme is so simple that ,i should feel that ,i ought to apologise for setting it1 were it not that ,i am quite certain that three out of four of your comrades to whom you may set it will not give the proper solution4 ,i saw a similar little problem given to men of different regiments in ,india4 ,the only troops who answered it properly were ,pathans4 ,it apparently much resembles traps which they set for one another in their inter-tribal fights4 ,although some twenty teams competed1 neither ,british troops1 ,sikhs1 ,hindustani1 ,mohammedans1 nor ,rajputs ever managed to successfully catch their men4 ,your affectionate father1 8,x4 ,y4 ,z40 ,,letter ,x ,illustration ,february #g1 #aiah4 ,,problem #aj ,,my ,,dear ,,dick1-- ,the problem ,i am setting you to-day has to do with fire control4 ,you are on outpost facing in a northerly direction and are in command of a picquet consisting of the headquarters of a platoon with a ,lewis gun and thirty men at ,g4 ,a man who has been sent in from a group on your left tells you that a company of the enemy is moving across your front from left to right along the road ,a ,b ,c ,d ,e ,f4 ,he says that the company is marching with an advanced guard of one platoon about #bjj yards in front of it4 ,the platoon has a couple of groups #bjj yards in front of it again4 ,five minutes after you have received this notice1 you see a group of the enemy marching from the wood at ,b4 ,problem4 ,how do you appreciate the situation and what action do you intend to take8 ,solution4 ,so long as you remain carefully concealed at ,g and your men do not show themselves1 it is at least as likely as not that the enemy's scouts will not discover you4 ,if1 however1 they should do so1 your danger will come from the enemy's company and the platoon in front of it and not from the scouts1 and it is with these larger bodies that you must make your plans to deal4 ,at this close range you ought to be able to put them out of action in the first minute after opening fire4 ,if your men conceal themselves properly1 even if the scouts do discover you1 they will not do so until the enemy's main body is nearing the point ,c4 ,your orders should consequently be somewhat as follows3 8,let every man conceal himself4 8,the ,lewis gun and ,nos4 #a and #b ,sections of the platoon on my command to open fire will direct their fire half left on the main body of the enemy's company1 which will be the rearmost party4 ,no4 #c ,section will deal with the platoon forming the advanced guard1 and ,no4 #d ,section1 taking its orders from the section commander1 will deal with isolated groups4 ,no man will put up his head until ,i give the order to fire4 ,the whole platoon will use fixed sights40 ,you should at once issue these preliminary orders4 ,if you are not discovered1 do not open fire until the head of the main body has reached ,d4 ,napoleon used to say that if you ever saw your enemy making a mistake1 you should give him lots of time to make it thoroughly before punishing him4 ,do not pull the bait out of the pike's mouth until he has properly gorged it4 ,this maxim applies equally whether you are dealing with armies or only with platoons4 ,i1 myself1 remember in my early days missing a tiger sixty yards off1 when1 if ,i had only waited1 he would have walked right under the tree on which ,i was seated4 ,your affectionate father1 8,x4 ,y4 ,z40 ,,letter ,,xi ,illustration ,february #aj1 #aiah4 ,,my ,,dear ,,dick1-- ,i hope you will master and remember the principles which govern the problem ,i am setting you to-day4 ,although very simple1 it requires a little more thought than most of those which have preceded it4 ,the ,germans have broken through our front line4 ,your company1 with its four ,lewis guns and with four ,vickers guns which have been placed under your command1 has been hastily thrown into the trench ,b1 which is well constructed and well concealed1 and has a good field of fire to the east4 ,four #ah-pounder guns were in action at a hundred yards north of the trench ,b1 but two of these guns have already been put out of action by the enemy's artillery4 ,the ,germans are advancing in great numbers regardless of sacrifice and are now about a mile distant4 ,their object is evidently to take the ridge ,a ,c1 and it is of the utmost importance that they should be frustrated in their endeavours4 ,the front allotted to you to defend runs from ,z ,clump on the north to ,u ,farm on the south4 ,other troops are responsible outside these limits4 ,you have in the trench ,b #ej1jjj rounds of ammunition besides that which the men have on them4 ,you are senior to the officer in command of the remaining two #ah-pounders4 ,what action would you take8 and give your reasons4 ,comments on the ,situation and ,action adjudged ,correct4 ,let us first of all consider how many rounds a minute you could expect the troops under your command to fire in the following circumstances3 7a7 ,if the fire were only to be continued for two minutes4 7b7 ,if it were to be kept up for half an hour4 ,rounds4 7a7 ,if it were to be kept up for two minutes only1 you might expect #ajj infantrymen to fire from fifteen to twenty rounds a minute 7let us say7 #c1bjj ,four ,lewis guns to fire #fjj rounds each in the two minutes #b1djj ,four ,vickers to fire #gej rounds each in two minutes #c1jjj ----- #h1fjj 7b7 ,if the fire were to be kept up for half an hour you might justly expect infantry to fire at an average rate of five rounds a minute #ae1jjj ,it would be unwise to attempt to exceed this average rate of fire1 for even if your men were muscularly able to continue firing at a greater rate1 it is a known thing that the nervous strain of firing is such that there are but few men who can fire #bjj rounds consecutively without breaking down1 and it is of paramount importance that you should keep a certain amount of reserve force in hand in case the enemy gets to a really close range4 ,four ,lewis guns would during the half-hour be able to fire #fjj rounds each1 and if these rounds were fired at fairly long ranges would still be in a position to fire #fjj rounds rapid when the enemy got to close quarters ,the platoon commanders would1 however1 be well advised to regard these ,lewis guns as their reserves and to do nothing to risk their being ready to fire #fjj rounds at the critical moment4 ,they should1 therefore1 use them very sparingly at medium ranges #b1djj ,four ,vickers ,maxims should be able to fire at an average rate of #bjj rounds a minute #bd1jjj ,in other words1 in the two minutes you could fire at the average rate of over #d1jjj rounds a minute1 but for half an hour could only keep up an average rate of about #hjj rounds a minute4 ,another thing to be considered is that your average of hits at the closer ranges would be greater than they would be at the farther ranges4 ,there is1 however1 no reason why you should not inflict as much loss as possible on the enemy at medium and long ranges1 provided you know at what distance to fire4 ,we used to consider in ,south ,africa that when we were advancing against a position held by the enemy1 he used to shoot straighter at #ejj yards than he did at #bjj1 for1 fine shots as the ,boers were1 their excitement at our near approach disturbed their accurate shooting4 ,you may therefore expect that your men will shoot comparatively better when the enemy is at medium ranges than when he is very close1 provided that they know the distance4 ,it cannot be expected that you will go in for such a long disquisition at a moment when you are called upon to act1 but you should have considered these points beforehand1 at all events to such an extent that you would have decided to open fire when the enemy was still at comparatively long ranges1 but to increase this fire as lie got closer and to reserve the maximum rate of fire until you can pour it in with deadly effect4 ,you must always remember that you are dealing with human beings who have nerves and not with machines4 ,as ,i have previously said1 the above principles should be those on which you decide to act1 but the first thing you should do would be to send to the officer commanding the section of guns and inquire from him the ranges of any objects within rifle shot which he has ascertained1 and you should at the same time desire him to obtain for you the ranges of any other prominent objects near which the enemy must pass1 so that if his remaining guns are knocked out you will know what sights to use4 ,whilst this is being done1 you should divide your front between your platoon commanders4 ,the ,lewis guns should remain with their platoons1 but you would be wise to keep the ,vickers ,maxims under your own special command1 so that you can turn them on to any portion of the advancing line which seems especially to threaten you4 ,in fact1 you should look on these as your reserve4 ,having thus considered the situation1 you should issue the following orders3 8,fire fronts are allotted as under3 ,no4 #a ,platoon to the right of ,farm ,u4 ,no4 #b ,platoon from farm ,u to ,y tree4 ,no4 #c ,platoon from ,y tree to farm ,w4 ,no4 #d ,platoon to the left of farm ,w40 ,order ,no4 #b4--8,ranges are being ascertained from the artillery and will be passed to platoon commanders4 ,platoon commanders can open fire at their own discretion1 but must bear in mind the enormous importance of being ready in all respects to use the full power of their fire should the enemy succeed in getting to close ranges4 ,the four ,vickers ,maxim guns will1 under my orders1 fire at any portion of the enemy's advance which appears to be especially threatening40 ,the majority of regimental officers now serving do not at all appreciate the enormous effect of rifle and machine-gun fire at medium and long ranges1 nor the importance of taking every step in their power to obtain the accurate ranges as soon as they have taken up a position4 ,the effect of the fire of a fairly good company in such circumstances as those above depicted and acting on the above carefully considered fire orders would be enormous1 whereas if the fire fronts were not properly allotted and if ranges were unknown1 it would be of comparatively little value4 ,your affectionate father1 8,x4 ,y4 ,z40 ,,letter ,,xii ,illustration ,february #bj1 #aiah4 ,,my ,,dear ,,dick1-- ,what would you do in the following circumstances8 ,a force is retiring in a north-westerly direction4 ,the ,river ,lea shown on the map is unfordable4 ,two companies are acting as the point of the rearguard4 ,their orders are to hold the bridges at ,a and ,b4 ,the bridge at ,b is to be held until #aj a4m4 and the bridge at ,a until #aj4cj a4m4 ,if they can hold out until these hours1 it is estimated that it will enable the main body to get away unmolested4 ,the trees shown on the map are mostly oak1 and are on an average forty feet high4 ,the roads marked on the map are metalled and good4 ,the farm buildings at ,d are strong4 ,you are commanding ,b ,company of your battalion1 which is at ,b bridge1 and are senior to ,captain ,a41 a reliable officer1 who is occupying ,a trench just south of ,a wood4 ,at #i4ae a4m4 two scouts mounted on motor bicycles inform you that they have patrolled to the front and that none of the enemy are within three miles of you except a few companies near ,e1 who are acting as support to an attack which is being made against ,a bridge4 ,at #i4bj a4m4 you receive the following message from ,captain ,a41 dated #i a4m43 8,please do whatever you can to support me4 ,i am being heavily shelled1 and infantry are trying to push across ,a bridge4 ,i fear that there is no chance of my being able to hold out until #aj4cj a4m40 ,what action would you take8 ,state your reasons for the manner in which you would act and then definitely say what you intend to do4 ,comments on the ,situation and ,action adjudged ,correct4 ,what you should always aim at is to obey the spirit of an order rather than its letter4 ,you know ,captain ,a4 to be a reliable officer1 and he says that he fears that he cannot hold out until #aj4cj4 ,if the enemy seize ,a trench before that hour1 not only will your retreat be cut off1 but the object of ordering ,a and ,b ,companies to hold the bridges so as to enable the main body to get a good start will be defeated4 ,the nearest hostile infantry to you1 at ,e1 is some two miles off1 that is to say1 some forty minutes' march4 ,in the circumstances it is your duty to go to the assistance of ,a ,company4 ,the next thing is to consider how you can best help him to carry out his retirement and also how you can best prevent the enemy from following up your main body4 ,if you were to march straight to ,a wood1 it is doubtful whether you would help him very materially4 ,the artillery firing from the south of the river would deal with the reinforcements you brought up and placed in ,a trench1 similarly to the way it dealt with ,b ,company4 ,by far your better plan will be to march as quickly as possible to ,d wood and occupy the strong buildings at ,d farm4 ,from the farm buildings you will be able to prevent the enemy marching along the road from ,a to ,x1 and should be able to comply with the spirit of the order1 and by the delay you will thus entail on the enemy's movements you will be able to effect the same purpose as if you had actually prevented him from crossing ,a bridge before #aj4cj4 ,you should be able to hold on to ,d farm until artillery are brought up to ,a wood1 and should then be able to slip away along the road ,b ,x4 ,without aeroplane observation1 hostile artillery could not observe the effect of their fire from the ,s4 of the river1 as trees intercept their view4 ,orders4 ,b ,company will at once march to ,d wood and occupy ,d farm4 ,order to ,officer ,commanding ,a ,company4 ,i am marching immediately to ,d farm1 which ,i hope to reach before #aj a4m4 ,from this place ,i shall be in a position to facilitate your retreat and prevent your being pursued farther than ,a wood4 ,you may retire as soon as you see that ,i have established myself in the farm buildings4 ,having accomplished the object for which we have been sent out1 ,i shall continue my retirement to ,x4 99 99 99 99 99 ,these twelve little schemes ,i have set you are1 as ,i think you will admit1 all very simple1 but ,i am willing to wager that you have not answered all of them correctly1 even though they were only applications of the axioms which ,i gave in the letter which preceded them4 ,the difficulty is1 in the heat of the moment1 to decide correctly which of the axioms deals with the special situation1 and nothing but practice will get over this difficulty4 ,you should always take every opportunity of discussing with your comrades little tactical situations which have occurred1 or those which may occur4 ,in talking over the former1 do not do so with the object of passing censure1 but merely with the view of learning what to do and what not to do should you find yourself in a similar situation4 ,whenever you have an opportunity1 carefully explain the situation to your men4 ,this is necessary if you expect them to co-operate intelligently in bringing about your designs4 ,in the solution of any little scheme which you may set to your subordinates1 insist on definite orders being given and do not be content with vague disquisitions4 ,when any little problem which you have set has been unsatisfactorily solved1 let another leader fall in1 take command1 and do it again properly4 ,this is the best way to ensure the proper solution being thoroughly understood and remembered for application on a future occasion4 ,so long as you do not censure a superior in front of his men1 it is a good thing to make your remarks in such a way that everybody can hear them4 ,you must guard against technical instructors giving wrong impressions4 ,the bombing sergeant is inclined to impress on the men that there is no such weapon as the bomb4 ,the instructors in the rifle grenade and the ,lewis gun are also apt to talk so much of the value of the weapons in which they instruct that their pupils come away with very false ideas4 ,the ,lewis-gun sergeant1 although he never fails to tell the men that the ,lewis gun can fire at the rate of #fjj rounds a minute1 very often does forget to inform them that after firing #fjj rounds it takes twenty minutes or half an hour to cool before it is capable of firing any more4 ,it is all very well for these men to be enthusiasts1 but you must see that they abide strictly by the truth and avoid giving false impressions4 ,i will close this letter with a few remarks on the moral forces4 ,as ,napoleon said1 these are1 compared with the physical1 as three is to one4 ,men's courage and determination and the will to conquer are more than half the battle4 ,the situation to-day is no less serious than it was when ,i ended the last of my ,twelve ,letters to you1 and it behoves you to devote the whole of your time and your energy to making yourself in every way efficient1 and you must always bear in mind that it is possible that the little action in the winning or losing of which your right or wrong decision may be the principal factor may be the turning-point of a great battle4 ,your affectionate father1 8,x4 ,y4 ,z40 ,transcriber's ,notes ,punctuation1 hyphenation1 and spelling were made consistent when a predominant preference was found in this book2 otherwise they were not changed4 ,simple typographical errors were corrected2 one unbalanced quotation mark was remedied4 ,ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained4